UBC Theses and Dissertations

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UBC Theses and Dissertations

Moral principles and moral education Parkinson, Shirley Lorraine 1973

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c 2-MORAL P R I N C I P L E S AND MORAL EDUCATION by S h i r l e y L o r r a i n e P a r k i n s o n B.A., U n i v e r s i t y o f S a s k a t c h e w a n , 1961 B.Ed., S t . D u n s t a n ' s U n i v e r s i t y , 1969 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS I n t h e D e p a r t m e n t o f E d u c a t i o n We a c c e p t t h i s t h e s i s as c o n f o r m i n g t o t h e r e q u i r e d s t a n d a r d THE UNIVERSITY OF B R I T I S H COLUMBIA A p r i l , 1973 I n p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r an advanced deg ree a t t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a , I ag ree t h a t t he L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e and s t u d y . I f u r t h e r ag ree t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e c o p y i n g o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y p u r p o s e s may be g r a n t e d by t h e Head o f my Depar tment o r by h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . I t i s u n d e r s t o o d t h a t c o p y i n g o r p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l n o t be a l l o w e d w i t h o u t my w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . Depar tment o f E d u e a t i o n The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a V a n c o u v e r 8, Canada Date A p r i l . 1973 ABSTRACT Most w r i t e r s on moral e d u c a t i o n see moral p r i n c i p l e s as c e n t r a l to that e n t e r p r i s e . The aim of moral e d u c a t i o n i s to produce moral persons and t h a t , i t i s b e l i e v e d , i s achieved by g e t t i n g students to grasp, or to develop, moral p r i n c i p l e s . I t i s important, t h e r e f o r e , f o r anyone engaged i n moral e d u c a t i o n , or f o r anyone developing or a s s e s s i n g programs of moral e d u c a t i o n , to have a c l e a r u nderstanding of j u s t what moral p r i n c i p l e s a r e . T h i s paper i s an attempt to become c l e a r e r about what moral p r i n c i p l e s are and i n what ways they are important to moral e d u c a t i o n . The approach taken c o n s i s t s i n f i r s t con-s i d e r i n g the theory of moral development put forward as a b a s i s of moral education by P r o f e s s o r Lawrence Kohlberg who has to date, done the most e x t e n s i v e work i n t h i s a r e a . Second, the q u e s t i o n 'What i s a moral p r i n c i p l e ? ' i s exam-ined at l e n g t h and arguments presented f o r the view t h a t there are two d i s t i n c t and e q u a l l y important senses of moral p r i n c i p l e . In the l i g h t of t h i s examination a c r i t i q u e i s o f f e r e d of P r o f e s s o r Kohlberg's account of the nature of moral p r i n c i p l e s . F i n a l l y , c o n s i d e r a t i o n i s given to the task of moral e d u c a t i o n . i i TABLE OF CONTENTS page INTRODUCTION 1 1. KOHLBERG'S THEORY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT 5 2. WHAT IS A MORAL PRINCIPLE? 11 3. ON HAVING PRINCIPLES 22 4. MORAL PRINCIPLES AND ACTION ON PRINCIPLE 48 5. MORAL PRINCIPLES AND MORAL RULES 70 6. KOHLBERG'S ACCOUNT OF MORAL PRINCIPLES— A CRITIQUE 82 7. THE TASK OF MORAL EDUCATION 107 BIBLIOGRAPHY 120 i i i ACKNOWLEDGMENT I w i s h t o t h a n k D r . J e r r o l d Coombs f o r h i s p a t i e n c e a n d h i s h e l p f u l c r i t i c i s m d u r i n g t h e c o u r s e o f w r i t i n g t h i s t h e s i s . I w o u l d l i k e a l s o t o t h a n k D r . L . B . D a n i e l s , D r . C h a r l e s J . B r a u n e r a n d D r . M u r r a y E l l i o t t f o r t h e i r h e l p f u l comments i n t h e f i n a l s t a g e o f i t s p r e p a r a t i o n . i v INTRODUCTION T h i s p a p e r c o n s i s t s o f an i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n t o t h e n o t i o n o f a m o r a l p r i n c i p l e a n d i t s r e l e v a n c e t o m o r a l e d u c a t i o n . M o r a l e d u c a t i o n h a s t h r o u g h t h e y e a r s named a v a r i e t y o f a c t i v i t i e s . T h e s e a c t i v i t i e s h a v e a t d i f f e r e n t t i m e s h a d s u c h a i m s a s p r o d u c i n g C h r i s t i a n a d u l t s , o r p r o d u c i n g w e l l -m a n n e r e d a d u l t s — a d u l t s f i t t o be c a l l e d " g e n t l e m e n " ; a n d t h e s e a i m s w e r e b e l i e v e d t o be i d e n t i c a l w i t h t h e a i m o f p r o d u c i n g m o r a l p e r s o n s . R e c e n t l y , h o w e v e r , m o r a l e d u c a t i o n h a s come t o L a v e r a t h e r d i f f e r e n t a i m s . C o n t e m p o r a r y e t h i c a l t h e o r i s t s i n s i s t t h a t m o r a l i t y i s i d e n t i c a l w i t h n e i t h e r r e l i -g i o n , m a n n e r s , n o r m o r e s . C o n s e q u e n t l y m o r a l e d u c a t i o n c a n -n o t c o n s i s t i n s o c i a l o r r e l i g i o u s t r a i n i n g , n o r c a n i t c o n -s i s t i n t r a i n i n g i n e t i q u e t t e . M o r a l e d u c a t i o n i s a d e l i b -e r a t e a c t i v i t y t h e a i m o f w h i c h i s t o p r o d u c e a d u l t s who a r e moral b e i n g s . I t i s t h e r e a l i z a t i o n t h a t m o r a l i t y i s a d i s -t i n c t "mode o f e x p e r i e n c e " t h a t makes m o r a l e d u c a t i o n a v e r y d i f f e r e n t e n t e r p r i s e f r o m w h a t i t was o n c e c o n s i d e r e d t o b e . I t i s s i m i l a r l y , ' t h i s r e a l i z a t i o n t h a t g i v e s r i s e t o p r i n -c i p l e s as c e n t r a l t o m o r a l e d u c a t i o n . An i n c r e a s e i n t h e l i t e r a t u r e r e l a t i n g t o m o r a l e d u c a -t i o n a s t h i s k i n d o f e n t e r p r i s e w o u l d i n d i c a t e t h a t i t i s b e c o m i n g o f more w i d e s p r e a d i n t e r e s t ; h o w e v e r , o n l y t h r e e w r i t e r s h a v e t h u s f a r p r e s e n t e d a n y t h i n g l i k e a c o m p r e h e n s i v e 1 2 a p p r o a c h t o m o r a l e d u c a t i o n . I r e f e r t o John W i l s o n , R. S. P e t e r s and Lawrence Kohlberg."^ Each o f t h e s e a u t h o r s has no t o n l y w r i t t e n a g r e a t d e a l on t h e s u b j e c t b u t has as w e l l put f o r w a r d an a p p r o a c h t o m o r a l e d u c a t i o n b a s e d on a p h i l o -s o p h i c , and i n t h e c a s e o f K o h l b e r g a l s o a p s y c h o l o g i c a l , t h e o r y o f m o r a l i t y . In each o f t h e s e a p p r o a c h e s p r o m i n e n c e i s a c c o r d e d t o p r i n c i p l e s . T h i s i s n o t t o s u g g e s t t h a t t h e i r v i e w s a r e i n a c c o r d , f o r i t i s n o t a t a l l c l e a r t h a t t h e y v i e w p r i n c i p l e s i n t h e same way. W i l s o n , f o r example, w r i t e s o f t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f t e a c h i n g s e c o n d - o r d e r p r i n c i p l e s w h i c h a r e n o t t h e m s e l v e s m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s b u t w h i c h r e p r e -s e n t t h e c r i t e r i a or n e c e s s a r y f o u n d a t i o n s f o r m o r a l p r i n -c i p l e s . P e t e r s s t r e s s e s t h e need t o t e a c h c h i l d r e n t h e f u n d a m e n t a l m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s as w e l l as t h e b a s i c r u l e s w h i c h a r e n e c e s s a r y f o r any f o r m o f s o c i a l l i f e . K o h l b e r g h o l d s t h a t p r i n c i p l e s a r e n a t u r a l e m e r g e n t s o f s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n . On h i s v i e w , t h e t a s k o f m o r a l e d u c a t i o n i s t o s t i m u l a t e t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s n o t by t e a c h i n g p r i n c i p l e s b u t by t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f arguments a p p r o p r i a t e t o t h e d e v e l o p m e n t a l l e v e l o f t h e c h i l d . T h i s p a p e r w i l l a t t e m p t t o c l a r i f y t h e n o t i o n o f a m o r a l p r i n c i p l e w h i c h i s so i m p o r t a n t f o r m o r a l e d u c a t i o n . ' P r i n c i p l e ' i s a f a m i l i a r t e r m i n our l a n g u a g e , y e t i t i s no t a t a l l . c l e a r j u s t what a p r i n c i p l e i s . One must s u s -p e c t t h a t p r i n c i p l e , and even m o r a l p r i n c i p l e , i s not u n i -v o c a l i n view o f t h e f a c t t h a t i t can h o l d a p l a c e o f p r o m i n e n c e i n t h r e e v i e w s a t l e a s t two o f w h i c h a r e 3 r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t . I s h a l l be d e a l i n g p r i m a r i l y w i t h K o h l b e r g ' s c o n c e p t i o n o f m o r a l e d u c a t i o n and s p e c i f i c a l l y w i t h t h e i d e a o f a p r i n c i p l e as i t f e a t u r e s i n t h a t c o n c e p -t i o n . I have c h o s e n K o h l b e r g ' s work as my f o c u s b e c a u s e he has done by f a r t h e most work i n t h i s f i e l d , b e c a u s e t h e work he has done i s so v e r y i m p o r t a n t , and b e c a u s e t h e c o n -s e q u e n c e s o f i t a r e so f a r - r e a c h i n g . I w i l l b e g i n w i t h an a c c o u n t o f K o h l b e r g ' s t h e o r y o f m o r a l d e v e l o p m e n t and o f h i s d e f i n i t i o n o f m o r a l i t y . As w i l l be s e e n , b o t h r e l y h e a v i l y on t h e n o t i o n o f a p r i n c i p l e and t h e m a j o r p a r t o f t h i s p a p e r w i l l be d e v o t e d t o an exam-i n a t i o n o f t h i s n o t i o n . T h i s e x a m i n a t i o n w i l l be f o l l o w e d by a c r i t i q u e o f K o h l b e r g ' s own a c c o u n t o f t h e " n a t u r e and f u n c t i o n i n g o f m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s " . I n c o n c l u s i o n I w i l l l o o k a t t h e a c t i v i t y o f m o r a l e d u c a t i o n . 4 FOOTNOTES 1. J . W i l s o n , N. W i l l i a m s , B. Sugarman. Introduction to Moral Education. B a l t i m o r e : P e n g u i n B o o k s , 1967. The work o f P e t e r s and K o h l b e r g a p p e a r s i n a number o f papers, o f which, t h e f o l l o w i n g a r e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e . R. S. P e t e r s , " M o r a l E d u c a t i o n and t h e P s y c h o l o g y o f C h a r a c -t e r " and " R e a s o n and H a b i t : The P a r a d o x o f M o r a l E d u -c a t i o n " b o t h i n I . S c h e f f l e r ( e d . ) Philosophy and Education ( s e c o n d e d i t i o n ) B o s t o n : A l l y n £ B a c o n , 1966. R. S. P e t e r s , " C o n c r e t e P r i n c i p l e s and t h e R a t i o n a l P a s s i o n s " i n J . G u s t a f s o n , et al ( e d s . ) Moral Education: Five Lectures. C a m b r i d g e : H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1970. See a l s o R. S. P e t e r s , Ethics and Education. New Y o r k : S c o t t , F o r e s m a n and Company, 1967. L. K o h l b e r g , " E d u c a t i o n f o r J u s t i c e : A Modern S t a t e m e n t o f t h e P l a t o n i c V i e w " i n J . G u s t a f s o n , et al ( e d s . ) Moral Education: Five Lectures. C a m b r i d g e : H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 7 0 . L. K o h l b e r g , " S t a g e s o f M o r a l D e v e l o p m e n t as a B a s i s f o r M o r a l E d u c a t i o n " i n C. M. B e c k , B. S. C r i t t e n d e n , E. V. S u l l i v a n ( e d s . ) Moral Education: Interdisciplinary Approaches. T o r o n t o : U n i v e r s i t y o f T o r o n t o P r e s s , 1 9 7 1 . 1. KOHLBERG'S THEORY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT K o h l b e r g ' s t h e o r y o f m o r a l d e v e l o p m e n t i s g r o u n d e d i n t h e c o g n i t i v e - d e v e l o p m e n t a l a p p r o a c h o f P i a g e t . A c c o r d i n g t o P i a g e t , c o g n i t i v e d e v e l o p m e n t - p r o g r e s s e s t h r o u g h s t a g e s . [ T h e ] c o g n i t i v e - d e v e l o p m e n t a l a s s u m p t i o n i s t h a t b a s i c m e n t a l s t r u c t u r e i s t h e r e s u l t o f a n i n t e r -a c t i o n b e t w e e n c e r t a i n o r g a n i s m i c s t r u c t u r i n g t e n d e n c i e s a n d t h e s t r u c t u r e o f t h e o u t s i d e w o r l d . . . . T h i s i n t e r a c t i o n l e a d s t o c o g n i t i v e s t a g e s w h i c h r e p r e s e n t t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f s i m p l e e a r l y c o g n i t i v e s t r u c t u r e s a s t h e s e a r e a p p l i e d t o C o r a s s i m i l a t e ) t h e e x t e r n a l w o r l d , a s t h e y a r e a c c o m m o d a t e d t o o r r e s t r u c t u r e d b y t h e e x t e r n a l w o r l d I n t h e c o u r s e o f b e i n g a p p l i e d t o i t . l T h e c r i t e r i a o f c o g n i t i v e s t a g e s a r e : 1) t h e r e a r e q u a l i t a t i v e d i f f e r e n c e s i n m o d e s o f t h i n k i n g a n d p r o b l e m -s o l v i n g a t d i f f e r e n t s t a g e s a n d t h e s e a r e a g e - r e l a t e d , 2) t h e s t a g e s f o r m a n i n v a r i a n t s e q u e n c e , i . e . , t h e o n l y way t o r e a c h a h i g h e r s t a g e i s b y h a v i n g g o n e t h r o u g h t h e p r e v i -o u s s t a g e s , 3) e a c h s t a g e o r mode o f t h o u g h t f o r m s a " s t r u c -t u r e d w h o l e " , i . e . , a n i n d i v i d u a l w i l l t e n d t o v i e w o r h a n d l e a l l p r o b l e m s i n a p a r t i c u l a r way d e p e n d i n g u p o n t h e s t a g e he i s a t , a n d 4) c o g n i t i v e s t a g e s a r e h i e r a r c h i c a l i n t e g r a -2 t i o n s . B o t h P i a g e t a n d K o h l b e r g a r e s a t i s f i e d t h a t t h e s e c o g n i t i v e s t a g e s n o t o n l y r e p r e s e n t a l o g i c a l h i e r a r c h y b u t t h a t t h e y d e s i g n a t e a n e m p i r i c a l s e q u e n c e , i . e . , t h e y e x i s t . P i a g e t t h e o r i z e d t h a t m o r a l d e v e l o p m e n t p r o g r e s s e d t h r o u g h s t a g e s b u t h i s m o r a l s t a g e s d i d n o t s a t i s f y t h e c r i t e r i a o f c o g n i t i v e s t a g e s . K o h l b e r g h a s i d e n t i f i e d 5 6 s t a g e s o f m o r a l d e v e l o p m e n t w h i c h he c l a i m s a r e c u l t u r a l l y -u n i v e r s a l and w h i c h do s a t i s f y s t a g e s . T h e r e a r e , a c c o r d i n g m o r a l d e v e l o p m e n t w h i c h d i v i d e c o n v e n t i o n a l , t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l , t h e c r i t e r i a o f c o g n i t i v e t o K o h l b e r g , s i x s t a g e s o f i n t o t h r e e l e v e l s : t h e p r e -and t h e p o s t - c o n v e n t i o n a l o r p r i n c i p l e d l e v e l . He s u m m a r i z e s t h e s e as f o l l o w s : I P r e — C o n v e n t i o n a l o r P r e - M o r a l S t a g e one: O b e d i e n c e and p u n i s h m e n t o r i e n t a t i o n . E g o c e n t r i c d e f e r e n c e t o s u p e r i o r power o r p r e s t i g e , o r a t r o u b l e - a v o i d i n g s e t . O b j e c t i v e r e s p o n s i -b i l i t y . S t a g e two: N a i v e l y e g o i s t i c o r i e n t a t i o n . R i g h t a c t i o n i s t h a t i n s t r u m e n t a l l y s a t i s f y i n g t h e s e l f ' s n e e d s and o c c a s i o n a l l y o t h e r ' s . A w a r e n e s s o f r e l a t i v i s m o f v a l u e t o e a c h a c t o r ' s n e e d s and p e r s p e c t i v e . N a i v e e g a l i t a r i a n i s m and o r i e n t a -t i o n t o e x c h a n g e and r e c i p r o c i t y . I I C o n v e n t i o n a l M o r a l i t y S t a g e t h r e e : Good-boy o r i e n t a t i o n . O r i e n t a t i o n t o a p p r o v a l and t o p l e a s i n g and h e l p i n g o t h e r s . C o n f o r m i t y t o s t e r e o t y p i c a l i m a g e s o f m a j o r i t y o r n a t u r a l r o l e b e h a v i o r , and j u d g e m e n t by i n t e n t i o n s . S t a g e f o u r : A u t h o r i t y and s o c i a l - o r d e r m a i n t a i n i n g o r i e n t a t i o n . O r i e n t a t i o n t o " d o i n g d u t y " and t o s h o w i n g r e s p e c t f o r a u t h o r i t y and m a i n t a i n i n g t h e g i v e n s o c i a l o r d e r f o r i t s own s a k e . R e g a r d f o r e a r n e d e x p e c t a t i o n s o f o t h e r s . I l l P o s t - C o n v e n t i o n a l o r S e l f - A c c e p t e d M o r a l P r i n c i p l e s S t a g e f i v e : C o n t r a c t u a l l e g a l i s t i c o r i e n t a t i o n . R e c o g n i t i o n o f an a r b i t r a r y e l e m e n t o r s t a r t i n g p o i n t i n r u l e s o r e x p e c t a t i o n s f o r t h e s a k e o f a g r e e m e n t . Duty d e f i n e d i n t e r m s o f c o n t r a c t , g e n e r a l a v o i d a n c e o f v i o l a t i o n o f t h e w i l l o r r i g h t s o f o t h e r s , and m a j o r i t y w i l l and w e l f a r e . S t a g e s i x : C o n s c i e n c e o r p r i n c i p l e o r i e n t a t i o n . O r i e n t a t i o n n o t o n l y t o a c t u a l l y o r d a i n e d s o c i a l r u l e s b u t t o p r i n c i p l e s o f c h o i c e i n v o l v i n g a p p e a l t o l o g i c a l u n i v e r s a l i t y and c o n s i s t e n c y as a d i r e c t i n g a g e n t and t o m u t u a l r e s p e c t and t r u s t . ^ 7 The i m p o r t a n t p o i n t a b o u t t h e s e s t a g e s i s t h a t t h e y a r e forms o f m o r a l t h i n k i n g . I t i s as m a t t e r s o f f o r m r a t h e r t h a n o f c o n t e n t t h a t t h e m o r a l s t a g e s s a t i s f y t h e c r i t e r i a o f c o g n i t i v e s t a g e s . K o h l b e r g has a g r e a t d e a l o f e m p i r i c a l e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t h i s c l a i m t h a t h i s s t a g e s meet t h e c r i t e r i a o f c o g n i t i v e s t a g e s . The n o t i o n s t h a t a r e c e n t r a l t o an i n d i v i d u a l ' s t h i n k i n g , as t h e names o r c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n s o f t h e s t a g e s s u g g e s t , have b e e n shown t o be d i f f e r e n t a t e a c h s t a g e . T h at t h e s t a g e s f o r m an i n v a r i a n t s e q u e n c e i s d e m o n s t r a t e d by e x p e r i m e n t s i n w h i c h s u b j e c t s d i s p l a y an u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f a l l s t a t e m e n t s o f t h e s t a g e w h i c h t h e y a r e a t and t h o s e b e l o w b u t c a n o n l y c o m p r e h e n d s t a t e m e n t s one and s o m e t i m e s two s t a g e s a b o v e t h e i r own. G e n e r a l l y t h e r e i s an i n a b i l i t y t o use s t a t e m e n t s more t h a n one l e v e l a b ove t h e i r own. E v i d e n c e t h a t e a c h s t a g e f o r m s a " s t r u c -t u r e d w h o l e " i s f o u n d i n t h e f a c t t h a t t h e r e i s s t a g e c o n -s i s t e n c y a c r o s s t h e v a r i o u s a s p e c t s and i n t h e s t a t e m e n t s o f s u b j e c t s , i . e . , most s t a t e m e n t s a r e a t a s i n g l e s t a g e w i t h o t h e r s b e i n g e i t h e r one s t a g e a b o v e o r one b e l o w . T h a t t h e s t a g e s f o r m h i e r a r c h i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n s a g a i n i s d e m o n s t r a t e d by t h e f a c i l i t y o r i n c r e a s e d a b i l i t y o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l t o s o l v e d i l e m m a s as he moves t h r o u g h t h e s t a g e s . E a c h a s p e c t i s i n c r e a s i n g l y d i f f e r e n t i a t e d and i n t e g r a t e d a t e a c h s t a g e . What s t a r t e d a t s t a g e one as an "eye f o r an e y e " n o t i o n o f j u s t i c e , becomes a t s t a g e s i x a u n i v e r s a l p r i n c i p l e o f j u s t i c e . W h i l e h i s s t a g e s o f m o r a l d e v e l o p m e n t 8 s a t i s f y t h e c r i t e r i a o f c o g n i t i v e s t a g e s K o h l b e r g c a u t i o n s , "what i s b e i n g a s s e r t e d t h e n , i s n o t t h a t m o r a l judgement s t a g e s a r e c o g n i t i v e b u t t h a t t h e e x i s t e n c e o f m o r a l j u d g e -ment s t a g e s i m p l i e s t h a t m o r a l d e v e l o p m e n t has a b a s i c s t r u c t u r a l component." As a r e s u l t o f K o h l b e r g ' s t h e o r y o f d e v e l o p m e n t a l m o r a l s t a g e s , i t i s a m a t t e r o f t h e g r e a t e s t i m p o r t a n c e t o him t h a t m o r a l i t y be d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m p a r t i c u l a r m o r a l -i t i e s o r m o r a l s y s t e m s . M o r a l i t y i s d e f i n e d by e t h i c a l p r i n c i p l e s and, he s a y s , " t h e s t i m u l a t i o n o f t h e i r d e v e l o p -ment i s a m a t t e r q u i t e d i f f e r e n t f r o m t h e i n c u l c a t i o n o f 5 a r b i t r a r y c u l t u r a l b e l i e f s . " T h i s i s so b e c a u s e t h e h i g h e s t s t a g e s o f m o r a l d e v e l o p m e n t a r e ' p r i n c i p l e d ' , i . e . , j u d g e m e n t s and m o r a l t h o u g h t i n g e n e r a l a t t h e h i g h e s t s t a g e s a r e p r i n -c i p l e d . I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o compare t h i s v i e w w i t h t h a t o f R. S. P e t e r s . They a r e i n c o m p l e t e agreement t h a t m o r a l i t y i s t o be d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m p a r t i c u l a r m o r a l s y s t e m s and t h a t m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s a r e d i s t i n c t f r o m a r b i t r a r y c u l t u r a l b e l i e f s . They l i k e w i s e a g r e e t h a t m o r a l i t y i s d e f i n e d by m o r a l p r i n -c i p l e s . The a p p a r e n t s i m i l a r i t y between them v a n i s h e s when t h e r e a s o n s f o r t h e i r c l a i m s a r e c o n s i d e r e d . P e t e r s w r i t e s : " M o r a l i t y , t h e n , i s c o n c e r n e d w i t h what t h e r e a r e r e a s o n s f o r d o i n g or n o t d o i n g , f o r b r i n g i n g i n t o o r r e m o v i n g f r o m e x i s t e n c e . " P r i n c i p l e s , he s a y s , a r e needed t o d e t e r m i n e t h e r e l e v a n c e o f r e a s o n s . F o r P e t e r s m o r a l i t y b e l o n g s t o t h e r e a l m o f p r a c t i c a l d i s c o u r s e - -a r e a l m w h i c h has i t s own d i s t i n c t i v e c o n c e p t s and p r o c e d u r e s 9 f o r a n s w e r i n g q u e s t i o n s . T h i s r e a l m d oes n o t , i n t h i s v i e w , owe i t s d i s t i n c t i v e n e s s t o t h e s t i m u l a t i o n o f t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f n a t u r a l s t r u c t u r e s . P e t e r s ' s t o r y i s t h i s : "Men h a v e l a b o r i o u s l y l e a r n e d t o d i s t i n g u i s h what t h e y demand o f t h e w o r l d f r o m how t h i n g s a r e . The d e v e l o p m e n t o f s u c h a d i f -f e r e n t i a t e d c o n s c i o u s n e s s i s a m a j o r a c h i e v e m e n t o f t h e human r a c e . How i s i t t h a t m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s c a n f o r m t h e b a s i s o f two v i e w s t h a t a r e so d i f f e r e n t ? What a r e m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s t h a t t h e y c a n be s e e n as d e v e l o p i n g i n p e o p l e i n some s e n s e , and y e t a l s o s e e n as th_e 'immanent p r i n c i p l e s ' o r f u n d a -m e n t a l r u l e s o f p r o c e d u r e o f a f o r m o f d i s c o u r s e ? What i s i t a b o u t p r i n c i p l e s t h a t makes them d i s t i n c t f r o m r u l e s i n e a c h o f t h e s e v e r y d i f f e r e n t v i e w s ? "What i s a p r i n c i p l e ? " w o u l d seem t o be an i m p o r t a n t q u e s t i o n t o anyone i n t e r e s t e d i n a s s e s s i n g v a r i o u s c o n c e p -t i o n s , o f m o r a l e d u c a t i o n . I s h o u l d l i k e t o t u r n now t o an i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f t h i s n o t i o n . 10 FOOTNOTES 1. L a w r e n c e K o h l b e r g , S t a g e and S e q u e n c e : The C o g n i t i v e -D e v e l o p m e n t a l A p p r o a c h t o S o c i a l i z a t i o n , i n D. A. G o s l i n ( e d . ) Handbook of S o c i a l i z a t i o n Theory and Research, C h i c a g o , Rand M c N a l l y Co., 1 9 6 9 , p. 353. 2. Ibid, pp. 3 5 2 - 3 5 3 . 3. T h i s summary i s f r o m " E d u c a t i o n F o r J u s t i c e " , i n J . G u s t a f s o n e t al ( e d s . ) Moral Education: Five Lectures, C a m b r i d g e , H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 7 1 , pp. 7 1 - 7 2 . 4. L. K o h l b e r g , op. c i t . , p. 390. 5. L a w r e n c e K o h l b e r g , S t a g e s o f M o r a l D e v e l o p m e n t as a B a s i s f o r M o r a l E d u c a t i o n , i n C. M. B e c k , B. S. C r i t -t e n d e n , E. V. S u l l i v a n ( e d s . ) Moral Education: Inter-d i s c i p l i n a r y Approaches, T o r o n t o , U n i v e r s i t y o f T o r o n t o P r e s s , 1 9 7 1 , p. 33. 6. R. S. P e t e r s , R e a s o n and H a b i t : The P a r a d o x o f M o r a l E d u c a t i o n , i n I s r a e l S c h e f f l e r ( e d . ) Philosophy and Education S e c o n d e d i t i o n , B o s t o n , A l l y n and B a c o n , I n c . , 1 9 6 6 , p. 247. 7. R. S. P e t e r s , Ethics and Education, New Y o r k , S c o t t , F o r e s m a n and Co., 1 9 6 7 , p. x i i . 2. WHAT IS A MORAL PRINCIPLE? P r o f e s s o r K o h l b e r g ' s work' on t h e n a t u r e o f p r i n c i p l e s , w h i c h w i l l be t h e s u b j e c t o f a c r i t i q u e i n s e c t i o n s i x , c o n -s i s t s m a i n l y o f c o n t r a s t i n g p r i n c i p l e s w i t h r u l e s . The r e l a t i o n between p r i n c i p l e s and r u l e s i s f r e q u e n t l y a p r o b -l e m a t i c f e a t u r e i n a c c o u n t s o f m o r a l i t y and m o r a l e d u c a t i o n and i s i m p o r t a n t t o c o n s i d e r . W h i l e many w r i t e r s c l e a r l y d i s t i n g u i s h between r u l e s and p r i n c i p l e s o t h e r s use t h e c o n -c e p t s i n t e r c h a n g e a b l y . " ' ' F o r some p u r p o s e s i t i s n o t i m p o r -t a n t t o d i s t i n g u i s h , p r i n c i p l e s f r o m r u l e s . B u t , when one i s c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e p r o b l e m o f j u s t what i t i s t o have a " r a t i o n a l m o r a l c o d e " o r t o be a " s t a g e s i x " p e r s o n , i t i s i m p o r t a n t t o draw t h e d i s t i n c t i o n c l e a r l y . The need f o r c l a r i t y i s even more a c u t e f o r one f a c e d w i t h t h e t a s k o f m o r a l e d u c a t i o n and t h e d e c i s i o n a b o u t what i t means t o t e a c h , or t o t e a c h f o r , p r i n c i p l e s . I t i s n o t s u r p r i s i n g t h e n t h a t K o h l b e r g s h o u l d d i s t i n g u i s h between p r i n c i p l e s and r u l e s and an i n q u i r y i n t o how and why t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n m i g h t be made s h o u l d a i d i n t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f p r i n c i p l e s . I t i s u n l i k e l y , however, t h a t t h e t a s k o f c l a r i f y i n g t h e n a t u r e o f m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s can be a c c o m p l i s h e d s i m p l y by d o i n g t h i s . A more p r o m i s i n g a p p r o a c h t o t h e c l a r i f i c a t i o n o f t h e n a t u r e o f m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s m i ght be t o c o n s i d e r t h e n o t i o n o f a p r i n c i p l e i n g e n e r a l . In The Great Ideas two c h a r a c -t e r i s t i c s a r e a t t r i b u t e d t o p r i n c i p l e s : t h e f i r s t i s 11 12 g e n e r a l i t y , t h a t i s , p r i n c i p l e s a p p l y t o an i n d e f i n i t e num-b e r o f c i r c u m s t a n c e s ; t h e s e c o n d i s " t h e q u a l i t y o f u n d e r -2 lying o r b e i n g t h e source of o t h e r t h i n g s " . T h e r e seems t o be l i t t l e e l s e o f a g e n e r a l n a t u r e t h a t one c a n s a y a b o u t a p r i n c i p l e . R. H a r r e d e v o t e s a s e c t i o n o f h i s b o o k , The Principles of S c i e n t i f i c Thinking, t o t h e q u e s t i o n 'what i s a p r i n c i p l e ? ' . A l t h o u g h he i s s p e c i f i c a l l y i n t e r e s t e d i n s c i e n t i f i c p r i n -c i p l e s , a c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f what he has t o s a y m i g h t s h e d l i g h t on o u r p r o b l e m . H a r r e w r i t e s : A p r i n c i p l e i s a g e n e r a l s t a t e m e n t , a d h e r e n c e t o w h i c h d e t e r m i n e s t h e way we v i e w t h e phenomena we s t u d y . . . . F u r t h e r m o r e , a p r i n c i p l e i s a d h e r e d t o : we s p e a k o f a d o p t i n g p r i n c i p l e s . A p r i n c i p l e i s a s t a t e m e n t whose f a l s i t y we a r e n o t l i k e l y l i g h t l y t o a d m i t . I n t h i s i t d i f f e r s f r o m o t h e r s t a t e m e n t s . . . T h i s d i f f e r e n c e i s . . . i n t h e a t t i t u d e w h i c h we a d o p t t o w a r d s a s t a t e m e n t o f p r i n c i p l e . A s t a t e m e n t becomes a p r i n c i p l e n o t b e c a u s e o f some s p e c i a l k i n d o f m e a n i n g , b u t b e c a u s e i t comes t o p l a y a c e r t a i n r o l e i n o u r t h i n k i n g . We may n o t c o n s c i o u s l y d e c i d e t o p i c k some s t a t e m e n t f o r t h e r o l e o f a p r i n c i p l e , b u t we may come t o s e e t h a t o u r a t t i t u d e s t o c e r t a i n s t a t e m e n t s a r e s u c h t h a t t h e y must be f u n c t i o n i n g as p r i n c i p l e s : t h a t i s , f u n c t i o n i n g as d e t e r m i n e r s o f o u r way o f t h i n k i n g . ^ T h e r e a r e t h r e e p o i n t s i n t h i s a c c o u n t w h i c h r e l a t e t o a c c o u n t s o f m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s . The f i r s t two o f t h e s e c o n c e r n t h e a t t i t u d e H a r r e c l a i m s we have t o w a r d s s o m e t h i n g we r e g a r d as a p r i n c i p l e C l ) w h i c h e n a b l e s t h a t p r i n c i p l e t o d e t e r m i n e how we i n t e r p r e t and t h i n k a b o u t phenomena, and ( 2 ) w h i c h makes i t immune f r o m f a l s i f i c a t i o n . The t h i r d p o i n t c o n -c e r n s a d h e r e n c e t o p r i n c i p l e s . 13 A s a p r e l i m i n a r y I m i g h t m e n t i o n t h a t o t h e r s , f o r e x a m p l e C h a r l e s F r i e d , a p p e a r t o s h a r e H a r r e ' s v i e w . I n F r i e d ' s w o r d s : " T h e e s s e n t i a l c r i t e r i o n o f a r a t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e i s t h e a t t i t u d e t o t h e p r i n c i p l e o f a p e r s o n who 5 u n d e r s t a n d s i t a n d w h o s e e n d i t u n d e r l i e s " . T h i s a t t i t u d e c r i t e r i o n , p a r t o f w h i c h i s t h e d e m a n d t h a t w h a t we h o l d a s p r i n c i p l e s d e t e r m i n e t h e way we v i e w c e r t a i n t h i n g s , h a s b e e n i m p l i c i t i n t h e w r i t i n g s o f a n u m b e r o f m o r a l p h i l o s o p h e r s . P e t e r s s h o w s t h a t i t i s p r i n c i p l e s w h i c h d e t e r m i n e w h a t we s e e a s m a k i n g a c l a i m o n u s i n a n y m o r a l s i t u a t i o n . O f t h e f a m i l i a r d i l e m m a o f t h e y o u n g man u n a b l e t o d e c i d e w h e t h e r h e s h o u l d j o i n t h e f o r c e s o f t h e F r e n c h r e s i s t a n c e o r s t a y a t home w i t h h i s a g e d m o t h e r , P e t e r s a r g u e s t h a t i t i s b e c a u s e he h o l d s c o n c e r n s l i k e f r e e d o m a n d t h e w e l f a r e o f h i s p a r e n t a s p r i n c i p l e s t h a t t h e s e c o n s i d e r a -t i o n s p r e s e n t t h e m s e l v e s a s r e l e v a n t t o a n y d e c i s i o n a b o u t w h a t t o d o . M e l d e n m a k e s a s i m i l a r p o i n t w h e n he a r g u e s t h a t i n m o r a l m a t t e r s o u r e v a l u a t i o n o f a n a c t i o n w i l l d e p e n d o n w h a t d e s c r i p t i o n we g i v e t o t h e a c t i o n , t h a t i s , o n w h a t we t a k e t h e a c t i o n t o b e , a n d w h a t we u n d e r s t a n d i t t o b e i s d e t e r -7 m i n e d b y o u r m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s . A n d R a w l s h o l d s t h a t w i t h -o u t u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d a c c e p t i n g p r i n c i p l e s we c a n n o t b e s u b j e c t t o c e r t a i n m o r a l f e e l i n g s . He w r i t e s : R e s e n t m e n t i s o u r r e a c t i o n t o t h e i n j u r i e s a n d h a r m s w h i c h t h e w r o n g s o f o t h e r s i n f l i c t u p o n u s , a n d i n d i g n a t i o n i s o u r r e a c t i o n t o t h e 14 i n j u r i e s w h i c h t h e w r o n g s o f o t h e r s i n f l i c t o n o t h e r s . B o t h r e s e n t m e n t a n d i n d i g n a t i o n r e q u i r e , t h e n , a n e x p l a n a t i o n w h i c h i n v o k e s a m o r a l c o n c e p t , s a y t h e c o n c e p t o f j u s t i c e , a n d i t s a s s o c i a t e d p r i n c i p l e C s ) a n d s o m a k e s a r e f e r -e n c e t o a r i g h t o r a w r o n g . I n o r d e r t o e x p e r -i e n c e [ o r r e c o g n i z e c a s e s o f ] r e s e n t m e n t a n d i n d i g n a t i o n o n e m u s t a c c e p t t h e p r i n c i p l e s w h i c h s p e c i f y t h e s e r i g h t s a n d w r o n g s . 8 The s e c o n d p o i n t t h a t c a n b e r e l a t e d t o m o r a l p r i n -c i p l e s i s H a r r y ' s c o n t e n t i o n t h a t t h e a c c e p t a n c e o f a p r i n -c i p l e i n v o l v e s a n a t t i t u d e t h a t m a k e s i t immune f r o m f a l s i -f i c a t i o n " i n t h e s h o r t r u n " . T h i s h a s a p p l i c a t i o n t o m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s b u t i t a p p l i e s t o t h e m i n a s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t w a y . B e f o r e c o m p a r i n g t h e t w o I w i l l d i g r e s s l o n g e n o u g h t o c o m m e n t o n H a r r e ' s a d d e n d u m " i n t h e s h o r t r u n " . T h i s w i l l , I b e l i e v e , l e a d t o a n i m p o r t a n t d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n p r i n c i p l e s . We c a n t h i n k o f p r i n c i p l e s i n b o t h s c i e n c e a n d m o r a l i t y t h a t d i d p l a y a p a r t i n d e t e r m i n i n g t h e t h i n k i n g o f t h o s e who h e l d t h e m a n d w h i c h e n j o y e d t h e k i n d o f i m m u n i t y t o f a l s i f i c a t i o n t o w h i c h H a r r e r e f e r s b u t w h i c h n e v e r t h e l e s s w e r e , w i t h m u ch d i f f i c u l t y , a d m i t t e d t o be f a l s e . E x a m p l e s m i g h t b e f o u n d i n t h e s c i e n c e o f t h e P t o l e m a i c s a n d t h e m o r a l i t y o f t h e A n c i e n t s . S u c h p r i n c i p l e s a r e , I t h i n k , w e l l c h a r a c t e r i z e d a s immune f r o m f a l s i f i c a t i o n " i n t h e s h o r t r u n " . . A n d t h i s i s , a s H a r r e s a y s , d i f f e r e n t f r o m o t h e r s t a t e m e n t s o f b e l i e f w h i c h , e v e n t h o u g h s t r o n g l y h e l d , a r e l i a b l e t o be a b a n d o n e d . C o n s i d e r a d h e r e n c e t o a p r i n c i p l e s u c h a s 'one o u g h t t o g i v e s p e c i a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n t o one's p a r e n t s ' . The f a c t t h a t i n many c a s e s one i s n o t j u s t i f i e d i n d o i n g what would c o u n t as g i v i n g s p e c i a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n t o one's p a r e n t s does n o t c o u n t a g a i n s t t h e v a l i d i t y o f t h e p r i n c i p l e . S i m i l a r l y , as D w o r kin a r g u e s i n r e g a r d t o l e g a l p r i n c i p l e s , t h e f a c t t h a t i n one c a s e a p r i n c i p l e does n o t p r e v a i l does n o t mean i t i s n o t a p r i n c i p l e o f our l e g a l s y s t e m , n e x t t i m e i t may 9 be d e c i s i v e . T h i s i s a t l e a s t a n a l o g o u s t o t h e c a s e i n s c i e n c e where what c o n s t i t u t e s a c o u n t e r i n s t a n c e s i m p l y i s n ' t a d m i t t e d t o have n e g a t i v e f o r c e . T h i s even s h o r t r u n t y p e o f immunity t o f a l s i f i c a t i o n i s r e l a t e d t o t h e f a c t t h a t p r i n c i p l e s a r e g e n e r a l , t h a t i s , t h e y c o v e r a wide r a n g e o f a c t i o n s or h a p p e n i n g s . Monte-f i o r e p o i n t s t o t h i s when he s a y s : "... but i f t o d a y I d i s -a p p r o v e o f s o m e t h i n g as a m a t t e r o f p r i n c i p l e , w h a t e v e r t h e p r i n c i p l e may be, t h e n i f I change my mind a b o u t i t , I am bound t o change my mind a b o u t e v e r y t h i n g e l s e t o w h i c h t h e same r e a s o n s m i g h t a p p l y " . In a d d i t i o n t o any one p r i n -c i p l e c o v e r i n g a whole r a n g e o f a c t i o n s , t h a t p r i n c i p l e i s r e l a t e d i n v a r i o u s ways t o o t h e r principles."''''' T h i s seems t o s u g g e s t t h a t i t i s t h e c o m p l i c a t i o n s s u r r o u n d i n g t h e abandonment o f p r i n c i p l e s t h a t g i v e them t h e i r immunity t o f a l s i f i c a t i o n . In f a c t , i t i s t o t h e i r b e i n g g r o u n d e d i n h i g h e r p r i n c i p l e s - i n t h e f u n d a m e n t a l p r i n c i p l e s - t h a t t h e y owe t h i s s t a t u s . And t h i s i s t h e d i s t i n c t i o n t h a t needs t o be a c k n o w l e d g e d . T h e r e a r e f u n d a m e n t a l p r i n c i p l e s and l o w e r - o r d e r p r i n c i p l e s and b o t h 16 s h a r e t h e f e a t u r e s d e s c r i b e d by H a r r e , t h e d i f f e r e n c e b e i n g i n t h e d e g r e e t o w h i c h t h e y have t h o s e f e a t u r e s . D i f f e r e n t w r i t e r s use d i f f e r e n t e x p r e s s i o n s t o c h a r -a c t e r i z e what I have c a l l e d l o w e r - o r d e r p r i n c i p l e s and some of t h e s e have a l r e a d y been m e n t i o n e d . J o n a t h a n H a r r i s o n c a l l s t h e s e p r i n c i p l e s " d e r i v a t i v e " and t h i s i s a r a t h e r i n f o r m a t i v e l a b e l f o r t h e s e p r i n c i p l e s a r e d e r i v e d ( s u b j e c t t o t h e l i m i t a t i o n o f a f a c t u a l p r e m i s e t h e v e r a c i t y o f w h i c h i s d e p e n d e n t upon t h e c u r r e n t s t a t e o f our k n o w l e d g e ) f r o m f u n d a m e n t a l p r i n c i p l e s w h i c h a r e i n t u r n , g r o u n d e d i n r e a s o n . S i n c e t h e y a r e g r o u n d e d i n r e a s o n t h e y a r e u n c h a n g i n g - and t h i s b r i n g s us t o t h e p o i n t o f t h i s d i g r e s s i o n - and so 12 immune f r o m f a l s i f i c a t i o n even i n t h e l o n g r u n . D e r i v -a t i v e p r i n c i p l e s , b e i n g l e s s a b s t r a c t and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f t h e s e f u n d a m e n t a l p r i n c i p l e s , have o n l y r e l a t i v e i m m u n i t y . I r e m a r k e d above t h a t w h i l e m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s a r e l i k e s c i e n t i f i c ones i n h a v i n g t h i s immunity t h e r e i s an i m p o r t a n t d i f f e r e n c e . T h i s i s t o be f o u n d i n t h e f o l l o w i n g c l a i m w h i c h i s t r u e f o r m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s b u t n o t s c i e n t i f i c o n e s . M o n t e f i o r e a r g u e s : But what one c a n n o t do i s t o d i s a p p r o v e a t a g i v e n moment o f t h e s t a n d a r d s one h o l d s a t t h a t moment, f o r t o d i s a p p r o v e o f them would be t o d i s a p p r o v e o f them by r e f e r e n c e t o a n o t h e r s e t o f s t a n d a r d s and these would now be t h e s t a n d a r d s one h e l d . 1 ^ T h i s d i f f e r e n c e l i e s i n t h e f a c t t h a t m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s a r e n o r m a t i v e w h i l e t h o s e o f s c i e n c e a r e d e s c r i p t i v e . T h i s d i f f e r e n c e i s r e f l e c t e d i n t h e i r a l t e r n a t e name - l a w s . 17 These a r e c l e a r l y d i f f e r e n t k i n d s o f p r i n c i p l e s w h i c h do, however, s h a r e t h e f e a t u r e o f g e n e r a l i t y , o f b e i n g t h e s o u r c e o f , or g r o u n d s f o r , r u l e s and a c t i o n s . B o t h have a l o g i c a l and a p s y c h o l o g i c a l a s p e c t , on t h e one hand t h e y a r e s t a r t i n g p o i n t s i n o u r r e a s o n i n g , on t h e o t h e r t h e y a r e n o t e a s i l y g i v e n up. I t u r n now t o t h e t h i r d p o i n t r e g a r d i n g a d h e r e n c e t o p r i n c i p l e s and H a r r e ' s c l a i m t h a t : "a p r i n c i p l e i s a d h e r e d t o : we speak o f a d o p t i n g p r i n c i p l e s " . F i r s t , t h i s s t a t e -ment i s c o r r e c t as i t s t a n d s b u t w h i l e we speak o f a d o p t i n g p r i n c i p l e s I doubt i f we actually a d o p t p r i n c i p l e s . A d o p t -i n g a p r i n c i p l e seems t o i m p l y h a v i n g c h o s e n i t b u t as P e t e r s s a y s "we do n o t d e c i d e on o u r f u n d a m e n t a l p r i n c i p l e s 14 . . . s t i l l l e s s do we 'choose* them". B e r n a r d W i l l i a m s s a y s t h a t " t h e i d e a t h a t p e o p l e d e c i d e t o a d o p t t h e i r m o r a l 15 p r i n c i p l e s seems t o me a myth". Harre" h i m s e l f s a y s "we 16 a d o p t t h e metaphor o f ' d e c i s i o n ' " . T h e r e i s some t r u t h , I b e l i e v e , i n H a r r e ' s c l a i m t h a t "we may n o t c o n s c i o u s l y d e c i d e t o p i c k some s t a t e m e n t f o r t h e r o l e o f a p r i n c i p l e , b u t we may come t o see t h a t our a t t i t u d e s t o c e r t a i n s t a t e -ments a r e s u c h t h a t t h e y must be f u n c t i o n i n g as p r i n c i p l e s " . W h i l e we do speak o f a d h e r i n g t o p r i n c i p l e s , do we speak o f a d h e r i n g t o s c i e n t i f i c p r i n c i p l e s w h i c h i s , a f t e r a l l , what Harre" i s c l a i m i n g ? I t h i n k t h a t i n f a c t we do n o t . A l t h o u g h i n b o t h c a s e s , i . e . , t h e s c i e n t i f i c and t h e m o r a l , p r i n c i p l e s s e r v e as a s t a r t i n g p o i n t i n r e a s o n i n g and have a p s y c h o l o g i c a l a s p e c t i n t h a t t h e y a r e n o t e a s i l y abandoned, t h e r e i s t h i s d i f f e r e n c e between them: we a d h e r e t o m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s b u t n o t s c i e n t i f i c o n e s . A d h e r e n c e t o a p r i n c i p l e i n v o l v e s a c t i n g on t h a t p r i n c i p l e . But we c a n -n o t a c t on a s c i e n t i f i c p r i n c i p l e . Of c o u r s e we c a n u n d e r -s t a n d a s c i e n t i f i c p r i n c i p l e and t h i s i n v o l v e s a b e l i e f . H a v i n g a b e l i e f e n t a i l s a c t i n g i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h a t b e -17 l i e f , b u t t h i s i s n o t a c t i n g on t h e p r i n c i p l e . We c a n n o t even a c t i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h s u c h a p r i n c i p l e b u t o n l y i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h a b e l i e f . We can b o t h a c t on and a c t i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s . These two ways o u r a c t i o n s can r e l a t e t o m o r a l p r i n -c i p l e s — a s a c t i o n s on them o r as a c t i o n s i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e m — a r e w o r t h c o n s i d e r i n g f o r a moment. When a p r i n c i p l e i s a c t e d upon t h e p r i n c i p l e c o n s t i t u t e s t h e r e a s o n f o r w h i c h the a c t i o n i s done. The p r i n c i p l e p r o v i d e s t h e a g e n t ' s r e a s o n f o r a c t i n g ; t h e p r i n c i p l e i s h i s p r i n c i p l e . When we say t h a t an i n d i v i d u a l a c t s i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h a p r i n -c i p l e we c l a i m o n l y t h a t h i s a c t i o n c o u l d be s u p p o r t e d by r e f e r e n c e t o t h a t p r i n c i p l e b u t do n o t c l a i m t h a t i t c o n s t i -t u t e s h i s r e a s o n f o r d o i n g t h e a c t i o n . On t h e one hand m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s u n d e r l i e a c t i o n , on t h e o t h e r , t h e y p r o v i d e s t a n d a r d s by w h i c h t o j u d g e b o t h i n d i v i d u a l a c t i o n s and s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l e v e n t s . T h e r e a r e , t h e n , d i f f e r e n t k i n d s o f p r i n c i p l e s , e . g . , s c i e n t i f i c , m a t h e m a t i c a l , m o r a l , e t c . and t h e s e a r e d i f f e r -e n t s o r t s o f t h i n g s . W h i l e t h e y have some f e a t u r e s i n com-mon t h e r e a r e marked d i f f e r e n c e s between them. M o r a l p r i n c i p l e s have a d i s t i n g u i s h i n g f e a t u r e i n t h a t t h e y c a n be our p r i n c i p l e s — p r i n c i p l e s we have. They have a d u a l r o l e : on t h e one hand t h e y a r e p r i n c i p l e s on w h i c h a r g u m e n t s c a n p r o c e e d and on t h e o t h e r t h e y a r e p r i n c i p l e s on w h i c h we c a n a c t . An i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f t h i s d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n m o r a l and n o n - m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s — t h a t we c a n ' a c t on m o r a l p r i n -c i p l e s , and t h a t t h e y c a n be o u r p r i n c i p l e s — w o u l d seem t o be a way t o become c l e a r e r a b o u t m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s and a b o u t what we a r e a i m i n g a t i n m o r a l e d u c a t i o n . 20 FOOTNOTES 1. Among t h o s e who do make t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n a r e R. S. P e t e r s , Ethics- and Education, New Y o r k : S c o t t F o r e s m a n , 1967 , a nd C o n c r e t e P r i n c i p l e s and t h e R a t i o n a l P a s s i o n s . J . G u s t a f s o n e t al C e d s . ) Moral Education: Five Lectures, C a m b r i d g e : H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 7 0 ; J o h n R a w l s , O u t l i n e o f a D e c i s i o n P r o c e d u r e f o r E t h i c s . Philosophical Review, 60, 1 9 6 1 , p. 195; M. G. S i n g e r , Generalization in Ethics, L o n d o n : E y r e and S p o t t i s w o o d e , 1 9 6 3 ; and R. D w o r k i n , The M o d e l o f R u l e s , University of Chicago Law Review, 35 , 1967 , 14-4-6. S e v e r a l d i f f e r e n t p r a c t i c e s a r e f o l l o w e d by t h o s e who do make t h e d i s t i n c t i o n . Some l i k e R. B. B r a n d t , Ethical Theories, E n g l e w o o d C l i f f s : P r e n t i c e H a l l , 1 9 5 9 , f r e q u e n t l y s u b s t i t u t e one t e r m f o r t h e o t h e r . O t h e r s , e . g . , R. M. H a r e , The Language of Morals, L o n d o n : O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 964, s t i c k m a i n l y t o one and o n l y o c c a s i o n a l l y u s e t h e o t h e r . J o h n W i l s o n , N. W i l l i a m s , B. Sugarman, Introduction to Moral Education, B a l t i m o r e : P e n g u i n B o o k s , 1 9 6 7 , e m p l o y s a n o t h e r common move, i . e . , t o d i s t i n g u i s h some p r i n c i p l e s as s e c o n d -o r d e r p r i n c i p l e s and t r e a t f i r s t — o r d e r p r i n c i p l e s as s y n -onymous w i t h r u l e s . T h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i s o f t e n m arked by r e f e r r i n g t o u l t i m a t e , p r o c e d u r a l , f o r m a l , o r l o g i c a l p r i n -c i p l e s as o p p o s e d t o l o w e r — o r d e r , d e r i v a t i v e , o r s p e c i f i c p r i n c i p l e s . I n a n o t h e r c l a s s a r e w r i t e r s who, l i k e B. G e r t , The Moral Rules, New Y o r k : H a r p e r and Row, 1 9 6 6 , us e o n l y m o r a l r u l e s and a v o i d c o m p l e t e l y t h e use o f p r i n c i p l e . 2. The Great Ideas: Syntopicon, Volume I I , C h i c a g o : E n c y c l o p a e d i a B r i t a n n i c a , 1 9 5 2 , p. 420. 3. R. Harre" , The P r i n c i p l e s of S c i e n t i f i c Thinking, L o n d o n : M a c m i l l a n , 1 9 7 0 , p. 206. 4. I t s h o u l d be c l e a r t h a t a t t i t u d e h e r e d o es n o t mean m e r e l y a p r o - a t t i t u d e o r a f a v o u r a b l e i m p r e s s i o n . S i m i l a r l y i t does n o t r e f e r t o a f e e l i n g . What i s r e f e r r e d t o i s t h e way a p r i n c i p l e f e a t u r e s i n o u r t h i n k i n g . 5. C h a r l e s F r i e d , An Anatomy of Values: Problems of Personal and Social Choice, C a m b r i d g e : H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 7 0 , p. 23. 6. R. S. P e t e r s , C o n c r e t e P r i n c i p l e s and t h e R a t i o n a l P a s -s i o n s , i n G u s t a f s o n , e t al ( e d s . ) , Moral Education: Five Lectures, C a m b r d i g e : H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 7 0 , p. 32. 7. A. I . M e l d e n , Rights and Right Conduct, O x f o r d : B a s i l B l a c k w e l l , 1 9 5 9 , p. 63. 21 8. J o h n R a w l s , The Sense o f J u s t i c e , Philosophical Review 72, 1 9 6 3 , p. 299. 9. R. D w o r k i n , op. c i t . , p. 26. 10. A l l a n M o n t e f i o r e , A Modern Introduction to Moral Philosophy, L o n d o n : R o u t l e d g e and Kegan P a u l , 1 9 5 8 , p . 96 . 1 1 . S. T o u l m i n d i s c u s s e s how f a r — r e a c h i n g t h e r o o t s o f o u r m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s a r e i n The P r i n c i p l e s o f M o r a l i t y , Philosophy, 3 1 , 1 9 5 6 , p. 149. 12. By " i n t h e l o n g r u n " I w i s h o n l y t o i m p l y so l o n g as we have t h e c o n c e p t o f r a t i o n a l i t y we now h a v e . See P a u l T a y l o r , Normative Discourse, E n g l e w o o d C l i f f s : P r e n t i c e - H a l l , I n c . , 1 9 6 1 , p. 119. 13. A l l a n M o n t e f i o r e , o p . c i t . , pp. 9 7 - 9 8 . 14. R. S. P e t e r s , op. c i t . , p. 33. 15. B e r n a r d W i l l i a m s , M o r a l i t y a n d , t h e E m o t i o n s . i n J o h n C a s e y Ced.) Morality and Moral Reasoning, L o n d o n : Methuen and Co. L t d . , 1 9 7 1 , p. 22. 16. R. H a r r e , op. c i t . , p. 209. 17. I s r a e l S c h e f f l e r , Conditions of Knowledge, G l e n v i e w , 1 1 1 . : S c o t t F o r e s m a n and Company, 1 9 6 5 , c h . 4. 18. D. G. B r o w n , E v a l u a t i v e I n f e r e n c e , Philosophy, 30, 1 9 5 5 , p. 227. 3. ON HAVING PRINCIPLES It would seem, then, to be s i g n i f i c a n t that only moral p r i n c i p l e s are adhered t o ; that they can, i n a d d i t i o n to being premises of arguments, be p r i n c i p l e s of conduct or p r i n c i p l e s people have. As p r i n c i p l e s of conduct they i s s u e i n a c t i o n . Too l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n has been given to p r i n c i p l e s i n t h i s sense and so i t i s the one I w i l l e x p l o r e i n t h i s 1 s e c t i o n . F r e q u e n t l y , when p h i l o s o p h e r s are d e a l i n g with the epistemology or l o g i c of morals some p a r t of the d i s c u s s i o n w i l l r e f e r to p r i n c i p l e s people have and o f t e n t h i s does not square with what we have i n mind when we u t t e r phrases such as 'I don't know much about h i s moral p r i n c i p l e s ' . In the r o l e which has been most i n t e r e s t i n g to p h i l o s o p h e r s , moral p r i n c i p l e s are seen as major premises i n p r a c t i c a l s y l l o g i s m s . In t h i s r o l e g e n e r a l i z a t i o n , d e duction from and a p p l i c a t i o n of moral p r i n c i p l e s have t h e i r proper p l a c e but these n o t i o n s are then c a r r i e d over to the other r o l e i n which we speak of persons a c t i n g on p r i n c i p l e s where there need not be, and t y p i c a l l y i s not, argument or g i v i n g of reasons i n v o l v e d . To say that argument and the g i v i n g of reasons are not t y p i c a l l y i n v o l v e d i n cases of a c t i n g on p r i n c i p l e s i s not to say that people don't have reasons and th a t such a c t i o n i s t h e r e f o r e not r a t i o n a l . It i s to say that people have p r i n -c i p l e s and do a l l s o r t s of t h i n g s on p r i n c i p l e s , such as being 22 23 c h a r i t a b l e o r h o n e s t f o r i n s t a n c e , w i t h o u t a n y p r o c e s s o f d e d u c t i o n o r g e n e r a l i z a t i o n g o i n g o n o r t h e n e c e s s i t y o f a n y v e r b a l a c t i v i t y s u c h a s t h e giving o f r e a s o n s . I b e l i e v e i t i s m i s l e a d i n g t o o b j e c t t h a t t h e s e p r o c e s s e s c o u l d , i n p r i n c i p l e , b e t a k i n g p l a c e . I t s e e m s t o me t h a t i t i s n o t e v e n n e c e s s a r y t h a t a p e r s o n a c t i n g o n a p r i n c i p l e t h a t i s o n e o f h i s p r i n c i p l e s be able to d e d u c e h i s a c t i o n f r o m a p r i n c i p l e . M r s . F o o t , i n h e r c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e s y m p o s i u m "When i s a P r i n c i p l e a M o r a l P r i n c i p l e ? " e x p r e s s e s h e r c o n c e r n o v e r t h e t e n d e n c y o f p h i l o s o p h e r s , a n d s p e c i f i c a l l y R. M. H a r e , t o c o n f l a t e t h e s e t w o u s e s . I n r e f e r e n c e t o h i s Language of Morals she w r i t e s : f o r M r . H a r e i s t h i n k i n g b o t h o f t h e c a s e i n w h i c h we s a y t h a t a p r i n c i p l e was b r o u g h t f o r w a r d i n a n a r g u m e n t a b o u t w h a t w a s t o b e d o n e , a n d o f t h e c a s e i n w h i c h i t was s u p p o s e d t o b e ' i n v o l v e d ' i n some o t h e r w a y . T h i s g i v e s r i s e t o a s e r i o u s d i f f i c u l t y f o r t h e n t h e n o t i o n o f a s u b c o n s c i o u s a r g u m e n t o r ' p r o c e s s o f i n f e r e n c e ' b e c o m e s a l m o s t i r r e s t i b l e , b e i n g f o r c e d o n u s b y o u r i n s i s t e n c e t h a t a p r i n c i p l e i s i n v o l v e d , a n d t h a t a p r i n c i p l e i s a m a j o r p r e m i s e . 2 I n t h e a r e a o f m o r a l e d u c a t i o n i n p a r t i c u l a r - i t s e e m s p l a u s i b l e t o s u g g e s t t h a t t h e c o n f l a t i o n o f t h e s e t w o s e n s e s o f m o r a l p r i n c i p l e t o p r i n c i p l e s o f a r g u m e n t h a s l e d t o t w o r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t p o s i t i o n s on w h a t t h e n a t u r e o f s u c h e d u -c a t i o n i s . I t a p p e a r s t h a t t h o s e who a r e p r i m a r i l y i n t e r -e s t e d i n t h e p s y c h o l o g y o f m o r a l s Cor t h e a f f e c t i v e s i d e o f m o r a l i t y ) a r e h i g h l y s u s p i c i o u s , a n d i n many c a s e s d e n y t h e 24 v a l i d i t y , o f t h e e f f o r t s o f t h o s e who s t r e s s t h e r a t i o n a l 3 a s p e c t o f m o r a l i t y . A n d t h e l a t t e r g r o u p h o l d a s i m i l a r v i e w r e g a r d i n g t h o s e o n t h e " a f f e c t i v e " s i d e . I h o p e i n t h i s p a p e r t o h e a b l e t o s h o w t h a t t o a t l e a s t some e x t e n t t h e s e p o s i t i o n s a r e l e s s r a d i c a l l y o p p o s e d t h a n t h e y s e e m . I s h a l l a p p r o a c h t h e t a s k o f g e t t i n g c l e a r e r a b o u t p r i n c i p l e s o f c o n d u c t b y c o n s i d e r i n g s u c h e x p r e s s i o n s a s " I d o n ' t k n o w m u c h a b o u t h i s m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s " . When we s a y s o m e t h i n g l i k e t h i s we a r e n o t t a l k i n g a b o u t a r g u m e n t s a p e r s o n m i g h t g i v e f o r o r a g a i n s t some a c t i o n , o r how he w o u l d g o a b o u t j u s t i f y i n g h i s own a c t i o n s a n d s a y i n g we s i m p l y d o n ' t k n o w o f w h a t s o r t t h e y w o u l d b e . R a t h e r , we a r e t h i n k i n g a b o u t w h a t s o r t s o f a c t i o n s t h a t p e r s o n w o u l d be l i k e l y t o p e r f o r m i n c e r t a i n s i t u a t i o n s o r how he m i g h t r e a c t t o c e r t a i n a c t i o n s o f o t h e r s . We a r e s a y i n g , a s M r s . F o o t s u g g e s t s , t h a t we do n o t k n o w w h e n h e w o u l d t h i n k a t h i n g r i g h t o r w r o n g . As s h e p o i n t s o u t , we m i g h t a l s o s a y o f s o m e o n e "he s e e m s t o me t o be a man w i t h o u t m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s " i n w h i c h c a s e "we [ d o ] n o t mean t h a t a s p e c i a l f a c t o r , c o n n e c t e d w i t h g e n e r a l i z a t i o n , [ i s ] a b s e n t i n h i s c a s e " . I n s u c h a c a s e w h a t we do mean i s t h a t t h a t p e r s o n i s w i c k e d . When we s p e a k i n t h i s way a b o u t a p e r s o n ' s p r i n c i p l e s we a r e r e f e r r i n g t o s o m e t h i n g v e r y b a s i c a b o u t h i m . We a r e n o t r e f e r r i n g t o a n i n n e r p r o c e s s o f d e d u c t i o n , n o r a r e we r e f e r r i n g t o c l a i m s he m i g h t make a b o u t h i m s e l f o r t h e p r i n -c i p l e s h e h a s . I f , f o r e x a m p l e , we s a y o f s o m e o n e t h a t i t 25 i s one o f h i s p r i n c i p l e s t h a t "one o u g h t n o t c a u s e p e o p l e p a i n " we mean more t h a n t h a t he f r e q u e n t l y s a y s t h i s i s one o f h i s p r i n c i p l e s o r t h a t he u s e s i t i n a r g u m e n t s . I t c o u l d i n f a c t be t h e c a s e t h a t he n e v e r d i d t h e s e t h i n g s . What we do mean i s t h a t he c o n s i s t e n t l y a c t s i n s u c h a way a s t o a v o i d c a u s i n g p e o p l e p a i n a s , f o r e x a m p l e , he w o u l d be d o i n g i n d r i v i n g c a r e f u l l y , i n k e e p i n g h a r m f u l i n s t r u m e n t s o r s u b s t a n c e s o u t o f t h e r e a c h o f c h i l d r e n , o r i n c o n s i d e r i n g t h e p o s s i b l e e f f e c t s o f a c o u n t l e s s number o f t h i n g s he m i g h t do o r s a y w h i c h c o u l d c a u s e p e o p l e p a i n . E ven t h o u g h we may n e v e r h e a r t h i s p e r s o n q u o t e s u c h a p r i n c i p l e we c a n and'do t a l k a b o u t h i m h a v i n g o r n o t h a v i n g t h e p r i n c i p l e . I t w o u l d be h e l p f u l i f we c o u l d be more s p e c i f i c a b o u t what we do mean when we s a y t h a t someone has a p r i n c i p l e o r h a s p r i n c i p l e s . B u r t o n L e i s e r , i n h i s f a s c i n a t i n g a n a l y s i s o f ' c u s t o m ' , i d e n t i f i e s a u s e o f c u s t o m w h i c h i s synonymous w i t h p r i n c i p l e and s e t s f o r t h c o n d i t i o n s f o r s a y i n g a p e r s o n has a p r i n c i p l e . A c c o r d i n g t o L e i s e r : When one s a y s t h a t a g i v e n p e r s o n , M, h a s t h e p r i n c i p l e X, o r t h a t he a c t s upon t h e maxim X, he means t h a t : ( 1 ) M r e g u l a r l y d o e s X u n d e r c e r t a i n s p e c i f i a b l e c i r c u m s t a n c e s . ( 2 ) M m i g h t c h o o s e n o t t o do X, and n o t do X, u n d e r t h o s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s . 13) M i s c o n s c i o u s o f d o i n g X when he d o e s i t . ( 4 ) M d o e s X d e l i b e r a t e l y . C5 ) M b e l i e v e s t h a t he o u g h t t o do X u n d e r t h o s e c i r e u r n s t a n c e s . ^ I w o u l d l i k e t o c o n s i d e r e a c h o f t h e s e f i v e c o n d i t i o n s s e p a r a t e l y b u t b e f o r e I b e g i n s h o u l d s a y a word i n r e l a t i o n 26 to the example I w i l l use: the p r i n c i p l e of n o n - i n j u r y . T h i s , while perhaps not one of the fundamental moral p r i n -c i p l e s , i s a h i g h e r — o r d e r p r i n c i p l e . The one L e i s e r used i n h i s account, 'one ought to give alms to beggars' i s of a low o r d e r . His use of a low order p r i n c i p l e i s understand-able s i n c e h i s purpose was to map the range of the concept 'custom' and so he was i n t e r e s t e d i n the p o i n t at which i t shaded i n t o ' p r i n c i p l e ' . Since our concern i s with the con-cept ' p r i n c i p l e ' i t would be u n d e s i r a b l e to use an example which only b a r e l y comes w i t h i n i t s range. F i r s t , when we say of M that i t i s one of h i s p r i n -c i p l e s , or he a c t s upon the maxim, t h a t 'one ought not to cause people p a i n ' we mean M r e g u l a r l y avoids causing people pain under c e r t a i n s p e c i f i a b l e c i r c u m s t a n c e s . It i s obvious that with a higher order p r i n c i p l e the circumstances are much l e s s e a s i l y s p e c i f i e d than i s the case with a lower order one. I t i s easy to e l a b o r a t e the circumstances surrounding a c t i n g on a p r i n c i p l e l i k e 'one ought to gi v e alms to beg-gars' . But, i n the case of a p r i n c i p l e l i k e the one we are usi n g the circumstances are l i k e l y to be many and v a r i e d . They can only be covered by a g e n e r a l phrase l i k e 'when M i s aware t h a t he might cause someone p a i n ' . Perhaps a word should be s a i d about the n o t i o n of ' r e g u l a r i t y ' b e f o r e c o n s i d e r i n g the p o i n t of t h i s c r i t e r i o n . As L e i s e r p o i n t s out, " r e g u l a r o c c u r r e n c e " i s a n o t o r i o u s l y vague phrase. It i s vague when used i n r e f e r e n c e to n a t u r a l o c c u r r e n c e s and even more vague when a p p l i e d to human a c t i o n . To say that a person r e g u l a r l y does something does not imply t h a t he i n v a r i a b l y does that t h i n g but i t does imply that h i s a c t i o n i s a r e p e t i t i o n and that he has done i t f r e q u e n t l y i n the pas t . Since we are c o n s i d e r i n g a c t i o n on a p r i n c i p l e the r e p e a t a b i l i t y of the a c t i o n i s dependent upon the e x i s t e n c e of c e r t a i n circumstances and r e p e t i t i o n s of the a c t i o n can only take plac e i n s i t u a t i o n s which are d e f i n e d by those circumstances. Such a c t i o n s , to be c a l l e d r e g u l a r , must not be separated by as many cases of f a i l u r e to act i n that way given the a p p r o p r i a t e s i t u a t i o n . Although the number of r e p e t i t i o n s of an a c t i o n which would q u a l i f y t h a t a c t i o n as a r e g u l a r occurrence cannot be s p e c i -f i e d we can say that the r e p e t i t i o n s must not be separated by f a i l u r e s to perform the a c t i o n i n s i t u a t i o n s i n which i t i s a p p r o p r i a t e . The main p o i n t of Cl) i s t h i s : i t i s a necessary and s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n f o r having a p r i n c i p l e that the p r i n -c i p l e be r e g u l a r l y acted on — i n t h i s case that M avoids causing i n j u r y to o t h e r s . Of a l l the statements we might make ahout M's having a p r i n c i p l e , the answer to the ques-t i o n "how do we know i t i s t r u e ? " must c o n t a i n r e f e r e n c e to M's beh a v i o r . This b e h a v i o r , i n a d d i t i o n to t h i n g s he does or avoids doing, i n c l u d e s a t t i t u d e s he expresses, and moral 7 f e e l i n g s to which he i s s u b j e c t . While some of the a c t i o n s which are evidence of one's having a p r i n c i p l e or p r i n c i p l e s i n v o l v e v e r b a l e x p r e s s i o n the v e r b a l a c t i v i t y of f o r m u l a t i n g , c r i t i c i z i n g , or d e f e n d i n g a p r i n c i p l e i s n o t s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e t h a t one has th e p r i n c i p l e . T h i s i s why i t i s wrong t o a r g u e , as we s h a l l l a t e r see H a r r i s o n d o i n g , t h a t i t i s n o t n e c e s s a r y t o h o l d i n g s o m e t h i n g as a p r i n c i p l e t h a t a p e r s o n a c t on i t . I would say r a t h e r t h a t i t i s n o t o n l y n e c e s s a r y b u t s u f -f i c i e n t t h a t he a c t on i t . Not o n l y i s i t n e c e s s a r y t h a t he a c t on i t b u t he must do so w i t h some d e g r e e o f r e g u l a r -i t y . I f i n most s i t u a t i o n s w h i c h i n v o l v e d o t h e r p e o p l e M d i d n o t a v o i d a c t s w h i c h might c a u s e i n j u r y , or p e r f o r m a c t i o n s t o p r e v e n t i n j u r y t o o t h e r s , b u t o n l y o c c a s i o n a l l y p e r f o r m e d s u c h a c t s , we s h o u l d be most u n l i k e l y t o say t h a t 'one ought n o t c a u s e p e o p l e p a i n ' was one o f h i s p r i n c i p l e s . Were he t o p e r f o r m a c t s i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h i s p r i n c i p l e i n some o f t h e s i t u a t i o n s w h i c h c a l l e d f o r s u c h a c t i o n , we c o u l d s ay he a c t e d i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h a t p r i n c i p l e i n t h o s e s i t u a t i o n s b u t n o t t h a t he was a c t i n g on it. I t i s o n l y when, i n s i t u a t i o n s where one c o u l d p r e v e n t c a u s i n g p a i n , M r e g u l a r l y does a c t s o f t h i s s o r t t h a t we c o u l d say t h a t t h i s was one o f h i s p r i n c i p l e s . I t i s i m p o r t a n t t o remember t h a t a c t i n g on a p r i n c i p l e means d o i n g an a c t i o n b e c a u s e o f a p r i n c i p l e , i . e . , t h e p r i n c i p l e p r o v i d e s t h e r e a s o n f o r t h e a c t i o n , and a l s o t h a t a c t i n g on a p r i n c i p l e i s n o t t h e same as b e i n g a b l e t o , n o r does i t e n t a i l t h a t one c a n , f o r m u l a t e or d e f e n d t h e p r i n c i p l e . I t i s c e r t a i n l y t r u e t h a t i f i n t h e a b s e n c e o f o c c a -s i o n f o r a c t i o n on M's p a r t , he c o u l d and d i d o f f e r t h a t p r i n c i p l e i n s u p p o r t o f j u d g e m e n t s and was w i l l i n g t o d e f e n d i t , e t c . , t h a t w o u l d be e v i d e n c e f o r us t o b e l i e v e t h a t he d i d a c c e p t t h e p r i n c i p l e o f n o n - i n j u r y . However, i t w o u l d n o t be s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e . One c a n u n d e r s t a n d t h e d e r i v a t i o n o f a p r i n c i p l e and know t h a t o t h e r p e o p l e b e l i e v e and a c c e p t i t w i t h o u t a c c e p t i n g i t h i m s e l f . C 2 ) M m i g h t c h o o s e n o t t o do X, and n o t do X, u n d e r t h o s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s . T h e r e a r e two ways i n w h i c h t h i s c o n -d i t i o n must h o l d . F i r s t , t o a c t on a p r i n c i p l e as t o act i n any way i t must be p o s s i b l e t o do o t h e r w i s e . I f M c o u l d n o t h e l p h i m s e l f b u t was somehow d r i v e n t o d e t e c t and p r e v e n t i n j u r i e s f r o m o c c u r r i n g t h e n we w o u l d n o t s a y i t was one o f h i s p r i n c i p l e s t h a t 'one o u g h t n o t c a u s e p e o p l e p a i n ' . F o r i t t o be p o s s i b l e f o r M t o a c t on h i s p r i n c i p l e i t must a l s o be p o s s i b l e f o r h i m t o f a i l t o a c t on i t . The s e c o n d way i n w h i c h i t must be t r u e t h a t M m i g h t c h o o s e n o t t o do X, and n o t do i t , u n d e r t h o s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s s t e m s f r o m t h e v e r y n a t u r e o f a p r i n c i p l e . I t i s an i m p o r -t a n t f a c t a b o u t a p r i n c i p l e t h a t i t s r e l e v a n c e t o a p a r t i c u -l a r s i t u a t i o n d o e s n o t mean t h a t a c t i o n on i t i s o b l i g a t o r y i n t h a t s i t u a t i o n . A l t h o u g h one may be j u s t i f i e d i n c o n s i d -e r i n g a c t i n g on a p a r t i c u l a r p r i n c i p l e w h i c h i s r e l e v a n t t o a s i t u a t i o n one i s n o t n e c e s s a r i l y e i t h e r c o m m i t t e d t o , o r j u s t i f i e d i n , a c t i n g on i t i n t h a t s i t u a t i o n . W h e t h e r o r n o t one i s j u s t i f i e d i n a c t i n g on a p r i n c i p l e d e p e n d s upon t h e p a r t i c u l a r c i r c u m s t a n c e s s u r r o u n d i n g t h e s i t u a t i o n and t h e r e l a t i v e w e i g h t o f o t h e r p r i n c i p l e s r e l e v a n t t o t h e s i t u a t i o n . T h i s i s d i f f e r e n t f r o m f o l l o w i n g o r o b e y i n g a r u l e . M may have a number o f p r i n c i p l e s i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e p r i n c i p l e o f n o n - i n j u r y . S uppose he a l s o a d h e r e s t o t h e p r i n c i p l e o f l i b e r t y and s u p p o s e f u r t h e r t h a t he f i n d s h i m -s e l f a b l e t o c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e f r e e i n g o f an o p p r e s s e d g r o u p w h i c h , t h o u g h n o t b r u t a l l y t r e a t e d , i s c o n t r o l l e d and e x -p l o i t e d by a s e c o n d g r o u p . M may b e l i e v e t h a t i t i s r i g h t f o r h i m t o work t o f r e e t h e o p p r e s s e d g r o u p e v e n a t t h e p r i c e o f c a u s i n g I n j u r y t o t h e o p p r e s s o r s . I n s u c h a c a s e M m i g h t h o l d 'one o u g h t n o t c a u s e i n j u r y ' as a p r i n c i p l e and y e t c h o o s e n o t t o a c t i n s u c h a way as t o e n s u r e a v o i d i n g i n j u r y . We must add a c o n d i t i o n t o L e i s e r ' s l i s t w h i c h r e l a t e s t o t h e d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n n o t d o i n g X i n t h e f i r s t way r e f e r r e d t o , t h a t i s , f a i l i n g t o do X a l t h o u g h one knows one o u g h t t o , and n o t d o i n g i t i n t h e s e c o n d . I n t h e s e c o n d , M may w e l l f e e l r e g r e t i f i n f a c t he does c a u s e i n j u r y t o some-o n e , he w i l l a c c e p t i t w i t h "a h e a v y h e a r t " as i t w e r e , b u t he w i l l n o t e x p e r i e n c e g u i l t o r r e m o r s e as he must i n t h e f i r s t c a s e . I n t h e s e c o n d c a s e M d i d what was r i g h t , t h a t i s t h e b e s t he c o u l d have done i n t h o s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s . H o w e v e r , i f , as. i n t h e f i r s t c a s e , M f a i l s t o do X and w i t h no j u s t i f i c a t i o n c a u s e s i n j u r y , he w i l l , i f he has t h e p r i n -c i p l e o f n o n - i n j u r y , f e e l r e m o r s e and t a k e t h e a p p r o p r i a t e s t e p s t o make amends. ( 3 ) M i s c o n s c i o u s o f d o i n g X when he does i t . A c t i n g i n s u c h a way t h a t i t c a n be s a i d t h a t t h i s i s one o f 31 h i s p r i n c i p l e s c a n n o t b e s o m e t h i n g t h a t M d o e s t h r o u g h f o r c e o f h . a b i t i n t h e way o n e s h i f t s g e a r s o r l i g h t s a c i g a r e t t e . O f c o u r s e many o f t h e t h i n g s we do w h i c h c o n s t i t u t e a n a c -t i o n o n p r i n c i p l e a r e t h e m s e l v e s h a b i t s , t h a t i s t o s a y , t h e y c a n be d o n e w i t h o r w i t h o u t o u r b e i n g c o n s c i o u s o f d o i n g t h e m . B u t w h e t h e r o r n o t o n e ' s a c t o f e n g a g i n g t h e b r a k e i s i t s e l f a c o n s c i o u s a c t o n e ' s a c t o f a r r e s t i n g t h e s p e e d o f h i s v e h i c l e t o p r e v e n t i n j u r y m u s t be a c o n s c i o u s a c t . To b e a c t i n g o n p r i n c i p l e , t h e n , M m u s t be a w a r e t h a t he i s d o i n g t h e a c t i o n c h a r a c t e r i z e d b y t h e p r i n c i p l e . F o r e x a m p l e , f o r 'one o u g h t n o t c a u s e p e o p l e i n j u r y ' t o b e M's r e a s o n f o r d r i v i n g w i t h i n t h e s p e e d l i m i t i t m u s t be t h e c a s e t h a t M i s a w a r e t h a t h e i s d r i v i n g w i t h i n t h e s p e e d l i m i t . I f a p a s s e n g e r w e r e t o c o m p l i m e n t M o n h i s c a r e f u l d r i v i n g a n d n o t e t h a t h e r a r e l y e x c e e d e d t h e s p e e d l i m i t o n l y t o h e a r M r e s p o n d "Oh r e a l l y ? I h a d no i d e a I was d r i v i n g w i t h i n a n y l i m i t " we s h o u l d d o u b t t h a t h e was a c t i n g o n a p r i n c i p l e . C+) M d o e s X d e l i b e r a t e l y . N o t o n l y m u s t M b e a w a r e o f w h a t he i s d o i n g he m u s t a l s o i n t e n d t o d o i t . I t m u s t h a v e b e e n M's i n t e n t i o n t o a v o i d h i t t i n g S m i t h w h e n h e s t o p p e d a t t h e c r o s s w a l k a n d n o t s i m p l y t h e c a s e t h a t h i s c a r r a n o u t o f g a s o r s t a l l e d a t t h a t p a r t i c u l a r moment f o r t h i s a c t i o n t o h a v e b e e n r e l a t e d t o h i s h a v i n g t h e p r i n c i p l e o f n o n - i n j u r y . T h i s f o u r t h c o n d i t i o n t h a t M m u s t h a v e h a d t h e 32 d e l i b e r a t e i n t e n t t o do X e n t a i l s t h e t h i r d : t h a t he must be c o n s c i o u s o f d o i n g X when he d o e s i t . I t i s s u f f i c i e n t t h e n t o c o m b i n e t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s i n t o one: i t must be M's i n t e n -t i o n t o do X when he does i t . ( 5 ) M b e l i e v e s t h a t he o u g h t t o do X u n d e r t h o s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s . Not b e i n g c o m p e t e n t t o d e a l w i t h t h e com-p l e x i t i e s o f t h e t e r m ' o u g h t ' I s h a l l i g n o r e them b u t c o n -t e n d anyway t h a t t h i s i s a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n o f h a v i n g a p r i n c i p l e and one t h a t i s c l o s e l y r e l a t e d t o t h e o t h e r c o n -d i t i o n s . I t i s n o t enough t h a t M r e g u l a r l y a v o i d s , c o n -s c i o u s l y and d e l i b e r a t e l y , c a u s i n g i n j u r y t o o t h e r s by s u c h a c t i o n s a s d r i v i n g w i t h i n t h e s p e e d l i m i t t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t he b e l i e v e s t h a t he o u g h t t o do s o . F o r M may a l s o c o n s c i -o u s l y and d e l i b e r a t e l y h ave t e a e a c h a f t e r n o o n a n d not b e l i e v e t h a t he o u g h t t o do s o . B e l i e v i n g t h a t he o u g h t n o t c a u s e p e o p l e p a i n demands t h e b r o a d e r v i e w o f a c t i o n e x p r e s s e d i n c o n d i t i o n C l ) where i n a d d i t i o n t o t h i n g s he d o e s he a l s o d i s a p p r o v e s o f a c t i o n s o f o t h e r s w h i c h u n j u s t i -f i a b l y c a u s e p e o p l e p a i n ; he f e e l s r e m o r s e when he does so h i m s e l f , and i n a l l p r o b a b i l i t y he u r g e s o r a d v i s e s o t h e r s , p a r t i c u l a r l y h i s own c h i l d r e n , n o t t o c a u s e p e o p l e p a i n . M w o u l d do none o f t h e s e t h i n g s as a r e s u l t o f h i s r e g u l a r l y h a v i n g t e a i n m i d - a f t e r n o o n . Were he t o n e g l e c t h i s t e a one day he m i g h t be a n n o y e d a t h a v i n g d e p r i v e d h i m s e l f o f t h e p l e a s u r e o r r e l a x a t i o n i t p r o v i d e d b u t he w o u l d n o t f e e l r e m o r s e . We c a n now r e s t a t e L e i s e r ' s c o n d i t i o n s f o r s a y i n g 33 t h a t M has t h e p r i n c i p l e X. They a r e : ( 1 ) M r e g u l a r l y does X u n d e r c e r t a i n s p e c i f i a b l e c i r c u m s t a n c e s . ( 2 ) M might c h o o s e n o t t o do X, and n o t do X, u n der t h o s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s . ( 3 ) In t h o s e s i t u a t i o n s i n w h i c h M b e l i e v e s he s h o u l d do X, but does n o t do X, he w i l l f e e l r e m o r s e and t a k e t h e a p p r o p r i a t e s t e p s t o make amends. (.4) I t must be M's i n t e n t i o n t o do X when he does i t . ( 5 ) M b e l i e v e s t h a t he ought t o do X u n d e r t h o s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s . W i t h L e i s e r ' s h e l p we have g i v e n an a c c o u n t o f what we mean when we s a y someone has a p r i n c i p l e . But what i s meant by c a l l i n g someone p r i n c i p l e d o r s a y i n g t h a t he has p r i n -c i p l e s ? F i r s t l e t us c o n s i d e r t h e a l l e g e d i d e n t i t y between h a v i n g p r i n c i p l e s and knowing t h e d i f f e r e n c e between r i g h t and wrong. In t h i s r a t h e r l e n g t h y q u o t a t i o n f r o m h i s p a p e r "On Knowing t h e D i f f e r e n c e Between R i g h t and Wrong," G i l b e r t P^yle i m p l i e s t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p . The c o n d i t i o n s o f someone's knowing t h i s d i f f e r e n c e a r e t h e same as o f h i s h a v i n g p r i n -c i p l e s . We a r e u n w i l l i n g t o a l l o w t h a t a p e r s o n has l e a r n e d [ t h e d i f f e r e n c e between r i g h t and wrong] who does n o t , f o r i n s t a n c e , c a r e a b i t w h e t h e r he b r e a k s a p r o m i s e o r k e e ps i t , and i s q u i t e i n d i f f e r e n t w h e t h e r someone e l s e i s c r u e l o r k i n d . T h i s c a r i n g i s n o t a s p e c i a l f e e l i n g ; i t c o v e r s a v a r i e t y o f f e e l i n g s , l i k e t h o s e t h a t go w i t h b e i n g s h o c k e d , ashamed, i n d i g n a n t , e mulous, d i s g u s t e d , and e n t h u s i a s t i c ; but i t a l s o c o v e r s a v a r i e t y o f a c t i o n s , as w e l l as r e a d i n e s s and p r o n e n e s s t o do t h i n g s , l i k e a p o l o g i z i n g , r e c o m p e n s i n g , s c o l d i n g , p r a i s i n g , p e r s e v e r i n g , p r a y i n g , c o n f e s s i n g , and making good r e s o l u t i o n s . Now, i f we c o n s i d e r what i n d e t a i l a p e r s o n who has l e a r n e d t h e d i f f e r e n c e between r i g h t and wrong has l e a r n e d , we do n o t n a t u r a l l y draw a l i n e between some t h i n g s , n a mely, 31+ what he has l e a r n e d t o say and do, and o t h e r t h i n g s , namely, what he has l e a r n e d t o f e e l , and r e l e g a t e t h e l a t t e r t o t h e c l a s s o f mere a f t e r e f f e c t s o f h i s l e a r n i n g t o say and do t h e p r o p e r t h i n g s . In t h i n k i n g a b o u t h i s c o n s c i e n c e o r h i s s e n s e o f d u t y , we do n o t n a t u r a l l y f e n c e o f f h i s qualms f r o m h i s a c t s o f r e p a r a t i o n ; h i s pangs f r o m h i s c o n f e s s i o n s o r h i s r e s o l v i n g s ; h i s p r i c k i n g s f r o m h i s p e r s e v e r i n g s . B e c a u s e he has l e a r n e d t h e d i f f e r e n c e between r i g h t and wrong, he b o t h makes r e p a r a t i o n s and f e e l s c o n -t r i t e ; and t h e ' b e c a u s e ' i s t h e same n o n - c a u s a l ' b e c a u s e ' . C e r t a i n l y h i s f e e l i n g c o n t r i t e i s n o t an e x e r c i s e o f a t e c h n i q u e o r t h e g i v i n g o f a p i e c e o f i n f o r m a t i o n ; b u t t h e same i s t r u e , t h o u g h f o r d i f f e r e n t r e a s o n s , o f h i s making r e p a r -a t i o n s , p e r s e v e r i n g , r e p r o a c h i n g , r e s o l v i n g , and k e e p i n g a p p o i n t m e n t s . A l l a r e marks, t h o u g h d i f f e r e n t s o r t s o f marks, o f h i s knowing t h e d i f -f e r e n c e between r i g h t and wrong; a l l show, t h o u g h i n d i f f e r e n t ways, t h a t he has p r i n c i p l e s , and what t h e s e p r i n c i p l e s a r e ; any one o f them i s one' o f t h e many s o r t s o f t h i n g s t h a t we have i n mind when we s a y t h a t he has a s e n s e o f d u t y . ^ The f a c t t h a t we s a y o f a man who d o e s n ' t know t h e d i f f e r e n c e between r i g h t and wrong t h a t he has no m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s w ould seem t o s u p p o r t R y l e ' s v i e w . ^ Knowing t h a t a p e r s o n can be d e s c r i b e d as h a v i n g p r i n c i p l e s t e l l us t h a t t h a t p e r s o n b o t h knows t h e d i f f e r e n c e between r i g h t and wrong and does r i g h t and a v o i d s wrong. Because o f what was s a i d e a r l i e r i t m i g h t a p p e a r as t h o u g h h a v i n g p r i n c i p l e s im-p l i e s k n owing t h e d i f f e r e n c e between r i g h t and wrong w h i l e knowing t h e d i f f e r e n c e between r i g h t and wrong does n o t n e c e s s a r i l y i n d i c a t e t h a t a p e r s o n has p r i n c i p l e s . I b e l i e v e t h a t R y l e i s c o r r e c t , however, s i n c e one can know what o t h e r s b e l i e v e t o be r i g h t and wrong and so a c t as i f he a l s o knows when i t i s t o h i s a d v a n t a g e t o do s o . T h i s i s why a p e r s o n ' s a b i l i t y t o use p r i n c i p l e s i n argument and t o d e m o n s t r a t e h i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e i r d e r i v a t i o n , e t c . , i s n o t s u f f i c i e n t 35 e v i d e n c e t h a t he has p r i n c i p l e s . I t i s n o t t h a t t h i s p e r s o n knows the d i f f e r e n c e between r i g h t and wrong but r a t h e r t h a t he knows what o t h e r s c a l l r i g h t and wrong. He may b e l i e v e q u i t e d i f f e r e n t t h i n g s t o be r i g h t and wrong i f i n f a c t he has any use a t a l l f o r t h e s e n o t i o n s . I f a p e r s o n can be s a i d t o have a p a r t i c u l a r m o r a l p r i n c i p l e , t h e n , he w i l l , i n t h o s e s i t u a t i o n s t o w h i c h t h a t p r i n c i p l e i s r e l e v a n t , r e s p o n d i n c e r t a i n ways. I f he i s i n v o l v e d p e r s o n a l l y he w i l l a c t on t h e p r i n c i p l e ; i f n o t , he w i l l a d o p t an a t t i t u d e t o w a r d t h e a c t i o n s o f t h o s e i n -v o l v e d w h i c h i s d e t e r m i n e d by h i s p r i n c i p l e . I f , on t h e o t h e r hand, a p e r s o n has p r i n c i p l e s he w i l l g i v e c o n s i d e r a -t i o n i n a l l s i t u a t i o n s t o t h o s e e l e m e n t s made r e l e v a n t by m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s . A p e r s o n ' s m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s r e p r e s e n t h i s m o r a l v a l u e s . I t seems t o me t o be t h e c a s e t h a t what we r e c o g n i z e as o u r m o r a l v a l u e s Cwhether or n o t we e v e r t h i n k o f them as p r i n -c i p l e s ) a r e t o o t h e r s s e e n and spo k e n o f either as v a l u e s we have or m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s we h a v e . It- i s c e r t a i n l y t r u e t h a t i n o ur e v e r y d a y c o n v e r s a t i o n we h e a r r e f e r e n c e made t o p r i n -c i p l e s r e l a t i v e l y i n f r e q u e n t l y . C o n s i d e r what a p e r s o n who knows M might r e p l y t o a n o t h e r who s a i d , when w o n d e r i n g what M might t h i n k a b o u t some e v e n t , " I do n o t know much ab o u t M's m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s . " He m i g h t say "He would d i s a p p r o v e o f t h a t , " or "He would be i n d i g n a n t , " o r "He i s a j u s t man, he 36 would condemn t h a t " , or "He v a l u e s j u s t i c e " . T here a r e any number o f n o t i o n s we might p r o p o s e w h i c h r e l a t e how a p e r s o n a c t s o r m i g h t a c t - s u c h n o t i o n s as h o n e s t , s i n c e r e , c o n s i d -e r a t e , f a i r , s e l f i s h , t r e a c h e r o u s , d e c e i t f u l , e t c . And do t h e s e n o t s a t i s f y our c o n c e r n o v e r t h a t p e r s o n ' s m o r a l p r i n -c i p l e s ? What e l s e c o u l d we mean by a q u e s t i o n about a p e r s o n ' s m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s ? And s u r e l y s u c h n o t i o n s do n o t t r a n s l a t e i n t o a s e t o f r u l e s a p e r s o n f o l l o w s b u t t o v a l u e s t h a t p e r s o n has - t o t h e k i n d s o f r e a s o n s t h a t move him. Whether we say o f a p e r s o n t h a t he i s t o l e r a n t , he v a l u e s f r e e d o m , o r t h a t t h e p r i n c i p l e o f l i b e r t y i s one o f h i s p r i n -c i p l e s , we a r e p r o v i d i n g t h e same i n f o r m a t i o n about t h a t p e r s o n - we a r e a n s w e r i n g t h e same q u e s t i o n . I t i s c l e a r t h a t some m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s t e l l us more abo u t a p e r s o n t h a n do o t h e r s . The h i g h e r t h e o r d e r o f t h e p r i n c i p l e t h e more we know a b o u t t h e p e r s o n whose p r i n c i p l e i t i s . To know t h a t a. man i s c o n s i d e r a t e o f h i s p a r e n t s o r t h a t he i s h o n e s t i s t o know s o m e t h i n g o f t h e k i n d o f man he i s , b u t i t i s t o know a g r e a t d e a l l e s s t h a n , f o r example, t o know t h a t he has t h e p r i n c i p l e t h a t ' p e r s o n s ought t o be t r e a t e d w i t h r e s p e c t ' o r t h a t ' p e o p l e ' s i n t e r e s t s o ught t o be g i v e n e q u a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n ' . When we c a l l a man ' p r i n c i p l e d ' o r 'a man o f p r i n c i p l e ' we mean he has m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s . I have been s p e a k i n g a t one t i m e o f having principles and a t a n o t h e r o f h a v i n g a prin-ciple as i f t h e same t h i n g s were t r u e o f b o t h . To say a p e r s o n i s j u s t and b e n e v o l e n t i s t o say he has p r i n c i p l e s -37 t h a t he i s a good man, hut t o s a y he i s c o n s i d e r a t e o f h i s p a r e n t s o r l o v i n g o f h i s c h i l d r e n i s t o say much l e s s , i t i s t o say he has t h e s e p r i n c i p l e s and t h a t he i s a good son o r a good f a t h e r . E a r l i e r i n t h i s d i s c u s s i o n i t was i m p o r t a n t t o make t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between f u n d a m e n t a l and d e r i v a t i v e p r i n c i p l e s . I t i s t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n w h i c h i s i m p o r t a n t h e r e . Those m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s s u c h as t h e p r i n c i p l e s o f j u s t i c e , r e s p e c t f o r p e r s o n s , e t c . , w h i c h i n a j u s t i f i c a t o r y c o n t e x t f u n c t i o n as f u n d a m e n t a l p r i n c i p l e s , becomes p e r s o n a l i z e d as m o t i v e s s u c h as t h e s e n s e o f j u s t i c e , t h e a t t i t u d e o f r e s p e c t f o r p e r s o n s , b e n e v o l e n c e , e t c . , w h i c h move a man t o a c t when t h e y a r e h i s p r i n c i p l e s , t h a t i s , o p e r a t i v e i n h i s c o n d u c t . 1 1 Knowing a man t o be c o n s i d e r a t e o f t h e i n t e r e s t s o f o t h e r s i n c l u d e s knowing a number o f l o w e r - o r d e r p r i n c i p l e s s u c h as t h o s e r e l a t i n g t o h i s t r e a t m e n t o f h i s c h i l d r e n , h i s w i f e , 12 h i s p a r e n t s , h i s f e l l o w - w o r k e r s , and so on. I have t r i e d t o c l a r i f y t h e n o t i o n o f a m o r a l p r i n -c i p l e i n t h e s e n s e i n w h i c h i t o p e r a t e s as a p r i n c i p l e o f a c t i o n — a s a p r i n c i p l e someone h a s . U s i n g L e i s e r ' s a n a l y s i s I have g i v e n an a c c o u n t o f what i t means t o say t h a t someone has a p r i n c i p l e and t h i s I have t r i e d t o r e l a t e t o t h e m a t t e r o f ' h a v i n g p r i n c i p l e s ' . F u r t h e r l i g h t can be s h e d , I b e l i e v e , on m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s as p r i n c i p l e s p e o p l e have by c o n s i d e r i n g a v e r y i n t e r e s t i n g a c c o u n t g i v e n by J o n a t h a n H a r r i s o n o f what i t i s t o have p r i n c i p l e s . F o l l o w i n g i s h i s c o n c l u s i o n : T h e r e a r e n o t one o r two, b u t a number o f l o g i c a l l y i n d e p e n d e n t c r i t e r i a f o r s a y i n g a man h o l d s s o m e t h i n g as a m o r a l p r i n c i p l e . 38 T h i n k i n g i t o b l i g a t o r y i s o n e ; a c t i n g on i t a n o t h e r . He may. a l s o f e e l r e m o r s e ( i f he has n o t become c a l l o u s ) when he f a i l s t o a c t on i t , and s e l f - a p p r o b a t i o n ( i f he has n o t s u c c e e d e d i n i n h i b i t i n g i t f r o m r e l i g i -ous m o t i v e s ) when he d o e s . He may f e e l a p p r o v a l o f o t h e r s when t h e y a c t on i t ( i f he does n o t d i s l i k e them t o o . m u c h ) , and blame them when t h e y do n o t ( i f t h e y a r e n o t f r i e n d s o f h i s , o r i f t h e y were n o t s u b j e c t t o s t r o n g e r t e m p t a t i o n t h a n t h e y c o u l d r e a s o n a b l y be e x p e c t e d t o r e s i s t ) ; he may a l s o e x h o r t o t h e r s t o a c t on i t ( i f he i s n o t too( b a s h f u l o r f r i g h t e n e d o f s o c i a l o s t r a c i s m o r l a c k a d a i s i c a l ) . P e r h a p s a l l t h e s e d i f f e r e n t marks o f h a v i n g a m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s h o u l d be f o u n d t o g e t h e r , b u t i n f a c t t h e y a r e n o t . ^ E s s e n t i a l l y H a r r i s o n ' s c o n c l u s i o n as t o what i t means t o have a p r i n c i p l e i s n o t u n l i k e t h e one p r e s e n t e d e a r l i e r i n t h i s s e c t i o n . The p o i n t s o f d i f f e r e n c e a r e o b v i o u s , e . g . , t h a t t h e c r i t e r i a a r e l o g i c a l l y i n d e p e n d e n t ; t h a t a c t i n g on a p r i n c i p l e i s n o t p a r t o f t h i n k i n g i t o b l i g a t o r y ; t h a t n o t f e e l i n g r e m o r s e a t m o r a l f a i l u r e i s s t i l l t o have t h a t p r i n -c i p l e , i . e . , t h a t s u c h a p e r s o n i s s t i l l c o n s i d e r a t e , f o r e x a m p l e , and n o t now c a l l o u s ; t h a t t h e s e "marks o f h a v i n g a m o r a l p r i n c i p l e " a r e n o t f o u n d t o g e t h e r , and so on. How and why o u r a c c o u n t d i f f e r s f r o m H a r r i s o n ' s on t h e s e p o i n t s s h o u l d be c l e a r f r o m what has a l r e a d y b e e n s a i d . T h e r e a r e t h r e e o t h e r m a t t e r s o f c o n c e r n i n H a r r i s o n ' s p a p e r t h a t I w o u l d l i k e t o q u e s t i o n b e c a u s e a d i s c u s s i o n o f them w i l l , I b e l i e v e , l e n d c l a r i t y t o t h e i d e a o f h a v i n g p r i n c i p l e s . The f i r s t o f t h e s e m a t t e r s was m e n t i o n e d when d e a l i n g w i t h t h e f i r s t c r i t e r i o n o f h a v i n g a p r i n c i p l e — t h a t i t must r e g u l a r l y he a c t e d u p o n . Not o n l y d o e s H a r r i s o n n o t a g r e e 14 t h a t t o t h i n k a p r i n c i p l e o b l i g a t o r y r e q u i r e s t h a t one a c t 39 on i t , but a l s o he does not t h i n k there need be any r e g u l a r -i t y to a c t i o n on a p r i n c i p l e . He says " i t i s not q u i t e true t h a t , as I suggested e a r l i e r , to hold a moral p r i n c i p l e i s to 15 t h i n k i t o b l i g a t o r y . We must a l s o o c c a s i o n a l l y act on i t . " I opposed this, view i n that s e c t i o n but there i s an ex t e n s i o n of i t i n t h i s passage: "Hence, i t i s not l o g i c a l l y impos-s i b l e t h a t a man's p r a c t i c e may be b e t t e r than h i s p r e c e p t s ; that he may, from impulse, make an e x c e p t i o n to p r i n c i p l e s he ac c e p t s , and which a more completely adequate set of p r i n -16 c i p l e s would have p e r m i t t e d , or even e n j o i n e d . " I am i n t e r e s t e d i n the f i r s t p a r t of t h i s sentence: that i t i s not l o g i c a l l y i m p o s s i b l e f o r a man's p r a c t i c e to he b e t t e r than h i s p r e c e p t s . I take H a r r i s o n to mean, by p r e c e p t s , p r i n c i p l e s s i n c e that i s the s u b j e c t of h i s d i s -c u s s i o n . And I would ask "How do we know what a man's p r i n c i p l e s a r e ? " Surely our assessment of t h i s i s not made on the b a s i s of a l i s t of precepts C i f anyone co u l d give such a l i s t ) i n response to some q u e s t i o n such as "what k i n d of man are you?" or " t e l l me your moral p r i n c i p l e s . " Even i f we d i d glean a set of p r i n c i p l e s i n t h i s t i d y manner, or from h i s v a r i o u s c o n v e r s a t i o n s , we should only believe that these were h i s p r i n c i p l e s i f , i n f a c t , they squared with h i s p r a c -t i c e . I t i s , I b e l i e v e , not l o g i c a l l y p o s s i b l e that a man's p r a c t i c e be b e t t e r than h i s p r i n c i p l e s f o r h i s p r i n c i p l e s are immanent i n h i s p r a c t i c e . Of course people can and do have b e l i e f s about t h e i r own values or p r i n c i p l e s , but the t r u t h of statements about the p r i n c i p l e s a person has i s not 40 dependent upon f i r s t - p e r a o n a u t h o r i t y . Hare i s clea r l y -aware of t h i s and begins h i s Language of Morals thus: I f we were to ask of a person 'What are h i s moral p r i n c i p l e s ? ' the way In which we co u l d be most sure of a true answer would be by s t u d y i n g what he did. He might, to be sure, p r o f e s s i n h i s c o n v e r s a t i o n a l l s o r t s of p r i n c i p l e s , which i n h i s a c t i o n s he completely d i s r e g a r d e d ; but i t would be when, knowing a l l the r e l e v a n t f a c t s of a s i t u a t i o n , he was faced w i t h c h o i c e s or d e c i s i o n s between a l t e r n a t i v e courses of a c t i o n , between a l t e r n a t i v e answers to the q u e s t i o n 'What s h a l l I do?' that he would r e v e a l i n what p r i n c i p l e s of con-duct he r e a l l y believed.-'- 7 Now i f a l l H a r r i s o n were s a y i n g i s t h a t from time to time a sc o u n d r e l may perform a decent a c t , that i s , t h a t .he may i n t e n t i o n a l l y do something good ( i n a r u l e - a c c e p t i n g and not j u s t a r u l e - c o v e r e d f a s h i o n ) then we would not d i s a g r e e . In f a c t , we have an e x p r e s s i o n to cover such a case which i s i n t e r e s t i n g In t h i s r e g a r d : we would say he acted "out of c h a r a c t e r . " But t h i s i s not a l l he i s s a y i n g ; t h i s i s but a sentence from a paragraph i n which he i s denying t h a t a c t -i n g on a p r i n c i p l e i s a necessary c o n d i t i o n of moral a c t i o n . And f u r t h e r , "a man's p r a c t i c e " would seem to r e f e r to h i s gen e r a l p r a c t i c e and not to some i s o l a t e d and e x c e p t i o n a l a c t i o n . The second matter I want to d e a l with concerns the p o i n t at which a p r i n c i p l e i s i n v o l v e d i n an a c t i o n . I b e l i e v e t h i s to be the problem i n a c c e p t i n g or r e j e c t i n g the f o l l o w i n g c l a i m : ". . . making an ex c e p t i o n to a p r i n c i p l e may take the form of not a c t i n g on i t , or of q u a l i f y i n g i t . Reprehensible as may be the former, the l a t t e r i s both sen-41 18 s i b l e and u n a v o i d a b l e . " T h i s a c t o f making an e x c e p t i o n t o a p r i n c i p l e by q u a l i f y i n g i t and so making i t more s p e c i f i c i s p a r t o f what R. M. Hare d e s i g n a t e s as making a 19 " d e c i s i o n o f p r i n c i p l e . " I t was i m p l i c i t i n an e a r l i e r argument t h a t , w h i l e i n s p e c i f i c s i t u a t i o n s we sometimes do n o t a c t on c e r t a i n p r i n -c i p l e s t o w h i c h we a d h e r e , n e i t h e r do we q u a l i f y them o r make them more s p e c i f i c . I f o l l o w M e lden i n m a i n t a i n i n g t h a t t h e 20 n o t i o n o f e x c e p t i o n s i s n o t a p p l i c a b l e t o p r i n c i p l e s . I p o s e t h i s as t h e p r o b l e m o f w h e n — o r a t what p o i n t - -a p r i n c i p l e i s i n v o l v e d i n an a c t i o n . I f we t h i n k o f t h e p r i n c i p l e u n d e r l y i n g an a c t i o n as com i n g i n t o e x i s t e n c e a t t h e moment we d e c i d e what t o do i n a p a r t i c u l a r i n s t a n c e and s e r v i n g us t i m e and a g a i n i n s u b s e q u e n t s i m i l a r i n s t a n c e s , and a t t h e same t i m e f u r n i s h i n g a b a s i s f o r a new p r i n c i p l e i n l e s s s i m i l a r i n s t a n c e s , t h e n p r i n c i p l e s a r e r a t h e r l i k e a s e t o f m e n t a l r u l e s . They a r e l i k e a s e t o f m e n t a l r u l e s b e c a u s e once we have made a d e c i s i o n o r judgement i n a p a r t i -c u l a r c a s e we have our p r i n c i p l e and a l t h o u g h i t may be t o o c o m p l i c a t e d t o a r t i c u l a t e we r e c o r d i t m e n t a l l y t o s e r v e i n th e f u t u r e , and so on f o r s i t u a t i o n a f t e r s i t u a t i o n . I f t h i s i s t h e c a s e t h e n Hare i s p r o b a b l y c o r r e c t i n s a y i n g "o u r m o r a l d e v e l o p m e n t , as we grow o l d e r , c o n s i s t s i n t h e main i n making our m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s more and more s p e c i f i c , by w r i t i n g i n t o them e x c e p t i o n s and q u a l i f i c a t i o n s t o c o v e r 21 t h e k i n d s o f c a s e s o f w h i c h we have had e x p e r i e n c e . " The a l t e r n a t i v e Hare e n v i s i o n s i s t h e p r a c t i c e o f t h e 42 h i d e b o u n d m o r a l i s t w h o s e s i m p l e s e t o f g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e s e x i s t " i n some u n e x p l a i n e d s e n s e " a n t e c e d e n t l y l i k e a " s e t o f 22 c o p y - b o o k h e a d i n g s . . " T h e s e he h a s r e a d y t o s e e h i m t h r o u g h a n y s i t u a t i o n w h i c h m i g h t a r i s e . H a r e o f f e r s e x a m p l e s o f a m o r a l p r i n c i p l e e a c h m i g h t h a v e . " T h e m o r a l p r i n c i p l e 'one o u g h t n e v e r t o make f a l s e s t a t e m e n t s ' i s h i g h l y g e n e r a l ; t h e m o r a l , p r i n c i p l e 'one o u g h t n e v e r t o make f a l s e s t a t e m e n t s t o 2 3 o n e ' s w i f e ' i s m u c h m o r e s p e c i f i c . " T h e f i r s t i s a n e x a m p l e o f a " c o p y - b o o k h e a d i n g " t y p e o f p r i n c i p l e ; t h e s e c o n d i s w h a t I h a v e c a l l e d " m e n t a l r u l e " t y p e . I b e l i e v e t h a t i n e a c h o f t h e s e a c c o u n t s — t h e m e n t a l r u l e a n d t h e c o p y - b o o k h e a d i n g — t h e r e i s a f a i l u r e t o u n d e r -s t a n d t h e r e l a t i o n o f a p e r s o n ' s m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s t o h i s a c t i o n s . E a c h i m p l i e s a r u l e i n h a n d , a p r o c e s s o f i n f e r e n c e a n d a c o n c l u s i o n . The i n d i v i d u a l c o m e s t o t h e s i t u a t i o n w i t h h i s p r i n c i p l e s a l r i g h t b u t t h e y a r e n o t i n t h e f o r m o f r u l e s ; t h e y a r e p e r s o n a l i z e d . I t i s , I b e l i e v e , c l o s e r t o t h e way R e i d e x p r e s s e s i t . " I t i s r a t h e r t h a t a m o r a l p e r s o n , a p -p r e h e n d i n g , f e e l i n g t h e g o o d n e s s , ' o u g h t n e s s ' a n d o b l i g a t o r -i n e s s o f j u s t i c e o r t r u t h , c o m e s t o t h i s o r t h a t p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n w i t h a l r e a d y f o r m e d s e n t i m e n t s , d i s p o s i t i o n a l t e n -s i o n s i n h i m ; t h e n , i n t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , he d o e s t h e j u s t 24 a n d t r u t h f u l t h i n g . " I t i s b e c a u s e o f h i s p r i n c i p l e s t h a t t h e i n d i v i d u a l u n d e r s t a n d s a n a c t i o n a s m a k i n g a f a l s e s t a t e -m e n t a n d t h e r e l a t i o n o f w i f e a s c a r r y i n g a s p e c i a l c l a i m . I h a s t e n t o s a y t h a t H a r e c o u l d n ' t b e m o r e c o r r e c t w h e n he s a y s , " o n no a c c o u n t m u s t we c o m m i t t h e m i s t a k e o f s u p p o s i n g t h a t d e c i s i o n s and p r i n c i p l e s o c c u p y two s e p a r a t e s p h e r e s and do n o t meet a t any p o i n t . . . . R a t h e r , d e c i -2 5 s i o n s and p r i n c i p l e s . I n t e r a c t t h r o u g h o u t t h e w h o l e f i e l d " . P r i n c i p l e s c a n n e v e r e l i m i n a t e d e c i s i o n s ; no p r i n c i p l e c a n d i c t a t e a s p e c i f i c l i n e o f a c t i o n . What t h e y c a n do i s e n a b l e us t o d e t e r m i n e w h a t t h e a l t e r n a t i v e s a r e i n a c o n -f l i c t s i t u a t i o n a n d g i v e us a b a s i s u p o n w h i c h we make a d e c i s i o n . M o r a l m a t u r i t y , I w o u l d s u g g e s t , d o e s n o t c o n s i s t i n t h e a c q u i s i t i o n o f more a n d more p r i n c i p l e s o f e v e r i n c r e a s -i n g s p e c i f i c i t y b u t i n b e c o m i n g e v e r more s e n s i t i v e t o t h o s e f e a t u r e s o f s i t u a t i o n s made r e l e v a n t by m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s a n d b e t t e r i n o n e ' s j u d g e m e n t a b o u t w h i c h o f t h e r e l e v a n t c o n s i d -e r a t i o n s h a s g r e a t e r w e i g h t a n d u p o n w h i c h a c t i o n i s o b l i -g a t o r y i n t h o s e s i t u a t i o n s . M o r a l w i s d o m g r o w s w i t h e x p e r i -e n c e i n u s i n g t h e p r i n c i p l e s a p e r s o n h a s l e a r n e d . To some e x t e n t he d o e s a d d new l o w e r - o r d e r p r i n c i p l e s a n d d r o p o r m o d i f y o t h e r s b u t wha t t h i s a m o u n t s t o i s t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f h i s more f u n d a m e n t a l p r i n c i p l e s , w h i c h a r e o f a l i m i t e d n u m b e r , t o an e v e r - w i d e n i n g a r e a o f e x p e r i e n c e . The t h i r d m a t t e r I s h a l l m e n t i o n o n l y b r i e f l y . H a r -r i s o n w r i t e s , " . . . t h e g o o d n e s s o r b a d n e s s o f a man a n d h i s a c t i o n s d e p e n d s more u p o n t h e h e a r t t h a n t h e h e a d , w h e r e -a s t h e a d e q u a c y o f h i s p r i n c i p l e s d e p e n d s as much u p o n t h e 2 6 h e a d as t h e h e a r t . " I am q u o t i n g t h i s p a s s a g e o n l y b e -c a u s e i t e x p r e s s e s a p o p u l a r n o t i o n w h i c h , I b e l i e v e , r e s t s on a m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g . 44 I f what I have been a r g u i n g a b o u t h a v i n g p r i n c i p l e s i s c o r r e c t , t h e n t h e g o o d n e s s o r b a d n e s s o f a man and h i s a c -t i o n s d e p e n d s upon h i s m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s . I f h i s m o r a l p r i n -c i p l e s a r e " a d e q u a t e " t h e n he and h i s a c t i o n s a r e go o d . When we a r e s p e a k i n g o f a p e r s o n ' s p r i n c i p l e s we a r e c o m m e n t i n g on h i s r e a s o n t o be s u r e , b u t e q u a l l y , we a r e t a l k i n g a b o u t h i s s e n t i m e n t s . F o r a s P e t e r s s a y s t h e f u n d a m e n t a l p r i n c i p l e s a r e p e r s o n a l i z e d i n t h e f o r m o f t h e r a t i o n a l p a s s i o n s , ". . . a d h e r e n c e t o s u c h p r i n c i p l e s i s a p a s s i o n a t e b u s i n e s s and t h e y c a n and s h o u l d e n t e r i n a v e r y c o n c r e t e way i n t o a man's a c t i v i t i e s , r o l e s , and more p e r s o n a l d e a l i n g s w i t h o t h e r • 27 men." The a d e q u a c y o f t h e p r i n c i p l e s a p e r s o n may g r a s p w e l l e n o u g h t o be s u c c e s s f u l i n a r g u m e n t o r i n f i n d i n g s o l u t i o n s t o h y p o t h e t i c a l s i t u a t i o n s may f a i l , and u n d e r s t a n d a b l y s o , t o i m p r e s s someone who i s s i n c e r e l y c o n c e r n e d w i t h p r e s e r v i n g o r e x t e n d i n g t h e e x i s t i n g m o r a l o r d e r . The a c t i o n s o f s u c h p e r s o n s may w e l l l e a d a man l i k e W i l l i a m s t o c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e e d u c a t i o n o f t h e e m o t i o n s m i g h t p r o d u c e b e t t e r r e s u l t s t h a n t h e i n c u l c a t i o n o f p r i n c i p l e s . I f , h o w e v e r , t h e i n c u l -c a t i o n o f p r i n c i p l e s r e s u l t s i n p e o p l e h a v i n g p r i n c i p l e s , t h a t i s , i f t h e s e p r i n c i p l e s a r e o p e r a t i v e i n t h e i r b e h a v i o r so t h a t t h e y f u n c t i o n as m o t i v e s t h a t move them t o a c t , t h e n t h e i n c u l c a t i o n o f a d e q u a t e p r i n c i p l e s i s a l s o t h e e d u c a t i o n o f t h e e m o t i o n s . 4 5 FOOTNOTES 1. I t w o u l d be w r o n g t o s u g g e s t t h a t no a t t e n t i o n h a s b e e n g i v e n t o m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s o f a c t i o n . C e r t a i n l y A. I . M e l d e n was c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h i s i n Rights and Right Conduct, O x f o r d : B a s i l B l a c k w e l l , 1 9 5 9 , a s was J o h n R a w l s i n T h e S e n s e o f J u s t i c e , Philosophical Review, 7 2 , 1 9 6 3 , 2 8 1 - 3 0 5 . P r o b a b l y t h e m o s t e x p l i c i t t r e a t m e n t i s b y R. S. P e t e r s i n C o n c r e t e P r i n c i p l e s a n d t h e R a t i o n a l P a s s i o n s . J . G u s -t a f s o n , e t a l Ceds . ) Moral Education: Five Lectures, C a m b r i d g e : H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 7 0 . A n d J o n a t h a n H a r r i s o n d e a l t w i t h t h i s m a t t e r i n h i s c o n t r i b u -t i o n t o t h e S y m p o s i u m : When i s a P r i n c i p l e a M o r a l P r i n -c i p l e ? Aristotelian Society , 2 8 , 1 9 5 4 ( s u p p l e m e n t ) . 2. P. R. F o o t , When i s a P r i n c i p l e a M o r a l P r i n c i p l e ? i n Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 2 8 , 1 9 5 4 , ( s u p p l e m e n t ) p . 9 9 . 3. As a n e x a m p l e o f o n e o f t h o s e u n a b l e t o a c c e p t t h e " m a j o r p r e m i s e " n o t i o n o f p r i n c i p l e s and s o d o w n p l a y t h e i m p o r -t a n c e o f p r i n c i p l e s i n m o r a l e d u c a t i o n i s B e r n a r d W i l l i a m s who c l a i m s t h a t " ... we a r e c o n c e r n e d ' w i t h s o m e t h i n g n o t s o a p t l y c a l l e d t h e i n c u l c a t i o n o f p r i n c i p l e s , b u t r a t h e r t h e e d u c a t i o n o f t h e e m o t i o n s " . p . 2 0 , M o r a l i t y a n d t h e E m o t i o n s . i n J o h n C a s e y ( e d . ) Morality and Moral Reason-ing, L o n d o n : M e t h u e n a n d C o m p a n y , L t d . , 1 9 7 1 . 4. P. R. F o o t , op. c i t . , p . 9 8 . 5. B u r t o n M. L e i s e r , Custom, Law, and Morality, G a r d e n C i t y , N.Y.: D o u b l e d a y a n d C o m p a n y I n c . , 1 9 6 9 , p p . 2 0 - 2 1 . 6. Ibid., p p . 4 0 - 4 3 c o n s i s t o f a d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e " m e a n i n g o f ' r e g u l a r i t y ' " . 7. J o h n R a w l s i n " T h e S e n s e o f J u s t i c e " s h o w s ' h o w t h e a c c e p -t a n c e o f p r i n c i p l e s i n v o l v e s l i a b i l i t y t o m o r a l f e e l i n g s a n d how " i t i s a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n a n d a d e f i n i n g f e a t u r e o f m o r a l f e e l i n g s t h a t t h e p e r s o n ' s e x p l a n a t i o n i n v o k e s a m o r a l c o n c e p t a n d i t s a s s o c i a t e d p r i n c i p l e ( s ) a n d t h e r e b y m a k e s a r e f e r e n c e t o a n a c k n o w l e d g e d r i g h t o r a w r o n g " . Philosophical Review, 7 2 , 1 9 6 3 , p . 2 9 5 . 8. S e e A. I . M e l d e n , Rights and Right Conduct, O x f o r d : B a s i l B l a c k w e l l , 1 9 5 9 , s e c t i o n s I I I a n d V I I I . 9. G i l b e r t R y l e , On F o r g e t t i n g t h e D i f f e r e n c e B e t w e e n R i g h t a n d W r o n g . i n A. I . M e l d e n ( e d . ) Essays in Moral Philosophy, S e a t t l e : U n i v e r s i t y o f W a s h i n g t o n P r e s s , 1 9 5 8 , p . 1 5 5 . 46 10. P. H. Nowe 11—Smith, t a k e s e x c e p t i o n t o t h i s and c l a i m s t h a t such, a p e r s o n i n f a c t a d o p t s and a d h e r e s t o bad m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s . On t h i s v i e w what we mean when we s a y t h a t a p e r s o n h a s p r i n c i p l e s i s t h a t he has good m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s . T h e r e i s some p l a u s i b i l i t y t o t h i s v i e w f o r c o n s i d e r j u s t what i t i s we know a b o u t a p e r -s o n when we know h i s p r i n c i p l e s . F o r e x a m p l e , we m i g h t r e f e r t o a man who has t h e p r i n c i p l e o f h o n e s t y as an h o n e s t man and t o one who d o e s n ' t as a c h e a t o r s w i n d l e r . S u c h a c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n w o u l d s u g g e s t n o t t h a t t h e man d i d n ' t know t h e d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n r i g h t and w r ong b u t t h a t he c h o s e t o do w r o n g — a t l e a s t t h a t w h i c h o t h e r s c a l l w r o n g . T h e r e i s , o f c o u r s e , t h e c a s e o f t h e man who may n o t be a c c u r a t e l y d e s c r i b a b l e e i t h e r as h o n e s t o r as a c h e a t b u t so c o n d u c t s h i s l i f e as t o be h o n e s t on t h i s o c c a s i o n and d i s h o n e s t on t h a t . S u c h a man m i g h t l i t e r a l l y be w i t h o u t p r i n c i p l e s . See P. H. N o w e 1 1 - S m i t h , Ethics, L o n d o n : Cox and Wyman L t d . , 1 9 6 9 , p. 265. 11 . R. S. P e t e r s , C o n c r e t e P r i n c i p l e s and t h e R a t i o n a l P a s s i o n s i n J . G u s t a f s o n , e t al ( e d s . ) Moral Education: Five Lectures, C a m b r i d g e : H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 197Q, p. 47. 12. See a l s o P a u l T a y l o r , Normative Discourse, E n g l e w o o d C l i f f s , N. J . : P r e n t i c e H a l l , I n c . , 1 9 6 1 , p. 3 2 1 f f . 13. J o n a t h a n H a r r i s o n , When i s a P r i n c i p l e a M o r a l P r i n c i p l e ? i n Proceedings of the A r i s t o t e l i a n Society, 28, 1 9 5 4 , ( s u p p l e m e n t ) pp. 12 7 - 1 2 8 . 14. I am u s i n g H a r r i s o n ' s e x p r e s s i o n " t o t h i n k a m o r a l p r i n -c i p l e o b l i g a t o r y " t o mean t h a t w h i c h a p e r s o n t h i n k s o u g h t t o be d o n e . A m o r a l p r i n c i p l e i s an " o b l i g a t i o n -m e e t i n g c o n s i d e r a t i o n . " A l t h o u g h H a r r i s o n d o es n o t use t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n , he does d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n someone t h i n k i n g a p r i n c i p l e o b l i g a t o r y and i t a c t u a l l y b e i n g o b l i g a t o r y . I w o u l d h o l d t h a t a p r i n c i p l e c a n n o t be o b l i g a t o r y b u t r a t h e r t h a t an a c t i o n i n a p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n i s o b l i g a t o r y b e c a u s e i t i s i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e most i m p o r t a n t p r i n c i p l e r e l e v a n t t o t h a t s i t u a t i o n . 15. J . H a r r i s o n , op. c i t . , p. 127. 16. Ibid., p. 126. 17. R. M. H a r e , The Language of Morals, O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1964. 18. J . H a r r i s o n , op. c i t . , p. 1 2 1 . 19. R. M. H a r e , op. c i t . , pp. 6 5 , 56-78. i+7 20. A. I . M e l d e n , op. c i t . , p. 42. 21. R. M. H a r e , Freedom and Reason, L o n d o n : O x f o r d U n i v e r -s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 6 9 , p. 4Q. 22. Ibid., p. 37. 23 . Ibid. , p. 40. 24. L. A. R e i d , Philosophy and Education, L o n d o n : H e i n e m a n n , 1 9 6 2 , p. 75. 25. R. M. H a r e , The Language of Morals, op. c i t . , p. 65. 26. J . H a r r i s o n , op. c i t . , p. 32. 27. R. S. P e t e r s , C o n c r e t e P r i n c i p l e s and t h e R a t i o n a l P a s s i o n s , op. c i t . , p. 55. 4. MORAL P R I N C I P L E S AND A C T I O N ON P R I N C I P L E M o r a l p r i n c i p l e s w e r e f o u n d t o be s i m i l a r t o o t h e r p r i n c i p l e s i n a n u m b e r o f r e s p e c t s i n c l u d i n g t h o s e e m p h a s i z e d b y H a r r e : t h a t a p r i n c i p l e i s a s t a r t i n g p o i n t i n r e a s o n i n g a n d i s n o t e a s i l y g i v e n u p . I n s p i t e o f t h i s p a r a l l e l t h e r e i s a s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s a n d o t h e r p r i n c i p l e s t h a t r e l a t e s t o t h e f a c t t h a t we a d h e r e t o m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s . We h a v e a n d a c t on m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s . I w o u l d l i k e now t o c o n s i d e r a c h a l l e n g e t o t h i s v i e w . T h i s c h a l l e n g e i s p u t f o r w a r d b y J u l i u s K o v e s i i n a m o s t i n t e r -e s t i n g c h a p t e r i n h i s b o o k Moral Notions. The c h a p t e r i s e n t i t l e d " M o r a l N o t i o n s a n d M o r a l J u d g e m e n t s " a n d t h e s e c t i o n w i t h w h i c h I w i l l m a i n l y be d e a l i n g i s s u b t i t l e d "Men o f P r i n c i p l e s a n d M o r a l P r i n c i p l e s " . T h e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f t h i s s u b t i t l e w i l l b e a p p a r e n t b y t h e e n d o f t h i s s e c t i o n . K o v e s i d e n i e s t h a t t h e r e a r e m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s ; t h i s i s c o n t r a r y t o w h a t h a s b e e n a s s u m e d t h r o u g h o u t t h i s p a p e r . He c o n t e n d s t h a t m o r a l j u d g e m e n t s l i k e " l y i n g i s w r o n g " o r " o n e o u g h t n o t l i e " a r e n o t , a s i s c o m m o n l y h e l d , m o r a l p r i n -c i p l e s . He a l l o w s t h a t t h e r e i s a s e n s e i n w h i c h s u c h j u d g e m e n t s d o p r o v i d e a p r i n c i p l e b u t s u c h a p r i n c i p l e c a n n o t b e a m a j o r p r e m i s e o f a d e d u c t i v e a r g u m e n t n o r c a n a p e r s o n who r e f e r s t o a p r i n c i p l e i n t h i s s e n s e be a c t i n g on prin-ciple. I w i l l t r y t o e x p l a i n w h a t K o v e s i m e a n s a n d a r g u e a g a i n s t h i m i n i n s i s t i n g t h a t j u d g e m e n t s l i k e " l y i n g i s w r o n g " a r e p r i n c i p l e s i n a s t r o n g s e n s e : t h a t t h e y c a n s e r v e a s 48 49 m a j o r p r e m i s e s o r a s t h e r e a s o n o r m o t i v e s u n d e r l y i n g some-o n e ' s a c t i o n on p r i n c i p l e . B e f o r e I do t h i s , h o w e v e r , I w o u l d l i k e t o d i s c u s s K o v e s i ' s e x a m p l e s o f b e h a v i n g on prin-c i p l e and what he d i s t i n g u i s h e s as p a t t e r n s o r ways o f d o i n g t h i s . T h i s w i l l I hope r e v e a l w h a t , i f a n y t h i n g , d i s t i n -g u i s h e s m o r a l a c t i o n on p r i n c i p l e f r o m o t h e r a c t i o n done on p r i n c i p l e . C o n s i d e r t h e f o l l o w i n g * C l ) He r e f r a i n s f r o m b u y i n g and e a t i n g t o m a t o e s on p r i n c i p l e . ( 2 ) B u t I p u t t h e h e a t e r o u t on p r i n c i p l e . C3) When I o b s e r v e someone c o u n t i n g a s e r i e s o f numbers I may a s k on what p r i n c i p l e he i s c o u n t i n g t h e s e r i e s . 1 W h i l e o n l y C l ) and C2) a r e e x a m p l e s o f a c t i o n on p r i n c i p l e I w i l l be m a k i n g r e f e r e n c e t o ( 3 ) i n t h i s d i s c u s s i o n and w i l l b e g i n by c o m m e n t i n g on i t . S e n t e n c e C3) i s a c l e a r - c u t c a s e o f f o l l o w i n g a r u l e . The a n s w e r o f f e r e d as t h e " p r i n c i p l e " on w h i c h t h e c o u n t i n g i s b e i n g done m i g h t be " I am g i v i n g e v e r y s e c o n d number s t a r t i n g f r o m number ' 2 ' " . Here t h e " p r i n c i p l e " and t h e r u l e b e i n g f o l l o w e d a r e i d e n t i c a l . A n o t h e r c a s e where t h i s m i g h t o c c u r ( i . e . , where t h e r u l e and t h e p r i n c i p l e a r e i d e n t i c a l ) i s when we s p e a k o f t h e p r i n c i p l e o n , o r a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h , a r o b o t o r t r a f f i c l i g h t i s o p e r a t i n g . The c r u c i a l d i f f e r -e n c e h e r e o f c o u r s e , i s t h a t t h e p e r s o n c o u n t i n g i s f o l l o w i n g a r u l e o r p r i n c i p l e w h i l e t h e m a c h i n e i s o p e r a t i n g a c c o r d i n g 2 t o some r u l e o r p r i n c i p l e . A l t h o u g h t h e e x p r e s s i o n s e x h i b i t a p a r a l l e l i s m t h e r e i s a d i f f e r e n c e f r o m t h e p o i n t o f v i e w o f 50 c a u s a l i t y b e t w e e n t h e p r i n c i p l e s w h i c h u n d e r l i e t h e b e h a v i o r o f a r o b o t , f o r e x a m p l e , o r a human b o d y , and t h o s e w h i c h u n d e r l i e and a c c o u n t f o r d e l i b e r a t e a c t i o n . T h i s may s o u n d e x c e e d i n g l y t r i v i a l b u t t h e s i m i l a r i t y i n e x p r e s s i o n makes t h i s an e a s i l y c o n f u s e d n o t i o n . The o n l y r e a l s i m i l a r i t y b e t w e e n t h e two c a s e s i n w h i c h s o m e t h i n g i s o p e r a t i n g a c c o r d -i n g t o some p r i n c i p l e and someone i s a c t i n g i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h some p r i n c i p l e C c o u n t i n g on some p r i n c i p l e ) i s t h a t i n e a c h c a s e t h e n o t i o n o f a c t i o n on p r i n c i p l e i s o u t o f p l a c e . A c t i o n on p r i n c i p l e , a s i n (.1) and ( 2 ) , a l s o s h a r e s a c o n d i t i o n w i t h p h y s i c a l o c c u r r e n c e s a c c o u n t a b l e f o r by r e f e r e n c e t o p r i n c i p l e s . T h i s i s t h e c o n d i t i o n o f r e g u l a r -i t y . I t i s c e r t a i n l y t r u e t h a t i f one p u t a k e r o s e n e h e a t e r o u t when l e a v i n g a h o u s e empty, on p r i n c i p l e , t h i s i m p l i e s t h a t he r e g u l a r l y p u t s i t o u t j u s t as someone who r e f r a i n s f r o m b u y i n g t o m a t o e s , o r d o e s a n y t h i n g on p r i n c i p l e , must do i t more t h a n o n c e ( o r a t l e a s t w o u l d do i t a g a i n were s i m i l a r c i r c u m s t a n c e s t o r e c u r ) . T h e s e , f o r t h e p r e s e n t a t l e a s t , a r e n o t t h e most i m p o r t a n t p o i n t s t o be made a b o u t a c t i o n on p r i n c i p l e and so I w i l l go on t o what K o v e s i has t o s a y . K o v e s i d e s c r i b e s what he c a l l s t h r e e ways o r p a t t e r n s o f b e h a v i n g on p r i n c i p l e . F i r s t , i s t h e t y p e o f a c t i o n s u g -g e s t e d i n e x a m p l e (1) where an i n d i v i d u a l e x p r e s s e s h i s s i n c e r i t y by h i s a c t i o n b u t i s n o t p a r t o f an o r g a n i z e d movement f o r c h a n g e . S e c o n d , i s ' t h e c a s e where t h e p o i n t o f t h e a c t i o n i s t o c h a n g e a p o l i c y and so n o t a p r i v a t e , i n d i v i d u a l a c t i o n . T h i r d , i s t h e a c t i o n t y p i f i e d by 51 example ( 2 ) . Now Kovesi's c l a i m i s t h i s : "being a p r i n c i p l e i s not a p r o p e r t y of c e r t a i n judgements.; i t Is people who regard c e r t a i n t h i n g s as matters of p r i n c i p l e , who adopt 3 c e r t a i n p r i n c i p l e s or behave a c c o r d i n g to p r i n c i p l e s " . It i s c l e a r that he takes, p r i n c i p l e s to be i n v o l v e d i n matters of p r i n c i p l e and that i n each a c t i o n on p r i n c i p l e there i s a person behaving a c c o r d i n g to a p r i n c i p l e . I t i s a l s o c l e a r , however, that he does not understand these to be l i k e the p r i n c i p l e s we have been d i s c u s s i n g . A c o n s i d e r a t i o n of what the p r i n c i p l e s K o v e sl r e f e r s to are l i k e seems i n o r d e r . Evidence that K ovesi believes, a p r i n c i p l e to be i n v o l v e d r a t h e r than simply being a l a b e l f o r a manner of doing something i s the f o l l o w i n g : " I t i s people . . . who make and have p r i n c i p l e s or l i v e a c c o r d i n g to p r i n c i p l e s " . And, "we can decide to make a p r i n c i p l e about almost a n y t h i n g . We can decide to get up every morning at the crack of dawn, or not eat tomatoes, or never to leave kerosene heaters a l i g h t i n an empty house, on p r i n c i p l e " . J u s t what then i s the p r i n c i p l e ? He suggests that g e t t i n g up e a r l y and not e a t i n g tomatoes because one b e l i e v e s these are ways to be h e a l t h y are not done on p r i n c i p l e because medical evidence can be summoned to d i s p u t e them. I f they are done on p r i n -c i p l e they are not open to c h a l l e n g e on e m p i r i c a l grounds, i . e . , no amount of e m p i r i c a l evidence can i n v a l i d a t e them. He says that people have reasons f o r adopting p r i n c i p l e s but that these are not based on the a c t u a l s i t u a t i o n s i n which the a c t s are performed; " ... there are reasons f o r making 52 5 t h i n g s matters of p r i n c i p l e " . From t h i s i t would seem t h a t Kovesi i s saying that we have reasons f o r making and adopting p r i n c i p l e s and when we do make or adopt a p r i n c i p l e , i . e . , do something on p r i n c i p l e , i t becomes a matter of p r i n c i p l e . But i t i s s t i l l not c l e a r what counts as a p r i n c i p l e . He ex-cludes the reason f o r the act and i n f a c t appears to c o n s i d e r the act I t s e l f , e.g., not e a t i n g tomatoes, p u t t i n g out the hea t e r , e t c . , to be the p r i n c i p l e . When d i s c u s s i n g one " p a t t e r n " of behaving on p r i n c i p l e he e x p l i c i t l y says, "He must make the p r i n c i p l e u n i v e r s a l : 'nobody should eat tomatoes'". I suggest that what Kovesi i s sa y i n g i s that the r u l e we f o l l o w i n doing the a c t i o n on p r i n c i p l e i s the p r i n c i p l e . He w r i t e s , "Whenever r e f e r e n c e i s made to a p r i n c i p l e the argument i s s h i f t e d away from the merits or demerits of the a c t i o n i n q u e s t i o n to a d i f f e r e n t f i e l d " . , and again "An appeal to a p r i n c i p l e f u n c t i o n s as a l e v e r that 7 s h i f t s the reason f o r one's a c t s to a d i f f e r e n t ground". So, i t would seem, Kovesi i s s a y i n g that when we do something on p r i n c i p l e the p a r t i c u l a r r u l e we f o l l o w (e.g., r e f u s i n g to buy tomatoes) c o n s t i t u t e s the p r i n c i p l e on which we act", however, the f a c t t h at the a c t i o n i s done on p r i n c i p l e i m p l i e s that our reason f o r doing the a c t i o n does not l i e i n the a c t i o n i t s e l f but i n a d i f f e r e n t f i e l d and i n f a c t g i v e s the act a new d e s c r i p t i o n (e.g., b o y c o t t i n g ) . But s u r e l y when we act on p r i n c i p l e the p a r t i c u l a r r u l e we f o l l o w does not c o n s t i t u t e the p r i n c i p l e on which we are a c t i n g . In Kovesi's example of r e f r a i n i n g from buying and e a t i n g tomatoes because one disapproves of the p o l i c i e s 53 o f t h e M a r k e t i n g B o a r d t h e p r i n c i p l e h a s t o d o w i t h o n e ' s d i s a p p r o v a l — i t i s t h e r e a s o n f o r t h e d i s a p p r o v a l . The p r i n c i p l e o n w h i c h o n e m i g h t he a c t i n g i f n o t t h e p r i n c i p l e o f j u s t i c e i t s e l f w o u l d a t l e a s t h e b a s e d o n t h a t p r i n c i p l e . The r e a s o n f o r n o t b u y i n g t o m a t o e s m i g h t b e a r e a s o n s u c h a s 'one o u g h t t o b o y c o t t t h e p r o d u c t s o f a n u n j u s t M a r k e t i n g B o a r d ' . When a n a c t i s d o n e o n p r i n c i p l e the reason f o r w h i c h i t i s d o n e i s t h e p r i n c i p l e . I n t h e t o m a t o c a s e t h e a c t i o n i s n o t n o t e a t i n g t o m a t o e s (.because i t i s d o n e on principle) b u t e x p r e s s i n g d i s a p p r o v a l a n d / o r a t t e m p t i n g t o c h a n g e t h e p o l i c i e s o f t h e M a r k e t i n g B o a r d . The p r i n c i p l e o n w h i c h t h e a g e n t i s a c t i n g i s i d e n t i c a l w i t h h i s r e a s o n f o r d i s a p p r o v i n g o f t h e M a r k e t i n g B o a r d . A t t h e b e g i n n i n g o f h i s c h a p t e r K o v e s i s a y s " ' B e i n g a p r i n c i p l e ' i s n o t a f e a t u r e o f s t a t e m e n t s o f j u d g e m e n t s . I t i s p e o p l e ... who ... h a v e p r i n c i p l e s " . I t h i n k t h i s i s c o r r e c t b u t b e i n g c a p a b l e o f b e i n g a p r i n c i p l e i s a f e a t u r e o f c e r t a i n r e a s o n s i n n o r m a t i v e d i s c o u r s e . F o r w h a t i s i t f o r a man t o h a v e a s o n e o f h i s p r i n c i p l e s t h a t ' p e o p l e ' s i n t e r e s t s o u g h t t o be c o n s i d e r e d e q u a l l y ' o r d e r i v a t i v e l y t h a t ' p r o d u c e r s o u g h t t o s h a r e i n p r o f i t s ' i f i t i s n o t f o r h i m t o h o l d , i n c a s e s w h e r e t h e y do n o t , t h a t t h e M a r k e t i n g B o a r d i s u n j u s t ? A n d w h a t i s t h i s , i f i t i s n o t f o r h i m t o h o l d t h i s a s a g o o d r e a s o n n o t t o s u p p o r t t h e B o a r d b y b u y i n g i t s p r o d u c t s . 8 When s u c h t h i n g s a s n o t e a t i n g o r b u y i n g t o m a t o e s b e c o m e m a t t e r s o f p r i n c i p l e a n d a r e d o n e o n p r i n c i p l e , t h e 51+ p r i n c i p l e s i n v o l v e d s i m p l y a r e n o t such, t h i n g s as " d o n ' t e a t o r buy tomatoes." o r "nobody s h o u l d e a t t o m a t o e s " . Once t h i s I s s e e n i t I s e a s y t o q u e s t i o n K o v e s i ' s c l a i m t h a t "we can d e c i d e t o make a p r i n c i p l e a b o u t a l m o s t a n y t h i n g " . .Of c o u r s e we can do a l m o s t a n y t h i n g on p r i n c i p l e b ut t h e p r i n c i p l e , as i n t h i s c a s e , i s n o t one we have d e c i d e d t o make. Now we a r e r e a d y t o c o n s i d e r K o v e s i ' s d i f f e r e n t p a t -t e r n s o f b e h a v i n g on p r i n c i p l e . My argument w i l l be t h a t t h e s e a r e n o t d i f f e r e n t ways o f d o i n g t h e same t h i n g b u t a r e d i f f e r e n t t h i n g s and o n l y a p p e a r t o be t h e same b e c a u s e o f t h e p r e s e n c e o f ' p r i n c i p l e ' i n e a c h c a s e . The t h r e e ways o r p a t -t e r n s o f b e h a v i n g on p r i n c i p l e a g a i n a r e : p a t t e r n 1 - an i n d i v i d u a l d o i n g an a c t i o n f o r r e a s o n s o u t s i d e t h e f i e l d o f t h a t a c t i o n as an e x p r e s s i o n o f h i s own s i n c e r i t y and n o t as an a t t e m p t t o b r i n g a b o u t c h a n g e . ( E . g . , an i n d i v i d u a l r e -f r a i n i n g f r o m b u y i n g t o m a t o e s m a r k e t e d by an u n j u s t B o a r d w h e t h e r o r n o t anyone e l s e was d o i n g l i k e w i s e ) ; p a t t e r n two - an a c t i o n p e r f o r m e d as p a r t o f a g r o u p a c t i o n , f o r r e a s o n s o u t s i d e t h e f i e l d o f t h e a c t i o n , t o i n s t i g a t e c h a n g e . ( E . g . , r e f r a i n i n g f r o m b u y i n g t o m a t o e s as p a r t o f a b o y c o t t on p r o d u c t s o f a c o r r u p t M a r k e t i n g B o a r d ) ; p a t t e r n t h r e e - an a c t i o n p e r f o r m e d r o u t i n e l y " b e c a u s e one does n o t want t o r e l y on t h e a c t u a l r e a s o n s [ f o r d o i n g 9 t h e a c t i o n ] e a c h t i m e " . ( E . g . , a l w a y s p u t t i n g o u t t h e k e r o s e n e h e a t e r b e f o r e l e a v i n g t h e h o u s e ; m o t h e r s r o u t i n e l y c l o s i n g s a f e t y p i n s ; p u t t i n g c o l d w a t e r i n t h e b a t h b e f o r e h o t , e t c . ) 55 These p a t t e r n s o f h e h a v i o r a r e " m a t t e r s o f p r i n c i p l e " b e c a u s e t r i e r e a s o n s f o r which, t h e y a r e done l i e o u t s i d e t h e f i e l d o f t h e a c t i o n — n o t so f a r o u t i n t h e c a s e o f t h e t h i r d p a t t e r n b u t o u t s i d e n o n e t h e l e s s . I n t h e f i r s t two p a t t e r n s t h e r e a s o n i s f o u n d i n t h e d i s a p p r o v a l o f t h e M a r k e t i n g B o a r d , i n t h e t h i r d , i n t h e e f f i c i e n c y p r o v i d e d by n o t d e a l -i n g w i t h e a c h c a s e i n d i v i d u a l l y . K o v e s i d o e s n o t f i n d p a t t e r n one v e r y i n t e r e s t i n g so we w i l l be c o n c e r n e d w i t h p a t t e r n s two and t h r e e . He p o i n t s t o t h e s e n s e o f u n i v e r s a l i t y i n t h e s e two p a t t e r n s as b e i n g d i f f e r e n t . I n t h e f i r s t , where t h e a c t i o n amounted t o an a t t e m p t t o c h a n g e t h e p o l i c i e s o f t h e M a r k e t i n g B o a r d , " i t was a q u e s t i o n o f a l l o r most p e o p l e d o i n g s o m e t h i n g , now i t i s a q u e s t i o n o f a l w a y s d o i n g s o m e t h i n g o r d o i n g s o m e t h i n g i n a l l c a s e s o f s u c h and s u c h " , ^ The d i f f e r e n c e e x t e n d s f a r b e y o n d t h i s h o w e v e r , and i s more o b v i o u s when he c a l l s t h e s e a c t i o n s on d i f f e r e n t t y p e s o f p r i n c i p l e s r a t h e r t h a n " d i f f e r -e n t p a t t e r n s o f b e h a v i n g a c c o r d i n g t o p r i n c i p l e s " . I t was my c o n t e n t i o n t h a t t h e p r i n c i p l e i n e a c h c a s e was t o be f o u n d i n t h e r e a s o n f o r d o i n g t h e a c t . I n p a t t e r n two t h e r e a s o n had t o do w i t h d i s a p p r o v a l o f t h e M a r k e t i n g B o a r d a n d , I w o u l d s u g g e s t , was a m o r a l p r i n c i p l e . B u t what t y p e o f p r i n c i p l e i s a t work i n p a t t e r n t h r e e ? I f t h e r e a s o n f o r s u c h a c t i o n was " c a u t i o u s n e s s " t h e n p e r h a p s we w o u l d s a y i t was a p r u d e n t i a l p r i n c i p l e . But s u r e l y one c o u l d a c t on a p r i n c i p l e o f p r u d e n c e a n d , f o r e x a m p l e , s t i l l n o t p u t t h e h e a t e r o u t e v e r y t i m e he l e f t t h e h o u s e b u t o n l y on t h o s e o c c a s i o n s when t h e r e was a d a n g e r o f f i r e . The 5 6 p o i n t of t h i s type of behavior i s r a t h e r to make the con-s i d e r a t i o n of each and every case unnecessary. There i s , i n f a c t , no p r i n c i p l e at work. When someone says that he i s doing such and such on p r i n c i p l e as i n p a t t e r n two i t i s reasonable to ask "what p r i n c i p l e ? " - at l e a s t one has the f e e l i n g that there i s a p r i n c i p l e behind such a c t i o n . When i t i s s a i d that someone i s a c t i n g i n the way d e s c r i b e d by p a t t e r n t h r e e , how/ever, no such q u e s t i o n or p r i n c i p l e comes to mind. If the p o i n t of d e s c r i b i n g the a c t i o n of p u t t i n g the heater out as an a c t i o n on p r i n c i p l e i s ca u t i o u s n e s s then there i s a p r i n c i p l e i n v o l v e d but the s t r i c t r e g u l a r i t y f e a -ture can be dropped. But i t i s t h i s sense of u n i v e r s a l i t y -that something i s done i n a l l cases - that c h a r a c t e r i z e s t h i s p a t t e r n and the p o i n t i s not cau t i o u s n e s s but r a t h e r that one does not have to d e a l with each case or each type of case i n d i v i d u a l l y . Of course the reason f o r making i t a r u l e always to put out the heater has to do with c a u t i o u s n e s s but i t i s not t h i s reason that i s being emphasized i n r e f e r r i n g to such a manner of behaving as a c t i o n on p r i n c i p l e - i t i s the s t r i c t r e g u l a r i t y f e a t u r e t h a t i s being emphasized. This i s not so i n p a t t e r n two type behavior where a p r i n c i p l e as opposed to a manner of behaving i s the p o i n t of sa y i n g the a c t i o n i s done on p r i n c i p l e . It seems to me c o r r e c t to say that there are d i f f e r e n t senses i n which one can act on p r i n c i p l e . In one sense, as i n p a t t e r n two,one i s obeying a p r i n c i p l e , i . e . , a c c e p t i n g i t 57 as b i n d i n g ; i n the other, there Is no p r i n c i p l e at a l l but one Is making i t a r u l e to do something. These are q u i t e d i f f e r e n t t h i n g s . P a t t e r n t hree-type behavior can be d e s c r i b e d as h a b i t u a l b ehavior. One puts out a h e a t e r , or c l o s e s p i n s , e t c . , as a matter of h a b i t . This i s not so i n p a t t e r n two-type b e h a v i o r : i t i s not the habit of the person i n v o l v e d not to buy or eat tomatoes. Burton L e i s e r , i n the same work on which I r e l i e d i n the p r e v i o u s s e c t i o n , i d e n t i f i e s a ' h a b i t ' as w e l l as a ' p r i n c i p l e ' use of custom. According to L e i s e r when some-one a c t s on or has a p r i n c i p l e the f o l l o w i n g c o n d i t i o n s must hold : C l ) M r e g u l a r l y does X under c e r t a i n s p e c i f i a b l e c i r c u m s t a n c e s . C2) M might choose not to do X, and not do X, under those circumstances. ( 3 ) M i s conscious of doing X when he does i t . C4) M does X d e l i b e r a t e l y . (5) M b e l i e v e s t h a t he ought to do X under those c o n d i t i o n s . 1 1 When someone has a h a b i t the f o l l o w i n g are t r u e : C l ) M r e g u l a r l y does X (sometimes under c e r t a i n s p e c i f i a b l e c i r c u m s t a n c e s ) . (2) M might choose not to do X, and not do X Cunder those c i r c u m s t a n c e s ) . ( 3 ) M i s C u s u a l l y ) not conscious of doing X when he does i t . ^ CO When M does X, he does not do i t d e l i b e r a t e l y . 1 ^ L e i s e r ' s account of the d i s t i n c t i o n between a c t i n g on a p r i n c i p l e and a c t i n g h a b i t u a l l y i s , I b e l i e v e , q u i t e compatible 58 w i t h t h e o n e g i v e n h e r e b e t w e e n p a t t e r n t w o a n d p a t t e r n t h r e e -14 t y p e b e h a v i o r . C o n s i d e r e i t h e r p a t t e r n o n e o r t w o b e h a v i o r w i t h L e i s e r ' s c o n d i t i o n s f o r a c t i n g o n p r i n c i p l e . To be r e f u s i n g t o b u y t o m a t o e s on p r i n c i p l e t h e i n d i v i d u a l — c a l l h i m M — m u s t do s o r e g u l a r l y w h e n t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s p r o m p t i n g h i s a c t i o n a r e p r e s e n t . M a l s o m u s t do t h i s c o n s c i o u s l y a n d d e l i b e r a t e l y o r h i s a c t i o n w o u l d n o t be o n p r i n c i p l e . T h i s w o u l d a l s o b e t r u e i f M d i d n o t t h i n k he s h o u l d b e r e f u s i n g t o b u y t o m a t o e s m a r k e t e d b y a c o r r u p t B o a r d . P a t t e r n o n e a n d t w o t y p e b e h a v i o r do n o t f i t t h e h a b i t c o n d i t i o n s h o w e v e r . S i m i l a r l y p a t t e r n t h r e e - t y p e b e h a v i o r i n c o r p o r a t e s t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r h a v i n g a h a b i t b u t n o t t h o s e f o r a c t i o n o n a p r i n c i p l e . The w h o l e p o i n t o f t h i s " p a t t e r n " i s t h a t i t i s d o n e r o u t i n e l y — u n d e r a l l c i r c u m s t a n c e s . M may o r may n o t he c o n s c i o u s o f h i s a c t i o n . A g a i n , i t i s d e f i n i t i v e o f t h i s p a t t e r n o f b e h a v i o r t h a t p r i o r d e l i b e r a t i o n d o e s n o t o c c u r i n e a c h c a s e . T h e r e a r e r e a s o n s f o r t h e b e h a v i o r b u t t h e a g e n t d o e s n o t h a v e t h e r e a s o n e a c h t i m e he a c t s . I t s h o u l d n o t be t h o u g h t t h a t h a v i n g h a b i t s - - i n t h e s e n s e o f m a k i n g i t a r u l e t o do c e r t a i n t h i n g s - - i s i n a n y way r e p r e h e n s i b l e . A s P e t e r s s a y s , " t h e a r t o f l i v i n g c o n s i s t s t o a l a r g e e x t e n t , i n r e d u c i n g m o s t t h i n g s t h a t h a v e t o be d o n e t o h a b i t ; f o r t h e n t h e m i n d i s s e t f r e e t o p a y a t t e n -15 t i o n t o t h i n g s t h a t a r e i n t e r e s t i n g , n o v e l a n d w o r t h w h i l e . " M a k i n g i t a h a b i t t o do c e r t a i n t h i n g s i s d i f f e r e n t f r o m d o i n g t h e m t h r o u g h " f o r c e o f s h e e r h a b i t , " i . e . , f o r n o r e a s o n . A n d i t i s , I t h i n k , w i t h t h i s i n m i n d t h a t K o v e s i 59 says "there are s p e c i a l s i t u a t i o n s and cases where a c t i n g on p r i n c i p l e s of t h i s type i s c a l l e d f o r " . (.What I would d i s p u t e i n t h i s i s the n o t i o n that there are any p r i n c i p l e s being acted on. Had he s a i d , "there are s p e c i a l s i t u a t i o n s and cases where a c t i n g on p r i n c i p l e i n t h i s way i s c a l l e d f o r " , I would be i n complete agreement.) He goes on to make what I c o n s i d e r to be a very important p o i n t . He says: "Our l i t e r a t u r e i s f u l l of examples of people who extend t h i s to cases and s i t u a t i o n s where such a p a t t e r n of behavior i s not 16 c a l l e d f o r " . I t i s c e r t a i n l y t r u e that people f r e q u e n t l y extend t h i s type of a c t i o n to s i t u a t i o n s where i t i s not c a l l e d f o r and r i g i d l y f o l l o w a predetermined set of r u l e s . That i s , they confuse one sense of behaving on p r i n c i p l e with the other: the sense i n which i t i s unnecessary to c o n s i d e r each case on i t s own me r i t s w i t h the sense i n which i t i s important to do so. It i s t h i s very problem that makes p u b l i c d i s c u s s i o n of m o r a l i t y and moral e d u c a t i o n so d i f f i -c u l t , t h a t i s , t h i s common, and f r e q u e n t l y immoral, behavior i s confused with r a t i o n a l a c t i o n - a c t i o n on p r i n c i p l e . Again I w i l l p o i n t out a reason why Kovesi can so r e a d i l y c l a i m that we "decide to make p r i n c i p l e s " . Of course we can make p r i n c i p l e s i f by th a t we s e r i o u s l y mean such t h i n g s as 'always put the heater out'. 'To make something a h a b i t ' or 'to make i t a r u l e to do something' i s much more f i t t i n g and a p p r o p r i a t e a phrase to d e s c r i b e what i s meant i n such a case than i s 'to make a p r i n c i p l e ' . I would l i k e now to c o n s i d e r Kovesi's views on the 60 sense i n which c e r t a i n judgements provide us with the moral 17 p r i n c i p l e . He holds that the way i n which a judgement l i k e " l y i n g i s wrong" can provide us with a moral p r i n c i p l e i s the same way that "the mathematical n o t i o n of 'even' gave the p r i n c i p l e " ( i n "I am counting the s e r i e s of even numbers") i n the answer to the q u e s t i o n i n example (3) ( i . e . , "on what p r i n c i p l e i s he c o u n t i n g the s e r i e s ? " ) . That i s , i t i s the formal element of the moral n o t i o n ' l y i n g ' which p r o v i d e s the p r i n c i p l e . I don't want to deny the importance of moral n o t i o n s to moral p r i n c i p l e s , p r u d e n t i a l n o t i o n s to p r u d e n t i a l p r i n c i p l e s , e t c . A moral p r i n c i p l e cannot be a moral p r i n -18 c i p l e without one, i . e . , i t gives the p r i n c i p l e i t s p o i n t . However, I cannot agree that that i s the only p r i n c i p l e con-nected with such judgements. What I am conceding i s t h i s : any judgement which q u a l i f i e s as, or c o n t a i n s , a moral p r i n -c i p l e c o n t a i n s a moral n o t i o n . This i s as true of ' l y i n g i s wrong' as i t i s of 'one ought not to cause unnecessary s u f -f e r i n g ' . The formal element of such a n o t i o n does give us a p r i n c i p l e i n the sense Kovesi says. It p r o v i d e s the p o i n t of the n o t i o n as i t were and i s the same sense of p r i n c i p l e that one encounters i n sentences l i k e the f o l l o w i n g : He has grasped the o r g a n i z i n g p r i n c i p l e of the work. We approve your p r o p o s a l i n p r i n c i p l e . This thermometer i s sometimes v a r i e d i n i t s form and arrangement, but the p r i n c i p l e remains the same. ' P r i n c i p l e ' i n t h i s sense cannot be a p r i n c i p l e of a c t i o n or a p r i n c i p l e on which arguments can proceed. What I am 61 c o n t e s t i n g i s : t h a t t h i s i s t h e o n l y s e n s e i n w h i c h t h e r e a r e m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s . I s h a l l a r g u e t h a t t h e r e a r e m o r a l p r i n -c i p l e s a n d t h e s e f e a t u r e i n t h e w a y s we d i s t i n g u i s h e d a b o v e a s p r i n c i p l e s o n w h i c h a r g u m e n t s c a n p r o c e e d , i . e . , a s m a j o r p r e m i s e s , a n d a s p r i n c i p l e s o f a c t i o n , i . e . , a s m o t i v e s . K o v e s i h a s t h e e x p r e s s i o n " c o m p l e t e m o r a l n o t i o n " f o r t h o s e m o r a l n o t i o n s w h i c h c a n p r o v i d e a m o r a l p r i n c i p l e i n h i s s e n s e . S u c h a n o t i o n a p p l i e s t o a c t s " s e l e c t e d c o m p l e t e -l y f r o m t h e m o r a l p o i n t o f v i e w " - n o t i o n s s u c h a s ' m u r d e r ' i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h w h i c h r i g h t a n d w r o n g f u n c t i o n o n l y a s 19 r e m i n d e r s o f t h e p o i n t o f f o r m i n g s u c h n o t i o n s . ' L y i n g " i s n o t a c o m p l e t e m o r a l n o t i o n ; i f i t w e r e , a n d h e s u g g e s t s i t c o u l d b e b y t h e i n c l u s i o n i n o u r l a n g u a g e o f a t e r m l i k e " s a v i n g d e c e i t " , t h e n we c o u l d on principle n e v e r l i e . K o v e s i o f f e r s a s a n a n a l o g y : t h r e a t i s t o p r o m i s e a s s a v i n g d e c e i t i s t o l y i n g i n t h e r e s p e c t t h a t t h r e a t maps o u t a f i e l d s u c h t h a t " t h e t e r m t h r e a t c o v e r s now a l l t h o s e p e r f o r m a n c e s ... t h a t s o m e o n e c o u l d h a v e c i t e d a s e x a m p l e s o f p r o m i s e s w h e n p r o m i s e s o u g h t n o t t o be k e p t , 2 0 [ A n d ] we c a n now f r e e l y s a y ' p r o m i s e s o u g h t t o b e k e p t ' " . B u t t h i s i s a b s u r d . I m a g i n e a c a s e o f a man h a v i n g i n c u r r e d a d e b t a n d p r o m i s e d t o r e p a y i t a t t i m e t . S u p p o s e t h a t a t t i m e t a q u i t e u n f o r s e e a b l e c i r c u m s t a n c e h a d a r i s e n i n w h i c h h i s c h i l d w a s v e r y i l l a n d a l l h i s r e s o u r c e s w e r e r e q u i r e d t o m e e t t h e e m e r g e n c y . S u r e l y i t i s n ' t t h e c a s e t h a t he s h o u l d k e e p h i s p r o m i s e . " T h r e a t " d o e s n o t h e l p o n e b i t . F u r t h e r -m o r e , i t i s t h e c a s e t h a t ' p r o m i s e s o u g h t t o be k e p t ' 62 c o n t i n u e s t o be a good r e a s o n f o r k e e p i n g one's p r o m i s e i n suc h a s i t u a t i o n and a l s o a m o r a l p r i n c i p l e on wh i c h an a g e n t c o u l d a c t . T h a t ' p r o m i s e s ought t o be k e p t ' i s a r e a s o n f o r k e e p i n g one's p r o m i s e i n a s i t u a t i o n does n o t make i t a s u f -f i c i e n t r e a s o n f o r d o i n g i t i n t h a t s i t u a t i o n . K o v e s i ' s c o n t e n t i o n i s t h a t making a p r i n c i p l e a b o u t l y i n g would i n v o l v e a d e c i s i o n t o n e v e r t e l l a l i e u n d e r any c i r c u m s t a n c e s . That i s t o s a y , i f i t were t h e c a s e t h a t a p e r s o n was r e f r a i n i n g f r o m t e l l i n g a l i e on p r i n c i p l e he would have made a d e c i s i o n n e v e r t o t e l l a l i e . And t h a t i s t o say f u r t h e r t h a t a p e r s o n a c t i n g i n t h i s way would n o t have t o c o n s i d e r e a c h s i t u a t i o n i n wh i c h l y i n g was r e l e v a n t on i t s own m e r i t s b u t make i t a h a b i t i n a l l s i t u a t i o n s n o t t o l i e . Now a p e r s o n would have a r e a s o n f o r s u c h a d e c i s i o n and h i s r e a s o n may be t h a t ' l y i n g i s wrong', b u t i t need n o t be. In t h i s t y p e o f c a s e o f a c t i n g on p r i n c i p l e one has made i t a p r i n c i p l e n e v e r t o l i e and i n t h i s t y p e o f c a s e K o v e s i i s c o r r e c t i n i n s i s t i n g t h a t t h e r e i s a d i f f e r e n c e between t h e judgement ' l y i n g i s wrong' and someone's n o t l y i n g on p r i n -c i p l e . T h i s i s a c a s e o f p a t t e r n t h r e e - t y p e b e h a v i o r on p r i n c i p l e , a p a t t e r n I s h a l l d i s t i n g u i s h as a c t i o n o r b e h a v i o r on p r i n c i p l e ^ t o i n d i c a t e i t s a f f i n i t y t o h a b i t . K o v e s i ' s c l a i m as t o t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f t h i s t y p e o f b e h a v i o r i s u n d e n i a b l e . The d i f f i c u l t y i s t h a t he s e e s t h i s as t h e o n l y t y p e o f a c t i o n on p r i n c i p l e when i n f a c t t h e r e i s a n o t h e r more i n t e r e s t i n g t y p e . Here a p e r s o n may n o t l i e on principle b u t i n no way commit h i m s e l f n e v e r , u n d e r any 63 c i rcumstances, to t e l l a l i e . In t h i s case h i s not l y i n g on p r i n c i p l e and the judgement l y i n g i s wrong are not d i f f e r e n t , f o r h i s reason f o r not l y i n g i n a p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n i s the r e l a t i v e importance in that s i t u a t i o n of the f a c t t h at doing such and such would be t e l l i n g a l i e . This i s the d i f f e r e n c e between making i t a r u l e never to l i e and a c t i n g on the p r i n -c i p l e 'one ought not l i e ' . I s h a l l d esignate t h i s type of a c t i o n a c t i o n on p r i n c i p l e ^ to i n d i c a t e the importance of a p r i n c i p l e i n t h i s k i nd of case. Let us c o n s i d e r an example of a c t i o n on p r i n c i p l e ^ i n which the p r i n c i p l e 'one ought not s t e a l ' i s i n v o l v e d . Sup-pose you are t e l l i n g me about how very much you need and would l i k e to have a p a r t i c u l a r book. Suppose a l s o t h at we are i n the l i b r a r y l o o k i n g at the book and both know i t would be r e l a t i v e l y easy simply to walk o f f with i t . I f I say to you "But why are you r e t u r n i n g the book to the s h e l f ? You want i t very much; why don't you take i t ? " You might w e l l r e p l y " I t i s a matter of p r i n c i p l e " or "I'm doing i t on p r i n c i p l e . " Three p o i n t s : f i r s t , t h i s i s an a c t i o n on p r i n c i p l e . Second, the r u l e a c c o r d i n g to which you r e t u r n the book to the s h e l f i s your a c t i o n ; the p r i n c i p l e on which i t i s done i s "one ought not s t e a l " or perhaps simply " s t e a l i n g i s wrong." T h i r d , the f a c t t h at t h i s i s one of your p r i n c i p l e s and t h a t i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n you have acted on p r i n c i p l e does not e n t a i l t h a t i n another s i t u a t i o n , f o r i n s t a n c e one i n which you or your f a m i l y are s t a r v i n g , you would not s t e a l ; nor would i t be the case that i n such a s i t u a t i o n t h i s had ceased to be one 64 o f y o u r p r i n c i p l e s . K o v e s i has c o r r e c t l y drawn o u r a t t e n t i o n t o one t y p e o f a c t i o n on p r i n c i p l e , however, h i s b e l i e f t h a t m o r a l p r i n -c i p l e s c a n n o t f u n c t i o n as major p r e m i s e s o r as p r i n c i p l e s o f a c t i o n , o r i n o t h e r words, t h a t t h i s i s t h e o n l y t h i n g we can mean by a c t i o n on p r i n c i p l e i s f a l s e . S i m i l a r l y , h i s c o n -t e n t i o n t h a t o n l y c o m p l e t e m o r a l n o t i o n s p r o v i d e us w i t h m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s i n any s e n s e and t h a t t h e s e do away w i t h s i t u a t i o n s o f m o r a l c o n f l i c t and d e c i s i o n i s u n t e n a b l e . A. I. M e l d e n ' s a c c o u n t o f what c o n s i d e r a t i o n s s u c h as ' l y i n g i s wrong' a r e , and how t h e y f u n c t i o n i n t h e t h o u g h t and a c t i o n o f one who i s m o r a l l y w i s e o r has a h e a l t h y m o r a l u n d e r s t a n d -22 i n g , shows ] u s t how u n t e n a b l e t h i s i s . F i n a l l y , I would l i k e t o c o n s i d e r a m a t t e r w h i c h , i n view o f t h e above d i s c u s s i o n , makes K o v e s i ' s s u b t i t l e "Men of Principles and Moral Principles" p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t e r e s t i n g . He w r i t e s : R e f e r e n c e t o a p r i n c i p l e does n o t make an a c t a m o r a l a c t . Whether t h e a c t i s m o r a l o r n o t c u t s a c r o s s t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between d o i n g some-t h i n g on p r i n c i p l e or n o t on p r i n c i p l e : i t depends on t h e s o r t o f r e a s o n we have f o r d o i n g s o m e t h i n g e i t h e r way.23 And I t h i n k I a g r e e w i t h K o v e s i on t h i s . By f a r t h e g r e a t e s t m a j o r i t y o f a c t i o n s on p r i n c i p l e a r e n o t m o r a l a c t s . But n what a b o u t a c t i o n s on p r i n c i p l e ^ ? The c a s e s t h a t would seem t o q u a l i f y , c a s e s l i k e e a t i n g c e r t a i n f o o d s f o r r e a s o n s o f h e a l t h , a r e n o t , a c c o r d i n g t o K o v e s i , c a s e s o f a c t i o n on p r i n c i p l e . (See page 51) Whether o r n o t t h e r e a r e n o n -65 m o r a l c a s e s o f a c t i o n on p r i n c i p l e ^ (and I see no r e a s o n why-t h e r e c o u l d n ' t b e) t h e r e i s an i n t e r e s t i n g and i m p o r t a n t f e a t u r e a b o u t m o r a l a c t i o n on p r i n c i p l e . I t i s t h i s : we P c a l l t h o s e who a c t on p r i n c i p l e ^ "men o f p r i n c i p l e " . Con-s i d e r t h i s s e n t e n c e : J o n e s i s a man o f p r i n c i p l e . By s u c h an e x p r e s s i o n we m i g h t be s a y i n g one o f two t h i n g s a b o u t J o n e s — one d e r o g a t o r y , t h e o t h e r commendatory. S h o u l d we be d o i n g t h e f o r m e r we would be r e f e r r i n g t o c e r t a i n s p e c i f i c a c t i o n s t h e p e r f o r m a n c e o f w h i c h would be h i g h l y p r e -d i c t a b l e . The s i t u a t i o n i n w h i c h t h e a c t i o n o c c u r s c o n t a i n s some f a c t o r w h i c h when p r e s e n t always f u r n i s h e s J o n e s w i t h a r e a s o n t o do t h a t a c t i o n . F o r example, any s i t u a t i o n i n w h i c h t o do x would be t o t e l l a l i e , J o n e s w i l l r e f r a i n f r o m d o i n g x. What i s i m p l i e d i s r i g i d i t y o r i n f l e x i b i l i t y . I t i s t h i s i m p l i c a t i o n t h a t i s c a r r i e d by s u c h an e x p r e s s i o n as " t h e s e a r e men o f s t r o n g p r i n c i p l e s " , and a l s o f r e q u e n t l y by r e f e r e n c e t o someone's b e i n g "a man o f h i g h p r i n c i p l e s " o r " h i g h p r i n c i p l e d " . G r i f f i t h s r e f e r s t o t h i s c o n n o t a t i o n when he s a y s "A man o f p r i n c i p l e i s sometimes t h o u g h t o f w i t h d i s t a s t e , as a man who a c t s i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h a f i x e d s e t o f r u l e s i g n o r i n g t h e c o m p l e x i t i e s o f s i t u a t i o n s and f a i l i n g t o 24 a d a p t h i s b e h a v i o r t o c h a n g i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s " . T h i s a l s o seems t o be t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g K o v e s i has o f "man o f p r i n c i p l e " g i v e n h i s s u b t i t l e , "Men o f P r i n c i p l e s and M o r a l P r i n c i p l e s " . In c a l l i n g J o n e s a man o f p r i n c i p l e i t i s much more l i k e l y t h a t we a r e p r a i s i n g him. The Oxford English 66 Dictionary g i v e s an e x a m p l e o f t h e use o f "man o f p r i n c i p l e " u n d e r 7b w h i c h i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d t h u s : "An i n w a r d p e r s o n a l l a w o f r i g h t a c t i o n ; p e r s o n a l d e v o t i o n t o r i g h t ; r e c t i t u d e , u p r i g h t n e s s , h o n o u r a b l e c h a r a c t e r . " ( T h i s i s v e r y s i m i l a r t o t h e d e f i n i t i o n g i v e n o f t h e a p p r o p r i a t e u s e o f " p r i n -c i p l e s " : " h a v i n g good o r r i g h t p r i n c i p l e s ; a c t u a t e d by m o r a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ; d e v o t e d t o r e c t i t u d e ; u p r i g h t , h o n o u r -2 5 a b l e . (The o p p o s i t e o f u n p r i n c i p l e d . ) " E x a m p l e s o f t h i s m e a n i n g a r e n o t d i f f i c u l t t o f i n d . M e l d e n ' s u s e o f i t i n s e c t i o n IX o f Rights and Right Conduct--"Kant was r i g h t , t h e n i n i n s i s t i n g a s men o f p r i n c i p l e h ave a l w a y s i n s i s t e d . . '."--i s b o t h f a m i l i a r and u n a m b i g u o u s . These o p p o s i n g m e a n i n g s o f "man o f p r i n c i p l e " h a v e two common e l e m e n t s i n t h a t t h e y r e f e r t o m o r a l m a t t e r s and t h e y r e n d e r p r e d i c t i o n o f c e r t a i n a c t i o n s and a t t i t u d e s p o s s i b l e ; t h e d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n them i s marked on t h e one hand by a c t i o n on p r i n c i p l e ^ and on t h e o t h e r by a c t i o n on p r i n c i p l e ^ . I n t h e c r i t i c a l u s e , t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c f e a t u r e o f t h e a g e n t ' s b e h a v i o r i s t h a t p a r t i c u l a r a c t i o n s a r e done w i t h o u t f a i l . When, h o w e v e r , we a r e p r a i s i n g someone by r e f e r r i n g t o h i m as a "man o f p r i n c i p l e " i t i s n o t t h e c a s e t h a t p a r t i c u l a r a c t i o n s w i l l be c a r r i e d o u t w i t h o u t f a i l b u t t h a t he i s a c e r t a i n kind o f p e r s o n — o n e who i s moved by c e r t a i n c o n s i d -e r a t i o n s and t h e s e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s a r e m o r a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . We s i m p l y w o u l d n o t c a l l a man a "man o f p r i n c i p l e " b e c a u s e he i n v a r i a b l y p u t o u t h e a t e r s . K a n t was n o t a man o f p r i n -c i p l e b e c a u s e o f t h e r e g u l a r a f t e r n o o n w a l k s he t o o k b u t b e c a u s e o f t h e m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s he had. S u r e l y P e t e r s i s c o r r e c t when he s a y s , " C e r t a i n l y some k i n d o f f i r m n e s s i s s u g g e s t e d by t h e p h r a s e 'a man o f p r i n c i p l e ' . But h e r e a g a i n t h e r e a r e m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s . A man o f p r i n c i p l e i s one who i s consistent i n a c t i n g i n t h e l i g h t o f h i s s e n s i -t i v i t y t o a s p e c t s o f a s i t u a t i o n t h a t a r e made m o r a l l y r e l e v a n t by a p r i n c i p l e . But t h i s does n o t p r e c l u d e a d a p t a b i l i t y due t o d i f f e r e n c e s i n s i t u a t i o n s , e s p e c i a l l y i f t h e r e i s more t h a n one p r i n c i p l e w h i c h makes d i f f e r e n t 2 6 f a c t o r s i n a s i t u a t i o n m o r a l l y i m p o r t a n t " . A man o f p r i n c i p l e i s one who i s g u i d e d by m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s , t h a t i s , one who has m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s , who makes t h e p r o p e r t h i n g s m a t t e r s o f p r i n c i p l e and who a c t s on p r i n c i p l e . 68 FOOTNOTES 1. These three examples are from Kovesi's book Moral Notions, London: Routledge and Kegan P a u l , 1967. Example C l ) can be found on p.110, (2) on p.99 and (3) on p.94. 2. In Black's terms the "counter" would be e x h i b i t i n g r u l e - i n v o l v i n g behavior while the machine would be r u l e - c o v e r e d . See Max Black "Rules and Routines", R. S. Peters C e d . ) The Concept of Education, London: Routledge and Kegan P a u l , 1967, pp. 92-104. 3. J . K o v e s i , op. c i t . , p. 102. 4. Ibid., p. 94. 5. Ibid., pp. 94-95. 6. Ibid., p. 94. 7 . J2>id. , p . 98 . 8. An argument of t h i s form can be found i n a paper by D. G. Brown, " E v a l u a t i v e I n f e r e n c e " , Philosophy, 30, 1955, p. 217. 9. J . Kovesi, op. c i t . , p. 99. 10. Ibid., p. 102. 11. Burton M. L e i s e r , Custom, Law, and Morality, Garden C i t y , N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1969, pp. 20-21. 12. L e i s e r acknowledges that d i s t i n c t i o n s c o n cerning degrees of consciousness might be drawn here. He does not e l u c i d a t e these as he f e e l s such an e x e r c i s e would con-t r i b u t e l i t t l e to h i s s u b j e c t and, I b e l i e v e , i t would c o n t r i b u t e l i t t l e to ours. 13 . Ibid. , p. 17. 14. It was necessary i n the p r e v i o u s s e c t i o n to r e s t a t e L e i s e r ' s c o n d i t i o n s f o r s a y i n g someone i s a c t i n g on a p r i n c i p l e and that restatement would make the case f o r t h i s argument s t r o n g e r . I do not t h i n k i t i s necessary to repeat i t however as the p o i n t can be made u s i n g L e i s e r ' s c o n d i t i o n s . 69 15. R. S. P e t e r s , R e a s o n and H a b i t : The P a r a d o x o f M o r a l E d u c a t i o n . i n I s r a e l S c h e f f l e r ( e d . ) Philosophy and Education, ( s e c o n d e d i t i o n ) , B o s t o n : A l l y n and B a c o n , I n c . , 1966 , p. 257 . 16. J . K o v e s i , op. c i t . , p. 1 0 1 . 17. J . K o v e s i , op. c i t . , p. 110. 18. M r s . F o o t p o i n t s t o t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f t h e " b a c k g r o u n d " t o w h e t h e r a p r i n c i p l e i s a m o r a l p r i n c i p l e . T h i s b a c k g r o u n d i s , I b e l i e v e , s u p p l i e d by a m o r a l n o t i o n . See P. R. F o o t , Symposium: When i s a P r i n c i p l e a M o r a l P r i n c i p l e ? Proceedings of the A r i s t o t e l i a n Society 28, 1 9 5 4 , ( s u p p l e m e n t ) p. 108. 19. J . K o v e s i , op. c i t . , p. 109. 20. Ibid., pp. 1 0 7 - 1 0 8 . 21. Ibid., p. 1 0 3 . 22. A. I . M e l d e n , Rights and Right Conduct, O x f o r d : B a s i l B l a c k w e l l , 1959. 23. J . K o v e s i , op. c i t . , pp. 9 8 - 9 9 . 24. A. P. G r i f f i t h s , U l t i m a t e M o r a l P r i n c i p l e s : T h e i r J u s t i f i c a t i o n . i n Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 1 9 6 7 , p. 177. 25. Oxford English Dictionary V o l . V I I I , p. 1 3 7 7 . 26. R. S. P e t e r s , C o n c r e t e P r i n c i p l e s and t h e R a t i o n a l P a s s i o n s . i n J . G u s t a f s o n , e t al ( e d . ) Moral Education, Five Lectures, C a m b r i d g e : H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 7 0 , p. 36. 5. MORAL PRINCIPLES AND MORAL RULES Before o f f e r i n g a c r i t i q u e of the p h i l o s o p h i c b a s i s of Kohlberg's approach to moral education there i s a thorny-problem that must be t a c k l e d or, rather, t r e a d over. That i s the problem of the d i s t i n c t i o n between p r i n c i p l e s and r u l e s . I i n d i c a t e d at the beginning of t h i s paper t h a t I thought i t was important to make t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n and r e f e r r e d to ways i n which i t has been handled by v a r i o u s w r i t e r s . I a l s o took the l i b e r t y of making here and there i n my paper such statements as " t h i s i s a case of f o l l o w i n g a r u l e and t h e r e -f o r e d i f f e r e n t from a c t i n g on a p r i n c i p l e " . While we f e e l i n t u i t i v e l y t h a t there i s a d i f f e r e n c e between p r i n c i p l e s and r u l e s i t i s q u i t e another matter to s p e c i f y j u s t what the d i f -f erence i s . Part of the problem i s , of c o u r s e , t h a t they are both common terms encompassing d i v e r s e kinds of t h i n g s . 1 In the f o l l o w i n g d i s c u s s i o n , which w i l l c o n s i s t of few argu-ments and much s p e c u l a t i o n , I w i l l be r e f e r r i n g only to moral r u l e s and moral p r i n c i p l e s u n l e s s I s p e c i f y otherwise. There i s l i t t l e t r o u b l e g e t t i n g agreement t h a t 'every-one's i n t e r e s t s ought to be given equal c o n s i d e r a t i o n ' i s a p r i n c i p l e and 'the maximum speed on t h i s roadway i s 30 mph' i s a r u l e . We might not a l l agree that the l a t t e r i s a moral r u l e however. In f a c t , i t i s d i f f i c u l t to come up with an u n c o n t r o v e r s i a l example of a moral r u l e . Shwayder p o i n t s out t h a t moral r u l e s seldom gain e x p l i c i t f o r m u l a t i o n f o r the f o l l o w i n g reason: "The moment we t r a p a moral p r a c t i c e i n a 70 71 p r e s c r i p t i o n , we are almost bound to s p e c i f y s a n c t i o n and c l a r i f y the a p p l i c a t i o n . The r e s u l t i s u s u a l l y e i t h e r a law 2 of the land or a law of the church or something comparable". One can, I t h i n k , argue that the example given can l e g i t i -mately he c a l l e d a moral r u l e on the grounds t h a t i t i s a r u l e r e g u l a t i n g behavior which n e c e s s a r i l y a f f e c t s the wel-f a r e of others, but I admit t h a t i t i s not a happy example. It might be suggested that i n j u n c t i o n s such as 'don't l i e ' , 'keep promises', e t c . are s u r e l y common enough examples of moral r u l e s . While I don't want to deny that these can be examples of moral r u l e s , I must deny t h a t a l l would agree on c a l l i n g them such f o r they might as r e a d i l y be seen as examples of moral p r i n c i p l e s . It i s my o p i n i o n that whether an e x p r e s s i o n such as 'keep promises' i s a r u l e or a p r i n -c i p l e depends upon how i t i s h e l d and obeyed. More w i l l be s a i d on t h i s s u b j e c t p r e s e n t l y . Here I am concerned about an example of something we accept as a r u l e but not as a p r i n c i p l e . I f the example given i s unacceptable perhaps a r u l e r e g u l a t i n g sexual behavior - p r o h i b i t i n g i n c e s t f o r example — would be more ac c e p t a b l e s i n c e i t i s l e s s l i k e l y a law of the l a n d . Whether or not we agree on a p a r t i c u l a r example we can probably agree that c e r t a i n t h i n g s are true of the r u l e that are not true of what we have taken as a p a r a -digm case of a p r i n c i p l e . For example, t h a t the p r i n c i p l e i s a b s t r a c t and the r u l e i s c o n c r e t e ; that they are g e n e r a l i n d i f f e r e n t r e s p e c t s - while one covers a vast number of d i f f e r e n t a c t i o n s , the other covers an u n l i m i t e d number of 72 a c t i o n s of one k i n d ; that the r u l e i s d e r i v a b l e from a p r i n -c i p l e and that the p r i n c i p l e , s i n c e i t i s a fundamental p r i n -3 c i p l e , i s not j u s t i f i e d i n that way; that while we can speak of b r e a k i n g the r u l e i t i s l e s s c l e a r what we could mean by b r e a k i n g the p r i n c i p l e ; that we can speak of having the p r i n c i p l e or i t being our p r i n c i p l e but not of having the r u l e or i t being our r u l e ; and so on. But what of 'one ought not l i e ' or Melden's example 'one ought to give s p e c i a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n to one's parents'? Can we agree on which they are? They appear to be l e s s a b s t r a c t than the p r i n c i p l e and l e s s concrete than the r u l e ; they cover fewer kinds of a c t i o n s than the former and yet more than one k i n d of a c t i o n ; they are d e r i v a b l e from a p r i n c i p l e as was the r u l e , yet the idea of b reaking them f i t s l e s s c omfortably than i t d i d with the r u l e ; and we can speak of these as our p r i n c i p l e s or as r u l e s , e.g., Commandments. Perhaps i t would be u s e f u l to r e c o n s i d e r the p o i n t of d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between p r i n c i p l e s and r u l e s . It i s common f o r d e r i v a t i v e or lower-order p r i n c i p l e s to be c a l l e d r u l e s and t y p i c a l l y what i s meant by moral r u l e s i s the s o r t of t h i n g we f i n d l i s t e d i n Gert's book The Moral Rules - don't 4-k i l l , don't d e c e i v e , e t c . Wilson's " f i r s t - o r d e r p r i n c i p l e s " are a l t e r n a t e l y c a l l e d r u l e s and Peters o f t e n c a l l s d e r i v a t i v e p r i n c i p l e s " r u l e s of a more r e l a t i v e s o r t " . This simply i s n ' t a problem i n so f a r as everyday understanding and com-munication are concerned. Where the problem l i e s i s i n the adequacy of the model of r u l e s f o r understanding and t e a c h i n g 7 3 such c o n s i d e r a t i o n s as 'one ought not to cause i n j u r y to other persons' . The main problem c e n t r e s on whether or not these so-c a l l e d r u l e s have e x c e p t i o n s . The p o s s i b i l i t y of exceptions seems to be very c l o s e to the n o t i o n of a r u l e . What we are r e l u c t a n t to allow i s that at l e a s t what we c a l l fundamental p r i n c i p l e s , a r e e x c e p t i o n a b l e ; that i s , that there are occa-s i o n s when persons ought not to be r e s p e c t e d , when not every-one's i n t e r e s t s should be co n s i d e r e d e q u a l l y , and so on. The most s a t i s f a c t o r y attempt so f a r to d i s t i n g u i s h between r u l e s and p r i n c i p l e s and so save at l e a s t our h i g h e s t • . 5 p r i n c i p l e s from e x c e p t i o n s i s the one made by Marcus S i n g e r . Singer d i s t i n g u i s h e s between l o g i c a l p r i n c i p l e s - the " g e n e r a l -i z a t i o n argument", the " g e n e r a l i z a t i o n p r i n c i p l e " , the " p r i n -c i p l e of consequence" and the " p r i n c i p l e of j u s t i f i c a t i o n " -and d e r i v a t i v e , s u b s t a n t i v e p r i n c i p l e s such as " i t i s always wrong to cause unnecessary s u f f e r i n g " . The former are unex-c e p t i o n a b l e , while the l a t t e r are made so by a q u a l i f i c a t i o n such as "unnecessary", "unless there i s a reason to the con-t r a r y " , or the l i k e . Moral r u l e s are d i v i d e d i n t o three k i n d s : l o c a l r u l e s , e.g., r u l e s governing t a x a t i o n , n e u t r a l norms, e.g., t r a f f i c r e g u l a t i o n s , and fundamental moral r u l e s , "a s p e c i a l c l a s s " i n c l u d i n g such t h i n g s as r u l e s a g a i n s t l y i n g , s t e a l i n g , e t c . Moral r u l e s are e x c e p t i o n a b l e and i t i s t h i s p r i m a r i l y which makes them d i s t i n c t from p r i n c i p l e s . T h i s attempt has i t s problems, however, as B a i e r p o i n t s out i n h i s review: 74 Singer's own statements of v a r i o u s moral p r i n -c i p l e s make them i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from moral r u l e s . . . . What i s the d i f f e r e n c e between the p r i n c i p l e , " i f not everyone has the r i g h t to act i n a c e r t a i n way, then i t i s wrong to act i n t h a t way u n l e s s there i s a reason to the con-t r a r y or .a j u s t i f i c a t i o n " and the rule , " i f not everyone has the r i g h t to act i n a c e r t a i n way, then i t Is generallg wrong to act i n that way"?^ On the one hand we want p r i n c i p l e s , themselves unexcep-t i o n a b l e , which can provide grounds f o r r u l e s to which there are e x c e p t i o n s ; but on the other hand we don't want to be i n the p o s i t i o n of having to obey such p r i n c i p l e s when they d i c -t a t e unjust a c t i o n s . One ought not cause people i n j u r y works very w e l l i n p r o v i d i n g grounds f o r a l l s o r t s of t r a f f i c r u l e s to which we can admit of e x c e p t i o n s i n unusual c i r c u m s t a n c e s . But what happens when there i s no r u l e to which we can appeal and we c o n f r o n t a d e c i s i o n i n which we must e i t h e r cause i n j u r y or a l l o w a d i s a s t e r of much g r e a t e r magnitude? Ronald Dworkin has argued that the model of r u l e s i s inadequate i n l e g a l p h i l o s o p h y . He i s concerned to show th a t the law i s not only a system of r u l e s but c o n s i s t s a l s o of other standards such as p r i n c i p l e s and p o l i c i e s which operate d i f f e r e n t l y from r u l e s . C l e a r l y , the problems of l e g a l p h i l o s o p h y and those of moral p h i l o s o p h y are not the same. No one i s s u g g e s t i n g that m o r a l i t y i s j u s t a system of r u l e s so Dworkin's success i s not c e n t r a l to our concern, but h i s support f o r h i s c l a i m that p r i n c i p l e s and r u l e s are standards which operate i n d i f f e r e n t ways might be. He claims that there i s a d i f f e r e n c e i n the c h a r a c t e r of the d i r e c t i o n given by l e g a l r u l e s on the one hand and l e g a l p r i n c i p l e s on the 7 5 other. Rules, he says, "are a p p l i c a b l e i n an a l l - o r - n o t h i n g 7 f a s h i o n " . When there are e xceptions these can be w r i t t e n i n t o the r u l e f o r a more complete statement of i t . This i s not the case with p r i n c i p l e s . P r i n c i p l e s do not d i c t a t e r e s u l t s of t h e i r being f o l l o w e d i n the way r u l e s do. "A p r i n c i p l e l i k e 'no man may p r o f i t from h i s own wrong' does not even purport to set out c o n d i t i o n s t h a t make i t s a p p l i -c a t i o n necessary. Rather, i t s t a t e s a reason that argues i n one d i r e c t i o n , but does not n e c e s s i t a t e a p a r t i c u l a r d e c i s i o n " . Furthermore, i n any case where a p r i n c i p l e i s r e l e v a n t a d e c i -s i o n to act may not be based on i t , " ... but t h a t does not mean our p r i n c i p l e i s not a p r i n c i p l e ... because i n the next case, when these c o n t r a v e n i n g c o n s i d e r a t i o n s are absent or 9 l e s s weighty, the p r i n c i p l e may be d e c i s i v e " . F a i l u r e to act on a r e l e v a n t p r i n c i p l e i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n does not make i t any l e s s a p r i n c i p l e but n e i t h e r do such i n s t a n c e s count as e xceptions to the p r i n c i p l e as they do with r u l e s . Dworkin goes on, "we could not hope to capture these counter-i n s t a n c e s simply by a more extended statement of the p r i n -c i p l e . They are not, even i n t h e o r y , s u b j e c t to enumera-t i o n , ... l i s t i n g these ... would not make f o r a more accurate or complete statement of the principle"."''^ Is there a l s o a d i f f e r e n c e i n the c h a r a c t e r of the d i r e c t i o n given by moral r u l e s and that given by moral p r i n -c i p l e s ? Do moral r u l e s apply i n an a l l - o r - n o t h i n g f a s h i o n ? Here we run i n t o problems f o r i t seems to depend upon what we are w i l l i n g to a l l o w as a moral r u l e . Two of S i nger's types 76 of moral r u l e s — l o c a l r u l e s and n e u t r a l norms—seem to be l i k e l e g a l r u l e s but t h i s i s not s u r p r i s i n g s i n c e , as we saw i n the case of the example given at the begin n i n g of t h i s d i s c u s s i o n , they are a l s o r u l e s of law. The t h i r d type--the fundamental r u l e s — o f which 'don't s t e a l ' i s an example may or may not be l i k e Dworkin's l e g a l r u l e s . It seems to me that whether or not they operate l i k e l e g a l r u l e s depends upon how we use them, that i s on whether or not we apply them i n an a l l - o r - n o t h i n g f a s h i o n as f o r example i s done i n what I c a l l e d a c t i o n on p r i n c i p l e i n the pre v i o u s s e c t i o n . When we n use them i n t h i s way they are indeed r u l e s . I f they d i c t a t e what i s to be done i n any s i t u a t i o n , and a f a i l u r e to obey r e -q u i r e s an e x c e p t i o n a l circumstance which co u l d be made p a r t of the r u l e then they are moral r u l e s . I f , however, we see them as c o n s i d e r a t i o n s r e l e v a n t to a s i t u a t i o n without t h e i r mere r e l e v a n c e determining what must be done i n th a t s i t u a -t i o n , then they are more l i k e p r i n c i p l e s . I f , t h a t i s , one has to j u s t i f y one's a c t i o n on the p a r t i c u l a r c o n s i d e r a t i o n r a t h e r than h i s f a i l u r e to act on i t , i t i s u n l i k e a r u l e . The p o i n t that these " s o - c a l l e d moral r u l e s " or moral p r i n c i p l e s should not he conceived of as r u l e s was made by A. I. Melden i n h i s very important c o n t r i b u t i o n to moral p h i l o s o p h y : Rights and Right Conduct. While i t i s important to understand that there are s i t u a t i o n s i n which i t would be wrong to act on a p a r t i c u l a r p r i n c i p l e , i t i s a mistake to think that f o r t h i s reason there are exceptions to the p r i n -c i p l e and so i t must be a r u l e . The mistake l i e s i n a 77 f a i l u r e to understand the d i f f e r e n c e between being j u s t i f i e d i n p r e s e n t i n g a p r i n c i p l e as a moral c o n s i d e r a t i o n and being j u s t i f i e d i n a c t i n g on i t i n that s i t u a t i o n . T h i s i s to confuse two d i s t i n c t n o t i o n s — o b l i g a t i o n meeting a c t i o n s and o b l i g a t o r y a c t i o n s . For example, one i s always j u s t i f i e d i n p r e s e n t i n g the f a c t t h at an act would c o n s t i t u t e s t e a l i n g as a reason a g a i n s t doing that a c t ; however, t h a t i s not the same as sa y i n g that because the only way to procure an essen-t i a l drug i s to s t e a l i t , a man i s j u s t i f i e d i n d e p r i v i n g h i s wife of the drug and a l l o w i n g her to d i e . This does not a f f e c t the v a l i d i t y of the p r i n c i p l e one b i t — i t i s s t i l l the case that one ought not s t e a l . As Melden puts i t "Kant was r i g h t , then, i n i n s i s t i n g as men of p r i n c i p l e have always i n s i s t e d that a c o n s i d e r a t i o n l i k e 'one ought to give s p e c i a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n to one's p a r e n t s ' i s c a t e g o r i c a l . . . .the no t i o n of exce p t i o n s i s simply not a p p l i c a b l e here. To sup-pose that i t i s and e i t h e r that there are no exceptions or tha t there are exceptions d e r i v e s from the c o n f u s i o n of such c o n s i d e r a t i o n s with r u l e s o r , as i n Kant's case, with the no t i o n of Law."^ In l e g a l p h ilosophy the q u e s t i o n r e g a r d i n g p r i n c i p l e s and r u l e s was "does the law c o n s i s t of any standards t h a t are not r u l e s ? " ; the q u e s t i o n i n moral ph i l o s o p h y seems to be "does m o r a l i t y c o n s i s t of any standards that a r e , s t r i c t l y s peaking, r u l e s ? " . The answer to the l a t t e r q u e s t i o n must s u r e l y be that there are moral r u l e s but we must s p e c i f y what we would mean i n sa y i n g t h i s . One p o s s i b i l i t y i s that we c a l l a l l moral standards ' r u l e s ' but w i t h i n t h i s category of moral 78 r u l e s there are standards which operate d i f f e r e n t l y from one another. For one set we have the name ' p r i n c i p l e s ' while the o t h e r s are simply c a l l e d r u l e s . Another p o s s i b i l i t y i s to adopt the p o s i t i o n taken by Shwayder. A moral r u l e i s some p a r t i c u l a r group's a p p l i -c a t i o n of a maxim. That i s , a r u l e i s -a way of p l a c i n g p a r t i c u l a r a c t s as murder, t h i e v e r y , a d u l t e r y , d e c e i t , Indecency, and the l i k e . I f t h i s i s a l l we mean by a r u l e , then the concept does indeed have an Important p l a c e i n moral philosophy.12 I have heen q u e s t i o n i n g the adequacy of the model of r u l e s f o r understanding and t e a c h i n g moral p r i n c i p l e s and up to now have been t a l k i n g about the misunderstandings which can r e s u l t from t h i n k i n g of p r i n c i p l e s as r u l e s . These are: one, c o n c l u d i n g that there must be exceptions to p r i n c i p l e s and two, f a i l i n g to see the d i f f e r e n c e between being j u s t i f i e d i n c o n s i d e r i n g those aspects of a s i t u a t i o n made r e l e v a n t by a p r i n c i p l e and being j u s t i f i e d i n a c t i n g on that p r i n c i p l e i n that s i t u a t i o n . I would now l i k e to say a word about the adequacy of t h i s model f o r t e a c h i n g moral r u l e s or moral p r i n c i p l e s . C e r t a i n l y i n the process of t e a c h i n g such c o n s i d e r a t i o n s as 'one ought to keep promises' to c h i l d r e n these c o n s i d e r a -t i o n s have, at l e a s t i n the e a r l y stages of such t e a c h i n g , many of the f e a t u r e s common to r u l e s . They appear to have authors i n the form of e i t h e r p a r e n t s , t e a c h e r s , or l e g a l a u t h o r i t i e s . They can be broken and there are p e n a l t i e s f o r breaking them. In a d d i t i o n they seem to come with excep-t i o n s w r i t t e n i n : a c h i l d may be t o l d always to keep h i s 79 word except when h i s promise was made to another c h i l d and an a d u l t i s r e q u e s t i n g that he break i t . And, i t would seem, such t e a c h i n g c o u l d happen i n no other way. This i s where the o p p o r t u n i t y f o r the c h i l d to make what R. M. Hare c a l l s " d e c i s i o n s of p r i n c i p l e " i s v i t a l . What the c h i l d w i l l do i s not make t h i s r u l e more and more s p e c i f i c f o r i t i s s p e c i f i c when he i s i n t r o d u c e d to i t . He w i l l r a t h e r , i f he i s lucky and/or w e l l - t a u g h t , come to understand the p o i n t of the r u l e and i t w i l l become l e s s a r u l e with an e v e r -i n c r e a s i n g set of e x c e p t i o n s and more a p r i n c i p l e — a good reason f o r doing c e r t a i n sorts of t h i n g s and not doing o t h e r s — b u t never a p r e c i s e answer to the q u e s t i o n "what i s i t I must do now?" I f i t becomes h i s p r i n c i p l e i t w i l l become a value he h a s — a motive that s e n s i t i z e s him to p a r t i c u l a r f e a t u r e s of s i t u a t i o n s and moves him to act i n accordance with those s e n s i t i v i t i e s . Perhaps there i s more than meets the eye i n the r a t h e r t r i v i a l - l o o k i n g p o i n t t h a t we have p r i n c i p l e s but don't have r u l e s . I f there i s , we can hark back to a l l t h a t has been s a i d i n e a r l i e r s e c t i o n s of t h i s paper. When a person has a p r i n c i p l e i t c o n s t i t u t e s i i i s motive f o r doing c e r t a i n t h i n g s and the reason why he sees c e r t a i n kinds of s i t u a t i o n s as c a l l i n g f o r c e r t a i n kinds of a c t i o n . F ollow-i n g r u l e s c e r t a i n l y i n v o l v e s doing what there are reasons f o r doing but i t need not i n v o l v e the p e r s o n a l commitment that i s p a r t of having a p r i n c i p l e . 80 FOOTNOTES F o r an i n t e r e s t i n g t r e a t m e n t o f t h e c o n c e p t o f r u l e s see K. B a l e r , The Moral Point of View, New Y o r k : Random House, 1966; M. B l a c k , The A n a l y s i s o f R u l e s , Models and Metaphors, I t h a c a : C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1962; B. J . D i g g s , R u l e s and U t i l i t a r i a n i s m , M. D. B a y i e s ( e d . ) Contemporary U t i l i t a r i a n i s m , New Y o r k : D o u b l e d a y , 1 9 6 8 , 2 0 3 - 2 3 8 ; B. M. L e i s e r , Custom, Law, and Morality, New Y o r k : D o u b l e d a y , 1 9 6 9 , and J . R a w l s , Two C o n c e p t s o f R u l e s , M. D. B a y l e s ( e d . ) Contemporary U t i l i t a r i a n i s m , New Y o r k : D o u b l e d a y , 1 9 6 8 , 59-98. Works d e a l i n g w i t h t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n p r i n c i p l e s and r u l e s : R. M. D w o r k i n , The M o d e l o f R u l e s , University of Chicago Law Review, 3 5 , 1 9 6 7 , 1 4 - 4 6 ; D. S. S h w a y d e r , M o r a l R u l e and M o r a l M a x i m s , Ethics, 67, 1 9 5 7 , 2 6 9 - 2 8 5 ; and M. G. S i n g e r , M o r a l R u l e s and P r i n c i p l e s , A. I . M e l d e n ( e d . ) Essays in Moral Philosophy, S e a t t l e : U n i v e r s i t y o f W a s h i n g t o n P r e s s , 1958. D. S. S h w a y d e r , M o r a l R u l e s and M o r a l Maxims. Ethics, 4 7 , 1 9 5 7 , p. 2 7 3-274. See R. S. P e t e r s , Ethics and Education, New Y o r k : S c o t t F o r e s m a n , 1 9 6 7 , on t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e f u n d a m e n t a l p r i n c i p l e s. B. G e r t , The Moral Rules, New Y o r k : H a r p e r and Row, 1966. M. G. S i n g e r , M o r a l R u l e s and P r i n c i p l e s , A. I . M e l d e n , ( e d . ) Essays in Moral Philosophy, S e a t t l e : U n i v e r s i t y o f W a s h i n g t o n P r e s s , 1958. K. B a i e r , R e v i e w o f A. I . M e l d e n ( e d . ) Essays in Moral Philosophy, op. c i t . Philosophical Review, 69, 1 9 6 0 , 4 1 6 - 1 4 7 . R. D w o r k i n , The M o d e l o f R u l e s , University of Chicago Law Review, 3 5 , 1 9 6 7 , p. 25. I b i d . , p. 26. Ibid. Ibid. A. I . M e l d e n , Rights and B l a c k w e l l , 1 9 5 9 , p. 42. I t s h o u l d be p o i n t e d o u t t h a t c o n s i d e r a t i o n s s u c h Right Conduct, O x f o r d : B a s i l See a l s o s e c t i o n s V and V I I . t h a t w h i l e M e l d e n was a r g u i n g as 'one o u g h t t o g i v e s p e c i a l 81 c o n s i d e r a t i o n t o o n e ' s p a r e n t s ' s h o u l d n o t be c o n c e i v e d o f as r u l e s he c h o s e t o c a l l t h e s e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s n o t p r i n c i p l e s : b u t maxims. 12. D. S. S h w a y d e r , op. c i t . , p. 278. 6. KOHLBERG'S ACCOUNT OF MORAL P R I N C I P L E S — A CRITIQUE P r o f e s s o r K o h l b e r g c l a i m s t o have d e f i n e d an a p p r o a c h t o m o r a l e d u c a t i o n w h i c h (1) i s b a s e d on t h e p s y c h o l o g i c a l and s o c i o l o g i c a l f a c t s o f m o r a l d e v e l o p m e n t , C2) i n v o l v e s e d u c a t i o n a l methods o f s t i m u l a t i n g m o r a l c h a n g e , (.3) i s b a s e d on a p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y d e f e n s i b l e c o n c e p t o f m o r a l i t y , (4) i s i n a c c o r d w i t h a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s y s t e m g u a r a n t e e i n g f r e e d o m o f b e l i e f , and (5 ) u n i t e s p h i l o s o p h i c and p s y c h o l o g i c a l c o n s i d -e r a t i o n s . 1 I t i s t h e t h i r d c l a i m , t h a t h i s a p p r o a c h t o m o r a l e d u c a t i o n i s b a s e d on a p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y d e f e n s i b l e c o n -c e p t o f m o r a l i t y , t h a t w i l l be c o n s i d e r e d i n t h i s c h a p t e r . T h i s c r i t i q u e w i l l be b a s e d e n t i r e l y on t h e p a p e r e n t i t l e d " S t a g e s o f D e v e l o p m e n t a s a B a s i s f o r M o r a l E d u c a t i o n " as K o h l b e r g ' s a t t e m p t t o s e t f o r t h t h e p h i l o s o p h i c b a s i s o f h i s ' work i s t h e c h i e f f o c u s o f t h a t p a p e r . S i n c e K o h l b e r g ' s t h e o r y o f m o r a l d e v e l o p m e n t and h i s m o r a l t h e o r y were s e t o u t i n t h e f i r s t c h a p t e r t h e y w i l l o n l y be s u m m a r i z e d h e r e . K o h l b e r g h o l d s t h a t m o r a l d e v e l o p m e n t p r o c e e d s t h r o u g h s t a g e s w h i c h f o r m an i n v a r i a n t s e q u e n c e and a r e h i e r a r c h i c a l . E a c h s t a g e i n t h e s e q u e n c e r e p r e s e n t s a more a d e q u a t e s t r u c t u r e o r way o f h a n d l i n g e x p e r i e n c e t h a n t h e one b e f o r e i t . H i s t h e o r y i s i n t e r a c t i o n i s t ; he h o l d s t h a t i t i s t h r o u g h i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h h i s s o c i a l e n v i r o n m e n t t h a t t h e c h i l d d e v e l o p s s t r u c t u r e s o f p r o g r e s s i v e l y h i g h e r s t a g e s . A l t h o u g h a l l s i x s t a g e s a r e n e c e s s a r y s t a g e s i n 82 83 moral development only the highestones are f u l l y moral. The c r i t e r i a a c c o r d i n g to which these h i g h e s t stages are judged to be more adequate developmentally are the c r i t e r i a of i n -creased d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n and i n t e g r a t i o n . These c r i t e r i a , Kohlberg b e l i e v e s , correspond to the formal c r i t e r i a of p r e s c r i p t i v i t y and u n i v e r s a l i z a b i l i t y which are h e l d by many p h i l o s o p h e r s to c h a r a c t e r i z e moral judgements. In t h i s paper Kohlberg i s e x p l i c i t l y concerned with s e t t i n g f o r t h the p h i l o s o p h i c b a s i s f o r h i s d e f i n i t i o n of moral m a t u r i t y . He says, "we d e f i n e m o r a l i t y i n terms of the formal c h a r a c t e r of a moral judgement or a moral p o i n t of 2 view, r a t h e r than i n terms of i t s c o n t e n t . " He agrees with those p h i l o s o p h e r s who hold that d e r i v a t i o n from moral p r i n -c i p l e s i s the c e n t r a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of judgements t h a t are f u l l y moral. To r e f e r to a stage of moral development as a mature stage i s to say t h a t moral thought at that stage has the f e a t u r e of judgements that are genuinely moral and, i n f a c t , Kohlberg r e f e r s to these mature stages as " p r i n c i p l e d s t a g e s . " Kohlberg says that to understand m o r a l i t y i t i s neces-sary to understand the nature and f u n c t i o n i n g of moral p r i n -c i p l e s . It i s mainly with h i s account of the nature and f u n c t i o n i n g of moral p r i n c i p l e s t h at I s h a l l be concerned i n t h i s chapter. He begins t h i s account by p o i n t i n g to the uniqueness of moral judgements. T h e i r uniqueness, Kohlberg b e l i e v e s , l i e s i n the f a c t t h at they are p r i n c i p l e d . He goes on to 84 c l a r i f y h i s conception of moral p r i n c i p l e s by c o n t r a s t i n g i t with what he c a l l s misuses of the concept of moral p r i n c i p l e . He says " a l l the misuses of the concept of moral p r i n c i p l e thus i n v o l v e a f a i l u r e e i t h e r to u n i v e r s a l i z e a ' p r i n c i p l e ' or to reduce i t to a guide to the p e r c e p t i o n of the claims of 3 persons i n a moral s i t u a t i o n . " My c r i t i q u e of Kohlberg's account w i l l c entre roughly on these i s s u e s : on the s o - c a l l e d "misuses of the concept of moral p r i n c i p l e " and on the a l l e g e d uniqueness of moral development. I s h a l l begin w i t h Kohlberg's attempt to c l a r i f y the nature and f u n c t i o n of moral p r i n c i p l e s . As was mentioned above Kohlberg does t h i s by c o n t r a s t i n g what he c a l l s misuses of the concept of moral p r i n c i p l e with i t s proper use. The f i r s t misuse c o n s i s t s i n c o n f u s i n g r u l e s with p r i n c i p l e s , t h a t i s , i n f a i l i n g to u n i v e r s a l i z e p r i n c i p l e s . Kohlberg begins: "A moral p r i n c i p l e i s a u n i v e r s a l mode of choosing, a r u l e of choosing which we want a l l people to adopt i n a l l s i t u a t i o n s . By ' p r i n c i p l e ' we mean something more a b s t r a c t than the o r d i n a r y r u l e . " He proceeds to out-l i n e , as an example of t h i s f i r s t misuse of p r i n c i p l e , a case where " r u l e s l i k e the Ten Commandments" are l a b e l l e d p r i n -c i p l e s or r e f e r e n c e i s made to the p r i n c i p l e of l o y a l t y to your f a m i l y . The reason these are not p r i n c i p l e s , says Kohl-berg, i s that one cannot u n i v e r s a l i z e or g e n e r a l i z e them to a l l s i t u a t i o n s . The reason one cannot u n i v e r s a l i z e such r u l e s as "be l o y a l to your f a m i l y " i s t h a t "not everybody has a f a m i l y . " 85 Now, on our i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of p r i n c i p l e the above example does not c o n s t i t u t e a misuse of p r i n c i p l e . I f the p r i n c i p l e of l o y a l t y to one's f a m i l y were a j u s t i f i a b l e p r i n -c i p l e i t would be u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e by v i r t u e of being true f o r anyone who d i d have a f a m i l y . A p r i n c i p l e of t h i s very s o r t was co n s i d e r e d i n an e a r l i e r p a r t of t h i s paper as a f i n e example of a moral p r i n c i p l e ; i t was the one borrowed from Melden: 'one ought to give s p e c i a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n to one's p a r e n t s ' . Not only can p r i n c i p l e s such as that of l o y a l t y to one's f a m i l y not be u n i v e r s a l i z e d — i n Kohlberg's o p i n i o n - - t h e y a l s o admit of e x c e p t i o n s . He contends that l o y a l t y to one's f a m i l y cannot be a p r i n c i p l e because had H i t l e r been a member of one's f a m i l y one would not have been bound to l o y a l t y to him. Arguments have a l r e a d y been presented to show how i t i s t h at p r i n c i p l e s are unex c e p t i o n a b l e : i . e . , that although a p r i n c i p l e ' s r e l e v a n c e to a p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n makes i t a c o n s i d e r a t i o n that ought to be taken i n t o account t h i s does not mean that a c t i o n on that p r i n c i p l e i s n e c e s s a r i l y o b l i -5 gatory i n th a t s i t u a t i o n . So, i t i s c e r t a i n l y t r u e , as Kohl-berg suggests, that i f H i t l e r were a member of one's f a m i l y , l o y a l t y to him would not be o b l i g a t o r y . The reason f o r t h i s i s t h a t 'one ought to prevent unnecessary s u f f e r i n g ' i s a l s o a r e l e v a n t p r i n c i p l e i n such a s i t u a t i o n , and one that takes p r i o r i t y over the o t h e r — o n e simply would not be j u s t i f i e d i n a c t i n g on a p r i n c i p l e of l o y a l t y i n that s i t u a t i o n . S i m i l a r l y , i f the Ten Commandments are not p r i n c i p l e s i t i s because of the 86 way they are o f t e n h e l d as i n f l e x i b l e i n j u n c t i o n s i s s u e d by a d i v i n e a u t h o r i t y or t h a t they are simply not v a l i d , t h a t i s , not backed by reason. I t i s not because they f a i l to s p e c i f y the p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n of every person at every p o i n t i n time (e.g., by r e f e r r i n g to parents which not every-one h a s ) , nor i s i t because a c t i o n on them i n some s i t u a t i o n s may not c o n s t i t u t e r i g h t a c t i o n . I don't b e l i e v e Kohlberg has succeeded i n exposing a misuse of the concept of moral p r i n c i p l e i n t h i s case. I am not sugg e s t i n g that the Ten Commandments and " l o y a l t y to one's f a m i l y " name moral p r i n c i p l e s but th a t Kohlberg has not shown us why they do not. So f a r , he has done l i t t l e to c l a r i f y the n o t i o n of a p r i n c i p l e or to d i s t i n g u i s h p r i n c i p l e s from r u l e s . More s e r i o u s , i t seems to me, i s h i s misuse of ' u n i v e r s a l i z a b i l i t y ' . When he can say t h a t the reason the p r i n c i p l e of l o y a l t y to f a m i l y cannot be u n i v e r s a l i z e d i s that not everybody has a f a m i l y , one can only wonder what he means when he says that moral judgements are p r i n c i p l e d . What does Kohlberg mean i n sa y i n g that a misuse of the concept of moral p r i n c i p l e i n v o l v e s a f a i l u r e to u n i v e r s a l i z e a p r i n c i p l e ? What does he mean by u n i v e r s a l i z a b i l i t y ? This i s , a f t e r a l l , a very important n o t i o n i n h i s theory s i n c e i t i s one of the c r i t e r i a a l l e g e d l y h e l d i n common by the psycho-l o g i s t (as i n t e g r a t i o n ) and the p h i l o s o p h e r as c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of judgements that are f u l l y moral. It i s the key to the u n i f i c a t i o n of the p h i l o s o p h i c and p s y c h o l o g i c a l c o n s i d e r a -t i o n s which he sees to be the great s t r e n g t h of h i s approach 87 to moral e d u c a t i o n . I t i s v i t a l to h i s c l a i m that t h i s ap-proach i s based on a p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y d e f e n s i b l e concept of m o r a l i t y . Kohlberg's statement that "a moral p r i n c i p l e i s a u n i -v e r s a l mode of choosing" could have been i n t e r p r e t e d to mean that everyone c o u l d or should base h i s d e c i s i o n s and cho i c e s on moral p r i n c i p l e s i n s i t u a t i o n s of moral c o n f l i c t . On t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n h i s use of the s i n g u l a r , "a moral p r i n -c i p l e i s . . . ", would be i n s i g n i f i c a n t and ' u n i v e r s a l ' would have a p e r f e c t l y o r d i n a r y meaning. But t h i s i s not what Kohlberg i s s a y i n g . He i s saying that a p r i n c i p l e i s not u n i v e r s a l or u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e unless i t a p p l i e s to a l l people i n a l l s i t u a t i o n s and h i s use of the s i n g u l a r i s very s i g n i f i c a n t . This gives r i s e to three q u e s t i o n s : one, i s or are, there any such p r i n c i p l e (s )?; two, what sense can be made of Kohlberg's c r i t i c i s m of f a i l i n g to u n i v e r s a l i z e a p r i n c i p l e " ; and t h r e e , does t h i s n o t i o n of u n i v e r s a l i z a b i l i t y " f i t " the p h i l o s o p h e r ' s c r i t e r i o n of u n i v e r s a l i z a b i l i t y ? The f i r s t q u e s t i o n of whether there can be any moral p r i n c i p l e s given Kohlberg's view i s too complicated to r e c e i v e a d e t a i l e d treatment here. C e r t a i n l y , many of the l i k e l y c a n d i d a t e s , e.g., 'one ought not cause i n j u r y to others', 'one ought not d e c e i v e ' , 'one ought to give s p e c i a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n to one's p a r e n t s ' e t c . , are r u l e d out e i t h e r because they do not apply to everyone (e.g., those who don't have p a r e n t s ) or they don't apply, i . e . , aren't o b l i g a t o r y , i n a l l s i t u a t i o n s . It i s easy to t h i n k of s i t u a t i o n s i n which decep t i o n and even 88 causing i n j u r y c o u l d r e p r e s e n t the best course of a c t i o n . Such p r i n c i p l e s as 'people's i n t e r e s t s should be con-s i d e r e d e q u a l l y ' , 'people's welfare should be cared f o r ' , 'persons should be t r e a t e d with r e s p e c t ' seem as though they might q u a l i f y . A c t u a l l y Kohlberg r u l e s out the p r i n c i p l e of benevolence. He says, "while benevolence can be u n i v e r s a l i z e d i n the sense of 'everyone should care f o r the w e l f a r e of a l l o t h e r s ' , when there i s a c o n f l i c t between w e l f a r e s , benevolence can provide no c r i t e r i o n except that of maximization." And he holds that the p r i n c i p l e of j u s t i c e i s the only true moral p r i n c i p l e . I t seems to me that one could c e r t a i n l y argue, as P e t e r s has done, that other p r i n c i p l e s are a l s o i n v o l v e d i n 7 a p p l y i n g the p r i n c i p l e of j u s t i c e . It i s a l s o at l e a s t arguable that the p r i n c i p l e of j u s t i c e i s based on the p r i n c i -p l e of r e s p e c t f o r persons and so s u r e l y the s t a t u s of t h i s p r i n c i p l e as a moral p r i n c i p l e cannot be denied. Secondly, Kohlberg's a c c u s a t i o n of those who f a i l to u n i v e r s a l i z e p r i n c i p l e s i s e i t h e r vacuous or n o n s e n s i c a l . One simply cannot u n i v e r s a l i z e ( i n h i s sense of u n i v e r s a l i z e ) what we o r d i n a r i l y take to be p r i n c i p l e s as he p o i n t s out i n the case of "the p r i n c i p l e of l o y a l t y . " How then can anyone be blamed f o r f a i l i n g to u n i v e r s a l i z e them? On the other hand, what he takes to be p r i n c i p l e s , i . e . , the p r i n c i p l e s of j u s -t i c e , are a l r e a d y u n i v e r s a l so there r e a l l y i s n o t h i n g to be done . It i s perhaps to h i s c r e d i t that he i s not e n t i r e l y l o y a l to t h i s view of u n i v e r s a l i t y . His n o t i o n of more i n t e g r a t e d judgements i s the n o t i o n of judgements r e g a r d i n g 89 p a r t i c u l a r s which are a p p l i c a b l e to a l l others who are not d i f f e r e n t i n a r e l e v a n t way from the judger. He does, i n a passage d i s c u s s i n g a stage one response, say: " ... he does not answer with a moral judgement that i s u n i v e r s a l ( a p p l i e s to a l l s i t u a t i o n s of t h i s kind) or that has any impersonal or g i d e a l ground". Cthe i t a l i c s are mine) In regard to q u e s t i o n three I quote from Kohlberg's paper: "Corresponding to the c r i t e r i o n of i n t e g r a t i o n i s the moral c r i t e r i o n of u n i v e r s a l i t y ... The c l a i m of p r i n c i p l e d m o r a l i t y i s that i t d e f i n e s the r i g h t f o r anyone i n any s i t u -9 a t i o n " . This n o t i o n of u n i v e r s a l i z a b i l i t y cannot be claimed to " f i t " the p h i l o s o p h e r ' s c r i t e r i o n of u n i v e r s a l i z a b i l i t y . The c l a i m of p r i n c i p l e d m o r a l i t y i s that i f an a c t i o n i s r i g h t , or i f a c t i o n on a p r i n c i p l e i s o b l i g a t o r y , f o r one person i n a p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n , the a c t i o n i s r i g h t , or the p r i n c i p l e o b l i g a t o r y , f o r anyone i n that s i t u a t i o n . More w i l l be s a i d about t h i s i n the d i s c u s s i o n which f o l l o w s r e g a r d i n g Kohlberg's c l a i m as to the uniqueness of moral judgements and of moral development. Kohlberg's b e l i e f t h a t the uniqueness of moral judge-ments, and t h e r e f o r e of moral development, l i e s i n the f a c t t h a t they are p r i n c i p l e d i s e v i d e n t i n the f o l l o w i n g paragraph. Many, although not a l l , p h i l o s o p h i c treatments of m o r a l i t y view the c e n t r a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of adequate moral judgement as i t s d e r i v a t i o n from 'moral p r i n c i p l e s ' . I t i s e v i d e n t enough that most of our value judgements are not d i r e c t l y based on p r i n c i p l e s . When we judge a m a r t i n i or a p a i n t i n g or a s c i e n t i f i c a r t i c l e as good, we do not attempt to d e r i v e our judgements from p r i n c i p l e . I f a bad 9 0 p a i n t i n g i s made a c c o r d i n g t o p r i n c i p l e , so much t h e w o r s e f o r t h e p r i n c i p l e . N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e w h o l e n o t i o n t h a t t h e r e i s a d i s t i n c t i v e l y m o r a l f o r m o f j u d g e m e n t demands t h a t m o r a l j u d g e m e n t s be p r i n c i p l e d . . . . When an e f f o r t i s made t o f o r m u l a t e a j u d g e m e n t w h i c h i s p r e s c r i p t i v e and u n i v e r s a l , t h e j u d g e m e n t a l m o s t o f n e c e s s i t y w i l l be made i n t e r m s o f a m o r a l p r i n c i p l e . To u n d e r s t a n d s t a g e - 6 m o r a l i t y , t h e r e f o r e we need t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e n a t u r e and f u n c t i o n i n g o f m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s . C l e a r l y K o h l b e r g b e l i e v e s t h a t what i s d i s t i n c t i v e a b o u t m o r a l j u d g e m e n t s i s t h a t t h e y a r e p r i n c i p l e d . T h i s v e r y i m p o r t a n t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c i s , h o w e v e r , h e l d i n t h o s e p h i l o s o p h i c t r e a t m e n t s t o w h i c h he a l l u d e s t o be common t o a l l v a l u e j u d g e m e n t s i n c l u d i n g s u c h j u d g e m e n t s as " t h i s i s a good painting"."''"'" T h i s , i n H a r e ' s t h e s i s , i s t h e f e a t u r e o f u n i v e r s a l i z a b i l i t y and i s a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c t h a t v a l u e j u d g e -ments s h a r e w i t h d e s c r i p t i v e j u d g e m e n t s . I t i s b e c a u s e v a l u e j u d g e m e n t s b e l o n g t o a r a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e t h a t , i n o r d e r t o be j u s t i f i e d , t h e y d e p e n d on p r i n c i p l e s i n t h i s way. I t i s n o t t h e c a s e t h a t m o r a l j u d g e m e n t s a r e d i s t i n c t f r o m o t h e r v a l u e j u d g e m e n t s i n t h a t m o r a l j u d g e m e n t s a r e r a t i o n a l , t h a t i s , t h e y a r e b a c k e d by r e a s o n s , w h i l e a l l o t h e r s a r e e m o t i o n a l and i r r a t i o n a l . K o h l b e r g r i g h t l y p o i n t s o u t t h a t w h i l e m o r a l j u d g e m e n t s a r e j u d g e m e n t s a b o u t t h e r i g h t and t h e g o o d , n o t a l l j u d g e -ments o f r i g h t and good a r e m o r a l j u d g e m e n t s - t h e y may be a e s t h e t i c , p r u d e n t i a l , r e l i g i o u s , p o l i t i c a l , e t c . Where he goes wrong i s i n a s s u m i n g t h a t j u d g e m e n t s f r o m o t h e r p o i n t s o f v i e w ( t h a n t h e m o r a l ) a r e n o t p r i n c i p l e d . The d i s t i n c t i o n t h a t i s a v a l i d one i n t h i s r e s p e c t i s t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n 91 e x p r e s s i o n o f o p i n i o n o r o f l i k e o r d i s l i k e and j u d g e m e n t s o f v a l u e . We do f r e q u e n t l y u s e t h e same e x p r e s s i o n t o make known a l i k e o r d i s l i k e as we do t o make a j u d g e m e n t o f v a l u e . The e x p r e s s i o n o f f a v o u r i s most t y p i c a l l y t h e i n t e n t b e h i n d s u c h p h r a s e s as " t h i s i s a good m a r t i n i " . When t h i s i s t h e c a s e we mean s i m p l y " I l i k e t h i s m a r t i n i " . H o wever, we a l s o e x p r e s s o u r d e l i g h t o v e r an a c t i o n , r a t h e r t h a n o u r m o r a l e v a l u a t i o n o f i t , by c a l l i n g i t g o o d , as f o r e x a m p l e we m i g h t when a member o f t h e team f o r w h i c h we a r e c h e e r i n g t r a m p l e s an o p p o n e n t i n o r d e r t o s c o r e . A n o t h e r f e a t u r e o f m o r a l j u d g e m e n t s i s p r e s c r i p t i v i t y . T h i s t o o i s a f e a t u r e common t o a l l v a l u e j u d g e m e n t s and n o t j u s t m o r a l o n e s i n so f a r as we c h o o s e t h o s e t h i n g s , e . g . , p a i n t i n g s , s c i e n t i f i c a r t i c l e s , e t c . , t h a t a r e good o v e r t h o s e t h a t a r e n o t g o o d . C l r e a l i z e t h a t p r e s c r i p t i v i t y i s n o t a f e a t u r e o f a l l v a l u e j u d g e m e n t s as s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d l y , o r i n q u i t e t h e same way, a s i t i s a f e a t u r e o f m o r a l j u d g e -m e n t s . I t I s n o t , h o w e v e r , t h a t w h i c h d i s t i n g u i s h e s m o r a l f r o m n o n - m o r a l v a l u e j u d g e m e n t s . ) P a u l T a y l o r , i n h i s i m p o r t a n t work Normative Discourse, d i s t i n g u i s h e s b e t w e e n t h e v a r i o u s v a l u e " l a n g u a g e s " , s u c h as m o r a l , e c o n o m i c , a e s t h e t i c , r e l i g i o u s , i n t e l l e c t u a l , and shows t h a t w h i l e t h e y r e p r e s e n t d i f f e r e n t " p o i n t s o f v i e w " t h e i r l o g i c i s t h e same; t h e y a l l b e l o n g i n t h e r e a l m o f n o r m a t i v e d i s c o u r s e . T a y l o r h o l d s t h a t i t i s t h e r u l e s o f v a l i d i n f e r e n c e common t o a l l n o r m a t i v e l a n g u a g e s w h i c h d i s -t i n g u i s h n o r m a t i v e f r o m o t h e r r e a l m s o f d i s c o u r s e ( e . g . , 92 s c i e n t i f i c ) . It i s r u l e s of re l e v a n c e only that separate one normative language, such as moral language, from another, such as a e s t h e t i c , r e l i g i o u s , p o l i t i c a l , e t c . That i s to say, they are a l l a l i k e i n heing r a t i o n a l . T a y l o r says: What I do wish to make c l e a r i s that the d i f f e r -ence between the two p o i n t s of view l i e s i n the rel e v a n c e of the reasons accepted i n j u s t i f i c a -t i o n of a given value judgement, not i n the goodness of the reasons. . . . a l l normative languages are used in fundamentally the same ways for the same purposes, but d i f f e r e n t normative languages are being used in these ways for these purposes.^ I t would seem t h a t the v a l i d i t y of Kohlberg's c l a i m that the "whole n o t i o n that there i s a d i s t i n c t i v e l y moral form of judgement demands that moral judgements be p r i n c i p l e d " depends upon h i s showing not t h a t moral judgements are p r i n -c i p l e d but that judgements of value from a l l other p o i n t s of view are not p r i n c i p l e d ; t h a t i s to say, they are not r a t i o n a l — t h e y cannot be r a t i o n a l l y j u s t i f i e d . Now i f Ta y l o r i s c o r r e c t there i s no d i s t i n c t i v e l y moral form of judgement. What d i s t i n g u i s h e s a moral from, say, an aes-t h e t i c judgement are the r u l e s of r e l e v a n c e which determine what makes the judgement a moral and not an a e s t h e t i c one. So f a r as h i s moral theory i s concerned, the uniqueness Kohl-berg c l a i m s f o r moral judgements must be found i n these ( r u l e s of r e l e v a n c e ) and not i n denying that there are normative p r i n c i p l e s other than moral ones. R. S. Peters has attempted to show t h a t the p r i n c i p l e of j u s t i c e i s a p r e s u p p o s i t i o n of a l l p r a c t i c a l d i s c o u r s e — i t 93 13 i s "the p r i n c i p l e t h at there should be p r i n c i p l e s " . John Rawls has argued that j u s t i c e as f a i r n e s s i s the fundamental 14 concept of m o r a l i t y . In t h i s sense the p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e are the r u l e s of r e l e v a n c e d e f i n i n g the moral p o i n t of view. Now showing that a l l adequate moral judgements are d e r i v a b l e from these does not i n any way preclu d e judge-ments not d e r i v a b l e from them being p r i n c i p l e d or r a t i o n a l but merely from being moral. I t h i n k that Kohlberg i s , i n f a c t , very much i n t e r e s t e d i n the r u l e s of r e l e v a n c e of m o r a l i t y and sees moral judge-ments not simply as judgements with a d i s t i n c t form but as judgements having to do with j u s t i c e and w e l f a r e . Evidence of t h i s i s found i n h i s many statements of the s o r t : "There i s no moral s i t u a t i o n t h at does not i n v o l v e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of people's happiness or welfa r e and c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of equal 15 treatment between people". Although I have quoted him say i n g "we d e f i n e m o r a l i t y i n terms of the fo r m a l c h a r a c t e r of a moral judgement . . . r a t h e r than i n terms of i t s con-t e n t " he leaves no doubt about h i s c o n c e p t i o n of m o r a l i t y as j u s t i c e and says at another p o i n t i n h i s paper "Now i t i s c l e a r . . . th a t one cannot u l t i m a t e l y separate form and con-16 tent In moral a n a l y s i s " . I t would seem that although he may be c o r r e c t about the content of m o r a l i t y , he i s wrong i n c o n s t r u i n g i t as d i s t i n c t i v e because of i t s form. His c l a i m that "When an e f f o r t i s made to formulate a judgement which i s p r e s c r i p t i v e and u n i v e r s a l , the judgement almost of neces-s i t y w i l l be made i n terms of a moral p r i n c i p l e " i s j u s t f a l s e and i f h i s f u r t h e r c l a i m that "To understand stage-6 m o r a l i t y , t h e r e f o r e we need to understand . . . moral p r i n -c i p l e s " f o l l o w s from i t , i t too i s open to q u e s t i o n . I do not wish to deny the importance of moral p r i n c i p l e s to mature m o r a l i t y or moral education but only to p o i n t to the problem i n c o n s t r u i n g m o r a l i t y as unique because moral judge-ments are p r i n c i p l e d . And i f t h i s mistaken n o t i o n forms the b a s i s of Kohlberg's theory of moral development i t would p o i n t to problems there as w e l l . The uniqueness of moral develop-ment i s i n q u e s t i o n i f the h i g h e s t stages of development are p r i n c i p l e d simply because moral judgements made at these stages are p r i n c i p l e d . Kohlberg b e l i e v e s that there are developmental l e v e l s of moral d i s c o u r s e and the h i g h e r stages of moral thought are r e v e a l e d i n the more advanced l e v e l s of d i s c o u r s e . But Kohlberg's developmental l e v e l s of moral d i s c o u r s e are very l i k e T a y l o r ' s stages of j u s t i f i c a t i o n and these stages apply 17 to a l l normative d i s c o u r s e . The q u e s t i o n then a r i s e s whether what Kohlberg has d i s c o v e r e d and i n t e r p r e t e d as u n i q u e l y moral development i s not i n f a c t normative develop-ment or one aspect of the development of r a t i o n a l i t y . This q u e s t i o n becomes more p r e s s i n g when claims l i k e the f o l l o w i n g are put forward s e r i o u s l y by developmental p s y c h o l o g i s t s . W i l l i a m Kay w r i t e s " ... we a l l agree on the e s s e n t i a l s -c h i l d r e n develop m o r a l l y j u s t as they develop i n t e l l e c t u a l l y , 18 s p i r i t u a l l y , and p h y s i c a l l y " . And Kay c i t e s r e f e r e n c e s to work done on r e l i g i o u s development. The p o i n t i s : how 95 unique i s moral development and what i s unique about i t ? I t cannot be, as we have seen, that at the h i g h e s t stages of moral development judgements are p r i n c i p l e d . It would seem, then, t h a t Kohlberg's moral theory, i n so f a r as he i n s i s t s t h a t m o r a l i t y i s unique because moral judgements are p r i n c i p l e d , i s wanting. His argument f o r the uniqueness of moral development i s i n need of defense p r e -c i s e l y because of i t s dependence on the former. A couple of p o i n t s that came up e a r l i e r i n t h i s paper might lend support to Kohlberg's c l a i m as to the d i s t i n c t i v e n e s s of moral develop-ment while i n no way denying that there are non-moral normative p r i n c i p l e s . The p o i n t s a r e , f i r s t , t h a t moral p r i n c i p l e s may be unique i n having a dual r o l e as p r i n c i p l e s of a c t i o n and as p r i n c i p l e s of argument, and second, t h a t we can only c a l l a person p r i n c i p l e d on the b a s i s of h i s moral p r i n c i p l e s and the moral judgements he makes. A person i s not p r i n -c i p l e d because of the r e l i g i o u s , economic, a e s t h e t i c or p r u -d e n t i a l p r i n c i p l e s a c c o r d i n g to which he makes v a r i o u s judge-ments of v a l u e , and c h o i c e s i n the course of h i s l i f e . I f , however, moral development i s unique Kohlberg has yet to demonstrate that i t i s . The second misuse of the concept moral p r i n c i p l e which Kohlberg c r i t i c i z e s i s the f a i l u r e "to reduce [a p r i n c i p l e ] to a guide to the p e r c e p t i o n of the claims of persons i n a 19 moral s i t u a t i o n " . In a p o s i t i v e v e i n he w r i t e s : "By 'moral p r i n c i p l e ' a l l t h o u g h t f u l men have meant a g e n e r a l 20 guide to choice r a t h e r than a r u l e of a c t i o n . " and, "In our e m p i r i c a l work we have s t a r t e d by c o n s i d e r i n g the term 96 ' p r i n c i p l e ' as r e f e r r i n g to c o n s i d e r a t i o n s i n moral choice or 2 1 reasons j u s t i f y i n g moral a c t i o n " . Kohlberg d e s c r i b e s t h i s misuse i n the f o l l o w i n g lengthy passage: From our p o i n t of view there i s a l o g i c a l f a l -l a c y p a r a l l e l to e l e v a t i n g the group above i t s members: the f a l l a c y of t r e a t i n g a p r i n c i p l e as e l e v a t e d above the i n d i v i d u a l s i n the s i t u -a t i o n to which i t a p p l i e s . Put i n d i f f e r e n t terms, most of us f e e l a c o l d c h i l l at the n o t i o n t h a t mature moral o b l i g a t i o n i s funda-mentally d i r e c t e d to an a b s t r a c t maxim or p r i n c i p l e as Kant h e l d . Moral o b l i g a t i o n s are toward concrete s i t u a t i o n s . The n o t i o n of a Kantian f e e l i n g o b l i g a t e d to the p r i n c i p l e of the c a t e g o r i c a l i m p e r a t i v e and so r e f u s i n g to t e l l a l i e to save a human l i f e ( i . e . , r e f u s i n g to modify the means f o r a concrete human end) i s as c h i l l i n g as a u t i l i t a r i a n B o l s h e v i k l e t t i n g 1 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 Kulaks s t a r v e f o r the g r e a t e r happiness of the unborn g r e a t e r number ( i . e . , r e f u s i n g to modify the ends f o r the concrete human means). True p r i n c i p l e s guide us to the o b l i g a t i n g elements i n the s i t u a t i o n , to the concrete human claims t h e r e . The case i s always h i g h e r than the p r i n c i p l e , a s i n g l e human l i f e i s worth more than a l l the p r i n -c i p l e s i n ph i l o s o p h y to the mature man. P r i n -c i p l e s simply t e l l us how to r e s o l v e these con-c r e t e c l a i m s , when claims compete i n a s i t u a t i o n i when i t i s one man's l i f e a g a i n s t another's. ^ I would c e r t a i n l y agree with Kohlberg that t r e a t i n g p r i n c i p l e s as more important than people i s a very great f a l -l a c y and one which has been mentioned e a r l i e r i n t h i s paper. I am l e s s sure that i t can p r o p e r l y be c a l l e d a misuse of the concept of p r i n c i p l e , however, even though the a c t i o n r e f e r r e d to i s u n j u s t i f i a b l e . It would seem t h a t Kohlberg i s more c o r r e c t i n r e f e r r i n g to h o l d i n g p r i n c i p l e s i n the way d e s c r i b e d as a f a l l a c y - at l e a s t i n so f a r as they are h e l d 97 to be moral p r i n c i p l e s or connected with moral a c t i o n . As we saw i n s e c t i o n f o u r there i s a sense of p r i n c i p l e i n which p r i n c i p l e s serve as r u l e s of a c t i o n making i t unnecessary f o r the h o l d e r to r e l y on the reasons f o r t h e i r being h e l d and so unnecessary to c o n s i d e r p a r t i c u l a r i n s t a n c e s f a l l i n g under them. We c a l l e d t h i s the habit sense of p r i n c i p l e . There i s a meaning f o r the l a b e l man of p r i n c i p l e c o r r e s p o n d i n g to t h i s sense and i n r e f e r e n c e to moral matters i t i s a derogatory l a b e l . Whether or not i t i s a p p r o p r i a t e to c a l l t h i s a misuse, he i s c o r r e c t i n g i v i n g i t no p a r t i n h i s c o n c e p t i o n of moral p r i n c i p l e . I would again agree with Kohlberg t h a t moral o b l i g a -t i o n s are toward other people and not to a p r i n c i p l e and that p r i n c i p l e s guide us to the o b l i g a t i n g elements i n s i t u a t i o n s . I do not agree, however, t h a t they simply t e l l us how to r e s o l v e c o n f l i c t i n g c l a i m s i n a s i t u a t i o n . As p r i n c i p l e s i n argument they lead to c o n c l u s i o n s t h a t can be judged more or l e s s j u s t i f i a b l e . A person who has p r i n c i p l e s i s s e n s i t i v e to the m o r a l l y r e l e v a n t f e a t u r e s i n such a s i t u a t i o n and chooses on the b a s i s of h i s p r i n c i p l e s but h i s p r i n c i p l e s do not t e l l him what to choose. There i s , I b e l i e v e , much more to the phrase " p r i n c i p l e s guide us ... " than Kohlberg seems to r e a l i z e . Since t h i s was l a r g e l y the s u b j e c t of an e a r l i e r chapter I w i l l not go too deeply i n t o i t here. While most of us would share Kohlberg's abhorrence at the thought of innocent l i v e s being l o s t f o r the sake of a p r i n c i p l e I do not see that the r e d u c t i o n of p r i n c i p l e s to 98 guides to the p e r c e p t i o n of claims i n moral s i t u a t i o n s i s an a l t e r n a t i v e to u s i n g p r i n c i p l e s In that way. In the f i r s t p l a c e , what sense can be made of the n o t i o n of g u i d i n g our p e r c e p t i o n l e t alone of r e d u c i n g something to such a guide? S u r e l y what we p e r c e i v e as c l a i m s i n moral s i t u a t i o n s does depend on what our p r i n c i p l e s are but we are not i n the p o s i -t i o n of being able to s e l e c t or c a l l upon a p r i n c i p l e i n a p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n a f t e r which time we begin to p e r c e i v e what m o r a l l y r e l e v a n t f e a t u r e s are i n v o l v e d . Our p e r c e p t i o n s come "guided" and I b e l i e v e p r i n c i p l e s p l a y a p a r t i n t h i s but they do so as p r i n c i p l e s t h a t we have - as that which s e n s i t i z e s us' to p a r t i c u l a r f e a t u r e s of s i t u a t i o n s . I s h a l l r e f e r to t h i s , on the b a s i s of the d i s t i n c t i o n s made i n s e c t i o n t h r e e , as p r i n c i p l e i n the m o t i v a t i o n sense and mark the d i s t i n c t i o n by the use of a s u b s c r i p t , c a l l i n g t h i s sense of p r i n c i p l e p r i n c i p l e ^ . P r i n c i p l e s ^ p lay a r o l e i n our p e r c e p t i o n or understanding of a c t i o n s - i n what we take an a c t i o n to be, and i n moving us to a c t . The other sense of p r i n c i p l e , that i n which they f u n c t i o n as p r i n c i p l e s of argument i n the context of j u s t i f i c a t i o n I s h a l l c a l l p r i n -c i p l e ^ . I b e l i e v e that Kohlberg's c l a i m s that p r i n c i p l e s are to be reduced to guides and that they t e l l us how to r e s o l v e c l a i m s i n s i t u a t i o n s of moral c o n f l i c t stem from a f a i l u r e to d i s t i n g u i s h between these uses of the concept -between p r i n c i p l e ^ and p r i n c i p l e ^ . Throughout Kohlberg's account of p r i n c i p l e s we f i n d p r i n c i p l e s r e f e r r e d to one time as guides to choice or 99 c o n s i d e r a t i o n s i n choosing, and another as reasons f o r j u s t i f y i n g moral a c t i o n ; f i r s t as guides to m o r a l l y r e l e v a n t elements, and then as the elements themselves. This dual r o l e In which moral p r i n c i p l e s f u n c t i o n has a l r e a d y been d i s -cussed and i t i s these r o l e s t hat have been d i s t i n g u i s h e d by r e f e r r i n g to them as p r i n c i p l e ^ and p r i n c i p l e ^ . As c o n s i d -e r a t i o n s i n choosing and guides to morally r e l e v a n t elements they are f u n c t i o n i n g as p r i n c i p l e s ^ . In t h i s sense they are p r i n c i p l e s the person has and as such guide h i s p e r c e p t i o n to morally r e l e v a n t elements that i s , determine what h i s under-s t a n d i n g of a s i t u a t i o n w i l l be and what the a l t e r n a t i v e s are between which he must choose. As reasons j u s t i f y i n g moral a c t i o n - answers to the q u e s t i o n "Why i s i t r i g h t to do such and such?" - or as u l t i m a t e terms or s t a t e s of a f f a i r s , or meta-rules, they are p r i n c i p l e s ^ . In t h i s r o l e they are used to j u s t i f y a c t i o n s and e v a l u a t i o n s of the moral agent and as t o o l s of the moral p h i l o s o p h e r and moral judge, and i t i s here that n o t i o n s of deduction and g e n e r a l i z a t i o n have t h e i r p l a c e . When i t i s c l e a r t h a t he i s d e a l i n g with p r i n c i p l e s ^ , I f i n d very l i t t l e with which to d i s a g r e e i n Kohlberg's account. U n f o r t u n a t e l y I t i s obvious that Kohlberg i s f r e q u e n t l y speaking of p r i n c i p l e s as motives or s e n s i t i v i t i e s , i . e . , p r i n c i p l e s ^ , but proceeding as i f there were no d i f f e r e n c e between the r o l e s . Because of t h i s he does an inadequate job of r e l a t i n g p r i n c i p l e s to a c t i o n , i . e . , showing how they operate. This is. e v i d e n t when he c o n s i d e r s the d e r i v a t i o n 100 of judgements from p r i n c i p l e s Cand speaks of our attempting to d e r i v e or making an e f f o r t to formulate them) and i s even more obvious here where he speaks of p r i n c i p l e s as guides to the p e r c e p t i o n and i n t e g r a t i o n of morally r e l e v a n t elements i n a s i t u a t i o n . As has a l r e a d y been s t a t e d , I b e l i e v e that p r i n c i p l e s are such guides and i n f a c t what we mean when we say that a person has a c e r t a i n p r i n c i p l e i s that he w i l l p e r c e i v e a c e r t a i n k i n d of s i t u a t i o n as c a l l i n g f o r a c e r t a i n a c t i o n . And as to the s u g g e s t i o n that we should reduce p r i n c i p l e s to such guides - I r e p e a t , we cannot guide our p e r c e p t i o n much l e s s reduce something to a gui-de . P r i n -c i p l e s are i n v o l v e d i n our p e r c e p t i o n of c l a i m s i n a r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t sense. We do not borrow the p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e from p h i l o s o p h y , or wherever, and then they p o i n t to those r e l e v a n t c l a i m s ; r a t h e r , i f they are our p r i n c i p l e s we per-c e i v e those claims as r e l e v a n t - as demanding our c o n s i d e r a -t i o n . Having p r i n c i p l e s i s p i c k i n g out c e r t a i n c laims as r e l e v a n t ; i t i s not f i r s t r e d u c i n g a p r i n c i p l e to a guide and then beginning to p e r c e i v e . In the same way they are o p e r a t i v e i n our r e s o l u t i o n s of c o n f l i c t s without t e l l i n g us how to r e s o l v e them. Kohlberg uses an i n t e r e s t i n g e x p r e s s i o n i n r e l a t i n g the misuse of a p r i n c i p l e when he says "here i s an e i g h t e e n -y e a r - o l d boy who uses the 'higher p r i n c i p l e of humanity' i n 2 3 t h i s disembodied and u n p r i n c i p l e d way ... ". There are , I b e l i e v e , two ways t h i s might be understood. ' U n p r i n c i p l e d ' might r e f e r to the f a c t that the s u b j e c t was not c o n s i s t e n t 101 i n h i s a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e p r i n c i p l e , i . e . , he was n o t a p p l y -i n g i t t o a l l c a s e s . T h i s i s l i k e l y what K o h l b e r g means by i t s i n c e t h e r e s p o n s e i n q u e s t i o n i n v o l v e d u s i n g t h e p r i n -c i p l e o f h u m a n i t y as j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t h e f t i n o r d e r t o s a v e a l i f e a s w e l l as a j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t a k i n g a l i f e t o s a v e t h a t o f a n o t h e r . ' D i s e m b o d i e d and u n p r i n c i p l e d ' p o i n t s t o a n o t h e r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , n a m e l y t h a t t h a t s u b j e c t i s u n p r i n -c i p l e d . ' B e i n g p r i n c i p l e d ' i n v o l v e s s o m e t h i n g more t h a n using e v e n a h i g h e r p r i n c i p l e , i t i n v o l v e s having p r i n c i p l e s , w h i c h i s , i n a way, ' e m b o d y i n g ' them. The i m p o r t a n t p o i n t r e l a t i n g t o t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s t h a t t h e s u b j e c t c o u l d h a v e b e e n u s i n g h i s p r i n c i p l e i n an u n p r i n c i p l e d way e v e n i f he had n o t f a i l e d t o see i t as a p p l i c a b l e t o a l l p e r s o n s i f i t were a p r i n c i p l e he u s e d i n a r g u m e n t b u t w h i c h made no c l a i m on hi m i n a c t u a l s i t u a t i o n s w i t h w h i c h he was f a c e d . One may i n h y p o t h e t i c a l s i t u a t i o n s u se p r i n c i p l e s and r e a s o n p e r -f e c t l y w e l l b u t be t h o r o u g h l y u n p r i n c i p l e d . T h i s i s e a s i l y o v e r l o o k e d when t h e r e i s a f a i l u r e t o d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n p r i n c i p l e ^ and p r i n c i p l e ^ . K o h l b e r g does a t t i m e s r e c o g n i z e t h a t b e i n g m o r a l i n v o l v e s more t h a n t h e c a p a c i t y f o r m a k i n g p r i n c i p l e d m o r a l j u d g e m e n t s as i s e v i d e n c e d i n h i s s t a t e m e n t o f t h e a i m s o f m o r a l e d u c a t i o n as t h e e n c o u r a g e m e n t o f a c a p a c i t y f o r p r i n -c i p l e d m o r a l j u d g e m e n t s and o f t h e d i s p o s i t i o n t o a c t i n 24 a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h i s c a p a c i t y . The q u e s t i o n i s w h e t h e r t h e c a p a c i t y f o r m a k i n g p r i n c i p l e d m o r a l j u d g e m e n t s p u r e l y i n t h e s e n s e o f b e i n g good a t m o r a l t h e o r i z i n g i s a n e c e s s a r y 102 c o n d i t i o n of being moral. This has alre a d y been answered i n the n e g a t i v e . Kohlberg has not taken s e r i o u s l y enough the d i s t i n c -t i o n between having the a b i l i t y to make p r i n c i p l e d moral judgements and having the d i s p o s i t i o n to act on moral p r i n -c i p l e s . That he has not i s evident i n h i s frequent r e f e r e n c e to s u b j e c t s who make p r i n c i p l e d judgements, i . e . , those who are at p r i n c i p l e d s tages, as " p r i n c i p l e d s u b j e c t s . " It i s a mistake to i d e n t i f y those who make p r i n c i p l e d judgements as p r i n c i p l e d s u b j e c t s f o r , as has been repeated over and over throughout t h i s paper, there i s no necessary c o n n e c t i o n be-tween the a b i l i t y to make p r i n c i p l e d judgements and the te n -dency to act m o r a l l y . It i s s u f f i c i e n t f o r a p r i n c i p l e d moral judgement to be based on a v a l i d moral p r i n c i p l e ( s ); i t i s not necessary f o r that p r i n c i p l e ( s ) to a c t u a l l y be o p e r a t i v e i n the p e r s o n a l c h o i c e s and a c t i o n s of the person doing the j u d g i n g . J u s t as we know that people can have p r i n c i p l e s without n e c e s s a r i l y being able to a r t i c u l a t e or defend them, we know t h a t others can a r t i c u l a t e and defend p r i n c i p l e s which they do not have. For t h i s reason i t i s r i s k y to move too q u i c k l y from e x p r e s s i o n s such as " p r i n -c i p l e d s t a g e s " and " p r i n c i p l e d judgements" to "stage-6 con-s c i o u s n e s s " and " p r i n c i p l e d s u b j e c t s . " " P r i n c i p l e d s t a g e s " can mean stages at which the best t h e o r i z i n g i s done but " p r i n c i p l e d s u b j e c t s " means much more. It i s important, I t h i n k , t h a t acknowledgement of t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n be i n s i s t e d upon and that assumptions l i k e the 103 f o l l o w i n g be given c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n : The f i r s t assumption behind our approach has been that the key to understanding a man's moral conduct or c h a r a c t e r i s to understand h i s moral p h i l o s o p h y , that i s , the assumption that we a l l , even and e s p e c i a l l y young c h i l -dren, are moral p h i l o s o p h e r s . 2 5 We know th a t a man's c h a r a c t e r , and t h e r e f o r e h i s moral con-duct, d e f i n e s and i s d e f i n e d by h i s moral p r i n c i p l e s . We a l s o know that those who have p r i n c i p l e s d i s p l a y mature con-duct i n c o n f l i c t s i t u a t i o n s . I f by understanding a man's 'moral p h i l o s o p h y ' Kohlberg means the form of h i s moral judge-ments I am not s a t i s f i e d t h a t t h i s i s the key to understanding someone's moral conduct or c h a r a c t e r . In f a c t , i t seems f a i r l y obvious t h a t i t i s not, f o r as has been p o i n t e d out here and elsewhere, people can do good and reasonable moral 2 6 t h e o r i z i n g which p l a y s no p a r t i n t h e i r moral p r a c t i c e . A man's moral p h i l o s o p h y , i f i n f a c t we a r e , as Kohlberg says, a l l moral p h i l o s o p h e r s , must i n c l u d e so much more than judge-ments made on a given number of h y p o t h e t i c a l dilemmas t h a t i t would be as complex a matter to understand as i s h i s having p r i n c i p l e s . That Kohlberg's claims are exaggerated i n t h i s way, and tha t there i s s t i l l much to be done by way of c l a r i f i c a t i o n of c e n t r a l n o t i o n s , should not be allowed to d i s t r a c t from the very v a l u a b l e work he has done i n the area of moral r e a s o n i n g . Encouraging students to develop the c a p a c i t y f o r p r i n c i p l e d moral judgement whether by s t i m u l a t i n g a n a t u r a l development or by te a c h i n g them how to j u s t i f y moral and non-moral value j u d g e m e n t s i s most w o r t h y a s an a i m o f m o r a l e d u c a t i o n , and p e r h a p s t h e most t h a t c a n be e x p e c t e d f r o m m o r a l e d u c a t i o n i n s c h o o l . I t i s n o t h o w e v e r , i d e n t i c a l w i t h p r o d u c i n g m o r a l l y m a t u r e s t u d e n t s . 1 0 5 FOOTNOTES 1 . L. K o h l b e r g , S t a g e s o f D e v e l o p m e n t a s a B a s i s f o r M o r a l E d u c a t i o n , i n C. M. B e c k , B. S. C r i t t e n d e n , E. V. S u l l i v a n ( e d s . ) Moral Education: Interdisciplinary Approaches, T o r o n t o : U n i v e r s i t y o f T o r o n t o P r e s s , 1 9 7 1 , p . 24 . 2 . Ibid., p . 5 5 . 3 . Ibid. , p . 6 2 . 4 . Ibid. , p . 5 8 . 5 . S e e s e c t i o n s V a n d V I o f t h i s p a p e r . 6 . K o h l b e r g , op. c i t . , p . 6 3 . 7 . R. S. P e t e r s , Ethics and Education, New Y o r k : S c o t t , F o r e s m a n a n d C o . , 1 9 6 7 , p p . 5 2 - 5 3 . 8 . K o h l b e r g , op. c i t . , p . 5 6 . 9 . Ibid. , p . 4 6 . 1 0 . Ibid., p p . 5 7 - 5 8 . 1 1 . K o h l b e r g m e n t i o n s s u c h p h i l o s o p h e r s a s H a r e , B a i e r a n d A i k e n i n t h e c o u r s e o f h i s d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e m o r a l . 1 2 . P a u l T a y l o r , Normative Discourse, E n g l e w o o d C l i f f s , N . J . : P r e n t i c e - H a l l , I n c . , 1 9 6 1 , p . 1 1 1 . 1 3 . R. S. P e t e r s , Ethics and Education, p . 5 1 . S e e a l s o M. S i n g e r , Generalizations in Ethics. S i n g e r i d e n t i f i e s t h e p r i n c i p l e o f j u s t i c e w i t h t h e g e n e r a l i z a t i o n p r i n -c i p l e a n d r e f e r s t h i s u s e t o n o n - m o r a l a s w e l l a s m o r a l c o n t e x t s , ( e . g . , p . 4 1 ) . 1 4 . J o h n R a w l s , J u s t i c e A s F a i r n e s s , i n P e t e r L a s l e t t , W. C. R u n c i m a n n ( e d s . ) Philosophy, P o l i t i c s , and Society, S e c o n d S e r i e s , O x f o r d , 1 9 6 2 . 1 5 . . K o h l b e r g , op. c i t . , p . 5 9 . 1 6 . Ibid., p . 6 0 . 106 17 18 B o t h K o h l b e r g ' s l e v e l s o f d i s c o u r s e and T a y l o r ' s s t a g e s o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n a r e o u t l i n e d a l o n g w i t h a d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e s i m i l a r i t i e s b e t w e e n them i n an u n p u b l i s h e d p a p e r by P r o f e s s o r L. B. D a n i e l s , " P r o f e s s o r K o h l b e r g ' s Use o f t h e C o n c e p t o f L e v e l s . " W i l l i a m Kay, Moral Development, London and U n w i n , 1 9 6 8 , p. 18. G e o r g e A l l e n 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 K o h l b e r g , op. c i t 62 . Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid . Ibid. 58 5 9 . 6 1 . pp. 61-62 p . 4 . p . 34 . D e r e k W r i g h t o f f e r s t h e e x a m p l e o f what he c l a s s i f i e s a s t h e ' n o r m a l l y a m o r a l ' p e r s o n . S u c h a p e r s o n i s a d m i r a b l y s k i l l e d a t u s i n g m o r a l d i s c o u r s e w h i l e h i s a c t i o n s a r e h i g h l y i m m o r a l . See h i s Psychology of Moral Behavior, B a l t i m o r e : P e n g u i n e B o o k s , 1 9 7 1 , pp. 2 0 9-210. 7. THE TASK OF MORAL E D U C A T I O N I f t h e a i m o f m o r a l e d u c a t i o n i s t o e n a b l e c h i l d r e n t o b e c o m e m o r a l l y m a t u r e a d u l t s a n d m o r a l m a t u r i t y c o n s i s t s i n b e i n g p r i n c i p l e d o r h a v i n g p r i n c i p l e s t h e m o r a l e d u c a t o r m u s t a s k how i t i s t h a t o n e c o m e s t o be p r i n c i p l e d o r t o h a v e p r i n c i p l e s . I n l o o k i n g t o t h o s e p h i l o s o p h e r s a n d p s y c h o l -o g i s t s w h o s e c o n c e r n i s t o u n d e r s t a n d a n d i m p r o v e t h e m o r a l o r d e r , a n d s o t o e n l i g h t e n t h e w o u l d - b e m o r a l e d u c a t o r , 1 o n e f i n d s a b e w i l d e r i n g a s s o r t m e n t o f v e r b s r e l a t i n g t o m o r a l t e a c h i n g w h i c h s e e m t o s u g g e s t a v a r i e t y o f d i f f e r e n t t e a c h -i n g a c t i v i t i e s n o t a l l o f w h i c h a r e c o m p a t i b l e . F o r e x a m p l e , o n e f i n d s K o h l b e r g u r g i n g h i m t o s t i m u l a t e t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o r g r o w t h o f m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s a n d r e f e r r i n g t o s t u d e n t s " d e v e l -o p i n g m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s " . P e t e r s s p e a k s o f t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f " p a s s i n g o n " r u l e s a n d p r i n c i p l e s o r g i v i n g s t u d e n t s a " g r a s p " o f f u n d a m e n t a l p r i n c i p l e s . The " i n c u l c a t i o n " o f p r i n c i p l e s i s o n e o f t h e m o s t common p h r a s e s u s e d b y t h o s e e x p r e s s i n g c o m m o n - s e n s e v i e w s o f m o r a l t e a c h i n g a s w e l l a s t h o s e w o r k i n g f r o m w i t h i n some t h e o r e t i c a l f r a m e w o r k . S t i l l o t h e r s s p e a k o f g e t t i n g c h i l d r e n t o a c c e p t , a d o p t , c h o o s e , d e c i d e o n , u n d e r s t a n d , a n d a p p r e c i a t e p r i n c i p l e s . N o t o n l y i s t h e v a r i e t y o f p o s s i b l e a c t i v i t i e s l i k e l y t o a r o u s e s u s p i c i o n a s t o t h e c o m p a r a b i l i t y o f t e a c h i n g m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s t o t e a c h i n g p h y s i c a l p r i n c i p l e s , f o r e x a m p l e , b u t s o t o o i s t h e f a c t t h a t t h e s e v e r b s r e l a t i n g t o t h e a c q u i s i -t i o n o f m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s a r e u s e d , a t t h e same t i m e , i n a 107 108 b r o a d e r c o n n e c t i o n . K o h l b e r g s p e a k s o f d e v e l o p i n g p r i n c i p l e s and o f c h i l d r e n d e v e l o p i n g m o r a l l y . O t h e r s move f r o m t h e i n c u l c a t i o n o f p r i n c i p l e s t o t h e i n c u l c a t i o n o f m o r a l i t y a n d e q u a t e t h i s t o l e a r n i n g t h e l a n g u a g e o f r i g h t a n d w r o n g o r l e a r n i n g t h e d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n r i g h t a n d w r o n g . The f o l l o w i n g q u e s t i o n s , p o s e d by G i l b e r t R y l e , a r e i m p o r t a n t t o o u r c o n c e r n . "Wha t s o r t o f t e a c h i n g , t h e n , i s t h e t e a c h i n g o f t h e d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n r i g h t a n d w r o n g ? What s o r t o f l e a r n i n g i s t h e l e a r n i n g o f t h i s d i f f e r e n c e ? What 2 k i n d o f k n o w i n g i s t h e k n o w i n g o f i t ? " T h a t s u c h l e a r n i n g , k n o w i n g a n d t e a c h i n g i s d i f f e r e n t f r o m o t h e r t y p e s i n w h i c h p r i n c i p l e s a r e i n v o l v e d ( e . g . , p h y s i c s o r f a r m i n g ) i s o b s e r v e d by R y l e i n t h e f a c t t h a t n o t i o n s l i k e " f o r g e t " a n d " b e r e m i n d e d o f " do n o t go w i t h k n o w i n g t h e d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n r i g h t a n d w r o n g . R y l e p o i n t s o u t t h a t we f o r g e t a l l s o r t s o f t h i n g s t h a t a r e l e a r n e d , i n f o r m a t i o n a s w e l l a s s k i l l s . The i d e a t h a t we s h o u l d s a y we o n c e l e a r n e d t h e d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n r i g h t a n d w r o n g b u t h a v e now f o r g o t t e n i t , he a r g u e s , i s a b s u r d . A n o t h e r c o n c e p t r e l a t e d t o t e a c h i n g , l e a r n i n g a n d k n o w -i n g d o e s n o t f i t c o m f o r t a b l y w i t h m o r a l k n o w l e d g e . T h a t i s t h e n o t i o n o f ' m a s t e r y ' . We s p e a k r e a d i l y o f m a s t e r i n g a p r i n c i p l e o f p h y s i c s o r l o g i c o r o f m a s t e r i n g a f i e l d o f s t u d y o r a s k i l l . T h e r e i s n o t h i n g odd a b o u t c a l l i n g someone who h a s m a s t e r e d c h e s s a c h e s s m a s t e r o r one who h a s a d v a n c e d k n o w l e d g e o f a f i e l d o f s t u d y , e . g . , E n g l i s h , an E n g l i s h m a s t e r . In s o d o i n g we a r e r e f e r r i n g , a s B r o u d y h a s 109 3 s u g g e s t e d , t o t h e c o n t r o l t h e y have o f t h e i r s u b j e c t . How-e v e r , we speak n e i t h e r o f m a s t e r i n g m o r a l i t y n o r o f a m o r a l m a s t e r . The t h o u g h t o f m a s t e r i n g a m o r a l p r i n c i p l e does n o t r e s t e a s i l y . W h i l e i t i s p e r f e c t l y r e a s o n a b l e and meaning-f u l t o t a l k o f m a s t e r y o f m o r a l c o n c e p t s , m a s t e r y above t h i s l e v e l , t h a t i s , o f m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s or o f m o r a l i t y , seems i n a p p r o p r i a t e . T h i s i s n o t so i n f i e l d s w h i c h p r i m a r i l y i n v o l v e i n f o r m a t i o n o r s k i l l s . What k i n d o f l e a r n i n g and knowing i s i t t h e n , t h a t we a r e i n t e r e s t e d i n b r i n g i n g a b o u t i n m o r a l e d u c a t i o n ? The c o n c l u s i o n R y l e comes t o i s t h a t knowing t h e d i f -f e r e n c e between r i g h t and wrong o r h a v i n g p r i n c i p l e s i s t h a t s o r t o f a t t a i n m e n t we c a l l a p p r e c i a t i o n . He w r i t e s : "To have been t a u g h t t h e d i f f e r e n c e [between r i g h t and wrong] i s t o have been b r o u g h t t o a p p r e c i a t e t h e d i f f e r e n c e , and t h i s a p p r e c i a t i o n i s n o t j u s t a competence t o l a b e l c o r r e c t l y o r j u s t a c a p a c i t y t o do t h i n g s e f f i c i e n t l y . I t i n c l u d e s an i n c u l c a t e d c a r i n g , a h a b i t o f t a k i n g c e r t a i n s o r t s o f t h i n g s s e r i o u s l y " . To be s u r e when one has t h i s a p p r e c i a t i o n w h i c h i s one with, h a v i n g p r i n c i p l e s , one a l s o has c o m p e t e n c e s i n v o l v i n g t h e r e c o g n i t i o n and u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f f a c t s as w e l l as a number o f s k i l l s . The l e a r n i n g o f t h e s e , however, would seem t o be o f t h e s o r t w i t h w h i c h n o t i o n s l i k e f o r g e t t i n g and m a s t e r y , b e l o n g . Whatever i t i s t h a t , i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e s e , y i e l d s a p p r e c i a t i o n i s i m p o r t a n t t o our c o n c e r n . R y l e s u g -g e s t s i n t h i s r e g a r d t h a t " t h e n o t i o n s o f learning, studying, teaching, and knowing a r e a m p l e r n o t i o n s t h a n our a c a d e m i c 1 1 0 e p i s t e m o l o g i e s have acknowledged. They are h o s p i t a b l e enough to house under t h e i r r o o f s n o t i o n s l i k e those of i n s p i r i n g , 5 k i n d l i n g , and i n f e c t i n g " . Ryle claims t h a t coming or c e a s i n g to a p p r e c i a t e the d i f f e r e n c e between r i g h t and wrong, f o r example, marks a change i n the i n d i v i d u a l , whereas coming to know or f o r g e t -t i n g i n f o r m a t i o n or how to do something does not. Learning or being taught to enjoy, to ca r e , to l o v e , to be k i n d , or j u s t , f o r example, p o i n t to changes i n a person - to h i s p e r s o n a l q u a l i t i e s - which are d i f f e r e n t from h i s "equipment" which he gets from " l e a r n i n g t h a t " or " l e a r n i n g how". Broudy suggests that the reason we don't use 'mastery' i n d e s c r i b i n g a t t i t u d i n a l or emotional l e a r n i n g i s perhaps "because to l e a r n an a t t i t u d e i s not to c o n t r o l i t , but r a t h e r to be c o n t r o l l e d by i t , that i s , one i s one's a t t i t u d e s i n a way that one i s 7 not i d e n t i f i e d w i t h h i s knowledge or s k i l l s " . Once ag a i n , t h i s i s not to suggest t h a t a p p r e c i a t i o n s , and e s p e c i a l l y moral knowledge, are not h e a v i l y dependent on one's "equipment" i n the form of f a c t u a l knowledge and s k i l l s ; o b v i o u s l y they a r e . On t h i s matter Ryle w r i t e s , "Learning to a p p r e c i a t e r e q u i r e s some stu d i o u s n e s s , j u d i c i o u s n e s s , and acuteness. The judge has reasons to give f o r h i s l i k i n g s , g h i s v e r d i c t s , and h i s c h o i c e s " . In a s i m i l a r manner Broudy p o i n t s out that one could not a p p r e c i a t e a Shakespearean p l a y without knowing how to read Shakespearean E n g l i s h and knowing a great d e a l about drama; that i s to say, he must have done some mastering i n order to now a p p r e c i a t e i t . Broudy w r i t e s : I l l "But when we use ' a p p r e c i a t e ' i n t h i s sense we mean not only that X ' l i k e s ' Shakespearean drama, but a l s o t h a t X e v a l u a t e s g i t a c c o r d i n g to c e r t a i n s tandards". A d m i t t e d l y , the knowledge, i f Ryle i s r i g h t , t h at having p r i n c i p l e s i n v o l v e s a p p r e c i a t i o n does not t e l l us how to do moral e d u c a t i o n . I t does, however, enable us to look c r i t i c a l l y at statements such as the f o l l o w i n g , once again from Kohlberg. What i s the d i f f e r e n c e between people a c t i n g i n accordance with p r i n c i p l e s of p h y s i c s which they know and t h e i r a c t i n g i n accordance with moral p r i n c i p l e s ? I would say th a t while people, do not always act i n terms of t h e i r knowledge of p h y s i c a l p r i n c i p l e s , on the whole they do. I would say the same t h i n g i s true of t h e i r a c t i o n w i t h regard to the moral p r i n c i p l e s t h at they a c c e p t , t h e i r moral c o g n i t i o n s . However, the d i f f e r e n c e between p h y s i c a l and moral p r i n c i p l e s i s t h a t the l a t t e r embody c e r t a i n a f f e c t i v e com-ponents i n themselves. You cannot have a con-c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e without some s o r t of a f f e c t -ive r e a c t i o n being i n v o l v e d , whereas you can have such a co n c e p t i o n of a p h y s i c a l p r i n c i p l e . 1 ^ There are d i f f e r e n c e s between a c t i n g i n accordance with one's knowledge of p r i n c i p l e s of p h y s i c s and a c t i n g i n accordance with moral p r i n c i p l e s . Over and above the a f f e c t i v e com-ponents t h a t may be embodied i n the l a t t e r i s the d i f f e r e n c e i n the knowing of the d i f f e r e n t kinds of p r i n c i p l e s . Know-ing i n the case of p h y s i c a l p r i n c i p l e s i n v o l v e d understanding and t h i s i m p l i e s b e l i e f and t h e r e f o r e a c t i o n . Understanding i n the case of moral p r i n c i p l e s may take the form of under-s t a n d i n g t h e i r d e r i v a t i o n or knowing that some people b e l i e v e them. I f moral knowledge, or knowledge of moral p r i n c i p l e s , i n v o l v e s a p p r e c i a t i o n and i t i s t h i s t h at i s s u e s i n a c t i o n , then the t h e o r e t i c a l grasp which i s adequate i n the case of p h y s i c a l p r i n c i p l e s simply i s not adequate f o r moral p r i n -c i p l e s . Or r a t h e r , i t i s adequate f o r the a c q u i s i t i o n of p r i n c i p l e s ^ but not f o r p r i n c i p l e s ^ . The reason we f e e l un-easy at the s u g g e s t i o n of mastering moral p r i n c i p l e s but not of mastering s c i e n t i f i c or l o g i c a l p r i n c i p l e s might be j u s t t h i s : t h a t having a t h e o r e t i c a l grasp of the l a t t e r i s suf-f i c i e n t to knowing and understanding, while i n the case of the former i t i s not. On the b a s i s of d e v e l o p i n g t h i s k i n d of t h e o r e t i c a l grasp alone one c o u l d not c l a i m to have been s u c c e s s f u l at moral e d u c a t i o n as one would i n s c i e n c e . Suc-cess i n s c i e n c e perhaps means mastery of p r i n c i p l e s , i n moral education i t i s more l i k e l y that i t means something c l o s e r to what P e t e r s suggests: ... a steady but i n t e n s e s e n s i t i v i t y to the consequences of a c t i o n s , a constant and i m a g i n a t i v e r e a l i z a t i o n t h a t i n i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s one i s d e a l i n g with persons who a l s o have t h e i r unique p o i n t of view on the world and t h a t there i s something about them which matters supremely. In other words, i t means the development of motives which p e r s o n a l i z e funda-mental p r i n c i p l e s . It means a l s o the develop-ment of judgement about p a r t i c u l a r moral matters that only comes to a person who has r e a l l y got on the i n s i d e of t h i s mode of experience.-'-^ The very c o n s i d e r a b l e problems of moral e d u c a t i o n then are: j u s t what components or competences make a person p r i n c i p l e d , i . e . , one who has those motives which p e r s o n a l i z e fundamental p r i n c i p l e s and the judgement about moral matters 113 to which Peters r e f e r s ? And how are they achieved? What i s i n v o l v e d i n a p p r e c i a t i o n ? Let us c o n s i d e r Kohlberg's c l a i m that people "develop" morally - " t h a t the goal of moral education i s the s t i m u l a t i o n of a " n a t u r a l , development of the i n d i v i d u a l c h i l d ' s own moral judgements and- capac-12 l t i e s " or " t h a t ' e t h i c a l p r i n c i p l e s ' are the end p o i n t of s e q u e n t i a l ' n a t u r a l ' development i n s o c i a l f u n c t i o n i n g and 13 t h i n k i n g " . C e r t a i n l y we do speak of d e v e l o p i n g a p p r e c i a -t i o n and i f knowledge i n the moral realm i s that type of attainment then t h i s would seem to support Kohlberg's conten-t i o n . The problem, however, i s t h a t "develop" and "develop-ment" are ambiguous terms so that j u s t what i s meant by any p a r t i c u l a r use i s not immediately apparent. Depending on i t s o b j e c t 'develop' i n v i t e s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n r a n g i n g from u n f o l d i n g or e v o l v i n g , to e l a b o r a t i n g or expanding. Kohl-berg does i n s i s t t h a t he does not r e f e r to a " n a t u r a l b i o -l o g i c a l u n f o l d i n g " but to " u n i v e r s a l and n a t u r a l trends i n development". Moral p r i n c i p l e s are the " i n t e r a c t i o n a l 14 emergents of s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n " . To say e t h i c a l or moral p r i n c i p l e s develop i s not enough f o r , as I have been a r g u i n g , there i s a d i f f e r e n c e between moral p r i n c i p l e s when they are p r i n c i p l e s of argument and when they are p r i n c i p l e s of a c t i o n - p r i n c i p l e s ^ and p r i n c i p l e s ^ . P r i n c i p l e s ^ seem to f i t with the n o t i o n of development i n r e f e r r i n g to the way a person comes to be while p r i n c i p l e s ^ f i t with another idea of development, that of working out, e l a b o r a t i n g , e t c . John Rawls shows how the "sense of j u s t i c e " may be seen 114 as the r e s u l t of a n a t u r a l d e v e l o p m e n t — t h r o u g h i t s connec-t i o n with, and dependency on, such n a t u r a l a t t i t u d e s as love 15 and t r u s t . He i s , however, speaking of the development of the sense of j u s t i c e which, i n P e t e r s ' words, i s the motive which p e r s o n a l i z e s the p r i n c i p l e C s ) of j u s t i c e . In Rawls' theory of j u s t i c e the c a p a c i t y f o r a sense of j u s t i c e i s the fundamental aspect of the moral p e r s o n a l i t y . Kohlberg doesn't appear to make t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n and when he speaks of d e v e l o p i n g p r i n c i p l e s he gives one the impression he means p r i n c i p l e s ^ . For example: " . . . the development of moral c h a r a c t e r i s i n l a r g e p a r t a s e q u e n t i a l p r o g r e s s i v e growth of b a s i c p r i n c i p l e s of moral r e a s o n i n g and t h e i r a p p l i c a t i o n to a c t i o n . " While i t makes sense, I b e l i e v e , to speak of t e a c h i n g and l e a r n i n g p r i n c i p l e s as p a r t of the process of d e v e l o p i n g the motives which p e r s o n a l i z e moral p r i n c i p l e s , i . e . , the development of p r i n c i p l e s ^ , I f i n d i t d i f f i c u l t to make sense of t a l k of s t i m u l a t i n g the development of p r i n c i p l e s ^ . The very word " s t i m u l a t e " seems to f i t with the n o t i o n of develop-ment as b i o l o g i c a l u n f o l d i n g . I f Kohlberg sees h i s educa-t i o n a l methods of p r e s e n t i n g arguments and c h a l l e n g e s as pas-s i n g on, or g e t t i n g students to understand moral p r i n c i p l e s as p r i n c i p l e s of argument and i n t u r n sees t h i s as conducive or p r e l i m i n a r y to t h e i r d e v e l o p i n g p r i n c i p l e s i n the other sense, then h i s p o s i t i o n would not be u n l i k e that of Peters who contends that "moral education i s c e n t r a l l y concerned with the development of c e r t a i n types of motives e s p e c i a l l y . 115 17 the r a t i o n a l p a s s i o n s . " It seems f a i r l y c e r t a i n , however, that what Kohlberg b e l i e v e s develops are mental s t r u c t u r e s and not motives or d i s p o s i t i o n s . There are many th i n g s we must be c l e a r e r about before we can say how a person comes to be p r i n c i p l e d or have p r i n -c i p l e s and the r e l a t i o n s h i p between moral p r i n c i p l e s as p r i n -c i p l e s of argument on the one hand and p r i n c i p l e s of a c t i o n on the oth e r , would seem to be one such t h i n g . Before we know more p r e c i s e l y what i t i s we are aiming at i n moral edu-c a t i o n we cannot say much about what methods we might use. It i s , however, i n t e r e s t i n g and as I suggested at the o u t s e t , somewhat p e r p l e x i n g , to look at v a r i o u s suggestions that have been put forward. The v a r i a t i o n i n methods seems to r e f l e c t the problem of the d i f f e r e n t senses i n which moral p r i n c i p l e s can be understood. On the m o t i v a t i o n s i d e there are such expres-s i o n s as s t i m u l a t e development, i n c u l c a t e , b r i n g to a p p r e c i -a te; on the major premise s i d e are expre s s i o n s l i k e give a grasp of . . . , get students to choose or decide on, pass on, e t c . It i s somewhat p a r a d o x i c a l that i t i s P e t e r s , to whom the development of the r a t i o n a l p a s s i o n s i s of the essence, who speaks of g i v i n g students a grasp of p r i n c i p l e s ; and Kohlberg, to whom s o p h i s t i c a t e d t h e o r i z i n g i s the c r u c i a l t h i n g , who claims that the only way to do moral e d u c a t i o n i s to s t i m u l a t e the development of p r i n c i p l e s . It looks very much l i k e both, aspects have an important place i n moral e d u c a t i o n . Although they might d i f f e r about what i s i n v o l v e d , a l l 116 the w r i t e r s I have c o n s i d e r e d , with the e x c e p t i o n of Kohlberg, agree that t e a c h i n g i s important i n b r i n g i n g about moral m a t u r i t y . And Kohlberg's c l a i m that h i s approach to moral education " i n v o l v e s e d u c a t i o n a l methods of s t i m u l a t i n g moral change" must at l e a s t make one s u s p i c i o u s , i n s p i t e of h i s d e n i a l , that he too sees t e a c h i n g as e s s e n t i a l to moral matur i t y . The f a c t i s that Kohlberg's method f o r s t i m u l a t i n g the development of moral p r i n c i p l e s , that i s , argument and d i s c u s -s i o n at a l e v e l which the c h i l d can understand and y e t be c h a l l e n g e d , d e s c r i b e s the a c t i v i t y t h a t i s at the very heart of the t e a c h i n g concept. Thomas Green, i n h i s a n a l y s i s of t e a c h i n g l o c a t e s ' i n s t r u c t i o n ' at j u s t t h a t p o i n t . He w r i t e s : " I n s t r u c t i o n seems, at h e a r t , to i n v o l v e a k i n d of c o n v e r s a t i o n , the o b j e c t of which i s to give reasons, weigh evidence, j u s t i f y , e x p l a i n , conclude, and so f o r t h . I t i s true that whenever we are i n v o l v e d i n g i v i n g i n s t r u c t i o n , i t f o l l o w s that we are engaged i n t e a c h i n g ; but i t i s not true that whenever we are engaged i n t e a c h i n g we are g i v i n g i n -18 s t r u c t i o n . " And f u r t h e r " I n s t r u c t i o n i s an a c t i v i t y which has to do not w i t h what people b e l i e v e but with how they b e l i e v e i t . It has to do not so much with a r r i v i n g at the ' r i g h t answer' as with a r r i v i n g at an answer on the r i g h t 19 grounds." T h i s , i t seems to me, i s j u s t the' a c t i v i t y Kohlberg recommends as the only way by which a person can be s t i m u l a t e d to move from one stage to the next and f i n a l l y to the p r i n c i p l e d s t a g e s . 117 It might look, on the other hand, as i f some of the other a c t i v i t i e s suggested, e.g., t r a i n i n g , i n c u l c a t i n g , im-p a r t i n g , and so on, l i e o u t s i d e the f i e l d of t e a c h i n g . In the e a r l y y ears of c h i l d h o o d some of these n e c e s s a r i l y take the form of c o n d i t i o n i n g . These too, however, as Green points, out can be a c t i v i t i e s of t e a c h i n g . Some of these a c t i v i t i e s , ones l i k e c o n d i t i o n i n g at the one extreme and i n d o c t r i n a t i o n at the oth e r , can t y p i c a l l y "only be j u s t i f i e d as the nearest approximation to t e a c h i n g a v a i l a b l e at the moment." That i s , they "may be sa n c t i o n e d only i n order that b e l i e f s adopted may l a t e r be redeemed by reasons, only 20 t h a t they may be v i n d i c a t e d by t e a c h i n g . " It i s not Improbable that most i f not a l l of the a c t i v -i t i e s suggested w i l l have some r o l e to p l a y i n a program of moral e d u c a t i o n . Which ones, and the p o i n t at which they are best employed, must wait upon answers to questions r e g a r d -ing what i s i n v o l v e d i n being p r i n c i p l e d and how people come to have p r i n c i p l e s . 118 FOOTNOTES 1. I am r e f e r r i n g to those l i k e Kohlberg, P e t e r s , Wilson who are i n the p o s i t i o n to a c t , In Wilson's words "as a s o r t of entrepreneur between the academic d i s c i p l i n e s and the world of a c t i o n " . J . Wilson, N. W i l l i a m s , B. Sugarman, Introduction to Moral Education, B a l t i m o r e : Penguin Books, 1967, p. 399. 2. G. Ryle, On F o r g e t t i n g the D i f f e r e n c e Between Right and Wrong. i n A. I. Melden C e d . ) Essays in Moral Philosophy, S e a t t l e : U n i v e r s i t y of Washington P r e s s , 1958, p. 153. 3. H. S. Broudy, Mastery. i n B. 0. Smith, R. H. Ennis (eds.) Language and Concepts in Education, Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1961, p. 72. 4. G. Ryle, op. c i t . , p. 156. 5. I b i d . , p. 154. 6. I b i d . , p. 15 6. 7. H. S. Broudy, op. c i t . , p. 73. 8. G. Ryle, op. c i t . , p. 153. 9. H. S. Broudy, op. c i t . , p. 72. 10. Lawrence Kohlberg, Stages of Moral Development as a Basis f o r Moral E d u c a t i o n . i n C. M. Beck, B. S. C r i t t e n -den, E. V. S u l l i v a n (eds.) Moral Education: I n t e r d i s -c i p l i n a r y Approaches, Toronto: U n i v e r s i t y of Toronto P r e s s , 1971, p. 393. 11. R. S. P e t e r s , Concrete P r i n c i p l e s and the R a t i o n a l Pas-s i o n s , i n J . Gustafson, et al (eds.) 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