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The evolution of a civilian power : the ESDP and the 'civilianisation' of security Aceti, Julia Rose 2007

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THE EVOLUTION OF A CIVILIAN POWER: THE ESDP A N D THE 'CIVILIANISATION' OF SECURITY by JULIA ROSE ACETI B.A. , Cornell University, 2005 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL F U L F I L L M E N T OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE D E G R E E OF M A S T E R OF ARTS in THE F A C U L T Y OF G R A D U A T E STUDIES (European Studies) THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH C O L U M B I A April 2007 © Julia Rose Aceti, 2007 ABSTRACT Departing from the 'civilian power Europe' debate, my thesis explores the development of the European Security and Defence Policy and considers the emergence of a new international identity for the European Union. Though the recent development of military capabilities seems to have ended the EU's tradition as a 'civilian power,' the ESDP actually functions as an expression of civilian power by providing the E U with an additional policy tool in its developing role as a comprehensive security actor. Though the Union has ultimately evolved beyond its civilian presence, the EU's new global role is informed by its civilian origins. First, I provide an outline of the civilian power Europe debate and consider how civilian power qualities have shaped current E U external activity. Next, I discuss the development of the ESDP and review its unique characteristics. Finally, I explore the idea of comprehensive security and highlight its impact on the burgeoning security culture of the EU. I reinforce the distinct features of the ESDP by considering a variety of E U operations in two locations: Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Rather than representing a regression into power politics, the ESDP is a unique expression of military might that maintains as its ultimate goal the reduction of violent conflict worldwide. Keywords: civilian power, comprehensive security, ESDP, European Security Strategy. i i TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract i i Table of Contents i i i List of Tables iv List of Abbreviations v Acknowledgements vi Preface vii Introduction 1 Chapter One: 1.0 The E U as an International Actor: Reconsidering the 'Civilian Power Europe' Debate 6 1.1 Origins of the Idea 7 1.2 Civilian Power in Practice 10 1.3 Civilian Power Reconsidered 16 1.4 Other Perspectives 20 1.5 Conclusion 24 Chapter Two: 2.0 The European Security and Defence Policy and the 'Civilianisation' of Security ... 27 2.1 Early Attempts Toward a Coordinated Defence Policy 28 2.2 A Common Foreign Policy 29 2.3 Introducing the ESDP 31 2.4 The Role of N A T O 40 2.5 Distinct Qualities of the ESDP 42 2.6 Conclusion 47 Chapter Three: 3.0 Comprehensive Security: An Evolved Role for the E U 49 3.1 The Call for Strategic Guidance 50 3.2 A New International Approach: Comprehensive Security 52 3.3 Introducing the European Security Strategy: Key Concepts and Characteristics 57 3.4 Contrasting the ESS with the National Security Strategy of the United States 61 3.5 Case Studies 67 3.6 The ESDP in Bosnia-Herzegovina 68 3.7 The ESDP in the Democratic Republic of Congo 71 3.8 Conclusion 74 Conclusion 76 References 80 iii LIST OF TABLES TABLE PAGE Figure 2.1: ESDP Operations 2003-2007 36 iv LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS A S E A N - Association of Southeast Asian Nations BiH - Bosnia-Herzegovina CFSP - Common Foreign and Security Policy CrVCOM - Civilian Committee CSCE - Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe DRC - Democratic Republic of Congo EC - European Community ECSC - European Coal and Steel Community EDC - European Defence Community EMP - Euro-Mediterranean Partnership ENP - European Neighbourhood Policy EPC - European Political Community ESDI - European Security and Defence Identity ESDP - European Security and Defence Policy ESS - European Security Strategy E U - European Union E U B A M - European Union Border Assistance Mission EUFOR - European Union Force Mission EUJUST - European Union Justice Mission E U M C - European Union Military Committee EUMS - European Union Military Staff EUPOL - European Union Police Mission EUSEC - European Union Security Sector Reform F Y R O M - Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia HFC - Helsinki Force Catalogue HHGC - Helsinki Headline Goal Catalogue ICISS - International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty ICTY - International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia IPTF - International Police Task Force IPU - Integrated Police Unit IR - International Relations MONUC - Mission of the United Nations in the DRC N A T O - North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NGO - Non-Governmental Organisation NSS - National Security Strategy of the United States OECD - Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development OSCE - Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe PSC - Political and Security Committee SAP - Stability and Association Pact SEA - Single European Act T E U - Treaty on European Union U K - United Kingdom U N - United Nations UNDP - United Nations Development Policy US - United States W E U - Western European Union WMD - Weapons of Mass Destruction v ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to extend my respect and gratitude to Dr. Stefan Ganzle for his kind guidance and vital suggestions throughout this process. I would also like to thank Dr. Katharina Coleman for her valuable insights, and Dr. Ljiljana Biukovic for providing her support and direction. To Rita Aceti, for helping me through this experience with her careful editing skills and her sharp wit and humour, I would like to express my gratitude and appreciation. To my classmates and friends, thank you for enriching this experience through the exchange of both ideas and laughter. Also, I would like to acknowledge the Institute for European Studies for offering me many external opportunities during my study at the University of British Columbia. In particular, I would like to thank Dr. Sima Godfrey for her helpful advice and interesting suggestions, and Rob Stoddard for always providing an answer to my many inquiries. vi "We are trying to build a global crisis management organisation including military and civil assets. Nothing like it exists elsewhere in the world." - E U M S Interview, July 2001 (Bremerton and Vogler 2006: 199) vii • INTRODUCTION With the recent and rapid development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), many questions emerge about the future of the European Union (EU) as a global actor. The international role of the E U has been classified as 'civilian power,' both for the Union's retreat from power politics and its prominence in the global economy; however, the inclusion of military capabilities into E U policy calls into question the validity of the characterisation. Ultimately, the creation of the ESDP represents the evolution of the E U from a civilian power into a more complex actor that maintains a comprehensive approach to security. With European integration initially designed to bring peace and stability to a continent that had been perpetually divided by war, the E U can indeed be regarded as a security actor even at its inception. In the early stages of the European project, creating peaceful relations through cooperation and coordination was an internal policy; today, the E U is projecting its success outwardly. The ESDP marks an attempt by the E U to organise its external activity under a structured framework that preserves the inner characteristics of the Union. Not without its flaws, the E U has endured a variety of obstacles and obstructions precisely because the European project is both bold and unprecedented. The architects of integration were aware of the ambition of their goal, understanding that building unity on the continent was "a method for introducing change in Europe and consequently in the world" (Monnet 1962: 26). The progress and development of European integration has certainly challenged the very assumptions of international relations theory. Defying conventional state-centric approaches, the E U indeed demands new classification. The realist school, for example, does not expect major powers to pool sovereignty and build common institutions. As a non-state actor, the E U is able to transcend the trappings of power politics to usher in a new era international cooperation. 1 • INTRODUCTION As a civilian power, the E U has acquired considerable capacity for promoting peaceful relations. Successful within its borders, the E U has emerged as a credible model for sustainable development. As such, the Union has garnered a prominent role in its neighbourhood as a promoter of values and purveyor of norms. The civilian approach has guided the EU's role as a regional actor, resulting in substantial success and influence. Considering the impact of the Union within its borders and throughout the larger region, the E U has inevitably emerged as a global actor. In order to achieve comparable influence, the E U has redefined its position, particularly as a developing international security actor. With the creation of the European Security and Defence Policy, many observers announced the demise of civilian power Europe, lamenting that the E U relinquished its unique international position. Rather than marking an end of the EU's legacy for promoting peace and cooperation, the ESDP is elevating the European project to a new phase. Transformed to meet the demands of the new security environment, the ESDP faces a distinct opportunity to transform conventional understanding of the utility of armed forces. Responding to the international development of a holistic approach to security, the E U - sensitive to its civilian roots - has developed into a 'comprehensive security actor.' In this role, the E U has designed the ESDP specifically to handle crisis management, using both civilian and military instruments. With territorial defence organised within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the ESDP has been able to develop into a distinct security actor committed to reducing international violence. As a result, the E U has encouraged the 'civilianisation' of security by continuing to promote civilian power values. Instead of marking a regression into power politics, the ESDP represents an enlightened understanding of the particular demands of the security environment 2 • INTRODUCTION by blending the capabilities of diplomatic, economic, and military instruments. By introducing civilian methods alongside military means, a multifaceted and long-term approach to security emerges. Moving beyond the state-centric view, such an approach seeks to alter the conditions of the international environment, improving conditions for all. By civilianising security, the ESDP is able to escape the path of power projection typically pursued when military forces exist alone. In Chapter One, I introduce the concept of civilian power and explain its development through two distinct phases. The first phase, characterised by the writing of Duchene and Harms Maull, presents the general characteristics of a civilian power. In the initial definition, the two mainstays of civilian power are wielding economic influence and domesticating relations among states. The first phase stresses the innovation of civilian power, designed to change the nature of international interaction. In order to display the practical applications of civilian power, Chapter One provides examples of non-military E U external activity that largely comply with the civilian model. The second phase applies the concept specifically to the E U , though a debate emerges regarding the suitability of the term considering the recent development of the ESDP. Ultimately, multilateral cooperation is central to civilian power, as is the promotion of universal values and norms. Considering the militarisation of the E U - meant to describe the inclusion of military tools in the E U toolbox - the concept of civilian power has come under scrutiny. I propose that the E U maintains its civilian power qualities at its core, but has essentially evolved past its role as a civilian power to embrace a comprehensive approach to security. Chapter One concludes with a brief assessment of other methods of characterising the militarisation of the Union. Chapter Two is dedicated to the ESDP, beginning with a brief history of its development. Early attempts at coordinating European defence policy ultimately failed, but they reveal that the 3 • INTRODUCTION recent emergence of the ESDP does not mark a departure from the original character of the Union. The second chapter continues with a description of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the E U , beginning with the pertinent geopolitical events that motivated its creation. Once established in 1999, the ESDP developed fairly rapidly. Chapter Two then provides an assessment of ESDP capabilities, stressing the comprehensive nature of its design. With civilian and military instruments working in coordination, the ESDP presents a 'civilianisation' of security made possible by the civilian tradition of the Union. The role of NATO is considered, as the two institutions maintain a strategic partnership that enables the distinct position of the ESDP. With N A T O providing the territorial defence of Europe, the ESDP is free to focus on crisis management. Civilian traits are apparent, as the ESDP favours multilateral action and maintains a comprehensive approach to security. Considering the civilian tradition of the E U , and recent inclusion of military means in E U external policy, Chapter Three characterises the Union as a comprehensive security actor. Comprehensive security is an international development; therefore, the third chapter places the E U within the larger international context. The changing demands of the new security environment call for a broad approach to security that targets economic and social factors in order to protect the individual. Comprehensive security emerges from the work of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the U N , with the concept of human security encouraging its progress. The international initiative that produced the Responsibility to Protect is a further example of the growing importance of comprehensive security. To illustrate how the E U has absorbed a comprehensive approach to security into its singular policy, Chapter Three provides an assessment of the European Security Strategy (ESS) of 2003. The document highlights the bourgeoning security culture of the Union. To further 4 • INTRODUCTION emphasise the distinct qualities of the E U as security actor, a comparison is made between the ESS and the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States. Chapter Three concludes with two case studies of ESDP activity - in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Democratic Republic of Congo - that further uncover the comprehensive nature of the E U as a security actor. These two cases are relevant not only because a military operation was deployed in each location, but also because extensive civilian resources were committed to each region by the ESDP. Furthermore, these two choices reflect both the strength of the E U as a regional power and the ability of the Union to also exert global influence. Though many flaws and limitations of the ESDP can be identified, I instead highlight its unique traits and unprecedented opportunities. Motivated by our collective frustration with unbridled military aggression, citizens and scholars alike should search for alternatives to promoting peace and stability worldwide. At this (still embryonic) stage of its development, the ESDP exhibits certain key characteristics that indicate its suitability for championing a new wave of international interaction - one that is ultimately motivated by human security and the reduction of violence worldwide. 5 • CHAPTER ONE 1.0 The EU as an International Actor: Reconsidering the 'Civilian Power Europe' Debate Conceptualising the European Union (EU) as an actor in the international system is an important first step before determining its capabilities and assessing its impact. Traditional International Relations (IR) literature has neglected the E U in the past because of the unique quality of the Union's existence. Typical state-centric approaches struggle to find a place for the multifaceted E U , and a sceptical eye will disregard it altogether. In 1982, Hedley Bull declared that "'Europe' is not an actor in international affairs, and does not seem likely to become one" (Bull 1982: 151). Bull regarded Western Europe as weak in state power, seeing the then-European Community (EC) as an organisation loosely connected by "communities, assemblies, and secretariats" (Bull 1982: ibid). A decade later, Christopher Hi l l echoed these sentiments, warning the international community not to expect much from the EC as an international actor, considering the dangerous "expectations-capabilities gap" that he perceived to be overwhelming (Hill 1993). As Richard Whitman explains, two approaches generally exist in conceptualising the E U as an international actor. The first places the E U within the context of traditional theory - as briefly explained above - and the second considers the E U as sui generis, and therefore in need of new conceptual categorisation. Stemming from the sui generis position is the concept of civilian power, which has garnered the most widespread usage (Whitman 2002: 3). First articulated by Francois Duchene, civilian power has evoked much debate in its thirty-year history. The concept can be understood in two overlapping phases: the first phase, characterised by the writing of Duchene and Hanns Maull, establishes the general qualities of a civilian power; the subsequent phase, represented by Karen Smith and Stelios Stavridis, applies the concept specifically to the E U , which has evolved considerably since it was first described as a civilian 6 • CHAPTER ONE power. In this section, I will first introduce the concept of civilian power by examining its roots and development, largely considering the contributions by Duchene and Maull. Then, I will outline how the E U has traditionally exercised civilian power in the international system through non-military means. Finally, I will consider how to conceptualise the recent inclusion of military capabilities in the EU's toolkit by consulting the second phase of the 'civilian power Europe' debate, as well as contributions by other scholars. Though the E U has evolved past civilian power, its new international role was born out of the civilian tradition and thus maintains certain distinctive qualities that ultimately provide the E U with a unique position in international affairs. 1.1 Origins of the Idea When Duchene first characterised the EC as a civilian actor, he was responding to the particular security environment of the Cold War. Evaluating the international system, Duchene designed a position that would generate the most clout for the EC, considering its strengths and limitations. If the EC were to be a power in international affairs, it would have to be "an exemplar of a new stage in political civilisation" (Duchene 1973: 19). Neutrality seemed equally inconceivable as becoming a nuclear super power. Hidden between the two dominant choices was a third option of civilian power, which would focus on both economic influence and domesticating relations among states. Duchene considered this role a unique opportunity for the EC, and urged the Community "to bring to international problems the sense of common responsibility" (Duchene 1973: 20). Duchene's definition of civilian power emerges in his description of the EC: "The European Community will only make the most of its opportunities i f it stays true to its inner characteristics. These are primarily: civilian ends and means, and a built in sense of collective action, which in turn express, however imperfectly, social values of equality, justice and tolerance" (Duchene 1973: ibid.). 7 • CHAPTER ONE Ultimately, Duchene's definition was based on the impossibility - and indeed, undesirability - of the EC as a military actor. Conventional understanding of civilian power is largely centred on the absence of military tools. Though such a construction was useful at the time of writing for Duchene, his concept was built to include other possibilities. His reasoning was informed by the Cold War dynamic of stalemate - though nuclear weapons greatly enhanced an actor's power, their actual utility was waning (Duchene 1973: 19). As military prowess diminished in effectiveness, an opportunity arose for economic strength. At the same time, Duchene noted that the EC would never be able to develop into a nuclear superpower, and would therefore be confined to other forms of influence (Duchene 1973: 11). As Stelios Stavridis observes, for Duchene the EC was a civilian power by default (Stavridis 2001: 7). The other aspects of civilian power, as articulated by Duchene, could arguably expand to include forms of military capabilities that he did not even consider—namely, conflict resolution and peacekeeping. Duchene calls for the EC to usher in a new era of international interaction, and he stresses the importance of values in motivating the Community's choices. Civilian 'means' and 'ends' could be expanded to include the use of force toward global peace and stability i f collective action and the promotion of certain values are maintained. This modification is possible because the security environment has changed since the end of the Cold War. The E U has more options, and is indeed able to become a civilian power by design (Stavridis 2001: 17). Thus, although Duchene labelled the EC as 'civilian' because of its lack of military capabilities, observers like Stavridis have since retooled the concept to include a particular brand of military might. Using post-war Germany and Japan as his subjects, Harms Maull's classic definition of civilian power places an emphasis on economic strength, but also allows for a particular use of force. The distinct positions of Germany and Japan after the war allowed them 8 • CHAPTER ONE to fully develop their economic abilities, but their political interests and military objectives were constrained by integration and cooperation with their partners (Maull 1990: 97). The result was a unique presence in international affairs considered to be an expression of civilian power. Though Germany and Japan are states, the restrictions levied on their sovereignty through cooperation make them comparable to the E U in this discussion. For Maull, civilian power was thus defined by three characteristics: the acceptance of cooperation with partners in the pursuit of international objectives; the emphasis on non-military instruments to secure national goals, with military power used only as a residual measure to safeguard other activities; and, the willingness to develop and employ supranational structures to address issues of international management (Maull 1990: 92). Maull also includes another vital element, also articulated by Duchene, which stresses the innovation of so-called civilian presence, and degree to which the international system is changed by civilian power influences (Maull 1990: 102). Indeed, "this change affects both the substance and the power structure of world politics, and requires major foreign policy adjustments from all powers. It also demands a willingness to think about, and act upon, a new model of international politics—complex interdependence..." (Maull 1990: ibid.). In his initial definition, Maull reserves a place for a limited military presence. In a later publication, he defends and expands this stance. Maull argues that Germany remained a civilian power, even after its participation in various military affairs (Maull 2000). Maull is largely concerned with the evolution of a civilian power in response to changes in the international environment. Germany was influenced by the increasing expansion of U N peacekeeping operations beginning in the late 1980s. Images of human suffering and rights violations prompted Germany to act out against international atrocities (Maull 2000: 12). Germany was thus involved in peacekeeping operations in Namibia, Central America, Turkey, Somalia, and 9 • CHAPTER ONE Yugoslavia. Such activity marked a "learning process [in which] German foreign policy had to reconcile its traditional foreign policy role concept with perceived new demands from within and new expectations from its allies for a more substantial and robust German participation in burden-sharing" (Maull 2000: 14). So the rebirth of German military presence marked a metamorphosis: force was not used to pursue selfish national interests, but was instead driven by adherence to international norms and values. Maull thus presents a new definition of civilian power, considering the German case, and decides that a civilian power should promote and initiate international action, encourage collective security and a commitment to supranational coordination, and uphold the rule of law and universal values (Maull 2000: 27). 1.2 Civilian Power in Practice Considering the essence of civilian power as defined by Duchene and Maull -emphasising economic and other non-military means, domesticating relations among states, adhering to and upholding a set of universal values, and promoting multilateral cooperation and supranational coordination - the question arises of how the E U has actually exercised civilian power. Though the concept of civilian power is essentially an academic construction used to describe the E U , policy makers seem to have welcomed the depiction. In fact, while serving as president of the Commission, Romano Prodi declared that the E U "must aim to become a global civil power at the service of sustainable global development" (Prodi 2000). Before considering how the ESDP is informed by civilian power characteristics in the next chapter, I will first display how civilian power ideas shape the EU's non-military external activity. These efforts include the EU's involvement in conflict prevention, as well as its commitment to regional stability. Indeed, the Communication on Conflict Prevention, the Stability Pact with South Eastern Europe, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, and the European Neighbourhood Policy 10 • CHAPTER ONE each provide prominent examples of E U external policies that largely adhere to recognised civilian power qualities. The E U has indeed developed into a security actor without the use of force. External activity of the Union has been described as possessing both comprehensive and cooperative qualities (Biscop 2004b). A distinctive European approach to security is thus characterised by maintaining interdependence between political, social, economic, cultural, and military activity, while also emphasising cooperation and partnership (Biscop 2004b: 5). Such an approach is congruent with the notion of civilian power Europe, and is indeed a means of operationalising the concept. Examples of this method exist in the EU's focus on conflict prevention. According to Christopher Hi l l , the identity of the Union makes conflict prevention a natural focus for E U policy; furthermore, preventing the outbreak of violence is also a practical desire for the Union (Hill 2001:316). Crises in a variety of locations, including Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, Russia, and the Mediterranean could destabilise the E U through the disruption of trade, the movement of displaced persons, or through the negative spillover effects of political instability (Hill 2001: ibid.). Of course, the moral element of conflict prevention should also be considered, but one would expect greater political will in response to conflicts that may present direct or indirect consequences for the E U . As Hi l l recognises, the E U has to be very pragmatic about its commitments, considering its limited resources (Hill 2001: 333). The E U has already been instrumental in helping to bring peace to Central and Eastern Europe, particularly in promoting democracy and development through the accession process. To guide this activity, while enabling application to a wider geographic scope, the Commission released the Communication on Conflict Prevention in 2001. The Communication seeks to ameliorate the root causes of conflict by creating 'structural stability' (Commission 11 • CHAPTER ONE 2001). The Communication stresses the support for viable political structures and sustainable economic development to ensure a struggling community will not resort to conflict. The E U characterises conflict prevention as both a political and moral imperative. The instruments available to the E U include external assistance and the development agenda, economic cooperation and trade policy, humanitarian aid, social and environmental policies, diplomatic negotiation and mediation, various sanctions, and ultimately, the new tools of the ESDP (Commission 2001: 6). A l l instruments exist in support of the others, hence emphasising the comprehensive approach to security. Cooperation is similarly stressed, and the Communication highlights relationships with the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe toward conflict prevention. Non-Governmental organisations (NGOs) are also identified as partners in the commitment to avoid the resort to violence (Commission 2001: 28). The Communication provides insight into how the E U regards its global role and its international responsibility. During the Gotenborg European Council in June of 2001, the E U Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflict was thus adopted and later implemented into all aspects of E U foreign policy (Biscop 2003a: 185). At the regional level, the E U is similarly effective in implementing its comprehensive approach to security. Of course, the enlargement of the Union to include the transformed nations of Central and Eastern Europe is a striking past example of successful E U external policy. Today, the Stability Pact with the Balkan states, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, and the European Neighbourhood Policy are relevant examples. An E U initiative that includes participation of third states and international organisations, the E U adopted the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe in 1999 (Friis and Murphy 2000: 774). The Pact emerged as a method of reducing the likelihood of conflict, rather than merely reacting to instability after violence 12 • CHAPTER ONE emerges. The Kosovo crisis of 1999 only served to reinforce the need for such a policy. Describing the Stability Pact as a potential "security community-building institution," Srdjan Vucetic explains that the EU's arrangement with the Balkans is a method of Europeanisation that seeks to provide the region with the tools necessary to eventually solve its own problems (Vucetic 2001). A long-term conflict prevention strategy, the Pact is truly comprehensive in nature, as it blends political goals with economic development and security concerns. Specifically, the Stability Pact focuses on three areas: democratisation and human rights; economic reconstruction, cooperation, and development; and security issues, including fighting organised crime and stabilising population movements (Friis and Murphy 2000: 775). The cooperative element of the Stability Pact is also very strong. A n agreement between the E U and Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Stability Pact also requires participation from the United Nations, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, NATO, and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. The World Bank, International Monetary Fund, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the European Investment Bank, and the Council of Europe Development Bank are also active partners in the Stability Pact (Friis and Murphy 2000: ibid). Since many of the recipient countries are recognised as potential E U members, the probability of success for the Stability Pact is very high (Friis and Murphy 2000: 769). Romania and Bulgaria, for example, are former recipient countries that have since joined the E U in January 2007. Enlargement is arguably the most powerful foreign policy tool available to the E U today, and it certainly provides an example of the E U exerting influence beyond its borders using traditional civilian power methods that are both comprehensive and cooperative in nature. 13 • CHAPTER ONE The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) maintains a similar approach, though the recipients are not considered to be potential members of the Union. The E M P was launched in 1995 after the Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Barcelona, and is often referred to as the Barcelona Process, after its guiding document, the Barcelona Declaration. The Barcelona Process has three 'chapters,' including political and security dialogue, economic and social partnership, and social and cultural exchange and understanding (Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 156). The creation of the EMP, and the variety of other initiatives that accompany it, mark an attempt by the E U to apply its approach to security to a struggling region of the world that does not include potential E U member states. The EMP again represents both a comprehensive and cooperative approach, as it involves bilateral negotiations between the E U and individual countries, as well as multilateral collaboration between the E U and the region as a whole. The countries involved include the E U member states, as well as Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Turkey, and Tunisia. For many observers, the Barcelona Process is generally not regarded as particularly successful. The Mediterranean region in question blends the E U together with North Africa and the volatile Middle East. The ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict regularly impedes the EMP process; the complexities of the conflict far exceed the capabilities of EMP (Edwards 2005: 45; Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 157). Distrust on both sides of the Mediterranean is also a commonly cited problem (Biscop 2003a: 184). The countries of the Southern Mediterranean often feel as though they are regarded as a source of threat, rather than as a partner in building security. The creation of the ESDP - which is not well understood outside of Europe - reinforces suspicion, as fears of intervention increase in the Southern Mediterranean (Biscop 2003a: 189). Biscop suggests that the EMP countries be included in the ESDP as partners in crisis 14 • CHAPTER ONE management. Such an arrangement would not only increase trust and cooperation, but it would also instigate real progress, particularly in the field of political and security dialogue (Biscop 2003a). The most prominent example today of European external policy is perhaps the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which seeks to build partnerships and create stability between the E U and its regional neighbours. The ENP has come to include the members of the Euro-Med Partnership, speaking to the desire of the E U to improve its impact in the Mediterranean region. Clearly, enlargement and the accession process carry the most influence in E U external policy; however, the E U cannot continue to expand indefinitely. The ENP marks an attempt to bridge the success of accession policy and the Stabilisation Pact to the less influential Euro-Med Partnership, blending neighbours with potential members (Emerson 2004: 1). Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia, and Ukraine are all a part of the ENP, and each state conducts a bilateral Action Plan with the E U (Emerson 2004: 7). The ENP echoes other external policy initiatives of the E U with a layered approach. The ENP aims to reduce conflict by targeting corruption, organised crime, and trafficking, as mentioned in the European Security Strategy. The ENP also emphasises political, cultural, and economic tools, again making it comprehensive in nature. The ENP encourages political and economic reforms, offering greater economic interdependence and partnership in return. Extension of the internal market and preferential trade are examples of the benefits of the ENP, as well as greater cooperation in transportation, energy and telecommunication networks. These benefits are offered instead of membership, as the ENP is a project distinct from the accession process (Commission 2004). In an assessment of the ENP 15 • CHAPTER ONE two years after its inception, the Commission recognised the need for E U member states to increase their commitment to the project to ensure success (Commission 2006). Though progress has undoubtedly been made, many challenges remain which will require greater political will on the part of the E U . In particular, the Commission calls for enhanced trade and economic relationships, improved mobility for neighbourhood migrants, and a more active role for the E U in conflict resolution for ongoing disputes (Commission 2006: 3-4). A deeper commitment on the part of the Union will add credibility to the ambitious ENP project, ultimately enabling long-term success. 1.3 Civilian Power Reconsidered Exercising so-called 'civilian power' should extend beyond the simple distinction of whether or not military means are used. If civilian power is meant to describe an actor that promotes particular values, certainly military capabilities might be useful to achieve those ends. The second phase of the civilian power debate is thus characterised by responding to changes in E U capabilities. As some observers have argued, militarising the E U may actually strengthen the EU's capacity as a civilian power (Stavridis 2001). Even so, for others, suggesting that military action is a part of civilian power is indeed a 'contradiction in terms' (Bull 1982: 149; Smith 2005). To overcome this divide, I contend that militarising the E U is neither wholly a 'civilian' activity, nor does it represent a total break from the civilian tradition. Instead, I argue that the E U maintains its civilian power qualities - particularly, extending a foreign policy that is both comprehensive and cooperative in approach - but has ultimately evolved past its role as a strictly civilian power. In this section, I will briefly review both sides of the civilian power Europe debate, before outlining other methods of describing the EU's new role as an international actor. 16 • CHAPTER ONE With the development of E U military capabilities in the late 1990s, many scholars announced the end of civilian power Europe. Karen Smith is particularly prominent in this debate, insisting that any use of military instruments is not fitting for a civilian power. Smith places military means (indicating the use of armed forces) at one end of a spectrum that sees civilian means (economic, diplomatic, and cultural tools) at the other extreme. On this basis, a civilian power should not use anything other than civilian instruments (Smith 2005: 1). Any wider interpretation, such as considering peacekeeping as a civilian expression of military power, presents too many uncertainties for Smith about where to drawn the line (Smith 2005: 9). Confining the scope of civilian power strictly to the means used seems overly limiting; such an approach fails to capture the full dynamic of the concept. Smith's next argument concerns 'ends.' She notes that many scholars in favour of the civilian power argument overly emphasise the goals that military operations are pursuing to determine civilian character. She rightly contends that looking solely at ends allows too many actors into the civilian model, and determining the definition of a civilian end is actually increasingly difficult (Smith 2005: 10). Looking exclusively at ends certainly does present a dilemma, since any clever administration can disguise its aggressive military pursuits as civilian endeavours, as recent events can attest. Smith questions whether the E U was ever really a civilian power to begin with, considering the degree to which its most civilian of tasks - enlargement and neighbourhood policies - can become increasingly coercive (Smith 2005: 7). Finally, Smith cautions that insisting the E U remains a civilian power in the face of militarisation leads to a biased view of the Union, suggesting its inherent goodness (Smith 2005: 1). Adrian Treacher aligns with Smith in regretting the addition of military capabilities in the EU's toolbox. Both scholars contend that as a civilian power the E U had the potential to be a 17 • CHAPTER ONE unique international actor by remaining outside the grasp of power politics. By choosing to militarise, the E U has forgone the possibility of being a progressive international leader (Treacher 2004). For Treacher, by "embracing militarisation, [the E U is] conforming to a conventional state model for dealing with security" (Treacher 2004: 66). Ian Manners echoes this view in a publication that describes his concept of 'normative power Europe.' When Manners first extended the idea of normative power, he sought to transcend the civilian-military divide by focusing on the ability of the E U to shape conceptions of what is 'normal' (Manners 2002: 240). Richard Rosecrance arrives at a similar conclusion, describing the E U as an entity that possesses a strong magnetic force (Rosecrance 1998: 16). Even though Rosecrance levels a strong critique against the CFSP, claiming that no such common foreign policy actually exists for the EU, he does recognise the "unique and unparalleled" role of the E U as a normative power (Rosecrance 1998: 15). In a later publication, Manners assesses how the militarisation of E U policy affects its role as a normative power. Though Manners once heralded the Union for its ability to "disregard Westphalian principles" (Manners 2002: 239), he too suggests that the E U is slipping back into power politics. Manners contends that including military instruments in E U external policy only serves to undermine the EU's role as a normative power, making the Union look like it is striving for great power (Manners 2006: 194). While Manners eventually concedes to the possibility of the E U retaining the positive qualities of normative power while also possessing military might, he believes that the Union has already begun to disregard its commitment to building sustainable peace (Manners 2006: ibid.). Manners is correct in identifying the boundaries the ESDP must maintain, but his announcement is premature. 18 • CHAPTER ONE Smith tries to formally announce the end of 'civilian power Europe,' but the concept remains. Considering Maull's contribution to the debate, particular use of military capabilities can maintain a civilian nature and render the term viable for a variety of circumstances (Maull 2000). Though Duchene constructed the concept in response to a particular security environment, updated interpretations reveal that the dynamic concept concerns more than just the policy tools involved. Several scholars contribute to this side of the debate. Juliet Lodge asserts that recent developments in international affairs have introduced the 'civilianisation of security,' by increasing focus on human security and the protection of human rights. Though she initially cites the 1990 Paris OSCE Charter, she also recognises the activity of the European Parliament and the inclusion of human rights and disarmament in security dialogue in Europe (Lodge 1993: 233-4). Lodge's description highlights the influence of civilian power qualities on the security environment. Ultimately for Lodge, civilian power attempts to limit - not eliminate - the use of force in the international system (Lodge 1993: 249). Lodge's contribution changes the manner in which we view the use of force. A civilian power may use military tools, however paradoxically, in an effort to reduce global violence and protect human rights. Stelios Stavridis is a strong advocate for the militarisation of civilian power Europe, claiming that only by possessing military instruments is the E U truly capable of pursuing civilian ends (Stavridis 2001). Stavridis reiterates that though Duchene envisioned an EC without profound military capabilities, ignoring the second component of his definition of civilian power - promoting certain political values abroad - would be remiss. For Stavridis, an actor remains a civilian power i f the use of force is geared towards promoting human rights and democratic principles. He considers this argument a reinterpretation of Duchene that focuses on the second part of Duchene's construction (Stavridis 2001: 17). Stavridis' work is not intended as a call to 19 • CHAPTER ONE arms; instead, he simply contends that military means should not be excluded. Rather, military tools should be used alongside other foreign policy instruments in pursuit of civilian ends, and called upon only when absolutely necessary. The militarisation of the E U , according to Stavridis, serves only to strengthen the EU's civilian presence by allowing the Union clout and impact. Of course, great care must be taken to ensure that the E U continues to wield its developing military power according to the civilian model (Stavridis 2001: 20). 1.4 Other Perspectives Considering the input of a variety of observers, the concept of civilian power seems well equipped to explain the new form of military presence showcased by the E U ; yet, the term is equally burdened by the surrounding controversy, and the simple game of semantics plaguing the terminology. I propose that the militarisation of the E U does not mark a break from the civilian tradition, but it certainly represents an evolution beyond simple civilian power toward a comprehensive approach to security. The emerging European security culture - the unique method of managing military capabilities - is well informed by its civilian past. How to effectively characterise the military presence of the E U is elusive, as it represents a new era of international relations, just as Duchene predicted. Returning to traditional theory yields few concrete results, as the militarisation of the Union defies expectations. Realist thought, represented here by Barry Posen, describes the ESDP as an attempt to balance American power. Though Posen's work is certainly not without merit, he fails to capture the full dynamic of the ESDP, denying the Union ownership of its design (Posen 2006). He considers the emergence of the ESDP as a "puzzle," considering the apparent redundancy of its existence. With N A T O and US ensuring the defence of Europe, and territorial disputes among member states a virtual impossibility, Posen sees no necessity in the creation of 20 • CHAPTER ONE the ESDP (Posen 2006: 149). To explain its existence, Posen turns to structural realism. Given the anarchical worldview of his chosen theory, actors in the international system are motivated by the acquisition of power. As such, actors vie and lobby for power in order to gain influence in world affairs. With the "unipolar" presence of the US in the current system, Posen explains that states must choose between bandwagoning with the US (as allies did with the creation of NATO), or balancing American power through alternative arrangements (Posen 2006: 155). For Posen, the ESDP represents an attempt by the E U to "quietly and cautiously" balance American power (Posen 2006: 153). Since the US does not pose an imminent threat to the E U , the ESDP is not an attempt to balance threat. Instead, common defence policy serves to establish autonomy to protect the E U from the often-capricious behaviour of the hegemon. Posen extends four predictions to support his evaluation: first, the biggest and most powerful E U states will be central to the development of the ESDP; second, certain events and predicaments will impel development of the policy; third, the results of the ESDP will be focused on bringing autonomy to the E U , without putting perceived American interests first; and finally, Posen expects the US to object to the development of the ESDP (Posen 2006: 164-5). Posen's work aptly captures certain demands of the international system, including the seemingly inescapable lure of power politics. His predictions are accurate. The ESDP was launched as a result of the cooperation of France and the U K , and the French have continually supported and sustained a number of ESDP operations. Similarly, the crisis in former Yugoslavia, the conflict in Kosovo, and the Iraq war are continually identified as key events that motivated the smooth functioning of a common defence policy for Europe. Furthermore, ESDP missions pursue declared E U values of crisis management and institution building, and the Americans certainly regard the policy with a permanent degree of suspicion. Of course, Posen's 21 • CHAPTER ONE article was written in 2006, a time when examples of all four of his expectations had already surfaced. Posen captures important elements of ESDP motivation, which clearly are not wholly altruistic. Nor should they be. As an actor in the international system, the E U maintains certain interests and goals. Nevertheless, the outcomes of the ESDP contribute to the public good, and its work is not a tiresome exercise in power projection. Posen does not acknowledge this equally important aspect of the European defence project. The ESDP represent an acknowledgement of the EU's place in the world, and it allows the E U to take ownership of its role by establishing comprehensive security as a complementary alternative to the sometimes-necessary work of NATO. At this stage, the ESDP is certainly not intended to replace N A T O , nor could the ESDP function without the existence of the Atlantic Alliance. The ESDP should be assessed with awareness of its informed design and attention to its benevolent use of military capabilities. To this end, the concept of good international citizenship proves useful. Andrew Linklater first explained the concept of good international citizenship, after a former Australian statesman proposed such a role for his country.1 The concept marries realism and liberalism to produce an actor that blends national interests with more elevated concerns such as "promoting world order, encouraging global reform and honouring duties to humanity" (Linklater 1992: 21). Tim Dunne and Nicholas Wheeler expand the concept, discussing a new role for Great Britain under Prime Minister Tony Blair. According to their model, a good international citizen does not revoke national interests, but constrains those interests with a notion of the greater good. The rules of international society - laws and norms -are granted an important role, as they must supersede the pursuit of political and commercial advantages when human rights or universal values are at stake (Dunne and Wheeler 2001: 171). 1 Senator Gareth Evans introduced the concept of'good international citizenship' during an address to the National Annual General Meeting of Amnesty International in Sydney, Australia on May 19, 1989 (Linklater 1992). 22 • CHAPTER ONE The authors stress that human rights promotion is central to good international citizenship, as is multilateral cooperation and respect for international laws; furthermore, international activity should be conducted with " U N authorization where possible" (Dunne and Wheeler 2001: 182). The concept of good international citizenship is thus quite similar to civilian power; Karen Smith suggests that they are, in fact, oftentimes interchangeable (Smith 2005: 14). In a similar manner, good international citizenship allows for the use of force in particular circumstances. Dunne and Wheeler explain that "good international citizens are morally required to use force in exceptional cases where it is judged that all credible peaceful alternatives have been exhausted, where delay in acting will lead to large numbers of civilians being killed, and where there is a reasonable prospect of success" (Dunne and Wheeler 2001: 183). This description is congruent with Lodge's idea that 'civilianised' military use actually serves to reduce overall violence in international affairs. The main flaw in Dunne and Wheeler's construction is suggesting that U N authorization is only necessary when possible. To ensure civilian ends do not become subject to manipulation, U N involvement is absolutely imperative. For Jean-Yves Haine, the E U can instead be thought of as 'soft power plus' (Haine 2004b: 71). Though he does not use the terms specifically, Haine's argument is rooted in the E U acting in a comprehensive and cooperative manner in external affairs. Using the provisional version of the European Security Strategy as the foundation for his argument, Haine discusses the two key concepts of the document - pre-emptive engagement and effective multilateralism. The former refers to nation building, and the use of a variety of foreign policy tools to bring stability to a region. Pre-emptive engagement "encapsulates the European way of dealing with instability that includes rapid deployment of troops, humanitarian assistance, policing operations, enhancement of the rule of law, and economic aid" (Haine 2004b: 72). Such a comprehensive 23 • CHAPTER ONE strategy is a marked difference to the American approach, according to Haine, and represents a distinct strength of the E U . Effective multilateralism refers to the EU's commitment not only to operating within the U N framework, but also to ensuring the U N remains effective. The U N legitimizes the use of force, and is thus a cornerstone of E U external action (Haine 2004b: ibid). Together, pre-emptive engagement and effective multilateralism constitute the 'soft power plus' approach of the E U as an international actor. For Sven Biscop, the E U objective of effective multilateralism summarises the entire European approach to security issues. Strengthening international institutions and prioritising a rule-based international order are goals that are global in scope, long term, cooperative, and target the underlying causes of instability and conflict (Biscop 2004a: 27). Biscop suggests that effective multilateralism is best understood as a system of global governance, or providing "stability and security, an enforceable legal order, an open and inclusive economic order and global welfare in all of its aspects" at the global level (Biscop 2004a: ibid). Equal access to global public goods is the key to Europe's security and stability. Biscop uses the ENP as an example of the E U promoting good governance at the regional level, and suggests that empowering the U N will allow the E U to positively contribute to global governance (Biscop 2004a: 29). The EU's contribution to and influence on the U N is vital to effective multilateralism, and allows the E U to promote global governance. In this capacity, the E U alters the notion of'security' slightly, by encompassing it in a comprehensive strategy that highlights economic and social development and good governance. 1.5 Conclusion The civilian power Europe debate provides the foundation for understanding the E U as an international actor. The concept has been developed in two overlapping phases, with each 24 • CHAPTER ONE providing valuable insights with which to move forward. In the first phase, Duchene establishes the general characteristics of a civilian power, which focus on economic influence and domesticating relations among states. Considering the particular constraints of the Cold War security environment, Duchene constructs the EC as a civilian power by default. Nevertheless, his concept is built to include other possibilities. When Maull adopts the term to describe post-war Germany and Japan, he recognises the opportunity for evolution. Particularly in the German case, a civilian actor responds to evolved demands of the security environment to find new methods of expressing civilian power. Initially designed as a unique role for the EC, the concept of civilian power recalls the innovation of the European project. The second phase of the civilian power debate thus responds to developments in European integration. With the inclusion of military instruments in E U policy, scholars questioned the longevity of the term. Some observers announced the demise of civilian power Europe, particularly Smith and Manners; nevertheless, other scholars, such as Stavridis, herald the ESDP as an opportunity for the E U to truly express civilian power internationally. Whether or not the term is meant to refer to the use of force, the concept of civilian power provides valuable insights into the EU's constantly evolving role. The EU's position today is very much informed by the civilian identity of the past; as such, the term should not be disregarded. It provides helpful insights into the EU's current international role. The E U has developed a distinct approach to external relations that is both comprehensive and cooperative in nature. Initiatives toward conflict prevention and the EU's extensive role as a regional actor provide prominent examples of civilian power operationalised. These policies have transformed the E U into a security actor, even with the absence of military tools. With the recent development of the ESDP, and the subsequent inclusion of the use of force in E U external 25 • CHAPTER ONE activity, I argue that the E U maintains at its core the qualities of civilian power, but has since evolved into a more complex actor. For a more effective international position, the E U has included modest military capabilities in its toolkit, which combine with non-military initiatives to formulate a truly comprehensive approach to security. Observers have tried to explain the militarisation of the E U with a variety of methods. The realist school captures certain characteristics of the international system, though it fails to consider the distinct purpose of the ESDP. Other ideas capture the full dynamic of the EU's new role, including the concept of good international citizenship. Furthermore, the distinct approach of the E U as an international actor can also be regarded as 'soft power plus,' or as part of a plan for global governance. Each of these explanations retains vital elements of civilian power, most notably the importance of maintaining a holistic approach to security, while prioritising cooperation with others. Ultimately, the E U has transformed into a comprehensive security actor, which is made possible by the civilian tradition of the Union. Once again, the E U is carving a unique position for itself as a reaction to the particular demands of the new security environment. The following chapter wil l introduce the European Security and Defence Policy, to specifically address how it was designed with civilian power in mind. 26 • CHAPTER TWO 2.0 The European Security and Defence Policy and the 'Civilianisation' of Security The concept of civilian power must be recalled and engaged when assessing the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The ESDP represents the inclusion of military instruments in the E U toolbox, though the policy maintains a view of security that extends well beyond the use of force. The ESDP is a comprehensive policy that blends a variety of foreign policy instruments. Of course, since European integration was designed to promote peace on the European continent, introducing military capabilities to the project has not been without its controversy. Using force to resolve conflict among member states has become obsolete; as a result, European defence issues have typically not been discussed outside the confines of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) (Haine 2004c: 35). Nevertheless, considering the demands of the new security environment, and taking into account the international role of the EU, a reconsideration of the use of force was required. The ESDP presents a unique expression of military power precisely because it was bom out of the civilian tradition and exists within the confines of comprehensive security. Indeed, a 'civilianisation' of security policy has transformed the use of force. In this section, I will first outline the history and development of the ESDP, beginning with early attempts at coordination, followed by the establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Next, I will explore the relationship between the ESDP and NATO, before determining the specific criteria that establish the ESDP as a truly distinct expression of military power. With this framework in mind, in the following chapter I will examine ESDP activity in two geographical locations: Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Democratic Republic of Congo. 27 • CHAPTER TWO 2.1 Early Attempts Toward a Coordinated Defence Policy Even though the ESDP is a relatively new development of the E U , security issues have been part of the European project since the early stages of integration. At its inception, the European Community recognised the potential for a united European foreign policy. In fact, defence policy was first initiated in the early 1950s with the Pleven Plan, which sought to create an integrated European army under joint command. The ideas presented in the Pleven Plan encouraged discussion, and after some debate, the six members of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) came together to form the European Defence Community (EDC) in 1953. The EDC was a bold project, and was ultimately defeated by the French National Assembly in 1954. Negotiations for an autonomous European defence project did,not resume until the 1960s with the introduction of the Fouchet Plan. Again, the goal was closer political cooperation for the member states with the introduction of common foreign and defence policies. The ambitious plans never came to fruition, and the project was abandoned in 1962. Europe's first two attempts to create a common defence policy were essentially ahead of their time, though they reveal that recent progress of defence policy is, in fact, not a departure from the original character of the Union. The international identity of a united Europe was still in its infancy in the 1950s and 1960s, making integration in defence policy an unlikely goal; nevertheless, the ESDP is rooted in the history of the European project. Creating an autonomous defence system for Europe was not particularly popular during the Cold War era given the strategic role of NATO. European territorial security was guaranteed by the Alliance, with the United States principally committed to maintaining the defence of Europe. Exclusively a defence organisation, N A T O was singularly focused on the threat posed by the Soviet Union (Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 192). The Western European Union (WEU) 28 • CHAPTER TWO was created in 1954 to work within the N A T O framework as a forum for discussion of European defence issues. Establishing the W E U under the auspices of N A T O further ensured the primacy of the Alliance in providing European defence (Bretherton and Vogler 2006: ibid). With the end of the Cold War, the future role of N A T O became a concern on both sides of the Atlantic. The W E U was almost dormant, but was nevertheless thought to be the future of European security. Observers envisioned that the W E U would form the arm of European defence, while it also maintained its role within the N A T O organisation (Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 194). Determining the true nature of the relationship between W E U and N A T O produced a divide among member states, with three camps emerging. The 'Europeanists,' led by France, sought an autonomous European defence; the ' Atlanticists,' led by the U K , did not want to undermine the primacy of N A T O (Haine 2004c: 37). The neutral countries encouraged non-military activity as a priority. Such disparity led to an impasse, with little progress being made. 2.2 A Common Foreign Policy Subsequent developments focused on coordinating foreign policy issues, without creating a common defence policy. The Davignon Report, presented at the Luxembourg Summit of 1970, marked a turning point in political integration by creating the European Political Community (EPC). Responsive to the shortcomings of the previous plans, the EPC called for consultation among member states, rather than outright convergence (Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 165). The sensitive natures of defence and security issues, which exist at the heart of state power, have to be gently coordinated into European integration. Only when consensus is reached can policies truly go forward. The EPC called for the gradual transfer of power to the European Community, which allowed it to achieve initial success. With heads of states and governments given more 29 • CHAPTER TWO control than with previous plans, the EPC moved forward; however, "initiatives that progressed beyond the routine and declaratory were relatively rare" (Bremerton and Vogler 2006: 166). In 1974, the European Council was established, allowing the EPC better coordination. At the same time, pertinent geopolitical events of the late 1970s illuminated the need for the EC to develop a unified voice. The growth of the EPC was immediately tested with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and the Islamic revolution in Iran that same year. Failure to coordinate, and general incapacity, revealed the need to strengthen the EPC if it was to survive. The London Report of 1981 echoed these sentiments, reiterating the need for consultation on foreign policy matters affecting all member states. Finally, in 1987, the EPC entered into legal force with the Single European Act (SEA). Securing the agreement into the treaties ensured the EPC commitment from the member states, while also reducing the possibility of a fleeting existence. The SEA introduced an institutional basis for the EPC, while also employing a group of European correspondents and a secretariat, each working directly under the authority of the presidency. The objectives of the EPC were extended to include not only problems relevant to all member states, but also to foreign policy issues of general interest. Such a change indicated that the EC was ready to augment its regional voice with an international presence. European security plans were becoming ever more serious; yet, as geopolitical concerns intensified at the end of the Cold War, reform to the EPC became increasingly necessary. In particular, the upheaval and violence stemming from the disintegration of former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s forced the E U to truly recognise the need for improvement. Conflict in the Balkans revealed the weaknesses and flaws of European geopolitical behaviour, prompting a variety of criticisms, including David Buchan's description of "tragic failure" (Buchan 1993). The need for coordination among E U member states was apparent, yet a common voice could 30 • CHAPTER TWO not be found. The US was reluctant to intervene, as the conflict was seen as a European problem to which the E U should find a solution (Haine 2004c: 39). As Jean-Yves Haine explains, "in the grey area between American ambivalence and European impotence, Slobodan Milosevic pursued his destructive programme with an impunity that culminated in Srebrenica, the worst massacre in Europe since the Second World War" (Haine 2004c: ibid.). The ineffectiveness of the E U in the Yugoslav crisis harmed the very credibility of the European project, revealing institutional weakness and an inability to overcome national discrepancies in the face of tragedy. The E U was discredited for allowing such a blatant disregard for its fundamental values to occur in the immediate vicinity of the Union. Calls for change were heeded with the Treaty on European Union (TEU) in 1993. The TEU, negotiated at Maastricht, created the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Within the treaty, Title V replaced the EPC with the CFSP, establishing it as a pillar under the new three-pillar structure of the European Union (Deighton 2002: 724). 2.3 Introducing the ESDP Certain flaws were obvious with the CFSP, including the vague mention of potential defence capabilities. Though amendments were made with the Amsterdam revision of the TEU, the true breakthrough for E U security and defence policy came from the convergence of French and British strategy at the end of 1998 (Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 198). In December 1998, at Saint-Malo, French President Jacques Chirac and U K Prime Minister Tony Blair released a declaration supporting autonomous E U action, complete with military resources. The Saint-Malo declaration marked a significant reversal of the British view that European defence should not be arranged outside of N A T O . The painful lessons of the Yugoslav crisis, the sudden indication that the US may not always be willing to intervene in Europe, and the recent desire of the U K to take a leading role within the E U allowed for the groundbreaking shift (Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 31 • CHAPTER TWO ibid.). In the spring of 1999, the US-led campaign in Kosovo served as a watershed event to reinforce the need for European autonomy. Of course, ambiguities remain over the altered role of NATO and the delicate balance that exists between establishing E U autonomy and maintaining the Atlantic Alliance. The language of the Saint-Malo declaration reflects the sensitivity in maintaining this balance. Speaking first to European autonomy, the declaration asserts that "[t]he European Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises" (Rutten 2001: 8). The following words couch the boldness of the preceding statement: In strengthening the solidarity between the member states of the European Union, in order that Europe can make its voice heard in world affairs, while acting in conformity with our respective obligations in NATO, we are contributing to the vitality of a modernized Atlantic Alliance which is the foundation of the collective defence of its members (Rutten 2001: ibid.). Nevertheless, the Saint-Malo declaration became the founding document of the ESDP. Though the creation of defence policy is surrounded by political sensitivities, and arguably impeded by the precarious transatlantic relationship, two significant characteristics emerge from what appears to be a compromise at Saint-Malo: first, the ESDP is not designed to ensure the territorial defence of Europe; and second, the ESDP is intended to deal with crisis management designed under European authority. The ESDP was formally established at the June 1999 European Council in Cologne. Operating as a part of the CFSP, policies and operations of the ESDP must follow the purpose and design of the CFSP. Toward effectiveness, several developments were made in the creation of a common defence policy. First, Javier Solana was made High Representative for CFSP. A Political and Security Committee (PSC) was created, consisting of member state ambassadors 32 • CHAPTER TWO who meet bi-weekly in Brussels. Rather significantly, the E U Military Committee (EUMC) and the E U Military Staff (EUMS) were also established. The E U M C brings together member state chiefs of defence staff (or their delegates), who give advice and recommendations to the PSC and the European Council. In addition, the EUMS provides the military expertise toward strategic planning for military crisis management missions (Haine 2004c: 44). The presence of personnel in uniforms was duly noted as a novelty in Brussels (Haine 2004c: ibid.). The duties of the ESDP are divided into three categories. The first two are known as the Petersberg Tasks, which include military crisis management and civilian crisis management. Conflict prevention is the third category. After the Cologne Council, the Petersberg Tasks were placed at the core of ESDP activity. Crisis management refers to assisting the resolution of a foreign conflict, and may require acute time pressure (Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 201). Each European Council meeting thereafter focused on enabling autonomous action by the E U under the ESDP by 2003. Particularly, the Helsinki summit of 1999 introduced the 'Headline Goal,' which requires the E U to have the capacity to deploy up to 60,000 persons within 60 days, sustainable for at least one year (Rutten 2001: 82). Accompanying the new military structure is a civilian component, which is both complementary and separable. The civilian component aims to improve humanitarian aid and intervention capabilities, led by E U M C sister organisation the Civil Committee (CIVCOM). While preventing and mediating conflict, the C I V C O M will call on four main instruments: police cooperation (providing police to restore order and to train local police); strengthening the rule of law (providing up to 200 judges, prosecutors, and other political experts); civilian administration (providing a team to establish or guarantee elections, taxation, education, and water provision); and, civilian protection (assistance during humanitarian emergencies). In an interview with ESDP personnel conducted by Bretherton and 33 • CHAPTER TWO Vogler, a senior officer of the EUMS explained, "We are trying to build a global crisis management organisation including military and civil assets. Nothing like it exists elsewhere in the world" (Bremerton and Vogler 2006: 199). Another interviewee described N A T O as a "one trick pony," while illuminating the distinct and comprehensive qualities of the ESDP, which blends a mix of both civilian and military crisis response methods (Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 201). Capability-building in the ESDP is described by Biscop as a bottom-up process (Biscop 2006a: 2). Member states choose to commit certain capabilities to E U initiatives. This process is wholly voluntary; as such, states cannot be outvoted nor compelled to participate with forces or finances. The Helsinki Headline Goal Catalogue (HHC) outlines the necessary equipment needed to achieve the Headline Goal; the Helsinki Force Catalogue (HFC) lists the capabilities pledged by individual member states. Of course, once actual operations are being designed, the member states again commit specific units, regardless of what has been promised to the HFC. For Biscop, a top-down approach should be instituted to allow the E U utmost effectiveness. Without bringing defence control to the European level, the E U risks performing below its expectations (Biscop 2006a: 5). Of course, the intergovernmental design of the ESDP is a reflection of the political sensitivity surrounding the policy areas of foreign and defence policy. At this stage, transferring power to the E U level is a bold and ambitious move. Since the ESDP is at such an early stage of development, the bottom-up approach can be regarded as a careful method of delineating which goals are 'European,' while still allowing the member states their international identities. Gradually, convergence toward acknowledged E U goals will become easier. In fact, since becoming operational in 2003, the ESDP has launched a variety of missions under five broad 34 • CHAPTER TWO categories. The first type of ESPD operation is the E U force mission (EUFOR), which includes military deployment. EUFOR missions have been deployed in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and in Bosnia- Herzegovina. The four remaining types of missions are all civilian, including police missions (EUPOL), justice missions (EUJUST), border assistance missions (EUBAM), and security sector reform (EUSEC). Police missions are increasingly common, and generally work to design an efficient police force, while providing the necessary training. Having been deployed in the F Y R O M , Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Palestinian territories, and the DRC, police missions typically precede and follow military missions, speaking to the holistic approach pursued by the ESDP. Justice missions conducted by the ESDP provide technical assistance in properly establishing the rule of law and installing effective justice systems. Such missions have been deployed in Georgia and Iraq. Justice missions mark an attempt by the E U to effect the security environment by tackling institutional weakness, which is often at the root of instability. The civilian power mentality is evident injustice missions, as the E U is working to promote certain values it has deemed fundamental. The ESDP has launched border assistance missions in two areas: the border between Moldova and Ukraine, and the Rafah crossing between Palestine and Israel. These two distinct projects reveal interesting information. The governments of Moldova and Ukraine requested E U presence at their common border. The border assistance mission in this area operates as part of the ENP, and reveals the importance of the E U as a regional actor. Moreover, the E U is active in the Middle East Peace Process, and its role in E U B A M Rafah is another expression of its will to bring peace to that region. E U presence was requested, which reveals the credibility of the Union in an international crisis. In addition, the ESDP has a security sector reform mission in the DRC, 35 • CHAPTER TWO which is one of four distinct E U operations in that country. The remaining ESDP operations include a monitoring mission in Aceh, which blends E U capabilities with A S E A N partners, and a support mission in Darfur, through which the E U cooperates with the African Union. A l l of these missions reveal the increasing geographical scope of the ESDP. The final operation currently organised by the ESDP is a planning mission in Kosovo. The E U is preparing for a potential civilian crisis when the status of Kosovo is decided. The Kosovo mission is proactive, and represents a strong commitment by the E U to be effective in its neighbourhood, particularly in an area in which it was once unable to act. The following table (figure 2.1) provides an overview of ESDP operations deployed since 2003. The ESDP is largely focused on civilian activity, with military capabilities available to safeguard this activity, just as Maull suggested. Figure 2.1 ESDP ACTIVITY 2003-2C 072 OPERATION LOCATION DURATION LEGAL BASIS INSTRUMENTS PARTICIPATION Civilian Military MEMBER STATES THIRD PARTIES Aceh Monitoring Mission Aceh (Indonesia) September 15, 2005-December 11,2006 Joint Action 2005/643/CFSP Peace agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement, August 15, 2005 (Helsinki) 219 unarmed personnel tasked with monitoring implementation of the peace agreement Sweden, Belgium, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, UK Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Norway, Switzerland EUFOR Althea Bosnia-Herzegovina December 2, 2004- (ongoing) Security Council Resolution 1575 (Chapter VII Mandate) Berlin-plus arrangement Council Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP 7,000 soldiers Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, UK Albania, Argentina, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Morocco, New Zealand, Norway, Romania, Switzerland, Turkey 2 Table compiled by the author, with assistance from the following sources: Deighton 2002, Grevi et al. 2002, Lindstrom 2004, Missiroli 2004, Ortega 2001. 36 • CHAPTER TWO OPERATION LOCATION DURATION LEGAL BASIS INSTRUMENTS PARTICIPATION CIVILIAN MILITARY MEMBER STATES THIRD PARTIES EUPM Bosnia-Herzegovina January 1, 2003-December 31, 2005 Security Council Resolution 1396 Council Joint Action 2005/824/CFSP 531 police officers 400 support staff Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine EU Support to AMIS II Darfur, Sudan July 18, 2005-(ongoing) Joint Action 2005/557/CFSP Request by the African Union 50 police officers 17 military experts 10 military observers Austria, Cyprus, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK — EUSEC DRC DRC June 8,2005-(ongoing) Council Joint Action 2005/355/ CFSP Official request by the Congolese government 8 security sector experts Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands, UK, Sweden -EUPOL Kinshasa DRC April 12, 2005-(ongoing) Council Joint Action 2004/847/CFSP 29 police staff France, Portugal, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden Canada, Turkey Operation Artemis DRC June 12, 2003-September 1, 2003 Security Council Resolution 1484 Council Joint Action 2003/423/CFSP 1,800 Soldiers France (lead nation), Italy, UK, Sweden, Belgium, Germany Canada, South Africa, Brazil 37 • CHAPTER TWO OPERATION LEGAL BASIS INSTRUMENTS PARTICIPATION LOCATION DURATION CIVILIAN MILITARY MEMBER STATES THIRD PARTIES EUFOR DRC Security Council Several Belgium, Cyprus, Turkey Resolution 1671 hundred Czech Republic, military Finland, France, Conducted in personnel Germany, Greece, EUFOR DRC DRC agreement with deployed in Hungary, Ireland, worked to assist the DRC authorities Kinshasa Italy, Lithuania, UN mission already during Luxembourg, deployed in the election time Netherlands, Poland, region April 25, 2006- Portugal, Slovakia, November 30, Battalion-size Slovenia, Spain, 2006 force outside Sweden, UK of the country on stand-by, ready to be rapidly deployed EUJUST Lex Council Joint 21 experts Latvia, Poland, EUJUST Lex is Action training over Germany, France, regarded as 2005/190/CFSP 700 judges, Spain, UK complementary to Iraq investigating the other efforts of Invitation from the magistrates, the EU and the Iraqi Transitional senior police various member July 1,2005- Government and states involved in (ongoing) penitentiary Iraq. EUJUST Lex officers is designed to bring added value to the work of the UN EUPAT Council Joint 30 police Austria, Belgium, Action advisors Cyprus, Denmark, FYROM 2005/826/CFSP Finland, France, — Germany, Greece, December 15, Hungary, Italy, 2005- Latvia, Slovakia, June 2006 Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, UK Operation Security Council 350 Lightly Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Concordia Resolution 1371 armed Finland, France, Czech Republic, military Germany, Greece, Estonia, Hungary, FYROM Berlin-plus personnel Italy, Luxembourg, Iceland, Latvia, arrangement Netherlands, Lithuania, Norway, March 31, 2003- Portugal, Spain, Poland, Romania, December 15, Council Joint Sweden, UK Slovakia, Slovenia, 2003 Action Turkey 2003/92/2003 38 • CHAPTER TWO OPERATION LEGAL BASIS INSTRUMENTS PARTICIPATION LOCATION DURATION CIVILIAN MILITARY MEMBER STATES THIRD PARTIES EUPOL Proxima Council Joint 150 police Pre-2004 Bulgaria, Romania, Action 2004/789/ officers enlargement: all 15 Turkey, Norway, CFSP member states Iceland, Canada, FYROM Ohrid Framework 50 civilian support staff. participated, with all 10 acceding states also involved. Russia, Ukraine, Switzerland, United States December 15, Agreement 2001 2003- (peace treaty) Post-2004 December 14, enlargement: all 25 2005 member states participated. EUJUST Themis Council Joint Action 2004/523/CFSP 10 criminal justice experts, plus Experts chosen among the member states Georgia Invitation by Prime local support staff July 16, 2004- Minister Zhvania July 14, 2005 EU Planning Council Joint 1,500 The EUPT is The EU is joined by Team Action international preparing for a the 'Contact Group', 2006/304/ police, potential civilian which regularly CFSP judges, crisis mission once consults on the Kosovo prosecutors, and customs officials the status of Kosovo is finalised; as such, member state status of Kosovo. The group includes the US, UK, France, April 10, 2006- participation is still in Germany, Italy, (ongoing) the planning phase. The mission will be part of an international effort. Russia. NATO, the UN, and the OSCE are also deployed in Kosovo. EUBAM Council Joint 120 border Belgium, the Czech The United Nations Moldova-Ukraine Action 2005/776/ and customs Republic, Denmark, Development CFSP experts Estonia, Finland, Programme is a Moldova and Germany, Greece, partner in EUBAM, Ukraine Request by the Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, providing practical and administrative December 1, presidents of Netherlands, Poland, support. 2005- Moldova and Portugal, Slovakia, (ongoing) Ukraine UK 39 • CHAPTER TWO OPERATION LOCATION DURATION LEGAL BASIS INSTRUMENTS PARTICIPATION Civilian Military MEMBER STATES THIRD PARTIES EUPOL COPPS Palestinian Territories January 1, 2006-(ongoing) Council Joint Action 2005/797/ CFSP 33 unarmed personnel Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Spain, Sweden, UK EUPOL COPPS exists as part of the larger involvement of the EU in the Middle East Peace Process, particularly as a member of the Quartet, which also includes Russia, the US, and the UN. EUBAM Rafah Palestinian Territories November 30, 2005-(ongoing) 'Agreement on Movement and • Access' between the Palestinian Authority and Israel 55-75 police officers Austria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK EUBAM Rafah exists as part of the larger involvement of the EU in the Middle East Peace Process, particularly as a member of the Quartet, which also includes Russia, the US, and the UN. 2.4 The Role of NATO Respecting the transatlantic relationship and balancing the varying degrees of commitment to N A T O among E U member states have duly impacted the creation of the ESDP. These sensitive political concerns have both shaped and impeded ESDP development. Endless speculation has arisen on the relationship between ESDP and N A T O , and whether the intention exists to fatally undermine the Atlantic Alliance. Of course, excessive N A T O involvement in ESDP could also be detrimental, described by Howorth as "US hegemony via the back door" (Howorth 2001: 783). Beneath the rhetoric and politically necessitated extolling of the transatlantic relationship, determining the potential outcome of this precarious balance between N A T O primacy and E U autonomy is a challenge. Perhaps naturally, the ESDP and N A T O experience a degree of institutional rivalry and jealousy. Javier Solana, the High Representative for the CFSP, is also the former Secretary General of N A T O . His knowledge and expertise of 40 • CHAPTER TWO both institutions effectively forms a bridge between them (Cornish and Edwards 2003: 591). The American view concerning autonomous European defence has wavered from indifference to hostility, with notable moments of careful consideration of the potential benefits. Ultimately, the Americans are keen to retain the important strategic position of N A T O . As such, increased European capabilities are welcomed, provided developments do not result in a newly bolstered American rival. Regardless of the surrounding politics, the role of N A T O is important for the current functionality of the ESDP. As a strategic partner, N A T O provides guidance for the organisational structure of the ESDP. The components of ESDP emulate N A T O chain of command; in addition, the European personnel of N A T O are often the very same people who contribute to ESDP operations. France is notably the only exception to this arrangement (Cornish and Edwards 2003: ibid.). Moreover, through a key arrangement, N A T O may contribute substantially to the resources used by the ESDP. In fact, stemming from the Balkans experience was the creation of the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), supported by the US and intended to function within the N A T O framework. This arrangement was defined in 1994 and finalised in 1996, and came to be known as the Berlin agreement, under which the W E U could access N A T O resources while still acting independently (Haine 2004a: 134). Following the creation of the ESDP, and considering the lessons learned by both the E U and the US during the Balkans experience, the Berlin arrangement was updated in 1999. Now referred to as the Berlin-plus agreement, the 1999 N A T O summit recognised the willingness of the E U to act autonomously while conducting the Petersberg Tasks, with assured access to N A T O resources (Haine 2004a: 137). Though the E U can surely benefit from the use of N A T O capabilities, the Union is not confined to such an arrangement. After a great deal of transatlantic dispute and intra-European debate, autonomous 41 • CHAPTER TWO operations led by the E U may be conducted under a particular national leadership (Haine 2004a: 141). Certainly, many flaws and even more ambiguities exist in the N A T O - E U relationship. Arguably, N A T O acts as a clutch for the bourgeoning ESDP, filling in the capabilities gap while the policy develops. Though the Americans are wary, continued N A T O involvement in European defence allows the US a continued strategic role in Europe. Neither party is wholly satisfied with the current state of the Atlantic Alliance, but particular benefits remain for both the E U and the US. 2.5 Distinct Qualities of the ESDP Certain qualities should emerge from the ESDP if it truly stems from the civilian power tradition of the E U , and i f it indeed represents a continuation of the E U as a comprehensive security actor. Three such qualities can be identified. First, the ESDP is not designed to provide territorial defence; as such, its focus on the Petersberg Tasks represents a distinct expression of military power unprecedented in Europe. Next, the ESDP explicitly declares a commitment to empowering the U N , an action congruent with civilian power. Finally, the ESDP has been specifically designed to provide comprehensive security. Military capabilities exist alongside civilian components; both units can respond alone or in conjunction to bring stability and security to a particular area. In fact, as figure 2.1 displays, the ESDP is largely organising civilian operations. The resulting quality of the ESDP can be characterised as the 'civilianisation' of security. This description does not lessen the military components of the ESDP, nor does it demoralise the potentially dangerous tasks facing Europe's soldiers. Instead, describing the ESDP 'civilianised security' recognises the vital inclusion of civilian elements into security strategy. Civilianised security represents an enlightened policy of the Union. 42 • CHAPTER TWO Considering the first distinct quality of the ESDP - that it is not focused on territorial defence - the role of N A T O must again be considered. In addition to providing functionality, N A T O involvement also allows the ESDP originality of design. Explicit in every ESDP document is the necessary role of N A T O for providing, under Article V , the defence of Europe. As Bretherton and Vogler explain, "War fighting and global power projection are not the functions of the ESDP, but stabilisation and peace enforcement, with the capability to operate beyond Europe are" (Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 209). With the ESDP atypically uninvolved in territorial defence, the E U is able to focus on providing comprehensive security outside its borders; the ESDP simply provides an additional tool for the E U in this endeavour. Since E U military capabilities emerged from the position of civilian power, they maintain a distinct character. Mette Eilstrup Sangiovanni cautions that the ESDP is not a sound development for the EU. She asserts that the E U cannot afford to balance US military power, and that any such attempt would be a waste of E U resources. She urges a continued focus on non-military civilian power (Sangiovanni 2003: 201). As Per Martinsen explains, "contemporary analyses, preoccupied with transatlantic comparisons of military capabilities, often fail to account for the wider strategic thinking reflected in the EU's focus on conflict prevention and crisis management" (Martinsen 2003: 1). In my view, the ESDP does focus on the types of goals Sangiovanni encourages. The conclusions issued after the Helsinki summit include the following declaration: "The European Council underlines its determination to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where N A T O as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises. This process will avoid unnecessary duplication and does not imply the creation of a European army" (Rutten 2001: 82). 43 • CHAPTER TWO Even within the (currently sidelined) Constitutional Treaty, which increases rhetoric on collective defence in combating terrorism, the role of N A T O is upheld (Ortega 2004: 79). In evolving into a security actor, the E U has maintained certain civilian characteristics, namely the tendency toward multilateral cooperation and the respect for international norms. With effective multilateralism as a stated goal of the ESS, two main objectives emerge -establishing the U N as the purveyor of international law and the mediator of international conflict. The ESDP is developing in the same tradition, with specific mention of the vital role of the U N in legitimizing the use of force. Emerging from the Helsinki summit was the following declaration on the role of the ESDP: "The Union will contribute to international peace and security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The Union recognises the primary responsibility of the United Nations Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security" (Rutten 2001: 82). As the following case studies will illuminate, all past and present ESDP military operations have been conducted under the guidance and authority of U N Security Council resolutions. Given "the strongly expressed view of a number of member states and the public position established by the Security Strategy, it is • doubtful whether any departure from this rule would be countenanced" (Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 210). An important expression of the EU's declared commitment to the U N exists in the Joint Declaration on Crisis Management of September 2004. The Joint Declaration outlines areas for improvement in international crises management, while also defining areas of cooperation between the two institutions. A n emphasis is placed on sharing information and increasing mutual knowledge of each institution's mechanisms (Council 2004b). This voluntary and dedicated commitment to working in partnership with the U N provides an important check on 44 • CHAPTER TWO E U activity. Working in coordination with the U N , ESDP missions will respect international law and curb any sudden aggressive activity on the part of E U military forces. The EU-UN relationship will ensure continued respect for values that stem from the EU's civilian past. As already discussed, the non-military external actions of the Union maintain a comprehensive approach to security. The military activity of the E U continues in the same spirit. Made up of two equal parts of military and civilian components, the ESDP accordingly develops the EU's role as a comprehensive security actor. Equipping a civilian actor with limited military capabilities allows for a truly comprehensive approach to security to emerge. At this stage, most operations undertaken by the ESDP have been organised as civilian crisis management missions. The military operations have been deployed in three locations that have also benefited from both justice and police missions, as the case studies will show. The military activity of the Union clearly does not mark an interruption from international role the E U has been pursuing since its inception. With extensive overlap in membership between the E U and N A T O , questions of the redundancy of the ESDP may arise. What added value does the ESDP present that cannot be accomplished by NATO? Though it has undergone extensive reform from its initial Cold War design to combat the Soviet threat, N A T O remains strictly a military alliance. Regardless of similar European membership, the E U and N A T O are vastly different institutions. The E U is an important development actor, and its range of competencies extend from economic to judiciary (Haine 2004a: 131). A fair comparison, however, should look exclusively as each institution's role as a security actor. Again, N A T O competence is purely military, though it has longer tradition than the E U , and maintains access to extensive military capabilities. Though NATO is currently focused on transforming to meet the demands of the new security environment 45 • CHAPTER TWO (including increasing involvement in peace keeping and crisis management), the resources favoured by the Alliance are still largely military. The E U instead possesses a wide array of instruments, ranging from long-term stabilisation efforts to rapid reaction military capabilities, while also including humanitarian aid and peacekeeping operations (Haine 2004a: ibid, 143). The additional capability of military means is one component of many; indeed, "a multidimensional civil identity continues to be at the core of the EU's external persona" (Bremerton and Vogler 2006: 214). The ESDP is certainly not without its flaws. Analysing these flaws is outside the scope of this project, though they are certainly worth acknowledging. Relatively new, E U defence policy needs time to grown and evolve. Tremendous potential exists within its distinct design. Of course, certain glaring contentious issues must be addressed in the future. Deployability and sustainability of troops still need vast improvement. Of the close to 2 million soldiers available across Europe, only about 10% of them are deployable for E U missions abroad (Schmitt 2004: 96). Furthermore, the ESDP relationship with N A T O cannot continue in a zone of ambiguity. A mutually beneficial partnership is possible, though politically delicate relationships must sustain difficult stages of growth. Beyond that, coordination between the two institutions is sometimes awkward, as some E U member states are not involved in N A T O , and some N A T O participants are not part of the E U . Creating inter-pillar coherence within the E U structure must also be prioritised. Though the Constitution may introduce effective changes, the current three-pillar organisation of the Union lends itself to inconsistency and delayed reaction. Further enlargement may also stress coordination of defence policy. Balancing the variances in member state capabilities is also a concern, with certain member states capable of much greater military activity (and associated interests) than others (Missiroli 2004: 70-1). This list is not exhaustive, 46 • CHAPTER TWO though it reflects the variety of challenges that lie ahead for the bourgeoning E U security culture and its potentially innovative ESDP. 2.6 Conclusion Indeed, the ESDP has developed so rapidly since it was introduced in 1999 that the early attempts at coordinating European defence policy are often overlooked. Both the Pleven Plan and the Fouchet plan were ambitious, though essentially inappropriate considering the contexts within which they were conceived; nevertheless, they reveal the longstanding desire to develop a security agenda within the E U . Developing a common foreign policy was equally difficult, as both policies exist at the very heart of state power. The introduction of the CFSP marks a breakthrough in the European project. External policy, both before and after the CFSP, is marked with a comprehensive approach, and the ESDP follows in this tradition. Though an autonomous European defence capability reflects the demands of the new security environment, the complexities of the transatlantic relationship make advancements in the policy field precarious at times. The relationship between the ESDP and N A T O maintains a delicate balance, but the EU's initiative remains distinct from the Atlantic Alliance. Given NATO' s responsibility for the territorial defence of Europe, the ESDP has developed as a unique expression of military power. The work of the ESDP - the Petersberg Tasks - focuses entirely on crisis management, allowing the ESDP to work toward civilian ends. Motivated by the civilian tradition of the EU, the ESDP also maintains the comprehensive identity of the E U as a security actor. With civilian components working alongside military capabilities, the ESDP wields a range instruments. Fostering a relationship with the U N contributes to the credibility of the E U as a security actor, by ensuring the legitimate use of force by the Union. Though flaws remain in the proper functioning of the ESDP, its unique design maintains a great deal of potential for the future of 47 • CHAPTER TWO the E U as comprehensive security actor. The semi-sovereign position of the E U as a unique international actor presents an interesting paradox. The precise quality that allows the E U to develop into a unique security actor could also impede its growth altogether: Able to transcend the constraints of sovereignty felt by a typical state actor, the E U can focus its ESDP on loftier civilian goals. Of course, whenever its component parts feel constrained by these developments, they may exert their perceived sovereign rights, potentially toppling the entire project. The sovereignty paradox is yet another delicate balance of which the E U must be mindful. 48 • CHAPTER THREE 3.0 Comprehensive Security: An Evolved Role for the EU As a civilian power, the E U introduced a new era of international interaction centred on economic strength and the promotion of certain social and political values. The inclusion of military capabilities in E U external activity augments civilian power to produce a comprehensive approach to security. Even at its inception, the European Union can indeed be regarded as a security project. Representing a commitment to end war on the continent, European integration brought stability and peace to nations that had been perpetually at war. The unique approach of pooling sovereignty and building institutional coordination has been successful. Solidifying peace within E U borders has motivated the stabilisation of the wider European neighbourhood. Peaceful and secure relations between the E U and its neighbours are certainly beneficial to the Union, and the wider region can also benefit from the externalisation of E U success. Inevitably a global player, the E U needs ever more coordination to impact the international security environment. Both the success of cooperation at the E U level and the degree of interdependence at the global level, encourage a reconsidered approach to security. Comprehensive security has gained credibility and prominence internationally, and the E U has adopted that approach as it continues to develop its own unique role as a security actor. Undeniably, the EU's history as a civilian power has contributed to the international development of comprehensive security; at the same time, the EU's civilian power foundation makes comprehensive security a natural progression for the Union. Ultimately, the E U has evolved past its role as a civilian power to become a comprehensive security actor. With a new global position that now includes military capabilities, the E U discovered the need for an integrated framework to guide external activity. Without a common strategic vision, " E U external action has lacked direction, determination, and consistency" (Biscop 2004b: 4). In 49 • CHAPTER THREE order to act with purpose and operate according to its own agenda, the E U needed to develop a clear security strategy. With a distinct approach to security emerging through various regional policies, a strategic document would ensure that the comprehensive approach would remain functional. To allow the E U to act with one motive, and to ensure the relevance of the EU's international influence, Javier Solana was asked to produce a strategic document outlining the EU's security goals in May 2003 (Biscop 2004b: 8). The European Security Strategy (ESS) can be viewed as a codification of existing security policies, which "creates a framework from which it is afterwards more difficult to depart; it circumscribes the room for manoeuvre of future policy-making" (Biscop 2006b: 2).The document also marks a new phase in the external relations of the European Union. In this section, I will first review why a security strategy was needed in Europe. Using the ESS as a guide, I will then assess the unique qualities of the bourgeoning E U security culture. Next, I will place the contents of the ESS within the greater context of the international environment, assessing the influences and guiding principles of E U strategy. To show the unique nature of the security culture of the E U , I will then conduct a brief contrast and comparison of the ESS with the National Security Strategy of the United States. From this analysis, the E U emerges as an innovative international actor with a strong civilian past and a capable comprehensive future. 3.1 The Call for Strategic Guidance On regional matters, including the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, the E U exerts a great deal of influence; however, globally, convergence has been more challenging. Regardless of capabilities, without the proper mechanisms the E U cannot effectively respond to crises (Biscop 2004b: 6). After September 11, 2001, weaknesses in E U external relations were again revealed. Tested with an acute crisis, the 50 • CHAPTER THREE E U struggled to find its unified voice. Most member states agreed that a comprehensive approach is the most effective reaction to the terrorist threat; nevertheless, when the United States declared its war on terrorism, member states were so divided that the E U was rendered powerless. With the U K , Spain, and Poland willing to join the US in its invasion of Iraq, other member states such as Belgium, France, and Germany were calling for an alternative approach and the appropriate U N mandate (Biscop 2003b: 3). This disagreement marked not only a transatlantic divide, but also a deep division within the E U itself. At stake was the very identity of the E U as a security actor. Those opposed to the Iraq invasion wanted to exhaust all other options before resorting to military force, and only if the use of force was deemed legitimate under international law. The comprehensive approach to security exists at the very heart of the EU's international identity. Clearly, the Iraq divide necessitated a clear E U framework in the future to clarify the E U approach and guide external activity. In addition to revealing the need for greater coordination, the events of September 11 also illuminated the realties of the new security environment. The E U now exists in circumstances unknown during the early days of integration. In the context of the Cold War divide, Europe was strictly focused on avoiding a direct attack from an identified enemy as it tried to balance its position in between the two superpowers. Guided by American leadership and anchored in N A T O , European defence policy was limited to territorial security. Additional components, such as diplomacy and development, were excluded (Biscop 2004b: 9). By the end of the Cold War, with disintegration of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the Soviet bloc, direct threats to European security disappeared and focus on defence policy subsequently diminished. E U member states were no longer threatening each other, and the resulting peace was spreading across the continent. 51 • CHAPTER THREE Just as the end of the Cold War seemed to be introducing a new era of stability, the European neighbourhood was becoming increasingly violent. A by-product of the Cold War, intra- and inter-state conflicts emerged that presented an increased threat to civilians and introduced negative spillover effects for the E U (Biscop 2004b: ibid.). The new security environment is thus defined by a rise in terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Increased organised crime and illegal immigration complicate the issues. Weak democratic institutions in the conflict zones, combined with social and economic underdevelopment, exacerbate the violence. Such complex threats so close to the E U prompted action and instigated a value-based view of security, congruent with the civilian power identity of the Union. Democracy, human rights protection, and the primacy of the rule of law were seen as integral components of long-term security in this new phase (Biscop 2003b: 4). 3.2 A New International Approach: Comprehensive Security As the E U evolves to address the new demands of a changing security environment, developments and progress in the international community inform its choices. Adopting ideas and concepts from international initiatives, the E U has been absorbing international norms and making them fixtures of the European approach. States and international organisations alike have shifted from the state-centric view that favours military focus to now embrace a method that targets the underlying causes of conflict by implementing a multifaceted and long-term approach to security (Biscop 2004b: 10). Comprehensive security now comprises a conceptual framework, referred to by Kirchner and Sperling as "the new security agenda" (Kirchner and Sperling 2002). Three prominent examples represent this international refocus. The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) offers the first example, providing a distinct framework for international activity. Additionally, the emerging concept of'human security' and the resulting 52 • CHAPTER THREE activities of the U N have also altered the international approach to security. In protecting human security, certain changes have been implemented regarding peace operations, and The Responsibility to Protect, thus provides a third example of a shifting international understanding of security. The civilian power roots of the E U facilitate placing comprehensive security at the very foundation of Union's emerging security culture. Absorbing the beneficial advancements in international thinking, the E U is indeed unique for constructing its singular presence as a security actor with internationally motivated goals for the public good. For Kirchner and Sperling, the new security agenda has three clear elements. First, moving beyond the singular defence of territory, the state is now responsible for protecting the social and economic fabric of society. Non-territorial threats to security have gained an important new position. The second element of the new security agenda requires the state to effectively distinguish between positive gains of complex interconnectedness (such as trade and capital flows) and negative interactions, like drug trafficking and organised crime. Finally, the new security environment demands international cooperation for the establishment of a stable economic and political environment to maximize gains and reduce the likelihood of conflict (Kirchner and Sperling 2002: 424-5). Considering these three components, threats cannot be determined solely by assessing the intentions of other states in the system. Instead, Kirchner and Sperling assert that a new conceptualisation is needed that looks beyond the state-centric view which suggests that maintaining territorial integrity is the only concern (Kirchner and Sperling 2002: 426). Comprehensive security is the resulting new conceptualisation, and the most effective response to the new demands of the security environment. A holistic approach is therefore required, recognising that security concerns go beyond the traditional politico-military 53 • CHAPTER THREE dimension. Using a broad range of instruments, the traditional military component of security activity becomes only one part of a much larger design (Biscop 2004b: 32). Instead of identifying threats, working against enemies, and reacting to crises, comprehensive security creates positive objectives, builds partnerships, and works to prevent conflict. Barry Buzan refers to this approach as an 'international security strategy,' because it aims to affect the system as a whole, creating a more secure environment for all. A 'national security strategy,' conversely, is more defensive in nature, with individual security trumping any international consideration (Buzan 1991). Comprehensive security demands a global scope. According to Biscop, "comprehensive security in effect translates the principles on which the E U itself is founded - liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law - into principles underlying the E U external action" (Biscop 2004b: 36). As such, the concept of comprehensive security - or being a comprehensive security actor - is better equipped to describe the E U than the concept of civilian power, "as it emphasises the integration of all fields of external action, and avoids the paralysing debate on the validity of the claim to 'civilian power-status' when possessing a military dimension..." (Biscop 2004b: 34). Of course, the guiding principles of civilian power - employing a diverse range of means toward value-based goals - remain in the character of comprehensive security. Civilian power is at the root of comprehensive security. Just as Duchene advised, the E U derives power by mimicking its internal structure in its external relations. The OSCE 3 champions the idea of a comprehensive and cooperative approach to security. Focusing on early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict 3 The OSCE was initially known as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Following a decision of the 1990s to improve the operational capacity of the CSCE, the institution was renamed the Organisation for Security Cooperation in Europe in 1994 (OSCE 2000: 15). For clarity, I will refer only to the OSCE. 54 • CHAPTER THREE reconstruction, the OSCE employs a broad range of instruments at the will of its 55 members (OSCE 2000: 1). The OSCE introduced comprehensive security in 1973 with the Helsinki Process, which called for the "protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms along with economic and environmental cooperation" (OSCE 2000: ibid.). The economic and human aspects of maintaining security are considered just as vital as politico-military issues, and as such, are regarded as interconnected and indivisible (OSCE 2000: 2). Implicit in the work of the OSCE is the equal partnership of all participating states; indeed, cooperation is regarded as an essential element of successful peace promotion. Engaged in fact-finding missions and active in mediating disputes and facilitating the peace process, OSCE maintains a presence all across Europe. Arguably, the most essential role of the OSCE is the framework it provides and communication it enables, ensuring that all international actors will embrace a comprehensive approach to security both in their participation with OSCE, and as a part of their national strategies. Though all E U member states maintain participation in the OSCE, the E U as a single actor has absorbed the OSCE approach and developed it into the particular strategy of the E U in external affairs. The concept of human security has become increasingly vital to the evolving security environment, and has contributed to changing the international method of conflict prevention. The EU, too, has centralised the importance of human security in international interaction. Human security moves beyond the realist-inspired focus on national security - the protection of states from external threats - to the morally charged objective to protect individuals from violence and suffering. Human security largely gained popularity after the release of the 1994 Human Development Report of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (Biscop 2004b: 11). Emerging from the shadow of the Cold War, human security has become a new 55 • CHAPTER THREE focus, with the U N spearheading the movement. The UNDP report called for a fundamental shift away from nuclear security and toward the very real struggle individuals face with crime, hunger, repression, and disease (UNDP 1994: 22). Protecting human security requires a comprehensive approach; accordingly, as the concept of human security gained recognition, the new approach to security gained credibility. Indeed, the UNDP report extended four characteristics of human security, among them the universal relevance of the concept, the interdependence of its components, the necessity for early detection, and its people-centred nature (UNDP 1994: 22-3). Human security transcends borders and political gains to reveal the essence of peace and stability - the protection of individuals and the defence of their ability to live a life free from fear and undue suffering. With the concept of human security gaining status worldwide, adjustments were made to the international reaction to violent conflict. The responsibility of international actors to respond to injustice and abuses to human rights was motivated in part by the importance of human security. The guiding principles of humanitarian intervention were reconsidered at the 2000 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), an initiative of the Canadian government that occurred under the auspices of the U N General Assembly (Biscop 2004b: 12). The ICISS produced a report, The Responsibility to Protect, which is intended to provide a framework and basis for international intervention including guiding principles about who may act and under what authority (ICISS 2001). The ideas behind the document contribute to the EU's developing security culture; in fact, The Responsibility to Protect has particular relevance to the inclusion of military capabilities within the E U because it outlines a role for the use of force that is largely concerned with 'civilian' ends. International intervention is an activity 56 • CHAPTER THREE that is seeped in controversy, and as the report suggests, both the act of intervening and the failure to intervene have received international criticism (ICISS 2001: viii). Considering the international desire to protect individuals, and the waning ability of the public to allow human rights atrocities to persist unrestrained, The Responsibility to Protect outlines key concepts for moving forward that have been absorbed into the E U vision. First, the document calls for a comprehensive approach to security, evidenced by its three main parts: the responsibility to prevent, to react, and to rebuild. Much like the OSCE, The Responsibility to Protect is concerned with all stages of the conflict life cycle, motivated by averting human suffering, and focused on international cooperation. The Responsibility to Protect empowers the U N , and maintains its primacy in granting the appropriate authority for intervention (ICISS 2001: xii). With this report, the ICISS hopes to encourage reform to ensure that its principles can be effectively implemented. The similarities between the guiding principles of The Responsibility to Protect and the European Security Strategy reveal that, just as the international notions of security are evolving, the E U is also evolving and thus absorbing new international norms into its singular strategy. 3.3 Introducing the European Security Strategy: Key Concepts and Characteristics Both the successes and failures of a variety of E U external initiatives have indicated that the E U needs a distinct framework to guide its activity as a security actor; the inclusion of military means in the E U toolbox further reinforces this requirement. Finally, the unique challenges of the evolving security environment demand a clear and organised response not only from the E U , but also from the international community at large. In December 2003, after a period of revision and reflection, the European Council adopted the final version of the Solana document, A Secure Europe in a Better World. The document begins with an analysis of the 57 • CHAPTER THREE security environment, before defining three main strategic objectives and assessing policy implications. The European Security Strategy (ESS) is the first attempt by the E U to consolidate its image as an international actor. The ESS is the cornerstone document from which debate and discussion will ensue, helping to further develop the emerging security culture of the European Union. In the assessment of the security environment, the ESS presents an underlying theme of globalisation. Though the developed world has benefited from the fruits of international interdependence, a harmful side of globalisation also exists. Increasing inequality is a major concern. The cycle of poverty, violence, and instability is recognised in the ESS, and security is thus identified as a precondition for development (Solana 2003: 2). Greater interconnectedness also means that instability in one part of the globe may have repercussions that far exceed the geographical limits of the conflict. Implicit in the document is the precarious balance between the favours and flaws of globalisation. Considering that war among the member states of the E U is now an improbable occurrence, the ESS recognises five key threats to the Union. These include terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), regional conflicts, state failure, and organised crime (Solana 2003). The five threats are considered to be interrelated and mutually reinforcing. Europe is identified as both a target for and a base of the terrorist threat, and W M D present the gravest potential danger, especially i f used by terrorists (Solana 2003: 3). Regional conflicts present a two-pronged risk, as they not only damage European interests, but also encourage state failure. Accordingly, state failure can produce terrorism and extremism, and also bring about regional conflict. Finally, organised crime presents an internal threat with an external 58 • CHAPTER THREE dimension, providing links for sex trafficking and the drug trade, while enabling illegal immigration (Solana 2003: 4). An interesting nuance should be noted when discussing 'threats.' Though a clear indication that the E U must act to defend itself is present in the document, the ESS also recommends a proactive approach to defuse threats by creating positive objectives. The notion of comprehensive security emerges in the ESS, as this proactive approach demands a wide view of security and a broad understanding of the required efforts. Biscop reflects that the emphasis on the comprehensive strategy came after the first revision of the document. The initial draft placed a greater emphasis on the defensive reaction to threats, rather than the dynamic approach that seeks to remedy the root of the problem (Biscop 2004b: 16). The five identified threats in the ESS also represent a marriage between what are considered 'old' and 'new' threats. Organised crime and regional conflicts have long been known in Europe as vital issues with wide reaching effects; nevertheless, terrorism and W M D have garnered more attention recently as the American government increases focus on them. A similar divide exists in Europe, as some member states lobbied for the primacy of the 'old' threats, while others called for a focus on the predominant threats in current discussion (Biscop 2004b: ibid.). Though terrorism and W M D are pervasive in the media and an increasing focus in Washington, regional conflicts and organised crime pose more imminent threats for Europe. Though terrorism remains a concern, and W M D will cause the most destruction, the likelihood of these threats remains questionable (Biscop 2004b: 17). Ultimately, a compromise between the two camps emerged. Considering the security environment illustrated in the ESS, three policy objectives materialise. Addressing threats is the first goal, which the E U has already begun with its measures against terrorism and its initiatives to fight the proliferation of nuclear weapons. 59 • CHAPTER THREE Interventions in regional conflicts in Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Balkans are also cited as examples of proactive European security behaviour (Solana 2003: 6). The discussion of the next phase of addressing threats is the telling portion of the ESS, as the European approach is clarified. In order to appropriately deal with tension in the new security environment, a broader view must be taken. As the ESS declares, during the Cold War, and in the centuries that preceded the conflict, the threat of invasion was of primary concern. Today, threats are dynamic and security concerns transcend borders (Solana 2003: 7). As such, "[i]n contrast to the massive visible threat in the Cold War, none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means. Each requires a mixture of instruments" (Solana 2003: ibid.). Political and economic instruments will be vital, as will policing and intelligence efforts. Humanitarian aid will play a role, and military means will not be excluded. This description is reminiscent of Haine's concept of 'soft power plus,' which calls for a comprehensive approach that emphasises economic instruments, but does not exclude the use of force. The second policy objective of the ESS is building security in the EU's neighbourhood. The non-military external activities discussed in the previous chapter, namely the Stability Pact, the Euro-Med Partnership, and the European Neighbourhood Policy, are prominent examples of this objective at work. Creating a ring of friends is thought to encourage stability in the region (Solana 2003: 8). The methods employed in these policies are largely civilian in nature, though again, the use of force is not barred. The E U is deemed to have a specific responsibility in the region, and the language of the ESS suggests that the EU's presence as an international actor simply cannot be ignored. Regardless of theoretical support or scholarly detail, that the E U has an impact on the international scene is undeniable. As a regional actor, "the onus is on the E U to 60 • CHAPTER THREE assume responsibility and take the lead" as the maintaining a stable neighbourhood is both a necessity and duty of the Union (Biscop 2004b: 19). Indeed, "through the force of attraction, the E U has succeeded in stabilising the European continent; now it has to replicate that success in a wider neighbourhood" (Biscop 2004b: ibid.). The third recommendation involves implementing effective multilateralism. Building a stronger international society is a goal of the EU, which includes enabling the U N and equipping it for effective action (Solana 2003: 9). This objective of the ESS is particularly unique. Though many actors proclaim a respect for the U N and multilateral activity, few would include building a stronger international community as a particular goal of security policy. The ESS states: We are committed to upholding and developing International Law. The fundamental framework for international relations is the United Nations Charter. The United Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfill its responsibilities and to act effectively, is a European priority (Solana 2003: 10 emphasis added). As I discussed in chapter one, building effective multilateralism can also be described as contributing to global governance (Biscop 2004a). The distinct qualities of the E U - its sui generis origins, and its civilian power tradition - allow the Union a particular position in the international community that transcends the constraints of sovereignty. 3.4 Contrasting the ESS with the National Security Strategy of the United States To folly determine the distinct qualities of the European Security Strategy, a contrast and comparison with the objectives of other international security actors is useful. The most obvious evaluation begins with the National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States. Released in 2002, the document very much reflects the American reaction to the new security environment -particularly after the terrorist attacks of the previous year. The ESS, too, is a response to new and 61 • CHAPTER THREE evolving demands in maintaining security; though from there, the strategies diverge in tone and implication. From a formal standpoint, the documents are quite different. The NSS is significantly longer than the ESS, and therefore goes into greater depth on particular issues. The tone of the American document is forceful, and the language conveys a sense of finality, whereas, the European document presents the possibility of continued development, both as threats evolve and as the Union develops. Felix Sebastian Berenskoetter observes that the NSS exists to close the debate on the war in Iraq and end doubt about the international role of the US, while the ESS serves to open a discussion among the member states to clarify the security identity of the E U (Berenskoetter 2005: 73). Of course, as the US and the E U are two very different actors in the international system, these types of differences are expected. Conducting a comparison of the two documents, Berenskoetter analyses instead how the US and E U define responsibility, understand threat, and select the required instruments (Berenskoetter 2005: 71). How each actor regards international cooperation should also be considered. These four questions allow a deeper understanding of the security cultures of the two actors. In defining responsibility, both documents depart from a particular historical process, and each actor's resulting position in the international system is used as justification for further international action. For the US, American triumph in the Cold War forms the basis for American dominance. In his opening address to the NSS, George W. Bush asserts that the end of the Cold War left "a single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise (Washington 2002: i , emphasis added). America retains a duty to safeguard and extend these principles internationally. This responsibility is not confined geographically, but promoted as universal in application and global in scope (Berenskoetter 2005: 75-6). Because the promotion of liberal values was successful inside America's borders, "the national security 62 • CHAPTER THREE strategy of the United States must start from these core beliefs and look outward for possibilities to expand liberty" (Washington 2002: 3). The motivation for this activity, however, is not entirely altruistic. As Berenskoetter notes, the active global role of the US is motivated by both the desire to secure American hegemony and the will to advance American values worldwide (Berenskoetter 2005: 76). Conversely, the global responsibility of the E U derives from the success of European integration and the resulting peace among E U member states (Solana 2003: 1). Rather than justifying a dominant role for the E U , prosperity in Europe instead provides a model for success. The American model is founded on freedom, democracy, and free enterprise, while the European model is founded on cooperation, the rule of law, and democracy. The 'cooperation' element of the European model is critical, as it reveals both the past development of the E U and its progress for the future. Though the ESS suggests an inevitable global role for the E U , the regional responsibility of the Union is much more prevalent. Just as achievement in America calls for the promotion of American values abroad, success in Europe calls for similar activity. The ESS asserts that promoting stability on the continent is a particular duty of the E U to protect European values and security (Solana 2003: 7). An international component is also included, as building a strong international system and promoting multilateralism is a stated objective of the ESS (Solana 2003: 9). Of course, the global role established for the E U is more about leadership than domination. Motivation comes from both protecting E U interests and establishing stability abroad. Development plays a major role as a precursor for stability. Contrasting how the two actors understand threats reveals even further divergence between American and European security cultures. The NSS is dominated with talk of terrorism, with 'rogue states' and weapons of mass destruction included to produce a security environment 63 • CHAPTER THREE "more complex and dangerous" than during the Cold War (Washington 2002: 13). The ESS also recognises terrorism as a major threat, along with W M D , regional conflicts, failing states, and organised crime. Nevertheless, the ESS instead declares, "Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free. The violence of the first half of the 20th Century has given way to a period of peace and stability unprecedented in European history" (Solana 2003: 1). Such opposing worldviews stem from divergent historical experiences, especially with regard to war. The approach to handling threats is also very different. Missing from the American document is a discussion on the causes of terrorism, and the steps that can be taken to eliminate the threat by dealing with the root of the problem. The ESS, on the other hand, recognises that ameliorating the conditions that foster terrorism is the most appropriate way to handle the problem (Berenskoetter 2005: 80-1). The ESS admits that terrorism is "also part of our own society," further emphasising the need for a comprehensive approach (Solana 2003: 3) Another notable disparity in threat assessment is the discussion of rogue states versus failing states. Maintaining different categorisations, the US prefers the former, while the E U uses the latter. From the US perspective, rogue states abuse their people, act aggressively toward other states, seek to acquire W M D , sponsor terrorism, and hate the United States (Washington 2002: 14). The chosen language places emphasis on behaviour. The NSS actively promotes pre-emptive action, and the document can be read as a justification for the American foreign policies that preceded and followed the release of the document. Dealing with rogue states will require more integrated intelligence capabilities and improved capability for rapid military operations (Washington 2002: 16). The ESS does not refer to rogue states, but instead mentions failing states, which can foster terrorism and crime, while also contributing to regional instability and undermining global governance (Solana 2003: 4). Instead of framing failing states in total 64 • CHAPTER THREE opposition to the E U (by mentioning 'hatred' or other such rhetoric) or focusing on their behavioural choices, failing states are viewed as victims of weak institutions. As such, further development of these regions is required. Though the ESS talks of preventive action ('pre-emptive' was removed from the document in an earlier draft), which can include military activity to restore order, a mix of instruments will be called upon, including humanitarian aid and economic instruments to address "underlying political causes" (Solana 2003: 7). An additional category of comparison examines how each actor selects the necessary instruments to address the threats they define. The tone of the NSS is very proactive, stressing the offensive nature of American external activity. As such, military means are preferred, as stated in the document: "It is time to reaffirm the essential role of American military strength. We must build and maintain our defenses beyond challenge" (Washington 2002: 29). The presence of the American military overseas is also seen as the greatest expression of American friendship toward its allies. American military might is therefore central to all aspects of American presence in the world. Some mention of other instruments exists in the document, especially the role of intelligence capabilities, though none are given the attention and primacy of military power. The ESS does not prioritise the use of force, but it certainly does not rule out the possibility of military engagement on the part of the E U . Actually, with the new developments with the ESDP, the ESS can be read as a political message supporting the militarisation of the E U . The essential difference is how military means will be used. The ESS talks about using the military to restore order during post-conflict reconstruction, not as the main mechanism for addressing threat. Indeed, "regional conflicts need political solutions but military assets and effective policing may be needed in the post conflict phase" (Solana 2003: 7). This 65 • CHAPTER THREE idea, of course, is a reference to what Maull and others may consider exercising civilian power using military instruments. A final point of contention between the security strategies of the E U and the US concerns cooperation and coordination with others. In the NSS, cooperation is mentioned with the appropriate amount of rhetoric to be perceived as a political necessity. More importantly, unilateral action is certainly permitted by the NSS "when our interests and unique responsibility require" (Washington 2002: 31). Certainly not thrust into a position of power and guidance, the U N is only mentioned a few times in the American document. The International Criminal Court is rejected outright. The E U , on the other hand, sees cooperation as the key to effective security. Arguably, the success the Union has experienced through integration encourages a favourable view of coordinated activity. As such, intra-European cooperation should be mimicked outside its borders and brought to a larger scale. To guide international cooperation, the U N is identified as integral. Given the important responsibility of legitimizing the use of force, the U N should provide the framework for all international interaction. A stated goal of the ESS is to empower the U N (Berenskoetter 2005: 87). Robert Kagan famously asserted that the E U lives in a post-historical Utopia, while the US remains mired in historical reality (Kagan 2002). He considers the current approach of the E U as one that only exists because the Union is too weak to muster traditional military might. The US, on the other hand, remains the sole actor cognizant of historical reality and thus continues prioritising traditional power politics. Kagan is correct to suggest that a gap between the security cultures of the US and the E U exists, though his larger argument unfairly judges the Union. Though the E U is arguably unable to match the military prowess of the US, such an ambition is outside the realm of desire, and quite simply 'misses the point.' As the E U grows 66 • CHAPTER THREE into an international power, its role is intended to reflect the nature of integration as a peace project. As Robert Cooper aptly explains, "Europe may have chosen to neglect power politics because it is militarily weak; but it is also true that it is militarily weak because it has chosen to abandon power politics" (Cooper 2003: 159). The current comprehensive strategy, reflected in the ESS, is very much a response to the lessons of European history. The NSS can equally be read as a product of the unique experiences America has undergone. Clearly, the two actors play significantly different roles internationally and their security strategies reflect this reality. 3.5 Case Studies The distinct qualities of the ESDP should be recalled as the cases are considered. These include the 'civilian power' goal of crisis management pursued by the ESDP, the comprehensive nature of its approach, and the commitment the ESDP has made with the United Nations and the larger international community. The ESDP has coordinated several civilian and military missions in various parts of the world, including the coordination of military forces, police operations, and justice missions. To illuminate the comprehensive nature of the ESDP, I will provide an overview of ESDP operations deployed in two locations: Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Democratic Republic of Congo. These two locations are relevant not only because a military operation was deployed in each case, but also because extensive civilian efforts were launched there as well. Furthermore, these two choices reflect both the strength of the E U as a regional power and the ability of the Union to also exert global influence. Though the various operations deployed in both locations undoubtedly revealed certain ESDP weaknesses, whether in sustainability of operations or in the quality of planning and communication efforts, the overall success of ESDP is high. 67 • CHAPTER THREE 3.6 Case Study I: The ESDP in Bosnia-Herzegovina The E U most naturally and willingly steps into the leadership role in its neighbourhood, especially when dealing with potential members. Accordingly, the very first mission of the ESDP was launched on January 1, 2003 in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH). A police mission, E U P M is strictly a civilian crisis management operation, initially designed with a three-year term to last until the end of 2005. E U P M was recently recharged with an further two-year term to last until the end of 2007 (Council 2005: 55). In December of 2004, the E U launched an additional military mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, known as Operation A Ithea, which assumed control from a N A T O operation already in place in the region. Operation Althea is ongoing, though a reduction in the force size was implemented in February 2007. Overall, ESDP presence in B i H maintains a comprehensive approach, as both E U P M and Operation Althea exist as part of an overall strategy to prepare B i H for eventual E U membership. ESDP presence in B i H is firmly rooted in both domestic and international law. The Council of the E U initiated the ESDP police mission in B i H with a joint action released in March of 2002. E U P M was both supported by the Peace Implementation Council Steering Board, which was established with the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995, and mandated by Security Council Resolution 1396. In October of 2002, the E U and Bosnian authorities drafted and signed an agreement highlighting the objectives of E U P M (Grevi et al. 2004: 3). In response to the E U request to launch a military mission in B iH , the U N later issued Security Council Resolution 1575 to authorize the E U to launch the engagement on December 2, 2004. An additional U N mandate, Security Council Resolution 1551, granted the E U a Chapter VII peace enforcement directive. 68 • CHAPTER THREE The U N is a strategic partner for European engagement in the Balkans; the role of N A T O only further emphasises the multilateral approach of the ESDP involvement in B i H . When the war in Bosnia ended with the Dayton Peace Accord in 1995, the U N organised the International Police Task Force (IPTF). The E U P M in B i H assumed control,of this operation from the U N , with a seven-month overlap for proper training and exchange of information. The E U P M maintains an international component, as 20% of the contributing police officers come from non-E U member states. A l l 15 E U member states participated in E U P M , as did nine of the member states that joined the Union in 2004, and both member states that joined in 2007. Canada, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Switzerland, Turkey, and Ukraine also contributed. Operation Althea was organised under the Berlin-plus arrangement with NATO. In 2004, at the Istanbul summit, N A T O decided to complete its mission in B i H . The U N subsequently granted the E U a comparable Chapter VII mission in the region. As such, the operation required a blending of E U capabilities and N A T O instruments. Having been active in the region for seven years previous, N A T O granted a degree of credibility to the EU's presence (Grevi et al. 2004: 7). Regular consultation occurs between the two organisations. With 22 of the 25 member states participating, Althea also includes 11 non-EU member states. Major contributors include the U K , Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain. Traditionally neutral countries, including Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, and Switzerland, all participate in Operation Althea. Monitoring the operation is Lord Paddy Ashdown, who represents both the E U and U N as Special Representative to B i H . Another vital task of Operation Althea is to provide support and security to the Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), to ensure a safe environment for proper prosecution of war criminals. 69 • CHAPTER THREE Each ESDP commitment in B i H maintains the 'civilian' goal of providing peace and stability to the region through a broad range of instruments. The E U P M in B i H has four main objectives, including developing police independence and accountability, fighting organised crime, ensuring the financial viability and sustainability of the police force, and creating institutional capacity of both the police and border services agencies (Lindstrom 2004: 114). These main objectives translate into seven programmes instituted by the E U P M : the Crime Police programme, which seeks to reform and restructure the current police force in B i H ; the Criminal Justice Programme, which trains police officers to work efficiently with the judiciary; the Internal Affairs Programme, which involves creating a transparent internal control system for all law enforcement agencies to ensure they are complying with human rights standards and international norms; the Police Administration Programme, which trains the administrative arm of the police in democratic practices and financial credibility; and, the Public Order and Security Programme, which trains police to handle a variety of civil disorders. The final two programmes, the State Border Services Programme and the State Information and Protection Agency will work together to ensure the proper management of law enforcement within state borders. Stressed in the description of each of these programmes is the importance of creating a multi-ethnic law enforcement agency in B i H (Lindstrom 2004: 113-5). Operation Althea assumed control from the N A T O mission in B i H , which was organised as a part of the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995. As a Chapter VII mission, Althea is intended to establish a stable environment in which peace can be secured. Operation Althea thus follows the guidelines outlined in Annexes 1A and 2 of the Dayton Peace Accord, including monitoring the peace process and allowing for the full implementation of the Dayton agreement. Althea resources are particularly geared toward fighting organised crime in B i H (Grevi et al. 2004: 7). 70 • CHAPTER THREE Both E U P M and Operation Althea exist as part of the larger goal of stabilising the European neighbourhood. Once both missions are complete, E U engagement in B i H will continue in the long term through both neighbourhood policy and the accession process. Ongoing political engagement in B i H is ensured with the long-term comprehensive security strategy the Council adopted in June 2004. The comprehensive strategy devised for B i H exists both as implementation of the ESS and as a forerunner to the accession process. A year previous, at the 2003 Thessaloniki summit, the E U Council declared that the future of the Western Balkans was within the European Union; as such, a variety of E U policies (including those of the ESDP) are geared toward preparing B i H for membership to the Union. The comprehensive strategy is guided by the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP), which outlines the EU's relationship with each of the Balkan states. Both the comprehensive strategy and SAP ensure the continued benevolent presence of the E U in B i H long after the troops have completed their mission. 3.7 Case Study II: The ESDP in the Democratic Republic of Congo Escalating violence in the region of Ituri produced a threat not only to the peace agreement in place in the DRC, but also to the stability of the Great Lakes region as a whole. In June of 2003, the ESDP deployed approximately 2,000 European troops in the troubled northeast region of Ituri. Conflict between two ethnic groups, the Hema and Lendu, has been ongoing; in fact, over 50,000 people have been killed in the past ten years, and over 500,000 displaced (Lindstrom 2004: 119). Operation Artemis certainly provides an important case study, as it was the EU's first military engagement organised and deployed without N A T O assistance. In addition, the mission represents the global outlook of ESDP, proving that the E U has ambitions beyond its neighbourhood and interests outside of enlargement. After Artemis was completed in 71 • CHAPTER THREE September 2003, ESDP launched a policing mission in Kinshasa, displaying not only the continued commitment of the E U in the region, but also the trust of the Congolese government in the competencies of the E U . Like all ESDP military missions, the U N authorized the use of force in the DRC. On May 30, 2003, the U N produced Security Council Resolution 1484 to prevent a humanitarian crisis in the northeast region of Ituri in the DRC. The E U designed the Artemis mission in response to this international call for assistance in the Ituri capital of Bunia. The operation ended on September 1, 2003, and was succeeded by M O N U C , a newly bolstered U N mission comprised of a multinational force of 18,000 troops. In October 2003, both the Congolese government and the U N requested a renewed E U presence in the DRC, in the form of a police mission in Kinshasa (EUPOL Kinshasa). The police forces deployed with the EUPOL mission are a product of the Pretoria Agreement, signed in December 2002, and the Memorandum on Security and the Army of 29 June 2003. Both agreements are an integral part of the long-term peace process in the DRC (Grevi et al. 2004: 8). Organised by the ESDP, France emerged as the lead E U nation for Operation Artemis. As such, Major General Neveux of France acted as the E U Operation Commander, with Brigadier General Thonier, also of France, serving as E U Force Commander. The EU's special representative to the DRC, Italian Aldo Ajello, coordinated activity with the two generals. The U K and Sweden also contributed combat troops, with Belgium and Germany sending non-combat forces. In addition, Operation Artemis incorporated the temporary efforts of non-EU member states, including Canada, South Africa, and Brazil (Lindstrom 2004: 120). Since the E U mission was sent in to relieve U N troops, and M O N U C forces assumed control upon completion 72 • CHAPTER THREE of Operation Artemis, the U N closely monitored the ESDP mission. The cooperation between the E U and U N bolstered the bourgeoning partnership between the two institutions. Artemis was designed to bring stability to Bunia by protecting civilians, safeguarding camps containing internally displaced individuals, and securing the local airport (Lindstrom 2004: ibid.). The police mission in Kinshasa, on the other hand, was designed to establish an Integrated Police Unit (IPU) to serve the entire country. The IPU has been supplied with both funds and equipment to ensure the internal security of the DRC. The PSC of the ESDP has outlined particular goals for the police mission, which includes establishing an appropriate training centre for the IPU, followed by engaging in training exercises with the IPU. After the initial training phase, the EUPOL mission is committed to continued monitoring and mentoring of the developing IPU (Council 2004a: 2). Once operational, the IPU should be suited to protect to ongoing peace process and the upcoming elections. Though Artemis was deployed for only a short time, E U commitment in the DRC maintains a long-term approach. Following another request by the Congolese government, the ESDP launched a third operation in the DRC, this time a civilian security sector reform mission. Continued E U commitment in DRC is also guaranteed through the European Development Fund, which organises E U development aid. Launched in June 2005 with Council Joint Action 2005/355/CFSP, the EUSEC mission is mainly advisory, with E U experts providing advice and assistance to authorities in the DRC in the realm of security. The EUSEC mission is designed to promote policies that uphold human rights standards, as well as international laws and norms, and democratic principles. The rule of law is stressed, as is transparency in government. The EUSEC mission displays the EU's continued commitment to development in the DRC, as well as its comprehensive commitment to long-term stability in the region (Grevi et al. 2004: 10). 73 • CHAPTER THREE 3.8 Conclusion Ultimately, the EU's new international role is a reflection of its own development. European integration focuses on cooperation and coordination to achieve success. Rebuilding Europe after a devastating war called for an economic and diplomatic focus; traditional military might simply lost its lustre. Now that the E U has grown enough to maintain an international position, these successful methods can be focused outwardly. External activity began in the E U within the realm of civilian power. These characteristics enlighten the evolved role the E U now maintains internationally. Comprehensive security is the approach favoured by the Union, as reflected in a variety of regional policies and the recent security strategy. Blending the benefits of many foreign policy instruments is both reminiscent of civilian power and reflects the nature of European integration. The E U has adopted the comprehensive approach just as the international community begins to recognise the benefits of a broad view of security. A reciprocal relationship exists whereby the E U is borrowing from international advancements just as the international community is being shaped by E U initiatives. Indeed, focusing on development and tackling the root of instability wil l achieve long-term security. The E U has diverged substantially from the US in absorbing the comprehensive approach and maintaining its primacy in security policy. Though the US also engages in diplomatic and humanitarian efforts, the American security strategy as outlined in the NSS is heavily focused on identifying an enemy and responding to threats militarily. A contrast and comparison between the ESS and the NSS reveals that the E U stands apart in allowing international concerns and norms to largely inform its security strategy. As a non-state actor, the E U is in the unique position to transcend traditional state-centric power politics to become a comprehensive security actor. 74 • CHAPTER THREE With the recent inclusion of military capabilities in the E U toolbox, sceptics suggest that the E U may be venturing away from its civilian history and pacifist roots. Nevertheless, the newly militarised E U presents a reconsideration of military power in the international system. Existing as only part of a holistic approach to security, the E U "will never be conquering, expansionist, imperialist, or hegemonic" (RIIR 2004: 7). Instead, the use of force by the E U has undergone a 'civilianisation,' as it works alongside a variety of other initiatives in a comprehensive approach, toward the goal of peacekeeping or post-conflict reconstruction. As the case studies suggest, ESDP activity embraces the civilian past of the E U , while recognising the importance of a comprehensive approach. The ESDP presence in both Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Democratic Republic of Congo maintains a holistic approach and a multifaceted design. Civilian efforts are prioritised, but instability in both locations demanded military engagement. With military tools now available to the EU, the ESDP has the potential for utmost effectiveness. With both military and civilian efforts working in coordination, the ESDP has the opportunity to not only end conflict in the short term, but to also implement stable structures to ensure security in the future. 75 • CONCLUSION Given the guiding principles of the ESDP, the potential of the policy is significant. The European integration process has been, since its inception, an exercise in responding to historical lessons to produce inventive ways of thinking and behaving. Pooling resources within the European Coal and Steel Community among the founding six member states was designed to make war an impossibility. On May 9, 1950, Robert Schumann spoke of "creative efforts" to preserve peace, and the spirit of his message exists in many of the endeavours of the European Union today (Fontaine 2000: 36). The role of ideas and the impact of innovative design in all aspects of life cannot be denied. At the very foundation of the complex workings of international politics lie modest ideas with bold implementation. In its origins, the European project sought to . change the system in which it resided. Within the ESDP exists a similar opportunity. Of course, the ESDP must respect and stay true to the inner characteristics of European integration to realise this potential. As a civilian power, and a non-state actor in the international system, the E U was able to transcend the trappings of power politics by promoting a new form of international interaction that prized economic relationships and championed multilateral cooperation. As a civilian power, the E U has contributed to global security by addressing the issues that exist at the root of instability. Policies like the Stability Pact and the European Neighbourhood Policy are examples of civilian power at work. Garnering considerable clout as a regional actor, the moment arrived for the E U to design an international role for itself in the realm of defence and security. Maintaining the layered and holistic approach of its civilian activity, while including the possibility of military force, the creation of the ESDP has transformed the E U into a comprehensive security actor. Rather than a retreat back into power politics, the emergence of the ESDP should be read as a distinct expression of military power that maintains as its ultimate 76 • CONCLUSION goal the reduction of violent conflict worldwide - a goal that is congruent with the founding mission of the European Union. Comprehensive security targets all sources of instability, including economic disparity and political weakness. When violence emerges, military forces are certainly necessary to broker the peace. After the conflict is resolved, social, political, and economic resources are again necessary to build sustainable development. Targeting these underlying problems before conflict surfaces reduces the need for armed forces. Of course, at this stage, military instruments are still a necessary component. Adopting comprehensive security as a part of European strategy is progressive, and allows the E U to maximize its impact as an international actor. With territorial defence organised under the auspices of NATO, the E U is faced with the distinct opportunity to employ military means toward ends unrelated to power projection. The E U is in the unique position to direct its military capabilities toward benevolent ends. The focus should remain on ameliorating the root causes of violence, with military capabilities available as a safeguard. Internationally, our focus needs to shift from the power derived from the ability to make war toward the far-reaching impact of the capacity to create peace. The United States is heralded as the world's sole super power for its unmatched ability in the military realm. Though, as Robert Cooper affirms, "it is also true that, as in the Balkans, as in Afghanistan (and probably in Iraq too), the United States may be able to fight wars on its own, but it still needs help from others to maintain the peace" (Cooper 2003: 156). The Human Security Report 2005 has revealed a dramatic global decline in political violence, and has attributed such a decline to international activism (HSC 2005: 9). War-aversion is spreading, and public willingness to support peace support operations should follow. In order to ensure the trend identified in the Report continues, international efforts must be organised to promote peace and stability in the 77 • CONCLUSION international system. The ESDP is an example of such an attempt, as is the EU's declared commitment to the United Nations. Significantly, the citizens of the Union are largely in favour of the EU's contribution to global peace and stability. In a 2006 Eurobarometer study, 75% of respondents support the common defence policy among the member states of the E U (Eurobarometer 2006: 25). In an assessment of personal values, peace ranked first as a value most cherished by individual Europeans. When asked to identify the values most associated with the E U , human rights, democracy, and peace formed the top three (Eurobarometer 2006: 34). Though the US undoubtedly contributes valuable resources to international development, its current security strategy is markedly different than that of the EU. The world's hegemon prizes its military prowess and is decidedly comfortable maintaining a unilateral approach to policy objectives. In contrast to the robust public support for the ESDP, a January 2007 Gallup Poll revealed that 72% of Americans disapprove of the way George W. Bush is handling the situation in Iraq. In fact, 55% of Americans actually feel that the war in Iraq has made the United States a less secure place to live (PollingReport 2007). Though the tenets of realism represent a foundational theory of international relations, and the lure and persistence of power politics is difficult to deny, focus should now shift away from a state's capacity to engage in warfare to embrace instead an actor's willingness to promote peace. Cooper reminds us that the very values we demand at home should be the same standards we promote internationally. The often-devastating lessons of the 20 t h century ushered in an era of unprecedented stability on the European continent, whereby peace and a high standard of living for the individuals of Europe would be prized ahead of petty grievances and the lobbying for power among states. Not as a dominating force, but as a partner in the international community, 78 • CONCLUSION the E U should encourage stability and development worldwide. 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