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UBC Theses and Dissertations

Convention and the intensional concepts Hadley, Robert Francis 1973

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CONVENTION AND THE INTENSIONAL CONCEPTS by ROBERT FRANCIS HADLEY B.A. w i t h High Honors, U n i v e r s i t y  of V i r g i n i a ,  1967  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE  REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY  i n the Department of Philosophy  We a c c e p t  this  t h e s i s as conforming t o t h e  required  THE  standard  UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA A p r i l , 1973  In p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s i n p a r t i a l  f u l f i l m e n t o f the r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r  an advanced degree at the U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a , I agree the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y  that  a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e and s t u d y .  I f u r t h e r agree t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e c o p y i n g o f t h i s  thesis  f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may be g r a n t e d by the Head o f my Department o r by h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .  I t i s u n d e r s t o o d that c o p y i n g o r p u b l i c a t i o n  of t h i s thesis f o r f i n a n c i a l written  g a i n s h a l l not be a l l o w e d w i t h o u t my  permission.  Department o f  Philosophy  The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Columbia Vancouver 8, Canada  i  ABSTRACT  The  c e n t r a l theme of t h i s  t h e s i s i s t h a t our use o f language i s  guided by l i n g u i s t i c c o n v e n t i o n s o r l i n g u i s t i c r u l e s . a r e produced conventions.  S u b s t a n t i a l arguments  t o show t h a t we must suppose language use t o be guided by such F u r t h e r arguments a r e produced  t o show t h a t the t h e o r y t h a t  language use i s c o n v e n t i o n - g u i d e d can e x p l a i n many f a c t s which have n o t y e t received s a t i s f a c t o r y explanations.  Some o f the main e x p l a n a t o r y advantages  of the c o n v e n t i o n - g u i d e d n e s s t h e o r y a r e : 1)  i t e x p l a i n s the a n a l y t i c - s y n t h e t i c  distinction.  2)  i t e n a b l e s us t o s t a t e , w i t h f a i r p r e c i s i o n , e x a c t l y what a concept a n a l y s i s i s , and how i t i s p o s s i b l e f o r people t o use concepts w i t h o u t knowing the a n a l y s i s o f those c o n c e p t s .  3)  i t e x p l a i n s why p e o p l e ' s i n t u i t i o n s about meaning and synonomy agree t o such a l a r g e e x t e n t .  4)  i t e x p l a i n s how l i n g u i s t i c d e s c r i p t i o n s o f e x p e r i e n c e a r e j u s t i f i e d by experience.  5)  i t e x p l a i n s why a l l the o b j e c t s denoted by a g i v e n term o f t e n share some s e t o f p r o p e r t i e s which c a n , f a i r l y e a s i l y , be d e s c r i b e d . One problem which has plagued e a r l i e r t h e o r i e s o f l i n g u i s t i c  con-  v e n t i o n has been the l a c k o f any a c c e p t a b l e p r i n c i p l e o f i n d i v i d u a t i o n f o r linguistic for  rules.  In t h i s  thesis a satisfactory principle of individuation  l i n g u i s t i c rules i s developed.  S i m i l i a r i t i e s a r e noted between the way  computer b e h a v i o u r i s guided by a program and human l i n g u i s t i c b e h a v i o u r i s guided by l i n g u i s t i c r u l e s .  I t i s noted t h a t v e r y p r e c i s e c r i t e r i a  the i d e n t i t y o f computer programs, and these c r i t e r i a i d e n t i t y of l i n g u i s t i c  rules.  exist for  suggest c r i t e r i a  f o r the  ii  Other q u e s t i o n s a)  investigated i n this  thesis are:  Whether Quine i s r i g h t i n t h i n k i n g t h a t a b s o l u t e l y any o f our b e l i e f s might be abandoned i n the f a c e o f e x p e r i e n c e s which c o n f l i c t w i t h an accepted theory.  I t i s c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h i s d o c t r i n e o f Quine's i s  mistaken. b)  Whether the n o t i o n precision.  This  of " l o g i c a l constant"  question  must take the g e n e r a l b u i l d i n g blocks c)  i s answered n e g a t i v e l y .  I t i s shown t h a t we  concepts o f n e c e s s i t y and v a l i d i t y as fundamental  i n intellectual inquiry.  Whether a l l n e c e s s a r y t r u t h s a r e a n a l y t i c . to t h i s question  d)  can be e l u c i d a t e d w i t h any  I t i s shown t h a t the answer  i s to a large extent a r b i t r a r y .  Whether n e c e s s a r y t r u t h s a r e t h e r e s u l t o f l i n g u i s t i c  convention.  Itis  shown t h a t n e c e s s a r y t r u t h s a r e n o t , i n any i n t e r e s t i n g sense, the r e s u l t of  convention.  iii  CONTENTS  Chapter 1  Introduction  1  Chapter 2  General Discussion . . .  7  Chapter 3  Conceptual Revision  Chapter 4  Concept Analysis and the  36  Analytic-Synthetic Distinction Chapter 5  Recalcitrant Experiences  Chapter 6  Analytic Truth and Necessary Truth . . .  Chapter 7  Convention and Necessary Truth  Bibliography Footnote Index  46 .  70 87 103 133 13 5  iv  AC KNOWLED GEMENT  I w i s h t o thank my h i s invaluable suggestions Many of the i d e a s  contained  t h e s i s s u p e r v i s o r , Mr.  and  i n the p r e p a r a t i o n of t h i s  thesis.  h e r e i n r e s u l t e d from our d i s c u s s i o n s .  I would a l s o l i k e f o r t h e i r h e l p f u l suggestions Finally,  criticisms  Jonathan B e n n e t t , f o r  to thank Mr.  Howard J a c k s o n and Mr.  i n the p r e p a r a t i o n of the f i n a l  I would l i k e to thank the Canada  of B r i t i s h Columbia f o r F i n a n c i a l A s s i s t a n c e d u r i n g  draft.  C o u n c i l and the  last  John Stewart  the U n i v e r s i t y  four  years.  Introduction  (a)  "A  rose by any  Shakespeare i s p o i n t i n g words we tic  use.  He  o t h e r name would s m e l l as to a c e r t a i n  i s also  f a c t , namely, how  pointing  In t h i s  to a c e r t a i n n o n - a r b i t r a r y  sweet" depends upon both o f these  line  l i n g u i s t i c a r b i t r a r i n e s s about  a rose s m e l l s .  Quine makes a r e l a t e d  sweet".  The  t r u t h of  the  the  extralinguis-  sentence "Roses s m e l l  factors.  point  when he  says,  " I t i s obvious that t r u t h i n g e n e r a l depends on b o t h language and e x t r a U n g u i s t i c f a c t . The statement 'Brutus k i l l e d C e a s a r ' would be f a l s e i f the world had been d i f f e r e n t i n c e r t a i n ways, but i t would a l s o be f a l s e i f the word ' k i l l e d ' happened r a t h e r to have the sense of 'begat'. Thus one i s tempted t o suppose i n g e n e r a l t h a t the t r u t h of a statement i s somehow a n a l y z a b l e i n t o a l i n g u i s t i c component and a f a c t u a l component." 1  But and  the  root  Quine a l s o  s a y s , "My  present suggestion i s that  i t i s nonsense  of much nonsense, to speak of a l i n g u i s t i c component, and  a  o  f a c t u a l component i n the these two  claims are  remarks are  t r u t h o f any  consistent.  sentence whose t r u t h v a l u e would be (b)  the word  I t i s i n a r e a l sense a r b i t r a r y sense of  'begat', and  happened i n the  Quine  thinks  However, on a c e r t a i n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  obviously inconsistent.  been d i f f e r e n t o r  i n d i v i d u a l statement."  Quine h i m s e l f p r o v i d e s us w i t h a different i f either  (a)  ' k i l l e d ' happened to have the that  his  the word  the  arbitrary  had  sense of  ' k i l l e d ' does not  i t i s i n a r e a l sense not  world  that  have  'begat the  certain  thing  world.  I t i s c l e a r that  the  t r u t h v a l u e of  the  sentence "Brutus  C e a s a r " depends upon an a r b i t r a r y element, i . e . , how  we  use  b i t s of  killed language  2  and a n o n - a r b i t r a r y element,  i . e . , an e x t r a l i n g u i s t i c e v e n t .  This  seems to r e f u t e Quine's c l a i m t h a t i t i s nonsense to speak o f a component and a f a c t u a l component i n the t r u t h of any  certainly  linguistic  individual  statement.  P a r t o f the m o t i v a t i o n f o r Quine's c l a i m i s t h a t he t h i n k s v e r y little  can be s a i d about  affects of  the l i n g u i s t i c component, i . e . , the meaning, which  the t r u t h of a s e n t e n c e .  Empiricism".  However, we  T h i s i s c l e a r l y h i s p o s i t i o n i n "Two  have a l r e a d y s a i d something  component - t h a t i t i s a r b i t r a r y i n a p a r t i c u l a r way. f o l l o w I s h a l l say a l o t more about t h a t the a r b i t r a r i n e s s we In  p a r t I s h a l l be  in  h i s book C o n v e n t i o n .  use o f language (b)  this  have noted  about  l i n g u i s t i c component.  I will  i s a sure s i g n of l i n g u i s t i c  l e a n i n g on an a n a l y s i s of c o n v e n t i o n g i v e n by David Lewis But  I w i l l d e v e l o p and a p p l y the t h e o r y t h a t  i s convention-guided  'possibility',  our  i n ways which Lewis does not c o n s i d e r ,  Some o f these concepts a r e e x p r e s s e d by  In "Two  argue  convention.  In a d d i t i o n to the n o t i o n of l i n g u i s t i c c o n v e n t i o n , t h i s  'necessity', 'thought'.  linguistic  In the c h a p t e r s which  w i l l d e a l w i t h a number o f problems s u r r o u n d i n g the s o - c a l l e d concepts.  the  Dogmas  'meaning',  'analytic ,  'concept', and  1  perhaps  thesis  intensional 'synonomy , 1  'belief  and  Dogmas o f E m p i r i c i s m " Quine d i s c u s s e s problems which  p e r t a i n to the c l a r i f i c a t i o n of these c o n c e p t s . some of h i s main p o i n t s .  I w i l l now  briefly  summarize  L a t e r when i t i s a p p r o p r i a t e , I w i l l d e s c r i b e h i s  arguments i n more d e t a i l . Quine f o c u s e s on the problem ' a n a l y t i c ' and  'synthetic'.  classes.  The  first  unmarried  man  i s married".  He notes  o f c l a r i f y i n g our use o f the terms t h a t a n a l y t i c statements  fall  c l a s s c o n s i s t s of f o r m a l l o g i c a l t r u t h s , e.g.,  into "No  two  3  Quine c h a r a c t e r i z e s a l o g i c a l t r u t h as one  "which remains t r u e  under a l l r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f i t s components o t h e r than  logical  where "a p r i o r i n v e n t o r y of l o g i c a l p a r t i c l e s , c o m p r i s i n g  'no',  'if,  'then',  'and', i s  The  second  "(2)  particles" 'un',  'not',  presupposed."^  c l a s s of a n a l y t i c t r u t h s i s t y p i f i e d  by  No b a c h e l o r i s m a r r i e d .  The c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of such a statement i s t h a t i t can be turned i n t o a l o g i c a l t r u t h by p u t t i n g synonyms f o r synonyms; thus (2) can be turned i n t o (a f o r m a l l o g i c a l t r u t h ) by p u t t i n g 'unmarried man' f o r i t s synonym ' b a c h e l o r ' . " The appeals  problem w i t h t h i s c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of  ' a n a l y t i c ' i s that i t  to the n o t i o n of "synonomy" which, Quine m a i n t a i n s ,  need of c l a r i f i c a t i o n  than a n a l y t i c i t y  " i s no  less i n  itself.  Quine next i n v e s t i g a t e s whether our n o t i o n of "synonomy" can adequately  clarified.  He notes  t h a t we  can s a f e l y i d e n t i f y synonomy w i t h  sameness of meaning, but he q u e s t i o n s whether we of meaning.  In Quine's view we  coextensiveness  of terms (two  to the same o b j e c t s ) . and  He  of sameness  i d e n t i f y sameness of meaning w i t h mere  g e n e r a l terms  o n l y i f they a p p l y  'creature with a heart'  a r e perhaps a l i k e i n e x t e n s i o n , but u n l i k e i n  Quine e v e n t u a l l y c o n c l u d e s , a f t e r r e j e c t i n g v a r i o u s attempts  clarification, clarified  1  can make sense  terms a r e c o e x t e n s i v e i f and  s a y s , "The  'creature with a kidney  meaning".^  cannot  be  and  t h a t our n o t i o n of sameness of meaning cannot is unintelligible.  he c o r r e c t l y notes  be  adequately  This i s a paradoxical r e s u l t ,  given that  t h a t sameness of meaning cannot  e x t e n s i v e n e s s of terms.  F o r on the one hand we  a s s e r t i o n c o n t a i n i n g the e x p r e s s i o n hand he c o n c l u d e s  at  be i d e n t i f i e d w i t h co-  f i n d Quine making a t r u e  ' u n l i k e i n meaning', and  t h a t the e x p r e s s i o n  on the o t h e r  ' u n l i k e i n meaning' does not have a  4  c l e a r use.  This  paradox i s the f o c a l p o i n t o f an a t t a c k by G r i c e and Straw-  son which I w i l l d i s c u s s  i n the f o l l o w i n g  chapter.  One attempted c l a r i f i c a t i o n o f "synonomy" which Quine appeals  t o the n o t i o n  because i t p l a c e s  of a d e f i n i t i o n .  the c a r t b e f o r e  the h o r s e .  we take t o be e x i s t i n g synonomies. of synonomy b e f o r e notion  But t h i s  " c l a r i f i c a t i o n " i s rejected  D e f i n i t i o n s merely r e p o r t what  C e r t a i n l y we must a l r e a d y  we can s e t about r e p o r t i n g a synonomy.  of a d e f i n i t i o n w i l l not help  discusses  us t o understand  have the i d e a  C o n s e q u e n t l y , the  synonomy.  Another attempted c l a r i f i c a t i o n o f "synonomy" which Quine r e j e c t s is  the f o l l o w i n g :  be  interchanged  t r u t h value  "Two e x p r e s s i o n s  Quine t h i n k s , i s t h a t u n l e s s to c o n t a i n modal a d j e c t i v e s  terms w i l l contains  The problem w i t h t h i s  the language under c o n s i d e r a t i o n like  s a l v a v e r i t a t e guarantees synonomy.  al  terms l i k e  So u n l e s s  i s r i c h enough  'necessarily', i t i s just false  that  inter-  Mere c o e x t e n s i v e n e s s o f language (one which  no i n t e n s i o n a l t e r m s ) , and we know t h a t c o e x t e n s i v e  synonomous.  the language under c o n s i d e r a t i o n  terms need n o t  contains  intension-  ' n e c e s s a r i l y ' , the proposed c r i t e r i o n o f synonomy i s j u s t f a l s e .  However, i f we m o d i f y the proposed c r i t e r i o n i n t e r c h a n g e a b i l i t y i n n e c e s s i t y contexts a p p e a l t o the i d e a o f n e c e s s i t y ^ w h i c h as  "clarification",  guarantee i n t e r c h a n g e a b i l i t y i n an e x t e n s i o n a l  be  i f they may  i n a l l s e n t e n c e s i n which they o c c u r w i t h o u t a f f e c t i n g the  o f those s e n t e n c e s . "  changeability  a r e synonomous i f and o n l y  i n such a way t h a t i t r e q u i r e s  as a c o n d i t i o n o f synonomy, then we  i s j u s t as p r o b l e m a t i c a l ,  Quine  thinks,  the i d e a o f synonomy and a n a l y t i c i t y . (Quine o v e r l o o k s  a synonomy c r i t e r i o n which Frege has proposed,  namely, i n t e r c h a n g e a b i l i t y i n b e l i e f c o n t e x t s .  This  i s a serious  f o r the r e a s o n t h a t t h i s c r i t e r i o n has many a d v o c a t e s .  oversight,  I w i l l discuss  this  5  criterion  i n chapter  4.)  By now a p a t t e r n may be seen i n Quine's i n v e s t i g a t i o n of a n a l y t i c i t y and synonomy.  H i s view i s t h a t , w i t h the e x c e p t i o n o f one c l a s s o f  a n a l y t i c s e n t e n c e s , i . e . , the f o r m a l l o g i c a l a n a l y t i c sentence can o n l y be e l u c i d a t e d  t r u t h s , our concept o f an  i n terms o f o t h e r  intensional  c o n c e p t s , which a r e j u s t as u n c l e a r and dubious as a n a l y t i c i t y i t s e l f .  In  a l a t e r c h a p t e r on N e c e s s i t y I w i l l show t h a t even the c l a s s o f f o r m a l logical  t r u t h s , which Quine h o l d s up as a paradigm o f c l a r i t y ,  i d e n t i f i e d i f we presuppose an u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f e i t h e r i n f o r m a l or n e c e s s i t y  can o n l y be validity  ( a l t h o u g h Quine p l a c e s b o t h o f these concepts i n a c l a s s  with  the i n t e n s i o n a l c o n c e p t s which he f i n d s so u n c l e a r ) . (c)  I have, so f a r , summarized o n l y a s m a l l p o r t i o n o f Quine's  However, t h i s b r i e f  summary s u f f i c e s  article.  t o s e t the s t a g e f o r a d i s c u s s i o n o f  G r i c e and Strawson's paper, " I n Defense o f a Dogma", which i s an i n t e r e s t i n g r e p l y t o Quine's paper.  I t u r n now t o d i s c u s s G r i c e and Strawson's paper,  and, i n so d o i n g , t o d i s c u s s f u r t h e r a s p e c t s o f  "Two Dogmas".  6  Chapter  w.V.  1  Quine, From a L o g i c a l  1  P o i n t of View, Cambridge, 1953,  2  I b i d . , p.  3  David L e w i s , C o n v e n t i o n , Cambridge,  4  Quine,  Op.  42.  C i t . , pp.  I b i d . , p.  23.  6  I b i d . , p.  23.  7  I b i d . , p.  21.  5  22-3.  1969.  p.36.  Chapter 2  In t h i s c h a p t e r  I w i l l discuss aspects  Strawson, Jonathan Bennett, and distinction.  of a r t i c l e s w r i t t e n by  H i l a r y Putnam on  I have chosen these a r t i c l e s  Grice  and  the Ana l y t i c - S y n t h e t i c  f o r d i s c u s s i o n because they  b r i n g up many of the i s s u e s which I w i l l d i s c u s s i n l a t e r  chapters.  8  I.  Some Remarks on " I n Defense o f a Dogma"  In t h i s s e c t i o n I w i l l d i s c u s s and  some o f the arguments which  Strawson b r i n g a g a i n s t Quine's "Two Dogmas o f E m p i r i c i s m " .  Grice  It will  become apparent t h a t a l t h o u g h I l a r g e l y agree w i t h G r i c e and Strawson, I think  t h a t t h e i r arguments a r e m a i n l y s u g g e s t i v e  r e f u t e a s o p h i s t i c a t e d Quinean. the  suggestive  and do n o t s u f f i c e t o  I n l a t e r c h a p t e r s I attempt t o f o l l o w up  arguments o f G r i c e and Strawson w i t h more p o w e r f u l c o u n t e r -  Quinean arguments.  But l e t us now c o n s i d e r  some of G r i c e and Strawson's  arguments. 1.  G r i c e and Strawson take Quine t o be d e n y i n g the e x i s t e n c e o f  the a n a l y t i c / s y n t h e t i c d i s t i n c t i o n a l t o g e t h e r . says,  "That t h e r e  i s such a d i s t i n c t i o n  philosophers  t o t h i s view.  i s n a t u r a l s i n c e Quine  t o be drawn a t a l l ,  dogma o f e m p i r i c i s t s , a m e t a p h y s i c a l a r t i c l e strongly object  This  o f faith."''-  They p o i n t o u t t h a t t h e r e  i s an  unempirical  G r i c e and Strawson i s a community o f  who  " a p p l y the term ' a n a l y t i c ' t o more o r l e s s the same c a s e s , w i t h o l d i t from more o r l e s s the same c a s e s , and h e s i t a t e over more o r l e s s the same c a s e s . T h i s agreement extends n o t o n l y to cases w h i c h they have been taught so t o c h a r a c t e r i z e , b u t t o new c a s e s . In s h o r t , ' a n a l y t i c * and ' s y n t h e t i c ' have a more o r l e s s e s t a b l i s h e d p h i l o s o p h i c a l use; and t h i s seems t o suggest t h a t i t i s a b s u r d , even s e n s e l e s s , to say t h a t t h e r e i s no such d i s t i n c t i o n . F o r , i n general, i f a p a i r of c o n t r a s t i n g expressions are h a b i t u a l l y and g e n e r a l l y used i n a p p l i c a t i o n t o the same c a s e s , where these cases do n o t form a c l o s e d l i s t , this i s a s u f f i c i e n t condition f o r s a y i n g that t h e r e a r e k i n d s o f cases t o which the e x p r e s s i o n s a p p l y ; and n o t h i n g more i s needed f o r them to mark a d i s t i n c t i o n . Now Quine admits i n "Two Dogmas" t h a t the a n a l y t i c - s y n t h e t i c d i s t i n c t i o n could expressions  be drawn i n terms o f a n o t h e r d i s t i n c t i o n - t h a t between  which mean the same and e x p r e s s i o n s  which mean d i f f e r e n t t h i n g s ,  9  but he b e l i e v e s t h a t t h i s  l a t t e r d i s t i n c t i o n i s a l s o suspect.  In f a c t he  doubts t h a t we can a t t a c h any meaning to the c l a i m t h a t two e x p r e s s i o n s mean the same, a p a r t from s a y i n g t h a t the two e x p r e s s i o n s a r e c o e x t e n s i v e . position  o f Quine's runs c o u n t e r  t o the v e r y o r d i n a r y b e l i e f  This  t h a t whereas  'oxygen' and 'a gas produced by p l a n t s d u r i n g p h o t o s y n t h e s i s ' may be coextensive,  they c e r t a i n l y  do n o t mean the same.  G r i c e and Strawson p o i n t out t h a t the o r d i n a r y language e x p r e s s i o n 'means the same a s ' has an e s t a b l i s h e d use, j u s t as the p h i l o s o p h e r ' s nical  term  'analytic'  does.  By and l a r g e people agree about which  mean the same, about which mean d i f f e r e n t approximately establish thought  tech-  expressions  t h i n g s , and they h e s i t a t e over  the same group o f e x p r e s s i o n s .  This fact  i s s u f f i c i e n t to  t h a t t h e r e i s some d i s t i n c t i o n between e x p r e s s i o n s which a r e  t o mean the same and e x p r e s s i o n s which do n o t . Furthermore, i t c e r t a i n l y makes sense t o say t h a t term x has a  meaning and t h a t term y has a meaning. infer  From t h i s i t i s q u i t e p l a u s i b l e t o  t h a t i t makes sense t o say t h a t x and y have the same meaning.  So i f  Quine wishes t o deny t h a t t h e r e i s any d i s t i n c t i o n marked by the e x p r e s s i o n s 'means the same' and 'means something d i f f e r e n t ' , And  by Quine's own a d m i s s i o n ,  and non-synonomous e x p r e s s i o n s and  then he i s p r o b a b l y  wrong.  i f t h e r e i s a d i s t i n c t i o n between synonomous t h e r e i s a l s o a d i s t i n c t i o n between  analytic  s y n t h e t i c sentences. In an a r t i c l e e n t i t l e d "Quine on Meaning and E x i s t e n c e " G i l b e r t  Harman o b j e c t s t o the l i n e o f argument I have been d e s c r i b i n g . follows. analytic  The f a c t  He argues as  t h a t many p h i l o s o p h e r s agree about what sentences a r e  and s y n t h e t i c (and about which e x p r e s s i o n s mean the same) does n o t  10  e n t i t l e us the  to i n f e r  t h a t some sentences a c t u a l l y a r e a n a l y t i c , any  f a c t t h a t people once agreed i n t h e i r use  witch'  e n t i t l e s us  of the  terms  'witch'  to i n f e r t h a t some t h i n g s a r e w i t c h e s .  the s e n t e n c e comes to be  claim,  then no  true.  I f no  sentences are a n a l y t i c .  sentence f i t s  and  'non-  In Harman's view,  to c l a i m t h a t a sentence i s a n a l y t i c i s to make an e x p l a n a t o r y how  more than  c l a i m about  this  explanatory  Harman does concede, however,  that  "There i s a d i s t i n c t i o n between t r u t h s t h a t seem to be a n a l y t i c and t r u t h s t h a t seem s y n t h e t i c , and t h a t d i s t i n c t i o n " u n d e r l i e s " g e n e r a l agreement on the use of ' a n a l y t i c ' and ' s y n t h e t i c ' w i t h r e s p e c t to an open c l a s s , " 3  Harman a l s o concedes t h a t there be w i t c h e s and Now r a i s e d any  people who given  serious  do  i s a d i s t i n c t i o n between people who  not.  these c o n c e s s i o n s i t i s d i f f i c u l t problem f o r G r i c e and  the i n t e r e s t i n g p o i n t which G r i c e and t h a t t h e r e must be be a n a l y t i c and describe igating.  regardless  the A-S  of how  to s a y i n g  synthetic.  For  to  Whether i t i s p r o p e r  to  worth i n v e s t -  i s answered there  still  remains  c e r t a i n sentences appear, to l a r g e numbers of do not  so appear.  Also,  i f there  t h a t some s e n t e n c e s appear to be a n a l y t i c , but  sentences r e a l l y a r e a n a l y t i c , then we  must be a b l e  s e n t e n c e s which appear to be a n a l y t i c f a i l able  has  remains; namely,  d i s t i n c t i o n i s a question  this question  p e o p l e , to be a n a l y t i c , w h i l e o t h e r s point  t h a t Harman  Strawson's l i n e of r e a s o n i n g .  Strawson make s t i l l  those which appear to be  the problem of e x p l a i n i n g why  be any  to see  some d i s t i n c t i o n between those sentences which appear  t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n as But  seem to  to say  to be a n a l y t i c .  i n what And  we  i s to no  way should  be  to say what i t i s about seemingly a n a l y t i c sentences which makes them  appear to be a n a l y t i c . need to have a f a i r l y  In o r d e r  to be a b l e  to do both these t h i n g s we  c l e a r account of what would count as an a n a l y t i c  would  11  sentence.  ( J u s t as we can g i v e a f a i r l y c l e a r account of what would count as  a witch.)  I t i s a l s o i n t e r e s t i n g t o note t h a t  say  i n what ways seemingly a n a l y t i c s e n t e n c e s resemble r e a l a n a l y t i c s e n t e n c e s ,  we would a l s o be a b l e  to say what d i s t i n g u i s h e s  a n a l y t i c from those which seem t o be 2. that  synthetic.  ' a n a l y t i c ' has u s u a l l y been d e f i n e d  'synonomy'.  intensional  t h a t Quine has n o t i c e d  i n terms o f a f a m i l y  terms, e.g., ' n e c e s s i t y ' ,  Quine a l s o b e l i e v e s  terms i s c l o s e d  that  the f a m i l y  to u n d e r s t a n d the i n t e n s i o n a l  term,  ' i m p o s s i b i l i t y ' , and  can be f o r m a l l y  intensional defined  C o n s e q u e n t l y , i f one wishes  ' a n a l y t i c ' , one can o n l y  i n t e n s i o n a l terms, which Quine c l a i m s ,  of ( a l l e g e d l y )  of i n t e r d e f i n a b l e  i n s o f a r as no member o f the f a m i l y  except i n terms o f o t h e r members o f the f a m i l y .  'analytic'  sentences which seem t o be  I t was mentioned i n the i n t r o d u c t i o n  interdefinable  as  i f we were i n a p o s i t i o n t o  turn  toother  stand i n as much need o f c l a r i f i c a t i o n  itself.  In t h e i r d e f e n s e o f the a n a l y t i c - s y n t h e t i c d i s t i n c t i o n G r i c e and Strawson a r e w i l l i n g  t o concede, f o r the sake of argument, t h a t  may b e l o n g t o a c l o s e d but  they deny t h a t  belongs to a c l o s e d 'denial',  intelligibility with  of mutually i n t e r d e f i n a b l e  I t may be e q u a l l y  t r u e o f the term  c i r c l e of i n t e r d e f i n a b l e  'truth', that i t  terms, e.g., ' f a l s e ' ,  o f the term ' t r u t h ' (a term which Quine c o n t r a s t s  'analytic').  'statement , 1  ' a s s e r t i o n ' , e t c . , but t h i s does not lead us t o doubt the favorably  G r i c e and Strawson c o n c l u d e t h a t Quine must have some  s p e c i a l reason f o r being suspicious it  i n t e n s i o n a l concepts,  t h i s f a c t c o n s t i t u t e s any r e a s o n f o r d o u b t i n g the i n t e l l i g -  i b i l i t y of 'analytic'.  'fact',  circle  'analytic'  i s allegedly definable  only  of ' a n a l y t i c ' , a p a r t  from the f a c t  i n terms o f i n t e n s i o n a l c o n c e p t s .  that  T h i s con-  12  e l u s i o n i s a s a f e one, g i v e n can  o n l y be e l u c i d a t e d  'analytic' i t s e l f .  t h a t Quine c o n s t a n t l y  i n terms o f n o t i o n s  The q u e s t i o n  terras l i k e ,  'analytic'  which a r e j u s t as u n c l e a r as  a r i s e s , why does Quine t h i n k t h a t the f a m i l y  of i n t e n s i o n a l concepts i s u n c l e a r 'truth' are not.  remarks t h a t  i n some way t h a t e x t e n s i o n a l  concepts  Quine might s a y t h a t he j u s t does n o t understand i n t e n s i o n a l  ' a n a l y t i c ' , 'synonymous'.  Quine t o make, g i v e n  T h i s would be a p a r a d o x i c a l  t h a t he a l s o c l a i m s  that  For i n claiming  t h a t , e.g., ' n e c e s s i t y * and ' i m p o s s i b i l i t y ' a r e i n t e r d e f i n a b l e , he admits t h a t he understands the n o t i o n  really  betray  "Everything  Now does my i n d e c i s i o n over t h i s  I think not.  The t r o u b l e i s n o t w i t h " g r e e n "  4  i f Quine's doubts about the i n t e n s i o n a l f a m i l y o f terms stem  from h i s h e s i t a t i o n over whether t o say " E v e r y t h i n g  green i s extended", and  a r e a n a l y t i c , then h i s doubts a r e i l l founded.  G r i c e and  Strawson p o i n t out t h a t whatever h e s i t a t i o n e x i s t s about s a y i n g t h i n g green i s extended" i s a n a l y t i c a l s o e x i s t s when we r e p l a c e with  'true'.  example  an i n c o m p l e t e u n d e r s t a n d i n g , an i n c o m p l e t e g r a s p , o f the mean-  or"extended" b u t w i t h " a n a l y t i c " . "  r e l a t e d cases,  o f i n t e n s i o n a l terms i s  " I do n o t know whether t h e statement  ings o f " g r e e n " and "extended"?  But  do  way.  Perhaps Quine's d i f f i c u l t y w i t h t h e c i r c l e  green i s extended" i s a n a l y t i c .  tacitly  o f synonomy and t h a t p h i l o s o p h e r s  these terms i n a f a i r l y c l e a r and s y s t e m a t i c  e x p r e s s e d when he s a y s ,  claim f o r  ' a n a l y t i c ' , 'synonymous',  'necessary', and ' i n c o n s i s t e n t ' a r e i n t e r d e f i n a b l e terms.  use  like  that  "Every-  'analytic'  But Quine would n o t c o n c l u d e t h a t o u r concept o f t r u t h i s  h o p e l e s s l y vague j u s t because we cannot always say whether a s e n t e n c e i s true.  G r i c e and Strawson c o n c l u d e t h a t Quine does n o t produce  convincing  13  reasons f o r d o u b t i n g the i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y agree w i t h G r i c e and  Strawson, but  of the  i n t e n s i o n a l concepts.  I  I sympathize w i t h Quine i n s o f a r as  he  seeks a t h e o r e t i c a l l y s a t i s f y i n g account of " a n a l y t i c " . 3.  I t was  mentioned e a r l i e r t h a t G r i c e and  i n t e n s i o n a l terms may al  terms, but  explained  be  formally d e f i n a b l e only  us c o n s i d e r  i n terms of o t h e r  they m a i n t a i n t h a t i n t e n s i o n a l terms can a l s o be  i n non-intensional  to break out  terms.  I f they a r e  intension-  informally  r i g h t , then i t i s p o s s i b l e  Strawson's example of such an i n f o r m a l  They c o n t r a s t  They p o i n t out  two  A.  My  three y e a r o l d c h i l d understands  B.  My  three year old c h i l d  t h a t i f anyone a s s e r t e d  explanation.  Statements which a r e b e w i l d e r i n g  A we  would be v e r y  s k e p t i c a l , but  However, i f someone a s s e r t e d  i n the way  Statements l i k e A a r e d i f f i c u l t  u l t i m a t e l y come to r e s t i s t h a t between not u n d e r s t a n d i n g something; i t would be  would be  B we  t o b e l i e v e , but  would  are i n -  they a r e  d i s t i n c t i o n i n which  b e l i e v i n g something and  r a s h to m a i n t a i n t h a t  be  bewildered.  that B i s bewildering  Strawson c o n c l u d e t h a t "The  does not need c l a r i f i c a t i o n , but  Spinoza.  i s nine years o l d .  unable t o make sense of t h a t person's a s s e r t i o n , we  G r i c e and  Let  sentences:  would understand the a s s e r t i o n .  sistent.  that  of the c i r c l e o f i n t e n s i o n a l terms, i n an i n f o r m a l way. G r i c e and  consistent.  Strawson admit  this  conwe  not  distinction  i t would be absurd to m a i n t a i n t h a t i t does  not e x i s t . Now broken out  someone might o b j e c t  t h a t G r i c e and  o f the c i r c l e of i n t e n s i o n a l terms.  'understand' i s an  i n t e n s i o n a l term.  But  Strawson have not  One  might c l a i m  really  that  i t would be absurd f o r someone to  14  that and  they do not understand what i t i s t o understand something, and Strawson p o i n t out i t would be absurd to m a i n t a i n  e x i s t s between not b e l i e v i n g something and be  f o r a p a r t i c u l a r sentence to be  true.  t h a t no  not u n d e r s t a n d i n g  as  Grice  distinction what i t would  So t h i s o b j e c t i o n does not  seem  to have much f o r c e . Jonathan Bennett r a i s e s a d i f f e r e n t S y n t h e t i c " he "It  p o i n t s out  i s r a i n i n g and  that while  a l s o not  statements t h a t a r e n o r m a l l y  considered  the window a t the sunshine and  t h a t we  In " A n a l y t i c -  i t i s t r u e t h a t a statement l i k e  r a i n i n g " i s bewildering,  are a s s e r t e d i n c e r t a i n s i t u a t i o n s .  shouldn't  objection.  i t i s a l s o true that  s y n t h e t i c a r e b e w i l d e r i n g when they  F o r example, i f a f r i e n d  asserts  (C)  i s s t a r i n g out  (D) " I t i s r a i n i n g so hard  go o u t " h i s remark i s e q u a l l y b e w i l d e r i n g as  cannot d i s t i n g u i s h i n c o n s i s t e n t sentences by  (C).  their  that  you  So i t appears bewildering  property. G r i c e has  tried  t o answer t h i s o b j e c t i o n .  d i s t i n g u i s h the former sentence from the  l a t t e r by  sentence i s p r i m a - f a c i e b e w i l d e r i n g , whereas the i n some c i r c u m s t a n c e s .  its  claims  the f a c t  t h a t we  t h a t the  "a s e n t e n c e ' s b e i n g b e w i l d e r i n g  the problems about meaning which one  "The  only  F o r suppose we o n l y s t o r y we  the  e l u c i d a t e d by some such  t o anyone who  knows the meaning of this raises a l l  wishes to a v o i d .  I t h i n k i t can be shown t h a t Bennett's o b j e c t i o n does not  ment as f o l l o w s :  former  l a t t e r i s bewildering  c o n s t i t u e n t terms even i f t h a t i s a l l he knows",^ and  much f o r c e , however.  may  Bennett r e j e c t s t h i s answer on the grounds t h a t  n o t i o n of " p r i m a - f a c i e bewilderment" can o n l y be n o t i o n as  He  d i s t i n g u i s h the two  cases  have to t e l l about C,  of  have  bewilder-  for i t s assertion  15  to be b e w i l d e r i n g , The  a s s e r t i o n of D,  i s t h a t the e x p r e s s i o n s on  the o t h e r hand, i s b e w i l d e r i n g o n l y i f the  i n D bear t h e i r u s u a l meanings and false.  i n C bear t h e i r u s u a l meanings.  What i s b e w i l d e r i n g  we  i n this  expressions  b e l i e v e i t s a s s e r t e r b e l i e v e s i t to  be  l a t t e r case i s t h a t the a s s e r t e r seems t o  have c o n t r a d i c t o r y b e l i e f s . I t i s t r u e t h a t t h i s way i d e a of a s e n t e n c e b e a r i n g  of drawing the d i s t i n c t i o n a p p e a l s  i t s u s u a l meaning, but o n l y i n a harmless  Whenever a person advances a p h i l o s o p h i c a l t h e o r y assumption t h a t the sentences c o n s t i t u t i n g the ings.  And  whenever we  judge the  ence bears i t s u s u a l meaning.  theory  assume t h a t the  I t can h a r d l y count a g a i n s t my  The  way.  bear t h e i r u s u a l mean-  t r u t h of a s e n t e n c e we  discourse.  the  t h e r e i s a background  way  the n o t i o n of p r i m a - f a c i e bewilderment t h a t i t makes e x p l i c i t an t h a t i s always p r e s e n t  i n any  s e n t e n c e b e f o r e we  t e l l whether i t i s b e w i l d e r i n g does not  can  to  fact  sent-  of c l a r i f y i n g assumption  t h a t we must u n d e r s t a n d a count a g a i n s t  the bewilderment/non-bewilderment d i s t i n c t i o n any more than i t counts a g a i n s t the t r u e / f a l s e d i s t i n c t i o n  t h a t we  must understand a s e n t e n c e b e f o r e we  can  say  that i t i s true. Perhaps t h i s answers Bennett's o b j e c t i o n , but a f e e l i n g s a t i s f a c t i o n may  y e t remain.  i n c o n s i s t e n c y i s adequately an a s s e r t i o n and  One  feels  clarified  not u n d e r s t a n d i n g  by  i s not  in a theoretically  theoretically  say " i t would be  t h a t our concept of i n c o n s i s t e n c y (and deep way.  dis-  concept  of  the d i s t i n c t i o n between not b e l i e v i n g  d i s t i n c t i o n does not need c l a r i f i c a t i o n . "  clarified  t h a t our  an a s s e r t i o n ( o r b e i n g b e w i l d e r e d  a s s e r t i o n ) , because t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n Strawson concede t h i s when they  r e l u c t a n t t o say  of  deep.  by  Grice  r a s h to m a i n t a i n  that  I w i l l argue i n a l a t e r  concept of  and this  chapter  i t s c o u s i n , n e c e s s i t y ) cannot C o n s e q u e n t l y our  an  be formal  16  logical  t r u t h cannot be c l a r i f i e d  so I w i l l a r g u e ) .  i n a t h e o r e t i c a l l y deep way, e i t h e r ( o r  But I a l s o hope t o show t h a t the ana l y t i c - s y n t h e t i c  t i n c t i o n can be c l a r i f i e d  dis-  i n a t h e o r e t i c a l l y s a t i s f y i n g way, even though we  must take the concept o f l o g i c a l t r u t h as one o f our b u i l d i n g b l o c k s . In "Two Dogmas" Quine b r i e f l y d i s c u s s e s the k i n d o f synonomy which r e s u l t s from s t i p u l a t i v e d e f i n i t i o n .  C o n c e r n i n g i t he s a y s , "Here the  d e f i n i e n d u m becomes synonymous w i t h the d e f i n i e n s s i m p l y because c r e a t e d e x p r e s s l y f o r the purpose  i t has been  of b e i n g synonymous w i t h the d e f i n i e n s .  Here we have a r e a l l y t r a n s p a r e n t case o f synonymy c r e a t e d by d e f i n i t i o n ; would t h a t a l l s p e c i e s o f synonymy were as i n t e l l i g i b l e . " ^  An example o f  the k i n d of s t i p u l a t i v e d e f i n i t i o n Quine i s r e f e r r i n g  t o i s the c o n v e n t i o n  of w r i t i n g  t h i s k i n d o f synonymy  'B.A.' f o r b a c h e l o r o f a r t s .  Quine f i n d s  a c c e p t a b l e and i n t e l l i g i b l e , b u t complains  t h a t he cannot make sense o f o t h e r  k i n d s o f synonymy. G r i c e and Strawson  p o i n t o u t t h a t Quine's  position i s like  that of  one who says " I can understand what i t means t o s a y t h a t one t h i n g f i t s  into  a n o t h e r , o r t h a t two t h i n g s f i t t o g e t h e r , i n the case where one was s p e c i a l l y made t o f i t the o t h e r ; but I cannot understand what i t means t o s a y t h i s i n any o t h e r case."8 on t h i s p o i n t .  G r i c e and Strawson  We can o n l y understand  contend  t h a t Quine's  view i s i n c o h e r e n t  s t i p u l a t i v e d e f i n i t i o n because  what i t i s t o f o l l o w a l i n g u i s t i c p r a c t i c e over a p e r i o d o f time.  we know  And i f we  know what i t i s t o f o l l o w a l i n g u i s t i c p r a c t i c e over time, we s h o u l d be a b l e to understand  t h a t the same l i n g u i s t i c p r a c t i c e can govern  d i f f e r e n t words. s t a n d i n g synonymy.  That, a c c o r d i n g t o G r i c e and Strawson,  the use o f two  amounts t o under-  17  I t h i n k G r i c e and more needs to be need to be a b l e  said.  For  Strawson are the  say  to n a t u r a l law.  t h a t the c o e x t e n s i v e n e s s of the e x p r e s s i o n s  'gas  to l i n g u i s t i c  which p l a n t s  regularity.  I f we  ness which i s due not  r i g h t t r a c k h e r e , but much  to d i s t i n g u i s h r e g u l a r i t i e s which are due  a d u l t male' i s due with  the  s o p h i s t i c a t e d Quinean might o b j e c t  custom from r e g u l a r i t i e s which are due we  on  p r a c t i c e , but  release during  a r e not  able  t o c o n v e n t i o n and  conclude that there I w i l l not  i s no  the  how  and  i s due  do  'unmarried 'oxygen'  to a n a t u r a l  d i s t i n c t i o n between  coextensive-  to n a t u r a l law must  we  such d i s t i n c t i o n ?  t r y to answer t h i s q u e s t i o n .  show, i n a l a t e r c h a p t e r ,  F o r example, why  c o e x t e n s i v e n e s s of  t h a t which i s due  we  linguistic  'bachelor'  photosynthesis'  to e x p l a i n the  to  that  we  Rather I w i l l attempt  can draw the r e q u i r e d  distinction.  d o i n g I w i l l say a l o t more about l i n g u i s t i c c o n v e n t i o n s and attempt t o g i v e a much f i r m e r f o u n d a t i o n  In  rules,  t o the p o s i t i o n G r i c e and  to so  and Strawson  sketch. 4. any  G r i c e and  b e l i e f might be  experience. o n l y be  Strawson c h a l l e n g e  sacrificed  i n order  Quine's d o c t r i n e  to keep a t h e o r y  that  absolutely  consistent  with  They contend t h a t some s e n t e n c e s , i . e . , the a n a l y t i c ones,  r e j e c t e d i f a change i n meaning o c c u r s i n the sentence b e i n g  In t h i s way G r i c e and  a n a l y t i c sentences d i f f e r from s y n t h e t i c s e n t e n c e s .  Strawson the  change o f o p i n i o n  r e j e c t i o n of a s y n t h e t i c sentence may  s o l e l y as  to m a t t e r s of f a c t . "  But  can  rejected.  According  reflect  "a  the r e j e c t i o n of  an  a n a l y t i c sentence always r e q u i r e s a meaning change. Once a g a i n , but more needs t o be  I agree w i t h the p o s i t i o n G r i c e and said.  For  Strawson  the s o p h i s t i c a t e d Quinean may  sketch,  contend  that  to  18 we  cannot r e a l l y d i s t i n g u i s h the case where the  r e f l e c t s o n l y a change i n b e l i e f s r e f l e c t s a change i n meaning. meaning change i s what needs In the  from the case where the  He would p r o b a b l y i n s i s t  f o l l o w i n g c h a p t e r I w i l l argue t h a t we  i d e a of a meaning change.  G r i c e and  Strawson when they  rejection also  t h a t the  i d e a of a  clarifying.  meaning change from a change i n b e l i e f s . the  r e j e c t i o n of a sentence  The  Also  conclusion  can  distinguish a  I w i l l attempt to I will  elucidate  reach e n t i r e l y  supports  say,  "The p o i n t of s u b s t a n c e t h a t Quine i s making, by t h i s emphasis on r e v i s a b i l i t y , i s t h a t t h e r e i s no a b s o l u t e n e c e s s i t y about the a d o p t i o n or use of any c o n c e p t u a l scheme whatever, o r , more n a r r o w l y and i n terms t h a t he would r e j e c t , t h a t t h e r e i s no• a n a l y t i c p r o p o s i t i o n such t h a t we must have l i n g u i s t i c forms b e a r i n g j u s t the sense r e q u i r e d to e x p r e s s t h a t p r o p o s i t i o n . But i t i s one t h i n g to admit t h i s , and q u i t e a n o t h e r t h i n g to say t h a t t h e r e a r e no n e c e s s i t i e s w i t h i n any c o n c e p t u a l scheme we adopt or use, o r , more n a r r o w l y a g a i n , t h a t there a r e no l i n g u i s t i c forms which do e x p r e s s a n a l y t i c p r o p o s i t i o n s . "  II.  Some Remarks on  1. of  "Analytic-Synthetic"  R e c a l l the remarks of G r i c e and  ' a n a l y t i c ' and  'synthetic'.  about which s e n t e n c e s to c a l l philosophers very  They p o i n t out  Strawson c o n c e r n i n g  t h a t most p h i l o s o p h e r s  ' a n a l y t i c ' , which to c a l l ' s y n t h e t i c ' and  h e s i t a t e over r o u g h l y  strong evidence f o r saying  the same c a s e s .  this  This  fact  use agree most  constitutes  t h a t these words do mark some d i s t i n c t i o n ,  though, i t i s q u i t e p o s s i b l e t h a t many p h i l o s o p h e r s about the n a t u r e of  the  hold mistaken  beliefs  distinction.  In " A n a l y t i c - S y n t h e t i c " ( r e p r i n t e d i n N e c e s s a r y T r u t h ,  Summer  19  and Woods) Bennett d e s c r i b e s a s o p h i s t i c a t e d Quinean. Quinean h o l d s t h a t  'analytic , 1  The  sophisticated  ' s y n t h e t i c ' and o t h e r i n t e n s i o n a l terms mark  genuine d i s t i n c t i o n s , but he d e s i r e s a Quinean a n a l y s i s of these Bennett o f f e r s such an a n a l y s i s .  In so d o i n g he t r i e s  distinctions.  to e l u c i d a t e  the  Quinean t h e o r y t h a t c e r t a i n b e l i e f s a r e d e e p l y embedded i n our c o n c e p t u a l scheme, w h i l e o t h e r s l i e near the p e r i p h e r y o f our c o n c e p t u a l scheme, and still  o t h e r s l i e somewhere i n between.  embedded" and  "near  Bennett cashes  the p e r i p h e r y " i n t o the more l i t e r a l  i n d i s p e n s i b l e " and " r e l a t i v e l y d i s p e n s i b l e " . i s as  the metaphors " d e e p l y  Roughly  notions of "highly  the p i c t u r e he d e s c r i b e s  follows: "Accepted sentences of the form ( i ) 'The temperature of suchand-such a s t a r i s such-and-such' depend, f o r those who a c c e p t them, on sentences of the form ( i i ) 'Temperature c o r r e l a t e s w i t h l i g h t e m i s s i o n s i n such-and-such ways', and these depend on sentences of the form ( i i i ) 'Temperature c o r r e l a t e s w i t h mercurycolumn r e a d i n g s i n such-and-such ways', and these i n t h e i r t u r n depend on sentences a l o n g the l i n e s o f ( i v ) 'Temperature has t o do w i t h the o b t a i n i n g of such and such s e n s a t i o n s . ' R e j e c t i o n of ( i i ) j e o p a r d i s e s ( i ) and a l l t h a t depends on i t ; r e j e c t i o n of ( i i i ) j e o p a r d i s e s ( i ) and ( i i ) ; r e j e c t i o n o f ( i v ) j e o p a r d i s e s a l l the o t h e r three."*° "When I w i s h to say t h a t one sentence shares a g e n e r a l term w i t h a n o t h e r and has more depending on i t than depends on the o t h e r , I s h a l l say t h a t i t i s l e s s d i s p e n s i b l e than the o t h e r . " H  In  o r d e r of d i s p e n s i b i l i t y  dispensible. first  forms  p a r t o f the grounds f o r a c c e p t i n g the second, but not  least  vice-versa.  i f a l l the sentences s h a r i n g the same g e n e r a l term F  ranked a c c o r d i n g to d i s p e n s i b i l i t y ,  vides  ( i v ) the  A sentence i s l e s s d i s p e n s i b l e than a n o t h e r i f and o n l y i f the  A c c o r d i n g to Bennett, are  ( i ) i s the most d i s p e n s i b l e and  the t e s t f o r Fness which i s used  d i s p e n s i b l e sentences c o n t a i n i n g F, and  the l e a s t d i s p e n s i b l e sentence proi n e s t a b l i s h i n g the t r u t h of more these i n t u r n p r o v i d e the t e s t f o r  Fness which i s used i n e s t a b l i s h i n g even more d i s p e n s i b l e sentences c o n t a i n i n g  20  That f a i r l y a c c u r a t e l y d e s c r i b e s t i o n between h i g h l y i n d i s p e n s i b l e and his  and  f a i r l y d i s p e n s i b l e sentences.  'synthetic' i s this d i s p e n s i b i l i t y d i s t i n c t i o n .  t h a t most people who d i s t i n c t i o n as  use  these words would not  the d i s t i n c t i o n  of t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n . ' s y n t h e t i c ' we  I f we  'highly i n d i s p e n s i b l e According  1  and  allows  to e x p l a i n  theory  I am  to Bennett,  people a c t u a l l y use  to someone who  s k e p t i c a l whether t h i s t h a t one  sentence can  the a c c e p t a n c e of a n o t h e r s e n t e n c e , and  I will  a more s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d c a t e d Quinean h o l d s a special  ignore  this  i s true, since  understand  Bennett's  form p a r t of the  problem a t p r e s e n t ,  the view t h a t a b s o l u t e l y any  c l a s s of o b s e r v a t i o n  s e n t e n c e s ) may  recalcitrant  (with respect  to our  sentence may  be  T h i s view e n t a i l s  we might be w i l l i n g retain  of  distinction  does not  this involves  problem to be d e a l t w i t h .  retained.  nature  'analytic'  theories)  be  ground  the i d e a of  c a l consequence, which ( I s h a l l argue i n a l a t e r c h a p t e r ) i n v o l v e s of n e c e s s i t y .  this  of the c i r c l e of i n t e n s i o n a l terms,  the d i s t i n c t i o n  a p p e a l s to the f a c t  be  dispensibility  to Bennett t h i s r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of the A-S  and  i n t e n s i o n a l terms.  according  I t may  'relatively dispensible'.  the advantage t h a t i t breaks out us  the  by  t h a t i t c o r r e s p o n d s w i t h Bennett's use  has  yet  It i s  have been m i s t a k e n about the  look a t the way  shall find  recognize  they i n t e n d , but,  would o n l y show t h a t most p h i l o s o p h e r s  for  distinc-  view, i n " A n a l y t i c - S y n t h e t i c " t h a t the a c t u a l d i s t i n c t i o n marked  'analytic'  and  Bennett's p i c t u r e of the  logi-  the  idea  however, f o r there  It i s t h i s :  The  sophisti-  sentence ( e x c l u d i n g sacrificed  perhaps  i n the f a c e  e x p e r i e n c e , w h i l e any  is  of  other  t h a t under some c i r c u m s t a n c e s  to s a c r i f i c e the h i g h l y i n d i s p e n s i b l e sentence ( i v ) , and  ( i ) , ( i i ) , and  (iii).  But  i f this  i s so,  then how  can we  say  21  that  ( i v ) c o n s t i t u t e s the grounds  (iii)?  f o r the a c c e p t a n c e of ( i ) , ( i i ) , and  I f ( i v ) i s more i n d i s p e n s i b l e than the o t h e r t h r e e i n the sense  " r e j e c t i o n of ( i v ) j e o p a r d i s e s a l l the o t h e r t h r e e " , then i t i s not to  reject  ( i v ) and y e t r e t a i n a l l the o t h e r t h r e e .  that  possible  Furthermore, i f ( i v )  p r o v i d e s the t e s t f o r temperature i n v i r t u e of which a l l the o t h e r t h r e e came t o be e s t a b l i s h e d , i t i s d i f f i c u l t  to see what one would  be  asserting  when one a s s e r t e d any of the o t h e r t h r e e a f t e r h a v i n g r e j e c t e d ( i v ) . The s o p h i s t i c a t e d Quinean, who  wants t o use Bennett's  ity  r a n k i n g t h e o r y , might  the  k i n d o f p o s i t i o n Putnam d e s c r i b e s i n "The A n a l y t i c and the S y n t h e t i c "  when he d i s c u s s e s  t r y t o a v o i d the d i f f i c u l t y  dispensibil-  law-cluster concepts.  A c c o r d i n g to Putnam many of our  concepts a r e d e r i v e d from c l u s t e r s of laws.  F o r example, the word  t u r e ' does not d e r i v e i t s meaning from any s i n g l e whole c l u s t e r o f laws i n which i t a p p e a r s . law whose r e j e c t i o n would  nearly intact.  'tempera-  law, but r a t h e r from a  C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e r e i s no  d e s t r o y our concept o f temperature.  r e j e c t any p a r t i c u l a r law c o n t a i n i n g b e l i e f s about  I d e s c r i b e by a d o p t i n g  We  could  'temperature' and y e t r e t a i n our o t h e r  temperature, because our concept of temperature would I t might  more i n d i s p e n s i b l e  still  be  single  remain  true t h a t some laws about temperature a r e  than o t h e r s , because  meaning t o 'temperature' than o t h e r s .  some laws might c o n t r i b u t e more I t might a l s o be t r u e t h a t a  c l u s t e r of laws about temperature i s more i n d i s p e n s i b l e b e l i e f s about temperature, w h i l e no s i n g l e  single  than a l l our o t h e r  law i s a b s o l u t e l y  indispensible.  Thus Putnam's view seems t o be c o m p a t i b l e w i t h the k i n d o f r a n k i n g o f d i s p e n s i b i l i t y which Bennett Unfortunately, will  describes.  f o r the s o p h i s t i c a t e d Quinean,  this  modification  not s u f f i c e . F o r w h i l e i t may, be t r u e t h a t the r e j e c t i o n of  particular  22  laws about temperature does n o t s i g n i f i c a n t l y a l t e r our concept ture, i t w i l l s t i l l rejection  be t r u e (assuming a d i s p e n s i b i l i t y  of the whole c l u s t e r  of tempera-  r a n k i n g ) t h a t the  o f h i g h l e v e l laws about temperature  d i s e s o u r low l e v e l b e l i e f s about temperature,  and so i t w i l l  s t i l l be  true t h a t we cannot s i m u l t a n e o u s l y r e j e c t a l l o u r h i g h l e v e l b e l i e f s temperature and r e t a i n  our low l e v e l b e l i e f s  intact.  i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y between h o l d i n g t h a t some b e l i e f s  jeopar-  about  There i s a b a s i c  c o n s t i t u t e grounds f o r  o t h e r b e l i e f s , and a l s o h o l d i n g t h a t any b e l i e f may be r e j e c t e d w h i l e any other b e l i e f An holds  i s retained. interesting  p o i n t i s emerging h e r e .  t h a t each o f our b e l i e f s  Namely t h a t anyone who  i s open t o r e j e c t i o n  w h i l e any o t h e r  belief  may be r e t a i n e d i s g o i n g t o have an i m p o s s i b l e time making sense o f the i d e a t h a t one b e l i e f any  c o n s t i t u t e s the grounds f o r a c c e p t i n g another  belief.  If  c o n c l u s i o n can always be r e j e c t e d w h i l e any s e t of premises can be  r e t a i n e d , then what sense can we make of l o g i c - n o t j u s t but any l o g i c ?  traditional  logic,  I t w i l l n o t h e l p t o say t h a t a premise p l o g i c a l l y e n t a i l s a  conclusion q provided r e j e c t i o n  o f q and r e t e n t i o n o f p would e n t a i l an  enormously c o m p l i c a t e d  i n the remainder o f our b e l i e f s ,  the v e r y concept The Bennett,  revision  fori t is  o f e n t a i l m e n t which i s i n q u e s t i o n .  upshot o f a l l t h i s  wants t o r e t a i n  i s t h a t i f the s o p h i s t i c a t e d Quinean, o r  his dispensibility  r a n k i n g t h e o r y , he must  reject  the Quinean d o c t r i n e t h a t any b e l i e f can be r e j e c t e d w h i l e any o t h e r is  retained.  T h i s would e l i m i n a t e one problem f o r the d i s p e n s i b i l i t y  t h e o r y , b u t o t h e r problems remain. t h a t on t h i s  t h e o r y some b e l i e f s  F o r example, t h e r e i s s t i l l  belief ranking  the problem  a r e l o g i c a l l y dependent upon o t h e r s , and  23  t h i s may w e l l i n v o l v e the i n t e n s i o n a l n o t i o n of n e c e s s i t y .  Other  problems  a r i s e from Bennett's view that the l e a s t d i s p e n s i b l e sentence p r o v i d e s the t e s t f o r Fness which i s used i n e s t a b l i s h i n g the t r u t h of more d i s p e n s i b l e sentences c o n t a i n i n g F , and these i n t u r n p r o v i d e the t e s t f o r Fness which 12 is  used i n e s t a b l i s h i n g even more d i s p e n s i b l e sentences c o n t a i n i n g F .  There i s a problem about d e c i d i n g which sentences p r o v i d e the t e s t f o r Fness.  And t o a Quinean  the view t h a t a d e f i n i t e c l a s s o f sentences p r o v i d e s  the t e s t f o r Fness may appear j u s t as much a dogma as the view t h a t the c o n v e n t i o n s g u i d i n g our use o f 'F' a r e e x a c t , o r t h a t defined.  In any case i t seems c l e a r  'F' can be p r e c i s e l y  t h a t a l o t more needs  t o be s a i d  about  what i t i s f o r a c l a s s of sentences t o p r o v i d e the t e s t f o r F n e s s . I w i l l discuss  this issue at length ( i n a s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t  form)  when I d i s c u s s the q u e s t i o n o f how c o n v e n t i o n s guide the use of p a r t i c u l a r words, why t h e r e must be such c o n v e n t i o n s , and how we c a n d i s t i n g u i s h c o n v e n t i o n s from r e g u l a r i t i e s . n e c e s s i t y , must a w a i t a l a t e r 2.  But t h i s d i s c u s s i o n , l i k e  the d i s c u s s i o n o f  chapter.  I n " A n a l y t i c - S y n t h e t i c " Bennett argues f o r the view t h a t "any  a n a l y t i c sentence may become f a l s e  through a meaning change which i s brought 1o  about by the o c c u r r e n c e o f r e c a l c i t r a n t e x p e r i e n c e s . "  This accords with  the p o s i t i o n G r i c e and Strawson adopt i n "Defense o f a Dogma", but whereas G r i c e and Strawson s t r e s s  the f a c t t h a t an a n a l y t i c sentence cannot become  f a l s e u n l e s s a meaning change o c c u r s , Bennett s t r e s s e s  the f a c t t h a t an  a n a l y t i c sentence c a n become f a l s e _ i f a meaning change o c c u r s . Now Bennett's c l a i m may n o t seem v e r y c o n t r o v e r s i a l .  Almost  everyone concedes t h a t the t r u t h v a l u e o f a s e n t e n c e i s p a r t l y a f u n c t i o n  24  of  the meaning o f the sentence, and t h e r e i s n o t h i n g God-given  meaning o f a s e n t e n c e ;  about the  i t can change i f people's l i n g u i s t i c h a b i t s  What i s c o n t r o v e r s i a l about Bennett's c l a i m , however, i s the i d e a  change.  that a  meaning change can be brought about by the o c c u r r e n c e o f r e c a l c i t r a n t experiences.  Bennett b r i e f l y d e s c r i b e s  how t h i s might happen.  He s a y s ,  " A s s o c i a t e d w i t h any a n a l y t i c sentence t h e r e i s a range o f synt h e t i c sentences s t a t i n g f a c t s about the w o r l d i n v i r t u e of which i t i s c o n v e n i e n t t h a t the words i n the a n a l y t i c sentence s h o u l d have the meanings they do have; suppose a f a l s i f i c a t i o n o f a j u d i c i o u s l y s e l e c t e d s u b - s e t of these s y n t h e t i c s e n t e n c e s , and you a r e w e l l on the way t o d e s c r i b i n g a s t a t e o f a f f a i r s which i n v i t e s the f a l s i f i c a t i o n o f the a n a l y t i c s e n t e n c e . " ^ 1  Now t h e r e i s a c e r t a i n m i s l e a d i n g n e s s when Bennett says "you a r e w e l l on the way t o d e s c r i b i n g a s t a t e o f a f f a i r s which i n v i t e s the f a l s i f i c a t i o n o f the a n a l y t i c s e n t e n c e . "  F o r t h i s might  easily  t h a t t h e r e i s some s t a t e o f a f f a i r s which f a l s i f i e s which,  i n t u r n , would l e a d us t o i n f e r  something  l e a d us t o b e l i e v e  the a n a l y t i c s e n t e n c e ,  t h a t an a n a l y t i c sentence can a s s e r t  false. But t h i s i s n o t i n f a c t Bennett's view.  t h a t a change i n our f a c t u a l b e l i e f s  Rather Bennett i s c l a i m i n g  can make i t c o n v e n i e n t t o change the  meaning o f an a n a l y t i c sentence i n such a way t h a t the sentence ceases t o be a n a l y t i c , and ceases t o be t r u e .  Of c o u r s e , Bennett b e l i e v e s  time a sentence i s a n a l y t i c i t i s t r u e .  t h a t a t the  T h i s , however, makes i t somewhat  m i s l e a d i n g f o r Bennett t o c l a i m t h a t we may r e j e c t our b e l i e f i n any a n a l y t i c sentence.  F o r i t i s s t r a n g e t o say, a t T , t h a t we have r e j e c t e d o u r b e l i e f 2  i n S, when we s t i l l some b e l i e f s  b e l i e v e t h a t S was t r u e a t T^.  c o n c e r n i n g those " f a c t s about  We may have r e j e c t e d  the w o r l d i n v i r t u e o f which i t  i s c o n v e n i e n t t h a t the words ( i n S) have the meaning they do have", b u t  25  those  b e l i e f s are d i s t i n c t  from the b e l i e f expressed  by S a t T^.  In  general,  a sentence, S, does not make an a s s e r t i o n about the f a c t s which make i t convenient  f o r S to have the meaning i t has.  C o n s e q u e n t l y , i f an a n a l y t i c  sentence changes meaning because some of these m e a n i n g - r e l a t e d been f a l s i f i e d ,  t h a t does not c o n s t i t u t e a reason  formerly associated with The  the a n a l y t i c sentence has  r e a d e r may  have n o t i c e d the use  the p r e c e d i n g " d i s c u s s i o n . he  i n g ) expressed expressed form "S^  which c o u l d  of a n a l y t i c s e n t e n c e s .  a n a l y s i s of t h i s  at  Bennett i n t r o d u c e s  t a l k s about c i r c u m s t a n c e s  t r u t h value  belief  falsified.  i f and  2  t h i s i n t e n s i o n a l language when to change the meaning  However, he o f f e r s a  only i f  says,  "The  only i f S  n  an a p p r o p r i a t e  and  non-intensional p r o p o s i t i o n (mean-  s e t of sentences of  2  So  that a h i t h e r t o a n a l y t i c  o n l y i f i t comes to express a d i f f e r e n t p r o p o s i t i o n  i t formerly the success  expressed."^ of t h i s n o n - i n t e n s i o n a l a n a l y s i s of meaning change  depends upon the i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y of Bennett's " d i s p e n s i b i l i t y "  ranking  theory.  this  But we  the  i s t r u e " which a r e h i g h l y i n d i s p e n s i b l e  t\ a r e not h i g h l y i n d i s p e n s i b l e a t t .  sentence can be denied  and  in  by S^ a t t ^ i s d i f f e r e n t from the p r o p o s i t i o n (meaning)  i s t r u e i f and  Now  been  that the  have  of i n t e n s i o n a l t e r m i n o l o g y  l e a d us  i n t e n s i o n a l language when he  by S\ a t t  from the one  f o r saying  beliefs  have a l r e a d y seen t h a t t h e r e a r e problems w i t h  a l o t more needs to be  s a i d about i t . C o n s e q u e n t l y , a l t h o u g h  theory,  I agree  w i t h Bennett t h a t an a n a l y t i c sentence can o n l y be  r e j e c t e d i f i t s meaning  and  demonstrated t h i s  t r u t h v a l u e a r e changed, I do not  or c l e a r l y e x p l a i n e d  t h i n k he has  i t i n non-intensional  language.  thesis,  26  3.  I n the l a s t  s e c t i o n o f " A n a l y t i c - S y n t h e t i c " Bennett  p o s s i b l e c o n f l i c t s between Quine's b e l i e f s  that  discusses  (a) c e r t a i n e x p e r i e n c e s ( t h e  r e c a l c i t r a n t ones) can f o r c e us t o make some r e v i s i o n i n our t o t a l network of b e l i e f s , and (b) t h a t when we r e v i s e our t o t a l s e t of b e l i e f s  i n the f a c e  of a r e c a l c i t r a n t e x p e r i e n c e a b s o l u t e l y any b e l i e f i s a p o s s i b l e  candidate  for revision.  I do not i n t e n d  i n any d e t a i l ,  p a r t i a l l y because Bennett now r e j e c t s the arguments  therein. it  to discuss  this  p o r t i o n of Bennett's  paper contained  But I do w i s h t o c a l l a t t e n t i o n to one o f h i s arguments, because  r e l a t e s t o a n o t h e r argument which I w i l l examine i n a l a t e r  chapter.  Bennett shows t h a t i f Quine i s to r e t a i n (b) then he must h o l d t h a t our t o t a l s e t of b e l i e f s set of b e l i e f s  is finite,  trant with respect the  existence  i f our  and i f some e x p e r i e n c e o c c u r s which i s r e c a l c i -  t o those b e l i e f s ,  then we cannot s i m u l t a n e o u s l y  t r u e , and so " t h e r e  affirm o f a l l the  i s a sentence ( a l b e i t a l o n g one) which  i n i s o l a t i o n , strongly disconfirmed  t h a t Quine might escape t h i s c o n c l u s i o n beliefs  He argues as f o l l o w s :  o f the r e c a l c i t r a n t e x p e r i e n c e and the c o n j u n c t i o n  s e n t e n c e s we c a l l is,  is infinite.  by e x p e r i e n c e . " ^ 1  Bennett suggests  by s u p p o s i n g t h a t o u r t o t a l s e t o f  i s i n f i n i t e , and Bennett goes on t o i n v e s t i g a t e t h i s p o s s i b l e move  on Quine 's p a r t . Rather than d i s c u s s however, I suggest t h a t  the complex arguments which Bennett  the i s s u e whether o u r t h e o r y  o r f i n i t e number o f sentences i s i r r e l e v a n t . or i n f i n i t e  c o n s i s t s o f an i n f i n i t e  F o r whether o u r theory  i t i s c l e a r t h a t we cannot s i m u l t a n e o u s l y  is finite  a f f i r m the e x i s t e n c e o f  a r e c a l c i t r a n t e x p e r i e n c e and the t r u t h o f our t o t a l t h e o r y . t h a t a c e r t a i n b e l i e f i s f o r c e d on us by  considers,  And t h i s means  e x p e r i e n c e , (namely the b e l i e f  that  27  some r e v i s i o n i n our t o t a l s e t of b e l i e f s s t r o n g l y d i s c o n f i r m e d by e x p e r i e n c e . w i l l be c o n s i d e r a b l y expanded i n my  III.  i s r e q u i r e d ) and  i t s negation i s  ( T h i s argument i s but a s k e t c h . c h a p t e r on r e c a l c i t r a n t  Some Remarks on Putnam's "The  A n a l y t i c and  experience.)  the S y n t h e t i c "  In t h i s s e c t i o n I w i l l d i s c u s s some a s p e c t s of Putnam's of the A-S  distinction.  Although  I will  In p a r t i c u l a r , h i s d e f i n i -  ' a n a l y t i c ' i s s u g g e s t i v e of a t h e o r y which I l a t e r d e v e l o p .  l e t us now  t h e r e i s no a n a l y t i c - s y n t h e t i c d i s t i n c t i o n a t a l l . which i t would be unreasonable i n any  circumstances.  There a r e  These a r e the statements  that  statements time  which p h i l o s o p h e r s have  There a r e a l s o  which can be r e j e c t e d on the b a s i s of i s o l a t e d experiments.  statements  These a r e  which p h i l o s o p h e r s have c i t e d as paradigm cases of s y n t h e t i c o r  contingent statements. of a n a l y t i c and out)  thesis  f o r anyone to h o l d t o be f a l s e a t any  c i t e d as paradigm cases of a n a l y t i c s t a t e m e n t s .  statements  But  c o n s i d e r Putnam's t h e o r y . A c c o r d i n g to Putnam Quine i s wrong i n h i s l i t e r a l  and  theory  r e j e c t many of Putnam's d o c t r i n e s ,  I t h i n k much of what he says i s v e r y s u g g e s t i v e . t i o n of  It  By and  l a r g e people agree  s y n t h e t i c statements,  and  on what a r e the paradigms  (as G r i c e and  Strawson a l s o p o i n t  "Where t h e r e i s agreement on the use of the e x p r e s s i o n s i n v o l v e d w i t h  r e s p e c t to an open c l a s s , p r e s e n t . S o t i n c t i o n has  t h e r e must n e c e s s a r i l y be some k i n d of  t h e r e i s an A-S  d i s t i n c t i o n , but  the importance  distinction of the  been immensely o v e r e s t i m a t e d because people have f a i l e d  to  dis-  28  realize one.  the f o l l o w i n g p o i n t s :  (a)  The d i s t i n c t i o n i s not an e x h a u s t i v e  Many statements a r e n e i t h e r a n a l y t i c nor s y n t h e t i c ,  p h i l o s o p h e r s have m i s t a k e n l y taken some i m p o r t a n t and to  be a n a l y t i c .  Among these are the statements  and some statements of p h y s i c s . i n a c l a s s w i t h such u t t e r l y unmarried", like  (b)  Most  interesting  o f l o g i c and mathematics,  Having m i s t a k e n l y p l a c e d these  trivial  statements  statements as " A l l b a c h e l o r s a r e  these p h i l o s o p h e r s have assumed t h a t the i n t e r e s t i n g  the t r i v i a l  s t a t e m e n t s , owe  statements  t h e i r t r u t h to l i n g u i s t i c  statements,  convention.  (c)  S i n c e a l l a n a l y t i c statements a r e o b v i o u s l y a n a l y t i c and u t t e r l y  trivial  cannot hope to use  interesting  truths.  the A-S  d i s t i n c t i o n as a t o o l f o r d i s c o v e r i n g  Putnam puts the m a t t e r somewhat as  one  follows:  " ' C h a i r ' may be synonymous w i t h 'movable s e a t f o r one w i t h a back' but t h a t bakes no p h i l o s o p h i c bread and washes no p h i l o s o p h i c windows. I t i s the b e l i e f t h a t t h e r e a r e synonymies o f a deeper n a t u r e -- synonymies and a n a l y t i c i t i e s t h a t cannot be d i s c o v e r e d by the l e x i c o g r a p h e r o r the l i n g u i s t but o n l y by the p h i l o s o p h e r -- t h a t i s i n c o r r e c t . Let (a), For  we  us c o n s i d e r each o f these t h r e e p o i n t s i n t u r n .  have a l r e a d y seen t h a t the A-S  d i s t i n c t i o n has some b o r d e r l i n e c a s e s .  example, the sentence " E v e r y t h i n g green i s extended"  a n a l y t i c o r s y n t h e t i c , but i t i s not c l e a r l y fact  that  the A-S  Concerning  i s not  clearly  t r u e or f a l s e e i t h e r .  The mere  d i s t i n c t i o n i s not e x h a u s t i v e s h o u l d n o t l e a d us to doubt  the  importance of t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n , any more than i t s h o u l d i n the case o f  the  true-false  Concerning ( b ) .  distinction. Putnam h o l d s t h a t statements of mathematics and  i n a c l a s s w i t h h i g h - l e v e l p h y s i c a l laws, t h a t statements n e i t h e r a n a l y t i c nor s y n t h e t i c , and  t h a t any  statement  l o g i c belong  i n this class are  i n this indeterminate  c l a s s can be r e j e c t e d as f a l s e , w i t h o u t a l t e r i n g any of our concepts to a  29  s i g n i f i c a n t extent. logical  A l t h o u g h Putnam never does prove t h a t m a t h e m a t i c a l  and  laws b e l o n g i n t h i s c l a s s of s t a t e m e n t s , h i s reasons f o r h o l d i n g  t h i s view a r e f a i r l y a p p a r e n t .  They stem from h i s t h e o r y about  law-cluster  concepts which I b r i e f l y d e s c r i b e d i n the s e c t i o n on Bennett. Remember t h a t , a c c o r d i n g to Putnam, a l l m a t h e m a t i c a l , and s c i e n t i f i c  logical,  terms d e r i v e t h e i r meaning from whole c l u s t e r s of laws i n which  they o c c u r , and none of these terms d e r i v e t h e i r meaning from s i n g l e For t h i s r e a s o n he t h i n k s  t h a t any s i n g l e m a t h e m a t i c a l , l o g i c a l ,  or p h y s i c a l  law c o u l d be r e j e c t e d , w i t h o u t d e s t r o y i n g the concepts e x p r e s s e d by a p p e a r i n g i n the r e j e c t e d  law.  F o r example, the word  d e r i v e s i t s meaning from c o u n t l e s s i t would  be a r b i t r a r y  logical  laws and  to s i n g l e out any p a r t i c u l a r  t h a t i t c o m p l e t e l y d e f i n e s the meaning o f i n Putnam's o p i n i o n , t o t h i n k t h a t any  'and'.  logical  that since l o g i c a l  terms  'and' appears i n , and  theorems. logical  Consequently,  law and  So i t would  'and'.  claim  be a m i s t a k e ,  law i s " t r u e by  i n the sense t h a t i t f o l l o w s from the d e f i n i t i o n o f  laws.  definition",  Putnam c o n c l u d e s  laws do not h o l d i n v i r t u e of any d e f i n i t i o n , o r s i m p l e  c o n v e n t i o n , they a r e not n e c e s s a r y t r u t h s , and a r e open to r e j e c t i o n . t h i s i s because he i d e n t i f i e s convention". mistaken  "necessary" with "true  by d e f i n i t i o n o r  In l a t e r c h a p t e r s I t r y to show t h a t t h i s  identification is a  one. I t h i n k t h e r e a r e some s e r i o u s problems  of which have a l r e a d y been mentioned Quinean).  Perhaps  They  a r e : (A) Putnam, who  to have an extremely d i f f i c u l t can l o g i c a l l y  i n my  w i t h Putnam's view (some  d i s c u s s i o n of the s o p h i s t i c a t e d  i s a s o p h i s t i c a t e d Quinean,  time making sense of the i d e a  f o l l o w from c e r t a i n p r e m i s e s .  i s going  that a c o n c l u s i o n  F o r s i n c e he h o l d s t h a t  any  30  logical  law ( o r r u l e of i n f e r e n c e )  holding  t h a t , i n p r i n c i p l e , any c o n c l u s i o n  of premises i s r e t a i n e d . p o s s i b l e only  could  be r e j e c t e d , he i s committed t o c o u l d be r e j e c t e d w h i l e any s e t  Of c o u r s e , he w i l l want t o c l a i m t h a t t h i s i s  i f r e v i s i o n s a r e made elsewhere i n our t o t a l system of b e l i e f s .  That i s , he w i l l  c l a i m t h a t the r e j e c t i o n o f a l o g i c a l  law o r l o g i s t i c  l o g i c a l l y e n t a i l s a r e v i s i o n elsewhere i n our s e t o f b e l i e f s . question  a r i s e s , according  law e n t a i l some o t h e r  And n o t e v e r y l o g i c w i l l e n t a i l some  So what happens i f the l o g i c b e i n g  l o g i c which i s supposed to e n t a i l some o t h e r  i s a c e n t r a l requirement.  revision?  other  F o r example, the i s a logic i n  C o n s e q u e n t l y , i f we r e j e c t t h i s  l o g i c a l system, i n c l u d i n g the l o g i c a l requirement o f c o n s i s t e n c y , the m o t i v a t i o n  logic  r e j e c t e d i s the same as the  l o g i c which now m o t i v a t e s us t o make r e v i s i o n s i n o u r theory which c o n s i s t e n c y  logical  Presumably i t i s n o t some second o r d e r  which i s n o t open t o r e j e c t i o n . revision.  But the  t o what l o g i c does the r e j e c t i o n o f a  revision?  system  we r e j e c t  f o r some o t h e r r e v i s i o n .  I think  the r e a s o n Putnam, and Quine, have n o t f a c e d  problem i s t h a t they r e a l l y b e l i e v e t h a t we a r e ,  up t o t h i s  i n some a b s o l u t e  l o g i c a l l y committed t o making some o t h e r  r e v i s i o n when we r e j e c t a  p r i n c i p l e ; and t h i s  with t h e i r b e l i e f  i s j u s t incompatible  way, logical  t h a t any l o g i c a l  p r i n c i p l e can be r e j e c t e d . (B)  Putnam  sufficient terms.  denies  ( i ) that  there  i s any s e t o f l o g i c a l l y n e c e s s a r y and  c o n d i t i o n s which d e f i n e s  He a l s o h o l d s  ( i i ) that  s c i e n t i f i c , m a t h e m a t i c a l , and l o g i c a l  these terms d e r i v e  c l u s t e r o f laws i n which they o c c u r . interpret  ( i i ) i n such a way t h a t  interpret  ( i i ) as the c l a i m t h a t  Now there  t h e i r meaning from the  i s a problem about how t o  ( i i ) i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h ( i ) . We might (iii)  the meaning of l a w - c l u s t e r  terms i s  31 some c o m p l i c a t e d as  f u n c t i o n o f the c l u s t e r o f laws i n which they o c c u r ( o r  the view t h a t the use o f l a w - c l u s t e r  terms i s determined i n some  complicated  way by the way we use the whole c l u s t e r of laws i n which they o c c u r ) .  But  t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f ( i i ) seems to be i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h ( i ) . F o r i f the meaning o f some term, T, i s a f u n c t i o n o f some s e t of laws, L, then f u n c t i o n must be d e s c r i b a b l e . at  least i n principle).  this  ( I assume t h a t whatever e x i s t s can be d e s c r i b e d ,  And i f the meaning f u n c t i o n which r e l a t e s T t o the  s e t o f laws L can be d e s c r i b e d ,  then we can c o n s t r u c t  a d e f i n i t i o n of T i n  terms o f the meaning f u n c t i o n and L as f o l l o w s : The  meaning o f T = f ( L )  There i s a m o d i f i c a t i o n o f Putnam's view ( o r perhaps i t i s m e r e l y a generous i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ) which would a v o i d It i s this:  suppose we admit t h a t the meaning o f s c i e n t i f i c  complicated this  the d i f f i c u l t y  f u n c t i o n o f some c l u s t e r o f p h y s i c a l laws.  just  terms i s a  We a l s o admit  f u n c t i o n i s d e s c r i b a b l e , and t h a t , i n p r i n c i p l e , s c i e n t i f i c  definable. scientific  From t h i s i t might f o l l o w t h a t some g e n e r a l  that  terms a r e  statements  containing  terms a r e " t r u e by d e f i n i t i o n " o r a n a l y t i c , b u t t h i s i s c e r t a i n l y  compatible with h o l d i n g  that  the p a r t i c u l a r laws, which c o n s t i t u t e the  d e f i n i n g c l u s t e r o f laws, a r e always open t o r e j e c t i o n . that a s c i e n t i f i c We a p p l y  term, T, can be d e f i n e d  F o r example, suppose  i n the f o l l o w i n g c o m p l i c a t e d  way:  T t o those cases where most o f the f o l l o w i n g laws a r e  satisfied: Clearly  described.  Lpl^  .... L . n  the r e j e c t i o n o f any one o f the laws  .... L> would n o t b a r us n  from a p p l y i n g  T i n a p a r t i c u l a r c a s e , (though r e j e c t i o n of v e r y many o f these  laws w o u l d ) ,  On the o t h e r  hand, n o t e v e r y statement i n which T o c c u r s can  32  be  r e j e c t e d without destroying Putnam might a c c e p t  he  should  abandon h i s b e l i e f  the concept expressed by T. the m o d i f i c a t i o n j u s t s u g g e s t e d .  I f he does  t h a t t h e r e a r e no deep, o r n o n - t r i v i a l  mies and a n a l y t i c i t i e s f o r p h i l o s o p h e r s  to d i s c o v e r .  synony-  F o r there i s no reason  to b e l i e v e t h a t the meaning f u n c t i o n which r e l a t e s a p a r t i c u l a r l a w - c l u s t e r term to a w h o l e - c l u s t e r  o f laws w i l l u s u a l l y be t r i v i a l o r o b v i o u s .  To say t h a t a p a r t i c u l a r l a w - c l u s t e r term d e r i v e s from some i d e n t i f i a b l e s e t o f laws i s a l r e a d y about the meaning o f the l a w - c l u s t e r term.  i t s meaning  t o say something i n t e r e s t i n g  But t o d e s c r i b e  i n any d e t a i l  the meaning r e l a t i o n s h i p between a p a r t i c u l a r term and some c l u s t e r o f laws should  be a complex and i n t e r e s t i n g t a s k .  I t i s , o f course,  open to Putnam  to deny t h a t t h i s meaning r e l a t i o n s h i p , o r meaning f u n c t i o n , can be d e s c r i b e d i n any d e t a i l , but t h i s would c a s t c o n s i d e r a b l e of Putnam's c l a i m t h a t the l a w - c l u s t e r  doubt on the i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y  terms d e r i v e t h e i r meaning from a  whole c l u s t e r o f laws. D i s c u s s i o n of ( c ) . (c),  By now some reasons have been g i v e n f o r d o u b t i n g  i . e . , the view t h a t a l l a n a l y t i c sentences a r e u t t e r l y  uninteresting.  t r i v i a l and  I do n o t t h i n k Putnam has demonstrated t h a t the t r u t h s o f  mathematics and l o g i c a r e n o n - a n a l y t i c ,  and they a r e f a r from t r i v i a l .  what f o l l o w s I w i l l argue t h a t Putnam's view about the t r i v i a l i t y  In  of a l l  a n a l y t i c sentences i s n o t even c o n s i s t e n t w i t h h i s own f o r m a l d e f i n i t i o n o f 'analytic sentences'.  Here i s Putnam's d e f i n i t i o n :  " ( 1 ) The statement has the form: "Something (Someone) i s an A i f and o n l y i f i t (he, she) i s a B," where A i s a s i n g l e word. (2)The statement holds w i t h o u t e x c e p t i o n , a n d p r o v i d e s us w i t h a c r i t e r i o n f o r something's b e i n g the s o r t o f t h i n g t o which term A a p p l i e s . " C r i t e r i o n i s d e f i n e d as f o l l o w s : "A s t a t e ment o f the form "Something i s an A i f and o n l y i f i t i s a B"  33  p r o v i d e s a c r i t e r i o n f o r something's b e i n g a t h i n g to which the term A a p p l i e s i f people can and do determine whether o r not something i s an A by f i r s t f i n d i n g out whether i t i s a B." Very l i t t l e  r e f l e c t i o n w i l l show t h a t a statement which  a c c o r d i n g to Putnam's c r i t e r i a w i l l be obvious and criterion general,  i n q u e s t i o n i s obvious and to t h i n k t h a t  trivial.  the c r i t e r i o n ,  trivial  o n l y i f the  But t h e r e i s no reason, i n  by which people determine whether some-  t h i n g i s an A, i s a t a l l obvious or t r i v i a l .  In the case o f "Someone i s a  b a c h e l o r i f and o n l y i f he i s an unmarried a d u l t male" i t may that we  is analytic  be  obvious  determine whether someone i s a b a c h e l o r by d e t e r m i n i n g t h a t he i s an  unmarried a d u l t male, but we a p p l y many o f our words w i t h o u t  consciously  knowing what c o n s i d e r a t i o n s determine our a p p l i c a t i o n s of the words. t h i s i s because  the p r o c e d u r e we  c o m p l i c a t e d , and we  f o l l o w when we  a p p l y many words i s v e r y  i n t e r n a l i z e the procedure a t an e a r l y age. F o r example,  p e o p l e can and do determine whether sentences a r e grammatical.  The f a c t  p e o p l e agree t o a g r e a t e x t e n t about which sentences a r e grammatical which a r e not suggests t h a t auditory  t h e r e may  whether a sentence i s grammatical.  T h i s u n c o n s c i o u s p r o c e s s i n g of i n f o r m a -  "Some I s s u e s i n the Theory o f Grammar". o r ungrammatical  He s a y s , " T h i s a c t of seems to be one  g i v e n no i n p u t e x c e p t the sentences themselves. d o i n g t h i s j o b I am  implicitly  i s conven-  'grammatical'.  Oddly enough Putnam argues f o r t h i s view i n an a r t i c l e  sentences as grammatical  and  do b e f o r e d e c i d i n g  o c c u r a c c o r d i n g to a complex d e c i s i o n procedure which  t i o n a l l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the word  that  be some u n c o n s c i o u s p r o c e s s i n g o f  ( o r v i s u a l ) i n f o r m a t i o n which p e o p l e f i r s t  t i o n might  Perhaps  entitled  classifying  I can p e r f o r m  In s h o r t , i t seems t h a t i n  r e l y i n g on something  l i k e an  effective  34  procedure."  In Chapter 4 I w i l l expand t h i s  l i n e o f thought and  produce  f u r t h e r arguments t o show t h a t a l t h o u g h the procedures which guide our of language a r e not o b v i o u s , and need against their existence.  I w i l l argue  (or c o n v e n t i o n s , a t l e a s t ) i f we  to be d i s c o v e r e d , t h i s does not t h a t we must p o s t u l a t e such  a r e to e x p l a i n why  use count  procedures  t h e r e i s widespread  agree-  ment on the use of a word w i t h r e s p e c t t o an open c l a s s . But r e g a r d l e s s of whether my think i t i s c l e a r l y possible  l a t e r arguments a r e s u c c e s s f u l ,  ( a t l e a s t ) t h a t the c r i t e r i o n  ( i n Putnam's  s e n s e ) , which p e o p l e use when they a p p l y c e r t a i n words, i s not always or t r i v i a l , is  and may  be complex and  C l e a r l y a l o t more would need  to e n a b l e us to draw any  For t h i s reason I think i t  ' c r i t e r i a ' and  come to be e s t a b l i s h e d .  this  criteria  to note the s i m i l i a r i t y between Putnam's use  Bennett's c l a i m t h a t c e r t a i n h i g h l y i n d i s p e n s i b l e  p r o v i d e the tes t f o r Fness  to the i d e a  to be s a i d about  f i r m c o n c l u s i o n s on t h i s q u e s t i o n .  (It i s interesting  is  obvious,  s h e e r dogma on Putnam's p a r t t o c l a i m t h a t t h e r e a r e no h i d d e n synonymies  to be d i s c o v e r e d .  of  interesting.  I  i n v i r t u e o f which o t h e r sentences about  I t h i n k b o t h o f these n o t i o n s a r e c l o s e l y  sentences Fness related  t h a t t h e r e a r e c o n v e n t i o n s which guide our use o f language.  l a t t e r idea  t h a t I w i l l pursue i n the c h a p t e r s which f o l l o w . )  It  35  Chapter 2  1  Quine, From a L o g i c a l P o i n t o f View, p. 37. G r i c e and Strawson, " I n Defense o f a Dogma", r e p r i n t e d i n N e c e s s i t y , ed. Sumner and Woods, New York, 1969, p. 143.  3  Lbert Harman, "Quine on 1 G i l b e r t Harman, "Quine on Meaning and E x i s t e n c e " , The Review o f M e t a p h y s i c s , v o l . XXI, 1967, p. 137.  4 Quine, Op. C i t . , p. 32. G r i c e and Strawson, Op. C i t . , p. 152. Jonathan Bennett, " A n a l y t i c - S y n t h e t i c " , r e p r i n t e d i n N e c e s s i t y , p. 175, ^ Quine, Op. C i t . , p. 26. 8 G r i c e and Strawson, Op. C i t . , p. 153. 1  9  I b i d - , P-  0  158.  B e n n e t t , Op. C i t . , p. 164.  11 I b i d . , P. 165. 12 I b i d . , pp.. 165 13 I b i d . , P- 162. 14 I b i d . , P. 163. 15 I b i d . , P. 169. 16 I b i d . , P. 177 17 H i l a r y Putnam, P h i l o s o p h y o f S c i e n c e , I I I , ed. by H. F e i g l e and G. Maxwell, M i n n e a p o l i s , 1962, p. 360. 1  8  1 9  I b i d . , p. 362.  I b i d . , pp. 392-93.  20 Putnam, "Some Issues i n the Theory o f Grammar", P r o c e e d i n g s o f the T w e l f t h Symposium i n A p p l i e d Mathematics, American M a t h e m a t i c a l S o c i e t y , P r o v i d e n c e , 1961, p. 39.  Chapter 3  Conceptual  Revision  37  "Any  statement  enough adjustments  can be h e l d  t r u e come what may, i f we make  elsewhere i n the system.  the p e r i p h e r y can be h e l d  drastic  Even a statement v e r y c l o s e t o  t r u e i n the f a c e o f r e c a l c i t r a n t e x p e r i e n c e by  p l e a d i n g h a l l u c i n a t i o n o r by amending c e r t a i n statements of the k i n d logical  laws.  revision."!  C o n v e r s e l y , by the same token, no statement  called  i s immune t o  I n t h i s passage, and i n i t s a d j a c e n t paragraphs, Quine i s  c l a i m i n g t h a t i n the f a c e of an e x p e r i e n c e which c o n f l i c t s w i t h an a c c e p t e d theory a b s o l u t e l y any sentence might be g i v e n up as f a l s e , changes were made elsewhere i n our system o f b e l i e f s .  provided s u f f i c i e n t  What I w i s h t o show i n  t h i s c h a p t e r i s t h a t some s e n t e n c e s , a t l e a s t , cannot be r e j e c t e d u n l e s s we e i t h e r make a m i s t a k e o r change the meaning o f the s e n t e n c e , a s s e r t i o n made by the s e n t e n c e ) . 1.  ( i . e . change the  My p r o o f i s as f o l l o w s .  I f a s e n t e n c e S a s s e r t s the same t h i n g , o r can g e n e r a l l y be used t o  e x p r e s s the same b e l i e f , a t  as a t  then i f S i s t r u e a t T^, then,  a)  S must be t r u e a t T  b)  the d e n i a l o f S must be f a l s e a t T 2 and  c)  whoever d e n i e s S a t T 2 i s wrong.  2.  I f the s e n t e n c e P which p r e s e n t l y a s s e r t s the law o f Modus Ponens i s  2  and  t r u e , then whoever d e n i e s P, a t any time, i s e i t h e r wrong o r does n o t r e a l l y deny what the s e n t e n c e P p r e s e n t l y 3.  asserts.  The law o f Modus Ponens i s t r u e , and the s e n t e n c e which  presently  a s s e r t s Modus Ponens i s t r u e . 4.  Whoever d e n i e s , a t any f u t u r e time, the s e n t e n c e which we  presently  use t o a s s e r t Modus Ponens i s e i t h e r wrong o r he does n o t deny what we presently  assert.  38  On a c e r t a i n usage o f ' a s s e r t s the same t h i n g ' , premise For example, a t o k e n - r e f l e c t i v e statement different  of e x c e p t i o n s .  such as " I am happy" may have  t r u t h v a l u e s when a s s e r t e d by d i f f e r e n t p e o p l e , o r when a s s e r t e d by  the same person a t d i f f e r e n t of  1 admits  times, even though,  on a c e r t a i n  understanding  ' a s s e r t the same t h i n g ' , I a s s e r t the same t h i n g when I u t t e r " I am happy"  at d i f f e r e n t  times.  However, on my use o f ' a s s e r t s admit  o f these e x c e p t i o n s .  the same t h i n g ' premise  1 does n o t  There i s a s t a n d a r d p h i l o s o p h i c a l usage (which I  am here f o l l o w i n g ) a c c o r d i n g to which i t i s c o r r e c t  t o say t h a t when I a s s e r t  " I am happy" and you a s s e r t " I am happy" we a r e a s s e r t i n g d i f f e r e n t On t h i s usage a m i n i m a l assertion  c o n d i t i o n f o r s a y i n g t h a t two sentences make t h e same  ( o r express the same b e l i e f ) i s t h a t they have the same t r u t h v a l u e . Regarding  premise 3, i f anyone chooses  t o deny premise 3 I do n o t  w i s h t o argue w i t h t h a t p e r s o n , indeed I cannot argue w i t h t h a t The  things.  r e a d e r may wonder whether Quine's  just given,  I think i t i s .  person.  p o s i t i o n i s a f f e c t e d by the argument  F o r I have produced  a case where i t i s c l e a r  t h a t we c o u l d n o t r e j e c t a p a r t i c u l a r sentence w i t h o u t e i t h e r making a m i s t a k e or changing i t s t r u t h v a l u e (and hence i t s meaning and a s s e r t i v e c o n t e n t ) . in  the l a t t e r c a s e , where we r e j e c t S by changing i t s t r u t h v a l u e and i t s  a s s e r t i v e c o n t e n t , i t i s c l e a r t h a t we have n o t r e j e c t e d by S a t T p cannot  s i n c e we s t i l l  reject  a mistake. is  And  b e l i e v e S was t r u e a t T-^.  the a s s e r t i o n made  I t follows  t h a t we  the a s s e r t i o n made by some s e n t e n c e s , e.g., S, w i t h o u t making  But t h i s i s j u s t what Quine d e n i e s when he s a y s , "No  statement  immune t o r e v i s i o n . " Quine might  t r y t o c o u n t e r t h i s argument by i n s i s t i n g t h a t no r e a l  39  d i s t i n c t i o n e x i s t s between (a) cases where r e j e c t i o n o c c u r s because which we and  f o r m e r l y thought to be  t r u e i s d i s c o v e r e d t o have been f a l s e a l l a l o n g ,  (b) cases where r e j e c t i o n o c c u r s because  the t r u t h v a l u e o f a sentence i s  b e i n g changed by changing the meaning of the s e n t e n c e . not work i n the p r e s e n t case because of S has  a sentence  But t h i s  counter w i l l  our e v i d e n c e f o r s a y i n g t h a t the meaning  changed would be t h a t i t s t r u t h v a l u e had changed.  One might  t h a t , i n g e n e r a l , no r e a l d i s t i n c t i o n e x i s t s between s a y i n g t h a t our  claim  opinion  about the t r u t h v a l u e of S has changed and s a y i n g t h a t the t r u t h v a l u e of S has been changed.  But t h i s would e n t a i l the absurd p o s i t i o n t h a t no  real  d i s t i n c t i o n e x i s t s between s a y i n g t h a t a sentence S i s f a l s e a t T-^ and T£, and and f a l s e a t 1^.  saying that S i s true at  I t would a l s o e n t a i l the  p o s i t i o n t h a t no r e a l d i s t i n c t i o n e x i s t s between what we  false  b e l i e v e t o be the  case and what i s the c a s e . As I mentioned account of how  i n the l a s t c h a p t e r , Bennett has o f f e r e d a  to d i s t i n g u i s h cases where we  and has been f a l s e a l l a l o n g , though we t h a t i f S was on Bennett's I f S was  s h o u l d say t h a t S i s now  once thought i t t o be t r u e .  h i g h l y i n d i s p e n s i b l e i n our network of b e l i e f s t h e o r y ) , then we  s h o u l d say t h a t S was  not i n d i s p e n s i b l e i n our network o f b e l i e f s  Bennett's t h e o r y ) , then we once thought i t t o be  Quinean  s h o u l d say t h a t S was  (i.e.  t r u e but now  false He c l a i m s  analytic  is false.  ( i . e . not a n a l y t i c  on  f a l s e a l l a l o n g though  we  true.  F o r reasons which were g i v e n i n the p r e c e d i n g c h a p t e r , I f i n d Bennett's a c c o u n t i n c o m p l e t e .  Consequently,  I would  l i k e another account o f  the d i s t i n c t i o n between sentences which a r e "True then, f a l s e now" ences which a r e " F a l s e a l l a l o n g though we  d i d n ' t know i t " .  and s e n t -  I t h i n k I can  40  provide  a way  t h a t the  of t e l l i n g ,  i n some cases a t  something d i f f e r e n t which i s o b v i o u s l y or -(p'-p) ) , and  than we true  I f S i s not  suppose we  t r u t h I am  now  should  I f S i s now  there are  sentence i s t r u e .  t r u t h value  (and  S as  obviously  present  belief in  o b j e c t has  truth value  The  do  t h a t any  true,  now  then we  not  may  to the n o t i o n of infallible.  obvious  But  I  p r e v e n t us  o b j e c t has  from s a y i n g  changed, any changed.  that  there  the  more than  Any  belief  of  Nevertheless,  s t r o n g a case f o r  of p a r t i c u l a r s e n t e n c e s change as  am  any  is for  it  saying  saying  changes. fact  that i t i s p o s s i b l e  t h a t our most c e r t a i n b e l i e f s may cannot be  of Quine's premises c o u l d be  false.  That does not mean t h a t  used as a premise i n an argument.  same h o l d s  law of Modus Ponens and  true of premises l i k e These might t u r n out  the  to be  f a l s e , but  be  used i n p h i l o s o p h i c a l  they are not w e l l enough known to be  people".  assert,  S.  There i s j u s t as  m i s t a k e n does not mean t h a t these b e l i e f s Any  2+2=4,  t h i s would show  from what we  changed f o r x to y " i s f a l l i b l e . change.  something  are mistaken i n t h i n k i n g that  t h i s should  from s a y i n g  i s obvious t h a t t h i n g s  that anything  false,  a s s e r t i v e c o n t e n t ) of a s e n t e n c e has  p r e v e n t us  the form " T h i s  But  believe  p e o p l e , people e a t b r e a k f a s t ,  p r e s u p p o s i n g t h a t some of our b e l i e f s a r e  given  argument.  used to a s s e r t  S to a s s e r t something d i f f e r e n t  (perhaps) t h a t we  now  say  that future people a s s e r t  someone might t h i n k t h a t i n a p p e a l i n g  It i s possible  the  say  used to a s s e r t something o b v i o u s l y  not.  that  (e.g.  (a)  were m i s t a k e n i n our Now  should  do.  should  f u t u r e people r e g a r d  t h a t f u t u r e people use  it  whether we  p o s s i b l e f u t u r e r e j e c t i o n of some sentence S, which we  would prove us wrong, or whether we  (b)  least,  "There  i n f a c t they w i l l  The  are  not.  This  41  i s n o t dogmatism.  I t i s m e r e l y the r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t i n p h i l o s o p h i c a l d i s c u s -  s i o n we a r e e n t i t l e d are  entitled  to premises.  t o these.  And i f we a r e e n t i t l e d  I t would be m e t h o d o l o g i c a l l y  t o any premises we  absurd  to suspend  judgement about these and t o c o n t i n u e an i n t e l l e c t u a l i n q u i r y . ological absurdity possible the  i s i l l u s t r a t e d by the oddness o f s a y i n g  T h i s method-  " I ti s logically  ( c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the laws o f l o g i c ) t h a t we a r e m i s t a k e n i n t h i n k i n g  laws o f l o g i c a r e t r u e . " In my argument a t the b e g i n n i n g o f t h i s c h a p t e r I say t h a t whoever  d e n i e s the s e n t e n c e , S, w h i c h I now use t o a s s e r t Modus Ponens i s e i t h e r wrong o r does n o t deny what I have been a s s e r t i n g . between these a l t e r n a t i v e s . one  A c t u a l l y we c a n d e c i d e  I t would be much more r e a s o n a b l e to suppose  who denied Modus Ponens was n o t d e n y i n g what we a s s e r t  to suppose such a d e n i a l to be wrong. that people should  This  t r u e as Modus Ponens.  Quine here i m p l i e s  be m i s t a k e n about  This conclusion  to some o f Quine's remarks where he says " P r e - l o g i c a l i t y by bad t r a n s l a t o r s . "  than i t would be  i s because i t i s much more l i k e l y  change meanings than t h a t they s h o u l d  something as o b v i o u s l y  that  i s very  is a trait  t h a t an assumption which  close  injected should  guide us i n the t r a n s l a t i o n o f any h i t h e r t o unknown language i s the assumption t h a t speakers o f the language do n o t h o l d b e l i e f s mistakes.  This  i s n o t because i t i s i m p o s s i b l e  i n v o l v i n g elementary  logical  t h a t any b e i n g s might make  elementary l o g i c a l o r f a c u t a l m i s t a k e s , b u t r a t h e r  t h a t we always have b e t t e r  r e a s o n t o suppose t h a t o u r t r a n s l a t i o n i s wrong than t h a t a l i n g u i s t i c community might make v e r y elementary l o g i c a l m i s t a k e s . What I have s a i d so f a r i s c o m p a t i b l e w i t h a k i n d t i o n which may come c l o s e t o the theory  of Quinean p o s i -  which Quine s k e t c h e s a t the end o f  42  "Two Dogmas o f E m p i r i c i s m " and which i s s t i l l empiricists.  a c c e p t a b l e t o many  ( T h i s p o s i t i o n i s suggested by G r i c e and Strawson).  m o d i f i e d Quinean p o s i t i o n goes l i k e not be t o t a l l y adequate l o g i c a l concepts might  this:  t o cope w i t h d e s c r i b i n g r e a l i t y . be improved  be l i k e n e d  An improved  The  "Our p r e s e n t s e t of concepts may  on, and perhaps  t r u t h may be too c o a r s e f o r d e s c r i b i n g r e a l i t y . might  traditional  Even our p r e s e n t  even our concept o f  Our t o t a l s e t o f concepts  to a g r i d o f squares which we use t o approximate  s e t o f concepts would be more c l o s e l y g r a i n e d ;  a curve.  the g r i d o f  squares would be s m a l l e r and the curve more c l o s e l y approximated.  (For  example, a language which was n o t o f s u b j e c t - p r e d i c a t e form, and which d i d not i n v o l v e s u b j e c t - p r e d i c a t e concepts might ing r e a l i t y  than our p r e s e n t language.)  be a b e t t e r t o o l f o r understand-  I t i s h a r d t o imagine a s e t o f  l o g i c a l concepts which c o u l d enable us t o b e t t e r d e a l w i t h r e a l i t y p r e s e n t ones, might  but f o r a l l we know they c o u l d e x i s t .  j u s t be l i n e a r descendents  the same words.  concepts  o f o u r p r e s e n t c o n c e p t s , and be e x p r e s s e d by  P r o p o s i t i o n s might  the p r o p o s i t i o n s we now e x p r e s s .  And these  than o u r  be e x p r e s s e d which a r e c l o s e l y r e l a t e d t o  These c l o s e l y r e l a t e d  p r o p o s i t i o n s might be  e x p r e s s e d by the same sentences which now e x p r e s s t h e i r c l o s e r e l a t i v e s . example, i n the f u t u r e people might  use the words  what we would express by ' i f p, then p r o b a b l y q . 1  f u n c t i o n a l c o n n e c t i v e s might  true. related  s i n c e i t would n o t f o l l o w t h a t  I t might  1  And the o t h e r  undergo s i m i l a r changes.  the f u t u r e an i n f e r e n c e o f the form " I f p, then q. invalid,  ' i f p, then q  In this  For  to express truth  language o f  p, t h e r e f o r e q" would be  q was t r u e - o n l y t h a t q was p r o b a b l y  be t h a t t h i s p r o b a b i l i s t i c  concept o f ' i f - t h e n ' and i t s  t r u t h - f u n c t i o n a l concepts would e n a b l e us to b e t t e r cope w i t h  reality  43  than our p r e s e n t c o n c e p t s , reason.  and we might adopt these new concepts  We might r e j e c t our o l d c o n c e p t s ,  and " r e j e c t " Modus Ponens i n the  sense t h a t we no l o n g e r used Modus Ponens. Ponens expressed  an i n v a l i d  T h i s would n o t show t h a t Modus  i n f e r e n c e i n our o l d language, or t h a t  who once used Modus Ponens were making a m i s t a k e , more p o w e r f u l developed  o r more e f f i c i e n t  system o f concepts  people  but i t would mean t h a t a and i n f e r e n c e s had been  which was r e p l a c i n g our o l d system." In the above I t r i e d  to s k e t c h a way i n which one c o u l d be s a i d  to r e j e c t o r abandon our p r e s e n t c o n c e p t s . about t h i s s k e t c h .  But t h e r e i s something  T h i s s e t o f new, though r e l a t e d , concepts  supposed t o r e p l a c e our p r e s e n t concepts present  f o r this  peculiar  which a r e  can a l r e a d y be expressed  i n our  language (and t h i s must be t r u e o f any example we can d e s c r i b e ) and  can p e r f e c t l y h a p p i l y c o e x i s t w i t h our p r e s e n t s e t o f c o n c e p t s .  Thus  seems t o be no need f o r our p r e s e n t words t o change meaning, even i n o r d e r t o express  these new c o n c e p t s .  The q u e s t i o n a r i s e s ,  there  slightly,  t h e r e f o r e , how  e x p e r i e n c e might i n f l u e n c e us t o change the meanings o f our p r e s e n t words. Putnam, i n "The A n a l y t i c and the S y n t h e t i c " answers t h i s q u e s t i o n w i t h an example.  H i s example i s r o u g h l y as f o l l o w s :  Suppose t h a t the word  now means "a sane male a d u l t who has n e v e r been m a r r i e d " .  'bachelor'  And suppose a l s o  t h a t a t some f u t u r e time i t i s d i s c o v e r e d t h a t a l l b a c h e l o r s have some neurosis, c a l l another  story).  i t sexual f r u s t r a t i o n .  (A v e r y u n l i k e l y example - but t h a t ' s  As f a r as anyone knows a l l and o n l y b a c h e l o r s s u f f e r  sexual f r u s t r a t i o n .  from  And imagine t h a t everyone a c q u i r e s such a h i g h degree  of p s y c h o l o g i c a l i n s i g h t  t h a t they can t e l l w i t h i n a few minutes  conversation  w i t h a person whether he i s s e x u a l l y f r u s t r a t e d , and hence, whether he i s a  44  bachelor.  A l s o suppose t h a t a whole c l u s t e r o f i n t e r e s t i n g p s y c h o l o g i c a l  laws a r e d i s c o v e r e d about s e x u a l l y f r u s t r a t e d  people.  Now under these  cir-  cumstances some f a c t u a l d i s c o v e r y might l e a d us to change the meaning o f 'bachelor'.  F o r example, i f i t were d i s c o v e r e d t h a t i n r a r e cases  there a r e  b a c h e l o r s who a r e n o t s e x u a l l y f r u s t r a t e d we s h o u l d e i t h e r have t o g i v e up a whole c l u s t e r o f c o m p l e t e l y e l s e change the e x t e n s i o n 'bachelor' r e f e r r e d  g e n e r a l p s y c h o l o g i c a l laws about b a c h e l o r s , o r  (and meaning) o f ' b a c h e l o r ' s l i g h t l y so t h a t  t o a l l and o n l y s e x u a l l y f r u s t r a t e d  people.  Which o f  these a l t e r n a t i v e s we choose w i l l depend upon how i n t e r e s t e d we a r e i n the o l d concept  o f a b a c h e l o r , and how d i f f i c u l t  i t would be t o r e p h r a s e a whole  c l u s t e r o f p s y c h o l o g i c a l laws i n terms o f some new word. i n the o l d concept occurrence,  of a bachelor  (because  marriage  I f we l o s e i n t e r e s t  became an i n f r e q u e n t  f o r example) we might w e l l change the e x t e n s i o n o f the word  ' b a c h e l o r ' t o a l l o w " A l l b a c h e l o r s a r e s e x u a l l y f r u s t r a t e d " and a whole c l u s t e r of p s y c h o l o g i c a l laws t o remain e x c e p t i o n l e s s .  I n t h a t case  b a c h e l o r s a r e unmarried" would come t o have e x c e p t i o n s . not mean t h a t people were f o r m e r l y m i s t a k e n bachelors are unmarried.  the o l d law, " A l l  However, t h i s would  when they a s s e r t e d t h a t a l l  F o r s i n c e the e x t e n s i o n o f the word  ' b a c h e l o r ' would  have changed t h e r e i s no reason f o r the o l d law t o have the same t r u t h v a l u e as the new law.  Some may q u e s t i o n whether we s h o u l d have good reason f o r  s a y i n g t h a t the e x t e n s i o n o f the word this  ' b a c h e l o r ' had changed.  i s t h a t we would have the b e s t p o s s i b l e e v i d e n c e  My answer t o  f o r s a y i n g t h a t the  e x t e n s i o n had changed, namely t h a t " A l l b a c h e l o r s a r e u n m a r r i e d " had changed from a t r u e law t o a g e n e r a l i t y w i t h  exceptions.  45  Chapter 3  Quine, From a L o g i c a l P o i n t of View, p. Quine, The Ways of Paradox, New  43.  York, 1966,  p.  102.  Chapter  Concept A n a l y s i s and  4  the  A-S  Distinction  47  In t h i s c h a p t e r I w i l l  t r y to g i v e a t h e o r e t i c a l b a s i s  analytic-synthetic distinction. what I t h i n k i s a v e r y define  In o r d e r  that I w i l l  u s e f u l k i n d of concept a n a l y s i s , and  first  the  describe  then go on  to  the a n a l y t i c - s y n t h e t i c d i s t i n c t i o n i n terms of t h i s s p e c i a l k i n d  concept a n a l y s i s .  B e f o r e d o i n g e i t h e r of these,  take a look a t some f a m i l i a r n o t i o n s assumed by p h i l o s o p h e r s  that  there  counts as a concept a n a l y s i s , and t h a t we  to do  to  however, I would l i k e  of concept a n a l y s i s .  i s a l a r g e amount of agreement about what about what e x p r e s s i o n s  than t h a t .  disagreement about s p e c i f i c c a s e s ,  to  It i s often  a r e synonymous,  l a c k a t h e o r e t i c a l b a s i s f o r making these d i s t i n c t i o n s .  problem i s more c o m p l i c a t e d  of  and  but  I think  the  There i s i n f a c t a l a r g e amount of that g r e a t l y complicates  any  attempt  to g i v e these d i s t i n c t i o n s a t h e o r e t i c a l b a s i s . Suppose we  temporarily  put a s i d e Quine's doubts about synonomy,  r n e c e s s i t y , and  concept a n a l y s i s .  are n e c e s s a r i l y c o e x t e n s i v e  And  suppose we  concepts.  Would we  agree t h a t "2" a l s o say  that  "\3S"  and  •St""^32" i s an  S. a n a l y s i s of our  concept of  synonymous e x p r e s s i o n s ? willing  to count any  "2"?  And  would we  Some p h i l o s o p h e r s  to j u s t i f y  t h i n k , however, t h a t t h e r e a r e than t h a t between n e c e s s a r y and  '"S32* a r e  Some p h i l o s o p h e r s  w i t h the concept to be  t h a t use  f i n e r and  '2' and  are  s t r u c t u r e o f c o m p l e x i t y as  I do not w i s h to argue w i t h these p h i l o s o p h e r s . i e n t number of p h i l o s o p h e r s  that  would.  d e s c r i p t i o n which has  a n a l y s i s i f i t i s n e c e s s a r i l y coextensive  say  analysed.  Perhaps t h e r e a r e a of  an  suffic-  'concept a n a l y s i s ' .  I  more u s e f u l d i s t i n c t i o n s to be  non-necessary  do  drawn  truths.  S. Some p h i l o s o p h e r s , e x p r e s s e s an a n a l y s i s of our  on  the o t h e r  hand, r e j e c t the  concept of "2",  idea  that  or i s synonymous w i t h  ">|32' '2',  48  because, they say, an e x p r e s s i o n cannot mean a n y t h i n g more than what  people  u s u a l l y mean by i t .  that  I t seems i m p l a u s i b l e to h o l d t h a t when one says  there a r e two b i r d s i n the t r e e , one means t h a t t h e r e a r e the f i f t h 32 b i r d s i n the t r e e .  In g e n e r a l , i t i s c l a i m e d , one cannot mean t h a t x  when a s s e r t i n g y, u n l e s s one b e l i e v e s y o n l y i f one b e l i e v e s x. account one  root of  On t h i s  two e x p r e s s i o n s a r e synonymous o n l y i f they a r e i n t e r c h a n g e a b l e  another  a concept analysed  i n b e l i e f c o n t e x t s , and the e x p r e s s i o n o f the c o r r e c t a n a l y s i s o f  must be i n t e r c h a n g e a b l e w i t h the e x p r e s s i o n o f the concept i n belief The  view j u s t expressed  comes c l o s e t o a v i e w d i s c u s s e d by Benson  "Synonymity".'''  I t would be c o n v e n i e n t  t r u e , because the c r i t e r i o n o f synonymity expressed  correct.  t h e r e i s no reason  once we r e a l i z e  we n o r m a l l y  use.  produce an a n a l y s i s o f o u r concept  i s c l e a r and s i m p l e .  ( F o r example, most p e o p l e  o f "grammatical"  t a s k to produce a c o r r e c t concept  this  Un-  t h a t we r a r e l y know the could not  when asked, n o r c o u l d  e a s i l y r e c o g n i z e i t s a n a l y s i s when p r e s e n t e d w i t h i t .  considerable r e f l e c t i o n  i f t h i s view were  t o b e l i e v e t h a t the proposed c r i t e r i o n i s  T h i s becomes apparent  a n a l y s i s o f concepts  difficult  t o be  contexts.  Mates i n h i s a r t i c l e  fortunately,  with  they  In general, i t i s a  a n a l y s i s , and i t o f t e n r e q u i r e s  t o a s c e r t a i n whether one has a r r i v e d a t the c o r r e c t  result.)  Given  fact,  t h e r e i s no reason  a concept  w i l l be i n t e r c h a n g e a b l e w i t h  in belief  contexts.  t o t h i n k t h a t the a n a l y s i s o f  the e x p r e s s i o n o f the a n a l y s e d  concept  I t might be o b j e c t e d t h a t i n some sense o f 'know' we u n c o n s c i o u s l y know the a n a l y s i s o f a l l the concepts e x i s t s a t a l l (which  I doubt),  we u s e .  But t h i s sense o f know, i f i t  i s n o t g o i n g t o be h e l p f u l i n the p r e s e n t  49  case.  For  i n t h i s sense of  'know' i t i s p o s s i b l e  to know t h a t  unaware t h a t p i s t r u e .  In t h i s sense of know someone c o u l d  and  " I do not  yet  sincerely assert  believe  t h a t p."  So  yet  be  "know" t h a t f a c t that  p  someone  "knows" the a n a l y s i s  of a concept does not  the a n a l y s i s w i l l be  i n t e r c h a n g e a b l e w i t h the analysandum i n b e l i e f c o n t e x t s ,  u n l e s s we we  g i v e us any  the  p and  think  i n f a c t the  argued i n " I n t e n s i o n a l  many words i n , say,  the  t r a n s l a t i n g the a n a l y s i s . means f o r t n i g h t .  For  German e x p r e s s i o n f o r "two a f o r t n i g h t has two  E'.  i s j u s t the  a n a l y s i s , and  only  be  "There  i n t o another  weeks", and  the  language  s i n c e any  i t follows  that  the  the  "John  German t r a n s l a t i o n of  German t r a n s l a t i o n  G.  same t r u t h v a l u e as  G must have the  E' must have the  r e s u l t of r e p l a c i n g  the  C a l l the  t r a n s l a t i o n has  then  'fortnight' into  German t r a n s l a t i o n of  same as  are  s i n g l e German word which  must t r a n s l a t e the word  weeks have p a s s e d " ( E ' ) .  Hence E and  is this:  translated  example, t h e r e i s no  p a s s e d " (E) i s the  sentence b e i n g t r a n s l a t e d b o t h E and  the  I d e n t i t y of B e l i e f  E n g l i s h concept i n t o i t s components, and  C o n s e q u e n t l y , one  Church then c l a i m s t h a t  E'  do  i t s a n a l y s i s a r e always i n t e r -  His argument, b r i e f l y ,  E n g l i s h which can  German, by a n a l y s i n g  "John b e l i e v e s  Isomorphism and  e x p r e s s i o n of a concept and  changeable i n b e l i e f c o n t e x t s .  believes  I  clarity.  Church has  the  problematical.  the move from "synonomy" t o "unconscious b e l i e f s " i s a move i n  d i r e c t i o n of  say,  If  " s u b s t i t u t i v i t y i n b e l i e f contexts"  c r i t e r i o n f o r synonomy becomes h i g h l y m y s t e r i o u s and  that  that  r e s o r t t o t a l k i n g about what a p e r s o n u n c o n s c i o u s l y b e l i e v e s .  move i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n , however, the  not  r e a s o n to t h i n k  same t r u t h v a l u e  same t r u t h v a l u e i n E n g l i s h .  the as But  e x p r e s s i o n of a concept i n E w i t h i t s  i n p r i n c i p l e " f o r t n i g h t " and  "two  weeks" c o u l d  have been  any  50  English expression  and i t s concept a n a l y s i s .  same argument c o u l d its  be g i v e n  to show t h a t  analysis are interchangeable  Therefore,  the e x p r e s s i o n  i n belief  contexts  i n p r i n c i p l e , the o f any c o n c e p t and  salva v e r i t a t e . "  Church's argument can q u i c k l y be shown t o be i n a d e q u a t e . F o r Church g i v e s no r e a s o n t o t h i n k E,  i n t o the German b e l i e f  t h a t the t r a n s l a t i o n o f the E n g l i s h b e l i e f context,  G, must have t h e same t r u t h v a l u e .  sumably he would argue t h a t E and G must have the same t r u t h v a l u e they mean the same. the  same than t h e r e  anyone who t h i n k s  But t h e r e  i s no more r e a s o n f o r s a y i n g  i s f o r saying  context,  t h a t E and E  1  because  t h a t E and G mean  mean the same.  t h a t E and E' have d i f f e r e n t t r u t h v a l u e s  Pre-  Consequently,  will  remain  unmoved by Church's argument, s i n c e such a p e r s o n would e i t h e r deny t h a t E and  E ' mean e x a c t l y  the  same must have the same t r u t h v a l u e .  were "Mary b e l i e v e s theory  i s 0".  as  the t h e o r y  (where  concept o f t r u t h . ) solve  the same, o r would deny t h a t b e l i e f  T h i s would be more o b v i o u s i f E  '0' i s a d e s c r i p t i o n o f the c o r r e c t a n a l y s i s o f o u r  A c t u a l l y , Church's argument i s an u n s u c c e s s f u l  thought t o f o l l o w )  The paradox i s u s u a l l y s t a t e d somewhat  analysed.  From t h i s  i t follows  the same  (or i s usually  t h a t any s e n t e n c e , S, c o n t a i n i n g a p a r t i c u l a r  expression,  the same p r o p o s i t i o n as the s e n t e n c e w h i c h r e s u l t s from s u b s t i t u -  t i n g f o r E i n S the concept a n a l y s i s o f E . a n a l y s i s o f the c o n c e p t e x p r e s s e d by E . 'E = E ' e x p r e s s e s since  attempt t o  I t i s thought t h a t any a n a l y s i s o f a c o n c e p t e x p r e s s e s  c o n c e p t as t h e concept b e i n g  E, e x p r e s s e s  w h i c h mean  i s t r u e " and i f E ' were "Mary b e l i e v e s the  the famous paradox o f a n a l y s i s .  follows:  contexts  Thus, suppose t h a t A i s an  Then i t ought t o be t r u e  the same p r o p o s i t i o n as 'E = A*.  'E = A' e x p r e s s e s a concept a n a l y s i s whereas  that  But t h a t seems a b s u r d , 'E = E' does n o t .  51  Furthermore, t h a t E=A.  i t i s d o u b t f u l t h a t whoever b e l i e v e s  The problem,  then, i s t o r e c o n c i l e  'A' and 'E' e x p r e s s i d e n t i c a l  t h a t E=E a l s o  believes  these f a c t s w i t h the c l a i m  that  concepts.  I w i l l now t r y t o d e s c r i b e a k i n d o f concept a n a l y s i s which (1) can e x p l a i n the paradox  of a n a l y s i s ,  (2) can e x p l a i n why the term e x p r e s s i n g  a concept a p p l i e s i n j u s t those cases i t does a p p l y , and (3) c a n e x p l a i n t o some e x t e n t how we r e c o g n i z e t h a t a term, and the concept i t e x p r e s s e s , a p p l y i n a given s i t u a t i o n .  The k i n d o f concept a n a l y s e s I w i l l d e s c r i b e c o n s t i t u t e s  a s u b c l a s s o f those statements which would be c l a s s e d as concept a n a l y s e s by the account  g i v e n i n terms o f the n e c e s s a r y c o e x t e n s i v e n e s s o f c o n c e p t s , and  w i l l c o n t a i n as a s u b c l a s s those statements  c l a s s e d as a n a l y s e s by the  i n t e r c h a n g e a b i l i t y i n b e l i e f contexts c r i t e r i o n . w i l l be more r e s t r i c t i v e  T h i s means t h a t my  account  than the " n e c e s s a r y c o e x t e n s i v e n e s s " c r i t e r i o n , b u t  n o t as r e s t r i c t i v e as the " i n t e r c h a n g a b i l i t y  i n belief  contexts" c r i t e r i o n .  My account i s g i v e n i n terms o f l i n g u i s t i c c o n v e n t i o n s o r r u l e s . I w i l l argue  t h a t such c o n v e n t i o n s must e x i s t  a p p l y language r e g u l a r i t y that  i f we a r e t o e x p l a i n why we  i n the s i t u a t i o n s we do a p p l y i t , language  exhibits.  and i f we a r e t o e x p l a i n the  Of c o u r s e , t h e r e i s a v e r y obvious  sense  i n which the r e l a t i o n s h i p between a word and i t s d e n o t a t i o n i s c o n v e n t i o n a l . There i s n o t h i n g i n t r i n s i c about do.  the word  ' r a i n ' which makes us use i t as we  We c o u l d j u s t as w e l l have i n t e r c h a n g e d the r o l e s o f the words  'snow' i n our language.  I n what f o l l o w s I w i l l  c o n v e n t i o n a l i t y w i t h the n o t i o n o f a l i n g u i s t i c Now some p h i l o s o p h e r s have -suggested state  t r y t o connect  ' r a i n ' and  t h i s element o f  r u l e and w i t h concept  analysis.  t h a t concept a n a l y s e s ought to  the r u l e s which govern o u r use o f words, and some p h i l o s o p h e r s (Kant,  52  Bennett) have s a i d  t h a t concepts a r e r u l e s , o r s e t s o f r u l e s , f o r a p p l y i n g  words o r c l a s s i f y i n g o b j e c t s , s i t u a t i o n s , e t c . to  physical objects  incomplete, notions  these  r u l e s o r conventions  In the case o f terms a p p l y i n g may be vague o r i m p r e c i s e , o r  but i n the case o f l o g i c a l terms, numbers, and o t h e r a b s t r a c t  such as p h i l o s o p h e r s  a r e prone t o d e a l w i t h ,  the r u l e s may be v e r y  p r e c i s e and e x a c t l y s t a t e a b l e . But  some p h i l o s o p h e r s  have r i d i c u l e d  the i d e a t h a t t h e r e  rules governing  our a p p l i c a t i o n o f words t o s i t u a t i o n s , o r o b j e c t s .  example, c l a i m s  that behavioural  r e g u l a r i t y i s rule-guided  r e g u l a r i t y i s the r e s u l t o f c o n s c i o u s planned.  Ziff  rule-guided.  scorns  o n l y i f the  the i d e a t h a t the r e g u l a r i t y which language e x h i b i t s i s  A t no time d i d people e v e r  s i t down and draw up r u l e s f o r a c e r t a i n end by  language. I want t o grant Z i f f  the p o i n t t h a t l i n g u i s t i c  always, a t l e a s t , t h e r e s u l t o f p l a n n i n g o r c o n s c i o u s t h i s f a c t counts a g a i n s t s a y i n g t h a t l i n g u i s t i c  r e g u l a r i t y i s not  i n t e n t i o n , b u t deny t h a t  regularity i s rule-guided.  maintain  t h a t b e h a v i o u r does n o t have t o be the r e s u l t o f c o n s c i o u s  i n order  t o be r u l e - g u i d e d .  but  Ziff, for  i n t e n t i o n - o n l y i f the r e g u l a r i t y i s  language, and a t no time d i d p e o p l e ever p l a n t o a c h i e v e inventing  unconscious  I  intention  Perhaps r u l e - g u i d e d b e h a v i o u r must be p u r p o s e f u l ,  i t i s a mistake to think that a l l purposeful behaviour i s c o n s c i o u s l y  intended.  Now c e r t a i n l y  communication.  Ziff  l i n g u i s t i c r e g u l a r i t y e x i s t s f o r a purpose, namely,  tries  t o obscure t h i s p o i n t where he ways, "The import-  ance o f communication i s u s u a l l y e x a g g e r a t e d " , examples of l i n g u i s t i c u t t e r a n c e s cate anything.  and he goes on t o produce  which he a l l e d g e s a r e n o t i n t e n d e d  t o communi-  But Z i f f must admit, i f we a r e t o take him s e r i o u s l y , that  most a s s e r t i o n s a r e made f o r the purpose o f communicating something, a t l e a s t .  53  I w i l l assume t h a t most l i n g u i s t i c b e h a v i o u r i s p u r p o s e f u l . Given t h i s premise I t h i n k I can b u i l d a good case f o r s a y i n g t h a t is  rule-guided.  I base t h i s c l a i m on the f a c t  an a n a l y s i s o f r u l e - g u i d e d n e s s  which can e a s i l y be e x t r a p o l a t e d  Lewis' a n a l y s i s of r u l e s i n Convention,^ correct.  i s rule-guided  from  i s roughly  as f o l l o w s :  David  A behav-  i f and o n l y i f (a) P^ i s a v o l u n t a r y  of r e g u l a r i t i e s which a r e performed by members o f a group i n o r d e r some end (e.g. communication) which i s m u t u a l l y t h a t group,  satisfy  and I t h i n k L e w i s ' a n a l y s i s i s  L e w i s ' account o f r u l e - g u i d e d n e s s  iour pattern  t h a t language does  language  system to a c h i e v e  d e s i r e d by a l l members o f  (b) t h a t same end (e.g. communication) c o u l d be a c h i e v e d i f  members o f the group had each chosen t o a c t a c c o r d i n g b e h a v i o u r p a t t e r n , P2, and ( c ) i t m a t t e r s l i t t l e whether they a c t a c c o r d i n g  t o some d i f f e r e n t  t o members of the group  t o P^ o r Pg, but i t m a t t e r s t o each member o f the  group t h a t he/she s h a l l a c t a c c o r d i n g  to whichever o f the two p a t t e r n s most  o t h e r members adopt. Condition  ( c ) i n s u r e s the k i n d o f a r b i t r a r i n e s s o r c o n v e n t i o n a l i t y  required f o r rule-guidedness. largely indifferent  t o what b e h a v i o u r a l  desired r e s u l t occurs. we c a l l  something  Conditions is ing  The i d e a i s t h a t members o f the group a r e p a t t e r n they  I t matters l i t t l e  f o l l o w as l o n g as the  t o any o f us, f o r example, whether  'red' o r 'sned' as l o n g as we succeed i n communication.  a, b, and c a r e a l l met by human languages.  no b a r r i e r  Consequently,  t o s a y i n g t h a t our l i n g u i s t i c b e h a v i o u r i s r u l e - g u i d e d  there (assum-  Lewis' a n a l y s i s i s r i g h t ) . We a r e now i n a p o s i t i o n t o s k e t c h what I t h i n k i s the i n t e r e s t i n g  and  perhaps most u s e f u l c o n c e p t i o n  o f a concept a n a l y s i s .  A c o r r e c t concept  54  a n a l y s i s s t a t e s a s e t o f r u l e s f o r a p p l y i n g words t o o b j e c t s o r s i t u a t i o n s (or f o r d i s t i n g u i s h i n g o b j e c t s and s i t u a t i o n s i n the n o n - l i n g u i s t i c case) (a) which w i l l s e l e c t a l l and o n l y those the concept b e i n g a n a l y s e d , the e x p r e s s i o n s  o b j e c t s or s i t u a t i o n s which  (b) on the b a s i s of which we a c t u a l l y do a p p l y  which e x p r e s s the concept b e i n g a n a l y s e d ,  a c t u a l l y do guide our use o f these  expressions  i . e . , the r u l e s  i n something l i k e  computer's response t o e x t e r n a l s t i m u l i i s guided (In order  satisfy  the way a  by i t s program.  t o be as c l e a r as p o s s i b l e , I would l i k e t o e x p l a i n the  a n a l o g y between r u l e - g u i d e d b e h a v i o u r and computer-programmed b e h a v i o u r . I t is  important  behaviour,  t h a t we have some e x p l a n a t i o n  otherwise  i t w i l l n o t e x p l a i n much t o say t h a t our l i n g u i s t i c  behaviour i s rule-guided. tic  So here i s my e x p l a n a t i o n .  r u l e s c o n s t i t u t e a p a r t i a l program o f our b r a i n s .  occur  On my t h e o r y ,  t o the p a r t i c u l a r  linguis-  T h i s programming c o u l d  i f each b r a i n were i n n a t e l y programmed t o program i t s e l f  according  further,  l i n g u i s t i c environment which i t grows up i n .  There i s n o t h i n g a b s u r d i n t h i s i d e a . f u r t h e r program i t s e l f a c c o r d i n g and  o f how r u l e s guide o u r l i n g u i s t i c  A computer c o u l d be programmed t o  t o the k i n d o f environment i t was p l a c e d i n ,  t h e r e i s no reason why humans c o u l d n o t do the same t h i n g , a t a n e u r a l  level.  I t seems p l a u s i b l e t h a t c h i l d r e n do something l i k e t h i s when  l e a r n the grammar of the language they  they  l e a r n t o speak.  C e r t a i n n e u r a l changes may o c c u r when we l e a r n t o use a p a r t i c u l a r word, and these n e u r a l changes may cause us t o use the word as i f we were consciously following a certain rule.  I n such a case i t may be a p p r o p r i a t e  to say t h a t the r u l e i s g u i d i n g our use o f the word. c r e a t u r e ' s n e u r a l s t r u c t u r e changes as a r e s u l t  F o r example, i f (a) a  o f the c r e a t u r e ' s  having  55  observed some l i n g u i s t i c  r e g u l a r i t y which h o l d s by c o n v e n t i o n ( i n L e w i s '  s e n s e ) , and i f (b) the l i n g u i s t i c b e h a v i o u r produced is  such as would be produced  then we.may say t h a t rule.  by t h a t n e u r a l change  by c o n s c i o u s l y f o l l o w i n g a p a r t i c u l a r  rule,  the l i n g u i s t i c b e h a v i o u r i s guided by the l i n g u i s t i c (1) the r e l e v a n t  We may say t h i s because  l i n g u i s t i c behaviour i s being  guided by a n e u r a l change which o c c u r r e d i n o r d e r t o enable the c r e a t u r e to imitate a l i n g u i s t i c  r e g u l a r i t y , and (2) the l i n g u i s t i c  i m i t a t e d i s c o n s e q u e n t l y d e t e r m i n i n g the r e l e v a n t (3)  the l i n g u i s t i c  r e g u l a r i t y being  l i n g u i s t i c b e h a v i o u r , and  r e g u l a r i t y b e i n g i m i t a t e d i s a r e g u l a r i t y which e x i s t s by  convention ( i n Lewis' sense). c o n v e n t i o n s guide l i n g u i s t i c  T h i s , I suggest, i s the mechanism by which behaviour.)  More has to be s a i d about my s k e t c h o f concept a n a l y s e s but f i r s t l e t us see how i t s a t i s f i e s  the requirements  (1)  I l a i d down.  The concept  a n a l y s i s e x p l a i n s why the term e x p r e s s i n g a concept a p p l i e s i n j u s t cases i t does a p p l y , because  the concept a n a l y s i s s t a t e s  i n g the term and the r u l e s l i n k  the term t o j u s t  term can be c o r r e c t l y a p p l i e d .  (2)  those  the r u l e s f o r a p p l y -  those cases t o which the  The concept a n a l y s i s e x p l a i n s t o some  e x t e n t how we r e c o g n i z e t h a t a term a p p l i e s i n a g i v e n s i t u a t i o n , because the a n a l y s i s s t a t e s the r u l e s w h i c h guide our l i n g u i s t i c We come to know whether the term a p p l i e s  response  i n that  t o a g i v e n case because  to the case i s guided by r u l e s which we have l e a r n e d i n language (3)  My account o f a concept a n a l y s i s e x p l a i n s the paradox  situation.  our response training.  of a n a l y s i s .  To  see t h i s c o n s i d e r the f o l l o w i n g . On my account a concept a n a l y s i s d e s c r i b e s the r u l e s which guide the use o f some word.  The r u l e s which guide our use o f words need n o t be c o n s c i o u s  56  r u l e s t h a t we c o u l d f o r m u l a t e on demand; they need n o t be a p p l i e d w i t h our awareness.  We can know how t o use words w i t h o u t knowing what we a r e d o i n g  when we use them, j u s t as a m u s i c i a n may know how t o p l a y a p i e c e w i t h o u t b e i n g a b l e t o d e s c r i b e t h e complex ways she i s moving h e r f i n g e r s .  This  e x p l a i n s how we can know how t o use a concept w i t h o u t knowing the a n a l y s i s of t h a t  concept. The r u l e - g u i d e d n e s s t h e o r y o f l i n g u i s t i c b e h a v i o u r can a l s o  explain  how a person can know the sentence " T h i s s e n t e n c e i s g r a m m a t i c a l " t o be t r u e w i t h o u t knowing " T h i s sentence i s XYZ"  t o be t r u e (where  'XYZ'  d e s c r i p t i o n which i s n e c e s s a r i l y c o e x t e n s i v e w i t h the word The  explanation i s this:  The d e n o t a t i o n o f t h e complex  f u n c t i o n o f t h e r u l e s g u i d i n g our use (assuming different  *X*,  V,  and'Z* t o  of'X*, our use  i s some complex  'grammatical').  expression'XYZ  1  of'Y', and o u r use o f ' z '  be s e p a r a t e words o r p h r a s e s ) .  These r u l e s a r e  from the r u l e g u i d i n g o u r use o f 'grammatical', even though the  combined e f f e c t o f these r u l e s a p p l i e s to j u s t  l o g i c a l l y i n s u r e s t h a t the e x p r e s s i o n  those s e n t e n c e s t h a t  f a c t t h a t the r u l e s g u i d i n g  'XYZ'  'grammatical' a p p l i e s  are different  'XYZ'  t o . And t h e  from the r u l e  guiding  'grammatical' a l l o w s a p e r s o n t o c o r r e c t l y a p p l y the sentence " T h i s is  is a  sentence  g r a m m a t i c a l " i n a g i v e n s i t u a t i o n w i t h o u t knowing whether the s e n t e n c e  " T h i s s e n t e n c e i s XYZ"  would a p p l y i n t h a t s i t u a t i o n .  g u i d i n g the use of a s i m p l e e x p r e s s i o n a r e d i f f e r e n t the use o f a complex e x p r e s s i o n .  I n g e n e r a l the r u l e s from the r u l e s  guiding  That i s why the e x p r e s s i o n o f a concept and  the a n a l y s i s o f t h a t concept a r e n o t i n t e r c h a n g e a b l e i n b e l i e f c o n t e x t s . Once we see t h e concept e x p r e s s e d by a word as a r u l e we a r e no l o n g e r tempted to t h i n k t h a t the a n a l y s a n s and analysandum phrases e x p r e s s the same c o n c e p t .  57  We can a l s o see why i t i s m i s l e a d i n g  to say t h a t simple sentences and complex  sentences express the same thought o r p r o p o s i t i o n . sense to say t h a t it  two words i n d i f f e r e n t languages express  the same concept  i s because i t makes sense to say t h a t speakers o f d i f f e r e n t languages a r e  following p r a c t i c a l l y but  And i n s o f a r as i t makes  the same l i n g u i s t i c  rules.  The words a r e d i f f e r e n t ,  the r u l e s a r e the same, i n the r e l e v a n t way. I t h i n k I have now e x p l a i n e d  c o u l d be s a i d about i t , but t h i s  the paradox o f a n a l y s i s .  Much more  i s n o t the p l a c e .  (aside) I t i s o f i n t e r e s t t o note t h a t sometimes we can r e c o g n i z e as  c o r r e c t when i t i s p r e s e n t e d t o u s .  l i n g u i s t i c behaviour. we a c t e d  t h a t the r e a s o n  i n a p a r t i c u l a r way i s t h a t we were f o l l o w i n g a c e r t a i n r u l e .  p a r t i c u l a r way i n a g i v e n  Our  Something analogous happens w i t h non-  I t sometimes happens t h a t we r e c o g n i z e  example, we might ask a t e n n i s  effect  a concept a n a l y s i s  p l a y e r whether the reason she a c t e d  For  ina  s i t u a t i o n was t h a t she had l e a r n e d a r u l e t o the  t h a t i n s i t u a t i o n s o f such-and-such a k i n d  t e n n i s p l a y e r might c o r r e c t l y answer yes,  i t i s best  t o a c t so-and-so.  even though she c o u l d n o t have  produced the r u l e which would e x p l a i n h e r a c t i o n . . (end  aside)  I t u r n now to some problems w i t h my s k e t c h analysis. logically  An immediate problem a r i s e s when we t r y t o d e c i d e which o f the equivalent  of a c o n c e p t . states If  of a c o r r e c t concept  a l t e r n a t i v e analyses  a c t u a l l y states  the t r u e  analysis  That i s , which of the a l t e r n a t i v e proposed a n a l y s e s  actually  the r u l e s which guide our a p p l i c a t i o n o f words to o b j e c t s  or situations?  these r u l e s a r e unconscious how a r e we t o d e c i d e what r u l e s guide our  58  l i n g u i s t i c behaviour? E n g l i s h ' seems to be  F o r example, our use rule-guided.  sentences a r e grammatical and a particular our use be  i s not  'grammatical i n  There i s widespread agreement about which  which are not.  But  i f we  ask  ourselves  whether  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l grammar i n f a c t s t a t e s a l l the r u l e s which govern  of the word  e a s i l y recognised  such as  of the e x p r e s s i o n  'the b r o t h e r  'grammatical' we  draw a b l a n k .  as c o r r e c t , e.g., of John' may  be  P a r t s of the grammar  a r u l e which says  converted  into  that  may  possessives  'John's b r o t h e r ' ,  but  t r u e of more complex r u l e s p e r t a i n i n g to the deep s t r u c t u r e of complex  sentences.  The  q u e s t i o n a r i s e s , how  c o u l d we  d e c i d e which ( i f any)  of  two  complete t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l grammars s t a t e s the r u l e s which a c t u a l l y guide judgements of g r a m m a t i c a l i t y ?  Perhaps t h i s q u e s t i o n  I t seems i n p r i n c i p l e p o s s i b l e t h a t we be a b l e a map  to t r a c e the c i r c u i t r y  can be answered as  should  a t some f u t u r e  of the b r a i n so c o m p l e t e l y  t h a t we  our follows.  time  could  obtain  or f l o w c h a r t of the s u c c e s s i v e e l e c t r o n i c s t a t e s of the b r a i n when a  person generates a g i v e n s e n t e n c e , or when a person performs a g i v e n tion.  this  And  calcula-  i t seems p o s s i b l e t h a t t h e r e c o u l d be an isomophic mapping between  the s u c c e s s i v e  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l stages  of a p a r t i c u l a r sentence and  which a grammar a s s i g n s  to the  generation  the s u c c e s s i v e b r a i n s t a t e s which o c c u r when that  sentence i s g e n e r a t e d . To see  that this  i s p o s s i b l e c o n s i d e r an analogous case w i t h  I t i s w e l l known t h a t t h e r e i s an i s o m o r p h i c p r o p o s i t i o n a l c a l c u l u s and  circuits  I f e i t h e r of the two closed c i r c u i t , Analogously,  branches has  two  of the p a i r p,q  The  formula  branches, l i k e  a current running  then the major trunk has  i f one  mapping between statements i n the  i n computers.  example, c o r r e s p o n d s to a c i r c u i t which has  computers.  'p v q , 1  this  for  — .  through i t , i . e . , i s a  a current running  through i t .  i s t r u e , then the whole d i s j u n c t i o n i s  59  true. circuit  T r u t h i n a s e n t e n t i a l component of a formula corresponds in circuitry,  corresponds  falsity  to a branched  corresponds  circuit.  to an open c i r c u i t ,  In g e n e r a l , g i v e n any  p r o p o s i t i o n a l c a l c u l u s one can draw a c i r c u i t versa.  Consequently,  and  disjunction  formula i n the  c o r r e s p o n d i n g to i t ,  to d i f f e r e n t  the same consequent,  conditionals having  and  vice-  Analogously,  i f two  different  i t f o l l o w s that d i f f e r e n t d e r i v a t i o n s  the same formula i n the p r o p o s i t i o n a l c a l c u l u s c o r r e s p o n d i n computers.  and  s i n c e d i f f e r e n t d e r i v a t i o n s of the same formula i n the  s e n t e n t i a l c a l c u l u s correspond antecedents  to a c l o s e d  to d i f f e r e n t  computers were programmed to t e s t  f o r g r a m m a t i c a l i t y a c c o r d i n g to two non-isomorphic,  of  circuits  sentences  but l o g i c a l l y e q u i v a l e n t ,  grammars, then the p r o c e s s e s which take p l a c e i n each computer when the computers t e s t a sentence would be d i f f e r e n t .  And  i f we  were t a k i n g p l a c e i n a computer when i t t e s t s a sentence we  c o u l d t e l l how  what p r o c e s s e s  the computer was  programmed.  knew what p r o c e s s e s f o r grammaticality  L i k e w i s e , I t h i n k , i f we  take p l a c e i n the human b r a i n when a person judges a  f o r g r a m m a t i c a l i t y , we  sentence  s h o u l d be a b l e to r e c o n s t r u c t a program f o r the  which i s i s o m o r p h i c w i t h the p r o c e s s e s t h a t take p l a c e i n the b r a i n . we  find  certain and  t h a t a p a r t i c u l a r t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l grammar, G, l e v e l of d e t a i l ) w i t h the program we  i f the i n d i v i d u a l sentences  i n d i v i d u a l sentences then we  brain And i f  i s isomorphic (at a  have r e c o n s t r u c t e d f o r the  of the grammar G a r e i s o m o r p h i c w i t h  brain,  the  of the r e c o n s t r u c t e d program w i t h which they a r e p a i r e d ,  c o u l d conclude  t h a t G c o r r e c t l y r e p r e s e n t s the grammar which guides  our judgements of the g r a m m a t i c a l i t y of s e n t e n c e s . d e c i d e which o f two non-isomorphic, e i t h e r , expressed  know  but  In t h i s way  we  could  l o g i c a l l y e q u i v a l e n t grammars, i f  the r u l e s which c o n s t i t u t e our concept o f g r a m m a t i c a l i t y .  60  Whether i n f a c t we w i l l e v e r be a b l e to d e c i d e , i n j us t the way I have d e s c r i b e d , which o f two non-isomorphic,  but l o g i c a l l y e q u i v a l e n t grammars  express our concept o f g r a m m a t i c a l i t y depends i n p a r t upon whether the b r a i n i s v e r y much l i k e a computer. l i k e a computer, we might r o u g h l y analogous  d e c i d e t h i s q u e s t i o n i s some way which i s  t o the method I have d e s c r i b e d .  ( I t might produced  still  But even i f the b r a i n i s n o t v e r y much  be h e l p f u l a t t h i s p o i n t  a p p e a l s t o the premise  to s t r e s s  t h a t we can i n f e r  that  the example  the program o f a computer  from a d e s c r i p t i o n o f i t s s t r u c t u r e and i t s i n t e r n a l p r o c e s s e s . of t h i s premise  does n o t h o l d .  c e r t a i n way we cannot structure. differing  From the f a c t  just  The converse  t h a t a computer i s programmed a  i n f e r t h a t the computer has a p a r t i c u l a r  internal  Two computers may f o l l o w the same program a l t h o u g h they have internal structures.  By a n a l o g y ,  the f a c t t h a t two people a r e  f o l l o w i n g the same r u l e does n o t a l l o w us t o i n f e r t h a t b r a i n s t r u c t u r e and b r a i n p r o c e s s e s .  they have the same  However, i f two people cio have the same  b r a i n s t r u c t u r e and b r a i n p r o c e s s e s t h i s c o n s t i t u t e s e v i d e n c e f o l l o w i n g the same l i n g u i s t i c  rules.  A l s o , i f two computers,  which have i d e n t i c a l i n t e r n a l  go through d i f f e r e n t p r o c e s s e s when s o l v i n g the same problem, that they have been programmed d i f f e r e n t l y . identical brain structures  t h a t they a r e  structures,  we may  infer  A n a l o g o u s l y , i f two people w i t h  ( i n the r e l e v a n t r e s p e c t s ) need to go through  d i f f e r e n t i n t e l l e c t u a l p r o c e s s e s when j u d g i n g , say, the g r a m m a t i c a l i t y o f a sentence, we may i n f e r  that  those two people a r e b e i n g guided by d i f f e r e n t  rules.) A problem a r i s e s now, and t h a t i s , i s n ' t  i t i m p l a u s i b l e to suppose  61  that  the c o r r e c t a n a l y s i s  future  psychological  concept a n a l y s i s results?.  and  i s an e m p i r i c a l  like  i t explains  our use of language, Arguments have  a l o t t o suppose t h a t  the r u l e s which guide the use of words, i n the n o n - l i n g u i s t i c c a s e ) .  be  Arguments have been g i v e n t o  q u e s t i o n what these r u l e s a r e .  a l s o been g i v e n t o show t h a t  probablistic  other t h i n k e r s ,  t h e r e have t o be r u l e s o r c o n v e n t i o n s g u i d i n g  distinctions  only  good reasons have been g i v e n to s u p p o r t  and perhaps p h i l o s o p h e r s must,  i t j u s t i s an e m p i r i c a l  state  e n q u i r y which can y i e l d  to a c c e p t some s u r p r i s i n g r e s u l t s .  show t h a t  await  i n q u i r y , and i n g e n e r a l i s n ' t i t odd t o suppose t h a t  Perhaps so, but I t h i n k  this conclusion, prepared  of our concept "grammatical i n E n g l i s h " must  concept a n a l y s e s  ( o r guide us when we make  But I do n o t r e a l l y i n s i s t  use  the e x p r e s s i o n  'concept a n a l y s i s ' i n t h i s way.  use  the e x p r e s s i o n  'concept a n a l y s i s ' .  that  I do not c a r e how  we  we  My main c o n c e r n has been t o show  t h a t we can draw a d i s t i n c t i o n which i s f i n e r and more u s e f u l t h a t the n e c e s s a r y / n o n - n e c e s s a r y d i s t i n c t i o n , and y e t which i s n o t as r e s t r i c t i v e as the  interchangeability  i n b e l i e f c o n t e x t s c r i t e r i o n f o r synonomy.  some d e f i n i t e e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l  advantages r e s u l t from f o c u s i n g  on the r u l e s or c o n v e n t i o n s g u i d i n g merits already By f o c u s i n g  c o n s i d e r e d under p o i n t s  our a t t e n t i o n  i n common.  p r o p e r t y P, i f we "the  We  our a t t e n t i o n  In a d d i t i o n t o the  1-3, t h e r e i s the f o l l o w i n g  or cases d e s c r i b e d  point.  by an e x p r e s s i o n have c e r t a i n  can e x p l a i n why a l l the items i n c l a s s C have the  can show t h a t a r u l e f o r p l a c i n g an i t e m i n c l a s s C i s  i t e m must have p r o p e r t y P".  the o b j e c t s  think  on r u l e s g o v e r n i n g the a p p l i c a t i o n of words, we can  e x p l a i n why a l l the o b j e c t s properties  the use of words.  I  F o r example, i t g e n u i n e l y e x p l a i n s  i n a c e r t a i n box have f o u r  sides  why a l l  i f we know t h a t a r u l e f o r  62  p l a c i n g an o b j e c t explanation  i n t h a t box i s " t h e o b j e c t must have f o u r s i d e s " .  i s required  t o e x p l a i n why a l l the o b j e c t s  Further  i n the box have the  cube r o o t o f 64 s i d e s . To  explain this  tical the  latter  propositions.  f a c t we must t a l k about e n t a i l m e n t s  So there  i s a n advantage t o f o c u s i n g  necessary entailments properties  between p r o p o s i t i o n s .  P, Q, and R u n l e s s  r u l e f o r s e l e c t i n g items a c c o r d i n g  To a n a l y s e a concept i n t o  we p o i n t out t h a t  the con-  t h e concept i s a  t o whether they have the p r o p e r t i e s  P, Q,  R. An  say,  of concepts o r t h e  P, Q, and R does n o t e x p l a i n why a l l the items s a t i s f y i n g  cept have p r o p e r t i e s  ing  our a t t e n t i o n on  r u l e s g o v e r n i n g t h e use o f language t h a t does n o t r e s u l t from m e r e l y  f o c u s i n g our a t t e n t i o n on the n e c e s s a r y c o e x t e n s i o n  and  between a r i t h m e -  o b j e c t i o n t o my l a s t s e r i e s o f p o i n t s may be made on t h e f o l l o w -  grounds.  What i s t o p r e v e n t us from s a y i n g  t h a t a word s h o u l d  be a p p l i e d o n l y  same as a r u l e t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t objects  that a r u l e to the e f f e c t ,  t o o b j e c t s h a v i n g f o u r s i d e s i s the  the same word s h o u l d  h a v i n g t h e cube r o o t o f 64 number o f s i d e s ?  reason f o r saying  be a p p l i e d o n l y t o  I f we c a n p r o v i d e no  these a r e d i f f e r e n t r u l e s , must we n o t conclude t h a t my  account o f concept a n a l y s i s has no advantages over t h e a c c o u n t i n terms o f necessary  coextensiveness? To  r e p l y to t h i s o b j e c t i o n :  reason f o r saying  these a r e d i f f e r e n t r u l e s , i t i s s t i l l  c o n c e p t s as r u l e s s i n c e i t s t i l l  explains  under a s i n g l e term have t h e p r o p e r t i e s we can p r o v i d e  (1) No, even i f we can p r o v i d e no  a reason f o r saying  the f a c t  an advantage t o see  t h a t a l l the t h i n g s  they share i n common.  (2)  classed  I think  these a r e d i f f e r e n t r u l e s , namely, one  63  would go through d i f f e r e n t  p r o c e s s e s i n f o l l o w i n g these two r u l e s .  the f o l l o w i n g as a g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e f o r i n d i v i d u a t i n g r u l e s . would need  I submit  " I f any person  t o go through d i f f e r e n t b e h a v i o u r a l , o r i n t e l l e c t u a l  (thought)  p r o c e s s e s when c o n s c i o u s l y f o l l o w i n g r u l e x and r u l e y, then x and y a r e different  rules,"  intellectual  F o r example, most people would go through  p r o c e s s e s when f o l l o w i n g the r u l e s  different  (a) "Put f o u r - s i d e d  objects  i n t h i s box" and (b) "Put o b j e c t s i n the box h a v i n g the cube r o o t o f 64 s i d e s " . When f o l l o w i n g r u l e  (a) one might  count the s i d e s o f o b j e c t s o r j u s t  a t o b j e c t s t o see whether they were f o u r - s i d e d . i n v o l v e d when an average person f o l l o w e d r u l e  glance  More than t h i s would be  (b).  The average person would  have t o c a l c u l a t e a c o u p l e o f seconds when f o l l o w i n g r u l e  (b) and then, a f t e r  c a l c u l a t i n g , he o r she would go through the same procedure one would go through i n f o l l o w i n g r u l e ( a ) . In t h i s example i t i s f a i r l y easy t o say t h a t d i f f e r e n t u a l p r o c e s s e s would o c c u r when an average p e r s o n f o l l o w e d r u l e s Not  every case w i l l be so easy t o d e c i d e .  n o t i o n o f "same p r o c e s s " . different  intellect-  (a) and ( b ) .  There may be some vagueness  And f o r some purposes we may want t o count  p r o c e s s e s as t h e same p r o c e s s .  "same p r o c e s s " i s s u f f i c i e n t l y l o g i c a l l y equivalent rules.  i n the slightly  But I t h i n k t h a t the n o t i o n o f  c l e a r t o enable u s , i n many c a s e s , t o d i s t i n g u i s h  That i s s u f f i c i e n t  f o r p r e s e n t purposes.  a l s o i n t e r e s t i n g t o note t h a t we do n o t always need  It is  t o be i n a p o s i t i o n t o  say what r u l e a p e r s o n i s f o l l o w i n g i n o r d e r t o have s t r o n g reasons f o r s a y i n g t h a t the p e r s o n i s f o l l o w i n g some r u l e  ( j u s t as we do n o t always need  t o be  i n a p o s i t i o n t o say what program a computer i s f o l l o w i n g i n o r d e r t o know t h a t i t i s f o l l o w i n g some  program).  64  I t u r n now it are  is this:  can we  which may  we  should  note t h a t we  rules.  w i t h someone and  by  f o r some word.  In examples such as  speak the same language  P r a c t i c a l l y everyone has  discovering  this  these we  can  people  had  the  t h a t the disagreement  to the disagreement had  O f t e n these v e r b a l disagreements a r e  comparing m e t a l i n g u i s t i c remarks such as  whale?"  reader;  B e f o r e a t t e m p t i n g to answer  r e a l l y a v e r b a l disagreement - t h a t each p a r t y d i f f e r e n t use  to the  o c c a s i o n a l l y have s t r o n g e v i d e n c e t h a t  following different l i n g u i s t i c  e x p e r i e n c e of a r g u i n g  have o c c u r r e d  t e l l whether people who  f o l l o w i n g the same l i n g u i s t i c r u l e s ? "  question are  "How  to a q u e s t i o n  " W e l l , what would you  was  a  uncovered count as  u s u a l l y t e l l whether two  a  people  have e x t e n s i o n a l l y d i f f e r e n t r u l e s . Sometimes, however, people make m e t a l i n g u i s t i c remarks about meanings o f words and  about what sentences they take t o be a n a l y t i c .  the The  t h a t these i n t e n s i o n a l remarks o f t e n agree i s e a s i l y e x p l a i n e d  by  t h e s i s t h a t many p e o p l e f o l l o w the same l i n g u i s t i c  i t i s very  difficult  (at l e a s t ) to e x p l a i n t h i s  tions alone.  The  this uniformity  f a c t t h a t the  other  But  the hypo-  f a c t by a p p e a l to e x t e n s i o n a l  rule-guidedness hypothesis e a s i l y  consideraexplains  of i n t e n s i o n a l m e t a l i n g u i s t i c remarks, combined w i t h the  of competing e x p l a n a t i o n s , There a r e  rules.  g i v e s us  some r e a s o n to a c c e p t t h i s  fact  lack  hypothesis.  reasons.  People w i l l u s u a l l y complete the number s e r i e s "2,4,6,8..." i n the same way,  even though t h e r e  t h i s sequence of numbers. (or  brains)  are  i n f i n i t e l y many r u l e s which c o u l d  generate  T h i s f a c t c o n s t i t u t e s e v i d e n c e t h a t people's minds  o f t e n work i n a s i m i l i a r f a s h i o n .  of l o g i c a l systems which people f i n d easy and  Also  there a r e a s m a l l  n a t u r a l to work w i t h ,  number  although  65  t h e r e a r e i n f i n i t e l y many ways t o c o n s t r u c t , s a y , a system calculus.  T h i s f u r t h e r supports the view  of the p r e d i c a t e  t h a t most people have  i n t e l l e c t u a l equipment - t h a t t h e i r "computers"  similiar  are very s i m i l i a r .  Further-  more, what p h y s i o l o g i c a l e v i d e n c e we p r e s e n t l y have i n d i c a t e s t h a t  people's  b r a i n s and b r a i n p r o c e s s e s a r e s i m i l i a r .  people  These f a c t s suggest  o f t e n a r e b e i n g guided by the same l i n g u i s t i c  r u l e s when t h e i r  b e h a v i o u r i s i d e n t i c a l i n the r e l e v a n t r e s p e c t s . ally  that  linguistic  F o r i f people have  structur-  i d e n t i c a l i n t e l l e c t u a l equipment, and t h e i r b e h a v i o u r i s i d e n t i c a l ,  they a r e p r o b a b l y undergoing  the same i n t e r n a l p r o c e s s e s .  then  In p r i n c i p l e , we  c o u l d v e r i f y whether people do i n f a c t undergo s i m i l i a r b r a i n p r o c e s s e s when they judge, s a y , the g r a m m a t i c a l i t y o f the same s e n t e n c e .  I f we found the  b r a i n p r o c e s s e s , b r a i n s t r u c t u r e , and l i n g u i s t i c b e h a v i o u r t o be i d e n t i c a l i n the r e l e v a n t r e s p e c t s we c o u l d say f o r s u r e whether people a r e b e i n g guided by the same r u l e s .  We a r e n e a r l y i n a p o s i t i o n t o g i v e a d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e a n a l y t i c synthetic d i s t i n c t i o n . namely,  'the semantic  understood  But f i r s t  I wish t o introduce a t e c h n i c a l  term,  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f a semantic r u l e ' , which may be  somewhat as f o l l o w s :  I n g e n e r a l t h e semantic  r u l e s which a r e  d e s c r i b e d i n a concept a n a l y s i s w i l l r e l a t e an e x p r e s s i o n , E, t o a c l a s s o f situations  o r c a s e s , C.  The semantic  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s o f a g i v e n r u l e i s the  u n i v e r s a l c l o s u r e o f a c o n d i t i o n a l , i n which the a n t e c e d e n t a s s e r t s s i t u a t i o n C o b t a i n s , and the consequent  that  e x p r e s s e s C i n terms o f the e x p r e s s i o n  66  E, a c c o r d i n g t o the s e m a n t i c a l r u l e i n q u e s t i o n .  The f o l l o w i n g examples  may be h e l p f u l : 1.  Rule^,  "You may a p p l y ' s i s t e r  1  t o any female  Semantic T r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f Rule-^,  2.  Rule , 2  "You may connect 'and'."  Semantic T r a n s f o r m a t i o n ,  " F o r any x, i f x i s a female s i b l i n g , then x i s a s i s t e r . "  any p a i r of t r u e sentences  r  p and q* i s t r u e . "  t h i s c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n i s somewhat vague, i t s h o u l d g i v e  the r e a d e r a g e n e r a l i d e a o f how t o form the semantic of a g i v e n r u l e .  w i t h the word  " F o r a l l p and q, i f p i s t r u e and q i s t r u e , then  Although  sibling."  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n (S-T)  The m o t i v a t i o n f o r i n t r o d u c i n g the i d e a of an S-T i s t h i s :  by c o n s i d e r i n g the l o g i c a l consequences of a g i v e n S-T we can uncover the purely  l o g i c a l consequences o f f o l l o w i n g a g i v e n l i n g u i s t i c  rule.  This  b r i n g s us t o my d e f i n i t i o n o f a n a n a l y t i c s e n t e n c e , namely, "A sentence i s a n a l y t i c i f and o n l y i f i t i s a l o g i c a l consequence o f the semantic m a t i o n of the r u l e s d e s c r i b e d i n some concept  analysis."  transfor-  " I f a sentence i s  not a n a l y t i c i s i t s y n t h e t i c " . I t h i n k t h a t my d e f i n i t i o n o f the a n a l y t i c - s y n t h e t i c n e a r l y c a p t u r e s one s t a n d a r d c o n c e p t i o n o f the d i s t i n c t i o n . t h a t i t a c c u r a t e l y matches everyone's  use o f ' a n a l y t i c ' .  does n o t match t h a t use o f ' a n a l y t i c ' a c c o r d i n g t o which ially  interchangeable with  designed  I do n o t c l a i m  In p a r t i c u l a r i t 'analytic' i s t r i v -  My d e f i n i t i o n o f ' a n a l y t i c ' i s  t o c a p u t r e the i d e a t h a t a n a l y t i c sentences  of a c o n c e p t , language.  'necessary'.  distinction  r e l a t e t o the a n a l y s i s  o r a r e i n some way the l o g i c a l consequence o f the r u l e s o f  The q u e s t i o n whether, on my use o f ' a n a l y t i c ' , a l l n e c e s s a r y t r u t h s  are a n a l y t i c  i s an i n t e r e s t i n g q u e s t i o n which I w i l l c o n s i d e r i n a l a t e r  67  chapter.  ( I n what f o l l o w s I w i l l a b b r e v i a t e my d e f i n i t i o n o f ' a n a l y t i c '  by s a y i n g t h a t a sentence concept  i s a n a l y t i c i f f i t i s a l o g i c a l consequence o f some  analysis). There i s a n o t h e r  q u e s t i o n which I would l i k e  to consider a t this  s t a g e , i . e . , Does my d e f i n i t i o n make the a n a l y t i c - s y n t h e t i c d i s t i n c t i o n one of  degree o r o f k i n d ?  Answer:  In the sense t h a t p r a c t i c a l l y e v e r y  distinc-  t i o n i s one o f degree the a n a l y t i c - s y n t h e t i c d i s t i n c t i o n i s one o f degree. But  i n s o f a r as the q u e s t i o n whether a sentence  on a n o t h e r  q u e s t i o n , e.g., what r u l e s guide  the d i s t i n c t i o n i s a sharp  one;  i s a n a l y t i c c l e a r l y depends  the use o f t h i s  i t i s one o f k i n d .  expression?,  The q u e s t i o n s  o f degree  come i n when we t r y t o d e c i d e what the p a r t i c u l a r r u l e s g u i d i n g the use o f an e x p r e s s i o n a r e . vague,e.g., "Apply  Sometimes the r u l e g u i d i n g the use o f an e x p r e s s i o n i s the term F t o a n y t h i n g  p r o p e r t i e s P^....P ."  T h i s vagueness w i l l  t h a t has n e a r l y a l l , o f the engender u n d e c i d a b l e  questions  about whether something i s an F, but t h a t s h o u l d n o t l e a d us t o s u s p e c t the concept  of a r u l e , o r any concepts  i n v o l v i n g the concept  of a r u l e .  Again,  sometimes the q u e s t i o n whether something i s a r u l e g u i d i n g the use o f a p a r t i c u l a r e x p r e s s i o n w i l l be v e r y d i f f i c u l t t o d e c i d e , b u t t h a t s h o u l d n o t l e a d us t o r e j e c t my a n a l y s i s o f a n a l y t i c i t y i n terms o f r u l e s . q u e s t i o n s about the t r u t h o f a sentence  Likewise,  a r e sometimes u n d e c i d a b l e ,  but that  s h o u l d n o t l e a d us t o r e j e c t an a n a l y s i s o f knowledge i n terms o f t r u e Questions  about t r u t h a r e o f t e n unanswerable j u s t because the use o f some  term i s u n c l e a r , o r because i t i s n o t c l e a r what r u l e s do guide term. of  belief.  For this  reason  I t h i n k Quine i s wrong when he says  the use o f a  t h a t the concept  t r u t h i s r e s p e c t a b l e and t o l e r a b l y c l e a r , but t h a t the concepts  o f meaning  68  and  linguistic  about  c o n v e n t i o n a r e n e i t h e r r e s p e c t a b l e nor c l e a r .  t r u t h can be s e t t l e d  g u i d i n g the use of terms. minate, and  the use of any  answerable  o n l y i f t h e r e a r e d e f i n i t e c o n v e n t i o n s and  F o r i n s o f a r as the use of an e x p r e s s i o n i s i n d e t e r -  And  i f t h e r e a r e d e f i n i t e c o n v e n t i o n s g u i d i n g the  then q u e s t i o n s about what these c o n v e n t i o n s a r e must be  in principle.  can d i s t i n g u i s h l i n g u i s t i c  I do not know o f a d e c i s i o n procedure by which c o n v e n t i o n s from n o n - c o n v e n t i o n s ,  never seen a d e c i s i o n procedure by which we from o t h e r s e n t e n c e s .  conventions.  we  but then I have  can d i s t i n g u i s h t r u e sentences  I s u g g e s t , however, t h a t we  d e c i s i o n procedure f o r t r u t h u n l e s s we linguistic  rules  sentence c o n t a i n i n g t h a t e x p r e s s i o n i s i n d e t e r m i n a t e ,  so i s i t s t r u t h v a l u e .  use of these terms,  Questions  c o u l d never produce  c o u l d produce  a  a d e c i s i o n procedure f o r  69  Chapter 4  Benson Mates, "Synonymity", U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a P h i l o s o p h y , 1950.  Publications i n  A l o n z o Church, " I n t e n s i o n a l Isomorphism and the I d e n t i t y of B e l i e f " , P h i l o s o p h i c a l S t u d i e s , 1954. Ziff, Lewis,  Semantic A n a l y s i s , I t h i c a , 1960, p. 36. Convention.  Chapter 5  Recalcitrant  Experience  71  In  c h a p t e r 3 I c o n s i d e r e d and r e j e c t e d Quine's c l a i m t h a t a b s o l u t e l y any  b e l i e f might be r e j e c t e d i n the f a c e o f an e x p e r i e n t i a l r e p o r t which f l i c t e d w i t h an a c c e p t e d  theory.  In what immediately  con-  f o l l o w s I hope t o show  t h a t a counterexample t o Quine's view i s p r o v i d e d by one o f h i s o t h e r views about  theories. In  belief  "Two Dogmas o f E m p i r i c i s m " , and elsewhere,  Quine expresses the  t h a t a l l t h e o r i e s must pass e m p i r i c a l t e s t s , o r be answerable t o  experience.  This b e l i e f e n t a i l s  which a d e q u a t e l y adequately  that there i s a c e r t a i n c l a s s of t h e o r i e s  e x p l a i n s our e x p e r i e n c e , and another  e x p l a i n our e x p e r i e n c e .  must be a l t e r e d  c l a s s which f a i l s t o  Quine a l s o a s s e r t s t h a t t h e o r i e s can and  i n the f a c e o f r e c a l c i t r a n t e x p e r i e n c e , and r i g h t l y s o . F o r  i f we do n o t h o l d t h a t some t h e o r i e s , u n m o d i f i e d , must be abandoned i n the f a c e o f e x p e r i e n c e , then we can make no sense  of the n o t i o n t h a t t h e o r i e s  must be answerable t o e x p e r i e n c e , and so Quine's p o s i t i o n becomes u n i n t e l l i g ible.  But i f we admit t h a t some t h e o r i e s , u n l e s s m o d i f i e d , must be abandoned  i n t h e f a c e o f e x p e r i e n c e by any r a t i o n a l b e i n g , then we admit t h a t a c e r t a i n b e l i e f i s f o r c e d upon us by e x p e r i e n c e . It  i s t r u e , o f c o u r s e , t h a t t h e sentence  (S) "Some t h e o r i e s ,  m o d i f i e d , must be abandoned i n the f a c e o f e x p e r i e n c e by any r a t i o n a l  unless being",  might a t some f u t u r e time be regarded as f a l s e by most people, but t h i s would not show t h a t t h i s one  to r e j e c t  sentence  i s n o t now t r u e .  the b e l i e f now expressed  much the same way i t would be absurd  And i t would be absurd  f o r some-  by S i n o r d e r t o save a t h e o r y .  to r e j e c t  i n o r d e r t o make one's t h e o r y c o n s i s t e n t w i t h  In  the law of n o n - c o n t r a d i c t i o n experience.  Now an argument c o u l d e a s i l y be c o n s t r u c t e d ( e x a c t l y analogous  to  72  to the argument g i v e n to defend Modus Ponens) which would show t h a t whoever d e n i e s S i n the f u t u r e i s e i t h e r wrong or does not deny the b e l i e f we a s s e r t by S.  We  s i m p l y p o i n t out t h a t a s s e n t t o S i s a p r e c o n d i t i o n o f  i n t e l l i g i b l e d i s c o u r s e a t t h i s time. premise  i n any argument, and  The  T h i s enables us to take S as a t r u e  t h i s commits us t o s a y i n g t h a t anyone who  S i n the f u t u r e i s e i t h e r m i s t a k e n a s s e r t by S.  l a t t e r a l t e r n a t i v e might  o c c u r i f new e.g.,  expresses.  t h a t S would e x p r e s s something fact  What e n t i t l e s  different  now  experiences lead  us  our concept o f a  t h e o r y , or our concept of e x p e r i e n c e , so t h a t S comes t o express from what S now  denies  or e l s e i s not r e a l l y d e n y i n g what we  to m o d i f y our p r e s e n t s e t o f concepts i n some way,  different  now  something  us t o say w i t h a s s u r a n c e  from what S now  e x p r e s s e s i s the  t h a t sameness o f t r u t h v a l u e i s a p r e c o n d i t i o n of sameness of b e l i e f  sameness o f a s s e r t i o n .  I f S i s f a l s e a t some f u t u r e time and S i s t r u e  then S e x p r e s s e s something So f a r we experience.  different  remains, how  What a r e r e c a l c i t r a n t  iences?  i n Chapter  K a r l Popper has d i s c u s s e d t h i s problem  trilemma which i s due b e l i e f s about  to J.F. F r i e s .  can be j u s t i f i e d  i n an i n f i n i t e  exper-  V o f The L o g i c of  The  trilemma  is this.  Either  e x p e r i e n c e a r e t o be a c c e p t e d d o g m a t i c a l l y , w i t h no  s t a t e m e n t s , then we  by  Popper i n t r o d u c e s the problem by d i s c u s s i n g a  t i o n , or they a r e t o be j u s t i f i e d . o r statement  now.  does e x p e r i e n c e d i s c o n f i r m a  p a r t i c u l a r theory i n a p a r t i c u l a r formulation?  S c i e n t i f i c Discovery.^  now,  i n the f u t u r e from what S e x p r e s s e s  have shown t h a t c e r t a i n t h e o r i e s must be e x c l u d e d  But the problem s t i l l  or  cannot  I f we  justifica-  a c c e p t the p r i n c i p l e t h a t any  o n l y by d e d u c i n g i t from o t h e r b e l i e f s  j u s t i f y any statement w i t h o u t becoming  regress of j u s t i f i c a t i o n s .  our  But i f we  reject  the  belief  or  involved  principle  73  t h a t a l l b e l i e f s a r e to be j u s t i f i e d then we must j u s t i f y o n l y o t h e r way  our b e l i e f s  beliefs  by deducing them from o t h e r b e l i e f s ,  some o t h e r way.  c o u l d be j u s t i f i e d  Popper b e l i e v e s  i s by e x p e r i e n c e i t s e l f  opposed t o a l i n g u i s t i c d e s c r i p t i o n o f e x p e r i e n c e ) .  p s y c h o l o g i s m a v o i d s the problems of b o t h dogmatism and  cause b e l i e f s ; n o t j u s t i f y  them.  Now  the  (as  Popper c a l l s  t h a t our b e l i e f s a r e j u s t i f i e d by e x p e r i e n c e s p s y c h o l o g i s m .  Popper r e j e c t s p s y c h o l o g i s m because  that  the d o c t r i n e although  the i n f i n i t e r e g r e s s ,  he t h i n k s t h a t e x p e r i e n c e s c o u l d o n l y  He b e l i e v e s  that j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s a  logical  r e l a t i o n which can h o l d o n l y between sentences o r b e l i e f s , and n o t between b e l i e f s and e x p e r i e n c e s . logical  In Popper's  view c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n s a r e  never  justifications. S i n c e Popper r e j e c t s  dogmatism or the i n f i n i t e alternatives. statements  p s y c h o l o g i s m he can o n l y f a l l back e i t h e r  regress.  In f a c t he t r i e s  B r i e f l y h i s t h e o r y o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s as f o l l o w s :  can o n l y be j u s t i f i e d  i n terms o f o t h e r s t a t e m e n t s , and  c h a i n o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r a statement s t o p somewhere i n t h i s  is infinite.  two  In p r i n c i p l e the  possible  But i n p r a c t i c e we  must  c h a i n o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n and j u s t d e c i d e t o assume t h a t  p a r t i c u l a r statements a r e t r u e . for science.  to combine these  on  Statements  o f t h i s k i n d form the  touchstone  They a r e the b a s i c statements which d e s c r i b e i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e l y  o b s e r v a b l e e v e n t s , and  they must have a l o g i c a l form such t h a t t h e i r n e g a t i o n s  are i n c o n s i s t e n t with general law-like statements.  " B a s i c statements  t h e r e f o r e - i n the m a t e r i a l mode of speech - statements  a s s e r t i n g that  are an  2 o b s e r v a b l e event i s o c c u r i n g i n a c e r t a i n r e g i o n of space and p r a c t i c e , we  time."  d e c i d e whether t o a c c e p t o r r e j e c t a p a r t i c u l a r b a s i c  a f t e r p e r f o r m i n g a t e s t o r experiment.  We  do not j u s t i f y  In  statement  our d e c i s i o n t o  a c c e p t o r r e j e c t a p a r t i c u l a r b a s i c statement, however, s i n c e t h i s would  74  i n v o l v e us i n an  infinite  regress.  our d e c i s i o n i s r u l e - g u i d e d absolute.  I t can be  and  Rather we  not  changed i n the  just decide,  arbitrary.  A l s o our  can  use  to a c c e p t or r e j e c t a b a s i c statement  i t t o t e s t our  theories  ( f o r the  b a s i c statements a r e not  That r o u g h l y  a c c e p t e d as are  governed by  The  Now  what i s Popper to say on  grounds t h a t  the b a s i s  But  "Basic  Popper w i l l  a r b i t r a r y con-  but  on  the b a s i s  can  justified  of of  case  b a s i c statements.  t h a t b a s i c statements must be  One  accepted  Popper e x c l u d e b a s i c statements whose  i n any  t h a t our d e c i s i o n to a c c e p t  way?  I think not.  o f s c i e n t i s t s adopted c e r t a i n b a s i c statements a r b i t r a r i l y we t h e i r d e c i s i o n to adopt those s t a t e m e n t s .  To say  are  they  t r y to e x c l u d e t h i s k i n d  b a s i c statements need not  claim.  statements  i f a group of s c i e n t i s t s d e c i d e to a c c e p t  a l s o hold  u n r e a s o n a b l e , and  to  basic  to t h a t e x t e n t  the d e c i s i o n s are not  a c c e p t a n c e v i o l a t e s c e r t a i n r u l e s , and be  we  these  Popper's view o f  i t v i o l a t e s the r u l e s f o r a c c e p t i n g  of o b s e r v a t i o n .  time being)  we  justified.  the b a s i s of an o b s e r v a t i o n ,  of these r u l e s , presumably, w i l l say on  once  reached i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h a procedure  that extent  s u p e r s t i t i o n , or r e l i g i o n , say? the  But  But  b e l i e f s , but  o b j e c t i o n . Popper says,  d e c i s i o n s are (To  rules."  a b a s i c statement not  on  other  discover  Thus our d e c i s i o n s  the r e s u l t of a d e c i s i o n or agreement; and  conventions.  ventions.)  ( f o r the  themselves  i s Popper's p o s i t i o n .  statements i s open to a s e r i o u s  d e c i s i o n i s not  fulfilled.  time b e i n g ) .  a c c e p t or r e j e c t b a s i c statements j u s t i f y our d e c i s i o n s and  though  l i g h t of f u t u r e e x p e r i e n c e i f we  t h a t some t r u t h c o n d i t i o n of a basic statement i s not have d e c i d e d  freely;  We  I f a group  would not  would c l a i m they were  I t h i n k Popper would make t h i s c l a i m a l s o , or some  accept  being equivalent  t h a t a d e c i s i o n to adopt a c e r t a i n b a s i c statement v i o l a t e d  the  75  rules f o r adopting  b a s i c statements i s to say  b a s i c statement was  t h a t the a d o p t i o n  of  that  unjustified.  Popper's s o l u t i o n i s an attempt t o d e a l w i t h the problem of fallibility it  and  r e v i s a b i l i t y of a l l statements of o b j e c t i v e f a c t .  i s commonly r e c o g n i s e d  the way  t h a t a l l statements about the way  t h i n g s seem to be)  have attempted  fallible.  This foundation  or s e n s e - d a t a .  m i s t a k e i n comparing any  two  t h a t when we  about the e x t e r n a l world these  assumptions may  b e l i e f s about the way this  we must a l l o w  one  Now  (and  l e s s , and when we  even i f one  the  we make assumptions, i n d u c t i v e and I see no way  sense-datum  otherwise,  to a v o i d a d m i t t i n g but  the events we  report.  But we  theory  t h a t the r e c a l c i t r a n t e x p e r i e n c e s  as  things  neverthefalsify  (provided  occurred.)  t h a t i s r e q u i r e d to make sense of the i d e a of r e c a l c i t r a n t e x p e r i e n c e sometimes, c o l l e c t i v e l y , have more c o n f i d e n c e  why  fallible,  do have our b e l i e f s ,  must m o d i f y our  that  partly  These b e l i e f s a r e  b e l i e v e t h a t c e r t a i n t h i n g s have o c c u r r e d which then we  and  I do not see  Things do happen i n the w o r l d , and  adopt c e r t a i n b e l i e f s .  some p r e d i c t i o n s of our t h e o r y ,  we  grants  move from s e n s a t i o n r e p o r t s to o b j e c t i v e c l a i m s  things o b j e c t i v e l y are f a l l i b l e ,  do not abandon our b e l i e f  however,  can make a  because sometimes b e l i e f s about events a r e caused i n us by  unconnected w i t h  of  of r e p o r t s a r e f a l l i b l e ,  t h i n g s , even s e n s a t i o n s . )  i s e s p e c i a l l y a problem.  of c o u r s e ,  others  f o r our knowledge of  i n v o l v e comparison, and  j u s t be f a l s e .  a consequence of t h i s we  (not  i s supposed to c o n s i s t of r e p o r t s  that s e n s a t i o n r e p o r t s are i n f a l l i b l e t h e o r i s t s do)  foundation  (Even these k i n d s  s i n c e a l l r e p o r t s about s e n s a t i o n s  things are  Sense-datum t h e o r i s t s and  to p r o v i d e an i n c o r r i g i b l e  the e x t e r n a l w o r l d . experiences  are  I think  we All  i s that  t h a t a c e r t a i n event E,  or  76  of events E,  class  Sometimes we this 1.  are  position.  has  occurred  in this position. The  as  they would have i f E  be  causally  affected  3.  something l i k e E-like  h a v i n g had  o c c u r r e d and  event 4.  the  correct.  do we  get  in  following:  experiences  they were s i t u a t e d  (experiences  i n such a way  such as  to  event of an  type E has E-like  E-like  r e p o r t s an  o c c u r r e d , say  e x p e r i e n c e the  the  experience i t i s  p r o b a b i l i t i e s are  odds are  10/1. E-type  99/100 t h a t an  occurred.  I f 100  that  theory i s  E).  by  I f 2 people report  our  q u e s t i o n a r i s e s , how  Assume t h a t when a p e r s o n s i n c e r e l y  p r o b a b l e that an  E  an E - l i k e  people report  e x p e r i e n c e the  odds approach  certainty  occurred.  5.  Almost no  6.  In the  t h e o r y has  The  (involving  case j u s t d e s c r i b e d i s , of  something l i k e  theories  i n the  this kind  l i g h t of our  d e s c r i b e d assumes the to e s t a b l i s h the  had  that.  would have g r e a t e r  oversimplification.  I think not.  to e s t a b l i s h  the  The  experiential  experiential  assume the  Yet,  t e s t and  procedure  reject  just  reports i n order  reports.  Does t h i s  I t would r a i s e i n f i n i t e  raise regress  t r u t h of c e r t a i n e x p e r i e n t i a l  p r o b a b l e t r u t h of o t h e r r e p o r t s ,  Rather we  con-  theory i s r i g h t .  of r e a s o n i n g goes on when we  p r o b a b l e t r u t h of our  first  our  c o u r s e , an  t r u t h of c e r t a i n of our  i n o r d e r to e s t a b l i s h the must do  people) we  certainty.  b e l i e f s about e x p e r i e n c e .  r e g r e s s type problems?  problems i f we  100  an E-type event o c c u r r e d than t h a t  I think,  infinite  a p r o b a b i l i t y approaching  case d e s c r i b e d  findence that  we  have t h a t  The  answer might be  Suppose 2 people r e p o r t  2.  than we  t r u t h of some of our  but  I do  not  experiential  reports think  77  b e l i e f s on something l i k e K a n t i a n grounds, t h a t our  e x p e r i e n c e i s to be i n t e l l i g i b l e a t a l l ,  i s , on the grounds t h a t i f  then some o f our e x p e r i e n t i a l  b e l i e f s must be t r u e . (For purposes o f t h i s t h e s i s I do n o t t h i n k  i t i s necessary to  defend the assumption t h a t some o f our e x p e r i e n t i a l b e l i e f s a r e t r u e .  But  f o r c u r i o s i t y ' s sake I w i l l b r i e f l y o u t l i n e a K a n t i a n defense o f t h i s assumption.  " I f we d i d n o t assume t h a t some o f o u r e x p e r i e n t i a l b e l i e f s a r e t r u e  then we s h o u l d have no b e l i e f s about what c o n s t i t u t e s  e x p e r i e n c e s o f an o u t e r  o b j e c t i v e w o r l d , and no way of d i s t i n g u i s h i n g our own s u b j e c t i v e s t a t e s o f the e x t e r n a l w o r l d . ourselves selves.  states  from  Hence, we s h o u l d have no way o f d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  from the o u t e r o b j e c t i v e w o r l d , and we would have no concept o f ourBut s i n c e we do d i s t i n g u i s h our i n n e r  world, i t f o l l o w s  states  from an o u t e r  objective  t h a t we must assume the t r u t h o f some e x p e r i e n t i a l b e l i e f s .  N o t h i n g d i c t a t e s w h i c h o f our e x p e r i e n t i a l b e l i e f s we must assume t o be t r u e , but  we n a t u r a l l y r e t a i n those b e l i e f s which e n a b l e us t o form a coherent p i c -  t u r e o f the world.") I t would, o f c o u r s e , be c i r c u l a r  t o assume the t r u t h o f c e r t a i n  e x p e r i e n t i a l b e l i e f s i n o r d e r t o j u s t i f y a l l our b e l i e f s about e x p e r i e n c e , but I am n o t t r y i n g t o do t h a t .  I n f a c t I am d e n y i n g t h a t t h a t can be done.  The  j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f a l l o f o u r b e l i e f s about e x p e r i e n c e i s n o t something we can give. ience  That does n o t imply t h a t does n o t e x i s t .  of a c h a i n  of reasons.  of what j u s t i f i e s not  itself  the j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f our b e l i e f s about exper-  The j u s t i f i c a t i o n does e x i s t , but i t does n o t c o n s i s t I n what f o l l o w s  I w i l l t r y t o g i v e a rough  our b e l i e f s about the w o r l d .  should  be c o n s t r u e d as a j u s t i f i c a t i o n . I n an e a r l i e r c h a p t e r I argued t h a t  use  But t h i s e x p l a n a t i o n  explanation  o f language.  there a r e r u l e s g u i d i n g our  These r u l e s guide our use of p a r t i c u l a r words, p h r a s e s ,  78  and  sentences.  There a r e grammatical r u l e s as w e l l as s e m a n t i c a l  r u l e s , and  we o f t e n use o r f o l l o w these r u l e s w i t h o u t knowing t h a t we do s o . these r u l e s a r e uncovered i n s t a t i n g concept a n a l y s e s .  There a r e a l s o  t y i n g language t o e x p e r i e n c e s w h i c h can o n l y be known o s t e n s i v e l y . example, t h e r e see  i s a r u l e which may be r o u g h l y  something l i k e  'this'  i s given The  respond  s t a t e d as f o l l o w s :  t h i s you may s a y "That i s r e d . "  rules  For When you  (Wtiere the d e n o t a t i o n  of  ostensively.)  r u l e s which guide our use o f language do n o t r e q u i r e  to our experiences  linguistically.  Rather they a l l o w  t o our e x p e r i e n c e s w i t h a c e r t a i n range o f d e s c r i p t i o n s . allowing a certain l i n g u i s t i c closure  Sometimes  us t o  us t o respond  I f there  i s no r u l e  r e s p o n s e , then t h a t r e s p o n s e i s e x c l u d e d by a  r u l e w h i c h says t h a t a r e s p o n s e i s p e r m i t t e d  only  i f i t i s permitted  by a r u l e . We a r e now i n a p o s i t i o n t o e x p l a i n how l i n g u i s t i c experience are j u s t i f i e d .  What j u s t i f i e s  o f our e x p e r i e n c e i s the f a c t linguistic  descriptions of  us i n a s s e r t i n g a c e r t a i n d e s c r i p t i o n  ( n o t the b e l i e f  that i t i s a f a c t ) that our  r e s p o n s e was a r e s p o n s e t o an e x p e r i e n c e and was guided by the  r u l e s g o v e r n i n g the use o f language, i . e . , our response was  linguistically  acceptable. The  fact  t h a t our l i n g u i s t i c  i m p l y t h a t we make d e c i s i o n s  responses a r e rule-guided  o r form b e l i e f s  does n o t  t h a t we a r e f o l l o w i n g  linguistic  r u l e s c o r r e c t l y , and i t does n o t imply  t h a t we check t o see t h a t any c o n d i t i o n s  s p e c i f i e d by the r u l e s a r e s a t i s f i e d .  To f o l l o w a l i n g u i s t i c  it  s u f f i c e s to react  t o an e x p e r i e n c e i n a c e r t a i n way.  This  rule correctly r e a c t i n g t o an  e x p e r i e n c e may be a c a u s a l m a t t e r - t h e e x p e r i e n c e may be one c a u s a l  condition  79  among o t h e r c o n d i t i o n s which j o i n t l y conditions  result  i n a l i n g u i s t i c response.  Other  (not n e c e s s a r i l y c a u s a l ) which must accompany an e x p e r i e n c e , E,  i n order f o r a c o r r e c t  linguistic  response t o E to o c c u r may  f a c t o r s as w i l l i n g n e s s  t o respond  l i n g u i s t i c a l l y , and  include  previous  such  language  training, etc. There might response  seem t o be a problem i n s a y i n g t h a t a  to an e x p e r i e n c e / c a n both be p a r t i a l l y caused  'provoked  b y ' ) , and a l s o r u l e - g u i d e d .  serious i n this  case.  But I don't  linguistic  ( i n the sense of  t h i n k the problem i s  Suppose a computer i s programmed t o respond  to s t i m u l i  a c c o r d i n g to c e r t a i n r u l e s when c e r t a i n o t h e r c a u s a l f a c t o r s a r e p r e s e n t . The programming of the computer a c c o r d i n g t o c e r t a i n r u l e s then becomes one of the c a u s a l f a c t o r s which  jointly  p a r t o f the computer. e x t e r n a l s t i m u l i and may  result  in a particular  guided by c e r t a i n r u l e s .  they l e a r n these r u l e s , and can be c r i t i c i s e d though  response on the  Thus the response of the computer i s b o t h provoked Human b e i n g s , u n l i k e  not be programmed w i t h a l l the r u l e s they need  even  linguistic  t h e i r response may  be  is  i f they v i o l a t e  these  be b o t h r u l e - g u i d e d and provoked  by e x t e r n a l s t i m u l i .  rules,  provoked.  In f a c t  linguistic  by our e x p e r i e n c e s , than t h e r e  i n s u p p o s i n g t h a t the response of computers may  provoked  computers,  t o speak a language, but  I t h i n k t h e r e i s no more problem i n s u p p o s i n g t h a t human response may  both be programmed  and  the case i s easy t o make f o r human  b e i n g s , s i n c e a c o n d i t i o n u s u a l l y n e c e s s a r y f o r human l i n g u i s t i c  response i s  w i l l i n g n e s s t o respond  linguistically.  is usually voluntary.  Thus, t h e r e can be no o b j e c t i o n - t o s a y i n g t h a t  linguistic  by  T h i s means that l i n g u i s t i c  responses a r e r u l e - g u i d e d - on the grounds  response  that l i n g u i s t i c  responses  80  are  involuntary  rule-guided). haviour  (though someone might o b j e c t The r e m a i n i n g c o n d i t i o n s  i s rule-guided  f o r saying  are also s a t i s f i e d  voluntary order  t h a t our l i n g u i s t i c be-  (as I p o i n t e d  David Lewis's account of r u l e s i n an e a r l i e r r e f r e s h our memory.  t o c a l l i n g computer b e h a v i o u r  chapter.  out when I d i s c u s s e d I repeat  "A b e h a v i o u r p a t t e r n , P^, i s r u l e - g u i d e d  them now t o  i f (a) P^ i s a  system o f r e g u l a r i t i e s which a r e performed by members o f a group i n  t o a c h i e v e some end (e.g. communication) which i s m u t u a l l y d e s i r e d by  a l l members o f t h a t group, achieved  (b)  t h a t same end (communication)could be  i f members o f the group had c o l l e c t i v e l y  some d i f f e r e n t b e h a v i o u r a l  pattern,  of the group whether they a c t a c c o r d i n g  chosen t o a c t a c c o r d i n g t o  and ( c ) i t m a t t e r s  t o members  t o P^ o r 1?^ , but i t m a t t e r s t o each  member of the group t h a t he/she s h a l l a c t a c c o r d i n g patterns  little  t o whichever o f the two  most o t h e r members adopt.) Now i t may sound s t r a n g e t o say t h a t  linguistic  e x p e r i e n c e s a r e b o t h provoked and a l s o v o l u n t a r y , are voluntary  and s i n c e r u l e - g u i d e d  one might t h i n k i t s t r a n g e t o say t h a t  b o t h provoked and r u l e - g u i d e d . s t r a n g e n e s s o f these c l a i m s  But t h e r e  responses t o acts  l i n g u i s t i c responses a r e  i s no r e a l problem h e r e .  The  a r i s e s , I t h i n k , from t h i n k i n g t h a t whatever we  c a l l ' r e s p o n s e s ' must be e n t i r e l y caused by e x t e r n a l s t i m u l i , o r must be c o r r e l a t a b l e i n a 1-1 use  fashion with external s t i m u l i .  'response' i n such a narrow s e n s e .  But I do n o t i n t e n d t o  When I say t h a t some  linguistic  b e h a v i o u r i s a response t o an e x p e r i e n c e , o r i s provoked by an e x p e r i e n c e , I o n l y mean t h a t t h e l i n g u i s t i c response w i l l o c c u r whenever the e x p e r i e n c e occurs,  provided  include  things  c e r t a i n other  like willingness  conditions  are s a t i s f i e d .  These o t h e r  conditions  t o respond, h a v i n g a r e a s o n t o respond, h a v i n g  81  language t r a i n i n g , e t c . partial  I do n o t c l a i m  causes o f the l i n g u i s t i c  that  response.  these o t h e r c o n d i t i o n s a r e That q u e s t i o n  Given t h i s a c c o u n t o f the sense i n which l i n g u i s t i c by e x p e r i e n c e I see no i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y i n s a y i n g are  provoked and v o l u n t a r y .  using nor  the e x p r e s s i o n  am compelled  i s caused.  tic  conditions  both t h a t  t o , take a s t a n d on the q u e s t i o n  This  linguistic  responses  I f the r e a d e r chooses he o r she may suppose I am  (However, I am committed  response.  open.  responses a r e provoked  'provoked' i n a t e c h n i c a l s e n s e .  i n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l  i s left  conditions  to saying  I neither  intend t o ,  whether a l l human a c t i o n  that there  i s some s e t o f  which w i l l r e g u l a r l y be f o l l o w e d  by a l i n g u i s -  seems a f a i r l y s a f e c l a i m once i t i s r e a l i z e d  t o which I r e f e r i n c l u d e  things  like willingness  the i n t e r n a l  t o respond, h a v i n g  a r e a s o n t o respond, e t c . ) So f a r I have t r i e d  to explain  the j u s t i f i c a t i o n  r e s p o n s e s t o our e x p e r i e n c e s o r sense i m p r e s s i o n s . whether t h i s k i n d of d e s c r i p t i o n s descriptions  of e x p l a n a t i o n  of objective  of o b j e c t i v e  some d e s c r i p t i o n s which a r e l i k e  can a l s o be g i v e n  states of a f f a i r s ,  states of a f f a i r s  of experiences.  to explain  e.g., " T h i s  arises  the j u s t i f i c a t i o n  i s water".  For  go beyond what i s j u s t i f i e d by  those o f water, w i t h o u t our e x p e r i e n c e s a c t u a l l y b e i n g o f water.  I t h i n k much the same k i n d  i s water"? of thing j u s t i f i e s descriptions of  s t a t e s as j u s t i f i e s d e s c r i p t i o n s  that a p a r t i c u l a r o b j e c t i v e belief  The q u e s t i o n  linguistic  We a l l know t h a t we may have e x p e r i e n c e s  So what j u s t i f i e s our a s s e r t i o n " T h i s  objective  o f some  of s u b j e c t i v e  states.  s t a t e e x i s t s i s j u s t i f i e d by the f a c t  t h a t i t i s a f a c t ) t h a t our l i n g u i s t i c  r u l e s g o v e r n i n g the a p p l i c a t i o n o f words.  Our a s s e r t i o n ( n o t the  response was p e r m i t t e d by the  (Again,  our r e a c t i n g t o a n  82  experience  i n a r u l e - g u i d e d way need n o t i n v o l v e any judgements on our p a r t  t h a t the c o n d i t i o n s f o r a p p l y i n g a r u l e a r e s a t i s f i e d . to an e x p e r i e n c e may s i m p l y be provoked The  our response  by the e x p e r i e n c e . )  r u l e s which permit o b j e c t i v e s t a t e - d e s c r i p t i o n s as responses t o  e x p e r i e n c e s a r e more c o m p l i c a t e d descriptions.  Rather  Rules  l i n g u i s t i c responses l i n g u i s t i c response  than those p e r m i t t i n g s u b j e c t i v e s t a t e -  permitting objective state-descriptions w i l l t o a whole network o f e x p e r i e n c e s .  link  F o r example, the  " T h i s i s water" w i l l be p e r m i t t e d o n l y when c e r t a i n , but  f i n i t e l y many, background e x p e r i e n c e s e x i s t i n a d d i t i o n t o water-type iences.  exper-  I n g e n e r a l , background e x p e r i e n c e s w i l l be e x p e r i e n c e s o f what  philosophers o f t e n c a l l "standard c o n d i t i o n s of observation". I t s h o u l d n o t be thought responses  t h a t because o b j e c t i v e s t a t e - d e s c r i b i n g  a r e a l l o w e d by l i n g u i s t i c  r u l e s these responses must be t r u e .  the f a c t t h a t o b j e c t i v e s t a t e - d e s c r i p t i o n s a r e a l l o w e d by l i n g u i s t i c  From  rules,  g i v e n c e r t a i n f a m i l i e s o f e x p e r i e n c e s , i t o n l y f o l l o w s t h a t the o b j e c t i v e state-descriptions are j u s t i f i e d .  I t i s p o s s i b l e f o r an a s s e r t i o n , A, t o be  j u s t i f i e d by c e r t a i n e x p e r i e n c e s and y e t be f a l s e . c e r t a i n other experiences  o c c u r r e d which j u s t i f i e d  d e s c r i p t i o n i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h A.  T h i s c o u l d happen i f some o b j e c t i v e s t a t e -  I f the v a s t m a j o r i t y of our e x p e r i e n c e s  j u s t i f y a d e s c r i p t i o n i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h A, then we c o n c l u d e i n s p i t e o f the f a c t experiences.  t h a t A was i n i t i a l l y  that A i s f a l s e ,  j u s t i f i e d by c e r t a i n o f our  On the o t h e r hand, i f the v a s t m a j o r i t y o f our e x p e r i e n c e s  continue to j u s t i f y  the a s s e r t i o n t h a t A, then we c o n c l u d e  Perhaps a n example would be u s e f u l h e r e .  that A i s true.  A r u l e which would  permit  the o b j e c t i v e s t a t e d e s c r i p t i o n " T h i s i s w a t e r " might be something l i k e the  83  the f o l l o w i n g :  We may say " T h i s  experiences occur:  E-jTi^. . . E . n  i s water" i f most o f the f o l l o w i n g s e t s o f Thus i f a person has most of the e x p e r i e n c e s  E ^ . . . E , t h a t person w i l l be j u s t i f i e d n  i n claiming  may be t h a t each member o f the s e t E ^ . . . E experiences,  i s water."  And i t may be t h a t t h i s  Fj_,F ,G^,G2. • .M^,M2 i s c o n s i d e r e d  may depend i n a g i v e n  2  may be c o r r e l a t e d  t o the q u e s t i o n  So the t r u t h of the statement " T h i s  i s water"  case, upon whether t h i s f u r t h e r s e t o f c o r r e l a t e d  e x p e r i e n c e s can be made t o o c c u r .  I f t h i s f u r t h e r s e t of c o r r e l a t e d  never o c c u r s i t may be a p p r o p r i a t e  to override  water", and t o s u b s t i t u t e the judgement " T h i s not mean, however, t h a t the i n i t i a l (The  other  t o t a l s e t of c o r r e l a t e d relevant  2  whether something i s water.  Now i t  i s r e g u l a r l y correlated with  e.g., E ^ may be c o r r e l a t e d w i t h F^,F2, and E  w i t h G^,G2, and so on. experiences,  n  "This  example j u s t g i v e n  the i n i t i a l  judgement " T h i s i s  i s sulfuric acid".  judgement " T h i s  T h i s would  i s water" was u n j u s t i f i e d .  i s m e r e l y s p e c u l a t i o n on my p a r t .  want t o commit m y s e l f t o the p a r t i c u l a r s t r u c t u r e o f t h i s example. w i s h to suggest a p o s s i b l e way i n which a j u s t i f i e d , a s e t o f e x p e r i e n c e s may be o v e r r i d d e n I n t h e example j u s t d e s c r i b e d  by o t h e r  experiences  rule-guided  I do n o t I merely  response t o  experiences.)  I say "The t r u t h o f the statement  "This  i s water" may depend, i n a g i v e n c a s e , upon whether t h i s f u r t h e r s e t o f c o r r e l a t e d e x p e r i e n c e s can be made t o o c c u r . " and  There i s , i n f a c t , a d i f f i c u l t  i n t e r e s t i n g problem about what makes a statement t r u e , as opposed t o  merely j u s t i f i e d .  Some c l a i m t h a t t o say a p a r t i c u l a r o b j e c t i v e s t a t e -  d e s c r i p t i o n i s t r u e means t h a t the v a s t m a j o r i t y and  w i l l continue to j u s t i f y  o f our e x p e r i e n c e s  justify,  t h a t s t a t e - d e s c r i p t i o n , and n o t i t s d e n i a l .  This  view i s a t t r a c t i v e because i t s u p p o r t s the view t h a t we i n some way c o n s t r u c t  84  our world  from o u r e x p e r i e n c e s ,  the o b j e c t i v e s t a t e of the world possible experiences. our  and t h e r e can be no m e a n i n g f u l q u e s t i o n s which cannot be reduced t o q u e s t i o n s  about  about  On the o t h e r hand, i t does n o t seem to do j u s t i c e t o  concept o f o t h e r people to say t h a t they a r e c o n s t r u c t i o n s o f our exper-  iences.  I do n o t wish t o take a s t a n d  on t h i s  controversy  here.  I b r i n g up  the i s s u e t o p o i n t out t h a t my a c c o u n t o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n can stand whether (a) we t h i n k the c l a i m - t h a t a s s e r t i o n s which the v a s t m a j o r i t y o f our e x p e r i e n c e s j u s t i f y a r e t r u e - expresses  an a n a l y s i s o f our concept o f t r u t h , o r (b)  whether we t h i n k t h i s c l a i m expresses  some transcendent  Someone might o b j e c t t h a t my e x p l a n a t i o n e x p e r i e n t i a l b e l i e f s are j u s t i f i e d world  or metaphysical  truth.  o f how some o f our  presupposes the e x i s t e n c e o f an o b j e c t i v e  which c a u s e s , i n p a r t , c e r t a i n b e l i e f s  i n us.  F o r example, I c l a i m t h a t  we w i l l s t r o n g l y f a v o r a d e s c r i p t i o n which t h e v a s t m a j o r i t y o f our e x p e r i e n c e s justify. will  T h i s seems t o imply  support  t h a t u s u a l l y the v a s t m a j o r i t y of our e x p e r i e n c e s  a p a r t i c u l a r b e l i e f , and t h a t the s i t u a t i o n w i l l n o t o f t e n a r i s e  where our e x p e r i e n c e s or i t s d e n i a l .  do n o t s t r o n g l y s u p p o r t  either a particular assertion  The q u e s t i o n a r i s e s whether we a r e e n t i t l e d  to make  this  assumption. To answer t h i s o b j e c t i o n :  First,  assumptions which I make i n my e x p l a n a t i o n justified.  o f the p r e s e n t  assumption t h a t t h e r e experiences  o f how e x p e r i e n t i a l b e l i e f s a r e  I am o f f e r i n g a t h e o r y , and the t h e o r y  to which i t e x p l a i n s what i t i s i n t e n d e d context  I do n o t t h i n k I need t o j u s t i f y  i s confirmed  to e x p l a i n .  d i s c u s s i o n i t seems odd t o c a l l  t o the e x t e n t  Second, w i t h i n the i n t o q u e s t i o n the  i s an o b j e c t i v e w o r l d , and t h a t the v a s t m a j o r i t y o f our  w i l l support  c e r t a i n b e l i e f s and n o t o t h e r b e l i e f s .  In f a c t i t  85  seems odd i n any t h e o r e t i c a l d i s c u s s i o n objective  reality.  to question  the e x i s t e n c e  I f we do not assume the e x i s t e n c e  then what a r e we t h e o r i z i n g about?  o f an  of an o b j e c t i v e  reality,  Chapter 5  K a r l Popper, The L o g i c of S c i e n t i f i c D i s c o v e r y , I b i d . , p.  103.  I b i d . , p.  106.  London,  1968.  Chapter  6  A n a l y t i c T r u t h and Necessary  Truth  88  T h i s c h a p t e r w i l l d e a l w i t h the q u e s t i o n whether a l l n e c e s s a r y truths are a n a l y t i c .  One  way  some d e f i n i t i o n of a n a l y t i c whether a n y t h i n g about  of a t t a c k i n g t h i s q u e s t i o n would be t o examine  t r u t h , f o r example, my  the d e f i n i t i o n of a n a l y t i c  own  d e f i n i t i o n , and  t r u t h would e n a b l e us  d e c i d e the q u e s t i o n whether a l l n e c e s s a r y t r u t h s a r e a n a l y t i c . t h i s procedure  I will  to follow  here.  R e c a l l my t i o n a sentence  see  d e f i n i t i o n of a n a l y t i c  i s a n a l y t i c i f and  c o r r e c t concept a n a l y s i s .  Now,  truth.  A c c o r d i n g to that  defini-  o n l y i f i t i s a l o g i c a l consequence of a  depending  on how  we  c o n s t r u e the e x p r e s s i o n  ' l o g i c a l consequence o f a c o r r e c t concept a n a l y s i s ' we may  or may  not have a  ready answer t o the q u e s t i o n whether a l l n e c e s s a r y t r u t h s a r e a n a l y t i c . people c o n s t r u e  ' l o g i c a l consequence' i n such a way  n e c e s s a r i l y f o l l o w s from c e r t a i n premises premises.  t h a t any  Most  c o n c l u s i o n which  i s a l o g i c a l consequence of  those  Many l o g i c i a n s a l s o h o l d t h a t every n e c e s s a r y t r u t h f o l l o w s from  any  premises  whatsoever, s i n c e , i f the c o n c l u s i o n o f an argument i s n e c e s s a r -  ily  t r u e , then i t i s i m p o s s i b l e t h a t the premises  clusion false.  Given the t r u t h of my  claim that  s h o u l d be t r u e and  the  con-  ' a n a l y t i c ' a p p l i e s t o any  l o g i c a l consequence of a c o r r e c t concept a n a l y s i s , i t i s l i k e l y  that  these  l o g i c i a n s would want t o c l a i m t h a t every n e c e s s a r y t r u t h i s a n a l y t i c , s i n c e they h o l d t h a t e v e r y n e c e s s a r y t r u t h i s a l o g i c a l consequence of any  concept  analysis. Some l o g i c i a n s , however, c o n s t r u e ly.  And  i f we  do c o n s t r u e  ' l o g i c a l consequence' more narrow-  ' l o g i c a l consequence' i n a more narrow way  q u e s t i o n whether a l l n e c e s s a r y t r u t h s a r e a n a l y t i c may to answer.  But, i n a way,  the disagreement  o v e r how  we  the  be much more d i f f i c u l t should construe  the  89  expression  ' l o g i c a l consequence' may  m a t t e r how we  seem i d l e .  c o n s t r u e t h i s e x p r e s s i o n as l o n g as we  c o n s t r u i n g the e x p r e s s i o n each way?  The answer  t h i n k i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o c o n s i d e r whether c o n n e c t i o n between the mere f a c t  After a l l ,  what does i t  see the consequences o f  to this question i s t h i s :  t h e r e i s a more  I  interesting  concept a n a l y s e s and the s e t of a l l n e c e s s a r y t r u t h s than  t h a t n e c e s s a r y t r u t h s cannot be f a l s e a t the same time t h a t a  concept a n a l y s i s  i s true.  I t would be i n t e r e s t i n g t o see whether we  can f i n d  a sense f o r ' l o g i c a l consequence' i n which i t would be t r u e t o say t h a t a g i v e n n e c e s s a r y t r u t h i s a l o g i c a l consequence of one concept a n a l y s i s , but not a n o t h e r .  So l e t us c o n s i d e r whether we  can f i n d such a sense f o r ' l o g i c a l  consequence'. Most  l o g i c i a n s c l a i m t h a t we  sequences from f o r m a l v a l i d  can d i s t i n g u i s h i n f o r m a l v a l i d  consequences  (a f o r m a l l y v a l i d  one which f o l l o w s from the premises of a g i v e n argument the form o f the argument).  con-  consequence  purely i n v i r t u e of  These l o g i c i a n s would r e g a r d "x i s a  triangle;  t h e r e f o r e , x has t h r e e s i d e s " as an i n f o r m a l i n f e r e n c e , on the grounds although this  inference i s v a l i d  i t i s not v a l i d  There i s a problem, however, about how are f o r m a l l y v a l i d  Formally v a l i d  t h a t between  l o g i c a l and  non-logical  i n f e r e n c e s a r e then d e f i n e d as those i n which o n l y  l o g i c a l constants occur e s s e n t i a l l y .  (A term T i s s a i d t o o c c u r  in a valid  argument  a different  term which r e n d e r s the argument  t r u t h s a r e sometimes  which  U s u a l l y p e o p l e t r y t o make t h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n by making a n o t h e r d i s t i n c t i o n , constants.  that  i n v i r t u e of i t s l o g i c a l form.  t o d i s t i n g u i s h those arguments  from o t h e r arguments.  being  essentially  i f and o n l y i f there i s a p o s s i b l e replacement of T by invalid.)  Likewise formal  d e f i n e d as t r u e s e n t e n c e s i n which o n l y l o g i c a l  logical  constants  90  occur and  essentially.  formal  ( I t i s commonly r e c o g n i z e d  that formally v a l i d  l o g i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s a r e r e l a t e d i n t h e f o l l o w i n g way:  c o n d i t i o n a l i s formed which has as i t s a n t e c e d e n t the c o n j u n c t i o n  arguments If a o f the  premises o f a f o r m a l l y v a l i d argument, and as i t s consequent the c o n c l u s i o n of t h a t argument, then t h a t c o n d i t i o n a l i s a f o r m a l conditional i s called general sarily  the c o r r e s p o n d i n g  i f an argument i s v a l i d true.  logical  should  Such a  c o n d i t i o n a l o f the argument.  then i t s c o r r e s p o n d i n g  In  c o n d i t i o n a l i s neces-  I n what f o l l o w s I s h a l l sometimes be d i s c u s s i n g the v a l i d i t y  of an argument and sometimes the n e c e s s i t y of a c o r r e s p o n d i n g It  truth.  be understood t h a t u s u a l l y when I d i s c u s s v a l i d i t y  conditional. i n this  chapter  analogous remarks c o u l d be made about n e c e s s i t y , and v i c e - v e r s a . ) Now i f we had an adequate d e f i n i t i o n o f ' l o g i c a l c o n s t a n t '  we c o u l d  make use o f the d e f i n i t i o n s o f ' f o r m a l l y v a l i d ' and ' f o r m a l l y t r u e ' and then we could r e s t r i c t  the c l a s s o f a n a l y t i c t r u t h s t o those which a r e f o r m a l l y  consequences o f concept a n a l y s e s . 'logical constant ? 1  Arthur  valid  But do we have an adequate d e f i n i t i o n o f  There i s a n e x c e l l e n t d i s c u s s i o n o f t h i s q u e s t i o n by  Pap i n Ch. 6 o f Semantics and N e c e s s a r y T r u t h . *  Pap c o n c l u d e s  that  t h e r e i s no i m p o r t a n t d i s t i n c t i o n between i n f e r e n c e s which a r e f o r m a l l y and this  those which a r e i n f o r m a l l y v a l i d .  I w i l l b r i e f l y e x p l a i n how Pap reaches  conclusion. Pap  first  r e j e c t s attempts t o d e f i n e  enumeration o f i n s t a n c e s . of l o g i c a l c o n s t a n t s and  valid  ' l o g i c a l constant'  by complete  I t i s o f no t h e o r e t i c a l i n t e r e s t t o be g i v e n a  which i n c l u d e s s e n t e n t i a l c o n n e c t i v e s ,  list  the e x i s t e n t i a l  u n i v e r s a l q u a n t i f i e r s , the i d e n t i t y s i g n , s e t membership s i g n , but which  excludes things without being  like  ' i s l a r g e r than',  ' i s the f a t h e r o f , ' i s round', e t c . ,  t o l d why members o f the f i r s t  members o f the second l i s t  are not.  list  a r e l o g i c a l constants  I t i s even l i k e l y  while  t h a t p e o p l e would  91 d i s a g r e e about whether c e r t a i n terms, i n a complete  enumeration  e.g., the s e t membership s i g n ,  of l o g i c a l constants.  Next Pap c o n s i d e r s some proposed and  finds  1.  One proposed  belong  these i n a d e q u a t e .  definitions  of ' l o g i c a l  constant'  I w i l l d i s c u s s o n l y t h e most p l a u s i b l e  definitions.  d e f i n i t i o n i s the f o l l o w i n g :  "A term i s a l o g i c a l c o n s t a n t i f and o n l y i f i t occurs e s s e n t i a l l y i n some necessary i m p l i c a t i o n . "  Pap e a s i l y produces  p o s a l , namely:  ' t r i a n g l e ' occurs e s s e n t i a l l y i n the i n f e r e n c e schema  The word  a counter-example  to this  pro-  "x i s a t r i a n g l e ; t h e r e f o r e , x has t h r e e s i d e s " , a l t h o u g h almost no one wants to s a y t h a t 2.  'triangle' i s a logical  constant.  A m o d i f i c a t i o n o f the above p r o p o s a l i s a l s o c o n s i d e r e d by Pap.  It i s this:  "A term i s a l o g i c a l c o n s t a n t i f and o n l y i f i t occurs e s s e n t i a l l y i n e v e r y n e c e s s a r y i m p l i c a t i o n i n which i t o c c u r s " . ^ to Reichenbach. implication  He r e j e c t s i t f o r the f o l l o w i n g r e a s o n .  ((p*q) V ( q * r ) ) D  sign i s inessential commutability admits  of d i s j u n c t i o n ) .  definition  I n the n e c e s s a r y  ( ( q ' r ) V (p*q)) the o c c u r r e n c e o f the c o n j u n c t i v e  But almost  everyone,  including  t h a t the c o n j u n c t i v e s i g n i s a l o g i c a l c o n s t a n t . i t e x c l u d e s something  Pap's counter-example  t o Reichenbach's  So  Reichenbach,  Reichenbach's  which i s a l o g i c a l  constant.  d e f i n i t i o n makes use o f the  t h a t the o c c u r r e n c e o f any s e n t e n t i a l component i n a t a u t o l o g y i s  inessential. tial  this  ( t h e n e c e s s i t y o f t h e i m p l i c a t i o n r e q u i r e s o n l y the  c r i t e r i o n i s t o o narrow;  fact  pap a t t r i b u t e s  Consequently,  i f a l o g i c a l c o n s t a n t i s a p a r t of such a senten-  component i t s o c c u r r e n c e i s i n e s s e n t i a l .  counter-example  by m o d i f y i n g Reichenbach's  I suggest  t h a t we a v o i d Pap's  p r o p o s a l as f o l l o w s :  l o g i c a l c o n s t a n t i f and o n l y i f L occurs e s s e n t i a l l y  R' "L i s a  i n every v a l i d  argument  92  i n which i t o c c u r s , e x c l u d i n g those arguments where L occurs whose o c c u r r e n c e avoids  i n the v a l i d argument i s a l s o i n e s s e n t i a l . "  Pap's,counter-example.  '•' o c c u r r e d occurrence modified  i n a valid  i n f e r e n c e , but i t a l s o o c c u r r e d  c r i t e r i o n , R', would exclude  i n a sentence whose  A l s o , i t seems c l e a r t h a t the  something l i k e  ' t r i a n g l e ' from the c l a s s  F o r i n the f o l l o w i n g argument the word  i n e s s e n t i a l l y w i t h i n a sentence whose o c c u r r e n c e A triangle exists.  T h e r e f o r e , something  i n f e r e n c e the occurrence  f a c i e the occurrence  exists. but t h e r e a r e  T h e r e f o r e , something i s a d o o r . o f 'not' i s i n e s s e n t i a l .  And prima  o f 'not' i s w i t h i n a sentence whose o c c u r r e n c e  the argument i s e s s e n t i a l . proposal  'not' would n o t be a l o g i c a l  constant. t h a t we  o u r s e l v e s o n l y w i t h f o r m a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s o f v a l i d arguments.  i f we symbolize (3x)(Dx).  the argument j u s t c o n s i d e r e d we g e t :  In t h i s f o r m a l i z a t i o n the o c c u r r e n c e  as "x i s n o t r o t t e n negation  within  So i t seems t h a t a c c o r d i n g t o the m o d i f i e d  Someone might t r y t o meet t h i s d i f f i c u l t y by s u g g e s t i n g concern  1 1  occurs  F o r example, c o n s i d e r the f o l l o w i n g i n f e r e n c e ;  Some doors a r e n o t r o t t e n . In t h i s v a l i d  'triangle'  i n the argument i s e s s e n t i a l :  T h i s m o d i f i c a t i o n , R', looks p r o m i s i n g a t f i r s t , d i f f i c u l t i e s with i t .  This m o d i f i c a t i o n  I n Pap's counter-example the c o n j u n c t i v e s i g n  i n t h a t i n f e r e n c e was i n e s s e n t i a l .  of l o g i c a l c o n s t a n t s .  i n a sentence  i s inessential.  (3x)(Dx»  For  -Rx) T h e r e f o r e  o f '-Rx', which we may  And s o , the o c c u r r e n c e  read  o f '-' ( t h e  s i g n ) w i t h i n t h i s f o r m a l i z e d argument i s w i t h i n a s e n t e n t i a l  component whose o c c u r r e n c e sequently,  i f we concern  w i t h i n the v a l i d argument i s i n e s s e n t i a l .  Con-  ourselves only w i t h f o r m a l i z a t i o n s of o r d i n a r y  language arguments then the argument I have produced would n o t c r e a t e a  93  problem f o r the m o d i f i e d  criterion  However, t h e r e it  i s this.  constants.  i s something odd about the s u g g e s t i o n  We a r e a t t e m p t i n g  i s a l o g i c a l constant.  of l o g i c a l  to find  Given t h i s  a criterion  the r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t we c o n s i d e r  For  arises,  valid  the  Not e v e r y f o r m a l  i n f e r e n c e s , and n o t e v e r y t r a n s l a t i o n  ment i n t o a f o r m a l  f o r s a y i n g whether something  only formalized  what f o r m a l i z a t i o n s o f o r d i n a r y  a r e we t o count as a c c e p t a b l e ?  considered,  g o a l i t i s odd t o i n c l u d e i n the statement  of our c r i t e r i o n the q u e s t i o n  just  language p r e s e r v e s  i n f e r e n c e , "Some doors a r e n o t r o t t e n .  language arguments  language i s a system o f  of a v a l i d  validity.  arguments.  ordinary  language argu-  F o r example, we c o u l d t r a n s l a t e  Therefore,  i n t o some s e n t e n t i a l c a l c u l u s i n the f o l l o w i n g way:  something i s a d o o r . "  "p, t h e r e f o r e q" (where  'p' and 'q' a r e s e n t e n t i a l c o n s t a n t s ) . Clearly  this  f o r m a l i z a t i o n i s unacceptable  the c r i t e r i o n  under c o n s i d e r a t i o n .  the c r i t e r i o n  i n question  ordinary They a r e :  (a) a l l e x i s t i n g inventory  to advance a c r i t e r i o n tory of l o g i c a l three  false  for logical  s i d e s " as a v a l i d  (b)  language arguments.  calculus  preserves  constants.  constants  the v a l i d i t y  r a i s e s two s e r i o u s  At best, a l o g i s t i c o f those o r d i n a r y  of .  problems.  l o g i c a l systems  pre-  I t would h a r d l y make sense inven-  therefore, T  language, then i t i s j u s t  system p r e s e r v e s  i n v i r t u e o f form.  restricting  w h i c h presupposes a p r i o r  argument i n o r d i n a r y  the v a l i d i t y  i n some s e n s e , v a l i d  problem by  I f we count "T i s a t r i a n g l e ,  formalized  ordinary  restriction  f o r m a l i z a t i o n s of a c c e p t a b l e  of l o g i c a l  constants.  t h a t any e x i s t i n g  this  to f o r m a l i z a t i o n s which preserve  language arguments, but t h i s  suppose a p r i o r  has  We m i g h t a v o i d  f o r purposes o f 'applying  the v a l i d i t y  of a l l  system s u c h as the p r e d i c a t e language arguments w h i c h a r e ,  Now we m i g h t c o n s t r u e  the expression  94  ' o r d i n a r y language argument which i s v a l i d to those arguments  i n v i r t u e of form' as  which can s u c c e s s f u l l y be t r a n s l a t e d  system, but t h i s r a i s e s  the problem c i t e d  the n o t i o n of an  "ordinary  i n v i r t u e o f form" by c o m p i l i n g a l i s t  o r d i n a r y language l o g i c a l c o n s t a n t s . because i t a g a i n r a i s e s  into a formal l o g i s t i c  i n (a).  On the o t h e r hand we might t r y t o c l a r i f y language argument which i s v a l i d  referring  of  But t h i s a l t e r n a t i v e i s f r u i t l e s s  the q u e s t i o n "What i s a l o g i c a l c o n s t a n t ? "  I n view of the problems  just cited,  I doubt t h a t  t h e r e i s any hope  of s a l v a g i n g the c r i t e r i o n f o r l o g i c a l c o n s t a n t s which a p p e a l s t o any d e f i n e d n o t i o n of a f o r m a l i z e d v a l i d  precisely  argument.  F o l l o w i n g the next t h r e e paragraphs I w i l l o f f e r a vague account of l o g i c a l c o n s t a n t s and f o r m a l systems which bypasses these problems. vague a c c o u n t o f f o r m a l l y v a l i d  arguments  my  does not meet the s t a n d a r d s o f  c l a r i f i c a t i o n which Reichenbach and Pap have been Pap d i s c u s s e s a n o t h e r way  But  applying.  i n which Reichenbach t r i e s  between l o g i c a l and n o n - l o g i c a l terms, and t h a t i s as f o l l o w s :  to d i s t i n g u i s h non-logical  terms a r e d e n o t a t i v e terms - terms which denote o b j e c t s , p r o p e r t i e s , e t c , , whereas l o g i c a l terms do not denote a n y t h i n g and cannot be reduced o r d e f i n e d i n terms of d e n o t a t i v e  terms.  Pap e a s i l y produces a counter-example out t h a t we  to t h i s d e f i n i t i o n by  c o u l d c o n s t r u e the l o g i c a l c o n s t a n t 'or' as d e n o t i n g a two-place  r e l a t i o n a l property.  And  i n g e n e r a l we  c o u l d c o n s t r u e a l l the s e n t e n t i a l  c o n n e c t i v e s as d e n o t i n g t r u t h - f u n c t i o n a l r e l a t i o n a l p r o p e r t i e s . expression  Thus,  the  'p o r q' c o u l d be c o n s t r u e d as s a y i n g t h a t the p r o p o s i t i o n s  "p"  and " q " s a t i s f y a p a r t i c u l a r t r u t h - f u n c t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p , denoted by  pointing  'or'.  If i t i s objected  t h a t we  i . e . , the one  c o u l d not c o n s t r u e e x i s t i n g  truth-  95  f u n c t i o n a l c o n n e c t i v e s as d e n o t i n g  r e l a t i o n a l p r o p e r t i e s , because they do  not have the a p p r o p r i a t e meaning, then we c o u l d r e p l y t h a t i t would be easy to c o n s t r u c t a p r o p o s i t i o n a l c a l c u l u s C, i s o m o r p h i c p r o p o s i t i o n a l c a l c u l u s D, such p r o p e r t i e s correspond  t o some e x i s t i n g  t h a t terms i n C which denote  relational  t o terms i n D which a r e t r u t h - f u n c t i o n a l  connectives.  That would show t h a t we c o u l d c o n s t r u c t a l o g i s t i c system i n which the l o g i c a l constants  denoted t r u t h - f u n c t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  would be d e n o t a t i v e terms, and, i n f a c t , as a l o g i c a l c o n s t a n t ,  Such l o g i c a l  i f we count  constants  the s e t membership s i g n  then some l o g i c a l c o n s t a n t s now denote  relationships.  F o r the s e t membership s i g n denotes the r e l a t i o n a l p r o p e r t y o f s e t membership. Perhaps even the q u a n t i f i e d between a f o r m u l a  1  denotes a r e l a t i o n which h o l d s  and a l l o b j e c t s i n the u n i v e r s e o f d i s c o u r s e , namely, the  r e l a t i o n s h i p " s a t i s f i a b l e by". 1  '(x)  I t i s c e r t a i n l y arguable, a t least,  ( x ) ' does denote t h i s r e l a t i o n - a t l e a s t as a r g u a b l e  as t h a t words  'even' and 'as' denote ( I assume Reichenbach would want t o s a y t h a t and  that like 'even'  'as' a r e n o t l o g i c a l terms, i . e . , they do denote.) Looking  back, we see t h a t a l l the proposed d e f i n i t i o n s  of 'logical  c o n s t a n t s ' we have c o n s i d e r e d have s e r i o u s problems, even when m o d i f i e d t o meet i n i t i a l  objections.  I think i t u n l i k e l y  between l o g i c a l and n o n - l o g i c a l c o n s t a n t s can do i s g i v e a vague account l o g i c a l constants.  t h a t any c l e a r  can be drawn.  distinction  Perhaps the b e s t we  o f the d i f f e r e n c e between l o g i c a l and non-  We might say t h a t l o g i c a l c o n s t a n t s a r e terms which most  f r e q u e n t l y have e s s e n t i a l o c c u r r e n c e s following suggestion i s b e t t e r .  in valid  inferences.  Or perhaps the  Those e x p r e s s i o n s a r e l o g i c a l  which may s u c c e s s f u l l y be taken as c o n s t a n t s  constants  i n a very general theory of v a l i d  96  inference. a formal  I f by t r e a t i n g a g i v e n s e t o f terms as c o n s t a n t s  system o f i n f e r e n c e s , i n a f a i r l y  t h a t s e t o f terms l o g i c a l c o n s t a n t s . d e f i n e d as those directly, as  those  i n which o n l y  constants  Therefore,  and  we have n o t attempted t o d e f i n e  This i s important,  i n a very  g e n e r a l and f a i r l y  as an e x p l a n a t i o n  'validity'  (except  inferences,  account o f f o r m a l  can c e r t a i n l y  not be taken  s i n c e my account  i n terms o f l o g i c a l consequences, which can o n l y  i n terms o f v a l i d i t y and n e c e s s i t y i n g e n e r a l . e.g., Quine, would r e j e c t  o f l o g i c a l consequence, l o g i c a l  the c o n c l u s i o n  and e n t a i l m e n t ) .  theory  that  t r u t h , and f o r m a l v a l i d i t y can  i n terms o f v a l i d i t y and n e c e s s i t y i n g e n e r a l .  founded a l o g i c a l  (analyticity  or not,  i n terms of n e c e s s i t y ) .  "Mr. Strawson on L o g i c a l Theory" Quine c a u s t i c a l l y  f o r having  inferences i s  of v a l i d  o f the concepts o f n e c e s s i t y and v a l i d i t y ,  i s given partly  o n l y be e x p l a i n e d article  note two  which does n o t presuppose the concepts o f v a l i d -  Now some p h i l o s o p h e r s , our n o t i o n s  and o t h e r  i n f e r e n c e s as a subset  and n e c e s s i t y , then my account o f a n a l y t i c i t y  explained  inferences  economical  i n f e r e n c e s , we should  because i f t h e r e i s no s a t i s f a c t o r y  v a l i d i t y and f o r m a l d e d u c t i o n  be  Or, more  B i s n o t l a r g e r than A" i s f o r m a l l y v a l i d  We have d e f i n e d f o r m a l l y v a l i d  of a n a l y t i c i t y  essentially.  f o r example, whether the i n f e r e n c e "A i s  (b)  ity  occur  between f o r m a l l y v a l i d  I t i s l e f t unclear,  l a r g e r than B.  i n f e r e n c e s may then be  and d e f i n e f o r m a l l y v a l i d  t h i s a c c o u n t of f o r m a l  (a) the d i s t i n c t i o n  l e f t vague.  valid  consider  inference.  I f we a c c e p t things,  Formally  i n f e r e n c e s which c o u l d occur  system o f v a l i d  e c o n o m i c a l way, then we may  l o g i c a l constants  we might bypass l o g i c a l  we can c o n s t r u c t  on " t o o s o f t  attacks  In h i s Strawson  and f r i a b l e a k e y s t o n e "  Quine would o b j e c t w i t h e q u a l s t r e n g t h i f  97  Strawson had founded h i s system upon the concepts o f n e c e s s i t y and v a l i d i t y . (In  fact  Strawson was n o t d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between n e c e s s i t y and  i n h i s book on l o g i c a l  theory).  v a l i d i t y and n e c e s s i t y  i n s o f a r as we understand f o r m a l  truth.  Quine b e l i e v e s  'Formal v a l i d i t y ' and ' l o g i c a l  t h a t we o n l y  t r u t h ' should  understand  v a l i d i t y and l o g i c a l  be d e f i n e d ,  to Quine, i n terms o f "statement forms which a r e l o g i c a l , c o n t a i n i n g no c o n s t a n t s  analyticity  according  i n the sense o f  beyond l o g i c a l v o c a b u l a r y , and ( e x t e n s i o n a l l y )  i n the sense t h a t a l l statements e x e m p l i f y i n g  the form i n q u e s t i o n  valid,  a r e true."-^  Quine admits t h a t " l o g i c a l v o c a b u l a r y i s s p e c i f i e d . . .only by enumeration'.', and  admits f u r t h e r t h a t  does n o t r e a l l y  this  enumeration i s a p p a r e n t l y  arbitrary.^  come t o terms w i t h the problem o f d e f i n i n g  Perhaps Quine t h i n k s  i t unnecessary t o d e f i n e  he  thinks a s u f f i c i e n t  is  t h a t they have always been r e c o g n i z e d  ' l o g i c a l constant'  'logical  ' l o g i c a l constant',  r e a s o n f o r t a k i n g c e r t a i n terms as l o g i c a l  Quine has no answer t o the c o n c l u s i o n  So Quine  as such by l o g i c i a n s .  constant'.  o r perhaps constants  I n any c a s e ,  I have so f a r d e r i v e d , namely,  can o n l y be d e f i n e d  i n terms o f the g e n e r a l  that  concepts o f  v a l i d i t y or necessity. But there  l e t us t e m p o r a r i l y  suppose, f o r the sake o f argument,  c o u l d be a c o r r e c t account o f l o g i c a l  constants  suppose an u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f v a l i d i t y o r n e c e s s i t y . to d e f i n e  logical  that  which d i d n o t pre-  Then i t would be p o s s i b l e  t r u t h s i n the way Quine wants t o do, namely, as those  which remain t r u e under a l l r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f n o n - l o g i c a l c o n s t a n t s . I w i s h t o p o i n t o u t , i s t h a t any a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h i s  definition  t r u t h presupposes p r i o r i n t u i t i o n s about what i n f e r e n c e s truths are necessary.  F o r the q u e s t i o n  truths What  of l o g i c a l  a r e v a l i d and what  a r i s e s , how c o u l d we e v e r d e c i d e , f o r  98  example, t h a t a l l r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of n o n - l o g i c a l c o n s t a n t s non-contradiction,  -(P'-p),  leave  the  the number of r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of law  t r u t h of the  'p' are  i n f i n i t e , we  under every p o s s i b l e r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .  t h a t a l l r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of the  t h a t we  cannot e s t a b l i s h f o r m a l  i t y w i t h o u t p r e s u p p o s i n g t h a t we n e c e s s a r y and t h a t we way  we  way  prove the  law  are v a l i d .  of n o n - c o n t r a d i c t i o n  i n e s s e n t i a l i s t h a t we  t h a t i s , the  law  Quine i s wrong when he  can  i s n e c e s s a r i l y true. claims  see  nothing  about what t r u t h s a r e  of l o g i c .  v a l i d without appealing  i n a general  t r u e and  way  the prove  of We  the cannot  t r u t h of f o r m a l  i t is s i l l y  t h a t the  i n the law  valid-  are  to p r e t e n d  is logically  t h a t the concept of l o g i c a l  formally  c o u l d not  Because of t h i s  f i r m e r f o o t i n g than the concepts of v a l i d i t y and  test  that c e r t a i n truths And  of  Since  t r u t h value  know t h a t a l l o c c u r r e n c e s of n o n - l o g i c a l c o n s t a n t s  c o n t r a d i c t i o n are false,  know, a p r i o r i ,  that c e r t a i n inferences  i n any  c o u l d not  law do not a f f e c t the law  law  unaffected?  Furthermore, we  law w i t h o u t p r e s u p p o s i n g the v a l i d i t y of some o t h e r get away from the f a c t  law  i n the  true.  The  law of non-  c o u l d not I think  be  that  t r u t h i s on a much  necessity.  We  can  say  what i n f e r e n c e s  are  formally  to i n t u i t i o n s of n e c e s s i t y  and  validity. I have been a r g u i n g  t h a t the concepts of v a l i d i t y and  more fundamental than the concepts of f o r m a l v a l i d i t y and Pap  and  and  formal  t h a t we  I have s e r i o u s doubts whether we t r u t h from o t h e r k i n d s  can  is correct).  logical  of n e c e s s a r y t r u t h ( u n l e s s my  necessity?  I t would be  reasoning  suggestion  which can  Given t h i s p o s i t i o n someone might ask,  your a c c o u n t of v a l i d i t y and  are  t r u t h . Both  even d i s t i n g u i s h f o r m a l  draw the d i s t i n c t i o n i n terms of those i n f e r e n c e s  systematized  necessity  p o i n t l e s s to  be "What i s  define  99  n e c e s s a r y t r u t h s as of  the c l a s s of a l l a n a l y t i c t r u t h s s i n c e your  'analytic truth' involves  the concept of l o g i c a l consequence, which  an u n d e r s t a n d i n g of v a l i d i t y and and we  necessity?"  necessity.  Answer, I don't.  learn ostensively.  I t r a i n s , so i t n e c e s s a r i l y f o l l o w s validity  So how  We  use  rules.  I f you  similiar  the modals  'can'  and  the r u l e s you  'can't'  a l l the  "You can  grow."  cases. can't  We do  involves  validity  n e c e s s i t y are  t h a t the s p i n a c h w i l l  from t h i s and  a b i d e by  define  " I f i t r a i n s , then the s p i n a c h  i d e a of n e c e s s i t y from p l a y i n g games w i t h r u l e s . breaks the  do you  I t h i n k v a l i d i t y and  Someone says,  i d e a of n e c e s s i t y and  definition  concepts  will  grow.  We  get  the  can  get  the  that, i t  o n l y make c e r t a i n moves."  time, o f t e n  to denote  absolute  p o s s i b i l i t y and i m p o s s i b i l i t y . Perhaps we  a r e now  i n a p o s i t i o n to examine the q u e s t i o n  a l l necessary truths are a n a l y t i c . t r u t h s which a r e  I have d e f i n e d  large extent  valid  inference a formally v a l i d  point  i n d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between f o r m a l l y v a l i d  any  other  purposes.  When we  say  we  of concept a n a l y s e s .  is  false.  those  at least f o r  we  i f i t i s impossible Unfortunately  the  a  be  no analyses  present  l o g i c a l consequences of valid  consequences  r e s u l t of making a b s o l u t e l y every n e c e s s a r y  a c c e p t the t h a t the  f o r our  have  call  consequences of concept  c o u l d mean that a n a l y t i c t r u t h s a r e any T h i s has  We  C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e r e may  t h a t a n a l y t i c t r u t h s a r e any  t r u t h a n a l y t i c , provided only  inference.  a r b i t r a r y whether we  v a l i d consequences of concept a n a l y s e s ,  concept a n a l y s e s  and  a n a l y t i c t r u t h s as  l o g i c a l consequences of a c o r r e c t concept a n a l y s i s .  reason to b e l i e v e t h a t i t i s t o a  and  whether  p r i n c i p l e t h a t an argument i s v a l i d i f premises are  intuitions,  t r u e w h i l e the  t h i s has  n e c e s s a r y t r u t h which i s Goedel's i n c o m p l e t e n e s s  the  conclusion  r e s u l t that  theorem i s a l o g i c a l  the con-  100 sequence o f the concept a n a l y s i s of " b r o t h e r " . We might t r y t o a v o i d  t h i s p a r a d o x i c a l r e s u l t by r e s t r i c t i n g  consequences t o those consequences of v a l i d be r e a d i l y s y s t e m a t i z e d  or included  would r u l e o u t r u l e s o f i n f e r e n c e Goedel's theorem".  i n f e r e n c e s which i n f e r e n c e s can  i n a general  like,  logical  theory  of inference.  "From any premise you may  This  infer  But\Jiat about the r u l e o f i n f e r e n c e which says t h a t we  may i n f e r any n e c e s s a r y t r u t h from any premise whatsoever?  That i s a v a l i d  r u l e o f i n f e r e n c e which i s o f g e n e r a l  form and which i s i n c l u d e d  systems o f modal l o g i c .  t h a t r u l e o f i n f e r e n c e , then we a r e  once a g a i n  stuck with  I f we a c c e p t  paradoxical results.  i n some  ( F o r example, w i t h i n a p a r t i c u l a r  formal  system which i n c l u d e d t h i s r u l e o f i n f e r e n c e we might d e r i v e t h e  result  t h a t Goedel's theorem i s a n e c e s s a r y t r u t h .  we d e r i v e the r e s u l t  Then by a p p l y i n g  this  rule  t h a t Goedel's theorem i s a l o g i c a l consequence o f "2+2=4".)  However, I c a n t h i n k o f no r e a s o n , o t h e r  than ad hoc r e a s o n s , f o r e x c l u d i n g  t h i s as a r u l e of i n f e r e n c e f o r our p u r p o s e s .  So why n o t a c c e p t  t h e para-  d o x i c a l r e s u l t t h a t e v e r y n e c e s s a r y t r u t h i s a l o g i c a l consequence o f any concept a n a l y s i s , and a c c e p t analytic?  I f the r e a d e r  the c o r o l l a r y t h a t e v e r y n e c e s s a r y t r u t h i s  finds this  or she i s welcome t o c o n s t r u e appropriate.  We c o u l d c o n s t r u e  result  too c o u n t e r i n t u i t i v e to accept,  he  ' l o g i c a l consequence' as n a r r o w l y as seems ' l o g i c a l consequence' t o mean  consequence i n the p r e d i c a t e c a l c u l u s , f o r example.  logical  T h i s might have t h e  e f f e c t o f making many n e c e s s a r y t r u t h s , e.g., t r u t h s o f a r i t h m e t i c , nonanalytic  ( s i n c e s e t t h e o r y may a l s o be r e q u i r e d  a r i t h m e t i c from a s e t o f d e f i n i t i o n s ) .  to d e r i v e  the t r u t h s o f  I t does n o t much m a t t e r which conven-  t i o n we adopt as l o n g as we r e a l i z e t h a t we a r e a d o p t i n g  conventions.  I f we  101  construe result  ' l o g i c a l consequence' v e r y b r o a d l y we w i l l have  that a l l necessary  the L e i b n i z i a n  t r u t h s a r e a n a l y t i c and v i c e - v e r s a .  I f we  construe  ' l o g i c a l consequence' v e r y n a r r o w l y we w i l l have the K a n t i a n r e s u l t t h a t not a l l necessary  truths are a n a l y t i c .  ( I do not mean to imply  that e i t h e r  L e i b n i z o r Kant a r r i v e d a t these r e s u l t s by the k i n d of r e a s o n i n g I have been  presenting.)  102  Chapter 6  1  2  A. Pap, Semantics and Necessary T r u t h , New Haven, Ibid.,  p. 136.  3 Quine, The Ways of Paradox, pp. 138-9. 4  I b i d . , p. 139.  1958.  Chapter  7  C o n v e n t i o n and N e c e s s a r y  Truth  104  In the p r e c e d i n g c h a p t e r I examined the q u e s t i o n whether a l l necessary truths are a n a l y t i c .  The  t r u t h s a r e a n a l y t i c , p r o v i d e d we very broadly.  c o n c l u s i o n reached was  c o n s t r u e the concept  I f , on the o t h e r hand, we  that a l l necessary  of l o g i c a l  c o n s t r u e the concept  consequence i n a more narrow, and a d m i t t e d l y a r b i t r a r y way, necessary truths are a n a l y t i c .  logical  then not a l l  In t h i s c h a p t e r I w i l l c o n s i d e r the q u e s t i o n  whether a l l n e c e s s a r y t r u t h s are the r e s u l t o f l i n g u i s t i c p h i l o s o p h e r s have i d e n t i f i e d  of  consequence  convention.  Some  the t h e s i s t h a t a l l n e c e s s a r y t r u t h s are. a n a l y t i c  w i t h the c o n v e n t i o n a l i s t t h e s i s t h a t a l l n e c e s s a r y t r u t h s a r e the r e s u l t convention. and  In what f o l l o w s I hope t o show t h a t these two  issues are  t h a t n e c e s s a r y t r u t h s a r e n o t the r e s u l t of c o n v e n t i o n - i n any  sense.  use of  'analytic'.  distinct,  interesting  Of c o u r s e , i t i s always open to someone to s t i p u l a t e a use o f  of c o n v e n t i o n ' which i s i d e n t i c a l w i t h my  of  'result  In t h a t case  my  answer t o the q u e s t i o n whether a l l n e c e s s a r y t r u t h s a r e the r e s u l t o f c o n v e n t i o n would be the same as my analytic.  answer t o the q u e s t i o n whether a l l n e c e s s a r y t r u t h s a r e  But, as I w i l l now  argue, i t would be v e r y m i s l e a d i n g to e s t a b l i s h  such a use f o r ' r e s u l t o f c o n v e n t i o n ' . necessary t r u t h (or v a l i d i f and valid  (a)  inference) results  only i f that necessary t r u t h inference) i s a v a l i d  Suppose someone c l a i m s t h a t a from our l i n g u i s t i c  ( o r the c o r r e s p o n d i n g c o n d i t i o n a l o f t h a t  consequence o f a d e s c r i p t i o n o f the  r u l e s g u i d i n g the use of some word or words i n our possible valid  conventions  language.  i n the f o l l o w i n g d i s c u s s i o n I w i l l r e f e r t o o n l y one  i n f e r e n c e / n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n a l , i t b e i n g understood  linguistic  (Wherever o f the  pair,  t h a t analogous  remarks c o u l d be made about the r e m a i n i n g member of t h i s p a i r . )  I t would  n a t u r a l t o c o n s t r u e t h i s c l a i m as i m p l y i n g t h a t n e c e s s i t y i s i n some  way  be  105  created  by  linguistic  convention (otherwise,  r e s u l t from l i n g u i s t i c c o n v e n t i o n ? ) .  Now  why  between any  'or .  For  1  two  s e n t e n c e s p and  i f p,  not  the  linguistic  .  But  necessity  linguistic  i s created  inserted  pair is true"  l i n g u i s t i c rules create  could  we  perform t h i s  may  deduction  l o g i c a l n e c e s s i t y or  rules together (validity) .  i n p a r t by  logical necessity  with c e r t a i n v a l i d  logical  But  follows:  p o i n t can be more c l e a r l y and  l o g i c a l t r u t h s and  i d e n t i c a l w i t h our r u l e s a r e , but we rules are. l i m i t e d by  The  may  not  since a v a l i d  We  may  once we  longer  s t i p u l a t e the  we  not  that  put  s t i p u l a t e what our  not  linguistic linguistic  s e t of r u l e s  In a c e r t a i n sense i t i s t r u e t h a t we  e f f e c t s w i l l o c c u r by d e c i d i n g what r u l e s  have d e c i d e d  to f o l l o w a g i v e n s e t of r u l e s we  consequences of f o l l o w i n g those r u l e s . i n this  is  as  r u l e s of i n f e r e n c e a r e  s t i p u l a t e l o g i c a l t r u t h or v a l i d i t y , and  l e a d i n g to say  inference  s t i p u l a t e what the consequences of our  the r u l e s t h e m s e l v e s .  logical  premises.  less metaphorically  consequences of c o r r e c t l y f o l l o w i n g a g i v e n  s t i p u l a t e what r u l e - g u i d e d f o l l o w , but  logically valid  linguistic rules.  inference  i t i s absurd to suppose t h a t  logical validity,  i t is  (or v a l i d i t y ) .  r u l e s of  where the c o n c l u s i o n n e c e s s a r i l y f o l l o w s from the The  may  from the f a c t t h a t we  r u l e s alone that create  logical necessity  j u s t one  of the  be  the  F o r , assuming i t makes sense to t a l k of " c r e a t i n g n e c e s s i t y " ,  Rather our create  one  'or' may  of  then p or q , which i s the c o r r e s p o n d i n g c o n d i t i o n a l of  cannot i n f e r t h a t our  validity.  provided  the use  *i  p, t h e r e f o r e , p or q we  q,  truths  c o u l d deduce some  rule guiding  example, from the r u l e "the word  r v a l i d l y derive  that necessary  suppose that we  n e c e s s a r y i m p l i c a t i o n from a d e s c r i p t i o n of the E n g l i s h word  say  can  to  can  In t h i s  are  no  sense  sense i t i s mis-  l o g i c a l n e c e s s i t y r e s u l t s from l i n g u i s t i c  convention.  106  M i c h a e l Dutnmett makes t h i s argument i n a s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t l e s s d e t a i l e d ) form when he d i s c u s s e s what he c a l l s m o d i f i e d Modified  (and  conventionalism.  c o n v e n t i o n a l i s m i s the view t h a t a l t h o u g h some n e c e s s a r y  truths are  d i r e c t r e g i s t e r s of c o n v e n t i o n , o t h e r s a r e "more o r l e s s remote consequences of c o n v e n t i o n s " . ^ we  adopt  Dummett's c r i t i c i s m of t h i s view i s , " I t appears  the c o n v e n t i o n s  r e g i s t e r e d by the axioms, t o g e t h e r w i t h  that i f  those  r e g i s t e r e d by the p r i n c i p l e s of i n f e r e n c e , then we must adhere t o the way t a l k i n g embodied i n the theorem, and us, one  t h a t we meet w i t h .  convention."  I t cannot  t h i s n e c e s s i t y must be one itself  I t may  be  true that c e r t a i n necessary  t r u t h s a r e merely  logical  c o n v e n t i o n s , but these t r u t h s  be e x p l a i n e d i n terms of c o n v e n t i o n s .  y i t surely suffices  F o r t o e x p l a i n x i n terms of  to show t h a t x can l o g i c a l l y be deduced from y.  say t h a t a n e c e s s a r y necessary  the a d o p t i o n of a  argument one might o b j e c t as  consequences of c o n v e n t i o n s , and not themselves can s t i l l  upon  2  A g a i n s t Dummett's argument and my follows:  express  imposed  of  t r u t h i s the r e s u l t  When we  of c o n v e n t i o n we mean o n l y t h a t the  t r u t h i s a l o g i c a l r e s u l t of c o n v e n t i o n , or t h a t i t can be  logically  e x p l a i n e d i n terms of c o n v e n t i o n . C o n s i d e r another ' s i s t e r ' i s t h a t we may Surely,  r u l e would e x p l a i n why  ' s i s t e r ' i s female, and  s i s t e r s are female". any  a p p l y t h i s word to a l l and  the c i t i n g of t h i s  c o r r e c t l y be c a l l e d  example, suppose the r u l e g u i d i n g our use o n l y female  of  siblings.  e v e r t h i n g which can  t h a t e x p l a i n s the t r u t h of " A l l  To be sure t h i s e x p l a n a t i o n i n v o l v e s the use of l o g i c -  e x p l a n a t i o n does. So f a r so good.  tions  But what s h a l l we  to a l l l o g i c a l l y necessary  truths.  the use of l o g i c , o r the making of v a l i d  say when we  a p p l y these c o n s i d e r a -  I f every e x p l a n a t i o n  presupposes  i n f e r e n c e s , then i n a sense we  can  107  e x p l a i n v a l i d i t y and should  n e c e s s i t y i n terms of c o n v e n t i o n ,  a l s o note the o d d i t y of s a y i n g t h a t c o n v e n t i o n  i t y and  necessity.  I f t h e r e were no v a l i d i t y and  l o g i c a l r e s u l t s and  no  explanation.  but  i f we  say t h i s  i s the source  of  valid-  n e c e s s i t y t h e r e would be  The problem i s whether we  can  cannot.  (Jonathan Bennett d i s c u s s e s  no  explain  the e x i s t e n c e of something which i s a p r e c o n d i t i o n of a l l e x p l a n a t i o n . t h i n k we  we  t h i s problem b r i e f l y  I  in  "On  3 Being Forced  to A C o n c l u s i o n " .  the e x i s t e n c e at a l l .  concludes  that e i t h e r conventions  of l o g i c , or e l s e the e x i s t e n c e  I choose the (b)  He  i n " T r u t h by C o n v e n t i o n " .  g i v e s an argument s i m i l a r t o the one  o n l y i f a l l of l o g i c i s t r u e by  is  one  i n (a).  He  a l l of l o g i c as  convention.  l o g i c a l vocabulary  t r u e by  i s reduced to a few  Briefly,  The method he  to be  p r i m i t i v e s and  c a l c u l u s (completely  t h a t the b a s i c axioms and  taken as  true.  We  do not  thereby  implicitly  we  describes  one  "We  i n which  i n which the b a s i c We  then  devoid  treat  of meaning).  r u l e s of i n f e r e n c e of the  system  p r e d i c a t e t r u t h of the axioms,  t h a t would presuppose t h a t the axioms had meaning. f o r the axioms (and  convention  the method i s t h i s :  r u l e s of i n f e r e n c e have been kept to a minimum.  stipulate  that  then attempts t o show how  t r u e by c o n v e n t i o n .  the f o r m a l system as an u n i n t e r p r e t e d Next we  He  (which  p o i n t s out  of the many f o r m a l i z a t i o n s of the p r e d i c a t e c a l c u l u s ;  axioms and  are  In t h a t a r t i c l e  -one  Dogmas of E m p i r i c i s m " ) Quine  I presented  commonly known as i m p l i c i t d e f i n i t i o n .  take the  4  l o g i c a l consequences of s t i p u l a t i v e d e f i n i t i o n s w i l l be  might c o n s t r u e  explained  to c o n s i d e r a n o t h e r v e r s i o n of c o n v e n t i o n a l i s m  c o n t a i n s much t h a t Quine l a t e r r e j e c t s i n "Two  the  l o g i c cannot be  latter alternative.)  I t u r n now  which Quine d i s c u s s e s  of  explain  Rather we  establish a  f o r t h e i r p a r t s ) by d e s c r i b i n g the  use  circumstances  108  i n which they may be counted as t r u e . c i r c u m s t a n c e s whatsoever.  We count l o g i c a l axioms as t r u e i n any  (More a c c u r a t e l y , o u r f o r m a l  system c o n t a i n s  axiom  schemas and i n f e r e n c e schemas, and we s t i p u l a t e t h a t a l l s u b s t i t u t i o n i n s t a n c e s o f these schemas a r e t o be counted as t r u e and v a l i d , r e s p e c t i v e l y ) . T h i s appears t o s o l v e validity  r e s u l t from c o n v e n t i o n  t r u e and v a l i d  the problem o f how l o g i c a l n e c e s s i t y and directly.  L o g i c a l axioms and i n f e r e n c e s a r e  because we use them as i f they were t r u e and v a l i d , and i t i s  the use o f an e x p r e s s i o n  which determines i t s meaning.  Our l i n g u i s t i c  b e h a v i o u r i s such t h a t we l e t the l o g i c a l p a r t i c l e s have any meaning which preserves  the v a l i d i t y o f o u r i n f e r e n c e s .  When we a r e d e a l i n g w i t h a f o r m a l  system, the s t i p u l a t i o n s as t o which axioms a r e t r u e and which i n f e r e n c e s a r e v a l i d a r e made e x p l i c i t and a r e v e r b a l i z e d . these s t i p u l a t i o n s a r e n o t made e x p l i c i t . formal  In ordinary  language, however,  What j u s t i f i e s us i n t a k i n g the  system as a model f o r what happens i n o r d i n a r y  language i s the f a c t  t h a t t h e r e i s a correspondence between s e n t e n c e s and i n f e r e n c e s which a r e accepted as  w i t h i n the f o r m a l  t r u e and v a l i d  system and sentences and i n f e r e n c e s which we  i n ordinary  regard  language."  There a r e numerous problems w i t h  the " i m p l i c i t  of the o r i g i n o f l o g i c a l n e c e s s i t y j u s t d e s c r i b e d .  d e f i n i t i o n " account  Here a r e some o f them  ( t h o s e due t o Quine a r e so i n d i c a t e d ) . 1.  (Quine)  A b s o l u t e l y any body o f d o c t r i n e can be rendered t r u e by d e f i n i t i o n  i f we f o l l o w the method we have c o n s i d e r e d . t h a t the axioms o f p h y s i c s in  F o r example, we c o u l d s t i p u l a t e  a r e t r u e by l e t t i n g  those axioms take on the r e q u i r e d sense.  r e s u l t o f f o r m a l i z i n g the axioms o f p h y s i c s  the p r i m i t i v e terms  occurring  As i n the case o f l o g i c , the and s t i p u l a t i n g  t h e i r t r u t h would  109  preserve  our o r d i n a r y b e l i e f s about which sentences of p h y s i c s a r e t r u e , and  which a r e f a l s e .  Unfortunately,  such a procedure would n o t p r e s e r v e  d i n a r y b e l i e f s about what sentences a r e n e c e s s a r y contingent.  Therefore,  our o r -  and what sentences a r e  those who h o l d t h a t t h e . n e c e s s i t y o f l o g i c and math-  ematics d e r i v e s from i m p l i c i t d e f i n i t i o n must e x p l a i n why we c o n v e n t i o n a l l y treat  the axioms o f mathematics and l o g i c as t r u e , but do n o t so t r e a t the  axioms of p h y s i c s and every  other e m p i r i c a l science.  Quine suggests an e x p l a n a t i o n , namely, t h a t we t r e a t l o g i c and mathematics as t r u e by c o n v e n t i o n , t h e o r i e s , because o f t h e i r a p r i o r i n a t u r e our c o n c e p t u a l a p r i o r i nature  scheme.  but  i n contrast with physical  o r because they a r e v e r y deep i n  Quine's e x p l a n a t i o n  i s u n s a t i s f a c t o r y , however.  o f l o g i c and mathematics i n o r d i n a r y  why we t r e a t c e r t a i n f o r m u l a t i o n s  o f these  the axioms o f  language may e x p l a i n  d i s c i p l i n e s as c o n v e n t i o n a l l y t r u e ,  i t cannot e x p l a i n why we t r e a t these d i s c i p l i n e s as c o n v e n t i o n a l l y  when they a r e expressed  i n unformalized  ordinary  c l a i m t h a t the o r d i n a r y language e x p r e s s i o n s a priori  i f they had some meaning.  d e c i s i o n to treat these  conceptual  language.  We c o u l d  true  only  o f l o g i c and mathematics were  But on the a c c o u n t we a r e c o n s i d e r i n g our  l o g i c and mathematics as t r u e by c o n v e n t i o n  d i s c i p l i n e s w i t h meaning.  The  i s what endows  S i n c e m e a n i n g l e s s t h e o r i e s a r e n o t i n any  scheme, we can h a r d l y d e c i d e  t o t r e a t a meaningless theory as  c o n v e n t i o n a l l y t r u e on the grounds t h a t the meaningless t h e o r y  is a priori.  2.  of the b a s i c  (Quine)  When we s t i p u l a t e t h a t a l l s u b s t i t u t i o n i n s t a n c e s  axiom schema and i n f e r e n c e schema o f some l o g i c a l t h e o r y a r e t o be counted as the  t r u e we do so i n o r d e r  t o render  a l l l o g i c t r u e by c o n v e n t i o n .  But from  f a c t t h a t a l l s u b s t i t u t i o n i n s t a n c e s o f the b a s i c axiom schema a r e t r u e  110  we can d e r i v e by  inference.  the r e s u l t t h a t a p a r t i c u l a r s u b s t i t u t i o n i n s t a n c e This  inference  system under c o n s i d e r a t i o n , o n l y axiom and i n f e r e n c e  i s true  only  i s n o t i t s e l f an i n f e r e n c e made w i t h i n the  s i n c e the system under c o n s i d e r a t i o n  schema - n o t p a r t i c u l a r i n f e r e n c e s .  contains  Hence any  p a r t i c u l a r s u b s t i t u t i o n i n s t a n c e we can name w i l l n o t be t r u e p u r e l y by convention.  I t w i l l be the j o i n t  r e s u l t o f c o n v e n t i o n and i n f e r e n c e .  We  might t r y t o a v o i d  t h i s consequence by s t i p u l a t i n g t h a t each and e v e r y sub-  s t i t u t i o n instance  of a p a r t i c u l a r schema i s t r u e .  an 3.  infinite  repeat  a l i s m , s i n c e t h a t i s the k i n d  Dummett's o b j e c t i o n t o m o d i f i e d  of conventionalism  o b j e c t i o n , remember, i s t h a t even g r a n t i n g  Quine d e s c r i b e s .  conventionDummett's  t h a t a l l the axioms and r u l e s o f  o f a system r e g i s t e r c o n v e n t i o n s t o t a l k a c e r t a i n way, we  cannot e x p l a i n why we must a c c e p t a c e r t a i n theorem g i v e n of i n f e r e n c e , u n l e s s  we presuppose the v a l i d i t y  still  the axioms and r u l e s  of c e r t a i n l o g i c a l  C o n v e n t i o n s , by themselves, cannot e x p l a i n t h e i r own consequences. see  with  task.  A t t h i s p o i n t we c o u l d  inference  But then we a r e f a c e d  inferences. We can  t h a t Dummett's o b j e c t i o n i s r e l a t e d t o Quine's o b j e c t i o n a t (2), i n s o f a r  as b o t h o b j e c t i o n s  p o i n t out t h a t c o n v e n t i o n , by i t s e l f , Logic  i s also  does n o t s u f f i c e t o  get  us moving, l o g i c a l l y s p e a k i n g .  required.  4.  Quine a l s o makes the p o i n t t h a t even the v e r b a l f o r m u l a t i o n  of our a d o p t i o n  of the axioms and r u l e s o f i n f e r e n c e as c o n v e n t i o n s presupposes the use o f l o g i c a l v o c a b u l a r y , i . e . , the v e r y  idioms which we a r e p u r p o r t i n g  a l l y define.  I t seems, t h e r e f o r e ,  t h a t a l l l o g i c cannot be t r u e by c o n v e n t i o n  i f we r e q u i r e  l o g i c a l vocabulary,and consequently l o g i c ,  conventions.  to convention-  t o even f o r m u l a t e  Ill  Quine suggests a way t h a t i n o r d i n a r y language need n e v e r be v e r b a l i z e d .  of a v o i d i n g t h i s o b j e c t i o n .  the c o n v e n t i o n to adopt Indeed,  p o i n t s out  c e r t a i n ways of s p e a k i n g  i f a l l l i n g u i s t i c c o n v e n t i o n s had  i n t r o d u c e d by e x p l i c i t v e r b a l agreement, language ground,  He  s i n c e we would need a language  to be  c o u l d never get o f f the  to s t a r t a language.  Consequently,  t h e r e i s no need t o suppose t h a t the c o n v e n t i o n s to adopt c e r t a i n axioms r u l e s o f i n f e r e n c e i n o r d i n a r y language Thus the problem  i s avoided.  ever were, o r ever need be  verbalized  That our l i n g u i s t i c b e h a v i o u r i s guided  c o n v e n t i o n , someone c o u l d m a i n t a i n , i s shown by the r e g u l a r i t y our  and  by  linguistic  b e h a v i o u r e x h i b i t s , q u i t e a p a r t from e x p l i c i t v e r b a l c o n v e n t i o n s . Quine does n o t r e j e c t at  least).  this  solution  (not i n " T r u t h by  He does p o i n t out, however, t h a t the i d e a t h a t  Convention"  t h e r e might  be  u n v e r b a l i z e d , u n e x p l i c i t c o n v e n t i o n s which a r e m a n i f e s t e d by b e h a v i o u r a l r e g u l a r i t y i s i n need of c l a r i f i c a t i o n .  I have argued  ( i n an e a r l i e r  t h a t such a c l a r i f i c a t i o n has been g i v e n by D a v i d L e w i s , the c r i t e r i a (c) follows. in  I am  f o r r u l e - g u i d e d n e s s which I d e s c r i b e d i n c h a p t e r  chapter  referring  to  4.  The next v e r s i o n o f c o n v e n t i o n a l i s m I wish t o c o n s i d e r i s as  " L o g i c a l n e c e s s i t y and v a l i d i t y  result  from l i n g u i s t i c  the sense t h a t i f any person d e n i e s a n e c e s s a r y t r u t h , S, we  conventions are  justified  i n c o n c l u d i n g t h a t the person does not know the meaning o f some word or words i n S, i . e . , does n o t know a l l the l i n g u i s t i c all  or p a r t o f S."  c o n v e n t i o n s g u i d i n g the use of  F o r example, i f someone a s s e r t s  the sky i s b l u e " i s t r u e , but d e n i e s t h a t "Grass  i s g r e e n " i s t r u e , we  have t o c o n c l u d e t h a t the person does not know how the person's use o f  'and' i s not guided by  t h a t "Grass i s green  to use the word  the p r o p e r r u l e s .  and  would  'and', i . e  I f the person  112  d i d not b e l i e v e t h a t "Grass i s g r e e n " i s t r u e , then he o r she i s not perm i t t e d by the r u l e s g u i d i n g the use o f w i t h any  other sentence.  t h a t we may  insert  Roughly,  'and' t o c o n j o i n "Grass  the r u l e g u i d i n g our use o f  'and' o n l y between sentences  A l t h o u g h the example we a l o t more i s r e q u i r e d  have j u s t  t o demonstrate  t h a t we  i s green" 'and' i s  b e l i e v e are  true.  c o n s i d e r e d i s a c o n v i n c i n g one,  t h a t whenever a person d e n i e s a  neces-  sary t r u t h or v a l i d  i n f e r e n c e t h a t person d i s p l a y s a m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g of some  p i e c e o f language.  F o r the example we  a case.  There  special  seems t o be no room f o r m i s t a k e , o t h e r than a l i n g u i s t i c  when, f o r some we  have j u s t c o n s i d e r e d i s much too  p and q , one a s s e r t s  r  p  and q*  and d e n i e s p.  can e x p l a i n the v a l i d i t y of the i n f e r e n c e from  r  p and q"  1  t o p by  the r u l e s g u i d i n g our use o f the word  'and .  more complex and cannot be so c l o s e l y  linked with l i n g u i s t i c  the use o f l o g i c a l p a r t i c l e s .  But o t h e r v a l i d  1  In t h i s  one, sense  describing  inferences are rules  governing  Because one can know a l l the l i n g u i s t i c  rules  g u i d i n g our use of l o g i c a l v o c a b u l a r y w i t h o u t s e e i n g a l l the consequences these r u l e s , one can f a i l  t o see t h a t v a l i d i t y o f a complex i n f e r e n c e w i t h o u t  thereby d i s p l a y i n g a misunderstanding one  can know a l l  of any  l o g i c a l vocabulary.  Likewise,  the r u l e s of chess w i t h o u t s e e i n g a l l the consequences  these r u l e s i n a p a r t i c u l a r chess board s i t u a t i o n .  T h i s i s not a  i n t e r e s t i n g t o see why it i s t r u e .  To t h i s end I w i l l  be  t r y t o e x p l a i n i n more  f o r example, i t i s p o s s i b l e f o r someone to deny even so simple  a n e c e s s a r y t r u t h as t h a t 7+5=12 w i t h o u t  thereby d i s p l a y i n g a misunderstanding  of any a r i t h m e t i c a l symbol o r i g n o r a n c e of any My  of  new  o b s e r v a t i o n , o r a v e r y c o n t r o v e r s i a l o b s e r v a t i o n , but I t h i n k i t would  d e t a i l how,  of  e x p l a n a t i o n i s as f o l l o w s ;  linguistic  Suppose we  conventions.  take F r e g e ' s account  of  113  numbers t o be c o r r e c t .  On t h i s s u p p o s i t i o n numbers a r e s e t s .  The number  z e r o , f o r example, can be d e f i n e d as the s e t o f a l l o b j e c t s which a r e n o t self-identical. is  The number one can be d e f i n e d as the s e t whose o n l y member  the number z e r o .  members  The number two can be d e f i n e d as the s e t whose o n l y  a r e the numbers one and z e r o .  can be c o n s t r u e d  as the s e t S whose o n l y members  which occur e a r l i e r on every  other  an o r d e r e d ,  And so on.  zero  c o n s i s t o f a l l the numbers  i n the s e r i e s o f s e t s than S.  theory  Each number a f t e r  On t h i s a c c o u n t , and  o f numbers which i s adequate, t h e i n t e g e r s c o n s t i t u t e  l i n e a r s e r i e s of o b j e c t s .  T h i s means t h a t we can s a f e l y view the  whole numbers as a s e r i e s o f p o i n t s on a l i n e , some numbers a p p e a r i n g i n the s e r i e s than o t h e r s . a number which occurs '5'. no  But the f a c t  convention;  Now i t i s a c o n v e n t i o n  sequently, not  later  t h a t we use '12' t o denote  l a t e r i n the number s e r i e s than the number we denote by  t h a t the number so denoted o c c u r s  i t i s something g i v e n t o u s .  l a t e r i n the s e r i e s i s  Thus even the simple  t r u t h t h a t 12 i s g r e a t e r than 5 i s n e i t h e r a c o n v e n t i o n , of c o n v e n t i o n .  indeed  Rather i t i s the j o i n t  arithmetic  n o r p u r e l y the r e s u l t  r e s u l t of convention  and f a c t .  Con-  t h e t r u t h t h a t 12=5+c, where 'c' denotes some p o s i t i v e number, i s  p u r e l y the r e s u l t o f c o n v e n t i o n .  We a l l know t h a t c t u r n s  number 7, but t h a t c=7 once had t o be d i s c o v e r e d ;  out t o be the  i t i s not a convention.  way t o d i s c o v e r t h a t c=7 i s t o count the i n t e g e r s i n the c l o s e d i n t e r v a l 6 t o 12.  Now i t i s p o s s i b l e t o make a m i s t a k e i n c o u n t i n g w i t h o u t  d e m o n s t r a t i n g t h a t one m i s u n d e r s t a n d s any numerals o r how t o c o u n t .  One from  thereby As a  consequence i t i s p o s s i b l e t o t h i n k t h a t 7+5=13, and t o deny t h a t 7+5=12,without  thereby  or t o c o u n t .  d i s p l a y i n g t h a t i n g e n e r a l one does n o t know how t o use numerals  114  I have p o r t r a y e d our d i s c o v e r y t h a t 7+5=12 as a d i s c o v e r y o f f a c t . The  q u e s t i o n a r i s e s , how do I r e c o n c i l e t h i s view w i t h the common b e l i e f  t h a t "7+5=12" i s an a p r i o r i n e c e s s a r y  truth?  I will  t r y t o answer  this  question. We can f o r m u l a t e a g e n e r a l r u l e f o r a d d i n g numbers. number x t o a number y s t a r t w i t h the s e r i e s and count,  To add a  immediate s u c c e s s o r t o x i n the number  i n o r d e r , the i n t e g e r s f o l l o w i n g x u n t i l you a r r i v e a t the  y t h such i n t e g e r .  The y t h i n t e g e r w i l l be the sum o f x and y.  Now, i n a  sense, when we sum two numbers a c c o r d i n g t o the r u l e j u s t g i v e n we make a n empirical discovery; concerned rule  we a r e c o u n t i n g some o b j e c t s .  But the o b j e c t s we a r e  w i t h , i . e . , the i n t e g e r s , can be generated  ( e . g . , c o n s t r u c t each number by a d d i n g  number i s z e r o . )  a c c o r d i n g t o an exact  one t o i t s a n t e c e d e n t .  I n t e g e r s a r e a l s o named a c c o r d i n g t o a n e x a c t  summation procedure  i s purely a rule-guided process.  r e s u l t o f a p a r t i c u l a r summation i s determined  The f i r s t  r u l e , and the  So, i n a sense, the  by the r u l e f o r g e n e r a t i n g  i n t e g e r s , the naming r u l e , and by the r u l e g u i d i n g t h e process  of summation.  Of c o u r s e , i n a p a r t i c u l a r case i t i s always p o s s i b l e t o miscount by a c c i d e n t ally  o m i t t i n g an i n t e g e r o r by c o u n t i n g t w i c e .  an i n d i v i d u a l count correctly,  i s contingent.  In t h a t sense the r e s u l t o f  But, p r o v i d e d we f o l l o w the c o u n t i n g  the r e s u l t o f an i n d i v i d u a l count  rules  o f the i n t e g e r s between 5 and 12  i s not contingent. Analogous remarks can be made c o n c e r n i n g  l o g i c a l proofs.  Suppose we  b l i n d l y a p p l y some r u l e s o f i n f e r e n c e t o a s e t o f premises and generate a n unexpected c o n c l u s i o n . rule  Each s t e p i n our p r o o f i s the r e s u l t o f a p p l y i n g a  (which may i m p l i c i t l y embody a c o n v e n t i o n )  but the c o n c l u s i o n we generate  115  comes as a s u r p r i s e to us. deduced from our  And  when we  d i s c o v e r t h a t our  o r i g i n a l s e t of premises we  I t i s , of c o u r s e ,  contingent  i s not  whether the c o n c l u s i o n  contingent  t h a t we  t i o n of the r u l e s of i n f e r e n c e . certain conclusion  follows  d i s c o v e r a f a c t , pure and  generated the c o n c l u s i o n we can be generated by  When we  logically  which stand  question,  from p a r t i c u l a r premises we  g i v e n the v a l i d  There i s more to be s a i d . proof are  rule-guided  processes  We  see  does not  i n v e s t i g a t i o n are determined, given c o r r e c t l y , and  can  how  do we  i t i s not objects  f a c t t h a t summation  and  s u f f i c e to e x p l a i n the s o u r c e of the  r e s u l t s of a p a r t i c u l a r  investigated.  e x p l a i n why  given  e x p l a i n the f a c t  that i n t e r v a l ?  W e l l , we  i n t h a t i n t e r v a l we  someone who  counts the  integers  that there are 7 integers i n that  t h a t t h e r e a r e , and  c o u l d p o i n t out  c o u l d not be  must be,  that unless  t h e r e were 7  t a l k i n g about t h a t i n t e r v a l .  change through time the r e l a t i o n s between numbers do not  time.  C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e r e w i l l always be  criteria  the f a c t  t h a t the r u l e s g o v e r n i n g our use  interval.  integers  Since  numbers  change through  7 integers i n that i n t e r v a l .  f o r i d e n t i t y of numbers i s e x a c t .  Also  I t h i n k t h i s r e s u l t s from  of numerals a r e  the  seven i n t e g e r s i n  do n o t  the  But  the c l o s e d i n t e r v a l from 6 to 12 w i l l always count 7 i n t e g e r s , p r o v i d e d  count i s c o r r e c t l y made, and But  in a particular  t h a t the i n v e s t i g a t i o n i s c a r r i e d out  g i v e n the f a c t s b e i n g  F o r example, we  a  l o g i c a l consequence t o premise. t h a t the  n e c e s s a r y t r u t h , though i t might e x p l a i n why  in  stand  that a  discover  r u l e s of i n f e r e n c e , whether  i n the r e l a t i o n R a r e r e l a t e d as  simple.  d i d , but i t  proof,  r e l a t i o n R to the p a r t s o f the p r e m i s e - s e n t e n c e s .  a contingent  be  correct applica-  d i s c o v e r , i n a given  f a c t , namely,that the p a r t s of the c o n c l u s i o n - s e n t e n c e geometrical  c o n c l u s i o n can  p e r f e c t l y exact.  116  This exactness  i s p o s s i b l e because numbers do n o t change through  time, and  because (as we have noted) the r e l a t i o n s between numbers do not change  through  time. I t h i n k the case i s s i m i l i a r f o r l o g i c a l terms. t h e i r use a r e v e r y e x a c t , because two sentences  The r u l e s g u i d i n g  e i t h e r stand i n a p a r t i c u l a r  t r u t h - f u n c t i o n a l r e l a t i o n o r they do n o t .  Consequently,  i d e n t i t y of l o g i c a l truths i s very exact.  Perhaps a l l n e c e s s a r y  t h i s kind of exactness. (d)  T h i s i s not v e r y c l e a r , but I t h i n k i t i s s u g g e s t i v e . brand  A c c o r d i n g t o Dummett, W i t t g e n s t e i n once b e l i e v e d t h a t  t r u t h which we a c c e p t as n e c e s s a r y  c e r t a i n way.  truths involve  I t u r n now t o d i s c u s s Dummett's view o f W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s  of c o n v e n t i o n a l i s m . any  the c r i t e r i a f o r  F o r example,  expresses a convention to t a l k a  the m a t h e m a t i c a l  t r u t h t h a t 7+5=12 i s not a  consequence o f c o n v e n t i o n , b u t i s i t s e l f a c o n v e n t i o n .  7+5=12 because our  c r i t e r i o n f o r s a y i n g t h a t someone has added 7 and 5 c o r r e c t l y i s t h a t the r e s u l t be  12. At f i r s t  g l a n c e t h i s k i n d o f c o n v e n t i o n a l i s m seems v e r y i m p l a u s i b l e .  One i s tempted t o say t h a t i t i s n o t open t o us t o s t i p u l a t e the t r u t h o f 7+5=12, because the t r u t h o r f a l s i t y  of t h a t statement  i s already  determined  by the c o n v e n t i o n s we have l a i d down g o v e r n i n g a d d i t i o n i n g e n e r a l .  For  example, we might c o n s t r u e the c o n v e n t i o n g o v e r n i n g a d d i t i o n as f o l l o w s : o b t a i n the sum a+b s i m p l y count b d i g i t s p a s t t h e number a i s the sura o f a and b . 7 digits  p a s t the number 5.  p a s t the number a .  and  The b t h d i g i t  Thus, t o add 7 t o 5 we s i m p l y  The 7 t h d i g i t we count w i l l be the sum.  c e r t a i n l y seems t h a t the sum o f 7+5 i s determined  by t h i s  to  counting  count  Now i t  procedure,  any c o n v e n t i o n we l a y down d i c t a t i n g what t h i s sum s h o u l d be runs t h e  117  r i s k of c o n f l i c t i n g w i t h the c o n v e n t i o n s c o u l d n o t , f o r example, s t i p u l a t e would c o n f l i c t w i t h o t h e r  we  have a l r e a d y l a i d  t h a t the sum  of 7+5  determined  by e x i s t i n g c o n v e n t i o n s  of c o u n t i n g r u l e s ?  i n the sense t h a t whoever counts  number 12,  f o r i t i s always p o s s i b l e to m i s c o u n t .  determined  by any  proof are f a l l i b l e .  Consequently,  have counted  p r o c e s s e s we  c o r r e c t l y or c a r r i e d  5 o b j e c t s i t i s convenient  a c o r r e c t summation of 7 and So far we  suggested  Likewise,  5.  But  once we  i s not  i s not  p r o o f we  c o r r e c t l y deduced.  whether a count was We  We  out the proof c o r r e c t l y .  t o make the sum,  12,  the  But  matter.  theory  and  t h i s answer i s  do not need t o take  have independent ways of c h e c k i n g ,  c o r r e c t l y made, o r whether a theorem was  counts.  We  f o r example, correctly derived.  the person  then check to make sure t h a t each o b j e c t  numbered by a d i f f e r e n t number and  i n the c o r r e c t sequence.  the  result  made a c c o r d i n g to the r u l e s .  can check someone's c o u n t i n g of a s e t of o b j e c t s by h a v i n g the o b j e c t s as he  of  criterion  this i s purely a p r a c t i c a l  was  us.  And  of 12 when c o u n t i n g a c o l l e c t i o n  c o n s i d e r t h a t we  m e r e l y check to see whether each move  con-  c o n c l u s i o n on  a r r i v a l a t an orthodox r e s u l t as the c r i t e r i o n f o r s a y i n g whether the was  the  o t h e r methods of  have s t a t e d an o b j e c t i o n to W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s  T h i s i s apparent  of  need some c r i t e r i o n f o r d e c i d i n g  a p o s s i b l e answer on W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s b e h a l f .  inadequate.  sum  the sum  n e i t h e r method f o r c e s any  s i n c e , most people do a r r i v e a t a count  for  this  o b j e c t s must a r r i v e a t  Both the c o u n t i n g method and  S i n c e b o t h methods a r e f a l l i b l e  7 o b j e c t s and  7+5  The  p r o o f , s i n c e i t i s always p o s s i b l e t h a t any  c o n t a i n s some m i s t a k e .  whether we  i s 13, because  In what sense i s the sum  determined  struct  We  conventions.  W i t t g e n s t e i n might r e p l y as f o l l o w s : 7+5  down.  Of course  We  number was i t is  118  p o s s i b l e t h a t we a l l make the same m i s t a k e i n our c h e c k i n g , but the chances t h a t we would a l l a r r i v e a t the same r e s u l t by a c c i d e n t  are very  small.  C o n s e q u e n t l y , i f a l a r g e number of p e o p l e check a person's count ( p r o o f ) and a r r i v e a t the same r e s u l t , we have v e r y  good e v i d e n c e t h a t  i s c o r r e c t o r i n c o r r e c t , as t h e case may be.  the count  (proof)  T h i s , then, c o n s t i t u t e s one  i m p o r t a n t o b j e c t i o n t o the proposed answer. There a r e o t h e r  problems as w e l l .  F o r example, W i t t g e n s t e i n  has no  way o f e x p l a i n i n g why, when most people count 7+5 and a r r i v e a t 12, we can f i n d no m i s t a k e i n t h e i r c o u n t i n g , counting  rule.  i . e . , no p l a c e a t which they v i o l a t e d a  And he cannot e x p l a i n why we can always d i s c o v e r a m i s t a k e when  a p e r s o n counts 7+5 and does n o t get 12. these m a t t e r s .  Miscounting c o n s i s t s i n v i o l a t i n g a counting  a r r i v i n g a t a c e r t a i n wrong number. count  7 objects  correctly  and 5 o b j e c t s  other  12 t h i n g s .  i s t h a t they u s u a l l y f o l l o w the c o u n t i n g  and 5 o b j e c t s  and i t i s an a b s o l u t e  c o r r e c t l y , then one w i l l  T h i s n e c e s s i t y cannot i t s e l f be e x p l a i n e d  rules necessity  have  i n terms o f  c o n v e n t i o n s , however, s i n c e i t w i l l always be t r u e o f any c o n v e n t i o n s  we c i t e t h a t when they a r e f o l l o w e d Wittgenstein to m i s c o u n t .  And t h e r e  c e r t a i n r e s u l t s must o c c u r .  would be r i g h t t o p o i n t  out t h a t i t i s always p o s s i b l e  i s no v e r i f i c a t i o n o f the f a c t  t h a t 7+5=12 which  does n o t r e s t upon some f a l l i b l e procedure such as c o u n t i n g order  r u l e ; not i n  The r e a s o n p e o p l e u s u a l l y get 12 when they  ( u s u a l l y we can d i s c o v e r no m i s t a k e ) ,  t h a t i f one counts 7 o b j e c t s counted  On my account i t i s easy t o e x p l a i n  t o r e c o n c i l e t h i s f a c t w i t h the f a c t  unassailable  truth, Wittgenstein  or proof.  t h a t we a l l r e g a r d  In  7+5=12 as an  might suppose t h a t we i n f a c t t r e a t 7+5=12  as a c o n v e n t i o n , t h a t i s , we w i l l n o t a l l o w  7+5=12 to be f a l s i f i e d .  I think  119  Wittgenstein's any  r e a s o n i n g may take the f o l l o w i n g form.  proof i s f a l l i b l e ,  an a p r i o r i n e c e s s a r y "7+5=12" e x p r e s s e s lies  s i n c e any truth.  Conventions The  i n equating a p r i o r i necessary  I have argued i n an e a r l i e r c h a p t e r ,  convention.  conclusion of  proof may c o n t a i n a m i s t a k e .  a convention."  judgement can be m i s t a k e n  "The  a r e not f a l l i b l e .  "7+5=12" i s Therefore,  f a l l a c y i n this reasoning,  truths with i n f a l l i b l e  I suggest,  truths.  But, as  t h e r e i s no a b s o l u t e i n f a l l i b i l i t y . Any  - i n c l u d i n g the judgement t h a t we a r e a d o p t i n g a  W i t t g e n s t e i n would be r i g h t  to note  t h a t i f the v e r i f i c a t i o n  of  "7+5=12" i s made to r e s t upon c o u n t i n g , o r upon p r o o f of any k i n d , then t h a t verification is fallible, discovery. covered  But  the r e s u l t of t h a t v e r i f i c a t i o n comes as a  I have been a r g u i n g t h a t the f a c t  i s compatible  empirical.  and  t h a t "7+5=12" must be d i s -  with that truth's being a p r i o r i , necessary,  What ensures  the n o n - e m p i r i c a l  c h a r a c t e r of t h i s  and  non-  arithmetical  p r o p o s i t i o n i s t h a t , a l t h o u g h i t s p r o o f must be d i s c o v e r e d o r i n v e n t e d by us, t h a t p r o o f must be generated i f a p r o o f i s generated  a c c o r d i n g to r u l e s , i f i t i s to be c o r r e c t . And  a c c o r d i n g to the proper  be n e c e s s a r i l y t r u e , p r o v i d e d  argument W i t t g e n s t e i n might use  i n "On sidered  Being F o r c e d  then the c o n c l u s i o n w i l l  the premises a r e n e c e s s a r i l y t r u e .  In the p r e c e d i n g s e c t i o n I have t r i e d  i s , however, a n o t h e r  rules,  t o d i s p o s e of one p o s s i b l e  to support h i s brand  of c o n v e n t i o n a l i s m .  l i n e of argument which i s d i s c u s s e d by Jonathan to a C o n c l u s i o n " ^ .  It relates  s i m p l i f i e d account As  of Bennett's  Bennett  sees  l e d to r e j e c t  con-  What f o l l o w s i s a  r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s  i t W i t t g e n s t e i n was  Bennett  to the argument j u s t  i n t h a t i t a l s o f o c u s s e s on a problem about p r o o f .  There  argument.  modified  c o n v e n t i o n a l i s m i n f a v o r of a b o l d e r form of c o n v e n t i o n a l i s m ,  because  120  W i t t g e n s t e i n b e l i e v e d t h a t h i s b e h a v i o u r a l t h e o r y o f meaning ( t o be e x p l a i n e d i n a minute) i s i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h the t r a d i t i o n a l p i c t u r e of l o g i c a l and  committal  because m o d i f i e d c o n v e n t i o n a l i s m r e q u i r e s the t r u t h o f the t r a d i t i o n a l  p i c t u r e of l o g i c a l committal. l o g i c a l committal  Bennett  d e s c r i b e s the t r a d i t i o n a l p i c t u r e of  as t h a t a c c o r d i n g t o which we a r e a b s o l u t e l y committed t o  c e r t a i n c o n c l u s i o n s by the a d o p t i o n o f c e r t a i n premises.  (There i s no room  f o r c h o i c e on the t r a d i t i o n a l p i c t u r e o f l o g i c a l committal.) t h a t m o d i f i e d c o n v e n t i o n a l i s m does indeed t h e o r y o f l o g i c a l committal,  r e q u i r e the t r u t h o f the t r a d i t i o n a l  since according to modified  a b s o l u t e l y committed t o the t r u t h o f c e r t a i n sentences language we a d o p t .  Now i t i s c l e a r  c o n v e n t i o n a l i s m we a r e  by the c o n v e n t i o n s o f  So i f t h e r e r e a l l y i s an i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y between  Wittgen-  s t e i n ' s b e h a v i o u r a l t h e o r y o f meaning and the t r a d i t i o n a l t h e o r y o f l o g i c a l c o m m i t t a l , W i t t g e n s t e i n was r i g h t  to reject modified conventionalism.  c o n s i d e r whether such an i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y does Bennett the o n l y e v i d e n c e  exist.  d e s c r i b e s the b e h a v i o u r a l t h e o r y o f meaning as the view t h a t f o r what a p i e c e o f language means i s how we use i t . F u r t h e r -  more, " t o mean such and such by a n o i s e is j u s t t o be d i s p o s e d c e r t a i n ways."  Our use of language i s not guided  Rather,  d e f i n e s the meanings o f words and determines  rules.  r a t h e r they d e s c r i b e  Now the prima f a c i e i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y between the b e h a v i o u r a l t h e o r y o f  meaning and the t r a d i t i o n a l p i c t u r e of l o g i c a l committal  i s this.  of c e r t a i n sounds o r the w r i t i n g of c e r t a i n s i g n s a t one time one  our l i n g u i s t i c  linguistic  L i n g u i s t i c r u l e s do not p r e s c r i b e l i n g u i s t i c b e h a v i o u r , it.  t o use i t i n  by meanings o r r u l e s , as  i f meanings and r u l e s were over and above b e h a v i o u r . behaviour  L e t us  t o u t t e r i n g o r w r i t i n g any s p e c i f i c  t h i n g a t another  time.  The u t t e r i n g  cannot commit There can be  121  nothing before  i n c o r r e c t about a community's u s i n g words a c c o r d i n g time T and a c c o r d i n g  patterns meaning.  taken t o g e t h e r  to a d i f f e r e n t  p a t t e r n a f t e r T.  c r e a t e a p a t t e r n which g i v e  Thus t h e r e seems t o be n o t h i n g  t o one p a t t e r n  t o prevent  F o r the two  t h e i r words a u n i t a r y a community o f people from  a s s e n t i n g t o a c e r t a i n s e t o f w r i t t e n premises and d e n y i n g a c o n c l u s i o n we normally  t h i n k o f as b e i n g  e n t a i l e d by those  premises.  Such l i n g u i s t i c be-  h a v i o u r may be d e v i a n t w i t h r e s p e c t t o o u r l i n g u i s t i c b e h a v i o u r , say  the b e h a v i o u r i s wrong.  but we cannot  We can c o n c l u d e t h a t such a d e v i a t i n g community  must mean something d i f f e r e n t by the premises and c o n c l u s i o n than we do, but on t h e b e h a v i o u r a l  theory  o f meaning t h i s i s j u s t a n o t h e r way o f s a y i n g  the d e v i a t o r s ' l i n g u i s t i c b e h a v i o u r i s d i f f e r e n t  from o u r s .  that  We cannot s a y t o  p e o p l e i n the d e v i a t i n g community "You a r e committed t o a c c e p t i n g a c e r t a i n c o n c l u s i o n by the meaning you a t t a c h t o these  p r e m i s e s , " because what meaning  they a t t a c h t o the premises i s d e t e r m i n e d , i n p a r t , by what c o n c l u s i o n they a r e willing  t o draw.  We can form i n d u c t i v e hypotheses about o t h e r p e o p l e ' s  l i n g u i s t i c behaviour,  future  and hence about what they mean by c e r t a i n words, but  t h e r e i s no n e c e s s i t y about what people's f u t u r e l i n g u i s t i c b e h a v i o u r w i l l be like. deviate is  The p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t some sub-community o f our l i n g u i s t i c  l i n g u i s t i c a l l y from o u r community cannot be r u l e d o u t a p r i o r i .  the source  o f the problem about s a y i n g t h a t o t h e r  committed t o c e r t a i n c o n c l u s i o n s . now  community  will  This  people a r e l o g i c a l l y  Whether the problem c a n be s o l v e d we  shall  consider. I n h i s a r t i c l e "On Being F o r c e d  the b e h a v i o u r a l  theory  o f meaning w i t h  to a Conclusion"  Bennett r e c o n c i l e s  the t r a d i t i o n a l p i c t u r e o f l o g i c a l  c o m m i t t a l i n much the same way t h a t many p h i l o s o p h e r s  of science r e c o n c i l e  122  everyday s c i e n t i f i c  practice with  make room w i t h i n s c i e n t i f i c  the problem o f i n d u c t i o n .  reasoning  f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y  S c i e n t i s t s do n o t  that nature  should  cease t o be l a w l i k e - p r i m a r i l y because s c i e n c e would n o t be p o s s i b l e i n t h a t case.  Likewise  we do n o t make room w i t h i n l o g i c i t s e l f  f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t some l i n g u i s t i c sub-community w i l l d e v i a t e from us s i g n i f i c a n t l y i n t h e i r l i n g u i s t i c behaviour,  f o r i f that p o s s i b i l i t y should  be r e a l i z e d  i n a general-  i z e d way communication would breakdown, a t l e a s t i n a l i m i t e d a r e a .  Bennett  put  f o r the  the m a t t e r t h u s :  possibility  "We make no room w i t h i n the communication-game  t h a t the game w i l l become u n p l a y a b l e ,  i n s c i e n c e f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y of  j u s t as we make no room w i t h -  t h a t s c i e n c e w i l l cease t o be a p o s s i b l e k i n d  activity. The q u e s t i o n a r i s e s , what do we mean by s a y i n g "we make no room  w i t h i n l o g i c f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y expression  t o mean t h a t a l l p r o o f  of l i n g u i s t i c d e v i a t i o n " ? takes  On the b e h a v i o u r a l  what we mean by them.  i n c l u d i n g those who p o s i t  p r o p o s i t i o n s , have t r a d i t i o n a l l y s a i d .  Most p h i l o s o p h e r s  assumption t h a t one means by the premise-sentences c e r t a i n things.  The b e h a v i o u r a l  theory  theory of  T h i s agrees  the e x i s t e n c e o f would say t h a t  a s s e n t i n g t o c e r t a i n sentences commits one t o c e r t a i n c o n c l u s i o n s  other  that  t o t h e assumption t h a t we a r e d e a l i n g  w i t h people who mean by words a p p r o x i m a t e l y w i t h what most p h i l o s o p h e r s ,  this  p l a c e r e l a t i v e t o t h e assumption  we a r e n o t d e a l i n g w i t h l i n g u i s t i c d e v i a t o r s . meaning t h i s assumption i s e q u i v a l e n t  I take  o f meaning s u p p o r t s  o n l y on the  t h i n g s and n o t this  traditional  view, b u t u n l i k e t r a d i t i o n a l t h e o r i e s o f meaning the b e h a v i o u r a l  theory of  meaning does n o t i n any way e x p l a i n why people u s u a l l y draw the same c o n c l u s i o n from the same p r e m i s e s .  On the b e h a v i o u r a l  theory nothing  i s e x p l a i n e d by  123  s a y i n g t h a t people who  mean the same t h i n g s by premises P w i l l u s u a l l y draw  the same c o n c l u s i o n , and being  nothing  i s explained  committed t o c e r t a i n c o n c l u s i o n s  the p r e m i s e s .  by  s a y i n g t h a t one  can  avoid  by a s s i g n i n g a d i f f e r e n t meaning to  T h i s i s because, on the b e h a v i o u r a l  t h e o r y , what one means by  premises P i s d e t e r m i n e d , i n p a r t , by what c o n c l u s i o n s  one  is willing  to draw,  not v i c e v e r s a . So f a r I have d e s c r i b e d , the b e h a v i o u r a l proof.  As  theory  f a r as  the  t i o n t h a t c o u l d be My  i n a s i m p l i f i e d way,  of meaning w i t h  how  the t r a d i t i o n a l p i c t u r e of  r e c o n c i l i a t i o n goes, I t h i n k i t i s the best  g i v e n , but  I am  reconcilia-  reasons a r e as f o l l o w s . individuals  themselves t h a t they a r e committed to a c e r t a i n c o n c l u s i o n . I accept  both " I t i s r a i n i n g "  w i l l clear"  (Q), I can see  pollution w i l l clear" committed t o , and  behavioural accept  theory  t h a t I am And,  we  But  this  sees t h a t he or she is irrelevant  these  e x p l a i n why  we  a r e to be  fully  a r e going  to a c c e p t  premises P and  then the  pollution "The  conclusions.  Now  often f e e l  t h a t we  rational,  Q and  the must  a given conclusion.  i f t h a t p e r s o n i s not a case,  On  conclusion  R  linguistic  s i n c e , when a person  to R on a c e r t a i n u n d e r s t a n d i n g  to t h a t p e r s o n whether he or she  I  though i t might  t h a t someone must a c c e p t  r e l e v a n t to our p r e s e n t  i s committed  F o r example, i f  i n g e n e r a l , I o f t e n know what c o n c l u s i o n s  c o u l d c o r r e c t l y say  i s not  can know about  committed t o the c o n c l u s i o n  I f e e l t h a t I must a c c e p t  c o u l d know t h a t we  or she a c c e p t s  deviator.  "If i t is raining,  of meaning does n o t  Bennett's theory we i f he  (R).  (P) and  a c e r t a i n c o n c l u s i o n i f we  e x p l a i n how  it  logical  d o u b t f u l whether i t i s e n t i r e l y s u c c e s s f u l .  Bennett's t h e o r y does not e x p l a i n how  am  Bennett r e c o n c i l e s  is a linguistic  of P and  Q,  deviator.  124  Even l i n g u i s t i c d e v i a t o r s  can  be  u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the p r e m i s e s .  committed  A person can  c l u s i o n w i t h o u t even knowing whether he i s disposed  to c e r t a i n c o n c l u s i o n s f e e l and  or she  to be a l i n g u i s t i c d e v i a t o r .  be  - not  (Of c o u r s e , someone h o l d i n g  i s a l i n g u i s t i c deviator,  I t h i n k we  theory  to understand a s e t of premises i n a c e r t a i n way l i n g u i s t i c and t h a t we  other  dispositions.  f e e l compelled  But we  Now  linguistically.  this d i f f i c u l t y  of Bennett's p o s i t i o n .  claim  that  i s j u s t t o have c e r t a i n e x p l a i n the  t o a c c e p t c e r t a i n premises by a p p e a l i n g  l i n g u i s t i c d i s p o s i t i o n s i s t h a t we  i s committed  of meaning may  could hardly  l i n g u i s t i c d i s p o s i t i o n s , f o r a l a r g e p a r t of the  or  must c o n c l u d e t h a t i t i s  one's d i s p o s i t i o n s to d e v i a t e  the b e h a v i o u r a l  their  committed t o a con-  one's u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the premises which determines whether one to a c e r t a i n c o n c l u s i o n  on  fact  to our  e v i d e n c e t h a t we  present  have c e r t a i n  f e e l compelled to a c c e p t c e r t a i n  conclusions.)  c o u l d be a v o i d e d by a p a r t i c u l a r m o d i f i c a t i o n  The m o d i f i c a t i o n  is this.  Instead  of t r y i n g to  the o r i g i n of the f e e l i n g of  l o g i c a l c o m m i t t a l by  d e v i a t o r s , we  recognize  l i n g u i s t i c d e v i a t i o n i s i r r e l e v a n t t o whether  i n d i v i d u a l JJJ  or f e e l s committed to a c e r t a i n c o n c l u s i o n .  however, i s one's own  that  internal neural  state.  t a l k i n g about  explain  how  A l s o , we  may  has  b r a i n f e a t r u e s may  to  change,  a r e ever to e x p l a i n , p h y s i o l o g i c a l l y ,  assume, p e o p l e who  c e r t a i n n e u r a l o r b r a i n s t r u c t u r e s i n common. s p e a k e r , say,  learns  (Such a n e u r a l  someone passes from a p r e - l i n g u i s t i c s t a t e t o a s t a t e of  competence.)  an  What .is r e l e v a n t ,  Presumably, when one  speak a language some change o c c u r s i n one's b r a i n . or something l i k e i t , must e x i s t i f we  linguistic  c e r t a i n brain features  linguistic  speak the same language have Now,  given  t h a t an  English  unique to E n g l i s h s p e a k e r s ,  these  o c c a s i o n a l l y cause an E n g l i s h speaker to a c c e p t a c e r t a i n  125  c o n c l u s i o n once he o r she has a c c e p t e d f o r those cases where people f e e l People f e e l they must a c c e p t  c e r t a i n premises.  they must a c c e p t  This could  a particular  account  conclusion.  the c o n c l u s i o n because they a r e p h y s i o l o g i c a l l y  compelled by t h e i r n e u r a l s t r u c t u r e t o a c c e p t i t . T h i s m o d i f i c a t i o n of Bennett's p o s i t i o n does e x p l a i n why people o f t e n f e e l they must a c c e p t  a certain conclusion.  I t a l s o can be used t o  e x p l a i n a r e l a t e d problem, namely, why people who a c c e p t g e n e r a l l y can be made t o a c c e p t  the same c o n c l u s i o n .  does not a d e q u a t e l y e x p l a i n a l l a s p e c t s committal.  the same premises  But t h i s m o d i f i c a t i o n  o f the t r a d i t i o n a l p i c t u r e o f l o g i c a l  F o r example, suppose a group o f E n g l i s h speakers a l l a c c e p t e d  a  s e t o f p r e m i s e s , and suppose a l s o t h a t one day the o l d laws o f b r a i n / n e u r a l physiology  ceased t o h o l d .  would no l o n g e r  I t might then be t r u e t h a t the E n g l i s h speakers  f e e l committed  to accept  any c o n c l u s i o n s ,  l o n g e r by p h y s i o l o g i c a l l y compelled t o a c c e p t  s i n c e they would no  any c o n c l u s i o n .  But a c c o r d i n g  to the t r a d i t i o n a l p i c t u r e o f l o g i c a l c o m m i t t a l t h e group would s t i l l be committed t o c e r t a i n c o n c l u s i o n s . are  committed t o c o n c l u s i o n s  difficult  According  whether o r n o t anyone f e e l s committed.  It i s  t o s e e , t h e r e f o r e , how Bennett c o u l d e x p l a i n the e x i s t e n c e o f  l o g i c a l c o m m i t t a l i n such a c i r c u m s t a n c e considering).  ( g i v e n t h e m o d i f i c a t i o n we a r e  He might deny i t s e x i s t e n c e ,  r e c o n c i l e the b e h a v i o u r a l logical  t o the t r a d i t i o n a l p i c t u r e p e o p l e  theory  but then he would have f a i l e d t o  o f meaning w i t h  the t r a d i t i o n a l p i c t u r e o f  committal. T h i s completes my l i s t  r e c o n c i l i a t i o n o f the b e h a v i o u r a l of l o g i c a l c o m m i t t a l .  o f doubts about the success theory  o f meaning w i t h  o f Bentmett's  the t r a d i t i o n a l view  I do n o t c l a i m t h a t t h e problems I have uncovered d i s -  126  prove Bennett's view, but they a r e problems which can be a v o i d e d a l t o g e t h e r if  one r e j e c t s  w i l l show t h a t  the b e h a v i o u r a l t h e o r y of meaning.  Very l i t t l e  reflection  I have, so f a r i n t h i s t h e s i s , adopted a p o s i t i o n  w i t h the b e h a v i o u r a l t h e o r y of meaning.  inconsistent  F o r i t has been p a r t o f my  thesis  t h a t the r e g u l a r i t y which language e x h i b i t s i s e x p l a i n e d by the f a c t  t h a t our  use o f language i s r u l e - g u i d e d - r u l e - g u i d e d i n the sense t h a t t h e r e a r e r u l e s which u n d e r l i e our use of language. language i s r u l e - g u i d e d i s n o t j u s t patterns.  In my  sense of r u l e - g u i d e d , t o say t h a t  to say t h a t  language use f a l l s  into  I b e l i e v e t h a t the r u l e s which guide our use of language a r e  i n f e r r e d e n t i t i e s which e x p l a i n the r e g u l a r i t y of language i n something the way I reject  regular  i n which a computer  like  program e x p l a i n s the b e h a v i o u r of a computer.  Thus  the b e h a v i o u r a l t h e o r y o f meaning i n f a v o r of the t h e o r y which says  t h a t language use i s r u l e - g u i d e d . In "On  B e i n g F o r c e d t o a C o n c l u s i o n " Bennett says t h a t "The  of r u l e s , which i s l e g i t i m a t e i n i t s e l f ,  c o u l d m i s l e a d us i n t o d e n y i n g t h a t  l o g i c a l c o m m i t t a l i s r e d u c i b l e t o r e l a t i o n s amongst complex W i t t g e n s t e i n saw  sets of n o i s e s .  t h i s danger, and i n s i s t e d a t l e n g t h t h a t problems  meanings cannot be s e t t l e d  stress  about  j u s t by an a p p e a l t o r u l e s , because t h e r e  always remain the problem of the meanings o f the r u l e s . " t h e o r y o f r u l e s I have adopted I have i m p l i c i t l y  rejected  will  In a d o p t i n g the the simple-minded  t h e o r y of r u l e s which W i t t g e n s t e i n appears t o have i n mind.  People do not  l e a r n the r u l e s of language by b e i n g t o l d what the r u l e s a r e , r a t h e r they l e a r n the r u l e s by o b s e r v i n g p e o p l e ' s b e h a v i o u r .  And  the e v i d e n c e f o r what  l i n g u i s t i c r u l e s a person i s f o l l o w i n g i s the person's l i n g u i s t i c b e h a v i o u r n o t what the person says about r u l e s .  Consequently, i f a l i n g u i s t i c  sub-  127  community of our l i n g u i s t i c respect  t o what p r o o f s  community s t a r t s d e v i a t i n g l i n g u i s t i c a l l y  with  they a c c e p t as l o g i c a l l y v a l i d , and i f i t s members  cannot be made t o admit a m i s t a k e , then we have e x t r e m e l y good e v i d e n c e f o r saying rules are  that  t h e i r use o f some p o r t i o n o f our language i s guided by d i f f e r e n t  than our use.  This  remains t r u e r e g a r d l e s s  of what r u l e s they say they  f o l l o w i n g , s i n c e , a l t h o u g h they may say they a r e f o l l o w i n g the same v e r b a l  r u l e as we a r e ,  they may understand t h a t v e r b a l r u l e d i f f e r e n t l y from u s .  ( T h i s view seems a n a t u r a l one - Bennett even seems t o adopt t h i s view i n h i s a r t i c l e when he s a y s , of the word r e q u i r e d  "We c o u l d  show him (a l i n g u i s t i c d e v i a t o r )  t h a t h i s use  the l e a r n i n g o f r u l e s f o r our use o f i t , p l u s , as a s h e e r Q  addition,  the l e a r n i n g o f r u l e s f o r h i s use o f i t . "  language r e q u i r e s  The i d e a  t h a t the use o f  the l e a r n i n g o f r u l e s i s c l o s e l y connected w i t h the view t h a t  language use i s guided and e x p l a i n e d the b e h a v i o u r a l  7  theory  by r u l e s , and does n o t s i t h a p p i l y  with  o f meaning which Bennett endorses elsewhere i n h i s a r t i c l e .  I t has always been a p a r t o f the t r a d i t i o n a l p i c t u r e o f l o g i c a l c o m m i t t a l t h a t premises commit one t o a c e r t a i n c o n c l u s i o n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f those p r e m i s e s . p a r t i c u l a r way i s t o a l l o w linguistic rules. evidence f o r saying tic  On my t h e o r y ,  t o i n t e r p r e t premises i n a  one's use of those premises t o be guided by c e r t a i n  A l s o , on my t h e o r y , that  o n l y on a c e r t a i n  i t i s c l e a r t h a t we have v e r y  l i n g u i s t i c deviators  r u l e s from our l i n g u i s t i c  group.  are following d i f f e r e n t linguis-  C o n s e q u e n t l y , i f one adopts the t h e o r y  of r u l e s I have been d e f e n d i n g , i t i s easy t o e x p l a i n why l i n g u i s t i c do n o t p r e s e n t  a problem f o r the t r a d i t i o n a l p i c t u r e o f p r o o f .  d e v i a t o r s who r e j e c t t r a d i t i o n a l p r o o f s and  good  are following deviant  thus a r e n o t committed t o c o n c l u s i o n s  we s t a n d a r d l y  accept  deviators  Linguistic linguistic (given  rules,  12 8  standard  linguistic rules).  T h i s i s one e x p l a n a t o r y power o f the  guidedness  theory.  There a r e o t h e r s .  F o r example, on t h i s  r e a s o n why  people o f t e n f e e l t h a t  that t h e i r  l i n g u i s t i c b e h a v i o u r i s guided by c e r t a i n r u l e s .  rule-  t h e o r y , the  they must a c c e p t a c e r t a i n c o n c l u s i o n , i s I f they were t o  deny the c o n c l u s i o n which they f e e l they must a c c e p t , then they would, a t some p o i n t , be v i o l a t i n g a l i n g u i s t i c r u l e they have l e a r n e d ( w i t h o u t knowing T h i s p o i n t connects w i t h a problem mentioned of a l i n g u i s t i c  community who  the same c o n c l u s i o n .  e a r l i e r , namely, why  a c c e p t the same premises  The s o l u t i o n t o t h i s problem,  people a r e guided by the same l i n g u i s t i c  rules  it).  most members  can be made t o a c c e p t  I think, i s that  those  ( i n the r e l e v a n t a r e a s ) .  Con-  s e q u e n t l y , t h o s e people can be p r e s e n t e d w i t h an argument whose i n d i v i d u a l s t e p s a r e s m a l l enough t o enable those people to f e e l t h a t they must a c c e p t the c o n c l u s i o n o f each s t e p .  And  i f we  can get a person t o a c c e p t the immediate  c o n c l u s i o n o f each s t e p o f an argument we  can get t h a t person t o a c c e p t the  c o n c l u s i o n o f the l a s t s t e p of the argument, t h a t i s , the c o n c l u s i o n o f the entire proof. A q u e s t i o n which may  now  guide our l i n g u i s t i c b e h a v i o u r ? " l i n g u i s t i c behaviour?"  o c c u r t o the r e a d e r i s , " I n what way or "By what mechanism do r u l e s guide  T h i s q u e s t i o n was  r u l e - g u i d e d n e s s t h e o r y , but because the p r e s e n t d i s c u s s i o n I r e p e a t my I s a i d e a r l i e r that something  l i k e the way  I think l i n g u i s t i c  answered when I f i r s t  do  rules  our  i n t r o d u c e d the  the q u e s t i o n i s important and  relevant  to  answer h e r e .  l i n g u i s t i c r u l e s guide our l i n g u i s t i c b e h a v i o u r i n  i n which a computer program guides a computer.  r u l e s c o n s t i t u t e a p a r t i a l program of our b r a i n s .  In f a c t This  programming c o u l d o c c u r i f each b r a i n were i n n a t e l y programmed t o program  12 9  itself  f u r t h e r , a c c o r d i n g to the p a r t i c u l a r  p l a c e d i n , and  t h e r e i s no r e a s o n why  a neural level.  l i n g u i s t i c environment  humans c o u l d n o t do the same t h i n g , a t  I t seems p l a u s i b l e t h a t c h i l d r e n do something  they l e a r n the g e n e r a t i v e grammar o f the language C e r t a i n n e u r a l changes may consciously following a certain rule.  i t was  like  they l e a r n to  cause us to use  speak.  the word as i f we  In such a case i t may  to say t h a t the r u l e i s g u i d i n g our use o f the word.  t h i s when  were  be a p p r o p r i a t e  F o r example, i f (a) a  c r e a t u r e ' s n e u r a l s t r u c t u r e changes as a r e s u l t o f the c r e a t u r e ' s h a v i n g observed some l i n g u i s t i c r e g u l a r i t y which h o l d s by c o n v e n t i o n ( i n Lewis's s e n s e ) , and  i f (b) the l i n g u i s t i c b e h a v i o u r produced  such as would be produced  by t h a t n e u r a l change i s  by c o n s c i o u s l y f o l l o w i n g a p a r t i c u l a r r u l e ,  may  say t h a t the l i n g u i s t i c b e h a v i o u r i s guided by the l i n g u i s t i c  may  say t h i s because  (1) the r e l e v a n t  then  rule.  we  We  l i n g u i s t i c b e h a v i o u r i s b e i n g guided  by  a n e u r a l change which o c c u r r e d i n o r d e r t o e n a b l e the c r e a t u r e t o i m i t a t e a l i n g u i s t i c r e g u l a r i t y , and  (2) the l i n g u i s t i c  c o n s e q u e n t l y d e t e r m i n i n g the r e l e v a n t tic  regularity being imitated  Lewis's  sense).  linguistic  l i n g u i s t i c b e h a v i o u r , and  (3) the  linguis-  i s a r e g u l a r i t y which e x i s t s by c o n v e n t i o n ( i n  T h i s , I suggest, i s the mechanism by which c o n v e n t i o n s  guide  behaviour. Now  people's  r e g u l a r i t y being imitated i s  the q u e s t i o n a r i s e s , what i s the advantage  to saying that  l i n g u i s t i c b e h a v i o u r i s guided by r u l e s r a t h e r than by n e u r a l impulses  of a c e r t a i n k i n d .  The advantages  out i n an e a r l i e r c h a p t e r ) i f we can e x p l a i n why incorrect.  are s e v e r a l .  F o r one  thing,  (as was  pointed  suppose l i n g u i s t i c b e h a v i o u r i s r u l e - g u i d e d we  i t i s a p p r o p r i a t e t o c r i t i c i z e d e v i a n t l i n g u i s t i c b e h a v i o u r as  F o r a n o t h e r t h i n g , we  i n v o l v e d i n u s i n g the word  can e x p l a i n the obvious element  ' r a i n ' to denote  of c o n v e n t i o n  r a i n , r a t h e r than the word ' s n a i n ' .  130  A t h i r d advantage i s t h a t we can e x p l a i n (where Bennett's failed by  to e x p l a i n ) why people  the a d o p t i o n  cease t o h o l d . if  To see t h i s c o n s i d e r the f o l l o w i n g .  t o be c a r r i e d o u t , but i t would s t i l l  t o be c a r r i e d  programmed.  to a c e r t a i n  According  Likewise,  conclusion should  t o my  s h o u l d break down, then our l i n g u i s t i c  med to f o l l o w c e r t a i n r u l e s . may f a i l  be committed  o f c e r t a i n premises even i f the laws o f p h y s i o l o g y  the laws o f p h y s i o l o g y  would f a i l  would s t i l l  theory  theory,  programming  be t r u e t h a t we were program-  i f a computer breaks down i t s program  o u t , but i t w i l l remain t r u e t h a t the computer was  Now g i v e n the l i n g u i s t i c  r u l e s t h a t program o u r l i n g u i s t i c  behaviour,  and g i v e n t h a t we a r e programmed t o f o l l o w these  linguistic  t r a i n i n g ) , and g i v e n t h a t we a s s e n t  r u l e s (by o u r  t o c e r t a i n sentences,  committed t o c e r t a i n c o n c l u s i o n s , even i f the laws o f p h y s i o l o g y  we a r e  cease t o h o l d .  T h i s i s because, what c o n c l u s i o n s we a r e committed t o a r e determined by what linguistic  r u l e s we have been programmed t o f o l l o w .  The program need n o t  a c t u a l l y be c a r r i e d out f o r t h i s committment t o e x i s t , because we a r e committed to  those  c o n c l u s i o n s which we would a c c e p t  i f we d i d f o l l o w the l i n g u i s t i c  r u l e s o f our m e n t a l program.  T h i s ends my d i s c u s s i o n o f how Bennett attempts t o r e n d e r the b e h a v i o u r a l t h e o r y o f meaning compatible l o g i c a l committment.  I conclude  t h a t the two t h e o r i e s cannot be made com-  p a t i b l e and t h a t W i t t g e n s t e i n was r i g h t of  w i t h the t r a d i t i o n a l p i c t u r e o f  to reject  the t r a d i t i o n a l p i c t u r e  l o g i c a l committment g i v e n h i s a c c e p t a n c e o f the b e h a v i o u r a l t h e o r y o f  meaning.  However, I t h i n k I have g i v e n good reasons  f o r r e j e c t i n g the  b e h a v i o u r a l t h e o r y of meaning i n f a v o r o f the r u l e - g u i d e d n e s s  theory o f  13 1  meaning.  So I t h i n k W i t t g e n s t e i n was wrong t o h o l d the b e h a v i o u r a l  of meaning, and c o n s e q u e n t l y  h i s reasons  f o r r e j e c t i n g modified  convention-  a l i s m were a l s o wrong (Assuming Bennett i s c o r r e c t i n t h i n k i n g t h a t Wittgenstein's modified  b e h a v i o u r a l t h e o r y of meaning l e d to h i s r e j e c t i o n o f  conventionalism.)  theory  132  Chapter 7  ^ M i c h a e l Dummett, " W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s P h i l o s o p h y of Mathematics", r e p r i n t e d i n W i t t g e n s t e i n , e d . by P i t c h e r , Garden C i t y , N.Y., 1969, p. 424. 2  I b i d . , p. 425.  3 Bennett, "On B e i n g F o r c e d t o a C o n c l u s i o n " , Proceedings S o c i e t y , Supplementary V o l . 35, 1961. 4  Quine,  The Ways o f Paradox.  5  Bennett,  Op. C i t .  ^ I b i d . , p. 16. 7  I b i d . , p. 32.  8  I b i d . , p. 17.  9  Ibid.,  p. 32.  o f the A r i s t o t e l i a n  133  SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY  Aune, B., " I s There an A n a l y t i c A P r i o r i ? " , J o u r n a l Volume 60, 1963. Ayer, A . J . , Language,  Truth  and L o g i c , London,  of P h i l o s o p h y ,  1946.  Bennett, J . F . , (1)  " A n a l y t i c - S y n t h e t i c " , r e p r i n t e d i n N e c e s s i t y , ed. by Sumner and Woods, New York, 1969. (2) "A Myth About L o g i c a l N e c e s s i t y " , A n a l y s i s , Volume 22, 1961. (3) "On B e i n g F o r c e d t o a C o n c l u s i o n " , P r o c e e d i n g s o f the A r i s t o t e l i a n S o c i e t y , Supplementary Volume 35, 1961.  B r a d l e y , R.D., "Geometry and Necessary T r u t h " , Volume 73, 1964. Carnap, R., "Meaning and Synonomy i n N a t u r a l Volume 6, 1955.  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Review o f M e t a p h y s i c s ,  H i n t i k k a , J . , "Are L o g i c a l T r u t h s A n a l y t i c ? " , r e p r i n t e d Op. C i t . Kant, I . , C r i t i q u e of Pure Reason,  t r a n s l a t e d by N.K.  i n Necessity,  Smith, London,  K a t z , J . J . , (1) " A n a l y t i c i t y and C o n t r a d i c t i o n i n N a t u r a l Language", The S t r u c t u r e o f Language, ed. by Fodor and K a t z , Englewood C l i f f s , N.J., 1964. (2) "Some Remarks on Quine on A n a l y t i c i t y " , r e p r i n t e d i n N e c e s s i t y , Op. C i t .  1933.  134  K n e a l e , W.C.,  and K n e a l e , M. , The Development  o f L o g i c , O x f o r d , 1962.  L e w i s , D., C o n v e n t i o n , Cambridge, 1969. Mates, B., "Synonymity", U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a Volume 25, 1950.  Publications  i n Philosophy,  Pap, A., Semantics and N e c e s s a r y T r u t h , New Haven, 1958. Popper, K.R., The L o g i c o f S c i e n t i f i c D i s c o v e r y , London, 1968. Putnam, H., (1) "The A n a l y t i c and the S y n t h e t i c " , M i n n e s o t a S t u d i e s i n the P h i l o s o p h y o f S c i e n c e , I I I , ed. by H. F e i g l and G. Maxwell, M i n n e a p o l i s , 1962. (2) "Some Issues i n the Theory o f Grammar", P r o c e e d i n g s o f the T w e l f t h Symposium i n A p p l i e d Mathematics, American Mathemat i c a l S o c i e t y , P r o v i d e n c e , 1961. Quine, W.V.,  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  " T r u t h by C o n v e n t i o n " , The Ways o f Paradox, New York, 1966. "Mr. Strawson on L o g i c a l Theory", I b i d . "Carnap and L o g i c a l T r u t h " , I b i d . "Two Dogmas o f E m p i r i c i s m " , From a L o g i c a l P o i n t o f View, Cambridge, 1953. "The Problem o f Meaning i n L i n g u i s t i c s " , I b i d . "On a S u g g e s t i o n o f K a t z " , r e p r i n t e d i n N e c e s s i t y , Op. C i t .  Sommers, F., "Meaning R e l a t i o n s and the A n a l y t i c " , J o u r n a l of P h i l o s o p h y , Volume 60, 1963. Ziff,  P., Semantic A n a l y s i s , I t h i c a , 1960.  FOOTNOTE INDEX  F o o t n o t e s f o r each Chapter appear on the f o l l o w i n g pages  Chapter 1  6  Chapter 2  35  Chapter 3  45  Chapter 4  69  Chapter 5  86  Chapter 6  102  Chapter 7  132  

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