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Sieve or shield : the Canada-U.S. border and high tech labor connectivity within Cascadia under NAFTA… Richardson, Kathrine E. 2006

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Sieve or Shield: The Canada-U.S. Border and High Tech Labor Connectivity within Cascadia Under NAFTA and After September 11  By  Kathrine E. Richardson  B.S. Western Washington University, 1991 M.S. and M.C.R.P. The University of Oregon, 1996  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY In THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Geography) The University of British Columbia August 2006 © Kathrine E. Richardson, 2006  Abstract This dissertation involves understanding how the particular provisions of Chapter 16 of the North American Free Trade Agreement ( N A F T A ) dealt with temporary labor mobility of N o r t h American professionals across the Canada-U.S. border, with particular emphasis in the Pacific Northwest region (Cascadia) of Canada and the United States. Ideally, N A F T A visa/status provisions should make the temporary entry of professionals easier across the borders of all N A F T A countries - namely Canada, the United States, and Mexico-thus facilitating crossborder trade and enterprise. However, in the case of software engineers, which are a very important category for the expanding high-tech service industries of Vancouver and Seattle, it is arguably not so. Additionally, the concept of 'cross border regions' has gained increasing prominence in policy and academic discourse beginning in the early 1990s. However, in light of September 11, 2001, nation states have found it problematic to balance the need for more open borders to facilitate trade (borders as sieves) with the need for sovereignty or security concerns (borders as shields). Thus, within the context of recent literatures on 'labor mobility/immigration, industrial clusters, borders and borderlands, cross border institutions, and pre/post September 11 security measures', this research aims to better understand the dynamics of transitory immigration of 'knowledge-workers' between Vancouver and Seattle. The research methodology involved in-depth interviews with 10 companies based in Cascadia, 19 officials responsible for creating or interpreting the N A F T A visa provisions, and 15 attorneys primarily in the Cascadia region conversant with facilitating N A F T A and related international work applications. The objectives of this study were to test whether firms' demands for cross-border movements of knowledge workers (e.g. for recruitment or for international sales) were facilitated or impeded by recent N A F T A status provisions, and whether this encumbered the development of a "Cascadia" high-technology cluster, similar to Silicon Valley in the U . S . A . Findings for this dissertation suggest that the mobility of high tech employees working for Vancouver based firms was not impeded by the N A F T A status provisions. However, interpretation of the complex nature of Chapter 16 of N A F T A in part worked against certain occupations emerging in the high-technology field (especially in information technology) and there were significant differences in interpretation by border officials on the Canadian and the United States sides of the international border. Although there were delays and increased anxieties in traveling to the U.S., the events of 9/11 did not stop the flow of Canadian N A F T A professionals into the U . S . and U.S. N A F T A professionals into Canada. W h i l e access to the U . S . was not an over-riding problem for Vancouver based firms, many of these firms (and their attorneys) practiced something called "port shopping" when it came to Canadians professionals seeking N A F T A statuses at U.S. ports-of-entry. This involved seeking out a specific port-ofentry along the border line, which - based on the advice of attorneys or other professional colleagues - were felt to be more facilitative towards issuing a N A F T A status without problems. M u c h of the reputation of each U.S. port-of-entry's attitude towards N A F T A visa provisions was dependent on the interpretation of the port director or other influential personalities within the particular port-of-entry. B y comparison, port shopping did not appear so prevalent in the case of U . S . knowledge workers seeking temporary work visa into Canada. This was due to more rigorous on-going standardized training among Canadian border officials, • and a deliberate process of communication between front-line port-of-entry officers and headquarters in Ottawa. Since the creation of the U . S . Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in March of 2003, the U.S. had moved more towards the model of Citizenship and Immigration (CIC) Canada in some of its mandate, which requires that all D H S officers be in a ii  state o f " o n - g o i n g " t r a i n i n g . A l s o , there was a greater d e m a n d o f p r o f e s s i o n a l conduct for D H S officers, w h i c h was s o m e t h i n g that had a l w a y s been r e q u i r e d o f C I C officers. A s w e l l , a l l airport U . S . pre-flight inspections port directors n o w had s o m e t h i n g c a l l e d " D i s c r e t i o n a r y A u t h o r i t y . " T h i s p o w e r a l l o w e d the port director to grant a right o f travel into the U . S for a foreigner w h o , n o r m a l l y , might be d e n i e d entry. C a n a d i a n port directors have had this p o w e r prior to September 11. A d d i t i o n a l l y , the U . S . ' s D H S became m o r e l i k e the C a n a d i a n m o d e l i n its effort to create distance b e t w e e n its port-of-entry officers and i m m i g r a t i o n attorneys, b y n o t a l l o w i n g U . S . attorneys to a c c o m p a n y clients through the a d j u d i c a t i o n process o f seeking a N A F T A status at ports-of-entry.  ( T h e U . S . government tolerated this a c t i v i t y until A u g u s t  2003.) A l t h o u g h there was a g r o w i n g distance b e t w e e n port-of-entry i m m i g r a t i o n officers a n d C a n a d i a n and U . S . attorneys, f i r m s needed i n c r e a s i n g l y the h e l p o f i m m i g r a t i o n attorneys w i t h N A F T A a p p l i c a t i o n s , e s p e c i a l l y after September 11. In c o n c l u s i o n , despite the c o n t i n u e d m o b i l i t y o f professionals under N A F T A across the C a n a d a - U . S . border b e t w e e n V a n c o u v e r and Seattle, this study indicates that m a n y o f the f i r m ' s e m p l o y e e s were i n fact destined for C a l i f o r n i a or other u r b a n centers i n the U . S . or the rest o f the w o r l d , rather than Seattle. T h e same h e l d true for the one large Seattle based f i r m i n t e r v i e w e d . M u c h o f this f i r m ' s m o v e m e n t s o f N A F T A professionals into C a n a d a were not directed to V a n c o u v e r per se. T h u s , the study suggests that the e c o n o m i c construct o f C a s c a d i a continues to r e m a i n a f i g m e n t i n the i m a g i n a t i o n o f m a n y , and that the cross border-flows o f k n o w l e d g e w o r k e r s i n V a n c o u v e r and Seattle reflect " m e s o / m a c r o r e g i o n a l " a n d " g l o b a l " f l o w s rather than " m i c r o r e g i o n a l " f l o w s . Indeed, the patterns o f travel for m a n y o f these N A F T A professionals a c t u a l l y f e l l m o r e c l o s e l y w i t h i n the boundaries o f D a v i d M c C l o s k e y ' s o r i g i n a l n o t i o n o f C a s c a d i a , w h i c h was based o n an e c o l o g i c a l perspective and r e a c h e d from A l a s k a into N o r t h C a l i f o r n i a ; rather than the e c o n o m i c n o t i o n o f C a s c a d i a c o n s t r u c t e d b y A l a n A r t i b i s e , w h i c h reached f r o m W h i s t l e r , B . C . to E u g e n e , O r e g o n . F i n a l l y , r e g a r d i n g the c o n c e p t o f the C a n a d a - U . S . b o r d e r b e i n g a " S i e v e or S h i e l d , " there r e m a i n e d a t e n s i o n between U . S . federal c o n c e r n s , n a m e l y " s h i e l d " effects, o f heightened security c o u p l e d w i t h cross border e c o n o m i c r e g i o n a l needs for m o r e f l e x i b l e and predictable border management, namely " s i e v e " effects. T h i s d u a l mandate o f C a n a d a - U . S . border management h i g h l i g h t e d the continued b i p o l a r nature that the C a n a d a - U . S . border, as it relates to C h a p t e r 1 6 o f N A F T A , is still e m b r o i l e d w i t h i n - c o n t i n u e d mandates towards greater N o r t h A m e r i c a n r e g i o n a l integration (sieve effects) but is s t i l l dictated b y strong federal p o l i c y d i r e c t i v e s i n a post 9 / 1 1 climate ( s h i e l d effects).  iii  Table of Contents Abstract  «  T a b l e o f Contents  iv  List o f Tables  viii  List o f Figures  ix  L i s t o f Illustrations  x  Acknowledgements  •  -xi  Part I Chapter 1 - Introduction 1. I n t r o d u c t i o n 1.2 G e n e r a l B a c k g r o u n d  1 1 4  1.3 R e s e a r c h Q u e s t i o n s  6  1.3.1 T h e P r i m a r y R e s e a r c h Q u e s t i o n  6  1.3.2 M e t h o d o l o g y a n d O t h e r P r i m a r y R e s e a r c h Q u e s t i o n s  8  1.4 E m p i r i c a l R e s e a r c h a n d the I n t e r v i e w s 1.4.1 T h e F i r m s  9 .'  10  1.4.2 T h e I m m i g r a t i o n O f f i c i a l s  13  1.4.3 T h e I m m i g r a t i o n A t t o r n e y s  16  1.5 S u m m a r y  17  Chapter 2 - Introduction  18  2.2 B o r d e r s a n d B o r d e r l a n d s : T h e i r H i s t o r y , C u r r e n t S i t u a t i o n , a n d P o s s i b l e Futures  18  2.2.1  T h e H i s t o r i c a l Importance o f B o r d e r s a n d B o r d e r l a n d s  2.2.2  19  The Contemporary Importance o f Borders and Borderlands  22  2 2.3 C r o s s - B o r d e r R e g i o n a l D e v e l o p m e n t i n T h e o r y a n d P r a c t i c e 2.3.1 S i m i l a r i t i e s i n the D e v e l o p m e n t o f C r o s s B o r d e r R e g i o n s 2.3.2 T y p e s o f C r o s s - B o r d e r R e g i o n s a n d their D e v e l o p m e n t  23 25 26 29  2.4 P o s t 9/11 S e c u r i t y M e a s u r e s a n d Its Influence o n B o r d e r s a n d the M o v e m e n t s o f Peoples ....32 2.4.1 B o r d e r M a n a g e m e n t 2.5 H i g h T e c h C o m p a n i e s , I n n o v a t i v e R e g i o n s , a n d their D e m a n d f o r L a b o u r 2.5.1  H i g h T e c h Companies and their Regions  35 37 38  2.5.2 I n n o v a t i o n , L e a r n i n g R e g i o n s , a n d T h e i r Institutions  41  2.5.3 Institutions, L e a r n i n g , a n d L a b o u r i n H i g h T e c h n o l o g y R e g i o n s  42  2.6 T r a n s n a t i o n a l i s m , L a b o u r M o b i l i t y o f the H i g h l y S k i l l e d , a n d Its S h o r t c o m i n g s 2.6.1 I n t r o d u c t i o n  45 45  2.6.2 T r a n s n a t i o n a l i s m  46  2.6.3 L a b o u r M o b i l i t y a n d the Internationally H i g h l y S k i l l e d  47  2.7 C r o s s B o r d e r Institutions i n the F a c i l i t a t i o n / I m p e d i n g o f T r a n s b o r d e r L a b o u r M o b i l i t y and S o j o u r n e r R i g h t s 2.7.1  50  T h e R o l e o f S u p r a - N a t i o n a l A g r e e m e n t s o r Institutions that A f f e c t International  Labour Mobility 2.8 S u m m a r y C h a p t e r 3 - T h e C a s c a d i a R e g i o n I n Its W i d e r C o n t e x t  53 58 61  3.1 G e n e r a l Introduction - P u r p o s e o f C h a p t e r  61  3.2 C a s c a d i a as a " B o r d e r Z o n e o f H u m a n C o n t a c t "  62  iv  3.2.1 I n t r o d u c t i o n  62  3.2.2 T h e C a s c a d i a R e g i o n  64 T h e Seattle-Post d o t c o m B u s t a n d September 11 F a l l o u t  76 T h e V a n c o u v e r E c o n o m y - F r o m P e r i p h e r a l H i n t e r l a n d t o G r o w i n g N e w 78  Economy 3.3 C a s c a d i a i n Its W i d e r C o n t e x t  84  3.3.1 M o d e 4 o f the G e n e r a l A g r e e m e n t o n T r a d e i n S e r v i c e s ( G A T S )  87  3.3.2 V a r i o u s U . S . V i s a s for T h e A d m i s s i o n o f F o r e i g n P r o f e s s i o n a l s into the U n i t e d States 88 P e r m a n e n t M i g r a t i o n o f S k i l l e d W o r k e r s to the U n i t e d States U . S . T e m p o r a r y I m m i g r a t i o n - T h e H - 1 B P r o g r a m 3.3.3 C a n a d i a n P r o f e s s i o n a l I m m i g r a t i o n  89 91 95 P e r m a n e n t M i g r a t i o n for F o r e i g n P r o f e s s i o n a l s 3.3.4 C h a p t e r 16 o f the N o r t h A m e r i c a n Free T r a d e A g r e e m e n t N A F T A a n d L a b o u r M o b i l i t y  95 98 99  3.3.5 T h e C a n a d a - U . S . B o r d e r a ' S i e v e ' o r ' S h i e l d ' under N A F T A ?  104  3.3.6 S e c t i o n S u m m a r y  105  3.7 C h a p t e r C o n c l u s i o n  106  Part II Chapter 4 - The Firms  108  4.1 I n t r o d u c t i o n  108  4.2 T h e T y p e s o f F i r m s S u r v e y e d a n d the Q u e s t i o n n a i r e  108  4.3 G e n e r a l F i r m H i s t o r y a n d R e a s o n s for L o c a t i n g i n V a n c o u v e r o r Seattle  110  4.4 Strategic C o n n e c t i o n s b e t w e e n the U . S . , C a n a d a , and the R e s t o f the W o r l d  113  4.4.1 S a l e s C o n n e c t i o n s to T h e U . S . a n d B e y o n d  113  4.4.2 S o u r c e s o f F i n a n c i n g a n d T e c h n o l o g y  116  4.4.3 T h e H i r i n g o f F o r e i g n a n d D o m e s t i c P e r s o n n e l  119  4.4.4 R e a s o n s for M o v e m e n t s o f P r o f e s s i o n a l s A c r o s s International B o r d e r s 4.5 V i s a s a n d W o r k Statuses  123 125  4.5.1 R e c r u i t i n g E m p l o y e e s f r o m the U = S . A  126  4.5.2 R e c r u i t i n g E m p l o y e e s from C a n a d a  130  4.6 E x p e r i e n c e s w i t h C r o s s i n g the C a n a d a - U . S . B o r d e r  133  4 . 7 F i r m Strategies W h e n C r o s s i n g the C a n a d a - U . S . B o r d e r  137  4.8 W a s the C a n a d a - U . S . B o r d e r an I m p e d i m e n t to a H i g h T e c h C l u s t e r b e t w e e n Seattle and Vancouver?  140  4.9 W h a t w o u l d H a p p e n i f C r o s s B o r d e r M o b i l i t y w a s I m p e d e d ?  141  4 . 1 0 M o b i l i t y o f N o r t h A m e r i c a n P r o f e s s i o n a l s i n a P o s t 9/11 W o r l d  144  4 . 1 2 R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s for I m p r o v i n g the E x p e r i e n c e o f C r o s s i n g B o r d e r s  148  4.13 C o n c l u s i o n  150  Chapter 5 - The Immigration Officials  152  5.1  152  Introduction  5.2 M e t h o d o l o g y for the E m p i r i c a l R e s e a r c h  152  5.3 T h e C a n a d a - U . S . B o r d e r a n d N A F T A Status P r o v i s i o n s  153  5.3.1  B a c k g r o u n d C o m m e n t s by U . S . Immigration Officials  154  5.3.2  C o m m e n t s by C a n a d i a n I m m i g r a t i o n O f f i c i a l s  155  5.3.2 N A F T A Statuses - T h e V i e w o f U . S . I m m i g r a t i o n O f f i c i a l s  156  5.3.3  N A F T A Statuses: T h e V i e w o f C a n a d i a n I m m i g r a t i o n O f f i c e r s  160  5.4 T h e Interpretation o f W o r k Status A p p l i c a t i o n s U n d e r N A F T A 5.4.1.  162  The U . S . Immigration Officers' Experience  162  5.4.2 C a n a d i a n I m m i g r a t i o n O f f i c e r s ' E x p e r i e n c e  163  5.5 T r a i n i n g a n d A v a i l a b l e R e s o u r c e s for the U n d e r s t a n d i n g o f N A F T A 5.5.1  164  The U . S . Immigration Officers' Experience  165  5.5.2 T h e C a n a d i a n I m m i g r a t i o n O f f i c e r s ' E x p e r i e n c e  169  5.6 T h e G e o g r a p h y o f Port S h o p p i n g  174  5.6.1 T h e U . S . I m m i g r a t i o n O f f i c e r s ' E x p e r i e n c e  175  5.6.2 T h e C a n a d i a n I m m i g r a t i o n O f f i c e r s ' E x p e r i e n c e  180  5.7 T h e R o l e o f A t t o r n e y s i n the N A F T A Status A p p l i c a t i o n P r o c e s s  182  5.7.1 T h e U n i t e d States' I m m i g r a t i o n O f f i c e r s ' E x p e r i e n c e  182  5.7.2 T h e C a n a d i a n I m m i g r a t i o n O f f i c e r s ' E x p e r i e n c e  183  5.8 I m m i g r a t i o n O f f i c i a l s i n a P o s t 9/11 W o r l d  185  5.8.1 T h e U . S . E x p e r i e n c e  186  T h e D e v e l o p m e n t o f N e w B o r d e r M a n a g e m e n t Institutions  186 T h e R i s e o f P r o f e s s i o n a l i s m i n U . S . I m m i g r a t i o n M a n a g e m e n t  186 N e w S e c u r i t y P r i o r i t i e s for the D e p a r t m e n t o f H o m e l a n d S e c u r i t y  189 T h e I l l e g a l I m m i g r a t i o n R e f o r m and I m m i g r a t i o n R e s p o n s i b i l i t y A c t o f 1996 and the U . S . Patriot A c t o f 2001  190 T h e P o w e r o f D i s c r e t i o n a r y A u t h o r i t y  191  5.8.2 T h e C a n a d i a n E x p e r i e n c e a n d the C a n a d i a n C o d e o f C o n d u c t  193 C a n a d i a n H u m a n i t a r i a n Perspectives  195  5.9 H a s N A F T A F a c i l i t a t e d C r o s s B o r d e r L a b o u r M o b i l i t y i n C a s c a d i a ?  196  5.9.1 T h e U n i t e d States I m m i g r a t i o n O f f i c e r s ' E x p e r i e n c e  196  5.9.2 T h e C a n a d i a n I m m i g r a t i o n O f f i c e r s ' E x p e r i e n c e  197  5.10 C o n c l u s i o n s  198  Chapter 6 -The Immigration Attorneys  201  6.1  Introduction  201  6.2 M e t h o d o l o g y for the E m p i r i c a l R e s e a r c h  202  6.3 T h e R o l e o f A t t o r n e y s i n the N A F T A Status A p p l i c a t i o n P r o c e s s  203  6.4 T h e R o l e o f A d v o c a c y to P o l i c y A n a l y s t s a n d the U S C o n g r e s s a n d C a n a d i a n Parliament :  204  6.5 T h e C a n a d a - U . S . B o r d e r a n d P e r c e i v e d O p p o r t u n i t i e s a n d P r o b l e m s w i t h the N A F T A Status P r o v i s i o n s  205  6.6 N A F T A Status R e g u l a t i o n s a n d the R a n g e o f V a r i a b i l i t y i n their A d j u d i c a t i o n  208  6.7  N A F T A and Professional S k i l l s  6.8 P o r t S h o p p i n g  209 214  6.8.1 T h e B e g i n n i n g o f Port o f E n t r y A d j u d i c a t i o n s u n d e r N A F T A i n the U . S . A  215  6.8.2 T h e G e o g r a p h y o f ' P o r t S h o p p i n g ' A l o n g the U . S . B o r d e r  216  6.8.3 A d d i t i o n a l A s p e c t s o f " P o r t S h o p p i n g "  219  6.9 P e r c e i v e d P r o b l e m s / O p p o r t u n i t i e s w i t h U S / C a n a d i a n B o r d e r O f f i c i a l s  220  6.10 T h e R o l e o f T h e P o r t D i r e c t o r  221  6.11 A l t e r n a t i v e s to Ports o f E n t r y A d j u d i c a t i o n s ? 6.12 C h a n g e s since 9/11 a n d L a b o u r M o b i l i t y under N A F T A Canadian Attorneys  222 ; 225 226  6.12.1 T h e G r o w i n g " D i s t a n c e " B e t w e e n U . S . A t t o r n e y s a n d U . S . I m m i g r a t i o n Officers, P o s t 9/11  227  vi  6.12.2 E x p e d i t e d R e m o v a l i n the U . S . A  228  6.12.3 U . S . E x p e d i t e d R e m o v a l E x p a n d i n g to C a n a d a ?  229  6.13 T h e C a n a d i a n E x p e r i e n c e : A S t r a i n e d R e l a t i o n s h i p ?  230  6.14 O v e r a l l C o m m e n t s o n the P o s t 9/11 S i t u a t i o n a n d N A P T A Statuses  233  6.15 H a s N A F T A F a c i l i t a t e d C r o s s B o r d e r L a b o u r M o b i l i t y i n C a s c a d i a ?  234  6.16 N A F T A ' s B r o a d e r Influences  235  6.17 C o n c l u s i o n  237  Part III Chapter 7 - C o n c l u s i o n  241  7.1  241  Introduction  7.2 S u m m a r y o f F i n d i n g s 7.2.1 T h e F i r m s  241 242  7.2.2 T h e C a n a d i a n a n d U . S . I m m i g r a t i o n O f f i c i a l s  243 T h e C a n a d i a n I m m i g r a t i o n O f f i c i a l s T h e U . S . I m m i g r a t i o n O f f i c i a l s  244 245  7.2.3 T h e I m m i g r a t i o n A t t o r n e y s , 7.3 Is the C a n a d a - U . S . B o r d e r an I m p e d i m e n t to the D e v e l o p m e n t o f a H i g h T e c h C l u s t e r B e t w e e n Seattle and V a n c o u v e r ?  246  7.4 W h a t T y p e o f C l u s t e r is C a s c a d i a ? 7.4.1 V a n c o u v e r  248 248  7.4.2 Seattle  247  249  7.4.3 S u m m a r y o f C l u s t e r T y p e s 7.5 W h a t T y p e o f B o r d e r B i s e c t s the C a s c a d i a C o r r i d o r ? 7.6 International L a b o u r M o b i l i t y o f the H i g h l y S k i l l e d  250 251 252  7.7 P o l i c y I m p l i c a t i o n s : Institutions that A f f e c t L a b o u r M o b i l i t y  255  7.8 P o l i c y I m p l i c a t i o n s : B o r d e r s a n d L a b o u r M o b i l i t y M a n a g e m e n t  255  7.9 Further R e s e a r c h  257  Bibliography  258  Appendices Appendix 1  277 277  Appendix 2  280  Appendix 3  283  Appendix 4  -  285  Appendix 5  287  Appendix 6  290  Appendix 7  •  292  Appendix 8  297  Appendix 9  299  A p p e n d i x 10  303  A p p e n d i x 11  305  A p p e n d i x 12  -307  A p p e n d i x 13  310  A p p e n d i x 14  312  A p p e n d i x 15  317  A p p e n d i x 16  319  Appendix 17...  321 vii  List of Tables  Table 2.1 Typology of Border Region Development 31 Table 3.1 U.S. Temporary Entry Statuses ..84 Table 3.2 Canadian Temporary and Permanent Entry Statuses 86 Table 4.1 Selected Distribution of Sales for Firms Interviewed 115 Table 4.2 Sources of Financing for Firms Interviewed 118 Table 4.3 Paces of Origin for the Professionally Highly Skilled 123 Table 5.1 Types and Characteristics of Attributes which Contribute to Varying Border Management Styles along the Canada U.S. Border in Cascadia - Pre and Post 9/11 200  List of Figures  Figure 2.1 Professional Worker Visas/Statuses Issued under the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement and NAFTA to Canadians from 1989 to 2004 56 Figure 3.1 Breakdown of Border Crossing Types at Four.Largest Land Border Crossings Between Vancouver, B.C. and Seattle, Washington (Canada entering U.S 72 Figure 6.1 Envisioned System of Communication and Influence Under Chapter 16 of NAFTA 239 Figure 6.2 Chapter 16 of NAFTA's Realistic System of Communication and Influence 240  ix  List of Illustrations I l l u s t r a t i o n 2.1 T h e U . S . M e x i c o B o r d e r l a n d s i n S o u t h e r n C a l i f o r n i a  21  I l l u s t r a t i o n 2.2 T h e S i n g a p o r e - J o h o r e - R i a u G r o w t h T r i a n g l e  21  I l l u s t r a t i o n 2.3 T u m e n R i v e r A r e a D e v e l o p m e n t Z o n e  30  I l l u s t r a t i o n 2.4 S a a r - L o r - L u x C r o s s B o r d e r L a b o r M a r k e t  30  I l l u s t r a t i o n 2.5 S i l i c o n V a l l e y  40  I l l u s t r a t i o n 3.1 C a s c a d i a  69  I l l u s t r a t i o n 3.2 E c o n o m i c C a s c a d i a I l l u s t r a t i o n 5.1 A l l P o r t s o f E n t r y B e t w e e n W e s t e r n - M o s t U . S . a n d C a n a d a  70 175  x  Acknowledgements T h i s thesis c o u l d not have been p r o d u c e d w i t h o u t the support, w o r k , a n d sincere efforts o f s o m a n y people, m a n y o f w h o m I w i l l p r o b a b l y inadvertently o m i t f r o m this b r i e f note o f t h a n k s . First o f a l l , I w o u l d l i k e to thank k e y people w i t h i n the D e p a r t m e n t o f G e o g r a p h y and the F a c u l t y o f G r a d u a t e Studies w h o have offered their support and care i n m a n y w a y s over the years. T h e s e people i n c l u d e O l a v S l a y m a k e r , T e r r y M c G e e , S a n d y L a p s k y , M i k e B o v i s , Ian M c K e n d r y , D a v i d L e y , J u n n i e C h e u n g , E l a i n e C h o and A n n R o s e . W i t h o u t the help o f these people, I might have fallen into one o f the m a n y U . B . C . crevasses.  I w o u l d also l i k e to  dedicate a very s p e c i a l thanks to P i t m a n Potter o f the Institute o f A s i a n R e s e a r c h and F a c u l t y o f Law.  P i t m a n has offered n o t h i n g but true support, e x c e l l e n t a d v i c e , a n d a n "expectation o f  success" through the d u r a t i o n o f m y time at U . B . C .  I a m d e e p l y grateful for P i t m a n ' s  leadership i n the most c h a l l e n g i n g o f times. I w o u l d also l i k e to offer a grateful thanks to D a v i d L e y , one o f m y c o m m i t t e e members. D a v i d has also offered e x c e l l e n t a d v i c e and a strong sense o f support that m a d e the last " p u s h " o f the dissertation p o s s i b l e . M a n y m a n y thanks to D a v i d L e y . A g r a n d "thank y o u " goes to D a v i d E d g i n g t o n , m y s u p e r v i s o r , w h o has stayed w i t h m y w o r k and m e for eight years w i t h o u t l o o s i n g sight o f the g o a l o f c o m p l e t i n g the dissertation. I greatly a d m i r e D a v e for r e m a i n i n g steadfast through s o m e v e r y d i f f i c u l t t i m e s , and standing b y me i n times o f extreme adversity as w e l l as success. T h a n k y o u , D a v e . A l t h o u g h I cannot n a m e research participants, I w o u l d also l i k e to s i n c e r e l y thank the m a n y i m m i g r a t i o n l a w y e r s , i m m i g r a t i o n o f f i c i a l s , and V a n c o u v e r a n d Seattle h i g h tech firms w h o gave g e n e r o u s l y o f their t i m e to participate i n m y w o r k . W i t h o u t their t i m e and d e d i c a t i o n towards m y research project, this dissertation w o u l d not h a v e b e e n p o s s i b l e . I truly hope that the f i n d i n g s f r o m m y w o r k w i l l h e l p these p r o f e s s i o n a l s i n a s m a l l w a y . I must also thank s o m e o f m y 5 2 0 c o m r a d e s , and others, w h o h a v e b e c o m e the dearest o f friends t h r o u g h m y d u r a t i o n o f t i m e at U . B . C . a n d life. T h e s e p e o p l e i n c l u d e G r a h a m H o r n e r , J o h a n n a W a t e r s , R i c h a r d P o w e l l , Jeff R e m p e l , S i m o n D a d s o n , and J o e Steele. T h e support, a d v i c e , and friendships that these people offered have m a d e m y m e m o r i e s o f the Department o f G e o g r a p h y and V a n c o u v e r s o m e o f the happiest since m y c h i l d h o o d . T h a n k y o u to a l l o f y o u ! I must also r e c o g n i z e and thank k e y people a r o u n d the w o r l d w h o h a v e been true supporters and friends as I m a d e the l o n g trek through the P h . D . T h e s e p e o p l e i n c l u d e P a s c a l e S o u m o y , N a t a l i a S a n t a m a r i a L a o r d e n , and D a v e R a y a t . I offer m y kindest and sincerest thanks to these three people. F i n a l l y , I dedicate this dissertation to m y father, H e n r y V . M . R i c h a r d s o n a n d m y sister Frances H a i n e s d u B r u y e r e R i c h a r d s o n w h o have offered me n o t h i n g but d a i l y support and encouragement a l o n g the l o n g r o a d o f the dissertation. T h e o r i g i n s o f the dissertation and its c o m p l e t i o n w o u l d not have been p o s s i b l e i f it w e r e not for m y sister s u p p o r t i n g me i n the b e g i n n i n g and m y father e n c o u r a g i n g me at the end. T h a n k y o u both for y o u r confidence i n me, and more i m p o r t a n t l y , y o u r l o v e .  xi  Part I Chapter 1 - Introduction 1. Introduction The idea of borders as sieves or shields has come to the forefront of topics in the discipline of geography in the past few years. The opportunities presented by free trade and the emergence of cross border regions have been compromised by the constraints imposed after the attacks o n the W o r l d Trade Center in N e w Y o r k C i t y in September 2001 (hereafter 9/11), and the subsequent "fortressing up" with drastic security measures taken not only along the U . S . borders, but also along international borders throughout the world (Andreas, 2003). The overall trend since the ending of the C o l d W a r has been one of free access across international borders, especially for international trade and multinational business interests (Ohmae, 1995). In fact, the trend of globalization, in general, has been seen as a catalyst to making international borders more and more irrelevant, fostering the idea of borders operating as a 'sieve'. However, i n a post 9/11 environment, 'borders are back', and a new set of security issues have arisen, which contribute to the idea of borders functioning again as 'shields', as they did during the C o l d War, but now with an emphasis on shielding citizens from terrorists as opposed to rogue nation states (Andreas, 2003). In other words, borders represent a fascinating case study of a more general intersection between geography and contemporary public policy (Cox, 1997).  Borders have always been important to geographers since the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. This treaty helped to end the 30 Years W a r in Europe and legitimately recognized the demarcations of a state's territory by physical boundaries or borders. In fact, the Treaty of Westphalia i n 1648 helped to establish the creation o f the borders and boundaries of many contemporary nation states, which evolved out of the kingdoms and territories of European royalty and nobles starting in the eighteenth century. M o v i n g forward to the late twentieth century, new regional groups are beginning to form, which cut across the borders of nation states. This includes the triad economy of North America under the North American Free Trade Agreement (which includes Canada, the United States, and Mexico) the European Union, and the Association of South East Asian Nations, ( A S E A N ) . Within these larger continental trading blocks are sub national cross-border regions; these include SIJORI (Singapore-Johore-Riau Growth Triangle) and Cascadia (the Pacific Northwest region of North America), for example. In fact, Cascadia may be considered a local example where issues of cross-border flows are critical to the growth of a post-industrial high tech service oriented  region that benefits from Seattle and Vancouver's interaction and dynamism. Ideally, Chapter 16 of N A F T A (the North American Free Trade Agreement), which is dedicated, in part, to facilitating the movements of North American business persons, traders, investors, and professionals, should help to foster movements of these qualified people between Vancouver and Seattle. This dissertation explores the intersection of the Canada-U.S. border, the high tech economy in the Seattle-Vancouver corridor, namely Cascadia, and how well N A F T A has contributed to the movement of North American professionals between these two cities. The North American Free Trade Agreement ( N A F T A ) since its inception in 1994, was designed to allow for the greater ease and cross border mobility of goods, services, investment, government procurement, intellectual property, competition policy, and finally the mobility of business persons.  1  For the most part, N A F T A may be considered a success in terms of the  majority of factors in that it allows facilitated cross border entries. Within continental North America there is a general perception that access into the U.S. from Canada is almost guaranteed for North American business people and vice versa. However, as will be shown in the thesis, the legitimate N A F T A Information Technology (IT) professional has perceived difficulties moving back and forth across the Canada-U.S. border for a variety of reasons. Unlike the European Union's Schengen Agreement developed through the 1990s (Anderson, 2000), which allows for complete labour mobility between all signatory countries, there has been no attempt to harmonize the regimes of N A F T A entry for Canada, the U . S . , and M e x i c o . Essentially, each N A F T A country has set its own standards for the entry of skilled workers. Hence, there are three country systems operating under N A F T A , which look alike but are quite different from each other. These differences, coupled with the growing post 9/11 restrictive nature at U.S. ports of entry, has led to considerable variability in border controls, not only between the U.S. and Canada, but also between U . S . ports of entry.  In addition, there is a widening gap between  the Canadian and American interpretations of NAFTA at the actual ports of entry as it applies to the North American business person. The following interview excerpt provides a rather v i v i d example of these complexities and of the difficulties encountered by one Canadian high technology firm trying to seek entry of its workers into the U . S . after 9/11 in order to perform a job for the U . S . Navy.  Chapter 16 of N A F T A includes the preferential treatment of North American business visitors, traders, investors, intracompany transferees, and 65 professional job categories. 1  2  K R : I remember, a while back when I first spoke with you on the phone, you and your crew had a very interesting time in trying to get across the Canada-U.S. border. Could you tell me about it? C - F 6 O h yes that was our U S Navy fiasco [in 2002]. W e were contracted to do a job for the U . S . Navy in San Diego. W e expected some problems. So we got a letter from the U . S . Admiral in charge. He was an Admiral. W e were each issued letters from the U S Navy and the State Department letterhead stating who we were and the fact that we had to provide maintenance on U . S . Navy equipment. W e go to the P O E [port of entry, but it is actually the "U.S. preflight inspection area"] at Y V R (Vancouver Airport). The guys always push me to the front of the line when we go through the border. I got through because I am a dual citizen. The next guy goes through, the immigration officer talks to h i m and pulls h i m aside. He then pulled all the other guys aside, and refused entry to all of them!!! One of them had an H - l card [a designated U.S. work visa], but it had expired and he did not return it. (The card is the property of the U.S. government.) For the other three, they said that the letter was not specific enough. W e had the U . S . immigration talk with the Navy [on the phone]. They [the border officials] considered our work "maintenance", and said anyone can do this! They sent us home and told us to come back the next day. W e went back the next day with additional paperwork from the Navy. However, they gave us a one-time entry, and as soon as we reentered any port in Canada we would lose this status. So we went to San Diego and performed the job for a week or so. They did not want to pay for us to stay there, so they sent us home. However, four days later the U . S . Navy called us back saying they needed us, right away. This was the worst time for this to happen, there was another terrorist threat or something like that, I don't know. Essentially, the U . S . border went on Orange alert in early October [of 2002]. I called the U . S . immigration people at the Peace Arch/Douglas border crossing, and they said it would be highly unlikely that they would let us through. The N a v y said we have to go. The guys rented a car, and we put all of our gear (work hats, equipment, everything) in a big box, shipped it to San Diego. We then rented a car, filled it with Doritos chips and pop and said we are going to Seattle [for the week] to do some shopping and maybe some fishing. They drove to Seattle, ditched the rental car in a hotel parking lot, took the shuttle bus to SeaTac [airport]. W e went to San Diego for the week, got the job done. Came back home, drove through the [Canadian] border. " Y e a h , it was a great trip." Y o u know. I mean, what are you going to do? The U . S . N a v y does not work that fast [with paper pushing]. I don't believe we did this, and I don't believe we didn't get nailed! In the end it all worked out well. I cannot believe we had a contract with the U . S . Navy, and we had to sneak people into the U . S . to get the job done. Although not frequent, many of the smaller Canadian firms I interviewed noted that they would take extreme measures in order to get into the United States to perform a job, land a contract, or provide services to U . S . firms. The above excerpt provides a very determined and creative example of what Canadian firms w i l l do in order to continue their working linkages and networks not only with U . S . firms, but also with powerful U . S . governmental bodies, such as  3  the U . S . Navy. Even more interesting is the paradox or tension, which apparently exists between the U . S . Department of Homeland Security (DHS), directed to guard the U.S.'s domestic borders and the U . S . Navy, mandated, among other things, to protect the U.S. from enemy invasions by water and "to hold the oceans." Based on the above example, the U . S . Navy found it in the best interest of the U.S. to allow passage into the U . S . for these five Canadian aquatic equipment specialists. However, the U . S . Department of Homeland Security port of entry officers were not convinced of their professional significance, and exercised their right as immigration officials first in the line of defense of the U . S ' s border to refuse entry to four of the five Canadian professionals.  The above example demonstrates that my examination of the role of the international border i n the high-tech Cascadia region leads, naturally, to a focus on, first, the firms' that need to send highly qualified employees across the border. In addition, my study also led me to focus on the role that the port of entry officials and other governmental officials played, especially with regard to their interpretation of N A F T A status provisions. Thus, as w i l l be shown shortly, my examination of border management has led also to the important role carried out by immigration lawyers who specialize in preparing complex visa applications for cross-border business travelers in both the U . S . A . and Canada.  Overall, in the dissertation, the plans, dreams, and goals of these smaller Cascadian firms w i l l be explored in relation to how they see themselves within a North American context, and how the Canada-U.S. border affects their day-to-day operations and their long-term goals.  An  examination of the other players and actors such as immigration officers and immigration attorneys, in addition to the experiences of larger U . S . firms moving people through the U.S.Canadian border, w i l l also be explored in hopes of gaining a better understanding of the similarities and differences between the Canadian and American experiences of moving across the Canada-U.S. border under N A F T A .  1.2 G e n e r a l B a c k g r o u n d N A F T A intended to give freer mobility to high tech professional workers across the international borders between Canada, the U.S., and M e x i c o . In fact, even prior to September 11, 2001,  there was a growing "push" from key decision makers on both sides of the Canada-  4  U . S . border to create blanket North American visa policies and procedures, develop common terminology, stream-line entrance and exit databases, and the possibility of greater harmonization of Canada-U.S. immigration policies.  Despite these long-term coordinating  efforts between Canada and the U . S . , this study found that there is still considerable variability between the U . S . and Canada when it comes to the actual inspection, facilitation and admittance of North American business people across the Canada-U.S. border, as discussed in the preceding paragraph. This growing variability may have tremendous impacts on the predictability of mobility for professionals, which arguably, in turn, may have severe impacts on the continued development and success of the integrated North American high tech economy. For example, Vasquez A z p i r i (2000) argues that this fluid stream of legitimate professionals under N A F T A is crucial in moving both the U . S . and Canada into a stable and growing information economy.  The need for greater ease and mobility of professionals or "knowledge workers" is especially relevant for the emerging new economy high tech corridor in Cascadia which transcends the international border between Vancouver, B . C . and Seattle, Washington. (See Appendix 16 for a satellite image of this region). These two urban settlements have developed successfully over the past 100 years into modern cities, both lauded internationally for their quality of life (MacDonald, 1987). Seattle is home to major high technology companies such as the software giant Microsoft, and the commercial headquarters of the aircraft manufacturer Boeing, both world leaders in their respective industries  (Puget Sound Business Quarterly, 2004).  Vancouver is quickly developing its own critical mass of new economy industries with over 600 high tech firms in 2003 when the industry employed over 52,000 people  (Business in  Vancouver, 2003). In fact, Vancouver is often stated as a city of choice for young high tech specialists looking for quality of life as they embark on their fast paced careers in software development (Mackie, 2000). Additionally, over the past fifteen years, Vancouver has developed strong human and economic networks with three of the four East A s i a n tigers  The Canada-U.S. Smart Border Declaration, signed in December 2001 had been in develop between senior Canada and U.S. officials since the early 1990s. 3  A Knowledge worker, is a term orginally developed by by Peter Drucker in 1959 and generally refers to a person who works primarily with information or one who develops and uses knowledge in the workplace.  5  (Singapore, Hong K o n g , and Taiwan), South Asia, and continues to maintain a robust trade relationship with Japan (Edgington, 1995) and more recently mainland China. 1.3 Research Questions Based on the above introduction and background, this dissertation examines how the particular provisions of Chapter 16 of the North American Free Trade Agreement ( N A F T A ) actually deal with temporary labour mobility of North American high tech professionals across the CanadaU . S . border, with particular emphasis in the Pacific Northwest region of Canada and the United States. The empirical research includes the Vancouver, B.C.-Seattle, Washington corridor, namely the Cascadia region (see Figure I). In principle, the N A F T A status (visa) provisions should have made the temporary movement of professionals easier across the border of all N A F T A countries (Canada, the United States, and Mexico), and facilitate cross-border trade and enterprise. However, in the case of software engineers and related professions, which are a very important category for the expanding high-tech service industries of Vancouver and Seattle, I argue in the thesis that it is not so. Drawing from four primary literatures, which include material on high tech/industrial clusters; borders and borderlands i n a post 9/11 era; transnationalism and labour mobility; and transborder institutions, my research aims to understand better the dynamics of transitory immigration of 'knowledge-workers' between Vancouver and Seattle. A greater understanding of these dynamics also helps to shed light on whether or not the Canada-U.S. border is an impediment to the development of high-tech clusters in the Cascadia region. In essence, is the border a 'sieve' or 'shield' to successful regional development in this part of North America?  1.3.1 The Primary Research Question M o r e concretely, the primary research question is as follows: "Is the Canada-U.S. border an impediment to the development of a high-tech industrial cluster in the Cascadia region?" This is of critical importance because much of the 'new economy' in the Cascadia region (as in 4  The New Economy is a term that was developed in the 1990s to describe OECD countries transitions from industrial/manufacturing-based economies into a high technology-based economy, arising largely from new developments in the technology sector. Initially, many business analysts though that the "New Economy" would rendered obsolete many traditional business practices. After the bursting of the dotcom bubble in early 2000, many o f these predictions and new business practices proved to be wrong. However the term "New Economy" is freqeuntly used to describe the contemporary American economy.  6  other similar regions) is dependent on the free movement of highly skilled peoples over international boundaries who can respond quickly to the ever changing needs and developments of firms that develop and work with new technologies (Richardson, 2006a). Historically, over the past 300 years since the development of nation state borders, one primary purpose of the border was to keep people residing in one nation state from moving and residing in another nation state. N o w , networks of firms involved in information technology, and the new economy in general, span international borders. Thus, the information technology sector needs to draw from a talented pool of well educated professionals residing throughout the globe as these firms compete in a 'high stakes game' of product development where timing and cleverness are keys to success or failure (Saxenian, 2002). A n d so, the immediate needs of the new economy require more cross-border integration and more predictable transparent border regulations when it comes to the movement of professionals across international boundaries. The need for greater ease and mobility of professionals is especially true for the emerging hightech corridor of Cascadia, which transcends the international border between Vancouver, B . C . and Seattle, Washington. It shares the natural drainage basin of the Georgia Basin, but is bisected politically by the Canada-U.S. border. These settlements have similar histories as two new northwest coast cities designed to function as outposts in the export of natural resources, such as timber and fisheries (MacDonald, 1987).  A s mentioned previously, these two cities  have developed successfully over the past 100 years into modern settlements, both lauded internationally for their quality of life and globally competitive high tech industries. In the context of the high levels of growth and success of high tech in Seattle and Vancouver, the question emerges as to whether or not the Canada-U.S. border impedes their integration and the development of a high - tech complex, as has been the case with Silicon V a l l e y in Northern California (Lee et al., 2000). From a Canada-U.S. studies perspective, the impact of the North American Free Trade Agreement ( N A F T A ) and its implementation in Cascadia is also a pertinent issue. There is a need to understand how N A F T A has impacted the emerging high tech cross-border complex. W h i l e N A F T A was introduced in 1993 to facilitate cross-border trade, its detailed implementation and outcomes remains a relatively understudied area of research. Moreover, compared with other Canada-U.S. border regions (e.g. the Detroit-Windsor corridor and the  7  Atlantic Maritime and Northeast States) very little detailed research has been carried out on the industrial connections between Cascadia. Historically, there has been more scholarly work done on the Canadian branch economy located within the Golden Horseshoe of southern Ontario, (Molat, 1999; and Holmes, 2003). Here a sophisticated Just-in-Time (JIT) delivery process of the big three auto manufacturers created networks of production that span across the Ambassador Bridge linking Detroit and Windsor. This JIT system has carefully integrated Canadian production facilities into a powerful chain of auto production plants originating in Detroit and extending into Ohio and Tennessee (Holmes, 2000). However, no research to date has attempted to "map out" similar chains of interactions between high tech firms in the Vancouver, B . C . and the Seattle corridor. Additionally, rather than moving car parts, as is frequently the case between Detroit and Ontario, the Cascadia area has a greater potential of moving knowledge workers across its regional borders due to the fact that the high tech industry is much more dependent on flows of people as opposed to goods (Florida, 2003). Thus, this research project places special emphasis on the movement of knowledge workers across the Canada-U.S. border in Cascadia, and how Chapter 16 of N A F T A , which deals with labour mobility, has affected these movements. Indeed, it is intended that a primary outcome of this work w i l l be a better understanding of how high tech firms span across the Canada-U.S. border within the Cascadia region, and whether the border impedes possible flows of peoples working in the high tech industry.  1.3.2 Methodology and Other Primary Research Questions The methodology behind this research study includes semistructured in-depth interviews with 16 Canadian/U.S. front-line immigration officials and the Canadian/U.S. officials who wrote and continue to negotiate Chapter 16 of N A F T A . A s part of the study, I also interviewed 15 Canada-U.S. immigration attorneys, and 13 of the chief executive officers and human resource managers of 9 high tech firms based in Vancouver and one Fortune 500 company based in Seattle that move people, goods, and/or services across the Canada-U.S. border.  The  semistructured in-depth interview format was chosen as the major approach to gathering information due to the lack of consistent quantitative data on knowledge workers crossing the U.S.-Canada border. This assessment of N A F T A in the case of highly skilled labour immigration, was used due to the fact that there was a lack of documentation regarding the varied experiences of North American professionals seeking entry across North American borders for purpose of work.  8  I prepared initially a list of pertinent questions for the firms, border officials and immigration lawyers. These structured interview questions provided a framework to begin with not only for myself, but also for the interviewee involved. Due to the nature and time constraints of many of the participants, the semi-structured interview methodology provided an air of comfort and "predictability" regarding such a sensitive subject matter as cross border flows, especially following 9/11. Indeed, the firms and Canadian immigration officers were most adamant about seeing the questions before they agreed to be interviewed (see Appendices 1, 2, and 3). Surprisingly, the U . S . legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service/ Department of Homeland Security was probably the most flexible when it came to interview structure, 5  questions, and the actual tape recording of the interviews.  The interview process was considered "semi-structured" due to the fact that many of the interviewees added other dimensions to the interview that could not be captured by the questions that I asked (see Appendices 1, 2, and 3). Additionally, once the interview began, many of the participants became very comfortable talking about the topic area, and I did not want to impose such a rigid structure that the more traditional "structured interview" requires (Fontana and Frey, 2000).  Despite the flexibility in the research structure, there were four questions that were asked to all interviewees. These questions include the following: Is the Canada-U.S. border an impediment to a high tech industrial cluster developing along the Vancouver/Seattle corridor?; H o w has Chapter 16 of N A F T A influenced this region and or your work/firm?; H o w did September 11, 2001 influence the flows and experiences of high tech professionals moving back and forth across the Canada-U.S. border; and, What is the relationship between all of the actors involved?  1.4 E m p i r i c a l R e s e a r c h a n d the I n t e r v i e w s  In order to answer the question, "Is the Canada-U.S. border an impediment to the development of software firms in the Cascadia region?," empirical research was conducted in the form of 44  The U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) ceased to exist as of March I, 2003. The U.S. INS was then folded into the new Department of Homeland Security. When one refers to the former "INS", the proper title now is "Legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service." 5  semi structured interviews in Vancouver, Seattle, San Francisco, Washington D . C . and Ottawa. They included interviews with the C E O s , vice presidents, and human resource managers from a variety of firms that engage in 'high tech' work in Vancouver, B . C . and Seattle, Washington. These companies employ software engineers who have to cross the Canada-U.S. border often for purposes of work (e.g. sales, research, and service activities). These firms also recruit specialists, such as software engineers, computer graphic design artists, and engineers in general from either side of the Canada-U.S. border in order for the firm to remain competitive in its respective industry. Canadian and U . S . immigration lawyers practicing law primarily within the Vancouver-Seattle corridor were also included in this study for their background and understanding of the T N status and the H l - B visas. I felt that these attorneys were important 6  in order to determine i f intermediaries, such as immigration attorneys, were significant in the management of the U . S . border within the Cascadia region. In fact, I found that they played an important role. Specifically, the attorneys contributed tremendous insights into the culture and sprit of both the Canadian and U . S . immigration services, in addition to providing leads to companies that move people back and forth across the Canada-U.S. border under N A F T A . Canadian and U . S . front-line immigration officials and port of entry directors were also interviewed for this research since their understandings, interpretations, and adjudications of N A F T A statuses (in addition to being the gatekeeper to the flows of people, in general) were pivotal to learning how the border acts as a shield and/or sieve when allowing for the legitimate movements of professionals. Finally, interviews with key officials within institutions, primarily governmental, which affect or have influence on the policy development and or adjudication of cross border labour mobility policies were also included as part of this study due to the fact that many of the ideas and policy influence regarding the border originate with these actors in the major ministries and departments in Ottawa and Washington D . C . The following section expands on the nature of these three types of actors involved in cross-border regulations.  1.4.1 T h e F i r m s Currently there is a minuscule amount of literature that explores the development and operations of clusters of high tech firms that operate in a cross border transnational setting. However, there appears to be a growing trend in the need for smaller, non-multinational firms  6  The T N status and the H-1B visa will be explored in more detail in Chapter 3 of the dissertation. 10  to have a global reach upon firm inception, and the necessary requirement to move beyond the borders of nation states. For example, Saxenian (2000) demonstrated that Chinese and Indian engineers started 29 percent of Silicon Valley's technology companies between the years of 1995-98, and spend considerable time traveling between their operations in Silicon Valley and China and Taiwan, which contributed to a growing transnational economic network between North America and Asia. Saxenian expanded on this idea two years later in a study conducted for the Brookings Institution in 2002 by stating the following,  A s recently as the 1970s, only giant corporations had the resources and capabilities to grow internationally, and they did so primarily by establishing marketing offices or manufacturing plants overseas. Today, new transportation and communications technologies allow even the smallest firms to build partnerships with foreign producers to tap overseas expertise, cost-savings, and markets. Start-ups in Silicon Valley are often global actors from the day they begin operations. (Saxenian 2002)  The above quote helps to confirm Canada and the U . S . ' s growing experience in transcending international boundaries as a part of daily operations for the emerging information and technology sector.  This phenomenon w i l l be explored more thoroughly in the dissertation in  the hopes of contributing to this nascent body of literature. W i t h i n the large and varied "high tech" sector of Cascadia a total of 10 companies, located in either the Vancouver and Seattle areas, that have Canada-U.S. cross border connections/activities participated in this research project. I originally intended to interview 30 firms in both Vancouver and Seattle. However, due to the bursting of the "dotcom" bubble in early 2001, followed by the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the U . S . , many software firms in both Seattle and Vancouver either went out of business or were barely remaining in business with a "barebones" professional staff when I began my empirical research in 2002. In fact, when I first commenced interviewing firms in November of 2002, one software firm, which ranked number 16 in terms of sales and size according to the  Seattle Business Journal 2002 annual  report, noted that they once had a staff of about 70-80 people in 2000. However, due to the bubble bursting and 9/11 a vice president of the firm (who answered the main phone line when I first called the firm) said to me, "Kathrine, we are down to 18 people. Essentially, we sent all of the foreigners, which included Canadians, home. W e couldn't pay them. I don't think we can help you with your research at this time." This was frequently the case for many of the  11  software firms especially those in the Seattle area, which, ironically, were touted as having much potential all through the late 1990s.  Based on the above circumstances, I decided to broaden the sample of firms to any firm that worked within the "high tech" sector, which needed to employ software engineers for the firms various line of work. This strategy yielded a much more robust sample since many firms, whether mature or new, had gone "high tech" in order to remain competitive and employed at least some software engineers and related professions. I found this to be especially true for some of the largest companies located in the Seattle area (including resourced based firms). For example, Weyerhaeuser, headquartered in Federal W a y , Washington and the largest timber and paper-manufacturing firm in the world, employed approximately 50,000 people globally, and had a considerable number of software engineers as professional staff at their headquarters (Weyerhaeuser Annual Report, 2004). Additionally, Boeing, the world's largest manufacturer of commercial airplanes, employs over 1,000 software engineers also for a variety of purposes within the production of commercial aircraft and related products, such as Minute M a n missiles and other U . S . defense ballistics. Regionally, Boeing is responsible for employing or creating " s p i n - o f f employment for roughly 100,000 jobs within the Seattle area. Microsoft, located in Redmond, Washington, not only employed over 9,000 software engineers, but it has also helped to draw many start-up software firms to the Seattle area that have, in turn, employed hundreds of foreign software engineers (Markusen, 1999). The interview with from the Seattle-based firm revealed four key themes: (1) for the most part, the firm sometimes did have difficulties bringing in software engineers and related professionals from Canada, especially after 9/11; (2) a representative the firm noted that due to the fact that it used an in-house attorney and the firm had experienced human resources professionals, the firm was usually capable o f avoiding any serious problems, and, in fact, had never had a refusal of entry for the personnel that they hire under N A F T A ; (3) for the most part, the U . S . firm lauded the Canadian experience when sending employees across the border as intracompany transferees, new American hires, or for services contracts; and (4) finally all U . S . and Canadian firms found the Canadian immigration service to be extremely professional, knowledgeable, and most importantly, predictable in their adjudications and issuing of working permits/visas, stressing that the U . S . side could possible learn from this management style. These findings will be explored in more detail in Chapter 4 of the dissertation as well as in the conclusion.  12  B y comparison, the Vancouver based firms were much more varied and significantly smaller than the Seattle firm. H i g h tech firms interviewed ranged from relatively small-scale firms that developed single person operated submarines to large-scale companies in leading edge hydrogen fuel cell and professional printing technologies. Additionally, the largest firm interviewed in Vancouver employed a total of about 1,000 people within the Greater Vancouver area. O f course, these employment numbers are a few magnitudes less than those employed by Boeing and Microsoft or their high-technology supply firms within the Seattle area. Despite these employment size differentials between key firms in Seattle and Vancouver^ Vancouver is beginning quickly to "come into its o w n " with key world class technologies and firms that should prosper and flourish within the next decade. This concept and growth potential w i l l be explored more deeply within Chapter 4 of the dissertation. Interviews from these Vancouver based firms revealed five key themes: (1) firm size is significantly smaller than the Seattle based firm, and led to less firm recognition and "clout" when trying to cross into the U . S . ; (2) the mobility of employees is based on time zones and regions, not countries; (3) the Canada-U.S. border has become much more unpredictable since September 11; and (4) firms are turning more and more to attorneys for advice on N A F T A applications and general cross border mobility strategies when moving employees or potential employees across the Canada-U.S. border for work. These findings w i l l be explored in detail in Chapter 4 of the dissertation as well as the conclusion.  1.4.2 The Immigration Officials Historically, the state has played the most important role in modern times when it comes to controlling movements of people (Scott, 1998). Despite the increasing inquisition of the State over time in the movements of people across international boundaries, the freest time for the movements of wealthy foreigners occurred in Europe, just prior to W o r l d W a r I (Torpey, 2001).  During this time period, there was considerable emphasis placed on the fact that these  foreigners could bring considerable wealth into foreign cities and nation states. This welcoming attitude of the state towards foreigners ended abruptly during W o r l d War I, and since this time emphasis has been placed on controlling the entry of foreigners into other nation states, and there has been a growth of discretionary power of immigration officers who represent and execute the w i l l of the state towards foreigners. There is a relatively sparse literature on this topic area, but there have been some studies conducted over the past ten  13  years. B y way of illustration the Migration Policy Institute, formerly the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, has probably been the most prolific with pragmatic publications on this topic area, both before and after 9/11. For instance, in the late 1990s, the Carnegie Endowment published an important monograph, authored by Demetrios Papademetriou, T. Alexander Aleinkiff, and Deborah Waller Meyers, entitled,  Reorganizing the U.S. Immigration Function:  Toward a New Framework for Accountability. This explored the purpose and function of the legacy U . S . Immigration and Naturalization Service, and to some extent the professional backgrounds of the actual immigration officers. Slightly later, Joseph Nevins in  Operation  Gatekeeper (2002) and Peter Andreas in Border Games (2000) explored the culture and attitude of U.S. immigration officers along the U . S . - M e x i c o border. However, shortly following 9/11, the U . S . Immigration and Naturalization Service was abolished and completely restructured into the newly created U . S . Department of Homeland Security in early 2003. The Canadians quickly followed suit with the creation of the Canadian Border Service Agency, which replaced Customs and Revenue Canada and Citizenship and Immigration Canada. A relative "flurry" o f recent literature has been published on these new developments regarding the immigration function and enforcement along and within the North American borders, with Peter Andreas  and Thomas Biersteker, edited volume, The Rebordering of North America: Integration and  Exclusion in a New Security Context (2003); and, from the Migration Policy Institute, Stephen Yale-Loehr, Demetri Papademetriou, and Betsy Cooper's  Secure Borders, Open Doors: Visa  Procedures in the Post-September 11 Era (2005) as well as Deborah Waller Meyers' report, One Face at the Border: Behind the Slogan (2005). The above narrative provides an introduction to the fact that literature on the topic of immigration and immigration officials is ever changing and growing with new perspectives, especially after 9/11. Chapters 2 and 3 comprise a more detailed review of these topics. For the purpose of this study, a greater understanding of the nature and culture of immigration officers is extremely important since much power rests in the hands of the reviewing officer at each port of entry for N A F T A applications. Thus, considerable time is dedicated to this topic area in the dissertation, especially with regard to commenting on the semi-structured interviews. The next few paragraphs w i l l provides a short review of the types of immigration officers involved in this study, and the key findings, which emerged from this component of the research.  14  Immigration officers include district directors, special agents, port directors, and front line supervisors for both the B . C . / Y u k o n District of Citizenship and Immigration Canada and the Seattle District of the U . S . Department of Homeland Security (formerly the U . S . Immigration and Naturalization Service). Immigration policy experts employed by Citizenship and Immigration Canada and the Department of Homeland Security and based in Ottawa or Washington D . C . were also included in the study within the cohort of interviewees. The rationale for interviewing front-line Canadian and U . S . immigration officials for this research project was that this cohort is a primary official gatekeeper/facilitator to labour mobility across the Canada-U.S. border under N A F T A . In addition, the need to interview a number of key policy officials who wrote and annually amend Chapter 16 of N A F T A (either in Washington D . C . or in Ottawa) was essential to understand the ideas behind the origins of Chapter 16 of N A F T A (e.g. how changes are negotiated between all actors involved and the dissemination and implementation of these changes with front-line immigration officials at the ports of entry.) To provide some background for the reader, N A F T A was written originally in the early 1990s in such a way that a person applying for a N A F T A status might go to a port of entry (POE) of the receiving country with completed application materials. Then, ideally, he/she would be issued a N A F T A status within ten minutes to a few hours of applying. This procedure has given powers of review and adjudication rights to front-line immigration officers at the P O E , which was not the case prior to N A F T A , and understandably the change in border policy has had tremendous influence in the gate keeping/facilitation mechanism of North American labour flows under N A F T A (Vazquez-Azpiri, 2000). In collecting information for the thesis, I found the majority of immigration officials (especially those in the U.S.) were extremely cooperative and helpful with the interview process. Indeed, many Canadian officials were most concerned as to what would happen with my work when it was complete, in addition to the fact that they wanted to know who my supervisor was and other U . B . C . faculty that were involved with my research project. Once this was established, Citizenship and Immigration Canada was extremely helpful, and even served me tea at our first meeting at the C I C downtown Vancouver office! Regarding the actual interviews, each interviewee was asked a series of approximately 15 questions relating to the Canada/U.S. border (see Appendices 1, 2, and 3). From these questions, six themes began to emerge: 1) the impact of N A F T A on labour mobility between Canada and the U . S . and the Cascadia region specifically; 2) the types of professions that are difficult to interpret under N A F T A ; 3) how 15  immigration officials are educated about Chapter 16 of N A F T A ; 4) the issue of port shopping (i.e. choosing the 'easiest' port of entry); 5) how immigration officials saw the role of attorneys in the N A F T A application process; and 6) how September 11 had influenced the flows of professionals across the Canada-U.S. border. These themes and possible consequences towards the development of a high tech corridor within Cascadia w i l l be explored within Chapter 5 and the Conclusion of the dissertation. 1.4.3 T h e I m m i g r a t i o n A t t o r n e y s  Overall, the 'migration industry' (i.e. the lawyers who prepare immigration and visa applications and argue cases on behalf of their clients) may be considered a 'meso-structure" which acts in the space between micro (local) - and macro (international)-structures, by linking individual activities to the state and the economy (Castles and M i l l e r 1998: 26). This mesostructure or layer is especially true for the role of business immigration attorneys. This group not only serves as an interface between individuals, firms, and front-line immigration officials at ports-of-entry, but the immigration attorneys also act as key 'spokespeople' and 'lobbyists' to the national government officials who create immigration policy and also to the public at large. In regards to this study, many of the attorneys interviewed had served since the early 1990s in a capacity as professional advocates and facilitators for N A F T A applicants. They also have a wide breadth of knowledge about the labour mobility process and immigration law, especially when it involved crossing the U.S.-Canada-Mexico borders. Consequently, understanding their part in how the Canada-U.S. border operates in the Cascadia region is critical, and a key pillar within the empirical work of this study. This component is also significant as there is very little literature, i f at all, on the role of attorneys in the movements of professional foreign workers across international boundaries. Therefore, it is hoped that the outcomes and findings of this study w i l l help to provide more academic insights into the role and capacities that business immigration attorneys fill in the movement of professionals across North American borders. The majority of immigration attorneys interviewed had law offices in either the Vancouver or Seattle areas . T w o attorneys were located outside of the Cascadia corridor. One practiced law in Toronto at a medium sized firm and the other practiced law in San Francisco at a large and well-established firm. M a n y of the attorneys stressed that although much of their client base came from the region, they also had clients throughout North America, Europe, and Asia. 16  S i m i l a r to i m m i g r a t i o n o f f i c i a l s , each l a w y e r was a s k e d a series o f a p p r o x i m a t e l y 15 questions relating to the C a n a d a / U . S . border. (See A p p e n d i x 3.) F r o m these i n t e r v i e w s , s i x major themes b e c a m e apparent:  1) the impact o f N A F T A o n l a b o u r m o b i l i t y b e t w e e n C a n a d a and t h e  U . S . and the C a s c a d i a r e g i o n s p e c i f i c a l l y ; 2) the p o w e r and " c l o u t " o f large versus small f i r m s ; 3) the types o f professions that were e s p e c i a l l y d i f f i c u l t to 'interpret' u n d e r N A F T A p r o v i s i o n s ; 4) h o w i m m i g r a t i o n officials were educated about C h a p t e r 16 o f N A F T A ; 5) the issue o f ' p o r t s h o p p i n g ' (i.e. c h o o s i n g the 'easiest' port o f entry); 6) the s e e m i n g l y i n d i s p u t a b l e power o f the front-line i m m i g r a t i o n officials and the " d i s c o n n e c t " b e t w e e n distant p o l i c y makers i n n a t i o n a l capitals and these front-line o f f i c i a l s ; and, 7) h o w 9/11 has i n f l u e n c e d the f l o w s o f professionals across the C a n a d a - U . S . border and the attorneys' l i n e o f w o r k . T h e s e themes a n d p o s s i b l e consequences for the d e v e l o p m e n t o f a h i g h tech c o r r i d o r w i t h i n C a s c a d i a w i l l be e x p l o r e d w i t h i n C h a p t e r 6 and i n the C o n c l u s i o n o f the dissertation.  1.5 Summary T h i s chapter has p r o v i d e d a general i n t r o d u c t i o n and r e a s o n i n g for the p u r p o s e o f c o n d u c t i n g this dissertation. Part I w i l l c o n t i n u e w i t h C h a p t e r 2, w h i c h w i l l r e v i e w the appropriate realms o f literatures that p r o v i d e a theoretical and c o n c e p t u a l structure to the dissertation. A d d i t i o n a l l y , it w i l l depict an i d e a l type o f cross b o r d e r f l o w s for p r o f e s s i o n a l labour m o b i l i t y u n d e r N A F T A rules i n the n e w e c o n o m y , and h o w e a c h actor i n f l u e n c e s a n d interplays w i t h other actors i n terms o f the m o v e m e n t o f these p r o f e s s i o n a l s . C h a p t e r 3 w i l l e x p l o r e the c o n c e p t o f the r e g i o n o f " C a s c a d i a " and h o w it operates e c o n o m i c a l l y . Part II o f the thesis focuses o n the e m p i r i c a l w o r k c o v e r e d i n the study, w i t h C h a p t e r 4 e x p l o r i n g the f i r m s ' experiences i n m o v i n g p e o p l e b a c k and forth across the C a n a d a - U . S . b o r d e r . S p e c i a l attention w i l l be p l a c e d o n the V a n c o u v e r f i r m s ' experiences (as s m a l l e r f i r m s ) i n contrast to the larger Seattle based f i r m ' s experience w h e n it c o m e s to m o v i n g e m p l o y e e s and p o t e n t i a l employees b a c k a n d forth across the C a n a d a - U . S . border. C h a p t e r 5 e x p l o r e s the r o l e o f i m m i g r a t i o n o f f i c i a l s , b o t h front-line o f f i c i a l s at the v a r i o u s ports o f entry i n a d d i t i o n to k e y i m m i g r a t i o n p o l i c y o f f i c i a l s based i n O t t a w a and W a s h i n g t o n D . C . T h e r e l a t i o n s h i p a n d interplay between these g o v e r n m e n t a l p o l i c y makers and the o f f i c i a l s w h o interpret a n d adjudicate N A F T A a p p l i c a t i o n s ' o n the g r o u n d ' w i l l be e x a m i n e d i n a d d i t i o n to h o w other actors see and interpret their e x p e r i e n c e s w i t h these p r i m a r y gatekeepers and p o l i c y m a k e r s . C h a p t e r 6 examines the r o l e o f i m m i g r a t i o n attorneys i n the m o v e m e n t o f professionals across the C a n a d a - U . S . border. P a r t i c u l a r emphasis is p l a c e d o n h o w i m m i g r a t i o n attorneys are seen and p o r t r a y e d b y other 17  actors in addition to their own reflections of themselves and their profession. Part III of the dissertation w i l l include Chapter 7, which provides a discussion of the research findings, policy implications and recommendations, and a conclusion of the dissertation research and possible next steps.  Chapter 2 - Borders and the Movement of the Highly Skilled 2 . 1 Introduction In order to begin to answer the question as to whether the international border impedes the development of Cascadia as a high technology region, a number of more general themes are relevant in framing this study. Clearly, geographers have long been interested in borders and borderlands, and this suggests a rich array of literature to review. Similarly, Cascadia has been identified as a high-tech region, albeit growing on either side of an international border. The growth of the 'knowledge intensive firm' and the workforce in the past 20 years or so provides a hint that highly skilled labour is important to the success of Cascadia, and that mobility of labour is equally important as the mobility of goods and services within the Cascadia region. Still, understanding the dynamics of the Cascadia economy is complex, and so requires a review of diverse literatures and frameworks that have hitherto rarely been juxtaposed, namely the geography of borders and borderlands; the spatial dynamics of high-technology regions; transnationalism and labour mobility of the highly skilled; and cross border institutions that facilitate or impede labour mobility. These general literatures are discussed within the following chapter, which closes with a discussion of how they might be applied to research on highly skilled labour mobility within the Cascadia corridor.  2 . 2 Borders and Borderlands: Their History, Current Situation, and Possible Futures  Boundaries have been long associated with kingdoms, tribal territories, and tribal kingships. However, not until the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, when the H o l y Roman Emperor conferred sovereign independence on princes who remained formally within the E m p i r e , ending the 7  Thirty Years' War which involved much of Europe, did the inviolable nature of territory, and its respective boundaries, begin to be associated with the modern state (Muir, 1983: 20). Since this inception in the mid-1600s, national boundaries in Europe have been riddled with conflict Sovereignty involves the recognition by the sovereign of the exclusive rights of other sovereigns to govern within their respective states, and of the inviolable nature of the territory of other states (Muir, 1983: 20). 7  18  between any two neighboring nation states (see for example, Prescott, 1965; Eyre, 1968; Hodder, 1968; Beckinsale, 1969; and Rushton, 1968). For instance, it not until the latter part of the 20th century that regions spanning international boundaries were seen as having economic promise and opportunity to literally transcend the nation state (Anderson, 2000). This section provides a brief introduction to how borders have been interpreted over the past century; how these current trends towards globalization have shifted the image of border regions; and, currently with a greater emphasis on meso scale regional development, how various border regions might be perceived due to the globalization of neo-liberal regimes. It should also be stressed that due to a "Post 9-11 World" borders throughout the world have taken on a much more security focused position. This trend will also be explored in the remaining sections. 2.2.1 The Historical Importance of Borders and Borderlands Borders may be seen as one of the important variables that allow any particular state to be part of an international system composed of sovereign nations. Specifically, a state's sovereignty terminates at its boundaries, as this represents the interface between two or more neighboring territories. It is here that the roles of boundaries and borders have been crucial for over the past 300 years. Historically, boundaries have always been problematic in a political or administrative sense, although the nature and degree of potential conflict has greatly varied from border to border (Sahlins, 1989; Martinez, 1986; and Muir, 1983). Therefore, borders have typically been seen as 'buffer zones', and this perception has often diminished opportunities for both wide-scale international trade as well as international conflict. In fact, historically, there have been often few incentives to develop and populate borderlands especially since frequent warfare in continents such as Europe resulted in constant alterations of nation state boundaries. Nations that often lost part of their borderland territories in conflict had good reason not to develop or populate their remaining borderlands in order to keep the national "heartland" at a safe distance from aggressive neighbors. For example, the ScottishEnglish border region created an extremely unstable environment with devastating consequences for the local border communities over the course of three centuries. George MacDonald Fraser, in his book, The Steel Bonnets: The Story of the Anglo-Scottish Reivers,  Border  captures this situation well: Whoever gained in the end, the Border Country suffered fearfully in the process. It was the ring in which the champions met; armies marched and counter-marched and fought and fled across it; it was wasted and burned and despoiled, its people harried and robbed 19  and slaughtered, on both sides, by both sides. Whatever the rights and wrongs, the Borderers were the people who bore the brunt; for almost 300 years, from the late thirteenth century to the middle of the sixteenth, they lived on a battlefield. (Fraser, 1989 cited in Martinez, 1994, p. 13) A s well, the experiences of 'tejanos' (Texas Mexicans) in the 19th century were similar to those living along the Scottish and English borders, although the period of instability was m u c h shorter (Martinez, 1994). Oscar Martinez, in his book Border People: Life and Society in the U.S. - Mexico Borderlands, describes this war-torn borderland:  During the Texas rebellion of the 1830s and the U . S . - M e x i c o War in the following decade, the Texas-Mexico border became a ravaged wasteland, forcing many borderlands to choose between remaining in their war-torn land and abandoning it for safer ground. Scores of tejanos sought asylum in Mexican territory, returning to their homes years later after the issue of a permanent boundary had been settled. (Martinez, 1994, p. 13) The decline of territorial conflicts after W o r l d War II and advancements in technology allowed countries to both modernize their transportation and communication systems as well as steadily increase international trade. In fact, interdependence between once warring countries has quickly become a way of life, as can be seen with the strong economic relationship between two former enemies, namely Germany and France, and the experience of the larger European Community following 1945. Since the 1970s with the onset of globalization, border regions found in North America, Europe, and A s i a (with some important exceptions being North and South Korea, for example) have begun to have a more prominent role in labour exchanges, commercial transactions, and binational industrialization due to growing international trade (Held, 2000 and Edgington et al., 2003). These concepts and others w i l l be explored more thoroughly in the following sections. Illustrations 2.1 and 2.2 provide visual depictions of two of the better know border regions throughout the world.  20  Z2.  \  The U.S.-Mexico Borderlands in Southern California A  Port of Entry  Interstate  (60S)  Source: Andreas, 2000  Grossman  Illustration 2.1  SINGAPORE  IN 0 0 N ESI A  The Singapore-Jnhore-Riau Growth Triangle  Source: Macleod and M c G e e , 1996  Illustration 2.2  21  2.2.2 The Contemporary Importance of Borders and Borderlands In an era of globalization, transborder trade and movements of people across international borders is key. Ohmae has explored these concepts in a popular fashion in his 1990 book, Borderless  World and empirically the issue has been treated in Regions and the World  Economy (1998) by A l a n Scott. In the post cold war period, border regions have been perceived as having many positive prospects rather than being characterized by the more traditional problems such as illegal migration, smuggling, air pollution, water contamination, and trade protection, although these latter issues remain important. In fact, border regions once seen as national hinterlands are now cooperating with crossborder partner regions to form crossborder regional alliances, such as the Regio Basiliensis, formed in 1963, which includes Alsace (France), South Baden (Germany) and the border cantons of Switzerland (Briner, 1986). This trinational body, which has received endorsement from each nation's respective government, assesses the needs of the common border area, collects data, and engages in transportation and environmental planning for the region as a whole. The Regio Basiliensis provides a positive model for not only the European Commission, in its long, yet deliberate, process of integrating Europe's borderlands with capital for transnational economic development, but also for other regions throughout the world which are separated by international boundaries, but are drawn to one another in an age of global economic integration.  Although the above paragraph may appear optimistic about the overall future progress of crossborder cooperation and integration, it should be noted that the three major global triads, Europe, A s i a , and North America are at very different stages of mesoregional integration. W h i l e there has been an acceleration in the number of regional trading block agreements in recent years (e.g. the European Union, the North American Free Trade Agreement, and Association of South East Asian Nations) most outside of the European U n i o n are very limited in the depth and extent of their integration and these differences have commensurate implications for particular cross-border (or meso-level) regions ( W u , 2001). Only Europe has advanced to the stage of a formal economic union, which the harmonization of certain economic and social policies under supranational control. North America, which includes Canada, M e x i c o , and the United States, has not integrated beyond a simple free trade agreement, namely the North American Free Trade Agreement ( N A F T A ) - although labour and environmental side agreements were an important part of N A F T A . E v e n slower in formal .  22  integration is Asia, which has not progressed beyond the stage of international free trade commitments, such as the ten nations involved in the Association of South East Asian Nations ( A S E A N ) , or the A s i a Pacific Economic Cooperation ( A P E C ) forum, which has scheduled a reduction of trade barriers by 2020 in the Bogor Agreement  ( A P E C , 2005). Ultimately, at  whatever level of economic and political integration that these regional entities finally achieve, it is the borders and borderlands of component nations that w i l l likely receive a tremendous amount of influence and change from their roles as peripheries of the nation state to the gateways of international regional economies.  2.2.3 The Potential Futures of Borders and Borderlands The future focus of borders lie within the crossborder or transborder regions in which they transect. For example, the means by which binational communities in Europe such as France and Germany have made dramatic efforts to make their national borders more porous to facilitate trade and economic growth also provides a solid and inspiring model for other crossborder regions to follow. However, even the success of Europe's border region integration is not uniform. B y way of illustration, the economic integration of the DutchGerman border is much more complete than that of Spain and Portugal (Dickens, 1998, and Capellin and Bates, 1993). Additionally, the Nijmegen Centre for Border Research at the Radboud University Nijmegen, established i n 1998, has an extensive listing of recent publications dedicated to the European challenge of "debordering", "rebordering", and "reordering" its boundaries, both inside and outside the E U . Wong-Gonzalez (2001) captured well the opportunities, but also the struggles that many of these emerging transnational regions face i n an era of globalization,  The relationship between territory and globalization can be said to have a double face O n one side, it supposes the creation of a single world space of interdependencies that constitutes the scope of the new global economy and culture; on the other, it entails the restructuring of existing territories, a new division of international labour, and a new geography of development with winning and losing regions, becoming a factor of both opportunity and danger. In this sense , the possible regional impacts of globalization w i l l depend strongly on the specific territorial response; that is, the modality of integration-the exogenous condition-and on the region's endogenous ability to enhance such a process The emergence of transborder regions is noteworthy as a part of this The difference between cross border and transborder regions will be discussed in a upcoming section of this chapter. 8  23  change in economic geography and territorial division of labour on a global scale, resulting form the processes of globalization and international integration; these are entities with qualifications superior to those called simply border regions. (Wong Gonzalez, 2001; 59) Overall, even i n an era of "free trade" the successful development of transborder regions depends on specific circumstances, agencies and willingness to cooperate. It is the painstaking details of transborder development and the institutions, structures and agencies that make this happen, which w i l l help to determine i f these new meso scale regions w i l l succeed in increasing trade and economic growth in addition to the development of the transborder region's own culture. A l a i n Vanneph in Wong-Gonzalez (2001) explained this idea, as a 'region of the third k i n d ' . He states,  When market forces transcend the obstacles conventionally established by people and generate a migratory and economic dynamics, inducing such evolutions, [such as ] solidarities and convergences on both sides of the border, that a single transitional space is created between them or, better said, about them; a 'region of the third kind'- with a l l the interest that covers this hybrid, this 'cross fertilization,' creator not only of change and wealth but also of a new culture or a new space of cultural identity from the neighborhood to the region. (Alain Vanneph in Wong-Gonzalez , 2001; 59) The above implies that there is much potential not only economically and geographically with the development of transborder regions, but also the opportunity to develop a hybrid culture between and within the transborder region. Examples of this include Cascadia (McCloskey, 1988 and Artibise, 1996), the many communities along the U . S . - M e x i c o border (Martinez, 1994), and the domestic settlements that have straddled international borders throughout Europe for centuries (Ratti, 1993). What is most interesting about these referent examples of crossborder regions is that there is a strong transborder culture, which has existed long before the emergence of globalization and its subsequent transborder regional development. Thus, the communities situated along these international borders might be in a stronger position to develop a 'region of the third kind' as compared to newer transborder regions, driven primarily by globalization and economics. However, a new factor that has been added to the mix of transborder regions is the concept of 'security', especially following 9/11. In fact, security is now the number one priority for all border regions that deal with the United States when it comes to shipping, or staging, goods and services, and/or moving people either into or out of the U . S . A . (Rudd and Furneaux, 2002). In the foreseeable future, it is likely that the successful facilitation of N A F T A at all North American borders, as well as the smooth implementation of 24  trade policies around the world, must succumb to the ever changing concept of security and its increasing influence (Rudd and Furneaux, 2002).  The next section moves from a general history of the role of borders and border regions to the more specific notion of developing cross border regions. It briefly explores the idea of cross border regional development in theory and practice. The chapter w i l l then move to some of the primary concepts regarding post September 11 security within North America. It will place particular emphasis on continental perimeter security as well as the Mexican experience along the U . S . - M e x i c o border, and how these new security policies may influence the movements o f legitimate travelers that influence and impede cross border development.  2.3 Cross-Border Regional Development in Theory and Practice Besides a historical perspective, discussion of theories relevant to cross-border regions (hereafter C B R s ) and their development in an era of globalization is also pertinent to this essay. Thus, a literature has emerged that examines many different perspectives o f these changing borders. From a more tangible approach, C B R s have specific characteristics that distinguish them from other types of regions located within a nation state (e.g. their intersections with boundaries between provinces and states). Consequently, theorizing and policy formation regarding their long-term development has been relatively complex and difficult. In concrete terms, the major theoretical foundations of regional theory and analysis centering around traditional models - such as regional growth theory (Perloff and Dodd, 1963), location theory 9  (Losch), the original regional development formulations of John Friedmann , and the growth 10  pole theory of Peroux (Friedmann, 1965; and Darwent, 1969) do not apply easily to those regions containing cross-border areas. For example, much of the literature using these theoretical models was dedicated to British Post- W o r l d War II N e w Towns, in an effort to decentralize growth away from the central city of London. Hence, the following section w i l l begin to discuss why particular regional growth theories, which are based on regional linkages Perloff and Dodd (1963) focus on the idea of "export" and "internal" determinants as they relate to regional growth. Internal determinants can be characterized by a region's natural strengths and the success of its growth sequences. Export determinants can be described as that part of a region's growth, which is attributed to exported goods or services at a competitive advantage with respect to other regions. Friedmann (1965:12) stresses the fact that no matter at what scale (world, continent, nation, and city) the centreperiphery hypothesis appears on all the relevant scales of explanation simultaneously as cause and as effect of economic transformation. Essentially, industrial growth tends to be concentrated upon a few metropolitan regions, or to use Francois Peroux's vivid expression, "the growth poles" of an economy. 9  0  25  within nation states, do not adequately represents the needs and unique characteristics of regional cross-border development.  2.3.1 Similarities in the Development of Cross Border Regions Although there are differences between cross-border regional development and conventional regional development, as noted in the preceding section, there are also similarities. Indeed, a number of studies have been carried out on cross border regions. However, I would argue that these have been primarily focused on describing particular cross border flows. (See for example  Regional Studies, 1999, Geojournal, 1998, and the Journal of Borderland Studies).  There has been relatively little literature that has attempted to analyze the importance of border management to the overall growth of these regions. Thus, one objective of this dissertation w i l l be to provide a solid analysis of how, as a whole, Cascadia's international border separating Vancouver and Seattle is administered, and whether this serves the growing needs of the region. This section reviews studies that focus on the particular needs of cross border regions, which points out the similarities between cross border regions and more conventional regional development theories. According to W u (1998: 5) there are four aspects that are more or less similar in importance to their successful development: the role of infrastructure, the significance of transportation costs, the importance of factor supplies, such as labour and comparatively inexpensive land, and the crucial role of government in promoting development. Thus, appropriate infrastructure is considered crucial in promoting economic development as the 'backwardness' of formerly remote locations close to borders can affect cross border transportation costs as well as business investment location decisions. W u argues that the strongest attribute with remote border locations is often the availability of inexpensive land and labour. The fourth factor seen as important to development of cross border regions is government intervention in the form of seed capital and effort has been seen as essential for a region to succeed in attracting investment and engaging in sustained regional economic development.  O f course all of these factors identified by W u can also be considered key factors in the success of conventional regional development as well as cross-border development. However, according to W u (1998), there are a number of aspects of economic growth i n cross-border  26  regions that are unique from other types of regional development, and which are not considered in the convention regional development literature.  The first of these differences include complementary factors of production. A key point is that cross-border development hinges on the complementarities of factors across borders, such as high levels of capital in California along-side low wage labour and relatively inexpensive land in M e x i c o . A second example of this concept includes cross-border regions that profit from providing expertise, adding value, or storing a good until it is purchased as it moves from one country to the other (e.g. the Hong Kong-Shenzhen corridor). Essentially, these border regions often specialize in the disjuncture and different trade policies within a natural geographical region divided by an international border. Compared with the reality of cross border zones , conventional regional development theory often assumes the mobility of factors of production, including labour across borders. Finally, unlike regions lying completely within any nation state, one of the greatest challenges with a cross border region involves the transaction costs and delays that are an inherent attribute of all but the most intricately integrated borders, such as the Benelux region of Europe (Bertram, 1998).  Thirdly, yet another challenge of developing a cross-border region is integrating two or more areas with incompatible economic systems. For example, Hong Kong-Shenzhen, Germany and Poland, and the border areas of Thailand-Laos have proved to be very complicated in blending various transitional economies with market based ones. A n even greater challenge in this mix is where transitional economies are also going through political reforms. Bertram (1998) calls these cases "double transformations". W u (1998) noted that developing cross border regions with incompatible economic systems may pose other challenges. These include the fact that there is the issue of additional institutional learning that must occur as the economy moves from one system to another, as well as the challenges of being a latecomer to industrialization.  Fourthly, the role and stability of national institutions are pivotal to the success of any crossborder development. For example, much of the delay in achieving results i n the Hong KongShenzhen region has been due to institutional problems. Specifically, the Chinese government had to progressively liberalize many restrictions such as wages and lease o f land to nonChinese citizens ( W u , 1998).  27  Fifthly, economic complementarities must be present in order for cross-border development to work. This is the most important attribute to successful cross border development. Essentially, Cross border development fixes differences in space, and attracts movement of investment across the border to the region, which has the less expensive labour force and land (Wu, 1998: 7). (Conventional theory by comparison expects movement of labour towards the center or urban core of a region.) The U . S . - M e x i c o border is probably the best example of this dynamic. Within Cascadia, there is some activity that fits into this type of cross border complementarity. (See Merrit, 1998; and Richardson, 1998). However, since the greater Vancouver area can be described as a post-manufacturing economy, and with land and labour costs i n the neighbouring U . S . county not being that dramatically different compared to the Greater Vancouver area, there is not the same ferocity of economic activity that can be found along key urban corridors along the U . S . - M e x i c o border where macquiladora zones attract U . S . direct foreign investment that takes advantage of cheap wages in M e x i c o (Andreas, 2000).  Finally, much of conventional regional development theory has revolved around the importance of large-scale industrialization and the formal economy ( W u , 1998). However, by comparison, many cross-border developments focus on trade within small-scale industries (e.g. clothing, household goods, electronics, and so forth), and also within the service sector, and cross border regions have taken advantage of exchanges between the small-scale informal economies. For example, cross-border areas straddling between the transitional market economies of Russia and China and China and Vietnam have engaged i n cross-border trade since it provides an opportunity for residents on either side of the border to buy affordable consumer goods or hard currency, in exchange for agricultural products or raw materials.  Over time, this small-scale  trading potentially allows entrepreneurs to invest in larger trading operations or diversify into other activities (ibid.).  A s mentioned previously, the development of cross-border regions to facilitate international trade and economic development is a relatively new and changing phenomenon. Therefore, in the literature there has been little theoretical work dealing rigorously with the underlying cycles and dynamics of cross border regions, even though there are specific case studies to describe these recent and unfamiliar activities. This section's discussion has attempted to demonstrate that border regions have many unique attributes, which are not dealt with by conventional theories of development. Hence, due to this poverty of literature, which critically examines .  --•  28  cross border theorization, there is a need for more articulate research on this topic area. The following section w i l l examine various type of cross-border development drawing from European, Asian, and North American experiences in an attempt to gain a greater understanding of possibly theories, which might be derived from these new activities.  2.3.2 Types of Cross-Border Regions and their Development Although the various meso regions within the "global triad" have had different histories, and most likely w i l l experience different futures, many cross-borders regions, whether in Europe or South East Asia, appear to be going through significant transitions. This section reviews a series of representative case studies from the various mesoscale cross-border regions of Europe, A s i a , and North America, stressing their unique features but also drawing attention to their commonalties.  W u (1998) in a review of the European and A s i a Pacific situations emphasizes that crossborder regions have a number of different characteristics, but fall primarily into three different types (see Table 2.1). W u calls his first category "border regions", which are primarily the least developed regions of the three types and have the least potential for trade and other forms of cross-border interaction. The Russia-China-North Korea border area is an example of this type of border region (see Illustration 2.3). The second type he calls "cross-border regions". These are characterized by inter-dependent economic relations and substantial trade, but some types of flows (e.g. immigration) are still tightly controlled. The H o n g Kong-Guangdong Province in A s i a and the Cascadia Corridor in North America are examples of this type of border region development. He notes that these types of regions have the greatest potential in achieving a "transborder region" which is the most open of the three border types that he recognizes (Table 2.1). This third type of region is characterized by true symbiotic economic development, a joint management regime, and almost free movement of regional citizens across international borders. The Benelux region of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg is an example of this type of border region development, as well as the "Saar-Lor-Lux" region of Luxembourg, Germany, and France (see Illustration 2.4.)  29  W CHINA (North East Asia Regional Development Area)  Tiimen River Area Development Zone  * i  „  (  H0 S S I A Viadiv  mi  X  T  /;••  7^—^ "TBJJA" V r , "TBDA" '*v»„4A ••^.TuJiea.Jcononiip.' p«T)eve pP*ejKi Area ,  /  1  )  J  N O R T H K O R E A  N  /••'-•, ^ ' ' l  (Tumon River Kconomic Zone)  \  CHONGJIN  /fHua<Jhun  \ \ \  KAST S B A  1  201  Illustration  2.3  Source: Lee, 1998  Saar-Lor-Lux Cross Border Labor Market  Illustration 2.4 Source: Schulz, 1999  Table 2.1 Typology of Border Region Development Type of Economic Institutional/Governmental Border Relations Frameworks Region Few and strictly controlled  Types of Enterprises  State of Migration Differences Example Infrastructure in Labour Cost Networks  Few  Individuals or small enterprises  Bottlenecks due to strict and cumbersome border controls  Strictly controlled (frontier)  Extremely high  RussiaChina (Tumen) ChinaVietnam  Emerging, but one-sided  Spontaneous development  (as above)  (as above)  High  Enterprises large and small acting on their own - largely contractual relationshipsjoint ventures  Consultative planning-border controls still important  Controlled migration (shoppers who commute) university students also commute  High  ThailandChinaBurmaLaos PolandGermany  Border Regions  Dependent relations  CrossBorder Regions  1  Emerging consultative mechanisms  Hong KongShenzhen Diminishing  CASCADIA  Transborder Region  Symbiotic  Cooperative Institutions  Enterprise networks; technology transfer/ sharing networks  Joint planning o f infrastructure networks  Simplified procedures and relatively free movement  Little or none  'Base Source: Wu (2001) - Adapted from C.-T. Wu, "Cross-border Development in Asia and Europe," Geographic Journal 44(3) 1998:198.  European Union (planned)  The most difficult objective to attain regarding the above three factors is the free mobility of people across international boundaries. M u c h of the existing literature on cross border regions has tended to focus on "core" and "periphery" regions such as Singapore-Johore, Hong-KongGuangzhou, and Los Angeles-Tijuana.  In this case, interactions across the border, which bisect C B R s are defined by traditional coreperiphery relations, e.g. direct foreign investment from the core flowing to a cheap wage periphery. However, little has been written on 'core' - 'core' regions such as the VancouverSeattle corridor, where wages and levels of development are roughly similar. Perhaps the European Union may provide examples of 'core' to 'core' cross border economic connectivity due to its efforts to unite the continent economically for the past 40 years (Anderson, 2000). In fact, the E U is the only meso-scale region that has allowed for complete employment mobility for its citizens through the E U labour mobility policies and the Schengen Border Accord. A s w i l l be discussed in Chapter 6, the Canada-U.S. relationship has not evolved to this level of trust between nations when it comes to its citizens. For example, even before September 11, under Section 110 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, U . S . Congress was seriously considering that all Canadians attain visas upon entering the United States, even for a simple shopping t r i p " . This portion of the bill was finally defeated in 2000. However, the spirit of "restrictiveness" when it comes to allowing "familiar" foreigners, such as Canadians, to traverse easily into the U . S . was mounting long before 9/11.  2.4 Post 9/11 Security Measures and Its Influence on Borders and the Movements of Peoples Finally, in considering the theoretical literature on borders and C B R s , the impact of events following the terrorist attack of 9/11, 2001 must be considered. The horrific events of September 11 placed a spotlight on America's borders, and how porous they are to terrorists. W h i l e gazing at America's own borders, attention was also drawn specifically to the CanadaU . S . border, and U.S. Congress raised strong concerns about the perceived openness and little security, which might be found on the Canadian side of the border. Thus, Senator Hilary  " Theodore Cohn (1999) has provided a thorough analysis of the development and possible impact that Section 110 would have on Canada-U.S. cross border travel, and the ripple effect within border communities and beyond if this portion of the IIRIRA Act were to be enacted into U.S. law.  32  Clinton, remarked erroneously that four of the terrorists involved with the 9/11 hijacking had slipped into the U.S. from Canada (Biersteker, 2003). Senator Clinton later retracted these comments when it was determine that all 19 terrorists directly involved with September 11 had directly entered the U . S . legally. However, there was a time lag of a few weeks between Senator Clinton's comments and factual evidence that these comments were incorrect. W i t h i n this time period of only a few weeks, many alarmist articles in U . S . papers were generated about the perceived laxness of Canadian security along its borders, and the fact that this "irresponsible" neighbor shares the longest demilitarized border with the U . S . (Klein, 2003). This created a public relations nightmare for the Canadian government, since much of the "openness" of the Canada-U.S. border rests on the American perception that Canada is a safe, non-threatening country.  Still senior levels of the Canada Government had anticipated a  scenario of this sort occurring long before September 11 (Rudd and Furneaux, 2002)). In fact, the Canadian federal government has been working with the U . S . government on tighter and more harmonious border controls since the early 1990s. A product of these joint efforts was the signing o f the Ridge-Manley Smart Border 30 Point Declaration on December 12, 2001 by Governor T o m R i d g e and Foreign Minister John Manley. These products are examples of 12  long-term Canadian planning and advancement when it came to the Canada-U.S. border that allow it to remain relatively open, with seemingly unofficial preferential treatment for Canadians entering into the U . S . , but also to establish more restrictive measures using 1 3  sophisticated technology for all others entering the United States through Canada.  The above paragraph draws attention to the fact that there was a scramble after 9/11 by U . S . politicians from across the political spectrum to be seen as doing something about the perceived "leaky" and dangerous border between Canada and the U . S . (Andreas, 2003). In fact, the more traditional topics of trade issues and immigration/labour mobility have been seen through a lens of security since 9/11. Andreas (2003) considers that the growing momentum developed through the 1990s regarding talks and efforts towards open borders in North America have been replaced by discussions regarding security perimeters and homeland defense. Moreover, he notes that it is now seen as politically incorrect to talk about open borders. He stresses,  First Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security Unlike many western European countries, Canadians, for the most part, are still visa exempt when it comes to seeking entry into the U.S. 12  13  33  A n y politician who does talk about open borders may be quite possibly muted, attacked, and ostracized by their political opponents (Andreas, 2003: 2) Based on the darkened mood emanating from the terrorist events on September 11, 2001 towards borders and security, Andreas concludes that "borders are back" with a vengeance (Andreas, 2003). However, Biersteker (2003: 160) writing in the same collection of essays, reflects on the fact that borders are not fixed, but are "socially constructed by the practices of state and nonstate actors." In fact, during the latter part of the twentieth century, many states have lifted controls on goods, currency, and ideas, but have continued to control the cross border movement of a majority of people. He notes that the range of activities controlled by the state at borders, and also the points and places of inspections, also varies. Biersteker goes on to point out the changing and elusive natures of borders in addition to the different actors, both state and nonstate, that has control within these zones of power and authority: Thus, when thinking about the nature of borders and boundaries, the important point to remember is that the border changes in two dimensions: both over what it attempts to control, and where it attempts to assert its controlling authority. Its salience and meaning vary according to the ease with which different types of goods and services are allowed across it (the porosity of the border), and it varies according to the actual physical location at which the state attempts to assert its authority Perhaps the most significant aspect of the line to demarcate the border is not the actual physical location of the inspection of goods and people, but the jurisdiction under which the inspections take place . There are often competing and/or conflicting claims of legal jurisdiction in any particular case, but the changing meaning of the border may be captured best by the idea of moving from a physical line of demarcation, the traditional nineteenth century view, to a legal jurisdiction, defined by practices of authority claims by states (and some nonstate actors) and recognized as legitimate by other states and nonstate actors (Hall and Biersteker, 2003). In the final analysis, state jurisdictional claims of authority define the operational meaning of the border, both how hard or how soft it is, and precisely where (in legal, not physical space) the authority is exercised. Not only are the issues over which states claim authority (and the need for control) variable, but the location of the assertion of that control also changes (Biersteker, 2003: 160-161). 14  Indeed, controls over flows and networks across borders (Luke, 1991) are becoming as important as the actual "traditional territorial imaginary of international political economy" (Biersteker, 2003: 161). Added to these new developments around transnational movements and imaginary boundaries are the development of transborder regions, as has been discussed in the previous section, which physically emerge along international borders, and serve as a site of facilitation and a catalyst towards moving and developing goods, services, and even people,  4  M y emphasis.  34 -  from one nation state to another. Biersteker (2003) used the example of the dramatic fall of the Mexican Peso in 1994 to demonstrate that it had major short-term impacts on the regional economies of the American Southwest, which was highly dependent on the economy of northern M e x i c o , but very little impact, if at all, on the economy of Boston, Massachusetts. Thus, the idea of a transborder region may be expanded to different scales, with perhaps the nexus being the strength of the social and economic networks that have emerged between these different regions.  Cascadia has been identified as a core-core C B R , one with the potential to emerge as a high technology region in continental North America. Accordingly, as part of my review of relevant literature framing this study, an upcoming section shall continue to explore the idea of innovative regions and their spatial implications as they apply to high tech companies and their networks of operations. However, before the dissertation moves to explore innovative regions, the concept of border management w i l l be explored.  2.4.1 B o r d e r M a n a g e m e n t The concept of border management has taken many different forms over the past century. This range and variety of management agencies and raisons d'etre is reflected in the many different governmental agencies responsible for some part of managing the goods, people, and services that flow from one country to the next. It was not until the formation of the E U in the late 1980s and the aftermath of 9/11 that Europe and North America began to take a more integrative and "upfront" approach to how borders were managed. From the perspective of the E U , this may be demonstrated in the development of the Schengen A c q u i s  15  in the early 1990s  (Anderson, 2000).  The North American effort towards the joint management of borders includes the RidgeManley Smart Border 30 Point Declaration, which was first initiated in the early 1990s, and was finally ratified in December 2001 between then Minister of International Affairs, John Manley and T o m Ridge, the newly appointed Secretary of the U . S . Department of Homeland Security.  1 5  Despite these initial collaborative efforts between the U . S . and Canada regarding  A combination of the Schengen Agreement (1985) and the 1990 Schengen Application Convention, (Anderson,  2000). 35  shared understandings and possibly seamless management of the two countries' borders, the Smart Border 30 Point Declaration was more of a broad based visioning statement and listing of all current collaborative work rather than a strategic foundation for joint Canada-U.S. policy work. The actual workings and details needed to develop a policy foundation for a seamless Canada-U.S. border remain for a future Canada-U.S. border declaration. M o r e importantly, perhaps, the events following 9/11 made policy experts in the U . S . take a closer look at how exactly the U . S . manages its border, especially from the perspective of the movements of people. Thus, the Migration Policy Institute (MPI), based on Washington D . C . conducted some recent analysis on this topic area in 2005 in the form of three publications. T w o of the three publications focused directly on the management of borders as it relates to people. The first relevant publication was entitled Secure Borders, Open Doors:  Visa Procedures in the Post-  September 11 Era authored by Stephen Yale-Loehr, Demetri Papademetriou, and Betsy Cooper (2005) and the second was Deborah Waller Meyers' report, One Face at the Border:  Behind  the Slogan (2005). The first report, Secure Borders, Open Doors, provided detailed analysis as to how visa procedures were administered after 9/11, and the effectiveness of these procedures in relation to U . S . security needs. The second report, One Face at the Border, examines the effectiveness of changes within the legacy INS as a result of the organization's amalgamation into the Department of Homeland Security in 2003. Overall, both reports provide a detailed analysis of the changes in the U . S . government's management towards the facilitation of foreigners into the U . S . since 9/11. However, both reports found many flaws in these new U . S . governmental procedures and approaches and cautioned that due to these flaws, the U.S. government may continue to compromise, inadvertently, the security of the U . S . and its people, despite the fact that the majority of these changes were instituted in an attempt to provide better security for the U . S . regarding the admittance of foreigners.  A different perspective towards the approach of managing borders in a post-9/11 climate is the one taken by the Canadian Policy Research Initiative (PRI) based in Ottawa, Canada. The initiative is sponsored by the Canadian Government and examines key issues pertinent to Canada and its people. Currently, one main focus of the initiative is the study of Canada's relationship to the United States, or "North American Linkages." The effort began in 2000 with a major conference on the Canada-U.S. Border hosted in Vancouver, B . C . in October 2000. The P R I has subsequently followed up on this conference platform with key publications, such as North American Linkages, in June 2004; the November 2005 Interim  36  Report on Cross Border Regions; and The Emergence of Cross Border Regions in February 2006. Rather than security, the main thrust of these reports focuses on trade and economic relationships between the different crossborder regions between Canada and the U.S., and Canada and the U . S . in general. Surprisingly, there was no mention of high tech clustering or connectivity between the different Canada-U.S. cross border regions within any of these reports, which further bolsters the importance for a study of this sort.  Overall, the above review of some of the current border management work conducted by the Migration Policy Institute, based in the U . S . (and dedicated to U . S . federal policy development) and the Canadian Government's Policy Research Initiative (dedicated to both federal policy and also geographically regional Canadian initiatives) helped to demonstrate the conflicting priorities and concerns regarding border management within North America. Specifically, the difference in the scale of perspective was very important here. The more federally based perspective, namely the Migration Policy Institute, placed considerable emphasis on the "shield" effects of the U . S . border, while the more regionally focused efforts of the Canadian Policy Research Initiative emphasized more border management flexibility, or a "sieve" approach. Hence, the tension regarding Chapter 16 of N A F T A between federal policy priorities and cross border regional economic needs has not been solved at this time. The following section shall begin to explore high tech companies within innovative regions and their demand for internationally highly skilled labour.  2.5 High Tech Companies, Innovative Regions, and their Demand for Labour W h i l e growing scholarly attention has been paid to cross border regions, Cascadia is a special type o f emerging cross-border region, one to be shown later that is focused on high-technology. There is no literature on cross-border high-tech regions per se, but there has been substantial research on high tech companies, their vocational preferences together with the notion of "learning regions", and the geography of innovation, which has emphasized the importance of labour mobility. Thus, this section reviews the major pieces of literature within this topic area, and closes with how these themes may be applied to an analysis of the Cascadia region.  37  2.5.1 H i g h T e c h C o m p a n i e s a n d t h e i r R e g i o n s  H i g h tech companies, and the regions that they are located in, emerged through the interactions of three major developments: the technological revolution, the formation of a global economy, and the emergence of an informational form of economic production and management (Castells and H a l l , 1994). These advanced activities and the areas they occupy may be considered the 'mines and factories' of the information age. However, despite the new economic wealth that these regions have generated over the past thirty years, albeit unevenly, they are still poorly understood in regards to their composition, and the fundamental dynamics contributing to their success. M a n y regional economic development agencies envision that clusters of successful firms w i l l eventually cause a spill-over into the larger region with more and more firms growing and benefiting from success as has been the case in Silicon Valley. However, in recent times, high technology regions have had a volatile cycle of development. For instance, the high tech industry has experienced a massive "bust" with the bursting of the dotcom bubble in 2000, followed by the slowing of the North American economy immediately after 9/11. These negative events impacted the high tech industry in the form of massive employee layoffs as well as firm closures during 2000 to 2003. It was not until 2005 that high tech firms began to hire in substantial numbers, led by Silicon Valley (Tam, 2006). A more recent phenomenon has been the outsourcing of certain high technology jobs, reflected, for example, in the hiring o f high tech software professionals found in India. For example, Microsoft Corporation, headquartered in Redmond, Washington announced plans in 2005 to invest over $ 1.7 billion dollars and double its workforce in India by adding 3,000 computer related jobs over the next four years. The Chairman and cofounder of Microsoft, B i l l Gates, stressed that the foreseeable growth in employment for Microsoft w i l l be higher for India that in the U . S . (Mehapatra, 2005).  These dramatic and fast moving circumstances, have caused regional development agencies to reassess what type of industries they wish to generate and foster within their region, and how they can attract, draw, and retain key talented employees who, ideally, w i l l contribute to building a successful region. Nonetheless, despite the volatility of information technology firms and associated high tech sectors, many regional economic development agencies continue to strive for the next "Silicon Valley", with a combination of research facilities, access to venture capital, a well-educated workforce, and a strong quality of life. Analysis of other 38  successful high tech regions can be found in Kenney (2000) (Silicon Valley), Markusen et al. (1999) (Seattle) and Saxenian (1994) (Boston and Silicon Valley). The evaluation of Silicon Valley  16  is of special interest to an analysis of Cascadia, as it hints at what Cascadia might  become. Silicon V a l l e y Silicon Valley is a region or social system located in the southern portion of the San Francisco Bay area. It is not a formal geographical area, but encompasses much o f San Mateo and Santa Clara counties, from San Carlos in the north to San Jose in the south, covering approximately a 100-kilometer corridor. (Please see Illustration 2.5). Over the past four decades, Silicon Valley has commercialized some of the most important electronics and biomedical technologies developed i n the second half of the twentieth century (Kenney, 2000: 1). The region is the product of a rich overlay of at least five distinct institutional groupings: an impressive cluster of innovative electronics firms: Stanford University and its nonprofit research spin-offs; large domestic computing and instrumentation forms, many of them branch operations; research, marketing, and information-gathering operations of foreign firms; and a military-industrial component of both private corporations and government offices (Markusen, 1999: 307). Saxenian (1994), through her study of small and medium sized electronics firms, described a "fuzzy" mutually beneficial social relationship within this network of firms. Primary characteristics of this relationship were based on egalitarianism, trust, and cooperation. These attributes enabled these smaller firms to quickly reposition themselves in response to industry change in the late 1980s and continue to succeed. These behaviors were contrary to electronics firms in the Boston area, which she characterized as larger, hierarchical, and more culturally conservative.  Markusen (1999), along with others such as Stopper (1999), is rather firm in her argument that the success of Silicon Valley is likely very difficult to replicate elsewhere for a variety of factors, based on its specific history, the influence of the military in Northern California, big firm leadership, and continual massive foreign direct investment within the region. Additionally, Silicon Valley is not without a number of social challenges. For instance, the region's income distribution is highly skewed and collective bargaining to protect the wages of  Silicon Valley is a similar 100 to 150 kilometer north-south corridor, albeit lying within one country rather than straddling an international border, as is the case with Cascadia. 16  39  the working class is almost nonexistent. Hence, Markusen (1999) has stressed that perhaps the dynamics or " m i l i e u " behind the success of other high tech clusters such as the "Third Italy" (Piore and Sable, 1984), North Carolina's Research Park (Luger and Goldstein, 1990) and Seattle (Markusen et al., 1999) may provide more appropriate case studies for many other regions wanting to achieve similar high tech success due to their more manageable nature and greater income equity, as compared to Silicon Valley. These three geographic regions, in addition to other high tech areas, are associated with various characteristics, such as innovation and learning institutions. They appear to have an ability to attract and retain highly skilled workers (whether foreign or domestic). Thus, these factors together may have the synergistic effects of contributing to a successful prosperous new economy region. Hence, the next two sections review these concepts, and how they might be applied to the Cascadia region.  "Silicon Valley'  /  /  PACIFIC OCFA N  San Francisco.  V  a-' "7  , Berkeley  Oakland  w  1  S o u t h S a n FT.incisci)  I  i '  <  /  fy  S'IJH FraiK.tsi.ii Kill/  (  Belmont.  'Jifat  San C a r l o s '  G~<  •x KCIIWIKKI City  i- .  .  Mt-nki I'.irk • SAN  •'• / \.  *  Altai*"Vt, -A  Palo  Is.  /  M A T F . O  C O U N T Y Mountain  View  .  Sunnyvale  A' / /  *  S A N T A  I.  \ \  C I . A K A  C O U N T Y  San Jose * >l >  :  :  !  II  :  2  I  •.  ,•  (. .  s Mi.  '.  III  12  Km.  Illustration 2.5 Source: Kenney, 2000  40  2.5.2 Innovation, Learning Regions , and Their Institutions 17  Innovation, in a regional context, is often seen as the consequence of the critical institutional o r organizational frameworks of production i n an attempt to make change or create something new. Storper (1999) argues that there are two schools of American thought dedicated to what factors are important to regional development. These factors include innovation, high technology, institutions, and regional development. The first stresses the university-production link and uses the experiences of Silicon Valley and Boston's Route 128 as their examples (See Markusen et. al., 1986). The second approach focuses on a 'regional polities', and stresses the importance of the dynamics of regional coalitions that rally to attract certain high technology, allowing for the transfer of high-technology resources into the region's economy. For example, much of the 'gunbelt' economy o f N e w England and Southern California developed because o f influential federal politicians representing N e w England and Southern California who lured substantial amounts of federal monies to their regions for the purpose of defense research. Storper adds that both approaches to successful regional development have flaws to their arguments. For instance, the first approach emphasizes university-industrial linkages and it only works well with a significant formal science base, such as advanced science based universities and the semiconductor industry. However, there were no strong research universities in the Los Angeles area in the 1920s and 1930s when the development of the airplane industry began in this region (Scott 1993; Storper 1982). The second argument is also flawed. A g a i n , the importance of an external influence such as military investment (using the Southern California aerospace industry example) was in place long before the development of a military industrial complex. In sum, for Storper, the American school on what factors make for a successful high tech region has still not developed a coherent and convincing theory linking high-technology development to regional development (Storper, 1999).  Another, perhaps more convincing, approach has been developed by the G R E M I group (Group de Recherche Europeen sur les M i l i e u x Innovateurs) which is made up principally of FrancoItalian-Swiss regional economists. Their ideas on innovation and regional development revolve around the notion of a milieu. Storper (1999:35) essentially summarizes the work of various academics who specialize in this topic area (Aydalot 1986, Aydalot and Keeble 1988, Camagni  Richard Florida (1995) defines this term as collectors and repositories of knowledge and ideas that provide and underlying environment or structure which facilitates the flow of knowledge, ideas, and learning (p. 528). 17  41  1991, Maillat and Perrin 1992, Maillat et. al. 1993, Maillat et. al. 1990, Camagni 1992), by stating that the milieu is a context for development, which motivates and guides "innovative agents" to be able to innovate and coordinate with other innovative agents. The notion of milieu might be described as a system of regional institutions, rules, and practices, which lead to innovation. It is essentially a territorial version of the embeddedness of social and economic processes described initially by the sociologist, Mark Granovetter (1985). The milieu revolves around the concept of a network of actors, such as producers, researchers, and politicians, for example. Such a network is embedded in a milieu, which helps to provide these actors with what they need in order to succeed with innovation. In closing, though, the G R E M I group cannot explain the logic or the essence of the intangible that they seek. In sum, the essential factors behind successful innovative regions are largely unclear (Storper 1999).  2.5.3 Institutions, Learning, and Labour in High Technology Regions The growth of any high-tech region generates a commensurate demand for skilled labour. In changing economic times, great emphasis is placed on the ability of regional based institutions to acquire, absorb, and diffuse relevant knowledge and information throughout the region that affect the process of economic development and change (Wolfe and Gertler, 2002: 2). Additionally, Gertler (2004:10) stressed the need for institutions and related industrial practices to rethink their existing policies and approaches to innovations and industrial development within a region. He stressed that a matrix regulating investment decisions and time horizons, labour market decisions, and labour-management relations i n the workplace have the most impact from a perspective of innovation and learning within an industrial region. Thus, this section briefly examines the role of institutions and the process of learning, both within and between institutions situated within a given geographical space in addition to the essential ability to draw and retain labour to a region. Based on the foundational works of Weber, Veblen, Schumpeter, and K a r l Polanyi, economic processes are embedded in a variety of institutions such as local customs, government, firms, associations of firms, religion, culture, and the legal framework within a society. This being the case, the ability of these institutions to respond to and flourish within changing economic times is critical to a region's success. The other critical attribute of these local institutions is their ability to retain and transmit learning and knowledge to their members (Wolfe and Gertler, 2002). Hence, the continued success of a region may be attributed to the abilities of its institutions, down to the firm level, to capitalize 42  on social learning and increased networking between firms and other organizations within a geographical space.  B y way of example, (Cooke 2002) examined to what degree European regions were able to support innovation at the firm level. His findings were interesting in the sense that they revealed that most of the firms he interviewed operated in regional and national markets rather than international ones. Additionally, these firms innovated due to the pressures of competition, which required higher quality products at lower costs. Finally, the regional organizations, which were meant to help firms innovate, failed to do so since they do not reach nor help identify the regional firms' needs. Thus, this particular case study puts into question the preparedness of these regions to continue to innovate and learn in addition to the actual strength of the regional "network" beyond the firm level. Gertler (2002) adds to this questioning with his study, which examined the relationship between German manufacturers and North American clients. His research found that the importance of institutional forces beyond the level of the nation-state was rarely taken into consideration. Although firms tried to collaborate at the international level, much of their knowledge and experiences had not been shaped by a similar set of national institutions. This often led to confusion and misunderstandings between actors, and lessened considerably the likelihood of achieving interfirm learning beyond regions located within a nation state.  Since Gertler (2002) stresses the need for the same institutions, usually found within a nation state, for learning and innovation to occur at the firm level and resonate outward to the region, there may be many challenges for the concept of Cascadia to achieve high tech aspirations, since it does straddle an international border. Thus, there are many different types of institutions and understandings formulated and reassured by two different nation states, namely Canada and the United States. Therefore, management of the border and achieving harmonization of practices and procedures when interpreting 'rules of crossing' seem to be important. However, Gertler's findings provide an interesting departure point to the next paragraph, which shall briefly introduce the critical importance of the access and availability of skilled labour within a region.  The literature in the above paragraphs helps to draw attention to the factors of regional based institutions and learning within key firms and how these attributes ripple outward to the larger 43  region. One additional factor that is essential to the growth and development of a high tech region is the availability of locally highly skilled labour and/or a region's ability to attract highly skilled labour, whether domestic or international in origin. Thus, it is not only important for a cluster to create networks within the local environment, but also to develop and maintain crucial alliances and networks both within the region and also externally beyond the region. Bresnahan, et. al. (2002) noted that the key ingredients that are needed to operate a regional cluster, in general, included entrepreneurship, linkages to a major and growing market, and the availability of skilled labour. Biotechnology firms, especially, have been seen as operating along these complex local to global networks in the development of strategic alliances regarding financing, Research and Development ( R & D ) , and scientific innovation. These factors have been argued to be important if the firm stands a strong chance of success (Darby et. al. 1999).  The reason for these vast and complicated networks is that the global biotechnology industry is an inherently risky and complicated one with many processes and potential pitfalls. Thus, any innovative firm requires extensive finances and seasoned experience, which is sometimes beyond the realm of the immediate firm. In addition to these needs, a biotechnology cluster, for example, specifically needs close physical proximity to key research centers that attract star scientists (Darby and Zucker, 1996), and a subsequent entourage of leading international researchers and graduate students with (or developing) highly sophisticated skills.  In fact,  Wolfe and Gertler (2003: 54), based on an extensive study of various types of industrial clusters throughout Canada, bolstered this milieu of critical factors, stressing that the centrality of skilled labour was seen as the single most important local asset to a successful high-tech cluster. They elaborated on this phenomenon as follows:  "The local endowment of 'talent' in the labour force is emerging as a crucial determinant of regional-industrial success. This endowment is created and maintained by the retention and attraction of highly-educated, potentially mobile workers who are drawn to thick, deep, opportunity-rich local labour markets. The emergence of a strong, concentrated talent pool in local and regional economies also serves as a key factor in launching individual clusters along the path to sustained growth and development. Critical mass appears to be important here: Until this is achieved, local employers will fight a losing battle in attempting to retain or attract the skilled talent they need. Once it is achieved, this set in motion a positive self-reinforcing circle through which regions with a critical mass of highly skilled workers in a particular sector are able to attract still more workers of this kind. The initial source of the local talent pool can be highly varied, with both government laboratories and local anchor firms playing a key role in 44  developing the initial talent base. Post-secondary educational institutions also play a central role in many of the health-based biotech clusters, but seem to be less critical for the initial launch of many of the other clusters." The next section of the literature review shifts from a focus upon critical institutions to examining the concepts of labour mobility, immigration, and transnationalism, which are also essential to a successful high-tech region, as argued by Florida (2002).  Despite the many  challenges and confusion that arise between actors originating from different regions and learning experiences, there is still a great desire, opportunity, and need for highly skilled people to move across international boundaries for the purposes of work and immigration.  2.6 Transnationalism, Labour Mobility of the Highly Skilled, and Its Shortcomings 2.6.1 Introduction A s noted in Chapter 1, a critical component to a high tech firm's success is its ability to draw from a talented pool of well educated professionals residing throughout the globe as these firms compete in a high stakes game of product development where timing and cleverness are keys to success or failure (Florida, 2005). Thus, the immediate needs of the new economy require more cross-border integration and more predictable and transparent border regulations when it comes to the movement of professionals across international boundaries. Beaverstock and Smith (1996) have supported this thesis by providing a comprehensive review of the significance of the transnational investment banking community in the City of London. Sassen (Sassen-Koob, 1984, 1986; and Sassen 1988, 1991) has provided a comprehensive review of immigrant labour demands in a global city's downgraded manufacturing and mainly lowwaged service sectors, placing particular emphasis on N e w Y o r k and Los Angeles, as case studies. These scholars, in sum, covered the two opposing ends of the 'income hourglass' of 18  global cities. B y contrast, there has been little research conducted on second-tier cities, such as The 'income hourglass' can be defined as the increasing bifurcation of an urban economy where there are high end service providers such as stock brokers, consultants, lawyers, bankers, and so forth paired with very low end service providers such as restaurant workers, janitors, dry cleaning services, and so on, which exist to provide services to these high end urban service providers. What is often absent from this dynamic is the socio economic middle class and usually includes teachers, police officers, professional government bureaucrats and so on. New York city is typically cited as a good example of the income hourglass since it is one of the global headquarters of world finance, providing well-paid jobs to a global elite in addition to being home to many immigrants, who often willingly work these low-end service jobs as undocumented workers. The most difficult positions to fill in this urban dynamic are middle class jobs. The reason being is that the cost of living is so high in the actual city and these middle class professionals can seek employment, domestically, in other urban centers where they will most likely have a better access to housing, good schools, and less of a commute time compared to New York City. 18  45  Vancouver or Seattle regarding labour mobility of the knowledge worker across international boundaries, especially in the growing information technology (IT) industry and within the regional area of Cascadia.  It should be noted that the regional mobility of international workers to some degree has been continuous for over 300 years. Yet, historically, the majority o f skilled migrations were regional rather than truly global in nature (Held et al., 1999). For example, from the seventeenth century onwards, mercantilist-oriented states drew on the flows of skilled labour such as the Dutch moving to Germany and England for land drainage projects and Peter the Great attracting artisans and gunsmiths to imperial Russia (Lucassen, 1987). Thus, current professional labour movements within North America may be described as part of a more historic and natural pattern of labour movements that occurred before technological and military capabilities allowed for more global labour movement (Held et al., 1999).  2.6.2 T r a n s n a t i o n a l i s m F r o m a broader perspective of "Transnationalism", Ong (1999) has captured theoretically the experiences of the mobile elite, for example, moving from Hong K o n g to North America and returning yet again to A s i a , in the form of a circular mobility. A m o n g other things, Ong discusses the apparent ease and agility that these flexible elites experience as they move from one country to another. This global fluid mobility has been an experience of a select elite originating in the capital cities of great colonial powers over the past three centuries. In this ~ regard, Carlos and Nicholas (1988) found that imperial trading companies used an extensive and elaborate network of salaried managers, usually expatriates, to oversee and monitor the hundreds of thousands of annual company transactions. A l s o , the Japanese Soga Shosa (general trading companies) have moved much of their managerial personnel around the world to support their global networks for the past century. N o w , a considerable number of transnational elites originate in powerful cities in the Asian Pacific (e.g. Singapore, Hong K o n g , and Bagalore, India) (Sassen, 2000 and Waters, 2004). Instead of moving from the capital city o f London, to Burma on behalf of a British trading company, as in the nineteenth century, these new transnationals from Asia gain a professional education at leading education institutes throughout the world (e.g. Harvard, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, The University of British Columbia, Cambridge, and Oxford) (Waters, 2004). Based on the caliber 46  of their education (and class agility) many of these elites are then offered a job in a primary c i t y or region, which focuses on leading edge activities such as banking in London or New Y o r k City or high tech development in Silicon Valley (Florida, 2005; and Saxenian, 2000). The above scholarly work emphasizes the experiences of an elite, which has always found relative predictability and ease in moving across the boundaries of one nation state to another for either work or pleasure. N o w , with the growth of knowledge workers throughout the western world in the face of global restructuring, there is a greater and greater need to draw larger pools of global talent. Often this labour force comes from not only the developed world, but also increasingly the developing world (Florida, 2005). These knowledge workers might not have been born into a privileged background, but through the experience of a good education, they often have the opportunity and eligibility to work for a powerful or quickly growing high tech firm in North America.  2.6.3 Labour Mobility and the Internationally Highly Skilled Compared with the mainstream flows of overseas migration whose goal is typically full-time settlement, skilled transient migratory movements often go highly unnoticed both within the receiving country at large and within the academic literature. Possible reasons for this may be that this type of temporary migration poses no threat in terms of social and economic burdens to the host countries, as well as often being invisible ethnically and culturally (Findlay, 1995). A majority of these skilled migrants move from core country to core country, (e.g. between England, United States, Canada, Australia, and Japan). However, there still is a "brain drain" of well-educated professionals immigrating from Asia, Eastern Europe and Africa to the western world. Africa is probably the worst off on a per capita basis having lost over 60,000 professionals between 1985-1990 and is continuing to lose approximately 20,000 professionals annually (Stalker, 2000). Nonetheless, the majority of highly skilled migrant movements are between core economies, such as the U S A , Japan, and Western Europe, for short durations of time, namely anywhere from two to five years.  The majority of these migrants move as  intracompany transferees within these global firms. Historically, much of these movements have been reserved for executive and management personnel. However, now, with an economy based on information and highly sophisticated technologies, the crossborder movements o f highly skilled professionals are becoming more commonplace (Findlay, 1995). This can been  47  seen within a North American context, especially with the onset of N A F T A in the early 1990s. Since N A F T A ' s inception in early 1994, over 75,000 Canadians have entered the U.S. on professional work statuses for temporary employment and these numbers grow by about 10,000 new work statuses every year ( D H S statistics, various years).  The international hiring and movements of skilled professionals and star junior executives is a dynamic activity, historically dominated by large multinational corporations (PriceWaterhouseCooper, 2002). However, due to cost cutting measures, many large corporations are scaling back on these types o f overseas assignments for their executive ranks, and incorporating shorter-term assignments with the expectation of performance (Lopes, 2004). Thus, these types of assignments are no longer seen as a "perk" or a "fast tracking" mechanism to the executive level as they once were ( L i , 2005). Perhaps a growing type of the internationally highly skilled is something that Boyle and Motherwell (2004:15) found in their policy study, which examined how to lure highly skilled Scots away from the vibrant city of Dublin, Ireland, back to Scotland. Through a series of 10 focus groups conducted in Ireland with newly located highly skilled Scots (usually since 1998), they noted one of the following themes, " A definitive feature of the Scottish expatriate community in D u b l i n is the footlooseness of migrants. Throughout the Focus Groups, there was a constant trivialization of the decision to migrate. This casualisation of what still is an international relocation decision after all, was most manifest when participants talked about the almost accidental and happenstance circumstances that surrounded their decision to migrate, and when they proffered the belief that it would not be a problem to reverse the decision were they to feel unhappy in Dublin. Clearly the relative youth and lack of ties of the Focus Groups cohort allied to the close proximity of Dublin to Scotland (repeatedly mentioned in relation to the growth of low cost airlines), goes some way to explaining this liberated attitude to displacement." The study also worked to move beyond the traditional motivators of the highly skilled being economic, career enhancement, and quality of life factors, (PriceWaterhouseCooper, 2002), usually promoted by the human resource department of large corporations, by examining something called "cultural cosmopolitanism," based on the use of key cultural indices (the Bohemian Index, the G a y Index, and the Multicultural Index) developed by Richard Florida i n his 2002 book, The Rise of the Creative Class.  According to Florida, members of the creative  class are essential to the success, dynamism, and ability to innovate for regional economies. It should also be stressed that a majority of these highly skilled expatriate Scots worked for 48  smaller less established firms in Dublin, which seemed to contribute to the "Bohemianness" o f Dublin (Boyle and Motherwell, 2004).  From a more clinical perspective on this topic area,  Saxenian (2000) demonstrated that Chinese and India engineers started 29 percent of S i l i c o n Valley's technology companies between the years of 1995-98.  The above helps to demonstrate that in an era of globalization there are different types of firms, especially smaller start-up firms, needing to hire and retain international highly skilled talent. Additionally, the new type of the internationally highly skilled professional may not be of a "traditional corporate culture", but one with many different diverse backgrounds, as described by Boyle and Motherwell (2004) and Florida (2002, 2005).  Overall, the phenomenon of the movements and intermittent and final destinations of the internationally highly skilled is a relatively understudied one within the academic literature for a variety of reasons. This includes the fact that data and general information regarding international personnel are hard to extract at the firm level due to corporate confidentiality policies. A l s o , once a highly skilled migrant is within the host country, there is a likelihood that the person may move from one type of work visa to another, which makes tracking these types of immigrants through government immigration data a serious challenge.  Highly skilled professionals' origins, patterns, and durations of stay can be described as somewhat different compared to the more predictable and secure forms of migratory movements for corporate elites.  19  For example, professionals may originate from many  different countries other than the country that hosts a multi-national corporation's headquarters, while a majority of these corporate elites originate from the country that hosts the headquarters of multinational corporations. A s well, international professionals are transferred to other international corporate sites for projects, training, and generally shorter term assignments as compared to corporate elites. Additionally, they are usually not given the privileged pay structure and moving allowances given to international corporate elites.  This is reflected in many foreign work visas' length of time to remain in host countries. The U.S., for example, allows a professional, usually on an H- IB visa (which will be explained in more detail in Chapter 3), three years to remain in the U.S., whereas a foreign executive working for the same firm is usually allowed five years to remain in the U.S. for purposes of work. 19  49  In an era of flexible accumulation, larger global firms have developed many sophisticated strategies to using and moving highly skilled professional people's expertise, without taking direct responsibility for these professionals as corporate employees. For example, many larger multi national firms contract out work responsibilities to smaller and local high tech firms. It then becomes the burden of the smaller firm to move their highly skilled professional employee across the border for meetings with, or to provide direct services for, the larger multinational. Findlay (1995) has stressed that these firms' patterns possibly indicate a new production regime involving sophisticated networks of high technology contractors and suppliers, which transcend international boundaries (see also Sunley, 1992).  Based on his research of electronics firms i n  Hong K o n g , Findlay (1995) concludes that there are scarce technical skills residing in key individuals, which allow the relatively uninhibited movement of those with skills, and these movements do not necessarily need to be channeled through the international labour markets o f large firms. Secondly, global cities with clusters of high tech specialized firms may prove attractive to high tech international professionals since they can locate within these clusters, and have the option of moving to another firm within a cluster. Ideally, the international migrant can position himself/herself for future international employment without being directly tied to a multinational company.  Hence, the highly skilled professional migrant can operate as  his or her own independent actor within the global economy. Despite the apparent free mobility of elite 'knowledge-workers' suggested by Findley, the next section reviews some o f the major constraints on the autonomy of the global professional worker.  2.7 Cross Border Institutions in the Facilitation/Impeding of Transborder Labour Mobility and Sojourner Rights Historically, the state has played the most important role in modern times when it comes to controlling movements of people. Torpey (2001) emphasized that perhaps the freest time for the movements of wealthy foreigners occurred in Europe, just prior to W o r l d War I. He cites the work of Bertelsmann (1914), who stressed the fact that foreigners moving throughout Europe were no longer viewed with suspicion, but welcomed by a host state since it was recognized that these foreigners bring "tremendous economic value in goods and exchange." This spirit of "open borders" did not last for long, and immediately after the commencement of W o r l d War I, states recommenced monitoring and controlling the movements of its own citizens, as well as the entry and movements of foreigners, which has lasted well into the latter part of the twentieth century. However, beginning in the early 1980s, states began to respond 50  to a resurgence of international trade and commerce, and started to rethink and consider the facilitation of foreigners involved in these actives (Sassen, 1998). This was especially true in Europe, since the Berlin W a l l fell in late 1989 and allowed many undocumented migrants from Eastern Europe to enter Western Europe free from historical barriers placed between East and West Germany. It was also at this time that supranational organizations, such as the European Union ( E U ) and the W o r l d Trade Organization ( W T O ) , began to a reconfigure the responsibilities and rights normally attributed to the state, such as mobility of persons within the E U and international human rights codes (Sassen, 1998). Additionally, the emergence of supranational legal trade regimes, such as the G A T T , N A F T A , and E U policies towards labour equalization and the E U ' s Schengen Agreement, intervened in many aspects of international trade, services, finance, and, most notably, cross border labour mobility - within the E U region and in other global regions such as continental North America and East A s i a . Finally, since September 11, transnational legal regimes, such as N A F T A have undergone a heavy veil of security measures and surveillances, which were not originally anticipated when initially written. The roles of these suprational legal agreements on cross border labour mobility w i l l be reviewed in the following sections. Special emphasis w i l l be placed on N A F T A , and the various actors involved in its original development, its daily implementation/facilitation, and what type of actors makes use of this trade agreement.  However, before turning to these supra national institutions, it should be underlined here that the general culture and management of U . S . borders over the past twenty years has deteriorated regarding port of entry officer professionalism and general respect for basic human rights for all persons seeking entry into a nation state. A s w i l l be noted in the empirical chapters of this thesis, this is a critical issue in the flow of knowledge intensive workers across the border in Cascadia. In fact, a reoccurring theme for many people seeking entry into the United States, whether legally or illegally, has been a rather 'hostile' one when encountering any U . S . immigration officer responsible for inspecting the person seeking entry (Nevins, 2002). Although cross border mobility was often perceived as 'on the rise' during the latter part of the 1980s and early 1990s (Ohmae, 1995), as part of globalization, for many seeking entry into foreign countries the experience is frequently not a humane or welcoming one. This is a far too common experience for many seeking entry into the U.S., either legally or illegally. In fact, there have been a growing number of books over the past five years on this topic. For example, Operation Gatekeeper by Joseph Nevins (2002) explores the remaking of the U.S.-Mexico 51  border in an era of globalization under the Clinton Administration. The book places particular emphasis on the project's failure to hold back the tide of undocumented immigrants while at the same time the legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service's treatment of undocumented aliens worsened. In fact, the drastic measures placed along the U . S . - M e x i c o border contributed to a dramatic rise in death rates as Mexican and other Latin Americans seek more difficult and dangerous entry points along the border. The following is a quote from the American C i v i l Liberties Union ( A C L U ) web site reflecting on the impact that Operation Gatekeeper has had on those trying to cross the U . S . - M e x i c o border illegally,  The violence is inhumane. One recently adopted Border Patrol tactic, Operation Gatekeeper, seeks to deter migrants from traditional passage routes. Although some anti-immigration zealots extol Operation Gatekeeper's success at border control, the human toll has been very high: In the first ten months of 1997 alone, at least 72 people have died trying to traverse treacherous alternative passages over 5,000-foot Tecate mountains or through the 120-degree heat of the Imperial desert. American C i v i l Liberties U n i o n Web cite, M a y 2005  Overall, the driving thesis of Nevins' work is that the state has actually created the crisis of illegality along the U . S . - M e x i c o border that it is now responding to. In Detained: Immigration Laws and the Expanding I.N.S. Jail Complex, Michael W e l c h (2002) reveals the the unrelenting power given to the legacy INS as a result of Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility A c t (IIRIRA) passed by the U . S . Congress in 1996. Among other unchecked powers, the INS was given the right to "expedited removal", which is discussed at length in this dissertation, and "indefinite detention", which may be applied to asylum seekers waiting for a hearing, which may never occur. Overall, this has led to growing levels of incarceration rates and a rise in detention centers, which are usually run for profit - all of this is spurred by the United State's moral panic towards perceived outsiders. These draconian measures against immigrants were in place before the events of 9/11 and before the passing of the U . S . Patriot A c t in 2001, which shall be explored later in the dissertation.  Both of the above studies discussed in elegant detail how immigration law passed by U.S. congress over the past 10 years has allowed and even encouraged drastic and inhumane approaches to dealing with foreigners at the U.S.'s boundaries, especially the southern border in an era o f "globalization" and pre 9/11 "open borders." 52  2.7.1 The Role of Supra-National Agreements or Institutions that Affect International Labour Mobility O n a global basis, the most important formal arrangements regulating international labour mobility include the W o r l d Trade Organization's General Agreement on Trade in Services ( G A T S ) , the North American Free Trade Agreement ( N A F T A ) , and the European Union's (EU) policies on labour mobility which allow for the transnational movements of each signatory country's citizens for purposes of work within the territories of all signatory countries. Although each of these agreements, were designed to facilitate easier mobility of foreigners for purposes of work, they are quite different in their make-up and intricacies. These differences are briefly explored in the following paragraphs. General Agreement on Trade in Services  (GATS)  M o d e 4 of the G A T S recognizes the need for the temporary movement of natural persons for purposes of service deliveries. It has usually been applied to higher-level personnel, especially to intra-corporate transferees, whose mobility is basically an adjunct of foreign direct investment (Winters et al., 2002: V ) . The G A T S is usually used by citizens o f developing countries when seeking access to developed countries, since there are other supra-national agreements, such as the N A F T A , allowing for the movement of North American executives, service providers, traders and various professionals, and E U policies, designed to create a panEurope dynamic knowledge based economy, and the Schengen Agreement which specifically allows for open borders and free movement of all E U citizens. One drawback to the G A T S is that it has not allowed for easy movements of medium skilled service providers (such as professional assistants, trades people and technical support personnel, which would include systems analysts and programmers) due to its complicated nature regarding interpretation. For example, among other structural problems, there is a lack of uniformity in the definition and coverage of the various categories of service personnel, allowing to liberal interpretations by immigration officials and consular offices (Chanda, 2001). These problems also contribute to the difficulties of entry under the G A T S for medium skilled personnel, where developing countries have more of a comparative advantage over developed countries, which more frequently export highly skilled and executive level personnel. Additionally, similar to  53  N A F T A and the E U ' s Schengen Agreement, the G A T S is subject to immigration legislation and labour market policy rather than international trade policy (Winters et. al. 2002). The European Union's Policies on Labour Mobility and the Schengen Border System The European Union has developed aggressive policies designed to encourage spatial job mobility across state borders. In fact, the E U has made tremendous efforts to create an E U wide acceptance of educational and skills certificates and gearing social securities systems towards a balancing of all E U countries, so that the E U labour market may become more transparent. These open labour market policies are coupled with the Schengen Border 20  System , which allows for the creation of a free movement area without border controls. This is balanced by exceedingly strict border enforcement at the E U ' s external frontier designed to curtail illegal immigration, to enhance police cooperation, and to improve judicial cooperation (Anderson, 2000). Despite these well thought-out efforts and transparent preferential policies, the vast majority of Europeans are still rather immobile. In fact, V a n der Velde and van Houtum (2004) identified a study conducted by Fischer et. al. (2000) where only 4 percent of people in their study had actually moved from one E U country to another E U country since the late 1980s. Additionally, Fischer et. al. (2000) found that only 1.5 percent of the people living within E U border regions commute across the border for purposes of work. Thus, V a n der Velde and van Houtum (2004) concluded that spatial job immobility, not mobility, is usually the dominant spatial practice of people living within the E U . Hence, national borders still play an important influence on the socially constructed frameworks o f familiar locales. Additionally, these new E U citizens have not been able to conceptualize, nor operationalize, the possibility of including other countries into their ideas of feasible work opportunities. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) The North American Free Trade Agreement is yet another supra-national legal regime which allows for the preferential status/visa treatment for four different types of North American business persons. This includes business visitors, traders, investors, intracompany transferees, A compilation of the 1985 Schengen Agreement and the 1990 Schengen Application Convention. The Schengen Agreement brought together the Benelux Common Travel Area with the proposed open frontier agreement between France and Germany to abolish all border controls on goods and persons between them. The Application Convention set up a series of arrangements, including a strengthening and standardization of controls at the external border, and of police and judicial cooperation between the E U member states (Anderson, 2000: 21). 2 0  54  and certain professionals established under N A F T A (Folsom, 1999). A primary idea behind the development of the N A F T A visa status was that it was to allow preferential entry for these business persons so that the other provisions of N A F T A , which deal with services, investments, and goods could be carried out with ease. However, these business persons can enter into all signatory countries on their own right. Provided that a N A F T A applicant has the correct and required documentation, they are only subject to public safety and national security reviews at international borders. N A F T A professionals and intracompany transferees do not have to undergo labour certification screens, which the U . S . Department of Labour and the Human Resources and Development Canada usually require before a foreigner is issued a professional work status/visa. Private interests saw this particular requirement as a big drawback to N A F T A ' s predecessor, the U . S . ' s H l - B visa. Hence, the N A F T A status, or " T N Status" especially for professionals, was heralded in the early 1990s as a vast improvement over the H l - B visa, famous for its slow cumbersome nature, and its application cost, which could run into the thousands of dollars. Another salient point of the N A F T A status was its port of entry adjudication. The H l - B visa required that all paperwork be mailed to the legacy INS case processing center in L i n c o l n , Nebraska, and an average H l - B application took anywhere between 4 to 6 months to process. Thus, the N A F T A T N status was framed to U . S . Congress as a much more efficient and immediate way to allow for North American professionals to access Canada, the U . S . and M e x i c o in an era of globalization and fast moving capital. Ideally, port of entry adjudication would take anywhere from ten minutes to an hour for the majority o f N A F T A applicants. These factors have contributed to N A F T A ' s rising success as a supra national legal document that has allowed for over 85,000 Canadians to enter into the U . S . as N A F T A professionals with annual rising increments of approximately 10,000 Canadian annually ( D H S / I N S Annual Yearbook, various years), see Figure 2.1.  55  Professional Worker Visas/Statuses Issued under the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement and NAFTA to Canadians from 1989 to 2004 100,000  2000  90,000  2001  80,000  2002  '99  70,000  2004  '98  60,000  2003  50,000  FJ Series 1  40,000  94" W  '96  '97  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  Year  Figure 2.1 Source: U . S . Immigration Service and Department of Homeland Security Annual Yearbook, Various years. Note: N o data exists for the year 1997 (or Number "9") on Figure 2.1. N A F T A a n d Its A c t o r s  Overall, from the rising number of N A F T A visas issued since 1993, one may conclude that Chapter 16 o f N A F T A , which covers labour mobility, has, in general, been a positive factor for the North American business community and the mobile North American professional. However, certain professions listed under N A F T A , which include software engineers, computer systems analysts, management consultants, and scientific technicians, have had a more difficult time crossing borders with N A F T A visa statuses than the other 65 professions listed under N A F T A for a variety of reasons. (See Appendix 14 for a listing of these 65 professional job listings.) Specifically, the way N A F T A was crafted, the rather esoteric job descriptions and nature o f the above mentioned professions (exclusive of management consultants) and the variety of ways that front-line immigration officials understand and  56  interpret N A F T A at each Canada-U.S. port of entry can lead to a host of problems for firms trying to hire these professionals under N A F T A (Vazquez-Azpiri 2000, and Richardson 2002). In fact, there has been considerable discussion regarding the varied norms and rules that N A F T A adjudications operate within, both between each signatory country and also between each nation state's ports of entry. In fact, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) more generally discuss the relationship between rules and norms in the context of how certain norms at the bureaucratic level influence international politics.  Their study spends considerable time  defining exacting what norms are, the relationships between domestic and international norms, and whether norms are agents of stability or change. Although their research is aimed at examining dynamic international issues, such as women's suffrage and the banning of land mines, the authors' topic areas and concepts may be applied to the detailed implementation of a regional trade agreement, such as N A F T A . Specifically, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 891) stress that norms involve a prescriptive (or evaluative) quality o f "oughtness" that set norms apart from other kinds of rules. The authors go on to stress that there are no 'bad norms' from the vantage point of those promoting the norms. For example, slaveholders and nonslaveholders believed that slavery was an appropriate behavior, for without this belief, the institution of slavery would not have been possible (ibid). Although norms may be difficult to document empirically prima facie, norms promote shared moral assessment among participating actors and leave extensive trails of communication and evidence of their influence. Additionally, norms are usually found naturally within the community or regional level (i.e. in this case, the respective Canadian and U . S . immigration authorities), but usually not at the international level, and vary between countries in their strength and influence.  The above intellectual context of the definition of what a norm is and where it might be found provides a framework for explaining why variability exists in interpreting N A F T A between Canadian and U . S . border officials and the many U . S . P O E s . T o begin with, although the actual "rules" of N A F T A has been constructed and approved by each signatory country, there is considerable leeway between each particular country in the interpretation and implementation of N A F T A . Thus, it is up to each country (Canada, the U . S . A . and Mexico) as to how its front-line officials understand and interpret N A F T A applications. These domestic "norms" then set the tone as to the actual interpretation of N A F T A applications. A s will be explained in detail in the empirical section of the dissertation (Chapters 4, 5, and 6) this  57  "leeway of interpretation" has proven to be an important impediment to the "easy" mobility o f high tech firms' employees and new hires between Vancouver and Seattle. Overall, the challenges found within the use and implementation of N A F T A and the three primary actors involved, namely government officials, immigration attorneys, and the firms and individuals who use N A F T A statuses, serve as the departure point for Chapter 3, which examines the Cascadia region specifically, in addition to the remainder of the dissertation.  2.8  Summary  This chapter has reviewed the existing literature on cross border regions and analyzed its strengths and weaknesses in framing a study of the role of the border in the Cascadia region. It has revealed that existing studies o f C B R s have focused on some o f the factors behind their success, but have rarely focused on how the management o f international borders, per se, has influenced patterns of development. Similarly, scholarship of innovation and high technology regions have pointed to the important role of skilled labour and also the institutions in 'social learning' and the transmission of knowledge in regional networks, but has generally underplayed the significance of institutions that facilitate labour mobility. Studies of international labour mobility have suggested an increasing importance of footloose knowledgeintensive workers, but have rarely focused on the very real constraints imposed by regulatory mechanisms embedded in the W T O , the E U , and N A F T A . Building on this nanative, I w i l l indicate the importance of the international border for Cascadia and spotlight the role of a number of significant actors.  Overall, one outcome of the review reveals the transition of  'border regions' in the popular imagination-from the concept of being a 'shield' to a 'sieve' in the late 1980s and 1990s, and now back to a rather ambiguous 'shield' rather than a 'sieve' in light of 9/11. However, despite this new trend, the U . S . is still committed to business interests and globalization in general i n the form o f "open borders."  A t a broad-scale, this rapid transition of the concept of borders in the imagination, as well as the actual practices of regulating movement across North American borders, warrants the need for a more concrete study; one that examines in detail this rapid transition, and how it has influenced flows of professionals back and forth across the Canada-U.S. border. A s stressed earlier, Cascadia is a particular type of border region, which for the most part contains a critical  58  mass of high technology companies, and one that I argue suggests a strong demand for highly skilled labour. A s stressed earlier in this chapter, high tech regions grow best when supported with suitable institutions, and in the Cascadia case those that facilitate the mobility of labour are equally, i f not more important, than those that support the mobility of goods. Finally, because there is a paucity of published statistics indicating who crosses the Cascadia border, and who applies for various visas, I argue that a more qualitative approach, one that interviews the various actors - high tech firms, immigration lawyers, and regulators - is an appropriate methodology adopted for this thesis.  W i t h regard to the three different types o f actors involved with the facilitation and movement of N A F T A professionals within North American space, representatives of each N A F T A signatory country's government are significant. This group includes actors at the governmental policy level who actually developed N A F T A . This group also includes actors employed by North American governments at the ports of entry who actually interpret the N A F T A document and adjudicate the N A F T A applications on a day-to-day basis. A second set of actors encompasses Canadian and U . S . immigration attorneys, who have served as professional facilitators with difficult N A F T A applications. Additionally, as w i l l be examined later in the thesis (Chapter 6) since 9/11, attorneys are becoming more of the "norm" as facilitators for firms and individuals looking to use N A F T A statuses when moving across North American boundaries. The final sets of actors involved in the N A F T A status are the actual firms and professionals that use the N A F T A status. Thus, one main purpose of this dissertation is to tie together the roles and relationships of these various actors when it comes to moving professionals within the Cascadia corridor. In fact, there is no comprehensive data source as to why people move across the Canada-U.S. border for purposes of work and the experiences they encounter, especially at the actual border crossings. Hence, there is a need to collect information from the firms concerned. Finally, there is also no comprehensive data source as to what types of people are refused visas/statuses and why, and what types of people are granted statuses/visas and why. Thus, this research w i l l explore these issues and examine possible reasons for patterns that the new data analyses reveal.  The above research activities assist to build a unique framework in understanding the needs and constraints of cross-border labour flows within Cascadia, and the relationship of government officials, immigration officers, and firms/professionals on either side of the Canada-U.S.  59  border. Additionally, the relationship that each of these national actors has with their counterparts on the other side of the border, especially in light of September 11 w i l i also be explored. Chapter 3 w i l l build on this argument by exploring the economic history and contemporary economy of the Cascadia corridor, and how N A F T A , with a focus on the research framework adopted here, may be central to its future success.  60  C H A P T E R 3 - The Cascadia Region In Its Wider Context 3.1 General Introduction - Purpose of Chapter This chapter builds on the literature review carried out in Chapter 2 and argues that the Cascadia cross border region is significantly different from the more traditional 'goods and trade' oriented border zones between the U . S . A . and Canada, such as Detroit-Windsor and the San Diego-Tijuana, M e x i c o border.  In particular, cross border flows of skilled labour are much more important in Cascadia than cross border flows of parts or assembled final goods. Cascadia, from a development perspective, m