UBC Theses and Dissertations

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UBC Theses and Dissertations

Acts, agents and moral assessment Simak, Douglas B. 1990

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ACTS, AGENTS AND MORAL ASSESSMENT by DOUGLAS B. SIMAK THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT THE  REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY  in THE  FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES Department  We a c c e p t to  THE  this  of Philosophy  thesis  the required  as  conforming  standard  UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA October  1989  © D o u g l a s B. Simak, 1989  In presenting  this thesis in partial fulfilment of the  degree at the  and  study. I further agree that permission for extensive  copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may or  by  his or  her  representatives.  be  permission.  Philosophy  The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada Date  DE-6  (2/88)  January 13,  1990  granted by  It is understood  publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be  Department of  advanced  University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it  freely available for reference department  requirements for an  the head of  my  that  or  copying  allowed without my  written  ABSTRACT A p e r e n n i a l problem formulation  of an  i n moral  acceptable  utilitarianism  is  initial  i n v o l v e s the  appeal  practical apply  one  These  uncertainty  a b o u t what  to a  moral  which  concerns  theory.  of  'right  account,  fact  However,  act u t i l i t a r i a n i s m  tenability.  account  popular  application.  philosophy  that  and  it  become  issues  action'.  Act  much  its  very  acute  in  relate  to  have to  about  the  to  of  attempt  questions  constitutes tenability  These  the  i s taken  i t i s the raises  concerns  its  face  with  of  respect  questions  of  methodology. One of  question  intuitions  concerning  ( i n the  sense  a s s e s s i n g moral  t h e o r i e s and  M e t h o d o l o g y and  Intuitions,  in  theory  possible  assessment to a v o i d  explored with  intuitions  totally  reference  J o h n R a w l s . The meta-ethics  and,  of  examines the  status  judgements')  Chapter role  in particular,  to the  normative  i n v o l v e s the  'reflective  principles.  their  possibility  and  methodology  of  one,  in  Moral  intuitions  whether  it  is  employment. T h i s q u e s t i o n v i e w s of  of u s i n g ethics  Peter  Singer  the  distinction  to  avoid  of  AU,  is and  between  reliance  on  i s considered.  Chapter distinctions  two,  A  Formulation  among a g e n t , a c t i o n and  utilitarianism  in  involves discussion  the of  strongest whether  i i  it  utilizes  motive to present possible  light.  is  plausible  more  the act This to  understand act u t i l i t a r i a n i s m consequences. fundamental  Finding  itself? end  neither  question  explored—what With  is  t o an a c t u a l  to  purpose  models  moral  however,  model  or p r o b a b l e  satisfactory,  both  of  provisions,  consequences  of a c t u a l  account  relevant  the  certain  i n terms  is  a then  classification we  return  f o r purposes of  in  the  further  exploration. Chapter examines  t h r e e , AU  the  issue  s e l f - d e f e a t i n g . While utilitarianism  and of  the I s s u e of  Self-defeatingness,  whether  utilitarianism  i t i s not  act  strictly  self-defeating, act  does  incorporate  a  with v a l u a b l e moral  norms w h i c h  damages i t s  The  distinction  between  certain  decision-making  rightness-making c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  is  becomes  'brinkmanship' plausibility.  procedures  and  important at  this  po i n t . Act  utilitarianism's  account of  seems t o r e d u c e t h e m o r a l maximizer. Machine,  four,  f o c u s e s on t h i s  concerning Chapter  Chapter  basic  five,  Williams'  AU  responsibility  to a u t i l i t y  The  AU  problem,  Moral  as w e l l  conductor  Agent: as r e l a t e d  v a l u e s and t h e a c t s / o m i s s i o n s and M o r a l R e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,  criticisms  implications  agent  moral  of a c t  for negative r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  different  interpretations  Williams'  critical  by  prominant  suggestions  about  Utility issues  distinction.  examines  utilitarianism  and  i n terms  Bernard of  its  integrity.  Two  philosophers  of  utilitarianism  and  and  integrity  a r e examined and  Chapter n a t u r e of  six,  act  utilitarianism's personal  near  Integrity,  further  the  integrity.  Act  threatens  the  requiring  the  construal of  of p e r s o n a l  them, t h e  and  inadequate.  utilitarianism's  integrity  sacrifice  morality  AU  b o t h are. f o u n d t o be  of  abandonment  i s supposed  threat moral  the moral projects  t o be  of  explores  agency  agent  and the  iv  by  commitments, and, personal  for persons,  object ion.  to  this  self.  is a  with Since  crippling  TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract  i i  Acknowledgements  v i i  I. M o r a l Methodology and I n t u i t i o n s A. M e t h o d o l o g y a n d O b j e c t i v i t y B. An A n a l o g y W i t h " T r u t h " C. M e t h o d o l o g y a n d I n t u i t i o n s D. M e t a - e t h i c s a n d I n t u i t i o n s II.  III.  1 1 14 20 29  A F o r m u l a t i o n of AU A. . The P u r p o s e o f AU B. A c t u a l and P r o b a b l e C o n s e q u e n c e s C. The I n s t r u m e n t a l i s t A s p e c t o f M o r a l Classification D. A c t u a l C o n s e q u e n c e s and P r o b a b i l i t y Considerations  35 35 39  AU a n d t h e I s s u e o f S e l f - d e f e a t i n g n e s s A. Hodgson on AU's S e l f - d e f e a t i n g n e s s B. S i n g e r ' s R e p l y : A S t a n d a r d AU R e s p o n s e C. AU and t h e P r o b l e m o f C o o p e r a t i o n D. AU: D e c i s i o n - p r o c e d u r e a n d / o r Rightness-making T r a i t E. AU, Famine R e l i e f and I n d e t e r m i n a c y  64 64 69 76  49 59  88 93  IV. The AU M o r a l A g e n t : U t i l i t y M a c h i n e A. AU and t h e R e i t e r a t i v e Argument B. AU and U t i l i t y M a x i m i z a t i o n C. AU and B a s i c V a l u e s D. AU and O m i s s i o n s V.  VI.  AU and M o r a l R e s p o n s i b i l i t y A. AU, N e g a t i v e R e s p o n s i b i l i t y and I n t e g r i t y B. Two I n t e r p r e t a t i o n s 1. S c h e f f l e r ' s I n t e r p r e t a t i o n 2. H o n d e r i c h ' s I n t e r p r e t a t i o n AU a n d I n t e g r i t y A. AU M o r a l A g e n t s and M o r a l S a i n t s B. P e r s o n a l I d e n t i t y , P e r s o n a l R e l a t i o n s and Personal Integrity C. AU and t h e Supremacy o f M o r a l i t y D. A Dilemma: U n a t t r a c t i v e n e s s o r D i s h a r m o n y ? E. AU and S o c i e t a l I n t e g r i t y  Summary and C o n c l u s i o n  105 105 116 124 131 ...  138 139 144 144 155 159 159  ..  168 175 178 186 195  v  Selected  Bibliography  ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Many p e o p l e writing  of  emotional not  have  this  have  supported  dissertation.  Without  and f i n a n c i a l s u p p o r t  of these  reached  I would  this point.  especially  unfailing,  from  The the  the  I would  t o them a l l .  my s u p e r v i s o r ,  due t o h i s e f f o r t s t h a t  the process.  considerably  individuals  encouragement and p a t i e n c e  and i t i s l a r g e l y  made i t t h r o u g h  t o thank  me d u r i n g  the i n t e l l e c t u a l ,  I am g r a t e f u l  like  E a r l Winkler. H i s support,  benefited  and h e l p e d  dissertation  criticisms  of  Dr. were  I  have  has  also  Dr.  Gary  Wedeking. I would a l s o of  like  t o acknowledge the f i n a n c i a l  an I z a a k  Walton K i l l a m  during part  of the w r i t i n g  Memorial of t h i s  vii  Predoctoral  dissertation.  support  Fellowship  I. The is  the  MORAL METHODOLOGY AND  s u b s t a n t i v e moral subject  principle  o f numerous  There a r e d i s p u t e s  internal  proper a p p l i c a t i o n  involve  t h e a c c e p t a n c e o f AU  theory,  though  and employment. O t h e r and c o n c e r n  the  application,  o f AU.  of a c t  disputes  of  controversies.f  AU r e q u i r e s .  Such  as a g e n e r a l l y  certain  problems  disputes are of  overall  and  utilitarianism  t o an AU framework w h i c h  what a  one w i t h  INTUITIONS  tenability,  concern disputes  adequate  of  moral  interpretation  a different  nature,  as  to the  opposed  A. METHODOLOGY AND OBJECTIVITY Q u e s t i o n s about moral a c t i o n issue  the t e n a b i l i t y  are significant  o f AU i t s e l f .  Peter  of  AU a s an a c c o u n t  i n ways w h i c h  Singer  of  e x t e n d beyond t h e  notes the importance  that  a t t a c h e s t o such c o n c e r n s . The c r i t e r i o n by w h i c h we decide to r e j e c t , s a y , u t i l i t a r i a n i s m i n f a v o u r of a c o n t r a c t u a l t h e o r y of j u s t i c e ( o r v i c e versa) is, i f a n y t h i n g , even more fundamental than the choice of t h e o r y i t s e l f , s i n c e our c h o i c e of moral theory may w e l l be d e t e r m i n e d by t h e c r i t e r i o n we u s e . $ Not  only  a r e such  than d i s p u t e s  methodological issues  involving  the a p p l i c a t i o n  more of  fundamental  AU, i t i s  also  t Throughout the course of t h i s w r i t i n g the abbreviation 'AU' will be u s e d f o r 'act u t i l i t a r i a n i s m ' and ' a c t utilitarian' . $ S i n g e r ( 3 ) : p. 490. 1  Moral Methodology unclear  how we a r e t o r e s o l v e  The one  need  considers  particular the  a c c e p t a n c e of  different  Sartorius,  the for  counterexamples  involving  alternative  attitudes  illustrate  however,  i s highlighted  when  disagreements concerning the strength  criticisms  AU a r e  example,  of  often  traceable  methodological c r i t e r i a .  taken toward  absence  / 2  them.  for resolution, that  and I n t u i t i o n s  a  counterexamples shared  i s highly  methodology.  critical  a s a means o f a s s e s s i n g  serve  of  of to The to Rolf  employing  AU.  A c t - u t i l i t a r i a n i s m h a s come t o seem t o me to have such great initial plausibility so a s t o be virtually immune from b e i n g d i s c r e d i t e d by means of isolated counterexamples—the unprincipled p o t s h o t s of those moral " p h i l o s o p h e r s " who a r e e i t h e r unwilling or u n a b l e t o d e f e n d a l t e r n a t i v e t h e o r i e s of t h e i r own. f By  contrast,  other philosophers  central  form of  critical  Feldman  notes the f o l l o w i n g .  rely  on c o u n t e r e x a m p l e s  argument. In  discussing  AU,  as a Fred  We have now c o n s i d e r e d s e v e r a l d i f f e r e n t objections to act u t i l i t a r i a n i s m . In each c a s e , i t was alleged that some a c t i o n , or kind of a c t i o n , r e c e i v e s an incorrect evaluation under [AU], O b j e c t i o n s s u c h a s t h e s e must be w e i g h e d carefully. $ Clearly, about the  Sartorius  and Feldman  t h e power o f arguments  question  from c o u n t e r e x a m p l e s  of the t e n a b i l i t y  f S a r t o r i u s ( 1 ) : p . 33. $ F e l d m a n ( 2 ) : p . 60.  have, v e r y d i f f e r e n t  of the g e n e r a l  attitudes to  affect  t h e o r y o f AU.  M o r a l M e t h o d o l o g y and I n t u i t i o n s The  place  methodologies Sartorius openly play  that  i n t u i t i o n s occupy  may  account  forswears  r e l i e s on  any  for  an e s s e n t i a l  role  this  appeals  them. A c c o r d i n g  in their  to to  i n assessing  respective  difference.  While  intuitions,  Feldman,  moral  / 3  Feldman  such  appeals  theories.  E a c h r e a d e r must r e f l e c t , i n regard to e a c h o b j e c t i o n , whether the r e s u l t s of t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f [AU] a r e c o r r e c t , or whether t h e i n t u i t i o n s o f t h e o b j e c t o r s are c o r r e c t . Aside from t h i s a p p e a l to the i n t u i t i o n s of i m p a r t i a l , r e f l e c t i v e , and c a r e f u l i n d i v i d u a l s , t h e r e seems t o be no way t o determine whether a c t u t i l i t a r i a n i s m h a s been r e f u t e d , f This position that  relies  suggests the on  judgements t o  people's serve as  inescapability  intuitions a final  test  and of  of a  methodology  considered a moral  moral  theory's  tenability. According fallacious lacks  to  and,  force.  Singer,  therefore,  Commenting  such  reliance  much  generally  standard  on  intuition  criticism  on c r i t i c i s m s  remarks: Much of the criticism has been i n c o n c l u s i v e because i t has c o n s i s t e d of the o u t l i n i n g of unusual s i t u a t i o n s , in which the application of act-utilitarianism is said to give results which conflict with our "ordinary moral convictions." This method o f argument c a n n e v e r move anyone who has g r e a t e r confidence in the act-utilitarian principle than in his " o r d i n a r y moral convictions." Whenever the c o n f l i c t i s a real one, and n o t t  F e l d m a n ( 2 ) : p . 60.  is  of  AU  o f AU,  he  Moral Methodology  and I n t u i t i o n s  / 4  m e r e l y an a p p a r e n t c o n f l i c t , dependent on t h e o m i s s i o n o f f a c t o r s which the a c t - u t i l i t a r i a n c a n and s h o u l d t a k e i n t o account, the genuine act-utilitarian will be prepared to jettison his " o r d i n a r y moral c o n v i c t i o n s " rather than the p r i n c i p l e of a c t - u t i l i t a r i a n i s m , f The  contrast  account  between t h e two a c c o u n t s i s s t r i k i n g .  requires  that  subordinate  to  methodology  employs  for  assessing  of  clarifying  evaluation  d i s p u t e over  What  what moral  requires  as  any A  while  the  highlights  constitutes  adequate  explanation  significant  variety  to ' i n t u i t i o n s ' .  of  criteria  basic  and ' o r d i n a r y  moral  t o deny  place  'ordinary  in  c o n c e r n s have  an  been  'intuitions'  because  moral  adequate  raised  f o r example,  o f o u r u p b r i n g i n g and a r e t h u s open  with  contends  they are  to the charge  prejudiced.  S i n g e r ( 2 ) : p . 94.  of  this  What p r i m a f a c i e p r i n c i p l e s ought we to a d o p t ? What i n t u i t i o n s ought we t o have? On these questions the r h e t o r i c of r i g h t s s h e d s no l i g h t w h a t e v e r , any more t h a n do a p p e a l s t o i n t u i t i o n ( i . e . to prejudice, i . e . t o the prima facie principles, good or bad, which our u p b r i n g i n g s happen t o have i m p l a n t e d i n f  necessity  and d i s c u s s i o n .  R i c h a r d Hare, to  criterion  the  In p a r t i c u l a r ,  of ' i n t u i t i o n '  a l w a y s be  alternative  a fundamental  contrast  theories.  no w e i g h t a t t a c h e s  result being  intuitions  l e a d s S i n g e r , and o t h e r s ,  methodology?  that  principle,  the r o l e  convictions'  respect  AU  AU. Such a  for  convictions'  the  'ordinary moral c o n v i c t i o n s '  Singer's  a of  Moral Methodology  and I n t u i t i o n s  / 5  us.) t Likewise,  Singer  t h e danger  refers  i n employing  methodological c r i t e r i a  to suspect particular  origins  in pointing  intuitive  for assessing  moral  judgements  out as  theories.  Why s h o u l d we not r a t h e r make the opposite assumption, that a l l the particular moral judgements we i n t u i t i v e l y make are l i k e l y to derive from d i s c a r d e d r e l i g i o u s systems, from warped views of sex and bodily f u n c t i o n s , o r from c u s t o m s n e c e s s a r y f o r the s u r v i v a l of the group i n the d i s t a n t p a s t ? I n w h i c h c a s e , i t would be b e s t t o f o r g e t a l l about our p a r t i c u l a r moral j u d g e m e n t s , a n d s t a r t a g a i n from a s n e a r as we can get t o s e l f - e v i d e n t moral axioms. $ Singer  contends  c a n be  built  culturally believes not  by  that  up  from a x i o m s ,  instilled  that  rest  whether  ordinary  a theory  Singer's  acknowledges  an axiom, o r  intuitions  mere.prejudice. Therefore,  f o r the assessment rather,  moral  upon  of moral  having  are he  axioms a n d intuition.  theories  does  i n determining the status  of  axioms.  subordination represents in this  based  i t consists  involves principles  axioms  justification  w h i l e moral  moral c o n v i c t i o n s  in intuitions;  self-evident  to moral  and a r e  i s either  we s h o u l d be g u i d e d by s e l f - e v i d e n t  Proper methodology not  t h e AU p r i n c i p l e  moral  of  particular  one common philosophy.  a p p r o a c h , and i t s i d e a  t H a r e ( 6 ) : p . 125. $ S i n g e r ( 3 ) : p. 516.  moral  approach Norman of the  judgements to  theory Daniels  composition  Moral Methodology of  moral  t h e o r y i n the  and  Intuitions  / 6  following:  T h e r e i s a w i d e l y h e l d view t h a t a m o r a l theory consists of a set of moral j u d g e m e n t s p l u s a s e t of p r i n c i p l e s t h a t account f o r or generate them. This t w o - t i e r e d view of m o r a l theories has helped make the problem of theory a c c e p t a n c e or justification in ethics intractable, unless, that i s , one is willing to grant privileged epistemological status to the moral judgements ( c a l l i n g them "intuitions") or t o t h e m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s ( c a l l i n g them " s e l f - e v i d e n t " or o t h e r w i s e a p r i o r i ) , f Given  the s u s p e c t  o r i g i n s of  Singer contends that 'privileged  and  considering  these  and  axioms.  how  do  a  a  judgements,  what D a n i e l s This  gives  of t h e a x i o m s status.t  more  calls  rise  to  themselves  However,  fundamental  'intuition'  t o ground T h i s need  self-evident  self-evident  g e n e r a l moral  what t h e t e r m want  issues,  constitutes  specifically,  who  privileged  moral  before question  attention.  What  basic  this  have  status'.  the j u s t i f i c a t i o n  the n a t u r e of  requires  m o r a l axioms  epistemological  q u e s t i o n s about  particular  m o r a l axioms  intuitions? has been  moral  to c l a r i f y  moral  theories  We  taken on  t h e terms  need  axiom?  More  differ  from  to  determine  t o mean by  those  self-evident  moral  of d i s c u s s i o n  becomes  t D a n i e l s O ) : pp. 256-257. i There a r e also questions involving t h e model i t s e l f and i t s i m p l i c i t foundational approach to j u s t i f i c a t i o n . Either p a r t i c u l a r m o r a l judgements a r e s u b o r d i n a t e t o m o r a l axioms or moral axioms are subordinate to p a r t i c u l a r moral j u d g e m e n t s . D a n i e l s may be r i g h t i n a r g u i n g f o r a model w i t h a more complex structure.  M o r a l M e t h o d o l o g y and I n t u i t i o n s / 7 glaring  when, a s  previously  n o t e d , Hare  treating  'intuition'  and ' p r e j u d i c e '  may be t h a t  ' s e l f - e v i d e n t m o r a l a x i o m s ' a r e open t o t h e same  charge concerning once t h e t e r m out  that  the  also apply  'prejudice'  'intuition' objections  the term  consistent  does  noting  not  have  that  in  requires  clarified. meaning  i n a wide  the present that  R o s s , Regan p o i n t s  is  'self-evident  uniform  i t employed  the senses of ' i n t u i t i o n '  'intuition'  any  turn  'intuition'  these questions and  directly  appear  to  or  variety  context.  that After  i n t h e works o f  out a t h i r d  relevant  It  is,  i t may  to  of  That  o u t two s e n s e s o f ' i n t u i t i o n '  significant  G.E. Moore and W.D.  regard  be d e l i n e a t e d  u s e , and one f i n d s  especially  clarified,  the status  r e s o l u t i o n of  of ways. Tom Regan p o i n t s are  h a s been  'intuition'.  raised with  'intuition'  'Intuition'  t h e y were synonymous.  as i s  to p r i n c i p l e s having  m o r a l a x i o m s ' . Any that  as i f  i s found  the  sense  of  issue  of  prejudice.f A third sense i n which ' i n t u i t i o n ' is sometimes u s e d i n m o r a l p h i l o s o p h y i s to mean " o u r unexamined m o r a l c o n v i c t i o n s , " including our initial response or immediate r e a c t i o n s t o h a r d m o r a l c a s e s . It i s in this sense t h a t t h e word i s u s e d when people are asked, What a r e y o u r i n t u i t i o n s ? , a f t e r an u n u s u a l case o r s i t u a t i o n h a s been d e s c r i b e d ( e . g . , a c a s e where a man h a s t o k i l l and e a t h i s own g r a n d s o n i n order to survive, and t A c c o r d i n g t o Regan, ' i n t u i t i o n ' i s u s e d by Moore t o r e f e r to e t h i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n s that a r e ' i n c a p a b l e of p r o o f , and by Ross t o r e f e r t o ' s e l f - e v i d e n t ' m o r a l t r u t h s . Regan(3): p. 1 3 3 .  Moral Methodology  and  Intuitions  /  8  the q u e s t i o n i s whether he ought to). ... F o r convenience, l e t us refer to intuitions in this sense as prereflective intuitions, f Of  course,  really is  i t i s reasonable  prejudices  i f this  to conclude is  the  that  s e n s e of  intuitions  are  'intuition'  that  meant. Regan  goes  on  to  point  'intuition'--the  reflective  after  of  procedures  out  another  sense—which  clarification  and  one  sense  of  arrives  at  impartial,  rational  deliberation. The j u d g e m e n t s we make a f t e r we have made this effort are not our "gut responses," nor are they merely expressions of what we happen to believe; they are our considered b e l i e f s , b e l i e f s we h o l d when, and only when, we have done our best to be impartial, rational, cool, and so forth.t This  sense  reflects  methodological expressions  sense  of  c h a r g e of as  criterion  like  debate over  'ordinary  proper  'prejudice'  a criterion  philosophical  t R e g a n ( 3 ) : pp. t R e g a n ( 3 ) : p.  for  t o be  this  moral  moral  criticism.  'intuition' " AU.  The  leaves and  it  a  use  of  this the  unclear allows use  of  for  the which the  intuition  theories.  frequently provides For  as  convictions', within  d i r e c t e d at  nature  133-134. 134.  of  assessing  i s intended,  in assessing of  use  methodology,  'intuition'  Ambiguity for  the  example,  in  the  basis  discussing  M o r a l M e t h o d o l o g y and psychological term  'selfish'  'intuition'. and  egoism, Singer which  Singer  is  considers  a n a l o g o u s to*  notes  one  a resulting difficulty  an  Intuitions /  ambiguity  Regan's p o i n t  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of  f o r an  in  advocate  of  9  the about  'selfish',  psychological  egoism. In the first i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , to be selfish is to take no a c c o u n t of the i n t e r e s t s of anyone e l s e , e x c e p t when by d o i n g so you can g e t more of what you want f o r y o u r s e l f . T h i s i s r o u g h l y what we u s u a l l y mean when we say t h a t someone i s s e l f i s h , but i t i s very implausible t o say t h a t everyone i s always selfish in t h i s sense. There are examples of p e o p l e who do t h i n g s f o r o t h e r s w i t h no prospect of reward, ranging from p a t r i o t s who die for t h e i r country to v o l u n t e e r s who donate a p i n t of their blood to h e l p a s t r a n g e r . f The  proponent  Either to  she  psychological  egoism  faces  egoism  or  f i n d s some  way  donor w i t h i n  i t s scope.  This  abandons p s y c h o l o g i c a l  include  requires  of  cases  an  like  the  blood  a l t e r n a t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ' of  a  dilemma.  'selfish'.  So p s y c h o l o g i c a l egoists often take a b r o a d e r view of " s e l f i s h " b e h a v i o r . They say that i f patriots volunteer for s u i c i d a l missions, that must show that they, want t o d i e f o r t h e i r c o u n t r y more t h a n t h e y want t o go on l i v i n g ; and if blood donors give blood a t no f e e t o a s t r a n g e r , t h a t must be b e c a u s e t h e y get s a t i s f a c t i o n from h e l p i n g s t r a n g e r s . $ Singer  acknowledges that  psychological  t i  egoist  S i n g e r (8) : p. S i n g e r ( 8 ) : p.  1~27 . 127.  but  such a response  points  out  that  there  i s open t o  the  i s a cost  in  M o r a l M e t h o d o l o g y and I n t u i t i o n s / advocating  10  such a p o s i t i o n . In this second interpretation of " s e l f i s h " i t i s much more d i f f i c u l t to r e f u t e the c l a i m that everyone always a c t s s e l f i s h l y — b u t now that claim has c h a n g e d i t s meaning so r a d i c a l l y t h a t i t i s no l o n g e r t h e b o l d c h a l l e n g e t o more i d e a l i s t i c t h e o r i e s o f human n a t u r e t h a t i t a t f i r s t seemed t o be. T h i s refined v e r s i o n of p s y c h o l o g i c a l egoism i s q u i t e compatible with distinguishing between behavior that i s s e l f i s h i n the ordinary sense of t h e term and b e h a v i o r t h a t is " s e l f i s h " only i n the p e c u l i a r sense i n which the person who would r a t h e r help others than see them suffer is selfish.f  Thus, the f o r c e it  is  noted  different  that  sense  Continuing respect  to  importance  of p s y c h o l o g i c a l 'selfish'  than  the analogy  Singer  i s being  largely i s lost  once  employed  a  very  raised  with  in  usual.  'intuition', that  egoism  with  there  the  is  concerns  an a d d i t i o n a l  point  of  g o e s on t o make.  T h i s second sense of " s e l f i s h " i s so all-encompassing that i t serves no useful function at a l l . If a l l behavior i s , i n t h i s s e n s e , s e l f i s h , but some i s also selfish i n the f i r s t , narrower sense, c l a r i t y w i l l be b e s t s e r v e d by r e s t r i c t i n g t h e term t o i t s narrower meaning, which has the advantage of c o n t r a s t i n g some k i n d s o f b e h a v i o r with others. $ Regan  makes  'prejudice'. of  critics  a  similar  point  Regan a r g u e s t h a t to  keep t h e  f  Singer(8):  p. 127.  i  Singer(8):  pp. 127-128.  regarding  'intuition'  i t i s the f a i l u r e  different  senses  of  and  on t h e p a r t 'intuition'  M o r a l M e t h o d o l o g y and distinct  that  c h a r g e of  leads  t o the  initial  Intuitions /  plausibility  of  11 the  'prejudice'. I f , a f t e r we have made a conscientious effort to think about our beliefs ideally, we are still said to be p r e j u d i c e d , t h e n o t i o n of p r e j u d i c e has lost any clear or helpful meaning. I n t e r p r e t e d i n t h i s way, e v e r y t h i n g t h a t one believes would qualify as a prejudice. When we appeal to our intuitions, in the reflective sense, t h e r e i s ample r e a s o n not t o view them as p r e j u d i c e s , f  Even  accepting  remains c o n c e r n i n g assessment is  taken  the  point,  proper  of moral t h e o r i e s .  t o mean  hunch' or  this  'reflective  'prejudice',  however,  role That  of  the  intuition  i s , even  belief',  and  i t seems l i k e l y  if  that  methodological  a p p r o a c h of Hare and  retain  the  same p o s i t i o n  about  role  that  'intuition'  can  subordinating  fact,  play  in  seems t o a n t i c i p a t e Regan's s e n s i t i v i t y of  'intuition'  Singer  adequate  to d i f f e r e n t  'intuition'.  R e g a n ( 3 ) : p.  i~36.  would  of  to the  methodology  At t h i s p o i n t some p h i l o s o p h e r s w i l l be ready to s t e p in with t h e i r intuitions, and t e l l us t h a t some d i s t r i b u t i o n s or ways of achieving distributions are o b v i o u s l y more j u s t t h a n o t h e r s , or t h a t everyone w i l l agree on r e f l e c t i o n that they a r e . These philosophers appeal to our i n t u i t i o n s or p r e j u d i c e s i n support of the most w i d e l y d i v e r g e n t methods or p a t t e r n s of d i s t r i b u t i o n . ... I n t u i t i o n s t  who  intuitions  Hare's d i s c u s s i o n an  the  individuals  the  m o r a l a x i o m s . In  in  not ' p r e r e f l e c t i v e  favour  self-evident  question  senses  Moral Methodology  and I n t u i t i o n s  / 12  prove nothing; general consensus proves n o t h i n g ; b o t h have been u s e d t o s u p p o r t c o n c l u s i o n s w h i c h o u r i n t u i t i o n s and o u r c o n s e n s u s may w e l l f i n d o u t r a g e o u s , f Alongside  the  reflective  judgement.  'intuitions' in  seem t o be t h a t  Reluctance testing  to allow  considerable variation  in  different  cultures. would  a d v o c a t e s a methodology at  a certain  reference  level  t o Rawls,  emphasizes  maintains  are  a result  this  H a r e ( 6 ) : p . 124.  even  of  position  our would  escape the charge  to play  i s traceable  in  of  But  even  still  be  point that  i f there a  Singer  out,  are  were  problem.  w h i c h , under c e r t a i n  of theory,  i n the  to concerns  frequently  the b e l i e f s  any r o l e  about there  accepted universal  John  conditions  Rawls and  i n v o l v e s moral consensus. With  claims:  T h e r e i s no s e n s e i n w h i c h we c a n speak of a t h e o r y b e i n g o b j e c t i v e l y v a l i d , no m a t t e r what c o n s i d e r e d m o r a l judgements people happen to hold. ... Even i f everyone s h a r e d t h e same considered m o r a l judgement, t h i s would only mean t h a t a t h e o r y m i g h t have i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e validity: it would not make for objective validity. People might have j u d g e d d i f f e r e n t l y , and t h e n a d i f f e r e n t  t  that  heritage.  As Hare and o t h e r s  there  of  'intuition'  is  agreement,  beliefs', result  of moral p r i n c i p l e s  objectivity.  he s t i l l  use o f r e a s o n c a n  due t o c u l t u r a l  Hare  because our ' i n t u i t i o n s ' ,  But one  no  'prejudice'  Nevertheless,  'considered  heritage.  prejudice  to  a r e not u s e f u l  the sense of  cultural  reference  Moral Methodology moral  t h e o r y would  According  to  considered  moral  determining oneself  Singer,  judgements  aside  Henry  subjectivism  the  that  that  Rawls  to play  a  question  of Rawls, Sidgwick  either  i t is as  intuitions  significant  principles  entails  moral  useful  to  the  or  role  i s to  in  commit  subjectivism.  o f whether  avoiding  / 13  Intuitions  "valid".f  allow  of m o r a l  t o a methodology  interpretation views  to  the v a l i d i t y  Leaving  have been  and  this  is a  n o t e why charge  fair Singer  of  moral  i s s u p p o s e d l y open t o .  Agreement, no m a t t e r how w i d e s p r e a d it may be, i s n o t a c r i t e r i o n f o r t h e t r u t h or v a l i d i t y of a normative theory. ... [ S i d g w i c k ] d o e s not d e f i n e v a l i d i t y for a moral theory i n terms of agreement w i t h our u l t i m a t e i n t u i t i o n s o r i n t e r m s of a match with our particular judgements. Therefore he is not committed t o the kind of subjectivism that is consequent upon any such definition of validity for a moral theory. $ Sidgwick or  does  not d e f i n i t i o n a l l y  shared considered  avoids moral  judgements.  tie validity It  to  i s in this  intuitions way  that  the v a l i d i t y  or p r i n c i p l e ,  is constituted  by  the a l l e g e d l y  sharp contrast  with  of a m o r a l  consensus  i s what  Rawls.  Common s e n s e morality, representing as i t does the accumulated e x p e r i e n c e of mankind, is a useful check on our i n t u i t i o n s of s e l f - e v i d e n t moral axioms; Singer(3): Singer(3):  he  subjectivism.  Sidgwick's denial  t i  that  pp. pp.  494-495. 514-515.  theory, leads  to  M o r a l M e t h o d o l o g y and I n t u i t i o n s / 14 but even when i t i s i n harmony w i t h o u r own i n t u i t i o n s we may after a l l be mistaken. I t i s t h i s possibility ... t h a t marks t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between t h e two a u t h o r s — f o r on R a w l s ' s view, one c o u l d n o t even make s e n s e of s u c h a p o s s i b i l i t y . F o r Rawls, reaching this k i n d o f harmony i s t h e g o a l of moral philosophy; i t i s the d e f i n i t i o n of " v a l i d " so f a r a s m o r a l theories are concerned: f o r Sidgwick, i t i s the best p o s s i b l e insurance against e r r o r , but because our t a r g e t i s a moral theory w h i c h i s t r u e , and n o t m e r e l y i n harmony w i t h o u r i n t u i t i o n s and common sense m o r a l i t y , we may s t i l l be i n e r r o r , f For  the sake of the f o l l o w i n g d i s c u s s i o n ,  interpretations only  o f Rawls and S i d g w i c k  qualification  should  not  be  Subjectivism  regarded  this.  view  Thus,  B. AN ANALOGY The what  of  dispute  between Rawls  to claim  One c a n c l a r i f y  these philosophers  moral  theory.  developing  that  Rawls  'subjectivism'. there  are  s o m e t h i n g more accounts  moral  objectivist are  labelled  largely  concerns  objectivism.  pp.  and S i n g e r a  construes  Perhaps  508-509.  moral theory  the dispute  this  an a n a l o g y between  t SingerO):  that  alternative  and ' s t r o n g '  of  The  WITH "TRUTH"  i t means  'valid'.  form  denies  involves  the  'weak' o b j e c t i v i s m  a  the  o f f e r e d by S i n g e r .  the p o s i t i o n a t t r i b u t e d to as  classically  ' t r u t h s ' . Rawls' than  i s that  we c a n a c c e p t  by c o n t r a s t i n g  the bedrock can  i s 'true'  be  the issue  how  each  or foundation  achieved that  best  divides  or  of by  Rawls  M o r a l M e t h o d o l o g y and and  Singer,  and  correspondence  of  following  dispute  theories  Intending account  the  to  of  both  'reflective  between  'truth'  in  clarify  and  equilibrium',  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of  Intuitions / coherence  15 and  epistemology. expand Daniels  Rawls' o r i g i n a l  upon  Rawls'  advances  the  notion.  The method of wide reflective equilibrium is an attempt to produce c o h e r e n c e i n an o r d e r e d t r i p l e of sets of b e l i e f s _ h e l d by a p a r t i c u l a r person, namely, (a) a set of c o n s i d e r e d moral judgments, (b) a set of moral p r i n c i p l e s , and (c) a s e t of relevant b a c k g r o u n d t h e o r i e s . ... We can imagine the a g e n t w o r k i n g back and f o r t h , making adjustments to his considered judgements, h i s moral principles, and h i s b a c k g r o u n d t h e o r i e s . In t h i s way he a r r i v e s at an equilibrium point that c o n s i s t s of t h e o r d e r e d t r i p l e ( a ) , ( b ) , (c). f Thus, moral t h e o r y achieve  'equilibrium'  Therefore, which All  moral  i s not  that  i s u n d e r s t o o d as  one  between  theory  subject  does  three not  to p o s s i b l e  ever a c h i e v e s  i n v o l v i n g an different  have any  fixed  a l t e r a t i o n and  is 'provisional  fixed  attempt  to  elements.$ foundation revision. points'.  t D a n i e l s U ) : pp. 258-259. $ As D a n i e l s p o i n t s o u t , i f one c o n s t r u e s t h e e q u i l i b r i u m i n t e r m s of the f i r s t two e l e m e n t s , t h e n one i s working in t e r m s of 'narrow' equilibrium. It is the i n c l u s i o n o f the t h i r d element which p r o v i d e s the b a s i s f o r the distinction between 'wide' and 'narrow' equilibrium. The-third element i s v i t a l to D a n i e l s ' attempt to r e s o l v e the d i f f i c u l t i e s he contends are associated w i t h the traditional "two-tiered v i e w of moral t h e o r i e s " . Furthermore, i t i s important to note that such e q u i l i b r i u m may not e v e r be a t t a i n e d . The w o r l d may j u s t be too c o m p l i c a t e d and c h a n g i n g to allow a c h i e v i n g wide r e f l e c t i v e e q u i l i b r i u m , y e t we keep seeking i t i n our t h e o r e t i c a l r e v i s i o n s .  Moral Methodology The  crucial  to  be u n d e r s t o o d  are  different  important to  i s how wide r e f l e c t i v e  relative ways  to  interpretation  define  validity.  equilibrium theory.t  issue  itself  On that  Singer rejects  equilibrium  cannot  there i s  have  judged d i f f e r e n t l y ,  topic  construe  the  takes  validity'  and then  fact'  in  terms  in  and judgement a b o u t of e q u i l i b r i u m ,  be more t h a n one s y s t e m  one  is  for  for this  stable  a  According to  a different  that  thought  'moral  exists  but  equilibrium  i t  because  There  moral Singer,  would  entail  "people  might  moral  theory  Apparently, Singer's conception  seeks a correspondence  thought  validity  validity  Singer  that  relation  validity  such a view.  requires  of human  of v a l i d i t y .  understanding  constitutes  / 16  equilibrium i s  wide r e f l e c t i v e  this  no o b j e c t i v e  w o u l d have been v a l i d " .  independently  t o the  constitute  that  'objective  and I n t u i t i o n s  moral  t r u t h must  and b e l i e f .  between the world  In some  sense,  independently of cannot  for i t i s possible of moral  exist  a judgement and  i t . Validity  thought  that  that  be  of  some our  defined  there could  could  achieve  t D a n i e l s h i m s e l f seems t o r e j e c t t h i s v i e w . T h e r e i s some reason to think that D a n i e l s understands wide reflective equilibrium in terms of providing evidence and j u s t i f i c a t i o n , and n o t a s d e f i n i n g validity for a moral t h e o r y . I n one d i s c u s s i o n o f wide r e f l e c t i v e equilibrium, D a n i e l s c l a i m s t h e f o l l o w i n g i n a f o o t n o t e . " I f we construe wide r e f l e c t i v e e q u i l i b r i u m a s p r o v i d i n g us w i t h t h e b a s i s for a full-blown coherence theory of moral justification, then my argument suggests that i t faces the same difficulties and a d v a n t a g e s as coherence theories of n o n m o r a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n . I c a n n o t h e r e d e f e n d my view t h a t a coherence theory of j u s t i f i c a t i o n c a n be made compatible w i t h a n o n c o h e r e n c y a c c o u n t o f t r u t h . " D a n i e l s ( l ) : p. 277.  M o r a l M e t h o d o l o g y and equilibrium. requires  In  of  of  validity  criticism  Bertrand  of  Russell's  reflective objections  'truth'. Russell claims  suppose t h a t ...  only  is  no  proof  system".f This be  one  something  and  only  one  t e r m s of  system  claim  and,  a result,  as  different  coherence the  that  place,  constitutes  Russell  that  t r u t h ; and  of  to the  "...  definition can  h i n g e s on the  the  So,  since  following  be  theory.  'truth'  is Francis  response  to  the  One  type  defined  in  analogous  to  differently  cannot  71.  in  be of  Bradley,  and  H. of  objection  a  what  proponent  advances.  R u s s e l l ( 1 ) : p.  must one  established  equilibrium  in moral  there makes  be  judge  because coherent  that  is directly  to  possible.  one  that  belief  people could  wide r e f l e c t i v e  of  idea  t r u t h cannot  claim  is  be  theory  reason  truth f a i l s  only  s y s t e m s of  true.  i s no  beliefs of  parallels  'But.', i t may s t i l l be objected, 'my fancy is unlimited. I can therefore invent an imaginary world even more o r d e r l y t h a n my known w o r l d . ... To t h i s possible objection, I should reply f i r s t , that i t has probably f a i l e d to understand r i g h t l y the c r i t e r i o n which I d e f e n d . The a s p e c t of comprehensiveness has not r e c e i v e d h e r e i t s due emphasis. The i d e a of s y s t e m demands t h e i n c l u s i o n t  truth  coherence  there  equilibrium could  validity  theory  equilibrium  body of  there  coherence. This  Singer's  offers  the  objection  outside  that,  coherent  T h u s , c o h e r e n c e as  there  requires  17  correspondence.  Singer's one  short,  Intuitions /  the he  which  Moral Methodology  and  Intuitions /  18  of a l l p o s s i b l e m a t e r i a l . Not o n l y must you i n c l u d e e v e r y t h i n g t o be g a i n e d from immediate e x p e r i e n c e and p e r c e p t i o n , but you must a l s o be ready to a c t on the same p r i n c i p l e w i t h r e g a r d t o f a n c y , f Bradley's equally  response questions coherent  comprehensive  systems  with  whether of  respect  there  thought  to a l l  really  that  possible  can  be  are  two  equally  evidence  and  experience. The claim  same  that  issue  is  relevant  e q u i l i b r i u m might  be  with  respect  "found at  to  Singer's  different places".  Since a l l considered judgements are r e v i s a b l e , t h e judgement " I t i s wrong t o inflict pain gratuitously on another p e r s o n " i s , t o o . But we can a l s o e x p l a i n why it is so hard to imagine not a c c e p t i n g i t , so h a r d t h a t some t r e a t i t as a necessary truth. To imagine r e v i s i n g such a p r o v i s i o n a l f i x e d point we must imagine a vastly altered wide r e f l e c t i v e equilibrium that nevertheless i s much more a c c e p t a b l e t h a n our own. F o r example, we m i g h t have t o imagine persons quite unlike the persons we know. $ Essentially, Singer's  the  claim  point  of  that  there  comprehensive  system  of  equilibrium.  Thus,  the  constitutes thought issue  of  Daniels  moral  can  could  parallel  analogous  comprehensiveness.  t B r a d l e y ( 2 ) : p. i D a n i e l s ( 1 ) : p.  214. 267.  taken  be  thought  'truth' in epistemology  involve  be  in  questions  challenge  more  than  wide  reflective  disputes and  to  over  'validity'  with  respect  one  what  in  moral to  the  Moral Methodology D i s p u t e s c o n c e r n i n g 'weak' and moral  t h e o r y a r e of t h e  coherence  and  coherence  Proponents  permits  equally  coherent  essence  of  contend  that  coherence can  be  t o note  theory defines  terms that  'truth'  correspondence  theory,  "...  cannot  after  though a  it  certain  in  is often  of t r u t h  provide a test  truth  for  stable a  moral  of  and  theory  for believing  R u s s e l K 1 ) : p.  71 .  that  allows  a moral  the that,  of  of a moral  realm.  it  The  whether t h e o r y or involving In  other  definition only  of  truth  known".f  equilibrium  does  while  involves  p r o v i d e the or  coherence  test  become  is  upon  t h e meaning  important  i n the moral  it  rely  ways. The  Russell,  has  'truth'  However,  as g i v i n g  the  coherence  So,  of c o h e r e n c e ,  reflective  truth  of  comprehensive  'truth'  philosophy  equilibrium  moral  of  f o r the t r u t h  of s h a r e d  constitutes  justification  t  in  theories  a most  that  multiplicity  coherence.  be a c c e p t e d  intuitions  words, d o e s  argue  advocates stable  terms  in  i s incompatible with  according to  dispute  intuitions  a  in significant  amount  idea  of  both  analogous  whether the  this  a fully  n o t i o n of coherence  truth,  and  of  In r e s p o n s e ,  in  19 in  'truth'  not a l l o w f o r s u c h m u l t i p l i c i t y .  defined  coherence  of  correspondence  possibility  achieving  will  /  'strong' objectivism  theories  of  systems,  'truth'.  important the  the  Intuitions  same s t r u c t u r e as d i s p u t e s i n v o l v i n g  correspondence  epistemology.  and  of  provide  theory i s true?  In  Moral Methodology w h i c h c a s e what  i s truth  present  i s the r o l e  and  concern  'strong'  i n morals? F o r t u n a t e l y ,  objectivism,  necessary. Nevertheless, remains c r u c i a l  C.  a n d I n t u i t i o n s / 20  played  by i n t u i t i o n s i n  r e s o l u t i o n of t h i s the  since  dispute  meaning/evidence  t o the d i s c u s s i o n  our  'weak' i s not  distinction  of i n t u i t i o n s .  METHODOLOGY AND INTUITIONS The  two p o s i t i o n s on  represented relation  t h e n a t u r e of m o r a l  by Rawls and S i d g w i c k , to  metaphysical;  two the  questions. second  objectivity,  need t o be c o n s i d e r e d  The  first  in  question  i s epistemological.  is  First,  what  makes a m o r a l p r i n c i p l e v a l i d ? And s e c o n d , how does one know that these cast  a moral p r i n c i p l e i s two q u e s t i o n s greater  objectivism. role  that  light  and t h e  both  r e l a t i o n s between  on t h e i s s u e  Our d i s c u s s i o n  intuition  Ultimately,  v a l i d ? t The p u r p o s e o f  plays views  between  will within  also  them i s t o  'weak' a n d serve  'strong'  to clarify  each of the  inescapably  examining  require  the  alternatives. the  use of  intuition. 'Weak' o b j e c t i v i s m that  validity  answers t h e f i r s t  i s a complex  function  an  answer  of  '.truth' f o r m o r a l s w i t h o u t  moral  r e f l e c t s a metaphysical  ' f a c t s ' that  are built  question  saying  of s h a r e d b e l i e f .  concern  to allow  Such  a concept  any o n t o l o g i c a l commitment  into the world  f For the present d i s c u s s i o n , t a k e n t o be synonymous.  by  'valid'  to  independently of  and ' t r u e '  shall  be  M o r a l M e t h o d o l o g y and m o r a l a g e n t s . Thus,  the  conceptually  fact  true,  or  to  that  conditions.t is  easy  to  to  it.  If  the  we  that  true,  principle  is  conformed The  truth  to  we  will  through  of  a moral  intuitions.  under  first  is  consulting  be  certain  question,  is directly  to  tied  p r i n c i p l e to  true  to the  seek  it  related  what  makes  a  know  whether  a  our  rationally  with  agreement,  This  Singer's  understand  on  Rawls'  involves  Requirements  in  like  on  psychology the  reflective  position requires that  the  defines  and  of  one  of  also  agreement  procedure  with  interpretation, of  terms  kind  conformity and  consulting  imposed. And  and  requirements  notion  process  be  amount  human n a t u r e  'weak' o b j e c t i v i s t  r o l e i n the  the  specific  of  is,  principle  agreement need t o  understanding  a  the  i t t o be  second q u e s t i o n  then  supplement  reaching  the  believe  rationalized belief  true  intersubjective  required  we  21  beliefs.'  reflective  needs  that  a moral p r i n c i p l e i s  answer g i v e n  the  shared,  principle  of  would b e l i e v e  From the  see  truth  Intuitions /  and  our  best  so  proper  forth. way  equilibrium. that  intuition  establishes  for  the  to Thus, play truth  t It should be n o t e d t h a t e v i d e n c e f o r the b e l i e f can be i n d i r e c t in that c e r t a i n other b e l i e f s may be e x p l a i n e d by ascribing b e l i e f in the p r i n c i p l e to t h e a g e n t . The agent might t h e n be s a i d to b e l i e v e t h e p r i n c i p l e as w e l l , but this could be a very implicit, unconscious belief, as o p p o s e d t o one the a g e n t would i m m e d i a t e l y and unhesitantly avow.  Moral Methodology  of m o r a l  contrast  to  different  objectivism 'weak'  imagines i t s e l f  objectivism.  conception  morals. While  of  what  The  i s involved  'weak' o b j e c t i v i s m  attempts  w i t h o u t o n t o l o g i c a l commitment,  entails  an o n t o l o g i c a l commitment  'truths'  that  is morally  correct  are  question,  but  under  'strong'  ideal  'strong' the  question.  This  principles The  recognize concerns  are true  difficulty  is alluded Singer  22  t o by  points  'strong'  one  independent of p r o v i d i n g  Singer- i n h i s  out, i n t u i t i o n  t r u t h of a moral  in  moral  objectivism of  agents  moral think  c a n answer  component  answer w i l l belief.  such  can  be t h a t  truth  B u t , however  of our  we  first second moral  agents.  an answer discussion  provides  any  d e t e r m i n e which  of moral  the  of  answer t o our  the a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s how  a  c o n s t r a i n t s . There are a  essential  i d e a , any  sharp  'truth'  to preserve  objectivism  objectivist  to understand t h i s must  in  to the e x i s t e n c e  i n d e p e n d e n t o f human t h o u g h t and  question  the  even  in  concerns  i n d e p e n d e n t l y of what m o r a l  o f ways i n w h i c h  appropriately is  exist  to stand  contrast  'truth'  first  Intuitions /  principles.f  'Strong'  variety  and  to t h i s  question  of S i d g w i c k .  the b a s i c  As  evidence for  principle.  t I t i s more a c c u r a t e t o speak of t h e ' p r o v i s i o n a l ' t r u t h of moral p r i n c i p l e s , as opposed to the truth of moral p r i n c i p l e s . The 'weak' o b j e c t i v i s t p o s i t i o n , construed in terms o f 'wide' r e f l e c t i v e e q u i l i b r i u m , e n t a i l s that there a r e no p r i n c i p l e s whose t r u t h i s f i x e d i n a manner that p r e c l u d e s r e v i s i o n i n the l i g h t of f u t u r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .  Moral Methodology  and I n t u i t i o n s  / 23  S i d g w i c k would admit t h a t , i n t h e end, we have n o t h i n g to f a l l back on o t h e r than c a r e f u l consideration of whether some fundamental principle really is i n t u i t i v e l y c l e a r and c e r t a i n ( t h o u g h we may be a b l e t o s u p p o r t o u r i n t u i t i o n s t o some e x t e n t by a c o m p a r i s o n w i t h common • sense m o r a l i t y ) . f Thus,  t h e answer  t o the question  moral p r i n c i p l e reflective claiming result i.e.  is  intuition.  that  the  finally  This  truth  of i t s f o l l o w i n g  of  one knows  Ultimately,  the  intuition.  There  intuition  answer  rests  result  knows t h a t  on  may  an  be  the p a r t i c u l a r  from  from o t h e r s e l f - e v i d e n t  c o n c e r n s how  to  true  o f how one  to  postponed  by  principle  the t r u t h will  of these  have t o  grounding  belief  a  principles,  moral  rest  in  is  The q u e s t i o n  in  i s s i m p l y no means o f a v o i d i n g  in  appeal  more f u n d a m e n t a l moral axioms.  a  then  axioms.  reflective  some  appeal  fundamental  moral  principles. Recalling to  arrive  that  at  independently  the purpose  a  of  'true'  o f m o r a l axioms  for  'strong'  the  objectivism can  be  the d i s t i n c t i o n f  in  would  the  that  terms  of  S i n g e r ( 3 ) : p . 514.  which  ultimate  results  stands  i n a dilemma if  'strong'  the t r u t h of the moral intuition, a view  our two q u e s t i o n s  is  epistemological  Obviously,  be a b a n d o n e d . Such  between  objectivism  theory  in intuitions  objectivist.  were t o c l a i m  defined  objectivism  moral  intuition,  grounding  of ' s t r o n g '  axioms  then  'strong'  would  collapse  i n t h e same  way  Moral Methodology that  'weak' o b j e c t i v i s m  'strong' 'is  objectivism  true'  and  difficulties. maintained,  d o e s . On t h e o t h e r  by  preserving  ' i s believed  moral axioms.  to provide However,  then the to  there  maintaining  results  in  other  when t h e d i s t i n c t i o n i s for  i f intuition  the t r u t h  is  of  understood  i s no o t h e r  i s no means f o r s e t t l i n g  between  source  disputes  the  as  a  possible,  with  respect  to  t r u t h o f m o r a l a x i o m s . f When d i f f e r e n t i n d i v i d u a l s c l a i m know t h e t r u t h o f  of  intuition,  principle) is  true'  evidence  source of e v i d e n c e , and t h e r e  hand,  the d i s t i n c t i o n  The r o l e o f i n t u i t i o n ,  is  and I n t u i t i o n s / 24  conflicting  there  is  for settling  no  m o r a l a x i o m s on t h e  method  the question  available o f who  (even  believed  distinction  moral  between  agents,  objectivism ' i s true'  under  moral p r i n c i p l e s . T h i s means t o d e t e r m i n e fact  true.  maintain  'is true  1  is  no  and ' i s  true'.  'Strong'  rational  t h e gap between  in  i s r i g h t a n d who  wrong. One h a s ended up i n a s i t u a t i o n where t h e r e  p o s s i b l e means o f c r o s s i n g  basis  In  ideal  a thoroughgoing  to  maintain  and ' i s b e l i e v e d constraints)  r e s u l t s i n there  rationally  contrast,  attempts  that  being  a given  'weak' m o r a l distinction  with  true  1  respect no  a (by to  possible  principle i s in  objectivism between  does  not  ' i s true'  and  t T h i s i s c l e a r l y too s t r o n g . N o t i o n s such as consistency, f o r example, w i l l have a role to play i n considering such d i s a g r e e m e n t s . But d i f f e r e n c e s i n f u n d a m e n t a l i n t u i t i o n can be expected to survive a l l such additional bases f o r criticism.  M o r a l M e t h o d o l o g y and 'is  believed  intuition moral of  true'.  to play  principle.  intuition  a  role  at  the  the  latter  truth  gap  'strong'  We  the  with  reliance  now  or  intuition. are  theories.  should  We  judgements,  not  characterizes corresponding  to  not  to  a  as  evidence  as  j  use  for  for while  of  principles.  moral and  'Weak'  truth,  and  a  criterion  for  Singer  view  objection  to  methodological  claims data  sound  judgements to that of  the  for  our  "Our  testing  theories  Singer use  that,  to  advocates, of  moral ethical  practical  theories."t  intuition,  manner.  327.  the  metaphysics,  a criterion  final  work from  criticism  S i n g e r ( 7 ) : p.  true  alternative  A f i n a l c r i t i c i s m against using appeals t o i n t u i t i o n s as a means of validating e t h i c a l p r i n c i p l e s — a n d t h i s perhaps is t h e most b a s i c c r i t i c i s m - - i s that this way of v i e w i n g our i n t u i t i o n s has things backwards. Rather than appealing to i n t u i t i o n s to test e t h i c a l t h e o r i e s , we ought t o appeal to a sound theory to t  a  between e p i s t e m o l o g y  intuition  reliable  from our the  as  of  a definition  moral  25  consensual  their  and  /  knowledge.  consider  convictions  following  distinction  uses  committed  intuition  into  and  definition  in  intuition  intuition  belief  on  uses  respect  uses  may  views are  between e p i s t e m o l o g y  objectivism  justified  actual  point  former  which d e n i e s  objectivism  the  some  incorporates  metaphysics  reflective  i n the  B o t h of  m e t h o d o l o g i e s . The leaping  It allows  Intuitions  and in  Regan the the  Moral test Regan goes on has  our  M e t h o d o l o g y and  intuitions,  t o a r g u e two  that  intuition.$  Singer  p o i n t s . The  Regan t a k e s  argument, where t h e possible  does,  for his  in  this  first  theory, fact,  i s that while  make  t o amount t o a  onus i s on  methodology  /  26  t  f a i l e d t o p r o v i d e a sound m o r a l  insists  Intuitions  Singer  the  second  appeals  to  burden-of-proof  t o show  to produce  Singer  an  that  it  adequate  is  moral  theory. Given  the  previous  conclusion  may  be  provide  moral  a  discussion,  drawn. Not theory  which  intuitions,  i t i s impossible  on  approach,  Singer's  justifying might  the  respond  difference  other  that  intuitions. then  that  intuition;  generate  them, and  force  intuitions  you  the  c o n s e q u e n c e s of  have  about  the  ignore those  the  at  is  put,  known  to  failed  the  a to  to  use  a theory.  relate  to the on  such  stronger  of Even  level  moral axioms.  are  yourself may  Crudely  amount  from  there  that  a  Singer  enter  particular  intuitions  m e t h o d o l o g y would moral axioms  to provide  claiming  between  a x i o m s , and  of  has  i s free  i n t u i t i o n must  adoption by  only  however,  Singer  significant the  Singer's  moral  proposed  following: find basis these  of  the  reflective  axioms;  whatever  of  follow  particular  c o n s e q u e n c e s . Such  a  t R e g a n ( 3 ) : p. 140. i Regan r e f e r s the reader to S i n g e r ( 6 ) : p. 87. When one c o n s u l t s the r e f e r e n c e i n q u e s t i o n , one finds that Singer makes more than one appeal to a statement's being in 'harmony w i t h our i n t u i t i v e j u d g e m e n t s ' .  Moral Methodology view  seems t o be b e s t  geometry, tested  and I n t u i t i o n s  understood as the methodology  where t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s o f  by r e f e r e n c e back t o  t h e axioms  the axioms.  / 27  of moral  can only  I t i s worth  be  noting  one c o n s e q u e n c e o f s u c h a m e t h o d o l o g y . C o u n t e r e x a m p l e s t o moral p r i n c i p l e , criticizes reflective allow  Rawls  on  it  Putting the q u e s t i o n  the issue arises  between  those that  relate  intuitions relate  the  is  whether  tends  much  of to  weight.  to contend  aside  there  i n regard  for a  that  i s any to  moment,  significant  t h e axioms  j u d g e m e n t s . J . J . C . Smart  problems  when t h e y c o n c e r n  method  i t  too  dangerous  of m e t h o d o l o g y  to p a r t i c u l a r  to particular  the  Singer  and have no w e i g h t .  intuitions  potential  that  judgements  equally  as t o  impossible.  dangerous because  are irrelevant  difference  aware o f  grounds  intuitive  i s perhaps  judgements  are l o g i c a l l y  the  equilibrium  particular  However, such  o r axiom,  a  in  assigning  principles,  weight  b u t n o t when  cases.  Admittedly utilitarianism does have consequences which a r e i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e common moral consciousness, but I t e n d e d t o t a k e t h e v i e w " s o much t h e worse for the common moral c o n s c i o u s n e s s " . T h a t i s , I was inclined to reject t h e common methodology of t e s t i n g general ethical principles by s e e i n g how t h e y s q u a r e w i t h o u r f e e l i n g s in particular instances. ... I t is undeniable that we do have anti-utilitarian moral feelings in particular cases, but perhaps they s h o u l d be d i s c o u n t e d a s f a r a s p o s s i b l e , as due to our moral conditioning in c h i l d h o o d . (The weakness of t h i s l i n e o f  and is to they  Moral Methodology  and  Intuitions  /  28  t h o u g h t i s t h a t a p p r o v a l of t h e general p r i n c i p l e of u t i l i t a r i a n i s m may be due to moral c o n d i t i o n i n g t o o . And even if benevolence were in some way a ' n a t u r a l ' , n o t an ' a r t i f i c i a l ' attitude, this consideration could at best have persuasive force, without any clear r a t i o n a l e . To a r g u e from t h e n a t u r a l n e s s to the c o r r e c t n e s s of a moral attitude would be to commit the naturalistic fallacy.) t There  i s an  explicit  mention  reference normative of  to  this  this  that  made  in this  'naturalistic  distinction One  possible  in  this  may  moral  objection  axioms can  i n t u i t i o n . Hare seems t o h o l d  for be  1  Smart  makes and  to the e n t i r e  is  the  that an  line  i t fails  to  appreciation  possibility  known w i t h o u t  such a  Through  meta-ethics  In p a r t i c u l a r , allow'  passage.  fallacy  between  discussion  distinction.  distinction  maintaining to  the  pursued  appreciate  point  of t h e  ethics.  thought  of  important  of  reference  position.  T h e r e can a l s o be a n o t h e r ... k i n d of intuitionist--one who intuits the validity of a single principle or o r d e r e d system of them, or a single method, and e r e c t s h i s e n t i r e structure of m o r a l t h o u g h t on t h i s . S i d g w i c k m i g h t come i n t o this category—though if he were l i v i n g t o d a y , i t i s unlikely that he would f i n d i t necessary to r e l y on moral intuition.$ The that  sense  of  'intuition'  the reason Sidgwick  on m o r a l  intuition  f S m a r t ( 2 ) : p. 68. $ H a r e ( 5 ) : p.146.  used  here  might  not  depends upon  i s unclear  but  it  find  i t necessary to  the  distinction  seems rely  between  M o r a l M e t h o d o l o g y and m e t a - e t h i c s and intuition reached  by  Hare  here  that  theories,  i t is  distinction need t o allows  normative e t h i c s . and  intuition necessary  between  determine for  others,  the  has to  the  elimination  of  i s understood  j u d g e m e n t . Such  elimination,  D.  the  face  t o be  left  there  is  necessity  of  the  with only  if  argument  one  essential  intuitions.  methodology  distinction  reflective  p o s s i b l e , might  that  by  involve  allows  difference  of social  intuitions,  of m o r a l  a l t e r n a t i v e . One  This  acceptance  that  serve  to  Singer.  r e l i a n c e on i n t u i t i o n s  a d v o c a t e of m o r a l  of  We  t o mean i m p a r t i a l ,  the  may  the  intuition,  unacceptable,  intuitions  of  r e l i a n c e on  methodology  out,  moral  ethics.  this  the  particular points  normative  that  an  of  conclusion  discussion  of  29  INTUITIONS  u n a v o i d a b l e and  therefore  all  the  in assessing  to a  and  rejection  moral geometric methodology proposed  META-ETHICS AND In  is  the  a place turn  the  with  employment  where i n t u i t i o n  justify  coupled  meta-ethics if  Given  Intuitions /  seems d u b i o u s either  geometry  might  between  geometry  general  conditioning.f  i t seems p r e f e r a b l e  seems  contend  that  general  since, or  as  and Smart  particular  Thus, g i v e n  the  to endorse  room f o r some r e l i a n c e on  is  both  a  kinds  t Smart's observation also serves to undercut Singer's sweeping c l a i m t h a t "... i t would be b e s t to f o r g e t all a b o u t our p a r t i c u l a r m o r a l j u d g e m e n t s , and s t a r t a g a i n from as near as we can get to self-evident moral axioms". S i n g e r O ) : p. 516.  Moral of  intuitions.  However,  M e t h o d o l o g y and I n t u i t i o n s it  might  appearances  notwithstanding,  meta-ethics  and n o r m a t i v e e t h i c s  use  of g e n e r a l  allowing leading level  for  intuitions  on  reliance  the  basis  S i n c e Hare  so s t r o n g l y  account  order  on  while  intuitions.  analysis  objects to to consider  to determine  particular  to  intuitions.  'prescriptivism',  is  restricts  to intuitions  appeals  the  The  normative to  avoid  intuitions.  i t i s appropriate  reliance  between  criteria,  enough a t t h e  meta-ethical  that,  to j u s t i f y  of p a r t i c u l a r  intuitions, in  distinction  does s e r v e  establish  of  on p a r t i c u l a r  the  claimed  as methodological  the r e j e c t i o n  i d e a would be t o  be  / 30  a likely  t h e employment his  meta-ethical  what e x t e n t Hare's view,  candidate  for  i n normative  of  it  avoids  known  a view  as  which  ethics.  The r u l e s of moral r e a s o n i n g a r e ... prescriptivity and universalizability. ... I f , when we c o n s i d e r some proposed action, we find that, when universalized, i t yields prescriptions w h i c h we c a n n o t a c c e p t , we r e j e c t this action as a solution t o our moral p r o b l e m — i f we cannot u n i v e r s a l i z e the prescription, it cannot become an 'ought'.f Hare t h i n k s t h a t the deep  s t r u c t u r e of moral  embodied  moral  in  meta-ethical  ordinary principles  of  thinking,  reasoning, reveals  prescriptivity  as the and  universalizability. To  clarify  t Hare(2):  and i l l u s t r a t e  pp. 89-90.  Hare's account,  i t is  useful  Moral to consider being he  the  line  r e l e v a n t t o an  M e t h o d o l o g y and  of argument individual  'ought' t o b r e a k  Intuitions  which Hare  who  presents  is considering  a p r o m i s e t h a t he  has  /  31 as  whether  made t o a  dying  individual. I s he p r e p a r e d t o p r e s c r i b e universally t h a t p e o p l e s h o u l d a c t i n t h i s way? ... Now i t seems t o me t h a t he has v e r y good reason to refuse to accept this universal prescription. The r e a s o n can be b r o u g h t out by a s k i n g him t o imagine h i m s e l f on his deathbed, i n the same s i t u a t i o n as t h a t d e s c r i b e d . ... Most of us would be e x t r e m e l y averse to being deceived in this way; and we should t h e r e f o r e be v e r y f a r from a c c e p t i n g t h e universal prescription that requires it ,f The  determination  promise t o the logic  of  whether one  dying  'ought'.  universal unless  of  man,  one  situation  is  break  their  i n c l u d e the case  dying  individual.  for  see  why  promise  Hare the  validity  draw any  particular  Hare(2):  p.  was  Hare's m e t a - e t h i c s  134.  of  on  this  one's  involves  ought  keep  the  involves  one's in  promise the  same  In p a r t i c u l a r ,  this  cannot  particular case  keep  i n the p o s i t i o n  provide  the  Even  analysis,  concerning  of  one  what t h e  the  basis  intuitions,  further.  his meta-ethical conclusion  of  everyone  as w e l l .  where one  to consider  to  have  to  to Hare,  logic  ought  to  eliminating a l l reliance  illuminating  t  the  one  prepared  would  To  according  Since  prescription,  'ought'  it is  granting cannot content  M o r a l M e t h o d o l o g y and I n t u i t i o n s of  the u n i v e r s a l  consideration.  prescription  There  w h i c h one p e r s o n the  promise,  universal  i s no d i f f i c u l t y  while  another  possible  to claim  violated  the  In  one,  conceptual  of  ultimately  that  moral  would  neither or the  constraints  manifest  themselves  analysis  alone cannot  to relate  in  action,  serve  the  case  opposite  would  other,  i t  individual  associated if  with  normative  Hare's  be had the  debate  to p r a c t i c a l decisions then  in  the b r e a k i n g of  advocate  r e a s o n i n g . Thus,  i s intended  under  i n imagining cases  would u n i v e r s a l l y p r e s c r i b e  prescription.!  structure  would be i n t h e example  / 32  that  meta-ethical  to generate p a r t i c u l a r  normative  conclusions. T h e r e must analysis relied  be s o m e t h i n g  and an u n d e r s t a n d i n g  upon  i n normative  s u g g e s t s what t h e the  extra  on h i s  saying,  i n e f f e c t , that  judgement willing  in to  in  involves.  t h e same  what  Hare  himself  him t o  that imagine  s i t u a t i o n " , Hare their  decisions  prescribe.  that i s  In s a y i n g  o u t by a s k i n g  i n d i v i d u a l s employ  considering  meta-ethical  of the p a r t i c u l a r case  reliance  deathbed,  universally  to  e t h i c a l reasoning.  "... r e a s o n c a n be b r o u g h t  himself  in addition  While  they he  is  reflective would does  be not  t T h i s c l a i m does need t o be q u a l i f i e d i n an i m p o r t a n t way. T h e r e i s no d i f f i c u l t y i n i m a g i n i n g different universal p r e s c r i p t i o n s . However, such difficulty exists when t h e cases are completely s i m i l a r . I f 'completely s i m i l a r cases' i s i n t e r p r e t e d so a s t o i n c l u d e s i t u a t i o n s i n which each p e r s o n ' s c o n s c i e n c e d i c t a t e s t h e same c o u r s e o f a c t i o n , t h e n it will be d i f f i c u l t to understand how their universal p r e s c r i p t i o n s c a n c o n s i s t e n t l y be d i f f e r e n t .  Moral explicitly  use t h e term  intuitions assertion  in  intuitions  i n order  d e c i d i n g whether  is  forced to rely would  negative employs to  of  to  in  what one  'intuition',  terms  amounts  M e t h o d o l o g y and given  reflective  the c l a i m  judgements,  that  one  on  can t o l e r a t e  imagination  or  would  not  and  one must  the  of  to  analysis.  So, one  concerning  Hare,  of i n t u i t i o n s ,  generation  Hare's  appeal  intuitions  accept.  33 of  universalization,  despite  his  ultimately  them t o s u p p l e m e n t h i s m e t a - e t h i c a l for  /  the c o n s t r u a l  t o supplement m e t a - e t h i c a l  characterization  allow  Intuitions  theory  particular  still  in  order  normative  conclusions. The serve on  meta-ethics/normative  t o e l i m i n a t e , or  intuitions.  order  to  even  ethics  substantially  The d i s t i n c t i o n  attempt  to  was  justify  the  regarding moral p r i n c i p l e s  failure  of  combined  with  distinction  Smart's p o i n t  to  for  rejection  moral  geometry's  this  the s i m i l a r there  of  i s no  particular  i s not r e a l l y  principles  and  t h e o r i e s i n s c i e n c e , f o r example,  procedure  that  reflective  equilibrium.  require  geometric  a  to Just  surprising.  parallel as  methodology  of  there  The  moral the  function, status  of  intuitions.  evaluation  Rawls' is  in  justification  Such a r e s u l t  seems  reliance  and t h e o r i e s . G i v e n  about  intuitions,  cannot  introduced  methodology  fulfill  g e n e r a l and p a r t i c u l a r  reduce,  originally  geometry  the  distinction  involves account  no  for s c i e n t i f i c  reason  of a of to  reasoning,  M o r a l M e t h o d o l o g y and I n t u i t i o n s there  seems t o be no r e a s o n  moral  reasoning.  Thus,  a l l o w s weight to both a s s e s s i n g moral  theory.  t o demand  a method  / 34  such a methodology f o r  must  be  g e n e r a l and p a r t i c u l a r  employed  which  intuitions  in  I I . A FORMULATION OF The  discussion  consideration  of  now  moral  between m e t a - e t h i c s and direct AU,  examination  adopting  the  turns  of  AU  away  from  methodology  and  the the  n o r m a t i v e e t h i c s . We  the  substantive  following  explicit distinction  will  take  up  a  n o r m a t i v e p r i n c i p l e of  formulation.  An a c t is right i f and only if the c o n s e q u e n c e s of performing i t are at least as good as the consequences a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the p e r f o r m a n c e of any a l t e r n a t i v e a c t open t o t h e a g e n t , f This  formulation  have t o be must be  critically  either  from the  actions  actual  or  clarify  presenting  the  p o s i t i o n as  exercise  relevant  A.  THE  i n the  purpose  constitutes focus.  equally  t  nature fairly  of  the  act  agent.  And  identified  and  that  in  terms  It  is  also  function  of  AU,  strongly  as  possible.  that  become  AU.  AU of  the  AU  i s to  moral  c e n t r a l questions  S a r t o r i u s ( 1 ) : p.  and  of  the  considerations  examination  right action. This For  of  consequences.  introduce  later  PURPOSE OF  The  in  will  the  distinctions  morality  clearly  probable  to  The  morality  must be  important  This  important  discussed.  kept d i s t i n c t  c o n s e q u e n c e s of of  h i g h l i g h t s two  provide  is  pertaining  35  account  p u r p o s e must be  realm  18.  an  complex to the  kept and  moral  of  what  clearly includes  assessment  A F o r m u l a t i o n o f AU / 36 of  motives,  Feldman  intentions  uses  importance  the  and t h e c h a r a c t e r  following  of keeping  such  scenario  issues  of moral to  agents.  emphasize  the  distinct.  Suppose an a s s a s s i n i s t r y i n g t o murder a beloved religious l e a d e r . The shot misses, i t h i t s a rock, and o u t f l o w s some o i l . Those watching check more c l o s e l y , and they d i s c o v e r a previously unknown o i l r e s e r v e c o n t a i n i n g enough o i l t o make them a l l rich and happy. Everyone then shares i n the wealth, and l i v e s h a p p i l y ever a f t e r . In t h i s case, the a c t had a t e r r i b l e motive, but i t nevertheless produced a tremendous amount o f u t i l i t y , f a r more t h a n would have been p r o d u c e d by a n y t h i n g e l s e t h e assassin could have done instead. According t o [ A U ] , what he d i d was morally right! f A  failure  explain common  t o keep c e r t a i n  the f e e l i n g  o f shock  questions d i s t i n c t  that  helps  such c a s e s engender  to for  sense.$  As  Smart a n d o t h e r d e f e n d e r s  difference designed of  moral  between  the m o r a l i t y  o f AU i n s i s t , of  actions,  t o e v a l u a t e , and q u e s t i o n s i n v o l v i n g  the c h a r a c t e r and motive  there i s a  which  AU  is  the assessment  of the agent.  What we do need i s a p a i r o f t e r m s o f appraisal f o r agents and m o t i v e s . I suggest that we use terms 'good' a n d 'bad' f o r t h e s e p u r p o s e s . A good agent is one who a c t s more nearly in a generally optimific way than the a v e r a g e . A bad a g e n t i s one who a c t s i n f F e l d m a n ( 2 ) : p . 37. $• I t s h o u l d be n o t e d t h a t Feldman's s c e n a r i o p o r t r a y s AU s t r i c t l y i n t e r m s o f a c t u a l c o n s e q u e n c e s . An understanding of AU i n t e r m s o f p r o b a b l e c o n s e q u e n c e s p r o d u c e s a d i f f e r e n t result.  A Formulation  o f AU / 37  a l e s s o p t i m i f i c way t h a n t h e a v e r a g e . A good motive i s one w h i c h generally r e s u l t s i n b e n e f i c e n t a c t i o n s , and a bad m o t i v e i s one w h i c h g e n e r a l l y ends i n maleficient actions.f I f AU i s t o have any p l a u s i b i l i t y , maintained necessary  and  employed.  i n defending  s u c h d i s t i n c t i o n s must be  Smart makes  AU a g a i n s t  the  cases  point  like  that  that  of  is the  assassin. C l e a r l y there i s no inconsistency in s a y i n g t h a t on a p a r t i c u l a r occasion a good man d i d t h e wrong a c t i o n , that a bad man d i d a r i g h t a c t i o n , t h a t a r i g h t a c t i o n was done from a bad m o t i v e , or t h a t a wrong a c t i o n was done from a good m o t i v e . Many s p e c i o u s a r g u m e n t s against u t i l i t a r i a n i s m come f r o m o b s c u r i n g t h e s e distinctions. $ Within was  an AU framework, t o c l a i m  ' r i g h t ' does  with,  the  assassin  claims  that  the  h a s a good m o r a l  There by  not i n v o l v e ,  motive  c a s e . The AU  According  t o AU, t h e a s s a s s i n ' s  praise  and i t  was good  of importance  claim  involve  no r e a s o n ,  any  n o t be or  the  commitment  that to  action  p r o b a b l y would  illustrated  an a c t i o n  praising  is  the  right agent.  was r i g h t , b u t be i n a p p r o p r i a t e ,  him f o r t h e a c t i o n .  S m a r t ( 2 ) : p . 48. S m a r t ( 2 ) : p . 48.  confused that  P r a i s i n g a person i s t h u s an important action in itself--it has significant effects. A utilitarian must therefore f i  action  character.  i s an a d d i t i o n a l p o i n t  the a s s a s s i n  the a s s a s s i n ' s  and should  does n o t  is  that  there to  A Formulation  o f AU / 38  l e a r n t o c o n t r o l h i s a c t s o f p r a i s e and d i s p r a i s e , thus perhaps c o n c e a l i n g h i s a p p r o v a l o f an a c t i o n when he thinks that the expression o f such approval m i g h t have bad e f f e c t s , and p e r h a p s even praising actions of which he d o e s n o t r e a l l y approve.! Praising  is  itself  consequences, as the  that  case  act  which  in reinforcing  same b e h a v i o u r The  an  behaviour  have and  important encouraging  in others.  involving  the a s s a s s i n concerns  s h o u l d n o t be p r a i s e d . Smart  action  can  i s wrong, b u t s h o u l d  a right  c o n s i d e r s a case  action  where t h e  be p r a i s e d .  F o r example, a man n e a r B e r c h t e s g a d e n i n 1938 might have jumped i n t o a r i v e r and r e s c u e d a drowning man, o n l y to find t h a t i t was H i t l e r . He would have done t h e wrong t h i n g , f o r he would have s a v e d the world a l o t of t r o u b l e i f he had left Hitler below t h e s u r f a c e . On t h e o t h e r hand h i s motive, the d e s i r e to save l i f e , w o u l d have been one w h i c h we approve of people h a v i n g : in general, though not i n t h i s case, the d e s i r e to save l i f e l e a d s t o a c t i n g r i g h t l y . I t i s w o r t h our w h i l e to strengthen such a d e s i r e . Not only should we p r a i s e t h e a c t i o n (thus e x p r e s s i n g our a p p r o v a l of i t ) b u t we s h o u l d p e r h a p s even g i v e t h e man a m e d a l , t h u s e n c o u r a g i n g o t h e r s to e m u l a t e i t . $. In  this  manner  maintaining rightness, utility,  t i  a  Smart clear  or u t i l i t y ,  illustrates  and  sharp  Smart(2): Smart(2):  p p . 49-50. p . 49.  importance  distinction  o f an a c t i o n  o f p r a i s e and blame.  the  between  and the r i g h t n e s s ,  of the or  A Formulation Proponents explain  and  of AU  defuse  are  much of  AU  stemming  from  is  designed  t o p r o v i d e an  the  initial  often  cases  more  agents  their Once t h e  action  explicitly  only to  concerns  AU  should  utility can  the  of  of  distinct  functions. ways  to  framework. I t either main of  actual  reason  probable  AU  action.  as  the  well  and  or  the c h a r a c t e r  of  the  agent,  and  the  residual  actions  motive  fact  AU  reaction  between  of p r a i s i n g  hesitation  and  that  negative  distinction  the u t i l i t y  scenarios  Tightness  as  among  the  However,  to moral  i s r e c o g n i z e d , no  Finally,  p o i n t our  important  actually  the a s s a s s i n .  the  about  the  action the  AU  PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES  this  an  to  actions.  B. ACTUAL AND At  reaction  to  acknowledged,  t o e l i m i n a t e any  assessment  negative  Reactions concern  latter  remain.  to  right  reactions  39  contend,  have  distinctions  of the a c t i o n  serve  of  /  they  involving  people  motivations  themselves. are  initial  account  than  the a c t i o n .  position,  that  that  w r o n g n e s s of and  the  like  reactions  involve  in a  of AU  discussion  consideration As  D.H.  or p r o b a b l e  why  one  might  consequences.  with  consequences to conceive  consequences. construe  clarification  respect  Hodgson n o t e s ,  construe  is possible  t u r n s to the  to  how  AU  there are within  of AU  two  an  AU  i n terms  of  Hodgson p r e s e n t s  the  utilitarianism  in  terms  A F o r m u l a t i o n o f AU / 40 Utilitarian principles may be divided into those which refer to actual c o n s e q u e n c e s o f a c t s o r r u l e s , and t h o s e which refer to their probable or foreseeable or foreseen consequences. ... The p r i n c i p a l argument i n f a v o u r of h a v i n g some p r o b a b i l i t y q u a l i f i c a t i o n i n r e s p e c t o f c o n s e q u e n c e s i s t h a t an a g e n t c o u l d n o t be e x p e c t e d t o know what t h e a c t u a l consequences of a c t s or rules would be. t The  previous  formulation  consequences  model  (PC  replaces  model)  probable  o f AU was i n terms  (AC m o d e l ) .  o f an AU  An AU p r o b a b l e  reference  to  actual  actual  consequences results  with  results. An a c t i s r i g h t i f and o n l y i f the probable consequences of p e r f o r m i n g i t a r e a t l e a s t a s good a s t h e p r o b a b l e consequences associated with the p e r f o r m a n c e o f any a l t e r n a t i v e a c t open to the agent.  An  elaboration  drowning model  Hitler  c a n be  case of  used t o  i s walking beside  drowning.  little  Edward  danger  t h e man  illustrate  f u n c t i o n s and t h e m o t i v a t i o n Edward  is  o f Smart's  that  a river  and n o t i c e s  drowning  the  t o do would  or foreseeable,  person are such that action  will  promote  that  i f he goes  s h o u l d Edward do? A c c o r d i n g  probable,  how a  i t i s reasonable the g r e a t e s t  t H o d g s o n ( 1 ) : pp. 12-13.  good.  to  t o t h e PC  be t o s a v e t h e d r o w n i n g  consequences  PC  a man  i s an a c c o m p l i s h e d swimmer, so t h e r e  o f Edward h i m s e l f  thing  both  the  leads to i t .  man's a i d . What right  who s a v e s  of s a v i n g  a  the  model,  man. The drowning  to expect that As h i s t o r y  is  will  that later  A Formulation show, i t i s  very  prove  disastrous,  t o be  unfortunate  However, t h a t  does  action  be  would  the  since alter  right.  moral c h a r a c t e r , that  not  So,  m o t i v e and  right  action  that  the  the the  conclusion  putting  Edward  aside the  i s to  PC  AU  /  41  consequences  d r o w n i n g man  praise,  for  actual  of  is  Hitler.  that  Edward's  questions model  about  concludes  save the  drowning  man. Smart's e v a l u a t i o n difference  rests  Edward d i d  the  action the  had  action  This  i n the wrong  not  assessment  this  fact that thing  disastrous, did  of  is  in  the  different.  Smart employs an  in saving  the  though u n f o r e s e e a b l e ,  p r o m o t e the is  case  greatest spirit  man  model.  since  results.  good, of  AC  i t was the  The  his Since  wrong. following  considerations. A utilitarian would surely not, for example, be i n c l i n e d t o c a l l an a c t w i t h disastrous consequences right, simply b e c a u s e the a g e n t d i d not f o r e s e e these c o n s e q u e n c e s , or b e c a u s e , due t o d e f e c t s i n t h e s c i e n t i f i c knowledge of t h e t i m e , these consequences were not reasonably f o r e s e e a b l e or p r o b a b l e on t h e b a s i s of t h a t knowledge, f This  contention  discussion actions. a  also  about  the  importance of  the  earlier  d i s t i n c t i o n s among a g e n t s , m o t i v e s  and  S m a r t ' s a s s e s s m e n t p r o v i d e s a c l e a r example of  how  proponent  consequences,  of  the  recalls  AU,  operating  needs t o employ  f Hodgson (1 ) : p.  i~3.  in  terms  of  t h e s e d i s t i n c t i o n s . The  actual action  A F o r m u l a t i o n o f AU / 42 was wrong b u t could  the agent  justifiably  conclude that  a bad c h a r a c t e r . c o n s t r u e AU  satisfied  The  the  t o Smart,  utilitarianism"  that  of p r o b a b l e ,  the  And  be blamed  come  for  such a  explicit  many  from  there  is  as opposed  one  no need to  need  to  can  of be  to  be  these  employed,  " s p e c i o u s arguments  failing  to  actual,  construal  employment  distinctions  since  and no  t h e a g e n t had b a d m o t i v e s o r  contends  motivation  through  distinctions. according  Smart  i n terms  consequences.  should not  against  appreciate  these  distinctions. Sartorius when one actual  is  employs  sensitive a  to  framework  t h e need which  is  to exercise cast  in  terms  care of  consequences. Put a s i t i s . i n terms of the a c t u a l consequences of the performance o f an act, this is a p r i n c i p l e of objective Tightness: i t o p e r a t e s most reliably o n l y with the b e n e f i t of h i n d s i g h t . But t h e r e i s a l s o good s e n s e t o be made of s a y i n g of someone t h a t "he d i d t h e r i g h t t h i n g , " even t h o u g h what he d i d i n fact had bad c o n s e q u e n c e s that could have been avoided had he chosen to do something else. F o r i f he had good r e a s o n t o b e l i e v e t h a t what he d i d would have t h e b e s t c o n s e q u e n c e s , he d i d a l l that could r e a s o n a b l y be demanded o f him. f  The  distinction  'subjective' Edward s a v i n g  t  between what S a r t o r i u s c a l l s  Tightness i s designed to account the  Sartorius(1):  drowning  p . 18.  Hitler.  There  ' o b j e c t i v e ' and f o r cases  i s some s e n s e  like in  A Formulation w h i c h Edward d i d the 'subjective' make  right  Tightness.  clear,  as  'subjective'  and  the  moral agent  from a l a c k also  is  of  Smart,  'objective'  a  actually  is  different  motivations.  obtain  that  agent  speaking,  the  as  know what t h e it  acted  practical  its  actual  w r o n g l y . To Edward  him'  i s to  'did say  what PC  and  p r i o r to  that  The  present  appropriate  and  i f he  did  the  act,  resulting  consequences. is  morally  less  two  knowledge  pertaining  i t must be  reasonable  increasingly  f o r Edward or saving  suggestion everything  the  contend  anyone man  that  be  Edward case,  demanded  t o blame Edward  i s that that  i f no  could  to  would  i n such a  reasonably  of  practically  become  would  to upon  importance  important,  Sartorius  It  right  involves  and  i t i s inappropriate  his action.  supposed  rest  nature  could  is  these motivations  c o u n t e r i n t u i t i v e to  a l l that  distinguish  effort  impossible  as  to  t o have made, the  c o n s e q u e n c e s of  say,  is correct  model  model  requirements  i t was  is highly  that  becomes  of  undue c r i t i c i s m  obtainable  t o make, or  Morality  unknowable. S i n c e  be,  PC  relevant  knowledge. B o t h of  acknowledging morality.  the  the  Morally  t o c o n s e q u e n c e s must be the  of  ensure that So,  43  Tightness.  open t o  knowable.  /  sense  to  knowledge c o n c e r n i n g a c t u a l to  i n the  need  reasonable e f f o r t  i s not  supposed  to expect  only  Sartorius  the  employment  given  but  Doubtless,  does  P r e s u m a b l y , the to ensure t h a t ,  thing,  of AU  of for  blame  is  possibly  be  A Formulation demanded of that  the  anyone,  action  saving  Hitler  turned  out  justify under  badly,  these  in  m i s s the  and  point.  and  could  a medal, then  any  and  what  d r o w n i n g man. demanded  is  that  social  instrument  cuts  to  the  model. I t  is  p e r h a p s one  enough,  to  correctable quite  do  root  of  something  deficiences  another  thing  of  to  in  action  was  guiding  that  thing  did  be  contend  for  in  with  that  the  using  consequences  right  he  conduct. the  someone, meaning  bad  not  morality  of  a v a i l a b l e knowledge. identify  is  and  usefulness  e s s e n c e of  difficulty  with  everything  rewarded  guidance  to  acted  i f h i s motives  should  f o r the  among  seems  i f his character  very  can  Edward  what p r a c t i c a l  the  the  account  distinctions  i t make t o of  a PC  i f he  him;  good;  s e n s e does  Yet  Thus,  action  contention  But  i f his action  such a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n ?  This  the  model c o n c l u d e s  is  a  a d v a n t a g e s of  crucially,  to  classification.  model u s i n g  be  to have.  practical,  in  things  required  the  44  contend  that  knowledge  that  /  right thing  fact  impossible  the  moral  AC  the  w r o n g l y ? And,  of  of  insist  deemed m o r a l l y  open t o q u e s t i o n ;  the  m o t i v e . However, t h i s  possibly are  AC  The  in saving  intentions  acted  to  subverts  an  kind  AU  p l a u s i b l e to  Edward d i d t h e  drown was  contends that  agent, a c t i o n  that  man  conditions,  preserved  wrongly  b e c a u s e the  of m o r a l i t y  Smart  i s more  drowning, d e s p i t e  the  wrong,  function  it  r i g h t . So,  from  letting  actually  be  was  then  of  well  due  But action  AC  it  to is with  A Formulation w h a t e v e r would whether the  there  morality. essence. PC  may  be  one  n e e d e d by  agent  would  Richard  have,  necessary is a  fever.  who  treatment  for high  from the  'reasonable  body.  fever that  So,  c o n s e q u e n c e s of had  t I t i s assumed b l e e d i n g had not  has  the  dies  bleeds  shortly  i n t e n t i o n s or  t h a t the g i r l occurred.  the  century.  and  the  after But  young  the  be  the  He has  competent the  best  Bleeding  t o be  drained  girl.  She  treatment.f  The  this  i s not  that h i s moral  would  who  patient.  blood  is a  knowledge.  view t h a t  the  that  agent's  prompted  a dedicated  Not  would  of a young g i r l  t h e a c t i o n were bad. bad  in  in  i t also  expectation'  eighteenth  accepted  of  practical  expectation'.  relevant  f o u l e d the  Richard  purpose  its  have,  i s bleeding  action  is reflected  anything  treatment  to the  first  much e f f o r t  should  is  at  knowing  t o have a c q u i r e d  how  to acquire  of  in p r i n c i p l e ,  agent  whether or  the  subscribes  poison  Richard  knowable the  Richard  weakens f u r t h e r and  that  of m o r a l i t y  45 of  social  subvert  p h y s i c i a n i n the  physician  the  only  involving  and  been c h a r g e d w i t h high  overall  /  regardless  the  issue i n v o l v i n g 'reasonable  the  investigation  a very  with  to expect  principally  experience  In c a l l i n g  we  t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s be  reasonable  complex  in principle)  be.  nature  model's c o n c e r n s  be  allows  (even  second,  practical  k n o w l e d g e . The  has  way  consequences,  s e r v i n g the  the  The  best  t h i s might  By  o n l y must must  i s any  t i m e what  'wrong' we  the  have t h e  of AU  to  say  character  have r e c o v e r e d  if  the  A Formulation is  open  that  t o q u e s t i o n . Of  Richard's action An  state  PC  to b e l i e v e  that  it  be  cannot were  would be  was  at the  information  prior  a c t i o n ? And  even  that  was  if  the  the  on  h i s own  a t the time?  is  no.  treatment.  be  Richard's  i s whether  not  the  suspect,  best course  of  could  that,  practice  i n so  available  he  of  of b l e e d i n g .  f a r as at the  he  time,  was  have  bleeding  answer t o b o t h q u e s t i o n s to expect  that to  ineffectiveness  reasonable  it  reason  clearly  Richard to  t o have a c t e d upon, knowledge about  c o n s e q u e n c e s of t h e  reason  R i c h a r d t o have a c q u i r e d  the  The  the  However,  of  q u e s t i o n then  d i d so  t r u t h about  I t w o u l d not  information  Given  sufficient  consequences  d o i n g was  he  discovered  46  concludes  t o a c t i n g . D i d R i c h a r d have any  what he  and  still  result.  t h e r e was  the proper  to expect  suppose t h a t  concludes  time,  u n f o r t u n a t e . The  reasonable  acquired,  a different  b l e e d i n g was denied  model  /  wrong.  model g e n e r a t e s  of m e d i c i n e  action  c o u r s e , an AC  of AU  So,  acting  have  the  actual  PC  model  an on  the  Richard's action  best  was  not  wrong. William cabin  near  take her The  a l a k e . On  t o the  morning  beautiful never  i s spending  does  sky  day. at  t h e summer  several  l a k e so i s bright  she and  o c c a s i o n s she can  swim, and  clear,  However, t h e weather this  time  of  with h i s daughter  and  has today  he  the  as girl  him  a to  agrees.  i t promises  turns f o u l ,  y e a r , and  asked  in  t o be  a  i t almost drowns.  William's be  m o t i v e was  evaluated?  An  wrong, s i n c e heavily its  the  good, but  AC  model  action  employs the  of AU  i s the  itself  to  action  as  portrays  failed  t o maximize good. T h i s  act/agent/motive d i s t i n c t i o n s  i n taking h i s daughter  b l a m e w o r t h y but  nevertheless  Considering highlights expectation' relevant answer  foul  different Should  information  had  Since  no  weather,  about the  reason it  t o have c a l l e d  the  with  lake  light  that the  had  weather  weather. A l l information  the  to  that  was  to  required  would  important  feature  question.  There can  real  call  have  for  been  involving be  cases  the  to a c t i n g ?  The  needed  to expect  to  a weather  the  do  going  in effect,  to to and  extremely  foul  acquire  this  to  effort  highlights  'reasonable  i n which there  of for  i t comes  r e p o r t . The This  and  him,  report before  predicted  minimal.  clear,  possibility  been a w e a t h e r a d v i s o r y  William  model  acquired  However, s u p p o s e  had  be  'reasonable  b r i g h t and  f o r a weather  not  PC  the  weather p r i o r  unreasonable  forecast  an  have  suppose any  h i s daughter.  there  William  acted  wrong. of  - of  w e a t h e r was  would be  example,  terms  aspects  blunt  that William  h i s a c t i o n was in  model  to  t o swim.f W i l l i a m may  scenario  issue.  i s no.  William  the  the  action  William's  seemingly c o u n t e r i n t u i t i v e assessment  wrongly  that  how  /  47  A Formulation  an  expectation'  i s no  reason  for  f R e s i s t a n c e t o s u c h h e a v y employment may r e s t ( i n p a r t ) on c e r t a i n l i n g u i s t i c i n t u i t i o n s . In p a r t i c u l a r , i t seems hard t o s e p a r a t e t o t a l l y 'Your a c t i o n was wrong' from 'You acted w r o n g l y ( i . e . , you a r e t o b l a m e ) ' .  A Formulation the  agent  to  think  information  but  nevertheless  be  by  acquired  does not involve  entail  there  'should  no  there  reason  William  did a l l  Despite  things  morally  permissible  We the  c o n s e q u e n c e s of  for  an  not  nevertheless different  probable  their  the  agent  i s morally outcome  time,  of  three  of  unreasonable  And  scenarios.  the  act  to expect  a  Given  finally,  expected  lake today,  of  him.  action  In a l l t h r e e This  fault PC  the  was  cases  sufficient  any  but  model o f f e r s is  it  to  person  ensure  is  young  would  check w i t h  a  intended  knowable. S i n c e  the  The  way  girl have  the  the  good,  knowledge a v a i l a b l e  bleeding  that William  is  demands and  drowning  since  in  Such a model  i s reasonably  of  the  a c t i o n s were wrong.  at  each c a s e .  right.  they  model.f  that  saving  agent'  reasonable  William's  a c t i o n s were bad.  right  of  w e a t h e r on  be  badly,  PC  the  to a n t i c i p a t e i t  from u n r e a l i s t i c  Richard's  permissible.  foul  48  easily  a g e n t ' , as  question  a c t i o n s were wrong. An  Edward's a c t i o n was the  out  blameworthy or  assessment  to p r o t e c t what  be  the  the  /  relevant  could  known by  reasonably  model t o c o n c l u d e  a g e n t s may  that  the  by  for William  the  additional  information  known  is rarely  turning on  is  ' c o u l d be  of  that could  have c o n s i d e r e d  AC  such  be  facets  Since  was  there  a g e n t . So,  different  expectation. and  the  that  of AU  at was been  weather  t ' M o r a l l y p e r m i s s i b l e ' i n v o l v e s n o t h i n g more i n t h i s claim t h a n 'not m o r a l l y wrong'. No f u r t h e r a n a l y s i s of 'morally p e r m i s s i b l e ' i s assumed h e r e .  A Formulation office  before  swim was  not  How either  going morally  i s one  to a  model. T h i s social  be  model has  difficulty  to m o r a l i t y .  ourselves  THE It  will  be  they  a social if  acting  two  we  not  be  serve  is  49 to  better  what m e r e l y  provide  off  right  never  be  the  AC  importance  we  of  the  right  practically  a c t i o n and  on  this  morality. an  account  serve  to  concern  least  we  matter  more  idea  of  right  fact  that  a social  of  of  the  Instrumentalist  without  moral e n t e r p r i s e  M o r e o v e r , and  can  MORAL C L A S S I F I C A T I O N  wrongly a  PC  what t h i s i s .  t o underscore the  act  the  important  seems r i g h t ? At  expand  of  the  Though already  of  i s an  i t s construal  c h a n c e of d e c i d i n g  not  i n the  wrongly.  have  in favour  for  morally  p r a c t i c e , e x i s t s to  wrongly  we  indeterminate,  accounting  nature do  accounts?  morality  seriously  h e l p f u l to  someone can  participants acting  that  INSTRUMENTALIST ASPECT OF  Rather  even  in  instead with  considerations  as  or  i n t e r e s t i n the  instrumentalist  se.  fact  Indeed, g i v e n  should  would have a b e t t e r  C.  between t h e  Because a c t u a l consequences o f t e n  unknowable,  abandon our  h i s daughter  adopted c o n s i s t e n t l y ,  concerns the  why  his taking  fundamental c o n s i d e r a t i o n  instrument.  action,  lake,  /  wrong.  completely  attach  the  to choose  model can  alluded  to  of AU  action  morality,  purpose.  deserving  to the  to  point,  So,  blame,  indifference.  would p r e f e r  per  All avoid  acting  A Formulation wrongly  always  wrong when  involves  goes  epistemically,  or  characterologically,  or m o t i v a t i o n a l l y ,  o r i n some o t h e r  way  besides  out badly.  is  just  turning  a s wrong, r e g a r d l e s s  still  did  acts  Something  wrongly—either  action  anyone  some s o r t of f a i l i n g .  o f AU / 50  t o say that  i s something  there  being  right  and  preserve  t o be  wrong. I n the  these  exactly  we have  as  seen  we would  would c o n t i n u e  only  t o be  Caroline of  flight  pilot action  should of  rescuing of  Despite  e r r o r s , having chosen, and  do, t h e AC model  steering  that  for  of as not  moral wrong  epistemically, or i n  any  t o overcome o r a v o i d . I n  insist,  possibility  does  motivationally  everyone  i s the p i l o t  path  wrong  take steps Smart  AC model  an a c t i o n c a n be  one  in  and do and s t i l l  like  a f l o c k of b i r d s .  navigational the  cases  is,  and  actions  function  went  wish  wrong t h i n g . And t h i s involve  social  was  and p a r c e l  categorizing  procedurally,  we c o u l d  agent  i s part  terms, the  nothing  way a t a l l t h a t as  to  of a c t i o n s . That  characterologically,  fact,  point  an  i s appropriate,  and d o i n g a s t h a t  practical,  though  to categorize  o f whether blame  avoided. This  a practical  classification even  being  Therefore,  c a n be  such  and  do  circumstances  have done a  i s pervasive;  morally  i t does  not  Hitler.  a plane being  that  crashes  a good p i l o t ,  no r e a s o n  to  suspect  doing  everything  still  characterizes  p a r t i c u l a r course  because  making  no  birds  on  that  a  good  Caroline's  as the  morally  A Formulation wrong t h i n g t o s h o u l d be  have done.  or  do  n e v e r t h e l e s s her  other action  Such e x a m p l e s can  action PC  its  i t d o e s not David  virus  which as  even when  However,  e m p h a s i s on  it  f o r the  the a c t i o n  An  i s more  rationally  further  investigation  exercise  proper  Was  David  have  he  any  agent's  c a r e and  acting  reason  have l e a d  him  to suspect  action  not  wrong. I t  The  agent PC  investigate model  that  every  involves  the  outcome.  should  have  Did  David  vaccinated  polio  to  before  structure  the Did  vaccine should  amiss,  unreasonable  of  question  in h i s experience  richer  as  status  action.  possibility a  action  the moral  s o m e t h i n g was  would be  polio  p h y s i c i a n would a c t ? that  Since nothing  moral.  live  optimal  when he  to think  live  an  is  i n v o l v e s the  before  as a r e a s o n a b l e  virus?  expectations,  experience  caution  contained  was  and  this  the  rationally  the  determining  prompted  the  s t r e n g t h of  One  t o be  to produce  the  in  AC  the  model c o n s t r u e s D a v i d ' s  in  wrong.  avoiding  AC  whether a n y t h i n g  girl?  to r e s u l t  reasonable  complicated  but  s i n c e the  inadvertantly injects  model,  did  as m o r a l l y  fails  51  Caroline  or  who  failed PC  was  /  m o r a l l y wrong; and  demand o m n i s c i e n c e  into a c h i l d .  that  indefinitely,  of a f f a i r s  i s a doctor  wrong, s i n c e  that  she  would have r e q u i r e d o m n i s c i e n c e .  model, w i t h  that  nothing  i s construed  action  persists  is  what  be m u l t i p l i e d  possible state  classification  than still  model c h a r a c t e r i z e s any best  There  of AU  his  demand  acting. in  the  A Formulation determination model. I t  of  is  question  right  and  superior  is  whether  to  PC  with  provide  an  adequate account  present  contention  brought  out  classifying  t h e AC  the  structure,  by  wrong a c t i o n s  of  i s that  noting  model.  model  i t s e m p h a s i s on  than  right  and  a  a  crucial  rich  enough  expectations,  The  to  reason  The  can  be  the c o n s i d e r a t i o n s advanced  a  r a n g e of a c t i o n s . In o t h e r  words, a c o n s i s t e n t employment  of  the m o t i v a t i o n  PC  has  has  a very  been e x p o s e d simply the By  black  and  man.  The the  who  unacceptable  in  sharp  friendship attempts  kept  the  great  never  things,  and  moral  and  friend  she  beliefs,  community.t  that a  friend,  in a  r e l a t i o n s h i p with  their  relationship  distress,  between t h e  t o persuade her  has  a t t i t u d e s and  discovers  life.  value  she  religious t o end  since  the  it  places  a  secret  community. Knowledge of  conflict her  b e c a u s e she  p r e j u d i c e s of h e r  i s involved has  town a l l h e r  of u n d e r s t a n d i n g  i s white,  couple racism  and,  i n her  and  r e l a t i o n s h i p causes Betty a  way  reflects  biases  Betty,  isolated  education  other  i s white,  b e c a u s e of  in  i n c l u d e too  model g e n e r a t e s  in a small,  limited  racial  accident also  lived  t o any  accepts,  strong  who  the  wrong  classifications. Betty  She  behind  not  for  broad  moral  D a v i d ' s a c t i o n as  52 AC  wrong a c t i o n s .  i t does n o t .  that  does t h e  But  has  reasonable  of AU'/  their results on  values. relationship  the Betty but  t T h i s example i s drawn f r o m a p a p e r r e a d by M i c h a e l P h i l i p s t o t h e U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a P h i l o s o p h y D e p a r t m e n t .  A Formulation she  is unsuccessful.  publicly  So,  e x p o s e s t h e c o u p l e . As  i s d e s t r o y e d , t h e woman community  and  The  t h e man  terrible  sufficient  be  reasonable  have p r o m p t e d answer  Betty  assessment  of her  all,  the  be  David  his  action  the  case may  rise  action  i s not  that  involving  manner t h a t  she  that  really  d i d , but  unreasonable  I t was  action  not  in  her  we  the  model  wrong.  After  reflect  ones And  o t h e r ways of  involving  David,  it  unreasonableness  of  supports  and  reasons  the  classifying  recognition  such  would  not  wrong, d e s p i t e t h e her  The  PC  in  a conclusion. that  blame B e t t y f o r a c t i n g  to expect  to  unreasonable  support  still  was  community.  However, s i m i l a r  not  are  acted?  the  action  In t h e c a s e  Betty's action may  life.  she  even aware t h a t  recognizing  the  in Betty's experience  her  accepted  of  i s more c o m p l e x . Would  i t was  motivated  she  the a c t i o n  otherwise,  B e t t y does not  as a l l r i g h t .  for his Betty's  t o have a c t e d o t h e r w i s e  understand  w o u l d be  is  as p e r m i s s i b l e .  eyes  s i n c e i t would be  have a c t e d  t o i t . P e r h a p s we  action  and,  things exist.  argued  expecting  We  no, to  she  understanding may  anything  overwhelmingly  furthermore,  model  53  relationship  the  that  /  t o do,  the  c o n s i d e r a t i o n before  'values' that  which are  of  model t o c o n c l u d e  to expect  to expect  to f l e e  consequences  further  what  i s 'disgraced' in  w i t h i n t h e PC  seems t o be  over  a result,  i s forced  f o r t h e AC  wrong. A s s e s s m e n t it  despairing  of AU  gave i n the  classify fact  t o have a c t e d  that  her it  otherwise.  A F o r m u l a t i o n o f AU / T h e r e a r e many expect  i n s t a n c e s where  the agent  perhaps would action  still  PC model  would  seems t o f a i l  is  if  an a g e n t ' s a c t i o n  there  morally  keeping  classification simply  morality The  an  unacceptable  itself need  the  praise  in i t s  failing,  as a s o c i a l  action  of  when  different  an  the there  agent's  classifying  phenomena, has some  broad  has some  purpose.  thereby  point  The  involves  of the a c t i o n .  moral  more  than  I t also  is  i s served with respect  to  an a c t i o n  brought  assessments  or  agent  a s wrong.  the instrumental point  c a n be  to  of t h e  that  what p o i n t  in portraying  itself  to  of blame,  and blame,  of a c t i o n s  with  to appreciate  so  o r wrong s e r v e s t o e n c o u r a g e  the consequences  to consider  classification noting  of  examining  important  the  account  some f a i l i n g  assignment  the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n in  of  b e h a v i o u r , b o t h on t h e p a r t  others. Morality,  is  sort  i s no  as r i g h t  similar  purpose and  the  that  o v e r t h e AC model  attributes  i s wrong. And, l i k e  discourage  the fact  we  importance of m o r a l i t y , t h e  some  a s wrong  something  behaviour  nevertheless  t o p r o v i d e an a d e q u a t e  involves  an a c t i o n  a g e n t . So, even  that  So, d e s p i t e  and where  to  action.  D o i n g wrong  and  be wrong.  agent, but  of the p r a c t i c a l  and wrong  still  the  b'e u n r e a s o n a b l e  differently,  r e p r e s e n t s an improvement  model s t i l l  classify  acted  n o t blame  acknowledgement  right  t o have  i t would  54  out  provided  of  further by t h e  moral through two  AU  A Formulation models with daughter The  AC  to  swim and  produced  wrong. The  PC  would be  William's  right  Betty's  public  e x p o s u r e of  best  unreasonable  action  step  and  it  was  Why  do  daughter n o t ? In  we  that  f o r the  call  William's  that  he  pressure  the  the as  actions  were  a l l right,  since  a g e n t s t o have to c l a i m Betty's  is a social resources  acted that action  practice  necessary  addressed  w i t h the  is a  for  wrong a c t i o n . Q u e s t i o n s  need t o be  that  William's  permissible  relevant  troubled  i t also  information  is true, in  action but  to d i s c o v e r  nothing  an  about purpose  their  behaviour act  i t would  morally every  be  Betty's  action  was  a v a i l a b l e and  would  in d i f f e r e n t  ways  in  such  prompted  Despite  reason  if  behaviour  experience  too  possibility  his  though  much  everyone  taking  was  permissible,  w r o n g l y . The  of  i t their  additional information.  d i d not  investigate  the  morality  that  was  have c h a n g e d . And  fact  neither  seems most p l a u s i b l e  r i g h t and  say  both cases  a g e n t s had  search  wrong. S i n c e  actions  to expect  his  i n mind.  swimming  each,  the  taking  55  couple.  consequences,  toward p r o v i d i n g of  as  /  the  r i g h t , o r a l l r i g h t , and  wrong a c t i o n  of m o r a l i t y  the  of W i l l i a m  model p o r t r a y s  adequate account  for  cases  wrong. R e a l i z i n g t h a t  crucial  the  the  the  o t h e r w i s e . However,  was  to  model c o n s t r u e s b o t h a c t i o n s  action  it  respect  of AU  or  at  a l l this, l e a s t we  for t h i s great  a  with  we say  rests  in  burden  to  circumstances  connected  the  to  omnimous  A Formulation weather when t h e r e w e a t h e r . But we everyone  to  not  any  of a k i n d  that  before  If actions like  wrong, t h e r e avoiding  doing  as  William's  i s no r e a s o n  dispositions,  the  kind,  s u c h a c t i o n s wrong u n d e r c u t s  and  seriously  to care  about  s i n c e an a g e n t c a n a c t any f a i l i n g the very  whatsoever.  social  purpose calling  a c t i o n wrong d o e s n o t u n d e r c u t  but a c t u a l l y  promotes  t o blame, b u t t h e r e  a  social  function  attitudes  were,  p u r p o s e o f m o r a l i t y . B e t t y may n o t  was a g e n e r a l  to  in fact,  highlight both  does p r o m o t e t h e s o c i a l to  prejudice.  guard  against  The same c a n n o t  adequate account function  to  In c o n t r a s t ,  encourages the s o c i a l  people  him  classification.  be  it  be w i t h o u t  PC  expect  as m o r a l l y  To  Betty's  to  information  are c l a s s i f i e d  but n e v e r t h e l e s s  of m o r a l i t y and m o r a l  b i t of  merely  correctly  wrongly call  he  did  model  f o r agents  wrongs o f t h i s  racial  action. William  be u n r e a s o n a b l e  acting,  pressure,  These a r e g e n e r a l d i s p o s i t i o n s  information—a  i t would  such  a t t i t u d e s concerning  harmful  specific  to suspect  and even  toward harmful  generally  have a q u i r e d insists.  behaviour.  people  l a c k e d a b i t of  reason  to encourage,  investigate their  can i n c l i n e have  apparent  do want  m a t t e r s and s e x u a l that  i s no  o f AU / 56  of  right  and importance  failing  that  critically.  deficient  be s a i d  kind  of  Her  racial  to  encourage  ignorance  of W i l l i a m ' s  action will  serves  and c o r r e c t a b l e ; and  purpose of m o r a l i t y this  i t  action.  have t o c a p t u r e  of m o r a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  itself,  and Any the and  A Formulation this  r e l a t e s t o what c a n be r e a s o n a b l y e x p e c t e d Skepticism  actions  still  may  such as W i l l i a m ' s  sense,  i t may  remain  about  be c l a i m e d ,  objection  but i t  to  the  instrumentalist  classification  that  i s suggested  in  'William  was a l l  reference  unfortunate'.  claims  about  Caroline  flying  the course  s o m e t h i n g wrong same a s  that  having she  that  be  some wrong  sense  a claim also  moral use  of  the  did  like, ' i t  prevails  in  wrong c o u r s e '  in  that  an a g e n t  of 'unfortunate') agent  an  The s e n s e o f 'wrong'  involves  'taken  of  Not e v e r y  d i d . Claiming  the  that  d i d the  conception  here.  This  ( i n the sense  claiming  claim  does n o t c o n s t i t u t e  to morality.  d i d t h e wrong t h i n g '  very  the  i n which W i l l i a m  i s true  involves  of a g e n t s .  a r e n o t wrong. T h e r e must  t h i n g . Such a c l a i m  'wrong'  o f AU / 57  i s not  something  did the  morally  wrong.f Instrumentalist captured attached  in to  either  fails Yet  of  point  of  fully  i s some a f f i n i t y  express  model — t h e o f an  is  the s o c i a l  an i n s i g h t  social  considering  moral c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  to appreciate  there  AU  the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  wrong. The m a j o r aspect  considerations  significance  a c t i o n as the  not  right  or  instrumentalist  to i l l u s t r a t e importance  between u t i l i t a r i a n  that  AU  of m o r a l i t y . reasoning  and  t An a d v o c a t e o f t h e AC model d e n i e s t h i s p r o p o s a l . The AC model c o n s t r u e s t h e c l a i m t h a t s o m e t h i n g was m o r a l l y wrong i n terms o f t h e c l a i m t h a t t h i n g s d i d n o t t u r n o u t ideally. T h i s i s what l e a v e s t h i s model open t o t h e o b j e c t i o n t h a t i t robs m o r a l i t y of i t s p r a c t i c a l relevance.  A Formulation the  considerations  relevant  moral c l a s s i f i c a t i o n .  t o .the  After  instrumentalist  a l l , the l a t t e r  consequences of moral c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . some  sort  previously  of  noted,  classification it  practical, the  i s not p r e j u d i c e d  theory  inconsistencies  i n our c o n s i d e r e d  judgements  involve kinds  utility of  it,  the  Betty.  may  of  be  aspect  of  some o f t h e  quite  complex, theories have  of  and  theory. apparent  judgements,  like  underlying  and  they  could  o f r i g h t s and a l l overlooked  moral c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  enterprise  As moral  of r i g h t a c t i o n ,  considerations  Utilitarians  whole  function.  aspect  normative  The  considerations,  things.  instrumentalist with  and  explain  of  serves  t o w a r d any p a r t i c u l a r n o r m a t i v e  considerations  these  Classification  instrumentalist  Instrumentalist  between W i l l i a m  aspect  does c o n c e r n t h e  action-guiding  i s not a g e n e r a l  o f AU / 58  morality  the  itself as  a  and, social  institution,f Morality  i s s o m e t h i n g we have t o be a b l e  upon, and employ. S m a r t ' s use o f t h e AC model serious  objection  something any  that  it  turns  the  right  to learn,  rely  i s open t o t h e action  into  so unknowable by t h e a g e n t a s t o be u n a b l e t o p l a y  sufficient  role in  shaping  the agent's behavior.$  But,  t Smart and S a r t o r i u s a r e s e n s i t i v e t o t h e f a c t t h a t t h e AC model d i v o r c e s m o r a l i t y from t h e r e a l m of p r a c t i c a l human c o n c e r n s . However, b o t h seem s a t i s f i e d t h a t t h e d i s t i n c t i o n s among a g e n t / a c t i o n / m o t i v e and between the u t i l i t y of the a c t i o n and t h e u t i l i t y o f p r a i s i n g t h e a c t i o n a r e s u f f i c i e n t to defuse such c r i t i c i s m . $ These considerations also expose the root of the d i f f i c u l t y i n t h e AC model's assessment of the a s s a s s i n  A F o r m u l a t i o n o f AU because  of  i t s widespread  examination  of  However, t h e examined  examining  required  that  AU  it  on will  for  be  the  best  i n terms  AU  shows of  understood  a  restriction  to the  consequences,  on  that  the  s e r v e as a guide  to  that  for  by  the agent, then  our  model. we  have under  care In  in what  knowledge  assessment  is  must  be  prior  to  t h e AC  f o r examining  59  model  AU.  PROBABILITY CONSIDERATIONS  issue  contends  AC  cases.  whatever  i s observed,  the v e h i c l e  Smart e x p l i c i t l y  the  need  particular  given a reasonable e f f o r t  turn  of  assessments  appropriate u t i l i t y  ACTUAL CONSEQUENCES AND now  i t s simplicity,  conflicting  of  c o n t i n u e t o s e r v e as  We  and  v a r i o u s examples  the b a s i s  the a c t . I f t h i s  D.  the  received  construals  obtainable,  can  continues  fact  have  different  follows  AU  acceptance  /  o f how  standard that  probability  relates  interpretation  utilitarianism  of  i s designed  to AU. to  conduct.  The utilitarian criterion, then, is d e s i g n e d t o h e l p a p e r s o n , who c o u l d do v a r i o u s t h i n g s i f he c h o s e t o do them, to decide which of these things he s h o u l d do. H i s u t i l i t a r i a n deliberation i s one of t h e c a u s a l a n t e c e d e n t s o f his a c t i o n , and i t would be p o i n t l e s s i f i t were n o t . f Smart's c l a i m  about  t h e use  o f AU  demonstrates  the  necessity  $(cont'd) case. Since the actual consequences resulted p u r e l y by a c c i d e n t , t h e r e i s no way t o l e a r n t o p e r f o r m s u c h 'right' actions, t S m a r t ( 2 ) : p. 46.  A Formulation of  taking  probability  Adopting  a  into  consideration.  model t h a t  employs a c t u a l ,  probable,  c o n s e q u e n c e s does n o t i n v o l v e  reference  to probability.  action  of  producing  probabilities cases the highest of  When t h e  open t o t h e d e l i b e r a t i n g  chance  a r e even  right  utility.  action  lack  situation,  this  whenever  same  In  such  with  the  the a l t e r n a t i v e is  of  utilities,  alternative  and t h i s  p r o b a b i l i t i e s become  of a l l  each possess t h e  the  to  courses  underdetermining.  involves  feature,  the r e j e c t i o n  respective  and t h u s  However,  as opposed  alternative  agent  their  action  o f AU / 60  courses  t h e most  common  relevant.  If t h e r e i s a very low p r o b a b i l i t y of p r o d u c i n g v e r y good r e s u l t s , t h e n i t i s n a t u r a l t o say that the r a t i o n a l agent would p e r h a p s go f o r o t h e r more p r o b a b l e t h o u g h n o t q u i t e so good r e s u l t s . F o r a . more a c c u r a t e formulation [ o f AU] we s h o u l d have t o weigh t h e g o o d n e s s o f t h e r e s u l t s with t h e i r p r o b a b i l i t i e s , f Such a q u a l i f i c a t i o n attempt as  a  constitutes  t o employ AU b o t h a s an a c c o u n t  guide  to conduct.  The  considerations are to function of  a specific,  one m o r n i n g  which t h e r e a r e only  Bill t  either  manner  two  spends t h e day i n t h e  S m a r t ( 2 ) : p . 47.  which  any and  probability by  means  example.  Bill  spend  park,  of  action  illustrated  is  in a  courses of a c t i o n  go t o t h e l a k e o r  feature  of r i g h t  in  i s best  though a r t i f i c i a l ,  Suppose t h a t  can  a central  situation  open t o h i m .  t h e day i n t h e p a r k .  i twill  result  in 4  in He If  units  A Formulation of  u t i l i t y . Going  is  an  to the  individual  antecedents  than  that  how  he  spending  he  go  the  likelihood  of  alternative  outcomes i s t h e  there, for he  he  Bill will  will  on  achieving  the  to t r a v e l have  bicycle  the  p a r k , he  the  lake  suffer are or  mechanical  relevant  t o spend  the  incorporate  the  p a r k , and  his  the  day  in a l l  20%  with  actually  get  spending  the  t o the day  use  of AU  the  i f he lake  the the  s p e n d s the  day  i s too  far  away  goes t o the  down a  to  lake,  get  there.  lot lately,  So,  if Bill  good c h a n c e car.  while  goes  that  Such  whether  p a r k , and  chance that  i n the  that  a  in  to  t o go  the on  park  Bill  to the  a proponent  into  the  will  odds a r e  will  lake  of AU  can  calculations. with  actually  90%  that  his bicycle.  The  is 4 units,  he  for  considerations  mechanical d i f f i c u l t i e s  park  would  greater  involved  I f he  the  in deciding  In c o n t r a s t ,  causal  l i k e l i h o o d , a r r i v e . Heading  involves a  in  the  i t has  in order  been b r e a k i n g  current a  The  car  these c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  i s only  lake.  utilities  bicycle.  troubles  of  assumption  good w o r k i n g o r d e r .  will,  since  Bill  p a r k . However, s u c h  the  bicycle.  his  h i s car  clearly  there  has  i s in  in  Given  on  to d r i v e  However, h i s c a r his  his  one  61  same.  c l o s e t o the on  lake  /  10.units.  act. His  i n the  follows  go  as  will  day  only  lives  AU  to the  conclusion  Bill  would g e n e r a t e  employs  in deciding  seem t o r e q u i r e utility  who  lake  of AU  while  the  car,  arrive Bill  utility  going  to  at  will of the  A Formulation lake  involves  - and t h e i r the In  10  units  corresponding  two a l t e r n a t i v e s the case  units.  of u t i l i t y .  respect  probabilities,  to the  to the  in  the park:  to  the l a k e has g r e a t e r  .9 t i m e s  actually  decision of  achieving  that  utilitarian  utility  less  good  results This the  i s higher  feature  refers  to  course  the  t h a n an  functions with  of  summarize  the  Thus, w h i l e  spending  when of  day going  t h e day i n t h e  i s that  action  that  of  type  that  a  involves  achieving  with better  in  right  It i s this claims  important.  example  the  he  probability  alternative  AU, f o r  respect  units=2.0  of spending  i n the park.f  o f AU i s e x t r e m e l y  examination  To  if  10  a r e combined w i t h t h e p r o b a b i l i t i e s  choose a  results  than  of  calculations.  times  them, t h e AU r e s u l t  Smart  will  .2  alternative  i s t o spend t h e day  case  lake:  utilities,  an AU a s s e s s m e n t  4 units=3.6 u n i t s .  p a r k , when t h e u t i l i t i e s of  these  generates the following  of going  With  Given  o f AU / 62  the  results.  It i s crucial  considering  how  in AU  t o famine r e l i e f . $  the d i s c u s s i o n  so f a r , AU o f f e r s  a  strict  t I t i s worth noting that i f B i l l a c t u a l l y attempts to p e r f o r m s u c h c a l c u l a t i o n s , t h e r e s u l t i s t h a t he w a s t e s much of t h e day t r y i n g t o d e t e r m i n e t h e u t i l i t i e s . S u c h a result h i g h l i g h t s t h e need f o r s p o n t a n e i t y and c a s u a l assessments of p r o b a b i l i t y . $ In t h i s example I have f o l l o w e d what has been standard practice i n assigning u t i l i t y values d i r e c t l y to resulting s t a t e s o f a f f a i r s and t h e n a r r i v i n g a t an o v e r a l l practical c a l c u l a t i o n by m u l t i p l y i n g these times p r o b a b i l i t i e s of success. This procedure actually rides rough shod over certain technical distinctions between end s t a t e and anticipated u t i l i t y calculations t h a t a r e now common i n f o r m a l d e c i s i o n t h e o r y . T h i s , however, does not a f f e c t the f o r c e o f t h e example and t h e argument t h a t i t s u p p o r t s .  A Formulation account  of r i g h t  action;  complete account the  motive  of  reactions  to  of e v a l u a t i o n the  moral  moral  a s p e c t s of o v e r a l l  important  utility for  to  not  probabilities action  the  into  scope  i s construed  the  force  when  likelihoods  c r i t i c i s m o f AU o f AU, and  questions situations ,It  of the  requiring  of the  trust,  i s t o t h e s e more complex  AU  alternative  agent  particular  must  and take  courses  of  of success. involves  the  failing  distinctions,  coordination that  to  distinctions,  restricted  among t h e s e  issues  of  the  it the  terms of a c t u a l ,  the c i t e d  relevant  remain. P r i n c i p a l  in  is  or  separate  between  of p r a i s i n g  a  initial  definition  distinction  Finally,  a c c o u n t . But even a c k n o w l e d g i n g and  various,  clear  distinction  account  have d i f f e r e n t  limited  people's  and t h e u t i l i t y  consequences.  Much o f t h e  Since  o f AU i s c r u c i a l . As a c o r o l l a r y ,  This  when AU  probable,  the character  involve  acknowledge the  action.  significance  agent.  t o s e r v e as  either  moral e v a l u a t i o n ,  of the action  the  for  scenarios  scope of t h e p r i n c i p l e is  i t i s not intended  o f AU / 63  focus of  into AU  fundamental  i s AU's a d e q u a c y and common we now  take  turn.  in  effort.  III.  A U AND T H E I S S U E O F  SELF-DEFEATINGNESS  C o n c e r n s about AU's t h e o r e t i c a l a d e q u a c y p e r t a i n i n g cooperation The  a n d common e f f o r t  strongest  society  is  the charge  of the fact  unable t o achieve  the  substantiation  fatal  that  AU  i n various  ways.  i s self-defeating.  A  composed o f c o m m i t t e d AU a g e n t s who a r e r a t i o n a l and  cognisant  The  c a n be v o i c e d  to  blow  that  everyone  common g o a l  of t h i s  i s so committed of u t i l i t y  objection  t o AU. We t h e r e f o r e  will  be  maximization.  would c o n s t i t u t e a n e a r  need t o c o n s i d e r  t h e i s s u e of  whether AU i s s e l f - d e f e a t i n g .  A.  HODGSON  ON A U ' S  SELF-DEFEATINGNESS  Hodgson a r g u e s t h a t involves ideal in  imagining  AU i s s e l f - d e f e a t i n g . H i s  a society  and then c o n s i d e r i n g  which c o r r e s p o n d s  whether  such a s o c i e t y t o expect  t o be k e p t . Hodgson p o r t r a y s  there  to the  or promises  AU s o c i e t y a s :  ... a s o c i e t y i n w h i c h e v e r y o n e accepts [AU] a s h i s o n l y personal r u l e , and attempts t o a c t i n accordance with i t . We assume that everyone is highly r a t i o n a l , s u f f i c i e n t l y so t o u n d e r s t a n d the i m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h e use o f [AU] ( i n c l u d i n g t h o s e t o be d e m o n s t r a t e d i n this section). We assume too that the universal u s e o f [AU] and u n i v e r s a l r a t i o n a l i t y i s common knowledge, i n t h e sense that everyone knows o f i t , and e v e r y o n e knows t h a t e v e r y o n e knows, a n d so o n . t  t  H o d g s o n O ) : pp. 38-39.  64  AU  w o u l d be any r e a s o n  t h e t r u t h t o be t o l d the i d e a l  argument  AU  and  the  Issue  of  Hodgson t h e n a r g u e s t h a t  there  to believe  anyone e l s e  anything  expectation The  of  that  promises being  argument t h a t  mistakes  occurring  emphasizes  that  Self-defeatingness  would be  no  s a i d and  honoured  the  i s not  utility  many a r g u m e n t s a g a i n s t  for  no  anyone  society.  contingent  on  calculations. AU  65  reasonable  i n such a  Hodgson a d v a n c e s in  reason  /  He  have:  ... proceeded on the basis of the p o s s i b i l i t y of t h e m i s a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e system, either through mistaken c a l c u l a t i o n or m o r a l f a i l i n g ; and i t can be s a i d t h a t a moral theory should be a s s e s s e d on the b a s i s not of possible misapplications of it, but of its implications.t R a t h e r , Hodgson a r g u e s t h a t the  p r o p e r AU  that  AU  c a l c u l a t i o n s and  conduct  and  thumb'  or  AU AU  in t h i s  agents  agents  takes  'practical  perform  know  (and for  there  told  i s no  the  considerations  truth.  are  H o d g s o n ( 1 ) : p.  way  that  their  this  it is  e n t a i l s that  f o r an Every  agent  to  agent that  governing 'rules  So,  for  example, moral  subordinate on  any  to  the  AU  particular  know whether knows  of  might  a conventional  totally  o v e r r i d i n g and 38.  be)  any  ideal  individuals  conduct.  cannot  i n an  principle  precedence over  maxims'  to govern  society,  i s that,  fundamental  Such s u b o r d i n a t i o n  occasion  t  the  t h e . t r u t h ' i s not  itself.  being  is  thereby  o t h e r w i s e employ  rule  other  e s s e n c e of Hodgson's argument  society,  'tell  that  the  is self-defeating.  The AU  i t i s because  that  she  is  utility  truth is  told  AU a n d t h e I s s u e only  when  i t maximizes u t i l i t y .  way t o know on any p a r t i c u l a r 'information' utility,  whether  the  that  So, s i n c e  occasion  honesty  agent  'information'  of S e l f - d e f e a t i n g n e s s  can  is  when b e i n g  or  And  i t is  being  told  t h e t r u t h when one i s s e e k i n g  order  t o murder  Since  expect  only  knows  kept  t h i s as  thereby  illusions) affairs  do  a b o u t what  i s to  perhaps  facia  on  impossible)  cooperation without since  the t r u t h  involves  these  is not in  to  promises.  maximizes  this  As a  that  i s the case,  result,  to  alter  regardless  she  expectations  p r a c t i c e s play  social a role  not  (or  s t a t e of promise pointless  allows  of  practices.  prima  i s a society  communication  i s possible  in  general  e x c h a n g e d and  f o r c e of promises  b e n e f i t than  the  AU s o c i e t y .  of i n f o r m a t i o n  these  would be  society that  levels  will  o f whether a  "promising"  a  utility.  i t m a x i m i z e s u t i l i t y ; and  i n an i d e a l  greater  f o r mutual  access  like  someone  i s t o be done, s i n c e t h e b e s t  r e l i a n c e on t h e b i n d i n g  which  to find  so  that  unless  nothing  be p r o d u c e d  Hodgson c o n t e n d s reliance  the  uncertainty  concerning  doing  well.  been made. C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  (and  on  unusual cases  exists  when  a p r o m i s e t o be k e p t  promises  has  argument  i t i s u n i v e r s a l knowledge  promisee  some  them.  analogous  Promises are  to  such  no  maximizes  reliance  pervasive;  An  not r e s t r i c t e d  no  has  given  deception  place  provided.  the agent  / 66  and  in a society Consequently,  any s o c i e t y t h a t  has  AU optimal AU  utility,  agents,  optimal  an  AU  the  which,  fails  society. •  The  illustrates  before,  the  because of  words, a  in a  be  a  society  maximization  society  society  of  at  the  is  not  main  societies, of of  claim an  issue  possible  by  of with  level  of  utility.  Hodgson w i t h  AU  agent  is largely  promising AU  a g e n t s , and  that  being  society  concerns  an  H o d g s o n ( 1 ) : pp.  society a  non-AU  highlights  the  promising  also  AU  agent  in  is self-defeating. reliance  deception. According  55-56.  respect  in a  to  and  a As  sincerity  Hodgson:  ... t h e d e c e i t of the act-utilitarian promisor in making a promise could affect the promisee in three ways: b r e a c h of p r o m i s e would be more likely; i f t h e p r o m i s e were b r o k e n , c o m p e n s a t i o n would be less likely; and if the p r o m i s e e a n d / o r o t h e r s got t o know that he was an act-utilitarian, the bad c o n s e q u e n c e s of b r e a c h would be reduced so t h a t ( i f t h e p r o m i s o r knew t h a t t h e s e persons knew) b r e a c h would be more l i k e l y s t i l l . The p o i n t of a l l t h i s is not j u s t t h a t i t w o u l d be d e c e i t f u l to promise, f o r a c c o r d i n g to a utilitarian i t might be r i g h t to d e c e i v e . Rather, the point is that, in regard to p r o m i s i n g , b e i n g an a c t - u t i l i t a r i a n can have d i s u t i l i t y . f t  67  individuals  to maximize  a c o m m i t t e d AU  society  Hodgson's  which  cannot  i s advanced  example in a  society  available  /  self-defeating.  a l l existing  difficulties  Self-defeatingness  collectively  situation facing like  not  society  other  A s i m i l a r argument to  I s s u e of  to u t i l i t y  actions  i s thereby  the  they are  In  solely  individual AU  and  ideal  utility.  committed  and  AU The  suggestion  undermining  and t h e I s s u e  i s that  this  of the p o s s i b i l i t y  o f S e l f - d e f e a t i n g n e s s / 68  disutility  results  from  the  of cooperation.  For where a person who accepts a personal rule requiring promise-keeping can u s e f u l l y c o - o r d i n a t e p l a n s by means of a s i n c e r e p r o m i s e , an a c t - u t i l i t a r i a n has only the following three a l t e r n a t i v e s , or p o s s i b l y only the f i r s t two o f them: n o t t o make a p r o m i s e , to make a p r o m i s e t o a p e r s o n who knows t h a t he i s an a c t - u t i l i t a r i a n , or t o make a p r o m i s e t o , a n d so d e c e i v e , a p e r s o n who d o e s n o t know t h i s . f All to  three be  o f t h e a l t e r n a t i v e s open t o t h e AU a g e n t may  as u s e f u l  (i.e.,  utility  maximizing) as  a  fail  sincere  promise. The first misses the opportunity usefully to co-ordinate p l a n s ; and t h e s e c o n d i s l i t t l e b e t t e r , f o r a s we saw, such a promise c o u l d n o t be r e l i e d on w i t h c o n f i d e n c e a n d so w o u l d n o t be v e r y e f f e c t i v e for co-ordinating plans. The t h i r d i n v o l v e s d e c e i t , a n d even t h o u g h a u t i l i t a r i a n can say t h a t t h i s i s not bad in itself, deceit may have bad c o n s e q u e n c e s ; and i f i t would have b a d c o n s e q u e n c e s f o r an a c t - u t i l i t a r i a n to deceive i n t h i s way, f o r example, by d e s t r o y i n g h i s candour and openness of c h a r a c t e r and thus r e d u c i n g h i s a b i l i t y to be of use, a l l that an a c t - u t i l i t a r i a n c a n do i s t o t u r n t o one of the other two unsatisfactory alternatives.$ Hodgson t h u s ideal  AU  concludes  society  t h a t AU i s s e l f - d e f e a t i n g i n b o t h t h e  and  the  non-AU  s e l f - d e f e a t i n g n e s s does n o t , i n e i t h e r  f H o d g s o n ( 1 ) : p . 56. $ H o d g s o n ( 1 ) : p . 56.  society. case,  And  this  depend upon t h e  AU  and t h e I s s u e o f S e l f - d e f e a t i n g n e s s  AU  a g e n t s making m i s t a k e s  B.  SINGER'S REPLY: A STANDARD AU RESPONSE Singer  rejects  self-defeating. claim  that  Singer is  in their  utility  Hodgson's  argument  i s self-defeating  i n the  c o u n t e r s Hodgson's argument  a society  of  consideration.  calculations.  that  The f o c u s o f S i n g e r ' s r e s p o n s e  AU  individuals  S i n c e i t i s an i d e a l  ideal  AU  AU  to  is  is  Hodgson's  AU  society.  by e m p a h a s i z i n g  committed  / 69  AU t h a t  that is  i t  under  society:  people would not a c t from the m o t i v e s w h i c h most commonly l e a d people to make false promises and t o tell lies--motives like self-interest, m a l e v o l e n c e , p r i d e , a n d so o n . Nor would t h e r e be any need t o make f a l s e p r o m i s e s or t e l l l i e s from u t i l i t a r i a n motives, i n t h e s o r t of c i r c u m s t a n c e s of which u t i l i t a r i a n c r i t i c s a r e so f o n d : there would be no need t o make consoling p r o m i s e s t o d y i n g p e o p l e who w i s h their e s t a t e s t o be d i s t r i b u t e d i n some way contrary to u t i l i t y , since dying people w o u l d n o t w i s h t h i s ; no need, e i t h e r , t o tell a l i e t o save a man from h i s would-be m u r d e r e r . f Thus,  t h e r e would  false  promises  illustrates  this  Suppose A  seem t o be no need  i n the  ideal  contention believes  to t e l l  AU s o c i e t y . $  lies  Singer  w i t h an i n t e r e s t i n g  that  the  greatest  o r t o make further  example.  good  will  be  f S i n g e r ( 2 ) : p . 97. $ S i n g e r s u g g e s t s t h a t Hodgson m i s s e s t h i s p o i n t b e c a u s e he fails to appreciate the importance of the d i s t i n c t i o n between t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a r e a s o n f o r l y i n g o r b r e a k i n g a promise and t h e absence of a s u f f i c i e n t reason f o r t e l l i n g the t r u t h or keeping a promise.  AU served plans the  i f B works on t a k i n g  departure  and t h e I s s u e of S e l f - d e f e a t i n g n e s s an hour  of the l a s t  the  departure possible leaves? even one  on  time  A should  bus. B asks A  last  bus. Singer  the fact  holds.  that  B  asks:  able  As  before,  i t i s an i d e a l  AU  bus to  as  to the  is  i t not  what t i m e t h e l a s t bus  goes, t h e r e  to believe  B  until  are reasons t o l i e  s o c i e t y . T h u s , Hodgson's argument  may have no r e a s o n provides  only  of being  misleading  l i e t o B about  Since  when t h e l a s t  by  I f so, the o b j e c t i o n AU  on w o r k i n g  good  of the  i n an i d e a l  agent  he i n t e n d s .  i s i n the p o s i t i o n  greatest  that  than  t h e bus home, he p l a n s  d e p a r t s and A t h e r e b y produce  longer  / 70  the information Singer's  that  that  response  any  focuses  society.  T h i s o b j e c t i o n f o r g e t s t h a t both A and B t a k e [AU] a s t h e i r p e r s o n a l rule and a l w a y s t r y t o a c t on i t . So i f i t i s t h e c a s e t h a t t h e good o f B w o r k i n g an e x t r a hour outweighs the d i s u t i l i t y of h i s having t o walk home, a l l that is necessary t o ensure t h a t he does t h e e x t r a work i s that A explain this to him. ... So, A s t i l l has no good reason for l y i n g . f It  i s not that  society.  lying  Rather Singer  maximize u t i l i t y as  her  argument  fails that  rule  would  governing  conduct.  would e x i s t  i n an i d e a l  to appreciate  So,  to appreciate  AU  always  i n which everyone a c c e p t s  fails  pp. 98-99.  se i n an i d e a l  the t r u t h  b e c a u s e he  i s important  t-Singer(2):  contends that  in a society  personal  conditions It  would be wrong p e r  AU  Hodgson's fully  the  AU s o c i e t y .  t h e extreme  idealism  that  AU Singer's is  c o n s t r u a l of  better  the  seen as  agent  which  can C  from an  utility  instead, B should  do  the  agreement  the  extreme u n r e a l i s m  there  i s an While  analysis ideal  AU  similar  can  not  A  fails  increased agent w i l l  If B later  paying  A but  B's  of  Singer's  utility  any  occasion  through do  so  without  that  g i v i n g the A  have  no  breaking  But  of AU  correctly  to a p p r e c i a t e  objection. of AU  At and  the  points fully  'best'  the  outset  t o mean  Singer  i t f o r the  explicitly  that,  'best  that  Hodgson's  circumstances  counterargument  accepts  noting  out  in  i s open notes  the to  a  Hodgson's  p u r p o s e s of  the  "Hodgson,  for  uses  shall  same."! Such a t e r m i n o l o g i c a l c o n v e n t i o n  the  beyond agency,  convenience, do  she to  should  utility.  A  money  decision, since  construal  the  suppose t h a t  discovers  furthermore,  maximizes g e n e r a l  society, Singer's  discussion,!  be  it  Since  with on  71  perhaps  extreme u n r e a l i s m .  f o r example,  s o . And  or  /  a d d i t i o n a l problem. Singer  formulation  requires?  concern  the  So,  f o r B.  by  Self-defeatingness  perspective,  or h e s i t a t i o n about with  of  agent  utility,  some work  maximize u t i l i t y  complaint  AU  impersonal  or . c o m p l a i n t .  t o do  Issue  overriding  of p e r s o n a l  hesitation agreed  the  an  general  sacrifice  the  i n c o r p o r a t i n g an  has  maximization in  and  or e q u a l  best,'  and may  I be  ! Hodgson's f o r m u l a t i o n of AU i s : An a c t i s right i f and only if it would have best consequences, that is, consequences at l e a s t as good as t h o s e of any alternative a c t open t o t h e a g e n t . See H o d g s o n ( l ) : p. 1. ! S i n g e r ( 2 ) : p. 95.  AU convenient leads  but  Singer  resulting society.  ultimately to  maximizing i t . It  light  the  outcome t h a t The  state  is  that  AU  other  is that  of  and  affairs  that  i n an  ideal  not  an  that  may  It  and  the  ideal  AU  self-defeating  there  reconsider  there  through  out,  AU  i s only  only the  be  one  one  action  argument  more t h a n  s o c i e t y are  their  a l l that  the  action  i s no  does  reason  s t a t e s of  affairs  words, one  in one  So,  i s necessary  maximize  affairs  to patterns  of  utility  assume t h a t  agents  committed  Recognizing  t h i s can  have s e r i o u s  that the  utility.f  such agents are  to  Singer  to ensure  must  produced  when  equally  well.  have t o assume t h a t  indifferent  as  i s t o make i t c l e a r t o  indeed  of  committed  a l l maximize u t i l i t y  does not  are  actions.  t o assume t h a t  i n d i f f e r e n t to which s t a t e s  several In  prevail in  72  'best'.  points  However, t h e r e be  may  that  /  misleading.  circumstances,  agent perform a c e r t a i n a c t i o n  agent  be  the  assumption  possibility  maximizing u t i l i t y  an  that  the  Self-defeatingness  proves to  i s i n s t r u c t i v e to  agents  correctly  it  argument  r e s t s on  produces  I s s u e of  misdescribe  Singer's  of  the  ramifications,  implicitly utility  and  agents  d i s t r i b u t i o n in order to u t i l i t y ramifications  are to  maximization. in  assessing  f It i s important to keep i n mind t h a t S i n g e r assumes that t h e r e a r e no mistakes in the u t i l i t y c a l c u l a t i o n s of the a g e n t s . L i k e Hodgson, S i n g e r c o n t e n d s t h a t AU must be j u d g e d on t h e basis of i t s proper applications, and not its m i s a p p l i c a t i o n s . T h u s , t h e r e i s no c o n f u s i o n on t h e p a r t of the agents as t o what c o n s t i t u t e s the u t i l i t y maximizing s t a t e of a f f a i r s .  AU and t h e I s s u e the  claim  counted  that  the agents  upon t o t e l l  It  i n an  one a n o t h e r  i s reasonable  are  utility.f  t o assume t h a t ,  state  of  obtains  interested  Imagine t h a t  of a f f a i r s .  So,  greater  more p e r s o n a l  prefers  Y.  guarantee X through on  A will  state  prevent  of a f f a i r s  telling h e r from  and  lying  i d e a l AU s o c i e t y . T h u s , lie,  since  utility  she  and t h e g e n e r a l l y  are  highly  So,  B i s fully  states that  i t  would be  However, r e c a l l  A will  that  aware t h a t  tell  i n an i d e a l their  from X,  that  and A  optimal  A  while B  that  A and  A prefers X while i s in  lying. X i s  a  position  facia  seems r e a s o n a b l e  simultaneously  A  B B to  constraints  a morally  i s not prima  optimal  wrong  t o expect  promoting  in  an  A  to  personal  s t a t e of a f f a i r s .  t h e members o f an i d e a l  AU  society  the i m p l i c a t i o n s of  i f X and Y b o t h r e s u l t i n prefers  which  receives  that  a l i e t o B. No m o r a l  optimal  states  suppose  i t i s true  AU  personal  i n d i f f e r e n t to  by AU),  r a t i o n a l and u n d e r s t a n d  of a f f a i r s ,  agents  However,  from Y. W h i l e  further  be  the c o n s t r a i n t s  promoting  utility  (as r e q u i r e d  Suppose  the  produced.  personal  b o t h want X o r Y  s o c i e t y can  within  B are morally  is  utility  in  AU  X and Y b o t h r e p r e s e n t  A and  affairs  ideal  the t r u t h .  imposed by m o r a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , society  / 73  of S e l f - d e f e a t i n g n e s s  X, t h e n  B the t r u t h . Furthermore,  B cannot  AU.  optimal assume  s i n c e B can never  t One c o u l d deny t h i s c l a i m . However, i t i s n o t c l e a r what sense o f agency, i f any, remains when one i m a g i n e s agents who a r e i n d i f f e r e n t t o t h e i r own u t i l i t y .  AU know, f o r any case, the  B can  as  never  i n an  so,  at  the  ideal  AU  AU  very  that  self-defeating  threatened J.L.  t h a t AU  Hodgson  of  when t h e r e Mackie  not  the  important  able  agents  apparent  does not  But,  s t a t e of  essentially  optimal  the  same  in  resolved Singer  disasterous  while  communication  upon,  provide.  t o AU.f  affairs  the  tensions  have t h e  a  telling  to r e l y  automatically  i s more t h a n one  makes  is  appears that  i s committed  claims. one  that A  other  are not  be  74  /  c o n s t i t u t e such,  I t thereby  there  that are  when o n l y  reliability  confident  that  each agent  Self-defeatingness  i t does not  to her.  least,  have d e m o n s t r a t e d  of  society will  society  consequences that  the  that  'information'  the  Issue  completely  lying  ideal  through noting may  be  not  t r u e , the  And  the  situation,  t r u t h and  agents  and  AU is  can  is  not  optimal, still  be  state.$ mistake.  He  t Such t e n s i o n s a r e p r o b a b l y not s u f f i c i e n t t o r e s u l t i n AU being s e l f - d e f e a t i n g . A f t e r a l l , a non-AU society does i n c o r p o r a t e b o t h 1) the g e n e r a l r e l i a n c e on the t r u t h of ' i n f o r m a t i o n ' p r o v i d e d , and 2) that deception i s sometimes j u s t i f i e d . And t h i s does not e n t a i l t h a t a non-AU s o c i e t y i s s e l f - d e f e a t i n g . I t may be t h a t an AU s o c i e t y can accommodate t h e above m e n t i o n e d c o n f l i c t s among i t s members as l o n g as they are r e l a t i v e l y i n f r e q u e n t . $ These p o t e n t i a l d i f f i c u l t i e s are even more a p p a r e n t when one makes r e a l i s t i c a s s u m p t i o n s a b o u t the r a t i o n a l a b i l i t i e s of t h e agents in the i d e a l AU s o c i e t y . As G a r y Wedeking p o i n t s o u t , even a s s u m i n g t h a t A knows B t o be a committed AU a g e n t , A may r e m a i n u n c e r t a i n a b o u t what B w i l l do. F o r B may be reasoning in a manner t h a t is different from A. R a t i o n a l i t y d o e s not imply t h a t a l l a g e n t s w i l l a r r i v e at t h e same conclusions in complex e m p i r i c a l reasoning. So, t h e r e may be u n c e r t a i n t y a b o u t what o t h e r AU a g e n t s w i l l do w h i c h m i g h t not be r e s o l v e d on t h e b a s i s of what t h e y say will do. It should also be noted that the utilities p e r t a i n i n g to A's e x p e c t a t i o n s that B will do something b e c a u s e she has s a i d t h a t she w i l l a l s o have t o be taken i n t o a c c o u n t . T h i s makes the c a l c u l a t i o n s even more c o m p l e x .  AU assumes t h a t can  be  ideal  noAU  and  commitment  conflict  society.  by Hodgson and  the  I s s u e of S e l f - d e f e a t i n g n e s s /  t o common w e l f a r e e n t a i l s  between t h e  R e m a r k i n g on  G.J.  ends o f t h e  there  members o f  the c r i t i c i s m  Warnock, M a c k i e  that  of AU  says the  75  an  advanced  following.t  Hodgson, and Warnock s t i l l more s o , have made the mistake of not considering t h e i r own h y p o t h e s i s in a sufficiently t h o r o u g h - g o i n g way: t h e y have not seen t h a t the move t o an [AU] society, in w h i c h t h e r e a r e no c o n f l i c t s o f i n t e r e s t or p u r p o s e , d o e s away w i t h t h e need for our o r d i n a r y c o n v e n t i o n a l r u l e s a t the same t i m e t h a t i t does away w i t h both c o n v e n t i o n a l and u t i l i t a r i a n r e a s o n s f o r o b s e r v i n g them. Such a society could e n j o y t h e b e n e f i t s of c o - o p e r a t i o n a s i t a r i s e s from an a u t o m a t i c harmonization of e f f o r t w i t h o u t r e q u i r i n g t h e devices t h a t we now need i f we a r e t o e r e c t some measure of mutually beneficial co-operation on a foundation of d i v e r g e n t purposes.:*; Mackie  appears  distribution For,  a s we  former, still  have  confused  with those p e r t a i n i n g  have j u s t  seen,  as opposed t o the  work an  distribution potential  hour. and  not  The  about  to u t i l i t y issues  utility  difficulties  involving  i s s u e may  maximization.  with the d i r e c t  that  the  AU  may  Singer's  deceive B in order  crucial  utility  maximization.  which suggest  cooperation. Recall  whether A s h o u l d  extra  issues  i t i s often latter,  f a c e problems about  involving  are  to  t o get B  involve Given  that  employment  f Warnock o f f e r s an argument a g a i n s t AU that w i t h the argument f o r w a r d e d by Hodgson. See c h a p t e r 3. $ M a c k i e ( 1 ) : p. 298.  case to  utility there of  AU  shares much Warnock(l):  AU and t h e I s s u e and  that  harmony  maximization, respect that  does  there  issue of  allows  entail  f o r some  of  the  efforts  utility  harmony  i t may w e l l  instructive  whether, as Mackie  f o r coordinated  terms  interpersonal  and  I t i s thereby  in  be t h e  'devices' to achieve  cooperation  communication.  aim,  distribution,  i s a need of  general  not  to u t i l i t y  benefits  the  of  o f S e l f - d e f e a t i n g n e s s / 76  the  reliability to explore  insists,  to achieve  an i d e a l  with case full of  further society  mutual b e n e f i t s .  C. AU AND THE PROBLEM OF COOPERATION The it  central  theme o f Warnock's c r i t i c i s m  does n o t a l l o w  f o r even  the p o s s i b i l i t y  o f AU i s  that  of c o o p e r a t i o n .  Can one s a y t h a t what [AU] essentially defeats is the possibility of c o - o p e r a t i o n ? I t seems t h a t , i f two o r more persons are effectively to c o - o p e r a t e ... t h e r e must be such a thing as b e i n g prepared t o be, and r e c o g n i z e d as b e i n g , bound t o specific requirements of the co-operative ' e t h i c s ' , or t o s p e c i f i c undertakings. I t i s n o t ... e s s e n t i a l t h a t s u c h bonds s h o u l d ... n e v e r ... be b r o k e n ; b u t i t is essential that they should not i n g e n e r a l make a b s o l u t e l y no difference. ... But i f [AU] i s t o be our s o l e c r i t e r i o n , they would i n e v i t a b l y count for nothing.f Warnock d i s c u s s e s  a  specific  contention  t h a t AU p r e c l u d e s  AU i t s e l f .  The  concerns t  the  example  is  coordination  W a r n o c k ( 1 ) : p . 34 .  example  appeals  to  illustrate  to anything  set in a  military  that  necessary  is  other  context, to  his than and  achieve  AU and t h e I s s u e victory  of S e l f - d e f e a t i n g n e s s  / 77  on t h e b a t t l e f i e l d . . What w i l l be the best way of securing t h i s end? I t does not seem--in this c a s e — a t a l l p a r a d o x i c a l t o say t h a t the end w i l l n o t be most e f f e c t i v e l y p u r s u e d by t e l l i n g e a c h man so t o a c t a s , i n h i s judgement, b e s t t o a c h i e v e i t ; even i f a l l my men are highly sagacious and experienced s o l d i e r s , mere chaos will ensue, s i n c e the task t h u s s e t them i s not merely difficult, but completely impossible.!  A common commitment which  each  to v i c t o r y  soldier  i n the  p o s i t i o n of  However, a c c o r d i n g  leaves  directly  s e l f - d e f e a t i n g . V i c t o r y i s only are  still  the s i t u a t i o n i n  pursues  that  p o s s i b l e when t h e  accepting  and  goal soldiers  a c t i n g upon  t o Warnock, a s o l d i e r  orders.  whose c r i t e r i o n  action  i s what he j u d g e s  i s most c o n d u c i v e  accept  and f o l l o w o r d e r s  i n the usual  to v i c t o r y  of  cannot  manner.  I t i s ... o r t h o d o x military doctrine t h a t ... a m i l i t a r y subordinate i s to comply w i t h an o r d e r t h a t i s g i v e n . ... But t h i s , of c o u r s e , i s t o s a y t h a t the s u b o r d i n a t e ' s c r i t e r i o n of a c t i o n i s t o be t h e o b e d i e n c e to orders, not h i s judgement a b o u t what i s most conducive to t h e end of victory; and if my s o l d i e r s a r e r e a l l y t o be g u i d e d by t h i s latter criterion alone, then their a c c e p t a n c e of the former can only be conditional—each will obey t h e orders o f h i s s u p e r i o r commander, p r o v i d e d t h a t he t h i n k s i t most c o n d u c i v e t o victory t o do so.$ The  difficulties  that  analogous t o the concerns f Warnock(1 ) : p . 3 1 . t W a r n o c k ( 1 ) : p . 32.  result  from  this  situation  t h a t Hodgson a d v a n c e s w i t h  are  respect  AU to  promises.  to  AU  loses  force.  truth  Similarly,  soldier  to v i c t o r y ,  force. Soldiers conducive  to  when  I s s u e of S e l f - d e f e a t i n g n e s s / and  only personal rule,  commander and conducive  the  Since both promisor  as t h e i r its  and  only  from  of an  orders  just  as  the  committed  the n o t i o n of a  what  obey  judge  are  Warnock c o n t e n d s ,  the n o t i o n  victory, they  act  promisee  when  they  judge  both to  'order' loses  individuals truth  'promise'  since  they  judge  only  conducive  78  tell to  be its them the  utility  maximization. But here trouble lurks. For if s u b o r d i n a t e s make t h i s r e s e r v a t i o n , t h e n t h e y may see r e a s o n sometimes t o d i s o b e y an o r d e r . But t h e i r commander w i l l know that, and accordingly may find it necessary to c o n f i n e himself to orders s u c h t h a t i t w i l l not be t o o d i s a s t e r o u s a m a t t e r i f t h e y a r e d i s o b e y e d . But t h i s in turn his intelligent subordinates w i l l a p p r e c i a t e . ... The c h a n c e o f t h e i r disobeying orders i s thereby increased. ... And the upshot may be that their 'commander' w i l l have no r e a s o n t o t h i n k t h a t h i s i s s u i n g ' o r d e r s ' w i l l make any d i f f e r e n c e at a l l . f Warnock g e n e r a l i z e s military  this  apparent  difficulty  context to express h i s c r i t i c i s m  of  beyond  AU.  I t t h u s a p p e a r s t h a t , i f t h e end of e a c h and a l l i s t o be e f f e c t i v e l y p u r s u e d , i t is actually necessary i n such a case t h a t p r o m o t i o n of t h i s end s h o u l d n o t be e a c h man's sole c r i t e r o n of practical d e c i s i o n ; on t h e c o n t r a r y , e a c h man must be p r e p a r e d t o do, must t h i n k i t wrong not t o do, some acts which, in his judgement and p e r h a p s a l s o i n f a c t , are not s u c h as to promote that general t W a r n o c k ( 1 ) : p.  32.  the  AU  a n d t h e I s s u e o f S e l f - d e f e a t i n g n e s s / 79  end.f Thus, Warnock c o n t e n d s as t h e i r  sole personal  w i t h one a n o t h e r goal  of u t i l i t y It  in a  a  rule  group  of p e o p l e  f o r conduct  way t h a t  employing  cannot  AU  cooperate  allows a c h i e v i n g the  common  maximization.  i s illuminating  cooperative military victory  that  to  contrast  effort  w i t h an a c c o u n t  by  suggested  Warnock's p o r t r a y a l  individuals  committed  of to  by H a r e .  I f a r m i e s were t o s a y t o s o l d i e r s when training them, "On the battlefield, a l w a y s do what i s most c o n d u c i v e t o t h e g e n e r a l good o f mankind," o r even " o f your countrymen," nearly a l l the soldiers would easily convince t h e m s e l v e s ( b a t t l e s b e i n g what t h e y a r e ) t h a t t h e c o u r s e most c o n d u c i v e t o t h e s e desirable ends was h e a d l o n g flight. Instead they say, "Leave those c a l c u l a t i o n s t o y o u r s u p e r i o r s . ... Your j o b i s t o g e t on w i t h the f i g h t i n g . " O n l y i n t h i s way c a n wars be won.$ L i k e Warnock, military  Hare  generalizes  c o n t e x t and s u g g e s t s  t o t h e g e n e r a l good c o n v e n t i o n a l moral  h i s argument  that  beyond  i t i s probably  i f people value  ( a n d even  conducive  overvalue) the  norms o f s o c i e t y .  When faced with a choice between s t i c k i n g t o one o f t h e s i m p l e general p r i n c i p l e s we have l e a r n t and engaging i n more s p e c i f i c r e a s o n i n g , we have t o ask o u r s e l v e s w h i c h p r o c e d u r e i s l i k e l y t o a p p r o x i m a t e t o t h e r e s u l t w h i c h would be a c h i e v e d by a r e a s o n e r n o t hampered by human frailties. ... My own inclination, in light o f my assessment f W a r n o c k O ) : pp. 32-33. $ H a r e ( 3 ) : p . 175.  the  AU  and  the  I s s u e of  Self-defeatingness  /  80  of my own l i m i t a t i o n s , i s t o t h i n k that t h e o c c a s i o n s on w h i c h I s h o u l d be safe in departing from my firm general p r i n c i p l e s (which are not of extreme g e n e r a l i t y ) are very r a r e . f The  contrast  claims and  that  with  a proponent  generally  contends that the  manner  adhering s u c h an  t o ' AU.  self-defeatingness on  whether  such  personal argue  in  p r i n c i p l e s , while  Warnock  precisely  because  disputes  possibilities to  AU  Hodgson and  that  of  can  employ  Warnock AU  Singer  v i e w s of  is AU's  social contend as  the  and  Hare  readily  Singer  and  suggests f o r an  practices  that AU  like  Hodgson may  community  to  be  c o n f u s e d about  what  obtain  the  benefits  promising.  I t may be that in t a l k i n g of "forming habits to do acts known not to be j u s t i f i e d a c c o r d i n g t o [AU]" Hodgson has i n mind the f o r m u l a t i o n of habits or p r a c t i c e s of always t e l l i n g the truth, and a l w a y s k e e p i n g p r o m i s e s , no matter what the consequences. This certainly would be i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h [AU], but it t  she  cooperation  such a p p e a l s are  examine t h e  norms i n  about  with taking  one's c o n d u c t , w h i l e  a g e n t s . We  social  turn.  required  social  valuing  i s incompatible  way)  Hare  by  general,  to a c t .  own  striking.  maximizes u t i l i t y  Hare in  how  is  cannot adhere to  regarding  in his  t o AU  Singer is  by  r u l e governing  available Hare  agent  And  reliance  (each  AU  someone c o m m i t t e d  norms i n d e c i d i n g that  of  analysis  to general  suggested  committed  turn  Warnock's  H a r e ( 3 ) : p.  178.  of  AU  and  the  Issue  of  Self-defeatingness  /  81  would a l s o be u n n e c e s s a r y . ... A l l that i s n e c e s s a r y i s t h a t t h e r e be h a b i t s of t e l l i n g the t r u t h and k e e p i n g promises unless there is a clear disutility in d o i n g so w h i c h o u t w e i g h s the b e n e f i t s of preserving the useful practices and f u l f i l l i n g the e x p e c t a t i o n s aroused.f Despite  the  situation There particular  apparent  i s not i s no  of  to  Singer's as  suppose,  failing  existing social  when he  in  straightforward  reason  instance  u n d e r m i n e an correct  as  appeal  to  he  remarks,  portrays i t .  f o r example,  fulfill  practice.$  the  that  a promise  any could  Bernard Williams  is  notes:  T h e r e i s one v e r y g e n e r a l remark t h a t i s w o r t h making about arguments of this s o r t . The certainty that attaches to t h e s e h y p o t h e s e s about p o s s i b l e effects is usually p r e t t y low; i n some cases, indeed, the hypothesis invoked is so i m p l a u i b l e t h a t i t would s c a r c e l y pass i f i t were not b e i n g u s e d t o d e l i v e r t h e respectable moral answer, as in the s t a n d a r d f a n t a s y t h a t one of t h e e f f e c t s of one's t e l l i n g a p a r t i c u l a r l i e i s to weaken t h e d i s p o s i t i o n of the w o r l d at l a r g e to t e l l the t r u t h . * The  question  the  truth  of in  considerations must be  true  inconvenience reasoning  of  whether any  voting.  suggests  ought  particular  specific  by  one  not that  to  the  to  keep a p r o m i s e or  case  mainly  p a r t i c u l a r c a s e . And  Suppose Donna can bothering since  depends  to  Donna's  f S i n g e r ( 2 ) : p. 102. $ We leave aside the question of p r a c t i c e s c o u l d e v e r become e s t a b l i s h e d * W i l l i a m s ( 2 ) : p. 100.  the  save h e r s e l f  vote.  One  line  vote w i l l  whether i n an AU  make  tell upon same some of no  any social community.  A U and t h e I s s u e of S e l f - d e f e a t i n g n e s s difference  t o t h e outcome o f  t h e e l e c t i o n , and s i n c e  can  save h e r s e l f  some t r o u b l e  the  wrong a c t i o n  f o r Donna  Singer  objects  to  by n o t v o t i n g ,  to  this  line  of  but  it still  the  Tightness  rests  e x i s t . And s u c h s m a l l  r e s u l t must  upon  be t a k e n  into  What  that  however s m a l l ,  if  is certainly contributions  account  in  Donna's  no  small to the  determining  o f an a c t i o n . E s s e n t i a l l y , S i n g e r ' s  the contention  difference,  i t i s therefore  reasoning.  v o t e s ? The c o n t r i b u t i o n o f e a c h v o t e  obtained  Donna  vote.  one  must  / 82  objection  v o t e does  make  a  t o t h e outcome o f t h e e l e c t i o n .  An a c t can contribute to a result without being either a necessary or sufficient condition o f i t , and i f i t does contribute, the act-utilitarian should take this contribution into a c c o u n t . The c o n t r i b u t i o n t h a t my vote makes t o w a r d t h e r e s u l t t h a t I j u d g e to be b e s t i n an election is a relevant consideration in deciding whether t o vote, although i t i s , almost certainly, neither a necessary nor sufficient c o n d i t i o n of that r e s u l t ; for i f this were n o t so, the a c t - u t i l i t a r i a n view w o u l d l e a v e us w i t h a r e s u l t which was u n c o n n e c t e d w i t h t h e a c t i o n s o f any o f the v o t e r s , s i n c e what i s true of my v o t e i s e q u a l l y t r u e of every i n d i v i d u a l vote.f The  suggestion  i s that  the c o n t r i b u t i o n  that  any  particular  a g e n t makes t o t h e outcome o f t h e e l e c t i o n by v o t i n g , almost  certainly  condition decide t  to  of the vote.  Singer(2):  neither result, Yet such  p. 103.  a  necessary  provides a  reason  claim  seems  nor  while  sufficient  f o r the agent problematic  to and  AU appears to concern  run  general  r e l i a n c e on a  because  the  truth  that  t o do.  But  of  t o do,  regarding tendency  to  by  only  by  wrong  thing  This  incorporate We  take t h i s Hare's  different the  to  the  AU  AU  the  then  t o do,  enough o t h e r of  may  i t is the thing right  fail  In  decisions display  an  a  the  long  voting  AU  as be  as  the  it  is  voting.  agent  into practical  them  correct  construed  as  to  contributions  agents w i l l  how  And  intuitively  contributions.  agent  the  to undervalue  the  considerations  i n what  actual  and  is  wrong  often  supposed  truth for  comes t o AU  to  i s the  agent  i s more p r o p e r l y  problem  should reason.  follows.  to the  emphasis than  agent's  83  makes  telling  the  to vote  the  agent's  by  be  When i t  generates  voting  the  response  that  purposes  threshold up  utility  deciding  so.  the  condition  r e a s o n , d e f e n d e r s of  c e r t a i n that  points  /  overriding  agent  telling  t r u t h may  fact  overvaluing  i t seems t h a t  reasonably  the  So,  case,  for  the  that  doing  their  when i t d o e s n o t .  AU's  truth-telling.  maximize  tell  overvalue  when i t s u i t s  result  to  by  sufficient  not  despite  practical  of  particular  r e l i a n c e on  i t seems  maximize u t i l i t y  any  nor  may  deciding  Self-defeatingness  spirit  truth-telling  general  agent  now  to the  that  necessary  preservation  I s s u e of  maximization.  contribution  neither  the  counter  with u t i l i t y  The  thing  and  p r o b l e m of  Singer's.  contributions,  Rather as  cooperation than does  has  focusing Singer,  a on  Hare  AU and t h e I s s u e e m p h a s i z e s human decisions  in  frailty  a way  considerations  that  and  o f S e l f - d e f e a t i n g n e s s / 84  the tendency  favours personal  l e a d Hare t o c o n c l u d e  firm  general  Such a p r o p o s a l about  how  an agent  Smart, t h e AU  norms i n m a t t e r s  i s in  the s p i r i t  best  rationalize  utility.  t h a t , as noted  t h e r e a r e few o c c a s i o n s when an a g e n t fairly  to  can s a f e l y  maximizes u t i l i t y .  earlier,  depart  of p r a c t i c a l  of Smart's  These  from  reason.  observations According  to  agent:  ... may s u s p e c t t h a t on some occasions personal bias may prevent him from reasoning in a correct utilitarian f a s h i o n . Suppose t h a t he i s trying to d e c i d e between two j o b s , one o f w h i c h i s more h i g h l y p a i d t h a n t h e o t h e r , though he has g i v e n an i n f o r m a l p r o m i s e t h a t he w i l l take the l e s s e r p a i d one. He may w e l l d e c e i v e h i m s e l f by underestimating the e f f e c t s of b r e a k i n g the promise ( i n causing loss of confidence) and by o v e r e s t i m a t i n g t h e good he c a n do i n t h e h i g h l y p a i d j o b . He may w e l l f e e l that i f he t r u s t s t o t h e a c c e p t e d r u l e s he i s more l i k e l y t o a c t i n t h e way t h a t an u n b i a s e d a c t - u t i l i t a r i a n would recommend t h a n he would be i f he t r i e d t o e v a l u a t e the consequences of h i s p o s s i b l e a c t i o n s himself.t Along  much  t h e same l i n e s ,  Hare s u g g e s t s  successfully  maximizes  utility  conventional  norms t h a n  by t r y i n g  practical proposal  reason.  to avoid being  t  Smart(2):  a  by a d o p t i n g  sufficient  free-rider.  p . 43.  and  more  following  t o employ AU d i r e c t l y  But i t i s i m p o r t a n t  d o e s not p r o v i d e  t h a t an a g e n t  to r e a l i z e reason  in  that Hare's  f o r t h e AU  agent  AU and t h e I s s u e There in  favour  its  due  threat an  i s indeed  in practical  deliberation  to cooperative  walking  has t o d e c i d e  decide force  and on  unhealthy  prohibits  there the  is  grass  t o walk  walking  will  tempted  to  on t h e g r a s s  completely  ignore lawn  t o walk on t h e g r a s s  when  then  then  a  Such r e a s o n i n g unable  i t will  favour  of  n o t do  knows  agent  should  since  t h a t no  does  not  of a p e r s o n a l  there are p o t e n t i a l  for  any  p o i n t , i f the grass  t h e AU  decision  cooperate  the  she  i f the  mutual  difficulties.  on i t damage  involve  preference.  does n o t l e a v e AU s e l f - d e f e a t i n g to  to  for  prime c o n d i t i o n a s i n g l e agent walking  then  Nevertheless,  on t h e g r a s s ,  on t h e g r a s s ,  will  agent  acknowledging  decision in  AU a g e n t  AU  has reason  to  a  a d e c i s i o n i n favour  the  a g e n t does w e l l s i m p l y  And i f t h e  rationalizing  to  or  i s the c r u c i a l  such  that  i s in a questionable  d o e s no damage. done,  looks  suspect  the agent  lawn  on w a l k i n g  to  contribute  g r a s s . And,  and g r e e n ,  the p r o h i b i t i o n  be  s o . I f t h e lawn  on t h e g r o u n d s t h a t  lush  i s i n such  that  reason  rationalize  tendency  f o r example,  doing  t h e AU  this  AU's  against walking  damage. However, and t h i s is  does  further  i f the  c o n d i t i o n , then  obey t h e p r o h i b i t i o n be  rationalization  n o t overcome  thereby  on t h e  of Hare's p o i n t ,  might  whether  s t a t e of the g r a s s ,  not  uncertain  toward  e n d e a v o u r . Suppose,  i s a sign that  unhealthy  tendency  o f p e r s o n a l d e s i r e s . However, g i v i n g  AU a g e n t  there  a human  o f S e l f - d e f e a t i n g n e s s / 85  or  the  benefit. For a l l  AU  AU agents  will  while  no  reason single  and  the  I s s u e of S e l f - d e f e a t i n g n e s s  in  t h i s manner.  instance  of  The  walking  across  u n d e r m i n e s t h e common good, t h e  integrity  undertaking  a  undermined to  (i.e., by  restrain  Still,  a s AU  agents, each w i l l  do  way,  AU  social  sufficient leads  sustain  Any  in for  further  kind  of  m a i n t a i n and  complex  system  beneficial  threshold  accumulation  of  integrity  of t h e s y s t e m  and  in  t i m e , one  peace  that,  do  enough t o o f f s e t  t o the g e n e r a l system It  can  can  on  the  forsee AU  and  see  with  this  general  be a b l e t o rules  e n j o i n s agents  to  the point  where  contribute  to  threatens So,  at  a the  least  duty each  the p l e a s u r e s of  minuscule  time one's  damage one  might  order. between what AU  as  this.  any c o o p e r a t i v e  that  o f f guard  of m i l i t a r y  is  failing  good. In  i t s benefits.  increase  principle  to  likely)  'violations'  happening  lawn)  with the general  up  i s important to d i s t i n g u i s h  reasonably  acting  underlie  (or w i l l  whatever  lawn  'violations'  of c o o p e r a t i o n w i l l  s h o u l d walk  by d o i n g s o , one  friends  that  thus  the  m o t i v a t e d t o walk  i t s b e n e f i t s . AU  will  can  'brinkmanship'  nonconformity  nonconformity  agents  the p u b l i c  of n o n c o n f o r m i t y  i t produces  that,  lush  where f u r t h e r  damage t o s p o i l  some d e g r e e  through which  AU  be p r o p e r l y  the p o i n t  to a  norms t h a t  endeavour.  go  until  is  of many a g e n t s  course,  86  of t h e c o o p e r a t i v e  healthy,  a c u m u l a t i v e tendency  on t h e g r a s s up will  preserving  t h e m s e l v e s . Of  problem  /  a result  what  AU  of  agents  agents everyone can  be  AU motivated utility, acting  morally even  will  be  and to  subordination to  the  integrity  not  of  virtually  soldiers  conditions. soldier  should  And  knows  establishment is  to  beginning she  should  not  obey h e r It  a c t so a s  Yet,  the  to  the  maintain i t is  not  individual  agents,  i t seems  orders even of  individual  number  of  brink  t o maximize u t i l i t y  these  though the  each  military before  soldier  violations of  and  by that  under  many v i o l a t i o n s  system t o the  to  maximize u t i l i t y  case  the  them  cooperation  i n which  integrity so  of  as a b o v e ,  will  follow  the  that  the  level  so  social  taking  necessary  c o m m i t t e d AU  However, u n t i l  to take  is  they  only absorb  believe  Returning  remains the  that can  undermined.  reason  this  of c e r t a i n  disaster.  many c a s e s  not  everyone's  by  that  know t h a t  of  efforts  is a certain  imagine v e r y  87  a g e n t must a c t t o m a x i m i z e  stability  military.  f o l l o w i n g o r d e r s . As  the  the  orders  the  Self-defeatingness /  tendency  b r i n k of  there  of  AU  eventual  the  and  soldiers  Every  cooperative  situation,  to  Issue  to threaten  somewhere n e a r  difficult  the  t o do.  i f the  institutions  military  and  it has are  s e r i o u s damage, thus  she  should  orders.  seems t h a t w h i l e  it  d o e s have a  AU  agents are p a r a s i t i c  their  moral  often  l a c k any  AU  i s not  'brinkmanship'  theory  on  the  strictly  p r o b l e m . In a v e r y institutions  r e q u i r e s them t o be  reason  to  self-defeating,  conform  of  s o . The  to general  real  society, AU  rules  agent  sense and will  defining  o f S e l f - d e f e a t i n g n e s s / 88  AU and t h e I s s u e systems of c o o p e r a t i o n begins  to  radically  until  threaten.the different  the frequency  system  approach  to  s e l f - d e f e a t i n g n e s s and s o c i a l  D.  itself. AU's  of  We  nonconformity  now t u r n  problems  to  a  regarding  cooperation.  A U : DECISION-PROCEDURE AND/OR RIGHTNESS-MAKING TRAIT Issues  objective  involving  AU's  adequacy  as  an  account  Tightness  are d i s t i n c t  from  adequacy a s a guide  f o r conduct.  Many d i s c u s s i o n s o f AU seem  to run these action?' t o do  two i s s u e s t o g e t h e r .  a n d 'How  what  is  fundamentally first  of  does  mistaken  these  are  other. Recognizing  this  an a g e n t  different  t o assume  questions  AU's  that  right  go a b o u t  trying  questions.  It is  in  one a u t o m a t i c a l l y  may  of  'What c o n s t i t u t e s a  (or should)  right?'  the question  of  considering addresses  the the  r e c a s t much o f t h e d i s c u s s i o n o f  whether AU i s s e l f - d e f e a t i n g . R. Eugene demonstrate contention  Bales considers  that  AU  is  i s that these  arguments t h a t  self-defeating.  arguments  fail  questions  a b o u t AU a s a r i g h t n e s s - m a k i n g  distinct  from  decision-making  the  question  procedure.  whether  He c l a i m s  purport His  to  central  to appreciate  that  characteristic  are  AU  is  an  that:  . . . t h e a r g u m e n t s I am c h a l l e n g i n g gain t h e i r p l a u s i b i l i t y from p l a y i n g t h e one o f f a g a i n s t t h e o t h e r . My c l a i m i s t h a t a proposed ethical theory—and I have [AU] i n m i n d — c o u l d p r o v i d e a correct account of r i g h t - m a k i n g characteristics  adequate  AU  a n d t h e I s s u e o f S e l f - d e f e a t i n g n e s s / 89  without s p e l l i n g out a procedure which, i f f o l l o w e d , would c r a n k o u t i n p r a c t i c e a c o r r e c t and i m m e d i a t e l y h e l p f u l answer t o q u e s t i o n s l i k e , "Ought I i n t h i s c a s e t o use enough gas a n d e l e c t r i c i t y to keep my home warm?"f AU  p r o v i d e s an a c c o u n t  right  of  b u t i t seems t h a t  AU's c r i t i c s  have p o r t r a y e d AU a s i f deciding  is,  that  Tightness  however, no  an  answer  should a l s o  involve p r a c t i c a l answer t o attempts  one o f  (and d e f e n d e r s  alike)  to  reason.  the  reason  question  why one about  should  objective  t h e answer t o c o n c e r n s  Bales  for  situations.$  obvious  serve as  the  objectively  i t a l s o provides the c r i t e r i o n  how t o a c t i n p a r t i c u l a r  There expect  what makes an a c t i o n  suggests  questions  is  that  that  providing  an  n o t even  relevant  to  t o answer t h e o t h e r . The ... a r g u m e n t [ s ] I am c h a l l e n g i n g may be telling critiques of the decision-procedure most frequently associated with [AU], as a d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e d u r e f o r [AUT, b u t I c a n n o t s e e t h a t t h e y a r e even r e l e v a n t t o t h e q u e s t i o n o f whether [ A U ] , a s i t is usually formulated, i s true.*  In any reason  event,  i t certainly  t o assume t h a t  seems  right  that  there i s  an answer t o t h e one q u e s t i o n  no  entails  t B a l e s ( 1 ) : pp. 261-262. $ Hodgson s e t s h i s d i s c u s s i o n i n t h e c o n t e x t o f e v e r y member of t h e community b e i n g s u c h t h a t he a c c e p t s AU a s , "... h i s o n l y p e r s o n a l r u l e , and attempts to a c t i n accordance with i t . " H o d g s o n ( l ) : p . 1. Warnock t a l k s o f AU b e i n g , "... e a c h man's s o l e c r i t e r i o n o f p r a c t i c a l d e c i s i o n . " W a r n o c k ( l ) : p. 32. And S i n g e r a c c e p t s Hodgson's framework, a n d d i s c u s s e s the s i t u a t i o n i n which people accept AU a s , "... t h e i r p e r s o n a l r u l e and a l w a y s t r y t o a c t on i t . " S i n g e r ( 2 ) : p . 98. * B a l e s ( 1 ) : p . 263.  AU an  answer t o t h e  and  the  I s s u e of S e l f - d e f e a t i n g n e s s /  90  other.  The a s s u m p t i o n w h i c h seems t o u n d e r l i e t h e a r g u m e n t s we a r e c o n s i d e r i n g ... is t h a t a c c e p t a n c e of t h e [AU] a c c o u n t of right-making characteristics somehow commits one a p r i o r i to a particular decision-making procedure: the procedure of e s t i m a t i n g and comparing probable c o n s e q u e n c e s of alternative acts. This i s an e r r o n e o u s assumption.f Thus, even for  i_f AU  practical  argument)  reason,  that  rightness-making in  claiming  objective following  fails  AU  in  t e r m s of p r o v i d i n g a m o r a l  i t does is  not  faulty  characteristic.  that  AU  provides  Tightness,  while,  c o n v e n t i o n a l moral  appreciate practical There  of  AU  the d i s t i n c t i o n  as  an  There the  for  fails  (at l e a s t account  i s no  claiming  a correct  procedureSo, it  between o b j e c t i v e  of  the  definition  example,  because  without  inconsistency  correct  norms i s  the a p p r o p r i a t e d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g standard c r i t i c i s m  follow  guide  of that  account  of  much of  d o e s not  the fully  Tightness  and  reason. i s something  wrongheaded a b o u t  Bales'  response  to  t B a l e s ( 1 ) : p. 263. $ While Hare does not employ the terminology of 'rightness-making characteristic' and 'decision-making procedure', h i s d i s c u s s i o n of c o o p e r a t i v e m i l i t a r y actions seems s e n s i t i v e t o , and c o g n i s a n t o f , t h e d i s t i n c t i o n . What makes an a c t i o n r i g h t i s t h a t i t i s c o n d u c i v e t o t h e g e n e r a l good of h u m a n i t y but t h i s d o e s not e n t a i l t h a t p e o p l e s h o u l d make j u d g e m e n t s of p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n on t h i s b a s i s . How one d e c i d e s what a c t i o n s t o p e r f o r m i s a d i f f e r e n t i s s u e than what a c t i o n s a r e right. This distinction also clarifies Hare's p r o p o s a l that one s h o u l d o v e r v a l u e the r u l e s . Such overvaluing i s a decision-making procedure that may be conducive to promoting a c t i o n s that are o b j e c t i v e l y r i g h t .  AU and t h e I s s u e o f S e l f - d e f e a t i n g n e s s / 91 criticisms benefits  of  AU  through  redefining dissolve  rather  than  the  reasons  characteristic  frailty,  like.  After  recognize  and a p r a c t i c a l  the  historical  procedure  does  Bales  f o r maximizing  he a t t a c h e s t o t h e practical  Essentially,  involves  problems.  The  h a s been t r a d i t i o n a l l y procedure  very  for  except  something  else—spontaniety,  knowledge, l a c k that  when  AU,  procedure  of time  spirit  of  AU.  there  and  the  h a s made AU  both  theory. Bales u t t e r l y For  fails  this  to  reason  is dissatisfying. think  the  utility  i s ? In l i g h t  distinction  reason,  mutual  o f AU so a s t o  potential  i t i s this connection  alone, Bales' discussion What  on  insufficient  all,  a reformist  relying  of  response  and f u n c t i o n  the  decision-making  for  human  and  The  scope  solve  achievement  a s s o c i a t e d with a decision-making  providing are  the  cooperation.  the t r a d i t i o n a l  rightness-making closely  concerning  his  best  decision-making of the  between o b j e c t i v e answer  is  Tightness  problematic.  despite h i s p r o t e s t s against popular  of AU, B a l e s p r o v i d e s a t r a d i t i o n a l  weight  AU answer.  Although the a c t - u t i l i t a r i a n ' s account of rightness-making characteristics p l a c e s no a p r i o r i l i m i t a t i o n s on t h e decision-making procedures he adopts, there i s a sense i n which h i s account does d i c t a t e h i s p r o c e d u r e s . H i s account d i c t a t e s h i s procedures i n s o f a r a s , but only i n s o f a r a s , the procedures a r e or a r e n o t r e l i a b l e methods for singling out, under immediately helpful d e s c r i p t i o n s , w h i c h o f t h e a c t s open t o him at a given time would maximize  portrayals  AU  and  the  Issue of S e l f - d e f e a t i n g n e s s /  92  utility. Here I echo the claim, frequently made by act-utilitarians, t h a t use o f r u l e s - o f - t h u m b , game t h e o r y , or the like, may be justified on a c t - u t i l i t a r i a n grounds.t The  acceptance  may  of  place  no  procedure.  But  action  this  a  as  priori  that  one  unless there  case  a rightness-making  acceptance  implies  utility  AU  reasons  means f o r  least  this  moral  T i g h t n e s s i s supposed to  on  the moral In  between  end,  merely  attempting  Otherwise  we  legitimacy  of  of  t  the case  And  Bales(1):  to  right  maximize  employment  in  o f AU  and  a c t . Or  at  the d e f i n i t i o n  of  how  so l o n g as  to  have some p r a c t i c a l  r e s t a t e s and  to  of  extends  that  would rules  not  bearing  of  real  i t fails  p.  264.  from  thumb  decision-making  idea  It  has,  that  'rules  already i n AU. from  p r o v i d e AU  of  after a l l ,  characteristics  decision-making  departure to  distinction  p l a c e i n the c a l c u l a t i o n s  rightness-making  be  the  and  the  maximize u t i l i t y .  clear  r e p r e s e n t any AU.  of  the c o n t r a r y . Only  Bales' a r t i c u l a t i o n  conceptually distinct  not  to  attempt  deciding  have a l e g i t i m a t e  been p e r f e c t l y are  definition  rightness-making c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  thumb' c a n  agents  be  AU  decision-making  life.  the  procedures of  the  the  abandon t h e d i r e c t  seek an a l t e r n a t i v e must  of  on  should d i r e c t l y  are  s h o u l d one  limits  characteristic  familiar  procedures. with  the  Bales' discussion  does  traditional construals with  any  additional  AU and t h e I s s u e theoretical  resources  self-defeatingness our is a  for  of S e l f - d e f e a t i n g n e s s / 93  addressing  and c o o p e r a t i o n  concerns  about  f o r mutual b e n e f i t .  What  d i s c u s s i o n o f B a l e s ' d i s c u s s i o n does f o c u s a t t e n t i o n t h a t AU  i s s u p p o s e d t o be a p r a c t i c a l  significant  Acknowledging brinkmanship  role  i n an  valuable  self-defeatingness, can  be a s a p r a c t i c a l  in deliberations  treatment been  concern i t s  norms,  and  not AU  INDETERMINACY strengthes  about  calculus  o f nonhuman  i t splace  deliberations.  difficulties  social  plays  theory.•  One o f t h e s u p p o s e d  Bentham's h e d o n i c  which  we now t u r n t o c o n s i d e r how e f f e c t i v e  E. AU, FAMINE R E L I E F AND  role  agent's p r a c t i c a l  t h a t AU's t h e o r e t i c a l with  theory  on  how a g e n t s to Singer's  animals,  in practical  o f AU i s i t s f u n d a m e n t a l  a  ought  to act.  concerns  central  From  about  the  o f AU  has  theme  reason.  The utilitarian criterion, then, is d e s i g n e d t o h e l p a p e r s o n , who c o u l d do v a r i o u s t h i n g s i f he c h o s e t o do them, to decide which of these things he s h o u l d do. H i s u t i l i t a r i a n deliberation i s one o f t h e c a u s a l a n t e c e d e n t s o f h i s a c t i o n , and i t would be p o i n t l e s s i f i t were n o t . f What c o n s t i t u t e s r i g h t and  poverty  Smart's useful t  provides  insistance as a guide  Smart(2):  p . 46.  a c t i o n i n the a useful vehicle  face of world for reflecting  t h a t AU w o u l d be p o i n t l e s s u n l e s s f o r conduct.  famine upon  i t were  AU Much of in moral level  and  Issue  the disagreement  philosophy  that  the  it  resolve  i t .  Consider,  made by  Garrett  is  to  for  Self-defeatingness /  concerning  generally,  is difficult  of  see  at  such  how  example,  world a  one  the  poverty,  94 as  fundamental  could begin  following  to  remarks  Hardin.  We cannot safely divide the wealth e q u i t a b l y among a l l p e o p l e s as l o n g as people reproduce at d i f f e r e n t r a t e s . To do so would guarantee that our grandchildren, and everyone else's g r a n d c h i l d r e n , would have o n l y a ruined world to inhabit. ... We should call this point to the a t t e n t i o n of those who, from a commendable l o v e of justice and e q u a l i t y , would institute a system of t h e commons, e i t h e r i n t h e form of a world food bank, or of unrestricted i m m i g r a t i o n . We must c o n v i n c e them i f we w i s h t o s a v e a t l e a s t some p a r t s o f the w o r l d from e n v i r o n m e n t a l ruin.f Yet,  at  least  individuals that of  following  case,  some c a s e s ,  need t o be  getting  reason  in  people  policy  in  convinced  to  realize  specific  policies  f o r abandoning Hardin  of  the  results  of a d h e r i n g  t  person  H a r d i n ( 1 ) : p.  will  give At  such think  consequences  them  'Tightness'  sufficient  i n the of  a  famine specific  of a d h e r i n g  to  the  of  the  i s a c c u r a t e , not  a l l  that Hardin's policies  be  convinced  of  who  advocates  a principle  the  what  seems t o  least  to these  21.  clear  expectable  consequences  However, even a s s u m i n g  One  the  the  policy.  will  not  of. Hardin  the p o l i c i e s .  understands  terms  individuals  it is  need  account  f o r change. of  e q u i t y , even i n  AU and t h e I s s u e the  face  of 'environmental  o f S e l f - d e f e a t i n g n e s s / 95  ruin',  and worse,  is  Richard  Watson. We s h o u l d share a l l food equally, at l e a s t u n t i l everyone i s w e l l - n o u r i s h e d . Besides food, a l l the n e c e s s i t i e s of l i f e should be s h a r e d , at least until everyone i s adequately supplied with a humane minimum. The h a r d conclusion remains t h a t we s h o u l d share a l l food e q u a l l y even i f t h i s means t h a t e v e r y o n e s t a r v e s and t h e human species becomes e x t i n c t . ... But t h i s grisly prospect d o e s n o t show that anything i s wrong with the p r i n c i p l e of e q u i t y . f Radically  different  constitute  adequate c r i t e r i a  stand behind these  these  alternative  between  conceptions  deontological  and  m o r a l i t y . Watson a d v o c a t e s equity,  The  In c o n t r a s t ,  principles,  appears  accounts  of t h e p r i n c i p l e  to  accept  the consequences of f o l l o w i n g a p r i n c i p l e  Tightness.*  Rather  than  attempting  in  by t h e d i s t i n c t i o n  consequentialist  Hardin  what  basic difference  i s captured  the adoption  and  r e g a r d l e s s of the consequences t h a t r e s u l t  adoption.t that  morality,  f o r a s s e s s i n g moral  two p o s i t i o n s . conceptions  of  to settle  of of  from  its  the  view  determine i t s the  dispute  t W a t s o n ( 1 ) : p . 123. i W a t s o n ( l ) : p. 119. " T h e r e i s a s t r i c t a n a l o g y h e r e between adhering t o moral p r i n c i p l e s f o r t h e sake o f b e i n g moral, and a d h e r i n g t o C h r i s t i a n p r i n c i p l e s f o r .the s a k e o f being C h r i s t i a n . The m o r a l w o r l d c o n t a i n s p i t s a n d l i o n s , b u t one l o o k s a l w a y s t o t h e h i g h e s t l i g h t . The u l t i m a t e t e s t always harks to the highest p r i n c i p l e — r e c a n t or d i e — a n d i t i s pathetic to profess m o r a l i t y i f one q u i t s when t h e g o i n g g e t s r o u g h . " T h i s r e i n f o r c e s t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f Watson a s a deontologist. * Joseph Fletcher claims that Hardin "... embraces t h e act-utilitarian method of situation ethics". See F l e t c h e r ( l ) : p. 113.  AU  and  between d e o n t o l o g i c a l morality,  our  present  addressed  within  Even w i t h there of  an  objection  Self-defeatingness  consequentialist is  how  conceptions  world  poverty  /  96 of is  framework. restricted  t o an  AU  disagreement. Singer,  aid,  t e r m s of  I s s u e of  concern  serious  foreign  in  and  discussion  i s room f o r  massive  AU  the  the  recognizes  the  consequences  of  framework, an  advocate  basis  for  providing  an such  aid. P e r h a p s the most s e r i o u s objection to t h e argument t h a t we have an obligation t o a s s i s t i s t h a t s i n c e t h e major cause of a b s o l u t e poverty i s overpopulation, h e l p i n g t h o s e now in poverty w i l l only e n s u r e t h a t y e t more p e o p l e a r e b o r n to l i v e i n poverty in the f u t u r e . f In  explicating this  to Hardin,  and  support  this  of  to  objection,  the  lifeboat  Singer  makes d i r e c t  metaphor  that  reference  Hardin  uses  in  the  AU  objection.  We in rich nations are like the o c c u p a n t s of a crowded l i f e b o a t adrift i n a sea f u l l of d r o w n i n g p e o p l e . I f we t r y to save the d r o w n i n g by bringing them a b o a r d our b o a t w i l l be overloaded and we shall a l l drown. Since it is b e t t e r t h a t some s u r v i v e t h a n none, we s h o u l d l e a v e t h e o t h e r s t o drown. In t h e world today, according to Hardin, ' l i f e b o a t e t h i c s ' a p p l y . The r i c h s h o u l d l e a v e the p o o r t o s t a r v e , f o r otherwise the poor w i l l drag the r i c h down with them.$ Unlike  Watson,  Singer  framework. R a t h e r , f $  Singer(6): Singer(6):  p. p.  he  T7 5. 175.  obviously says  that  d o e s not  question  H a r d i n ' s argument  "...  must  AU and t h e I s s u e be  tackled  on  i t s own  o f S e l f - d e f e a t i n g n e s s / 97  grounds,  within  consequentialist  ethics".f  Hardin,  that  way  eliminate  the  only  population; limit  and s i n c e  populations,  Singer,  famine  change  expectations massive  of  as  is  to  limit  In  for  and  reasonable  or r e d u c t i o n .  can  to  contrast,  for political  precondition  ultimately  claims  countries refuse  inevitable.  limitation  of  serve  Thus,  to  limit  growth.$  Disagreement conundrum o v e r determinate each  utility.  aid  famine  s e e s t h e need  a  framework  a neo-Malthusian,  stricken is  population  economic  population  of t h i s  the  because  difficulties  AU.  can leave AU  i t i s possible,  However, t h e r e  disagreement  nature  use of  action in  to the p r a c t i c a l the  famine  a developmentalist,  economic  assess  to  the  terms of clearly  employment between  the agent  i s often at least  whether  said  in to  i n theory,  i t does  are d i f f i c u l t i e s  a be to  maximize pertaining  o f AU. As we have s e e n , much  of  Singer  on  and  and u n c e r t a i n t i e s o f t h i s  Hardin  turns  kind.  Precisely because results are fundamental in utilitarian moral thinking, i t i s deeply dependent on a c c u r a t e (even i f i m p r e c i s e ) i n f o r m a t i o n about l i k e l y results. ... I t i s n o t suprising that utilitarians disagree over famine and d e v e l o p m e n t policies. F o r u t i l i t a r i a n s , i t i s r e s u l t s and n o t t S i n g e r ( 6 ) : p . 176. i No a t t e m p t i s made here t o assess the r e l a t i v e merits of H a r d i n ' s and S i n g e r ' s a l t e r n a t i v e v i e w s . F o r an explicit discussion and c o m p a r i s o n of Hardin and S i n g e r , see O'NeillO).  AU  and  the  I s s u e of  Self-defeatingness  /  98  p r i n c i p l e s or i n t e n t i o n s t h a t c o u n t . The c a l c u l a t i o n of r e s u l t s must t h e r e f o r e be t a k e n s e r i o u s l y and i s n ' t a d e q u a t e i f i t neglects remote and long-term consequences in global deliberations. ... If we are to work out the consequences of alternative available a c t i o n s and p o l i c i e s , as u t i l i t a r i a n i s m demands, we shall repeatedly find ourselves confronted with impossible calculations,f Besides  the  p r a c t i c a l i m p o s s i b i l i t y of  consequences with  respect  regarding  issue  social well.  a  single  like  c o n c e r n s must e n t e r Think,  f o r example, the  and  resources,  to mention only  a d e t e r m i n a t e employment  the  with  entire  respect  r a n g e of  calculated.  AU  has  between m u l t i p l e involving  in one  to  the  social  of  the  of  few AU  such  money  to  famine r e l i e f ,  of  goals  support  t O ' N e i l l O ) : p.  right  how  are relief  action  global  only  must  consequences also  have t o  to p r o p o r t i o n  the  problems  favours  for be  necessarily  ourselves  to  of  action  to  involved  c l e a r l y enormous. or  as  consequences  restricting  efforts directed  315.  the  Not  in circumstances  Even  picture  non-renewable  the  s o c i a l issues  problem  famine  of  issues.  ascertain  right action  c o n c e r n s ? A s s u m i n g the d o e s one  a  other  proliferation,  consumption  the  policies  numerous  utilitarian  monetary d o n a t i o n s a l o n e ,  determining donate  total nuclear  competing  trade-offs.  questions  the  rapid  particular  famine r e l i e f ,  of  pollution  actions  to various  determining  Does  environmental famine  toward p o p u l a t i o n  relief, control  or  toward  AU  and  efforts  to  indeterminacy to  guide  s u c h q u e s t i o n s . And Not  utility  difficulties  (Z).f that be,  (i.e.,  This  utility).  And  (Z) her a c t i o n send if  that  result  i s that  comparable  competing  reason  member  a  practical  the  relief  The  i s reduced  and  she  right price  this  right  of t h e  produces  be  So,  less to  famine  (Z)  to  greater buys  that  utility  could  relief,  t A (Z) Ts any n o n e s s e n t i a l consumer good Examples a r e b i c y c l e s , m i c r o w a v e o v e n s , s t y l i s h meals i n r e s t a u r a n t s .  the  t i m e one  than  a to  actions,  of m a r g i n a l  utility  would  i t seems  right  a  believe  would be  she wanted t o h e l p . Any  contribution  to  action  action  as w e l l .  to a l e v e l  produces  buys  o c c a s i o n when she  a l l to  AU's  prosperous  there i s reason  that  of  additional  relatively  the purchase  a c t i o n s are  a  than  agent.  world today),  wrong, and  that  is  avoid  goals,  raise  f o r the  f u r t h e r m o r e , on any  she  to  impossible  to  of  (on t h e a s s u m p t i o n  is  s i n c e AU  more complex  social  returns  to donate  actions  with  face  99  practical  i s no way  i s even  agent  i s wrong, s i n c e  to those  Christine's produced  a  money t o famine  Christine's  there  t o maximize u t i l i t y .  f o r example, relief  underestimated. Yet,  the Western  action  it fails  famine  the  in practical is  Such  f o r the long-term consequences  problem  Christine society  AU  both  for  'brinkmanship'  hungry?  the s i t u a t i o n  o n l y does t h e  and  be  the  f o r conduct,  calculations  policies  I s s u e of S e l f - d e f e a t i n g n e s s /  feed  s h o u l d not  serve as a  this.  the  of be  then  or service. clothes and  AU  and  Christine's action It right  to  a c t i o n s being  levels  fortunate over  the  society  then  universally are  people.  i t would  Yet  i f the  evils  like  performed  relative  or  famine.  of w o r l d  f a m i n e would have t o be  affluent  s o c i e t y ' s reducing  marginal  utility  giving  is able  t o be  a virtually imposed the  either  on  i n an  affluent  the g i v i n g and  world  i n order  t h e economy  for generations  its  effort  of  evil  in  the  be  future  the order  culture  that  t o assume  n e e d , t h e r e must be  the  the  h e l p , or e l s e  to prevent  to  comparable  i t i s reasonable  that w i l l  into  by  the massive  t h e economy and  some h e l p . S i n c e  inexhaustable  society,  to help  of  purpose  of an  to a state  i t wants t o  t h e c o n t i n u a t i o n of  least  crippled,  away  of  themselves  w o u l d have t o s t o p w e l l s h o r t of t h i s p o i n t  to ensure  100  of a  overcome w e l l s h o r t of  itself  those  reduce  culture  had  So,  the agents  utilitarian  seriously  what t h e y  world  with  by  to the world's  s e r v e no  economy and  destroyed,  members g i v i n g most of fight  eventual consequences  t h a t a l l the agents utility  were  of S e l f - d e f e a t i n g n e s s /  t h a t the  of m a r g i n a l  l o n g run  society  Issue  i s wrong.  would a p p e a r  prosperous  the  limits  exhaustion  able to  of  continue  i f i t retains  its  vitality. The  difficulty  one  found  she  can  But,  facing  the agent  i n the v o t i n g s i t u a t i o n .  over  with  now  the course  respect  of h e r  t o famine  The  life  relief,  i s analogous  agent  may  do  to maximize  to  the  a l l that utility.  i f e v e r y o n e does  this  AU over  a  ruin.  single Just  and  generation  as  it  is  t h e economy  never-  her  undermines  the democratic p r o c e s s ,  alone  wreck t h e economy. So  this  that into  threshold  account?  that  that  t h r e a t e n s the So,  the  the  possible  brought point shifts  by  economic  effects.t system  in trouble,  utilities the  to  to  vote  The  That  agent  take to  accumulation  well-being posed  by  of the  of  to  strain.  So,  society  relief  to  see  Perhaps research,  to c o n t r i b u t e i s , each agent  to  the  expectable  need  the agents  of  their  Besides  i s the  begin  relief  t o take account  t o famine  there  system.  t h e famine  decline  agents  the l i k e .  t h e AU  actions  to a threshold  marginal u t i l i t y . patterns,  her  which  t h e answer r e l a t e s  to maintain s c i e n t i f i c  levels.  brought  t o a s s e s s the  giving  i s undergoing  and  be  capacity  economic  of c o n t i n u i n g  current  can  agents a r e supposed  everyone  comparable  enough s u r p l u s are  AU  i n economic  threshold  how  and  problem  general  about  of  integrity  specific  c a s e c o n c e r n s how  101  i t i s never  i n v o l v e s AU's  a c t i o n s make  will  failure  In b o t h s i t u a t i o n s  phenomena and  contribution  /  t h e I s s u e of S e l f - d e f e a t i n g n e s s  to  assess  that  their  there i s and  not  the  arts  reassess  the  famine  s e e s , and  relief  at  i s perhaps  t I s s u e s p e r t a i n i n g t o t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s of s h i f t i n g economic patterns in l i g h t of a significant r e d i s t r i b u t i o n of the world's wealth are extremely complex i n t h e m s e l v e s . Gary Wedeking has p o i n t e d o u t t h a t one r e s u l t o f any significant r e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f the w o r l d ' s w e a l t h would be t h a t t h e t h i r d w o r l d would t h e n s e r v e as a market f o r t h e consumer goods produced i n today's a f f l u e n t s o c i e t i e s . So, an a g e n t i n an a f f l u e n t s o c i e t y can i n d i r e c t l y c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e demand f o r consumer goods by d i r e c t l y c o n t r i b u t i n g t o the elimination of t h i r d w o r l d p o v e r t y .  AU now  publicly  to  the  encouraged  contributing ability  and  to  for  of  to see,  a trend  build  Issue  t h a t her  that  the  Self-defeatingness / further giving  i s weakening  f u t u r e and  the  remain  102 is  society's  economically  powerful. The  concerns  essentially vote  the  unless  vote  as  the  same. AU  there  contributes democratic  in  provides  i s reason  to a t r e n d that process.  long  strangely,  the  c a s e . The  AU  as  not  that  threatens  appear  t o be  should  immediate  usually  by  give  what m a t t e r s  integrity  voting.  i n the  t o famine there  is  two  cases  by  and  to  of  giving  believe trend  economy.  While  other  i s not  does not to  than  a morally  i s t h e q u a n t i t y of  famine  the  one  i t may  not  voting  vote,  while  relief who  relevant  utility  not  to a  i s analogous,  who  to  relief  immediate b e n e f i t s o f not  the agent  agents  the  the  Somewhat  relief  reason  s t r e n g t h of  of  famine  consumer goods c o n t r i b u t e s  g i v i n g . However, t h i s for  prevails  unless  benefits  enjoyed  are  to  voting  others  so b e c a u s e t h e  the  not  enough  i n the  u s u a l l y enjoyed  believe that  agent  e n j o i n s a g e n t s not  ongoing  are  f o r an  are  words, AU  purchasing  reasoning  to  reason  cases  In o t h e r  same r e a s o n i n g  the  no  famine  the  agent  that  and  threatens  p u r c h a s e consumer goods  the  voting  does  are the  difference,  p r o d u c e d and  not  which agents e x p e r i e n c e i t . Just benefits  as  AU  is  of d e m o c r a c y ,  not it  self-defeating a l s o i s not  in with  terms  of  the  respect  to  the  AU and t h e I s s u e benefits  of  theoretical  a  healthy  resources  d e m o c r a c y by h a l t i n g collapse  of  a  a non-voting  should  self-defeating.  p r o b l e m . In relief until  both  agents there  threaten  i t ever  by  to  those  to  practical  an a g e n t  determinate,  will  serve  to  on more t h a n  maximize  being  insist,  AU  more  in  deeply  to decide  with  respect  i s to  all,  to  will  I t seems  answers  undermines  provide  AU's  claims  policies  what p o i n t  affect  utterly  to these  relief,  to p r a c t i c a l  which s o c i a l  p r o p o r t i o n s ? And  which, a f t e r  the  utility.  i n t h e d e l i b e r a t i o n s o f an a g e n t . B u t , as  the future?  determine  of  theoretically  indeterminate  sacrifice,  could  t o d i s c o v e r what a c t i o n  terribly  what  behaviour  for i t i s ,  is  in  is  self-defeatingness  from t h e d i s c u s s i o n o f AU and f a m i n e  And  AU  famine  t o do so  apparent  i s the agent  of  their  is  How  for  brinkmanship  case  failing  the charge of  As we have seen Smart  guidance  a  to reverse  possible  However, AU p r i d e s i t s e l f determinate.  of  good.  in principle,  open  correcting  and t h e  e m p h a s i z e s t h a t AU i s t h e o r e t i c a l l y least  the  of the b e n e f i t s  invite  think that  AU's way o f a v o i d i n g  at  has  need t o . AU, t h e r e f o r e ,  does  reason  AU  t r e n d ; and i t c a n h a l t t h e  v o t i n g case  have no  i s reason  AU  economy. loss  economy  But  the  t h e common  vital  t o a v o i d the  thriving  overzealeousness, not  and  o f S e l f - d e f e a t i n g n e s s / 103  of  reason. support? personal  her a b i l i t y hopeless  questions. to  to  AU  to give  to t r y  A l l of  practicality  to  which and  AU usefulness.  and  the  I s s u e of  Self-defeatingness  /  104  IV.  A  T H E A U MORAL  fundamental  ground  s u g g e s t e d by W i l l i a m s question  for  utilitarianism's  when he  says,  of  MACHINE  skepticism  insists  is  answer?' way  UTILITY  for  philosophy  utilitarianism's  Williams  AGENT:  not  but  'do  'do  looking  that  the  t h e aim of i n v e s t i g a t i n g  AU  is  "... t h e  you you  at  about  first  agree  really  with accept  question?'"f  As  AU:  ... i s not j u s t t o o f f e r o r e l i c i t m o r a l i n t u i t i o n s a g a i n s t which utilitarianism can be tested. Although i n the end e v e r y o n e has t o r e f l e c t , i n r e l a t i o n to questions l i k e these, what he w o u l d be prepared to l i v e with, the aim of the e x a m p l e s and their discussion i s not j u s t t o ask a question about t h a t and w a i t f o r t h e answer: r a t h e r , t h e aim is to lead into reflections which might show up i n g r e a t e r d e p t h what w o u l d be i n v o l v e d i n l i v i n g with these i d e a s . $ What would  i t be l i k e t o  moral e v a l u a t i o n s  actually  were made  in  l i v e i n a world AU  terms  as a  in  which  matter  of  makes  an  course?  A.  A U AND T H E R E I T E R A T I V E  Within action  the  right  considerations upon whether the  AU  practical  ARGUMENT  classification  is  that  a b o u t how  it  scheme  maximizes  utility.  t o c l a s s i f y an a g e n t ' s a c t i o n  the a c t i o n maximizes u t i l i t y . difficulties  t W i l l i a m s ( 2 ) : p. i W i l l i a m s ( 2 ) : p.  what  that  78. 78. 105  exist  Even  So, rest  discounting  because of f a u l t y  or  The imprecise that  empirical  the a c t i o n s  AU M o r a l  Agent: U t i l i t y  Machine / l06  i n f o r m a t i o n , i t seems p l a u s i b l e  of most a g e n t s  AU. As S i n g e r n o t e s ,  this  generally f a i l  i s not very  surprising  to claim  to  satisfy  since:  ... i t i s ... v e r y d i f f i c u l t t o obey a r u l e w h i c h commands us t o save a l l t h e l i v e s we c a n . To l i v e a c o m f o r t a b l e , or even l u x u r i o u s l i f e i t i s n o t necessary t o k i l l anyone; but i t i s n e c e s s a r y to a l l o w some t o d i e whom we might have s a v e d , f o r t h e money t h a t we need to l i v e comfortably could have been given away. ... S a v i n g every l i f e we could would mean cutting our standard of living down t o the bare essentials needed t o keep us a l i v e . f It  would  action  thereby  that  an agent  minimum n e c e s s a r y direction This  of  leaves  properly  seem t o  d o e s n o t need  to  reducing world almost  none  this  e x e r c i s e s care not qualifies  survive,  that  AU  classifies  to perform,  which famine  o f an  c o n s t r u e d as r i g h t  However,  follow  does n o t and  agent's  past  poverty as particular  p . i~63.  wrong. actions  or a l l r i g h t .  conclusion to overstate  h i s above s t a t e m e n t  Singer (6):  the bare  move i n t h e  is  too  what AU  extreme. requires,  in a footnote.  S t r i c t l y , we would need t o c u t down t o the minimum level compatible with earning the income which, after p r o v i d i n g f o r our needs, l e f t us t h e most t o g i v e away. Thus i f my present p o s i t i o n e a r n s me, s a y [ $ ] 1 0 , 0 0 0 a y e a r , b u t r e q u i r e s me t o spend [$] 1,000 a y e a r on d r e s s i n g r e s p e c t a b l y a n d m a i n t a i n i n g a car, I cannot save more p e o p l e by g i v i n g away t h e c a r and c l o t h e s i f t h a t w i l l mean t a k i n g a j o b w h i c h , although t  any  Singer and  he  The  AU  Moral Agent: U t i l i t y  Machine /  107  it does not involve. me in these e x p e n s e s , e a r n s me o n l y [ $ ] 5 , 0 0 0 . f These q u a l i f i c a t i o n s They p l a y the  a  claim  significant that  AU  affluent  society  resources  to world  required be  but  too  prosper,  they  powers of AU  the  purpose  rapid  a  to  of  an  right. the  But  case  that  i s not  continue is  Any  now  will  need  now  a l l the  a l l ,  or  wealth  retention  c e r t a i n of  action  the  most  several  their are  At  of  means  the  begin  serve  level  can  the  Classifying  the  too  of  the  number as still utility  agent  to general  a l l such  c o n c e r n s a b o u t AU's  by  i t is  promotes p e r s o n a l  efficiently  to  no  recognize  that  to ensure that  a  technological  abilities  the  to  at  i t would  and  to a p p r e c i a t e  necessary  an  must be  regions  the  w h i c h AU  which  to  of  a l l ,  q u a l i f i c a t i o n s enlarge  actions  wrong.  members  nearly  poverty-stricken  important  any  response  a c t u a l l y would p r o v e  the  wealth.  ways.  Some c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t r a n s f e r of  of  ordinary  to contribute  wrong c r e a t e s  practical  u n d e r m i n e t h e s e powers  as  v a r i e t y of  a f f l u e n t s o c i e t i e s , and  strictly  classified  that  f o r example,  When  i t is that  any  many c o n t r i b u t i o n s  agent, Singer's  agent's  in.  in a  famine r e l i e f . $  transferring  individual  role  requires  counterproductive.  production.  important  contribute  pace which a l l o w s , of  are  can  utility  actions  as  acceptability.  t S i n g e r ( 6 ) : p. T63. t Such a c o n t e n t i o n i s l a r g e l y a n a l o g o u s i n s t r u c t u r e argument that AU is self-defeating, and the c o n s i d e r a t i o n s p r o v i d e the b a s i s f o r r e s p o n s e .  to  the same  The For the  AU M o r a l A g e n t : U t i l i t y  purposes of i l l u s t r a t i o n ,  relevant  t h e o r e t i c a l concerns  though  fanciful  policy  ( X ) , which  water t h a t  is  is full  t o throw  (X),  one more  discussion assist. in  of  life like the  Singer's  jacket a  case  poverty  example  concrete  some government h a s  jackets  i s thrown that  into  Singer  issue  life  discuss  i n t o a body  a of  ten d o l l a r s  t o t h e government's p o l i c y of  involves  a p o s i t i o n t o save t h e  direct  life  to  of a  of drowning p e o p l e . F o r e v e r y  an i n d i v i d u a l c o n t r i b u t e s  is  i s useful  i n terms  example. Imagine t h a t  that  scenario  i t  M a c h i n e / 108  and  the water. mentions  the  This  in his  obligation  to  a s i t u a t i o n where one  is  of a drowning c h i l d  through  intervention. The path from the library at my university to the Humanities lecture theatre passes a shallow ornamental pond. Suppose t h a t on my way t o g i v e a l e c t u r e I notice that a small c h i l d has f a l l e n i n and i s i n d a n g e r o f d r o w n i n g . Would anyone deny t h a t I ought t o wade i n and p u l l t h e c h i l d o u t ? This will mean getting my clothes muddy, and e i t h e r c a n c e l l i n g my l e c t u r e o r d e l a y i n g it until I can f i n d something dry to change into; but compared with the avoidable death of a c h i l d this i s insignificant, f  It for  i s l a r g e l y on t h e b a s i s the c l a i m  that,  of t h i s  with  respect  Singer  takes  i t as s e l f - e v i d e n t t h a t  effort  necessary  Singer(6):  Singer  argues  a s i n d i v i d u a l s , we have an o b l i g a t i o n t o  assist  f  case that  to  p.168.  to  the e l i m i n a t i o n  save t h e  of world  one o u g h t  drowning c h i l d  poverty.  t o expend t h e and hopes  to  The demonstrate t h a t such from the As  cases  are  two  others  case  do  famine  indirectly  on  the  agencies  which are a s s i g n e d  efforts.  The  the  ten d o l l a r  child  case.  life  respect  to  the  task  of  open q u e s t i o n issue  action  it  of  world  famine,  a  at t h i s  model  the  which  s e c o n d way  jacket  reiterative  nature  world  famine  thus,  each  contribute dollar  life  and  Singer's  preserves  of  the  poverty.  individual to  the  case  Famine has  elimination  j a c k e t model  numerous of w o r l d  highlights  both  drowning the with the  relevant,  and  with  concerning feature  is  respect  to  from the  life  capture  the  not  r e g a r d i n g the is a  in  Since  this  apply  does  situation  relief  relevant  that Singer's a n a l y s i s d i f f e r s  scenario.  achieved  p o i n t whether  morally  of  government  actual situation  p r e f e r a b l e . Analogous c o n s i d e r a t i o n s the  lives  i n the  morally  be  There  a i d i s captured not  an  exceptions,  to  classification. f e a t u r e may  characteristic  few  of c o o r d i n a t i n g  but  is  as  poverty.  t o save t h e  famine  directness/indirectness is a  serve  contributions  nature  directness/indirectness  With  intervene  j a c k e t analogy,  I t i s an  to  i s s u e s of w o r l d  of  109  different  regions. Intervention i s  basis  indirect  morally  i t fails  failure.  directly  i n famine s t r i c k e n  way  Machine /  relief.  stands,  for t h i s  not  Agent: U t i l i t y  i s i n no  for addressing  reasons  individuals  Moral  a case  involving  Singer's  a d e q u a t e model  AU  relief  constant  problem;  opportunities famine. the  of  The  to ten  reiterative  The aspect  Agent: U t i l i t y  Machine / 1 1 0  and t h e i n d i r e c t n e s s f e a t u r e o f t h e a c t u a l  Besides  being  .a  more  famine, the  life  illustrating  both  Capturing  case,  analogy  AU r e a s o n i n g  analogy  reference  a better  and  Indirectness allows  question  involving life  is  with  some o f  vehicle the  the ten  saving  dollar  life  life  An o b v i o u s  for  contributions  f o r famine r e l i e f  life  model  a ten d o l l a r that of  for  way t o do t h i s  value  alternative contribute to  the  than  scenario  since in  can  life  questions occur.  case  In t h i s  way  the  to  the  i n v o l v e d the idea  one's  indicate  that  life  clothes. one  than  to  going  a ten d o l l a r  a ten d o l l a r  is Our  ought  ( X ) , r a t h e r than  circumstances  i s of g r e a t e r moral v a l u e  concerning  pertaining  of  to policy  these  increases  since the c h i l d ' s  the s t a t e would  i s through  j a c k e t a n d , f o r example,  original  the c h i l d ,  the ten d o l l a r s  a movie,  jacket  of a t e n d o l l a r  t o save  which  questions  movie. S i n g e r ' s  one ought  greater  allows  a  jackets allows  number  occasions  particular  The  the  value  problems  directly.  use o f t h e medium o f money. T h i s d r a m a t i c a l l y  relative  for  t h e s c e n a r i o . In S i n g e r ' s  the  jacket  to  f o r the i n t r o d u c t i o n of  into  concerns  indirectly.  of  situation.  a s s o c i a t e d with i t .  o r medium of exchange the  model  the f e a t u r e of i n d i r e c t n e s s i s of  significance. vehicle  accurate  jacket  characteristically  saving  AU M o r a l  trip  life to  movies. This  line  of  argument  serves  to  emphasize  Singer's  The claim  that  his  views  individuals'  daily  about  to  going  generalized required  to  by  day-to-day  AU M o r a l A g e n t : U t i l i t y have  lives.  the  Since  movies,  lives.  in  one  spends t e n d o l l a r s a r e  the  life  this  view  occasion  could  contribute  ought  is  same  nothing  normal  to  of l e s s moral  forgo  ten d o l l a r s  that  course  of the a c t i v i t i e s  to the  can  the d e c i s i o n s  the  of  their  for  which  life  than  jacket,  on e a c h  such  alternative activity (X)--not  to policy  be are  significance  p o s i t i o n that  the  for unique  reasoning  be s a v e d w i t h a t e n d o l l a r  commits one one  of  B e c a u s e most  implications  there  the  encompass most  individuals  that  serious  Machine / 1 1 1  t o do so  and leaves  one  i n t h e s i t u a t i o n i n w h i c h one's a c t i o n  i s wrong. T h i s i s  the  essence  of the  involving be  world  the ' r e i t e r a t i v e '  element  poverty.  require  reiterated until  further give  giving  to or,  would over  lower  AU w o u l d  we r e d u c e o u r s e l v e s  at least,  to  a state  our p o t e n t i a l course  in  of our l i v e s .  in restaurants, do.  or  And any  argument in  which  anyone we  which  could  further  giving  efficient  giving  Thus,  one s h o u l d  f o r new s o c k s ,  f o r any o f  situation  the  to a state  f o r maximally  t e n d o l l a r s f o r the movies,  normally  that  would make us worse o f f t h a n  the future  spend out  of  eating  things  we  action  is  s e v e r i t y of such a c o n c l u s i o n ,  i t  time  that  the countless  for  not  one  does,  the  wrong. Despite is  in fact  the apparent  embraced,  in various  forms,  by many  philosophers  The who c o n s i d e r Ted of  AU M o r a l  themselves  Honderich, the a c t i o n s  t o be p r o p o n e n t s o f  f o r example,  M a c h i n e / 112  Agent: U t i l i t y  i s explicit  utilitarianism.  in h i s  of i n d i v i d u a l s i n t h e Western  condemnation  world.  ... we who a r e l a w - a b i d i n g , c o n t r a r y to our common belief, do n o t l i v e lives which a r e anything like right on t h e whole. Our conduct is wrong. The argument for this i s that by our o r d i n a r y l i v e s we c o n t r i b u t e t o c e r t a i n terrible circumstances. We make essential contributions to the s h o r t e n i n g o f t h e l i f e t i m e s o f whole p e o p l e s and c l a s s e s , a n d t o many kinds of suffering and distress and d e g r a d a t i o n , a n d t o d e n i a l s f o r autonomy and o f f r e e d o m s . In f a c t we e n s u r e by our o r d i n a r y l i v e s that multitudes of individuals die before time, that f a m i l i e s e x i s t i n s i n g l e w r e t c h e d rooms, and that this or that people are powerless in their homeland, or s u b s e r v i e n t i n i t , or a r e d r i v e n from it. f While  stated  advocates  with  of  this  uncharacteristic. individuals  more  force  position,  Singer  toward  those  Honderich s  explicitly  have a m o r a l  contributions  than  1  endorses  of  view  H o n d e r i c h ( 1 ) : p . 58-59.  other not that  significant  of famine.  P e o p l e do n o t f e e l i n any way ashamed o r guilty about spending money on new c l o t h e s o r a new c a r i n s t e a d of giving i t t o famine r e l i e f . ... T h i s way o f l o o k i n g a t the matter i s not justified. When we buy new c l o t h e s n o t t o keep ourselves warm but to look " w e l l - d r e s s e d " we a r e n o t p r o v i d i n g f o r any i m p o r t a n t need. We would n o t be s a c r i f i c i n g anything s i g n i f i c a n t i f we were to continue t o wear our o l d f  is  t h e view  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o make  the e l i m i n a t i o n  many  The  AU  Moral Agent: U t i l i t y  Machine /  113  c l o t h e s , and g i v e the money t o famine relief. By doing so, we would be p r e v e n t i n g a n o t h e r p e r s o n from s t a r v i n g . I t f o l l o w s f r o m what I s a i d e a r l i e r t h a t we ought t o g i v e money away, r a t h e r t h a n s p e n d i t on c l o t h e s w h i c h we do not need t o keep us warm, f This  consequence  Singer  i t is  portrayal  we  n a t u r a l l y from  the  argument  that  advances.  And  are  follows  o f AU  wrong. In need  important  to  generates  to  does e n t a i l  light  of  consider  realize that  that  most of  an  Singer's  general  agent's  actions  such a seemingly  radical  more  the  carefully  such a c o n c l u s i o n .  Singer  asserts  conclusion,  reasoning the  that  following:  A p l a u s i b l e p r i n c i p l e t h a t would s u p p o r t t h e judgement t h a t I ought t o p u l l the c h i l d out i s t h i s : i f i t i s i n our power t o p r e v e n t s o m e t h i n g v e r y bad h a p p e n i n g , without thereby s a c r i f i c i n g anything of c o m p a r a b l e m o r a l s i g n i f i c a n c e , we ought to do i t . This principle seems uncontroversial. $ However,  it  is  important  uncontroversial. should relates Singer  pull to  the the  between t h e  t i  does  child status  seem  out, of  recognize  the  but  exactly  uncontroversial it  i s not  principle,  what that  c l e a r how  call  i t (P),  is one this that  defends.  There are  child.  It  to  v a r i e t y of  p r i n c i p l e (P)  Perhaps  Singer(5): Singer(6):  a  p. p.  the  most  27. 168.  and  ways the  to construe  the  relation  scenario  the  drowning  plausible is  of  to c o n c e i v e  of  the  The relation It the  i n t e r m s of an  i s true  that  case that  involve  the  significance. for  the  The  morally  2) the  The  leads  action  of  required  is this  inference  this  action  of  save the  of  of  a general  two  construal the  hasty  case  involves  of moral  reasoning  general  any  such g e n e r a l  the  truths  may  a  that  relation  the  1)  child. involve  do  not  are  cost morally  there  between are  even g r a n t i n g  argument  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n , f The  original  any  of  the  is highlighted  accounts  they e f f e c t .  First,  premises,  not  significance.  significance  drowning c h i l d ,  areas.  of  of  moral  i t d o e s not  truth, actions  good t h a t  i t does  more f o r m a l l y :  comparable moral  moral  feature  that  life  114  reasoning.  comparable  feature  r i g h t because  anything  The  i s that  a c t i o n . Stated i s to  Machine /  normative  child.  i s morally  of  the of  conclusion  this  it  this  least  fallacy  to  comparable  scenario  b o t h of  save the  Therefore, of  of  ought to  anything  f o r the  Given  illustration  of  as  anything  Moral Agent: U t i l i t y  sacrifice  right  sacrifice  in at  one  Tightness  Therefore,  the  AU  the  situation'So,  t r u t h drawn  informal  acknowledges that  'rare  in regard  the  of  this  Singer  really  truth  d u b i o u s n a t u r e of  when  not  and  difficulties the  involves  (P)  allow  the  this  formulation  t o normative e t h i c s . At from a case  example  like  of  least,  Singer's  may  t I f one r e a d s the ' b e c a u s e ' as a logical one, t h e n the f o r m a l e q u i v a l e n t i n v o l v e s v i o l a t i o n of the r e s t r i c t i o n s on universal generalization. $ T h e r e i s a c e r t a i n i r o n y i n t h e f a c t t h a t S i n g e r seems to d e f e n d AU upon the b a s i s of an u n u s u a l c a s e when he objects t o a t t e m p t s t o c r i t i c i z e AU upon t h e b a s i s of u n u s u a l c a s e s .  The be  open  t o important  For  one  through h i s situations the  basis  qualifications.  thing, choice  as of  i n which  previously  example,  of ( P ) . I s s u e s  relevant  excluded  applied  to the  whether  one c a n p r o d u c e more  going  its  famine  only  contributions, are for  a d e q u a t e . And, respect any  an  follows  only  utility  relevant  through  that  permissible. more f u l l y  very  others  that  (P), as a l l that  equally to  do  well  not generate  i n terms  o f how  t r y i n g t o do what  they  i s right.  seem  i f (P)  famine  now  make  is is  relief  This i t  has  similiar  provides  stands, been  some  i s not  said  with  AU condemns  a n d , a s we  have  the vast  majority  of  optimal  utility,  it  few o f any n o r m a l a g e n t ' s a c t i o n s  So, we need t o e x p l o r e  done  concern  t o AU. S i n c e  argument,  on  c o n t r i b u t i o n s , and  maximize u t i l i t y  from t h e ' r e i t e r a t i v e ' actions  be r e q u i r e d  i n many c o n t e x t s ,  irrelevant.  course,  which f a i l s  agent's  agent  of  t o (P) a p p l i e s  action  seen  the  that  thereby  suspecting  fails,  considering  by ( P ) . F o r example,  issue,  fair  for  would  t o the movies. Claims about past  being  grounds  t o allow  Singer  such as ' f a i r n e s s ' and 'having  one's s h a r e ' , which appear  or  noted,  repeated actions  t o be s y s t e m a t i c a l l y  Machine / 1 1 5  AU M o r a l A g e n t : U t i l i t y  a r e even  the r a m i f i c a t i o n s of relate  t o an  AU  individual  The B.  AU  AND  UTILITY  Consider possible  action the  two  highest  ticket  to  X and  action  the  individuals  Y.  Jill  action  result  in J i l l  resulting  from  Y.  p r o m o t e s the  is  If Y w i l l  Joe  being  forgoing  Y.  involved,  there  generalized  so as  seen  decisions  from t h e  money t h a t misspent. proper  are  now  Singer  that  To  the  further  devoted  of  Failing  to  this AU.  itself  a  f o r any  social  r e s u l t as  h i g h l i g h t the  extent  AU  of an  the will  are the  conclusion innumerable as  we  are  have  extreme and  of  morally  might  affluent  the  if  disutility  a c o n s e q u e n c e of  personal  of  Y  enormous amounts  i s too  r e s u l t of  and  then  this  t o AU,  A d v o c a t e s of AU  these  unique about  activities  a the  in question  r e a s o n why  conditioning  of  t o do  t o condemn m o r a l l y  f e e l i n g that  social  utility,  argument,  with  to  higher  i s nothing  right  d o l l a r s on  dollars  actions  one  affairs  circumstances,  the  i s no  the  each  actions. According  accepts  the  m o r a l demands i s d e s i r e s and  there  AU  two  of  should  responsible  'reiterative'  application  moreover,  and  the  Since  individuals  ordinary  in  ten  ten  i n d i v i d u a l s i s Y.  and  be  sending What  By  s t a t e of  spending  promote t h e  n o r m a l human a c t i o n s ,  cannot  116  and  X or  R e l i e f Fund.  and  Joe,  whether t o do  X involves  f o r both  and  independent  l i k e l i h o o d i s apparent  right  Jill Joe,  movies. Y  do?  Machine /  and  that  utility.  Emergency Famine  this  individuals,  deciding  i s the  Moral Agent: U t i l i t y  MAXIMIZATION  actions,  another, are  AU  the  argue, in  its  selfish society.  counterintuitive  The thrust  of AU  imagine  annual  salaries  of  AU  the  employed by  the  have t h e  same number  of  end  However, t h e here. J i l l  income t o large  f o l l o w i n g . Both J i l l  and  various  i n the  similarities  time to v o l u n t e e r  f r i e n d s and  family.  She  Joe,  other  hand,  is a creature  of  spends a  large  percentage  his  kind.  the  He  m o v i e s and  eating  is  to  devoted  self-centred, own  two  t o him  pursuing and  f e e t . He that  he  very  their  s t r i v e s for  would  might  Jill  and  This  seem r e l e v a n t  to a s s e s s i n g  are  Jill  and  information  cannot  be  actions  s e . f The  open  to  per  of  people  are  financial  kind  of  taken  for  into  status  of  She  is  to  her  different  income g o i n g Most  of  stand  world  and  of  his  on  by  the  account  is  their  suggest going  to they  temporal,  actions  in can that  such  additional  in  evaluating  actions  t Such a d d i t i o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n may be t a k e n respect to a c t i v i t i e s s u c h as p r a i s e and  to time  Joe  information  AU,  the  a  a very  general  morality But  monthly  d i f f e r e n t , and  both  the  Joe  humanity.  should  very  and  good of  pleasures.  i n the  same  devotes  i t i f someone were t o  Joe  Joe.  moral  the  other  more good  resources,  d i f f e r e n t ways.  that  resent  do  and  she  is loyal  restaurants.  these  believes  fewer m o v i e s . So, allocate  i n d i v i d u a l who  in expensive  her  organizations.  caring  on  the  between J i l l  a c o m p a s s i o n a t e and  have  capacity,  they are  addition,  117  dollars.  same  a s u b s t a n t i a l p e r c e n t a g e of In  Joe  thousand  d e p e n d e n t s , and  charities.  her  thirty  same company  relevant  gives  amount of  Machine /  approximately  They a r e  age.  Moral Agent: U t i l i t y  is  decided  i n t o account blame. But  with this  The purely the  on t h e  highest Now  action,  basis  and does  the  that  there are only two  n o t send  i t to the R e l i e f  f r o m t h e movie  not e l i m i n a t e  generate  a full  stomach.f  The s e c o n d  situation  i n which  J o e sends  rather  Joe's c h a r a c t e r does  give  choice, terms  of a f f a i r s  Joe obtains  spends  utility state  and g e n e r a l  disposition. relief  some  t h e money  on  concerning  connected  of a f f a i r s  the ten  to  movie  dollars  In t h i s  with  involves to  than spending i t a t the movies.  the  Recall  s c e n a r i o he  but i t i s not a  happy  and we may u n d e r s t a n d h i s d o i n g i t a t a l l l a r g e l y i n  of h i s f e e l i n g toward  self-reliance others,  this  disutility  self-reliance. in  certain people  and d i s d a i n  assault Not  the state  social is  pressures.  based  on  f o r those that  alternative  of not seeing  i n the  utility  producing  h i s money on a  he  positive  t h e money t o f a m i n e  disposition  found  / 118  courses of  any u n h a p p i n e s s  having  Fund  any  states  Fund.  but because  or  Relief  in  two p o s s i b l e  J o e spends  hunger  the  efficacy  alternative  In t h e f i r s t  movie J o e does  causal  Machine  utility.  and t h u s o n l y  be c o n s i d e r e d .  utility  of t h e i r  overall  suppose  AU M o r a l A g e n t : U t i l i t y  involves  the movie.  on J o e ' s  the  Joe's  ideas  of  request a i d  from  more There  Since  than i s also  just  the  disutility  a t t i t u d e s and b e l i e f s  about  surprisingly  however,  there  is  more  of a f f a i r s  i n which  J o e spends  the  t ( c o n t ' d ) does not p e r t a i n t o t h e assessment only the agent. f During the present d i s c u s s i o n 'utility', ' h a p p i n e s s ' a r e t r e a t e d a s synonymous.  of the  action,  'pleasure'  and  The money on f a m i n e does n o t  results  relief  produce  responsible  AU M o r a l A g e n t : U t i l i t y  for  and n o t  this  the d i s u t i l i t y  the f i r s t  know, J i l l much o f  scenario  time  and  someone s u g g e s t s t h a t view  exist  i s that  need, and t h a t self-reliant  money  she  p e o p l e must  related  to  dollars  to the  utility  associated  utility. The  only  seeing  disutility  the  movie.  Jill  since  maximizes u t i l i t y  is  decision  responsible  should  for  of when  movie.  i n times of  people  in their  movie  could  being  but  eliminates  be  islands  disutility  give in  p r o d u c e s some  positive  that  the missed AU  Joe  felt.  enjoyment  results  relief,  the circumstances. Just that  results  i s similarly  of  i n the  t h e money t o f a m i n e  t h e hunger  t o go t o t h e m o v i e , J i l l  ten  negative  resentment  is  sends  some  a p p l i c a t i o n of  that  Joe  Jill  An  good  t o see t h e  that  we  devotes  the  Alternatively, J i l l  none o f t h e  conclusion this  the  hunger and  for  As  s p e n d s t h e money on t h e m o v i e .  R e l i e f Fund. T h i s  feels  assessment  one a n o t h e r  to b e l i e v e  from  hunger p e r s i s t .  Jill  that  r e a c t i o n as Joe  n o t go  resulted  utility  with  hunger  p e r s o n who  promoting  support  i t i s foolish  some  to  should  i n a way t h a t  obtains  morally  i s considered.  have t h e same  u n t o t h e m s e l v e s . Suppose J i l l She  is  when t h e AU  i s a c o m p a s s i o n a t e and c a r i n g  her  he  i n v o l v i n g the  involving J i l l  h u m a n i t y . She does n o t  Her  affairs,  So, i f J o e  t o go t o t h e m o v i e .  Analogous c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of  a t the movies.  s t a t e of  from h i s d e c i s i o n  M a c h i n e / 119  from  as his  responsible.  The However, n o t e  that  the  fact  she has p r e v i o u s l y  and  money  past,  that  or intended  assessment While may be are  come.  previous  contribute.  This  to the  appeal  that  results  Jill  Jill  than J i l l  that  is  contribute  go  to  the  responsibility consequences  only  a  the that  single  contribution  contribute. and  Suppose From  n o t go  movie Joe  and  the to not  experiences  i n t h e s i t u a t i o n where he does n o t before,  Jill  can  make no  she h a s c o n t r i b u t e d  not.$  being  should  from t h e f a c t  m o v i e . And, a s  i n her  there  Any  instance.  any a d d i t i o n a l  should  should  follows  J o e has  Fund.  additional positive u t i l i t y . f  Joe  to the fact  that  by time  are i r r e l e v a n t to  more d i f f i c u l t  and that  Joe or  while  more d i s u t i l i t y  fact  activities  Imagine  discussion,  movie,  the R e l i e f  of a t t r i b u t i n g moral  required,  which of  as  responsibility in this  t o p r o d u c e any  we a s k  go  future,  t h e s e means  to  made d o n a t i o n s o f h e r  organizations  of moral  contribution  the  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y is. not lessened  c o n s i s t e n t l y embraced,  yet  fails  Jill's  t o such  M a c h i n e / 120  AU M o r a l A g e n t : U t i l i t y  For J i l l  morally  before  to f a i l  responsible  to  f o r the  direct  or t o the contribute specific  t This implausible claim i s made to i l l u s t r a t e important theoretical considerations involving AU. We have also ignored the broader i s s u e s o f whether t h e money s h o u l d be t a k e n ( p e r h a p s i n t h e f o r m o f t a x e s ) f o r u s e on a future o c c a s i o n a n d whether the agents should save t h e money f o r future contributions t h e m s e l v e s . As the h y p o t h e t i c a l case h e r e i s d e s c r i b e d , t h e r e a r e o n l y two o p t i o n s . $ The s c e n a r i o may be underdescribed at this point. In p a r t i c u l a r , j u s t a s J o e ' s a t t i t u d e s have t o be t a k e n into account, i f J i l l feels this i s unfair then such feelings have t o be i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o t h e c a l c u l a t i o n s .  The results.  And  described, This cannot  her  i s therefore  address  dispositions reasonable  or  appropriate  Fund  certain  derives,  views  contribute,  in  about In  with  The  o f whether  AU  AU  the a t t i t u d e s  lacks  that  the  involve  and  themselves  resources  to  reasonable  and  w h i c h do n o t . A c c o r d i n g contribute  contribution part,  as  calculation  i n the c a l c u l a t i o n s a r e  is  Jill's  t o the  Relief this  that  Joe  holds  needing  aid  and  about  greater  obligation  responsibility  needed.  to  But  from t h e  individuals  short, the  circumstances  his.f  problem.  than J o e , should one  the  than  a t t i t u d e s and t h o s e  self-reliance.  function  figure  utilities  only  conclusion  severe  appropriate.  rather  when  a  in  stronger  the question  that  distinguish  AU J i l l ,  obligation,  reveals  M a c h i n e / 121  AU M o r a l A g e n t : U t i l i t y  fact  i t  entails,  to  is  o f J o e ' s u n g e n e r o u s and u n r e a s o n a b l e a t t i t u d e s  a and  beliefs. Such a r e s u l t i s n o t r e s t r i c t e d define  utility  satisfaction  h a p p i n e s s . Dan B r o c k n o t e s t h a t in  attempts  utility  to provide  in  terms  of  o f AU  pleasure  an a n a l o g o u s r e s u l t  a version  i n terms of p r e f e r e n c e  to versions  o f AU  that  that or  obtains  understands  satisfaction.  A person's d e s i r e s and p r e f e r e n c e s t h e p r o d u c t of b i o l o g i c a l needs and s o c i a l i z a t i o n p r o c e s s by w h i c h he o r is inducted into a society, state,  are the she and  f I t may a l s o be n o t e d t h a t i f t h e r e q u i r e d c o n t r i b u t i o n i s t o be o b t a i n e d t h r o u g h d i v i d i n g t h e g i v i n g t h e n J i l l should g i v e more t h a n J o e .  The  AU M o r a l  Agent: U t i l i t y  M a c h i n e / 122  various social groups. They are i m p o r t a n t l y d e t e r m i n e d by and w i l l tend to r e f l e c t and r e i n f o r c e the existing s o c i a l a r r a n g e m e n t s , power and a u t h o r i t y relations, and e x p e c t a t i o n s i n one's environment. Consequently, utilitarianism formulated so a s to require maximal satisfaction of preferences as they exist, in turn serves to r e i n f o r c e the e x i s t i n g social structures; i t w i l l have a significant c o n s e r v a t i v e b i a s . F o r example, a r a c i s t or s e x i s t s o c i e t y may f o s t e r r a c i s t and s e x i s t p r e f e r e n c e s i n i t s members, and preference utilitarianism seems committed then to seeking the s a t i s f a c t i o n of those p r e f e r e n c e s , f Just  as Joe's  a t t i t u d e s and b e l i e f s  a way t h a t c a n i n c r e a s e the to  Relief racist  satisfy  Jill's  Fund, t h e p r e f e r e n c e and s e x i s t  such  unreasonable  obligation calculus,  to contribute in allowing  p r e f e r e n c e s , may p r o d u c e o b l i g a t i o n s t o  the maximization  have  to  weight  a t t i t u d e s a n d p r e f e r e n c e s . So, f o r m u l a t i o n s  AU t h a t c o n c e r n satisfaction  can i n f l u e n c e u t i l i t y i n  the  attitudes,  same beliefs  of  utility  difficulty  or  when  of  preference faced  with  and p r e f e r e n c e s  f B r o c k ( 1 ) : p . 223. $ It i s possible that some formulations of ideal u t i l i t a r i a n i s m a v o i d these d i f f i c u l t i e s . While such a c c o u n t s r e q u i r e some t h e o r y o f what c o n s t i t u t e s t h e end o f a good life, they allow for discounting utilities that are incompatible with f u l f i l l i n g t h i s e n d . On the other hand, one o f t h e a p p e a l s o f p r e f e r e n c e u t i l i t a r i a n i s m i s t h a t i t avoids the disputes a b o u t what people should value and simply takes t h e i r v a l u e s as they a r e . I t a l s o s h o u l d be noted that taking people as they a r e may n o t have t h e significant conservative bias t h a t Brock suggests. While p e o p l e g e n e r a l l y a r e made uncomfortable by c h a n g e , any d i s c o m f o r t r e s u l t i n g from no change a l s o h a s t o be taken i n t o a c c o u n t . Brock may have o v e r s t a t e d h i s c a s e . At t h e very l e a s t , the c l a i m that AU has a tendency toward a "significant conservative bias" involves assumptions that  The D e f e n d e r s o f AU eventual  there per  may  consequences  sexist) preferences justify  AU M o r a l  se.  frustrate  respond  of  by  Such  preferences  other  preferences  sufficient  racist are  this  sexism  way r a i s e s  sexist  policies  because people case,  AU  values the  real  relies  of  recognize  about  they  subordinate  someone were an AU a g e n t by  sexism,  that  t(cont'd)  were  they  f o r other  in  and  for  AU. When r a c i s t  disutility,  i t  is  and often  u n j u s t l y t r e a t e d . In  upon t h e  operation  this  of  certain  are to  explain  which  i t  any i n d e p e n d e n t  does  not  weight.  But  and s e x i s m  these  t h i n g s a r e not  feel  about  them; t h e y  badly  are felt  t o be g r o s s l y  feel  unjust  dignity.  justice  to u t i l i t y .  she w o u l d n o t f e e l  f o r example, p r o v i d e d  others  because  and u t i l i t y  they  offensive to individual  preferences  to preferences  as having  them b e c a u s e  AU must  only  that  of  and s e x i s m )  v i c t i m s of racism  to  or s e x i s t  the d i s u t i l i t e s (which racism  disutility  the morality  produce  unfairly  t o be bad b e c a u s e  badly and  feel  i n producing  officially  held  come t o  or  linking  s e r i o u s problem  actually  wrongness  for  a  (racist  and promote d i s u t i l i t y  directly  the  does n o t e n t a i l  wrong  members o f t h e community. However, r a c i s m and  certain  them. Y e t , t h i s  wrong w i t h  M a c h i n e / 123  p o i n t i n g out that  satisfying  w i l l produce  not s a t i s f y i n g  i s anything  Agent: U t i l i t y  made b e t t e r  Therefore,  unfairly  that u t i l i t i e s off  by h e r  fell  i^f  treated out  so  inferiority  of  r e q u i r e f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n and j u s t i f i c a t i o n .  The status.  But  people  because  they  unfairly  treated  really  are  feel  favour  AU M o r a l  the  not l i k e  unfairly  because  they  victims'  feel do  not  utilities  servitude.  point  of  view  that  only  badly  In  feel  do  fact,  not if  sexism,  makes  things  n o t i n any way m o r a l l y  better.  BASIC VALUES  Questions  about  utility  illustrate  of AU.  The  associated  the  both  n o t i o n of  o p e r a t i o n of  values  other  potential  s t r e n g t h s and  'maximizing  utility',  w i t h AU, r e q u i r e s  t o one t h i n g has  of  People they  think that  M a c h i n e / 124  i n l a r g e numbers by r a c i s m o r  m o r a l l y much worse, c e r t a i n l y  C. AU AND  this.  treated;  the arrangement  o t h e r s a r e made happy from  Agent: U t i l i t y  that  fundamental  than  weaknesses  as  normally  value  o n l y , say h a p p i n e s s . T h i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  attach of  AU  been c o n s i d e r e d a s t r e n g t h by some and a f l a w by o t h e r s .  Although  various c r i t i c s  p o s s e s s e s an a p p a r e n t moral  theories  believe  virtue  that  that  AU i s t o o s i m p l e ,  many c o m p e t i n g  do n o t .  Utilitarianism i s both a simple and fully determinate or complete moral t h e o r y . Both t h e s e f e a t u r e s stem from its c h a r a c t e r as a theory requiring maximization of a single variable. ... [T]he t h e o r y i s simple i n the sense t h a t we o n l y calculate the e f f e c t s o f an action for a single variable, say h a p p i n e s s , and t h e n m a x i m i z e f o r that variable. It i s fully determinate in that i t i s i n p r i n c i p l e possible to d e t e r m i n e f o r any a c t i o n whether i t c a n be e x p e c t e d t o p r o d u c e a t l e a s t a s much h a p p i n e s s a s any a l t e r n a t i v e a c t i o n open  i t  normative  The  AU M o r a l A g e n t : U t i l i t y  M a c h i n e / 125  to i t s agent. ... A common f e a t u r e of nearly a l l n o n - u t i l i t a r i a n theories i s t h a t t h e y make a p l u r a l i t y o f d i f f e r e n t p r o p e r t i e s of a c t i o n s r e l e v a n t t o their m o r a l a s s e s s m e n t . ... We a r e t h e n faced w i t h a c a s e of m o r a l c o n f l i c t a n d what m i g h t be c a l l e d " t h e p r i o r i t y problem"; which moral consideration or duty i s more i m p o r t a n t , and what, a l l things considered, ought we to do? ... Utilitarianism, in virtue of being a s i n g l e v a r i a b l e , m a x i m i z i n g t h e o r y , does not f a c e t h e p r i o r i t y p r o b l e m , f Accepting question  that  AU  does n o t f a c e  i s whether t h i s  really  the p r i o r i t y  problem,  i s a v i r t u e of the  P e r h a p s AU h a s o v e r s i m p l i f i e d t h e m o r a l r e a l m . F o r one a  cost  of s o l v i n g t h e p r i o r i t y  single  variable  considerations Issues  like  skepticism role  such  that about  maximizing  is  that  as  'fairness'  in  making have  moral no  of  judgements  direct  can c r e a t e  plausibility  over  a p p e a l s t o any o t h e r objections  a  basic  single values.  t o h i s argument a b o u t  important  objections  denying  required  high  i t i s unreasonable  that  Singer's  response  in light  of  variable Singer  famine  involves  standards  role.  considerable 'fairness'  relief.  the claim  Singer's  t o expect  AU  a  precludes  considers  people  that  the  t o meet  i s as f o l l o w s .  B r o c k C 1 ) : p . 232-233.  various  One o f  conclusions  The f i n a l o b j e c t i o n t o t h e argument an o b l i g a t i o n t o a s s i s t i s t h a t i t f  example,  i n moral c a l c u l a t i o n s . By  most  theory.  p r o b l e m by c a l c u l a t i n g o v e r  of famine r e l i e f the  the  for sets  the moral  are  so  them.  The  AU  Moral  Agent: U t i l i t y  Machine /  126  a s t a n d a r d so h i g h t h a t none but a s a i n t could attain i t . ... M i g h t i t not be counter-productive to demand so much? M i g h t not people say: 'As I can't do what i s m o r a l l y r e q u i r e d anyway, I won't b o t h e r t o g i v e a t a l l . ' I f , however, we were t o s e t a more r e a l i s t i c standard, p e o p l e might make a genuine e f f o r t to r e a c h i t . ... I t i s i m p o r t a n t t o g e t t h e status of this objection clear. Its accuracy as a prediction of human behavior i s q u i t e compatible with the argument t h a t we a r e o b l i g e d t o g i v e to the p o i n t at which by g i v i n g more we s a c r i f i c e something of comparable moral s i g n i f i c a n c e . What would f o l l o w f r o m t h e objection i s that public advocacy of t h i s s t a n d a r d of g i v i n g i s u n d e s i r a b l e . I t would mean that in order t o do the maximum t o r e d u c e absolute poverty, we should advocate a standard lower than t h e amount we think that people really ought t o g i v e . f Such a r e s p o n s e  i s in  correlative  the d i s t i n c t i o n  an  action'  now  it  with and  is  principle'  a and  the  the  strictest  spirit  between t h e  ' T i g h t n e s s of p r a i s i n g  distinction the  between  the  of  AU  and  is  'rightness  the a c t i o n ' , 'Tightness  of only  of  a  advocating  a  'Tightness  of  publicly  t o p o i n t out  one  consequence  principle'. Singer to  goes on  follow naturally  from  that  h i s argument.  Of c o u r s e we o u r s e l v e s — t h o s e of us who a c c e p t the o r i g i n a l argument, w i t h its higher standard—would know that we ought to do more than we publicly p r o p o s e p e o p l e ought t o do, and we m i g h t a c t u a l l y g i v e more t h a n we u r g e others t o g i v e . T h e r e i s no i n c o n s i s t e n c y h e r e , s i n c e i n b o t h our p r i v a t e and our p u b l i c f  S i n g e r ( 6 ) : p.  180.  seems  The  AU M o r a l  Agent: U t i l i t y  b e h a v i o r we a r e t r y i n g t o do what most r e d u c e a b s o l u t e p o v e r t y , t It  should  be n o t e d ,  modest g i v e n understand  an  the  argument  "should  requested  of  cannot  be  must  One q u e s t i o n  that  standard  pertains to  of  fairness.  at  which p e r s o n a l  the  who  more"  than  position  sacrifices  of such  their  a task  framework d o e s n o t a l l o w such  an  are  does  not  for  amount  that  others justify  in  acting  address  sets too  of  i s some p o i n t  one h a s t o  unless shoulder  Singer's  articulation  o b j e c t i o n assumes  because  required  i t i s unfair.  a cogent  'doing  to considerations  that there  No  moral  and  inadequate  no l o n g e r  in his  high a  'fairness'  appears  share.  because  the  the  not  involved  AU  manner.  t h a t AU  the notions  does  is  of  understand  The f a c t  what  F a i r n e s s would d i c t a t e  since  g i v e more" t h a n  i n d i v i d u a l s 'any r e c o u r s e  others a l s o are doing  objection  who  rightly  Singer  Singer's  to allow  burden  act  the o b j e c t i o n  fails  give  to act in this  to  it  those  at large.$  to  response  the  that  i s too  that those  a consistent application  understand  in failing  one's s h a r e ' .  be  the p u b l i c  who  He c o n t e n d s  "might a c t u a l l y  actually  brought  individuals rightly  AU framework.  of o t h e r s . For  conclusion  will  however, t h a t S i n g e r ' s c o n c l u s i o n  t h e argument  amount u r g e d  M a c h i n e / 127  of  that there  AU this are  t S i n g e r ( 6 ) : p . 180. $ S i n g e r may s i m p l y be a l l o w i n g f o r human m o r a l f r a i l t y w i t h t h e "might a c t u a l l y g i v e more" c l a i m . But i t s t i l l needs t o be n o t e d t h a t a c o n s i s t e n t AU a s s e s s m e n t d o e s r e q u i r e that one " s h o u l d a c t u a l l y g i v e more".  The other  s o u r c e s of b a s i c  response that  AU M o r a l A g e n t : U t i l i t y  to  the ' f a i r n e s s '  others  similar child;  this  After  cannot  r e s p o n s e makes in  imagining  besides claim  shirking in their  neglect.  question  values  justify  sense  i n the  others  i n walking child  case. This  C a l c u t t a . AU  to saving  starving  occasions require  one  when  persons. I t save  i t is  morally  that  reality.  This  basic the  values  moral  relevance  that,  i n a l l cases,  Thus,  for  AU,  contribute  to  counterproductive possible and  in  may e x i s t  the  of  Skepticism  but i t  to  on  i s quite  in  more t h a t  i s reducible  only  relief relief  like  element  the  herself morally rare to one  everpresent  importance  of and  the that  rejects  and  assumes  to a single  source.  from  the  lies  in  i n terms of u t i l i t y  by  that  one s o u r c e . AU  the r e i t e r a t i v e  This  out  another  s t a r v i n g person  the  to  those  normative c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  appeals to notions  subordinate  one t h i n g  the p o s s i b l e  value  famine  to sustain  in  open  demands t h a t  s t a r v i n g p e o p l e a r e an  highlights  element  is  brought  person  one save e v e r y  c a n , even when  reiterative  is  a drowning  possible;  possibly  by a s w e l l .  c a n be  devote a l l energy not r e q u i r e d  that  contention  walk by  case but  individual  require  the  One AU  d u t y d o e s n o t ' j u s t i f y one  one  individual in  utility.  involves  a l l , suppose t h a t  the famine  an  simply  M a c h i n e / 128  obligation i t  becoming  m a x i m i z a t i o n . The  f a i r n e s s must  to  somehow  only link  fairness to u t i l i t y . about  the  subordination  of  fairness  to  The utility simply  connects t h a t AU  Thomas N a g e l , about  any  with  AU  Moral  Agent: U t i l i t y  a more g e n e r a l  i s too  impoverished  f o r one,  has  of AU.  i n terms of b a s i c  expressed  r e d u c t i o n of v a l u e  criticism  Machine /  a very  to a s i n g l e  deep  129  It  is  values.  skepticism  source.  I do not believe that the source of value is unitary-displaying apparent m u l t i p l i c i t y only in i t s a p p l i c a t i o n to the world. I believe that value has fundamentally different kinds of s o u r c e s , and t h a t t h e y a r e r e f l e c t e d in t h e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of v a l u e s i n t o t y p e s . Not a l l v a l u e s r e p r e s e n t t h e p u r s u i t of some single good in a variety of settings, f If  basic  sources, other  values then  than  can  derive  from  m o r a l d e c i s i o n s can  l a c k of m o r a l w i l l  a variety be  of  problematic  different for  reasons  or of e m p i r i c a l i n f o r m a t i o n .  T h e r e can be c a s e s where, even i f one i s fairly sure about the outcomes of a l t e r n a t i v e c o u r s e s of a c t i o n , or about their probability distributions, and even t h o u g h one knows how t o d i s t i n g u i s h t h e p r o s and c o n s , one i s nevertheless unable to bring them together in a s i n g l e e v a l u a t i v e judgement, even t o t h e e x t e n t of f i n d i n g them e v e n l y balanced. An even balance requires comparable quantities.$ The  discussion  of  famine  Nagel's p o i n t . P r e c i s e l y one  is  actually  particularly  in  obliged light  highlights  because to  the  i t i s so u n c e r t a i n how  c o n t r i b u t e to  of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  seems c l e a r  t h a t t h e answer  t Nagel(2): $ Nagel(2):  pp. 131-132. p. 128.  importance  cannot  be  famine of  much  relief,  fairness,  determined  of  solely  it on  The the  basis  of  Nagel result  AU  u t i l i t y c a l c u l a t i o n s over  isolates five  in  conflicts  additional  Moral Agent: U t i l i t y  basic  that  are  values not  Machine /  130  a single variable. which  he  resolvable  thinks  by  can  obtaining  information. F i r s t , there are s p e c i f i c o b l i g a t i o n s to other people or institutions: obligations to patients, to one's f a m i l y , t o t h e h o s p i t a l or u n i v e r s i t y a t w h i c h one works, t o o n e ' s community or one's c o u n t r y . ... The n e x t c a t e g o r y is t h a t of c o n s t r a i n t s on a c t i o n deriving from g e n e r a l r i g h t s that everyone has e i t h e r t o do c e r t a i n t h i n g s o r not t o be treated in c e r t a i n ways. ... The third category i s t h a t which is technically called utility. This is the consideration that takes into account the effects of what one. d o e s on everyone's welfare-whether or not the components of t h a t w e l f a r e a r e c o n n e c t e d with special obligations or general r i g h t s . ... The f o u r t h c a t e g o r y i s that of p e r f e c t i o n i s t ends o r v a l u e s . By t h i s I mean the i n t r i n s i c v a l u e of certain achievements or creations, apart from their value to individuals who e x p e r i e n c e or use them. ... The final c a t e g o r y i s t h a t of commitment t o one's own p r o j e c t s or u n d e r t a k i n g s , w h i c h i s a value in a d d i t i o n to whatever reasons may have led to them in the first place. t  AU  attempts  all  values  disagree correct adequate  to  with  the  to hold to  Nagel(2):  a l l such c o n f l i c t s  to u t i l i t y . This  have t o have t  resolve  our  that  actual  more t h a n pp.  129-131.  list  Nagel's of  basic  processes one  subordinating-  i s deeply questionable.  members of any  by  of  list values moral  member. F o r  One  may  but  he  that  i s at a l l  reasoning  example,  seems  will  regarding  The famine are  relief,  utterly  stretches that  rejection  values of  serious  the  together  which  AND As  we  upon t h e  or  the  Yet  to  allow  form e n t a i l s  p r o b l e m . However, by  it  Rather  should  theory.  At  t o view t h e  prospect  of  demand r e g a r d i n g one's f a m i l y , is  relatively  i t i s at  s i m p l i f y i n g the  the  the  close  than  realm  seeing  the  i t is  least, to  to that  of  plausibility  a not  continuously  relief, a level  to AU's  seen as  having  reaches  moral  least  p e r h a p s be  famine  g r e a t l y damaging t h e  have s e e n , on  fact  to  certain  priority  of  form of  that  AU,  long  oneself. actions  duty'  The  the  This  in unqualified  form,  as more good critical  until of  marginal  the of  one,  world's AU.  way  or  the  a b o u t AU  rests  imposes no  limit  i s that  offsets AU  common m o r a l r e g a r d s as  a n o t h e r . The  are  objection  for others  claim  moral conscience,  i n one  concerns  objection.  o b l i g a t o r y which  reflective  bounds of  many of  one  o b l i g a t i o n as  cost  family  OMISSIONS  variations  on  one  131  considerations  point.  i n more t h a n  strength,  AU  most p o o r , as  AU  a  with  utility  utility  breaking  implausibility.  weakness  reapply  one's o b l i g a t i o n s t o  general  the  i t does t h i s  as  unreasonable  D.  the  of  simplicity  to  to  exist  that  Machine /  AU.  avoids  point  Moral Agent: U t i l i t y  claim  subordinate  arguable that the  AU  credibility  basic  AU  the  AU  the  renders outlook,  'beyond  most common  the form  The of  the  that  idea  that  certain  favourable  AU  Moral Agent: U t i l i t y  something  actions  utility  are  i s 'beyond  the  not  obligatory  made  c a l c u l a t i o n s because  would p l a c e  impossible  m o r a l demands  result  enormous,  and  that  would become m o r a l l y the  objection  between a c t i o n s morally In  as  that  contrast,  simply  way  of  the  the  fosters  distinction  those which  'beyond  to  criticize and  the  different AU  for  accompanying  bounds  of  manner. I t can bringing actions,  duty' be  are  utterly into  the  assessment.  F e l d m a n ( 2 ) : pp.  50-51.  can  be  interpreted  Suppose a g i r l comes i n t o the kitchen early one morning. She sees three boxes—Wheat Toasties, Rice Toasties, and Oat T o a s t i e s . She's n e v e r p a i d much a t t e n t i o n t o b r e a k f a s t c e r e a l s , and she really doesn't care very much which c e r e a l she e a t s , a l t h o u g h she w i l l get s l i g h t l y more p l e a s u r e from e a t i n g the Oat T o a s t i e s t h a n she w i l l from eating e i t h e r of t h e o t h e r c e r e a l s . N e i t h e r she nor anyone else will suffer any pain f r o m any of t h e three p o s s i b l e cereal c h o i c e s , a l t h o u g h she w i l l have a hunger pang i f she e a t s nothing at a l l . ... [AU] e n t a i l s t h a t the girl is morally obligated to eat Oat Toasties for breakfast, and that she is morally f o r b i d d e n t o e a t e i t h e r of t h e o t h e r two c e r e a l s or n o t h i n g a t a l l . f  t  by  sacrifice  thinking  s u p e r e r o g a t o r y and  is  determinations  personal  c a n n o t accommodate  are  i n a very  situations, moral  AU  This  such  duty'  upon p e o p l e , w i t h  unreasonable,  required.  bounds of  132  required.  understood so  that  Machine /  nonmoral realm  of  The This objection objection  and,  understand the  to  AU  On  actions  this  that  t h e AU  of no  obligation.  to  is  AU  that  r e a d i n g of  to  famine.  This  play  from  is  a  clubhouse  peanut  sandwich  butter  c o n c e r n s of moral  more e f f e c t i v e l y sandwich  for lunch,  famine  relief,  what k i n d  moral  the  and AU  o b l i g a t i o n . f And  one  discovers  the realm  are  within  'possible the context  of whether  one's  $1.00)  a matter  However, s i n c e  or  one  dollar  for lunch into  i n d o i n g s o , AU  implies  a  beneath  h a v i n g a peanut extra  when  respect  could butter  to  the seemingly t r i v i a l has  of  objections  that  (costing  sending the  carries  of sandwich  fact  the issue  by  seems  realms that  $2.00) seems  utility  it  i t s demands w i t h  obligation.  produce  'beyond  seem t o combine  sandwich  (costing  to  operation.  an ominous r o l e  the famine q u e s t i o n . N o r m a l l y  lunch  into  into  objections and  easy  where  e s s e n c e of t h e s e  is carried  follows  is  o c c u r , and  such a c t i o n s  133  action'  the e x p r e s s i o n  importance  principle  actions'  it  examines s i t u a t i o n s  combined  Machine /  'trivial  example c i t e d ,  t h e s e two  e x a m i n e s t h e AU  of  called  i t s p r o p e r sphere of  one  for  the  obligation  Ironically,  the  been  brings  The  above or b e n e a t h  alternative  Utility  moral  principle  moral  Moral Agent:  the  bounds o f d u t y ' , one  that  of  has  given  why.  AU  Oxfam matter  t h e r e a l m of that  we  have  t The m a t t e r i s more complex t h a n t h i s s u g g e s t s . I s s u e s s u c h as t h e agent's p r e f e r e n c e s , the s u f f e r i n g of t h e turkeys r a i s e d f o r t h e c l u b h o u s e s a n d w i c h and Oxfam's effectiveness would a l l need a t t e n t i o n i n any a t t e m p t t o make such a calculat ion.  The obligations cheapest  which  lunch  Actual are  those  actions do,  seem  actions could  have  that  to eat  omission plays possible action,  an  action  to c l a r i f y  i f the  how t h e s e  actions  girl  role  Since  actions  possible  i n terms  ate the Rice This  i n AU. An  of  omission i f an  If  Given use  or  that  one h a s s p e n t  of that  Also, The  a c c o m p a n i e s an i n n u m e r a b l y  money a s  one c a n n o t  use  serve  one buys a c a r ,  part that  of a  relief,  been p e r f o r m e d  i f the  are  action  had n o t been p e r f o r m e d .  sit  down t o r e a d  and  to  possible  commit if  a  the  send t o f a m i n e  actions  of spending By t a k i n g  action  each of  of taking  relief.  on a  house,  could  t h e money on  to sleep,  which a  that  house.  a walk, one o m i t s  book. One a l s o o m i t s  suicide,  on a  o f a down payment  possible  car  one c a n n o t make  down payment  money t o  this  number o f o m i s s i o n s .  t h e money on a c a r ,  u s e o f t h e money a s p a r t f o r famine  large  a  actual  t h e n one p e r f o r m s a c e r t a i n a c t i o n . The p e r f o r m a n c e o f action  an  is  n o t been p e r f o r m e d . E x a m p l e s function.  of  Toasties,  notion  have been p e r f o r m e d  notions  The  done, b u t d i d n o t  Oat T o a s t i e s .  could had  have  of p o s s i b l e  important  or a c t i o n s ,  while p o s s i b l e  one c o u l d  the  that  the  t o Oxfam.  i s innumerable.  i t makes s e n s e t o t h i n k  omitted  choosing  been done b u t were n o t done.  possible actions  are actions  M a c h i n e / 134  like  our g i f t s  a r e performed,  o m i s s i o n s . F o r example, she  unreasonable,  so a s t o i n c r e a s e  that  range of  AU M o r a l A g e n t : U t i l i t y  would  walk  had  have the to  to eat,  have not  been been  The performed. to  The  'action,  The  AU  present  sketch  or a c t i o n s ' .  spending  of  Moral  one  Agent: U t i l i t y  of o m i s s i o n s makes  T h i s i s an dollar  on  omission  famine  relief  f u n d . However, t h r o u g h  action  ten times,  of  relief.  An  omission  o m i s s i o n can  have to  repetition  sending  exist  qualification.  cannot  a series of  reference  ten d o l l a r s  the  135  of  of a c t i o n s ten  of a  the the that  dollars  as a r e s u l t  a  to  series  actions. Given  omission, morally  this the  brief  sketch  relevant. It  importance.  omits  to eat  constitutes  an  omissions  are  omission  has  e a t s c h o c o l a t e i c e cream, t h e n  one  is clear  I f one  strawberry  abnormal c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  that  There concerns  one  omits  a r e we  number of  omissions  with  the  into  topic  such  i n one's  an  equally  The  spending  family  t o f e e d one's  not  family  circumstances, which  omissions  not? attempts moral  of  extremely  i t is  weight.  to determine  have  particularly  under  t o see how  under n o r m a l  w h i c h do  about  every  Except  result  r e l e v a n c e and been a  not  may  This i s ,  r e l e v a n t . So how  have m o r a l  that  do have m o r a l  enough t o e a t . T h u s ,  morally  to which  r e l e v a n t . However,  some o m i s s i o n s  because of gambling.  what  i t is difficult  a l l o n e ' s money gambling'  having  as  i c e cream.  o m i s s i o n c o u l d be m o r a l l y clear  of  question arises  moral  of  t o send  there r e s u l t s  corresponding  famine  failing  important coffee  corresponding  have a  of  Machine /  to  incorporate  theory,  responsibility.  connected The  AU  The principle  provides  not  recognize  and  o m i s s i o n s , and  and  any  perform,  utility.  morally  previous  moral o b l i g a t i o n s that Since  Singer  alterations  that  surprising  that  that  been  have  frequency maintain  a  However,  he  believes  i s something  normally  to  determine,  serves  to  maximize  one  can  in  see  that  t e r m s of  in  principle, our  here.  daily by  between which that  the  Singer  is criticized  those  contends  w e l l - f o u n d e d . He there  AU  distinction and  AU  r e m a i n s unmoved  considered  supererogatory  obliged  consequences  the  i t requires  w i t h which  acts  the  exist for i n d i v i d u a l s .  accepts  he  d i f f e r e n c e between  discussion,  serious  issue.  136 does  that  this  Machine / It  i s morally  alternative  has  to  relevant  t h u s one  the  such a p o s i t i o n  Moral Agent: U t i l i t y  a c l e a r approach  the  Given  AU  and  lives,  such  that  the  AU  wrong w i t h  the  way  major  i t is  objections  to  acknowledges  because  it fails  actions  are  the  morally  which  not AU the to are  obligatory.  criticism  is  not  p r i n c i p l e shows  that  the  distinction  drawn. I f my argument so f a r has been sound, n e i t h e r our d i s t a n c e from a preventable e v i l nor t h e number o f o t h e r s who, in respect to that e v i l , are i n the same situation as we are, lessens our o b l i g a t i o n to m i t i g a t e or p r e v e n t that e v i l . ... The outcome of t h i s argument i s t h a t our t r a d i t i o n a l m o r a l c a t e g o r i e s are upset. The t r a d i t i o n a l distinction between duty and charity cannot be drawn, or a t l e a s t , not i n the p l a c e we n o r m a l l y draw i t . Giving money t o the B e n g a l R e l i e f Fund i s r e g a r d e d as an a c t of c h a r i t y i n our s o c i e t y . ... To do so  is  The  AU  Moral Agent: U t i l i t y  Machine /  137  i s not c h a r i t a b l e , or g e n e r o u s . Nor is i t the k i n d of act which philosophers and theologians have called "supererogatory"-an act which i t would be good t o do, but not wrong not t o do. On t h e c o n t r a r y , we ought to give the money away, and i t i s wrong not t o do so. t In  short,  principle  considerations  raised  are  as  application Part in  embraced  of  of  the  the  recognizing  The  method  requires  that  principles  the  particular favour  discussed. allowed  it  is left  have as  result  self-evidence over  i s that  any  any  Singer  and  moral  between AU  open .what  force  criticisms  I t i s thereby  of AU,  important  27.  considerations  hopes of  to  with return  reaching  be  which  a role in So,  raised  dismissed  to questions  the  even i f above  solely  a sound a p p l i c a t i o n  some d e e p e r  in  previously  methodology  more t e n a b l e .  they cannot  they c o n f l i c t  moral agency, with  p.  the  was  and  systematically  particular intuitions  assessment  endorses,  particular  that  a  involved.  moral  conflicts  resolved  lies  for general  was  conclusion  theory  Singer(5):  which  m e t h o d o l o g y were  AU.  AU  proper  analyses  this  grounds t h a t  f  such d i f f e r e n t  Concerns with  the  the  the  are  The  of  of  judgements  both general  dialectic  of  precedence  moral  of AU.  of  geometry,  intuitions  j u d g e m e n t s . One  consequences  to  a l t e r n a t i v e moral methodologies  moral  take  objections  principle.  explanation  of  as  about  on of AU  diagnosis.  V.  A U AND MORAL  RESPONSIBILITY  As we h a v e s e e n , AU i s c o m m i t t e d account of  moral  responsibility.  produce  the  morally  responsible  consequence of  state  of  particular  requires  type  that  with  maximum  disutility  that  This of  of a  utility  objection.  Noting  interests  be  fail  exists  to are  as  status  c o n d u c t o r and  to a the  a  i t s assignment  utility  AU open  strong  utility  reduces the moral  leaves  everyone's  that  So AU, t h r o u g h  affairs,  to  I n d i v i d u a l s who  i n the p r o d u c t i o n of  of a f f a i r s .  devastating  Brock  of  agent  c a u s a l mechanism states  f o r any  of such a f a i l u r e .  value to states  any  affairs  t o an e x t r e m e l y  of a  maximizing particularly  fact  that  given equal  AU  weight,  says the f o l l o w i n g . Each person's own l i f e is uniquely i m p o r t a n t t o him, i n a way t h a t t h e l i v e s o f o t h e r s , even o t h e r s t o whom he is closely related and about whom he cares a great deal, a r e n o t . Our own f r e e l y c h o s e n ends a n d p u r p o s e s i n t u r n have a s p e c i a l i m p o r t a n c e t o us t h a t t h e ends and p u r p o s e s o f o t h e r s do n o t h a v e . On t h e u t i l i t a r i a n v i e w , a n y o n e ' s e n d o r purpose has i n p r i n c i p l e j u s t a s much c l a i m on me and my a c t i o n a s does my own, a n d t h i s i s why o u r own ends a n d p u r p o s e s on t h e u t i l i t a r i a n view a r e t o o easily overwhelmed by t h e needs a n d purposes of o t h e r s , most e s p e c i a l l y i n "aid to others" s o r t s of cases, f  This  i s one o f  endorses  the r e s u l t s  that  the  way  in  responsibility  and  morally right  f  which  B r o c k ( 2 ) : p . 232. 1 38  an  one AU  must a c c e p t conceives  action.  In  of  i f one moral  circumstances  AU where  i t is  one's own  and  Moral R e s p o n s i b i l i t y /  p o s s i b l e t o maximize purposes  responsible  to  f o r any  those  disutility  utility  of  others,  that  of n o t  doing  A.  NEGATIVE RESPONSIBILITY AND  AU,  One  important  of  results  subordinating  one as  is a  morally  consequence  so.  consequences doctrine  by  139  result  involves, negative  of  in  AU's  INTEGRITY exclusive  Williams'  concern  terms,  the  with  "strong  responsibility".  I t i s because c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s m attaches value u l t i m a t e l y to s t a t e s of affairs, and i t s c o n c e r n i s w i t h what s t a t e s of affairs the world contains, that it essentially involves the notion of negative r e s p o n s i b i l i t y : that i f I am ever r e s p o n s i b l e for anything, then I must be just a s much responsible for t h i n g s t h a t I a l l o w or f a i l t o prevent, a s I am f o r t h i n g s t h a t I m y s e l f , i n t h e more e v e r y d a y restricted sense, bring about, f In  short,  state  of  i t does not affairs  m a t t e r who  i n the  world  b r i n g s about  any  particular  because:  ... for consequentialism, a l l causal c o n n e x i o n s a r e on t h e same l e v e l , and i t makes no difference, so far as that g o e s , whether t h e c a u s a t i o n of a given s t a t e of affairs lies through another a g e n t , or n o t . $ An  agent  fails  i s as m o r a l l y  to prevent,  does h e r s e l f .  So,  f W i l l i a m s ( 2 ) : p. $ W i l l i a m s ( 2 ) : p.  responsible  others an 95. 94.  from d o i n g  agent  i s not  f o r what as only  she  she  prevents,  i s f o r what  responsible  for  or she any  AU disutility she  also  allows  that  she  could  i s morally  t o do  illustrate  the  Moral R e s p o n s i b i l i t y /  have p r e v e n t e d w i t h her  responsible  someone e l s e  To  and  when  something  her  o f m o r a l a g e n c y and  considers  two  moral  d i f f e r e n t cases.  The  actions,  failing  to  act  worse.  counterintuitive  construal  140  results  of  responsibility first  involves  a  this  Williams chemist  named G e o r g e . G e o r g e , who has j u s t t a k e n h i s Ph.D. in chemistry, f i n d s i t extremely difficult t o g e t a j o b . ... An o l d e r c h e m i s t , who knows a b o u t t h i s s i t u a t i o n , s a y s t h a t he can get George a d e c e n t l y p a i d j o b i n a certain laboratory, which pursues research into chemical and biological warfare. George says that he cannot accept t h i s , since he is opposed to chemical and biological warfare. The o l d e r man r e p l i e s that he i s not too keen on i t h i m s e l f , come to t h a t , but a f t e r a l l G e o r g e ' s r e f u s a l i s not going t o make t h e j o b or l a b o r a t o r y go away; what i s more, he h a p p e n s t o know t h a t i f George refuses the job, it will certainly go to a contemporary of G e o r g e ' s who is not i n h i b i t e d by any s u c h s c r u p l e s and i s l i k e l y i f a p p o i n t e d t o p u s h a l o n g the r e s e a r c h w i t h greater z e a l than George would, t Assuming, as ultimately that  And  c a u s e more  George's  accept so  Williams  AU  the  job,  strongly  i n any  family  seems harm  would  if  i n d i c a t e s . But  pp.  97-98.  that  the  research  pursued with  suffer  i t seems t h a t  case, George's  t Williams(2):  to,  this  more z e a l  more f r o m h i s  George should  take  seems t h e  commitment  to  would  the  and  failure  to  the  Or  wrong  job.  choice.  rejection  of  AU s u c h means of he  should The  is  lost  Moral R e s p o n s i b i l i t y /  any  place  in determining  141 how  act. impoverished  equally  botanist  w a r f a r e has  and  nature  apparent  named  in  of AU's  the  conception  second  of  scenario.  morality  Consider  a  Jim.  Jim f i n d s h i m s e l f i n the c e n t r a l square o f a s m a l l S o u t h A m e r i c a n town. T i e d up a g a i n s t the w a l l are a row of twenty I n d i a n s , most t e r r i f i e d , a few defiant, i n f r o n t of them s e v e r a l armed men in u n i f o r m . A heavy man ... e x p l a i n s that the Indians are a random g r o u p of the i n h a b i t a n t s who, a f t e r recent acts of p r o t e s t a g a i n s t the g o v e r n m e n t , a r e j u s t about to be killed to remind other p o s s i b l e p r o t e s t o r s of t h e a d v a n t a g e s o f n o t p r o t e s t i n g . However, s i n c e J i m i s an h o n o u r e d v i s i t o r from a n o t h e r l a n d , the c a p t a i n i s happy t o o f f e r him a guest's p r i v i l e g e of k i l l i n g one o f t h e Indians himself. If Jim accepts, then as a s p e c i a l mark o f t h e o c c a s i o n , t h e other I n d i a n s w i l l be l e t o f f . Of c o u r s e , if Jim refuses, then there i s no special o c c a s i o n , and P e d r o h e r e w i l l do what he was a b o u t t o do when Jim a r r i v e d , and k i l l them a l l . ... The men a g a i n s t the wall, and the other villagers, understand the situation, and are o b v i o u s l y b e g g i n g him t o a c c e p t , t By  AU,  i t seems  Indians.  Even  clear  i f this  answer a p p e a r  too  is  never  take  another's  place  in  t  i s the  o b v i o u s and  suppose J i m  AU  that Jim  a pacifist  and  should  of  action,  i t makes  too  simple.  For  calculations.  Indeed,  crucial to  belief  expand on  the the-  example,  s t r o n g l y b e l i e v e s he  Such a  98-99.  one  right  life.  W i l l i a m s ( 2 ) : pp.  kill  should has  no  Williams'  AU a n d M o r a l R e s p o n s i b i l i t y / 142 example, with it.  s u p p o s e J i m knew t h a t  himself Even  i f he k i l l e d  if  Jim eventually  guilt,  this  so  is still  i t  highlight and  only  moral  effects  the  of  integrity  p r e f e r r e d consequence.  that  AU t o o e a s i l y  do  negative  a variety and  examples  overwhelms t h e  needs  negative  of  responsibility  d i r e c t i o n s that  responsibility.f  important  i n moral  Both  agent. of  assessment  emphasized  to  and  doctrine in  ought  r e s u l t s i n two d e a t h s , and n o t t w e n t y , the  commits  He s t i l l  live  the  ends o f t h e m o r a l  implications  Indian.  to  s u i c i d e b e c a u s e of  the point  The  the  he would n o t be a b l e  and  pertain  Williams  i n t e r e s t i n g question  responsibilty  on  has  the  of  concept  to has the of  thinking.  A f e a t u r e of u t i l i t a r i a n i s m i s that i t c u t s out a k i n d of c o n s i d e r a t i o n which f o r some makes a d i f f e r e n c e t o what t h e y f e e l about such cases: a consideration i n v o l v i n g t h e i d e a , a s we m i g h t first and v e r y s i m p l y p u t i t , t h a t e a c h o f us is specially responsible f o r what he d o e s , r a t h e r t h a n f o r what o t h e r people do. T h i s i s an idea c l o s e l y connected w i t h the v a l u e of i n t e g r i t y . $ Williams  construes  an a g e n t ' s  conduct  in relation  central  commitments o f t h e a g e n t ' s  s t a t u s of such  to values  p r o j e c t s that  and  forms  integrity  i n terms of her  p r o j e c t s which life.  form  the  I t i s the r e s u l t i n g  the b a s i s  of  Williams'  t W i l l i a m s ' a n a l y s i s h a s been t h e s u b j e c t o f a g r e a t d e a l o f critical examination. F o r examples, see H a r r i s ( l ) and DavisO). £ W i l l i a m s ( 2 ) : p . 99.  AU and M o r a l R e s p o n s i b i l i t y / 143 charge  that  AU i n v o l v e s  an a t t a c k  on t h e agent'.s  integrity.  F o r , t o take t h e extreme s o r t of case, how c a n a man, as a u t i l i t a r i a n agent, come t o r e g a r d a s one s a t i s f a c t i o n among o t h e r s , and a d i s p e n s i b l e one, a p r o j e c t or a t t i t u d e r o u n d w h i c h he has b u i l t h i s life, just because someone else's p r o j e c t s have so s t r u c t u r e d t h e causal scene that t h a t i s how t h e utilitarian sum comes out? ... I t i s a b s u r d to demand o f s u c h a man ... t h a t he should j u s t s t e p a s i d e from h i s own p r o j e c t and d e c i s i o n and a c k n o w l e d g e the d e c i s i o n which u t i l i t a r i a n c a l c u l a t i o n requires. I t i s t o a l i e n a t e him i n a r e a l sense from h i s own a c t i o n s and t h e s o u r c e of h i s a c t i o n i n h i s own c o n v i c t i o n s . I t i s t o make him i n t o a c h a n n e l between t h e i n p u t of e v e r y o n e ' s p r o j e c t s , including h i s own, and an output of o p t i m i f i c d e c i s i o n ; but t h i s i s to neglect the extent t o which h i s actions and h i s d e c i s i o n s have t o be seen a s t h e a c t i o n s and decisions which flow from the p r o j e c t s and a t t i t u d e s w i t h w h i c h he i s most c l o s e l y i d e n t i f i e d . I t i s t h u s , in t h e most l i t e r a l s e n s e , an a t t a c k on h i s integrity, f It  was n o t e d  that by  earlier  i t allows  that  of  this  incompatability  Williams'  point  i n an  between  responsibility  and p e r s o n a l  f  p . 116.  Williams(2):  AU on t h e g r o u n d s  an a g e n t ' s ends t o be t o o e a s i l y  t h e ends o f o t h e r s .  expansion  Brock c r i t i c i z e s  the  overwhelmed  argument c a n be seen a s  an  attempt  an  to  doctrine  integrity.  demonstrate of  negative  AU B.  TWO  Moral R e s p o n s i b i l i t y /  i s not  there  is a certain  appeal  c l e a r e x a c t l y what responsibility  that  personal  integrity.  an  effort  be  helpful  to  his  remarks.  insights  it  will  interpretations  of  In  in Williams'  i t i s about  negative  1.  144  INTERPRETATIONS  While it  and  the  constitutes to  remarks,  doctrine  of  attack  on  the  clarify  consider  Williams'  two  different  Scheffler's Interpretation One  possible  reference  to the  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of W i l l i a m s a g e n t ' s p r o j e c t s as  Samuel S c h e f f l e r n o t e s t h i s  way  of  focuses  'dispensable'  reading  on  his  under  AU.  Williams.  One natural way to read him is as maintaining that utilitarianism a l i e n a t e s an a g e n t from h i s own actions by making the permissibility of the agent's d e v o t i n g energy to h i s projects and commitments d e p e n d e n t on t h e state of t h e w o r l d v i e w e d from an impersonal s t a n d p o i n t . I f , t h r o u g h no f a u l t of the a g e n t ' s , t h i n g s get bad enough f r o m the impersonal standpoint, his projects become d i s p e n s a b l e , f Scheffler Williams' having  too  goes  on  remarks  to  in  note  a  difficulty  t h i s manner. I t  results  in  construing  i n the  wide an a p p l i c a t i o n . F o r v i r t u a l l y any m o r a l t h e o r y w i l l make the permissibility of pursuing one's p r o j e c t s depend a t l e a s t i n p a r t on the. s t a t e of the world from an impersonal standpoint. Virtually any moral view w i l l h o l d t h a t i f t h i n g s g e t bad enough  t  S c h e f f l e r ( 1 ) : p.  8.  point  AU  and  Moral R e s p o n s i b i l i t y /  145  from the impersonal standpoint, the a g e n t ' s p r o j e c t s become d i s p e n s a b l e . ... [ I ] f the objection from integrity is interpreted as an objection to the in-principle dispensability of the agent's projects, then i t must be r e g a r d e d as a criticism of a l m o s t a l l non-egoistic theories, and not as an objection to which utilitarianism is distinctively vulnerable.f In  short,  objection  it as  is  implausible  b a s e d on  a g e n t ' s p r o j e c t s . An Scheffler Williams' spirit  formulation integrity  allows  while  proposes that agent  its us  to  Williams'  dispensibility  can  be  greater  it  manner range  is possible which both of  the  claims  accomplished  weight  to her  to  claims  S c h e f f l e r ( 1 ) : pp.  8-9.  an  interpret  captures  its  Such  of  a  personal  of  egoism.  Scheffler  by  allowing  the  own  interests.  U t i l i t a r i a n i s m thus r e q u i r e s the agent t o a l l o c a t e e n e r g y and a t t e n t i o n t o the p r o j e c t s and p e o p l e he c a r e s most about in s t r i c t proportion t o the v a l u e from an i m p e r s o n a l s t a n d p o i n t of his doing s o , even t h o u g h p e o p l e t y p i c a l l y a c q u i r e and c a r e a b o u t t h e i r commitments quite independently o f , and out of proportion t o , the value that their having and c a r i n g about them i s assigned in an i m p e r s o n a l r a n k i n g of o v e r a l l s t a t e s of affairs. It is this feature of u t i l i t a r i a n i s m w h i c h may be t h o u g h t to a l i e n a t e t h e a g e n t 'from h i s a c t i o n s and the source of his action in his own c o n v i c t i o n s ' , and thereby to undermine  f  of  required.  application.  accomodate the  resisting  this  to attach  that  in a  limits  in-principle  understand  alternative interpretation is  believes  objection  and  the  to  moral  AU and M o r a l R e s p o n s i b i l i t y / 146 his This the of  echoes Brock's p o i n t  Williams'  this  By  constitutes  argument  does serve  AU.  a  concerning  on  the  proper  p r o p o s e s what This  determining  seems  involves  what  impersonal  an  i s required  ranking  such  issues.  t o be a n a t u r a l  modification  to  o f an a g e n t of  move  purely  away  affairs.  possible  if i t  i s acknowledged  that  an a g e n t ' s  deserve  special  consideration  when  determining  morally  required  for  alternative  results  i n an a g e n t b e i n g  her  own  i n t e r e s t s . Accordingly,  for  producing  s t a n d s beyond state  optimal some  of a f f a i r s  with  states  entitled  t h e agent  between t h e  and t h e s a c r i f i c e  S c h e f f l e r ( 1 ) : p . 9.  what  is  agent's This  weight t o  i s not r e s p o n s i b l e  when s u c h value  production  of the  optimal  by t h e a g e n t  p r o d u c e s u c h an outcome.  t  for  interests  affairs.  greater  required  If a s a t i s f a c t o r y account general l i n e s c o u l d indeed I think that the r e s u l t agent-centred prerogative  room  to the  of  to give  s t a t e s of a f f a i r s  ratio  allow  respect  of  Scheffler's  integrity  the agent  to  from  i n terms  is  of  position  proportion',  attempt  is  of  'strict  of s t a t e s i t  question  a  contention  responsibility  that  of  the  interpretation  integrity,  notion  overwhelming  aside  t o r a i s e i n t e r e s t i n g and i m p o r t a n t  focusing  Scheffler  an  a b o u t AU t o o e a s i l y  p r o j e c t s of the moral agent. P u t t i n g whether  to  integrity.!  along these be produced, would be an of j u s t the  to  AU and M o r a l R e s p o n s i b i l i t y / 147 sort that is required. Such a prerogative would obviously make i t p e r m i s s i b l e f o r agents t o devote time and energy to their projects, commitments, and p e r s o n a l relationships out o f p r o p o r t i o n t o t h e w e i g h t f r o m an impersonal standpoint of t h e i r doing so. ... Thus s u c h a p r e r o g a t i v e would e n a b l e a n o r m a t i v e v i e w t o accommodate p e r s o n a l integrity without collapsing into egoism, f Such a r e v i s i o n o f AU, a c c o r d i n g incorporate Williams' an  integrity  objection.$  agent-centred  sacrifice/gain distinquish which  i n such  i t might  a manner  He r e f e r s t o t h i s  prerogative  ratio,  and  view  from  this  to S c h e f f l e r , allows  he  that  to  is  frequently  effort,  considerations  some  effort  concerns  a to with  be c o n f u s e d .  advanced  m a x i m i z e d when  most  involves  consequentialist  In p a r t i c u l a r , S c h e f f l e r d i s t i n g u i s h e s claim  accommodate  r e v i s i o n i n terms of  (ACP) goes  as t o  one t o  upon that  agents  t h e ACP from t h e  by c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t s focus  their are often  own  most  that  utility  a t t e n t i o n , and  projects.  presented  He  notes  i n support  expend two  of such a  view. F i r s t , i t i s s a i d that one i s in a better position t o promote one's own w e l f a r e and t h e w e l f a r e o f t h o s e one i s c l o s e s t t o than t o promote t h e welfare of o t h e r p e o p l e . So an a g e n t produces f S c h e f f l e r ( 1 ) : pp. 20-21. t The q u e s t i o n of whether Scheffler's account meets Williams' objection i s addressed later i n the present s e c t i o n . But i t i s worth n o t i n g here that one general d i f f i c u l t y w i t h t h e a c c o u n t i s t h a t i t seems u n l i k e l y that one c o u l d p r o v i d e an o b j e c t i v e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h i s r a t i o .  AU  and M o r a l R e s p o n s i b i l i t y  /  148  maximum good per u n i t of activity by focusing his e f f o r t s on those he is closest to, including himself. Second, i t i s s a i d t h a t human n a t u r e b e i n g what it is, people cannot function e f f e c t i v e l y at a l l unless they devote somewhat more e n e r g y t o p r o m o t i n g their own w e l l - b e i n g than to promoting the w e l l - b e i n g of other people. Here the appeal is no longer to immediate c o n s e g u e n t i a l i s t advantages of p r o m o t i n g o n e ' s own w e l l - b e i n g , but r a t h e r t o the long-term advantages of having p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y h e a l t h y a g e n t s who are e f f i c i e n t p r o d u c e r s o f t h e good, f He  contends  plausibility  that  of those  Rather, S c h e f f l e r constitutes  it  is  not h i s  two  consequentialist  wants t o c l a r i f y  purpose  t h e way  to  assess  considerations. i n which  a d e p a r t u r e from c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s m .  The consequentialist arguments are i n t e n d e d t o show t h a t one may frequently be j u s t i f i e d , from a consequentialist p o i n t of view, i n d e v o t i n g more energy t o o n e ' s own w e l f a r e t h a n t o t h e w e l f a r e of o t h e r s . These a r g u m e n t s i n no way deviate from the consequentialist p o s i t i o n that one ought a l w a y s to do what would have the best overall outcome, and t h a t one ought t h e r e f o r e t o devote energy and attention to one's projects and commitments in strict proportion to the w e i g h t of doing so from the impersonal standpoint. The arguments a r e simply intended, within the context of that consequentialist p o s i t i o n , to support a p a r t i c u l a r t h e s i s about the l i k e l y r e l a t i v e weighing from the i m p e r s o n a l s t a n d p o i n t of a t t e m p t s t o promote one's own well-being and attempts to promote t h e well-being of others.$  t t  Scheffler(1): Scheffler(1):  p. 15. pp. 16-17.  the  the  ACP  AU Having  explicated  general on  to  the  function  consequentialist, articulate  and  how  or  Moral R e s p o n s i b i l i t y  of  the  AU,  this  two  /  arguments w i t h i n  framework, S c h e f f l e r  differs  149  from an  ACP  a  goes  account,  which: ... would deny that people ought to devote energy and attention to their projects and commitments in strict proportion to the weight from an i m p e r s o n a l s t a n d p o i n t of t h e i r d o i n g s o . I t would s y s t e m a t i c a l l y permit people, w i t h i n c e r t a i n l i m i t s , to devote energy and attention to their projects and commitments even i f t h e i r d o i n g so would not on b a l a n c e promote t h e b e s t outcomes overall. Whereas the consequentialist seeks to show that devoting more a t t e n t i o n t o one's own p r o j e c t s t h a n to the w e l f a r e of other people is often d e s i r a b l e on consequentialist grounds, the function of the agent-centred p r e r o g a t i v e would be t o deny t h a t the permissibility of devoting energy to one's p r o j e c t s and commitments depends on t h e e f f i c a c y of s u c h a c t i v i t y as an i n s t r u m e n t of o v e r a l l b e n e f i t , t In  this  manner  differences  between  consequentialist To  Scheffler  w i t h AU  the has  now  time t o c o n s i d e r  the  concerns  Jill/Joe  t  the  ACP  and  e x p l i c a t i o n of been a t  ACP  expressed  scenarios  introducing  the  the  theoretical  more  standard  considerations.  t h i s point  contrasts  explicates  ACP,  S c h e f f l e r ( 1 ) : p.  in light in  pertain it will  17.  a highly  our  of  a  the  how  it  level.  specific  example.  earlier  useful  and  abstract  directly be  ACP,  discussion to  to  the  return  It i s As  of  the  point  of  to  them  as  AU and M o r a l R e s p o n s i b i l i t y / 1 5 0 a  foil  is  for considering  whether  defects a  the  ACP  t h e ACP. I n p a r t i c u l a r , t h e successfully  o f AU. The o r i g i n a l  s i t u a t i o n where J o e  remedies  scenario  the  Alternatively,  he c a n f o r g o  t h e m o v i e , and send  R e l i e f F u n d . AU c o n c l u d e s t h a t  Joe should  to  famine  relief.  is  disutility  involved  t o go t o t h e his  action  how  Joe  additional  question  utilities  f o r the  involves  relevance.  utilities  states  and  from  i n determining  more  utilities.  Two,  chooses  results  than  the  T h e r e a r e two  One, t h e q u e s t i o n  distributed constitutes  the agent's u t i l i t i e s ,  alternative  responsible  consideration  are relevant.  Fund.  t h e money t o  a l t e r n a t i v e i f he  of aggregate  are  J o e c a n go  t h e money  much u t i l i t y  ACP  to  give  f o r ACP, b u t n o t AU. I n s h o r t ,  has d i r e c t  between t h e s e  For  the only  f a c t o r s that  concerning  first  a c t . An  evaluation  consideration  he  m o v i e . F o r AU, how  should  comparative  how t h e  Further,  constitutes  able  ten d o l l a r s to the R e l i e f  the  i n the  concerns  of being  p r o d u c e one o f two a l t e r n a t i v e s t a t e s o f a f f a i r s . send  perceived  i n v o l v i n g Joe  i s i n the p o s i t i o n  t o t h e m o v i e , and n o t  question  given  a  relevant  t h e ' F o r whom?' the  information  one c a l c u l a t e s t h e  the o v e r a l l  of  ratio  utilities  i n the  arbitrarily  assume  of a f f a i r s .  t h e sake o f i l l u s t r a t i o n ,  the  sacrifice/gain ratio  the  first  not  send t h e money t o  s t a t e of a f f a i r s  let's  i s established at  two t o one.  In  J o e goes t o t h e m o v i e , and  does  t h e R e l i e f Fund. Assume f u r t h e r  that  AU this  state  with  3 a t t r i b u t e d to Joe  and  of  affairs  that  the  second  10  due  to  with  hunger  and  -3  between  the  two  are  understanding  the  than  units,  not  act  two  then  However,  t h e n Joe  i s not  utilities  of  the  continuing  should  between  of  affairs two  ACP,  states  and  this  the  AU  be  noted that  i f he  produce  i s free to act  the  responsibility is a  and  the to  7.  function  simply  However, of  the  way total  affairs  disutility the  movie. case,  difference  According  responsibility is -17  the  substantial  alternative calculations.  between  i n the  of  of  units,  same r e s u l t i n t h i s  is a  does  state 12  between  for  greater  i f he  i s l e s s than  c h o o s e s t o go  there  is  optimal  alternative states  hunger  difference  responsible  responsible  units.  u n i t s . For  two  morally  Joe  units  in the  is  to  for  the  affairs  to produce the  some  6  if  of  difference  7 units,  reaction  t o one,  r e s u l t i s 12 the  of  is 6  difference  and  difference  Joe's  of  hunger;  utilities  The  framework J o e ' s m o r a l the  in  his  151  units,  eliminating  him.  ACP  the  of  movie and  i s morally  i f the  involved  T h u s , Joe  it  utility  of  Joe  satisfies  24.  the  a value  the  responsible,  is  While  has  the  i n s u c h a manner as  most  affairs  alternative  affairs.  that  continuing  difference  and  -17  the  missing  two,  of  to  sacrifice/gain ratio  between 12  of  -20  alternative states  m u l t i p l i e d by  arbitrary  and  The  Moral R e s p o n s i b i l i t y /  aggregate u t i l i t y  positive  f o r Joe  situation.  an  state  the  such a  Given a  has  and  a  with  to  an  AU  result  of  the  difference  ACP,  between  AU and M o r a l 24 and 12. G i v e n  the d i f f e r e n t  clear  ACP y i e l d s  that  discretion  the  and l e s s m o r a l  However, adequately  ACP  These c o n c e r n s  centre  the  possibility  fails  to  to  the  this  f e a t u r e of  Williams agent  AU t o w h i c h  shares Brock's  Williams'  objections  Because o f t h e d o c t r i n e no m o r a l  space  Jim  whether  cases  concern  objectionable  actions  to  they  basis  by  AU  ACP f a i l s  if  one t e l l s  he  Williams. easily  agent.  It is  his  objections.  an  (X)/(Y) s a c r i f i c e / g a i n  ratio.  moral  and c o n d u c t o r . Brock's  point.  AU l e a v e s  do  certain  of t h e George  must  perform  and  certain  do t h i n g s  to address  which  the force  way t h e p o i n t  should k i l l  for  too  refuse to  others to  e x a m p l e s . I n an i m p o r t a n t Jim that  beyond  is  the I n d i a n because  The same p o i n t  issue  c h e m i c a l and  i n v o l v e s more t h a n  biological  warfare.  simply a s a c r i f i c e / g a i n  of  missed  c a n be  r e s p e c t t o the i s s u e o f whether George s h o u l d take involving  is  more  c o n s t r u i n g the  The f o r c e  or a l l o w  have worse c o n s e q u e n c e s . Williams'  a  producer  go  for individuals utilities.  job  about  much  of n e g a t i v e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  things despite their  with  directs  s i m p l y a s some form o f u t i l i t y  However,  that  i t  does AU.  of the moral  Brock  concerns  than  raised  idea  overwhelms t h e p r o j e c t s and ends  of  provide  the concerns  on  / 152  methods o f c a l c u l a t i o n ,  responsibility  still  responding  Responsibility  Again  of made the the  ratio.t  t ACP s h a r e s a n o t h e r p r o b l e m w i t h AU. As we have s e e n , s i n c e AU s i m p l y compares the u t i l i t i e s of a l t e r n a t i v e s t a t e s of affairs, the t h e o r e t i c a l structure does not allow f o r q u e s t i o n s about t h e r e a s o n a b l e n e s s o f s p e c i f i c u t i l i t i e s . As  AU Scheffler  believes  that  protection  f o r an a g e n t ' s  protection  provided i s  t h e y a r e , and with  the  personal  as  a g e n t ' s most c e n t r a l proposed  protection  h a s , whether projects. Joe's  or  So,  hardly  can  be  While  t h e ACP  there  i s no  preserving  does  in this being  requiring  G e o r g e t o do  most c e n t r a l if  matter  is  the movies.  more  true  The  i s not  overwhelmed.  ACP  complex  that  than  this  should either  or  interest  discretion, i n terms  of  seems i n a d e q u a t e  in  it  the  is  Jim  kill  Jim of  a  directly  a  agent  integrity.  moral  in  that  an  protection for  discretion  Rather  imagine he  the  commitments  simply a matter  something  that  that  And  greater  in  to  Scheffler's  with personal  i m a g i n a b l y even  values. Again,  i t is  interest  construe t h i s  it  whatever  realized  to central  a l l o w an a g e n t  case  The  relate  commitments.  as c o n n e c t e d  (and  concerns  p r o v i d e s moral  personal integrity. case  i s mistaken.  e x p r e s s e d or  i t pertains  interests  Even  it is  going to  seen  153  sufficient  interests,  Williams'  includes every  reason to  the George because  in  /  o f whether t h e r e i s any c o n n e c t i o n  p r o j e c t s and  not  allows  This  agent's  f o r example, ACP  interest  ACP  integrity.  integrity.  integrity,  the  of t h e  independent  agent's  and M o r a l R e s p o n s i b i l i t y  George's matter  violates  is a  the  case)  of his  pacifist.  Indian,  staightforward  the AU  t ( c o n t ' d ) B r o c k n o t e s , an a d v o c a t e of AU seems c o m m i t t e d to i n c l u d i n g , f o r example, r a c i s t and s e x i s t p r e f e r e n c e s , w i t h their corresponding u t i l i t i e s , i n t o the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of what c o n s t i t u t e s optimal states of a f f a i r s . This problem p e r s i s t s i n S c h e f f l e r ' s ACP.  AU and M o r a l R e s p o n s i b i l i t y / 154 utility So,  c a l c u l a t i o n o r an  despite  its  satisfactorily The  reason  initial  plausibility,  meet t h e t y p e o f c o n c e r n  for this failure  determines utility  ACP s a c r i f i c e / g a i n r a t i o  the  rests  right action  involves utility  their  analyses  calculations.  structure  By  r a i s e d by  basis  difference  of  fails  what  to  Williams.  i n the f a c t that  upon t h e  c a l c u l a t i o n s . The o n l y  ACP  allows.  of  ACP  still  favourable  between AU and ACP  constitutes  maintaining  the  favourable same  basic  a s AU, ACP r e m a i n s open t o t h e same o b j e c t i o n s  as  AU. Scheffler,  by f o c u s i n g  on what s t a t e s  p r o d u c e d , p r o d u c e s an a c c o u n t with  the  issue  Williams' states that  of  affairs  by r e d u c i n g  Williams'  produces  are  negative  the  t h e m o r a l demands greater  weight  to  clarify  and  discussion  Honderich's discussion  states  of  that  of  we now  i t  Williams. turn.  t o what think  allowing  interests  Williams'  integrity  grips  seems t o  o f AU t h r o u g h t h e i r own  are  affairs.  i n t e g r i t y c a n be s a t i s f i e d .  to f u r t h e r  second  t o come t o  produced. S c h e f f l e r  responsibility a  fails  i n t e g r i t y a r e not r e d u c i b l e  c o n c e r n s about  s o . In o r d e r  examine  who  c o n c e r n s about  agents t o give  not  of  which  of a f f a i r s  This i s  concerns is  that  about  useful It  is  to to  AU 2.  Honderich's  the  Moral  Responsibility /  155  Interpretation  Honderich taking  and  focuses  job  According  to  principle  which  on  in  the  Honderich,  judgement t h a t  Williams'  can  biological there  lend  George's  case  is a  support action  warfare need t o to  in  involving  laboratory. provide  Williams'  refusing  George's  the  some  implicit job  is  permissible. The main d i f f i c u l t y a b o u t the c a s e , it seems t o me, i s t h a t of a c t u a l l y f i n d i n g what c o n s i d e r a t i o n of p r i n c i p l e it is which i s supposed to lead us t o agree t h a t the c h e m i s t ' s act in refusing the job is right. That consideration or principle is not a c t u a l l y supplied to u s . L e t us see what, i f a n y t h i n g , can be found, f The  first  there and  possibility  simply  being  that  Honderich  consistency  considers  between t h e  agent's  involves actions  attitudes. The f i r s t of them w h i c h must be got out of t h e way i s the m a t t e r of f a c t that that chemist, in refusing the j o b , is a c t i n g i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h deep a t t i t u d e s of h i s own. H i s a c t i o n i s i n no s e n s e i n c o n f l i c t with these a t t i t u d e s , whatever they are. Hence we say, i f obscurely, t h a t t h e r e e x i s t s a u n i t y o r a w h o l e . He remains whole. I n t e g r i t y , in a literal sense, i s maintained. $  Honderich providing  immediately any  basis  for  right.  f HondericM 1 ) : p. $ HondericM 1 ): p.  38. 38 .  rejects claiming  this  consideration  as  that  George's a c t i o n  is  AU  and  Moral  Responsibility /  156  In this, however, we have no c o n s i d e r a t i o n whatever t h a t might lead us t o a g r e e t h a t r e f u s i n g t h e j o b i s t h e right thing to do. It seems obvious enough that there i s no connection w h a t e v e r between t h e d e s c r i b e d i n t e g r i t y and r i g h t a c t s . An a c t of i n t e g r i t y in this sense, given certain imaginable d e e p a t t i t u d e s on t h e p a r t of an agent, w i l l be an a c t of a b s o l u t e immorality. N o t h i n g f o l l o w s about the T i g h t n e s s or wrongness of t h e a c t from t h e f a c t a l o n e t h a t i t i s i n l i n e w i t h an a g e n t ' s deep a t t i t u d e s , which p r e s u m a b l y may be of any k i n d , t So,  integrity,  deeply  felt  i n the  s e n s e of m a i n t a i n i n g  a t t i t u d e s , provides  George's a c t i o n i s m o r a l l y is  required  action  is  i n order  right.  to allow  for  with  basis for claiming  that  Some o t h e r the  consideration  conclusion  that  the  right.  A second p o s s i b i l i t y upon t h e  no  consistency  first  which Honderich c o n s i d e r s  builds  proposal.  To say the chemist preserves his i n t e g r i t y by r e f u s i n g t h e j o b , t h e n , is n e c e s s a r i l y t o do something other than s t a t e a m o r a l l y i r r e l e v a n t and somewhat o b s c u r e m a t t e r of f a c t . I t i s t o a p p r o v e of him, t o commend him. I t may be to approve of him or to commend him b e c a u s e , as we may s a y , he i s true to himself. The chemist perseveres in certain deep a t t i t u d e s . The second speculation about what is said of i n t e g r i t y i s of c o u r s e r e l a t e d to the first, and it faces a similar objection.$ Honderich  f i  raises  essentially  H o n d e r i c M 1 ) : pp. 38-39. H o n d e r i c h ! 1 ) : p. 39.  the  same  objection  to  this  AU and M o r a l R e s p o n s i b i l i t y / 157 suggestion  as he d i d t o t h e l a s t . There are s e v e r a l r e l a t e d t h i n g s t o be s a i d about t h i s second s p e c u l a t i o n as t o the matter of integrity. One i s the g e n e r a l one t h a t t h e r e seems t o be very l i t t l e r e l e v a n t c o n n e c t i o n between a man b e i n g commendable i n t h e g i v e n way and h i s a c t i o n b e i n g r i g h t . A man, i t seems, can be commendable f o r the reason that he i s t r u e t o h i m s e l f no m a t t e r what a c t he p e r f o r m s , s o l o n g a s he h i m s e l f is m o r a l l y committed to i t . A l l that is r e q u i r e d i s t h a t he s t i c k s t o h i s m o r a l c o n v i c t i o n s , whatever they a r e , having t o do with a s e l f - p i c t u r e o r n o t . An a p p a l l i n g l y wrong a c t , perhaps one o f p o i n t l e s s t o r t u r e , does n o t move a b i t i n t h e d i r e c t i o n o f b e i n g r i g h t when we l e a r n that the t o r t u r e r i s being true to himself, f  H o n d e r i c h makes an i m p o r t a n t  point.  being  not e n t a i l  true  morally  to  h e r s e l f does  r i g h t . However, t h i s p o i n t  to Williams'  c o n c e r n s about  integrity  makes an portray  Williams'  defining  serve  sufficient puts  t  her a c t i o n  is  with  respect  supposition  AU a s t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  right.  concern.  the  This  Williams'  fails point  to is  which  accurately  that  AU  t h e r i g h t n e s s - m a k i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of a c t i o n s )  incompatible can  is  has no f o r c e  seems t o i n v o l v e  i s to replace  action morally  that  someone  integrity.  Honderich's d i s c u s s i o n that  Knowing t h a t  with  integrity.  as a replacement  His claim  i s not t h a t  f o r AU. C l e a r l y  constantly  H o n d e r i c M 1 ): p. 39.  in peril  integrity  i s suspect.  is  integrity is  f o r T i g h t n e s s . But any a c c o u n t o f T i g h t n e s s  integrity  (as  Morality  not  that is  AU and M o r a l R e s p o n s i b i l i t y / for  persons,  integrity  of  and  i t thereby  the  person.  someone's a c t i o n s . action  must  simply  a utility  the  leave  optimal  And  s t a t e of  and  integrity. right  of  H i s concern  integrity.  proposing  that  holds  This  allowing  Honderich  i s that  to  essentially  exploration.  with  the  AU  and  i n an a c c o u n t  of  the p r e s e r v a t i o n  of  Williams of  of W i l l i a m s .  as right  Scheffler  c a n be s a t i s f i e d  greater  weight  to her  concession  this  by own  and p r o j e c t s . R a t h e r  t o t h e i s s u e of i n t e g r i t y ,  n a t u r a l l y u n d e r s t o o d as a  integrity,  producing  about  construes  give  pertaining  personal  into  misconstrued  concerns  o b j e c t i o n s t o AU  an a g e n t  to explore  right  and n o t t u r n h e r  have  misrepresentation  i n c l u d i n g commitments  necessary  the  always  of  r e p l a c e AU a s t h e a c c o u n t  interests,  more  account  AU r e s u l t s  Honderich  that Williams*  simply  are  c a u s a l machine i n  Williams'  integrity  is a  and  i s incompatible  personal  actions  acceptable intact,  respect  affairs. and  depth  a c t i o n which  action.  any  conductor  generally  After a l l ,  t h e someone  Both S c h e f f l e r nature  must  158  than seems  t o egoism. I t  is  f u r t h e r t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between AU and and t h e  d i s c u s s i o n now  turns  to  such  V I . AU AND Clarifying provides a personal this  what  crucial  integrity.  INTEGRITY  c o n s t i t u t e s an contrast  ideal  by w h i c h  AU  moral  to consider  The f o r m u l a t i o n o f AU a d o p t e d  agent AU  and  throughout  u n d e r t a k i n g h a s been t h e f o l l o w i n g : An a c t i s r i g h t i f a n d o n l y i f the consequences of p e r f o r m i n g i t are at least a s good as the consequences a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e p e r f o r m a n c e o f any a l t e r n a t i v e a c t open t o t h e a g e n t , f  From t h i s , reached  together  the  with the  conclusion  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s must limits  to  questions personal questions  such  that  extend  an  the  relations  moral  agent's  This  status  and p e r s o n a l  we now  argument, AU  f a r beyond commonly  responsibility.  about  that  'reiterative'  moral accepted  conclusion  of  raises  personal  identity.  It  we  ideals,  i s to  these  turn.  A. AU MORAL AGENTS AND MORAL SAINTS Singer extend that  accepts the  much  further  common  w h i l e he  idea  than  portrayals  obligations  of  of  obligation of  people  as understood  people's  t h e y commonly  i s an a d v o c a t e  impossibility  that  b e l i e v e and  are  AU, S i n g e r actually  obligations  wrong.  i n t e r m s o f AU.  Taking s e r i o u s l y the idea of impartial concern f o r a l l would be i m p o s s i b l y t  Sartorius(1):  p . 18. 159  hence  However,  acknowledges fulfilling  do  the their  AU and I n t e g r i t y  / 160  demanding; t h e r e i s a l w a y s s o m e t h i n g I c a n do t o make someone e l s e a little h a p p i e r . T r u e , any l o s s of happiness I m y s e l f i n c u r i n w o r k i n g f o r o t h e r s would have t o be s e t a g a i n s t t h e h a p p i n e s s I b r i n g about; b u t even so, as long as there are others who w i l l b e n e f i t more f r o m my h e l p t h a n h e l p i n g w i l l c o s t me, an ethic which commands us t o aim, d i r e c t l y and i m p a r t i a l l y , a t t h e w e l f a r e of a l l r e n d e r s m o r a l l y d u b i o u s a l l my l e i s u r e and s e l f - i n d u l g e n c e a b o v e t h e minimum I need t o r e c u p e r a t e t o be f i t f o r more w e l f a r e - m a x i m i z i n g labors. This i s an e t h i c f o r s a i n t s , f Singer ideal  p o r t r a y s AU a s  an e t h i c  AU m o r a l a g e n t a c t u a l l y  majority  of  self-indulgent  activities  dubious a t t h i s p o i n t the agent and then  these  a moral  that  are  virtually  activities  become  dubious.  theory  p o r t r a y s an a g e n t who  But  is itself  impossible  demands  fails  to s a t i s f y  Wolf  echoes  no l i m i t  Singer's  on what  point  that  there  is  i s morally  of the  AU  required  agent. U t i l i t a r i a n i s m r e q u i r e s him t o want t o achieve the g r e a t e s t general happiness, and t h i s would seem t o commit him t o t h e i d e a l of t h e moral s a i n t . ... The gain in happiness that would accrue to o n e s e l f and one's n e i g h b o r s by a more well-rounded, richer l i f e than t h a t of the moral s a i n t would be pathetically small i n comparison t o t h e amount by w h i c h one could increase the general  t  the  Thus, the  morally  i t places  with  saint.  s a y t h a t AU m o r a l  because  saints,  demands a s m o r a l l y s e l f - i n d u l g e n t . Susan  moral  being  moral  nonwelfare-maximizing  p e r h a p s one might a s w e l l  on  for  S i n g e r ( 8 ) : p . 159.  AU  and  Integrity /  161  happiness if one devoted oneself e x p l i c i t l y t o the c a r e of the s i c k , the downtrodden, the starving, and the homeless.f In  her  follows a  account  of  Singer.  Yet  "well-rounded,  the  requirements  Wolf d e s c r i b e s  richer  life",  moral  s e l f - i n d u l g e n c e . And  short  of  the  positively  AU  f r o m an  saintly AU  imposed  by  AU,  Wolf  the  nonsaint  i n terms  of  against  Singer's  reference  to  in general ideal  she  cannot  notes be  that  falling  characterized  perspective.  Of c o u r s e , t h e r e may be psychological l i m i t s to the e x t e n t t o which a person can devote himself to such things without going crazy. But the utilitarian's individual limitations would not thereby become a positive f e a t u r e of h i s p e r s o n a l i d e a l s , $ The  contention  people) to  satisfy  correct.  Singer  As  that  i t i s impossible  (at l e a s t  the  requirements  AU  of  idealism  notes:  I f we were more r a t i o n a l , we would be d i f f e r e n t : we would use our r e s o u r c e s t o save as many lives as possible, i r r e s p e c t i v e of whether we do it by r e d u c i n g the road toll or by saving specific, identifiable lives; and we w o u l d be no readier to kill children from g r e a t h e i g h t s t h a n f a c e t o f a c e . An e t h i c s that r e l i e d s o l e l y on an appeal to impartial rationalilty would, however, be followed only by the i m p a r t i a l l y r a t i o n a l . An e t h i c f o r human b e i n g s must t a k e them a s t h e y a r e , o r a s t h e y have some c h a n c e of b e c o m i n g . *  t W o l f ( 1 ) : p. 428. $ W o l f ( 1 ) : p. 428. * S i n g e r ( 8 ) : p. 157.  f o r most seems  AU and I n t e g r i t y However, t h i s  avoids Wolf's  the  the  issue  of  'impartially 'impartial can  rational',  a personal  people t o s t r i v e  sainthood  which  people  basic  Besides  could  question  is  i n t h e s e n s e meant by AU, ideal  which  i t would  become whether properly  be good  for  toward.  considers and  to  t h e more  rationality',  serve as  Wolf  extent  fundamental q u e s t i o n .  / 162  the d e s i r a b i l i t y  finds  it  of the i d e a l  unsatisfactory.  She  of  moral  notes  the  following. I d o n ' t know whether t h e r e a r e any m o r a l s a i n t s . But i f t h e r e a r e , I am g l a d t h a t n e i t h e r I nor t h o s e about whom I care a r e among them. By m o r a l s a i n t I mean a p e r s o n whose e v e r y a c t i o n i s a s morally good a s p o s s i b l e , a p e r s o n , t h a t i s , who i s as m o r a l l y w o r t h y a s c a n be. ... I b e l i e v e that moral p e r f e c t i o n , i n the sense of moral saintliness, does not constitute a model of personal well-being toward which i t would be particularly rational or good or d e s i r a b l e f o r a human b e i n g t o s t r i v e , f There  i s a certain  saint  i s someone who  accordance with would  on a s c a l e purely  t  strives  be p a r t i c u l a r l y  i t would  i n Wolf's suggestion.  rational  The p a r a d o x  not n e c e s s a r i l y  of r a t i o n a l  rational  toward  AU s a i n t l i n e s s ,  seems p a r a d o x i c a l . that  tension  (i.e.,  W o l f ( 1 ) : p . 419.  impartial  then to may  If a  rationality in  the d e n i a l  that  be i m p a r t i a l l y be  resolved  be more r a t i o n a l  p r e f e r e n c e ) t o choose  moral  rational by  (i.e.,  t o become  more c o m p l e t e l y d o m i n a t e d  it  noting higher more  by i d e a s o f  AU impartial  aid).  question  possible.f  i_s This  supremacy o f the  set  ideals.  she  be  ideal  importance  against Wolf  morally  and  or in  apparently i t has  d i s c u s s i o n of  relates  in p r a c t i c a l  the  163  prompts  the  ideas  good to  of  or  the  whether m o r a l i t y competition  issue  endorses  the  as  of  the  morality  everything  i s one  with  impartial  worthy  reason—whether  w h i c h encompasses  general  Integrity /  however,  d o m i n a t e d by  as  question  morality  suggests that her  to  supreme  fundamental is  resolution,  a b o u t whether b e i n g  rationality  offers  This  and  ideal  other  latter  of that  nonmoral view  and  public acceptance. Referring  undesirability  of m o r a l  to  saintliness  says: Outside of the context of moral d i s c u s s i o n , t h i s w i l l s t r i k e many a s an o b v i o u s p o i n t . But, w i t h i n t h a t c o n t e x t , the p o i n t , i f i t be g r a n t e d , will be g r a n t e d w i t h some d i s c o m f o r t . F o r w i t h i n that context it is generally assumed t h a t one ought t o be as m o r a l l y good as p o s s i b l e and t h a t what l i m i t s t h e r e are to morality's hold on us are set by f e a t u r e s of human n a t u r e of which we ought not t o be p r o u d . $  Wolf's point  is  well  believe  it  is a  that  they cannot only  achieve  people could  taken. Singer,  the  tragic ideal  become m o r a l  feature of  f o r example, of  seems  human b e i n g s  to that  impartial rationality.  s a i n t s , the  world  would be  If a  t I t a l s o o p e n s the q u e s t i o n of whether t h e m o r a l s a i n t is d e s c r i b e d more p r o p e r l y as a m o r a l f a n a t i c , s i n c e what Wolf p o r t r a y s as a m o r a l i d e a l may be more a p t l y c o n s t r u e d as a m o r a l e x t r e m e w h i c h may be a d m i r a b l e o n l y i n some r e s p e c t s . * W o l f ( 1 ) : p. 419.  AU a n d I n t e g r i t y better of  place.  But such  the almost  model  for  about  whether  which  to To  universal  living. moral  appears  rejection  Most  people  saintliness  very dubious  of the  have  moral  serious  constitutes  an  164  in light  saint  as  a  reservations ideal  toward  strive.  clarify  description qualities  a claim  /  of  that  such the  reservations moral  a moral  saint.  saint  would  Wolf  provides  She  advances  a  need  to possess.  a  fuller list  of  B u t , a b o v e a l l , a m o r a l s a i n t must have and c u l t i v a t e t h o s e q u a l i t i e s which are apt to allow him t o treat others as j u s t l y and k i n d l y a s p o s s i b l e . He will have the standard moral v i r t u e s to a n o n s t a n d a r d d e g r e e . He w i l l b e patient, c o n s i d e r a t e , even-tempered, hospitable, c h a r i t a b l e i n thought as well as i n d e e d . He w i l l b e v e r y r e l u c t a n t t o make n e g a t i v e judgements of o t h e r p e o p l e . He w i l l b e c a r e f u l n o t t o f a v o r some p e o p l e o v e r o t h e r s on the b a s i s of properties they could not help but have.t Wolf  then  goes  troubling  about  on a  to  suggest  person  who  that manages  there  i s  to satisfy  description. P e r h a p s what I have already said i s e n o u g h t o make some people begin to regard the absence of moral s a i n t s in their lives as a blessing. For there comes a p o i n t i n t h e l i s t i n g o f virtues that a moral saint i s likely to have where one might naturally begin to wonder whether the moral saint isn't, a f t e r a l l , t o o g o o d — i f n o t t o o good f o r h i s own g o o d , a t l e a s t t o o g o o d f o r h i s own w e l l - b e i n g . F o r the moral virtues, g i v e n t h a t t h e y a r e , by h y p o t h e s i s , a l l t  W o l f ( 1 ) : p. 421.  something such  a  AU a n d I n t e g r i t y  / 165  p r e s e n t i n t h e same i n d i v i d u a l , a n d t o an extreme d e g r e e , a r e a p t t o crowd o u t t h e n o n m o r a l v i r t u e s , a s w e l l a s many o f the interests and personal c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s t h a t we g e n e r a l l y think contribute to a healthy, well-rounded, r i c h l y developed c h a r a c t e r , f Ambivalence more s t r i k i n g  about  the nature  of the moral  saint  i s even  when one c o n s i d e r s how dominance by t h e  virtues manifests  itself  i n terms of a c t i o n s  moral  and p r o j e c t s .  ... i f t h e m o r a l saint i s devoting a l l his time to feeding the hungry or h e a l i n g t h e s i c k o r r a i s i n g money f o r Oxfam, then necessarily he is not reading V i c t o r i a n novels, playing the oboe, or improving his backhand. A l t h o u g h no one o f t h e i n t e r e s t s or t a s t e s i n the category c o n t a i n i n g these l a t t e r a c t i v i t i e s c o u l d be c l a i m e d t o be a necessary element in a life well lived, a l i f e i n w h i c h none of these possible aspects of character are developed may seem to be a life strangely barren. $ The  barrenness  nature The  of t h e  moral  dominated act  of such a l i f e concern  saint  with doing  and t h e i d e a l  by t h e same  results  basic  from  the a l l pervasive  the m o r a l l y r i g h t  AU m o r a l  agent  characteristics,  thing.  b o t h need  t o be  and they  will  i n much t h e same ways. Defenders  of  the  ideal  to  be aimed  personal  ideal  projects  and c h a r a c t e r t r a i t s  moral  agent  and  his life.  t W o l f ( 1 ) : p . 421. $ W o l f ( 1 ) : p . 421.  moral a t , may  agent  contend  must be a p a r t  Wolf,  of  however,  AU, that  as  the  nonmoral  of the i d e a l p o i n t s out  AU  that  AU such t r a i t s  do n o t have  independent  and I n t e g r i t y / 166  value.  I t may be t h a t a good g o l f game i s j u s t what i s needed to secure that big donation for Oxfam. Perhaps the cultivation of one's exceptional a r t i s t i c t a l e n t w i l l t u r n o u t t o be t h e way one can make one's greatest contribution to society. ... The m o r a l s a i n t , then, may, by happy accident, find himself w i t h nonmoral v i r t u e s on w h i c h he c a n c a p i t a l i z e m o r a l l y o r w h i c h make p s y c h o l o g i c a l demands t o w h i c h he has no c h o i c e b u t t o a t t e n d . The point is that, for a moral saint, the e x i s t e n c e o f t h e s e i n t e r e s t s and skills c a n be g i v e n a t b e s t t h e s t a t u s o f happy a c c i d e n t s - t h e y c a n n o t be e n c o u r a g e d f o r t h e i r own s a k e s a s d i s t i n c t , i n d e p e n d e n t aspects of t h e r e a l i z a t i o n o f human good, f Yet  i t  remains true  nonmoral t r a i t s effective frequently  characteristics.  we  i n ways t h a t  means form  that  value,  and  generating  our  ideals reference  in to  utility. terms such  of ideal  In such  One would hope that they would be f i g u r e s who a r e m o r a l l y good-and by t h i s I mean more than just not morally b a d - b u t one would hope, t o o , t h a t they a r e n o t j u s t m o r a l l y good, b u t t a l e n t e d or accomplished or attractive in nonmoral ways a s w e l l . We may make ideals out of athletes, scholars, artists-more frivolously, out of cowboys, p r i v a t e e y e s , and rock stars. ... Though there i s c e r t a i n l y nothing immoral a b o u t the i d e a l characters or t r a i t s I have i n mind, they cannot be s u p e r i m p o s e d upon t h e i d e a l o f a moral Wolf(1):  p . 425.  fact,  being we  nonmoral  figures  notes the f o l l o w i n g .  t  encourage  do n o t depend upon t h e i r  for  With  admire  Wolf  AU and I n t e g r i t y  / 167  s a i n t . F o r a l t h o u g h i t i s p a r t o f many of t h e s e i d e a l s t h a t t h e c h a r a c t e r s s e t h i g h , and n o t m e r e l y a c c e p t a b l e , moral standards f o r themselves, i t i s also essential to their power and a t t r a c t i v e n e s s that the moral strengths go, so t o speak, a l o n g s i d e o f s p e c i f i c , i n d e p e n d e n t l y a d m i r a b l e , nonmoral ground projects and dominant personal traits.t Wolf's point ideals  and  is much  t h a t AU  idealism  o f what  we  threatens  normally  many  perceive  of  our  as  having  threat, i t  remains  value. Even g r a n t i n g t h e e x i s t e n c e of t h i s an  open q u e s t i o n  ordinary  ideals  defender  o f AU  values  i n favour  how much f o r c e t h e c o n f l i c t and v a l u e s simply  may  has  as a  reject  between AU  criticism  these  of  normal  and  AU.  ideals  A  and  o f AU.  Whenever t h e c o n f l i c t i s a r e a l one, and not merely an apparent conflict, d e p e n d e n t on the omission of factors w h i c h t h e a c t - u t i l i t a r i a n c a n and s h o u l d take into account, the genuine act-utilitarian will be p r e p a r e d to jettison his "ordinary moral convictions" rather than the p r i n c i p l e of a c t - u t i l i t a r i a n i s m . $ However,  i t i s important  in  rejecting  by  t h e AU  that  moral  achieve.  a l l values  principle. sainthood Rejecting  to appreciate except  The is the  f W o l f ( 1 ) : pp. 422-423. t S i n g e r ( 2 ) : p . 94.  those  just  that are  i s s u e goes f a r an i d e a l value  t h a t we of  what  i s involved underwritten  beyond  the  simply  nonmoral  claim  fail  to  strivings,  AU commitments and concerning  ground p r o j e c t s  personal  agent's personal  B.  PERSONAL  integrity,  relations  IDENTITY,  has as  and  Integrity  serious  this  is  personal  PERSONAL  and  /  168  ramifications  involved in  the  identity.  RELATIONS  AND  PERSONAL  INTEGRITY  Rejecting dominant  the  personal  value traits  with Williams' concerns negative  responsibility  projects  b e c a u s e of  sacrifices in  are  about  unrealistic  ideal  do  have v a l u e  personal agent  utility.  represent  personal An  an  issues  the  results  of  The  an  demands. M o r a l  their  causal  ideal  goes  and  moral  ideal  because the  saint  which  ideal  and  agency  difficulty beyond  satisfy  commitments  the  in our  with  concerns this which  producing concept  ideal  i s incompatible- with  r e q u i r e s the  Such  of m o r a l  efficacy  of  personal  calculations.  This ultimately threatens The  connected  s a c r i f i c e of  a g e n t s who  traits  and  endorsement  principal  moral agency  personal  AU's  utility  with  projects  that are  way  i n the  'favourable'  have any  integrity.  integrity  about  o u t s i d e of  impersonal  raises  saintliness.  understanding  not  nonmoral ground  only compatible  t e r m s of m o r a l  this  of  AU  of  moral  personal  s a c r i f i c e of  the  self. agent's personal  often  is  grounded  which  serve  in  self  (i.e.,  individual  t o d e f i n e , u n i f y and  her  personal  commitments  and  g i v e meaning t o an  identity) projects agent's  '  AU life.  By  r e q u i r i n g that  sacrificed threatens a  in light the  distinct  Williams' accept and  a  very  of  s u c h commitments favourable  charactersitics  person  with  an  c a s e of G e o r g e , t h e job  in a  biological  AU  position. and  But,  biological  George's  AU  AU's  o l d e r chemist being  ground  likely  projects  requirement an  (i.e., of  a  i n the  a  self  and  which  cannot  research  in  chemical  opposition  George a c c e p t  rejection  of  the  chemical  of a  sacrifice  agent d i s t i n c t  s t o r y who  maintaing  i s more t h a n  works  from,  of  commitment for  i n the  sacrifice  serious  to  complications,  the  to r e q u i r e the is  b e l i e v e s he  example,  laboratory.  of  such  liability.  For  personal such  a  the moral p e r m i s s i b i l i t y a well-defined simply  personal  a continuing  of  self  subject  experiences). This  suggests a  an  as  Recall  a c e n t r a l commitment  ultimately questions  agent's having  who  AU  agent  express  requires  be  identity.  his strong  his principled  w h i c h d e f i n e s G e o r g e as the  chemist  169  projects  w h i c h d e f i n e an  require that  w a r f a r e may  life,  and  B e c a u s e of v a r i o u s  seems t o  since  Integrity /  calculations,  individual  w a r f a r e because of  assessment  utility  laboratory pursuing  s u c h methods of w a r f a r e . t an  and  'human'  concern  is  expressed  that moral p r o p o s a l s  by  must be  W.E.  Cooper  compatible  when  with  he  living  life.  f Williams p r o v i d e s the George case i n 97-98. The example i s f i r s t p r e s e n t e d and p r e s e n t work i n C h a p t e r F i v e , S e c t i o n A.  Williams(2): discussed in  pp. the  AU a n d I n t e g r i t y  / 170  As f o r t h e n o t i o n , j u s t i n t r o d u c e d , o f a human life or human form of life ( a l t e r n a t i v e l y : a g e n u i n e l y human life, a l i f e worth l i v i n g ) , I w i l l employ i t w i t h a somewhat s p e c i a l sense. A human l i f e i s a human's l i f e , when t h e r e i s a deep motivation to live i t . The requirement of a deep motivation i s meant t o demand a richer motivational structure than an a n i m a l ' s urge to s u r v i v e , a f e a r of d e a t h , and t h e like. The i d e a o f a human life suggests a reasonable constraint on moral proposals: they should be compatible with leading a g e n u i n e l y human l i f e . A stronger constraint also seems r e a s o n a b l e : they should be compatible w i t h our l i v e s c o n t i n u i n g t o be human. T h a t i s , w h a t e v e r c h a n g e s m i g h t be made i n o u r l i v e s , by t h e a d o p t i o n o f a m o r a l proposal, those changes would leave enough of us intact-properties of ourselves that a r e important t o us, etc.-so that we would remain deeply motivated to continue l i v i n g , f Cooper's intact  concern  such  continue  about  that  living  there s t i l l belongs  by W i l l i a m s . The i d e a l by m o r a l person  of  the  agent  subordination  t  projects  a deep m o t i v a t i o n  moral  dominated is  agent to  threatened  i s totally the extent with  to  expressed dominated that  extinction.  the As  t h e a l l p e r v a s i v e n a t u r e o f AU r e q u i r e s t h e  happen a t any p o i n t  personal  AU  o f any o f t h e  an i m p e r s o n a l  remains  enough of t h e p e r s o n  with the kinds of concerns  requirements;  Williams argues,  in  morality leaving  agent's  and f o r w h a t e v e r  utility  calculation.  be e x p e c t e d  C o o p e r ( 1 ) : p . 521.  personal projects reason  t o be  But t h e n  outweighed  how c a n  t o s u r v i v e ? Cooper's  that  any  concern  AU and I n t e g r i t y about  remaining  'human'  Williams addresses  i s essentially  through  who  i s completely  changing  t h e same c o n c e r n  h i s discussion  Cooper goes on t o n o t e  t h e dominant  alienated  demands o f g l o b a l  from  of  that  integrity.  trait  o f an  h i s actions  utility  / 171  agent  by t h e  ever  maximization.  Something l i k e the f o l l o w i n g suggests i t s e l f as t h e dominant t r a i t of moral c h a r a c t e r i n a H o n d e r i c h - g o o d man: B e i n g s u f f i c i e n t l y m a l l e a b l e so a s t o a d a p t t o the c o n s t a n t l y changing requirements of e f f i c i e n t world-wide d i s t r e s s - r e l i e f . I suppose that there is something a d m i r a b l e about such a c h a r a c t e r , but also a good d e a l that i s u n a t t r a c t i v e and even l o a t h e s o m e . A man w i t h s u c h a c h a r a c t e r c o u l d never be r e g a r d e d a s a good f r i e n d , f a t h e r , h u s b a n d , c o l l e a g u e , or c i t i z e n , f By  noting that  being a  AU i d e a l i s m  a good f r i e n d ,  further  aspect  personal  identity  father  of  partly  so a l s o  i t i s founded  Part  thereby  of  of  certain  his  relations  family  means  t  f a r as  Cooperd):  personal  person' t h a t  of w a r f a r e ;  they  Just  integrity)  as is  may  rest  serve  pp. 526-527.  family  relations.  he i s may be another in  and f r i e n d s . These a l s o  by AU. P e r s o n a l commitments t o extend as  highlights  integrity.  and d i s c o v e r e d i n p e r s o n a l  personal identity  with  on  agent  p r o j e c t s and commitments t o c a u s e s ,  o f what makes G e o r g e t h e  rejection part  i n ground  w i t h an  or c o l l e a g u e , Cooper  AU's a t t a c k  (and  founded  i s incompatible  his  essential personal  are threatened  and f r i e n d s c a n  t o maximize  his  utility  from  only an  AU impersonal  perspective.  father  p r o d u c e more u t i l i t y  can  a Big Brother t h e n he to  see  and  should his  do  own  constitutes  So,  relations  example,  on  the  if  weekends by  becoming  i f this  another  way  that  AU  year  means t h a t he  Such a t h r e a t  172  divorced  so,  even  /  a  n e g l e c t i n g h i s ten  son.f  old  son,  never  gets  to p e r s o n a l  relations  attacks personal  integrity  identity.  Winkler  explicity  may  i n the  play  Integrity  totally  through a t t a c k i n g personal E.R.  for  and  notes  the  formulation  role  of an  that agent's  personal personal  identity. For many people, though not a l l , r e l a t i o n s of emotional involvement and commitment and l o v e f o r a s p o u s e , c h i l d , f r i e n d are importantly constitutive of their self-conceptions, of t h e i r sense of t h e i r own identity, and of their sense of the defining values for which they l i v e . A c c o r d i n g l y , f o r many, this sense of the self-constitutive i n t e r n a l i t y of r e l a t i o n s with intimate others contributes essentially to the i d e a s and c o n s t r u c t i o n s t h e y compose of t h e meaning and s i g n i f i c a n c e of their lives, t T h i s account  of a c e n t r a l  correct,  as  the  s e n s e of  only  only  f a r as  permits  a continuing account  of  an  aspect  i t goes, identity  understanding  subject  obligation  t Tom P a t t o n s u g g e s t e d $ W i n k l e r ( 1 ) : p. 275.  of  and  of  personal  i t stands  t h a t can of  the  experiences.  which  this  seems  in c o n f l i c t  with  s u r v i v e w i t h i n AU. agent  i n t e r m s of  Thus,  i s compatible  example.  identity  AU  with  AU being  provides  an  continuing  to  AU be  the  full  same s e n t i e n t  s e n s e of  the  being  fully  AU  fails  identified  Cooper  person  (or  p o i n t by  and  in  commitments Cooper  emphasize  the  personal  worthy  of  personal of  role  self  'right  a  conception  of  agent's personal the AU of  Winkler  agent  /  173  in  at  express  t o become and  least  the the  an  Winkler  a  the  make  related remain  same role  of p r o j e c t s  agent's similar  personal point  relationships  i n an  Essentially  the c r i t i c i s m  i s t h a t AU  theory  that  AU  provides on  the  an  recasts  the  agent  maximizer,  which  radically  personal  self.  And  self,  AU  its  by  as  but  agent's  ideal  that  condition  abandoned. Through  a  person).  by  is largely  a  same p e r s o n  establishing  played  action', and  the  emphasizing  realization—only  conductor  of  and  identity.  acceptable--as  and  t o a l l o w an  W i l l i a m s makes t h e  identity.  not  Integrity  term.f  Thus, W i l l i a m s , concerns.  but  and  that  is is the  definition a  utility  threatens  any  threatening  the  ipso facto threatens  the  integrity  person. i d e a l i s m can  t h e m o r a l a g e n t as  e v e n be  imagined  autonomous and  to threaten  the  self-directed.  idea Cooper  again: t The d i s t i n c t i o n between ' s e n t i e n t b e i n g ' and ' p e r s o n ' can be more fully articulated in v a r i o u s ways. Derek Parfit c a p t u r e s i t w i t h h i s a n a l y s i s of p e r s o n a l i d e n t i t y i n p u r e l y qualitative terms. See Parfit(l): part three. Alasdair M a c l n t y r e ' s p o r t r a y a l of a person's life as constituted w i t h i n a n a r r a t i v e s t r u c t u r e , c e r t a i n e l e m e n t s of w h i c h are e s s e n t i a l or c e n t r a l , p r o v i d e s a n o t h e r way of e x p r e s s i n g t h e d i s t i n c t i o n . See M a c I n t y r e ( 1 ) : c h a p t e r 15.  AU  and  Integrity /  174  One might wonder whether i t w o u l d be c o r r e c t t o say of a m a l l e a b l e man that he l e a d s h i s l i f e . I f he i s an ordinary human b e i n g , he i s not g o i n g t o be able to grasp the p e r t i n e n t f a c t s and make the necessary calculations of p r o b a b i l i t i e s ; bear in mind that the relevant perspective is worldwide. P e r h a p s a c o m m i t t e e of e x p e r t s m i g h t do t h e s e t h i n g s . Then a H o n d e r i c h - g o o d man would be one whose life would e f f e c t i v e l y be led by them, by their decisions about how he might best f a c i l i t a t e universal well-being. This i s a life t h a t we, or most of us, would r e c o g n i z e as not w o r t h l i v i n g . I am not denying that there i s a place in our lives for the perspective of the d i s t r e s s - r e d u c e r . What i s objectionable is its total domination of moral thinking, f Cooper is  r a i s e s an  important  point  about  utility  objectionable  distress moral  reduction  thinking.  perspective  perspective)  Clearly,  cannot  be  the  as  i n the  maximization  is  its total  Singer  necessary.  understood  How  i n t e r m s of  are  morality  question  pertains directly  morality  in practical  f  C o o p e r ( 1 ) : p.  527.  these  t o the  reason.  what  (i.e.,  the  domination  of  the  AU  from w h i c h  an  a c t i o n . Other p o i n t s  of  other  and  that  acknowledges,  sole perspective  a g e n t makes a l l d e c i s i o n s r e g a r d i n g view are  suggestion  perspectives  practical  i s s u e of  the  to  reason? supremacy  be This of  AU and I n t e g r i t y / 175 C.  AU AND THE SUPREMACY The  issue  OF MORALITY  of t h e  supremacy o f  reason concerns the r o l e that with  respect  impossibilty being  to  governed  remains as  the  proper  understanding  short,  what p l a c e  does t h e  concept  the  s t r u c t u r e of  practical  reason  the  foregoing  possibilities Morality is can as  conclusion  supreme The moral  for  practical  well-rounded  agent  t o have  while  that  personal  that  in  the  relation  have  general?  the  ideal  In  within  In l i g h t  of  saintliness  would a p p e a r  t o be  supremacy  ideal.  the moral  action question  of m o r a l i t y  of  reason.  i n the fact  practical  the  i n any e v e n t , AU  and  play  theoretical level.  in practical  two  question.  reason  i f AU  Alternatively,  i f morality  i s not  AU  taken  reason.  possibility  ideal,  of  t o be supreme  in practical  first  insistance  AU  out as t h e moral  the  rest  that,  concerning  the status  be h e l d  at the  d e s i r a b l e there  may be h e l d  denied  the  by m o r a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ,  and a c t i o n  not a l t o g e t h e r  practical  does o r s h o u l d  Acknowledging  between m o r a l i t y  is  in  agent's d e l i b e r a t i o n s concerning  solely  to  morality  action.  o f an  morality  involves  maintaining  the d e n i a l  that  AU  t h e supremacy o f m o r a l i t y  The r a t i o n a l e f o r  such a d e n i a l  AU f a i l s  t h e agent a  life,  any a d e q u a t e such a l i f e . t  is  to  allow  together moral  with  theory  But, of course,  the  may full,  bedrock  must a l l o w this  view  the is  t W i l l i a m s , Cooper and W i n k l e r a d v a n c e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s which are i n t h e s p i r i t of t h i s c o n s t r u a l of the r e l a t i o n between  AU tantamount AU  fails  utility  t o a b a n d o n i n g AU  to p r o v i d e the becomes  reasoning.  one  Taking  endorse  a view w h i c h  obligation. to  So,  a proponent  of  rationale  the p o s i t i o n  for this ideal  obligation  one  c o u l d t a k e AU  i s supreme view  other  speaking,  implicitly,  that  Though t h e AU entail further one  the  morally  AU  have  morality  definition  supremacy o f  premise  others  and  in  supreme  in  of m o r a l  ideal,  t h e AU  176  theory.  of o b l i g a t i o n ,  moral  practical is  account  possibility  is  that  ought  to  it  as  practical to  a proponent  such  the moral  to of  closed  ideal  reason.  a need t o  valuable aspects  consistently  However, w h i l e c o n s i s t e n t , of  in  would a p p e a l  against  can  Proponents  first  /  AU.  'human'.f S t r i c t l y of  AU  be  i s incompatible with  morality  the moral  account  to  o b v i o u s l y , the  Alternatively, deny t h a t  correct  morality  while denying  Integrity  as a g e n e r a l normative  c o n s i d e r a t i o n among  reason,  and  of  adopt a move  of  being account  alternative.  i s not  attractive.  generally  accepted,  i s supreme  in p r a c t i c a l  of o b l i g a t i o n  does not  at  least reason.  in  itself  morality—entailment requires is overall  do--rejection  The  balance  t h e AU  this  but  the  best  a l w a y s t o do  what  of  this doctrine  runs  f ( c o n t ' d ) m o r a l i t y and p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n . M o r a l i t y i t s e l f is too r i c h a phenomenon t o be c a p t u r e d and e x p r e s s e d by AU considerations alone. f G i v e n h e r r e m a r k s a b o u t m o r a l s a i n t s and what i s n e c e s s a r y for a healthy, well-rounded c h a r a c t e r , there i s reason to take Wolf as accepting, at least implicitly, this u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e r e l a t i o n between m o r a l i t y and p r a c t i c a l reason.  AU a n d I n t e g r i t y / 177 directly  counter  defense of-AU. moral  to the h i s t o r i c a l In o t h e r  t h e AU a c c o u n t  of  i t means t o  what  acknowledging  that  moral. Adoption position  that  be  this  i t i s not  fundamental ascribed place  status  in practical  altogether  available The  former  latter,  is  directly  influence  has  limits  of the  counter  of  involves  ramifications  AU  frailty  AU  account  have  the  usually  morality's i s not  but i s r a t h e r  of  itself, a  way  a a  of m o r a l i t y readily  obligation. the  limits  the  that  runs  o f AU.  morality  as  as t h e m o r a l  f o r moral  the  moral,  AU a c c o u n t , w h i l e  in  spirit  taking  to  alternative i s  AU  partly  exclusively  the a u t h o r i t y  morality  r e a s o n and r e g a r d i n g  serious  of  the  of  relinquishing  AU a c c o u n t  with  to the general  t o be  subordination  Thus, n e i t h e r  consistent  AU  by s u b o r d i n a t i n g  inconsistent with  AU t y p i c a l l y practical  that  cost  r i g h t . The AU  proponents  this  analysis  t o be f u l l y  by  t o human m o r a l  proponent  though  theoretical  only  r e a s o n . And  reason.  to a  morally  and thus  concession  practical  best  AU  o f AU c a n  only  commits  and  that  a t the  o f f being  f o r an a g e n t  is  that  concession  theoretical  better  preserved  to morality  practical  in  is  only  alternative  i t i s not o v e r a l l best  obligation  granted  then a proponent  moral but  people are  of  i t is  o f o b l i g a t i o n as t h e p r o p e r  c o n c e r n e d w i t h d o i n g what of  if  s a i n t l i n e s s i s undesirable,  preserve  since  words,  a n d modern e x p r e s s i o n  agents.  supreme  in  ideal.  This  Besides  the  AU impossibility  of a  person  fulfilling  t h e y a r e so u n d e r s t o o d , t h i s  places  the agent  is  in  jeopardy. There  w i t h an a c c o u n t o f o b l i g a t i o n continuing advanced.  existence The  appreciated.  of  force It is  of  for  this criticism that  (at l e a s t  t h e argument  against  c o n c e r n s what  perceives not  i t t o be a t r a g i c  ideal  AU  agents  agents r e a l i z e d The  force  of  challenge  the  would  cost  believes would  p o i n t . AU  i s t o remain  it  t o be.  D.  A  DILEMMA:  willing  feature  ideal  we  moral  obligation  already  would  OR  seen,  wrong  is  to  be  agent  is  needs AU  be  because desirable  Again,  Singer  of p e o p l e t h a t  they  that  in  a world  be a much b e t t e r AU  that  cannot  if  are which  world.  obligation  i f people meeting  UNATTRACTIVENESS  have  of AU  obligation,  something  of  it  by most p e o p l e )  argument a g a i n s t  latter  realization,  Such an  t h e AU the  of  radically  and  whose use  obstacles.  us t o o much. T h u s ,  obligations  As  practical  when  radically  the i d e a l  in practice  of  178  i s i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h the  unrealizeable  independently  /  the v e r y personhood  the person  AU  Integrity  her o b l i g a t i o n s  something  which  irrelevant  and  is  to  realized,  their  moral  i s c o m p l e t e l y worthy be what AU  portrays  DISHARMONY?  the  AU  agent  diverges  from what n o r m a l l y i s deemed p e r s o n a l l y a d m i r a b l e . agent  to  is  not, for  sacrifice  for  example,  someone  his 'friends'.  who  Given  would a  be  normal  AU understanding successful  AU  p r o j e c t s and perspective  life  us.  what  agent  of  has  no  involved  do  not  survive  179  friendship,  friends. Friendships,  illustrates  the  extent  i n t e r m s of AU  example, AU  requires  like  i n the  connection  and  a personal  meaning of  t o which the  agency are  r e j e c t i n g the  commonly p e r c e i v e d the  in  Integrity /  the ground  impartial  AU.  understood  For  is  commitments,  Winkler a  of  and  contours  of  t o most  of  alien  legitimacy  between a p e r s o n a l  of  the  sacrifice  life.  The u t i l i t a r i a n ideal seems to leave c o m p l e t e l y out of a c c o u n t any set of significant connections between the a g e n t ' s s e l f - c o n c e p t i o n and t h e s e n s e of t h e meaning of h i s or h e r l i f e and the outcome secured by an action of s a c r i f i c e . When, f o r example, one thinks o f t h e h a c k n e y e d example of t h e soldier who t h r o w s h i m s e l f on a g r e n a d e t o save t h e l i v e s of other s o l d i e r s it is the connection of a shared cause and s t r u g g l e and p u r p o s e t h a t recommends i t s s t a t u r e as an expression of heroism. Compare a foreign correspondent, reporting on a guerrila war in A f g h a n i s t a n , who would throw h i m s e l f on any g r e n a d e t h a t was s u r r o u n d e d by any t h r e e or more s o l d i e r s from any side. T h i s would no d o u b t be i n t e r e s t i n g , but questionably ideal.t The  foreign  bewilderment be  than a d m i r a t i o n .  s k e p t i c a l about  who  was  But  it is  t  correspondent's  so  totally this  Winkler(1):  p.  the  It  would be  psychological  d o m i n a t e d by  domination 281 .  a c t i o n would  that  the AU  cause  difficult  well-being  of  holds  up  as  not  an  impartial point  more  of  the  to  agent view. moral  AU ideal. the an  Winkler  impartial agent  expresses  serious price  s k e p t i c i s m about  p e r s p e c t i v e . He  always a c t i n g  from  attached  and  suggests  the  Integrity  such  180  domination  t h a t t h e AU  impartial  /  ideal  by of  p e r s p e c t i v e has  a  to i t .  ... a commonly s h a r e d i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n of this 'moral ideal' would necessarily g e n e r a t e a d e p r e c i a t i o n of t h e variety of p e r s o n a l moral i d e a l s w h i c h can be equally rational, while involving very d i f f e r e n t a d j u d i c a t i o n s of t h e tension between p e r s o n a l and l i m i t e d commitments and a g e n e r a l humanitarian concern. In t h i s way, the general success of the utilitarian ideal would involve an i m p o v e r i s h m e n t of t h e human drama.f The  full  causes  'human drama' r e q u i r e s f r i e n d s h i p s ,  and  lost  i n AU  that  it  a diversity  of p e r s o n a l  i d e a l i s m . AU leaves  no  The  receptacle"  for u t i l i t y  AU  turns  producer ignores human  and  individual  the agent conductor.  the v a l u e drama  for  into This  persons  grounds as  as a  as a d i s t i n c t not  than the  a  an "mere way  utility  individual  person. simply  to are  It i s in this  of v i e w i n g  and  the  simply  n o t h i n g more way  on  these  individual,  disutility.$  of t h e a g e n t  requires  the  i s construed  and  A l l of  been c r i t i c i z e d  place  individual.  that  has  ideals.  commitments  But  the  utility  receptacles. Issues concerning acts  in  accordance  the a d m i r a b i l i t y with  AU  perhaps  of t h e are  agent  captured  who more  t W i n k l e r ( 1 ) : p. 282. i Regan uses t h i s terminology, and he a t t r i b u t e s i t to Singer. For a critical d i s c u s s i o n of AU generally, and S i n g e r ' s v i e w s i n p a r t i c u l a r , see R e g a n ( 3 ) : c h a p t e r 6.  AU precisely  in  terms  bewilderment less  in  of the  i n the case  t h e what  agent  of the  of h i s  by  clarifying  motivation  relates  Emphasizing only  to further  acting  lives  he  of  projects  no  any  foreign  anyone  It i s  to  of  individual  correspondent's considerations.  to  utilitarian  soldier  persons  that  the  his agent  soldier  (as e x p r e s s e d shares) that  only  he  whose  i s n o t an  correpondent  but  the  no v a l u e t o  value that  foreign  of  correspondent  imagine  generally  the  the  is  to the persons  h i s comrades  commitments t h a t a d m i r a b l e . The  why  attributes  of p e o p l e  to the persons  and  who  lies  c a p t u r e s the  foreign  (or  The  his  the a d m i r a b i l i t y  difficult  181  of  AU  the  his l i f e  admiration.  sacrifice value  value to  or t o the l i v e s  attributes  his  the  Assuming  AU.  t h e why  primary motive  makes i t  s a v e s ) . And  life  worthy  doubt.  in  from AU  to  from  /  correspondent  as  directly  the agent's  from AU  attributes  own  than  s e r v e s t o open t h e q u e s t i o n o f  agent is  that  that  Integrity  acts  foreign  action  a c t i o n . f D e s c r i b i n g the a c t i o n aspect  who  and  in  makes  attributes  to  individual  a r e not  restricted  abstractions. Concerns to  the  thereby  ideal lack  about AU  AU  and  agent's  admirability lack  of a d m i r a b i l t y .  of  Cases  personal may  arise  identity i n which  it  and is  f One c a n i m a g i n e p e o p l e who b e l i e v e t h a t t h e y w i l l go to heaven i f t h e y d i e f o r any three people. Concerns about someone a c t i n g from t h i s motive would be q u i t e different than those i n v o l v i n g the foreign correspondent. But both a c t i o n s s t i l l might be i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h AU.  AU reasonable  t o assume t h a t t h e  w h i c h her  primary  out  t o be  the  intention  can  martyr be the  motive p r e c i s e l y  optimal reduce  f o r an  to the  apparently  come  a d m i r a t i o n . And,  certain  crucially,  to maintain  behind  the  legends  death,  then  admiration despite  and  serving  hero,  by  hopelessness,  and  the  s e l f - c o n s c i o u s motive as  a heroic  symbol  may  basis  for  perhaps  attributes  in a lost  primary cause  s u b j e c t of  is  folksongs  for others after  her  compromised.  individual's  it  a  commitment  i f one  seriously  forth  very  individual  a c t i o n s . I f the  the  turns  Consider  become d i f f i c u l t ,  her  is  in  this  p r o v i d e s the  inspiration  admiration  and  commitment, d e s p i t e  admiration  tragic  a f o c u s of  is called  the  dominant by  and  which  to  yet  I t i s the  a c t i o n s of a m a r t y r  t o become a famous and and  of her  i t may  motives  and  Such an  the cause.  this  life  admirability.  cause.  what may,  utilitarian  intention  of  182  i s t o p r o d u c e what  and  the q u a l i t y  /  Integrity  v a l u e s her  of a f f a i r s ,  lost  hopelessness  ideal,  impossible,  state  sympathy  a d m i r e d b e c a u s e of apparent  agent  and  commitment,  i s incompatible t o enhance  The  with  future  around which  a  utility  people  will  gather. Recognizing further  concern  something  about  seriously  which a l l o w s to act  this  aspect the  of  admirability  tenability  wrong w i t h  a  theory  f o r i n s t a n c e s i n w h i c h one  rightly  ( w i t h i n the  of  t e r m s of  of  cannot the  raises  a  There  is  AU.  right  action  fully  intend  theory),  without  AU and I n t e g r i t y that  intention  diminishing  Since a d m i r a b i l i t y directly action AU  And t h e AU  agent  object  incompatible utility  commitments for  The  another AU  threat to the who a c t s  of  with  from  admiration,  a genuine  maximization. seems a  of the  with  an  agent's  agent's  integrity  AU may o f t e n since  the  fail  such to  that  is  agent.  t o be  agency  anything  possibility  i s felt  the  o f how  personhood of the  commitment And  illustration  a is  other  of  p r e r e q u i s i t e for admiration.  example, t h e a d m i r a t i o n  agent.  supposed u l t i m a t e l y t o save  becomes  integrity.  by AU's  incompatible  is  in~ AU t e r m s , t h i s  threatened  than  be  i n t e n d i n g what  threatens  proper  can  the a d m i r a b i l i t y  / 183  such  Consider,  f o r Martin  Luther  King. Martin Luther King appeals ... not s i m p l y b e c a u s e he c o n t r i b u t e d so much t o so many. He inspires because of the i n t e g r a t i o n between his understanding, v a l u e s and commitments, h i s c o n c e p t i o n of h i s r o l e i n l i f e , and t h e n a t u r e and f o c u s o f h i s commitments, f o r w h i c h he paid f i n a l l y with h i s l i f e . f If  one i m a g i n e s t h a t K i n g ' s  maximization result. left  The p e r s o n  an  impartial  of King  corresponent  grounds t h a t disappear  in  existed for  because  none  disappears  and t h e r e  W i n k l e r ( 1 ) : p . 282.  Afghanistan. the admiration  of the  was t o  perspective,  t o d i s t i n q u i s h h i m ( a s a p e r s o n ) from,  foreign  t  from  o n l y commitment  personal  utility  two is  things nothing  f o r example, t h e  In  addition,  of t h e  the  man  also  commitments  that  AU and I n t e g r i t y / 184 define one  King  (as King) s u r v i v e  recasts  thereby  King  a s an  the reasons  Defenders pointing  out  portraying decides  of  ideal  AU a g e n t ,  f o r admiration AU  that  AU  i n t h e AU p e r s p e c t i v e .  may the  best  defused  defining taking this is  and  as a  that that  maximize rule  the  optimal  fails the  utility  admirability,  The  upon  an  agent  that  states  involved  distinction  affairs  that  in this between  o f t e n the  of  by d i r e c t l y  is,  trying  claim  taking  agent  successfully  t h e AU  t h e n an  i s caught  that  One  of r i g h t  AU  as and But  t o a c t but  can i n t e n d  to  following  e n d . But i f a can  action  to  criticism  that  maximize u t i l i t y  sole  undermine  i n terms  of  i n her e f f o r t s  to  tenable. in  a dilemma  o b l i g a t i o n s . On  t h e one  achieves  ideal  t h e AU  how  f o r example,  account i s not  decide  result.  way t o a c h i e v e  intention to  AU a g e n t  AU t o  and d e c i d e ,  maximization  her  uses  The  the  i s to  for action.  to address the c r i t i c i s m .  he i n t e n d s  dominating  utility  i s not  rest  i n how  decision-making procedure  (X) i s t h e b e s t  satisfy  to  by  the rightness-making c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of a c t i o n s  AU  not  utility  Any p a r a d o x  through  response  rather  seems  a d i r e c t a p p l i c a t i o n o f AU. F r e q u e n t l y ,  way t o m a x i m i z e  and  criticism  t o a c t . Many p r o p o n e n t s o f AU c o n t e n d  maximize u t i l i t y . be  this  direct role  most e f f e c t i v e means o f p r o d u c i n g avoids  to  criticism a  person  disappear.  respond  as p l a y i n g  the  So, i f  hand, t h e  i s an  agent  agent  who  who h a s  no  AU deep  or  demanding  relations. we  Such an  normally  personal a g e n t has  understand  the  agent  fails  person,  the  agent  has  commitments t h a t agent, there to  fulfill  and  are  i s the  her  agent'  itself.  The  personal  agent's o v e r a l l  and  AU,  fragmented Assuming  wholeness  guaranteeing there  are  incompatible  self  hand, a s  o b l i g a t i o n s . As  AU.  But  AU  d i v i d e s the  as  t o do  disharmony with  what  to  is right.  fulfill  agent has,  her  AU  order  'person' againstthe  Thus,  AU  given  obligations  of n e c e s s i t y , a  a and  an  in  self  as  i s more  includes projects with  in  and  identity  d i s c o r d between t h e  is  impossible  unity  of  attack  on  personal the  is  understood  the the  be  self,  a g e n t , or  as  divided  case  of  through  involving AU the  the  that  agent.t  the the  a  practically agent.  AU  attacking  i t attacks personal  for questioning the  as  then  integrity  integrity  disharmony w i t h i n  grounds  a g e n t . I t may  which  AU  185  self.  and  of  other  her  f r a g m e n t s and  the  attacks  personhood  life  integrity  g u a r a n t e e s an either  a  the  satisfy  commitment  i t i s humanly by  to  on  /  commitments  abiding personal  o b l i g a t i o n s . The  'AU  construed  no  Integrity  o b l i g a t i o n t o maximize u t i l i t y  the  that  projects,  i t . Or,  likely,  and  integrity  In e i t h e r  a d m i r a b i l i t y of possibility  the  of  by  case the  AU  discord  t An a g e n t who c a r e s o n l y about maximizing u t i l i t y avoids t h i s dilemma. However, an a g e n t whose only deep ground project is utility maximization from an impersonal perspective i s only a person i n the thinnest and most t r i v i a l s e n s e of p e r s o n h o o d .  AU and I n t e g r i t y c a n n o t be a l t o g e t h e r personal  agent.  obligation fuller  in  w h i c h would  principle, that  either  a  an  life  of  account  of  such a consequence, determining  However, a t p r e s e n t , of  AU  personal  if  and d i v i s i o n  least worth  i n t e r m s o f t h e dilemma  has an a n a l o g u e  a  other  i t is  characteristics  a  or  of else  involving society  community.  SOCIETAL  can a t t a c k  a g e n t who process.  This  can  would  self  morality.  ideal  comes  of t h e k i n d s  the  into  AU t h r e a t e n s  agent  corrosion  integrity t h e AU  the  a l s o can ideal.  conflict societal  and  conflict  among  the s o c i e t y through i t s goals  the  of p r o j e c t s  and  as  a  AU  demand.  An  when t h e  AU  distinct  t h e 'personhood' of  disharmony  integrity  the  in  result  Now  same two ways. E i t h e r AU t h r e a t e n s i t attacks  of  ways.  in that  l o s e s her personhood  define  survive  to achieve  i n two d i f f e r e n t  of the agent d i r e c t l y  t h e AU  on p e r s o n a l  fails  integrity  i s b e c a u s e none  individual  agent  personal  achieves  which  assault  INTEGRITY  the person  relations  or  require  result.  of  AU t h r e a t e n s  the  would  this  loss  E. AU AND  the  accepting  seem t o e n t a i l  the c r i t i c i s m  fragmentation  It  before  the moral  (which a r e e q u a l l y p l a u s i b l e ) c o u l d a v o i d , a t  noting  and  But,  discussion  accounts  e l i m i n a t e d from  / 186  with  i n something  the s o c i e t y  There  like  directly  c r e a t i n g disharmony  and i t s members.  its  is  and some  /  187  achieves the  AU  AU and I n t e g r i t y reason ideal the  to suspect may  Lose  same way  achieves  (and f o r  does.  would  both  be  reasons)  i n something that  Such a s o c i e t y  any more t h a n  p r o j e c t s and r e l a t i o n s  which  identity  or c i v i l i z a t i o n  society  In  society  similiar  ideal  have no c u l t u r e  agent.  the  its distinctive  t h e AU  distinct  that  t h e agent  to  w h i c h would d e f i n e i t a s the i d e a l  such  subordinate  who  would seem  AU a g e n t  to  a  would have  which would d e f i n e her as a  instances,  like  distinct  defining  characteristics  utility  maximization  considerat ions.f But that It  more  importantly, the  AU i n v o l v e s  also  exists  f r a g m e n t a t i o n and  i s not r e s t r i c t e d at the  level  to the i n d i v i d u a l  of s o c i e t y  r e q u i r e s d i s h o n e s t y and m a n i p u l a t i o n on moral  agent  society. recalling  dealings with the  P a r t of the reason the importance  between t h e praising  i n her  utility  of  division  and community. the p a r t  of the  o t h e r members o f  f o r t h i s c a n be b r o u g h t  that the  AU  p l a c e s on t h e  action  agent.  and  the  out  AU AU her by  distinction utility  of  the a c t i o n . P r a i s i n g a person i s t h u s an important action in itself-it has significant  t F o r example, i n t h e same way t h a t AU c o n s i d e r a t i o n s a r e the s o l e d e t e r m i n i n g f a c t o r i n whether George s h o u l d take the j o b i n the chemical and b i o l o g i c a l w a r f a r e laboratory, so utility c o n s i d e r a t i o n s are the only concerns, for i n s t a n c e , i n whether t o t e a r down t h e E i f f e l Tower i n o r d e r t o b u i l d a n o t h e r s t r u c t u r e . No d i r e c t a p p e a l s c a n be made t o the p a r t s that a p r i n c i p l e d o b j e c t i o n to warfare and an h i s t o r i c a l monument m i g h t p l a y i n d e f i n i n g the distinctive c h a r a c t e r s o f George and P a r i s .  AU and I n t e g r i t y  / 188  effects. A utilitarian must therefore l e a r n t o c o n t r o l h i s a c t s o f p r a i s e and d i s p r a i s e , thus perhaps c o n c e a l i n g h i s a p p r o v a l o f an a c t i o n when he thinks that the expression of such approval m i g h t have bad e f f e c t s , and p e r h a p s even praising actions of which he does n o t r e a l l y approve, f Putting integrity  aside  what  effect  such  deception  o f t h e AU m o r a l a g e n t , what does t h i s  has  it  does f o r  the moral  and d i v i s i o n  the i n d i v i d u a l .  can  It  a position  a r e aware  i n v o l v i n g such  involve. Singer,  to maintain  the i n t e g r i t y  of the p o t e n t i a l deception  f o r example,  some l e v e l  of s o c i e t a l  and  that of  i s sensitive  Smart(2):  pp. 49-50.  problems  manipulation to the  integrity.  Imagine there were no commitment to t e l l i n g t h e t r u t h , o n l y a commitment to doing what impartially advances everyone's interests. Then in many s i t u a t i o n s we would n o t be a b l e t o rely on i n f o r m a t i o n g i v e n to' u s : t h e p a t i e n t a w a k e n i n g from an e x p l o r a t o r y o p e r a t i o n , w a n t i n g t o know i f a m a l i g n a n t tumor was found; the e l d e r l y woman asking her a t h e i s t f a m i l y t o give her a religious funeral; the dispirited student r e c e i v i n g a s u r p r i s i n g l y good g r a d e f o r his essay. In a l l o f t h e s e cases, without a commitment to t e l l i n g the truth, the i n f o r m a t i o n , promise, or g r a d e would be a s l i k e l y t o have been given i n order t o make the person i n v o l v e d h a p p i e r a s t o have been given because i t i s the t r u t h or r e f l e c t s the t  entails  i n t h e same way  threatens  do  community.  Some u t i l i t a r i a n s that  in society  the  deception  t o t h e i n t e r a c t i o n s among t h e members o f s o c i e t y ? AU fragmentation  on  need  AU  and  Integrity  189  /  true intentions or judgements of the person giving i t . Once the patient, e l d e r l y woman, o r s t u d e n t r e a l i z e s t h i s , the communication w i l l f a i l to achieve w h a t e v e r i t was intended to achieve, whether t h i s was t o make t h e recipient h a p p i e r o r t o communicate t r u t h f u l l y , t This In  d o e s not  keeping  may  r e q u i r e , however, t h a t t h e  with  override  the such  spirit  o f AU,  concerns  contention  seems t o c r e a t e an  an  t o remove  effort  upon S i d g w i c k ' s  this  distinction  moral code. A c c o r d i n g  to  truth  Singer  about internal  potential between a  must  be  contends  told.  that  truthfulness.  AU This  t e n s i o n w i t h i n AU. tension Singer private  and  a  In  relies public  Sidgwick:  ... i t may be r i g h t t o do and privately recommend u n d e r certain circumstances, what i t w o u l d not be r i g h t t o advocate o p e n l y ; i t may be c o n c e i v a b l y r i g h t to do, i f i t c a n be done w i t h comparative s e c r e c y , what i t w o u l d be wrong t o do i n the face of the world; and even, if perfect secrecy can be reasonably e x p e c t e d , what i t would be wrong to recommend by private advice or example.$ Noting this  that Sidgwick  might  be  does not  p r o v i d e any  acceptable, Singer  examples of  s u p p l i e s one  himself.  I t might be r i g h t for a professor to g i v e a s t u d e n t a h i g h t e r grade than his work m e r i t s , on the grounds that the student i s so d e p r e s s e d over h i s work t h a t one more poor grade w i l l l e a d him to abandon his studies altogether, whereas i f he can pull out of his depression he will be capable of  f i  S i n g e r ( 8 ) : pp. 162-163. S i d g w i c k ( 2 ) : p. 4 8 9 .  when  AU reaching Singer's  rests  a satisfactory  standard.f  i s that there  i s nothing  contention  wrong w i t h  such  and  deception  and  i n t h e acknowledgement  Integrity  190  unacceptable  d i s h o n e s t y . The  t h a t one  /  only  does such  or  problem  things.  I t would n o t , however, be right for a professor to advocate this publicly, s i n c e then the s t u d e n t would know that the higher grade was undeserved and-quite apart from e n c o u r a g i n g other students to feign depression-the higher g r a d e m i g h t c h e e r t h e s t u d e n t o n l y i f he b e l i e v e s t h a t i t i s m e r i t e d . T h a t i t may be right for an individual to do s e c r e t l y what i t i s a l s o r i g h t f o r the p u b l i c c o d e of e t h i c s t o condemn, has an a i r of p a r a d o x . The p a r a d o x b e l o n g s , not to the doctrine itself, but to the attempt to s t a t e i t . For s t a t i n g this view jj> s t a t i n g i t p u b l i c l y , and t h u s i s s u b v e r s i v e of t h e p u b l i c code o f ethics w h i c h t h e same d o c t r i n e s a y s we should support. $ There c e r t a i n l y deception  are  called  r e q u i r e d . Honesty something  agent  even s t a t e he  t  for  i s not  agent's  Singer's account,  privately  be  instances and  an  AU  the  actually  guarantees  i s committed  S i n g e r (8) : p. S i n g e r ( 8 ) : p.  to  l"66. 166.  even But  of  there  the  moral  codes.  dishonesty  (in light  of  the the  On  because  fictions fact  is  dynamic  v a r i o u s norms w h i c h  undermining  and  morally  t o v i o l a t e . M o r e o v e r , he  without uphold  public  support  prepared  truth  construal  and  must  are  virtue.  private  publicly  must be  AU's  when d i s h o n e s t y  perhaps  overriding  i m p l a u s i b l e about  between an  t h e AU  may  that  he  cannot that such  AU fictions this  are  liable  makes AU  furthermore, statable,  ends) i s  the  best  Integrity  results).  'morality' necessarily unstatable since  i t is  unteachable  to produce  and  in  not  and  these  aspects  teachable. A  unstatable  implausible  at  it  But  191 then  in f u l l . not  And  publicly  p u b l i c m o r a l i t y which  (without  its  is  /  best  undermining and  is  its  own  at  its  incoherent  worst. The  situation  suggested  by  a  unteachable. committed social and  other  are  kind  of  to a  prepared  agent  a way  must  t o honour  in  are  so  work. The  each  committed,  are  committed  b e l i e v e anyone e l s e ' s  the  advantages  truth-telling,  and  to  what he  t o AU  the  of  a  t o AU  expressions  general  conversion  in  the  and  This enshrines  the  So  be  allegiance  to recognize then  to  he  profess  committed  and  truth-telling,  more i m p o r t a n t l y ,  truth-telling-regardless-of-utility. retain  else  is  and  know  hypocrisy  will  if  cannot largely  mean t h a t  wanting  of e v e r y o n e  his  that  of a p p r o v a l  social  a  realized  common knowledge t h a t s o c i e t y i s  composed of a g e n t s who will  of  practice.  agent  is  to maintain  degree c o n s i d e r a b l y beyond  that allows  others  in order  reliance  d e s i r e t h a t e v e r y o n e be  possibly  one  However,  than  i s unstatable  wants e v e r y o n e  u n i v e r s a l h y p o c r i s y . But,  general  paradoxical  code w h i c h  a general  AU  more  of AU  as w e l l .  a d v a n t a g e s of  they  the  p u b l i c moral  t o AU  every  actually  A proponent  truth-telling  in  is  no for  both  to  reliance  on  t o AU,  the  AU and I n t e g r i t y conversion  must o c c u r i n a p r o f o u n d l y p a r a d o x i c a l  t h e most p a r t , a r e committed the moral  each AU a g e n t t o AU. T h a t  identity  AU b u t t h i s  must  t h e members o f s u c h a will of  know t h a t  generalized  advantages  of  something  about  a morality allows  Everyone  on  u n r e c o g n i z e d a n d unknown  to  recognition everyone something of  this  of  social  one t h i n g  and  be  lost.  paradoxical adopted  in  one a n o t h e r s '  i s i t t o want  a way  that  moral  everyone  excludes  identity?  a  mutual  It  i s to  want  to successfully  look  like  seems t o mock t h e v e r y  idea  but  Such a d e s i r e  approval  morality.  with  integrity  but i n  and  will  be s u c c e s s f u l l y  recognition  everyone  and t h e r e b y t h e  disposition  shared moral  fundamental  captured  self,  be  else.t  a public One  t o AU  of t h i s  to  advocacy  is hypocritical  i d e n t i t y . F u r t h e r m o r e , what e x a c t l y t o be c o m m i t t e d  recognize  community. O t h e r w i s e ,  cannot  mutual  others  to  extremely implausible  which  that  For  i s committed  else's public  reliance  is  that  moral  truth-telling  There  way  others.  largely  everyone  form.  i s , e a c h a g e n t must n o t  of the  remain  must n o t r e c o g n i z e  / 192  reference  involves  societal  difficulty  'integrity'.  a harmony,  integrity  morality  to  to  w i t h such  wholeness  involves  encompass  proposal  Just  as  and  unity  something the  a  is  personal of  the  analogous. For a  analogue  of  personal  t B e s i d e s t h e i m p l a u s i b l e and p a r a d o x i c a l n a t u r e of s u c h a p o r t r a y a l o f s o c i a l m o r a l i t y , i t a l s o s i m p l y m i g h t be e a s i e r t o l e t p e o p l e be t h e s o m e t h i n g e l s e , p a r t i c u l a r l y g i v e n the t r u t h i n t h e adage t h a t we a r e what we p r e t e n d t o be.  AU integrity, could  be  social  morality  s h a r e d by  a l l members of  recognizing  the  basic  the  and  a l l being  others,  support be  a  of  these  social  effectively of  moral  better  morality  achieve  in  l e a s t be  the  m o r a l community,  and  in  AU  sense,  since  light  (or at  l e a s t most) p e o p l e must be  committed  social  a d v a n t a g e s of  being  adhering  to c e r t a i n basic  morality  therefore  somehow t o be upon the flies  is goal  in  the  involving  societal  recognition  not  inconsistent  moral order several  for  features  With respect AU  seems  distinctive  to  to  rely  norms w i l l  cannot  on  be  s e c r e t l y or  the  people  lost.  AU  statable  or  universal conversion  any  generally  portrayal  shared  as  generally as  the  teachable;  that  the  the  idea  of  is  social  i n d i v i d u a l agent  either  the  characterize  harmonious,  of  at  it the  odds  may best with  morality. and  extinction agent  this  morality  While  theory  were  contingent  public  values.  it certainly  normal  guarantee  as  public  unknown. A l l of  norms and  a  t o AU  r e a l i z e d i n the  t o champion AU  to both  elements  in  all  of  society, of  of  But  publicly  of  of  each  recognition  t o AU.  not  integrity,  mutual be  able  remaining  face  it  cannot  it  r e a l i z e d , i t s s u c c e s s would r e m a i n  conversion  193  adoption.  wants e v e r y o n e  i f the  simply  of m u t u a l  committed  even  that  dispositions  values.  t o be  and  such  o f f through cooperation  this  i t s end  Integrity /  at  p r i n c i p l e s and  s h a r e d norms  i t s a c c e p t a n c e and Singer  should  and  and  society, of  the  society,  AU and I n t e g r i t y or, as  is  integrity  more l i k e l y ,  of  possibility  There leaves  i s something  individuals deception norms.  the  opens  its  and  fact the  disharmony  society.  o f some d i s c o r d  unavoidable, disharmony  agent  a  Even  allowing  that  AU  seems  account of  either  to  about  a moral  destroyed  hypocrisy  in  the support  or  to  the  that  entail  obligation  and a t t h e same t i m e c o m m i t t e d  and  threatens  i n b o t h a g e n t and s o c i e t y  unacceptable  adherents  that  / 194  the  may be such  a  question.  theory  which  fragmented  as  t o some d e g r e e o f of f a m i l i a r  moral  SUMMARY AND Singer,  in a discussion  accounts of r i g h t a c t i o n ,  CONCLUSION  o f AU and p o s s i b l e  alternative  says the f o l l o w i n g :  The u t i l i t a r i a n position i s a minimal one, a first base w h i c h we reach by universalizing self-interested decision m a k i n g . We c a n n o t , i f we are to think e t h i c a l l y , refuse t o take t h i s step. If we a r e t o be p e r s u a d e d t h a t we s h o u l d go beyond utilitarianism and accept n o n - u t i l i t a r i a n moral r u l e s or i d e a l s , we need t o be p r o v i d e d w i t h good r e a s o n s f o r t a k i n g t h i s f u r t h e r s t e p . U n t i l such reasons are produced, we have some grounds f o r remaining u t i l i t a r i a n s , f Granting  Singer  that  AU p r o v i d e s  a starting point,  then  becomes what would c o n s t i t u t e a good r e a s o n  any  further  step  beyond  AU.  One  controversial—the  straightforward  instances  AU g i v e s  i n which  dismisses  familiar  potshots",  while  convictions" cases,  claim  always should  such p r o p o s a l s  proposes  that  a methodology  is  in  moral  t i  there  are  Sartorius  "unprincipled  to  moral  AU.$ I n  both  not a c c e p t a b l e ,  necessary  assessing  one, and  is  r e s t upon a c c e p t a n c e o f t h e method  of ' r e f l e c t i v e  important  that  "ordinary  be s u b o r d i n a t e  ( i n the sense  point  taking  response  as  intuitions  Sartorius'  for  'wrong' a n s w e r .  counterexamples  Singer  m o r a l g e o m e t r y . Such  the  natural  the issue  about  'unprincipled  i t must be  195  potshots'  p . 94.  are  Nevertheless,  allowed considerable  S i n g e r ( 6 ) : p . i~3. See S a r t o r i u s ( 1 ) : p . 33 and S i n g e r ( 2 ) :  and  judgements')  theories.  of  is  an  force.  196  /  Effective  o b j e c t i o n s t o AU  Essentially,  the  must be  objections  raised  t h i s work have r e v o l v e d a r o u n d any  moral  for  persons, persons The  t h e o r y must be  AU  account  unknowable.  And  or  of  expend t h e  morality.  instrument action fails of  involving  to f u l f i l l  praising  utility  the a c t i o n ,  i s , classifying  i n v o l v e any socially  sort  of  encouraged  of m o r a l  practical  suggests  right  to  purpose,  among  principle  the agent  misses  and  agent, the  action  does not  blunt  a c t i o n s as m o r a l l y failing  and  counter  classification,  and  the  this  that to  social an  purpose.  use,  and  and  whole  classifying  heavy  action  to that  the  important  i n keeping with that  r e q u i r e m e n t . The  actual  to acquire,  AU an  is  radically  in  expect  necessary  is  of  action  when  i s that  a broad  runs  that  morality.  i n terms  even  Morality  of  concern  in  AU  moreover,  motive, utility  and of  criticism  of  AU.  wrong t h a t  do  not  actually the  are to  be  instrumentalist  leaves morality  without  relevance.  Additional the  this  distinctions  between t h e  aspect  effort  a s wrong needs t o be  the  That  l e a v e s the  i s unreasonable  k n o w l e d g e . What t h i s point  action  furthermore,  i t often  fundamental  t o AU  able to address: since morality  of r i g h t  frequently  possess,  one  objections'.  with respect  s h o u l d be a b l e t o use  consequences  knowable,  'principled  charge t h a t  practical AU  concerns  surface  is self-defeating.  While  in relation i t d o e s not  to seem  / 197 that  AU i s  charge clear one  strictly  l e a v e s i t open t o  to  actually  defining  actually  moral  these  of  begins  benefit.  not  The  t o conform until  n o r Hare  this  this  t o cooperate  c a n pose  with  AU a g e n t  will  to general the  t o t h r e a t e n t h e system  Neither Singer  to  i n o t h e r ways. I t i s n o t  cooperation  t o t h e danger  rules  frequency  itself.  of  That i s ,  with  familiar  p r o v i d e an  adequate  to the s o c i a l  values  norms p r o t e c t Bales'  use of the d i s t i n c t i o n  rightness-making  characteristic  decision-making pertaining  to  examination practical  procedure, AU  to  emphasize  and  extremely  between AU a s o f f e r i n g and  to  AU  as  counter  then  that  AU  is  poverty h i g h l i g h t s  indeterminate  reason. This s e r i o u s l y  only  with  undermines  the  to  that  to  one s u p p o s e d  concerns on  be  a  o f AU i n t h e  fact  respect  a  serves  supposed  the c o n s i d e r a t i o n  a  providing  possible  and s e l f - d e f e a t i n g n e s s ,  t h e o r y . But  f a c e of famine often  response  r e q u i r e s a k i n d of 'brinkmanship'  norms.  response  have r e a s o n  AU's  i t s agents  a c h i e v e common  systems  nonconformity AU  question  t o what e x t e n t AU p e r m i t s  another  often  self-defeating,  AU  is  practical  strength  of  AU. At  the  obligation  theoretical  level  a s l o n g a s more good  AU  imposes  f o r others o f f s e t s  to o n e s e l f . P a r t of the e x p l a n a t i o n of t h i s and  t h e common  moral  outlook  no  d e r i v e s from  clash  limit the  on cost  between AU  AU's b e i n g  too  /  impoverished all  values  to  values  utility.  i n terms of b a s i c v a l u e s ,  to u t i l i t y . like  anything  extend  counts,  other  far  obligations. contribute it  than  famine  becoming  relief,  relief  from  This  leaves  AU  demanding  fact  as  threaten  The moral then the  identity  as we  AU  either  o b l i g a t i o n s . On the  agent's  'person'  because  of  projects  and  effects actually thin  agent  and  o f AU  of the the  way  demand. I t  c o u l d be trivial  her  AU  a  is placed agent's  the  other  obligations.  to in  utility  demanding.  So  preservation  of  fails  to s a t i s f y  i f the agent i s threatened in jeopardy.  more t h a n  truly  hand, t h e  because  This  the  this  an  satisfying agent event,  her  succeeds,  self-identifying  ( i n any  In  AU  lies  of  u n d e r m i n e d by  while  The  of  occurs ground  corrosive  i s even u n c e r t a i n whether  'person'  sense)  the  integrity  an  obligations  programs,  terms  or  hand,  commitments a r e  o b l i g a t i o n s . On satisfy  agent  appeals  understand i t .  satisfies  personal  allow  the o b l i g a t i o n  impossibly  normally  t h e one  to  extent  such  in  maximization.  personal  the e x t e n t  limits.  the  or o t h e r  to  to  recognized  counterproductive  in  fairness  t h a t the agent's  illustrates only  on  i t d o e s not  commonly  argument  limits  subordinates  p o s s i b l e appeals  subordinate  because  utility,  Thus, the  to  must  p l a c e s no  and  beyond  'reiterative'  f o r example, any  fairness  I t i s b e c a u s e AU  which u t i l i t y to  So,  s i n c e AU  198  someone extremely AU  moral  may  fail  to  the  personal  integrity the s e l f  of the i s now  agent a t war  i s attacked, w i t h the  'AU  since  the  moralist'.  t h r e a t e n s t h e p e r s o n of t h e a g e n t  o r , as  fragments  of the agent  accepts  t h e w h o l e n e s s and  i t . 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