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UBC Theses and Dissertations

Anglo-German relations, 1898-1914 1932

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AIT GLO - GERMAN RE LA TI0ITS 1898-1914. b y H a r r i e t M u r i e l E m b l i n g D a n i e l s . Thesis submitted f o r the Degree of MASTER OP ARTS i n the Department of HISTORY THE UNIVERSITY OP BRITISH COLUMBIA APRIL, 1932. CONTENTS. CHAPTER ' ^ I . Anglo-German N e g o t i a t i o n s 1898-1901 1. I I . .Anglo-German R e l a t i o n s 1898-1904 . .. 36. I I I . The Morocco C r i s i s 1904—1906 76. IV. N a v a l R i v a l r y 1906-1912 100. V„ H i l l s of D i f f i c u l t y 148« V I . The L a s t Y e a r s of Peace. 1912-1914...... 182. C o n c l u s i o n . . . .207, B i b l i o g r a p h y 211. ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS 1898-1914. CHAPTER I. Anglo-German Negotiations 1898-1901. Recent revelations i n European diplomacy have cast a b l i n d i n g l i g h t upon the hidden places i n the Foreign Offices of the powers of Europe. Some Governments have published un- reservedly the documents that r e v e a l a f a s c i n a t i n g story of the t o r t u o s i t i e s of for e i g n r e l a t i o n s and diplomatic i n t e r - course; others have given to the world only a s e l e c t i o n - albe- i t a s e l e c t i o n made by i m p a r t i a l h i s t o r i a n s , not by ministers t r y i n g to cl e a r themselves i n the eyes of the present generat- i o n . In addition to act u a l diplomatic documents, there are numerous autobiographies, memoirs, and r e c o l l e c t i o n s from the pens of the chief actors i n the decades p r i o r to the cataclysm. Altogether there i s a wealth of material available f o r anyone who wiahes to study the origins of the war and to attempt to apportion the g u i l t . One of the most important phases of the pre-war h i s t o r y of Europe i s the r e l a t i o n s h i p between two of the greatest powers, the kindred nations of England and Germany. At times i t seemed as i f the fate of Europe depended upon these two countries, t h e i r f r i e n d s h i p or t h e i r enmity. T r a d i t i o n and common i n t e r e s t 2. c a l l e d f o r f r i e n d s h i p , f o r u n i t y of a c t i o n ; but an atmosphere of suspicion, of d i s t r u s t , almost of d i s l i k e , arose i n the late nineteenth and e a r l y twentieth centuries. Such an atmosphere grew out of Germany's change of p o l i c y - her expanding commer- c i a l i n t e r e s t s and consequent desire f o r colonies; her appar- ent l y arrogant threats and demands; and l a t e r her determination to become a strong naval power. A l l these brought her into c o n f l i c t with England and, i n spite of the e f f o r t s of states- men on both sides, led to B r i t a i n ' s entering the l i s t s against her when the f i n a l t e s t came. After a study of the documents r e l a t i n g to proposals of a l l i a n c e between GBemany and England, the thought a r i s e s , what would have been the consequences of such an a l l i a n c e , suppos- ing i t had been made. Time and time again the two Governments were on the verge of a defensive a l l i a n c e ; time and time again such negotiations f a i l e d . By the p e r v e r s i t y of f a t e , when- ever Germany proposed an.alliance E n g l i s h ministers became suspicious and wary; whenever England showed h e r s e l f desirous of an agreement Germany became d i s t r u s t f u l and r e l u c t a n t . Yet both Governments professed the greatest desire f o r a s a t i s f a c t - ory understanding and good r e l a t i o n s between the two countries. From the course of events one wonders i n how f a r these extreme- l y suave statements were sincere. Had such an a l l i a n c e been possible would i t have b e n e f i t - ted Europe? The fond b e l i e f of statesmen and, indeed, of pro- minent private men of the time was that such a combination 3. would have kept the peace of Europe f o r at l e a s t h a l f a cent- ury. That i s possible, since i t would manifestly have been too strong a combination f o r the other powers of Europe. Would i t have operated f o r the good of the continent or would i t have tyrannized the lesser nations? E i t h e r a l t e r n a t i v e was possible. Would the c e r t a i n t y of England's support or n e u t r a l i t y have led the Germans to ddopt an even more arrogant tone than ever? So long as they were i n doubt as to England's p o l i c y they were more l i k e l y to move warily . They might delude themselves that Eng- land was more i n need of t h e i r assistance than they of hers. England saw with clea r e r eyes that Germany could not a f f o r d to l e t her pe r i s h , and i n that b e l i e f rested content. She had, i n f a c t , the balance of power between the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e and the Dual A l l i a n c e , despite the Kaiser's determination that the two should league against her. That leads to a more d i f f i c - u l t question - did i t l i e i n her hands to prevent the Balkan s i t u a t i o n of 1914 from developing i n t o a world war? Had she come forv/ard and stated d e f i n i t e l y that she would not remain ne u t r a l but would come.in on the side of the Dual A l l i a n c e , Germany might have curbed A u s t r i a and l o c a l i s e d the conflict,* Thus another c r i s i s would have been passed, but the forces that made such c r i s e s possible would s t i l l have been present. Sooner or l a t e r c o n f l i c t between the two armed camps of Europe was i n e v i t a b l e . The idea of an a l l i a n c e between the German Empire and Great B r i t a i n goes back to the days of Bismarck. After the 4. Franco-Prussian Avar had given him what he desired - a united Empire - Bismarck concentrated his energies on b u i l d i n g this new state i n t o one of the foremost countries of Europe. To t h i s end he evolved a system of a l l i a n c e s to preserve the peace of Europe and, perhaps more important s t i l l , to protect t h i s new power i n time of danger. Germany i s so situated that she runs a r i s k of invasion on a l l f r o n t i e r s - from Russia, France, and Austria-Hungary. Bismarck, then, had to seek the friendship of at l e a s t two of these countries. Before the end of William I's r e i g n , the master mind of the Empire had arranged a defens- ive a l l i a n c e with A u s t r i a and I t a l y f o r protection against France and Russia. At the same time he had lured Russia into a reinsurance treaty to keep her quiet. He was sure of Austria and reasonably sure of I t a l y , but not of Russ^ia. Russia and A u s t r i a had so many c o n f l i c t i n g i n t e r e s t s that an a l l i a n c e f o r a prolonged period with the two was almost impossible. I f Russia joined France, Germany would have to be c a r e f u l . There was one other country to whom Bismarck might turn for p rotection against France and, i f need be, against Russ^da. England seemed f r i e n d l y towards the new Empire, whose inte r e s t s as yet d i d not clash with hers. A u s t r i a and I t a l y would r a i s e no objections to German fri e n d s h i p with England. The drawback lay i n the f r i c t i o n between England.and Russia. An.open a l l i - ance with England might w e l l lead Russia and France i n t o the same path and r e s u l t i n Germany's being threatened on two f r o n t i e r s . On the other hand dare France attack i f she knew 5 . England would help Germany? The s i t u a t i o n Bismarck created i n Europe was complicated i n the extreme. He alone could juggle s u c c e s s f u l l y with f i v e h a l l s and keep three of them i n the a i r at once. Several times during h i s twenty years i n o f f i c e Bismarck approached England with the suggestion f o r a rapprochment or an a l l i a n c e . E a r l y i n 1876 during a conversation with Lord Odo R u s s e l l , the E n g l i s h Embassador to Germany, he suggested a rapprochment between England and.Germany on the Eastern n Question. On January 12, 1876 Munster, German Ambassador to London, reported that Lord Derby r e f e r r i n g to Bismarck's over- tures had said, "Since he had been Foreign Minister, he had received no communication that had given him greater pleasure, and about which he had f e l t greater r e l i e f . He had a down- r i g h t admiration f o r Your Highness and considered a rapproch- ment between England and Germany to be the only r i g h t p o l i c y . " In spite of Lord Derby's approval the matter dropped f o r the time being. Writing to Lady Salisbury on February 11, 1877 Salisbury expressed h i s opinions regarding such proposals, "Bismarck had made new proposals f o r an offensive and defens- 2. ive a l l i a n c e - which have happily not been accepted." Another noteworthy attempt was made i n 1879 a f t e r the Congress of B e r l i n . Eckardstein r e l a t e s that Bismarck broached the question to Beaconsfield at a dinner at the Chancellor's 1. G.D. vol.1.p.144. German Note. 2. C e c i l - L i f e of Salisbury - vol.2.p.127. 6. Palace i n 1878. Beaconsfield was cautious and wished time to 1. bring Parliament and public opinion i n t o a favourable mood. Although no o f f i c i a l note of such conversations i s a v a i l a b l e , i t i s by no means improbable that the two statesmen did dis- cuss the subject. Of the 1879 negotiations there i s o f f i c i a l proof on both sides. Presumably the proposal was made during Munster's v i s i t to Beaconsfield at Hughenden about September 27, 1879. The reports sent by the Ministers to t h e i r respect- ive superiors d i f f e r . Beaconsfield n o t i f i e d the l^ueen that the German Ambassador had proposed a defensive a l l i a n c e of Germany, Austria and England, but he had not encouraged the idea. Munster, on the other hand, t o l d Bismarck that Beaconsfield proposed an a l l i a n c e , when he (Munster) spoke of the somewhat 2. cooler r e l a t i o n s between Germany and Russia. In his despatch- es of October 14 and 17 Munster speaks confidently of Beacons- f i e l d ' s good intentions and desire f o r the a l l i a n c e , and of 3. Salisbury's favourable a t t i t u d e . I f Beaconsfield's account to the Queen expressed his true feelings. t>ne wonders how Munster could have been so sanguine. Beaconsfield may have reported thus to the Queen because he knew.her sympathy f o r Prance; while Munster may have placed a f a l s e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n on the E n g l i s h Minister's words. Whatever the s i t u a t i o n i n Sept- ember and October, the following year found Gladstone i n power 1. Eckardstein - p.134-5. 2. G.D. vol.1.p.145. German Note. 3. G.D.vol. I.p.l49» IV. 11. Munster to Bismarck, Oct. 14,1879 p.150. IV. 12. Same Oct. 17, 1879. 7. and d i f f e r e n t p o l i c i e s i n vogue. As a r e s u l t Bismarck became i r r i g a t e d and abandoned negotiations. In January 1880 Salisbury thought i t advisable to a l l a y Bismarck's suspicions that E n g l i s h ministers d i d not t r u s t him and refused his o f f e r s . Accordingly, he wrote on January 14, 1880 to Lord Odo R u s s e l l , asking him to assure Bismarck of Eng- land's willingness at a l l times to co-operate with Germany. "Of course, we have to pick our steps so as not to seem to err from the s t r a i g h t path i n France's eyes; f o r France i s capable of g i v i n g us a great deal of trouble. But, on the sound rtile that you love those most whom you compete with l e a s t , Germany i s c l e a r l y cut out to be our a l l v . - We may intermediately i n 1. a l l things c u l t i v a t e Bismarck's f r i e n d s h i p without fear." Bismarck's l a s t attempt at a l l i a n c e with England i n 1889 was also doomed to f a i l u r e . On November 22, 1887 the Chancellor had written personally to Salisbury assuring him that the views of the h e i r to the German throne were not a n t i - B r i t i s h , and expressing fears that Pan-Slavism was becoming a menace to the peace of Europe. He also urged B r i t a i n to form an a l l i a n c e with Au s t r i a and I t a l y , Germany's two a l l i e s , to maintain the status 2. quo i n the Near East. Salisbury r e p l i e d i n courteous non- committal manner. The most he offered to the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e 3. was moral support. Nothing daunted, Bismarck i n January 1889 1. C e c i l - op. c i t . - vol.2.p.373. 2. G.D; vol.1.p.345. Bismarck to Salisbury , November 22, 1887, 3. G.D. vol.1.p.355^ Salisbury to Bismarck, November 30, 1887-, 8. instructed Hatzfeldt (now German Ambassador i n London) when i n private conversation to intimate to Salisbury Bismarck's convict- ion that the surest way to keep peace i n Europe was through a defensive a l l i a n c e f o r a l i m i t e d period between Germany and Eng- land against Prance. Such an a l l i a n c e could be secret or have Parliamentary sanction. Should Salisbury f e e l obliged to r e - fuse i t would not a f f e c t the good r e l a t i o n s e x i s t i n g between 1. the two countries. Hatzfeldt, following these i n s t r u c t i o n s , approached Salisbury, who accepted the suggestion but begged leave to postpone the discussion of d e t a i l s . He expressed the desire to regard the proposal as s t r i c t l y c o n f i d e n t i a l - a 2. desire that met with Bismarck's approval. For some time nothing more happened. Then i n March, Herbert Bismarck v i s i t e d London. While there he had a conver- sation with Salisbury i n which the d e s i r a b i l i t y of an Anglo- German a l l i a n c e to promote European peace came up for discuss^ion. Salisbury explained the d i f f i c u l t i e s of entering into a secret a l l i a n c e . In a democratic country a tr e a t y could not be r e a l l y binding unless i t had the approval of public opinion. I f h i s Government entered upon an agreement and a s i t u a t i o n arose where England should come to the assistance of her a l l y , unless public opinion approved, the Government was helpless and would have to stand aside i n response to the demand of the people. Under such conditions, caution i n entering into a l l i a n c e s was 1. G.D. vol.l.p.3 69. IV. 400. Bismarck to Hatzfeldt, Jan.11, 1889. 2. G.D. vol.1.p.372. IV. 403.Hatzfeldt to Bismarck, Jan.16, 1889. 9. e s s e n t i a l . Nevertheless, Salisbury expressed his gratitude for the suggestion and hoped that at a l a t e r date he might be i n a p o s i t i o n to consider i t ; "meanwhile, we leave i t on the table, without saying yes or no; that i s unfortunately a l l I can do 1. at present." Thus ended Bismarck's e f f o r t s to come to terms with the country that claimed as i t s key-word fo r foreign p o l - i c y "splendid i s o l a t i o n " . So f a r the i n i t i a t i v e had come from Germany. This was due to Bismarck's p o l i c y based on the needs of the Empire. As Salisbury had said the two countries had few divergent i n t - e r e s t s . This remained true u n t i l the Wilheminic Era with i t s new p o l i c i e s and i t s c o l o n i a l expansion. The retirement of the Chancellor i n 1890 l e f t the r e i n s i n the hands of men of less gigantic mould, men who could not play as s k i l f u l l y with a l l i a n c e s , men who lacked the reputation of the maker of Germ- any. The Kaiser announced hi s i n t e n t i o n to follow the course l a i d out by Bismarck. His intentions may have been good, the f u l f i l m e n t proved disastrous. C o l o n i a l expansion meant c o n f l i c t with England i n the few remaining parts of the world s t i l l unclaimed. In spite of various disputes" and i r r i t a t i o n s Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s during the n i n e t i e s ' were f a i r l y calm. There were occasions when f e e l i n g ran high on both, sides of the North Sea, but time and the s k i l l of the diplomats prevented open rupture. There l.G.D. vol.1.p.373. lV.404-5.H.Bi§marckto Bismarck, Mar. 22, 1889. 10. existed fewer points of f r i c t i o n between England and Germany than between England and Russia ©r England and Prance. There- fore i t ^ e h o v e d England to keep on terms of fri e n d s h i p with Germany, or so at l e a s t thought the l a t t e r country and a few E n g l i s h statesmen. Toward the end of the century England awoke to f i n d her- s e l f rather unpopular on the continent, just at a time when she was confronted by various thorny problems. Troubles i n A f r i c a and the Par East brought upon her the adverse c r i t i c i s m of the European nations. Some ministers viewed with alarm the s i t u a t i o n i n t o which England's p o l i c y of i s o l a t i o n had brought her. Accordingly, they applied themselves to the task of remedying i t . The s o l u t i o n they chose was an a l l i a n c e with another strong nation. Etassia and Prance were not very prom- i s i n g . To s e t t l e a l l the disputes then e x i s t i n g would demand a greater s a c r i f i c e than England was prepared at that time to make. Au s t r i a and I t a l y could not help her very m a t e r i a l l y . Germany, then, was the only one l e f t . Prom every point of view she seemed most suitable - a strong m i l i t a r y power, open to attack from Prance and Russia and therefore i n need of guarantee against them. Moreover, she had sought a l l i a n c e previously with England. The wooed, then, became the wooer. England approached Germany on the subject of en a l l i a n c e . The men i n charge of foreig n a f f a i r s i n Germany did not rush in t o England's arms. Here was the opportunity they had been awaiting many y e a r s y e t they l e t i t s l i p past. Why? 11. Because they were so sure of themselves and of England's need of Germany. I f they waited a l i t t l e longer England would f i n d h e r s e l f i n a more d i f f i c u l t p o s i t i o n and would have to o f f e r higher terms. Confident that England would never come to terms with Russia and possibly not with Prance, compelled to remain on good terms with Russia, they f e l t they could a f f o r d to wait, to delay, always holding out the prospect of a l l i a n c e i n the fu t u r e . In November 1897 during the Kiao-Chou incident and Russ- ian action, Bulow suggested that Hatzfeldt might very d i s c r e e t - l y enquire i t i t were possible to b r i n g about an improvement i n Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s . Germany desired some token of Eng- land's f r i e n d l i n e s s to b r i n g pressure to bear on Russia. Be- sides i f she had to give up Kiao-Chou she might want"a harbour 1. i n South China i n the British.sphere of influence. S a l i s - bury was not enthusiastic f o r he remembered the Kruger Tele- gram and Zanzibar. He had personally no objections to Germ- any's occupying Kiao-Chou and apparently d i d not want to see a concession to Russia. Hatzfeldt believed i n the p o s s i b i l i t y of England's going over to Russia and Prance. This time he was mistaken. B r i t a i n came forward with an o f f e r of a l l i a n c e . Chamberlain and his group analysed the s i t u a t i o n and declared i n favour of agreement with Germany. On March 29, 1898 a f t e r a private dinner at A l f r e d Rothschild's house Chamberlain opened h i s mind f r e e l y to Hatzfeldt and made l.G.D. vol.3.p.18. XIV. 86.Hohenlohe to Hatzfeldt, Nov. 16,1897. p.17. XIV. 83. Same Nov. 13, 1897. 12. d e f i n i t e proposals. He explained that the p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n c a l l e d f o r a change i n England's t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i c y . Public opinion r e a l i s e d the danger and would support the making of a l l i a n c e s to preserve peace. Negotiations with Prance over West A f r i c a were not progressing s a t i s f a c t o r i l y ; China present- ed d i f f i c u l t i e s . Could Germany and England agree on the great p o l i t i c a l issues? I f Germany helped England now, England would aid. Germany i n case of attack and work with her i n China. I t would p r a c t i c a l l y mean the accession of England to the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e . He stressed the need f o r a d e c i s i o n within the nest 1. few days. Here was the 16ng-looked-for opportunity. How would the German Government react? Biilow r e p l i e d on March 30, 1898 to Hatzfeldt's despatch. He thanked Chamberlain f o r h i s over- tures, hut pointed out various drawbacks fo r Germany. Al l i a n c e with Germany would so strengthen England that her enemies would not dare to attack. I f , l a t e r on, Germany were attack- ed could she be c e r t a i n that England would come to her a s s i s t - ance? He f e l t that the B r i t i s h Government, having made the a l l i a n c e , would not be able to keep i t f o r long since they might go out of power. This Parliamentary system i n England l e f t a back door by which she could escape from f u l f i l l i n g the obligations of t r e a t i e s . In considering t h i s "no German statesman, however great his sympathies f o r England and how- l.G.D. vol.3.p.21. XIV. 196. Hatzfeldt to German Foreign Of f i c e , Mar.29 ,1898. 13. ever sure he might be that the maintenance of England's power i s needed f o r upholding the world balance, would be l i k e l y to assume r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the consequences which an Anglo-German treaty, entered into with an eye to future events, would e n t a i l 1. f o r Germany." A p o l i t e but d e f i n i t e r e f u s a l J Billow consider- ed the r i s k s too great. He and H o l s t e i n d i s t r u s t e d t h i s sudden o f f e r and suspected treachery. England would use Germany to gain her own ends; then i f Germany found h e r s e l f i n trouble thro ugh her a l l i a n c e with England, the l a t t e r would p e r f i d i o u s l y desert her. Russia was to be feared f o r had she not said, "the only danger to peace would arise i f we were forced to the conviction that Germany had come to a d e f i n i t e agreement with 2. England threatening the balance of power." Moreover, public opinion i n Germany would not accept an E n g l i s h agreement. Holste i n possessed the idea that a l l i a n c e should be considered only i n two e v e n t u a l i t i e s (1) i f Russia threatened Germany, 3 (2) i f England showed h e r s e l f less overbearing than at present. In view of t h i s a ttitude there could be l i t t l e doubt as to the fate of Chamberlain's overture. Ignorant of the d i s - t r u s t and suspicion, Chamberlain made further suggestions on A p r i l 1. He abandoned the aggressive attitude towards Russia in.China. In i t s place he substituted the idea of saving the remainder of China and keeping i t open f o r world trade. Germ- 1. G.D. vol.3.p.23-4. XIV. 199. Billow to Hatzfeldt, Mar. 30, 1898. 2. Brandenburg - Prom Bismarck to the World War - p.107. 3.Ibid.p.108. 14. any's reward f o r co-operation would be s p e c i a l p r i v i l e g e s i n 1. Ghina. In an interview with Balfour on A p r i l 5 the E n g l i s h - man had mentioned the conversations. H a t z f e l d t , c a r e f u l l y ex- plained the German reasons f o r reluctance. Balfour understood and remarked that he d i d not know how the B r i t i s h Parliament would react at present. He admitted the great r i s k f o r Germ- any. Prom hi s comment that Mr. Chamberlain sometimes wished to advance too quickly Hatzfeldt deduced that he was not i l l - pleased at Mr. Chamberlain's lack of success. Balfour agreed to the wisdom of removing i l l - f e e l i n g by agreements i n small matters and of preparing public opinion f o r a possible future 2. p o l i t i c a l rapprochment. In vain Hatzfeldt warned B e r l i n that England would not give concessions i f she l o s t hope of co-operation i n world 3. p o l i c y . Bulow, i n the b e l i e f that Prance would not prejudice her Russian agreement to favour England, wished to l e t England t r y to gain a l l i e s i n Europe. When she found that no one want- ed her, and that she was not i n a p o s i t i o n to chose her a l l i e s , 4. Germany would begin discussions afresh. The Kaiser held views s i m i l a r to those of his ministers, but he sounded a timely note of warning i n h i s l e t t e r to .•'the Foreign O f f i c e , A p r i l 10, a f t e r having studied a despatch from Hatzfeldt. 1. G.D. vol.3.p.24. XIV. 203.Hatzfeldt to German Foreign O f f i c e , A p r i l 1, 1898. 2. G.D. vol.3.p.24. XIV. 211.Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, A p r i l 7, 1898. 3. Brandenburg - op. c i t . - p.109-110. 4.Ibid.p.109. 15. The E n g l i s h hope of an a l l i a n c e must be kept up. "A f r i e n d l y England gives us a spare card against Russia, and besides that, there i s a prospect of our r e q u i r i n g c o l o n i a l and commercial 1. t r e a t i e s from England." I f Germany declined the o f f e r , a rapprochment with Prance would not be u n l i k e l y " i n the pres- 2. ent r a b i d mood of the E n g l i s h Cabinet." Hatzfeldt s t i l l continued to work f o r a good understand- ing between the two countries. In conversations with Salisbury he t r i e d to b r i n g about agreements on lesser matters. S a l i s - bury declared himself w i l l i n g , but declined to permit England to do a l l the gi v i n g and Germany a l l the r e c e i v i n g . He avoid- ed making any offers regarding c o l o n i a l matters. Hatzfeldt considered i t h i s task "to work by l e i s u r e l y but f r i e n d l y e f f o r t f o r an a l l i a n c e with Germany and so to act that the 3. way was l e f t open f o r an understanding l a t e r on'.' Under the circumstances that was a l l he could do. On his side Chamber- l a i n continued to hope f o r a l l i a n c e and took evdry opportunity i n h i s speeches to educate public opinion to that end. Negotiations came to a s t a n d s t i l l . Then the Kaiser took matters into his own hands and alarmed his Ministers. He wrote to the Czar of Russia t e l l i n g him i n grossly exagger- ated language of the a l l u r i n g offers made to Germany by England and asking what Russia would o f f e r i f he refused. Not a very t a c t f u l procedure; However, the Czar paid him back i n h i s 1.Brandenburg - op. c i t . - p.108. 2.Ibid.p.108. 3.Ibid.p.110-111. 16. own coin. His r e p l y was cautious, but revealed some astound- ing news. Three months previous England had offered Russia a complete settlement of a l l disputes then existent. He, the Czar, thought t h i s so good that there must be some t r i c k e r y 1. involved. Therefore, he unhesitatingly declined. A f t e r t h i s the German Ministers became more convinced of the necessity of proceeding cautiously with "perfidious Albion"« No doubt, the Czar's report of England's o f f e r to Russia was every b i t as exaggerated as the Kaiser's report to him of the o f f e r to Germany. I t i s , however, quite reasonable to suppose that England may have approached Russia. H o l s t e i n and Bulow agreed on the p o l i c y of a l l i a n c e with neither Russia nor England, but of f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s with both countries. To avoid offending England Hatzfeldt continu- ed academic discussions with. Salisbury and Billow d i d the same 2. with Lascelles i n B e r l i n . The dying embers were fanned to a feeble flame when i n the course of a conversation with the Kaiser, S i r Prank Lascelles mentioned that some i n f l u e n t i a l men wished f o r an a l l i a n c e which should be s t r i c t l y defensive and should take e f f e c t only i f e i t h e r party were attacked by 3. two Powers at the same time. The Kaiser was impressed by the idea and seemed i n c l i n e d to regard i t more s e r i o u s l y than i t was intended. Bulow and Holstein took care that nothing came of i t . 1.Brandenburg - op. c i t . - p.111. 2.Ibid.p.114. 3.B.D. vol.1.p.100.No.122. Lascelles to Balfour. Aug. 23, 1898. 17. Such then was the f i r s t attempt en the part of England to form an a l l i a n c e with Germany. The story i s t o l d almost completely from German sources since the English Foreign. Office contains no despatches or memoranda on the subject. The neg- ot i a t i o n s on t h e i r side must have been car r i e d on p r i v a t e l y . U n t i l the biography of Joseph Chamberlain i s published and the l i f e of Lord Salisbury completed, the story from the Eng l i s h point of view remains a blank. Germany had f a i l e d to seize her opportunity i n 1898. Would fortune favour her again and prove the value of her p o l i c y of watchful waiting? In spite of Salisbury's d i s t r u s t - f u l attitude toward Germany, Chamberlain retained h i s confid- ence and continued to work f o r h i s object. In November 1899 the Kaiser, accompanied by Billow, paid a v i s i t to Windsor. Chamberlain had the p r i v i l e g e of several conversations with both men. He had now the idea of a general understanding between England, Germany, and the United States. Billow and the Kaiser, however, declined to be tempted. They saw no further advantage to Germany and accordingly r e f r a i n e d from committing themselves beyond a desire f o r good r e l a t i o n s . The Kaiser in s t r u c t e d Chamberlain i n how England should tr e a t Germany i f she desired that Country's f r i e n d s h i p . The German was 'touchy' therefore England should handle him c a r e f u l l y and avoid making him impatient. Always i t i s B r i t a i n v/ho must c o n c i l i a t e GermanyJ B r i t a i n i s asking favours, she must pay the p r i c e . B r i t a i n needs Germany, l e t hes? r e a l i s e to the 18. f u l l her dependence. Unfortunately f o r Germany; "The "best-laid schemes o' mice an' men Gang a f t agley." Billow complacently concluded h i s memorandum; "I consider that Germany's future task w i l l be, w h i l s t possessing a strong f l e e t and maintaining good r e l a t i o n s on the side of Russia as w e l l as of England to await the further development of events pat- .1. i e n t l y and c o l l e c t e d l y . " Prom these conversations Chamberlain obtained the convict ion that he had Bulow's authorisation to proclaim to the world the desire of England and Germany f o r an a l l i a n c e . Hence the famous Leicester Speech, November 30, 1899, i n which he said: "There i s something more which I think any far-seeing Eng- l i s h statesman must have long desired, and that i s that we should not remain permanently Isolated on the continent of Europe, and I think that the moment that a s p i r a t i o n was formed i t must have appeared evident to everybody that the natural a l l i a n c e i s between ourselves and the Great German Empire. We have had our differences with Germany, we have had our quarrels and contentions, we have had our misunderstandings. I do not conceal that the people of t h i s country have been i r r i t a t e d , and j u s t l y i r r i t a t e d , by circumstances which we are only too glad to forget; but, at the root of things, there has always been a force which has n e c e s s a r i l y brought us together. What 1«G.D. vol.3.p.108-114. XV. 413. Memorandum by Billow at Windsor, Nov. 24, 1899. 19. then unites nations? Interest and sentiment. What i n t e r e s t have we which i s contrary to the i n t e r e s t of Germany? "I cannot conceive any point which can arise i n the immediate future which would b r i n g ourselves and the Germans i n t o antagonism of i n t e r e s t s . On the contrary, I can see many things which must be a cause of anxiety to the statesmen of Europe, but i n which our i n t e r e s t s are c l e a r l y the same as the in t e r e s t s of Germany and i n which that understanding of which I have spoken i n the case of America might, i f extended to Germany, do more perhaps than any combination of arms i n order to preserve the peace of.the world. " I f the union between England and America i s a powerful fa c t o r i n the cause of peace, a new T r i p l e A l l i a n c e between the Teutonic race and the two branches of the Anglo-Saxon race w i l l be a s t i l l more potent influence i n the future of the world. I have used the word ' a l l i a n c e 1 , but again I desire to make i t clear that to me i t seems to matter l i t t l e whether you have an a l l i a n c e which i s committed to paper, or whether you have an understanding i n the.minds of the statesmen of the respective countries. An understanding i s perhaps better than an a l l i a n c e , which may stereotype arrangements which cannot be regarded as permanent i n view of the changing circumstances from day to day." Of this speech Grey says, " i t was a public i n v i t a t i o n to Germany and a public recommendation of p o l i c y to B r i t a i n and the B r i t i s h Empire. I t made a great and c r i t i c a l moment fraught 20. 1. with the greatest p o s s i b i l i t i e s . " In a l e t t e r to ven Eckard s t e i n dated December 1, 1899 Chamberlain s a i d : "Count Billow, whose acquaintance I was delighted to make, also greatly im- pressed me. He expressed a wish that I might be able at some time to say something as to the mutual i n t e r e s t s which bound the United States to a t r i p l e understanding with Germany, as w e l l as to Great B r i t a i n . Hence my speech yesterday which I 2. hope w i l l be not u n s a t i s f a c t o r y to him." Instead of welcoming the speech Bulow p r a c t i c a l l y repud- i a t e d i t i n a speech i n the Reichstag. I t was done to s a t i s - f y public opinion; but the episode was d i s t i n c t l y unfortunate. Chamberlain considered i t a personal i n s u l t and resented i t greatly. In Billow's Memorandum there i s l i t t l e or nothing s u f f i c i e n t l y encouraging to j u s t i f y Chamberlain's claims. His desire to advance too quickly led him to read i n t o Bulow's 3. p o l i t e words a meaning not intended. The episode did not shake h i s determination to e f f e c t an a l l i a n c e between the two countries, but i t may have sown the f i r s t seeds of d i s t r u s t of Germany i n h i s mind. "Thus once more the e f f o r t s of the B r i t 1. Grey - Twenjjy-five Years - vol.1.p.43. 2. Eckardstein - op. c i t . - p.130. 3. Bulow - Memoirs - vol.1.p.327. "Chamberlain'*s speech at Leicester about B r i t a i n ' s r e l a t i o n s with America and Germ any v/as a gaucherie, I believe unintentional, but s t i l l a gaucherie f o r , i n view of the general world s i t u a t i o n and of public opinion i n Germany such a d e l i c a t e question should f i r s t have been discussed only i n t r a muros, i f i t was intended to achieve the desired r e s u l t . Chamberlain had f a r too much contempt f o r the force of German public opinion." 21. i s h statesmen were wrecked by the determination of Billow and the Emperor to c l i n g to t h e i r p r i n c i p l e of a free hand, and by t h e i r d i s i n c l i n a t i o n to enter i n t o an a l l i a n c e which would prob- ably involve them i n a war with Russia, and consequently with Prance, i n which they, as they f i r m l y believed, would have to 1. shoulder the p r i n c i p a l burden." Germany and*England came to the crossroads i n 1901. Neg- o t i a t i o n s , begun e a r l y i n the year and c a r r i e d on to the end of December, d e f i n i t e l y decided the d i r e c t i o n s i n which the two nations were i n future to t r a v e l . The i n i t i a t i v e f o r t h i s attempt i s assigned by the E n g l i s h to the German's and by the Germans to the E n g l i s h . Relations between the Governments had been t o l e r a b l y good, i n spite of the h o s t i l i t y of the press and public opinion. Germany stood by England when opinion on the continent was adverse during the Boer War. She had d e c l i n - ed to j o i n Russia and Prance i n intervention on beEialf of the Boers. As always there had been points of f r i c t i o n , f e l t per- haps more keenly on the German side, and there were destined to be others during 1901. About the middle of January 1901 Eckardstein v i s i t e d the Devonshires at Chatsworth. In the course of after-dinner con- versations, p a r t i c u l a r l y the one on January 16, the Duke and Chamberlain formulated t h e i r p o s i t i o n d e f i n i t e l y regarding Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s . Hatzfeldt was very s a t i s f i e d and l.Pribram - England and Europe - p»79. 22. reported the substance of Eckardstein's converse tions to the Chancellor and i n more modified form to H o l s t e i n . The despatch to the Chancellor, January 18, stated that England r e a l i s e d she must seek a l l i a n c e . The choice lay between Prance and Russia on the one hand and the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e on the other. In spite of the Russian sympathies of some of the Cabinet, Chamberlain and h i s friends would work f o r agreement with Germ- any. This they expected would come about gradually, and as a sta r t i n g - p o i n t suggested an arrangement regarding Morocco. Salisbury would leave f o r the South i n a short time. When he had gone, Chamberlain and Lansdowne would discuss d e t a i l s . I f they found i t impossible to come to an agreement with Germany they would turn to Russia. With the exception of the Morocco 1 question, the conversation must be regarded as purely academic. Holst e i n r e p l i e d on January 21 to Eckardstein's s p e c i a l l y worded communication. He derided the p o s s i b i l i t y of an Anglo- Russian rapprochment. Germany ran too great a r i s k i n a l l i a n c e with England since such an a l l i a n c e would lead i n e v i t a b l y to war. In view of the danger, the compensation from.England must be correspondingly great. Moreover, he d i s t r u s t e d S a l i s - bury and considered the English.Minister had i l l - t r e a t e d Germany Then the Kaiser came to England just before the death of Queen V i c t o r i a and remained u n t i l a f t e r her f u n e r a l . His v i s i t caused an outburst of f r i e n d l y f e e l i n g i n England and led to l.Eckardstein - op. c i t . - p.185-6. 2.Ibid.p.187. 23. more c o r d i a l r e l a t i o n s at the Court. Prom Eckardstein he heard the story of the recent conversations with Chamberlain. He telegraphed to Billow: "They are coming on i t seems, just 1. where we had expected." T e r r i f i e d l e s t some impetuous act on the part of the Kaiser should s p o i l h i s c a r e f t i l l y l a i d plans Biilow urged the necessity of neither encouraging nor discour- aging the B r i t i s h hopes. "Everything now depends on neither discouraging the E n g l i s h nor l e t t i n g ourselves be captured by them prematurely* Any eagerness would diminish our pros- 2. pects of gain." He f i r m l y believed i n the absurdity of Eng- land's swinging to the side of the Dual A l l i a n c e . Somewhat r e l u c t a n t l y the Kaiser consented and avoided committing Germ- any to any d e f i n i t e agreement, while at the same time encour- aging f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s . On March 9, 1901 H o l s t e i n i n a private telegram to Eck- ardstein s a i d , "In my personal opinion - and that i s a l l i t amounts to at present - Germany miglit consider such a general defensive a l l i a n c e rather than an agreement on a s p e c i a l point, e.g. Morocco - where the r i s k i s the same, but the ad- 3. vantage l e s s . " At the same time he expressly warned Eckard- s t e i n not to suggest such a thing to the B r i t i s h , because the idea must come from them. He was rather a f r a i d t h a t Salisbury would communicate to St. Petersburg any German o f f e r , thus 1.Brandenburg - op. c i t . - p.157 2;ibid.p.l57. 3IG.D. vol.3.p.140. German Note. 24. a f f e c t i n g adversely Russo-German r e l a t i o n s . Once more the old d i s t r u s t and the underground methods of the mystery man of the Wilhelmstrasse were at work to the detriment of h i s country's welfare. He d i d not seem to r e a l i s e that England might grow weary of making advances to a s i n g u l a r l y unresponsive Germany, als o he overestimated the value of Germany to England. "You ask too much fo r your f r i e n d s h i p , " Salisbury had remarked two or three years previous. H o l s t e i n had deeply resented the accusation hut had not taken heed of the warning. Instead he was awaiting the time when England's extremity would enable him to ask more. Actual proposals f o r a l l i a n c e came i n March. In a very secret despatch to S i r Prank L a s c e l l s , B r i t i s h Ambassador i n B e r l i n , on March 19, Lansdowne reported a conversation with Eckardstein i n which the German expressed h i s b e l i e f that h i s Government while averse to an agreement confined to China would consider favourably an understanding of a more durable and extended character - a defensive a l l i a n c e which would operate only i f England or Germany were attacked by two Powers (Prance and Russia). He thought England would be more i n need of help than Germany, but Lansdowne considered the Russian f r o n t i e r rendered Germany just as vulnerable as England and her scattered p o s s e s s i o n s . Lansdowne also stressed the d i f f i c - u l t y of deciding what constituted self-defence. He feared one country being dragged into complications by the other. He concluded h i s despatch by remarking,"Baron Eckardstein was 25. c a r e f u l to assure me that h i s suggestion was not made under i n s t r u c t i o n s , hut I f e e l no doubt that he hag been desired to 1. 2. sound me." In t h i s Lascelies agreed. This credits the German side with the i n i t i a l d e f i n i t e proposal. Eckardstein's account of the same interview, contained i n a despatch to Holst e i n on March 19, d i f f e r s s l i g h t l y . Lans- downe at a dinner asked Eckardstein c o n f i d e n t i a l l y i f there' were hope of Anglo-German ac t i o n i n L o c a l i s i n g possible Russo- Japanese c o n f l i c t . Eckardstein feared not, unless Germany had assurance of support from England. The next afternoon, presumably the conversation reported by Lansdowne, the English Minister said he had been thinking of an Anglo-German defens- ive a l l i a n c e extending over a considerable period. He would not,- however, b r i n g forward such a proposal u n t i l he f e l t reasonably sure that Germany would be disposed to accept. Eckardstein could not speak o f f i c i a l l y but would transmit any 3. suggestions to B e r l i n . In view of Holstein's emphatic instruc t i o n s , Eckardstein could not report that he had made the f i r s t 4. suggestion. He does, however, say i n h i s memoirs that he 1. B.D. vol.2.p.60.No.77. Lansdowne to Lascelle s , Mar.19, 1901. 2. B.D. vol.2.p.61.Ho.78. Lascelles to Lansdowne, Mar.23, 1901. 3«Eckardstein - op. c i t . - p.207-8. 4.cf. Gooch-Studies i n Modern History-p.69. Mr. Gooch i s strongly of the opinion that.Lansdowne's version i s correct. He says:"Lansdowne was not only a man of spotless i n t e g r i t y and wide experience, but he was bound by every obli g a t i o n of honour and precedent to provide the.Cabinet with an acc- urate account of a conversation of such high s i g n i f i c a n c e . Eckandstein's report, on the other hand, was conveyed i n the form Of a private telegram to Holstein, who i n a l e t t e r of March 17- which reached him on March 19, sent a precise injunction:"I expressly f o r b i d you the s l i g h t e s t mention of an a l l i a n c e . The moment, i f i t ever comes, has not yet arrived." 26. gave Lansdowne a strong h i n t that the German Government would consider any E n g l i s h proposals f o r a defensive a l l i a n c e . The main f a c t i s evident,hy the middle of March 1901 the idea was under discussion. In many of the conversations Eck- ards t e i n took Hatzfeldt's place. He seemed to think negotiat- ions were proceeding s a t i s f a c t o r i l y u n t i l the Kaiser and Hol- s t e i n , i r r i t a t e d over the Chinese indemnity question, decided to send Dr. Stuebel to discuss that Problem and reach a speedy conclusion. This act was not calculated to clear the a i r f o r the a l l i a n c e . Eckardstein was angry:"So there we were again. On the one side, an a l l i a n c e trembling i n the balance en which the fate of the world turned and oh the other these twopenny- 1. halfpenny l i t t l e money matters." Probably Eckardstein was a. l i t t l e too optimistic r e - garding the s a t i s f a c t o r y progress of the a l l i a n c e negotiations. Hatzfeldt saw Lansdowne on March 22. Lansdowne said he had prepared a memorandum on the a l l i a n c e question and desired to ask Hatzfeldt's personal opinion on various points. (1) Would the Imperial Government consent to a binding defensive agreement with England?, (2) Would the a l l i a n c e be absolutely defensive or one i n which the casus foederis would aris e only when one of the two parties were attacked by two or more sides? (3) Should the agreement be secret or r a t i f i e d by Parliament? (4) Was Japan to be included? Hatzfeldt r e p l i e d cautiously l.Eckardstein - op. c i t . - p.212. 27. (1) The Imperial Government might he disposed to consider an agreement r e s t i n g on f u l l r e c i p r o c i t y , p a r t i c u l a r l y i f i t meant England's j o i n i n g the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e . In (2) and (3) the second idea would be preferable. (4) Probably the addition of 1. 2. Japan. Billow e n t i r e l y approved of Hatzfeldt's answers. Lansdowne made no mention of thi s conversation. On March 29 he wrote to Lascelles that he had informed Eckardstein of his i n a b i l i t y to continue the conversations en account of S a l i s - bury's i l l n e s s . He stressed the Prime Minister's reluctance to enter i n t o such far-reaching agreements. Altogether he seemed rather cool i n spite of his courteous language. Eck- ardstein agreed to l e t the matter drop i n view of the present s i t u a t i o n . In A p r i l Eckardstein renewed discussions with Lansdowne. Conversations continued i n t e r m i t t e n t l y u n t i l the end of May without material progress. On A p r i l 13 Lansdowne wrote private - l y to Lascelles regarding.Eckardstein's advances. In the course of h i s l e t t e r he expressed h i s private opinion, "I doubt wheth- er much w i l l come of the project. In p r i n c i p l e the idea i s good enough. But when each side comes, i f i t ever does, to formulate i t s terms, we s h a l l break down; and I know Lord S a i l s - 3. bury regards the scheme with, to say the le a s t , suspicion." B e r l i n wished to make England.join the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e and transfer negotiations to Vienna. London fought shy of 1. G.D. vol.3.p.141.XVII.46.Hatzfeldt to German Foreign O f f i c e , March 23, 1901. 2. G.D. vol.3.p.l43.XVll.48.Billow to Hatzfeldt, March .2.4., 1901. 3. B.D. vol.2.p.63.No.81.Lansdowne to Las c e l l e s , A p r i l 13, 1901 28. undertaking obligations toward Austria and I t a l y , and d i d not f e e l sure of Parliamentary consent to such a treaty. Eckard- s t e i n knew thi s and yet f e l t sure of success. Lansdowne was expected to consent i n p r i n c i p l e to joi n i n g the T r i p l e a l l i a n c e before he was allowed to see the terms and discuss them. Ber- l i n p o s i t i v e l y refused to allow Hatzfeldt or Eckardstein to give written memoranda as a beginning f o r discussion, u n t i l London committed h e r s e l f i n w r i t i n g . The r e s u l t was deadlock. The attitude of E n g l i s h statesmen i s expressed i n various memoranda. On May 27 Mr. T.H. Sanderson went so f a r as to outline a convention. He pointed out the d i f f i c u l t i e s of decid ing exactly what constitutes a defensive war. I f either side were allowed to judge f o r i t s e l f at the time of c r i s i s i t might be tempted to desert i t s a l l y . Naturally, he thought Germany more l i k e l y to desert England, than.England to desert Germany. Salisbury, i n a memorandum of May 29, betrayed h i s d i s t r u s t of Germany. Again he brought up the excuse that i t does not l i e within the power of a democratic country to pledge i t s e l f to a s s i s t another country i n war. I f England joined the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e she would be undertaking too great a respon s i b i l t t y and r e c e i v i n g . l i t t l e compensation. He s t i l l preserved hi s b e l i e f i n " i s o l a t i o n " . " I t would hardly be wise to incur novel and most onerous obligations i n order to guard against a danger i n whose existence we have.no h i s t o r i c a l reason f o r l.B.D. vol.2.p.66.No.85.Memorandum by T.H.Sanderson, May 27, 1901. ' 29. 1. "believing." He feared public opinion i n Germany and i t s i n - 2. fluence on the actions of the German Government. O f f i c i a l c i r c l e s , i n c l u d i n g King Edward, were not p a r t i c u l a r l y pleased when the Kaiser r e f e r r e d to some of the En g l i s h ministers as "unmitigated noodles" because they l i s t e n e d to Russia and f e a r - ed the Kaiser may have a secret agreement with that country. I t was treated as a joke i n B r i t a i n , but i t d i d not improve r e l a t i o n s • As f a r as the Germans were concerned they wanted a l l or nothing. England must j o i n the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e , since Germany f e l t the r i s k of a separate a l l i a n c e too great. The agreement must have the sanction of Parliament before i t could possess any value. U n t i l England transferred negotiations to Vienna and obtained Austrian consent, they would do nothing. There was no hurry as Germany's r e l a t i o n s with both England and Russia were f r i e n d l y . - S t i l l the same l e i s u r e l y procedure u n t i l England found h e r s e l f forced by circumstances to bow before Germany's wishes. In a conversation between the Kaiser and King Edward and S i r Frank Lascelles at Homburg i n August the Kaiser expressed disappointment that an a l l i a n c e had not been concluded, since i t would have placed the r e l a t i o n s bet- 3. ween the two countries on a much more s a t i s f a c t o r y f o o t i n g . In 1898 he had said no formal a l l i a n c e was necessary because l.B.D. vol.2.t».68.Ho.86.Memorandum by Salisbury, May 29, 1901. 2.Ibid. 3.B.D. vol.2.p.73.No.90.Lascelles to Lansdowne, Aug«25, 1901. 3d. i f a c r i s i s arose an agreement could be reached within twenty- 1. four hours. Hatzfeldt desired an a l l i a n c e and wished to give i n to some of England's wished. B e r l i n f e l t her repres- entative was going too f a r and was probably not sorry to get him away from England i n June. England returned to the question i n November and Decem- ber 1901. A memorandum of November 9 by Mr. Bertie admits the a d v i s a b i l i t y of an agreement with a powerful and sure a l l y ; but doubts the s i n c e r i t y of Germany. I f England stood i n danger of destruction by Russ^ia, Germany, to ensure her own safety, would have to come to England's assistance. The price would be high, but probably no higher than the r e s u l t s of a 2. formal a l l i a n c e . Lansdowne's memorandum of November 11, disagrees with Salisbury's a t t i t u d e , sees various d i f f i c u l t i e s i n a l l i a n c e , and wishes to speak fran k l y to the German Ambass- ador l e s t B e r l i n accuse them of not knowing t h e i r own mind and and of breaking o f f negotiations i n a discourteous and unfriend- l y manner. He sees the following d i f f i c u l t i e s ; (1) OOf d e f i n - ing a s a t i s f a c t o r y casus foederis; (2) Certainty of a l i e n a t i n g France and Russia; (3) Complications with the Colonies which might not approve of hanging on the s k i r t s of the T r i p l e A l l - iance; (4) Risk of being involved i n a p o l i c y h o s t i l e to Amer- i c a ; (5) Parliamentary sanction i n the present mood.' Instead 1. B.D. vol.1.p.102.No.124.Lascelles to Salisbury, Dec. 21, 1898. 2. B.D. vol.2.p.73 -6.No.91. Memorandum by Be r t i e , Nov. 9, 1901. 31. of dropping the a l l i a n c e completely have a general agreement 1. regarding p o l i c y i n commercial i n t e r e s t s . Before leaving f o r B e r l i n f o r Christmas, Metternich, the new German Ambassador, on December 19, c a l l e d to see Lansdowne who took the opportunity to r e f e r to the negotiations f o r a l l - iance during the spring and early summer. He pointed out care- f u l l y that England could not take up the proposal to j o i n the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e at present. Metternich said i t was to be an agreement between Great B r i t a i n and her colonies on the one side and the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e on the other. He believed i t would preserve peace for at le a s t h a l f a century, besides being of great value to B r i t a i n . He expressed surprise that B r i t a i n had not jumped at "the maginificent opportunity. By her ad- herence to i s o l a t i o n England was i n danger. She had offended I t a l y and driven her to turn to Prance for understanding. Regarding the A l l i a n c e , Germany had concluded . that B r i t a i n wished to drop negotiations, therefore he had not mentioned the subject. Lansdowne explained the summer holidays had made i t d i f f i c u l t to carry on discussions f o r a time. Metternich thanked him f o r the explanations. He expressed the opinion that there might not again be such a favourable opportunity as l a s t summer. As the years passed by he believed that Germany would draw closer to Russia. Lansdowne wished to preserve f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s and suggested a general commercial under- l.B.D. vol.2.p.76-9.No.92.Memorandum by Lansdowne, Nov. 11, 1901. 32. standing. Metternich was sure this would not be acceptable i n place of a l l i a n c e . To t h i s djjaft of despatch King Edward added the following minute: "The King does not consider the language and arguments made use of by the German Ambassador to l o r d 1© Lansdowne as at a l l s a t i s f a c t o r y . " In r e p l y to thi s Lascelles r e l a t e d a conversation with Billow on December 28. Metternich had not yet reported the interview with Lansdowne. Billow was glad to hear Lansdowne's explanation and agreed to postpone the discussions while ex- pressing the hope that the question would hot be dropped a l t o - 2. gether. Thus the negotiations ended i n courteous language and pious hopes f o r the future. They had f a i l e d . Germany had demanded more than B r i t a i n was prepared to give. She had carr- ie d out her p o l i c y and b e l i e f to the l e t t e r . The r e s u l t was contrary to her expectations. E n g l i s h statesmen who previously had been f r i e n d l y began to d i s t r u s t German motives. Chamber- l a i n , the guiding force i n the recent negotiations, decided 3 . to have nothing more to do with the people of B e r l i n . He and others had the impression "that Germany had never r e a l l y been i n earnest, but rather had kept them dangling f o r years and had used the s i t u a t i o n as a pretext f o r asking c o l o n i a l 1. B.D. vol.2.p.80-2.No.94.Lansdowne to Lascelle s , Dec.19, 1901. 2. B.D. vol.2.p.83. No.94.Lascelles to Lansdowne,Jan.3, 1902. 3. Brandenburg - op. c i t . -p.171.;Pribram - op. c i t . - p.89. . July 1905 Chamberlain remarked,"Once burned twice shy; from that moment I was determined never again to run i n double harness with that, man (Billow)." 33. 1. concessions For many years Germany had sought a l l i a n c e with England. During that time England, secure i n proud independence, p o l i t e - l y declined to "be drawn i n t o European entanglements. Granted, she worked generally with the members of the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e , hut she refused a binding agreement. When, at the end of the century, changed conditions brought her into countless c o n f l i c t s i n da8?erent parts of the world, she decided upon a defensive a l l i a n c e . She turned to the country whose overtures she had so often put aside. I t was only n a t u r a l that Germany, i n her pride, should refuse to come the f i r s t time England l i f t e d her fin g e r to beckon. As they conceived i t , the tables were turned, and.they were not averse to making England come as a suppliant. Unfortunatel?/, i n t h e i r over-confidence, they misread the times, and the Engl i s h character. The s i t u a t i o n was not so serious that England need dance to Germany's piping, nor was England's love f o r Germany so great that she would continue to come back so long as Germany offered her a f a i n t hope of success. She acted as Germany would have done. She offered h e r s e l f i n other markets. The very thing that the Germans dreaded and v/ished to avoid happened. England f u l f i l l e d her threat and turned to France and Russia. D i s t r u s t and suspicion poison the r e l a t i o n s h i p between nations as between i n d i v i d u a l people. I t i s not quite clear I.Brandenburg - op. c i t . p.171. 34. where th i s originated. Salisbury, i n spite of h i s courtesy, revealed h i s d i s t r u s t of Germany. He, i n h i s turn, was sus- pected by H o l s t e i n , who even c a r r i e d h i s suspicion so f a r as to accuse Salisbury of using other nations to p u l l England's chestnuts out of the f i r e , and of waiting and planning f o r a European war i n which England would play the part of onlooker 1. and take a l l the p r o f i t s . This attitude of d i s t r u s t spread from the o f f i c i a l s to the public and the press. In such an atmosphere how could an a l l i a n c e be formed, and i f formed, how could i t endure? Assured of support each country might have gone i t s own way, seeking i t s own i n t e r e s t s by aggressive means. Neither would have allowed the other to influence i t s p o l i c y . B r i t a i n feared t h i s i n Germany; Germany, probably sensing t h i s suspic- ion, feared England might leave her i n the lurc h . The s i t u a t - ion was impossible. ' The a l l i a n c e might have kept peace i n Europe, but i t would probably have been through i n s p i r i n g fear. F r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s and co-operation up to a point were possible and remained so f o r some years; but so long as the statesmen of the F i l h e l m i n i c Era were i n c o n t r o l a formal a l l i a n c e was out of the question. Brandenburg's conclusion i s f a s c i n a t i n g i n i t s s i m p l i c i t y and h i n t of tragedy; 11 They had offered us t h e i r hand and had l.B.D. vol.2.p.84.No.96.Holstein to C h i r o l , Jan. 3, 1902. G.D. vol.3.p.146. XVII. l o l . Memorandum by Holstein, Oct.31, 1901. 35. had withdrawn i t when we made the conditions of acceptance too onerous f o r f u l f i l m e n t . They never came back to us. They went 1. instead to our enemies." 1.Brandenburg - op. c i t . p.181. 36. CHAPTER I I . Anglo-German Relations 1898-1904. During these years when England was slowly emerging from her era of "splendid i s o l a t i o n " and casting out f e e l e r s for a l l - iances, her r e l a t i o n s with Germany never lacked an element of uncertainty that lent spice to even the most casual intercourse. On the whole, the desire to work i n harmony predominated - part- l y because Germany fancied she could gain more by so doing^ and p a r t l y because she d i d not f e e l s u f f i c i e n t l y strong on the sea to arouse the B r i t i s h l i o n too mueh. On the B r i t i s h side was a genuine desire to l i v e on f r i e n d l y terms with Germany - a desire which l a t e r gave way to d i s t r u s t and doubt i n view of Germany's e r r a t i c p o l i c y . This p a r t i c u l a r period witnessed the f a i l u r e of the Anglo-German a l l i a n c e , and the gradual swing toward Prance and l a t e r toward Russia culminating i n the Anglo- French Agreements of 1904 and the Anglo-Russian understanding of 1907. Thorny problems occupied the diplomats of both countries during these s i x years. Caution and coolness were e s s e n t i a l to bring the disputes to a peaceful settlement. The Portugese Colonies, the South A f r i c a n War, the Venezuelan Question, the Yangtsze Treaty, a l l taxed the powers of the o f f i c i a l repres- entatives. The Governments found t h e i r task rendered more d i f f - i c u l t by the violence of public opinion i n both countries. Out- 37. bursts of h o s t i l i t y towards Germany i n the Engl i s h Press made i t hard f o r Salisbury and Lansdowne to preserve t o l e r a b l y am- icab l e r e l a t i o n s o f f i c i a l l y . The extremely a n t i - B r i t i s h tone of the German Press aroused the i r e of the B r i t i s h and increas- ed the complications. There were, however, periods of r e l a t i v e calm between the storms. As always Germany asked too much f o r her friendship, or acted too impulsively, or had aims considerably d i f f e r e n t from those of B r i t a i n . The rash, bombastic utterances of the Kais- er brought suspicion on Germany's motives. The new Empire's r e s t l e s s s t r i v i n g f o r f i r s t place among nations i n e v i t a b l y brought her int o c o n f l i c t with the proud mistress of the seas. On many occasions B r i t a i n proved y i e l d i n g and c o n c i l i a t o r y ; hut she would not always pay the high prices Germany demanded. Re c o n c i l i a t i o n with Prance did not prove as c o s t l y as Germany had fondly imagined, so B r i t a i n turned to the German enemy. Eckardstein's prophecies, so long scorned as nafive and imposs- i b l e by Holstein and Bulow, came true with the formation of the Anglo-French Entente. The f i r s t important agreement of this period was that be- tween England and Germany over the Portugese Colonies i n South A f r i c a . In t h i s case the i n i t i a t i v e came from the German Gov- ernment, HHd was somewhat r e l u c t a n t l y taken up by the English. In 1898 the Portugese f i n a n c i a l p o s i t i o n gave cause for consid- erable anxiety. A loan seemed necessary, so the Governor-Gener- a l of Portugese East A f r i c a sounded Paris, London, and B e r l i n 38. on the subject. In a memorandum of May 1, 1898, Mr. Bertie ad- vocated discussing the future of the Portugese possessions i n A f r i c a and o f f e r i n g a loan to Portugal i n return for guarantees and p r i v i l e g e s . He believed Germany l i k e l y to ste-p i n and, i n 1." return f o r a loan, acquire some of the Colonies. By ancient t r e a t i e s England was interested i n the fate of Portugese poss- essions; while the p o s i t i o n of these colonies i n A f r i c a made th e i r fate of importance to the B r i t i s h Empire. I f they f e l l i n to the hands of a power h o s t i l e to England, complications were almost c e r t a i n to a r i s e . Since Prance and Germany also had some commercial i n t e r e s t s involved, they were not disposed to s i t calmly by while B r i t a i n came to an arrangement with Port- ugal and walked away with the s p o i l s . The Germans discovered that on June 3 the Portugese Ambass- ador i n London, M. de Soveral, l e f t Lisbon with i n s t r u c t i o n s to obtain a loan by mortgaging the revenues from the South A f r i c a n possessions of Portugal, r i g h t s of sovereignty being involved 2. i n the mortgage. Billow considered i t time f o r Germany to i n t e r f e r e since i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s were concerned. There- fore on June 14 the German Ambassador c a l l e d upon Salisbury to enquire the terms under which de Soveral proposed to r a i s e money for h i s Government. As Chamberlain '©as carrying on the discussions Salisbury could supply no information. However, since he wished to maintain the best r e l a t i o n s with Germany he 1. B.D. vol.1.p.44.No.65.Memorandum by B e r t i e , May 1, 1898. 2. G.D. vol.3.p.30-1.XIV. 266. Billow to Munster,June 18, 1898. 3 9. would i n due time inform the Ambassador of any steps that might 1. concern the r i g h t s or legitimate i n t e r e s t s of Germany. This d i d not s a t i s f y Germany. Hatzfeldt asked Salisbury "whether we would j o i n with Germany i n a common action i n regard to the f i n a n c i a l operations which the Government of Portugal desired to carry through." Salisbury thought the whole a f f a i r concern- ed only England and Portugal. B r i t a i n wished to maintain the status quo, but i f i t bacame necessary to d i s t r i b u t e t e r r i t o r y 2. he would consult Germany. Bulow was disposed to think i t would be to B r i t i s h ad- vantage to j o i n Germany before coming to an agreement with Port- ugal. Germany had helped England in.Egypt without d e r i v i n g any b e n e f i t . She was not i n the p o s i t i o n to render p o l i t i c a l ser- vices g r a t i s , but expected some ret u r n . He had the idea that England was getting ready very q u i e t l y to seize a considerable portion of A f r i c a n t e r r i t o r y without consulting German i n t e r e s t s . Accordingly, he instructed Hatzfeldt to ask Salisbury his views on the future p a r t i t i o n of Portugese colonies between England and Germany, also whether he would be ready to undertake a binding agreement on the question i f Germany gave f u l l recogn- 3. i t i o n . and consideration to B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s . On June 23 Salisbury had an interview with Hatzfeldt during which the l a t t - er suggested two schemes - f i r s t , a p a r a l l e l loan made by Eng- 1. B.D. vol.1.p.48.Ho.66. Salisbury to Gough, June 14, 1898. 2. B.D. vol.1.p.49.Ho.67. Salisbury to Gough, June 21, 1898. 3. G.D. vol.3.p.32.XlV. 272. Bulow to Hatzfeldt, June 22, 1898. 40. land and Germany to Portugal, the se c u r i t y of each loan to be customs revenue of c e r t a i n c o l o n i a l t e r r i t o r y to which the res- pective countries would have f i r s t claim i n case of " c e r t a i n e v e n t u a l i t i e s " ; second, that Germany would give up to B r i t a i n Delagoa Bay and the Mozambique Province up tb the Zambezi, i f B r i t a i n would allow Germany to take Portugese t e r r i t o r y beyond the Zambezi up to the Rovuma and the Shir3, and the Colony of Angola i n case the Portugese Empire f e l l . Hatzfeldt based the jus t i c e of the German claim on services rendered by Germany to England i n the past. Salisbury requested time f o r considerat- i o n . ! . In the meantime Germany took steps at Lisbon to prevent 2. an agreement without German consent. To the English she urg- ed speed and silence i n order to exclude France. England, how- ever, was not disposed to rush in t o such an agreement. She de- si r e d above a l l to maintain the status quo and prolong the l i f e of the Portugese Empire. Knowing the German Colonial ambitions Salisbury d i s t r u s t e d this sudden outburst of enthusiasm. Accord i n g l y , the negotiations dragged a l i t t l e i n spite of German e f f - orts and assurances. As usual Salisbury f e l t the Germans were 3. asking too much and givi n g too l i t t l e . Hatzfeldt, who had been f e r t i l e i n suggestions f o r the basis of the understanding, feared t h i s would cause h i s Government to break o f f discussions. 1. B.D. vol.1.p.52.Ho.70. Salisbury to Gough, June 23, 1898. 2. G.D. vol.3.p.35.Tattenbach to German Foreign O f f i c e , June 30 1898; B.D.vol.l.p.54. No.73.MacDonnell to Salisbury, July 6, 1898. 3. B.D. vol.1.p.58.No.78.Salisbury to Gough, July 20, 1898. 41. He t o l d Salisbury i t would be a splendid opportunity for estab- l i s h i n g good r e l a t i o n s l o s t . Germany could not stand alone. I f thi s agreement f a i l e d to materialise she would have to turn to 1. Russia. Conversations continued, each side t r y i n g to secure the t e r r i t o r y best suited to i t s own i n t e r e s t s . In August S a l i s - bury went on leave and l e f t the Foreign Office i n the hands of Balfour. Mr B e r t i e , i n a memorandum of August 10, 1898, str e s s - ed the advantages to be derived by Germany from the proposed 2. agreement, and questioned the presence of any f o r England. Just as a settlement seemed to be i n sight, f r e s h d i f f i c u l t i e s arose over the i n c l u s i o n of Timor. Germany refused to continue i f t h i s t e r r i t o r y were not assigned to her. England was r e l u c t - 3. ant to agree. In r e p l y to the statement that Balfour com- plained Germany d i d nothing but threaten and neither conceded nor promised anything, Richthofen said i t was incomprehensible at the moment "when we are l e t t i n g England have South A f r i c a and are ready to f u l f i l our promises. In our eyes the agree- ment was to be the starting-point of a j o i n t c o l o n i a l p o l i c y . Our demands are the minimum f o r our leaving the Boers to them- 4. selves." So eager were the Germans f o r a settlement that the Kaiser i n a conversation with Lascelles went so far as to say, 1. B.D.vol.1.p.58.No.78.Salisbury to Gough, July 20, 1898. 2. B.D.vol.1.p.60,No.81.Memorandum by B e r t i e , Aug.10, 1898-. 3. G.D.vol.3.p.37.XIV.321.Richthofen to Hatzfeldt, Aug.19, 1898 4.Ibid; also B.D.vol.1.p.67.No.85.Balfour to Las c e l l e s , Aug. 19, 1898. 42. "unless the negotiations i n progress during the l a s t few days between my Ambassador and Mr. Balfour lead to no more acceptable r e s u l t than they had up to the present, the continued presence 1. of my Ambassador i n London would be superfluous just nov/." On August 30, 1898 the Convention was signed. The respect ive areas of influence were c a r e f u l l y defined. A.secret Convent ion agreed to oppose the intervention of any t h i r d power i n the s p e c i f i e d t e r r i t o r y ; while a secret note prevented_one Govern- ment's accepting concessions from Portugal unless the other 2. Government received s i m i l a r concessions. In view of the complications Portugal had decided not to 3. borrow money. She d i d approach Prance, but the negotiations never materialized. After the Agreement had been signed Balfour t o l d de Soveral that Germany and England were ready to make a 4. loan on very easy terms. Germany resented B r i t a i n ' s action i n not keeping the agreement e n t i r e l y secret. She f e l t this 5. postponed i n d e f i n i t e l y i t s carrying out. In case the French caused trouble by persuading Portugal to borrow from them Hatz- f e l d t suggested to Balfour that they intimate to Portugal that England and Germany would not permit intervention by a t h i r d 6. Power. Regarding t h i s Salisbury wrote the following minute, 1. G.D.vol.3.p.38. XIV.334. Note. 2. B.D.vol.1.p.71.No.90.Balfour to Lascel l e s , Aug. 31, 1898.; p.73.No.91.Balfour to Hatzfeldt; p.74.Englosure In No.92. August 30, 1898. 3. B.D.vol.1.p.57.No.76.Salisbury to Macdonnell,July 13,.1898. 4. B.D.vol.1.p.75.No.93.Balfour to Soveral, Aug. 31, 1898. 5. G.D.vol.3.p.40. German note. 6. B.D.vol.1.p.75.No.94.Balfour to Lascelles, Sept. 1, 1898. 43. "I expected t h i s . They are not content to wait f o r events to give them t h e i r share of Portugese t e r r i t o r y but wish to force 1. the pace of destiny." On October 14, 1899 an Anglo-Portugese Agreement r e a f f i r m - ed the terms of the old t r e a t i e s between England and Portugal, and made arrangements whereby Portugal, andertook not to allow the passage of arms and munitions across Portugese t e r r i t o r y to the Boers i n event of a South A f r i c a n War, and agreed not to pro 2. claim n e u t r a l i t y i n such a war. When this so-called Windsor Treaty became known i t aroused a storm of protest i n Germany. Nearly every German o f f i c i a l f e l t i t to be contrary to the Anglo German agreement - a t y p i c a l example of Albion's perfidy. Billow says i t was "perfidious d u p l i c i t y . " England had gone behind Germany's back to render i n e f f e c t u a l the treaty over the Port- 3. ugese Colonies. He even goes further and accuses the Prince of Wales of p a r t i c i p a t i n g personally and e n e r g e t i c a l l y i n under- 4. mining the Anglo-German tr e a t y over the Portugese Colonies. A l l the discussion, a l l the eagerness, a l l the mistrust, a l l the i r r i t a t i o n had been to no purpose. The Agreement was never put into p r a c t i c e . Germany's schemes ( i f she had any) for acquiring new t e r r i t o r y came to naught, not because of Eng- land's l a t e r renewal of old Portugese t r e a t i e s , and lack of 1. B.D.vol.1.p.76.Minute by Salisbury. 2. B.D.vol.1.p.93-4. Text of Agreement. 3. Billow - Memoirs - vol.1.p.327. 4.Ibid. p.326. 44. f a i t h , as they believed, but because the negotiations had arous- ed Portugal's suspicions and made her cautious. Following t h i s Agreement came the trouble over Samoa bring in g with i t great excitement i n Germany. In 1889 by the B e r l i n Convention the Samoan Islands were placed under the j o i n t con- t r o l of B r i t a i n , Germany, and the United States. Trouble began when the King, Malietoa, died i n August 1898. The Convention had provided f o r the l e g a l e l e c t i o n of a new king, but the Powers divided when the l o c a l chiefs elected a Pretender and the Chief Justice declared the e l e c t i o n i l l e g a l and appointed the son of the old r u l e r . I l l e g a l action on the part of the German representatives led to protests from the B r i t i s h and Americans and to acts of violence i n Samoa. Germany, who had a sentimental i n t e r e s t i n Samoa as the starting-point of her c o l o n i a l a spirations, had long wanted a p a r t i t i o n of the group so arranged as to give her the Island of Upolu. Acting on Bulow's i n s t r u c t i o n s at the beginning of September 1898 Hatzfeldt approached the B r i t i s h Foreign Office with a proposal f o r p a r t i t i o n of the islands as the best s o l u t - 1. ion of the d i f f i c u l t y . Germany was ready to offer concessions 2. to induce England to agree to the proposal. Hatzfeldt . : found Balfour attentive but non-committal. He promised to write to Salisbury, but did not see what England would gain by the Tonga Islands since she could have taken them long ago had 1. G.D.vol.3.p.42-3.XlV 567.Bulow to Hatzfeldt, Aug.31, 1898; p.43. Xiv:569.Hatzfeldt to German Foreign O f f i c e , 2. G.D.vol.3.p.44.German Note. (Sept, 1, 1898. 45. 1. she wanted. Salisbury s u c c e s s f u l l y vetoed the suggestion by telegraphing to the Foreign Office that he did not think any- thing could be done about Samoa because A u s t r a l i a would object 2. to any a l t e r a t i o n . The question remained In abeyance u n t i l January 1899, when the German representatives put themselves i n the wrong. The s i t u a t i o n caused f a r more discussion on the German side than on the B r i t i s h . On January 20 the Emperor c a l l e d at the B r i t i s h Embassy i n B e r l i n to discuss Samoa and to stress the a d v i s a b i l i t y of a more s a t i s f a c t o r y arrangement. Billow on the 3. other hand thought the time not yet opportune. Since S a l i s - bury showed no d i s p o s i t i o n to do anything f o r Germany i n Samoa or elsewhere Hatzfeldt advised discussions of a l l i a n c e between 4. France and Germany to br i n g him to h i s senses. Germany be- came convinced that England was using the United States to drive Germany out of Samoa. Chamberlain suggested Germany might.give up the Samoa group and take compensation elsewhere since her inte r e s t s there were decreasing. Hatzfeldt maintain- 5. ed German inte r e s t s were great i n Upolu. Billow feared the good r e l a t i o n s between England and Germany, which had been i n evidence since the agreement regarding the Portugese Colonies, 1. G.D.vol.3.p.44.XIV.570.Hatzfeldt to German Foreign O f f i c e , Sept. 2, 1898. 2. G.D.vol.3.p.45.XlV.571.Hatzfeldt to German Foreign O f f i c e , Sept. 8, 1898. 3. B.D.vol.1.p. I O 8 V N 0 .128.Lascelles to Salisbury, Jan.20, 1899. 4 • G.D. v o l . 3. r>. 48.XIV. 57 9.Hatzfeldt to German Foreign Office, Feb. 23, 1899. 5.G.D.vol.3.p.54.XIV.585.Hatzfeldt to German Foreign O f f i c e , Mar. 25, 1899. 46. would be s p o i l t i f England persisted i n t r e a t i n g Germany so harshly over Samoa. Public opinion would not allow the Govern- ment to bow to England's wishes even i f i t so desired. The bombardment by the B r i t i s h and American ships, during which the German Consulate received damage, had increased the i l l - f e e l i n g i n Germany. Moreover the B r i t i s h had expressed no re- gret whereas the United States had apologised. I f England r e - fused to guarantee that she would uphold the previous treaty Germany would have to r e c a l l her ambassador from London. Eng- 1. land would not behave l i k e t h i s i f Germany had a strong navy. The Emperor grew very heated over the English treatment of Germany i n Samoa. He regarded i t as a personal matter and f e l t a l l h i s e f f o r t s towards an understanding had been i n vain. England persisted i n treating.Germany as a nonentity; but she would l i v e to f i n d them strong, then perhaps i t would be too late to repent. He greatly feared public opinion would prevent his proposed'pleasure v i s i t to Cowes which would be very d i s - 2. V appointing. His resentment f ound^further expression i n a l e t t e r to Queen V i c t o r i a i n which he abused B r i t i s h p o l i c y , and 3. harshly c r i t i c i s e d Salisbury. Deeply hurt, the Queen admin- is t e r e d grave reproof and forwarded a memorandum by Salisbury 4. r e f u t i n g the Kaiser's accusations. 1. G.D.vol.3.p.56-7.XIV.590.Billow to German Foreign O f f i c e , A p r i l 1, 1899.; also B.D.vol.1.p.111.Ho.133.Lascelles to Salisbury, March 24, 1899. 2. B.D.vol.1.p.117.Ho.141.Lascelles to Salisbury, May 26, 1899. 3. G.D.vol.3.p.64.XIV.617.Emperor to Queen V i c t o r i a , May22,1899. 4. G.D.vol.3.p.64.XIV.620.Queen V i c t o r i a to the Emoeror, Junel2, 1899. 47. On A p r i l 4 Salisbury telegraphed the assurance that he would observe the terms of the B e r l i n Convention. The f e e l i n g existed i n England and Samoa that Germany was t r y i n g to drive 1. England and the United States out of the i s l a n d s . After f u r - ther d i f f i c u l t i e s a commission was dispatched to investigate the s i t u a t i o n and make recommendations f o r a settlement of the ques- t i o n . This Commission advised against a continuation of the j o i n t c o n t r o l , i n the i n t e r e s t s of peace i n Samoa. Hatzfeldt urged Salisbury to suggest some way out of the d i f f i c u l t y . Salisbury refused to be fturried. He saw no immediate need f o r settlement and stressed the problem of a f a i r d i v i s i o n . Germany wanted Upolp, the most valuable i s l a n d . A u s t r a l i a would object to B r i t - ain's surrendering these islands to a f o r e i g n power. Moreover, he was convinced as he t o l d Lascelles that Germany was pushing the point not because of the value of the islands or of public opinion but because the Kaiser had set h i s hear$ on i t . So negotiations ©ontinued to drag on and on d r i v i n g the German Government to the verge of despair. On September 22 Salisbury informed Lascelles that England had agreed to a r b i t - 3. r a t i o n by the King of Norway and Sweden. Then d i f f i c u l t i e s 4. arose again over the rules f o r the guidance of the a r b i t e r s . 1. B.D.vol.1.p.113.No.137.Lascelles to Salisbury, A p r i l 6, 1899. also Enclosure i n No.137.Salisbury to Las c e l l e s , A p r i l 4, 1899 2. B.D.vol.1.p.121.No.146.Salisbury to Lascelles,Sept. 15, 1899. 3. B.D.vol.Ip. 124.No.148.Salisbury to Lascelles,Sept. 22, 1899. 4. B.D.vol.1.p.125.No.149.Salisbury to Lascelles,Oct. 6, 1899. 48-. In the midst of t h i s l a s t phase came the Boer War. With that, German f r i e n d s h i p assumed a new importance. The sympathy of Europe was with the Boers. A v i s i t of the Kaiser to England would show that B r i t a i n had at le a s t one f r i e n d on the Contin- ent. The German Government found themselves i n a somewhat awkward p o s i t i o n . By making c a p i t a l out of England's i s o l a t - ion they could t r y to force a settlement. Such action would lead to an outcry i n B r i t a i n against the b r u t a l i t y and s e l f i s h - ness of the Germans. On the other hand i f they d i d not reach a favourable agreement public opinion i n Germany would be an- gry and disgusted. During an interview with Chamberlain, Eck- ardstein urged him to accept Germany's very moderate proposals. Y/hen Chamberlain hesitated, Eckardstein warned him public opin- ion might force German p o l i c y , h i t h e r t o l o y a l to England, into another d i r e c t i o n . Chamberlain immediately r a i s e d the cry of blackmail; but Eckardstein refuted the accusation by reminding him that the proposals had been made weeks before war was 1. thought probable. The a f f a i r was s e t t l e d by England's y i e l d i n g . Germany received Upolu and salved her wounded pride. The f i n a l r a t i f - i c a t i o n took place on February 16, 1900. On that day Lascelles wrote to Salisbury that Richthofen was delighted with the settlement. He assured Lascelles that the German Government would i n no way mix themselves up with the Boer War and would l.G.D.vol.3.p.68.XlV.637. Hatzfeldt to German Foreign O f f i c e , Sept. 20, 1899. 49. 1. decline to intervene i f asked by other powers. The whole a f f a i r seems rather a storm i n a teacup. Yet the i l l - f e e l i n g aroused i n Germany might e a s i l y have proved a serious menace to England i n her hour of d i f f i c u l t y . The Germ- ans could not see why England wished to stand i n t h e i r way over such a small piece of t e r r i t o r y . On the other hand had Germ- any any greater claim then her partners? The English f a i l e d to see the j u s t i c e of the German demand.and objected to the barely v e i l e d threats.. B r i t a i n could have surrendered a l l claim i n favour of Germany, but such an act would have set a dangerous precedent. I f the German Navy had been larger the Kaiser might have been tempted to back up some of his bombastic utterances. However, the dispute was s e t t l e d i n Germany's favour and the new Empire proceeded to Demonstrate to B r i t a i n the value of i t s fri e n d s h i p i n time of war. " I t was highly s i g n i f i c a n t that the negotiations over these comparatively minor matters should nearly have caused a breach i n t h e i r dip- lomatic r e l a t i o n s . The way i n which German p o l i c y i n v a r i a b l y opened f i r e at once with i t s biggest guns was extremely a n t i - pathetic to Engl i s h statesmen, who were more t r a n q u i l and t o l - erant i n t h e i r diplomatic intercourse and very sensitive to 2. threats." The Hague Conference i n the summer of 1899 accomplished 1. B.D.vol.1.p.130.No.156.Lascelles to Salisbury, Feb. 16, 1900. 2. Brandenburg - op. c i t . - p.129. 50. l i t t l e of material value. None of the Powers proved enthusias- t i c , hut i t f e l l to Germany to bring odium upon h e r s e l f f o r de- c l i n i n g to l i m i t armaments or submit to a r b i t r a t i o n . VJhen B r i t a i n suggested the establishment of a permanent t r i b u n a l Germany objected, but f o r the sake of appearances had to con- 1. sent to a modified voluhtary sort of a r b i t r a t i o n machinery. I f anything the.Conference increased the impression, already e x i s t i n g , that Germany was inten s e l y m i l i t a r i s t i c and a menace to peace proposals. A c t u a l l y she was no more so than the other 2. powers• The question of the German attitude i n the South A f r i c a n War caused B r i t a i n a c e r t a i n amount of anxiety i n view of the Kruger Telegram episode. At the time of the Jameson Raid German sympathy had been with the Boers. The Kaiser i n p a r t i c - u l a r wished to take some action to show this sympathy. Mars- chall- i n h i s d i a r y f o r January 3, 1896 stated that at a confer- ence the Kaiser had made wild proposals f o r a s s i s t i n g the Boers 1. B.D.vol.l.p.229. Note 1. 2. Lowes Dickinson - The International Anarchy - p.347-52. There i s abundant evidence that few of the statesmen of Europe believed anything could or would be done about arm- aments. The o f f i c i a l French report on the Conference said "From the f i r s t meeting i t was easy to see that the delegate of every Power, while appearing animated by the desire to respond to the humanitarian intentions of t h e i r own Govern- ments, derived eith e r from t h e i r own convictions or from the i n s t r u c t i o n s of t h e i r Governments (the same Governments that had the 'humanitarian i n t e n t i o n s ' ) , a resolve not to accept any measure which might r e s u l t i n r e a l l y diminishing the defensive or offensive forces of t h e i r country, or even i n l i m i t i n g those forces$" Wilson - The War G u i l t - p.69. Also supports these views. 51. F i n a l l y at Marschall's suggestion the Kaiser agreed to send a congratulatory telegram to Kruger. The widow of Kayser, the Director of the Colonial Department, claims that her husband thought of the telegram and made the f i r s t d r a f t . The Chancell- or, Prince von Hohenlohe, t o l d h i s son that he had agreed to the 1. telegram "to avert something worse." Suffice i t to say that the Kruger Telegram was sent and aroused a storm of anger i n England, while pleasing the Boers. On January 21 Hatzfeldt wrote to H o l s t e i n p r i v a t e l y that f o r a short time the Germans i n London could do hardly any business with the English. Even he, himself, had received many i n s u l t i n g and threatening l e t t e r s . Had the Government l o s t i t s head and wished fo r war, the whole of public opinion would have been behind i t . Public opinion i n England could control the Government. Salisbury had maintained a c o n c i l i a t o r y attitude towards Germany i n the b e l i e f that time 2. would bring calmness. The i r r i t a t i o n remained f o r some time, and German interference and obvious backing of the Boers made the r e l a t i o n s between the Governments d i f f i c u l t . Billow claims that even as late as June 1897 some of the bitterness s t i l l remained - Prince Albrecht of Prussia r i d i n g i n the ceremonial procession on June 22 was repeatedly informed by the crowds, " I f you want to send a telegram to Oom Kruger, y o u ' l l f i n d a 3. Post Office round the corner on the r i g h t . " German sympathy continued to be on the side of the Boers 1. G.P.Gooch - Recent Revelations i n European Diplomacy - p.9. 2. G.D.vol.2.p.403.XI.53.Hatzfeldt to Holstein, Jan. 21, 1896. 3. Billow - Memoirs - vol.1.p. 16. 52. during the subsequent troubles. The Government, however, was not w i l l i n g to r i s k a breach with England for the sake of the South A f r i c a n Republic. During the spring and summer of 1899 i n d i t e c t l y they urged c o n c i l i a t i o n and an avoidance of anything 1. that might lead to outbreak of h o s t i l i t i e s . They determined i n event of war to amintain an a t t i t u d e of s t r i c t n e u t r a l i t y , and to work fo r l o c a l i z a t i o n of the c o n f l i c t . As a rev/ard f o r such conduct they probably hoped to exact tribute from B r i t a i n i n the future. On August 13, 1899 Richthofen instructed the German Consul at Pretoria to avoid declarations regarding the Transvaal since Germany must not be drawn int o the dispute i n 2. any form. In September Billow wrote to the Foreign Office that the language of the German Press should be calm and cool abovit the Transvaal c r i s i s and confine i t s e l f s t r i c t l y to f a c t s . The German Government did not wish to incur the enmity of England since the other continental powers were c e r t a i n l y not considering 3. such a p o l i c y . The outbreak of war was the s i g n a l f o r a v i o l e n t attack on B r i t i s h p o l i c y by the Continental press, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n France, Russia, and Germany. This attitude greatly inconvenien- ced the Governments i n t h e i r attempts to maintain n e u t r a l i t y . To add to the complications Dr. Leyds, a Boer o f f i c i a l , toured 4. Europe i n 1899 seeking aid against B r i t a i n . Billow, who states, 1. G.D.vol.3.p.85.XV.371.Hatzfeldt to German Foreign O f f i c e , June 7, 1899.;p.88.Billow to Flotow - July 4, 1899. 2. G.D.vol.3.p.95.XV.384.Richthofen to Biermann, Aug.13, 1899. 3. G.D.V01.3.p.l02.XV.395.Bulow to German Foreign Office,Sept.20, 4. G.D.vol.3.p.106.Note. (1899. 53. "I was determined from the f i r s t to keep us clear of any steps 1. for the Boers, and against the B r i t i s h , " urged Rilcher-Jenisch, the Charge d'Affaires i n Brussels, to use h i s influence to pre- vent Dr. Leyds from coming to B e r l i n because "I could not r e u e i - 2. ve him." As a r e s u l t on t h i s occasion Dr. Leyds did not v i s i t 3. B e r l i n . Prom Paris Monson reported the modification of the attitude of the French press. He also commented on the f a c t that France and Russia seemed to be conspiring to take advantage of B r i t a i n ' s extremity to get a European c o a l i t i o n against her. He thought Russia at the bottom of i t , b$tt could not r e a l l y say 4. as nothing d e f i n i t e had leaked out. The Austro-Hungarian Minister f o r Foreign A f f a i r s , Goluchowski, saw no l i k e l i h o o d of c o a l i t i o n i n the European c a p i t a l s against England. He f e i t sure Germany would not countenance such action, so Russia would 5. not gain much support f o r her absurd proposals. In the midst of t h i s h o s t i l i t y i t was important f o r Eng- land to f e e l she had at least one f r i e n d . English statesmen welcomed the proposed v i s i t of the Kaiser as proof of his good- w i l l . Delay over the Samoan Question and consequent a n t i - B r i t - i s h f e e l i n g i n Germany nearly led to a c a n c e l l a t i o n of the v i s i t i n spite of the Kaiser's genuine desire to carry out the project. Once the question was s e t t l e d s a t i s f a c t o r i l y for Germany the 1. Billow - Memoirs - vol.1.p.289. 2. G.D.vol.3.p. 106.XV.405.Billow to Rilcker-Jenisch, Oct. 16, 1899. 3. G.D.vol.3.p.106.Note.. 4. B.D.vol.l.p.233-6.Nos.285-7,9Monson to Salisbury,Oct.1,24,27, Nov. 3,. 1899. 5. B.D.vol.l.p.237.Nos.290,291. Rumbold to Salisbury, Nov.3, 1899 54. Emperor announced hi s i n t e n t i o n to v i s i t the Queen at the end of November. The h o s t i l i t y of public opinion i n Germany caus- ed the Emperor and h i s advisers to stress the purely family nature of the v i s i t and to avoid any public functions while i n England. The v i s i t proved i n every way s a t i s f a c t o r y , the Kaiser and the Prince of Wales managed not to i r r i t a t e each other, the Kaiser appeared sympathetic and very desirous of helping England as much as possi b l e . B r i t i s h statesmen who were hon- oured with an interview expressed g r a t i f i c a t i o n at the German Government's attitude and assurances. The English public £nr- got any anti-German f e e l i n g s and welcomed the Emperor. Bulow- who accompanied the Kaiser, observed that the B r i t i s h were f a r less anti-German than the Germans were a n t i - B r i t i s h . Therefore he feared the possible influence of men l i k e C h i r o l and Saund- ers, who, knowing the depth of German h o s t i l i t y , might reveal t h e i r knowledge to the E n g l i s h public and thereby cause an un- 1. favourable change i n Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s . During the v/ar the Kaiser wrote very sympathetic l e t t e r s , f u l l of advice, to the Prince of Wales. The Prince, although not altogether appreciating h i s nephew's kindness, on the whole avoided remarks that would offend. Occasionally the pro- vocation v/as too great and the Prince administered sharp reproof 2. which was immediately met by an injured protest. For the 1. G.D.vol.3.p.108-114.XV.413.Memorandum of Bulow, Nov.24, 1899. 2. Lee - King Edward VII. - vol.1.p.754. 55. assistance of h i s English r e l a t i v e s Wilhelm drew up some notes on the War i n the Transvaal. The f i r s t instalment he sent on December 21, 1899; the second, i n which he suggested a plan of campaign and indulged i n the famous f o o t b a l l s i m i l e , came i n 1. February 1900. This l a t t e r was destined to cause consider- able i r r i t a t i o n when the information came to l i g h t i n the D a l l y Telegraph Incident. The Kaiser claimed to have submitted i t to the General S t a f f f o r t h e i r approval before sending I t to the Prince. In 1908 Billow stated i n the Reichstag that n e i t h - er the said plan of campaign nor any other s i m i l a r work by the Kaiser had been examined by the General S t a f f . The Emperor may have shown i t to his aide-de-camp on duty, who did belong 2. to the General S t a f f . Nevertheless, the plan was sent, but f a i l e d to impress the E n g l i s h a u t h o r i t i e s . Why the Kaiser took a l l t h i s trouble to be so gracious to England i s somewhat obscure. By the time the war ended he was disposed to be any- thing but gracious i n view of imagined i n s u l t s received from 3. En g l i s h o f f i c i a l s . Whether, as Lee f i r m l y believes, he was doing i t to cover his treacherous attempts to organize a con- t i n e n t a l c o a l i t i o n against England or not one can hardly say. Evidence does not point toward Germany as the i n s t i g a t o r of such a plan. Before 1899 ended Chamberlain complained to Eckardstein 1. Lee - op. c i t . vol.1.p.805. 2. G.D.vol.3.p.123. German Note 3. Lee - op. c i t . vol.1.p.761. 56. about German army o f f i c e r s s e r v i n g on the side of the Boers. He had received the information from S i r A l f r e d Milner. He regret- ted the"effect of t h i s news on public opinion when i t became 1. known. • The Kaiser's comments on Hatzfeldt's despatch reveal deep indignation. He concludes, "The Ambassador must inform Mr. Chamberlain of my Order to a l l Army Corps, that none of t h e i r members including even troops that have been disbanded, are permitted to go to A f r i c a . That i s a l l that i s reaui^ed. - I f 2. we had a f l e e t , Ghamberlain would not have dared J " Bulow l a t e r assured Lascelles that reports concerning the number of German o f f i c e r s i n Boer service had been exaggerated. The Gov- 3. ernment knew of only two o f f i c e r s so f a r . Prom conversations with Chamberlain, Eckardstein got the impression that B r i t a i n might take some action regarding Delag- oa Bay to stop the Boers importing arms by t h i s channel. He thought they would f i r s t approach Germany to see i f she were 4. agreeable. Germany might th&s gain some concession. Billow took the precaution of informing Portugal that Germany must be 5. n o t i f i e d i f any other nation asked f o r control of Delagoa Bay. As usual Germany was on the a l e r t not only to protect her i n t e r - ests, but to gain a l l she could. Then came the incident that threatened to wreck the good l.G.D.vol.3.p.115-6.XV.426.Hatzfeldt to the German Foreign O f f i c e , D c. 20, 1899. 2.Ibid. 3. B.D.vol.1.p.245.Ho.304.Lascelles to Salisbury, Jan. 4, 1900. 4. G.D.vol.3.p.116-7.XV.428.Hatzfeldt to German Foreign O f f i c e , Dec. 21, 1899. 5. G.D.vol.3.p.117.XV.453.Billow to Tattenbach. Dec. 25, 1899. 57. r e l a t i o n s between England and the German Government. B r i t a i n claimed.and put i n t o practice the r i g h t to search ships of neu- t r a l nations suspected of carrying contraband of war. At the end of December 1899 B r i t i s h naval vessels seized three German mail steamers of the Woermann Line, the "Bundesrath", the "Gen- e r a l " , the"Hertzog',' on the charge of carrying contraband. They soon released the "General" and the"Hertzog", but took the "Bund esrath" to the Prize Court at Durban. German anger knew no bounds. Billow says, " I t was inexcusable that the German Govern- ment, while s t r i v i n g to come to an understanding with B r i t a i n , should have had d i f f i c u l t i e s thrown into i t s way at a c r i t i c a l moment from the B r i t i s h side by the u n j u s t i f i e d and absolutely 1. b r u t a l seizure of the German mail-boats." T i r p i t z and the Naval Party took the opportunity to urge the need for speed i n augmenting the German Navy. Through diplomatic channels Germany protested sharply against England's action and demanded immediate release of the ship together with compensation. The B r i t i s h Government resent- ed the accusation that she had exceeded her r i g h t s . Eckardstein who was s t r i v i n g f o r an a l l i a n c e , cursed the s t u p i d i t y of the German Foreign Office f o r t h e i r a r i b t r a r y demands. In a private despatch to Eckardstein on January 14, 1900 Holstein revealed h i s impatience at the delay over the release and said the Emp- eror was considering whether someone ought to be sent at once within f o r t y - e i g h t hours to f i n d out d i r e c t l y from London wheth- l.Bulow - Memoirs - vol.1.p.527. 58. er an understanding was possible or i f some other method must be resorted to. He deplored the apathy of the B r i t i s h Govern- 1. ment. That they ever n o t i f i e d the English i n d i r e c t l y of t h e i r i n t e n t i o n to send an Admiral with an ultimatum i s d i s t i n c t l y 2. doubtful. Salisbury at length yielded, ordered the release of the ves s e l , and agreed to compensation. The incident was s e t t l e d , but l e f t i l l - f e e l i n g on both sides which the newspap- ers d i d t h e i r best to preserve. Throughout the entir e course of the war e f f o r t s were made to intervene between B r i t a i n and the Boers. The o r i g i n of the scheme i s v e i l e d i n the mists of obscurity. Lee lays the blame on the Kaiser who i n conversations v/ith the Russians 3. hinted at a c o a l i t i o n . Brandenburg believes Prance f i r s t suggested i t by her c a r e f u l enquiries i n October 1899 regard- ing Germany's attitude towards England i n South A f r i c a and suggestions of precautionary measures against English expansion 4. i n that area. ' Monson, the Engl i s h Ambassador i n Paris, sus- 5. pected Russia. In March 1900 Russia d e f i n i t e l y came forward with a proposal that Germany j o i n i n mediation. Germany de- c l i n e d . In a private note to Lascelles the Emperor said Russia could do so on her own - Germany would not r i s k England's f r i e n d - 6. shipj He t o l d Lascelles during an interview that he thought 1. G.D.vol.3.p.121.XV.471.Holstein to Eckardstein, Jan.14, 1900. Eckardstein - op. c i t . - p.142-3. 2. G.D.vol.3.p.121.German Note. 3. Lee - op. c i t . - vol.1.p.761. 4. Brandenburg - op. c i t . - p.136. 5. B .D.vol. 1.p.233 • ITo.285-6. p. 234.No „ 287.Monson t o Lansdowne . 6. G.D.vol.3.p.124.Note. 59. i t only f a i r England should know and recognise that h i s action had influenced the conduct of Prance and Russia or i n h i s words, 1 c "that I have kept those two t i g e r s quiet." When the Boers asked f o r mediation on March 10, 1900 Bulow consented. On th i s occasion the Emperor wrote to Bulow, "England, the Paramount Power! That pleases S i r Frank Lascelles and pleases i n London. Should, however, London be i n c l i n e d to go into mediation, at any rate i t knows what i t has to expect from us. I f i t turns to us, tant mieux; then my goal i s attained, and England receives South A f r i c a from me J V o i l a J The consequences you can imagine 2. f o r yourself." A t y p i c a l example of the Kaiser's high-flown dreams J Any offers of mediation were declined and the war went on. In January 1901 the Kaiser won favour for himself i n Eng- land by hurrying to the deathbed of h i s Grandmother, Queen V i c - t o r i a . He stayed u n t i l a f t e r the funeral, and maintained e x c e l l - ent r e l a t i o n s with everyone during h i s stay. King Edward was p a r t i c u l a r l y gracious when he bestowed the Order of the Garter on the German Crown Prince. The Kaiser honoured Lord Roberts with the Order of the Black Eagle. At the farewell luncheon, he expressed a wish f o r the formation of an Anglo- German a l l i a n c e 3. which would preserve the peace of the world. Unfortunately, these c o r d i a l f e e l i n g s cooled r a p i d l y when he returned to B e r l i n . 1. B.D.vol.1.p.253.Ho.313.Lascelles to Salisbury, March 2, 1900. 2. G.D.vol.3.p.l24.Hote. 3. Lee - op. c i t . - vol.2.p.11. 60. The German o f f i c i a l s had l i v e d i n terro r a l l the time the Emp- eror was i n England. The German people strongly disproved any f r i e n d l y acts towards England. Prom then on the Kaiser grad- u a l l y became more and more i r i i t a t e d with Great B r i t a i n . The German Press commented on the b r u t a l i t y of the B r i t - i s h Army i n South A f r i c a much to the annoyance of the B r i t i s h . On October 25, 1901 Chamberlain made a speech at Edinburgh i n which he defended B r i t i s h methods, denied b r u t a l i t y , and said the B r i t i s h s o l d i e r s *ere no worse than continental soldiers i n previous wars. He mentioned the Prussians In the Franco- German war. The German public was beside i t s e l f with rage. Bulow t r i e d to extract an apology from Chamberlain. When that f a i l e d to materialize he suggested a public explanation that the speech was not intended as an i n s u l t to Germany. Then he wished a written statement that he could use i n the Reichstag. Lansdowne absolutely declined to take Chamberlain to task. He 1. could not see what Germany had to be so angry about. Austria 2. quite approved Lansdowne's f i r m stand on the question. Thus the bi c k e r i n g went on. For the most part the Germ- an Government kept t h e i r heads and continually assured B r i t a i n of t h e i r desire f o r good r e l a t i o n s . The Press they could not control, nor could the B r i t i s h ministers control t h e i r news- papers. Thus the t̂ ow forces i n each country often worked at 1. B.D.voih.l.p.263.Ho.326.Lansdowne to Buchanan, Hov.26, 1901; p.265.No.328.Lansdowne to Buchanan, Dec. 3, 1901. 2. B.D.vol.l.p.269.No.333.Plunkett to Lansdowne, Jan.19, 1902. 61. cross purposes and made the task more d i f f i c u l t . In the Par East during these years the r e l a t i o n s h i p was just as uncertain. Here again the aims of each were d i f f e r e n t . B r i t a i n viished to maintain the open door and e s t a b l i s h her i n - fluence i n the r i c h e s t parts of China. This brought her int o c o n f l i c t with Russia who looked with hungry eyes upon parts of China that offered her a warm ocean port. Germany wished to protect her already e x i s t i n g commercial enterprises i n China and to extend her influence. In t h i s she saw the advantage of co-operation with England provided the co-operation did not bring her int o opposition to Russia. She would support no scheme that was dire c t e d against Russia. England f e l t t h i s and became cautious• The murder of the German Minister and of German mission- aries i n China gave the Kaiser a wonderful opportunity f o r bom- ba s t i c speeches and s a b r e - r a t t l i n g whose only achievement was the bringing of f r e s h suspicion on German motives. He succeeded i n having the German General, Waldersee, appointed to the supre- me command of the a l l i e d armies i n 1900. In august the Emperor hinted to Lascelles that Salisbury was to blame f o r delay In 1. the f i n a l confirmation of appointment. At t h i s time the German desire f o r j o i n t action was so great that Hatzfeldt proposed to Salisbury a mutual engagement not to acquire t e r r i t o r i a l advantages i n China as a r e s u l t of 1.B.D.vol,2.p.7.Ho.8.Lascelles to Salisbury, Aug. 24% 1900. 62. l c present troubles. The outcome of th i s suggestion was the 2. Yangtsze Treaty of October 1900. When Russia claimed Manchur- i a B r i t a i n wished to protest since t h i s seizure of t e r r i t o r y was contrary to the terms of the treaty. Germany, not wishing to incur the i l l - w i l l of Russia, maintained that Manchuria was 3. excepted from the Treaty. Lansdowne o b l i g i n g l y gave way and when questioned i n the House of Lords brought h i s statements 4. int o l i n e with those of Bulow i n the Reichstag. Lascelles had an idea that although Germany wished to remain on good terms with England she would not be sorry to see B r i t a i n and Japan f i g h t i n g Russia i n the Par East. She, of course, would remain a spectator but would reap the p r o f i t s of a check to Russian aggression.' The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador i n B e r l i n agreed 5. with S h i s . In A p r i l Lascelles had an interview with the Emp- eror during which he gathered the l a t t e r was t r y i n g to i n c i t e B r i t a i n to war with Russia. Russia was not to be trusted. She was advancing and B r i t a i n was doing nothing, thereby l o s i n g her 6. prestige i n the East. This opinion regarding the Emperor's wishes f o r an Anglo-Russian war was shared by Mr.T.H.Sanderson of the Foreign O f f i c e , "The Emperor, who has I believe been 1. G.DZvol.3.p.133.XV1.221.Hatzfeldt to German Foreign O f f i c e , Sept. 14, 1900. 2. B.D.vol.2f.p.l5.No. 17.Salisbury to Las c e l l e s , Oct.15, 1900. 3. B.D.vol.21p.32.Extract from Bulow's speech i n Reichstag, March 15, 1901; p.26,No.35.Lansdowne to MacDonald, Marchl6, 1901. 4. B.D.vol,2.p.28.No.37.Lansdowne to Las c e l l e s , A p r i l 7, 1901. 5. B.D.vol.2.p.46.Ho.59.Lascelles to Lansdowne, March 15, 1901. 6. B.D.vol.2.p.53.No.72.Lascelles to Lansdowne, A p r i l 11, 1901. 63. very excitable since h i s accident i s apparently furious with us f o r not having got i n t o a quarrel with Russia over the bus- iness arid obviously that would have suited the Germans very Is w e l l . " Once again the same atmosphere of d i s t r u s t ] The Germans believed England wished to involve them i n a war from which she could derive the b e n e f i t s . How Englishmen believed the same regarding Germany. The Kais_^er's uncontrolled lang- uage sowed antagonism. In 1902 B r i t a i n shook off her d i s l i k e of a l l i a n c e s so f a r as to negotiate and sign the Anglo-Japanese Agreement. During the e a r l y discussions the statesmen considered the i n - c l u s i o n of Germany but knowledge of the Kaiser's fear of the Yellow P e r i l combined with other d i f f i c u l t i e s deterred them from carrying out the idea. King Edward took an i n t e r e s t i n the proceedings and when the Agreement was signed on January 30, 1902 he advised n o t i f y i n g the Kaiser and h i s Government 2. f i r s t before the Treaty was made pu b l i c . Lansdowne accord- i n g l y informed Eckardstein who thanked him warmly on behalf of 3. the German Government f o r this mark of confidence. The Kaiser wrote to congratulate the King on the new a l l i a n c e "which we 4. a l l look upon as a guarantee of peace i n the East." To Las- c e l l e s he expressed not only approval b#t also surprise that such an a l l i a n c e had not heen concluded e a r l i e r . He was also 1. B.D.vol.2.p.58.Sanderson to Satow, A p r i l 12, 1901. 2. B.D.vol.2.p.121.Minute by King Edward. 3. Lee - op. c i t . vol.2.p.143-4. $.Ibid.p.144. 64. 1. g r a t e f u l f o r the s t r i c t l y c o n f i d e n t i a l communication. Some- what i n contrast to t h i s general r e j o i c i n g comes Billow's l e t t e r to Metternich, March 13, 1902; the Anglo-Japanese Agreement w i l l set aside attempts at a rapprochment between England and Russia f o r the present. Metternich and Eckardstein should observe c a r e f u l l y the B r i t i s h Press since " i t i s important i n view of German decisions i n the future to see against whom the increased self-confidence, which you mention as a r e s u l t of the departure from i s o l a t i o n w i l l be d i r e c t e d . Against Russia, - France, - Ourselves?" The Anglo-Japanese group may come f o r - ' 2. ward i n opposition to Germany's aspirations i n the Far East. The year 1902 found a continuation of the petty i r r i t - a t ions. Metternich complained of the a r t i c l e s In "The Times" as keeping the f i r e s of hatred burning. I t almost seemed as i f the German Press could be as a n t i - B r i t i s h as i t pleased, but i f the B r i t i s h papers r e t a l i a t e d the German Government immediately protested and blamed them f o r the e x i s t i n g i l l - f e e l i n g . The - King and the Kaiser clashed over the Boer Generals i n the summer of 1902. They were received i n England, went on to the Contin- ent and were accorded a tumultuous welcome i n Holland, a c h i l l y one by the French ministers i n Paris, and a most enthusiastic one by the B e r l i n populace. The Kaiser wished to receive them i n spite of the warnings of h i s ministers who were wise enough 1. B.D.vol.2.p.122.No.128.Lascelles to Lansdowne, Feb. 7, 1902. 2. G.D.vol.3.p.l57-8.XVll.l49.Bulow to Metternich, March 13, 1902. 65. to foresee the e f f e c t on England. At the command of the King Lascelles informed the Kaiser that I f he ca r r i e d out h i s intent- ions "his v i s i t to England would he very unpopular i n t h i s country." As a r e s u l t the Kaiser decided to give up the idea, representing h i s act as "a spontaneous and calculated express- 1. ion of courtesy and f r i e n d s h i p to England." Then he said he would receive them as B r i t i s h subjects i f they were presented by L a s c e l l e s . This f e l l through and the matter dropped. Here was another opportunity to stress h i s kindness to and consider- 2. ation f o r England despite the h o s t i l i t y of public opinion. In November the Kaiser paid h i s proposed v i s i t and further i r r i t a t e d h i s uncle. Open f r i c t i o n was avoided and the two parted apparently amicably - the Kaiser delighted with the impression he thought he had made, the King thankful to see hi s troublesome nephew s a f e l y away once more. ''Although t r e a t i e s regarding Sotith A f r i c a , East Asia, and the South Seas seemed to have removed so many causes of f r i c t - ion no r e a l confidence had been established between either the Governments or the peoples of Germany and England. The two nations viewed each other with suspicion and attributed e v i l motives to every small d i f f e r e n c e . Press and Parliament i n both countries were constantly g i v i n g expression to t h i s d i s t r u s t . Yet far-seeing men on both sides of the water ac. - l.Lee. - op. c i t . - vol.2.p.148. 2.Ibid.p.148-9. 3.Eckardstein - op. c i t . - p.245. When the Kaiser l e f t on board his yacht King Edward was heard to murmur "Thank God he's gone J " 66. * knowledged the f e e l i n g that we were of the same kin, that both peoples, i f they d e a l t honourable by one another, were u n a s s a i l - able economically and p o l i t i c a l l y and might long maintain un- 1 • broken the peace of the world." The desire to co-operate revealed i t s e l f again during the Venezuelan A f f a i r 1902-3. Several of the European powers had accounts"of long-standing to s e t t l e with the Venezuelan Govern- ment. Since diplomatic measures secured no r e s u l t England and Germany began to consider the necessity of employing more f o r c e f u l methods. On January 20, 1902 Bulow wrote to the Emp- eror suggesting a peaceful blockade of Venezuelan ports i f they received no s a t i s f a c t i o n f o r German claims. He also wished to get i n touch with the B r i t i s h Government with a view to securing combined a c t i o n . The Emperor added the note - " I f you can be sure B r i t a i n w i l l not use the opportunity to make America sus- picious of Germany and s p o i l the e f f e c t of Prince Henry of 2. Prussia's v i s i t . " In the summer Lansdowne f e l t that In view of the attitude of the Venezuelan Government toward.British shipping he would have to intervene. On July 23 Metternich proposed j o i n t a ction against Venezuela, and suggested a p a c i f - i c blockade. Lansdowne was ready to confer with the German Government but requested time to consider before giving a 3. d e f i n i t e answer. 1. Brandenburg - op. c i t . - p.153. 2. G.D.vol.3.p.l60-l.XV11.241.Bulow to Emperor, Jan. 20, 1902. 3. B.D.vol.2.p.153.Ho.171.Lansdowne to Buchanan, July 23, 1902. 67. The r e s u l t of several discussions was the Agreement to co- operate f i r s t i n sending a f i n a l notice to Venezuela, then i f that f a i l e d , to further, more d r a s t i c , action. Both countries c l a s s i f i e d t h e i r claims f o r damages, and pledged themselves 1. not to make an independent settlement. P i n a l arrangements provided f o r a b e l l i g e r e n t blockade with modifications. In 2. t h i s Germany gave way to England's wishes. The s i t u a t i o n required careful, handling because of the United States and the Monroe Doctrine. On the whole the Americans supported the European powers and avoided adding any complications. The Engli s h press objected to co-opextation with Germany and the United States public opinion leaned towards England. The bomb- ardment and sinking of Venezuelan ships i r r i t a t e d the American public and threatened Anglo-American r e l a t i o n s . S i r Michael Herbert telegraphed to Lansdowne on December 16, 1902 - "The Administration i s not suspicious of us, but i s undoubtedly apprehensive as to German designs. The impression prevails i n Washington that Germany i s using us, and our friends here r e - gret from the point of view of American good f e e l i n g towards 3. us, that we are acting with her." The Germans possibly r e a l i z e d the s i t u a t i o n , f o r Metternich assured Lnasdowne they were desirous of meeting B r i t i s h wishes and would do nothing 1. B.D.vol,2.p.156.No.174.Lansdowne to Buchanan, Nov. 11, 1902. 2. G.D.vol.3«p.l62-4.XVll.258.Billow to Emperor, Dec. 12, 1902; .B.D.vol,2.p.160.No.177.Lansdowne to Metternich, Dec. 2, 1902; p.161.No.179.Lansdowne to Buchanan, Dec. 13, 1902. 3. B.D.vol.2.p.162.No.180.Herbert to Lansdowne, Dec. 16, 1902. 68. 1. to make the B r i t i s h r o l e any more d i f f i c u l t . Lansdowne's statement i n Parliament that no B r i t i s h men-of-war had taken part i n sinking the Venezuelan vessels, and the Prime Minister's promise to uphold the Monroe Doctrine allayed any suspicions the American public may have entertained. They even went so f a r as to express r e l i e f that the B r i t i s h f l e e t was there to check the Germans. I f the a f f a i r were s e t t l e d speedily by a r b i t r a t i o n Herbert considered that f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s between B r i t a i n and the United States would be strengthened rather than impaired by the Venezuelan i n c i d e n t . In support of t h i s b e l i e f he quoted from a leading New York paper "the American people i n general have come to place a higher value than they ever placed before on the mutual goodwill and the co-operation i n common causes of the two great branches of the English-speaking race, the Great 2. Empire, and the Great Republic." Germany delayed her acceptance of a r b i t r a t i o n u n t i l Roose- v e l t , f e a r f u l of public opinion and desirous to preserve amiable r e l a t i o n s , p r i v a t e l y threatened to use the United States navy against possible German aggressive designs i n Venezuela, i f the Kaiser hesitated any longer. As a r e s u l t , Germany yielded and Roosevelt p u b l i c l y congratulated the Kaiser on h i s enthusiasm 3. fo r the cause of a r b i t r a t i o n J Despite the e f f o r t s of Mr. Bowen, the Venezuelan representative, to cause f r i c t i o n between 1. B.D.vol.2.p.162.No.181.Lansdowne to Lascel l e s , Dec. 18, 1902. 2. B.D.vol.2pp.163-4.No.184.Herbert to Lansdowne, Dec. 29, 1902. 3#Newton - Lord Lansdowne'- p.257.; J.B.Bishop - Roosevelt and His Times - vol.1.Chap. 20. f o r Roosevelt's account of the Venezuela incident. 69. the E n g l i s h and German representatives during the negotiations, a settlement was made without either England or Germany break- ing her o r i g i n a l promises. Public opinion i n England objected to such co-operation, and America was none too pleased, but Lansdowne said i n a f t e r y.ears, "the Germans, upon the whole, ran 1. s t r a i g h t as f a r as we were concerned." "The Bagdad Railway overstepped the bounds of Turco-German 2. r e l a t i o n s h i p s and became an i n t e r n a t i o n a l diplomatic problem" when i n 1903 Germany obtained new concessions from the Porte and organized a new company. The terminus of the l i n e was to be at some point on the Persian Gulf. In view of B r i t a i n ' s i n t e r - ests i n t h i s Gulf and the route to India, i t was natural she should watch with apprehension the progress of Germany's vast undertaking. As a guarantee f o r the expenses i t was proposed to Increase the customs revenue of Turkey. In t h i s the other nations had to be consulted. Prominent B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l s fav- oured B r i t i s h p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the construction and control of the l i n e , equal at l e a s t to that of any other power. When Lans- downe brought th i s to the attention o£ the German Ambassador i n March 1902 Metternich saw ho objections as he believed the door 3. was open i n t h i s project. In several memoranda Lansdowne expressed the d e s i r a b i l i t y of i n t e r n a t i o n a l control of t h i s l i n e . Otherwise he f e l t i t menaced B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s i n Persia and i n 1. Nexvton - op. c i t . - p.260. 2. Earle - Turkey, the Powers and the Bagdad Railway - p.7. 3. B.D.vol.2.p.177-8.Ho.204.Lansdowne to Lasc e l l e s , March 18, 1 1902. In 1888 B r i t a i n had the chance of constructing a l i n e to Bagdad,but did not take i t up. In 1899 when Germany had become interested B r i t a i n could have joined i n with the French and Germans but again she l e t her opportunity s l i p , c f . :Earle - op. c i t . p.3x, 59-60. 70. India. Koweit v/as not the only possible terminus on the Pers- ian Gulf. I f B r i t a i n withheld her consent to an increase i n the Turkish revenues and opposed Koweit as the terminus,She would probably delay the construction of the l i n e ; but ultimately, with or without her sanction, i t would be completed. Then B r i t - a i n would f i n d h e r s e l f i n an awkward p o s i t i o n . At that late date she would be able to obtain an i n t e r e s t i n the railway, only at enormous cost, i f at a l l . Therefore, he favoured j o i n - ing Germany,and any other nations who were interested, on an 1. equal f o o t i n g while there was yet time. France, also, was w i l l i n g to invest c a p i t a l provided she had equal advantages. I f Germany t r i e d to arrange matters so that she would have c o n t r o l the French Government would refuse to countenance French p a r t i c i p a t i o n . Germany appeared agreeable to International c o n t r o l , and organised a meeting at B e r l i n i n 1903 of the f i n a n c i a l i n t e r e s t s to discuss terms. B r i t i s h cap- i t a l i s t s proved reluctant at f i r s t , but Lansdowne f i n a l l y per- suaded the House of Baring to represent B r i t a i n o f f i c i a l l y . B r i t i s h public opinion opposed the scheme i n the b e l i e f that i t was a German enterprise and would involve B r i t a i n i n more d i f f i c - 2. u l t i e s . This h o s t i l i t y became so intense that the Government 3. repudiated the idea of co-operation. Therefore B r i t a i n had to drop out, to the disappointment of Lansdowne and many other l a B . D .vol.2,p.178-9.Minute by Lansdowne; p.187-8.No.216.Memor- andum by- Lansdowne, A p r i l 14, 1903. Balfour also favoured co-operation on a basis of equality, c f . Earle - op. c i t . - p.181-2. 2. E a r l e - op. c i t . - p.182-3. The B r i t i s h press indulged i n a v i o l e n t outburst against Germany and the Bagdad Railway. 3. Earle - op. c i t . - p«185. Pressure from public, House of Commons and part of the Cabinet persuaded Balfoxu? not to r i s k the l i f e of h i s ministry on the question of B r i t i s h p a r t i c i p - ation i n the Bagdad Railway. 71. 1. o f f i c i a l s , also B r i t i s h finance. The French Government followed s u i t on the grounds that the proposed terms secured an unfair advantage i n the control to Germany. Apparently Germany was raSher disappointed, and had been prepared to offe r 2. better terms had B r i t a i n asked f o r further discussions. Bulow avers he wished to come to an understanding with England regard- ing the terminus of the Bagdad Railway and to avoid anything that might "arouse opposition or suspicion i n the breasts of India's masters." Arthur von Gwinner had agreed with Billow that "the splendid project of the Bagdad Railway could only be 3. c a r r i e d out i f England agreed to i t . " Thus through the host- i l i t y of the B r i t i s h public and t h e i r d i s t r u s t of anything German, B r i t a i n l o s t an opportunity of co-operating with Germ- any i n an enterprise which concerned her greatly. Judged In the l i g h t of subsequent events the course pursued was a wise one. I t was probably better f o r the a l l i e s i n the war that the 4. railway had never been completed to the Persian Gulf. When the Anglo-German negotiations of 1901 f a i l e d , English statesmen turned to France. In January 1902 Eckardstein, at a dinner at Marlborough House observed Chamberlain and the French > l.B.D.vol.2.p.l96.Mimute by Lansdowne, also Earle - op. c i t . p.185-7. 2. B.D.vol.2.p.l95-6.No.224.0'Conner to Lansdowne, Dec.15, 1903. 3. Billow - Memoirs - vol.1.p.564. 4. Earle - op. c i t . - p.188. holds a d i f f e r e n t views "As events turned out, the f a i l u r e of the Balfour Government to e f f e c t the i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of the Bagdad Railway was a coloss- a l diplomatic blunder. I f the proposed agreement of 1903 had been consummated, the Entente of 1904 between France and England would have taken control of the enterprise out of the hands of the Germans, who would have possessed, with t h e i r Turkish collaborators, only 14 of the 30 votes i n the Board of D i r e c t o r s . " 72. Ambassador, Cambon, i n animated conversation and overheard the words "Morocco" and "Egypt". That same evening Chamberlain hinted to the German representative he would no longer work fo r an a l l i a n c e with Germany, and King Edward expressed his oninion 1 that i t would be wise to accept the French offers of f r i e n d s h i p . From then on very slowly but surely France and England drew clos e r , u n t i l i n 1904 they s e t t l e d t h e i r outstanding differences and entered into a secret understanding regarding Morocco. German diplomats had warned the Foreign Office times without number, but always t h e i r warnings had f a l l e n on deaf ears or 2. had been r i d i c u l e d as naive. In 1903 Eckardstein wrote to Billow of h i s b e l i e f that an understanding between B r i t a i n , France, and Russia was Imminent. King Edward's stay i n Paris had a s s i s t e d matters, and France would soon t r y to draw Russia i n t o any a l l i a n c e with England. Billow thought the whole idea 3. impossible. But time soon proved the t r u t h of Eckardstein's observations. King Edward's v i s i t to Paris, proposed by himself to a s s i s t European r e l a t i o n s with England, turned out success- 4. f u l l y . Billow, e n t i r e l y unsuspicious f o r once, thought i t merely a sign that France would not support Russia against Eng- 5. land i n the East. However, the impossible happened, the 1. Eckardstein - op. c i t . - p.230. 2. G.D.vol.3.p.171.XVII.342.Metternich to German Foreign O f f i c e , Jan. 30, 1902; Brandenburg - op. c i t . - p.192. 3. G.D.vol.3.p.l72.XVll.570.Biilow to Alvensleben, May 13, 1903. 4. Lee - op. c i t . - vol.2.p.236-43.• G.D,vol.3.p.l75-6.XVll. 591.Metternich to Billow, June 2, 1903. 5. Brandenburg - op, c i t , - p.193. 73. Entente Cordiale was formed. Confronted with the f a i t accompli Germany could do nothing save accept the s i t u a t i o n with as good a grace as possib l e . She must have r e a l i s e d i t meant the lessen- ing of B r i t a i n ' s dependence on her goodwill, and of the probabil- i t y of a formal a l l i a n c e between B r i t a i n and the T r i p l e A l l a i n c e . Her only hope now was that Russia would gradually turn away from France towards Germany. Yet the s i t u a t i o n was f a r from being hopeless. Friendship with. France, B r i t a i n said, did not mean enmity towards Germany. B r i t a i n and Germany s t i l l continued t h e i r e f f o r t s to maintain good r e l a t i o n s and to work together whenever possible. Germany r a i s e d d i f f i c u l t i e s to her assent to the Khedivial Decrees by demanding the same p r i v i l e g e s as had been accorded to France. England objected on the grounds that France had given England i n return corresponding p r i v i l e g e s i n Morocco, while . Germany was asking favours and g i v i n g nothing. The other Powers 1. had agreed without question. Eventually England c o n c i l i a t e d Germany by guaranteeing to German commerce i n Egypt for t h i r t y years the most favoured nation treatment, by promising to re s - pect e x i s t i n g German Agreements there, and by other concessions regarding German schools and the status of German o f f i c i a l s . In return Germany recognised the Khedivial Decree of A p r i l 8, 1904 and agreed not to ask f o r a l i m i t of time to B r i t a i n ' s 2. occupation of Egypt. Lansdowne regarded the German attitude 1. B.D.vol.3.p.19-20.No.18.Lansdowne to Metternich, June 6, 1904. 2. B.D.vol.3.p.21.No.19.Lansdowne to Metternich, June 15, 1904. 74. 1. as unjust and grasping, and.resented i t accordingly. Various minor disputes i r r i t a t e d public opinion on e i t h e r side during 1904. Some Englishmen became obsessed by the idea that the German navy was intended to annihilate England, and wrote wild a r t i c l e s i n the press suggesting a preventive war or 'copenhagening the German f l e e t " before i t grew large enough to 2. be a serious menace. The German Government were hi g h l y indign- ant, but were reassured by the responsible E n g l i s h ministers. The str>rm gradually subsided, unfortunately leaving increased suspicion on both sides. The Kaiser experienced a spasm of bi t t e r n e s s towards England and wrote v i o l e n t l e t t e r s to Nicky. His idea now seemed to be a continental c o a l i t i o n against England, Nicky proved unresponsive and the a f f a i r sank into the background u n t i l 1905. For some reason Wilhelm f i r m l y believed England was 3. m a l i c i o u s l y awaiting an opportunity to attack Germany. He complained of s l i g h t s , i n s u l t s , and attacks on him personally i n the E n g l i s h Press. Lansdowne admitted the Kaiser was not a l - together to blame fo r the strained r e l a t i o n s that existed between the Emperor and h i s English uncle. "The King talks and writes about h i s ROJB.1 Brother i n terms which make one's f l e s h creep, and the o f f i c i a l papers which go to him, whenever they r e f e r to His Imperial Majesty, come back with a l l sorts of annotations 4. of a most incendiary character." Even the Dogger Bank i n c i d - 1. Newton - op. c i t . - p.329. 2. G.D.vol.3.p.184.X1X.332.Memorandum by Metternich, Dec, 18,3904 3. Newton - on. c i t . - p.331. 4. I b i d . p. 530". 7 5 e ent was ascribed, unjustly, to German hints to Russia. Gradually the s i t u a t i o n was becoming worse. Seeds of d i s - t r u s t and suspicion, once sown, are not e a s i l y eradicated. German d i s t r u s t of E n g l i s h motives f i n a l l y aroused the resent- ment of the phlegmatic Englishman and created i n England a host- i l e public opinion of which the Government had to take note i f i t wished to remain i n power. O f f i c i a l s i n both countries ob- v i o u s l y laboured to preserve a f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s h i p ; but they could not co n t r o l the Press. Agreements they signed, j o i n t act- ion they undertook during these s i x years, but always the path was stony. The understanding was reached only aft e r dela3'-s, caused by petty grievances on eith e r one side or the other, had robbed the settlement of mush of i t s value. The way seemed so d i f f i c u l t , the goal, when f i n a l l y reached so i n s i g n i f i c a n t that one i s tempted to ask, "Was the r e s u l t worth the struggle?" Yet i t had to be. The two countries could not l i v e i n i s o l a t i o n In so many parts of the globe t h e i r i n t e r e s t s met and overlapped Questions arose and had to be s e t t l e d . Fighting against over- whelming odds the statesmen struggled on, always professing f r i e n d s h i p , always hoping the mirable would happen and Germany- and England f u l f i l t h e i r destiny side by side as guardians of the peace of the world. 76. CHAPTER I I I . The Morocco C r i s i s 1904-1906. After the signing of the Anglo-French Agreements i n 1904 r e l a t i o n s between England and Germany grew s t e a d i l y worse. Although outwardly the German Government accepted the Agreement inwardly they resented i t as i n t e r f e r i n g with t h e i r p o l i c i e s . To say that they d e l i b e r a t e l y set themselves the task of break- ing the newly-formed bonds i s perhaps going a l i t t l e too f a r , despite the incriminating evidence of the following months. Germany's actions during the sudceeding two years l a i d her open to the accusation of attempts to i s o l a t e England by creating a European League, to lure France away from the Entente, or f a i l - ing that to wreck the Dual A l l i a n c e by r e v i v i n g the Three Emp- eror's League. As always her diplomacy lacked f i n e s s e . I f she knew v/hat she wanted, and even i f that desire had a l e g a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n , her method of procedure was so blundering and arrogant that i t aroused the resentment of the other Powers and defeated her own purpose. Her b l u s t e r i n g statements, her steady increase i n naval armaments, and her fear of a B r i t i s h attack bred i n En g l i s h ministers and i n English public opinion a corresponding suspicion of German motives toward England. I t seemed f u t i l e f o r the respective governments to reassure each other. Billow and Hols t e i n t o l d Lascelles the idea that Germany was preparing to attack B r i t a i n woû -d be laughed to 77. scorn "by any German. Yet they considered Germany had every reason to fear that England intended to crush the German navy before i t became too strong. Lascelles maintained on his side the absurdity of the German fears and the j u s t i c e of the B r i t - 1. i s h apprehensions. The Government might, and did, preserve an outv/ardly correct a t t i t u d e ; but the Press recognized the e x i s t i n g h o s t i l i t y and exerted i t s e f f o r t s , not to, ameliorat- ing, but to accentuating the d i f f i c u l t i e s of the s i t u a t i o n . To make matters even worse the King and the Kaiser were anything but kindly disposed to each other, p a r t i c u l a r l y during the l a t t e r part of 1905. As a r e s u l t the Kaiser talked w i l d l y against that arch-intriguer, h i s uncle; while the King declined 2. to have anything to do with h i s tempestuous nephew. Such then was the background for the drama of the Morocco C r i s i s . U n t i l 1905 no one had thought Germany r e a l l y i n t e r e s t - ed i n Morocco despite various hints to the contrary. In 1899 the German Ambassador had r a i s e d the question i n connection with a possible understanding between England and Germany. Salisbury had stated B r i t a i n desired maintenance of the status quo, but i n event of a break-up of the e x i s t i n g Empire, she could not look with indifference on the fate of the A t l a n t i c seaboard. He then enquired the views of the German Government. 1. B.D.vol.3.p.56-8.No.65(a).Lascelles to Lansdowne, Dec.28, 1904 p.58-9.No.65(b).Lascelles to Lansdowne, Dec.30, 1904 p.79. No.97. Lascelles to Lansdowne, Junel2, 1905 G.D.vol.3.p.212-3.XIX.372.Biilow to Emperor, Dec. 26, 1904. 2. Lee - op. c i t . - vol.2.p.346-54. 78, The Ambassador proved non-committal, merely s t a t i n g that he con- sidered an exchange of views on the subject desirable i n event 1. of an emergency. The matter came up again during the Kaiser's v i s i t to England i n November 1899, when Chamberlain discussed a 2. possible p a r t i t i o n i n which Germany would receive a share. As the Germans waited f o r the B r i t i s h to make the d e f i n i t e sug- gestions i n w r i t i n g the negotiations dragged and f i n a l l y came to 3. nothing. Germany l o s t her opportunity through her p o l i c y of not tunning a f t e r England. In 1900 Bulow said that Germany had maritime i n t e r e s t s of her own i n Morocco and no German Gov- ernment could afford to look with indifference on the seizure of Moroccan t e r r i t o r y or any arrangements i n which Germany had not 4. been consulted. France, however, desired an agreement with England alone regarding Morocco. In 1902 the French Ambassador discussed with Lansdowne the disturbed state of Morocco and the a d v i s a b i l - i t y , i f intervention were necessary, of excluding various powers who had no r e a l i n t e r e s t s i n the problem, namely Germany and the United States. He gave Lansdowne the impression that France 5. would not mind i f the Moroccan Empire disintegrated. About 1. B.D.vol.2.p.256.BO.307.Salisbury to Lascell e s , June 7, 1899; Brahdenburg - op. c i t . - p.146. 2. G.D.vol.3.p.108-114.XV.413.Memorandum by Bulow, Nov. 24, 1899. 3. Brandenburg - op. c i t . - p.146. 4. Anderson - The F i r s t Moroccan C r i s i s 1904-1906. - p.64. 5. B.D.vol.2.p.274-5.No.330.Lansdowne to Monson, Dec. 31, 1902. France bought I t a l y by agreeing to allow her a free hand i n T r i p o l i ; and made an arrangement with Spain recognizing her sbbere of influence i n Morocco. 79. . the same time Metternich expressed the b e l i e f that a l l the Pow- ers wished to maintain the status quo i n Morocco and to avoid 1. a l l intervention i n that country. The previous year i n an o f f i c i a l memorandum the German Government. had set f o r t h the p r i n c i p l e of a p o l i c y of reserve i n Morocco, as they did not consider the question i n I t s e l f of s u f f i c i e n t inportance to run 2. the r i s k of serious i n t e r n a t i o n a l compli.cations. In view of these reserved utterances France decided to follow her i n c l i n a t i o n s , ignore Germany, and come to an agree- ment with England regarding her in t e r e s t s i n Morocco. In the - Convention signed A p r i l 8, 1904 both countries declared t h e i r i n t e n t i o n to uphold the status quo and the p r i n c i p l e of the op- en door i n Morocco. Secret a r t i c l e s recognized French i n t e r e s t s i n that country and promised En g l i s h diplomatic support to 3. France i n event of any d i f f i c u l t i e s . Kt the time none of the Powers ra i s e d objections, rather they welcomed the improvement i n Anglo-French r e l a t i o n s that had made these arrangements poss- i b l e . Germany received no o f f i c i a l n o t i f i c a t i o n of the Agree- ment concerning Morocco, but the news was published i n the papers. Billow d i d not see anything detrimental to German i n t e r - 1. B.D.vol.2.p.275.No.331.Landdowne to Lascel l e s , Dec. 31, 1902. 2. B.D.vol.2.p.96. Enclosure i n No.104.Memorandum Communicated by Metternich, Sept. 3, 1901. 3. Grey - op. c i t . - vol.1.p.50. says regarding this Convention "On the face of the Agreement with France there was nothing more than a desire to remove caused of dispute between the two nations, to iaake up old quarrels, to become fr i e n d s . I t was a l l made public, except a clause or two of no importance, which were not published at the time, owing to regard, as I suppose, f o r the s u s c e p t i b i l i t i e s of the Sultan of Morocco; even these were published a few years l a t e r . " An amazing statement! 80. 1. ests and passed over the i n c i d e n t . The Kaiser several times 2. expressed his i n d i f f e r e n c e to the whole question. Backed by the terms of the Convention Prance soon proceed- ed to take action i n Morocco. Since the corruption and incom- petency of the Sultan's Government rendered reforms necessary, Prance undertook to have these c a r r i e d out thereby e s t a b l i s h - ing securely her Influence over the country. Then Germany began to b e s t i r h e r s e l f . Bulow and H o l s t e i n i n p a r t i c u l a r became alarmed and i n i t i a t e d a p o l i c y doomed to d i s a s t e r . In a Memorandum of June 3, 1904, H o l s t e i n set f o r t h his point of view. I f Prance obtained control of Morocco German commercial in t e r e s t s would s u f f e r . Since Morocco was one of the few r e - maining parts of the world s t i l l open to free competition i n trade, Germany could not a f f o r d to allow her interests there to be disregarded. Besides her prestige would s u f f e r . There- fore she must protest against Prance's intentions. I t was p e r f e c t l y safe to assume that B r i t i s h diplomatic support pro- mised i n the Convention would remain pl a t o n i c . He concluded by saying " I f we l e t ourselves be trampled on i n Morocco, we 3. s h a l l encourage them to do i t again elsewhere." Billow held 1. B.D.vol.3.p.69-70.Ho.86.Lansdowne to B e r t i e , May 3, 1905. c f . Hale - Germany and the Diplomatic Revolution - p.79. f o r the attitude of some of the German Papers. They ex- pressed d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n , asking where was Germany's place i n the sun, and what would be the future of German trade i n Morocco. 2. Brandenburg - op. cit„ - p.219; Billow - Memoirs - vol.2. p. 100-101. Billow t e s t i f i e s to the Kaiser's indifference to Morocco and h i s willingness to l e t Prance occupy, h e r s e l f there and so turn her attention away from the l o s t provinces. 3. G.D.vol.3.p.220-1.XX.207.Memorandum by Holstein, June 3, 1904 81. the same views; he objected to these two powers arrogantly d i s - posing "of a great and most important f i e l d of c o l o n i a l i n t e r - ests without even deigning to take the German Empire into con- • 1. s i d e r a t i o n . " " I f once we suffered ourselves to be trampled on with impunity, t h i s f i r s t attempt to treat us badlv would 2. soon have been followed by a second and a t h i r d . " Obviously something must be done to checkmate the French. The German Ambassador i n Morocco had complained of French 3. arrogance and urged the Germans to take action. F i n a l l y the Government sent Dr. Vassel to Fez to inform the Sultan that Germany had not consented to French proceedings. Although no e f f e c t u a l a i d was promised - Billow d i s t i n c t l y said that Germany would not go to war with France over Morocco - the Sultan de- 4. cided to r e s i s t the French. A l l t h i s took place very qui e t l y , almost s e c r e t l y . Then out of a seemingly clear sky came the thunderbolt. In March 1905 the Kaiser v i s i t e d Tangier and proclaimed the independence of the Sultan, and the i n t e g r i t y 5. of h i s domains. Europe was dumbfounded. What d i a b o l i c a l schemes was B e r l i n planning? The Kaiser proclaims h i s reluctance to comply with Billow.*s suggestion and evidence confirms the t r u t h of h i s statements. When Billow suggested that the Emperor land at Tangier while he 1.Billow - Imperial Germany - p.78. 2.Ibid. p.80. 3. G,D.vol.3.p.219.XX.202.Mentzingen to Billow, A p r i l 5, 1904; Brandenburg - op. c i t . - p.219. 4. Brandenburg - op. c i t . - p.219. 5. c f . Wilson - op. c i t . - p.98. 82. was c r u i s i n g i n the Mediterranean, Wilhelm refused. At length, a f t e r exhausting arguments, Billow prevailed upon the Emperor, 1. who gave in"with a heavy heart." Even then Billow was not sure of h i s master. To make r e t r e a t impossible he published an o f f i c i a l notice i n the "Nord-Deutsche Allgemeine Z e i t i n g " of 2. the coming v i s i t to Tangier. S t i l l the Kaiser was uneasy, he feared the possible e f f e c t on Baris and dreaded anything that might strengthen the bond between England and Prance. 3. U n t i l the l a s t moment he: hoped fo r some excuse not to land. Nevertheless, he had to carry out the programme. Europe blam- 4. ed the Kaiser for t h i s i n d i s c r e t i o n , this time unjustly. For once, at l e a s t , h i s i n s t i n c t s were wiser than the counsels of h i s advisers. Billow had sown the ?/ind and was to reap the whirlwind. What he hoped to gain by t h i s demonstration i s 5. somewhat obscure. He seems for the time being to have be- 1. Wilhelm I I . - Memoirs - p.107. 2. G.D.vol.3.p.223.XX.262.Billow to Emperor, March.20, 1905. 3. G.D.vol.3.p.224.XX.285.Schoen to German Foreign O f f i c e , March 31, 1905; Schoen - Memoirs - p.19-20; Brandenburg - op. c i t . - p.221. 4.Wilhelm I I . - Memoirs - p. 109. He p l a i n t i v e l y remar&s that he got the blame fo r obeying h i s ministers. 5.Pribram - op. c i t . - p.102. says that the Kaiser d i s l i k e d the idea "but he allowed himself to be persuaded by Billow, behind whom Holstein as the r e a l i n s t i g a t o r lay hidden, to c a l l at Tangier on h i s Mediterranean cruise.; Gooch - Studies i n Modern History - p.86. maintains Hol- s t e i n was the originator of the Tangier scheme. Billow approved i t and forced i t on the Kaiser. Hale - op. c i t . - p.119, holds Billow and Holstein respon- s i b l e as i n s t i g a t o r s of Morocco action. Billow - Memoirs - vol,2.p. 107. claims that he was the i n - s t i g a t o r of the whole a f f a i r , that H o l s t e i n had not as much influence during Billow's regime as before. 83. - come imbued with the Kaiser's delight i n s a b r e - r a t t l i n g . He probably hoped th i s act would overawe the powers and deter Fr- 1. ance from further a c t i v i t i e s i n Morocco. Unfortunately f o r him, the e f f e c t was the exact opposite. Europe regarded i t as a piece of unwarrantable impudence. King Edward wrote to Lans- downe; "The Tangier incident was the most mischievous and u n c a l l ed f o r event which the German Emperor has ever been engaged i n since he came to the throne. I t was also a p o l i t i c a l t h e a t r i c - a l f i a s c o , and i f he thinks he has done himself good i n the eyes of the world he i s very much mistaken. He i s no more nor less than a p o l i t i c a l 'enfant t e r r i b l e ' and one can have no f a i t h i n any of h i s assurances. His own pleasure seems to 2. wish to set every country by the ears." Lansdowne consider- ed the incident i n keeping with Germany's secret attitude to- ward the Anglo-French Agreement, and the Kaiser's d i s p o s i t i o n to put a spoke i n England's wheels. He did not think Germany 1. c f . Biilow - Memoirs - vol.2.p. 104. for Billow's own statement of h i s intentions regarding Morocco. He-says:"In the face of t h i s chain of French aggressions i t seemed to me necess- ary to remind Paris again of the German Empire. I t was not only the extent of our economic and p o l i t i c a l interests In and about Morocco which decided me to advise the Kaiser to set his face against Prance, but also the conviction that i n the interests of peace we must no longer permit such provoc- ations. I d i d not desire war with France either then or l a t e r , because I knew that every serious c o n f l i c t as things lay i n Europe would lead to a world war. But I did not hes- i t a t e to confront France with the p o s s i b i l i t y of war becavise I had confidence i n my own s k i l l and caution. I f e l t that I could prevent matters coming to a head, cause Delcasse's f a l l , break the continuity of aggressive French p o l i c y , knock the continental dagger out of the hands of EdwardVTI. and the war group i n England, and, simultaneously ensure peace, preserve German honour, and improve German prestige." 2. Lee - op. c i t . - vol.2.p.340. 84. had anything to complain about i n the Morocco Agreement, since 1. i t provided for the i n t e g r i t y of Morocco. Bulow had instructed the Kaiser to avoid committing Germ- 2. an$r to any d e f i n i t e p o l i c y i n h i s speeches at Tangier. He should have known that Wilhelm's tongue was l i k e l y to run away with him. The Emperor proclaimed that he would deal with the Sultan as an independent sovereign, secure recognition f o r Germ- 3. any's just claims, and would expect Prance to recognize them. No wonder Europe gasped. How were they to know that Germany had no war-like intentions hut merely wished "to uphold German prestige, to show they were not w i l l i n g to be l e f t out, to check Prance's introduction of a p o l i c y of peaceful penetration u n t i l Germany's consent had been obtained by means of concessions 4. elsewhere." After Tangier Germany was d e f i n i t e l y committed to a p o l - i c y of upholding the i n t e g r i t y of Morocco i n the face of Anglo- French opposition. She had Irrevocably pledged h e r s e l f to the p o l i c y of the open door and equality of commercial in t e r e s t among the nations i n Morocco. She was working not for h e r s e l f , but f o r Morocco and the l e s s e r powers. She was the champion of the weak against the grasping might of the strong. She l i v e d to regret her r o l e . Had i t not been so openly proclaimed 1. Newton - op. c i t . - p.334. 2. Hale - op. cit.-p.101. 3. Brandenburg - op. c i t . - p.221. 4.Ibid.p.222. 85. she could probably have obtained compensations from Prance and 1. drawn closer to her i n a general settlement of differ e n c e s . 2. Prance was somewhat puzzled. Her e f f o r t s to f i n d out what compensations Germany wished proved unavailing. The Wilhelm- strasse maintained a sphinx-like s i l e n c e . Then the Sultan sug- gested a conference of the Powers to discuss the s i t u a t i o n . Germany, welcoming an honourable way out of the d i f f i c u l t y , immediately accepted the i n v i t a t i o n and urged the others to 3. follow s u i t . Prance hesitated. England considered a Confer- 4. ence unnecessary but promised to do as Erance wished. The smaller powers made t h e i r acceptance conditional upon that of England and Prance. negotiations proceeded between Prance and Germany regard- ing the Conference. Prance was reluctant to agree. Delcasse, the Foreign Minister, pursued a p o l i c y antagonistic to Germany. 1. c f . Hieolson - Lord Carnock - p.164. Rouvier offered a d i r e c t Franco-German Agreement i n settlement of outstand- ing questions, p.166. Billow and Holstein never t o l d the Kaiser at the time. When he learned of i t several years l a t e r he wrote,"If I had been t o l d about t h i s , I should have gone int o i t thoroughly and the i d i o t i c Conference would never have taken place." 2. B.D.vol.3.p.69-70.No.86.Lansdowne to B e r t i e , May 3, 1905; p.68.No. 84. Bertie to Lansdowne, A p r i l 27, 1905. 3. B.D.vol.3.p.79-80.No.77.Lascelles to Lansdov/ne, Junel2, 1905. p.80-2.No. 98.Lascelles to Lansdowne, Junel2, 1905. 4. B.D.vol.3.p.89. No.3.08.Lansdowne to Lowther, June 5, 1905. p.92. No.116.Lansdowne to Lowther, June 8, 1905. 86. The Germans p r a c t i c a l l y refused to do anything so long as he 1. remained i n o f f i c e . Rouvier, i n the hope of improving Francd German r e l a t i o n s , forced Delcasse's resign a t i o n . This appear- ed as a triumph for Germany, but instead of pursuing th e i r ad- vantage by c o n c i l i a t i n g France the German Governmant s t i l l i n - s i s t e d on i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n t r o l i n Morocco, and a Conference. Rouvier soon saw the f o l l y of being a pawn i n Germany's hands and s t i f f e n e d French resistance. Moreover, England had assured 2. him of her u n f a i l i n g support. Obviously the German aim was to prevent France from assum 3. ing a protectorate over Morocco. They might pose as bene- factors of the world but at bottom they were working f o r t h e i r own i n t e r e s t s . King Edward commented "In p l a i n English - Germ- 4. any ousts France from Morocco and puts h e r s e l f i n her place." English ministers were annoyed with Germany. They could not see why the German Government had to make so much fuss over Morocco where her i n t e r e s t s were considerably less than those of France and England. None of the other Powers had voiced 1. B.D.vol.3.p.78.No.96.Bertie to Lansdowne, June 10, 1905. G.D,vol.5.p.227.XX.358.Memorandum by Holstein, May 2, 1905. Hale - op. c i t . - Chapter V shows that Delcasse's p o l i c y was unpopular i n the House of Deputies. Really Rouvier was giving i n to his own countrymen i n dismissing Delcasse as much as he was c o n c i l i a t i n g the Germans. Germany did object to Delcasse's Morocco p o l i c y but so did Rouvier and some of the French, and they knew i t . The French press expressed general s a t i s f a c t i o n at the Minister's resignat- ion, regarding i t not as a nation a l humiliation imposed on France by Germany but as a natural r e s u l t of Delcasse's own b l i n d and mistaken p o l i c y . 2. B.D.vol.3.p.72.No.80.Lansdowne to B e r t i e . A p r i l 22, 1905; G.D.vol.3.p.2S2-3.XX.647.Metternich to Bulow, July 22, 1905 3. G.D.vol.3.p.234-7.Metternich to Billow, Jan.3, 1906; B.D.vol.3.p.222-3,No.240.Lascelles to Grey, Jan.13, 1906. 4. B.D.vol.3.p.106.Minute by King Edward. 87. objections, why should Germany. The German o f f i c i a l s came to 1. believe that England v/ould l i k e to see a war with Germany. I f such a c o n f l i c t broke out England would side with Prance. Had the Germans wished to prove to the French the u n r e l i a b i l i t y of E n g l i s h promises of assistance, they were f a i l i n g rather badly. Metternich t o l d Lansdowne he thought the French would 2. come to terms " i f you do not s t i f f e n t h e i r backs for them." German honour was staked upon a Conference. In despair the Kaiser appealed to Roosevelt to exert pressure upon Prance and England to make"them accept. Roosevelt did not care to be mixed up i n Morocco, nor d i d he wish to take sides between 4. Prance and Germany. Eventually the French compromised and agreed to a Conference. Then came the question of a programme. Again negotiat- ions proceeded between Paris and B e r l i n ; again Roosevelt had to 5. come to the rescue; again B r i t a i n supported France 6nd was taken f u l l y into the French confidence. Whereas before the German Government had pressed eagerly f o r a Conference, now that France Had consented i n p r i n c i p l e , they d i l l y - d a l l i e d , r e f u s i n g to say exactly what they wanted, always coming f o r - ward with some fre s h proposals, d e c l i n i n g to .agree to a date 6. and place f o r meeting. At length, they reached an agreement, 1. G.D.vol.3.p.230.XX.418,Bulow to Tattenbach, June 7, 1905.; p.227-8 XX.368.Eulow to G rman Foreign O f f i c e , May 5, 1905. 2. B.D.vol.3.p.92-3.No.117.Lansdowne to Lascelles,June8, 1905. 3. Bishop - o p . c i t . - vol.1.p.468-71. 4.Ibid.p.472. 5.Ibid.p.479-87. 6.B.D.vol.3.p.128.No.179.Lister to Lansdowne,. Aug.15, 1905; p.!29.No.3.72.Cartwright to Lansdowne, Aug.24, 1905; p.140. No.182.Bertie to Lansdowne, Sept.24, 1905. 88. the Conference should discuss p o l i c e , finance, customs and rev- enue, and equality i n commerce. On the i n v i t a t i o n of Spain, who was also interested i n Morocco, the Conference was to he held i n Spain e a r l y i n 1906. Then came the question of representatives. The chief French delegate was M. E e v o i l ; the German, Herr von Radowitz, ass i s t e d hy Count Tattenbach; the sole B r i t i s h representative was S i r Arthur Nicolson. The other delegates played secondary roles f o r the most part, with the possible exception of the Aus- t r i a n s , the I t a l i a n s , and the Americans. To Spain f e l l the honour of supplying the President of the Conference. Germany did not approve t h e i r e a r l y choice of a delegate and hastened to warn the Spanish Government that h i s appointment would be regarded as an unfriendly act. Nicolson regretted that Spain 2. should not be allowed a free hand i n appointing her delegate. Nicolson had emphatic i n s t r u c t i o n s to support France to the f u l l 3. as agieed i n A r t i c l e IX. of the Anglo-French Convention. From one point of view the Morocco c r i s i s and the A l g e c i r - as Conference may be regarded as an Anglo-German duel. From beginning to end the B r i t i s h Government supported the French whole-heartedly. In the e a r l y stages France may have f e l t a l i t t l e doubtful of B r i t i s h intentions, but continual assurances by word and deed convinced her that her fears were groundless. 1. B.D.vol.3.p.143.Enclosure I. i n No.184., Sept. 28, 1905. 2. B.D.vol.3.p.l50.No.l92.Nicolson to Grey, Dec. 14, 1905. 3. B.D.vol.3.p.161.No.199.Grey to Nicolson, Dec. 20, 1905.; p.151.No.193.Grey to Nicolson, Dec. 14, 1905. 89. Eol s t e i n ' s comforting b e l i e f i n purely platonic support went by the boards. I f Germany was out to wreck the Entente, B r i t - a i n was determined to preserve i t , and strengthen it.Metternich accused the Eng l i s h of being more French than the French, and of encouraging French re s i s t a n c e . Germany, knowing that the Agreement c a l l e d only f o r diplomatic support, d i s l i k e d the . attitude assumed by t h e " B r i t i s h p u b l i c , who acted as i f armed 1. support were promised. Germany, i s s u i n g a challenge to France, found h e r s e l f answered by two countries instead of one. Before the end of the Conference she was destined to f i n d h e r s e l f p r a c t i c a l l y i s o l a t e d . She became entangled i n the net she had spread f o r B r i t a i n ; and then turned round and accused B r i t a i n of m a l i c i o u s l y i n t r i g u i n g to e n c i r c l e Germany. For a moment i t i s necessary to go back to July 1905 to a d e l i g h t f u l comic-opera interlude enacted i n Northern waters by the Admiral of the A t l a n t i c and the Admiral of the P a c i f i c . The Kaiser was at t h i s time possessed with a b i t t e r hatred f o r England. He dire c t e d a l l h i s e f f o r t s to i s o l a t i n g the object of h i s hate. In 1904 he had t r i e d to secure an a l l i a n c e with Russia but the attempt had f a l l e n through. Nov/, the s i t u a t i o n was d i f f e r e n t . Russia had suffered defeat at the hands of Jap- an. The Czar f e l t i s o l a t e d and f r i e n d l e s s , f o r France, h i s a l l y , had done l i t t l e to a s s i s t him during t h i s ignominious war; while at the peace conference the nations were i n d i f f e r - 1.B.D.vol,3.p.209-11.No.229.Gs?ey to Lascelles, Jan.9, 1906. 90. ent. Never would a better opportunity offe r i t s e l f . The Kaiser c r u i s i n g i n Northern waters placed himself at the Czar's service should the Russian favour a meeting. The Czar wired back d e l - ighted acceptance. The two yachts anchored at Bjttrko and ex- changed courtesies. W i l l y caught Nicky at the psychological moment, posed as h i s ffciend and saviour, produced the treaty, scorned a year ago, and induced the Czar to sign. In Nicky's cabin, i n the presence of the s p i r i t s of th e i r ancestors, they pledged t h e i r k i n g l y words and sealed t h e i r compact with an em- brace. The treaty, according to the Kaiser's fond b e l i e f , was to be a landmark i n h i s t o r y . He had won Russia, through her he would win France from the Entente. Then England would be alone, against a continental a l l i a n c e . What a gloriotis revenge for a l l the s l i g h t s and i n s u l t s he had received at the hands of the English] "Thus the act was accomplished. How was i t poss- i b l e ? The Emperor's explanation was simple and s a t i s f y i n g - God d i d i t . For He was present, as were various s p i r i t s and shades of dead and departed kinsmen. A humble and depressed Czar and an i n s p i r e d Emperor with h i s 'Losungen der Briiderge- meinde', tears, sighs, and embraces, many a dainty dish and f l a s k of old wine, many a s a t i s f y i n g burst of anger at absent 1. enemies - no wonder the BjBrkb Treaty was signedJ " The Kaiserts triumph was short l i v e d . Billow found f a u l t 1.Anderson - op. c i t . - p.285. 91. with the addition of the words " i n Eurot)e" to the clause promis- 1. ing assistance i n case of war, Russia could be of most use to Germany i n attacking England's Indian f r o n t i e r . When the Czar's ministers found out, they condemned i t as contrary to the s p i r i t of the Dual A l l i a n c e . The unlucky Czar had to write to the Kaiser withdrawing h i s consent. The Kaiser stormed i n vain. The Treaty never came int o e f f e c t , so that attempt to i s o l a t e England f a i l e d dismally. The E n g l i s h knew p r a c t i c a l l y nothing of the interview. The only B r i t i s h diplomatist who got any information was Mr. Tower i n Munich, who knew a member of the Kaiser's s u i t . This German prince had sat next to the Czar at lunch on the f a t e f u l day. He had noticed the Czar seemed i n high s p i r i t s ; the Kaiser r e s t l e s s l y t a l k a t i v e and s i l e n t i n turn, seemed preoccupied through the whole c r u i s e . "The Kaiser's t a l k i s ever of a l l i a n - ces and p o l i t i c a l combinations, and he gave utterance on the cruise to h i s cherished idea of being able to e f f e c t a c o a l i t - ion between Germany, Prance, and Russia to the exclusion of 2. Great B r i t a i n . " Lansdowne r e p l i e d to Tower's l e t t e r , "I must say that the d e s c r i p t i o n of the Kaiser's language and demeanour f i l l s me with d i s q u i e t . What may not a man i n such a frame of 3. mind do next?" Of the r e a l facts Europe remained i n ignor- ance . 1. Billow - Memoirs - vol.2.p. 131-2.; Pribram - op. c i t . - p.104-5 '. Gooch - Studies i n Modern History - p.79. Mr. Gooch says that Billow r e l i e d on Holstein's advice i n every step i n the Bjorkb* a f f a i r . 2. Newton - op. c i t . - p.337. 3.Ibid.p.338. 92. To return to the Morocco question. The change of Govern- ment i n B r i t a i n at the end of 1905 placed S i r Edward Grey i n charge of Foreign A f f a i r s . He loyally, c a r r i e d on the po l i c y of Lansdowne i n supporting France. His sympathies were with the French i n t h i s question and he l e f t neither side i n doubt as to h i s a t t i t u d e . With Metternich he was quite frank. In event of war between France and Germany he f e l t sure that English public opinion would not allow the Government to remain n e u t r a l . Metternich argued that Germany might not be the aggressor; that England was bound to give only diplomatic support; that Germany v/as too strong a nation to allow h e r s e l f to be overawed by Fran- ce and B r i t a i n combined; that,so long as B r i t a i n supported France, Germany could not, f o r the sake of d i g n i t y , make the concessions that she could make to France alone. Grey remain- ed adamant. France should have support to the f u l l . He could not hope to improve Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s nor the h o s t i l e a t t i - tude of the B r i t i s h press u n t i l the Conference had s e t t l e d the 1. question. Then he hoped to work for f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s , Metternich saw the dangers and warned hi s Government:"Here the Morocco question i s generally regarded as a test of the Anglo- Fr e n c h Entente and our Morocco p o l i c y as an attempt to smash 2. i t up," To the Frendh Ambassador Grey promised f u l l diplomatic 1. B.D.vol.3.p.209-ll.No.229.Grey to Las c e l l e s , Jan. 9, 1906. G.D.vol.3.p.234-7.Metternich'to Billow, Jan. 3, 1906. 2. G.D.vol,3.p.237.XXI.52.Metternich to German Foreign O f f i c e , Jan. 4, 1906. 93. backing. In answer to the French enquiries regarding armed assistance he was more wary. He f e l t that above a l l things he must preserve England's r i g h t to freedom of action; and avoid making pledges that he might not be able to f u l f i l . As he pointed out to Cambon i t was one thing f o r him to warn Metter- n i c h that i n case of c o n f l i c t England would intervene, but i t was altogether d i f f e r e n t f o r him to repeat the same assurance to the Frendh. I f the test came and he were unable to f u l f i l t h i s threat to Germany no harm would be done; but i f he made the promise to France and then had to break i t he'and England 1. would be disgraced before the nations of Europe. So the French had to proceed without formal assurance of anything save f u l l diplomatic support. Nevertheless there seemed to be an undercurrent of f e e l i n g that France was sure of B r i t i s h aid i n an emergency. The rumour that England offered to land 120,000 men i n Schleswig and give France m i l i t a r y assistance i n war against Germany has been emphatically denied by the B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l s and has no evidence to support i t i n any of 2. the documents. However, m i l i t a r y conversations between the General S t a f f s were permitted by Grey without the knowledge 1. B.D..vol.3.p.l70-l.No.210.Grey to B e r t i e , Jan.10, 1906.; p.177-8.No.216.Grey to B e r t i e , Jan.15, 1906.; p.180-2.No.219.Grey to B e r t i e , Jan.31, 1906.; p.266-7.No.299.Memorandum by Grey, Feb.20, 1906.; Grey - op. c i t . - vol.1.p.82-5. 2. B.D.vol.3.p.87.No.105(a).Sanderson to Temperley, Aug.17, 1922 p.87.No.105(b).Comment by Lansdowne, Ap. 4, 1927. Newton - op. c i t . - p.484. 9 4 c of the whole Cabinet. He was very care'ful to make i t absolute- l y clear that neither B r i t a i n nor Prance were at a l l committed 1. by these conversations. "The communications must be s o l e l y p r o v i s i o n a l and non-committal", and should take place with the cognizance of the o f f i c i a l heads of the Admiralty and the War 2 . O f f i c e . The point was a very f i n e one. Admittedly I t was advisable to be prepared f o r speedy action and transport of troops i n case of necessity. Yet, i n spite of Grey's s t i p u l a t - ions, d i d not the conversations carry with them an obli g a t i o n of honour? Nevertheless, the communications continued, plans were perfected and when the test came i n 1 9 1 4 were executed 3 . as Haldane says without a h i t c h . One f e e l s that whether Grey wished i t or not he would be i n e v i t a b l y dragged into a 4 . c o n f l i c t should Prance and Germany f a i l to reach an agreement. The Conference opened at Algeciras on January 1 6 , 1 9 0 6 , and dragged p a i n f u l l y on u n t i l the beginning of A p r i l . Most of the negotiating was done behind the scenes In conversations between representatives. There i s no doubt that Hicolson 5 . played a very important part i n preventing f a i l u r e . The United States delegate also worked to secure harmony but avoid- ed doing anything to offend Prance and England. Germany, then, 1 . Grey - op, c i t , - vol. 1 .Chap. 6 . 2 . B.D.vol.3 .p.1 7 4 .Minute by Grey. 3 . Haldane - Before the War - p . 3 3 - 5 . 4 . c f . C h u r c h i l l - World C r i s i s - v o l . 1 . p . 2 7 . "However e x p l i c - i t l y the two Governments might agree and aff i r m to each other that no n a t i o n a l or p o l i t i c a l engagement was involved i n these te c h n i c a l discussions, the f a c t remained that they constituted as exceedingly potent t i e . " 5 . c f . Nicolson - Lord Carnock - for the part played by N i c o l - son at the Conference. 95. soon found h e r s e l f i n an awkward p o s i t i o n . The most d i f f i c u l t question, as expected, was the Po l i c e . The French wanted the force i n the hands of themselves and Spain. Germany held out fo r i n t e r n a t i o n a l control or control by the Sultan himself. Neither side could be shaken from i t s p o s i t i o n . Several times i t seemed as i f the Conference must break up. In which case matters must be so manoeuvred that the blame f o r the f a i l u r e would f a l l not on France but on Germany. Such was the aim of the French and the B r i t i s h , also the Spanish who, on the whole, despite German e f f o r t s to detach them, worked with the Entente. During the e a r l y stages, the German representative, Tatt- enbach, endeavoured to detach Nicolson from his l o y a l t y to France, and urged him to bring pressure to bear on the French to accept German demands. He hinted that i f the Conference f a i l e d i t would be l a r g e l y Nicolson's f a u l t . Nicolson was furious, but co n t r o l l e d himself and informed Tattenbach that England intended to f u l f i l her obligations to France. While he c e r t a i n l y would not urge concessions on the French, he would 1. not encourage them to r e s i s t . He wrote home to Grey regard- ing Tattenbach and the general s i t u a t i o n . "He i s a rasping, disagreeable man, not straightforward or t r u t h f u l and evident- l y has to exercise much e f f o r t to control his temper. M.Revoil complains that M.de Radowitz i s too elusive to treat with, and that he cannot bring him to the point. This M.Revoil a t t r i - l.B.D.vol.3.p.241.No.265.Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 4, 1906. 96. butes to the f a c t that the Germans do not r e a l l y know what they want. I t e l l him that I have l i t t l e doubt that they do 1. know; but unfortunately they keep i t to themselves." At l a s t Germany made concessions i n the police question. The French declined to compromise. Opinion at the Conference swung away from France momentarily. Rumour had i t that Eng- l i s h support would be withdrawn unless France c o n c i l i a t e d Germ- any. Both Nicolson and the B r i t i s h Government denied the sug- gestion and reassured the French. Whatever t h e i r private op- i n i o n the E n g l i s h would redeem t h e i r promise. Fortune favour- ed the French f o r B e r l i n came to i t s senses. Billow, r e a l i z i n g that Germany was heading f o r the abyss, took the matter out of Holstein's hands; and devoted his e f f o r t s to getting out of the a f f a i r with as l i t t l e loss of prestige for Germany as poss- i b l e . That Germany was i s o l a t e d he had l i t t l e doubt, the vote of March 3 i n the Conference had shown that. He could probably r e l y on the'support of A u s t r i a ; but of I t a l y he could not be sure; and the United States were apparently more on the French 2. side. They agreed to French and Spanish control of the police under the inspection of a Swiss. In the Bank they ob- tained i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n t r o l . . On the face of i t Germany a t t a i n ed what she wanted - i n t e r n a t i o n a l control i n Morocco, the i n t e g r i t y of the Empire, and the f r u s t r a t i o n of the French 1. B.D.vol.3.p.243.No.268.Nicolson to Grey - Feb. 5, 1906. 2. c f . Bishop - op. c i t . vol.1.Chap. 37. f o r the American a t t i t u d e . 97, plans. A c t u a l l y she achieved l i t t l e save a loss of prestige, and a strengthening of the Entente. For the time being the tension relaxed and Europe, giving a sigh of r e l i e f , resumed i t s normal r e l a t i o n s . Yet everyone knew Germany had suffered humiliation, i n spite of p o l i t e ex- changes of congratulation upon the settlement of differences with neither conqueror nor vanquished. I t a l y could no longer be r e l i e d upon. Russia had supported France. Spain could not be lured away from England and France. Even the United States leaned towards France. While England, the arch-demon and e v i l genius of Germany, was succeeding i n her deep-laid schemes for i s o l a t i n g the great German Empire. As Brandenburg so admirably phrases i t ; "The Morocco C r i s i s and the Algeciras Conference weakened the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e , but l e f t the Dual A l l i a n c e unhurt 1. and the Franco-English Entente m a t e r i a l l y strengthened." That Germany had j u s t i f i c a t i o n i n objecting to French penetration of Morocco none can dispute. Had she proceeded i n a more t a c t f u l manner she could probably have come to terms with France and have gained concessions elsewhere. But such was not her method. Threats and arrogance were i n her eyes the only was to b r i n g people terms. I t was the blundering p o l i c y of the Wilhelmstrasse and the i l l - c o n s i d e r e d remarks of the eloquent Wilhelm that set her feet on the path to humiliat- ion. One i s tempted to agree with Eckardstein's b i t t e r condemn- 1.Brandenburg - op. c i t , - p.251.; C h u r c h i l l - op, c i t . - p.28. says "Algeciras was a milestone on the road to Arma- geddon. " 98. ation of h i s Government's p o l i c y ; "There has probably never been a n a t i o n a l p o l i c y so laughable and so lamentable as that of the Wilhelminic Era,* I t was worse than perfidious, i t was 1. i d i o t i c , " Brandenburg gives a more r a t i o n a l and impartial judgment: " I t was a petty p o l i c y d i c t a t e d i n turn by greed, perplexity, and love of prestige, which sought t r i v i a l things 2. rather than what was great and l a s t i n g . " I t was r e a l l y the staunch English support of Prance that ruined Germany's Morocco venture. Without En g l i s h backing Prance would have been easy prey f o r Germany. Russia, weakened af t e r the Russo*Japanese War, could have given l i t t l e e f f e c t - u a l aid to her a l l y . I f B r i t a i n had stood aside Germany might have disposed of the French menace. England knew her danger too w e l l to stand aside i n event of a Franco-German c o n f l i c t . Germany i n possession of naval bases #ast across the Channel might prove too uncomfortable a neighbour. Her motives i n supporting France i n Morocco were not e n t i r e l y d i s i n t e r e s t e d . She had learned the disadvantages of i s o l a t i o n , and the appar- ent i m p o s s i b i l i t y of coming to a s a t i s f a c t o r y agreement with Germany. Therefore, having s e t t l e d her differences with Prance she exerted h e r s e l f to keep and strengthen the new-found dlriend ship. To the minds of her ministers friendship with Prance 1, Eckardstein - op, c i t . 2. Brandenburg - op. c i t . - p.60. - p.224. QQ d i d n o t mean e n m i t y towards Germany. That she d e s i r e d a m i c a b l e r e l a t i o n s w i t h the Empire was shown i n subsequent y e a r s . A f t e r the Conference f r i e n d l y f e e l i n g began t o show i t s e l f . Billow went out of h i s way t o e x p r e s s h i s a p p r e c i a t i o n o f the t a c t f u l , c o u r t e o u s way i n w h i c h S i r A r t h u r H i c o l s o n conducted a f f a i r s a t A l g e c i r a s . He q u i t e u n d e r s t o o d the B r i t i s h a t t i t u d e and the way she had f u l f i l l e d h e r o b l i g a t i o n s t o P r a n c e . A t the same time he v o i c e d the s t r o n g c o n v i c t i o n t h a t r e l a t i o n s between the two c o u n t r i e s were i m p r o v i n g , and t h e v c o u l d l o o k f o r w a r d t o a 1. p e a c e f u l summer. T h i s a m i c a b l e message B a r r i n g t o n o f the F o r e i g n O f f i c e a c c e p t e d as an e a r n e s t of g o o d w i l l . I t i s n o t e - w o r t h y t h a t f o r a time more f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s were e s t a b l i s h e d between the two Governments and between Emperor and K i n g . Thus the c r i s i s p a s s e d n o t a c t u a l l y c a u s i n g an open b r e a c h , b u t l e a v - i n g a dangerous u n d e r c u r r e n t of r e s e n t m e n t and s u s p i c i o n t h a t became s t r o n g e r as f u r t h e r c r i s e s came and went. 1.B.D.vol.3.p.540.Ho.404.Lascelles t o Grey, May 17, 1906 100. CHAPTER IV. Naval R i v a l r y 1006-1912. In 1897 Germany set her foot on a path destined to lead u l t i m a t e l y to acute f r i c t i o n with England. In that year the Kaiser appointed Admiral von T i r p i t z Secretary of State f o r the Navy. His Majesty's object was to b u i l d a German f l e e t f or the protection of growing German trade and f o r the g r a t i f i c a t i o n of his own desires. To the world at large he proclaimed h i s purpose - the Navy was purely f o r defence and was directed against no one. Yet the preambles to the early F l e e t Laws proclaimed the in t e n t i o n to b u i l d a Navy so strong that even the strongest sea-power would hesitate to attack i t . T i r p i t z himself l a t e r 1. wrote that the German f l e e t was b u i l t as a " r i s k - f l e e t " . Laws providing f o r the construction of appropriate vessels pass- ed the Reichstag i n 1898 and 1900 and b u i l d i n g proceeded accord- ing to plan under the capable d i r e c t i o n of T i r p i t z . At f i r s t England, secure i n her overwhelming s u p e r i o r i t y , looked on with tolerant amusement. King Edward was quite w i l l - ing to allow h i s nephew to enjoy his new toy, i n peace, so long as i t remained a toy. However, when the King v i s i t e d the Kaiser at K i e l i n 1904, he r e a l i s e d "that t h i s toy was becoming a, l i t t l e too l i f e - s i z e . In h i s c h i l d i s h desire to display to his uncle 1 . T i r p i t z - the German Navy i n the World War - These Eventful Years - vol.1.p.314. 101, the wonderful achievements of which Germany was capable, the Kaiser assembled every available war-vessel i n the harbour at 1. K i e l , despite the warnings of h i s advisers. King Edward and his suite r e a l i s e d to the f u l l , then, the danger of such a r a p i d l y growing, up-to-date f l e e t facing them across the North Sea. In h i s attempt to impress the English v i s i t o r s the Kaiser had as usual gone too f a r and aroused not only admiration but 2. also d i s q u i e t i n the hearts of h i s f r i e n d s . He would have done w e l l to follow Bernstorff»s advice "to guard our f l e e t l i k e a hidden but indispensable treasure and to l e t the Eng- 3. l i s h see and hear as l i t t l e about i t as possible." Prom 1904 onward the suspicion deepened i n English minds that the German f l e e t was directed against the Island Mistress of the Seas. German statesmen, even the Kaiser himself, might protest Germany's innocence a hundred times i n a year. Their words f e l l upon deaf ears or were used by the anti-German e l - ement as further proof of German deceitfulness. Germany's actions i n Europe, they f e l t , b e l i e d her f r i e n d l y protestations. Outbursts of antagonism i n England n a t u r a l l y led to r e t a l i a t i o n i n Germany by the aggressive Navy League and the Pan-German element. As a r e s u l t a v e r i t a b l e press war waged int e r m i t t e n t l y during the f i r s t decade of the nineteenth century. I f the Eng- l i s h were suspicious of Germany, the Germans were doubly sus- 1. Bulow - Memoirs - vol.2.p.22. 2. Brandenburg - op. c i t . - p.271. 3.Ibid. p.273. 102. picious of England. Here was a country, whose f l e e t could wipe out the t i n y German squardons i n a few hours, complaining b i t t e r l y against German intentions and u t t e r i n g wild remarks about "Copenhagening" the enemy ships. Naturally, the German Navy League had l i t t l e d i f f i c u l t y i n making converts. The years 1904 and 1906 witnessed the so-called Naval. scare i n England. Peeling on the continent was s t i l l against England. The Anglo-French Entente, concluded only a few months before, remained untested; Russia and England had not yet come to an understanding; while Germany's attitude was somewhat un- c e r t a i n . The Kaiser, s u f f e r i n g from a severe attack of Anglo- phobia, dreamed of a Continental League against England. Hence his overtures to Russia i n the autumn of 1904 and the Treaty of BjBrko i n July 1905. This undercurrent of h o s t i l i t y aroused the fears of c e r t a i n Englishmen. Wild rumours began.to c i r c u l - ate regarding the intentions of the growing f l e e t concentrated across the North Sea. Sensational papers made the most of these reports and p r a c t i c a l l y convinced some of th e i r more credulous public that the Germans had a c t u a l l y planned a naval r a i d on 1. England. The i l l - a d v i s e d v i s i t of the German squadron to Plymouth added f u e l to the f i r e . Not only did I t show the e f f - i c i e n c y of the enemy, but also gave r i s e to the suspicion, u t t e r l y u n j u s t i f i e d , voiced by the D a i l y Mail that the squadron had 2. heen sent to spy on the E n g l i s h . No wonder Metternich wrote 1. Hammann - The World Pol i c y of Germany, 1890-1912. - p.161, 2. Hale - op. c i t . p.52. 103. to Germany i n tones of regret regarding the v i s i t which had merely served to remind England that her control of the seas 1. might be challenged i n the future. Papers l i k e "Vanity Pair" preached a preventive war, while the "Array and Navy Gazette" h e a r t i l y endorsed these views. Even the C i v i l Lord of the Admiralty i n February sounded a warning. S i r Sohn Fisher be- came F i r s t Sea Lord of the Admiralty and inspire d various reforms i n the E n g l i s h navy. Since Fisher's tongue was sharp and frank and h i s sympathies d i s t i n c t l y anti-German, German apprehensions increased under the tutelage of the Navy League. Eventually the scare died down leaving both nations profoundly d i s t r u s t f u l and ready to misconstrue every action and every word. By way of precaution B r i t a i n changed the d i s - t r i b u t i o n of her f l e e t , concentrating more vessels i n Home 2. waters and e s t a b l i s h i n g new bases. In October 1906 Fisher wrote "our only probable enemy i s Germany. Germany keeps her whole f l e e t always concentrated within a few hours of England. We must therefore, keep a f l e e t twice as powerful concentrated within a few hours of Germany" and again "the German button w i l l only be pressed as regards the B r i t i s h Empire when the Channel and A t l a n t i c Fleets are absent at sea from the v i c i n i t y 3. of German waters." U n t i l 1906 B r i t a i n did not f e e l her s u p e r i o r i t y serious- 1. Hale - op. c i t . - p.52. 2. Lee - op. c i t . - vol.2.p.328; Brandenburg - op. c i t . - p.270. 3. Lee - op. c i t . vol.2,p.331. and p.333. 104. l y challenged. Then came the introduction of the new type of b a t t l e s h i p - the Dreadnaught - which rendered the old type p r a c t i c a l l y worthless. Fisher triumphantly presented this supership to the world, boasting that one of these monsters was capable of wiping out the whole German Navy. Unfortunately he overlooked the f a c t that Germany also could b u i l d Dreadnaughts and that i n this l i n e she could compete on an equal footing with England. With the coming of the Dreadnaught, then, England l o s t the advantage of her s u p e r i o r i t y and immediately, the trouble began. Germany could and did b u i l d the new ships. She introduced a Supplementary Naval B i l l i n 1906 providing for a consider- 1. ably augmented programme during the nest few years. At f i r s t B r i t a i n was a l i t t l e s c e p t i c a l of Germany's carrying out t h i s programme. She soon found, however, that Germany was determ- ined to b u i l d a strong navy, when towards the end of 1907 T i r - p i t z secured an amendment to the e x i s t i n g Naval Law. In Oct- ober, Captain Dumas, the Naval Attache i n B e r l i n , reported that a l l parties i n Germany seemed agreed upon the necessity for a strong Navy and were prepared to pay the price of con- s t r u c t i o n and maintenance. At the same time he did not think 2. the German Admiralty desired a war with England. Upon this report Hardinge and Grey commented; " I t seems that a p e r s i s t - ent p o l i c y on the part of the English Admiralty i n regulating 1. Brandenburg - op. c i t . - p.273. 2. B.D.vol.6.p.63-6.Enclosure i n No.39. Dumas to Lascelles, Oct. 23, 1907. 105. the E n g l i s h b u i l d i n g programme by the double of t h a t o f 'Germany 1. may i n the end i n d u c e the German p u b l i c t o c r y out 'Enough'." B r i t a i n had s e t h e r s e l f the two-Power s t a n d a r d i n n a v a l armaments. Up t o now she had had l i t t l e d i f f i c u l t y i n m a i n t - a i n i n g i t . Germany's i n c r e a s e d programme n o t u n n a t u r a l l y a r o u s e d r e s e n t m e n t and a d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o u p h o l d B r i t i s h s u p e r - i o r i t y . As Haldane t o l d the Emperor i n 1906, the more s h i n s 2. Germany b u i l t , the more B r i t a i n w ould b u i l d . T i r p i t z • con- t e n t i o n t h a t a f t e r p a s s i n g t h r o u g h a "danger zone" the German f l e e t w ould emerge so s t r o n g the B r i t a i n would a t t a c k o n l y a t g r e a t r i s k o f d e f e a t was based on a m i s c o n c e p t i o n o f B r i t i s h i d e a s and p o l i c y . He c o u l d n o t s e e , i n s p i t e o f i n c e s s a n t w a r n i n g s f r o m g r e a t e r s t a t e s m e n , t h a t B r i t a i n would augment h e r programme so t h a t the " r i s k " p e r i o d f o r h e r would e x i s t o n l y i n the i n f i n i t e l y remote f u t u r e ; t h a t i t would be a t e s t o f endurance i n w h i c h B r i t a i n w i t h h e r v a s t r e s o u r c e s and w e a l t h would p r o b a b l y emerge v i c t o r i o u s . I n Hovember 1907 Stumm wrote f r o m London t h a t the Germans must g e t used t o the i d e a t h a t 3. the B r i t i s h f l e e t would always be s u p e r i o r t o t h e i r s . Times w i t h o u t number M e t t e r n i c h emphasised the B r i t i s h a t t i t u d e and t h e i r b e l i e f t h a t the maintenance of E n g l i s h supremacy a t sea 4. was a m a t t e r o f l i f e and d e a t h . "There can be no m i s t a k e t h a t the German n a v a l programme has av/akened the v i g i l a n c e o f 1. B.D.vol.6.p.66.Minute by Ha r d i n g e and Grey. 2. Haldane - B e f o r e the War - p. 40. 3. G.D.vol.3.o.268-9.XXIV.21.Stumm t o German F o r e i g n O f f i c e , 'Nov. 25, 1907. 4. G . D . v o l . 3 . p . 2 6 9 . X X l X . 2 5 . M e t t e r n i c h t o Bulow, Dec. 14, 1907. 106, the B r i t i s h i n the h i g h e s t d e g r e e , and t h a t E n g l a n d i n t e n d s t o m a i n t a i n h e r supremacy a t sea w i t h o u t q u e s t i o n . I t i s t o the i n t e r e s t o f good Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s t h a t t h e r e s h o u l d he no 1. i l l u s i o n about t h i s i n Germany " M e t t e r n i c h T s was as a v o i c e c r y i n g i n the w i l d e r n e s s . The German Navy League con- t i n u e d i t s work of p r e a c h i n g a g a i n s t E n g l a n d and o f d e l u d i n g the p e o p l e w i t h the a s s u r a n c e t h a t soon E n g l a n d would become t i r e d of t h e c o n t e s t and l e a v e t o Germany the u n d i s p u t e d p o s s - 2. e s s i o n o f the s e a . Annoyed a t German p e r s i s t e n c e , E n g l i s h papers c r i t i c i s e d the new N a v a l programme and p o i n t e d out the n e c e s s i t y f o r i n - c r e a s e d e x p e n d i t u r e on the B r i t i s h f l e e t i n o r d e r t o m a i n t a i n the r e q u i r e d s t a n d a r d . These a t t a c k s e x c i t e d the K a i s e r t o s uch an e x t e n t t h a t he committed a n o t h e r f a u x pas and w i t h o u t c o n s u l t i n g h i s r e s p o n s i b l e a d v i s e r s wrote t o L o r d Tweedmouth, the F i r s t L o r d o f the A d m i r a l t y , p r o t e s t i n g a g a i n s t the B r i t i s h s u s p i c i o n s and " p e r p e t u a l q u o t i n g o f the 'German Danger' " as " u t t e r l y unworthy o f the g r e a t B r i t i s h n a t i o n w i t h i t s w o r l d - wide Empire and i t s m i g h t y Navy"* "There i s something n e a r l y l u d i c r o u s about i t . The f o r e i g n e r s i n o t h e r c o u n t r i e s might e a s i l y c o n c l u d e t h a t the Germans must be an e x c e p t i o n a l l y s t r o n g l o t , as t h e y seem t o be a b l e t o s t r i k e t e r r o r i n t o the h e a r t s of the B r i t i s h , who are f i v e t i m e s t h e i r s u p e r i o r s J * The 1. G .D.vol.3.p.272.XXIX.30.Metternich t o Bulow, Feb. 3, 1908. 2. B . D . v o l . 6 . p . 1 1 8 - 3 1 . E n c l o s u r e i n No.81.Dumas t o L a s c e l l e s , Feb. 12, 1908. 107. German H a v a l B i l l i s n o t aimed a t E n g l a n d , and i s n o t a ' c h a l l - enge t o B r i t i s h supremacy of the s e a ' 'which w i l l r e m a i n un- c h a l l e n g e d f o r g e n e r a t i o n s t o come." A t the same time he w r o t e t o the K i n g t o i n f o r m h i m o f t h i s s t e p . To say t h a t B r i t i s h s t a t e s m e n were amazed s t a t e s the case m i l d l y , Tweed- mouth s e n t the " a s t o u n d i n g Communication f r o m the German Emperor" 2. t o Grey. K i n g Edward a d m i n i s t e r e d r e p r o o f i n a b r i e f l e t t e r t o h i s nephew: "Your w r i t i n g t o my F i r s t L o r d o f the A d m i r a l t y i s a 'new d e p a r t u r e ' and I do n o t see how he can p r e v e n t our p r e s s f r o m c a l l i n g a t t e n t i o n t o the g r e a t I n c r e a s e i n b u i l d i n g of German s h i p s of war, w h i c h n e c e s s i t a t e s our i n c r e a s i n g our 3. navy a l s o . " Tweedmouth r e p l i e d t o the Emperor's g r a c i o u s c ommunication i n s u i t a b l e terms and s e n t a copy of the B r i t i s h n a v a l e s t i m a t e s f D r 1908-9 n o t y e t made p u b l i c . I n s p i t e o f e f f o r t s t o keep the e p i s o d e q u i e t rumours s p r e a d and q u e s t i o n s were asked i n P a r l i a m e n t . The C a b i n e t t a c t f u l l y t r e a t e d the whole m a t t e r as p r i v a t e and d e c l i n e d t o r e a d the c o r r e s p o n d e n c e t o the House. Billow knew n o t h i n g o f the K a i s e r ' s i n d i s c r e t i o n 4. u n t i l the m a t t e r became p u b l i c . B o t h s i d e s f i n a l l y agreed on 5. the i n a d v i s a b i l i t y o f p u b l i s h i n g the l e t t e r and r e p l y , and 1. Lee - op. c i t . - v o l . 2 . p . 6 0 5 - 6 . 2. B.D.vol".6.p. 132.Ho.82.Tweedmouth t o Grey, P r i v a t e , Feb.18, 3. Lee - op. c i t . - v o l . 2 . p . 6 0 6 . (1908. 4. Billow - Memoirs - v o l . 2 . p . 3 1 5 . 5. The B r i t i s h C a b i n e t d i d n o t w i s h the p u b l i c t o know t h a t Tweedmouth had communicated t o the Emperor the B r i t i s h H a v a l E s t i m a t e s . The K a i s e r blamed the K i n g f o r not w i s h i n g the p u b l i c a t i o n o f the l e t t e r because i t s i n f l u e n c e would have been t r a n q u i l l i s i n g . U n f o r t u n a t e l y the K a i s e r ' s judgment of the b e n e f i c i a l e f f e c t of the p u b l i c a t i o n of h i s u t t e r a n c e s r e g a r d i n g E n g l a n d was o f t e n a t f a u l t . W i t n e ss the D a i l y T e l e - graph I n c i d e n t ] 108. the a f f a i r ended without undue f r i c t i o n between the two Govern- ments . The p o l i c y of the L i b e r a l s demanded a decrease i n money spent on armaments and the use of the money thus saved f o r s o c i a l improvements. During t h e i r two years i n o f f i c e they had, to the great disgust of the Conservatives, a c t u a l l y re- duced the naval expenditure. The spectre of the German P e r i l rendered the continuation of this reduced programme d i f f i c u l t i f not impossible. Public opinion feared l e s t B r i t a i n be caught unprepared and the Conservatives took advantage of the s i t u a t - ion to launch a vigorous attack on the L i b e r a l s . Obviously the Government must y i e l d to the wished of the people and Increase the expenditure on the Navy, or seek an arrangement with Germany to remove the menace and render the increase unnecessary. The leading statesmen were very much i n favour of the l a t t e r course. This meant persuading Germany to reduce her programme or slack- en her rate of construction. In view of the Kaiser's attitude success i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n seemed rather u n l i k e l y . Metternich reported a conversation with Grey and Lloyd George about the naval question during which he had st o u t l y maintained that B r i t a i n must adopt a reassuring p o l i c y towards Germany before there could be discussion of the Navy. The Emperor added explosive marginal comments to the e f f e c t that he v/ould never discuss reduction of the Navy and would regard any such o f f i c - i a l request from B r i t a i n as a declaration of war. "I do not wish f o r good r e l a t i o n s with England at the price of not b u i l d - 109 0 ing the German F l e e t . I f England means only to show us her favour on condition of our reducing the f l e e t , i t i s impertin- ence without l i m i t and a deep i n s u l t to the German people and t h e i r Emperor, which the Ambassador must repBl at the very s t a r t . ... The German f l e e t i s b u i l t against nobody and so not against England. I t i s governed by our own needs The Law w i l l be c a r r i e d out to the l a s t t i t t l e , whether the B r i t - ons l i k e i t or not; i t i s the same to us. I f thev want war 1. l e t them begin i t ; we are not a f r a i d of i t . " According to Metternich's reports, Lloyd George was very much i n favour of an agreement f o r reducing the speed of construction and went 2. so f a r as to suggest a r a t i o of 3:2. However, i n view of the Kaiser's mood,little could be done. In August 1908 King Edward v i s i t e d the Emperor at Cron- berg. Grey provided him with a Memorandum i n case the Kaiser discussed p o l i t i c s . In t h i s he devoted considerable space to the Naval Question, s t r e s s i n g the necessity for an increased naval programme i n B r i t a i n , and the consequent b a r r i e r to good r e l a t i o n s , i f Germany adhered to her p o l i c y . He pointed out the advantages and the improved r e l a t i o n s that would r e s u l t i f 3. both sides slackened construction. S i r Charles Hardinge, who accompanied the King, had the honour of two conversations with the Kaiser. During the f i r s t of these they discussed the naval 1. G.D.vol.3.p.284-9.XXIV.99.Metternich to Billow, July 16, 1908. 2. G.D .vol.3.p.289-91.XXIV. 107.Metternich to Billow, Aug.l, 1908. 3. Lee - op* c i t . - vol.2.p.616-7. 110. question rather f r a n k l y . The Kaiser refused to move from h i s former standpoint that the German navy was only f o r defence, that i t was never intended against England, and that the naval law was being c a r r i e d out exactly as published. Hardinge up- held the j u s t i c e of E n g l i s h fears and gave figures to prove that B r i t a i n ' s s u p e r i o r i t y was i n danger. The Kaiser declared him misinformed and sent f o r a copy of "Hauticus" to prove the point. According to h i s own h i g h l y dramatised account he t o l d Hardinge that as Admiral of the B r i t i s h F l e e t he was better informed than Hardinge as a mere c i v i l i a n . F i n a l l y , Hardinge abruptly remarked "You must stop b u i l d i n g . " To this the Kaiser r e t a l i a t e d "Then we s h a l l f i g h t . I t i s a question of n a t i o n a l 1. honour." From t h i s interview Hardinge gathered that the Kaiser was utterljr opposed to any discussion Involving reduction of 2. the German Havy B i l l . To the Emperor such a suggestion on England's part savoured of d i c t a t i o n and impertinent meddling i n the i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s of Germany. Whether or not Hardinge's 1. G.D.vol.3.p.291-5.XXIV.125.Emperor to Bulow, Aug. 12, 1908. The Kaiser's written accoun* of the interview i s obviously h i g h l y coiLoured and exaggerated. His sense of the dramatic ran away with h i s pen. He wanted to convey the impression that he^had shown his teeth and that was the only way to bring the English to reason. Bulow says that the verbal account given l a t e r was much more moderate. Onlookers said the conversation was very amicable and informal, with the two men seated side by side on a b i l l i a r d table and the Emp- eror p a r t i c u l a r l y gracious throughout. Billow - Memoirs - vol.2.p..313-4. c f . B.D.vol.6.p.184-90.Ho.117.Memorandum by Hardinge, Aug.16, 1908. f o r the B r i t i s h side. 2. Lloyd George,visiting Germany a l i t t l e l a t e r , confirmed Hardinge's impressions. Brandenburg - op. c i t . - p.289. m © step i n introducing t h i s c o n t r o v e r s i a l subject into the conver- sation, a f t e r he knew that the Kaiser had avoided p o l i t i c a l topics when t a l k i n g to the King, was wise or t a c t f u l i t did serve the purpose of enlightening the B r i t i s h statesmen ( i f they needed any enlightenment) regarding Germany's a t t i t u d e . Billow regretted that Hardinge had approached the Kaiser instead of one of the responsible ministers on this t o p i c . He f e l t that much asp e r i t y could have been avoided. T i r p i t z was r e a l l y not u n w i l l i n g to discuss the question with the English naval experts and rather favoured a ship-building agreement. The d i f f i c u l t y at present lay i n ways and means on account of the unfriendliness of B r i t i s h public opinion and B r i t i s h p o l i c y . The tension would have to die down before Billow could engage 1. i n conversations with b e f i t t i n g d i g n i t y . Apparently Billow was beginning to contemplate the d e s i r - 2. a b i l i t y of an arrangement with England. He had always upheld the p o l i c y of b u i l d i n g a strong navy, but did not wish to do so at the expense of B r i t i s h h o s t i l i t y . P o l i t i c a l developments showed him the dangers of German i s o l a t i o n , while the consist- ent campaign of the E n g l i s h press and the constant warnings of Metternich convinced him of the r e a l i t y of the B r i t i s h fears and the basis of t h e i r u n f r i e n d l i n e s s . During the l a t t e r part of the year 1908 he exerted himself i n an e f f o r t to win the 1. G.D.vol.3.p.297-8.XXIV.161.Billow to Metternich, Sept.22 1908 2. J.Cambon - Billow and the War - Foreign A f f a i r s - A p r i l 1932. vol.lO.Uo.3. says p.414. "In October 1908 von Billow was begin ning to see that the antagonism between the -two Powers was becoming more marked. He would have l i k e d to reverse engines but i t was too late for that, and his p o l i c y was destined to end i n the catastrophe of 1914." 112. s u p p o r t of the K a i s e r and T i r p i t z t o n e g o t i a t i o n s f o r an a r r a n - gement w i t h E n g l a n d . He t a l k e d s e r i o u s l y t o the K a i s e r and " l . c a r r i e d on a c o r r e s p o n d e n c e w i t h T i r p i t z . The A d m i r a l f i r n i l y m a i n t a i n e d t h a t t h e b a s i s o f E n g l i s h h o s t i l i t y l a v i n commercial 2. j e a l o u s y n o t i n n a v a l armaments. When M e t t e r n i c h v i g o r o u s l y c o n t r a d i c t e d h i m , he s c o r n e d the Ambassador as one who d i d not 3. know what he was t a l k i n g a b o u t . F i n a l l y , Bulow adked T i r p i t r , d i r e c t l y i f Germany c o u l d l o o k f o r w a r d w i t h e q u a n i m i t y t o an a t t a c k by E n g l a n d . A f t e r a d e l a y o f f o u r t e e n days the A d m i r a l 4. r e p l i e d i n the n e g a t i v e . The C h a n c e l l o r t h e n s u g g e s t e d t o T i r p i t z the wisdom of s t r e n g t h e n i n g German c o a s t d e f e n c e s , submarines and s m a l l c r a f t i n o r d e r t o r e s i s t more e f f e c t i v e l y any p o s s i b l e a t t a c k f r o m B r i t a i n . T i r p i t z b e l i e v e d I n the n e c e s s i t y f o r r a p i d c o n s t r u c t - i o n of a s t r o n g f l e e t o f b a t t l e s h i p s , b u t what use would t h a t be i f E n g l a n d w i t h h e r s u p e r i o r f o r c e s e n t e r e d i n t o a c o n f l i c t ? The German navy would be a n n i h i l a t e d and the German c o a s t s l e f t u n p r o t e c t e d . I t was v e r y i m p o r t a n t t o a v o i d i m p l a n t i n g the i d e a o f a p r e v e n t i v e war i n the mind of the B r i t i s h p u b l i c . S i n c e i n f l u e n t i a l q u a r t e r s i n E n g l a n d had p l a i n l y shown t h a t a s l a c k e n i n g o f the German r a t e of c o n s t r u c t i o n would r e a s s u r e the B r i t i s h . Would i t n o t be p o s s i b l e t o work out some programme 5. as the b a s i s o f an arrangement? However, T i r p i t z remained 1. Bulow - Memoirs - v o l . 2 . p . 3 1 1 . 2. G . D . v o l . 3 . p . 3 2 8 . X X V l l l . l 3 . T i r p i t z t o B i l l o w , Hov.25, 1908. 3. M e t t e r n i c h wrote t o B i l l o w : " I doubt whether any i m p a r t i a l ob- s e r v e r , a f t e r a s t a y o f o n l y a few months i n E n g l a n d , c o u l d have any o p i n i o n b u t t h a t the c a r d i n a l p o i n t of our r e l a t i o n s w i t h E n g l a n d i s the growth of our f l e e t . I t may not be p l e a s - a n t h e a r i n g f o r u s , b u t I see no good i n h i d i n g the t r u t h , nor do I t h i n k i t c o m p a t i b l e w i t h my d u t y . " G.D.vol.3.p.329.XXV111. 1 7 . M e t t e r n i c h t c B i l l o w , Hov. 26, 1908. S.Brandenburg - op. c i t . - p.292. 113. adamant. An;/ r e d u c t i o n i n c a p i t a l s h i p s would i n d i c a t e a r e - t r e a t b e f o r e B r i t i s h t h r e a t s . B r i t i s h a g i t a t i o n and a l a r m showed c l e a r l y t h a t the mere e x i s t e n c e of a German f l e e t would f o r c e E n g l a n d t o 'pay more a t t e n t i o n t o Germany i n the f u t u r e t h a n i n the p a s t . To y i e l d now meant g r e a t danger t o Germany and f u r t h e r h u m i l i a t i o n a t the hands of E n g l a n d . R e d u c t i o n of speed of c o n s t r u c t i o n r e q u i r e d a Supplementary N a v a l B i l l . E a ch y e a r saw the F l e e t n e a r e r the end of the "danger p e r i o d " . The c o a s t d e f e n c e s and submarines were b e i n g amply p r o v i d e d f o r , 1. b u t were n o t s u f f i c i e n t i n t h e m s e l v e s f o r adequate p r o t e c t i o n . A t the end o f the y e a r M e t t e r n i c h wrote u r g i n g a r e d u c t i o n o f tempo as the remedy f o r Anglo-German h o s t i l i t y . He f e l t t h a t l a s t summer had been the p s y c h o l o g i c a l moment, f o r E n g l i s h . s t a t e s m e n were h e s i t a t i n g and d o u b t f u l and a l i t t l e c o m p l i a n c e on Germany's r»art might have g a i n e d much. Now t h e y seemed 2. d e t e r m i n e d t o meet Germany on the two-Power s t a n d a r d . A t the same time B i l l o w spoke i n the R e i c h s t a g a g a i n s t s p e n d i n g more money t h a n was a b s o l u t e l y n e c e s s a r y on n a v a l armaments. He t o l d S i r Edward Goschen, the new E n g l i s h Ambass- ador i n B e r l i n , t h a t Germany would never b u i l d more s h i p s t h a n she needed f o r p r o t e c t i o n . He emphasised the p u r e l y d e f e n s i v e purpose of the f l e e t . Goschen p o i n t e d out t h a t the E n g l i s h programme was open t o m o d i f i c a t i o n , depending upon the a t t i t u d e 1. G.D.vol.3.p.335-40.XXV111.51.Tirpitz t o B i l l o w . J a n , 4, 1909. 2. G.D.vol.3.p.333-5, X X V l l l . 4 0 . M e t t e r n i c h t o B i l l o w , Dec.29, 114. of others. Billow understood, but explained the d i f f i c u l t y I f not i m p o s s i b i l i t y of changing the German programme already f i x - 1. ed by lav/. Goschen was a l i t t l e s c e p t i c a l of a l l Billow's pro- testations of f r i e n d s h i p . He wrote to Hardinge i n a private l e t t e r : "I wonder while he i s t a l k i n g whether he momentarily believes what he i s saying. He i s so convincing and speaks with such a glorious a i r of s i n c e r i t y that i t r e a l l y looks as i f he d i d . One would think to hear him t a l k that England poss- essed nowhere i n the world a greater admirer, or a sincerer 2. f r i e n d , and yet! " This time, however, Billow appeared genuine- l y w i l l i n g to attempt to reach some understanding, not to accom- modate England, but to render Germany's pos i t i o n i n Europe more secure. I f England wanted a naval agreement she would have to pay f o r i t . I t would be a bargain i n which the scales tipped to the advantage of Germany. In December Grey Informed Metternich that, although Billow may have been t e c h n i c a l l y correct when he said that Germany had received no proposals from England regarding naval expenditure, England had frequently expressed her willingness to compare Havy Estimates and discuss them with a view to reduction. He made i t p e r f e c t l y clear that England had not made d e f i n i t e pro- posals because she understood that German expenditure was f i x e d by law and did not depend upon English estimates. He explained 1. B.D.vol.6.p.l69.No.l08.Goschen to Grey, Dec. 10, 1908. 2. B.D.vol.6.p.171-2.No.109.Goschen to Hardinge, Private, Dec. 11, 1908. 115. again that the Eng l i s h programme depended on that of Germany; that German delay or reduction would he w e l l received and would 1. tend to improve r e l a t i o n s . Billow came forward a l i t t l e more d e f i n i t e l y when i n January he Instructed Metternich to explain to Grey, i f the occasion arose, that B r i t a i n would gain nothing by a mere of f e r to l i m i t her programme i n return for a German reduction. The German programme was absolutely independent of B r i t i s h estimates, being intended only for purposes of defence. Germany would depart from her naval programme only i f England 2. were prepared to accommodate her i n other parts of the world. During the King's State v i s i t to B e r l i n , the naval quest- ion remained i n the background. The King and the Kaiser r e f r a i n - ed from discussing p o l i t i c a l matters to any great extent. Both sides expressed pleasure at the success and c o r d i a l i t y of the meeting but were inwardly s c e p t i c a l of any l a s t i n g b e n e f i c i a l e f f e c t on the r e l a t i o n s between the two countries. Metternich, present during the v i s i t , apparently took advantage of the opportunity to warn T i r p i t z of the dangers of his obstinacy. Billow reports that as they stood on the platform awaiting the King's t r a i n , Metternich remarked to T i r p i t z : "Unless you make i t possible f o r Prince Billow to bring o f f the Naval Agreement he wants with England, and i s doing h i s utmost to get, this w i l l probably be the l a s t time that an English King comes here 1. B.D.vol.6.p.172-3.No.110.Grey to de S a l i s , Dec. 18, 1908. 2. G.D.vol.3.p.340.XXVlll.59.Biilow to Metternich, Jan. 11, 1909. 116. 1. t o v i s i t a German Emperor." A n o t h e r v o i c e was h e a r d i n supp- o r t o f Billow when von Bussche-Haddenhausen sounded a w a r n i n g t h a t Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s , improved f o r the moment by the R o y a l v i s i t , w o uld s l i p h a c k i n t o t h e i r o l d h o s t i l i t y when the E n g l i s h N a $ a l B i l l was b r o u g h t i n . Germany must r e a l i s e t h a t h e r f l e e t would n e v e r be s t r o n g enough t o c r u s h B r i t a i n . " I f we f a i l t o come t o an u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h E n g l a n d - and t h i s I c o n s i d e r p o s s i b l e now t h a t we a r e t a c k l i n g the n a v a l q u e s t i o n - 2. a l l our o t h e r p o l i t i c a l a s p i r a t i o n s may l a r g e l y be r u i n e d . " D i s c u s s i o n i n P a r l i a m e n t o f the E n g l i s h N a v a l E s t i m a t e s l e d t o many m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s and much i l l - f e e l i n g i n Germany. As a r e s u l t the K a i s e r grew i n d i g n a n t , w h i l e the German Admir- 3. a l t y f e l t i n s u l t e d and became u n a p p r o a c h a b l e . D i s l i k i n g the atmosphere o f m u t u a l s u s p i c i o n Grey s u g g e s t e d t h a t Germany a l l o w the B r i t i s h N a v a l A t t a c h e f r e e a c c e s s t o the N a v a l Yards t o see f o r h i m s e l f how many s h i p s were under c o n s t r u c t i o n , i n r e t u r n B r i t a i n would a c c o r d the same p r i v i l e g e s t o the German 4. A t t a c h e . To Goschen he e x p r e s s e d the w i s h t h a t b o t h c o u n t - r i e s w ould put a l l t h e i r c a r d s on the t a b l e r e g a r d i n g n a v a l 5. c o n s t r u c t i o n and thus a v o i d m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s . Billow d e c l i n - ed t o e n t e r t a i n t h e s e p r o p o s a l s f o r exchange o f i n f o r m a t i o n on 1. Billow - Memoirs - v o l . 2 . p . 4 0 7 . 2. G.D.vol.3.p.344-5.XXVlll.91.Memorandum by von Bussche-Hadden- hausen t o German F o r e i g n O f f i c e , Feb. 19, 1909. 3. B . D . v o l . 6 . p . 2 5 2 . E n c l o s u r e i n No.162.Trench t o Goschen, March 26, 1909.jp.255.Enclosure i n No.165.Heath t o Goschen, March 30, 1909. 4. B.D.vol.6.p.240.No.155.Grey t o Goschen, March 5, 1909: p.241. No.154. Same, March 10, 1909.•p.242-3.No.155.Same, March 17,19 5. B.D.vol.6.p.242-3.No.155.Grey t o Goschen, March 17, 1909. (09 117. the grounds that i t would he useless since B r i t a i n refused to believe the authentic facts supplied to them recently. In A p r i l Goschen advised England to adopt the increased programme and lay down the four extra ships at once. This would probably convince the Germans of the B r i t i s h determination to r e t a i n supremacy at sea, then they might be ready to recognise the uselessness of competition and ease the f i n a n c i a l s t r a i n by 2. dropping a ship or two. Yet, i n spite of h i s outwardly uncompromising att i t u d e , Billow was working hard to secure some basis for negotiation. In A p r i l he again approached the Kaiser and at Venice managed to secure his consent i n p r i n c i p l e to a naval arrangement pro- vided England would agree at the same time to a general p o l i t - i c a l understanding. Immediately, Billow returned to Germany and drew up a v a r i e t y of drafts of t r e a t i e s to which a naval agree- ment could be added - a general defensive a l l i a n c e , an agreement for n e u t r a l i t y , an Entente promising general friendship and con- s u l t a t i o n i n time of danger; s p e c i a l t r e a t i e s f o r such questions as the Bagdad Railway, foreigners' rig h t s i n Egypt, the r i g h t of capture at sea. "Taken i n th e i r e n t i r e t y these proposals indicated a well thought-put plan f o r the permanent settlement of a l l disputes as the basis of the common p o l i t i c a l attitude 3. of both States." In Metternich's absence, he sent Stumm to 1. G.D.vol.3.p.349.XXVlll.ll4.Biilow to Metternich, March 19, 1909 2. B.D.vol.6.p.261.Ho.170.Goschen to Grey, Private, A p r i l 9, 1909 S.Brandenburg - op. c i t . - p.344. 118. London to sound the Foreign O f f i c e . Unfortunately the English 1. showed l i t t l e enthusiasm. Grey pointed out the d i f f i c u l t y of u n i t i n g the two camps i n Europe into one. The most he could 2 do would be to discuss the d i f f i c u l t i e s f r a n k l y as they arose. Obviously, Grey declined to entertain any suggestion that might imperil the Entente. Metternich spoke t r u l y when he said to Billow i n 1906: "The instruments are never simultaneously i n Key with one another, the harmony of the one i s answered by the other's discord. England and Germany have not the same sound- 3. ing boards." Although he spoke more p a r t i c u l a r l y of the pres his remarks apply also to the Governments. The question natur- a l l y a r i s e s , could Billow have c a r r i e d through his suggestions? T i r p i t z held himself opposed to material naval reductions such as B r i t a i n would no doubt have demanded. The most he would concede was a f i x e d r a t i o of 3:4 f o r future construction, with the s t r i c t i n j u n c t i o n to the Foreign Office that England, not 4. Germany, must make the f i t j s t d e f i n i t e proposals. The Kaiser agreed with T i r p i t z and emphasised the prerequisite B r i t i s h attitude - "Courteous negotiations between equals instead of 5. peremptory desires imposed by one party only." In the face of this opposition Billow's chances of success seemed i n f i n i t e l y small. 1. G.D.vol.3p.351.Note.; Brandenburg - op. c i t . - p.345. 2. Brandenburg - op. c i t . - p.345. 3. Billow - Memoirs - vol.2.p. 194. 4. Brandenburg - op. c i t . - p.346. 5. Billow - op. c i t . - vol.2.p.419. 119. Nevertheless the Chancellor continued M s e f f o r t s . On June 3, 1909 he summoned.a Conference to discuss the subject. Those present besides Bulow wereTirpitz, Metternich, Bethmann- Hollweg, Schoen, Muller, and Moltke. The Chancellor stated the case c l e a r l y - the English fear of possible German equality v/ith her i n Naval armaments was becoming more serious a l l the time and was leading to Eng l i s h h o s t i l i t y to German aims a l l over the world. T i r p i t z affirmed that Germany could not com- f o r t a b l y face a war v/ith England during the next few years. Metternich once more refuted T i r p i t z ' idea that English anta- gonism had a commercial b a s i s . The Chancellor then suggested that Metternich be instructed to approach England about the naval question without making any d e f i n i t e proposals but merely h i n t i n g that German concessions v/ould consist i n slowing dov/n the rate of construction and abstaining from supplementary pro- grammes. England would of course have to give r e c i p r o c i t y i n these matters and a p o l i t i c a l assurance. T i r p i t z . was r e a l l y opposed to drav/ing up any formula f o r a general understanding, the i n i t i a t i v e ought to come from England. In his opinion, 1. Germany's danger period v/ould be over by 1915. On June 23 Bulow authorised Metternich to make i t clear to the B r i t i s h Foreign Office on every available occasion, v/ith out f o r c i n g discussion on England, that a naval understanding was not out- side the bounds of p o s s i b i l i t y provided B r i t a i n avoided threats 1.G.D.vol.3.p.352-60.XXV111.168.Minutes of Discussion on Question of Understanding with England, June 3, 1909. 120. 1. and directed her general p o l i c y into a more f r i e n d l y channel. By the summer of 1909 Germany had d e f i n i t e l y intimated her willingness to receive proposals from England with a view to a naval agreement and a p o l i t i c a l understanding. That, a t l e a s t , was a step i n the r i g h t d i r e c t i o n . However, i t was one thing to i n i t i a t e discussions, but i t was a very much more d i f f i c u l t task to carry these d i s c i s s i o n s through to a s a t i s f a c t o r y con- cl u s i o n . In July of 1909 Billow r e t i r e d and was succeeded by Beth- mann-Hollweg. The nev; Chancellor lacked the b r i l l i a n c e of his predecessor, but i n s p i r e d more t r u s t i n the minds of the English statesmen. They had never f e l t e n t i r e l y sure of Billow's protest- ations of f r i e n d s h i p . His deeds had on occasion seemed to con- t r a d i c t h i s words . The new man came into power with a genuine determination to work fo r an agreement with England. In this respect he i n h e r i t e d a l l the d i f f i c u l t i e s that had confronted Billow. As he himself states: "the f l e e t was the pet of Germany and seemed to embody the energies and enthusiasms.of the nation. Whenever an issue arose between the naval authorities and the p o l i t i c a l administration the public almost i n v a r i a b l y supported the former. The d i r e c t i o n of the f l e e t had l a i n for years i n the hands of a man who had arrogated to himself a p o l i t i c a l author- i t y f a r beyond h i s functions and who had had a l a s t i n g Influence 2. on the p o l i t i c a l point of view of an important c i r c l e . " There- 1. G.D.vol.3.p.360.XXV111.181.Billow to Metternich, June 23, 1909. 2. Bethmann-Hollweg - Reflections on the World War.- p.91. 121. fore, the Chancellor's attempts at a rapprochment with England 1. proved unpopular with the general public. In August of 1909 Goschen reported to Grey a conversation with Bethmann-Hollweg during which the Chancellor had asked i f the B r i t i s h Government were ready i n p r i n c i p l e to revise Anglo- German r e l a t i o n s In such a way as to lead to a good understanding and to enter at t h e i r own time in t o a griendly exchange of views regarding the general r e l a t i o n s between the two countries and such proposals f o r a t e c h n i c a l naval agreement as the Imperial Government was now ready to put forward. He made a sp e c i a l plea for s t r i c t secrecy both from other powers and from the press . The arrangement should be one which would provide on 2. eith e r side the necessary sense of sec u r i t y . At the Foreign Office suspicion was r i f e and caution urged. Many feared that a formula would f e t t e r England, r u i n her f r i e n d - 3 ship with France and Russia and leave her at the mercy of Germany. Grey thought England could at once consider naval proposals but the general agreement would be better between the two great 4. groups of powers - the T r i p l e a l l i a n c e and the Entente. Hardinge emphasised to Grey the necessity of a naval agreement 5. f i r s t since anything further was r e a l l y superfluous. The 1. Bethmann-Hollweg - op. c i t . - p«89. 2. B.D.vol.6.p.283.Ho.186.Goschen to Grey. Aug.21, 1909;p.284. Ho.187.Same, Aug.21,1909;G.D.vol.3.p.407.XXV111.222.Beth- mann-Hollweg to Emperor, Aug.21, 1909. 3. B.D.vol.6,p.284.Minute by Langley;p.286.Ho.191.Mallet to Grey, Aug.26, 1909,Private. He also says England had better inform Russia before the Kaiser t e l l s the Czar some d i s t o r t - ed t a l e . 4. B.D.vol.6.p.284.Minute by Grey. 5. B.D.vol.6.p.285.Ho.189.Hardinge to Grey, Private, Aug.25, 1909. 122. Foreign Secretary thanked Bethmann-Hollweg f o r his f r i e n d l y communication and promised to consider the ideas when the Prime 1. Minister returned. The Chancellor decided to wait f o r B r i t i s h 2. proposals calmly and without d i s p l a y of great eagerness. At the beginning of September acting on Grey's instructions Goschen informed Bethmann-Hollweg that the B r i t i s h Government were prepared to discuss naval expenditure at any time and would c o r d i a l l y welcome proposals. With reference to the p o l i t i c a l understanding they would consider anything not inconsistent with 3. the maintenance of e x i s t i n g B r i t i s h f r i e n dships. The Chancell- or expressed pleasure at the warmth of the B r i t i s h response, but 4. could not go d e f i n i t e l y i n t o the matter u n t i l October. In the meantime B r i t a i n n o t i f i e d her friends of German overtures. "/hen Goschen returned from leave i n October he intimated to Schoen that England set great store by the conclusion of a naval agreement followed probably by a p o l i t i c a l understanding. When Schoen hinted that Germany was interested more v i t a l l y i n the p o l i t i c a l agreement Goschen gave him to understand that Eng- land could not give Germany more than she had given Fi-ance and 5. Russia. A day or two l a t e r the Chancellor declined to make any d e f i n i t e proposals beyond suggesting the p o s s i b i l i t y of.re- 1. B.D.vol.6.p.285.No.188.Grey to Goschen.Private.Aug.23.,1909. 2. G.D.vol.3.p.408.XXV111.224.Bethmann-Hollweg to'Metternich, Aug.31, 1909. 3. B.D.vol.6.p.288,No.194.Grey to Goschen, Sept.l, 1909.; G.D.vol.3.p.408.3DOn.il.226.Goschen to Bethmann-Hollweg, Sept. 2, 1909. 4. B.D.vol.6.p.289.No.196.Goschen to Grey, Sept.3, 1909. 5. G.D.vol.3.p.409.XXVlll.238.Memorandum by Schoen, Oct. 12, 1909 123. laxing the tempo of construction within the e x i s t i n g B i l l . He would want some very d e f i n i t e assurance from England of p a c i f i c intentions f i r s t to make the path easier f o r the German Govern- ment. Goschen, f e e l i n g that the German Minister wished to throw the i n i t i a t i v e f o r making naval proposals on England, pointed 1. out that i t was Germany's turn. Grey used s i m i l a r language 2. to Metternich i n London. A Memorandum by Schoen dated November 1 gives a^ in s i g h t into the German point of view. For Germany the p o l i t i c a l agree- ment was a conditio sine qua non bound up inseparably with a naval agreement. The two would have to be published. Since Germany did not r e a l l y want a neval agreement and England did, the E n g l i s h would have to pay f o r I t on the p o l i t i c a l side. "England wants something from us and must pay f o r i t . " Germany could not depart from her naval laws but might b u i l d more slow- l y i f England did the same. Exchange of information through the Naval Attaches was useless, but might be agreed to with the reservation that there i s a l i m i t beyond which secrecy 3. would have to be maintained. On November 4 Goschen reported the Chancellor's proposals. On the naval side each country should pledge i t s e l f f o r a cert- ain period not to b u i l d more than a stated number of ships, the number to be s e t t l e d by the naval experts. Regarding the 1. B.D.vol.6.p.293-6.Ho.200.Goschen to Grey, Oct.15, 1909. 2. B.D.vol.6.p.303.No.202.Grey to Goschen, Set.28, 1909. 3. G.D.vol.3.p.411-2.XXV111.253.Memorandum by Schoen, Nov.1,1909 124. exchange of f u l l e r information through Naval Attaches he said l i t t l e and d i d not seem en t h u s i a s t i c . On the p o l i t i c a l side the two Governments should give a mutual assurance that neither of them entertained any idea of aggression the one against the other, that they would not attack each other, and further that i n the case of an attack made on either power by a t h i r d power or group of powers, the power not attacked should stand aside. Goschen informed Schoen that he thought the naval proposals hardly went far enough while the p o l i t i c a l proposals went too far under the 1. e x i s t i n g circumstances. The comments of Foreign Office o f f i c - i a l s on t h i s despatch eloquently f o r e t e l l the fate of these negotiations. Crowe thought the bargain t i e d B r i t a i n but not 2. Germany and was therefore a l i t t l e one-sided. Hardinge con- sidered any naval agreement that did not l i m i t the present Germ- an programme useless. He suggested a courteous r e p l y to Germany that the Cabinet would consider the proposals c a r e f u l l y , then using the i n t e r n a l s i t u a t i o n and possible elections i n January as an excuse f o r adjourning a d e c i s i o n and l e t t i n g the question drop altogether. In t h i s way they could avoid any difference of opinion and any accusation of r e f u s i n g Germany's offered hand 5. of f r i e n d s h i p . Grey acted on Hardinge's suggestion and explained to Metternich that England v/ould have to defer decision u n t i l a f t e r 4. the General E l e c t i o n i n January. The German Government quite 1. B.D.vol.6.p.504-7.Ho.204.Goschen to Grey, Hov. 4, 1909. 2. B.D.vol.6.p.310.Minute by Crov/e. 3. B.D.vol.6.p.312.Minute b;y Hardinge. 4. B.D.vol.6.p.312-3.Ho.205.Grey to Goschen, Hov. 17, 1909. 125. 1. u n d e r s t o o d the s i t u a t i o n a l t h o u g h t h e y r e g r e t t e d the d e l a y . Prom Schoen Goschen g a t h e r e d t h a t Germany was n o t l i k e l y t o come f o r w a r d a t any l a t e r d a t e w i t h any more a c c e p t a b l e p r o ~ 2. p o s a l f o r a n a v a l arrangement. T h i s m e r e l y s t r e n g t h e n e d the s u s p i c i o n a t t h e F o r e i g n O f f i c e . Grey, Crowe, and L a n g l e y h e a r t i l y a g r e e d t h a t " L i t t l e doubt i s a l l o w e d t o r e m a i n t h a t the whole o b j e c t o f Germany i s (1) t o o b t a i n a p o l i t i c a l a g r e e - ment w i t h E n g l a n d tinder w h i c h Germany would be f r e e t o d e a l w i t h t h i r d c o u n t r i e s w i t h o u t the p o s s i b i l i t y o f E n g l a n d i n t e r - v e n i n g , however i n i m i c a l t o B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t such German d e a l - i n g s might be, and (2) t o r e t a i n f u l l l i b e r t y as t o the com- p l e t i o n o f the German n a v a l programme, s u b j e c t t o the c o n s t r u c t - i o n of a few c a p i t a l s h i p s b e i n g s p r e a d over a s l i g h t l y l o n g e r p e r i o d t h a n i s a t p r e s e n t c o n t e m p l a t e d . The German p r o p o s a l s r e v e a l no genuine w i s h t o meet the views of H i s M a j e s t y ' s Gov- 3. ernment." A l t h o u g h Goschen f e l t the p resence of a s i n c e r e d e s i r e on the p a r t o f Germany t o come t o an u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h B r i t a i n , he d i d n o t b e l i e v e t h a t Germany i n t e n d e d t o g i v e h e r 4. g o o d w i l l f o r n o t h i n g . W i t h t h a t , the n e g o t i a t i o n s were dropped f o r some t i m e . I n March M e t t e r n i c h reminded Grey t h a t he had n o t s a i d a n y t h i n g about the German p r o p o s a l s s i n c e the G e n e r a l E l e c t i o n . Grey p l e a d e d the excuse of i n t e r n a l u n c e r t a i n t y and the a p p a r e n t 1. B.D.vol.6.p.312-3.Wo.205.Grey t o Goschen, Nov.17, 1909.; p.314-5.No.207.Goschen t o Grey, Nov.25, 1909. 2. B.D.vol.6.p.314-5.No.207.Goschen t o Grey, Nov.25, 1909. 3. B.D.vol.6.p.315.Minute by Grey, Crowe, and L a n g l e y . 4. B.D.vol.6.p.323.Report of Anglo-German R e l a t i o n s f o r 1909. 126. lack of i n t e n t i o n to modify the German navy programme which to 1. the English was the key to the s i t u a t i o n . Discussions took place i n t e r m i t t e n t l y throughout the year without any display of enthusiasm on eit h e r side. B r i t a i n wanted a naval agreement with d e f i n i t e l i m i t a t i o n of the e x i s t i n g German programme. In return f o r this she was not prepared to make the far-reaching declarations of assurance on the p o l i t i c a l side required by Germany to whom the naval agreement meant nothing and the p o l - i t i c a l agreement everything. Neither side evinced a d i s p o s i t - ion to come forward with acceptable proposals. Each waited f o r the other to make the f i r s t move. In Germany the Navy had be- come a n a t i o n a l and a party question. Reduction as a concess- ion to England v/ould have been looked upon as an unpardonable di s p l a y of weakness by the general public. Accordingly, the Government resolved to make England pay f o r her dfesires. Both sides were h e l p l e s s l y d r i f t i n g with the t i d e . In August Goschen reopened the negotiations by handing 2. an English Memorandum to the Chancellor. Bethmann-Hollv/eg expressed g r a t i f i c a t i o n that the B r i t i s h Government had shown 3. i t s goodwill by reopening the discussions. He went over the old ground again regarding Germany's at t i t u d e . He s i g n i f i e d h i readiness to allow the interchange of information to Naval Attaches provided i t did not bind Germany not to go beyond the 1. B.D.vol.6.p.442.No.336.Grey to Goschen, March 22, 1910. 2. B.D.vol.6.p.511.Ho.393.Goschen to Grey, Aug. 15, 1910. 3. B.D.vol.6.p.521-4.No.400.Goschen to Grey, Oct. 12, 1910. 127. provisions of the e x i s t i n g F l e et Lav;. Once again he stressed the importance of a p o l i t i c a l agreement, complaining of English opposition to German i n t e r e s t s i n every part of the world, and the reserve of B r i t i s h diplomats towards t h e i r German colleagues i n contrast to t h e i r intimacy with the representatives of other nations. Then he said (according to Goschen) "I maintain that i f the B r i t i s h people had not been taught by the i r Governments to regard Germany as an enemy, the expansion of the German Fle e t would have caused them as l i t t l e anxiety as the expansion of the Navy of the United States." This statement caused a miniature storm. B r i t a i n n a t u r a l l y resented the Chancellor's accusations and instructed Goschen to defend B r i t i s h p o l i c y . The Chancellor accepted the frank explanations i n good part, but the Foreign Office protested vigorously that the Chancellor had never passed th i s p a r t i c u l a r remark. Goschen must have made a mistake or misunderstood the Chancellor's words. They were obviously anxious to smooth things over, but did i t i n 1. t h e i r usual blundering underhand fashion. Grey, not wishing to make trouble, l e t the matter drop. Regarding the o r i g i n a l conversation with the German Chancellor Goschen confided to Nicolson that he f e l t l i k e r e p l y i n g to the Chancellor's accus- ations, "that i f i t was i r r i t a t i n g to Germans to f i n d English- l . c f . B.D.vol.6.p.557-60.No.417.Goschen to Grey, Dec.2, 1910.; p.561-2.No.419.Same, Dec.5, 1910.:p.562-4.No.420.Same, Dec. 9, 1910.;p.566-7.No.421.Grey to Goschen, Dec.12, 1910.; n.568-70.No.424.Goschen to Grey, Dec. 16, 1910. 128. men always i n possession i t was equally i r r i t a t i n g f o r English- men, wherever they had vested and important i n t e r e s t s , to have Germans poking t h e i r noses i n and demanding shares i n concerns and i n t e r e s t s which had been b u i l t up by years of B r i t i s h hard 1. work and enterprise." The Kaiser did not help negotiations by informing Goschen that England's opposition to Germany had to stop. He would not undertake to bind himself not to increase the e x i s t i n g naval programme. The i r r i t a t i o n In Germany was quite natural and j u s t i f i e d , f o r instead of coming to Germany f i r s t England had joined the Franco-Russian A l l i a n c e which had from the beginning been dir e c t e d against the Germans. When Goschen commented on this language to Kiderlen, that gentleman said the Kaiser had 2. gone beyond what he meant, to say. Such, incidents were typ- i c a l of the Emperor and r e a l l y s i g n i f i e d l i t t l e , but they un- doubtedly tended to increase the suspicions of those B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l s who ?/ere s u f f i c i e n t l y anti-German without being made more so by such i l l - a d v i s e d utterances. The only advance made i n 1910 was the agreement of both Governments i n p r i n c i p l e to the exchange of information through the Naval Attaches. They s t i l l had to decide upon the ways 1. B.D.vol.6.p.529-50.No.402.Goschen to Nicolson, Private, Oct. 14, 1910. 2. B.D.vol.6.p.530-3.No.403.Goschen to Grey, Oct. 16, 1910. 129. and means of exchange and the form i n which assert to such an 1. agreement should he made. The early part of 1911 brought further p a r t i c u l a r s r e - garding the exchange of information to Attaches and assurances on both sides of willingness and desire to reach an understand- ing on both naval and p o l i t i c a l questions. Negotiations dragged on with i n t o l e r a b l e slowness. One can understand Crowe's f e e l - ing when he once minuted a despatch "Words - words - words." In March Nicolson wrote that he did not believe these discuss- ions would ever come to any r e s u l t , but thev could not leave 2 . the Chancellor's overtures unanswered. On A p r i l 11, 1911 Crowe summarised his view of the objective of the present Germ- an e f f o r t s : (1) Ostentatiously seeking B r i t i s h friendship; (2) Doing everything possible to c r e a t e f r i c t i o n between B r i t a i n and other States with a view to levying p o l i t i c a l blackmail; (3) Being absolutely prepared f o r a war when i t comes; (4) En- couraging the p a c i f i s t movement i n England to prevent B r i t a i n from taking any serious measures fo r combining with Prance and 3. Russia to r e s i s t a German attack. 1. B.D.vol.6.p.575.No.425.Grey to Goschen, Dec. 16, 1910.; G.D.vol.3.p.418.XXV111.367.Memorandum by Chancellor to Goschen, Oct. 13, 1910.;p.421.XXVlll.388.Metternich to Bethmann-Hollweg, Dec.17, 1910. 2. B.D.vol.6.p.604.No.450.Nicolson to Buchanan, March 14, 1911. 3. B.D.vol.6.p.620.Minute by Crowe. Crowe's views were extreme and not e n t i r e l y representative of the Government's a t t i t - ude, but because of his reputation for e f f i c i e n c y and i n t e l l - igence his ideas must of necessity have influenced h i s c o l l e a - gues and are therefore worthy of attention. In a review of B.D.vol.6.in the American H i s t o r i c a l Review fo r October 1930 S.B.Pay says:"Inevitably his h o s t i l e d i s s e c t i o n of the reports from Germany greatly influenced S i r Edward Grey and the other o f f i c i a l s who ner.t read them, and who generally endorsed with b r i e f comments Crowe's long c r i t i c i s m s . Crowe appears to have been accepted as an i n f a l l i b l e authority on German;/. But unfortunately he was prone to accept baseless gossip as gospe 1 150. In May the Chancellor regretted i t was now too late to put into e f f e c t the proposal to reduce the tempo within the e x i s t i n g b i l l . He had no other proposal to make but would con- sider anything B r i t a i n cared to put forward regarding the Navy Question. He would await d e f i n i t e advances before putting f o r t h h i s suggestions f o r a p o l i t i c a l agreement since he knew B r i t a i n 1. wanted the two together. B r i t a i n made no d e f i n i t e response. June saw only further d e t a i l s i n connection with the exchange of Information to Attaches. Neither side seemed to be i n any p a r t i c u l a r hurry to reach an agreement on this phase or any other, so they t a c i t l y permitted the negotiations to lapse. Moreover, during the Agadir c r i s i s f e e l i n g ran so high on both sides of the North Sea that a l l t a l k of an agreement was out of the question. In the autumn came rumours of an increase i n the German Naval Estimates. The Naval Attache i n B e r l i n advised B r i t a i n to adopt a heavy naval programme f o r several years i n order to con- vince German public opinion of the f u t i l i t y of attempting to surpass the English F l e e t . He f e l t convinced that this was 2. the only way to restore the German sense of proportion. Heed- less to sav Crowe h e a r t i l y agreed and advised i n addition indef- 3. i n i t e i n a c t i v i t y regarding the negotiations. truth One has heard much of the malign influence of Holstein i n the Wilhelmstrasse. What of that of Crowe i n Downing St.?" American H i s t o r i c a l Review, Oct. 1930.vol.36. No.1.p.154-5. 1. B.D.vol.6.p.621-2.No.462.Goschen to Grey, May 9, 1911. 2. B.D.vol.6.p.644-6.Enclosure i n No.476.Watson to Goschen, Sept. 27, 1911. 3. B.D.vol.6.p.647.Minute by Crowe. 131. In the meantime the German Naval Attache i n London was sending home exactly the type of report T i r p i t z and the Kaiser most loved to receive. England was d i r e c t i n g her Navy against Germany. During the c r i s i s i n August and September the entire E n g l i s h f l e e t had mobilised and only awaited a s i g n a l from Prance to f a l l on Germany. Now that the impetuous C h u r c h i l l was i n charge at the Admiralty moderation during crises would not be i n vogue. The menace from England was so great that Germany ought to ask h e r s e l f i f her present armaments were s u f f i c i e n t . A consistent naval programme would soon c a l l the E n g l i s h b l u f f and make her r e a l i s e the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of pre- 1. venting Germany from becoming a naval power. The f a i t h f u l Metternich, conscious of h i s own helplessness, s t i l l carried out h i s duty and refuted the Attached statements. B r i t a i n was ready f o r any s a c r i f i c e to maintain her s u p e r i o r i t y at sea. Last summer she had taken precautionary measures, but had cert- a i n l y not mobilised the whole f l e e t . Moreover, C h u r c h i l l as Lord of the Admiralty could not decide upon war. In view of the E n g l i s h state of mind any extension of the German Navy Lav/ meant not only "a f r e s h e f f o r t to come up to ours but one high- er i n proportion." The r a t i o of s u p e r i o r i t y would be adhered to i n England "quite apart from whether we b u i l d more or l e s s . " England had no i n t e n t i o n of destroying the German navy or she would have done so years ago when i t was easy. Upon this master- l.G.D.vol.4.p.42-5.XXXl.ll.Widermann to T i r p i t z , Oct.28, 1911. 132. l y survey of the s i t u a t i o n the Kaiser commented " I do not agree 1. with the Ambassador's judgment. The Naval Attache i s r i g h t . " In the face of such obstinacy what could a sane man do? In November the Chancellor complained somewhat b i t t e r l y about the E n g l i s h neglect of the negotiations which he had i n - ' 2. i t i a t e d with so much good w i l l and anxiety to please England, He urged Metternich to sound Grey with the object of s t a r t i n g the b a l l r o l l i n g again. He desired to obtain a satisfactovj p o l i t i c a l formula from England to check the Kaiser's determin- ation to introduce a new Havy Law i n the spring of 1912 and to 3. f i n d out what England r e a l l y wanted. After the Agadir C r i s i s public opinion i n England swung gradually round i n favour of Germany. Metternich informed h i s Government that the B r i t i s h Cabinet could not long ignore the new tendencv provided some unforeseen action on Germany's part 4. did not cause a r e a c t i o n . Accordingly, i n January Grey i n - structed Goschen to renew the negotiations as soon as conven-1. G.D.vol.4.p.46-7.XXXI.18.Metternich to Bethma n-Hollweg, Hov.1.1911. Metternich wrote to Bethmenn-Hollweg p r i v a t e l y complaining of the damage being done by the Attache who was secure under the protection of T i r p i t s and refused to con- fine himself to the purely t e c h n i c a l . The Attache frequent- l y said he f e l t i t his duty to spend the r e s t of his time i n England warning against the danger from England i n his report I f Metternich Refused to forward these reports there would be a disturbance and the Kaiser would declare the Attache r i g h t and Metternich wrong, c f . G.D.vol.4.p.54.XXXI.47.Metternich to Chancellor, Dec.10, 1911. 2. B.D.vol.6.p.647.No.477.Goschen to Grey. Nov. 3, 1911. 3. G.D.vol.4.p.48-50.XXXI.31.Bethmann-Hollweg to Metternich, Nov 22, 1911. 4. G.D.vol,4.p.50-2.Metterncih to Bethmann-Hollweg, Hov.24, 1911 p.52.XXXI.72.Metternich to Bethmann-Hollweg, Dec.9, 1911. 133 . 1. l e n t a f t e r the Reichstag e l e c t i o n . On January 28, 1912 Gos- chen reopened the discussions by giving Kiderlen a Memorandum 2 on the d e t a i l s of exchange of information through Naval Attaches At t h i s juncture came the now famous Haldane Mission of February 1912 which neither side i s prepared to claim the honour of i n i t i a t i n g . The Kaiser and Bethmann-Hollweg give a l l the • cr e d i t to the English; while many of the English maintain that the Germans took the f i r s t step. Overtures came through un- o f f i c i a l channels. Harold Nicolson i n his biography of Lord Carnock stiggests that B a l l i n and Cassel put the i r heads togeth- er and concocted a scheme whereby Cassel would t e l l the B r i t i s h Government that the Emperor had expressed a wish to receive a Cabinet Minister i n B e r l i n ; and B a l l i n would t e l l the Emperor that the B r i t i s h Government desired to send a s p e c i a l repres- entative to Germany to discuss an accommodation. C h u r c h i l l was i n correspondence M t h Cassel i n January of 1912, apparent- l y with reference to a proposal from B a l l i n and Cassel that he should v i s i t B e r l i n to have discussions with a certa i n august f r i e n d . C h u r c h i l l f e l t i t unwise to make a sp e c i a l t r i p at 4. present, using his o f f i c i a l p o s i t i o n as an excuse. Lloyd George, since Agadir had f e l t something should be done to hesl 1. B.D.vol.6.p.661.No.487.Grey to Goschen, Jan. 17, 1912. 2. B.D.vol.6.p.662.No.489.Goschen to Grey, Jan.28, 1912. and Enclosures p.662-3. 3. Nicolson - op. c i t . - p.362. 4. B.D.vol.6.p.666.No.492.ChurchIll to Cassel, Jan.7, 1912. Private; p.666-7.No.493.Churchill to Grey, Jan.20, 1912; G.D.vol.4.v,71.German Note XXXI.97. 134. any smart from which Germany might be su f f e r i n g . As a r e s u l t he and C h u r c h i l l worked together In consultation with Grey and obtained the Prime Minister's consent to send Cassel to B e r l i n 1. with a Memorandum to present to the Emperor. Accordingly, Cassel went to B e r l i n and through B a l l i n ob- tained an audience with the Kaiser to whom he handed a memorand- um along the following l i n e s : Naval s u p e r i o r i t y recognised as es s e n t i a l to B r i t a i n ; the present German Naval Programme should not be increased but i f possible retarded and reduced; as England desired not to i n t e r f e r e with German c o l o n i a l expansion, she would discuss forwarding German aspirations i n that d i r e c t i o n . Proposals f o r r e c i p r o c a l assurances debarring either Power from 2. j o i n i n g aggressive designs against the other would be welcome. According to his own account the Emperor was astounded at such a step. He sent f o r the Chancellor who was equally amazed. How- ever, they decided to welcome the B r i t i s h move and drew up a 3. suitable r e p l y i n which every word was c a r e f u l l y weighed. Whether the good gentlemen i n B e r l i n were astonished or not matters l i t t l e . Their reply expressed t h e i r pleasure i n wel- coming the B r i t i s h move, and t h e i r f u l l accord with the terms of Cassel's d r a f t provided the 1912 estimates for which arrange- ments had been completed were Included i n the present German naval programme. The best way to press negotiations rapidl;/ 1. C h u r c h i l l - op . c i t . - vol.1.p.95-6.;G.D.vol.4.p.71.German Note. XXXI.97. 2. G.D.vol.4.p.71.XXXI.97.Memorandum by Chancellor, Jan.29, 1912 No.l. 3. Wilhelm 1ft. - Memoirs - p.148-9. 135. forward would "be for Grey to v i s i t the Emperor as soon as poss- 1. i b l e . With t h i s , Cassel returned to London. The matter came before the Cabinet who decided to comply with the request to send a minister to B e r l i n . Although Grey feared possible sus- picions i n Paris and St. Petersburg i f such a v i s i t took place, he f e l t that a r e f u s a l would be a wanton rebuff. He had no great hope that anything would come of these new overtures but considered that no great harm would be done i f the v i s i t were 2. kept s t r i c t l y private and Informal. To send Grey was out of the question, as he was not i n the habit of v i s i t i n g the con- t i n e n t . The choice f e l l upon Haldane who knew Germany well and often spent a holiday there. Goschen paid a f l y i n g v i s i t to London to discuss the matter and returned to B e r l i n to make 3. arrangements. On February 8 Haldane arrived i n B e r l i n ostensibly on a commission to study u n i v e r s i t y education i n Germany. He met the Chancellor at the B r i t i s h Embassy and discussed the s i t - uation frankly. He impressed upon Bethmann-Hollweg that the German p o l i c y of p i l i n g up magnificent armaments had the i n - evitable consequence of drawing together other nations i n the i n t e r e s t s of t h e i r own security. B r i t a i n had n a t u r a l l y made preparations f o r defence but had no secret m i l i t a r y t r e a t i e s . 1. G.D.vol.4.p.72.XXXI.97.Memorandum by Chancellor, Jan.29,1912. Ho.II. 2. Grey - op. c i t . - vol.1.p.242-3. 3. B.D.vol.6.p.667.No.494.Grey to Goschen, Feb.2, 1912.Private; Haldane - Before the War - p.57. 136, However, i f Prance were attacked and her t e r r i t o r y occupied, Germany could not safe l y r e l y on B r i t i s h n e u t r a l i t y . B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s and commercial needs demanded that she lay down two keels f o r every one l a i d down by Germany. Haldane received the impression that Bethmann-Hollweg sin c e r e l y desired to avoid 1« war. The next day, February 9, Haldane had a long t a l k with the Kaiser and T i r p i t z during which he repeated the same state- ments regarding B r i t a i n s attitude to naval armaments. The Emperor provided him with a copy of the d r a f t of a new Fleet Lav;. They discussed the Lav/ i n general terms with T i r p i t z f i g h t i n g hard f o r i t i n i t s e n t i r e t y and Haldane pointing out the necessity f o r modification i f improved r e l a t i o n s were to follow. T i r p i t z broached the idea of a r a t i o . He f e l t the two-Power standard a hard one for Germany. Haldane pointed out that Germany v/as f r e e , so was England. F i n a l l y they agreed to drop the idea of d e f i n i n g a standard proportion i n any gen- e r a l agreement reached and to say nothing i n i t about ship- b u i l d i n g . The Emperor would announce to the German public that the agreement on general questions ( i f they concluded one ) had e n t i r e l y modified his wish for a new f l e e t law, as o r i g i n - a l l y conceived, and that I t shotxld be delayed and future ship- b u i l d i n g be spread over a longer period. The Emperor seemed agreeable and said the Chancellor would arrange a formula with Haldane. When Haldane received t h i s he wovild return to London 1.Haldane - op. c i t . - p.58. 137. and put the matter In the hands of the Cabinet, since he had come not to make an actual agreement but only to explore the 1. ground f o r one. The l a s t interview with the Chancellor took place on Sat- urday, February 10. They worked over the whole f i e l d of a gen- e r a l agreement and as a r e s u l t of some of Haldane's remarks the Chancellor received a mistaken imnression of the extent to which 2. England was prepared to go i n her concession. Haldane seemed to agree that the r e l a x a t i o n of tempo proposed by T i r p i t z within 3. the new Law would be acceptable. Bethmann-Hollweg suggested as a formula f o r the basis of an agreement: (1) assurances of desire f o r peace and fri e n d s h i p ; (2) neither power to enter into any combination directed against the other, and each power to declare expressly that i t i s not bound by any such combination; (3) i f either power became entangled i n war with one or more other powers the other would maintain at least benevolent neut- r a l i t y and do i t s utmost to l o c a l i s e the c o n f l i c t : (4) the duty of n e u t r a l i t y should not be applicable i n so f a r as i t may not be reconcilable with e x i s t i n g agreements. Neither power shotild make new arrangements that would prevent the maintenance of 4. n e u t r a l i t y . Haldane f e l t this went too far and endangered B r i t i s h freedom of action. He suggested a r e v i s i o n of the d r a f t 1. Haldane - op. c i t . - p.60-2. 2. G.D.vol.4.p.74-5.XXXI.112.Emperor to Bethmann-Hollweg, Feb. 9, 1912.; p.75-6.XXX1.120.Bethmann-Hollweg to Metternich, Feb. 12, 1012. 3.It was r e a l l y no concession at a l l , although T i r p i t z l a t e r stated i n his memoirs that.he was prepared to drop the entire law i f England offered a suitable p o l i t i c a l agreement. Un- fortunately, he gave no i n d i c a t i o n of this during the negot- i a t i o n s , c f . Brandenburg. - op. c i t . - p.405. 4.Haldane - op. c i t . - p.64. 138. by confining the terms to an undertaking by each Power not to make any unprovoked attack upon the other:not to j o i n i n any combination or design against the other for purposes of aggress- ion; not to become party to any plan or naval or m i l i t a r y com- binat i o n , alone or i n conjunction with any other power, d i r e c t - 1 . ed to such an end. The Chancellor agreed to t h i s . Haldane returned to London f u l l of hope that r e l a t i o n s would be improved and convinced of the s i n c e r i t y of Bethmann-Hollweg, yet uneasy on three points: (1) He had a strong impression that the new F l e e t Law v/ould be i n s i s t e d on. (2) He feared the p o s s i b i l i t y of T i r p i t z d i s p l a c i n g Bethmann-Hollweg as Chancellor. (3) He noted a want of continuity i n the supreme d i r e c t i o n of German 2. p o l i c y , e s p e c i a l l y Foreign P o l i c y . On the B r i t i s h side at l e a s t , many o f f i c i a l s entertained grave doubts as to the success of the mission and indeed the a d v i s a b i l i t y of embarking upon such a venture at a l l . Hicolson regarded i t "with anxiety and dismay. He foresaw that i n the l a s t r e sort Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg would not be strong enough to impose upon Admiral von T i r p i t z any substantial reduction of the naval programme. He feared, on the other hand, that Mr. Haldane might be inveigled into making p o l i t i c a l concessions 3. i n return f o r some flim s y assurance of naval retardation." On February 10 Goschen wrote p r i v a t e l y to Hicolson that i t seem- 1. Haldane - op. c i t . - p.65.;B.D.vol.6.p.682.Appendix 1. 2. Haldane - op. c i t . - p.70. 3. Hicolson - op, c i t . - p.362-3. 139. ed as I f Germany were going to obtain a p o l i t i c a l agreement for nothing and give no naval agreement. Haldane could not do any more and had at l e a s t been f i r m on the idea of two keels 1. to one. On February 11 Bertie wrote from Paris that i n his opinion the Mission was a f o o l i s h move that had created grave suspicion i n Paris. B r i t a i n should go on increasing her naval expenditure and not waste words t r y i n g to come to.an agreement with Germany which would be of no value since the Germans never 2. did keep the s p i r i t of t h e i r agreements. The v i s i t of an E n g l i s h Cabinet Minister to B e r l i n sup- posedly of an u n o f f i c i a l nature not unnaturally aroused the 1. B.D.vol.6.p.674-5.No.504.Goschen to Nicolson, Feb.10, 1912. 2. B.D.vol.6.p.687-8.No.509.Bertie to Nicolson, Private, Feb. 11, 1912. Poincare t e l l s an amazing story of Bertie's actions at the time of the Haldane Mission. He pays tribute to the entire l o y a l t y of the B r i t i s h Cabinet to the French a l l through i n keeping her informed of a l l things i n the negotiations. Bertie came to Poincare on March 27 and asked i f Poincare would allow him to forget f o r a few moments that he (Bertie) was an ambassador. Poincare agreed to forget the f a c t i f Bertie wished. Bertie then spoke of Grey's assurance to France that B r i t a i n had refused the declaration of neut- r a l i t y requested by Germany. He pointed out that Grey had refused i t now, but he was surrounded by men with German leanings. He then went on to say:"This makes me f e e l a l i t t l e uncomfortable; i t i s imperative that this declaration of neu- t r a l i t y s h a l l not be made, and there i s some r i s k of i t i f the German Government returns again and again to the charge. I t may be true that we are only asked to be neutral i n the event of Germany being attacked; but who can say that the day may not a r r i v e when France, i r r i t a t e d beyond measure and thre- atened by Germany, w i l l not be forced to take the offensive? No, believe me, i t w i l l not do f o r M.Paul Cambon to appear s a t i s f i e d , and i f only you speak r e s o l u t e l y to London, the B r i t i s h Government w i l l do more than hesitate before committing the blunder which I dread." Poincare says that Cambon prompt- l y saw Grey and hoisted the danger f l a g . Y/hen the neutral- i t y agreement was d e f i n i t e l y o f f and negotiations dropped, Cambon was much r e l i e v e d and Nicolson said Grey was a l s o . For the story c f . Poincare - Memoirs - vol.1.p.81-91. 140, c u r i o s i t y and the suspicions of England's f r i e n d s . Grey, anxious to preserve harmony, instructed the B r i t i s h representatives i n France, Russia, and Japan, to reassure the Governments and to communicate the information that B r i t a i n intended to renew d i s - cussions v/ith Germany for a naval understanding. He, himself, spoke to the diplomats i n London. Haldane v i s i t e d Camboh i n B e r l i n to clear away any d i s t r u s t . Haldane's report went before the Cabinet f o r c a r e f u l perusal, the d r a f t of the German Haval Law a t t r a c t i n g p a r t i c - u l a r a ttention. They found upon examining that p a r t i c u l a r document c l o s e l y that i t provided f o r substantial increases notably i n personnel. They one and a l l saw that i n the face of this B i l l , B r i t a i n would have to increase her Estimates. The German meagre concessions amounted to nothing, while the form- ula they proposed would t i e England's hands. As Grey said, they had to r e a l i s e that the p o l i t i c a l formulae were not safe and that a s u b s t a n t i a l naval agreement, such as would relax tension 1 . and give security, was not to be obtained. By February 24 Metternich had gained the impression that the proposals made by Haldane were not going to be accepted i n th e i r e n t i r e t y by the B r i t i s h Government. He voiced his f e e l - ing to Grey who confirmed i t . Grey believed that negotiations 'on i n d i v i d u a l points would drag on some time, the main thing l.Grey - op, c i t . - vol.1.p.244. 141. was to reach an agreement on the Supplementary B i l l and the 1. p o l i t i c a l d e c l a r a t i o n as soon as possible. In a Memorandum to Metternich he pointed out the increases i n the German B i l l and the correspondingly necessary increases by the B r i t i s h ' 2. Admiralty. This news annoyed the Kaiser and made him £eel that the B r i t i s h Cabinet had disavowed Haldane and drooped the 3. points upon which he had agreed with Germany. Further talks with Haldane assured Metternich that the Cabinet was not dev- i a t i n g from i t s o r i g i n a l standpoint, i t earnestly wished an agreement on the various questions, but the Estimates were heing increased and more ships r e c a l l e d from the Mediterranean to the Channel. This drove the Emperor almost to the verge of declaring war. He vowed that he would stand by the Hovelie, that the increased man-power did not enter into the discussion 4. with England. On March 6 Metternich pointed out that Haldane had not complained of the increase i n personnel during the early neg- o t i a t i o n s . The B r i t i s h Government were making objections to points that had seemed s a t i s f a c t o r y when Haldane was i n B e r l i n . The German Government repeated t h e i r readiness to reduce the 1. G.D.vol.4.p.76-7.XXXI.135.Metternich to Bethmann-Hollweg, Feb. 24, 1912. 2. B.D.vol.6.p.698-9.Enclosure i n Ho.524. 3.1n a l e t t e r to the Chancellor the Emperor stated "We demand of England a f r e s h o r i e n t a t i o n of her entire p o l i c y i n the sense that she renounces her e x i s t i n g Ententes and that we step more or less into the p o s i t i o n occupied by France." ' G.D.vo'1.4.r>.78.Hote. 4.G.D.vol.4.p.78-81.XXXI. 145.Me11ernich to Bethmann-Iio 1 Iweg, March 1, 1912.;p.81.XXXI.156.Emperor to Metternich, March 5, 1912. 142. tempo of construction within the new B i l l and trusted this 1. would supply a s a t i s f a c t o r y basis for continuing negotiations. Grey heped that f r i e n d l y discussions and relations would go on even i f no d e f i n i t e agreement were reached. He added to Goschen that the German Government seemed to be tr e a t i n g Haldane as i f ' he had had f u l l powers to make a binding agreement and were 2. d i s t o r t i n g what he had said. Haldane reported an extraordin- ary conversation i n the course of which Metternich said he had heard that i f B r i t a i n offered a suitable p o l i t i c a l formula the proposed f l e e t law as i t stood would be withdrawn and a much 3. more moderate one substituted. On March 14 Grey, i n response to a reminder from Metternich communicated to him the B r i t i s h d r a f t of a formula. "England w i l l make no unprovoked attack upon Germany and pursue no aggress ive p o l i c y towards her. Aggression upon Germany i s not the sub- ject and forms no part of any treaty understanding or combinat- ion to which England i s now a party nor w i l l she become a party 4. to anything that has such an object." Metternich, r e a l i s i n g that this would not s u i t Germany, t r i e d to persuade Grey to make some mention of n e u t r a l i t y , but the wary Grey declined to enter any trap that would hamper England's freedom of action i n event 1 . B.D.vol.6.p.704-6.Ho.529.Memorandum by Metternich, March 6, 1912. 2. B.D.vol.6.p.707-8.Wo.530.Grey to Goschen, March 6, 1912. 3. B.D.vol.6.p.710-1.Ho.533.Memorandum by Haldane, March 12, 1912.; p.712.No.535.Grey to Nicolson, March 13, 1912. 4. B.D.vol.6.p.713-4.Enclosure i n No.537. 143. 1. of Franco-German h o s t i l i t i e s . Grey pointed out that he had confidence i n Bethmann-Hollweg hut he had to consider that there may he a change of p o l i c y i f Bethmann-Hollweg f e l l from 2. power. When this reached the ears of the Emperor, he gave vent to hi s feelings:"Hever i n my l i f e have I heard of anyone concluding an agreement with one and regarding one p a r t i c u l a r statesman, Independently of the reigning Sovereign. From the foregoing, i t i s evident that Grey does not i n the least r e a l - ise who the r u l e r here i s , and that I am the Ruler. He ac t u a l - l y d i c t a t e s to me who my: Minister i s to he, supposing I con- 3. elude an agreement with England." The formula f a i l e d to s a t i s f y the Chancellor who seemed to wish a guarantee of absol- ute n e u t r a l i t y as the only basis upon which he could undertake 4. to renounce any sub s t a n t i a l part of the Supplementary Law. When Metternich explained the Chancellor's d i f f i c u l t i e s and hi s desire to continue c o n f i d e n t i a l r e l a t i o n s with England, Grey 5. used the coal question as an excuse for delaying discussions. Aft e r that both sides by mutual consent abandoned the attempt to f i n d a suitable formula. B r i t a i n introduced her i n - creased naval estimates, and Germany passed the Novelle. The 1. B.D.vol.6.p.714.Ho.538.Metternich to Grey, March 14, 1912; p.714.No.539.Grey to Goschen, March 15, 1812; GID.vol.4. p.82-3.XXXI.178.Metternich to German Foreign Offic e , March' 14, 1912. 2. B.D.vol.6.p.718-9.No.544.Grey to Goschen, March 16, 1912. 3. G.D.vol.4.p.83.Note. 4. B.D,vol.6.p.719-21.No.545.Grey to Goschen, March 19, 1912; G.D.vol.4.p.85.XXXI.188.Bethmann-Hollweg, March 18, 1912. 5. B.B.vol.6.p.724-5.Ho.548.Grey to Goschen, March 22, 1912. 144. door-.leading to a naval understanding had closed, hut the door leading to a settlement of e o l o n i a l and t e r r i t o r i a l questions was s t i l l l e f t open. The f a i l u r e of these negotiations pleased the anti-German section of the Foreign O f f i c e . Nicolson f e l t that so long as Germany could not r e l y on B r i t a i n s abstention or n e u t r a l i t y she 1. would not be disposed to disturb the peace. To Goschen he voiced h i s r e l i e f that the formula was o f f . He had been a f r a i d 2. B r i t a i n might be trapped. These sentiments Goschen h e a r t i l y 3. reciprocated. In Germany opinions varied. The Kaiser and the Naval Group maintained that the B r i t i s h e f f o r t had been from the beginning to force Germany to drop her proposed Navy B i l l i n return f o r c o l o n i a l concessions that would have involved Germany i n c o n f l i c t with other nations. However, the Kaiser "saw through him (Hald- ane) and his honest colleagues i n time and thoroughly spoiled th e i r l i t t l e joke ... though I may have increased t h e i r hatred I have won t h e i r respect which w i l l cause them i n due time to resume negotiations, l e t us hope, i n a more modest tone and with 4. a favourable outcome." Bethmann-Hollweg believed the attempt 5. r e a l l y honourable on B r i t a i n ' s part. He admitted that the introduction of the Navy B i l l was to a certain extent a mistake i n that i t did not relax the tension. The Haldane Mission did 1. B.D.vol.6p.740-1.No.566.Minute by Nicolson for Grey, Ap.4, 191 2. B.D.vol.6pp\747.Ho.575.Nicolson to Goschen, Ap.15, 1912.Priv- ate . 3. B.D.vol.6.p.750.No.579.Goschen to Nicolson, Ap.20, 1912.Priv- cl "fcG • 4. G.D .vol.4.p. 87-8.XXXI.209.: \7iIhelm 11.Memoirs .p. 160. 5. Bethmann-Hollweg - op. c i t . - p.57. 145. 1. make combined work easier than before and" more f r u i t f u l . Once again attempts to reach an understanding had r e s u l t - ed i n nothing save vain hopes and empty words. Once again German statesmen had ignored the warnings and nhisinterpreted the signs. B r i t a i n desired a naval understanding to r e l i e v e the f i n a n c i a l pressure and to calm public h o s t i l i t y towards Germany, but she d i d not desire i t at the price of her l i b e r t y of a c tion i n European c r i s e s . German-policy may have been pac- i f i c , i f so thought the B r i t i s h e r why did she want a strong navy, and a.pledge of our n e u t r a l i t y ? " Her actions throughout the past few years had been anything but reassuring to an out- sid e r . To a c e r t a i n extent B r i t i s h suspicions were .justified. On the other hand she had less cause to fear Germany than Germ- any had to fear her. Her f l e e t was more than a match f o r the German and would remain so i f she adhered to her two-power standard. However, unreasonable as these fears may seem, they were undoubtedly genuine at the time. Unfortunately, the d i s - t r u s t on both sides prevented the statesmen from negotiating an agreement on a sensible basis. Both sides wanted too much for t h e i r f r i e n d s h i p . The platforms upon which they opened discussions were poles apart. The miracle would have been i f they had sefiured an agreement. The blame f o r f a i l u r e f a l l s not on one alone but on both. B r i t a i n knew that she had no intention of attacking Germany -a seapower could hardly a n n i h i l - ate a continental power l i k e Germany. On the other hand the 1.Bethmann-Hollweg - op. c i t . - p.59. 146. Germans, not understanding B r i t i s h temperament, could not f e e l p e r f e c t l y c e r t a i n . The same applied to the Germans and the B r i t i s h suspicion of t h e i r peaceful intentions- Some of the German writers believe that Germany should have accepted the B r i t i s h formula as at lea s t better than nothing. "An exagger- ated determination to possess naval power on Germany's part led her to rush b l i n d l y past the second turning-point, which nevertheless might have offered auspicious prost>ects f o r a 1. better future f o r the Empire." The mistake i n the f i r s t place lay i n the German ambition to create a strong navy, which sooner or l a t e r must lead her into d i r e c t c o n f l i c t with England, and i n the f a i l u r e on the part of leading o f f i c i a l s to recognise what Metternich so clear l y saw, that "fear would never drive the English into our arms, 2. but i n t o f a c i n g us f u l l y armed." The tension had poisoned Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s during these years. I t relaxed so f a r during the next two that the two Governments were able to draw up several agreements on c o l o n i a l and other questions, that might have formed the prelude to an Entente had the war not suddenly rendered them void. A l l the pa i n f u l negotiations and discussions from 1908-1912 led only to a t a c i t agreement f o r each Government to go i t s own way i n the Naval (Question. B r i - t i s h statesmen learned the lesson of preparedness. C h u r c h i l l 1. Hammann -,op. c i t . - p.239. 2. Brandenburg - op. c i t . - p.295. 147. took charge of the Admiralty and silence reigned over the naval question. "But I t was not the silence of sleep. V/ith every r i v e t that von T i r p i t z drove into his ships of war, he united B r i t i s h opinion throughout wide c i r c l e s of the most powerful people i n every walk of l i f e and i n every part of the Empire. The hammers that clanged at K i e l and WillieImshaven were forging the c o a l i t i o n of nations by which Germany was to be r e s i s t e d and f i n a l l y overthrown. Every threatening gesture that she made every attempt to shock, or shake the c l o s e l y knit structure of 1. the Entente made i t close and f i t together more t i g h t l y . " The tone of the B r i t i s h statesmen "was not the r e s t r a i n t impos- ed by fear of the 'nearly completed f l e e t i n the North Sea' but 2. the calm r e s u l t i n g from the resolve to be prepared." 1.Churchill - op. c i t . - p.118. 2.Ibid.p.119. 148 CHAPTER V. H i l l s o f D i f f i c u l t y . A f t e r the A l g e c i r a s Conference Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s e n t e r e d upon a p e r i o d of c o m p a r a t i v e c a l m . The n a v a l q u e s t i o n had n o t y e t assumed i t s l a t e r immense p r o p o r t i o n s and t h e r e were no s e r i o u s i n d i v i d u a l .'points of f r i c t i o n , m e r e l y a g e n e r a l 1. r i v a l r y . The Morocco c r i s i s had r e v e a l e d t o the German s t a t e s - men the dangers of t h e i r p o s i t i o n . The A n g l o - F r e n c h E n t e n t e had p r o v e d s t r o n g e r t h a n t h e y a n t i c i p a t e d . I f R u s s i a and Eng- l a n d drew c l o s e r t o g e t h e r ^ German e n c i r c l e m e n t , t h e y b e l i e v e d , would be c o m p l e t e . A c c o r d i n g l y , t h e y a t t e m p t e d t o improve t h e i r r e l a t i o n s w i t h E n g l a n d i n o r d e r t o p r e v e n t i f p o s s i b l e an A n g l o - R u s s i a n rapprochment. Grey says t h a t a f t e r the A l g e c i r a s Con- f e r e n c e "the sun of German c o r d i a l i t y shon on London". He f e l t t h a t i f Germany would o n l y l e t w e l l a l o n e , r e l a t i o n s would be- come s t i l l b e t t e r . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , t h e y would t r y t o improve the o c c a s i o n and so make i t more d i f f i c u l t f o r the B r i t i s h Gov- 2. ernment. B i l l o w ' s m e d i t a t i o n s suggested the p o s s i b i l i t y of renewed a t t e m p t s t o r e a c h a n . u n d e r s t a n d i n g . " I want t o r e m a i n on good terms w i t h E n g l a n d , b u t on a f o o t i n g of complete e q u a l - i t y , on a b a s i s of complete independence. - I t i s n o t m e r e l y c r i m i n a l , i t i s s t u p i d , t o e m b i t t e r German f e e l i n g a g a i n s t Eng- 1. Brandenburg - op. c i t . - p.266. 2. Grey - op. c i t . v o l . 1 . p . 1 1 0 . 149. land, to fan t i n y sparks into a blaze. - We have numerous points of contact with England: she i s our best cixstomer; so far she has opened her ports and her trade to us as to her own subjects. •. Obviously there are points of f r i c t i o n , questions In which r e c i p r o c a l concessions may be necessary, but not one i n which. with calm goodwill and r e q u i s i t e doigte, i t i s impossible to reach an understanding along peaceful lines i n the i n t e r e s t of 1. both countries." So while the King and the Kaiser exchanged c o r d i a l l e t t e r s , the statesmen and diplomats of both countries conversed i n amicable terms and indulged i n p o l i t e expressions of desire f o r ; and determination tc promote^good r e l a t i o n s . In May the Emperor graciously hinted that i f Haldane cared to come over to Germany to see something of their m i l i t a r y org- 2. anization he would be warmly welcomed. Tschirschky confirmed Lascelles impression that the Kaiser r e a l l y desired friendship with England. He spoke of the g r a t i f i c a t i o n i n Germany over the c o r d i a l reception i n England of the Burgomasters and t h e i r reception by the King. Bulow had expressed the hope that this would lead to the establishment of a f r i e n d l y understanding be- 3. tween Germany and England. These remarks immediately aroused the suspicions of the wary Crowe. He commented: "Past h i s t o r y has shown us that a f r i e n d l y Germany has usually been a Germany asking f o r something by way of proving our friendship. I t w i l l 1. Billow - Memoirs - vol.2.p.227. 2. B.D.vol.3.p.356-7.Ho.415.Lascelles to Grey, May 24, 1906. 3. B.D.vol.3.p.357. Ho.416.Lascelles to Grey, May 24, 1906. 150. be prudent to be prepared f o r proposals f o r an understandinn- 1. being made to us by Germany on similar l i n e s . " "The way to maintain good r e l a t i o n s with Germany i s to be ever courteous and correct, but reserved and f i r m i n the defence of B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s and to object and remonstrate i n v a r i a b l y when Germany offends We were never so badly treated by Germany as i n the years when we were always making concessions i n order to gain t h e i r r e a l friendship and goodwill. They are e s s e n t i a l l y 2. people whom i t does not pay to run a f t e r . " Exactly the same sentiments as German statesmen had frequently expressed regarding t h e i r dealings with England-^ Grey heard thet Radolin had informed Bourgeois o f f i c i a l l y that an entente was proceeding between Germany and England, but i t was i n no way intended to impair r e l a t i o n s between Prance and England. This i n t e l l i g e n c e Grey denied. Admittedly the King on h i s way to Marienbad would meet the Kaiser but that had 3. no p o l i t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e . A few days l a t e r Metternich com- plained that a sensitiveness i n Prance seemed to be preventing English f r i e n d s h i p with Germany as well as with Prance. In add- i t i o n to the understanding with Prance, B r i t i a n had now expressed a desire for one with Russia. 'Germany f a i l e d to see why she should be excluded from the r i n g . Inclusion would assure peace while exclusion would cause an attempt to break the r i n g . Grey 1. B.D.vol.3.p.358.Minute by Crowe. 2. B.D.vol.3.p.359-60.Minute by Crowe. 3. B.D.vol.3.p.361-2.Grey to Be r t i e , July 9, 1906. 151. pointed out that England merely sought to s e t t l e with Russia differences that had nothing to do v/ith Germany. Should any auestion arise i n which German inte r e s t s v/ere affected, natur- 1. a l l y they would consult her. Apparently the negotiations 2. with Russia v/ere causing a l i t t l e uneasiness i n German c i r c l e s . By August the King and the Kaiser had so f a r overcome t h e i r mutual antipathy and the r e l a t i o n s between t h e i r respective countries had improved s u f f i c i e n t l y to warrant a meeting at Gronberg on August 15, on the King's outward journey to Marlen- bad. The v i s i t passed o f f well without any d i s t i n c t l y p o l i t i c a l 3. conversation between the two menarchs. Hardinge, who accom- panied King Edward, discussed the general trend of r e l a t i o n s v/ith the Emperor's ministers i n f r i e n d l y manner. The Emperor seemed genuinely f r i e n d l y towards England and expressed pleasure 4. at Haldane's coming v i s i t . The press exercised reserve i n i t s 5. comments, avoiding either h o s t i l i t y or sincere c o r d i a l i t y . A few days l a t e r the Emperor and his o f f i c i a l s welcomed Haldane and entertained him hospitably. He talked v/ith many prominent men and f e l t that the majority were peaceably i n - c l i n e d , anxious to be on good terms with England and of the opinion that to t h i s end the Anglo-French Entente v/ould prove 6. a help rather than a hindrance. With the assistance of the 1. B.D.vol.3.p.363.Ho.422.Grey to Lascelles, July §.1. 1906. 2. B.D.vol.4.p.231-2.Ho.216.Grey to Hicolson, May 23, 1906. 3. Lee - op. c i t . - vol.2.p.529. 4. B.D.vol.3.p.366-70.Ho.425.Hardinge to Grey, Aug.16, 1906. Private. 5. B.D.vol.3.p.370-2.Ho.426.Gartwright to Grey, Aug.20, 1906. 6. Haldane - Before the War - p.22-46Autobiography - p.201-7. 152. m i l i t a r y s t a f f he studied the army organisation and was present at a parade. Naturally he saw only what was already known to the p u b l i c . His attendance at the parade threatened to cause a storm i n Prance, where the b e l i e f prevailed that i t commemor- ated the German v i c t o r y at Sedan. However, the Ambassadors cleared up the s i t u a t i o n and Anglo-French friendship continued 1. unimpaired. The year 1906 concluded with f r i e n d l y f e e l i n g on both sides i n o f f i c i a l c i r c l e s . The Governments recognized the importance of proceeding slowly and co-operating whenever possible u n t i l public opinion recovered from i t s attack of h o s t i l i t y . As a proof of h i s goodwill the Kaiser offered to present to England a r e p l i c a of a statue of William of Orange, King of England. The King accepted the g i f t i n the correct s p i r i t . The Prime Minister expressed his suspicions privately:"He who makes more fuss of you than usual has either deceived you or proposes to do so." Parliament g r a t i f i e d i t s sense of humour by placing 2. the statue near the Orangery i n front of Kensington Palace. The following year continued these amicable re l a t i o n s but to a lesser degree. E a r l y i n the year King Edward i n the course of h i s travels on the continent met the King of I t a l y at Gaeta. A r t i c l e s appeared i n the Neue Preie Presse and i n the 1. B.D.vol.3.p.374.No.451.Lascelles to Grey, Aug.31, 1906. . p.575.No.433,Lascelles to Grey, Sept.l, 1906; p.376.No. 435.Diary of Haldane's v i s i t to Germany. 2. Lee - op. c i t . - vol.2.p.531-2. 153. Cologne Gazette c r e d i t i n g King Edward with the int e n t i o n of i s - o l a t i n g and humiliating Germany. As a r e s u l t B e r l i n want "stark s t a r i n g raving mad" under the impression that war between England 1 e and Germany was imminent. Further newspaper a r t i c l e s calmed the public and restored t h e i r sanity. Lascelles reported a great f e e l i n g of 'nervosity' i n Germany probably because the people f e l t t h e i r country no longer occupied i t s previous p o s i t - ion i n Europe. Instead of blaming th e i r own p o l i c y they believed themselves the victims of the machinations of some wicked man - at one time they blamed Delcasse, now they suspected King Edward. Many were a f r a i d of being deserted by I t a l y at Ehe Hague as at 2. Algeciras, f o r they v/ould have to oppose disarmament. The second Hague Conference, summoned by Russia on the request of the United States, met i n the summer of 1907. Several times during 1906 and 1907 the Kaiser expressed h i s opposition to the discussion of l i m i t a t i o n of armaments and declared the whole conference absolute nonsense. B r i t a i n , already becoming alarmed at the increased naval forces around her, wished to br i n g the question before the Conference. A l l the countries s e c r e t l y considered the meeting useless and the discussion of disarmament f u t i l e , but they kept quiet, allowed B r i t a i n to bring up the idea and l e f t i t f o r Germany to incur the odium of shelving the question. Other matters proved equally d i f f i c u l t 1. B.D.vol.6.p.28.Ho.15.Lascelles to Grey, A p r i l 19, 1007.Private 2. B.D.vol.6.p.28.Ho.15.Lascelles to Grey, A p r i l 19, 1907.Private p.29-32.Ho.l6.Cartwright to .Grey, A p r i l 23, 1907. 154. and unproductive of success. An Obligatory Court of A r b i t r a t i o n was turned down because Germany.declined to have anything to do with i t . Once more Germany emerged with an enhanced reputation for standing i n the way of anything that would promote the peace of the world. Once again she was no more to blame than the other 1. countries, only less d i s c r e e t i n her conduct. This year witnessed the culmination of the Anglo-Russian negotiations which had been causing the Germans considerable anxiety, For many years English and Russian interests had con- f l i c t e d i n Asia. So long as t h i s f r i c t i o n continued Germany f e l t f a i r l y safe. I t was the keynote of her p o l i c y to keep Eng- land and Russia apart, so long as she could not bind either of them to her i n f r i e n d s h i p . However, the conclusion of the Anglo- French Entente i n e v i t a b l y meant an attempt on the part of France to b r i n g England and Russia together and so to change the Dual Entente into the T r i p l e Entente. During the negotiations of 1906 the Germans t r i e d hard to i n t e r f e r e on both sides. Their v e i l e d hints probably had more e f f e c t on Isvolsky and the R'uss- 2. ians than on the English. On the surface they affected to welcome the improved r e l a t i o n s between England and Russia and admitted that no German inte r e s t s were involved i n the discuss- ions. Although Billow expressed l i t t l e anxiety, the Kaiser was none too pleased: "A pretty state of a f f a i r s , " he said, " i n 1. Lowes Dickinson - on. c i t . -.n.354-6.jBrandenburg - op. c i t . p.275-7. 2. B.D.vol.4.p.246-9.Ho.234.Lascelles to Grey, Oct.29, 1906.; p.255-7.Ho.243.Annual Report fnr Russia, 1906; p.282-3.Ho.260. Nicolson to Grey, March 26, 1907.;p.412.No.369.Nicolson to Grey, Nov. 7, 1906. 155. future v/e s h a l l have to deal v/ith the Franco-Russian A l l i a n c e , the Entente Cordiale "between France and England, and the Entente between England and Russia, and i n the second place v/ith Spain, 1. I t a l y , and Portugal as s a t e l l i t e s i n this system of a l l i a n c e s . " When the agreement was announced i n September 1907 the Germans received i t calmly, the o f f i c i a l c i r c l e s maintaining a correct attitude as i n the case of the Anglo-French agreement of 1904. Bulow expressed to Hardinge his s a t i s f a c t i o n at the removal of causes of f r i c t i o n i n Asia and his b e l i e f that the understanding 2. would help to consolidate the int e r e s t s of peace i n Europe. The press was moderately favourable, but the commercial Inter- ests wished Germany had also p a r t i c i p a t e d and feared possible 3. i n j u r y to German trade i n Persia. Cartv/right i n Munich ob- 4. served some b i t t e r press attacks on the agreement. Once more they had to accept the f a i t accompli v/ith as good grace as poss- i b l e . With the Anglo-Russian Entente the r i n g around Germany 5. was complete. There were nov/ telegraph wires i n existence between Paris and St.Petersburg, 1891; London and Tokio, 1902; London and Paris, 1904; Paris and Tokio, 1907; St.Petersburg 6 and Tokio, 1907; and London and St.Petersburg, August 31, 1907. "The system of a l l i a n c e s created by Bismarck had only embraced a great part of the European continent: that of the T r i p l e En-1. Pribram - op. c i t . - p.120. 2. B.D.vol.6.p.43-6.Ho.25.Memorandum by Hardinge, Aug.19, 1907. 3. B.D.vol.4.p.599-600.Ho.540.Lascelles to Grey, Oc t . l , 1907. 4. B.D.vol.4.p.601-2.Ho.542.Cartv/right to Grey, Oct.8, 1907. 5. Hammann - op. c i t . - p.176. 6.Ibid.p.174." 156. tente drew within i t s o r b i t a great part of the Eastern Hemis- phere." " I f we b r i n g unbiased judgment to bear upon these events our v e r d i c t w i l l be that the diplomatic brains of the western Great Powers p a r t i c u l a r l y of England, were f a r superior to those of Germany, both i n the clearness with which they per- ceived t h e i r goal and i n the l o g i c a l accuracy with which they carr i e d on t h e i r negotiations. I t must alwayys be considered one of the greatest mistakes made by Germany's leading states- men, that they maintained i n general a passive attitude, i n con- t r a d i s t i n c t i o n to the u n t i r i n g and ceaseless a c t i v i t y of the French and the B r i t i s h , and that they neglected to follow B i s - marck's example i n securing a l l i e s by s a t i s f y i n g the covetous- 1. ness of the other Powers." Thus have the German and Austrian h i s t o r i a n s judged the p o l i c y of the Entente as a c a r e f u l l y thought out scheme methodically car r i e d to a conclusion. Their statements are open to c r i t i c i s m . They c r e d i t the Entente statesmen with deep-laid plans. In a l l p r o b a b i l i t y these men, p a r t i c u l a r l y the English, merely saw the danger to t h e i r own country i f the points of f r i c t i o n were allowed to remain and grow worse. They saw i n Europe a compact group led by a seemingly aggressive state and dreaded the consequences of facing the group alone or of being drawn into i t s o r b i t as a dependent nation. Apprehen- sion caused them to come to an understanding. Then Germany com- plained of encirclement and Machiavellian p o l i t i c s conducted by the malicious, i n t r i g u i n g King of England. I t never seemed to I.Pribram - op. c i t . - p.118. 157. occur to her statesmen that I t might he advisable f o r them to change t h e i r t a c t i c s and be a l i t t l e more c o n c i l i a t i n g before i t was too l a t e . E a r l y i n 1907 Hardinge suggested that King Edward should i n v i t e the Kaiser to Windsor i n the autumn. The Emperor had not yet returned the King's K i e l v i s i t of 1904 because of the strained atmosphere during the Morocco C r i s i s . How r e l a t i o n s had improved s u f f i c i e n t l y f o r a v i s i t to prove b e n e f i c i a l . In June the i n v i t a t i o n was issued to the Kaiser and accepted. P i n a l arrangements were made when the King broke his journey to Marien- bad at WilheImshBhe i n August 1907 to spend a few hours with his nephew. As usual the composition of the Kaiser's suite caused a l i t t l e trouble. The p o s s i b i l i t y of his bringing two ministers and one of these the Chancellor brought protests from Grey who wished to avoid anything that might suggest a v i s i t of 1. p o l i t i c a l importance and alarm Prance. Lascelles thought prob- ably Bulow would not come, but had heard that the Kaiser intend- 2. ed to arrive escorted by a f l e e t of c r u i s e r s . Since the Emp- eror seemed determined to regard the v i s i t as a state v i s i t , i t would be best to recognise i t as such, at the same time using the absence of the Chancellor to emphasise the s l i g h t p o l i t i c a l importance attached to i t . This would avoid any offence to 3. Prance. This disturbance had scarcely died down, when the 1. B.D.vol.6.p.80.No.47.Grey to Knollys, Aug.28, 1907.Private• 'p.81.No.48.Grey to Lascelles, Sept,18. 1907.Private. 2. B.D.vol.6.p.82.No.49.Lascelles to Grey, Sept.20. 1907. 3.Ibid. 158, Kaiser became alarmed about his health and telegraphed his desire 1. to send the Crown Prince i n his place or to postpone the v i s i t . However, the i n d i s p o s i t i o n soon passed, and united pressure from Billow and the King induced His Imperial Majesty to reconsider his d e c i s i o n . The Emperor and Empress arrived on Hovsmber 11 and remain- ed u n t i l November 18. The v i s i t was successful i n every way, and the Kaiser highly g r a t i f i e d by h i s c o r d i a l reception both by the Royal Family and the London public. He again stressed his great desire f o r the best r e l a t i o n s between the two countries. At the G u i l d h a l l Luncheon^November 13,he said, "The main prop and base for the peace of the world i s the maintenance of good re l a t i o n s between our two countries, and I s h a l l further strengthen them as f a r as l i e s i n my power. Blood i s thicker than water., The 2. German nation's wishes coincide with mine." The most import- 3. ant p o l i t i c a l matter discussed was the Bagdad Railway. At the conclusion of the v i s i t the Empress returned to Germany and the Kaiser went on to H i g h c l i f f e Castle, the home of Col. Stuart- 4. Wortley, f o r a r e s t and a holiday. The press i n both countries received the v i s i t favourably and viewed i t as an e f f e c t i v e r e - c o n c i l i a t i o n . "For a few weeks Anglo-German rel a t i o n s breathed a c o r d i a l i t y which they had not known since the Kruger telegram 5 and which they were not to know again for a dozen years or more." 1. B.D.vol.6.p.88.Ho.56.Grey to Lascelles , Hov.l, 1907; Billow - Memoirs - vol.2.p.296. 2. Lee - op. c i t . - vol.2.p.558-9. 3. c f . I n f r a , p. 4. Lee - op. c i t . - vol.2.p.561. 5.Ibid. p.563. 159. Unfortunately, the good e f f e c t wore off very soon. Naval r i v a l r y and the strengthening Anglo-Russian friendship aroused public opinion on both sides. The French P r e s i d e n t came to Eng- land i n May of 1908 and was e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y received. This v i s i t coupled with the proposed meeting of the King and the Czsr 1. r u f f l e d the temper of the German press. On t h e i r v/ay to Reval the King and Queen stopped at K i e l to meet Prince and Princess Henry."- of Prussia. When they l e f t the harbour they were escort- ed by a squardon of German destroyers. "The smart appearance of the whole German North Sea F l e e t l y i n g at anchor i n the port gave food for r e f l e c t i o n upon the recent German naval programme of construction, while the i n t r i c a t e evolutions of the torpedo f l o t i l l a , which excited the admiration of a l l the naval o f f i c e r s on board the Royal Yacht served as a useful object lesson of the 2. e f f i c i e n c y of the German Navy." At Reval there was no t a l k of a l l i a n c e s against Germany, only a general pleasure at the establishment of c o r d i a l r e l a t i o n s between England and Russia and discussion of such matters as affected Anglo-Russian i n t e r - 3. ests. German d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n was acute, although Metternich 4. admitted to Grey that i t had no j u s t i f i c a t i o n . Bulow estimates 1. B.D.vol.6.p.l50-3.No.96.Cartwright to Grey, June 1, 1908. 2. B.D.vol.5.p.237-45.No.195.Hardinge Memorandum of Reval v i s i t , June 1908. 3. Bulow - Memoirs - vol.2.p.308. 4. B.D.vol.6.p.154.No.97.Grey to de S a l i s , June 15, 1908. Really the Germans had some grounds for th e i r apprehensions since several important o f f i c i a l s were present at the meeting Stolypin and Isvolsky on the Russian side, and French, Fisher Hardinge, and Nicolson on the English side. This seemed to h i n t at more than a family reunion. Harold Nicolson suggests that the Germans feared the e f f e c t of King Edward's tact on the Czar, i n contrast to the somewhat patronizing tone adopt- ed by the Kaiser. The Germans were r e l y i n g on the r e l a t i o n - ship"between Kaiser and Czar .to keep the l i n e open between B e r l i n and St.Petersburg.Nicolson-op . c i t r-p.274. 160. Reval as the c e n t r a l p o l i t i c a l event of 1908 and remarks that, "I had no doubts whatever on the p o l i t i c a l significance of this meeting nor of the p o l i t i c a l consequence that might follow i t 1. i f our p o l i c y were clumsy and incautious." A view with which Brandenbtirg agrees i n p r i n c i p l e , "Here i t was that the foundat- ions of a p r a c t i c a l p o l i t i c a l Entente betv/een Russia and England were l a i d , and here too, Russian p o l i c y f i r s t turned d e c i s i v e l y 2>. away- from f r i e n d s h i p with Germany. » The main feature of the King's meeting with the Kaiser 3. at Cronberg i n August 1908 has already been described. One subject that occupied the two monarchs was the retirement of • S i r Prank Lascelles and the question of h i s successor. For some months the matter had taxed the resources of the Foreign Office without any s a t i s f a c t o r y r e s u l t . At this meeting, how- ever, they agreed upon B i r Edward Goschen as the new B r i t i s h Ambassador to B e r l i n . In October the Kaiser brought down upon his head a v e r i t - able deluge of c r i t i c i s m by permitting the publication of some of his opinions on Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s . The idea was con- ceived as a r e s u l t of the Kaiser's stay at H i g h c l i f f e Castle and was intended to a s s i s t better r e l a t i o n s between England and Germany by revealing the Kaiser's n e v e r - f a i l i n g f r i e n d s h i p . I t t o l d of h i s keeping Russia and France from intervening against HBulow - Memoirs - vol.2.p.307. Another example of Billow's wisdom] 2. Brandenburg - op. c i t . -.p.310. 3. c f . supra, p.109-110. 161. England i n the Boer War, of h i s supplying a plan of campaign to Queen V i c t o r i a , of his friendship i n spite of the opposition of German public opinion- This and much else i t related, often i n the exaggerated language of the Kaiser himself. The manu- s c r i p t had been sent to the Kaiser by Col. Stuart-Wortley f o r his approval. He forwarded i t to Bulow at Horderney. That gentleman, being b u s i l y occupied with matters of v i t a l import- ance, passed i t on to the Foreign Office with s t r i c t orders, h e a v i l y underlined, to make such corrections, additions or de- l e t i o n s as may seem suitable and then to return the revised copy to him. This they did with speed and secrecy. Bulow noted a few minor corrections but s t i l l d i d not read i t . He t o l d his a s s i s t a n t to see i f he considered i t suitable f o r publication. This done, he rettumed i t to the Emperor, passed by Foreign 1. Office and Chancellor. Thus the i l l - f a t e d report found i t s way i n t o the press and was the r a i s o n d'etre of an a r t i c l e i n the D a i l y Telegraph, October 28, 1908. The a f f e c t i n England was the exact opposite of that i n - tended. A l l the papers held i t up to r i d i c u l e and regarded many of the assertions as an i n s u l t to the English people. In Germany i t led to a v i o l e n t campaign against the personal rule 2. of the Kaiser. Bulow was h o r r i f i e d and offered to resign. The Kaiser suffered a nervous collapse and thought of abdicat- 1 . Bulow - Memoirs - vol.2.p.329. Jules Cambon i s i n c l i n e d , on the testimony of Zimmermann to believe that Billow read the Manuscript and yet passed i t . c f . Cambon - Billow and the War - Foreign A f f a i r s . A p r i l 1932.vol.10.Ho.3.p.410. 2. Brandenburg - op. c i t . - p.291. 162. ing. Goschen wrote p r i v a t e l y to Grey that "everybody was angry 1 • with somebody." To Metternich Grey expressed regret at the e f f e c t of the interview, but saw nothing i n the way of £nglo- 2. German fri e n d s h i p and co-operation. On the whole the Incident served to reveal to the Germans some of the f a u l t s of t h e i r o f f i c i a l system; and to put the English even more on the i r guard against Germany. By December Grey thought a l l t a l k about i t should cease or Germany would turn her i r r i t a t i o n against Eng- land. Besides i t had served a good purpose.* "Never since I have been i n o f f i c e has opinion here been so thoroughly awake with regard to Germany and on i t s guard as i t i s now. I haven't the f a i n t e s t tremor of anxiety about that. Never has the Emper- or's p o s i t i o n been so low i n the world. Why then not l e t well alone J " Just before the storm over the D a i l y Telegraph Incident Austria formally announced the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovnia, an act which p r e c i p i t a t e d a European C r i s i s that might have led to war had the powers affected been prepared. The c r i s i s of the winter 1908-9 did not a f f e c t Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s as might have been expected. For the most part both countries worked together for the preservation of peace. Grey disapproved of the v i o l a t i o n of treaty r i g h t s by stronger powers and declined to recognize the l e g a l i t y of Austria's act. When Serbia became 1. B.D.vol.6.p.217-8.No.136.Goschen to Grey, Nov. 13, 1908. 2. B.D.vol.6.p.206-8.No.130.Grey to Goschen, Nov. 7, 1908. 3. B,D.vol.6.p.225*6.No.142.Grey to Ber t i e , Dec.l, 1908.Private. 163. involved, and with her, Russia, he/urged.the: ap p l i c a t i o n of pre- ssure i n Vienna to enforce a p o l i c y of moderation. Germany supported her a l l y , A u s t r i a , and declined to exert pressure i n Vienna, when she considered the provocation had come from Bel- grade. On the whole, the two Foreign Offices succeeded i n d i s - cussing the d i f f e r e n t phases of the c r i s i s i n a calm sensible manner. Wo doubt, there was resentment i n Germany because Eng- land would not order Russia and Serbia to give i n . S t i l l Gre;^ stood firm, u n t i l the Serbian reply' to Austria convinced him that the provocation was not e n t i r e l y on one side, and u n t i l Germany presented to St.Petersburg a diplomatic ultimo turn which caused the Russians to surrender a l l along the l i n e . Suggestions made by eith e r Government to preserve peace were c a r e f u l l y examined by the other and i f considered unsuitable were p o l i t e l y rejected with f r i e n d l y explanations. In spite of this co-oper- ation, various actions strengthened the d i s t r u s t already f i r m l y ingrained i n the minds of the o f f i c i a l s of both sides. Germany f e l t that Grev was not so much opposing Austria as Austria's 1. a l l y . They accused Nicolson, then English Ambassador at St. 2. Petersburg, of inflaming Russia against Austria and Germany. 3. This Nicolson denied. He had spoken f r e e l y to Isvolsky of the d i f f i c u l t i e s but had never urged him to adopt a lin e that might widen the breach between him and Vienna. There can be no doubt that Nicolson deplored Isvolsky's retreat a f t e r the German warn- 1. Bulow - Imperial Germany - p.51. 2. Brandenburg - op. c i t . - p.331. 3. Nicolson - op. c i t . - p.310-12. 164. 1. ing. He resented the humiliation of the Entente raid feared that France and Russia v/ould desert England. Then Germany's end v/ould he accomplished. She would be d i c t a t o r i n Europe and i n 2. a p o s i t i o n to challenge England's maritime supremacy. This pessimistic point of view and d i s t i n c t anti-German bias boded i l l f or Germany when Hicolson became Permanent Under Secretary at the Foreign Office i n 1910. The C r i s i s passed leaving the d i v i s i o n between the two groups more marked, and the hatred be- tween the i n d i v i d u a l members more intense. Between England and Germany, however, i t l e f t a c e r t a i n hond,in that both had worked fo r peace and had succeeded i n maintaining i t . I t "may have i n - creased the mutual suspicion to a s l i g h t extent; but i n that i t pales Into i n s i g n i f i c a n c e beside the naval question and the Agadir C r i s i s . During one of the calm i n t e r v a l s the King and Queen paid a state v i s i t to B e r l i n , February 1909. Their reception, a l - though somewhat lacking i n warmth at f i r s t , r a p i d l y became cord- i a l and enthusiastic. Both King and Kaiser v/ere delighted with the splendid success. The tone of the press l e f t nothing to be 3. desired. P o l i t i c a l l y the v i s i t s i g n i f i e d nothing. Heither side s e r i o u s l y expected i t would. I t was merely a necessary gesture of courtesy. The summer of 1909 witnessed the change i n leadership 4. i n Germany..already.'-.mentioned. Billow, unpopular v/ith the Kaiser 1.B.D.vol.5.p.736.Ho.764.Hicolson to Grey, March 24, 1909. 2.Ibid; also Hicolson - op. c i t . - p.306-8. 3. B.D.vol.6.p.232.Ho.146.Goschen to Grey, Feb.12, 1909. 4. c f . supra, p.120. 165. since the D a i l y Telegraph Incident, had to go. During his regime Germany had f a i l e d to come to an agreement with England and had p r e c i p i t a t e d various c r i s e s that led to her "encirclement". Yet he had heen popular i n Germany. Brandenburg condemns him i n c a r e f u l l y measured terms. "He lacked a sense of the great i n t e r - dependence of the nations v/ith whom our fate was also bound up and he had no grasp of the broad lines of the world's h i s t o r y . The p o l i c y of missing opportunities, the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r v/hich rests with him, brought Germany into a p o s i t i o n the d i f f i c u l t y of v/hich he occasionally experienced but did not r e a l i s e i n i t s f u l l extent. Outwardly he was leaving the Empire strong and sectxre, i n r e a l i t y , hov/ever, i n an extremely c r i t i c a l 1. p o s i t i o n demanding the utmost prudence, s k i l l and energy." Jules Cambon, the French Ambassador i n B e r l i n , says of him: "Billow did not f i g h t the war; but he p i l e d up i n Europe a l l the reasons and a l l the resentments that made war i n e v i t a b l e . He did so to gain prestige f o r his own p o l i c y ; he slighted Prance systematically; he i r r i t a t e d England; he gave Austria a license to do what she pleased. He has no occasion, therefore, to be surprised that a l l the animosities v/hich h i s p o l i c y aroused 2. should have combined against Germany." The new Chancellor took o f f i c e v/ith the fixed intention to improve Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s and i f possible to reach some 1. Brandenburg - op. c i t . - p.248-9. 2. Cambon - Bulow and the Y/ar - Foreign A f f a i r s , p.415. l.lien H olstein was dying he urged Billow to stay and guide Germany, because i f he l e f t the Chancellorship Germany v/ould become involved i n disastrous war. c f . Billow - Memoirs vol.2.p.456-7. also Gooch-Holstein-in "Studies i n Modern History". 166. agreement. His apparent s i n c e r i t y created a favourable impress- ion i n England. Goschen wrote " I f the Chancellor i s as well disposed as he i s reported to be, there then appears to be some ground f o r the hope that the new era w i l l r e s u l t i n a quieter. 1. more open and less cantankerous foreign p o l i c y . " The remainder of 1909 and most of 1910 were taken up with the naval question and i t s attendant tension. In May 1910 Germ- any t r i e d to s t a r t trouble over per s i a . Fearing i n j u r y to German commerce there, she pressed England f o r an agreement. England could not see why the matter had suddenly become so urg- 2. ent. Fortunately, the Germans dropped the question i n a short 3. time explaining that there had been a misunderstanding. May 6, 1910 King Edward died. The man whom Germany had feared was removed at l a s t . A c t u a l l y h i s death made l i t t l e d i f f erence to the course of events i n Europe. The legend of his intrigues had l i t t l e foundation. His ministers guided the f o r - eign p o l i c y of England, the King by h i s personal charm strength- ened the li n k s they had made. He was by no means hi s own F o r e i g Minister i n spite of the Emperor's b e l i e f . The Kaiser came to England f o r his uncle's funeral and succumbed once more to the charm of the country. During a l l these years the Bagdad Railway proved an i n - terminable subject f o r discussion. England, jealous of her i n - 1. B.D.vol.6.p.279-82.Ho.185.Goschen to Grey, July 23, 1909. 2. B.D.vol.6.p.484-5. Ho.369.Grey to de s a l i s , May 21, 1910. 3. B.D.vol.5.n.486-7. Ho.371.de S a l i s to Grey, May 24, 1910. 167. fluence i n the Persian Gulf and f e a r f u l of losing the gateway to India, used every means i n her power to obstruct the scheme unless the whole l i n e became i n t e r n a t i o n a l , or she obtained con- t r o l of the Gulf Section. Nevertheless, she kept the door open as f a r as possible for her p a r t i c i p a t i o n . Grey recognised that the railway would be f i n i s h e d i n spite of B r i t a i n , therefore he would prefer to p a r t i c i p a t e . S t i l l he v/ould do nothing to offend Russia and France'who both regarded the l i n e as p r e j u d i c i a l to •1. t h e i r i n t e r e s t s . Unfortunately, t h i s decision kept him from coming to an agreement v/ith Germany. When the Kaiser v i s i t e d Windsor i n November 1907 he ex- pressed regret to Haldane that there was so much f r i c t i o n over the Bagdad Railway. What did B r i t a i n want as a basis of co- operation? Speaking from a m i l i t a r y point of view Haldane be- l i e v e d England wanted a "gate" to protect India. In response to a further question Haldane explained that a "gate" meant control of the section near the Persian Gulf. The Kaiser then said,"I w i l l give you the gate'.' Having ascertained that the Kaiser r e a l l y meant t h i s , Haldane went up to London to consult with Grey, who welcomed the prospect of discussion but s t i p u l - a t ed the i n c l u s i o n of France and Russia. At f i r s t the Emperor feared there would be d i f f i c u l t y with Russia but Schoen assured him that Isvolsky was ready to discuss the question. Haldane 1.B.D.vol.4.p.382.No.529.Grey to Spring-Rice, May 11, 1906.; B.D.vol.6,p.336-7.Ho.222.Grey to B e r t i e , A p r i l 6, 1906. 168. suggested a conference i n B e r l i n a quatre. Metternich opposed the scheme, hut was over-ruled. Schoen went to London the next 1. morning to make an o f f i c i a l proposal to the Foreign Secretary. Grey informed France and Russia of the proposals and promised to take no action without them. In spite of his willingness to enter into discussions he did not think they would go through and suspected that the Kaiser had done i t a l l on h i s own i n i t - 2. i a t i v e and impulse. His doubts proved correct. After a few weeks B e r l i n r a i s e d d i f f i c u l t i e s . Germany was w i l l i n g to discuss the question of the terminus with England alone. A conference would probably f a i l and accentuate the differences between Germ- 3. any and the other two powers. Thus the matter rested. In June of 1908 Metternich t o l d Haldnae that he had strong- l y opposed the idea of a conference a quatre because i t would c e r t a i n l y f a i l and Germany would always be i n a minority of one to three. However, whenever B r i t a i n wished to enter into neg- 4. otiations alone Germany would be w i l l i n g . In November H e l f f e r - ich,alarmed at the German p o s i t i o n i n Turkey, urged the necessity of an understanding with B r i t a i n over the Bagdad Railway, as the key to the whole s i t u a t i o n . "The dream of a Bagdad Railwav Germ- 5. an down to the Gulf i s over." For a time German influence i n Turkey declined. The young 1. Haldane - Before the War - p.48-51.; B.D.vol.6.p.95.Ho.62. Note of Private Conversation between Grey and Haldane,Nov.21, 1907.;p.96-8.No.63.Memorandum by Haldane, Nov.15, 1907.; p.98.No.64.Grey to de S a l i s , Nov. 15, 1907. 2. B.D.vol.6.p.104.No.71.Grey to Nicolson, Nov.21,1907, Private. 3. Haldane - Before the Y.'c-r - p.51. 4. B.D.vol.6.p.368.No.267.Grey to de S a l i s , July 13, 1908. 5. G.D.vol.3.p.364-5.XXV111.560.Enclosure - H e l f f e r i c h to Gwinner, Nov.30, 1908.• 169. Turks, who gained power i n 1909, favoured the Entente. .They wished to procure the withdrawal of B r i t i s h opposition to the Railway and induced Gwinner to re-open negotiations with Cassel. On November 8, 1909 the Turkish Ambassador i n London asked for a statement of the terms upon which England would withdraw her 1 • , objections. In the meantime Grey seized the opportunity to make a p p l i c a t i o n f o r a concession for a railway between Bagdad and the Persian Gulf v i a Buss or ah. and the T i g r i s Valley, without 2. a f i n a n c i a l guarantee from the Turkish Government. The Otto- man Government, f e a r i n g German wrath, put B r i t a i n off with p o l - i t e excuses. Gwinner and Cassel ca r r i e d on negotiations with the know- ledge of t h e i r Foreign O f f i c e s . The German Company was w i l l i n g to recognize a separate company formed by England or Turkey f o r the construction of the Gulf Section provided i t had 50t i n t e r - 3. est i n the new company. Seeing that England wished control of the Gulf Section, the business men i n the Foreign Office decided to make her pay i f they could. Metternich i n October suggested that a general p o l i t i c a l and naval understanding he made a necessary prelude 4. to a railway agreement. In December Schoen, presenting the case to Goschen i n diplomatic language, conveyed the impression that the Imperial Government might use the construction and con-1. Earle - op. c i t . - p.221. 2. B.D.vol.6.p.374-5.No.272.Grey to Lowther, Aug.18, 1909. 3. B.D.vol.6.p.410.Enclosure i n No.309.Memorandum of Gwinner- Cassel Conversations, Dec. 15, 1909. 4. G.D.vol.3.p.369-70.XXVll.580.Me11ernich to Bethmann-HoiIweg, Oct.28, 1909. 170. t r o l of the Bagdad-Persian Gulf Section of the Railway as a lever to push England further i n the d i r e c t i o n of a p o l i t i c a l ' u n d e r - 1. standing then she had yet shown any d i s p o s i t i o n to go. During 1910 and 1911 B r i t a i n successfully blocked the 4# increase i n customs desired by the Turkish Government p a r t l v to 2. supply Kilometric guarantees f o r the Railway. Grey endeavour- ed to exert a l i t t l e pressure on the Turks by demanding the con- cession applied f o r i n 1909 i n return f o r consent to the customs 3. increase. Turkey explained the d i f f i c u l t y of giving a con- cession that would compete with the Bagdad Railway; but offered to persuade Germany to give up the Bagdad-Gulf section and allow 4. Turkey to construct and control that part of..the l i n e . The end of 1910 saw at le a s t one step forward. The Czar 5. promised to withdraw his diplomatic opposition to the Railway, thus removing Russia from the f i e l d . During 1911 Turkey negot- iated with England with the idea of forming a new company con- s i s t i n g of Turkey, Prance, B r i t a i n , and Germany to control the 6. Gulf Section. Both Turkey and Germany appeared so desirous of c o n c i l i a t i n g B r i t a i n and drawing her in t o the enterprise that a settlement was merely a matter of time and patience. 1. B.D.vol.6.p.408.Wo.308.Goschen to Hardinge, Dec.15, 1909. Private. 2. Earle - op. cit.-p.226. 3. B.D.vol.6.p.433.Ho.324.Grey to Lowther, March 30, 1910.; p.468-72.Ho.352.Grey to Lowther, A p r i l 20, 1910. 4. B.D.vol.6.p.492-3.Ho.577.Grey to Lowther, June 6, 1910. 5. Earle - op. c i t . - p.239. 6. G.D.vol.3.p.375.XXVll.670.Marschall to German Foreign O f f i c e , Feb.10, 1911;also XXV11.672.Same, Feb.24, 1911. 171. The early months of 1911 brought no new complications into Anglo- German r e l a t i o n s . On the i n v i t a t i o n of King George the Kaiser paid what was destined to be his l a s t v i s i t to England. He and the K a i s e r i n attended the unveiling of the memorial to Queen 1. V i c t o r i a . Once again the people of London received them c o r d i a l l y . The Emperor was delighted with everything and f e l t the absence of any v e i l e d antagonism i n the attitude of the Royal Family - a f e e l i n g that he noted with pleasure as a wel- come change from the days of King Edward. He discussed the Morocco question with King George who seemed to think the Alge- ciras Treaty a thing of the past. The f r i e n d l y atmosphere created by this v i s i t was soom poisoned by another of Germany's famous faux pas. On July 1 1911 the German gunboat "Panther" suddenly appeared i n Agadir Harbour. On the same day the nations of Europe were informed that Germany considered i t necessary to protect German l i v e s and property endangered by the disturbances i n Morocco. As soon as 2. order was restored the ship would be withdrawn. This step surprised Europe as much as the Tangier demonstrations had done six years previous. Everyone r e a l i s e d that the Algeciras Conference had not d e f i n i t e l y disposed of the Morocco question, and that France would not r e s t u n t i l she had established h e r s e l f i n that t e r r i t - 1. Wilhelm 11. - Memoirs - p.142-5. 2. G.D.vol.4.p.6-7.XXlX.155.Kiderlen to Metternich, June 30, 1911.; B.D.vol.7.p.322.Ho.338.Aide-Memoire by Metternich, July 1, 1911; p.322-3.Ho.539.Minute by Hicolson to Grey, July 1, 1911. 17S. ory. A Franco-German agreement i n 1909 seemed for a time to produce calmness and a more c o r d i a l co-operation, but f a i l e d to b r ing l a s t i n g peace. In 1911 a f f a i r s v/ithin the Shereefian Empire reached such a state of chaos that France seized the op- portunity to send an armed force to Fez on the pretext of re s t o r - ing order and protecting the l i v e s of Europeans i n the neighbour- hood. The French Ambassador n o t i f i e d Germany of his country's intentions and motives. Kiderlen, the Secretary of State for Foreign A f f a i r s , expressed f u l l confidence i n the l o y a l t y of the French Government, but added a v e i l e d hint that i f French troops remained i n Fez u n t i l the Sultan governed only with the help of French bayonets Germany.would consider the Algeciras Act void 1. and hold h e r s e l f free to act as she thought f i t . Obviously something was going to happen. Kiderlen evolved a b r i l l i a n t scheme to add to Germany's A prestige and her material possessions. Y/hen the French troops reached Fez Germany would p o l i t e l y enquire how long they expect- ed to stay. The French Government would have to name a date, but would no doubt remain longer. Then Germany would declare the Sultan had l o s t his independence, therefore the Act of Alge- cir a s was n u l l and void and the signatory Powers were free to act as they pleased. Since protests were generally useless, Germany should do something to make France offer compensation. France had seen f i t to protect her business firms and subjects i n Fez: Germany.would protect her firms at Mogador and Agadir 1.G.D.vol.4.p.1.XX1X.97.Memorandum by Kiderlen, A p r i l 28, 1911. 173. by sending a warship to anchor i n the harbour. These ports were too f a r away from the Mediterranean for the act to cause England any anxiety. Moreover, they had f e r t i l e hinterlands that probably contained mineral wealth. In possession of such a pledge Germany could await developments and see whether Prance offered proper compensation from her own Colonial possessions. Should such compensation be forthcoming Germanv would withdraw 1. from the ports. A charming scheme had everything turned out according to planJ Unfortunately for Germany, Kiderlen»s reason- ing proved f a u l t y . He took no o f f i c i a l advice, but by t e l l i n g the Kaiser h a l f - t r u t h s obtained his consent to the despatch of the 2. ships. He acted f i r s t and stopped to think afterwards. He "seems to have expected with extraordinary s i m p l i c i t y that a threatening gesture would straightway bring f o r t h offers of com- 3. pensation from Prance. Yet Metternich had warned him i n May that Grey had said England was "bound by an agreement to support 4. Prance i n Morocco. Had he stopped to think f o r even a moment he must have r e a l i s e d that such an act of provocation would 5. draw others besides Prance and Germany into the arena. 1. G.D.vol.4.p.2-4.XXIX.105.Memorandum by Kiderlen, May 3, 1911. 2. G.D.vol.4.p.6.XXIX.152.Kiderlen to German Foreign O f f i c e , June 26, 1911. S.Brandenburg - op. c i t . - p.372. 4.G.D.vol.4.p.4-5.XXIX.119.Metternich to German Foreign Office, May 22, 1911. Grey was ready to send a B r i t i s h ship to Agadir, while the French were considering sending one to Agadir or Mogador. F i n a l l y they decided to r e f r a i n from doing so for the time being, c f . B.D.vol.7.p.326.Minute by Hicolson and Grey, Jtily 2, 1911. ;p.530-1.Ho.551.Grey to B e r t i e , July 3, 1911.;p.333.Ho.354.Hicolson to Grey, July 4, 1911.;p.333-4.Ho.355.Grey to B e r t i e , July 4. 1911. 174. Grey told Metternich on July 3 on behalf of His Majesty's Government that England's attitude could not be a d i s i n t e r e s t e d one i n view of her treaty obligations to Prance and of her own i n t e r e s t s i n Morocco. The despatch of the German warship had created a new s i t u a t i o n i n which further developments might a f f e c t B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s . For that reason they could not recog- nize any new arrangement made without their knowledge and con- sent. Metternich said England was p e r f e c t l y at l i b e r t y to take 1. measures to protect her i n t e r e s t s i n Morocco. Kiderlen ignor- 2. ed these hints and confined his negotiations to the French. He t r i e d to make Cambon come forward v/ith some d e f i n i t e o f f e r . When he f a i l e d he l o s t patience and suggested the whole of the French Congo to the amazement of Cambon. France refused this but s t i l l professed willingness to negotiate. The Kaiser found out hov; things were and expressed his annoyance at the handling 3. of the matter. Kiderlen,caught i n his own net, wished to 4. use b l u s t e r and threats of force. "So t h i s so-called great statesman v/ould not have hesitated to involve Germany i n a war 5. f o r her very existence i n order to gain the French Congo." Bethmann-Hollweg had to smooth things over and tone Kiderlen down. Altogether the s i t u a t i o n was decidedly unpleasant for Germany. 1. G.D.vol.4.p.8.XXlX.i67«Metternich to German Foreign O f f i c e , May July 4, 1911; Grey - op. c i t . - vol.1.p.214-5; B.D.vol.7. . p.328.Ho,347.Grey' to de S a i l s , July 3, 1911.;p.334.No.356 Grey to de S a l i s , July 4, 1911. 2. The French kept the B r i t i s h informed of German demands, cf. B.D.vol.7.p.371-2.Ho.392.Bertie to Grey, July 18, 1911. for information regarding the French Congo. 3. Brandenburg - op. c i t . - p.376. 4.Ibid.p.376.:G.D.vol.4.p.12.XXIX.189.Kiderlen to Chancellor, July 17, 1911.Private. 5.Brandenburg - op. c i t . - p.377. 175. " I n the e x p e c t a t i o n of an e a s y s u c c e s s t h e y had plunged i n t o an a d v e n t u r e w i t h o u t c o n s i d e r i n g how t h e y were t o e x t r i c a t e tbem- 1. s e l v e s i f t h i n g s t o o k a d i f f e r e n t t u r n from what t h e y e x p e c t e d . " Then came a v e r y u n l o o k e d f o r i n c i d e n t . The German F o r - e i g n O f f i c e had l e f t M e t t e r n i c h w i t h o u t i n s t r u c t i o n s o r ' i n f o r m - a t i o n a f t e r Grey's message of J u l y 4, London n a t u r a l l y wonder- 2. ed what was g o i n g on. They h e a r d rumours of e x t r a v a g a n t Germ- an demands and w i t h t h e i r knowledge of t h e German methods f e a r - ed the w o r s t . So on J u l y 21 L l o y d George went t o see Grey. He e n q u i r e d i f Grey had r e c e i v e d any answer from Germany. Upon r e c e i v i n g a r e p l y i n the n e g a t i v e he s a i d t h a t he had t o speak i n the C i t y o f London t h a t e v e n i n g and proposed t o say something about the a f f a i r . He s u b m i t t e d t o Grey the d r a f t he had p r e - p a r e d . Grey c o n s i d e r e d i t q u i t e j u s t i f i e d and c o r d i a l l y a greed 3. w i t h the s u g g e s t i o n . T h e r e f o r e L l o y d George spoke a t the M a nsion House i n the f o l l o w i n g s t r a i n : "But I am a l s o bound t o 1. Brandenburg - on. c i t . - p.378. 2. B.D.vol.7.p.377-8.Ho.399.Grey t o A s q u i t h , J u l y 19, 1911. P r i v a t e . Grey t o l d A s q u i t h t h a t he had n o t y e t r e c e i v e d any communication f r o m Germany r e g a r d i n g the J u l y 4 message. Perhaps t h e y had b e t t e r take some a c t i o n or Germany w i l l t h i n k she can do as she l i k e s . By Friday, J u l y 21 i f no r e p l y had been r e c e i v e d Grey would l i k e t o be a u t h o r i z e d t o i m p r e s s - o n Germany t h a t i f Franco-German n e g o t i a t i o n s came t o n o t h i n g E n g l a n d must become p a r t y t o the D i s c u s s i o n s of the s i t u a t i o n , and t h a t i f Germany d i d n o t keep h e r i n f o r m e d of any new dev- elopment of a f f a i r s a t A g a d i r E n g l a n d would have t o send a B r i t i s h s h i p t h e r e t o see t h a t B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s were n o t p r e - j u d i c e d . On J u l y 20 Grey wrote t o B e r t i e , " T h e French have d r i f t e d i n t o d i f f i c u l t i e s , w i t h o u t knowing w h i c h way t h e y r e a l l y want t o go. We are bound and p r e p a r e d t o g i v e them d i p l o m a t i c s u p p o r t , b u t we cannot go t o war i n o r d e r t o s e t a s i d e the A l g e c i r a s A c t and put France i n v i r t u a l p o s s e s s i o n of Morocco." He went on t o say t h a t i f E n g l a n d went t o war i t would have t o 'be f o r B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s n o t f o r F r e n c h , c f . Hammond - Review of B.D.vol.7. i n The Manchester G u a r d i a n Week l y , March 11, 1932. 3. Grey - op. c i t . - v o l . 1 . p . 2 1 5 - 6 . 176. say t h i s - that I believe i t i s e s s e n t i a l In the highest i n t e r - ests, not merely of t h i s country, but of the world, that B r i t - a i n should at a l l hazards maintain her place and her prestige amongst the Great Powers of the world I conceive that noth- ing would j u s t i f y a disturbance of i n t e r n a t i o n a l goodwill except questions of the gravest n a t i o n a l moment. But i f a s i t u a t i o n were to be forced upon us i n which peace could only be preserved by the surrender of the great and beneficent p o s i t i o n B r i t a i n has won by centuries of heroism and achievement, by allowing B r i t a i n to be treated where her interests were v i t a l l y affected, as i f she were of no account i n the Cabinet of Nations, then I say emphatically that peace at that price would be a humiliat- 1 . ion, i n t o l e r a b l e f o r a great country l i k e ours to endure." This pronouncement burst l i k e a bomb-shell i n Europe. A l l construed i t as a v e i l e d threat on the part of B r i t a i n , more p a r t i c u l a r l y since i t came from a Cabinet Minister, and a man who had previously been considered pro-German i n sympathy. Prance looked upon i t as an assurance of B r i t i s h support. Germany thought i t added i n s u l t to i n j u r y : and constituted a threat to 2. which she must not y i e l d . As i f her p o s i t i o n were not s u f f i c - i e n t l y alarming already, without England entering the l i s t s on the side of Prance J Undoubtedly, the speech would never have 1. Grey - op. c i t . - vol.1.p.215-6.;B.D.vol.7.p.591. No.412. Extract from Lloyd George's Speech, July 21, 1911. 2. Before the text of the speech had reached the German Foseign Office Metternich, acting on i n s t r u c t i o n s , had explained to Grey the German motives i n sending the ship to Agadir. He had said that i f secrecy were maintained i n the negotiations and i f the h o s t i l e tone of the B r i t i s h and French press did not s p o i l the discussions Germany would probably be able to make concessions. Grey wished to use this communication i n P a r l - iament, but the German Government withheld permission i n view of the Mansion House Speech, c f . B .D .vol.7 .T>.394-6.No.417 . . Grev to Goschen, July 24, 1911:p.397.No.419". Grey to Goschen, 177. been made, had Germany given Grey assurance -tha't'she <2id :'. not intend to take t e r r i t o r y i n Morocce. But Germany could not give that assurance withovit revealing her whole plan of campaig and thereby robbing i t of i t s effectiveness, since any inform- ation v/ould c e r t a i n l y be passed on to Prance. The only thing to do then was to b l u f f the a f f a i r through. Kiderlen ordered Metternich to remonstrate with Grey im- mediately. Negotiations with Prance had been proceeding amic- ably and had no concern v/ith B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s . I f B r i t a i n wished to complain why did she not use the diplomatic channels instead of making a public threat, " i f i t was the B r i t i s h Gov- ernment's i n t e n t i o n to complicate and confuse the p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n and bring about a settlement by means of force, they could not have chosen a better way, than by the Chancellor's speech, which so ignored the d i g n i t y v/hich he claimed for Eng- land or the p o s i t i o n of a GreatLPower such as ourselves. ... I f he (Grey) asserts that the press in t e r p r e t a t i o n of the speech does not correspond with the words used, please t e l l 1. him that we expect a clear public statement to that e f f e c t . " As might be expected the interview was somewhat stormy. Grey resented the tone of the German communication and said so "I f e l t that the tone of th e i r communication made i t not con- s i s t e n t with our d i g n i t y to give explanations as tb the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer." However, he d i d say that I.G.D.vol.4.p.14-5.XXIX.210.Kiderlen to Metternich, July 24, 1911. 178 „ i t was not intended to embroil German negotiations with Prance. Metternich could not see that B r i t a i n had any grounds for the suspicions voiced i n the speech. No one questioned England's r i g h t to protect her own i n t e r e s t s and no one intended to d i s - pose of those i n t e r e s t s without consulting her. The more threats 1. Germany received the more determined would be her action. The tension thus created continued f o r some time, while the negotiations dragged p a i n f u l l y to a conclusion oh November 2. 4. The a f f a i r ended i n another f i a s c o for Germany. She def- i n i t e l y surrendered her r i g h t s i n Morocco and accepted i n r e - turn a part of the French Congo. I t was an i l l - c o n c e i v e d scheme that served only to bring disgrace upon Germany and to strength- en the Entente. The blame f a l l s p r i m arily upon Kiderlen who "considered that the only proper and successful way to conduct p o l i t i c s was to negotiate with a p i s t o l i n your hand, or at 3. le a s t bulging i n your coat pocket." Unfortunately for his prestige he encountered someone s k i l l e d i n the use of the b i g s t i c k and came of f the w02?st i n the encounter. No doubt the German act was deplorable and foolhardy, but Lloyd George's speech was hardly less i l l - a d v i s e d . I f Germany had s e r i o u s l y 1. G.D.vol.4.p.15-6.XXIX.213.Metternich to German Foreign Offic e , July 25, 1911; Grey - op. c i t . - vol.1.p.220-2.; B.D.vol.7. p.397-9,No.419.Grey to Goschen, July 25, 1911. 2. B.D.vol.7.p.786-8.No.761.Goschen to Grey, Dec. 16, 1911. The German papers were very c r i t i c a l of German handling of the Morocco question and d i s s a t i s f i e d with Bethmann-Hollweg and Kiderlen's methods. 3. Brandenburg - op. c i t . - p.384. 179. considered war'before,". July 21, she c e r t a i n l y dropped the idea a f t e r , but Lloyd George's words did not make the path of r e t r e a t very easy f o r a proud nation. Grey and C h u r c h i l l both approved Lloyd George's step and considered that i t had contributed large 1. l y to preserving the peace of Europe i n 1911. The peace could have been preserved by more diplomatic methods that would have avoided the unpleasant resentment on both sides. In a l l p r o b a b i l i t y the European'nations read more into the speech than was intended, bp:t such arguments had l i t t l e soothing e f f e c t on the excited German public opinion. The words had been spoken by an Englishman, therefore they must have some hidden meaning directed against Germany. I t would have been better f o r Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s had Lloyd George refrained from overt action. As they discovered l a t e r , subterranean neg- 2. otiations were proceeding to the s a t i s f a c t i o n of both sides. Of course, Nicolson h e a r t i l y approved the strong stand taken 3. by B r i t a i n on the side of the Entente. During August and September, England took serious precaut- ionary measures. The Fleet was held i n readiness, a s p e c i a l meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence was convened August 23, 1911,every preparation was made and every d e t a i l worked out 1. Grey - op. c i t . - vol.1.p.217.;Churchill - op. c i t . - p.46. 2. Nicolson - op. c i t . - p.349. 3.Ibid.p.345."I have every b e l i e f , " N i c o l s o n wrote,"that the maintenance by us of our present attitude - and I am quite convinced that there w i l l be no f l i n c h i n g on our side - may eventually render Germany more compliant and reasonable. She w i l l "see that the T r i p l e Entente i s not so weak a com- bin a t i o n as she apparently imagined. She had i n fact comm- i t t e d a great blunder. I think she w i l l have great d i f f i c - 180. on paper, tunnels and bridges on the South Eastern Railway v/ere p a t r o l l e d night and day. The War Office hummed v/ith secrets. In the midst of a l l these secret preparations, the oress exer- 1. cised an exemplary r e s t r a i n t and kept i t s e l f quiet. However, the precautions proved unnecessary t h i s time. By the end of September they relaxed the state of war preparedness. Bethmann-Hollweg, at l e a s t , decided not to harbour resent- ment against England. On November 19 he wrote to Metternich hoping that Grey would be s a t i s f i e d with his remarks regarding the Mansion House speech i n the Reichstag debate of November 9. He had avoided any c r i t i e i s m of i t because he wished to maint- 2. ain the former good r e l a t i o n s v/ith England. Once more, out- wardly correct r e l a t i o n s existed betv/een the two Governments. In a short time, the tide of public opinion i n England turned i n favour of Germany and enabled the Governments to enter upon negotiations f o r an understanding. Among the problems of these years the Agadir C r i s i s stands 3. out as the most important. Peeling on both sides ran high and the danger of war was very r e a l . The episode should have proved conclusively to Germany that i n event of a c o n f l i c t v/ith Prance i t l t y i n e x t r i c a t i n g h e r s e l f from i t without l o s i n g consider- able prestige." Hicolson and Crowe had feared that Germany might take France from B r i t a i n and " i f she had succeeded Prance would have been dependent on Germany and England would have been i s o l a t e d and f r i e n d l e s s i n Europe." cf.Hammond - Review of B.D.vol.7. i n Manchester Guardian Weekly, March 11, 1. Churchill-op. cit.-p.53,62,63. 1932. 2. G.D.vol.4.p. 17-8.XXIX.255.Bethmann-Hollweg to Metterni'ch,Nov. 19, 1911. 3. B.D.vol.7.The Agadir C r i s i s , just published gives very f u l l y the B r i t i s h pert i n the c r i s i s and shows how staunchly they supported the French; hov/ very a c t i v e l y and conscientiously Grey worked for peace when war became a r e a l danger; how acute was the tension between England and Germany. Unfortun- a t e l y the volume came out too late to permit Intensive study, 181, she could not count on B r i t i s h n e u t r a l i t y . Unluckily, the Germ- an o f f i c i a l s never p r o f i t e d by experience. These years d i d l i t t l e to e s t a b l i s h Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s on a f r i e n d l y footing. The Naval Question dominated everything and v;as not conducive to a rapprochment. Other matters the Governments discussed without undue f r i c t i o n , u n t i l the "Panther' Spring", but they never co-operated with the genuine c o r d i a l i t y and t r u s t so e s s e n t i a l to true f r i e n d s h i p . 182. CHAPTER VI. The L a s t Y e a r s of Peace 1912-1914. Prom 1912 t o 1914 Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s improved s u f f i c - i e n t l y t o e n a b l e the Governments t o c o - o p e r a t e i n the B a l k a n Q u e s t i o n and t o n e g o t i a t e and i n i t i a l agreements r e l a t i n g t o c o l o n i a l i n t e r e s t s and the i n t e r m i n a b l e Bagdad R a i l w a y . P u b l i c o p i n i o n i n Germany remained d i s t i n c t l y h o s t i l e f o r some time 1. a f t e r the A g a d i r C r i s i s . The K a i s e r f e l t so annoyed t h a t he even r e v e r t e d t o the o l d i d e a o f a c o n t i n e n t a l league and sugg- 2. e s t e d t o the F o r e i g n O f f i c e an u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h F r a n c e . When Kuhlmann wrote f r o m London t h a t Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s had a g a i n a r r i v e d a t a t u r n i n g - p o i n t ; t h a t Germany c o u l d o b t a i n an an arrangement w i t h E n g l a n d r e g a r d i n g c o l o n i e s i f she r e f r a i n e d f r o m i n c r e a s i n g the f l e e t and c o n f i n e d h e r e f f o r t s t o the army, the K a i s e r e x p l o d e d . Kuhlmann had s a i d : "The two ways now l i e s h a r p l y a p a r t f o r German p o l i c y - on the one hand i s the p o s s - i b i l i t y o f an h o n o u r a b l e peace, c o l o n i a l e x p a n s i o n and s u c c e s s - f u l K u l t u r work w i t h g r o w i n g w e a l t h , on the o t h e r a r e s u r r e c t - i o n of o l d q u a r r e l s , a s t i f f e r p o l i c y o f m u t u a l h o s t i l i t y and c r e a t i o n o f s e r i o u s r i s k s . " The K a i s e r commented: "The o t h e r way r ound] The l a s t sentence a p p l i e s t o E n g l a n d and not t o us. 1. B.D.vol.6.p.653.Ho.483.Goschen t o Grey, Jan. 3, 1912. 2. Brandenburg - op. c i t . - p.388. 183. Kuhlmann i s a d i l i g e n t p u p i l o f M e t t e r n i c h ' s and r e p e a t s a l l the nonsense w h i c h ahs been s e r v e d up t o me e v e r s i n c e I began b u i l d - i n g my f l e e t ; b u t i t has n e v e r i m p r e s s e d me; I s h a l l n o t take the t r o u b l e t o r e f u t e i t ; I want no c o l o n i a l p r e s e n t s f r om Eng- l a n d , f o r t h e y w i l l a l w a y s be made a t o t h e r ' s expense and c o n t a i n the seeds o f c o n f l i c t s , the end o f w h i c h cannot be f o r e s e e n . The s t r e n g t h e n i n g , w h i c h I c o n s i d e r n e c e s s a r y w i l l and s h a l l be 1. pushed ahead." I n s p i t e o f the K a i s e r ' s p r e d e l i c t i o n s the German Govern- ment c o n t i n u e d t o f e e l i t s way i n London. Towards the end o f December 1911 M e t t e r n i c h a c t i n g u n o f f i c i a l l y i n t i m a t e d h i s de- s i r e t o f i n d some way t o r e l a x the t e n s i o n between England and Germany. He mentioned the P o r t u g e s e c o l o n i e s and a d v i s a b i l i t y , i n v i ew o f the f i n a n c i a l p o s i t i o n of. P o r t u g a l , o f r e v i s i n g the Anglo-German Agreement o f 1898. He a l s o t a l k e d of the B e l g i a n 2. Congo. Then came the Haldane M i s s i o n w i t h i t s g r a n d i l o q u e n t scheme f o r a f a r - r e a c h i n g s e t t l e m e n t of a l l d i f f e r e n c e s - n a v a l , p o l i t i c a l , and c o l o n i a l . 'Then, t h r o u g h i n a b i l i t y t o agree upon n a v a l and p o l i t i c a l f o r m u l a e , the Governments abandoned the d i s c u s s i o n s , t h e y e x p r e s s e d t h e i r w i l l i n g n e s s t o c o n t i n u e the c o l o n i a l n e g o t i a t i o n . However, b e f o r e t h e y c o u l d a c c o m p l i s h much i n t h a t d i r e c t - i o n , a change t o o k p l a c e i n the German Embassy i n London. F o r 1. G.D.vol.4.p.56-7.XXXI.87.Kuhlmann t o Bethmann-Hollweg, J a n . 8, 1912. 2. B.D.vol.6.p.650-1.Ho.480.Grey t o Goschen, Dec.20, 1911. 184. some time M e t t e r n i c h ' s r e p o r t s had proved u n p a l a t a b l e t o the K a i s e r and T i r p i t z . M e t t e r n i c h r e a l i s e d h i s p o s i t i o n b u t was t o o h o n e s t a man and t o o good a German t o s a c r i f i c e h i s c o u n t r y w e l f a r e f o r h i s own g a i n . Ho one was s u r p r i s e d when i n May 191 M e t t e r n i c h was r e c a l l e d from London. Grey r e g r e t t e d h i s d e p a r t ure and p a i d t r i b u t e t o him i n the House o f Commons. He had always f e l t t h a t , r i g i d as M e t t e r n i c h had been i n u p h o l d i n g German vi e w s a g a i n s t the E n g l i s h , I n h i s r e p o r t s he had always r e p o r t e d f a i r l y e v e r y t h i n g Grey had s a i d and had ne v e r t u r n e d a chance and u n i n t e n t i o n a l s l i p on Grey's p a r t t o an u n f a i r 1. a d v a n t a g e . M e t t e r n i c h was succeeded by M a r s c h a l l von B i e h e r - s t e i n , an e x c e p t i o n a l l y a b l e d i p l o m a t known t o be u n f r i e n d l y t o B r i t a i n . However, he was n o t d e s t i n e d t o h o l d o f f i c e l o n g enough t o i n f l u e n c e Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s . A l r e a d y s u f f e r i n g I l l - h e a l t h a t the time o f h i s a p p o i n t m e n t , he remained o n l y a few weeks i n E n g l a n d b e f o r e r e t u r n i n g t o Germany t o d i e . F o r two months Kuhlmann remained i n charge o f the Embassy u n t i l L i c h n o w s k y a r r i v e d i n November 1912/ The new Ambassador soon made h i m s e l f v e r y p o p u l a r b o t h i n p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l c i r c l e s . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , he became so E n g l i s h i n sjrmpathy t h a t he l o s t the c o n f i d e n c e of h i s Government and h i s words o f w a r n i n g f B l l on d e a f e a r s . He and Grey worked w e l l t o g e t h e r and each p a i d t r i b u t e t o the o t h e r ' s p e r s o n a l i t y and e f f o r t s i n the cause of 2. peace . 1. Grey - op. c i t . - v o l . 1 . p . 2 3 6 - 7 . 2. L i c h n o w s k y - My M i s s i o n t o London - p.4. He says of Grey's 135. M a r s c h a l l s i z e d up the s i t u a t i o n d u r i n g h i s b r i e f s t a y i n London and r e p o r t e d t o h i s Government the e x i s t e n c e of a gen- u i n e d e s i r e i n E n g l a n d f o r a s l a c k e n i n g o f the t e n s i o n and a b e l i e f t h a t the q u e s t i o n o f l i m i t a t i o n of armaments was d e f i n - 1. i t e l y out of the way. N e g o t i a t i o n s r e g a r d i n g the c o l o n i e s were c a r r i e d on d u r - i n g 1912 c h i e f l y by Kuhlmann. On A p r i l 17 the E n g l i s h C o l o n i a l 2. S e c r e t a r y i n v i t e d Kuhlmann t o d i s c u s s the t e r r i t o r i a l q u e s t i o n s . 3. The major q u e s t i o n was t h a t of the P o r t u g e s e c o l o n i e s . Germany hoped t o see the P o r t u g e s e Empire d i s i n t e g r a t e i n the near f u t u r e so t h a t she c o u l d s e i z e t e r r i t o r y i n A f r i c a . E a r l y i n June M e t t e r n i c h r e p o r t e d t h a t Grey and Harcotu"t were r e a d y t o d r a f t 4. a r e v i s i o n of the Anglo-German T r e a t y o f 1898. The r e v i s i o n p o l i c y : " I t was n o t h i s o b j e c t t o I s o l a t e u s , b u t t o the b e s t of h i s power t o make us p a r t n e r s i n the e x i s t i n g a s s o c - i a t i o n . As he had succeeded i n overcoming A n g l o - F r e n c h and A n g l o - R u s s i a n d i f f e r e n c e s , so he a l s o w i shed t o do h i s b e s t t o e l i m i n a t e the Anglo-German, and by a n e t w o r k of t r e a t i e s , w h i c h would i n the end no doubt have l e d t o an agreement about the t r o u b l e s o m e q u e s t i o n of n a v a l armaments, t o ensure the peace of the w o r l d , a f t e r our p r e v i o u s p o l i c y had l e d t o an a s s o c i a t i o n - the E n t e n t e - w h i c h r e p r e s e n t e d a m u t u a l i n s u r a n c e a g a i n s t the r i s k of war." 1. G.D.vol.4.p.134-42.XXXI.241.Marscha11 t o Bethmann-Hollweg, Aug. 5, 1912. 2. G.D.vol.4.p.128.XXXI.270.Kuhlmann t o German F o r e i g n O f f i c e , A p r i l 17, 1912. 3. c f . L i c h n o w s k y - op, c i t . - p.14-19. 4. G.D.vol.4.p.133.XXX1.281.Metternich t o Bethmann-Ho1Iweg, June 4, 1912. 186, s u b m i t t e d d i d n o t a l t o g e t h e r s u i t K i d e r l e n , b u t a f t t e r months of keen b a r g a i n i n g t h e y s e c u r e d a d r a f t s a t i s f a c t o r y t o b o t h s i d e s . On the whole Germany d i d q u i t e w e l l . She gave up h e r c l a i m t o Timor and a s t r i p on the l e f t bank of the Zambezi, b u t r e c e i v e d i n r e t u r n the c e n t r a l p a r t o f A n g o l a and the a s s u r a n c e of d i s - . i n t e r e s s e m e n t r e g a r d i n g the i s l a n d s of St.Thomas and P r i n c i p e . The c l a u s e r e l a t i n g t o the p r e t e x t f o r o c c u p a t i o n was m o d i f i e d i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h German w i s h e s . Then t r o u b l e a r o s e over the B r i t i s h d e s i r e t o p u b l i s h t h i s and the o l d e r T r e a t i e s . The Germans f e l t t h a t p u b l i c a t i o n would d e l a y i n d e f i n i t e l y the p o s s - i b i l i t y of t a k i n g over the P o r t u g e s e C o l o n i e s . They c o n s i d e r - ed E n g l a n d had d e l u d e d them i n 1898 and d e c l i n e d t o be robbed of t h e i r s p o i l s a g a i n . Grey s t o o d f i r m . I n J u l y 1913 he a g r e e d t o postpone p u b l i c a t i o n u n t i l the w i n t e r p r o v i d e d a p a r aphrase 1. were g i v e n s h o r t l y . The n e g o t i a t i o n s on t h i s p o i n t dragged on u n t i l 1914. I n A p r i l Grey t o l d L ichnowsky he c o u l d nnt> s i g n 2. the C o n v e n t i o n u n l e s s i t were made p u b l i c . F i n a l l y i n J u l y on the eve of the war Bethmann-Hollweg co n s e n t e d t o p u b l i c a t i o n . Jagow i n f o r m e d L i c h n o w s k y t h a t a d e s p a t c h was on i t s way a u t h o r - i s i n g the r e o p e n i n g of n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h Grey on the P o rtugese C o l o n i e s Agreement. He s t i l l c o n s i d e r e d p u b l i c a t i o n unwise and l i k e l y t o have a d e t r i m e n t a l e f f e c t on German p u b l i c o p i n i o n and Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s . However, "we have g i v e n way t o 1. G.D.vol.4.p.227.XXXVll.59.Lichnowsky t o German F o r e i g n O f f i c e , J u l y 7, 1913. 2. G . D . v o l . 4 . p . 2 3 2 . X X V l l . 1 1 5 . A p r i l 1, 1914. 187. JOUT d e s i r e s , b u t you w i l l have t o c a r r y a s p e c i a l amount o f 1. the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . " A n o t h e r agreement r e a d y f o r f i n a l s a n c t i o n about the same 2. time was t h a t c o n c e r n i n g the Bagdad R a i l w a y . The P o r t e con- t i n u e d t o n e g o t i a t e w i t h E n g l a n d c o n c e r n i n g the R a i l w a y d v i r i n g 1912-13. I n March of 1912 Germany reminded Turkev t h a t she ex- 3. p e c t e d t o be k e p t au c o u r a n t o f the c o u r s e o f the n e g o t i a t i o n s . The B a l k a n c r i s i s i n t e r r u p t e d t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n s , b u t as soon. as a b r e a t h i n g space o c c u r r e d the Turks resumed t h e i r e f f o r t s . I n F e b r u a r y o f 1913 H a k k i Easha came t o London v / i t h i n s t r u c t i o n s 4. t o l e a v e no s t o n e u n t u r n e d t o s e t t l e the m a t t e r w i t h B r i t a i n . D i s c t i s s i o n s were c a r r i e d on by Grey and Pasha i n c o n f e r e n c e 5. v / i t h L i c h n o w s k y and Kuhlmann. I n March Jagow t o l d L i c h n o w s k y n o t t o i n i t i a t e the s u b j e c t o f the R a i l w a y b u t i f Grey spoke of I t t o . g i v e him t o u n d e r s t a n d t h a t Germany was r e a d y t o come t o an agreement w i t h B r i t a i n i f she v/ould s t a t e what she wanted and what she was p r e p a r e d t o g i v e . The s e t t l e m e n t was i n B r i t - a i n ' s hands, she c o u l d d e l a y the work b u t n o t p r e v e n t i t s f i n a l 6. c o m p l e t i o n . I n -May Grey; told:"the F r e n c h a n d - . R u s s i a n s t h a t E n g l a n d was n o t g o i n g t o oppose the R a i l w a y i n p r i n c i p l e and w o u l d , I f she o b t a i n e d s u i t a b l e t e r m s , consent t o the f o u r per 7. c e n t i n c r e a s e i n customs p r o v i d e d R u s s i a and France a g r e e d . 1. G.D.vol.4.p.233-4.XXXVll.137.Jagow t o L i c h n o w s k y , J u l y 2 7 , 1 9 1 4 . 2. c f . L i c h n o w s k y - o p . c i t . - p.1920. P r i v a t e . 3. G . D . v o l . 4 . p . 2 3 6 . X X X I . 3 3 1 . K i d e r l e n t o Marscha11,March 25, 1912. 5 . E a r l e - op. c i t . - o.254. 5 . I b i d . p . 2 5 5 . ; G . D . v o l . 4 . p . 2 5 6 - 5 5 . 6. G.D.vol.4.p.239-40.XXXVll. 154. Jagow t o Lichnowsky,March.25ml9l5 7. G.D.vol.4.p.241.German Note X X X V l l . 1 7 0 . 188, He a l s o s u g g e s t e d t h a t Germany e n t e r i n t o n e g o t i a t i o n w i t h France 1. as w e l l as v / i t h E n g l a n d . So n e g o t i a t i o n s c o n t i n u e d backwards and f o r w a r d s u n t i l on June 15, 1914 Grey and L i c h n o w s k y i n i t i a l e d a C o n v e n t i o n r e g a r d - i n g the d e l i m i t a t i o n of E n g l a n d ' s and Germany's i n t e r e s t s i n A s i a t i c .Turkey. T h i s c o v e r e d a number of minor q u e s t i o n s . B r i t - a i n w i t h d r e w h e r o p p o s i t i o n t o the c o m p l e t i o n o f the Bagdad R a i l w a y and c o n s e n t e d t o the i n c r e a s e i n the customs t o 3.5$. The t e r m i n u s of the R a i l w a y s h o u l d be B a s r a u n l e s s B r i t a i n a greed t o an e x t e n s i o n . H e I t h e r s h o u l d t h e r e be h a r b o u r c o n s t r u c t i o n on the P e r s i a n G u l f u n l e s s she a g r e e d . Germany u n d e r t o o k t o p e r m i t no d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i n r a t e s and t r a f f i c on the r a i l w a y , and c o n s e n t e d t o the appointment of two B r i t i s h D i r e c t o r s on the B o a r d o f the Bagdad R a i l w a y Company. B o t h agreed t o observe the p o l i c y of the open door i n the o p e r a t i o n o f r a i l w a y s , p o r t s and i r r i g a t i o n i n T u r k e y - i n - A s i a . Any d i f f e r e n c e s o f o p i n i o n 2. a r i s i n g f r o m t h e s e terms s h o u l d be s u b m i t t e d t o a r b i t r a t i o n . A t the same time t h e y s e t t l e d o t h e r c o m m e r c i a l q u e s t i o n s between the r i v a l E n g l i s h and German s t e a m s h i p l i n e s I n the Hear E a s t - e r n w a t e r s ; and between the Bagdad R a i l w a y Company and the S m y r n a - A i d i n Compan^r. Germany c o n s e n t e d t o r e c o g n i s e the r i g h t s of the A n g l o - P e r s i a n Company i n the o i l - f i e l d s o f South and 3. C e n t r a l P e r s i a , a n d South Mesopotamia. 1. G.D.vol.4.p.243.XXXVll.l85.Kuhlmann t o Bethmann-Hollweg, May 28, 1915. A Franco-German Agreement was r e a c h e d F e b r u a r y 15, 1 9 i 4 . c f . E a r l e - op. c i t . - p.247-8. 2. E a r l e - op. c i t . -.p.261-2. 3.Ibid.p.59-61. 189c The German o b j e c t of the n e g o t i a t i o n s had been t o f r e e German c o m m e r c i a l a c t i v i t i e s i n Mesopotamia and e s p e c i a l l y the Bagdad R a i l w a y f rom E n g l i s h r i v a l r y . The t a s k had been d i f f i c - u l t because E n g l a n d had e n j o y e d f o r c e n t u r i e s a p r e f e r e n t i a l p o s i t i o n i n Mesopotamia and the P e r s i a n G u l f whereas Germany i. had p o s s e s s e d l e g a l r i g h t s t h e r e f o r s c a r c e l y t wenty y e a r s . On the whole Germany had emerged w i t h c r e d i t , n or had B r i t a i n l o s t . On J u l y 27, 1914 the Emperor i s s u e d t o Lichnowsky f o r m a l ' 2. a u t h o r i t y t o s i g n the Agreements. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , the war b r o k e out a few days l a t e r and the y e a r s of p a i n f u l n e g o t i a t i o n 3. came t o n o u g h t . "The s p e c t r e of the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y " had been l a i d t o o l a t e t o have a b e n e f i c i a l e f f e c t on European r e - l a t i o n s . The H a v a l Q u e s t i o n s t i l l i n t e r e s t e d b o t h s i d e s b u t no l o n g e r formed a s u b j e c t f o r o f f i c i a l n e g o t i a t i o n . C h u r c h i l l as F i r s t L o r d o f the A d m i r a l t y made t h i n g s move. He d e v o t e d a l l h i s e n e r g i e s t o c r e a t i n g as s t r o n g and e f f i c i e n t a navy as p o s s - i b l e . H i s watchword was " P r e p a r e d n e s s " . A t Glasgow i n 1912 he e x p l a i n e d h i s p o i n t o f v i e w : "The purpose o f B r i t i s h n a v a l power i s e s s e n t i a l l y d e f e n s i v e . Vie have no t h o u g h t s , and we have n e v e r had any t h o u g h t s of a g g r e s s i o n , and we a t t r i b u t e no such t h o u g h t s t o o t h e r g r e a t Powers. ... The B r i t i s h navy i s t o us a n e c e s s i t y , and from some p o i n t s of v i e w , the German navy i s t o them more 1. G.D.vol.4.p.253-5.XXXVll.449.Zimmermann t o V.'edel, June 19,1914 2. G.D.vol.4.p.255.German Note; a l s o X X X V l l . 4 6 9 . 3. E a r l e - op. c i t . -.p.142. 190. i n the n a t u r e o f a l u x u r y . Our n a v a l -cower i n v o l v e s B r i t i s h 1 e x i s t e n c e . I t i s e x i s t e n c e t o u s : i t i s e x p a n s i o n t o them...." T h i s caused an o u t b u r s t i n Germany b u t C h u r c h i l l went h i s way u n d e t e r r e d . I n 1913 and 1914 he b r o u g h t i n i n c r e a s e d N a v a l E s t i m a t e s t o p r o v i d e f o r the c o n s t r u c t i o n o f as many s h i p s as the y a r d s c o u l d b u i l d . He p r o v i d e d f o r a l l the l a t e s t i m prove- ments I n armoured s h i p s and guns. De adopted the o i l - b u r n e r s f o r new s h i p s and d e v e l o p e d the f i f t e e n i n c h guns. To ensure g r e a t e r p r o t e c t i o n f o r E n g l a n d he s t r e n g t h e n e d the Home and Channel F l e e t s by w i t h d r a w i n g s h i p s f rom the M e d i t e r r a n e a n and t h e n i n 1914 proposed the c o n s t r u c t i o n o f new s h i n s t o s t r e n g t h - 2. en the M e d i t e r r a n e a n squadron. I n s p i t e o f a l l these p r e c a u t i o n a r y measures he p r e s e r v e d the i d e a o f an agreement w i t h Germany f o r a l i m i t a t i o n of arma- ments . . I n March 1912 he spoke i n P a r l i a m e n t i n f a v o u r of a n a v a l h o l i d a y . " I f Germany w i l l b u i l d no s h i p s i n any s i n g l e 3. y e a r , we s h a l l f o l i o ? ; t h e i r example." B e r l i n made no response N e v e r t h e l e s s , she watched w i t h e a g l e eyes the development of E n g l i s h n a v a l armaments. The German N a v a l A t t a c h e k e p t h i s Government f u l l y i n f o r m e d of e v e r y B r i t i s h movement, whether t r u e or m e r e l y rumour. He d i d n o t f a i l t o urge upon Germany the n e c e s s i t y o f c a r r y i n g out h e r programme and even i n c r e a s i n g the tempo o f c o n s t r u c t i o n . T h i s s u i t e d the K a i s e r and the Pah-Germ- an e lement. They l o o k e d w i t h a n x i e t y upon the f o r t h c o m i n g a i d 1. C h u r c h i l l - op. c i t . -.p.101. 2. F o r p a r t i c u l a r s c f . C h u r c h i l l - op. c i t . - p a s s i m . 3. N i c o l s o n - op. c i t . -.p.375. 191. f r o m the Dominions seeming t o t h i n k t h a t t h e r e would be no q u e s t - i o n o f t h e i r s h i p s m a t e r i a l i s i n g . I n December Bethmann-Hollweg w i t h d i f f i c u l t y persuaded the Emperor t o drop the i d e a of new 1. armament b i l l s a t p r e s e n t . I n F e b r u a r y 1913 T i r p i t z , s p e a k i n g i n the R e i c h s t a g , s a i d he would be the f i r s t t o welcome an under- s t a n d i n g w i t h E n g l a n d . He t o o k e a r e , however, t o d e s c r i b e the 2. German H a v a l B i l l as n e c e s s a r y and u n a l t e r a b l e . When C h u r c h i l l i n t r o d u c e d the H a v a l E s t i m a t e s f o r 1913-14 i n March 1915 he a g a i n e x p r e s s e d England's w i l l i n g n e s s t o p a r t i c - i p a t e w i t h a l l c o u n t r i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y w i t h the g r e a t n e i g h b o u r on the o t h e r s i d e of the H o r t h Sea, i n a n a v a l h o l i d a y f o r a y e a r . I n r e p o r t i n g t h i s t o h i s Government Lichnowsky v o i c e d h i s doubt as t o C h u r c h i l l ' s s e r i o u s n e s s i n the m a t t e r . I t was 3. p r o b a b l y an a t t e m p t t o p l e a s e the p a c i f i s t p a r t y i n B r i t a i n . Stumm th o u g h t Germany would have t o examine v e r y c a r e f u l l y the Question o f a n a v a l h o l i d a y b e f o r e e n t e r i n g upon i t . They had 4. b e t t e r w a i t and see i f B r i t a i n were r e a l l y s e r i o u s . I n June C h u r c h i l l spoke i n f o r m a l l y t o the German H a v a l A t t a c h e about the proposed H a v a l h o l i d a y . He thought i t would be p o s s i b l e t o d i s c o v e r a f o r m a c c e p t a b l e t o En g l a n d and Germany. I f the C a b i n e t a g r e e d he i n t e n d e d t o come f o r w a r d w i t h a more d e f i n i t e p r o p o s a l a g a i n i n . t h e autumn. He was sure the o t h e r c o u n t r i e s would come i n i f E n g l a n d and Germany s t a r t e d the scheme 1. G.D.vol.4.p.259-61.XXXIX.145.Memorandum by Bethmann-Hollw g, Dec.14, 1912.;p.262-4.XXXIE.9.Bethmann-Hollweg t o Emperor, Dec.18, 1912. 2. G.D.vol.4.p.266.Hote. 3. G.D.vol.4.p.273-7.XXXXX.24.Lichnowsky t o Bethmann-Hollweg, March 27, 1913. 4. G.D.vol.4.n.283-4.XXXIX.35.Memorandum by Stumm, March 31,191 192, L l u l l e r p r o v e d n o n - c o m m i t t a l and c e r t a i n l y u n e n t h u s i a s t i c . He warned h i s Government t h a t t h e r e was d i s h o n e s t y a t the bottom of e v e r y s i n g l e B r i t i s h . N a v a l P r o p o s a l . They were t r y i n g t o b l u f f Germany t h a t c o m p e t i t i o n was v a i n . Because of t h e i r own f i n a n c i a l d i f f i c u l t i e s o f c o n s t r u c t i o n t h e y were t r y i n g t o d e l a y 1. or p r e v e n t the German N a v a l Law b e i n g c a r r i e d o u t . L i c h n o w s k y v e r y s e n s i b l y endeavoured t o tone down the A t t a c h e s s t a t e m e n t s b y p r e s e n t i n g the B r i t i s h p o i n t o f v i e w . He d i d n o t want B r i t - i s h n a v a l p o l i c y and C h u r c h i l l ' s a c t i o n s t o l e a d to bad f e e l i n g and s u g g e s t e d a v e r y f r i e n d l y r e f u s a l i f any approaches were made. I f the German Government w i s h e d , he would i n d i c a t e c a s u a l - l y t o Grey t h a t Germany would p r e f e r C h u r c h i l l n o t t o come f c r - 2. ward a g a i n w i t h t h e i d e a o f a n a v a l h o l i d a y . As a r e s u l t the B r i t i s h F o r e i g n O f f i c e n e v e r approached the German Government 3. w i t h a p r o p o s a l f o r a n a v a l h o l i d a y . I n December 1913 the P a l l M a l l G a s e t t e welcomed the im- provement i n Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s announced i n Bethmann-Hollweg' speech and e x p r e s s e d the b e l i e f t h a t "Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s would c o n t i n u e t o improve a c c o r d i n g as t h o s e r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the B r i t - i s h Navy t o o k c a r e t o d e v e l o p B r i t i s h sea-power,"and t h a t "the o n l y t r u e b a s i s f o r f r i e n d s h i p " was sea-power. T h i s the K a i s e r 1. G.D.vol.4.p.286-90.XXXlX.59.Report by M i l l i e r , June 20, 1913 As a r e s u l t the Emperor urged the b t i i l d i n g o f f o u r b a t t l e - s h i p s , b u t t i r p i t z r e f u s e d , c f . p.290-1. 2. G.D.vol.4.p.291-2.XXXIX.46.LichnowsIcy t o Bethmann-Ho 1 lweg, June 23, 1913. To t h i s Germany agreed on June 29. c f . p . 2 9 2 . German N o t e . 3. G.D.vol.4.p.305-6.German Note. Lichnowsky - op. c i t . - p21. says t h a t o f f i c i a l l y Grey d i d not s u p p o r t the p r o p o s a l and never spoke of i t t o him, a l t h o u g h C h u r c h i l l f r e q u e n t l y d i d . 193. l a b e l l e d as nonsense, "Friendship on the condition that one i s always to recognise the other as the stronger eo ipso i s absurd; i t i s nothing more nor less than a protectorate J And i t means Germany's c a p i t u l a t i o n on the sea, which w i l l not now or ever be 1. subscribed to by me. So they w i l l have to do without i t . " The e a r l y months of 1814 witnessed a feeble attempt to r e - commence naval discussions. T i r p i t z , on February 4 i n the Reich- stag, stated that the idea of a naval holiday could not be r e a l - ised but po s i t i v e proposals had not yet reached Germany. I f they came they would be examined with goodwill. In reply. Grey author- ised Goschen to state that B r i t a i n had not made positive proposals because she had been given to understand by private intimations that such proposals would be unwelcome and would have a bad e f f e c t on public opinion i n Germany. He asked exactly what T i r p i t z meant and how proposals for a naval holiday would be received. 2. He would make proposals i f they would be welcome. Bethmann- Hollweg t o l d Goschen that Germany would be quite ready to examine any o f f i c i a l proposal from the B r i t i s h Government f o r the reduct- ion of expenditure on armaments. He did not consider the idea of a naval holiday r e a l i s a b l e i n practice but l e f t i t e n t i r e l y to the B r i t i s h Government whether they chose to approach Germany 3. on the question. Hothing seems to have been done along these l i n e s , so both sides followed t h e i r own i n c l i n a t i o n s . T i r p i t z 1. G.D.vol.4.p.314.XXXlX.69.Kuhlmann to Bethmann-Hollweg, Dec. 11, 1913. 2. G.D.vol.4.p.318-9.XXXD:.74.Aide-Memoire by Goschen to B e r l i n , Feb. 6. 1914. 3. G.D.vol.4.p.319-20.XXXIX.77.Chancellor to Emperor, Feb.8, 1914. p.320-1.XXXIX.78.Emperor to Chancellor, Feb. 9. 1914. 194. had s u f f i c i e n t wisdom to agree with the Chancellor that the Navy must avoid anything to disturb the development of the 1. f r i e n d l y English r e l a t i o n s now being c u l t i v a t e d . In June, at the wish of the B r i t i s h Government and with the consent of the Kaiser, B r i t i s h warships v i s i t e d Germany. The Emperor chose K i e l week, June 23 to 30,for the v i s i t . Everything went o f f w e l l . The men and o f f i c e r s f r a t e r n i s ed amicably and neither side displayed undue c u r i o s i t y i n technical 2. matters. Three B r i t i s h cruisers were permitted to return through the K i e l Canal on the a p p l i c a t i o n of the B r i t i s h Admiral. In the midst of these f e s t i v i t i e s came the news of the assassin- a t i o n of the Archduke and his wife. This had l i t t l e e f f e c t on the c o r d i a l r e l a t i o n s or the length of the v i s i t . The question of how f a r England and Prance were committed i n m i l i t a r y matters r a i s e d conjectures and caused some uneasiness i n German o f f i c i a l c i r c l e s . Rumours were current which seemed to be confirmed by l i t t l e i ncidents. Since B r i t a i n had decreased the strength of the Mediterranean sqtxadron Prance must have undertaken the p o l i c i n g of that sea. Milller reported i n Sept- ember 1913 that there must be closer communication between the Admiralties of London and Paris than between London and any other c a p i t a l , f o r the Naval Attaches Sf Prance were shown more when 3. they v i s i t e d the yards. In February 1914 he expressed the 1. G.D.vol.4.p.342.German Note. 2. G.D.vol.4.p.342-3.XXXIX.99.Jagow to Emperor, A p r i l 25, 1914; p.343.XXXlX.100.Treutler to German Foreign O f f i c e , A p r i l 27, 1914.;B.D.vol.ll.p.6-7.No.6.Rumbold to Grey, July 2 , 1914.; p.8-10.Enclosure i n No.7.Henderson to Rumbold, July 3, 1914.; C h u r c h i l l - op. c i t . - p.198. 3. G.D.vol.4.p.297-8.XXXIX.134.Report by Miiller, Sept. 18, 1913. 195. b e l i e f that secret m i l i t a r y and naval arrangements existed bet- 1. ween England and Prance. Lichnowsky believed that the B r i t - i s h navy would protect Prance i f she were attacked but he did not think there was any written treaty of defence between the 2. two countries, f o r Asquith had stated i n 1915 that there e x i s t - ed no secret arrangements between England and another Power that 3. would oblige England to take part i n a continental war. As i t turned out there were some grounds for the German suspicions. The m i l i t a r y and naval conversations begun i n 1906 had continued. During the Agadir C r i s i s , Prance t r i e d hard to extract an assurance of armed support from Grey but f a i l e d . Asquith, who had heard about these conversations i n 1906 and then forgotten a l l about them, was reminded again by Grey and considered them a dangerous encouragement to Prance and a trap fo r England. In 1912 the facts were l a i d before the Cabinet and discussed. The conversations were permitted to continue provided a statement that they were non-committal was put into w r i t i n g by either side. This was done and the Grey-Cambon l e t t e r s of November 1912 expressly recognised this f a c t , as well as the 4. promise to consult together i n case of trouble. In 1914 Prance drew Russia i n t o the c i r c l e by persuading Grey to permit naval conversations between the English and Russian Admiralties. Grey 1. G.D.vol.4.p.324-7.Enclosure, Report by Muller, Feb.19, 1914. 2. G.D.vol.4.p.523-4.XXXIX. 155Lichnews ky to Bethmann-Hollweg, Feb.. 19, 1914. 3. G.D.vol.4.p.272-3.XXXIX.126.Lichnowsky to Bethmann-Hollweg, March 25, 1913. 4. Grey - op. c i t . - vol.1.p.92-6. 196. could not see the value of this but hesitated to r i s k offending Russia by r e f u s a l . The Cabinet consented, so the Grey-Cambon l e t t e r s were communicated to Russia, who subscribed to t h e i r 1. text, and the conversations proceeded. The Germans learned of :these arrangements through t h e i r secret service and f e l t considerable alarm. Rumour exaggerated the incident u n t i l they believed that an Anglo-Russian naval agreement was pending. They accordingly requested B a l l i n to go to London to reconnoitre and to warn some of his i n f l u e n t i a l friends p r i v a t e l y that such an agreement would r u i n Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s . B a l l i n discover ed that the reports were f a l s e and that Grey had no int e n t i o n 2. of consenting to any Haval Conventions. Prom 1912 on, with i n t e r v a l s of calm, the Balkans occupied the attention of Europe. Inevitably, the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e and the T r i p l e Entente were drawn into the quarrels of the unruly states through the opposing interests of Austria and Russia. In t h i s c r i s i s , England and Germany co-operated for peace. Grey earnestly d e s i r i n g to preserve the peace of Europe,took a step to draw nearer to Germany. On October 14, 1912 Grey's private secretary, S i r William T y r r e l l , dined with Kuhlmann and t o l d him that Grey was s i n c e r e l y t i r e d of the long quarrel and most h e a r t i l y wished to extend h i s hand f o r a genuine and permanent r e c o n c i l i a t i o n . He considered the time suitable f o r getting 1. Grey - on. c i t . - vol.l.p.275-5. 2. G.D*.vol.4.p.375-7.XXXIX.640.Jagow to B a l l i n , July 15, 1914; p.377.German Note; p.377-8.XXXIX.643.Ballin to Jagow, July 24, 1914. 197 « i n t o c o n f i d e n t i a l p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p and so o f f e r e d Germany the " o l i v e b r a n c h of peace". I n the p r e s e n t c r i s i s B r i t a i n and Germany had i n t e r e s t s w h i c h seemed I d e n t i c a l . England's s o l e o b j e c t was t o l o c a l i s e the B a l k a n c o n f l i c t , n o t t o seek g a i n f o r h e r s e l f . He t h o u g h t an exchange of views f i r s t t o e s t a b l i s h - u n a n i m i t y a d v i s a b l e . Then the two c o u n t r i e s c o u l d show themselves o p e n l y t o Europe hand i n hand. I n r e p o r t i n g t h i s t o h i s Govern- ment Kuhlmann s t r o n g l y a d v i s e d a p r a c t i c a l and d e t a i l e d r e n l v •i. s i n c e Grey was o b v i o u s l y s i n c e r e . T h i s approach was s t r i c t l y c o n f i d e n t i a l and p e r s o n a l . N e i t h e r N i c o l s o n nor Goschen had 2. any knowledge of t h e m a t t e r . K i d e r l e n f e l t somewhat p e r p l e x e d and d o u b t f u l . However, he d e c i d e d t o p r o c e e d i n a c a u t i o u s manner. Kuhlmann c o u l d i n f o r m Grey or T y r r e l l t h a t German;/- was p e r f e c t l y w i l l i n g t o go hand i n hand w i t h E n g l a n d p r o v i d e d : ( 1 ) t h a t the d i s c u s s i o n s were a b s o l u t e l y c o n f i d e n t i a l , and any a g r e e - ment r e a c h e d were I m m e d i a t e l y made p u b l i c ; (2) t h a t an agreement were a r r i v e d a t , t h a t n e i t h e r power would f i g h t a g a i n s t the o t h e r on f o r e i g n t e r r i t o r v , e s p e c i a l l y where i t s own v i t a l I n t e r e s t s 3. were n o t c o n c e r n e d , s i m p l y t o s e r v e a t h i r d power. E x a c t l y what the o v e r t u r e meant i s d i f f i c u l t t o say. A t l e a s t , i t u s h e r e d i n a p e r i o d of c o - o p e r a t i o n and s u c c e s s f u l n e g o t i a t i o n . 1. G.D.vol.4.p.115-7.XXZ111.223.Kuhlmann t o C h a n c e l l o r , Oct.15, 1912. 2. G.D.vol.4.p.117.XXX111.232.Kuhlmann t o German F o r e i g n O f f i c e , Oct.16, 1912. 3. G.D.vol.4.p.117-8.XXX111.233.Kiderlen t o Kuhlmann, Oct.20, 1912. TIiis a c c o u n t i s t a k e n p u r e l y from the German s o u r c e s . No m e n t i o n of i t o c c u r s i n the contemporary E n g l i s h a u t h o r - i t i e s . 1 O.C( „ 1. Grey worked h a r d f o r peace d u r i n g the w i n t e r of 1912-13. On the whole the German F o r e i g n O f f i c e seconded h i s e f f o r t s , and supplemented h i s p r o p o s a l s . True t o h i s co^'c-r ;he ro-~s no a s s u r a n c e o f armed s u p p o r t t o h i s f r i e n d s . I n s t e a d he a t t - empted t o c o n c i l i a t e a l l p a r t i e s . He p r e s i d e d over and d i r e c t - ed the Ambassadors' Conference i n London and was p r o b a b l y l a r g e - l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r i t s s u c c e s s . He was f o r t u n a t e i n h a v i n g as h i s c o l l e a g u e s a d m i r a b l e men w i t h whom he was on f r i e n d l y terms p e r s o n a l l y . L i c h n o w s k y c o - o p s r a t e d w i t h him perhaps a l i t t l e 2. t o o w h o l e - h e a r t e d l y t o s u i t the German Government. As Grey a f t e r w a r d s s a i d r e g a r d i n g the whole a f f a i r : "The d e t a i l s w i t h w h i c h we d e a l t were i n s i g n i f i c a n t - i n themselves mere s p a r k s : 3. b u t we were s i t t i n g on a powder magazine." They succeeded i n f i n d i n g a s e t t l e m e n t of the q u e s t i o n s , thus a v e r t i n g a g e n e r a l c o n f l a g r a t i o n . U n f o r t u n a t e l y t h e i r s o l u t i o n s were not perman- e n t l y e f f e c t i v e and J u l y 1914 found Europe a g a i n f a c i n g a c r i s i s t h i s time w i t h o u t e i t h e r the w i l l or the m a c h i n e r y t o promote peace. The s p r i n g and summer of 1914 had been marked by an un- u s u a l t r a n q u i l l i t y i n Europe, as w e l l as i n Anglo-German r e l a t - i o n s . I t p r o v e d t o be the q u i e t b e f o r e the stoimi. On June 28, the Archduke and h i s w i f e were a s s a s s i n a t e d a t S a r a j e v o . Europe 1. c f . L i c h n o w s k y ' s t r i b u t e t o him i n "My M i s s i o n t o London" p.10-11. 2. They had t o remind him a t times d u r i n g t h e s e y e a r s somewhat s h a r p l y t h a t i t was h i s d u t y t o u p h o l d t h e i r w i s h e s . i n h i s pamphlet "My M i s s i o n t o London" he complains of h i s t r e a t - ment a t the"hands of the German F o r e i g n O f f i c e and puts i t down t o j e a l o u s y of h i s s u c c e s s i n London. 5.Grey - op. c i t . - vol.1.p.258. TOO, t h r i l l e d v / i t h h o r r o r a t the b r u t a l i t y of the outrage and f o r a time s y m p a t h i s e d v / i t h A u s t r i a i n h e r d e s i r e f o r r e d r e s s . Days passe d w i t h o u t a c t i o n . Rumours s p r e a d a b r o a d , Europe w a i t e d i n a p p r e h e n s i o n . Would A u s t r i a p r e c i p i t a t e a n o t h e r c r i s i s , and i f so v/ould Europe succeed i n a v e r t i n g war? On J u l y 6 Lichnow- sky spoke p r i v a t e l y t o Grey o f the a n x i e t y and p e s s i m i s m he had found i n B e r l i n and'the d i f f i c u l t y o f Germany's p o s i t i o n . He hoped t h a t i f t r o u b l e came E n g l a n d would do h e r b e s t t o m i t i g a t e 1. f e e l i n g i n S t . P e t e r s b u r g . A day or two l a t e r he hoped t h a t E n g l a n d and Germany would be a b l e t o keep i n t o u c h and a v e r t 2. t r o u b l e . Thus t h e y went on u n t i l the A u s t r i a n n ote t o S e r b i a on J u l y 24. Then the t r o u b l e began. Gre;y c o n s i d e r e d i t the most f o r m i d a b l e n o t e a d d r e s s e d by one i n d e p e n d e n t s t a t e t o an- 3. o t h e r . To L i c h n o w s k y he s a i d t h a t he had no c o n c e r n w i t h the n o t e u n l e s s i t l e d t o t r o u b l e between A u s t r i a and R u s s i a . I f r e l a t i o n s between th e s e two c o u n t r i e s became t h r e a t e n i n g , Eng- l a n d c o u l d do n o t h i n g u n l e s s Germany proposed and p a r t i c i p a t e d 4. i n m o d e r a t i n g i n f l u e n c e a t V i e n n a . Germany o b v i o u s l y f e a r e d p o s s i b l e R u s s i a n a c t i o n w h i c h would i n e v i t a b l y o b l i g e h e r t o f u l f i l h e r t r e a t y pledge t o Aus- t r i a and so p r e c i p i t a t e a w o r l d war. Y e t she h e s i t a t e d t o put- p r e s s u r e upon A u s t r i a . W h i l e Grey s t r o v e f o r peace and r a c k e d h i s b r a i n f o r a c c e p t a b l e methods of m e d i a t i o n , Germany m e r e l y 1. B.D.vol.11.p.24.Ho.32.Grey £o Rumbold, J u l y 6 , 1914. 2. B.D.vol.11.p.33.Ho.41.Grey t o Rumbold, J u l y 9, 1914. 3. B.D.vol.11.p.73.Ho.91.Grey t o Bunsen, J u l y 2 4 , 1914. 4. B . D . v o l . l l . P . 7 8 . H o . 9 9 . G r e y t o Rumbold, J u l y 2 4 , 1914. 200. "passed on" s u g g e s t i o n s t o V i e n n a , and urged B r i t a i n t o h o l d S t . P e t e r s b u r g i n check. She f e a r e d t h a t h e r p r o t e s t s might annoy A u s t r i a and d r i v e h e r t o some r a s h a c t . As m a t t e r s be- came worse and A u s t r i a d e c l a r e d war on S e r b i a and R u s s i a m o b i l - i z e d , Grey's e f f o r t s became more f r a n t i c . He proposed a Con- f e r e n c e . Germany thought i t c o n s t i t u t e d p r a c t i c a l l y a C o u r t of A r b i t r a t i o n and t h e r e f o r e c o u l d o n l y be c o n s i d e r e d i f the p r o p o s a l came f r o m A u s t r i a . F i n a l l y t h e y promoted d i r e c t con- v e r s a t i o n s between S t . P e t e r s b u r g and V i e n n a . W h i l e Germany was d a l l y i n g w i t h V i e n n a , R u s s i a and F r a n c e were u r g i n g Grey t o d e c l a r e h i s i n t e n t i o n t o g i v e armed s u p p o r t t o them I n e vent of war. T h i s Grey p o s i t i v e l y r e f u s e d t o do. I f t h e y I n t e n d e d t o p r e c i p i t a t e a war t h e y would have t o do so t h e n w i t h o u t c e r t a i n t y of B r i t i s h a i d . On J u l y 29 Grey t o l d L i c h n o w s k y t h a t he d i d n o t want him t o be m i s l e d b y the f r i e n d l y tone of t h e i r c o n v e r s a t i o n s i n t o t h i n k i n g t h a t E n g l a n d would s t a n d a s i d e i n a European c o n f l i c t . I f Germany and F r a n c e were i n v o l v e d B r i t a i n may n o t s t a n d a s i d e That same e v e n i n g , b e f o r e the German Government r e c e i v e d t h i s news f r o m L i c h n o w s k y , the C h a n c e l l o r s e n t f o r Goschen and made a s t r o n g b i d f o r E n g l i s h n e u t r a l i t y i n event of war. He s a i d t h a t he was c o n t i n u i n g h i s e f f o r t s f o r peace b u t might n o t be s u c c e s s f u l . I n e v e n t of Germany h a v i n g t o f u l f i l h e r t r e a t y 1.B.D.vol.11.p.182-3.Ho.286.Grey t o Goschen, J u l y 29, 1914. KautsIcy Documents . p.321.Ho.368.Lichnowsky t o German F o r - e i g n O f f i c e , J u l y 29, 1914. I f t h i s news had been r e c e i v e d e a r l i e r , the C h a n c e l l o r would n e v e r have made the n e u t r a l ! t p r o p o s a l , cf.B.D.vol.11.p.194-5.Ho.305.Goschen t o Grey, J u l y 30, 1914. 201. o b l i g a t i o n s t o A u s t r i a he hoped t h a t E n g l a n d would r e m a i n n e u t - r a l . He was p r e p a r e d t o g i v e B r i t a i n a s s u r a n c e , i f she s t o o d a s i d e , t h a t Germany v/ould n o t annex F r e n c h t e r r i t o r y . Upon Goschen's a s k i n g i f t h i s a p p l i e d a l s o t o the F r e n c h c o l o n i e s , he r e p l i e d t h a t i t was n o t p o s s i b l e f o r h i m t o g i v e the same a s s u r a n c e t h e r e . Germany v/ould a l s o r e s p e c t the n e u t r a l i t y of H o l l a n d i f the o t h e r b e l l i g e r e n t s d i d the same. R e g a r d i n g B e l g i u m he was n o t so s u r e , b u t would promise t h a t i f B e l g i u m r e f r a i n e d f r o m t a k i n g s i d e s a g a i n s t Germany h e r i n t e g r i t y would be r e s p e c t e d a f t e r the c o n c l u s i o n o f the war. He hoped t h a t t h i s , would f o r m the b a s i s of an agreement between E n g l a n d and Germany and promote good r e l a t i o n s . I t was an u n f o r t u n a t e s t e p , t a k e n p r o b a b l y by a s o r e l y p e r p l e x e d Government. The E n g l i s h c o n s i d e r e d i t an ou t r a g e and an i n s u l t . Grey s a i d "the p r o p o s a l 1. made t o us meant e v e r - l a s t i n g d i s h o n o u r i f we a c c e p t e d i t . " Crowe c o n s i d e r e d t h a t t h e s e a s t o u n d i n g p r o p o s a l s r e f l e c t e d d i s - 2". c r e d i t on t h e st a t e s m a n who made them. B r i t a i n r e f u s e d u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y . "My answer must be t h a t we must p r e s e r v e our f u l l freedom t o a c t as c i r c u m s t a n c e s may seem t o us t o r e q u i r e i n any development o f the p r e s e n t c r i s i s so u n f a v o u r a b l e and r e g r e t t a b l e as the C h a n c e l l o r c o n t e m p l a t e s , " wrote Grey. The one way t o m a i n t a i n good r e l a t i o n s was f o r E n g l a n d and Germany t o c o n t i n u e t o work t o g e t h e r t o p r e s e r v e 3. the peace o f Europe. 1. Grey - op. c i t . - v o l . 1 . p . 3 1 6 . 2. B . D " . v o l . l l . p . l 8 6 . M i n u t e b y Crowe, J u l y 50, 1914. 3. B.D.vol.11.p.193-4.No.303.Grey t o Goschen, J u l y 30, 1914.; Ka t i t s k y Documents .p. 408.Ho. 4 9 7 . E n g l i s h Ambassador t o German C h a n c e l l o r , 202. On July 31 Grey t o l d Lichnowsky that i f Germany would get any reasonable proposal put forward which made i t clear that Germany and Austria were s t r i v i n g to preserve European peace and that Prance and Russia would be unreasonable i f they rejected i t , he (Grey) would support i t at St.Petersburg and Paris and even go the length of saying that i f they did not accept i t England would have nothing more to do with the con- sequences. Otherwise, i f France were involved England would 1. be drawn i n . The same day Grey formally asked France and Germanv i f 2. they v/ould respect the n e u t r a l i t y of Belgium. France gave 3. prompt reassurance, but Germany hedged the issue, Lichnow- sky asked Grey on August 1 i f England would promise n e u t r a l i t y i f Germany guaranteed the i n t e g r i t y of France and her colonies. 4. Grey, however, f e l t compelled to keep h i s hands fr e e . Germany was doing her utmost to keep England out of the war now that c o n f l i c t seemed i n e v i t a b l e . Unfortunately, she had, by rashly g i v i n g the "blank cheque" to Austria, placed h e r s e l f i n an extremely precarious p o s i t i o n . She did not r e a l - l y want war, but th i s time her clumsy diplomacy had made peace almost impossible. With Russia mobilising and France mobilis- ing and England uncertain, she f e l t her very existence endanger- ed. Everything now depended upon-rapid action on her part be- 1. B.D.vol.11.p.215-6.Ho.340.Grey to Goschen, July 31,,1914; Kautsky Documents.p.403-4.Ho.489.Lichnowsky to German For- eign O f f i c e , July 31, 1914; p.407.Ho.496.Memorandum by Jagow, July 31, 1914.. 2. B.D.vol.11.p.218.Ho.348.Grey to Ber t i e , July 31, 1914. 5.B.D,vol.11.p.234.Ho.382.Bertie to Grey, July 31, 1914.; p.254©5.Ho.383.Goschen to Grey, July 31, 1914. 4.B.D.vol.11.p.260-1.Ho.448.Grey to Goschen, Aug. 1, 1914. 203. f o r e h e r enemies were r e a d y . She at t e m p t e d t o put the b r a k e s on A u s t r i a r a t h e r t o o l a t e i n the day. The o n l y way out was war. A c c o r d i n g l y she d e c l a r e d war on R u s s i a , j u s t a t a moment when Grey was h o p i n g t h a t d i r e c t c o n v e r s a t i o n s between A u s t r i a and R u s s i a m i g h t y e t a v o i d a "w o r l d war. Mar w i t h R u s s i a meant war w i t h P r a n c e . Germany made a b i d f o r F r e n c h n e u t r a l i t y b u t on terms w h i c h no s e l f - r e s p e c t i n g n a t i o n c o u l d a c c e p t . She d i d h e r b e s t t o c o n v i n c e B r i t a i n t h a t the F r e n c h had t a k e n the i n - i t i a t i v e i n v i o l a t i n g the Franco-German f r o n t i e r and a l s o the n e u t r a l i t y of B e l g i u m . Then she committed the f i n a l b l u n d e r of p r e s e n t i n g the u l t i m a t u m t o B e l g i u m and upon i t s r e j e c t i o n , p r o c e e d i n g t o march t h r o u g h the n e u t r a l c o u n t r y . T h i s a c t i o n gave Grey and the C a b i n e t the n e c e s s a r y m otive f o r e n t e r i n g the war w i t h a u n i t e d n a t i o n b e h i n d them. Ho doubt the m o r a l o b l i g a t i o n s t o Prance and the p r o t e c t i o n o f B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s c o n s t i t u t e d a s u f f i c i e n t i n c e n t i v e f o r a c e r t - a i n s e c t i o n of t h e Government, and mig h t have s a t i s f i e d a narrow m a j o r i t y i n P a r l i a m e n t , b u t t h e y would n o t have e n l i s t e d the 1. sympathy of the n a t i o n as a whole. L i t e r a l l y E n g l a n d had p r e s e r v e d h e r freedom of a c t i o n , m o r a l l y she had bound h e r s e l f t o P r a n c e more c l o s e l y t h a n i f she had had a w r i t t e n d e f e n s i v e a l l i a n c e . On August 3 Grey e x p l a i n e d the s i t u a t i o n t o the House e m p h a s i s i n g the f a c t t h a t t h e y were f r e e t o a c t as t h e y chose. l.On Sunday, August 1, the C o n s e r v a t i v e s d e c i d e d t o s u p p o r t the Government i n ev e n t of war, and on Monday Mor n i n g , August 2, s e n t the f o l l o w i n g note t o ' t h e C a b i n e t a t Downing St.:"Dear M r . A s q u i t h . - L o r d Lansdowne and I f e e l i t our d u t y t o i n f o r m you t h a t i n our o p i n i o n , as w e l l as t h a t o f a l l the c o l l e a g u e s whom we have been a b l e t o c o n s u l t , i t would be f a t a l t o the honour and s e c u r i t y of the U n i t e d Kingdom t o h e s i t a t e i n sup- p o r t i n g F r a n c e and R u s s i a a t the p r e s e n t j u n c t u r e , and we o f f e r our u n h e s i t a t i n g s u p p o r t t o the Government i n any measures t h e y may c o n s i d e r n e c e s s a r y f o r t h a t o b j e c t . Yours v e r y t r u l y , A . B o n a r 204. He hourly expected the v i o l a t i o n of Belgium v/hich he believed v/ould so rouse the indignation of the people that England's p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the war v/ould be unavoidable. Soon a f t e r he had f i n i s h e d speaking the German ultimatum to Belgium arrived, 1 . and he read i t before the House rose. Even at the l a s t minute Germany made one more e f f o r t to keep B r i t a i n out of the v/ar. At noon August 4 Lichnov/sky com- municated o f f i c i a l assurance that Germany v/ould not annex Bel- gian t e r r i t o r y and explaining that she had to prevent the French 2. advance. At 2P.M., August 4, Grey telegraphed to Goschen to ask f o r his passports at midnight unless Germany promised not 3. to v i o l a t e Belgian n e u t r a l i t y . After that the Cabinet awaited the hour at v/hich the u l - timatum v/ould expire. They had l i t t l e doubt of the outcome. A l l preparations v/ere completed. During the week previous a l l precautionary measures had been taken. A t r i a l mobilisation of the Third F l e e t , planned months before, had taken place. 1. Grey - op. c i t . - vol.2.p.294-309.Appendix D. for text of the"Speech. In reading the l e t t e r of November 22, 1912 addressed to Cambon to the House Grey omitted the l a s t sentence: " I f these measures Involved action, the plans of the general s t a f f s would at once be taken into considerat- ion and the Governments v/ould then decide v/hat e f f e c t should be.given to them." Grey says that up to 1923 he was not conscious of having omitted i t . The only explanation he could give was that i t was e n t i r e l y unintentional, a question interrupted him at that point and he may have forgotten that 'he had not f i n i s h e d reading, or he may have thought the l a s t sentence unimportant. In any case the complete l e t t e r was published two days l a t e r i n the O f f i c i a l Book of Documents, c f . Grey - op. c i t . - vol.2.p.16. 2. B.D.vol.11.p.312.Ho.587.Communication by the German Ambass- ador, Aug.4, 1914.; Kautsky Documents.p.569.Ho.810.Jagow to Lichnow s Icy, Aug. 4, 1914. 3. B.D.vol.11.p.314.Ho.594.Grey to Goschen, Aug.4, 1914.; Kautsky Documents p.582.No.839.English Ambassador to German Foreign O f f i c e , Aug.4, 1914.Aide-Memoirc. Given by Goschen tc Jagow at 7.P.M. 205. When the l i u s t r o - S e r b i a n q u a r r e l assumed a European a s p e c t the C a b i n e t had deemed i t w i s e t o h o l d the F l e e t r e a d y i n case of emergency. On Wednesday, J u l y 29, the F l e e t was o r d e r e d t o 1 p r o c e e d t o i t s war s t a t i o n s w i t h the utmost speed and s e c r e c y . A t the War O f f i c e e v e r y t h i n g was i n r e a d i n e s s f o r the f i n a l word of command. T h e r e f o r e , the C a b i n e t M i n i s t e r s s a t w a t c h - i n g the passage of the h o u r s t h a t b r o u g h t n e a r e r and e v e r n e a r - e r the g r e a t c a t a s t r o p h e . A t 11.P.M. the F o r e i g n O f f i c e d e s p a t d i e d t o L i c h n o w s k y the f o r m a l d e c l a r a t i o n of war t o g e t h e r w i t h p a s s p o r t s f o r him, h i s f a m i l y and s t a f f . B r i t a i n was a t war w i t h Germany. The war w h i c h n e i t h e r wanted b u t b o t h f e a r e d had come t o p a s s . The n a t i o n s were t o pay d e a r l y f o r t h e i r m u t u a l d i s t r u s t and antagonism.. The f i n a l c l i m a x of the drama had come s u d d e n l y . The e v e n t s o f the l a s t days of peace crowded one upon the o t h e r i n b r e a t h l e s s c o n f u s i o n . Messages poured i n t o the F o r e i g n O f f i c e s of Europe day and n i g h t g e n e r a l l y t e l l i n g o f f u r t h e r c o m p l i c - a t i o n s b u t o c c a s i o n a l l y c o n v e y i n g a b r i e f gleam of hope. The men who g u i d e d the d e s t i n i e s of n a t i o n s l a b o u r e d u n c e a s i n g l y f o r t h e i r o b j e c t i v e s . Those who d e s i r e d t o p r e s e r v e the peace of Europe t r i e d t o check the machine i n i t s h e a d l o n g c a r e e r t o d e s t r u c t i o n . A t l a s t , t h e y were f o r c e d t o r e a l i s e t h e i r h e l p - l e s s n e s s and were condemned t o watch the work o f a l i f e t i m e b e i n g swept away. They must have f e l t as Grey d i d one e v e n i n g d u r i n g 1 . C h u r c h i l l - op. c i t . - p.224. 206. the l a s t week of peace, when he s t o o d w i t h a f r i e n d a t a window of h i s room i n the F o r e i g n O f f i c e , w a t c h i n g the l i g h t i n g o f the lamps i n the space below and remarked: "The lamps are g o i n g out a l l o v e r E u r o p e ; we s h a l l n o t see them l i t a g a i n i n our l i f e - 1. t i m e . " l . G r e y - op. c i t . - v o l . 2 . p . 2 0 . 20V CONCLUSION. The c r u c i a l y e a r i n Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s was 1901. Then B r i t a i n , j u s t emerging f r o m h e r " s p l e n d i d i s o l a t i o n " , had as y e t formed no a l l i a n c e s , e n t e n t e s , or o b l i g a t i o n s . D e s i r o u s of i m p r o v i n g h e r f r i e n d l e s s p o s i t i o n i n Europe she t u r n e d t o Germany as h e r most n a t u r a l a l l y . N a v a l r i v a l r y had n o t y e t s e t up a b a r r i e r between them. There was no v i o l e n t e n m i t y nor were t h e r e any r e a l l y i r r e c o n c i l a b l e d i f f e r e n c e s . B r i t a i n , t r u e t o t r a d i t i o n , p roved h e r s e l f a -hard b a r g a i n e r , u n w i l l i n g t o s u r r e n d e r one i n c h more th a n n e c e s s a r y . Germany, on h e r s i d e , g r o s s l y m i s c a l c u l a t e d B r i t a i n ' s i s o l a t i o n and d i r e need, and s e t h e r p r i c e t o o h i g h . Unable t o r e a c h a c o n c l u s i o n w i t h Germany, E n g l a n d c a s t about h e r f o r p o s s i b l e a l l i e s . She t u r n - ed t o h e r o l d enemy. P r a n c e . F o r t h a t Germany had h e r s e l f t o t h a n k . She had p l a c e d too h i g h a v a l u a t i o n on her i n d i s p e n s a - b i l i t y , f o r g e t t i n g t h a t t h e r e were o t h e r n a t i o n s i n Europe. A f t e r 1904 B r i t a i n had o b l i g a t i o n s . She v a l u e d h e r new- f r i e n d s h i p g r e a t l y and German e f f o r t s t o b r e a k the E n t e n t e o n l y w e l d e d i t c l o s e r . F r i e n d s h i p w i t h E n g l a n d now e n t a i l e d f r i e n d - s h i p w i t h F r a n c e and l a t e r w i t h R u s s i a . B r i t a i n f r e q u e n t l y s a i d t h a t h e r E n t e n t e d i d n o t s t a n d i n the way o f good r e l a t i o n w i t h Germany, b u t i t a c t u a l l y made a c l o s e u n d e r s t a n d i n g a l m o s t i m p o s s i b l e . I n a l l the attempts a t n e g o t i a t i o n the B r i t i s h w o uld take no s t e p t h a t m ight be c o n s i d e r e d b y the F r e n c h as 208. p r e j u d i c i a l to t h e i r i n t e r e s t s . As the years went on this be- came an even more hard and f a s t r u l e . Hot that B r i t a i n ' s mo- tives v/ere a l t r u i s t i c . She dreaded German hegemony on the con- tinent and feared becoming dependent on that aggressive power. Therefore, she clung to her f r i e n d s . Unfortunately, German statesmen learned nothing by experience. They continued to labo\ir under the delusion that the stronger they made Germany and the more unyielding they proved the sooner they would con- vince England of the necessity of deserting the Entente and of . throwing h e r s e l f i n t o Germany's arms. The creation of a strong f l e e t and the attempt to use i t to demand from England a n e u t r a l i t y agreement r e a l l y made matters worse. In spite of the warnings of t h e i r Ambassadors, they chose to believe that England would not support the Entente by force. They knew that no d e f i n i t e treaty obliged her to do so; and that Grey had determined to keep his hands fj?ee, so they l i v e d i n a f o o l ' s paradise u n t i l the eleventh hour when i t was too late to r e t r i e v e t h e i r f o l l i e s . Public opinion no doubt influenced t h e i r actions to a c e r t a i n extent, but t h e i r own i n c l i n a t i o n s leaned towards public opinion. Mutual d i s t r u s t that increased with the passage of time blinded the o f f i c i a l s and made them hesitate to commit their countries to any agreement that was not impossibly one-sided. The Kaiser, Holstein, and T i r p i t z , and, to a c e r t a i n extent, Bulow suspected "perfidious Albion", and subscribed to the be- l i e f that " A l l things come to those who wait". On the other 209. s i d e , Grey, a l t h o u g h a s t a u n c h u p h o l d e r of the peace and s i n c e r e - l y d e s i r o x i s o f p r o m o t i n g good r e l a t i o n s w i t h e v e r y c o u n t r y i n - c l u d i n g Germany, s e c r e t l y q u e s t i o n e d the i n t e g r i t y and good f a i t h o f the Germans. F o r t h a t r e a s o n he w a l k e d w a r i l y when- ev e r n e g o t i a t i o n s were p r o c e e d i n g . Among the permanent o f f i c - i a l s a t the F o r e i g n O f f i c e , E y re Crowe was s t e e p e d i n the i d e a of the "German Menace". E v e r y Minute r e f l e c t e d h i s f e a r s and r e i t e r a t e d h i s w a r n i n g s . From 1910 on he r e c e i v e d the e n t h u s - i a s t i c s u p p o r t of A r t h u r N i c o l s o n , a n o t h e r f o l l o w e r o f h i s c u l t . These two l i v e d i n p e r p e t u a l t e r r o r of s e e i n g Grey l e a d E n g l a n d i n t o the t r a p s e t by Germany. They would have p l e d g e d E n g l a n d f i r m l y and o p e n l y t o the E n t e n t e and then have s a t down f u l l y armed t o keep Germany i n o r d e r , \7hether t h e i r system would have p r e s e r v e d the peace of Europe i s open t o q u e s t i o n . R u s s i a and F r a n c e a s s u r e d of h e r s u p p o r t might have been tempted t o p r o c e e d l e s s c a u t i o u s l y . The A u s t r i a n h o r s e r a n away w i t h i t s German r i d e r i n 1914, might n o t the R u s s i a n h o r s e have done the same w i t h , i t s E n g l i s h r i d e r ? Yftiat would have happened can o n l y be a m a t t e r f o r c o n j e c t u r e . The m i s t a k e l a y deeper t h a n the f o r m a t i o n and s t r e n g t h e n - i n g o f the E n t e n t e . I t l a y i n the i n a b i l i t y o f the two n a t i o n s t o a g r e e w h i l e B r i t a i n was s t i l l i n the mood f o r a German under- s t a n d i n g . I t l a y i n the p s y c h o l o g y of the two n a t i o n s and t h e i r i n a b i l i t y t o u n d e r s t a n d each o t h e r ' s temperament and p o l - i c i e s . T r y as t h e i r s t a t e s m e n d i d , t h e y c o u l d n o t a c h i e v e a d e f i n i t e rapprochment. I t i s the i r o n y of f a t e t h a t , when t h e y 2 1 0 e r e a c h e d a p o i n t where t h e y c o u l d s e t t l e o u t s t a n d i n g p o i n t s of d i f f e r e n c e i n a C o n v e n t i o n t h a t might have been the p r e l u d e t o an e r a o f c o r d i a l c o - o p e r a t i o n , the C r i s i s o f 1914 came and c a s t them b a c k i n t o u t t e r d a r k n e s s . Once the y e a r 1901 was passed the s p e c t r e of war s t a l k e d a b road more f r e e l y . G r a d u a l l y , and a t f i r s t a l m o s t u n c o n s c i o u s - l y , the n a t i o n s of Europe a r r a n g e d themselves f o r c o n f l i c t . C r i s e s came and went, each one more s e r i o u s t h a n the l a s t . S t i l l the s t a t e s m e n hoped t o c o n t i n u e t h e i r o l d t a c t i c s w i t h o u t p r e - c i p i t a t i n g a war. They had become i n v o l v e d i n a system of t h e i r •own c r e a t i o n , so i n t r i c a t e t h a t no one was c l e v e r enough or s t r o n g enough t o c a s t i t a s i d e and l e a d the way t o peace and freedom. H e l p l e s s l y t h e y went on , t r u s t i n g i n the g o o d w i l l o f t h e i r c o l l e a g u e s , u n t i l one day t h e y f o u n d themselves on the b r i n k o f the abyss and awoke t o the danger o n l y when i t was t o o l a t e t o draw back from the edge. These s i x t e e n y e a r s o f Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s r e p r e s e n t a p e r i o d of wasted o p p o r t - u n i t i e s . The f u t u r e depends upon whether the p r e s e n t l e a r n s i t s l e s s o n f r o m the p a s t r a t h e r more e f f e c t i v e l y t h a n d i d the s t a t e s m e n of the f i r s t decade of the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y . BIBLIOGRAPHY. - BIBLIOGRAPHY. Documents• 1. G.P.Gooch and H. Temperley, ed. - B r i t i s h Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914. - London - His.Majesty's' Stationery Office - 1927 - Vol, 1. (1927) The End of B r i t i s h I s o l a t i o n . Vol. 2. (1927) The Japanese Al l i a n c e and the French Entente Vo l . 3. (1928) The Testing of the Entente 1904-6. Vol. 4. (1929) The Anglo-Russian Rapprochment 1903-7. Vol,5. (1928) The Hear East, 1905-9. Vol . 6. (1930) The Anglo-German Tension, 1907-12. Vol . 7. (1952) The Agadir C r i s i s . Vol.11. (1926) The Outbreak of War (ed. J.W.Headlam-Morley) The editors have done t h e i r work thoroughly. The s e l - e ction of documents included i s adequate, the notes and tables of contents clear and h e l p f u l . Very valuable.Vol.7 unfortunately came out too late to be used i n this study of Agadir. 2. E.T.S.Dugdale, dd. - German Diplomatic Documents, 1871- 1914. - London - Methuen and Co. Ltd. - 1930 - 4 v o l s . Vol.1. The Bismarck Period. Vol.2. The n i n e t i e s . Vol.3. The Growing Antagonism, 1898-1910. Vol.4. The Descent to the Abyss. These documents selected and translated from the German c o l l e c t i o n omit many documents that would be useful, Hecess ary, but not as adequate as they might be. 3. K.Kautsky - German Documents on the Outbreak of the World War - Hew York - Oxford University Press - 1924. Useful and d e t a i l e d . Of value for the days of July and August 1914. 212. G e n e r a l . 1. E.rT.Anderson -mThe F i r s t Moroccan C r i s i s 1904-1906. - Ch i c a g o - U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago P r e s s - 1930. A c a r e f u l p i e c e of r e s e a r c h based on the documents. V e r y d e t a i l e d . On the whole f a i r l y i m p a r t i a l , i n p l a c e s s l i g h t l y a n t i - G e r m a n . Some p e n e t r a t i n g comments. A'use- f u l book. 2. H . H . A s q u i t h - The Gen e s i s o f the War - London - Cass e l l & Co. L t d . - 1923. The v i e w s of a man who t o o k p a r t i n many o f the e v e n t s he n a r r a t e s . C l e a r s up one or two obscure p o i n t s , b u t on the whole does n o t c o n t r i b u t e much t o the s t o r y of the'se y e a r s . E a s y r e a d i n g . More d e t a i l e d on the l a t e r y e a r s . 3. Th. von Bethmann-Hollweg - R e f l e c t i o n s on the World War - London - T h o r n t o n B u t t e r w o r t h , L t d . - 1920. Bethmann's a p o l o g y f o r h i m s e l f and Germany. C o n s i s t s c h i e f l y i n s h i f t i n g the blame on t o the s h o u l d e r s of the T r i p l e E n t e n t e and E n g l a n d i n p a r t i c u l a r . Some of h i s p o i n t s j u s t . One does n o t wonder t h a t Germany came t o d i s a s t e r under h i s l e a d e r s h i p . He r e v e a l s h i m s e l f a b s o l - u t e l y u n s u i t a b l e t o guide the d e s t i n i e s of a g r e a t n a t i o n t h r o u g h any c r i s i s . C o n t r i b u t e s l i t t l e t o our knowledge of the p e r i o d . 4. J . B . B i s h o p - Theodore R o o s e v e l t and H i s Time - Hew Y o r k - C h a r l e s S c r i b n e r ' s Sons - 1920. - 2 v o l s . V o l . 1 . Chapters 36 and 37 g i v e a l o n g l e t t e r by Roose- 13 • v e l t g i v i n g an a c c o u n t of t h e events l e a d i n g up t o the C o n f e r e n c e and o f the Conference i t s e l f . He t e l l s of h i s share i n c o n c i l i a t i n g the r i v a l s . He quotes s e v e r a l i n t e r - e s t i n g l e t t e r s exchanged w i t h the F r e n c h and German Ambass- adors . One wonders i f he o v e r e s t i m a t e s h i s own i n f l u e n c e . E n t e r t a i n i n g r e a d i n g . E.Brandenburg - From B i s m a r c k t o the World War - London - O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s - 1927. A v e r y s c h o l a r l y work b a s e d on German Documents. He sees t h e f a u l t s and m i s t a k e s of German p o l i c y . H i s comments show a keen mind and a p r a i s e w o r t h y i m p a r t i a l i t y . H a n d i - capped a l i t t l e by n o t h a v i n g a c c e s s t o the B r i t i s h .Docu- ments, b u t g i v e s s v e r y s t u d i e d and j u s t a c c o u n t w i t h o u t them. V a l u a b l e . B.von Bulow - I m p e r i a l Germany - London - C a s s e l l & Co. L t d , 1914. I m p e r i a l i s t i c i n the extreme. Great f a i t h i n Germany and h e r p o l i c y . G reat p r i d e i n h e r s t r e n g t h and wisdom,. B i a s e d . He p r a c t i c a l l y p r o v e s , b u t o n l y t o h i m s e l f , t h a t Germany g a i n e d by the A l g e c i r a s C o n f e r e n c e , t h a t h e r a l l i e s s t o o d by h e r . B.von Bulow - Memoirs - London - Putnam - vol.1.-!L§§0i vol.2.-1951. L e i s u r e l y i n s t y l e . F ree e x p r e s s i o n of the a u t h o r ' s o p i n i o n s on e v e r y t h i n g and everybody. I n t e n s e l y p a t r i o t i c . Billow i s the h e r o o f h i s own s t o r y . I n t e r e s t i n g r e v e l a t - 214. i o n s of h i s c h a r a c t e r . R e v e a l s the K a i s e r i n a l l h i s moods Hot i m p a r t i a l , r a t h e r s p i t e f u l a t t i m e s . H i s s t a t e m e n t s o f t e n c h a l l e n g e argument. I n many p l a c e s he i s o b v i o u s l y r e a d i n g the p a s t i n the l i g h t of the p r e s e n t . 8. V/.S. C h u r c h i l l . - The 'world C r i s i s - Hew Y o r k - C h a r l e s S c r i b n e r ' s Sons - 1923. v o l . 1 . A b r i l l i a n t s t u d y of n a v a l p r e p a r a t i o n s w r i t t e n by the F i r s t L o r d o f the A d m i r a l t y d u r i n g the l a s t y e a r s o f peace. G r e a t d e t a i l of the minute p r e p a r a t i o n s f o r the p r o t e c t i o n of B r i t a i n a g a i n s t - a t t a c k . I n t e r e s t i n g comments on B r i t i s h a c t i o n s and on t h e c r i s e s . F a s c i n a t i n g l y w r i t - t e n i n a j o u r n a l i s t i c s t y l e . V i v i d and p i c t o r i a l . 9. G.Lowes D i c k i n s o n - The I n t e r n a t i o n a l Anarchy 1904-1914 - Hew Y o r k - C e n t u r y Co. - 1926, U s e f u l f o r h i s p o i n t of v i e w and o p i n i o n s . Spares n e i t h e r s i d e i n h i s c r i t i c i s m of the pre-war d i p l o m a c y . 10. E.M.Earle - Turkey, the G r e a t Powers, and the Bagdad R a i l - way - Hew Y o r k - M a c M i l l a n Co. - 1923. An e x c e l l e n t s t u d y of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o m p l i c a t i o n s i n the Hear E a s t and the p a r t p l a y e d i n t h e s e by the Bag- dad R a i l w a y . I l l u m i n a t i n g comments and u s e f u l I n f o r m a t i o n . 11. H.von E c k a r d s t e i n - Ten Y e a r s a t the C o u r t of S t , James' 1895-1905. - London - T h r o n t o n B u t t e r w o r t h L t d . - 1921. A -remarkably f a s c i n a t i n g account f r o m the pen of a German d i p l o m a t . D e l i g h t f u l s t y l e , c o l o u r e d by the a u t h o r ' s p e r s o n a l i t y . I n c l i n e d t o the B r i t i s h s i d e i n h i s sympathies O 1 q Appears t h have seen c l e a r l y the abyss toward w h i c h Germ- an p o l i c y was h e a d i n g - or i s he r e a d i n g the p a s t i n the l i g h t o f what happened i n 1914-18? Hot always s t r i c t l y a c c u r a t e . 12. S.B.Fay - The O r i g i n s of the World War - New Y o r k - M a c r i i l l a n Co. 1928. 2 v o l s . A c a r e f u l p i e c e of r e a s e a r c h work, the r e s u l t o f much c o n s i d e r a t i o n and wide r e a d i n g . V ery u s e f u l and e x h a u s t i v e . 13. G.P.Gooch - Recent R e v e l a t i o n s of European D i p l o m a c y - London - Longmans, Green Z- Co. - 1930. The c h a p t e r s on Germany and E n g l a n d and the S u p p l e - mentary c h a p t e r s of 1927, 1928 and 1929 p r e s e n t a v a l - u a b l e d i s c u s s i o n o f the works p u b l i s h e d i n r e c e n t y e a r s b y p r o m i n e n t men of t h e s e c o u n t r i e s . Comments on the v a l u e of e a ch work and the p o i n t of view of the a u t h o r are p a r t i c u l a r l y i n s t r u c t i v e and i n t e r e s t i n g . V a l u a b l e . 14. E. Grey - T w e n t y - f i v e Y e a r s , 1896-1916. - London - Hodder and S t o u g h t o n - 1925. 2 v o l s . I m p o r t a n t as b e i n g the Memoirs of the M i n i s t e r i n charge of F o r e i g n A f f a i r s i n E n g l a n d d u r i n g the c r i s e s t h a t l e d t o the war. P u b l i s h e s many de s p a t c h e s and c l e a r s up some p o i n t s i n d i s p u t e . Defends h i s p o l i c y a g a i n s t the c r i t i c i s m s l e v e l l e d a t i t . Some evirious s t a t e m e n t s . An i d e a l i s t , i n a sense a t r a g i c f i g u r e . V e r y h o n e s t , v e r y p e a c e - l o v i n g , v e r y a t t r a c t i v e . W e l l - w r i t t e n , 216. 15. R.Haldane - A u t o b i o g r a p h y - London - Eodder .and Stoughton 1 9P9 E n j o y a b l e p e r s o n a l r e m i n i s c e n c e s by a man who p l a y e d an a c t i v e p a r t i n p o l i t i c a l l i f e . P a r t i c u l a r l y f u l l on m i l i t a r y p r e p a r a t i o n s and h i s v i s i t s t o Germany and comments on the German mind. Throws some l i g h t on h i s c o l l e a g u e s and t h e i r methods. An a d m i r e r of Grey. T h i s book and " B e f o r e the War" are sup p l e m e n t a r y . 16. R.Haldane - B e f o r e the War - London - C a s s e l l and Co.Ltd. 1920. I n t e r e s t i n g , c a r e f u l l y c o n s i d e r e d . W r i t t e n b y a man who was i n p o l i t i c a l l i f e d u r i n g these y e a r s . Hot b i t t e r b u t i n c l i n e d t o blame Germany. U s e f u l f o r the a c c o u n t of the a u t h o r ' s v i s i t t o B e r l i n i n 1906 and i n 1912. C l e a r l y w r i t t e n w i t h o u t e x c e s s of d e t a i l s . Gives i l l u m i n a t i n g comments on h i s c o l l e a g u e s and on the l e a d - i n g German o f f i c i a l s whom he met. 17. 0..T.Hale - Germany and the D i p l o m a t i c R e v o l u t i o n - A Study i n D i p l o m a c y and the P r e s s , 1904-6; - P h i l a d e l p h i a U n i v e r s i t y o f P e n n s y l v a n i a P r e s s - 1931. A v a l u a b l e s t u d y o f the i n f l u e n c e o f the p r e s s d u r i n g a c r i t i c a l p e r i o d i n European r e l a t i o n s . He b r i n g s out v e r y c l e a r l y the dangers of a f r e e p r e s s - how i t can c i r c u l a t e f a l s e news and promote i l l - f e e l i n g and make the t a s k of the Governments h a r d e r . C l e a r l y w r i t t e n . F a c t s w e l l s u p p o r t e d . One wishes the s t u d y c o v e r e d more y e a r s . 217. 18. O.Hammann - The Y.'orId P o l i c y of Germany 1890-1912. - London - George A l l e n & Unwin L t d . - 1927. The hook i s n o t so d e t a i l e d as t h a t of Branden- b u r g , b u t I s good f o r a s u r v e y o f these y e a r s . I s based on German documents and p e r s o n a l e x p e r i e n c e i n a d d i t i o n . 19. S.Lee - K i n g Edward V I I . - A B i o g r a p h y - London - Mac- M i l l a n & Co. L t d . - 1927. - 2 v o l s . The o f f i c i a l b i o g r a p h y . The r e s u l t of much p a i n s - t a k i n g work. I n t e r e s t i n g . D e c i d e d l y anti-German i n t o n e . S u s p i c i o u s of e v e r y move on the p a r t of the K a i s e r . An e s s e n t i a l book. 20. K.M.Lichnowdky - My M i s s i o n t o London 1912-1914 - London- C a s s e l l & Co. L t d . - 1918. T h i s i s the s h o r t pamphlet d e a l i n g w i t h Lichnow- sky's two y e a r s i n London, I t i s p r o - E n g l i s h i n t o n e , and b i t t e r a g a i n s t the s t u p i d i t y of the German O f f i c i a l s who wrecked h i s m i s s i o n a t e v e r y t u r n . Of use f o r h i s s t a t e m e n t s on the agreements r e a c h e d and on the members o f the E n g l i s h Government. 21 . E.Ludwig - K a i s e r W i l h e l m I I . - London - G.P.Putnam's Sons, L t d . - 1927. A f a s c i n a t i n g s t u d y of a complex c h a r a c t e r . V i v i d and v i g o r o u s i n s t y l e . Hot a l t o g e t h e r j u s t t o some of the c h a r a c t e r s . Remarkable f o r i t s f o r c e and sense o f the d r a m a t i c , r e a d s l i k e a t r a g e d y . W r i t t e n w i t h i n s i g h t and g e n i u s t h a t make the men o f the Court l i v e . 218. 22. E.Ludwig - J u l y '14 - London - G.P.Putnam's. Sons - 1929. E x c e l l e n t f o r c o n v e y i n g the atmosphere of the days of the J u l y C r i s i s , g e t s the t e n s i o n v e r y w e l l . V i v i d , i m p r e s s i o n i s t i c p i c t u r e s . The men i n charge .of F o r e i g n A f f a r i s l i v e and a c t a g a i n i n t h i s c o m p e l l i n g s t o r y . 23. L o r d Newton - L o r d Lansdowne - London ~ M a c m i l l a n & Co. L t d . - 1929. C l e a r s up s e v e r a l p o i n t s and s u p p l i e s e x t r a i n f o r m a t i o n , h u t i s r a t h e r d i s a p p o i n t i n g . R e a d a b l e . 24. H . N i c o l s o n - S i r A r t h u r N i c o l s o n , L o r d Carnock - London- Ma c m l l l a n 8: Co. L t d . - 1930. A r e m a r k a b l y f r a n k , e n t e r t a i n i n g a c c o u n t of d i p - lomacy i n Europe. C l e v e r and d r a m a t i c . Statements w e l l s u p p o r t e d ; o p i n i o n s i n t e r e s t i n g and c h a l l e n g i n g . Worth r e a d i n g . 25. K.F.Nowak - K a i s e r and C h a n c e l l o r - New York - M a c m i l l a n Co. - 1930. A b r i l l i a n t l y w r i t t e n p i e c e of work. Under the a u t h o r ' s a b l e pen the p e r s o n a l i t i e s of t h i s p e r i o d l i v e . The p o r t r a i t s of the K a i s e r , H o l s t e i n and B i s m a r c k are e x c e l l e n t . I t i s f a v o u r a b l e t o the K a i s e r and n o t s t r i c t l y r e l i a b l e f o r f a c t s . 26. R . P o i n c a r e - Memoirs 1912 - London - W.Heinemann L t d . - 1926. Used on Haldane M i s s i o n r e g a r d i n g B e r t i e ' s a c t i o n . 219. 27. A . P . P r i b r a m - E n g l a n d and the I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i c y of the European G r e a t Powers, 1871-1914. - F o r d L e c t u r e s a t the U n i v e r s i t y o f O x f o r d i n Michaelmas Term 1929. - O x f o r d - A t the C l a r e n d o n P r e s s - 1931. A v e r y p r a i s e w o r t h y b r i e f s u r v e y of t h i s f a t e f u l p e r i o d . Hot room f o r much d e t a i l , b u t g i v e s c l e a r , im- p a r t i a l a c c o u n t . Pronounces a sane, w e l l - b a l a n c e d j u d g - ment on the v a r i o u s e v e n t s . C o n c i s e and w e l l - w r i t t e n . 28. G.l/V.Prothero - German P o l i c y B e f o r e the War - London - J.Murray - 1916. An expanded l e c t u r e d e l i v e r e d b e f o r e the R o y a l H i s t o r i c a l S o c i e t y i n J a n u a r y 1915. Hot based on docu- ments. Anti-German. Hot v e r y v a l u a b l e . 29. T.Rhodes - The R e a l von Kuhlmann - London - H o e l Douglas 1925. A d e f e n c e o f Kuhlmann and h i s p o l i c i e s . Many of h i s s t a t e m e n t s c h a l l e n g e comment. Of no g r e a t v a l u e . 30. B . E . s c h m i t t - E n g l a n d and Germairy 1740-1914. - P r i n c e t o n P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s - 1916. A t h o u g h t f u l p i e c e of work, based on contemporary e v i d e n c e f r o m newspapers and a r t i c l e s , a l s o f r o m o f f i c i a l p u b l i c a t i o n s a t the time o f the war. R a t h e r anti-German. Some s t a t e m e n t s d i s p r o v e d i n the l i g h t of f u l l e r r e v e l a t - i o n s o f post-war p e r i o d . 31. P.von Schoen - The Memoirs of an Ambassador - London - George A l l e n & Unwin, L t d . - 1922. 220. Hot c o n t r i b u t i n g much new m a t e r i a l on the p e r i o d . G i v e s h i s own o p i n i o n s on the v a r i o u s c r i s e s . Was I n t i m a t e l y - c o n n e c t e d w i t h some o f t h e pre-war e v e n t s . I n c l i n e d t o excuse h i s c o u n t r y as much as p o s s i b l e , a l t h o u g h he does admit h e r g u i l t I n some a c t i o n s , n o t a b l y i n the v i o l a t - i o n o f B e l g i a n n e u t r a l i t y . B r i e f . W i l h e l m I I . - The K a i s e r ' s Memoirs - London - Harper & B r o t h e r s P u b l i s h e r s - 1922. The K a i s e r ' s j u s t i f i c a t i o n of h i m s e l f and h i s c o u n t r y ' s a c t i o n s . Some of the a l l e g a t i o n s c h a l l e n g e d e n i a l . C o l o u r e d b y the w r i t e r ' s p e r s o n a l i t y . W r i t t e n f r o m memory and a f t e r the e v e n t s . I n t e r e s t i n g . Heeds t o be used w i t h g r e a t c a r e . G r a i n s of t r u t h a re d e e p l y h i d d e n . H.W.Wilson - The War G u i l t - London - Sampson, Low, M a r s t o n and Co. L t d . - 1928. A work b a s e d on a s t u d y of documents and memoirs. A t t e m p t s t o be i m p a r t i a l b u t h i s c o n c l u s i o n s a re c o l o u r - ed b y h i s anti-German b i a s and h i s poor o p i n i o n of the L i b e r a l Government. U s e f u l because of h i s p o i n t o f view and the i n g e n i o u s s e l e c t i o n o f m a t e r i a l t o s u p p o r t h i s t h e o r i e s . V e r y d e t a i l e d on the p a r t r e l a t i n g t o the C r i s i s o f 1914. R a t h e r b r i e f on p r e v i o u s e v e n t s . 221, A r t i c l e s , R e v i e w s , and E s s a y s , v l . J . L . B a s h f o r d - G r e a t B r i t a i n and Germany - A C o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h von B i l l o w , the German C h a n c e l l o r - N i n e t e e n t h Cent- u r y - Vol.LVI.No.334. Dec. 1904. I n t e r e s t i n g i n t e r v i e w , contemporary e v i d e n c e . Shows d e s i r e on the p a r t o f some t o promote good r e l a t i o n s be- tween E n g l a n d and Germany. Gives B i l l o w ' s o p i n i o n s on o u t s t a n d i n g p o i n t s o f f r i c t i o n . I n t e n d e d f o r the b e n e f i t o f the p u b l i c. 2. C.A.Beard - The I n s i d e of Germany's War P o l i t i c s - E s s a y s i n I n t e l l e c t u a l H i s t o r y . - New Y o r k - Harper and B r o t h e r s P u b l i s h e r s - 1929, Give s an o u t l i n e of the d o m e s t i c drama as i t appears i n the new German documents. A c o n c i s e d i s c u s s i o n of the s t a t e of a f f a i r s i n the German Government b o t h b e f o r e and d u r i n g the war. He shows the c o n f u s i o n t h a t r e s u l t e d f r o m l a c k o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f o f f i c i a l s , and the i n f l u e n c e o f the H i g h Command. 3. J . D . B i c k f o r d & E.N.-Johnson - The Contemplated Anglo-Germ- an A l l i a n c e 1890-1901. - P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e Q u a r t e r l y - v o l . 4 2 . - March 1927. An e x c e l l e n t a c c o u n t drawn l a r g e l y f r o m German Documents. Shows i n s i g h t i n t o the problem, comments shrewd and p e n e t r a t i n g . Lays blame on German p o l i c y f o r f a i l u r e of n e g o t i a t i o n s . 4. J.Cambon - Billow and the War - F o r e i g n A f f a i r s - v o l . 1 0 . 222. Ho. 5. - A p r i l 1932. J' V e r y good a r t i c l e on B i l l o w ' s Memoirs by a man who knew h i m i n h i s o f f i c i a l c a p a c i t y . J u s t comments on B i l l o w ' s p o l i c y . 5. S.B.Fay - Review of B r i t i s h . Documents on the O r i g i n s o f the W orld War 1898-1914. V o l . 6 . - A m e rican H i s t o r i c a l Review - V o l . X X X V I . H o . l . - Oct. 1930. E x c e l l e n t summary of the main p o i n t s and a good c r i t i c i s m of Crowe's p o i n t o f v iew a t the F o r e i g n O f f i c e 7 . G.deT. G l a z e b r o o k - The End of B r i t i s h I s o l a t i o n - O f f p r i n t f r o m Queen's Q u a r t e r l y C o n c i s e , u s e f u l a r t i c l e . B r i e f summary of d i r e c t i o n of B r i t i s h p o l i c y f r o m 1898-1907, based on documents Cl e a r l y w r i t t e n . 6. S.B.Fay - Review of "The Coming of the War: 1914" b y B . E . S c h m i t t - J o u r n a l of Modern H i s t o r y - V o l . 3 . H o . l . March, 1931. A r e a d a b l e r e v i e w . C r i t i c i s e s some of S c h m i t t ' s c o n c l u s i o n s . G i v e s some u s e f u l p o i n t s f r om the book. 8. G.P.Gooch - B a r o n von H o l s t e i n , the M y s t e r y Man of the German F o r e i g n O f f i c e 1890-1906. - Cambridge H i s t o r i c a l J o u r n a l - v o l . 1 . 1923-5. An i n t e r e s t i n g , comprehensive s u r v e y of H o l s t e i n term of o f f i c e and i t s e f f e c t on Germany. R e v e a l s v e r y w e l l the d e v i o u s underground w o r k i n g s of H o l s t e i n i n f o r e i g n a f f a i r s . 225. 9. G.P.Gooch. - B a r o n von H o l s t e i n - S t u d i e s i n Modern H i s t o r y - London - Longmans Green and Co. - 1931. R e a l l y an enlargement of the p r e v i o u s a r t i c l e , w e l l - w r i t t e n and i n t e r e s t i n g . 10. G.P.Gooch - P r i n c e B i l l o w ' s Memoirs - Contemporary Review - V o l . 1 3 8 . Ho.780. Dec. 1930. A r e v i e w of V o l . 1. of B i l l o w ' s Memoirs. An a b l e p i e c e of c r i t i c i s m , and a good summary of the c o n t e n t s , 11. G.P.Gooch - P r i n c e Billow and the K a i s e r - Contemporary Review - Vol.139.Ho.782. - Feb. 1931. A r e v i e w of V o l . 2 . of the Memoirs. E x c e l l e n t . 12. S.W.Halperin - Review of " S a l i s b u r y und d i e T u r k i s c h e F rage im J a h r e 1895" by Hugo P r e l l e r ; " F i i r s t Billow und E n g l a n d , 1897-1909" by W i l l y B e c k e r : "Die e n g l i s e h e F l o t t e n p o l i t i k v o r dem W e l t k r i e g 1904-1909" by F r i t z u p l e g g e r . - J o u r n a l o f Madern H i s t o r y - v o l . 3 . H o . 1 . - March, 1931. G i v e s an i d e a o f the t h e s e s of the books. U s e f u l comments on the j u s t i c e of the p o i n t s o f view t a k e n i n the books under r e v i e w . 15. J.L.Haramond - Review of B r i t i s h Documents on the O r i g i n s o f the W o r l d War 1898-1914 - V o l . 7 . - Manchester G u a r d i a n Weekly, March 11, 1932. An i l l u m i n a t i n g r e v i e w , w i t h some u s e f u l q u o t a t i o n s f r o m the volume. 1 4 . D . H a r r i s - B i s m a r c k ' s Advance t o E n g l a n d , J a n u a r y 1876. - J o u r n a l o f Modern H i s t o r y - v o l . 3 . N o . 3 , - S e p t . 193.1. V a l u a b l e i n f o r m a t i o n on the advances t o E n g l a n d by B i s - marck. Despatches f r o m L o r d Odo R u s s e l l t o L o r d Derby and r e p l i e s t e l l t h e i r own s t o r y from the E n g l i s h p o i n t o f v i e w , and p r e s e n t w e l l the E n g l i s h a t t i t t i d e and r e - l u c t a n c e t o e n t e r i n t o f o r m a l b i n d i n g a l l i a n c e s . 15. F . H . H e r r i c k - The Abandonment of ' S p l e n d i d I s o l a t i o n ' : B r i t i s h P o l i t i c s and the F o r e i g n O f f i c e a t the c l o s e of the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y - P a c i f i c Coast B r a n c h o f the A m e r i c a n H i s t o r i c a l A s s o c i a t i o n . - 1950. An e n l i g h t e n i n g a r t i c l e on the w o r k i n g s of the F o r e i g n O f f i c e . Shows the i n f l u e n c e o f permanent o f f i c - i a l s , a n d the appointment and system of t r a i n i n g of o f f i c i a l s and d i p l o m a t s . 16. IvI.A.Huttman - B a r o n von H o l s t e i n , the D a r k F o r c e of the German F o r e i g n O f f i c e - E s s a y s i n I n t e l l e c t u a l H i s t o r y - Hew Y o r k - H a r p e r ! & . B r o t h e r s P u b l i s h e r s - 1929 8 A v e r y u s e f u l a r t i c l e on t h i s m y s t e r i o u s c h a r a c t e r . Throws l i g h t on h i s c h a r a c t e r and h i s p o l i c i e s , showing hov/ s t r o n g l y he i n f l u e n c e d the conduct of F o r e i g n A f f a i r s w h i l e he was i n o f f i c e . 17. R.B.IvIowat - Review of B r i t i s h Documents on the O r i g i n s of the W o r l d War, 1898-1914. Vol.6. - E n g l i s h H i s t o r i c a l Review - Vol.XLVI. Ho.183. - J u l y 1931. B r i e f . G i v e s the main t h e s i s o f the volume. 18. R.B.Mowat - Review o f "The Coming of the War, 1914" by B . S . S c h m i t t - E n g l i s h H i s t o r i c a l Review - Vol.XI.VII.Ho. 185 J a n . 1932. 225. S h o r t , h u t s t a t s s the main i d e a o f the hook. 19o A . P a r k e r - Bagdad R a i l w a y N e g o t i a t i o n s - Q u a r t e r l y Review Vol.228.No.453. - October 1917. Good a r t i c l e . .Clear p r e s e n t a t i o n o f the f a c t s . Comments show the a u t h o r t o be under the i n f l u e n c e o f f e e l i n g d u r i n g the war, t h e r e f o r e he i s i n c l i n e d t o see s e l f i s h m o t i v e s b e h i n d German a c t s . Not a l l the s o u r c e s a v a i l a b l e when the a r t i c l e was w r i t t e n . 20. R . J . S o n t a g - B r i t i s h . F o r e i g n P o l i c y , 1898-193.2. - J o u r n a l o f Modern H i s t o r y - V o l ; 2. No.3. - S e p t . 1930. I n t e r e s t i n g i n g i v i n g Sontag's views on B r i t i s h , p o l i c y as r e v e a l e d or l e f t obscure by the B r i t i s h . F o r e i g n Documents. O p i n i o n s c h a l l e n g e comment. 21. H.Temperley -"The Coming of the V/ar, 1914" by B.E.S6nmit Review - F o r e i g n A f f a i r s - Vol.9.No.2. - J a n . 1931. P o i n t s w e l l t a k e n . S c h o l a r l y r e v i e w . 22. Review of B r i t i s h Documents on the O r i g i n s o f the 17 or I d War, 1898-1914, V o l . 7 . - Times L i t e r a r y Supplement,March 10, 1932. U s e f u l q u o t a t i o n s and summary of the main i d e a o f the volume. A p r o - B r i t i s h b i a s i n the r e v i e w e r . 23. A. von T i r p i t z - The German Navy i n the World War - These E v e n t f u l Years - London - E n c y c l o p a e d i a B r i t a n r . i c a C o . L t d . - 1924. 2 v o l s . - Vol.1.p.313-26. Not of much v a l u e . W r i t t e n when the f u l l b i t t e r n e s of the war was a t i t s h e i g h t . Does s e t f o r t h h i s main 226. t h e s i s r e g a r d i n g Germany and E n g l a n d end the n a v a l quest- i o n . Not s t u d i e d or I m p a r t i a l . 24c O.H.V.'edel - A u s t r o - H u n g a r i a n D i p l o m a t i c Documents. 1908- 1914. - J o u r n a l of Modern H i s t o r y - V o l . 3 . H o . l , - M a r c h , 1931, A u s e f u l r e v i e w a r t i c l e . S k e t c h e s and summarizes- the I n f o r m a t i o n r e v e a l e d i n t h i s p u b l i c a t i o n of docximents. Good comments on B e r c h t h o l d and h i s p o l i c y , g i v e s him . c r e d i t f o r p u r s u i n g a c o n t i n u o u s p o l i c y .

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