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UBC Theses and Dissertations

Anglo-German relations, 1898-1914 Daniels, Harriet Muriel Embling 1932

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AIT GLO - GERMAN RE LA TI0ITS 1898-1914. by H a r r i e t Muriel Embling  Daniels.  T h e s i s submitted f o r the Degree of MASTER OP ARTS i n the Department of HISTORY  THE UNIVERSITY OP BRITISH APRIL, 1932.  COLUMBIA  CONTENTS. CHAPTER  '  I . Anglo-German N e g o t i a t i o n s II. III.  1898-1901  .Anglo-German R e l a t i o n s 1898-1904 The M o r o c c o C r i s i s  IV. N a v a l R i v a l r y V„ H i l l s  1904—1906  Conclusion Bibliography  1. . .. 3 6 . 76.  1906-1912  100.  of D i f f i c u l t y  V I . The L a s t Y e a r s  ^  148«  o f Peace. 1912-1914...... ...  182. .207, 211.  ANGLO-GERMAN  RELATIONS  1898-1914. CHAPTER I . Anglo-German N e g o t i a t i o n s 1898-1901. Recent r e v e l a t i o n s  i n European diplomacy have c a s t a  b l i n d i n g l i g h t upon the h i d d e n p l a c e s i n the F o r e i g n O f f i c e s o f the  powers o f Europe.  reservedly the  Some Governments have p u b l i s h e d un-  the documents t h a t r e v e a l a f a s c i n a t i n g s t o r y o f  t o r t u o s i t i e s o f f o r e i g n r e l a t i o n s and d i p l o m a t i c  inter-  course; others have g i v e n t o the w o r l d o n l y a s e l e c t i o n - a l b e it  a s e l e c t i o n made by i m p a r t i a l h i s t o r i a n s , n o t by m i n i s t e r s  t r y i n g t o c l e a r themselves i n the eyes of the p r e s e n t g e n e r a t ion.  In addition  to actual diplomatic  documents, there are  numerous a u t o b i o g r a p h i e s , memoirs, and r e c o l l e c t i o n s from the pens o f the c h i e f a c t o r s  i n the decades p r i o r t o the c a t a c l y s m .  A l t o g e t h e r there i s a w e a l t h o f m a t e r i a l  a v a i l a b l e f o r anyone  who wiahes t o study the o r i g i n s o f the war and t o attempt t o a p p o r t i o n the g u i l t . One  o f the most important phases o f the pre-war h i s t o r y  of Europe i s the r e l a t i o n s h i p between two of the g r e a t e s t the  k i n d r e d n a t i o n s of England and Germany.  powers,  A t times i t seemed  as i f the f a t e o f Europe depended upon these two c o u n t r i e s , friendship  or t h e i r enmity.  T r a d i t i o n and common i n t e r e s t  their  2. c a l l e d f o r f r i e n d s h i p , f o r u n i t y o f a c t i o n ; b u t an atmosphere of s u s p i c i o n , of d i s t r u s t , almost of d i s l i k e , arose i n the l a t e n i n e t e e n t h and e a r l y t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r i e s .  Such an atmosphere  grew out o f Germany's change o f p o l i c y - her expanding  commer-  cial  appar-  i n t e r e s t s and consequent d e s i r e f o r c o l o n i e s ; her  e n t l y a r r o g a n t t h r e a t s and demands; and l a t e r h e r d e t e r m i n a t i o n to become a s t r o n g n a v a l power.  A l l these brought her  into  c o n f l i c t w i t h England and, i n s p i t e o f the e f f o r t s of s t a t e s men  on b o t h s i d e s , l e d t o B r i t a i n ' s e n t e r i n g the l i s t s  against  her when the f i n a l t e s t came. A f t e r a study o f the documents r e l a t i n g t o p r o p o s a l s of a l l i a n c e between GBemany and England, the thought a r i s e s , what would have been the consequences ing  i t had been made.  o f such an a l l i a n c e ,  Time and time a g a i n the two  suppos-  Governments  were on the verge o f a d e f e n s i v e a l l i a n c e ; time and time a g a i n such n e g o t i a t i o n s f a i l e d .  By the p e r v e r s i t y o f f a t e , when-  ever Germany proposed a n . a l l i a n c e E n g l i s h m i n i s t e r s became s u s p i c i o u s and wary; whenever England showed h e r s e l f d e s i r o u s of  an agreement Germany became d i s t r u s t f u l and r e l u c t a n t .  Yet  b o t h Governments p r o f e s s e d the g r e a t e s t d e s i r e f o r a s a t i s f a c t ory  u n d e r s t a n d i n g and good r e l a t i o n s between the two  From the course o f events one wonders i n how ly  suave Had  ted  f a r these  extreme-  statements were s i n c e r e . such an a l l i a n c e been p o s s i b l e would i t have b e n e f i t -  Europe?  minent  countries.  The f o n d b e l i e f of statesmen and, i n d e e d , o f p r o -  p r i v a t e men  of the time was  t h a t such a combination  3. would have kept the peace o f Europe f o r a t l e a s t h a l f a c e n t ury.  That i s p o s s i b l e , s i n c e i t would m a n i f e s t l y have been too  s t r o n g a combination f o r the o t h e r powers  of Europe.  Would i t  have operated f o r the good o f the c o n t i n e n t or would i t have t y r a n n i z e d the l e s s e r n a t i o n s ?  E i t h e r a l t e r n a t i v e was p o s s i b l e .  Would the c e r t a i n t y o f England's support or n e u t r a l i t y have l e d the  Germans t o ddopt an even more a r r o g a n t tone than e v e r ?  So  l o n g as they were i n doubt as t o England's p o l i c y they were more l i k e l y t o move w a r i l y .  They might delude themselves t h a t Eng-  l a n d was more i n need o f t h e i r a s s i s t a n c e than they o f h e r s . England saw w i t h c l e a r e r eyes t h a t Germany c o u l d n o t a f f o r d t o l e t h e r p e r i s h , and i n t h a t b e l i e f r e s t e d c o n t e n t .  She had,  i n f a c t , the b a l a n c e o f power between the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e and the  D u a l A l l i a n c e , d e s p i t e the K a i s e r ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t  the  two should league a g a i n s t h e r .  ult  q u e s t i o n - d i d i t l i e i n h e r hands t o p r e v e n t the B a l k a n  That leads t o a more d i f f i c -  s i t u a t i o n o f 1914 from d e v e l o p i n g i n t o a w o r l d war?  Had she  come forv/ard and s t a t e d d e f i n i t e l y t h a t she would n o t remain n e u t r a l b u t would come.in on the s i d e o f the D u a l A l l i a n c e , Germany might have curbed A u s t r i a and l o c a l i s e d the c o n f l i c t , * Thus another c r i s i s would have been passed, b u t the f o r c e s t h a t made such c r i s e s p o s s i b l e would s t i l l have been p r e s e n t . Sooner or l a t e r c o n f l i c t between the two armed was  camps o f Europe  inevitable. The i d e a o f an a l l i a n c e between the German Empire and  Great B r i t a i n goes back t o the days o f Bismarck.  A f t e r the  4. F r a n c o - P r u s s i a n Avar had  g i v e n him what he d e s i r e d - a u n i t e d  Empire - Bismarck c o n c e n t r a t e d h i s e n e r g i e s on b u i l d i n g new  s t a t e i n t o one  of the foremost  this  c o u n t r i e s of Europe.  To  t h i s end he e v o l v e d a system of a l l i a n c e s t o preserve the peace of new  Europe and,  perhaps more important  power i n time  of danger.  still,  to protect t h i s  Germany i s so s i t u a t e d t h a t she  runs a r i s k of i n v a s i o n on a l l f r o n t i e r s - from R u s s i a , and A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y . of  a t l e a s t two  Bismarck, then, had  of these  countries.  t o seek the  Before  the end  I's r e i g n , the master mind of the Empire had ive  a l l i a n c e w i t h A u s t r i a and  France  and R u s s i a .  friendship  of W i l l i a m  arranged  a  defens-  I t a l y f o r protection against  At the same time he had  a r e i n s u r a n c e t r e a t y t o keep her q u i e t . and r e a s o n a b l y  France,  lured Russia  He was  into  sure of A u s t r i a  sure o f I t a l y , but not of R u s s ^ i a .  Russia  and  A u s t r i a had  so many c o n f l i c t i n g i n t e r e s t s t h a t an a l l i a n c e f o r  a prolonged  p e r i o d w i t h the two was  Russia  impossible.  j o i n e d F r a n c e , Germany would have to be There was  for  almost  one  careful.  other c o u n t r y t o whom Bismarck might t u r n  p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t France  England  and,  i f need be, a g a i n s t Russ^da.  seemed f r i e n d l y towards the new  as y e t d i d n o t c l a s h w i t h h e r s .  Empire, whose i n t e r e s t s  A u s t r i a and I t a l y would r a i s e  no  o b j e c t i o n s to German f r i e n d s h i p w i t h England.  lay  i n the f r i c t i o n between England.and R u s s i a .  ance w i t h England  The  might w e l l l e a d R u s s i a and France  On the other hand dare France  drawback  An.open  same p a t h and r e s u l t i n Germany's b e i n g threatened frontiers.  If  into on  allithe  two  a t t a c k i f she knew  5 . England  would h e l p Germany?  Europe was c o m p l i c a t e d  The s i t u a t i o n Bismarck c r e a t e d i n  i n the extreme.  He alone c o u l d juggle  s u c c e s s f u l l y w i t h f i v e h a l l s and keep three o f them i n the a i r a t once. S e v e r a l times d u r i n g h i s twenty years i n o f f i c e Bismarck approached England an a l l i a n c e . Odo  w i t h the s u g g e s t i o n f o r a rapprochment or  E a r l y i n 1876 d u r i n g a c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h Lord  R u s s e l l , the E n g l i s h Embassador t o Germany, he  a rapprochment between England  suggested  and.Germany on the E a s t e r n n  Question.  On January  12, 1876 Munster, German Ambassador t o  London, r e p o r t e d t h a t Lord Derby r e f e r r i n g t o Bismarck's  over-  t u r e s had s a i d , "Since he had been F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r , he had r e c e i v e d no communication t h a t had g i v e n him g r e a t e r p l e a s u r e , and about which he had f e l t  greater r e l i e f .  He had a down-  r i g h t a d m i r a t i o n f o r Your Highness and c o n s i d e r e d a r a p p r o c h ment between England  and Germany t o be the o n l y r i g h t  policy."  In s p i t e o f Lord Derby's a p p r o v a l the matter dropped f o r the time b e i n g .  W r i t i n g t o Lady S a l i s b u r y on F e b r u a r y  S a l i s b u r y expressed  11, 1877  h i s o p i n i o n s r e g a r d i n g such p r o p o s a l s ,  "Bismarck had made new p r o p o s a l s f o r an o f f e n s i v e and d e f e n s 2. i v e a l l i a n c e - which have h a p p i l y n o t been  accepted."  Another noteworthy attempt was made i n 1879 a f t e r the Congress of B e r l i n .  E c k a r d s t e i n r e l a t e s t h a t Bismarck broached  the q u e s t i o n t o B e a c o n s f i e l d a t a d i n n e r a t the C h a n c e l l o r ' s 1. G.D. vol.1.p.144. German Note. 2. C e c i l - L i f e o f S a l i s b u r y - vol.2.p.127.  6. Palace  i n 1878.  B e a c o n s f i e l d was  b r i n g Parliament A l t h o u g h no it  and  cautious  p u b l i c opinion i n t o a favourable  o f f i c i a l note of such c o n v e r s a t i o n s  i s by no means improbable t h a t the two  cuss the s u b j e c t . proof  and wished time to 1.  Of the  on b o t h s i d e s .  Munster's v i s i t The  1879  mood.  is available,  statesmen d i d d i s -  negotiations  there i s  Presumably the p r o p o s a l was  official  made d u r i n g  t o B e a c o n s f i e l d a t Hughenden about September  27,  1879.  reports  ive  superiors d i f f e r .  sent by the M i n i s t e r s to t h e i r Beaconsfield n o t i f i e d  German Ambassador had  proposed a d e f e n s i v e  A u s t r i a and England, but he had not  the l^ueen t h a t  encouraged the  idea.  Beaconsfield  (Munster) spoke of the somewhat 2.  c o o l e r r e l a t i o n s between Germany and R u s s i a . es of October 14 and  In h i s d e s p a t c h -  17 Munster speaks c o n f i d e n t l y of Beacons-  f i e l d ' s good i n t e n t i o n s and Salisbury's favourable  d e s i r e f o r the a l l i a n c e , and 3.  attitude.  I f Beaconsfield's  to the Queen expressed h i s t r u e f e e l i n g s . t>ne wonders  of  account how  Munster c o u l d have been so sanguine.  B e a c o n s f i e l d may  reported  knew.her sympathy f o r  thus to the Queen because he  Prance; while  the  a l l i a n c e of Germany,  Munster, on the other hand, t o l d Bismarck t h a t proposed an a l l i a n c e , when he  respect-  Munster may  have  have p l a c e d a f a l s e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n on  the E n g l i s h M i n i s t e r ' s words.  Whatever the  s i t u a t i o n i n Sept-  ember and October, the f o l l o w i n g year found Gladstone i n power 1. E c k a r d s t e i n - p.134-5. 2. G.D. vol.1.p.145. German Note. 3. G.D.vol. I.p.l49» IV. 11. Munster to Bismarck, Oct. 14,1879 p.150. IV. 12. Same Oct. 17, 1879.  7. and d i f f e r e n t p o l i c i e s i n vogue.  As a r e s u l t Bismarck became  i r r i g a t e d and abandoned n e g o t i a t i o n s . In January 1880 S a l i s b u r y thought i t a d v i s a b l e Bismarck's s u s p i c i o n s  t h a t E n g l i s h m i n i s t e r s d i d not t r u s t him  and r e f u s e d h i s o f f e r s . 1880  to a l l a y  Accordingly,  he wrote  on January 14,  t o Lord Odo R u s s e l l , a s k i n g him t o assure Bismarck of Eng-  land's w i l l i n g n e s s a t a l l times t o co-operate w i t h Germany. "Of c o u r s e , we have t o p i c k our steps so as not t o seem t o e r r from the s t r a i g h t p a t h i n France's eyes; f o r France i s capable of g i v i n g us a g r e a t d e a l of t r o u b l e .  But, on the sound r t i l e  t h a t you love those most whom you compete w i t h l e a s t , Germany i s c l e a r l y cut out t o be a l l things  may  intermediately i n 1.  c u l t i v a t e Bismarck's f r i e n d s h i p without f e a r . "  Bismarck's was  our a l l v . - We  l a s t attempt a t a l l i a n c e w i t h England i n 1889  a l s o doomed t o f a i l u r e .  On November 22, 1887  the  Chancellor  had w r i t t e n p e r s o n a l l y to S a l i s b u r y a s s u r i n g him t h a t the views of the h e i r t o the German throne were n o t a n t i - B r i t i s h , expressing peace  and  f e a r s t h a t Pan-Slavism was becoming a menace t o the  o f Europe.  He a l s o urged B r i t a i n t o form an a l l i a n c e w i t h  A u s t r i a and I t a l y , Germany's two a l l i e s , t o m a i n t a i n the s t a t u s 2. quo i n the Near E a s t .  S a l i s b u r y r e p l i e d i n courteous non-  committal manner. was  The most he o f f e r e d t o the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e 3. moral s u p p o r t . N o t h i n g daunted, Bismarck i n January 1889  1. C e c i l - op. c i t . - vol.2.p.373. 2. G.D; vol.1.p.345. Bismarck to S a l i s b u r y , November 22, 1887, 3. G.D. vol.1.p.355^ S a l i s b u r y to Bismarck, November 30, 1887-,  8. instructed Hatzfeldt  (now  private conversation  to intimate  i o n t h a t the defensive  s u r e s t way  Parliamentary  to keep peace i n Europe was  convict-  through a  Such an a l l i a n c e c o u l d be  sanction.  Eng-  s e c r e t or have  Should S a l i s b u r y f e e l o b l i g e d to r e -  i t would not a f f e c t the good r e l a t i o n s e x i s t i n g between 1.  the two  countries.  H a t z f e l d t , f o l l o w i n g these i n s t r u c t i o n s ,  approached S a l i s b u r y , who leave  to S a l i s b u r y Bismarck's  a l l i a n c e f o r a l i m i t e d p e r i o d between Germany and  l a n d a g a i n s t Prance.  fuse  German Ambassador i n London) when i n  a c c e p t e d the  suggestion  to postpone the d i s c u s s i o n of d e t a i l s .  d e s i r e to r e g a r d d e s i r e t h a t met For  the p r o p o s a l  H e r b e r t Bismarck v i s i t e d  expressed  the  as s t r i c t l y c o n f i d e n t i a l - a 2.  w i t h Bismarck's  some time n o t h i n g  He  but begged  approval.  more happened.  London.  Then i n March,  While there he had  a conver-  s a t i o n w i t h S a l i s b u r y i n which the d e s i r a b i l i t y of an AngloGerman a l l i a n c e to promote European peace came up f o r d i s c u s s ^ i o n . Salisbury explained alliance.  the d i f f i c u l t i e s  of e n t e r i n g i n t o a s e c r e t  In a democratic c o u n t r y a t r e a t y c o u l d not be  binding unless  i t had  Government e n t e r e d  the a p p r o v a l  of p u b l i c o p i n i o n .  upon an agreement and  where England should  If his  a s i t u a t i o n arose  come to the a s s i s t a n c e  p u b l i c o p i n i o n approved, the  really  Government was  of her a l l y ,  unless  h e l p l e s s and  would  have t o stand a s i d e i n response to the demand of the  people.  Under such c o n d i t i o n s , c a u t i o n i n e n t e r i n g i n t o a l l i a n c e s 1. G.D.  v o l . l . p . 3 69.  2. G.D.  vol.1.p.372.  IV. 400.  was  Bismarck to H a t z f e l d t , Jan.11, 1889. IV. 4 0 3 . H a t z f e l d t to Bismarck, Jan.16, 1889.  9. essential.  Nevertheless,  the s u g g e s t i o n  S a l i s b u r y expressed  and hoped t h a t a t a l a t e r date he might be i n a  p o s i t i o n to c o n s i d e r i t ; "meanwhile, we without at  s a y i n g yes 1.  present."  w i t h the icy  or no;  t h a t i s u n f o r t u n a t e l y a l l I can  t h a t claimed  isolation".  erests.  s a i d the two  i t s c o l o n i a l expansion.  the C h a n c e l l o r i n 1890  a l l i a n c e s , men  laid  This  was  few d i v e r g e n t  who  The  int-  Era with i t s  retirement  of  l e f t the r e i n s i n the hands of men  l e s s g i g a n t i c mould, men  The  c o u n t r i e s had  T h i s remained true u n t i l the Wilheminic  p o l i c i e s and  any.  come from Germany.  to Bismarck's p o l i c y based on the needs of the Empire.  As S a l i s b u r y had  new  do  as i t s key-word f o r f o r e i g n p o l -  So f a r the i n i t i a t i v e had due  leave i t on the t a b l e ,  Thus ended Bismarck's e f f o r t s to come to terms  country  "splendid  his gratitude for  who  c o u l d not p l a y as s k i l f u l l y  of with  l a c k e d the r e p u t a t i o n of the maker of Germ-  K a i s e r announced h i s i n t e n t i o n to f o l l o w the  out by Bismarck.  H i s i n t e n t i o n s may  course  have been good, the  f u l f i l m e n t proved d i s a s t r o u s . C o l o n i a l expansion meant c o n f l i c t w i t h England i n the few  remaining  p a r t s of the world  v a r i o u s disputes" and  s t i l l unclaimed.  In s p i t e  i r r i t a t i o n s Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s d u r i n g  the n i n e t i e s ' were f a i r l y calm.  There were occasions when  f e e l i n g r a n h i g h on both, s i d e s of the N o r t h Sea, b u t and  the s k i l l  of  of the diplomats  prevented  time  open r u p t u r e .  There  l.G.D. vol.1.p.373. lV.404-5.H.Bi§marckto Bismarck, Mar. 22, 1889.  10. e x i s t e d fewer p o i n t s of f r i c t i o n between England and Germany than between England and R u s s i a ©r England and Prance.  There-  f o r e i t ^ e h o v e d England t o keep on terms of f r i e n d s h i p w i t h Germany, or so a t l e a s t thought the l a t t e r c o u n t r y and a few English  statesmen.  Toward the end o f the c e n t u r y England awoke t o f i n d h e r s e l f r a t h e r unpopular on the c o n t i n e n t , j u s t a t a time when she was  c o n f r o n t e d by v a r i o u s t h o r n y problems.  Troubles i n  A f r i c a and the Par E a s t brought upon her the adverse of the European n a t i o n s .  criticism  Some m i n i s t e r s viewed w i t h a l a r m  the s i t u a t i o n i n t o which England's p o l i c y of i s o l a t i o n had brought h e r . of remedying  A c c o r d i n g l y , they a p p l i e d themselves t o the t a s k it.  The  s o l u t i o n they chose was  another s t r o n g n a t i o n . ising.  Etassia and Prance were n o t v e r y prom-  To s e t t l e a l l the d i s p u t e s then e x i s t i n g would demand  a g r e a t e r s a c r i f i c e t h a n England was make.  an a l l i a n c e w i t h  prepared a t t h a t time to  A u s t r i a and I t a l y c o u l d n o t h e l p her v e r y m a t e r i a l l y .  Germany, then, was  the o n l y one l e f t .  Prom e v e r y p o i n t of  view she seemed most s u i t a b l e - a s t r o n g m i l i t a r y power, open t o a t t a c k from Prance and R u s s i a and t h e r e f o r e i n need of guarantee a g a i n s t them.  Moreover,  p r e v i o u s l y with England. England approached The men  she had sought  alliance  The wooed, then, became the wooer.  Germany on the s u b j e c t o f en a l l i a n c e .  i n charge o f f o r e i g n a f f a i r s  r u s h i n t o England's arms.  Here was  i n Germany d i d n o t  the o p p o r t u n i t y they had  been a w a i t i n g many y e a r s y e t they l e t i t s l i p p a s t .  Why?  11. Because they were so sure of themselves and of  Germany.  I f they w a i t e d  h e r s e l f i n a more d i f f i c u l t h i g h e r terms.  a little  l o n g e r England would f i n d  p o s i t i o n and would have to o f f e r  C o n f i d e n t t h a t England  would never come to terms  w i t h R u s s i a and p o s s i b l y not w i t h Prance, on good terms w i t h R u s s i a , they f e l t to  of England's need  compelled  to remain  they c o u l d a f f o r d to w a i t ,  d e l a y , always h o l d i n g out the p r o s p e c t of a l l i a n c e i n the  future. In November 1897 ian  d u r i n g the Kiao-Chou i n c i d e n t and Russ-  a c t i o n , Bulow suggested  t h a t H a t z f e l d t might v e r y d i s c r e e t -  l y enquire i t i t were p o s s i b l e to b r i n g about an improvement i n Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s .  Germany d e s i r e d some token o f  land's f r i e n d l i n e s s t o b r i n g p r e s s u r e t o bear s i d e s i f she had  on R u s s i a .  Be-  to g i v e up Kiao-Chou she might want"a harbour 1.  i n South China i n the B r i t i s h . s p h e r e of i n f l u e n c e . b u r y was  Eng-  Salis-  n o t e n t h u s i a s t i c f o r he remembered the Kruger T e l e -  gram and Z a n z i b a r . any's occupying  He had  p e r s o n a l l y no o b j e c t i o n s to Germ-  Kiao-Chou and a p p a r e n t l y d i d not want to see  a c o n c e s s i o n to R u s s i a .  H a t z f e l d t b e l i e v e d i n the  of England's going over to R u s s i a and T h i s time he was an o f f e r of a l l i a n c e .  mistaken.  possibility  Prance.  B r i t a i n came forward  with  Chamberlain and h i s group a n a l y s e d  the  s i t u a t i o n and d e c l a r e d i n f a v o u r of agreement w i t h Germany. On March 29,  1898  a f t e r a p r i v a t e dinner at A l f r e d Rothschild's  house Chamberlain opened h i s mind f r e e l y to H a t z f e l d t and made l.G.D. vol.3.p.18. p.17.  XIV. XIV.  86.Hohenlohe to H a t z f e l d t , Nov. 83. Same Nov. 13, 1897.  16,1897.  12. definite  proposals.  He  e x p l a i n e d t h a t the p o l i t i c a l  situation  c a l l e d f o r a change i n England's t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i c y . opinion r e a l i s e d alliances  the danger and would support  t o preserve  peace.  Negotiations  Public  the making of  w i t h Prance over  West A f r i c a were not p r o g r e s s i n g s a t i s f a c t o r i l y ; China ed d i f f i c u l t i e s .  Could  p o l i t i c a l issues?  present-  Germany and England agree on the  I f Germany h e l p e d England now,  great  England  would a i d . Germany i n case of a t t a c k and work w i t h her i n  China.  I t would p r a c t i c a l l y mean the a c c e s s i o n of England to the  Triple  Alliance.  nest  He  s t r e s s e d the need f o r a d e c i s i o n w i t h i n the  1. few  days. Here was  the  the 16ng-looked-for o p p o r t u n i t y .  German Government r e a c t ?  to H a t z f e l d t ' s d e s p a t c h . t u r e s , hut p o i n t e d  He  Biilow r e p l i e d  on March 30,  out v a r i o u s drawbacks f o r Germany.  would not dare to a t t a c k .  ance?  would  certain  1898  thanked Chamberlain f o r h i s  w i t h Germany would so s t r e n g t h e n  ed c o u l d she be  How  over-  Alliance  England t h a t her enemies  I f , l a t e r on,  Germany were a t t a c k -  t h a t England would come to her  assist-  He f e l t t h a t the B r i t i s h Government, h a v i n g made the  a l l i a n c e , would not be might go out of power.  a b l e to keep i t f o r l o n g s i n c e This Parliamentary  they  system i n England  l e f t a back door by which she  c o u l d escape from f u l f i l l i n g  the o b l i g a t i o n s of t r e a t i e s .  In c o n s i d e r i n g t h i s "no  German  statesman, however g r e a t h i s sympathies f o r England and l.G.D. vol.3.p.21. XIV.  196.  how-  H a t z f e l d t to German F o r e i g n O f f i c e , Mar.29 ,1898.  13. ever sure he might be  t h a t the maintenance of England's  i s needed f o r u p h o l d i n g the w o r l d b a l a n c e , would be  power  l i k e l y to  assume r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the consequences which an Anglo-German t r e a t y , e n t e r e d i n t o w i t h an eye t o f u t u r e events, would 1. A p o l i t e but d e f i n i t e r e f u s a l J  f o r Germany."  ed the r i s k s too g r e a t . o f f e r and  England would use  Germany to  ends; then i f Germany found h e r s e l f i n t r o u b l e t h r o  ugh her a l l i a n c e w i t h England, desert her.  Billow c o n s i d e r -  He and H o l s t e i n d i s t r u s t e d t h i s sudden  suspected t r e a c h e r y .  g a i n her own  entail  R u s s i a was  the l a t t e r would p e r f i d i o u s l y  t o be f e a r e d f o r had  she not  said,  "the o n l y danger t o peace would a r i s e i f we were f o r c e d t o the c o n v i c t i o n t h a t Germany had England  come t o a d e f i n i t e agreement w i t h 2.  t h r e a t e n i n g the balance  of power."  Moreover, p u b l i c  o p i n i o n i n Germany would not a c c e p t an E n g l i s h agreement. H o l s t e i n possessed o n l y i n two  the i d e a t h a t a l l i a n c e should be  eventualities  considered  (1) i f R u s s i a threatened Germany, 3  (2) i f England  showed h e r s e l f l e s s o v e r b e a r i n g than a t p r e s e n t .  I n view of t h i s a t t i t u d e t h e r e c o u l d be to the f a t e  of Chamberlain's  overture.  t r u s t and  s u s p i c i o n , Chamberlain  A p r i l 1.  He  in.China.  little  doubt as  Ignorant of the d i s -  made f u r t h e r suggestions  on  abandoned the a g g r e s s i v e a t t i t u d e towards R u s s i a  I n i t s p l a c e he  s u b s t i t u t e d the i d e a of s a v i n g the  remainder of China and keeping i t open f o r world t r a d e . Germ1. G.D. vol.3.p.23-4. XIV. 199. Billow t o H a t z f e l d t , Mar. 30, 1898. 2. Brandenburg - Prom Bismarck t o the World War - p.107. 3.Ibid.p.108.  14. any's reward f o r c o - o p e r a t i o n 1. Ghina. man  would be  In an i n t e r v i e w w i t h B a l f o u r  had  mentioned the  p l a i n e d the  conversations.  on A p r i l 5 the  would r e a c t a t p r e s e n t .  He  Balfour  the B r i t i s h  admitted the  Prom h i s comment t h a t Mr.  English-  H a t z f e l d t , c a r e f u l l y ex-  German reasons f o r r e l u c t a n c e .  and remarked t h a t he d i d not know how  any.  special privileges in  understood  Parliament  g r e a t r i s k f o r Germ-  Chamberlain sometimes wished  to advance too q u i c k l y H a t z f e l d t deduced t h a t he was pleased  a t Mr.  Chamberlain's l a c k of s u c c e s s .  not  Balfour  ill-  agreed  to the wisdom of removing i l l - f e e l i n g by agreements i n s m a l l matters and  of p r e p a r i n g p u b l i c o p i n i o n f o r a p o s s i b l e f u t u r e 2. p o l i t i c a l rapprochment. I n v a i n H a t z f e l d t warned B e r l i n t h a t England would not g i v e c o n c e s s i o n s i f she 3. policy.  l o s t hope of c o - o p e r a t i o n  Bulow, i n the b e l i e f t h a t Prance would not  h e r R u s s i a n agreement to favour try  i n world  to gain a l l i e s  ed h e r , and  i n Europe.  t h a t she was  not  prejudice  England, wished to l e t England When she  found t h a t no  one  i n a p o s i t i o n to chose her 4.  Germany would b e g i n d i s c u s s i o n s a f r e s h .  The  views s i m i l a r to those of h i s m i n i s t e r s , but he  Kaiser  wantallies,  held  sounded a  t i m e l y note of warning i n h i s l e t t e r t o .•'the F o r e i g n O f f i c e , A p r i l 10, 1. G.D.  a f t e r h a v i n g s t u d i e d a d e s p a t c h from H a t z f e l d t . vol.3.p.24. XIV.  2 0 3 . H a t z f e l d t t o German F o r e i g n O f f i c e , A p r i l 1, 1898. 2. G.D. vol.3.p.24. XIV. 2 1 1 . H a t z f e l d t to Hohenlohe, A p r i l 1898. 3. Brandenburg - op. c i t . - p.109-110. 4.Ibid.p.109.  7,  15. The  E n g l i s h hope o f an a l l i a n c e must be kept up.  England g i v e s us a spare  "A f r i e n d l y  c a r d a g a i n s t R u s s i a , and b e s i d e s  that,  there i s a prospect  o f our r e q u i r i n g c o l o n i a l and commercial 1. t r e a t i e s f r o m England." I f Germany d e c l i n e d the o f f e r , a rapprochment w i t h Prance would n o t be u n l i k e l y " i n the p r e s 2. ent r a b i d mood o f the E n g l i s h C a b i n e t . " Hatzfeldt s t i l l  continued  i n g between the two c o u n t r i e s . he  t o work f o r a good understandIn conversations with S a l i s b u r y  t r i e d t o b r i n g about agreements on l e s s e r m a t t e r s .  Salis-  b u r y d e c l a r e d h i m s e l f w i l l i n g , b u t d e c l i n e d t o permit  England  t o do a l l the g i v i n g and Germany a l l the r e c e i v i n g . ed making any o f f e r s r e g a r d i n g c o l o n i a l m a t t e r s .  He a v o i d -  Hatzfeldt  c o n s i d e r e d i t h i s t a s k " t o work by l e i s u r e l y b u t f r i e n d l y e f f o r t f o r an a l l i a n c e w i t h Germany and so t o a c t t h a t the 3. way was l e f t  open f o r an u n d e r s t a n d i n g  circumstances l a i n continued  l a t e r on'.'  t h a t was a l l he c o u l d do.  Under the  On h i s s i d e Chamber-  t o hope f o r a l l i a n c e and took evdry  opportunity  i n h i s speeches t o educate p u b l i c o p i n i o n t o t h a t end. Negotiations  came t o a s t a n d s t i l l .  Then the K a i s e r  took matters i n t o h i s own hands and alarmed h i s M i n i s t e r s . He wrote t o the Czar o f R u s s i a t e l l i n g him i n g r o s s l y exaggera t e d language o f the a l l u r i n g o f f e r s made t o Germany by England and a s k i n g what R u s s i a would o f f e r i f he r e f u s e d . t a c t f u l procedure;  Not a v e r y  However, the Czar p a i d him back i n h i s  1.Brandenburg - op. c i t . - p.108. 2.Ibid.p.108. 3.Ibid.p.110-111.  16. own  coin.  H i s r e p l y was  i n g news.  c a u t i o u s , but r e v e a l e d  Three months p r e v i o u s  complete s e t t l e m e n t  England had  of a l l disputes  offered Russia  then e x i s t e n t .  Czar, thought t h i s so good t h a t t h e r e must be involved. the  Therefore,  some astound-  He,  he u n h e s i t a t i n g l y d e c l i n e d .  German M i n i s t e r s became more convinced of the  After this necessity No  Czar's r e p o r t of England's o f f e r to R u s s i a was  as exaggerated as the K a i s e r ' s r e p o r t t o him Germany.  the  some t r i c k e r y 1.  of p r o c e e d i n g c a u t i o u s l y w i t h " p e r f i d i o u s Albion"« the  a  doubt,  every b i t  of the o f f e r to  I t i s , however, q u i t e r e a s o n a b l e t o suppose t h a t  England may  have approached  H o l s t e i n and  Russia.  Bulow agreed on the p o l i c y of a l l i a n c e w i t h  n e i t h e r R u s s i a nor England, but both countries.  of f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s w i t h  To a v o i d o f f e n d i n g England H a t z f e l d t  ed academic d i s c u s s i o n s with. S a l i s b u r y and 2. with Lascelles i n B e r l i n . f e e b l e flame when i n the  The  continu-  Billow d i d the same  d y i n g embers were fanned to a  course of a c o n v e r s a t i o n  with  the  K a i s e r , S i r Prank L a s c e l l e s mentioned t h a t some i n f l u e n t i a l men  wished f o r an a l l i a n c e which should be  and  should  two  Powers a t the  i d e a and was  strictly  defensive  take e f f e c t o n l y i f e i t h e r p a r t y were a t t a c k e d 3. same time.  The  seemed i n c l i n e d t o r e g a r d  intended.  Bulow and  K a i s e r was  impressed by  by the  i t more s e r i o u s l y than i t  H o l s t e i n took care  that nothing  of i t . 1.Brandenburg - op. c i t . - p.111. 2.Ibid.p.114. 3.B.D. vol.1.p.100.No.122. L a s c e l l e s to B a l f o u r . Aug.  came  23,  1898.  17. Such then was to  the f i r s t  attempt en the p a r t of England  form an a l l i a n c e w i t h Germany.  The s t o r y i s t o l d  almost  c o m p l e t e l y from German sources s i n c e the E n g l i s h Foreign. O f f i c e c o n t a i n s no despatches or memoranda on the s u b j e c t .  The  neg-  o t i a t i o n s on t h e i r s i d e must have been c a r r i e d on p r i v a t e l y . U n t i l the b i o g r a p h y of Joseph Chamberlain i s p u b l i s h e d and the life  o f L o r d S a l i s b u r y completed, the s t o r y from the E n g l i s h  p o i n t o f view remains a b l a n k . Germany had f a i l e d  t o s e i z e h e r o p p o r t u n i t y i n 1898.  Would f o r t u n e f a v o u r h e r a g a i n and prove the v a l u e of h e r p o l i c y of w a t c h f u l w a i t i n g ? ful  attitude  In s p i t e of S a l i s b u r y ' s  toward Germany, Chamberlain r e t a i n e d h i s c o n f i d -  ence and c o n t i n u e d t o work f o r h i s o b j e c t . the  K a i s e r , accompanied  He had now  I n November  by Billow, p a i d a v i s i t  Chamberlain had the p r i v i l e g e b o t h men.  of s e v e r a l conversations with  the i d e a of a g e n e r a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g  K a i s e r , however, d e c l i n e d t o be tempted.  f u r t h e r advantage  a d e s i r e f o r good  The K a i s e r i n s t r u c t e d Chamberlain i n how  They saw  must c o n c i l i a t e GermanyJ  from  England s h o u l d t r e a t  'touchy' t h e r e f o r e England should handle him  and a v o i d making him i m p a t i e n t .  no  relations.  Germany i f she d e s i r e d t h a t Country's f r i e n d s h i p .  pay the p r i c e .  Billow and  t o Germany and a c c o r d i n g l y r e f r a i n e d  committing themselves beyond  was  1899  t o Windsor.  between E n g l a n d , Germany, and the U n i t e d S t a t e s . the  distrust-  The German carefully  Always i t i s B r i t a i n v/ho  B r i t a i n i s a s k i n g f a v o u r s , she must  B r i t a i n needs Germany, l e t hes? r e a l i s e t o the  18. f u l l her dependence. "The  Unfortunately  f o r Germany;  " b e s t - l a i d schemes o' mice an' Gang a f t  men  agley."  Billow complacently concluded h i s memorandum; " I c o n s i d e r Germany's f u t u r e t a s k w i l l be, w h i l s t p o s s e s s i n g and as  maintaining  good r e l a t i o n s on the  that  a strong  s i d e of R u s s i a  as  well  of England t o await the f u r t h e r development of events .1.  i e n t l y and  i o n t h a t he had  Chamberlain obtained  Bulow's a u t h o r i s a t i o n to p r o c l a i m  the d e s i r e of England and  1899,  Hence  f a r - s e e i n g Eng-  continent  i t must have appeared e v i d e n t  to everybody t h a t the  a l l i a n c e i s between o u r s e l v e s  and  and  of  we  have had  have had  g l a d to f o r g e t ; b u t ,  natural  our  our m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s .  t h a t the people of t h i s c o u n t r y have been  j u s t l y i r r i t a t e d , by  circumstances which we  not  irritated,  are  only  too  always  n e c e s s a r i l y brought us t o g e t h e r .  1«G.D. vol.3.p.108-114. XV. 413. Windsor, Nov. 24, 1899.  We  quarrels  I do  a t the r o o t of t h i n g s , there has  been a f o r c e which has  formed  Great German Empire.  our d i f f e r e n c e s w i t h Germany, we  contentions,  conceal  we  I t h i n k t h a t the moment t h a t a s p i r a t i o n was  the  the  said:  that i s that  should not remain permanently I s o l a t e d on the  and  convict  i n which he  "There i s something more which I t h i n k any l i s h statesman must have l o n g d e s i r e d , and  the  to the world  Germany f o r an a l l i a n c e .  famous L e i c e s t e r Speech, November 30,  have had  pat-  collectedly."  Prom these c o n v e r s a t i o n s  Europe, and  fleet  Memorandum by Billow at  What  19. then u n i t e s n a t i o n s ?  I n t e r e s t and sentiment.  What i n t e r e s t  have we which i s c o n t r a r y t o the i n t e r e s t of Germany? " I cannot c o n c e i v e any p o i n t which can a r i s e i n the immediate  f u t u r e which would b r i n g o u r s e l v e s and the Germans  i n t o antagonism of i n t e r e s t s .  On the c o n t r a r y , I can see many  t h i n g s which must be a cause of a n x i e t y to the statesmen o f Europe, b u t i n which our i n t e r e s t s are c l e a r l y the same as the i n t e r e s t s of Germany and i n which t h a t u n d e r s t a n d i n g of which I have spoken i n the case of America might, i f extended t o Germany, do more perhaps than any combination of arms i n order t o p r e s e r v e the peace o f . t h e w o r l d . " I f the u n i o n between England and America i s a powerful f a c t o r i n the cause o f peace, a new  T r i p l e A l l i a n c e between  the T e u t o n i c race and the two branches of the Anglo-Saxon r a c e w i l l be a s t i l l more p o t e n t i n f l u e n c e i n the f u t u r e of the world.  I have used the word  t o make i t c l e a r t h a t t o me  ' a l l i a n c e , but again I desire 1  i t seems t o matter l i t t l e  whether  you have an a l l i a n c e which i s committed  to paper, or whether  you have an u n d e r s t a n d i n g i n the.minds  o f the statesmen o f the  respective countries.  An u n d e r s t a n d i n g i s perhaps b e t t e r than  an a l l i a n c e , which may  s t e r e o t y p e arrangements which cannot be  regarded as permanent i n view of the changing circumstances from day to day." Of t h i s speech Grey says, " i t was to Germany and a p u b l i c recommendation the B r i t i s h Empire.  a public  invitation  of p o l i c y t o B r i t a i n and  I t made a great and c r i t i c a l moment f r a u g h t  20. 1. w i t h the g r e a t e s t p o s s i b i l i t i e s . " s t e i n dated December 1, 1899 whose acquaintance pressed me.  He  I was  expressed  I n a l e t t e r t o ven  Eckard  Chamberlain s a i d : "Count Billow,  d e l i g h t e d to make, a l s o g r e a t l y ima w i s h t h a t I might be able a t some  time t o say something as t o the mutual i n t e r e s t s which bound the U n i t e d S t a t e s t o a t r i p l e u n d e r s t a n d i n g w e l l as t o Great B r i t a i n .  Hence my  hope w i l l be n o t u n s a t i s f a c t o r y t o  w i t h Germany, as  speech y e s t e r d a y which I 2. him."  I n s t e a d of welcoming the speech Bulow p r a c t i c a l l y i a t e d i t i n a speech i n the R e i c h s t a g . fy  p u b l i c o p i n i o n ; b u t the episode was  I t was  repud-  done t o s a t i s -  distinctly  unfortunate.  Chamberlain c o n s i d e r e d i t a p e r s o n a l i n s u l t and r e s e n t e d i t greatly.  I n Billow's Memorandum there i s l i t t l e or n o t h i n g  s u f f i c i e n t l y encouraging  to j u s t i f y Chamberlain's c l a i m s .  His  d e s i r e to advance too q u i c k l y l e d him to read i n t o Bulow's 3. p o l i t e words a meaning not i n t e n d e d .  The  episode d i d n o t  shake h i s d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o e f f e c t an a l l i a n c e between the c o u n t r i e s , but i t may  have sown the f i r s t  two  seeds of d i s t r u s t  of  Germany i n h i s mind. "Thus once more the e f f o r t s of the B r i t 1. Grey - Twenjjy-five Years - vol.1.p.43. 2. E c k a r d s t e i n - op. c i t . - p.130. 3. Bulow - Memoirs - vol.1.p.327. "Chamberlain'*s speech a t L e i c e s t e r about B r i t a i n ' s r e l a t i o n s w i t h America and Germ any v/as a g a u c h e r i e , I b e l i e v e u n i n t e n t i o n a l , but s t i l l a gaucherie f o r , i n view of the g e n e r a l world s i t u a t i o n and of p u b l i c o p i n i o n i n Germany such a d e l i c a t e q u e s t i o n s h o u l d f i r s t have been d i s c u s s e d o n l y i n t r a muros, i f i t was i n t e n d e d to achieve the d e s i r e d r e s u l t . Chamberlain had f a r too much contempt f o r the f o r c e of German p u b l i c opinion."  21. i s h statesmen were wrecked by the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of Billow and the Emperor t o c l i n g to t h e i r p r i n c i p l e  of a f r e e hand, and  t h e i r d i s i n c l i n a t i o n to e n t e r i n t o an a l l i a n c e which would a b l y i n v o l v e them i n a war Prance,  w i t h R u s s i a , and  consequently  by prob-  with  i n w h i c h they, as they f i r m l y b e l i e v e d , would have to 1.  s h o u l d e r the p r i n c i p a l burden." Germany and*England came t o the c r o s s r o a d s i n 1901. o t i a t i o n s , begun e a r l y i n the y e a r and  c a r r i e d on to the end  December, d e f i n i t e l y d e c i d e d the d i r e c t i o n s i n which the n a t i o n s were i n f u t u r e t o t r a v e l .  The  i n i t i a t i v e for this  public opinion.  the c o n t i n e n t was  the  R e l a t i o n s between the Governments had  been t o l e r a b l y good, i n s p i t e of the h o s t i l i t y of the and  of  two  attempt i s a s s i g n e d by the E n g l i s h t o the German's and by Germans to the E n g l i s h .  Neg-  press  Germany stood by England when o p i n i o n on  adverse  d u r i n g the Boer War.  She had  declin-  ed to j o i n R u s s i a and Prance i n i n t e r v e n t i o n on beEialf of the Boers.  As always there had been p o i n t s of f r i c t i o n , f e l t  haps more k e e n l y on the German s i d e , and t o be  others d u r i n g  of January  a t Chatsworth.  Chamberlain f o r m u l a t e d  1901  Eckardstein v i s i t e d  I n the course  v e r s a t i o n s , p a r t i c u l a r l y the one  on January  H a t z f e l d t was  16, the Duke and  very s a t i s f i e d  and Europe - p»79.  the  of a f t e r - d i n n e r con-  their position d e f i n i t e l y regarding  Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s . l . P r i b r a m - England  there were d e s t i n e d  1901.  About the middle Devonshires  per-  and  22. r e p o r t e d the substance C h a n c e l l o r and  of E c k a r d s t e i n ' s converse  t i o n s to the  i n more m o d i f i e d form to H o l s t e i n .  t o the C h a n c e l l o r , January 18, she must seek a l l i a n c e .  The  R u s s i a on the one hand and I n s p i t e of the R u s s i a n  The  despatch  s t a t e d t h a t England r e a l i s e d  c h o i c e l a y between Prance  the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e on the  sympathies of some of the  and other.  Cabinet,  Chamberlain and h i s f r i e n d s would work f o r agreement w i t h Germany.  T h i s they expected  s t a r t i n g - p o i n t suggested  would come about g r a d u a l l y , and as a an arrangement r e g a r d i n g Morocco.  S a l i s b u r y would leave f o r the South i n a s h o r t time. had  gone, Chamberlain and  they found  i t impossible  When he  Lansdowne would d i s c u s s d e t a i l s .  If  to come t o an agreement w i t h Germany  they would t u r n t o R u s s i a .  With the e x c e p t i o n of the Morocco 1  q u e s t i o n , the c o n v e r s a t i o n must be regarded Holstein replied  as p u r e l y academic.  on January 21 t o E c k a r d s t e i n ' s  specially  worded communication.  He d e r i d e d the p o s s i b i l i t y of an Anglo-  R u s s i a n rapprochment.  Germany r a n too g r e a t a r i s k i n a l l i a n c e  w i t h England s i n c e such an a l l i a n c e would l e a d i n e v i t a b l y to war.  I n view of the danger, the compensation from.England  must be b u r y and  correspondingly great.  Moreover, he d i s t r u s t e d S a l i s -  c o n s i d e r e d the E n g l i s h . M i n i s t e r had  ill-treated  Then the K a i s e r came to England j u s t b e f o r e  Germany  the death of  Queen V i c t o r i a and remained u n t i l a f t e r her f u n e r a l .  His  caused an o u t b u r s t of f r i e n d l y f e e l i n g i n England and  l e d to  l . E c k a r d s t e i n - op. c i t . - p.185-6. 2.Ibid.p.187.  visit  23. more c o r d i a l r e l a t i o n s a t the  Court.  heard the  conversations  He  s t o r y of the r e c e n t  telegraphed  where we  had  t o Billow: "They are 1.  expected."  Prom E c k a r d s t e i n  should  w i t h Chamberlain.  coming on i t seems, j u s t  Terrified  on the p a r t of the K a i s e r  l e s t some impetuous a c t  spoil his careftilly laid  Biilow urged the n e c e s s i t y o f n e i t h e r encouraging nor aging  the B r i t i s h hopes. " E v e r y t h i n g  discouraging  the E n g l i s h nor  them p r e m a t u r e l y * 2. pects land's  of g a i n . "  Any He  now  aging  discour-  be  captured  eagerness would d i m i n i s h our  by pros-  f i r m l y b e l i e v e d i n the a b s u r d i t y of Eng-  swinging t o the  t o any  plans  depends on n e i t h e r  l e t t i n g ourselves  s i d e of the D u a l A l l i a n c e .  r e l u c t a n t l y the K a i s e r consented and any  he  Somewhat  avoided committing Germ-  d e f i n i t e agreement, w h i l e a t the same time encour-  friendly relations. On March 9,  1901  H o l s t e i n i n a p r i v a t e telegram to Eck-  a r d s t e i n s a i d , "In my  personal  opinion  - and  that i s a l l i t  amounts t o a t p r e s e n t  - Germany miglit c o n s i d e r  such a  general  d e f e n s i v e a l l i a n c e r a t h e r than an agreement on a s p e c i a l p o i n t , e.g. Morocco - where the r i s k i s the same, but the 3. vantage l e s s . " s t e i n not  At the same time he  e x p r e s s l y warned E c k a r d -  to suggest such a t h i n g t o the B r i t i s h , because  i d e a must come from them.  He was  ad-  the  rather afraid that Salisbury  would communicate to S t . P e t e r s b u r g 1.Brandenburg - op. c i t . - p.157 2;ibid.p.l57. 3IG.D. vol.3.p.140. German Note.  any  German o f f e r ,  thus  24. a f f e c t i n g a d v e r s e l y Russo-German r e l a t i o n s . d i s t r u s t and  Once more the o l d  the underground methods of the mystery man  of the  W i l h e l m s t r a s s e were a t work to the d e t r i m e n t of h i s country's welfare.  He d i d not seem t o r e a l i s e  t h a t England might grow  weary of making advances t o a s i n g u l a r l y unresponsive a l s o he  Germany,  o v e r e s t i m a t e d the v a l u e of Germany t o England.  "You  ask too much f o r your f r i e n d s h i p , " S a l i s b u r y had remarked or three years p r e v i o u s .  H o l s t e i n had d e e p l y r e s e n t e d the  a c c u s a t i o n h u t had not taken heed of the warning. was  two  a w a i t i n g the time when England's  I n s t e a d he  e x t r e m i t y would  enable  him t o ask more. A c t u a l p r o p o s a l s f o r a l l i a n c e came i n March.  In a very  s e c r e t d e s p a t c h t o S i r Prank L a s c e l l s , B r i t i s h Ambassador i n B e r l i n , on March 19, Lansdowne r e p o r t e d a c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h E c k a r d s t e i n i n which the German expressed h i s b e l i e f t h a t h i s Government w h i l e averse t o an agreement c o n f i n e d t o China would c o n s i d e r f a v o u r a b l y an u n d e r s t a n d i n g and extended operate  of a more durable  c h a r a c t e r - a d e f e n s i v e a l l i a n c e which would  o n l y i f England  (Prance and R u s s i a ) .  He  or Germany were a t t a c k e d by two  thought England would be more i n need  of h e l p than Germany, but Lansdowne c o n s i d e r e d the f r o n t i e r rendered  Russian  Germany j u s t as v u l n e r a b l e as England  her s c a t t e r e d p o s s e s s i o n s .  Lansdowne a l s o s t r e s s e d the  u l t y of d e c i d i n g what c o n s t i t u t e d s e l f - d e f e n c e . one  Powers  and diffic-  He f e a r e d  c o u n t r y b e i n g dragged i n t o c o m p l i c a t i o n s by the o t h e r .  concluded h i s d e s p a t c h by remarking,"Baron E c k a r d s t e i n was  He  25. c a r e f u l t o assure me t h a t h i s s u g g e s t i o n was n o t made under i n s t r u c t i o n s , h u t I f e e l no doubt t h a t he hag been d e s i r e d t o 1. 2. sound me." I n t h i s L a s c e l i e s agreed. T h i s c r e d i t s the German s i d e w i t h the i n i t i a l d e f i n i t e p r o p o s a l . E c k a r d s t e i n ' s account  o f the same i n t e r v i e w , c o n t a i n e d  i n a d e s p a t c h t o H o l s t e i n on March 19, d i f f e r s  slightly.  Lans-  downe a t a d i n n e r asked E c k a r d s t e i n c o n f i d e n t i a l l y i f t h e r e ' were hope o f Anglo-German a c t i o n i n L o c a l i s i n g p o s s i b l e RussoJapanese c o n f l i c t . had assurance  E c k a r d s t e i n f e a r e d not, u n l e s s Germany  o f support from England.  The next a f t e r n o o n ,  presumably the c o n v e r s a t i o n r e p o r t e d by Lansdowne, the E n g l i s h M i n i s t e r s a i d he had been t h i n k i n g of an Anglo-German d e f e n s ive  a l l i a n c e e x t e n d i n g over a c o n s i d e r a b l e p e r i o d .  not,- however, b r i n g forward  He would  such a p r o p o s a l u n t i l he f e l t  r e a s o n a b l y sure t h a t Germany would be d i s p o s e d t o a c c e p t . E c k a r d s t e i n c o u l d n o t speak o f f i c i a l l y b u t would t r a n s m i t any 3. suggestions to B e r l i n . I n view of H o l s t e i n ' s emphatic i n s t r u c t i o n s , E c k a r d s t e i n c o u l d n o t r e p o r t t h a t he had made the f i r s t 4. suggestion. He does, however, say i n h i s memoirs t h a t he  1. B.D. vol.2.p.60.No.77. Lansdowne t o L a s c e l l e s , Mar.19, 1901. 2. B.D. vol.2.p.61.Ho.78. L a s c e l l e s t o Lansdowne, Mar.23, 1901. 3«Eckardstein - op. c i t . - p.207-8. 4 . c f . Gooch-Studies i n Modern H i s t o r y - p . 6 9 . Mr. Gooch i s s t r o n g l y o f the o p i n i o n that.Lansdowne's v e r s i o n i s c o r r e c t . He says:"Lansdowne was n o t o n l y a man o f s p o t l e s s i n t e g r i t y and wide e x p e r i e n c e , b u t he was bound by every o b l i g a t i o n of honour and precedent t o p r o v i d e the.Cabinet w i t h an accu r a t e account of a c o n v e r s a t i o n o f such h i g h s i g n i f i c a n c e . E c k a n d s t e i n ' s r e p o r t , on the other hand, was conveyed i n the form Of a p r i v a t e telegram t o H o l s t e i n , who i n a l e t t e r of March 17- which reached him on March 19, sent a p r e c i s e i n j u n c t i o n : " I e x p r e s s l y f o r b i d you the s l i g h t e s t mention of an a l l i a n c e . The moment, i f i t ever comes, has n o t y e t arrived."  26. gave Lansdowne a s t r o n g h i n t t h a t the German Government would c o n s i d e r any E n g l i s h p r o p o s a l s The i d e a was  f o r a defensive  main f a c t i s e v i d e n t , h y under d i s c u s s i o n .  stein, irritated to  send Dr.  seemed to t h i n k n e g o t i a t -  over the Chinese indemnity q u e s t i o n ,  Hol-  decided  not c a l c u l a t e d t o c l e a r the a i r f o r  E c k a r d s t e i n was  angry:"So there we  were a g a i n .  s i d e , an a l l i a n c e t r e m b l i n g i n the balance  the f a t e of the world little  turned and  money  oh the other these 1.  a. l i t t l e  g a r d i n g the s a t i s f a c t o r y progress H a t z f e l d t saw  en which  twopenny-  matters."  P r o b a b l y E c k a r d s t e i n was  prepared  Eck-  s a t i s f a c t o r i l y u n t i l the K a i s e r and  T h i s a c t was  the a l l i a n c e .  halfpenny  He  the  S t u e b e l to d i s c u s s t h a t Problem and r e a c h a speedy  conclusion.  On the one  the middle of March 1901  In many of the c o n v e r s a t i o n s  a r d s t e i n took H a t z f e l d t ' s p l a c e . i o n s were proceeding  alliance.  too o p t i m i s t i c r e -  of the a l l i a n c e n e g o t i a t i o n s .  Lansdowne on March 22.  Lansdowne s a i d he  had  a memorandum on the a l l i a n c e q u e s t i o n and d e s i r e d t o  ask H a t z f e l d t ' s p e r s o n a l o p i n i o n on v a r i o u s p o i n t s . (1) Would the I m p e r i a l Government consent t o a b i n d i n g d e f e n s i v e w i t h England?, or one  (2) Would the a l l i a n c e be a b s o l u t e l y d e f e n s i v e  i n which the casus f o e d e r i s would a r i s e o n l y when  of the two  p a r t i e s were a t t a c k e d by two  Should the agreement be (4) Was  agreement  Japan to be  s e c r e t or r a t i f i e d by  included?  l . E c k a r d s t e i n - op.  or more s i d e s ?  one (3)  Parliament?  Hatzfeldt replied cautiously  c i t . - p.212.  27. (1) The I m p e r i a l  Government might he d i s p o s e d  t o c o n s i d e r an  agreement r e s t i n g on f u l l r e c i p r o c i t y , p a r t i c u l a r l y i f i t meant England's j o i n i n g the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e .  I n (2) and (3) the  second i d e a would be p r e f e r a b l e . (4) Probably the a d d i t i o n o f 1. 2. Japan. Billow e n t i r e l y approved o f H a t z f e l d t ' s answers. Lansdowne made no mention o f t h i s c o n v e r s a t i o n .  On March 29  he wrote t o L a s c e l l e s t h a t he had informed E c k a r d s t e i n i n a b i l i t y t o continue the c o n v e r s a t i o n s bury's i l l n e s s . to e n t e r  of h i s  en account of S a l i s -  He s t r e s s e d the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s  i n t o such f a r - r e a c h i n g agreements.  reluctance  A l t o g e t h e r he  seemed r a t h e r c o o l i n s p i t e o f h i s courteous language.  Eck-  a r d s t e i n agreed t o l e t the matter drop i n view o f the present situation. In A p r i l E c k a r d s t e i n renewed d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h Lansdowne. C o n v e r s a t i o n s continued  i n t e r m i t t e n t l y u n t i l the end o f May  without m a t e r i a l progress.  On A p r i l 13 Lansdowne wrote p r i v a t e -  l y to Lascelles regarding.Eckardstein's  advances.  I n the course  of h i s l e t t e r he expressed h i s p r i v a t e o p i n i o n , " I doubt whether much w i l l come of the p r o j e c t . good enough.  I n p r i n c i p l e the i d e a i s  But when each s i d e comes, i f i t ever does, t o  formulate i t s terms, we s h a l l b r e a k down; and I know Lord b u r y regards the scheme w i t h ,  t o say the l e a s t , s u s p i c i o n . "  B e r l i n wished t o make E n g l a n d . j o i n and  transfer negotiations  Sails3.  to Vienna.  the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e  London fought shy of  1. G.D. vol.3.p.141.XVII.46.Hatzfeldt t o German F o r e i g n O f f i c e , March 23, 1901. 2. G.D. vol.3.p.l43.XVll.48.Billow t o H a t z f e l d t , March .2.4., 1901. 3. B.D. vol.2.p.63.No.81.Lansdowne to L a s c e l l e s , A p r i l 13, 1901  28. u n d e r t a k i n g o b l i g a t i o n s toward A u s t r i a and I t a l y , and d i d n o t f e e l sure o f P a r l i a m e n t a r y consent s t e i n knew t h i s and y e t f e l t expected  t o consent  t o such a t r e a t y .  sure o f s u c c e s s .  i n principle  Eckard-  Lansdowne was  t o j o i n i n g the T r i p l e  alliance  b e f o r e he was a l l o w e d t o see the terms and d i s c u s s them.  Ber-  l i n p o s i t i v e l y r e f u s e d t o a l l o w H a t z f e l d t or E c k a r d s t e i n t o g i v e w r i t t e n memoranda as a b e g i n n i n g f o r d i s c u s s i o n , u n t i l London committed h e r s e l f i n w r i t i n g .  The r e s u l t was  The a t t i t u d e o f E n g l i s h statesmen memoranda.  i s expressed  i n various  On May 27 Mr. T.H. Sanderson went so f a r as t o  outline a convention.  He p o i n t e d out the d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n g e x a c t l y what c o n s t i t u t e s a d e f e n s i v e war. were a l l o w e d t o judge f o r i t s e l f a t the time might be tempted t o d e s e r t i t s a l l y . Germany more l i k e l y t o d e s e r t England, Germany.  deadlock.  of decid  I f either side of c r i s i s i t  N a t u r a l l y , he than.England  thought to desert  S a l i s b u r y , i n a memorandum of May 29, b e t r a y e d h i s  d i s t r u s t of Germany.  A g a i n he brought  up the excuse t h a t i t  does n o t l i e w i t h i n the power of a democratic i t s e l f t o a s s i s t another  c o u n t r y i n war.  c o u n t r y t o pledge  I f England  joined  the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e she would be u n d e r t a k i n g too g r e a t a respon s i b i l t t y and r e c e i v i n g . l i t t l e his belief i n "isolation".  compensation.  He s t i l l  preserved  " I t would h a r d l y be wise t o i n c u r  n o v e l and most onerous o b l i g a t i o n s i n order t o guard a g a i n s t a danger i n whose e x i s t e n c e we have.no h i s t o r i c a l reason f o r  l.B.D. vol.2.p.66.No.85.Memorandum by T.H.Sanderson, May 27, 1901. '  29. "believing."  1.  He f e a r e d p u b l i c o p i n i o n i n Germany and i t s i n 2.  f l u e n c e on the a c t i o n s of the German Government. circles,  Official  i n c l u d i n g K i n g Edward, were not p a r t i c u l a r l y p l e a s e d  when the K a i s e r r e f e r r e d to some of the E n g l i s h m i n i s t e r s as " u n m i t i g a t e d n o o d l e s " because they l i s t e n e d t o R u s s i a and ed the K a i s e r may I t was  fear-  have a s e c r e t agreement w i t h t h a t c o u n t r y .  t r e a t e d as a joke i n B r i t a i n , but i t d i d not improve  relations• As f a r as the Germans were concerned nothing. felt  they wanted a l l or  England must j o i n the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e , s i n c e Germany  the r i s k of a s e p a r a t e a l l i a n c e too g r e a t .  The  agreement  must have the s a n c t i o n of P a r l i a m e n t b e f o r e i t c o u l d possess any v a l u e .  U n t i l England  t r a n s f e r r e d n e g o t i a t i o n s t o Vienna  and o b t a i n e d A u s t r i a n consent, they would do n o t h i n g . was  no h u r r y as Germany's r e l a t i o n s w i t h b o t h England  R u s s i a were f r i e n d l y .  -  Still  the same l e i s u r e l y  and  procedure  u n t i l England found h e r s e l f f o r c e d by circumstances to b e f o r e Germany's wishes.  There  bow  I n a c o n v e r s a t i o n between the K a i s e r  and King Edward and S i r Frank L a s c e l l e s a t Homburg i n August the K a i s e r expressed disappointment  t h a t an a l l i a n c e had  not  been concluded, s i n c e i t would have p l a c e d the r e l a t i o n s b e t 3. ween the two In  c o u n t r i e s on a much more s a t i s f a c t o r y f o o t i n g .  1898 he had  s a i d no f o r m a l a l l i a n c e was  n e c e s s a r y because  l.B.D. vol.2.t».68.Ho.86.Memorandum by S a l i s b u r y , May 29, 1901. 2.Ibid. 3.B.D. vol.2.p.73.No.90.Lascelles t o Lansdowne, Aug«25, 1901.  3d. i f a c r i s i s arose an agreement c o u l d be reached w i t h i n twenty1. four hours.  H a t z f e l d t d e s i r e d an a l l i a n c e and wished t o  g i v e i n t o some o f England's wished.  B e r l i n f e l t her r e p r e s -  e n t a t i v e was g o i n g t o o f a r and was p r o b a b l y n o t s o r r y t o g e t him away from England England ber 1901.  i n June.  r e t u r n e d t o the q u e s t i o n i n November and Decem-  A memorandum o f November 9 by Mr. B e r t i e admits the  a d v i s a b i l i t y of an agreement w i t h a p o w e r f u l and sure b u t doubts the s i n c e r i t y o f Germany.  I f England  ally;  stood i n  danger o f d e s t r u c t i o n by R u s s ^ i a , Germany, t o ensure her own s a f e t y , would have t o come t o England's a s s i s t a n c e .  The p r i c e  would be h i g h , b u t p r o b a b l y no h i g h e r than the r e s u l t s o f a 2. formal a l l i a n c e .  Lansdowne's memorandum o f November 11,  d i s a g r e e s w i t h S a l i s b u r y ' s a t t i t u d e , sees v a r i o u s  difficulties  i n a l l i a n c e , and wishes t o speak f r a n k l y t o the German Ambassador l e s t B e r l i n accuse and  of b r e a k i n g o f f n e g o t i a t i o n s i n a d i s c o u r t e o u s and u n f r i e n d -  l y manner. ing  them o f n o t knowing t h e i r own mind and  He sees  the f o l l o w i n g d i f f i c u l t i e s ;  a s a t i s f a c t o r y casus f o e d e r i s ;  France  and R u s s i a ;  (1) OOf d e f i n -  (2) C e r t a i n t y o f a l i e n a t i n g  (3) Complications w i t h the C o l o n i e s which  might not approve o f h a n g i n g on the s k i r t s o f the T r i p l e iance; ica;  All-  (4) R i s k o f b e i n g i n v o l v e d i n a p o l i c y h o s t i l e t o Amer-  (5) P a r l i a m e n t a r y s a n c t i o n i n the p r e s e n t mood.'  1. B.D. vol.1.p.102.No.124.Lascelles  Instead  t o S a l i s b u r y , Dec. 21, 1898. 2. B.D. vol.2.p.73 -6.No.91. Memorandum by B e r t i e , Nov. 9, 1901.  31. of d r o p p i n g  the a l l i a n c e completely have a g e n e r a l agreement 1.  r e g a r d i n g p o l i c y i n commercial Before  interests.  l e a v i n g f o r B e r l i n f o r Christmas,  M e t t e r n i c h , the  new German Ambassador, on December 19, c a l l e d t o see Lansdowne who took the o p p o r t u n i t y t o r e f e r t o the n e g o t i a t i o n s f o r a l l i a n c e d u r i n g the s p r i n g and e a r l y summer.  He p o i n t e d out c a r e -  f u l l y t h a t England c o u l d n o t take up the p r o p o s a l t o j o i n the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e a t present.  M e t t e r n i c h s a i d i t was t o be an  agreement between Great B r i t a i n and h e r c o l o n i e s on the one s i d e and the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e on the o t h e r .  He b e l i e v e d i t  would preserve  peace f o r a t l e a s t h a l f a c e n t u r y , b e s i d e s  of  to B r i t a i n .  great value  He expressed  being  surprise that B r i t a i n  had n o t jumped a t "the m a g i n i f i c e n t o p p o r t u n i t y . herence t o i s o l a t i o n England was i n danger.  By h e r a d -  She had offended  I t a l y and d r i v e n h e r t o t u r n t o Prance f o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g . Regarding the A l l i a n c e , Germany had concluded  . that B r i t a i n  wished t o drop n e g o t i a t i o n s , t h e r e f o r e he had n o t mentioned the s u b j e c t . it difficult  Lansdowne e x p l a i n e d the summer h o l i d a y s had made t o c a r r y on d i s c u s s i o n s f o r a time.  thanked him f o r the e x p l a n a t i o n s .  He expressed  t h a t there might n o t a g a i n be such a f a v o u r a b l e l a s t summer.  Metternich the o p i n i o n o p p o r t u n i t y as  As the years passed b y he b e l i e v e d t h a t Germany  would draw c l o s e r t o R u s s i a .  Lansdowne wished t o preserve  f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s and suggested  a g e n e r a l commercial under-  l.B.D. vol.2.p.76-9.No.92.Memorandum b y Lansdowne, Nov. 11, 1901.  32. standing.  M e t t e r n i c h was sure t h i s would n o t be a c c e p t a b l e i n  p l a c e of a l l i a n c e .  To t h i s djjaft o f despatch King Edward added  the f o l l o w i n g minute: "The King does n o t c o n s i d e r the language and  arguments made use o f by the German Ambassador t o l o r d 1© Lansdowne as a t a l l s a t i s f a c t o r y . " In r e p l y t o t h i s L a s c e l l e s r e l a t e d a conversation with  Billow on December 28.  M e t t e r n i c h had n o t y e t r e p o r t e d the  i n t e r v i e w w i t h Lansdowne. e x p l a n a t i o n and agreed  Billow was g l a d t o hear  Lansdowne's  t o postpone the d i s c u s s i o n s w h i l e ex-  p r e s s i n g the hope t h a t the q u e s t i o n would h o t be dropped  alto-  2. gether. Thus the n e g o t i a t i o n s ended i n courteous pious hopes f o r the f u t u r e .  They had f a i l e d .  demanded more than B r i t a i n was prepared  She had c a r r -  The r e s u l t was  E n g l i s h statesmen  had been f r i e n d l y began t o d i s t r u s t lain,  Germany had  to give.  i e d out h e r p o l i c y and b e l i e f t o the l e t t e r . contrary to her expectations.  language and  who p r e v i o u s l y  German m o t i v e s .  Chamber-  the g u i d i n g f o r c e i n the r e c e n t n e g o t i a t i o n s , d e c i d e d 3 .  to have n o t h i n g more t o do w i t h the people  of B e r l i n .  He  and others had the i m p r e s s i o n " t h a t Germany had never  really  been i n e a r n e s t , b u t r a t h e r had kept them d a n g l i n g f o r years and had used the s i t u a t i o n as a p r e t e x t f o r a s k i n g c o l o n i a l 1. B.D. vol.2.p.80-2.No.94.Lansdowne t o L a s c e l l e s , Dec.19, 1901. 2. B.D. vol.2.p.83. N o . 9 4 . L a s c e l l e s t o Lansdowne,Jan.3, 1902. 3. Brandenburg - op. c i t . -p.171.;Pribram - op. c i t . - p.89. . J u l y 1905 Chamberlain remarked,"Once burned twice shy; from t h a t moment I was determined never a g a i n t o r u n i n double harness w i t h that, man (Billow)."  33. 1. concessions F o r many y e a r s Germany had sought D u r i n g t h a t time England,  a l l i a n c e with  secure i n proud  independence,  l y d e c l i n e d t o "be drawn i n t o European entanglements. she worked g e n e r a l l y w i t h the members of the T r i p l e h u t she r e f u s e d a b i n d i n g agreement.  England. polite-  Granted, Alliance,  When, a t the end of the  c e n t u r y , changed c o n d i t i o n s brought h e r i n t o c o u n t l e s s c o n f l i c t s i n da8?erent p a r t s of the world, she d e c i d e d upon a d e f e n s i v e alliance.  She turned t o the c o u n t r y whose o v e r t u r e s she had  so o f t e n put a s i d e .  I t was o n l y n a t u r a l t h a t Germany, i n h e r  p r i d e , should r e f u s e t o come the f i r s t time England f i n g e r t o beckon.  l i f t e d her  As they c o n c e i v e d i t , the t a b l e s were turned,  and.they were n o t averse t o making England  come as a s u p p l i a n t .  Unfortunatel?/, i n t h e i r o v e r - c o n f i d e n c e , they misread and the E n g l i s h c h a r a c t e r .  the times,  The s i t u a t i o n was n o t so s e r i o u s  t h a t England need dance t o Germany's p i p i n g , nor was  England's  love f o r Germany so g r e a t t h a t she would continue t o come back so l o n g as Germany o f f e r e d h e r a f a i n t hope o f s u c c e s s . a c t e d as Germany would have done. markets.  She o f f e r e d h e r s e l f i n other  The v e r y t h i n g t h a t the Germans dreaded  a v o i d happened.  England  She  and v/ished t o  f u l f i l l e d h e r t h r e a t and turned t o  France and R u s s i a . D i s t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n p o i s o n the r e l a t i o n s h i p between n a t i o n s as between i n d i v i d u a l p e o p l e . I.Brandenburg - op. c i t . p.171.  I t i s not quite clear  34. where t h i s o r i g i n a t e d .  S a l i s b u r y , i n s p i t e of h i s c o u r t e s y ,  r e v e a l e d h i s d i s t r u s t of Germany. pected by H o l s t e i n , who t o accuse  i n h i s t u r n , was  sus-  even c a r r i e d h i s s u s p i c i o n so f a r as  S a l i s b u r y of u s i n g other n a t i o n s to p u l l England's  c h e s t n u t s out of the f i r e , and European war and  He,  i n which England 1.  take a l l the p r o f i t s .  from the o f f i c i a l s atmosphere how  of w a i t i n g and p l a n n i n g f o r a would p l a y the p a r t of  onlooker  T h i s a t t i t u d e of d i s t r u s t  to the p u b l i c and  the p r e s s .  spread  I n such  an  c o u l d an a l l i a n c e be formed, and i f formed,  how  c o u l d i t endure? Assured way,  of support each c o u n t r y might have gone i t s own  s e e k i n g i t s own  i n t e r e s t s by a g g r e s s i v e means.  Neither  would have allowed the o t h e r to i n f l u e n c e i t s p o l i c y .  Britain  f e a r e d t h i s i n Germany; Germany, p r o b a b l y s e n s i n g t h i s s u s p i c i o n , f e a r e d England i o n was  might leave her i n the l u r c h .  i m p o s s i b l e . ' The  situat-  a l l i a n c e might have kept peace i n  Europe, but i t would p r o b a b l y have been through F r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s and  The  inspiring  c o - o p e r a t i o n up to a p o i n t were p o s s i b l e  and remained so f o r some y e a r s ; but so l o n g as the  statesmen  of the F i l h e l m i n i c E r a were i n c o n t r o l a f o r m a l a l l i a n c e out of the  fear.  was  question.  Brandenburg's c o n c l u s i o n i s f a s c i n a t i n g i n i t s s i m p l i c i t y and h i n t of tragedy;  11  They had  o f f e r e d us t h e i r hand and  had  l.B.D. vol.2.p.84.No.96.Holstein to C h i r o l , Jan. 3, 1902. G.D. vol.3.p.146. XVII. l o l . Memorandum by H o l s t e i n , Oct.31, 1901.  35. had withdrawn i t when we made the c o n d i t i o n s of acceptance too onerous f o r f u l f i l m e n t .  They n e v e r came back t o u s . 1.  i n s t e a d t o our enemies."  1.Brandenburg - op. c i t . p.181.  They went  36.  CHAPTER I I . Anglo-German R e l a t i o n s D u r i n g these years her  1898-1904.  when England was  era of " s p l e n d i d i s o l a t i o n " and  i a n c e s , her r e l a t i o n s w i t h  s l o w l y emerging from  c a s t i n g out f e e l e r s f o r  all-  Germany never l a c k e d an element of  u n c e r t a i n t y t h a t l e n t s p i c e to even the most c a s u a l i n t e r c o u r s e . On  the whole, the d e s i r e t o work i n harmony predominated - p a r t -  l y because Germany f a n c i e d she  c o u l d g a i n more by so d o i n g ^  p a r t l y because she d i d not f e e l s u f f i c i e n t l y s t r o n g on the to arouse the B r i t i s h l i o n too mueh. a genuine d e s i r e to l i v e  Germany's e r r a t i c p o l i c y .  was  doubt i n view of  T h i s p a r t i c u l a r p e r i o d witnessed  l a t e r toward R u s s i a  F r e n c h Agreements of 1904 of  to d i s t r u s t and  of the Anglo-German a l l i a n c e , and  toward Prance and  sea  on f r i e n d l y terms w i t h Germany - a  d e s i r e which l a t e r gave way  the f a i l u r e  On the B r i t i s h s i d e  and  and  the g r a d u a l  culminating  swing  i n the Anglo-  the Anglo-Russian u n d e r s t a n d i n g  1907. Thorny problems occupied  during  these s i x y e a r s .  b r i n g the d i s p u t e s  Caution  Yangtsze T r e a t y , a l l taxed The  and  coolness  to a p e a c e f u l s e t t l e m e n t .  C o l o n i e s , the South A f r i c a n War,  entatives.  the diplomats of b o t h  countries  were e s s e n t i a l to The  Portugese  the Venezuelan Q u e s t i o n ,  the powers of the  official  the  repres-  Governments found t h e i r t a s k rendered more d i f f -  i c u l t by the v i o l e n c e  of p u b l i c o p i n i o n i n b o t h c o u n t r i e s .  Out-  37. b u r s t s o f h o s t i l i t y towards  Germany i n the E n g l i s h Press made  i t h a r d f o r S a l i s b u r y and Lansdowne t o p r e s e r v e t o l e r a b l y icable relations o f f i c i a l l y . of  The extremely a n t i - B r i t i s h  amtone  the German Press aroused the i r e o f the B r i t i s h and i n c r e a s -  ed the c o m p l i c a t i o n s .  There were, however, p e r i o d s of r e l a t i v e  calm between the storms. As always  Germany asked too much f o r h e r f r i e n d s h i p , or  a c t e d t o o i m p u l s i v e l y , or had aims c o n s i d e r a b l y d i f f e r e n t those o f B r i t a i n . er  The r a s h , bombastic  u t t e r a n c e s of the K a i s -  brought s u s p i c i o n on Germany's m o t i v e s .  restless striving for f i r s t  from  The new  Empire's  p l a c e among n a t i o n s i n e v i t a b l y  brought h e r i n t o c o n f l i c t w i t h the proud m i s t r e s s of the seas. On many o c c a s i o n s B r i t a i n proved y i e l d i n g and c o n c i l i a t o r y ; h u t she would n o t always  pay the h i g h p r i c e s Germany demanded.  R e c o n c i l i a t i o n w i t h Prance d i d n o t prove as c o s t l y as Germany had f o n d l y imagined, so B r i t a i n t u r n e d t o the German enemy. E c k a r d s t e i n ' s p r o p h e c i e s , so l o n g scorned as nafive and impossi b l e by H o l s t e i n and Bulow, came t r u e w i t h the f o r m a t i o n of the Anglo-French E n t e n t e . The f i r s t  important agreement o f t h i s p e r i o d was t h a t be-  tween England and Germany over the Portugese C o l o n i e s i n South Africa.  I n t h i s case the i n i t i a t i v e  came from the German Gov-  ernment, H H d was somewhat r e l u c t a n t l y taken up by the E n g l i s h . In  1898 the Portugese f i n a n c i a l p o s i t i o n gave cause f o r c o n s i d -  erable anxiety. al  A l o a n seemed n e c e s s a r y , so the  Governor-Gener-  o f Portugese E a s t A f r i c a sounded P a r i s , London, and B e r l i n  38. on the  subject.  vocated  d i s c u s s i n g the f u t u r e of the  A f r i c a and and  In a memorandum of May  1, 1898,  Bertie  Portugese p o s s e s s i o n s  privileges.  in  He b e l i e v e d Germany l i k e l y to ste-p i n and, 1."  t r e a t i e s England was essions; while  some of the  Colonies.  By  in  ancient  i n t e r e s t e d i n the f a t e of Portugese poss-  the p o s i t i o n of these c o l o n i e s i n A f r i c a made  t h e i r f a t e of importance t o the B r i t i s h Empire. i n t o the hands of a power h o s t i l e were almost c e r t a i n to a r i s e .  to England,  Since Prance and  I f they  fell  complications Germany a l s o  some commercial i n t e r e s t s i n v o l v e d , they were not  disposed  to s i t c a l m l y by w h i l e B r i t a i n came t o an arrangement w i t h u g a l and walked away w i t h The  ad-  o f f e r i n g a l o a n t o P o r t u g a l i n r e t u r n f o r guarantees  r e t u r n f o r a loan, acquire  had  Mr.  the  Germans d i s c o v e r e d  ador i n London, M.  Port-  spoils. t h a t on June 3 the  Portugese Ambass-  de S o v e r a l , l e f t L i s b o n w i t h i n s t r u c t i o n s to  o b t a i n a l o a n by mortgaging the revenues from the South A f r i c a n possessions  of P o r t u g a l , r i g h t s of s o v e r e i g n t y b e i n g 2.  i n the mortgage. interfere  There-  German Ambassador c a l l e d upon S a l i s b u r y to  the terms under which de S o v e r a l proposed to r a i s e  money f o r h i s Government.  As  Chamberlain '©as c a r r y i n g on  d i s c u s s i o n s S a l i s b u r y c o u l d supply no s i n c e he wished t o m a i n t a i n 1. B.D. 2. G.D.  i t time f o r Germany to  s i n c e i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s were concerned.  f o r e on June 14 the enquire  Billow c o n s i d e r e d  involved  information.  the  However,  the b e s t r e l a t i o n s w i t h Germany he  vol.1.p.44.No.65.Memorandum by B e r t i e , May 1, 1898. vol.3.p.30-1.XIV. 266. Billow to Munster,June 18, 1898.  3 would i n due  time i n f o r m  9.  the Ambassador of any  steps  t h a t might 1.  concern the r i g h t s or l e g i t i m a t e i n t e r e s t s of Germany. did we  not  s a t i s f y Germany.  This  H a t z f e l d t asked S a l i s b u r y "whether  would j o i n w i t h Germany i n a common a c t i o n i n r e g a r d  f i n a n c i a l operations  which the  Government of P o r t u g a l  t o c a r r y through."  S a l i s b u r y thought the whole a f f a i r  ed o n l y England and  Portugal.  s t a t u s quo,  but  to  the  desired concern-  B r i t a i n wished t o m a i n t a i n  the  i f i t bacame n e c e s s a r y to d i s t r i b u t e t e r r i t o r y 2.  he would c o n s u l t Germany. Bulow was  disposed  to t h i n k i t would be  vantage t o j o i n Germany b e f o r e ugal.  Germany had  benefit.  She  was  v i c e s g r a t i s , but England was  ad-  coming t o an agreement w i t h  h e l p e d England i n . E g y p t not  to B r i t i s h  without d e r i v i n g  i n the p o s i t i o n to r e n d e r p o l i t i c a l  expected some r e t u r n .  Port-  He had  the i d e a  g e t t i n g ready v e r y q u i e t l y t o s e i z e a  any  serthat  considerable  p o r t i o n of A f r i c a n t e r r i t o r y w i t h o u t c o n s u l t i n g German i n t e r e s t s . Accordingly,  he  i n s t r u c t e d H a t z f e l d t to ask S a l i s b u r y h i s views  on the f u t u r e p a r t i t i o n of Portugese c o l o n i e s between England and  Germany, a l s o whether he would be  binding  agreement on the  i t i o n . and  question  ready to undertake a  i f Germany gave f u l l 3.  c o n s i d e r a t i o n to B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s .  S a l i s b u r y had  recogn-  On June  23  an i n t e r v i e w w i t h H a t z f e l d t d u r i n g which the  latt-  e r suggested two schemes - f i r s t , a p a r a l l e l l o a n made by Eng1. B.D. vol.1.p.48.Ho.66. S a l i s b u r y to Gough, June 14, 1898. 2. B.D. vol.1.p.49.Ho.67. S a l i s b u r y to Gough, June 21, 1898. 3. G.D. vol.3.p.32.XlV. 272. Bulow to H a t z f e l d t , June 22, 1898.  40. l a n d and Germany t o P o r t u g a l , the s e c u r i t y o f each l o a n t o be customs revenue  o f c e r t a i n c o l o n i a l t e r r i t o r y t o which the r e s -  p e c t i v e c o u n t r i e s would have f i r s t  c l a i m i n case o f " c e r t a i n  e v e n t u a l i t i e s " ; second, t h a t Germany would give up t o B r i t a i n Delagoa Bay and the Mozambique P r o v i n c e up t b the Zambezi, i f B r i t a i n would a l l o w Germany t o take Portugese t e r r i t o r y beyond the  Zambezi up t o the Rovuma and the S h i r 3 , and the Colony o f  Angola i n case the Portugese Empire justice  fell.  H a t z f e l d t based the  of the German c l a i m on s e r v i c e s rendered by Germany t o  England i n the p a s t .  S a l i s b u r y r e q u e s t e d time f o r c o n s i d e r a t -  ion.!. In  the meantime Germany took steps a t L i s b o n t o prevent 2.  an agreement w i t h o u t German consent.  To the E n g l i s h she u r g -  ed speed and s i l e n c e i n order t o exclude F r a n c e .  England, how-  e v e r , was n o t d i s p o s e d t o r u s h i n t o such an agreement.  She de-  s i r e d above a l l t o m a i n t a i n the s t a t u s quo and p r o l o n g the l i f e of  the Portugese Empire.  Knowing the German C o l o n i a l ambitions  S a l i s b u r y d i s t r u s t e d t h i s sudden o u t b u r s t o f enthusiasm. i n g l y , the n e g o t i a t i o n s dragged a l i t t l e o r t s and a s s u r a n c e s .  been f e r t i l e  i n s p i t e of German e f f -  As u s u a l S a l i s b u r y f e l t 3.  a s k i n g t o o much and g i v i n g too l i t t l e .  Accord  the Germans were  H a t z f e l d t , who had  i n s u g g e s t i o n s f o r the b a s i s o f the u n d e r s t a n d i n g ,  f e a r e d t h i s would cause h i s Government t o break o f f d i s c u s s i o n s . 1. B.D. 2. G.D. 1898; 1898. 3. B.D.  vol.1.p.52.Ho.70. S a l i s b u r y t o Gough, June 23, 1898. vol.3.p.35.Tattenbach t o German F o r e i g n O f f i c e , June 30 B.D.vol.l.p.54. No.73.MacDonnell t o S a l i s b u r y , J u l y 6, vol.1.p.58.No.78.Salisbury t o Gough, J u l y 20, 1898.  41. He t o l d S a l i s b u r y i t would be a s p l e n d i d o p p o r t u n i t y f o r e s t a b l i s h i n g good r e l a t i o n s l o s t .  Germany c o u l d n o t stand a l o n e .  t h i s agreement f a i l e d t o m a t e r i a l i s e 1.  If  she would have t o t u r n t o  Russia. Conversations  c o n t i n u e d , each s i d e t r y i n g t o secure the  t e r r i t o r y b e s t s u i t e d t o i t s own i n t e r e s t s . b u r y went on l e a v e and l e f t Balfour.  I n August  Salis-  the F o r e i g n O f f i c e i n the hands of  Mr B e r t i e , i n a memorandum of August 10, 1898, s t r e s s -  ed the advantages t o be d e r i v e d by Germany from the proposed 2. agreement, and q u e s t i o n e d the presence  o f any f o r England.  J u s t as a s e t t l e m e n t seemed t o be i n s i g h t , f r e s h  difficulties  arose over the i n c l u s i o n of Timor. Germany r e f u s e d t o continue i f t h i s t e r r i t o r y were n o t a s s i g n e d t o h e r . England was r e l u c t 3. ant t o agree.  I n r e p l y t o the statement  t h a t B a l f o u r com-  p l a i n e d Germany d i d n o t h i n g b u t t h r e a t e n and n e i t h e r conceded nor promised  a n y t h i n g , R i c h t h o f e n s a i d i t was  incomprehensible  at the moment "when we are l e t t i n g England have South A f r i c a and are ready t o f u l f i l  our promises.  I n our eyes the agree-  ment was t o be the s t a r t i n g - p o i n t o f a j o i n t c o l o n i a l p o l i c y . Our demands are the minimum f o r our l e a v i n g the Boers t o them4. selves."  So eager were the Germans f o r a s e t t l e m e n t t h a t the  K a i s e r i n a c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h L a s c e l l e s went so f a r as t o say, 1. B.D.vol.1.p.58.No.78.Salisbury t o Gough, J u l y 20, 1898. 2. B.D.vol.1.p.60,No.81.Memorandum by B e r t i e , Aug.10, 1898-. 3. G.D.vol.3.p.37.XIV.321.Richthofen t o H a t z f e l d t , Aug.19, 1898 4 . I b i d ; a l s o B.D.vol.1.p.67.No.85.Balfour t o L a s c e l l e s , Aug. 19, 1898.  42. "unless the n e g o t i a t i o n s i n progress d u r i n g the l a s t few  days  between my Ambassador and Mr. B a l f o u r l e a d to no more a c c e p t a b l e r e s u l t than they had up t o the p r e s e n t , the continued presence 1. of my Ambassador i n London would be s u p e r f l u o u s j u s t nov/." On August 30, 1898  the Convention was  signed.  i v e areas of i n f l u e n c e were c a r e f u l l y d e f i n e d .  The  respect  A . s e c r e t Convent  i o n agreed t o oppose the i n t e r v e n t i o n of any t h i r d power i n the s p e c i f i e d t e r r i t o r y ; w h i l e a s e c r e t note prevented_one  Govern-  ment's a c c e p t i n g c o n c e s s i o n s from P o r t u g a l u n l e s s the other 2. Government r e c e i v e d s i m i l a r c o n c e s s i o n s . I n view of the c o m p l i c a t i o n s P o r t u g a l had d e c i d e d not t o 3. borrow money. She d i d approach Prance, but the n e g o t i a t i o n s never m a t e r i a l i z e d .  A f t e r the Agreement had been s i g n e d B a l f o u r  t o l d de S o v e r a l t h a t Germany and England were ready t o make a 4. l o a n on v e r y easy terms. Germany r e s e n t e d B r i t a i n ' s a c t i o n i n not keeping the agreement e n t i r e l y s e c r e t . 5. postponed  i n d e f i n i t e l y i t s c a r r y i n g out.  She f e l t  this  I n case the French  caused t r o u b l e by p e r s u a d i n g P o r t u g a l to borrow from them Hatzf e l d t suggested to B a l f o u r t h a t they i n t i m a t e t o P o r t u g a l t h a t England and Germany would not permit i n t e r v e n t i o n by a t h i r d 6. Power. Regarding t h i s S a l i s b u r y wrote the f o l l o w i n g minute,  1. G.D.vol.3.p.38. XIV.334. Note. 2. B.D.vol.1.p.71.No.90.Balfour t o L a s c e l l e s , Aug. 31, 1898.; p.73.No.91.Balfour to H a t z f e l d t ; p.74.Englosure In No.92. August 30, 1898. 3. B.D.vol.1.p.57.No.76.Salisbury t o M a c d o n n e l l , J u l y 13,.1898. 4. B.D.vol.1.p.75.No.93.Balfour to S o v e r a l , Aug. 31, 1898. 5. G.D.vol.3.p.40. German n o t e . 6. B.D.vol.1.p.75.No.94.Balfour t o L a s c e l l e s , Sept. 1, 1898.  43. "I expected t h i s .  They are not content t o w a i t f o r events t o  g i v e them t h e i r share of Portugese t e r r i t o r y but wish to f o r c e 1. the  pace  of d e s t i n y . "  On October 14, 1899 an Anglo-Portugese Agreement r e a f f i r m ed the terms o f the o l d t r e a t i e s between England and and made arrangements  Portugal,  whereby P o r t u g a l , andertook not to a l l o w  the  passage  of arms and munitions a c r o s s Portugese t e r r i t o r y t o  the  Boers i n event of a South A f r i c a n War, 2.  c l a i m n e u t r a l i t y i n such a war.  and agreed not t o pro  When t h i s s o - c a l l e d Windsor  T r e a t y became known i t aroused a storm of p r o t e s t i n Germany. N e a r l y e v e r y German o f f i c i a l f e l t  i t t o be c o n t r a r y to the Anglo  German agreement - a t y p i c a l example of A l b i o n ' s p e r f i d y . says i t was  "perfidious duplicity."  Billow  England had gone behind  Germany's back t o r e n d e r i n e f f e c t u a l the t r e a t y over the P o r t 3. ugese C o l o n i e s . He even goes f u r t h e r and accuses the P r i n c e of Wales of p a r t i c i p a t i n g p e r s o n a l l y and e n e r g e t i c a l l y i n under4. mining the Anglo-German t r e a t y over the Portugese  Colonies.  A l l the d i s c u s s i o n , a l l the eagerness, a l l the m i s t r u s t , a l l the i r r i t a t i o n had been to no purpose. never put i n t o p r a c t i c e . for  a c q u i r i n g new  The Agreement  Germany's schemes ( i f she had  t e r r i t o r y came t o naught, not because  was any)  of Eng-  land's l a t e r renewal of o l d Portugese t r e a t i e s , and l a c k of 1. B.D.vol.1.p.76.Minute by S a l i s b u r y . 2. B.D.vol.1.p.93-4. Text of Agreement. 3. Billow - Memoirs - vol.1.p.327. 4 . I b i d . p.326.  44. f a i t h , as they b e l i e v e d , but because the n e g o t i a t i o n s had ed P o r t u g a l ' s  s u s p i c i o n s and made her  arous-  cautious.  F o l l o w i n g t h i s Agreement came the t r o u b l e over Samoa b r i n g i n g w i t h i t g r e a t excitement i n Germany.  In 1889  by the  Convention the Samoan I s l a n d s were p l a c e d under the t r o l of B r i t a i n , Germany, and  the U n i t e d S t a t e s .  when the King, M a l i e t o a , d i e d i n August 1898. had  provided  f o r the l e g a l e l e c t i o n of a new  Powers d i v i d e d when the the  joint  The  k i n g , but  and  I l l e g a l a c t i o n on the p a r t of the and  t o a c t s of v i o l e n c e i n Samoa.  Germany, who  had  s t a r t i n g - p o i n t of her  a sentimental  i n t e r e s t i n Samoa as  c o l o n i a l a s p i r a t i o n s , had  p a r t i t i o n of the group so arranged  the  long wanted a  as to give her the I s l a n d of  A c t i n g on Bulow's i n s t r u c t i o n s at the b e g i n n i n g  September 1898  the  appointed  German r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s l e d to p r o t e s t s from the B r i t i s h  Upolu.  began  Convention  l o c a l c h i e f s e l e c t e d a Pretender  the son of the o l d r u l e r .  con-  Trouble  C h i e f J u s t i c e d e c l a r e d the e l e c t i o n i l l e g a l and  Americans and  Berlin  of  H a t z f e l d t approached the B r i t i s h F o r e i g n O f f i c e  w i t h a p r o p o s a l f o r p a r t i t i o n of the i s l a n d s as the b e s t s o l u t 1. i o n of the d i f f i c u l t y . Germany was ready to o f f e r concessions 2. t o induce  England to agree to the p r o p o s a l .  found B a l f o u r a t t e n t i v e but non-committal. w r i t e t o S a l i s b u r y , but d i d not the Tonga I s l a n d s s i n c e she  Hatzfeldt . He  :  promised to  see what England would g a i n by  c o u l d have taken them l o n g ago  had  1. G.D.vol.3.p.42-3.XlV 567.Bulow to H a t z f e l d t , Aug.31, 1898; p.43. X i v : 5 6 9 . H a t z f e l d t to German F o r e i g n O f f i c e , 2. G.D.vol.3.p.44.German Note. (Sept, 1, 1898.  45. 1. she wanted.  S a l i s b u r y s u c c e s s f u l l y vetoed  the s u g g e s t i o n by  t e l e g r a p h i n g t o the F o r e i g n O f f i c e t h a t he d i d not t h i n k anyt h i n g c o u l d be done about Samoa because A u s t r a l i a would o b j e c t 2. t o any a l t e r a t i o n . The  q u e s t i o n remained I n abeyance u n t i l January 1899,  when the German r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s put themselves i n the wrong. The  s i t u a t i o n caused f a r more d i s c u s s i o n on the German s i d e  than on the B r i t i s h .  On January 20 the Emperor c a l l e d a t the  B r i t i s h Embassy i n B e r l i n t o d i s c u s s Samoa and t o s t r e s s the a d v i s a b i l i t y o f a more s a t i s f a c t o r y arrangement. 3.  Billow on the  other hand thought the time n o t y e t opportune.  Since  Salis-  b u r y showed no d i s p o s i t i o n t o do a n y t h i n g f o r Germany i n Samoa or elsewhere H a t z f e l d t a d v i s e d d i s c u s s i o n s of a l l i a n c e between 4. France  and Germany t o b r i n g h i m t o h i s senses.  came convinced  t h a t England was  d r i v e Germany out o f Samoa. might.give  Germany be-  u s i n g the U n i t e d S t a t e s t o  Chamberlain suggested  Germany  up the Samoa group and take compensation elsewhere  s i n c e h e r i n t e r e s t s there were d e c r e a s i n g . 5.  H a t z f e l d t maintain-  ed German i n t e r e s t s were g r e a t i n Upolu.  Billow f e a r e d the  good r e l a t i o n s between England and Germany, which had been i n 1. G.D.vol.3.p.44.XIV.570.Hatzfeldt t o German F o r e i g n O f f i c e , evidence ince the agreement r e g a r d i n g the Portugese C o l o n i e s , Sept. s 2, 1898. 2. G.D.vol.3.p.45.XlV.571.Hatzfeldt t o German F o r e i g n O f f i c e , Sept. 8, 1898. 3. B . D . v o l . 1 . p . I O 8 V N 0 . 1 2 8 . L a s c e l l e s t o S a l i s b u r y , Jan.20, 1899. 4 • G.D. v o l . 3. r>. 48.XIV. 57 9 . H a t z f e l d t t o German F o r e i g n O f f i c e , Feb. 23, 1899. 5.G.D.vol.3.p.54.XIV.585.Hatzfeldt t o German F o r e i g n O f f i c e , Mar. 25, 1899.  46. would be s p o i l t i f England p e r s i s t e d i n t r e a t i n g Germany so h a r s h l y over Samoa. ment to bow  P u b l i c o p i n i o n would not a l l o w the Govern-  t o England's wishes even i f i t so d e s i r e d .  The  bombardment by the B r i t i s h and American s h i p s , d u r i n g which the  German Consulate r e c e i v e d damage, had i n c r e a s e d the i l l -  f e e l i n g i n Germany.  Moreover the B r i t i s h had expressed no r e -  g r e t whereas the U n i t e d S t a t e s had a p o l o g i s e d .  I f England r e -  f u s e d t o guarantee t h a t she would uphold the p r e v i o u s Germany would have t o r e c a l l her ambassador  treaty  from London.  Eng1.  l a n d would not behave l i k e t h i s i f Germany had a s t r o n g navy. The Emperor  grew v e r y h e a t e d over the E n g l i s h treatment of  Germany i n Samoa.  He r e g a r d e d i t as a p e r s o n a l matter and  felt  a l l h i s e f f o r t s towards an u n d e r s t a n d i n g had been i n v a i n . England p e r s i s t e d i n treating.Germany as a n o n e n t i t y ; but she would l i v e t o f i n d them s t r o n g , then perhaps i t would be too late to repent.  He g r e a t l y f e a r e d p u b l i c o p i n i o n would prevent  his  p r o p o s e d ' p l e a s u r e v i s i t t o Cowes which would be v e r y d i s 2. appointing. H i s resentment f ound^further e x p r e s s i o n i n a l e t t e r t o Queen V i c t o r i a i n which he abused B r i t i s h p o l i c y , and 3.  harshly c r i t i c i s e d Salisbury.  V  Deeply h u r t , the Queen admin-  i s t e r e d grave r e p r o o f and forwarded a memorandum by S a l i s b u r y 4. r e f u t i n g the K a i s e r ' s a c c u s a t i o n s . 1. G.D.vol.3.p.56-7.XIV.590.Billow t o German F o r e i g n O f f i c e , A p r i l 1, 1899.; a l s o B.D.vol.1.p.111.Ho.133.Lascelles to S a l i s b u r y , March 24, 1899. 2. B.D.vol.1.p.117.Ho.141.Lascelles t o S a l i s b u r y , May 26, 1899. 3. G.D.vol.3.p.64.XIV.617.Emperor to Queen V i c t o r i a , May22,1899. 4. G.D.vol.3.p.64.XIV.620.Queen V i c t o r i a to the Emoeror, Junel2, 1899.  47. On A p r i l 4 S a l i s b u r y t e l e g r a p h e d would observe the  the assurance t h a t  terms of the B e r l i n Convention.  e x i s t e d i n England and  Samoa t h a t Germany was  England and  States  the U n i t e d  out of the  t h e r d i f f i c u l t i e s a commission was s i t u a t i o n and  he  The f e e l i n g  t r y i n g to d r i v e 1.  islands.  dispatched  After fur-  to i n v e s t i g a t e  make recommendations f o r a s e t t l e m e n t  of the  the  ques-  tion. T h i s Commission a d v i s e d  against a continuation  c o n t r o l , i n the i n t e r e s t s of peace i n Samoa. S a l i s b u r y to suggest some way refused and  to be  fturried.  He  saw  ain's surrendering he was  out  of the d i f f i c u l t y .  Salisbury  no  immediate need f o r  settlement  island.  Germany wanted  A u s t r a l i a would o b j e c t to B r i t -  these i s l a n d s to a f o r e i g n power.  convinced as he  Moreover,  t o l d L a s c e l l e s t h a t Germany was  the p o i n t not because of the value  of the  o p i n i o n but because the K a i s e r had  s e t h i s hear$ on i t .  So n e g o t i a t i o n s  joint  H a t z f e l d t urged  s t r e s s e d the problem of a f a i r d i v i s i o n .  Upolp, the most v a l u a b l e  of the  i s l a n d s or of p u b l i c  ©ontinued to d r a g on and  German Government t o the verge of d e s p a i r .  pushing  on d r i v i n g the  On September  22  S a l i s b u r y informed L a s c e l l e s t h a t England had agreed t o a r b i t 3. r a t i o n by the K i n g of Norway and Sweden. Then d i f f i c u l t i e s 4. arose a g a i n over the r u l e s f o r the guidance of the a r b i t e r s . 1. B.D.vol.1.p.113.No.137.Lascelles to S a l i s b u r y , A p r i l 6, 1899. a l s o E n c l o s u r e i n No.137.Salisbury to L a s c e l l e s , A p r i l 4, 1899 2. B.D.vol.1.p.121.No.146.Salisbury to L a s c e l l e s , S e p t . 15, 1899. 3. B.D.vol.Ip. 124.No.148.Salisbury to L a s c e l l e s , S e p t . 22, 1899. 4. B.D.vol.1.p.125.No.149.Salisbury to L a s c e l l e s , O c t . 6, 1899.  48-. In the midst of t h i s l a s t phase came the Boer War. German f r i e n d s h i p assumed a new importance. Europe was w i t h the B o e r s .  A visit  With t h a t ,  The sympathy o f  o f the K a i s e r  t o England  would show t h a t B r i t a i n had a t l e a s t one f r i e n d on the C o n t i n ent.  The German Government found themselves i n a somewhat  awkward p o s i t i o n .  By making c a p i t a l out o f England's  i o n they c o u l d t r y t o f o r c e a s e t t l e m e n t . l e a d t o an o u t c r y i n B r i t a i n a g a i n s t ness o f the Germans. a favourable  isolat-  Such a c t i o n would  the b r u t a l i t y and s e l f i s h -  On the other hand i f they d i d not r e a c h  agreement p u b l i c o p i n i o n i n Germany would be an-  g r y and d i s g u s t e d .  D u r i n g an i n t e r v i e w w i t h Chamberlain, Eck-  a r d s t e i n urged him t o accept Germany's v e r y moderate  proposals.  Y/hen Chamberlain h e s i t a t e d , E c k a r d s t e i n warned him p u b l i c  opin-  i o n might f o r c e German p o l i c y , h i t h e r t o l o y a l t o England, i n t o another d i r e c t i o n .  Chamberlain immediately r a i s e d the c r y o f  blackmail; but Eckardstein him  t h a t the p r o p o s a l s 1.  r e f u t e d the a c c u s a t i o n by reminding  had been made weeks b e f o r e  war was  thought p r o b a b l e . The  a f f a i r was s e t t l e d by England's y i e l d i n g .  r e c e i v e d Upolu and s a l v e d h e r wounded p r i d e . i c a t i o n took place  on F e b r u a r y 16, 1900.  wrote t o S a l i s b u r y t h a t R i c h t h o f e n settlement.  Germany  The f i n a l  ratif-  On t h a t day L a s c e l l e s  was d e l i g h t e d w i t h the  He a s s u r e d L a s c e l l e s t h a t the German Government  would i n no way mix themselves up w i t h the Boer War and would l.G.D.vol.3.p.68.XlV.637. H a t z f e l d t t o German F o r e i g n O f f i c e , Sept. 20, 1899.  49. d e c l i n e t o i n t e r v e n e i f asked by other powers. The whole a f f a i r  1.  seems r a t h e r a storm i n a teacup.  Yet  the i l l - f e e l i n g aroused i n Germany might e a s i l y have proved a s e r i o u s menace t o England i n h e r hour o f d i f f i c u l t y . ans c o u l d n o t see why England wished such a s m a l l p i e c e o f t e r r i t o r y .  t o stand i n t h e i r way over  On the other hand had Germ-  any any g r e a t e r c l a i m then h e r p a r t n e r s ? t o see the j u s t i c e  The Germ-  The E n g l i s h  failed  o f the German demand.and o b j e c t e d t o the  b a r e l y v e i l e d t h r e a t s . . B r i t a i n c o u l d have surrendered a l l c l a i m i n f a v o u r o f Germany, b u t such an a c t would have s e t a dangerous  precedent.  I f the German Navy had been l a r g e r the  K a i s e r might have been tempted utterances.  t o back up some o f h i s bombastic  However, the d i s p u t e was s e t t l e d i n Germany's  f a v o u r and the new Empire  proceeded  t o Demonstrate  the v a l u e of i t s f r i e n d s h i p i n time of war.  to B r i t a i n  " I t was h i g h l y  s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t the n e g o t i a t i o n s over these c o m p a r a t i v e l y minor matters should n e a r l y have caused a b r e a c h i n t h e i r lomatic r e l a t i o n s .  The way i n which German p o l i c y  dip-  invariably  opened f i r e a t once w i t h i t s b i g g e s t guns was extremely a n t i p a t h e t i c t o E n g l i s h statesmen, who were more t r a n q u i l and t o l e r a n t i n t h e i r d i p l o m a t i c i n t e r c o u r s e and v e r y s e n s i t i v e t o 2. threats." The Hague Conference i n the summer of 1899 accomplished  1. B.D.vol.1.p.130.No.156.Lascelles 2. Brandenburg - op. c i t . - p.129.  t o S a l i s b u r y , Feb. 16, 1900.  50. little tic,  of m a t e r i a l v a l u e .  hut i t f e l l  None of the Powers proved e n t h u s i a s -  to Germany t o b r i n g odium upon h e r s e l f f o r de-  c l i n i n g t o l i m i t armaments or submit  to a r b i t r a t i o n .  VJhen  B r i t a i n suggested the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a permanent t r i b u n a l Germany o b j e c t e d , but f o r the sake of appearances  had to con1.  sent t o a m o d i f i e d v o l u h t a r y s o r t of a r b i t r a t i o n  machinery.  If  a n y t h i n g the.Conference  i n c r e a s e d the i m p r e s s i o n , a l r e a d y  e x i s t i n g , t h a t Germany was i n t e n s e l y m i l i t a r i s t i c and a menace to peace p r o p o s a l s . A c t u a l l y she was no more so than the other 2. powers• The War  q u e s t i o n of the German a t t i t u d e i n the South  caused B r i t a i n a c e r t a i n amount of a n x i e t y i n view  Kruger Telegram e p i s o d e .  of the  At the time of the Jameson R a i d  German sympathy had been w i t h the B o e r s . u l a r wished  African  The K a i s e r i n p a r t i c -  to take some a c t i o n t o show t h i s sympathy.  c h a l l - i n h i s d i a r y f o r January 3, 1896  Mars-  stated that at a confer-  ence the K a i s e r had made w i l d p r o p o s a l s f o r a s s i s t i n g the Boers 1. B.D.vol.l.p.229. Note 1. 2. Lowes D i c k i n s o n - The I n t e r n a t i o n a l Anarchy - p.347-52. There i s abundant evidence t h a t few of the statesmen of Europe b e l i e v e d a n y t h i n g c o u l d or would be done about armaments. The o f f i c i a l French r e p o r t on the Conference s a i d "From the f i r s t meeting i t was easy to see t h a t the d e l e g a t e of every Power, w h i l e a p p e a r i n g animated by the d e s i r e to respond t o the h u m a n i t a r i a n i n t e n t i o n s of t h e i r own Governments, d e r i v e d e i t h e r from t h e i r own c o n v i c t i o n s or from the i n s t r u c t i o n s of t h e i r Governments (the same Governments t h a t had the 'humanitarian i n t e n t i o n s ' ) , a r e s o l v e not t o accept any measure which might r e s u l t i n r e a l l y d i m i n i s h i n g the d e f e n s i v e or o f f e n s i v e f o r c e s of t h e i r c o u n t r y , or even i n l i m i t i n g those f o r c e s $ " W i l s o n - The War G u i l t - p.69. A l s o supports these views.  51. F i n a l l y at Marschall's congratulatory  suggestion  the K a i s e r agreed to send a  t e l e g r a m t o Kruger.  D i r e c t o r of the  The  widow of Kayser,  C o l o n i a l Department, claims  t h a t her  thought of the  telegram and  made the f i r s t d r a f t .  or, P r i n c e von  Hohenlohe, t o l d h i s son t h a t he had 1.  t e l e g r a m " t o a v e r t something worse." the Kruger Telegram was  sent and  husband  The  Chancell-  agreed to  S u f f i c e i t to say  On  Germans i n  London c o u l d do h a r d l y any b u s i n e s s w i t h the E n g l i s h .  the  r e c e i v e d many i n s u l t i n g and  threatening  of p u b l i c o p i n i o n would have been behind i t . c o n t r o l the  Government.  Even  he,  letters.  Government l o s t i t s head and wished f o r war,  England c o u l d  that  January 21 H a t z f e l d t  wrote t o H o l s t e i n p r i v a t e l y t h a t f o r a s h o r t time the  Had  the  aroused a storm of anger i n  England, w h i l e p l e a s i n g the B o e r s .  h i m s e l f , had  the  the whole  Public opinion i n  S a l i s b u r y had  maintained  a c o n c i l i a t o r y a t t i t u d e towards Germany i n the b e l i e f t h a t time 2. would b r i n g calmness. and  The  German i n t e r f e r e n c e and  the r e l a t i o n s between the  i r r i t a t i o n remained f o r some time, obvious b a c k i n g of the Boers made  Governments d i f f i c u l t .  t h a t even as l a t e as June 1897 remained - P r i n c e A l b r e c h t procession "If  on June 22 was  Billow  some of the b i t t e r n e s s  of P r u s s i a r i d i n g i n the repeatedly  informed by  the  claims  still  ceremonial crowds,  you want to send a t e l e g r a m to Oom  Kruger, y o u ' l l f i n d a 3. Post O f f i c e round the corner on the r i g h t . " German sympathy continued to be on the s i d e of the Boers 1. G.P.Gooch - Recent R e v e l a t i o n s i n European Diplomacy - p.9. 2. G.D.vol.2.p.403.XI.53.Hatzfeldt to H o l s t e i n , Jan. 21, 1896. 3. Billow - Memoirs - v o l . 1 . p . 16.  52. d u r i n g the subsequent t r o u b l e s .  The  Government, however,  was  not w i l l i n g t o r i s k a b r e a c h w i t h England f o r the sake of the South A f r i c a n R e p u b l i c .  During  the  s p r i n g and  summer of  i n d i t e c t l y they urged c o n c i l i a t i o n and an avoidance of 1. t h a t might l e a d t o outbreak of h o s t i l i t i e s . i n event of war and  to a m i n t a i n  to work f o r l o c a l i z a t i o n of the c o n f l i c t .  i n the f u t u r e .  On August 13,  1899  anything  They determined  an a t t i t u d e of s t r i c t  such conduct they p r o b a b l y hoped to exact  1899  neutrality,  As a rev/ard f o r  t r i b u t e from B r i t a i n  Richthofen  i n s t r u c t e d the  German Consul a t P r e t o r i a to a v o i d d e c l a r a t i o n s r e g a r d i n g the T r a n s v a a l s i n c e Germany must not be drawn i n t o the d i s p u t e i n 2. any form. I n September Billow wrote to the F o r e i g n O f f i c e t h a t the language of the German Press the T r a n s v a a l c r i s i s  and  should be  calm and  c o o l abovit  c o n f i n e i t s e l f s t r i c t l y to f a c t s .  The  German Government d i d not wish to i n c u r the enmity of England s i n c e the other c o n t i n e n t a l powers were c e r t a i n l y not 3.  considering  such a p o l i c y . The  outbreak of war  on B r i t i s h p o l i c y by France, ced  R u s s i a , and  the  was  the  signal for a violent  Continental press, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n  Germany.  This a t t i t u d e g r e a t l y  the Governments i n t h e i r attempts to m a i n t a i n  To add  attack  inconvenien-  neutrality.  to the c o m p l i c a t i o n s Dr.  Europe i n 1899  Leyds, a Boer o f f i c i a l , toured 4. seeking a i d against B r i t a i n . Billow, who s t a t e s ,  1. G.D.vol.3.p.85.XV.371.Hatzfeldt to German F o r e i g n O f f i c e , June 7, 1899.;p.88.Billow t o Flotow - J u l y 4, 1899. 2. G.D.vol.3.p.95.XV.384.Richthofen to Biermann, Aug.13, 1899. 3. G.D.V01.3.p.l02.XV.395.Bulow to German F o r e i g n O f f i c e , S e p t . 2 0 , 4. G.D.vol.3.p.106.Note. (1899.  53. "I was  determined from the f i r s t  to keep us c l e a r of any steps 1.  for  the B o e r s , and a g a i n s t the B r i t i s h , "  the  Charge d ' A f f a i r e s i n B r u s s e l s , t o use h i s i n f l u e n c e t o p r e -  v e n t D r . Leyds from coming  urged R i l c h e r - J e n i s c h ,  to B e r l i n because  " I c o u l d not r e u e i -  2. ve him." As a r e s u l t on t h i s o c c a s i o n Dr. Leyds d i d not v i s i t 3. Berlin. Prom P a r i s Monson r e p o r t e d the m o d i f i c a t i o n of the attitude  of the F r e n c h p r e s s .  He a l s o commented on the f a c t  t h a t France and R u s s i a seemed t o be c o n s p i r i n g t o take  advantage  of B r i t a i n ' s e x t r e m i t y t o get a European c o a l i t i o n a g a i n s t h e r . He  thought R u s s i a a t the bottom  of i t , b$tt c o u l d not r e a l l y say 4.  as n o t h i n g d e f i n i t e had l e a k e d out. Minister f o r Foreign A f f a i r s , c o a l i t i o n i n the European  Goluchowski, saw no l i k e l i h o o d of  c a p i t a l s a g a i n s t England.  sure Germany would n o t countenance not  The Austro-Hungarian  feit  such a c t i o n , so R u s s i a would 5.  g a i n much support f o r her absurd p r o p o s a l s . In  the midst of t h i s h o s t i l i t y i t was  l a n d to f e e l she had a t l e a s t one f r i e n d . welcomed the proposed v i s i t will. ish in  He  important f o r EngEnglish  statesmen  of the K a i s e r as p r o o f of h i s good-  D e l a y over the Samoan Q u e s t i o n and consequent  anti-Brit-  f e e l i n g i n Germany n e a r l y l e d t o a c a n c e l l a t i o n of the  visit  s p i t e of the K a i s e r ' s genuine d e s i r e t o c a r r y out the p r o j e c t .  Once the q u e s t i o n was  s e t t l e d s a t i s f a c t o r i l y f o r Germany the  1. Billow - Memoirs - vol.1.p.289. 2. G.D.vol.3.p. 106.XV.405.Billow to R i l c k e r - J e n i s c h , Oct. 16, 1899. 3. G.D.vol.3.p.106.Note.. 4. B.D.vol.l.p.233-6.Nos.285-7,9Monson t o Salisbury,Oct.1,24,27, Nov. 3,. 1899. 5. B.D.vol.l.p.237.Nos.290,291. Rumbold t o S a l i s b u r y , Nov.3, 1899  54. Emperor announced h i s i n t e n t i o n to v i s i t of November.  the Queen a t the  end  The h o s t i l i t y of p u b l i c o p i n i o n i n Germany caus-  ed the Emperor and h i s a d v i s e r s to s t r e s s the p u r e l y nature of the v i s i t and  to a v o i d any  family  p u b l i c f u n c t i o n s while  in  England. The and  v i s i t proved i n e v e r y way  the P r i n c e of Wales managed not  the K a i s e r appeared sympathetic and England as much as p o s s i b l e .  s a t i s f a c t o r y , the t o i r r i t a t e each very desirous  Kaiser other,  of h e l p i n g  B r i t i s h statesmen who  were hon-  oured w i t h an i n t e r v i e w expressed g r a t i f i c a t i o n a t the German Government's a t t i t u d e and got any who  assurances.  The E n g l i s h p u b l i c  anti-German f e e l i n g s and welcomed the Emperor.  Bulow-  accompanied the K a i s e r , observed t h a t the B r i t i s h were f a r  l e s s anti-German than the Germans were a n t i - B r i t i s h . he  £nr-  feared  e r s , who,  the p o s s i b l e i n f l u e n c e of men  l i k e C h i r o l and  thereby cause an 1.  un-  change i n Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s .  D u r i n g the v/ar the K a i s e r wrote v e r y sympathetic f u l l of a d v i c e , to the  P r i n c e of Wales.  The  whole avoided  remarks t h a t would o f f e n d .  v o c a t i o n v/as too g r e a t and immediately met  letters,  P r i n c e , although  not a l t o g e t h e r a p p r e c i a t i n g h i s nephew's kindness,  which was  Saund-  knowing the depth of German h o s t i l i t y , might r e v e a l  t h e i r knowledge t o the E n g l i s h p u b l i c and favourable  Therefore  on  the  O c c a s i o n a l l y the  pro-  the P r i n c e a d m i n i s t e r e d sharp r e p r o o f 2. by an i n j u r e d p r o t e s t . For the  1. G.D.vol.3.p.108-114.XV.413.Memorandum of Bulow, Nov.24, 2. Lee - King Edward V I I . - vol.1.p.754.  1899.  55. a s s i s t a n c e of h i s E n g l i s h r e l a t i v e s Wilhelm drew up some notes on the War  i n the T r a n s v a a l .  December 21,  1899;  The  first  i n s t a l m e n t he  the second, i n which he  sent  on  suggested a p l a n of  campaign and i n d u l g e d i n the famous f o o t b a l l s i m i l e , came i n 1. F e b r u a r y 1900.  T h i s l a t t e r was  d e s t i n e d to cause  consider-  able i r r i t a t i o n when the i n f o r m a t i o n came to l i g h t i n the D a l l y Telegraph  Incident.  The  K a i s e r claimed  t o have submitted i t  to the General S t a f f f o r t h e i r a p p r o v a l b e f o r e the P r i n c e .  In 1908  Billow s t a t e d i n the R e i c h s t a g  er the s a i d p l a n of campaign nor any K a i s e r had been examined by may  sending  General  Staff.  the General  Nevertheless,  Staff.  The  the  Emperor did  the p l a n was  f a i l e d t o impress the E n g l i s h a u t h o r i t i e s . Why took a l l t h i s t r o u b l e to be  that n e i t h -  other s i m i l a r work by  have shown i t t o h i s aide-de-camp on duty, who 2.  t o the  I t to  the  belong  sent,  but  Kaiser  so g r a c i o u s to England i s somewhat  obscure.  By the time the war  t h i n g but  g r a c i o u s i n view of imagined i n s u l t s r e c e i v e d from 3.  English o f f i c i a l s .  ended he was  Whether, as Lee  d o i n g i t to cover h i s treacherous  disposed  to be  firmly believes,  attempts t o organize  t i n e n t a l c o a l i t i o n a g a i n s t England or not  one  he  was  a con-  can h a r d l y  Evidence does not p o i n t toward Germany as the i n s t i g a t o r such a p l a n . Before 1899  any-  say. of  ended Chamberlain complained to E c k a r d s t e i n  1. Lee - op. c i t . vol.1.p.805. 2. G.D.vol.3.p.123. German Note 3. Lee - op. c i t . vol.1.p.761.  56. about German army o f f i c e r s s e r v i n g on the s i d e of the Boers. had  r e c e i v e d the i n f o r m a t i o n from S i r A l f r e d M i l n e r .  He  He  regret-  ted t h e " e f f e c t of t h i s news on p u b l i c o p i n i o n when i t became 1. known.  • The  K a i s e r ' s comments on H a t z f e l d t ' s despatch r e v e a l  deep i n d i g n a t i o n . Chamberlain of my  He  concludes,  we had  Ambassador must i n f o r m  t o go to A f r i c a .  t h a t have been disbanded, are  That i s a l l t h a t i s r e a u i ^ e d . 2.  a f l e e t , Ghamberlain would not have dared J "  l a t e r assured  L a s c e l l e s t h a t r e p o r t s concerning  ernment knew of o n l y two  officers  Prom c o n v e r s a t i o n s w i t h  oa Bay  - If  Bulow  the number of  German o f f i c e r s i n Boer s e r v i c e had been exaggerated. 3.  impression  Mr.  Order t o a l l Army Corps, t h a t none of t h e i r  members i n c l u d i n g even troops permitted  "The  The  Gov-  so f a r .  Chamberlain, E c k a r d s t e i n got  the  t h a t B r i t a i n might take some a c t i o n r e g a r d i n g D e l a g -  to s t o p the Boers i m p o r t i n g arms by t h i s channel.  He  thought they would f i r s t approach Germany to see i f she were 4. agreeable.  Germany might th&s g a i n some c o n c e s s i o n .  Billow  took the p r e c a u t i o n of i n f o r m i n g P o r t u g a l t h a t Germany must be 5. n o t i f i e d i f any  other n a t i o n asked f o r c o n t r o l of Delagoa  As u s u a l Germany was  on the a l e r t not  o n l y t o p r o t e c t her  Bay. inter-  e s t s , but t o g a i n a l l she c o u l d . l.G.D.vol.3.p.115-6.XV.426.Hatzfeldt to the German F o r e i g n i d e n t t h a t t h r e a t e n e d to wreck the good O Then f f i c e ,came Dec.the20,i n c1899. 2.Ibid. 3. B.D.vol.1.p.245.Ho.304.Lascelles to S a l i s b u r y , Jan. 4, 1900. 4. G.D.vol.3.p.116-7.XV.428.Hatzfeldt to German F o r e i g n O f f i c e , Dec. 21, 1899. 5. G.D.vol.3.p.117.XV.453.Billow to Tattenbach. Dec. 25, 1899.  57. r e l a t i o n s between England and  the German Government.  claimed.and put i n t o p r a c t i c e the r i g h t to search t r a l nations end  suspected  of December 1899  Britain  ships of neu-  of c a r r y i n g contraband of war.  At  B r i t i s h n a v a l v e s s e l s s e i z e d three  m a i l steamers of the Woermann L i n e , the  the  German  "Bundesrath", the  "Gen-  e r a l " , the"Hertzog',' on the charge of c a r r y i n g contraband.  They  soon r e l e a s e d the  "Bund  e s r a t h " t o the bounds.  "General"  the"Hertzog", but  P r i z e Court a t Durban.  Billow says,  ment, w h i l e  and  " I t was  took the  German anger knew no  inexcusable  t h a t the  German Govern-  s t r i v i n g to come t o an u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h  should have had  difficulties  thrown i n t o i t s way  moment f r o m the B r i t i s h s i d e by b r u t a l s e i z u r e of the N a v a l P a r t y took the  at a  the u n j u s t i f i e d and 1.  German m a i l - b o a t s . " opportunity  Britain, critical  absolutely  T i r p i t z and  the  to urge the need f o r speed i n  augmenting the German Navy. Through d i p l o m a t i c  channels Germany p r o t e s t e d  sharply  a g a i n s t England's a c t i o n and demanded immediate r e l e a s e of ship together with  compensation.  ed the a c c u s a t i o n t h a t she had who  was  The  B r i t i s h Government r e s e n t -  exceeded her r i g h t s .  s t r i v i n g f o r an a l l i a n c e , cursed  Eckardstein  the s t u p i d i t y of  German F o r e i g n O f f i c e f o r t h e i r a r i b t r a r y demands. d e s p a t c h to E c k a r d s t e i n on January 14,  the  1900  the  In a p r i v a t e  Holstein revealed  h i s impatience a t the d e l a y over the r e l e a s e and  s a i d the Emp-  e r o r was  sent a t once  c o n s i d e r i n g whether someone ought to be  w i t h i n f o r t y - e i g h t hours to f i n d out d i r e c t l y from London whethl.Bulow - Memoirs - vol.1.p.527.  58. er  an u n d e r s t a n d i n g  was p o s s i b l e or i f some other method must  be r e s o r t e d t o . He d e p l o r e d the apathy of the B r i t i s h Govern1. ment. That they ever n o t i f i e d the E n g l i s h i n d i r e c t l y of t h e i r i n t e n t i o n t o send an A d m i r a l w i t h an ultimatum 2. doubtful. of  S a l i s b u r y a t l e n g t h y i e l d e d , ordered the r e l e a s e  the v e s s e l , and agreed  t o compensation.  s e t t l e d , but l e f t i l l - f e e l i n g ers  is distinctly  The i n c i d e n t was  on b o t h s i d e s which the newspap-  d i d t h e i r best to preserve. Throughout the e n t i r e course  of the war e f f o r t s were  made t o i n t e r v e n e between B r i t a i n and the Boers. of  The o r i g i n  the scheme i s v e i l e d i n the m i s t s of o b s c u r i t y .  Lee l a y s  the blame on the K a i s e r who i n c o n v e r s a t i o n s v/ith the Russians 3. hinted at a c o a l i t i o n . suggested  Brandenburg b e l i e v e s Prance f i r s t  i t by h e r c a r e f u l e n q u i r i e s i n October 1899 r e g a r d -  i n g Germany's a t t i t u d e towards England i n South A f r i c a and suggestions o f p r e c a u t i o n a r y measures a g a i n s t E n g l i s h expansion 4. i n that area. ' Monson, the E n g l i s h Ambassador i n P a r i s , s u s 5. pected R u s s i a .  I n March 1900 R u s s i a d e f i n i t e l y came forward  w i t h a p r o p o s a l t h a t Germany j o i n i n m e d i a t i o n .  Germany de-  clined. I n a p r i v a t e note t o L a s c e l l e s the Emperor s a i d R u s s i a c o u l d do so on h e r own - Germany would n o t r i s k England's f r i e n d 6. shipj He t o l d L a s c e l l e s d u r i n g an i n t e r v i e w t h a t he thought 1. G.D.vol.3.p.121.XV.471.Holstein t o E c k a r d s t e i n , Jan.14, 1900. E c k a r d s t e i n - op. c i t . - p.142-3. 2. G.D.vol.3.p.121.German Note. 3. Lee - op. c i t . - vol.1.p.761. 4. Brandenburg - op. c i t . - p.136. 5. B .D.vol. 1.p.233 • ITo.285-6. p. 234.No „ 287.Monson t o Lansdowne . 6. G.D.vol.3.p.124.Note.  59. it  o n l y f a i r England should know and r e c o g n i s e t h a t h i s a c t i o n  had i n f l u e n c e d the conduct of Prance and R u s s i a or i n h i s words, 1c " t h a t I have kept those two t i g e r s q u i e t . "  When the Boers  asked f o r m e d i a t i o n on March 10, 1900 Bulow consented. o c c a s i o n the Emperor wrote  On  this  t o Bulow, "England, the Paramount  Power! That p l e a s e s S i r Frank L a s c e l l e s and p l e a s e s i n London. Should, however, London be i n c l i n e d t o go i n t o m e d i a t i o n , a t any r a t e i t knows what i t has t o expect from us.  I f i t turns to  us, t a n t mieux; then my g o a l i s a t t a i n e d , and England r e c e i v e s South A f r i c a from me J V o i l a J The consequences you can imagine 2. for yourself." dreams J  A t y p i c a l example o f the K a i s e r ' s h i g h - f l o w n  Any o f f e r s o f m e d i a t i o n were d e c l i n e d and the war went  on. I n January 1901 the K a i s e r won l a n d by h u r r y i n g to the deathbed toria.  He  favour f o r himself i n E n g -  of h i s Grandmother, Queen V i c -  s t a y e d u n t i l a f t e r the f u n e r a l , and maintained e x c e l l -  ent r e l a t i o n s w i t h everyone d u r i n g h i s s t a y . p a r t i c u l a r l y g r a c i o u s when he bestowed on the German Crown P r i n c e .  K i n g Edward  the Order of the G a r t e r  The K a i s e r honoured  w i t h the Order of the B l a c k E a g l e .  was  Lord Roberts  At the f a r e w e l l luncheon, he  expressed a wish f o r the f o r m a t i o n o f an Anglo- German a l l i a n c e 3. which would  p r e s e r v e the peace o f the w o r l d .  Unfortunately,  these c o r d i a l f e e l i n g s cooled r a p i d l y when he r e t u r n e d t o B e r l i n . 1. B.D.vol.1.p.253.Ho.313.Lascelles 2. G.D.vol.3.p.l24.Hote. 3. Lee - op. c i t . - vol.2.p.11.  t o S a l i s b u r y , March 2,  1900.  60. The  German o f f i c i a l s had l i v e d i n t e r r o r a l l the time the Emp-  e r o r was i n England.  The German people s t r o n g l y d i s p r o v e d any  f r i e n d l y a c t s towards England.  Prom then on the K a i s e r grad-  u a l l y became more and more i r i i t a t e d w i t h Great B r i t a i n . The German Press commented on the b r u t a l i t y o f the B r i t i s h Army i n South A f r i c a much t o the annoyance of the B r i t i s h . On October 25, 1901 Chamberlain made a speech a t Edinburgh i n which he defended B r i t i s h methods, d e n i e d b r u t a l i t y , and s a i d the B r i t i s h s o l d i e r s * e r e no worse than c o n t i n e n t a l i n p r e v i o u s wars. German war.  He mentioned  the P r u s s i a n s I n the F r a n c o -  The German p u b l i c was b e s i d e i t s e l f w i t h r a g e .  Bulow t r i e d t o e x t r a c t an a p o l o g y from Chamberlain. failed  soldiers  When t h a t  t o m a t e r i a l i z e he suggested a p u b l i c e x p l a n a t i o n t h a t  the speech was n o t i n t e n d e d as an i n s u l t  t o Germany.  Then he  wished a w r i t t e n statement t h a t he c o u l d use i n the R e i c h s t a g . Lansdowne a b s o l u t e l y d e c l i n e d t o take Chamberlain t o t a s k . He 1. c o u l d n o t see what Germany had t o be so angry about. Austria 2. q u i t e approved Lansdowne's f i r m stand on the q u e s t i o n . Thus the b i c k e r i n g went on. F o r the most p a r t the German Government kept t h e i r heads and c o n t i n u a l l y a s s u r e d B r i t a i n of t h e i r d e s i r e f o r good r e l a t i o n s .  The Press they could n o t  c o n t r o l , n o r c o u l d the B r i t i s h m i n i s t e r s c o n t r o l t h e i r newspapers.  Thus the t^ow f o r c e s i n each c o u n t r y o f t e n worked a t  1. B.D.voih.l.p.263.Ho.326.Lansdowne t o Buchanan, Hov.26, 1901; p.265.No.328.Lansdowne t o Buchanan, Dec. 3, 1901. 2. B.D.vol.l.p.269.No.333.Plunkett t o Lansdowne, Jan.19, 1902.  61. c r o s s purposes and made the t a s k more d i f f i c u l t . I n the Par E a s t d u r i n g these years the r e l a t i o n s h i p was j u s t as u n c e r t a i n .  Here a g a i n the aims o f each were d i f f e r e n t .  B r i t a i n viished t o m a i n t a i n  the open door and e s t a b l i s h h e r i n -  f l u e n c e i n the r i c h e s t p a r t s of China.  This brought h e r i n t o  c o n f l i c t w i t h R u s s i a who looked w i t h hungry eyes upon p a r t s of China t h a t o f f e r e d h e r a warm ocean p o r t .  Germany wished t o  p r o t e c t h e r a l r e a d y e x i s t i n g commercial e n t e r p r i s e s i n China and  t o extend h e r i n f l u e n c e .  I n t h i s she saw the advantage of  c o - o p e r a t i o n w i t h England p r o v i d e d the c o - o p e r a t i o n d i d n o t bring her into opposition to Russia. t h a t was d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t R u s s i a .  She would support no scheme  England f e l t t h i s and became  cautious• The murder of the German M i n i s t e r and of German m i s s i o n a r i e s i n China gave the K a i s e r a wonderful o p p o r t u n i t y f o r bombastic  speeches and s a b r e - r a t t l i n g whose o n l y achievement was  the b r i n g i n g o f f r e s h s u s p i c i o n on German motives. i n having  the German G e n e r a l , Waldersee, appointed  me command of the a l l i e d armies i n 1900.  He succeeded t o the supre-  I n august the Emperor  h i n t e d t o L a s c e l l e s t h a t S a l i s b u r y was t o blame f o r d e l a y I n 1. the f i n a l c o n f i r m a t i o n of appointment. A t t h i s time the German d e s i r e f o r j o i n t a c t i o n was so g r e a t t h a t H a t z f e l d t proposed t o S a l i s b u r y a mutual engagement not t o a c q u i r e t e r r i t o r i a l advantages i n China  as a r e s u l t o f  1.B.D.vol,2.p.7.Ho.8.Lascelles t o S a l i s b u r y , Aug. 24% 1900.  62. lc  present troubles.  The outcome o f t h i s s u g g e s t i o n was the 2.  Yangtsze T r e a t y o f October 1900.  When R u s s i a c l a i m e d Manchur-  i a B r i t a i n wished t o p r o t e s t s i n c e t h i s s e i z u r e of t e r r i t o r y was  c o n t r a r y t o the terms o f the t r e a t y .  Germany, n o t w i s h i n g  t o i n c u r the i l l - w i l l  o f R u s s i a , m a i n t a i n e d t h a t Manchuria was 3. excepted from the T r e a t y . Lansdowne o b l i g i n g l y gave way and when q u e s t i o n e d i n the House o f Lords brought h i s statements 4. i n t o l i n e w i t h those o f Bulow i n the R e i c h s t a g . Lascelles had an i d e a t h a t a l t h o u g h Germany wished t o remain on good terms w i t h England she would n o t be s o r r y t o see B r i t a i n and Japan f i g h t i n g R u s s i a i n the Par E a s t .  She, o f c o u r s e , would  remain  a s p e c t a t o r b u t would reap the p r o f i t s of a check t o R u s s i a n a g g r e s s i o n . ' The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador i n B e r l i n agreed 5. with Shis.  I n A p r i l L a s c e l l e s had an i n t e r v i e w w i t h the Emp-  e r o r d u r i n g which he gathered the l a t t e r was t r y i n g t o i n c i t e B r i t a i n t o war w i t h R u s s i a . was  R u s s i a was n o t t o be t r u s t e d .  She  advancing and B r i t a i n was d o i n g n o t h i n g , thereby l o s i n g h e r 6.  p r e s t i g e i n the E a s t .  T h i s o p i n i o n r e g a r d i n g the Emperor's  wishes f o r an A n g l o - R u s s i a n war was shared by Mr.T.H.Sanderson of the F o r e i g n O f f i c e , "The Emperor, who has I b e l i e v e been 1. G.DZvol.3.p.133.XV1.221.Hatzfeldt t o German F o r e i g n O f f i c e , Sept. 14, 1900. 2. B.D.vol.2 .p.l5.No. 1 7 . S a l i s b u r y t o L a s c e l l e s , Oct.15, 1900. 3. B.D.vol.21p.32.Extract from Bulow's speech i n R e i c h s t a g , March 15, 1901; p.26,No.35.Lansdowne t o MacDonald, Marchl6, 1901. 4. B.D.vol,2.p.28.No.37.Lansdowne t o L a s c e l l e s , A p r i l 7, 1901. 5. B.D.vol.2.p.46.Ho.59.Lascelles t o Lansdowne, March 15, 1901. 6. B.D.vol.2.p.53.No.72.Lascelles t o Lansdowne, A p r i l 11, 1901. f  63. very e x c i t a b l e since h i s accident i s apparently furious with us f o r not h a v i n g  got i n t o a q u a r r e l w i t h R u s s i a  over the bus-  i n e s s arid o b v i o u s l y t h a t would have s u i t e d the Germans v e r y Is well."  Once a g a i n the same atmosphere of d i s t r u s t ]  The  Germans b e l i e v e d England wished t o i n v o l v e them i n a war which she  c o u l d d e r i v e the b e n e f i t s .  the same r e g a r d i n g  Germany.  The  How  from  Englishmen b e l i e v e d  Kais_^er's u n c o n t r o l l e d l a n g -  uage sowed antagonism. In 1902  B r i t a i n shook o f f her d i s l i k e  f a r as to n e g o t i a t e During  and  of a l l i a n c e s  so  s i g n the Anglo-Japanese Agreement.  the e a r l y d i s c u s s i o n s the statesmen c o n s i d e r e d  the i n -  c l u s i o n of Germany but knowledge of the K a i s e r ' s f e a r of  the  Yellow P e r i l combined w i t h other d i f f i c u l t i e s d e t e r r e d them from c a r r y i n g out the i d e a . the proceedings 30,  1902  he  f i r s t before  King Edward took an i n t e r e s t i n  and when the Agreement was  signed on January  a d v i s e d n o t i f y i n g the K a i s e r and h i s Government 2. the T r e a t y was  i n g l y informed  made p u b l i c .  Lansdowne  accord-  E c k a r d s t e i n who  thanked him warmly on b e h a l f of 3. the German Government f o r t h i s mark of c o n f i d e n c e . The K a i s e r wrote t o c o n g r a t u l a t e the King on the new a l l i a n c e "which we 4. a l l l o o k upon as a guarantee of peace i n the E a s t . " c e l l e s he expressed  not  o n l y a p p r o v a l b#t  such an a l l i a n c e had not heen concluded  To  Las-  a l s o surprise that  earlier.  1. B.D.vol.2.p.58.Sanderson to Satow, A p r i l 12, 2. B.D.vol.2.p.121.Minute by King Edward. 3. Lee - op. c i t . vol.2.p.143-4. $.Ibid.p.144.  He was 1901.  also  64. g r a t e f u l f o r the  s t r i c t l y c o n f i d e n t i a l communication.  1.  Some-  what i n c o n t r a s t t o t h i s g e n e r a l r e j o i c i n g comes Billow's to M e t t e r n i c h ,  March 13,  1902;  letter  the Anglo-Japanese Agreement  w i l l s e t aside attempts a t a rapprochment between England Russia  f o r the p r e s e n t .  Metternich  observe c a r e f u l l y the B r i t i s h Press  and E c k a r d s t e i n  and  should  s i n c e " i t i s important i n  view of German d e c i s i o n s i n the f u t u r e t o see  a g a i n s t whom  the  increased  s e l f - c o n f i d e n c e , which you mention as a r e s u l t of  the  departure  from i s o l a t i o n w i l l be d i r e c t e d .  -  France, - Ourselves?"  The  Against Russia,  Anglo-Japanese group may  come f o r - ' 2.  ward i n o p p o s i t i o n to Germany's a s p i r a t i o n s i n the Far The ations.  year 1902  found a c o n t i n u a t i o n of the p e t t y  Metternich  complained of the a r t i c l e s In "The  as keeping the f i r e s the German Press  of h a t r e d b u r n i n g .  c o u l d be  East. irritTimes"  I t almost seemed as i f  as a n t i - B r i t i s h as i t p l e a s e d , but i f  the B r i t i s h papers r e t a l i a t e d the German Government immediately p r o t e s t e d and King and of 1902.  blamed them f o r the e x i s t i n g i l l - f e e l i n g .  the K a i s e r c l a s h e d  The -  over the Boer Generals i n the  They were r e c e i v e d i n England, went on to the  ent and were accorded a tumultuous welcome i n H o l l a n d , one by  the F r e n c h m i n i s t e r s i n P a r i s , and  one by  the B e r l i n populace.  The  summer  Contina  chilly  a most e n t h u s i a s t i c  K a i s e r wished to r e c e i v e them  i n s p i t e of the warnings of h i s m i n i s t e r s who  were wise enough  1. B.D.vol.2.p.122.No.128.Lascelles t o Lansdowne, Feb. 7, 1902. 2. G.D.vol.3.p.l57-8.XVll.l49.Bulow to M e t t e r n i c h , March 13, 1902.  65. to  f o r e s e e the e f f e c t  L a s c e l l e s informed ions " h i s v i s i t country."  on England.  At the command of the  the K a i s e r t h a t I f he  c a r r i e d out h i s i n t e n t -  to England would he v e r y unpopular i n t h i s  As a r e s u l t the K a i s e r d e c i d e d  to give up the i d e a ,  r e p r e s e n t i n g h i s a c t as "a spontaneous and ion  c a l c u l a t e d express1.  of c o u r t e s y and f r i e n d s h i p t o England."  Then he  would r e c e i v e them as B r i t i s h s u b j e c t s i f they were by L a s c e l l e s . was  another  King  T h i s f e l l through and  said  presented  the matter dropped.  o p p o r t u n i t y t o s t r e s s h i s kindness  he  to and  Here  consider2.  a t i o n f o r England d e s p i t e the h o s t i l i t y of p u b l i c o p i n i o n . I n November the K a i s e r p a i d h i s proposed v i s i t and f u r t h e r i r r i t a t e d his uncle.  Open f r i c t i o n was  p a r t e d a p p a r e n t l y amicably i m p r e s s i o n he his  avoided  and  the  - the K a i s e r d e l i g h t e d w i t h  thought he had  made, the King t h a n k f u l to  two the see  troublesome nephew s a f e l y away once more. ''Although  t r e a t i e s r e g a r d i n g Sotith A f r i c a , E a s t A s i a , and  the South Seas seemed to have removed so many causes of f r i c t ion  no r e a l c o n f i d e n c e had been e s t a b l i s h e d between e i t h e r  the Governments or the peoples  of Germany and England.  two n a t i o n s viewed each other w i t h s u s p i c i o n and e v i l motives to every s m a l l d i f f e r e n c e . i n both  Press  The  attributed  and  Parliament  c o u n t r i e s were c o n s t a n t l y g i v i n g e x p r e s s i o n to t h i s  distrust.  Yet f a r - s e e i n g men  on b o t h  s i d e s of the water ac. -  l . L e e . - op. c i t . - vol.2.p.148. 2.Ibid.p.148-9. 3 . E c k a r d s t e i n - op. c i t . - p.245. When the K a i s e r l e f t on board h i s yacht King Edward was heard to murmur "Thank God he's gone J "  66. * knowledged the f e e l i n g t h a t we were of the same k i n , t h a t b o t h p e o p l e s , i f they d e a l t honourable  by one  another, were u n a s s a i l -  a b l e e c o n o m i c a l l y and p o l i t i c a l l y and might l o n g m a i n t a i n 1• broken the peace of the  world."  The d e s i r e t o co-operate Venezuelan  Affair  1902-3.  r e v e a l e d i t s e l f a g a i n d u r i n g the  S e v e r a l of the European powers had  a c c o u n t s " o f l o n g - s t a n d i n g t o s e t t l e w i t h the Venezuelan ment.  un-  Govern-  S i n c e d i p l o m a t i c measures secured no r e s u l t England  Germany began t o c o n s i d e r the n e c e s s i t y of employing f o r c e f u l methods.  On January 20,  1902  e r o r s u g g e s t i n g a p e a c e f u l blockade  and  more  Bulow wrote t o the Emp-  of Venezuelan  r e c e i v e d no s a t i s f a c t i o n f o r German c l a i m s .  p o r t s i f they  He a l s o wished t o  get i n t o u c h w i t h the B r i t i s h Government w i t h a view t o s e c u r i n g combined a c t i o n .  The Emperor added the note  - " I f you can be  sure B r i t a i n w i l l not use the o p p o r t u n i t y t o make America susp i c i o u s of Germany and 2. Prussia's v i s i t . " of the a t t i t u d e  s p o i l the e f f e c t of P r i n c e Henry of  I n the summer Lansdowne f e l t  of the Venezuelan  Government t o w a r d . B r i t i s h  s h i p p i n g he would have t o i n t e r v e n e . proposed ic  On J u l y 23 M e t t e r n i c h  j o i n t a c t i o n a g a i n s t Venezuela,  blockade.  Lansdowne was  t h a t In view  and suggested  a pacif-  ready t o c o n f e r w i t h the German  Government but r e q u e s t e d time t o c o n s i d e r b e f o r e g i v i n g a 3. d e f i n i t e answer. 1. Brandenburg - op. c i t . - p.153. 2. G.D.vol.3.p.l60-l.XV11.241.Bulow t o Emperor, Jan. 20, 1902. 3. B.D.vol.2.p.153.Ho.171.Lansdowne to Buchanan, J u l y 23, 1902.  67. The r e s u l t o f s e v e r a l d i s c u s s i o n s was the Agreement t o cooperate f i r s t  i n sending a f i n a l n o t i c e t o Venezuela,  t h a t f a i l e d , t o f u r t h e r , more d r a s t i c , a c t i o n .  then i f  Both c o u n t r i e s  c l a s s i f i e d t h e i r claims f o r damages, and pledged themselves 1. not t o make an independent s e t t l e m e n t . P i n a l arrangements p r o v i d e d f o r a b e l l i g e r e n t blockade t h i s Germany gave way t o England's  with modifications. In 2. wishes.  The s i t u a t i o n  r e q u i r e d c a r e f u l , h a n d l i n g because of the U n i t e d S t a t e s and the Monroe D o c t r i n e .  On the whole the Americans supported the  European powers and avoided adding any c o m p l i c a t i o n s .  The  E n g l i s h press o b j e c t e d t o co-opextation w i t h Germany and the U n i t e d S t a t e s p u b l i c o p i n i o n leaned towards England. ardment and s i n k i n g o f Venezuelan  ships i r r i t a t e d  p u b l i c and t h r e a t e n e d Anglo-American r e l a t i o n s .  The bomb-  the American S i r Michael  H e r b e r t t e l e g r a p h e d t o Lansdowne on December 16, 1902 - "The A d m i n i s t r a t i o n i s n o t s u s p i c i o u s o f u s , b u t i s undoubtedly apprehensive  as t o German d e s i g n s .  The i m p r e s s i o n p r e v a i l s i n  Washington t h a t Germany i s u s i n g u s , and our f r i e n d s here r e g r e t from the p o i n t of view of American good f e e l i n g towards 3. us, t h a t we are a c t i n g w i t h her."  The Germans p o s s i b l y  r e a l i z e d the s i t u a t i o n , f o r M e t t e r n i c h assured Lnasdowne they were d e s i r o u s o f meeting B r i t i s h wishes and would do n o t h i n g 1. B.D.vol,2.p.156.No.174.Lansdowne t o Buchanan, Nov. 11, 1902. 2. G.D.vol.3«p.l62-4.XVll.258.Billow t o Emperor, Dec. 12, 1902; .B.D.vol,2.p.160.No.177.Lansdowne t o M e t t e r n i c h , Dec. 2, 1902; p.161.No.179.Lansdowne t o Buchanan, Dec. 13, 1902. 3. B.D.vol.2.p.162.No.180.Herbert t o Lansdowne, Dec. 16, 1902.  68. to make the B r i t i s h r o l e any more d i f f i c u l t . statement i n Parliament  Lansdowne's  t h a t no B r i t i s h men-of-war had  p a r t i n s i n k i n g the Venezuelan v e s s e l s , and promise t o uphold  1.  the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s  the Monroe D o c t r i n e a l l a y e d any  the American p u b l i c may  have e n t e r t a i n e d .  suspicions  They even went so f a r  as t o express  r e l i e f t h a t the B r i t i s h f l e e t was  the Germans.  I f the a f f a i r were s e t t l e d s p e e d i l y by  Herbert  considered  the Venezuelan i n c i d e n t .  strengthened I n support  arbitration  on the mutual g o o d w i l l and  of t h i s b e l i e f he  the Great  by  quoted  i n general  than they ever p l a c e d b e f o r e  the c o - o p e r a t i o n i n common causes of  g r e a t branches of the E n g l i s h - s p e a k i n g r a c e , the 2.  Empire, and  and  r a t h e r than impaired  York paper "the American people  have come t o p l a c e a h i g h e r value  the two  there to check  t h a t f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s between B r i t a i n  the U n i t e d S t a t e s would be  from a l e a d i n g New  taken  Great  Republic."  Germany d e l a y e d her acceptance of a r b i t r a t i o n u n t i l Roosev e l t , f e a r f u l of p u b l i c o p i n i o n and d e s i r o u s to preserve r e l a t i o n s , p r i v a t e l y threatened  to use  the U n i t e d S t a t e s navy  a g a i n s t p o s s i b l e German a g g r e s s i v e designs K a i s e r h e s i t a t e d any Roosevelt  longer.  amiable  i n Venezuela, i f the  As a r e s u l t , Germany y i e l d e d and  p u b l i c l y c o n g r a t u l a t e d the K a i s e r on h i s enthusiasm 3.  f o r the cause of a r b i t r a t i o n J  Despite  the e f f o r t s of  Mr.  Bowen, the Venezuelan r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , to cause f r i c t i o n between 1. B.D.vol.2.p.162.No.181.Lansdowne t o L a s c e l l e s , Dec. 18, 1902. 2. B.D.vol.2pp.163-4.No.184.Herbert to Lansdowne, Dec. 29, 1902. 3 Newton - Lord Lansdowne'- p.257.; J.B.Bishop - R o o s e v e l t and H i s Times - vol.1.Chap. 20. f o r R o o s e v e l t ' s account of the Venezuela i n c i d e n t . #  69. the E n g l i s h and a settlement i n g her  German r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s d u r i n g  was  the  negotiations,  made w i t h o u t e i t h e r England or Germany break-  o r i g i n a l promises.  to such c o - o p e r a t i o n ,  and  P u b l i c o p i n i o n i n England America was  objected  none too p l e a s e d ,  but  Lansdowne s a i d i n a f t e r y.ears, "the s t r a i g h t as f a r as we "The  Germans, upon the whole, r a n 1. were concerned."  Bagdad Railway overstepped the bounds of Turco-German 2.  r e l a t i o n s h i p s and became an i n t e r n a t i o n a l d i p l o m a t i c when i n 1903 organized  Germany obtained  a new  company.  at some p o i n t on the e s t s i n t h i s G u l f and  new  The  concessions  As  Persian Gulf. the route  to I n d i a , i t was  the customs revenue of Turkey.  n a t i o n s had  to be  saw  open i n t h i s p r o j e c t .  ho 3.  proposed  In t h i s the  other power.  downe brought t h i s to the a t t e n t i o n o£ the  was  of Germany's v a s t  c o n s t r u c t i o n and  l i n e , equal a t l e a s t to t h a t of any  Metternich  she  other  Prominent B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l s  oured B r i t i s h p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the  March 1902  to be  natural  a guarantee f o r the expenses i t was  consulted.  and  In view of B r i t a i n ' s i n t e r -  t o Increase  the  from the Porte  terminus of the l i n e was  should watch w i t h apprehension the progress undertaking.  problem"  fav-  c o n t r o l of When Lans-  German Ambassador i n  o b j e c t i o n s as he b e l i e v e d the door In s e v e r a l memoranda Lansdowne  expressed the d e s i r a b i l i t y of i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n t r o l of t h i s Otherwise he f e l t i t menaced B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s i n P e r s i a and  line. in  1. Nexvton - op. c i t . - p.260. 2. E a r l e - Turkey, the Powers and the Bagdad Railway - p.7. 3. B.D.vol.2.p.177-8.Ho.204.Lansdowne to L a s c e l l e s , March 18, 1 1902. I n 1888 B r i t a i n had the chance of c o n s t r u c t i n g a l i n e to Bagdad,but d i d not take i t up. In 1899 when Germany had become i n t e r e s t e d B r i t a i n c o u l d have j o i n e d i n w i t h the F r e n c h and Germans but again she l e t her o p p o r t u n i t y s l i p , c f . :Earle - op. c i t . p.3x, 59-60.  70. India. ian  Koweit v/as not  Gulf.  the o n l y p o s s i b l e terminus  I f B r i t a i n w i t h h e l d her  T u r k i s h revenues and  consent  on the  Pers-  to an i n c r e a s e i n the  opposed Koweit as the terminus,She would  p r o b a b l y d e l a y the c o n s t r u c t i o n of the l i n e ; but u l t i m a t e l y , w i t h or w i t h o u t h e r ain  s a n c t i o n , i t would be  completed.  would f i n d h e r s e l f i n an awkward p o s i t i o n .  date  she would be  Germany,and any  equal f o o t i n g while France, had  At t h a t l a t e  a b l e to o b t a i n an i n t e r e s t i n the r a i l w a y ,  o n l y a t enormous c o s t , i f a t a l l . ing  Then B r i t -  T h e r e f o r e , he f a v o u r e d  other n a t i o n s who there was  a l s o , was  e q u a l advantages.  yet  were i n t e r e s t e d , on 1.  joinan  time.  w i l l i n g to i n v e s t c a p i t a l provided I f Germany t r i e d t o arrange  she  matters  so  t h a t she would have c o n t r o l the French  Government would r e f u s e  to  countenance French  Germany appeared  to  I n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n t r o l , and  1903  participation.  o r g a n i s e d a meeting a t B e r l i n i n  of the f i n a n c i a l i n t e r e s t s t o d i s c u s s terms.  italists  proved  agreeable  British  r e l u c t a n t a t f i r s t , but Lansdowne f i n a l l y  suaded the House of B a r i n g t o r e p r e s e n t B r i t a i n  capper-  officially.  B r i t i s h p u b l i c o p i n i o n opposed the scheme i n the b e l i e f t h a t i t was a German e n t e r p r i s e and would i n v o l v e B r i t a i n i n more d i f f i c 2. ulties. T h i s h o s t i l i t y became so i n t e n s e t h a t the Government 3. r e p u d i a t e d the i d e a of c o - o p e r a t i o n . drop out, t o the disappointment  Therefore B r i t a i n had  to  of Lansdowne and many other  l a B . D . v o l . 2 , p . 1 7 8 - 9 . M i n u t e by Lansdowne; p.187-8.No.216.Memorandum by- Lansdowne, A p r i l 14, 1903. B a l f o u r a l s o favoured c o - o p e r a t i o n on a b a s i s of e q u a l i t y , c f . E a r l e - op. c i t . p.181-2. 2. E a r l e - op. c i t . - p.182-3. The B r i t i s h press i n d u l g e d i n a v i o l e n t o u t b u r s t a g a i n s t Germany and the Bagdad Railway. 3. E a r l e - op. c i t . - p«185. Pressure from p u b l i c , House of Commons and p a r t of the Cabinet persuaded Balfoxu? not to r i s k the l i f e of h i s m i n i s t r y on the q u e s t i o n of B r i t i s h p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the Bagdad Railway.  71. officials,  also B r i t i s h finance.  f o l l o w e d s u i t on the grounds an u n f a i r advantage Germany was  1.  The F r e n c h Government  t h a t the proposed terms  i n the c o n t r o l t o Germany.  secured  Apparently  raSher d i s a p p o i n t e d , and had been prepared t o o f f e r 2.  b e t t e r terms had B r i t a i n asked f o r f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n s .  Bulow  avers he wished t o come t o an u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h England r e g a r d i n g the terminus of the Bagdad Railway and to a v o i d a n y t h i n g t h a t might  "arouse o p p o s i t i o n or s u s p i c i o n i n the b r e a s t s of  I n d i a ' s masters."  A r t h u r von Gwinner had agreed w i t h Billow  t h a t "the s p l e n d i d p r o j e c t of the Bagdad Railway c o u l d o n l y be 3. c a r r i e d out i f England agreed t o i t . " ility  Thus through the h o s t -  of the B r i t i s h p u b l i c and t h e i r d i s t r u s t of a n y t h i n g  German, B r i t a i n l o s t an o p p o r t u n i t y of c o - o p e r a t i n g w i t h Germany i n an e n t e r p r i s e which concerned her g r e a t l y . the l i g h t of subsequent one.  I t was  Judged  events the course pursued was  In  a wise  p r o b a b l y b e t t e r f o r the a l l i e s i n the war that the 4.  r a i l w a y had never been completed  t o the P e r s i a n  Gulf.  When the Anglo-German n e g o t i a t i o n s o f 1901 f a i l e d , statesmen t u r n e d to F r a n c e .  English  I n January 1902 E c k a r d s t e i n , a t a  d i n n e r a t Marlborough House observed Chamberlain and the French > l.B.D.vol.2.p.l96.Mimute by Lansdowne, a l s o E a r l e - op. c i t . p.185-7. 2. B.D.vol.2.p.l95-6.No.224.0'Conner t o Lansdowne, Dec.15, 1903. 3. Billow - Memoirs - vol.1.p.564. 4. E a r l e - op. c i t . - p.188. h o l d s a d i f f e r e n t views "As events turned out, the f a i l u r e of the B a l f o u r Government t o e f f e c t the i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of the Bagdad Railway was a c o l o s s a l d i p l o m a t i c b l u n d e r . I f the proposed agreement of 1903 had been consummated, the Entente of 1904 between France and England would have taken c o n t r o l of the e n t e r p r i s e out of the hands of the Germans, who would have possessed, w i t h t h e i r T u r k i s h c o l l a b o r a t o r s , o n l y 14 of the 30 votes i n the Board of D i r e c t o r s . "  72. Ambassador, Cambon, i n animated words "Morocco" and  "Egypt".  c o n v e r s a t i o n and overheard  That same evening  the  Chamberlain  h i n t e d t o the German r e p r e s e n t a t i v e he would no longer work f o r an a l l i a n c e w i t h Germany, and K i n g Edward expressed h i s o n i n i o n 1 t h a t i t would be wise  t o a c c e p t the F r e n c h o f f e r s of f r i e n d s h i p .  From then on v e r y s l o w l y but s u r e l y France and England drew c l o s e r , u n t i l i n 1904  they s e t t l e d t h e i r o u t s t a n d i n g d i f f e r e n c e s  and e n t e r e d i n t o a s e c r e t u n d e r s t a n d i n g r e g a r d i n g Morocco. German diplomats had warned the F o r e i g n O f f i c e times number, but always t h e i r warnings had 2. had been r i d i c u l e d as n a i v e .  without  f a l l e n on deaf ears or  I n 1903  E c k a r d s t e i n wrote t o  Billow of h i s b e l i e f t h a t an u n d e r s t a n d i n g between B r i t a i n , F r a n c e , and R u s s i a was  Imminent.  K i n g Edward's s t a y i n P a r i s  had a s s i s t e d m a t t e r s , and France would soon t r y t o draw R u s s i a i n t o any a l l i a n c e w i t h England. Billow thought the whole i d e a 3. impossible. But time soon proved the t r u t h of E c k a r d s t e i n ' s o b s e r v a t i o n s . K i n g Edward's v i s i t to P a r i s , proposed by h i m s e l f t o a s s i s t European r e l a t i o n s w i t h England, turned out s u c c e s s 4. fully. Billow, e n t i r e l y u n s u s p i c i o u s f o r once, thought i t merely a s i g n t h a t France would not support R u s s i a a g a i n s t Eng5. l a n d i n the E a s t . However, the i m p o s s i b l e happened, the  1. E c k a r d s t e i n - op. c i t . - p.230. 2. G.D.vol.3.p.171.XVII.342.Metternich t o German F o r e i g n O f f i c e , Jan. 30, 1902; Brandenburg - op. c i t . - p.192. 3. G.D.vol.3.p.l72.XVll.570.Biilow to A l v e n s l e b e n , May 13, 1903. 4. Lee - op. c i t . - vol.2.p.236-43.• G.D,vol.3.p.l75-6.XVll. 591.Metternich t o Billow, June 2, 1903. 5. Brandenburg - op, c i t , - p.193.  73. Entente  C o r d i a l e was  formed.  Confronted w i t h the f a i t  accompli  Germany c o u l d do n o t h i n g save accept the s i t u a t i o n w i t h as good a grace as p o s s i b l e . ing  She must have r e a l i s e d i t meant the l e s s e n of the  probabil-  i t y of a f o r m a l a l l i a n c e between B r i t a i n and the T r i p l e  Allaince.  Her  of B r i t a i n ' s dependence on h e r g o o d w i l l , and  o n l y hope now  France  was  that  towards Germany.  hopeless.  R u s s i a would g r a d u a l l y t u r n away from  Yet the s i t u a t i o n was  f a r from b e i n g  F r i e n d s h i p with. F r a n c e , B r i t a i n s a i d , d i d not mean  enmity towards Germany.  B r i t a i n and  Germany s t i l l  t h e i r e f f o r t s t o m a i n t a i n good r e l a t i o n s and  continued  to work together  whenever p o s s i b l e . Germany r a i s e d d i f f i c u l t i e s  t o h e r assent t o the K h e d i v i a l  Decrees by demanding the same p r i v i l e g e s as had been accorded France. England  England  o b j e c t e d on the grounds t h a t France had  to  given  i n r e t u r n c o r r e s p o n d i n g p r i v i l e g e s i n Morocco, w h i l e .  Germany was  a s k i n g f a v o u r s and g i v i n g n o t h i n g . 1.  had agreed w i t h o u t q u e s t i o n .  The  E v e n t u a l l y England  Germany by g u a r a n t e e i n g to German commerce i n Egypt  other Powers conciliated for thirty  years the most f a v o u r e d n a t i o n treatment, by p r o m i s i n g to r e s p e c t e x i s t i n g German Agreements t h e r e , and by other  concessions  r e g a r d i n g German s c h o o l s and the s t a t u s of German o f f i c i a l s . In r e t u r n Germany r e c o g n i s e d the K h e d i v i a l Decree of A p r i l  8,  1904  and agreed not t o ask f o r a l i m i t of time t o B r i t a i n ' s 2. o c c u p a t i o n of Egypt. Lansdowne regarded the German a t t i t u d e 1. B.D.vol.3.p.19-20.No.18.Lansdowne t o M e t t e r n i c h , June 6, 1904. 2. B.D.vol.3.p.21.No.19.Lansdowne t o M e t t e r n i c h , June 15, 1904.  74. as u n j u s t and  g r a s p i n g , and.resented i t a c c o r d i n g l y .  1.  V a r i o u s minor d i s p u t e s i r r i t a t e d p u b l i c o p i n i o n on e i t h e r s i d e d u r i n g 1904.  Some Englishmen became obsessed by  t h a t the German navy was wrote w i l d a r t i c l e s  intended  i n the press  to a n n i h i l a t e England, suggesting  'copenhagening the German f l e e t " b e f o r e 2. be  a s e r i o u s menace.  The  ant, b u t were r e a s s u r e d by The  N i c k y proved unresponsive u n t i l 1905.  i t grew l a r g e enough to  unfortunately leaving increased K a i s e r experienced  a spasm of to  Nicky.  a c o n t i n e n t a l c o a l i t i o n a g a i n s t England, and the a f f a i r sank i n t o the background  For some r e a s o n Wilhelm f i r m l y b e l i e v e d England 3.  m a l i c i o u s l y a w a i t i n g an o p p o r t u n i t y to a t t a c k Germany. complained of s l i g h t s , i n s u l t s , and i n the E n g l i s h P r e s s . together  was  He  personally  the K a i s e r was  not a l -  s t r a i n e d r e l a t i o n s t h a t e x i s t e d between  the Emperor and h i s E n g l i s h u n c l e .  and  a t t a c k s on him  Lansdowne admitted  to blame f o r the  about h i s ROJB.1 B r o t h e r  or  the r e s p o n s i b l e E n g l i s h m i n i s t e r s .  The  seemed t o be  and  a p r e v e n t i v e war  b i t t e r n e s s towards England and wrote v i o l e n t l e t t e r s H i s i d e a now  idea  German Government were h i g h l y i n d i g n -  str>rm g r a d u a l l y s u b s i d e d ,  s u s p i c i o n on b o t h s i d e s .  the  "The  King t a l k s and  writes  i n terms which make one's f l e s h  creep,  the o f f i c i a l papers which go t o him,  whenever they r e f e r  to  H i s I m p e r i a l Majesty, come back w i t h a l l s o r t s of annotations 4. of a most i n c e n d i a r y c h a r a c t e r . " Even the Dogger Bank i n c i d 1. Newton - op. c i t . - p.329. 2. G.D.vol.3.p.184.X1X.332.Memorandum by M e t t e r n i c h , Dec, 3. Newton - on. c i t . - p.331. 4. I b i d . p. 530".  18,3904  75e  ent was  a s c r i b e d , u n j u s t l y , t o German h i n t s  G r a d u a l l y the s i t u a t i o n was  to R u s s i a .  becoming worse.  Seeds of d i s -  t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n , once sown, are not e a s i l y e r a d i c a t e d . German d i s t r u s t of E n g l i s h motives f i n a l l y aroused the r e s e n t ment of the phlegmatic Englishman ile  and c r e a t e d i n England a h o s t -  p u b l i c o p i n i o n of which the Government had t o take note i f  i t wished  t o remain i n power.  O f f i c i a l s i n b o t h c o u n t r i e s ob-  v i o u s l y l a b o u r e d t o p r e s e r v e a f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s h i p ; but they c o u l d n o t c o n t r o l the P r e s s .  Agreements they s i g n e d , j o i n t  i o n they undertook d u r i n g these s i x y e a r s , but always was  stony.  The u n d e r s t a n d i n g was  s i d e or the o t h e r , had  the s e t t l e m e n t of mush of i t s v a l u e .  difficult,  the path  reached o n l y a f t e r dela3'-s,  caused by p e t t y g r i e v a n c e s on e i t h e r one robbed  The way  seemed so  the g o a l , when f i n a l l y reached so i n s i g n i f i c a n t  one i s tempted t o ask, "Was Yet i t had t o be.  The two  the r e s u l t worth the  that  struggle?"  c o u n t r i e s c o u l d not l i v e i n i s o l a t i o n  In so many p a r t s of the globe t h e i r i n t e r e s t s met Questions arose and had t o be s e t t l e d . whelming odds the statesmen  act-  and  overlapped  F i g h t i n g a g a i n s t over-  s t r u g g l e d on, always  professing  f r i e n d s h i p , always h o p i n g the m i r a b l e would happen and Germanyand England f u l f i l  t h e i r d e s t i n y s i d e by s i d e as guardians of  the peace of the w o r l d .  76.  CHAPTER I I I . The Morocco C r i s i s  1904-1906.  A f t e r the s i g n i n g of the Anglo-French Agreements i n  1904  r e l a t i o n s between England and Germany grew s t e a d i l y worse. Although outwardly the German Government accepted the Agreement i n w a r d l y they r e s e n t e d i t as i n t e r f e r i n g w i t h t h e i r To say t h a t they d e l i b e r a t e l y s e t themselves ing  the newly-formed  bonds i s perhaps  policies.  the t a s k of break-  going a l i t t l e  too f a r ,  d e s p i t e the i n c r i m i n a t i n g evidence of the f o l l o w i n g months. Germany's a c t i o n s d u r i n g the sudceeding two years l a i d her open to  the a c c u s a t i o n of attempts to i s o l a t e England by c r e a t i n g a  European ing  League, t o l u r e France away from the E n t e n t e , or  fail-  t h a t t o wreck the D u a l A l l i a n c e by r e v i v i n g the Three Emp-  e r o r ' s League.  As always her diplomacy l a c k e d f i n e s s e .  If  she knew v/hat she wanted, and even i f t h a t d e s i r e had a l e g a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n , h e r method of procedure was a r r o g a n t t h a t i t aroused the resentment and d e f e a t e d her own  purpose.  so b l u n d e r i n g and  of the other Powers  Her b l u s t e r i n g statements, her  steady i n c r e a s e i n n a v a l armaments, and her f e a r of a B r i t i s h a t t a c k b r e d i n E n g l i s h m i n i s t e r s and i n E n g l i s h p u b l i c a c o r r e s p o n d i n g s u s p i c i o n of German motives toward It  seemed f u t i l e  each o t h e r . Germany was  opinion  England.  f o r the r e s p e c t i v e governments t o r e a s s u r e  Billow and H o l s t e i n t o l d L a s c e l l e s the i d e a  that  p r e p a r i n g t o a t t a c k B r i t a i n wou^-d be laughed t o  77. s c o r n "by any German.  Yet they c o n s i d e r e d Germany had  reason to f e a r t h a t England  i n t e n d e d to c r u s h the German navy  b e f o r e i t became too s t r o n g .  L a s c e l l e s maintained  the a b s u r d i t y of the German f e a r s and the 1. i s h apprehensions.  The  every  justice  on h i s s i d e of the  Brit-  Government might, and d i d , preserve  an outv/ardly c o r r e c t a t t i t u d e ; but the Press r e c o g n i z e d  the  e x i s t i n g h o s t i l i t y and e x e r t e d i t s e f f o r t s , not to, a m e l i o r a t i n g , but t o a c c e n t u a t i n g the d i f f i c u l t i e s To make matters  even worse the King and  of the  situation.  the K a i s e r were a n y t h i n g  but k i n d l y d i s p o s e d to each o t h e r , p a r t i c u l a r l y d u r i n g the l a t t e r p a r t of 1905.  As a r e s u l t the K a i s e r t a l k e d w i l d l y  a g a i n s t t h a t a r c h - i n t r i g u e r , h i s u n c l e ; while the King d e c l i n e d 2. to have a n y t h i n g t o do w i t h h i s tempestuous nephew. Such then was Crisis.  U n t i l 1905  the background f o r the drama of the Morocco no one had  thought  Germany r e a l l y  ed i n Morocco d e s p i t e v a r i o u s h i n t s to the c o n t r a r y .  interestIn  1899  the German Ambassador had r a i s e d the q u e s t i o n i n c o n n e c t i o n with a p o s s i b l e understanding S a l i s b u r y had  seaboard.  and  Germany.  s t a t e d B r i t a i n d e s i r e d maintenance of the s t a t u s  quo, but i n event could not  between England  of a break-up of the e x i s t i n g Empire,  look w i t h i n d i f f e r e n c e on the f a t e of the He  then enquired  she  Atlantic  the views of the German Government.  1. B.D.vol.3.p.56-8.No.65(a).Lascelles to Lansdowne, Dec.28, 1904 p.58-9.No.65(b).Lascelles to Lansdowne, Dec.30, 1904 p.79. No.97. L a s c e l l e s to Lansdowne, Junel2, 1905 G.D.vol.3.p.212-3.XIX.372.Biilow to Emperor, Dec. 26, 1904. 2. Lee - op. c i t . - vol.2.p.346-54.  78, The Ambassador  proved non-committal, merely s t a t i n g t h a t he con-  s i d e r e d an exchange 1. of an emergency. visit  of views on the s u b j e c t d e s i r a b l e i n event The matter came up a g a i n d u r i n g the K a i s e r ' s  t o England i n November 1899, when Chamberlain d i s c u s s e d a 2.  p o s s i b l e p a r t i t i o n i n which Germany would r e c e i v e a share. As the Germans w a i t e d f o r the B r i t i s h to make the d e f i n i t e  sug-  g e s t i o n s i n w r i t i n g the n e g o t i a t i o n s dragged and f i n a l l y came t o 3. nothing.  Germany l o s t h e r o p p o r t u n i t y through her p o l i c y of  not tunning a f t e r England.  I n 1900 Bulow s a i d t h a t Germany  had maritime i n t e r e s t s of h e r own i n Morocco and no German Government  c o u l d a f f o r d t o l o o k w i t h i n d i f f e r e n c e on the s e i z u r e of  Moroccan t e r r i t o r y or any arrangements i n which Germany had not 4. been  consulted. F r a n c e , however, d e s i r e d an agreement w i t h England alone  r e g a r d i n g Morocco.  I n 1902 the French Ambassador  discussed  w i t h Lansdowne the d i s t u r b e d s t a t e of Morocco and the a d v i s a b i l ity,  i f i n t e r v e n t i o n were n e c e s s a r y , of e x c l u d i n g v a r i o u s powers  who had no r e a l i n t e r e s t s i n the problem, namely Germany and the United States.  He gave Lansdowne the i m p r e s s i o n t h a t France 5. would not mind i f the Moroccan Empire d i s i n t e g r a t e d . About 1. B.D.vol.2.p.256.BO.307.Salisbury t o L a s c e l l e s , June 7, 1899; Brahdenburg - op. c i t . - p.146. 2. G.D.vol.3.p.108-114.XV.413.Memorandum by Bulow, Nov. 24, 1899. 3. Brandenburg - op. c i t . - p.146. 4. Anderson - The F i r s t Moroccan C r i s i s 1904-1906. - p.64. 5. B.D.vol.2.p.274-5.No.330.Lansdowne t o Monson, Dec. 31, 1902. France bought I t a l y by a g r e e i n g t o a l l o w her a f r e e hand i n T r i p o l i ; and made an arrangement w i t h Spain r e c o g n i z i n g h e r sbbere of i n f l u e n c e i n Morocco.  79. . the same time M e t t e r n i c h expressed e r s wished to m a i n t a i n  the b e l i e f t h a t a l l the Pow-  the s t a t u s quo 1.  a l l i n t e r v e n t i o n i n that country.  i n Morocco and The  p r e v i o u s year i n an  o f f i c i a l memorandum the German Government. had principle  to a v o i d  set f o r t h  the  of a p o l i c y of r e s e r v e i n Morocco, as they d i d not  c o n s i d e r the q u e s t i o n i n I t s e l f of s u f f i c i e n t i n p o r t a n c e 2. the r i s k of s e r i o u s i n t e r n a t i o n a l  compli.cations.  In view of these r e s e r v e d u t t e r a n c e s France f o l l o w her i n c l i n a t i o n s , ignore Germany, and  decided  come t o an  ment w i t h England r e g a r d i n g her i n t e r e s t s i n Morocco. Convention  signed A p r i l 8, 1904  i n t e n t i o n t o uphold  the  both  s t a t u s quo  countries declared  and  S e c r e t a r t i c l e s r e c o g n i z e d French  i n t h a t c o u n t r y and  promised E n g l i s h d i p l o m a t i c support 3.  i n event  of any d i f f i c u l t i e s .  Kt  ible.  t h a t had  agreeI n the their op-  interests to  the time none of the  Powers r a i s e d o b j e c t i o n s , r a t h e r they welcomed the i n Anglo-French r e l a t i o n s  to  the p r i n c i p l e of the  en door i n Morocco.  France  to run  improvement  made these arrangements  poss-  Germany r e c e i v e d no o f f i c i a l n o t i f i c a t i o n of the Agree-  ment c o n c e r n i n g Morocco, but the news was  p u b l i s h e d i n the  papers. Billow d i d not see a n y t h i n g d e t r i m e n t a l to German i n t e r 1. B.D.vol.2.p.275.No.331.Landdowne to L a s c e l l e s , Dec. 31, 1902. 2. B.D.vol.2.p.96. E n c l o s u r e i n No.104.Memorandum Communicated by M e t t e r n i c h , Sept. 3, 1901. 3. Grey - op. c i t . - vol.1.p.50. says r e g a r d i n g t h i s Convention "On the f a c e of the Agreement w i t h France there was n o t h i n g more than a d e s i r e to remove caused of d i s p u t e between the two n a t i o n s , to iaake up o l d q u a r r e l s , t o become f r i e n d s . It was a l l made p u b l i c , except a clause or two of no importance, which were not p u b l i s h e d a t the time, owing to r e g a r d , as I suppose, f o r the s u s c e p t i b i l i t i e s of the S u l t a n of Morocco; even these were p u b l i s h e d a few years l a t e r . " An amazing statement!  80. e s t s and  passed over the i n c i d e n t .  1.  The  expressed h i s i n d i f f e r e n c e to the whole Backed by  the terms of the  ed to take a c t i o n i n Morocco. petency of the S u l t a n ' s  K a i s e r s e v e r a l times 2. question.  Convention Prance soon proceed-  Since  the c o r r u p t i o n and  incom-  Government rendered reforms n e c e s s a r y ,  Prance undertook to have these c a r r i e d out thereby e s t a b l i s h i n g s e c u r e l y her  Influence  began t o b e s t i r h e r s e l f . became alarmed and  Then Germany  Bulow and H o l s t e i n i n p a r t i c u l a r  i n i t i a t e d a p o l i c y doomed to d i s a s t e r .  a Memorandum of June 3, view.  over the c o u n t r y .  1904,  I f Prance obtained  i n t e r e s t s would s u f f e r .  In  H o l s t e i n set f o r t h h i s p o i n t of  c o n t r o l of Morocco German commercial Since Morocco was  maining p a r t s of the w o r l d s t i l l  one  of the few  re-  open to f r e e c o m p e t i t i o n  in  t r a d e , Germany c o u l d not a f f o r d to a l l o w her i n t e r e s t s there to be d i s r e g a r d e d .  Besides  her  p r e s t i g e would s u f f e r .  f o r e she must p r o t e s t a g a i n s t Prance's i n t e n t i o n s . p e r f e c t l y safe to assume t h a t B r i t i s h d i p l o m a t i c mised i n the Convention would remain p l a t o n i c . by s a y i n g " I f we  It  support He  Therewas pro-  concluded  l e t o u r s e l v e s be  s h a l l encourage them t o do  trampled on i n Morocco, we 3. i t a g a i n elsewhere." Billow h e l d  1. B.D.vol.3.p.69-70.Ho.86.Lansdowne to B e r t i e , May 3, 1905. c f . Hale - Germany and the D i p l o m a t i c R e v o l u t i o n - p.79. f o r the a t t i t u d e of some of the German Papers. They expressed d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n , a s k i n g where was Germany's place i n the sun, and what would be the f u t u r e of German trade i n Morocco. 2. Brandenburg - op. cit„ - p.219; Billow - Memoirs - v o l . 2 . p. 100-101. Billow t e s t i f i e s to the K a i s e r ' s i n d i f f e r e n c e to Morocco and h i s w i l l i n g n e s s to l e t Prance occupy, h e r s e l f there and so t u r n her a t t e n t i o n away from the l o s t p r o v i n c e s . 3. G.D.vol.3.p.220-1.XX.207.Memorandum by H o l s t e i n , June 3, 1904  81. the same views; he o b j e c t e d t o these two powers a r r o g a n t l y d i s p o s i n g "of a g r e a t and most important f i e l d  of c o l o n i a l  inter-  e s t s w i t h o u t even d e i g n i n g t o take the German Empire i n t o • 1. sideration."  " I f once we  s u f f e r e d o u r s e l v e s to be  con-  trampled  on w i t h impunity, t h i s f i r s t attempt  to t r e a t us b a d l v would 2. soon have been f o l l o w e d by a second and a t h i r d . " O b v i o u s l y something must be done t o checkmate the F r e n c h .  The  German Ambassador i n Morocco had  complained of French 3. arrogance and urged the Germans to take a c t i o n . F i n a l l y the Government sent Dr. V a s s e l t o Fez t o i n f o r m the S u l t a n t h a t Germany had not consented t o French p r o c e e d i n g s . e f f e c t u a l a i d was  promised  Although no  - Billow d i s t i n c t l y s a i d t h a t Germany  would not go t o war w i t h France over Morocco - the S u l t a n de4. c i d e d t o r e s i s t the F r e n c h . almost s e c r e t l y . thunderbolt.  A l l t h i s took p l a c e v e r y q u i e t l y ,  Then out of a seemingly c l e a r sky came the  I n March 1905  the K a i s e r v i s i t e d  Tangier and  p r o c l a i m e d the independence  of the S u l t a n , and the 5.  of h i s domains.  dumbfounded.  schemes was  Europe was  integrity  What d i a b o l i c a l  B e r l i n planning?  The K a i s e r p r o c l a i m s h i s r e l u c t a n c e t o comply w i t h Billow.*s s u g g e s t i o n and evidence confirms the t r u t h of h i s statements. When Billow suggested that the Emperor l a n d a t Tangier w h i l e he 1.Billow - I m p e r i a l Germany - p.78. 2 . I b i d . p.80. 3. G,D.vol.3.p.219.XX.202.Mentzingen t o Billow, A p r i l 5, Brandenburg - op. c i t . - p.219. 4. Brandenburg - op. c i t . - p.219. 5. c f . W i l s o n - op. c i t . - p.98.  1904;  82. was  c r u i s i n g i n the M e d i t e r r a n e a n , Wilhelm r e f u s e d .  At  length,  a f t e r e x h a u s t i n g arguments, Billow p r e v a i l e d upon the Emperor, 1. who gave i n " w i t h a heavy h e a r t . " Even then Billow was not sure of h i s master. o f f i c i a l notice the he  coming v i s i t feared  To make r e t r e a t i m p o s s i b l e  i n the  published  an  "Nord-Deutsche Allgemeine Z e i t i n g " of 2.  to Tangier.  the p o s s i b l e  he  S t i l l the K a i s e r was  e f f e c t on B a r i s and  uneasy,  dreaded a n y t h i n g  t h a t might s t r e n g t h e n the bond between England and  Prance. 3.  U n t i l the l a s t moment he: hoped f o r some excuse not to l a n d . N e v e r t h e l e s s , he had to c a r r y out the programme. Europe blam4. ed the K a i s e r f o r t h i s i n d i s c r e t i o n , t h i s time u n j u s t l y . For  once, a t l e a s t , h i s i n s t i n c t s were w i s e r than the  of h i s a d v i s e r s .  Billow had  sown the ?/ind and was  counsels  to reap  the  whirlwind.  What he hoped to g a i n by t h i s demonstration i s 5. somewhat obscure. He seems f o r the time b e i n g to have be-  1. Wilhelm I I . - Memoirs - p.107. 2. G.D.vol.3.p.223.XX.262.Billow to Emperor, March.20, 1905. 3. G.D.vol.3.p.224.XX.285.Schoen to German F o r e i g n O f f i c e , March 31, 1905; Schoen - Memoirs - p.19-20; Brandenburg op. c i t . - p.221. 4.Wilhelm I I . - Memoirs - p. 109. He p l a i n t i v e l y remar&s t h a t he got the blame f o r obeying h i s m i n i s t e r s . 5.Pribram - op. c i t . - p.102. says t h a t the K a i s e r d i s l i k e d the i d e a "but he allowed h i m s e l f to be persuaded by Billow, behind whom H o l s t e i n as the r e a l i n s t i g a t o r l a y hidden, to c a l l a t Tangier on h i s Mediterranean c r u i s e . ; Gooch - S t u d i e s i n Modern H i s t o r y - p.86. maintains H o l s t e i n was the o r i g i n a t o r of the Tangier scheme. Billow approved i t and f o r c e d i t on the K a i s e r . Hale - op. c i t . - p.119, h o l d s Billow and H o l s t e i n respons i b l e as i n s t i g a t o r s of Morocco a c t i o n . Billow - Memoirs - v o l , 2 . p . 107. claims t h a t he was the i n s t i g a t o r of the whole a f f a i r , t h a t H o l s t e i n had not as much i n f l u e n c e d u r i n g Billow's regime as b e f o r e .  83. come imbued w i t h the K a i s e r ' s d e l i g h t i n s a b r e - r a t t l i n g .  He  p r o b a b l y hoped t h i s a c t would overawe the powers and d e t e r F r 1. ance from f u r t h e r a c t i v i t i e s i n Morocco. him,  the e f f e c t was  the exact o p p o s i t e .  a p i e c e of unwarrantable downe; "The  impudence.  T a n g i e r i n c i d e n t was  Unfortunately f o r Europe regarded  i t as  King Edward wrote t o  the most mischievous  and  Lansuncall  ed f o r event which the German Emperor has ever been engaged i n s i n c e he  came t o the t h r o n e .  a l f i a s c o , and  i f he  eyes of the world he  I t was  also a p o l i t i c a l theatric-  t h i n k s he has done h i m s e l f good i n the i s v e r y much mistaken.  He  l e s s than a p o l i t i c a l 'enfant t e r r i b l e ' and  one  f a i t h i n any  of h i s a s s u r a n c e s .  H i s own  i s no more nor can have no  p l e a s u r e seems t o  2.  wish t o s e t every country by the e a r s . "  Lansdowne c o n s i d e r -  ed the i n c i d e n t i n keeping w i t h Germany's s e c r e t a t t i t u d e t o ward the Anglo-French  Agreement, and  to put a spoke i n England's  wheels.  the K a i s e r ' s d i s p o s i t i o n He d i d not t h i n k Germany  1. c f . Biilow - Memoirs - v o l . 2 . p . 104. f o r Billow's own statement of h i s i n t e n t i o n s r e g a r d i n g Morocco. He-says:"In the f a c e of t h i s c h a i n of French a g g r e s s i o n s i t seemed to me necessary t o remind P a r i s a g a i n of the German Empire. I t was not o n l y the e x t e n t of our economic and p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t s In and about Morocco which d e c i d e d me t o advise the K a i s e r to s e t h i s f a c e a g a i n s t Prance, but a l s o the c o n v i c t i o n t h a t i n the i n t e r e s t s of peace we must no longer permit such provocations. I d i d not d e s i r e war w i t h France e i t h e r then or l a t e r , because I knew t h a t every s e r i o u s c o n f l i c t as t h i n g s l a y i n Europe would l e a d t o a world war. But I d i d not hesi t a t e to c o n f r o n t France w i t h the p o s s i b i l i t y of war becavise I had confidence i n my own s k i l l and c a u t i o n . I f e l t t h a t I c o u l d prevent matters coming to a head, cause D e l c a s s e ' s f a l l , break the c o n t i n u i t y of a g g r e s s i v e French p o l i c y , knock the c o n t i n e n t a l dagger out of the hands of EdwardVTI. and the war group i n England, and, s i m u l t a n e o u s l y ensure peace, preserve German honour, and improve German p r e s t i g e . " 2. Lee - op. c i t . - vol.2.p.340.  84. had it  anything provided  to complain about i n the Morocco Agreement, s i n c e 1. f o r the i n t e g r i t y of Morocco.  Bulow had  i n s t r u c t e d the K a i s e r to a v o i d committing Germ2. an$r t o any d e f i n i t e p o l i c y i n h i s speeches a t T a n g i e r . He should have known t h a t Wilhelm's tongue was w i t h him.  The Emperor p r o c l a i m e d  l i k e l y to run away  t h a t he would d e a l w i t h  S u l t a n as an independent s o v e r e i g n ,  secure r e c o g n i t i o n f o r Germ3.  any's j u s t c l a i m s , and would expect Prance t o r e c o g n i z e No wonder Europe gasped. had  no w a r - l i k e  How  the  them.  were they to know t h a t Germany  i n t e n t i o n s hut merely wished " t o uphold German  p r e s t i g e , to show they were not w i l l i n g to be  left  out, to check  Prance's i n t r o d u c t i o n of a p o l i c y of p e a c e f u l p e n e t r a t i o n u n t i l Germany's consent had been obtained by means of concessions 4. elsewhere." A f t e r Tangier i c y of u p h o l d i n g  Germany was  the i n t e g r i t y of Morocco i n the face of Anglo-  French o p p o s i t i o n .  She had  p o l i c y of the open door and among the n a t i o n s  d e f i n i t e l y committed to a p o l -  I r r e v o c a b l y pledged h e r s e l f to the e q u a l i t y of commercial i n t e r e s t  i n Morocco.  but f o r Morocco and  She  was  the l e s s e r powers.  working not f o r h e r s e l f , She was  of the weak a g a i n s t the g r a s p i n g might of the l i v e d to r e g r e t her r o l e .  Had  the  strong.  i t not been so openly  1. Newton - op. c i t . - p.334. 2. Hale - op. c i t . - p . 1 0 1 . 3. Brandenburg - op. c i t . - p.221. 4.Ibid.p.222.  champion She proclaimed  85. she c o u l d p r o b a b l y have o b t a i n e d compensations  from Prance and 1. drawn c l o s e r t o h e r i n a g e n e r a l s e t t l e m e n t of d i f f e r e n c e s . 2. Prance was somewhat p u z z l e d . compensations  Her e f f o r t s  to f i n d  Germany wished proved u n a v a i l i n g .  strasse maintained a s p h i n x - l i k e s i l e n c e .  out what  The Wilhelm-  Then the S u l t a n sug-  gested a conference o f the Powers t o d i s c u s s the s i t u a t i o n . Germany, welcoming an honourable way out of the d i f f i c u l t y , immediately a c c e p t e d the i n v i t a t i o n and urged the others t o 3. follow suit. Prance h e s i t a t e d . England c o n s i d e r e d a Confer4. ence unnecessary b u t promised t o do as Erance wished.  The  s m a l l e r powers made t h e i r acceptance c o n d i t i o n a l upon t h a t o f England and Prance. n e g o t i a t i o n s proceeded between Prance and Germany r e g a r d i n g the Conference.  Prance was r e l u c t a n t t o agree.  Delcasse,  the F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r , pursued a p o l i c y a n t a g o n i s t i c t o Germany. 1. c f . H i e o l s o n - Lord Carnock - p.164. R o u v i e r o f f e r e d a d i r e c t Franco-German Agreement i n s e t t l e m e n t of o u t s t a n d i n g q u e s t i o n s , p.166. Billow and H o l s t e i n never t o l d the K a i s e r a t the time. When he l e a r n e d of i t s e v e r a l years l a t e r he w r o t e , " I f I had been t o l d about t h i s , I should have gone i n t o i t t h o r o u g h l y and the i d i o t i c Conference would never have taken p l a c e . " 2. B.D.vol.3.p.69-70.No.86.Lansdowne t o B e r t i e , May 3, 1905; p.68.No. 84. B e r t i e t o Lansdowne, A p r i l 27, 1905. 3. B.D.vol.3.p.79-80.No.77.Lascelles t o Lansdov/ne, Junel2, 1905. p.80-2.No. 9 8 . L a s c e l l e s t o Lansdowne, Junel2, 1905. 4. B.D.vol.3.p.89. No.3.08.Lansdowne t o Lowther, June 5, 1905. p.92. No.116.Lansdowne t o Lowther, June 8, 1905.  86. The  Germans p r a c t i c a l l y r e f u s e d t o do a n y t h i n g so l o n g as he 1.  remained  in office.  R o u v i e r , i n the hope of improving Francd  German r e l a t i o n s , f o r c e d D e l c a s s e ' s r e s i g n a t i o n .  This  appear-  ed as a triumph f o r Germany, but i n s t e a d of p u r s u i n g t h e i r vantage  by c o n c i l i a t i n g France  the German Governmant s t i l l i n -  s i s t e d on i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n t r o l i n Morocco, and a Rouvier soon saw  the f o l l y  ad-  Conference.  of b e i n g a pawn i n Germany's hands  and  s t i f f e n e d French r e s i s t a n c e . Moreover, England had assured 2. him of h e r u n f a i l i n g support. O b v i o u s l y the German aim was t o prevent France from assum 3. i n g a p r o t e c t o r a t e over Morocco.  They might pose as bene-  f a c t o r s of the world but a t bottom they were working f o r t h e i r own  interests.  K i n g Edward commented "In p l a i n E n g l i s h - Germ4.  any ousts France from Morocco and puts h e r s e l f i n her p l a c e . " E n g l i s h m i n i s t e r s were annoyed w i t h Germany. see why  They c o u l d not  the German Government had to make so much f u s s over  Morocco where her i n t e r e s t s were c o n s i d e r a b l y l e s s than of France and England.  those  None of the other Powers had v o i c e d  1. B.D.vol.3.p.78.No.96.Bertie t o Lansdowne, June 10, 1905. G.D,vol.5.p.227.XX.358.Memorandum by H o l s t e i n , May 2, 1905. Hale - op. c i t . - Chapter V shows t h a t D e l c a s s e ' s p o l i c y was unpopular i n the House of D e p u t i e s . R e a l l y Rouvier was g i v i n g i n t o h i s own countrymen i n d i s m i s s i n g D e l c a s s e as much as he was c o n c i l i a t i n g the Germans. Germany d i d o b j e c t to D e l c a s s e ' s Morocco p o l i c y but so d i d Rouvier and some of the F r e n c h , and they knew i t . The French press expressed g e n e r a l s a t i s f a c t i o n a t the M i n i s t e r ' s r e s i g n a t i o n , r e g a r d i n g i t not as a n a t i o n a l h u m i l i a t i o n imposed on France by Germany but as a n a t u r a l r e s u l t of D e l c a s s e ' s own b l i n d and mistaken p o l i c y . 2. B.D.vol.3.p.72.No.80.Lansdowne t o B e r t i e . A p r i l 22, 1905; G.D.vol.3.p.2S2-3.XX.647.Metternich t o Bulow, J u l y 22, 1905 3. G.D.vol.3.p.234-7.Metternich to Billow, Jan.3, 1906; B.D.vol.3.p.222-3,No.240.Lascelles t o Grey, Jan.13, 1906. 4. B.D.vol.3.p.106.Minute by K i n g Edward.  87. o b j e c t i o n s , why  should Germany.  The  German o f f i c i a l s  came to 1.  b e l i e v e t h a t England v/ould l i k e to see a war w i t h Germany. I f such a c o n f l i c t broke out England would s i d e w i t h Prance. Had  the Germans wished t o prove to the French the u n r e l i a b i l i t y  of E n g l i s h promises of a s s i s t a n c e , they were f a i l i n g badly.  rather  M e t t e r n i c h t o l d Lansdowne he thought the French would 2.  come t o terms  " i f you do not s t i f f e n t h e i r backs f o r them."  German honour was  s t a k e d upon a Conference.  In d e s p a i r  the K a i s e r appealed t o R o o s e v e l t t o e x e r t p r e s s u r e upon Prance and England  to make"them a c c e p t .  R o o s e v e l t d i d not care to  be mixed up i n Morocco, nor d i d he wish to take s i d e s between 4. Prance and Germany.  E v e n t u a l l y the French compromised and  agreed t o a Conference. Then came the q u e s t i o n of a programme.  Again n e g o t i a t -  i o n s proceeded between P a r i s and B e r l i n ; a g a i n R o o s e v e l t had t o 5. come t o the r e s c u e ;  a g a i n B r i t a i n supported France 6nd  taken f u l l y i n t o the F r e n c h c o n f i d e n c e .  Whereas b e f o r e the  German Government had p r e s s e d e a g e r l y f o r a Conference, t h a t France Had  was  now  consented i n p r i n c i p l e , they d i l l y - d a l l i e d ,  r e f u s i n g to say e x a c t l y what they wanted, always  coming f o r -  ward w i t h some f r e s h p r o p o s a l s , d e c l i n i n g to .agree to a date 1. G.D.vol.3.p.230.XX.418,Bulow t o Tattenbach, June 7, 1905.; 6. p.227-8.XX.368.Eulow German F o r e i an g n agreement, Office, and p l a c e f o r meeting. At l e n g t h ,to they reached May 5, 1905. 2. B.D.vol.3.p.92-3.No.117.Lansdowne to L a s c e l l e s , J u n e 8 , 1905. 3. Bishop - o p . c i t . - vol.1.p.468-71. 4.Ibid.p.472. 5.Ibid.p.479-87. 6.B.D.vol.3.p.128.No.179.Lister t o Lansdowne,. Aug.15, 1905; p.!29.No.3.72.Cartwright to Lansdowne, Aug.24, 1905; p.140. No.182.Bertie to Lansdowne, Sept.24, 1905.  88. the Conference  should d i s c u s s p o l i c e , f i n a n c e , customs and r e v -  enue, and e q u a l i t y i n commerce. who  was  On the i n v i t a t i o n of S p a i n ,  a l s o i n t e r e s t e d i n Morocco, the Conference was  held i n Spain e a r l y i n  1906.  Then came the q u e s t i o n of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . French d e l e g a t e was  to he  The  chief  M. E e v o i l ; the German, Herr von Radowitz,  a s s i s t e d hy Count Tattenbach; the s o l e B r i t i s h r e p r e s e n t a t i v e was  S i r Arthur Nicolson.  The  other d e l e g a t e s p l a y e d  secondary  r o l e s f o r the most p a r t , w i t h the p o s s i b l e e x c e p t i o n of the t r i a n s , the I t a l i a n s , and the Americans.  To S p a i n f e l l  honour of s u p p l y i n g the P r e s i d e n t of the Conference. did  not approve t h e i r e a r l y c h o i c e of a d e l e g a t e and  Aus-  the  Germany hastened  to warn the S p a n i s h Government t h a t h i s appointment would be regarded as an u n f r i e n d l y a c t .  N i c o l s o n r e g r e t t e d that S p a i n  2. should not be allowed a f r e e hand i n a p p o i n t i n g her d e l e g a t e . N i c o l s o n had emphatic  i n s t r u c t i o n s t o support France to the 3.  as a g i e e d i n A r t i c l e IX. of the Anglo-French  Convention.  From one p o i n t of view the Morocco c r i s i s as Conference  may  b e g i n n i n g to end whole-heartedly. little  full  and the A l g e c i r -  be regarded as an Anglo-German d u e l .  From  the B r i t i s h Government supported the French I n the e a r l y stages France may  have f e l t a  d o u b t f u l of B r i t i s h i n t e n t i o n s , but c o n t i n u a l  assurances  by word and deed convinced her t h a t her f e a r s were g r o u n d l e s s . 1. B.D.vol.3.p.143.Enclosure I . i n No.184., 2. B.D.vol.3.p.l50.No.l92.Nicolson t o Grey, 3. B.D.vol.3.p.161.No.199.Grey to N i c o l s o n , p.151.No.193.Grey t o N i c o l s o n ,  Sept. 28, 1905. Dec. 14, 1905. Dec. 20, 1905.; Dec. 14, 1905.  89. E o l s t e i n ' s c o m f o r t i n g b e l i e f i n p u r e l y p l a t o n i c support went by the b o a r d s .  I f Germany was out t o wreck the E n t e n t e , B r i t -  a i n was determined  to preserve i t ,  and s t r e n g t h e n i t . M e t t e r n i c h  accused the E n g l i s h of b e i n g more French than the French, and of encouraging F r e n c h r e s i s t a n c e .  Germany, knowing t h a t the  Agreement c a l l e d o n l y f o r d i p l o m a t i c support, d i s l i k e d the . a t t i t u d e assumed by t h e " B r i t i s h p u b l i c , who a c t e d as i f armed 1. support were promised.  Germany, i s s u i n g a c h a l l e n g e t o France,  found h e r s e l f answered by two c o u n t r i e s i n s t e a d of one. the end of the Conference practically isolated.  Before  she was d e s t i n e d t o f i n d h e r s e l f  She became e n t a n g l e d i n the net she had  spread f o r B r i t a i n ; and then turned round and accused of m a l i c i o u s l y i n t r i g u i n g t o e n c i r c l e  Britain  Germany.  F o r a moment i t i s n e c e s s a r y t o go back t o J u l y 1905 t o a d e l i g h t f u l comic-opera  i n t e r l u d e enacted i n Northern waters  by the A d m i r a l o f the A t l a n t i c and the A d m i r a l of the P a c i f i c . The K a i s e r was a t t h i s time possessed w i t h a b i t t e r h a t r e d f o r England.  He d i r e c t e d a l l h i s e f f o r t s t o i s o l a t i n g the o b j e c t  of h i s h a t e .  I n 1904 he had t r i e d t o secure an a l l i a n c e w i t h  R u s s i a b u t the attempt had f a l l e n through. was d i f f e r e n t . an.  Nov/, the s i t u a t i o n  R u s s i a had s u f f e r e d d e f e a t a t the hands of Jap-  The Czar f e l t i s o l a t e d and f r i e n d l e s s , f o r France, h i s  a l l y , had done l i t t l e  t o a s s i s t him d u r i n g t h i s  ignominious  war; w h i l e a t the peace conference the n a t i o n s were 1.B.D.vol,3.p.209-11.No.229.Gs?ey  indiffer-  t o L a s c e l l e s , Jan.9, 1906.  90. ent.  Never would a b e t t e r o p p o r t u n i t y o f f e r i t s e l f .  c r u i s i n g i n N o r t h e r n waters  p l a c e d h i m s e l f a t the Czar's  should the R u s s i a n f a v o u r a meeting. ighted acceptance. changed c o u r t e s i e s .  The K a i s e r service  The Czar w i r e d back d e l -  The two yachts anchored a t Bjttrko  and ex-  W i l l y caught N i c k y a t the p s y c h o l o g i c a l  moment, posed as h i s ffciend and s a v i o u r , produced  the t r e a t y ,  scorned a year ago, and induced the Czar t o s i g n .  I n Nicky's  c a b i n , i n the presence  o f the s p i r i t s  o f t h e i r a n c e s t o r s , they  pledged t h e i r k i n g l y words and s e a l e d t h e i r compact w i t h an embrace.  The t r e a t y , a c c o r d i n g t o the K a i s e r ' s fond b e l i e f , was  to be a landmark i n h i s t o r y .  He had won R u s s i a , through h e r  he would win France from the E n t e n t e . alone, against a c o n t i n e n t a l a l l i a n c e . f o r a l l the s l i g h t s the E n g l i s h ] ible?  Then England would be What a g l o r i o t i s  revenge  and i n s u l t s he had r e c e i v e d a t the hands of  "Thus the a c t was accomplished.  How was i t poss-  The Emperor's e x p l a n a t i o n was simple and s a t i s f y i n g -  God d i d i t . shades  F o r He was p r e s e n t , as were v a r i o u s s p i r i t s and  of dead and d e p a r t e d kinsmen.  A humble and depressed  Czar and an i n s p i r e d Emperor w i t h h i s 'Losungen der Briidergemeinde', t e a r s , s i g h s , and embraces, many a d a i n t y d i s h and f l a s k o f o l d wine, many a s a t i s f y i n g b u r s t of anger a t absent 1. enemies - no wonder the B j B r k b T r e a t y was signedJ " The K a i s e r t s triumph was s h o r t l i v e d .  1.Anderson - op. c i t . - p.285.  Billow found  fault  91. w i t h the a d d i t i o n of the words " i n Eurot)e" t o the clause 1. i n g a s s i s t a n c e i n case of war,  Russia  promis-  could be of most use  t o Germany i n a t t a c k i n g England's I n d i a n f r o n t i e r .  When the  Czar's m i n i s t e r s found out, they condemned i t as c o n t r a r y t o the spirit  o f the D u a l A l l i a n c e .  The u n l u c k y Czar had t o w r i t e t o  the K a i s e r withdrawing h i s consent. The  The K a i s e r stormed i n v a i n .  T r e a t y never came i n t o e f f e c t , so t h a t attempt t o i s o l a t e  England f a i l e d d i s m a l l y . The The  E n g l i s h knew p r a c t i c a l l y n o t h i n g  of the i n t e r v i e w .  o n l y B r i t i s h d i p l o m a t i s t who got any i n f o r m a t i o n was Mr.  Tower i n Munich, who knew a member of the K a i s e r ' s s u i t .  This  German p r i n c e had s a t next t o the Czar a t l u n c h on the f a t e f u l day.  He had n o t i c e d the Czar seemed i n h i g h s p i r i t s ;  r e s t l e s s l y t a l k a t i v e and s i l e n t i n t u r n , seemed through the whole c r u i s e .  the K a i s e r  preoccupied  "The K a i s e r ' s t a l k i s ever of a l l i a n -  ces and p o l i t i c a l combinations, and he gave u t t e r a n c e  on the  c r u i s e t o h i s c h e r i s h e d i d e a of b e i n g able t o e f f e c t a c o a l i t i o n between Germany, Prance, and R u s s i a t o the e x c l u s i o n of 2. Great B r i t a i n . " Lansdowne r e p l i e d t o Tower's l e t t e r , " I must say t h a t the d e s c r i p t i o n of the K a i s e r ' s language and demeanour f i l l s me w i t h d i s q u i e t . 3. mind do n e x t ? "  What may n o t a man i n such a frame of  Of the r e a l f a c t s Europe remained i n i g n o r -  ance . 1. Billow - Memoirs - v o l . 2 . p . 131-2.; Pribram - op. c i t . - p.104-5 '. Gooch - S t u d i e s i n Modern H i s t o r y - p.79. Mr. Gooch says t h a t Billow r e l i e d on H o l s t e i n ' s advice i n every step i n the Bjorkb* a f f a i r . 2. Newton - op. c i t . - p.337. 3.Ibid.p.338.  92. To r e t u r n t o the Morocco q u e s t i o n .  The change o f Govern-  ment i n B r i t a i n a t the end of 1905 p l a c e d S i r Edward Grey i n charge of F o r e i g n A f f a i r s .  He l o y a l l y , c a r r i e d on the p o l i c y o f  Lansdowne i n s u p p o r t i n g F r a n c e .  H i s sympathies were w i t h the  F r e n c h i n t h i s q u e s t i o n and he l e f t n e i t h e r s i d e i n doubt as to h i s a t t i t u d e .  W i t h M e t t e r n i c h he was q u i t e f r a n k .  of war between France and Germany he f e l t  I n event  sure t h a t E n g l i s h  p u b l i c o p i n i o n would n o t a l l o w the Government t o remain n e u t r a l . M e t t e r n i c h argued t h a t Germany might n o t be the aggressor; England was bound t o g i v e o n l y d i p l o m a t i c support;  that  t h a t Germany  v/as too s t r o n g a n a t i o n t o a l l o w h e r s e l f t o be overawed by F r a n ce and B r i t a i n combined; t h a t , s o l o n g as B r i t a i n France,  supported  Germany c o u l d not, f o r the sake of d i g n i t y , make the  concessions ed adamant.  t h a t she c o u l d make t o France a l o n e . France should have support  Grey remain-  t o the f u l l .  He c o u l d  not hope t o improve Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s nor the h o s t i l e  atti-  tude of the B r i t i s h press u n t i l the Conference had s e t t l e d the 1. question.  Then he hoped t o work f o r f r i e n d l y  Metternich  saw the dangers and warned h i s Government:"Here the  Morocco q u e s t i o n i s g e n e r a l l y regarded  relations,  as a t e s t of the Anglo-  F r e n c h Entente and our Morocco p o l i c y as an attempt t o smash 2. i t up," To the Frendh Ambassador Grey promised f u l l  diplomatic  1. B.D.vol.3.p.209-ll.No.229.Grey t o L a s c e l l e s , J a n . 9, 1906. G.D.vol.3.p.234-7.Metternich'to Billow, J a n . 3, 1906. 2. G.D.vol,3.p.237.XXI.52.Metternich t o German F o r e i g n O f f i c e , Jan. 4, 1906.  93. backing.  In answer t o the F r e n c h e n q u i r i e s r e g a r d i n g armed  a s s i s t a n c e he was  more wary.  must p r e s e r v e England's  He  f e l t t h a t above a l l t h i n g s he  r i g h t t o freedom  of a c t i o n ; and a v o i d  making pledges t h a t he might not be able t o f u l f i l . p o i n t e d out t o Cambon i t was  one  As he  t h i n g f o r him t o warn M e t t e r -  n i c h t h a t i n case of c o n f l i c t England would i n t e r v e n e , but i t was to  a l t o g e t h e r d i f f e r e n t f o r him t o r e p e a t the same assurance the Frendh.  I f the t e s t came and he were unable to  fulfil  t h i s t h r e a t t o Germany no harm would be done; but i f he made the promise  t o France and then had t o break i t he'and England 1.  would be d i s g r a c e d b e f o r e the n a t i o n s of Europe. F r e n c h had  t o proceed w i t h o u t f o r m a l assurance of a n y t h i n g  save f u l l d i p l o m a t i c s u p p o r t .  N e v e r t h e l e s s t h e r e seemed to be  an u n d e r c u r r e n t o f f e e l i n g t h a t France was in  an emergency.  120,000 men  So the  sure of B r i t i s h a i d  The rumour t h a t England o f f e r e d to l a n d  i n S c h l e s w i g and g i v e France m i l i t a r y  assistance  i n war a g a i n s t Germany has been e m p h a t i c a l l y denied by the B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l s and has no evidence to support i t i n any of 2. the documents.  However, m i l i t a r y c o n v e r s a t i o n s between the  G e n e r a l S t a f f s were p e r m i t t e d by Grey w i t h o u t the knowledge 1. B.D..vol.3.p.l70-l.No.210.Grey t o B e r t i e , Jan.10, 1906.; p.177-8.No.216.Grey t o B e r t i e , Jan.15, 1906.; p.180-2.No.219.Grey t o B e r t i e , Jan.31, 1906.; p.266-7.No.299.Memorandum by Grey, Feb.20, 1906.; Grey - op. c i t . - vol.1.p.82-5. 2. B.D.vol.3.p.87.No.105(a).Sanderson t o Temperley, Aug.17, 1922 p.87.No.105(b).Comment by L a n s d o w n e , Ap. 4, 1 9 2 7 . Newton - op. c i t . - p.484.  94c  of  the whole C a b i n e t .  He was  v e r y care'ful t o make i t a b s o l u t e -  ly  c l e a r t h a t n e i t h e r B r i t a i n nor Prance were a t a l l committed 1. by these c o n v e r s a t i o n s . "The communications must be s o l e l y p r o v i s i o n a l and non-committal", and  should take p l a c e w i t h  cognizance  of the o f f i c i a l heads of the A d m i r a l t y and  Office.  The  2.  a d v i s a b l e t o be troops i n case  p o i n t was  a very f i n e  prepared  one.  Admittedly I t  f o r speedy a c t i o n and  of n e c e s s i t y .  honour?  War was  t r a n s p o r t of  Y e t , i n s p i t e of Grey's  i o n s , d i d not the c o n v e r s a t i o n s c a r r y w i t h them an of  the  the  stipulat-  obligation  N e v e r t h e l e s s , the communications c o n t i n u e d ,  were p e r f e c t e d and when the t e s t came i n 1 9 1 4 were  plans  executed  3.  as Haldane says w i t h o u t  a hitch.  One  Grey wished i t or not he would be  feels  t h a t whether  i n e v i t a b l y dragged i n t o a 4.  c o n f l i c t s h o u l d Prance and The  Conference  Germany f a i l  t o r e a c h an agreement. 16,  opened a t A l g e c i r a s on January  and dragged p a i n f u l l y on u n t i l the b e g i n n i n g of A p r i l . the n e g o t i a t i n g was  done behind  between r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .  the scenes  1906, Most of  In c o n v e r s a t i o n s  There i s no doubt t h a t H i c o l s o n 5.  p l a y e d a v e r y important  part i n preventing f a i l u r e .  The  U n i t e d S t a t e s d e l e g a t e a l s o worked t o secure harmony but a v o i d , - o fvfoeln.d1 .Prance C h a p . 6 . and England. ed 1 d. oGrey i n g a- n yop, t h i ncgi tto Germany, then, 2 . B . D . v o l . 3 . p . 1 7 4 . M i n u t e by Grey. 3 . Haldane - Before the War - p.33-5. 4 . c f . C h u r c h i l l - World C r i s i s - v o l . 1 . p . 2 7 . "However e x p l i c i t l y the two Governments might agree and a f f i r m t o each other t h a t no n a t i o n a l or p o l i t i c a l engagement was i n v o l v e d i n these t e c h n i c a l d i s c u s s i o n s , the f a c t remained t h a t they c o n s t i t u t e d as e x c e e d i n g l y potent t i e . " 5 . c f . N i c o l s o n - Lord Carnock - f o r the p a r t p l a y e d by N i c o l son a t the Conference.  95. soon found h e r s e l f i n an awkward p o s i t i o n . q u e s t i o n , as expected, was  the P o l i c e .  f o r c e i n the hands of themselves for  The most  The French wanted the  and S p a i n .  Germany h e l d  out  i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n t r o l or c o n t r o l by the S u l t a n h i m s e l f .  N e i t h e r s i d e c o u l d be shaken from i t s p o s i t i o n . it  difficult  seemed as i f the Conference must b r e a k up.  S e v e r a l times I n which case  matters must be so manoeuvred that the blame f o r the f a i l u r e would f a l l not on France b u t on Germany. the F r e n c h and the B r i t i s h ,  Such was  a l s o the S p a n i s h who,  the aim of on the whole,  d e s p i t e German e f f o r t s t o d e t a c h them, worked w i t h the E n t e n t e . D u r i n g the e a r l y s t a g e s , the German r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , enbach, endeavoured  Tatt-  to d e t a c h N i c o l s o n from h i s l o y a l t y t o  F r a n c e , and urged him to b r i n g pressure to bear on the French to  a c c e p t German demands.  f a i l e d i t would be  He h i n t e d t h a t i f the  largely Nicolson's f a u l t .  Conference  N i c o l s o n was  f u r i o u s , but c o n t r o l l e d h i m s e l f and informed Tattenbach England i n t e n d e d t o f u l f i l her o b l i g a t i o n s to F r a n c e .  that While  he c e r t a i n l y would not urge concessions on the French, he would 1. not encourage ing  them t o r e s i s t .  Tattenbach and  d i s a g r e e a b l e man,  He wrote home t o Grey r e g a r d -  the g e n e r a l s i t u a t i o n .  "He  i s a rasping,  not s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d or t r u t h f u l and e v i d e n t -  l y has t o e x e r c i s e much e f f o r t to c o n t r o l h i s temper. complains  t h a t M.de  M.Revoil  Radowitz i s too e l u s i v e to t r e a t w i t h ,  and t h a t he cannot b r i n g him t o the p o i n t . l.B.D.vol.3.p.241.No.265.Nicolson  T h i s M.Revoil  t o Grey, Feb. 4,  1906.  attri-  96. butes t o the f a c t t h a t the Germans do not r e a l l y know what they want.  I t e l l him t h a t I have l i t t l e  doubt t h a t they do 1.  know; b u t u n f o r t u n a t e l y they keep i t to themselves." At  l a s t Germany made c o n c e s s i o n s i n the p o l i c e q u e s t i o n .  The F r e n c h d e c l i n e d to compromise.  Opinion a t the Conference  swung away from France momentarily.  Rumour had i t t h a t Eng-  l i s h support would be withdrawn u n l e s s France c o n c i l i a t e d Germany.  Both N i c o l s o n and the B r i t i s h Government denied the sug-  g e s t i o n and r e a s s u r e d the F r e n c h .  Whatever t h e i r p r i v a t e  i n i o n the E n g l i s h would redeem t h e i r promise. ed the F r e n c h f o r B e r l i n came t o i t s senses. t h a t Germany was  op-  Fortune f a v o u r Billow, r e a l i z i n g  heading f o r the abyss, took the matter out of  H o l s t e i n ' s hands; and devoted h i s e f f o r t s to g e t t i n g out of the  a f f a i r w i t h as l i t t l e  ible. of  That Germany was  loss  of p r e s t i g e f o r Germany as poss-  i s o l a t e d he had l i t t l e  March 3 i n the Conference had shown t h a t .  doubt, the vote He  could p r o b a b l y  r e l y on t h e ' s u p p o r t of A u s t r i a ; b u t of I t a l y he could not be s u r e ; and the U n i t e d S t a t e s were a p p a r e n t l y more on the French 2. side.  They agreed t o F r e n c h and Spanish c o n t r o l of the  p o l i c e under the i n s p e c t i o n of a Swiss.  I n the Bank they ob-  t a i n e d i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n t r o l . . On the f a c e of i t Germany a t t a i n ed what she wanted - i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n t r o l i n Morocco, the i n t e g r i t y o f the Empire,  and the f r u s t r a t i o n of the French  1. B.D.vol.3.p.243.No.268.Nicolson to Grey - Feb. 5, 1906. 2. c f . Bishop - op. c i t . vol.1.Chap. 37. f o r the American attitude.  97, plans.  A c t u a l l y she a c h i e v e d l i t t l e  save a l o s s of p r e s t i g e ,  and a s t r e n g t h e n i n g of the E n t e n t e . For the time b e i n g the t e n s i o n r e l a x e d and Europe, a s i g h of r e l i e f , resumed i t s normal r e l a t i o n s . knew Germany had  Yet  giving  everyone  s u f f e r e d h u m i l i a t i o n , i n s p i t e of p o l i t e  ex-  changes of c o n g r a t u l a t i o n upon the s e t t l e m e n t of d i f f e r e n c e s w i t h n e i t h e r conqueror be r e l i e d upon. be  nor vanquished.  R u s s i a had  supported F r a n c e .  l u r e d away from England and France.  leaned towards F r a n c e . genius of Germany, was  While England,  i t ; "The  S p a i n c o u l d not  Even the U n i t e d S t a t e s the arch-demon and  As Brandenburg so  Morocco C r i s i s and the A l g e c i r a s  admirably  Conference  weakened the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e , but l e f t the Dual A l l i a n c e and the F r a n c o - E n g l i s h Entente m a t e r i a l l y That Germany had  evil  succeeding i n her d e e p - l a i d schemes f o r  i s o l a t i n g the g r e a t German Empire. phrases  I t a l y c o u l d no longer  unhurt 1.  strengthened."  j u s t i f i c a t i o n i n o b j e c t i n g t o French  p e n e t r a t i o n of Morocco none can d i s p u t e .  Had  she proceeded  in  a more t a c t f u l manner she c o u l d p r o b a b l y have come to terms w i t h France and have gained concessions elsewhere. was  not h e r method.  the o n l y was  Threats and arrogance were i n her  t o b r i n g people terms.  p o l i c y of the W i l h e l m s t r a s s e and the e l o q u e n t Wilhelm ion.  One  But  I t was  such eyes  the b l u n d e r i n g  the i l l - c o n s i d e r e d remarks of  t h a t s e t her f e e t on the path to h u m i l i a t -  i s tempted to agree w i t h E c k a r d s t e i n ' s b i t t e r condemn-  1.Brandenburg - op. c i t , - p.251.; C h u r c h i l l - op, c i t . p.28. says " A l g e c i r a s was a m i l e s t o n e on the road to Armageddon. "  98. a t i o n of h i s Government's p o l i c y ; "There has p r o b a b l y never been a n a t i o n a l p o l i c y so laughable and so lamentable as t h a t of the W i l h e l m i n i c Era,* I t was 1. idiotic,"  Brandenburg  judgment: " I t was  worse than p e r f i d i o u s , i t was  g i v e s a more r a t i o n a l and  impartial  a p e t t y p o l i c y d i c t a t e d i n t u r n by greed,  p e r p l e x i t y , and love of p r e s t i g e , which sought t r i v i a l t h i n g s 2. r a t h e r than what was I t was  g r e a t and  lasting."  r e a l l y the staunch E n g l i s h support of Prance  r u i n e d Germany's Morocco v e n t u r e .  Without E n g l i s h b a c k i n g  Prance would have been easy prey f o r Germany. a f t e r the Russo*Japanese u a l a i d to her a l l y .  War,  that  R u s s i a , weakened  c o u l d have g i v e n l i t t l e  effect-  I f B r i t a i n had stood a s i d e Germany might  have d i s p o s e d of the F r e n c h menace.  England knew her  danger  too w e l l t o stand a s i d e i n event of a Franco-German c o n f l i c t . Germany i n p o s s e s s i o n of n a v a l bases #ast a c r o s s the might prove too uncomfortable a neighbour.  Her motives i n  s u p p o r t i n g France i n Morocco were not e n t i r e l y She had  Channel  disinterested.  l e a r n e d the disadvantages of i s o l a t i o n , and the appar-  ent i m p o s s i b i l i t y of coming t o a s a t i s f a c t o r y agreement w i t h Germany.  T h e r e f o r e , h a v i n g s e t t l e d her d i f f e r e n c e s w i t h Prance  she e x e r t e d h e r s e l f t o keep and  s t r e n g t h e n the new-found dlriend  ship. To the minds of her m i n i s t e r s f r i e n d s h i p w i t h Prance 1, E c k a r d s t e i n - op, c i t . - p.60. 2. Brandenburg - op. c i t . - p.224.  QQ  did  not  mean e n m i t y t o w a r d s Germany.  relations with the  t h e E m p i r e was  desired  o f h i s way  c o u r t e o u s way  to express h i s appreciation  i n which S i r Arthur  Algeciras.  He  way  f u l f i l l e d her  she  t i m e he  had  peaceful Foreign  Hicolson  After  Billow  of the  tactful,  conducted a f f a i r s  q u i t e u n d e r s t o o d t h e B r i t i s h a t t i t u d e and  voiced  countries  amicable  shown i n s u b s e q u e n t y e a r s .  C o n f e r e n c e f r i e n d l y f e e l i n g b e g a n t o show i t s e l f .  went out  two  T h a t she  the  o b l i g a t i o n s to Prance.  strong  This  the  the  same  c o n v i c t i o n t h a t r e l a t i o n s between  w e r e i m p r o v i n g , and 1.  summer.  At  thev could  look forward  a m i c a b l e message B a r r i n g t o n  O f f i c e a c c e p t e d as  an e a r n e s t  of g o o d w i l l .  at  of  the  to  a  the  I t i s note-  w o r t h y t h a t f o r a t i m e more f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s w e r e  established  between the  King.  two  G o v e r n m e n t s and  passed not  b e t w e e n E m p e r o r and  the  crisis  ing  a d a n g e r o u s u n d e r c u r r e n t of r e s e n t m e n t and  became s t r o n g e r  as  a c t u a l l y causing  an  f u r t h e r c r i s e s came and  Thus  open b r e a c h , b u t suspicion  leavthat  went.  1 . B . D . v o l . 3 . p . 5 4 0 . H o . 4 0 4 . L a s c e l l e s t o G r e y , May  17,  1906  100.  CHAPTER IV. Naval R i v a l r y  1006-1912.  In 1897 Germany s e t h e r f o o t on a path d e s t i n e d t o l e a d u l t i m a t e l y t o acute K a i s e r appointed Navy.  f r i c t i o n with England.  Admiral  In t h a t year the  von T i r p i t z S e c r e t a r y of State f o r the  H i s Majesty's o b j e c t was t o b u i l d a German f l e e t f o r the  p r o t e c t i o n of growing German trade and f o r the g r a t i f i c a t i o n of his  own d e s i r e s .  To the world  a t l a r g e he proclaimed  h i s purpose  - the Navy was p u r e l y f o r defence and was d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t no one.  Y e t the preambles t o the e a r l y F l e e t Laws proclaimed the  i n t e n t i o n t o b u i l d a Navy so s t r o n g t h a t even the s t r o n g e s t sea-power would h e s i t a t e t o a t t a c k i t .  T i r p i t z himself  later 1.  wrote t h a t the German f l e e t was b u i l t as a " r i s k - f l e e t " . Laws p r o v i d i n g f o r the c o n s t r u c t i o n o f a p p r o p r i a t e v e s s e l s ed the R e i c h s t a g  i n 1898 and 1900 and b u i l d i n g proceeded  i n g t o p l a n under the capable At f i r s t England, secure looked  pass-  accord-  d i r e c t i o n of T i r p i t z . i n her overwhelming s u p e r i o r i t y ,  on w i t h t o l e r a n t amusement.  King Edward was q u i t e  will-  i n g t o a l l o w h i s nephew t o enjoy h i s new t o y , i n peace, so l o n g as i t remained a t o y . However, when the King v i s i t e d  the K a i s e r  at K i e l i n 1904, he r e a l i s e d "that t h i s t o y was becoming a, l i t t l e too l i f e - s i z e .  I n h i s c h i l d i s h d e s i r e to d i s p l a y to h i s uncle  1 . T i r p i t z - the German Navy i n the World War - These E v e n t f u l Years - vol.1.p.314.  101, the  w o n d e r f u l achievements  K a i s e r assembled  of which Germany was  e v e r y a v a i l a b l e w a r - v e s s e l i n the harbour a t 1.  K i e l , d e s p i t e the warnings his  capable, the  of h i s a d v i s e r s .  s u i t e r e a l i s e d t o the f u l l ,  King Edward and  then, the danger  of such a  r a p i d l y growing, up-to-date f l e e t f a c i n g them a c r o s s the North Sea.  I n h i s attempt to impress the E n g l i s h v i s i t o r s the K a i s e r  had as u s u a l gone too f a r and aroused not o n l y a d m i r a t i o n b u t 2. a l s o d i s q u i e t i n the h e a r t s of h i s f r i e n d s . done w e l l t o f o l l o w Bernstorff»s  He would have  a d v i c e " t o guard  our f l e e t  l i k e a h i d d e n b u t i n d i s p e n s a b l e t r e a s u r e and t o l e t the Eng3. l i s h see and hear as l i t t l e Prom 1904  onward the s u s p i c i o n deepened  t h a t the German f l e e t was of  the Seas.  about i t as p o s s i b l e . " i n E n g l i s h minds  d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t the I s l a n d M i s t r e s s  German statesmen, even the K a i s e r h i m s e l f , might  p r o t e s t Germany's innocence a hundred  times i n a y e a r .  Their  words f e l l upon deaf ears or were used by the anti-German e l ement as f u r t h e r p r o o f of German d e c e i t f u l n e s s .  Germany's  a c t i o n s i n Europe, they f e l t , b e l i e d her f r i e n d l y  protestations.  Outbursts of antagonism i n England n a t u r a l l y l e d to r e t a l i a t i o n in  Germany by the a g g r e s s i v e Navy League and the Pan-German  element.  As a r e s u l t a v e r i t a b l e p r e s s war waged i n t e r m i t t e n t l y  d u r i n g the f i r s t decade  of the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y .  I f the Eng-  l i s h were s u s p i c i o u s of Germany, the Germans were doubly sus1. Bulow - Memoirs - vol.2.p.22. 2. Brandenburg - op. c i t . - p.271. 3 . I b i d . p.273.  102. p i c i o u s of England.  Here was  a country, whose f l e e t c o u l d wipe  out the t i n y German squardons i n a few hours, complaining b i t t e r l y a g a i n s t German i n t e n t i o n s and u t t e r i n g w i l d remarks "Copenhagening" the enemy s h i p s . League had  little  England.  and  1906  witnessed  the s o - c a l l e d  P e e l i n g on the c o n t i n e n t was  s t i l l against  u n t e s t e d ; R u s s i a and England had not y e t come  an u n d e r s t a n d i n g ; w h i l e Germany's a t t i t u d e was  certain.  Naval.  The Anglo-French E n t e n t e , concluded o n l y a few months  b e f o r e , remained to  N a t u r a l l y , the German Navy  d i f f i c u l t y i n making c o n v e r t s .  The y e a r s 1904 scare i n England.  about  somewhat un-  The K a i s e r , s u f f e r i n g from a severe a t t a c k of Anglo-  phobia, dreamed of a C o n t i n e n t a l League a g a i n s t England. his of  o v e r t u r e s t o R u s s i a i n the autumn of 1904 BjBrko i n J u l y 1905.  ate  W i l d rumours began.to  r e g a r d i n g the i n t e n t i o n s of the growing  a c r o s s the N o r t h Sea. r e p o r t s and  fleet  aroused circul-  concentrated  S e n s a t i o n a l papers made the most of these  p r a c t i c a l l y convinced some of t h e i r more credulous  p u b l i c t h a t the Germans had 1. England.  and the T r e a t y  T h i s u n d e r c u r r e n t of h o s t i l i t y  the f e a r s of c e r t a i n Englishmen.  Hence  a c t u a l l y planned a n a v a l r a i d  The i l l - a d v i s e d v i s i t  Plymouth added f u e l t o the f i r e .  of the German squadron Not  on to  o n l y d i d I t show the  i c i e n c y of the enemy, but a l s o gave r i s e  eff-  to the s u s p i c i o n , u t t e r  l y u n j u s t i f i e d , v o i c e d by the D a i l y M a i l t h a t the squadron had 2. heen sent t o spy on the E n g l i s h . No wonder M e t t e r n i c h wrote 1. Hammann - The World P o l i c y of Germany, 1890-1912. - p.161, 2. Hale - op. c i t . p.52.  103. to Germany i n tones of r e g r e t r e g a r d i n g the v i s i t which  had  merely served t o remind England t h a t her c o n t r o l of the seas 1. might be c h a l l e n g e d i n the f u t u r e .  Papers l i k e  "Vanity P a i r "  preached a p r e v e n t i v e war, w h i l e the "Array and Navy Gazette" h e a r t i l y endorsed these views.  Even the C i v i l Lord of the  A d m i r a l t y i n F e b r u a r y sounded a warning.  S i r Sohn F i s h e r  be-  came F i r s t Sea Lord of the A d m i r a l t y and i n s p i r e d v a r i o u s reforms i n the E n g l i s h navy. and h i s sympathies  Since F i s h e r ' s tongue was  d i s t i n c t l y anti-German,  sharp and f r a n k  German apprehensions  i n c r e a s e d under the t u t e l a g e of the Navy League. E v e n t u a l l y the scare d i e d down l e a v i n g b o t h n a t i o n s p r o f o u n d l y d i s t r u s t f u l and ready to misconstrue e v e r y a c t i o n and e v e r y word.  By way  t r i b u t i o n of her f l e e t ,  of p r e c a u t i o n B r i t a i n changed the d i s c o n c e n t r a t i n g more v e s s e l s i n Home 2.  waters and e s t a b l i s h i n g new wrote  bases.  I n October 1906  "our o n l y probable enemy i s Germany.  whole f l e e t always  Fisher  Germany keeps her  c o n c e n t r a t e d w i t h i n a few hours  of England.  We must t h e r e f o r e , keep a f l e e t twice as powerful c o n c e n t r a t e d w i t h i n a few hours  of Germany"  and a g a i n "the German b u t t o n  w i l l o n l y be p r e s s e d as r e g a r d s the B r i t i s h Empire  when the  Channel and A t l a n t i c F l e e t s are absent a t sea from the v i c i n i t y 3. of German waters." U n t i l 1906 B r i t a i n d i d not f e e l her s u p e r i o r i t y s e r i o u s 1. Hale - op. c i t . - p.52. 2. Lee - op. c i t . - vol.2.p.328; Brandenburg 3. Lee - op. c i t . vol.2,p.331. and p.333.  - op. c i t . - p.270.  104. ly  challenged.  Then came the i n t r o d u c t i o n of the new  type of  b a t t l e s h i p - the Dreadnaught - which rendered the o l d type p r a c t i c a l l y worthless.  F i s h e r t r i u m p h a n t l y presented  s u p e r s h i p t o the w o r l d , b o a s t i n g t h a t one was he  capable  of these monsters  of w i p i n g out the whole German Navy.  overlooked the f a c t  and t h a t i n t h i s with England.  line  this  Unfortunately  t h a t Germany a l s o c o u l d b u i l d Dreadnaughts she c o u l d compete on an e q u a l f o o t i n g  With the coming of the Dreadnaught, then, England  l o s t the advantage of her s u p e r i o r i t y and immediately,  the  t r o u b l e began. Germany c o u l d and d i d b u i l d the new a Supplementary N a v a l B i l l i n 1906  ships.  She i n t r o d u c e d  providing for a consider1.  a b l y augmented programme d u r i n g the n e s t few y e a r s . B r i t a i n was  a little  programme.  She  At  s c e p t i c a l of Germany's c a r r y i n g out  soon found, however, t h a t Germany was  i n e d to b u i l d a s t r o n g navy, when towards the end  first this  determ-  of 1907 T i r -  p i t z secured an amendment to the e x i s t i n g Naval Law.  In Oct-  ober, C a p t a i n Dumas, the N a v a l Attache i n B e r l i n , r e p o r t e d t h a t a l l p a r t i e s i n Germany seemed agreed upon the n e c e s s i t y for  a s t r o n g Navy and were prepared t o pay the p r i c e of con-  s t r u c t i o n and maintenance.  At the same time he d i d not t h i n k 2.  the German A d m i r a l t y d e s i r e d a war w i t h England. r e p o r t Hardinge  and  Upon t h i s  Grey commented; " I t seems t h a t a p e r s i s t -  ent p o l i c y on the p a r t of the E n g l i s h A d m i r a l t y i n r e g u l a t i n g 1. Brandenburg - op. c i t . - p.273. 2. B.D.vol.6.p.63-6.Enclosure i n No.39. Dumas to L a s c e l l e s , Oct. 23, 1907.  105. t h e E n g l i s h b u i l d i n g programme b y t h e d o u b l e may i n t h e e n d i n d u c e t h e German p u b l i c  o f t h a t o f 'Germany 1.  t o c r y o u t 'Enough'."  B r i t a i n had s e t h e r s e l f t h e two-Power s t a n d a r d i n n a v a l armaments.  Up t o now  she had h a d l i t t l e  difficulty  i n maint-  aining i t .  Germany's i n c r e a s e d programme n o t u n n a t u r a l l y  aroused resentment and a d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o u p h o l d B r i t i s h iority.  As H a l d a n e  Germany b u i l t ,  told  t h e E m p e r o r i n 1 9 0 6 , t h e more 2.  t h e more B r i t a i n w o u l d b u i l d .  t e n t i o n t h a t a f t e r p a s s i n g t h r o u g h a "danger f l e e t would great r i s k  shins  T i r p i t z • conzone"  t h e German  emerge s o s t r o n g t h e B r i t a i n w o u l d a t t a c k o n l y a t o f d e f e a t was b a s e d  i d e a s and p o l i c y .  on a m i s c o n c e p t i o n o f B r i t i s h  He c o u l d n o t s e e , i n s p i t e  of incessant  warnings from g r e a t e r statesmen, t h a t B r i t a i n would h e r programme  so t h a t t h e " r i s k "  o n l y i n the i n f i n i t e l y remote of endurance would  super-  augment  p e r i o d f o r h e r would  exist  f u t u r e ; t h a t i t w o u l d be a  test  i n w h i c h B r i t a i n w i t h h e r v a s t r e s o u r c e s and w e a l t h  p r o b a b l y emerge v i c t o r i o u s .  I n Hovember 1907 Stumm w r o t e  f r o m L o n d o n t h a t t h e Germans m u s t g e t u s e d t o t h e i d e a t h a t 3. the B r i t i s h f l e e t would  a l w a y s be s u p e r i o r t o t h e i r s .  w i t h o u t number M e t t e r n i c h e m p h a s i s e d their belief  Times  t h e B r i t i s h a t t i t u d e and  t h a t the maintenance of E n g l i s h supremacy a t sea 4.  was a m a t t e r o f l i f e  and d e a t h .  "There  c a n be no m i s t a k e  l . 6 . p . 6n6a.vM ai nl u programme te by Harh d ia nsg eav/akened and G r e ty h .e v i g i l a n c e of t h a1.t B .tDh.ev oGerman 2. H a l d a n e - B e f o r e t h e War - p . 4 0 . 3. G . D . v o l . 3 . o . 2 6 8 - 9 . X X I V . 2 1 . S t u m m t o German F o r e i g n O f f i c e , 'Nov. 2 5 , 1 9 0 7 . 4. G . D . v o l . 3 . p . 2 6 9 . X X l X . 2 5 . M e t t e r n i c h t o B u l o w , D e c . 14, 1907.  106, the B r i t i s h  i n t h e h i g h e s t d e g r e e , and  maintain her  supremacy a t sea w i t h o u t  interest  question.  I t i s to  o f good Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s t h a t t h e r e 1.  i l l u s i o n about t h i s  i n Germany  "  a v o i c e c r y i n g i n the w i l d e r n e s s . t i n u e d i t s work of p r e a c h i n g the people tired  that England intends  c o n t e s t and 2.  e s s i o n of the  German N a v y L e a g u e of  Naval  creased  expenditure  s u c h an e x t e n t  Lord  s u s p i c i o n s and  on  t h a t he  as  pointed  the B r i t i s h  out the n e c e s s i t y f o r i n fleet  i n order to  maintain  These a t t a c k s e x c i t e d the K a i s e r committed another  "perpetual quoting  unworthy of the  f a u x pas  and  conclude  The  without  Tweedmouth,  t h e B r i t i s h , who  British  'German D a n g e r ' " as  "There i s something n e a r l y  f o r e i g n e r s i n other  t h a t the  seem t o be  of the  to  great B r i t i s h nation with i t s world-  i t s m i g h t y Navy"*  about i t .  they  poss-  criticised  of the A d m i r a l t y , p r o t e s t i n g a g a i n s t the  w i d e E m p i r e and  lot,  con-  t h a t s o o n E n g l a n d w o u l d become  c o n s u l t i n g h i s r e s p o n s i b l e a d v i s e r s wrote to Lord  easily  as  deluding  l e a v e t o Germany t h e u n d i s p u t e d  programme a n d  the r e q u i r e d standard.  ludicrous  no  sea.  t h e new  "utterly  was  T  A n n o y e d a t German p e r s i s t e n c e , E n g l i s h p a p e r s  the F i r s t  the  s h o u l d he  Metternich s  a g a i n s t E n g l a n d and  w i t h the assurance  of the  The  to  Germans must be able  are f i v e  to s t r i k e  times  their  c o u n t r i e s might  an e x c e p t i o n a l l y s t r o n g  terror  i n t o the h e a r t s  superiors J *  of  The  1. G . D . v o l . 3 . p . 2 7 2 . X X I X . 3 0 . M e t t e r n i c h t o B u l o w , F e b . 3, 1908. 2. B . D . v o l . 6 . p . 1 1 8 - 3 1 . E n c l o s u r e i n No.81.Dumas t o L a s c e l l e s , Feb. 12, 1908.  107. German H a v a l B i l l enge t o B r i t i s h  i s not  aimed a t England,  supremacy of the  challenged f o r generations  At the  of t h i s  step.  s t a t e s m e n w e r e amazed s t a t e s t h e  mouth s e n t the  "astounding  i s not  'which w i l l  t o come."  wrote t o the K i n g t o i n f o r m him British  sea'  and  a  'chall-  remain  un-  same t i m e To  say  he  that  case m i l d l y ,  Tweed-  C o m m u n i c a t i o n f r o m t h e German E m p e r o r "  2. to  Grey.  K i n g Edward a d m i n i s t e r e d r e p r o o f i n a b r i e f  t o h i s nephew: "Your w r i t i n g is  a  'new  departure'  and  t o my  I do n o t  First  Lord  see how  he  of the  letter  Admiralty  can prevent  our  p r e s s f r o m c a l l i n g a t t e n t i o n t o the g r e a t I n c r e a s e i n b u i l d i n g o f German s h i p s o f w a r , w h i c h n e c e s s i t a t e s o u r i n c r e a s i n g o u r 3. navy a l s o . " Tweedmouth r e p l i e d t o t h e E m p e r o r ' s g r a c i o u s communication i n s u i t a b l e naval estimates efforts  i n Parliament.  whole matter  sent a copy of the  f D r 1908-9 n o t y e t made p u b l i c .  t o keep the e p i s o d e  were asked  to  t e r m s and  as p r i v a t e and  q u i e t rumours spread The  Cabinet  tactfully  d e c l i n e d to read  the  British  In spite and  of  questions  t r e a t e d the correspondence  the House.  B i l l o w knew n o t h i n g o f t h e K a i s e r ' s i n d i s c r e t i o n 4. u n t i l t h e m a t t e r became p u b l i c . B o t h s i d e s f i n a l l y a g r e e d on 5. t h e i n a d v i s a b i l i t y o f p u b l i s h i n g t h e l e t t e r and r e p l y , and  1. Lee - op. c i t . - v o l . 2 . p . 6 0 5 - 6 . 2. B.D.vol".6.p. 132.Ho.82.Tweedmouth t o G r e y , P r i v a t e , F e b . 1 8 , 3. Lee - op. c i t . - v o l . 2 . p . 6 0 6 . (1908. 4. B i l l o w - M e m o i r s - v o l . 2 . p . 3 1 5 . 5. The B r i t i s h C a b i n e t d i d n o t w i s h t h e p u b l i c t o know t h a t Tweedmouth h a d c o m m u n i c a t e d t o t h e E m p e r o r t h e B r i t i s h H a v a l Estimates. The K a i s e r b l a m e d t h e K i n g f o r n o t w i s h i n g t h e p u b l i c a t i o n of the l e t t e r because i t s i n f l u e n c e would have been t r a n q u i l l i s i n g . U n f o r t u n a t e l y the K a i s e r ' s judgment of the b e n e f i c i a l e f f e c t of the p u b l i c a t i o n of h i s u t t e r a n c e s r e g a r d i n g E n g l a n d was o f t e n a t f a u l t . W i t n e s s t h e D a i l y T e l e graph I n c i d e n t ]  108. the a f f a i r ended without undue f r i c t i o n between the two  Govern-  ments . The  p o l i c y of the L i b e r a l s demanded a decrease  spent on armaments and the use s o c i a l improvements. had,  i n money  of the money thus saved f o r  D u r i n g t h e i r two years i n o f f i c e  they  t o the g r e a t d i s g u s t of the C o n s e r v a t i v e s , a c t u a l l y r e -  duced the n a v a l e x p e n d i t u r e . rendered  The  s p e c t r e of the German P e r i l  the c o n t i n u a t i o n of t h i s reduced  i f not i m p o s s i b l e . unprepared  programme  difficult  P u b l i c o p i n i o n f e a r e d l e s t B r i t a i n be  and the C o n s e r v a t i v e s took advantage of the  i o n t o launch a v i g o r o u s a t t a c k on the L i b e r a l s . Government must y i e l d the e x p e n d i t u r e  caught  situat-  O b v i o u s l y the  to the wished of the people and  Increase  on the Navy, or seek an arrangement w i t h Germany  to remove the menace and render the i n c r e a s e unnecessary. l e a d i n g statesmen  were v e r y much i n favour of the l a t t e r  The course.  This meant p e r s u a d i n g Germany to reduce her programme or s l a c k en her r a t e of c o n s t r u c t i o n . success  I n view of the K a i s e r ' s a t t i t u d e  i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n seemed r a t h e r u n l i k e l y .  Metternich  r e p o r t e d a c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h Grey and L l o y d George about the n a v a l q u e s t i o n d u r i n g which he had B r i t a i n must adopt  s t o u t l y maintained  that  a r e a s s u r i n g p o l i c y towards Germany b e f o r e  there c o u l d be d i s c u s s i o n of the Navy.  The Emperor added  e x p l o s i v e m a r g i n a l comments to the e f f e c t t h a t he v/ould never d i s c u s s r e d u c t i o n of the Navy and would r e g a r d any such i a l r e q u e s t from B r i t a i n as a d e c l a r a t i o n of war. wish f o r good r e l a t i o n s w i t h England  offic-  " I do not  at the p r i c e of not b u i l d -  109 ing  the German F l e e t .  0  I f England  means only to show us  f a v o u r on c o n d i t i o n of our r e d u c i n g the f l e e t , ence without  l i m i t and  i t i s impertin-  a deep i n s u l t to the German people  t h e i r Emperor, which the Ambassador must r e p B l a t the start.  ... The  German f l e e t i s b u i l t  a g a i n s t England.  her  Law  w i l l be  c a r r i e d out to the l a s t t i t t l e ,  ons  l i k e i t or n o t ; i t i s the same to us.  let  them b e g i n i t ; we  are not a f r a i d  very  a g a i n s t nobody and  I t i s governed by our own  M e t t e r n i c h ' s r e p o r t s , L l o y d George was  so not  needs  The  whether the  Brit-  I f thev want 1.  of i t . "  and  war  According  to  v e r y much i n f a v o u r of  an agreement f o r r e d u c i n g the speed of c o n s t r u c t i o n and went 2. so f a r as to suggest  a r a t i o of 3:2.  However, i n view of  the K a i s e r ' s m o o d , l i t t l e c o u l d be done. In August 1908 berg.  K i n g Edward v i s i t e d  the Emperor a t Cron-  Grey p r o v i d e d him w i t h a Memorandum i n case  discussed p o l i t i c s . the Naval Q u e s t i o n ,  I n t h i s he devoted  the K a i s e r  c o n s i d e r a b l e space to  s t r e s s i n g the n e c e s s i t y f o r an i n c r e a s e d  n a v a l programme i n B r i t a i n , and  the consequent b a r r i e r to good  r e l a t i o n s , i f Germany adhered to her p o l i c y .  He p o i n t e d  out  the advantages and the improved r e l a t i o n s t h a t would r e s u l t i f 3. both  s i d e s slackened c o n s t r u c t i o n .  accompanied the King, had  S i r Charles Hardinge,  the honour of two  who  conversations with  the K a i s e r . D u r i n g the f i r s t of these they d i s c u s s e d the n a v a l 1. G.D.vol.3.p.284-9.XXIV.99.Metternich to Billow, J u l y 16, 1908. 2. G.D .vol.3.p.289-91.XXIV. 107.Metternich to Billow, A u g . l , 1908. 3. Lee - op* c i t . - vol.2.p.616-7.  110. question  rather frankly.  former s t a n d p o i n t t h a t i t was law was  t h a t the  never i n t e n d e d  being  h e l d the  Kaiser refused  German navy was  to move from h i s  only f o r defence,  a g a i n s t England, and  t h a t the  c a r r i e d out e x a c t l y as p u b l i s h e d .  justice  that B r i t a i n ' s  of E n g l i s h f e a r s and  s u p e r i o r i t y was  him misinformed and point.  The  According  Hardinge  i n danger.  The  Kaiser  h i g h l y dramatised account he  informed than Hardinge as a mere c i v i l i a n .  retaliated 1. honour."  "Then we  declared  to prove  Hardinge t h a t as A d m i r a l of the B r i t i s h F l e e t he was  a b r u p t l y remarked "You  must stop b u i l d i n g . "  shall fight.  up-  gave f i g u r e s to prove  sent f o r a copy of "Hauticus"  to h i s own  naval  the told  better  F i n a l l y , Hardinge To t h i s the  I t i s a question  Kaiser  of n a t i o n a l  From t h i s i n t e r v i e w Hardinge gathered t h a t the  Kaiser  was  u t t e r l j r opposed to any d i s c u s s i o n I n v o l v i n g r e d u c t i o n 2.  of  the  German Havy B i l l .  on  To the Emperor such a suggestion  England's p a r t savoured of d i c t a t i o n and in  the  internal affairs  of Germany.  impertinent  meddling  Whether or not Hardinge's  1. G.D.vol.3.p.291-5.XXIV.125.Emperor to Bulow, Aug. 12, 1908. The K a i s e r ' s w r i t t e n accoun* of the i n t e r v i e w i s o b v i o u s l y h i g h l y coiLoured and exaggerated. His sense of the dramatic r a n away w i t h h i s pen. He wanted to convey the impression t h a t he^had shown h i s t e e t h and t h a t was the only way to b r i n g the E n g l i s h to r e a s o n . Bulow says that the v e r b a l account g i v e n l a t e r was much more moderate. Onlookers s a i d the c o n v e r s a t i o n was v e r y amicable and i n f o r m a l , w i t h the two men seated s i d e by side on a b i l l i a r d t a b l e and the Empe r o r p a r t i c u l a r l y g r a c i o u s throughout. Billow - Memoirs vol.2.p..313-4. c f . B.D.vol.6.p.184-90.Ho.117.Memorandum by Hardinge, Aug.16, 1908. f o r the B r i t i s h s i d e . 2. L l o y d G e o r g e , v i s i t i n g Germany a l i t t l e l a t e r , confirmed Hardinge's i m p r e s s i o n s . Brandenburg - op. c i t . - p.289.  m© step i n i n t r o d u c i n g t h i s c o n t r o v e r s i a l s u b j e c t s a t i o n , a f t e r he  knew t h a t the K a i s e r had  t o p i c s when t a l k i n g to the King, was serve  the purpose of e n l i g h t e n i n g  they needed any  of one  of the r e s p o n s i b l e  avoided  Germany's a t t i t u d e .  approached the K a i s e r  ministers  experts  and  the  political  the B r i t i s h statesmen ( i f  on t h i s t o p i c .  that much a s p e r i t y c o u l d have been a v o i d e d . not u n w i l l i n g to d i s c u s s  conver-  wise or t a c t f u l i t d i d  enlightenment) r e g a r d i n g  Billow r e g r e t t e d t h a t Hardinge had  i n t o the  instead  He  felt  T i r p i t z was  q u e s t i o n w i t h the E n g l i s h  really naval  r a t h e r f a v o u r e d a s h i p - b u i l d i n g agreement.  d i f f i c u l t y at present unfriendliness  l a y i n ways and  The  means on account of  of B r i t i s h p u b l i c o p i n i o n and  the  British policy.  The  t e n s i o n would have to d i e down b e f o r e Billow could engage 1. i n conversations with b e f i t t i n g d i g n i t y . A p p a r e n t l y Billow was  b e g i n n i n g to contemplate the d e s i r 2.  a b i l i t y of an arrangement w i t h E n g l a n d .  He had  always upheld  the p o l i c y of b u i l d i n g a s t r o n g navy, but d i d not wish to do at the expense of B r i t i s h h o s t i l i t y . showed him ent  Metternich and  P o l i t i c a l developments  the dangers of German i s o l a t i o n , w h i l e the  campaign of the E n g l i s h press convinced him  and  he  the constant  consist-  warnings of  of the r e a l i t y of the B r i t i s h  the b a s i s of t h e i r u n f r i e n d l i n e s s .  of the year 1908  exerted  himself  so  D u r i n g the  fears  latter  i n an e f f o r t to win  part  the  1. G.D.vol.3.p.297-8.XXIV.161.Billow to M e t t e r n i c h , Sept.22 1908 2. J.Cambon - Billow and the War - F o r e i g n A f f a i r s - A p r i l 1932. vol.lO.Uo.3. says p.414. "In October 1908 von Billow was begin n i n g to see that the antagonism between the -two Powers was becoming more marked. He would have l i k e d to reverse engines but i t was too l a t e f o r t h a t , and h i s p o l i c y was d e s t i n e d to end i n the catastrophe of 1914."  112. s u p p o r t of the  K a i s e r and  gement w i t h E n g l a n d . carried  Tirpitz  He  know w h a t he  of E n g l i s h h o s t i l i t y l a v i n commercial 2. armaments. When M e t t e r n i c h v i g o r o u s l y  i n naval  c o n t r a d i c t e d him, was  he  s c o r n e d t h e A m b a s s a d o r as one who d i d n o t 3. t a l k i n g about. F i n a l l y , Bulow adked T i r p i t r ,  d i r e c t l y i f Germany c o u l d a t t a c k by  England.  i n the  The  then suggested to T i r p i t z  German c o a s t  Tirpitz believed  I t was  i d e a of a p r e v e n t i v e  slackening  as  very war  of the  small  possible attack  I n the n e c e s s i t y f o r r a p i d  entered  a n n i h i l a t e d and important  the  to avoid  craft  from  construct-  would  into a  of  that  conflict?  German c o a s t s implanting  left  the  i n the mind of the B r i t i s h p u b l i c .  i n f l u e n t i a l quarters  British.  d e f e n c e s , s u b m a r i n e s and  superior forces  German n a v y w o u l d be  unprotected.  Admiral  the wisdom  o f b a t t l e s h i p s , b u t w h a t use  i f England with her  Since  of f o u r t e e n days the  an  negative.  i o n of a s t r o n g f l e e t  The  with equanimity to  t o r e s i s t more e f f e c t i v e l y a n y  Britain.  be  look forward  After a delay 4.  Chancellor  strengthening order  arran-  t h a t the b a s i s  jealousy not  in  f o r an  t a l k e d s e r i o u s l y t o t h e K a i s e r and " l . on a c o r r e s p o n d e n c e w i t h T i r p i t z . The A d m i r a l f i r n i l y  maintained  replied  to negotiations  i n E n g l a n d had  German r a t e  p l a i n l y shown t h a t  of c o n s t r u c t i o n would r e a s s u r e  a the  W o u l d i t n o t be  the b a s i s  p o s s i b l e t o w o r k o u t some programme 5. of an arrangement? However, T i r p i t z remained  1. B u l o w - M e m o i r s - v o l . 2 . p . 3 1 1 . 2. G . D . v o l . 3 . p . 3 2 8 . X X V l l l . l 3 . T i r p i t z t o B i l l o w , H o v . 2 5 , 1908. 3. M e t t e r n i c h w r o t e t o B i l l o w : " I d o u b t w h e t h e r a n y i m p a r t i a l obs e r v e r , a f t e r a s t a y o f o n l y a few months i n E n g l a n d , c o u l d h a v e any o p i n i o n b u t t h a t t h e c a r d i n a l p o i n t o f our r e l a t i o n s w i t h E n g l a n d i s t h e g r o w t h o f o u r f l e e t . I t may n o t be p l e a s a n t h e a r i n g f o r u s , b u t I see no good i n h i d i n g t h e t r u t h , nor do I t h i n k i t c o m p a t i b l e w i t h my d u t y . " G . D . v o l . 3 . p . 3 2 9 . X X V 1 1 1 . 1 7 . M e t t e r n i c h t c B i l l o w , Hov. 2 6 , 1908. S . B r a n d e n b u r g - op. c i t . - p . 2 9 2 .  113. adamant.  An;/ r e d u c t i o n  treat before  British  showed c l e a r l y  that  threats. the  f o r c e E n g l a n d t o 'pay t h a n i n the and  past.  in capital  B r i t i s h a g i t a t i o n and  mere e x i s t e n c e  To  yield  now  o f a German f l e e t  meant g r e a t  E a c h y e a r saw The  coast  but  were not At  the  last  end  of the  end  year Metternich  the  been the  wrote u r g i n g  doubtful  d e t e r m i n e d t o meet Germany on  and  armaments.  He  told  ador i n B e r l i n , she  Now  two-Power  that  the  programme was  fleet.  He  reduction felt  compliance  t h e y seemed 2.  standard. against  a b s o l u t e l y n e c e s s a r y on  S i r Edward Goschen, the  new  naval  E n g l i s h Ambass-  Germany w o u l d n e v e r b u i l d more s h i p s  needed f o r p r o t e c t i o n .  purpose of  the  a little  same t i m e B i l l o w s p o k e i n t h e R e i c h s t a g  s p e n d i n g more money t h a n was  a  p s y c h o l o g i c a l moment, f o r E n g l i s h .  Germany's r»art m i g h t h a v e g a i n e d much.  the  for, 1.  protection.  remedy f o r Anglo-German h o s t i l i t y .  summer h a d  period".  amply p r o v i d e d  i n themselves f o r adequate  of  Bill.  "danger  s u b m a r i n e s were b e i n g  s t a t e s m e n w e r e h e s i t a t i n g and  At  Reduction  sufficient o f the  Germany  a Supplementary Naval  F l e e t n e a r e r the  d e f e n c e s and  o f tempo as that  the  would  future  danger to  f u r t h e r h u m i l i a t i o n a t the hands of E n g l a n d .  re-  alarm  more a t t e n t i o n t o Germany i n t h e  speed of c o n s t r u c t i o n r e q u i r e d  on  ships would i n d i c a t e a  He  e m p h a s i s e d the  Goschen p o i n t e d  out  purely  t h a t the  than  defensive English  o p e n t o m o d i f i c a t i o n , d e p e n d i n g u p o n the  attitude  1. G . D . v o l . 3 . p . 3 3 5 - 4 0 . X X V 1 1 1 . 5 1 . T i r p i t z t o B i l l o w . J a n , 4, 1909. 2. G . D . v o l . 3 . p . 3 3 3 - 5 , X X V l l l . 4 0 . M e t t e r n i c h t o B i l l o w , D e c . 2 9 ,  114. of o t h e r s . not  Billow understood, but  i m p o s s i b i l i t y of changing the 1.  ed by  lav/.  Goschen was  a little  explained  the d i f f i c u l t y I f  German programme a l r e a d y f i x s c e p t i c a l of a l l Billow's  pro-  t e s t a t i o n s of f r i e n d s h i p .  He wrote to Hardinge i n a p r i v a t e  l e t t e r : "I wonder w h i l e he  i s t a l k i n g whether he  b e l i e v e s what he  i s saying.  He  momentarily  i s so c o n v i n c i n g  and  speaks  w i t h such a g l o r i o u s a i r of s i n c e r i t y t h a t i t r e a l l y looks i f he  did.  One  would t h i n k to hear him  as  t a l k t h a t England poss-  essed nowhere i n the world a g r e a t e r admirer, or a s i n c e r e r 2. f r i e n d , and  yet! "  T h i s time, however, Billow appeared genuine-  l y w i l l i n g to attempt to r e a c h some u n d e r s t a n d i n g , not modate England, but secure. pay  to accom-  to r e n d e r Germany's p o s i t i o n i n Europe more  I f England wanted a n a v a l agreement she would have to  f o r i t . I t would be  a bargain  i n which the  scales tipped  to  the advantage of Germany. In December Grey Informed M e t t e r n i c h may  have been t e c h n i c a l l y c o r r e c t when he  t h a t , although Billow s a i d t h a t Germany had  r e c e i v e d no  proposals  England had  f r e q u e n t l y expressed her w i l l i n g n e s s to compare  Havy E s t i m a t e s and  from England r e g a r d i n g  discuss  naval  expenditure,  them w i t h a view to r e d u c t i o n .  made i t p e r f e c t l y c l e a r t h a t England had  not made d e f i n i t e pro-  p o s a l s because she understood t h a t German expenditure was by  law and  He  d i d not depend upon E n g l i s h e s t i m a t e s .  He  fixed  explained  1. B.D.vol.6.p.l69.No.l08.Goschen to Grey, Dec. 10, 1908. 2. B.D.vol.6.p.171-2.No.109.Goschen to Hardinge, P r i v a t e , Dec. 11, 1908.  115. again t h a t the E n g l i s h programme depended on t h a t o f Germany; t h a t German d e l a y or r e d u c t i o n would he w e l l r e c e i v e d and would 1. tend t o improve r e l a t i o n s .  Billow came forward  a little  more  d e f i n i t e l y when i n January he I n s t r u c t e d M e t t e r n i c h t o e x p l a i n to Grey, i f the o c c a s i o n a r o s e , t h a t B r i t a i n would g a i n n o t h i n g by a mere o f f e r reduction.  t o l i m i t h e r programme i n r e t u r n f o r a German  The German programme was a b s o l u t e l y independent of  B r i t i s h e s t i m a t e s , b e i n g i n t e n d e d o n l y f o r purposes of defence. Germany would d e p a r t from h e r n a v a l programme o n l y i f England 2. were prepared  t o accommodate h e r i n other p a r t s o f the w o r l d .  D u r i n g the King's  State v i s i t  i o n remained i n the background.  Both  and c o r d i a l i t y of the  of any l a s t i n g  on the r e l a t i o n s between the two c o u n t r i e s .  present d u r i n g the v i s i t ,  quest-  t o any g r e a t e x t e n t .  p l e a s u r e a t the success  meeting b u t were i n w a r d l y s c e p t i c a l effect  the n a v a l  The King and the K a i s e r r e f r a i n -  ed from d i s c u s s i n g p o l i t i c a l matters s i d e s expressed  to B e r l i n ,  beneficial Metternich,  a p p a r e n t l y took advantage of the  o p p o r t u n i t y t o warn T i r p i t z o f the dangers of h i s o b s t i n a c y . Billow r e p o r t s t h a t as they stood on the p l a t f o r m a w a i t i n g the King's  t r a i n , M e t t e r n i c h remarked t o T i r p i t z : "Unless  you make  i t p o s s i b l e f o r P r i n c e Billow t o b r i n g o f f the Naval Agreement he wants w i t h England,  and i s doing h i s utmost t o g e t , t h i s  w i l l p r o b a b l y be the l a s t time t h a t an E n g l i s h King comes here 1. B.D.vol.6.p.172-3.No.110.Grey to de S a l i s , Dec. 18, 1908. 2. G.D.vol.3.p.340.XXVlll.59.Biilow t o M e t t e r n i c h , Jan. 11, 1909.  116. to  visit  ort  a German E m p e r o r . "  1.  A n o t h e r v o i c e was h e a r d i n s u p p -  o f B i l l o w when v o n B u s s c h e - H a d d e n h a u s e n  t h a t Anglo-German  relations,  i m p r o v e d f o r t h e moment b y t h e  Royal v i s i t , would s l i p hack i n t o t h e i r E n g l i s h N a $ a l B i l l was b r o u g h t i n . her  o l d h o s t i l i t y when t h e  Germany m u s t r e a l i s e  that  f l e e t w o u l d n e v e r be s t r o n g e n o u g h t o c r u s h B r i t a i n .  "If  we f a i l  t o come t o a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h E n g l a n d - a n d t h i s  c o n s i d e r p o s s i b l e now all  sounded a w a r n i n g  t h a t we  our o t h e r p o l i t i c a l  are t a c k l i n g  a s p i r a t i o n s may  the n a v a l  l a r g e l y be  I  question2.  ruined."  D i s c u s s i o n i n Parliament of the E n g l i s h Naval Estimates led  t o many m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s a n d much i l l - f e e l i n g  As a r e s u l t alty felt  t h e K a i s e r grew i n d i g n a n t , w h i l e  i n Germany.  t h e German A d m i r 3.  i n s u l t e d a n d became u n a p p r o a c h a b l e .  Disliking  atmosphere of m u t u a l s u s p i c i o n Grey suggested t h a t  the  Germany  a l l o w the B r i t i s h N a v a l Attache f r e e access t o the Naval Yards t o see f o r h i m s e l f how many s h i p s w e r e u n d e r c o n s t r u c t i o n , i n r e t u r n B r i t a i n w o u l d a c c o r d t h e same p r i v i l e g e s t o t h e German 4. Attache.  To G o s c h e n he e x p r e s s e d t h e w i s h t h a t b o t h  r i e s would put a l l t h e i r  c a r d s on t h e t a b l e r e g a r d i n g 5.  c o n s t r u c t i o n and thus a v o i d m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s .  countnaval  Billow  declin-  ed t o e n t e r t a i n t h e s e p r o p o s a l s f o r e x c h a n g e o f i n f o r m a t i o n on 1. B i l l o w - M e m o i r s - v o l . 2 . p . 4 0 7 . 2. G . D . v o l . 3 . p . 3 4 4 - 5 . X X V l l l . 9 1 . M e m o r a n d u m b y v o n B u s s c h e - H a d d e n h a u s e n t o German F o r e i g n O f f i c e , F e b . 1 9 , 1 9 0 9 . 3. B . D . v o l . 6 . p . 2 5 2 . E n c l o s u r e i n N o . 1 6 2 . T r e n c h t o G o s c h e n , M a r c h 26, 1909.jp.255.Enclosure i n No.165.Heath t o Goschen, March 30, 1909. 4. B . D . v o l . 6 . p . 2 4 0 . N o . 1 5 5 . G r e y t o G o s c h e n , M a r c h 5, 1 9 0 9 : p . 2 4 1 . No.154. Same, M a r c h 10, 1909.•p.242-3.No.155.Same, M a r c h 17,19 5. B . D . v o l . 6 . p . 2 4 2 - 3 . N o . 1 5 5 . G r e y t o G o s c h e n , M a r c h 17, 1909. (09  117. the grounds t h a t i t would he u s e l e s s s i n c e B r i t a i n r e f u s e d to b e l i e v e the a u t h e n t i c f a c t s s u p p l i e d to them r e c e n t l y . A p r i l Goschen a d v i s e d England and  to adopt the i n c r e a s e d programme  l a y down the f o u r e x t r a s h i p s a t once.  convince  In  This would  probably  the Germans of the B r i t i s h d e t e r m i n a t i o n to r e t a i n  supremacy a t sea, then they might be ready to r e c o g n i s e uselessness  of c o m p e t i t i o n and ease the f i n a n c i a l s t r a i n 2.  d r o p p i n g a s h i p or  working h a r d t o secure  uncompromising a t t i t u d e ,  some b a s i s f o r n e g o t i a t i o n .  In A p r i l he a g a i n approached the K a i s e r and to secure h i s consent v i d e d England  at Venice managed  i n p r i n c i p l e t o a n a v a l arrangement pro-  would agree a t the same time  i c a l understanding.  to a g e n e r a l  polit-  Immediately, Billow r e t u r n e d to Germany and  drew up a v a r i e t y of d r a f t s of t r e a t i e s to which a n a v a l ment could be  by  two.  Yet, i n s p i t e of h i s outwardly Billow was  the  agree-  added - a g e n e r a l d e f e n s i v e a l l i a n c e , an agreement  f o r n e u t r a l i t y , an Entente  p r o m i s i n g g e n e r a l f r i e n d s h i p and  s u l t a t i o n i n time of danger; s p e c i a l t r e a t i e s f o r such as the Bagdad Railway, of capture a t sea.  f o r e i g n e r s ' r i g h t s i n Egypt,  "Taken i n t h e i r e n t i r e t y these  i n d i c a t e d a w e l l thought-put  p l a n f o r the permanent  the  con-  questions right  proposals settlement  of a l l d i s p u t e s as the b a s i s of the common p o l i t i c a l a t t i t u d e 3. of both S t a t e s . " In M e t t e r n i c h ' s absence, he sent Stumm to 1. G.D.vol.3.p.349.XXVlll.ll4.Biilow to M e t t e r n i c h , March 19, 2. B.D.vol.6.p.261.Ho.170.Goschen to Grey, P r i v a t e , A p r i l 9, S.Brandenburg - op. c i t . - p.344.  1909 1909  118. London to sound the F o r e i g n O f f i c e . U n f o r t u n a t e l y the E n g l i s h 1. showed l i t t l e enthusiasm. Grey p o i n t e d out the d i f f i c u l t y of u n i t i n g the do would be  two  camps i n Europe i n t o one.  to d i s c u s s  Obviously,  The  the d i f f i c u l t i e s f r a n k l y as they  Grey d e c l i n e d to e n t e r t a i n any  might i m p e r i l the E n t e n t e . to Billow i n 1906:  "The  most he  Metternich  could 2 arose.  suggestion  that  spoke t r u l y when he  said  instruments are never simultaneously  in  Key w i t h one another, the harmony of the one i s answered by the other's d i s c o r d . England and Germany have not the same sound3. ing  boards."  Although he  spoke more p a r t i c u l a r l y of the  his  remarks a p p l y a l s o t o the  Governments.  The  question  a l l y a r i s e s , c o u l d Billow have c a r r i e d through h i s T i r p i t z held himself  concede was the  a f i x e d r a t i o of 3:4  suggestions?  The  most he  would  O f f i c e t h a t England, 4.  Germany, must make the f i t j s t d e f i n i t e p r o p o s a l s . agreed w i t h T i r p i t z and  such  f o r future construction, with  s t r i c t i n j u n c t i o n to the F o r e i g n  The  not  Kaiser  emphasised the p r e r e q u i s i t e B r i t i s h  a t t i t u d e - "Courteous n e g o t i a t i o n s peremptory d e s i r e s imposed by of t h i s  natur-  opposed to m a t e r i a l n a v a l r e d u c t i o n s  as B r i t a i n would no doubt have demanded.  pres  one  between equals i n s t e a d 5. party only."  In the  o p p o s i t i o n Billow's chances of success seemed  small. 1. G.D.vol.3p.351.Note.; Brandenburg - op. 2. Brandenburg - op. c i t . - p.345. 3. Billow - Memoirs - v o l . 2 . p . 194. 4. Brandenburg - op. c i t . - p.346. 5. Billow - op. c i t . - vol.2.p.419.  of face  infinitely  c i t . - p.345.  119. Nevertheless  the C h a n c e l l o r  June 3, 1909 he summoned.a Those present  besides  continued  efforts.  Conference to d i s c u s s  On  the s u b j e c t .  Bulow w e r e T i r p i t z , M e t t e r n i c h , Bethmann-  Hollweg, Schoen, M u l l e r , and Moltke. the  Ms  The C h a n c e l l o r  stated  case c l e a r l y - the E n g l i s h f e a r of p o s s i b l e German e q u a l i t y  v/ith her i n Naval armaments was becoming more s e r i o u s a l l the time and was l e a d i n g t o E n g l i s h h o s t i l i t y t o German aims a l l over the w o r l d .  T i r p i t z affirmed  that Germany c o u l d not com-  f o r t a b l y face a war v/ith England d u r i n g the next few y e a r s . Metternich  once more r e f u t e d T i r p i t z ' i d e a t h a t E n g l i s h  gonism had a commercial b a s i s .  The C h a n c e l l o r  anta-  then suggested  t h a t M e t t e r n i c h be i n s t r u c t e d t o approach England about the n a v a l q u e s t i o n without making any d e f i n i t e proposals h i n t i n g t h a t German concessions  but merely  v/ould c o n s i s t i n slowing dov/n  the r a t e of c o n s t r u c t i o n and a b s t a i n i n g from supplementary grammes.  England would of course have t o give r e c i p r o c i t y i n  these matters and a p o l i t i c a l assurance. opposed t o drav/ing up any formula the  initiative  T i r p i t z . was r e a l l y  f o r a general understanding,  ought t o come from England.  In h i s o p i n i o n , 1.  Germany's danger p e r i o d v/ould be over by 1915. Bulow a u t h o r i s e d M e t t e r n i c h Foreign  pro-  Office  On June 23  t o make i t c l e a r t o the B r i t i s h  on every a v a i l a b l e o c c a s i o n , v/ith out  forcing  d i s c u s s i o n on England, t h a t a n a v a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g was not outs i d e the bounds o f p o s s i b i l i t y provided  B r i t a i n avoided  threats  1.G.D.vol.3.p.352-60.XXV111.168.Minutes of D i s c u s s i o n on Q u e s t i o n of Understanding w i t h England, June 3, 1909.  120. and d i r e c t e d her g e n e r a l p o l i c y i n t o a more f r i e n d l y By the summer of 1909 willingness  to r e c e i v e p r o p o s a l s  n a v a l agreement and was to  Germany had  d e f i n i t e l y i n t i m a t e d her  a p o l i t i c a l understanding.  That, a t l e a s t ,  However, i t was  d i s c u s s i o n s , but i t was  t a s k to c a r r y these d i s c i s s i o n s  1.  from England w i t h a view to a  a step i n the r i g h t d i r e c t i o n . initiate  channel.  one  thing  a v e r y much more d i f f i c u l t  through to a s a t i s f a c t o r y con-  clusion. I n J u l y of 1909 mann-Hollweg. predecessor, statesmen.  Billow r e t i r e d and was  The nev; C h a n c e l l o r l a c k e d the b r i l l i a n c e  They had never f e l t e n t i r e l y sure of Billow's p r o t e s t -  t r a d i c t h i s words . determination  Billow. and  of h i s  but i n s p i r e d more t r u s t i n the minds of the E n g l i s h  a t i o n s of f r i e n d s h i p .  r e s p e c t he  succeeded by Beth-  The  H i s deeds had new  man  on o c c a s i o n seemed to con-  came i n t o power w i t h a genuine  to work f o r an agreement w i t h England.  i n h e r i t e d a l l the d i f f i c u l t i e s  As he h i m s e l f s t a t e s : "the f l e e t  seemed to embody the e n e r g i e s  t h a t had was  In t h i s  confronted  the pet of Germany  and enthusiasms.of the n a t i o n .  Whenever an i s s u e arose between the n a v a l a u t h o r i t i e s and p o l i t i c a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n the p u b l i c almost i n v a r i a b l y the former.  The  hands of a man  d i r e c t i o n of the f l e e t had  who  had  arrogated  i t y f a r beyond h i s f u n c t i o n s and who  had had  supported  l a i n f o r years  to h i m s e l f a p o l i t i c a l  the  i n the  author-  a lasting  on the p o l i t i c a l p o i n t of view of an important  Influence 2. circle." There-  1. G.D.vol.3.p.360.XXV111.181.Billow to M e t t e r n i c h , June 23, 2. Bethmann-Hollweg - R e f l e c t i o n s on the World War.p.91.  1909.  121. f o r e , the  C h a n c e l l o r ' s attempts at a rapprochment w i t h England 1.  proved unpopular w i t h the g e n e r a l p u b l i c . I n August of 1909  Goschen r e p o r t e d to Grey a c o n v e r s a t i o n  w i t h Bethmann-Hollweg d u r i n g which the C h a n c e l l o r had the B r i t i s h Government were ready German r e l a t i o n s In such a way and  to enter at t h e i r own  asked i f  i n p r i n c i p l e to r e v i s e Anglo-  as to l e a d to a good  understanding  time i n t o a g r i e n d l y exchange of views  r e g a r d i n g the g e n e r a l r e l a t i o n s between the two  countries  such p r o p o s a l s  f o r a t e c h n i c a l n a v a l agreement as the  Government was  now  plea f o r s t r i c t press .  The  ready  to put forward.  Imperial  special  s e c r e c y both from other powers and from the  arrangement should be  e i t h e r s i d e the n e c e s s a r y  sense of  one which would provide 2.  Many f e a r e d t h a t a formula  r i f e and  c a u t i o n urged.  would f e t t e r England, r u i n her  and R u s s i a and  on  security.  At the F o r e i g n O f f i c e s u s p i c i o n was  s h i p w i t h France  He made a  and  friend3  leave her a t the mercy of Germany.  Grey thought England c o u l d a t once c o n s i d e r n a v a l proposals  but  the g e n e r a l agreement would be b e t t e r between the two  great 4. groups of powers - the T r i p l e a l l i a n c e and the E n t e n t e . Hardinge emphasised to Grey the n e c e s s i t y of a n a v a l agreement 5. f i r s t s i n c e a n y t h i n g f u r t h e r was r e a l l y s u p e r f l u o u s . The 1. Bethmann-Hollweg - op. c i t . - p«89. 2. B.D.vol.6.p.283.Ho.186.Goschen to Grey. Aug.21, 1909;p.284. Ho.187.Same, Aug.21,1909;G.D.vol.3.p.407.XXV111.222.Bethmann-Hollweg to Emperor, Aug.21, 1909. 3. B.D.vol.6,p.284.Minute by Langley;p.286.Ho.191.Mallet to Grey, Aug.26, 1909,Private. He a l s o says England had b e t t e r i n f o r m R u s s i a b e f o r e the K a i s e r t e l l s the Czar some d i s t o r t ed t a l e . 4. B.D.vol.6.p.284.Minute by Grey. 5. B.D.vol.6.p.285.Ho.189.Hardinge to Grey, P r i v a t e , Aug.25, 1909.  122. F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y thanked Bethmann-Hollweg f o r h i s f r i e n d l y communication and promised t o c o n s i d e r the ideas when the Prime 1. Minister returned. The C h a n c e l l o r d e c i d e d to w a i t f o r B r i t i s h 2. p r o p o s a l s c a l m l y and without d i s p l a y of g r e a t eagerness. At the b e g i n n i n g Goschen informed were prepared  of September a c t i n g on Grey's i n s t r u c t i o n s  Bethmann-Hollweg t h a t the B r i t i s h  to d i s c u s s n a v a l expenditure  c o r d i a l l y welcome p r o p o s a l s . understanding  a t any time and would  With r e f e r e n c e to the p o l i t i c a l  they would c o n s i d e r a n y t h i n g not i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h 3.  the maintenance of e x i s t i n g B r i t i s h f r i e n d s h i p s . or expressed  Government  The C h a n c e l l -  p l e a s u r e a t the warmth of the B r i t i s h response, 4.  c o u l d not go d e f i n i t e l y i n t o the matter u n t i l October.  but  In the  meantime B r i t a i n n o t i f i e d her f r i e n d s of German o v e r t u r e s . "/hen Goschen r e t u r n e d from leave i n October he i n t i m a t e d to Schoen t h a t England s e t g r e a t s t o r e by the c o n c l u s i o n of a n a v a l agreement f o l l o w e d p r o b a b l y by a p o l i t i c a l  understanding.  When Schoen h i n t e d t h a t Germany was i n t e r e s t e d more v i t a l l y i n the p o l i t i c a l agreement Goschen gave him to understand  t h a t Eng-  land c o u l d not give Germany more than she had g i v e n Fi-ance and 5. Russia.  A day or two l a t e r the C h a n c e l l o r d e c l i n e d to make  any d e f i n i t e p r o p o s a l s beyond s u g g e s t i n g the p o s s i b i l i t y o f . r e 1. B.D.vol.6.p.285.No.188.Grey to Goschen.Private.Aug.23.,1909. 2. G.D.vol.3.p.408.XXV111.224.Bethmann-Hollweg to'Metternich, Aug.31, 1909. 3. B.D.vol.6.p.288,No.194.Grey to Goschen, S e p t . l , 1909.; G.D.vol.3.p.408.3DOn.il.226.Goschen to Bethmann-Hollweg, Sept. 2, 1909. 4. B.D.vol.6.p.289.No.196.Goschen to Grey, Sept.3, 1909. 5. G.D.vol.3.p.409.XXVlll.238.Memorandum by Schoen, Oct. 12, 1909  123. l a x i n g the tempo o f c o n s t r u c t i o n w i t h i n the e x i s t i n g B i l l . would want some v e r y d e f i n i t e assurance intentions f i r s t ment.  He  from England of p a c i f i c  t o make the path e a s i e r f o r the German Govern-  Goschen, f e e l i n g t h a t the German M i n i s t e r wished t o throw  the i n i t i a t i v e f o r making n a v a l p r o p o s a l s on England, p o i n t e d 1. out t h a t i t was Germany's t u r n . Grey used s i m i l a r language 2. to M e t t e r n i c h i n London. A Memorandum by Schoen dated November 1 g i v e s a^ i n s i g h t i n t o the German p o i n t of view.  F o r Germany the p o l i t i c a l  agree-  ment was a c o n d i t i o s i n e qua non bound up i n s e p a r a b l y w i t h a n a v a l agreement.  The two would have t o be p u b l i s h e d .  Since  Germany d i d not r e a l l y want a n e v a l agreement and England d i d , the E n g l i s h would have t o pay f o r I t on the p o l i t i c a l s i d e . "England wants something from us and must pay f o r i t . "  Germany  c o u l d n o t depart from h e r n a v a l laws b u t might b u i l d more slowl y i f England d i d the same.  Exchange o f i n f o r m a t i o n through  the N a v a l Attaches was u s e l e s s , but might be agreed  to with  the r e s e r v a t i o n t h a t there i s a l i m i t beyond which s e c r e c y 3. would have to be  maintained.  On November 4 Goschen r e p o r t e d the C h a n c e l l o r ' s On the n a v a l s i d e each country should pledge  proposals.  i t s e l f f o r a cert-  a i n p e r i o d n o t to b u i l d more than a s t a t e d number of s h i p s , the number t o be s e t t l e d by the n a v a l e x p e r t s .  Regarding the  1. B.D.vol.6.p.293-6.Ho.200.Goschen to Grey, Oct.15, 1909. 2. B.D.vol.6.p.303.No.202.Grey t o Goschen, Set.28, 1909. 3. G.D.vol.3.p.411-2.XXV111.253.Memorandum by Schoen, Nov.1,1909  124. exchange of f u l l e r i n f o r m a t i o n through N a v a l Attaches little two  and d i d not  seem e n t h u s i a s t i c .  Governments should  them e n t e r t a i n e d any  he  said  On the p o l i t i c a l s i d e  the  g i v e a mutual assurance t h a t n e i t h e r of  i d e a of a g g r e s s i o n  the  t h a t they would not a t t a c k each o t h e r , and  one  a g a i n s t the  other,  f u r t h e r t h a t i n the  case of an a t t a c k made on e i t h e r power by a t h i r d power or group of powers, the power not a t t a c k e d informed far  Schoen t h a t he  enough w h i l e  stand a s i d e .  the p o l i t i c a l p r o p o s a l s 1. The  went too f a r under the  comments of F o r e i g n O f f i c e o f f i c -  on t h i s d e s p a t c h e l o q u e n t l y f o r e t e l l the f a t e of  negotiations. Germany and was  Goschen  thought the n a v a l p r o p o s a l s h a r d l y went  e x i s t i n g circumstances. ials  should  these  Crowe thought the b a r g a i n t i e d B r i t a i n but 2. therefore a l i t t l e  one-sided.  s i d e r e d any n a v a l agreement t h a t d i d not an programme u s e l e s s .  He  not  Hardinge con-  l i m i t the present  Germ-  suggested a courteous r e p l y to Germany  t h a t the Cabinet would c o n s i d e r the proposals u s i n g the i n t e r n a l s i t u a t i o n and as an excuse f o r a d j o u r n i n g  carefully,  then  p o s s i b l e e l e c t i o n s i n January  a d e c i s i o n and  l e t t i n g the  question  drop a l t o g e t h e r . In t h i s way they c o u l d a v o i d any d i f f e r e n c e of o p i n i o n and any a c c u s a t i o n of r e f u s i n g Germany's o f f e r e d hand 5. of f r i e n d s h i p . Grey a c t e d on Hardinge's s u g g e s t i o n and e x p l a i n e d to Metternich  t h a t England v/ould have to d e f e r d e c i s i o n u n t i l a f t e r 4. the General E l e c t i o n i n January. The German Government q u i t e  1. B.D.vol.6.p.504-7.Ho.204.Goschen to Grey, Hov. 2. B.D.vol.6.p.310.Minute by Crov/e. 3. B.D.vol.6.p.312.Minute b;y Hardinge. 4. B.D.vol.6.p.312-3.Ho.205.Grey to Goschen, Hov.  4, 17,  1909. 1909.  125. understood  the s i t u a t i o n a l t h o u g h t h e y r e g r e t t e d the d e l a y .  Prom Schoen Goschen g a t h e r e d come f o r w a r d a t a n y  t h a t Germany was  This merely  s u s p i c i o n a t the F o r e i g n O f f i c e .  Grey,  that " L i t t l e  strengthened  Crowe, and  doubt i s allowed to remain  with third  tinder w h i c h  Germany w o u l d be  c o u n t r i e s w i t h o u t the p o s s i b i l i t y  v e n i n g , however i n i m i c a l t o B r i t i s h i n g s m i g h t be, and  interest  (2) t o r e t a i n f u l l  free  the  Langley that  t h e w h o l e o b j e c t o f Germany i s (1) t o o b t a i n a p o l i t i c a l ment w i t h E n g l a n d  to  l a t e r d a t e w i t h a n y more a c c e p t a b l e p r o ~ 2.  p o s a l f o r a n a v a l arrangement.  h e a r t i l y agreed  not l i k e l y  1.  agree-  to deal  of England  inter-  s u c h German d e a l -  l i b e r t y as t o t h e  com-  p l e t i o n o f t h e German n a v a l programme, s u b j e c t t o t h e c o n s t r u c t ion  o f a few  c a p i t a l s h i p s b e i n g spread over a s l i g h t l y  longer  p e r i o d than i s a t present contemplated. The German p r o p o s a l s r e v e a l no g e n u i n e w i s h t o meet t h e v i e w s o f H i s M a j e s t y ' s Gov3. ernment." A l t h o u g h Goschen f e l t the presence of a s i n c e r e desire  on t h e p a r t o f Germany t o come t o a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h  B r i t a i n , he d i d n o t b e l i e v e 4.  t h a t Germany i n t e n d e d t o g i v e h e r  goodwill for nothing. W i t h t h a t , t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s were dropped In  March M e t t e r n i c h reminded  G r e y t h a t he h a d  f o r some t i m e . not said  a b o u t t h e German p r o p o s a l s s i n c e t h e G e n e r a l E l e c t i o n . pleaded the excuse  o f i n t e r n a l u n c e r t a i n t y and  the  anything Grey  apparent  1. B . D . v o l . 6 . p . 3 1 2 - 3 . W o . 2 0 5 . G r e y t o G o s c h e n , N o v . 1 7 , 1 9 0 9 . ; p . 3 1 4 - 5 . N o . 2 0 7 . G o s c h e n t o G r e y , N o v . 2 5 , 1909. 2. B . D . v o l . 6 . p . 3 1 4 - 5 . N o . 2 0 7 . G o s c h e n t o G r e y , N o v . 2 5 , 1909. 3. B . D . v o l . 6 . p . 3 1 5 . M i n u t e b y G r e y , Crowe, a n d L a n g l e y . 4. B . D . v o l . 6 . p . 3 2 3 . R e p o r t o f A n g l o - G e r m a n R e l a t i o n s f o r 1909.  126. l a c k of i n t e n t i o n to modify the German navy programme which to 1. the E n g l i s h was  the key  to the s i t u a t i o n .  D i s c u s s i o n s took  p l a c e i n t e r m i t t e n t l y throughout the year without of enthusiasm on e i t h e r s i d e . with d e f i n i t e  B r i t a i n wanted a n a v a l agreement  l i m i t a t i o n of the e x i s t i n g German programme.  r e t u r n f o r t h i s she was declarations  any d i s p l a y  not prepared  of assurance  to make the f a r - r e a c h i n g  on the p o l i t i c a l side r e q u i r e d by  Germany to whom the n a v a l agreement meant n o t h i n g and i t i c a l agreement e v e r y t h i n g .  the  pol-  N e i t h e r s i d e evinced a d i s p o s i t -  i o n to come forward w i t h a c c e p t a b l e the other to make the f i r s t move. come a n a t i o n a l and  In  proposals.  Each waited  I n Germany the Navy had  a party question.  Reduction  as a  for be-  concess-  i o n to England v/ould have been looked upon as an unpardonable d i s p l a y of weakness by the g e n e r a l p u b l i c .  Accordingly,  the  Government r e s o l v e d to make England pay f o r her dfesires. s i d e s were h e l p l e s s l y d r i f t i n g w i t h the  Both  tide.  I n August Goschen reopened the n e g o t i a t i o n s by handing 2. an E n g l i s h Memorandum to the C h a n c e l l o r . Bethmann-Hollv/eg expressed g r a t i f i c a t i o n t h a t the B r i t i s h Government had shown 3. i t s g o o d w i l l by r e o p e n i n g  the d i s c u s s i o n s .  o l d ground a g a i n r e g a r d i n g Germany's a t t i t u d e . readiness Attaches  to a l l o w the interchange  He went over He  the  signified h i  of i n f o r m a t i o n to Naval  p r o v i d e d i t d i d not b i n d Germany not to go beyond the  1. B.D.vol.6.p.442.No.336.Grey to Goschen, March 22, 1910. 2. B.D.vol.6.p.511.Ho.393.Goschen to Grey, Aug. 15, 1910. 3. B.D.vol.6.p.521-4.No.400.Goschen to Grey, Oct. 12, 1910.  127. p r o v i s i o n s of the e x i s t i n g F l e e t Lav;.  Once a g a i n he s t r e s s e d  the importance of a p o l i t i c a l agreement, complaining  of E n g l i s h  o p p o s i t i o n t o German i n t e r e s t s i n every p a r t of the world, and the r e s e r v e  o f B r i t i s h diplomats  towards t h e i r German  colleagues  i n c o n t r a s t t o t h e i r i n t i m a c y w i t h the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of other nations. if  Then he s a i d  ( a c c o r d i n g t o Goschen) " I m a i n t a i n  that  the B r i t i s h people had n o t been taught by t h e i r Governments  to r e g a r d  Germany as an enemy, the expansion of the German  F l e e t would have caused them as l i t t l e of the Navy o f the U n i t e d miniature  storm.  accusations  This statement caused a  B r i t a i n n a t u r a l l y resented  the C h a n c e l l o r ' s  and i n s t r u c t e d Goschen t o defend B r i t i s h  The C h a n c e l l o r accepted but  States."  a n x i e t y as the expansion  the f r a n k e x p l a n a t i o n s  policy.  i n good p a r t ,  the F o r e i g n O f f i c e p r o t e s t e d v i g o r o u s l y t h a t the C h a n c e l l o r  had never passed t h i s p a r t i c u l a r remark.  Goschen must have  made a mistake or misunderstood the C h a n c e l l o r ' s words.  They  were o b v i o u s l y anxious t o smooth t h i n g s over, but d i d i t i n 1. t h e i r u s u a l b l u n d e r i n g underhand f a s h i o n . to make t r o u b l e , l e t the matter drop. c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h the German C h a n c e l l o r N i c o l s o n t h a t he f e l t  Grey, not w i s h i n g  Regarding the o r i g i n a l Goschen c o n f i d e d t o  l i k e r e p l y i n g to the C h a n c e l l o r ' s  accus-  a t i o n s , " t h a t i f i t was i r r i t a t i n g t o Germans to f i n d E n g l i s h l . c f . B.D.vol.6.p.557-60.No.417.Goschen t o Grey, Dec.2, 1910.; p.561-2.No.419.Same, Dec.5, 1910.:p.562-4.No.420.Same, Dec. 9, 1910.;p.566-7.No.421.Grey t o Goschen, Dec.12, 1910.; n.568-70.No.424.Goschen t o Grey, Dec. 16, 1910.  128. men always i n p o s s e s s i o n  i t was e q u a l l y i r r i t a t i n g f o r E n g l i s h -  men, wherever they had v e s t e d and important Germans poking and  i n t e r e s t s , to have  t h e i r noses i n and demanding shares  i n t e r e s t s which had been b u i l t up by years 1.  i n concerns  of B r i t i s h  hard  work and e n t e r p r i s e . " The  K a i s e r d i d n o t h e l p n e g o t i a t i o n s by i n f o r m i n g  t h a t England's o p p o s i t i o n t o Germany had t o s t o p .  He would n o t  undertake t o b i n d h i m s e l f n o t t o i n c r e a s e the e x i s t i n g programme.  Goschen  naval  The i r r i t a t i o n In Germany was q u i t e n a t u r a l and  j u s t i f i e d , f o r i n s t e a d of coming t o Germany f i r s t England had j o i n e d the Franco-Russian  A l l i a n c e which had from the b e g i n n i n g  been d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t the Germans.  When Goschen commented on  t h i s language t o K i d e r l e n , t h a t gentleman s a i d the K a i s e r had 2. gone beyond what he meant, t o say.  Such, i n c i d e n t s were t y p -  i c a l of the Emperor and r e a l l y s i g n i f i e d l i t t l e , b u t they undoubtedly  tended t o i n c r e a s e the s u s p i c i o n s o f those  o f f i c i a l s who ?/ere s u f f i c i e n t l y anti-German without more so by such i l l - a d v i s e d The  British b e i n g made  utterances.  o n l y advance made i n 1910 was the agreement of both  Governments i n p r i n c i p l e the N a v a l A t t a c h e s .  t o the exchange of i n f o r m a t i o n  They s t i l l had to decide  through  upon the ways  1. B.D.vol.6.p.529-50.No.402.Goschen t o N i c o l s o n , P r i v a t e , Oct. 14, 1910. 2. B.D.vol.6.p.530-3.No.403.Goschen to Grey, Oct. 16, 1910.  129. and means of exchange and agreement should The garding  the 1.  form i n which a s s e r t to such  he made.  e a r l y p a r t of 1911  brought f u r t h e r p a r t i c u l a r s r e -  the exchange of i n f o r m a t i o n  on b o t h s i d e s of w i l l i n g n e s s and i n g on b o t h n a v a l and  t o Attaches and  assurances  d e s i r e to r e a c h an understand-  p o l i t i c a l questions.  on w i t h i n t o l e r a b l e slowness. i n g when he  an  One  Negotiations  dragged  can understand Crowe's f e e l -  once minuted a despatch "Words - words - words."  In March N i c o l s o n wrote t h a t he  d i d not b e l i e v e these d i s c u s s -  ions would ever come to any r e s u l t , but  thev c o u l d not  leave  2.  the  Chancellor's  overtures  unanswered.  Crowe summarised h i s view of the an e f f o r t s :  and  other  possible  1911  o b j e c t i v e of the present  (1) O s t e n t a t i o u s l y seeking  (2) D o i n g e v e r y t h i n g  On A p r i l 11,  Germ-  B r i t i s h friendship;  to c r e a t e f r i c t i o n between B r i t a i n  S t a t e s w i t h a view to l e v y i n g p o l i t i c a l  (3) B e i n g a b s o l u t e l y prepared f o r a war  blackmail;  when i t comes; (4)  En-  c o u r a g i n g the p a c i f i s t movement i n England to prevent B r i t a i n from t a k i n g any Russia  s e r i o u s measures f o r combining w i t h Prance 3. to r e s i s t a German a t t a c k .  and  1. B.D.vol.6.p.575.No.425.Grey to Goschen, Dec. 16, 1910.; G.D.vol.3.p.418.XXV111.367.Memorandum by C h a n c e l l o r to Goschen, Oct. 13, 1910.;p.421.XXVlll.388.Metternich to Bethmann-Hollweg, Dec.17, 1910. 2. B.D.vol.6.p.604.No.450.Nicolson to Buchanan, March 14, 1911. 3. B.D.vol.6.p.620.Minute by Crowe. Crowe's views were extreme and not e n t i r e l y r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the Government's a t t i t ude, but because of h i s r e p u t a t i o n f o r e f f i c i e n c y and i n t e l l igence h i s ideas must of n e c e s s i t y have i n f l u e n c e d h i s c o l l e a gues and are t h e r e f o r e worthy of a t t e n t i o n . In a review of B.D.vol.6.in the American H i s t o r i c a l Review f o r October 1930 S.B.Pay s a y s : " I n e v i t a b l y h i s h o s t i l e d i s s e c t i o n of the r e p o r t s from Germany g r e a t l y i n f l u e n c e d S i r Edward Grey and the other o f f i c i a l s who ner.t read them, and who g e n e r a l l y endorsed w i t h b r i e f comments Crowe's long c r i t i c i s m s . Crowe appears to have been accepted as an i n f a l l i b l e a u t h o r i t y on German;/. But u n f o r t u n a t e l y he was prone to accept b a s e l e s s g o s s i p as gospe 1  150. In May  the C h a n c e l l o r r e g r e t t e d i t was  put i n t o e f f e c t the p r o p o s a l to reduce existing b i l l .  now  too l a t e to  the tempo w i t h i n the  He had no other p r o p o s a l to make but would  con-  s i d e r a n y t h i n g B r i t a i n cared to put forward r e g a r d i n g the Navy Question. his  He would await d e f i n i t e advances b e f o r e p u t t i n g f o r t h  s u g g e s t i o n s f o r a p o l i t i c a l agreement s i n c e he knew B r i t a i n 1.  wanted the two June saw  together.  B r i t a i n made no d e f i n i t e  response.  o n l y f u r t h e r d e t a i l s i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h the exchange  of I n f o r m a t i o n to A t t a c h e s .  N e i t h e r s i d e seemed to be i n any  p a r t i c u l a r h u r r y to r e a c h an agreement on t h i s phase or any so they t a c i t l y  p e r m i t t e d the n e g o t i a t i o n s to l a p s e .  d u r i n g the A g a d i r c r i s i s North Sea  other,  Moreover,  f e e l i n g r a n so h i g h on both s i d e s of the  t h a t a l l t a l k of an agreement was  out of the q u e s t i o n .  In the autumn came rumours of an i n c r e a s e i n the German Naval E s t i m a t e s .  The Naval Attache i n B e r l i n a d v i s e d B r i t a i n t o  adopt a heavy n a v a l programme f o r s e v e r a l years i n order to conv i n c e German p u b l i c o p i n i o n of the f u t i l i t y of attempting surpass the E n g l i s h F l e e t . the o n l y way  He  f e l t convinced  to r e s t o r e the German sense  that t h i s  to  was 2.  of p r o p o r t i o n .  Heed-  l e s s to sav Crowe h e a r t i l y agreed and a d v i s e d i n a d d i t i o n i n d e f 3. i n i t e i n a c t i v i t y r e g a r d i n g the n e g o t i a t i o n s . truth One has heard much of the malign i n f l u e n c e of H o l s t e i n i n the W i l h e l m s t r a s s e . What of t h a t of Crowe i n Downing S t . ? " American H i s t o r i c a l Review, Oct. 1930.vol.36. No.1.p.154-5. 1. B.D.vol.6.p.621-2.No.462.Goschen to Grey, May 9, 1911. 2. B.D.vol.6.p.644-6.Enclosure i n No.476.Watson to Goschen, Sept. 27, 1911. 3. B.D.vol.6.p.647.Minute by Crowe.  131. In the meantime the German N a v a l Attache sending home e x a c t l y the type most loved to r e c e i v e . Germany.  During  of r e p o r t T i r p i t z and  England was  the c r i s i s  i n London the  was Kaiser  d i r e c t i n g her Navy a g a i n s t  i n August and  September the e n t i r e  E n g l i s h f l e e t had m o b i l i s e d and  o n l y awaited a s i g n a l from  Prance to f a l l  t h a t the impetuous  was  on Germany.  Now  i n charge at the A d m i r a l t y  not be  i n vogue.  The  moderation d u r i n g c r i s e s would  menace from England was  Germany ought to ask h e r s e l f i f her present sufficient.  so great  armaments were  conscious  out h i s duty and ready f o r any  of h i s own  L a s t summer she had  statements.  to m a i n t a i n her  Lord of the A d m i r a l t y  o n l y "a f r e s h e f f o r t  Britain  The  extension  sea. cert-  In view of  of the German Navy Lav/  to come up to ours but  r a t i o of s u p e r i o r i t y would be  i n t e n t i o n of d e s t r o y i n g the  would have done so years  was  Moreover, C h u r c h i l l as  to i n England " q u i t e a p a r t from whether we no  carried  s u p e r i o r i t y at  c o u l d not decide upon war.  the E n g l i s h s t a t e of mind any  England had  faithful  taken p r e c a u t i o n a r y measures, but had  a i n l y not m o b i l i s e d the whole f l e e t .  er i n p r o p o r t i o n . "  The  helplessness, s t i l l  r e f u t e d the Attached  sacrifice  the  the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of pre1.  v e n t i n g Germany from becoming a n a v a l power.  meant not  that  A c o n s i s t e n t n a v a l programme would soon c a l l  E n g l i s h b l u f f and make her r e a l i s e  Metternich,  Churchill  ago when i t was  one  adhered  b u i l d more or German navy or  easy.  high-  less." she  Upon t h i s master-  l.G.D.vol.4.p.42-5.XXXl.ll.Widermann to T i r p i t z ,  Oct.28,  1911.  132. l y survey  of the s i t u a t i o n the K a i s e r commented " I do not  w i t h the Ambassador's  judgment.  The N a v a l Attache  is right."  In the f a c e of such o b s t i n a c y what c o u l d a sane man In November the  agree 1.  do?  C h a n c e l l o r complained somewhat b i t t e r l y  about the E n g l i s h n e g l e c t of the n e g o t i a t i o n s which he had i n - ' 2. i t i a t e d w i t h so much good w i l l and He  urged M e t t e r n i c h  to sound Grey w i t h the  the b a l l r o l l i n g a g a i n . p o l i t i c a l formula a t i o n to i n t r o d u c e find  a n x i e t y to p l e a s e  He  starting  d e s i r e d to o b t a i n a s a t i s f a c t o v j  from England to check the K a i s e r ' s determina new  Havy Law  i n the s p r i n g of 1912 3.  and  to  out what England r e a l l y wanted. A f t e r the A g a d i r  C r i s i s p u b l i c o p i n i o n i n England swung  g r a d u a l l y round i n favour  of Germany.  Government t h a t the B r i t i s h Cabinet new  o b j e c t of  England,  tendencv p r o v i d e d  c o u l d not  some unforeseen 4.  d i d not cause a r e a c t i o n .  Metternich  informed  long ignore  his the  a c t i o n on Germany's p a r t  A c c o r d i n g l y , i n January Grey i n -  s t r1.u cG.D.vol.4.p.46-7.XXXI.18.Metternich t e d Goschen to renew the n e g o t i a t i o nto s Bethmann-Hollweg, as soon as convenHov.1.1911. M e t t e r n i c h wrote to Bethmenn-Hollweg p r i v a t e l y complaining of the damage b e i n g done by the Attache who was secure under the p r o t e c t i o n of T i r p i t s and r e f u s e d to conf i n e h i m s e l f to the p u r e l y t e c h n i c a l . The Attache f r e q u e n t l y s a i d he f e l t i t h i s duty to spend the r e s t of h i s time i n England warning a g a i n s t the danger from England i n h i s r e p o r t I f M e t t e r n i c h Refused to forward these r e p o r t s there would be a d i s t u r b a n c e and the K a i s e r would d e c l a r e the Attache r i g h t and M e t t e r n i c h wrong, c f . G.D.vol.4.p.54.XXXI.47.Metternich to C h a n c e l l o r , Dec.10, 1911. 2. B.D.vol.6.p.647.No.477.Goschen to Grey. Nov. 3, 1911. 3. G.D.vol.4.p.48-50.XXXI.31.Bethmann-Hollweg to M e t t e r n i c h , Nov 22, 1911. 4. G.D.vol,4.p.50-2.Metterncih to Bethmann-Hollweg, Hov.24, 1911 p.52.XXXI.72.Metternich to Bethmann-Hollweg, Dec.9, 1911.  133 . l e n t a f t e r the R e i c h s t a g  1. election.  On January 28, 1912 Gos-  chen reopened the d i s c u s s i o n s by g i v i n g K i d e r l e n a Memorandum on the d e t a i l s o f exchange of i n f o r m a t i o n At t h i s  juncture  2 through N a v a l Attaches  came the now famous Haldane M i s s i o n of  F e b r u a r y 1912 which n e i t h e r s i d e i s prepared t o c l a i m the honour of i n i t i a t i n g .  The K a i s e r and Bethmann-Hollweg give a l l the •  c r e d i t t o the E n g l i s h ; w h i l e many o f the E n g l i s h m a i n t a i n t h a t the  Germans took the f i r s t  o f f i c i a l channels.  Harold  step.  Overtures came through un-  Nicolson  i n h i s biography of Lord  Carnock stiggests t h a t B a l l i n and C a s s e l put t h e i r heads  togeth-  er and concocted a scheme whereby C a s s e l would t e l l the B r i t i s h Government t h a t the Emperor had expressed a w i s h t o r e c e i v e a Cabinet M i n i s t e r i n B e r l i n ; and B a l l i n would t e l l the Emperor t h a t the B r i t i s h Government d e s i r e d to send a s p e c i a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e t o Germany t o d i s c u s s  an accommodation.  Churchill  was i n correspondence M t h C a s s e l i n January of 1912, apparentl y with reference should  to a proposal  from B a l l i n and C a s s e l t h a t he  v i s i t B e r l i n t o have d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h a c e r t a i n august  friend.  Churchill felt  i t unwise to make a s p e c i a l t r i p a t 4.  present,  u s i n g h i s o f f i c i a l p o s i t i o n as an excuse.  George, since Agadir had f e l t  Lloyd  something should be done t o h e s l  1. B.D.vol.6.p.661.No.487.Grey t o Goschen, J a n . 17, 1912. 2. B.D.vol.6.p.662.No.489.Goschen t o Grey, Jan.28, 1912. and E n c l o s u r e s p.662-3. 3. N i c o l s o n - op. c i t . - p.362. 4. B.D.vol.6.p.666.No.492.ChurchIll t o C a s s e l , Jan.7, 1912. P r i v a t e ; p.666-7.No.493.Churchill to Grey, Jan.20, 1912; G.D.vol.4.v,71.German Note XXXI.97.  134. any smart from which Germany might be s u f f e r i n g . he  As a r e s u l t  and C h u r c h i l l worked t o g e t h e r I n c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h Grey and  obtained the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s consent  t o send C a s s e l t o B e r l i n 1.  w i t h a Memorandum t o p r e s e n t t o the Emperor. A c c o r d i n g l y , C a s s e l went t o B e r l i n and through B a l l i n obt a i n e d an audience um  w i t h the K a i s e r t o whom he handed a memorand-  a l o n g the f o l l o w i n g l i n e s : N a v a l s u p e r i o r i t y r e c o g n i s e d as  e s s e n t i a l to B r i t a i n ;  the p r e s e n t German Naval Programme should  not be i n c r e a s e d b u t i f p o s s i b l e r e t a r d e d and reduced;  as England  d e s i r e d n o t t o i n t e r f e r e w i t h German c o l o n i a l expansion, she would d i s c u s s f o r w a r d i n g  German a s p i r a t i o n s i n t h a t d i r e c t i o n .  Proposals f o r r e c i p r o c a l assurances  d e b a r r i n g e i t h e r Power from 2.  j o i n i n g a g g r e s s i v e designs a g a i n s t the other would be welcome. A c c o r d i n g t o h i s own account step.  the Emperor was astounded a t such a  He sent f o r the C h a n c e l l o r who was e q u a l l y amazed.  How-  ever, they d e c i d e d t o welcome the B r i t i s h move and drew up a 3. s u i t a b l e r e p l y i n which e v e r y word was c a r e f u l l y weighed. Whether the good gentlemen i n B e r l i n were a s t o n i s h e d or n o t matters  little.  T h e i r r e p l y expressed  t h e i r p l e a s u r e i n wel-  coming the B r i t i s h move, and t h e i r f u l l accord w i t h the terms of C a s s e l ' s d r a f t p r o v i d e d the 1912 estimates  f o r which  arrange-  ments had been completed were Included i n the present German n a v a l programme. The b e s t way t o press n e g o t i a t i o n s r a p i d l ; / 1. C h u r c h i l l - o p . c i t . - vol.1.p.95-6.;G.D.vol.4.p.71.German Note. XXXI.97. 2. G.D.vol.4.p.71.XXXI.97.Memorandum by C h a n c e l l o r , Jan.29, 1912 No.l. 3. Wilhelm 1ft. - Memoirs - p.148-9.  135. forward would "be f o r Grey to v i s i t 1.  the Emperor as soon as  poss-  ible. With t h i s ,  C a s s e l r e t u r n e d to London.  b e f o r e the Cabinet who  The matter came  d e c i d e d to comply w i t h the r e q u e s t  send a m i n i s t e r to B e r l i n .  Although  Grey f e a r e d p o s s i b l e sus-  p i c i o n s i n P a r i s and S t . P e t e r s b u r g i f such a v i s i t he f e l t  to  t h a t a r e f u s a l would be a wanton r e b u f f .  g r e a t hope t h a t a n y t h i n g would come of these new  took p l a c e ,  He had  no  overtures but  c o n s i d e r e d t h a t no g r e a t harm would be done i f the v i s i t were 2. kept s t r i c t l y p r i v a t e and the q u e s t i o n , as he was tinent.  The  Informal.  To send Grey was  not i n the h a b i t of v i s i t i n g the  choice f e l l upon Haldane who  out of con-  knew Germany w e l l  and o f t e n spent a h o l i d a y t h e r e . Goschen p a i d a f l y i n g v i s i t to London to d i s c u s s the matter and r e t u r n e d to B e r l i n to make 3. arrangements. On February  8 Haldane a r r i v e d i n B e r l i n o s t e n s i b l y on a  commission t o study u n i v e r s i t y e d u c a t i o n i n Germany.  He  the C h a n c e l l o r a t the B r i t i s h Embassy and d i s c u s s e d the uation frankly.  He  impressed  met sit-  upon Bethmann-Hollweg t h a t the  German p o l i c y of p i l i n g up m a g n i f i c e n t armaments had  the i n -  e v i t a b l e consequence of drawing t o g e t h e r other n a t i o n s i n the interests  of t h e i r own  security.  p r e p a r a t i o n s f o r defence  B r i t a i n had n a t u r a l l y made  but had no  secret m i l i t a r y  treaties.  1. G.D.vol.4.p.72.XXXI.97.Memorandum by C h a n c e l l o r , Jan.29,1912. Ho.II. 2. Grey - op. c i t . - vol.1.p.242-3. 3. B.D.vol.6.p.667.No.494.Grey to Goschen, Feb.2, 1912.Private; Haldane - Before the War - p.57.  136, However, i f Prance were a t t a c k e d and her t e r r i t o r y  occupied,  Germany c o u l d not s a f e l y r e l y on B r i t i s h n e u t r a l i t y . i n t e r e s t s and  British  commercial needs demanded t h a t she l a y down two  k e e l s f o r e v e r y one  l a i d down by Germany.  Haldane r e c e i v e d  the i m p r e s s i o n t h a t Bethmann-Hollweg s i n c e r e l y d e s i r e d to a v o i d 1« war.  The next day, February  9, Haldane had  a long t a l k w i t h  the K a i s e r and T i r p i t z d u r i n g which he repeated the same s t a t e ments r e g a r d i n g B r i t a i n s a t t i t u d e to n a v a l armaments.  The  Emperor p r o v i d e d him w i t h a copy of the d r a f t of a new  Fleet  Lav;.  They d i s c u s s e d the Lav/ i n g e n e r a l terms w i t h  Tirpitz  f i g h t i n g hard f o r i t i n i t s e n t i r e t y and Haldane p o i n t i n g out the n e c e s s i t y f o r m o d i f i c a t i o n i f improved r e l a t i o n s were to follow.  T i r p i t z broached  two-Power standard a hard  the i d e a of a r a t i o . one f o r Germany.  out t h a t Germany v/as f r e e , so was to drop  building.  and  F i n a l l y they  agreed  The Emperor would announce to the German p u b l i c t h a t ( i f they concluded  e n t i r e l y m o d i f i e d h i s wish f o r a new c o n c e i v e d , and  b u i l d i n g be  fleet  law, as  one  )  origin-  t h a t I t shotxld be delayed and f u t u r e s h i p -  spread over a longer p e r i o d .  agreeable and Haldane.  Haldane p o i n t e d  t o say n o t h i n g i n i t about s h i p -  the agreement on g e n e r a l q u e s t i o n s  ally  the  the i d e a of d e f i n i n g a standard p r o p o r t i o n i n any gen-  e r a l agreement reached  had  England.  He f e l t  The Emperor seemed  s a i d the C h a n c e l l o r would arrange  a formula  with  When Haldane r e c e i v e d t h i s he wovild r e t u r n t o London  1.Haldane - op. c i t . -  p.58.  137. and put the matter In the hands of the Cabinet, since he  had  come not to make an a c t u a l agreement but o n l y to explore the 1. ground f o r one. The  l a s t i n t e r v i e w w i t h the C h a n c e l l o r took place on S a t -  urday, F e b r u a r y 10.  They worked over the whole f i e l d  e r a l agreement and as a r e s u l t of some of Haldane's  of a gen-  remarks the  C h a n c e l l o r r e c e i v e d a mistaken i m n r e s s i o n of the extent to which 2. England was prepared to go i n her c o n c e s s i o n . Haldane seemed to  agree t h a t the r e l a x a t i o n of tempo proposed by T i r p i t z w i t h i n 3.  the new  Law would be a c c e p t a b l e .  Bethmann-Hollweg suggested  as a formula f o r the b a s i s of an agreement: (1) assurances of d e s i r e f o r peace and f r i e n d s h i p ;  (2) n e i t h e r power t o e n t e r i n t o  any combination d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t the other, and each power to d e c l a r e e x p r e s s l y t h a t i t i s not bound by any such  combination;  (3) i f e i t h e r power became e n t a n g l e d i n war w i t h one  or more  other powers the other would m a i n t a i n a t l e a s t benevolent rality  and do i t s utmost to l o c a l i s e  the c o n f l i c t :  neut-  (4) the duty  of n e u t r a l i t y should not be a p p l i c a b l e i n so f a r as i t may  not  be r e c o n c i l a b l e w i t h e x i s t i n g agreements. N e i t h e r power shotild make new arrangements t h a t would prevent the maintenance of 4. neutrality. B r i t i s h freedom  Haldane f e l t of a c t i o n .  t h i s went too f a r and He  endangered  suggested a r e v i s i o n of the d r a f t  1. Haldane - op. c i t . - p.60-2. 2. G.D.vol.4.p.74-5.XXXI.112.Emperor to Bethmann-Hollweg, Feb. 9, 1912.; p.75-6.XXX1.120.Bethmann-Hollweg to M e t t e r n i c h , Feb. 12, 1012. 3.It was r e a l l y no c o n c e s s i o n at a l l , although T i r p i t z l a t e r s t a t e d i n h i s memoirs that.he was prepared t o drop the e n t i r e law i f England o f f e r e d a s u i t a b l e p o l i t i c a l agreement. Unf o r t u n a t e l y , he gave no i n d i c a t i o n of t h i s d u r i n g the negoti a t i o n s , c f . Brandenburg. - op. c i t . - p.405. 4.Haldane - op. c i t . - p.64.  138. by c o n f i n i n g the terms t o an u n d e r t a k i n g  by each Power not t o  make any unprovoked a t t a c k upon the other:not  t o j o i n i n any  combination or d e s i g n a g a i n s t the other f o r purposes of  aggress-  i o n ; not t o become p a r t y to any p l a n or n a v a l or m i l i t a r y comb i n a t i o n , alone  or i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h any other power,  direct-  1.  ed t o such an end. returned and  The C h a n c e l l o r agreed to t h i s .  t o London f u l l  convinced  of hope t h a t r e l a t i o n s would be improved  of the s i n c e r i t y of Bethmann-Hollweg, y e t uneasy  on three p o i n t s : (1) He had a s t r o n g impression F l e e t Law v/ould be i n s i s t e d  t h a t the new  on. (2) He f e a r e d the p o s s i b i l i t y  of T i r p i t z d i s p l a c i n g Bethmann-Hollweg as C h a n c e l l o r . noted a want  Haldane  (3) He  of c o n t i n u i t y i n the supreme d i r e c t i o n of German 2.  policy, e s p e c i a l l y Foreign Policy. On the B r i t i s h s i d e a t l e a s t , many o f f i c i a l s grave doubts as to the success advisability regarded  entertained  of the m i s s i o n and indeed the  of embarking upon such a venture  i t "with a n x i e t y and dismay.  at a l l .  Hicolson  He foresaw t h a t i n the  l a s t r e s o r t Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg would not be s t r o n g to impose upon Admiral the n a v a l programme.  enough  von T i r p i t z any s u b s t a n t i a l r e d u c t i o n of He f e a r e d , on the other hand, t h a t Mr.  Haldane might be i n v e i g l e d i n t o making p o l i t i c a l  concessions 3. i n r e t u r n f o r some f l i m s y assurance of n a v a l r e t a r d a t i o n . " On F e b r u a r y 10 Goschen wrote p r i v a t e l y to H i c o l s o n t h a t i t seem1. Haldane - op. c i t . - p.65.;B.D.vol.6.p.682.Appendix 1. 2. Haldane - op. c i t . - p.70. 3. H i c o l s o n - op, c i t . - p.362-3.  139. ed as  I f Germany were going to o b t a i n a p o l i t i c a l agreement  f o r nothing  and  any more and had 1. t o one. opinion  give no n a v a l agreement.  Haldane c o u l d not  a t l e a s t been f i r m on the idea of two  do  keels  On F e b r u a r y 11 B e r t i e wrote from P a r i s t h a t i n h i s the M i s s i o n was  suspicion i n Paris. e x p e n d i t u r e and  a f o o l i s h move t h a t had  B r i t a i n should  The  spirit  visit  on i n c r e a s i n g her  grave naval  not waste words t r y i n g to come to.an agreement  w i t h Germany which would be d i d keep the  go  created  of no value  s i n c e the 2.  Germans never  of t h e i r agreements.  of an E n g l i s h Cabinet M i n i s t e r to B e r l i n sup-  p o s e d l y of an u n o f f i c i a l nature not u n n a t u r a l l y aroused  the  1. B.D.vol.6.p.674-5.No.504.Goschen to N i c o l s o n , Feb.10, 1912. 2. B.D.vol.6.p.687-8.No.509.Bertie to N i c o l s o n , P r i v a t e , Feb. 11, 1912. Poincare t e l l s an amazing s t o r y of B e r t i e ' s a c t i o n s a t the time of the Haldane M i s s i o n . He pays t r i b u t e to the e n t i r e l o y a l t y of the B r i t i s h Cabinet to the French a l l through i n keeping her informed of a l l things i n the negotiations. B e r t i e came to Poincare on March 27 and asked i f Poincare would a l l o w him to f o r g e t f o r a few moments that he ( B e r t i e ) was an ambassador. Poincare agreed to f o r g e t the f a c t i f B e r t i e wished. B e r t i e then spoke of Grey's assurance to France t h a t B r i t a i n had r e f u s e d the d e c l a r a t i o n of neutr a l i t y r e q u e s t e d by Germany. He p o i n t e d out t h a t Grey had r e f u s e d i t now, but he was surrounded by men w i t h German l e a n i n g s . He then went on to say:"This makes me f e e l a l i t t l e uncomfortable; i t i s imperative t h a t t h i s d e c l a r a t i o n of neut r a l i t y s h a l l not be made, and there i s some r i s k of i t i f the German Government r e t u r n s again and again to the charge. I t may be true that we are o n l y asked to be n e u t r a l i n the event of Germany b e i n g a t t a c k e d ; but who can say t h a t the day may not a r r i v e when France, i r r i t a t e d beyond measure and t h r e atened by Germany, w i l l not be f o r c e d to take the o f f e n s i v e ? No, b e l i e v e me, i t w i l l not do f o r M.Paul Cambon to appear s a t i s f i e d , and i f o n l y you speak r e s o l u t e l y to London, the B r i t i s h Government w i l l do more than h e s i t a t e b e f o r e committing the b l u n d e r which I dread." Poincare says t h a t Cambon promptl y saw Grey and h o i s t e d the danger f l a g . Y/hen the n e u t r a l i t y agreement was d e f i n i t e l y o f f and n e g o t i a t i o n s dropped, Cambon was much r e l i e v e d and N i c o l s o n s a i d Grey was a l s o . For the s t o r y c f . Poincare - Memoirs - vol.1.p.81-91.  140, c u r i o s i t y and  the s u s p i c i o n s of England's f r i e n d s .  Grey, anxious  to preserve harmony, i n s t r u c t e d the B r i t i s h r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s i n France,  R u s s i a , and  Japan, to r e a s s u r e  the Governments and  to  communicate the i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t B r i t a i n intended  to renew d i s -  c u s s i o n s v/ith Germany f o r a n a v a l understanding.  He,  spoke to the diplomats  i n London.  B e r l i n to c l e a r away any  Haldane v i s i t e d  the Cabinet  p e r u s a l , the d r a f t of the German H a v a l Law  notably i n personnel.  They one  attracting  partic-  f o r s u b s t a n t i a l increases  and  a l l saw  t h a t i n the face  B r i t a i n would have to i n c r e a s e her E s t i m a t e s .  German meagre concessions  amounted to n o t h i n g , while  u l a they proposed would t i e England's hands. had  for careful  They found upon examining t h a t p a r t i c u l a r  document c l o s e l y t h a t i t p r o v i d e d  this B i l l ,  Camboh i n  distrust.  Haldane's r e p o r t went b e f o r e  ular attention.  himself,  to r e a l i s e  As  of  The  the form-  Grey s a i d , they  t h a t the p o l i t i c a l formulae were not safe  and  t h a t a s u b s t a n t i a l n a v a l agreement, such as would r e l a x t e n s i o n 1.  and  g i v e s e c u r i t y , was  not  to be  obtained.  By F e b r u a r y 24 M e t t e r n i c h had the p r o p o s a l s  gained  the impression  that  made by Haldane were not going to be accepted  t h e i r e n t i r e t y by i n g to Grey who  the B r i t i s h Government.  confirmed  it.  He  voiced h i s  in  feel-  Grey b e l i e v e d t h a t n e g o t i a t i o n s  'on i n d i v i d u a l p o i n t s would drag on some time, the main t h i n g l . G r e y - op, c i t . - vol.1.p.244.  141. was  to r e a c h an agreement on the Supplementary B i l l and the 1. p o l i t i c a l d e c l a r a t i o n as soon as p o s s i b l e . I n a Memorandum to  M e t t e r n i c h he  p o i n t e d out the i n c r e a s e s i n the German B i l l  and  the c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y n e c e s s a r y i n c r e a s e s by the B r i t i s h ' 2. Admiralty. This news annoyed the K a i s e r and made him £eel t h a t the B r i t i s h Cabinet had p o i n t s upon which he had  disavowed Haldane and drooped 3.  agreed w i t h Germany.  Further  w i t h Haldane a s s u r e d M e t t e r n i c h t h a t the Cabinet was  the  talks  not dev-  i a t i n g from i t s o r i g i n a l s t a n d p o i n t , i t e a r n e s t l y wished an agreement on the v a r i o u s q u e s t i o n s , but  the Estimates  h e i n g i n c r e a s e d and more ships r e c a l l e d from the to  the Channel.  were  Mediterranean  T h i s drove the Emperor almost to the verge of  d e c l a r i n g war. He vowed t h a t he would stand by the H o v e l i e , t h a t the i n c r e a s e d man-power d i d not e n t e r i n t o the d i s c u s s i o n 4. w i t h England. On March 6 M e t t e r n i c h p o i n t e d out t h a t Haldane had  not  complained of the i n c r e a s e i n p e r s o n n e l d u r i n g the e a r l y negotiations.  The  p o i n t s t h a t had The  B r i t i s h Government were making o b j e c t i o n s to seemed s a t i s f a c t o r y when Haldane was  German Government r e p e a t e d  in Berlin.  t h e i r r e a d i n e s s to reduce  the  1. G.D.vol.4.p.76-7.XXXI.135.Metternich to Bethmann-Hollweg, Feb. 24, 1912. 2. B.D.vol.6.p.698-9.Enclosure i n Ho.524. 3.1n a l e t t e r to the C h a n c e l l o r the Emperor s t a t e d "We demand of England a f r e s h o r i e n t a t i o n of her e n t i r e p o l i c y i n the sense t h a t she renounces her e x i s t i n g Ententes and t h a t we step more or l e s s i n t o the p o s i t i o n occupied by France." ' G.D.vo'1.4.r>.78.Hote. 4.G.D.vol.4.p.78-81.XXXI. 145.Me11ernich to Bethmann-Iio 1 Iweg, March 1, 1912.;p.81.XXXI.156.Emperor to M e t t e r n i c h , March 5, 1912.  142. tempo of c o n s t r u c t i o n w i t h i n the new B i l l and t r u s t e d  this  would s u p p l y a s a t i s f a c t o r y b a s i s f o r c o n t i n u i n g n e g o t i a t i o n s .  1.  Grey heped t h a t f r i e n d l y d i s c u s s i o n s and r e l a t i o n s would go on even i f no d e f i n i t e agreement were r e a c h e d .  He added to Goschen  t h a t the German Government seemed to be t r e a t i n g Haldane as i f ' he had had f u l l powers to make a b i n d i n g agreement 2. d i s t o r t i n g what he had s a i d . ary  and were  Haldane r e p o r t e d an e x t r a o r d i n -  c o n v e r s a t i o n i n the course of which M e t t e r n i c h s a i d he had  heard t h a t i f B r i t a i n o f f e r e d a s u i t a b l e p o l i t i c a l formula the proposed f l e e t law as i t stood would be withdrawn and a much 3. more moderate one s u b s t i t u t e d . On March 14 Grey, i n response to a reminder from M e t t e r n i c h communicated  t o him the B r i t i s h d r a f t of a f o r m u l a .  "England  w i l l make no unprovoked a t t a c k upon Germany and pursue no aggress ive  p o l i c y towards h e r .  A g g r e s s i o n upon Germany i s not the sub-  j e c t and forms no p a r t of any t r e a t y u n d e r s t a n d i n g or combination to  t o which England i s now  a p a r t y nor w i l l she become a p a r t y 4.  a n y t h i n g t h a t has such an o b j e c t . "  t h a t t h i s would not s u i t Germany, t r i e d  Metternich,  realising  to persuade Grey to make  some mention of n e u t r a l i t y , but the wary Grey d e c l i n e d to enter any t r a p t h a t would hamper England's freedom of a c t i o n i n event 1 . B.D.vol.6.p.704-6.Ho.529.Memorandum by M e t t e r n i c h , March 6, 1912. 2. B.D.vol.6.p.707-8.Wo.530.Grey to Goschen, March 6, 1912. 3. B.D.vol.6.p.710-1.Ho.533.Memorandum by Haldane, March 12, 1912.; p.712.No.535.Grey to N i c o l s o n , March 13, 1912. 4. B.D.vol.6.p.713-4.Enclosure i n No.537.  of  Franco-German h o s t i l i t i e s .  143. 1.  Grey p o i n t e d out that he had  c o n f i d e n c e i n Bethmann-Hollweg h u t he had t o c o n s i d e r  that  there may he a change of p o l i c y i f Bethmann-Hollweg f e l l 2. power.  from  When t h i s reached the ears of the Emperor, he gave  vent t o h i s f e e l i n g s : " H e v e r i n my l i f e  have I h e a r d of anyone  c o n c l u d i n g an agreement w i t h one and r e g a r d i n g one p a r t i c u l a r statesman, Independently of the r e i g n i n g S o v e r e i g n .  From the  f o r e g o i n g , i t i s e v i d e n t t h a t Grey does n o t i n the l e a s t ise  who the r u l e r here i s ,  and that I am the R u l e r .  real-  He a c t u a l -  l y d i c t a t e s t o me who my: M i n i s t e r i s t o he, supposing I con3. elude an agreement w i t h England."  The formula f a i l e d t o  s a t i s f y the C h a n c e l l o r who seemed t o wish a guarantee of a b s o l ute to  n e u t r a l i t y as the o n l y b a s i s upon which he c o u l d undertake 4. renounce any s u b s t a n t i a l p a r t o f the Supplementary Law.  When M e t t e r n i c h e x p l a i n e d the C h a n c e l l o r ' s d i f f i c u l t i e s and h i s d e s i r e t o continue c o n f i d e n t i a l r e l a t i o n s w i t h England, Grey 5. used the c o a l q u e s t i o n as an excuse f o r d e l a y i n g d i s c u s s i o n s . A f t e r t h a t b o t h s i d e s by mutual consent abandoned the attempt t o f i n d a s u i t a b l e f o r m u l a .  B r i t a i n introduced her i n -  creased n a v a l e s t i m a t e s , and Germany passed theMarch N o v e l l14, e . The 1. B.D.vol.6.p.714.Ho.538.Metternich t o Grey, 1912; p.714.No.539.Grey t o Goschen, March 15, 1812; GID.vol.4. p.82-3.XXXI.178.Metternich t o German F o r e i g n O f f i c e , March' 14, 1912. 2. B.D.vol.6.p.718-9.No.544.Grey t o Goschen, March 16, 1912. 3. G.D.vol.4.p.83.Note. 4. B.D,vol.6.p.719-21.No.545.Grey t o Goschen, March 19, 1912; G.D.vol.4.p.85.XXXI.188.Bethmann-Hollweg, March 18, 1912. 5. B.B.vol.6.p.724-5.Ho.548.Grey t o Goschen, March 22, 1912.  144. door-.leading  to a n a v a l understanding  l e a d i n g to a s e t t l e m e n t was  still The  left  had  of e o l o n i a l and  c l o s e d , hut  territorial  the door  questions  open.  failure  of these n e g o t i a t i o n s pleased  s e c t i o n of the F o r e i g n O f f i c e .  Nicolson f e l t  the  anti-German  t h a t so long as  Germany c o u l d not r e l y on B r i t a i n s a b s t e n t i o n or n e u t r a l i t y she 1. would not be d i s p o s e d to d i s t u r b the peace. To Goschen he v o i c e d h i s r e l i e f t h a t the formula was o f f . He had been a f r a i d 2. B r i t a i n might be trapped. These sentiments Goschen h e a r t i l y 3. reciprocated. In Germany o p i n i o n s v a r i e d . maintained to  The  K a i s e r and  the N a v a l Group  t h a t the B r i t i s h e f f o r t had been from the  f o r c e Germany to drop her proposed Navy B i l l  beginning  i n return for  c o l o n i a l concessions  that would have i n v o l v e d Germany i n c o n f l i c t  with  other n a t i o n s .  However, the K a i s e r "saw  ane)  and h i s honest c o l l e a g u e s  their l i t t l e I have won  joke  i n time and  ... though I may  through him  thoroughly  spoiled  have i n c r e a s e d t h e i r  t h e i r r e s p e c t which w i l l cause them i n due  (Hald-  hatred  time to  resume n e g o t i a t i o n s , l e t us hope, i n a more modest tone and w i t h 4. a f a v o u r a b l e outcome." Bethmann-Hollweg b e l i e v e d the attempt 5. r e a l l y honourable on B r i t a i n ' s p a r t . i n t r o d u c t i o n of the Navy B i l l was in  He  admitted  that  the  to a c e r t a i n extent a mistake  t h a t i t d i d not r e l a x the t e n s i o n . The Haldane M i s s i o n d i d 1. B.D.vol.6p.740-1.No.566.Minute by N i c o l s o n f o r Grey, Ap.4, 191 2. B.D.vol.6pp\747.Ho.575.Nicolson to Goschen, Ap.15, 1912.Private . 3. B.D.vol.6.p.750.No.579.Goschen to N i c o l s o n , Ap.20, 1912.Privcl "fcG  •  4. G.D .vol.4.p. 87-8.XXXI.209.: \7iIhelm 11.Memoirs .p. 160. 5. Bethmann-Hollweg - op. c i t . - p.57.  145. make combined work e a s i e r than b e f o r e and" more Once a g a i n attempts  to r e a c h an understanding had  ed i n n o t h i n g save v a i n hopes and empty words. German statesmen had i g n o r e d the warnings the s i g n s .  fruitful.  Once a g a i n  and n h i s i n t e r p r e t e d  to calm p u b l i c h o s t i l i t y  towards  Germany, but she d i d not d e s i r e i t a t the p r i c e of her a c t i o n i n European  ific,  result-  B r i t a i n d e s i r e d a n a v a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g to r e l i e v e  the f i n a n c i a l p r e s s u r e and  of  1.  i f so thought  navy, and a.pledge  crises.  German-policy  the B r i t i s h e r why  may  liberty  have been pac-  d i d she want a s t r o n g  of our n e u t r a l i t y ? " Her a c t i o n s  throughout  the p a s t few years had been a n y t h i n g but r e a s s u r i n g to an outsider.  To a c e r t a i n e x t e n t B r i t i s h s u s p i c i o n s were  On the other hand she had any had  to f e a r h e r .  Her f l e e t was  German and would remain standard.  l e s s cause  were undoubtedly  to f e a r Germany than Germmore than a match f o r the  so i f she adhered  However, unreasonable genuine  .justified.  to her two-power  as these f e a r s may  a t the time.  seem, they  U n f o r t u n a t e l y , the  dis-  t r u s t on b o t h s i d e s prevented the statesmen from n e g o t i a t i n g an agreement on a s e n s i b l e b a s i s . for  their friendship.  Both s i d e s wanted too much  The p l a t f o r m s upon which they opened  d i s c u s s i o n s were p o l e s a p a r t .  The m i r a c l e would have been i f  they had sefiured an agreement. not on one alone but on b o t h .  The blame f o r f a i l u r e  falls  B r i t a i n knew t h a t she had  no  i n t e n t i o n of a t t a c k i n g Germany -a seapower could h a r d l y a n n i h i l ate  a c o n t i n e n t a l power l i k e  Germany.  1.Bethmann-Hollweg - op. c i t . -  p.59.  On the other hand the  146. Germans, n o t u n d e r s t a n d i n g B r i t i s h temperament, could not f e e l perfectly certain.  The same a p p l i e d t o the Germans and the  B r i t i s h s u s p i c i o n of t h e i r p e a c e f u l  intentions-  Some o f the  German w r i t e r s b e l i e v e t h a t Germany should have accepted the B r i t i s h formula as a t l e a s t b e t t e r than n o t h i n g . ated d e t e r m i n a t i o n  t o possess n a v a l power on Germany's p a r t  l e d her to rush b l i n d l y past nevertheless  "An exagger-  the second t u r n i n g - p o i n t ,  might have o f f e r e d a u s p i c i o u s 1.  which  prost>ects f o r a  b e t t e r f u t u r e f o r the Empire." The to c r e a t e  mistake i n the f i r s t  place  l a y i n the German ambition  a s t r o n g navy, which sooner or l a t e r must l e a d h e r  i n t o d i r e c t c o n f l i c t w i t h England, and i n the f a i l u r e p a r t of l e a d i n g o f f i c i a l s  to recognise  what M e t t e r n i c h  on the so c l e a r  l y saw, t h a t " f e a r would never d r i v e the E n g l i s h i n t o our arms, 2. but  i n t o f a c i n g us f u l l y armed."  Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s d u r i n g during up  The t e n s i o n had poisoned  these y e a r s .  I t relaxed  the next two t h a t the two Governments were able  s e v e r a l agreements on c o l o n i a l and other  questions,  so f a r t o draw that  might have formed the prelude t o an Entente had the war n o t suddenly rendered them v o i d . discussions  A l l the p a i n f u l n e g o t i a t i o n s and  from 1908-1912 l e d only t o a t a c i t agreement f o r  each Government t o go i t s own way i n the N a v a l (Question. t i s h statesmen l e a r n e d  the l e s s o n of preparedness.  1. Hammann -,op. c i t . - p.239. 2. Brandenburg - op. c i t . - p.295.  Bri-  Churchill  147. took charge question. rivet  of the A d m i r a l t y and s i l e n c e r e i g n e d over the n a v a l "But I t was  not the s i l e n c e of s l e e p .  V/ith every  t h a t von T i r p i t z drove i n t o h i s ships of war, he  B r i t i s h o p i n i o n throughout wide c i r c l e s people i n every walk of l i f e  united  of the most powerful  and i n every p a r t of the  Empire.  The hammers t h a t clanged a t K i e l and WillieImshaven were f o r g i n g the c o a l i t i o n of n a t i o n s by which Germany was and f i n a l l y overthrown. every attempt  t o shock,  t o be  Every t h r e a t e n i n g gesture t h a t she made or shake the c l o s e l y k n i t s t r u c t u r e of 1.  the Entente made i t c l o s e and f i t t o g e t h e r more The tone of the B r i t i s h statesmen ed by f e a r of the  resisted  "was  'nearly completed  tightly."  not the r e s t r a i n t  impos-  f l e e t i n the North Sea' but 2. the calm r e s u l t i n g from the r e s o l v e to be prepared."  1 . C h u r c h i l l - op. c i t . - p.118. 2.Ibid.p.119.  148  CHAPTER Hills A f t e r the A l g e c i r a s e n t e r e d upon a p e r i o d had  of  V.  Difficulty.  Conference Anglo-German  of comparative calm.  relations  The n a v a l q u e s t i o n  n o t y e t a s s u m e d i t s l a t e r immense p r o p o r t i o n s and  w e r e no  serious 1.  rivalry.  The  men  the dangers  had  proved  w o u l d be  i n d i v i d u a l .'points of f r i c t i o n , m e r e l y a g e n e r a l M o r o c c o c r i s i s h a d r e v e a l e d t o t h e German of t h e i r  position.  The  Anglo-French  stronger than they a n t i c i p a t e d .  l a n d drew c l o s e r  there  states-  Entente  I f R u s s i a and  Eng-  t o g e t h e r ^ German e n c i r c l e m e n t , t h e y b e l i e v e d ,  complete.  A c c o r d i n g l y , they attempted  t o improve  r e l a t i o n s w i t h England  i n order to prevent i f possible  Russian rapprochment.  Grey says t h a t a f t e r  f e r e n c e " t h e s u n o f German c o r d i a l i t y t h a t i f Germany w o u l d  shon  an  Anglo-  the A l g e c i r a s on L o n d o n " .  their  Con-  He  o n l y l e t w e l l a l o n e , r e l a t i o n s would  felt be-  come s t i l l b e t t e r . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , they would t r y t o improve t h e o c c a s i o n a n d so make i t more d i f f i c u l t f o r t h e B r i t i s h Gov2. ernment.  Billow's m e d i t a t i o n s suggested the p o s s i b i l i t y  renewed a t t e m p t s t o r e a c h a n . u n d e r s t a n d i n g .  " I want t o  on good t e r m s w i t h E n g l a n d , b u t on a f o o t i n g o f c o m p l e t e ity,  on a b a s i s  of complete  criminal, i t i s stupid, 1. B r a n d e n b u r g - op. 2. G r e y - op. c i t .  independence.  -  I t i s not  of  remain equalmerely  t o e m b i t t e r German f e e l i n g a g a i n s t E n g -  c i t . - p.266. vol.1.p.110.  149. l a n d , to f a n t i n y sparks i n t o a b l a z e . of c o n t a c t w i t h England: has •.  - We have numerous p o i n t s  she i s our b e s t cixstomer; so f a r she  opened her p o r t s and her trade to us as to her own O b v i o u s l y there are p o i n t s of f r i c t i o n ,  r e c i p r o c a l concessions may  subjects.  questions In which  be n e c e s s a r y , but not one  i n which.  w i t h calm g o o d w i l l and r e q u i s i t e d o i g t e , i t i s i m p o s s i b l e to r e a c h an u n d e r s t a n d i n g 1. both c o u n t r i e s . "  a l o n g p e a c e f u l l i n e s i n the i n t e r e s t  So while the King and  c o r d i a l l e t t e r s , the statesmen conversed  i n amicable  the K a i s e r exchanged  and diplomats  terms and  of  of both c o u n t r i e s  indulged i n p o l i t e  expressions  of d e s i r e f o r and d e t e r m i n a t i o n t c promote^good r e l a t i o n s . ;  In May  the Emperor g r a c i o u s l y h i n t e d t h a t i f Haldane cared  to come over t o Germany to see something of t h e i r m i l i t a r y 2. a n i z a t i o n he would be warmly welcomed.  org-  T s c h i r s c h k y confirmed  L a s c e l l e s i m p r e s s i o n t h a t the K a i s e r r e a l l y d e s i r e d f r i e n d s h i p w i t h England.  He  spoke of the g r a t i f i c a t i o n i n Germany over  the c o r d i a l r e c e p t i o n i n England r e c e p t i o n by the K i n g .  Bulow had  of the Burgomasters and expressed  their  the hope t h a t t h i s  would l e a d to the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a f r i e n d l y understanding 3. tween Germany and England.  These remarks immediately  the s u s p i c i o n s of the wary Crowe. has  He  be-  aroused  commented: "Past h i s t o r y  shown us t h a t a f r i e n d l y Germany has u s u a l l y been a Germany  a s k i n g f o r something by way of p r o v i n g our f r i e n d s h i p . It will 1. Billow - Memoirs - vol.2.p.227. 2. B.D.vol.3.p.356-7.Ho.415.Lascelles to Grey, May 24, 1906. 3. B.D.vol.3.p.357. Ho.416.Lascelles to Grey, May 24, 1906.  150. be prudent  t o be prepared f o r p r o p o s a l s f o r an understandinn1.  b e i n g made t o us by Germany on s i m i l a r l i n e s . "  "The way t o  m a i n t a i n good r e l a t i o n s w i t h Germany i s t o be ever and c o r r e c t , b u t r e s e r v e d and f i r m i n the defence i n t e r e s t s and to o b j e c t and remonstrate offends  We were never  courteous of B r i t i s h  i n v a r i a b l y when Germany  so b a d l y t r e a t e d by Germany as i n  the years when we were always making concessions i n order to g a i n t h e i r r e a l f r i e n d s h i p and g o o d w i l l .  They are e s s e n t i a l l y 2.  people whom i t does not pay to r u n a f t e r . "  E x a c t l y the same  sentiments as German statesmen had f r e q u e n t l y expressed r e g a r d i n g t h e i r d e a l i n g s w i t h England-^ Grey heard t h e t R a d o l i n had informed Bourgeois  officially  t h a t an entente was p r o c e e d i n g between Germany and England, but i t was i n no way i n t e n d e d t o i m p a i r r e l a t i o n s between Prance and England.  This i n t e l l i g e n c e  Grey d e n i e d .  A d m i t t e d l y the  King on h i s way t o Marienbad would meet the K a i s e r but that had 3. no p o l i t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e .  A few days l a t e r M e t t e r n i c h com-  p l a i n e d t h a t a s e n s i t i v e n e s s i n Prance  seemed to be p r e v e n t i n g  E n g l i s h f r i e n d s h i p w i t h Germany as w e l l as w i t h Prance.  In add-  i t i o n to the u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h Prance, B r i t i a n had now  expressed  a d e s i r e f o r one w i t h R u s s i a . 'Germany f a i l e d should be excluded from the r i n g .  to see why she  I n c l u s i o n would assure peace  while e x c l u s i o n would cause an attempt to break the r i n g . 1. B.D.vol.3.p.358.Minute by Crowe. 2. B.D.vol.3.p.359-60.Minute by Crowe. 3. B.D.vol.3.p.361-2.Grey to B e r t i e , J u l y 9, 1906.  Grey  151. pointed  out t h a t England merely sought to s e t t l e w i t h  d i f f e r e n c e s t h a t had  nothing  to do v/ith Germany.  Russia  Should  any  a u e s t i o n a r i s e i n which German i n t e r e s t s v/ere a f f e c t e d , n a t u r 1. a l l y they would c o n s u l t h e r . A p p a r e n t l y the n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h R u s s i a v/ere c a u s i n g  a little  By August the King and mutual a n t i p a t h y and c o u n t r i e s had  The  the K a i s e r had  so f a r overcome t h e i r  improved s u f f i c i e n t l y to warrant a meeting a t  visit  on the King's outward journey  to Marlen-  passed o f f w e l l w i t h o u t any d i s t i n c t l y 3.  c o n v e r s a t i o n between the panied  uneasiness i n German c i r c l e s .  the r e l a t i o n s between t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e  Gronberg on August 15, bad.  2.  two  King Edward, d i s c u s s e d  menarchs.  political  Hardinge, who  accom-  the g e n e r a l t r e n d of r e l a t i o n s  v/ith the Emperor's m i n i s t e r s i n f r i e n d l y manner.  The  Emperor  seemed g e n u i n e l y  f r i e n d l y towards England and expressed pleasure 4. a t Haldane's coming v i s i t . The press e x e r c i s e d r e s e r v e i n i t s 5. comments, a v o i d i n g e i t h e r h o s t i l i t y or s i n c e r e A few Haldane and  cordiality.  days l a t e r the Emperor and h i s o f f i c i a l s welcomed e n t e r t a i n e d him h o s p i t a b l y .  prominent men  and  felt  c l i n e d , anxious to be  He  t a l k e d v/ith many  t h a t the m a j o r i t y were peaceably i n on good terms w i t h England and  o p i n i o n t h a t to t h i s end  of the  the Anglo-French Entente v/ould prove 6. a h e l p r a t h e r than a h i n d r a n c e . With the a s s i s t a n c e of the 1. B.D.vol.3.p.363.Ho.422.Grey to L a s c e l l e s , J u l y §.1. 1906. 2. B.D.vol.4.p.231-2.Ho.216.Grey to H i c o l s o n , May 23, 1906. 3. Lee - op. c i t . - vol.2.p.529. 4. B.D.vol.3.p.366-70.Ho.425.Hardinge to Grey, Aug.16, 1906. Private. 5. B.D.vol.3.p.370-2.Ho.426.Gartwright to Grey, Aug.20, 1906. 6. Haldane - Before the War - p . 2 2 - 4 6 A u t o b i o g r a p h y - p.201-7.  152. m i l i t a r y s t a f f he at  a parade.  the  public.  s t u d i e d the army o r g a n i s a t i o n and was  N a t u r a l l y he saw  only what was  present  a l r e a d y known to  H i s attendance a t the parade t h r e a t e n e d t o cause  a storm i n Prance, where the b e l i e f p r e v a i l e d that i t commemorated the German v i c t o r y a t Sedan.  However, the Ambassadors  c l e a r e d up the s i t u a t i o n and Anglo-French f r i e n d s h i p continued 1. unimpaired. The year 1906 circles.  concluded w i t h f r i e n d l y f e e l i n g on b o t h s i d e s  in  official  The Governments r e c o g n i z e d the importance  of  p r o c e e d i n g s l o w l y and c o - o p e r a t i n g whenever p o s s i b l e  p u b l i c o p i n i o n r e c o v e r e d from i t s a t t a c k of h o s t i l i t y .  until As a  p r o o f of h i s g o o d w i l l the K a i s e r o f f e r e d to p r e s e n t to England a replica  of a s t a t u e of W i l l i a m of Orange, K i n g of England.  The K i n g accepted the g i f t  i n the c o r r e c t s p i r i t .  The  M i n i s t e r expressed h i s s u s p i c i o n s p r i v a t e l y : " H e who  Prime  makes more  f u s s of you than u s u a l has e i t h e r d e c e i v e d you or proposes to do so." the  P a r l i a m e n t g r a t i f i e d i t s sense of humour by  placing 2.  s t a t u e near the Orangery i n f r o n t of Kensington P a l a c e . The f o l l o w i n g year continued these amicable r e l a t i o n s  but  t o a l e s s e r degree.  E a r l y i n the year King Edward i n the  course of h i s t r a v e l s on the c o n t i n e n t met at  Gaeta.  the King of I t a l y  A r t i c l e s appeared i n the Neue P r e i e Presse and i n the  1. B.D.vol.3.p.374.No.451.Lascelles to Grey, Aug.31, 1906. . p.575.No.433,Lascelles t o Grey, S e p t . l , 1906; p.376.No. 435.Diary of Haldane's v i s i t to Germany. 2. Lee - op. c i t . - vol.2.p.531-2.  153. Cologne  Gazette c r e d i t i n g  olating  and h u m i l i a t i n g Germany.  staring  r a v i n g mad"  and  Germany was  K i n g Edward w i t h the i n t e n t i o n of i s -  under the i m p r e s s i o n t h a t war between England 1e  imminent.  F u r t h e r newspaper a r t i c l e s  the p u b l i c and r e s t o r e d t h e i r great f e e l i n g people f e l t  of  themselves at one  sanity.  calmed  Lascelles reported a  ' n e r v o s i t y ' i n Germany p r o b a b l y because  their  i o n i n Europe.  As a r e s u l t B e r l i n want " s t a r k  c o u n t r y no l o n g e r occupied i t s p r e v i o u s  I n s t e a d of blaming t h e i r  own  the v i c t i m s o f the machinations  time they blamed D e l c a s s e , now  Many were a f r a i d  policy  the posit-  they b e l i e v e d  of some wicked man  -  they suspected King Edward.  of b e i n g d e s e r t e d by I t a l y a t Ehe Hague as a t 2.  A l g e c i r a s , f o r they v/ould have t o oppose disarmament. The  second Hague Conference, summoned by R u s s i a on the  r e q u e s t of the U n i t e d S t a t e s , met times d u r i n g 1906  and 1907  i n the summer of 1907.  the K a i s e r expressed h i s o p p o s i t i o n  to the d i s c u s s i o n of l i m i t a t i o n  of armaments and d e c l a r e d the  whole conference a b s o l u t e nonsense. alarmed  B r i t a i n , a l r e a d y becoming  at the i n c r e a s e d n a v a l f o r c e s around h e r , wished  b r i n g the q u e s t i o n b e f o r e the Conference. secretly  c o n s i d e r e d the  disarmament f u t i l e ,  Several  to  A l l the c o u n t r i e s  meeting u s e l e s s and the d i s c u s s i o n of  but they kept q u i e t , allowed B r i t a i n to  b r i n g up the i d e a and l e f t i t f o r Germany to i n c u r the odium of s h e l v i n g the q u e s t i o n .  Other matters proved e q u a l l y  difficult  1. B.D.vol.6.p.28.Ho.15.Lascelles to Grey, A p r i l 19, 1007.Private 2. B.D.vol.6.p.28.Ho.15.Lascelles to Grey, A p r i l 19, 1907.Private p.29-32.Ho.l6.Cartwright to .Grey, A p r i l 23, 1907.  154. and u n p r o d u c t i v e of s u c c e s s . was  turned down because  with i t .  An O b l i g a t o r y Court of A r b i t r a t i o n  Germany.declined  to have a n y t h i n g to do  Once more Germany emerged w i t h an enhanced r e p u t a t i o n  f o r s t a n d i n g i n the way of the world.  of a n y t h i n g t h a t would promote the peace  Once a g a i n she was  no more to blame than the other 1.  countries, only l e s s d i s c r e e t i n her  conduct.  T h i s year witnessed the c u l m i n a t i o n of the Anglo-Russian n e g o t i a t i o n s which had been c a u s i n g the Germans c o n s i d e r a b l e anxiety, flicted  For many years E n g l i s h and R u s s i a n i n t e r e s t s had i n Asia.  f e l t f a i r l y safe.  con-  So l o n g as t h i s f r i c t i o n continued Germany I t was  the keynote  of her p o l i c y to keep Eng-  l a n d and R u s s i a a p a r t , so l o n g as she c o u l d not b i n d e i t h e r of them to her i n f r i e n d s h i p .  However, the c o n c l u s i o n of the Anglo-  F r e n c h Entente i n e v i t a b l y meant an attempt  on the p a r t of France  to b r i n g England and R u s s i a t o g e t h e r and so to change the Dual Entente i n t o the T r i p l e E n t e n t e . 1906  D u r i n g the n e g o t i a t i o n s of  the Germans t r i e d h a r d to i n t e r f e r e  on both s i d e s .  Their  v e i l e d h i n t s probably had more e f f e c t on I s v o l s k y and the R'uss2. i a n s than on the E n g l i s h . welcome the improved  On the s u r f a c e they a f f e c t e d t o  r e l a t i o n s between England and R u s s i a and  admitted t h a t no German i n t e r e s t s were i n v o l v e d i n the d i s c u s s ions.  Although Billow expressed l i t t l e  a n x i e t y , the K a i s e r was  none too p l e a s e d : "A p r e t t y s t a t e of a f f a i r s , " he s a i d , " i n 1. Lowes D i c k i n s o n - on. c i t . -.n.354-6.jBrandenburg - op. c i t . p.275-7. 2. B.D.vol.4.p.246-9.Ho.234.Lascelles to Grey, Oct.29, 1906.; p.255-7.Ho.243.Annual Report f n r R u s s i a , 1906; p.282-3.Ho.260. N i c o l s o n to Grey, March 26, 1907.;p.412.No.369.Nicolson t o Grey, Nov. 7, 1906.  155. f u t u r e v/e s h a l l have t o d e a l v/ith the F r a n c o - R u s s i a n A l l i a n c e , the  Entente C o r d i a l e "between France and England, and the Entente  between England and R u s s i a , and i n the second place v/ith Spain, 1. I t a l y , and P o r t u g a l as s a t e l l i t e s i n t h i s system of a l l i a n c e s . " When the agreement  was announced  i n September 1907 the Germans  r e c e i v e d i t c a l m l y , the o f f i c i a l c i r c l e s m a i n t a i n i n g a c o r r e c t a t t i t u d e as i n the case o f the Anglo-French agreement  of 1904.  Bulow expressed t o Hardinge h i s s a t i s f a c t i o n a t the removal of causes of f r i c t i o n i n A s i a and h i s b e l i e f t h a t the u n d e r s t a n d i n g 2. would h e l p t o c o n s o l i d a t e the i n t e r e s t s of peace i n Europe. The press was moderately f a v o u r a b l e , b u t the commercial  Inter-  e s t s wished Germany had a l s o p a r t i c i p a t e d and f e a r e d p o s s i b l e 3. i n j u r y t o German trade i n P e r s i a . Cartv/right i n Munich ob4. served some b i t t e r press a t t a c k s on the agreement.  Once more  they had t o a c c e p t the f a i t a c c o m p l i v/ith as good grace as possible.  With the A n g l o - R u s s i a n Entente the r i n g around Germany 5.  was  complete.  There were nov/ t e l e g r a p h w i r e s i n e x i s t e n c e  between P a r i s and S t . P e t e r s b u r g , 1891; London and T o k i o , 1902; London and P a r i s , 1904; P a r i s and Tokio, 1907; S t . P e t e r s b u r g 6  and T o k i o , 1907; and London and S t . P e t e r s b u r g , August 31, 1907. "The  system o f a l l i a n c e s c r e a t e d by Bismarck had only embraced  1. Pribram - op. c i t . - p.120. a g r e a t p a r t of the European c o n t i n e n t : t h a t of the T r i p l e En2. B.D.vol.6.p.43-6.Ho.25.Memorandum by Hardinge, Aug.19, 1907. 3. B.D.vol.4.p.599-600.Ho.540.Lascelles t o Grey, O c t . l , 1907. 4. B.D.vol.4.p.601-2.Ho.542.Cartv/right t o Grey, Oct.8, 1907. 5. Hammann - op. c i t . - p.176. 6.Ibid.p.174."  156. tente drew w i t h i n i t s o r b i t a g r e a t p a r t of the E a s t e r n Hemisphere." events western  " I f we b r i n g unbiased  judgment t o bear upon these  our v e r d i c t w i l l be t h a t the d i p l o m a t i c b r a i n s of the Great Powers p a r t i c u l a r l y of England, were f a r s u p e r i o r  to those of Germany, b o t h i n the c l e a r n e s s w i t h which they p e r c e i v e d t h e i r g o a l and i n the l o g i c a l a c c u r a c y w i t h which they c a r r i e d on t h e i r n e g o t i a t i o n s . one men,  I t must alwayys be c o n s i d e r e d  of the g r e a t e s t mistakes made by Germany's l e a d i n g s t a t e s t h a t they maintained  i n g e n e r a l a p a s s i v e a t t i t u d e , i n con-  t r a d i s t i n c t i o n t o the u n t i r i n g and F r e n c h and the B r i t i s h , and  c e a s e l e s s a c t i v i t y of the  t h a t they n e g l e c t e d to f o l l o w B i s -  marck's example i n s e c u r i n g a l l i e s by s a t i s f y i n g the 1. ness  of the other Powers."  historians  covetous-  Thus have the German and A u s t r i a n  judged the p o l i c y of the Entente as a c a r e f u l l y  out scheme m e t h o d i c a l l y c a r r i e d t o a c o n c l u s i o n . are open t o c r i t i c i s m . deep-laid plans.  They c r e d i t the Entente  I n a l l p r o b a b i l i t y these men,  the E n g l i s h , merely  saw  the danger to t h e i r own  Their  thought  statements  statesmen  with  particularly country i f the  p o i n t s of f r i c t i o n were allowed to remain and grow worse. saw  They  i n Europe a compact group l e d by a seemingly a g g r e s s i v e  s t a t e and dreaded  the consequences of f a c i n g the group alone or  of b e i n g drawn i n t o i t s o r b i t as a dependent n a t i o n . s i o n caused them to come to an u n d e r s t a n d i n g .  Then Germany com-  p l a i n e d of e n c i r c l e m e n t and M a c h i a v e l l i a n p o l i t i c s the m a l i c i o u s , i n t r i g u i n g King of England. I.Pribram - op. c i t . - p.118.  Apprehen-  conducted  by  I t never seemed to  157. occur  to her  statesmen t h a t I t might he a d v i s a b l e f o r them to  change t h e i r t a c t i c s and be i t was  too  more c o n c i l i a t i n g  Hardinge suggested t h a t King Edward  the K a i s e r to Windsor i n the autumn.  not y e t r e t u r n e d  the King's K i e l v i s i t  improved s u f f i c i e n t l y f o r a v i s i t  June the i n v i t a t i o n was  of 1904  How  relations  to prove b e n e f i c i a l .  his  nephew.  As u s u a l the  caused a l i t t l e m i n i s t e r s and Grey who  trouble.  one  The  of these  a b l y Bulow would not  with  of the K a i s e r ' s s u i t e two  the C h a n c e l l o r brought p r o t e s t s from t h a t might suggest a v i s i t 1.  alarm Prance.  come, but had  heard t h a t the K a i s e r 2.  e r o r seemed determined to r e g a r d the v i s i t  of  L a s c e l l e s thought prob-  ed to a r r i v e e s c o r t e d by a f l e e t of c r u i s e r s .  would be b e s t to r e c o g n i s e  Pinal  to Marien-  p o s s i b i l i t y of h i s b r i n g i n g  wished to a v o i d a n y t h i n g  p o l i t i c a l importance and  to spend a few hours  composition  In  accepted.  arrangements were made when the King broke h i s journey a t WilheImshBhe i n August 1907  had  because of the  i s s u e d to the K a i s e r and  bad  should  The Emperor  s t r a i n e d atmosphere d u r i n g the Morocco C r i s i s . had  before  late.  E a r l y i n 1907 invite  a little  Since  intend-  the Emp-  as a s t a t e v i s i t , i t  i t as such, a t the same time u s i n g  the absence of the C h a n c e l l o r to emphasise the s l i g h t p o l i t i c a l importance a t t a c h e d to i t . This would a v o i d any offence to 3. Prance. This d i s t u r b a n c e had s c a r c e l y d i e d down, when the 1. B.D.vol.6.p.80.No.47.Grey to K n o l l y s , Aug.28, 1907.Private• 'p.81.No.48.Grey to L a s c e l l e s , Sept,18. 1907.Private. 2. B.D.vol.6.p.82.No.49.Lascelles to Grey, Sept.20. 1907. 3.Ibid.  158, K a i s e r became alarmed to  about h i s h e a l t h and t e l e g r a p h e d h i s d e s i r e 1.  send the Crown P r i n c e i n h i s p l a c e or to postpone  the  visit.  However, the i n d i s p o s i t i o n soon passed, and u n i t e d pressure from Billow his  and the King induced His I m p e r i a l Majesty t o r e c o n s i d e r  decision. The Emperor and Empress a r r i v e d on Hovsmber 11 and  ed u n t i l November 18.  The v i s i t was  remain-  s u c c e s s f u l i n every way,  and  the K a i s e r h i g h l y g r a t i f i e d by h i s c o r d i a l r e c e p t i o n both by the R o y a l F a m i l y and  the London p u b l i c .  He a g a i n s t r e s s e d h i s g r e a t  d e s i r e f o r the b e s t r e l a t i o n s between the two G u i l d h a l l Luncheon^November 13,he for  countries.  At the  s a i d , "The main prop and base  the peace of the w o r l d i s the maintenance of good r e l a t i o n s  between our two as f a r as l i e s  c o u n t r i e s , and I s h a l l f u r t h e r s t r e n g t h e n them i n my  power.  Blood i s t h i c k e r than water., The 2. German n a t i o n ' s wishes c o i n c i d e w i t h mine." The most import3. ant p o l i t i c a l matter d i s c u s s e d was the Bagdad Railway. At the c o n c l u s i o n of the v i s i t the Empress r e t u r n e d to Germany and the K a i s e r went on t o H i g h c l i f f e  C a s t l e , the home of C o l . S t u a r t 4.  Wortley, f o r a r e s t and a h o l i d a y .  The press i n b o t h c o u n t r i e s  r e c e i v e d the v i s i t f a v o u r a b l y and viewed conciliation.  i t as an e f f e c t i v e r e -  "For a few weeks Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s breathed  a c o r d i a l i t y which they had not known since the Kruger  telegram 5  and which they were not to know a g a i n f o r a dozen years or more." 1. B.D.vol.6.p.88.Ho.56.Grey to L a s c e l l e s Memoirs - vol.2.p.296. 2. Lee - op. c i t . - vol.2.p.558-9. 3. c f . I n f r a , p. 4. Lee - op. c i t . - vol.2.p.561. 5 . I b i d . p.563.  , H o v . l , 1907;  Billow -  159. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , the good e f f e c t wore o f f v e r y soon. r i v a l r y and  the s t r e n g t h e n i n g Anglo-Russian  p u b l i c o p i n i o n on b o t h s i d e s . land i n May visit  of 1908  and was  friendship  aroused  The French P r e s i d e n t came t o Eng-  enthusiastically received.  coupled w i t h the proposed  Naval  meeting  r u f f l e d the temper of the German p r e s s .  This  of the King and t h e Czsr 1. On t h e i r v/ay to R e v a l  the K i n g and Queen stopped a t K i e l to meet P r i n c e and P r i n c e s s Henry."- of P r u s s i a . ed by a squardon  When they l e f t  the harbour  of German d e s t r o y e r s .  "The  they were e s c o r t -  smart appearance of  the whole German N o r t h Sea F l e e t l y i n g a t anchor  i n the p o r t  gave f o o d f o r r e f l e c t i o n upon the r e c e n t German n a v a l programme of  c o n s t r u c t i o n , w h i l e the i n t r i c a t e e v o l u t i o n s of the  flotilla,  which e x c i t e d the a d m i r a t i o n of a l l the n a v a l o f f i c e r s  on board the R o y a l Yacht  served as a u s e f u l o b j e c t l e s s o n of the 2.  e f f i c i e n c y of the German Navy." of  torpedo  At R e v a l there was  no  talk  a l l i a n c e s a g a i n s t Germany, o n l y a g e n e r a l p l e a s u r e a t the  e s t a b l i s h m e n t of c o r d i a l r e l a t i o n s between England and R u s s i a and d i s c u s s i o n of such matters as a f f e c t e d Anglo-Russian i n t e r 3. ests. German d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n was a c u t e , a l t h o u g h M e t t e r n i c h 4. admitted to Grey t h a t i t had no j u s t i f i c a t i o n . Bulow estimates 1. B.D.vol.6.p.l50-3.No.96.Cartwright to Grey, June 1, 1908. 2. B.D.vol.5.p.237-45.No.195.Hardinge Memorandum of R e v a l v i s i t , June 1908. 3. Bulow - Memoirs - vol.2.p.308. 4. B.D.vol.6.p.154.No.97.Grey to de S a l i s , June 15, 1908. R e a l l y the Germans had some grounds f o r t h e i r apprehensions s i n c e s e v e r a l important o f f i c i a l s were p r e s e n t a t the meeting S t o l y p i n and I s v o l s k y on the R u s s i a n s i d e , and French, F i s h e r Hardinge, and N i c o l s o n on the E n g l i s h s i d e . This seemed to h i n t a t more than a f a m i l y r e u n i o n . H a r o l d N i c o l s o n suggests t h a t the Germans f e a r e d the e f f e c t of King Edward's t a c t on the Czar, i n c o n t r a s t to the somewhat p a t r o n i z i n g tone adopted by the K a i s e r . The Germans were r e l y i n g on the r e l a t i o n ship"between K a i s e r and Czar .to keep the l i n e open between B e r l i n and S t . P e t e r s b u r g . N i c o l s o n - o p . c i t r - p . 2 7 4 .  160. R e v a l as the c e n t r a l p o l i t i c a l event of 1908 and remarks "I had no doubts whatever  on the p o l i t i c a l  meeting nor of the p o l i t i c a l consequence if  significance  that, of t h i s  t h a t might f o l l o w i t 1.  our p o l i c y were clumsy and i n c a u t i o u s . "  A view w i t h which  Brandenbtirg agrees i n p r i n c i p l e , "Here i t was  t h a t the f o u n d a t -  ions of a p r a c t i c a l p o l i t i c a l Entente betv/een R u s s i a and England were l a i d , and here t o o , R u s s i a n p o l i c y f i r s t turned d e c i s i v e l y 2>. away- from f r i e n d s h i p w i t h Germany. » The main f e a t u r e of the King's meeting w i t h the K a i s e r 3. at  Cronberg i n August 1908 has a l r e a d y been d e s c r i b e d .  s u b j e c t t h a t occupied the two monarchs was  One  the r e t i r e m e n t o f •  S i r Prank L a s c e l l e s and the q u e s t i o n of h i s s u c c e s s o r .  For  some months the matter had taxed the r e s o u r c e s of the F o r e i g n O f f i c e without any s a t i s f a c t o r y r e s u l t .  At t h i s meeting, how-  ever, they agreed upon B i r Edward Goschen as the new  British  Ambassador t o B e r l i n . In  October the K a i s e r brought down upon h i s head a v e r i t -  able deluge of c r i t i c i s m by p e r m i t t i n g the p u b l i c a t i o n of some of h i s o p i n i o n s on Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s .  The i d e a was  c e i v e d as a r e s u l t of the K a i s e r ' s s t a y a t H i g h c l i f f e and was  con-  Castle  i n t e n d e d to a s s i s t b e t t e r r e l a t i o n s between England and  Germany by r e v e a l i n g the K a i s e r ' s n e v e r - f a i l i n g f r i e n d s h i p .  It  t o l d of h i s keeping R u s s i a and France from i n t e r v e n i n g a g a i n s t H B u l o w - Memoirs - vol.2.p.307. Another example of Billow's wisdom] 2. Brandenburg - op. c i t . -.p.310. 3. c f .  supra, p.109-110.  161. England i n the Boer War,  of h i s s u p p l y i n g a p l a n of campaign  to Queen V i c t o r i a , of h i s f r i e n d s h i p i n s p i t e of the of German p u b l i c o p i n i o n -  This and much e l s e i t r e l a t e d , o f t e n  i n the exaggerated language of the K a i s e r h i m s e l f . s c r i p t had been sent to the K a i s e r by his  approval.  He  C o l . Stuart-Wortley  heavily underlined,  This they d i d w i t h  few minor c o r r e c t i o n s but  way  i f he  speed and  secrecy.  s t i l l d i d not read  considered  Chancellor.  i n t o the press  tended.  de-  Bulow noted a  i t . He  told his  i t suitable for publication. Foreign  Thus the i l l - f a t e d r e p o r t found i t s  and was  the D a i l y Telegraph, The  orders,  then to r e t u r n the r e v i s e d copy  This done, he rettumed i t to the Emperor, passed by 1. O f f i c e and  import-  to make such c o r r e c t i o n s , a d d i t i o n s or  seem s u i t a b l e and  a s s i s t a n t to see  strict  for  That  w i t h matters of v i t a l  ance, passed i t on to the F o r e i g n O f f i c e w i t h  to him.  The manu-  forwarded i t to Bulow at Horderney.  gentleman, b e i n g b u s i l y occupied  l e t i o n s as may  opposition  the r a i s o n d'etre of an a r t i c l e i n  October 28,  a f f e c t i n England was  1908. the exact  A l l the papers h e l d i t up  opposite  to r i d i c u l e and  of t h a t i n regarded  many of the a s s e r t i o n s as an i n s u l t to the E n g l i s h people. In Germany i t l e d to a v i o l e n t campaign a g a i n s t the p e r s o n a l r u l e 2. of the K a i s e r . The  Bulow was  h o r r i f i e d and  K a i s e r s u f f e r e d a nervous c o l l a p s e and  o f f e r e d to r e s i g n . thought of  abdicat-  1 . Bulow - Memoirs - vol.2.p.329. J u l e s Cambon i s i n c l i n e d , on the testimony of Zimmermann to b e l i e v e t h a t Billow read the Manuscript and y e t passed i t . c f . Cambon - Billow and the War - F o r e i g n A f f a i r s . A p r i l 1932.vol.10.Ho.3.p.410. 2. Brandenburg - op. c i t . - p.291.  162. ing.  Goschen wrote p r i v a t e l y t o Grey t h a t "everybody was angry 1• w i t h somebody." To M e t t e r n i c h Grey expressed r e g r e t a t the e f f e c t of the i n t e r v i e w , but saw n o t h i n g i n the way 2. German f r i e n d s h i p and c o - o p e r a t i o n .  of £nglo-  On the whole the I n c i d e n t  served t o r e v e a l to the Germans some of the f a u l t s  of t h e i r  o f f i c i a l system; and to put the E n g l i s h even more on t h e i r guard a g a i n s t Germany.  By December Grey thought a l l t a l k about i t  should cease or Germany would t u r n her i r r i t a t i o n land.  a g a i n s t Eng-  B e s i d e s i t had served a good purpose.* "Never s i n c e I  have been i n o f f i c e has o p i n i o n here been so thoroughly awake w i t h r e g a r d to Germany and on i t s guard as i t i s now. the or's  f a i n t e s t tremor of a n x i e t y about t h a t . p o s i t i o n been so low i n the w o r l d .  I haven't  Never has the Emper-  Why  then not l e t w e l l  alone J " J u s t b e f o r e the storm over the D a i l y Telegraph I n c i d e n t A u s t r i a f o r m a l l y announced the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovnia, an a c t which p r e c i p i t a t e d a European C r i s i s t h a t might have l e d to war had the powers a f f e c t e d been prepared.  The c r i s i s  of the  w i n t e r 1908-9 d i d not a f f e c t Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s as might have been expected.  For the most p a r t b o t h c o u n t r i e s worked  t o g e t h e r f o r the p r e s e r v a t i o n of peace. the  Grey disapproved of  v i o l a t i o n of t r e a t y r i g h t s by s t r o n g e r powers and d e c l i n e d  to r e c o g n i z e the l e g a l i t y of A u s t r i a ' s a c t .  When S e r b i a became  1. B.D.vol.6.p.217-8.No.136.Goschen to Grey, Nov. 13, 1908. 2. B.D.vol.6.p.206-8.No.130.Grey to Goschen, Nov. 7, 1908. 3. B,D.vol.6.p.225*6.No.142.Grey to B e r t i e , D e c . l , 1908.Private.  163. i n v o l v e d , and w i t h h e r , R u s s i a , he/urged.the: a p p l i c a t i o n of p r e ssure i n Vienna  to e n f o r c e a p o l i c y of moderation.  Germany  supported h e r a l l y , A u s t r i a , and d e c l i n e d to e x e r t pressure i n Vienna, when she c o n s i d e r e d the p r o v o c a t i o n had grade.  On the whole, the two F o r e i g n O f f i c e s succeeded i n d i s -  c u s s i n g the d i f f e r e n t phases of the c r i s i s manner.  come from B e l -  Wo  doubt, there was  l a n d would not  i n a calm s e n s i b l e  resentment i n Germany because Eng-  order R u s s i a and  S e r b i a to give i n .  Still  stood f i r m , u n t i l the S e r b i a n r e p l y ' to A u s t r i a convinced t h a t the p r o v o c a t i o n was Germany presented caused  not e n t i r e l y on one  s i d e , and  Gre;^ him  until  to S t . P e t e r s b u r g a d i p l o m a t i c ultimo turn which  the Russians  to surrender a l l a l o n g the l i n e .  made by e i t h e r Government to preserve peace were examined by the other and  Suggestions  carefully  i f c o n s i d e r e d u n s u i t a b l e were p o l i t e l y  rejected with f r i e n d l y explanations. a t i o n , v a r i o u s a c t i o n s strengthened  In s p i t e of t h i s  co-oper-  the d i s t r u s t a l r e a d y f i r m l y  i n g r a i n e d i n the minds of the o f f i c i a l s  of b o t h s i d e s .  Germany  f e l t t h a t Grev was not so much opposing A u s t r i a as A u s t r i a ' s 1. ally. They accused N i c o l s o n , then E n g l i s h Ambassador a t S t . 2. P e t e r s b u r g , of i n f l a m i n g R u s s i a a g a i n s t A u s t r i a and Germany. 3. This N i c o l s o n d e n i e d .  He had  spoken f r e e l y to I s v o l s k y of the  d i f f i c u l t i e s but had never urged him  to adopt a l i n e  widen the b r e a c h between him and Vienna.  that might  There can be no doubt  t h a t N i c o l s o n d e p l o r e d I s v o l s k y ' s r e t r e a t a f t e r the German warn1. Bulow - I m p e r i a l Germany - p.51. 2. Brandenburg - op. c i t . - p.331. 3. N i c o l s o n - op. c i t . - p.310-12.  164. ing.  1.  He  r e s e n t e d the h u m i l i a t i o n of the Entente  t h a t France  and R u s s i a v/ould d e s e r t England.  v/ould he accomplished.  raid f e a r e d  Then Germany's end  She would be d i c t a t o r i n Europe and i n 2.  a p o s i t i o n to c h a l l e n g e England's maritime  supremacy.  This  p e s s i m i s t i c p o i n t of view and d i s t i n c t anti-German b i a s boded ill at  f o r Germany when H i c o l s o n became Permanent Under S e c r e t a r y  the F o r e i g n O f f i c e i n 1910.  d i v i s i o n between the two  The  C r i s i s passed  l e a v i n g the  groups more marked, and the h a t r e d  be-  tween the i n d i v i d u a l members more i n t e n s e .  Between England  Germany, however, i t l e f t a c e r t a i n hond,in  t h a t both had worked  for  peace and had  succeeded i n m a i n t a i n i n g i t .  I t "may  and  have i n -  creased the mutual s u s p i c i o n to a s l i g h t e x t e n t ; but i n that i t pales Into i n s i g n i f i c a n c e beside Agadir  the n a v a l q u e s t i o n and  the  Crisis. During  one  a state v i s i t  of the  calm i n t e r v a l s  to B e r l i n , February  the King and Queen p a i d  1909.  Their reception, a l -  though somewhat l a c k i n g i n warmth a t f i r s t , r a p i d l y became c o r d i a l and e n t h u s i a s t i c . the s p l e n d i d s u c c e s s . 3. desired.  Both King and K a i s e r v/ere d e l i g h t e d w i t h The tone of the press l e f t n o t h i n g to be  P o l i t i c a l l y the v i s i t  s i d e s e r i o u s l y expected  i t would.  s i g n i f i e d nothing. I t was  Heither  merely a n e c e s s a r y  gesture of c o u r t e s y . The summer of 1909 in  witnessed the change i n l e a d e r s h i p 4. Germany..already.'-.mentioned. Billow, unpopular v/ith the K a i s e r  1.B.D.vol.5.p.736.Ho.764.Hicolson to Grey, March 24, 1909. 2 . I b i d ; a l s o H i c o l s o n - op. c i t . - p.306-8. 3. B.D.vol.6.p.232.Ho.146.Goschen to Grey, Feb.12, 1909. 4. c f . supra, p.120.  165. s i n c e the D a i l y T e l e g r a p h I n c i d e n t , Germany had  had  c r i s e s that  heen popular i n Germany.  c a r e f u l l y measured terms.  "He  dependence of the n a t i o n s and  he had The  for  no  D u r i n g h i s regime  "encirclement".  Brandenburg condemns him lacked  a sense of the f a t e was  of v/hich he  opportunities,  did  a l s o bound  o c c a s i o n a l l y experienced but d i d Outwardly he was  f i g h t the war;  but he  p i l e d up  s y s t e m a t i c a l l y ; he  pleased.  s u r p r i s e d t h a t a l l the  He has  energy." him:  He  s l i g h t e d Prance  gave A u s t r i a a l i c e n s e  occasion,  therefore,  to be  animosities  should have combined a g a i n s t new  no  critical 1.  inevitable.  p o l i c y ; he  i r r i t a t e d England; he  Empire  i n Europe a l l the  a l l the resentments t h a t made war  so to g a i n p r e s t i g e f o r h i s own  The  up  not  l e a v i n g the  Cambon, the F r e n c h Ambassador i n B e r l i n , says of  to do what she  inter-  the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  p o s i t i o n demanding the utmost prudence, s k i l l and  reasons and  in  great  sectxre, i n r e a l i t y , hov/ever, i n an extremely  "Billow d i d not  Yet  brought Germany i n t o a p o s i t i o n the  r e a l i s e i n i t s f u l l extent.  Jules  had  grasp of the broad l i n e s of the world's h i s t o r y .  v/hich r e s t s w i t h him,  s t r o n g and  l e d to her  v/ith whom our  p o l i c y of m i s s i n g  difficulty  to go.  f a i l e d to come to an agreement w i t h England and  p r e c i p i t a t e d various he  had  Chancellor  v/hich h i s p o l i c y aroused 2. Germany."  took o f f i c e v/ith the f i x e d i n t e n t i o n  to improve Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s and  i f possible  to r e a c h some  1. Brandenburg - op. c i t . - p.248-9. 2. Cambon - Bulow and the Y/ar - F o r e i g n A f f a i r s , p.415. l.lien H o l s t e i n was d y i n g he urged Billow to stay and guide Germany, because i f he l e f t the C h a n c e l l o r s h i p Germany v/ould become i n v o l v e d i n d i s a s t r o u s war. c f . Billow - Memoirs vol.2.p.456-7. a l s o G o o c h - H o l s t e i n - i n "Studies i n Modern History".  166. agreement. ion  H i s apparent s i n c e r i t y c r e a t e d a f a v o u r a b l e impress-  i n England.  Goschen wrote  " I f the C h a n c e l l o r i s as w e l l  d i s p o s e d as he i s r e p o r t e d t o be, there then appears to be some ground f o r the hope t h a t the new  era w i l l r e s u l t i n a quieter. 1.  more open and l e s s cantankerous f o r e i g n The remainder the  of 1909  policy."  and most of 1910 were taken up w i t h  n a v a l q u e s t i o n and i t s a t t e n d a n t t e n s i o n .  any t r i e d t o s t a r t t r o u b l e over p e r s i a .  In May  1910  Germ-  F e a r i n g i n j u r y to  German commerce t h e r e , she pressed England f o r an agreement. England c o u l d not see why the matter had suddenly become so u r g 2. ent. F o r t u n a t e l y , the Germans dropped the q u e s t i o n i n a s h o r t 3. time e x p l a i n i n g t h a t there had been a misunderstanding. May f e a r e d was  6, 1910  K i n g Edward d i e d .  removed a t l a s t .  The man  A c t u a l l y h i s death made l i t t l e  erence to the course of events i n Europe. i n t r i g u e s had l i t t l e  whom Germany had  foundation.  The  diff  legend of h i s  H i s m i n i s t e r s guided the f o r -  e i g n p o l i c y of England, the K i n g by h i s p e r s o n a l charm s t r e n g t h ened the l i n k s they had made.  He was  by no means h i s own  M i n i s t e r i n s p i t e of the Emperor's b e l i e f .  Foreig  The K a i s e r came to  England f o r h i s u n c l e ' s f u n e r a l and succumbed once more to the charm of the c o u n t r y . D u r i n g a l l these years the Bagdad Railway proved an i n terminable s u b j e c t f o r d i s c u s s i o n .  England, j e a l o u s of her i n -  1. B.D.vol.6.p.279-82.Ho.185.Goschen to Grey, J u l y 23, 2. B.D.vol.6.p.484-5. Ho.369.Grey to de s a l i s , May 21, 3. B.D.vol.5.n.486-7. Ho.371.de S a l i s t o Grey, May 24,  1909. 1910. 1910.  167. f l u e n c e i n the  P e r s i a n Gulf and  f e a r f u l of l o s i n g the  to I n d i a , used every means i n her unless  power to o b s t r u c t the scheme  the whole l i n e became i n t e r n a t i o n a l , or she  t r o l of the  Gulf Section.  as f a r as p o s s i b l e f o r her the r a i l w a y would be  Nevertheless,  and  obtained  con-  kept the door open  Grey r e c o g n i s e d  that  f i n i s h e d i n s p i t e of B r i t a i n , t h e r e f o r e S t i l l he v/ould do n o t h i n g  France'who b o t h regarded the •1.  their interests.  she  participation.  would p r e f e r to p a r t i c i p a t e . Russia  gateway  Unfortunately,  to  offend  l i n e as p r e j u d i c i a l  t h i s d e c i s i o n kept him  he  to  from  coming to an agreement v/ith Germany. When the K a i s e r v i s i t e d Windsor i n November 1907 pressed  r e g r e t to Haldane t h a t there was  the Bagdad Railway. operation?  he  so much f r i c t i o n  What d i d B r i t a i n want as a b a s i s of  over co-  Speaking from a m i l i t a r y p o i n t of view Haldane  l i e v e d England wanted a "gate"  to p r o t e c t I n d i a .  to a f u r t h e r q u e s t i o n Haldane e x p l a i n e d c o n t r o l of the  s e c t i o n near the  s a i d , " I w i l l g i v e you  the gate'.'  Persian Gulf.  The  meant  Kaiser  Having a s c e r t a i n e d t h a t  with  Grey, who  welcomed the prospect  ated  the i n c l u s i o n of France and R u s s i a .  then the  to London to c o n s u l t  of d i s c u s s i o n but At f i r s t  stipul-  the Emperor  f e a r e d there would be d i f f i c u l t y w i t h R u s s i a but Schoen t h a t I s v o l s k y was  be-  In response  t h a t a "gate"  K a i s e r r e a l l y meant t h i s , Haldane went up  him  ex-  ready to d i s c u s s the q u e s t i o n .  assured  Haldane  1.B.D.vol.4.p.382.No.529.Grey to S p r i n g - R i c e , May 11, 1906.; B.D.vol.6,p.336-7.Ho.222.Grey to B e r t i e , A p r i l 6, 1906.  168. suggested a conference i n B e r l i n a q u a t r e . the scheme, hut was  over-ruled.  M e t t e r n i c h opposed  Schoen went t o London the next 1.  morning to make an o f f i c i a l p r o p o s a l to the F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y . Grey informed France to  and R u s s i a of the p r o p o s a l s and  take no a c t i o n w i t h o u t them.  promised  In s p i t e of h i s w i l l i n g n e s s  e n t e r i n t o d i s c u s s i o n s he d i d not t h i n k they would go  through  and suspected t h a t the K a i s e r had done i t a l l on h i s own 2. i a t i v e and impulse.  His doubts  weeks B e r l i n r a i s e d d i f f i c u l t i e s .  proved  correct.  Germany was  init-  A f t e r a few  w i l l i n g to d i s c u s s  the q u e s t i o n of the terminus w i t h England a l o n e . A would p r o b a b l y f a i l  to  conference  and accentuate the d i f f e r e n c e s between Germ3.  any and the other two In  June of 1908  powers.  Thus the matter r e s t e d .  M e t t e r n i c h t o l d Haldnae that he had s t r o n g -  l y opposed the i d e a of a conference a quatre because i t would certainly f a i l to  three.  and Germany would always be i n a m i n o r i t y of one  However, whenever B r i t a i n wished to e n t e r i n t o 4.  o t i a t i o n s alone Germany would be w i l l i n g .  neg-  In November H e l f f e r -  i c h , a l a r m e d a t the German p o s i t i o n i n Turkey, urged the n e c e s s i t y of an u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h B r i t a i n over the Bagdad Railway, as the key to the whole s i t u a t i o n . "The dream of a Bagdad Railwav Germ5. an down to the G u l f i s over." For a time German i n f l u e n c e i n Turkey d e c l i n e d . The young 1. Haldane - Before the War - p.48-51.; B.D.vol.6.p.95.Ho.62. Note of P r i v a t e C o n v e r s a t i o n between Grey and Haldane,Nov.21, 1907.;p.96-8.No.63.Memorandum by Haldane, Nov.15, 1907.; p.98.No.64.Grey to de S a l i s , Nov. 15, 1907. 2. B.D.vol.6.p.104.No.71.Grey to N i c o l s o n , Nov.21,1907, P r i v a t e . 3. Haldane - Before the Y.'c-r - p.51. 4. B.D.vol.6.p.368.No.267.Grey to de S a l i s , J u l y 13, 1908. 5. G.D.vol.3.p.364-5.XXV111.560.Enclosure - H e l f f e r i c h to Gwinner, Nov.30, 1908.•  169. Turks, who  gained  wished to procure Railway and  power i n 1909,  the Entente.  .They  the w i t h d r a w a l of B r i t i s h o p p o s i t i o n to the  induced  On November 8,  favoured  1909  Gwinner to re-open n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h  Cassel.  the T u r k i s h Ambassador i n London asked f o r  a statement of the terms upon which England would withdraw her 1• , objections.  In the meantime Grey s e i z e d the  make a p p l i c a t i o n f o r a c o n c e s s i o n and  the  opportunity  f o r a r a i l w a y between Bagdad  P e r s i a n G u l f v i a Buss or ah. and  the T i g r i s V a l l e y , 2.  a f i n a n c i a l guarantee from the T u r k i s h Government.  without  The  Otto-  man  Government, f e a r i n g German wrath, put B r i t a i n o f f w i t h  ite  excuses. Gwinner and  ledge  the  a separate  The  German Company was  Seeing the b u s i n e s s  willing  company formed by England or Turkey f o r  c o n s t r u c t i o n of the G u l f S e c t i o n p r o v i d e d 3.  e s t i n the new  pol-  C a s s e l c a r r i e d on n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h the know-  of t h e i r F o r e i g n O f f i c e s .  to r e c o g n i z e  to  i t had  50t  inter-  company.  t h a t England wished c o n t r o l of the G u l f S e c t i o n , men  i f they c o u l d .  i n the F o r e i g n O f f i c e decided Metternich  pay  i n October suggested t h a t a g e n e r a l  p o l i t i c a l and n a v a l understanding 4. t o a r a i l w a y agreement.  to make her  he made a n e c e s s a r y  prelude  In December Schoen, p r e s e n t i n g  case to Goschen i n d i p l o m a t i c language, conveyed the  the  impression  t h a t1. Ethe i a l c Government might use the c o n s t r u c t i o n and cona r l eI m p-e rop. i t . - p.221. 2. B.D.vol.6.p.374-5.No.272.Grey to Lowther, Aug.18, 1909. 3. B.D.vol.6.p.410.Enclosure i n No.309.Memorandum of GwinnerC a s s e l C o n v e r s a t i o n s , Dec. 15, 1909. 4. G.D.vol.3.p.369-70.XXVll.580.Me11ernich to Bethmann-HoiIweg, Oct.28, 1909.  170. t r o l of the Bagdad-Persian G u l f S e c t i o n of the Railway as a l e v e r to push England f u r t h e r i n the d i r e c t i o n of a p o l i t i c a l ' u n d e r 1. s t a n d i n g then she had y e t shown any d i s p o s i t i o n to go. D u r i n g 1910 and 1911 B r i t a i n s u c c e s s f u l l y b l o c k e d the  4#  i n c r e a s e i n customs d e s i r e d by the T u r k i s h Government p a r t l v to 2. s u p p l y K i l o m e t r i c guarantees f o r the Railway. ed t o e x e r t a l i t t l e  Grey  endeavour-  p r e s s u r e on the Turks by demanding the con-  c e s s i o n a p p l i e d f o r i n 1909 i n r e t u r n f o r consent to the customs 3. increase.  Turkey e x p l a i n e d the d i f f i c u l t y of g i v i n g a con-  c e s s i o n t h a t would to persuade  compete w i t h the Bagdad Railway; but  offered  Germany to g i v e up the Bagdad-Gulf  s e c t i o n and a l l o w 4. Turkey to c o n s t r u c t and c o n t r o l t h a t p a r t of..the l i n e . The end of 1910 saw a t l e a s t one s t e p forward. The Czar 5.  promised to withdraw  h i s d i p l o m a t i c o p p o s i t i o n to the Railway,  thus removing R u s s i a from the f i e l d .  D u r i n g 1911  i a t e d w i t h England w i t h the i d e a of f o r m i n g a new  Turkey negotcompany con-  s i s t i n g of Turkey, Prance, B r i t a i n , and Germany to c o n t r o l the 6. Gulf Section.  Both Turkey and Germany appeared so d e s i r o u s  of c o n c i l i a t i n g B r i t a i n and drawing her i n t o the e n t e r p r i s e t h a t a s e t t l e m e n t was merely a matter of time and p a t i e n c e . 1. B.D.vol.6.p.408.Wo.308.Goschen to Hardinge, Dec.15, 1909. Private. 2. E a r l e - op. c i t . - p . 2 2 6 . 3. B.D.vol.6.p.433.Ho.324.Grey to Lowther, March 30, 1910.; p.468-72.Ho.352.Grey to Lowther, A p r i l 20, 1910. 4. B.D.vol.6.p.492-3.Ho.577.Grey to Lowther, June 6, 1910. 5. E a r l e - op. c i t . - p.239. 6. G.D.vol.3.p.375.XXVll.670.Marschall t o German F o r e i g n O f f i c e , Feb.10, 1911;also XXV11.672.Same, Feb.24, 1911.  171. The  e a r l y months of 1911 brought no new  German r e l a t i o n s . p a i d what was  cordially.  Anglo-  On the i n v i t a t i o n of King George the K a i s e r  d e s t i n e d to be h i s l a s t v i s i t  the K a i s e r i n attended 1. Victoria.  complications i n t o  to England.  He  and  the u n v e i l i n g of the memorial to Queen  Once a g a i n the people The Emperor was  of London r e c e i v e d them  d e l i g h t e d w i t h e v e r y t h i n g and  felt  the absence of any v e i l e d antagonism i n the a t t i t u d e of the Royal F a m i l y - a f e e l i n g t h a t he noted w i t h p l e a s u r e as a welcome change from the days of King Edward. Morocco q u e s t i o n w i t h King George who c i r a s T r e a t y a t h i n g of the The  of Germany's famous faux pas.  On the same day  suddenly  appeared i n A g a d i r informed  to p r o t e c t German l i v e s  p r o p e r t y endangered by the d i s t u r b a n c e s i n Morocco. 2. r e s t o r e d the s h i p would be withdrawn.  years  and  As soon as This step  s u r p r i s e d Europe as much as the Tangier demonstrations six  soom  On J u l y 1  the n a t i o n s of Europe were  t h a t Germany c o n s i d e r e d i t n e c e s s a r y  order was  Alge-  past.  the German gunboat "Panther"  Harbour.  seemed t o t h i n k the  f r i e n d l y atmosphere c r e a t e d by t h i s v i s i t was  poisoned by another 1911  He d i s c u s s e d the  had done  previous.  Everyone r e a l i s e d  t h a t the A l g e c i r a s Conference  d e f i n i t e l y d i s p o s e d of the Morocco q u e s t i o n , and would not r e s t u n t i l she had  had  not  t h a t France  established h e r s e l f i n that  territ-  1. Wilhelm 11. - Memoirs - p.142-5. 2. G.D.vol.4.p.6-7.XXlX.155.Kiderlen to M e t t e r n i c h , June 30, 1911.; B.D.vol.7.p.322.Ho.338.Aide-Memoire by M e t t e r n i c h , J u l y 1, 1911; p.322-3.Ho.539.Minute by H i c o l s o n to Grey, J u l y 1, 1911.  17S. ory.  A Franco-German agreement i n 1909 seemed f o r a time to  produce calmness and a more c o r d i a l to b r i n g l a s t i n g Empire reached  peace.  co-operation, but f a i l e d  I n 1911 a f f a i r s v / i t h i n the S h e r e e f i a n  such a s t a t e o f chaos t h a t France  s e i z e d the op-  p o r t u n i t y t o send an armed f o r c e t o Fez on the p r e t e x t of r e s t o r ing  order and p r o t e c t i n g the l i v e s o f Europeans i n the neighbour-  hood.  The F r e n c h Ambassador n o t i f i e d  i n t e n t i o n s and motives. Foreign A f f a i r s , French  Germany of h i s country's  K i d e r l e n , t h e S e c r e t a r y of State f o r  expressed  full  confidence i n the l o y a l t y  Government, b u t added a v e i l e d  h i n t t h a t i f French  remained i n Fez u n t i l the S u l t a n governed  of the troops  o n l y w i t h the h e l p of  French bayonets Germany.would c o n s i d e r the A l g e c i r a s A c t v o i d 1. and h o l d h e r s e l f f r e e t o a c t as she thought  fit.  Obviously  something was going t o happen. K i d e r l e n evolved a b r i l l i a n t  scheme t o add to Germany's  A  p r e s t i g e and h e r m a t e r i a l p o s s e s s i o n s .  Y/hen the F r e n c h  reached Fez Germany would p o l i t e l y enquire how l o n g they ed t o s t a y .  troops expect-  The French Government would have t o name a date,  but would no doubt remain l o n g e r .  Then Germany would d e c l a r e  the S u l t a n had l o s t h i s independence, t h e r e f o r e the A c t of A l g e c i r a s was n u l l and v o i d and the s i g n a t o r y Powers were f r e e t o act  as they p l e a s e d .  Since p r o t e s t s were g e n e r a l l y u s e l e s s ,  Germany should do something to make France  offer  compensation.  France had seen f i t to p r o t e c t h e r business f i r m s and s u b j e c t s i n F e z : Germany.would p r o t e c t h e r f i r m s a t Mogador and Agadir 1.G.D.vol.4.p.1.XX1X.97.Memorandum by K i d e r l e n , A p r i l 28, 1911.  173. by sending a warship t o anchor i n the harbour.  These p o r t s  were too f a r away from the Mediterranean f o r the a c t to cause England any a n x i e t y .  Moreover,  they had f e r t i l e  that probably contained mineral wealth. a pledge Germany c o u l d await developments o f f e r e d proper compensation  from her own  hinterlands  In p o s s e s s i o n of such and see whether Prance Colonial possessions.  Should such compensation be f o r t h c o m i n g Germanv would withdraw 1. from the p o r t s . a c c o r d i n g to planJ ing the  A charming  scheme had e v e r y t h i n g turned out  U n f o r t u n a t e l y f o r Germany, Kiderlen»s r e a s o n -  proved f a u l t y . He took no o f f i c i a l a d v i c e , but by t e l l i n g K a i s e r h a l f - t r u t h s o b t a i n e d h i s consent to the despatch of the 2.  ships.  He a c t e d f i r s t and stopped to t h i n k a f t e r w a r d s .  He  "seems to have expected w i t h e x t r a o r d i n a r y s i m p l i c i t y t h a t a t h r e a t e n i n g g e s t u r e would s t r a i g h t w a y b r i n g f o r t h o f f e r s of com3. p e n s a t i o n from Prance. Yet M e t t e r n i c h had warned him i n May t h a t Grey had s a i d England was "bound by an agreement to support 4. Prance i n Morocco. Had he stopped t o t h i n k f o r even a moment he must have r e a l i s e d t h a t such an a c t of p r o v o c a t i o n would 5. draw others b e s i d e s Prance and Germany i n t o the arena.  1. G.D.vol.4.p.2-4.XXIX.105.Memorandum by K i d e r l e n , May 3, 1911. 2. G.D.vol.4.p.6.XXIX.152.Kiderlen to German F o r e i g n O f f i c e , June 26, 1911. S.Brandenburg - op. c i t . - p.372. 4.G.D.vol.4.p.4-5.XXIX.119.Metternich to German F o r e i g n O f f i c e , May 22, 1911. Grey was ready to send a B r i t i s h s h i p to A g a d i r , w h i l e the French were c o n s i d e r i n g sending one to A g a d i r or Mogador. F i n a l l y they d e c i d e d to r e f r a i n from d o i n g so f o r the time b e i n g , c f . B.D.vol.7.p.326.Minute by H i c o l s o n and Grey, Jtily 2, 1911. ;p.530-1.Ho.551.Grey t o B e r t i e , J u l y 3, 1911.;p.333.Ho.354.Hicolson to Grey, J u l y 4, 1911.;p.333-4.Ho.355.Grey to B e r t i e , J u l y 4. 1911.  174. Grey t o l d M e t t e r n i c h  on J u l y 3 on b e h a l f of His Majesty's  Government t h a t England's a t t i t u d e could not be a d i s i n t e r e s t e d one  i n view of her t r e a t y o b l i g a t i o n s to Prance and  i n t e r e s t s i n Morocco. c r e a t e d a new  The  sent.  despatch of the German warship  own had  s i t u a t i o n i n which f u r t h e r developments might  affect British interests. n i z e any new  of her  For t h a t reason  arrangement made without  recog-  t h e i r knowledge and  con-  p e r f e c t l y at l i b e r t y to take 1. measures to p r o t e c t her i n t e r e s t s i n Morocco. Kiderlen ignor2. ed these h i n t s and c o n f i n e d h i s n e g o t i a t i o n s to the French. He  Metternich  they could not  tried  When he  s a i d England was  to make Cambon come forward f a i l e d he  l o s t patience  and  v/ith some d e f i n i t e  suggested the whole of  F r e n c h Congo to the amazement of Cambon. but  still  France r e f u s e d  p r o f e s s e d w i l l i n g n e s s to n e g o t i a t e .  out hov; t h i n g s were and expressed 3. of the m a t t e r . Kiderlen,caught use b l u s t e r and  offer.  The  this  K a i s e r found  h i s annoyance at the  handling  i n h i s own n e t , wished to 4. t h r e a t s of f o r c e . "So t h i s s o - c a l l e d g r e a t  statesman v/ould not have h e s i t a t e d to i n v o l v e Germany i n a f o r her v e r y e x i s t e n c e Bethmann-Hollweg had Altogether  the  war 5.  i n order t o gain the French Congo."  t o smooth t h i n g s over and  the s i t u a t i o n was  tone K i d e r l e n down.  d e c i d e d l y unpleasant  f o r Germany.  1. G.D.vol.4.p.8.XXlX.i67«Metternich to German F o r e i g n O f f i c e , May J u l y 4, 1911; Grey - op. c i t . - vol.1.p.214-5; B.D.vol.7. . p.328.Ho,347.Grey' to de S a i l s , J u l y 3, 1911.;p.334.No.356 Grey to de S a l i s , J u l y 4, 1911. 2. The French kept the B r i t i s h informed of German demands, c f . B.D.vol.7.p.371-2.Ho.392.Bertie to Grey, J u l y 18, 1911. f o r i n f o r m a t i o n r e g a r d i n g the French Congo. 3. Brandenburg - op. c i t . - p.376. 4.Ibid.p.376.:G.D.vol.4.p.12.XXIX.189.Kiderlen to C h a n c e l l o r , J u l y 17, 1911.Private. 5.Brandenburg - op. c i t . - p.377.  175. " I n the e x p e c t a t i o n o f an e a s y s u c c e s s adventure  w i t h o u t c o n s i d e r i n g how  they had  plunged  into  t h e y were t o e x t r i c a t e  an  tbem1.  selves i f t h i n g s took a d i f f e r e n t Then came a v e r y u n l o o k e d e i g n O f f i c e had  for incident.  Grey's  ed w h a t was  g o i n g on.  m e s s a g e o f J u l y 4, 2.  So  London n a t u r a l l y  r e c e i v e d any  answer from  r e c e i v i n g a r e p l y i n t h e n e g a t i v e he  said  t h e C i t y o f L o n d o n t h a t e v e n i n g and  about the a f f a i r .  He  Germany.  t h a t he h a d  proposed  justified  and  Germfear-  Grey.  He  Upon t o speak  t o say  s u b m i t t e d t o G r e y t h e d r a f t he h a d  Grey c o n s i d e r e d i t q u i t e 3.  w i t h the s u g g e s t i o n .  wonder-  k n o w l e d g e o f t h e German m e t h o d s  on J u l y 2 1 L l o y d George w e n t t o see  e n q u i r e d i f Grey had  pared.  German F o r -  They h e a r d r u m o u r s o f e x t r a v a g a n t  a n demands and w i t h t h e i r  in  The  expected."  l e f t Metternich without instructions or'inform-  ation after  ed t h e w o r s t .  t u r n f r o m what t h e y  cordially  T h e r e f o r e L l o y d George spoke a t  something preagreed the  M a n s i o n House i n the f o l l o w i n g s t r a i n : " B u t I am a l s o b o u n d t o 1. B r a n d e n b u r g - o n . c i t . - p . 3 7 8 . 2. B . D . v o l . 7 . p . 3 7 7 - 8 . H o . 3 9 9 . G r e y t o A s q u i t h , J u l y 19, 1911. Private. G r e y t o l d A s q u i t h t h a t he h a d n o t y e t r e c e i v e d a n y c o m m u n i c a t i o n f r o m Germany r e g a r d i n g t h e J u l y 4 m e s s a g e . P e r h a p s t h e y h a d b e t t e r t a k e some a c t i o n o r Germany w i l l t h i n k she c a n do as she l i k e s . By Friday, J u l y 2 1 i f no r e p l y h a d b e e n r e c e i v e d G r e y w o u l d l i k e t o be a u t h o r i z e d t o i m p r e s s - o n Germany t h a t i f F r a n c o - G e r m a n n e g o t i a t i o n s came t o n o t h i n g E n g l a n d m u s t become p a r t y t o t h e D i s c u s s i o n s o f t h e s i t u a t i o n , and t h a t i f Germany d i d n o t k e e p h e r i n f o r m e d o f a n y new d e v elopment o f a f f a i r s a t A g a d i r E n g l a n d would have t o send a B r i t i s h s h i p t h e r e t o see t h a t B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s were n o t p r e judiced. On J u l y 20 G r e y w r o t e t o B e r t i e , " T h e F r e n c h h a v e d r i f t e d i n t o d i f f i c u l t i e s , w i t h o u t k n o w i n g w h i c h way t h e y r e a l l y w a n t t o go. We a r e b o u n d and p r e p a r e d t o g i v e them d i p l o m a t i c s u p p o r t , b u t we c a n n o t go t o war i n o r d e r t o s e t a s i d e t h e A l g e c i r a s A c t and p u t F r a n c e i n v i r t u a l p o s s e s s i o n o f M o r o c c o . " He w e n t on t o s a y t h a t i f E n g l a n d w e n t t o war i t w o u l d h a v e t o 'be f o r B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s n o t f o r F r e n c h , c f . Hammond - R e v i e w o f B . D . v o l . 7 . i n The M a n c h e s t e r G u a r d i a n Week l y , M a r c h 1 1 , 1932. 3. G r e y - op. c i t . - v o l . 1 . p . 2 1 5 - 6 .  176. say t h i s  - t h a t I b e l i e v e i t i s e s s e n t i a l In the h i g h e s t  e s t s , not merely of t h i s  country, but  of the world,  inter-  that B r i t -  a i n should a t a l l hazards m a i n t a i n her place and her p r e s t i g e amongst the Great  Powers of the world  i n g would j u s t i f y a d i s t u r b a n c e questions  I conceive  that  of i n t e r n a t i o n a l g o o d w i l l  of the g r a v e s t n a t i o n a l moment.  But i f a  has won  by  of the g r e a t and b e n e f i c e n t p o s i t i o n  c e n t u r i e s of heroism  B r i t a i n to be  and  t r e a t e d where her  as i f she were of no account  achievement, by  except  situation  were to be f o r c e d upon us i n which peace c o u l d only be by the surrender  noth-  preserved Britain  allowing  i n t e r e s t s were v i t a l l y a f f e c t e d ,  i n the Cabinet  of N a t i o n s ,  I say e m p h a t i c a l l y t h a t peace a t t h a t p r i c e would be  then  a humiliat1.  i o n , i n t o l e r a b l e f o r a g r e a t country l i k e  ours  to endure."  This pronouncement b u r s t l i k e a bomb-shell i n Europe. construed  i t as a v e i l e d  All  t h r e a t on the p a r t of B r i t a i n , more  p a r t i c u l a r l y s i n c e i t came from a Cabinet M i n i s t e r , and  a man  had  Prance  p r e v i o u s l y been c o n s i d e r e d pro-German i n sympathy.  looked upon i t as an assurance thought i t added i n s u l t  of B r i t i s h support.  to i n j u r y : and 2.  which she must not y i e l d .  As  i e n t l y a l a r m i n g a l r e a d y , without  who  Germany  c o n s t i t u t e d a t h r e a t to  i f her p o s i t i o n were not  suffic-  England e n t e r i n g the l i s t s  on  the s i d e of Prance J Undoubtedly, the speech would never have 1. Grey - op. c i t . - vol.1.p.215-6.;B.D.vol.7.p.591. No.412. E x t r a c t from L l o y d George's Speech, J u l y 21, 1911. 2. Before the t e x t of the speech had reached the German F o s e i g n O f f i c e M e t t e r n i c h , a c t i n g on i n s t r u c t i o n s , had e x p l a i n e d to Grey the German motives i n sending the s h i p to A g a d i r . He had s a i d t h a t i f s e c r e c y were maintained i n the n e g o t i a t i o n s and i f the h o s t i l e tone of the B r i t i s h and French press d i d not s p o i l the d i s c u s s i o n s Germany would probably be able to make concessions. Grey wished to use t h i s communication i n P a r l iament, but the German Government w i t h h e l d p e r m i s s i o n i n view of the Mansion House Speech, c f . B .D .vol.7 .T>.394-6.No.417 . . Grev to Goschen, J u l y 24, 1911:p.397.No.419". Grey to Goschen,  177. been made, had  Germany g i v e n Grey assurance -tha't'she <2id :'.  not i n t e n d t o take t e r r i t o r y i n Morocce.  But Germany c o u l d not  give t h a t assurance withovit r e v e a l i n g her whole p l a n of campaig and t h e r e b y r o b b i n g i t of i t s e f f e c t i v e n e s s , s i n c e any i n f o r m a t i o n v/ould c e r t a i n l y be passed on to Prance. to do then was  to b l u f f the a f f a i r  The o n l y t h i n g  through.  K i d e r l e n ordered M e t t e r n i c h t o remonstrate w i t h Grey mediately.  N e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h Prance had been p r o c e e d i n g amic-  a b l y and had no concern v/ith B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s . wished  im-  t o complain why  If Britain  d i d she not use the d i p l o m a t i c channels  i n s t e a d of making a p u b l i c t h r e a t ,  " i f i t was  the B r i t i s h  ernment's i n t e n t i o n t o complicate and confuse the  Gov-  political  s i t u a t i o n and b r i n g about a s e t t l e m e n t by means of f o r c e , they c o u l d not have chosen a b e t t e r way,  than by the C h a n c e l l o r ' s  speech, which so i g n o r e d the d i g n i t y v/hich he claimed f o r Engl a n d or the p o s i t i o n of a GreatLPower I f he  such as o u r s e l v e s . ...  (Grey) a s s e r t s t h a t the press i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the  speech does n o t correspond w i t h the words used, please  tell 1.  him  t h a t we  expect a c l e a r p u b l i c statement  As might be expected the i n t e r v i e w was  to t h a t  effect."  somewhat  stormy.  Grey r e s e n t e d the tone of the German communication and s a i d so "I f e l t  t h a t the tone of t h e i r communication made i t not  s i s t e n t w i t h our d i g n i t y t o g i v e e x p l a n a t i o n s as t b the of the C h a n c e l l o r of the Exchequer."  I.G.D.vol.4.p.14-5.XXIX.210.Kiderlen  conspeech  However, he d i d say t h a t  to M e t t e r n i c h , J u l y 24, 1911.  178 „ i t was  not  intended  Metternich  could not  to e m b r o i l see  German n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h Prance.  t h a t B r i t a i n had  s u s p i c i o n s v o i c e d i n the speech. r i g h t to p r o t e c t her own pose of those  No  one  i n t e r e s t s and no  i n t e r e s t s without  any grounds f o r the questioned one  England's  intended  consulting her.  to d i s -  The more t h r e a t s 1.  Germany r e c e i v e d the more determined would be her a c t i o n . The  t e n s i o n thus c r e a t e d continued  f o r some time, while  the n e g o t i a t i o n s dragged p a i n f u l l y to a c o n c l u s i o n oh November 2. 4.  The  a f f a i r ended i n another f i a s c o f o r Germany.  i n i t e l y surrendered  her r i g h t s i n Morocco and  t u r n a p a r t of the F r e n c h Congo. t h a t served  p o l i t i c s was  The blame f a l l s  t h a t the  o n l y proper  and  s t i c k and  def-  in re-  an i l l - c o n c e i v e d scheme to s t r e n g t h -  p r i m a r i l y upon K i d e r l e n s u c c e s s f u l way  who  to conduct  to n e g o t i a t e w i t h a p i s t o l i n your hand, or a t 3.  l e a s t b u l g i n g i n your coat pocket." p r e s t i g e he  accepted  only to b r i n g d i s g r a c e upon Germany and  en the E n t e n t e . "considered  I t was  She  Unfortunately for h i s  encountered someone s k i l l e d i n the use  came o f f the w02?st i n the encounter.  German a c t was  d e p l o r a b l e and  of the b i g  No doubt the  f o o l h a r d y , but L l o y d George's  speech was h a r d l y l e s s i l l - a d v i s e d . I f Germany had s e r i o u s l y 1. G.D.vol.4.p.15-6.XXIX.213.Metternich to German F o r e i g n O f f i c e , J u l y 25, 1911; Grey - op. c i t . - vol.1.p.220-2.; B.D.vol.7. p.397-9,No.419.Grey to Goschen, J u l y 25, 1911. 2. B.D.vol.7.p.786-8.No.761.Goschen to Grey, Dec. 16, 1911. The German papers were v e r y c r i t i c a l of German h a n d l i n g of the Morocco q u e s t i o n and d i s s a t i s f i e d with Bethmann-Hollweg and K i d e r l e n ' s methods. 3. Brandenburg - op. c i t . - p.384.  179. considered  war'before,". J u l y 21,  a f t e r , but  L l o y d George's words d i d not make the path of r e t r e a t  v e r y easy f o r a proud n a t i o n . L l o y d George's step and  she  c e r t a i n l y dropped the  Grey and  considered  C h u r c h i l l b o t h approved  t h a t i t had c o n t r i b u t e d 1.  l y to p r e s e r v i n g the peace of Europe i n The  both sides.  large  1911.  peace c o u l d have been preserved  methods t h a t would have avoided  idea  by more d i p l o m a t i c  the unpleasant resentment  on  In a l l p r o b a b i l i t y the European'nations read more  i n t o the  speech than was  intended,  bp:t such arguments had  soothing  e f f e c t on the e x c i t e d German p u b l i c o p i n i o n .  had been spoken by an Englishman, t h e r e f o r e h i d d e n meaning d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t  Germany.  b e t t e r f o r Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s had from o v e r t a c t i o n .  As  little  The  words  they must have some  I t would have been  L l o y d George r e f r a i n e d  they d i s c o v e r e d  l a t e r , subterranean  neg2. o t i a t i o n s were proceeding to the s a t i s f a c t i o n of both s i d e s . Of course, N i c o l s o n h e a r t i l y approved the s t r o n g stand taken 3.  by B r i t a i n on the s i d e of the E n t e n t e . D u r i n g August and i o n a r y measures. meeting of the 23,  The  September, England took s e r i o u s  F l e e t was  held i n readiness,  Committee of I m p e r i a l Defence was  1911,every p r e p a r a t i o n was  made and  precaut-  a special  convened August  every d e t a i l worked  out  1. Grey - op. c i t . - v o l . 1 . p . 2 1 7 . ; C h u r c h i l l - op. c i t . - p.46. 2. N i c o l s o n - op. c i t . - p.349. 3.Ibid.p.345."I have every b e l i e f , " N i c o l s o n wrote,"that the maintenance by us of our present a t t i t u d e - and I am q u i t e convinced t h a t there w i l l be no f l i n c h i n g on our side - may e v e n t u a l l y r e n d e r Germany more compliant and r e a s o n a b l e . She w i l l "see t h a t the T r i p l e Entente i s not so weak a comb i n a t i o n as she a p p a r e n t l y imagined. She had i n f a c t commi t t e d a great blunder. I t h i n k she w i l l have great d i f f i c -  180. on paper,  t u n n e l s and b r i d g e s on the South E a s t e r n Railway v/ere  p a t r o l l e d n i g h t and day.  The War  O f f i c e hummed v/ith s e c r e t s .  In the midst of a l l these s e c r e t p r e p a r a t i o n s , the oress e x e r 1. c i s e d an exemplary  r e s t r a i n t and kept i t s e l f q u i e t .  the p r e c a u t i o n s proved unnecessary  t h i s time.  September they r e l a x e d the s t a t e of war  However,  By the end of  preparedness.  Bethmann-Hollweg, a t l e a s t , d e c i d e d not to harbour r e s e n t ment a g a i n s t E n g l a n d .  On November 19 he wrote to M e t t e r n i c h  hoping t h a t Grey would be s a t i s f i e d w i t h h i s remarks r e g a r d i n g the Mansion House speech i n the R e i c h s t a g debate  of November  He had avoided any c r i t i e i s m of i t because he wished 2. a i n the former good r e l a t i o n s v/ith England.  9.  to maint-  Once more, out-  wardly c o r r e c t r e l a t i o n s e x i s t e d betv/een the two  Governments.  In a s h o r t time, the t i d e of p u b l i c o p i n i o n i n England turned i n f a v o u r of Germany and enabled the Governments to e n t e r upon n e g o t i a t i o n s f o r an u n d e r s t a n d i n g . Among the problems of these years the A g a d i r C r i s i s 3. out as the most important. the danger of war was  stands  P e e l i n g on b o t h s i d e s r a n h i g h and  very r e a l .  The episode should have proved  c o n c l u s i v e l y t o Germany t h a t i n event of a c o n f l i c t v/ith Prance i t l t y i n e x t r i c a t i n g h e r s e l f from i t without l o s i n g c o n s i d e r able p r e s t i g e . " H i c o l s o n and Crowe had f e a r e d that Germany might take France from B r i t a i n and " i f she had succeeded Prance would have been dependent on Germany and England would have been i s o l a t e d and f r i e n d l e s s i n Europe." cf.Hammond Review of B.D.vol.7. i n Manchester Guardian Weekly, March 11, 1. C h u r c h i l l - o p . cit.-p.53,62,63. 1932. 2. G.D.vol.4.p. 17-8.XXIX.255.Bethmann-Hollweg t o Metterni'ch,Nov. 19, 1911. 3. B.D.vol.7.The Agadir C r i s i s , j u s t p u b l i s h e d gives v e r y f u l l y the B r i t i s h p e r t i n the c r i s i s and shows how s t a u n c h l y they supported the French; hov/ v e r y a c t i v e l y and c o n s c i e n t i o u s l y Grey worked f o r peace when war became a r e a l danger; how acute was the t e n s i o n between England and Germany. U n f o r t u n a t e l y the volume came out too l a t e to permit I n t e n s i v e study,  181, she could n o t count on B r i t i s h n e u t r a l i t y .  U n l u c k i l y , the Germ-  an o f f i c i a l s never p r o f i t e d by e x p e r i e n c e . These years d i d l i t t l e on a f r i e n d l y f o o t i n g .  to e s t a b l i s h Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s  The N a v a l Q u e s t i o n dominated  and v;as n o t conducive to a rapprochment.  everything  Other matters the  Governments d i s c u s s e d without undue f r i c t i o n , u n t i l the "Panther' S p r i n g " , but they never co-operated w i t h the genuine c o r d i a l i t y and t r u s t so e s s e n t i a l to true  friendship.  182.  CHAPTER The P r o m 1912 iently  L a s t Y e a r s o f Peace  t o 1914  t o e n a b l e the  Q u e s t i o n and  VI. 1912-1914.  Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s improved  Governments t o c o - o p e r a t e i n the  to negotiate  c o l o n i a l i n t e r e s t s and  and  the  initial  suffic-  Balkan  agreements r e l a t i n g  interminable  to  Bagdad R a i l w a y .  Public  o p i n i o n i n Germany r e m a i n e d d i s t i n c t l y h o s t i l e f o r some t i m e 1. a f t e r the A g a d i r C r i s i s . The K a i s e r f e l t so a n n o y e d t h a t he even r e v e r t e d ested  t o the  t o the Foreign  old idea  o f a c o n t i n e n t a l l e a g u e and  O f f i c e an u n d e r s t a n d i n g  with  sugg2.  France.  When K u h l m a n n w r o t e f r o m L o n d o n t h a t A n g l o - G e r m a n r e l a t i o n s h a d again an  a r r i v e d a t a t u r n i n g - p o i n t ; t h a t Germany c o u l d  arrangement w i t h England r e g a r d i n g  f r o m i n c r e a s i n g the the  Kaiser exploded.  sharply apart ibility ful  fleet  and  efforts  s a i d : "The  f o r German p o l i c y - on  the  one  two  K u l t u r work w i t h growing w e a l t h ,  c r e a t i o n of s e r i o u s r i s k s . " r o u n d ] The  last  on  the  t o the  army,  ways now  lie  hand i s the  other  posssuccess-  a resurrect-  p o l i c y of mutual h o s t i l i t y  The  Kaiser  commented: "The  s e n t e n c e a p p l i e s t o E n g l a n d and  1. B . D . v o l . 6 . p . 6 5 3 . H o . 4 8 3 . G o s c h e n t o G r e y , J a n . 2. B r a n d e n b u r g - op. c i t . - p . 3 8 8 .  an  refrained  o f a n h o n o u r a b l e p e a c e , c o l o n i a l e x p a n s i o n and  i o n of o l d q u a r r e l s , a s t i f f e r  way  c o l o n i e s i f she  confined her  Kuhlmann had  obtain  3,  not  and other  to  1912.  us.  183. Kuhlmann  is a diligent  p u p i l o f M e t t e r n i c h ' s and r e p e a t s a l l  n o n s e n s e w h i c h a h s b e e n s e r v e d up t o me  e v e r s i n c e I began  i n g my f l e e t ; b u t i t h a s n e v e r i m p r e s s e d me; the t r o u b l e  to refute  land, f o r they w i l l  it;  build-  I s h a l l not take  I w a n t no c o l o n i a l p r e s e n t s f r o m E n g -  a l w a y s be made a t o t h e r ' s e x p e n s e and  the seeds of c o n f l i c t s ,  contain  t h e e n d o f w h i c h c a n n o t be  foreseen.  strengthening, which I consider necessary w i l l 1. pushed ahead."  and s h a l l  The  In s p i t e  the  of the K a i s e r ' s  ment c o n t i n u e d t o f e e l i t s way  predelictions i n London.  be  t h e German G o v e r n -  Towards  t h e end o f  December 1911 M e t t e r n i c h a c t i n g u n o f f i c i a l l y i n t i m a t e d h i s desire  to f i n d  Germany.  some way  t o r e l a x the t e n s i o n between England  He m e n t i o n e d t h e P o r t u g e s e c o l o n i e s a n d  and  advisability,  i n v i e w o f t h e f i n a n c i a l p o s i t i o n of. P o r t u g a l , o f r e v i s i n g t h e Anglo-German Agreement o f 1898. 2. Congo.  He a l s o t a l k e d  of the B e l g i a n  Then came t h e H a l d a n e M i s s i o n w i t h i t s  scheme f o r a f a r - r e a c h i n g s e t t l e m e n t o f a l l political,  and c o l o n i a l .  grandiloquent  differences  'Then, t h r o u g h i n a b i l i t y  - naval,  t o agree upon  n a v a l and p o l i t i c a l f o r m u l a e , t h e G o v e r n m e n t s a b a n d o n e d t h e discussions, colonial  they expressed t h e i r w i l l i n g n e s s  t o continue the  negotiation.  However, b e f o r e  t h e y c o u l d a c c o m p l i s h much i n t h a t  i o n , a c h a n g e t o o k p l a c e i n t h e German E m b a s s y  i n London.  directFor  1. G . D . v o l . 4 . p . 5 6 - 7 . X X X I . 8 7 . K u h l m a n n t o B e t h m a n n - H o l l w e g , J a n . 8, 1 9 1 2 . 2. B . D . v o l . 6 . p . 6 5 0 - 1 . H o . 4 8 0 . G r e y t o G o s c h e n , D e c . 2 0 , 1 9 1 1 .  184. some t i m e M e t t e r n i c h ' s K a i s e r and T i r p i t z .  r e p o r t s had proved unpalatable  t o the  M e t t e r n i c h r e a l i s e d h i s p o s i t i o n b u t was  t o o h o n e s t a man a n d t o o g o o d a German t o s a c r i f i c e h i s welfare  f o r h i s own g a i n .  Ho one was s u r p r i s e d when i n May 1 9 1  M e t t e r n i c h was r e c a l l e d f r o m L o n d o n . ure  and p a i d  always f e l t  tribute  German v i e w s a g a i n s t reported  Grey r e g r e t t e d h i s d e p a r t  t o h i m i n t h e House o f Commons.  that, r i g i d  country  He h a d  as M e t t e r n i c h h a d been i n u p h o l d i n g  t h e E n g l i s h , I n h i s r e p o r t s he h a d a l w a y s  f a i r l y everything  Grey had s a i d and had n e v e r  turned  a chance  a n d u n i n t e n t i o n a l s l i p on G r e y ' s p a r t t o a n u n f a i r 1. advantage. M e t t e r n i c h was s u c c e e d e d b y M a r s c h a l l v o n B i e h e r stein,  an e x c e p t i o n a l l y able diplomat  to B r i t a i n .  known t o be u n f r i e n d l y  H o w e v e r , he was n o t d e s t i n e d  to hold  enough t o i n f l u e n c e Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s .  office  Already suffering  I l l - h e a l t h a t t h e t i m e o f h i s a p p o i n t m e n t , he r e m a i n e d few weeks i n E n g l a n d b e f o r e two m o n t h s K u h l m a n n r e m a i n e d  only a  r e t u r n i n g t o Germany t o d i e . F o r i n charge o f the Embassy  until  L i c h n o w s k y a r r i v e d i n November 1 9 1 2 / The new A m b a s s a d o r made h i m s e l f v e r y  popular  b o t h i n p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l  U n f o r t u n a t e l y , he became s o E n g l i s h i n sjrmpathy t h a t he the  confidence  on d e a f e a r s .  He a n d G r e y w o r k e d  w e l l together  p e r s o n a l i t y and e f f o r t s  and each  soon  circles. lost  o f h i s Government and h i s words o f w a r n i n g  t r i b u t e t o the other's 2. peace .  long  fBll paid  i n t h e cause o f  1. G r e y - o p . c i t . - v o l . 1 . p . 2 3 6 - 7 . 2. L i c h n o w s k y - My M i s s i o n t o L o n d o n - p . 4 . He s a y s o f G r e y ' s  135. M a r s c h a l l s i z e d up London and uine  reported  itely  t h a t the  t o h i s Government the  out  question 1.  of the  existence  1912  Secretary  regarding  c h i e f l y by invited  Kuhlmann.  the  so t h a t she  could  of a  gen-  t e n s i o n and  o f armaments was  a  defin-  c o l o n i e s were c a r r i e d  On  April  t h a t of the  17  the  on  dur-  the E n g l i s h C o l o n i a l territorial  questions.  seize t e r r i t o r y i n Africa. t h a t G r e y and  2.  3. P o r t u g e s e c o l o n i e s . Germany  P o r t u g e s e Empire d i s i n t e g r a t e i n the near  Metternich reported a r e v i s i o n of the  the  Kuhlmann t o d i s c u s s  m a j o r q u e s t i o n was  h o p e d t o see  of l i m i t a t i o n  stay i n  way.  Negotiations  The  situation during his b r i e f  d e s i r e i n E n g l a n d f o r a s l a c k e n i n g of the  belief  ing  the  future  E a r l y i n June  Harcotu"t  Anglo-German T r e a t y  were r e a d y t o d r a f t 4. o f 1898. The r e v i s i o n  p o l i c y : " I t was n o t h i s o b j e c t t o I s o l a t e u s , b u t t o t h e b e s t o f h i s power t o make us p a r t n e r s i n t h e e x i s t i n g a s s o c iation. As he h a d s u c c e e d e d i n o v e r c o m i n g A n g l o - F r e n c h and A n g l o - R u s s i a n d i f f e r e n c e s , so he a l s o w i s h e d t o do h i s b e s t t o e l i m i n a t e t h e A n g l o - G e r m a n , and b y a n e t w o r k o f t r e a t i e s , w h i c h w o u l d i n t h e end no d o u b t h a v e l e d t o an a g r e e m e n t a b o u t the t r o u b l e s o m e q u e s t i o n of n a v a l armaments, t o ensure the peace of the w o r l d , a f t e r our p r e v i o u s p o l i c y had l e d t o an a s s o c i a t i o n - t h e E n t e n t e - w h i c h r e p r e s e n t e d a m u t u a l i n s u r a n c e a g a i n s t the r i s k of war." 1. G . D . v o l . 4 . p . 1 3 4 - 4 2 . X X X I . 2 4 1 . M a r s c h a 1 1 t o B e t h m a n n - H o l l w e g , Aug. 5, 1912. 2. G . D . v o l . 4 . p . 1 2 8 . X X X I . 2 7 0 . K u h l m a n n t o German F o r e i g n O f f i c e , A p r i l 17, 1912. 3. c f . L i c h n o w s k y - op, c i t . - p . 1 4 - 1 9 . 4. G . D . v o l . 4 . p . 1 3 3 . X X X 1 . 2 8 1 . M e t t e r n i c h t o B e t h m a n n - H o 1 I w e g , J u n e 4, 1912.  186, submitted  d i d not  keen b a r g a i n i n g On  altogether  they secured  a strip  on  the  central part  interessement  regarding  clause  B r i t i s h desire Germans f e l t ibility  gave up h e r  the  to p u b l i s h this  and  spoils  deluded again.  Grey  stood  was  modified  and  the  The  i n d e f i n i t e l y the  Portugese Colonies.  them i n 1898  Principe.  older Treaties.  that p u b l i c a t i o n would delay  ed E n g l a n d h a d  of d i s - .  Then t r o u b l e a r o s e o v e r the  They  poss-  consider-  d e c l i n e d t o be  firm.  to  received  assurance  pretext f o r occupation  of  sides.  claim  Zambezi, but  i s l a n d s o f St.Thomas and  German w i s h e s .  of t a k i n g over the  of t h e i r  o f A n g o l a and  the  r e l a t i n g t o the  i n accordance w i t h  She  l e f t b a n k of the  i n r e t u r n the  a f t t e r months  a d r a f t s a t i s f a c t o r y to both  t h e w h o l e Germany d i d q u i t e w e l l .  T i m o r and  The  s u i t K i d e r l e n , but  I n J u l y 1913  robbed he  agreed  t o postpone p u b l i c a t i o n u n t i l the w i n t e r p r o v i d e d a paraphrase 1. were g i v e n s h o r t l y . The n e g o t i a t i o n s on t h i s p o i n t d r a g g e d on u n t i l the on  1914.  In A p r i l  Convention unless t h e eve  o f t h e war  Grey t o l d  L i c h n o w s k y he 2.  i t w e r e made p u b l i c .  Colonies likely and  r e o p e n i n g of n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h Agreement.  Finally in July  Bethmann-Hollweg consented to p u b l i c a t i o n .  Jagow i n f o r m e d L i c h n o w s k y t h a t a d e s p a t c h was i s i n g the  c o u l d nnt> s i g n  He  still  considered  t o h a v e a d e t r i m e n t a l e f f e c t on  Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s .  on i t s way  G r e y on t h e  Portugese  p u b l i c a t i o n unwise  German p u b l i c  H o w e v e r , "we  author-  opinion  h a v e g i v e n way  1. G . D . v o l . 4 . p . 2 2 7 . X X X V l l . 5 9 . L i c h n o w s k y t o German O f f i c e , J u l y 7, 1913. 2. G . D . v o l . 4 . p . 2 3 2 . X X V l l . 1 1 5 . A p r i l 1, 1914.  to  Foreign  and  187. JOUT  the  d e s i r e s , b u t y o u w i l l h a v e t o c a r r y a s p e c i a l amount o f 1. responsibility." Another agreement r e a d y f o r f i n a l  t i m e was tinued  t h a t c o n c e r n i n g the Bagdad R a i l w a y .  to n e g o t i a t e w i t h England  1912-13.  s a n c t i o n about 2.  I n M a r c h o f 1912  The  t h e same  Porte  con-  c o n c e r n i n g the R a i l w a y dviring  Germany r e m i n d e d  T u r k e v t h a t she  ex3.  p e c t e d t o be The  k e p t au c o u r a n t of the course of the  Balkan c r i s i s  i n t e r r u p t e d t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n s , b u t as  as a b r e a t h i n g s p a c e In  negotiations.  F e b r u a r y o f 1913  o c c u r r e d the Turks resumed t h e i r  efforts.  instructions 4. t o l e a v e no s t o n e u n t u r n e d t o s e t t l e t h e m a t t e r w i t h B r i t a i n . D i s c t i s s i o n s w e r e c a r r i e d on b y G r e y and P a s h a i n c o n f e r e n c e 5. v/ith L i c h n o w s k y and not to i n i t i a t e It  t o . g i v e him  H a k k i Easha  soon.  Kuhlmann.  came t o L o n d o n v / i t h  I n M a r c h Jagow t o l d  Lichnowsky  the s u b j e c t o f the R a i l w a y b u t i f Grey spoke t o u n d e r s t a n d t h a t Germany was  an agreement w i t h B r i t a i n  r e a d y t o come t o  i f she v/ould s t a t e w h a t she s e t t l e m e n t was  wanted  and w h a t she was  prepared to give.  ain's hands,  c o u l d d e l a y the work b u t n o t p r e v e n t i t s f i n a l  she  The  of  in Brit-  6. completion. E n g l a n d was would,  I n -May  Grey; t o l d : " t h e F r e n c h a n d - . R u s s i a n s  n o t g o i n g t o oppose t h e R a i l w a y i n p r i n c i p l e  I f she  obtained suitable  that and  t e r m s , consent t o the f o u r  per 7. Xm X sX V lp lr .o 1v 3i 7d.eJda gR ou ws s ti oa and L i c hFnroawnsckey , aJ gu rl ey e2 d7 ., 1 9 1 4 . c e1.n tG . iD n. cv ro el a.s4e. p .i 2n3 3c -u 4s . to 2. c f . L i c h n o w s k y - o p . c i t . - p . 1 9 2 0 . Private. 3. G . D . v o l . 4 . p . 2 3 6 . X X X I . 3 3 1 . K i d e r l e n t o M a r s c h a 1 1 , M a r c h 2 5 , 1912. 5 . E a r l e - op. c i t . - o.254. 5.Ibid.p.255.;G.D.vol.4.p.256-55. 6. G . D . v o l . 4 . p . 2 3 9 - 4 0 . X X X V l l . 154. Jagow t o L i c h n o w s k y , M a r c h . 2 5 m l 9 l 5 7. G . D . v o l . 4 . p . 2 4 1 . G e r m a n N o t e X X X V l l . 1 7 0 .  188, He  also  s u g g e s t e d t h a t Germany e n t e r i n t o n e g o t i a t i o n w i t h 1. as w e l l as v / i t h E n g l a n d . So n e g o t i a t i o n s June  15,  1914  c o n t i n u e d backwards  G r e y and  i n g the d e l i m i t a t i o n A s i a t i c .Turkey.  Lichnowsky  and f o r w a r d s u n t i l  initialed  of England's  and  France  on  a Convention r e g a r d -  Germany's i n t e r e s t s  T h i s c o v e r e d a number o f m i n o r  in  questions.  Brit-  a i n w i t h d r e w h e r o p p o s i t i o n t o the c o m p l e t i o n o f the Bagdad R a i l w a y and The  consented to the i n c r e a s e  t e r m i n u s o f t h e R a i l w a y s h o u l d be B a s r a u n l e s s B r i t a i n  t o an e x t e n s i o n .  HeIther  s h o u l d t h e r e be h a r b o u r  on t h e P e r s i a n G u l f u n l e s s she a g r e e d . p e r m i t no d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i n r a t e s a n d and  consented t o the appointment  the Board the p o l i c y and  3.5$.  i n the customs t o  irrigation  s h o u l d be  A t t h e same t i m e t h e y s e t t l e d t h e r i v a l E n g l i s h and  railway,  Both agreed  to  differences  submitted to  of  Compan^r.  observe ports  opinion 2.  arbitration.  other commercial q u e s t i o n s between  German s t e a m s h i p l i n e s  I n the Hear E a s t -  e r n w a t e r s ; and b e t w e e n t h e B a g d a d R a i l w a y Company and Smyrna-Aidin  on  i n the o p e r a t i o n of r a i l w a y s ,  i n T u r k e y - i n - A s i a . Any  a r i s i n g f r o m t h e s e terms  on t h e  to  o f two B r i t i s h D i r e c t o r s  o f t h e B a g d a d R a i l w a y Company. o f t h e open d o o r  construction  Germany u n d e r t o o k traffic  agreed  the  Germany c o n s e n t e d t o r e c o g n i s e t h e  o f t h e A n g l o - P e r s i a n Company i n t h e o i l - f i e l d s 3. C e n t r a l P e r s i a , a n d South Mesopotamia.  of South  rights  and  1. G . D . v o l . 4 . p . 2 4 3 . X X X V l l . l 8 5 . K u h l m a n n t o B e t h m a n n - H o l l w e g , May 2 8 , 1915. A F r a n c o - G e r m a n A g r e e m e n t was r e a c h e d F e b r u a r y 1 5 , 1 9 i 4 . c f . E a r l e - op. c i t . - p . 2 4 7 - 8 . 2. E a r l e - op. c i t . - . p . 2 6 1 - 2 . 3.Ibid.p.59-61.  189c The  German o b j e c t  of the n e g o t i a t i o n s had been t o f r e e  German c o m m e r c i a l a c t i v i t i e s  i n Mesopotamia and e s p e c i a l l y t h e  Bagdad R a i l w a y f r o m E n g l i s h r i v a l r y .  The  t a s k had been  u l t because England had enjoyed f o r c e n t u r i e s a  diffic-  preferential  p o s i t i o n i n Mesopotamia and t h e P e r s i a n G u l f whereas  Germany  i. had p o s s e s s e d l e g a l r i g h t s  there  f o r s c a r c e l y twenty years.  On t h e w h o l e Germany h a d e m e r g e d w i t h c r e d i t , n o r h a d lost.  Britain  On J u l y 2 7 , 1914  the Emperor i s s u e d t o Lichnowsky f o r m a l ' 2. a u t h o r i t y t o s i g n the Agreements. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , t h e war b r o k e o u t a f e w d a y s l a t e r and t h e y e a r s o f p a i n f u l n e g o t i a t i o n 3. came t o n o u g h t . been l a i d  "The  too late  spectre  of the t w e n t i e t h century"  t o have a b e n e f i c i a l e f f e c t  had  on E u r o p e a n r e -  lations . The H a v a l Q u e s t i o n s t i l l longer First his  formed a s u b j e c t f o r o f f i c i a l n e g o t i a t i o n . Lord  o f t h e A d m i r a l t y made t h i n g s move.  energies  ible.  i n t e r e s t e d b o t h s i d e s b u t no  H i s w a t c h w o r d was  essentially defensive.  He d e v o t e d a l l  " P r e p a r e d n e s s " . A t G l a s g o w i n 1912  great  Powers.  a n d f r o m some p o i n t s  purpose of B r i t i s h n a v a l  he  power  Vie h a v e no t h o u g h t s , a n d we have n e v e r  had any t h o u g h t s of a g g r e s s i o n , to other  as  t o c r e a t i n g as s t r o n g and e f f i c i e n t a n a v y as p o s s -  e x p l a i n e d h i s p o i n t o f v i e w : "The is  Churchill  a n d we a t t r i b u t e no s u c h t h o u g h t s  ... The B r i t i s h n a v y i s t o us a n e c e s s i t y ,  o f v i e w , t h e German n a v y i s t o them more  1. G . D . v o l . 4 . p . 2 5 3 - 5 . X X X V l l . 4 4 9 . Z i m m e r m a n n t o V.'edel, June 2. G.D.vol.4.p.255.German Note; a l s o XXXVll.469. 3. E a r l e - op. c i t . - . p . 1 4 2 .  19,1914  190. in  the nature  existence. This  caused an o u t b u r s t  Estimates  Our n a v a l -cower i n v o l v e s  I t i s existence  undeterred.  the  of a luxury.  t o u s : i t i s e x p a n s i o n t o them...."  I n 1913 a n d 1914 he b r o u g h t i n i n c r e a s e d  t o provide  He p r o v i d e d  f o ra l l the l a t e s t  i n c h guns.  g r e a t e r p r o t e c t i o n f o r E n g l a n d he s t r e n g t h e n e d Channel F l e e t s by withdrawing  improve-  De a d o p t e d t h e o i l - b u r n e r s  f o r new s h i p s a n d d e v e l o p e d t h e f i f t e e n  To e n s u r e  t h e Home and  ships from the Mediterranean  t h e n i n 1914 p r o p o s e d t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f new s h i n s 2.  and  to strength-  squadron.  I n s p i t e o f a l l these the  Naval  f o r t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f as many s h i p s as  yards could b u i l d .  the Mediterranean  1  i n Germany b u t C h u r c h i l l w e n t h i s way  ments I n armoured s h i p s and guns.  en  British  p r e c a u t i o n a r y m e a s u r e s he  preserved  i d e a o f a n a g r e e m e n t w i t h Germany f o r a l i m i t a t i o n o f a r m a -  m e n t s . . I n M a r c h 1912 he s p o k e i n P a r l i a m e n t  i n favour  of a  n a v a l h o l i d a y . " I f Germany w i l l b u i l d n o s h i p s i n a n y s i n g l e 3. y e a r , we s h a l l f o l i o ? ; t h e i r e x a m p l e . " Nevertheless,  she w a t c h e d w i t h e a g l e  B e r l i n made no r e s p o n s e eyes the development o f  E n g l i s h n a v a l armaments.  The German N a v a l A t t a c h e  Government f u l l y  of every  true  informed  or m e r e l y rumour.  kept h i s  B r i t i s h movement, w h e t h e r  He d i d n o t f a i l  t o u r g e u p o n Germany t h e  n e c e s s i t y o f c a r r y i n g o u t h e r programme a n d e v e n i n c r e a s i n g t h e tempo o f c o n s t r u c t i o n .  This  s u i t e d t h e K a i s e r and t h e Pah-Germ-  an e l e m e n t . They l o o k e d w i t h a n x i e t y u p o n t h e f o r t h c o m i n g a i d 1. C h u r c h i l l - o p . c i t . - . p . 1 0 1 . 2. F o r p a r t i c u l a r s c f . C h u r c h i l l - o p . c i t . - p a s s i m . 3. N i c o l s o n - op. c i t . - . p . 3 7 5 .  191. f r o m t h e D o m i n i o n s s e e m i n g t o t h i n k t h a t t h e r e w o u l d be no ion  of t h e i r  ships m a t e r i a l i s i n g .  with d i f f i c u l t y armament b i l l s in  I n December B e t h m a n n - H o l l w e g  p e r s u a d e d t h e E m p e r o r t o d r o p t h e i d e a o f new 1. a t present.  I n February  1913 T i r p i t z ,  t h e R e i c h s t a g , s a i d he w o u l d be t h e f i r s t  standing w i t h England. German H a v a l B i l l  He t o o k e a r e , h o w e v e r , t o d e s c r i b e t h e 2.  as n e c e s s a r y  and u n a l t e r a b l e .  M a r c h 1915 he a g a i n e x p r e s s e d  f o r 1913-14  England's w i l l i n g n e s s t o p a r t i c -  ipate w i t h a l l c o u n t r i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y with the great on  the other  year. his  side of the  In reporting this  Horth  an attempt  Stumm t h o u g h t  neighbour  Sea, i n a naval h o l i d a y f o r a  t o h i s Government L i c h n o w s k y v o i c e d  doubt as t o C h u r c h i l l ' s  probably  speaking  t o welcome a n u n d e r -  When C h u r c h i l l i n t r o d u c e d t h e H a v a l E s t i m a t e s in  quest-  seriousness  t o please  i n the matter.  the p a c i f i s t  I t was 3.  party i n B r i t a i n .  Germany w o u l d h a v e t o e x a m i n e v e r y c a r e f u l l y t h e  Question o f a n a v a l h o l i d a y b e f o r e  e n t e r i n g upon i t . They h a d 4.  b e t t e r w a i t a n d see i f B r i t a i n w e r e r e a l l y s e r i o u s . In Attache  June C h u r c h i l l spoke i n f o r m a l l y  t o t h e German  Haval  about the proposed Haval h o l i d a y .  He t h o u g h t  i t would  be  p o s s i b l e t o d i s c o v e r a form acceptable  If  the Cabinet  definite  agreed  he i n t e n d e d  t o England  a n d Germany.  t o come f o r w a r d w i t h a more  p r o p o s a l a g a i n i n . t h e autumn.  He was s u r e  the other  c o u n1.t rG.D.vol.4.p.259-61.XXXIX.145.Memorandum i e s w o u l d come i n i f E n g l a n d a n d Germany h Heo l scheme b y s tB aertthemda n t nlweg, Dec.14, 1912.;p.262-4.XXXIE.9.Bethmann-Hollweg t o Emperor, Dec.18, 1912. 2. G . D . v o l . 4 . p . 2 6 6 . H o t e . 3. G . D . v o l . 4 . p . 2 7 3 - 7 . X X X X X . 2 4 . L i c h n o w s k y t o B e t h m a n n - H o l l w e g , March 27, 1913. 4. G.D.vol.4.n.283-4.XXXIX.35.Memorandum b y Stumm, M a r c h 3 1 , 1 9 1  192, L l u l l e r p r o v e d n o n - c o m m i t t a l and c e r t a i n l y u n e n t h u s i a s t i c . warned h i s Government of  t h a t t h e r e was  d i s h o n e s t y a t the bottom  every single British. Naval Proposal.  bluff  Germany t h a t c o m p e t i t i o n was  vain.  They w e r e  trying  to  Because of t h e i r  f i n a n c i a l d i f f i c u l t i e s o f c o n s t r u c t i o n t h e y were or  He  p r e v e n t t h e German N a v a l Law b e i n g c a r r i e d  trying 1.  out.  own  to delay  Lichnowsky  v e r y s e n s i b l y e n d e a v o u r e d t o t o n e down t h e A t t a c h e s s t a t e m e n t s by p r e s e n t i n g the B r i t i s h  point of view.  i s h n a v a l p o l i c y and C h u r c h i l l ' s a c t i o n s  He d i d n o t w a n t to lead  to bad  Brit-  feeling  a n d s u g g e s t e d a v e r y f r i e n d l y r e f u s a l i f a n y a p p r o a c h e s were made. ly  I f t h e German G o v e r n m e n t  w i s h e d , he w o u l d i n d i c a t e  casual-  t o G r e y t h a t Germany w o u l d p r e f e r  C h u r c h i l l n o t t o come f c r 2. ward a g a i n w i t h t h e i d e a o f a n a v a l h o l i d a y . As a r e s u l t t h e B r i t i s h F o r e i g n O f f i c e n e v e r a p p r o a c h e d t h e German G o v e r n m e n t 3. with a proposal f o r a naval I n D e c e m b e r 1913  holiday.  the P a l l M a l l G a s e t t e welcomed  provement i n Anglo-German  relations  s p e e c h and e x p r e s s e d t h e b e l i e f  announced  that  the im-  i n Bethmann-Hollweg'  "Anglo-German  relations  c o n t i n u e t o improve a c c o r d i n g as t h o s e r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the i s h Navy  took care t o develop B r i t i s h  o n l y t r u e b a s i s f o r f r i e n d s h i p " was  sea-power,"and  sea-power.  would  Brit-  t h a t "the  This the K a i s e r  1. G . D . v o l . 4 . p . 2 8 6 - 9 0 . X X X l X . 5 9 . R e p o r t b y M i l l i e r , June 2 0 , 1913 As a r e s u l t t h e E m p e r o r u r g e d t h e b t i i l d i n g o f f o u r b a t t l e s h i p s , b u t t i r p i t z r e f u s e d , c f . p.290-1. 2. G . D . v o l . 4 . p . 2 9 1 - 2 . X X X I X . 4 6 . L i c h n o w s I c y t o Bethmann-Ho 1 l w e g , J u n e 2 3 , 1 9 1 3 . To t h i s Germany a g r e e d on June 2 9 . c f . p . 2 9 2 . German N o t e . 3. G . D . v o l . 4 . p . 3 0 5 - 6 . G e r m a n N o t e . L i c h n o w s k y - op. c i t . - p 2 1 . s a y s t h a t o f f i c i a l l y Grey d i d n o t s u p p o r t t h e p r o p o s a l and n e v e r spoke of i t t o him, a l t h o u g h C h u r c h i l l f r e q u e n t l y d i d .  193. l a b e l l e d as nonsense, always t o r e c o g n i s e it  i s nothing  "Friendship  the other  on the c o n d i t i o n that one i s  as the stronger  eo i p s o i s absurd;  more n o r l e s s than a p r o t e c t o r a t e J  And i t means  Germany's c a p i t u l a t i o n on the sea, which w i l l not now or ever be 1. subscribed  t o by me.  So they w i l l have t o do without i t . "  The e a r l y months of 1814 witnessed a f e e b l e attempt to r e commence n a v a l d i s c u s s i o n s .  Tirpitz,  on February 4 i n the R e i c h -  s t a g , s t a t e d that the i d e a of a n a v a l h o l i d a y could not be r e a l i s e d b u t p o s i t i v e proposals  had n o t y e t reached Germany.  came they would be examined w i t h g o o d w i l l .  I n r e p l y . Grey author-  i s e d Goschen t o s t a t e that B r i t a i n had not made p o s i t i v e because she had been g i v e n t o understand by p r i v a t e t h a t such proposals  I f they  proposals  intimations  would be unwelcome and would have a bad e f f e c t  on p u b l i c o p i n i o n i n Germany.  He asked e x a c t l y what  Tirpitz  meant and how p r o p o s a l s  f o r a n a v a l h o l i d a y would be r e c e i v e d . 2.  He would make proposals  i f they would be welcome.  Hollweg t o l d  Goschen t h a t Germany would be q u i t e ready t o examine  any o f f i c i a l p r o p o s a l ion  Bethmann-  from the B r i t i s h Government f o r the r e d u c t -  of expenditure on armaments.  He d i d n o t c o n s i d e r  of a n a v a l h o l i d a y r e a l i s a b l e i n p r a c t i c e b u t l e f t  the i d e a  i t entirely  to the B r i t i s h Government whether they chose t o approach Germany 3. on the q u e s t i o n .  H o t h i n g seems t o have been done along  these  l i n e s , so b o t h s i d e s f o l l o w e d t h e i r own i n c l i n a t i o n s . Tirpitz 1. G.D.vol.4.p.314.XXXlX.69.Kuhlmann to Bethmann-Hollweg, Dec. 11, 1913. 2. G.D.vol.4.p.318-9.XXXD:.74.Aide-Memoire by Goschen to B e r l i n , Feb. 6. 1914. 3. G.D.vol.4.p.319-20.XXXIX.77.Chancellor t o Emperor, Feb.8, 1914. p.320-1.XXXIX.78.Emperor to C h a n c e l l o r , Feb. 9. 1914.  194. had  s u f f i c i e n t wisdom to agree w i t h the C h a n c e l l o r that the  Navy must a v o i d a n y t h i n g to d i s t u r b the development 1.  of the  f r i e n d l y E n g l i s h r e l a t i o n s now b e i n g c u l t i v a t e d . In the  June, a t the wish of the B r i t i s h Government and w i t h  consent of the K a i s e r , B r i t i s h warships v i s i t e d  Germany.  The Emperor chose K i e l week, June 23 to 3 0 , f o r the v i s i t . E v e r y t h i n g went o f f w e l l . The men and o f f i c e r s f r a t e r n i s e d amicably and n e i t h e r s i d e d i s p l a y e d undue c u r i o s i t y i n t e c h n i c a l 2. matters.  Three B r i t i s h c r u i s e r s were p e r m i t t e d t o r e t u r n  through the K i e l Canal on the a p p l i c a t i o n of the B r i t i s h A d m i r a l . In  the m i d s t of these f e s t i v i t i e s  came the news of the a s s a s s i n -  a t i o n of the Archduke and h i s w i f e . the  cordial relations  This had l i t t l e  e f f e c t on  or the l e n g t h of the v i s i t .  The q u e s t i o n of how f a r England and Prance were  committed  i n m i l i t a r y matters r a i s e d c o n j e c t u r e s and caused some uneasiness in  German o f f i c i a l  circles.  be confirmed by l i t t l e the  Rumours were c u r r e n t which seemed to  incidents.  Since B r i t a i n had decreased  s t r e n g t h of the M e d i t e r r a n e a n sqtxadron Prance must have  undertaken the p o l i c i n g of t h a t sea.  M i l l l e r r e p o r t e d i n Sept-  ember 1913 t h a t there must be c l o s e r communication Admiralties  between the  of London and P a r i s than between London and any other  c a p i t a l , f o r the N a v a l Attaches Sf Prance were shown more when 3. they v i s i t e d the y a r d s . I n February 1914 he expressed the 1. G.D.vol.4.p.342.German Note. 2. G.D.vol.4.p.342-3.XXXIX.99.Jagow t o Emperor, A p r i l 25, 1914; p.343.XXXlX.100.Treutler t o German F o r e i g n O f f i c e , A p r i l 27, 1914.;B.D.vol.ll.p.6-7.No.6.Rumbold t o Grey, J u l y 2 , 1914.; p.8-10.Enclosure i n No.7.Henderson t o Rumbold, J u l y 3, 1914.; C h u r c h i l l - op. c i t . - p.198. 3. G.D.vol.4.p.297-8.XXXIX.134.Report by M i i l l e r , Sept. 18, 1913.  195. b e l i e f t h a t s e c r e t m i l i t a r y and n a v a l arrangements e x i s t e d b e t 1. ween England  and Prance.  Lichnowsky b e l i e v e d t h a t the  Brit-  i s h navy would p r o t e c t Prance i f she were a t t a c k e d but he d i d not t h i n k there was any w r i t t e n t r e a t y of defence between the 2. two  countries,  ed no  f o r A s q u i t h had  s t a t e d i n 1915  s e c r e t arrangements between England  would o b l i g e England  that there  and another  exist-  Power t h a t 3.  to take p a r t i n a c o n t i n e n t a l war.  As i t turned out there were some grounds f o r the German suspicions. had  The m i l i t a r y and n a v a l c o n v e r s a t i o n s begun i n  continued.  D u r i n g the Agadir  e x t r a c t an assurance A s q u i t h , who  C r i s i s , Prance t r i e d hard  of armed support from Grey but  had heard  1906  about these  failed.  c o n v e r s a t i o n s i n 1906  then f o r g o t t e n a l l about them, was  to  and  reminded a g a i n by Grey and  c o n s i d e r e d them a dangerous encouragement to Prance and a t r a p f o r England.  I n 1912  and d i s c u s s e d .  The  p r o v i d e d a statement  the f a c t s were l a i d b e f o r e the  c o n v e r s a t i o n s were p e r m i t t e d to continue t h a t they were non-committal was  w r i t i n g by e i t h e r s i d e . of November 1912  Cabinet  This was  done and  put  into  the Grey-Cambon  e x p r e s s l y r e c o g n i s e d t h i s f a c t , as w e l l as 4.  promise to c o n s u l t together i n case  of t r o u b l e .  drew R u s s i a i n t o the c i r c l e by persuading  In 1914  Grey to permit  letters the Prance  naval  c o n v e r s a t i o n s between the E n g l i s h and Russian A d m i r a l t i e s . Grey 1. G.D.vol.4.p.324-7.Enclosure, Report by M u l l e r , Feb.19, 1914. 2. G.D.vol.4.p.523-4.XXXIX. 1 5 5 L i c h n e w s ky to Bethmann-Hollweg, Feb.. 19, 1914. 3. G.D.vol.4.p.272-3.XXXIX.126.Lichnowsky to Bethmann-Hollweg, March 25, 1913. 4. Grey - op. c i t . - vol.1.p.92-6.  196. c o u l d not see the value of t h i s but h e s i t a t e d to r i s k R u s s i a by r e f u s a l .  offending  The Cabinet consented, so the Grey-Cambon  l e t t e r s were communicated to R u s s i a , who s u b s c r i b e d to t h e i r 1. t e x t , and the c o n v e r s a t i o n s proceeded. of :these arrangements c o n s i d e r a b l e alarm.  The  Germans l e a r n e d  through t h e i r s e c r e t s e r v i c e and  felt  Rumour exaggerated the i n c i d e n t u n t i l they  b e l i e v e d t h a t an A n g l o - R u s s i a n n a v a l agreement was  pending.  They a c c o r d i n g l y r e q u e s t e d B a l l i n t o go to London to r e c o n n o i t r e and  to warn some of h i s i n f l u e n t i a l f r i e n d s p r i v a t e l y t h a t such  an agreement would r u i n Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s .  B a l l i n discover  ed t h a t the r e p o r t s were f a l s e and t h a t Grey had no 2. of  intention  c o n s e n t i n g t o any H a v a l Conventions. Prom 1912  on, w i t h i n t e r v a l s  of calm, the Balkans occupied  the  a t t e n t i o n of Europe.  I n e v i t a b l y , the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e  the  T r i p l e Entente were drawn i n t o the q u a r r e l s of the u n r u l y  s t a t e s through the opposing i n t e r e s t s In  this c r i s i s ,  of A u s t r i a and R u s s i a .  England and Germany co-operated f o r peace.  e a r n e s t l y d e s i r i n g to p r e s e r v e the peace to  draw n e a r e r to Germany.  him t h a t Grey was  On October 14, 1912  reconciliation.  sincerely tired  Grey  of Europe,took a step Grey's  s e c r e t a r y , S i r W i l l i a m T y r r e l l , d i n e d w i t h Kuhlmann and  h e a r t i l y wished  and  private told  of the l o n g q u a r r e l and most  to extend h i s hand f o r a genuine and permanent He c o n s i d e r e d the time s u i t a b l e f o r g e t t i n g  1. Grey - on. c i t . - v o l . l . p . 2 7 5 - 5 . 2. G.D*.vol.4.p.375-7.XXXIX.640.Jagow to B a l l i n , J u l y 15, 1914; p.377.German Note; p.377-8.XXXIX.643.Ballin to Jagow, J u l y 24, 1914.  197 « into the  confidential political " o l i v e b r a n c h of peace".  Germany h a d o b j e c t was for  r e l a t i o n s h i p and I n the  to l o c a l i s e He  the  o p e n l y t o Europe hand i n hand. ment K u h l m a n n s t r o n g l y a d v i s e d G r e y was  obviously  c o n f i d e n t i a l and  knowledge of the  and  doubtful.  manner.  H o w e v e r , he  perfectly willing that  countries  to seek  could  In reporting this a p r a c t i c a l and  •i.  Neither 2.  matter.  Kuhlmann c o u l d  two  sincere.  personal.  any  This  inform  Grey  were a r r i v e d a t , t h a t n e i t h e r  concerned, simply  what the  overture  meant i s d i f f i c u l t  ushered i n a period  cautious German;/- was  provided:(1) any  (2) t h a t an  of c o - o p e r a t i o n  to say. and  vital 3.  power. At  agree-  agreement  power w o u l d f i g h t a g a i n s t  to serve a t h i r d  had perplexed  c o n f i d e n t i a l , and  e s p e c i a l l y w h e r e i t s own  were n o t  strictly  somewhat  or T y r r e l l t h a t  ment r e a c h e d w e r e I m m e d i a t e l y made p u b l i c ;  Govern-  Goschen  decided to proceed i n a  were a b s o l u t e l y  on f o r e i g n t e r r i t o r v ,  show t h e m s e l v e s  detailed renlv  nor  Kiderlen felt  sole  to e s t a b l i s h -  a p p r o a c h was  Nicolson  and  gain  to h i s  t o go h a n d i n h a n d w i t h E n g l a n d  the d i s c u s s i o n s  Britain  exchange of views f i r s t  Then t h e  Germany  England's  Balkan c o n f l i c t , not  t h o u g h t an  unanimity advisable.  offered  present c r i s i s  i n t e r e s t s w h i c h seemed I d e n t i c a l .  herself.  since  so  the  other  Interests Exactly  least, i t  successful  negotiation.  1. G . D . v o l . 4 . p . 1 1 5 - 7 . X X Z 1 1 1 . 2 2 3 . K u h l m a n n t o C h a n c e l l o r , O c t . 1 5 , 1912. 2. G . D . v o l . 4 . p . 1 1 7 . X X X 1 1 1 . 2 3 2 . K u h l m a n n t o German F o r e i g n O f f i c e , Oct.16, 1912. 3. G . D . v o l . 4 . p . 1 1 7 - 8 . X X X 1 1 1 . 2 3 3 . K i d e r l e n t o K u h l m a n n , O c t . 2 0 , 1912. T I i i s a c c o u n t i s t a k e n p u r e l y f r o m t h e German s o u r c e s . No m e n t i o n o f i t o c c u r s i n t h e c o n t e m p o r a r y E n g l i s h a u t h o r ities .  1  Grey worked hard On  the whole the  and no  f o r peace d u r i n g the w i n t e r  German F o r e i g n  O f f i c e seconded h i s  supplemented h i s p r o p o s a l s .  T r u e t o h i s co^'c-r  assurance  o f armed s u p p o r t  empted t o c o n c i l i a t e ed  O.C( „  to h i s f r i e n d s .  a l l parties.  He  l y responsible f o r i t s success. his  colleagues  personally.  admirable  w h i c h we b u t we  to s u i t  the  w i t h him  conflagration.  Unfortunately their  ently effective  and  time w i t h o u t  either  att-  direct-  probably  large-  on f r i e n d l y perhaps a 2.  "The  terms  little Grey  details  with  sparks:  They s u c c e e d e d i n averting a  s o l u t i o n s were n o t  general perman-  found Europe a g a i n f a c i n g a  the w i l l  as  As  - i n t h e m s e l v e s mere 3.  q u e s t i o n s , thus  J u l y 1914  was  was  on a powder m a g a z i n e . " of the  ro-~s  and  German G o v e r n m e n t .  d e a l t were i n s i g n i f i c a n t  were s i t t i n g  ;he  fortunate i n having  s a i d r e g a r d i n g the whole a f f a i r :  finding a settlement  this  was  w i t h whom he  Lichnowsky co-opsrated  too whole-heartedly afterwards  men  He  over  1.  efforts,  I n s t e a d he  presided  t h e A m b a s s a d o r s ' C o n f e r e n c e i n L o n d o n and  o f 1912-13.  or the m a c h i n e r y to  crisis  promote  peace. The  s p r i n g and  summer o f 1914  had  been marked by  an  u s u a l t r a n q u i l l i t y i n E u r o p e , as w e l l as i n A n g l o - G e r m a n ions.  I t p r o v e d t o be  t h e A r c h d u k e and  the  quiet before  the  stoimi.  On  unrelat-  June  h i s w i f e were a s s a s s i n a t e d a t S a r a j e v o .  28,  Europe  1. c f . L i c h n o w s k y ' s t r i b u t e t o h i m i n "My M i s s i o n t o L o n d o n " p.10-11. 2. T h e y h a d t o r e m i n d h i m a t t i m e s d u r i n g t h e s e y e a r s somewhat s h a r p l y t h a t i t was h i s d u t y t o u p h o l d t h e i r w i s h e s . in his p a m p h l e t "My M i s s i o n t o L o n d o n " he c o m p l a i n s o f h i s t r e a t ment a t t h e " h a n d s o f t h e German F o r e i g n O f f i c e and p u t s i t down t o j e a l o u s y o f h i s s u c c e s s i n L o n d o n . 5 . G r e y - op. c i t . - v o l . 1 . p . 2 5 8 .  TOO,  t h r i l l e d v/ith h o r r o r a t the b r u t a l i t y time sympathised v/ith A u s t r i a passed w i t h o u t a c t i o n . i n apprehension. if  s o v/ould E u r o p e  sky  spoke  o f t h e o u t r a g e and f o r a  i n her desire  for redress.  Rumours s p r e a d a b r o a d ,  Would A u s t r i a succeed  precipitate  i n a v e r t i n g war?  difficulty  waited  another c r i s i s , On  p r i v a t e l y t o Grey o f the a n x i e t y and  found i n B e r l i n and'the  Europe  Days  July 6  and  Lichnow-  p e s s i m i s m he  o f Germany's p o s i t i o n .  had He  hoped t h a t i f t r o u b l e  came E n g l a n d w o u l d do h e r b e s t t o m i t i g a t e 1. feeling i n St.Petersburg. A d a y o r two l a t e r he h o p e d t h a t  E n g l a n d and 2. trouble. on J u l y 2 4 .  Germany w o u l d be a b l e t o k e e p i n t o u c h and Thus t h e y w e n t on u n t i l Then t h e t r o u b l e b e g a n .  most f o r m i d a b l e n o t e a d d r e s s e d by 3. other.  To L i c h n o w s k y he  said  one  avert  the A u s t r i a n note t o S e r b i a Gre;y c o n s i d e r e d i t t h e independent  t h a t he h a d no  state  t o an-  concern w i t h  n o t e u n l e s s i t l e d t o t r o u b l e b e t w e e n A u s t r i a and R u s s i a . r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n t h e s e two  c o u n t r i e s became t h r e a t e n i n g ,  l a n d c o u l d do n o t h i n g u n l e s s Germany p r o p o s e d 4. i n moderating influence  and  tria  p r e s s u r e upon A u s t r i a . his  Eng-  at Vienna. which  i n e v i t a b l y o b l i g e her t o f u l f i l her t r e a t y pledge and s o p r e c i p i t a t e  If  participated  Germany o b v i o u s l y f e a r e d p o s s i b l e R u s s i a n a c t i o n would  the  a w o r l d war. While  Y e t she h e s i t a t e d  G r e y s t r o v e f o r p e a c e and  to Aust o putracked  b r a i n f o r a c c e p t a b l e m e t h o d s o f m e d i a t i o n , Germany m e r e l y  1. B . D . v o l . 1 1 . p . 2 4 . H o . 3 2 . G r e y 2. B . D . v o l . 1 1 . p . 3 3 . H o . 4 1 . G r e y 3. B . D . v o l . 1 1 . p . 7 3 . H o . 9 1 . G r e y 4. B . D . v o l . l l . P . 7 8 . H o . 9 9 . G r e y  £o to to to  Rumbold, Rumbold, Bunsen, Rumbold,  July 6, J u l y 9, July24, July24,  1914. 1914. 1914. 1914.  200. " p a s s e d on"  suggestions  St.Petersburg  i n check.  a n n o y A u s t r i a and came w o r s e and ized,  to Vienna, She  d r i v e her  feared  proposal  therefore  came f r o m A u s t r i a .  were u r g i n g  could  o n l y be  proposed a  Finally and  J u l y 29  Germany a n d  Grey t o l d the  con-  Vienna. Russia  and  France support  to  do.  t h e y w o u l d h a v e t o do  L i c h n o w s k y t h a t he  f r i e n d l y tone  of t h e i r aside  d i d not want  conversations  i n a European  F r a n c e w e r e i n v o l v e d B r i t a i n may  T h a t same e v e n i n g ,  before  news f r o m L i c h n o w s k y , t h e  the  not  so  conflict.  German G o v e r n m e n t r e c e i v e d  Chancellor  sent  aside this  f o r G o s c h e n and He  made said  c o n t i n u i n g h i s e f f o r t s f o r peace b u t m i g h t n o t I n e v e n t o f Germany h a v i n g  to f u l f i l her  him  into  stand  a s t r o n g b i d f o r E n g l i s h n e u t r a l i t y i n e v e n t of war.  successful.  i f the  Grey p o s i t i v e l y r e f u s e d  t h i n k i n g t h a t England would stand  was  Con-  c e r t a i n t y of B r i t i s h a i d .  m i s l e d by  t h a t he  mobil-  Court  G r e y t o d e c l a r e h i s i n t e n t i o n t o g i v e armed This  be-  they promoted d i r e c t  I n t e n d e d t o p r e c i p i t a t e a war  then without  considered  d a l l y i n g w i t h Vienna,  t o them I n e v e n t of war.  On  Russia  Germany t h o u g h t i t c o n s t i t u t e d p r a c t i c a l l y a  W h i l e Germany was  they  As m a t t e r s  on S e r b i a and He  to h o l d  p r o t e s t s might  t o some r a s h a c t .  v e r s a t i o n s between S t . P e t e r s b u r g  If  t h a t her  A u s t r i a d e c l a r e d war  o f A r b i t r a t i o n and  t o be  urged B r i t a i n  G r e y ' s e f f o r t s became more f r a n t i c .  ference.  If  and  be  treaty  1.B.D.vol.11.p.182-3.Ho.286.Grey t o Goschen, J u l y 29, 1914. KautsIcy D o c u m e n t s . p . 3 2 1 . H o . 3 6 8 . L i c h n o w s k y t o German F o r e i g n O f f i c e , J u l y 2 9 , 1914. I f t h i s news h a d b e e n r e c e i v e d e a r l i e r , t h e C h a n c e l l o r w o u l d n e v e r h a v e made t h e n e u t r a l ! t p r o p o s a l , cf.B.D.vol.11.p.194-5.Ho.305.Goschen to Grey, J u l y 30, 1914.  201. obligations ral.  t o A u s t r i a he h o p e d t h a t E n g l a n d w o u l d r e m a i n  He was p r e p a r e d  aside,  t o g i v e B r i t a i n a s s u r a n c e , i f she s t o o d  t h a t Germany v/ould n o t a n n e x F r e n c h  Goschen's a s k i n g i f t h i s he  replied  assurance Holland  territory.  applied also t o the French  t h a t i t was n o t p o s s i b l e there.  colonies,  Germany v/ould a l s o r e s p e c t t h e n e u t r a l i t y o f  B e l g i u m he was n o t s o s u r e , b u t w o u l d p r o m i s e  be  Upon  f o r h i m t o g i v e t h e same  i f t h e o t h e r b e l l i g e r e n t s d i d t h e same.  refrained  neut-  Regarding  that i f Belgium  f r o m t a k i n g s i d e s a g a i n s t Germany h e r i n t e g r i t y  respected after  this, would form  the c o n c l u s i o n of the war.  He h o p e d t h a t  the b a s i s o f an agreement between England and  Germany and p r o m o t e g o o d r e l a t i o n s .  I t was a n u n f o r t u n a t e s t e p ,  t a k e n p r o b a b l y by a s o r e l y p e r p l e x e d G o v e r n m e n t . considered  would  i t an outrage  and an i n s u l t .  made t o u s meant e v e r - l a s t i n g d i s h o n o u r  The E n g l i s h  Grey s a i d  "the proposal 1. i f we a c c e p t e d i t . "  Crowe c o n s i d e r e d t h a t t h e s e a s t o u n d i n g p r o p o s a l s r e f l e c t e d d i s 2". c r e d i t on t h e s t a t e s m a n who made them. B r i t a i n refused unconditionally. we m u s t p r e s e r v e o u r f u l l  "My a n s w e r m u s t b e t h a t  f r e e d o m t o a c t as c i r c u m s t a n c e s may  seem t o us t o r e q u i r e i n a n y d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e p r e s e n t s o u n f a v o u r a b l e a n d r e g r e t t a b l e as t h e C h a n c e l l o r wrote  Grey.  crisis  contemplates,"  The one way t o m a i n t a i n good r e l a t i o n s was f o r  England  a n d Germany t o c o n t i n u e t o w o r k t o g e t h e r t o p r e s e r v e 3. the peace o f Europe. 1. G r e y - o p . c i t . - v o l . 1 . p . 3 1 6 . 2. B . D " . v o l . l l . p . l 8 6 . M i n u t e b y Crowe, J u l y 5 0 , 1 9 1 4 . 3. B . D . v o l . 1 1 . p . 1 9 3 - 4 . N o . 3 0 3 . G r e y t o G o s c h e n , J u l y 3 0 , 1914.; Ka t i t s k y D o c u m e n t s .p. 408.Ho. 4 9 7 . E n g l i s h A m b a s s a d o r t o German Chancellor,  202. On J u l y 31 Grey t o l d Lichnowsky get  t h a t i f Germany would  any r e a s o n a b l e p r o p o s a l put forward which made i t c l e a r  t h a t Germany and A u s t r i a were s t r i v i n g to p r e s e r v e European peace and t h a t Prance and R u s s i a would be unreasonable i f they r e j e c t e d i t , he Paris  (Grey) would support i t a t S t . P e t e r s b u r g and  and even go the l e n g t h of s a y i n g t h a t i f they d i d not  a c c e p t i t England would have n o t h i n g more to do w i t h the sequences.  con-  Otherwise, i f France were i n v o l v e d England would 1.  be drawn i n . The  same day Grey f o r m a l l y asked France and Germanv i f 2. they v/ould r e s p e c t the n e u t r a l i t y of Belgium. France gave 3. prompt r e a s s u r a n c e , b u t Germany hedged the i s s u e , sky asked Grey on August if  1 i f England would promise  Lichnowneutrality  Germany guaranteed the i n t e g r i t y of France and her  Grey, however, f e l t Germany was war now  colonies. 4.  compelled to keep h i s hands f r e e .  d o i n g her utmost  that c o n f l i c t  t o keep England out of the  seemed i n e v i t a b l e .  U n f o r t u n a t e l y , she  had, by r a s h l y g i v i n g the "blank cheque" to A u s t r i a , p l a c e d h e r s e l f i n an extremely p r e c a r i o u s p o s i t i o n . l y want war, b u t t h i s almost i m p o s s i b l e . ing  She d i d not r e a l -  time her clumsy diplomacy had made peace  With R u s s i a m o b i l i s i n g and France m o b i l i s -  and England u n c e r t a i n , she f e l t her v e r y e x i s t e n c e endanger-  ed. E v e r y t h i n g now depended upon-rapid a c t i o n on her p a r t be1. B.D.vol.11.p.215-6.Ho.340.Grey to Goschen, J u l y 31,,1914; Kautsky Documents.p.403-4.Ho.489.Lichnowsky to German F o r e i g n O f f i c e , J u l y 31, 1914; p.407.Ho.496.Memorandum by Jagow, J u l y 31, 1914.. 2. B.D.vol.11.p.218.Ho.348.Grey to B e r t i e , J u l y 31, 1914. 5.B.D,vol.11.p.234.Ho.382.Bertie to Grey, J u l y 31, 1914.; p.254©5.Ho.383.Goschen to Grey, J u l y 31, 1914. 4.B.D.vol.11.p.260-1.Ho.448.Grey to Goschen, Aug. 1, 1914.  203. f o r e h e r enemies were r e a d y . on A u s t r i a r a t h e r t o o l a t e war.  She a t t e m p t e d  i n the day.  t o put the brakes  The o n l y way o u t was  A c c o r d i n g l y she d e c l a r e d w a r on R u s s i a , j u s t a t a moment  when G r e y was h o p i n g  that direct  c o n v e r s a t i o n s between  and  R u s s i a might y e t a v o i d a "world war.  war  w i t h Prance.  Mar w i t h R u s s i a meant  Germany made a b i d f o r F r e n c h n e u t r a l i t y b u t  on t e r m s w h i c h n o s e l f - r e s p e c t i n g n a t i o n c o u l d a c c e p t . her best  t o convince  itiative  i nviolating  neutrality  Austria  B r i t a i n that the French had taken  of Belgium.  She d i d the i n -  the Franco-German f r o n t i e r and a l s o the Then she c o m m i t t e d t h e f i n a l  of p r e s e n t i n g the u l t i m a t u m  t o Belgium  proceeding  the n e u t r a l country.  t o march through  blunder  and upon i t s r e j e c t i o n ,  T h i s a c t i o n gave G r e y a n d t h e C a b i n e t  the necessary  f o r e n t e r i n g t h e war w i t h a u n i t e d n a t i o n b e h i n d  them.  motive  Ho  doubt t h e m o r a l o b l i g a t i o n s t o Prance and the p r o t e c t i o n o f British interests  constituted a sufficient incentive f o r a cert-  a i n s e c t i o n o f t h e Government, and m i g h t have s a t i s f i e d  a narrow  m a j o r i t y i n P a r l i a m e n t , b u t t h e y w o u l d n o t have e n l i s t e d t h e 1. sympathy o f t h e n a t i o n as a w h o l e .  L i t e r a l l y England had  p r e s e r v e d h e r f r e e d o m o f a c t i o n , m o r a l l y she h a d bound t o P r a n c e more c l o s e l y t h a n alliance. emphasising  herself  i f she h a d h a d a w r i t t e n d e f e n s i v e  On A u g u s t 3 G r e y e x p l a i n e d t h e s i t u a t i o n t o t h e House t h e f a c t t h a t t h e y were f r e e t o a c t as t h e y  chose.  l . O n S u n d a y , A u g u s t 1, t h e C o n s e r v a t i v e s d e c i d e d t o s u p p o r t t h e G o v e r n m e n t i n e v e n t o f w a r , a n d on Monday M o r n i n g , A u g u s t 2, sent the f o l l o w i n g note t o ' t h e C a b i n e t a t Downing St.:"Dear M r . A s q u i t h . - L o r d Lansdowne a n d I f e e l i t o u r d u t y t o i n f o r m you t h a t i n our o p i n i o n , as w e l l as t h a t o f a l l t h e c o l l e a g u e s whom we h a v e b e e n a b l e t o c o n s u l t , i t w o u l d be f a t a l t o t h e honour and s e c u r i t y o f t h e U n i t e d Kingdom t o h e s i t a t e i n supp o r t i n g F r a n c e a n d R u s s i a a t t h e p r e s e n t j u n c t u r e , a n d we o f f e r our u n h e s i t a t i n g s u p p o r t t o t h e G o v e r n m e n t i n a n y m e a s u r e s t h e y may c o n s i d e r n e c e s s a r y f o r t h a t o b j e c t . Y o u r s v e r y t r u l y , A . B o n a r  204. He h o u r l y expected  the v i o l a t i o n of Belgium v/hich he b e l i e v e d  v/ould so rouse the i n d i g n a t i o n of the people t h a t p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the war v/ould be u n a v o i d a b l e . had f i n i s h e d  England's  Soon a f t e r  speaking the German ultimatum t o Belgium  and he read i t b e f o r e the House r o s e .  he  arrived,  1.  Even a t the l a s t minute Germany made one more e f f o r t to keep B r i t a i n municated  out of the v/ar.  At noon August  4 Lichnov/sky com-  o f f i c i a l assurance t h a t Germany v/ould not annex B e l -  g i a n t e r r i t o r y and e x p l a i n i n g t h a t she had  to prevent the French  2. advance.  At 2P.M., August  4, Grey t e l e g r a p h e d to Goschen to  ask f o r h i s p a s s p o r t s a t midnight u n l e s s Germany promised 3.  not  to v i o l a t e B e l g i a n n e u t r a l i t y . A f t e r t h a t the Cabinet awaited the hour a t v/hich the u l timatum v/ould e x p i r e .  They had  A l l p r e p a r a t i o n s v/ere completed.  little  doubt  of the outcome.  D u r i n g the week p r e v i o u s a l l  p r e c a u t i o n a r y measures had been taken.  A trial  of the T h i r d F l e e t , planned months b e f o r e , had  mobilisation taken p l a c e .  1. Grey - op. c i t . - vol.2.p.294-309.Appendix D. f o r t e x t of the"Speech. In r e a d i n g the l e t t e r of November 2 2 , 1912 addressed t o Cambon to the House Grey omitted the l a s t sentence: " I f these measures I n v o l v e d a c t i o n , the plans of the g e n e r a l s t a f f s would a t once be taken i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n and the Governments v/ould then decide v/hat e f f e c t should b e . g i v e n to them." Grey says t h a t up to 1923 he was not conscious of h a v i n g omitted i t . The only e x p l a n a t i o n he c o u l d g i v e was t h a t i t was e n t i r e l y u n i n t e n t i o n a l , a q u e s t i o n i n t e r r u p t e d him a t t h a t p o i n t and he may have f o r g o t t e n t h a t 'he had not f i n i s h e d r e a d i n g , or he may have thought the l a s t sentence unimportant. In any case the complete l e t t e r was p u b l i s h e d two days l a t e r i n the O f f i c i a l Book of Documents, c f . Grey - op. c i t . - vol.2.p.16. 2. B.D.vol.11.p.312.Ho.587.Communication by the German Ambassador, Aug.4, 1914.; Kautsky Documents.p.569.Ho.810.Jagow to Lichnow s Icy, Aug. 4, 1914. 3. B.D.vol.11.p.314.Ho.594.Grey to Goschen, Aug.4, 1914.; Kautsky Documents p.582.No.839.English Ambassador to German F o r e i g n O f f i c e , Aug.4, 1914.Aide-Memoirc. Given by Goschen t c Jagow a t 7.P.M.  205. When t h e l i u s t r o - S e r b i a n q u a r r e l a s s u m e d a E u r o p e a n a s p e c t C a b i n e t had  deemed i t w i s e  emergency.  On W e d n e s d a y , J u l y 2 9 ,  proceed At  t o i t s war  t h e War  Office  w o r d o f command. i n g the  t o h o l d the F l e e t r e a d y t h e F l e e t was  s t a t i o n s w i t h t h e u t m o s t s p e e d and  Cabinet M i n i s t e r s sat watch-  the  At  and  The  events  final  of the  breathless  men  who  for their  w h i c h n e i t h e r wanted but b o t h  The  n a t i o n s were t o p a y d e a r l y f o r  the d e s t i n i e s  l e s s n e s s and s w e p t away.  At  war  feared their  come s u d d e n l y .  night generally t e l l i n g  objectives.  destruction.  at  with  upon the  The other i n  Messages poured i n t o the F o r e i g n O f f i c e s  o c c a s i o n a l l y conveying  of Europe t r i e d  despat  antagonism..  confusion.  guided  near-  together  war  c l i m a x o f t h e drama h a d  and  ever  B r i t a i n was  l a s t d a y s o f p e a c e c r o w d e d one  of Europe day ations but  and  staff.  a brief  of n a t i o n s  Those who  of f u r t h e r complicgleam of hope.  laboured  The  unceasingly  d e s i r e d to preserve  the  peace  t o check the machine i n i t s h e a d l o n g c a r e e r last,  t h e y were f o r c e d t o r e a l i s e  their  They m u s t h a v e f e l t  c i t . - p.224.  as  G r e y d i d one  evening  to  help-  w e r e condemned t o w a t c h t h e w o r k o f a l i f e t i m e  1 . C h u r c h i l l - op.  1  final  11.P.M. t h e F o r e i g n O f f i c e  h i s f a m i l y and  come t o p a s s .  The  secrecy.  Therefore,  f o r him,  mutual d i s t r u s t  to  i n r e a d i n e s s f o r the  d i e d t o L i c h n o w s k y t h e f o r m a l d e c l a r a t i o n o f war  had  of  e v e r y t h i n g was  e r the g r e a t c a t a s t r o p h e .  w i t h Germany.  i n case  ordered  passage of the h o u r s t h a t b r o u g h t n e a r e r  passports  the  being  during  206. the  l a s t week o f p e a c e , when he  stood w i t h a f r i e n d  of h i s room i n the F o r e i g n O f f i c e , lamps i n the  s p a c e b e l o w and  all  o v e r E u r o p e ; we 1. time."  l . G r e y - op.  s h a l l not  c i t .-  watching  r e m a r k e d : "The see  the  a t a window  lighting  of  the  lamps a r e g o i n g  out  them l i t a g a i n i n our  vol.2.p.20.  life-  20V  CONCLUSION. The  c r u c i a l y e a r i n A n g l o - G e r m a n r e l a t i o n s was  Then B r i t a i n , as  yet  j u s t emerging from her  f o r m e d no  a l l i a n c e s , ententes,  of i m p r o v i n g her Germany as h e r s e t up nor true  a b a r r i e r b e t w e e n them. any  to t r a d i t i o n ,  to surrender  one  really  set her  to her  i n c h more t h a n n e c e s s a r y .  For  f o r g e t t i n g t h a t t h e r e were o t h e r  f r i e n d s h i p g r e a t l y and welded i t c l o s e r .  said  that her  with  Germany, b u t  impossible. w o u l d t a k e no  obligations.  She  She  l a t e r with Russia.  to  indispensa-  i n Europe.  valued  her  new-  stand  Britain  i n the  way  frequently  o f good  attempts a t n e g o t i a t i o n the  t h a t m i g h t be  considered  by  only  entailed friend-  relation  i t a c t u a l l y made a c l o s e u n d e r s t a n d i n g  I n a l l the  turn-  herself  on h e r  nations  with  German e f f o r t s t o b r e a k t h e E n t e n t e  Entente d i d not  step  a valuation  F r i e n d s h i p w i t h E n g l a n d now  F r a n c e and  her  d i r e need,  allies.  t h a t Germany h a d  bility,  ship with  too h i g h  B r i t a i n had  Britain,  Germany, on  for possible  She  1904  yet  Unable to r e a c h a c o n c l u s i o n  thank.  After  placed  not  unwilling  B r i t a i n ' s i s o l a t i o n and  o l d enemy. P r a n c e .  to  v i o l e n t enmity  p r o v e d h e r s e l f a -hard b a r g a i n e r ,  p r i c e too h i g h .  had  no  had  Desirous  turned  N a v a l r i v a l r y had  T h e r e was  Germany, E n g l a n d c a s t a b o u t h e r ed  or o b l i g a t i o n s .  irreconcilable differences.  side, grossly miscalculated and  isolation",  f r i e n d l e s s p o s i t i o n i n E u r o p e she  most n a t u r a l a l l y .  were t h e r e  "splendid  1901.  the  almost  British French  as  208. p r e j u d i c i a l to t h e i r i n t e r e s t s . came an even more h a r d and t i v e s v/ere a l t r u i s t i c .  As  the years went on t h i s  fast rule.  She  Hot  that B r i t a i n ' s  f e a r e d becoming dependent on t h a t a g g r e s s i v e  Therefore,  she  to her  friends.  Unfortunately,  statesmen l e a r n e d n o t h i n g  by e x p e r i e n c e .  labo\ir under the d e l u s i o n  t h a t the s t r o n g e r  and  mo-  dreaded German hegemony on the  t i n e n t and  clung  be-  power.  German  They continued  the more u n y i e l d i n g they proved the  con-  to  they made Germany  sooner they would con-  v i n c e England of the n e c e s s i t y of d e s e r t i n g the Entente and  of .  throwing h e r s e l f i n t o Germany's arms. The  c r e a t i o n of a s t r o n g f l e e t and  the  attempt to use i t  to demand from England a n e u t r a l i t y agreement r e a l l y made matters worse.  In s p i t e of the warnings of t h e i r  they chose to b e l i e v e t h a t England would not by f o r c e . so; and  They knew t h a t no d e f i n i t e  t h a t Grey had  own  i n c l i n a t i o n s leaned  blinded  the  countries  officials  to any  towards p u b l i c  to  do  Public opinion but  no  their  opinion.  t h a t i n c r e a s e d w i t h the passage of time and made them h e s i t a t e to commit  agreement t h a t was  K a i s e r , H o l s t e i n , and  not  T i r p i t z , and,  Bulow suspected " p e r f i d i o u s A l b i o n " , and l i e f that " A l l things  Entente  u n t i l the e l e v e n t h hour when  t h e i r a c t i o n s to a c e r t a i n e x t e n t ,  Mutual d i s t r u s t  The  t r e a t y o b l i g e d her  too l a t e to r e t r i e v e t h e i r f o l l i e s .  doubt i n f l u e n c e d  support the  determined to keep h i s hands fj?ee, so  they l i v e d i n a f o o l ' s p a r a d i s e i t was  Ambassadors,  come to those who  impossibly  their  one-sided.  to a c e r t a i n extent, subscribed wait".  On  to the the  be-  other  209. side,  Grey,  a l t h o u g h a s t a u n c h u p h o l d e r o f t h e p e a c e and  l y desiroxis of promoting  good r e l a t i o n s w i t h e v e r y c o u n t r y i n -  c l u d i n g Germany, s e c r e t l y q u e s t i o n e d t h e i n t e g r i t y and faith  o f t h e Germans.  a t the F o r e i g n O f f i c e , Eyre  o f t h e "German M e n a c e " .  Among t h e p e r m a n e n t  Crowe was  Every Minute  r e i t e r a t e d h i s warnings. iastic  good  F o r t h a t r e a s o n he w a l k e d w a r i l y when-  e v e r n e g o t i a t i o n s were p r o c e e d i n g . ials  sincere-  F r o m 1910  offic-  steeped i n the i d e a  reflected h i s fears  on he r e c e i v e d t h e  enthus-  support of A r t h u r N i c o l s o n , another f o l l o w e r of h i s  T h e s e two  lived  i n perpetual terror  i n t o the t r a p s e t by f i r m l y and  Germany.  of s e e i n g Grey  lead  They w o u l d have p l e d g e d  o p e n l y t o the E n t e n t e and  armed t o k e e p Germany i n o r d e r ,  England  t h e n h a v e s a t down  \7hether t h e i r  system  and F r a n c e proceed  assured of her  less  German r i d e r  cautiously.  fully  would  i n 1914,  Russia  s u p p o r t might have been tempted The  might  cult.  England  h a v e p r e s e r v e d t h e p e a c e o f E u r o p e i s open t o q u e s t i o n .  to  A u s t r i a n h o r s e r a n away w i t h i t s  n o t t h e R u s s i a n h o r s e h a v e done  same w i t h , i t s E n g l i s h r i d e r ? be  and  Yftiat w o u l d h a v e h a p p e n e d c a n  the only  a matter f o r conjecture. The m i s t a k e  l a y deeper  i n g of the E n t e n t e .  I t l a y i n the i n a b i l i t y  t o a g r e e w h i l e B r i t a i n was standing. their  definite  still  o f t h e two n a t i o n s  i n t h e mood f o r a German  I t l a y i n t h e p s y c h o l o g y o f t h e two n a t i o n s  inability  icies.  t h a n the f o r m a t i o n and s t r e n g t h e n -  to understand  T r y as t h e i r rapprochment.  each  under-  and  o t h e r ' s t e m p e r a m e n t and  pol-  statesmen d i d , they could not achieve a I t i s the i r o n y of f a t e  t h a t , when t h e y  210  e  r e a c h e d a p o i n t where t h e y c o u l d difference an e r a  of c o r d i a l  Once t h e  co-operation,  the  y e a r 1901  the n a t i o n s came and  was  Gradually,  w e n t , e a c h one  They had  •own c r e a t i o n , so i n t r i c a t e  was  too  colleagues,  late  until  a b y s s and  its  The  spectre  at f i r s t  more s e r i o u s their  t h a t no  statesmen of the  came  o f war  almost  to  and  past  first  stalked  unconscious-  conflict.  t h a n the  and  one  was  last.  c l e v e r enough  l e a d t h e way , trusting  day  awoke t o t h e  represent  t o peace  Still pre-  i n the  edge.  their  or and  goodwill  they found themselves  on  d a n g e r o n l y when i t These s i x t e e n y e a r s  a period  f u t u r e depends upon whether the  l e s s o n f r o m the  prelude  old t a c t i c s without  one  t o draw b a c k f r o m the  of Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s unities.  and  H e l p l e s s l y t h e y w e n t on  the b r i n k of the  of  become i n v o l v e d i n a s y s t e m o f  enough t o c a s t i t a s i d e  of t h e i r  C r i s i s o f 1914  of Europe a r r a n g e d themselves f o r  c i p i t a t i n g a war.  freedom.  the  passed the  statesmen hoped t o continue  strong  points  u t t e r darkness.  a b r o a d more f r e e l y .  Crises  outstanding  i n a C o n v e n t i o n t h a t might have been the  c a s t them b a c k i n t o  ly,  settle  of wasted present  r a t h e r more e f f e c t i v e l y  decade of the n i n e t e e n t h  opportlearns  than d i d century.  the  BIBLIOGRAPHY.  - BIBLIOGRAPHY. Documents• 1. G.P.Gooch and H. Temperley, ed. - B r i t i s h Documents O r i g i n s of the War,  on the  1898-1914. - London - H i s . M a j e s t y ' s '  S t a t i o n e r y O f f i c e - 1927 V o l , 1. (1927) The End of B r i t i s h I s o l a t i o n . V o l . 2. (1927) The Japanese A l l i a n c e and the French Entente V o l . 3. (1928) The T e s t i n g of the Entente 1904-6. V o l . 4. (1929) The A n g l o - R u s s i a n Rapprochment 1903-7. Vol,5. (1928) The Hear E a s t , 1905-9. V o l . 6. (1930) The Anglo-German Tension, 1907-12. V o l . 7. (1952) The A g a d i r C r i s i s . Vol.11.  (1926) The Outbreak of War  (ed. J.W.Headlam-Morley)  The e d i t o r s have done t h e i r work t h o r o u g h l y .  The  sel-  e c t i o n of documents i n c l u d e d i s adequate, the notes and t a b l e s of contents c l e a r and h e l p f u l . u n f o r t u n a t e l y came out too l a t e  Very v a l u a b l e . V o l . 7  to be used i n t h i s  study  of A g a d i r . 2. E.T.S.Dugdale, dd. - German D i p l o m a t i c Documents,  1871-  1914. - London - Methuen and Co. L t d . - 1930 - 4 v o l s . V o l . 1 . The Bismarck P e r i o d . V o l . 2 . The n i n e t i e s . V o l . 3 . The Growing Antagonism, 1898-1910. V o l . 4 . The Descent to the Abyss. These documents s e l e c t e d and t r a n s l a t e d from the German c o l l e c t i o n omit many documents t h a t would be u s e f u l , Hecess a r y , but not as adequate as they might be. 3. K.Kautsky - German Documents War  on the Outbreak of the World  - Hew York - Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press - 1924. U s e f u l and d e t a i l e d . Of value f o r the days of J u l y and August 1914.  212. General. 1. E . r T . A n d e r s o n -mThe F i r s t M o r o c c a n C r i s i s Chicago - U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago Press A c a r e f u l piece Very d e t a i l e d .  of research  ful  - 1930.  b a s e d on t h e d o c u m e n t s .  On t h e w h o l e f a i r l y  s l i g h t l y anti-German.  1904-1906. -  i m p a r t i a l , i n places  Some p e n e t r a t i n g  comments.  A'use-  book.  2. H . H . A s q u i t h - The G e n e s i s o f t h e War - L o n d o n - Cass e l l & Co. L t d . - 1 9 2 3 . The v i e w s o f a man who t o o k p a r t i n many o f t h e e v e n t s he n a r r a t e s .  Clears  up one o r two o b s c u r e p o i n t s , b u t on  t h e w h o l e d o e s n o t c o n t r i b u t e much t o t h e s t o r y o f the'se years.  Easy reading.  More d e t a i l e d on t h e l a t e r  years.  3. T h . v o n B e t h m a n n - H o l l w e g - R e f l e c t i o n s on t h e W o r l d War London - T h o r n t o n B u t t e r w o r t h , Bethmann's  L t d . - 1920.  apology f o r himself  chiefly i n shifting  t h e blame  a n d Germany.  on t o t h e s h o u l d e r s  T r i p l e E n t e n t e and E n g l a n d i n p a r t i c u l a r . points  just.  One d o e s n o t w o n d e r  d i s a s t e r under h i s l e a d e r s h i p . utely unsuitable  Consists of the  Some o f h i s  t h a t Germany came t o  He r e v e a l s h i m s e l f  absol-  t o guide the d e s t i n i e s of a great  nation  through any c r i s i s .  Contributes  little  t o our knowledge  of the p e r i o d . 4. J . B . B i s h o p - T h e o d o r e R o o s e v e l t Charles  Scribner's  Vol.1.  a n d H i s Time - Hew Y o r k -  Sons - 1 9 2 0 . - 2 v o l s .  C h a p t e r s 36 a n d 37 g i v e a l o n g l e t t e r b y R o o s e -  13 • v e l t g i v i n g a n a c c o u n t o f t h e e v e n t s l e a d i n g up t o t h e Conference  and  of the Conference  itself.  share i n c o n c i l i a t i n g the r i v a l s . esting  letters  adors .  One  exchanged  w o n d e r s i f he  He  He  quotes  w i t h t h e F r e n c h and  tells  of h i s  several  inter-  German Ambass-  o v e r e s t i m a t e s h i s own  influence.  Entertaining reading. E.Brandenburg  - F r o m B i s m a r c k t o t h e W o r l d War  Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press -  1927.  A v e r y s c h o l a r l y work based sees  the f a u l t s  - London -  on German D o c u m e n t s .  and m i s t a k e s o f German p o l i c y .  H i s comments  show a k e e n m i n d a n d a p r a i s e w o r t h y i m p a r t i a l i t y . capped  a little  Handi-  b y n o t h a v i n g a c c e s s t o t h e B r i t i s h .Docu-  ments, b u t g i v e s s v e r y s t u d i e d and them.  He  j u s t account without  Valuable.  B . v o n B u l o w - I m p e r i a l Germany - L o n d o n - C a s s e l l & Co. L t d , 1914. Imperialistic and h e r p o l i c y . Biased.  He  Great p r i d e  Great f a i t h  i n Germany  i n h e r s t r e n g t h and wisdom,.  p r a c t i c a l l y proves, but only to himself,  Germany g a i n e d b y stood by  i n the extreme.  the A l g e c i r a s  Conference, that her  that allies  her.  B.von Bulow - Memoirs - London - Putnam -  vol.1.-!L§§0i  vol.2.-1951. Leisurely i n style. opinions  Free e x p r e s s i o n of the a u t h o r ' s  on e v e r y t h i n g and e v e r y b o d y .  B i l l o w i s t h e h e r o o f h i s own  story.  Intensely Interesting  patriotic. revelat-  214. ions Hot  of h i s c h a r a c t e r .  Reveals  i m p a r t i a l , r a t h e r s p i t e f u l at times. His  often challenge reading  the  argument.  past  i n the  8. V/.S. C h u r c h i l l . - The  A brilliant the F i r s t peace.  Lord  Great  I n many p l a c e s he  light  of the  'world C r i s i s  S c r i b n e r ' s Sons - 1923. study  i s obviously  present.  - Hew  York -  Charles  vol.1. of n a v a l p r e p a r a t i o n s w r i t t e n by  of the A d m i r a l t y d u r i n g the detail  statements  l a s t years  of the minute p r e p a r a t i o n s  for  of  the  p r o t e c t i o n of B r i t a i n a g a i n s t - a t t a c k .  I n t e r e s t i n g comments  on B r i t i s h a c t i o n s and  Fascinatingly writ-  ten i n a 9.  t h e K a i s e r i n a l l h i s moods  journalistic  G.Lowes D i c k i n s o n Hew  York - Century  on t h e  crises.  style.  - The Co.  Vivid  and  I n t e r n a t i o n a l A n a r c h y 1904-1914 -  1926,  U s e f u l f o r h i s p o i n t of v i e w and neither  side i n h i s c r i t i c i s m  10. E . M . E a r l e - T u r k e y , the way  - Hew An  e x c e l l e n t study  dad  Railway.  opinions.  of the pre-war  Great  York - MacMillan  i n t h e H e a r E a s t and  P o w e r s , and  Co.  of the  -  Spares  diplomacy.  the Bagdad  Rail-  1923. international  the p a r t p l a y e d  complications  i n these by  I l l u m i n a t i n g comments a n d  1 1 . H.von E c k a r d s t e i n - Ten  pictorial.  Bag-  Information.  Court  of S t ,  James'  1895-1905. - London - T h r o n t o n B u t t e r w o r t h  Ltd. -  1921.  A -remarkably German d i p l o m a t . personality.  Y e a r s a t the  useful  the  f a s c i n a t i n g a c c o u n t f r o m t h e pen Delightful  style,  c o l o u r e d by  I n c l i n e d t o the B r i t i s h  of a  the  side i n h i s  author's  sympathies  O 1 q  Appears t h have seen c l e a r l y a n p o l i c y was light  t h e a b y s s t o w a r d w h i c h Germ-  h e a d i n g - o r i s he  reading  o f what happened i n 1914-18?  Hot  the p a s t i n the always  strictly  accurate. 12.  S.B.Fay - The  O r i g i n s o f t h e W o r l d War  M a c r i i l l a n Co.  1928.  2  A c a r e f u l piece  - New  York -  vols. of r e a s e a r c h work, the r e s u l t  much c o n s i d e r a t i o n a n d  wide r e a d i n g .  Very u s e f u l  of  and  exhaustive. 13.  G.P.Gooch - R e c e n t R e v e l a t i o n s  of E u r o p e a n D i p l o m a c y  L o n d o n - Longmans, G r e e n Z- Co.  -  The  chapters  mentary chapters uable by  are 14.  E. and  Germany and  o f 1927,  1928  of these  o f e a c h w o r k and  particularly instructive Grey - Twenty-five S t o u g h t o n - 1925.  t h a t l e d t o the war.  An  and  1929  countries.  2  the  present  a val-  idealist,  Comments on  interesting.  years the  author  Valuable.  1896-1916. - London - Hodder  the Memoirs of the M i n i s t e r i n i n E n g l a n d d u r i n g the  crises  P u b l i s h e s many d e s p a t c h e s and Defends h i s p o l i c y  l e v e l l e d at i t .  Some e v i r i o u s  i n a sense a t r a g i c f i g u r e .  very peace-loving,  Supple-  vols.  some p o i n t s i n d i s p u t e . criticisms  and  Years,  charge of F o r e i g n A f f a i r s  the  E n g l a n d and  the p o i n t of v i e w of the  I m p o r t a n t as b e i n g  up  1930.  d i s c u s s i o n of the works p u b l i s h e d i n r e c e n t  p r o m i n e n t men  value  on  -  very a t t r a c t i v e .  Very  clears  against statements. honest,  Well-written,  216. 15. R . H a l d a n e  - Autobiography  - L o n d o n - E o d d e r .and S t o u g h t o n  1 9P9 Enjoyable played full  an a c t i v e  personal reminiscences part i n p o l i t i c a l  life.  and  comments on t h e German m i n d .  his  colleagues  Throws  and t h e i r methods.  R.Haldane - B e f o r e  t h e War"  t h e War  who  Particularly  on m i l i t a r y p r e p a r a t i o n s and h i s v i s i t s  T h i s b o o k and " B e f o r e 16.  b y a man  t o Germany  some l i g h t  An a d m i r e r  on  of Grey.  are supplementary.  - L o n d o n - C a s s e l l and  Co.Ltd.  1920. Interesting, a man who was  carefully  in political  b i t t e r but i n c l i n e d  1912.  life  t o blame  account of the author's  considered.  Written by  d u r i n g these  Germany.  years.  U s e f u l f o r the  v i s i t t o B e r l i n i n 1906 and i n  Clearly written without  excess  of d e t a i l s .  Gives  i l l u m i n a t i n g comments on h i s c o l l e a g u e s and on t h e ing 17.  German o f f i c i a l s  Hot  whom he  lead-  met.  0..T.Hale - Germany and t h e D i p l o m a t i c R e v o l u t i o n - A S t u d y i n D i p l o m a c y and t h e P r e s s , 1904-6; - P h i l a d e l p h i a U n i v e r s i t y of Pennsylvania A valuable  study  Press  - 1931.  of the i n f l u e n c e  o f the  d u r i n g a c r i t i c a l period i n European r e l a t i o n s . b r i n g s out very  c l e a r l y the dangers of a f r e e  how  i t can c i r c u l a t e  and  make t h e t a s k o f t h e G o v e r n m e n t s h a r d e r .  written. covered  f a l s e news a n d p r o m o t e  Facts w e l l supported. more  years.  press He  press  -  ill-feeling Clearly  One w i s h e s t h e  study  217. 18.  O.Hammann - The Y.'orId P o l i c y o f Germany 1 8 9 0 - 1 9 1 2 . London - George A l l e n & Unwin L t d . - 1927. The h o o k i s n o t so d e t a i l e d as t h a t o f B r a n d e n b u r g , b u t I s good f o r a s u r v e y o f t h e s e y e a r s . on German d o c u m e n t s  1 9 . S.Lee  and p e r s o n a l e x p e r i e n c e i n a d d i t i o n .  - K i n g Edward V I I . - A B i o g r a p h y  M i l l a n & Co. L t d . - 1 9 2 7 . - 2 The  tone.  The r e s u l t  o f much p a i n s -  D e c i d e d l y anti-German i n  S u s p i c i o u s o f e v e r y move on t h e p a r t o f t h e K a i s e r .  An e s s e n t i a l 20.  Interesting.  - L o n d o n - Mac-  vols.  o f f i c i a l biography.  t a k i n g work.  Is based  book.  K.M.Lichnowdky  - My M i s s i o n t o L o n d o n 1912-1914  - London-  C a s s e l l & Co. L t d . - 1 9 1 8 . This i s the s h o r t pamphlet d e a l i n g w i t h Lichnowsky's  two y e a r s i n L o n d o n ,  and b i t t e r  I t i s p r o - E n g l i s h i n tone,  a g a i n s t t h e s t u p i d i t y o f t h e German  who w r e c k e d h i s m i s s i o n a t e v e r y t u r n . statements  on t h e a g r e e m e n t s r e a c h e d  of the E n g l i s h  Officials  Of u s e f o r h i s  a n d on t h e members  Government.  2 1 . E . L u d w i g - K a i s e r W i l h e l m I I . - L o n d o n - G.P.Putnam's S o n s , L t d . - 1927. A fascinating and  vigorous i n s t y l e .  the c h a r a c t e r s .  genius  Vivid  H o t a l t o g e t h e r j u s t t o some o f  R e m a r k a b l e f o r i t s f o r c e and s e n s e o f  the d r a m a t i c , reads and  s t u d y of a complex c h a r a c t e r .  like  a tragedy.  t h a t make t h e men  Written with  of the Court  live.  insight  218. 22.  E.Ludwig - J u l y  '14 - L o n d o n - G.P.Putnam's. Sons - 1 9 2 9 .  Excellent  f o r c o n v e y i n g the atmosphere o f the  days o f t h e J u l y C r i s i s , Vivid,  gets the tension  impressionistic pictures.  Foreign  Affaris live  very w e l l .  The men i n c h a r g e .of  and a c t a g a i n i n t h i s  compelling  story. 23.  L o r d N e w t o n - L o r d Lansdowne - L o n d o n ~ M a c m i l l a n & Co. Ltd.  - 1929. Clears  information, 24.  up s e v e r a l p o i n t s  hut i s rather  H.Nicolson - S i r Arthur  and s u p p l i e s  disappointing.  Nicolson,  extra  Readable.  L o r d Carnock - London-  Ma c m l l l a n 8: Co. L t d . - 1 9 3 0 . A remarkably frank, lomacy i n Europe. supported; opinions  Clever  e n t e r t a i n i n g account of d i p -  and d r a m a t i c .  Statements  i n t e r e s t i n g and c h a l l e n g i n g .  well  Worth  reading. 25.  K.F.Nowak - K a i s e r Co.  and C h a n c e l l o r  - New Y o r k - M a c m i l l a n  - 1930. A b r i l l i a n t l y w r i t t e n piece  author's able The  pen the p e r s o n a l i t i e s o f t h i s  Under the period  live.  p o r t r a i t s o f t h e K a i s e r , H o l s t e i n and B i s m a r c k a r e  excellent. strictly 26.  o f work.  R.Poincare  I t i s favourable  reliable  t o the Kaiser  and n o t  for facts.  - M e m o i r s 1912 - L o n d o n - W.Heinemann L t d .  -  1926. U s e d on H a l d a n e M i s s i o n  regarding  Bertie's  action.  219. 27. A.P.Pribram  - England  and  the I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i c y of the  E u r o p e a n G r e a t Powers, 1871-1914. - F o r d L e c t u r e s a t U n i v e r s i t y of Oxford i n Michaelmas At the C l a r e n d o n Press -  survey of t h i s  Pronounces  ment on t h e v a r i o u s e v e n t s .  -  C o n c i s e and  well-written. - London -  1916.  An e x p a n d e d l e c t u r e d e l i v e r e d b e f o r e t h e H i s t o r i c a l S o c i e t y i n J a n u a r y 1915. ments. 29.  im-  a sane, w e l l - b a l a n c e d judg-  G.l/V.Prothero - German P o l i c y B e f o r e t h e War J.Murray  -  fateful  H o t r o o m f o r much d e t a i l , b u t g i v e s c l e a r ,  p a r t i a l account.  28.  - Oxford  1931.  A very praiseworthy b r i e f period.  Term 1 9 2 9 .  the  Anti-German.  T.Rhodes - The  Hot  very  Hot based  Royal on  docu-  valuable.  R e a l von Kuhlmann - London - H o e l  Douglas  1925. A defence his  statements  30. B . E . s c h m i t t  o f K u h l m a n n and h i s p o l i c i e s . c h a l l e n g e comment.  - England  and  Of no  1916.  A t h o u g h t f u l p i e c e of work, based e v i d e n c e f r o m n e w s p a p e r s and a r t i c l e s , a t the time of the war.  Some s t a t e m e n t s d i s p r o v e d i n t h e l i g h t ions  of post-war  great value.  Germairy 1 7 4 0 - 1 9 1 4 . - P r i n c e t o n  Princeton U n i v e r s i t y Press -  publications  Many o f  on  contemporary  a l s o from Rather  official  anti-German.  of f u l l e r  revelat-  period.  3 1 . P . v o n S c h o e n - The  M e m o i r s o f an A m b a s s a d o r - L o n d o n -  George A l l e n & Unwin, L t d . -  1922.  220. Hot  c o n t r i b u t i n g much new m a t e r i a l on t h e p e r i o d .  his  own o p i n i o n s  on t h e v a r i o u s  crises.  Was I n t i m a t e l y -  c o n n e c t e d w i t h some o f t h e p r e - w a r e v e n t s . excuse h i s country  ion  Inclined to  a s much a s p o s s i b l e , a l t h o u g h  a d m i t h e r g u i l t I n some a c t i o n s , n o t a b l y of Belgian n e u t r a l i t y .  Gives  he d o e s  i n the v i o l a t -  Brief.  W i l h e l m I I . - The K a i s e r ' s M e m o i r s - L o n d o n - H a r p e r & Brothers  P u b l i s h e r s - 1922.  The  Kaiser's  country's  actions.  denial.  Coloured  j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f h i m s e l f and h i s Some o f t h e a l l e g a t i o n s c h a l l e n g e by the w r i t e r ' s p e r s o n a l i t y .  f r o m memory a n d a f t e r t h e e v e n t s . t o be u s e d w i t h g r e a t  care.  Grains  Written  Interesting.  Heeds  of t r u t h are deeply  hidden. H . W . W i l s o n - The War G u i l t - L o n d o n - Sampson, Low, M a r s t o n a n d Co. L t d . - 1 9 2 8 . A w o r k b a s e d on a s t u d y  o f documents and memoirs.  A t t e m p t s t o be i m p a r t i a l b u t h i s c o n c l u s i o n s  are colour-  ed b y h i s a n t i - G e r m a n b i a s a n d h i s p o o r o p i n i o n o f t h e L i b e r a l Government. and  the ingenious  theories. Crisis  U s e f u l because of h i s p o i n t of view  s e l e c t i o n o f m a t e r i a l t o support h i s  V e r y d e t a i l e d on t h e p a r t r e l a t i n g t o t h e  o f 1914.  Rather b r i e f  on p r e v i o u s  events.  221, A r t i c l e s , Reviews, vl.  and E s s a y s ,  J . L . B a s h f o r d - G r e a t B r i t a i n and  Germany - A C o n v e r s a t i o n  w i t h v o n B i l l o w , t h e German C h a n c e l l o r - N i n e t e e n t h C e n t ury - Vol.LVI.No.334.  Dec.  1904.  I n t e r e s t i n g i n t e r v i e w , contemporary desire  evidence.  Shows  on t h e p a r t o f some t o p r o m o t e good r e l a t i o n s  t w e e n E n g l a n d and  Germany.  outstanding points  Gives Billow's o p i n i o n s  of f r i c t i o n .  be-  on  Intended f o r the benefit  o f t h e p u b l i c. 2. C . A . B e a r d - The  Inside  o f Germany's War  in Intellectual History. Publishers  -  t h e new  state  - Essays  Y o r k - H a r p e r and B r o t h e r s  1929,  Gives an o u t l i n e in  - New  Politics  o f t h e d o m e s t i c drama as i t a p p e a r s  German d o c u m e n t s .  of a f f a i r s  d u r i n g the war.  A c o n c i s e d i s c u s s i o n of the  i n t h e German G o v e r n m e n t b o t h b e f o r e  and  He  from  shows t h e c o n f u s i o n t h a t r e s u l t e d  l a c k of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  of o f f i c i a l s ,  and t h e i n f l u e n c e  of  t h e H i g h Command. 3. J . D . B i c k f o r d & E.N.-Johnson - The an A l l i a n c e vol.42.  Contemplated  1890-1901. - P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e Q u a r t e r l y  - March  shrewd failure 4.  -  1927.  An e x c e l l e n t a c c o u n t d r a w n l a r g e l y f r o m Documents.  Anglo-Germ-  Shows i n s i g h t  and p e n e t r a t i n g .  i n t o the problem,  German  comments  L a y s b l a m e on German p o l i c y f o r  of n e g o t i a t i o n s .  J.Cambon - B i l l o w and  t h e War  - Foreign Affairs  - vol.10.  222. Ho.  5.  J' who  - April  1932.  V e r y good a r t i c l e knew h i m  in his  on B i l l o w ' s M e m o i r s b y  official  capacity.  Just  a  man  comments  on B i l l o w ' s p o l i c y . 5.  S . B . F a y - R e v i e w o f B r i t i s h . D o c u m e n t s on the  W o r l d War  1898-1914. V o l . 6 .  Review - Vol.XXXVI. H o . l . Excellent criticism 7.  of  - Oct.  summary o f t h e  Crowe's p o i n t  G.deT. G l a z e b r o o k - The O f f p r i n t f r o m Queen's  End  - American  Origins  of  Historical  1930. main points  of v i e w a t the  and  a good  Foreign  Office  of B r i t i s h I s o l a t i o n -  Quarterly  Concise, u s e f u l a r t i c l e . ion  the  B r i e f summary o f d i r e c t  of B r i t i s h p o l i c y f r o m 1898-1907, based  on  documents  Cle a r l y w r i t t e n . 6.  S . B . F a y - R e v i e w o f "The B.E.Schmitt - Journal March,  C o m i n g o f t h e War:  of Modern H i s t o r y  conclusions.  German F o r e i g n  foreign  H o l s t e i n , the  some o f f r o m the  M y s t e r y Man  Schmitt's book. of  1923-5.  and  i t s e f f e c t on  Germany.  Holstein  Reveals  d e v i o u s underground w o r k i n g s of H o l s t e i n affairs.  the  Historical  i n t e r e s t i n g , comprehensive s u r v e y of  term of o f f i c e w e l l the  Vol.3.Ho.l.  O f f i c e 1890-1906. - Cambridge  - vol.1. An  Criticises  G i v e s some u s e f u l p o i n t s  G.P.Gooch - B a r o n von  Journal  by  1931. A readable review.  8.  -  1914"  very in  225. 9. G.P.Gooch. - B a r o n v o n H o l s t e i n  - S t u d i e s i n Modern  History-  L o n d o n - Longmans G r e e n and Co. - 1 9 3 1 . R e a l l y an e n l a r g e m e n t o f the p r e v i o u s w e l l - w r i t t e n and  article,  interesting.  1 0 . G.P.Gooch - P r i n c e B i l l o w ' s M e m o i r s V o l . 1 3 8 . Ho.780. Dec.  - Contemporary Review  1930.  A r e v i e w o f V o l . 1. o f B i l l o w ' s M e m o i r s . piece  of c r i t i c i s m ,  -  and a good summary o f t h e  1 1 . G.P.Gooch - P r i n c e B i l l o w and t h e K a i s e r Review - Vol.139.Ho.782.  - Feb.  An  able  contents,  - Contemporary  1931.  A r e v i e w of V o l . 2 . of the Memoirs.  Excellent.  1 2 . S . W . H a l p e r i n - R e v i e w o f " S a l i s b u r y und d i e T u r k i s c h e F r a g e i m J a h r e 1895" b y Hugo P r e l l e r ; E n g l a n d , 1897-1909"  " F i i r s t Billow und  by W i l l y B e c k e r : "Die e n g l i s e h e  p o l i t i k v o r dem W e l t k r i e g 1 9 0 4 - 1 9 0 9 "  by F r i t z  uplegger.-  J o u r n a l o f Madern H i s t o r y - v o l . 3 . H o . 1 . - March, G i v e s an i d e a  Flotten  1931.  of the theses of the books. U s e f u l  comments on t h e j u s t i c e  of the points of view taken i n  the books under r e v i e w . 1 5 . J.L.Haramond  - R e v i e w o f B r i t i s h D o c u m e n t s on t h e  o f t h e W o r l d War  Origins  1898-1914 - V o l . 7 . - M a n c h e s t e r G u a r d i a n  Weekly, March 11, 1932. An i l l u m i n a t i n g r e v i e w , w i t h some u s e f u l  quotations  from the volume. 1 4 . D . H a r r i s - B i s m a r c k ' s Advance  t o E n g l a n d , J a n u a r y 1876.  J o u r n a l o f M o d e r n H i s t o r y - v o l . 3 . N o . 3 , - S e p t . 193.1.  -  V a l u a b l e i n f o r m a t i o n on t h e a d v a n c e s marck.  Despatches  and r e p l i e s  tell  f r o m L o r d Odo  their  own  t o England by  R u s s e l l to Lord  luctance  to enter i n to formal binding  1 5 . F . H . H e r r i c k - The British  Politics  Abandonment of and  American H i s t o r i c a l A s s o c i a t i o n . An e n l i g h t e n i n g a r t i c l e  ials,and officials  and  : of  Coast Branch of the -  1950.  on t h e w o r k i n g s  system  - Baron von H o l s t e i n ,  of the  of permanent of t r a i n i n g  offic-  of  York - Harper &.Brothers !  Throws l i g h t  1 7 . R.B.IvIowat  - Vol.XLVI.  on t h i s m y s t e r i o u s c h a r a c t e r .  o f B r i t i s h D o c u m e n t s on t h e 1898-1914. Vol.6. Ho.183. - J u l y  Gives the main t h e s i s  1 8 . R.B.Mowat - R e v i e w  1932.  8  showing  i n office.  o f t h e W o r l d War,  B.S.Schmitt  - 1929  -  i n f l u e n c e d the conduct of F o r e i g n A f f a i r s  - Review  Brief.  Publishers  on h i s c h a r a c t e r and h i s p o l i c i e s ,  hov/ s t r o n g l y he w h i l e he was  the D a r k F o r c e of the  - Essays i n I n t e l l e c t u a l H i s t o r y  A very useful article  Jan.  alliances.  and d i p l o m a t s .  German F o r e i g n O f f i c e  Review  and r e -  'Splendid I s o l a t i o n '  Shows t h e i n f l u e n c e  the appointment  1 6 . IvI.A.Huttman  Hew  point  the F o r e i g n O f f i c e a t the c l o s e  the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y - P a c i f i c  Foreign Office.  Derby  s t o r y from the E n g l i s h  o f v i e w , and p r e s e n t w e l l t h e E n g l i s h a t t i t t i d e  Bis-  o f "The  - English  Origins Historical  1931. of the  volume.  C o m i n g o f t h e War,  - E n g l i s h H i s t o r i c a l Review  1914"  by  - Vol.XI.VII.Ho. 185  225. Short, hut 19o  s t a t s s the main i d e a of the  A . P a r k e r - Bagdad R a i l w a y  Negotiations  Vol.228.No.453. - October Good a r t i c l e .  f e e l i n g d u r i n g the war, motives behind  a v a i l a b l e when t h e  - Q u a r t e r l y Review  1917.  .Clear p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e  Comments show t h e a u t h o r  selfish  hook.  t o be  under the  t h e r e f o r e he  was  20. R . J . S o n t a g - B r i t i s h . F o r e i g n  i n f l u e n c e of  is inclined  German a c t s .  article  Not  Documents.  or l e f t  Opinions  2 1 . H . T e m p e r l e y -"The  Policy,  obscure by  challenge  Points w e l l taken.  1898-1914, V o l . 7 .  10,  1932. Useful quotations  the 2 3 . A.  volume. von  - The  by  - Vol.9.No.2. - Jan.  Not  - 1924.  - Times L i t e r a r y  B.E.S6nmit 1931.  and  Supplement,March  summary o f t h e m a i n i d e a  German N a v y i n t h e W o r l d War  o f much v a l u e .  W r i t t e n when t h e  at i t s height.  of  reviewer.  - Vol.1.p.313-26.  was  Foreign  O r i g i n s o f t h e 17 o r I d  2 vols.  o f t h e war  pol  S c h o l a r l y review.  These E v e n t f u l Y e a r s - London - E n c y c l o p a e d i a Co.Ltd.  1930.  on B r i t i s h ,  the B r i t i s h .  A p r o - B r i t i s h b i a s i n the  Tirpitz  - Sept.  comment.  2 2 . R e v i e w o f B r i t i s h D o c u m e n t s on t h e War,  sources  1898-193.2. -  C o m i n g o f t h e V/ar, 1914"  Review - F o r e i g n A f f a i r s  see  written.  I n t e r e s t i n g i n g i v i n g Sontag's views as r e v e a l e d  to  a l l the  J o u r n a l o f M o d e r n H i s t o r y - V o l ; 2. No.3.  icy  facts.  -  Britanr.ica  f u l l bitternes  Does s e t f o r t h h i s m a i n  226. t h e s i s r e g a r d i n g Germany a n d E n g l a n d end t h e n a v a l ion. 24c  quest-  Not s t u d i e d or I m p a r t i a l .  O.H.V.'edel - A u s t r o - H u n g a r i a n 1914.  D i p l o m a t i c Documents. 1908-  - J o u r n a l o f Modern H i s t o r y - V o l . 3 . H o . l , - M a r c h ,  1931, A u s e f u l review the  article.  Information revealed  Good comments  i n this  on B e r c h t h o l d  . credit f o r pursuing  S k e t c h e s and s u m m a r i z e s p u b l i c a t i o n o f docximents.  and h i s p o l i c y ,  a continuous  policy.  gives him  

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