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Cooperative industrial relations in the B.C. solid wood products sector Murphy, David Gerald 1991

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COOPERATIVE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN THE B.C. SOLID WOOD PRODUCTS SECTOR by DAVID GERALD MURPHY B.A., St. Mary's University, 1972 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT THE REQUIREMENTS OF DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES POLITICAL SCIENCE We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA August 1991 © D a v i d Gerald Murphy, 1991 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of ^<MxJc^t</ J Z ^ ^ y w ^ The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada Date DE-6 (2/88) ABSTRACT The i n i t i a t i o n of more cooperative r e l a t i o n s between the companies and the union (IWA-Canada) i n the B.C. s o l i d wood products sector, on the one hand, and between these two and the federal government, on the other hand, appears to s i g n a l an end to the "exceptionalism" which precluded the establishment of "corporatism" i n Canadian industry. As the sector has been under tremendous pressure from various s t r u c t u r a l and technological changes, as well as i n t e r e s t groups both inside the forest industry and outside of i t , does t h i s change i n i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s provide a model for the future forest industry or i s i t an impediment to change, as many c r i t i c s contend. This thesis w i l l explore the formation of "F o r d i s t " i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s i n the sector and the present " c r i s i s " i n Fordism as i t r e l a t e s to the sector, i n order to understand the factors impelling cooperative i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s , and how these factors w i l l a f f e c t these r e l a t i o n s i n the future. As these factors are undermining Fordism, they might also undermine the t e n t a t i v e , defensive cooperation between the three p a r t i e s . In place of t h i s exclusive policy-making regime a new, broad-based, decentralized, and more democratically c o n t r o l l e d forest sector might emerge which w i l l encourage cooperative i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s , but without the dominance of the old Fordist structures. The ensuing changes w i l l widely a f f e c t economic, p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s throughout the province. i i i TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT i i L I S T OF TABLES i v FIGURE v I . INTRODUCTION 1 I I . ECONOMIC PRODUCTION AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: THE C R I S I S I N FORDISM. A. I n d u s t r i a l P r o d u c t i o n , S t r u c t u r a l R e l a t i o n s a n d Human A g e n c y 10 B. The R i s e a n d F a l l o f F o r d i s m 15 I I I . THE B R I T I S H COLUMBIA SOLID WOOD PRODUCTS SECTOR: FROM CONFRONTATION TO COOPERATION. A. E a r l y F o r e s t I n d u s t r i a l R e l a t i o n s 32 B. The 19 8 0 s : C r i s i s a n d Change i n t h e B.C. S o l i d Wood P r o c e s s i n g S e c t o r 36 C. The M a j o r E x t e r n a l F a c t o r s A f f e c t i n g C hange i n t h e S e c t o r 45 D. The I n t e r d e p e n c y o f t h e F a c t o r s a n d t h e i r R e c i p r o c a l R e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h t h e S e c t o r 70 I V . CONCLUSION: THE PROSPECTS FOR COOPERATIVE RELATIONS I N THE B.C. SOLID WOOD PRODUCTS SECTOR 77 ENDNOTES 88 BIBLIOGRAPHY 90 APPENDICES 99 i v LIST OF TABLES TABLE Page 1. Number of Employees - Annual Averages Total A c t i v i t y -Forest Industry - 1980-1987 38 2. Trends i n the Concentration of Committed Harvesting Rights 40 3. Value of Exports of a l l Forest Products From B.C. 105 V FIGURE FIGURE P a g e 1. B.C. SOFTWOOD LUMBER PRODUCTION 38 1 I. INTRODUCTION. Recently, more cooperative r e l a t i o n s between organized labour i n the B r i t i s h Columbia s o l i d wood products sector and t h e i r employers and responsible state agencies have been developed. This unprecedented and unforseen 1 attenuation of the t r a d i t i o n a l a d v ersarial r e l a t i o n s h i p i s bound to have long-term consequences for the woodworkers' c o l l e c t i v e organizational behaviour. Due to the c e n t r a l i t y of t h i s sector to the economy and p o l i t i c s of the province, i t should have a r e c i p r o c a l e f f e c t on the factors which have influenced the change as new e q u i l i b r a t i n g mechanisms become established to s t a b i l i z e the new r e l a t i o n s . This essay w i l l seek to determine the forces behind the changes i n r e l a t i o n s i n the B. C. s o l i d wood products sector and connect them to events i n the encompassing economic, p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l environment. As a l l the factors a f f e c t i n g the sector have an independent impact on the structure of the sector and on the ideology of those i n i t and, i n turn, are a l t e r e d by the responses of those i n the sector, we need to evaluate each factor from both perspectives. We w i l l then examine the character of the new i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s r e s u l t i n g from t h i s process i n v o l v i n g the unionized employees and t h e i r employers, on the one hand, and between these two and the "policy-making community," on the other hand. We w i l l then be better able to evaluate the process which brought about the newly cooperative i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s i n the sector and the future prospects f o r t h i s new r e l a t i o n s h i p . 2 The most notable feature of human h i s t o r y and economic development i s the increasing global interdependence of human beings. Economic and p o l i t i c a l changes i n one part of the world have an ever-increasing impact on the r e s t of the world. The impact i s objective, i n the material e f f e c t r e s u l t i n g d i r e c t l y from the change, and subjective, i n the i n d i v i d u a l ' s knowledge and evaluation of the change, r e s u l t i n g from advances i n global communications. As the changes i n the s o l i d wood product sector are happening i n the context of an i n t e r n a t i o n a l c r i s i s i n the once hegemonic Fo r d i s t model of production and labour r e l a t i o n s , t h i s two-fold e f f e c t i s e s p e c i a l l y important to t h i s study. As t h i s c r i s i s involves both a revolution i n technology and i n humans' expectations concerning t h e i r r o l e i n the economy and i t s governance, the parameters of the p o s s i b i l i t i e s for change are broader than they have been since the introduction of the F o r d i s t model. In the wake of the decline of the F o r d i s t model i n the Western liberal-democracies since the l a t e 1960s2, and with no new model yet broadly accepted as a new paradigm, the r o l e of human agency i n choosing among the possible options a v a i l a b l e during t h i s interregnum becomes c e n t r a l 3 . Out of a s i m i l a r c r i s i s during the 1930s and WW I I , emerged the new F o r d i s t system and the "regulatory" mechanisms which supported i t 4 , which came to dominate the post-war advanced i n d u s t r i a l economies. As stable i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s were c r u c i a l to the p r o f i t a b i l i t y of the mass production corporations, i n d u s t r i a l unions and national productivity-based 3 bargaining became incorporated into the system. National macro-economic, c o u n t e r - c y c l i c a l f i s c a l and monetary p o l i c i e s , reinforced by i n t e r n a t i o n a l American-led trade l i b e r a l i z a t i o n and " s t a b i l i t y , " f a c i l i t a t e d the ensuing economic growth. The erosion of t h i s system has served to undermine the l e g a l l y and normatively formalized partnership between i n d u s t r i a l unions and corporations. Labour r e l a t i o n s , mediated by a more i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t state, i t s e l f engaged i n c o l l e c t i v e bargaining with t h e i r p u b l i c - s e c t o r employees, have become a see-saw b a t t l e over fundamental issues of workers r i g h t s and economic power, as the foundations of the F o r d i s t accord collapse. As the Canadian model of economic production and of labour r e l a t i o n s was based upon that of the United States and t h i s influence continues through the increasing i n t e g r a t i o n of our economies, we w i l l b r i e f l y examine the development and the subsequent decline of the Fordist model i n the United States. We w i l l see that the factors e f f e c t i n g change i n our case study are p a r t i a l l y derived from s t r u c t u r a l changes and the r e a c t i v e p o l i c y responses of leading a u t h o r i t i e s , i n the U. S. economy. In Canada, the continuing s o c i a l , p o l i t i c a l and economic repercussions have been p a r t i c u l a r l y serious. Arguably, the growing c r i s i s i n our nationhood has become primary, to no small degree, as a consequence of the larger economic c r i s i s . I n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s have been profoundly affected, as we have witnessed national and p r o v i n c i a l general s t r i k e s , the routine governmental suspension of free c o l l e c t i v e bargaining, and the r e s t r u c t u r i n g of 4 organized labour. The "permeability" of our trade and resource dependent economy and the overwhelming influence of the United States on our a f f a i r s , has been r e f l e c t e d i n the extreme s e n s i t i v i t y of our economy to outside events. The increasing assault by both government and business on labour has s i m i l a r roots. However, the s u r p r i s i n g strength and a d a p t a b i l i t y of Canadian organized labour's resistance to t h i s attack has played a r o l e i n the i n i t i a t i v e s undertaken during the 1970s and 1980s by both government and business to attempt new, more cooperative r e l a t i o n s with labour. The i n i t i a t i v e s undertaken by government and business i n Canada i n response to the economic c r i s i s have become i n c r e a s i n g l y diverse between sectors and p o l i t i c a l j u r i s d i c t i o n s owing to the f e d e r a l i s t nature of economic structures and the increasing l i b e r a l i z a t i o n of trade 5. The f a i l u r e , during the 1970s, to e s t a b l i s h peak-level t r i p a r t i t e bargaining has given way to meso-l e v e l s t a t e - f a c i l i t a t e d i n d u s t r i a l policy-making and t r i p a r t i t e i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s by the federal government. At the p r o v i n c i a l -l e v e l , as the federal government retreats from "nation-building" and the provinces become increasingly capable, governments have undergone a s i m i l a r process of adjusting p o l i c i e s to protect t h e i r economic bases and maintain s o c i a l peace. In B r i t i s h Columbia, the s o l i d wood products sector i s of c e n t r a l importance i n the p r o v i n c i a l economy, i n the character of i n d u s t r i a l labour r e l a t i o n s , and i n the p o l i t i c s of the province. The sector continues to dominate smaller, d e r i v a t i v e economic 5 a c t i v i t i e s based on the forest resource. P r o v i n c i a l l y c e n t r a l i z e d organizational structures, i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s , and government policy-making mechanisms i n the sector permit i n c l u s i v e and comprehensive i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s between the major players while excluding and p e r i p h e r a l i z i n g other forest r e l a t e d i n t e r e s t s . This dominance of the policy-making process and of the economy insures that the changes impelled by the c r i s i s i n Fordism w i l l make the responses of the sector to the challenges of primary importance i n the p o l i t i c s of the province 6. Playing an analogous r o l e to that of the automobile industry i n the United States, the B. C. s o l i d wood products sector led the way i n the province i n the adoption of Fordism, and i t s performance and development continues to influence the economic, s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l agenda of the province. During the decline of the dominant post-war model d e f i n i n g r e l a t i o n s i n the sector, the various factors e f f e c t i n g change i n the sector are, i n turn, affected by the adaptive choices made by actors i n the sector. The major factors which provoked the c r i s i s i n the sector, and which reached a c l i m a c t i c stage during the l a t e 1980s, impelled the new cooperative regime seen to be emerging i n the 1990s. This cooperation mitigated the legally-sanctioned and li m i t e d confrontational s t y l e of labour r e l a t i o n s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of post-war c o l l e c t i v e bargaining. A change i n the r e l a t i o n a l "morality" of the major parties i n the sector i s required which w i l l , i n turn, change the i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c s of each party as well as the external r e l a t i o n s of these parties with the encompassing and regulatory i n s t i t u t i o n s of the society. This period of 6 s t r u c t u r a l and i d e o l o g i c a l change, as i t undermines the previously s t a b i l i z i n g organizational norms of the sector, c a r r i e s both a danger to the continued organizational v i a b i l i t y of the main players and the opportunity to construct new systems ordering the a c t i v i t i e s of those involved i n the sector. Owing to the importance of the sector the construction of a new model of i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s i n the sector w i l l a f f e c t the i n t e r e s t s and behaviour of the surrounding society. In order to determine the changes occurring i n the sector, we w i l l i d e n t i f y and evaluate the disaggregated "independent" variables impinging on the sector. Five categories of f a c t o r s , l i s t e d i n a s e r i a l order determined by t h e i r degree of autonomous and independent o r i g i n from the sector, w i l l be l i s t e d . F i r s t , technological change has affected the sector through the market-driven imperative forcing i t s adoption by i n d i v i d u a l firms. Since the adoption of new technology, and the work-methods i t f o s t e r s , are a matter of human choice, the process of i t s adoption i s revelatory of the p o l i t i c s of i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s . Second, Canada's economy, and i n p a r t i c u l a r the s o l i d wood products sector, are i n c r e a s i n g l y subject to foreign-based bodies. L i b e r a l i z e d trade, and the accompanying diminution of Canadian economic p o l i c y -making autonomy, has made the sector subject to the actions of foreign governmental and quasi-governmental agencies. The changing structure and i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s of the sector are a defensive response to t h i s f actor. Third, the post-war c r i s i s i n Fordism has witnessed a growing challenge by new ideologically-motivated 7 i n t e r e s t groups to the l e g a l l y enshrined normative assumptions of the F o r d i s t "accord," as well as the fundamental values underpinning Western s o c i e t i e s . These groups, e i t h e r excluded from or subordinated to the int e r e s t s of the primary producer-groups who order the Fo r d i s t economy, are not e a s i l y reconciled to the p r e v a i l i n g l o g i c of the political-economy 7. In B r i t i s h Columbia, the representatives of these new groups, as they impact on the case i n question, are environmentalists and native Indians, as well as feminists who c r i t i q u e the paternalism exemplified by the male-dominated structures of the sector. The former groups, i n p a r t i c u l a r , have had an increasing impact on the operations of the sector, as well as the p o l i t i c s of the forest union and the companies. As organized labour, more so than business, needs the support of other progressive movements, p a r t i c u l a r l y during times of c r i s i s , t h e i r choice of a l l i a n c e with these groups or with t h e i r employers w i l l have substantive consequences f o r the p o l i t i c s of the province. Fourth, other forest industry groups on the fringes of the policy-making network which has dominated the sector up to the present have become increasingly vocal and i n f l u e n t i a l as a r e s u l t of changes i n the market-place as well as i n pu b l i c consciousness. These groups include small independent logging contractors, sawmill owners and "value-added" manufacturers; pulp and paper m i l l s ; professional f o r e s t e r s , f o r e s t r y economists and independent consultants; and others dependent to varying degrees on the forest resource including the tourism industry, farmers and ranchers, f i s h e r s , and hunters and trappers. These groups, unlike 8 those i n the t h i r d category, are not fundamentally opposed to the norms and values of the sector but rather are demanding i n c l u s i o n i n the policy-making and c o n t r o l l i n g structures of the sector. The sector's c e n t r a l i z e d i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s system could incorporate these groups and t h e i r interests into t h e i r d e l i b e r a t i o n s or continue to attempt to marginalize them, with contradictory a f f e c t s on the future of the sector's present and future workforce. F i f t h are those state agencies which, d i r e c t l y and i n d i r e c t l y , a f f e c t the economic v i a b i l i t y of the firms i n the sector, the s t r u c t u r a l character of the sector, and the labour r e l a t i o n s and, from t h i s , the work-processes and productivity of the sector, as well as the public's input into the a c t i v i t i e s of the sector. In p a r t i c u l a r , we w i l l look at the r o l e the state plays, at both the federal and p r o v i n c i a l l e v e l , i n the emerging more cooperative r e l a t i o n s i n the sector as well as i n the adjusting of the sector to the pressures impinging on i t . In examining the responses of the sector to the above f a c t o r s , we w i l l focus on the major producer group associations representing, on the one hand, the firms i n the sector, and, on the other, the unionized employees i n the sector. The l a t t e r group were i n the forefront of the establishment of i n d u s t r i a l unions i n the e a r l y 2 0 t h century, and are at present e x c l u s i v e l y represented by the very h i g h - p r o f i l e International Woodworkers of America-Canada (IWA-Canada). The former have engaged i n sectoral-wide c o l l e c t i v e bargaining through predecessors to the present Forest I n d u s t r i a l Relations (FIR) and i n s e t t i n g industry standards as 9 well as public r e l a t i o n s and governmental lobbying through the B.C. Council of Forest Industries (COFI). Major attention w i l l be focused on the present r o l e as well as future prospects of these s e c t o r - l e v e l associations as they adapt to the broadening of the policy-making community administering the sector. The primary source of union strength i s the a b i l i t y of the union leaders to t r a n s f e r the l o y a l t y of the workers from the employer to the bargaining agent. The establishment of more cooperative labour r e l a t i o n s at both the peak s e c t o r a l l e v e l as well as at the firm l e v e l c a r r i e s the p o t e n t i a l to weaken the s o l i d a r i t y and the c o l l e c t i v e strength of the workers. Unless new forms of c o l l e c t i v e strength and s e c u r i t y r e s u l t from the s t r u c t u r a l and technological changes occurring i n the wake of the erosion of F o r d i s t r e l a t i o n s , then the new economic model w i l l not serve the i n t e r e s t s of e i t h e r the workers i n the sector, or, as we have seen during the c r i s e s of the 1930s and the e a r l y 1980s, the la r g e r society. The union and i t s members have to f i n d a balance between the exigencies promoting cooperation i n the changing f o r e s t sector and the need to organize to counter t h e i r continuing inherent i n f e r i o r i t y under capitalism. 10 I I . ECONOMIC PRODUCTION AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: THE CRISIS IN FORDISM. A. I n d u s t r i a l Production, Structural Relations and Human Agency. The i n i t i a t i o n of cooperative r e l a t i o n s i n the B. C. s o l i d wood products sector i s occurring i n the midst of fundamental change i n the post-war global economy and i n p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s . This brings to the fore the central questions of t h i s essay. What i s the r e l a t i o n s h i p between these two phenomena? To what degree i s the former determined by the l a t t e r ? How much of the change i n the sector i s a product of i t s own autonomous development? F i r s t , we need to situate events i n the sector i n global context. The s o l i d wood products sector has been the focus of media and public attention unprecedented i n i t s h i s t o r y . People both i n s i d e and outside the sector sense that a l l aspects of the sector's operations are i n the midst of fundamental change. Public review of tree farm licences was once not of wide i n t e r e s t , "nobody paid any attention; these days the rooms are f u l l and there i s a demand f o r more rooms i n more towns to view a l l of the plans that are a v a i l a b l e (Roger Stanyer, Interview, June, 1991)." The unionized workers and the employers are reacting by attempting to change t h e i r r e l a t i o n s with each other, while forming an a l l i a n c e against formerly excluded public i n t e r e s t s and i n c r e a s i n g l y unstable market forces impelling change. This " c r i s i s " takes place i n the context of s i m i l a r events i n the economies of Canada and i t s i n t r u s i v e neighbour, the United States. The economies of the United States and, consequently, Canada are widely acknowledged to be i n the midst of dramatic change, economically, p o l i t i c a l l y and s o c i a l l y (Bendix et a l , 1984; Piore and Sabel, 1984; Gonick, 1987; Jane Jenson, 1989, '90). The roots of t h i s c r i s i s are seen as r e s u l t i n g from the exhaustion of the dominant 20th century model of i n d u s t r i a l production, Fordism, and i t s s t r u c t u r a l regulatory regimes. While American Fordism served as a paradigmatic model f o r other states' i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n , i n d i v i d u a l states adapted the model to t h e i r own pec u l i a r economic t r a d i t i o n s and conditions and each regulatory regime was a r e f l e c t i o n of the p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l s t r u c t u r a l arrangements which each had developed up to, and as a consequence of, each state's adoption and adaption of the model. The v a r i a t i o n among states i n the p a r t i c u l a r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of t h e i r methods of economic production and the regulation of the s t r u c t u r a l r e l a t i o n s governing the society explains to a large extent the d i f f e r e n t i a l e f f e c t of the present c r i s i s i n Fordism between states. While the U.S. and Canadian economies and t h e i r encompassing i n s t i t u t i o n a l structures appear to be d e c l i n i n g i n both functional a b i l i t y and public esteem, t h e i r counterparts i n other states, with economies rooted i n the l o g i c of Fordism, appear to be f l o u r i s h i n g . While leading o f f i c i a l s i n the U.S. and Canada are unable to come up with c r e d i b l e solutions to the s t r u c t u r a l impasse, other states' leaders are able to plan and win s o c i a l 12 consensus f o r s t r u c t u r a l reform. This would lead us to conclude, with the above noted students of the c r i s i s , that the post-war Fo r d i s t model i n North America has created contradictions i n s o c i e t y which have undermined the s o c i a l accord underpinning national s t a b i l i t y and development. In turn, for our purposes, t h i s breakdown has had repercussions throughout our s o c i e t i e s , including the primary i n d u s t r i a l sector i n B r i t i s h Columbia, the s o l i d wood products sector. Before continuing, we should c l a r i f y the meaning of Fordism and i t s "regulatory" regime. The term Fordism i s derived from the mass production, assembly-line technique notably introduced by Henry Ford. However, Fordism more p r e c i s e l y r e f e r s to the highly structured, c e n t r a l i z e d c o l l e c t i v e bargaining structures which were developed i n the 1930s and l e g a l l y and normatively sanctioned following WW II i n a l l the major industries of the United States and Canada. We w i l l see a more d e t a i l e d d e s c r i p t i o n of the system as we examine i t s development and decline i n subsequent sections. "Regulation" r e f e r s to the major i n s t i t u t i o n s - economic, p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l - and t h e i r systemic features which, through t h e i r l e g a l and normative rules as well as the economic "laws," regulate and r e i n f o r c e the dominant economic c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the nation. These regulatory mechanisms, i n the case of Fordism, arose as a consequence of the imperative need for of the mass production i n d u s t r i e s to s t a b i l i z e of factor input costs and of the growing mass market for i t s output. When technological and s o c i a l changes bring about changes i n the economy but the "superstructure" of 13 i n s t i t u t i o n s , laws and normative values lag behind, then there eventually r e s u l t s an economic and, hence, p o l i t i c a l c r i s i s r e q u i r i n g reestablishment of an equilibrium between the two. An empirical study of t h i s process w i l l be undertaken i n subsequent sections 8. What i s the nature of t h i s contemporary c r i s i s ? Is i t a c r i s i s i n s o c i a l values, s t r u c t u r a l r e l a t i o n s or methods of economic production, or a combination of the three? Can we f i n d any comparable s i t u a t i o n i n h i s t o r y and how do the contemporary features of our s o c i e t i e s d i s t i n g u i s h t h i s c r i s i s from others? I f e e l that the depth and nature of t h i s c r i s i s has a d i r e c t consequence on the r o l e of human agency i n re s o l v i n g the c r i s i s and i n constructing a new system to s t a b i l i z e and advance our s o c i e t i e s . The most recent great c r i s i s i n our s o c i e t i e s was the Depression of the 1930s and the ensuing World War. This was a c r i s i s of under-consumption where the great productive capacity of the mass production industries i n s p i r e d by Frederick Taylor and Henry Ford were exceeded the consumptive capacity of society. The s t r i c t c ontrol of input and output engineered by the p r i v a t e mass production corporation was not complemented by a s i m i l a r " c o r p oratization" of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s . That i s , the conditions of s o c i a l production i n the factory were not being complemented by s o c i a l consumption i n society. While the material method of production was sound the regulation of society needed reform. This i s not the case today. The exhaustion of the North American model of production has been exacerbated by the simultaneous dismantling of the regulatory regime. The d i f f e r e n t i a l national repercussions of the o i l - p r i c e shocks of 1974 and 1979 are r e f l e c t i v e of the underlying problems i n North America. In some states, notably Japan and western Germany, the shocks turned out to be temporary disruptions which spurred these economies to r e f i n e t h e i r methods and r e l a t i o n s so as to resume with renewed vigour t h e i r pre-shock courses. In North America the shocks worsened s t a g f l a t i o n , i n the f i r s t instance, and led to the biggest recession i n post-war h i s t o r y , i n the second. While the F o r d i s t mass production economy may have s t i l l had the p o t e n t i a l to underpin s t r u c t u r a l reform, the responses of regulatory a u t h o r i t i e s to the symptoms of c r i s i s exacerbated the c r i s i s and e s s e n t i a l l y precluded any reform of Fordism. The regulatory regime established under the New Deal and post-war welfare reforms, which provided the framework for post-war North American economic supremacy, were now c r i t i c i z e d as obstacles to recovery by these a u t h o r i t i e s . Because of the measures taken by these a u t h o r i t i e s to dismantle the means to reproduce the F o r d i s t model, we now have a c r i s i s i n both regulation and i n the mass production model of production. Now that Fordism i t s e l f has been weakened by the "reforms" of the New Right, those groups peripheralized by post-war Fordism (working women, sin g l e mothers, m i n o r i t i e s , youth etc.) have been joined by those b l u e - c o l l a r workers displaced by the c r i s i s i n t h e i r c r i t i c i s m of the underlying assumptions of Western cap i t a l i s m . These groups and the New Right have now become a major 15 determining cleavage i n society, superseding that between the producer groups at the centre of Fordism. Beside the c l a s s d i v i s i o n s based on i n d u s t r i a l production, we have ethnic d i v i s i o n s , feminist challenges to patriarchy, environmentalist c r i t i c i s m of economic growth, etc., which s t r i k e at the fundamentals of Euro-c e n t r i c "white", male, h i e r a r c h i c a l , n a t i o n a l i s t , Judeo-Christian values underpinning Western c i v i l i z a t i o n . Because of t h i s expansion of the parameters of the c r i s i s , these extra-class factors must be included i n an analysis of the factors acting upon any p a r t i c u l a r economic sector i n the West and i t s i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s system. Therefore, we w i l l be studying the e f f e c t on the structure and ideology of the major actors i n the case i n question i n response to the "independent" factors e f f e c t i n g change i n the sector. B. The Rise and F a l l of Fordism. 1. Mass production and i t s regulation: While mass production was developed i n the United States, i t s regulatory regime i s a d i s t i n c t i v e v a r i e t y among many d i f f e r e n t national systems. As the various regimes of regulation developed since the advent of mass production came and went, the underlying l o g i c of mass production, up u n t i l recently, maintained i t s hegemony. However, with i t s apparent exhaustion, the nation which originated and grew to global supremacy with i t has suffered p a r t i c u l a r l y acutely with i t s decline. The thoroughness with which 16 the exigencies of mass production has shaped not just a l l the ce n t r a l i n s t i t u t i o n s but also the ideals and norms of the U.S. has made the c r i s i s p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t r a c t a b l e . However, although the problem may appear less serious and the solutions less problematic elsewhere, the decline i n Fordism has affected every corner of the globe. The development of mass production according to the p r i n c i p l e s of Frederick Taylor's s c i e n t i f i c management and Henry Ford's assembly l i n e allowed and, more c r u c i a l l y , necessitated an ever increasing output of goods. As production volume increased, the marginal cost decreased. Through complementary developments i n transportation and s o c i a l development i n the vast U.S. market, a mass demand for uniform consumer products was emerging. In the mass production f a c t o r i e s , the expansion of output allowed tasks to be broken down into t h e i r simplest components so that u n s k i l l e d and, hence cheap, labour could operate the p r e c i s i o n machinery and be placed along the assembly-line. The corporation which managed mass production was able to bring under a h i e r a r c h i c a l , p r o f e s s i o n a l authority structure a l l the planning and implementation of the production process. It quickly outstripped the productive capacity of the old c r a f t production model, e s p e c i a l l y i n providing standard consumer goods. However, i t required a s t a b i l i z a t i o n of input and output i n order to maintain a steady turnover of c a p i t a l and a competitive return to i t s investor-owners. As the economy became dominated by the mass producers i t became more s e n s i t i v e to fluctuations i n the market. The crash i n 1929, the f i r s t economic downturn during the mass production era, created a steamroller e f f e c t which overtook the whole economy. As Keynes argued, the way out, short of abolishing capitalism, was to duplicate the corporate system of input and output regulation on a macro-economic l e v e l . A v a r i e t y of means were attempted to e s t a b l i s h t h i s national regulation. The New Deal i n the U.S., and v a r i a t i o n s of i t i n Canada and B r i t a i n , did as well at r e s t o r i n g economic growth i n the 1930s as d i d the other systems of regulation i n the other nations which had adopted mass production. Bureaucratic centralism i n S t a l i n i s t Russia, state corporatism i n F a s c i s t I t a l y and i n National S o c i a l i s t Germany, and other v a r i a t i o n s of these i n m i l i t a r i z e d Japan, social-democratic Scandinavia, etc., managed to es t a b l i s h the i n t e r n a l s t a b i l i t y needed by mass production. The productive p o t e n t i a l of mass production and the need to feed i t s increasing need for human and material input and market consumption undoubtedly contributed to World War I I . The m i l i t a r y triumph of the o r i g i n a t o r of mass production, the U.S., and of i t s great competitor, the Soviet Union, which i n many ways imitated the corporate and bureaucratic U.S. model, insured the dominance of the paradigmatic model. 2. The U . S . regulatory regime: In order to complement the corporate l e v e l c o n t r o l of material inputs and outputs, the reforms of the New Deal era were introduced to control the human factor i n the production c y c l e . 18 The Wagner Act of 1935, which accompanied and l e g a l i z e d the growth of i n d u s t r i a l unions, served to s t a b i l i z e the corporate cost of labour. In return for acknowledgement of the decision-making prerogatives of corporate managers, labour was insured a share i n the rewards of r i s i n g p r o d u c t i v i t y . By extending t h i s system to the national l e v e l , a growing market for the consumer goods of the corporations was assured. The c r i p p l i n g of the economies of Europe and m i l i t a r y primacy provided an outlet for the surplus production and accumulating c a p i t a l of the U.S.-based corporations. Keynesian c o u n t e r - c y c l i c a l regulation at home and dollar-based i n t e r n a t i o n a l trade abroad t i e d the growing i n t e r n a t i o n a l market to the success of the U.S. economy. The Bretton-Woods agreement, the World Bank, the IMF and the OECD acted to promote the l i b e r a l i z e d trade so important to the most competitive economy, the U.S. When the U.S. advantage evaporated during the Vietnam War, t h i s e d i f i c e q uickly collapsed under the pressure of the p r o t e c t i o n i s t response of the Nixon and subsequent Presidencies 9. While other nations suffered s i m i l a r shocks to t h e i r systems ( i . e . the two o i l c r i s e s of 1974 and 1979), the U.S. response seemed to exacerbate t h e i r problems while other nations' economies were invigorated by t h e i r s 1 0 . The reason for the c r i s i s and the problems with the responses from U.S. leaders has received considerable a t t e n t i o n (Bowles et a l , 1984; Piore and Sabel, 1984; Crozier et a l , 1975). The lack of consensus as to how to resolve the problems continues as the c r i s i s i n the nation deepens. Whereas during the 1960s and the 1970s the s o c i a l groups formerly excluded from the F o r d i s t 19 c e n t r a l negotiating structures of U.S. society and from the ensuing benefits were seeking i n c l u s i o n i n the system, t h e i r continuing exclusion has i n c i t e d resignation, withdrawal or fundamental questioning of the whole system underlying the society. The s e l f -destructive ghetto culture of U.S. i n n e r - c i t i e s and the greed and dishonesty of Wall Street r e f l e c t a cynicism toward the values once held dear i n the U.S. The defeat of the Equal Rights Amendment, the attack on unions and the reversal of desegregation r e f l e c t s the desperate e f f o r t s by U.S. e l i t e s to maintain t h e i r p r i v i l e g e s while the basis of the system decays. The i n s t i t u t i o n s which regulated the macro-economy are s i m i l a r l y decaying as union roll-backs are j u s t i f i e d as a means to increase competitiveness, and predatory corporate r a i d i n g undermines the long-term planning a b i l i t y of managers. The easy c r e d i t which corporations could r e l y upon to finance expansion as well as consumer purchasing has been undermined by the use of high i n t e r e s t rates to ease i n f l a t i o n . I n f l a t i o n i t s e l f i s merely increased when corporate i n s t a b i l i t y hurts t h e i r a b i l i t y to increase p r o d u c t i v i t y . Further weakening the v i a b i l i t y of the model i s the i n c r e a s i n g l y i n f l u e n t i a l questioning of the underlying l o g i c of mass production and economic growth coming from environmentalist ranks. The end to the post-war annual increases i n income and l i v i n g standards has reinforced the legitimacy of the c r i t i c i s m of the i n d u s t r i a l economy's depletion of resources, destruction of the natural environment, and "dehumanization" of l i f e . While during 20 the 1930s there was widespread c r i t i c i s m of the unequal d i s t r i b u t i o n of the income of the nation, few questioned the benefits of i n d u s t r i a l growth. Now not only i s t h i s done but some adherents of "deep ecology" question man's r i g h t to occupy earth at a l l i n l i g h t of his penchant for destructive behaviour. What a l l t h i s s i g n i f i e s i s that there i s no consensus on what model of production w i l l serve U.S. society and how that model should be regulated so as to include the p l u r a l i s t i n t e r e s t s of U.S. society. While the leading and p r i v i l e g e d place of U.S. industry and i t s employees i n U.S. society was accepted when economic growth benefitted most people to some extent, the c r i s i s i n the economy and i n the supporting s o c i a l accord has l e f t a vacuum with no new model i n sight. 3. The Canadian regulatory regime: a. Canadian unions and the c r i s i s i n Fordism. The primary influence on the character of Canadian i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n and the i n s t i t u t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s which govern i t has been the United States. It has been e s p e c i a l l y i n f l u e n t i a l during the period from the 1930s up to the present, during which the F o r d i s t model of mass production was established i n Canada. Since both the ownership of the firms which introduced the mass production corporation and the headquarters of the i n d u s t r i a l unions which were formed i n i t s wake were p r i m a r i l y American based, the character of i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s , on the one hand, and the la r g e r macro-economic regulatory p o l i c i e s which developed i n response, on the other hand, made the Canadian economy e s p e c i a l l y close to the U.S. model. However, the defensive nature of Canadian confederation, symbolized by the f i r s t National P o l i c y , the continuing need for a more economically i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t state, both to construct and maintain a national i n f r a s t r u c t u r e , and the r e l a t i v e l y greater adoption of Keynesian w e l f a r i s t measures following the Depression of the 1930s, by Canada, has been undertaken i n order to mitigate the influence of American economic penetration of our regulatory regime. The influence of the American model and of American branch plants plus our increasing dependence on the U.S. market has hindered the attempt at constructing an independent economy and at e s t a b l i s h i n g an autonomous i n d u s t r i a l strategy. The power of American corporate i n t e r e s t s i s shown by the t i m i d i t y with which the two o l d - l i n e national parties introduced " n a t i o n a l i s t " economic p o l i c i e s and the e l e c t o r a l fate they suffered when they drew too much negative attention from American i n t e r e s t s . The acceptance of U.S. dominance has even tempered c r i t i c i s m by the CCF-NDP, owing to the dominance of the labour movement by "International" unions. The influence of American c a p i t a l on Canadian Fordism has been most s t r i k i n g i n i t s e f f e c t on the l e f t and labour i n Canada. In contrast to most other Western labour movements, Canada's has not complemented i t s power i n industry with power i n p o l i t i c s . Labour unions i n Canada, perhaps even to a greater extent than business, have been dominated by American structures and i d e a l s . The ea r l y craft-unions i n Canada were branches of American unions and adhered to the p o l i c y of p o l i t i c a l n e u t r a l i t y of Gomperism. The new i n d u s t r i a l unions, established during the 1930s, were i n i t i a t e d by the American-based Committee on In d u s t r i a l Organization and, l i k e t h e i r head o f f i c e , l i m i t e d t h e i r p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y to lobbying the governing p a r t i e s and urging p o l i t i c a l support to the CCF-NDP at e l e c t i o n time. The low-level of p o l i t i c a l consciousness of labour and the e f f e c t on labour's e l e c t o r a l a l l y , the CCF-NDP, revealed i t s e l f when labour and the NDP f a i l e d to push for the entrenchment of labour r i g h t s i n the Charter of Fights and Freedoms and the fac t that opposition to the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA), which would c l e a r l y hurt Canadian unions and s o c i a l programs, was led not by the NDP and labour but by the L i b e r a l Party and c i t i z e n s c o a l i t i o n s . When the e f f e c t s of the c r i s i s i n the American economy began to be f e l t i n the Canadian economy, the legacy of labour p o l i t i c a l quiescence hindered both i t s p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n and resistance to the policy-making response of business and government. However, perhaps due to the growth of Canadian-based unions i n the labour movement with the organization of the public sector during the 1960s and the 1970s and t h e i r example and growing clout i n the Canadian labour movement, unions, at lea s t i n the 1980s, were able to avoid the emasculation of many of t h e i r American counterparts. The subsequent move to Canadianize and consolidate the fractured, decentralized i n d u s t r i a l unions provides a basis for resistance to the dismantling of the welfare state i n the wake of Fordism's e c l i p s e . Furthermore, the continued v i t a l i t y of Canadian unions s t r i k e and as the public-sector employs p r o p o r t i o n a l l y more workers, they are more i n f l u e n t i a l i n the movement. This i s important i n that they brought with them more women, wh i t e - c o l l a r and educated workers who have d i f f e r e n t concerns which more c l o s e l y r e f l e c t e d the concerns of workers i n the new non-blue c o l l a r sectors. Canada has had no equivalent of the U.S. a i r t r a f f i c c o n t r o l l e r s dispute and the closest p o l i t i c a l version we have of Reaganism n a t i o n a l l y (we w i l l see that B r i t i s h Columbia has had i t s version), Mulroney and the Conservatives, did not gain o f f i c e u n t i l the post-recession recovery when the c r i s i s atmosphere had passed. We have also not seen any equivalent n a t i o n a l l y (again B. C. i s an exception) of the U.S. states' right-to-work laws. Concession bargaining and de-unionization was not introduced i n Canada to anywhere near the degree i n the U.S. owing to the economic conditions mentioned above and the more balanced labour l e g i s l a t i o n across Canada. Instead, the l a t e 1980s saw the beginning of the Canadianization of our i n d u s t r i a l unions and a concerted e f f o r t to both consolidate Canada's branch plant union structure, r e s i s t government and business attacks on unions, and to organize i n other sectors. The former was seen as a way to distance themselves from American union concession-bargaining. Consolidation gave i n d i v i d u a l unions more organizational strength and deeper pockets to organize, bargain and s t r i k e . Many of the U.S. plants which southern Ontario had gained at the expense of the i n d u s t r i a l i s e d U.S. mid-west were organized and forays were made into non-traditional sectors. 26 Consequently due to the s t r u c t u r a l response and the d i f f e r e n t composition of our unions as well as to unique t r a d i t i o n s , Canada's unions have a more progressive image and public support than U.S. unions ( i b i d . , p 60). This factor, perhaps more than the others, has protected Canadian unions. Governments and business do not enjoy s i m i l a r public acquiescence or outright support f o r a concerted attack on unions. Public support for and bargaining e f f o r t s i n winning paid maternity leave, on-site day care, equal pay for work of equal value and other progressive benefits has given unions a p o s i t i v e public image not shared by U.S. unions. Thus Canadian unions have retained the strength and r e s i l i e n c y to respond to the exigencies of new working arrangements, the changing workforce and the evolving needs of Canadian business. Whether they have altered t h e i r structure, composition and ideology s u f f i c i e n t l y to survive the apparent decline of b l u e - c o l l a r industry which i s occurring during the present recession (ten years a f t e r a s i m i l a r decline i n the U.S.) we cannot say d e f i n i t i v e l y . A review of the changing i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s scene during the 1980s provides a mixed answer. Although they have shown a willingness to adjust to the new f l e x i b l e "team-work" techniques, introduced most prominently i n the auto-industry, the f a i l u r e to gain a secure foothold i n new sectors and the " l e v e l - p l a y i n g - f i e l d " e f f e c t of the FTA and now the proposed North American trade accord counters t h i s advantage. b. The t r i p a r t i t e option: 27 In response to the s t a g f l a t i o n of the 1970s, consequent to the in t e r n a t i o n a l c r i s i s i n Fordism, the federal government attempted i n 1984 to win the support of business and organized labour f o r a program of voluntary wage and pri c e r e s t r a i n t . The o i l p r i c e increases of 1979 and 1984 had brought higher prices and, soon, union demands for s i m i l a r r i s e s i n wages. In order to stop the ensuing s p i r a l i n p r i c e s , wages and i n t e r e s t rates and more importantly to break the emerging i n f l a t i o n a r y psychology, the federal government sought to introduce a c e n t r a l i z e d , n a t i o n a l -l e v e l producer group bargaining forum s i m i l a r to that i n many Western European nations. As i n the U.S. and Western Europe, Canada was experiencing the symptoms of a collapse of the s o c i a l accords which complemented Fordism. The organization of the public sector and of professional workers, who sought to share the benefits enjoyed ex c l u s i v e l y by the b l u e - c o l l a r worker, also brought q u a l i t a t i v e l y d i f f e r e n t concerns to the bargaining table. The "youth r e b e l l i o n " and the connected emergence of a non-reformist "New L e f t , " which was feared to be replacing the moribund Communist Party, the growth of the sovereigntist movement i n Quebec, and the r i s e of feminist, native Indian and environmentalist demands, a l l s i g n a l l e d a c r i s i s i n post-war Canadian Fordism. Whether a new c e n t r a l i z e d accord with organized labour could have stemmed the collapse of the Fordist paradigm i s highly questionable. It may have merely served to s p l i t b l u e - c o l l a r organized labour from the newly organized white- c o l l a r as well as 28 from the new progressive movements which continued to c r i t i q u e the assumptions of Fordism. Regardless, the attempt f a i l e d . The f a i l u r e to win labour's support was followed by l e g i s l a t e d wage controls i n 1975-6 and again, i n only the public sector, i n 1982-3. F a i l u r e at macro-level t r i p a r t i t e bargaining led a u t h o r i t i e s to s h i f t a ttention to the meso-level. The f a i l u r e i n 1974 can be traced to s t r u c t u r a l obstacles to a u t h o r i t a t i v e peak-level bargaining as well as i d e o l o g i c a l obstacles, both a legacy of the h i s t o r y described i n the preceding section (Panitch, 1986a; Gonick, 1987, pp.184-8). The federal government had attempted to obtain voluntary constraint because i t lacked the a b i l i t y both to e s t a b l i s h an independent monetary-policy and to control l e g i s l a t i v e l y a l l wages and p r i c e s , i n hope of lowering i n f l a t i o n . The l i n k i n g of the Canadian d o l l a r and i n t e r e s t rates to t h e i r U.S. counterparts precluded an independent monetary e f f o r t to regulate economic growth. The nature of the Canadian economy l i m i t e d the effectiveness of l e g i s l a t e d controls on p r i c e s . Canada imported i n f l a t i o n both due to i t s trade dependency, e s p e c i a l l y with the U.S.,. and to the high degree of inner-firm trans-border trade, which further t i e d i t s p r i c e s to U.S. p r i c e s . Canadian federalism l e f t those areas under p r o v i n c i a l c o n t r o l , t h e i r public employees, purchases and services, outside Ottawa's j u r i s d i c t i o n . Except during war-time, Ottawa had not i n t e r f e r e d with private-sector bargaining nor with corporate a c t i v i t y . Consequently, there was weak p o l i t i c a l support within the L i b e r a l Party and no support among the opposition p a r t i e s for 29 t r i p a r t i s m . Germany's attempt at t r i p a r t i t e r e s t r a i n t bargaining, 'Koncertation, 1 had required c o a l i t i o n government, but, despite t h i s advantage, i t was s h o r t - l i v e d , succumbing to decentralized bargaining (Berghahn and Karsten, 1987; Swensen, 1989). Business i n Canada retains what Atkinson and Coleman c a l l a "firm-centred c u l t u r e " (1989, p. 33). Association among firms has been l i m i t e d to issues which do not intrude into i n d i v i d u a l firm autonomy. Governments i n Canada have resorted to d i r e c t ownership of key firms when seeking to implement i n d u s t r i a l p o l i c i e s , as they have been unable to obtain cooperation from business. Much of t h i s , obviously, i s due to the foreign ownership of most manufacturing and energy firms. When business has associated i t has been along s e c t o r a l l i n e s , while i n t e r - s e c t o r a l associations have been weak and divided among several f u n c t i o n a l l y d i s t i n c t organizations. (The peak-level Business Council on National Issues-BCNI was not founded u n t i l 1976, a f t e r the f a i l u r e of Trudeau's t r i p a r t i t e r e s t r a i n t project.) Business supported t r i p a r t i s m , knowing that p r i c e - c o n t r o l was beyond federal competence. Furthermore, the L i b e r a l government could have been r e l i e d upon not to do anything which would alienate t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l base i n business. Organized labour was neither structured nor o r g a n i z a t i o n a l l y united to engage i n peak-level t r i p a r t i s m . The Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) was l i t t l e more than a lobby group for i t s a f f i l i a t e s , who, e s p e c i a l l y the "Internationals," looked to headquarters for p o l i c y d i r e c t i o n . The a f f i l i a t e s were u n w i l l i n g to give CLC leaders authority to negotiate and they often opposed t r i p a r t i s m for i d e o l o g i c a l reasons. Many unionists, on the l e f t , associated t r i p a r t i s m with inter-war European fascism and, on the r i g h t , with Sov i e t - s t y l e trade unionism. Social-democrats were reluctant to negotiate with a government run by the NDP1s r i v a l s , as i t might weaken rank and f i l e e l e c t o r a l support for the NDP i f negotiations were successful. Labour leaders also, j u s t i f i a b l y , feared that t r i p a r t i s m meant wage r e s t r a i n t only, and once the membership became aware of t h i s , t h e i r positions would be threatened, and more seriously, union strength and c r e d i b i l i t y might be undermined (Panitch, 1986b). In the wake of the f a i l u r e of the 1974 experiment, the federal government s h i f t e d attention to t r i p a r t i s m at the s e c t o r a l - l e v e l . The Major Projects Task Force discussions sponsored by the federal Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce brought together over seventy business and labour leaders to engage i n long-range economic forecasting and planning. While the previous t r i p a r t i t e experiment had focused on national macro-policy-making, the subsequent i n i t i a t i v e s were less grandiose. Training, r e s t r u c t u r i n g , labour displacement, and introducing new work methods were t h e i r main concerns. (In 1976 the federal government established a "Quality of Work L i f e " centre i n Toronto to encourage adoption by industry of Japanese-style work-team production methods.) Labour and business representatives were provided with a j o i n t method for both gathering information on market labour changes and recommending appropriate government p o l i c i e s , with the establishment, i n 1984, of the Canadian Labour Market and P r o d u c t i v i t y Centre (CLMPC), funded by Labour Canada and run by the BCNI and the CLC. Labour Canada, subsequently, organized j o i n t forums i n various sectors to f a c i l i t a t e the addressing of problems of mutual concern. For example, when the U.S Congress threatened to impose a duty on a l l imported s t e e l , the j o i n t United Steelworkers/Steel Employers-run Canadian Steel Trade and Employment Centre (CSTEC) was able to lobby the U.S. Congress f o r exclusion of Canadian imports from the duty. Subsequently, CSTEC proposed and received federal funding for j o i n t l y administered labour t r a i n i n g and r e t r a i n i n g programs. These s e c t o r a l i n i t i a t i v e s by the federal government to promote union/employer cooperative policy-making and administration have resulted i n the formation of j o i n t structures i n several i n d u s t r i a l sectors (see Appendix I ) . The short duration, modest focus, and diverse nature of these s e c t o r a l experiments precludes d e f i n i t i v e prognostications regarding t h e i r future. However, a case study focusing on one sector, the B.C. s o l i d wood products sector, should permit more in s i g h t . Furthermore, rather than seeking to compare the variable character of cooperative r e l a t i o n s within diverse sectors, we w i l l explore the p a r t i c u l a r e f f e c t on one sector of the changes occurring i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l , national and l o c a l economic structures and i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s . 32 I I I . THE BRITISH COLUMBIA SOLID WOOD PRODUCTS SECTOR: FROM CONFRONTATION TO COOPERATION. A. E a r l y Forest I n d u s t r i a l Relations. Since the 1890s, when the Panama Canal opened the markets of the Eastern Seaboard and Europe to B.C. wood products, the forest industry has been of primary importance to the B.C. economy. The c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the organization and evolution of i t s labour r e l a t i o n s has played a major r o l e i n shaping the tone of labour r e l a t i o n s i n other sectors of the p r o v i n c i a l economy. The p r o v i n c i a l government, through i t s control of the forest resource base and i t s j u r i s d i c t i o n over forest labour r e l a t i o n s , has helped structure the industry and i t s labour r e l a t i o n s . Working conditions during the sector's formative years shaped labour r e l a t i o n s up to the present. (The forest industry has been and continues to be dominated by the s o l i d wood products sector. Pulp and paper, "value-added" etc. are d e r i v a t i v e i n both resource and labour r e l a t i o n s . ) The structure of the industry was s i m i l a r to that of Eastern Canada where the industry was f i r s t begun and slowly moved west. M i l l s were p r i m a r i l y small, family-owned operations and work was seasonal and c y c l i c a l , s e n s i t i v e to the extreme fluctuations i n demand i n the construction industry. These small firms were f i n a n c i a l l y precarious and t h e i r frequent bankruptcy lent the sector i t s "cut and run" reputation. Working conditions were bad: l i v i n g conditions i n the logging camps were 33 minimal, the work dangerous and t r a i n i n g non-existent. Unlike woodworkers i n the East, those i n the West often d i d not have ei t h e r the economic cushion provided by the family farm or the t r a i n i n g experience derived from family farm logging operations. Owing to these conditions, union organization was begun e a r l y and frequently, usually by the members of the more r a d i c a l labour and p o l i t i c a l movements of the time, who were i n s p i r e d to undertake the d i f f i c u l t task and who found common cause with the woodworkers. Beginning around 1900, there were a series of i n d u s t r i a l unions established i n the forest by s o c i a l i s t s from the Vancouver and D i s t r i c t Labour Council, Wobblies from the U.S. North West, and Communists from the Canadian Communist movement. Due -to the i t i n e r a n t nature of the work and the i s o l a t i o n of the camps and m i l l s , organizing was d i f f i c u l t and unions unstable. Furthermore, the p r o v i n c i a l government aided the employers, who also organized e a r l y into the Lumber Manufacturers Association i n 1919, i n breaking unions and s t r i k e s . Despite the d i f f i c u l t i e s , the workers were strong supporters of unions; the s h o r t - l i v e d Lumber Workers In d u s t r i a l Union had 23,000 members i n B.C., i n 1920. The forerunner to the present International Woodworkers of America-Canada (IWA-Canada), was established by Canadians before other Canadian i n d u s t r i a l unions were organized by the U.S.-based Committee on I n d u s t r i a l Organization during the 1930s. I t was also i n the vanguard i n the winning of many of the contractual norms underpinning today's unions. It has, to a great extent, mirrored the h i s t o r y of unions across Canada. 34 In 1931, the Workers Unity League of the Communist Party of Canada started a new Lumber Workers I n d u s t r i a l Union which a f f i l i a t e d with the International Brotherhood of Carpenters i n 1935. A f t e r s p l i t t i n g with the c r a f t - o r i e n t e d Carpenters, i t a f f i l i a t e d with the American-based Committee on I n d u s t r i a l Organization i n 1937 as D i s t r i c t 1 of the IWA. Both D i s t r i c t 1 and the International were led by Communists u n t i l 1940 when International President, Harold P r i c h e t t , was barred from the U.S. for t h i s a f f i l i a t i o n . This event was a forerunner to the expulsion of communists from both the Canadian and American branches during the McCarthy era. In 1943, the f i r s t master contract covering the majority of the Coastal Forestry Region was signed with R.V. Research Limited, which was the predecessor of the present Forest I n d u s t r i a l Relations (FIR), on behalf of 143 member-firms of the B.C. Lumber and Shingle Employers Association. In 1946, D i s t r i c t 1 was chosen by the Canadian Congress of Labour to spearhead a national campaign to win the 40 hour work-week, the automatic dues check-off, and the f i r s t post-war wage r a i s e . After a lengthy s t r i k e , a settlement recommended by Chief J u s t i c e Sloan gave the union a 40 hour work-week (during the summer working period), the voluntary irrevocable dues check-off, and a f i f t e e n cent an hour wage increase. By 1948, the D i s t r i c t was the o f f i c i a l bargaining agent, without exception, fo r the e n t i r e wood-working industry i n B.C., with 27,000 members and 10,00 non-members covered by i t s contracts. In 1944, the same Jus t i c e Sloan had been appointed to 35 recommend changes i n p r o v i n c i a l forest p o l i c y so as to p r e c i p i t a t e the r e s t r u c t u r i n g of the industry i n order to "modernize" the sector and, not i n c i d e n t a l l y , to preclude s t r i k e s l i k e i n 1946. He recommended larger and longer forest tenure agreements with, preferably, large forest corporations. This would provide a more secure source of raw material which could be used by the tenure-holder as c o l l a t e r a l to secure bank loans or stock issues. D i s t r i c t 1 favoured t h i s , as i t would help to eliminate the "cut-and-run" o u t f i t s and ease i t s p o l i c i n g and negotiation of c o l l e c t i v e agreements. A second Sloan Commission i n 1956 recommended a continuation of t h i s process by further increasing the s i z e and duration of tenure, with the r i g h t of automatic renewal f o r the present tenure-holder. Owing to t h i s d e l i b e r a t e p r o v i n c i a l government p o l i c y , by the l a t e 1950s, the industry was becoming dominated by large, integrated forest corporations which could control the industry from c u t t i n g to m i l l i n g and, l a t e r , to pulping. The province c o l l e c t e d rent on the use of i t s timber through stumpage rates on cut timber set at a percentage of the value of the logs when sold on the Vancouver log-market. As the logs at t h i s market were bought by the same firm which had cut them, log price s were kept a r t i f i c i a l l y low by the firms. Furthermore, wage costs were factored i n when stumpage was determined. The conditions f o r stable Fordist production and i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s were now established, with the blessing of the union, by the i n i t i a t i v e of the p r o v i n c i a l government. The integrated f o r e s t 36 corporations c o n t r o l l e d t h e i r input costs through long-term control of the resource-base and low stumpage fees. Labour r e l a t i o n s were c e n t r a l i z e d and wage costs were factored into material costs, thus removing them as a competitive factor i n production. I n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s were regulated, producing wage and working conditions unparalleled by other unionized sectors i n the province. However, the high wages were a d i s i n c e n t i v e to invest i n downstream secondary manufacturing as well as i n upstream input manufacturing. P a t r i c i a Marchak argues that t h i s d i s i n c e n t i v e and p r o v i n c i a l government complicity i n i n d u s t r i a l concentration i n the primary sector perpetuated the underdevelopment and p e r i p h e r a l i z a t i o n of the B.C. economy (Marchak, 1983, 1988). Whether the lack of d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n of the economy was p r i m a r i l y the r e s u l t of t h i s or not, the recession of 1981-3 knocked the sector o f f i t s pedestal. We w i l l therefore turn now to the catharsis that occurred i n the sector during the 1980s. B. The 1980s: C r i s i s and Change i n the B.C. S o l i d Wood Processing Sector. The l a s t decade has been a c l i m a c t i c period i n the economic fortunes and i n the i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s of the sector. The bracketing of the decade by severe recessions i n the sector serves to d i s t i n g u i s h the decade from the preceding periods, h i g h l i g h t i n g the ensuing changes i n the sector and dramatizing the connected changes i n public perception of the sector's r o l e i n the province. As production methods and i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s i n the sector are d e r i v a t i v e of the dominant post-war North American model, we w i l l juxtapose the c r i s i s and response i n the sector against those of the encompassing areas discussed e a r l i e r . Doing so we w i l l d i s t i n g u i s h the peculiar variations of factors a f f e c t i n g change i n the sector, as well as the features of the sector which determined i t s response. Thus equipped we can go on to draw tent a t i v e conclusions as to the prospect for r e l a t i o n s within the sector as well as between the sector and the larger forest policy-making community11. We w i l l focus on the r o l e of i n d u s t r i a l production methods, s t r u c t u r a l r e l a t i o n s connected with them, and the r o l e of human agency. The decade began with the deepest and longest downturn i n the sector's market i n i t s post-war hist o r y . At one point during the recession between 1981-3, one half of the unionized work-force represented by the IWA was l a i d - o f f . Following the recovery i n i t s markets, less than one-half of those who had been l a i d - o f f found work again i n the sector even though production set post-war records (Table 1 and Figure 1). Employees i n the sector were shocked by the severity of the downturn. During previous downturns, the l a y - o f f s had been shorter and employment l e v e l s q u i c k l y recovered during the subsequent upturn. As housing s t a r t s and the determining i n t e r e s t rates had been of c e n t r a l importance i n the Keynesian c o u n t e r - c y c l i c a l instruments used by government to maintain the post-war growth model, the sector had benefitted from t h i s system. When high i n t e r e s t rates were used by governments to cool i n f l a t i o n i n 1981, the sector was h i t p a r t i c u l a r l y hard. Like Table 1 NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES — ANNUAL AVERAGES TOTAL ACTIVITY— FOREST INDUSTRY —1980-1987 B.C. V Source: Statistics Canada 38 Year Logging Wood Ind. Pulp & Paper totar 1980 24,270 49,708 21,540 95,518 1981 19,561 46,627 20.660 86.848 1982 16.371 40,309 18,458 75,138 1983 19.906 40.392 17.390 77.688 1984 20.586 38.901 17.433 76,920 1985 • 19,468 39.603 16.850 75.921 1986 i 19,848 37,204 17,254 74,306 1987 18,941 42.425 17.662 79,028 Figure 1 B.C. SOFTWOOD LUMBER PRODUCTION (billion board feet) . .Source: S t a t i s t i c s Canada 5 6 7 8 9 80 1 2 3 4 5 6 other employers i n the mass production industries of North America, they, with the encouragement of the p r o v i n c i a l government attempted to renegotiate the labour r e l a t i o n s accord which was now seen as being a source of the c r i s i s . Following the encouraging p o l i c i e s of the p r o v i n c i a l government, by the 1970s the sector was t o t a l l y dominated by large, integrated f o r e s t corporations (Table 2). The Pearse Commission on Forest P o l i c y , i n 1975, had endorsed t h i s process, c a l l i n g f o r a strengthening of the "partnership" between the union and the companies. Even though the union leaders supported t h i s partnership, because i t resulted i n high wages and easier contract negotiation and enforcement, the consequences for the i n d i v i d u a l worker were not so sanguine. As Marchak notes (Marchak, 1983, p. 212), the union leaders based t h e i r analysis on comparisons between contemporary conditions i n the big corporations with conditions p r i o r to union recognition i n the small "cut-and-run" operations. Marchak, however, comparing contemporary conditions between large corporations and smaller firms, found more job v a r i e t y and worker s a t i s f a c t i o n as well as greater job se c u r i t y i n the small firms than i n the larger corporations. Even a f t e r the mass l a y - o f f s of the e a r l y 1980s, the union leaders s t i l l d i d not question the assumed s u p e r i o r i t y of the Fordist corporations. To emphasize the point, when the recession struck, many of these s o - c a l l e d stable, committed corporations b a i l e d out of the sector. The change i n ownership merely s h i f t e d control from B.C.-based corporations to national and i n t e r n a t i o n a l multi-national corporations (Wagner, 40 T a b l e : 2 Trends i n the Concentration of Committed Harvesting Rights Company Group 1975 1980/81 1989 ' 1990 Single largest . 1-3% 11% 14% 17% Four largest 35% 32% 41%; 44% Eight largest. 53% 51% .57% . .62% Twenty largest 74% 77% 79% 86% SOURCE: 1975 - Royal Commission, 1976, Tables B9 & 23 - Includes private land inside TFL's 1980/81 - TSA reports of the MoF - Does not include any private land 1989 - AAC Apportionment, MoF 1990 - AAC Apportionment, MoF N o t e s f o r T a b l e " " T h i s t a b l e i n d i c a t e s the c o n c e n t r a t i o n - o f h a r v e s t i n g r i g h t s i n .. the l a s t 10 t o 15 years. Unfortunately, the 1975 data are s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t i n .that i t i n c l u d e s the s m a l l amount of p r i v a t e land i n s i d e t r e e farm l i c e n c e s . I t i s i n c l u d e d t o show t h a t the e i g h t l a r g e s t holders of h a r v e s t i n g rights- d i d not r e a l l y concentrate f u r t h e r from 1975 t o 1980/81. Comparisons from 1980 t o 1990 are based on s i m i l a r data and are v a l i d i n i n d i c a t i n g the percentage increases dn concentration- shown. In the l a s t 10 years s i g n i f i c a n t c o n c e n t r a t i o n has occurred. Note t h a t i n g e n e r a l the r a t e of c o n c e n t r a t i o n i n c r e a s e d toward the end of the p e r i d d and t h a t there i s a s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e between 1989 and 1990. S o u r c e : - P e e l Commission Report 41 1989). The p r o v i n c i a l government, through example and changes i n the p r o v i n c i a l agencies administering the forest sector, encouraged employers i n the sector to renegotiate r e l a t i o n s with i t s work-force. As part of then-Premier B i l l Bennett's r e s t r a i n t program, over 25% of Forest Service s t a f f were released, weakening the administrative capacity of the province over the f o r e s t . Due to the r e s u l t i n g necessity and encouraged by the governing S o c i a l Credit p r e d i l e c t i o n for " p r i v a t i z a t i o n " of services, the then-Forest Minister Tom Waterland established a program of "sympathetic administration" i n the sector. Stumpage c o l l e c t i o n and supervision were turned over to the forest companies i n the former case and to the forest companies association, the COFI, i n the l a t t e r . Practices such as under-measurement of stumpage and d e l i b e r a t e l y damaging timber and not counting i t for stumpage but using i t none-t h e l e s s became common. High-grading (taking the best logs and leaving the r e s t to r o t ) , poor logging-road maintenance by the logging companies, stream-bed destruction, and inadequate replanting followed (Mahood and Drushka, 1990, pp. 211-5). The r e s u l t of the Socred government r e s t r a i n t program was to prolong the recession i n the province u n t i l the middle of the decade and more importantly provoked massive union and public opposition which was to lead to a change i n the r e l a t i o n s between these groups and the IWA (Allen and Rosenbluth, 1986, p. 120). The f o r e s t industry used t h i s slow period and the w i n d f a l l p r o f i t s r e s u l t i n g from "sympathetic administration" to pay-down debts and to automate i t s m i l l s . They were then able to r i d e the subsequent recovery to unprecedented p r o f i t l e v e l s and record s e t t i n g production volumes with a s u b s t a n t i a l l y reduced work-force. The p o l i c y of s e l f - s u p e r v i s i o n by the industry was, i n hindsight, lamented by the employers. Ross Stryvoke, Senior I n d u s t r i a l Relations Advisor with FIR, admitted that "sympathetic administration" had "reduced the c r e d i b i l i t y of the Forest Service among the B.C. public to zero (Interview, July, 1991)." This p o l i c y , as mentioned above, was part of a broad-based attempt to reduce s o c i a l services and union strength by the p r o v i n c i a l government. The attempt p r e c i p i t a t e d the creation of an a l l i a n c e between organized labour and public i n t e r e s t groups - the S o l i d a r i t y C o a l i t i o n - leading to a planned general s t r i k e . The prominent r o l e of IWA leader Jack Munro i n signing the "Kelowna Accord" which aborted the s t r i k e made the IWA a pariah among both the province's labour unions and the public i n t e r e s t groups which had opposed the Socred p o l i c i e s . This episode undoubtedly increased the antagonism between the IWA and the new groups c r i t i c a l of the sector's p r a c t i c e s . The forest companies, taking the lead from the Socreds, s i m i l a r l y used t h i s period to attempt to break the F o r d i s t labour r e l a t i o n s accord. I r o n i c a l l y , the outcome of t h i s attempt l a i d the groundwork for a new, more cooperative labour r e l a t i o n s system. The IWA, having long since bought into the l o g i c of Fordism had resignedly accepted the l a y - o f f s and the automation of t h e i r m i l l s as necessary to the maintenance of t h e i r employers' competitive v i a b i l i t y . A f t e r a l l , the remaining workers had maintained t h e i r high wages as a r e s u l t of the subsid i z a t i o n of the sector by the taxpayer under "sympathetic administration." The union turned to the government again, t h i s time the federal l e v e l , f o r assistance with labour adjustment r e s u l t i n g from the displacement of t h e i r members. The companies assisted the union i n e s t a b l i s h i n g a f e d e r a l l y funded "labour tracking" program. The two producer groups had long accepted government subsidy of "labour reproduction" through i t s provision of unemployment insurance payments during seasonal and c y c l i c a l downturns. The companies, however, had bigger "labour adjustment" p o l i c i e s on t h e i r c o l l e c t i v e minds. In the contract negotiations of 1986, they demanded concessions from the IWA and the r i g h t to subcontract to non-union firms. The companies, having weakened the union during the downturn, were surprised when the union balked at the demands and struck. The settlement of the four and a half month s t r i k e r e s u l t e d i n a stalemate but, more importantly, won f o r the union the respect of the employers due to the tenacity of the s t r i k e r s . The contentious contracting-out issue was referred to an a r b i t r a t o r and the r e s u l t i n g McKenzie Report established new provisions to protect the employee rather than the p o s i t i o n . Employees displaced by job d e l e t i o n due to technological change were allowed to t r a n s f e r between m i l l s . Sub-contracting requests by employers were r e f e r r e d to j o i n t union-management committees comprised of people not d i r e c t l y a f f e c t e d by the proposal. These committees soon had t h e i r 44 mandates expanded to include other issues which arose during mid-contract which might be i n danger of esca l a t i n g before they could be dealt with during contract negotiations or which were not conducive to contract negotiations. Shortly a f t e r the s t r i k e was s e t t l e d , the second issue which f a c i l i t a t e d more cooperative r e l a t i o n s i n the sector arose i n the form of the 1986 softwood lumber dispute with the U.S. The f a i l u r e of Ottawa or the national forest industry lobby group, the Canadian Forest Industry Council (CFIC), to mount an e f f e c t i v e defence against the U.S. threat to impose a counter-vailing duty on imports of Canadian lumber prompted the B.C.-based COFI and the IWA to send representatives to Washington to lobby Congressional o f f i c i a l s . Their j o i n t e f f o r t s served to highlight to the s e c t o r a l "partners" the importance of cooperative e f f o r t s i n addressing external problems of mutual concern. The t h i r d event which followed gave the union more freedom to create a new r e l a t i o n s h i p with the employers. While D i s t r i c t 1 had been f i g h t i n g against demands for concessions and attempting to counter the e f f e c t s of l a y - o f f s , t h e i r American brothers had not. The American IWA members had accepted demands for concessions and subcontracting, r e s u l t i n g i n the de-unionization of many of t h e i r m i l l s and the gutting of the contracts of those they retained. The Canadian D i s t r i c t , r e j e c t i n g t h i s s u i c i d a l p o l i c y and the in e v i t a b l e destruction of the union, sought and obtained a peaceful d i s a f f i l i a t i o n i n January, 1977. With t h i s new found autonomy, the IWA-CANADA now turned toward the establishment of a more permanent 45 forum for j o i n t policy-making with the employers. In A p r i l , 1988, the Western Wood Products Forum (WWPC), under the co-chairmanship of IWA-Canada President, Jack Munro, and MacMillan Bloedel President and CEO, Ray Smith, was founded (Appendix I I ) . The federally-funded Forum was modelled on the s t e e l sector j o i n t forum, CSTEC, which had also been formed to manage labour displacement and i n d u s t r i a l r e s t r u c t u r i n g as well as to lobby the U.S. Congress against imposing import duties on Canadian s t e e l . With a Board of Directors c o n s i s t i n g of f i v e CEOs from some of the biggest corporations i n the sector and f i v e l o c a l IWA-Canada Presidents, the WWPF was structured to favour the present character of the se.ctor against the pressures of the market, technological change and government p o l i c i e s , domestic and foreign, as well as the approaching challenges of new i n t e r e s t groups. C. The Major External Factors A f f e c t i n g Change i n the Sector. The gradual introduction of a system of "regulation" to complement the p o t e n t i a l of the now dominant mass-production economy served to s t a b i l i z e both labour r e l a t i o n s and the market. The post-war equilibrium between the producers and the market was accomplished by p o l i t i c a l decisions to guarantee a constant, i f d i f f e r e n t i a t e d , r i s e i n c i t i z e n s l i v i n g standards. Now that we have reviewed the general process of change i n the dominant post-war model of i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s as applied to the 46 p a r t i c u l a r conditions of the B.C. s o l i d wood products sector. We w i l l now examine the major factors i n t h i s process as they af f e c t e d the sector, with a view both to the response of the sector to these pressures and the a f f e c t on r e l a t i o n s within the sector and with groups outside the sector. These factors are derived from the general pressures undermining North American Fordism and i t s regulatory regime, refine d to r e f l e c t the conditions of the sector i n question. Therefore, while we w i l l be focusing on the sector, we w i l l also see that the dynamics of the sector r e f l e c t , i n microcosm, the processes occurring across the Canadian and the American economies. F i r s t we w i l l i s o l a t e and examine the factors as they apply to t h i s p a r t i c u l a r manifestation of Fordism. 1. Technological change: Although technological change i n a market-based economy i s seemingly driven by a deterministic positivism, the process of i t s adoption by industry and the determination as to who or what groups benefit from i t s adoption i s subject to human choice (Piore and Sabel, 1984). Ultimately, the impact of technological development varies depending on the influence of the various groups i n industry and t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r r e l a t i o n s h i p and ideology. This was seen during the revolution i n technology i n the 19th century which ushered i n mass production. Frederick Taylor's ideas regarding " s c i e n t i f i c " management of labour and Henry Ford's assembly l i n e perfected the p a r t i c u l a r means by which mass production was to triumph over c r a f t production. Labour input was placed under 47 t i g h t e r management con t r o l , s i m p l i f i e d and disaggregated, reducing worker d i s c r e t i o n over his input and weakening his bargaining p o t e n t i a l . The r e s u l t i n g i n a b i l i t y to increase working c l a s s purchasing power i n tempo with the increase i n production, r e s u l t e d i n the c r i s i s of the 1930s. S i m i l a r l y , the more recent process of automated production, thereby increasing p r o d u c t i v i t y and the p r o f i t s of the innovators, has resulted i n job-loss, further d e s k i l l i n g of labour, and increased supervisory control of the workers, for example among telephone operators. Yet, automation could also increase the control and d i s c r e t i o n a r y power of newly semi-autonomous work-teams as has occurred i n some of the "workshop f a c t o r i e s " i n western Germany and elsewhere i n the West ( i b i d . , pp. 267-8). If the former use of automation were to become the norm during the decline of Fordism, we could be creating the conditions for another 1930s-type c r i s i s . However, the l a t t e r model of production, with a more balanced r e l a t i o n s h i p between management and labour, could help to r e e s t a b l i s h a new s o c i a l equilibrium. In the forest sector, along with the government induced s h i f t i n the structure of ownership following the Sloan Reports i n 1945 and 1956 came the mechanization of both logging and m i l l i n g . As we saw above, the IWA supported t h i s process as they shared i n the p r o d u c t i v i t y benefits through higher wages and safer working conditions. S i m i l a r l y , the IWA, at f i r s t , saw the automation of the sawmills i n the 1980s as leading to a sharing of the b e n e f i t s . However, t h i s was not management's plan, r e s u l t i n g i n the s t r i k e 48 and the new, but unstable, labour accord. It i s unstable because the new technology of automation also gives smaller producers the a b i l i t y to o f f s e t the economies of scale enjoyed by the large corporations through increased f l e x i b i l i t y to not just capture new niche markets but to invade the dimension lumber market long dominated by the majors 1 2. Many of the new, independent m i l l s r e s i s t unionization by the IWA, as i t s mass production-style contractual provisions are seen as being too r i g i d and thus an obstacle to the f l e x i b i l i t y necessary for economic v i a b i l i t y . However, faced with the mushrooming of these new operations and mounting evidence that the majors are planning on e i t h e r following t h i s example or, l i k e Fletcher-Challenge, leaving the sector e n t i r e l y , the IWA has begun experimenting with contracts allowing f l e x i b l e work methods. Supplementary to the master agreements with t h e i r r i g i d job descriptions, authority structures and work schedules, the IWA has signed p l a n t - l e v e l agreements which r e f e r to "team-work, f l e x i b i l i t y and cooperation (Appendix I I I ) . " Encouraging cooperative work methods at the micro-level, however, c a r r i e s with i t the p o t e n t i a l to create d i v i s i o n s between the union centre and the l o c a l union. The new working arrangements are s i m i l a r to those already established i n the pulp and paper m i l l s where l o y a l t y to the l o c a l employer and job s a t i s f a c t i o n has been found to be higher than at the sawmills (Marchak, 1984, pp. 258-66) . Another aspect of new technology and working r e l a t i o n s which may change the r e l a t i o n s h i p between employer and employee and which w i l l require consequential adjustments by both p a r t i e s c e n t r a l associations i s the e f f e c t on workers' s k i l l s and t r a i n i n g requirements. A l l employers representatives interviewed for t h i s t h e s i s noted the higher education and s k i l l - l e v e l s required of employees as numeric co n t r o l l e d machinery i s introduced i n the m i l l s . The knowledge and ongoing t r a i n i n g requirements needed to work i n the team-work si t u a t i o n s w i l l f a l l on the employers. If the i n d i v i d u a l employer pays for t h i s m u l t i - s k i l l i n g / h is investment i n the employee w i l l make the employee more of a " f i x e d " asset akin to his investment i n machinery and, thus, i n order to protect his investment from " p i r a t i n g " by other firms, the employee w i l l need to be made more of a stake-holder i n the firm. However, to avoid t h i s , the employers association together with the union, i f there i s one, and with the f i n a n c i a l assistance of the state, could e s t a b l i s h s e c t o r a l t r a i n i n g schools. In t h i s case, the union and the employers' association would grow c l o s e r through t h e i r mutual concern for t r a i n i n g and the r e s u l t i n g c o r p o r a t i z a t i o n of t h e i r i n t e r e s t s . The resurrection of the s k i l l e d craftsman and the sp e c i a l i z e d production firm w i l l hasten the e c l i p s e of the F o r d i s t model. Which version of the new model, meso-level corporatism or micro-level cooperation, w i l l dominate w i l l depend on the other factors to be investigated. 2. Foreign-regulatory agencies: The Canadian economy has become inc r e a s i n g l y subject to foreign and in t e r n a t i o n a l regulatory authority pressure as trade 50 was l i b e r a l i z e d during the post-war era and, more recently, as Canada entered into b i l a t e r a l trade agreements with the U.S. Highly export-dependent sectors such as the B.C. s o l i d wood products sector are extremely vulnerable to r u l i n g s by off-shore governmental and quasi-governmental bodies over which they have l i t t l e influence. In order both to counter po s s i b l y adverse ru l i n g s by these bodies and to adjust quickly i f t h i s f a i l s , producers groups, with the assistance of domestic state agencies, have been encouraged to form b i p a r t i t e , union/employer associations. This scenario was behind the formation of several s e c t o r a l bodies, including the sector i n question, as we have seen. This type of cooperation shows signs of spreading from the peak-l e v e l down to the p l a n t - l e v e l as c e n t r a l i z e d national F o r d i s t macro-regulatory capacity diminishes. We are aware, due to the recent attention garnered by the recently signed FTA with the U.S., of the growing volume of trade issues being addressed by both foreign national and i n t e r n a t i o n a l agencies which a f f e c t the Canadian economy. This loss of economic sovereignty has been ongoing since the end of World War I I . The post-war l i b e r a l i z a t i o n of trade between developed c a p i t a l i s t nations and the consequent increasing interdependence of national economies has added to the regulatory authority of agencies such as GATT, the diplomatic bargaining of national macro-economic p o l i c y -making by the Group of Seven, and the i n d i r e c t v e t t i n g of national i n d u s t r i a l planning by the IMF and the World Bank. In Canada's case, t h i s process has been compounded by Canada's dependence on 51 trade with the U.S. Thus, the loss of economic sovereignty has been overwhelmingly to the U.S. This process i s relevant to i n d u s t r i a l policy-making and t r i p a r t i t e r e l a t i o n s i n small, open economies such as Canada's. In the case of the softwood sector, t h i s has been e s p e c i a l l y i n f l u e n t i a l i n the shaping of labour r e l a t i o n s . Cooperation i n the sector i n response to foreign pressures and aided by domestic state agencies has taken several forms and i s being i n i t i a t e d at various l e v e l s of the sector. A b r i e f review of some major cases w i l l help reveal concomitant changes i n the structure and i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s of the sector. Furthermore, we w i l l see the changing r o l e of the state i n the economy, i n general, and i n the sector, i n p a r t i c u l a r , as conditions of trade change. During the 1980s, due to the e f f e c t of the economic c r i s e s on various forest r e l a t e d sectors i n the U.S., the B.C. s o l i d wood products sector was often faced with threats to i t s U.S. markets from p r o t e c t i o n i s t state regulatory a u t h o r i t i e s at various l e v e l s of government. Charges by U.S. timber i n t e r e s t s and t h e i r Congressional a l l i e s that Canada was s u b s i d i z i n g the export of dimensional lumber through a r t i f i c i a l l y low p r o v i n c i a l stumpage rates had been dismissed by federal a u t h o r i t i e s i n the e a r l y 1980s, only to resurface again i n 1986. As a r e s u l t Canada had to impose a 15% export tax on lumber destined for the U.S. The IWA, having r e c e n t l y suffered as a r e s u l t of the imposition of a 35% import duty by U.S. a u t h o r i t i e s on B.C. shakes and shingles, had urged negotiation and a voluntary cutback on exports of lumber to the 52 U.S. Many COFI member companies and the p r o v i n c i a l Forest M i n i s t r y had backed t h i s t a c t i c , while the CFIC and the federal government had opposed any negotiation. The adverse outcome, which the IWA had predicted, prompted the federal labour department to urge the IWA and B.C. sec t o r a l employers to cooperate i n monitoring and responding to future threats to t h e i r markets 1 3. The opportunity to implement t h i s type of j o i n t e f f o r t came soon a f t e r , i n 1988, when the plywood sector came under market pressure. Loss of market both domestically and offshore i n the plywood sector due to uncompetitiveness and a l t e r n a t i v e products, as well as U.S. challenges to Canadian standards for plywood use i n r e s i d e n t i a l construction, which resulted i n the favouring of the better q u a l i t y Canadian product over U.S. plywood, threatened the B.C. manufacturers. The IWA and the plywood producers agreed to hi r e an outside consultant, who recommended r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of the sector i n order to bring about a more s p e c i a l i z e d d i v i s i o n of production among the firms. Under recent amendments to federal competition r u l e s , t h i s c a r t e l i z a t i o n of the plywood sector was to be permitted as i t was deemed directed p r i m a r i l y at the export market and would lower production costs to the Canadian construction industry. The project was aborted when a major producer, Fletcher-Challenge, chose to shut down i t s plywood m i l l s instead. Losing a key player, no r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n occurred and shutdowns of other plywood m i l l s continue to t h i s day. This f a i l u r e brings to our attention s t r u c t u r a l impediments to cooperation which w i l l be addressed further on, a f t e r we look at 53 other attempts at sectoral cooperation. Since t h i s f a i l u r e the two producer groups have continued t h e i r e f f o r t s at a less ambitious l e v e l . This has mainly been i n the form of j o i n t marketing missions and e f f o r t s to adjust work-place organization and norms so as to meet changing market conditions. At the sectoral l e v e l , the COFI and the IWA have formed the Cooperative Overseas Market Development Commission to attempt to overcome foreign regulatory obstacles to B.C. exports: for example, the n o n - t a r i f f b a r r i e r s i n the Japanese r e s i d e n t i a l construction industry. At the' p l a n t - l e v e l , Mayo Forest Products has formed a j o i n t (unionized) employee and management committee to tour Japanese markets and to, s u c c e s s f u l l y , persuade the grading a u t h o r i t i e s at the Japanese A g r i c u l t u r a l Standards o f f i c e (JAS) to allow the m i l l to pre-grade lumber destined for Japan. J o i n t committees have also been established at Mayo to f a c i l i t a t e more f l e x i b l e working conditions and employee input so to promote a more rapid response to emerging market opportunities. The COFI has followed Mayo's success by negotiating the r i g h t to set JAS grading standards for other B.C. m i l l s . Threats to the sector's market from foreign regulatory a u t h o r i t i e s under the pretence of environmental concerns have also p r e c i p i t a t e d j o i n t IWA-employer actions. We have seen reports recently of j o i n t sector delegations v i s i t i n g European c a p i t a l s to counter threats from European Green Party l e g i s l a t o r s to block B.C. f o r e s t products exports, as well as the sponsoring of tours by European Parliamentarians of B.C. f o r e s t s . Although encouraged by 54 Canadian federal and p r o v i n c i a l governments, the fact that these i n d u s t r i a l delegations are performing what was formerly a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of national government, that i s protecting national trade, r e f l e c t s the gradual diminishing willingness and capacity of national government to act i n the i n t e r e s t s of export-dependent sectors. This trend, l i k e l y to grow under the constraints of national Canadian f i s c a l c r i s i s , interest-group "overload," and a preoccupation with c o n s t i t u t i o n a l questions, as well as the loss of national sovereignty over economic matters to both national and sub-national a u t h o r i t i e s (this item to be discussed l a t e r under factor #5.), leaves producer groups to take the lead i n protecting markets. Fundamental obstacles to b i p a r t i t e cooperation a r i s e i n consequence of both the i d e o l o g i c a l t r a d i t i o n s m i l i t a t i n g against i n d u s t r i a l cooperation and the s t r u c t u r a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s impeding cooperation. We saw how Fletcher-Challenge sabotaged cooperative e f f o r t s to save the plywood sector. Foreign-based holding companies l i k e t h i s have less of a long-term commitment to any p a r t i c u l a r sector or l o c a t i o n . Furthermore, capital-based corporations, as opposed to credit-based corporations, have pressures which impede long-term s t r a t e g i c planning i n favour of a focus on quarterly performance (Zysman, 1983). Beyond t h i s , there i s l i t t l e t r a d i t i o n i n Canada of i n t e r - f i r m (legal) cooperation as competition laws and our "firm-centred i n d u s t r i a l c u l t u r e " discourage i t . Up u n t i l recent amendments to the Competition Act, " c a r t e l i z a t i o n " i n a sector for r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n or foreign market 55 penetration was i l l e g a l . Business has t r a d i t i o n a l l y been suspect when any interference i n business prerogatives has been proposed. (The BCNI, i n 1976, recommended b i p a r t i t e union-employer cooperation over t r i p a r t i t e cooperation.) Canada's trade unions, h i s t o r i c a l l y more s y n d i c a l i s t i n t h e i r ideologies, have t r a d i t i o n a l l y viewed cooperation with management as company unionism. The debate, subsequent f a i l u r e and continuing c r i t i c i s m of t r i p a r t i s m i n Canada by the l e f t has reinforced these misgivings (Panitch, 1986a, 1986b, 1988.). However, countering t h i s i d e o l o g i c a l legacy and s t r u c t u r a l features which complement i t , i s the l i k e l i h o o d that export dependence and the concomitant t r a n s f e r of regulatory j u r i s d i c t i o n from the nation-state w i l l continue to grow, as w i l l the need to increase producer group cooperation to protect mutual i n t e r e s t s . The ongoing transformation i n the structure, product composition, market focus, and employee and community input into the a c t i v i t y of the sector w i l l impel cooperation throughout the sector. 3. New ideologically-motivated i n t e r e s t groups: The decline of the Fordist model and i t s accompanying regulatory regime has coincided with the growth of new movements which not only challenge the r e l a t i o n s and l o g i c of Fordism but the c e n t r a l i d e o l o g i c a l tenets of Western society and with i t the hegemonic hierarchy which s t a b i l i z e d economic, s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s . The ideals of these movements cannot e a s i l y be incorporated into conventional p o l i t i c a l discourse or the p l u r a l i s t 56 i n t e r e s t group bargaining of l i b e r a l democracy nor can they be accommodated to the dominant p o l i t i c a l , s o c i a l and economic accords. These groups, which include environmentalists, feminists, and native Indians i n B r i t i s h Columbia, have posited and begun to create new s o c i e t a l cleavages which compete with the old c l a s s -based i d e o l o g i c a l models and have, thus, disrupted the assumptions of the Fo r d i s t partners. They view the whole l o g i c and basis of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between union and employer i n the B.C. s o l i d wood products sector as an increasingly antagonistic and anachronistic c o l l a b o r a t i o n i n the continuing domination and exclusion of these groups by these over-privileged partners. The dynamism of these new i d e o l o g i c a l l y motivated groups has, i n the case i n question, thrown the leaders of the two producer groups into a defensive a l l i a n c e . Yet because these new groups arose out of contradictions inherent i n the dominant post-war model of economic production, Fordism, the r e s o l u t i o n of these contradictions w i l l e n t a i l a substantial change i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p of the union and employers i n the B.C s o l i d wood products sector. The structures and r e l a t i o n s which emerge i n consequence must then incorporate the concerns as well as the membership of the new groups. Since the ideals of these groups are so r a d i c a l l y opposed to those of the system they c r i t i q u e - d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n , consensus-based decision-making versus bureaucratic centralism, enhancement of values which are non-market based, non-paternalistic, and non-white empowerment - t h i s process of change i s l i k e l y to be long and d i f f i c u l t , and unpredictable. These developments have brought p r o p o r t i o n a l l y greater pressure on the s o l i d wood sector, as i t i s c e n t r a l to these groups concerns; i n the case of environmentalists and natives, the a c t i v i t i e s of the sector are of primary concern and i n the case of feminists, i t s male-dominated structure and normative operational values are antipathetic to feminists i d e a l s . The concerns of these groups have already begun to gain c r e d i b i l i t y within the f o r e s t policy-making community. Leading figures i n the sector, as well as the recently released Report of the Forest Resources Commission (the Peel Report), acknowledge that control and management of the f o r e s t , and of the industry which uses the resource, must undergo substantive r e s t r u c t u r i n g . Within the sector, the major actors have already begun the process of r e s t r u c t u r i n g , although t h e i r o b s t r u c t i o n i s t public statements appear to b e l i e t h i s . Fletcher-Challenge, the New Zealand-based number two corporation i n the sector, has put most of i t s lumber m i l l s up for sale. MacMillan Bloedel, c o n t r o l l e d by Eastern Canada-based Noranda, number one i n the sector, i s shutting m i l l s along the coast and s e l l i n g o f f some of i t s long-held p r i v a t e tree-farms. The IWA held a conference with B.C. natives groups i n P a r k s v i l l e i n 1988 to discuss the possible impact of native land-claims on the IWA membership. As well there have been established numerous l o c a l community-based groups comprised of natives, environmentalists, the forest companies, l o c a l f o r e s t r y workers, and concerned c i t i z e n s , under p r o v i n c i a l government i n i t i a t i v e , to review forest resource planning. The former stonewalling of the 58 province on the recognition of native-land claims has been modified with the creation of a Native A f f a i r s land-claims review process. Also the province has been forced to set aside some old-growth forests as reserves and parks and has an on-going p r o v i n c i a l forest-use review process. Thus, i n s p i t e of the apparent governmental antipathy to these new groups and the extensive p u b l i c r e l a t i o n s campaign by the forest companies to counter the e f f o r t s of these groups, the increasing public support f o r t h e i r demands has forced change. Attempting to mitigate the consequences f o r the p r o v i n c i a l economy and for i n d i v i d u a l forest companies of the negative p u b l i c i t y r e s u l t i n g from confrontation, the province and the large forest tenure holders have turned de-facto c o n t r o l over some forest lands to Indian bands and l o c a l community boards (Cassidy and Cole, 1988, and Drushka, 1985). The Peel Report, released i n the spring of t h i s year, has made recommendations which would encourage the r e s t r u c t u r i n g of the forest industry so as to encourage smaller, community-based firms c o n t r o l l e d by Indian t r i b e s , cooperatives, or community boards (Executive Summary, 1991, Part 5). As these new firms w i l l be c o n t r o l l e d by those people most immediately dependent on the success of the firm and the preservation of not only a v i a b l e f o r e s t r y but a "wholistic" forest environment, they w i l l l i k e l y show more concern for long-term firm v i a b i l i t y , i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s s t a b i l i t y , and resource-base s u s t a i n a b i l i t y than the multi-nationals that presently dominate the sector. 59 4. Other forest-resource user groups: There are several forest-resource user groups which have long been peri p h e r a l i z e d by the dominant partners i n the sector's F o r d i s t r e l a t i o n s h i p but whose in t e r e s t s have been gaining increasing attention with the emerging c r i s i s of legitimacy i n the operations of the sector. Unlike the i d e o l o g i c a l l y motivated groups, the other user groups are not opposed to fundamental s o c i e t a l norms nor to the present means of e x p l o i t i n g the forest resource but rather are seeking i n c l u s i o n into the F o r d i s t p o l i c y -making process. They are d i s s a t i s f i e d with a system which places t h e i r i n t e r e s t s i n a subordinate p o s i t i o n to those of the dominant partners i n the sector. Their varying i n t e r e s t s place them somewhere i n the middle between the two opposing poles of the i d e o l o g i c a l groups and the F o r d i s t partners. From t h i s middle ground, they form a series of s h i f t i n g s t r a t e g i c a l l i a n c e s among themselves and with some members from the two major opponent groups, depending on the issue and the balance of forces and public opinion. Although the precise nature of the s t r u c t u r a l model and regulatory regime which w i l l emerge from the struggle between the two p o l a r i z e d protagonists i s unclear, the a l t e r n a t i v e user groups are l i k e l y to gain from the expected r e s t r u c t u r i n g of the sector and the expansion of the policy-making network. This conclusion follows not from drawing a Hegelian synthesis from the fundamental co n t r a d i c t i o n but rather from the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the emerging i d e o l o g i c a l consensus among the Fordist partners, government regulators, and various forest commissions and community planning forums. As for the fate of the recently established cooperative mechanisms between the IWA and the large forest firms, the cooperative i d e a l i s l i k e l y to be adopted as a normative value among the more p l u r a l i s t i c forest community. The c e n t r a l i t y of the id e a l i n the debate among both those focusing on the fo r e s t sector and those engaging i n the larger enveloping economic, s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l debates m i l i t a t e s for i t s incorporation i n the new i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s system. The m u l t i p l i c i t y of group i n t e r e s t s i n t h i s fourth category precludes the p o s i t i n g of a si n g l e , i n c l u s i v e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of int e r e s t s and thus a precise estimation of ei t h e r the contours of the struggle i n the sector or the outcome. We w i l l therefore break them into four sub-categories, examining t h e i r i n t e r e s t s , influence and future prospects v i s - a - v i s the forest industry. F i r s t , there are the s o - c a l l e d "independents:" logging contractors, sawmill owners, and value-added or "remanufacturing" firms. Second, are the pulp and paper m i l l s , at present often owned by the integrated corporations but, as the s o l i d wood operations become more problematic, i n c r e a s i n g l y autonomous. Third, are the professional groups i n the sector: foresters, economists and independent consultants. Fourth, are those i n d i r e c t l y dependent on the fo r e s t resource base: the tourism industry, ranchers and farmers, f i s h e r s , and hunters and trappers. The f i r s t group represents the much heralded new paradigm of economic production said to be emerging i n the t w i l i g h t of the mass-production model (Piore and Sabel, 1984; Bowles et a l , 1984). They are small, s p e c i a l i z e d and f l e x i b l e f o r est firms with a more m u l t i - s k i l l e d work-force i n a less h i e r a r c h i c a l and more team-like production process. They also, i n t e r e s t i n g l y , represent both pre-and post-Fordist methods of production and organization. Independent logging contractors and sawmills dominated the sector p r i o r to the advent of the integrated forest firms i n the 1950s. Most are unionized, taking a junior r o l e i n the c e n t r a l i z e d bargaining process, yet maintaining t h e i r own associations as w e l l . The remanufacturers are a newer phenomenon, having grown as a r e s u l t of technological developments and market demands, as well as from new, encouraging regulations from the p r o v i n c i a l Forest M i n i s t r y which, following some of the recommendations of the 1976 Pearse Commission Report, insure greater access to the resource base and provide assistance i n t r a i n i n g and marketing. Already, according to Ross Stryvoke of FIR, most of the large m i l l s formerly found along the lower Fraser River have been replaced by hundreds of these small operations (Interview, July, 1991). The second group, pulp and paper m i l l s , were o r i g i n a l l y s tarted as a cheap and, eventually, p r o f i t a b l e means to eliminate the wood-chip and sawdust "waste" from the s o l i d wood sector operations. They were started by the integrateds but are i n c r e a s i n g l y autonomous from the sawmills both i n ownership and i n access to t h e i r raw resource base. Their use of s o l i d wood waste, "weed" species, and, more recently, recyclable paper as inputs has given the sector a more benign public image. Although t h i s image has been damaged l a t e l y by p u b l i c i t y concerning the harmful environmental e f f e c t s of t h e i r m i l l emissions, the on-going i n s t a l l a t i o n of "closed" e f f l u e n t recovery systems and less harmful pulp bleaching processes should diminish the c r i t i c i s m . The t h i r d group, the forest professionals, lend t h e i r expertise and r e l a t i v e professional o b j e c t i v i t y to the r i s i n g chorus of c r i t i c i s m against the way the forests are being managed and exploited. Although most members of t h i s group r e l y on the integrateds f o r t h e i r incomes, the voices that are heard have exposed the myth of sustained y i e l d f o r e s t r y supposedly guiding the management of the forests since i t s espousal i n the 1945 Sloan Report (Mahood and Drushka, 1989), the waste and misuse of the resource by the integrateds (Drushka, 1985), and the poor return to the p r o v i n c i a l treasury i n rent (the Peel Report, Part 6.). The professionals' recommendations tend to a l i g n them with the i n t e r e s t s of the independents as well as with the new p o l i c y proposals for forest reform of the S o c i a l Credit and New Democratic p a r t i e s . The t h i r d group i s made up of forest resource user groups who are i n d i r e c t l y dependent on a healthy forest base and share a s i m i l a r mixed image i n the public mind. Although t h e i r e x p l o i t a t i o n of the resource base does provoke some negative reactions, tourism, ranching and farming, f i s h i n g , and hunting and trapping do not, even cumulatively, pose a s i m i l a r threat to the v i a b i l i t y of the forest ecology nor do they arouse as great a public outcry. Their increasing importance to the p r o v i n c i a l economy, e i t h e r d i r e c t l y through income or i n d i r e c t l y through, for 63 example, the p o s i t i v e image they portray to p o t e n t i a l immigrant-investors, w i l l increase t h e i r access to the decision-making forums i n the province. The common feature among a l l these groups i s that they provide multi-use models for organization and management of the resource base as an a l t e r n a t i v e to the hegemonic control of the integrated forest firms. Their growing v i s i b i l i t y among the p u b l i c , increasing importance to the p r o v i n c i a l economy, and i n c r e a s i n g l y i n f l u e n t i a l r o l e i n f o r e s t - p o l i c y review processes i s symbolized by the use of the name "Share the Forests" by the " c i t i z e n s " groups fro n t i n g f o r the Fordist partners. Their prominent representation on the Board of the Forest Resources Commission has been r e f l e c t e d i n i t s recommendations 1 4. The increasing access these groups have to state policy-making mechanisms, which i s l i k e l y to tra n s l a t e into t h e i r increased importance i n the forest industry as a whole and the s o l i d wood sector, i n p a r t i c u l a r , as a r e s u l t , impels i n v e s t i g a t i o n into the r o l e of the state i n the sector. Federal and p r o v i n c i a l influence i n the i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s i n the sector has been dealt with i n d i r e c t l y so f a r . We w i l l now turn to the d i r e c t r o l e of the state i n the process. 5. Canadian governmental influence on r e l a t i o n s i n the sector: Although d i r e c t j u r i s d i c t i o n over the operations i n the B.C. s o l i d wood products sector rests with the province, i t was the federal government which has orchestrated peak-level cooperation i n 64 the sector. The p r o v i n c i a l government has, except during b r i e f periods when i t l e g i s l a t e d structure a f f e c t i n g change i n the sector, i . e . following the periodic forest commission reports, been eager to allow the sector actors to p o l i c e t h e i r own r e l a t i o n s . Furthermore, r e i n f o r c i n g t h i s d i s t i n c t i v e d i f f e r e n c e i n approach from that of the federal l e v e l , apart from federal grants to p r o v i n c i a l s i l v i c u l t u r e projects, there has been no j o i n t f e d e r a l / p r o v i n c i a l policy-making i n the sector. Thus, examination of the r o l e of the two governments i n the sector w i l l be separated. In s p i t e of having no s e c t o r a l - s p e c i f i c r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , the federal government has a determining influence on the economic performance of the sector. As both c a p i t a l investment and the c r u c i a l construction sector are dependent on c r e d i t , Ottawa's r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for s e t t i n g i n t e r e s t rates makes i t s monetary p o l i c i e s of primary importance to the sector. Furthermore, through i t s manipulation of exchange rates and i t s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for treaty-making and foreign trade, i t has a d i r e c t influence on the export market of the sector, as we saw during the softwood lumber dispute with the U.S. The federal treasury also subsidizes labour maintenance costs i n the sector through i t s pr o v i s i o n of unemployment insurance during the frequent seasonal and c y c l i c a l periods of employee l a y - o f f s , as well as through i t s t r a i n i n g and r e t r a i n i n g grants. It underwrites input costs by funding f o r e s t replanting programs run by the province which might otherwise have to be funded by the companies eith e r d i r e c t l y , through higher stumpage charges, or through higher p r o v i n c i a l corporate tax rates. 65 The federal government, therefore, has considerable leverage over the sector which only recently, i t has begun to use to manage change i n union/employer r e l a t i o n s . Together with t h i s monetary and f i s c a l leverage, federal a u t h o r i t i e s who deal d i r e c t l y with forest sector actors also enjoy considerable autonomy from sectoral influence. As i t s p o l i c i e s and the responsible departments have m u l t i - s e c t o r a l , trans-national influence and c l i e n t e l e s , they are less vulnerable to "capture" by the B.C. wood-products sector, the way the primary p r o v i n c i a l department has been. Using t h i s leverage and i t s r e l a t i v e autonomy from the sector, i t has the capacity to orchestrate changes i n the r e l a t i o n s of the producer groups which complement i t s national i n d u s t r i a l planning p r i o r i t i e s . In exchange fo r performance enhancing p o l i c i e s and federal largesse, the sector i s more predisposed to federal e f f o r t s to i n i t i a t e cooperative labour r e l a t i o n s . Even though corporate spokesmen object i n p r i n c i p l e to government interference i n t h e i r sector, at l e a s t p u b l i c l y , they know that t h e i r acceptance of Ottawa's hand-outs usually c a r r i e s a small p r i c e . Since the demise of macro-level t r i p a r t i s m i n the 1970s and the switch to s e c t o r a l - l e v e l i n d u s t r i a l planning, and the r e t r e a t from the more i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t p o l i c i e s of the Trudeau era, the federal government has confined i t s " c o r p o r a t i s t " a c t i v i t y to the areas of labour productivity, labour market planning, and s e c t o r a l union/employer cooperation. The t r i p a r t i t e Major Products Task Force programs of the l a t e 1970s and the Canadian Labour Market and 66 P r o d u c t i v i t y Centre, of the mid-1980s have been followed more recently by the encouragement of j o i n t union/employer cooperation i n planning and administering t r a i n i n g and r e t r a i n i n g , and labour displacement programs funded by Labour Canada. This was the impetus for the establishment of the Western Wood Products Forum (WWPF) i n 1988. The main focus of the WWPF has been market planning, i n d u s t r i a l plant re s t r u c t u r i n g , and labour t r a i n i n g and adjustment. I n i t i a l funding for the Forum and f o r a s e c t o r a l conference bringing together IWA and employer representatives from the l o c a l and plant l e v e l , held i n Vancouver i n March, 1991, has been provided by Labour Canada. At present, through the Forum, IWA and MacMillan Bloedel o f f i c i a l s are planning programs to manage the shutdown of two m i l l s i n Port Al b e r n i . It i s doubtful whether the federal l e v e l involvement i n t r i p a r t i s m i n the sector w i l l move from t h i s r e a c t i v e , c r i s i s -induced a c t i v i t y to a more pro-active a n t i c i p a t o r y policy-making a c t i v i t y f o r several reasons. The major levers for structure a l t e r i n g i n i t i a t i v e s remain with the p r o v i n c i a l government l e v e l and, i f anything, j u r i s d i c t i o n a l authority i s l i k e l y to be i n c r e a s i n g l y concentrated there i n consequence of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l reform. Lacking t h i s transformative power, the federal l e v e l must t r y to orchestrate cooperative producer group management of change i n the sector which, since i t i s dominated by a few large, m u l t i -national corporations, i s r e s i s t a n t to government interference and less impelled to i n t e r - f i r m cooperation. The f a i l u r e of the plywood c a r t e l demonstrates t h i s s t r u c t u r a l impediment. Only the 67 province has the a b i l i t y to change the structure of the sector. The p r o v i n c i a l government has used i t s authority to p e r i o d i c a l l y change the structure of the sector yet i n between these bursts of a c t i v i t y i t has been content to l e t the sector govern i t s e l f with the assistance of a "captive" forest bureaucracy. The primary agency responsible for the sector, the M i n i s t r y of Forests, has long been run by industry executives on sa b b a t i c a l . The recent Minister, Dave Parker, was Woodlands Manager fo r Westar Timber. Long-time Deputy Minister, Mike Apsey, i s now head of COFI. These d i r e c t connections are not necessary to insure M i n i s t r y compliance with the wishes of the employers. During the 1950s, the then Forest Minister Robert Sommers was convicted and j a i l e d for accepting a bribe i n return f o r awarding a tree farm l i c e n s e to an American-based forest company. The r e s t r a i n t program of the early 1980s under the then Socred Premier B i l l Bennett, by c u t t i n g Forest Ministry s t a f f and funding, reduced the independent data c o l l e c t i n g and the stumpage monitoring capacity of the Ministry, damaging both the i n t e r e s t s of the p u b l i c i n i t s capacity as landlord, and the industry, which saw i t s public image plummet as i t s unregulated a c t i v i t y despoiled the resource base. Doubtless, t h i s h i s t o r y of government negligence of Crown land and the industry's i r r e s p o n s i b l e use of what has become a f i d u c i a r y p r o p r i e t o r s h i p of the resource has impelled the recommendations of the Peel Commission. In order to lessen p o l i t i c i a n s ' interference, i t proposes creation of a s e l f - f i n a n c i n g Forest Resources 68 Corporation to manage the timber resource under the supervision of a new super-Ministry of Renewable Natural Resources. The super-M i n i s t r y would, hopefully, eliminate the competition, d u p l i c a t i o n and counter-productive a c t i v i t i e s between separate m i n i s t r i e s . The Corporation, with a Board of Directors comprised of representatives from " a l l regions and sectors" of the forest industry, would widen the policy-making network and be mandated to run the forests i n a "business-like" manner i n the i n t e r e s t s of the public landlord. If the recommendations of the Commission are r e f l e c t e d i n new l e g i s l a t i o n , then a change as substantive as that which followed i n the wake of the two Sloan Reports w i l l occur. A broad-based co r p o r a t i z a t i o n of the forest base w i l l have been effecte d . As mentioned, the p r o v i n c i a l government has used i t s j u r i s d i c t i o n a l authority to restructure the sector i n the past i n reaction to larger trends i n economic organization and to accompanying trends i n thinking as to the regulation of that a c t i v i t y . Control of the resource enabled the province to restructure the sector from one dominated by hundreds of small family-owned logging and m i l l i n g firms to the mass-production corporate model then i n vogue i n less than one generation between 1945 and 1960. S i m i l a r l y , i n reaction to the downturn i n the sector during the mid-1970s, the province reformed f o r e s t tenure to recognize the needs of small m i l l i n g operations and the emerging remanufacturers for secure timber supply. Now we have the demands for broad-based, decentralized, p l u r a l i s t i c input i n t o f o r e s t management and for encouragement to the newer value-added producers 69 from the p u b l i c , as r e f l e c t e d i n the Peel Commission Report. Just as enabling l e g i s l a t i o n to transform the sector into the mass-production model followed the Sloan Commission Reports and the reform of tenuring i n the mid-1970s followed the Pearse Commission Report, the Peel Commission should p r e c i p i t a t e government a c t i v i t y . As f o r influencing labour r e l a t i o n s i n the sector, the p r o v i n c i a l government may have fostered cooperation i n s p i t e of i t s int e n t i o n . Although the So c i a l Credit government, i n o f f i c e except during the b r i e f reign of the NDP from 1972 to 1975 continuously from the mid-1950s, has never been sympathetic to unions, i t s labour p o l i c i e s have been most ove r t l y anti-labour only since the recession of 1981-3. As mentioned, the forest companies were encouraged during the period up to the s t r i k e of 1986 to a c t i v e l y attempt to de-unionize the sector by So c i a l Credit r e s t r a i n t p o l i c i e s . The outcome of the s t r i k e resulted i n j o i n t sub-contracting committees. Since the passage of the most recent labour l e g i s l a t i o n , B i l l 19, under the Vander Zalm government, the B.C. union movement has o f f i c i a l l y boycotted the I n d u s t r i a l Relations Council. This has, i n the opinion of both management and union, forced the two to resolve t h e i r differences without p r o v i n c i a l government c o n c i l i a t i o n or a r b i t r a t i o n . In the s o l i d wood products sector, the IWA has r e l i e d on the fo r e s t companies to r e i n i n the more extreme anti-union i n s t i n c t s of the po p u l i s t Socred government for fear of a repeat of the Operation S o l i d a r i t y episode i n 1982. The companies are aware of the IWA a b i l i t y to disrupt the sector and they need the good w i l l of the IWA to mount t h e i r defence of the sector's unpopular f o r e s t r y p r a c t i c e s . Furthermore, the large corporations are wary of r e l y i n g on t h e i r Socred a l l i e s who around e l e c t i o n time are prone to revive t h e i r a n t i - b i g business, i n tandem with t h e i r a n t i - b i g union, r h e t o r i c for p o p u l i s t consumption. The two partners i n Fordism can at l e a s t r e l y on the p r e d i c t a b i l i t y of each other's behaviour and during t h i s period of c r i s i s they need each others support to defend t h e i r precarious s e c t o r a l hegemony. D. The Interdependency of the Factors and t h e i r Reciprocal Relationship with the Sector. Now that we have examined the i n d i v i d u a l impacts of each of the f i v e factors a f f e c t i n g change i n the B.C. s o l i d wood products sector, we w i l l explore how the factors have acted on each other to both transform and reinforce t h e i r impact on the sector. By exploring t h i s dynamic process, we w i l l be more able to make predictions as to the cumulative impact on the major actors i n the sector and the fate of t h e i r recent e f f o r t s at e s t a b l i s h i n g more cooperative labour r e l a t i o n s . From here we w i l l place t h i s process i n the context of the larger decline of Fordism i n North America i n order to discover whether the actors' response to pressures w i l l s u f f e r the fate of the Fordist model or whether i t i s i n t e g r a l to the new model which i s emerging. The answer i s obviously of importance to the leaders and membership of the two dominant partners organizations as well as to those formerly p e r i p h e r a l i z e d by the Fo r d i s t partners. Furthermore, due to the sector's 71 c e n t r a l i t y to the province's economic, p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s , the answer i s of importance to the larger p o l i t y . We saw that technological developments have s t e a d i l y diminished the inherent advantages of Fordism which with other s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l factors allowed i t to act as paradigmatic model f o r most of the 2 0 t h century. Yet technological change, that i s , advances i n both the technology and the technique of production, i s contingent on s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s and s o c i a l need. Fordism i s i n decline not just because of advances i n micro-processing and numeric control but because of market changes, s h i f t s i n the hierarchy of national economies, and developments i n the s o c i a l structure and normative demands of peoples. Thus are brought into the technological equation demographic and socio-economic changes, new i d e a l s , the l i b e r a l i z a t i o n of trade and s h i f t s i n regulatory authority, and the simultaneous i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n and l o c a l i z a t i o n of p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y . Technological change i s inc r e a s i n g l y impelled by advances among competitors outside the once protected national markets and regulatory regimes of the nation-state. As U.S. hegemony declined and with i t market sec u r i t y , American and, by extension, Canadian i n d u s t r i a l sectors l o s t t h e i r homogeneous character. International competition has reintroduced pressures to innovate i n technology and i n labour r e l a t i o n s . As we have seen, these new employees' c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s w i l l bring about a changed r e l a t i o n s h i p with the firm and with t h e i r c o l l e c t i v e bargaining a s s o c i a t i o n . Q u a l i t a t i v e l y advanced c o l l e c t i v e demands w i l l force the firm to recognize the employee as a "stakeholder," i n the former case, and t h e i r union must adapt i t s structure to r e f l e c t r e s u l t i n g employee s h i f t s i n consciousness to the firm l e v e l and the more "professional" concerns of the post-Fordist workers. Like t h e i r public-sector counterparts during the 1960s and 1970s and the Ford i s t unions during t h e i r formative years, the new unionists are more l i k e l y to voice the progressive concerns of the contemporary pu b l i c . Enjoying the "low-cost" p o l i t i c a l pressure-group advantages of unions but not yet possessing the s t r u c t u r a l s e c u r i t y of the For d i s t unions during t h e i r heyday, the new union vanguard w i l l , l i k e t h e i r predecessors, use the p o l i t i c a l forum to secure t h e i r status and, i n consequence, transform the p o l i t i c a l debate. Unless unions such as the IWA can move with the workers both o r g a n i z a t i o n a l l y and i d e o l o g i c a l l y , they w i l l go the way of the Ford i s t model from which they originated. We have seen how in t e r n a t i o n a l trade l i b e r a l i z a t i o n , whether among blocs or g l o b a l l y , and the concurrent loss of national economic and, hence, p o l i t i c a l sovereignty, has affe c t e d the s o l i d wood products sector's structure and labour r e l a t i o n s . This has increased the pace of i n d u s t r i a l innovation as competition and imi t a t i o n follow i n the wake of trade l i b e r a l i z a t i o n . I n t e r n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n has also increased trans-national linkages between like-minded new ideologically-motivated groups. "Think g l o b a l l y , act l o c a l l y " r e f l e c t s t h i s tendency i n forming i n t e r n a t i o n a l a l l i a n c e s i n support of l o c a l a c t i v i t i e s . Local representatives of the new i d e o l o g i c a l groups and the other f o r e s t user groups have found common cause i n the demand for increasing l o c a l community control over forest p o l i c y . Diminished national control over macro-economic policy-making has s h i f t e d the i n i t i a t i v e to the sectoral and sub-national l e v e l . A c o i n c i d e n t a l desire for d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of control over the f o r e s t sector by the above i n t e r e s t groups and an increasingly able p r o v i n c i a l administration should r e s u l t i n increased attention to the f o r e s t sector i n p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c s i n consequence of i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n . The new ideologically-motivated movements are perhaps the most i n f l u e n t i a l and dynamic force a f f e c t i n g our s o c i e t i e s at t h i s time and t h e i r long-term impact i s the most problematic. Their concerns transcend those of the Fordist actors and t h e i r ideals c o n f l i c t with those underpinning the development of Western economies. While s i m i l a r previous Utopian proposals of such v i s i o n a r i e s as Rousseau, Proudhon and Thoreau were swept aside by the hegemonic appeal of i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n , today i n d u s t r i a l and p o l i t i c a l leaders, despite t h e i r obvious opportunism, pay l i p - s e r v i c e to the ideals of those who seek to ultimately, topple the whole system. They lack a confidence i n s p i r i n g b e l i e f i n the fundamental id e a l s of patriarchy, individualism, materialism and hierarchy which have driven Western c i v i l i z a t i o n and they have no a l t e r n a t i v e able to capture the public imagination. The m i l l e n n i a l character of the new idealism, transcending the formerly "primary" c l a s s c o n t r a d i c t i o n of Western developed s o c i e t i e s , i s attested to by the simultaneous e c l i p s e of both the Soviet Union and the United States 74 as the two a l t e r n a t i v e models of t h i s century. As we have seen, the new group concerns, r e f l e c t e d i n demands fo r w h o l i s t i c management of the forest, i s p r e c i p i t a t i n g a l l i a n c e s challenging the exclusionary practices of the p r o v i n c i a l policy-makers and seeking to transfer a u t h o r i t a t i v e decision-making power from the state to society. The c r i s i s i n the Fordist model i n the s o l i d wood sector has served to broaden the policy-making network to include the other fo r e s t user groups i n the policy-making community. These p l u r a l i s m inducing actors w i l l introduce q u a l i t i e s such as f l e x i b i l i t y and competitiveness which w i l l mitigate the t r a d i t i o n a l boom-bust v u l n e r a b i l i t y of the sector, the concession extracting power of the F o r d i s t partners over the province, and the threat of sector-wide foreign-based export penalizing enactments. Resistance by the F o r d i s t partners to t h i s adaptive process w i l l only serve to d i s s i p a t e any l i n g e r i n g sympathy for t h e i r p l i g h t as t h e i r structure declines. Many of those woodworkers displaced during the 1980s undoubtedly found employment among the new user groups. While they l o s t the s e c u r i t y and high wages of the F o r d i s t structure, the need to be m u l t i - s k i l l e d and f l e x i b l e i n the marketplace has enhanced t h e i r organizational and bargaining leverage as the new firms f o r which they work grow i n importance i n the sector while the integrateds continue t h e i r decline. Market d i v e r s i t y 1 5 and non-r e l i a n c e on input subsidizing stumpage s e t t i n g leaves the sector le s s open to the erection of offshore protective trade b a r r i e r s . Contrary to the over-privileged image of the F o r d i s t partners, the new user groups possess c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s more conducive to public and, hence, p o l i t i c a l party promotion. The small business and community enhancing recommendations of the Peel Report have found favour i n the public statements of both major p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s . The fortuitous release of the Report just p r i o r to the expected p r o v i n c i a l e l e c t i o n , due to i t s b i - p a r t i s a n support, should further the chances that forest p o l i c y changes a f t e r the e l e c t i o n w i l l r e f l e c t the goals of the Report. The c r i s i s i n the Fordist structure of the s o l i d wood sector has undermined the long-held assumptions of the class-based e l e c t o r a l p o l i t i c s of B.C. The NDP has attempted to balance the demands of t h e i r long-time a l l i e s i n the IWA leadership with the concerns of the c r i t i c s of the F o r d i s t partnership. NDP w a f f l i n g , seen by the former as treachery, has been met with public questioning by IWA leaders of t h e i r e l e c t o r a l endorsement of the NDP. However, the party no doubt recognizes the growing i d e o l o g i c a l and e l e c t o r a l clout of the new groups and the continuing i s o l a t i o n of the IWA following Jack Munro's r o l e i n the Kelowna Accord, his loss of the B.C. Federation of Labour Vice-Presidency p o s i t i o n following t h i s event, and the subsequent r o l e of many a c t i v i s t s from the S o l i d a r i t y C o a l i t i o n i n the new groups c r i t i c i z i n g the Fordist structures 1 6. Munro's public statements, although often l a t e r dismissed as being o f f - t h e - c u f f , should not be seen as being u n r e f l e c t i v e of his s h i f t i n g union p o l i c y . Questioning t h e i r e l e c t o r a l a l l i a n c e with the NDP surely signals to IWA members that they would be j u s t i f i e d i n voting against t h e i r old a l l i e s . Subsequent public feuding with NDP members of the Legislature and of Parliament has rei n f o r c e d t h i s s p l i t (New Directions magazine, July, 1991, pp. 12-7) . The NDP have probably weighed the consequences of winning the environmental, native and other user-groups' e l e c t o r a l support against l o s i n g the public endorsement of the IWA leadership. Nationally, the NDP has been more supportive, t r a d i t i o n a l l y , of environmental concerns and of native land claims negotiations. As the party's vote i s f a i r l y strong i n forest-based communities, they probably see negative long-term consequences for t h i s constituency of a f a i l u r e to increase employment opportunities i n these communities through forest economic d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n . The climax of t h i s process w i l l surely come i f Jack Munro resigns, as expected, from the IWA Presidency to head the industry-funded lobby group, the B.C. Forest A l l i a n c e , established by the notorious p u b l i c r e l a t i o n s firm Burton-Marstellar Limited 1 7. 77 IV. CONCLUSION: THE PROSPECTS FOR COOPERATIVE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN THE B.C. SOLID WOOD PRODUCTS SECTOR. We have seen that the major factors a f f e c t i n g change i n the structure and i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s of the sector i n question have created a c r i s i s atmosphere impelling cooperation between the IWA and the large corporations, on the one hand, and between these two and the federal state, on the other hand. The factors have acted on each other and i n a r e c i p r o c a l way with the leading agents i n the sector to shape a l l i a n c e s and ideologies determining the future course of the sector. These factors are, i n turn, derived from and representative of broader changes occurring i n the economies of the developed world, yet possessing p e c u l i a r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s r e f l e c t i v e of the conditions of the sector. As the sector changes i n response to these factors and establishes new working patterns and i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s , i t s central importance to the province w i l l r e s u l t i n i t i n f l u e n c i n g the economy and p o l i t i c s of the province. I n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s i n c a p i t a l i s t democracies have revolved around the attempt to peacefully resolve the c o n f l i c t s a r i s i n g from d i v i s i o n s between owners and workers and shaped by the structure of industry. The i n s t i t u t i o n s , mechanisms and norms of behaviour which have expanded the meaning and scope of democracy from the p o l i t i c a l realm to the s o c i a l and, at l e a s t i n theory, the economic realm have resulted from t h i s channelling of the dynamics of c l a s s c o n f l i c t s into the p o l i t i c a l sphere. Thus, states have evolved, out of the immediate economic struggle, governing i n s t i t u t i o n s 78 which recognize and include the demands of the organized working class i n t h e i r regulation of s o c i a l consensus underpinning the economy. The means of incorporating the organized representation of the working c l a s s into the policy-making mechanisms of the c a p i t a l i s t economies has varied between states, depending on t h e i r p e c u l i a r economic, p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l legacies. Students of t h i s process have unravelled the connections between the features of states and the regulatory regimes which they have adopted. N a t i o n a l - l e v e l government, peak business and union associations f i r s t met to bargain over macro-economic p o l i c i e s i n response to a perceived c r i s i s i n the nation. This t r i p a r t i s m coincided with the r i s e of large corporations and i n d u s t r i a l unions and was f i r s t attempted i n Europe during war emergencies or on the eve of i n s u r r e c t i o n (Gerald Feldman, 1981, and P h i l l i p p e Schmitter, 1974). As the i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n of peak l e v e l bargaining, corporatism, was f i r s t associated with e i t h e r counter-revolutionary social-democracy and cooptation or with Fascism during the interwar years, i t was denigrated by both Marxists and l i b e r a l democrats. However, despite t h i s i t became the preferred means of regulating c a p i t a l i s m i n most s o c i a l democracies i n the post WW II era, e s p e c i a l l y i n Western Europe. In non-social democratic states, t r i p a r t i t e bargaining was not i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d , notably i n the Anglo-American states. Nevertheless, Keynesian macro-regulation of demand and of economic growth, Fordist l i n k i n g of wages and p r o d u c t i v i t y growth, and the promotion of ( s t r u c t u r a l l y ) f u l l employment were adopted to 79 varying degrees by a l l developed c a p i t a l i s t democracies i n order to incorporate the demands of organized labour. The c r i s i s of the 1930s and the War which followed had c l a r i f i e d among democratic governments the r e l a t i o n s h i p between Fo r d i s t mass production and macro-regulation of the d i s t r i b u t i o n of i t s growing, seemingly unlimited, p o t e n t i a l . Canada, l i k e the other Anglo-American developed economies, chose to regulate i t s economy through i n c l u s i v e income maintenance programs and l e g a l l y regulated private c o l l e c t i v e bargaining regimes. This d i v i s i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n the Anglo-American t r a d i t i o n , between the state as f i s c a l and monetary regulator and industry as micro-input and -output regulator worked to maintain r e l a t i v e increases i n income, based on what John Rawls termed "the dif f e r e n c e p r i n c i p l e , " u n t i l the s t a g f l a t i o n of the 1970s. In desperation, the federal government, as d i d other non-corporatist states, attempted to obtain voluntary r e s t r a i n t from business and unions to restore the quickly d i s i n t e g r a t i n g F o r d i s t accord. Their f a i l u r e to e s t a b l i s h t r i p a r t i s m has been a t t r i b u t e d to a number of conditional obstacles including the external basis of much i n f l a t i o n , the absence of a u t h o r i t a t i v e peak producer group association and state structures, and the lack of t r u s t among the three p a r t i e s , e s p e c i a l l y labour. However, the model which impelled i t s attempt, national t r i p a r t i s m , as i t was meant to r e s t a b i l i z e Fordism, i s a model whose time has l i k e l y passed. The same forces which undermined Fordism, i n Canada, would s i m i l a r l y have undermined t r i p a r t i s m i f i t had been established i n 80 the mid-1970s. Since then, technological change and market forces have been most advantageous to new industries outside the o l d F o r d i s t structures. As Peter Swensen's comparative study demonstrated i n the case of Sweden and Denmark, national economies less dependent on F o r d i s t industries arid bargaining structures and instead r e t a i n i n g more craft-type structures, l i k e Denmark, are better able to weather the i n t e r n a t i o n a l c r i s i s of Fordism unlike the Fordist states l i k e Sweden or, i n t h i s case, Canada. Canada's lack of economic sovereignty, termed "permeable Fordism" (Jenson, 1990), would undermine the a b i l i t y of the t r i p a r t i t e peak bargainers to manage macro-economic s t a b i l i t y . The groups outside the F o r d i s t structures would have rebelled against any attempt by government to perpetuate t h e i r exclusion under t r i p a r t i s m . L a s t l y , never having had a national s o c i a l democratic government e i t h e r to promote union d e n s i f i c a t i o n or to l e g i t i m i z e organized labour partnership i n national governance and with l i t t l e l i k e l i h o o d of t h i s occurring i n a country divided more by t e r r i t o r i a l than c l a s s cleavages and lacking the structures and t r a d i t i o n s of consensual p o l i t i c s , t r i p a r t i s m i s even less v i a b l e now than i t was during the heyday of Fordism. The continuing c r i s i s i n Fordism has been accompanied by the decline of Keynesian-inspired national c o u n t e r - c y c l i c a l f i s c a l and monetary adjustment (Piore and Sabel, 1984; and A l a i n L i p i e t z , 1984, 1985). National t r i p a r t i t e bargaining was premised on the willingness and a b i l i t y of the central government to use macro-controls to reward union/employer cooperation on wage and p r i c e 81 r e s t r a i n t . The f a i l u r e during the 1970s of federal governments to obtain union acceptance of wage r e s t r a i n t i n return f o r f u l l employment i s often explained as r e s u l t i n g from i n f l a t i o n a r y pressures (Berghahn and Karsten, 1987, on German Koncertation; and Panitch, 1986, on Canadian t r i p a r t i s m ) . However, the f r a c t u r i n g of peak-level bargaining i n Sweden during a period of comparatively low i n f l a t i o n i n the early 1980s (Esping-Andersen, 1985; and Swensen, 1989) indicates that the preconditions f o r macro-corporatism are evaporating with Fordism's decline. The recent decisions of Sweden and Austria, the paragons of macro-corporatism, to apply f o r membership i n the European Community, as i t e n t a i l s a p a r t i a l surrender of the tools of national macro-economic planning, reinforces t h i s pessimism. In place of macro-corporatism, many states have switched t h e i r attention to the s e c t o r a l l e v e l as a more promising area of state economic intervention (Cawson, 1985). This i n d u s t r i a l p o l i c y -making strategy appears to be e s p e c i a l l y suited to f e d e r a l i s t states l i k e Canada (Atkinson and Coleman, 1985,, 1989; Coleman, 1985; Coleman and Jacek, 1989). As was the case with macro-corporatism, there i s disagreement as to the meaning and the structures of meso-corporatism. It has been used to r e f e r to se c t o r a l bargaining (Cawson, 1985; Atkinson and Coleman, 1989) and to regional bargaining (Grant, 1985; Coleman and Jacek, 1989). Some observers require the i n c l u s i o n of two or more contending p a r t i e s bargaining with the state (Atkinson and Coleman, 1989), others only one industry representative (Cawson, 1986; Grant, 82 1985). The term i s also used to describe state/industry bargaining whether labour union representation i s included or not. The v a r i a t i o n between sectors within sing l e states, explains t h i s d i v e r s i t y of usage of the term unlike the case with macro-corporatism. As mentioned, Canada appears to be p a r t i c u l a r l y suited to meso-corporatism. Business and labour are organized i n f e d e r a l i s t structures p a r a l l e l i n g government c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d i v i s i o n s of j u r i s d i c t i o n . More importantly, s e c t o r a l associations are more act i v e , i n c l u s i v e and a u t h o r i t a t i v e than c r o s s - s e c t o r a l associations among both business and labour. Up u n t i l recently, with one exception, a l l meso-corporatist structures i n Canada excluded unions. Only i n the Quebec construction industry where the f r a c t i o u s c r a f t unions were compelled by the p r o v i n c i a l government to j o i n i n c l u s i v e , a u t h o r i t a t i v e c o l l e c t i v e bargaining structures were unions included. The best examples of meso-corporatism i n Canada are found i n the numerous a g r i c u l t u r a l marketing boards where unions are not prominent actors. Other se c t o r a l business/government a s s o c i a t i o n a l networks which f a l l short of the c o r p o r a t i s t d e f i n i t i o n exclude unions from bargaining as w e l l , even where the work-force i s organized (Atkinson and Coleman, 1989). Recent developments have challenged t h i s pattern. Labour Canada's e f f o r t s to e s t a b l i s h union/management s e c t o r a l forums are the f i r s t sign of the voluntary i n c l u s i o n of organized labour i n meso-corporatist policy-making networks. Owing to the t e n t a t i v e , modest mature of t h i s assemblage of diverse sectors, no 83 attempt can be made to draw general conclusions to be applied to the sector i n question. However, since our focus i s on union involvement i n cooperative r e l a t i o n s t h i s development i s notable. From our look at the conditions e f f e c t i n g r e l a t i o n s i n the B.C. s o l i d wood products sector and drawing from the information we have just reviewed and the experience of the sector i n question with F o r d i s t cooperation, we can draw some conclusions as to the future of t h i s cooperation. As peak-level cooperation between the federal government, the IWA and the integrated forest corporations has been i n response to a perceived c r i s i s i n the structure and management of the sector and the sector i s i n the midst of dramatic transformation, t h i s present structure of cooperation w i l l be of l i m i t e d duration. However, the prospects for a d i f f e r e n t form of cooperation appear more p o s i t i v e . From a review of the l i t e r a t u r e on the subject i t can be stated that the following conditions favour the long-term success of meso-corporatist bargaining, however between a much more encompassing group of actors: long-term economic v i a b i l i t y of the sector; i n c l u s i v e business and labour associations; regional concentration of p r i m a r i l y small and medium-sized firms; domestic control of firms i n the sector; the need for marketing associations eit h e r to protect the domestic market from foreign penetration or to aid small producers to penetrate foreign markets; and the p o l i t i c a l capacity and commitment to negotiate with producer groups. T r i p a r t i t e cooperation i s tenuous and l i m i t e d i f b e l i e f i n s e c t o r a l v i a b i l i t y i s missing. This precondition i s undermined by 84 the crisis-management nature of federal government i n i t i a t i v e s and the apparent s t r a t e g i c retreat from the sector being undertaken by Fletcher-Challenge and MacMillan Bloedel. The unionized work-force, lacking comparable mobility, has persuaded the integrateds to engage i n a defensive pact against the groups they perceive to be undermining sectoral v i a b i l i t y . However, a restructured, d i v e r s i f i e d and broader-based forest industry could restore dynamism to the sector. The Peel Commission proposal f o r a p u b l i c l y c o n t r o l l e d Forest Resources Corporation contains features of c o r p o r a t i s t policy-making by an expanded network of for e s t users. The long t r a d i t i o n of i n c l u s i v e , monopolistic representation of workers and of employers has made possible the exceptional c e n t r a l i t y of c o l l e c t i v e bargaining and, more rec e n t l y , the operation of the Western Wood Products Forum. However, owing to various reasons explored, the Forum has not developed a permanent membership nor permanent i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d r e l a t i o n s with the federal or p r o v i n c i a l a u t h o r i t i e s . However, the s t r u c t u r a l features of the future sector, once s t a b i l i z e d , should enhance a s s o c i a t i o n a l inclusiveness. Firm usage of the as s o c i a t i o n to communicate with the state, other firms and t h e i r employees or employee representatives, w i l l grow i n consequence of r e l a t e d changes i n the sector, the economy and the market. Concentration of the firms i n the sector i n one region i s conducive to i n t e r - f i r m communication and i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . Furthermore, an association l i m i t e d to B.C. firms, as are the 85 present s e c t o r a l associations, avoids p o l i t i c a l d i v i s i o n s among m u l t i - j u r i s d i c t i o n a l associations. The new value-added firms which are becoming increasingly prominent i n the sector w i l l need to form r e l a t i o n s with each other, the larger multi-national firms or state agencies to f a c i l i t a t e research or market development. Furthermore t r a i n i n g requirements and the fear of p i r a t i n g w i l l increase the need for a s s o c i a t i o n a l cooperation and bargaining with state agencies. Local ownership or control of firms increases the commitment of a l l p a r t i e s to the economic success of the sector whereas non-l o c a l c o n t r o l l e d firms are less rooted i n any p a r t i c u l a r sector or region and therefore less i n c l i n e d to form l a s t i n g s e c t o r a l a l l i a n c e s s e n s i t i v e to community or government i n t e r e s t s . Firms s u c c e s s f u l l y competing i n foreign markets are less l i k e l y to recognize the benefits of association with other firms or to seek state or union assistance i n penetrating foreign markets. As we saw e a r l i e r , only the threat of U.S. Congressional blockage of Canadian imports i n 1986, prompted t r i p a r t i t e correspondence i n the sector to counter the threat. However on going market-enhancing cooperation by multi-national firms i s u n l i k e l y once the c r i s i s passes. Increasing competition from foreign producers, a s h i f t to value-added products, and a down-sizing of average firm s i z e should counter t h i s go-it-alone s t y l e . A c r i t i c a l ingredient missing from the recent attempt at cooperation has been p r o v i n c i a l government capacity and commitment to negotiate with producer groups i n the sector. Capacity would be L 86 enhanced i f t o t a l j u r i s d i c t i o n over forest resources were concentrated i n a single super-Ministry and control over the timber resource were transferred to a semi-autonomous crown corporation, as recommended i n the Peel Report. The present Forest M i n i s t r y lacks the authority and the autonomy to develop long-term p o l i c y . P o l i t i c a l interference and a high s t a f f turnover rate at the top l e v e l of the Forest M i n i s t r y prompted the remedial recommendations of the Commissioners. In conclusion, the present meso-level corporatism appears to be an intermediary stage between the old stable F o r d i s t model and the restructured model i n the process of formation. The two producers groups dominating the sector are i n c r e a s i n g l y using t h e i r cooperation to cope with c r i s i s . The integrateds w i l l l i k e l y t r a n s f e r attention to pulp and paper or t h e i r parent firms w i l l move c a p i t a l out of the industry e n t i r e l y . The IWA w i l l continue to organize workers i n the new m i l l s and the remanufacturing plants as well as workers outside of the sector altogether, i n order to maintain i t s numbers. The big firms and the IWA w i l l seek the a i d of the state i n managing the closures of outdated or resource depleted m i l l s . They w i l l cooperate to block attempts to stop t h e i r desperate e f f o r t s to log the l a s t of the old growth forests before a change i n government. The bitterness t h i s w i l l leave among both the c r i t i c s and the general public w i l l hasten the increase i n the demands to end the hegemony of the perpetrators. In the new p l u r a l i s t network which w i l l emerge i n the restructured forest, the IWA and the remaining large firms w i l l 87 have to share the policy-making table with those groups formerly marginalized, by them. They w i l l e i t h e r have learned to adjust or they w i l l go under. It i s a sad irony that the formerly unorganized and exploited i n d u s t r i a l woodworkers who prompted the reforms of the 1930s and the 1940s and who subsequently would replace the old c r a f t unions as the new labour vanguard w i l l , i n turn, be replaced by a new, s k i l l e d work-force r e f l e c t i n g many of the ideals of the old c r a f t workers. The new r i s i n g s t a r i n the i n d u s t r i a l labour movement w i l l , l i k e t h e i r p u b lic sector counterparts, demand not only more control over t h e i r work-places but a say i n the control of the firm i t s e l f . As the leading figures i n the old Fordist structures acknowledge, many of the new firms w i l l be employee or community owned and c o n t r o l l e d . In t h i s case associations of cooperative owners may become a new synthesis of both the labour movement and the i n d u s t r i a l a s s o c i a t i o n . It i s disconcerting to watch the IWA leadership and t h e i r confused membership f i g h t i n g t h i s process of change by climbing into the pocket of t h e i r employers who have t h e i r eye on the e x i t . However, the c r a f t unions i n the 1920s and 1930s resorted to s i m i l a r reactionary t a c t i c s to prevent the independent organization of the new i n d u s t r i a l unions. Like them, the present "dinosaurs" of organized labour may have to be pushed aside for the sake of the new model of the next century. 88 Notes: 1 P a t r i c i a Marchak, 1983, noted a trend toward an increasing divergence of i n t e r e s t and more c o n f l i c t between labour and t h e i r employers and governments, during the 1970s. 2 The period of decline varies from country to country. In Canada, the period of s t a g f l a t i o n , during the 1970s, i s generally acknowledged as the beginning of the period ( see Gonick, 1987. ) 3 See Piore and Sabel, 1984, pp. 44-50, regarding the " i n d u s t r i a l d i v i d e s " and the "branching points" and the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of these periods for human choice. 4 See A g l i e t t a , 1976, and L i p i e t z , 1979, f o r a Marxian economic explanation of "regulation" or Piore and Sabel, i b i d . , f o r a non-Marxian explanation. 5 See Atkinson and Coleman, 1989, p. 184, regarding the absence of a pattern i n the i n d u s t r i a l policy-making a c t i v i t y of the federal government. 6 P a t r i c i a Marchak, 1983 and 1986, argues that the c e n t r a l i t y of the sector to the province has played a determining r o l e i n the continuing economic p e r i p h e r a l i z a t i o n and underdevelopment of the B.C. economy. As t h i s c e n t r a l i t y continues, i t must be factored into our analyses of the impact of the changes i n the sector on the province. 7 See A. Pizzorno, 1981, regarding the r o l e of these type of per i p h e r a l i z e d groups i n the s t r i k e s and upheaval during the l a t e 1960s i n Western Europe. 8 Piore and Sabel, 1984, discuss "regulation" s p e c i f i c a l l y on pp. 4-16 and Fordism on p. 20, and both throughout the book. A Marxian economics explanation of the terms can be found i n A g l i e t t a , 1979, and L i p i e t z , 1984, 1985. 9 Samuel Bowles et. a l . , 1984, trace the u n r a v e l l i n g of the national and i n t e r n a t i o n a l accords which underpinned the success of the post-war U. S. economy. 1 0 I r e f e r to the r e l a t i v e advantage gained by such competitors as Japan and western Germany due to t h e i r pursuit of i n d u s t r i a l p o l i c i e s which were less r e l i a n t on imported o i l . See Richard J . Samuels. The Business of the Japanese State: Energy Markets i n  Comparative and H i s t o r i c a l Perspective. Ithaca: C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1987; and Berghahn and Karsten, 1987. 1 1 The term "policy-making community" i s taken from Atkinson and Coleman, 1989, who used i t to r e f e r to a l l groups and i n d i v i d u a l s who are concerned and affected by p o l i c i e s changes i n an i n d u s t r i a l sector but are not necessarily included i n the policy-making process, which describes the "policy-making network." 1 2 Mayo Forest Products, i n Nanaimo, owned j o i n t l y by Canadian P a c i f i c Forest Products Limited and Mitsubishi Corporation of Japan, i s an example of t h i s ; see the F i n a n c i a l Times, June 10, 1991, p 17. 1 3 This i s the opinion of both P h i l i p Legg of the IWA and Ross Stryvoke of FIR who organized the WWPF; interviews i n 1990 and 1991. 1 4 See The Future of Our Forests: Volume 11, Biographies of the Commissioners, for t h i s conclusion. 1 5 Ross Stryvoke of FIR claims that during the 1980s, the dimensional lumber manufacturers have switched from dependence on the U.S. market to dependence on the Japanese market; Interview, July, 1991; see Appendix IV. 1 6 See Munro and McCarthy, 1989, p.p. 140-3 for Munro's evaluation of t h i s incident. 1 7 This was the public r e l a t i o n s firm for the Argentinean junta responsible f o r the mass "disappearances" during the 1970s and f o r Union Carbide following the Bhopal, India d i s a s t e r . 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C , 1935-85: Reflections on a Barren P o l i t i c a l Debate." B r i t i s h Columbia Studies. 76:3-32 (1987-8). . "Wilderness P o l i t i c s i n B. C : The Business Dominated State and the Containment of Environmentalism." i n P o l i c y  Communities and Public P o l i c y i n Canada: A S t r u c t u r a l  Approach. Edited by William Coleman and Grace Skogstad. Toronto: Copp, Clark and Pitman, 1989. Windmuller, John P.; Gladstone, Alan., eds. Employers Associations and I n d u s t r i a l Associations: A Comparative  Study. Oxford: Clarendon, 1984. Wood, W. D. The Current I n d u s t r i a l Relations Scene i n Canada: 1976. Kingston: I n d u s t r i a l Relations Centre, 1976. Zysman, John. Governments, Markets, and Growth. Ithaca: C o r n e l l 98 Uni v e r s i t y Press, 1983. Private Interviews: Cameron, Gordon: Executive Director, Western Wood Products Forum. Vancouver, November, 1990. Getzie, Tom: Senior I n d u s t r i a l Relations Advisor, Forest I n d u s t r i a l Relations (FIR). Vancouver, November, 1990. Hadju, Csaba: Director of Research, FIR. Vancouver, November, 1990. James, Trevor: Director of Human Resources, Fletcher-Challenge Canada. Vancouver, June 27, 1991. Johncox, Gary: Vice-President, Human Resources, MacMillan Bloedel Limited. Vancouver, July 8, 1991. Legg, P h i l i p : Assistant Research Director, IWA-Canada. Vancouver, November, 1990 and July, 1991. Perry, Clay: L e g i s l a t i v e Director, IWA-Canada. Vancouver, J u l y 3, 1991. Stanyer, Roger: 4th National Vice-President, IWA-Canada. Vancouver, June 24, 1991. Stryvoke, Ross: Senior Economist, FIR. Vancouver, July, 1991. 99 APPENDIX I Roundtable on Labour-Management Cooperation Participants  (Ottawa - July 10, 1990) CHAIRPERSON; JUDGE ALAN B. GOLD LABOUR CANADA HONOURABLE JEAN CORBEIL - MINISTER JENNIFER R. MCQUEEN - DEPUTY MINISTER MICHAEL MCDERMOTT - SENIOR ASSISTANT DEPUTY MINISTER - FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION JIM LAHEY - ASSISTANT DEPUTY MINISTER - POLICY HERMAN HANSEN - ASSISTANT DEPUTY MINISTER - OPERATIONS YVES DESJARDINS-SICIALIANO - CHIEF OF STAFF KEN JAMES - PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY CANADIAN STEEL TRADE AND EMPLOYMENT CONGRESS ROGER PHILLIPS - CO-CHAIRMAN (BUSINESS) GLEN PATTINSON - CO-CHAIRMAN (LABOUR) DERWYN SANGSTER - EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR WESTERN WOOD PRODUCTS FORUM GORDON CAMERON - EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR PHILLIP LEGG - IWA-CANADA 100 CENTRE D'ADAPTATION DE LA MAIN-D'QEUVRE AEROSPATIALE AU QUEBEC SERGE TREMBLAY - PRESIDENT BRIAN DUFFY - 1ST VICE-PRESIDENT (BUSINESS) MARIO CLERMONT - 2ND VICE-PRESIDENT (LABOUR) COUNCIL OF MARITIME AFFAIRS GEORGE MILLER - CO-CHAIRMAN (BUSINESS) ANDREW BOYLE - SECRETARY-TREASURER, SEAFARERS' INTERNATIONAL UNION (LABOUR) JOHN FUCHS - EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR Source: Western Wood Products Forum APPENDIX II 101 Western Wood Products Forum Board of Directors CO-CHAIRMEN Jack Munro, President, IWA-Canada Ray Smith, President and C.E.O., MacMillan Bloedel DIRECTORS Harvey Arcand, President, Local 1-425, IWA-Canada Peter Bentley, Chairman and C.E.O., Canadian Forest Products Ltd. Tom B u e l l , President, Weldwood of Canada Tim Kerr, Vice-President, Lignum Dick Nelson, President, Atco Lumber Terry Smith, Secretary-Treasurer, IWA-Canada Roger Stanyer, President, Local 1-80, IWA-Canada Warren Ull e y , President, Local 1-71, IWA-Canada Wayne Nowlin, President, Local 1-4&5 IWA-Canada Doug Whitehead, Sr. Vice-President and C.E.O., Fletcher-Challenge Canada Source: IWA-Canada APPENDIX III 102 AGREEMENT THIS AGREEMENT entered into t h i s 1st day of July, 1990. BETWEEN: WOODLAND WINDOWS LTD. and SCANA INDUSTRIES LTD. (hereinafter known as the 'Company) OF THE FIRST PART AND: IWA-CANADA, LOCAL 1-424, C.L.C. (hereinafter known as the union) OF THE SECOND PART 1. WHEREAS the B r i t i s h Columbia Secondary Industry i s faced with intense competition from substitute products manufactured close to our t r a d i t i o n a l markets.... The par t i e s agree that f l e x i b i l i t y and co-operation are v i t a l i n manufacturing q u a l i t y products.... 2. WHEREAS the Company accepts r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to observe each and a l l provisions and conditions of t h i s Agreement, and to promote orderly and peaceful r e l a t i o n s with the Employees, AND 3. WHEREAS the Union accepts r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to observe each and all...promote orderly and peaceful r e l a t i o n s with the  Company. 09 -Section 3: Alternate S h i f t Scheduling a) Management, Plant or Camp Committees and Local Unions s h a l l have the r i g h t under the terms of the C o l l e c t i v e Agreement to agree upon and implement other schedules. 103 - 41 -ARTICLE XXII ~ NEW CONCEPTS COMMITTEE A committee w i l l be established to consider new ways of organizing the work within the plant, with a view to the Company implementing a more co-operative and consultative approach based on the team work model. LETTER OF UNDERSTANDING  Re: Job Postings and Posting Procedure 1.) The p a r t i e s w i l l engage i n an evaluation of e x i s t i n g jobs f o r the purpose of determining job groupings. Source: IWA-Canada 104 A p p e n d i x 17 T a b l e : 3 DOLLAR VALUE OF EXPORTS OF ALL FOREST PRODUCTS FROM BRITISH COLUMBIA -1989 Commodity U.S.A.' Japan Other Pac. Rim1 UK. Other E.E.C. All Other Total CRUOE MATERIALS Logs. Poles, Other Roundwood & Misc. Wood Chips and Sawdust 48.1 32.4 134.0 126.8 13.0 0.0 00 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.4 0.0 195.7 159.2 TOTAL CRUDE MATERIALS. 80.5 260.8 13.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 354.9 FABRICATED MATERIALS WOOD 2.8 Lumber. Hardwood 0.4 1.6 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.1 Softwood 2.387.2 1,049.6 139.5 330.7 198.4 112.1 4.217.S TOTAL 2.387.6 1.051.2 139.8 331.0 198.5 112.2 4.220.3 Plywood. Hardwood 4.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 4.3 Softwood 5.6 12.9 0.5 53.6 23.6 1.9 98.1 TOTAL 9.8 12.9 0.5 53.7 23.6 1.9 102.4 Wafer board 44.9 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 46.1 Particleboard 2.9 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.1 Rbreboard 4.3 0.0 5.5 1.0 0.3 0.3 11.4 Shingles/Shakes 187.7 0.4 1.7 0.9 2.4 0.5 193.6 Veneers, Hardwood 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.9 Softwood 23.1 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 24.2 TOTAL 23.9 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 25.1 Misc. Fabricated Wood 43.2 3.7 0.5 1.1 0.7 0.2 49.4 TOTAL WOOD 2.704.3 1.070.6 148.1 387.7 225.5 115.2 4.651.4 PULP AND PAPER Pulp, All Grades 845.5 828.7 534.1 124.8 1,226.8 158.9 3,718.8 Paper, Newsprint 700.1 15.9 183.9 43.2 2.3 23.2 968.6 All Olher 229.1 36.5 75.5 29.0 55.1 27.2 452.4 TOTAL 929.2 52.4 259.4 72.2 57.4 50.4 1,421.0 TOTAL PULP AND PAPER 1.774.7 881.1 793.5 197.0 1,284 2 209 3 5.139.8 TOTAL FABRICATED MATERIALS 4,479.0 1,951.7 941.6 584.7 1.509.7 324.5 9.791.2 Grand Total: 1989 4.559.5 2,212.5 954.6 584.7 1.509.9 324.9 10,146.1 1988 4,622.2 1.912.0 1.021.8 600.7 1.346.1 . 334.7 9.837.5 1987 4,709.5 1.768.5 897.8 486.7 1,163.3 286.1 9.311.9 1986 3.944.1 1.126.8 574.7 339.9 776.8 198.9 6.961.2 1385 3,746.8 913.0 N.A. 253.6 5779 746.7 6.238.0 1984 3.319.7 905.6 N.A. 306.9 698.3 795.2 6.025.7 1983 3.118.6 776.7 N.A. 294 0 622.7 650.1 5,462.1 1982 2,202.4 800.9 N.A. 293.8 711.3 555.6 4,564.0 1981 2.269.1 803.1 N.A. 331.7 827.1 608.0 4,839.0 1980 2.565.2 1,017.5 N.A. 393.7 1,011.2 664.8 5.652.4 • Does not include softwood lumber shipped through ' Includes East Asia & Oceania. Source: Statistics Canada Canadian reload centres. 

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