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Political obligation : the good man and his duty to obey the law Hogg, Frances Howard 1973

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POLITICAL OBLIGATION: THE GOOD MAN AND HIS DUTY TO OBEY THE LAW BY Frances Howard Hogg B.A., York U n i v e r s i t y , Toronto, 1966 A t h e s i s submitted i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f the requirements f o r the degree of Master of A r t s i n the Department of P o l i t i c a l S c i e nce We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming to the r e q u i r e d standard The U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia September, 1973 In presenting t h i s thesis i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the Library s h a l l make i t f r e e l y available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of t h i s thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by h i s representatives. It i s understood that copying or publication of t h i s thesis for f i n a n c i a l gain s h a l l not be allowed without my written permission. Department of The University of B r i t i s h Columbia Vancouver 8, Canada Date i A b s t r a c t The 'problem of p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n ' i s understood, here, t o be one of t r y i n g to r e c o n c i l e obedience t o government and law w i t h the e s s e n t i a l p r e -c o n d i t i o n of r e s p o n s i b l e moral conduct - t h a t i s , w i t h the freedom of the i n d i v i d u a l t o a c t a c c o r d i n g to the d i c t a t e s of h i s own c o n s c i e n c e . P r i m a r i l y , we are concerned w i t h t h a t theory of p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n wherein the duty of obedience (and the corresponding r i g h t of government t o punish the d i s o b e d i e n t ) are d e r i v e d from the 'consent' of the i n d i v i d u a l . By r e p r e s e n t i n g the duty of obedience t h u s l y , as one which i s f r e e l y and w i l f u l l y undertaken by the i n d i v i d u a l upon whom i t f a l l s , we would seem to be s a t i s f y i n g the requirements of the e t h i c a l i n d i v i d u a l . We argue, however, t h a t t h e r e are problems w i t h 'consent theory' - problems which d i f f e r , i n themselves, depending on how one understands the a c t of consent. For example, where consent i s taken t o imply an ' i n v i o l a b l e ' a c t o f submission t o government and law, then each and every law becomes o b l i g a t o r y . The subsequent use of ' v a l i d i t y * as the i n d i c a t o r of a law's a u t h o r i t y , and the i r r e l e v a n c y of the content of a law (moral or immoral) to one's o b l i g a t i o n t o obey i t are of p a r t i c u l a r importance t o us here. For they imply, u l t i m a t e l y , the i r r e l e v a n c y of i n d i v i d u a l moral judgement where a law a p p l i e s . (One i s no longer f r e e t o a c t on t h a t judgement.) Far from accommodating the 'good man', t h i s use of consent appears t o i n v o l v e , we argue, an a b d i c a t i o n of one's freedom t o be good. A l t e r n a t i v e l y , consent may be i n t e r p r e t e d as a ' c o n d i t i o n a l ' a c t whereby the i n d i v i d u a l r e - a f f i r m s h i s r i g h t to r e s i s t government where i t goes beyond c e r t a i n ' l i m i t s ' set upon i t s nature and purpose. Here, i t i s the reasons f o r which one might consent ( r a t h e r than the a c t of consent i t s e l f ) which g i v e r i s e t o the duty of obedience. The v a l u e s one expects t o r e a l i z e through law - order , freedom, j u s t i c e , the common good, e t c . - these, r a t h e r than simple ' v a l i d i t y * , become the f i n a l i n d i c a t o r s of l e g i t i m a t e a u t h o r i t y . But what i f a law f r u s t r a t e s the achievement o f these end? Does a duty t o obey then e x i s t ? Whose judgement i s t o count i n such an i n s t a n c e ? These q u e s t i o n s a r i s e here p r e c i s e l y because one does not n e c e s s a r i l y i n c u r , w i t h t h i s use of consent, a duty t o obey a l l v a l i d law. For the same reason, we argue, t h i s approach f a i l s t o e x p l a i n the r i g h t of punishment t h a t governments may s t i l l e x e r c i s e over over any or a l l r e s i s t o r s . Out o f t h i s d i s c u s s i o n o f the 'ends o f government' one f i n a l q u e s t i o n a r i s e s concerning the very assumption of i i i c ompatibility between public and private 'goods'; or between public p r i n c i p l e s of morality and the ones we use i n our private l i v e s . We conclude, i n other words, by r a i s i n g doubts about the f e a s i b i l i t y of ever s t r i k i n g a ' f i n a l ' accord between the good c i t i z e n and the good man. i v Table of Contents I n t r o d u c t i o n 1 I. The 'Good Man 1 and the Problem of P o l i t i c a l O b l i g a t i o n 5 i ) T h e 'Good Man 1 and h i s O b l i g a t i o n s . . . 5 i i ) T h e Problem of P o l i t i c a l O b l i g a t i o n . . 10 i i i ) T h e Theory o f P o l i t i c a l O b l i g a t i o n as a Necessary L i n k Between the 'Good Man' and the L e g i t i m a t e S t a t e . . 16 I I . L e g i t i m a t e A u t h o r i t y : Consent and the Duty of Obedience 24 i ) C o n s e n t and L e g i t i m a t e A u t h o r i t y 24 i i ) P o l i t i c a l A u t h o r i t y and Moral Man.... 26 i i i ) T h e O b l i g a t o r y Nature of Consent 35 i v ) T h e Duty of Obedience: Absolute or C o n d i t i o n a l 48 I I I . The Value of L e g a l i t y and the Duty of Obedience 54 i)Freedom: Order and S e c u r i t y 55 i i ) J u s t i c e and the Common Good 63 i i i ) T h e Ends of Government and the Duty of Obedience 76 IV. C o n c l u s i o n 90 Footnotes I l l B i b l i o g r a p h y 120 POLITICAL OBLIGATION: THE GOOD MAN AND HIS DUTY TO OBEY THE,LAW I n t r o d u c t i o n Among one's moral o b l i g a t i o n s i s a ^ prima f a c i e o b l i g a t i o n to obey the law. Why ought I to obey the law? Why ought I to do what I am l e g a l l y o b l i g e d to do? That i s the q u e s t i o n to which our concept o f p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n addresses i t s e l f . I should l i k e to d e a l w i t h those e x p l a n a t i o n s wherein the duty to obey the law i s p e r c e i v e d (as above with Wasserstrom) as a moral i s s u e . I w i l l not, f o r the purposes of t h i s paper, concern myself d i r e c t l y w i t h those t h e o r i e s t h a t p r o v i d e e x p l a n a t i o n s i n terms o f expediency, n e c e s s i t y , o r f o r c e . The c o n t e x t w i t h i n which I wish to d i s c u s s the theory of p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n i s the l i b e r a l democratic S t a t e . The i n d i v i d u a l , upon whom t h i s o b l i g a t i o n t o obey the law f a l l s , w i l l be taken as a ' g i v e n 1 . He i s the autonomous, 2 r a t i o n a l and r e s p o n s i b l e man who r e s t s a t the c e n t r e o f the moral system u n d e r l y i n g the l i b e r a l democratic S t a t e . He i s the man capable o f independent r a t i o n a l and moral judgment, and consequently o f r e s p o n s i b l e self-government and moral s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n . He i s the man endowed wit h the n a t u r a l r i g h t to the freedom t o deci d e where he ought to go w i t h h i s l i f e and how he ought to go t h e r e . His own ' d i g n i t y ' , e s s e n t i a l to h i s humanity, depends upon the freedom he has to a c t a c c o r d i n g to h i s own w i l l , wherein h i s humanity r e s i d e s . H is 'goodness' depends upon the freedom he has to f o l l o w the d i c t a t e s o f h i s own conscience, wherein f i n a l moral a u t h o r i t y i s l o c a t e d . W i t h i n t h i s l i b e r a l t r a d i t i o n , the 'good man' has c e r t a i n d e f i n a b l e f e a t u r e s . He i s , as Weldon d e s c r i b e s him, a r e s p o n s i b l e moral agent, and not a s u b j e c t of moral laws. As such, he obeys o n l y those r u l e s to which he has consented, and i s " f o r t h a t very reason e n t i t l e d and o b l i g e d to break them when h i s moral judgment f i n d s them in a p p r o -2 p r i a t e i n a p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n " . Upon t h i s man can f a l l no ' o b l i g a t i o n ' to a c t , where t h a t a c t i o n or the 'good' at which i t aims i s not of h i s own choosing. C o n f r o n t i n g t h i s i n d i v i d u a l i s government: a d i s t i n c t p o l i t i c a l apparatus t h a t enables some men to make r u l e s which ot h e r men are r e q u i r e d to obey, r u l e s t o which obedience i s n e i t h e r v o l u n t a r y , nor o p t i o n a l . 3 The demand we would make of the theory o f p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n i s t h a t i t e x p l a i n how i t i s t h a t s e l f - g o v e r n i n g moral men would have a prima f a c i e moral o b l i g a t i o n t o obey these laws made by o t h e r s . I n s o f a r as i t takes as i t s s u b j e c t matter the obedience t o a l l v a l i d laws o f the St a t e t h a t i s i n f a c t r e q u i r e d o f us (or a t l e a s t t o those laws which can a p p r o p r i a t e l y be d i s c u s s e d i n terms of 'obedience'), and the f a c t of punishment t h a t w i l l f o l l o w any breach o f a v a l i d law, t h i s theory u s u a l l y tends to be, p e r f o r c e , a g e n e r a l one. I t seeks t o e x p l a i n obedience to a l l such laws (even to those which we might i n conscience r e j e c t ) as a 'duty', and the punishment t h a t f o l l o w s any a c t of di s o b e d i e n c e as the corres p o n d i n g ' r i g h t ' possessed by the S t a t e . Government and compulsory law would seem to pose, however, c e r t a i n obvious d i f f i c u l t i e s f o r the freedom r e q u i r e d f o r the r e a l i z a t i o n o f human goodness, d i f f i c u l t i e s which cannot be ignored by such a theory o f obedience. As Par r y d e f i n e s i t , The problem o f p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n i s one of r e c o n c i l i n g government w i t h the ve r y p r e c o n d i t i o n o f moral conduct.^ The nature o f t h a t o b l i g a t i o n i s one of the concerns of t h i s paper. Of p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t t o us, however, i s the manner and extent t o which our r a t i o n a l and e t h i c a l i n d i v i d u a l , our 'good man', can be s u c c e s s f u l l y accommodated by a g e n e r a l theory o f obedience. Can such 4 obedience to government and law be r e c o n c i l e d with r e s p o n s i b l e moral behaviour? 5 I. The 'Good Man* and the Problem o f P o l i t i c a l O b l i g a t i o n i ) The 'Good Man' and h i s O b l i g a t i o n s The premise of our d i s c u s s i o n i s t h a t the i n d i v i d u a l i s the e t h i c a l u n i t of r e l e v a n c e . There are two p a r t s to t h i s view: f i r s t l y , the l o c u s of moral judgment r e s t s with the i n d i v i d u a l ; and secondly, supreme v a l u e i s p l a c e d on the i n d i v i d u a l , h i m s e l f . D e s c r i b i n g the b e l i e f c o n t a i n e d i n the moral ph i l o s o p h y u n d e r l y i n g the l i b e r a l democratic p o l i c y , Deutsch w r i t e s , . . . a man's d i g n i t y i s impaired. . . i f he i s f o r c e d to do something t h a t d e p r i v e s him of autonomous c o n t r o l over h i s own behaviour and makes him i n s t e a d the ' o b j e c t ' of another p r o c e s s , a 'means' i n s t e a d of an e n d . l T h i s c o n c e p t i o n of an autonomous i n d i v i d u a l w i l l and the value t h a t i s attached t o the e x e r c i s e of t h a t w i l l r e s t s upon a broader understanding of man as an independent, r a t i o n a l and r e s p o n s i b l e being whose fundamental d i g n i t y r e s i d e s i n h i s i n d i v i d u a l i t y : i n h i s s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n . Human f u l f i l l m e n t l i e s i n the i n d i v i d u a l r e a l i z a t i o n of one's own w i l l and one's one l i f e , and not i n the s e r v i c e o f the w i l l s o r g o a l s of o t h e r s . To be used by another man as a means to h i s own ends, or to be f o r c e d to seek h i s g o a l s as your own i s to s u f f e r an u n j u s t i f i a b l e a c t of v i o l e n c e , an a c t a g a i n s t m o r a l i t y , f o r one's e x i s t e n c e as a man i s negated. The necessary c o n d i t i o n f o r s e l f - f u l f i l l m e n t through s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n i s freedom. I t i s the elemental r i g h t i n t r i n s i c to the human p e r s o n a l i t y , a g r a n t from no one, b e l o n g i n g t o the i n d i v i d u a l simply because he has been born a man, and without which he cannot be human. For the most p a r t , our understanding of freedom, here, i s c o n t i n g e n t , as Tussman notes, upon an e a r l i e r a s s o c i a t i o n o f the i n d i v i d u a l ' s e l f w i t h reason, and not 2 a p p e t i t e o r i n s t i n c t . Rousseau views man i n such terms - "For t o be s u b j e c t t o a p p e t i t e i s to be a s l a v e . . . . So too does Locke: The freedom, then, of man, and the l i b e r t y o f a c t i n g a c c o r d i n g t o h i s own w i l l i s grounded on h i s having reason which i s a b l e to i n s t r u c t him i n t h a t law he i s to govern him-s e l f by. ^  Our i n d i v i d u a l then i s not s e l f i s h , i r r a t i o n a l and ungoverned. He i s s e l f - g o v e r n e d . That freedom e s s e n t i a l t o h i s humanity l i e s not i n h i s doing as he l i k e s , but i n h i s doing as he t h i n k s he ought. The narrower r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h which we are concerned, between freedom and moral f u l f i l l m e n t , r e s t s upon a s i m i l a r view o f man and i n d i v i d u a l moral w i l l . In h i s freedom l i e s the essence of man's r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and 'goodness'. 7 Without i t , m o r a l i t y i s i m p o s s i b l e . Where a man's behaviour i s governed by an e x t e r n a l w i l l , where he cannot a c t as he t h i n k s he ought, a c c o r d i n g t o h i s own w i l l , he i s denied moral s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n . N e i t h e r he nor h i s behaviour can be d e s c r i b e d as f u l l y moral. For he cannot c l a i m r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r h i m s e l f o r h i s a c t i o n s . Again, t h i s freedom e s s e n t i a l to the e t h i c a l p e r s o n a l i t y i m p l i e s not a l a c k o f r e s t r a i n t s , but r e s t r a i n t s t h a t are se l f - i m p o s e d . That some men do not behave i n a r a t i o n a l , r e s p o n s i b l e and moral f a s h i o n does not a f f e c t h i s a s s o c i a t i o n of freedom w i t h m o r a l i t y . P a r a d o x i c a l l y , as Werner notes, t o the man h o l d i n g moral i d e a l s , t h i s statement t h a t he i s f r e e t o do as he l i k e s w i l l be t r i v i a l . And the person u n a f f e c t e d by such i d e a l s w i l l do as he l i k e s 5 anyway. That i s not t o a s s o c i a t e the r e s t r i c t i o n s which our moral i d e a l s p l a c e on our behaviour w i t h a l o s s o f freedom. That would obscure the nature of m o r a l i t y t h a t p o s i t s freedom and i n d i v i d u a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y as the essence o f moral a c t i v i t y . Without t h a t freedom, we cannot t a l k o f the 'good man' a t a l l . Given the primacy of the i n d i v i d u a l w i l l i n the realm of moral a c t i o n , the i n d i v i d u a l conscience r e i g n s supreme as the f i n a l a u t h o r i t y i n moral judgment, the u l t i m a t e source o f moral l e g i t i m a c y . S p i t z confirms t h i s f a i t h i n the i n d i v i d u a l conscience as a fundamental p r e c e p t of our 8 s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y : On i n t r i n s i c grounds democracy a f f i r m s t h a t each man's conscience i s r i g h t . 6 That i s so, w r i t e s Plamenatz i n agreement, not because the i n d i v i d u a l c o nscience i s i n f a l l i b l e , but because " i t cannot be o t h e r w i s e " . That c o n s c i e n c e i s u l t i m a t e "only i n the sense t h a t no f r e e agent can p o s s i b l y appeal to any other 7 a u t h o r i t y " . Men can go no f u r t h e r than t h a t source f o r moral guidance ( f a l l i b l e though such guidance may be) without compromising the moral nature of t h e i r a c t i o n s , and without s a c r i f i c i n g t h e i r c l a i m to goodness. In essence, t h i s means t h a t m o r a l i t y cannot be imposed from without on man, by the State or any o t h e r a u t h o r i t y . The i n d i v i d u a l c o n s c i e n c e cannot be bound by or d i c t a t e d t o by any o t h e r w i l l . And the moral d u t i e s a man has w i l l d e r i v e from the p r i n c i p l e s he holds and the judgments he makes. He cannot be bound, i n conscience, to seek a good t h a t h i s own conscience r e j e c t s . He cannot have an ' o b l i g a t i o n ' t h a t i s not o f h i s own choosing. His d u t i e s can o n l y be imposed by h i m s e l f . We are not i m p l y i n g t h a t the acceptance o f a moral o b l i g a t i o n i s what makes i t o b l i g a t o r y . I t i s so i n i t s own r i g h t , as the embodiment of a moral p r i n c i p l e . We are sugge s t i n g o n l y t h a t the acceptance o f t h a t p r i n c i p l e i s i t s e l f a p r e - c o n d i t i o n f o r a man having a moral o b l i g a t i o n to abide by i t . Or, as Werner puts i t , the o b l i g a t o r i n e s s 9 o f an a c t i o n s a i d t o be moral w i l l be s e n s i b l e o n l y t o the g man who a l r e a d y sees the a c t i o n as moral. A s i m i l a r p o s i t i o n i s r e f l e c t e d i n the suggestion by Benn and P e t e r s , t h a t a man "must see the p o i n t o f an o b l i g a t i o n b e f o r e he can 9 c o n s i d e r h i m s e l f bound". Unless a man 'sees the p o i n t ' , u n l e s s he accepts the p r i n c i p l e t h a t i m p l i e s the presence of an o b l i g a t i o n , he cannot be induced to a c t on the b a s i s of 'having an o b l i g a t i o n ' to do so. Where he i s r e q u i r e d to seek a good t h a t i s i n c o n t r a d i c t i o n with h i s own moral p e r c e p t i o n s , the s i t u a t i o n w i l l appear t o him as one of f o r c e , not o f duty. He may a c t as d e s i r e d i n response to t h a t f o r c e , but he w i l l not con-s i d e r h i m s e l f m o r a l l y o b l i g a t e d . The problem t h a t such a man f a c e s under government, the 'problem of p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n 1 , would appear to be i n h e r e n t i n the p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p i t s e l f between man and government: i n the making o f laws by some men, laws which o t h e r f r e e and equal men are r e q u i r e d to obey; i n the supremacy o f p u b l i c judgment (as contained i n those laws) over p r i v a t e judgment (to which we have a l r e a d y granted f i n a l a u t h o r i t y ) . In t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p , the i n d i v i d u a l f i n d s h i m s e l f r e q u i r e d t o a c t i n ways t h a t may not be o f h i s own choosing. He f i n d s h i s w i l l subordinated t o the a u t h o r i t y of the w i l l o f o t h e r s . His behaviour f i n d s i t s reasons i n t h a t e x t e r n a l a u t h o r i t y , not i n h i s own reason and judgment. He i s a s u b j e c t , not a moral agent. What then of h i s goodness? 10 i i ) The Problem of P o l i t i c a l O b l i g a t i o n How can obedience t o a u t h o r i t y and law be r e c o n c i l e d w i t h the p r e - r e q u i s i t e s o f r a t i o n a l , moral e x i s t e n c e -w i t h the freedom e s s e n t i a l t o moral s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n ? Given our view o f man and the self- i m p o s e d nature o f h i s o b l i g a t i o n s , our theory must s t a r t w i t h man as a f r e e moral agent i f t h e r e i s to be any duty of obedience a t a l l . And to w r i t e r s such as Rousseau, who are deeply committed to man and human d i g n i t y , i t must end w i t h man as a f r e e moral agent. That concern i s r e f l e c t e d i n the s e r i o u s n e s s with which he views any l o s s o f freedom to man: When a man renounces h i s l i b e r t y , he renounces h i s e s s e n t i a l manhood, h i s r i g h t s , and even h i s duty as a human being.10 Yet an abandonment of freedom, and of c o n s c i e n c e i s i m p l i e d by the 'duty' to behave i n accordance w i t h the judgments and laws made by o t h e r s . The punishment t h a t f o l l o w s any a c t of d i s o b e d i e n c e on the grounds of p r i v a t e judgment makes our problem even more acute. P a r t i c u l a r l y i f one i n t e r p r e t s t h a t punishment not merely as the r e s u l t o f b r e a k i n g a law, but i n a broader sense, as the r e s u l t of being a 'good man', of a c t i n g i n accordance w i t h one's own conscience i n c o n t r a v e n t i o n t o what i s p e r c e i v e d as an i n i q u i t o u s law. For Rousseau, the s o l u t i o n t o our problem of m o r a l i t y and obedience to a u t h o r i t y i s to be found by 11 c o n s t r u c t i n g the p o l i t i c a l a s s o c i a t i o n i n such a way, . . . t h a t each, when u n i t e d w i t h h i s f e l l o w s , renders obedience to h i s own w i l l and remains as f r e e as b e f o r e . 11 The a u t h o r i t y of the i n d i v i d u a l conscience remains i n t a c t . The problems surrounding the q u e s t i o n of d i s o b e d i e n c e d i s a p p e a r . For the s i t u a t i o n would never a r i s e . Our modern c o n s t i t u t i o n a l t h e o r i s t s are somewhat more w i l l i n g to r e c o g n i z e the presence of government a u t h o r i t y and c o n t r o l , the e x i s t e n c e of which i s b e l i e d by Rousseau's d e s c r i p t i o n of the p o l i t i c a l a s s o c i a t i o n . The laws o f the S t a t e do e x i s t . They are not the product o f the w i l l or judgment of the i n d i v i d u a l s to whom they apply. The f o r c e attached t o the s a n c t i o n s behind those laws leaves l i t t l e doubt as to t h e i r compulsory nature. Obedience to them does not embody freedom, m o r a l i t y , and s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n . That obedience i s b e t t e r d e s c r i b e d by r e s t r a i n t , compulsion, a l a c k of c h o i c e and a l a c k of p e r s o n a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . From the s t a n d p o i n t o f the S t a t e , the a u t h o r i t y o f i t s laws, as Thompson argues, has nothing to do w i t h m o r a l i t y . I t cannot. For the l a t t e r i s the area of c h o i c e . And there 12 i s no freedom of c h o i c e i n law. Both S p i t z and Mars draw our a t t e n t i o n to t h i s f a c t as an element b u i l t i n t o the l o g i c of law. "There can be no law t o which obedience i s o p t i o n a l " , w r i t e s the former, and t h e r e can be no l e g a l r i g h t t o d i s o b e y . For such a r i g h t i s not e n f o r c e a b l e 13 by law. Nor can the c o n s t i t u t i o n , w r i t e s the l a t t e r , 12 guarantee the r i g h t to what has come to be c a l l e d c i v i l d i s o b e d i e n c e . For " l e g a l l y p e r m issable law-breaking i s non-• -,„ 14 s e n s i c a l . U n l i k e our moral r u l e s which are d e f i n e d by t h e i r c o ntent and which are a u t h o r i t a t i v e and hence o b l i g a t o r y by v i r t u e of t h a t content, the laws of the St a t e are d e f i n e d by the process by which they are made. They are a u t h o r i t a t i v e and hence o b l i g a t o r y by v i r t u e of the f a c t t h a t they are ' v a l i d ' , t h a t they conform t o the r u l e s d e f i n i n g them i n t o e x i s t e n c e . A l l v a l i d laws must be obeyed. The content of those laws, good or bad, j u s t or u n j u s t , does not a f f e c t the f a c t t h a t they are laws. Nor does i t a f f e c t the q u e s t i o n of obedience. V a l i d i t y d e f i n e s a law, and v a l i d i t y d e f i n e s the o b l i g a t i o n t o obey. Given the r e a l i t y of these l e g a l o b l i g a t i o n s , the problem of obedience and moral e x i s t e n c e remains. For u n l i k e our obedience t o moral r u l e s , the obedience r e q u i r e d o f law depends not on any r a t i o n a l o r moral e v a l u a t i o n of the content of law, but on the simple f a c t t h a t a law e x i s t s . Our problem takes on an added dimension g i v e n the p o s s i b i l i t y of some c o n f l i c t between the behaviour d i c t a t e d by law and the moral d i c t a t e s of an i n d i v i d u a l ' s c o n s c i e n c e . I t i s the ver y d e f i n i t i o n of law, i n terms of procedure and l e g a l i t y t h a t enables such a s i t u a t i o n t o e x i s t . T h a t J d e f i n i t i o n a l l o w s us to t a l k o f a j u s t or u n j u s t law. Hobbes c l a i m s t h a t such t a l k i s n o n - s e n s i c a l . "No law can be u n j u s t " , 13 he argues, so l o n g as i t i s made by the d e s i g n a t e d Sovereign.' But i f j u s t and u n j u s t do imply more than the l e g a l p r i n c i p l e of v a l i d i t y w i t h which Hobbes equates them; i f Good and E v i l do have more substance to them than he i s w i l l i n g t o a l l o w when he reduces them to mere "names which s i g n i f y our 16 a p p e t i t e s and a v e r s i o n s " ; and i f they are not absorbed by s o c i e t y and the S t a t e , as i n Rousseau when he contends t h a t "to obey the r u l e s of s o c i e t y i s to be f r e e " and a l l e l s e i s 17 s l a v e r y ; then we w i l l have a 'problem of p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n ' . Such a problem i s o n l y s e n s i b l e g i v e n a presumption i n favour o f m o r a l i t y as both a reasonable and r e l e v a n t system o f thought i n i t s own r i g h t . The p o s s i b i l i t y ( i f not the r e c o g n i t i o n ) o f j u s t such an autonomous moral realm, open to man, independent o f the S t a t e i s i m p l i e d by modern i n s t i t u t i o n a l and p o s i t i v i s t l e g a l t h e o r i e s . I t i s i n h e r e n t i n t h e i r s e p a r a t i o n of m o r a l i t y from p o l i t i c s and law and i n t h e i r appeal to the p r i n c i p l e s of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y as the source o f p o l i t i c a l and l e g a l a u t h o r i t y . The S t a t e i s not Good; i t i s L e g i t i m a t e . I t has no a u t h o r i t y over the 'good man'; o n l y over the c i t i z e n . I t s laws do not f u n c t i o n as do moral r u l e s . For they make no c l a i m s upon the c o n s c i e n c e s of men, o n l y upon t h e i r behaviour. Whereas our moral r u l e s b i n d both. The s o l u t i o n t o our problem of s e c u r i n g the a u t h o r i t y of the i n d i v i d u a l c o n s c i e n c e and the freedom f o r moral s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n i s presumed to l i e i n t h i s p r i n c i p l e of s e p a r a t i o n . 14 U n f o r t u n a t e l y , the d e f i n i t i o n a l and o p e r a t i o n a l d i s t i n c t i o n s t h a t we draw between our l e g a l and moral r u l e s do not enable us to draw such neat boundaries between the content of the p o l i t i c a l process and t h a t o f the moral p r o c e s s . In keeping w i t h the conceptual d i s t i n c t i o n between m o r a l i t y and p o l i t i c s f and law, p o l i t i c s ought t o be pr e c l u d e d from o p e r a t i n g i n the area o f moral a f f a i r s , but i t i s not. Our laws and our moral r u l e s do happen t o d e a l q u i t e o f t e n w i t h the same s u b j e c t matter. Moral judgments, on the i s s u e , f o r example, of a b o r t i o n , are made u s i n g the p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s of decision-making. Laws, such as those f o r b i d d i n g t h e f t or murder, do have moral c o n t e n t . Others such as our tax laws, do r e f l e c t c e r t a i n p r i n c i p l e s o f j u s t i c e . Moral judgments are a l s o made by our judges, who are empowered to r e q u i r e i n d i v i d u a l s t o l i v e up t o them. The Court can de-c l a r e a woman to be ' u n f i t ' as a mother, and take custody o f her c h i l d u n t i l such time as she demonstrates, 'to the s a t i s f a c t i o n o f the Court', the c a p a c i t y f o r such a r o l e . The p o l i t i c a l r a t i o n a l e used t o j u s t i f y such laws may be perhaps p r u d e n t i a l , r a t h e r than moral. But we s t i l l can-not prevent the e f f e c t s o f these kinds o f d e c i s i o n s from s p i l l i n g over i n t o the moral sphere which the i n d i v i d u a l has d e f i n e d f o r h i m s e l f . What might be o f p u r e l y p r a c t i c a l import f o r the law-maker may be o f moral s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r the i n d i v i d u a l . 15 We cannot keep p o l i t i c s and law from i n t r u d i n g i n t o the p r i v a t e realm of m o r a l i t y . Nor are we accustomed t o an i d e a o f p o l i t i c s o r law i n t o which m o r a l i t y cannot i n t r u d e . S t r i c t l y adhered t o , the conc e p t u a l d i v i s i o n o f p o l i t i c s and m o r a l i t y would remove such n o t i o n s as e q u a l i t y , freedom and J u s t i c e from the realm o f p o l i t i c s . Yet these p r i n c i p l e s have been e s s e n t i a l t o our attempts t o m i t i g a t e the e v i l s and i n j u s t i c e s t h a t may accompany p o l i t i c a l power. They j u s t i f y the c o n t r o l s we p l a c e on p o l i t i c a l power, the l e g i t i -macy we bestow upon i t and the demands we make o f i t . Indeed, as Weldon argues, "Dmocracy depends on moral p h i l o s o p h y , and 18 does not i n c l u d e i t as a by-product". We may r e j e c t , then, any pretense by our p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t i e s to p r o c l a i m the Good and the J u s t . But t h i s does not imply a r e j e c t i o n o f the Good and the J u s t as guides f o r the c r e a t i o n and e x e r c i s e o f p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y . I t i s because laws do have moral content and because they may have a moral impact t h a t they pose a problem f o r the freedom o f men to be 'good'. Because they have not o n l y form, but a l s o content, t h e i r v a l i d i t y i s no longer the s o l e c r i t e r i o n f o r d e c i d i n g whether o r not they ought to be obeyed. We are r e q u i r e d i n f a c t to obey law, no matter how u n j u s t , because of i t s v a l i d i t y . Because of i t s u n j u s t content, how-ever, the i n d i v i d u a l may dec i d e t h a t he has a moral o b l i g a t i o n to disobey. He must then choose to do e i t h e r what the law r e q u i r e s o f him o r e l s e as h i s conscience d i c t a t e s . His p r e -16 dicament i s such t h a t he may be punished i f he chooses to be a 'good man'. But he cannot be a 'good man' i f he abandons h i s own conscience and behaves i n accordance with the judg-ment c o n t a i n e d i n the law. We might note, a t t h i s p o i n t , t h a t where a man i s r e q u i r e d t o obey a law w i t h which he i s i n f u l l agreement, the problem c r e a t e d by the duty o f obedience to p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y and law w i l l have no measurable impact on man. In such an i n s t a n c e , we cannot t e l l whether he i s obeying his'iOwn . w i l l or a v a l i d law. I t i s where a p a r t i c u l a r law r e q u i r e s o f an i n d i v i d u a l some a c t i o n which he f i n d s immoral, or p r o h i b i t s him from a c t i n g f o r what he f e e l s i s the Good t h a t the f u l l impact o f the duty o f obedience i s f e l t . I t i s where t h a t duty i s i n doubt, where d i s o b e d i e n c e becomes a c o n s i d e r a t i o n and punishment a p o s s i b i l i t y , t h a t our p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n comes i n t o d e f i n a b l e c o n f l i c t with the terms of moral e x i s t e n c e . The t a s k o f our theory of p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n would be t o e x p l a i n how i t i s t h a t obedience to such a law, so much at odds w i t h one's own w i l l , should be viewed w i t h a sense of ' o b l i g a t i o n ' , and not w i t h a f e a r o f the t h r e a t o f punishment t h a t l i e s behind i t . i i i ) The Theory o f P o l i t i c a l O b l i g a t i o n as a Necessary L i n k Between the Good Man and the L e g i t i m a t e S t a t e There i s a sense i n which the p r i n c i p l e o f s e p a r a t i o n 17 between law and m o r a l i t y does l e s s t o s o l v e our dilemma , than to c l a r i f y i t . F or the d e n i a l o f i n h e r e n t moral a u t h o r i t y to p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y ( a b s o l u t i s t o r democratic) l e a v e s p o l i t i c a l power and law to r e s t on l i t t l e o t h e r than the f a c t of t h e i r e x i s t e n c e . That power stands i n need of a new j u s t i f i c a t i o n i f i t s laws are to be o b l i g a t o r y and not j u s t commands backed by f o r c e . Obedience t o a l e g a l d i r e c t i v e t h a t l a c k s moral f o r c e - t h a t can t e l l us o n l y what we must do, not what we ought t o do - r e q u i r e s a j u s t i f i c a t i o n which obedience t o a moral r u l e does not. Why ought we to do what i s l e g a l l y r e q u i r e d o f us, e s p e c i a l l y when the conduct r e q u i r e d i n a l e g a l o b l i g a t i o n i s c o n t r a r y t o what our moral r u l e s p r e s c r i b e ? Why ought we to be good c i t i z e n s i f , i n so doing, we are prevented from b e i n g good men? We do not u s u a l l y ask why we ought t o be good men or why we ought t o do what i s m o r a l l y r e q u i r e d o f us (that which i s ' r i g h t ' f o r us to do). We do ask why we ought to do what the law commands. Our moral r u l e s would appear t o have a st r o n g e r c l a i m upon our behaviour than do the laws o f the S t a t e . H.A. Bedau weighs the r e l a t i o n s h i p between law and m o r a l i t y i n much t h i s way. No one, he argues, ought ever to do anything " j u s t because i t i s the law". He notes, i n t u r n , the "heavy burden" t h a t m o r a l i t y p l a c e s upon a law "before i t y i e l d s any a u t h o r i t y t o the law 19 to guide one's conduct". 18 The argument t h a t , one ought not to obey a law simply because i t i s a law, i m p l i e s t h a t the q u e s t i o n o f obedience i s i t s e l f o u t s i d e the scope o f law. T h i s i s not s u r p r i s i n g g i v e n our p r i n c i p l e o f s e p a r a t i o n whereby law makes no p r e -tense o f b i n d i n g the co n s c i e n c e s o f the men i t seeks t o r e g u l a t e . For how can law, so conceived, p o s s i b l y be o b l i g a t o r y i n i t s own r i g h t ? Thompson, d e s p i t e h i s a p p r e c i a t i v e remarks on the ' a u t h o r i t y o f law', a l s o p l a c e s the q u e s t i o n o f obedience o u t s i d e the framework o f l e g a l thought. 'Why obey?', he w r i t e s , i s indeed a moral i s s u e . But i t has nothin g to do with the a u t h o r i t y o f law. To obey 20 i s "something i n me, not i n the law". The argument t h a t , one ought t o obey law because i t i s law, i s , however, the c o n c l u s i o n reached i n law. From t h a t p e r s p e c t i v e , where a v a l i d law e x i s t s , so does an o b l i g a t i o n . Those laws t h a t are ' a u t h o r i t a t i v e ' (that are made by the men who have a c q u i r e d the a u t h o r i t y to do so by way o f the system of r u l e s by which such a u t h o r i t y i s c o n f e r r e d , and which conform t o the system o f r u l e s by which they are d e f i n e d as v a l i d ) are o b l i g a t o r y . For, w i t h i n the c o n f i n e s o f our grammar, as P i t k i n suggests, t o c a l l a d i r e c t i v e 21 a u t h o r i t a t i v e i s t o suggest t h a t i t ought to be obeyed. But these are l o g i c a l f a c t s b u i l t i n t o the meaning o f law i n a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l system t h a t d e f i n e s a u t h o r i t y and law i n terms of r u l e s , and not i n terms o f p e r s o n a l q u a l i t i e s or p e r s o n a l command. So f a r we have onl y been p r o v i d e d with 19 the e x p l a n a t o r y c i r c l e o f l e g a l theory. By i t s e l f , the a s s e r t i o n t h a t one ought to obey the law because i t i s the law merely r e - a s s e r t s the l e g a l l y o b l i g i n g nature of a l e g a l o b l i g a t i o n . (Or e l s e , as D'Entreves suggests, an unexplained v a l u e c l a u s e has been i n s e r t e d i n t o "what i s otherwise p u r e l y 22 and simply a t a u t o l o g y " . ) The f u l l burden o f t h a t c i r c l e becomes apparent when we i n q u i r e o f the a u t h o r i t y o f the more fundamental system of r u l e s from which p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y and l e g a l i t y are d e r i v e d . For the i n s t i t u t i o n a l j u r i s t and the l e g a l p o s i t i -v i s t , the l e g i t i m a c y o f these r u l e s , much l i k e the v a l i d i t y o f more immediate laws, i s a matter of f a c t . Where a law e x i s t s , i t i s v a l i d (an i n v a l i d law i s not a law). Where a l e g a l system e x i s t s , i t i s l e g i t i m a t e . I t e x i s t s i f i t works, i f i t gets i t s e l f obeyed. Such an approach, as D'Entreves p o i n t s out, leads us to the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t no f u n c t i o n i n g l e g a l system ever l a c k s l e g i t i m a c y o r a u t h o r i t y . I t n e c e s s i t a t e s t h a t we 'take f o r granted' the e s s e n t i a l a u t h o r i t y o f those r u l e s t h a t bestow a u t h o r i t y on the S t a t e . Yet those r u l e s themselves owe t h e i r e x i s t e n c e to the f a c t t h a t they are supported by the 23 S t a t e . The s e l f - j u s t i f y i n g ' d i v i n e ' State has been r e p l a c e d , i t would seem by the s e l f - j u s t i f y i n g ' j u r i s t i c ' S t a t e . To break t h a t c i r c l e , the p o s i t i v i s t or i n s t i t u t i o n a l t h e o r i s t 20 may make the assumption t h a t the f a c t o f g e n e r a l obedience to law bears witness to the correspondence o f the c o n s t i t u -t i o n a l system w i t h e x i s t i n g v a l u e s i n the s o c i e t y i t r e g u l a t e s . Obedience i s presumed to imply acceptance o f the system, and wi t h t h a t acceptance, the system a c q u i r e s a u t h o r i t y . But obedience does not n e c e s s a r i l y imply acceptance. The c o s t s o f such an assumption may be hi g h , not o n l y w i t h r e s p e c t to our a b i l i t y to estimate the s t a b i l i t y o f a g i v e n p o l i t i c a l system, but a l s o i n terms o f our theory. For i n the l a t t e r i n s t a n c e , ' a u t h o r i t y ' may be bestowed upon a system t h a t e l i c i t s obedience mainly by t h r e a t o f f o r c e . And t h a t i s g e n e r a l l y understood to be a c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n terms. The S t a t e and i t s laws s t i l l seem t o d e r i v e t h e i r ' a u t h o r i t y ' , we would argue, from the f a c t of t h e i r e x i s t e n c e d e s p i t e the p r i n c i p l e s o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y upon which t h a t a u t h o r i t y r e s t s . We would not l i k e to under-estimate the advantages o f the l e g a l i s m to which such a n o t i o n of a u t h o r i t y appeals: the p r o v i s i o n f o r an o r d e r l y and p r e d i c t a b l e a s c e n s i o n t o and e x e c u t i o n of a u t h o r i t y ; the e x i s t e n c e o f d e v i c e s f o r p r o t e c t i n g men a g a i n s t the a r b i t r a r y abuses o f p o l i t i c a l power and of channels f o r r e d r e s s i n g any wrong; and the e x i s t e n c e o f d e v i c e s f o r r e n d e r i n g p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y accountable and of channels f o r i n i t i a t i n g changes i n the p o l i t i c a l system and i n laws. But the e x i s t e n c e o f these l e g a l channels by which man may approach government, w h i l e they may a f f o r d him some 21 p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t a r b i t r a r y r u l e , - do not. render him a f r e e man under government and law. Nor does the e x i s t e n c e o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r u l e s d e f i n i n g what i s or i s not l e g a l l y a u t h o r i t a t i v e power or v a l i d law j u s t i f y t h a t power o r make v a l i d law o b l i g a t o r y . Those r u l e s o n l y s e t l e g a l boundaries upon p o l i t i c a l power and law. They inform us of the extent t o which we may be l e g a l l y o b l i g e d to obey. But they do not e x p l a i n our o b l i g a t i o n to obey a u t h o r i t y o r law t h a t conforms to those l i m i t s . While we may a p p r e c i a t e the l i m i t s t h a t are p l a c e d on p o l i t i c a l power, these l i m i t s do not thereby 'moralise' t h a t power o r make i t something t h a t 'ought' to be obeyed. N e i t h e r the p o s s e s s i o n o f power, l e g a l o r otherwise, nor the f a c t o f law are f i n a l words on the l e g i t i m a c y o f a u t h o r i t y o r the o b l i g a t o r i n e s s o f obedience. N e i t h e r the source of law, the S t a t e , nor the meaning of law p r o v i d e s us wit h a reason f o r doing what i s l e g a l l y r e q u i r e d o f us. We must go o u t s i d e the j u r i s t i c c i r c l e f o r t h a t reason. One's o b l i g a t i o n to obey-law, o n e ' s " p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n , i s , then, something q u a l i t a t i v e l y d i s t i n c t from one's l e g a l o b l i g a t i o n , and not e x p l a i n a b l e s o l e l y i n terms of law. The r o l e we would a s s i g n t o the theory o f p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n has to do wit h the r e l a t i o n s h i p (or r a t h e r , the l a c k o f any such r e l a t i o n s h i p t h a t we have noted above) between the L e g i t i m a t e S t a t e (no matter how rule-bound) and the men who are i t s s u b j e c t s . What i s the r e l a t i o n s h i p 22 between the a u t h o r i t y of laws t h a t can o n l y t e l l men what they must do and the s e l f - p o s s e s s e d a u t h o r i t y of men who alone can t e l l themselves what they ought to do. I f men are t o have a 'duty' to obey law, then some l i n k must e x i s t between the consciences of men and law. E s s e n t i a l l y , the gap between law and m o r a l i t y t h a t i s c r e a t e d by s t r i p p i n g p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y of i n h e r e n t moral f o r c e must be b r i d g e d a g a i n . I f the L e g i t i m a t e S t a t e and v a l i d law are to have any j u s t i f i a b l e c l a i m over the 'good man', then some l i n k must be e s t a b l i s h e d between the good man and the good (obedient) c i t i z e n . In i t s absence, the f a c t u a l supremacy of the demands of c i t i z e n s h i p over those of m o r a l i t y r e s t on inadequate grounds. The u l t i m a t e s o l u t i o n i m p l i e d by t h i s f o r m u l a t i o n of the problem i s to p r e s e n t law as something to which obedience i s m o r a l l y o b l i g a t o r y . A j u s t i f i c a t i o n of the power of the S t a t e and law on grounds of expediency, prudence or f o r c e cannot e x p l a i n the supremacy of law and the r i g h t to punish the good but d i s o b e d i e n t man. Only a moral j u s t i f i c a t i o n can e s t a b l i s h the necessary r e l a t i o n s h i p . I f the o b l i g a t i o n t o obey law i s to be a moral one, there would appear to be two approaches open to us. One i s to r e p r e s e n t t h a t duty as s e l f i m p o s e d and hence a duty t h a t has s a t i s f i e d the p r e r e q u i s i t e of a moral o b l i g a t i o n . The 23 o t h e r i s to focus on the v a l u e of law - to r e p r e s e n t law as something t h a t 'ought' to be obeyed. These approaches are not completely s e p a r a b l e . The s e l f - i m p o s e d duty to obey i s u s u a l l y i n c u r r e d i n the l i g h t of the v a l u e we a t t a c h to law. But the problems att a c h e d to each are d i f f e r e n t . The f i r s t f o cuses on the o r i g i n o f government and the r i g h t t o r u l e , and hence on the o b l i g a t o r y nature of the a c t o f consent; the second on the reasons f o r which we consent, and hence on the o b l i g a t o r y nature of the ends of government. For a n a l y t i c a l purposes, then, we s h a l l approach each argument s e p a r a t e l y . 24 I I . L e g i t i m a t e A u t h o r i t y ; Consent and the Duty of Obedience i ) Consent and L e g i t i m a t e A u t h o r i t y The need f o r some theory of p o l i t i c a l consent d e r i v e s from our i n i t i a l view o f man. As an autonomous, s e l f -governing being, he cannot be s u b j e c t to the w i l l o r power of o t h e r s - u n l e s s he h i m s e l f r e c o g n i z e s the a u t h o r i t y o f t h a t power, or consents to h i s own s u b j e c t i o n t o i t . Where t h a t assent i s l a c k i n g , comments S p i t z , democracy's c l a i m to obedience can o n l y r e s t on power, not on "a u n i v e r s a l m o r a l i t y " . ^ In the argument f o r obedience t o law t h a t d e r i v e s from the theory o f consent, i t i s our consent t h a t bestows ' a u t h o r i t y ' (the r i g h t t o make laws and punish the d i s -obedient) on p o l i t i c a l power. Corresponding to t h i s r i g h t to r u l e i s a duty of obedience, a duty which depends essen-t i a l l y upon the c o r r e l a t i o n between l e g i t i m a t e a u t h o r i t y and obedience. T h i s r i g h t to r u l e and the duty to obey d e r i v e ; t h e i r moral f o r c e , t h e i r o b l i g a t o r i n e s s , from the o b l i g a t o r y nature o f the a c t of consent, and not from the d e s i r e d ends f o r which p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y i s r a t i o n a l l y (or s e l f i s h l y ) accepted. They depend n e i t h e r on the 25 nature o f a u t h o r i t y as e x e r c i s e d , nor on the content o f enacted law. S p e c i f i c a l l y , we are assumed to have consented to the a u t h o r i t y o f the p o l i t i c a l and l e g a l system as a whole, to the r u l e s by which a u t h o r i t y i s c o n f e r r e d on law-makers and v a l i d i t y upon law. H o p e f u l l y , t h a t would enable us to formulate a theory o f obedience t h a t would e x p l a i n our duty t o obey a l l law, without e x c e p t i o n . A l l laws i s s u i n g from the 'accepted 1 process by which laws are made, even those which we do not f i n d t o our own l i k i n g , are o b l i g a t o r y . So long as a law i s a b s o l u t e l y v a l i d , made by the proper a u t h o r i -t i e s i n the proper manner, so too i s our o b l i g a t i o n t o obey i t a b s o l u t e and u n c o n d i t i o n a l . A man may s t i l l p l e a s e h i m s e l f as t o whether or not he a c t u a l l y w i l l obey, but having once consented, "what he cannot p l e a s e h i m s e l f about", i t i s argued, " i s whether t o acknowledge t h a t the government has 2 a r i g h t to be obeyed". We may o b j e c t , then, t o a law because i t i s u n j u s t , but we cannot c h a l l e n g e the r i g h t of the l e g i s l a t o r s t o make i t . We may, i n f a c t , disobey t h a t law because i t i s un j u s t , but we cannot c h a l l e n g e the r i g h t o f the c o u r t s to then command our punishment f o r t h a t breach o f duty. By c o n s e n t i n g to p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y , then, we are assumed to have i n c u r r e d an o b l i g a t i o n to obey i t s laws. Because i t i s self-imposed, t h i s duty o f obedience s a t i s f i e s 26 the minimum c o n d i t i o n o f any moral o b l i g a t i o n - t h a t i t be f r e e l y assumed by those upon whom i t f a l l s . In keeping w i t h our understanding of a s e l f - i m p o s e d duty, and i t s f u l -f i l l m e n t , i t i s not uncommon to f i n d our obedience to law r e p r e s e n t e d , not as a l o s s of freedom a t a l l , but as some-t h i n g t h a t should w i l l f u l l y and f r e e l y f o l l o w from our consent. For what a man orders on h i s own a u t h o r i z a t i o n , argues Rousseau, f o r example, can never have the f o r c e of law i n a 3 "compulsory sense". Hobbes takes a s i m i l a r stance. Where someone has been a u t h o r i z e d to make laws, "he b i n d e t h the author s£the man who consents};:, / no l e s s than i f he had 4 made i t h i m s e l f " . Having a u t h o r i z e d the making of law, i t would seem t h a t , i n obeying those laws, the i n d i v i d u a l i s o n l y obeying h i m s e l f . His v o l u n t a r y s u b j e c t i o n to law would seem to imply h i s v o l u n t a r y obedience. i i ) P o l i t i c a l A u t h o r i t y and Moral Men By v i r t u e of our consent, government and law a c q u i r e ' a u t h o r i t y ' . Consent theory thus encourages us to look upon law as something more than w i l l o r command backed by f o r c e . T h i s i s important f o r a theory o f p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n . For where the presence of f o r c e d i c t a t e s our behaviour, the e x i s t e n c e o f an o b l i g a t i o n i s u s u a l l y s a i d t o be i m p o s s i b l e . The view o f law as ' a u t h o r i t y ' and not 'might' enables us to p e r c e i v e obedience to i t i n the v o l u n t a r y terms t h a t we t r a d i t i o n a l l y a t t a c h to the concept o f o b l i g a t i o n and which i s l a c k i n g i n the l a t t e r view o f law:.as command. 27 However, t h i s view o f law as an ' a u t h o r i t a t i v e d i r e c t i v e ' has f u r t h e r s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r the i n d i v i d u a l s s u b j e c t to i t , g i v e n our understanding of the nature o f a u t h o r i t y (upon which t h e r e seems to be c o n s i d e r a b l e agreement among our t h e o r i s t s ) . A u t h o r i t y , Benn and P e t e r s remind us, c o n t a i n s w i t h i n i t s e l f the very reason f o r obedience. Thus law, when r e p r e s e n t e d as an a u t h o r i t a t i v e d i r e c t i v e , becomes, as they d e s c r i b e i t , "a r e g u l a t o r y u t t e r a n c e f o r which no reasons need be g i v e n " f o r obedience 5 beyond the f a c t o f i t s a u t h o r i t y . C a s s i n e l l i , i n a s i m i l a r v e i n , draws our a t t e n t i o n to the " r e l a t i v e i n s i g n i f i c a n c e o f g Tr u t h , Goodness, o r r a t i o n a l i t y " to the e x e r c i s e o f a u t h o r i t y . And there i s Day who w r i t e s t h a t obedience to a l e g a l d i r e c t i v e because o f i t s a u t h o r i t y must, of - n e c e s s i t y , be i r r a t i o n a l , "done without r e c o u r s e to reason". For i f we obey commands f o r good reasons, then we are not obeying them because o f 7 t h e i r a u t h o r i t y . I t would appear t h a t where the presence o f a u t h o r i t y d i c t a t e s our behaviour, any r a t i o n a l o r moral f o r c e behind a l e g a l command i s of no consequence. We might conclude, then, t h a t obedience to such a command because o f the f o r c e behind i t , be t h a t the f o r c e of s a n c t i o n s or the f o r c e o f reason, i n d i c a t e s a breakdown of a u t h o r i t y i n the former case, and the i r r e l e v a n c y o f a u t h o r i t y i n the l a t t e r . In the former we can have no o b l i g a t i o n i n any proper sense. In the l a t t e r , the concept o f o b l i g a t i o n i s s u p e r f l u o u s . For such an 28 o b l i g a t i o n to be r e l e v a n t , law can be n e i t h e r w i l l (as our command t h e o r i s t s p e r c e i v e i t ) nor reason o r ' j u s t i c e ' (as our n a t u r a l law t h e o r i s t s p e r c e i v e i t ) . That o b l i g a t i o n p e r t a i n s o n l y where law i m p l i e s a u t h o r i t y . Somewhere, then, a n a l y t i c a l l y separate from the realms o f ' f o r c e ' and 'reason' l i e s the realm of ' a u t h o r i t y ' , where law r e s i d e s , and from which the r a t i o n a l and moral judgment of the i n d i v i d u a l s s u b j e c t to i t i s excluded. There i s l i t t l e room here f o r our s e l f - g o v e r n i n g moral agent. Day comes to much the same c o n c l u s i o n s . He notes t h a t even though p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y "may be thought of as r a t i o n a l and moral because i t i s e s s e n t i a l to a harmonious s o c i e t y " , i t a l s o tends "to l i m i t the s u b j e c t ' s sphere o f r a t i o n a l g and moral d e c i s i o n s " . T h e r e i n l i e s the d i f f i c u l t y t h a t a theory o f obedience to p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y poses f o r men. I t seems to i n v i t e an abandonment o f i n d i v i d u a l judgment. But a man can do more than j u s t submit to p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y , Day t e l l s us. He can s t i l l have o p i n i o n s about 9 good or bad. U n f o r t u n a t e l y t h i s does not mean much i n the c o n t e x t o f our p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n . F o r a man's p r i v a t e judgments s t i l l remain i r r e l e v a n t to h i s duty to obey a u t h o r i t y . Without ever denying the r i g h t to i n d i v i d u a l judgment, consent theory renders t h a t judgment o f no consequence. In c o n s e n t i n g to obey p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y , we are agreeing 29 to a c t a c c o r d i n g t o the p u b l i c w i l l o f the Sovereign. We are agreeing not to r e s i s t t h a t Sovereign w i l l where our own w i l l d i c t a t e s a c o n t r a r y a c t i o n . Men s t i l l have the r i g h t to t h i n k as they l i k e , but they g i v e up the r i g h t to a c t as they t h i n k they ought. Hobbes uses the n o t i o n o f consent to imply j u s t such an agreement. I t i s the p r o l i f e r a t i o n o f these same kinds of judgments, and the chaos t h a t he f e e l s w i l l f o l l o w from men a c t i n g independently a c c o r d i n g to t h e i r own w i l l s , t h a t prompts him to do so. As Campbell notes, f o r Hobbes, p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y i s e s s e n t i a l i n order to p r o v i d e the u n i t y t h a t i s i m p o s s i b l e p r e c i s e l y because of "man's penchant f o r a t t a c h i n g moral v a l u a t i o n s to h i s conduct".^" 0 Bedau seems to express the same f e a r and d i s t r u s t o f such independent a c t i o n : We h e s i t a t e to a l l o w t h a t a man can know th a t he ought not to accept a c e r t a i n p o l i c y i f a l l he knows i s t h a t he has c o n s c i e n t i o u s s c r u p l e s a g a i n s t i t . 11 A somewhat s i m i l a r , and no l e s s c o n f u s i n g p o s i t i o n i s taken by S p i t z . "On i n t r i n s i c grounds. . . each man's conscience i s r i g h t " , he t e l l s us. But a t the same time he argues t h a t t h i s does not mean t h a t a man has "a r i g h t to subor-12 dxnate the laws to h i s co n s c i e n c e " . Yet, the s u b o r d i n a t i o n o f what we t h i n k to be ' r i g h t ' or 'good' to the a u t h o r i t y of law does not say much f o r the s t a t u s o f goodness and m o r a l i t y . I n d i v i d u a l moral 30 judgment, p r e v i o u s l y h e l d i n such h i g h r e g a r d t h a t we sought to p r o t e c t i t from the c l a i m s o f the S t a t e to moral a u t h o r i t y , seems to have become "mere o p i n i o n 1 , more a matter of i d e o l o g y perhaps, than a matter of r i g h t and wrong. A c t i o n i n defence of one's own moral c o n v i c t i o n s seems to have l o s t i t s v i r t u e . By d e v a l u i n g such a c t i o n , our n o t i o n of the 'good man' no longer has much s i g n i f i c a n c e . More i m p o r t a n t l y , the d e n i a l (or v o l u n t a r y a b d i c a t i o n ) of the r i g h t to such a c t i o n a c c o r d i n g to p r i v a t e c onscience wherever a law p e r t a i n s (even where t h a t judgment i s deemed to be c o r r e c t ) a l s o denies man the c a p a c i t y to be good. I t a l l o w s him o n l y the l u x u r y o f t h i n k i n g 'good thoughts*. The a s s e r t i o n t h a t he can s t i l l make such judgments seems to imply t h a t the s a l v a t i o n of man as an autonomous moral being can be secured by g r a n t i n g him t h i s r i g h t . That assumption i t s e l f i m p l i e s a d i v i s i o n o f thought and a c t i o n ; and a d i v i s i o n of man as w e l l i n t o a t h i n k e r (the moral being) and an a c t o r (the obedient c i t i z e n ) . His freedom and h i s goodness are presumed to l i e i n t h i s r i g h t to t h i n k as he l i k e s , d e s p i t e the l a c k o f freedom to do as he t h i n k s he ought. But man cannot always be d i v i d e d i n t h i s way. The 'good man' who holds p a c i f i s t ( p r i n c i p l e s ) does not r e t u r n home u n a f f e c t e d by the (act) o f k i l l i n g i n h i s r o l e as a 'good c i t i z e n ' a t war w i t h o t h e r s . Indeed, the 'good man', 31 (the t h i n k e r ) does not r e t u r n a t a l l i f the 'good c i t i z e n ' happens to be k i l l e d i n the course o f (acting) out h i s p o l i t i c a l duty t o f i g h t as commanded. The judgments a man holds and the a c t i o n s he takes are i n t i m a t e l y connected. Consequently, h i s l i b e r t y cannot be at t a c h e d to o n l y one f a c u l t y o r the o t h e r . The man who can o n l y t h i n k as he l i k e s i s not f r e e . As Arendt, i n her own i n i m i t a b l e s t y l e , suggests, Where knowing and doing have p a r t e d company, the space of freedom i s l o s t . Nor i s there any s a l v a t i o n to be had f o r the good man who i s f r e e to be moral o n l y i n mind and not i n a c t i o n . We can h a r d l y a t t r i b u t e to him any r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r h i s a c t i o n s where they do not d e r i v e from h i s own judgment. Nor can we a t t r i b u t e t o him any power of s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t i s i n any way s i m i l a r to what our l i b e r a l t h e o r i s t s had i n mind. In e f f e c t , t h i s s e p a r a t i o n o f thought and a c t i o n d e p r i v e s man o f the freedom e s s e n t i a l to the human d i g n i t y t h a t l i b e r a l i s m envisages f o r a l l men. U l t i m a t e l y t h a t d i v i s i o n renders both freedom and m o r a l i t y n o n - s e n s i c a l . To the extent t h a t they are i n t e r -n a l i z e d i n the f a c u l t y of mind, m o r a l i t y and freedom are removed from the co n t e x t i n which they normally apply -man's behaviour and h i s i n t e r - r e l a t i o n s w i t h o t h e r men. P a r a d o x i c a l l y , i t i s i n p r e c i s e l y t h i s realm o f e x t e r n a l a c t i o n and human r e l a t i o n s h i p s t h a t law i s o p e r a t i v e . 32 Yet, from the p e r s p e c t i v e of consent theory, obedience to those laws f o l l o w s from t h e i r ' a u t h o r i t y 1 , not from any r a t i o n a l o r moral judgment on the nature of the behaviour r e q u i r e d . Such moral knowledge i s i r r e l e v a n t where law a p p l i e s ; but law i t s e l f a p p l i e s t o the o n l y realm where . moral a c t i o n i s p o s s i b l e . I t would appear t h a t as the S t a t e g r a d u a l l y expands the scope o f i t s laws, we can p r o g r e s s i v e l y r i d o u r s e l v e s e n t i r e l y of the burden of m o r a l i t y i n our e x i s t e n c e . The r i g h t to one's own judgment on good or bad i s , we would argue, a r a t h e r hollow v i c t o r y f o r our 'good man' which tends to obscure the r e a l impact o f h i s presumed submission to p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y : i n h i s obedience to the laws of the S t a t e , man i s not f u l f i l l i n g h i s own moral w i l l , but the w i l l o f o t h e r s as c o n t a i n e d i n those laws. He behaves as o t h e r s t h i n k he ought. He seeks the 'good' which o t h e r s t h i n k he ought to pursue. He does not have, as Gough notes, human l i b e r t y , the l i b e r t y to do good or e v i l (which would be i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y ) . Under government and law he has o n l y c i v i l l i b e r t y , the 14 l i b e r t y t o do o n l y good. And t h a t good w i l l be d e f i n e d f o r him. The behaviour r e q u i r e d of our good c i t i z e n by t h i s t h eory of p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n , t h a t d e r i v e s from the n o t i o n o f consent appears to be much more l i k e the " m o r a l i t y of the 'good c h i l d 1 " (as Campbell so a p t l y d e s c r i b e s i t ) , than 33 t h a t of a r e s p o n s i b l e a d u l t . I t i n v o l v e s an a b d i c a t i o n o f p e r s o n a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t h a t i s l e g i t i m i z e d by an appeal to the ' a u t h o r i t y ' of law, to which w i l l i n g and u n c o n d i t i o n a l obedience i s due. The i n d i v i d u a l may o b j e c t , but i n the end he must d e f e r to t h a t a u t h o r i t y . And r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r h i s a c t i o n s w i l l be borne, not by h i m s e l f , but by the makers of law. Yet, c o n t r a r y to p a r e n t a l a u t h o r i t y , p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y aims not a t i t s own d i s s o l u t i o n , but a t i t s own p e r p e t u a t i o n . By h i s own consent the i n d i v i d u a l i s presumed to have p l a c e d h i m s e l f i n t h i s p e r p e t u a l S t a t e o f c h i l d h o o d . However, the f a c t t h a t h i s s u b j e c t i o n to government and law might be v o l u n t a r y does not a l t e r , we would contend, the impact t h a t such s u b j e c t i o n has upon the 'good man 1. Whether he consents or not, man does not have the p e r s o n a l l i b e r t y t o which Gough r e f e r s . He may have what Tussman c a l l s ' p o l i t i c a l l i b e r t y ' which, he w r i t e s , "does not t u r n on an absence of law but on whether the law i s s e l f - i m p o s e d " . 1 (Locke makes r e f e r e n c e to a s i m i l a r type of freedom: the l i b e r t y o f men i n s o c i e t y which c o n s i s t s of t h e i r being "under no o t h e r l e g i s l a t i v e power but t h a t e s t a b l i s h e d by 17 consent". ) But the l i b e r t y a man has under government would appear, then, to be not a t a l l the same as the p e r s o n a l freedom so e s s e n t i a l to h i s moral behaviour, the freedom t h a t c o n s i s t s o f h i s w i l l not being s u b j e c t to any o t h e r w i l l . Nor does the p o s s e s s i o n of t h a t p o l i t i c a l l i b e r t y appear to guarantee the p o s s e s s i o n o f p e r s o n a l l i b e r t y . 34 In f a c t , obedience to p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y , whether we have consented to i t o r not, i m p l i e s the l o s s of j u s t t h a t freedom or r i g h t to a c t a c c o r d i n g to one's own moral w i l l . The a u t h o r i t y of t h a t w i l l i s subordinated to the a u t h o r i t y of law. And the 'good man' i s subordinated to the 'good c i t i z e n 1 . Such i s the very nature o f our p r e s e n t s i t u a t i o n under government and law, the s i t u a t i o n which consent theory p u r p o r t s to e x p l a i n . The 'good man' can, i n f a c t , disobey laws a g a i n s t which he has c o n s c i e n t i o u s moral s c r u p l e s . The freedom he possesses to do so cannot be s u c c e s s f u l l y c u r t a i l e d i n any p r a c t i c a l sense. But the t h r e a t o f punishment t h a t l i e s behind law i s a f a i r l y e x p l i c i t s t a t e -ment on the a t t i t u d e of the S t a t e . The t h r e a t e x i s t s to d i s c o u r a g e men from e x e r c i s i n g t h e i r freedom to a c t a c c o r d i n g to c o nscience or any o t h e r f o r c e where i t might i n v o l v e b r e a k i n g a law. The a c t u a l punishment t h a t f o l l o w s such a breach serves to deny t h a t men have any ' r i g h t ' t o use t h a t freedom or power they have to disobey, even where they may have a moral o b l i g a t i o n to do so. Consent theory does not r e s t o r e t h i s r i g h t . I t suggests only t h a t i n the very a c t of a u t h o r i z i n g o t h e r s to make laws f o r us, we have ' f r e e l y ' a b d i c a t e d our freedom to a c t a c c o r d i n g to our own moral w i l l . The subordinate s t a t u s o f i n d i v i d u a l judgment and the o b l i g a t i o n not to a c t upon t h a t judgment i n c o n t r a v e n t i o n o f a v a l i d law are d e r i v e d from the f a c t of our consent. So too i s the r i g h t o f government to punish us i f we do d i s o b e y . 35 But what i s the o b l i g a t o r y nature o f t h i s a c t of consent by which the above r i g h t and duty are j u s t i f i e d ? How does our consent to p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y render our obedience to i t m o r a l l y o b l i g a t o r y ? i i i ) The O b l i g a t o r y Nature of Consent Why does the man who consents t o obey law t h e r e f o r e have a duty t o obey law? The answer to t h a t q u e s t i o n l i e s i n the common a s s i m i l a t i o n o f the n o t i o n o f consent o r c o n t r a c t w i t h t h a t o f 'the pr o m i s e 1 , and i n the e q u a l l y common assumption t h a t promises are themselves o b l i g a t o r y . Along these l i n e s , Weldon argues t h a t without the s e l f - e v i d e n t moral law t h a t one keep one's promise, the 18 problem o f p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n would be acute. S i m i l a r l y , Tussman comments w i t h regard to the n o t i o n o f consent, t h a t i f we d i d n ' t accept t h a t such agreements should be honored, then "the attempt to s o l v e problems by 19 making agreements would be f u t i l e or s i l l y " . P i t k i n , too, w r i t e s t h a t the making o f c o n t r a c t s presupposes "the s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n of prom i s i n g " . And she agrees t h a t such self-assumed o b l i g a t i o n s do o b l i g e . She f u r t h e r notes, however, t h a t the o b l i g a t i o n to keep one's word i s not i t s e l f an o b l i g a t i o n t h a t i s self-assumed. Nor i s the o b l i g a t i o n to keep a promise i t s e l f founded on a promise. Rather, the o b l i g a t i o n t o keep one's word r e s t s on the meaning of the words "I promise" o r "I c o n t r a c t " . We 36 do not need to go beyond the grammatical i m p l i c a t i o n s o f these words, she concludes, i n order to e x p l a i n the o b l i g a t i o n t h a t a r i s e s from them. Thus, the man who consents to obey law has an o b l i g a t i o n to do so because 20 t h a t i s what the words "I consent" mean. In keeping w i t h her l i n g u i s t i c approach, P i t k i n c a l l s a breach o f promise or c o n t r a c t a " p h i l o s o p h i c a l d i s o r d e r o r paradox". Tussman, however, c a l l s i t a "moral d i s o r d e r " . There i s a s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e between the two. In my o p i n i o n , P i t k i n ' s paradox i s more s e n s i b l e i n c e r t a i n circumstances than i s Tussman's moral d i s o r d e r . The l a t t e r phraseology suggests t h a t i t would be immoral t o break a p a r t i c u l a r promise even which, i f f u l f i l l e d , might l e a d to e v i l consequences. In the former i n s t a n c e , however, we can a t l e a s t r e c o g n i z e t h a t i t i s not always 'good' to keep a l l promises, nor t h a t every breach o f promise i s immoral. Indeed, the o c c a s i o n might a r i s e where the o n l y m o r a l l y c o r r e c t a c t i o n open to the i n d i v i d u a l i s to break h i s promise. In o t h e r words, i t i s r e a l l y o n l y 'good' t o keep good promises. To those who are unimpressed by the i n h e r e n t t a u t o l o g y c o n t a i n e d i n such a p r o p o s i t i o n , we can o n l y express our own s c e p t i c i s m about the a l t e r n a t i v e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t i t i s good t o do e v i l where i t i s r e q u i r e d o f us by a promise. (Or t h a t we have a moral o b l i g a t i o n t o commit some immoral a c t r e q u i r e d by law because we have consented to obey the law). 37 T h i s i s not t o deny t h a t we f a i l to f u l f i l l an o b l i g a t i o n when we do break a promise. But i t does deny t h a t we are n e c e s s a r i l y being immoral when we do so. What we are s u g g e s t i n g here i s t h a t the r i g h t and the o b l i g a t i o n t h a t d e r i v e from a promise have t h e i r c o - r e l a t i o n both i n l o g i c and m o r a l i t y . But the l o g i c and the m o r a l i t y do not always c o i n c i d e . The ' l o g i c ' of the promise has to do w i t h the words t h a t are spoken. P i t k i n has shown us the meaning o f those words. The ' m o r a l i t y ' of the promise, on the o t h e r hand, i n v o l v e s much more: the nature o f the r e l a t i o n s h i p t h a t a r i s e s from a v o l u n t a r y agreement, the nature of the agreement i t s e l f , and the consequences of t h a t agreement. The o b l i g a t o r y nature o f the promise h o l d s , i n l o g i c , r e g a r d -l e s s of the nature of the promised a c t i o n or i t s e f f e c t s . Such i s the c o n c l u s i o n , notes Raphael, t h a t i s reached by Hobbes. That i s , " I t i s not necessary i n f a c t . . . but i t i s necessary i n l o g i c . . . to obey a n o n - r a t i o n a l 21 o b l i g a t i o n . " The o b l i g a t o r y nature of the promise holds however, i n m o r a l i t y , o n l y a f t e r c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f the agreed upon a c t i o n and i t s e f f e c t s . I t may thus be necessary, i n f a c t , to disobey a n o n - r a t i o n a l or immoral o b l i g a t i o n a r i s i n g from a promise. In b r e a k i n g t h a t promise, we may be wayward i n our duty i n a l o g i c a l (grammatical) sense, but we are not n e c e s s a r i l y m o r a l l y remiss. The theory of consent, as we have noted, uses the language of "the promise'. We would argue, however, t h a t 38 i t r e j e c t s these u n d e r l y i n g sentiments t h a t e n t e r i n t o the m o r a l l y o b l i g a t o r y nature o f the promise. I t takes the form o f the promise, but r e j e c t s the r e l e v a n c y o f con t e n t . I t adopts the commitment o f the promise, but r e j e c t s the u n d e r l y i n g f l e x i b i l i t y w ithout which r a t i o n a l , moral men might never make such commitments. The argument t h a t we cannot disobey laws i s s u i n g from the p o l i t i c a l process to which we have consented c l e a r l y assumes the i n v i o l a b i l i t y o f the a c t o f consent. Having promised to obey, we are not a t l i b e r t y , nor do we have the r i g h t t o break our i m p l i e d o b l i g a t i o n , even i n the p a r t i c u l a r case o f an u n j u s t o r i r r a t i o n a l d i r e c t i v e . In e f f e c t , the theory o f consent adopts the l o g i c o f the promise but not the m o r a l i t y o f i t . The r i g h t o f the c o u r t s t o punish us i f we do disobey addresses i t s e l f t o t h a t l o g i c . Being 'purely' l o g i c a l , however, t h i s theory o f p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n f a i l s to address i t s e l f to our "good man' or t o the circumstances i n which he f i n d s h i m s e l f . His p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n i s reduced to a matter o f words 22 (as so notabley i n Hobbes ). That o b l i g a t i o n e x i s t s i n a vacuum, l o g i c a l , but nonetheless devoid o f content and removed from the s i t u a t i o n to which i t must apply. I t has l i t t l e b e a r i n g upon the s u b s t a n t i v e moral duty an i n d i v i d u a l might have to disobey i n a p a r t i c u l a r i n s t a n c e where 'keeping h i s word' would n e c e s s i t a t e t h a t he commit some i n j u s t i c e . 39 Indeed, t h i s t heory of p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n seems s t r a n g e l y i r r e l e v a n t to the q u e s t i o n o f whether o r not a law ought to i n f a c t be obeyed. I f i t i s consent alone which d e f i n e s l e g i t i m a t e a u t h o r i t y and the duty of obedience, then a government can be l e g i t i m a t e and law v a l i d without ever r e s o l v i n g the a c t u a l q u e s t i o n o f obedience. Our consent would be inadequate to conclude t h a t q u e s t i o n so long as we can s t i l l i n q u i r e as to the nature of the behaviour r e q u i r e d by a law and i t s consequences. As r a t i o n a l , moral beings we are e n t i t l e d to and would normally make such an i n q u i r y . And we are f u r t h e r " e n t i t l e d t o and o b l i g e d " to disobey laws, even those to which we have consented, where our "moral judgment f i n d s them i n a p p r o p r i a t e " i n c e r t a i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s. Such i s the o b l i g i n g nature o f our s e l f -imposed moral d u t i e s . And such would be the m o r a l l y o b l i g i n g nature of the a c t of consent. When the n o t i o n o f consent i s understood, however, as an i n v i o l a b l e a c t , the o b l i g a t i o n t h a t f o l l o w s i s not moral, but l o g i c a l . Such a theory of obedience cannot t e l l us whey we are m o r a l l y o b l i g a t e d to obey the laws of the S t a t e , but o n l y why we are l o g i c a l l y o b l i g a t e d t o do so. I t thus f a i l s to e s t a b l i s h a l i n k between the 'good man' and the 'good c i t i z e n ' . But p e c u l i a r t o t h i s s e l f - i m p o s e d duty o f obedience t o government and i t s laws i s , as we have noted, the subsequent i r r e l e v a n c y o f these same powers o f r a t i o n a l and moral judgment b e f o r e the p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y to which we 40 are c o n s e n t i n g . The moral nature of the content of t h a t a c t , t h a t i s of the s p e c i f i c r e l a t i o n s h i p i t s e t s up and i t s i m p l i c a t i o n s i s , l i k e i t s ' o b l i g a t o r i n e s s * open to q u e s t i o n . On t h i s s u b o r d i n a t i o n of r a t i o n a l , moral judgment to p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y , Strauss comments, The supremacy o f a u t h o r i t y as d i s t i n c t from reason f o l l o w s from an e x t r a -o r d i n a r y e x t e n s i o n o f the n a t u r a l r i g h t o f the i n d i v i d u a l . 23 On the b a s i s of h i s n a t u r a l r i g h t to s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n , man i s empowered to c r e a t e an a u t h o r i t y and s u b j e c t h i m s e l f t o i t i f he so wishes. T h i s i d e a o f men being a b l e to c r e a t e a u t h o r i t y enables the c o n t r a c t u a l t h e o r i s t to argue t h a t the a c t o f consent by which p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y i s rendered l e g i t i m a t e , i t s e l f j u s t i f i e s the ' r i g h t ' of government to r u l e and the 'duty' of men to obey i t . McPherson qu e s t i o n s t h i s arguing t h a t , t o assume an o b l i g a t i o n does not n e c e s s a r i l y j u s t i f y 24 b e ing o b l i g e d . Nor, presumably, would our consent to the r u l e of another n e c e s s a r i l y j u s t i f y t h a t r u l e . Most c o n t r a c t u a l i s t s appear to be s e n s i t i v e to t h i s p o i n t when they d i r e c t t h e i r a t t e n t i o n to the i s s u e of s l a v e r y and tyranny. Men are not g e n e r a l l y assumed to have the r i g h t to commit themselves to the r u l e o f a t y r a n t . Both Locke and Rousseau r e j e c t the ' l e g i t i m a c y ' of such an 41 a b s o l u t e and a r b i t r a r y power. (Hobbes n e i t h e r a f f i r m s nor r e j e c t s the t y r a n t . He manages to o b v i a t e the problem by d e f i n i n g tyranny out of e x i s t e n c e ) . The d i f f i c u l t i e s a t t e n d i n g the id e a o f consent and i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p to the n o t i o n o f a ' l e g i t i m a t e ' power can be found i n the c l a s s i c a l argument on s l a v e r y . I t i s allowed t h a t one man can consent to a c t u a l l y be the s l a v e of another. However, what he cannot do, i t i s argued, i s bestow on h i s master a ' r i g h t ' to h i s obedience. Nor can he i n c u r a 'duty' to be a s l a v e . The r e l a t i o n s h i p i s prima f a c i e u n j u s t i f i e d and immoral. And i t cannot be made moral by the a c t of consent. There are l i m i t s , i t would seem, to what a man's n a t u r a l r i g h t s empower him to do. More a c c u r a t e l y perhaps, t h e r e are l i m i t s t o the way he can use h i s language t o d e s c r i b e the world and h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p to i t . Thus, he cannot use the language o f ' r i g h t s and d u t i e s ' i n a s i t u a t i o n , such as tyranny o r s l a v e r y , which i s i n h e r e n t l y d evoid of any semblance o f l e g i t i m a c y . Nor can he use a n o t i o n such as consent to render the s i t u a t i o n l e g i t i m a t e . But what of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the c i t i z e n and h i s government? Is the f a c t o f h i s consent s u f f i c i e n t to j u s t i f y t h a t r e l a t i o n s h i p such t h a t government might s e n s i b l y have a ' r i g h t ' t o r u l e and the i n d i v i d u a l a 'duty' t o obey? We have a l r e a d y suggested t h a t the use of consent does not r e a l l y enable us t o d i s t i n g u i s h the u n c o n d i t i o n a l 42 w i l l i n g obedience t o p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y t h a t i s common to the c i t i z e n - S t a t e r e l a t i o n s h i p from the behaviour t h a t c h a r a c t e r i z e s the mas t e r - s l a v e , o r f a t h e r - c h i l d r e l a t i o n s h i p . Whether an i n d i v i d u a l has consented or not, where he i s r u l e d by o t h e r s he i s n e i t h e r f r e e nor s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g . Our q u e s t i o n i s whether man, on the b a s i s o f h i s n a t u r a l r i g h t to the freedom to determine h i s own l i f e , can renounce t h a t r i g h t and commit h i m s e l f to p e r p e t u a l childhood? Can he subordinate the e x e r c i s e and f u l f i l l m e n t o f h i s own r a t i o n a l and moral w i l l , the v e r y f a c u l t i e s by which be has been d e f i n e d as a man, to the w i l l and d i c t a t e s p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y ? Can he "renounce h i s e s s e n t i a l manhood"? While we must a l l o w t h a t a man can indeed consent t o h i s own s u b j e c t i o n to p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y , i t i s not a t a l l c l e a r t h a t through such consent government can a c q u i r e a moral ' r i g h t ' to r u l e nor t h a t the i n d i v i d u a l can thereby i n c u r a moral 'duty' to obey. For i t i s not c l e a r t h a t the r e l a t i o n s h i p i t s e l f i s a m o r a l l y j u s t i f i a b l e one. How one views t h a t r e l a t i o n s h i p would depend, to some degree, upon the s e r i o u s n e s s w i t h which one viewed some of the consequences. For some the l o s s o f the ab s o l u t e freedom to govern t h e i r own l i v e s may not be too bothersome, gi v e n the advantages o f government. In her book on Anarchism, however, A p r i l C a r t e r notes how o t h e r s may p e r c e i v e the l a c k of freedom t o a c t a c c o r d i n g t o one's own w i l l as conducive t o a n e g l e c t o f i n d i v i d u a l c r i t i c a l judgment and p e r s o n a l 43 r e s p o n s i b i l i t y - o f the s o r t common, f o r example, to "the 1somnambulent heroism' of those who go to war and commit 25 a t r o c i t i e s " . The a n a r c h i s t would stand opposed to the c i t i z e n - S t a t e r e l a t i o n s h i p as one t h a t i s d e t r i m e n t a l to the human c h a r a c t e r , and a t times d e s t r u c t i v e of m o r a l i t y and J u s t i c e . A more troublesome (and l e s s s u b j e c t i v e ) i s s u e , the one which S t r a u s s r a i s e s , i s t h a t of man v o l u n t a r i l y i n c u r r i n g a duty to abandon reason and m o r a l i t y i n favour of a u t h o r i t y . F i r s t l y , the p o s s i b i l i t y a r i s e s of a man i n c u r r i n g a moral duty to commit some i n j u s t i c e , as might happen where he must obey a l l ' a u t h o r i t a t i v e ' d i r e c t i v e s , good or bad. We would q u e s t i o n whether such a s i t u a t i o n i s r e a l l y s e n s i b l e . Can an u n j u s t law or immoral d i r e c t i v e ever be o b l i g a t o r y , something t h a t 'ought' to be obeyed? To us t h a t seems prima f a c i e n o n s e n s i c a l . We would f u r t h e r q u e s t i o n the very i d e a o f men being a b l e to render a u t h o r i t y supreme to reason and j u s t i c e by a simple a c t of w i l l . Men may i n f a c t respond to p o l i t i c a l power as though i t possesses supreme a u t h o r i t y . Whether or not i t a c t u a l l y does i s another q u e s t i o n . The u n d e r l y i n g assumption, t h a t men can themselves c r e a t e a u t h o r i t y as opposed to merely r e c o g n i z i n g i t where i t e x i s t s , i s perhaps a t the r o o t o f our d i f f i c u l t y here. C o m p l i c a t i n g t h i s s i t u a t i o n , however, i s the r a t h e r u nsubstantive c h a r a c t e r of a u t h o r i t y and law i n the government t h a t d e r i v e s i t s 44 l e g i t i m a c y s o l e l y from the a c t o f consent. Laws are a u t h o r i t a t i v e not by v i r t u e of t h e i r content, but r e g a r d l e s s o f t h a t c ontent. And men i n government possess a u t h o r i t y not by v i r t u e o f t h e i r wisdom and knowledge but by v i r t u e o f the o f f i c e they h o l d and the r u l e s d e f i n i n g t h a t o f f i c e . The incompetent R e p r e s e n t a t i v e does not l o s e h i s a u t h o r i t y to make d e c i s i o n s a f f e c t i n g our l i v e s because of our e s t i m a t i o n of him, u n t i l he a l s o l o s e s h i s o f f i c e . That a u t h o r i t y o f t h i s s o r t should r e i g n supreme over reason and m o r a l i t y , as a r e s u l t of our consent, n e c e s s i t a t e s t h a t we accept what would normally be a s e l f -c o n t r a d i c t o r y p r o p o s i t i o n - t h a t the i r r a t i o n a l , the immoral and the u n j u s t , so long as they are l e g a l i z e d , have supremacy over t h e i r o p p o s i t e s . In o t h e r words, the n o t i o n o f consent i s being used to l e g i t i m i z e or to bestow a u t h o r i t y upon d i r e c t i v e s t h a t would otherwise l a c k l e g i t i m a c y simply because they are c o n t r a r y to the good and the j u s t , and henee' the ' r i g h t ' course of a c t i o n . In the modern S t a t e t h i s type of a u t h o r i t y , i n s p i r e d by and bound onl y by r u l e s , may w e l l be necessary and v a l u a b l e . However, i t s p e c u l i a r l a c k o f content would l e a d us to suggest t h a t we ought not to be took quick to apply to i t the same meaning as i s g e n e r a l l y i m p l i e d by o t h e r non-p o l i t i c a l concepts of a u t h o r i t y ( i . e . they 'ought' t o be obeyed). For t h a t e quation d i s t o r t s or obscures a funda-mental d i f f e r e n c e between p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y and our s o c i a l a u t h o r i t i e s . The s c i e n t i s t who a c q u i r e s h i s a u t h o r i t y as a r e s u l t of h i s e x p e r t i s e and knowledge, or the s o c i a l r u l e t h a t d e r i v e s i t s a u t h o r i t y from i t s i n t r i n s i c c o n tent might p r o p e r l y e l i c i t w i l l i n g and u n q u e s t i o n i n g obedience. But we ought not to n e c e s s a r i l y look upon the f o r m a l i s t i c a u t h o r i t y o f government and law i n those same u n c o n d i t i o n a l and d u t i f u l terms. T h i s would seem to imply, agai n , t h a t p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y can be ' l e g i t i m a t e ' (we have consented to i t ) without being o b l i g a t o r y . A l t e r n a t i v e l y , we might argue t h a t l e g i t i m a t e a u t h o r i t y i s indeed o b l i g a t o r y , but t h a t i n o r d e r f o r p o l i t i c a l power and law to be t r u l y " l e g i t i m a t e ' they must d i s p l a y more than a simple c o n f o r m i t y w i t h the r u l e s of procedure and l e g a l i t y to which we are presumed t o have consented. In e i t h e r case, the r e l a t i o n s h i p of consent to the o b l i g a t o r i n e s s o f law seems to be r e s t r i c t e d . In the l a t t e r case, the r e l a t i o n s h i p o f consent to the n o t i o n of l e g i t i m a t e a u t h o r i t y i s a l s o r e s t r i c t e d . I t i s t h i s approach which we f i n d more c o m p e l l i n g , f o r i t suggests l i m i t s (not u n l i k e those commonly a p p l i e d i n the case of s l a v e r y ) upon the c a p a c i t y of man t o c r e a t e a u t h o r i t y or to render l e g i t i m a t e t h a t which i s i n h e r e n t l y not so. I t a l l o w s us t o d i s t i n g u i s h between the e x i s t e n c e of a u t h o r i t y and the r e c o g n i t i o n of a u t h o r i t y ; s i m i l a r l y , we can a v o i d c o n f u s i n g the p r e - c o n d i t i o n o f having an o b l i g a t i o n (that we r e c o g n i z e an a c t i o n as 'good') with the 'goodness* of the a c t i o n i t s e l f . 46 P i t k i n seems to r e c o g n i z e these d i s t i n c t i o n s when she suggests t h a t l e g i t i m a t e a u t h o r i t y i s not the product of consent a t a l l . I t i s , r a t h e r , "the k i n d of a u t h o r i t y one ought to consent t o " . Thus, You are o b l i g a t e d to obey not r e a l l y because you have consented; your consent i s v i r t u a l l y automatic. Rather, you are o b l i g a t e d to obey because of the c e r t a i n c h a r a c t e r of government. . . 26 By u s i n g consent t h u s l y , as an a f t e r - t h e - f a c t r a t h e r than a b e f o r e - t h e - f a c t concept, P i t k i n manages to a v o i d the problems a t t e n d i n g the n o t i o n o f man ' c r e a t i n g ' an a u t h o r i t y which i s removed from reason and m o r a l i t y , a t the same time t h a t i t i s g i v e n some a r t i f i c i a l p r i o r i t y over them. She a l s o avoids the d i s p l a c e d emphasis on ' w i l l ' from which we f e e l consent theory s u f f e r s . That i s , the theory o f consent, wherein i t i s argued t h a t s i n c e we v o l u n t a r i l y submit to law, law i s t h e r e f o r e something t h a t we ought to obey ( r e g a r d l e s s of what i t i s ) , i s too narrowly concerned, we would argue, with s a t i s f y i n g the p r e - c o n d i t i o n o f having such an o b l i g a t i o n , to the n e g l e c t of what man can o r cannot consent t o , and to the n e g l e c t o f what i s or i s not capable o f being m o r a l l y o b l i g a t o r y . A more balanced approach, and one t h a t i s i m p l i c i t i n P i t k i n ' s view o f consent, i s to argue t h a t i n order f o r law and a u t h o r i t y t o be m o r a l l y o b l i g a t o r y we must t h i n k of them as something we ought to obey and t h e r e f o r e do obey v o l u n t a r i l y . There i s added value i n such an approach i n t h a t , 47 a p a r t from c o n t i n u i n g to r e p r e s e n t the duty to obey law as se l f - i m p o s e d , i t i s a l s o probably c l o s e r i n i t s under-sta n d i n g o f what men do when they consent to government. That i s , t h e i r acceptance o f a u t h o r i t y does not occur i n a vacuum. To the c o n t r a r y , when men a u t h o r i z e others to r u l e them, they g e n e r a l l y have a c e r t a i n k i n d o f government i n mind. T h e i r acceptance of law i s purpo s i v e , and t h e i r v i s i o n o f what k i n d o f a u t h o r i t y would be ac c e p t a b l e i s determined by v a l u e s t h a t a f f e c t i t s l e g i t i m a c y . In oth e r words, the id e a of consent, as Benn and Pe t e r s note, u s u a l l y admits o f l e g i t i m a t e a u t h o r i t y o n l y when i t s a t i s f i e s c e r t a i n 27 moral c r i t e r i a . But perhaps, then, i t i s not so much a matter o f whether a man has the r i g h t to s u b j e c t h i m s e l f u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y to law; nor a matter o f whether he can ' l e g i t i m i z e ' u n j u s t laws by h i s consent; but whether or not he a c t u a l l y does so. The sugg e s t i o n t h a t men do consent to government and law i s i t s e l f f a c t u a l l y dubious. But then the p r i n c i p l e o f consent i s o n l y o f f e r e d as a conceptual a i d to our under-s t a n d i n g o f the man-State r e l a t i o n s h i p . Even so, however, the s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h i s d e v i c e tends to r e s t on how we al r e a d y understand t h a t r e l a t i o n s h i p and on what we want the concept t o e x p l a i n . A c c o r d i n g l y , consent i s o f t e n used t o j u s t i f y two a l t e r n a t i v e s i t u a t i o n s : e i t h e r the s u b o r d i n a t i o n o f the i n d i v i d u a l to the S t a t e ; or the v i n d i c a t i o n o f h i s 28 r i g h t s a g a i n s t i t . In the former, man's submission to 48 the S t a t e i s assumed to be a b s o l u t e ; In the l a t t e r , i t i s assumed to be c o n d i t i o n a l . i v ) The Duty of Obedience: Absolute or C o n d i t i o n a l Being a most a v i d proponent o f the a b s o l u t e sub-o r d i n a t i o n of the i n d i v i d u a l to the S t a t e , Hobbes draws up a c o n t r a c t of submission to secure the c i t i z e n ' s a b s o l u t e duty o f obedience to L e v i a t h a n . In t h a t S t a t e , the i n d i v i d u a l has no r i g h t t o disobey o r r e s i s t even tyranny. He has o n l y a duty to obey a l l law. As a s u b j e c t , he i s h e l d accountable f o r every breach o f duty. A l t e r n a t i v e l y , and h e r e i n l i e s the r e a l essence of the c o n t r a c t of submission, the Sovereign has no d u t i e s to h i s s u b j e c t s f o r which he can be h e l d i n account. For t h a t would imply t h a t the s u b j e c t s h o l d a corresponding r i g h t on the b a s i s o f which they might j u s t i f i a b l y disobey. The Sovereign does have d u t i e s ; t o m a i n t a i n i n e x i s t e n c e a system o f p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y and law; and to make good (needful) laws. But they are not d u t i e s t o h i s s u b j e c t s . For he i s " o b l i g e d by the law o f nature to render an account t h e r e o f to "God" and "to none 29 but him". In Hobbes' c o n t r a c t , then, a breach o f duty by the Sovereign does not c o n s t i t u t e a grounds f o r the s u b j e c t s t o disobey. Were the s i t u a t i o n to be any d i f f e r e n t , the Sovereign c o u l d not t r u l y be Sovereign. The j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t h i s a b s o l u t e l a c k of any r i g h t t o disobey, even where the government i s i n breach of i t s 49 d u t i e s , d e r i v e s from an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of consent as an a c t o f submission. However, an a l t e r n a t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of consent l i e s i n approaching i t as a c o n s t r u c t f o r j u s t i f y i n g j u s t such a r i g h t of d i s o b e d i e n c e . S e l i g e r , f o r example, suggests w i t h r e g a r d to Locke, t h a t " i t was f o r the purposes of j u s t i f y i n g r e v o l t t h a t he accepted the 30 p r i n c i p l e o f consent". And R i l e y argues, w i t h r e g a r d to Rousseau, t h a t consent and c o n t r a c t theory were f o r him "more a way o f d e s t r o y i n g wrong t h e o r i e s o f o b l i g a t i o n and a u t h o r i t y than of c r e a t i n g a comprehensive theory of what 31 i s p o l i t i c a l l y r i g h t " . T h i s use of consent suggests not an acceptance, but a r e j e c t i o n o f the a b s o l u t e r i g h t of government to command obedience. I t aims a t s e c u r i n g p r e c i s e l y t h a t r i g h t of d i s o b e d i e n c e which i s g i v e n up i n the c o n t r a c t of submission. I t does so by imposing l i m i t s on the duty o f obedience; our consent and our o b l i g a t i o n are understood to be c o n d i t i o n a l . These c o n d i t i o n s can take the form e i t h e r of r e s t r i c t i o n s upon the k i n d of power t h a t men need obey (commands o v e r s t e p p i n g these l i m i t s l a c k ' a u t h o r i t y ' and hence a r e not o b l i g a t o r y ) ; or they can take the form o f demands t h a t men make o f government. That i s , p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y i s d e f i n e d not o n l y i n terms o f the r i g h t s i t has over those who consent, but a l s o i n terms of the d u t i e s i t has to c o n s e n t i n g i n d i v i d u a l s . And the government which f a i l s t o perform those d u t i e s or which thwarts the achievement o f the ends f o r which men accept i t l o s e s i t s a u t h o r i t y . 50 T h i s c o n d i t i o n a l , r a t h e r than a b s o l u t e moral duty of obedience i s c e r t a i n l y more accommodating o f our e t h i c a l i n d i v i d u a l . S i m i l a r l y , the c o n d i t i o n a l use o f consent i s more compatible w i t h the m o r a l l y o b l i g i n g nature o f a s e l f -imposed o b l i g a t i o n than i s i t s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n as an i n v i o l a b l e a c t . And i t would a l s o appear to be more compatible w i t h l i b e r a l - d e m o c r a t i c theory than i s the Hobbesian a c t of submission. In our S t a t e , f o r example, we are more prone to argue t h a t the d u t i e s which b e f a l l government, those of e s t a b l i s h i n g the r u l e of law and of p u r s u i n g j u s t i c e , freedom and the common good, are d u t i e s which i t has towards i t s c i t i z e n s . And i t i s to those c i t i z e n s t h a t government i s accountable. S i m i l a r l y , i n Hobbesian theory a l l a l t e r n a t i v e grounds (moral or otherwise) upon which d i s o b e d i e n c e might be j u s t i f i e d are r e j e c t e d . But i n democratic theory, as Weldon notes, w h i l e a s t r o n g prima f a c i e case f o r obedience i s attempted, such a duty i s g e n e r a l l y p e r c e i v e d as "one t h a t i s s u b j e c t always to a l i a b i l i t y t o a m o r a l l y l e g i t i m a t e i n f r i n g e m e n t when 32 circumstances warrant t h i s " . Benn and P e t e r s t e s t i f y f u r t h e r to the ' l i m i t e d ' nature o f t h i s o b l i g a t i o n i n the l i b e r a l democratic p e r s p e c t i v e when they w r i t e , The r i g h t t o c r i t i c i s e and censure a government, and the r i g h t to e x e r c i s e a vote to remove i t i s a p r a c t i c a l r e c o g n i t i o n of the p r i n c i p l e t h a t the duty to obey, understood as a moral duty, must always be c o n d i t i o n a l . . . 3 3 51 However, the ' c o n d i t i o n a l ' acceptance of t h i s duty suggests to us the e x i s t e n c e of a l i n e a r r e l a t i o n s h i p between the duty of obedience and the r i g h t of d i s o b e d i e n c e t h a t t h i s n o t i o n of consent supports. Thus, i n the event of a c o n t r o v e r s i a l law, the c o n f l i c t i s not n e c e s s a r i l y between what one ought to do m o r a l l y and what one ought t o do p o l i t i c a l l y (or l o g i c a l l y , as Hobbes would have i t ) , but between what one ought t o do and what one ought not to do. In o t h e r words, the p o s s i b i l i t y a r i s e s t h a t the o b l i g a t i o n t o obey a law does not merely c o n f l i c t w i t h another (moral) o b l i g a t i o n but a c t u a l l y ceases where an o b l i g a t i o n t o disobey t h a t law o c c u r s . And i f the duty to obey does not e x i s t , nor does the r i g h t of punishment. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , t h i s c o n c l u s i o n i s somewhat removed from our p r e s e n t s i t u a t i o n . Any such a c t of disobedience i s always s u b j e c t t o punishment. For i n the p r a c t i c a l a p p l i c a t i o n of law and a u t h o r i t y , our S t a t e operates a c c o r d i n g to p r i n c i p l e s t h a t are hard t o d i s t i n g u i s h from the c o n t r a c t of submission t h a t Hobbes d e f i n e s f o r us. There i s no law to which obedience i s not o b l i g a t o r y . And, w h i l e the government may have d u t i e s t o i t s c i t i z e n s , f a i l u r e t o perform them, q u i t e simply does not c o n s t i t u t e j u s t i f i a b l e grounds f o r d i s o b e d i e n c e . We might argue even f u r t h e r , t h a t our governors, u n l i k e us are not punishable f o r any breach of t h e i r p o l i t i c a l 52 d u t i e s . They may l o s e t h e i r a u t h o r i t y ( t h e i r ' r i g h t ' t o r u l e ) , i f they are voted out of o f f i c e . The laws they make may a l s o l o s e t h e i r ' a u t h o r i t a t i v e n e s s ' , i f they are d e c l a r e d i n v a l i d . But we may go to j a i l , not o n l y f o r a breach of our duty t o obey, but a l s o when we e x e r c i s e the u l t i m a t e r i g h t by which we render government accountable t o us, t h a t i s , our presumed r i g h t t o disobey. Our r u l e r s , i t would seem, a r e , w i t h r e s p e c t to t h e i r d u t i e s , i n the end accountable o n l y to 34 God. * I f the c o n t r a c t o f submission (t h a t espouses the i n v i o l a b i l i t y of the a c t of consent) f a i l s to address i t s e l f to the 'good man', the ' c o n d i t i o n a l ' theory of consent does so, but f a i l s to e x p l a i n , we would contend, the a b s o l u t e r i g h t of punishment e x e r c i s e d by the S t a t e . T h i s l a t t e r use of consent a l s o s u b s t a n t i a l l y a l t e r s the nature of our theory of p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n . For i t d i r e c t s us away from the a c t of consent as the o r i g i n of l e g i t i m a t e a u t h o r i t y (as P i t k i n suggests, "your consent i s v i r t u a l l y a u t o m a t i c " ) . Instead, i t t u r n s us towards the ' c o n d i t i o n s ' or " c e r t a i n c h a r a c t e r " of l e g i t i m a t e a u t h o r i t y - t h a t i s , towards the nature and ends f o r which government and law are accepted. In the f o l l o w i n g chapter, then, we s h a l l o u r s e l v e s t u r n t o t h i s theory t h a t d e r i v e s the l e g i t i m a c y of a u t h o r i t y and the duty of obedience from the ends of government. We 53 s h a l l pursue the problem of d i s o b e d i e n c e , l o o k i n g , i n p a r t i c u l a r , a t the p r i n c i p l e of the common good by which the r i g h t o f punishment i s u l t i m a t e l y j u s t i f i e d i n t h i s argument. 54 I I I . The Value o f L e g a l i t y and the Duty o f Obedience I f the duty o f obedience does not d e r i v e s o l e l y from the a c t of consent, nor do those laws, as we might r e c a l l , c o n t a i n w i t h i n themselves the necessary "elements of o b l i g a t o r i n e s s " . D'Entreves has suggested a f u r t h e r p o s s i b i l i t y . R e j e c t i n g both the s e l f ' - j u s t i f y i n g j u r i s t i c arguments and the ' o r i g i n o f government* t h e o r i e s , he w r i t e s t h a t , f o r laws t o be b i n d i n g , " t h a t i s , t r u e o u g h t - p r o p o s i t i o n s and not mere statements c o n c e r n i n g the use o f f o r c e by the S t a t e " , then some v a l u e must be p l a c e d on the system i t s e l f . ' ' * The v a l u e of l e g a l i t y , we would suggest, r e s i d e s i n the ends which government and law are designed t o pursue and f o r which they are accepted. They are understood, here, t o be the reasons f o r which government and law 'ought' t o be obeyed. Our two q u e s t i o n s , again, a r e : What i s the nature o f the o b l i g a t i o n t o obey t h a t d e r i v e s from a c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f these ends? And, can such a theory of obedience be r e c o n c i l e d w i t h the e x i s t e n c e of the 'good man'? 55 i ) Freedom: Order and S e c u r i t y The laws of the S t a t e , i t i s argued, b r i n g t o our communal l i v e s an Order without which there c o u l d be no freedom and no m o r a l i t y . The law b r i n g s a measure of p r e d i c t a b i l i t y to the i n t e r - r e l a t i o n s between men; i t b r i n g s s e c u r i t y ; i t p r o t e c t s . Without these, j u s t i c e between men, and the freedom necessary f o r i n d i v i d u a l human d i g n i t y and moral e x i s t e n c e are both p r e c a r i o u s , i f not i m p o s s i b l e . I t i s o n l y through law t h a t such Order i s a t t a i n a b l e . T h e r e f o r e , we ought to obey law. In t h i s way obedience t o law i s rep r e s e n t e d not as a l o s s o f freedom a t a l l , but as a g a i n . A l l o w i n g the r a t h e r c l o s e i d e n t i t y o f Order and s t a b i l i t y t h a t i s i m p l i e d by t h i s approach, s e v e r a l q u e s t i o n s s t i l l remain. The f i r s t concerns y e t another equation made between Order and the laws of the S t a t e , and the subsequent assumption t h a t s i n c e Order i s e s s e n t i a l t o freedom, then these laws are e q u a l l y necessary. Our q u e s t i o n i s , i f we do need Order and s e c u r i t y , do we t h e r e f o r e need the State? Whether the S t a t e and i t s laws are v i t a l t o the e x i s t e n c e o f our f r e e , moral agent has y e t f we would contend, to be f i n a l l y demonstrated. " I t i s not a t a l l obvious", as P i t k i n notes, " t h a t government and law are i n d x s p e n s i b l e t o 2 human s o c i a l e x i s t e n c e " . S p i t z pursues the q u e s t i o n more 56 c l o s e l y , a rguing t h a t the v e r y equation of Law w i t h Order, upon which the assumption of ' i n d i s p e n s i b i l i t y ' would appear to r e s t , i s i t s e l f unsound. Law does not c r e a t e Order, he 3 notes. Custom, moral codes and sentiments do. But the law ' p r o t e c t s ' the i n d i v i d u a l , i t i s argued. Here, the type of 'freedom' secured by law appears to r e f e r t o the r e s t r i c t i o n s law imposes upon the a c t i o n s of other men, and hence to the p r o t e c t i o n we o u r s e l v e s g a i n from abuses by o t h e r men. We cannot o u r s e l v e s be f r e e u n l e s s o t h e r s are r e s t r a i n e d or have t h e i r freedom r e s t r i c t e d so t h a t they cannot i n f r i n g e upon our own l i b e r t i e s . The f r e e man would appear to be the secure man, the p r o t e c t e d man. But i f our own l i b e r t y depends upon the i m p o s i t i o n of r e s t r a i n t s upon other men, i t has not y e t been e x p l a i n e d why our own compliance w i t h those r e s t r i c t i o n s i s o b l i g a t o r y or even necessary. I f t h a t p r o t e c t i o n i s not forthcoming u n l e s s we too obey, then, i n the i n t e r e s t of s e l f ^ p r o t e c t i o n , i t would seem l i k e a very good i d e a to obey. But do we t h e r e f o r e have a duty to obey? On the whole, the c o n n e c t i o n i m p l i e d here between the n o t i o n s o f p r o t e c t i o n and o b l i g a t i o n i s not a l l t h a t c l e a r . I t i s not a c o n n e c t i o n t h a t we draw i n a l l such circumstances, A women, f o r example, may choose to become an 'obedient w i f e ' , i f her p e r s o n a l s e c u r i t y i s not o t h e r s i d e a t t a i n a b l e . However, whether the husband who p r o t e c t s h i s w i f e thereby d e r i v e s a 57 ' r i g h t ' t o command her and she a'duty' t o obey i s not a t a l l o b v i o u s . I t i s the emphasis on s e l f - p r o t e c t i o n and p e r s o n a l 4 s e c u r i t y t h a t i s perhaps the cause of our d i f f i c u l t y here. For i t reduces our p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n from a matter o f e t h i c a l p r i n c i p l e to one of s e l f - i n t e r e s t o r prudence. Yet, as Brown argues, the v e r y s u g g e s t i o n t h a t we have a 'duty' to obey law f o r reasons o f s e l f - i n t e r e s t (or f o r oth e r p r a c t i c a l purposes) i t s e l f confuses a v a l i d reason f o r 5 obeying w i t h a reason f o r obeying as a duty. I t i s much l i k e t e l l i n g the man who wishes t o c r o s s the r i v e r t h a t he has a 'duty' t o walk down to the b r i d g e ; where a l l we r e a l l y mean to say i s t h a t he 'ought' t o walk down to the b r i d g e ; t h a t i t would be a good i d e a i f he d i d so. But t h i s p e c u l i a r s o r t o f p r u d e n t i a l o b l i g a t i o n , as i t i s sometimes c a l l e d , i s simply not v e r y amenable t o the concept o f duty t h a t we wish t o a t t a c h (and t h a t we normally do attach) t o our concept of p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n T Law may be v a l u e d , then, out of a d e s i r e f o r se l f r -p r o t e c t i o n , however, the r e l e v a n c y o f 'duty' to t h i s v a l u e i s q u e s t i o n a b l e . But so too i s the u n d e r l y i n g i d e n t i t y of the f r e e man w i t h the man p r o t e c t e d by the laws of the S t a t e , Here agai n , we would q u e s t i o n the ' i n d i s p e n s i b i l i t y ' of law. As Wollheim (much l i k e P i t k i n and S p i t z ) has noted, w h i l e the 58 r e s t r a i n t o f others i s indeed necessary f o r our own l i b e r t y , t h i s does not imply t h a t law i s a necessary p r e - c o n d i t i o n f o r t h a t l i b e r t y . Men can and do r e s t r a i n themselves, without laws; they do so as t h e i r 'customs, moral codes and sentiments' d i c t a t e . (And i n t h a t s e l f - r e s t r a i n t they are f r e e i n a way t h a t they cannot be f r e e when they are r e s t r a i n e d by laws imposed from without by the State.) Indeed, we would suggest t h a t the e f f o r t s o f the S t a t e t o p r o t e c t men i n a s o c i e t y wherein such s e l f - r e s t r a i n t was not p r e v a l e n t would probably be q u i t e i n e f f e c t u a l . S i m i l a r l y , the Order t h a t we a l s o need e x i s t s independent of the S t a t e and i t s laws; and i f i t d i d not, those laws would not l i k e l y be v e r y e f f e c t i v e i n b r i n g i n g i t about. We may wish to c a l l the 'customs and moral codes' t h a t u n d e r l i e t h i s Order laws i n themselves, because o f the p a t t e r n s o f behaviour t h a t they d e f i n e and the r e s t r a i n t s they p l a c e on men's behaviour. But t h i s says n o t h i n g , we would argue, about the r u l e s o f behaviour and the r e s t r a i n t s imposed on men by the S t a t e or why we ought t o obey them. Our i n t e n t i o n here i s not to argue f o r the u s e l e s s n e s s of government, but o n l y to suggest t h a t we are perhaps m i s p l a c i n g our v a l u e s i f we obey out of a f e a r t h a t without the S t a t e and i t s laws, we cannot be f r e e , o r t h a t human d i g n i t y and goodness w i l l not be p o s s i b l e , or t h a t 59 J u s t i c e cannot p r e v a i l (the p r e - c o n d i t i o n f o r the achievement of these v a l u e s may be Order and s e c u r i t y of person, but not n e c e s s a r i l y the S t a t e ) ; and to suggest t h a t we ought to expect something d i f f e r e n t or more from government. Indeed, we would argue f u r t h e r t h a t i t i s not Order and p r o t e c t i o n t h a t we need to r e a l i z e these ends, but a c e r t a i n k i n d of order wherein c e r t a i n kinds of l i b e r t i e s are p r o t e c t e d . That i s , even i f we were to assume t h a t the S t a t e was e s s e n t i a l t o s o c i a l o r d e r , we cannot t h e r e f o r e assume t h a t these ends have been reached. F o r , we cannot assume t h a t the peace or s t a b i l i t y t h a t i s equated w i t h the o r d e r secured by law (or i n i t s absence, f o r t h a t matter) i s a j u s t one; or t h a t the i n d i v i d u a l who i s p r o t e c t e d by law i s t h e r e f o r e f r e e . Hobbes would d i s a g r e e . By equating the s t a b i l i t y and s e c u r i t y p r o v i d e d by law w i t h freedom, j u s t i c e and l i f e i t s e l f , the need f o r Order appears, to Hobbes, t o be s u f f i c i e n t to j u s t i f y the power of the man t h a t can c r e a t e i t ; and the need f o r i n d i v i d u a l s e c u r i t y appears to j u s t i f y the power of whoever can p r o t e c t us. But where Hobbes c l a i m s t h a t law can never be u n j u s t or o p p r e s s i v e , "For i t s h a l l never be t h a t war s h a l l p r e s e r v e 7 l i f e , and peace s h a l l d e s t r o y i t " , Locke asks, "What k i n d g of peace i s i t t h a t p r o t e c t s o p p r e s s i o n s ? " Locke, l i k e us, r e j e c t s any attempt t o equate Order w i t h freedom and j u s t i c e , and w i t h i t the u n d e r l y i n g assumption t h a t v i o l e n c e , i n s e c u r i t y , 60 i n j u s t i c e and o p p r e s s i o n are o n l y (and n e c e s s a r i l y ) a t t r i b u t e s o f the S t a t e o f anarchy. In f a c t , these may a l s o be a t t r i b u t e s of the p o l i t i c a l o r d e r secured by the S t a t e , perhaps even guaranteed by the laws of the S t a t e i n which they may be entrenched. C o n t r a r y to Hobbes, laws can be u n j u s t , they can oppress, and they can d e s t r o y l i f e . Men p r o h i b i t e d by law from ever l e a v i n g the c o n f i n e s of t h e i r home may be w e l l p r o t e c t e d from one another and from the world, but they would not be f r e e . Laws p r o v i d i n g f o r the e x e c u t i o n on the spot of a l l suspected c r i m i n a l s may e r a d i c a t e crime, but they do not a l l o w f o r j u s t i c e . Laws r e q u i r i n g the c o n s c i e n t i o u s o b j e c t o r to f i g h t o r p r o v i d e f i n a n c i a l support f o r a wa,j-_ may be defended i n the name o f n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y ; but t h a t s e c u r i t y i s achieved a t the expense o f h i s own goodness and s e l f - d i g n i t y . How can we appeal t o the homosexual t o obey laws t h a t prevent o r r e s t r i c t him from being what he i s by e x p l a i n i n g t h a t the domestic t r a n q u i l i t y gained w i l l p r o v i d e him w i t h a g r e a t e r o p p o r t u n i t y f o r s e l f ^ -determination and human d i g n i t y ? How can we ask f o r obedience to laws t h a t d e f i n e and support the e x i s t e n c e of a s l a v e c l a s s , laws which may be of g r e a t b e n e f i t t o the economic s e c u r i t y o f a p o l i t i c a l s o c i e t y , but which cannot be defended as having made j u s t i c e and freedom p o s s i b l e i n t h a t s o c i e t y . Why ought such laws to be obeyed? How do we j u s t i f y punishment f o r 61 d i s o b e d i e n c e to such laws t h a t are so c o n t r a r y t o the ends f o r which l e g a l i t y i s v a l u e d and from which the duty of obedience i s derived? Order and s e c u r i t y , then do not always appear to be compatible w i t h the freedom they are supposed t o i n c r e a s e . I t i s even p o s s i b l e f o r a p a r t i c u l a r order to i n f a c t negate the very c o n d i t i o n s f o r which i t i s the presumed p r e -c o n d i t i o n . Thus we would argue, as does S p i t z , t h a t the v a l u e of Order, f a r from e q u a l l i n g the 'harmony 1 or s t a b i l i t y t h a t e x i s t s , i s c o n d i t i o n a l upon other v a l u e s ; and t h a t Order i t s e l f " i s not a s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n f o r these 9 r e a l i z a t i o n of these v a l u e s " . T h i s i s q u i t e important f o r our theory of p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n . I t suggests t h a t the duty of obedience cannot be deduced from the need f o r Order by i t s e l f , without any q u a l i f i c a t i o n on the nature of t h a t o r d e r . To argue otherwise may l e a d us to a s s e r t a prima, f a c i e o b l i g a t i o n t o obey laws t h a t secure even the most u n j u s t and e v i l o f p o l i t i c a l o r d e r s , so long as peace and s t a b i l i t y r e i g n . For these can be secured j u s t as r e a d i l y , perhaps even more r e a d i l y , by an o p p r e s s i v e t y r a n t , as by a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l e g i s l a t u r e . We may f i n d o u r s e l v e s under an ' o b l i g a t i o n ' to obey such a r u l e r ; and i n accordance w i t h t h a t o b l i g a t i o n , our r u l e r would have a corresponding ' r i g h t ' t o p u n i s h us f o r any 62 d i s o b e d i e n c e . That, we would suggest, d i s t o r t s and devalues two r a t h e r important words. Order, then, as a v a l u e and as a reason f o r obedience, i s of a h i g h l y c o n d i t i o n a l nature. P r e c i s e l y because i t i s the c o n d i t i o n and not the p r e - c o n d i t i o n t h a t we seek through law, Order i s o f v a l u e , and t h e r e f o r e c o m p e l l i n g o n l y under c e r t a i n circumstances; f o r the v e r y same reason, the mere e x i s t e n c e of some s o r t of order o r another does not inform us as to whether l e g a l i t y i s i n f a c t s e r v i n g (or p r o h i b i t i n g ) our o r i g i n a l purpose, the reason f o r which we va l u e i t . L i k e the F e d e r a l i s t s - " J u s t i c e i s the end o f government. I t i s the end of c i v i l society.""""^ - we would a l s o contend t h a t t h a t purpose i s not merely Order; but t h a t we have a c e r t a i n k i n d of order i n mind when we accept government - t h a t i s , a j u s t o r d e r . 1 1 I t must c e r t a i n l y be so i f obedience to law i s t o be compatible w i t h the moral a c t i v i t y o f our f r e e , e t h i c a l agent. As a means to t h a t j u s t o r d e r , l e g a l i t y may be of c o n s i d e r a b l e v a l u e . But t h a t v a l u e i s i t s e l f c o n d i t i o n a l , as would be the duty o f obedience t h a t i t g i v e s r i s e t o , upon the nature o f the a c t u a l o r d e r secured. Whether or not obedience to law can be r e c o n c i l e d w i t h or s a i d to r e p r e s e n t an i n c r e a s e i n the freedom e s s e n t i a l t o i n d i v i d u a l moral a c t i v i t y w i l l i n e v i t a b l y depend on the 63 a c t u a l content o f the r e s t r i c t i o n s imposed and the a c t i o n s r e q u i r e d by law. A g r e a t d e a l thus depends on whether or not the laws are j u s t ones. An obvious q u e s t i o n a r i s e s here, of course, as to what c o n s t i t u t e s a j u s t p o l i t i c a l o r d e r o r j u s t laws. In response to t h i s , the 'common good* i s u s u a l l y o f f e r e d as the s u b s t a n t i v e p r i n c i p l e f o r the f i n a l l e g i t i m a t i o n of a u t h o r i t y , and as the c o n c l u s i v e answer as to why one ought t o obey the law. i i ) J u s t i c e and the Common Good The p r i n c i p l e of the common good p r o v i d e s both a l i m i t a t i o n on p o l i t i c a l power - t h a t i t not r u l e i n i t s own i n t e r e s t - and a j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r p o l i t i c a l power: In the e x e r c i s e of a u t h o r i t y , the use of f o r c e can be j u s t i f i e d o n l y i n the name of the common good. 12 As an e t h i c a l p r i n c i p l e , the common good i m p l i e s the e x i s t e n c e of a moral duty of obedience, and p u r p o r t s t o o f f e r an e t h i c a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f punishment, both o f which are l a c k i n g i n the f o r e g o i n g p r u d e n t i a l c a l c u l a t i o n o f government and law as a means to p e r s o n a l s e c u r i t y and s e l f -p r o t e c t i o n . As an e x t r a l e g a l p r i n c i p l e to which laws must conform, the common good a l s o opens the d i s c u s s i o n of l e g i t i m a t e a u t h o r i t y and the duty o f obedience to i n c l u d e the nature o f a u t h o r i t y as i t i s e x e r c i s e d , and the content 64 of law. As an e t h i c a l p r i n c i p l e i n the name of which one would have a duty t o obey law, the common good i m p l i e s a moral a t t i t u d e towards the community as a whole. I t i m p l i e s t h a t the s u b o r d i n a t i o n o f the r i g h t s and i n t e r e s t s o f the i n d i v i d u a l t o the c l a i m s of the community r e s t s on a moral b a s i s . The good of the community, the maintenance and s e r v i c i n g o f i t s needs and r i g h t s i s understood t o be the purpose o f the p o l i t y and the end of law. Law, i n s o f a r as i t aims a t the common good, i s o b l i g a t o r y . I t i s apparent t h a t the common good w i l l not be an easy p r i n c i p l e t o f i t i n t o the l i b e r a l democratic framework t h a t holds the i n d i v i d u a l , not the community, t o be the u l t i m a t e end o f any process, i n c l u d i n g government. For no t a b l y absent from l i b e r a l t h e o r y i s any su g g e s t i o n of an o b l i g a t i o n t o seek any good i n the name of the whole, r e g a r d l e s s of where one stands i n r e l a t i o n t o t h a t whole. Indeed, the fundamental element o f l i b e r a l i s m , as Sabine reminds us, i s the, . . . r e f u s a l t o contemplate a s o c i a l good which demands merely s e l f - s a c r i f i c e o r s e l f - a b n e g a t i o n on the p a r t of the persons who share and support i t . 13 The freedom and d i g n i t y o f men are s e r i o u s l y threatened, from t h i s l i b e r a l p e r s p e c t i v e , by any law r e q u i r i n g them t o a c t simply f o r the good of o t h e r s . 65 Nonetheless, l i b e r a l - democratic t h e o r i s t s h o l d , i t seems, "a primary commitment t o i n d i v i d u a l r e a l i z a t i o n 14 w i t h i n the framework of the common good." A major problem thus f a c i n g any d i s c u s s i o n o f the common good would be t h a t of r e c o n c i l i n g these c o l l e c t i v e v a l u e s w i t h i n d i v i d u a l v a l u e s , the r i g h t s o f the community w i t h the r i g h t s of the i n d i v i d u a l , the good o f the community as an end w i t h the good of the i n d i v i d u a l as an end. In p a r t i c u l a r , why should the r i g h t s and i n t e r e s t s o f the community take precedence over p r i v a t e r i g h t s ? How can the l i b e r t y of man be r e c o n c i l e d w i t h laws t h a t aim a t the good o f the community e s p e c i a l l y i f t h a t p u b l i c good should c o n f l i c t w i t h h i s own p a r t i c u l a r good? The advantage o f the common good becomes c l e a r . Through i t we can o b v i a t e the need f o r any such demand t o be made of the i n d i v i d u a l . F o r , as Hobbes argues, "the common 15 good d i f f e r e t h not from the p r i v a t e " . Or, as Locke suggests, s i n c e "no man would change h i s c o n d i t i o n w i t h the i n t e n t i o n t h a t i t be worse", men would o n l y accept a government t h a t extends no f u r t h e r than the common good1** (the i m p l i c a t i o n being t h a t the common good i s consonant wi t h the betterment o f the i n d i v i d u a l ' s c o n d i t i o n ) . And of course, t h e r e i s Rousseau: The u n i t y o f myself w i t h o t h e r s i n a common good i s the same i n p r i n c i p l e as the u n i t y of myself which I aim a t i n aiming a t my own good. 17 66 The s i g n i f i c a n c e o f t h i s ' u n i t y ' f o r our the o r y of p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n i s t w o f o l d : i t p r o v i d e s the i n d i v i d u a l w i t h a motive f o r obeying i n the name of the common good; and a t the same time, h i s l i b e r t y i s preserved, even i n the ac t o f obedience. For the common good i s a l s o h i s good. In h i s p r i v a t e enjoyment of ends 'common* t o o t h e r s , man can both be f r e e and s u b j e c t t o law. Indeed, the obedience o f man t o man i s an i l l u s i o n . He obeys o n l y h i m s e l f . For those laws, w r i t e s Rousseau, "are nothing but the r e c o r d o f what our 18 w i l l s have d e c i d e d " . The argument, however, t h a t the i n t e r e s t s of the community a r e our i n t e r e s t s , t h a t "we cannot labour f o r o t h e r s 19 without a t the same time, l a b o u r i n g f o r o u r s e l v e s " seems t o be l e s s an e x p l a n a t i o n o f our p o l i t i c a l d u t i e s , than i t i s an ev a s i o n . For i t t r i e s t o secure our obedience without ever mentioning moral w i l l o r duty. Our a t t e n t i o n i s d i v e r t e d from the moral i s s u e and d i r e c t e d t o the p e r s o n a l advantages t h a t are t o be had from obedience. And the common good appears t o be l e s s a matter o f e t h i c a l p r i n c i p l e than one of s e l f - i n t e r e s t . (As such, the n o t i o n of duty, as we have noted e a r l i e r , i s not r e l e v a n t . ) Nor can the f a c t t h a t the ends sought by government are 'common' be r e l i e d upon t o p r o v i d e the common good w i t h a moral c h a r a c t e r . For 'commonality* does not enable us t o d i s t i n g u i s h between p u r e l y p r a c t i c a l goods (or s e l f - i n d u l g e n t goods) and goods of moral s i g n i f i c a n c e (goods t h a t we would 67 have a 'duty' t o seek). A f u r t h e r q u e s t i o n t h a t a r i s e s where the i n d i v i d u a l obeys laws because they aim a t the common good which i s h i s good, laws t h a t a re a r e c o r d o f h i s own w i l l , i s whether he i s e q u a l l y j u s t i f i e d i n d i s o b e y i n g a law t h a t c o n f l i c t s w i t h h i s own i n t e r e s t . Why ought he to obey a law which contravenes h i s own w i l l , a law to which he does not g i v e h i s assent? So long as one adheres t o the c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of the common good i n terms of i n d i v i d u a l goods, and so long as one assumes t h a t the laws do i n f a c t aim a t the common good, t h i s s i t u a t i o n should not a r i s e . That laws which aim a t the common good can never c o n f l i c t w i t h the good of the i n d i v i d u a l becomes a t r u i s m . And one's presumed o b l i g a t i o n t o obey those laws would be p e r f e c t . There would be no reason t o disobey. Our o n l y d i f f i c u l t y would seem t o stem not from any c o n f l i c t between the good of the community and t h a t o f the i n d i v i d u a l , but from our dependency upon those who make the laws t o speak f o r the 'whole' community. We must r e l y upon them t o d i s c e r n the common good t h a t i s the o b j e c t o f the w i l l o f a l l men i n s o c i e t y . Yet, the order o f v a l u e s u n d e r l y i n g the views men have on what goods are worth p u r u s i n g , o r what freedoms are worth p r e s e r v i n g (or not worth pr e s e r v i n g ) i s f a r from a 68 s e t t l e d q u e s t i o n . I t thus seems l i k e l y t h a t some d i s c r e p a n c i e s w i l l a r i s e concerning what men c o n s i d e r t o be a common good or f o r the good of s o c i e t y . S i n c e the a u t h o r i t y c o n f e r r e d upon men t o make laws g i v e s them no monopoly over r a t i o n a l and moral powers of judgement as to what c o n s t i t u t e s t h a t good, what then i s the ' a u t h o r i t a t i v e ' nature o f t h e i r v o i c e ? T h e r e i n l i e s the p e c u l i a r d i f f i c u l t y which the common good pr e s e n t s f o r our theory o f obedience. We may indeed have a duty t o seek the common good. But as an e t h i c a l p r i n c i p l e i n v o l v i n g a moral judgement, t h a t n o t i o n has nothing t o do wi t h the formal p r i n c i p l e s o f p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y and law (assuming i t i s the content o f law t o which the common good r e f e r s , a n d not i t s s o u r c e ) . That was supposed t o be one o f the v i r t u e s o f the concept. In consequence, however, our d i s c u s s i o n o f obedience i s a l s o separated from the more formal a s p e c t s o f government and law. And, i n s o f a r as our duty i s to the common good r a t h e r than t o a u t h o r i t y o r law per se, i t would seem p o s s i b l e t o disobey, as w e l l as t o obey as law i n the name of the common good. However, i n the event o f some disagreement over what c o n s t i t u t e s the common good, the i n d i v i d u a l w i l l s t i l l f i n d h i m s e l f r e q u i r e d t o seek the good t h a t the government de c i d e s i s ' h i s good'; he must seek the good t h a t the government t h i n k s he ought. But how can a man's moral freedom be r e c o n c i l e d w i t h obedience t o the judgement of o t h e r s and 69 wit h p u r s u i t of a good t h a t he r e j e c t s ? Why ought a man, i n -deed, how can a man have a 'duty' t o abide by the judgement of those h o l d i n g p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y ? As Lukes suggests, i f i t i s " s p e c i a l competence" t h a t i s a t i s s u e , then "deference to expert o p i n i o n " may be r a t i o n a l l y j u s t i f i e d ; however, he c o n t i n u e s , where i t i s the "•common judgement of men 1" t h a t i s a t i s s u e , then such deference t o a u t h o r i t y would be 20 " c o n t r a r y t o reason and duty". I t c o u l d be, of course, t h a t a man may not know h i s own good, or t h a t he might be mistaken. And ot h e r men, such as Rousseau, might a c c o r d i n g l y take i t upon themselves to compel him to a c t i n c e r t a i n ways f o r h i s own good - t h a t i s , ' f o r c e him to be f r e e ' . (Although, i n order f o r an i n d i v i d u a l t o have i n f a c t been ' f r e e d 1 , those doing the f o r c i n g would have t o a c t u a l l y be ' r i g h t ' i n t h e i r e v a l u a t i o n o f h i s good.) But i t i s s t i l l not c l e a r why the i g n o r a n t should t h e r e f o r e have a 'duty* t o pursue the good put f o r t h by the wise. T h i s i s p a r t i c u l a r l y so where t h a t good i s presented as a moral one, one t h a t men ought to pursue because i t i s j u s t and r i g h t t o do so (as opposed t o merely being i n t h e i r s e l f - i n t e r e s t t o do s o ) . For g i v e n our (and Rousseau's premise t h a t no man can bi n d the conscience of another, i n d i v i d u a l c o n v i c t i o n f o r any good put b e f o r e him i s a p r e -r e q u i s i t e f o r h i s having an o b l i g a t i o n t o seek i t . 70 To accommodate t h i s need f o r i n d i v i d u a l w i l l i n g n e s s , Rousseau argues t h a t "the c i t i z e n consents t o a l l the laws, i n c l u d i n g those t h a t have been passed i n s p i t e o f him..." 2^ For laws t h a t aim a t the common good, aim a l s o a t h i s own good and g i v e e f f e c t t o h i s ' i d e a l * w i l l , t h a t i s h i s w i l l as i t ought t o be, as i t would be were i t not f o r i n t e r f e r e n c e from the ' p a r t i c u l a r ' , misguided w i l l t h a t he a c t u a l l y e x p e r i e n c e s . I t i s , then, not merely a matter o f a man not knowing h i s own good, but a l s o a matter of h i s not knowing h i s own w i l l . Rousseau thus c l a i m s not o n l y t h a t a man can be f o r c e d t o be f r e e ; but he a l s o argues t h a t even where a man c l e a r l y d i s a g r e e s ( i e . does not ' w i l l ' ) the good he i s compelled t o seek, h i s unco-operative obedience i s r e a l l y an a c t of ' f r e e w i l l ' and hence consonant w i t h the c o n d i t i o n of 'duty.' I t i s t h i s l a t t e r c l a i m which seems t o us to be somewhat l e s s than p e r s u a s i v e . Whether t h i s man has a 'duty' to pursue a good he r e j e c t s ; whether t h i s s i t u a t i o n , which has a l l the appearances of being one of f o r c e (he i s being r e q u i r e d t o a c t a g a i n s t h i s own w i l l ) i s r e a l l y one of l i b e r t y (he i s obeying o n l y h i m s e l f ) would seem t o be d i r e c t l y dependent upon the e x i s t e n c e o f Rousseau's second and t r u e moral w i l l . Yet, even i f we were t o assume the a c t u a l i t y o f t h i s w i l l , we would s t i l l suggest t h a t the v i s i o n o f the 71 'good man' t h a t devolves from i t r e p r e s e n t s a s u b s t a n t i a l d e p a r t u r e from our o r i g i n a l i d e a o f a s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g moral being. A t the r o o t o f t h i s d eparture i s the e s s e n t i a l o b s c u r i t y o f our moral w i l l , the f a c t t h a t i t i s unknown to us as i n d i v i d u a l s - "For the w i l l o f the i n d i v i d u a l tends n a t u r a l l y t o p r i v i l e g e , the g e n e r a l w i l l t o e q u a l i t y " 2 2 ; and the subsequent d e f i n i t i o n of t h i s w i l l as t h a t which accords w i t h the w i l l o f s o c i e t y , r a t h e r than w i t h t h a t which the i n d i v i d u a l e x p e r i e n c e s . F i r s t , the f a c t t h a t we do not experi e n c e the General W i l l as i n d i v i d u a l s would appear t o r e s u l t i n a s e p a r a t i o n o f the n o t i o n o f moral w i l l from the r a t h e r important element of 'consciousness' which we u s u a l l y a s s o c i a t e w i t h f r e e w i l l , m o r a l i t y (and s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n ) , and by which we t r a d i t i o n a l l y d i s t i n g u i s h between the good man and the good a c t . We do g e n e r a l l y i n s i s t , notes P i t k i n , t h a t men know what they are doing and t h a t they do i t f o r the r i g h t reasons b e f o r e we c a l l t h e i r a c t i o n s f u l l y moral.^3 To the exte n t t h a t the 'consciousness' of the moral a c t o r i s at a l l s i g n i f i c a n t , the unco - o p e r a t i v e performance of some good (the u n w i l l i n g f u l f i l l m e n t o f the unknown w i l l ) would f a i l t o s a t i s f y the requirements of i n d i v i d u a l moral a c t i o n -an a c t i o n performed f r e e l y and w i l f u l l y by a man who understands i t t o be r i g h t and t h e r e f o r e o b l i g a t o r y ( r a t h e r than i t being o b l i g a t o r y because o t h e r s say i t i s r i g h t ) . 72 Secondly, we would suggest t h a t t h i s same 'unknown' q u a l i t y of Rousseau's moral w i l l tends to s e r i o u s l y undermine i n d i v i d u a l moral autonomy. In e f f e c t , i t causes the l o c a t i o n of moral l e g i t i m a c y t o be a l t e r e d . For man must now go beyond h i s own conscience and r e f e r t o the a u t h o r i t y of the broader ' c o l l e c t i v e c o n s c i e n c e ' of the s o c i e t y of which he i s a p a r t . He becomes i n c a p a b l e of t a k i n g a moral p o s i t i o n independent of s o c i e t y ; he i s d e p r i v e d of p e r s o n a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r h i s a c t i o n s (that r e s p o n s i b i l i t y would have t o be shared by the s o c i e t y t h a t w i l l s the a c t i o n ) . Our i n d i v i d u a l would appear t o have l o s t c o n t r o l over h i s own a c t i o n s . Indeed, we would argue t h a t , by g i v i n g the i n d i v i d u a l a second w i l l which can be d e f i n e d o n l y i n terms of the w i l l o f s o c i e t y , and by l o c a t i n g freedom and (morality) i n t h a t second w i l l , Rousseau e f f e c t i v e l y d e p r i v e s the i n d i v i d u a l of the freedom t h a t i s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the l i b e r a l demand t h a t he be a b l e to determine h i s own l i f e a c c o r d i n g t o h i s own w i l l , t h a t i s , a w i l l f r e e from s u b j e c t i o n t o o t h e r w i l l s . For the w i l l t h a t can e x i s t o n l y i n r e l a t i o n t o the w i l l o f s o c i e t y i s not f r e e from s u b j e c t i o n t o the w i l l o f others;it i s , i n s t e a d , s u b j e c t t o the ' w i l l o f a l l ' . L i k e de J o u v e n a l , we would argue t h a t t h i s " i l l u s i o n a r y p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the a b s o l u t e s o v e r e i g n t y of the s o c i a l Whole" (the freedom t h a t Rousseau l e a v e s h i s i n d i v i d u a l ) does not s a t i s f y the e s s e n t i a l c o n d i t i o n s o f i n d i v i d u a l freedom, where t h a t freedom means" d i r e c t , 73 immediate and co n c r e t e s o v e r e i g n t y of man over h i m s e l f " . These problems n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g , we have y e t t o d e a l w i t h the s t i l l important q u e s t i o n concerning the very e x i s t e n c e o f Rousseau's second and t r u e moral w i l l t h a t i s c r u c i a l t o h i s ded u c t i o n o f the consent (and l i b e r t y ) o f the d i s s e n t i n g i n d i v i d u a l . Again, however, because i t i s ever unknown t o us as i n d i v i d u a l s , we f i n d i t t o be, i n p r i n c i p l e , r a t h e r d i f f i c u l t t o e i t h e r deny or a f f i r m the a c t u a l i t y o f t h i s w i l l . But, i f we cannot c o n f r o n t t h i s i s s u e , we might a t l e a s t d i s p u t e , as we a l r e a d y have, t h a t t h i s w i l l o r i t s o b j e c t (the common good) i s known t o anyone e l s e . I n s o f a r as the w i l l o f s o c i e t y i s a r e f l e c t i o n o f the w i l l supposedly possessed by the i n d i v i d u a l , we might look t o the former i n or d e r t o d i s c o v e r the l a t t e r . But we cannot assume t h a t the 'true' s o c i a l o r General W i l l (which, by d e f i n i t i o n can never be c o n t r a r y t o j u s t i c e o r equity) i s i n f a c t r e f l e c t e d i n s o c i e t y o r i n the i n s t i t u t i o n s by which i t r u l e s i t s e l f . On the c o n t r a r y , our s o c i e t i e s are not i n f a l l i b l y j u s t and e q u i t a b l e . They are o f t e n e l i t i s t , e x p l o i t i v e , r a c i s t and o p p r e s s i v e i n what they seem t o w i l l as a whole. They can and do commit gross i n j u s t i c e s a g a i n s t i n d i v i d u a l s and groups o f i n d i v i d u a l s ; and they do so o f t e n through t h e i r laws. We thus cannot assume t h a t a l l the laws t h a t we are i n f a c t r e q u i r e d t o obey do aim a t the common good, not even those laws t h a t seem t o r e f l e c t c e r t a i n g e n e r a l l y accepted s o c i a l 74 norms. More p o i n t e d l y , however, s o c i e t y does not r e a l l y appear t o us, f o r the most p a r t , the i d e a l form envisaged by Rousseau - t h a t i s , as an i n t e g r a l u n i t , o r a moral being i n i t s own r i g h t , w i t h a w i l l o f i t s own t h a t can never d e s i r e anything i n o p p o s i t i o n t o the i n t e r e s t s of i t s members. (I f the ' s o c i a l w i l l ' does not e x i s t , then n e i t h e r would i t s s m a l l e r corresponding component, t h a t w i l l unknowingly pos-sessed by the i n d i v i d u a l . ) S o c i e t y , i n f a c t , appears t o o f f e r us not one standard of what i s j u s t , e q u i t a b l e and r i g h t f o r a l l men, but competing standards which are them-s e l v e s used t o j u s t i f y r e b e l l i o n a g a i n s t the v a l u e s being e n f o r c e d by law. S o c i e t y , we would suggest, i s much b e t t e r r e p r e s e n t e d as a c o l l e c t i o n o f u n i t s w i t h competing needs, i n t e r e s t s and o p i n i o n s , r a t h e r than as a u n i f i e d whole. And one of the problems of p o l i t i c s and law i s t o e f f e c t some accommodation between these competing needs and i n t e r e s t s , t h a t i s , t o u n i t men who do not i n f a c t a c t w i t h one w i l l . But i t i s the ve r y absence of such u n i t y t h a t makes the common good so d i f f i c u l t t o e f f e c t and i t s o p p o s i t e so easy to secure. We might w e l l v a l u e the p o l i t i c a l and l e g a l framework as a d e v i c e f o r b r i n g i n g c o n f l i c t i n g purposes • p e a c e f u l l y ' i n t o accord; however, the p o l i t i c a l process o f 75 compromise and b a r g a i n i n g between competing i n t e r e s t s does not appear to us t o be w e l l s u i t e d t o producing a good t h a t 25 i s common, and hence i n our own i n t e r e s t t o pursue,; nor does i t appear w e l l s u i t e d t o producing a good t h a t i s .: n e c e s s a r i l y r i g h t and j u s t and hence one t h a t a l l men 'ought' to pursue. I t i s , a g a i n , t h i s absence of a u n i f i e d s o c i a l w i l l ( t h a t i s r e f l e c t i v e o f , r a t h e r than supreme over, the w i l l o f a l l i n d i v i d u a l s ) t h a t makes any p r e t e n s i o n on the p a r t of our p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t i e s t o speak f o r the 'whole', and t o j u s t i f y t h e i r a c t i o n s i n the name of the 'whole' ( i n a l l our names) so suspect. Murphy i s u n h e s i t a t i n g l y s k e p t i c a l o f such a c l a i m : The a u t h o r i t y of the common good as an e t h i c a l a b s t r a c t i s a moral p l a t i t u d e . The c l a i m of the governmental agents t o speak f o r i t i s a p r e t e n s i o n p r o p e r l y s u b j e c t t o the c o n t i n u a l s c r u t i n y of c i t i z e n s whose judgement i s not s u b j e c t t o command. 26 Our i n t e n t i o n here i s not to d e t r a c t from what i s e s s e n t i a l l y a j u s t and proper v i s i o n : t h a t i n the r e l a t i o n -s h i p between man and h i s government, t h e r e be some r e l a t i o n -s h i p between the ends sought through the laws governing s o c i e t y and the good of the i n d i v i d u a l s i n t h a t s o c i e t y . But t h i s u n i t y i s not t o be understood merely as an assumption whereby the power of government i s j u s t i f i e d . On the c o n t r a r y , where t h a t u n i t y i s not a f a c t , i t becomes a l e g i t i m a t e demand, 76 and an e f f e c t i v e l i m i t a t i o n upon the power of government; as such the i s s u e of u n i t y p r o v i d e s us not o n l y w i t h a reason f o r obedience, but a l s o w i t h j u s t i f i a b l e grounds f o r d i sobedience. i i i ) The Ends of Government and the Duty o f Obedience E a r l i e r , we asked of our theory of p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n t h a t i t b r i d g e the gap between the moral and the p o l i t i c a l - j u r i d i c a l realms. For as long as they remain a p a r t , the p r i o r i t y of a man's i n t e r e s t s and d u t i e s as a c i t i z e n over the good he seeks and the d u t i e s he has as a moral being remains unexplained. When we r e l a t e the ends of government t o such p r i n c i p l e s as i n d i v i d u a l freedom, j u s t i c e and the common good, we are suggesting the e x i s t e n c e of such a l i n k . We are i m p l y i n g the s u b o r d i n a t i o n of the p o l i t i c a l o rder t o these o t h e r v a l u e s . From such a p e r s p e c t i v e , the d e n i a l of i n h e r e n t moral a u t h o r i t y to the modern ' l e g i t i m a t e ' S t a t e does not r e p r e s e n t a ' s e p a r a t i o n ' of the moral and the p o l i t i c a l (although the duty of obedience, as noted e a r l i e r , does become a problem because of t h a t d e n i a l ) . I t merely a l t e r s the source of moral l e g i t i m a c y , such t h a t i t w i l l come from below, r a t h e r than from above, from a s e l f - j u s t i f y i n g p o l i t i c a l power. 77 Yet, the a p p l i c a t i o n of such c r i t e r i a t o the ends of government causes us some d i f f i c u l t y i n our attempt t o pr o v i d e a reason f o r obedience t o a l l laws of the S t a t e , o r a j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r the r i g h t o f government t o punish every t r a n s g r e s s i o n . F or, a t the same time t h a t they d e f i n e the l e g i t i m a c y o f a u t h o r i t y and the o b l i g a t o r i n e s s o f law, they a l s o s e t l i m i t s upon t h a t o b l i g a t i o n , l i m i t s t h a t supercede the q u e s t i o n of ' l e g a l i t y ' . Indeed, whatever i t i s t h a t we aim a t through law, when we r e l a t e obedience t o those ends, we are i m p l y i n g t h a t the p o s s e s s i o n of power and the f a c t o f law are not f i n a l words about the l e g i t i m a c y of a u t h o r i t y o r the o b l i g a t o r i n e s s o f law. T h i s assumes, of course, t h a t government and law are not u l t i m a t e ends i n themselves, but means, and f a l l i b l e means a t t h a t . And t h a t they do not a u t o m a t i c a l l y r e p r e s e n t the achievement o f the freedom, j u s t i c e o r good t h a t we seek through them. They may, i n f a c t secure the o p p o s i t e . But i f our duty t o obey d e r i v e s from these ends and the va l u e we a t t a c h t o them, c o u l d we not a l s o have, i n t h e i r name again , a r i g h t (perhaps even a duty) t o disobey laws t h a t f r u s t r a t e t h e i r achievement? Hobbes seems t o r e c o g n i z e such a r i g h t as being i m p l i e d by t h i s approach t o obedience. The o b l i g a t i o n a man may sometimes have, upon the command of the Sovereign... dependeth not on the words of our sub-m i s s i o n (our co n s e n t ) ; but on the 78 I n t e n t i o n which i s understood t o be the End t h e r e o f . Where our r e f u s a l t o obey f r u s t r a t e s the End f o r which S o v e r e i g n t y was o r d a i n e d : t h e r e i s no l i b e r t y to r e f u s e ; otherwise there i s . 27 Whether such e x c e p t i o n s are l i m i t e d , as i n Hobbes, t o ' l i f e and death' i s s u e s such as the r e f u s a l t o r i s k one's l i f e i n a war t h a t i s u n r e l a t e d t o the purposes f o r which the S t a t e e x i s t s , o r whether one expects more from the S t a t e than the simple p r e s e r v a t i o n o f l i f e , the c o n c l u s i o n remains the same. The theory of obedience t h a t d e r i v e s our duty t o obey from a contemplation o f the ends of government and law i s unable to e x p l a i n the duty we have t o obey a l l laws -r e g a r d l e s s o f how they stand i n r e l a t i o n t o the ends t h a t make them o b l i g a t o r y . Nor does i t e x p l a i n the r i g h t o f punishment which the S t a t e e x e r c i s e s over the i n d i v i d u a l who e x e r c i s e s h i s own r i g h t t o disobey where the law c o n t r a d i c t s the very v a l u e s which i t i s supposed t o h e l p him r e a l i z e . T h i s r i g h t o f punishment would i t s e l f seem to imply the supremacy of p u b l i c judgement over p r i v a t e i n d i v i d u a l e v a l u a t i o n of those laws, and even f u r t h e r , the r i g h t o f government t o i t s e l f d e f i n e what c o n s t i t u t e s the good t h a t i s the end o f government. Yet, the 'ends of government' argument does not r e a l l y account f o r the a u t h o r i t a t i v e c h a r a c t e r o f the p u b l i c view of what 79 c o n s t i t u t e s a j u s t p o l i t i c a l o r d e r , o r of how men ought t o behave, or of what l i b e r t i e s they should have and what 'goods' they ought t o pursue; nor does i t account f o r the duty o f the i n d i v i d u a l t o abide by the v a l u e s u n d e r l y i n g those p u b l i c d e c i s i o n s . Indeed, i n i t s a s s e r t i o n o f some i d e n t i t y between the p u b l i c goods sought through law and the good of the i n d i v i d u a l , the 'ends of government' approach t o law r a t h e r n e a t l y avoids the f a c t o f p u b l i c judgement and i t s supremacy over the p r i v a t e judgement of the i n d i v i d u a l . I t thereby o b v i a t e s the problems t h a t i t would pose f o r our 'good man' -the man who 'renders obedience t o h i s own w i l l ' o n l y , and who n e i t h e r i s , nor can be bound by those v a l u e s which our r u l e r s express i n t h e i r p e r c e p t i o n o f j u s t i c e and the common good, u n l e s s he a l r e a d y holds those v a l u e s h i m s e l f . Where i t i s t r u e t h a t the laws so c o n s i s t e n t l y r e f l e c t our own w i l l -where the ends pursued through law are our g o a l s too, where those laws never cause us t o s u f f e r any i n j u s t i c e o u r s e l v e s or b r i n g i n d i g n i t y t o our l i v e s , and where they never r e q u i r e us t o commit an a c t t h a t we f i n d immoral - then the problem of p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y (and p u b l i c judgement) versus i n d i v i d u a l moral autonomy simply does not a r i s e . C e r t a i n l y t h e r e would not appear t o be any problem i n obeying laws t h a t are i n acco r d w i t h what our own conscience d i c t a t e s . At the same time, however, we would probably obey such laws, q u i t e 80 w i l l i n g l y without having t o be t o l d why we ought t o do so. That i s , where the problem of obedience d i s a p p e a r s , so too does the need f o r a theory e x p l a i n i n g why we ought t o obey. Yet, a t times, the law i s q u i t e c l e a r l y a t odds wit h our own w i l l , r e s t r a i n i n g us from doing what we t h i n k we ought, or r e q u i r i n g us t o do what we t h i n k we ought not t o do; we're, a t times, r e q u i r e d t o obey laws t h a t aim a t some g o a l which we r e j e c t as e i t h e r good or our own. At these times, our duty t o abide by the p u b l i c w i l l c o n t a i n e d i n those laws i s not a t a l l c l e a r . Here, the a s s e r t i o n o f some u n i t y between the i n d i v i d u a l and the s o c i e t y o f which he i s a p a r t , between h i s good and t h a t pursued by s o c i e t y through i t s government appears t o be l e s s a r e a l i t y than the "c o n f u s i o n p r e t e n d i n g t o be a s y n t h e s i s " t h a t Bosanquet suggests i t i s . U l t i m a t e l y , i t does l e s s t o e x p l a i n our duty of obedience than t o obscure t h i s paradox t h a t e x i s t s where the i n d i v i d u a l and h i s government are a p a r t . F or, as Bosanquet a l s o notes, w h i l e t h a t s e p a r a t i o n remains, we cannot e x p l a i n the r i g h t s o f the m a j o r i t y o r why a community 2 8 should c o e r c e a s i n g l e r e b e l . I n s o f a r as t h i s u n i t y i s important, i t would appear t h a t a law c o u l d be produced o n l y by the consent of every i n d i v i d u a l . However, t h i s , as Locke notes, would make government v i r t u a l l y i m p o s s i b l e . He t h e r e f o r e suggests t h a t 81 the w i l l o f the m a j o r i t y i t s e l f be accepted as an "act of the 29 Whole." Tussman too, i n a very s i m i l a r f a s h i o n , suggests t h a t p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n d e c i s i o n s , wherein m a j o r i t i e s r u l e , be accepted as s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n f o r the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of law as 'self-imposed' (even though t h a t d e c i s i o n may not r e f l e c t the w i l l o f the i n d i v i d u a l bound by i t ) . For, we can g e t no c l o s e r , he argues, without d i s s o l v i n g the e n t e r -p r i s e . 30 Yet, i f we are to r e p r e s e n t the w i l l o f the m a j o r i t y as t h a t of the Whole and i f the ends pursued by the m a j o r i t y are t o r e p r e s e n t the good of the Whole; then i t would seem t o f o l l o w t h a t , a t times, the w i l l o f s o c i e t y and the common good d e f i n e d by law w i l l most c e r t a i n l y c o n f l i c t w i t h the w i l l and good of o t h e r i n d i v i d u a l s i n s o c i e t y . For t h i s reason, the use of the w i l l o f the m a j o r i t y as a d e v i c e f o r a c h i e v i n g the sought a f t e r u n i t y - t h a t i s , as the s o l u t i o n t o the paradox of d i s u n i t y t h a t i s i n h e r e n t i n the v e r y n o t i o n of m a j o r i t y r u l e - s t r i k e s us as somewhat p e c u l i a r . As an i n s t i t u t i o n a l d e v i c e f o r a r r i v i n g a t d e c i s i o n s , m a j o r i t y r u l e simple does not produce any c o l l e c t i v e or s o c i a l w i l l which c o u l d be s a i d t o embody the w i l l and i n t e r e s t s of a l l i n d i v i d u a l s i n s o c i e t y . No a b s o l u t e or autonomous v a l u e s , b i n d i n g a l l men, a r i s e from i t , o n l y p a r t i c u l a r v a l u e s . 82 Moreover, so l o n g as t h e a u t h o r i t y o f law and our o b l i g a t i o n t o obey i t a r e t o be d e r i v e d from t h e c h a r a c t e r of what i s w i l l e d , t h e n o ur •acceptance' o f t h e w i l l o f t h e m a j o r i t y would be i r r e l e v a n t t o t h a t o b l i g a t i o n . Those laws would have t o be jud g e d , by t h e m s e l v e s , f o r what t h e y a r e . Our c o n s e n t t o a b i d e by t h e w i l l o f t h e m a j o r i t y o r o f our r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s i n government cannot make t h e good t h e y d e c i d e upon a common good u n l e s s i t i s one i n f a c t . Our c o n s e n t cannot make t h e laws t h e y e n a c t t r u l y j u s t , u n l e s s t h e y t r u l y a r e so. On t h e o t h e r hand, i f i t i s t o be argued t h a t men a r e bound by t h e p a r t i c u l a r v a l u e s h e l d by t h e m a j o r i t y because t h e y have 'agreed t o a c c e p t ' t h a t r u l e , t h e n t h e n a t u r e o f our d u t y o f o b e d i e n c e w i l l have been s u b s t a n t i a l l y a l t e r e d . I n e f f e c t , t h i s r e t u r n s us t o t h e t h e o r y o f co n s e n t w h e r e i n man g i v e s up t h e r i g h t t o a c t on h i s own judgement; w h e r e i n t h e ' e n t e r p r i s e ' i s s e p a r a t e d from t h e q u a l i t y o f i t s achievements; and man's d u t y t o obey i s s e p a r a t e d from t h e re a s o n s f o r w h i c h he engages i n t h e ' e n t e r p r i s e ' . I n t h i s a p proach, some account i s a t l e a s t o f f e r e d f o r t h e supremacy o f p u b l i c judgement o v e r p r i v a t e 3 1 ( t h a t i s , t h e r i g h t o f government t o a p p l y i t s own p e r c e p t i o n o f j u s t i c e and t h e common good t o t h e s o c i a l o r d e r i t r u l e s ; 83 and t o punish those who r e b e l ) . However, the ' a u t h o r i t y ' t h a t i s bestowed on the p u b l i c judgement, and the p r i n c i p l e of ' e q u a l i t y ' t h a t u n d e r l i e s i n d i v i d u a l moral s e l f - d e t e r m i n a -t i o n are not made any more compatible by the n o t i o n of consent. As we have argued i n the p r e v i o u s chapter, our consent to abide by the p u b l i c judgement ( m a j o r i t y w i l l or otherwise) r a t h e r than our own, does not a l t e r the f a c t t h a t such obedience occurs a t the expense of i n d i v i d u a l moral autonomy. As a d e v i c e f o r s a l v a g i n g the a u t h o r i t y of the i n d i v i d u a l c o n s c i e n c e i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n , the second and t r u e moral w i l l t h a t Rousseau envisages ( i n harmony w i t h the p u b l i c w i l l ) i s , we would suggest, an even more p e r p l e x i n g s o l u t i o n t o what i s a d i f f i c u l t and perhaps i n s o l u b l e problem. There may be an i n h e r e n t and i r r e c o n c i l a b l e c o n f l i c t (or l a c k of 'unity') between p u b l i c and p r i v a t e r i g h t s ; between p u b l i c goods and the good of the i n d i v i d u a l ; and between the p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e t h a t operate i n the p u b l i c realm and those t h a t operate i n the p r i v a t e . Indeed, the r e c u r r e n t problem i n our d i s c u s s i o n of obedience t o law has been t h a t the i n d i v i d u a l i s not always w e l l served by government; t h a t the s p e c i f i c , or more immediate concerns of government -p u b l i c o r d e r , the p u b l i c good, p o l i t i c a l e q u a l i t y and the r u l e of law - are not always compatible w i t h the p e r s o n a l 84 d i g n i t y and happiness of i n d i v i d u a l s , nor w i t h the p e r s o n a l l i b e r t y e s s e n t i a l t o them. I f t h e r e were t o be any one s i n g l e a t t r i b u t e of the p u b l i c realm o f government and law t h a t would b r i n g i t i n t o c o n f l i c t w i t h the needs and concerns o f the i n d i v i d u a l , i t would probably be the e s s e n t i a l i r r e l e v a n c y o f man's i n d i v i d u a l i t y and uniqueness a t t h a t broader l e v e l . F or as C a r t e r has noted, Conscious d e l i b e r a t i o n s about s o c i e t y as a whole d e a l i n c a t e g o r i e s o f people and i n t e r e s t s , and must exclude the unique p e r s o n a l i t y and circumstances of each person a f f e c t e d by s o c i a l d e c i s i o n s . 32 Chomsky a l s o draws our a t t e n t i o n t o the s o c i a l o r p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n t h a t i s concerned more w i t h the broad and long-term consequences of a p o l i c y on the system as a whole, than w i t h the " i n t r i n s i c nature and q u a l i t y of the a c t i o n which the p o l i c y i n v o l v e s " . In a somewhat more impassioned f a s h i o n than C a r t e r , he notes how t h i s e v a l u a t i o n of p o l i c i e s , by r e f e r e n c e t o remote advantages, tends t o obscure from the p o l i t i c a l v i s i o n any c o n s e q u e n t i a l disadvantages t h a t they might b r i n g t o the immediate circumstances - t h a t the l i v e s of the i n d i v i d u a l s who are r e q u i r e d t o perform them may be made "subhuman, wretched and shameful t o themselves" d u r i n g 33 the process of obedience. Thus, a p a c i f i s t may be ordered i n t o b a t t l e t o 85 f i g h t and perhaps k i l l ; a farmer may be r e q u i r e d t o leav e the l a n d t h a t has been h i s l i f e f o r s i x t y years t o make way f o r an a e r o p o r t ; and s t i l l another man may be r e q u i r e d t o t e s t i f y a g a i n s t an accused murder, d e s p i t e t h r e a t s a g a i n s t the l i v e s of h i s c h i l d r e n should he a c t u a l l y do so. A l l are bidden t o do t h e i r 'duty' i n the name o f some remote ' p u b l i c good'; but l i t t l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n seems t o be g i v e n t o how s e r i o u s l y t h e i r own l i v e s are a f f e c t e d . Indeed, i t seems t o be t h a t , as Schaar has argued, from the p e r s p e c t i v e o f the p u b l i c realm, a l l t h a t r e a l l y matters about man i s h i s e x t e r n a l behaviour - t h a t i t i s uniform, r e g u l a r , and p r e d i c t a b l e . Such behaviour i s , o f course, q u i t e conducive t o p u b l i c order and u n i t y . But Schaar q u e s t i o n s , as do we, those who f u r t h e r presuppose t h a t "by t r e a t i n g men u n i f o r m l y - e q u a l l y i n the p u b l i c realm", we can "preserve i n d i v i d u a l i t y i n the p r i v a t e realm". Of such c o n s t i t u t i o n a l t h e o r i s t s , he w r i t e s , ...even though they may appear t o make a p l e a f o r u n q u a l i f i e d freedom, they i n f a c t a s p i r e t o f r e e o n l y p u b l i c man, t o pr o v i d e no more than h i s p o l i t i c a l e q u a l i t y . 3 ^ To us, t h i s r i g h t t o be t r e a t e d e q u a l l y under government appears t o be q u i t e d i f f e r e n t from and not n e c e s s a r i l y compatible w i t h the moral demand f o r the equal r i g h t of a l l men t o determine t h e i r own l i v e s . For t h i s l a t t e r demand i s p r e d i c a t e d upon a r e c o g n i t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l 86 d i s t i n c t i v e n e s s and an acceptance of the r i g h t of a l l men t o r e a l i z e t h e i r own i n d i v i d u a l i t y . I t i s p r e d i c a t e d upon a view of human d i g n i t y t h a t , as D'Entreves argues, i s s p e c i f i c a l l y opposed to "the d e g r a d a t i o n of the i n d i v i d u a l t o a simple means t o an end, even i f the end i s the common g o o d " . 3 5 However, the former r u l e of ( p o l i t i c a l ) e q u a l i t y , under which men are c o n s i d e r e d t o be no d i f f e r e n t from one another, and are r e q u i r e d to behave i n the same manner as one another, does not f r e e men from s u b j e c t i o n to o t h e r w i l l s . Men are s t i l l s u b j e c t t o r u l e s made by o t h e r s , but those r u l e s s h a l l now be c h a r a c t e r i z e d by t h e i r r e l a t i o n to s o c i e t y as a whole, and by the impersonal, i m p a r t i a l and detached manner i n which they t r e a t i n d i v i d u a l s i n t h a t s o c i e t y . D efined i n terms of what i s common among them, men are p l a c e d i n a p p r o p r i a t e c a t e g o r i e s , and made the o b j e c t s of c a l c u l a t i o n s made i n terms of g e n e r a l r u l e s and long-term s o c i a l o b j e c t i v e s . In e f f e c t , these i n d i v i d u a l s seem t o no l o n g e r be human beings, but " o b j e c t s ' of the governmental w i l l ; a t times, 'means' to o t h e r 'ends' t h a t the government f i n d s d e s i r a b l e and i n the p u b l i c good, r a t h e r than 'ends' i n themselves. And the r i g h t s or l i b e r t i e s they have as i n d i v i d u a l s tend t o be seen as a f u n c t i o n o f the Whole, c o n t i n g e n t upon the ' s t a b i l i t y ' of the group, r a t h e r than upon any c o n s i d e r a t i o n of what freedom a man ought t o 87 have because he i s a man and d e s p i t e any t h r e a t t h a t such freedom might present t o p u b l i c o r d e r . Man, as he i s envisaged by the p u b l i c realm, i s , as Schaar has observed, not very a t t r a c t i v e , e i t h e r m o r a l l y or a e s t h e t i c a l l y . Above a l l , however, t h i s ' p u b l i c man' i s " u n r e a l " . ^ As suggested e a r l i e r , a s i g n i f i c a n t o b s t a c l e t o our attempt to r e c o n c i l e the demands o f p u b l i c l i f e w ith the p r i v a t e happiness and p e r s o n a l l i b e r t y of the i n d i v i d u a l a r i s e s from t h i s p u b l i c a t t i t u d e towards man. The p r i n c i p l e s of p o l i t i c a l e q u a l i t y and i m p a r t i a l i t y may be u s e f u l , not o n l y t o government (as Schaar suggests) - by p r o v i d i n g i t w i t h a b a s i s f o r making p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n s and c r e a t i n g a s t a b l e p o l i t i c a l o r der; but a l s o t o the i n d i v i d u a l - by p r o v i d i n g c e r t a i n elementary p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e t o which the government and the l e g a l system must conform and by which they are r e s t r a i n e d . However, i t i s these same p r i n c i p l e s and t h i s same detached a t t i t u d e towards man t h a t can, a t times, obscure the impact o f p o l i t i c a l and l e g a l d e c i s i o n s upon r e a l men - d e c i s i o n s which, because of t h e i r impersonal and g e n e r a l nature, can cause p a r t i c u l a r and ' r e a l ' i n d i v i d u a l s t o s u f f e r s e r i o u s h a r d s h i p s and g r e a t i n j u s t i c e s . C a r t e r makes a s i m i l a r o b s e r v a t i o n . I t i s t h i s impersonal aspect of j u d i c i a l and p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n s and procedures t h a t e a s i l y promotes inhumanity, t h a t c r e a t e s a gap between p u b l i c and p r i v a t e m o r a l i t y , and arouses p a s s i o n a t e p r o t e s t a g a i n s t the 88 a r t i f i c i a l i t i e s o f law and government. I t i s i n t h i s sense t h a t t h e r e i s a separate realm of p u b l i c a f f a i r s which cannot be a s s i m i l a t e d t o o t h e r aspects of p r i v a t e l i f e . . . 37 The 'unreal* q u a l i t y of the p u b l i c man i s of s i g n i f i c a n c e not o n l y to the q u e s t i o n of c o m p a t i b i l i t y between the requirements of c i t i z e n s h i p and the p r i v a t e and moral l i f e o f the i n d i v i d u a l , but a l s o t o the theory of p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n - the 'duty' of the i n d i v i d u a l t o be a good c i t i z e n . For the i n d i v i d u a l upon whom the duty of obedience f a l l s i s a ' r e a l ' person whose p e r s p e c t i v e i s p r i v a t e and who a c t s upon p r i n c i p l e s t h a t a r e , i n a sense, p r i v a t e . That i s , the p r i n c i p l e s from which h i s d u t i e s d e r i v e ( u n l i k e those t h a t operate i n the p u b l i c realm) r e f l e c t a concern w i t h the p a r t i c u l a r , unique, and immediate c h a r a c t e r of h i s own e x i s t e n c e and of the l i v e s of o t h e r people who are r e a l and important t o him. As Weldon has argued, " i n s o f a r as the i n d i v i d u a l i s r e a l , a d e f i n i t e and not an a b s t r a c t person", then the p a r t i c u l a r r e l a t i o n s h i p s t h a t he has w i t h o t h e r s w i l l be fundamental t o him; but, "these r e l a t i o n s h i p s are d e s c r i b a b l e not i n terms of g e n e r a l laws, but of p a r t i c u l a r judgements", t h a t d e a l more w i t h the immediate consequences of the i n d i v i d u a l ' s a c t i o n s upon h i m s e l f and these o t h e r people. Moreover, i n s o f a r as the i n d i v i d u a l i s , a g a i n , ' r e a l ' and not an a b s t r a c t person, then the moral and p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n s t h a t he has, the 89 o b l i g a t i o n s t h a t w i l l be ' r e a l ' t o him, are those t h a t a r i s e from these p a r t i c u l a r r e l a t i o n s h i p s and p a r t i c u l a r judg-4. 38 ments. I t i s , of course, ' r e a l ' men who are r e q u i r e d to obey law, and i t i s to them t h a t the o b l i g a t i o n t o obey must be r e a l . That i s , the problem of p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n i s not one of r e c o n c i l i n g government and law wi t h the l e g a l p e r s o n a l i t y , o r p u b l i c p r i n c i p l e s w i t h ' p u b l i c man' (which i s s e l f - e x p l a n a t o r y ) . I t i s one of r e c o n c i l i n g p u b l i c p r i n c i p l e s w i t h the p r i n c i p l e s and v a l u e s i n p r i v a t e m o r a l i t y . As the p u b l i c realm becomes ever more a b s t r a c t , however, as the impersonalism of government and law and the remoteness of i t s ends i n c r e a s e s , the gap between t h a t realm and the p r i v a t e l i f e of the i n d i v i d u a l widens. And the duty of the 'good man' to be a 'good c i t i z e n ' becomes l e s s r e a l and i n c r e a s i n g l y more d i f f i c u l t to e x p l a i n . 90 IV. C o n c l u s i o n The attempt t o r e s t government and the duty to obey i t on some moral b a s i s i s , we would t h i n k , a proper one. The r i g h t of some men to make laws f o r o t h e r s , t o r e s t r i c t t h e i r freedom and to punish them i f they f a i l t o obey does seem t o us to be, i n some sense, i n need of a moral j u s t i f i c a t i o n . We would conclude, however, as does Campbell, t h a t a"a moral j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s more o f a bane than a boon to p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y . " For i t would a l s o enable us t o appeal t o m o r a l i t y t o j u s t i f y our di s o b e d i e n c e t o a S t a t e t h a t f a i l s t o a c t m o r a l l y or t o laws t h a t o f f e n d m o r a l i t y . To a r r i v e a t a g e n e r a l theory of obedience t h a t avoids t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y and t h a t e x p l a i n s the co m p u l s o r i -ness of a l l laws (even the most unj u s t ) a n o t i o n of 'consent' 91 i s sometimes used which assumed t h a t the i n d i v i d u a l consents to the e n t i r e system of government and law, r a t h e r than t o each and every law. And, i n s o f a r as i t i s to the process by which law i s made t h a t the i n d i v i d u a l consents, i t i s assumed t h a t he i n c u r s a duty to obey a l l the laws c r e a t e d by t h a t p r o c e s s . A t the same time, whether or not our r e s p o n s i b l e , s e l f - g o v e r n i n g moral man can have a moral duty to obey law does depend, f o r the most p a r t , on how s u c c e s s f u l l y law can be represented as se l f - i m p o s e d . In t h i s r e g a r d , the theory of consent has even f u r t h e r a t t r a c t i o n s . By c o n s e n t i n g , the i n d i v i d u a l f r e e l y c o n f e r s upon govern-ment the r i g h t t o make laws, and v o l u n t a r i l y i n c u r s the duty t o obey them. That d u t y r r e s t s not on the f a c t o f law, nor on the f o r c e behind i t , but on m o r a l i t y , the m o r a l i t y of an o b l i g a t i o n w i l f u l l y and r a t i o n a l l y s e l f -imposed. T h i s duty to obey law would appear then to s a t i s f y the e s s e n t i a l c o n d i t i o n s of m o r a l l y o b l i g a t o r y obedience. 92 And obedience t o government and law would a l s o appear t o s a t i s f y the " p r e - c o n d i t i o n s of human moral conduct". But can freedom, the c o n d i t i o n e s s e n t i a l t o human goodness be r e c o n c i l e d w i t h t h i s duty to obey a l l the laws of the St a t e ? Can the good man a l s o be a good and obedient c i t i z e n ? In t h i s r e g a r d , consent theory i s not without i t s problems. Indeed, i t i s our c o n c l u s i o n t h a t the sel f - i m p o s e d duty o f obedience, i n s o f a r as i t i s a duty t o obey a l l law, has r e p e r c u s s i o n s which amount t o a v i r t u a l n e g a t i o n of the e t h i c a l i n d i v i d u a l . F or, w i t h i n the terms s e t up by t h i s theory of obedience, a l l p r o p e r l y enacted laws are o b l i g a t o r y . The ' a u t h o r i t a t i v e n e s s ' of the laws i s s u i n g from the accepted p o l i t i c a l system d e r i v e s not from t h e i r content, but from t h e i r c o n f o r m i t y t o the accepted r u l e s o f l e g a l i t y . The duty of obedience i s due, then, independent o f the r e s u l t s of t h a t system. T h i s means t h a t a man's r a t i o n a l and moral judge-ment on a law i s simply i r r e l e v a n t t o h i s duty t o obey i t . Even j u s t laws are to be obeyed, not f o r t h e i r j u s t n e s s , but because of t h e i r ' a u t h o r i t y ' . Whether or not a law i s to be obeyed w i l l be determined by a s i n g l e q u e s t i o n . Does t h i s 93 law s a t i s f y the requirements of l e g a l i t y ? Not reason, then, nor j u s t i c e , but ' v a l i d i t y ' w i l l determine man's behaviour. Far from r e c o n c i l i n g moral conduct w i t h obedience t o law, consent theory would thus have the i n d i v i d u a l abandon t h a t v e r y f a c u l t y - h i s conscience - i n the e x e r c i s e of which h i s goodness r e s i d e s . The a u t h o r i t y of t h a t conscience i s to y i e l d t o the a u t h o r i t y of law. U l t i m a t e l y , however, the i n d i v i d u a l c o n s c i e n c e i s subordinated not o n l y to law, but a l s o t o the primacy of the ' p u b l i c judgements' c o n t a i n e d i n those laws. By r e n d e r i n g the i n d i v i d u a l c o nscience of no consequence, as i t does, consent theory thus a l t e r s , i n a sense, the e f f e c t i v e l o c u s of moral a u t h o r i t y , p l a c i n g i t i n the c o u r t s or the l e g i s l a t u r e . That i s , even though we may not be bound to accept the p u b l i c judgement as c o r r e c t or as our own, nor are we f r e e , having once consented, to a c t upon our own p r i v a t e judgement. But u l t i m a t e l y i t i s the former p u b l i c judgement t h a t i s expressed i n law which we must comply with. Thus, by our own p a s s i v e obedience t o those law, we f u l f i l l , i n the end, the moral w i l l of o t h e r s ; we seek the good they h o l d v a l u a b l e , and behave the way they t h i n k we ought. To the extent, however, t h a t our behaviour i s guided not by our own moral w i l l , but by the p u b l i c w i l l 94 con t a i n e d i n law, we are i n c a p a b l e o f d e s c r i b i n g o u r s e l v e s as moral men. Thus, i n d e p r i v i n g the i n d i v i d u a l o f the freedom t o a c t ac c o r d i n g t o the d i c t a t e s o f h i s own co n s c i e n c e , consent theory a l s o denies him the freedom t o be good. In p a r t , the problems a s s o c i a t e d with the theory of consent stem from i t s e s s e n t i a l g e n e r a l i t y . In i t s r e f e r e n c e t o the r u l e s d e f i n i n g the p o l i t i c a l system as a whole, t h a t theory seems, i n f a c t , t o completely embrace the s t r i c t l y l e g a l i t a r i a n p e r s p e c t i v e of the S t a t e , and the language and f o r m a l i s t i c l o g i c o f ' c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 1 j u r i s -prudence. In consequence, any ends sought through the p o l i t i c a l process are , f o r the purposes of obedience, sub-o r d i n a t e d t o the f i n a l i t y o f t h a t p r o c e s s . The d i s c u s s i o n of law and obedience t o i t i s a r r e s t e d a t the l e v e l of procedure and concluded by the f a c t o f ' v a l i d i t y ' . The impact of t h i s g e n e r a l i t y upon the i n d i v i d u a l i s t o leav e him unable t o a c t as a r e s p o n s i b l e moral agent, except by w i l l i n g l y obeying a l l laws i n f u l f i l l m e n t o f h i s o r i g i n a l c o n t r a c t . P o t e n t i a l l y , he even ends up wit h a moral o b l i g a t i o n t o commit some a c t t h a t i n conscience he f i n d s immoral. For a l l laws, even the most u n j u s t , become o b l i g a t o r y . But how can we a s s e r t t h a t our 'good man' remains 'as f r e e as b e f o r e ' , when he i s s u b j e c t t o a law t h a t r e q u i r e s 95 him t o a c t i n o p p o s i t i o n t o h i s own moral w i l l ? Our t h e o r i s t s may seek t o minimize the p o s s i b i l i t y o f any such moral dilemma a r i s i n g by imposing p h i l o s o p h i c a l and c o n s t i t u t i o n a l q u a l i f i c a t i o n s upon the nature and purposes of the government t o which men can or do consent. I d e a l l y , the c o n d i t i o n o f i n d i v i d u a l freedom i s t o be maximized i n the very process of government i t s e l f , and i n the order i t secures and the j u s t i c e i t b r i n g s t o the r e l a t i o n s between men. Men are t o be governed not so much by o t h e r men as by law, by a law t h a t i s ' t h e i r ' law, a law t h a t seeks o n l y the common good, which i s ' t h e i r ' good. In t h i s sense, even though the i n d i v i d u a l does not a c t u a l l y make the law h i m s e l f , h i s s u b j e c t i o n t o i t can be re p r e s e n t e d , a g a i n , a s ' s e l f -imposed' - and h i s obedience t o i t can thus be a s s i m i l a t e d w i t h freedom. For the law i s nothing l e s s than a r e f l e c t i o n of what he h i m s e l f would w i l l . I n s o f a r as t h i s i s t r u e , the i n d i v i d u a l c o u l d not s e n s i b l y c l a i m t o s u f f e r any i n j u s t i c e under law, nor be r e q u i r e d by law t o commit what he c o n s i d e r s t o be an i n j u s t i c e a g a i n s t o t h e r s . He can w i l l i n g l y obey without any l o s s of freedom o r moral i n t e g r i t y . To the extent t h a t these arguments d i s s o l v e the p o s s i b i l i t y of any c o n f l i c t between the requirements of law and the d i c t a t e s of the w i l l of the i n d i v i d u a l , t h e r e would not appear t o be any d i f f i c u l t y i n r e c o n c i l i n g government 96 and law w i t h the l i b e r t y e s s e n t i a l t o human goodness. Where th e r e i s no d i s c r e p a n c y between the p u b l i c w i l l c o n t a i n e d i n law and t h a t of the i n d i v i d u a l , obedience to law does not e n t a i l any l o s s of freedom. Where t h i s s i t u a t i o n holds t r u e , however, a theory of p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n would i t s e l f appear to be somewhat unnecessary, o r , a t b e s t , redundant. I t i s not l i k e l y t h a t the i n d i v i d u a l would even ask why he ought t o obey. And any formal statement on h i s duty to obey laws which are, i n f a c t , t r u e r e f l e c t i o n s of h i s own w i l l aiming a t none othe r than the v e r y good t h a t he h i m s e l f seeks, merely t e l l s him t h a t he ought t o do or r e f r a i n from doing t h a t which he a l r e a d y f e e l s o b l i g a t e d t o do, or not do. At the same time, however, a theory of p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n t h a t r e s t s on these p r i n c i p l e s cannot adequately e x p l a i n the duty t o obey where these circumstances do not i n f a c t h o l d t r u e - t h a t i s , where government o b s t r u c t s the r e a l i z a t i o n of freedom and j u s t i c e , or r e q u i r e s the i n d i v i d u a l t o a c t i n o p p o s i t i o n t o h i s own w i l l by having him seek some 'common' good or commit some a c t which i n conscience he r e j e c t s . Nor (so long as the i n d i v i d u a l ' s own judgement i s t o r e t a i n i t s a u t h o r i t y ) does i t e x p l a i n why he should be punished when, i n such an i n s t a n c e , he f a i l s t o obey. For t h a t e x p l a n a t i o n , our theory of p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n seems to be u l t i m a t e l y dependent upon a n o t i o n of consent t h a t i m p l i e s our w i l l i n g submission t o an a u t h o r i t y bound, i n i t s 97 law-making, o n l y by the formal l i m i t s of o f f i c e and procedure. But more i s meant by the q u a l i f i c a t i o n s l i m i t i n g p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y , we would contend, than the d e s c r i p t i v e r u l e s l a i d down i n the formal c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e f i n i t i o n s o f the S t a t e , i t s i n s t i t u t i o n s and t h e i r f u n c t i o n s . They i n c l u d e , r a t h e r , the a b s t r a c t g o a l s and guides i n the l i g h t of which we accept government and c o n s t r u c t i t s i n s t i t u t i o n s . They cannot be f o r g o t t e n once the a c t o f c o n s t r u c t i o n i s completed. To do so i s t o r e p r e s e n t the S t a t e as the achievement of these g o a l s , r a t h e r than as a means t o t h e i r p u r s u i t . Thus, the ' c o n d i t i o n a l ' nature which i s o f t e n a s c r i b e d t o the a c t o f consent (or, c o - i n c i d e n t l y , t o ' l e g i t i m a t e ' a u t h o r i t y ) , and consequently t o one's duty to obey law r e f e r s , we would argue, t o more than the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s s u e s of l e g a l i t y or v a l i d i t y . I t i m p l i e s the r e l e v a n c e of c e r t a i n s u b s t a n t i v e and p u r p o s i v e c r i t e r i a , beyond the f a c t of consent - c r i t e r i a which, i n the 'pure' theory of consent are so a b r u p t l y p r e c l u d e d from c o n s i d e r a t i o n i n the d i s c u s s i o n of l e g i t i m a t e a u t h o r i t y and the duty of obedience. In t h i s r e g a r d , the former theory of c o n d i t i o n a l consent would seem to p r o v i d e more room f o r our 'good man' to e x e r c i s e h i s r a t i o n a l and moral powers of judgement i n determining whether or not a law ought to be obeyed. That, we would suggest, i s to i t s 98 advantage. For where the moral (or immoral) content of law has no r e l e v a n c e t o the duty t o obey i t (as i s the case i n the l a t t e r ' c o n t r a c t of submission'), then i t may e q u a l l y be so t h a t such a theory i s of no r e l e v a n c e t o moral men. Such men may w e l l have doubts, on moral grounds, about whether or not a p a r t i c u l a r law ought t o be obeyed. But a theory of p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n t h a t can t e l l him, i n r e p l y , o n l y t h a t such doubts are of no consequence, f a i l s t o address i t s e l f e i t h e r t o the q u e s t i o n - or to the 'good man'. Assuming our i n d i v i d u a l i s not going t o abandon h i s c o n s c i e n c e , as suggested, such a theory of obedience seems t o o f f e r him v e r y l i t t l e h e l p i n d e c i d i n g what t o a c t u a l l y do (other than t o inform him t h a t he w i l l be punished i f he does disobey the law) . I n s o f a r as we wish t o formulate a theory of p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n t h a t does indeed accommodate, r a t h e r than negate the e t h i c a l i n d i v i d u a l , the theory of ' c o n d i t i o n a l ' consent seems t o o f f e r g r e a t e r p o s s i b i l i t i e s than does the ' c o n t r a c t of submission'. Not o n l y does i t a f f i r m the r e l e v a n c e of i n d i v i d u a l judgement i n the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of one's p o l i t i c a l d u t i e s (which need not be the same as one's l e g a l d u t i e s ) ; but a l s o , the c o n d i t i o n a l acceptance of law -which i m p l i e s t h a t c e r t a i n laws can and ought t o be broken where circumstances and one's own judgement so d i c t a t e - i s i t s e l f much c l o s e r , we would t h i n k , t o our i d e a of a s e l f -99 imposed moral duty, than i s the n o t i o n o f an a b s o l u t e duty t o obey a l l law, no matter how u n j u s t . A theory of p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n t h a t l i m i t s the i n d i v i d u a l o n l y t o w i l l i n g and obedient submission t o a u t h o r i t y cannot r e c o n c i l e c i t i z e n s h i p w i t h moral conduct. But, where the c i t i z e n remains a r a t i o n a l and r e s p o n s i b l e being i n h i s own r i g h t , a b l e to disobey as w e l l as obey law, i n the name o f good c i t i z e n s h i p , then some accommodation between the good man and the good c i t i z e n appears p o s s i b l e . That one's duty t o obey law should be understood as ' c o n d i t i o n a l ' i s , we would a l s o argue, of f u r t h e r and p a r t i c u l a r importance i n the modern S t a t e . That i s , a simple mediaeval f a i t h i n the supremacy of law i s no longer f u l l y a p p r o p r i a t e where one i s r u l e d , not by laws t h a t are 'given', but by laws t h a t are 'made' by men. The circumstances i n which such a b e l i e f was meaningful, no l o n g e r e x i s t . Created and r e p e a l e d a t w i l l i n the l e g i s l a t u r e , law tends now t o be more the product of government than i t s guide; or as Chomsky argues, more "an instrument f o r (government) purposes" than 2 "a p r i n c i p l e t o be upheld". (The same government commonly appeals t o the ' r u l e of law' as a l e g i t i m a c y symbol f o r i t s own d e c i s i o n s and f o r the r u l e s i t enacts i t s e l f . ) But such laws, made by men and r e s t i n g on human power,ought not t o be regarded as a b s o l u t e and supreme i n t h a t mediaeval t r a d i t i o n . To the c o n t r a r y , i t i s p r e c i s e l y t h i s s o r t of law, and the 100 very r i g h t o f o t h e r s t o make i t , t h a t r e q u i r e some j u s t i f i c a t i o n beyond the f a c t of t h e i r e x i s t e n c e ; i t i s p r e c i s e l y t h a t law and t h a t ' a u t h o r i t y ' t h a t ought t o be s u b j e c t t o one's moral and r a t i o n a l s c r u t i n y b e f o r e they are regarded as o b l i g a t o r y . However, the i d e a of a ' c o n d i t i o n a l ' duty of obedience t o law allows f o r the p o s s i b l e e x i s t e n c e of a v a l i d law t o which we not o n l y have no duty o f obedience, but to which we a l s o have a r i g h t of d i s o b e d i e n c e . Such a theory i s c l e a r l y a t odds wi t h our l i f e under the modern S t a t e . Our problem, here, i s t h a t the modern S t a t e , where-i n the c o n d i t i o n a l acceptance of law and the r i g h t o f r e s i s -tance seem e s p e c i a l l y e s s e n t i a l , operates a c c o r d i n g t o the c o n t r a r y p r i n c i p l e t h a t law i s indeed supreme and a b s o l u t e l y b i n d i n g . 3 There i s no law which i s not o b l i g a t o r y . Nor i s t h e r e , under the laws of the modern S t a t e , any r i g h t , moral, c i v i l o r otherwise, t o disobey a v a l i d law. The punishment t h a t s u r e l y f o l l o w s the e x e r c i s e o f such a presumed r i g h t bears t h i s out. T h i s d i s c r e p a n c y between a p o l i t i c a l l y r e c o g n i z e d r i g h t of d i s o b e d i e n c e and the l e g a l r e j e c t i o n o f any such r i g h t a r i s e s , i n p a r t , from the l i m i t e d nature o f the l e g a l or ' c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ' framework of thought - t h a t i s , from the l o g i c a l r e s t r i c t i o n s i n h e r e n t i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s of l e g a l a u t h o r i t y and v a l i d i t y , upon which the S t a t e r e s t s . 101 There i s , f o r example, no such t h i n g , i n law, as c i v i l d i s o b e d i e n c e , or a r i g h t t o i t . (No s p e c i f i c law e i t h e r a l l o w s or p r o h i b i t s i t . ) A l l d i s o b e d i e n c e from the perspec-t i v e o f law, i s c r i m i n a l , and i s t r e a t e d as such. Yet, i n n o n - l e g a l d i s c o u r s e , c i v i l d i s o b e d i e n c e i s o f t e n r e c o g n i z e d as a meaningful a c t i o n , d i s t i n c t from c r i m i n a l i t y , and capable o f p o l i t i c a l and moral j u s t i f i c a t i o n . Along the same l i n e , we w i l l not f i n d the r i g h t t o r e s i s t tyranny r e c o g n i z e d i n law. For the law t o p r o v i d e us, i n f a c t , w i t h such a r i g h t , i t would have t o s p e c i f y f o r us what does o r does not c o n s t i -t u t e tyranny. And such a law, as Bedau t e l l s us, "would be open t o the same c o n t r o v e r s y i t supposedly s e t t l e s " . " * But the f a c t t h a t t h e r e i s no l e g a l r i g h t t o r e s i s t tyranny does not p r o h i b i t the r e c o g n i t i o n o f a moral r i g h t t o do so. These s i t u a t i o n s should a l e r t us t o the l i m i t a t i o n s of l e g a l r e a s o n i n g i n our attempt t o understand the r i g h t of di s o b e d i e n c e . That i s , d i s o b e d i e n c e i s not o n l y a g a i n s t the law. I t i s a l s o o u t s i d e the law. In t h i s r e g a r d i t i s not u n l i k e the o b l i g a t i o n o f obedience. N e i t h e r the duty t o do what one i s l e g a l l y o b l i g e d t o do, nor the r i g h t not t o do what i s l e g a l l y r e q u i r e d o f one d e r i v e from or f i n d t h e i r e x p l a n a t i o n i n l e g a l p r i n c i p l e s . S p e c i f i c a l l y , the r i g h t t o disobey an u n j u s t or immoral law r e s t s on a c l a i m o f l e g i t i m a c y t h a t does not come 102 from law. T h i s i m p l i e s the r e j e c t i o n o f S t a t e law as the o n l y form of law, and the S t a t e as the o n l y source of r i g h t s . I t i m p l i e s the r e j e c t i o n o f l e g a l a c t i o n as the o n l y l e g i t i m a t e form of a c t i o n ; and a l s o , we would argue, a r e j e c t i o n of the l e g a l channels o f d i s s e n t and o p p o s i t i o n t o law as the o n l y l e g i t i m a t e ones open t o the i n d i v i d u a l . (In f a c t , d i s o b e d i e n c e u s u a l l y occurs p r e c i s e l y when d i s s e n t cannot be con t a i n e d w i t h i n the l i m i t s p e r m i t t e d by law; when, as MacFarlane notes, the methods of o p p o s i t i o n l e g i t i m i z e d by the p o l i t i c a l and l e g a l system prove inadequate t o s o l v e the problem t h a t impels the i n d i v i d u a l t o d i s o b e y . 5 ) So long as m o r a l i t y does e x i s t , then, as a l e g i t i m a t e system of thought, and i s a l s o independent of the St a t e (to which our c o n s t i t u t i o n a l t h e o r i s t s g i v e a s s e n t ) ; and so long as our assent t o and p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the p o l i t i c a l system i s not an a b d i c a t i o n o f m o r a l i t y , we would appear t o have a m o r a l l y l e g i t i m a t e r i g h t t o disobey immoral laws. Locke reminds us, however, of one important f a c t . That i s , w h i l e we have the r i g h t (to r e s i s t ) , we w i l l " s u r e l y l o s e " . In otherwords, we w i l l be punished f o r our di s o b e d i e n c e , d e s p i t e our moral j u s t i f i c a t i o n s . In f a c t , upon d i s o b e y i n g , we w i l l f i n d o u r s e l v e s b e f o r e a c o u r t t h a t w i l l not, and indeed, cannot address i t s e l f t o the moral nature of our a c t i o n . They 103 w i l l ask o n l y whether we d i d or d i d not break a v a l i d law. And punishment w i l l f o l l o w depending on the answer t o t h a t ' l e g a l ' q u e s t i o n alone. But, the l o g i c a l c o - e x i s t e n c e of a moral r i g h t t o disobey and the l e g a l r e j e c t i o n o f t h a t r i g h t does not i n i t s e l f p r o v i d e us wit h an e x p l a n a t i o n of t h i s f a c t u a l supremacy of the l a t t e r p r i n c i p l e over the former. How i s i t t h a t we are unable t o o b j e c t , i n moral terms, t o our l e g a l o b l i g a t i o n t o obey; whereas, an a c t of di s o b e d i e n c e t h a t r e s t s on moral grounds can be s u b j e c t e d t o l e g a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , and i n f a c t , concluded upon a l e g a l note? The l e g i t i m a c y o f t h i s f a c t u a l monopoly of l e g a l r a t i o n a l i t y over moral, i n a p a r t i c u l a r case o f d i s o b e d i e n c e , depends we would argue, on the e x i s t e n c e of some common ground between our l e g a l and our moral p r i n c i p l e s , from which, o r upon which the supremacy of the l a t t e r can be e s t a b l i s h e d . Prosch would l o c a t e t h a t 'common ground' i n the a c t of di s o b e d i e n c e i t s e l f . He adheres t o a not unpopular b e l i e f t h a t p a r t o f being a ' c o n s c i e n t i o u s o b j e c t o r ' i s the w i l l i n g n e s s t o accept punishment f o r one's d i s o b e d i e n c e . But t h i s d e s c r i p t i o n of the c o n s c i e n t i o u s o b j e c t o r , a p a r t from being somewhat a r b i t r a r y (and f a r from s e l f -104 e v i d e n t ) , i t s e l f d i s p l a y s a r a t h e r w i l l i n g (and, we would t h i n k , unwarranted) acceptance of the supremacy and f i n a l i t y o f law. Indeed, Prosch does not r e a l l y d e f i n e the r e l a t i o n -s h i p between the moral r i g h t t o disobey and the r i g h t of government t o punish the d i s o b e d i e n t . Nor does he demonstrate the supremacy of the l e g a l p o s i t i o n . He simply y i e l d s , some-what unexpectedly, t o the l e g a l f a c t t h a t t h e r e i s no r i g h t to disobey. T h i s tendency t o favour l e g a l p r i n c i p l e s i s perhaps more e v i d e n t i n h i s a s s e r t i o n t h a t the w i l l i n g acceptance o f punishment, which i s t o be the t r u e mark of the c o n s c i e n t i o u s o b j e c t o r , i s i t s e l f a r e c o g n i t i o n o f the f a c t t h a t we do not have the r i g h t t o disobey. (Unless we accept t h i s c l a i m as a p u r e l y ' l e g a l ' one - and not a moral d e n i a l of such a r i g h t - such a stance would make c o n s c i e n t i o u s d i s o b e d i e n c e n o n - s e n s i c a l . ) By r e q u i r i n g the d i s o b e d i e n t t o w i l l i n g l y accept punishment, we might a r r i v e , perhaps, a t a n o t i o n of c i v i l o r c o n s c i e n t i o u s d i s o b e d i e n c e which c o u l d be accommodated by the l i m i t s of s t r i c t l e g a l thought. By the l e g a l d e f i n i t i o n of such d i s o b e d i e n c e i s not the f i n a l word. Indeed, as w i t h the d i s c r e p a n c y between what the c o u r t s c o n s i d e r r e l e v a n t when we do disobey ( v a l i d i t y ) and what i s r e l e v a n t i n our a c t u a l d e c i s i o n t o disobey ( m o r a l i t y ) , t h e r e may be, a t t e n d i n g the f u r t h e r q u e s t i o n of punishment, s i m i l a r d i s p a r a t e c o n s i d e r a -t i o n s . That i s , punishment may be the l e g a l consequence of 105 d i s o b e d i e n c e ; but the acceptance of punishment i s not n e c e s s a r i l y an e t h i c a l r e q u i s i t e of d i s o b e d i e n c e t h a t occurs f o r moral reasons. For, when we disobey on moral grounds, we are u l t i m a t e l y s a y i n g t h a t i t i s wrong t o comply wi t h the p a r t i c u l a r d i r e c t i v e a t hand. But, i n s a y i n g t h a t i t i s wrong t o obey t h a t law, we are a l s o s a y i n g , i n a sense, t h a t t h a t law should not e x i s t . And i f we b e l i e v e t h a t the law should not e x i s t , we might a l s o argue t h a t the punishment should not e x i s t e i t h e r . In o t h e r words, the punishment i s no more ac c e p t a b l e than the law. I f we s t a y , then, w i t h i n the moral framework which o r i g i n a l l y i n s p i r e d our d i s o b e d i e n c e , we might a r r i v e a t a c o n c l u s i o n about punishment c o n t r a r y t o t h a t c o n t a i n e d i n the formal language o f l e g a l r i g h t and o b l i g a t i o n . But t h a t c o n c l u s i o n i s not n e c e s s a r i l y f a l s e . And, i n the absence of any obvious reason f o r suddenly jumping from t h a t s e t of moral r e f e r e n c e s (as does Prosch) t o the l e g a l p o s i t i o n when i t comes t o the q u e s t i o n of punishment, t h a t c o n c l u s i o n may even be l o g i c a l l y more c o n s i s t e n t w i t h our a c t of d i s o b e d i e n c e . As Power suggests, not to r e s i s t punishment may w e l l " d i s c r e d i t the l o g i c of d i s o b e d i e n c e " . We would suggest even f u r t h e r t h a t , not t o r e s i s t punishment may a l s o d i s c r e d i t the l o g i c of our theory of p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n . For the r i g h t of punishment depends 106 on the existence of a duty of obedience. But our theory of 'conditional' consent, although i t does imply a moral duty to obey law, also implies the absence of such a duty where the law f a i l s to s a t i s f y c e r t a i n moral (and non-legal) conditions. This i s better expressed, perhaps, by Locke when he argues that resistence to an unjust exercise of p o l i t i c a l power or to laws that contravene fundamental moral p r i n c i p l e s i s not r e a l l y disobedience at a l l . For such authority i s 9 not t r u l y legitimate, and such laws are not t r u l y laws. I t i s t h i s b e l i e f , that 'law' i s more than just a v a l i d rule enacted by the proper aut h o r i t i e s , that enable Locke to af f i r m the r i g h t to " r e s i s t " c e r t a i n unjust laws by denying the existence of a l e g a l obligation to obey them. Our notion of conditional consent does e s t a b l i s h , then, a connection between the moral r i g h t of disobedience and the l e g a l r e j e c t i o n of that r i g h t . But the rela t i o n s h i p i s a l i n e a r one. In other words, they do not represent c o n f l i c t i n g moral and l e g a l p r i n c i p l e s , one of which must y i e l d to the other. Instead, we either have a duty to obey, or (under cert a i n circumstances) we do not. And where the duty of obedience does not e x i s t , the r i g h t of disobedience does. But, i f there i s no duty to obey, nor i s there a r i g h t to punish those who do not obey. Unfortunately, our demand that law s a t i s f y more than the ru l e of v a l i d i t y before i t can claim f u l l authority 107 does not get us very f a r i n the modern S t a t e where laws are laws, and hence o b l i g a t o r y , no matter how u n j u s t ; and where punishment i s imposed on the moral r e s i s t o r , d e s p i t e h i s moral r i g h t t o disobey. Indeed, i n our d e a l i n g s w i t h t h a t S t a t e , our moral o b l i g a t i o n s seem t o be i m p o s s i b l e t o j u s t i f y , and our l e g a l o b l i g a t i o n s appear t o be i n need of no j u s t i f i -c a t i o n . At l e a s t , we cannot f i n d , i n our theory of p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n , an e x p l a n a t i o n f o r the compulsoriness of a l l those l e g a l d i r e c t i v e s , o r f o r the r i g h t of government t o p u n i s h a l l r e s i s t o r s , i n c l u d i n g the ' c o n s c i e n t i o u s ' . Apart from the q u e s t i o n o f whether we need obey laws which o f f e n d the p r i n c i p l e s and purposes u n d e r l y i n g our consent t o government, we must a l s o c o n f r o n t the assumption of c o m p a t i b i l i t y between the p u b l i c realm o f c i t i z e n s h i p and the p r i v a t e realm of the i n d i v i d u a l and the 'good man'; between p u b l i c v a l u e s and p r i v a t e ; and between the good of the community which i s the end of government and the l i b e r t y , d i g n i t y and happiness of the i n d i v i d u a l . Indeed, the p u b l i c and p r i v a t e realms appear t o operate a c c o r d i n g t o q u i t e d i f f e r e n t e t h i c a l codes - the former c e n t e r i n g around the r i g h t s and needs of the community, the l a t t e r around the r i g h t s and needs of the i n d i v i d u a l . B e r l i n , who pursues j u s t such a theme i n h i s a n a l y s i s of M a c h i a v e l l i , suggests t h a t , w h i l e these two 108 moral systems are not autonomous, nor are they n e c e s s a r i l y continuous ( p u b l i c v a l u e s as a means t o the r e a l i z a t i o n o f p r i v a t e v a l u e s ) . They a r e , i n f a c t , p o t e n t i a l l y c o n f l i c t i n g s y s t e m s . ^ And the problem of whether or not t o obey a p a r t i c u l a r law o f t e n i n v o l v e s l e s s a c l a s h o f judgement about a p a r t i c u l a r 'good', than a c o n f l i c t between these two e t h i c a l systems - between what i s good and j u s t i n the p u b l i c realm, and what i s good and j u s t f o r the i n d i v i d u a l i n h i s p r i v a t e l i f e . In t h i s l i g h t , the gap between the law-abiding c i t i z e n and the i n d i v i d u a l who abides by h i s co n s c i e n c e appears t o be a c o n f l i c t between two d i f f e r e n t moral systems, r a t h e r than a c o n f l i c t between c i t i z e n s h i p and m o r a l i t y . Rousseau, when he d e p r i v e s the i n d i v i d u a l o f any r i g h t s a g a i n s t the community and subordinates h i s needs t o the ' o v e r - r i d i n g c l a i m o f the community' seems to r e c o g n i z e the d i f f i c u l t y i n r e c o n c i l i n g the t w o . 1 1 Noting the problems t h a t might occur should some d e c i s i o n have t o be made between the r i g h t s o f the i n d i v i d u a l and those of the community, Rousseau simply chooses the m o r a l i t y of c i t i z e n s h i p and the p u b l i c realm. For the p u b l i c 'good' i s , a f t e r a l l , much more g e n e r a l and i m p a r t i a l than i s the ' p a r t i a l ' and p a r t i c u l a r good which i n d i v i d u a l s seek. 109 C o n t r a r y to Rousseau, however, we would suggest t h a t the p u b l i c good i s not 'higher' than, but of a d i f f e r e n t 12 o r d e r from the p a r t i c u l a r good of i n d i v i d u a l s . In o t h e r words, i t i s not a l l t h a t c l e a r t h a t the freedom t h a t w i l l be secured f o r the community by d e s t r o y i n g a p o l i t i c a l enemy i s of g r e a t e r moral v a l u e than the l o s s of d i g n i t y and moral i n t e g r i t y , and even the l i f e , of the i n d i v i d u a l who must go i n t o the b a t t l e i n o p p o s i t i o n t o the d i c t a t e s of h i s c o n s c i e n c e . Nor i s i t any c l e a r e r why the r i g h t o f the c o u r t to r e q u i r e testimony i n i t s p u r s u i t of j u s t i c e and s e c u r i t y f o r the community i s a m o r a l l y s u p e r i o r c l a i m than the r i g h t of the witness to h i s own s e c u r i t y from the p e r s o n a l danger he might expose h i m s e l f t o by t e s t i f y i n g . B e r l i n c r e d i t s h i s s u b j e c t , M a c h i a v e l l i , w i t h having unmasked these k i n d s of " a g o n i z i n g c h o i c e s " t h a t must sometimes be made, c h o i c e s betwen p u b l i c and p r i v a t e l i f e t h a t are l o g i c a l l y i n c o m p a t i b l e . We must c o n f r o n t , he suggests, ...the p o s s i b i l i t y of more than one system of v a l u e s , with no c r i t e r i o n common to the systems whereby a r a t i o n -a l c h o i c e may be made between them. 13 Mr. B e r l i n ' s g e n e r a l c o n c l u s i o n i s q u i t e r e l e v a n t to our narrower q u e s t i o n of obedience t o law: grave doubts a r i s e about any attempt to formulate a theory i n terms of a ' f i n a l ' s o l u t i o n . Is i t , then, worthwhile t r y i n g t o 110 e s t a b l i s h a f i n a l a ccord between the good man and the good c i t i z e n ? Whatever one concludes about t h a t q u e s t i o n , i t seems d i f f i c u l t t o deny the paradoxes i n v o l v e d , both i n our theory and i n our every day l i v e s , between the two realms. E q u a l l y d i f f i c u l t t o i g n o r e i s the very r e a l supremacy o f p u b l i c p r i n c i p l e s over p r i v a t e , u l t i m a t e l y expressed i n the r i g h t o f punishment possessed by the S t a t e . In e f f e c t , the S t a t e , i n e x e r c i s i n g t h a t r i g h t operates as though a f i n a l s o l u t i o n has been found. Whether t h a t r i g h t d e r i v e s from our 'consent' or from some oth e r j u s t i f i c a t i o n , i t r e p r e s e n t s , we would argue, l e s s o f an u l t i m a t e accommodation between the p u b l i c and p r i v a t e spheres, or between the good c i t i z e n and the good man, than an a n n i h i l a t i o n o f the l a t t e r . I l l FOOTNOTES I n t r o d u c t i o n (pp.1 _ 4) 1. R i c h a r d Wasserstrom, "Disobeying the Law", J o u r n a l  of P h i l o s o p h y , 58:21 (October, 1961), P. 647. 2. T.D. Weldon, S t a t e s and M o r a l s , p. 266. 3. G e r a i n t P a r r y , " I n d i v i d u a l i t y , P o l i t i c s and the C r i t i q u e of P a t e r n a l i s m i n John Locke", P o l i t i c a l S t u d i e s , 12:2 (June, 1964), p. 169. Chapter One (pp.5 - 23) 1. K a r l W. Deutsch, The Nerves of Government, pp. 131-2. 2. Joseph Tussman, O b l i g a t i o n and the Body P o l i t i c , p. 52. 3. Jean Jacque Rousseau, "The S o c i a l C o n t r a c t " , i n S o c i a l  C o n t r a c t , S i r E r n e s t Barker, ed., p. 36. 4. John Locke, "Second T r e a t i s e on C i v i l Government", i n S o c i a l C o n t r a c t , S i r E r n e s t Barker, ed., p. 137. 5. C h a r l e s Werner, "Good and O b l i g a t i o n " , E t h i c s , 77:2 (January, 1967), p. 137. 6. David S p i t z , "Democracy and the Problem of C i v i l D isobedience", American P o l i t i c a l S c i e nce Review, 48:2 (June, 1954), p. 393. 7. J.P. Plamenatz, Consent, Freedom and P o l i t i c a l  O b l i g a t i o n , p. 100. 8. Werner, i n h i s a n a l y s i s of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the ' p e r c e p t i o n of good' and the d o c t r i n e of o b l i g a t i o n goes somewhat f u r t h e r than do Benn & P e t e r s . Given the need f o r the moral a c t o r to h i m s e l f r e c o g n i z e the good t o be pursued, he suggests t h a t the d o c t r i n e of o b l i g a t i o n i s s u p e r f l u o u s to the s i t u a t i o n . We s h a l l o u r s e l v e s pursue t h i s l i n e of argument i n l a t e r chapters w i t h r e s p e c t t o the theory of p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n . Op. c i t . , pp. 135-8. 9. S t a n l e y I Benn & R.S. P e t e r s , The P r i n c i p l e s of  P o l i t i c a l Thought, p. 389. 10. Rousseau, op. c i t . , p. 175. 112 11. I b i d . , p. 180. 12. Samuel M. Thompson, "The A u t h o r i t y of Law", E t h i c s , 75:1 (October, 1964), pp. 20-21. 13. S p i t z , op. c i t . , p. 392. 14. David Mars, "The F e d e r a l Government and P r o t e s t " , Annals, 382 (March, 1969), p. 122. 15. Thomas Hobbes, L e v i a t h a n , M i c h a e l Oakshott, ed., p. 255. 16. I b i d . , p. 48-9. 17. Rousseau, op. c i t . , p. 186. 18. Weldon, op. c i t . , p. 130. 19. H.A. Bedau, "On C i v i l Disobedience", J o u r n a l o f  Philosophy, 58:21 (October, 1961), p. 662. 20. Thompson, Loc. c i t . 21. Hanna P i t k i n , " O b l i g a t i o n and Consent - P a r t I I " , American P o l i t i c a l S cience Review, 60:1 (March, 1966), pp. 39-40. 22. A.P. D'Entreves, The N o t i o n of the S t a t e , p. 4. 23. I b i d . , p. 147. 113 Chapter Two (pp. 24 - 53) 1. S p i t z , op. c i t . , p. 395. 2. Thomas McPherson, P o l i t i c a l O b l i g a t i o n , pp. 61-2. 3. Rousseau, op. c i t . , p. 203. 4. Hobbes, op. c i t . , p. 126. 5. Benn & P e t e r s , op. c i t . , p. 23. 6. C.W. C a s s i n e l l i , " P o l i t i c a l A u t h o r i t y : I t s E x e r c i s e and P o s s e s s i o n " / W e s t e r n P o l i t i c a l Q u a r t e r l y , 14:3 (September, 1961), p. 640. 7. John Day, " A u t h o r i t y " , P o l i t i c a l S t u d i e s , 11:3 (October, 1963) , p. 268. 8. I b i d . , p. 257. 9. I b i d . , p. 269. 10. B l a i r Campbell, " P r e s c r i p t i o n and D e s c r i p t i o n i n P o l i t i c a l Thought: The Case f o r Hobbes", American P o l i t i c a l Science Revlew, 65:2 (June, 1971), p. 386. Campbell a l s o notes how a d e v a l u a t i o n of moral t h i n k i n g i s e s s e n t i a l to Hobbes 1 d e s i r e t o deny man any grounds whatsoever by which he might j u s t i f y h i s r e s i s t e n c e t o a law. 11. Bedau, l o c . c i t . 12. S p i t z , op; c i t . , p. 393. 13. Hannah Arendt, On R e v o l u t i o n , p. 268. 14. J.W. Gough, The S o c i a l C o n t r a c t , p. 88. 15. Campbell t r a c e s how t h i s moral and r a t i o n a l dependence of the i n d i v i d u a l upon p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y o c c u r s i n Hobbes, op. c i t . , pp. 380-388. 16. Tussman, op. c i t . , p. 5. 17. Locke, op. c i t . , p. 15. 18. Weldon, op. c i t . , p. 268. 19. Tussman, op. c i t . , p. 128. 20. P i t k i n , " O b l i g a t i o n - I I " , op. c i t . , pp. 46-7. 114 21. D.D. Raphael, " O b l i g a t i o n and R i g h t s i n Hobbes", Phi l o s o p h y , 37:147 (October, 1962), p. 351. 22. Hannah P i t k i n , i n her a n a l y s i s of ' a u t h o r i z a t i o n ' i n Hobbes, draws our a t t e n t i o n to the incompleteness and hence the l i m i t e d value of h i s l o g i c a l d e r i v a t i o n of the concept of ' p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n ' from t h a t of 'authorized p o l i t i c a l power.' A u t h o r i t y , she m a i n t a i n s , means more than 'that which has been a u t h o r i z e d ' . The a u t h o r i z a t i o n o f power occurs i n some co n t e x t , or another, and thus i m p l i e s not merely the power to a c t , but the power to a c t i n 'a c e r t a i n manner' and towards c e r t a i n ends. Hobbes, she argues, pres e n t s us w i t h an o v e r l y narrow p e r s p e c t i v e on a u t h o r i t y which, by v i r t u e of i t s l a c k of substance, tends to be r a t h e r s t e r i l e and o f not much re l e v a n c e to men ' h e a v i l y i n f l u e n c e d by v a l u e s ' . See "Hobbes' Concept of R e p r e s e n t a t i o n " , American P o l i t i c a l Science Review, P a r t s I & I I , 58:2 (June, 1964) pp. 328-340; 58:4 (December, 1964), pp. 902-918. 23. Leo S t r a u s s , N a t u r a l Right and H i s t o r y , P. 186. 24. McPherson, op. c i t . , p. 25. 25. A p r i l C a r t e r , The P o l i t i c a l T h e o r i e s of Anarchism, p. 102. 26. Hanna P i t k i n , " O b l i g a t i o n and Consent - P a r t I " , American  P o l i t i c a l S c i e nce Review, 59:4 (December, 1965), p. 996. 27. Benn & P e t e r s , op. c i t . , p. 385. 28. Gough draws our a t t e n t i o n to these two t r a d i t i o n a l r o l e s p l a y e d by 'consent' i n p o l i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y , op. c i t . , p. 89. 29. Hobbes, op. c i t . , p. 247. 30. M a r t i n S e l i g e r , "Locke's Theory of R e v o l u t i o n a r y A c t i o n " , Western P o l i t i c a l Q u a r t e r l y , 16:63 (September, 1963), p. 550. 31. P. R i l e y , "A P o s s i b l e E x t e n s i o n of Rousseau's General W i l l " , American P o l i t i c a l Science Review, 64:1 (March, 1970), p. 89. 32. Weldon, op. c i t . , p. 279. 33. Benn & P e t e r s , op. c i t . , p. 175. 34. The cause o f t h i s s i t u a t i o n i s the f a c t t h a t , as c i t i z e n s , our p o l i t i c a l duty o f obedience i s t r a n s l a t a b l e d i r e c t l y i n t o our l e g a l o b l i g a t i o n s . That i s , when we break a s p e c i f i c law, we are a l s o b r e a k i n g our p o l i t i c a l duty. However, th e r e are no s p e c i f i c laws (that can be broken so as to r e s u l t i n punishment) i n t o which the p o l i t i c a l d u t i e s of the r u l e r can be t r a n s l a t e d . Thus he i s not bound by law, t o f u l f i l l h i s d u t i e s , as we are -115 t h a t i s , by the f o r c e behind i t . John D i c k i n s o n takes a stance, not u n l i k e our "accountable o n l y to God" argument, when he suggests t h a t the obedience o f our r u l e r s t o t h e i r p o l i t i c a l d u t i e s i s more a matter o f reason, m o r a l i t y and custom, than a matter o f s t r i c t l y l e g a l obedience. "A Working Theory of Sov e r e i g n t y " , P o l i t i c a l S c i e nce Q u a r t e r l y , 43 (1928), pp. 62-3. 116 Chapter Three (pp. 54 - 89) 1. A.P. D'Entreves, "Obeying Whom?", P o l i t i c a l S t u d i e s , 13:1 (February, 1965), p. 4. 2. P i t k i n , " O b l i g a t i o n - I I " , op. c i t . , p. 48. 3. S p i t z , op. c i t . , p. 399. 4. By f o c u s i n g on s e l f - p r o t e c t i o n , we n e g l e c t what i s l i k e l y to be a more f r u i t f u l approach i n the attempt to connect ' p r o t e c t i o n ' and the duty o f obedience - t h a t i s , the m u t u a l i t y of l i b e r t i e s secured and r e s t r i c t i o n s imposed. However, the d e r i v a t i o n o f the o b l i g a t o r i n e s s of laws from t h e i r m u t u a l i t y (which would seem to have more to do w i t h a f f e c t i o n f o r and t r u s t o f one's f e l l o w man than w i t h the need f o r p r o t e c t i o n from him) d i v e r t s us from the p r e s e n t i s s u e of s e c u r i t y as an end of l e g a l i t y and the source of our duty to obey. Nor i s the n o t i o n o f m u t u a l i t y i t s e l f f r e e from d i f f i c u l t y . Do men have a duty to obey o p p r e s s i v e o r u n j u s t laws, simply because they are a l l e q u a l l y oppressed? C e r t a i n l y the f a c t t h a t they are mutually oppressed does not a l t e r the f a c t t h a t they are not f r e e . 5. S t u a r t M. Brown J r . , "Duty and the P r o d u c t i o n of Good", P h i l o s o p h i c a l Review, 61 (1962), p. 299. 6. R i c h a r d Wollheim, "Democracy", P o l i t i c a l Thought Since  World War I I , W.J. S t a n k i e w i c z , ed., p. 121. 7. Hobbes, op. c i t . , pp. 122-3. 8. Locke, op. c i t . , p. 132. 9. S p i t z , op. c i t . , p. 393. 10. James Madison, "No. 51", F e d e r a l i s t Papers, p . 324. 11. the On the whole, the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t o r d e r i s a achievement of freedom and j u s t i c e appears to p r e - c o n d i t i o n us to be m i s l e a d i n g . Given the f a c t t h a t they do not always e x i s t wherever order e x i s t s , the more p e r t i n e n t i s s u e would seem t o be whether or not freedom and j u s t i c e are c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ( r a t h e r than the r e s u l t s ) of an e x i s t i n g o r d e r . 12. S. de G r a z i a , "What A u t h o r i t y i s Not", American P o l i t i c a l  S c i e n ce Review, 53:2 (June, 1959), p. 329. 13. George Sa b i n e , ' A ' H i s t o r y of P o l i t i c a l Theory, p. 732. 117 14. Neal Riemer, The R e v i v a l of Democratic Theory, p. 69 15. Hobbes, op. c i t . , p. 131. 16. Locke, op. c i t . , p. 76. 17. Bernard Bosanquet on Rousseau, T h e ; P h i l o s o p h i c a l Theory  of the S t a t e , p. 102. 18. Rousseau, l o c . c i t . 19. I b i d . , p. 196. 20. Stephen Lukes, "Durkheim's ' I n d i v i d u a l i s m and the I n t e l l e c t u a l s ' " , P o l i t i c a l S t u d i e s , 17:1 (March, 1969), p. 14. 21. Rousseau, op. c i t . , p . 273. 22. I b i d . , p. 190. 23. P i t k i n , " O b l i g a t i o n - I I " , op. c i t . , p. 50. 24. B e r t r a n d de Jouvenal, On Power, p. 318. 25. Benn and Peter s would l i k e t o use the n o t i o n of the common good i n j u s t such a cont e x t , wherein competing i n t e r e s t s v i e f o r s e r v i c e . In f a c t , they suggest t h a t the common good i s not so much a s p e c i f i c good t h a t ought t o be pursued, as the o b j e c t i v e manner i n which competing goods are looked i t . I t i s a way of making moral d e c i s i o n s . To say t h a t the S t a t e should seek i t (the common good) i s t o say o n l y t h a t p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n s should a t t e n d t o the i n t e r e s t s o f i t s members i n a s p i r i t of i m p a r t i a l i t y . (op. c i t . , p. 273.) The argument - t h a t the S t a t e should seek the common good, and men obey i n i t s name, even though t h e r e i s no common good -s t r i k e s us as being r a t h e r p e c u l i a r , and ve r y m i s l e a d i n g . The common good becomes a l e g i t i m a c y symbol f o r any r a t i o n a l , i m p a r t i a l d e c i s i o n - even d e c i s i o n s t h a t i n v o l v e o n l y p a r t i a l i n t e r e s t s . B r i a n Barry has, I t h i n k d i s c o v e r e d the c o n f u s i o n u n d e r l y i n g the argument. I t i s a c o n f u s i o n of concepts. Where a d e c i s i o n must be made between c o n f l i c t i n g i n t e r e s t s , where the i n t e r e s t s of some must be s a c r i f i c e d or compromised f o r the sake of other i n t e r e s t s , the 'common' good i s not ve r y a p p r o p r i a t e . We may t a l k about J u s t i c e i n t h i s i n s t a n c e , argues Barry, but not about the common good. See B r i a n Barry, " J u s t i c e and the Common Good", P o l i t i c a l P h i losophy, Anthony Quinton, ed., p. 189-192. 118 26. A r t h u r E. Murphy, "Simon's Philosophy of Democratic Government", P h i l o s o p h i c a l Review, 61 (1952), p. 210. 27. Hobbes, op. c i t . , p. 164-5. 28. Bosanquet, op. c i t . . , p. 71. 29. Locke, op. c i t . , p. 57. 30. Tussman, op. c i t . , p. 55. 31. Hobbes, too, r e v e r t s t o the ' a u t h o r i t y ' o f the S t a t e t o judge what laws are e s s e n t i a l t o i t s purposes, and t o thereby j u s t i f y the r i g h t of the S t a t e to punish the i n d i v i d u a l who, even i n the i n t e r e s t of s e l f - p r o t e c t i o n , e x e r c i s e s , on h i s own judgement, the r i g h t he has t o d i s o b e y . T h i s co-e x i s t e n c e of a duty t o obey (or be punished) and a r i g h t t o disobey depends upon a r a d i c a l s e p a r a t i o n of one's consent, and the reasons f o r which one consents. Where these i n t e n t i o n s , and consent i t s e l f are c o n s i d e r e d together t o be one a c t (as i n P i t k i n , where consent ' a u t o m a t i c a l l y ' f o l l o w s from the nature of government and law) t h i s o v e r l a p does not n e c e s s a r i l y happen. That i s , where government ceases to be of the s o r t t h a t 'one ought to consent t o (that one ought to obey), then the duty to obey would not e x i s t , and the r i g h t to disobey would come i n t o f o r c e . The i n d i v i d u a l , i n Hobbes, f i n d s h i m s e l f i n a much more un f o r t u n a t e p o s i t i o n of having t o choose between two o b l i g a t i o n s - he cannot a c t upon both. But Hobbes does not o f f e r any c o n n e c t i o n between these two o b l i g a t i o n s , nor any grounds upon which to choose. Nor does he e x p l a i n why the duty of man not t o a c t upon h i s own judgement should over-r i d e , (as i t f i n a l l y does, w i t h punishment) h i s r i g h t t o disobey on the b a s i s of h i s own p r i v a t e judgement. That punishment does e f f e c t i v e l y serve to deny any s i g n i f i c a n c e to such a r i g h t of d i s o b e d i e n c e . 32. C a r t e r , op. c i t . , p. 87. 33. Noam Chomsky, "The Case f o r C i v i l Disobedience", New York Review of Books, 16:11 (June 17, 1971) 34. John H. Schaar, "Some Ways of T h i n k i n g About E q u a l i t y " , J o u r n a l of P o l i t i c s , 26:4 (November, 1964), pp. 885-91. 35. D'Entreves, The S t a t e , p. 226. 36. Schaar, op. c i t . , p. 891. 37. C a r t e r , l o c . c i t . 38. Weldon, op. c i t . , p. 273. 119 FOOTNOTES (pp.111 - 119) 1. Campbell, op; c i t . , p. 380. 2. Chomsky, op. c i t . , p. 27. 3. P a r a d o x i c a l l y , a t the same time t h a t the S t a t e embraces a s o r t o f mediaeval b e l i e f i n the supremacy of law, i t r e j e c t s as i r r e l e v a n t t h a t aspect (or concept) of law t h a t made such a b e l i e f s e n s i b l e - t h a t i s , the v a l u e or p r i n c i p l e expressed i n law and from which the mediaeval law d e r i v e d i t s a u t h o r i t y . Now, a l l ' v a l i d ' laws are represented as 'supreme' and a b s o l u t e l y b i n d i n g . But the q u e s t i o n of ' v a l i d i t y ' , the modern i n d i c a t o r of a law's a u t h o r i t y , would be meaningless i n the context of mediaeval laws, which had no source t o which a u t h o r i t y might be a t t r i b u t e d . 4. Bedau, op. c i t . , p. 663. 5. L . J . MacFarlane, "Disobedience and the Bomb", P o l i t i c a l  Q u a r t e r l y , 37: (October-December, 1966), p. 374. 6. Locke, op. c i t . , p. 121. 7. Harry Prosch, "Towards an E t h i c s o f C i v i l Disobedience", E t h i c s , 77:3 ( A p r i l , 1967), p. 180. 8. Paul F. Power, "On C i v i l Disobedience i n Recent American Thought", American P o l i t i c a l S c i e nce Review, 64:1 (March, 1970), p. 40. 9. Locke, l o c . c i t . 10. I s a i a h B e r l i n , " M a c h i a v e l l i " , New York Review of Books, 17:7 (November 4, 1971), p. 23. 11. Rousseau, op. c i t . , p. 181. 12. Cahn's argument t h a t the d i s t i n c t i o n between the i n d i v i d u a l and the S t a t e i s not p h y s i c a l (scope and power) but b i o l o g i c a l (time and f u n c t i o n ) p r o v i d e s an i n t e r e s t i n g b a s i s upon which t o c h a l l e n g e Rousseau's f a i t h i n the g e n e r a l i t y and impersonalism o f the 'common' good as i n d i c a t o r s of i t s o b j e c t i v i t y or moral s u p e r i o r i t y . Edmund Cahn, The Predicament  o f Modern Democratic Man, pp. 21-22. 13. B e r l i n , op. c i t . , p. 30. 120 BIBLIOGRAPHY BOOKS Arendt, Hannah, On R e v o l u t i o n , New York, V i k i n g P r e s s , c. 1963. Barry, B r i a n , e t a l , i n P o l i t i c a l P h i losophy, Anthony Quinton, ed., London, Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1967. Benn, S t a n e l y I . , and R.S. P e t e r s , The P r i n c i p l e s o f P o l i t i c a l  Thought, New York, F r e s s Press^ (c. 1959), 1965. Bosanquet, Bernard, The P h i l o s o p h i c a l Theory of the S t a t e , London, MacMillan and Co., (c.1899), 1965. Cahn, Edmund, The Predicament of Modern Democratic Man, New York, D e l l P u b l i s h i n g Co., 1961. C a r t e r , A p r i l , The P o l i t i c a l T h e o r i e s of Anarchism, New York, Harper and Row, 1971. Deutsch, K a r l W., The Nerves o f Government, New York, Free P r e s s , c. 1963. d'Entreves, Alexander P a s s e r i n , The N o t i o n of the S t a t e , Oxford, Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1963. Gough, J.W., The S o c i a l C o n t r a c t , London, Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1957. Green, T.H., The P o l i t i c a l Theory o f T.H. Green, John R. Rodman, ed., New York, A p p l e t o n - C e n t u r y - C r o f t s , c. 1964. Grimes, A l a n P., "The Pragmatic Course of L i b e r a l i s m " , i n P o l i t i c a l Thought Since World War I I , W.J. S t a n k i e w i c z , ed., London, Free Press of Glencoe, 1964. Hamilton, Alexander, James Madison, John Jay, The F e d e r a l i s t Papers, C l i n t o n R o s s i t e r , ed., New York, The New American L i b r a r y , c. 1961. Hart, H.L.A., The Concept of Law, Oxford, The Clarendon P r e s s , c. 1961. Hobbes, Thomas, L e v i a t h a n , M i c h a e l Oakshott, ed., New York, C o l l i e r Booka, 1963. Hume, David, "Of the O r i g i n a l C o n t r a c t " , i n Social C o n t r a c t , S i r E r n e s t Barker, ed., New York, Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1962. 121 de Jouvenal, B e r t r a n d , The Pure Theory of P o l i t i c s , New Haven, Ya l e U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1963. L i n d s a y , A.D., The Modern Democratic S t a t e , New York, Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1943. Locke, John, "Second T r e a t i s e on C i v i l Government", i n S o c i a l C o n t r a c t , S i r E r n e s t Barker, ed., New York, Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1962. Macfarlane, L e s l i e J . , P o l i t i c a l D i sobedience, London, M a c m i l l i o n Press L t d . , 1971. McPherson, Thomas, P o l i t i c a l O b l i g a t i o n , London, Routledge and Kegan P a u l , 1967. Plamenatz, J.P., Consent, Freedom and P o l i t i c a l O b l i g a t i o n , London, Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , c. 1968. Riemer, Ne a l , The R e v i v a l o f Democratic Theory, New York, App1eton-Century-Crofts, 1962. Rousseau, Jean Jacque, "The S o c i a l C o n t r a c t " , i n S o c i a l  C o n t r a c t , S i r E r n e s t Barker, ed., New York, Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 19 62. Sabine, George H., A H i s t o r y o f P o l i t i c a l Theory, New York, H o l t , R i n e h a r t and Winston, (c. 1937), 1968. S t r a u s s , Leo, N a t u r a l R i g h t and H i s t o r y , Chicago, U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago P r e s s , 1953. Tussman, Joseph, O b l i g a t i o n and the Body P o l i t i c , New York, Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1960. Weldon, T.D., S t a t e s and Morals, London, John Murray L t d . , 1946. Wollheim, R i c h a r d , "Democracy", i n P o l i t i c a l Theory Since World War I I , W.J. S t a n k i e w i c z , ed., London, Free Press of Glencoe, 1964. JOURNAL ARTICLES Ake, Claude, " P o l i t i c a l O b l i g a t i o n and P o l i t i c a l D i s c o n t e n t " , Canadian J o u r n a l of P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e , 2:2 (June, 1969), 245-255. Bay, C h r i s t i a n , "Needs, Wants, and P o l i t i c a l L e g i t i m a c y " , Canadian J o u r n a l of P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e , 1:3 (September, 1968), 241-260. 122 Bedau, Hugo A., "On C i v i l D isobedience", J o u r n a l of Philosophy, 58:21 (October, 1961), 653-665. B e r l i n , I s a i a h , " M a c h i a v e l l i " , New York Review of Books, 17:7 (November 4, 1971), 20-32. Brown, S t u a r t M. J r . , "Duty and the P r o d u c t i o n o f Good", P h i l o s o p h i c a l Review, 61 (1962), 299-311. Campbell, B l a i r , " P r e s c r i p t i o n and D e s c r i p t i o n i n P o l i t i c a l Theory: The Case f o r Hobbes", American P o l i t i c a l S c i e nce  Review, 65:2 (June, 1971), 376-3WI C a s s i n e l l i , C.W., " P o l i t i c a l A u t h o r i t y : I t s E x e r c i s e and Po s s e s s i o n " , Western P o l i t i c a l Q u a r t e r l y , 14:3 (September, 1961) , 635-646": Chomsky, Noam, "The Case f o r C i v i l Disobedience", New York  Review o f Books> 16:11 (June 17, 1971), 19-28. Day. John, " A u t h o r i t y " , P o l i t i c a l S t u d i e s , 11:3, (October, 1963) , 257-271. D i c k i n s o n , John, "A Working Theory of Sov e r e i g n t y " , P o l i t i c a l  S c ience Q u a r t e r l y , 43 (1928), 32-63. d'Entreves, Alexander P a s s e r i n , "Obeying Whom?", P o l i t i c a l  S t u d i e s , 13:1 (February, 1965), 1-15. de G r a z i a , S., "What A u t h o r i t y i s Not", American P o l i t i c a l  S c ience Review, 53:2 (June, 1959), 321-331. Lukes, Stephen, "Durkeim's ' I n d i v i d u a l i s m and the I n t e l l e c t u a l s " , P o l i t i c a l S t u d i e s , 17:1 (March, 1969), 14-30. Macfarlane, L e s l i e J . , "Disobedience and the Bomb", P o l i t i c a l  Q u a r t e r l y , 37:4 (October-December, 1966), 366 - 3 7 T T , " P o l i t i c a l O b l i g a t i o n and the P o l i t i c a l System", P o l i t i c a l S t u d i e s , 16:3 (October, 1968), 335-364. Mars, David, "The F e d e r a l Government and P r o t e s t " , Annals, 382 (March, 1969), 120-130. 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' ' ' ' , " O b l i g a t i o n and Consent - P a r t I I " , American P o l i t i c a l  S c i e n ce Review, 60:1 (March, 1966), 39-52. Power, Paul F., "On C i v i l Disobedience i n Recent American Thought", American P o l i t i c a l S c i e nce Review, 64:1 (March, 1970), 35-VT. Prosch, Harry, " L i m i t s to the Moral Claim i n C i v i l Disobedience", E t h i c s , 75:2 (January, 1965), 103-111. , "Towards an E t h i c o f C i v i l Disobedience", E t h i c s , 77:3 T A p r i l , 1967), 176-191. Raphael, D.D., " O b l i g a t i o n and Righ t s i n Hobbes", Ph i l o s o p h y , 37:142 (October, 1962), 345-352. R i l e y , P., "A P o s s i b l e E x p l a n a t i o n o f Rousseau's General W i l l " , American P o l i t i c a l S c i e nce Review, 64:1 (March, 1970), 86-97. Schaar, John H., "Some Ways of T h i n k i n g about E q u a l i t y " , J o u r n a l  of P o l i t i c s , 26:4 (November, 1964), 867-895. S e l i g e r , M a r t i n , "Locke's Theory o f R e v o l u t i o n a r y A c t i o n " , Western P o l i t i c a l Q u a r t e r l y , 16:3 (September, 1963), 548-568. S p i t z , David, "Democracy and the Problem o f C i v i l Disobedience", American P o l i t i c a l Science Review, 48:2 (June, 1954), 386-403. Thompson, Samuel M., "The A u t h o r i t y o f Law", E t h i c s , 75:1 (October, 1964), 16-24. Walzer, M i c h a e l , "The O b l i g a t i o n to Disobey", E t h i c s , 77:3 ( A p r i l , 1967), 163-175. Warrender, Howard, " O b l i g a t i o n and Righ t s i n Hobbes", Phi l o s o p h y , 37:142 (October, 1962), 352-357. Wasserstrom, R i c h a r d , "Disobeying the Law", J o u r n a l o P h i l o s o p h y , 58:21 (October, 1961), 641-653. Werner, C h a r l e s , "Good and O b l i g a t i o n " , E t h i c s , 77:2 (January, 1967), 135-138. 

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