UBC Theses and Dissertations

UBC Theses Logo

UBC Theses and Dissertations

Cleavage in Ireland and integration in Europe Mallon, Catherine Mary 1991

Your browser doesn't seem to have a PDF viewer, please download the PDF to view this item.

Item Metadata

Download

Media
831-UBC_1991_A8 M25.pdf [ 3.01MB ]
Metadata
JSON: 831-1.0100835.json
JSON-LD: 831-1.0100835-ld.json
RDF/XML (Pretty): 831-1.0100835-rdf.xml
RDF/JSON: 831-1.0100835-rdf.json
Turtle: 831-1.0100835-turtle.txt
N-Triples: 831-1.0100835-rdf-ntriples.txt
Original Record: 831-1.0100835-source.json
Full Text
831-1.0100835-fulltext.txt
Citation
831-1.0100835.ris

Full Text

CLEAVAGE IN IRELAND AND INTEGRATION IN EUROPE by CATHERINE MARY HALLON .A., The U n i v e r s i t y o f S t i r l i n g , S c o t l a n d , 1988, A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES ( D e p a r t a e n t o f P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e ) We a c c e p t t h i s t h e s i s as c o n f o r m i n g t o t h e r e q u i r e d s t a n d a r d . THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA AUGUST 1991 ©Catherine Mary M a l l o n , 1991. In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of PcX-l T( cA< - ^ C i g - ^ g The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada Date to-"* A ^ ) o S b 1*VM. DE-6 (2/88) ( i i ) ABSTRACT; The o b j e c t o f t h i s s t u d y i s t o examine the i m p l i c a t i o n s a new u n i t e d s t a t e s o f Europe c o u l d have f o r a d i v i d e d i s l a n d s u c h as I r e l a n d . The purpose i s t o a s s e s s the e x t e n t t o w h i c h " P r o j e c t 1992" has a f f e c t e d , d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y , a member of t h e European Community ( E C ) , f o r which t h e r e i s s e p a r a t e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n f o r i t s n o r t h e r n and s o u t h e r n p a r t s . S p e c i f i c a l l y , t h e d i s c u s s i o n w i l l be r e l a t e d t o t h e S i n g l e European A c t (SEA) and i t s 1992 d e a d l i n e and t h e p o s s i b l e consequences f o r the I r i s h p o l i t i c a l s c e n e . Membership o f t h e EC, i t i s s u g g e s t e d , c u r r e n t l y p r o v i d e s th e i s l a n d of I r e l a n d , w i t h major o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o make r e a l p r o g r e s s . The p o t e n t i a l i s t h e r e t o g r e a t l y improve I r e l a n d ' s p r e s e n t t r o u b l e d c i r c u m s t a n c e s , i f t h e I r i s h t h e m s e l v e s w i s h t o do s o . ( i i i ) TABLE OF COMTBMT8 A b s t r a c t . ( i i ) I n t r o d u c t i o n . 1 Chapter One. A "Common European Home." 10 Chapter Two. The I r i s h C r i s i s . 19 Chapter Three. N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d . The Problem 29 P e r p e t r a t e d . Chapter F o u r . The R e p u b l i c of I r e l a n d . The 40 Problem C o m p l i c a t e d . Chapter F i v e . P r o s p e c t s f o r F u t u r e I n t e g r a t i o n 52 C o n c l u s i o n . i n Europe. R e f e r e n c e s and No t e s . 68 B i b l i o g r a p h y . 71 1 INTRODUCTION: Recently Europe has been at the center of many dramatic events. These events have taken place both insid e and outside the European Community. They have changed and are changing the nature of the Community, primarily by strengthening i t as a p o l i t i c a l e n t i t y . Great h i s t o r i c upheavals, destroying old orthodoxies and old c e r t a i n t i e s are leaving Europe with new hopes, new visio n s and a sense that the future i s blessedly open. P o l i t i c a l and id e o l o g i c a l d i v i s i o n s are disappearing. Europe, i t has been said, has emerged from a period of Eurosclerosis and Europessimism. x There has been a new discovery of Europe by Europeans, p a r t i c u l a r l y with the EC, following the adoption of the Single European Act. The Single European Act marks the culmination of several years of debate about how to restore the impetus to the process of European integration. It represents a great step forward i n the history of European integration and has a symbolic and p r a c t i c a l importance both within and outside the twelve member countries. The governments of the EC have committed themselves to grand sounding European goals and currently there i s well underway the process of passing three hundred European laws to r e s u l t i n the opening of Europe's f r o n t i e r s . The project set for 1992 aims to open up a f r o n t i e r l e s s market i n which 2 twelve nations with very d i f f e r e n t t r a d i t i o n s and systems of government w i l l co-exist and compete. In a b l i t z of speeches and advertising, European governments are proclaiming the benefits that w i l l flow from a sing l e European market of the nineties. C i t i z e n s of Europe are being t o l d that by the end of 1992 they w i l l belong to a sort of European haven and genuine common market i n which neither physical nor commercial ba r r i e r s w i l l divide them, and to a market and free trade arrangement which stands to make them a l l richer than they otherwise would be. The creation of a real common inter n a l market i s the biggest s i n g l e contribution that the community as such could make towards the restoration of Europe's i n d u s t r i a l competitiveness. It aspires to the overcoming and r e c o n c i l i a t i o n of previously warring peoples and also provides for a c l a s s i c example of how Europe can enhance the scope and capacity of what can be achieved at a national l e v e l . By 1992 the members of the EC are expected i n union to constitute a real European working order. Designed to break down the ba r r i e r s which had hitherto prevented the EC from becoming p o t e n t i a l l y the largest market i n the free world, the main aims and objectives of the Single European Act are for the provision of an economic environment i n which the industries of Europe can be more competitive on the world stage. A competitive business arrangement i s to be created to foster wealth and job 3 creation across the whole of the EC and to bring down prices and reduce i n f l a t i o n . The material benefits of the Community are obvious, and each member judges that there i s more to be gained from being i n the Community than being out. For although the par t i c u l a r balance of advantages and disadvantages varies from state to state, Community l e g i s l a t i o n aims to have a di r e c t e f f e c t on member states, o f f e r i n g the opportunity for countries to pursue s p e c i f i c i n t e r e s t s through c o l l e c t i v e action. In p a r t i c u l a r , the European Commission considers Northern Ireland an area of spe c i a l s i g n i f i c a n c e for two member states and assumes that the thrust of European economic and s o c i a l development must l o g i c a l l y involve integrating the whole island of Ireland. Its document, d e t a i l i n g the Community Support Framework 1989-93 for the north, contains clues to t h i s thinking. As with a l l aspects of EC policy, the document attaches s p e c i a l s i g n i f i c a n c e to f r o n t i e r regions. The p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t provides the main reason why Northern Ireland was made an "objective one region" and the report declares: "...that i t i s , therefore, important that the EC should contribute i n some ways towards a l l e v i a t i n g i t s consequences and, within the EC's p o s s i b i l i t i e s , make some contribution towards achieving a s o l u t i o n . " 2 The l a t e s t manifestation of E.C. assistance, the "Transportation Programme, Northern Ireland 1989-1993" has, 4 s p e c i f i c a l l y , a cross-border dimension. 9 But i t i s the Inter-Reg Programme which w i l l r a i s e north-south co-operation to new heights. The Inter-Reg Programme which covers the years 1990-1994 w i l l have a budget of ECU 800 million."* This, i n p a r t i c u l a r , provides a tangible commitment to integration within Ireland (as does the Community's support for organizations l i k e Co-operation North). The fact that, since the announcement of such an i n i t i a t i v e i n early 1990, there has been l i t t l e comment, might appear simply to r e f l e c t the underlying s e n s i t i v i t y of a programme with a large budget, capable of transforming north-south r e l a t i o n s . Reinforcing the EC's i n t e r e s t i n the cross-border dimension within the islan d of Ireland i s also i t s substantial subvention to the International Fund, amounting to more than ECU 200 m i l l i o n over the next two to three years. There e x i s t those p o l i t i c i a n s (and businessmen with investments on both sides of the border), therefore, who hope that the EC w i l l ultimately help provide a settlement of the p a r t i t i o n problem by contributing to the convergence of the northern and southern economies and by making re-u n i f i c a t i o n with the Republic more palatable to the north. There i s , at the same time, a special r o l e for the EC to a s s i s t the B r i t i s h government i n disentangling i t s e l f p o l i t i c a l l y from Northern Ireland and from a problem that has spanned eight centuries, from the very f i r s t time B r i t a i n involved herself i n the a f f a i r s of Ireland. 5 B r i t a i n presents i t s e l f as an honest broker i n Ireland, desperately t r y i n g to e s t a b l i s h peace between the two h o s t i l e communities of the north. But i t s involvement i s partisan. Since the Northern Ireland state i s a partisan creation, B r i t a i n i s upholding a state which represents the victory of one community over another; discrimination against n a t i o n a l i s t s and Catholics i s b u i l t into i t s very being. B r i t i s h p o l i t i c i a n s , moreover, have insulated themselves from the more general problems of the region and have proved themselves incapable of understanding the various d i f f i c u l t i e s there. Furthermore, Direct Rule from London i s not, i n fact, considered a long term s o l u t i o n to the I r i s h problem. It e x i s t s mainly because the variety of settlements, t r i e d i n the past, f a i l e d to command enough l o c a l support to succeed. There i s the hope now, though, that a new s o l u t i o n can be found with future European assistance. Positive intervention on the part of the "new" EC, be i t i n economic, p o l i t i c a l or s o c i a l terms should improve, at least, B r i t a i n ' s own track record i n the governance of the island, and increase the amount of f i n a n c i a l aid and support Ireland already receives. B r i t a i n and Ireland are currently the only two members of the European community with such an acute outstanding t e r r i t o r i a l quarrel. In 1922, a f t e r one of the f i r s t wars of national independence i n modern times, the majority of the 6 I r i s h people established the p o l i t i c a l l y independent state which i s now the Republic of Ireland. Sovereignty over Northern Ireland rests with the B r i t i s h crown i n parliament but i s disputed by the Republic, whose constitution claims right to j u r i s d i c t i o n over the whole isla n d . The I r i s h state claims j u r i s d i c t i o n over the s i x I r i s h counties which constitute Northern Ireland and remain part of B r i t a i n , and the B r i t i s h government refuses to relinquish sovereignty. The i s l a n d of Ireland, however, constitutes a s i n g l e geographical e n t i t y , i t s natural unity destroyed as a result of conquest and colonization, with the existence of a separate s i x county state standing i n basic contradiction to the natural national unity of the whole country. Northern Ireland i s regarded by the Republic as a fragment society having broken away from a larger society of which i t was once an i n t e g r a l part. In so far as t e r r i t o r i a l contiguity i s s i g n i f i c a n t i n theories of nationalism, the proponents of I r i s h nationalism would argue that the whole state of Ireland should occupy the i s l a n d to i t s e l f . For them, geography, not to mention the history of Ireland and Great B r i t a i n , should lead to the existence of two separate isla n d states. The f e e l i n g of I r i s h nationalism, moreover, i s already so well established i n both Northern and Southern of Ireland that i t provides a strong source of i d e n t i t y . There i s the problem within the north-east corner of the I r i s h i s l and, though, that not everyone has the same 7 sense of i d e n t i t y and a r i v a l r y now e x i s t s between two d i f f e r e n t n a t i o n a l i s t groupings. In contrast to the I r i s h N a t i o n a l i s t s , comprising one t h i r d of the state of Northern Ireland, there are, at the same time, those descendants of the o r i g i n a l s e t t l e r s sent to colonize Ireland more than three hundred years ago, the Ulster Unionists. Comprising two th i r d s of the population, they refuse to accept I r i s h r e - u n i f i c a t i o n , i n s i s t i n g instead on the continued integration of the area with the B r i t i s h mainland. Their differences, i n c i d e n t a l l y , have never been confined to party competition. Religion and disagreement about national i d e n t i t y have led Ulster Protestants and Unionists and I r i s h Catholics and N a t i o n a l i s t s to take up arms to s e t t l e matters outside Parliament, and the whole p o l i t i c a l b a t t l e has been waged largely by violence on the stree t s . Both parts of Ireland accept the need for violence as a necessary means to the i r p o l i t i c a l ends. Discord had been i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d for centuries and i t s i n t e n s i t y involved the use of force to break the deadlock. Yet, a l l the inhabitants of Ireland, north and south, are now within an EC which i s making a big push towards integration. Integration within Europe i s linked to greater integration within Ireland, for integrating Europe involves integrating Ireland. European integration i s a dynamic 8 process i n which one step i n v i t e s and leads on naturally to others. Within the new Europe which has now opened up there are provided the conditions for an evolving and modernizing integration of the whole i s l a n d . For Ireland, partitioned as i t i s , a Europe without borders i n the future has e s p e c i a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t implications. The 1992 programme of European integration i s fast becoming an important economic and s o c i a l determinant, and a p o l i t i c a l stimulant i n the islan d of Ireland. Yet i s the p o s s i b i l i t y of progress ultimately to be held back by the by-products of h i s t o r i c B r i t i s h p o l icy and the r i v a l r i e s of Ulster Unionism and I r i s h Nationalism, on the one hand, or retarded by the parochialism of economic and other i n t e r e s t s i n the Republic on the other? The European Parliament CEP) provides the opportunity for members from Northern Ireland and the Republic to discuss t h e i r s o c i a l as well as economic problems i n an assembly that i s accepted as legitimate by both. The f a c i l i t i e s and encouragement given by the European Commission and the projects carried out through Community funds enable regular meetings to take place on a l o c a l and national l e v e l between I r i s h p o l i t i c i a n s from both sides of the border. These are meetings, i n c i d e n t a l l y , which take place amidst the c o n f l i c t within the province of the north, and o f f e r the hope of possible r e c o n c i l i a t i o n . 9 The growth i n mutual understanding among the participants could well be the i n v i s i b l e power which eventually leads to genuine peace and j u s t i c e on the island of Ireland. The European framework has also made i t easier for the B r i t i s h government (especially a f t e r much barren negotiation) to o f f i c i a l l y discuss with the I r i s h government the problems of Northern Ireland and to foster an improvement i n Anglo-Irish r e l a t i o n s . More s i g n i f i c a n t l y , whereas the B r i t i s h government has t y p i c a l l y f a i l e d to deal adequately with the problems of the north, there now e x i s t s a provision i n the Single European Act which s t i p u l a t e s that anything that can not be carried out s a t i s f a c t o r i l y at the l o c a l , regional or national level i s to be managed at the European l e v e l . The completion of the inter n a l market within the EC, scheduled for 1992, holds out major opportunities from the Ir i s h point of view, both north and south. In a wider European p o l i t i c a l perspective, with a l l the s t r a t e g i c s o c i a l and economic consequences of membership, integration into a s i n g l e market i s expected to create the f e e l i n g of common destiny among a l l EC countries despite t h e i r differences. This should contribute to a l l a y i n g some of the differences between the two Irelands, thus drawing them closer together and improving th e i r present s i t u a t i o n . Such, at least, i s the hope that underlies t h i s thesis. 10 CHAPTER ONE: A COMMON EUROPEAN HOME. As a consequence of World War II, the countries of Western Europe were demoted to a subordinate place i n world a f f a i r s , facing increased competition from the United States and Japan, as well as the Third World. Hence the governments of Europe have pre-occupied themselves with a c o l l e c t i v e approach and with attempts to erect a more manageable and e f f e c t i v e p o l i t i c a l unit at some "supra-national" l e v e l . The increasing cohesion throughout these years has resulted i n the recognizable integration of Western Europe today. Having long recognized the need to consider, not only defense, but also s o c i a l and economic decisions within some wider a l l i a n c e , and i n an attempt to maintain peace and prosperity, several of the smaller powers and medium sized states of Western Europe came together i n 1952 to remove the customs f r o n t i e r , the main symbol of the d i v i s i o n s between the countries of Europe, and to erect a common external t a r i f f . This was followed by moves towards the eventual creation of a common market which came into being i n the Treaty of Rome i n 1957. This European Economic Community (EEC) set up rules to eliminate the monopoly of trade, thus protecting the less developed regions, and also established conditions of genuine competition throughout the Community. It also created a common a g r i c u l t u r a l policy. The economic component i n the integration of Europe, however, should not be overestimated. European u n i f i c a t i o n i n the aftermath of World War II was fundamentally a r e f l e c t i o n of the p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t i e s at the time. This was the " f u n c t i o n a l i s t " theory to assure peace and s t a b i l i t y i n Europe. Thus, economics may have brought the indi v i d u a l European states together, but i t was the necessity for p o l i t i c a l integration that inspired i t . In view of the p r a c t i c a l i t i e s , the need to hold Europe together, as well as to face the common problems of "recession, unemployment and i n f l a t i o n " , the European Community was a p o l i t i c a l enterprise formed to s t a b i l i z e and co-ordinate "a dynamic community i n an environment of change"19. But whereas the Rome Treaty did not state any provision for p o l i t i c a l integration, i n the sense of foreign policy or defense, i t was, i n fact, aimed and "determined to esta b l i s h the foundations of an ever closer union among the European peoples" 6. The Founding Fathers of the Community i n 1953 had quite simply f e l t that the coming together of the economic i n t e r e s t s of the Community could create a sense of common welfare. It should be noted that the i n i t i a l agreement had only involved s ix members, namely France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. In 1973 B r i t a i n entered, along with Ireland and Denmark. Ten years l a t e r Greece opted for membership as did Spain and Portugal i n 1986. Yet while the economic union was expanding i n those years the same can hardly be said of the p o l i t i c a l union. It soon became clear that p o l i t i c a l u n i f i c a t i o n simply did not a r i s e automatically as a consequence of the Community's economic decision making arrangement as had f i r s t been expected. In subsequent years, however, there was a move towards est a b l i s h i n g various procedures for p o l i t i c a l co-operation to speed up consultation and decision-making, e s p e c i a l l y during emergencies. The endeavors to improve mutual understanding through more regular contact resulted i n the development of the European P o l i t i c a l Community (EPC). Designed to e x i s t alongside the external r e l a t i o n s of the EEC, the attempts at the co-ordination of foreign policy views, while conducted outside the i n s t i t u t i o n s of the EEC, more often than not mirrored the views and progress inside. The European Commission also remained very much an i n t e r - s t a t e or an inter-governmental body, i t s power subordinated to the Council of Ministers (usually the foreign ministers). Many decisions were, i n fact, reached during meetings of government leaders, with national differences placing narrow constraints on common plans. By contrast, i n more recent years, there has been the general recognition of the need for a "true common market" to take place i n 1992. The countries of the EC were seen to need a common objective which could r a i s e t h e i r sights above d a i l y routine problems and thereby concentrate t h e i r 13 energies. Hence, i n 1983, the heads of government of the member states met at Stuttgart and acknowledged the need for the Community to "strengthen i t s cohesion, r e t a i n i t s dynamism and i n t e n s i f y i t s a c t i o n s . A n d they were resolved to transform themselves into a European union. Then i n 1985, already involved i n a wide range of economic and other functional interdependencies, the member states adopted the Single European Act. The Single European Act was designed to sweep before i t a l l national s e l f -i n t e r e s t which had hitherto prevented the EC from becoming a single i n t e r n a l market. The creation of a homogeneous internal community area was i t s chief p r i o r i t y and was to be achieved i n the main through the completion of the Rome Treaty. Designed to break the log jam of l e g i s l a t i o n which had pil e d up for nearly a decade through the internecine r i v a l r y of quarrelsome and competing governments, the Single European Act intended to break down the bar r i e r s which had up to then prevented the EC from becoming p o t e n t i a l l y the largest market i n the free worId. The l e g i s l a t i o n i t s e l f covers the most d i f f i c u l t parts of the task o r i g i n a l l y set out by the Treaty of Rome, including matters that have implications for personal freedom and security, monetary s t a b i l i t y and various other p o l i t i c a l l y s e n s i t i v e issues. Its contribution, moreover, means not just the elimination of constraints sapping e f f e c t i v e business performance, but more importantly the 14 creation of a new and pervasive competitive climate i n which the players of the EC can exploit new opportunities and better reach ava i l a b l e consumers. Wealth and job creation are to be fostered across the whole of the EC, with the free movement of persons and goods and a b o l i t i o n of d i s t o r t i o n s i n intra-community trade. This w i l l r e s u l t i n the establishment of an integrated common market and also a f i e r c e l y competitive business environment, bringing down prices and reducing i n f l a t i o n . In order to strengthen the Community decision making process, the Single European Act w i l l also allow most of the 1992 l e g i s l a t i o n to pass by q u a l i f i e d majority voting, rather than by the unanimous vote by in d i v i d u a l members which up to now has always operated. Equally important, the act fundamentally re-orients that l e g i s l a t i o n away from "harmonization" or the quest for uniform Community wide rules toward the concept of mutual r e c o g n i t i o n " 8 1992, moreover, implies a major transfer of power to EC i n s t i t u t i o n s and there has been the push to make them more democratic. The e x i s t i n g European Parliament CEP), for example, w i l l play a large r o l e and w i l l have a more s i g n i f i c a n t l e g i s l a t i v e function than i n the past. The extra powers of the Parliament are embodied i n the Single European Act which re-arranged the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of the Council of Ministers, the European Council and the European Parliament. For the 518 Euro Members of Parliament CMEPs), t h i s means a new power to amend draft laws on the 15 1992 project and a right of veto on international agreements concluded by the Council of Ministers. The Parliament's new powers come on top of those i t already had: these include the right to sack the Commission and j o i n t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y with the Council of Ministers for f i x i n g the Community's budget. The EP's position has attracted substantial support among i n d i v i d u a l governments, parliaments, inte r e s t groups, and the public i n member states. Certain contrary forces, however, remain strong p a r t i c u l a r l y i n bureaucracies, policy making processes and d i f f e r e n t c i v i l service t r a d i t i o n s . Nevertheless, there i s s t i l l a good chance that the end of the century w i l l see an economic and monetary union, as well as a Common Market governed by i n s t i t u t i o n s that can be called f e d e r a l . 1992 has infused the EC with a new sense of confidence and purpose. There i s a v i s i o n of Europe. It i s a v i s i o n of peace and hope, and growing p o l i t i c a l and economic, but also c u l t u r a l and s o c i a l interdependence. It permits a h i s t o r i c a l opportunity to turn fragmentation and the threat of armed c o n f l i c t into a broader process of European concertation and unity. Members of the Community have, together, come to place greater emphasis on cohesion and more equal sharing of economic opportunity and success. They have moved on from the practice of loose p o l i t i c a l co-operation to a more systematic and consistent strategy. The continuing process i n Europe i s one that brings an ever stronger committment to democracy, pluralism, the rule of law, f u l l respect for Human Rights and the p r i n c i p l e of market economy. The s i n g l e market i s beginning to take shape. The member states have recognized the need to quickly translate Community d i r e c t i v e s into national law and have adapted themselves to a new rhythm of Community decision-making. Progress towards completing the int e r n a l market i s i r r e v e r s i b l e and there i s the widespread f e e l i n g , both inside and outside the Community, that the objective w i l l be achieved on time. When Western Europe takes i t s giant step i n 1992, i t w i l l have i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d what has been true for years. Borders w i l l be open to people, commerce and ideas. The EC i s today a community of twelve nations a l l heading i n the same d i r e c t i o n : more than 340 m i l l i o n people heading towards a common future. A successful model of economic integration has evolved into a major p o l i t i c a l project, and has created a pattern and a pole of a t t r a c t i o n for a l l European countries. The new framework developed by the Community grows out of a r a d i c a l change i n consciousness. Whereas, the old European nationalisms of the past placed their trust i n ideology, the new community ethos puts i t s trust i n people. These people are, then, i n turn, r e a l i z i n g that 1992 means some fundamental change that w i l l benefit them and also t h e i r children i n years to come. 17 1992 w i l l see the removal of a l l borders i n Western Europe. Boundaries w i l l come down between Northern and Southern Ireland, and between Ireland and other European countries. The development of Europe, p a r t i c u l a r l y the completion of the internal market of 1992, w i l l undoubtedly decrease the s i g n i f i c a n c e of the I r i s h borders, making i t harder to deny, therefore, the mutual i n t e r e s t s of the two parts of the islan d r e l a t i v e to B r i t a i n . European passports are now replacing t r a d i t i o n a l B r i t i s h and I r i s h ones, and independently sovereign states, as we have t r a d i t i o n a l l y viewed both the I r i s h Republic and the United Kingdom, are, i n the near future, to be something of the past. The potential for a new international p o l i t i c s uniting forces i n Northern and Southern Ireland has never been brighter. The widespread support for the EC i s not merely sentimental and r h e t o r i c a l , whereas the Community i t s e l f has more than t h i r t y years of experience i n bringing small and medium sized nations together i n an economic unit. Far from halting the great journey towards European Union, the events i n Eastern Europe have speeded i t up. Those who had expected the eruption of post-communist nationalism to i n f e c t Western Europe are amazed. Most EC members have, i n fact, become keener to strengthen t h e i r mutual t i e s and proudly independent non EC Europeans, such as the Swiss, are also keener to scramble aboard. 18 Growing p o l i t i c a l freedom i n the East, a B e r l i n without ba r r i e r s , a cleaner environment, a less m i l i t a r i z e d Europe, a l l taken together, are the foundation of a larger v i s i o n of Europe that i s free, prosperous and at peace with i t s e l f . CHAPTER TWO: THE IRISH CRISIS 19 No discussion of Ireland at a l l , or the I r i s h , can begin without a br i e f survey of the country's history. For the I r i s h themselves are very inward looking, appealing to the past and allowing i t to dominate them. To understand I r i s h mentality, and something of the island's p o l i t i c a l culture, the subject matter must be placed i n h i s t o r i c a l context. Any examination of I r i s h p o l i t i c s must s t a r t from the experience of colonialism and imperialism which ended i n a compromise with the former colonized denied true emancipation. The roots of the p o l i t i c a l d i v i s i o n s i n Northern Ireland are set i n the d i f f e r e n t i a l success of B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l policy i n the island of Ireland. Ireland, i t said , i s B r i t a i n ' s oldest problem and B r i t a i n i s Ireland's. The province of Northern Ireland has never been absorbed and integrated into the rest of the United Kingdom and has never been treated i n the same way as other parts of B r i t a i n . Ever since B r i t a i n d i r e c t l y involved i t s e l f i n the government of the country i n 1169 there has been intermittent s t r i f e and warfare. This has t r a d i t i o n a l l y been portrayed as a c o n f l i c t between the B r i t i s h imperial state and the native I r i s h population, with the c o n f l i c t becoming increasingly marked during the l a t t e r part of the nineteenth century when Ireland began to assert i t s e l f with renewed vigor i n the struggle for home rule and then national independence. Plantation was the means by which English rule was firmly established. An attempt was made to uproot one group of people, the Catholics, and replace them with Protestant outsiders whose loyalty was assured. The greater success of the policy i n the north-east set the province of Ulster apart. The Republic of Ireland, by contrast, received nominal independence i n 1922. P o l i t i c a l independence was recognized as a precondition for the economic development of Southern Ireland, whereas the continued prosperity of the more i n d u s t r i a l i z e d north-east depended on maintaining i t s function within the B r i t i s h free-trade system. Hence two d i s t i n c t and spe c i a l i z e d sub-economies emerged, fundamentally independent of each other although more or less s t i l l dependent on B r i t a i n . P o l i t i c a l l y speaking, what developed i n the north of the country from 1921 onwards was an " i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d caste system" with the Protestant majority of the province i n permanent and complete control of the government.* The Protestant ascendency protected i t s i d e n t i t y and organized i t s own state i n conformity with the notorious siege mentality. Ulster Protestants had avoided becoming a hopeless minority i n Catholic Ireland and the continued defense of the i r position was i n the building of a B r i t i s h s t a t e l e t of the i r own where they had a helpless Catholic minority to dominate.*° Protesting their apprehensions of Catholic nationalism and Republican threats, the northern Protestants showed their continued real fear of a union of the Protestant and Catholic working class and maintained "the c l a s s i c appliance of the p r i n c i p l e "divide et impera" 1 1. Irishmen of d i f f e r e n t r e l i g i o n s and p o l i t i c a l persuasion were set against one another and the old b e l i e f "that dissenters were a people d i f f e r i n g i n character from the aboriginal inhabitants of I r e l a n d " 1 2 was enforced. Indeed, a s i g n i f i c a n t defense against "the apprehended threat to Protestant l i b e r t i e s " 1 3 s t i l l operates today through an elaborate system of discrimination along the l i n e s of r e l i g i o u s cleavage, unfair employment opportunities, prejudice i n the a l l o c a t i o n of housing, and e l e c t o r a l manipulation. Everything from i t s past has been "dredged up to build these f o r t i f i c a t i o n s . . . t h e c u l t s of King William and July the twelfth" 1** to mention but a few, with the r e s u l t that Northern Ireland emerged as a one party state where the "unionist manipulators of prejudice, of genuine fears and t r a d i t i o n s had produced a system of tyranny that operated on more than one t h i r d of the whole po p u l a t i o n . " 1 S . To Catholics, their Protestant fellows appeared as "canting bigots and hypocrites", for the very l i b e r t i e s they feared to lose for themselves i n an overwhelming Catholic state of a l l Ireland, they deprived others o f . l s Northern Ireland, however, had to be a one party state i n order to e x i s t . It was forced to discriminate i n order to preserve i t s e l f . It was simply that a section of the population (the Catholic section) was defined as inherently d i s l o y a l . Any chance of p o l i t i c a l power or influence for them, therefore, had to be a v o i d e d . 1 7 If p o l i t i c a l power or influence for Catholics might be gained through the b a l l o t box, then arrangements had to be made to counter i t . In a state where votes were only given to the tenants of the houses, that meant not giving tenancies to those who were known to be d i s l o y a l . That led to discrimination i n housing. There were not enough jobs for everyone, and i f there had to be discrimination, that would involve the work place. The lack of jobs was used to stoke up sectarian f e e l i n g . If p o l i t i c a l boundaries had to be gerrymandered i n order to return unionist majorities i n areas ( l i k e Derry City or i n the County of Fermanagh) that were patently anti-unionist, then they had to be gerrymandered. Within the boundaries of the s t a t e l e t of Northern Ireland, many Catholics were discriminated against with B r i t i s h acquiescence. I n s t i t u t i o n a l i n j u s t i c e s were b u i l t into the system from the very s t a r t . The Catholic population was systematically excluded from p o l i t i c a l power, treated as the enemy within, and deprived of i t s economic and c i v i l r i g h t s . At the end of the s i x t i e s , a section of the Catholic community f i n a l l y rebelled, and for the past twenty years B r i t a i n has been struggling to put t h i s r e b e l l i o n down. Having been driven out of predominant places of employment ( i . e . the shipyards and many of the larger engineering works) i n the early years of the Stormont regime, Catholics today remain excluded, with the problem of job discrimination e s p e c i a l l y acute i n recent years of high unemployment. At the same time, Catholics and n a t i o n a l i s t s l i v i n g i n predominantly Protestant areas were driven out of their homes and forced to seek refuge i n Catholic areas, where they continue to l i v e . They remain unable to acquire positions of prestige and importance i n areas such as the c i v i l service, and private industry, within the security forces and i n lo c a l government. A l l these jobs and associated benefits are awarded on the basis of e t h n i c i t y , mostly to Protestants. C i v i l l i b e r t i e s , limited for nearly f i f t y years under Northern Ireland's "emergency l e g i s l a t i o n " , have been cut back and abused even further. Repression i n terms of criminal j u s t i c e with the Prevention of Terrorism Act, e n t a i l i n g arrests without warrant and internment without t r i a l for up to seven days, was enacted by the almost exclusively Protestant Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and the Protestant a u x i l i a r y p olice unit, the Ulster Defense Regiment CUDR). This act, i n c i d e n t a l l y , was u n t i l 1984 only temporary, being considered and renewed every year. Now, however because of persistent I r i s h t e r r o r i s t a c t i v i t y and increased Republican violence, i t i s permanent s t a t u t e . 1 0 The right to t r i a l by jury has been removed and the rules of evidence so relaxed that a person can be sentenced to l i f e imprisonment s o l e l y on the basis of a confession which was not made vo l u n t a r i l y . The implications for c i v i l l i b e r t i e s are very serious indeed. F i n a l l y , whereas Protestant gerrymandering of lo c a l e l ections i s now somewhat circumscribed, i t s t i l l e x i s t s to weaken the Catholic vote e s p e c i a l l y i n Fermangh, where despite t h e i r majority position, Catholics are s t i l l underrepresented at the l o c a l government l e v e l . Hence, successive Southern governments have claimed that Northern Ireland discriminates against the minority of Catholics there, depriving them of s o c i a l , p o l i t i c a l and economic r i g h t s . They have concluded that as long as the unit of Northern Ireland remains, i t would, e n t a i l the majority repressing the minority. The obvious solution, as seen by the Republic i s to dissolve the a r t i f i c i a l boundary which cuts across Ireland. P a r t i t i o n i s seen i n the Republic of Ireland to be thi "root cause" of the problem, denying Northern n a t i o n a l i s t s th e i r democratic right as part of the Nationalist p o l i t i c a l majority" on the island, by turning them into a permanent p o l i t i c a l minority. Northern Ireland was an a r t i f i c i a l l y created e n t i t y , and i t s genesis was i l l e g a l not merely because i t partitioned the island, but because of the p a r t i c u l a r boundaries drawn. It was contrived to ensure a 3:1 protestant majority and a system stacked heavily agains Catholics and n a t i o n a l i s t s who were made to compromise a permanent minority of the t o t a l population. Consequently, Northern Ireland's i n c l u s i o n within the United Kingdom (UK) constituted the denial of the right to self-determination of the majority within the is l a n d . Currently Direct Rule from Westminster and the presence of B r i t i s h troops on the str e e t s have enhanced the c r e d i b i l i t y of the Republic's position i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y . The continued B r i t i s h presence constitutes a form of colonial rule, a point the Southern government and the sub-national e l i t e s of the north have been quick to appreciate and expl o i t . It i s unthinkable that the national t e r r i t o r y should i n p r i n c i p l e be regarded as detachable, a l l the more so i n l i g h t of the emergence of a re-united Germany of close to 80 m i l l i o n people i n the heart of Europe. Divided sovereignties on islands are rare, and the continued d i v i s i o n of Ireland i s an anomaly l e f t over from an e a r l i e r period. Much has been made inside the EC of the B r i t i s h government's o v e r a l l attempt and f a i l u r e at " c r i s i s management" of the I r i s h problem. Parti c u l a r c r i t i c i s m has been leveled at B r i t a i n ' s f a i l u r e to tackle the continuing phenomenon of employment discrimination against Catholics. This has put the issue of discrimination against Catholics firmly back on the p o l i t i c a l agenda. As an important part of necessary reform, the EC has suggested a new b i l l of ri g h t s for Northern I r e l a n d . 2 0 The introduction of a b i l l of righ t s , i t i s said, would be a clear expression of B r i t a i n ' s committment to Human Rights. It i s seen, by the EC to be an essential element i n any eventual resolution of the c o n f l i c t of Northern Ireland. It i s thought, by the European Commission, to be the primary means to tackle minority grievance i n the troubled province of the north. To the B r i t i s h government's evident annoyance, the EC has also internationalized the whole question of the c o n f l i c t i n Northern Ireland. Much c r i t i c i s m has been leveled i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y at B r i t a i n ' s most recent and half hearted e f f o r t to share the burden and p a r t i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of Northern Ireland with the government of the I r i s h Republic. In November 1985, largely as the re s u l t of B r i t i s h and I r i s h i n t e r a c t i o n at a European l e v e l , and following a barren phase of Anglo-Irish disagreement, there was the introduction of an Anglo-Irish Intergovermental Council and an arrangement whereby the twin governments of London and Dublin became locked into an Anglo-Irish Agreement to deal, on a regular basis, with p o l i t i c a l , legal and s o c i a l matters stemming from the c o n f l i c t i n the north. However, despite the persistent enthusiasm on the part of the Thatcher (and now Major) governments, more than f i v e years l a t e r l i t t l e , i n e f f e c t , has changed. Many of the s p e c i f i c reforms spoken of, such as a change i n the operation of the non-jury Diplock Courts, with the suggested replacement of one judge by three, have been rejected o u t r i g h t l y and repeatedly by the B r i t i s h government. The l a t t e r has apparently f a i l e d to stop the "shoot to k i l l " p o l i c y of the B r i t i s h Security Forces, a subject of continuing controversy since the RUC have not as yet published a code of conduct as promised. Shootings, explosions and deaths have a l l persisted, and the l o y a l i s t parliamentary presence has increased on the scene. The s t r i p searching of p o l i t i c a l prisoners continues, as do the alleg a t i o n s of police b r u t a l i t y and i l l treatment at interrogation centers. At the same time, the issue of r e l i g i o u s discrimination i n a l l areas of public l i f e has s t i l l to be tackled properly and successfully, and i n cu l t u r a l areas there s t i l l e x i s t s the ban on the p o l i t i c a l and cu l t u r a l symbols of the n a t i o n a l i s t community. High emigration within Catholic society Cat the alarming rate of 17% of the community's t o t a l ) also continues, as does the disrespect that Catholics receive as a group. Thus, while the B r i t i s h government apparently conceded to the Dublin government an advisory role i n the a f f a i r s of Northern Ireland, i t , nevertheless, t y p i c a l l y f a i l e d to deal with the problem of Northern Ireland adequately. The parameters of the B r i t i s h p o l i cy remain much the same. C r i s i s management i s s t i l l the most sui t a b l e description of how the B r i t i s h government rules the province. The approach i s to concede as l i t t l e as possible as late as possible. Any reforms that have been introduced have been more a grudging response to Catholic a g i t a t i o n and violence than anything else. B r i t a i n has usually only ever brought reforms i n at the la s t minute, and what has been done has normally been inadequate. At no stage has B r i t a i n ever taken any real reforming i n i t i a t i v e s , and the combined e f f o r t of i t s half measures i n the past twenty years has only had limited e f f e c t . Notwithstanding the p a r t i a l sharing of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y with the Republic, the burden of governing Northern Ireland has not diminished. The d i f f i c u l t problem of governing the north p e r s i s t s alongside the Republic's i r r e d e n t i s t challenge to the six I r i s h counties i n the face of B r i t a i n ' s insistence on maintaining sovereignty. Left to themselves, the two Irelands and the United Kingdom of Great B r i t a i n have not been able to resolve a c o n f l i c t whose roots are centuries old. Yet i t just might be that the simultaneous entry of a l l the inhabitants of Ireland, north and south, and the two surrogate governements, the B r i t i s h government and the government of the Republic of Ireland, into a new European arrangement, can provide a larger canvas against which the I r i s h question can be addressed i n a d i f f e r e n t l i g h t . CHAPTER THREE: NORTHERN IRELAND. THE PROBLEM PERPETRATED. As a fring e s t a t e l e t on the periphery of the United Kingdom outside B r i t i s h society, Northern Ireland i s far removed i n physical terms from the rest of mainland Europe. Psychologically too, and to a far greater extent than the Republic, i t i s cut o f f from the continental mainland for i t s external r e l a t i o n s are channeled through London. Northern Ireland has been described by Arend Lijphard as a p l u r a l society possessing the a t t r i b u t e of a "colonial fragment" 2* and often referred to by many as a constitutional oddity since i t has never been f u l l y integrated into the UK, either c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y or p o l i t i c a l l y . At times i t has been considered a p o l i t i c a l e n t i t y i n i t s own right and not simply a subordinate part of the UK, but ultimately i t lacks international recognition. There e x i s t i n Northern Ireland two r i v a l p o l a r i t i e s and e t h n i c i t i e s . They are two powerful detached and unmistakable n a t i o n a l i s t groupings both vying for the same small s t a t e l e t and neither one prepared to give up. There are two nations i n one state, namely those people descended from the English and Scottish s e t t l e r s of the seventeenth century, and those representatives of the old Gaelic stock, the so called native I r i s h . This l a t t e r group, i t s roots traceable far back into time, existed i n some form as a 30 nation long before the a r r i v a l of any n a t i o n a l i s t ideology. Indeed, t h i s form of a nation was so strong that i t survived the depletion of the I r i s h population at the time of the Great famine i n 1847, when one m i l l i o n I r i s h died due to starvation and another m i l l i o n emigrated. Within t h i s fundamental d i v i s i o n there are further differences. But whereas the d i s t i n c t i o n between more extremist and less extremist unionists and between constitutional and non-constitutional n a t i o n a l i s t s serves merely to compound the whole problem, each side's factions agree on the same grievances and long term goals. N a t i o n a l i s t s agree on the natural unity of the whole island, unionists on the need for maintaining the link with B r i t a i n . Catholics and Protestants have been able to co-exist peacefully i n the other countries of Europe and of the world but they are unable to do so i n the north of Ireland. There, Catholic and Protestant are terms that refer to profound ethnic differences, standing as important symbols of s o l i d a r i t y at least since the seventeenth century, with outbursts of violence serving to reinforce the s o l i d a r i t y of each side. As neither party, therefore, has ever shown an aversion to violence, t h i s stands i n sharp contrast to the prevalent atmosphere and ethos of integration taking place i n the rest of Western Europe. Northern nationalism has created an i n t r a c t a b l e problem. The problem i s not that everyone i n Northern Ireland has a sense of national i d e n t i t y but rather that there i s no agreement about the nation to which they belong. The cause of the d i f f i c u l t y i s the strong association of Irishness with Catholicism. I r i s h nationalism i s a form of nationalism i n which the Catholic i d e n t i t y i s c r u c i a l . Protestants reject t h i s d e f i n i t i o n of nationalism. They fe e l t h e i r own r e l i g i o u s and c i v i l l i b e r t i e s would be eroded by a state dominated by Catholics. It i s a case, therefore, of one nationalism contradicting the n a t i o n a l i s t aspirations of the other. Yet there are real benefits for a l l i n Northern Ireland i n any new organization of Europe. In p a r t i c u l a r , there i s the provision i n the Single European Act that where policy cannot be carried out s a t i s f a c t o r i l y at the l o c a l , regional or national l e v e l , i t can instead be executed more e f f e c t i v e l y at the European l e v e l . The European Commission has also given the Community's regions and municipalities a fresh opportunity to express themselves on a l l questions as regards the EC's regional policy and regional and l o c a l implications of a l l i t s other p o l i c i e s . 2 2 Thus, there should, i n the future, be encouraged more active and d i r e c t regional p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the EC. A superstate of Europe providing for increased lo c a l autonomy at the expense of central government, enabling the i n t e r a c t i o n of regional e l i t e s and community Eurocrats could, i n fact, prove i t s e l f a success i n view of the North I r i s h problem. Indeed, t h i s i s e s p e c i a l l y so i n the context of the current B r i t i s h Conservative government's endeavors to display i t s pro-European sentiments and also since the province of Northern Ireland currently enjoys a representation at the European level out of a l l proportion to i t s population per head. For there are three Members of the European Parliament i n the province for a population of 2.5 m i l l i o n people, compared with Scotland, for example, which has f i v e MEP's for a population of 7.5 m i l l i o n p e o p l e . 2 3 But the people of the Northern Ireland are apparently s t i l l unaware of t h i s p o t ential. Despite the fact that l o c a l government of the north (the province being considered a special region at European level) has benefitted from Community membership as a f i n a n c i a l recipient of European economic assistance i n general and p a r t i c u l a r l y with huge farm subsidies and grants from the Regional Fund, l o c a l people remain preoccupied with the national question. Between 1973 and 1988, the area was allocated ECU 118 m i l l i o n from the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and ECU 160 m i l l i o n for A g r i c u l t u r a l Guidance- Then, for the 1979, 1984 and 1989 elections to the EP, a separate voting system was also used i n the province, d i f f e r e n t from the rest of the United Kingdom, to ensure the Catholic minority there was properly represented at Strasbourg.*** Yet, matters s t i l l remained p r o v i n c i a l i z e d . Indeed, the bigoted e l e c t i o n campaigns and the subsequent v i c t o r i e s of the elected over the defeated candidates could even be seen to have reinforced such views. The majority of the Ulster Unionist's l o y a l t y continues to be paid to the nation-state of B r i t a i n rather than to any "embryo e q u i v a l e n t " 2 0 of Europe, whereas most n a t i o n a l i s t s , including those middle class elements who can be seen to benefit d i r e c t l y from European subsidies, continue to look i n s t i n c t i v e l y to Dublin, as opposed to Brussels, as the focus of their national allegiance. Thus, i n s p i t e of Northern Ireland's d e c l i n i n g i n d u s t r i a l base, excessive unemployment, poor l i v i n g standards and low wages, not to mention the B r i t i s h government's consistent neglect of the p o l i t i c a l problem, no real improvement by the way of European action can be made without the s i g n i f i c a n t l o c a l support that i s ostensibly lacking there. The sub-national e l i t e s of the north have never perceived t h e i r own struggle against the central authority as necessarily compatible with the object of supra-national organization. Hence, any sophisticated European organization might be seen to pose a threat to the regionalism of the province, e s p e c i a l l y i f the new arrangement i s to be considered i n terms of the continued colonization of Ireland l i f t e d to a higher more international plane. In view of the Marxist rhetoric of the I r i s h Republican Army (IRA), the escalation of violent resistance to a c a p i t a l i s t convention of Western Europe would appear a l l the more l i k e l y i f i t i s seen to perpetuate and reinforce B r i t i s h c a p i t a l i s t imperialism at home. Feeling that the supra-national model of the EC might detract from th e i r l o c a l i z e d 34 national struggle, I r i s h Republicans might seem l i k e l y to step up t h e i r campaign of violence. I r i s h terrorism has been transported to the continent with random, indiscriminate attacks on i n d i v i d u a l B r i t i s h army personnel, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n West Germany. Since the shooting i n Gibraltar of three unarmed IRA volunteers by the B r i t i s h SAS i n 1988, however, I r i s h t e r r o r i s t c e l l s abroad (apart from those i n operation around metropolitan London) have held t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s i n check. The IRA currently considers i t s e l f forced to concentrate i t s violent campaign back i n the North of Ireland. Simultaneously, Ulster Unionists might be expected, e s p e c i a l l y as they have always espoused their B r i t i s h t r a d i t i o n and heritage as the p r i n c i p a l protection for t h e i r continued constitutional insurance inside the UK, to also fear a "true" European community after 1992 and a predominantly Catholic European Assembly usurping the sovereignty of B r i t i s h Westminster rule. Having i n the past proclaimed themselves more B r i t i s h than the B r i t i s h , they have, at the same time, resorted to violence i n defiance of the B r i t i s h parliament (exemplified most recently i n their objections to the Anglo-Irish Agreement i n 1985, as i n 1912 and 1974 when Protestant Ulstermen were prepared to f i g h t against the B r i t i s h government with extra parliamentary means, and a l l i n a bid to remain part of B r i t a i n . ) . They maintain t h e i r claim to be B r i t i s h , but refuse to be part of B r i t a i n i n the most 35 elementary sense of obeying the B r i t i s h government's plans for the province, and have demonstrated t h e i r capacity to render Ulster ungovernable by taking up arms against t h e i r Queen and country. The Protestant majority of the north i n s i s t s that t h e i r province has r i g h t s and duties no d i f f e r e n t from any other part of the UK and that they are t o t a l l y loyal to the Crown, while at the same time, harshly opposing the B r i t i s h government . Thus, i n r e l a t i o n to Europe, Ulster Unionists might be expected to withhold t h e i r support as they have i n the past, r a l l y i n g around th e i r t r a d i t i o n a l cry of " no surrender ", t h i s time to Brussels instead of Dublin. Europe, for Ulster Unionists, i s to be cast i n the role of a d i v i s i v e a l i e n , encroaching body, hastening the d i l u t i o n of cherished t r a d i t i o n s S B S. Amid an ever increasing tension i n Northern Ireland. Ian Paisely, leader of the Democratic Unionist Party ( D.U.P > throughout the eighties and now i n the nineties, consistently repeated that "...the majority here are determined to remain B r i t i s h and w i l l not be swayed i n that conviction by the bombs and b u l l e t s of the IRA s t i l l l ess by the machinations of Europeans who understand l i t t l e of the s i t u a t i o n here In the hope of improving on h i s general e l e c t i o n success to the Westminster Parliament e a r l i e r i n 1987, i n a highly personalized manifesto and e l e c t i o n campaign to the European parliament i n 1989 he made i t clear that " for a free, f e a r l e s s Protestant and l o y a l i s t 36 voice i n Europe , , 3 M S he was the best possible nominee from the Protestant community. Any possible united and central convergence of Europe could be seen to threaten unionist sympathies and values, t h e i r l o y a l t y to the Monarchy, the i r Protestanism and t h e i r commitment to the sovereignty of the Westminster Parliament. Their concerns, moreover, are rendered a l l the more acute by the fact that Northern Ireland borders the Republic of Ireland and e x i s t s , i n the unionist view, alongside another neighboring h o s t i l e and annexationist member of the EC. Unionists consider the successive governments of the I r i s h Republic to have pressured the B r i t i s h government at the European level to recognize an I r i s h dimension to the problem within i t s borders. They have repeatedly denounced during the various meetings of the heads of the two states throughout the e i g h t i e s and now into the nineties, a "contrived s e l l - o u t " and "abandonment with European con t r i v a n c e " 2 3 . This i s the reason that supporters of the EC are usually associated with an "un-Ulsterness" and also the reason unionists have voted against EC membership right from the s t a r t i n 1971. Thus, whereas creating an enlarged democratic Europe of nations and regions could have been seen to help reduce c o n f l i c t i n Northern Ireland by providing a formula whereby the province's c i t i z e n s and representatives could r e l a t e to each other and to the rest of the Community through Brussels rather than Westminster, i t might not seem that t h i s i s the 37 way for matters i n the province to turn out. It i s not l i k e l y that the Protestant majority of the north w i l l want to bypass Whitehall when dealing with Brussels and any prospect for the integration or possible r e - u n i f i c a t i o n of the i s l a n d , therefore, might seem unimaginable. Ultimately though, surely Ulster Unionists must also r e a l i z e the patently undemocratic manner i n which they too have been governed. The present system of government i n Northern Ireland dates from the a b o l i t i o n of the Stormont Parliament and the introduction of Direct Rule i n 1974. For seventeen years the province has been subject to an unsatisfactory and undemocratic p o l i t i c a l system i n which the people of the province, both unionist, as well as n a t i o n a l i s t , have been deprived of any e f f e c t i v e say i n how they are governed. The people of Northern Ireland have a l l been l e f t with a heritage which includes p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s designed to prevent s i g n i f i c a n t s o c i a l change. •n i t s own, moreover, Northern Ireland has no prospect of real and sustainable growth. Because of i t s weak manufacturing base and high unemployment, the economy w i l l continue to be dependent upon outside resources for some time to come. The economy of Northern Ireland i s i n severe c r i s i s . In the f i f t i e s and s i x t i e s , the province was transformed as l o c a l industry was run down and multinationals moved i n to dominate i t s economy. But i n the l a s t twenty years the process has gone into reverse, with multinationals reducing 38 t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s or p u l l i n g out t o g e t h e r . 3 0 Only huge subsidies and external aid keep Northern Ireland a f l o a t ; without these the province could only survive on i t s own for a matter of a few weeks. Central to the north's future i s , i n fact, then, the maintenance of the substantial amount of f i n a n c i a l aid the area already gets from the EC and also the increasing amount i t expects to get i n the future under the new provisions of the Single European Act. U l s t e r ' s constitutional position i s the product of turbulent history and i n t r i c a t e geography. D i f f e r i n g visions have hitherto prevented the two communities i n Northern Ireland from s i t t i n g down together and working th e i r destiny out. They have always looked over their shoulder i n s t i n c t i v e l y to Dublin and London. For both sides, however, the p o l i t i c a l scene i s changing irrevocably. Because of the new European trends the o r i g i n a l aims of n a t i o n a l i s t s and unionists are no longer v a l i d . Everything i s changing and to survive i n the new European environment, so must the inhabitants of Ireland. I r i s h N a t i o n a l i s t s and Ulster Unionists have long li v e d by the theory that what i s good for one must be disastrous for the other. Now, however, the problems of the north can be set i n a stable context, without representing vi c t o r y for one side over the other. Both n a t i o n a l i s t s and unionists can look to the EC as a neutral or wider framework for examining Northern Ireland's problems and can share the b e l i e f that Europe has the potential to contribute towards a l l e v i a t i n g the troubles there. Both sides, i f they choose, can draw on the wider resources the EC has made avail a b l e to f i n d more adequate answers to the problems. In the absence of viable domestic i n i t i a t i v e s , the EC provides the opportunity to think afresh v i s - a - v i s Northern Ireland. Yet i f there i s to be any adequate preparation for 1992 and i f the promised f i n a n c i a l and international support i s to be properly u t i l i z e d , then the sort of sectarian controversy witnessed continually throughout the whole area must be replaced by a more co-operative p o l i t i c a l dialogue. Otherwise, both communities i n Northern Ireland r i s k being the losers i n the new Europe that i s being forged. Perhaps only when the next generation takes over, operating within a post 1992 Europe and a s i n g l e monetary system that forces the two t r a d i t i o n s to work together, may new answers begin to appear. 40 CHAPTER FOUR: THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND. THE PROBLEM  COMPLICATED. The Republic of Ireland, though a member state and not a region, nevertheless shows some p a r a l l e l s with the regions of larger states. Hence the Commission considers the whole of the Republic an "assisted region". There e x i s t s i n the Republic a curious family resemblance to the north and a s i m i l a r pre-occupation with the past. The obsessive concern with p o l i t i c s and n a t i o n a l i t y i s also common to both sides of the I r i s h border, as i s the frequent, flamboyant use of rhetoric and symbols drawn from the past eight hundred years of the whole island's p a r t i c u l a r l y troublesome history. In common with other peripheral areas of the Community, including the province of the north, the Republic of Ireland has suffered high unemployment, huge government d e f i c i t s and slow growth. 3 1 Southern Ireland remains one of the poorer countries i n Western Europe. It owes an enormous debt to l o c a l and foreign bankers and at one stage i n the mid e i g h t i e s i t had the fourth highest debt per capita i n the world. A t h i r d of i t s population l i v e below the poverty l i n e and the country has for many centuries experienced a catastrophic pattern of emigration. Hence, the Republic of Ireland shares a common int e r e s t with Northern Ireland i n 41 seeking more generous regional transfers within the Single European Act, p a r t i c u l a r l y those directed to s o c i a l and economic concerns. However, for much of the twentieth century, Northern Ireland and the Republic cultivated what was e s s e n t i a l l y a p o l i t i c a l and economic non-relationship. Whereas the Republic remained p o l i t i c a l l y and economically neutral during and after World War II, the north participated i n the foreign policy of the central government i n London and was integrated into the western system of a l l i a n c e and co-operation. Indeed, the current n e u t r a l i t y of the I r i s h Republic s t i l l remains unique within the EC. Southern Ireland, as the only member within the twelve to ex i s t outside NATO, i s always reluctant to get involved i n anything touching on defense and s e c u r i t y . 3 2 So too have the commercial and economic problems of north and south had l i t t l e i n common. As an int e g r a l part of the UK, the north was primarily concerned with free trade, while the Republic pursued a policy of protectionism under which domestic agriculture and small industries were protected by import duties from foreign competition. Thus Northern Ireland and the Republic co-operated only occasionally on projects which seemed to promote the construction of the in f r a s t r u c t u r e common to both. Then, i n 1961, the Republic of Ireland applied to j o i n the EEC simultaneously with B r i t a i n and primarily because of i t s dependence on B r i t a i n . The I r i s h government feared that 42 i f B r i t a i n joined the common market and Ireland did not, Ir i s h a g r i c u l t u r a l exports to the B r i t i s h market would suffer and i t s manufactured exports would face t a r i f f b a r r i e r s instead of the t a r i f f - f r e e access they had had since 1958. 3 3 In 1965, the Republic committed i t s e l f to a reduction of i t s own t a r i f f s against B r i t i s h imports i n a free trade agreement and i n January 1973 i t joined the EEC along with B r i t a i n and Denmark. Membership brought s i g n i f i c a n t f i n a n c i a l benefits, as well as additional resources for regional development. Simultaneously, i t transformed the t r a d i t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between two countries of such unequal s i z e and disparate resources as the Republic and B r i t a i n , placing Ireland on a new footing with B r i t a i n as part of a broader multicultural re l a t i o n s h i p . Marking the culmination of I r i s h trade l i b e r a l i z a t i o n policy, membership of the EC i n 1973 opened up the European market to I r i s h a g r i c u l t u r e exports and enabled Ireland to also benefit from the Community's Common A g r i c u l t u r a l Policy (CAP) and from i t s regional and s o c i a l funds. 3"* Thus there was offered for Ireland, new market opportunities, new overseas investment, and also the promise of new sources of economic assistance i n the form of f i n a n c i a l transfers. Under s o c i a l fund guidelines, Ireland i s currently considered a "super-priority" region of the type cast on the regional maps of the EC as one of Europe's "peripheral and 43 under-developed a r e a s . " 3 B Endemic poverty e x i s t s i n many areas, p a r t l y as the re s u l t of the country's r u r a l subsistence economy and low productivity and the great excess of people employed i n agriculture, and p a r t l y as the res u l t of few industries, a low level of urbanization and a high sustained rate of emigration since the late eighteenth century. As regional policy i s by d e f i n i t i o n targeted on the p a r t i c u l a r l y disadvantaged regions, the Republic of Ireland has, as expected, done well from Community r e d i s t r i b u t i o n funds. As a major beneficiary of Community spending programmes, the Republic presently e x i s t s as one of the biggest per capita r e c i p i e n t s from the Economic Regional Development Fund CERDF), i n p a r t i c u l a r , and from the Community's s t r u c t u r a l funds, i n general. The ERDF i t s e l f has received a great deal of p u b l i c i t y i n Ireland with regular press reports announcing the award of a grant to a firm or a l o c a l authority for various projects. However, for the Republic, the Community's CAP represented from the outset the most recognizable aspect of the EC involvement and the most s t r i k i n g aspect of Community membership has been the r i s e i n farm incomes. For agriculture, membership of the EC was the key to breaking out of dependence on the low price UK market. To the advantages of improved market access were added the expected benefits of high guaranteed farm prices financed by the Community as a whole. Hence, entry to the EC eliminated 44 some of the country's main a g r i c u l t u r a l competitors on the B r i t i s h market and simultaneously gave the I r i s h access to the a v a i l a b l e a g r i c u l t u r a l subsidies. Membership also resulted i n a substantial r i s e i n the importance of trade with almost a doubling of exports i n the f i r s t f i f t e e n years, accompanied by a considerable d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n of export markets away from the UK and towards the rest of the EC. The Community's share of the t o t a l I r i s h exports increased from 5X i n 1958 to 35Z i n 1985. =»s At the same time as the Community has encouraged Ir i s h business and industry to expand into Europe, many I r i s h businessmen and public servants have seen the EC as an opportunity to develop their talents i n a wider s e t t i n g than before. So too has the EC done i t s best to a t t r a c t a tremendous amount of inward investment. Japanese e l e c t r o n i c companies and US computer companies such as IBM have been persuaded of the advantages of re-locating i n Ireland. Most recently on the i n d u s t r i a l front, Sharp, the manufacturer of video recorders and microwave ovens and Brother, the typewriter manufacturers, have made arrangements to set up companies i n Ireland, no doubt attracted by a European wide market of 340 m i l l i o n consumers. 3 7 A g r i c u l t u r a l l y speaking, the Republic of Ireland i s , at the present time, the p r i n c i p a l beneficiary of the Community's budget i n terms of net receipts per head of 45 population because of the transfer i t receives under the CAP, as the only food surplus country amongst the Community's three poorest members. Even with the present CAP reforms, Ireland w i l l s t i l l continue to benefit. For despite the vote i n the EP to cut a g r i c u l t u r a l spending, (from ECU 173,000 m i l l i o n to ECU 26,954 m i l l i o n ) 3 * 3 , the Parliament agreed that there should, at the same time, be an increase i n appropriations for other areas, p a r t i c u l a r l y s o c i a l p o l i c i e s , transport and improvements i n in f r a s t r u c t u r e to give a new t o t a l of ECU 45,086 m i l l i o n , 10Z of which has been allocated s p e c i f i c a l l y to the Republic of I r e l a n d . 3 3 The Commission, moreover, has just very recently announced a special programme of ECU 308 m i l l i o n for the ru r a l communities and for the encouragement of small and medium s i z e farms."*0 Thus, i n any post 1992 arrangement a major concern of the I r i s h Republic w i l l , understandably, be to protect the p r e f e r e n t i a l treatment i t has, as a rule, received from community membership and also to take f u l l advantage of any potential new gains. The Single European Act, simultaneously o f f e r s the hope of a doubling of ERDF and other EC s t r u c t u r a l funds, as well as, an increased emphasis on concentrating resources i n the poorest areas. Reforms introduced i n 1985 have already brought into operation a more f l e x i b l e procedure from the ERDF. The e x i s t i n g quota arrangement, with spending controlled u n t i l 1985 by national quotas s e t t i n g out the exact proportions of the fund to be allocated to each member 46 state, was replaced at that time, by the system of " i n d i c a t i v e ranges" which now defines the the minimum and maximum a l l o c a t i o n s each member state receives from the fund. The minimum a l l o c a t i o n s t o t a l approximately 18Z of the fund, leaving a margin of only 12Z a v a i l a b l e to be spent at the d i s c r e t i o n of the community i n the countries and regions most i n need.1*1 Hence there i s broadly an unchanged proportion of community funds to each of the more well o f f nations, as well as an increased potential for concentrating spending on the least affluent countries. The least prosperous regions w i l l , between now and the end of 1993, receive a t o t a l of ECU 38,300 m i l l i o n i n aid from the Community. The aid i s intended to help them prepare for the s i n g l e market, and complements the f i n a n c i a l support provided by national and regional a u t h o r i t i e s . The Republic i t s e l f i s to receive ECU 3,670 m i l l i o n of t h i s and i s currently f i g h t i n g for a portion of an additional ECU 2,100 m i l l i o n devoted to the Community's own i n i t i a t i v e s to be proposed by the Commission at the end of 1990. "*:z S i g n i f i c a n t l y , the I r i s h government also advances the view that there i s an essential community of i n t e r e s t s on the i s l a n d of Ireland. Government o f f i c i a l s draw attention to the importance of agriculture, as well as, to the serious problems of unemployment and emigration. In r e l a t i o n to Community agricul t u r e price negotiations, moreover, I r i s h ministers have argued that the a t t i t u d e of the I r i s h representatives i n Brussels more 47 c l e a r l y r e f l e c t s the i n t e r e s t s of northern farmers than that of t h e i r own B r i t i s h representatives.** 3 Michael •'Kennedy, MEP, believed the same was true i n r e l a t i o n to regional policy and aspects of the Community's external trade policy, p a r t i c u l a r l y t e x t i l e imports. E a r l i e r t h i s year he claimed that the " I r i s h government believed that i n the long term economic i n t e r e s t s determined the action of states, so that while other i n t e r e s t s might seem to be uppermost i n Northern Ireland's mind, economic considerations would determine things south".**** Then, as President of the European Council of Ministers, Charles Haughey, the I r i s h premier, came north to Belfast i n A p r i l 1990, declaring that the small s i z e of the firms i n Ireland, both north and south made i t "absolutely mandatory that they at least as a f i r s t step i n t h i s new s i t u a t i o n , be encouraged to see the whole island as t h e i r operation base to enlarge the s i z e of their enterprises. "**a He spoke of the great potential for increased trade between the two parts of the island and for much more j o i n t tourism. It was he said: "Simple common sense to face the economic r e a l i t i e s of the future. As both parts of Ireland were to compete they had a clear mutual i n t e r e s t i n strengthening EC p o l i c i e s for peripheral regions of which they were both categorized as 'objective one'." Talking of a wide range of cross border i n i t i a t i v e s that could be undertaken he went on, " . . . i t i s more mportant s t i l l that we combine our e f f o r t s i n having community p o l i c i e s and 48 programmes t a i l o r e d to meet the economic circumstances which are common to both." It was clear, he said, that the s i m i l a r i t y i n circumstances of Northern Ireland and of the Republic made i t "economically sensible" that the two co-operate to the greatest extent possible and co-ordinate their e f f o r t s both at home and i n Brussels. "We must combine our e f f o r t s at the Community lev e l to secure the special measures we need as peripheral regions... But who are we? Who i n Dublin can combine with whom i n Belfast to have EC p o l i c i e s and programmes t a i l o r e d to s u i t e us. Such t a i l o r i n g i s e s s e n t i a l l y an a c t i v i t y of government within the Community; how can a government of one member state combine with a very small region of another member state to influence decisions i n Brussels. ""*6 On a f i n a l note, Prime Minister Haughey also suggested that a re-united Ireland would mean a single administrative unit for the whole of Ireland, north and south combined. This would eliminate the wasteful duplication of government e f f o r t . It would f a c i l i t a t e a more balanced phased development of the island's economy and ensure i t s f u l l i ntegration as a whole. It would, at the same time, allow more co-ordinated policy towards multi-national firms. S i g n i f i c a n t l y , as President of the EC i n the f i r s t half of 1990, Haughey ensured that the Community refers to the whole islan d as "Ireland", as compared to Northern Ireland and Southern Ireland, or when speaking about Ireland i n a s o c i a l l y and economically integrated way, "the island of I r e l a n d " . * 7 49 In r e l a t i o n to the future, r e f e r r i n g to the whole island i t s e l f as Ireland, the EC has, i n fact, declared that one of the aims of the European Structural Fund i s s p e c i f i c a l l y to promote economic and s o c i a l advancement and encourage contact and dialogue between n a t i o n a l i s t s and unionists throughout Ireland. For these purposes alone, the EC has proposed ECU 65 m i l l i o n i n contributions over the next three years. Over and above t h i s sum, a t o t a l of ECU 3,098 m i l l i o n (8.6% of t o t a l EC resources)"* 0 has been promised to the border countries of Ireland for the stimulation of private investment and public programmes and the support of any voluntary e f f o r t s , including s e l f - h e l p schemes. A further ECU 900 m i l l i o n has been set aside to aid the technological development of the island and the use of advanced telecommunication schemes i n the most disadvantaged p a r t s . 4 9 In monetary terms, the Dublin-Belfast r a i l - l i n k has likewise been made a p r i o r i t y . Thus, the benefits of the EC membership strongly suggest that there has been a considerable balance of advantage to Ireland from the integration process to date and that further economic benefits can be expected as a res u l t of the Single European Act. In view of the p o l i t i c a l damage i n f l i c t e d upon the island of Ireland by i t s p a r t i t i o n , the drain on i t s resources, and the retarding of both Northern and Southern Ireland's economic growth, the dismantling of trade barriers 50 and the i n j e c t i o n of economic aid w i l l undoubtedly be of immense benefit to a l l the people of Ireland. However, i n the event that s i g n i f i c a n t economic advance can be made i n the island while the c o n f l i c t and r i v a l r y between Northern Unionists and the a l l Ireland N a t i o n a l i s t s continues, t h i s does not eliminate the need to tackle Ireland's underlying p o l i t i c a l problems. The domestic p o l i t i c a l consequences of improved economic co-ordination cannot be ignored. Yet, the completion of the internal market alone cannot eliminate the bigotry and resentment that have blackened Ireland's long history. Mere f i n a n c i a l gain can never be enough i n i t s e l f to resolve the north's dismemberment from the rest of the isl a n d . Simple economics can do l i t t l e to narrow the p o l i t i c a l gulf between the island's two divided communities. The ethno-religious r i v a l r y that e x i s t s on the island of Ireland, regardless of the r o l e played by economic gain, i s i t s e l f an independent variable i n the problems of the divided country. To be f u l l y e f f e c t i v e any measures intended to stimulate Ireland's economy must, therefore, be accompanied by p o l i t i c a l i n i t i a t i v e s to end the c o n f l i c t i n the island of Ireland. Real p o l i t i c a l dialogue needs to take place between north and south, complementing that happening on the economic plane. There must ultimately be some attempt at successful r e c o n c i l i a t i o n at the p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l l e v e l . 51 At a European l e v e l y the association agreement can provide the i n s t i t u t i o n a l framework for p o l i t i c a l dialogue. It enables views to be exchanged on b i l a t e r a l and multi-l a t e r a l issues and also greatly f a c i l i t a t e s information flow. Such exchanges become even more important when further new forms of integration and co-operation i n Europe are put i n place i n any post 1992 arrangement. Admittedly, though, the EC can only help the I r i s h help themselves. The EC can provide the new framework within which the two t r a d i t i o n s i n Ireland and their two surrogate governments can work together. But for new answers to appear, the I r i s h , themselves, must take the i n i t i a t i v e . For the most part there has been a greater willingness to do so, at least i n the south. The Republic of Ireland has emphasized the importance of economic aid for i t s northern neighbor, and the need to accommodate wider considerations than before. It has demonstrated i t s e l f as being no longer economic p a r t i t i o n i s t and s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d . S i g n i f i c a n t l y , i t s Prime Minister has also warmly i n v i t e d Ulster Unionists to meet for talk s about Ireland's future with no pre-conditions. Thus, when one further thinks of such recent developments as p o l i t i c a l and economic u n i f i c a t i o n of Germany, and some of the changes i n Eastern Europe, i t may be that the prospects for peaceful change i n Ireland are greater than at any time i n the past. CHAPTER FIVE: PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE INTEGRATION IN EUROPE CONCLUSION Seemingly, there are some I r i s h N a t i o n a l i s t s attempting to break out of th e i r usual narrow mould of looking backward, and looking forward instead to some sort of acceptable p o l i t i c a l change for a l l the people of Ireland. For the f i r s t time i n i t s history, the Republic of Ireland, e s p e c i a l l y , appears more t o l e r a t i n g and accommodating. There would seem to be a new s p i r i t i n the a i r and a certain novel sense of hope and goodwill among those south of the border. Currently, the Republic of Ireland i s the only member of the EC which claims sovereignty over part of another member state's t e r r i t o r y . According to A r t i c l e two of the Ir i s h Constitution (1937): " The national t e r r i t o r y consists of the whole islan d of Ireland, i t s land and i t s t e r r i t o r i a l seas." Thus the I r i s h government has claimed the "right to speak i n r e l a t i o n to events that happen throughout the whole country," furthermore, A r t i c l e Three states, "Pending the re-integration of the national t e r r i t o r y and without prejudice to the right of the parliament and government established by t h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n to exercise j u r i s d i c t i o n over the whole t e r r i t o r y the laws enacted by that parliament s h a l l have the l i k e area and extent of app l i c a t i o n as the laws of Saorstat Eirean (the then "free state) and the l i k e extra e f f e c t . " * 9 0 These have been a r t i c l e s which have denied the right of a substantial minority of Ireland's inhabitants, namely the Ulster Unionists, to opt out of national unity, causing them great offense and, at the same time, to continue to behave as the old s e t t l e r s surrounded by h o s t i l e natives. Now, however, a l l national parties apparently accept the need for constitutional reform as the price of I r i s h unity. Even Fianna F a i l , the most Catholic of southern parties agrees and; for the f i r s t time i n f i f t y three years, A r t i c l e s two and three of the Republic's constitution have been debated i n the D a i l . The Republic's Fine Gael leader, John Bruton, called for people i n the south to "...re-think our whole att i t u d e to Northern Ireland; removing a l l t e r r i t o r i a l imperatives and h i s t o r i c channels that prevent the two from s i t t i n g down together and working th e i r own destiny out together". 0* Deputy leader of the Democratic Unionist Party of Northern Ireland, Peter Robinson, warmly welcomed the debate and said the removal of the a r t i c l e s could bring "su b s t a n t i a l l y increased co-operation between the north and the south". To t h i s , Christopher McGlimpsey, Honorary Secretary of the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) added that " . . . i t would open the door to p o l i t i c a l progress i n Ireland".« Ultimately, the motion for constitutional reform was defeated i n the Dail on a f i n a l count of seventy-four votes to s i x t y - s i x , i n view of the fact that Ulster Unionists 54 already have a guarantee of no change without consent as contained i n the Anglo-Irish Agreement. Yet, the fact that any debate at a l l took place over the issue i s i t s e l f meaningful. Strong support for I r i s h r e - u n i f i c a t i o n s t i l l e x i s t s among those i n the Republic. But now i t i s perhaps not as the f u l f i l l m e n t of i r r e d e n t i s t claims, but rather as the attempt at real c o n c i l i a t i o n within a p l u r a l i s t context. Re-u n i f i c a t i o n i s , undoubtedly, s t i l l on the agenda though presently subordinated to the higher p r i o r i t y of peaceable mutual accommodation between the two t r a d i t i o n s i n I r e l a n d . B a This has been a new departure. Currently the Republic of Ireland can be seen to appreciate better a l l the serious obstacles to I r i s h unity, economic, p o l i t i c a l and also " r e l i g i o u s - c u l t u r a l " . Southern Irishmen and women have, apparently, started to r e a l i z e that the p o l i t i c s of I r i s h unity i s more complex and multi-dimensional than they assumed i n the past. Thus, while the idea of I r i s h unity i s i t s e l f not dead, what i s obviously dead i s the old Catholic, gaelic republican consensus on I r i s h unity. In view of the i l l f e e l i n g the existence of A r t i c l e s two and three i n the Republic's Constitution has long caused unionists, any challenge to t h e i r purpose on the part of the Republic i s a clear sign, then, of p o s i t i v e and genuinely helpful action. This sign, moreover, has been reinforced by 55 the e l e c t i o n of Mary Robinson as the new President of Ireland i n l a t e 1990. Being the f i r s t female President, she stands herself as a symbol of change there. By her own account, she i s committed to change and determined to bring a d i f f e r e n t approach to her o f f i c e . She has had a long history of campaigning for the l i b e r a l i z a t i o n and modernization of the Southern I r i s h state, e s p e c i a l l y i n the areas of sexual and r e l i g i o u s discrimination and also personal morality. She i s a long time campaigner on such issues as family planning and divorce and stood against the forces of c l e r i c a l i s t reaction i n the two referendums i n the eig h t i e s Cone on divorce, the other on abortion). Mary Robinson has also been THE major figure i n I r i s h p o l i t i c s to understand the often negative reaction of Ulster Unionists to any attempt at compromise between Northern and Southern states. Hence her active protest at the exclusion of Ulster views on the Anglo-Irish Agreement i n 19B5. Her e l e c t i o n undoubtedly s i g n i f i e s a more open, tolerant, p l u r a l i s t i c and exclusive society. By e l e c t i n g Mary Robinson Ca f o r t y - f i v e year old l i b e r a l , woman and champion of progressive causes) as President of Ireland, the people of the Republic have made a statement about how they see themselves and how they wish to be seen. It i s an admirable and hopeful statement. 56 For Mary Robinson's record on reform i s second to none and her s e n s i t i v i t y to unionist aspirations unparalleled. She has spoken of her concern for people l i v i n g north of the border and how she hopes to maintain close t i e s with them as President. Referring to Northern Ireland, she said: "As the elected choice of the people of t h i s part of i s l a n d , I want to extend the hand of friendship and love to both communities i n the other part. And I want to do t h i s with no s t r i n g s attached, no hidden agenda.... As the person chosen by you to mobilize t h i s Republic and to project our s e l f image to others, I w i l l seek to encourage mutual understanding and tolerance between a l l the d i f f e r e n t communities sharing the island". 9 5** As she made i t clear i n her campaign, Mrs Robinson r e s i s t s the s i m p l i s t i c , i d e o l o g i c a l l a b e l l i n g that bedevils I r i s h p o l i t i c s . Ulster Unionist and MEP, John Taylor said Mrs Robinson was "somebody who understood unionist f e e l i n g " . To t h i s , the Deputy leader of the Democratic Unionist Party added that "she was not green and belligerent". 8* 8 1 Another feature of Mrs Robison's campaign was i t s attempt to l i f t Ireland's horizons and locate i t i n the new Europe, not only i n terms of s e i z i n g new market opportunities but also to set i n context the diminishing r o l e of the I r i s h border i n a b a r r i e r - f r e e future EC. Mrs Robinson's victory i s seen to represent real change, not just i t s appearance. Her victory she said, i n her i n s p i r i n g address, was because the people had "stepped out from the faded f l a g s of the c i v i l war and voted for a new Ireland". 57 The I r i s h Times summed up what Mary Robinson's " rainbow c o a l i t i o n " represented. It was the paper said: " a constitution for s o c i a l j u s t i c e , for republican values i n a real sense of democracy i n which every one has the right and means to p a r t i c i p a t e , for equality between the sexes, for a move away from ambivalence about the North, and for openness and tolerance". Her victory, i t was added, also symbolized a r e d e f i n i t i o n of nationalism, "less a n t i - B r i t i s h and more European". 3 6 The e l e c t i o n of Mary Robinson changed the agenda of the Republic beyond recognition. Not so much i n terms of economics or of s o c i a l policy change, but c e r t a i n l y i n terms of soul-searching and analysis. Her e l e c t i o n sounded the death knell for c i v i l war p o l i t i c s . Her success i n mobilizing such a broad range of people behind the progressive p r i n c i p l e s she espoused, shattered the t r a d i t i o n a l pattern of p o l i t i c a l support. For every p o l i t i c a l party, the r e a l i z a t i o n that a young woman with no strong t i e s to the p o l i t i c a l establishment, indeed, with a record very often at odds with the establishment, could be elected to the highest o f f i c e i n the country, was a shocking discovery. Despite such developments however, undoubtedly there s t i l l e x i s t those north of the border who would f a l l back on the old argument that I r i s h nationalism, i n whatever form, i s the monolithic ideology which produced as i t s i n e v i t a b l e embodiment the Southern I r i s h state. This nationalism i s 58 seen as s o c i a l l y conservative, deeply imbued with Catholicism, and certain to produce a narrow and inwardly looking state which would in e v i t a b l y contain and perpetuate these flaws. Faced with the modern I r i s h state, i t i s easy to f i n d i n I r i s h nationalism a l l the elements which serve as i t s ideology. These elements are undoubtedly present i n I r i s h nationalism, not just as at the level of ideology but also expressed i n i t s people. Undoubtedly there i s a s p e c i a l kind of collaboration between church and state which i s an evident mark of the Southern I r i s h state. Yet, even so, i t i s wrong to say that the church and i t s views dominate I r i s h society. Contraception i s now legal and ava i l a b l e i n the Republic. Abortions are banned both north and south of the border, and a l l I r i s h women, Protestant or Catholic, unionist or n a t i o n a l i s t have to travel to mainland B r i t a i n for terminations. The issue of divorce alone remains the major area of apparent difference. (At the moment, divorce i s prohibited under the Constitution of the Republic, whereas the province of the north's divorce laws p a r a l l e l B r i t a i n ' s . ) But even here the gulf should not be insurmountable. It should be clear, therefore, that Protestant fears about unity with the Republic though often genuine, are equally often misplaced. In any event, they have been shamelessly exploited and whereas, i n the past, there was 59 ample ammunition to bolster the contention that I r i s h independence meant "Rome Rule" and economic backwardness, t h i s can be seen to be no longer the case. The gap between Catholic and Protestant values i s nowhere as large as i s so often assured. It i s , furthermore, not necessarily the barrier to I r i s h unity as i s usually thought. In those areas where there may be cause for concern, Northern Protestants are e n t i t l e d to and can be given e x p l i c i t legal guarantees that can be ultimately protected inside the EC by the European Court of Human Rights. The EC can ease any new development of non-sectarian p o l i t i c s that might a r i s e between the two communities i n Ireland. For Northern Protestants and unionists and I r i s h Catholics and n a t i o n a l i s t s can come together i n an increasingly important European Assembly to discuss t h e i r own various i n t e r e s t s and concerns and also those a f f e c t i n g the rest of their European neighbors. It has always been impossible for a l l the people of Ireland to engage i n normal, hopeful, non-sectarian party p o l i t i c s . In the f i r s t instance, there has never been the common forum there i s now, whereas the fact that the people of the north are not governed democratically (they are governed by vi r t u e of the workings of a p o l i t i c a l system i n which they may not p a r t i c i p a t e ) 0 7 has always ensured the perpetration and permanent p o l i t i c i z a t i o n of the whole island's sectarian d i v i s i o n . For them, though, there i s now 60 a wider European Parliament that does not i s o l a t e them, and, at the same time, also takes notice of a l l t h e i r grievances and hardships. "Sovereignty and independence", declared John Hume, Euro MP and leader of the Social Democratic and Labour Party of Northern Ireland, "the issues at the heart of the B r i t i s h - I r i s h quarrel have changed their meaning... . The basic needs of a l l countries have led to shared sovereignty and independence as we move in e v i t a b l y towards a united states of Europe, and as we i n Ireland r i d ourselves of the obsession with B r i t a i n and rebuild our li n k s with the rest of Europe". Mr Hume, who was addressing a debate on "A new Ireland and a new UK i n a new Europe", at the I r i s h Association Annual Conference i n the Republic i n October 1990, went on to say that the new approach to B r i t i s h - I r i s h r e lationships since 19B0, which led to the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, could not have happened "had the new European order not changed the roots and nature of the B r i t i s h - I r i s h quarrel". In the same debate, Jim Nicholson, chairman of the Ulster Unionist Party and MEP, said there were harsh r e a l i t i e s for Ireland to face up to after 1992 and the completion of the channel tunnel when the island, "would be the l a s t border i n Europe". He added that Ireland was being l e f t behind i n economic, p o l i t i c a l and cu l t u r a l terms, and finis h e d by saying that unionists "want po s i t i v e and helpful 61 action so that the small i s l a n d can know peace and begin to rebuild a s p i r i t of hope for tomorrow". a & The importance of exploring ways forward through partnership was a recurring theme i n the conference and Mr Hume commented that i f a successful agreement could be reached, i t would transcend the current Anglo-Irish Agreement. In a follow up to the conference, the B r i t i s h government, encouraged by the government of the I r i s h Republic, began pushing Ulster Unionist leaders to the negotiating table for t a l k s with Ireland's n a t i o n a l i s t leaders. The r e s u l t i n the spring of 1991 has been that unionists and n a t i o n a l i s t s have sat down for landmark talks that could produce a power-sharing arrangement ending seventeen years of d i r e c t rule from London. Speaking i n his Westminster constituency, Peter Brooke, the B r i t i s h Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, i n s i s t e d that the B r i t i s h government had no economic or s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t i n the union of Great B r i t a i n and Northern Ireland. Mr Brooke repeated that B r i t a i n would accept the r e - u n i f i c a t i o n of Ireland by consent and said a non-violent republicanism could take i t s place alongside the other parties i n Northern I r e l a n d . = s Re-unification, however, seems unlikely. Yet, i f Northern Ireland acquired a regional assembly that would i t s e l f be a progressive step to democratize d i r e c t rule. If the province acquired a regional assembly elected by proportional representation and circumscribed by the European Convention on Human Rights that would both be the assauaging of unionist i n s e c u r i t i e s that devolution was merely a half-way house to a re-united Ireland, and the m o l l i f y i n g of n a t i o n a l i s t i n s e c u r i t i e s that devolution was simply a code for "a Protestant Parliament for a Protestant people".* 3 0 For such an administration there could also be three channels of redress. There could be the Courts t r y i n g out those a r t i c l e s i n the European convention. There could be the intercessory role for Dublin inscribed i n the current Anglo-Irish agreement. And there could be the appeal to the superordinate European Parliament. This type of an assembly would, at the same time, furnish the mechanism to develop the r e l a t i o n s h i p between north and south i n a kind of popular way. Negatively, i t would also be invulnerable to the unionist charge that their democratic ri g h t s were being infringed by another Anglo-I r i s h agreement going over th e i r heads. If there were a northern assembly and administration the prospect for north-south committees and i n t e r -departmental workings would be endless. It would appear no coincidence, therefore, that those i n the south most anxious to promote constitutional reform and to develop relationships with the north, have not only been c r i t i c a l of A r t i c l e s two and three, but also hopeful to see a devolved arrangement established on the other side of the border. In any event, there are now people i n Ireland appearing less obsessed with B r i t a i n , putting t h e i r e f f o r t s , instead, into building I r i s h l i n k s with the rest of Europe. For the island of Ireland has been i n a state of perpetual c r i s i s , f i n a n c i a l c r i s i s and i n s t i t u t i o n a l d r i f t , lacking long term objectives. There are presently, however, recognizable e f f o r t s being made to bring order back into i t s a f f a i r s . H i s t o r i c a l l y and geographically, the island of Ireland i s part of Europe. This i s something a l l Irishmen and women can neither deny nor imagine a future outside i t . Events compel togetherness. Europe, i t has been noted " w i l l have to work more closely to avoid bloody battles over a diminishing supply of raw materials, energy and a g r i c u l t u r a l s u p p l i e s " . e x Each member state needs the Community to enable i t to remain an important power i n the world. If Europe i s to have any future, i t l i e s within the community of twelve. Thus, whether i t i s due to movements i n f i n a n c i a l markets, the transfer within multi-national corporations or changing patterns i n world trade, v i r t u a l l y a l l Western European states have become increasingly affected by the international developments they have no control over. The twentieth century i s d i s t i n c t i n now having witnessed a concerted attempt at uniting peacefully the peoples of Europe i n order to overcome mutual economic and s o c i a l problems with the aim of p o l i t i c a l u n i f i c a t i o n . The 64 EC represents the unique attempt on the part of the people of d i f f e r e n t n a t i o n a l i t i e s with d i f f e r e n t h i s t o r i c a l experiences, (most of whom have clashed d e s t r u c t i v e l y over the centuries) to l i v e and work together to f i n d and pursue common objectives. The wish expressed by Jacques Delors that each European should have a f e e l i n g of belonging to a community tha t would be h i s second country,* 3 2 i s n e i t h e r Utopian or u n r e a l i s t i c . The idea of a state of Europe united i n common purpose i s fast becoming a r e a l i t y . The s h e l l of the e d i f i c e i s i n place, a l l the f i t t i n g s just have to be i n s t a l l e d to make i t work. P o l i t i c a l and economic union i s an essential i n s t i t u t i o n a l and p o l i t i c a l goal. Work on the s i n g l e market has already set i n motion changes both within the twelve nation Community and beyond. With less than two years to go to the December 1992 deadline, more than two-thirds of the proposals of the s i n g l e market programme have been approved by the Council of the Ministers and the EP. Of the one hundred and seven texts that should have come into force, some seventy percent have been embodied i n national l e g i s l a t i o n and work i s proceeding on the remainder. The balance sheet i s p o s i t i v e o v e r a l l . In the Europe of 1992 currently under construction, the desire to l i v e and work together i s to be found. Witness, for example, the large majorities by which resolutions of the EP are adopted, while increasing attention i s also turning to the need to £5 ensure that these are a l l implemented e f f e c t i v e l y across the Community so that the s i n g l e market indeed becomes a r e a l i t y for the peoples of Western Europe. At t h i s time of dramatic change, the world i s witnessing, more c l e a r l y than ever before, that a democratic, prosperous and peaceful Europe can be achieved by Europeans working together to build i t . It i s a new Europe that i s based on the strong p i l l a r s of p o l i t i c a l legitimacy, respect for Human Rights and the Rule of Law. It i s , simultaneously, based upon a s o l i d framework of market p r i n c i p l e s , as well as upon the bedrock of security. The new EC i s d i f f e r e n t from the old EC and d i f f e r e n t from a l l the empires, regimes and orders that have ris e n and f a l l e n before. There i s , therefore, a challenge now to the whole of the islan d of Ireland to keep pace with the tremendous transformation that has changed the face of Europe. The time has long passed to strengthen Ireland p o l i t i c a l l y , economically and i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y . The EC ensures a fresh p o l i t i c a l d i r e c t i o n , intending to foster the flow of ideas, people and information, creating, at the same time, opportunities for peaceful and further far reaching changes. Community proposals are coherent and workable and represent a substantive programme for Ireland's development. They are agreed upon i n p r i n c i p l e and warmly embraced by many. By themselves, though, they cannot duplicate, but rather only complement, the work performed by northern and 66 southern leaders and those, who must together, develop themselves the best methods of work to be most e f f e c t i v e i n Europe's new p o l i t i c a l and economic environment. Matters, i n t h i s respect, i n fact, look promising. For ultimately, not only do many of the I r i s h , e s p e c i a l l y the Southern I r i s h , appear to want to help themselves, but under the circumstances, presently beyond their control, even the most stubborn of the Northern I r i s h must, i n the end, r e a l i z e that they too must do the same. Peter Robinson, has for one, at least, said that he now looks forward to the "substantially increased co-operation" that the recent e f f o r t s of the Southern government and also membership of the EC look set to bring between Northern Ireland and the Republic.* 4 3 Jim Nicholson, a r i v a l Ulster Unionist has also said, that people must appreciate that a better future i s unlikely to emerge from "the sorry mess that currently passes for p o l i t i c s " i n the isl a n d . The aims of the divided parties i n I r i s h p o l i t i c s , moreover, he claims, are no longer v a l i d . The establishment of a new p o l i t i c a l framework i n Western Europe heralds a great time of change. Because of the new European trends, both n a t i o n a l i s t s and unionists have to r e a l i z e their o r i g i n a l aims are no longer r e a l i s t i c . The t r a d i t i o n a l , sovereign, independent re-united Ireland sought by republicans, and the former semi-independent government with majority rule sought by unionists are no longer possible. Thus, Ulster Unionists need no more fear 67 the t r a d i t i o n a l re-united Ireland with which I r i s h N a t i o n a l i s t s have threatened them and I r i s h N a t i o n a l i s t s need no longer worry about a return to the old Stormont regime which Ulster Unionists have wanted. So Nicholson concludes, "one era i s ending and another i s beginning".*'* Notwithstanding the complexities of the I r i s h c o n f l i c t , i t remains an anachronism, an ancient t r i b a l hangover i n the "new Europe". Yet, i f the deep bitterness which separates people l i k e the French and Germans, a bitterness perhaps deeper than that which divides the people of Ireland, could be l a i d aside inside the EC, why cannot the I r i s h do likewise? The people of Ireland should be looking forward i n the future to entering into a new experience of Europe on the same basis as everyone else. They have been able to p a r t i c i p a t e i n Community policy-making on a r e l a t i v e l y advantageous footing given the s i z e of their numbers, and must r e a l i z e that membership o f f e r s the island's war weary communities at l a s t the hope that, to paraphrase the g r a f f i t i on the F a l l s Road of West Belfast, there can be l i f e a f t e r death. 68 REFERENCES AND NOTES: INTRODUCTION; 1. S.Hoffman, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol 21 No.122 Sept/Dec 1982, P32. 2. FQRTNI6HT May 1990, P.9. 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid. CHAPTER ONE: 5. M.Burgess, Federalism and European Union. 6. A.Daltrop. P o l i t i c a l R e a l i t i e s ; P o l i t i c s and The  European Community. P.29 7. N.Nugent. The Government and P o l i t i c s of the European  Community. P.317. 8. E.C. Newsletter, I n s t i t u t i o n s of EC. November 1990. CHAPTER THO: 9. L. de paor, Divided Ulster. P.94. 10. ed Williams, National Integration, P.881. 11. T.Nairn, The Breakup of B r i t a i n . P.276. 12. Ibid., P.278. 13. Ibid. 14. Ibid. P226. 15. L de Paer, P143. 16. Ibid. P150. 17. M.Collins, Ireland After B r i t a i n . P5. 18. P.Crichton, Prospects of P o l i t i c a l Union In the  European Community. P. 23. 19. Ibid. 4. P.407 20. A.Guelke, N.Ireland: The International Perspective. P. 11. CHAPTER THREEi 21. M.Keating and B.Jones, Regions i n the European Community. P.129. 22. Target »92, Sept 1988 No.16 P.2. 23. J.A.Oliver, P o l i t i c a l Quarterly, No.35 1987 P.427. 24. With the Single Transferable vote System, used both i n Northern Ireland and the Republic, candidates are l i s t e d i n alphabetical order on the b a l l o t paper. Each voter can cast his vote for one candidate and , i n addition, indicate, i n order of preference, the candidates to whom his vote should be given i f the candidate of his f i r s t choice has already received more than the number of votes necessary for el e c t i o n , or has obtained too few votes and has been eliminated. By contrast representatives from England, Scotland and Wales are eleted according to the t r a d i t i o n a l majority vote 69 system. In in d i v i d u a l constituencies with the majority vote system the candidates, to win, must gain the highest number of votes. 25. M.Keating and B.Jones P.126. 26. Economist. March 26th 19B8, P.14. 27. Ibid. 28. P.Hainsworth, P.229. 29. New Statesman and Society, 9/9/88. 30. D.Coombes, Ced) Ireland and the European Community. P.2. CHAPTER FOUR: 31. McAleese and Mathews, The Single European Act. P.40. 32. Ibid., P.15. 33. Ibid., P.44. 34. K.A.Kennedy, Ireland i n Transition. P.23. 35. G.N.Minshull <3rded), The New Europe. P.266. 36. Armstrong, Journal of Common Market Studies, volI, No.23. sept 84 P.320. 37. Croxford, Wise and Chalky, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol.6,No.1 sept 1987, P.37. 38. Ep News Oct. 10-14 1988. 39. Ibid. 40. EP News Oct.-Nov. 1989. 41. Ibid. 42. Ibid. 43. Fortnight, May 1990 P.12. 44. Ibid. 45. Ibid. 46. Ibid. 47. Fortnight, May 1990 P.8. 48. Target '92. January 1990. 49. Fortnight, A p r i l 1990 P.12. CHAPTER FIVE: 50 Fortnight, A p r i l 1990 P.12. 51 Fortnight, December 1990 P. 22. 52 C.Coulter, Ireland Between F i r s t and Third Worlds. P.7. 53 An I r i s h Times/MRBI p o l l indicated that 82Z of the people i n the south aspired to a re-united Ireland, but the same proportion i n favour of postponing unity to achieve an intern a l settlement i n the north, (forthnight June 1991, P.12.) 55 Fortnight, January 1991. 55. Ibid. 56. Ibid. 57. The people of Northern Ireland are excluded from the party p o l i t i c a l system which determines the governement of the U.K. (the state of which Northern Ireland nominally forms a part). They have not chosen to exclude themselves but have been excluded by the actions of the major p o l i t i c a l 70 parties, and the i r continuing exclusion i s today sustained by the deliberate decision of the leaders of those parties. 58. North-South Co-operation Newsletter by I r i s h Association. No.3 Autumn 1990. 59. Fortnight, December 1990 P.19. 60. L.de Paor. P.94. 61. E.Wistrich, After 1992. The United States of Europe. P.162. 62. BIBLIOFLASH NO: 40, 1990. 63. Fortnight, Feb. 1991. 64. Ibid. 71 BIBLIOGRAPHY:  BOOKSz Allen,K. Is Ireland A Neo-colony?. Book Marks Dublin 1990. Allen,P., R.Rummel, W.Wessels, European P o l i t i c a l Co- operation. MacKays of Chatham 1982. Albert,M. and J . B a l i , Towards European Economic  Recovery i n the 80 ys. New York Praeger 1984. Almdal,A. Aspects of European Integration.. Narayana Press. 1986. Armstrong,P. Nations Before Nationalism. University of Carolina Press. 1982. B i r r e i l , D . A Government of Ireland and Obstacles of  Power Sharing.. Dublin, G i l l and MacMillan 1980. Boyce,K. & T.Happen, Ireland. A Posi t i v e Proposal. Penguin 1985. Brunt, B. The Republic of Ireland. P. C P . LTD. 1988. Bulmer,S. The European Council's F i r s t Decade: Between Interdependence and Domestic P o l i t i c s . . Burgess,M. Federalism and European Union.. MacKays of Chatham Press. 1989. Butler,M. Europe: More than a Continent.. B i l l i n g and Sons Ltd. 1986. Clout,H. Regional Variations within the E.C.. Cambridge University Press. 1986. Collected Conference Papers on Ireland. B r i t a i n and  Europe.. In s t i t u t e of Common Wealth Studies. May 1971. No.11. Collins,M. Ireland After B r i t a i n . Pluto Press 1985. Collins,N. & F.McEann, I r i s h P o l i t i c s Today. Manchester University Press 1989. Coulter,C. Ireland Between F i r s t and Third Worlds. A t t i c Press 1990. Coombes,D. Ireland and the EC. G i l l and McMillan 1983. 72 Coombes,D. et. a l . , European Integration. Regional  Devolution and National parliaments.. P.51. 1979. Crichton,P. Prospects of P o l i t i c a l Union i n the E.C.. Australian National Press 1972. Daltrop yA. P o l i t i c a l R e a l i t i e s . P o l i t i c s and E.C.. Longman (London and New york) 1982 (2nd ed.) Dudley,J.W. 1992 Strategies for the Single Market.. Koger Page Ltd. 1989. Esman,M.J. Ethnic C o n f l i c t i n the Western World.. Cornell N.Y. Press. 1977. Featherstone,K. S o c i a l i s t Parties and European  Integration.. Manchester University Press 1988. Finlay,F. Mary Robinson. A President With A Purpose. 0*Brian Press 1990. Girvin,B. and R.Stern, P o l i t i c s and Society i n  Contemporary Ireland.. Bower Publishing Co. 1986. Guelke,A. Northern Ireland. The International  Perspective.. G i l l and MacMillan 1988. Hederman,M. The road to Europe. I r i s h Attitudes 1948- 61.. I n s t i t u t e of Public Administration 1983. Hodges,M. and W.Wallace, Economic Divergence i n the  E.C.. George, A l l e n and Unwin 1981. Ionescu,G. Centripetal P o l i t i c s . . Hart-Davis 1975. Keating,M. State and Regional Nationalism.. B i l l i n g and Sons Ltd. 1988. Keating,M. and B.Jones, Regions i n the E.C.. Duke University Press. 1989. Kennedy,K.A. Ireland i n Transition.. Mercier Press. Dublin 1986. Kennedy,K.A. T.Giblin and D.McHugh, The Economic  Development of Ireland i n the Twentieth Century.. Gower Publishing Co. 1986. Kenny,A. The Road to Hillsborough. Oxford, New York,Pergamon Press. 1986. Kirby,P. Has Ireland A Future?. Mercier Press LTD 1988. 73 Kramnick,I. Is B r i t a i n Dying?. Corneil University Press. 1979. Langehein,B. and V.Weinsheile, Graduated Integration.  A Modest Path Towards Progress. Lewis,F. Europe. Simon and Schesler inc. 1986. Lodge,J. Direct Elections to the E.P. 1984. MacMillan Press Ltd. 1986. Maher,D.J. The Tortuos Path.. Criterwin Press. Ltd. Dublinl986. Marsh,J.S. and B.J.Swaney, Agriculture and The E.C.. George, Al l e n , Unwin 1980. Minshul1,G.N. The New Europe.. 3rd ed. Hoddert and Stronghton 1985. Molle,W. and R.Cappellin, Regional Impact of Community  P o l i c i e s i n Europe. Aldershott Hants England 198B. McAloeese,D. and A.Matthews, The Single European Act 2  Ireland. Dublin, G i l l and MacMillan 1985. Nairn,T. The Break Up of B r i t a i n . London NLB 1981. (2nd ed.> Noxon-Browne,A. Nation. State and Creed.. Aldershot, England 1983. Nugert,N. The government and P o l i t i c s of E.C.. Duke University Press 1989. 0'Neil,D.J. Studies of C o n f l i c t . . University of Arizona Press. 1970. Padoa-Schioppa,T. E f f i c i e n c y , S t a b i l i t y and Equity.. Oxford University Press 1987. Parker,G. A P o l i t i c a l Geography of Community Europe.. Mackays of Chatham 1983. de Paor,L. Milestones i n I r i s h History.. Penguin 1971. de Poar,L. Divided Ulster. Penguin 1971. Pringle,D.J. One Island. Two Nations.. Research Studies. Press. N.Y. 1985. Twitchett,L. and K.J. Building Europe.. London, Europe Publications 1981. 74 Tugenhart,C. Making Sense of Europe.. Penguin Books Ltd. 1986. Wallace,H. W.Wallace, C.Webb, Policy Making i n the  E.C.. Pitman Press. Ltd. (2nd ed. 1983). Watson,A. Europe at Risk.. George G. Harops Ltd. 1972. Wistrich,E. After 1992. The United States of Europe.. Routledge 1989. Yao-suhu, Europe Under Stress.. Royal Inst i t u t e of International A f f a i r s by Butterworth 1981. Rose,R. Governing Without Consensus.. London Faber and Faber 1971. de Rougement,D. The State of European Union.. Pergamen Press Ltd. 1979. Rowthorn,R. & N.Wayne, P o l i t i c a l Economy of C o n f l i c t . Policy Press 1988. Seers and Vaitsos, Integration and Unegual  Development.. MacMilla Press Ltd. 1980. Taylor,P. The Limits of European Integration.. Croom Helm 1983. WeiIs,R.A. and B.S.mawhinney, C o n f l i c t and  C h r i s t i a n i t y i n Northern Ireland.. Oxford University Press. Ltd. 1983. Who Owns Ireland. Who Owns You?. A t t i c Press 1988. ARTICLES'. E l l i o t , M . "Origins and Transformation of the Early I r i s h Republic" i n International Review of Social History. 23, 1978. Mc6arry,J. "Anglo-Irish Agreement and the Prospects For Power-Sharing i n Northern Ireland." i n P o l i t i c a l  Quarterly. 59. 1988. Gibson,M.J. and J.E.Spencer, "Unemployment and Work i n Northern Ireland." i n P o l i t i c a l Quarterly. 52. 19B3. SEPARATES PUBLISHED BY THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES: 75 Europe. 1992 Directory. A research and Information Guide. ITCU/Coventry Polytechnic. 1982. European Union. Forward from the Internal Market Programme and 1992. Address by RT Hon. Lord Cockfield, 12 Oct. 1989. European University I n s t i t u t e Florence. 19th Report on Competition Policy. Brussels Lux. 1990. (Published i n conjuntion with the XXIIIrd Report on the A c t i v i t i e s of the European Communities 1989). The European Single Act: Countdown to 31 December 1992. Oct. 1990. European Communities. European Commission Oct 1990. OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES'. BIBLIO 1992. European Communities. European Commission. March 1991- June 1991. BIBLIO FLASH. European Communities. European Commission. No.41- No.43 1991. EC Newsletter. European Communities. European Commission. No.1 1991. EUROPE. European Communities. European Commission. No.2 1989-No. 5 1991. EUROPEAN FILE. European Communities. European Commission. No.6 1989-No.12 1990. EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT NEWS. European Communities. Council of Europe. Parliamentary Assembly No.l-No.12 1990. TARGET '92. European Community. European commission. No.7-No.12 1990, N0.6-N0.12 1991. PERIODICALS: G0VERNEMENT AND OPPOSITION. London, Weidenfield & Nicholson 1965. JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES. Oxford, Blackwell 1962. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. New York, Columbia University 1947. WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS. London 1978. PUBLICATIONS: 76 ECONOMIST. London, England 1921. FORTNIGHT. Belfast, N.Ireland 1979. NEW STATESMAN AND SOCIETY. London, Statesman and Nation Publishing 1913 

Cite

Citation Scheme:

        

Citations by CSL (citeproc-js)

Usage Statistics

Share

Embed

Customize your widget with the following options, then copy and paste the code below into the HTML of your page to embed this item in your website.
                        
                            <div id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidgetDisplay">
                            <script id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidget"
                            src="{[{embed.src}]}"
                            data-item="{[{embed.item}]}"
                            data-collection="{[{embed.collection}]}"
                            data-metadata="{[{embed.showMetadata}]}"
                            data-width="{[{embed.width}]}"
                            async >
                            </script>
                            </div>
                        
                    
IIIF logo Our image viewer uses the IIIF 2.0 standard. To load this item in other compatible viewers, use this url:
https://iiif.library.ubc.ca/presentation/dsp.831.1-0100835/manifest

Comment

Related Items