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UBC Theses and Dissertations

Student's attribution of success and self-perception of abilities in the teacher-student interaction Cartwright, Johanna S 1973

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STUDENT'S ATTRIBUTION OF SUCCESS AND SELF-PERCEPTION OF ABILITIES IN THE TEACHER-STUDENT INTERACTION by JOHANNA S. CARTWRIGHT B.A., University of Bri t i s h Columbia, 1970 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n the Department of Psychology We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Apr i l , 1973 In p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s in p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f the r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r an advanced degree at the U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a , I ag r ee tha t the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e and s t u d y . I f u r t h e r ag ree t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e c o p y i n g o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y p u r p o s e s may be g r a n t e d by the Head o f my Department o r by h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . It i s u n d e r s t o o d tha t c o p y i n g o r p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l not be a l l o w e d w i t h o u t my w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . Johanna S. C a r t w r l g h t Department o f P s y c h o l o g y  The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Co lumb ia Vancouve r 8, Canada Date March 2 6 , 1973 A b s t r a c t S e v a r a l a t u d l e a p r a a a n t e v i d e n c e w h i c h a u p p o r t a t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t tra i n f a r o u r a t t i t u d e s a n d I n t e r n a l s t a t e s f m o b s e r v a t i o n o f o a r o v e r t b e h a v i o u r a n d t h a t t h e s e i n f e r e n c e s a r e v a c a t e d t o d i f f e r e n t i a l knowladga o r a t t r i b u t i o n s a b o u t t h a r e a s o n s f o r t h e b e h a v i o u r * f h i a p r o p o s i t i o n wut o x a s i n a d i n t h e teacher* s t u d e n t i n t e r a c t i o n f*©» t h a s t u d e n t s p o i n t o f v i e w , s i x t y aub~ j e o t s partioi|»tad i a a learning e x p e r i e n c e * H a l f t h a s u b j e c t s ware t a u g h t b y a ao c a l l e d o x p a r t teaohar ( h i g h - a x p e r i ) a n d t h e remitting h a l f were t a u g h t b y a f a l l o w a t u d a n t ( l o w - e x p e r t ) . A l l s u b j e c t s r e c e i v e d aueceas feed-fcaok a f t e r t h e teaching p e r i o d * I t was e x p e c t e d t h a t s u b j e c t s i n t h a M g h * e x p e r t c o n d i t i o n v o u l d a t -t r i b u t e s u c c e s s t o t h e teaohar aora- t h a n Sa i n t h a l o w - e x p e r t group* I n a d d i t i o n i t was p r e d i c t e d t h a t s u b j e c t s i n t h a h i g h - a x p a r t g r o u p would e x p e c t t o d o p o o r e r o n a s e c o n d l a a r n i n g teak w i t h o u t t h a h e l p o f t h e t e a o h a r , t h a n a f t b j e e t a i n t h a low-aagsert group* The r e s u l t e i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h a e x p e r i m e n t a l Kanipolation was s u c c e s s f u l i n p r o -d u c i n g d i f f e r e n t i a l p e r c e p t i o n o f teaohar e x p e r t i s e * f h a two hy-p o t h e s e s , however, wera n o t c o n f i r m e d b y t h a d a t a * S e v e r a l p o i n t e o f s i e t h o d o l o g i o a l a n d t f e e o r o t i o a l n a t u r a ware r a i s e d * w h i c h e u g g s e t p o s s i b l e f u t u r e avenues o f r e s e a r c h i n t h a a r e a o f a t t r i b u t i o n i n a o o i a l i n t e r a c t i o n * l i TABLE OP CONTENTS CHAPTER Page I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 II. Experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 (a) Subjects (b) Apparatus and Materials (c) Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . 12 III. Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 IV. Discussion * . 22 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 APPENDICES Appendix I. Wechsler Intelligence Seal© for Children Test Form . . . . . . . . 3 4 Appendix II. Attribution Questionnaire . . . . 35 Appendix III.Post-Experimental Questionnaire.. 38 Appendix IV. Prediction of Success Form . . . . 39 i i i LIST OF TABLES Page Table 1 Perceived teacher expertise scores and expectation about performance on the mental maze for high-expert and low-expert conditions • . . . . « . « 20 Table 2 Mean ratings and S.D. of subject's attribution of success i n low and high-expert conditions . < , . . . . 21 Table 3 Prediction of success on a second learning task i n low and high-expert groups . . * . . . . . . . 22 Aoknowledge&ents I would l i k e to express vsy appreciation to Dr, Donald Dutton and Dr, Tom storm for their advice and helpful guidance i n the preparation of this thesis* I also thank Dr, Ottfried Spreen, former Chalwaan of the Psycholo^r Departatont, at the University of Victoria, and the Superintendent of Sooke school District for their kind co-operation, as well as the principal and the teachers of the school Involved, Introduction The present study t*as designed to exawine the student's perception of ths> causes of successful **>rforrnnco after having par-ticipated l a a loamis^ situation and tfe® «ay those explanations ore related to th© student1© perception of his own a b i l i t y . The question deals with whether the student attributes success to i n t r i n s i c factors such as his own a b i l i t y , e f f o r t and concentration expended daring Isamirjr or to external variables such as th® teacher's perceived «?cperiisa during the to-aching situation. An additional interest i s the student*© differential inferences about his a b i l i t i e s dspandins? on whether the causas for success are psrcslvswi to be internal to the student or «%t»rnal* the problem of perception of internal vs. external causation was ajsai3ir>©d i n & study by Daviaoa and Valine (19&9)« Their fladings suegoet that on teSivid«al*s beliefs and attitudes are closely related to tho typo of oxplamtions which he applies to his behaviour* In this experiment a l l subjects underwent a pain threshold and shook tolerance tsst* than they inchested a dru.£ (actually a placebo) and repeated the shock tests with the intensities surreptitiously halvsd. A l l subjeots thus feslieved that the drug had ©hanged their performance subsequently half of the subject® wars told that the drug was really a placebo* Sub-jects i n this l a t t e r grow who thus attributed their Increased shook toleranea to theasslvea perceived shocks i n a third test as less painful 2 and tolerated more shocks than subjects who attributed their behaviour change to the drug. In other words, subjects had the same knowledge about their actual behaviour on the second series, but differing know-ledge about the reasons for that behaviour. Drug subjects would assume the behaviour had an extrinsic origin, implying nothing about their actual a b i l i t y to withstand shock. Placebo subjects would assume the behaviour had a more personal origin reflecting a new a b i l i t y to with-stand shock which led to increased a b i l i t y to withstand shock on a third shock series. Studies carried out within the cognitive dissonance frame-work can be reinterpreted i n the l i g h t of the kind of reasons which the subjects can give to account for their behaviour. Usually i n these studies subjects are subtly coerced into making a counterattitudinal statement (Festinger and Carlsmlth 1959* Brehm and Cohen 1962, Brock, 1962) and i t was consistently found that greater attitude change occurred when subjects appeared to be performing the new behaviour (counter-attitudinal statements) out of their own free w i l l . When subjects believed their behaviour was under the control of external contingencies, such as monetary reward, the experimenter's request, etc... attitude change was less marked than under the previously mentioned conditions. Again, i n these studies subjects performed the same behaviour but they had different reasons to account for their behaviour, which resulted i n differential change of attitude. 3 Attribution theory i s relevant to the problem of per-ception of causation because i t deals with the causal interpretations an individual applies to his own behaviour as well as to other people*s behaviour. This theory evolved from Heider's (1958) work with his book "The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations". The author described the processes and rules which govern a person*s attribution of causes for the behavioural effects around him. In a recent paper Nisbett and Vallns (1971) examine the causal interpretations that the individual applies to himself, using Bern's (19&7) proposition as an unifying theme. Bern has proposed that Individuals come to "know" their own attitudes, emotions and other internal states, pa r t i a l l y by inferring them from observations of their own overt behaviour and/or the circumstances i n which this behaviour occurs. Bern stated that, to the extent that i n -ternal cues are weak, amblgious or uninterpretable the individual i s functionally i n the same position as an outside observer, an observer who must necessarily rely upon those external cues to infer the i n d i -vidual* s inner states* A study by Bandler, Madaras and Bern (1968) provides evidence for Bern's self-perception hypothesis, i . e . , that we get to know our internal states by Inferring them from observations of our own overt behaviour* The authors found that subjects rated shocks as significantly more uncomfortable when they escaped them than when they endured them. Presumably escape from shock indicated that the shook i s strong and painful and needs to be escaped, whereas i f the subjects endured shock they might have inferred that the pain was 4 not strong enough to terminate i t . However, subjects had to perceive that they had some choice i n the matter. When subjects were made to either endure or escape the shock, they did not infer pain from escape behaviour and absence of pain from no-escape behaviour* This quali-fication leads to an important questionj When w i l l individuals infer their Internal states from observations made about their overt behaviour, and when w i l l they assume that their overt behaviour does not Indicate anything significant about their internal state? Nisbett and Valins (1971) attempted to define the type of situations i n which an individual w i l l use his own overt behaviour to make inferences about his Internal state. According to the authors people seem to infer their beliefs from their behaviour only when they have good reasons to believe that their behaviour toward a stimulus i s produced primarily by their feelings about the stimulus, which the authors c a l l "stimulus attribution 1'. A belief inference related to the behaviour w i l l not take place when the person has reasons to believe that his behaviour toward the stimulus was produced i n large part by circumstantial factors extrinsic to the stimulus, this would result i n "circumstance attribution". The distinction between stimulus and circumstance a t t r i -bution i s not equivalent to Kelley's (1967) "internal-external" dimension which i s concerned with the causal role of the person vs. the causal role of the environment. Circumstance and stimulus attributions deal 5 with the allocation of causes between various aspects of the environ-ment, being thus an expansion of Kelley's external category. For example, the shock i s a constant stimulus across both conditions i n the Davison and Valins study. In one of the conditions (informed placebo condition) subjects attributed their behaviour toward the shock stimulus, to their reactions to the shock I t s e l f , while i n the other condition (uninformed placebo condition) behaviour was attributed to the particular circumstance under which they were exposed to the shock, that i s to the effects of a drug which i s supposed to increase tolerance to shook. Both causes are "external" but i t made a difference which external, situational factor was perceived as causal. So far evidence was presented which supports the propo-si t i o n that we infer our attitudes from our overt behaviour and that these Inferences are related to differential knowledge or attributions about the reasons for the behaviour* I t i s f e l t that the foregoing discussion Is relevant to the teaching situation i n which one person, the teacher, attempts to produce change i n another person, the student. In this situation both the teacher and the student can search for explanations which might account for any improvement or lack of improvement i n the student's performance. The teacher can attribute improvement to his own teaching a b i l i t y or to the student's a b i l i t y to learn* The student i n turn can attribute improvement to his own a b i l i t y or to the teacher's a b i l i t y to teach. 6 Several studies deal with attribution of causality i n the teaching situation, but a l l of them fooussed on the teacher's a t t r i -bution. Ross, Bierbrauer and Polly (1971) conducted a study i n which professional teachers and college students attempted to teach an 11 year old boy the spelling of commonly misspelled words. Participants tended to rate "teacher factors" as being more important i n success than i n failure conditions* This pattern of attribution was con-siderably more pronounced for professional teachers than for college students* I t i s possible that the results of this study are partly explained by the fact that teachers did not receive information on the i n i t i a l level of a b i l i t y of the student. I f the teacher believed that the student's i n i t i a l l e v e l of a b i l i t i e s was high then fcfe might have been more l i k e l y to attribute student's failure to himself. Schopler and Layton (1972) examined teacher's attributions for I n i t i a l low a b i l i t y and high a b i l i t y students. They used a situation of inter-personal influence and found that teachers rated themselves as more influe n t i a l when a high-ability target failed than when he succeeded, and more Influence was attributed when a low a b i l i t y target person succeeded than when he failed. These studies indicate that the student level of success as well as his i n i t i a l level of a b i l i t i e s affect the teacher's perception of the degree of influence he had over the student performance* No studies were found which deal with the student's per-ception of causality i n the teaching situation. 7 The present study deals with the student's perception of causes of his performance and with the student's beliefs about his a b i l i t i e s , i.e., w i l l the student make inferences about his internal state of a b i l i t i e s based On his successful performance? I t was mentioned earlier that according to Nlsbett and Vallns (1971) a person w i l l infer his internal state from observation of his overt behaviour when he has made a stimulus attribution* No belief inference w i l l take place i f the subject makes a circumstance attribution. I f one analyzes the teacher-student relationship one could say that the l a t t e r i s exposed to two sets of stimuli. F i r s t there i s the learning material and second there i s the teacher. The student could attribute his successful per-formance to his i n t r i n s i c reaction to the learning material, i.e., his a b i l i t y to understand the material, or to the circumstantial stimulus which i s the teacher and the way i n which he presents the learning material. I f the student perceives his performance as having been caused by the teacher's expert teaching techniques rather than by his own a b i l i t y to cope with the learning material, then he might not infer that the performance reflects his internal a b i l i t y . The problem was analyzed i n a learning situation where the subject learned a mental maze which required him to remember a sequence of numbers* The experimental design contained two levels of teacher expertise, low-expert and high-expert. In the low-expert situation one student taught another student the task. In the high-8 expert condition the experimenter taught the task* The experimenter conveyed to the subject that she was an expert i n behaviour modification. She told him that she knew exactly how to manipulate reward and punish-ment contingencies to produce maximum learning. In order to control for the subjects' i n i t i a l expectation about their performance on the mental maze they were given a short test before learning the mental maze. This test was supposed to provide a base-rate from which im-provement was going to be evaluated, and a l l subjects were told that their performance was below average. After that, subjects learned the mental maze and a l l were told that their performance was above average. Then half of the subjects i n each group were asked to answer a question-naire which investigated their explanations for their performance on the mental maze. The remaining subjeots i n each group were asked to estimate how well they thought they would perform without the help of the teacher on a task which depended on the same type of s k i l l s which were required to learn the mental maze. After their estimate the subjects worked on the second task. Information about the subject's attribution about success on the mental maze and estimate about future performance data were collected from two separate groups of subjects because they might have become suspicious of the purpose of the experiment after having answered the attribution questionnaire. I f this was the case then i t would have been d i f f i c u l t to determine whether the subject's prediction of future success was a result of having answered the questionnaire or 9 a result of the learning experience. The hypotheses investigated i n the present study are as follows I 1 ) that the high-expert condition would be more conducive to external, teacher attributions, than the low-expert situation. Three reasons could be given i f this prediction was not supported by the experimental data, (a) The manipulation was not credible to the subjects and they did not believe that the instructor was an expert i n behaviour modifi-cation. In order to control for this possibility a post-experimental questionnaire was given to the subjects which inquired about the impres-sions of the instructor's expertise, (b) The pre-experimental mani-pulation was not successful i n making subjects believe they would not perform well on the mental maze. If this was the case then the subject would not need to search for an explanation for his successful performance because he f e l t he had the a b i l i t y to do well on this task to begin with. For this reason subjeots were asked after the learning situation how well they had expected to perform on the mental maze. Also subjects were given a fourth alternative explanation on the attribution question-naire, which required them to state how good they f e l t they were at this type of task, (c) Finally, i t could be possible that the expert instructor i s not perceived as an external controlling contingency i n this type of learning situation. Rather, the instructor could be perceived by the student as a source of information, and whether this information was presented i n an expert or non-expert manner i s irrelevant to the 10 learning process* To obtain information about this point, subjects were asked to give reasons to explain their performance on the mental maze* before they rated the k alternative explanations presented by the experimenter* 2) That subjects i n the high-expert condition would expect to do poorer on a second related learning task without the help of the teacher, than subjects i n the low-expert group. This prediction was based on the assumption that subjects i n the high-expert condition would attribute their success to the teacher. This would preclude the subject from making inferences about his a b i l i t i e s based on observation of his overt behaviour, i . e . , success performance. If he now has to perform i n a similar situation, but without the help of the Instructor he should predict that he w i l l do worse than i n the f i r s t situation. Experiment Subjects. 60 Subjects (Ss), from two different types of student populations participated i n the study, (University students and grade 12 High School students). 33 Ss were male and female students attending Summer School at the University of Victoria, B r i t i s h Columbia, They were taking courses i n various fields suoh as Geography, History, English and Mathematics, The remaining 27 Ss were male and female grade 12 students from Belmont Senior Secondary School i n Sooke, Brit i s h Columbia. Apparatus and Materials. A learning apparatus similar to the one used by Lykken (1955) was employed. I t consisted of a black 18" x 16" x 11" wooden eabinet. The panel which faced the student S displayed 4 switches numbered 1 to 4 and a red and white p i l o t l i g h t above each switch. The back panel of the cabinet had 4 lights which indicated to the teacher which switch the _S had depressed and 8 switches which were connected to the p i l o t lights on the student S*s panel. The "Digit Symbol" subtest of Wechsler's Adult Intelligence Scale was used for the second learning task. (See Appendix I ) . 12 Procedure, Learning phaset Ss were randomly assigned to the 2 experi-mental conditionst Group I (high-expert instructor) and Group II (low-expert instructor), In Group I (n=30) Ss were informed that the experi-menter (E) was an expert In behaviour modification techniques and that she was going to teach a task. The instructions were approximately li k e the followingt "This i s a learning experiment, and you w i l l have to learn a task. In this study I am interested i n finding out how effective behaviour modification techniques are i n helping people to learn. Now, before we continue, do you know what I mean by behaviour modification techniques?" (If subjects answered yes, they were told that the definition was going to be reviewed very b r i e f l y ) , "Behaviour modification technique refers to a method of teaching which has been investigated i n Psychology. Researchers have been interested i n finding out what goes on when people learn and they have found that learning takes place by systematic and speoifiable rules* Behaviour modification techniques take advantage of these rules i n producing optimal conditions for learning* We produce the best conditions for learning by varying reward and punishment i n certain ways. In this study you w i l l have to learn a task which i s called a mental maze* I have studied this maze very carefully and have taught i t to many people. I have found that I can help people learn this task by changing the length of these red and white lights 13 i n a certain way. Now I ' l l explain the task to you, but before we go on, do you have any questions so far?" In Group II (low-expert) one S taught another S the mental maze, A coin was tossed to assign the Ss to either the teacher or the student role. Instructions were worded more or less l i k e the followingt "This i s a learning experiment and one of you w i l l have to teach the other person. In this study I am interested i n finding out how effective behaviour modification techniques are i n helping people to learn. (At this point Ss received an explanation about behaviour modification tech-niques which was similar to the one given i n Group I ) . Now, i n this study you w i l l have to learn a mental maze and you w i l l use this appa-ratus here. Before I go on to explaining the mental maze, do you have any questions so far?" Following this introduction the E explained the mental maze to the S. Instructions for the high-expert group were as followst "This apparatus here i s called a mental maze. This mental maze has ten positionsf these are the positions you have to keep i n your mind and that's why i t i s called a mental maze. Each of these 10 positions contains one of these k numbers which you can see above the switches. For example, the f i r s t position could contain #3, the second position #1, the third position #4 and so on (The E drew a diagram to explain the mental maze). I have made up a sequence similar to this one and I 14 your task i s to find out which number goes i n each position. You do this by pressing any of these 4 switches. Ok, now you pressed that switch. Let's suppose i t was the wrong number. In this case I give you a red l i g h t , the red l i g h t means that your response was wrong. Now try the number for the second position. You pressed that number, let's assume that i t was correct. Now you get a white l i g h t , this means you made the right response and i t ' s l i k e a symbolic reward. Now you know that this number i s i n the second position, and whenever you come to the second position you w i l l press that switch. You go on doing this for each of the 10 positions and we w i l l go through the same sequence 12 times or un t i l you have learned i t , whichever comes f i r s t . At f i r s t you w i l l be guessing, but the second time through you have to try and remember which number belongs to each position. Do you have any questions?" For Group II the instructions were the same as for Group I, with the exception of the directions which were given to the teacher-S. "Your task i s to l e t him/her know whether he/she made a correct or incorrect choice. These switches here w i l l turn the red lights on and these the white lights. I want you to vary the length of these light8 to help him/her learn. Just use your intuition and keep the lights on longer or shorter i n a way than you think w i l l help him/her learn. Here i s the l i s t of numbers which he/she has to learn and 15 you just make a mark on the sheet which t e l l s i f the response was right or wrong. Do you have any questions?" Base-rate measurementt Following the instructions about the mental maze a l l student-Ss participated i n short test of "memory for numbers". This test was supposed to give the E a base rate from which she could evaluate the S's improvement. The instructions were approximately as followst "Before we go ahead with the learning task we need to know how good you are at remembering numbers, so that we can see how much you have improved on the mental maze. We w i l l do the following, I w i l l present to you a sequence of 15 digits containing the numbers from 1 to 4, over the white lights on the panel of the mental maze. I want you to watch very carefully and after I have presented the 15 numbers you have fco try and reproduce the sequence as well as you can using these switches. You probably won't remember a l l the numbers the f i r s t time around, but Just try your best. Then I ' l l present the sequence to you again and you'll have to reproduce i t again with the switches. After the second t r i a l I w i l l count how many numbers you got correct and this w i l l give us the base-rate. Do you have any questions before we begin?" After the instructions the E presented the 15 digits at the rate of one number per second. After the second presentation E 16 counted how many correct choices the S had made and rated his per-formance on a seven point scale. A l l Ss were told that compared to a group of people who done this test, their performance was below average. The E presented the S with a seven point scale printed on a sheet of paper and saldt "If we were to grade your performance on this seven point scale where "1" i s poor, "4" i s average and "7" i s excellent! compared to a group of people who have done this task your performance was below average and i t would be about a "2". The E made a cross on #2 of the scale, and then she b r i e f l y explained the mental maze again* "Now I w i l l teach you the mental maze. Remember, the mental maze has 10 positions and each position has one of the numbers from 1 to k, A red l i g h t means you made a mistake, a white l i g h t means that you were right. I w i l l change the length of the lights to help you learn (Group I ) . You change the lights to try and help him/her learn (Group II) " . The student S was taught the task by the E (Group I) or by the teacher-^ (Group II), The sequence of correct numbers was determined In a random manner but was held constant over t r i a l s and for a l l Ss. A l l Ss understood the nature of the task and were able to get at least 6 correct answers on the 12th t r i a l . 17 Feed-back on Performance} After completion of the learning task a l l Ss were told that their performance was above average. They were presented with a 7 point scale and their performance was rated at number 6. Attribution of success» Following the feed-back on per-formance half of the Ss i n each group answered a questionnaire i n which they had to rate statements on a 7 point scale as to how much they f e l t that reason explained their performance on the mental maze. The statements represented different explanations which could have accounted for their successful performance on the mental maze. They made reference to personal and external causation as well as to chance elements and past experience. The questionnaire also contained other questions to investigate the S's perception of the teacher and of the experiment (See Questionnaire, Appendix II). Prediction of successi The remaining 15 Ss i n eaoh Group I and Group II who did not answer the attribution questionnaire were told that they would have to participate i n one more short learning task, which was described to them i n the following way i "Now you w i l l have to participate i n one more short learning task which depends on the same a b i l i t i e s which you applied i n learning the mental maze. I t i s more or less described on this sheet here. Xou see, here at the top we have the positions again, but now we have 9 18 instead of 10, Each of these positions has a different symbol instead of a number as before, Down here we have the numbers from 1 to 9 again, but the symbols are missing. You have to f i l l i n the symbols which belong to each number. I w i l l give you 30 seconds to study the numbers and the symbols and then I w i l l give you 90 seconds to f i l l i n the symbols. F i l l them i n , i n the given order, don't skip any numbers. You w i l l be able to look at the top row whilst you are working, but because this i s a speed test, the more symbols you remember the less you have to look up and the better you w i l l do. Do you have any ques-tions about this task?" Following these instructions Ss were handed a sheet of paper with printed instructions and normative data for the learning task. The instructions were as followsi "The scale at the bottom of this sheet gives you some idea of how many symbols have to be f i l l e d i n to obtain an average score, below average score and above average score. Please examine the scale very carefully and then make a mark on the 7 point scale according to how well you think you w i l l do on this task" (See Appendix III). After j> made his estimate of how well he thought he would do, he was given 30 seconds to study the numbers and the symbols, Then he was given 90 seconds to work on the task. Following completion of the task he was asked to f i l l i n a questionnaire which inquired into his perception of the two learning tasks (See Appendix IV). A l l Ss were debriefed about the study at the end of the experiment* Results Verification of experimental manipulationt The mean ratings and S.D. for the Ss* expectation of success on the mental maze i n both experimental groups are presented i n table I. As expected Ss rated the teacher i n the high-expert condition as significantly more expert than they rated the teacher i n the low-expert group (t»9.37» d.f.= 28 p<.005). In addition, Ss i n both high and low-expert groups expected to perform below average on the mental maze. The difference between the average expectation scores was non-significant, (ts ,103, d.f•= 28) Table I, Perceived teacher expertise scores* and expectation about performance on the mental maze for high-expert and low-expert conditions. Low Expert (n=>15) High Expert (n=15) How expert did the instructor x 3.2U 6,33 appear to you? S.D. 1.32 0,61 How well did you expect to do on the x 3.13 3.26 mental maze after the i n i t i a l test? S.D. 1.18 1.27 * where highest rating;* 7 Attribution of causalityt The mean ratings and S.D. for the k attribution alternatives for low and high-expert Ss are presented i n table 2. I t was hypothesized that Ss i n the low-expert group would 21 attribute success to their own effort to a significantly greater extent than $s i n the high-expert group. The null hypothesis of no difference between means was tested. No significant differences were found between self-attribution ratings of high-expert and low-expert Ss, (t= .1?, d,f,« 28, n.s.) Table 2. Mean ratings and S.D. of subject's attribution of success i n low and high-expert conditions. High-Expert Low-Expert 1, I have always been good at X 3.53 3.73 this type of task. S.D. 1.45 1.27 2. I put a l o t of effort and concentration into learning X 5.3 5.13 the mental maze. S.D. 1.11 1.06 3. The instructor taught me the task very well and X 3.9 5.8 timed the reward so that S.D. 1.89 1.08 I could learn better. 4. I was just lucky to get x 3.36 3.2 the right answer. S.D. 1.54 1.52 A second hypothesis predicted that the high-expert Ss would rate the teacher's influence on their successful perfor-mance as greater than Ss i n the low-expert group. This hypothesis, however, was not confirmed (ts= 1.19, d.f .= 28, n.s.) 22 No significant differences between groups were observed i n the Ss' perception of chance as cause for their performance (t= ,101, d.f.= 28, n,s.) The difference between groups of Ss' ratings to the statement "I have always been good at this type of task" was found to be non-significant (t= ,14, d.f, 28, n.s.) Expectation of future successt I t was predicted that _Ss i n the low-expert condition would expect to perform better on the second task thaft Ss i n the high-expert group. The mean prediction of success scores and the S.D. are presented i n table 3* The results did not support this prediction. (t= ,1376, d.f.e 28, n.s.). Table 3. Prediction of success on a second task i n low and high-expert groups. Low-Expert High-Expert Prediction of success x 4,433 4.33 S.D. 0.6629 0.8193 Discussion The objective of this study was to examine the student' perception of internal vs. external control of his behaviour and i t relation to self-perception of a b i l i t i e s i n the teaching situation. I t was hypothesized that Ss i n the low-expert group would attribute success to their own effort to a greater extent than Ss i n the high-expert group, and that high-expert Ss would rate the teacher's i n -fluence on their performance as greater than Ss i n the low-expert group. (Hypothesis I) In addition i t was predicted that Ss i n the low-expert condition would expect to perform better on the second task than Ss i n the high-expert group. (Hypothesis II) The results indicate that the experimental manipulation was successful i n producing the desired effects on perception of teacher's expertise. Ss did believe that the instructor i n one condition was more expert than the instructor i n the second con-dition. In addition, a l l Ss expected to perform below average on the f i r s t learning task, thus starting with comparable expectation levels about success. The two hypotheses, however, were not supported by the data. The di f f e r e n t i a l perception of teacher's expertise did not result i n the predicted differences i n the student's perception of causes for their performance. Ss i n the high-expert condition did 2k not rate tho teacher's contribution AO more important than Sa In the low-expert group. In addition no differences i n attribution to self tiara observed between both groups. ¥ith regard to tha second hypothesis i t was found that tha Sa 1 perception of their own a b i l i t y did not d i f f e r significantly from tha low-expert to the high-expert condition* Sub-jects i n both groups tended to converge on the average range of the seven point auceeea-failura rating scale* The lack of support for the second hypothesis i s not sur-prising i n view of i t s being contingent upon the f i r s t hypothesis* I t was expected that Ss would make differential inferences about their a b i l i t i e e depending on whether they perceived the cause of their per-formance to be internal or external* However, as no differences i n attribution were obtained, the basis for tha second prediction was absent* The results suggest that the manipulation of perceived teacher expertise did not differentially succeed i n changing the Ss* perception of their own a b i l i t i e s . I t was also observed that Ss tended to Interpret the request to estimate their future success i n different ways* Most of them seemed to be reluctant to evaluate themselves* I t also was observed that Ss interpreted the request i n a more general sense, as i f they ware aaked "How intelligent do you think you are?" (Sows comments made by Ss which i l l u s t r a t e this point were, for examplet "1 have alwaya been an average etudent, ao I guess, I ' l l be average**t "Do you want to know i f I'm on an ego-trip?"t "Ok, I ' l l be conceited and rate myself 25 above average*") I t i s possible that sons of these d i f f i c u l t ! * ! night have bean reduced i f Ss had been told that the purpose of the estimate was to see how accurately they could predict their sueoese rather than to see how able or intelligent they thought they vara, this approach might be helpful i n self-perception studies which require th« £ to sales an evaluative statement about himself* The f i r s t hypothesis was formulated on the basis of ex» ternal contingency manipulations, i * e * , degree of teacher expertise, but this mnipulation did not succeed i n producing the predicted attributional differences* One of KeHey's (1971) assumptions about attrlbutlen of causality i s f e l t to be related to the f i r s t hypothesis and i t ' s outcome. According to Kelleyt "Attribution processes are to be understood not only as a Keens of providing the i n d i -vidual with a veridical view of hie world, but as a raeans for encouraging and main* taining his effective exerelse of control In that w o r l d , H i s latent goal In gaining knowledge i s that of effective management of himself and bis environment* Be i s not a pare scientist, but an applied one," (p.22) I f one accepts Seller's notion of the person as an applied scientist then the results of the present study could be viewed i n a different l i g h t * I f the individual needs to control his environ* ssent he needs to leant about i t * Increasing knowledge and Increasing s k i l l would widen the Individual's scope of control* In the present 26 study Ss might cot have attributed suoeess to the isanlpulatione of the expert teacher mere than to themselves because this Mould imply that they would lose control i n similar eireumataneee unless the taaoher was present* However* even though this i s a plausible explanation i t l a only speculative alnee i t i s not known how irapor-tent i n terms of "future control" the learning aituation waa to the Sa* toae, Eierbrauer and Polly (1971) reported findings which might be interpreted i n the l i g h t of the foregoing discussion* They found that tha trend of attributing success to student factors and failure to teacher factors waa more pronounced for professional teachers than for college atudenta* I t l a possible that the l a t t e r thought that their teaching a b i l i t y waa being evaluated by the student's success or failure rate and tola "apprehenalenn might have lead than to attribute failure to the student to a greater extent than the pre** fessional teacher* did* This study, however, provides only indirect aupport for the notion that perception of consequences of behaviour could affect a person's attribution, h study by Walster (1966) provides more direct evidence for this proposition* she found that manipulations of the perceived consequences of behaviour (serious or minor harm to another) resulted i n differential perception of the causes of behaviour (criminal negligence va* forgivable thoughtlessness). deleter's study however, dealt with observer's attribution of causality* I t would be 27 interesting to examine these attributional differences from the as tor'a point of view* the foregoing discussion suggests that the analysis of the attribution process i s sore complex i n a situation of social inter-action than i n a setting where as individual responds to non-personal* environmental forces* as for example, i n the Davison and valina (19^9) study* In this l a t t e r situation the temporal sequence between cause and effect was presented i n a f a i r l y clear out Banner* Ss ingested a drug and subsequently observed an increase i n shook tolerance* I t was f a i r l y easy for Ss to attribute behaviour change to the immediately preceding event* i«e*. Ingestion of a drug* %he temporal cause-effect sequence i n the learning situation* however* Is not that easily iden-t i f i a b l e * The student does observe a change i n performance but this eheage Is gradual* I t can be viewed as the end result of an ongoing give and take between teacher and student* In this type of interaction the student can view hlsself as being influenced by the teacher* but he also sees himself responding* which i n turn e l i c i t s a new response l a the teacher* f a such an interaction situation where the cause and effect relationship Is ambiguous, attributions might be particularly susceptible to Influences by motivational factors etieh i n the same way that per* eeption ef ambiguous stimuli i s susceptible to Ss* motives* expectations* 28 etc. (Sruner end Goodman, 194*?* Hastorf end Cantril, 195**). However, very l i t t l e attention has been paid to motivational faetora i n the attribution literature* Jones and liiabett (1971) i n their paper on differential actor-observer attribution processes bri e f l y mention the role of motivational faetora, but tend to emphaaiee the role of cog-nitive factors. They statei "We have emphasised -perhaps ©veremphasised-the role of cognitive and perceptual faetora i n developing our major theme* We have ar-gued that both actors and observers are con-cerned with processing useful information and auggested that action cues and situation cues are u t i l i z e d differentially by them* We would now l i k e to acknowledge that moti-vational factors may often serve to exaggerate i the broad tendencies that we tried to describe* At the same time, however, we would also l i k e to express the opinion that motivational faetora my often Bute those tendencies"* (pp. 14-15) Contrary to Jones and lisbett's opinion the present study suggests that i t might be perhaps simple minded to consider attribution primarily a cognitive matter* I t i s f e l t that i n conditions where the temporal cause-effect relationships are more ambiguous, the purely log i c a l inferencea could be more eaelly affected by motivational aspects. For example, I f one considers a situation of group decision making, i t would be interesting to examine the participant's perception of their own contribution toward the f i n a l decision i f the outcome i s positive or negative* I t Is possible that a person would tend to blame a poor 29 outcoas on other group washers, while taking personal credit for e good outcome. One point of theoreticel relevance was raised by this study and i t refers to the questioni "Do people attempt to explain their behaviour?" In the present study Ss were asked i f they had attempted to explain their successful performance, and 1? out cf 30 Ss answered "no*. This finding subsets that individuals do not always search for explanations cf their behaviour, or at least they ar© not aware of i t . I t also questions the va l i d i t y of inferring sssdiating attributions rather than treasuring them e x p l i c i t l y . Keay studies reported i n the attribution literature ere primarily con-cerned with other dependent variables, end only incidentally with attributions (Stoma and Blsbett 1970, Davison and Valine 19&8, Festinger and Carlsmith 1956, Bo«art, Loeb and Rutman 19&9)» I f the finding of the present study holds for other situations i t seems necessary to collect e x p l i c i t information about attributions. Other-wise i t i s possible that a process ether than attributions might have been responsible for the changes i n the dependent variable. The method for collecting e x p l i c i t attribution data used In this study wss found to be valuable. By collecting attribution data from one group of Ss and self-perception information from another group, one avoids the problem of sensitising tbe la t t e r group to the hypothesis of the experiment. 3§ I t also night fee useful to identify th# conditions i n which individuals w i l l seek to explain their behaviour* One possi-b i l i t y i s that people are more l i k e l y to search for reasons for their behaviour i f the event i s unusual and does not f i t into the general pattern of behaviour* I f one applies this notion to the results of this experiment, i t i s possible that some Ss did not attempt te ex-plain their performance beoauee suecsss i n a learning experience did not constitute an unusual event for them* this explanation, however* i s purely speculative since the Ss were not grouped into different levels of past academic achievement, which could have given some indication about the Ss' paat pattern of success, A more direct way of teetlng for this notion could be carried out by manipulating the frequency of occurrence of a certain event. For example, a group of i s could be taught a certain task and after the i n i t i a l learning period a l l Ss would receive f a i r l y consistont feed-back of success* In the second stage, half of the 5s would s h i f t to s failure pattern and the other half would continue with success feed-back* Following this experience a measure could be taken of the extent to which Ss had attempted to explain their performance* I would be predicted that more Ss i n the f i r s t than i n the second condition would answer the question affirmatively. In conclusion, the present study was designed to examine attributions! processes from the student's point of view i n the student-31 teacher interaction* the predicted attributions! and self-par-caption differences wore not obtained, but several points of methodological and theoretical natura vara raised which could suggest possible future avenues of research in the area of a t t r i -bution in social interaction* Pr©eeduree\*were suggested which could be used to collect explicit attribution and evaluative self-perception data* The importance of including motivational aspects in the analysis of the attribution processes was discussed* In addition, the desirability of obtaining explicit information about $s* attributions, rather than inferring them, was pointed out* Bandler, R.J., Kadera, G.R., ft Ben, D.J, self-observation as a source of pain perception. Journal of Personality and Social  Psychology. 19&8, £, 205-209, Bess, D.J, An axperlsantal analysis of self-persuasion. Joarnal of fxpcrlaantal Soeial Psychology. 196?, 70?-?10. Bea, D.J. Self •perception theory, i n L, Berkowits (ed,) Advances In axpeylgental Social .Psyeholoy, vol, 6, Eew Yorki Aeademlo Press, 1972, Bogart, Km Loeb, A,» & Ratea**, 2,D. Behavioural consequences of cognitive dissonance. Paper presented et Eastern Psychological Association t&eetlsg, 19&9* Brehis, J,&», & Cohen, B , a , Emigrations In cognitive dissonance. Hew lorkj wlley, 19&2* Brock, T,C, Cognitive re-structuring and attitude change, Journal of Abnormal social Psychology. 1962, 6f», 264-271, Bruner, J.S,, & Goodraan, C,C, 7eluec.rand need as organising factors In perception, Joarnal cf Abnortsal and Social Psychology. 19$?, Davison, G.C, and Valine, S. Maintenance of self-attributed and drug-attributed behavicttr change, Joarnal of Personality and Social PsvchelCCT. 19&9» 11, 25*33* Festinger, L«« & Carlss&th, J«K« Cognitive consequences of forced eoapllanes. Journal c f Abnormal and social Psychology, 1959, 2-3-210, Hastorf, A., & Cantrll, H, They saw a gaaet A ease study, Journal  of Abnoraal and Social.Psychology. 195^ » ^ 2 , 129-13**, Selder, P. ffee peycholoy cf Interpersonal relations. )4ew fork* Wiley, 1958. Jones, S«S, & Mabetfc, R,S. The actor and the cbservert Divargent l»rceptlcii8 cf the causes of behamcnr* New YorbtOenaral Learning Press, 1971* Kelley, B*S* Attribution theory l a social psychology* la B. Levine (ed,) Nebraska eyysl«m on motivation. lf6>, Unoolm University of Nebraska Press, 196?, pp. 192*233* Kelley, S*H, Attribution In social interaction. Eew forki General Learning Frees, 1971* Lykken* S*T*A* A study of anxiety In the soeiopathle personality* Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* 1957* Jg^t 6*10* Kisbstt, E*F*« & Valins, 8* PereelvinK the causes of one's own behaviour, Hew Xorfct General Learning Press* 1971* Ross* L*» Bierbrauer, G.A. and Polly, S* The attribution of success and failure In student-teacher Interaction* Un-published manuscript* Stanford University* 1971* Sohopler, J M H Leyton, B« Determinate of the se l f attribution of having Influenced another person* Journal of personality  and Social Psychology. 1972* 22, 326*332* . Stores, M.D* * & Kisbett, R*E* Xnscmnia and the attribution process* Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 1970. li» 3319*328* ' Halster* E* Assignment cf responsibility for an accident* •Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 19&6* 2* 72*79. APPENDIX I W I S C R E C O R D F O R M 34 NAME_ _AGE_ _SEX ADDRESS-PARENT'S NAME_ S C H O O L _GRADE_ REFERRED BY_ Year Month Day Date Tested Date of Birth A g e Verbal Scale Performance Scale Full Scale Scaled Score IQ * *Prorated if necessary N O T E S Raw Score VERBAL TESTS Information Comprehension Arithmetic Similarities Vocabulary (Digit Span) Sum of Verbal Tests PERFORMANCE TESTS Picture Completion Picture Arrangement Block Design Object Assembly . Coding (Mazes) Sum of Performance Tests Scaled Score Examiner Copyr igh t 1949 by The All r i gh ts reserved. No par t of t h i s record f o r m may be e l e c t r o n i c or mechan ica l , i n c l u d i n g , but not l i m i t e d to , por t raya l or d u p l i c a t i o n in any i n f o r m a t i o n s torage and pub l i sher . See Cata log for f u r t h e r i n f o r m a t i o n . Printed in U. S. A. The Psychological Corporation, Psycholog ica l Corpora t ion . rep roduced in any f o r m of p r i n t i n g or by any o t h e r means, p h o t o c o p y i n g , aud iov isua l r e c o r d i n g and t r a n s m i s s i o n , and r e t r i e v a l sys tem, w i t h o u t p e r m i s s i o n in w r i t i n g f r o m the 70-260 AS 1. I N F O R M A T I O N Score 1 orO Score 1 orO Score 1 orO 1. Ears 11. Season—Year 21 . Pounds—Ton 2. Finger 12. Color—Rubies 22. C a p i t a l — G r e e c e 3. Legs 13. Sun—Set 23. Turpentine 4. A n i m a l — M i l k 14. Stomach 24. New Y o r k — C h i c a g o 5. W a t e r — B o i l 15. O i l — F l o a t 25. Labor Day 6. Store—Sugar 16. Romeo—Jul iet 26. South Pole 7. Pennies 17. Fourth—July 27. Barometer 8. Days—Week 18. C.O.D. 28. Hieroglyphic 9. Discoverer—America 19. A m e r i c a n — M a n 29. Genghis Khan 10. Things—Dozen 20. Chile 30. Lien 2. COMPREHENSION Score 2, 1 or 0 1. Cu t—F inger 2. Lose—Balls (Dolls) 3. Loaf—Bread 4. Fight 5. Tra in—Track 6. House—Brick 7. Criminals 8. W o m e n — C h i l d r e n 9. Bil ls—Check 10. Char i t y—Beggar 11. Government—Examinations 12. Cot ton—F iber 13. Senators 14. Promise—Kept 3. ARITHMETIC Problem Response Time Score 1 orO 1. 45" 2. 45" 3. 45 " 4. 30" 5. 30" 6. 30" 7. 30" 8. 30" 9. 30" 10. 30" 11. 30" 12. 60" 13. 30" 14. 60" 15. 120" 16. 120" 2 4. SIMILARITIES Score 1 o r O 1. Lemons—Sugar 2. W a l k — T h r o w 3. Boys—Gir ls 4. Kni fe—Glass 5. Plum—Peach Score 2, 1 or 0 6. C a t — M o u s e 7. B e e r — W i n e 8. Piano—Viol in 9. P a p e r — C o a l 10. Pound—Yard 11. Scissors—Copper Pan 12. Mounta in—Lake 13. S a l t — W a t e r SUPPLEMENTARY TESTS DIGIT SPAN Digits Forward Score (Circle) Digits Backward Score (Circle) 3 - 8 - 6 6 -1 -2 3 3 2-5 6-3 2 2 3 - 4 - 1 - 7 6 - 1 - 5 - 8 4 4 5 -7 -4 2 -5 -9 3 3 8 - 4 - 2 - 3 - 9 5 - 2 - 1 - 8 - 6 5 5 7- 2 -9 -6 8- 4 -9 -3 4 4 3 - 8 - 9 - 1 - 7 - 4 7 - 9 - 6 - 4 - 8 - 3 6 6 4 - 1 - 3 - 5 - 7 9 - 7 - 8 - 5 - 2 5 5 5 - 1 - 7 - 4 - 2 - 3 -9 - 8 - 5 - 2 - 1 - 6 -8 3 7 7 1 - 6 - 5 - 2 - 9 - 8 3 - 6 - 7 - 1 - 9 - 4 6 6 1- 6 - 4 - 5 - 9 - 7 -2- 9 - 7 - 6 - 3 - 1 -6-3 5-4 8 8 8 - 5 - 9 - 2 - 3 - 4 -4 - 5 - 7 - 9 - 2 - 8 -2 1 7 7 5 - 3 - 8 - 7 - 1 - 2 -4 - 2 - 6 - 9 - 1 - 7 -4 - 6 - 9 8 - 3 - 5 9 9 6 - 9 - 1 - 6 - 3 - 2 -3 - 1 - 7 - 9 - 5 - 4 -5-8 8-2 8 8 F + B = H i g h e s t n u m b e r s c i r c l e d MAZES Maze Max. Errors Errors Score A . 30" 2 0 1 2 B. 30" 2 0 1 2 C. 30" 2 0 1 2 1. 30" 3 0 12 3 2. 45" 3 0 12 3 3. 60" 5 0 12 3 4. 120" 6 0 12 3 5. 120" 8 0 12 3 Notes: 14. L iberty—Just ice 15. First—Last 16. 4 9 — 1 2 1 Score 2 o r 0 5. V O C A B U L A R Y 1. Bicycle 2. Knife 3. Ha t 4. Letter 5. Umbrella Score 2, 1 or 0 6. Cushion 7. Nai l 8. Donkey 9. Fur 10. Diamond 11. Join 12. Spade 13. Sword 14. Nuisance 15. Brave 16. Nonsense 17. Hero 18. Gamble 19. Nitroglycerine 20. Microscope 2 1 . Shilling 22. Fable 23. Belfry 24. Espionage 25. Stanza 26. Seclude 27. Spangle 28. Hara-Ki r i 29. Recede 30. Aff l ict ion 3 1 . Ballast 32. Catacomb 33. Imminent 34. Mantis 35. Vesper 36. Aseptic 37. Chattel 38. Dilatory 39. Flout 40. Traduce 4 6. PICTURE COMPLETION Score 1 orO 1. Comb 2. Table 3. Fox 4. Gir l 5. Cat 6. Door 7. Hand 8. Ca rd 9. Scissors 10. Coat 11. Fish 12. Screw 13. Fly 14. Rooster 15. Profile 16. Thermometer 17. Hat 18. Umbrella 19. Cow 20. House Arrangement Time Order Score A . Dog 75" 1 0 1 2 ABC 2 ABC B. Mother 75" 0 1 OYT 2 TOY C. Train 60" 0 1 IR ON 2 IRON D. Scale 45" 0 2 ABC 7. PICTURE ARRANGEMENT (Fight) 1. Fire 4 5 " 2. Burglar 45 " 3. Farmer 45 " 4. Picnic 45' 5. Sleeper 60" 6. Gardener 75" 7. Rain 75" 11-IS 6-10 1-5 5 6 7 1 11-13 6-IO 1-5 5 6 7 I 11-15 6-10 1-5 5 6 7 | QRST OR SORT 11-15 6-10 1-5 5 6 7 1 EFGH OR EFHG 16-20 11-15 I'lO 5 6 7 I 21-30 16-20 1-15 5 6 7J FISHER OR FS1HER 0 2 MSTEAR ASTEMR 21-30 16-20 1-15 5 6 7 1 8. BLOCK DESIGN Design A . 45" B. 45' C. 45 " 1. 75" 2. 75" 3. 75' 4. 75" 5. 150" 6. 150" 7. 150" Pass-Fail Score 0 1 0 1 0 1 9. OBJECT ASSEMBLY Object Time Score anikin -LVJL 120" 21-120 16-20 11-15 1-10 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 I I orse 180" 31-180 21-30 16-20 1-15 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 -L ace 180 71-180 46-70 36-45 1-35 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A. uto 180" 46-180 31-45 26-30 1-25 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 21 -75 16-20 11-15 0 4 5 6 1-10 7 21-75 16-20 11.15 0 4 5 6 1-10 7 26-75 21.25 16-20 1-15 4 5 6 7 21-75 16-20 11-15 0 4 5 6 1-10 7 66-150 46-65 36-45 1-35 0 4 5 6 7 81-1 50 66-80 4 5 6-65 1-55 6 7 91-150 66-90 56-65 1-55 4 5 6 7 Notes: 5 _3MOOS iHOIa "ON (..031) • V o V V • V o • • o V • o V • • o o • V o V • V • o |V • o HO # V © & 31dkNVS U-s) v ONiaoo CODING B (8-15) ) ( 8 SAMPLE 2 1 4 6 3 5 2 1 3 4 2 1 3 1 2 3 1 4 2 6 3 1 2 5 1 3 1 5 4 2 7 4 6 9 2 5 8 4 7 6 1 8 7 5 4 8 6 9 4 3 • 1 8 2 9 7 6 2 5 4 7 3 6 8 5 9 4 1 6 8 9 3 7 5 1 4 9 1 5 8 7 6 9 7 8 2 4 8 3 5 6 7 1 9 4 3 6 2 7 9 3 TIME (120") SCORE (NO. RIGHT)-1« Hsieh are the raaeona that you could give ihat explain your performance es the cental ssase* Imp!*!* briefly* Tha following atatameBts represent various reasons which could have caused you* perforawsee on the mental aaae* Please read eaoh statement carefully and mftlfe a aark on the seven paint scale beside eaeh one of the* as to how much you feel that particular reason i s applicable* !• * I have always bees good at this type of task* 2* » 1 put a lot of effort and concentration into learning the % * the Instructor taught se the task very well and timed the reward s o that 1 could learn better* / definitely yea / definitely yes / definitely yes ne just lucky to get the right answer* / definitely 3»s 1, - Had you attempted to find reasons for your ispswesant on the- nantol ESS© boforo yo« vore e x p l i c i t l y asked about i t ? Yes Lo 2» - On the following sovsa point seal© fato, how export the instructor appeared to fe© to you. 1*•««2,,3**«•&,••«5*#••&«•*»7 not a-swrage highly expert export 3* - \Tow t«ell did you expect to do on tho rental case after the i n i t i a l test? 1»»»«2«»««3, •••-•**»»«5«»»»i^««»«7 jsoorly avprarj© ©seollent - aid you f e s l that tho h&m rat® tssasurersont «as an adequate reflection of your a b i l i t y to porfora on the mental »ase at teat tie®? 'iee «© 5» * I f your ansaor was •»now te tfco provlous question, stato why you thought that your jperforoanee on ts© base rate a©asxis*oc©at did not j*ofleet your actual a b i l i t y at that tisao. 6, * Did you thick that tho behaviour ncdlfieatlcn tsehnio;uas used by the instructor tier© i n largo part responsible for your isnprov©s»nt? It you answered "yes" to the previous question, d© you feel that you have learned the ssase and that you are now able to do well on your own on the cental snase? les So AFFB8SDE XXt Po0t-Sxperlra»nt«l Questionnaire Bid you think thai this lust task required stellar skills to those needed to pbtiem on the E*»tal isaae? les Be Did yea feel that yea had cade a noticeable improvement m the cental Ease a f t e r the Instruction? les Ke-en th» following scale raark how such you feel you improved on the senta! ssase*. K© Excellent laqsroveaent iBsproveesnt So you have any other eoEsents about the experiment l a general? If so, please explain briefly. 39 The following scale shove you tho approximate nusfcer of symbols which have to bo eonpleted to obtain sad average score* I t also shews you the sores for above average end below average perfortaar.ee* lising these norms as a frane of reference* sake a eark on the seven point scale which Indicates hew well you think you will do* excellent ®2-$0 wry good 71-82 above average 61-71 average *»7*£l 1****2*«**3»*«**>«***5****&**»«7 poor average excellent belew average 3*»-3o deffielent 17-23 poor 0-23 


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