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'The pleasures of merely circulation' : the interpretive anthropology of Clifford Geerts and the 'postmodern'.. Richardson, Joanne 1990

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'THE —  PLEASURES OF MERELY CIRCULATING  1  THE INTERPETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY OF CLIFFORD GEERTZ  AND THE 'POSTMODERN  1  ANTHROPOLOGY OF JAMES  CLIFFORD:  A DECONSTRUCTIVE READING By K. JOANNE  RICHARDSON  B.A. ( E n g l i s h ) , The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a , 1971 M.A. ( A n t h r o p o l o g y ) , The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i s t i s h C o l u m b i a , 1982  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE  REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in  THE  FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES  (Department o f A n t h r o p o l o g y and S o c i o l o g y ) t  We a c c e p t t h i s to  THE  thesis  the required  as c o n f o r m i n g standard  UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH  COLUMBIA  A u g u s t 1989 ©  K. Joanne R i c h a r d s o n , 1989  In presenting this  thesis  in partial  fulfilment  of the requirements  for an advanced  degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further copying  agree that permission for extensive  of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted  department  or  by  his or  her  representatives.  It  is  by the head of my  understood  that  copying or  publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.  Department of  ftuTHUGPoUhy  fiuO  The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada  Date  DE-6 (2/88)  A& u  ioCXOLoCy  ABSTRACT  In  this  Derrida's  dissertation  strategy  deconstructive anthropology  of  reading  attempt  anthropology  to  show  to  deconstruction of  Clifford  and James C l i f f o r d ' s  respectively,  o f how  I  I s e t about t h i s  and,  Geertz's  to  Jacques  through  a  interpretive  'postmodern'  i t s relevance  i n general.  explicate  anthropology  the d i s c i p l i n e  of  The f o l l o w i n g i s a s k e l e t a l o u t l i n e endeavour.  In my I n t r o d u c t o r y c h a p t e r ,  I a t t e m p t t o i n d i c a t e t h e way  i n w h i c h t h e n o t i o n o f l o g o s o r p r e s e n c e has d o m i n a t e d W e s t e r n philosophy including  from  the present  •presence' existence extant  i t s inception day.  As D e r r l d a u t i l i z e s  of a s e l f - c e r t a i n  and s e l f - i d e n t i c a l  phenomena and i s m a n i f e s t e d  defined  as  operates,  concept  presence e n t a i l s In  Chapter  and  t o and  Two,  basis for a l l as t r u t h ,  Because  i t i s always  self-identical,  wherever i t  the suppression  Derrida's s t r a t e g y f o r exposing  I  offer  o f d i f f e r e n c e and an  explication  of  and d e l i m i t i n g p r e s e n c e a s i t  i t s e l f t h r o u g h and t h r o u g h o u t W e s t e r n c o n c e p t u a l i t y ,  particular  Briefly,  up  i t , the term  i n such n o t i o n s  and s o on.  self-sufficient  otherness.  manifests  Greece  has t o do w i t h t h e a s s u m p t i o n o f and d e s i r e f o r t h e  meaning, God, s e l f ,  paying  i n ancient  this  attention  has t o do w i t h  t o h i s work arguing  are always a l r e a d y o r i g i n a r l l y doubled  on u n d e c i d a b i l i t y .  that concepts,  as  such,  and h e n c e , A r i s t o t e l i a n  logic  notwithstanding,  are  both  u n d e c i d a b l l i t y ) and  Impossible  identical  This  ideas).  assumptions t h e way  about  i n which  difference  and  the  calls  In  it  Chapter  premised  Four,  I  works by C l i f f o r d and  attempt  assumed  t o show t h a t  notion  of  finally,  anthropology  the  I further  definition  and  that,  I look a t  their  of  this  and  resign  argue  work, that  in principle, being the  a ruthless  itself  In  certain  t o an  seeing  the  conceptuality.  Cliffordian  Geertzian  'postmodern'  the  term  'postmodern'  Western c o n c e p t u a l i t y  both  repressive  c a s e , a n t h r o p o l o g y must  to p e r p e t u a t i n g the  metaphysics.  iii  is a i s , by  and o p p r e s s i v e  examine and r e - e v a l u a t e i t s most b a s i c a s s u m p t i o n s that,  and  respectively,  from  chosen  the  t o show  presence.  reading  of  Heidegger,  unrecognized dedication  of  our  indicates  interpretive  of  them  self-  s i d e s o f t h e same o l d c o i n and t h a t , w i t h  latter's  misnomer.  and  nature  and  (esp.  by James C l i f f o r d  prevents  of  question  d o i n g , attempt  assumption  their  presence  a n t h r o p o l o g y a r e two to  i n so  and  i n my c o n c l u d i n g c h a p t e r , I a r g u e t h a t  interpretive  respect  Three,  deconstructive  G e e r t z and  repressive/oppressive And,  a  an  effects  the r e p r e s s i o n  of contemporary  upon  offer  ensure  hermeneutic  a n t h r o p o l o g y and,  is  into  conceptuality  Chapter  ( H u s s e r l ) and  Gadamer, R i c o e u r ) b a c k g r o u n d  that  radically  nature of  otherness.  (as  (as s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t  these assumptions  phenomenological  •postmodern'  possible  inherited  either  re-  or, f a i l i n g l e g a c y of  TABLE OF  CONTENTS  Abstract  ii  Acknowledgements  iv  I.  Introductory and  II.  III.  IV.  Comments: P h i l o s o p h i c a l  Background  S t a t e m e n t o£ Ijp&sf}t  1  An E x p l i c a t i o n o f D e r r i d e a n D e c o n s t r u c t i o n  Philosophical  Background  and  •Postmodern'  and  Hermeneutics  Clifford  Interpretive  A n t h r o p o l o g y : Phenomenology 1  G e e r t z and James  A Deconstructive  of  22  Reading  V. C o n c l u d i n g A s s e s s m e n t s  60  Clifford:  106  165  Bibliography  188  iv  Ah t h e o l d q u e s t i o n s , t h e o l d a n s w e r s , t h e r e ' s n o t h i n g l i k e them! (Samuel B e c k e t t , Endgame)  . . . t h a t t h i n g s go r o u n d and Has r a t h e r a c l a s s i c a l s o u n d .  again  go  (Wallace Stevens, "The P l e a s u r e s o£ M e r e l y  round  Circulating")  What connection is there between the sartorial s p l e n d o u r s of the educated man and t h e p h o t o g r a p h of ruined h o u s e s and dead b o d i e s ? ( V i r g i n i a Woolf, Three  Daddy, daddy, you  bastard,  v  I'm  Guineas)  through. ( S y l v i a P l a t h , "Daddy")  ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS  I would l i k e t o t h a n k my a d v i s o r , D r . E l v i W h i t t a k e r , and my c o m m i t t e e members, D r . Kenelm B u r r i d g e and D r . M a r i e Francoise Guidon, f o r reading and commenting on this dissertation. I would l i k e t o t h a n k D i a n n e T l e f e n s e e f o r h e r l o v e and s u p p o r t and f o r g u i d i n g me t h r o u g h t h e t r e a c h e r o u s w o r l d o f computer t e c h n o l o g y . and  I would l i k e t o thank my many f r i e n d s f o r t h e i r camaraderie.  I would like t o thank Richardson, f o r t h e i r constant  vi  my parents, Jean l o v e and d e v o t i o n .  affection and  Fred  Chapter Introductory  Comments: P h i l o s o p h i c a l B a c k g r o u n d Statement  1)  Philosophical In  F.E.  his  Peters  One  of  and  Ija^at  Background  historical  lexicon  of  Greek  o f f e r s the  following entry  philosophical  concerning  terms  Logos:  lOgos: speech, account, reason, d e f i n i t i o n , rational faculty, proportion. 1. . . . [ F o r ] H e r a c l i t u s l o g o s i s ah u n d e r l y i n g o r g a n i z a t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e o f the u n i v e r s e . . . . And t h i s harmony, w h i c h i s r e a l l y a t e n s i o n of opposites, i s not t o be u n d e r s t o o d i n t h e s e n s e o f a c y c l i c r e t u r n , b u t as a s t a b l e s t a t e ( f r s . 10, 51). This logos principle, 1  I n t e r e s t i n g l y , a c c o r d i n g t o K i r k , Raven and S c h o f i e l d , t h e common n o t i o n t h a t H e r a c l i t u s was p r e d o m i n a n t l y , i f not entirely, concerned with f l u x and change as opposed to s t a b i l i t y and o r d e r has t o do w i t h h i s h a v i n g been m i s r e a d by P l a t o and A r i s t o t l e : 1  As f o r P l a t o and A r i s t o t l e , t h e r e is l i t t l e v e r b a t i m q u o t a t i o n of H e r a c l i t u s i n e i t h e r , nor were t h e y r e a l l y i n t e r e s t e d i n the a c c u r a t e objective assessment of early predecessors. Plato o c c a s i o n a l l y m e n t i o n s him, m a i n l y i n a humorous or i r o n i c a l way and w i t h emphasis on a v i e w f r e e l y a t t r i b u t e d t o him i n t h e d i a l o g u e s , t h a t ' a l l t h i n g s are i n f l u x ' . . . . A c c o r d i n g t o A r i s t o t l e a t Met. A6, 987a32, P l a t o was i n f l u e n c e d i n y o u t h by the e m p h a s i s l a i d by C r a t y l u s on t h i s k i n d of v i e w . But all Presocratic thinkers were struck by the dominance of change i n t h e w o r l d o f our e x p e r i e n c e . H e r a c l i t u s was o b v i o u s l y no e x c e p t i o n , indeed he p r o b a b l y e x p r e s s e d t h e u n i v e r s a l i t y o f change more c l e a r l y and more d r a m a t i c a l l y t h a n h i s p r e d e c e s s o r s ; b u t f o r him i t was t h e c o m p l e m e n t a r y i d e a of t h e measure i n h e r i n g i n change, the stability that p e r s i s t s t h r o u g h i t and c o n t r o l s i t , t h a t was of v i t a l importance. P l a t o may have been genuinely misled, especially by fifth-century sophistic  2 t h o u g h i t i s h i d d e n and p e r c e p t i b l e o n l y t o t h e i n t e l l i g e n c e ( f r s . 54, 114. . . ), i s s t i l l m a t e r i a l , as can be s e e n f r o m the identification of the Heraclitan logos with cosmic f i r e . . . . 2. P l a t o . . . used t h e t e r m l o g o s in a variety of ways, including the o p p o s i t i o n between mythos and logos . . . , where t h e l a t t e r s i g n i f i e s a t r u e , analytical account. This is common usage, but it leads off into an epistemological theory. In Phaedo 766 P l a t o marks as a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f t r u e knowledge ( e p l s t e m e ) t h e a b i l i t y t o g i v e an a c c o u n t ( l o g o s ) o f what one knows. In T h e a t . 201c-d t h i s a s p e c t o f l o g o s i s incorporated into the definition of e p l s t e m e : t r u e o p i n i o n (doxa) a c c o m p a n i e d by an a c c o u n t . S o c r a t e s d i s c u s s e s what l o g o s would mean i n t h i s c o n t e x t (ibid. 2 0 6 c - 2 1 0 6 ) , and f r o m h i s a n a l y s i s emerges a d e s c r i p t i o n o f l o g o s as t h e s t a t e m e n t of a d i s t i n g u i s h i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f a t h i n g ( i b i d . 2 0 8 6 ) . The v a l i d i t y of t h i s i s d e n i e d on t h e g r o u n d o f i t s b e i n g o f no value in the case of sensible, individual beings (compare Aristotle, Meta. 1 0 3 9 b ) . 3. But when t h i s c o n c e p t i o n o f l o g o s i s moved h i g h e r up t h e P l a t o n i c s c a l e o f b e i n g i t o b v i o u s l y d o e s have a r o l e t o p l a y ; i n Rep. 534b P l a t o d e s c r i b e s the exaggerations, i n h i s d i s t o r t i o n of Heraclitus' e m p h a s i s h e r e ; and A r i s t o t l e a c c e p t e d t h e P l a t o n i c f l u x - i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and c a r r i e d i t s t i l l further. Other r e f e r e n c e s to H e r a c l i t u s i n A r i s t o t l e a t t a c k him f o r d e n y i n g t h e law o f c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n h i s a s s e r t i o n t h a t o p p o s i t e s a r e 'the same.' A g a i n t h i s i s a m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n by A r i s t o t l e , who a p p l i e d h i s own t i g h t l o g i c a l s t a n d a r d s a n a c h r o n i s t i c a l l y ; by the 'same' Heraclitus evidently meant not ' i d e n t i c a l ' so much as 'not e s s e n t i a l l y d i s t i n c t . ' [In any case, Heraclitus was] less concerned w i t h the mechanics of development and change t h a n w i t h t h e u n i f y i n g r e a l i t y t h a t u n d e r l a y them. ( K i r k , Raven and S c h o f i e l d , 1984: 185-186)  3 d i a l e c t i c i a n . . . as one who c a n g i v e an account ( l o g o s ) of the t r u e b e i n g (or essence, o u s l a ) of s o m e t h i n g , i . e . t h e term of the process of division ( d l a l r e s i s ) d e s c r i b e d i n the S o p h i s t , the Aristotelian definition (. . . h o r o s ) by g e n e r a and s p e c i e s ; i n d e e d , A r i s t o t l e f r e q u e n t l y u s e s l o g o s as a synonym f o r [definition]. Another typical Aristotelian use i s logos as reason, r a t i o n a l i t y , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n an e t h i c a l c o n t e x t , e.g. P o l . 1332a, E t h . N l c h . V. 1134a, and f r e q u e n t l y In t h e combination " r i g h t reason" (orthos l o g o s , the S t o i c recta ratio) . . . . He a l s o u n d e r s t a n d s l o g o s as m a t h e m a t i c a l p r o p o r t i o n , r a t i o (Meta, 9 9 1 b ) , a usage p r o b a b l y g o i n g back t o the P y t h a g o r e a n s , even though i t i s unattested i n t h e i r fragments. . . . 4. The S t o i c p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e on l o g o s i s H e r a c l i t u s ' d o c t r i n e o f an a l l p e r v a s i v e formula of o r g a n i z a t i o n , which the Stoics considered divine. Logos i s the a c t i v e . . . f o r c e i n the u n i v e r s e (D^L. V I I , 1 3 4 ) , creative in t h e f a s h i o n o f sperm (SVF I , 87; D.L. V I I , 135; see l o g o ! s p e r m a t l k o l ) . As i n 8  a  4  Diogenes L a e r t i u s , L i v e s of the Eminent P h i l o s o p h e r s , e d . and t r a n s . R.D. H i c k s , L o e b C l a s s i c a l L i b r a r y , London, 1925. a  J . von A r n i m , L e i p z i g , 1903-1924. 3  Stolcorum  Veterum  Fragmenta,  4  vols.,  According to Peters: The S t o i c l o g o ! s p e r m a t l k o l , w h i c h a r e d e s i g n e d to e x p l a i n both plurality and teleology in a m o n i s t i c s y s t e m , a p p e a r t o be p a t t e r n e d a f t e r t h e A r i s t o t e l i a n eidos . . . i n i t s r o l e as physls [ n a t u r e ] . The l o g o s c o n s i d e r e d as a u n i f i e d e n t i t y c o n t a i n s w i t h i n i t s e l f , on t h e a n a l o g y o f animal sperm, t h e g r o w t h powers o f e x e m p l a r s o f a l l t h e i n d i v i d u a l s (SVF I I , 1027; D^L. V I I , 1 3 5 ) . These i n d i v i d u a l logo! are imperishable (SVF I I , 717), i.e. they survive the cyclical conflagration ( e k p y r o s l s ) t h a t consumes t h e kosmos and a r e t h e seedlings of the next kosmos (Ibid. I, 497). D e s p i t e t h e i r p a r a d i g m a t i c c h a r a c t e r t h e y a r e more  4  4 H e r a c l i t u s i t i s m a t e r i a l and identified with f i r e . . . . It is also i d e n t i c a l w i t h n a t u r e ( p h y s l s . . .) and Zeus (see C l e a n t h e s , Hymn t o Zeus; SVF I, 534). This pervasive presence i n the universe develops in several d i r e c t i o n s : since i t is a unity i t grounds the theory of c o s m i c sympathy . . . and o f n a t u r a l law and the ethical imperative "to live according to nature". . . . Stoic l i n g u i s t i c theory further distinguished interior logos ( = t h o u g h t ) and exterior logos (=speech) (SVF II, 135; Sextus E m p l r i c u s , Adv. Math. V I I I , 275" . . . ) , a d i s t i n c t i o n that clearly influenced P h i l o ' s n o t o r i o u s l y d i f f i c u l t v i s i o n of logos. 5. Philo knew the distinction between i n t e r i o r and e x t e r i o r l o g o s and could apply i t i n an orthodox Stoic f a s h i o n (De V i t a Mos. I I , 1 3 7 ) , and i t was perhaps t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n , together with the Jewish scriptural tradition a b o u t t h e "Word o f God," that led to h i s new treatment of logos. In t h e first i n s t a n c e l o g o s i s the D i v i n e Reason t h a t embraces t h e a r c h e t y p a l complex o f e l d e that will serve as the models of c r e a t i o n . . . . Next, t h i s logos t h a t i s God's mind i s e x t e r n a l i z e d i n t h e f o r m o f t h e kosmos n o e t o s . . ., t h e universe s  A r i s t o t e l i a n t h a n P l a t o n i c i n t h a t t h e y a r e immanent i n m a t t e r ( i b i d . I I , 1 0 7 4 ) . T h e y a l s o p l a y a major r o l e i n P l o t i n u s : they r e s i d e i n the psyche (Enn. I I , 3,14; IV, 3,10) where t h e y a r e t h e c a u s e o f i t s movement ( i b i d . IV, 3 , 1 5 ) , t h e l o g o l c o n t a i n a l l t h e d e t a i l s o f t h e b e i n g ( i b i d . I l l , 2,1) and a r e the r e a s o n s why individuals differ ( i b i d . IV, 4,12); unextended themselves, they are i n d i v i d u a l i z e d o n l y by t h e m a t t e r i n w h i c h t h e y I n h e r e ( i b i d . IV, 9,5). ( P e t e r s , 1967: 110) Sextus E m p i r i c u s , Adversus Mathematicos, 3 v o l s . , ed. and t r a n s . R.G. Bury,Loeb C l a s s i c a l L i b r a r y , London. 19351953. 5  6  vols.,  P h i l o , Works, e d . and t r a n s . F.H. Colson et a l . , L o e b C l a s s i c a l L i b r a r y , L o n d o n , 1929 t o d a t e .  10  a p p r e h e n s i b l e o n l y t o the intelligence ( i b i d . 7,29). It i s transcendent . . . and i t i s God, a l t h o u g h n o t t h e God . . ., b u t r a t h e r t h e " e l d e r s o n o f God". . . . With the c r e a t i o n of the v i s i b l e w o r l d (kosmos a l s t h e t o s ) t h e l o g o s b e g i n s t o p l a y an immanent r o l e as t h e " s e a l " o f c r e a t i o n (De f u g a 2 , 1 2 ) , t h e S t o i c "bond o f t h e u n i v e r s e " . . . and helmarmene tfate]. P h i l o d i f f e r s from the S t o i c s i n d e n y i n g t h a t t h i s immanent l o g o s i s God (De m l g r e . Abr. 32, 1 7 9 - 1 8 1 ) ; f o r t h e p r o v i d e n t i a l r o l e of F h i l o ' s l o g o s , see pronola. Philo gives his logos a 7  A c c o r d i n g t o P e t e r s , p r o n o l a means ' f o r e t h o u g h t ' providence': 1. The e a r l i e r h i s t o r y o f t h e c o n c e p t o f providence is to be seen in the emergence, from D i o g e n e s t o A r i s t o t l e , o f a n o t i o n o f an i n t e l l i g e n t p u r p o s e ( t e l o s . . .) o p e r a t i n g i n t h e u n i v e r s e . I n a l l of these thinkers it is clearly a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e i n t e l l i g e n t God whose f e a t u r e s b e g i n to appear i n the later P l a t o ( s e e Laws 899 where t h e d e n i a l of pronola i s reckoned b l a s p h e m y ) and in Aristotle. F o r t h e S t o i c s t h e immanent L o g o s g o v e r n s a l l by nous and pronola (D.L. V I I , 138; SVF I , 1 7 6 ) . I t i s given a new turn in the direction of anthropocentrism by Chrysippus where t h e r e s t o f t h e kosmos i s s u b j e c t e d to t h e good o f man. Stoic pronola, i d e n t i f i e d a s i t was with physis, was e s s e n t i a l l y immanent. 2. L a t e r Platonism, like the newly appeared S e m i t i c t r a d i t i o n , was t r a n s c e n d e n t and believed in a series of intermediate deities . . ., w i t h t h e result that p r o n o l a began t o be d i s t r i b u t e d through t h e e n t i r e r a n g e o f d e i t i e s ( P l u t a r c h , De f a c t o 5 7 2 f - 2 7 3 b ; A p u l e i u s , De P l a t o n e I , 12). As t h e supreme p r i n c i p l e grows more remote, i t s d i r e c t involvement i n p r o n o l a becomes m a r k e d l y l e s s . So i n P h i l o , De f u g a 101, t h e L o g o s e x e r c i s e s p r o v i d e n c e t h r o u g h t h e immanent d y n a m e l s , j u s t as i n P l o t i n u s (Enn. IV, 8,2) the World Soul has a general providence and the i n d i v i d u a l souls a p a r t i c u l a r providence 7  6 distinct role i n c r e a t i o n : i t i s the instrumental cause (De_ c h e r . 35, 1261 2 7 ) ; i t i s a l s o an a r c h e t y p a l l i g h t . . ., this latter image reappearing in P l o t i n u s , E n n . I l l , 2,16. But t h e r e i s a d i f f e r e n c e between t h e two t h i n k e r s ; what was i n P h i l o b o t h l o g o s and nous [intelligence, intellect, mind] is d i v i d e d i n P l o t i n u s who u s e s t h e l o g o l concept i n a fashion akin t o the s t o i c logoi spermatikoi. . . . ( P e t e r s , 1967: 110-112) 8  From  the foregoing  throughout ancient first  intimations  always,  either  extended  quotation  Greek p h i l o s o p h y , of C h r i s t i a n i t y ,  directly  of the existence  entity  a g a i n s t w h i c h a l l e l s e may  is  the  Presocratic  organizational principle in  various  inspired  forms,  Jacques  Logocentrism  Derrida  of  seen  associated —  of a  be m e a s u r e d . logos  through to coin  t o Western  that  of logos i s  as  with  However, i t  'the  to the present the term  philosophy's  some  changeless  underlying  of the universe', a p r i n c i p l e  persists  refers  the concept  of an a b s o l u t e  notion  be  up t o and i n c l u d i n g t h e  or i n d i r e c t l y ,  notion  i t may  which,  day, t h a t  'logocentrism.' assumption  of  f o r t h e b o d i e s t h e y i n h a b i t ; t h e One, o f course, i s beyond providence. Implicit in this distinction between g e n e r a l and p a r t i c u l a r p r o v i d e n c e , i . e . , between command and e x e c u t i o n , i s the reconciliation of the necessary t r a n s c e n d e n c e o f God and t h e n e c e s s a r y immanence o f p r o v i d e n t i a l a c t i v i t y . . . ( P e t e r s , 1967: p . 164) P l o t i n u s , Enneads, 6 v o l s . , ed. E. B r e h i e r , P a r i s , 1924-1938; t r a n s . S. MacKenna, 2nd e d . , L o n d o n , 1956. 0  7 presence, that a  plenitude,  accounting within  i s , i t s a s s u m p t i o n of an etc.  for  which,  all  in  extant  i d e n t i t y and/or the  the  process  phenomena, other  and  (idea) what  mortal the  presuppose  is  transient.  existents  eide  or  a division  is a  ideas.  As  For  Peters  of  the  the  and  difference  self.  between what the  absolute,  grounding  Aristotelian  Plato  reflection  of  subsumes  within  T h u s , f o r example, P l a t o n i c and eidos  e s s e n c e , an  notions is  changing unchanging  of  absolute world realm  of of  expresses i t ,  The r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e i n d i v i s i b l e , eternal eide and transient, sensible phenomena ( a l s t h e t a ) i s d e s c r i b e d in a number o f d i f f e r e n t ways. The e i d e a r e the cause . . . o f t h e a i s t h e t a (Phaedo l O O b - l O l c ) , and t h e l a t t e r a r e s a i d t o participate . . . i n t h e eide.. I n an e l a b o r a t e metaphor, p e r v a s i v e in Plato, t h e a l s t h e t o n i s s a i d t o be a c o p y ( e i k o n . . .) of t h e e t e r n a l model ( p a r a d e l g m a ) , the e i d o s . T h i s a c t of a r t i s t i c c r e a t i o n ( m i m e s i s . . .) i s t h e work o f a supreme c r a f t s m a n (demiourgos . . . ) . . . . . [Where] i s one to l o c a t e the e i d e ? Here a n a l o g y comes i n t o play. J u s t as t h e a l s t h e t a a r e c o n t a i n e d i n some s o r t o f o r g a n i c u n i t y t h a t i s t h e kosmos, so the eide exist in some " i n t e l l i g i b l e p l a c e " ( t o p o s n o e t o s . Rep. 508c, 517b . . . ) l o c a t e d "beyond the heavens" (Phaedrus 247c). ( P e t e r s , 1967: 48)  Thus P l a t o and  posits  accounting  a  transcendent  f o r the  realm  e a r t h l y realm.  capable As  for  of  grounding  Aristotle,  8 The c h i e f d i f f e r e n c e between t h e P l a t o n i c and A r i s t o t e l i a n v i e w o f t h e eide i s that f o r the l a t t e r the eidos i s not (except i n the cases of the f i r s t mover a n d / o r m o v e r s , and t h a t o f t h e nous [mind, intellect, intelligence] "that comes f r o m o u t s i d e " . . .) a separate subsistent . . ., b u t a p r i n c i p l e o f complete substances. I t i s the formal cause of things (Phys. I I , 1946), a c o r r e l a t i v e of matter i n composite beings (ibid. I , 1 9 0 b ) , and t h e i n t e l l i g i b l e essence ( o u s l a ) of an e x i s t e n t (Meta. 1013a . . . ) . I n knowing t h i n g s we know their eidos (Meta. 1010a), i.e., the a p p r o p r i a t e f a c u l t y (nous o r a i s t h e s l s ) becomes t h e t h i n g i t knows b y r e a s o n o f t h e e i d o s o f t h e known o b j e c t e n t e r i n g t h e s o u l (De_ a n . I l l , 4 3 1 b - 4 3 2 a ) . Eidos i s , i n b r i e f , an a c t u a l i z a t i o n ( e n e r g e l a , e n t e l e c h l a . . .; De a n . I I , 4 1 2 a ) . ( P e t e r s , 1967: 49-50)  In o t h e r and  takes  the P l a t o n i c notion  views i t not o n l y as transcendent  also an  words, A r i s t o t l e  a s immanent  existent').  unmoving  (e.g. f i r s t  ( e . g . 'the i n t e l l i g i b l e  essence  of eidos  mover), but (ousla) of  B u t t h e p o s i t i o n o f t h e e i d o s a s a b s o l u t e and  remains  eidos  as absolute  short  step  logic  of i d e n t i t y  constant.  Given  and c o m p l e t e  Aristotle's  In and o f  t o h i s p o s i t i n g of the founding —  the p r i n c i p l e  acceptance of  itself, principle  i t is a of the  of n o n - c o n t r a d i c t i o n :  F o r t h e same t h i n g t o h o l d good and n o t t o h o l d good s i m u l t a n e o u s l y o f t h e same thing and i n the same respect is impossible. . . . T h i s , then, i s the firmest of a l l p r i n c i p l e s . . . . For i t i s i m p o s s i b l e f o r anyone t o b e l i e v e t h a t t h e same t h i n g i s and i s n o t . . . . B u t i f i t i s not p o s s i b l e f o r c o n t r a r i e s t o hold good of the same thing  9 simultaneously . . ., and t h e o p i n i o n c o n t r a r y t o an o p i n i o n i s t h a t o f the contradictory, then obviously i t is i m p o s s i b l e f o r t h e same p e r s o n t o b e l i e v e s i m u l t a n e o u s l y t h a t t h e same t h i n g i s and i s n o t ; f o r anyone who made t h a t e r r o r would be holding contrary opinions simultaneously. T h a t i s why a l l t h o s e who d e m o n s t r a t e go back t o t h i s o p i n i o n i n t h e e n d : i t i s , JLn t h e n a t u r e o f things, the p r i n c i p l e of a l l the other axioms a l s o . ( A r i s t o t l e , 1987: 267) ( e m p h a s i s A r i s t o t l e ' s and mine)  This principle of  identity,  o f n o n - c o n t r a d i c t i o n and i t s c o n c o m i t a n t  premised  as they  a s a b s o l u t e and e s s e n t i a l , philosophy The  and/or two  Aristotelian Generally  a r e on an a s s u m p t i o n  have n e v e r c e a s e d  logic  of eidos  haunting  Western  theology.*  main  branches  philosophy  speaking,  are  of  post-Platonic  Empiricism  the seventeenth  century empiricist philosophers  and  century  and  post-  Rationalism.  and  eighteenth  (e.g. Bacon, Locke,  Berkeley,  Hume) h e l d t h a t knowledge d e r i v e s n o t f r o m i n n a t e o r a p r i o r i ideas  but  from  the  accumulation  of  concrete  sensory  With respect to Christian theology, whether t h e e m p h a s i s i s on God a s t r a n s c e n d e n t (and hence t h e need f o r a c h a i n o f i n t e r m e d i a r i e s s c h o o l e d i n t r a n s l a t i n g H i s ways t o h u m a n i t y ( e . g . Roman C a t h o l i c i s m ) ) o r on God a s immanent (and h e n c e t h e need o n l y f o r an 'open h e a r t and r e c e p t i v e mind' (e.g. P r o t e s t a n t i s m ) ) the important p o i n t i s t h a t God i s invariably viewed as omnipotent and o m n i p r e s e n t (also, i n t e r e s t i n g l y , a s male — metaphorics notwithstanding). In o t h e r w o r d s , w h a t e v e r p a r t i c u l a r a s p e c t o f t h e c o n c e p t o f God one c h o o s e s , f o r w h a t e v e r r e a s o n s , t o s t r e s s , God, a s s u c h , i s assumed t o be a b s o l u t e , u n c h a n g i n g and e t e r n a l — that which both accounts f o r and c o n t a i n s a l l known ( a n d , by e x t e n s i o n , unknown) phenomena. 9  experiences.  Here,  of  Inductive  'scientific  certainty  is  However,  before  empiricists they  assume  that  indubitable. of  existence  of  f o r m e r was not  the  God  the  business  logically  necessary,  resulting  in absurdity.  separation there  of  was  given; God,  reason  Berkeley  Hume, u n l i k e  but,  ideas  l i k e the  (e.g.  constituted The  of  any  merely  others,  analytic  definition,  held  that  and  therefore  the  latter,  questioned  example,  Locke  knowledge  without in  believed of  knowledge  questioned  the  being  Bacon b e l i e v e d  revelation;  others,  by  the  be  the  rationalists,  observation  that  the  questioned  they  priori  to  never  not  a  and  the  could  and  the  and  questioned  that  For  that  Plato  concern  an  rarely  case, —  notion  (and  are,  and  believed  that  nonsenslble  of  the  the  God  was  existence  a of  b e l i e v e d t h a t c e r t a i n r e l a t i o n s of propositions  n e c e s s a r y t r u t h s , and  empiricist  like  of  observation  primary  science  nonemplrical  phenomena;  Is  to concrete  of  the  rationalists  truths  subject  on  propositions  in  glimmerings  direct  empiricists  and,  necessary  not  the  what  certain  the  premised  c e r t a i n t y , and,  Thus  existence  see  through  like  them),  is s t i l l  we  method'  determinable  experience. Aristotle  course,  tradition,  so in  and  mathematics)  on. spite  of  its  stated  o p p o s i t i o n t o the P l a t o n i c d u a l i s m of unchanging t r a n s c e n d e n t i d e a s / t r a n s i e n t e a r t h l y phenomena and  the general  dualism  ideas,  of  a  priori/a  essentially duallstic  posteriori  in that  i t assumes t h e  rationalist  itself validity  remains of  the  11 distinction assumption truths the  between which,  necessary  except  i n so  tenets  of  w i t h i n the  human mind, d o e s  from  the  between  methodological every  b i t as  existence  of  predicated logic of  of  not  a  the  an  identity  observed  and/or  be,  by  and  the  essence  cannot both  be  and  in  or meaning  of a  what i t i s n o t :  p o s s i b l e and  traditions,  either  priority  identity  of  1 0  implicitly over  the  t r u t h s which  are  a l l  must  This or  principle  be  measured. as  such,  of  and non-  is definitive  class  of  being  the  and,  as  of  phenomena,  simultaneously,  explicitly,  difference  the  concretely  logic  t h a t which or  of  self-identical  the  i . e . i t cannot,  impossible.  Hence,  assumes  which  category  the  tradition,  Aristotelian  principle,  being  ideas.  assume c o n c e p t s ,  following  a concept,  of  empiricist  phenomena  in  assumption  indubltabllity  i n the  traditions  because,  contradiction,  the  necessary  r a t h e r than  tradition,  against  experienced  definition  indivisible  of  an  respect  self-evident  (as e v i n c e d  T h u s , f o r example, b o t h to  and  —  fundamental  posteriori  a s i d e , the  acceptance  non-contradiction)  logic  i n any  rationalist  self-certain  upon  universal  priori/a  truths  i t locates  rationalist  differences  much a s  contingent  f a r as  differ  aforementioned  distinction  and  case, assume will  be  both the  become  I t s h o u l d be n o t e d t h a t , n o t i o n s o f 'good' and 'bad' t h e o r i z i n g about c o n c e p t u a l i t y n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g , t h i s i s the s t a n d a r d d e f i n i t i o n o f ' c o n c e p t * as i t f u n c t i o n s t h r o u g h o u t the Western p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r a d i t i o n . (The r e a d e r may c o n s u l t t h e O x f o r d E n g l i s h D i c t i o n a r y or any r e p u t a b l e d i c t i o n a r y o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l terms.) 1 0  12 clear  In t h e f o l l o w i n g  section  on  Rationalism,  self  over  other. Of  the three  century  l e a d i n g seventeenth  rationalist  philosophers,  Spinoza,  i t i s Descartes  influence  on l a t e r  that that  indubitable famous  i s grounded  awareness  coglto  begins  ergo  everything but the f a c t Thus  f o r the f i r s t  grounded  form(s)  dispensed  undertook  existence."  to  f a r the  Descartes's  i n the  In  thought  i n Western  processes  words,  one  philosophy  science  that  may  This  logical  the doubt self.  knowledge i s i n a n assumed  i s not t o say that on t h e c o n t r a r y ,  necessity  of  God's  b e l i e v e d i n the existence of  i d e a s , such as the p r i n c i p l e s  (e.g.the p r i n c i p l e  —  I s presumed t o e x i s t  w i t h a n o t i o n o f God — the  most  individual's  o f one's own t h i n k i n g / d o u b t i n g  or i n a world  prove  and  demonstration  thinking  other  Moreover, Descartes  innate or a p r i o r i and  with  o f one's own c o n s c i o u s n e s s .  Descartes he  by  i n the p e r c e i v i n g s u b j e c t rather than  transcendent outside  time  had  Leibniz  I t i s g e n e r a l l y acknowledged  o f h e r own  sum.  Descartes,  has  philosophy.  modern p h i l o s o p h y certitude  who  c e n t u r y and e i g h t e e n t h  o f knowledge  of n o n - c o n t r a d i c t i o n )  which  " D e s c a r t e s a r g u e d t h a t t o know was a g r e a t e r p e r f e c t i o n t h a n t o d o u b t , and t h a t t h e r e f o r e , he h i m s e l f must be a n i m p e r f e c t b e i n g who, n o n e t h e l e s s , was c a p a b l e o f h a v i n g an idea of p e r f e c t i o n . This i d e a o f p e r f e c t i o n c o u l d o n l y have come f r o m a p e r f e c t b e i n g , i . e . God. Further to t h i s , D e s c a r t e s a r g u e d t h a t e x i s t e n c e , b e i n g a p e r f e c t i o n , c o u l d no more be s e p a r a t e d f r o m t h e n o t i o n o f a s u p r e m e l y p e r f e c t b e i n g t h a n h a v i n g t h r e e a n g l e s c o u l d be s e p a r a t e d f r o m t h e n o t i o n of a t r i a n g l e .  13 are  present  i n t h e human  evident  to the  doubt.  However, D e s c a r t e s ' s  centres  on h i s l i n k i n g  and  'natural  mind  the concomitant  reasons  light  birth  and w h i c h ,  of reason,'  Importance  of c e r t i t u d e  notion  i n the fourth  from  a r e immune  for later  with  being from  philosophy  the thinking  o f t h e mind/body  split.  self As he  Discourse,  . . . e x a m i n i n g a t t e n t i v e l y what I was, and s e e i n g t h a t I c o u l d p r e t e n d t h a t I had no body and t h a t t h e r e was no w o r l d or p l a c e t h a t I was i n , b u t t h a t I c o u l d not, f o r a l l t h a t , pretend t h a t I d i d not e x i s t , and t h a t , on t h e c o n t r a r y , from the very f a c t t h a t I thought of doubting the t r u t h of other t h i n g s , i t followed v e r y e v i d e n t l y and v e r y c e r t a i n l y t h a t I e x i s t e d ; w h i l e on t h e o t h e r hand, i f I had o n l y c e a s e d t o t h i n k , a l t h o u g h a l l t h e r e s t o f what I had e v e r Imagined had been t r u e , I would have no r e a s o n t o believe that I existed; I thereby concluded that I was a s u b s t a n c e , o f which the whole essence or nature c o n s i s t s i n t h i n k i n g , and which, i n order t o e x i s t , needs no p l a c e and d e p e n d s on no m a t e r i a l t h i n g ; s o t h a t t h i s ' I ' , t h a t i s t o s a y , t h e mind, b y w h i c h I am what I am, i s e n t i r e l y d i s t i n c t f r o m t h e body, and e v e n t h a t i t i s e a s i e r t o know t h a n t h e body, and m o r e o v e r , t h a t e v e n i f t h e body were n o t , i t would n o t c e a s e t o be a l l that i t i s . (Descartes,  Descartes unextended the  body  divisible.  reasoned and  that  t h e mind  indivisible  or matter  1980: 54)  or s e l f  and hence  ( r e s extensa)  (res cogltans)  totally  which  was  distinct extended  And b e c a u s e c e r t i t u d e c a n o n l y be a c h i e v e d  was from and  by and  through  the  thought  Descartes,  processes  knowledge  definition,  be  of  of  the  otherness  d e r i v e d from  and  thinking  (res  subject, for  extensa)  determined  by  must,  the  self  by  (res  cogitans). The  seventeenth  empiricist and as  tradition,  necessary the  century  truths  barometer  with and  of  and  eighteenth  i t s notions  of  i t s emphasis  certitude,  on  logical  induction  sensory  carried  century  on  experience  through  Auguste  Comte up t h r o u g h B e r t r a n d R u s s e l l , t h e e a r l y W i t t g e n s t e i n and the  logical  influenced  positivism  much o f  anthropology  of  this  Tylor,  white,  tradition  replicability,  Hempel,  Carnap  n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y and  (e.g.  Murdock, S t e w a r t ,  of  Fraser,  Boas,  L6vl-strauss,  include  objectivity,  a  quantitative  establishing data.  The  rationalist from  a  the observed,  laws b a s e d  The  tradition, priori  thinking/perceiving  century  with  on  testability,  analysis,  and  subject  as  and  separation  observable  eighteenth logical  emphasis  barometer  of  of  century deduction on  the  certitude,  carried  on t h r o u g h  and  hermeneutics  of  Schleiermacher,  Dilthey,  Heidegger,  and  and  particularly  influenced  twentieth  the  Gadamer century  Kant, Hegel,  its the  facts,  and t h e p o s s i b i l i t y  i t s n o t i o n of  ideas  century  hallmarks  on c o n c l u s i o n s drawn f r o m  seventeenth  and  Radcliffe-Brown,  c a u s a l or d e t e r m i n i s t i c e x p l a n a t i o n , a fundamental between t h e o b s e r v e r and  al.,  twentieth  etc.).  reliance  et  Ricoeur  interpretive  t h e p h e n o m e n o l o g y of H u s s e r l  anthropology  (e.g.  Geertz,  Sperber,  Rabinow,  Boon,  Hymes,  (e.g. C l i f f o r d , of  this  e t c . ) and  T y l e r , Marcus, F i s c h e r , e t c . ) .  tradition  belief  i n the  always  mediated  include  an  emphasis  intersubjective 'reality'  However, b o t h the l o g i c  validity they  profoundly and  rely  evident in  aspire  of i d e n t i t y  ( i . e . logic  the  metaphysical.  such  notions  attainment That  through  they  interpreted  whole-heartedly premised  of  on t h e  certitude,  i s t o say, they  idea,  and s o o n .  which truth,  remain  both  i . e . a guarantee  certainty  as essence,  consciousness, concept,  of s e l f -  expresses self,  assume  Itself  dialectic,  T h i s n o t i o n of presence,  phenomenologlcal/exlstentialist/hermeneutlcal  c o n c e r n i n g s e l f and/or structuralist  ideas  d i a l e c t i c i t y and t h r o u g h concerning  binary  dominates t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y thought dominated  Plato  explicit  notion  deconstruction  and  Aristotle.  of  seeks  an  o f n o n - c o n t r a d i c t i o n ) and i n t h a t  on a n o t i o n o f p r e s e n c e , and s e l f - i d e n t i c a l  of  of  a  facts. i n that  to  subjectivity,  construction  traditions,  of the p r i n c i p l e  both  social  on  anthropology The h a l l m a r k s  and t h e i m p o r t a n c e  meanings as opposed t o a n a l y z e d  embrace  'postmodern'  presence t o expose  ideas  semiological/  oppositionality,  e v e r y b i t a s much a s i t It  i s this  which and  implicit  Jacques  to delimit  or  DerrIda's within  the  works o f W e s t e r n p h i l o s o p h y a n d , i n s o d o i n g , t o i n d i c a t e t h e way  i n which,  due t o t h e v e r y n a t u r e  o f o u r most c h e r i s h e d  c o n c e p t s , i n d e e d , due t o t h e v e r y n a t u r e o f c o n c e p t s a s s u c h , we,  albeit  unknowingly,  constantly repress  otherness  and  16 difference.  ii)  Statement In  goals: to  o f JjfrfcgjTt  this  dissertation  I  attempt  demonstrate  the  relevance  of  three  presuppositions of i n t e r p r e t i v e  in  the  writings  anthropology  them  Western  principle,  i s both  being  case,  the  of  Clifford  (as e v i n c e d  to subject that  i t s application  anthropology  Geertz)  because,  'postmodern  i n t h e w r i t i n g s o f James  to a deconstructive conceptuality,  by  reading  anthropology  must  begin  on t h e work  and H e i d e g g e r  and  (3) t o and  and t h a t ,  to  1  Clifford)  definition  r e p r e s s i v e and o p p r e s s i v e  to concentrate  Nietzsche  (as evinced  and  f u n d a m e n t a l r e - e v a l u a t i o n o f i t s most b a s i c I choose  to  (2) t o d e l i n e a t e t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l b a c k g r o u n d  and  show  accomplish  (1) t o p r o v i d e an e x p l i c a t i o n o f D e r r i d e a n t h o u g h t and  anthropology,  and  to  engage  in this  in a  assumptions.  of Jacques  notwithstanding,  , a  Derrida the only  F r i e d r i c h N i e t z s c h e (1844 - 1900) i s o f g r e a t i n t e r e s t t o D e r r i d a i n t h a t t h e f o r m e r d e d i c a t e d h i s l i f e ' s work t o a r a d i c a l c r i t i q u e o f t h e t r u t h c l a i m s o f Western p h i l o s o p h y . In addressing the c o n c e p t o f t r u t h N i e t z s c h e e x p r e s s e s h i m s e l f as f o l l o w s : 1 2  What, t h e n , i s t r u t h ? A m o b i l e army o f m e t a p h o r s , metonyms, and a n t h r o p o m o r p h i s m s — i n s h o r t , a sum o f human r e l a t i o n s , w h i c h have been e n h a n c e d , t r a n s p o s e d , and e m b e l l i s h e d p o e t i c a l l y and r h e t o r i c a l l y , and w h i c h a f t e r l o n g u s e seem f i r m , c a n o n i c a l , and o b l i g a t o r y t o a people: truths are i l l u s i o n s a b o u t w h i c h one has f o r g o t t e n t h a t t h i s i s what t h e y a r e ; m e t a p h o r s w h i c h a r e worn o u t and w i t h o u t s e n s u o u s power; c o i n s w h i c h have l o s t t h e i r p i c t u r e s and now m a t t e r o n l y a s m e t a l , no longer as c o i n s . We s t i l l do n o t know where t h e u r g e f o r t r u t h comes f r o m ; f o r a s y e t we have h e a r d o n l y o f t h e o b l i g a t i o n  17  imposed b y s o c i e t y t h a t i t s h o u l d e x i s t : t o be t r u t h f u l means u s i n g t h e c u s t o m a r y m e t a p h o r s — i n moral terms: the o b l i g a t i o n t o l i e a c c o r d i n g t o a f i x e d convention, to l i e h e r d - l i k e i n a s t y l e o b l i g a t o r y f o r a l l . . . . ( N i e t z s c h e i n T a y l o r , 1986a: 219) I n o t h e r words, a c c o r d i n g t o N i e t z s c h e , W e s t e r n m e t a p h y s i c s , from Plato on, h a s engaged i n a prolonged process of mistaking r h e t o r i c a l convention f o r indisputable t r u t h . He f u r t h e r a r g u e s that human consciousness i s an e f f e c t of the i n t e r p l a y of d i f f e r e n t i a l f o r c e s and t h a t f o r c e i s , by d e f i n i t i o n , r e l a t i o n a l - i . e . t h a t f o r c e , as such, cannot e x i s t as a s i n g u l a r u n i t y but must a l w a y s e x i s t i n r e l a t i o n t o a n o t h e r force. I n t h i s way Nietzsche c h a l l e n g e s the general p h i l o s o p h i c a l assumption of s e l f identical, self-sufficient unity. For Nietzsche, . . . e v e r y t h i n g i s f i s s u r e d and e v e r y consciousness duplicitous. [He] b e l i e v e s t h a t t h e s e a r c h f o r t r u t h i s a c t u a l l y a n e x e r c i s e o f " t h e w i l l t o power" t h r o u g h w h i c h one t r i e s t o m a s t e r t h e u n c e r t a i n t i e s o f t h e human condition by repressing the inevitability of f r a g m e n t a t i o n and d i s c l o c a t i o n . . . . N i e t z s c h e ' s "gay wisdom" joyfully affirms the inescapability of i n c o m p l e t i o n and t h e i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f k n o w l e d g e . ( T a y l o r , 1986a: 16) Despite Nietzsche's attempt to unsettle the s e l f - a s s u r e d a s s u m p t i o n s o f W e s t e r n m e t a p h y s i c s , M a r t i n H e i d e g g e r (1889 - 1976) c o n s i d e r e d him t o be v e r y much a p r o p o n e n t o f t h a t w h i c h he s o u g h t to d i s c r e d i t . (Indeed, Heidegger r e f e r s t o N i e t z s c h e as t h e l a s t great metaphysician.) As f a r as Heidegger was concerned, N i e t z s c h e , l i k e a l l t h o s e who p r e c e d e d him back t o and i n c l u d i n g P l a t o , was m i r e d i n a c o n c e r n w i t h knowledge w h i c h p r e c l u d e d a n y serious a t t e n t i o n t o the question o f t h e meaning of Being. According t o Heidegger, N e i t h e r N i e t z s c h e n o r a n y t h i n k e r b e f o r e him . . . come to t h e commencing beginning, rather they see the b e g i n n i n g a l r e a d y and o n l y i n t h e l i g h t o f what i s a l r e a d y a f a l l i n g o f f f r o m t h e b e g i n n i n g and a q u i e t e n i n g of t h a t b e g i n n i n g : i n t h e l i g h t of P l a t o n i c p h i l o s o p h y . . . N i e t z s c h e h i m s e l f a l r e a d y e a r l y on d e s i g n a t e s h i s p h i l o s o p h y as r e v e r s e d P l a t o n i s m . The r e v e r s a l d o e s n o t e l i m i n a t e the P l a t o n i c premise, but r a t h e r s o l i d i f i e s i t e x a c t l y through the appearance of e l i m i n a t i o n . ( H e i d e g g e r i n S p i v a k i n D e r r i d a , 1982e: x x x i v ) I n o t h e r w o r d s , b e c a u s e N i e t z s c h e d o e s n o t go f a r enough, b e c a u s e he d o e s n o t q u e s t i o n t h e meaning o f B e i n g ( i . e . t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f p r e s e n c e a s s u c h ) , he i s l e f t w i t h no c h o i c e b u t t o o p e r a t e b y a  18  method o f s i m p l e r e v e r s a l ( e . g . a n t i - C h r i s t a s o p p o s e d t o C h r i s t , D i o n y s l a n as opposed t o A p p o l l o n i a n e t c . ) which, Heidegger a r g u e s (and Derrida would agree), leaves the philosophical field e s s e n t i a l l y untouched. Heidegger s e t s out t o a d d r e s s the p o s s i b i l i t y of presence t h r o u g h a t t e m p t i n g t o t h i n k d i f f e r e n c e as d i f f e r e n c e . He r e f e r s t o d i f f e r e n c e as 'the same' w h i c h , f o r H e i d e g g e r , i s t h a t w h i c h s i m u l t a n e o u s l y j o i n s and s e p a r a t e s . In o t h e r words, H e i d e g g e r a t t e m p t s t o move away f r o m t h e s t a n d a r d W e s t e r n p h i l o s o p h i c a l notion of presence as, by definition, u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d , and a t t e m p t s t o t h i n k presence as the 'luminous s e l f - c o n c e a l i n g ' of the •same.' However, a s Mark T a y l o r p o i n t s o u t , I t Is c l e a r t h a t i n s t r u g g l i n g t o t h i n k the unthought, Heidegger t r i e s to think philosophy's other. Y e t does he still think this other philosophically or even metaphysically, and, thus, not think i t as other? Insofar as Heidegger continues to value unity over plurality, he remains true to the most important assumption of Western p h i l o s o p h y . Though i n t e n d e d t o overcome m e t a p h y s i c a l n o t i o n s o f i d e n t i t y , H e i d e g g e r ' s c o n c e p t o f t h e same a p p r o a c h e s t h e n o t i o n o f i d e n t i t y i n - d i f f e r e n c e t h a t H e g e l d e v e l o p s i n r e s p o n s e t o what he regards as Schelling's inadequate "philosophy of identity." The L o g o s t h a t a r t i c u l a t e s H e i d e g g e r ' s same i s , l i k e t h e H e g e l i a n L o g o s , a " p r i m a l phenomenon," t h a t "draws and joins together what i s held apart in separation." By a t t e m p t i n g t o t h i n k d i f f e r e n c e as same, H e i d e g g e r seems t o e x t e n d t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l s e a r c h f o r origins. I n e x p l o r i n g t h e d i f f e r e n c e l e f t u n t h o u g h t by p h i l o s o p h y , H e i d e g g e r s e e k s what he e x p l i c i t l y l a b e l s an " e s s e n t i a l o r i g i n . " From t h i s p o i n t o f v i e w , t h e p r o b l e m w i t h t h e t r a d i t i o n a l n o t i o n o f B e i n g , as w e l l a s i t s modern m a n i f e s t a t i o n i n phenomenology's " p r i n c i p l e o f p r i n c i p l e s " ( i . e . transcendental s u b j e c t i v i t y ) , i s that both Being and subjectivity are insufficiently primordial, and, hence, cannot provide a proper foundation for thinking. As a more o r i g i n a l origin, difference can answer t h e q u e s t i o n o f how presence becomes p r e s e n t . (Taylor,  1986a: 20-21)  As w i l l become c l e a r i n t h e c o u r s e o f t h i s dissertation, D e r r i d a has a g r e a t d e a l o f sympathy w i t h p a r t s o f t h e N i e t z s c h e a n and H e i d e g g e r i a n e f f o r t s — much o f h i s work b e i n g c o n c e r n e d with m a i n t a i n i n g and d e v e l o p i n g many o f t h e i r i n s i g h t s w h i l e a v o i d i n g their essential acceptance of p r e s e n c e . For, although both N i e t z s c h e and Heidegger a t t a c k the p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of Western metaphysics, both, u l t i m a t e l y , remain d e d i c a t e d to t h a t metaphysics — Nietzsche through the r e t e n t i o n of a metaphorics which i s  19 thinker such  o f whom I am aware •psuedo-concepts  undecidability, metaphysics himself,  to  , a  who manages, as  1  originary  indicate  represses  succumbing  the  otherness to  through  such  way  and  h i s use of  doubling  in  which  difference  repression.  and  Western without,  I  choose  to  c o n c e n t r a t e on i n t e r p r e t i v e a n t h r o p o l o g y b e c a u s e i t i s w i d e l y perceived  to  be  a  reaction  to,  and  more  rigorously  comprehensive than, t r a d i t i o n a l i s t p o s i t i v i s t l c approaches t o anthropology and  ( S c h o l t e , 1974; Hymes e d . , 1974; W a t s o n - F r a n k e  Watson, 1975; Rabinow and S u l l i v a n  1982;  Geertz,  Clifford,  fact,  As h a s been s a i d ,  modelled  objectivity,  o b s e r v e d and so on. anthropology construct  argues  which  assumption  dispassionate,  themselves the  positivlst  on  separation  approaches  empiricist between  that  the  observer 'factual*  •objectivity'  anthropologist is  anthropologists  and  can  capable  account  of and  interpretive  i s an e p i s t e m o l o g l c a l  t h e unwarranted  who  to  notions  observer  I n o p p o s i t i o n t o t h i s view,  entails  that  unprejudiced  Interpretive  1979; Ruby e d . ,  1973, 1983, 1988; Boon, 1982; W h i t t a k e r , 1986;  1988).  anthropology  eds.,  of  exist  as  writing  of whatever  introduce  unacceptable  she  up  an a  observes.  phenomenological/  steeped in Platonic/Cartesian dualism (e.g. truth/error, appearance/ r e a l i t y e t c . ) and Heidegger t h r o u g h a n o s t a l g i a f o r r e c o v e r i n g t h e moment o f t h e meaning o f B e i n g .  Why t h e s e i n C h a p t e r Two. , a  are not t r a d i t i o n a l  concepts  i s explained  20 hermeneutical and  notions  dialecticity  whatever  the  facts any  concentrate itself and a  up  interpreted  of  on  discipline  construction  but w i t h  privilege  their  d i s p a s s i o n a t e account,  social  notion  into  a n t h r o p o l o g i s t produces,  unprejudiced, mediated  inter3ubjectlvity,  of  the  the on  as  which  part  of  the  f a r from  i s always deals  of  a  not  over  that  being  thoroughly  with  analyzed  objective,  sclentlstlc I  choose  because  interpretive  it  to sets  anthropology  a s embodying what i s au c o u r a n t w i t h i n t h e d i s c i p l i n e  whole  eds.,  (Marcus  1986;  Sangren, 1990).  and  Rabinow,  1988;  with,  Interpretive  anthropology  argues  over  of an  dialogue  hermeneutics  •postmodern' a n t h r o p o l o g y anthropologist  produces  as s u c h , u n l i k e  Clifford,  1988;  1989;  rather  than  while  than  on on  t o ensure In t h e  form  the  'postmodern' Gadamerian Diltheyan In  that  the  on  the the  actively  accepting  emphasis  interpretation.  be  Whittaker,  anthropology  intersubjectivity,  seeks  will  Marcus  posltivist  emphasis  of  and  Interpretive  Thus,  rather  as  that  interprets,  cultures.  places of  r e a l i t y ' and,  Kapferer,  anthropology  notion  Clifford  1987;  anthropologist's  phenomenological  Ricoeurean  1988;  merely other  1986;  Tylor,  i t s improvement  notwithstanding,  hermeneutics  eds.,  1986;  Geertz,  'Postmodern'  anthropology,  engaging  Fisher  an  hence d o i n g away w i t h  anthropology  improvement  maintain  anthropologist.  'postmodern'  an  and  so  meanings —  validity  interpretation  this  whatever  or way, the  of a ' n e g o t i a t e d  Interpretive anthropology,  will  disallow  any  remnants  of  possibility a  concentrate  they  are  literature  Clifford  of  and  characterized  in  the  Rabinow  Marcus and F i s c h e r e d s . , 1986;  Fischer 1988;  eds.,  1986;  Kapferer,  Geertzian  Marcus  unacknowledged d i f f e r e n c e and  legacy and,  to  representative  of  1986;  are  of  indeed,  otherness.  because  1982,  as  that  eds.,  1983;  S c h o l t e , 1986; 1982;  Geertz,  1990).  firmly  Western  Clifford  Sullivan  is  Sangren, that  both  within  an  they continue to  metaphysics  unrecognized  and  Cliffordian  embedded that  Parker, Clifford,  1988;  and  1979;  Marcus  I argue  anthropology  anthropology  the  choose  I  current anthropological  unexamined c o n c e p t u a l i t y w h i c h e n s u r e s perpetuate  the  Cushman,  Whittaker,  interpretive  'postmodern'  and  favour  James  Webster,  Rabinow,  1989;  as  and  1985;  Clifford:  1982;  of  anthropology  ed.,  re:  Boon,  in  view.  on  Ruby  1988.  1982;  of  Geertz  'postmodern*  (re. Geertz:  skewed  point  anthropology  representative how  being  privileged  on  interpretive  of  through  the  repression  of  22 Chapter An  Explication  Jacques  Derrida  its a  of D e r r l d e a n D e c o n s t r u c t l o n  maintains  Western metaphysics,  from  of  presence;  that  for  certain  because s e l f - i d e n t i c a l  as  and  truth,  Whether logos,  Christian  a  expressed  Platonic  or  n o t i o n of God,  Absolute  Husserlean Saussurian  Spirit,  as  notion  of  notion  Heideggerian  of  a  of  —  an  and  Presocratic notion  of  of  in and  absolutely  i n such  God,  to  itself  assumption  itself  source  of  concepts so  on.  notion  a priori,  a Rousseauian  the the  Inner  e i d o s , as  meaning  a as  as a H e g e l i a n n o t i o n  n o t i o n of n a t u r e , as  system  14  of  as a C a r t e s i a n n o t i o n o f c o g i t o ,  transcendental  n o t i o n of  grounds  self-sufficient  meaning, as  history  i n a n c i e n t Greece  the  Aristotelian  a K a n t i a n n o t i o n of s y n t h e t i c of  and  substance,  is  entire  signified'  which m a n i f e s t s  essence,  presence as  i s , in  'transcendental  knowledge  the  hermeneutics,  desire  being  a  that  i t s inception  e x p r e s s i o n i n modern d a y  concept  Two  subjectivity, of  language  of Being  as  as  or  a a  as  a  alethela, i t  a l w a y s e x p r e s s e s b o t h t h e p o s s i b i l i t y and t h e n e c e s s i t y o f an a b s o l u t e and s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t g r o u n d f o r a l l human e x p e r i e n c e . And  because  presence  must  be  assumed  to account  f o r any  and  The r e a d e r s h o u l d be aware t h a t , t h r o u g h o u t t h i s work, i t i s D e r r l d a ' s v i e w o f W e s t e r n m e t a p h y s i c s w i t h w h i c h I am concerned. I t s h o u l d n o t be assumed t h a t t h i s i s a v i e w w h i c h i s commonly s h a r e d by a l l p h i l o s o p h e r s . 1 4  all  discrete  fall  phenomena,  outside  unquestionable  because  i t s purview would  nothing  (for, i f this  have  to  be  must were  questioned  be to  and  allowed happen, chaos  t h r e a t e n l o g o s ) i t i s p e r c e i v e d t o be homogeneous —  to the  would  t o be  the  u l t i m a t e u n i t y w h i c h c o n t a i n s and a l l o w s f o r a l l m u l t i p l i c i t y but which A  i s not  in i t s e l f  corollary  of  the  multiple.  f o r e g o i n g view  of  presence  W e s t e r n c o n c e p t u a l i t y abounds w i t h i n n u m e r a b l e structured error,  oppositional  pairs  such  certainty/uncertainty,  as s p e e c h / w r i t i n g ,  referent/sign,  the l a t t e r term of each p a i r  of  the former.  T h u s , t o use  an  example, D e r r i d a a s s e r t s t h a t :  i s viewed  that  hierarchically  s i g n i f i e r , i d e n t i t y / d i f f e r e n c e , meaning/absurdity, wherein  is  truth/  signified/ self/other,  as a c o r r u p t i o n  t h e s p e e c h / w r i t i n g o p p o s i t i o n as  .phonocentrism merges with the h i s t o r i c a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e meaning of b e i n g i n g e n e r a l as p r e s e n c e , w i t h a l l the subdeterminations w h i c h depend on this g e n e r a l form and which organize within it their system and their historical sequence (presence of the thing to sight as e i d o s , p r e s e n c e as substance/essence/existence [ousia], temporal presence as p o i n t [stlgm6] of t h e now or of t h e moment [ n u n ] , t h e s e l f presence of the c o g i t o , consciousness, subjectivity, the co-presence of the o t h e r and of t h e s e l f , i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y as t h e I n t e n t i o n a l phenomenon o f t h e ego, and so f o r t h ) . Logocentrism [supports] the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of the b e i n g of the e n t i t y as p r e s e n c e [and t h e ] e p o c h o f t h e l o g o s t h u s d e b a s e s w r i t i n g c o n s i d e r e d as m e d i a t i o n o f m e d i a t i o n and as a f a l l i n t o  24 the  exteriority  I n o t h e r words, s p e e c h be  close  writing  to  an  of  meaning. ( D e r r i d a , 1982e: 12-13) 13  i s e x a l t e d because  originary  i s s c o r n e d because  presence, i t is a  i t i s considered to  truth  or meaning,  •mediation of m e d i a t i o n '  and c o n s e q u e n t l y t w i c e removed f r o m t h a t w h i c h approximate. secondary  Derrida  contends  or d e r i v a t i v e  form  a p r e c o n d i t i o n of language been w r i t t e n .  Clearly,  i n the s t a n d a r d sense  of  that,  so  speech,  far  i t attempts from  writing  of symbols  i s not r e f e r r i n g representing  being  to a  is actually  and t h a t s p e e c h has a l w a y s  Derrida  while  to  already writing  words:  As D e r r i d a d e p l o y s i t , t h e t e r m [ w r i t i n g ! i s c l o s e l y r e l a t e d t o t h a t element of signifying difference which Saussure thought essential t o the workings of language. W r i t i n g , f o r D e r r i d a , i s the 'free play' or element of 'undecidability' within every system of communication. Its operations are p r e c i s e l y those which escape the s e l f c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f s p e e c h and i t s d e l u d e d sense of the mastery of c o n c e p t over language. Writing is the endless displacement of meaning which both g o v e r n s l a n g u a g e and p l a c e s I t f o r e v e r beyond the reach of a s t a b l e , self-  A t t h i s p o i n t i t s h o u l d be n o t e d t h a t , t h r o u g h o u t t h i s s t u d y , I have c o n s u l t e d E n g l i s h t r a n s l a t i o n s o f D e r r I d a ' s works. I have n o t r e a d D e r r i d a i n F r e n c h and I do n o t c l a i m to account f o r the French v e r s i o n s of D e r r i d a . My sole concern i s with the E n g l i s h t r a n s l a t i o n s . 1 3  25 authenticating  Derrida's notions by,  basic  16  endeavour  of Western  Is  1986: 28-29)  t o demonstrate  metaphysics are rooted  i t s own a b s e n c e  itself  as  such  appropriately, ensured  that  remained  —  —  question  that  i t is  the r e p r e s s i o n  of t h i s  our predominant  the  rigorous  concept  point  their  beyond  of  f o r which  assumptions,  Derrida's  cannot  assessment  Linguistics  may s e r v e  goes  deconstructing  about  within text,  Western Derrida  the  approvingly  or,  difference  involves  premises  more  which  have  a  has  so f a r into  close  through  and b e c a u s e  into aporia  metaphysics,  and  —  exposing  of t h e i r  own  i n t o an i n s o l u b l e  due t o i t s own  basic  account. of  Saussure's  as an i l l u s t r a t i o n  thought.  denial  from  t e x t s w i t h the i n t e n t i o n of  following  Western  simply  help but  strategy for calling  presence  fundamental  which,  cannot  of thought  Derrida's  l o g i c , they i n e v i t a b l y lapse problem  modes  examination of s p e c i f i c  deconstructing  the key  i t s own o r i g i n a r y d i f f e r e n c e  and  unsatisfactory.  that  i n , and d e t e r m i n e d  the concept of presence, a concept which  contain  the  knowledge. (Norris,  unexamined With notes  respect how  Course  In  o f how he notions to  Saussure  this  of  General (Derrida) presence  particular  maintains  that  As D e r r i d a u t i l i z e s i t , ' w r i t i n g ' i s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h an open-ended chain o f terms which he refers t o as 'undecldables.' T h e s e w i l l be d i s c u s s e d i n a l a t e r p o r t i o n of t h i s chapter. , s  language -  that  they  essence them  i s a s y s t e m o£ s i g n s and t h a t s i g n s a r e a r b i t r a r y are not d e f i n e d  in relation  t o an  -  unchangeable  or p r e s e n c e but by t h e d i f f e r e n c e s which d i s t i n g u i s h  from  other  formulation resulted  signs.  which,  Derrida  had i t been  sees  followed  i n the r e c o g n i t i o n of a notion  this  as  a  through,  radical  would  have  of w r i t i n g wherein:  The play of d i f f e r e n c e supposes, i n effect, s y n t h e s e s and r e f e r r a l s which f o r b i d a t a n y moment, or i n a n y s e n s e , t h a t a s i m p l e e l e m e n t be p r e s e n t i n and of Itself, referring only to Itself. Whether i n t h e o r d e r o f s p o k e n o r w r i t t e n d i s c o u r s e , no e l e m e n t c a n f u n c t i o n a s a s i g n without r e f e r r i n g t o another element which i t s e l f i s n o t s i m p l y p r e s e n t . This i n t e r w e a v i n g r e s u l t s i n e a c h 'element* phoneme or grapheme — being c o n s t i t u t e d on t h e b a s i s o f t h e t r a c e w i t h i n i t of the other elements of the c h a i n or system. This interweaving, t h i s t e x t i l e , i s the t e x t produced o n l y in the transformation of another t e x t . N o t h i n g , n e i t h e r among t h e e l e m e n t s n o r within the system, i s anywhere ever simply present or a b s e n t . There a r e o n l y , e v e r y w h e r e , d i f f e r e n c e s and t r a c e s of t r a c e s . (Derrida,  However, writing distinct the  sole  Derrida,  Saussure and  thus  systems purpose  remains  dedicated  views  "[language]  of s i g n s of  1982e: 3 0 ) .  [with]  the t r a d i t i o n a l s p e e c h / w r i t i n g  to a notion and  this  the  of  writing  the second  representing Through  1981g: 26)  first"  limitation  phonetic [ a s ] two  [existing] for (Saussure  in  he r e i n f o r c e s  d i c h o t o m y and f u r t h e r c o n t e n d s  that:  "The  linguistic  combination  of  word  constitutes  alone  1982e: 3 1 ) . t o the 33)  the  object  written  and  the  In S a u s s u r i a n  the  to  the  defined  spoken  word:  in  writing is  (Saussure misty  by  the  (Saussure  linguistics  i s doomed t o wander  According  not  object"  i n n e r system of language"  and  is  spoken  Derrida, "unrelated  in Derrida,  flats  of  the  1982e:  exteriority.  Derrida,  The basic functional principle of phonetic w r i t i n g i s p r e c i s e l y to respect and protect the integrity of the • i n t e r n a l s y s t e m * of t h e l a n g u a g e , e v e n i f i n f a c t i t does not succeed i n d o i n g so. The S a u s s u r i a n l i m i t a t i o n d o e s n o t r e s p o n d , by a mere happy c o n v e n i e n c e , t o t h e s c i e n t i f i c e x i g e n c y of t h e ' i n t e r n a l system.* That exigency is Itself constituted, as the epistemological exigency in general, by the very p o s s i b i l i t y o f p h o n e t i c w r i t i n g and by the exteriority of the 'notation' to internal logic. ( D e r r i d a , 1982e: 33-34)  In  other  words,  necessitates underscore The  the  the  concept  i t s always  I n s i d e can  epistemological  o n l y be  assumed  outside),  (the  Inside), represents is  here  a  of  absence  in  its  own  but  never  I n f e r r e d from the  (the  There  whose  of  concept  sole  purpose  i s to  p r e s e n c e by  danger  to  the  Saussure h i m s e l f  i s not  order  realized outside.  presenting entire  to  existence. So w r i t i n g  represent  language  i t s absence.  edifice  m e t a p h y s i c s of presence which D e r r i d a m a i n t a i n s to develop.  presence  of  the  i t is crucial  unaware o f t h i s  danger:  "Writing,  though  continually disregard  to  it.  develop  to  represent We  shortcomings, and To  unrelated  must  be  its  inner  language.  We  acquainted  with  system,  is  cannot  used simply  i t s usefulness,  dangers" (Saussure i n D e r r i d a , 1982e: 3 4 ) . this  comments concerning  further,  consider  some  of  Saussure's  writing:  W r i t i n g v e i l s the appearance of language; i t Is not a guise f o r language but a disguise. (Saussure i n D e r r i d a , 1982e: 35) The g r a p h i c form [image] manages to f o r c e i t s e l f upon [people] a t the expense of sound . . . and the n a t u r a l sequence i s reversed. (Saussure i n D e r r i d a , 1982e: 35) . . . the g r a p h i c form [image] of words s t r i k e s us as being something permanent and s t a b l e , b e t t e r s u i t e d than sound to constitute the unity of language throughout time. Though i t c r e a t e s a p u r e l y f i c t i t i o u s u n i t y , the s u p e r f i c i a l bond of w r i t i n g i s much e a s i e r to grasp than the n a t u r a l bond, the o n l y t r u e bond, the bond of sound . . . . But the spoken word i s so I n t i m a t e l y bound to i t s w r i t t e n image t h a t the l a t t e r manages to usurp the main r o l e . (Saussure i n D e r r i d a , 1982e: 35-36) (emphasis D e r r i d a ' s )  D e r r i d a p o i n t s out t h a t Saussure*s c a s t i g a t l o n of w r i t i n g i s fundamentally m o r a l i s t i c i n tone. speech, reverses  i t usurps a  natural  the  Writing  privileged  sequence  —  forces  position  i t i s , in  of  itself  on  speech,  it  i t s essence,  a  29 perversion. because by  And w r i t i n g  i s a dangerous p e r v e r s i o n  i t threatens the natural  virtue  intuited  o£  i t s intimate  priority  association  precisely  accorded with  t o speech  an  assumed,  presence:  The affirmation o f t h e e s s e n t i a l and ' n a t u r a l ' bond between t h e phon6 and t h e sense, t h e p r i v i l e g e a c c o r d e d t o an o r d e r of signifier (which then becomes t h e major s i g n i f i e d o f a l l o t h e r s i g n i f i e r s ) depends e x p r e s s l y , and iin c o n t r a d i c t i o n to the other l e v e l s of the Saussurian discourse, upon a psychology of consciousness and of intuitive consciousness. What S a u s s u r e d o e s n o t question here is the essential p o s s i b i l i t y of n o n l n t u l t l o n . ( D e r r i d a , 1982e: 40) ( e m p h a s i s mine)  That a  i s , what S a u s s u r e d o e s n o t q u e s t i o n  determining  presence.  phenomenon o f w r i t i n g , to,  yet representative  threat If  very  Saussure  did  Derrida's  o f , language,  differences  not  deride  seriously, vision  and t r a c e s  Interestingly,  possibility  because i t i s d e f i n e d  of the absence of presence  ramifications to  The  i s the existence  —  as both  carries  writing, soon  there  being  points  exterior  within  i f  he  i t the  took  be d a n g e r o u s l y "only,  out t h a t :  . . . i t i s when he i s n o t d e a l i n g w i t h w r i t i n g , when he has closed the parentheses  its close  everywhere,  of traces."  Derrida  the  of presence as absence.  he would  of  of  of  expressly f e e l s he on that  30 s u b j e c t , t h a t S a u s s u r e opens t h e f i e l d o f a g e n e r a l grammatology. Which would no longer be excluded from general l i n g u i s t i c s , b u t would d o m i n a t e i t and contain i t within itself. Then one r e a l i z e s t h a t what was c h a s e d o f f l i m i t s , t h e w a n d e r i n g o u t c a s t o f l i n g u i s t i c s , has i n d e e d n e v e r c e a s e d t o h a u n t l a n g u a g e as its most intimate possibility. Then something w h i c h was never spoken and which i s nothing other than writing i t s e l f as t h e o r i g i n o f l a n g u a g e w r i t e s i t s e l f w i t h i n Saussure's d i s c o u r s e . ( D e r r i d a , 1982e: 43-44) 17  Saussure  states that: It i s impossible f o r sound alone, a n a t u r a l element, to belong to language. It i s only a secondary t h i n g , substance t o be p u t t o u s e . A l l our c o n v e n t i o n a l values have t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f not being confused with the t a n g i b l e element w h i c h s u p p o r t s them. . . . The l i n g u i s t i c signifier . . . i s not [ i n essence] p h o n i c b u t i n c o r p o r e a l -- c o n s t i t u t e d n o t by t h e m a t e r i a l s u b s t a n c e but by the d i f f e r e n c e s t h a t s e p a r a t e the sound-image f r o m a l l o t h e r s . . . .The i d e a or p h o n i c substance t h a t the s i g n c o n t a i n s i s of l e s s Importance than the o t h e r s i g n s t h a t surround i t . ( S a u s s u r e i n D e r r i d a , 1982e: 53)  Thus, i r o n i c a l l y , relation writing has  to  when S a u s s u r e i s n o t d e a l i n g w i t h s p e e c h i n  writing,  he  which, e a r l i e r ,  gone  from  "the  opens he  up  the  i s a t such  spoken  word  very pains  alone  possibility  of  to repress.  He  constitutes  the  I n D e r r i d a ' s u s a g e 'grammatology' ( w h i c h comes f r o m Littr6: "A treatise upon Letters, upon the alphabet, s y l l a b a t i o n , r e a d i n g , and w r i t i n g " ( D e r r i d a , 1982e: 323)) i s used i n t e r c h a n g e a b l y with ' w r i t i n g ' i n the u n d e c i d a b l e sense. 1 7  linguistic  object"  linguistic  (Saussure  signifier  In  . . .  is  incorporeal"  (Saussure  emphasize  contradiction within  points  the  out  in  Derrida, not  Derrida,  1982e: 31) .  .  1982e:  .  to  "the  phonic  but  53).  Saussure's  And,  work,  to  Derrida  that:  By definition, difference i s never in i t s e l f a sensible plenitude. Therefore, i t s n e c e s s i t y c o n t r a d i c t s the a l l e g a t i o n of a naturally phonic essence of language. I t c o n t e s t s by t h e same t o k e n the p r o f e s s e d n a t u r a l dependence of the graphic signifier. ( D e r r i d a , 1982e: 53)  Derrida  contends  metaphysics contradictory  of  that  it  presence  nature  of the  is  Saussure's  that Course  dedication  necessitates i n General  the  a  self-  Linguistics:  the intention that Institutes l i n g u i s t i c s as a s c i e n c e r e m a i n s within a contradiction. Its d e c l a r e d purpose indeed c o n f i r m s , saying what goes without saying, the subordination of grammatology, the historico-metaphysical reduction of writing to the rank o f an instrument e n s l a v e d t o a f u l l and o r i g i n a r i l y s p o k e n language. But another gesture (not a n o t h e r statement of purpose, f o r here what d o e s n o t go w i t h o u t s a y i n g i s done without being s a i d , w r i t t e n without being uttered) liberates the future of a general grammatology of which linguistics-phonology would be only a d e p e n d e n t and c i r c u m s c r i b e d area. ( D e r r i d a , 1982e: 29-30) general  to  32 In  maintaining  that  s i m p l y p r e s e n t or a b s e n t " such  as  doubled  presence, —  that  Is, that  Inception.  as In  iterability,  1 8  . . .  i s anywhere  Derrida i s proposing that  essence,  with the p o s s i b i l i t y heterogeneous  "nothing  meaning they  of t h e i r  opposed discussing  to  are own  e t c . , are always  otherness  homogeneous Derrida's  R o d o l p h e Gasch6 p u t s  always  already —  that  from  ever  concepts already inscribed they  their  are very  *psuedo-concept'  i t this  way:  . . . what i s i n q u e s t i o n h e r e i s n o t I t e r a t i o n or r e p e t i t i o n but o n l y t h e i r p o s s i b i l i t y , or i t e r a b i l i t y , which can o c c u r a s a p o s s i b i l i t y t o any u n i t and i s , consequently, a necessary p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t must be i n s c r i b e d i n t h e e s s e n c e o f that unit I t s e l f . A p r i o r i , then, the possibility of iteration divides the i d e n t i t y of a l l u n i t s ; i t e r a b i l i t y i s the i m p u r i t y o f an a b s e n c e t h a t , from the s t a r t , p r o h i b i t s t h e f u l l and r i g o r o u s attainment of the p l e n i t u d e of a u n i t , and t h a t i n p r i n c i p l e s u b v e r t s i t s s e l f identity. (Gasch6, 1986: 213) As  Derrida says, . the b e i n g - p r e s e n t (on) in i t s t r u t h , i n the presence of i t s i d e n t i t y and i n t h e i d e n t i t y o f i t s p r e s e n c e , is d o u b l e d as s o o n a s i t a p p e a r s , as s o o n as i t presents i t s e l f . It_ a p p e a r s . In i t s e s s e n c e , as t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f i t s own most p r o p e r n o n - t r u t h , o f i t s p s u e d o truth reflected in the icon, the phantasm, or t h e s i m u l a c r u m . What i s i s n o t what i t i s , i d e n t i c a l and Identical to itself, unique, u n l e s s i t adds t o  •Iterability'  i s another  Derridean  'undecidable.'  of  33 I t s e l f t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of b e i n g r e p e a t e d as s u c h . And i t s i d e n t i t y i s hollowed o u t by t h a t a d d i t i o n , w i t h d r a w s i t s e l f i n the supplement t h a t p r e s e n t s i t . ( D e r r i d a , 1981a: 168)  Thus,  for  example,  to  the  refer  Saussure's  text,  s p o k e n word  i s , because of  already written with own  supposed  the  n o n - p r e s e n c e , and,  a self-identical It  is  back  to  the  originary  i t s essential  possibility  as s u c h , w i t h  of  explication presence  of  lterability, i t s own  i t s own  of the  always  absence, i t s  impossibility  as  concept.  important  to  realize  that  Derrida  is  concerned  n e i t h e r w i t h a simple r e v e r s a l of o p p o s i t i o n a l concepts  (e.g.  writing/speech  instead  their  neutralization:  "[A g e n e r a l s t r a t e g y of d e c o n s t r u c t i o n ] i s t o  avoid  both  metaphysics  simply and  of  speech/writing)  neutralizing  simply  residing  these  oppositions, thereby  41).  A reversal  Yeatsian changed  vision places,  of these of  any  possibility  speechless with  call  into  lash  wherein goes  of these  difference  homogeneity.  philosophical  possibility  of  within  oppositions closed  "ttlhe  on"  he  attempts  o f o p p o s i t i o n a l i t y as s u c h , the  existence  and, of  1981g: to a  beggars  have  (Yeats,  hence  1973:  358)  preclude  result  to  of  lead  o p p o s i t i o n s would and  of  field  i t " (Derrida,  D e r r i d a does not attempt  opposition —  question  the  with  o p p o s i t i o n s would m e r e l y  the  whereas a n e u t r a l i z a t i o n  binary  confirming  revolution  but  the  nor  in  t o do  away  address  i n so d o i n g , presence  as  a  the to an  originarlly hence  of  self-sufficient accounting  hierarchically the  purpose  instances and  to  of  say  for  structured  of  a  seemingly  conceptual  deconstruction  contradiction  that  e n t i t y capable  these  is  within  hierarchical resolved  oppositions  which  by  any  are  i n d i c a t i n g other  In  given are  both  to  of  words, isolate oeuvre  logical  result  v a l i d i t y of  paired  premised  tp_ show t h e  As  and  or  the  text  to t r y to u n s e t t l e  possibilities.  chain  other  simply  to the  by a c o n c e p t o f p r e s e n c e , b u t  n a t u r e o f t h i s e n t i r e v i e w and it  not  grounding  endless  pairs.  contradictions  of W e s t e r n p h i l o s o p h y ' s s u b s c r i b i n g  of  on  and  contingent or  displace  Gasch6 p o i n t s  Deconstruction i s . . . the attempt to account for the heterogeneity constitutive of the philosophical d i s c o u r s e , n o t by t r y i n g t o overcome I t s inner differences but by maintaining them. . . . . . . deconstruction s t a r t s with a s y s t e m a t i c e l u c i d a t i o n of c o n t r a d i c t i o n , p a r a d o x e s , i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s , and aporias constitutive of conceptua1ity, a r g u m e n t a t i o n , and t h e d i s c u r s i v e n e s s of philosophy. Yet t h e s e d i s c r e p a n c i e s are not logical contradictions, the only d i s c r e p a n c i e s f o r which the p h i l o s o p h i c a l discourse can account. E l u d e d by the l o g i c of i d e n t i t y , t h e y are c o n s e q u e n t l y not contradictions properly speaking. Nor a r e t h e s e n e c e s s a r y i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s t h e r e s u l t o f i n e q u a l i t y between f o r m and content. T h e i r e x c l u s i o n from the canon o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l themes i s p r e c i s e l y what makes i t p o s s i b l e t o d i s t i n g u i s h between form and content, a d i s t i n c t i o n that t a k e s p l a c e s o l e l y a g a i n s t the h o r i z o n of the possibility of their homogeneous reunification. ( G a s c h 6 , 1986: 135)  out:  If  one  questions  the  possibility  of  the  r e u n i f i c a t i o n ' o f o p p o s i t i o n a l p a i r s t h e n one the  nature  viewing  of  philosophical  contradiction  as  oppositional  premised  upon  presence, former one  pairs  and  the  something  is closer  as  itself  always  Thus c o n t r a d i c t i o n resolved viewed  i n an as  possible is only  at  which  a l l .  a  between  itself  as  already  notion them  allows  of  than  dead  or end  that  the  for  the  divided  the  by  latter,  contradiction. not  of  only  unity,  thought  concept  heterogeneity,  of  a  so  something  cannot  but  of  be be  presence  expression  from  must  being  be  i n the  Gasch6,  . . . deconstruction . . . presupposes a c o n c r e t e l y d e v e l o p e d d e m o n s t r a t i o n of the fact that concepts and discursive totalities are already cracked and f i s s u r e d by n e c e s s a r y c o n t r a d i c t i o n s and heterogeneities that the discourse of  a  either  is actually  philosophy  Again, to r e f e r to  to  be  self-identical  far  —  must  unity  unifying  which  abandoned  possibility  (pace A r i s t o t l e ) .  the  originarlly differentiated,  i t s i m p o s s i b i l i t y as a  —  are  originary  being  source  transcendent  ( i . e . t r a n s c e n d e d ) or  which a l l o w s  actually  c o n t r a d i c t i o n , w h i c h i s , o f c o u r s e , an  philosophical  place  to  is  than  signified/slgnifier  within  Hence, t h e  p o s s i b l e due  re-think  Rather  which  becomes s o m e t h i n g t h a t  differentiation  overcome  as  organizing  o r i g i n a r y and  that  e n t i t y , and of  the  must v i e w p r e s e n c e  i.e.  such  division  to  to  t o Western thought, both terms  contained  only  has  contradiction.  r e s o l v a b l e , because, a c c o r d i n g of  'homogeneous  that first  36 philosophy f a l l s to take Into account, e i t h e r because t h e y are not, r i g o r o u s l y speaking, logical contradictions, or b e c a u s e a r e g u l a t e d ( c o n c e p t u a l ) economy must a v o i d them i n o r d e r t o s a f e g u a r d t h e ethico-theoretical decisions that orient its discourse. T h e s e f i s s u r e s become a p p a r e n t when we follow to i t s l o g i c a l end that which in the process of conceptualization or argumentation is only in a certain manner said. Deconstruction t h u s b e g i n s by t a k i n g up broached but d i s c o n t i n u e d I m p l i c a t i o n s - d i s c o n t i n u e d b e c a u s e t h e y would have contradicted the intentions of philosophy. (Gasch6, 1986:  We  have  already  Saussure,  in  signifier  seen  spite  of  is  not  . . .  constituted  not  differences  that  (Saussure  in  contradiction alone  it  by  to  this  because  of  presence: essential  an  examples  by  metaphysical  .  that  phonic  substance  the  image  sound  point,  that  " . . .  t h a t he he  is  Saussure of  does  from  'almosting'  the  concept  refusal of  to  presence  let  in direct  not  word  work,  to  notion  a  here  of a  in  because  in his  but of  is  the  1982e:  40).  a n o t h e r of  prevents  others"  spoken  (Derrida,  go  the  (Saussure  question  nonintuition"  —  by  all  the  object"  work on R o u s s e a u p r o v i d e s how  but  maintains t h i s ,  not  how  linguistic  maintains,  [linguistic]  --  incorporeal  material  yet  what  "the  but  53),  And  possibility  of  .  Saussure  ethico-theoretical dedication  "What  Derrida's  .  in  1982e:  the  1982e: 3 1 ) .  works  asserting  the  Derrida,  i s supported  this  separate  constitutes  Derrida,  how  136)  the  numerous Western  writer  from  37 seeing  the  implications  Rousseau p r i v i l e g e s  o£  his  own  work.  Like  Saussure,  speech over w r i t i n g :  L a n g u a g e s a r e made t o be s p o k e n , w r i t i n g s e r v e s o n l y as a s u p p l e m e n t t o s p e e c h . . Speech represents thought by conventional signs, and writing represents the same with regard to speech. Thus t h e a r t of w r i t i n g i s n o t h i n g b u t a m e d i a t e d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of thought. ( R o u s s e a u i n D e r r i d a , 1982e: 144)  What  is  interesting  •supplement,' within  itself  strange one  as  for,  19  two  here as  a  supposedly  supplement  complete  in  existence  of a  supplement  which  not  only  because  phenomenon although  destruction 1982e:  142),  scorns of  than  a  finds  and  an  out,  it  "harbours  144).  something  other  this  as  a  as  disease  himself  supplement  sense,  an  in  of  to  the  of  to  that  the And  speech,  speech"  attempting  very  precisely  itself. of  the  replaces.  dangerous  phenomenon  as  is  hand, t h e  effectively is  is  which  for a representation  the  term  On  incompleteness  but  'Supplement' a l s o b e l o n g s of D e r r i d e a n 'undecidables.' 1 9  the  1982e:  the  supplement  for  of  cohabitation  to  on  implies  writing  presence he  extra;  use  i t i s , in  to a preference  rather  he  —  supplements  Rousseau  i t leads  added  itself  inessential  whose  (Derrida,  is  an  to  points  significations  addition,  According  Rousseau's  Derrida  i t i s necessary"  hand,  it  is  "as  (Derrida,  supplement,  open-ended  company  38 through from  the  absence  o£  writing,  a  presence  that  is  absent  speech: I would l o v e s o c i e t y as o t h e r s do i f I were n o t s u r e o f s h o w i n g m y s e l f n o t j u s t at a disadvantage but as completely d i f f e r e n t f r o m what I am. The d e c i s i o n I have t a k e n t o w r i t e and t o h i d e m y s e l f away i s p r e c i s e l y t h e one t h a t s u i t s me. I f I were p r e s e n t p e o p l e would n e v e r have known what I was w o r t h . ( R o u s s e a u In D e r r i d a , 1982e: 142)  What  does  always  this  already  supplement  and  supplemented? and  point riddled that  but  with  like  the  intimation  absence  --  that  that  a l l supplements  entity  n o t and  has  with  never  which  speech  i t , too,  i t , too,  The phenomenon, as s u c h , as t h e  self-sufficient  h i m s e l f , does  to  may  is  is a be  self-identical  Rousseau  so  concerns  existed:  the indefinite process of supplementarity has always already Infiltrated presence, always already i n s c r i b e d t h e r e the space of r e p e t i t i o n and the splitting of the self. R e p r e s e n t a t i o n i r i t h e a b y s s [en a b y m e ] of presence is not an accident of p r e s e n c e ; t h e d e s i r e o f p r e s e n c e i s , on the c o n t r a r y , born from the abyss (the indefinite multiplication) of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , from the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  ao  A c c o r d i n g t o Barbara Johnson, t r a n s l a t o r of D e r r i d a ' s D i s s e m i n a t i o n : "The e x p r e s s i o n en abyme, p o p u l a r i z e d by G i d e , was o r i g i n a l l y u s e d i n h e r a l d r y t o d e s i g n a t e t h e s t a t u s o f t h e f i g u r e of a s m a l l s h i e l d used t o d e c o r a t e a s h i e l d . Now used whenever some p a r t o f a whole c a n be s e e n as a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h a t whole . . . ad i n f i n i t u m , as i n t h e Quaker O a t s box on w h i c h a man h o l d s up a Quaker O a t s box on w h i c h a m a n . . . e t c . " ( J o h n s o n i n D e r r i d a , 1981a: 265) 2 0  /  39 o£ r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , e t c . (Derrida,  In  other  ralson of  words,  d'etre  p r e s e n c e , so  is itself  163)  the  primordial  m e r e l y an  effect  supplementarity.  instances nature,  of  Rousseau's  Th6rdse  is  writing  i s a supplement  thought  and  itself  everything  a  Derrida  culture  is  underscores  a  supplement  supplement  of  so-called  supplement  of  a  'real  'normal mother,'  of speech, speech i s a supplement i s a supplement  of  of presence —  of  which  a l w a y s and e v e r y w h e r e o n l y a p p r o x i m a t e d t h r o u g h i t s  absence.  It  presence  that  complex  work,  supplementarity:  masturbation i s a  sexuality,'  is  Rousseau's  leads  him  supplementarity  definition is.  f a r from b e i n g  of the supplement,  Throughout  is  1982e:  never  What  Rousseau's  good  Derrida  commitment  into which,  enough  the  according  use o f t h e s u p p l e m e n t  to  a  tortuous  but which  attempts  to  concept  by-ways  to  him,  i s always  show  in  of is  of a by  a l l there  deconstructing  i s that:  . . . i n what one c a l l s t h e r e a l l i f e o f t h e s e e x i s t e n c e s o f " f l e s h and bone," beyond and b e h i n d what one b e l i e v e s c a n be circumscribed as Rousseau's text, there has never been anything but w r i t i n g ; t h e r e have n e v e r been a n y t h i n g but supplements, substitutive significations which could only come forth in a chain of differential r e f e r e n c e s , t h e " r e a l " s u p e r v e n i n g and b e i n g added o n l y w h i l e t a k i n g on meaning f r o m a t r a c e and f r o m an I n v o c a t i o n o f the supplement, etc. And thus to  40 i n f i n i t y , f o r we have r e a d , i r i t h e t e x t , t h a t the a b s o l u t e p r e s e n t , Nature, t h a t w h i c h words l i k e " r e a l m o t h e r " name, have always already escaped, have never existed; that what opens meaning and l a n g u a g e i s w r i t i n g as t h e d i s a p p e a r a n c e of n a t u r a l p r e s e n c e . ( D e r r i d a , 1982e: 158-159)  Although following Western  may  written be  explicitly  applied  to  any  about  Rousseau,  writer  operating  the within  metaphysics:  Rousseau's text must constantly be c o n s i d e r e d as a complex and m a n y - l e v e l e d structure; In i t , c e r t a i n propositions may be r e a d as i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f o t h e r p r o p o s i t i o n s t h a t we a r e , up t o a c e r t a i n p o i n t and w i t h c e r t a i n p r e c a u t i o n s , free t o r e a d o t h e r w i s e . R o u s s e a u s a y s A, t h e n f o r r e a s o n s t h a t we must d e t e r m i n e , he interprets A into B. A, which was already an interpretation, is reinterpreted into B. After taking c o g n i z a n c e o f i t , we may, w i t h o u t l e a v i n g Rousseau's text, isolate A from its interpretation into B, and discover p o s s i b i l i t i e s and resources there that indeed b e l o n g to Rousseau's t e x t , but were n o t e x p l o i t e d by him, which, f o r e q u a l l y l e g i b l e m o t i v e s , he p r e f e r r e d t o cut short. ( D e r r i d a 1982e: 307)  What short  traditional (and,  surmise  as  that,  metaphysics  Derrida whether  theoretical  decision)  lead  radical  to  a  consistently  points  out,  conscious i s any  or  i t is not,  exploration  questioning  of  prefers difficult  this that  presence.  i s an  to not  cut to  ethico-  threatens Thus,  to for  example,  In  the  possibilities his  text.  case  of  Rousseau,  supplementarity  Being  self-sufficient  o£  committed  he  does  that  to presence  not  explore  l i e untouched as  a  the  within  self-Identical,  entity,  Rousseau c o u l d not think this writing [supplementarity] that takes p l a c e b e f o r e and w i t h i n s p e e c h . To t h e extent that he belonged to the metaphysics o f p r e s e n c e , he dreamed o f t h e s i m p l e e x t e r i o r i t y of d e a t h t o l i f e , e v i l t o good, r e p r e s e n t a t i o n t o p r e s e n c e , s i g n i f i e r to s i g n i f i e d , representer to r e p r e s e n t e d , mask t o f a c e , w r i t i n g to speech. But a l l s u c h o p p o s i t i o n s a r e i r r e d u c i b l y rooted in that metaphysics. Using them, one can only operate by reversals, that is to say by c o n f i r m a t i o n s . The s u p p l e m e n t i s none of these terms. I t i s e s p e c i a l l y n o t more a signifier than a signified, a r e p r e s e n t e r than a presence, a w r i t i n g than a speech. None o f t h e t e r m s o f t h i s s e r i e s c a n , b e i n g comprehended w i t h i n i t , d o m i n a t e t h e economy of d l f f 6 r a n c e or supplementarity. Rousseau's dream c o n s i s t e d of making t h e s u p p l e m e n t e n t e r m e t a p h y s i c s by f o r c e . ( D e r r i d a , 1982e: 315) ( e m p h a s i s D e r r i d a ' s and mine) a >  A  look  at  Derrida's  'undecidables'  Is  Indispensable  further c l a r i f y i n g deconstruction's displacement In  attempting  process both  account  of d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  the  2 1  to  possibility  'Diff^rance'  of  i s an  for  an  always  of  already  presence. occurring  which a l l o w s , s i m u l t a n e o u s l y , presence  (as  'undecidable. '  an  effect)  to  and  for the  42 impossibility Derrida  of  presence  (as  p o s i t s a s e r i e s of  a  self-Identical  t e r m s s u c h as  trace,  entity),  lterablllty,  d l f f F r a n c e , s u p p l e m e n t , pharmakon, mark e t c . , w h i c h c a n n o t reduced  to  example,  any  single,  trace  combines  effacement both  of  that  coming the  which  from  which  differ  senses the  of,  effacement as  1  and  that  of  i t , without leaving  room  dialectics"  Derrida's  is  to  for  i s added  combines  (Derrida,  the  senses  other  so  (iter  supplement to  the  and  and  that  senses  of  both  the  on. no  These  longer  opposition  opposition,  constituting solution  in  third the  be but,  resisting a  of  combines  s e n s e s of  (binary)  a  mark and  defer,  r e f e r s t o them, "can  ever  for  diffFrance  trace,  philosophical  Thus,  the  which  which  the  the  combines  other),  pharmakon  Derrida  suggests a s i m i l a r i t y and  both  both  that  inhabit philosophical  ever  speculative  of  place  within they  to  meaning.  remedy, mark combines t h e  the  disorganizing without  and  both  •undecldables,  rather,  repeated  of  b o t h p o i s o n and  included  is  of  iterability  itara:  the  and  mark,  senses  Sanskrit  takes  trace  the  the  senses  combines  the  self-identical  be  and  term,  form  of  1981g: 4 3 ) .  Vincent  Leitch  between G e l l - M a n n ' s and  Zweig's  quark  2 2  undecldables:  L i k e the quark i n p h y s i c s , the [undecidable] is a theoretical unit . . . that, though imperceptible — more n o t h i n g t h a n s o m e t h i n g D e r r i d e a n t h o u g h t and quantum p h y s i c s Floyd Merrell's Deconstruction Reframed, ( I n d i a n a : Purdue U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1985). 2 2  are explored i n West Lafayette  43 — o p e r a t e s a m i d s t t h e i n n e r m o s t r e a c h e s o£ [ t e x t u a l i t y ] , permeating and e n e r g i z i n g i t s e n t i r e a c t i v i t y , a f f e c t i n g omnipresence, y e t r e m a i n i n g o u t o f hand. J u s t as the quark, posited b y G e l l - M a n n and Zweig d u r i n g t h e early 1960's, accounted f o r the strange activities of p a r t i c l e s within sub-atomic spheres, so D e r r i d a ' s [ u n d e c i d a b l e ] e x p l a i n s the p e c u l i a r e f f e c t s of t e x t u a l i t y d e t e c t e d a t m i c r o l e v e l s of the s i g n . N e i t h e r a f r e e quark nor a p u r e [ u n d e c i d a b l e ] c a n be d i s l o d g e d o r isolated because they are functions of relations — mirage ' e f f e c t s ' of p r i m o r d i a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n i n process. ( L e i t c h , 1983: 28)  And,  precisely  undecldables is,  they  because t h e y cannot  cannot  cannot  hierarchical  be p e r c e i v e d  be r e a b s o r b e d  oppositions  as  indeed, as s e l f - i d e n t i c a l respect to diffFrance, or  as concepts  into clear  a dialectical cut  terms a t a l l .  "every concept  p e r se —  'third  that  system of terms'  or,  As D e r r i d a s a y s  with  i s inscribed  i n a chain  i n a system w i t h i n which i t r e f e r s t o the o t h e r s , t o other  concepts,  by means  of the systematic  Such a p l a y , d l f f F r a n c e , but  be d i s l o d g e d o r i s o l a t e d ,  i s thus  rather the p o s s i b i l i t y  process  and  system  play  of  differences.  no l o n g e r s i m p l y a  concept,  of c o n c e p t u a l i t y , of a conceptual  i n general"  (Derrida,  1982a:  Gasch6 p o i n t s o u t :  Because t h e [ u n d e c l d a b l e s ] a r e n o t atoms, b e c a u s e t h e y have no i d e n t i t y i n t h e m s e l v e s , . . . t h e y c a n n o t be g a t h e r e d once and f o r a l l upon t h e m s e l v e s i n some ideal purity. L e t us n o t f o r g e t t h a t t h e undecldables are the conditions of possibility (and i m p o s s i b i l i t y ) o f t h e conceptual differences as w e l l as of  11).  As  44 d i s c u r s i v e I n e q u a l i t i e s ; thus, they are what makes t h e p r o j e c t o f s y s t e m a t i z a t i o n possible, without, however, being systematizable themselves. Yet t h i s i s not t o say t h a t a c e r t a i n s y s t e m a t i z a t i o n c a n n o t a p p l y t o them; i t s i m p l y means t h a t t h e i r s y s t e m c a n n o t be c l o s e d upon itself by means of some dominating center. . . . The system of the [undecidables] cannot be formalized, i d e a l i z e d , or s y s t e m a t i z e d b e c a u s e i t i s precisely i t s play that makes those projects possible. (Gasch6, 1986 184-185)  Derrida  takes  care  undecidables  "block  every  relationship  to  whatever of  "a  and,  form,  a  none  of  or  consequently, not  on  point  them may  a  that,  be  because  theology,"  signified' elevated  master-concept"  their  any  out  r e l a t i o n s h i p to  'transcendental  master-word  depending  to  or to  referent the  (Derrida,  number  is  open  --  possibility  of  absolute  which  presence)  are  but  grounded  on  textuality  may  attempt  show,  views  to  Of  outside  of  i t is  1981g:  their  hors  almost  text  texte]"  and  contained  creation  closure  play  of  by  Important  to  a  As  understand  (as  is  dialectic notion  of  piece  of  whatever  one's c o n s i d e r a t i o n .  40)  I will how  now  Derrida  textuality.  Grammatology the  and  nuances  under  l a n g u a g e and In  de  be  the  in  of  position  t h e c a s e w i t h p h i l o s o p h e m e s s u c h as t r u t h , m e a n i n g , etc.  every  Derrida  [there  (Derrida,  i n v a r i a b l y taken  out  i s no  states:  outside-text;  1982e: of  "There  158).  context,  is i _ l n'y  This has  led  nothing a  pas  statement, to  enormous  confusion  and  to  divergent  from  one  that  the  another  deconstruction  language. expresses  In his  a  belief, as  maintains  1984  Edward  with  with  such  by  Said  that nothing  interview  Irritation  expressed  and  critics E.D.  exists  Richard  Hirsch,  outside  Kearney  as  of  Derrida  mlsreadings:  I n e v e r c e a s e t o be s u r p r i s e d by c r i t i c s who see my work as a d e c l a r a t i o n t h a t t h e r e i s n o t h i n g beyond l a n g u a g e , t h a t we are imprisoned i n language; i t i s , i n f a c t , s a y i n g the exact opposite. The critique of l o g o c e n t r i s m i s above a l l e l s e t h e s e a r c h f o r t h e ' o t h e r ' and the 'other' of language. Every week I r e c e i v e c r i t i c a l c o m m e n t a r i e s and s t u d i e s on d e c o n s t r u c t i o n w h i c h o p e r a t e on the a s s u m p t i o n t h a t what t h e y call 'poststructuralism' amounts t o saying that t h e r e i s n o t h i n g beyond l a n g u a g e , t h a t we are submerged i n words — and other stupidities of t h a t s o r t . Certainly, deconstruction t r i e s t o show t h a t the question of reference is much more complex and p r o b l e m a t i c t h a n t r a d i t i o n a l t h e o r i e s supposed. I t even asks whether our t e r m ' r e f e r e n c e ' i s e n t i r e l y a d e q u a t e for d e s i g n a t i n g the 'other'. The o t h e r , which is beyond language and which summons language, is perhaps not a 'referent' i n the normal sense which linguists have a t t a c h e d to t h i s term. But t o d i s t a n c e o n e s e l f thus from the habitual structure of reference, to challenge or complicate our common a s s u m p t i o n s a b o u t i t , does n o t amount t o saying that there i s nothing beyond language. (Derrida  When the  Derrida  i n K e a r n e y ed.,  says  t e x t , " that there  that  i s no  1984:  "[tlhere  123-124)  i s nothing  * o u t s l d e - t e x t , ' no  outside  of  'extra-text,'  he  i s saying  that  self-identical for or  any  given  there  i s no  'transcendental  presence capable piece  of  writing  of g r o u n d i n g and or,  'framed' s i t u a t i o n w h a t s o e v e r .  such,  i s an  e f f e c t of  'undecidable' sense,  the  text  f o r , as  signified'  indeed, For  taken  f o r any  Derrida, in  isolated  i t s generalized  according to Derrida the g e n e r a l i z e d c o n c e p t o f t e x t Is p r e c i s e l y that which exceeds the traditional determination o f t e x t as a t o t a l i t y . In w h a t e v e r t e r m s — e m p i r i c a l , i d e a l i s t , or d i a l e c t i c a l — t e x t i s d e f i n e d , i t always implies a closure upon i t s e l f with a c l e a r i n s i d e and o u t s i d e , whether i t is t h e e m p i r i c a l c l o s u r e of t h e u n i t y of a c o r p u s , t h e i n t e l l i g i b l e u n i t y o f a work, or t h e d i a l e c t i c a l t o t a l i t y o f i t s f o r m a l or t h e m a t i c m e a n i n g s . Y e t i f t h e g e n e r a l t e x t d e l i m i t s the t r a d i t i o n a l t o t a l i z i n g c o n c e p t s o f what has been c a l l e d t e x t , i t a l s o i m p l i e s t h a t the e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t t e x t , b e c a u s e i t i s no l o n g e r a t o t a l i t y , has no inside or outside. The g e n e r a l i z e d t e x t i s not something t h a t i s c l o s e d upon i t s e l f i n s u c h a manner t h a t i t s l i m i t s would d e m a r c a t e an i n s i d e f r o m an o u t s i d e . . . . The g e n e r a l text is r a t h e r t h a t b o r d e r i t s e l f , from which the a s s i g n m e n t o f i n s l d e s and o u t s l d e s t a k e s p l a c e , as w e l l as where t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n u l t i m a t e l y c o l l a p s e s . . . . " T h e r e i s no extra-text" means just this: nothing o u t s i d e the t e x t can, l i k e a l a s t reason, assume a f u l f i l l i n g f u n c t i o n . . . of the textual referrals. I t c e r t a i n l y does not permit the conclusion that there is nothing else but texts, or for that matter, t h a t a l l i s language. ( G a s c h S , 1986  accounting  language,  Gasch6 i n d i c a t e s ,  279-181)  or  as or  It that  may,  of  Derrida  words i n an  course,  extraordinary  "There  158); in  is  Macksey  itself  on,  and  a 1  t o be  eds.,  (Derrida,  up  the  necessity  for  that  they,  one's  l e s s an e s t a b l i s h e d and  respected  this  unprofessional  sort  of  ordinary because  Such comments  perception" 272);  is,  1982e: (Derrida  "Immediacy  is  "Speech  . . .  i s already  in  1982e:  46);  "Wherever  it  (Derrida, almost  i n and  taking  uses  (Derrida,  1981g: 4 9 ) , invariably  though t h e y are  i n c u r r e d a contemptuous response precisely  text"  i s any  (again,  b a n d i e d a b o u t as  comments and  he  often  then complains  1982:  1982e: 157);  picked  indeed,  that  and  t h o u g h t ' means n o t h i n g "  tend  and,  c o n f u s e d or b o t h .  outside  Donato  writing"  c o n t e x t ) and  any  or g e t  nothing  (Derrida,  operates,  cuff  fashion  "I d o n ' t b e l i e v e t h a t t h e r e  derived"  so  argued,  i s maddeningly abstruse,  people take exception as:  be  of  their  critic  and  of the  preclude  seriously.  t h a n Ren6 W e l l e k  from D e r r i d a  dismissive  merely o f f  themselves,  author  out  and  for engaging  No has in  embarrassingly  behaviour:  I t d o e s not s u f f i c e , i n o r d e r t o know how t o r e a d , s i m p l y t o own a l i b r a r y and t o know how to t a l k . I n s a y i n g t h i s I am r e f e r r i n g t o what c a n be i n f e r r e d a b o u t n o n - r e a d i n g f r o m an a s s e r t i o n by W e l l e k , a c c o r d i n g t o which I supposedly advanced "the preposterous theory that writing precedes speaking, a claim r e f u t e d by e v e r y c h i l d and by t h e t h o u s a n d s p o k e n l a n g u a g e s t h a t have no w r i t t e n r e c o r d s . " I quote this "child" argument . because it demonstrates that the condemned texts have not even been opened. ( D e r r i d a , 1986d: 42)  48 The  point  i s , of  emphatically to  do  a  not  course,  that  o f f the c u f f  disservice  not  DerrIda's  comments  are  most  and  t o p o r t r a y them as s u c h i s  to  him  only  but  to  scholarship  in  general. One  of  the  strategies  attempting  to  always  remembered,  presence to  be as  a  delimit  such  as  the  text,  the  writing,  'other,'  to  concepts  metaphysics the Blue  self-sufficient  entity,  is  volatile sign,  which  notion  one  i s reminded  to  and  so  closed  of  of on,  presence,  of  be  concepts which  signifieds.  an  displacing Derrida  originarily  is  of  traditional  to  of Wallace Stevens's  The  Guitar: T h e y s a i d , "You have a b l u e g u i t a r , You do n o t p l a y t h i n g s as t h e y a r e . " The man r e p l i e d , " T h i n g s as t h e y a r e A r e c h a n g e d upon t h e b l u e g u i t a r . " And t h e y s a i d t h e n , "But p l a y , you A t u n e beyond u s , y e t o u r s e l v e s , A t u n e upon t h e b l u e g u i t a r Of t h i n g s e x a c t l y a s t h e y a r e . " ( S t e v e n s , 1982c: 165)  must,  of and  process  D e r r i d a ' s use  we By  to the p o s s i b i l i t y  occurring  respect to  appear  nature  t h e s e c o n c e p t s , by  already  With  i t must of  possibility  everywhere,  which,  in  notion  as d e f i n i t i v e l y  the  upon  employs  the  t o open W e s t e r n m e t a p h y s i c s  differentiation. and  and  meaning,  self-authenticating  always,  dependent  the s l i p p a g e w i t h i n  attempting its  is  Derrida  metaphysics,  u n s t a b l e and  commonly t e n d t o v i e w Indicating  Western  self-identical  demonstrate  which  of  notions Western Man  with  In  other  they  words,  although  a r e n o t t o be r e a d  simple  Derrida as  changed  Derrida  says:  upon  traditional  'traditional  -- t h e y a r e a l w a y s a l r e a d y  already  uses  the blue  concepts'  'under e r a s u r e '  a 3  concepts p u r e and —  always  g u i t a r of d e c o n s t r u c t i o n .  As  Since these concepts are indispensable for u n s e t t l i n g the h e r i t a g e t o which they b e l o n g , we s h o u l d [ n o t ] r e n o u n c e them. W i t h i n t h e c l o s u r e , by an o b l i q u e and always perilous movement, constantly r i s k i n g f a l l i n g back w i t h i n what i s b e i n g deconstructed, i t is necessary to surround the c r i t i c a l concepts with a c a r e f u l and t h o r o u g h d i s c o u r s e — t o mark t h e c o n d i t i o n , t h e medium, and t h e l i m i t s of t h e i r e f f e c t i v e n e s s and t o d e s i g n a t e r i g o r o u s l y the intimate r e l a t i o n s h i p to the machine whose d e c o n s t r u c t i o n they permit; and, i n the same process, d e s i g n a t e the c r e v i c e through which the y e t unnameable glimmer beyond t h e c l o s u r e c a n be g l i m p s e d . ( D e r r i d a , 1982e: 14)  This  'unnameable  glimmer'  Western metaphysics which, 'double  i n turn, gesture'  i s teased  i n the formless  are teased  o u t by  of d e c o n s t r u c t i o n .  c o n c i s e and u s e f u l summary o f t h i s  out  shape the  of of  texts  of  'undecldables'  'split  Vincent  the  writing'  Leitch  or  offers a  process:  The place where a reader notices a displacement or r e v e r s a l in a textual Concepts, which, having been deconstructed, are r e v e a l e d as b e i n g n o n - s e l f - i d e n t i c a l y e t i n d i s p e n s a b l e , a r e sometimes w r i t t e n : t ^ a ^ h . 3 9  50 chain or system o f t e n constitutes the site of philosophical or thematic opposition. D i s c l o s i n g such a c r e v i c e , the deconstructor systematically and tenaciously i n v e r t s the oppositions to reveal the a c t u a l h i e r a r c h i c a l r e l a t i o n of t h e d i c h o t o m o u s t e r m s . At t h i s p o i n t she steadfastly disallows any r e c o n s t i t u t l o n , s u b l i m a t i o n , or s y n t h e s i s (any Hegelian Aufhebung) of opposing terms. This strategic i n v e r s i o n and stubborn expos6 produce an unexpected gap, forcing t h e emergence of a new [ ' c o n c e p t ' ] , w h i c h n a m e l e s s mark n e i t h e r neutralizes nor reforms the old opposition. Rather, i t f u n c t i o n s as a disorganizing structural force that I n v i s i b l y i n h a b i t s and t r a n s g r e s s e s t h e opposition. . . . The p u r p o s e o f t h e deconstructor is to produce such u n d e c i d a b l e s and t o t r a c k t h e i r i n s i s t e n t operation throughout the t e x t . . . . The s p l i t w r i t i n g o f d e c o n s t r u c t i o n . . . c o n s i s t s of d e l i b e r a t e l y i n v e r t i n g t r a d i t i o n a l oppositions and m a r k i n g t h e mysterious and disorienting play of hitherto invisible ['concepts' i . e . u n d e c i d a b l e s ] t h a t r e s i d e , unnamed, i n t h e gap between o p p o s i n g t e r m s . (Between "nature" and "culture," f o r example, dwells the supplement.) In t h i s double gesture, deconstruction avoids simply defusing oppositions o r r e f o r m i n g them; i n o t h e r words, d e c o n s t r u c t i o n actively resists the inclusion of the new ['concept'] i n t o the o l d dichotomy. ( L e i t c h , 1983: 180)  J u s t as d e c o n s t r u c t i o n , doubling,  does  away  with  w i t h i t s i n s i s t e n c e on o r i g i n a r y the  notion  of  a  pure  origin,  b e g i n n i n g o r a r c h e , s o i t a l s o d o e s away w i t h t h e c o r r e l a t i v e notion  of a pure  finality,  case,  the western  notion  linear  sequence,  ending  or t e l o s .  of l i n e a r i t y ,  This  being the  and o f h i s t o r y  i s called r a d i c a l l y into  question,  as a  f o r , as  51 Derrida  points  out,  "history  has  no  doubt  always  been  a s s o c i a t e d w i t h a l i n e a r scheme o f t h e u n f o l d i n g o f  presence,  where  originary  the  line  relates  presence  according  (Derrida,  1982e: 8 5 ) .  often  tend  western, time  or,  latter  draw  the  with  the  "tbloth  figures  of  (Taylor, circle  a  are  presence.  presence  straight  sharp  to  line  distinction  'primitive'  end  is  and  the  or  the  t o be  70).  dominated  and that  circle"  serve  to  the  is  are  be  cyclical  we and of and  and  the  progressive, with  the  important forms  as  notions  beginning,  to  of  determined  by  the  realize  closure  totalizing  words, b o t h  According to J . H i l l i s  Eastern  'civilized'  and  it  line  In o t h e r and  with  linear  beginning,  circle  between  considered  coinciding  plenitude  1987c:  the  former  the  final  A l t h o u g h , as Mark T a y l o r i n d i c a t e s ,  i s considered  surpassing  that,  to  indeed,  wherein  static,  end  to  the  metaphors"  line  the  Miller,  The model o f t h e l i n e i s a p o w e r f u l p a r t of the t r a d i t i o n a l language of O c c i d e n t a l metaphysics. . . . The end o f t h e s t o r y i s the r e t r o s p e c t i v e r e v e l a t i o n of the law of the whole. That law i s an underlying 'truth' which ties a l l together in an inevitable sequence r e v e a l i n g a h i t h e r t o hidden f i g u r e i n the carpet. The image o f t h e l i n e tends a l w a y s t o i m p l y t h e norm o f a single continuous u n i f i e d structure determined by one external organizing principle. T h i s p r i n c i p l e holds the l i n e t o g e t h e r , gives it its law, controls its progressive extension, curving or straight, with some a r c h e , telos, or g r o u n d . O r i g i n , g o a l , or b a s e : a l l t h r e e  and  and  notion  the of  52 come t o g e t h e r i n t h e g a t h e r i n g movement of [ p r e s e n c e ] . ( M i l l e r i n T a y l o r , 1987c: 70)  Along  with  this,  of course,  goes  a severe  n o t i o n o f t h e book and i t s i m p l i c i t the  linearity  emphasized existence dispute  of beginning,  that, of  as  i s the existence  dependent  on  a  notion  or e x p l i c i t  m i d d l e and e n d .  obviously,  books  Derrida  tangible  o f books of  as  not —  i . e .presence.  whether  the  i n question  history,  an e t h n o g r a p h y , o r w h a t e v e r .  i t must be  dispute  what  he  comprehensive  pre-established  or order,  of the  assumption of  Again  does  objects  harmony  book  critique  And  this  happens  to  the does  wholes  self-contained critique be  According  a  holds  novel,  a  to Derrida,  The i d e a o f t h e book i s t h e i d e a o f a totality, finite or i n f i n i t e , of the s i g n i f i e r ; t h i s t o t a l i t y of the s i g n i f i e r c a n n o t be a t o t a l i t y , u n l e s s a t o t a l i t y c o n s t i t u t e d by t h e s i g n i f i e d preexists i t , s u p e r v i s e s i t s i n s c r i p t i o n s and i t s s i g n s , and i s i n d e p e n d e n t o f i t i n i t s ideality. The i d e a o f t h e book, w h i c h always r e f e r s t o a . . . t o t a l i t y , i s p r o f o u n d l y a l i e n t o the sense of w r i t i n g . It i s the encyclopedic p r o t e c t i o n of t h e o l o g y and o f l o g o c e n t r l s m a g a i n s t t h e disruption of writing, against i t s aphoristic e n e r g y , and . . . a g a i n s t difference i n general. If I distinguish t h e t e x t f r o m t h e book, I s h a l l s a y t h a t t h e d e s t r u c t i o n o f t h e book, a s i t i s now underway i n a l l d o m a i n s , denudes t h e s u r f a c e of the t e x t . ( D e r r i d a , 1982e: 18)  53 Not  surprisingly,  Derrida's  notion  o£  originary  d o u b l i n g , of i t e r a b i l i t y , a l s o p r o v i d e s a r a d i c a l our c o n c e p t  o f s e l f , and,  a u t h o r as s u c h . as:  "Person's  D e r r i d a has by  The  that  .  which  to  independent itself  identity in  Thus,  as  .  own  individuality  idea  of essence  i t impossible And  of  out  that  so w i t h  i t must, being by  that  definition,  1987c:  consciousness  possibility  of  the  to  be  of  --  a  as  And  self  such.  s e p a r a t i o n of  self  of  unique, the  1973b:  impenetrable  living  Oxford  "Originator an  present  is  As  168).  for self-presence the  self  Derrida says, a  absence  because,  dependent from  primordially  its  trace"  by  on —  the  on  an  of s e l f  as  "the  self  (Derrida,  85).  The  of  essence.  to  itself  1981a:  o r i g i n a r y d o u b l i n g which p r e c l u d e s the p o s s i b i l i t y a  and  And  withdraws  this  is  in  "[add]  d i s c o v e r y of  50).  and  unique  reiterate,  "[the] search  the  possible  n o t i o n of s e l f :  i t " (Derrida,  of  As  independent  addition,  s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s leads to the (Taylor,  an  the  to  in  self"  essence."  i s o n l y made  repeated  presents  T a y l o r p o i n t s out,  or  as  i t portends  --  possibility  supplement as  'self  what  i s hollowed  the  Oxford E n g l i s h D i c t i o n a r y d e f i n e s  concept.  essence  the  of the  renders  appear  of  by e x t e n s i o n , o f our c o n c e p t  shown, t h e  self-identical order  .  critique  author  contains  English  . . .; w r i t e r as a p e r s o n  what  she  means  Dictionary  defines  o f book, t r e a t i s e , (a s e l f ) to  say  who and  'author'  etc."  produces which  as:  We  think  a book  which  stands  as  a  completed m a n i f e s t a t i o n of her expressed in  mind  consider  the Derridean  critique  Intentions.  of o r i g i n ,  book  Bearing  and  self,  the f o l l o w i n g :  . . . iterability . . . excludes the hypothesis of i d e a l i z a t i o n , t h a t i s , the a d e q u a t i o n o f a meaning t o i t s e l f , o f a saying to i t s e l f , of understanding to a s e n t e n c e , whether w r i t t e n or o r a l , or t o a mark in general. Once again, i t e r a b i l i t y makes p o s s i b l e i d e a l i z a t i o n — and t h u s , a certain identity in repetition that i s independent of the m u l t i p l i c i t y of f a c t u a l events — while at the same time limiting the i d e a l i z a t i o n i t makes p o s s i b l e : b r o a c h i n g and b r e a c h i n g i t a t once t e l l e . 1'entame J . To put i t more simply and more c o n c r e t e l y : a t t h e v e r y moment ( a s s u m i n g t h a t t h i s moment i t s e l f m i g h t be f u l l and s e l f - i d e n t i c a l , i d e n t i f i a b l e -- f o r t h e p r o b l e m o f i d e a l i z a t i o n and i t e r a b i l i t y i s a l r e a d y posed here, i n t h e s t r u c t u r e o f t e m p o r a l i z a t i o n ) , a t t h e v e r y moment when someone would l i k e t o s a y o r w r i t e , "On t h e t w e n t i e t h . . . e t c . , " t h e v e r y f a c t o r t h a t w i l l p e r m i t t h e mark (be i t psychic, oral, graphic) to function beyond this moment — namely the p o s s i b i l i t y of i t s being repeated another time — breaches, d i v i d e s , expropriates the " i d e a l " p l e n i t u d e or s e l f - p r e s e n c e of 2 4  Of c o u r s e , f o r D e r r i d a , t h e 'moment' c a n n e v e r be ' f u l l and s e l f - I d e n t i c a l ' because the s t r u c t u r e of t e m p o r a l i t y , b e i n g p r e m i s e d on t h e e s s e n t i a l l y A r i s t o t e l i a n n o t i o n o f t h e non-temporal now, of presence as non-temporal because Immediate and s e l f - I d e n t i c a l , i s a l w a y s a l r e a d y f i s s u r e d b y i t s own i m p o s s i b i l i t y - - b y i t s ' o t h e r . ' To p u t i t a n o t h e r way, b e c a u s e t i m e i s d e f i n e d a s a l i n e a r ( o r c i r c u l a r ) number o f p a s t - n o w s and f u t u r e - n o w s ( " I t i s t h e now t h a t measures t i m e , c o n s i d e r e d a s b e f o r e and a f t e r " ( A r i s t o t l e , 1987: 1 2 5 ) ) and b e c a u s e t h e now a s s u c h c a n n o t be r e a l i z e d i n i t s s u p p o s e d s e l f - p r e s e n c e (always b e i n g a l r e a d y past or a l r e a d y f u t u r e ) the p o s s i b i l i t y of a f u l l and s e l f - i d e n t i c a l moment i s precluded by t h e v e r y t e m p o r a l i t y f o r which i t seeks t o account. 2 4  55 i n t e n t i o n , o f meaning ( t o s a y ) and, a fortiori, of a l l adequation between meaning and s a y i n g . Iterability alters, contaminating parasltlcally what it identifies and enables to repeat " i t s e l f " ; i t l e a v e s us no c h o i c e b u t t o mean ( t o s a y ) s o m e t h i n g t h a t i s ( a l r e a d y , a l w a y s , a l s o ) o t h e r t h a n what we s a y and would have wanted t o s a y , t o understand something other than . . . etc. In c l a s s i c a l t e r m s , t h e a c c i d e n t i s n e v e r an accident. ( D e r r i d a , 1977b: 199-200)  In  other  words,  possible  in  so  neither far  as  the either  and/or d e f i n i t i v e accounts can  be  no  closed  hermeneutlc possible  meanings  fissured  —  of  (Derrida, In  As  1981a:  on t h e  'book'  present  because  be  with  "It  is  replaced  number of  always i t s own this by  there  with  the  is  closed  And  as  possibility  meaning  says,  t h a t must  not,  is  the of  adequate already essential  hermeneutlc  dissemination"  262).  Positions,  statements  the  because  Derrida  polysemy  the  to  accounts  polysemy,  exceeds  but  presumes  I s a l w a y s a l r e a d y marked  non-essence. concept  of  nor  of a n y t h i n g whatsoever.  definitive  notion  representation,  'author'  Derrida  offers  one  p r o b l e m o f p o l y s e m y and  of  his  clearest  dissemination:  If dissemination, seminal dlffFrance, cannot be summarized into an exact c o n c e p t u a l t e n o r , i t i s because the f o r c e and form o f i t s d i s r u p t i o n e x p l o d e the semantic h o r i z o n . The a t t e n t i o n b r o u g h t to bear on p o l y s e m i a or polythematism doubtless represents progress in relationship to the linearity of the  56 m o n o t h e m a t l c w r i t i n g or r e a d i n g t h a t i s always anxious t o anchor i t s e l f t o the t u t e l a r y meaning, t h e p r i n c i p a l s i g n i f i e d of a t e x t , t h a t i s , i t s major r e f e r e n t . Nevertheless, polysemia, as such, is organized w i t h i n the i m p l i c i t h o r i z o n of a u n i t a r y r e s u m p t i o n o f meaning, t h a t i s , w i t h i n the h o r i z o n of a d i a l e c t i c s . . . a t e l e o l o g i c a l and t o t a l i z i n g d i a l e c t i c s t h a t a t a g i v e n moment, however f a r o f f , must permit the reassemblage of the t o t a l i t y of a t e x t i n t o the t r u t h of i t s meaning, constituting the text as e x p r e s s i o n , a s I l l u s t r a t i o n , and a n n u l l i n g t h e open and p r o d u c t i v e d i s p l a c e m e n t of t h e t e x t u a l c h a i n . D i s s e m i n a t i o n , on the contrary, although producing a n o n f i n i t e number o f s e m a n t i c e f f e c t s , c a n be l e d back n e i t h e r t o a p r e s e n t of simple origin . . . nor to an eschatalogical presence. I t marks an I r r e d u c i b l e and g e n e r a t i v e m u l t i p l i c i t y . The s u p p l e m e n t and t h e t u r b u l e n c e o f a c e r t a i n lack f r a c t u r e the l i m i t of the t e x t , f o r b i d d i n g an e x h a u s t i v e and c l o s e d formalization of i t , or at least a s a t u r a t i n g taxonomy o f i t s themes, i t s s i g n i f i e d , i t s meaning. (Derrida,  Dissemination, the  l i k e other Derridean  originary  displacement,  doubling, that  accounts  the  1981g:  'undecidables,' i n d i c a t e s originary  f o r both  the  impossibility  of a c o n c e p t u a l i t y premised  presence  i t s concomitant  and  principle over  monosemic  accountings  d e p e n d e n t upon a c o n c e p t unity.  logic  of n o n - c o n t r a d i c t i o n ) .  45)  of  slippage possibility  and  upon t h e n o t i o n o f identity  Polysemy,  notwithstanding,  ( i . e . the  i t s improvement still  remains  o f f r a y e d b u t u l t i m a t e l y t o be  As Gasch6 p u t s i t :  and  fused  57 Dissemination i s t h e name b y w h i c h t h e in-advance always a l r e a d y d i v i d e d u n i t y is affirmed. This in-advance d i v i d e d u n i t y of the undecldables i s not the polysemic d i s p e r s i o n o f a once u n i t a r y meaning b u t . . . an a l w a y s open ensemble o f s t r u c t u r e s , p r e s u p p o s e d by t h e p r o j e c t o f u n i t y and t o t a l i t y and a f f i r m e d by r e f l e c t i o n and s p e c u l a t i o n , w i t h o u t t h e i r knowledge, a s t h e l i m i t o f t h e i r p o s s i bility. The g e n e r a l t h e o r y o f d u p l i cation or r e d u p l i c a t i o n [iterability] outlines . . . the l i m i t s of the philosophical presuppositions of the philosophy of r e f l e x i v i t y — presuppositions of an o r i g i n a l spontaneity, of productive imagination, of i n t e l l e c t u a l i n t u i t i o n , and s o on. . . . No v i r g i n substance o r homogeneous and organic unity precedes or superintends the o r i g i n a r y d u p l i c a t i o n and t h e ' s y s t e m ' o f the [ u n d e c l d a b l e s ] . The myth o f a u n i t y is only an e f f e c t made p o s s i b l e and irrevocably undercut by reflection i t s e l f , I n s o f a r a s i t must r e l y , i n o r d e r t o t a k e p l a c e i n t h e f i r s t p l a c e , on what i t c a n n o t hope t o r e f l e c t . What l i e s beyond t h e m i r r o r , on t h e o t h e r s i d e o f the speculum, i n t h e beyond of the presuppositions of the philosophy of reflection -that i s to say, the 'system' of t h e [ u n d e c l d a b l e s ] — cannot be understood in terms of unity, s y n t h e s i s , t o t a l i t y , and t h e l i k e . ( G a s c h S , 1986: 237)  Dissemination, Western  metaphysics,  difference  a self-sufficient  as  a by-product  constantly  i s the  which a l l o w s  as  i.e.  the  repressed  limitless  play  f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y  grounding  totality  of the disseminating  'other' of  originary  of presence not  but as an e f f e c t  —  p l a y of u n d e c i d a b i l i t y ,  w r i t i n g , t r a c e , d l f f 6 r a n c e , supplement e t c .  now w i l l  of  come a s no s u r p r i s e , f o r D e r r i d a ,  And, a s by  58 P l a y Is t h e d i s r u p t i o n o£ p r e s e n c e . The presence of an element i s always a signifying and substitutive reference i n s c r i b e d i n a s y s t e m o f d i f f e r e n c e s and t h e movement o f a c h a i n . P l a y i s always p l a y o f a b s e n c e and p r e s e n c e , b u t i f i t i s t o be t h o u g h t r a d i c a l l y , p l a y must be c o n c e i v e d of b e f o r e the a l t e r n a t i v e of p r e s e n c e and absence. Being must be c o n c e i v e d as p r e s e n c e or a b s e n c e on t h e b a s i s o f t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f p l a y and n o t t h e o t h e r way a r o u n d . ( D e r r i d a , 19781: 292)  i n o t h e r words, what Is o f I n t e r e s t i s n o t themes and  or  philosophemes  fissures  and  will  already  displacement.  se,  but  the  w i t h i n them w h i c h p r o h i b i t  self-Identical always  per  As  which  Derrida  ensure, be  from  involved  specific play  of  concepts, the  cracks  them f r o m e v e r the  outset,  with  that  slippage  says,  From the very beginnings of Greek p h i l o s o p h y t h e s e l f - i d e n t i t y of t h e L o g o s i s a l r e a d y f i s s u r e d and d i v i d e d . I t h i n k one c a n d i s c e r n s i g n s o f s u c h f i s s u r e s o f 'diffFrance' i n every great philosopher: the 'Good beyond B e i n g ' (epekelna tes o u s l a s ) of P l a t o ' s R e p u b l i c , f o r example, or t h e c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h t h e 'Stranger' i n The S o p h i s t a r e a l r e a d y t r a c e s of an alterlty which r e f u s e s to be totally domesticated. Moreover, the r a p p o r t of s e l f - i d e n t i t y i s i t s e l f always a r a p p o r t o f v i o l e n c e w i t h t h e o t h e r ; so t h a t t h e n o t i o n s of p r o p e r t y , a p p r o p r i a t i o n and s e l f - p r e s e n c e , so c e n t r a l t o l o g o c e n t r i c m e t a p h y s i c s , a r e e s s e n t i a l l y d e p e n d e n t on an o p p o s i t i o n a l r e l a t i o n w i t h o t h e r n e s s . In this sense, identity presupposes alterity. ( D e r r i d a i n K e a r n e y , e d . , 1984: 117)  being they and  59 Rather notions  than  of  homogeneity,  contradiction, ending,  the  polysemy  doubling, play  emphasizing  of  linear and  the  and  logic  of  so  on,  Derrida  undecidabillty.  The  with  what  the  repressed  'other'  of  Western  and/or  for  anthropology  non-  and,  by  future  of  and  originary  the d i s s e m i n a t i n g chapters  has  to  anthropology  n o t i o n s of  etc.,  possible  in general.  identity,  concern  exploration  metaphysics  'postmodern'  meaning the  following  Derridean  phenomenological/hermeneutical intentionallty,  concomitant  stresses  h e t e r o g e n e i t y , d i s p l a c e m e n t , and  interpretive  its  t e l e o l o g y of b e g i n n i n g , middle  themselves  portends  presence  of  say  to  rooted  the an in  intersubjectlvity, extension, the  what  it  discipline  of  Chapter Philosophical  Background  Anthropology:  In  order  of  Three  Interpretive  P h e n o m e n o l o g y and  to  adequately  and  Hermeneutlcs  comprehend  contemporary i n t e r p r e t i v e and/or  'Postmodern'  the  status  'postmodern' a n t h r o p o l o g y i t  Is n e c e s s a r y t o be a c q u a i n t e d w i t h t h e i r r o o t e d n e s s modes o f C o n t i n e n t a l t h o u g h t . I  will  attempt  to  H u s s e r l and t h e h e r m e n e u t l c s respectively, concept  are  of  presence  as  a  extension, radical  their  and  close  within  the  constantly  to  works  on  such  so on and  of  any  expanding  threads weave  e t a l . , my  of t h e i r their  'postmodern'  way  in this  Gadamer and  unity,  a l l the the  library  concern  I  no  aforementioned shelves  the  anthropology,  deconstructive reading.  are  (and, to  claim  to  inherent  authors  attest  to  — the  With r e s p e c t t o H u s s e r l ,  i s s i m p l y t o show t h a t  fabric  the  open  complexities  r e a s o n i n g , w h i c h have woven and into  of  totality,  are  make  of  Ricoeur  manifestations  Obviously,  of  chapter  phenomenology  anthropological inheritors)  addressing  in certain  t h a t , as s u c h , t h e y  i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f s u c h an e n d e a v o u r . Heidegger  the  consciousness,  deconstruction.  coming  that  of Heidegger,  a l l based  plenitude, dialectic, by  Consequently,  demonstrate  of  of  continue  interpretive  prime  fodder  In t h i s c h a p t e r I w i l l  specific to  and/or for  not o f f e r  a any  f u l l s c a l e d e c o n s t r u c t i v e readings but, r a t h e r , w i l l d e l i n e a t e  c e r t a i n f e a t u r e s of C o n t i n e n t a l thought my  chapter  with  on  Geertz  and  Clifford  that w i l l reappear  and  will  there  be  in  dealt  in detail.  I PHENOMENOLOGY (1) H u s s e r l In  his  last  Transcendental statement natural  work,  The  Crisis  Phenomenology,  c o n c e r n i n g the then  and  of  Husserl  European makes  an  Sciences  and  impassioned  c u r r e n t s t a t u s ( 1 9 3 0 ' s ) of  human s c i e n c e s :  The e x c l u s i v e n e s s w i t h w h i c h t h e total w o r l d - v i e w o f modern [ h u m a n i t y ] , i n t h e second h a l f of the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y , l e t i t s e l f be d e t e r m i n e d by t h e p o s i t i v e sciences and be blinded by the 'prosperity' they produced, meant an Indifferent turning-away from the questions which are decisive for a genuine humanity. Merely fact-minded s c i e n c e s make m e r e l y f a c t - m i n d e d p e o p l e . . . . In our v i t a l need — so we a r e told — t h i s s c i e n c e has n o t h i n g t o s a y to us. It excludes in principle p r e c i s e l y the q u e s t i o n s which [humanity], g i v e n o v e r i n our unhappy t i m e s t o t h e most p o r t e n t o u s u p h e a v a l s , f i n d s t h e most burning: questions of the meaning or meaninglessness of the whole of this human e x i s t e n c e . Do n o t t h e s e q u e s t i o n s , universal and necessary for a l l [ h u m a n i t y ] , demand u n i v e r s a l r e f l e c t i o n s and a n s w e r s b a s e d on r a t i o n a l i n s i g h t ? . . . . What d o e s s c i e n c e have t o s a y a b o u t r e a s o n and u n r e a s o n or a b o u t us [human b e i n g s ] as s u b j e c t s o f t h i s f r e e d o m ? The mere science of bodies clearly has nothing to say; It abstracts from everything subjective. As for the h u m a n i s t i c s c i e n c e s , on t h e o t h e r hand, a l l t h e s p e c i a l and g e n e r a l d i s c i p l i n e s  the  62 of which t r e a t of [humanity's] s p i r i t u a l e x i s t e n c e , t h a t i s , w i t h i n the h o r i z o n of [its] historicity; their rigorous scientific character requires, we are t o l d , t h a t the s c h o l a r c a r e f u l l y exclude a l l v a l u a t i v e p o s i t i o n s , a l l q u e s t i o n s of r e a s o n or u n r e a s o n of t h e i r human s u b j e c t m a t t e r and i t s cultural configurations. Scientific objective truth is exclusively a m a t t e r of e s t a b l i s h i n g what t h e w o r l d , t h e p h y s i c a l as w e l l as t h e spiritual world, i s i n f a c t . But c a n t h e w o r l d , and human e x i s t e n c e in i t , truthfully have a meaning i f t h e s c i e n c e s recognize as true only what is objectively established In this fashion, and if h i s t o r y has n o t h i n g more t o t e a c h us t h a n t h a t a l l the s h a p e s of t h e spiritual world, a l l the conditions of life, ideals, norms upon which [humanity] r e l i e s , f o r m and d i s s o l v e t h e m s e l v e s l i k e f l e e t i n g waves, t h a t I t a l w a y s was and e v e r w i l l be s o , t h a t a g a i n and again r e a s o n must t u r n i n t o n o n s e n s e , and w e l l being into misery? Can we console ourselves with that? Can we l i v e i n t h i s world, where h i s t o r i c a l occurrence is n o t h i n g but an u n e n d i n g c o n c a t e n a t i o n of illusory progress and bitter disappointment? (Husserl,  Husserl away  with  'facts' This  believes  that  their  that  gap  human n e e d s .  they  have  a  and  forgotten  in turn  between As  sciences  methodologies  f o r g e t t i n g has  widening  the  led  technical  s o l u t i o n to  transcendental  phenomenology.  Husserl's  phenomenology  have  so  subjective of  sophistication  and  is  'crisis'  meant  carried  fascination  creation  this  the  6-7)  become  their  their to  1970:  to  with  origins.  Husserl  an  ever  actual offers  provide  an  a b s o l u t e l y sound, because a b s o l u t e l y i n d u b i t a b l e , o n t o l o g i c a l  foundation  f o r eplstemology.  Husserl  believes  that  what  t e r m s t h e ' n a t u r a l a t t i t u d e , • t h e unexamined e v e r y - d a y of  taken  exist  f o r granted  prior  to  consciousness  and  from  phenomenological natural  attitude  consciousness  must  a s , and The  unadulterated  by  is,  by d e f i n i t i o n ,  says,  "the  basic  consciousness Taylor, that being  a  1986a: 1 2 3 ) .  passive to  consciousness  This  of  something,  consciousness  waiting  other  of  and  the  appears  to  her  which Is  is  as  way  receive actually  As  produces  being  consciousness  the  case,  the  in  f a r from  a tabula  rasa)  sensations,  sensations.  words, o b j e c t i v i t y , a s s u c h , i s a s u b j e c t i v e  as  i s to say  so  objective objective  Husserl  (Husserl  of p u t t i n g t h i s  ( o r , & l a Locke,  exterior  the  consciousness,  i s constitutive, i . e . , that,  receptacle  on  consciousness  o|_ s o m e t h i n g . being  'pure'  that i s , that  is intentionality"  Another  t o her  supposedly  premised  some o b j e c t , t h a t a l l  character  a  suspended  is intentional —  consciousness  to  words, t h e  of a t t a i n i n g t o t h i s  interpretation,  intends  to  i n so f a r a s , i t appears  c o n v i c t i o n that consciousness consciousness  appear  subjected  what  description  world  perceiving  In other or  only  possibility a  the  be  'bracketed'  only  any  all  must  describe  objects  upon  or r e d u c t i o n . be  description,  wherein  impinge  without,  must  consciousness. of  to  epoch6  phenomenologist  form  assumptions  he  In  construct.  phenomenologlcally  i s i m m e d i a t e l y and u n m e d i a t e d l y p r e s e n t  reduced to i t s  intentional  phenomena,  thus  allowing  for  pristine  description. Interestingly, doubt  (e.g.  nature  his  for  emphasis  of c o n s c i o u s n e s s  res c o g l t a n s / r e s extensa to  doubt  or  consciousness  on  with  what  radicalizing  of  Cartesian  the  i n t e n t i o n a l or c o n s t i t u t i v e  the  attendant  c o l l a p s i n g of  d i s t i n c t i o n ) , H u s s e r l never  bracket or  'transcendental  a l l his  the he  s u b j e c t ' and/or  attempts  phenomenologically  alternately  refers  'primordial  the  reduced to  as  intuition'  2 3  the :  No t h e o r y we c a n c o n c e i v e c a n m i s l e a d us In regard to the principle of a l l p r i n c i p l e s : that every p r i m o r d i a l dator Intuition is a source of authority (Rechtsquelle) for knowledge, that whatever p r e s e n t s I t s e l f i n ' i n t u i t i o n ' [ c o n s c i o u s n e s s ] i n p r i m o r d i a l f o r m (as i t were i n i t s b o d i l y r e a l i t y ) , i s . s i m p l y t o be a c c e p t e d as i t g i v e s I t s e l f o u t t o be, though o n l y w i t h i n the l i m i t s i n which i t then presents I t s e l f . ( H u s s e r l i n D e r r i d a , 1973b: 62)  Taking  the  transcendental  given,  Husserl  proceeds  subject  to  show  as  the  how  i t is  constituting  ' r e a l i t y ' as we  know and  sense  of  attitude.  world  the  natural  accept It  only  indubitable  responsible i t i n the is  for  common  important  to  In o r d e r t o a v o i d c o n f u s i o n , f o r t h e d u r a t i o n o f t h i s section on H u s s e r l , I will use the term 'transcendental subject' rather than 'primordial intuition' or 'phenomenologically reduced consciousness.' However, the reader should bear in mind that these terms are interchangeable. 2 3  understand that Husserl  b e l i e v e s t h a t the c o n s t i t u t i v e nature  o£  subject  the  transcendental  'invariant  e s s e n t i a l forms' which  o f knowledge and reduction  results  to  which  i t i s the  in  allow  the  emergence  f o r the  purpose  of  of  possibility  phenomenological  reveal:  . . . t h e phenomenology of p e r c e p t i o n o f b o d i e s w i l l n o t be ( s i m p l y ) a r e p o r t on the f a c t u a l l y occurring' perceptions or t h o s e t o be e x p e c t e d ; r a t h e r i t w i l l be t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n of i n v a r i a n t s t r u c t u r a l systems without which p e r c e p t i o n of a body and a synthetically concordant m u l t i p l i c i t y of p e r c e p t i o n s o f one and the same body as such would be unthinkable. I f the phenomenological r e d u c t i o n c o n t r i v e d a means o f a c c e s s t o t h e phenomenon o f r e a l and a l s o p o t e n t i a l inner experience, t h e method f o u n d e d i n i t of " e i d e t i c r e d u c t i o n " p r o v i d e s the means of access to the invariant e s s e n t i a l s t r u c t u r e s of the t o t a l sphere of p u r e m e n t a l p r o c e s s . ( H u s s e r l i n T a y l o r , 1986a: 126-127)  In o t h e r world  words, t h r o u g h b r a c k e t i n g  and  sensations which  by  a  transcendental  as  of  of  subject,  Husserl  the  intentional i s able  granted existing  or  of the  forget that t h i s  to  activity  t o p o s i t the  that of  a  a  priori  structures  which,  o b j e c t i v i t y and  the p o s s i b i l i t y of the e v e r y d a y l i f e must n e v e r  for  concretely  i n v a r i a n t e s s e n t i a l forms ideal  taken  i n t e n t i o n a l phenomena —  product  s u c h , c o n s t i t u t e an  However, one  the  supposedly  and/or o b j e c t s to  is  existence  reducing  out  which a l l o w  for  natural attitude.  seeming  objectivity  Is  first  and  definition, activity  have  of the  Husserl risk  of  foremost  i s not  of  subjectivity,  subjectivity  existence  apart  transcendental  becoming  consequence  no  a  the  constituting to  the  can,  If everything  work  of  know a n y t h i n g  one  must  t o t h e w o r k i n g s o f one's own  consciousness,  one  be  actual  existence  Husserl  attempts  outside this  of  certain  one's  own  of  the  mind? '  problem through the  2  notion  of  is  the the  transcendental  the world ever  by  constituting  o f t e n appears to run  in solipsism.  i f i n order  from  it  subject.  unaware t h a t he  mired  as  of to  reduce, how  can  anything deal  with  intersubjectivity:  The r e d u c t i v e method i s t r a n s f e r r e d f r o m self-experience to the experience of o t h e r i n s o f a r as t h e r e c a n be a p p l i e d t o the envisaged . . . mental l i f e of the Other the c o r r e s p o n d i n g bracketing and d e s c r i p t i o n a c c o r d i n g to the s u b j e c t i v e "How" of i t s appearance and what Is appearing. . . . As a f u r t h e r c o n s e q u e n c e , t h e community t h a t i s e x p e r i e n c e d i n community e x p e r i e n c e i s reduced not only to the mentally particularized i n t e n t i o n a l f i e l d s but a l s o t o the u n i t y of t h e community l i f e t h a t c o n n e c t s them a l l t o g e t h e r , t h e community l i f e i n i t s phenomenological p u r i t y ( i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e reduction). . . .  At t h i s p o i n t i t does not h u r t t o r e c a l l t h a t , f o r H u s s e r l , pure e x p r e s s i o n — p u r e meaning as s u c h , c a n o n l y occur w i t h i n ' s o l i t a r y mental l i f e ' ( H u s s e r l i n M u e l l e r - V o l l m e r e d . , 1988: 1 7 3 ) . A c c o r d i n g t o H u s s e r l , o u t s i d e of the i n n e r workings of c o n s c i o u s n e s s , ' e x p r e s s i o n ' i s always Interwoven w i t h ' I n d i c a t i o n ' and hence 'meaning' c a n o n l y be i n t i m a t e d - i t c a n n o t be e x p e r i e n c e d i n i t s p u r e f o r m . ( I n S p e e c h and Phenomena D e r r i d a p r o v i d e s an e x t e n d e d d e c o n s t r u c t i v e r e a d i n g of H u s s e r l ' s use of ' e x p r e s s i o n * and ' i n d i c a t i o n . ' ) 2 6  67 To e v e r y mind t h e r e b e l o n g s n o t o n l y the u n i t y of i t s multiple intentional life-process . . . with all its inseparable unities of sense d i r e c t e d towards the "object." There i s a l s o , i n s e p a r a b l e from t h i s l i f e - p r o c e s s , the e x p e r i e n c i n g I - s u b j e c t as t h e identical I-pole g i v i n g a center for a l l s p e c i f i c i n t e n t i o n a l i t i e s , and as t h e c a r r i e r o f all h a b i t u a l i t i e s g r o w i n g out of this life-process. Likewise, then, the reduced i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y , i n pure form and c o n c r e t e l y g r a s p e d , i s a community o f pure "persons" acting in the i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e r e a l m of t h e p u r e l i f e of consciousness. ( H u s s e r l i n T a y l o r , 1986a: 125-126)  Yet  a l l of  the  principles,'  above  still  projection  of,  extension  and  be  the  consciousness.  must,  premised  Individual  For  Husserl,  reflection  of  transcendental  subjectivity,  more  bequeath  objective  than  i t can  the  taken A  notion insight  bequeath  for granted  brief of  look  inner  by  at  the  Husserl's upon,  and  'principle hence  transcendental the  remain  an  philosophy  of  phenomenology c a n  no  must  As  to  a  other  existence  to  subjectivities any  feature  of  world. Derrida's  time  i n t o phenomenology's principles.  deconstruction  consciousness  own  guiding  now  i s n e c e s s a r i l y something  provides  inability  According  (Husserl i n Derrida,  Husserl*s  considerable  to remain true to i t s  to  punctual  of  Husserl,  "the  actual  (ein Punktuelles)  r e m a i n s s o , a form t h a t p e r s i s t s t h r o u g h c o n t i n u o u s matter"  a or  self.  existence  merely  of  subject  other  Husserlean  objective  own  1973b: 6 2 ) .  In o r d e r  and  change of to  account  68 for  the  seeming  consciousness protention Husserl  Husserl  —  that  i s at pains  priority  continuity  of the  of  posits  i s , past  events  the  idea  nows and  at  any  ' a c t u a l ' or p r e s e n t  now:  retentional mine).  train"  indubitable by  unmediated  the  (Husserl  rests  on  definition,  a  the notion  However,  "[The a c t u a l ]  only  can  see  exist that  now-  o f a comet's t a i l  are  1973b:  the  i n an  as  connected  entire of  and  and e s s e n t i a l  62)  of now  as  a  (emphasis  structure  of  originary  and  of the c o n s t i t u t i v e  can  one  others  i n Derrida,  that  self-presence  present,  nows.  phase i s a c t u a l l y p r e s e n t  while  Remembering  phenomenology  which,  moment,  by  retention  t o underscore the necessary  [and] a p u n c t u a l  given  perceived  of  future  a p p r e h e n s i o n i s , a s i t were, t h e n u c l e u s retentions  as  consciousness Immediate  Husserl's  concept  and of  r e t e n t i o n a l and p r o t e n t i o n a l components o f t h e now s h a k e s h i s whole e d i f i c e  of thought.  As D e r r i d a  says,  . . . we c a n n o t a v o i d n o t i c i n g t h a t a . . . c o n c e p t o f t h e "now," o f t h e p r e s e n t as p u n c t u a l i t y o f t h e i n s t a n t , decisively sanctions [Husserl's] whole system. . . . I f the p u n c t u a l i t y of the instant is a myth, a spatial or mechanical metaphor, an inherited metaphysical concept, or a l l t h a t a t o n c e , and i f t h e p r e s e n t o f s e l f - p r e s e n c e i s not simple, i f i t i s c o n s t i t u t e d i n a primordial and irreducible synthesis, t h e n t h e whole o f H u s s e r l ' s a r g u m e n t a t i o n is threatened i n i t s very p r i n c i p l e . ( D e r r i d a , 1973b: 61)  69 l£  the  order  present to  cannot  be  be  now  must  known a s  absolute  be  such,  —  supplemented then  the  by  present  its possibility  a now  is  Derrida  always  already  contaminated  now  i s not  In and  i s c o n s t i t u t e d by i t s  i m p o s s i b i l i t y as a p u r e s e l f - i d e n t i c a l c o n c e p t . such,  past  by  I d e n t i t y , as  difference.  As  puts i t ,  . . . d i f f e r e n c e , which c o n s t i t u t e s the self-presence of the living present, i n t r o d u c e s i n t o s e l f - p r e s e n c e from the beginning a l l the impurity putatively excluded from I t . The living present s p r i n g s f o r t h out of i t s n o n i d e n t i t y w i t h itself and from the possibility of a retentional trace. I t i s always a l r e a d y a trace. T h i s t r a c e c a n n o t be thought o u t on t h e b a s i s o f a s i m p l e present whose l i f e would be w i t h i n i t s e l f ; the self of the living present is prlmordially a trace. ( D e r r i d a , 1973b: 85)  In  the  transcendental Husserl's philosophy  form  of  a  belief  in  primordial  subjectivity/constitutive  t r a n s c e n d e n t a l phenomenology e x p r e s s e s of presence.  As  Derrida  intuition/  consciousness itself  says,  what is signified by phenomenology's "principle of principles"? What does t h e value of primordial presence to intuition as s o u r c e o f s e n s e and e v i d e n c e , as t h e a p r i o r i of a p r l o r i s , s i g n i f y ? F i r s t of all i t s i g n i f i e s the c e r t a i n t y , Itself i d e a l and a b s o l u t e , t h a t t h e u n i v e r s a l form of a l l e x p e r i e n c e (Erlibnis), and t h e r e f o r e of a l l l i f e , has a l w a y s been and will a l w a y s be t h e p r e s e n t . The  as  a  70 present alone is presence presence.  I s and e v e r w i l l be. Being or the modification of (Derrida,  As w i t h a l l p h i l o s o p h i e s o f p r e s e n c e , extricated pristine Husserl  from  notions  origin,  of  of  the  essence,  1973b:  phenomenology c a n n o t  absolute, of  53)  of  a  t e l e o l o g y and  return so  to  on.  be a As  says,  In phenomenology a l l rational p r o b l e m s have t h e i r p l a c e . . . . F o r out of t h e a b s o l u t e s o u r c e s of t r a n s c e n d e n t a l experience . . . they f i r s t [are a b l e to] obtain their genuine formulation and f e a s i b l e means f o r t h e i r s o l u t i o n . . . . [Phenomenology] r e c o g n i z e s t h e a b s o l u t e norms which are to be picked out i n t u i t i v e l y . . . and a l s o i t s p r i m o r d i a l teleologlcal-tendentlal structure in a d i r e c t e d n e s s towards d i s c l o s u r e of these norms and their conscious practical o p e r a t i o n s . . . . The t r a c i n g back of a l l being t o the t r a n s c e n d e n t a l s u b j e c t i v i t y and its constitutive intentional f u n c t i o n s l e a v e s open . . . no o t h e r way of contemplating the world than the teleological. ( H u s s e r l i n T a y l o r , 1986a: 138-140) ( e m p h a s i s H u s s e r l ' s and mine)  And,  again,  phenomenology  as  with  a l l  philosophies  of  n e c e s s i t a t e s and  reinforces a  whole  presence, series  of  h i e r a r c h i c a l l y s t r u c t u r e d o p p o s i t i o n a l p a i r s s u c h as s u b j e c t / object, s e l f / o t h e r , essence/contingence, etc.  wherein  corruption  of  the the  latter former,  term thus  of  each  identity/difference, pair  ensuring  the  i s viewed  as  suppression  a of  71 difference  and/or  otherness.  As T a y l o r  says,  The a b s o l u t e knowledge made p o s s i b l e by the phenomenological reduction of difference to i d e n t i t y in s u b j e c t i v i t y ' s f u l l knowledge o f i t s e l f r e a l i z e s W e s t e r n p h i l o s o p h y ' s dream o f e n j o y i n g a t o t a l p r e s e n c e t h a t i s u n d i s t u r b e d by a b s e n c e or l a c k . ( T a y l o r , 1986b: 3)  II (i)  HERMENEUTICS Background The  term  'hermeneutics'  •hermeneuein,' 'hermeneia,' Richard taken  usually usually  Palmer  together  oracle) refers  translated translated  points with  comes  out,  as as  from  the  'to  words  interpret,'  'interpretation.'  'hermeneuein'  'hermeios'  Greek  (the p r i e s t  and at  and As  'hermeneia' the  back t o ,  the wing-footed messenger-god Hermes, f r o m whose name t h e words a r e apparently derived (or v i c e versa?). S i g n i f i c a n t l y , Hermes i s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the function of t r a n s m i t t i n g what i s beyond human u n d e r s t a n d i n g i n t o a f o r m t h a t human i n t e l l i g e n c e c a n g r a s p . The v a r i o u s forms o f t h i s word s u g g e s t t h e p r o c e s s o f b r i n g i n g a t h i n g or s i t u a t i o n from u n l n t e l l i g i b i l i t y t o u n d e r s t a n d i n g . ( P a l m e r , 1969: 13)  Delphic  Hermeneutlcs, seventeenth form and the  as  exegesis.  usually  In the l a t e  nineteenth  researches  century  hermeneutlcs  Wolf  Schleiermacher  t o the status  providing  comprehend  of  a  of a  method  who  first  which  sciences  on a n o t i o n o f h e r m e n e u t i c a l  ground  themselves  on  an  ground  meaning.  Like  Schleiermacher,  person's  inner  Dllthey's valid'  aim  1969:  epistemological  98).  process  of  of mental  mind.  possibility  This of  of For  one  an  As  the  of  the  that  transfer  says,  gaining of  through  (Palmer,  human of  i t was another " I t was  'objectively inner  'understanding'  mind  human  understanding  h a s t o do w i t h  intuitive  i t was  s c i e n c e s may  fact,  Palmer  Dilthey,  transfer" mental  ground  believed  'expressions  human  empathetlc  to re-experience  methods  n o t i o n which  the products  human  develop  an  Dilthey  consciousness. to  an  could  However,  of  on  and hence  interpretations  (Palmer,  of  themselves  to reconstruct  reader  understanding.  explanation  must  elevate  understanding  the  to  upon  In t h e  to  whereas t h e n a t u r a l  sciences  possible  of  through  attempted  century  A s t and  Intentions.  Dilthey  that,  the  focussed  attempted  Wilhelm  Dilthey believed  was  science  by  of i t s author's  to  eighteenth  and  t h e meaning o f a g i v e n t e x t  understanding  traced  i t was p e r c e i v e d t o be a  nineteenth c e n t u r y hermeneutlcs  philological  through  Is  c e n t u r y , a t which time  of b i b l i c a l early  such,  life'" i s an  the knowability "a  mysterious  1969: 104) t o a n o t h e r  takes  place  understanding  through the of  human  productions, Palmer  be  quotes  grasping  of  Dilthey  the  interpretation life  comes  114). be  written  possible text  the  of  of  Like makes use understood understood and  to  the  Wolf, of  of  to  the  under  right'  and  the  to  to determine the  specific  it  the  on  the  of  inner  Palmer,  1969:  interpretation 'works'  are  therefore  is  for  The  than  a  i t is of  a  scientific  difference in  as  the  lies  objective  inquiry.  circle' the  parts  before  him,  wherein  whole  i t s parts.  whole and  —  .  interpretation  Schleiermacher  in r e l a t i o n to  f o r t h between  else  rather  'hermeneutlc relation  as  an  these  formation.  study  r e s u l t s of  the in  it  in  Thus  .  texture  (Dilthey such  .  i s based  i n which the  because  whatever. all  life  hermeneutlc  geological  Ast  inner  i s anything a  or  "above  Dilthey,  valid'  for 'get  a  objects  validity  follows:  expression"  e x i s t i n g as  explanation in  to  'objectively  as  visual arts  of works , works  according  objectively  or  as  structure  fully  And,  would  just  they texts  and It  that  meaning of any  the the  is a  allows given  Dilthey parts  are  whole  is  tacking  back  understanding work:  . the sentence furnishes a clear example o f t h e i n t e r a c t i o n o f t h e whole and p a r t s and t h e need f o r b o t h : o u t of the meaning of individual parts is y i e l d e d an u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e s e n s e o f the whole, which in turn changes the indeterminateness of t h e words i n t o a f i x e d and meaningful pattern. Dilthey c i t e s t h i s example and t h e n a s s e r t s t h a t t h e same r e l a t i o n s h i p e x i s t s between t h e p a r t s and t h e whole o f one's l i f e . The meaning of the whole is a 'sense'  74 d e r i v e d f r o m t h e meaning o f i n d i v i d u a l parts. An e v e n t o r e x p e r i e n c e c a n s o a l t e r o u r l i v e s t h a t what was f o r m e r l y m e a n i n g f u l becomes m e a n i n g l e s s and an a p p a r e n t l y unimportant past experience may t a k e on meaning i n r e t r o s p e c t . The sense of the whole determines the f u n c t i o n and t h e meaning o f t h e p a r t s . And meaning i s s o m e t h i n g h i s t o r i c a l ; i t i s a r e l a t i o n s h i p o f whole t o p a r t s s e e n by us f r o m a g i v e n s t a n d p o i n t , a t a g i v e n time, f o r a g i v e n combination of p a r t s . It i s not something above o r o u t s i d e history but a part of a hermeneutlc c i r c l e always h i s t o r i c a l l y d e f i n e d . ( P a l m e r , 1969: 118)  Dilthey's  hermeneutics  consciousness  —  on t h e i d e a  human mind e x i s t s as  such.  direct  result  whose  of  of  whereby  the  objectively first  (ii)  concretely  life'  of the  definable  meanings.  valid  may  knowledge.  to  works  parts  is a  can  and  be  wholes  f o r the a t t a i n a b i l i t y His  i . e . to  aspire  knowledge  human  specific  sciences  valid'  that  accounts  epistemologlcal,  attempts  hermeneutlc  belief  interaction  historically  fundamentally  the 'inner  of ' o b j e c t i v e l y  his  into  reciprocal  that  on a p h i l o s o p h y o f  a s a knowable e n t i t y and i s u n d e r s t a n d a b l e  His notion  contextualized  i s premised  provide  the  a  Heidegger  grounding  is  method  achievement  I t i s Martin  t o p r o v i d e an o n t o l o g i c a l  concern  of who  f o r the  project.  Heidegger Heidegger  had  been  a  student  i n d e e d , a t one t i m e t h e l a t t e r  o f Edmund  entertained  Husserl  and,  t h e hope t h a t t h e  former  would  carry  on  h i s work.  case, the student proved teacher.  Heidegger  transcendental consciousness phenomenology Heidegger, ceased  to  t o be  nor a  Western take  his  the  with  hope  i s often  the  roots  Presocratic  a  t o the  in  human  development  science.' took  the  H u s s e r l ' s n o t i o n of  its  for  'rigorous  metaphysics  as  a major d i s a p p o i n t m e n t  could accept neither  subjectivity  as  However,  wrong  of  According  to  turn  it  questioning  of  seriously.  T h i s q u e s t i o n has t o d a y been f o r g o t t e n - although our time considers Itself progressive in again affirming 'metaphysics.' . . . . And what t h e n was wrested f r o m phenomena by t h e h i g h e s t e x e r t i o n of t h i n k i n g , a l b e i t i n fragments and f i r s t - b e g i n n i n g s , has l o n g s i n c e been trivialized. Not o n l y t h a t . On t h e f o u n d a t i o n o f t h e Greek p o i n t of d e p a r t u r e f o r the interpretation of Being a dogmatic a t t i t u d e has t a k e n shape w h i c h n o t o n l y d e c l a r e s t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e meaning o f B e i n g t o be s u p e r f l u o u s b u t s a n c t i o n s i t s neglect. I t i s s a i d t h a t "Being" i s the most u n i v e r s a l and t h e e m p t i e s t c o n c e p t . As such i t resists every attempt at definition. Nor does t h i s most u n i v e r s a l and thus i n d e f i n a b l e c o n c e p t need any d e f i n i t i o n . Everybody uses I t c o n s t a n t l y and also a l r e a d y understands what he means by i t . Thus what made a n c i e n t p h i l o s o p h i z i n g u n e a s y and k e p t I t s o by virtue of i t s obscurity has become o b v i o u s , c l e a r a s day; and t h i s t o t h e p o i n t t h a t whoever p u r s u e s i t i s a c c u s e d o f an e r r o r o f ' m e t h o d . ( H e i d e g g e r , 1962: 2)  when  'Being'  Heidegger  maintains  that  Western  metaphysics  e s s e n t i a l l y e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l programme and t h a t , it  an  consequently,  ' f o r g e t s ' t o ask t h e f u n d a m e n t a l l y o n t o l o g i c a l q u e s t i o n o f  the  meaning  Being.  from  of  He  2 7  existence  Being,  of p r i m o r d i a l  being  'thrown'  a  as  an  •concern' with  often a  the  Dasein  is  •Knowledge,' In  Dasein  of  —  problem  nature,  is  'human b e i n g ' ) already  with  Heidegger  —  as  involved  metaphysics,  and in  there. what  characterizes  the  is  is  'being i n the  primordial  defined  so f a r  (literally  phenomenon  i t is this  being  as  involvement  which  Daseln  always  secondary  already  that  and  the  that  constituted  maintains that,  Involvement  whole  in  always  its  as  which  already  concern  with  forgets.  Being  question  the  intrinsic  (world  preunderstands)  H u s s e r l ' s p r e s u p p o s i t i o n of  that  'care.'  always  and  and  between  subjectivity,  is a  involvement  world  being  loosely translated  such,  and/or  difference  intuition  world  i s Dasein's  world, '  the  constitutive  into  Knowledge, primary  of  disagrees with  'there-being,'  the  has  by of  Time  Heidegger  meaning being  of  whose  i t s awareness Being  is  i . e . i t s awareness  attempts  Being  through  special of  a of  past,  an  get  to  analysis  ontological  Being.  feature  to  status  This mindfulness of  Dasein's  present  and  the of is of  temporal future  as  Very r o u g h l y , 'being' r e f e r s t o the c o n c r e t e l y e x i s t i n g individual whereas 'Being' r e f e r s to the mystery of the ' i s n e s s ' o f e x i s t e n c e . ( S t e i n e r , 1980: 26) 2 7  coincidental  with  its  Heidegger  emphasizes  examination  of  awareness the  of  its  hermeneutic  own  finitude.  nature  of  his  Dasein:  In e x p l a i n i n g t h e t a s k s o f o n t o l o g y we f o u n d i t n e c e s s a r y t h a t t h e r e s h o u l d be a fundamental ontology taking as i t s theme t h a t e n t i t y w h i c h i s o n t o l o g i c o o n t i c a l l y d i s t i n c t i v e , Dasein, i n order t o c o n f r o n t t h e c a r d i n a l p r o b l e m -- t h e question of the meaning of Being in general. Our i n v e s t i g a t i o n i t s e l f will show t h a t t h e meaning o f p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l description as a method lies in interpretation. The logos of the phenomenology o f D a s e i n has t h e c h a r a c t e r of hermeneuein, through which the authentic meaning of Being, and also t h o s e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e s of B e i n g which D a s e i n i t s e l f p o s s e s s e s , a r e made known to D a s e i n ' s u n d e r s t a n d i n g of B e i n g . The phenomenology o f D a s e i n i s a h e r m e n e u t l c In t h e p r i m o r d i a l s i g n i f i c a t i o n o f t h e word, where i t d e s i g n a t e s t h i s b u s i n e s s of interpreting. (Heidegger,  Before looking at Heidegger's circle  i t i s necessary  understanding  and  to  grasp  1962:  61-62)  v e r s i o n of the what  he  has  interpretation.  to  For  hermeneutic say  about  Heidegger,  u n d e r s t a n d i n g i s an e q u i p r l m o r d l a l f e a t u r e o f D a s e i n ' s b e i n g in-the-world existential  and,  further,  structure In  "understanding  w h i c h we other  call  words,  has  in Itself  'projection'  184-185).  always  has a p r e - u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f any g i v e n s i t u a t i o n and, "Dasein always  by  (Heidegger,  1962:  p r o j e c t i o n r e f e r s to p o t e n t i a l ,  Dasein,  has  the  definition, as  understood  78 itself  and  always  possibilities" development  and  will  (Heidegger,  understand  itself  1962:  Interpretation  a r t i c u l a t i o n of  by u n d e r s t a n d i n g .  As  Heidegger  185). the  in  terms  possibilities  of  i s the  projected  says,  The p r o j e c t i n g of the u n d e r s t a n d i n g we call "interpretation." In it the u n d e r s t a n d i n g a p p r o p r i a t e s u n d e r s t a n d i n g l y t h a t which i s understood by i t . I n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , u n d e r s t a n d i n g d o e s n o t become s o m e t h i n g d i f f e r e n t . It becomes i t s e l f . Such i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s g r o u n d e d e x i s t e n t l a l l y In u n d e r s t a n d i n g ; the latter does not arise from the former. Nor is interpretation the acquiring o f i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t what i s understood; i t i s r a t h e r the working-out of possibilities projected in understanding. ( H e i d e g g e r , 1962: 188-189)  For  Heidegger,  superimpose disclosure always  upon  interpretation an  i s n o t a framework w h i c h  objectively  or r e t r i e v a l of D a s e i n ' s  already  Heidegger  an  occurring  existing  world  but  we a  p r e - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of i t s  involvement  with  the  world.  puts i t ,  In i n t e r p r e t i n g , we do n o t , so t o s p e a k , t h r o w a ' s i g n i f i c a t i o n ' o v e r some naked t h i n g w h i c h i s p r e s e n t - a t - h a n d , we do n o t s t i c k a v a l u e on i t ; b u t when s o m e t h i n g w i t h i n - t h e - w o r l d i s e n c o u n t e r e d as such, the t h i n g i n q u e s t i o n a l r e a d y has an involvement which i s d i s c l o s e d i n our understanding of the world, and this i n v o l v e m e n t i s one w h i c h g e t s l a i d o u t by the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . ( H e i d e g g e r , 1962: 190-191)  As  79  Interpretation  enables  o£  the understanding  as  tables,  chairs  structure' clear,  us t o v i e w  1  as. c o n s t i t u t e d  etc.  Heidegger  o£ i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  i s intimately  the ready-to-hand'  involved  by v a r i o u s o b j e c t s  refers  which, with  world  to this  as w i l l  such  a s t h e 'as  presently  become  the fore-structures  of  understanding. Heidegger the  realm  posits  of  development  understanding  in interpretation  fore-conception. to  three  Heidegger's  forestructures and —  which  which allow  belong t o for Its  f o r e - h a v i n g , f o r e - s i g h t and  As t h e s e a r e c r u c i a l  notion of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  concepts I will  with respect quote  length. The ready-to-hand is always understood i n terms of a t o t a l i t y o f involvements. T h i s t o t a l i t y need n o t be grasped explicitly by a thematic interpretation. E v e n i f i t has u n d e r g o n e s u c h an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , i t r e c e d e s i n t o an u n d e r s t a n d i n g w h i c h does n o t s t a n d o u t from t h e background. And t h i s i s t h e v e r y mode i n w h i c h i t i s t h e e s s e n t i a l foundation f o r everyday c i r c u m s p e c t i v e interpretation. In every case this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s grounded i n something we have i n a d v a n c e — i n a fore-having. As t h e a p p r o p r i a t i o n o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g , the interpretation operates i n Being towards a t o t a l i t y of Involvements which is a l r e a d y understood — a Being which understands. When something is u n d e r s t o o d b u t s t i l l v e i l e d , i t becomes u n v e i l e d b y an a c t o f a p p r o p r i a t i o n , and t h i s i s a l w a y s done under t h e g u i d a n c e o f a p o i n t of view, which f i x e s t h a t w i t h r e g a r d t o w h i c h what i s u n d e r s t o o d i s interpreted. In every case i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s g r o u n d e d In s o m e t h i n g  him a t  80 ve s e e I n a d v a n c e — in a fore-sight. T h i s f o r e - s i g h t 'takes the f i r s t c u t ' out of what has been t a k e n i n t o our f o r e h a v i n g , and I t d o e s s o w i t h a v i e w t o a definite way i n which this c a n be interpreted. Anything understood which is held i n o u r f o r e - h a v i n g and t o w a r d s w h i c h we s e t our s i g h t s 'foresightedly,' becomes conceptualizable through the interpretation. In such an interpretation, t h e way i n which the entity we a r e i n t e r p r e t i n g i s t o be c o n c e i v e d c a n be drawn f r o m t h e e n t i t y i t s e l f , or t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n can f o r c e the e n t i t y i n t o concepts t o which i t i s opposed I n i t s manner o f B e i n g . In either case, the interpretation has a l r e a d y d e c i d e d f o r a d e f i n i t e way o f c o n c e i v i n g i t , e i t h e r w i t h f i n a l i t y or with reservation; i t i s grounded i n s o m e t h i n g we g r a s p i n a d v a n c e — in a fore-conception. (Heidegger,  Thus t h e ' a s - s t r u c t u r e ' of t h e p r o j e c t e d turn,  allow  which'  having, and the  of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  'fore-structures'  f o r Heidegger's  of a p r o j e c t i o n  intelligible  existential  of which  something  In so f a r as  'meaning'  must  be  conceived  of the d i s c l o s e d n e s s  understanding  as  the  which  belongs t o  i n some f o r m  outside  of  constituted  by  definition,  In  formal-  'meaning' i s n o t s o m e t h i n g w h i c h e x i s t s i t i s , by  193).  of Being of  words,  —  1962:  fore-  other  Dasein  (Heidegger,  becomes  from a  make up t h e e x i s t e n t i a l s t a t e  framework  understanding"  o f meaning a s " t h e 'upon  i t gets i t s structure  and a f o r e - c o n c e p t I o n .  'there,'  i s the working out  of u n d e r s t a n d i n g which, i n  notion  i n terms  as something;  interpretation  1962: 191)  and  81 restricted  to the h i s t o r i c a l  understanding By along  now with  circular.  i n t h e form i t should being  be  horizon  projected  of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . clear  that  fundamentally  As H e i d e g g e r  of Daseln's  the Being  temporal,  is  of  Dasein,  essentially  says,  The ' c i r c l e ' In u n d e r s t a n d i n g b e l o n g s t o t h e s t r u c t u r e o f m e a n i n g , and t h e l a t t e r phenomenon i s r o o t e d i n t h e e x i s t e n t i a l c o n s t i t u t i o n of Dasein — that i s , i n the understanding which interprets. An e n t i t y f o r which, as B e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d , its Being is itself an i s s u e , has, ontologically, a circular structure. ( H e i d e g g e r , 1962: 195)  Thus t h e a l w a y s a l r e a d y e x i s t i n g projects be  itself  authentically  toward 2 8  futural  realized  pre-understanding possibilities  by d i s c l o s i n g  h a v i n g been o f p r i m o r d i a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g . go  forward  of Dasein  which  the always  can o n l y already  Like T.s. E l i o t ,  we  i n o r d e r t o come back p r o p e r l y :  We s h a l l n o t c e a s e from e x p l o r a t i o n And t h e end o f a l l our e x p l o r i n g W i l l be t o a r r i v e where we s t a r t e d And know t h e p l a c e f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e . ( E l i o t , 1963: 222)  John of  Caputo  provides a succinct  synopsis  of the c i r c u l a r i t y  Dasein:  In Heidegger ' a u t h e n t i c i t y ' has t o do w i t h D a s e l n ' s r e c o g n i t i o n o f , and b e i n g i n harmony w i t h , B e i n g whereas ' l n a u t h e n t i c l t y ' has t o do w i t h D a s e l n ' s f o r g e t t i n g o f B e i n g . 2 8  82  As an 'existing' being ( i n the Klerkegaardian s e n s e ) , t h e meaning o f D a s e i n i s t o move f o r w a r d , t o p r e s s ahead toward i t s authentic future. But t h i s f o r w a r d movement i s t a k e n by H e i d e g g e r t o be a t one and t h e same t i m e a movement back t o t h e b e i n g t h a t D a s e i n a l l a l o n g has b e e n . The movement f o r w a r d i s t h u s a l s o a movement o f r e c o v e r y o r r e t r i e v a l . . . . Heidegger . . . gives a special play to the 'circular' movement of D a s e i n ' s B e i n g i n B e i n g and Time l i n k i n g i n an o n t o l o g i c a l l o o p D a s e i n ' s f o r w a r d and backward movement, Its futural p r o j e c t i o n and i t s a l r e a d y h a v i n g b e e n . Wlederholung i n B e i n g and Time means a r e p e t i t i o n / r e t r i e v a l , a p r e s s i n g forward which r e c o v e r s something h i t h e r t o l a t e n t , in potentla, harboured in the possibility-to-be (Seinskonnen), of Dasein. D a s e i n ' s own B e i n g ' c i r c u l a t e s ' between I t s ' f u t u r i t y ' (Zukunftlgkelt) and I t s ' h a v i n g b e e n ' ( G e w e s e n h e l t ) . The Being of Dasein i s c o n s t a n t l y p r o j e c t e d ahead, never in a free-floating and absolute way, but always toward p o s s i b i l i t i e s i n t o which i t has a l l a l o n g been i n s e r t e d . Whence H e i d e g g e r speaks of "the c i r c u l a r Being of D a s e i n . " ( C a p u t o , 1987b: 60)  Heidegger's epistemological concern a  shifting to  with o r i g i n s  positive  knowing" word,  with  Time  is  holism. almost  unrestricted  the  ontological  hermeneutic  ground  of  the  most  circle  portrays  ("In t h e [ h e r m e n e u t i c ]  possibility  (Heidegger,  of  his  circle  unique  in  Solomon  primordial  Western  comments,  kind —  of in a  " B e i n g and  philosophy  e m p h a s i s on h o l i s m , i t s v i s i o n  deep  Is hidden  1962: 1 9 5 ) ) , u n i t y and t o t a l i t y As R o b e r t  from  in i t s  o f our b e i n g - i n -  83 the-world sees  as  the  seamless  whole  (Solomon, away  a  1988:  from  through  as  a  result  than  a  to  determine  desire  Heidegger  rather  attempting  his  abates.  than  his later  "luminous  loglcal  more  In  an  However,  even  156).  analysis  elucidating/obfuscating as  whole  of  Dasein  the  meaning  self-concealing" nostalgia f o r the  for  h i m s e l f as  of  and  Being  as  of  Being on  aletheia 1984:  —  108).  his eschato-teleocircle  "Anaximander  follows:  But what if that which is early o u t d i s t a n c e d e v e r y t h i n g l a t e ; i f the v e r y e a r l i e s t f a r s u r p a s s e d the v e r y l a t e s t ? What once o c c u r r e d i n t h e dawn of our d e s t i n y would t h e n come, as what once o c c u r r e d , a t t h e l a s t . . ., t h a t i s , a t the d e p a r t u r e of the l o n g - h i d d e n d e s t i n y of Being. The Being of beings is gathered . . . i n the u l t i m a c y of i t s destiny. The e s s e n c e o f B e i n g h i t h e r t o disappears, i t s truth s t i l l veiled. The h i s t o r y of Being i s gathered In this departure. The gathering in this d e p a r t u r e , as t h e g a t h e r i n g . . . a t the outermost point . . . of i t s essence h i t h e r t o , i s the e s c h a t o l o g y of Being. As something fateful, Being itself is inherently eschatological. . . . We t h i n k of the e s c h a t o l o g y of B e i n g i n a way corresponding to the way the phenomenology o f s p i r i t i s t o be t h o u g h t , i.e. from w i t h i n t h e h i s t o r y o f B e i n g . The phenomenology of spirit itself c o n s t i t u t e s a phase i n t h e e s c h a t o l o g y of B e i n g , when B e i n g g a t h e r s i t s e l f In t h e u l t i m a c y of i t s essence. . . . If we Being, then  moves  concentrates  h o r i z o n of the  Hence, i n commenting on t h e expresses  and  meaning  (who  point")  Heidegger  (Heidegger,  origins  unifying  starting  writing the  i n Hegel  think the eschatology of we must someday a n t i c i p a t e  never  Fragment,"  84 t h e f o r m e r dawn i n t h e d a y t o come; t o d a y we must l e a r n t o p o n d e r t h i s f o r m e r dawn t h r o u g h what i s imminent. ( H e i d e g g e r , 1984: 18) (ill)  Gadamer Gadamer does n o t f o l l o w h i s t e a c h e r , H e i d e g g e r ,  mysticism of  surrounding  Being  as  ontological it  into  purpose t o do,  full  of  but,  (Gadamer means  understanding process  concern  instead,  understanding  blown  of which  latter's  and  i s t o show " n o t what we over  and  as  out  the  a  system  fundamental  the  his  attempts  to  meaning mentor's develop  hermeneutlcs, ' do  or what we  above our  i n Baynes e t a l . , 1988:  working  with  takes  'philosophical  b u t what happens t o us  doing" this  aletheia  notion  a  the  i n t o the  339). which  universal  ought  wanting For  the  and  Gadamer,  accounts  for  ontological  o f b e i n g human:  "How is understanding (Verstehen) possible?" T h i s q u e s t i o n i s p r i o r t o any a c t i v i t y o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g on t h e p a r t of subjectivity, i n c l u d i n g the methodical a c t i v i t y of the verstehenden sciences, their norms and rules. I n my view, Heidegger's temporal a n a l y s i s o f human Dasein has convincingly shown that u n d e r s t a n d i n g i s n o t one o f many modes of a c t i o n on t h e p a r t o f t h e s u b j e c t but r a t h e r D a s e i n ' s v e r y mode o f b e i n g . It is i n t h i s sense that [I employ] t h e concept of hermeneutlcs. . . . It d e s i g n a t e s the fundamental movement o f Dasein, which c o n s t i t u t e s i t s f i n l t u d e and h i s t o r i c i t y and t h u s encompasses t h e whole o f i t s e x p e r i e n c e of t h e w o r l d . To s a y t h a t t h e movement of u n d e r s t a n d i n g i s c o m p r e h e n s i v e and u n i v e r s a l i s n e i t h e r a r b i t r a r y nor a c o n s t r u c t i v e e x a g g e r a t i o n of a s i n g l e a s p e c t ; i t l i e s r a t h e r i n t h e  85 very nature (Gadamer  Because  Gadamer  the temporal and  of t h i n g s . i n Baynes e t a l . ,  believes  beingness  Dilthey's  that  the  341)  understanding  o f D a s e i n he  n o t i o n of  1988:  is essential  opposes  possibility  Schleiermacher's  of  slipping  out  one's immediate h i s t o r i c a l c o n t e x t i n o r d e r t o comprehend authorial  intention  within  a  written  According  to  Gadamer,  separation  and  hence  reification  of  what  i s required  is a  present the  whereas  Heideggerian  inseparable  by  into  a  tradition argues  authority.  already  that  one  with beingness ever  of  of the  that  past  and  i s , by  Is and  be  the  past  on are  and  hermeneutics' maintains  more  definition,  of  hence t o e n s u r e t h a t  g r a s p i n g the  that,  is  Gadamer  fell  —  nor  never  less  a u t h e n t i c nature  one  Gadamer than  the  effectively  without  always  deny  these  To one's  into  prejudice,  respect to prejudice,  unaware  the  a p r e s e n t which i s  presuppositions. to  and  future).  he  neither  the era.  future  of p r e - u n d e r s t a n d i n g , which  existing  presuppositions  of  With  i t is actually  Heideggerian concept shows  into  of  impossible  recognition  'philosophical  notions  an  the  present  i s 'thrown'  another  d i s r e p u t e d u r i n g the Enlightenment  and  that  three  in  in  both  pre-understanding  out h i s  'rehabilitates'  results  past,  the p o s s i b i l i t y  In w o r k i n g  unwarranted  model,  ( i . e . Dasein  constituted projected  this  text  to  own will  involvement be  incapable  of understanding.  As  86 for  tradition,  [ I n ] our c o n t i n u a l l y m a n i f e s t e d a t t i t u d e t o t h e p a s t , t h e main f e a t u r e i s n o t . . . a d i s t a n c i n g and f r e e i n g of o u r s e l v e s f r o m what has been t r a n s m i t t e d . Rather, we stand always w i t h i n t r a d i t i o n , and t h i s i s no o b j e c t i f y i n g p r o c e s s , i . e . we do n o t c o n c e i v e o f what t r a d i t i o n s a y s as s o m e t h i n g o t h e r , a model or e x e m p l a r , a r e c o g n i t i o n o f o u r s e l v e s w h i c h our l a t e r h i s t o r i c a l judgement would h a r d l y see as a k i n d o f k n o w l e d g e , b u t as t h e s i m p l e s t p r e s e r v a t i o n of t r a d i t i o n . (Gadamer, 1975: 250)  In o t h e r does  words, as P a l m e r s u c c i n c t l y e x p r e s s e s  not  thought which  stand but  we  i s the do  recognition  over  our of  against  fabric  of  thinking"  tradition  as  belng-ln-the-world  leads  its  Gadamer  authority.  As  our  thinking  relations,  an  directly  the  an  object  horizon,  1969:  Integral to  as  the  (Palmer,  i t , "tradition  part  within  182). of  of  The  Dasein's  acknowledgement  of  says,  That which has been sanctioned by t r a d i t i o n . . . has an a u t h o r i t y t h a t i s n a m e l e s s , and our f i n i t e h i s t o r i c a l b e i n g i s marked by t h e f a c t t h a t a l w a y s t h e a u t h o r i t y o f what has been t r a n s m i t t e d - and n o t o n l y what i s c l e a r l y g r o u n d e d has power over our attitudes and behaviour. (Gadamer, 1975: 249)  Basically, to  be  the  Gadamer t a k e s  Enlightenment's  exception  superficial  t o what he view  that  perceives prejudice,  87 t r a d i t i o n and  a u t h o r i t y a r e t h e enemies o f c r e a t i v e t h o u g h t  -  that  i t s notion  somehow  muck o f t h e w o r l d and pure  reason.  determines order and  the  constructs.  the  view As  authority  thought  fundamental against power"  the  'principle  of of  effective  presuppositions.  i.e.  of  fact  second  deprives  the  is consciously on  a l l human  "there  is essential  enlightenment  Heidegger's  Dasein,  definitive,  and  to  is  one  i t : the  i s the p r e j u d i c e tradition  of  its  239-240)  D a s e i n must be aware t h a t is  of  Is c o n c e r n e d , p r e j u d i c e  Enlightenment:  which  r e a l m of  understanding  are simply part  that  the  possibility  exerts Its effect no  the  itself,  emphasizing  historicity  or  p r e j u d i c e of  (Gadamer, 1975:  Again  of  whether o r n o t t h i s  enlightenment  prejudice  transcend  upon u n a c k n o w l e d g e d  f a r as Gadamer  i t nonetheless  of  nature  premised  -- E n l i g h t e n m e n t  prejudice  p r e c l u d e s the  of t r a d i t i o n  n a t u r e o f t h i n g s and, acknowledged,  attitude  ontological  a world  to  t o have r e c o u r s e t o a p r i s t i n e  Such an  recognizing  i t i s possible  -  Gadamer  notion  posits  history.'  By  of  what this  the  essential  he he  terms means  i t s e x i s t e n c e as a h i s t o r i c a l it  cannot  be.  and  be  Thus,  If we are trying to understand a h i s t o r i c a l phenomenon from t h e h i s t o r i c a l d i s t a n c e t h a t i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f our h e r m e n e u t i c a l s i t u a t i o n , we a r e always subject t o the effects of effectivehistory. I t d e t e r m i n e s i n advance both what seems t o us w o r t h e n q u i r i n g a b o u t and what w i l l appear as an o b j e c t o f  the that  being  without  88 i n v e s t i g a t i o n , and we more or l e s s f o r g e t h a l f of what i s r e a l l y t h e r e -- i n f a c t , we m i s s t h e whole t r u t h of t h e phenomenon when we t a k e i t s immediate a p p e a r a n c e as t h e whole t r u t h . (Gadamer, 1975: 267-268) T a k i n g t h e h i s t o r i c i t y of D a s e i n as a g i v e n , f u r t h e r argues analogue  one  completion.' presents a with  must  initially  In other  engage  words,  one  ' u n i t y of meaning.'  Heidegger  Gadamer  t h a t i n l o o k i n g a t any  goes  concerning on  to  the  discuss  particular in  must  'the  or  of  text  t o h i s agreement  s t r u c t u r e of the importance  text  anticipation  assume t h a t t h e  In a t t e s t i n g  the  text  Gadamer  of  understanding the  completion: The significance of tthe hermeneutic] c i r c l e , which i s fundamental to a l l understanding, has a further h e r m e n e u t i c c o n s e q u e n c e w h i c h I may call t h e ' f o r e - c o n c e p t i o n of c o m p l e t i o n . ' But this, too, is obviously a formal condition of a l l understanding. It s t a t e s t h a t o n l y what r e a l l y c o n s t i t u t e s a u n i t y of meaning i s i n t e l l i g i b l e . So when we r e a d a t e x t we a l w a y s f o l l o w t h i s c o m p l e t e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n of completion, and o n l y when i t p r o v e s i n a d e q u a t e , i . e . t h e t e x t i s n o t i n t e l l i g i b l e , do we s t a r t t o d o u b t t h e t r a n s m i t t e d t e x t and seek t o d i s c o v e r i n what way i t c a n be r e m e d i e d . The a n t i c i p a t i o n o f c o m p l e t i o n t h a t g u i d e s a l l our u n d e r s t a n d i n g i s , then, always s p e c i f i c i n c o n t e n t . Not o n l y i s an immanent u n i t y of meaning g u i d i n g t h e r e a d e r assumed, b u t h i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g I s likewise guided by the constant transcendent expectations of meaning which proceed from the r e l a t i o n t o the t r u t h o f what i s b e i n g s a i d . . . . The anticipation of completion, then, c o n t a i n s not o n l y t h i s formal element that a text should fully express i t s meaning, but also t h a t what It says  notion  of  89 should be the whole truth. [Understanding means, primarily, to u n d e r s t a n d t h e c o n t e n t o f what i s s a i d , and only secondarily to isolate and understand another's meaning a s such. Hence the first of a l l hermeneutlc requirements remains one's own foreu n d e r s t a n d i n g , w h i c h p r o c e e d s from b e i n g c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e same s u b j e c t [ m a t t e r as e x p r e s s e d i n t h e t e x t ] . It i s this t h a t d e t e r m i n e s what u n i f i e d meaning c a n be r e a l i s e d and hence t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f the a n t i c i p a t i o n of c o m p l e t i o n . (Gadamer, 1975: 261-262) (emphasis mine)  The l a s t that  paragraph  what  Gadamer  conditions  of  epistemological understood. interest  lies  position  of  o f t h e p r e c e d i n g q u o t a t i o n makes i t c l e a r concerns  understanding  itself  structure  what  i n the misty f l a t s a  particular  of a p a r t i c u l a r  between  the  mediate: a  of  what  i s near  this  is  being  an  has  and  the  that  is  historically  intermediate area"  given  historical historical  distant  polarity and  the  attempts  and f a m i l i a r i t y  i s that  intermediate separate  1975:  to that  place  object  The t r u e home o f h e r m e n e u t i c s (Gadamer,  be  of herraeneutical  hermeneutics  intended  the  to  I t i s the seeming what  f o r us  than  presumed  area  "The p l a c e between s t r a n g e n e s s  being p a r t of a t r a d i t i o n . in  text  of  ontological  between t h e g i v e n  reader.  strangeness  t r a n s m i t t e d -text  between  of  are the rather  F o r Gadamer, t h e p r i m a r y  position  familiarity  himself with  and is  262-262).  In a t t e m p t i n g t o m e d i a t e between t e x t and r e a d e r Gadamer relies  on a d i a l e c t i c  that  i s p a r t P l a t o n i c and p a r t H e g e l i a n  90 and  which  results  i n what he  Gadamer*s P l a t o n i c i n f l u e n c e  terms a  i s evident  d i a l o g i c s t r u c t u r e of u n d e r s t a n d i n g between  the  assumed  ('anticipation immediate provides  of  the  ideal  unified  completion')  historical  ' f u s i o n of  horizons.'  in his belief  Is e s s e n t i a l t o  meaning and  situatedness.  model o f d i a l o g i c  of  a  mediating  given  text  i t s a p p l i c a t i o n to  one's  For  any  that  8 8  Gadamer,  Plato  questioning:  The a r t of q u e s t i o n i n g i s t h a t of b e i n g a b l e t o go on a s k i n g q u e s t i o n s , i . e . t h e art of thinking. It is called 'dialectic, • for it is the art of conducting a r e a l conversation. . . . To conduct a c o n v e r s a t i o n means t o allow o n e s e l f t o be c o n d u c t e d by t h e o b j e c t t o which the p a r t n e r s i n the conversation are d i r e c t e d . I t r e q u i r e s t h a t one d o e s not t r y t o out-argue the other person, b u t t h a t one r e a l l y c o n s i d e r s t h e w e i g h t of the o t h e r ' s o p i n i o n . Hence i t i s an a r t of t e s t i n g . But t h e a r t of t e s t i n g i s the a r t of q u e s t i o n i n g . For . . . t o q u e s t i o n means t o l a y open, t o p l a c e i n t h e open. As a g a i n s t t h e s o l i d i t y of o p i n i o n , q u e s t i o n i n g makes t h e o b j e c t and all its possibilities fluid. Dialectic consists not in trying to d i s c o v e r t h e weakness of what i s s a i d , but i n b r i n g i n g out i t s r e a l s t r e n g t h . The u n i q u e and c o n t i n u i n g r e l e v a n c e o f t h e P l a t o n i c d i a l o g u e s i s due t o t h i s a r t of s t r e n g t h e n i n g , f o r i n t h i s p r o c e s s what i s s a i d i s c o n t i n u a l l y t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o the u t t e r m o s t p o s s i b i l i t i e s of i t s r i g h t n e s s and t r u t h and overcomes a l l o p p o s i n g argument w h i c h s e e k s t o limit i t s v a l i d i t y . . . . What emerges in_ i t s t r u t h [ i n t h e P l a t o n i c d i a l o g u e s ] is_ t h e l o g o s , w h i c h i s n e i t h e r mine nor y o u r s  Gadamer d e f i n e s h o r i z o n as " t h e r a n g e of v i s i o n t h a t includes everything t h a t c a n be seen from a particular v a n t a g e p o i n t " (Gadamer, 1975: 269). 2 9  91 and hence so far transcends the s u b j e c t i v e opinions of the partners to the d i a l o g u e t h a t even t h e person l e a d i n g the conversation i s always ignorant. Dialectic as the a r t of c o n d u c t i n g a c o n v e r s a t i o n i s a l s o the a r t of s e e i n g t h i n g s i n t h e u n i t y o f an a s p e c t ( s u n o r a n e i s hen e i d o s ) i . e . i t i s t h e a r t o f t h e f o r m a t i o n o f c o n c e p t s as t h e working out of t h e common m e a n i n g . (Gadamer, 1975: 330-331) ( e m p h a s i s mine)  Gadamer  follows this  stating  that  what  331)  the  subject  mine).  case,  This  matter  of  to  the  by  i t i s a memory o f  describe  conversation  text,  dialogue  the  of  (Gadamer, 1975:  with  the text i s  intention  which  work  but with  transcends  any  i n t e n t i o n a l i t y and w h i c h emerges a s t h e f u s i o n o f  horizon of the t e x t  Gadamer  a metaphor,  n o t w i t h any p o s s i b l e a u t h o r i a l  individual the  was  to the P l a t o n i c  as a c o n v e r s a t i o n with the t e x t "  (emphasis  concerned the  " i t i s more t h a n  originally  hermeneutics  panegyric  with  the horizon of the reader.  says,  it i s part of any genuine conversation t h a t one s u b m i t s to the other, allows h i s viewpoint really to count and g e t s inside the other f a r enough t o u n d e r s t a n d n o t him, t o be s u r e , as t h i s i n d i v i d u a l i t y b u t r a t h e r what he says. T h a t w h i c h has t o be g r a s p e d i s the s u b s t a n t i v e v a l i d i t y of h i s o p i n i o n so t h a t we c a n be u n i t e d w i t h one a n o t h e r on t h e s u b j e c t - m a t t e r . (Gadamer i n Warnke, 1987: 100)  As  Gadamer's  notion  of  the  s t r i k i n g resemblance to Hegel's synthesis  of  while  maintaining  yet  differs  and  m a r k e d l y from  Absolute finds  thesis  Spirit  ultimate  version  of  the  secularization  fusion  Hegel  horizons  bears  n o t i o n of A u f h e b u n g —  antithesis  both.  of  which  Gadamer's i n so  f a r as he  has  no  fusion of H e g e l .  of  cannot horizons  belie reads  the  fact  very  the both  that  he  n o t i o n of  or Knowledge i n w h i c h t h e d i a l e c t i c a l completion  of  transcends  contention  a  process  that  much  his  like  a  Thus,  . . . t h e h o r i z o n of t h e p r e s e n t i s b e i n g continually formed, in that we have c o n t i n u a l l y t o t e s t a l l our p r e j u d i c e s . An i m p o r t a n t p a r t o f t h i s t e s t i n g i s t h e encounter with the past and the u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e t r a d i t i o n from w h i c h we come. Hence the horizon of the present cannot be formed without the past. There i s no more an isolated h o r i z o n of the present than t h e r e are historical horizons. Understanding, r a t h e r , i s always the f u s i o n of these h o r i z o n s w h i c h we imagine to e x i s t by themselves. . . . In . . . t r a d i t i o n this process of f u s i o n is continually going on, for there old and new continually grow together to make something of l i v i n g v a l u e , without e i t h e r b e i n g e x p l i c i t l y d i s t i n g u i s h e d from t h e other. (Gadamer, 1975: 273)  John  Caputo  nicely  captures  Gadamer's  reliance  on  Hegel: In t h e end . . . Gadamer r e m a i n s a t t a c h e d to tradition as t h e bearer of eternal truths, which i n a way does  Plato  and  93 n o t h i n g more t h a n m o d i f y P l a t o and H e g e l from a Heideggerian standpoint. Gadamer's h e r m e n e u t i c s i s t r a d i t i o n a l i s m and the philosophy of eternal truth pushed t o i t s h i s t o r i c a l limits. He offers us the most liberal form of traditionalism possible. He i n t r o d u c e s as much change as possible into the p h i l o s o p h y o f u n c h a n g i n g t r u t h , as much movement as possible into immobile verity. P l a t o s a i d t h a t t r u t h i s e t e r n a l and that we require a dialogue among o u r s e l v e s In o r d e r t o make t h e a s c e n t t o t h e f o r m s . H e g e l p u t t h e forms i n t o t i m e and required that they pass through d i a l e c t i c a l development, t h a t they prove t h e i r e t e r n a l worth i n time, i n the hard work and negativity of historical becoming. Gadamer d e l i m i t s t h e H e g e l i a n p r o j e c t of s e t t i n g t h e t r u t h I n t o t i m e , not by denying eternal truth but by p r o t e s t i n g t h a t t h e r e i s no one final f o r m u l a t i o n o f i t . He i n s i s t s t h a t t h e r e i s a l w a y s a p l u r a l i t y of a r t i c u l a t i o n o f the same t r u t h , t h a t the selfsame is capable of an indefinite number of historical expressions. But that is another way o f r e a s s u r i n g us that no m a t t e r how g r e a t t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f . . . t r a d i t i o n may be, i t s deep u n i t y i s always s a f e . Gadamer's whole argument t u r n s on an i m p l i c i t a c c e p t a n c e of the m e t a p h y s i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n between a more or l e s s s t a b l e and o b j e c t i v e meaning and i t s c e a s e l e s s l y changing expression. F o r Gadamer, t h e o n l y r e a l q u e s t i o n i s how meaning and t r u t h g e t p a s s e d a l o n g and handed down ( t r a n s - d a r e ) . That i s why t h e P l a t o n i c c o n c e p t i o n o f d i a l o g u e and t h e H e g e l i a n d o c t r i n e o f d i a l e c t i c a l m e d i a t i o n a r e so i m p o r t a n t t o him. These are the principle means of the t r a n s m i s s i o n o f meaning and t r u t h . ( C a p u t o , 1987b: 111)  Thus Gadamer's p h i l o s o p h i c a l h e r m e n e u t i c s , of  the  epistemologlcal  bases  of  previous  Its  critique  forms  of  hermeneutlcs  n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g , r e m a i n s embedded i n t r a d i t i o n a l  Western m e t a p h y s i c a l so  on.  In  n o t i o n s o£  light  o£  this  prefaces  his  magnum  following  laudatory address  unity, completion,  it  opus,  is  not  Truth to the  truth  surprising  and  that  Method,  suppression  of  and  with  he the  otherness:  C a t c h o n l y what y o u ' v e t h r o w n y o u r s e l f , a l l Is mere s k i l l and l i t t l e g a i n ; b u t when y o u ' r e s u d d e n l y t h e c a t c h e r o f a b a l l t h r o w n by an e t e r n a l p a r t n e r w i t h a c c u r a t e and measured s w i n g t o w a r d s y o u , t o y o u r c e n t r e , i n an a r c h from t h e g r e a t b r i d g e b u i l d i n g o f God: Why c a t c h i n g t h e n becomes a power — not y o u r s , a w o r l d ' s . ( R l l k e i n Gadamer, 1975: n.p.)  (iv)  Rlcoeur Like  Heidegger  hermeneutics  must  understanding finitude  and  Gadamer,  as  grasp  the  the  upon  relationship  According  accompanies,  closes,  and  and  thus  return,  explanation  develops  (Ricoeur  i n Baynes e t a l . , 1988:  with  of  attempting through  understanding  "Understanding  envelops  As  and a a and  precedes,  explanation.  understanding  of  human  Heidegger  epistemology  354).  that  significance  awareness  between  to Ricoeur:  believes  unlike  himself  ontology  explanation.  an  However,  concerns  between  Ricoeur  ontological  predicated  Ricoeur  of  Gadamer,  historicity.  reconciliation study  and  In  analytically"  Ricoeur  says,  95 I f t h e r e i s a f e a t u r e which d i s t i n g u i s h e s me not only from the hermeneutlc p h i l o s o p h y o f S c h l e i e r m a c h e r and D i l t h e y , but a l s o from t h a t o f H e i d e g g e r and e v e n Gadamer ( d e s p i t e my g r e a t p r o x i m i t y t o t h e work o f t h e l a t t e r ) , i t i s i n d e e d my concern to avoid the p i t f a l l o f an opposition between an 'understanding* w h i c h would be r e s e r v e d f o r t h e 'human sciences' and an 'explanation' which would be common t o t h e l a t t e r and t o t h e nomological sciences, primarily the physical sciences. [ I am c o n c e r n e d w i t h the] search f o r a f l e x i b l e articulation and a c o n t i n u a l t o and f r o between t h e i n v e s t i g a t o r ' s p e r s o n a l engagement w i t h the matter of the text, and t h e disengagement which the objective e x p l a n a t i o n by c a u s e s , laws, f u n c t i o n s or s t r u c t u r e s demands. . . . ( R i c o e u r , 19821: 36)  In  attempting  t o mediate  understanding the  written  (verstehen)  fixation  intention  (Ricoeur, traits  to Ricoeur,  upon  the text  t h e model o f  i s "characterized  o f meaning, (2) i t s d i s s o c i a t i o n  (4)  the  constitutes —  (3) t h e d i s p l a y  universal  the  text  explanation  o u t , n o t an  Dilthey)  relies  ( e r k l a r e n ) and  range  from t h e m e n t a l  of  of  by (1)  non-ostensive  i t s addressees"  1982e: 2 1 0 ) . The c o m b i n a t i o n o f t h e p r e c e d i n g  explanation point  Ricoeur  of the author,  references,  explanation  text.  According the  between  but a  import  as  an  being, from  possibility  object  as R i c o e u r  the n a t u r a l  which  four  susceptible  to  i s a t pains  to  sciences  i s inherent  within  (pace the  96 linguisticality transfer from  from one  the  within  o£  procedures"  of  same  objectification  given  facts  to  sphere  takes  of  place  ( R i c o e u r , 1982e:  Ricoeur  begins  Interpretation explanation.  text  as  such :  "There  3 0  r e g i o n of r e a l i t y t o another  sphere  the  any  by  his  sphere  signs and  signs.  the  rise  l e t us  to  of  E.D.  the from  nature  of  Hirsch, Rlcoeur  and  the  The  of g u e s s and  dialectic  holistic  nature  of the  latter  former  text.  As  to  to  explanation.  i s n e c e s s i t a t e d by  Ricoeur  to  between  corresponding  corresponding  validation  text  maintains  guessing  the  is of  understanding  t o do w i t h t h e d i a l e c t i c  and  It  explanatory  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n has  understanding  say,  process  that text  validating,  no  210).  a movement  from  of  that  gives  discussion  positing  Borrowing  the  —  is  the  says,  Why do we need an a r t o f g u e s s i n g ? Why do we have t o ' c o n s t r u e ' t h e meaning? . . . a t e x t has t o be c o n s t r u e d b e c a u s e i t i s n o t a mere s e q u e n c e of s e n t e n c e s , a l l on an equal footing and separately understandable. A t e x t i s a whole, a totality. . . . Correctly, the whole appears as a h i e r a r c h y of t o p i c s , or primary and subordinate topics. The r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e t e x t as a whole i s i m p l i e d i n the r e c o g n i t i o n of the p a r t s . And r e c i p r o c a l l y , i t i s i n c o n s t r u i n g t h e details that we construe the whole. There i s no n e c e s s i t y and no evidence c o n c e r n i n g what i s i m p o r t a n t and what i s  Ricoeur distinguishes between language-systems or l i n g u i s t i c c o d e s and l a n g u a g e - e v e n t or l i n g u i s t i c u s a g e . The f o r m e r i s s y n c h r o n i c and u n c h a n g i n g ( e . g . S a u s s u r e ' s langue) and hence amenable t o e x p l a n a t i o n whereas t h e latter is d i a c h r o n i c and d y n a m i c ( e . g . S a u s s u r e ' s p a r o l e ) . 3 0  97 u n i m p o r t a n t , what i s e s s e n t i a l and what is unessential. The judgement of importance Is a guess. ( R i c o e u r , 1982e: 211)  Thus,  according  plurivocal meaning. of  Ricoeur,  totality Bearing  possible  making  to  one's  validation.  of  any  i n mind  our given  that  constructions" 'guess' This  one  response  to  the  text  to  at  its  "the  of  of p r o b a b i l i t y ,  of  particular  g u e s s a g a i n s t what  most  the  text  probable  and  eventuates  meaning:  g e n i u s o f g u e s s i n g and which  constitutes  between v e r s t e h e n At  this  point  modern  understanding, function  of the  213),  after  i t to  a  his  the  is  the  determination balance  now  claims  of  of  text  from  he s t r e s s e s t h e i m p o r t a n c e  known of  the  between  the  c h a r a c t e r of  complement  of  manifests  i s presumed t o be  in  analysis  Working  process  which  validation  the  e r k l a r e n " ( R i c o e u r , 1982e:  in  explanation.  field  1982e:  dialectic 212).  interpretation  R i c o e u r r e v e r s e s t h e o r d e r o f t h e movement from to  limited  weighs the v a l i d i t y  the s c i e n t i f i c  the and  "Such  guess  is a  validation,  as a l o g i c  about  text  subjects  itself any  is  (Ricoeur,  then  process  initial  understanding  explanation of the  to  "referential  text."  T h i s r e f e r e n t i a l f u n c t i o n . . . exceeds t h e mere o s t e n s i v e d e s i g n a t i o n o f the situation common t o both speaker and hearer i n the d l a l o g i c a l s i t u a t i o n . This a b s t r a c t i o n from t h e s u r r o u n d i n g world g i v e s r i s e t o two o p p o s i t e a t t i t u d e s . As r e a d e r s , we may e i t h e r r e m a i n i n a k i n d  98 o£ s t a t e o£ s u s p e n s e as r e g a r d s any k i n d o£ r e £ e r r e d - t o w o r l d , or we may a c t u a l i z e the p o t e n t i a l n o n - o s t e n s i v e r e f e r e n c e s of t h e t e x t i n a new s i t u a t i o n , t h a t o f t h e reader. In t h e f i r s t c a s e , we t r e a t t h e text as a worldless entity; in the second, we create a new ostensive r e f e r e n c e t h r o u g h the k i n d of ' e x e c u t i o n which the a r t of r e a d i n g i m p l i e s . These two p o s s i b i l i t i e s a r e e q u a l l y e n t a i l e d by the a c t of r e a d i n g , c o n c e i v e d as t h e i r dialectical interplay. ( R i c o e u r , 1982e: 215-216) 1  Looking  at  the  text  as  system of s i g n s e n t a i l s explication.  a the  Contrasting  self-enclosed, use  self-referential  of e x p l a n a t i o n  this  mode  D i l t h e y ' s a t t i t u d e toward e x p l a n a t i o n ,  of  as  structural  explanation  Ricoeur  says,  . . . a new k i n d o f e x p l a n a t o r y a t t i t u d e may be e x t e n d e d t o t h e [text], which, c o n t r a r y t o t h e e x p e c t a t i o n of D i l t h e y , i s no l o n g e r b o r r o w e d from t h e n a t u r a l s c i e n c e s , i . e . f r o m an a r e a o f knowledge a l i e n to language i t s e l f . The o p p o s i t i o n between N a t u r and Gelst i s no longer operative here. If some model is borrowed, i t comes from . . . the s e m i o l o g i c a l f i e l d . . . . We have l e a r n e d from the Geneva school, the Prague s c h o o l , and t h e D a n i s h s c h o o l t h a t i t i s always p o s s i b l e t o a b s t r a c t systems from p r o c e s s e s and t o r e l a t e t h e s e s y s t e m s — whether phonological, lexical, or syntactical — to u n i t s which are merely defined by their opposition to other u n i t s of t h e same s y s t e m . T h i s i n t e r p l a y of merely d i s t i n c t i v e entities within f i n i t e s e t s of such u n i t s d e f i n e s the n o t i o n of s t r u c t u r e i n l i n g u i s t i c s . ( R i c o e u r , 1982e: 216)  to  99 Ricoeur example this  of  uses  the  case of  numerous  the  myth a r e  of r e l a t i o n s ' the of  the  that  myth as we  interpreted bring  out  •bundles  sentences reduced  Structural  explained  it.  We  a  can,  the  logic  of  relations'  constitutes  application  the  of  to  of  by  but  means  i t , the among  structural  of  explanation  a myth or  text  what  argues  the  text  that  integrity  this  of  "Structural  .  .  merely  analysis  the  .  .  as  a  narrative  meaning  .  represses  (Ricoeur,  Ricoeur analysis  to  oppositions),  the  origins. But  "say  we  have  analysis, relate  the  This  logic  myth  under  this structural understanding Ricoeur  violence  rather,  exclude,  [that]  function.  do  to  to  the  develops i t ,  but  myth  presupposes .  .  Structural i t cannot  .  has  a  analysis  suppress i t "  217).  maintains  i s t o go  narrative)  of  not  but,  not  us  i t s meaning.  does  does  To  added an  i.e.  analysis  hypothesis  this  1982e:  about,  understanding  structural  for: .  talks  which  the  1982e: 2 1 6 - 2 1 7 ) . must be  structure  that  themselves. law  'bundles  the  structural  (Ricoeur,  of  the  allows  operations  an  constitute  not  of  as  In  'mythemes' or  analysis  myth,  myth  explanation.  which  consideration" of  o£  i n t e r a c t i o n o f w h i c h makes up  such.  have  analysis  1  appropriate  the  narrative  L6vi-Strauss s  that  from s u r f a c e  depth  semantics  the  latter  the  purpose  semantics (the  of  structural  ( t h e myth or t e x t  mediation  constituting  of "the  as  fundamental ultimate  100 'referent' suggests  o f t h e myth"  ( R i c o e u r , 1982e: 2 1 7 ) .  Thus R l c o e u r  that,  I f . . . we c o n s i d e r s t r u c t u r a l a n a l y s i s as a s t a g e -- and a n e c e s s a r y one -between a naive interpretation and a critical interpretation, between a surface interpretation and a depth i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , t h e n i t would be p o s s i b l e t o l o c a t e e x p l a n a t i o n and u n d e r s t a n d i n g at two different stages of a unique hermeneutlcal a r c . It i s this depth semantics which c o n s t i t u t e s the genuine object of understanding and which r e q u i r e s a s p e c i f i c a f f i n i t y between t h e r e a d e r and t h e k i n d o f t h i n g s t h e t e x t i s about. ( R i c o e u r , 1982e: 218)  T h u s , as  opposed t o b e i n g c o n c e r n e d  or what t h e t e x t what  the  allow and, in  the  o s t e n s i v e l y s a y s , one  text  references.'  with a u t h o r i a l  is It  reader  consequently,  the r e a l i z a t i o n  about,  is to to  these blend  i.e.  must be c o n c e r n e d  with  its  non-ostensive  of p o s s i b l e  her  with  'non-ostensive  references  explanation with  exercise  Intention  which  understanding,  'productive imagination'  worlds.  As R i c o e u r  The n o n - o s t e n s i v e r e f e r e n c e o f t h e t e x t i s t h e k i n d o f w o r l d opened up by t h e depth semantics of the t e x t . Therefore what we want to understand is not something hidden behind the t e x t , but something d i s c l o s e d i n f r o n t of i t . What has t o be u n d e r s t o o d i s n o t t h e i n i t i a l s i t u a t i o n o f d i s c o u r s e , b u t what p o i n t s to a possible world. Understanding . . . wants t o g r a s p t h e p r o p o s e d worlds opened up by t h e r e f e r e n c e s o f t h e t e x t . To u n d e r s t a n d a t e x t i s t o f o l l o w i t s  says,  101 movement from s e n s e t o r e f e r e n c e , f r o m what i t s a y s t o what i t t a l k s a b o u t . In t h i s p r o c e s s t h e m e d i a t i n g r o l e p l a y e d by s t r u c t u r a l a n a l y s i s c o n s t i t u t e s both the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of t h i s o b j e c t i v e approach and t h e r e c t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e s u b j e c t i v e approach. ( R i c o e u r , 1982e: 218)  Thus,  whether  explanation  the  vis  explanation  movement  a  vis  is  guessing  to understanding  from and  vis a  understanding validating  v i s ostensive  to  or  from  and  non-  ostensive r e f e r e n c e s , according to Ricoeur: "Understanding i s entirely which  mediated  precede  by  i t and  the  whole  accompany  of  explanatory  i t " (Ricoeur,  procedures  1982e:  And, n o t s u r p r i s i n g l y , t h i s e n t i r e d i a l e c t i c a l p r o c e s s takes  place within  correlation  the hermeneutlc  e x p l a n a t i o n and  always  "Ultimately,  the  understanding,  between  u n d e r s t a n d i n g and e x p l a n a t i o n , i s t h e ' h e r m e n e u t i c a l  circle'"  (Ricoeur,  between  circle:  220).  1982e: 2 2 1 ) .  W i t h r e s p e c t t o h i s work on n a r r a t i v e , R i c o e u r that  " i t is  the  same  debate  e x p l a n a t i o n which i s pursued a story expresses  between  understanding  novels  and  the i r r e d u c i b l e  and  of n a r r a t i v e  fictional  and  here; f o r the c a p a c i t y to f o l l o w component  of understanding  i n t h e a c t o f n a r r a t i n g , whereas t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n history,  maintains  structures  literature  i n folk  i n general,  o f laws i n  tales,  plays,  corresponds  to  the e x p l a n a t o r y phase of the n o m o l o g i c a l s c i e n c e s "  (Ricoeur,  1982h:  fictional  38).  Very  briefly,  Ricoeur  contends  that  102 and  historical  and  that  this  historicity  narratives structure  i s an  o f t h e human a  major  have a common  narrative  indispensable  situation.  discussion  feature  of the  I do n o t w i s h  to get  involved  in  narrative  a s much o f i t would m e r e l y r e p e a t what h a s  been s a i d  concerning  text  of  structure  analysis  Ricoeur's  theory  of  already  (e.g.the necessity  of a  s t r u c t u r a l phase of a n a l y s i s , t h e importance o f n o n - o s t e n s i v e referentiality maintains  and s o o n ) .  Suffice  i t to say that  that:  . . . any n a r r a t i v e combines, i n v a r y i n g proportions, two dimensions: a chronological dimension and a nonc h r o n o l o g i c a l dimension. The f i r s t may be c a l l e d t h e ' e p i s o d i c d i m e n s i o n ' o f t h e narrative. W i t h i n the a r t of f o l l o w i n g a s t o r y , t h i s dimension i s expressed i n the e x p e c t a t i o n of contingencies which a f f e c t t h e s t o r y ' s d e v e l o p m e n t ; hence i t g i v e s r i s e t o q u e s t i o n s s u c h a s : and s o ? and t h e n ? what happened n e x t ? what was t h e outcome? e t c . But t h e a c t i v i t y o f narrating does n o t c o n s i s t simply i n addressing e p i s o d e s t o one a n o t h e r ; i t a l s o c o n s t r u c t s meaningful t o t a l i t i e s out of s c a t t e r e d e v e n t s . This aspect of the a r t of n a r r a t i n g i s r e f l e c t e d , on t h e s i d e of f o l l o w i n g a s t o r y , i n the attempt to 'grasp t o g e t h e r ' successive events. The a r t of n a r r a t i n g , as w e l l as t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g a r t of f o l l o w i n g a s t o r y , therefore require t h a t we a r e a b l e t o extract a configuration from a succession. This 'configurational' operation dimension  . . . c o n s t i t u t e s the second of the n a r r a t i v e a c t i v i t y . ( R i c o e u r , 1 9 8 2 f : 278)  Ricoeur  103 In  other  words,  all  narrative  is  ( c h r o n o l o g i c a l e p i s o d i c sequence t e n d i n g and the  eschatological all  proper  (non-chronological  encompassing  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of  u n d e r s t a n d i n g and maintains  absolute  meaning,  linguisticality persists meaningful  As  in  that that  viewing  totality  says,  —  in  to f i n a l  resolution)  meaningful t o t a l i t y final  requires  resolution)  a dialectic  the  polysemic/plurivocal  this  or  narrative  possibility,  text/narrative  that and  he as  — the  between  Thus, a l t h o u g h R i c o e u r ,  text  the  within,  of  teleological  the  precludes  contained  Caputo  which  explanation.  Gadamer,  always  structure  both  discloses nature  like no of  nonetheless a  unified,  i s , multiplicity/difference is dominated  contrasting  by,  Ricoeur  unity/identity. and  Gadamer  Derrida:  Dissemination effects a disruption of s e m a n t i c s , e v e n when s e m a n t i c s t r i e s t o protect i t s e l f , when i t t r i e s t o make c o n c e s s i o n s , w i t h a t h e o r y of polysemy, s u c h as t h o s e o f R i c o e u r and c o n t e m p o r a r y hermeneutical t h e o r i s t s . The r e a d i n g o f l i t e r a t u r e has been d o m i n a t e d by t h e r u l e of the s e m a n t i c . I t has assumed, f o r fundamentally metaphysical reasons, that there i s a r u l i n g "thematic" u n i t y to a t e x t , a s i n g l e , u n i f y i n g meaning by w h i c h the entire chain of signifiers is organized and to which it Is subordinated. In t h e o l d e r v e r s i o n , t h i s semantic unity was attributed to the u n i f y i n g i n t e n t i o n of t h e a u t h o r . In i t s more modern f o r m , i n t h e "new criticism" and i n t h e h e r m e n e u t i c s of Gadamer and R i c o e u r , i t i s a t t r i b u t e d t o a s y s t e m of meaning which operates in the text itself, which therefore exceeds and outlasts the original author and his original audience. For Derrida, this  to  104 amounts t o a r e t r e n c h m e n t o f s e m a n t i c i s m w h i c h has t h e e f f e c t of a l l o w i n g i t t o d i g i n even deeper. In e i t h e r v e r s i o n , the task of semantic criticism i s to f i n g e r t h i s golden t h r e a d , to f i n d the animating, u n i f y i n g centre. ( C a p u t o , 1987b: 149)  To summarize, of thought -  on  the  capable  manifest t h e i r  of  accounting  Husserl  essential  ontological circular  nature  upon  as  the  subjectivity, of  the  of D a s e i n ,  understanding of  a b s o l u t e and  insists  priority  as  horizons  on a c o n c e p t  f o r a l l human  structures'  transcendental  fusion  reliance  e x i s t e n c e o f an  example,  of  i n v a r i o u s ways a l l of t h e p r e c e d i n g modes  a  the  experience. existence of  Heidegger meaning  a  of  Being  yet  for  'invariant constitutive upon and  upon t h e  process  maintains  of  -  ground  Thus,  insists  insists  dialogical  which  unquestionable  product  Gadamer  of p r e s e n c e  on  the  validity  resulting  elevates  the  in  a  discrete  v i e w p o i n t s through a d i a l e c t i c a l p r o c e s s of transcendence  and  Ricoeur  the  insists  dialectical the u n i t y In  upon  of meaning w h i c h  the  anthropology are  as  the  product  of  I n t e r p l a y o f e x p l a n a t i o n and u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h i n  following  number o f c o n c e p t s  on)  interpretation  (e.g.  drawn  i s the  chapter  text.  I will  attempt  common t o i n t e r p r e t i v e interpretation,  directly  from  the  t o show t h a t  and/or  dialogic,  'postmodern'  meaning  aforementioned  a  and  so  phenomeno-  105 logical/  hermeneutical  case,  deconstructive  Indeed,  a  of  reading  conceptuality  anthropology's perpetuator  traditions  recognition  of t h e  values  as of  and of  that, these  such) itself  of W e s t e r n  is as  an  this  being  concepts  the (and,  essential  to  inheritor  and  metaphysics.  106  Chapter Clifford  Four  G e e r t z and James C l i f f o r d :  A Deconstructlve  Reading  I n t h i s c h a p t e r , I w i l l l o o k a t c e r t a i n works by C l i f f o r d Geertz of  and by James C l i f f o r d  i s o l a t i n g a number  Geertz's  case,  •context,'  of t h e i r key concepts  •meaning,'  'translation'  and  'metaphor/allegory,' 'discursivity,' them  to  a  to  themselves, at  the  Although overlap, specific  I  the  purpose  (particularly, in 'interpretation,'  ' t e x t ' and, i n C l i f f o r d ' s  case,  'dialogism,'  ' r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ' and ' s p e e c h ' ) and s u b j e c t i n g  allow  I will  beginning this  'concept,'  with  'subjectivity,'  deconstructive  possible,  respectively,  Geertz  and  In  of  each  of  their  illustrates  as  to  series  as for  of quotations  a certain  the  much  speak  respective  necessarily entails  i t effectively  order,  Clifford  p r o v i d e an e x t e n d e d  format  recurring  reading.  sections. amount o f  significance  concepts.  GEERTZ  (i) Culture B e l i e v i n g , w i t h Max Weber, t h a t man i s an a n i m a l s u s p e n d e d i n webs o f s i g n i f i c a n c e he h i m s e l f has s p u n , I t a k e c u l t u r e t o be t h o s e webs, and t h e a n a l y s i s o f i t t o be t h e r e f o r e n o t an e x p e r i m e n t a l s c i e n c e i n s e a r c h o f law b u t an I n t e r p r e t i v e one i n s e a r c h of meaning. It i s explication I  of  am a f t e r , c o n s t r u i n g s o c i a l e x p r e s s i o n s on t h e i r s u r f a c e e n i g m a t i c a l . ( G e e r t z , 19731: 5) (emphasis mine)  [Assuming t h a t ] t h e aim o f a n t h r o p o l o g y i s the enlargement of the u n i v e r s e of human d i s c o u r s e . . . . i t i s an aim t o w h i c h a s e m l o t l c c o n c e p t of c u l t u r e i s p e c u l i a r l y w e l l adapted. As i n t e r w o r k e d systems of construable signs (what, i g n o r i n g p r o v i n c i a l u s a g e s I would c a l l symbols), culture is not a power, something to which social events, behaviours, institutions, or processes can be causally attributed; i t is a c o n t e x t , something w i t h i n which t h e y can be i n t e l l i g i b l y — that i s , t h i c k l y — described. ( G e e r t z , 19731: 14) (emphasis mine)  To g e n e r a l i z e w i t h i n c a s e s i s u s u a l l y c a l l e d , a t l e a s t i n m e d i c i n e and depth psychology, c l i n i c a l i n f e r e n c e . Rather t h a n b e g i n n i n g w i t h a s e t of o b s e r v a t i o n s and a t t e m p t i n g t o subsume them under a g o v e r n i n g law, s u c h i n f e r e n c e b e g i n s w i t h a s e t of (presumptive) signifiers and attempts to place them within an i n t e l l i g i b l e f r a m e . M e a s u r e s a r e matched t o t h e o r e t i c a l p r e d i c t i o n s , b u t symptoms are scanned for theoretical peculiarities — that i s , they are diagnosed. In t h e s t u d y o f c u l t u r e t h e s i g n i f i e r s a r e n o t symptoms o r c l u s t e r s of symptoms, b u t s y m b o l i c a c t s , and t h e aim i s n o t t h e r a p y b u t t h e a n a l y s i s o f social discourse. But t h e way In w h i c h theory i s used — to_ f e r r e t out the unapparent i m p o r t of t h i n g s — i s the same. ( G e e r t z , 19731: 26) (emphasis mine)  culture Is b e s t seen not as complexes of c o n c r e t e b e h a v i o u r p a t t e r n s — customs, usages, traditions, habit clusters — as h a s , by and l a r g e , been t h e c a s e up t o now, b u t as a s e t o f control mechanisms — plans, recipes, rules, instructions (what computer engineers c a l l "programs") -- f o r t h e g o v e r n i n g of b e h a v i o u r . ( G e e r t z , 1 9 7 3 f : 44) ( e m p h a s i s mine)  . . . the c u l t u r e concept t o which I adhere has neither multiple referents n o r , so f a r as I c a n s e e , a n y u n u s u a l a m b i g u i t i e s : i t d e n o t e s an h i s t o r i c a l l y t r a n s m i t t e d p a t t e r n o f meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited c o n c e p t i o n s e x p r e s s e d i n s y m b o l i c forms by means o f w h i c h men communicate, p e r p e t u a t e , and d e v e l o p t h e i r knowledge a b o u t and a t t i t u d e s t o w a r d l i f e . ( G e e r t z , 1973g: 89) ( e m p h a s i s mine)  [To view a symbolic system as a " m e t a s o c i a l commentary"1 i s t o engage i n a b i t of m e t a p h o r i c a l r e f o c u s s i n g of one's own, f o r i t s h i f t s t h e a n a l y s i s o f cultural forms from an endeavour in general parallel to dissecting an organism, diagnosing a symptom, d e c i p h e r i n g a c o d e , or o r d e r i n g a s y s t e m — the dominant a n a l o g i e s i n contemporary anthropology — to one in general parallel with penetrating a literary text. If one takes the [Balinese] cockfight, or any other collectively s u s t a i n e d s y m b o l i c s t r u c t u r e , as a means of " s a y i n g something of something" ( t o i n v o k e a famous A r i s t o t e l i a n t a g ) , t h e n one i s f a c e d w i t h a p r o b l e m n o t i n s o c i a l mechanics but s o c i a l s e m a n t i c s . For the anthropologist, whose c o n c e r n i s w i t h formulating s o c i o l o g i c a l principles . . . t h e q u e s t i o n i s , what d o e s one l e a r n a b o u t s u c h p r i n c i p l e s from e x a m i n i n g  109 culture  (ii)  a s an a s s e m b l a g e o f t e x t s ? ( G e e r t z , 1973c: 448) ( e m p h a s i s mine)  Interpretation  . . . there are three c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of ethnographic description: i t is i n t e r p r e t i v e ; what i t i s i n t e r p r e t i v e o f i s t h e f l o w o f s o c i a l d i s c o u r s e ; and t h e interpreting involved consists i n trying to rescue the " s a i d " of such d i s c o u r s e f r o m i t s p e r i s h i n g o c c a s i o n s and f i x i t i n perusable terms. ( G e e r t z , 19731: 20) ( e m p h a s i s mine)  If anthropological interpretation is c o n s t r u c t i n g a r e a d i n g o f what h a p p e n s , t h e n t o d i v o r c e i t f r o m what happens — f r o m what, i n t h i s t i m e o r t h a t p l a c e , s p e c i f i c p e o p l e s a y , what t h e y do, what i s done t o them, from t h e whole v a s t b u s i n e s s o f t h e w o r l d -- i s t o d i v o r c e i t from i t s a p p l i c a t i o n and render i t vacant. A good i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of a n y t h i n g — a poem, a p e r s o n , a h i s t o r y , a r i t u a l , an i n s t i t u t i o n , a s o c i e t y — t a k e s us i n t o t h e h e a r t o f t h a t o f w h i c h i t i s an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . ( G e e r t z , 19731: 18) ( e m p h a s i s mine)  . . . f r o m w h a t e v e r l e v e l a t w h i c h one operates, and however i n t r i c a t e l y , t h e g u i d i n g p r i n c i p l e i s t h e same: s o c i e t i e s , like lives, contain their own interpretations. One has o n l y t o l e a r n how t o g a i n a c c e s s t o them. ( G e e r t z , 1 9 7 3 c : 453) ( e m p h a s i s mine)  110 Are we, in describing symbol uses, describing perceptions, sentiments, outlooks, experiences? And i n what sense? What do we c l a i m when we c l a i m t h a t we u n d e r s t a n d t h e s e m i o t i c means b y w h i c h . . . p e r s o n s a r e d e f i n e d t o one another? T h a t we know words o r t h a t we know m i n d s ? In answering this question, i t i s necessary, I think, f i r s t to notice the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c i n t e l l e c t u a l movement, t h e Inward c o n c e p t u a l r h y t h m . . . in. a l l . . . a n a l y s e s . . . namely, a c o n t i n u o u s dialectical tacking between t h e most l o c a l o f l o c a l d e t a i l and t h e most g l o b a l of g l o b a l s t r u c t u r e i n s u c h a way a s t o b r i n g them i n t o s i m u l t a n e o u s v i e w . . . . H o p p i n g back and f o r t h between t h e whole conceived through the parts that actualize i t and t h e p a r t s conceived t h r o u g h t h e whole t h a t m o t i v a t e s them, we seek to turn them, by a sort of intellectual perpetual motion, into e x p l i c a t i o n s o f one a n o t h e r . A l l t h i s i s . . . b u t t h e now f a m i l i a r trajectory o f what D i l t h e y c a l l e d t h e h e r m e n e u t l c c i r c l e , and my argument h e r e is merely that i t ^ i s . as c e n t r a l to e t h n o g r a p h i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , and t h u s t o the p e n e t r a t i o n o f o t h e r p e o p l e s ' modes of thought, as It i s to literary, historical, philological, psychoanalytic, or b i b l i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . . . . ( G e e r t z , 1983b: 69) (emphasis mine)  (ill)  Anthropology  anthropological writings are themselves interpretations, and s e c o n d and third order ones t o boot. (By d e f i n i t i o n , o n l y a " n a t i v e " makes f i r s t order ones: i t s h i s c u l t u r e . ) They a r e , thus, fictions; fictions i n the sense that they are "something made," "something fashioned" — the o r i g i n a l meaning o f f I c t i o — not that they are  false, unfactual, or merely "as i f " thought experiments. ( G e e r t z , 19731: 15) ( e m p h a s i s G e e r t z ' s and mine)  The ethnographer "Inscribes" social d i s c o u r s e : he w r i t e s i t down. In so d o i n g , he t u r n s i t f r o m a p a s s i n g e v e n t , w h i c h e x i s t s o n l y i n i t s own moment o f o c c u r r e n c e , i n t o an a c c o u n t , w h i c h e x i s t s in its Inscriptions and can be r e c o n s u l t e d . . . . "What," P a u l R i c o e u r , f r o m whom t h i s whole i d e a o f i n s c r i p t i o n o f a c t i o n i s b o r r o w e d . . . a s k s , "what does w r i t i n g f i x ? Not the event of speaking, but the " s a i d " of speaking, where we u n d e r s t a n d by the " s a i d " of speaking that i n t e n t i o n a l e x t e r i o r i z a t i o n constitutive of the aim of discourse t h a n k s t o w h i c h t h e s a g e n -- t h e s a y i n g wants to become Aus-sage -the e n u n c i a t i o n , the e n u n c i a t e d . In s h o r t , what we w r i t e i s t h e noema [ " t h o u g h t , " " c o n t e n t , " " g i s t " ] of the s p e a k i n g . It i s t h e meaning o f t h e s p e e c h e v e n t , n o t the event as event." . . . Cultural a n a l y s i s i s ( o r s h o u l d be) g u e s s i n g at meanings, assessing the guesses, and drawing e x p l a n a t o r y c o n c l u s i o n s from the better guesses. . . . ( G e e r t z , 19731: 19-20) ( e m p h a s i s G e e r t z ' s and mine)  We must, i n s h o r t , d e s c e n d i n t o d e t a i l , past the misleading tags, past the metaphysical types, past the empty similarities to grasp firmly the essential character of not only the v a r i o u s c u l t u r e s but the v a r i o u s s o r t s of i n d i v i d u a l s w i t h i n c u l t u r e , i f we w i s h t o encounter humanity face to f a c e . ( G e e r t z , 1973g: 53) (emphasis mine)  [The] issues are multiple, involving q u e s t i o n s of d e f i n i t i o n s , v e r i f i c a t i o n s ,  causality, representativeness, o b j e c t i v i t y , measurement, c o m m u n i c a t i o n . But a t base t h e y a l l b o l l down t o one question: how t o frame an a n a l y s i s of meaning -the conceptual structures I n d i v i d u a l s use t o c o n s t r u e e x p e r i e n c e - w h i c h w i l l be a t once c i r c u m s t a n t i a l enough t o c a r r y c o n v i c t i o n and abstract enough t o forward theory. These are e q u a l n e c e s s i t i e s . . . . But t h e y a l s o . . . p u l l i n o p p o s i t e d i r e c t i o n s , f o r the more one i n v o k e s d e t a i l s t h e more he is bound to the peculiarities of the immediate c a s e , t h e more one o m i t s them t h e more he l o s e s t o u c h w i t h t h e g r o u n d on w h i c h h i s a r g u m e n t s r e s t . Discovering how to escape t h i s paradox — or more e x a c t l y , f o r one n e v e r r e a l l y e s c a p e s I t , how to keep i t at bay — i s what, methodologically, thematic a n a l y s i s is a l l about. ( G e e r t z , 19731: 313) ( e m p h a s i s mine)  What i s needed i s some s y s t e m a t i c , rather t h a n m e r e l y l i t e r a r y or I m p r e s s i o n i s t i c , way t o d i s c o v e r what i s . g i v e n , what t h e conceptual structure embodied in the s y m b o l i c forms t h r o u g h w h i c h p e r s o n s a r e p e r c e i v e d a c t u a l l y i s . What we want . . . i s a d e v e l o p e d method o f d e s c r i b i n g and analyzing the meaningful structure of e x p e r i e n c e . . . as i t i s a p p r e h e n d e d by representative members of a p a r t i c u l a r s o c i e t y a t a p a r t i c u l a r p o i n t i n t i m e -i n a word, a s c i e n t i f i c phenomenology o f culture. ( G e e r t z , 1973h: 364) (emphasis mine)  . . . i t i s from the . . . difficult achievement of s e e i n g o u r s e l v e s amongst o t h e r s , as a l o c a l example o f t h e forms human l i f e has locally taken, a case among c a s e s , a w o r l d among w o r l d s , t h a t the largeness of mind, w i t h o u t which objectivity is self-congratulation and t o l e r a n c e a sham, comes. I f i n t e r p r e t i v e  113 a n t h r o p o l o g y has any general office in t h e w o r l d i t i s t o keep r e t e a c h i n g this figurative truth. ( G e e r t z , 1 9 8 3 f : 16) ( e m p h a s i s mine)  The question of signature, the e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f an a u t h o r i a l p r e s e n c e w i t h i n a t e x t , has haunted ethnography f r o m v e r y e a r l y on, t h o u g h f o r t h e most p a r t i t has done so i n a d i s g u i s e d f o r m . D i s g u i s e d , b e c a u s e i t has been g e n e r a l l y c a s t not as a n a r r a t o l o g l c a l I s s u e , a m a t t e r o f how b e s t t o g e t an h o n e s t s t o r y h o n e s t l y t o l d , b u t as an epistemological one, a matter of how to prevent s u b j e c t i v e views from c o l o r i n g o b j e c t i v e facts. ( G e e r t z , 1988b: 9) ( e m p h a s i s mine)  From  the  constitute  preceding  quotations,  which,  a  fairly  representative  sampling  anthropology,  i t may  be  'a  refocussing'  seen  notwithstanding,  v i e w s have r e m a i n e d q u i t e himself  as  a  purpose  is  to  varying  that,  throughout  consistent.  cultural  ever  contexts  more  in  According  think to  they  Geertz,  cultural  context  to  symbolic  structures,  are  up  to  meaning another thus  to" can  through  enabling  metaphorical Geertz's refers  arrive  at  'the  of more  under  1983d:  transferred the  ever  [the people  58).  from  interpretation enlargement  to  whose  descriptions  (Geertz,  be  Geertzian  anthropologist  a c c u r a t e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f "what t h e d e v i l scrutiny]  believe,  his career  precise  order  of  of  Geertz often  'meanlngs-and-symbols' assess  bit  I  of  one of the  114 universe moment  o£  human  Geertz  knowledge  work,  opines  "the  terrifying  road  Geertz  given')  and  the  whole  cultural  fixation  seeker  any  of  genuine  that  anthropological Quest,  54).  an  I t and  may  be  through  Throughout  'Quest.'  dialectical  who  would  Time and  so on.  He  to  the  . .  through through whatever  method  most  upon  the  embark  a g a i n G e e r t z makes use  truth,'  character,'  o f m e a n i n g ' and  principles is  of  t o d i s c o v e r what  parts conceived  hand  'figurative  'essential  the  'the  'genuine insists  a  his  application  continuous  them') at  those  as  ('a  romantic  f o r t h between t h e whole c o n c e i v e d  motivates  to  anthropological  matter,'  particularly  ( G e e r t z , 1973f:  actualize  context  phrases  like  a  ('some s y s t e m a t i c . . . way  that  appropriate  such  lies,  hermeneutical  parts that  In  f o r the  maintains  . [ h J o p p i n g back and the  that  complexity"  phenomenological is  discourse.'  heart  of  Quest,'  of the  'the  that,  The meanings t h a t s y m b o l s , t h e m a t e r i a l vehicles of thought, embody a r e often elusive, vague, fluctuating, and c o n v o l u t e d , but t h e y a r e , i n p r i n c i p l e , as c a p a b l e o f b e i n g d i s c o v e r e d t h r o u g h systematic empirical investigation especially i f t h e p e o p l e who perceive them w i l l c o o p e r a t e a l i t t l e — as t h e a t o m i c w e i g h t o f h y d r o g e n or t h e f u n c t i o n of t h e a d r e n a l g l a n d s . ( G e e r t z , 1973h: 362-363)  For  Geertz,  critics  such  cultures, as  Leo  like Spitzer  the and  literary Lionel  texts  examined  Trilling,  are,  by in  115 principle,  susceptible  meaning i s d i s c o v e r a b l e Interestingly, that  meaning  cycle .  of  and  terms  persistence, driven  by  constructing society"  in  i.e.  properly  principle, spite  of  symbol,  both  the  fact  a l l [my]  subtle an  (Geertz,  view  that  account 1983f:  v a r i o u s l y aimed  of  of  the  5),  naggingly persistent uneasiness.  how  one  "a  work  Thus,  for  is  and  recurring form,  text  i s system inquiries  should  imaginative his  contention  discoverable  meaning, c o n c e p t i o n ,  so  their  approached.  Care] d e s i g n e d t o s u g g e s t t h e r e  that a  analysis,  i f only they are  in  —  . . culture —  thematic  i n s p i t e of G e e r t z ' s c o n s t a n t  is,  transferable,  to  go  in are  about  make-up  of  a  haunted  by  a  example,  The s t u t t e r i n g q u a l i t y of . . . my own efforts . . . is a result. . . . of not knowing, i n so u n c e r t a i n an u n d e r t a k i n g , q u i t e where t o b e g i n , o r , h a v i n g anyhow begun, w h i c h way t o move. Argument grows o b l i q u e , and language with i t , because t h e more o r d e r l y and straightforward a p a r t i c u l a r c o u r s e l o o k s t h e more i t seems ill advised. ( G e e r t z , 1 9 8 3 f : 6)  F i n d i n g our f e e t , an u n n e r v i n g b u s i n e s s w h i c h n e v e r more t h a n d i s t a n t l y s u c c e e d s , i s what e t h n o g r a p h i c r e s e a r c h c o n s i s t s of as a personal experience; trying to formulate the basis on which one imagines, always e x c e s s i v e l y , one has found them is what anthropological writing consists of as a scientific endeavour. ( G e e r t z , 19731: 13)  116 El have n e v e r ] g o t t e n anywhere n e a r t o the bottom of anything I have ever w r i t t e n about. . . . C u l t u r a l a n a l y s i s i s intrinsically incomplete. And, worse t h a n t h a t , t h e more d e e p l y i t goes t h e l e s s complete i t i s . I t i s a strange s c i e n c e whose most t e l l i n g a s s e r t i o n s a r e i t s most t r e m u l o u s l y b a s e d , i n w h i c h t o g e t somewhere w i t h t h e m a t t e r a t hand i s t o i n t e n s i f y t h e s u s p i c i o n , b o t h y o u r own and t h a t o f o t h e r s , t h a t you are not quite getting i t right. ( G e e r t z , 19731: 29)  Meaning, t h a t e l u s i v e and ill-defined p s e u d o - e n t i t y we were once more t h a n content to leave philosophers and l i t e r a r y c r i t i c s t o fumble w i t h , has now come back into the heart of our discipline. ( G e e r t z , 19731: 29)  This effort, half-quixotic, halfSisyphean . . . to render anomalous t h i n g s i n n o t t o o anomalous w o r d s . . . . ( G e e r t z , 1983e: 225)  It is not that we no longer have conventions o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ; we have more t h a n e v e r , b u i l t — o f t e n enough j e r r y - b u i l t — t o accommodate a s i t u a t i o n a t once f l u i d , p l u r a l , u n c e n t e r e d , and ineradicably untidy. ( G e e r t z , 1983a: 21)  These should  examples be  could  be  multiplied,  sufficient  to  indicate  self-assured  pronouncements  there  but  that  what  I have  behind  lurks  an  quoted  Geertz's uneasiness  w h i c h t h e t e n e t s o f h i s c h o s e n c o n c e p t u a l i t y do  not a l l o w  more for him  117 adequately now  like  to account.  I t i s with  use  of,  'meaning,'  and  reliance  'concept,'  'translation'  and  and  already  self-Identical.  that  'fixation  is  Derrida maintains that  i t e r a b i l i t y precludes  i s the  a  called  himself useful  to  a  look  notions  as  'context,'  of  the  t h a t concepts  essential  them from e v e r  possibility  being  of  Western metaphysics  meaning' Into  i s both  question.  in  Geertz  general)  desirable refers  'meanings-and-symbols'  anthropologist  a t how  two  he  d e f i n e s these  of  assumption  p o s s i b l e and As  are  homogeneous  T h i s being the case, Geertz's  assumption  radically  as  such  about  'text.'  doubled,  (which  upon,  'interpretation,'  As w i l l be r e c a l l e d ,  their  i n mind t h a t I would  t o show what a d e c o n s t r u c t i v e r e a d i n g t e l l s us  Geertz's  always  this  terms:  . . . s i g n i f i c a n t s y m b o l s [ I n c l u d e ] words for t h e most p a r t b u t also gestures, drawings, musical sounds, mechanical d e v i c e s l i k e c l o c k s , or n a t u r a l o b j e c t s l i k e jewels — anything, i n f a c t , that i s disengaged f r o m i t s mere a c t u a l i t y and u s e d t o Impose meaning on e x p e r i e n c e . ( G e e r t z , 1973g: 45) ( e m p h a s i s mine)  [A s y m b o l ] i s . any o b j e c t , a c t , e v e n t , q u a l i t y , or r e l a t i o n w h i c h s e r v e s as a v e h i c l e f o r a c o n c e p t i o n -the c o n c e p t i o n i s t h e s y m b o l ' s "meaning." ( G e e r t z , 1 9 7 3 J : 91) ( e m p h a s i s mine)  it  to is  118 So  f o r Geertz,  s y m b o l s a r e ' c o n s t r u a b l e s i g n s * and what  a r e s i g n i f i c a t i v e o f i s meanings o r c o n c e p t s . to  Derrida, notions  'concept' belief which  a r e premised  longer  itself  exceeds  .  of  a  words,  the chain  presence  and c o n t a i n s  which both  would  of s i g n s ,  moment  multiplicity,  par  which,  dedication  form o f a b e l i e f conceptuality  signified'  and would  difference  and/or  inferior  which  the ultimate  self-  excellence  by  itself"  t o presence,  i n God, a b e l i e f  as  such,  ("the name o f God (Derrida,  does  whether  i n meaning  precludes  must  always  be  the  to identity  metaphysics  abounds  difference  within  dialectics  i n general)  the  Cartesian  identity  coglto  viewed  not  itself  i t be  i n the  or a b e l i e f i n possibility  a  (e.g.  c o r r u p t i o n of must  always  p h i l o s o p h i e s which the Hegelian within  i t s development  of  as_ o t h e r  i n f e r i o r t o the s e l f .  and t h e o t h e r and  as  and t h e o t h e r  with  1982e:  i t f u n c t i o n s a s an  definition,  viewed as a c o r r u p t i o n o f and/or Western  no  unity  acknowledging d i f f e r e n c e as d i f f e r e n c e or t h e other for  t o no  e x c e e d s and c o n t a i n s d i f f e r e n c e -- i t i s  referent This  to a  ( D e r r i d a , 1981g: 19-  f o r , b e i n g p e r f e c t i n and o f i t s e l f ,  refer.  —  refer  i s the ultimate  . . I s t h e name o f i n d i f f e r e n c e  absolute  'meaning' and  1  "'transcendental  i n i t s essence,  exceed  theological  71)),  'sign,  f u n c t i o n as a s i g n i f i e r "  In other  identity the  would  •symbol,'  according  upon a d e d i c a t i o n t o p r e s e n c e  i n and o f i t s e l f ,  20).  as  i n the existence  signifier,  both  such  Now,  they  be  Hence subsume  A u f h e b u n g and the s e l f (e.g. in  Husserlean  119 thought which the  and  i s apparent fact  within  that  a  functions he  phenomenology  i n Geertz's  his  to repress  the  intrinsically  ill-defined where he such.  And,  as  Derrida  seen  uneasiness  to  assumptions  f o r w h i c h he  be  due  imprison  framework  i s unable to  acknowledges t h a t  pseudo-entity' the  the  to him  which  difference/otherness/diversity that  incomplete'  questions  be  methodological  i n t i m a t e but  Even though G e e r t z is  and  Thus  work may  metaphysical  theoretical  i s able to  in general).  t h a t meaning he  never  'cultural i s an  arrives  n o t i o n of concept  account. analysis  'elusive at  the  and  point  or c o n c e p t u a l i t y as  says,  Every concept that lays claim to any r i g o u r whatsoever i m p l i e s the a l t e r n a t i v e of " a l l or nothing." Even if in "reality" or i n "experience" everyone b e l i e v e s he knows t h a t t h e r e i s n e v e r " a l l or n o t h i n g , " a c o n c e p t determines itself only according to "all or nothing." Even the concept of " d i f f e r e n c e of degree," the concept of relativity i s , qua concept, determined a c c o r d i n g t o t h e l o g i c o f a l l or n o t h i n g , o f y e s or no: d i f f e r e n c e s o f d e g r e e or. nondlfferences of degree. It is impossible . . . t o form a p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n c e p t o u t s i d e o f t h i s l o g i c o f a l l or nothing. ( D e r r i d a , 1988a: 116-117)  Thus,  given  that  (either  there  essence  or t h e r e  concepts  i s meaning i s not  or  are  there  e t c . ) and  q u e s t i o n the a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s  defined  as  i s not,  given  self-identical either  that Geertz  there  is  does  not  and/or adequacy of c o n c e p t u a l i t y  as  such,  it  himself  Is  not  'unnerved'  surprising by  that  what  •ineradicable  untidiness'  phenomena a r e  not  either  of  he  he  constantly  perceives  to  be  c u l t u r a l phenomena.  ( t i d y ) or. ( u n t i d y )  --  finds the  Cultural  they are  both  ( t i d y / u n t i d y ) and  (involved with i r r e d u c i b l e u n d e c l d a b i l i t y ) .  And  no  book  this  because  or  a  referring always already this not  philosophical only  to  already  —  a  it  exists is  otherness.  It  reducible  to e i t h e r / o r  logic,  f o r both the  into  taken  Geertz's example  of  assumptions certain  interpretation important  whether  way  prevent  For  of in  as  whole,  a as  him  c a u s e ) of  doubled,  thus  always  undecldability, etc.,  which  identity,  that  logic,  his  provides  is and the  that  which are  nonetheless  and  developing  inscribed  f o r Western metaphysics In t h e  determination  that,  tacking  Heideggerian  G a d a m e r i a n f u s i o n of h o r i z o n s , explanation,  however back  and  projection as or  another  theoretical/philosophical  recognizing  realize  Diltheyan  u n d e r s t a n d i n g and  and  a  itself,  (as e f f e c t ) and  from  consists  a  of  already  l o g i c of  interpretation  which  G e e r t z , as  to  the  ritual,  account.  possibilities  h i s work.  and  trace  possibility  self-sufficient  notion  the  in  is this  diff6rance,  must be  it a  s i g n i f y i n g chain,  iterability,  (as  be  always  of  impossibility  and  of  r i d d l e d with  play  concept,  Itself  part  yet which a l l o w s  is  c u l t u r a l phenomenon,  it  and  general,  meaning .  is  forth  a Ricoeurian as  of  in  within  It  expressed,  between  retrieval,  part as  w o r k i n g out  a Geertzian  a of  combination  of  Dilthey  and  hermeneutic  Ricoeur,  circle  over-riding  dialectical  dialectical  (or s p i r a l ,  unity  interpretation  the  as  upon  the  which  whether  the of  Hegelian  Geertzlan  i n t e r p r e t i v e anthropology,  oppositlonality. opposltes,/ (Stevens, Is  essential  capable  or  is  notion  unity.  anthropological literary  cannot  task  critic,  are  by  escape  theoretical  is  nature the  garb  polysemous  f o r , as  or  the  Geertz,  and  of  port" process  Hegel's  Absolute  (e.g.  Ricoeur's  out  within  in likening to  that  'assemblage polythematic,  homogeneous Derrida  as  dialectical  carried  an  in  resolution  pleasant  endless  though  as  Platonic  "a law of i n h e r e n t  interpretation  inevitably  paradigm,  as  always  culture  of  A  hermeneutlcs,  (e.g.  deemed  even of  views  is  whether  nonetheless Thus  says,  completion  it  of  i s based.  teleological  unity,  an  i s , by d e f i n i t i o n and  Stevens  And  of  whether it  of  the  As W a l l a c e  polysemy)  which  to  1982b: 2 1 5 ) .  deemed  Spirit)  Of  i n the  s p e c u l a t i o n , Gadamerian  dedicated  the  possibility  meaning  i t be  dialogue,  principle,  of  or a r c ) a l w a y s p r e s u p p o s e s  construing  structure,  movement  of of  says,  Polysemy always puts out its m u l t i p l i c i t i e s and v a r i a t i o n s w i t h i n t h e hor i z o n , at least, of some integral r e a d i n g w h i c h c o n t a i n s no a b s o l u t e r i f t , no s e n s e l e s s d e v i a t i o n — the h o r i z o n of t h e f i n a l p a r o u s i a o f a meaning a t l a s t d e c i p h e r e d , r e v e a l e d , made p r e s e n t i n t h e r i c h c o l l e c t i o n of i t s d e t e r m i n a t i o n s . Whatever i n t e r e s t one m i g h t f i n d i n them, w h a t e v e r d i g n i t y one m i g h t g r a n t them,  the the  texts'  he  strictures  a  still of  his  122 p l u r l v o c i t y , the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n I t c a l l s f o r , and t h e h i s t o r y t h a t I s p r e c i p i t a t e d out around i t remain lived as the enriching, temporary detours of some p a s s i o n , some s i g n i f y i n g martyrdom t h a t t e s t i f i e s t o a t r u t h p a s t or a t r u t h t o come, t o a meaning whose p r e s e n c e i s announced by enigma. A l l t h e moments o f polysemy are, as the word implies, moments o f m e a n i n g . ( D e r r i d a , 1981a: 350)  Thus,  even  though  proclaiming unifying  of  'Human  determinism)  various  attempts  to  'antl-anti-relativist'  notions  biological (e.g.  an  Geertz  forms  on  Nature' the  one  defend  diversity  stance  against  (e.g. v a r i o u s hand  and  by  of  forms  'Human  of p s y c h o l o g i c o - l i n g u i s t i c  the of  Mind'  determinism)  on t h e o t h e r , b o t h o f w h i c h d i s p l a y " t h e same t e n d e n c y t o see diversity 1984: own a  as  272),  surface he  and  universality  nonetheless, i r o n i c a l l y  most s t r e n u o u s e f f o r t s ,  promoter  the  of u n i t y .  repressive,  And  as  depth" in spite  of h i s  c a n n o t h e l p b u t end up as  himself  this  because  homogeneous  and  (Geertz,  he  does  implications  not of  question his  own  conceptuality. Geertz's dialectical  working  the e s s e n t i a l from  one  s a y s , he of  notion  of  interpretation,  o u t o f meaning, a l s o  possibility  cultural  besides e n t a i l i n g entails  a notion  of the t r a n s m i s s i b l l i t y  context  or  frame  to  another.  reasonably  intact  [ o f ] how from  one  meaning sort  g e t s moved, of  discourse  of  o f meaning As  i s c o n c e r n e d w i t h what he p e r c e i v e s t o be a  "translation,  a  Geertz problem  or  does  to  the  not, next"  123 (Geertz, Geertz, things [of] the  1983g:  154).  " i s not a s i m p l e in  terms  of  d i s p l a y i n g the locutions  views  And  in  of  'our'  (i.e.  translation)  own  .  .  i s concerned  reading  to  putting  ways of  .  .  vocabularies"  Geertz  according  r e c a s t i n g o f o t h e r s ' ways o f  logic  ours.  words,  interpretive  our  'translation,'  their  putting ways  of  [ i t i s a] (Geertz,  with  between  of  the  them  putting  catching  1983f:  via  a  of symbols which a l l o w s  .  them  of  10).  transmission  cultures  .  but in  'their' In  of  other  meaning  thematic  or  him  . . . t o p e n e t r a t e somewhat [ t h e ] t a n g l e of h e r m e n e u t l c a l involvements, to locate w i t h some p r e c i s i o n t h e i n s t a b i l i t i e s of t h o u g h t and sentiment i t generates and s e t them i n a s o c i a l f r a m e . Such an effort h a r d l y d i s s o l v e s the tangle or removes t h e i n s t a b i l i t i e s . Indeed . . . i t r a t h e r b r i n g s them more d i s t u r b i n g l y t o n o t i c e . But i t d o e s a t l e a s t ( o r can) p l a c e them i n an i n t e l l i g i b l e context, and until some cliometrician, sociobiologist, or deep linguisticist r e a l l y does c o n t r i v e t o s o l v e the R i d d l e o f t h e S p h i n x , t h a t w i l l have t o do. ( G e e r t z , 1983c: 45) ( e m p h a s i s mine)  From  the  Geertz  preceding  i s t r o u b l e d by  that, again, an  the  it  is  evident  amorphous n a t u r e  that,  of h i s  deconstructing  conceptuality. this  let  us  first  In look  again,  'data'  he a t t e m p t s t o a c c o u n t f o r i t t h r o u g h t h e  unexamined  • context.'  quotation  use  order  to  at  notion  the  and of  begin of  124 The "parts  Oxford  that  meaning  precede  (out  ambient  English  of  or  -,  conditions  without  which  it  of  capable  translatable clusters  (at  thus,  as s u c h , a  In to  other be  'the h e a r t o f t h e by  hence of  fix its  misleading);  context  to  be  a  particular  a  vehicle  the  matter,'  definition,  of  essentially  symbols centre as  or  of  symbolic any  concept  G e e r t z would  the  n o t i o n of  constituted and  dialectically  i n surrounding  in defining  by  both  the  isolable  and  definable Derrida  say)  context  'meaning'  d e f i n e s and  i t b o t h s a t u r a t e s and  purposes hence  entity.  of  comparison  transmissible With  respect  and/or  and/or to  this  is  i s saturated  What G e e r t z ends up w i t h i s a n o t i o n o f c u l t u r a l for  given  I t f u n c t i o n s In G e e r t z ' s work, I s , i n p r i n c i p l e ,  i t surrounds  which,  those  c l u s t e r ) hence r e n d e r i n g  words,  at  as,  anthropological  determine  or s y m b o l i c  perceived  d e f i n e d by and by.  and  r e c o g n i z e d as  usage and  and  a  'context*  or word and  terms  perceives  meaning.  by as  unific  which  being  are  these  surround  ( i . e . symbol  defines  a passage  In  Geertz  phenomenon  and  follow  conditions."  interpretation  context  Dictionary  context  contrast,  translatable notion  of  comments,  But a r e t h e c o n d i t i o n s . . . o f a context ever a b s o l u t e l y determinable. . . . I s t h e r e a r i g o r o u s and scientific concept of c o n t e x t ? Or d o e s t h e n o t i o n of context c o n c e a l , behind a certain confusion, philosophical presuppositions of a v e r y d e t e r m i n a t e n a t u r e ? . . . [ I ] t r y t o d e m o n s t r a t e why a c o n t e x t i s n e v e r a b s o l u t e l y d e t e r m i n a b l e , or r a t h e r , why  is as  a  context  125 i t s d e t e r m i n a t i o n can n e v e r be e n t i r e l y c e r t a i n or s a t u r a t e d . This structural non-saturation would have a double e f f e c t : 1) i t would mark t h e t h e o r e t i c a l inadequacy o|_ t h e current concept of c o n t e x t ( l i n g u i s t i c or non-linguistic), as i t i s a c c e p t e d by numerous d o m a i n s o f r e s e a r c h , i n c l u d i n g a l l the c o n c e p t s w i t h which i t i s s y s t e m a t i c a l l y associated; 2) it would necessitate a certain g e n e r a l i z a t i o n and a c e r t a i n d i s p l a c e m e n t o f t h e c o n c e p t of w r i t i n g . This concept would no longer be comprehensible in terms of communication, a t l e a s t i n the limited sense of a transmission of meaning. Inversely, i t Is w i t h i n the g e n e r a l domain o f w r i t i n g , defined in t h i s way, t h a t the e f f e c t s of s e m a n t i c communication can be determined as e f f e c t s that are p a r t i c u l a r , secondary, i n s c r i b e d , and s u p p l e m e n t a r y . ( D e r r i d a , 1988a: 2-3)  As Derrida  will refers  reiterate  a  to  As  I  of  i t forever  of  in  which,  premised allows  concepts  context,  context  Chapter  (as  as  for  which  is he  functions  as  to an  take  i t i s , to  beyond t h e  reach  (Norris,  is  the  upon  a  play  of  notion  of  to  primordial  isolable  of  impossibility  respect  into  1986:  possibility  their  this  --  which  which  the  and  with  precisely fails  is  both  effects)  entities). it  it  it  by  meaning  Two,  undecidability Geertz,  'undecidable'  endless displacement places  sense  argued  self-identical  notion  the  knowledge"  doubling,  philosophical (as  "the  i s an  in  self-authenticating  undecidability originary  writing,  i t above,  l a n g u a g e and  stable,  29).  recalled,  Norris,  both governs of  be  Geertz's play  account. framework  of For  which  126 surrounds  and  However, as been,  at  determines  Derrida  work  says,  within  that  itself an  which  frames  of the  a s an a b s o l u t e , " T h i s does n o t  outside  are  contexts  (Derrida,  (or  continue,  the  only  meaning,  And,  but  And  for  being  that  clusters,'  centre  of  his  he  within  to  already  already  itself  I t nowhere  exists  absolute  Geertz  unless  chosen  there  anchorage"  acknowledges  contextual  is  out, etc.]  contrary that  or  does),  his  such,  frames  or  not  until  he  already  at  and  always  the  conceptuality  he  will  i n t e n t i o n s , to  unity, d i f f e r e n c e to  identity,  the  self. d i s c u s s i n g Geertz's of  him,  is  i s that it  that  meaning,  meaning  which  i.e.  remembered  around i t "  a word, an a c t i o n  on t h e  whether  has  as D e r r i d a p o i n t s  u n d e c l d a b i l i t y that  transmissibility that,  always  i s always  i s , i t i s always  any  nature  diversity  t o the  —  not  contrary to h i s repeatedly professed  Before  to'  and  [a g e s t u r e ,  without 12).  play)  subordinate other  a  entity.  obviously,  acknowledges work  that  that  imposed  quite  fixes  of a c o n t e x t ,  1988a:  artificial, (and,  or  isolable imply  meaning.  i s a l w a y s , and  p l a y of u n d e c l d a b i l i t y —  is valid only  place,  isolable  In o t h e r words, c o n t e x t u a l i t y as  contextualized,  effect  equally  "Context  the  ( D e r r i d a , 1988a: 6 0 ) . as  an  Is  is  notion it  is  of t r a n s l a t i o n important  intentional,  contained  which  people  that  which  intentionality,  within  'symbols  'think they as  that  to  be  such,  the  clear  is,  meaning,  or  symbolic  [ i t i s ] they Intend.  or  It  are  up  must  be  is predicated  upon  127 a p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l n o t i o n of i n t e n t i o n a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s  which,  in turn,  i s p r e d i c a t e d upon a n o t i o n o f p r i m o r d i a l  intuition,  "where  'consciousness'  than  means  nothing  p o s s i b i l i t y of the s e l f - p r e s e n c e present" i s an  ( D e r r i d a , 1973b: 9 ) .  integral  posits  the  for  knowledge"  Intentionality,  as  defined  in  phenomenology  and  anthropology,  i s fundamentally  —  that  present or n o t  as  unmediated in  the  manifested and  in principle,  realization  that  Geertz  recognizes  which  i t (and,  "source Derrida,  of  of  an  authority  1973b:  Geertzian  62).  Husserlean  interpretive  fulfilment  i t intends. apparently,  which  —  of  irremediably  Is, i t e n t a i l s , of  intentionality  intuition  tradition  in  living  of c o n s c i o u s n e s s  of  (Husserl  the  i n the  In o t h e r words,  possibility  i m m e d i a t e l y s e l f - p r e s e n t and .  of the p r e s e n t  f e a t u r e of a p h i l o s o p h y  essential  other  teleological i n the And,  he  does  This telos of "fulfillment" Is constitutive of intentionality; i t is part of its concept. Intentional movement t e n d s t o w a r d t h i s fulfillment. T h i s i s t h e o r i g i n or t h e f a t a l i t y o f that "longing for metaphysical plenitude" w h i c h , however, c a n a l s o be p r e s u p p o s e d , d e s c r i b e d , or l i v e d w i t h o u t t h e r o m a n t i c , e v e n m y s t i c a l p a t h o s sometimes a s s o c i a t e d w i t h those words. . . . N e v e r t h e l e s s , i f one w i s h e s t o speak r i g o r o u s l y o f an intentional s t r u c t u r e one should take i n t o a c c o u n t , w i t h or w i t h o u t "longing," t h e t e l o s of p l e n i t u d e t h a t c o n s t i t u t e s it. . . . This plenitude (this "fulfillment"), for reasons I have a l r e a d y s t a t e d ( i t e r a b i l i t y , s t r u c t u r e of t h e t r a c e and o f t h e mark i n general [ i . e . the p l a y of u n d e c i d a b i l i t y ] ) , i s a l r e a d y i n a c c e s s i b l e i n p e r c e p t i o n or i n  self-  whether not),  128 I n t u i t i o n i n g e n e r a l as t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f a present content. ( D e r r i d a , 1988a: 121)  Now  a g a i n , as w i t h  realize  that  —  he  as a p h i l o s o p h i c a l ultimate  Derrida  of  (actualized,  concept  i s not being  introduces  .  . . which  are  intentionality, •possibility  Two  but  into  as  of  present'  . . .  present the  The  and  intentionality,  represses  such,  is predicated  self-presence  Impossible  worth r e p e a t i n g  of  to  because,  upon  as  As  of i t s  structuring a  cleft In  other  like  own  a l l as  a  essential  the  because  impossible  present stated  its  itself  functions  its  the  notion  simplicity  iteration  categories,  no  such,  but  this undecldability is essential  the —  in general,  or  to  iterability  ( D e r r i d a , 1988a: 1 0 5 ) .  of  is  existed.  by  i t a dehiscence  which  And  there  never  limited  adequate),  conceptual  structure  has  intentionality  concept  undecldability.  living  is  essential"  undeconstructed  that  on a t e l e o l o g i c a l  and  conscious  a priori  unifying  not  i t s undlvldedness.  i t i s important  t h a t i n t e n t i o n a l i t y as  premised  f u l f i l l e d , and  the  arguing  i s arguing  it  words,  not  "What  [undecldability]  features,  is  p l e n i t u d e , does  says,  character  n o t i o n of c o n t e x t ,  Derrida  intentionality  of  the  in  here,  . the being-present (on) in i t s t r u t h , i n t h e p r e s e n c e of i t s i d e n t i t y and i n t h e i d e n t i t y of i t s p r e s e n c e , i s d o u b l e d as s o o n as i t a p p e a r s , as s o o n as  In  the  Chapter  129 i t presents i t s e l f . r t appears, i n i t s e s s e n c e , a s t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f i t s own most p r o p e r n o n - t r u t h , of i t s psuedotruth reflected in the icon, the phantasm, o r t h e s i m u l a c r u m . What i s i s n o t what i t i s , I d e n t i c a l and I d e n t i c a l t o i t s e l f , u n l e s s i t adds t o I t s e l f t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of being repeated as such. And i t s i d e n t i t y i s h o l l o w e d o u t b y t h a t addition, withdraws itself i n the supplement t h a t p r e s e n t s i t . ( D e r r i d a , 1981a: 168)  Thus  Intentionality,  realization  or f u l f i l m e n t  self-present essential fissured does  with  framework, dictates is  meaning,  play  not  as  of  concept  is left  inevitably  transmissibility  a  whole  of  i t should strain  as  Geertz  conceptual  but t o f o l l o w the  ensuring that  heterogeneity  meaning  from  one  by now be c l e a r  of p h i l o s o p h i c a l  that  thought  cultural  of the  context  i t i s premised which,  among  notion of d i a l e c t i c a l  to upon  other  process  of i n t e n t i o n a l i t y as w e l l as the s e l f - i d e n t i c a l nature of  conceptuality. posits not,  already  n o t i o n of t r a n s l a t i o n ,  t h i n g s , presumes a t e l e o l o g i c a l and  his  and t h e  subsumed w i t h i n h o m o g e n e i t y .  With r e s p e c t t o G e e r t z ' s  another,  of  no a l t e r a t i v e  o f t h a t framework, t h u s  always  And a g a i n ,  implications  with  doubling  itself  impossibility.  the  upon i t s  i n t h e p l e n i t u d e o f an i n t e n d e d and  undecidability,  examine  predicated  i s , due t o o r i g i n a r y  i t s own  he  a  Thus i t s h o u l d  the p o s s i b i l i t y  reasonably  Intact  n o t be s u r p r i s i n g  that  Geertz  o f "meaning g e t t t i n g ] moved, o r . . . from  one  sort  of d i s c o u r s e  t o the  130 next."  It will  meaning that to and  remembered  i s contained within  that  Geertz's  that  c l u s t e r s and  And, o f c o u r s e ,  are signs  o f i s meaning.  " B u t what i s a s i g n a s s u c h ? the sign  Is considered a  i t i s a r e f e r e n c e , and t h u s  204).  contends  according  c o n c e p t u a l i t y , s i g n s must be s i g n s of_ s o m e t h i n g ,  what t h e y  Either  Geertz  symbols or s y m b o l i c  he d e f i n e s s y m b o l s a s s i g n s .  says,  Or  be  However, as  Derrida  T h e r e i s no s i g n a s s u c h .  t h i n g , and i t i s n o t a s i g n . not i t s e l f "  (Derrida,  1982e:  Further,  Is i t not evident t h a t no signifier, w h a t e v e r i t s s u b s t a n c e and f o r m , has a "unique and singular reality?" A s i g n i f i e r i s from t h e v e r y b e g i n n i n g t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f i t s own r e p e t i t i o n , o f i t s own image o r r e s e m b l a n c e . I t i s the condition of its ideality, what i d e n t i f i e s i t a s s i g n i f i e r , and makes i t function as such, relating i t to a s i g n i f i e d w h i c h , f o r t h e same r e a s o n s , c o u l d n e v e r be a " u n i q u e and s i n g u l a r reality." From t h e moment t h a t t h e s i g n a p p e a r s , t h a t i s t o s a y from t h e v e r y beginning, there is no chance of encountering anywhere the purity of "reality," "unicity," "singularity." ( D e r r i d a , 1982e: 91)  Nonetheless, within  Western  anthropology  the  concept  metaphysics  in particular,  of  'sign,'  i n general indicates  as  and w i t h i n the  isolable  translatable) Derrida  says,  from  and one  hence  cultural  to  of a  and w h i c h i s i n  transportable  context  Geertzlan  existence  meaning w h i c h i s by d e f i n i t i o n s e l f - i d e n t i c a l principle  i t functions  (i.e.  another.  As  131 . . . t h e model of t h e s i g n . . . marks t h e " s e m i o l o g i c a l " p r o j e c t i t s e l f and t h e organic totality of i t s concepts, in p a r t i c u l a r t h a t of communication, which i n e f f e c t i m p l i e s a t r a n s m i s s i o n charged w i t h making p a s s , f r o m one subject to another, the identity of a signified o b j e c t , of a meaning or o f a c o n c e p t r i g h t f u l l y s e p a r a b l e f r o m t h e p r o c e s s of passage and from the signifying operation. Communication presupposes s u b j e c t s (whose i d e n t i t y and p r e s e n c e a r e constituted before the signifying operation) and objects (signified concepts, a thought meaning that the passage of communication will have neither to constitute, nor, by all r i g h t s , to transform). A communicates B t o C. ( D e r r i d a , 1981g: 23)  Thus  Geertz's  inevitable  notion outcome  undeconstructed one  of  argues  of  his  may  that  Geertz  f a r too  i s , after  be  seen  embeddedness  system of c o n c e p t u a l i t y .  ' e v e r y d a y l a n g u a g e ' and i s t o put  translation  And  a l l , by  be  the  within whether  and  t h a t t o make so much o u t  f i n e a p o i n t on t h i n g s ,  to  large  an  or  not  using  of h i s u s a g e  I t c a n n o t be  that, . . ."everyday language" i s not innocent or neutral. It i s the language of W e s t e r n m e t a p h y s i c s , and i t c a r r i e s w i t h it not only a considerable number of p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of a l l t y p e s , b u t a l s o presuppositions inseparable from metaphysics, which, although little attended t o , are knotted i n t o a system. ( D e r r i d a , 1981g: 19)  denied  132 Thus, the  f o r example, t h e  notion  of an  signified,  concept  'sign,'  which c a r r i e s w i t h i t  e s s e n t i a l d i s t i n c t i o n between s i g n i f i e r  between t h e  sign  and  what  it  and  signs,  inherently leaves open the possibility of thinking a concept signified i n and of i t s e l f , a c o n c e p t simply present f o r thought, independent . . . o f a r e l a t i o n s h i p t o a s y s t e m of signifiers [i.e. a 'transcendental signified']. . . . [However] f r o m t h e moment t h a t one q u e s t i o n s t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of . . . a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l s i g n i f i e d , and t h a t one r e c o g n i z e s t h a t e v e r y s i g n i f i e d i s a l s o In t h e p o s i t i o n of a s i g n i f i e r , the d i s t i n c t i o n between s i g n i f i e d and s i g n i f i e r becomes p r o b l e m a t i c a l at i t s root. . . . In e f f e c t , t h e theme o f a transcendental signified took shape w i t h i n t h e h o r i z o n o f an a b s o l u t e l y p u r e , transparent, and unequivocal translatability. In t h e l i m i t s t o w h i c h it is possible, or at least appears possible, translation practices the difference between signified and signifier. But i f this difference is n e v e r p u r e , no more so i s t r a n s l a t i o n , and f o r the notion of translation we would have t o substitute a notion of transformation; a regulated transformation of one language by a n o t h e r , of one t e x t by a n o t h e r . (Derrida,  In  other  words,  distinction reverse  between  their  distinction an for  effect and  the  an  delimits  of  and  neither and  importance,  n e v e r has  essential the  is  signifier  levels  i s not of  point  notion  1981g:19-20)  neutralize  signified but  to  nor  —  which  conceptuality  the  simply  show t h a t  been a b s o l u t e  undecldability of  to  that both  to  their i t is allows  in general.  It  133 is  this  notion from it  essential  undecldability  of t r a n s l a t i o n  one  the  context to another  is this essential  into  as  simple  which  ensures  that  t r a n s m i s s i o n of  i s fundamentally  any  meaning  inadequate,  u n d e c l d a b i l i t y t h a t G e e r t z does n o t  and take  account. Before  like  to  that  of the  going  look  at  on  t o the  Geertz's  work  o f James C l i f f o r d ,  favourite  analogue  for  text:  The key t o t h e t r a n s i t i o n from t e x t t o t e x t a n a l o g u e , from w r i t i n g as d i s c o u r s e to action as d i s c o u r s e , i s , as Paul R i c o e u r has p o i n t e d o u t , t h e c o n c e p t o f "inscription": the f i x a t i o n of meaning. When we s p e a k , our u t t e r a n c e s f l y by as e v e n t s l i k e any o t h e r b e h a v i o u r ; u n l e s s what we s a y i s i n s c r i b e d i n w r i t i n g ( o r some other established recording p r o c e s s ) , i t i s as e v a n e s c e n t as what we do. I f i t i s so i n s c r i b e d , i t o f c o u r s e p a s s e s , l i k e D o r i a n G r a y ' s y o u t h , anyway; but a t l e a s t I t s meaning, the s a i d , not t h e s a y i n g -- t o a d e g r e e and f o r a w h i l e remains. T h i s too i s not d i f f e r e n t f o r action in general: i t s meaning can p e r s i s t i n a way i t s a c t u a l i t y c a n n o t . The g r e a t v i r t u e o f t h e e x t e n s i o n o f t h e n o t i o n o f t e x t beyond t h i n g s w r i t t e n on p a p e r or c a r v e d i n t o s t o n e i s t h a t i t trains attention on precisely this phenomenon: on how the i n s c r i p t i o n of action is brought about, what its v e h i c l e s a r e and how t h e y work, and on what t h e f i x a t i o n o f meaning from the flow of events -history from what happened, t h o u g h t from t h i n k i n g , c u l t u r e from behaviour — implies for sociological interpretation. ( G e e r t z , 1983a: 31)  I would culture,  134 Geertz, which,  l i k e Rlcoeur, as  isolate  s u c h and  and  to  views the  t e x t as a p l u r l v o c a l t o t a l i t y  in principle,  account  for  enables  specific  the  interpreter  meanings  —  the  of  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n c o n s i s t i n g of a d i a l e c t i c  between  at  and  the  validating said  written  discourse  verbal  are  structures,  embodied  within  symbolic  meanings. embodied  the  within  meanings  actions  structures  Whereas  or  of  clusters  —  but  Is b a s e d r e m a i n s t h e  possibility  the  a  of  necessary  structure assumed  feature  of t h e  it  in  Is,  the  general,  which  disallows  but,  indeed,  any  of,  heterogeneity  of  work,  commentary that  the  viewed  as  being  matter  of  how  (Geertz,  perceived upon  which  essential is  totalizing  I t Is p r e c i s e l y t h i s is  must  only  as  meanings w h i c h  be  a  feature  questioned, along  remain d e d i c a t e d  not  are  a  recognition  to a  rigorous of,  of for, with  notion  accounting  the  radical  things.  G e e r t z ' s penchant textual  discourse  Interpretation,  will  plenitude  or  same, i . e . t h e  which  which  in general,  linguistic  self-contained  structure,  guessing of  principle  or  process  meanings  actions  meaning  anthropological  interpretation of  of  of  of  t e x t or t e x t a n a l o g u e .  totalizing  conceptuality until  fixation  social  the  Interpretation  given  to  f o r v i e w i n g a n t h r o p o l o g y as  leads  him  to  anthropologist concerned best  1988b: 9 ) .  to Now  get  with an  posit, may "a  be  in  his  most  most  both n a r r a t i o n  story and  of  recent  constructively  narratological  honest  a kind  issue,  honestly  a  told"  story entail,  by  135 definition, episodes  the recounting  which  structure,  are  i.e.  eschatologlcal. As  such,  function  never  an  both  to contain  teleological  and  chapter  of  ( i . e . the within  of a s e l f - c o n t a i n e d  and a l l  or n a r r a t i v e  limits  of Western  f o r they  by an e s s e n t i a l u n d e c i d a b i l i t y  as such, as metaphysics,  a r e always which  an a n a l o g u e  ensures dedicated  that  o r model the  to a  notion  Woolf's c h a r a c t e r s  will  remain  of plenitude.  premised As  one  or s t o r y  enterprise  of  comments,  I have made up t h o u s a n d s o f s t o r i e s ; I have f i l l e d innumerable notebooks with p h r a s e s t o be u s e d when I have f o u n d t h e t r u e s t o r y , t h e one s t o r y t o w h i c h a l l these phrases r e f e r . B u t I have n e v e r yet found t h a t s t o r y . And I b e g i n t o ask, Are t h e r e s t o r i e s ? ( W o o l f , 1968: 160)  Geertz could  them  moment, p u r e o r s e l f - c o n t a i n e d .  f o r the a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l  latter  already  prevents  T h i s b e i n g t h e c a s e , t h e unexamined u s e o f n a r r a t i v e as  Three.)  things)  The s t o r y  from ever b e i n g , a t any g i v e n  plot  heterogeneity  untidiness'  existed  of events or  overarching  on n a r r a t i v e ,  the conceptual  n o t and have  fissured  are  paradigm).  within  sequence  within  ( i . e . the plenitude  encompassing  do  they  'ineradicable  homogeneity  defined  contained  (See R i c o e u r  they  perceived  of a l i n e a r  do worse t h a n t o b e g i n t o a s k a s w e l l .  upon  and  Virginia  136 II (1)  CLIFFORD Discourse Discourse . . . is a mode o£ c o m m u n i c a t i o n i n w h i c h t h e p r e s e n c e of t h e s p e a k i n g s u b j e c t and o f t h e immediate s i t u a t i o n of c o m m u n i c a t i o n a r e i n t r i n s i c . . . . D i s c o u r s e does not t r a n s c e n d the specific occasion i n which a subject a p p r o p r i a t e s t h e r e s o u r c e s of l a n g u a g e In order to communicate dlaloglcally. R i c o e u r a r g u e s t h a t d i s c o u r s e c a n n o t be i n t e r p r e t e d In t h e open-ended p o t e n t i a l l y p u b l i c way i n w h i c h a t e x t i s " r e a d . " To understand discourse "you had t o have been t h e r e , " i n the presence of the discoursing subject. For d i s c o u r s e t o become a text it must become "autonomous," in Ricoeur's terms, s e p a r a t e d from a s p e c i f i c u t t e r a n c e and authorial intention. Interpretation is not i n t e r l o c u t i o n . I t does n o t depend on b e i n g i n t h e p r e s e n c e of a s p e a k e r . ( C l i f f o r d , 1 9 8 8 f : 39) ( e m p h a s i s mine)  An i n t e r e s t i n t h e d i s c u r s i v e a s p e c t s o f c u l t u r a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n draws a t t e n t i o n not to the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of cultural "texts" but to their relations of production. D i v e r g e n t s t y l e s of w r i t i n g a r e , w i t h v a r y i n g d e g r e e s of success, grappling with these new orders of complexity — different rules and possibilities w i t h i n t h e h o r i z o n of a h i s t o r i c a l moment. . . . [ T h e r e i s a] g e n e r a l t r e n d toward a s p e c i f i c a t i o n of d i s c o u r s e s i n e t h n o g r a p h y : who speaks? who w r i t e s ? when and where? w i t h or t o whom? under what institutional and historical restraints? ( C l i f f o r d , 1986a: 13) ( e m p h a s i s C l i f f o r d ' s and mine)  A discursive model o£ ethnographic practice brings into prominence the i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y of speech, a l o n g w i t h i t s immediate p e r f o r m a t i v e context. ( C l i f f o r d , 1 9 8 8 f : 41) ( e m p h a s i s mine)  Once c u l t u r e s a r e no l o n g e r prefigured v i s u a l l y — as o b j e c t s , t h e a t e r s , t e x t s i t becomes p o s s i b l e to think of a c u l t u r a l p o e t i c s t h a t i s an I n t e r p l a y o f v o i c e s , of p o s i t i o n e d u t t e r a n c e s . In a d i s c u r s i v e r a t h e r than a v i s u a l paradigm, the dominant metaphors f o r ethnography s h i f t away f r o m t h e o b s e r v i n g eye and t o w a r d e x p r e s s i v e s p e e c h . . . . And the c r u c i a l p o e t i c problem f o r a d i s c u r s i v e e t h n o g r a p h y becomes how "to achieve by w r i t t e n means what s p e e c h c r e a t e s . " ( C l i f f o r d , 1986a: 12) ( e m p h a s i s mine)  ii)  Dialogue . . . d i a l o g i c a l processes p r o l i f e r a t e i n any complexly represented discursive space. . . . Many v o i c e s c l a m o r f o r expression. P o l y v o c a l i t y was r e s t r a i n e d and orchestrated in traditional e t h n o g r a p h i e s by g i v i n g t o one v o i c e a pervasive authorial function and to o t h e r s the r o l e of s o u r c e s , "informants," to be quoted or paraphrased. Once d l a l o g l s m and p o l y p h o n y a r e r e c o g n i z e d as modes of t e x t u a l p r o d u c t i o n , monophonic a u t h o r i t y i s q u e s t i o n e d , r e v e a l e d t o be characteristic of a science that has claimed to represent c u l t u r e s . ( C l i f f o r d , 1986a: 15) ( e m p h a s i s C l i f f o r d ' s and mine)  To the extent that the ethnographic p r o c e s s i s s e e n as i n s c r i p t i o n (rather t h a n , f o r example, as t r a n s c r i p t i o n , or dialogue) the representation will  continue to questionable,  enact a potent, and allegorical structure. ( C l i f f o r d , 1986b: 113) (emphasis mine)  The model of dialogue brings to prominence p r e c i s e l y those d i s c u r s i v e — circumstantial and intersubjectlve — e l e m e n t s t h a t R i c o e u r had t o e x c l u d e from h i s model of t h e t e x t . . . . If i t i s difficult for d l a l o g l c a l portrayals to escape t y p i f y i n g p r o c e d u r e s , t h e y can, t o a significant degree, resist the pull toward authoritative r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e o t h e r . T h i s d e p e n d s on t h e i r a b i l i t y f i c t i o n a l l y t o m a i n t a i n the s t r a n g e n e s s of t h e o t h e r v o i c e and t o h o l d i n v i e w the specific contingencies of the exchange. ( C l i f f o r d , 1 9 8 8 f : 43-44) (emphasis mine)  The fictional dialogue i s in fact a condensation, a s i m p l i f i e d representation of complex m u l t i v o c a l p r o c e s s e s . An alternative way of representing this d i s c u r s i v e complexity i s to understand t h e o v e r a l l c o u r s e of t h e r e s e a r c h as an ongoing n e g o t i a t i o n . ( C l i f f o r d , 1 9 8 8 f : 44) (emphasis mine)  ethnography [should be] a dlaloglcal enterprise in which both researchers and natives are active c r e a t o r s o r , t o s t r e t c h a term, a u t h o r s of cultural representations. D i a l o g i c a l , c o n s t r u c t i v i s t paradigms tend to d i s p e r s e or s h a r e o u t ethnographic authority. ( C l i f f o r d , 19881: 84) (emphasis mine)  139 [ F l e l d w o r k ] must . . . be s e e n as a historically contingent, unruly d i a l o g i c a l e n c o u n t e r i n v o l v i n g t o some d e g r e e b o t h c o n f l i c t and c o l l a b o r a t i o n i n the p r o d u c t i o n of t e x t s . ( C l i f f o r d , 19881: 90) (emphasis mine)  (iii)  Anthropology/Ethnography  . . . I t r e a t e t h n o g r a p h y I t s e l f as a performance emplotted by powerful stories. Embodied i n w r i t t e n reports, these stories simultaneously describe r e a l c u l t u r a l e v e n t s and make a d d i t i o n a l , m o r a l , i d e o l o g i c a l , and even c o s m o l o g i c a l statements. Ethnographic writing is allegorical a t the l e v e l both of i t s c o n t e n t (what i t s a y s a b o u t c u l t u r e s and t h e i r h i s t o r i e s ) and o f i t s f o r m (what i s i m p l i e d by i t s mode o f t e x t u a l l z a t i o n ) . ( C l i f f o r d , 1986b: 98) ( e m p h a s i s mine)  . . . t r a n s c e n d e n t a l meanings a r e n o t a b s t r a c t i o n s or i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s "added" to the original "simple" account. Rather, they are the c o n d i t i o n s of i t s meaningfulness. Ethnographic texts are i n e s c a p a b l y a l l e g o r i c a l , and a s e r i o u s a c c e p t a n c e o f t h i s f a c t c h a n g e s t h e ways t h e y c a n be w r i t t e n and r e a d . . . . I [applaud] a recent tendency to distinguish allegorical levels as specific " v o i c e s " w i t h i n the t e x t . I argue . . . t h a t the v e r y a c t i v i t y of ethnographic writing — seen as i n s c r i p t i o n o r t e x t u a l i z a t i o n -- e n a c t s a redemptive Western allegory. This p e r v a s i v e s t r u c t u r e needs t o be p e r c e i v e d and weighed against other possible emplotments for the performance of ethnography. ( C l i f f o r d , 1986b: 99) ( e m p h a s i s C l i f f o r d ' s and mine)  A r e c o g n i t i o n of a l l e g o r y c o m p l i c a t e s t h e w r i t i n g and r e a d i n g of e t h n o g r a p h i e s i n p o t e n t i a l l y f r u i t f u l ways. A tendency emerges t o s p e c i f y and s e p a r a t e d i f f e r e n t a l l e g o r i c a l r e g i s t e r s w i t h i n the text. The m a r k i n g o f f o f e x t e n d e d indigenous d i s c o u r s e s shows t h e e t h n o g r a p h y t o be a hierarchical structure of powerful s t o r i e s that t r a n s l a t e , encounter, and r e c o n t e x t u a l i z e other powerful stories. It i s a palimpsest. . . . M o r e o v e r , an a w a r e n e s s of a l l e g o r y h e i g h t e n s a w a r e n e s s of the narrative, and other temporal s e t u p s , I m p l i c i t l y or e x p l i c i t l y a t work. Is the redemptive s t r u c t u r e of s a l v a g e t e x t u a l i z a t i o n being replaced? By what new allegories? Of conflict? Of emergence? Of s y n c r e t i s m ? ( C l i f f o r d , 1986b: 120-121) (emphasis mine)  Interpretive anthropology, by viewing c u l t u r e s as a s s e m b l a g e s o f t e x t s , l o o s e l y and sometimes contradictorally [sic] u n i t e d , and by h i g h l i g h t i n g t h e i n v e n t i v e poeisis at work in all collective representations, has contributed s i g n i f i c a n t l y t o the d e f a m i l i a r i z a t i o n of ethnographic authority. In its m a i n s t r e a m r e a l i s t s t r a n d s , however, i t d o e s n o t e s c a p e t h e g e n e r a l s t r i c t u r e s of those critics of "colonial" representation who, since 1950, have rejected discourses that portray the c u l t u r a l r e a l i t y of other peoples without p l a c i n g t h e i r own r e a l i t y i n j e o p a r d y . . . . H e n c e f o r t h n e i t h e r the e x p e r i e n c e nor the interpretive activity of the s c i e n t i f i c r e s e a r c h e r c a n be c o n s i d e r e d innocent. It becomes necessary to conceive of ethnography not as the experience and interpretation of a c i r c u m s c r i b e d " o t h e r " r e a l i t y , but r a t h e r as a c o n s t r u c t i v e n e g o t i a t i o n i n v o l v i n g at least two, and usually more, conscious, politically significant subjects. Paradigms of e x p e r i e n c e and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n are y i e l d i n g to d i s c u r s i v e p a r a d i g m s o f d i a l o g u e and p o l y p h o n y . ( C l i f f o r d , 1 9 8 8 f : 41) ( e m p h a s i s mine)  Although is  Clifford  "to displace  (Clifford,  the  ("there  (Clifford,  overview  to  preferred  1986a:  seriously  question  approach  to  superficial.  this  a l l modes o f  the  desire.  theoretical  to represent  components  any  problems  aside,  h i s own  possibility  tends  am  of  the  Clifford's  to  ( i n a review I  that h i s  of  Unfortunately,  comments  observation  from which  'filled  any p l a c e of  22)), i t i s evident  precludes  As K a p f e r e r  following  i s no l o n g e r  point  (Clifford,  of  of a u t h e n t i c i t y "  and c r i t i q u e  "There  no A r c h i m e d e a n  'paradigm'  fulfilment  the  regime  that h i s desire  I s no whole p i c t u r e t h a t c a n be  1986a: 18)  . . .  world"  failure  transcendent  1988c: 1 0 ) , t o q u e s t i o n  totalization in'"  any  constantly reiterates  be  rather  with  which,  f a r from  being  in  agreement),  [ I n r e a d i n g C l i f f o r d ' s work] I c o u l d n o t escape a sense of superficiality. Clifford alights, like some gorgeous b u t t e r f l y , i n t h e g r e a t g a r d e n o f human possibility which i s the field of anthropology. But he p a s s e s f r o m f l o w e r t o f l o w e r , seldom s t a y i n g f o r long t o examine thoroughly their possibility. T h i s I found f r u s t r a t i n g . ( K a p f e r e r , 1989: 101)  Similarly,  Sangren c a l l s  invocation  of  other  than  to authorize  aura"  (Sangren,  Clifford going  academic  attention to "Clifford's luminaries and  i s not simply  no  apparent  their  annoying  about  t h a t he does n o t do what he s a y s  he I s  What  his text  purpose  within  1988: 4 0 9 ) .  locate  to  (1986a: 3)  i s most  t o do, i . e . d i s p l a c e t r a n s c e n d e n t ,  totalizing  regimes  of a u t h e n t i c i t y , but r e g i m e s by his  own  t h a t he  in fact  consistently overlooking  conceptual  question  framework.  I w i l l b e g i n my at  h i s use  In an e s s a y e n t i t l e d adopts  the  definitions things  and  parable: the  of  New  •allegory : 1  a l l e g o r i e s are  98).  He  argues  and  basis  which  upon to  used  of ideas  allegorical  According  he  subjectivity,  reading  that  does  of not  dlaloglsm, Accordingly,  of C l i f f o r d  by  Ethnographic Allegory" Twentieth "1.  a  Century  story  in  looking  for teaching  or  Dictionary  this  ethnographies fact  ethnographic  should  be  literature  people,  in a  fable  explaining.  by means of s u c h s t o r i e s " that  Clifford  which  h a p p e n i n g s have a n o t h e r m e a n i n g , as  presentation  1986b:  example,  nature  allegory. "On  Webster's  totalizing  or s p e e c h as s u c h .  deconstructive  o f metaphor and  the  For  metaphor/allegory,  d i s c u r s i v i t y , representation  f u r t h e r r e i n f o r c e s those  are  2.  (Clifford  Irremediably  accepted is  or  as  the  approached.  Clifford,  A scientific ethnography normally establishes a privileged allegorical register it identifies as "theory," " I n t e r p r e t a t i o n , " or " e x p l a n a t i o n . " But once a l l m e a n i n g f u l l e v e l s i n a t e x t , i n c l u d i n g t h e o r i e s and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , a r e r e c o g n i z e d as a l l e g o r i c a l , i t becomes difficult to view one of them as privileged, accounting for the rest. Once this anchor is dislodged, the staging and valuing of multiple allegorical registers, or "voices," becomes an i m p o r t a n t a r e a of c o n c e r n f o r ethnographic w r i t e r s . R e c e n t l y t h i s has sometimes meant giving indigenous discourse a semi-independent s t a t u s in the textual whole, interrupting the privileged monotone of "scientific" representation. Much of ethnography,  143 taking i t s distance from totalizing anthropology, seeks t o evoke multiple (but not l i m i t l e s s ) a l l e g o r i e s . ( C l i f f o r d , 1986b: 103)  In  o t h e r words, C l i f f o r d  are  viewed  in  and  as c o l l e c t i o n s  of  constructs This,  itself,  allegory,  prevents  essentially,  of  form  metaphor  Aristotle  a  with  from  is a  this  fact,  totalizing  anthropology.'  f o r the concept  totalizing  concept  of par  seems n o t t o n o t i c e .  Quintllian  into  being  'totalizing  o f metaphor,  develops  i f ethnographies  allegories,  the case,  Clifford  agrees a  them  itself,  And t h i s ,  Clifford  to  i s f a r from  i n and  excellence.  98).  of m u l t i p l e  contributing  however,  extended  seems t o t h i n k t h a t  that  that  is,  "any c o n t i n u o u s  allegory"  provides the c l a s s i c  allegory  (Clifford,  definition  or  1986b:  o f metaphor:  Metaphor ( m e t a p h o r a ) c o n s i s t s i n g i v i n g ( e p i p h o r a ) t h e t h i n g a name (onomatos) that belongs to something else (allotrlore). the transference being e i t h e r f r o m genus t o s p e c i e s . . ., o r from s p e c i e s t o genus . . ., o r from species t o s p e c i e s . . ., o r on t h e grounds of analogy. ( A r i s t o t l e i n D e r r i d a , 1982m: 231)  In  d i s c u s s i n g the p r e c e d i n g d e f i n i t i o n D e r r i d a emphasizes the  relationship nominalizable:  between  metaphor  and  that  which  is  It I s under [the] heading of [the nominal, t h e noun] that [Aristotle] treats metaphor (epiphora onomatos). Onoma c e r t a i n l y has two v a l u e s i n t h i s context. Sometimes i t i s o p p o s e d t o t h e v e r b (rhema), which i m p l i e s t h e i d e a o f time. Sometimes i t c o v e r s t h e f i e l d o f v e r b s , s i n c e metaphor, t h e d i s p l a c e m e n t of nouns, a l s o , i n t h e examples g i v e n i n t h e P o e t i c s , p l a y s upon v e r b s . This c o n f u s i o n i s p o s s i b l e by v i r t u e o f t h e profound i d e n t i t y o f t h e noun and t h e v e r b : what t h e y have i n common i s t h a t they are intelligible in and of t h e m s e l v e s , have an immediate r e l a t i o n t o an object or r a t h e r to a u n i t y of meaning. They c o n s t i t u t e t h e o r d e r of the phon& semantike from which are excluded . . . a r t i c l e s , conjunctions, prepositions, and i n g e n e r a l a l lthe elements of language which, a c c o r d i n g t o A r i s t o t l e , have no meaning i n t h e m s e l v e s ; in other words, which do not of themselves designate something. The adjective is capable of becoming s u b s t a n t i v e and n o m i n a l . To t h i s e x t e n t it may b e l o n g t o the semantic order. Therefore i t seems t h a t t h e f i e l d o f onoma -and consequently that of m e t a p h o r , a s t h e t r a n s p o r t o f names — i s less t h a t o f t h e noun i n t h e s t r i c t sense, (which i t a c q u i r e d v e r y l a t e i n rhetoric), than that of the nominalizable. E v e r y word w h i c h r e s i s t s t h i s n o m i n a l i z a t i o n would r e m a i n f o r e i g n to metaphor. Now, only that which c l a i m s , or h e n c e f o r t h c l a i m s — t o have a c o m p l e t e and i n d e p e n d e n t s i g n i f i c a t i o n , t h a t which i s i n t e l l i g i b l e by i t s e l f , o u t s i d e a n y s y n t a c t i c r e l a t i o n , c a n be nominalized. To t a k e up a t r a d i t i o n a l o p p o s i t i o n t h a t s t i l l w i l l be i n u s e i n H u s s e r l , metaphor would be a t r a n s p o r t o f categorematic and n o t syncategorematic words as. s u c h . (Derrida,  1982m: 233)  In  other  traceable rooted  words, to  in a  metaphor,  and  i t (e.g. a l l e g o r y , notion  o£  a l l concepts analogy,  self-identical  which  simile  essence  etc.),  or  are is  presence.  M e t a p h o r , a n d , by e x t e n s i o n , a l l e g o r y , has t o do n o t w i t h t h e displacement one meaning of  meaning  o£ meaning by a n o t h e r ,  as such  but with  the replacement  and , h e n c e , w i t h  a s an a l l - i n c l u s i v e ,  o£  the r e a f f i r m a t i o n  self-identical  concept.  As  Gasch6 p o i n t s o u t ,  D e r r i d a has never l e f t t h e s l i g h t e s t doubt that metaphor i s by n a t u r e a m e t a p h y s i c a l concept. In s p i t e , or r a t h e r because of i t s n e g a t i v i t y , i t belongs t o t h e v e r y o r d e r and movement o f m e a n i n g : the provisory loss o f meaning that metaphor i m p l i e s i s s u b o r d i n a t e d t o t h e t e l e o l o g y o f meaning a s one moment i n t h e process of the s e l f - m a n i f e s t a t i o n of meaning in a l l i t s propriety. The p h i l o s o p h i c a l concept o f metaphor (and t h e r e i s no o t h e r ) makes metaphor depend on t h e a b s o l u t e p a r o u s l a o f m e a n i n g . (Gasch<§, 1986: 293)  Indeed,  Derrida  p h i l o s o p h i c a l nature  is  very  clear  In  indicating  o f metaphor and t h e m e t a p h o r i c  the  nature of  philosophy: metaphor remains, in a l l its essential characteristics, a classical philosopheme, a metaphysical concept. . . . Metaphor h a s been i s s u e d f r o m a network o f p h i l o s o p h e m e s w h i c h t h e m s e l v e s c o r r e s p o n d t o t r o p e s o r t o f i g u r e s , and these philosophemes a r e contemporaneous to or i n s y s t e m a t i c s o l i d a r i t y with these t r o p e s or f i g u r e s . T h i s s t r a t u m of " t u t e l a r y " t r o p e s , the layer of "primary"  146 phllosophemes (assuming that the quotation marks will serve as a s u f f i c i e n t p r e c a u t i o n h e r e ) , cannot be dominated. I t cannot dominate itself, c a n n o t be d o m i n a t e d by what i t i t s e l f has e n g e n d e r e d , has made t o grow on i t s own soil, supported on its own base. T h e r e f o r e , i t g e t s " c a r r i e d away" e a c h t i m e t h a t one o f i t s p r o d u c t s — here, t h e c o n c e p t o f metaphor -- a t t e m p t s i n v a i n t o i n c l u d e under i t s own law t h e totality of the field to which the product belongs. If one wished to conceive and to class a l l the m e t a p h o r i c a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s of p h i l o s o p h y , one metaphor, a t least, always would remain e x c l u d e d , o u t s i d e the system: the metaphor, a t the very least, without w h i c h t h e c o n c e p t o f metaphor c o u l d n o t be c o n s t r u c t e d , . . . t h e metaphor o f metaphor. T h i s e x t r a metaphor, r e m a i n i n g o u t s i d e t h e f i e l d t h a t i t a l l o w s t o be circumscribed, extracts or abstracts I t s e l f from t h i s f i e l d , t h u s s u b t r a c t i n g I t s e l f as a metaphor l e s s . By v i r t u e o f [a] t r o p i c supplementarity, since the e x t r a t u r n o f s p e e c h becomes t h e m i s s i n g t e r m o f s p e e c h , t h e taxonomy or h i s t o r y of p h i l o s o p h i c a l m e t a p h o r s [ c a n ] never [be] s a t u r a t e d . (Derrida,  In  other  words,  realization includes allegories "the  that  is  radical  philosophical  anthropology)  are  is  not  works  replete  -- t h e y a r e so by d e f i n i t i o n  insight  conventions, provoking"  what  1982m: 219-220)  that  the  (which, with  interesting,  (Rabinow i n C l i f f o r d  with  philosophy  course,  metaphors  employing  literary  i s not  inherently  and Marcus e d s . , 1986c:  and  that  or  remarks,  b u t t h e r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t m e t a p h o r , as s u c h , relationship  of  or  ( a s Rabinow  anthropologists write  although  discovery  crisis 243))  i s in a symbiotic  they  must  both  be  deconstructed. existence  o£  metaphoriclty And  this  has as  such  i n general  —  which  which  to  i s always  philosophy,  then  already  recognized but  ideal  already  impossibility  possibility becomes  which,  not  the  possibility  of  of  thing.  from  the  extra  Implications anthropology, Clifford  for  so  never  containing  case,  on  that  may  and,  by  o r a l l e g o r y as the  them e v e r  the c e l e b r a t i o n  multiple allegorical  totalizing  metaphysics  by t h e  a  ( i . e . the of  metaphor)  escapes  the  as t h e  iterability,  harbour  radical  extension,  for  such.  notions  of  a l l e g o r y or  The r e c o g n i t i o n a n d , i n of ethnographic  registers —  an  'tropic  I t i s metaphoriclty  metaphor a s p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n c e p t s . Clifford's  which  supplementarity,  questions  account.  presence,  metaphor  t h e metaphor  philosophy  n o t metaphor  can  involves  ( i . e . that  as  a  and i f  from t h e o u t s e t  outset,  —  as  a more and a l e s s f o r  the  metaphor  and  itself,  o f an u n m e d i a t e d  of p h i l o s o p h y ) .  trace  to  metaphor  If  upon and r e f e r r i n g t o  both  i s fissured  undecidability,  diff6rance,  refer  with  of m e t a p h o r i c l t y  field  with  nor metaphor, as such,  whereby  the missing  totalizing  or  of the e x i s t e n c e  supplementarity'  a  is  i s h a r d l y t h e same  predicated  we a r e l e f t  of t o t a l i z a t i o n  impossibility  from  the  involved  represent  which n e i t h e r p h i l o s o p h y  play  be  metaphor  i s always  by  metaphor  The  to  comes back t o t h e n o t i o n o f o r i g i n a r y d o u b l i n g .  philosophy means  What  works  as  d o e s n o t f r e e them  on t h e c o n t r a r y ,  more t i g h t l y t o n o t i o n s o f e s s e n c e ,  I t binds  p r e s e n c e and so  148 on.  Take,  f o r example, C l i f f o r d ' s  the  allegorical  and  Words o f a  strands  effusive praise  of M a r j o r i e  Shostak's Nisa:  of  one  The  of Life  !Kung Woman:  The s t o r y [ o f N i s a ' s g i v i n g b i r t h ] has great immediacy. Nisa's voice is unmistakable, the experience sharply e v o k e d : "She l a y t h e r e , moving her arms a b o u t , t r y i n g t o suck her f i n g e r s . " But as r e a d e r s we do more t h a n r e g i s t e r a unique event. The story's unfolding requires us, first, to imagine a different c u l t u r a l norm (JKung birth, a l o n e i n t h e bush) and t h e n t o recognize a common human e x p e r i e n c e (the quiet heroism of childbirth, feelings of p o s t p a r t u m wonder and d o u b t ) . The s t o r y of an occurrence somewhere in the K a l a h a r i d e s e r t cannot remain j u s t t h a t . I t i m p l i e s b o t h l o c a l c u l t u r a l meanings and a general story of birth. A difference i s p o s i t e d and transcended. Moreover, Nisa's story tells us (how could i t not?) something basic about woman's e x p e r i e n c e . Shostak's l i f e of a JKung i n d i v i d u a l i n e v i t a b l y becomes an a l l e g o r y of (female) humanity. (Clifford,  Not  only  does t h i s p a s s a g e s i n g  dialectical  homogeneity  transcended'  'an  does  so  Clifford  in to  a  ('a  a l l e g o r y of  define  numbered  childbirth  is  praises  difference  c h i l d b i r t h as  among  about  as  99)  of a is  totalizing, posited  and  (female) humanity' e t c . ) , but  p a r t i c u l a r l y offensive  a b o u t woman's e x p e r i e n c e ' ? myself  the  1986b:  manner.  revealing  What a b o u t t h e  them, basic  to as  whom is  Who  it  is  James  'something  basic  m i l l i o n s o f women, the  flapping  experience our  arms  of and  149 flying  t o t h e moon?  childbirth doubt'  What a b o u t  i s a sorrow  the m i l l i o n s  and a b u r d e n ,  b u t d e p r e s s i o n and d e s p a i r ?  o f women t o whom  e v o k i n g n o t 'wonder and Aside  from  the fact  that  t h e r e a r e few t h i n g s q u i t e s o o f f - p u t t i n g a s some man g u s h i n g over  'the q u i e t  Clifford  here  heroism  of c h i l d b i r t h '  presents a c l a s s i c  i t seems t o me  that  example o f t h e way i n w h i c h  t h e r e p r e s s i v e / o p p r e s s i v e n a t u r e o f t o t a l i z a t i o n e x c l u d e s and debases  difference  by  subsuming  i t within  a  transcendent  homogeneity. Because and/or  he n e v e r  allegorical  point  that,  delineate engaging merely  questions  representation, Clifford  no m a t t e r  or produce  how  questioning  philosophy  various  meaning  philosophical  field  endlessly  many  a passage  with  herself  in a  year  allegorical  strata  as  —  o l d !Kung  Clifford  work, he i s  without leaves  ever the  a l l e g o r y / m e t a p h o r and t o each  T h u s , f o r example,  girl  he may  s o f a r from  meaning  and r e f e r r i n g  work w h e r e i n  grasps the  levels  Clifford  intact  reflecting  mirror,  of  such.  utterly  of Shostak's  a twelve  never  of a n o n - t o t a l i z i n g  within a closed c i r c u l a r i t y . to  of metaphorical  i n any g i v e n ethnography,  i n the c o n s t r u c t i o n juggling  the nature  other  i n referring  she d e p i c t s her banter  whom  comments  she f i n d s  admiring  ( a p p r o v i n g l y ) as  follows: A g r e a t d e a l o f t h e book i s h e r e : a n o l d v o i c e , a young v o i c e , a m i r r o r . . . t a l k of s e l f - p o s s e s s i o n . N a r c i s s i s m , a term of d e v i a n c e a p p l i e d t o women o f t h e West, is transfigured. We n o t i c e , t o o , t h a t i t  150 Is t h e e t h n o g r a p h e r , a s s u m i n g a v o i c e of age, who has b r o u g h t a m i r r o r , j u s t as N i s a p r o v i d e s an a l l e g o r i c a l m i r r o r when Shostak takes the role of youth. Ethnography gains subjective "depth" through the s o r t s of r o l e s , r e f l e c t i o n s , and r e v e r s a l s dramatized here. The w r i t e r , and her readers, can be both young ( l e a r n i n g ) and o l d ( k n o w i n g ) . They can simultaneously listen, and "give v o i c e t o , " the o t h e r . Nisa's readers follow — and p r o l o n g — the p l a y of a desire. T h e y i m a g i n e , i n t h e m i r r o r of the o t h e r , a g u i l e l e s s s e l f - p o s s e s s i o n , an uncomplicated feeling of "attractiveness." (Clifford,  For  Clifford,  and  vice  versa  constitutes place.  In  perceive  the  other  —  this  is a  the  to  mirror  circularity  a homogeneity order  1986b: 108-109)  wherein  Western c o n c e p t u a l i t y .  within As  the  Derrida  reflects  the  other  alterity  reflexive  as_ o t h e r one  must  self  has  says,  no  first  circularity  The b r e a k t h r o u g h t o w a r d r a d i c a l o t h e r n e s s (with respect to the philosophical concept — of the concept) always t a k e s , within philosophy, the form of an a p o s t e r l o r i t y or an e m p i r i c i s m . But t h i s i s an e f f e c t o f t h e s p e c u l a r n a t u r e of philosophical reflection, philosophy being incapable of inscribing (comprehending) what is outside it otherwise than through the a p p r o p r i a t i n g n e g a t i v e image of i t , and d i s s e m i n a t i o n i s w r i t t e n on t h e back — the t a i n — of that mirror. Not on i t s inverted spectre. Nor i n the t r i a d l c symbolic o r d e r of i t s s u b l i m a t i o n . ( D e r r i d a , 1981a: 33)  i  the  i s s e l f - p e r p e t u a t i n g and  think a r a d i c a l  cracks  which  of  151 Clifford relation  of  states fact  institutional may,  and  dedicated  is  saying  concerning applies  a  human  domain  (Clifford,  f a c t and  of  1986b:  However, what he  sciences  a l l e g o r y are  both p r e d i c a t e d of  essence.  To  emphasize  allegory  Clifford  inventive  goes,  seems  to  self-identical  think,  moment  i n the  history  (Clifford,  1986b:  109),  to  metaphor  rob  Peter  (and,  to  i t will  pay be  And  and this  consistently fails  presence,  as  the  struggle  119).  of  representation" old  is  the  to a notion  not,  troubled,  "In  allegory  true.  i s that  unquestionable fact  to  discipline"  I n d e e d , be  comprehend  that,  discover  upon and than "a  of c r o s s - c u l t u r a l  but  Paul.  to  rather  to  merely, As  as  Derrida  remembered,  to a l l e g o r y ) ,  Metaphor . . . is determined by philosophy as a provisional loss of meaning, an economy o f t h e p r o p e r w i t h o u t irreparable damage, a certainly inevitable d e t o u r , but also a history w i t h i t s s i g h t s s e t on, and w i t h i n the h o r i z o n of, the c i r c u l a r r e a p p r o p r i a t i o n of l i t e r a l , p r o p e r meaning. T h i s i s why t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l e v a l u a t i o n of metaphor a l w a y s has been ambiguous: metaphor i s dangerous and foreign as concerns Intuition ( v i s i o n or c o n t a c t ) , concept ( t h e g r a s p i n g or p r o p e r p r e s e n c e of t h e s i g n i f i e d ) , and c o n s c i o u s n e s s ( p r o x i m i t y or self presence); but it is in c o m p l i c i t y w i t h what i t e n d a n g e r s , i s n e c e s s a r y to i t i n the extent to which t h e d e - t o u r i s a r e - t u r n g u i d e d by the function of resemblance (mimesis or homoiosis). under t h e law o f t h e same. The o p p o s i t i o n o f i n t u i t i o n , t h e c o n c e p t , and c o n s c i o u s n e s s a t t h i s p o i n t no l o n g e r has any p e r t i n e n c e . These t h r e e values  this  the says also  152 b e l o n g t o t h e o r d e r and t o t h e movement of m e a n i n g . L i k e metaphor. Henceforth the entire teleology of meaning, which constructs the philosophical concept of metaphor, coordinates metaphor with the manifestation of truth, with the p r o d u c t i o n o f t r u t h as p r e s e n c e without v e i l , of t h e r e a p p r o p r i a t i o n o f a f u l l language without syntax, with the v o c a t i o n o f a pure n o m i n a t i o n : without differential syntax, or i n any case w i t h o u t a p r o p e r l y unnamable a r t i c u l a t i o n that i s irreducible . . . to d i a l e c t i c a l interiorization. [What i s needed i s a d e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f metaphor w h i c h ] i s no longer a [matter] of extending and c o n f i r m i n g a philosopheme, but r a t h e r , of u n f o l d i n g I t w i t h o u t l i m i t , and w r e s t i n g i t s b o r d e r s o f p r o p r i e t y from i t . And c o n s e q u e n t l y [ e x p l o d i n g ] the r e a s s u r i n g opposition of the metaphoric and the p r o p e r , t h e o p p o s i t i o n i n w h i c h t h e one and t h e o t h e r have n e v e r done a n y t h i n g b u t r e f l e c t and r e f e r t o e a c h o t h e r i n their radiance. (Derrida,  I would l i k e dialogue,  speech  now and  1982m: 270-271)  to look a t C l i f f o r d ' s voice.  anthropologists/ethnographers  Clifford utilize  use  of d i s c o u r s e ,  c o n s t a n t l y urges  that  discursive/dialogical  r a t h e r t h a n t e x t u a l / I n t e r p r e t i v e models or p a r a d i g m s i n t h e i r accountings focussing  of on  other  cultures.  attempting  discursive/dialogical  to  capture  of  monophonic  ethnographic writings. finally  determines  the  c o n t e x t of s p e e c h  e v o c a t i o n o f m u l t i p l e v o i c e s and dispersion  Clifford  immediacy  that  of  the  events a l l o w s f o r the  hence f o r t h e d i s r u p t i o n  authority  and  within anthropological/  A s i d e from t h e o b v i o u s  what ends up  believes  i n any  problem  of  who  given w r i t t e n account  153 and  what  decides  i t s format  upon what  problem  which,  will  be,  i s worth to  be  and,  writing sure,  appear  to  discourse, upon and notion  of  d e d i c a t e d t o an  i t s status  I argue  oppressive  been  and,  stated,  does  i s that  the  place  appear  (a to  does  concepts  of  Clifford's s p e e c h and At  reinforced  in  assumption.  dissertation,  remain  of  and  a  the  assumption  concepts of  Clifford  firmly within  asserts  that,  brings speech And  for a  he  means  what  primary  focus  is  point  i t is  discursive  concurs  that  its  with  presumed  to  has of the  Immediate Tyler  i s how  creates.'"  immediacy  helpful  model  Stephen  ethnography  the  As  prominence  with  speech  on  i t s aura.  into  discursive  best to depict  "a  along  written  this  is constantly  —  by e x t e n s i o n , so a r e t h e w o r k i n g  context."  how  of presence  repressive/  "problem by  notion  as t a k e n f o r g r a n t e d  practice  performative  form.  first  what)  in principle,  intersubjectivity  achieve  sway  i s , by d e f i n i t i o n  thought which  the  that  throughout t h i s  ethnographic  that  i n the  (or  problem which C l i f f o r d  unexamined  whose a u t h o r i t a t i v e  presence  Western  who  s p e e c h , v o i c e , d i a l o g u e and so on a r e a l l p r e m i s e d  h i s work by As  r e c o g n i z e , and  up  Clifford  r e c o g n i z e ) , t h e r e r e m a i n s a major not  indeed,  'to  clearly,  immediacy  of  i n ethnographic  quote  Derrida  length:  Within [the] logos, the original and e s s e n t i a l l i n k t o t h e phon& has never been b r o k e n . . . . [The] e s s e n c e o f t h e phon& [ i s p e r c e i v e d t o be] immediately proximate t o t h a t which w i t h i n "thought"  at  as l o g o s r e l a t e s t o "meaning," p r o d u c e s i t , r e c e i v e s i t , s p e a k s i t , "composes" it. If, for A r i s t o t l e , for example, "spoken words (ta_ en t e phon&) a r e the s y m b o l s of m e n t a l e x p e r i e n c e (pathemata t e s p s y c h e s ) and w r i t t e n words a r e the symbols of spoken words" (De i n t e r p r e t a t i o n e , 1, 16a, 3) i t i s b e c a u s e t h e v o i c e , p r o d u c e r of t h e f i r s t s y m b o l s , has a r e l a t i o n s h i p of essential and immediate p r o x i m i t y w i t h t h e mind. . . . The f e e l i n g s o f t h e mind, e x p r e s s i n g t h i n g s n a t u r a l l y , c o n s t i t u t e s a s o r t of u n i v e r s a l language which can t h e n e f f a c e itself. . . . In e v e r y case, the v o i c e i s c l o s e s t t o the s i g n i f i e d , whether i t i s d e t e r m i n e d s t r i c t l y as s e n s e ( t h o u g h t or l i v e d ) or more l o o s e l y as t h i n g . All signiflers . . . are derivative with regard to what would wed the voice indissolubly to the mind or to the thought of the s i g n i f i e d sense, indeed t o t h e t h i n g i t s e l f , (whether i t i s done i n the Aristotelian manner we have just i n d i c a t e d or In t h e manner o f m e d i e v a l t h e o l o g y , d e t e r m i n i n g t h e r e s as a t h i n g c r e a t e d from i t s e i d o s , from i t s sense t h o u g h t In t h e l o g o s or i n t h e infinite understanding of God). The written signifier is always technical and representative. I t has no c o n s t i t u t i v e meaning. T h i s d e r i v a t i o n i s the very o r i g i n of t h e n o t i o n of t h e " s i g n i f i e r . " The n o t i o n of the s i g n always implies within itself the distinction between signifier and signified, even i f , as Saussure argues, they are d i s t i n g u i s h e d s i m p l y as t h e two f a c e s of one and the same l e a f . T h i s n o t i o n remains t h e r e f o r e w i t h i n t h e h e r i t a g e of t h a t l o g o c e n t r i s m which i s a l s o a phonocentrism: a b s o l u t e p r o x i m i t y o f v o i c e and b e i n g , o f v o i c e and t h e meaning o f b e i n g , o f v o i c e and the i d e a l i t y of meaning. . . . What i s s a i d of sound i n g e n e r a l is a fortiori v a l i d f o r t h e phond by w h i c h , by v i r t u e of h e a r i n g (understanding)-oneself-speak — an l n d i s s o c i a b l e s y s t e m — t h e s u b j e c t e f f e c t s i t s e l f and i s r e l a t e d t o i t s e l f i n t h e e l e m e n t of i d e a l i t y . (Derrida,  1982e: 11-12)  155 And,  as  stated  emphasizing  at the beginning  of C h a p t e r  Two  and  worth r e -  here,  phonocentrism merges w i t h the h i s t o r i c a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e meaning of b e i n g i n g e n e r a l as p r e s e n c e , w i t h a l l t h e s u b - d e t e r m i n a t i o n s w h i c h depend on this g e n e r a l form and which organize within it their system and their historical sequence (presence of the thing to sight as e i d o s , p r e s e n c e as substance/essence/existence (ousla), t e m p o r a l p r e s e n c e as p o i n t ( s t i g m 6 ) of t h e now or of t h e moment ( n u n ) , t h e s e l f presence of the c o g l t o , consciousness, subjectivity, the co-presence of the o t h e r and o f t h e s e l f , i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y as t h e i n t e n t i o n a l phenomenon o f t h e ego, and so f o r t h ) . ( D e r r i d a , 1982e: 12)  Clifford's  emphasis  intersubjectivity phenomenological subjectivity.  problem  rather, between  dialogical  places of  him  this to  supposed  depict  the  immediacy  squarely  Clifford  within  to anthropology,  a  and/or the  consciousness  and  as  lntersubjective Thus,  and  assumes  consciousness  consciousnesses.  approach  the  consciousness  i n t e n t i o n a l or c o n s t i t u t i v e  best  such  speech,  philosophy  i s not  how  discursivity,  L i k e H u s s e r l b e f o r e him,  e x i s t e n c e o f an the  of  on  in  Clifford  such  but,  relations  extolling states,  fictions of d i a l o g u e have the effect of t r a n s f o r m i n g the "cultural" t e x t (a r i t u a l , an i n s t i t u t i o n , a l i f e h i s t o r y , or any u n i t o f t y p i c a l b e h a v i o r t o be d e s c r i b e d or i n t e r p r e t e d ) i n t o a s p e a k i n g s u b j e c t , who s e e s as w e l l as i s s e e n , who evades, argues, probes back. In t h i s v i e w o f e t h n o g r a p h y the proper  a  156 referent of any account is not a r e p r e s e n t e d " w o r l d " ; now i t i s s p e c i f i c instances of discourse. But the principle of dlaloglcal textual p r o d u c t i o n goes w e l l beyond t h e more o r less artful p r e s e n t a t i o n of "actual" encounters. It locates cultural interpretation in many sorts of reciprocal contexts, and i t obliges w r i t e r s t o f i n d d i v e r s e ways o f r e n d e r i n g n e g o t i a t e d r e a l i t i e s as m u l t i s u b j e c t i v e , p o w e r - l a d e n , and incongruent. In t h i s v i e w , " c u l t u r e " i s a l w a y s r e l a t i o n a l , an inscription of communicative processes that exist, historically, between s u b j e c t s i n r e l a t i o n s o f power. ( C l i f f o r d , 1986a: 14-15) (emphasis C l i f f o r d ' s and mine)  Clifford  then  monovocal  as  which a l l o w s  arrive  at  D i c k e n s , no are  argue  But  Clifford  to  realize  more  concerned  that  everything  although laughable structure  i t may  that with fits  must  be  to disperse viewed  'speech'  ( i n agreement  conclusion that  (Clifford,  as  there  are  ensuring together  with  such  the  Bakhtin)  works  to  totality" precisely  because  46-47).  Now  acquaintance with very  that in  few  there a  nonetheless  c o n t a i n i n g and  of  Charles  i t does Dickens's  novelists are  seamless  no  who  loose  whole,  indeed s t r e t c h c o i n c i d e n c e t o a l a r m i n g  extremes,  and  of  1988f:  n o t t a k e much more t h a n a n o d d i n g work  order  ' v o i c e ' or  "tend t o r e s i s t  plurivocal  in  It i s t h i s resolute non-questioning  bizarre  less,  that,  ethnographies  questioned.  the  to  polyvocal.  speech  they  on  authority,  constructed are never  goes  accounting  are ends,  which, i f not  provides  an  adamantine  f o r any  and  a l l events.  157 And  so  with  which w i l l  ethnography  lead  It  i s not  Derrida  of speech  has  or v o i c e as  shown,  i n immediate  consciousness  is  of  and  integrity  as  outset  unless  —  it  disallows What we  a  and  by  the  essential  —  to  otherness.  i t s existence  such,  privileged as  for i t i s of  i t cannot  be  possibility  interpretation Because concepts,  and/or  Clifford  addition  i.e.  intersubjectivity  speech, and  so  not  immediacy, on,  even  effect  does  totalizing  just  the  constructs,  opposite. Clifford  So  absolutely entity.  as  the  essential selfof  such.  question his basic  though  he  dialogue,  claims  to  be  a n t h r o p o l o g y he i n  f a r from  merely  own  diff6rance,  discourse,  concerned with espousing a n o n - t o t a l i z i n g  i t is  Inevitability  totalizing radically  from  its  What we do n o t have i s a concomitant  own  speech's  self-identical  i s the t r a c e ,  dialogical does  its  of  of d i s s e m i n a t i o n . the  always  what  possibility  and  and  i s compromised  i . e . u n d e c i d a b i l i t y and t h e c o n c o m i t a n t  concept  pure  In o t h e r words,  unique,  from the o u t s e t ,  the  supplement,  identical  voices  metaphysics  possibility  necessary  as a  be  as  concept  the  this  to  exist  o t h e r because itself  and  have,  cannot  self-sufficient i t s own  Western  speech,  not  adds  repetition  However,  i t s own  by  of  p r o x i m i t y w i t h b e i n g or  perceived  does  fissured  iterability  the  thus  meaning.  self-identical, already  number  such.  throughout  s p e e c h i s presumed t o be  vehicle  the  to a n o n - t o t a l i z i n g p r o d u c t , but a r e - w o r k i n g  of the v e r y n o t i o n As  —  adds  inventing  non-  h i s name t o t h e  158 long l i s t  o£  notion  subjectivity —  a  o£  thinkers  privileging  Clifford  of  the  that  or  The  their  work upon a  which, i n t u r n ,  discourse,  dialogue  of the  or s e l f .  Numerous v o i c e s  to  such  motivating  still  j u s t as  privileging  But  primary  is tied  to  Just  as  etc.  this  s u b j e c t i v i t y or  must  the  seems c o n t e n t  to  non-privileging  of  i s a very to  superficial  privileging  numerous s u b j e c t i v i t i e s  maintains  ethnographically,  the  come back  concepts remain  Clifford  inventive  s i n g u l a r v o i c e , so he  i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y ensures  s p e e c h as  back  a notion  speech,  singular subject  view.  predicate  seems c o n t e n t t o p o s i t t h a t p o l y v o c a l i t y e n s u r e s  non-privileging posit  who  voice  still  consciousness  as  come such.  untouched.  that  always  be  "identity, mixed,  [i.e. intersubjective]" (Clifford,  considered  relational, 1988c:  10)  and and  that, e t h n o g r a p h i c t e x t s are o r c h e s t r a t i o n s of multivocal exchanges occurring in politically charged situations. The s u b j e c t i v i t i e s produced i n these often u n e q u a l e x c h a n g e s — whether of " n a t i v e s " or o f v i s i t i n g p a r t i c i p a n t o b s e r v e r s , a r e constructed domains of truth, serious fictions. Once this is recognized, diverse inventive possibilities for p o s t c o l o n i a l ethnographic representations emerge. ( C l i f f o r d , 1988c: 10)  But  how  does t h i s  from H u s s e r l * s Referring  to  'recognition' d i f f e r  observation  i n any  significant  way  that s u b j e c t i v i t y i s c o n s t i t u t i v e ?  s u b j e c t i v i t y or  subjectivities  as  'constructed  159 domains  o£  truth, serious  problem  of  subjectivity  product  of  a  points  out  fictions'  as  such,  i n no  way  i . e . as,  addresses  the  essentially,  the  c o n s t i t u t i v e consciousness.  t h a t any  given  self  Clifford  or s u b j e c t i v i t y  is  merely  'fashioned'  f r o m numerous f r a g m e n t s —  of language, of c u l t u r e , of  personal  so  relations  conservative,  and  totalizing  acknowledge  as  much:  (Tennyson,  1958:  66).  "I  poet am  a  It  is  transforming  subjectivity  desperate  to avoid  a b o u t as  bid  w e l l as  on,  but  Tennyson  i f ever  there  part  a l l that  of  the  into  old  was  one) I  Husserlean  i t works  for Husserl.  As  for  Derrida  according to Husserl . . . the subject [ i s ] d e s i g n a t e d i n t e r m s of t h e c l a s s i c a l metaphysical schema w h i c h d i s t i n g u i s h e s substance (present being) from its attributes. A n o t h e r schema t h a t k e e p s the . . . a n a l y s i s w i t h i n the c l o s u r e of the metaphysics of presence is the subject-object opposition. This being whose "absolute properties" are indescribable is present as absolute subjectivity, i s an a b s o l u t e l y present and a b s o l u t e l y s e l f - p r e s e n t b e i n g , only i n o p p o s i t i o n to the o b j e c t . The o b j e c t is relative; what i s absolute is the subject. . . . This determination of " a b s o l u t e s u b j e c t i v i t y " would . . . have t o be c r o s s e d o u t as s o o n as we conceive t h e p r e s e n t on t h e b a s i s of d i f f e r e n c e , and not the reverse. The concept of subjectivity belongs a priori and in g e n e r a l to the order of the c o n s t i t u t e d . T h i s holds a f o r t i o r i f o r the a n a l o g i c a l appresentation that constitutes intersubjectivity. (Derrida,  1973b: 84-85)  (a  could  have  met"  trick  intersubjectlvity  s o l i p s i s m , and  i t worked  even  inter-  in  of a  Clifford says,  160 In o t h e r words, notion  of  constitutive  subjectivity is  not  but  per s e .  and  identical the  intersubjectivity  cannot  entity, notions  or  But  be  an  then of  Is as much a p r o d u c t  intentional i f , as we  consciousness  have s e e n ,  a b s o l u t e l y s e l f - p r e s e n t and  not o n l y the n o t i o n of  intentionality,  the  have  i t s roots  seen  t o have  order  self,  i n H u s s e r l , so h i s n o t i o n i n Gadamer.  relies  on  a  subjectivity, as w e l l .  This  attainment  Clifford's  essentially wherein  of  in  Chapter  dialogue  in  ' f u s i o n o f h o r i z o n s ' and t h e  n o t i o n of 'negotiated r e a l i t i e s '  r e l i e s on an  'truth*  cum  Gadamerlan  (partial  parties.  or  by t h e Again,  notion  otherwise)  'fusion'  the f a c t  that  ( i . e . the  'partial'  in  the  that  discounts  fact  of of  dialogue any  given  of the views of the  upon t h e n o n - a b s o l u t e way  shown  be  I n t h e same  i s determined  negotiating  As was  may  'the common m e a n i n g . '  Platonic  the  situation  of  be s e e n t o  of d i a l o g u e  Platonic notion  to achieve h i s hermeneutlc  no  self-  consciousness,  n o t i o n o f s u b j e c t i v i t y may  i t s roots  Gadamer  concomitant way,  is  does n o t r e c o g n i z e .  J u s t as C l i f f o r d ' s  Three,  as  consciousness  i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y and so on must be r e t h o u g h t Clifford  of the  Clifford  nature  of  his entire  insists 'truth')  conceptual  s y s t e m r e m a i n s p r e d i c a t e d upon and d e d i c a t e d t o an unexamined notion  of  existence other  presence of the v e r y  words,  attaining  which,  it  absolute  is  by  absolutes no  truth  use  definition, he  i s at pains  denying  i f one's  implies  the  entire  the  t o deny.  In  possibility  of  conceptual  frame  assumes taken  that  possibility  f o r granted  unexamined dialogue,  concept  —  one must  first  notions f o r , t o paraphrase i s not worth  f o r , as D e r r i d a  having.  look  to  one's  A r i s t o t l e , the  So w i t h s p e e c h and  points out,  [The s y s t e m o f s p e e c h ] r e q u i r e s t h a t i t be h e a r d and u n d e r s t o o d i m m e d i a t e l y by whoever emits i t . I t produces a s i g n i f i e r w h i c h seems n o t t o f a l l into the world, o u t s i d e the i d e a l i t y of the signified, but t o remain s h e l t e r e d — even a t t h e moment t h a t i t a t t a i n s t h e a u d i o p h o n i c s y s t e m o f t h e o t h e r -- w i t h i n the pure i n t e r i o r i t y of a u t o - a f f e c t i o n . I t does n o t f a l l i n t o t h e e x t e r i o r i t y o f s p a c e , i n t o what one c a l l s t h e w o r l d , which i s nothing but the o u t s i d e of speech. Within so-called "living" speech, the s p a t i a l e x t e r i o r i t y of the s i g n i f i e r seems a b s o l u t e l y r e d u c e d . . . Conversation [dialogue] i s , then, a communication between two absolute origins that, i f one may v e n t u r e t h e formula, auto-affect reciprocally, r e p e a t i n g a s immediate echo t h e a u t o affection produced by the other. Immediacy is here the myth of consciousness. Speech and c o n s c i o u s n e s s of s p e e c h — t h a t i s t o s a y c o n s c i o u s n e s s simply as self-presence — are the phenomenon o f a n a u t o - a f f e c t i o n l i v e d a s suppression of dlffFrance. That phenomenon, t h e presumed s u p p r e s s i o n o f d i f f 6 r a n c e , t h a t l i v e d r e d u c t i o n of the o p a c i t y of the s i g n i f i e r , a r e the o r i g i n s of what i s c a l l e d p r e s e n c e . ( D e r r i d a , 1982e: 166)  And,  indeed, C l i f f o r d  v e r y much s u b s c r i b e s t o t h i s  system of  s p e e c h and d i a l o g u e a s i n d i c a t i v e o f immediate  and  instances  of any account  of presence  —  "the proper r e f e r e n t  unmediated  is  not a r e p r e s e n t e d  of  discourse"  discourse'  (Clifford,  are  place of  nature  speech  of  of  as  14).  and  These  dlaloglcal  But  unquestioned  Immediate  i t is specific  which  to n e g o t i a t e .  w i t h i n the  . . .  1986a:  composed  intersubjective ethnographer  'world,'  it  the  entire  domain  of  being subject to i t e r a b i l i t y ,  riddled  i t s own  Impossibility Again,  as  unmedlated,  the r a m i f i c a t i o n s  Finally, that,  an  although  as  researchers  and  representations' questions  'has  Clifford's)  anthropology  the  'a  of t h i s Clifford  monophonically,  (emphasis  he  natives  follows:  "place likeness l i k e n e s s of  stand  f o r , correspond  t o be  p a r t of t h e 'sign'  something") — re-presenting  that an  .  .  to."  the  verb  in  which of  such. 'to  or  perceiving  i s to say,  he  The  never Oxford  represent'  senses,  as  serve  or  a c t as embodiment o f ,  as  be  seen  (n.b. t h e  OED  representative  of  i t assumes t h e  phenomenon  both  cultural  words,  in general  used  own  cultures'  T h u s , r e p r e s e n t a t i o n may  of the s i g n  or  its  anthropology  in  other  b e f o r e mind  "thing  idea  an  authors  In  have  concept.  represent  . . .symbolize,  order as  of  we  with  difficulty  mine).  defines  —  enterprise .  as  considered.  o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n as  Dictionary  defines  are  (emphasis  English  be meant as  no  to  takes  i s always a l r e a d y  such  must be  the  presence,  self-Identical  claimed has  of  as  and,  criticizes  dlaloglcal  nature  as  of the  procedure  self-identical  impossibility  task  speech  seen, speech, with  'Instances  situations,  is  this  instances  which  possibility pre-exists  of  said  163 representation  as a  self-contained  plenitude.  As  Derrida  points out, Between the overture and the philosophical accomplishment of phonologism (or l o g o c e n t r i s m ) , the motif o f p r e s e n c e was d e c i s i v e l y a r t i c u l a t e d . It underwent an i n t e r n a l modification whose most c o n s p i c u o u s index was t h e moment of c e r t i t u d e i n the C a r t e s i a n cogito. Before that, the i d e n t i t y of presence offered t o the mastery of repetition was constituted under t h e " o b j e c t i v e " form o f t h e I d e a l i t y o f t h e eidos or the s u b s t a n t i a l i t y of o u s i a . Thereafter, t h i s o b j e c t i v i t y takes the form of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , o f t h e i d e a as the modification of a self-present substance, conscious and c e r t a i n of i t s e l f a t t h e moment o f i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p to i t s e l f . W i t h i n i t s most g e n e r a l f o r m , the mastery of presence a c q u i r e s a s o r t of infinite assurance. The power o f r e p e t i t i o n t h a t t h e e i d o s and o u s i a made a v a i l a b l e seems t o a c q u i r e an a b s o l u t e independence. Ideality and s u b s t a n t i a l i t y r e l a t e to themselves, i n t h e e l e m e n t o f t h e r e s c o g l t a n s , by a movement of pure auto-affection. Consciousness i s the experience of pure auto-affection. ( D e r r i d a , 1982e: 97-98)  In  other  words,  representation consciousness presence.  We  consciousness Husserlean  i n post-Cartesian is as  philosophy  indissociable pure  from  auto-affection  have a l r e a d y  seen  i s developed  and e x t e n d e d  phenomenology  the —  as  concept pure  how t h e C a r t e s i a n  i s assumed  anthropology v i s & v i s Geertz  the concept of  self-  notion of  by H u s s e r l  by both  of  and how  'interpretive'  and 'postmodern*  anthropology  164 vis  & vis Clifford.  assumes  a  The n o t i o n  philosophy  moment o f i n d u b i t a b i l i t y t h e moment o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s  as pure  assumed  of  presence,  To r e p e a t ,  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s what  originary self-presence.  metaphor  etc.),  i s called  i s the concept of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n .  t h e n r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a s s u c h i s no l o n g e r can  no  phenomenon  longer  —  which  re-present  a  I f presence  speech,  i s always  i t s own a b s e n c e ,  a v i a b l e concept f o r  unique,  i s to say that  (e.g.  into question, so,  a l r e a d y d i v i d e d , always a l r e a d y r i d d l e d with  it  re-presents  However, i f t h e c o n c e p t  i n a l l i t s varied manifestations  consciousness, too,  which  such  as i t s  an  subjectivity  as  takes  self-presence.  of  of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  i t cannot  self-contained re-present,  as  such, a t a l l . Clifford, in  general,  Western  l i k e Geertz,  must  become  more  conceptuality.  Clifford, wittingly  and  aware  Unless  anthropologists  like  anthropologists  of the i m p l i c a t i o n s of  and  until  i n general,  this will  happens continue,  o r u n w i t t i n g l y , t o r e i n f o r c e and t o p e r p e t u a t e  repression/oppression acceptance  and, indeed,  which  of t o t a l i z a t i o n  comes  with  and h o m o g e n e i t y .  an  the  unexamined  165 Chapter  Concluding  In  this  final  chapter  Five  Assessments  I will  begin  by a s s e s s i n g  what  I  have a l r e a d y s a i d a b o u t G e e r t z and C l i f f o r d r e s p e c t i v e l y , and, in  so  doing,  will  attempt  'postmodern' a n t h r o p o l o g y H a v i n g done t h a t , consideration importance  Derridean  Geertz  phenomenology  and  and  that  i n t e r p r e t i v e and  t h e n go on t o s u g g e s t why  t o the d i s c i p l i n e  Both  show  a r e two s i d e s o f t h e same o l d c o i n .  I will  of  to  deconstruction of  is  of  or  Clifford  have  hermeneutlcs  totality.  methodological,  Their  i n that  and  o f t h e t e x t whereas C l i f f o r d the  dialogue.  •fixation record Clifford  of  of  3 1  meaning'  what lauds  discourses'  Thus  main  Geertz  their  both  roots  profess  difference  prefers  in  to  be  overarching  seems  the R i c o e u r i a n  to  be  model  p r e f e r s t h e G a d a m e r l a n model o f  Geertz  lauds  through  has  said"  the  possibility emphasizing  the  possibility  establishing a  man  through  crucial  anthropology.  c o n c e r n e d w i t h r e s c u i n g c u l t u r a l d i v e r s i t y f r o m an unity  a serious  (Geertz, of "the  a  of  a  "consultable  19731:  30)  while  'specification  intersubjectivity  of of  I n t e r e s t i n g l y , Rabinow comments t h a t i n C l i f f o r d ' s a r t i c l e , "On E t h n o g r a p h i c A u t h o r i t y " ( R e p r e s e n t a t i o n s 1, no. 2, 1983: 1 1 8 - 1 4 6 ) , he p r a i s e s Gadamer f o r a s p i r i n g t o ' r a d i c a l dialogism. However, i n t h e 1988 r e p r i n t o f t h i s a r t i c l e i n Clifford's The P r e d i c a m e n t of C u l t u r e , a l l reference to Gadamer has been d e l e t e d , one wonders why. 3 1  1  166 speech,  along  (Clifford, the  with  1988f: 41).  dlaloglcal  validation  whereby  dialogical  the  dialectic  idea  constitutive through of  of  of  a  speech). of  to  narrative  story  Clifford: a  hierarchical  explicitly course,  definition, and  awareness  nature  be  notion  of  a t work" be  the  (Clifford, that  their  respective  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n on t h e one  o f how  .  .  of  hand and s p e e c h  and  (Geertz  be]  the  9)  ethnography [and] or  (It will, such  i s , by  Thus on  get and  implicity  as  to  cast  stories  concept.)  emphases  the  best to  120-121)).  of  his notion  1988b:  .  a  and  respect  should  narrativity  a teleological/totalizing  Clifford,  with  powerful  1986b:  authors  emphasize  shows t h e  narrative  the  notion  idea  through  (Geertz,  of  an the  dialogue)  authors  of a l l e g o r y ]  remembered  both  his  of  stories  told"  of  at  consciousness  a matter  and  involved with  through  both  issue,  structure of  arrives But  "[Ethnography  honestly  "[A r e c o g n i t i o n  heightens  of  his  and/or  (e.g. Geertz:  honest  be  (Geertz  this,  . . as a n a r r a t o l o g i c a l  to  to  guess  represent  phenomenological  intentional  Further  ethnography  an  he  'reality.'  through  privilege or  context"  truth'  to  whereby  anthropology  of  'partial  attempts  such  process  process  h i s n o t i o n o f meaning and C l i f f o r d  importance  .  as  a  the  Clifford  Clifford  authors  at  of a n e g o t i a t e d  doing  and  through  arrives  situation(s)  hermeneutlc  both  he  performative  I n o t h e r words, G e e r t z a b s t r a c t s from  whereas  truth'  perceive  immediate  situation(s)  interpretation  'partial  its  Geertz  text  d i a l o g u e on  and the  167 o t h e r n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g , may be s e e n more  importantly,  t o be b o t h  perpetuators  of  a  c o n c e p t u a l i t y which m i t i g a t e s a g a i n s t t h e i r to  emphasize d i v e r s i t y / h e t e r o g e n e i t y  over  i n h e r i t o r s and, philosophical professed  unity/homogeneity.  At t h i s p o i n t i t i s n e c e s s a r y t o t a k e a b r i e f term  'postmodern' and a t t e m p t  desire  both t o s i t u a t e  look a t the  i t and t o a s s e s s  i t s a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s a s a d e s c r i p t i v e t a g f o r t h e work o f James Clifford.  Mark  3 2  postmodernism yet  Taylor  and i t s  encountered  provides  relationship  and s o I w i l l  quote  the c l e a r e s t t o modernism  account that  of  I have  him a t some l e n g t h :  The s e a r c h f o r I r r e d u c i b l e d i f f e r e n c e and r a d i c a l o t h e r n e s s o b s e s s e s many o f our most i m a g i n a t i v e and c r e a t i v e artists, w r i t e r s , p h i l o s o p h e r s , p s y c h o l o g i s t s , and theologians. Although i t recurs throughout the century, concern with difference and otherness is a d i s t i n g u i s h i n g t r a i t o f t h i n k e r s who c a n be described as "postmodern." " P o s t m o d e r n i s m " i s a n o t o r i o u s l y vague term. The o b s c u r i t y o f p o s t m o d e r n i s m reflects, in part, the continuing c o n f u s i o n s u r r o u n d i n g the n o t i o n of the modern. . . . W h i l e i t i s i m p o s s i b l e t o define and d e l i m i t m o d e r n i t y w i t h any d e g r e e o f p r e c i s i o n , t h e r e seems t o be a c o n s e n s u s t h a t modern p h i l o s o p h y b e g i n s with Descartes's inward turn to the subject. Plagued by u n c e r t a i n t y and doubt, Descartes seeks c e r t a i n t y through doubt. He d o u b t s e v e r y t h i n g u n t i l he r e a c h e s what he r e g a r d s a s i n d u b i t a b l e h i s own d o u b t i n g self. Descartes  F o r an i n t e r e s t i n g a c c o u n t o f t h e v a r i o u s s t r a n d s o f p o s t m o d e r n i s t t h o u g h t , t h e r e a d e r may w i s h t o c o n s u l t E . Ann Kaplan, e d . P o s t m o d e r n i s m and i t s D i s c o n t e n t s : T h e o r i e s , P r a c t i c e s (London: V e r s o , 1989). 3 3  labels this self-certain subject res c o g l t a n s , w h i c h he d i s t i n g u i s h e s f r o m a l l e l s e , d e s c r i b e d as r e s e x t e n s a . Having radically differentiated res cogltans from r e s e x t e n s a , D e s c a r t e s f a c e s the problem of e s t a b l i s h i n g the r e l a t i o n s h i p between s u b j e c t i v i t y and o b j e c t i v i t y . In a move t h a t becomes d e c i s i v e f o r many l a t e r thinkers, Descartes i n s i s t s that the s u b j e c t ' s r e l a t i o n t o o t h e r n e s s i s mediated by and reducible to its r e l a t i o n s h i p to I t s e l f . In the wake of Descartes's m e d i t a t i o n s , modern p h i l o s o p h y becomes a p h i l o s o p h y of t h e s u b j e c t . As t h e l o c u s o f c e r t a i n t y and t r u t h , s u b j e c t i v i t y i s the f i r s t p r i n c i p l e from which e v e r y t h i n g a r i s e s and t o w h i c h a l l must be r e t u r n e d . W i t h t h e movement f r o m D e s c a r t e s , t h r o u g h the Enlightenment to idealism and romanticism, attributes traditionally predicated of the divine subject are gradually displaced onto the human s u b j e c t . Through a d i a l e c t i c a l r e v e r s a l , t h e c r e a t o r God d i e s and i s r e s u r r e c t e d i n the c r e a t i v e s u b j e c t . As God created the world through the Logos, so man creates a "world" through conscious and unconscious projection. In different t e r m s , t h e modern s u b j e c t d e f i n e s itself by i t s c o n s t r u c t i v e a c t i v i t y . Like God, the sovereign subject r e l a t e s only to what i t constructs and therefore is u n a f f e c t e d by a n y t h i n g o t h e r t h a n i t s e l f . What a p p e a r s t o be a r e l a t i o n s h i p to o t h e r n e s s -- be t h a t o t h e r God, nature, o b j e c t s , s u b j e c t , c u l t u r e or h i s t o r y — always t u r n s out to be an aspect of mediate s e l f - r e l a t i o n t h a t i s n e c e s s a r y for complete self-realization in transparent self-consciousness. Absolute knowledge a c t u a l i z e d i n t h e f u l l selfconsciousness of the subject seems t o realize Western p h i l o s o p h y ' s dream of enjoying a t o t a l presence that i s n e i t h e r d i s t u r b e d by i r r e d u c i b l e d i f f e r e n c e nor i n t e r r u p t e d by t h e r e t u r n of an a b s o l u t e other. (Taylor,  1987a: x x i - x x l i )  169 Thus  modernism  self-certain  has  has  radical  alterity  Clifford  falls  as  do  with  knowledge and  postmodernism  for,  to  has  to  notions  totality  do  with  o£  self-identical/  ( i . e . presence),  irreducible  (i.e. undecidability).  difference In  these  camp as does  been  Geertz  seen,  both  he  and  a c o n c e p t u a l i t y t h a t i s r o o t e d i n assumptions of hence  totality)  dialecticlty the  case,  to  the  Clifford  literature one  hence  term and  application  to  (and  has for  that  gained i t can  currency do  merely  contradictory.  by  default,  the  wish  to  there"  i n order  not And  if  suffice  intentions  implicit  reach  the  (Descombes,  promised 1985:  will  w i t h i n one's  Descombes r e m a r k s ,  "We  must be  land  77).  This  of  being  as a p p l i e d that  this  anthropological  is referred to  state  t o be  so  -- i f  ends  up  being  one  contradiction (as  is  not  i t i s not  and  submits  always  (In  merely  actually  pursued  a  i.e.  spawn c o n f u s i o n .  i n C l i f f o r d ' s work) t h e n one f o r one's  misnomer  even G e e r t z  this  —  assumptions  other.  recent  on  subjectivity  unfortunate  follow suit  i t s ramifications  assumptions  Vincent  is a  but  not  and  the  in  nothing  I t does  c o n c e p t u a l i t y does  t h e y are not  on  ( K a p f e r e r , 1989)  one's  and  hand  exceedingly  is non-totalizing  recognized  one  totality)  is  postmodernist!) one  the  'postmodernism' it  recent a r t i c l e as  on  Geertz  rely  i s phenomenological/hermeneutical  and  terms,  as much i n t o t h e m o d e r n i s t  conceptuality that  (and  whereas  to  totality  remain prey  conceptual  to  frame.  As  wary o f m i s t a k i n g  the  for having  already  arrived  170 In  any  Clifford its  case,  also  given  holds  which  diversity  are  always  within  avoid  this  assumption,  unity,  to  term  (which  i s always  its  partner),  essence  and/or  and  utterly  closer help  have of  viewed  as  assumption  away  t o an  assumed be of  which  self-certain  such  an  hierarchical  always  from  seen  the  as  favoured  presence  than i s  repressive  presence  oppressivity that  i t is crucial  of  both  avoid  and  Is t h e  very  for i t requires,  there  be  exists  an as  plenitude.  by  absolute, an  It  a  ultimate,  follows  that  o t h e r n e s s a r e g i v e n c r e d e n c e o n l y i n so f a r as  the  status  course, in  of  mere  variations  otherness,  of  difference  that  on  being absolute presence)  any  way  threatening  of o v e r - a r c h i n g p l e n i t u d e .  essential  certain,  falling  but  to  because  is  of  identity,  how  And  a series term  notion  within  becomes  and  i . e . that  assumed  presence  the assumption  signified,'  dominant,  d i f f e r e n c e and  the  a  in principle,  'transcendental  theme,  as  cannot  Indeed,  problem  one  Geertz  in general,  i n an  i t does,  o f r e p r e s s i v i t y and  definition  they  as  for  difference  of  wherein  subservient  oppressive.  the  assumption  pairs  holds  remaining coherent.  requiring,  oppositional  embedded  subsumes  doing t h i s while s t i l l to  what  for anthropology  c o n c e p t u a l frames  presence  that  possibility radical  the  This  disrupts presence  -and —  an  theme  they  of  displaces never  not  fundamental case,  radical  otherness  is  (the  are  b e i n g the  undecldability,  difference  actually  self-identical  of  to  --  a  a  and  a  self-  seriously  171 considered outset,  because  such  t o be u t t e r l y  a possibility  charter every if  works  Itself  f o r sexism,  out  an  then  ultimate,  there  which  presence. nearer  or  perceived  no  mistake,  European  example, still  analysis,'  self-contained  closely  phenomena  are  favoured  from  c u l t u r e s because  s u b j e c t peoples  of  Western  is  to that  those  t o be  which  are derided. culture  t h e former  was  was  are  To t a k e  ( a n d , make  considered  of d i f f e r e n c e  and  A l lthis  of  What  them  i s this  into  minor  what  a s t o who  should  i s , of course,  burden* essence versions  but the r e p r e s s i o n /  i n t h e name o f e s s e n t i a l secret  t o be  'progress  man's  o f b r i n g i n g o u t t h e human  i t I s no  essential  Thus t h e 'white  by t r a n s f o r m i n g  Europeans.  discouraged.  as t o  are perceived  while  presence  and s o o n .  of  of course,  presence,  notions  t o God, t h e r l g h t n e s s and i n e v i t a b i l i t y  oppression  For  to refer  approximate  which  Western European  was p e r c e i v e d t o c o n s i s t  what  most  p o l i t i c s of  i s ) presumed t o be s u p e r i o r t o n o n - W e s t e r n  civilization'  And,  and  very  i t n o t be?  b u t be c o r r e s p o n d i n g  t o be f u r t h e r  obvious  i t Is the  ( i n t h e g u i s e o f God, t h e Good, T r u t h , t h e  whatever)  an  and  those  t o presence  Proper  closer  help  phenomena  Thus  —  how c o u l d  i n the ' f i n a l  self-certain  cannot  existing  In p r a c t i c e  And, i n d e e d ,  e v e r y t h i n g I s presumed,  to  t o s e e how t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n o f  r a c i s m and G o d - i s - o n - o u r - s i d e  description.  from t h e  impossible.  Now i t i s n o t d i f f i c u l t presence  i s presumed,  be  gets  identity? to define  developed,  well  what  documented and  172 need  not  be  dwelt  same d e d i c a t i o n continues I  of  Derrida,  premised  definition  this  upon  so  I  do  s i t u a t i o n , but  recognizing  and  the  I do  the  effort  old  questions,  rather  involved  different  forgiveness?"  old  know  not  think of,  1963b:  40))  baby —  you  t r y harder"  time  to  take  remembered  a  closer  from  undecldability prevents  effort  any  of  Chapter  i s an  given  at  such  from  i t is  the with  deal  possible  very  least,  recognition  t o s h y away from the  mire of  Eliot  says,  'the in  knowledge,  rather,  to  a  what  take  the  better  trying effort,  for  existence  As  disseminative occurring  ever  ( i t s i m p o s s i b i l i t y ) while the  by and  to  know what you  the  always a l r e a d y  of  of  how  undecldability.  identical the  be,  do  ( J o p l i n , 1975).  Two,  concept  that  T.S,  trying, this  look  exactly  at  but,  l a t e J a n i s J o p l i n : "You  in this  notion  oppression  out  "After  of the  So,  unexamined  along  (as  advice  better  an  o b l i g a t i o n not  context,  (Eliot,  our  institutionalized  to  answers*  and  point i s ,  as  to  i n t r y i n g to get  the  today  conceptuality  a c k n o w l e d g i n g i t . And  acknowledgement comes t h e  this  long  Importance  and  that  operative  repression/  pretend  Is  The  principle,  not  over-emphasize  so  me  oppression.  dedicated  will  in  and  that  and  long  and  inevitable.  to  to presence remains f u l l y  with  presence,  with  what c o n c e r n s  t o foment r e p r e s s i o n  believe,  remains  upon h e r e ,  being  simultaneously  concept  as  an  will play  process  closed  i t is  and  be of  which self-  allowing  effect  (its  173 possibility) , primordial  concepts  are  occupying  they  are  any  position  recognized  which  absolutely  as  determines  impossibility  --  a  accounting  of  being  always  both  their  play for  which any  cease  function concepts  as  to  function  --  all-determining  as s u c h .  As  as they  absolute  only  effects are  and  them  situation  entitles  they or  by  a  their  from  ever  whatsoever.  i s not t o say t h a t that  a  because  fissured  possibility  prevents  of  precluded  dominance  already  given  A g a i n , I must e m p h a s i z e t h a t t h i s will  seen  disseminative undecidability,  from  play  Once  3 3  will  essences,  concepts cease  to  i . e . as  Henry S t a t e n puts i t ,  D e r r i d a . . . d e n i e s what we c o u l d c a l l the i m p e r m e a b i l i t y of the as-such, the transcendenta 1ity or logical s u p e r h a r d n e s s o f t h e b a r r i e r t h a t marks off the conceptual purity of X from e v e r y t h i n g t h a t i s not-X. I t i s not t h a t identity i s drowned i n o t h e r n e s s , b u t that i t is necessarily open to i t , c o n t a m i n a t e d by i t . Yet t h e n e c e s s i t y or e s s e n t i a l c h a r a c t e r of t h i s c o n t a m i n a t i o n c a n n o t be named u n l e s s we f i r s t g r a s p t h e c o n c e p t or e s s e n c e or form as p u r i t y , as pure p o s i t i v e s e l f - i d e n t i t y . Otherwise e i t h e r there i s nothing to contaminate, or t h e f o r c e o f t h e c o n t a m i n a t i o n i s n o t felt. Furthermore, the claims of positive s e l f - i d e n t i t y are undeniable. I t s h o u l d be n o t e d t h a t t h i s h o l d s f o r t h e c o n c e p t o f d i f f e r e n c e e v e r y b i t as much as i t h o l d s f o r t h e c o n c e p t o f identity. The reader must take care not to confuse 'difference,' a philosophical concept which presupposes ultimate r e s o l u t i o n w i t h i n a u n i f i c , s e l f - i d e n t i c a l presence, w i t h d l f f F r a n c e , the always a l r e a d y o c c u r r i n g p r o c e s s of u n d e c i d a b i l i t y , w h i c h i s n e i t h e r d i f f e r e n c e nor i d e n t i t y b u t w h i c h a l l o w s f o r t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f b o t h as an e f f e c t o f i t s disseminative play. 3 3  174 The Now c a n n o t be r e d u c e d t o t h e not-now. I t s e s s e n t i a l l i n k a g e w i t h t h e not-now compromises t h e p u r i t y o f i t s p o s i t i v e I d e n t i t y without d e s t r o y i n g i t . The point of departure of deconstruction from p h i l o s o p h y i s thus q u i t e s u b t l e . The v a l u e and n e c e s s i t y o f pure concepts and c a t e g o r i e s are not d e n i e d , b u t t h e y a r e no l o n g e r t h e l a s t word. We no l o n g e r s i m p l y n o t e and t h e n set aside the f a c t u a l or empirical contamination o f our u n i t i e s , but see that they a r e Impure always and I n p r i n c i p l e , and p u r s u e t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h i s e s s e n t i a l law o f i m p u r i t y . (Staten,  Now  i f concepts,  as such,  dominate any g i v e n last  word,'  then  conceptuality openness this  field,  to radical  otherness  which  c a n no l o n g e r c a n no l o n g e r  i t  as such  1984: 18-19)  becomes  and t o t a k e alterity. cannot  be s e e n  totally  be s e e n t o have 'the  necessary account  And  to  this  to  re-think  of i t s  essential  radical  alterity,  within  the s e l f -  be h o m o g e n i z e d  same o f c l a s s i c a l c o n c e p t u a l i t y , i s t h e d i s s e m i n a t i v e  play of  undecldability. It concern  is  important  with  nihilistic.  to  realize  undecldability As D e r r i d a  is  that  the  neither  deconstructive negative  says,  Deconstruction always presupposes affirmation, as I have frequently attempted t o p o i n t o u t . . . . I do n o t mean t h a t t h e d e c o n s t r u c t i n g s u b j e c t o r s e l f a f f i r m s . I mean t h a t d e c o n s t r u c t i o n i s , i n i t s e l f , a p o s i t i v e r e s p o n s e t o an a l t e r i t y w h i c h n e c e s s a r i l y c a l l s , summons or m o t i v a t e s i t . . . . The o t h e r , a s t h e other than s e l f , t h e other t h a t opposes  nor  175 s e l f - i d e n t i t y , i s not something t h a t can be detected and disclosed within a p h i l o s o p h i c a l s p a c e and w i t h t h e a i d of a p h i l o s o p h i c a l lamp. The o t h e r p r e c e d e s philosophy and n e c e s s a r i l y invokes and p r o v o k e s t h e s u b j e c t b e f o r e any g e n u i n e q u e s t i o n i n g can b e g i n . It is in this r a p p o r t with the other t h a t a f f i r m a t i o n expresses itself. ( D e r r i d a i n K e a r n e y , ed., 1984: 118)  In  other  words,  explanation presence, e.g.  an  such  on  the  on t h e  and  This  hand  in  the  or  an  guise  on t h e  predicated  disseminative  Impossibility  insists  entire  the  authority.  To  undecidability situates contained  put  Western  of  self-sufficient  o r i g i n a r y doubling  constantly both  the  affirms  not  negate  i s to say,  inevitable,  the  way,  concept which  along  as  such, into the  presupposes  its  concern  philosophy  rather than being  Western thought  an  with  Derrida's  Western  of  possibility  openness which c a l l s  thought  i t another  does  i t . That and  of  notion  closure,  interpreted  interpretation/explanation  classical  tradition  an  of  essential possibility  for  on a r e c o g n i t i o n of r a d i c a l  question  of  or  p l a y of a n o n - f i n i t e on  play  in allowing  of  of  explained  concentrates  which,  upon n o t i o n s  essential possibility  (which, b e i n g  undecidability  one  one  interpretation  predicated  u n d e c i d a b i l i t y , presupposes the  openness).  and  the  referent  other)  dissemination  unlike  (which, being  presuppose ultimate  theme(s) result  as  deconstruction,  s e e n as  i s seen  as  with —.  it  selfmerely  p o s s i b l e o f f s h o o t o f an o r i g i n a r y u n d e c i d a b i l i t y , and,  as  such, what  It  i s always  already riddled  i t defines i t s e l f  other.  And  prohibits  this  a dominance which  nihilism  or  most  essential  Western  Similarly,  as  thought  possibility from  respect  absolute  the  p r o p e r l y not  ever  i t nonetheless with  with  of  possibility  of  being,  i.e. its  radical  alterity  attaining  a  closure  and  presumes.  to  undecidability  indeterminacy,  Derrida  entailing  comments  as  follows:  DlffFrance i s not indeterminacy. It renders determinacy both possible and necessary. Someone m i g h t s a y : b u t i f i t renders determinacy possible, i t is because i t itself is "indeterminacy." P r e c i s e l y n o t , s i n c e f i r s t of a l l i t " i s " i n I t s e l f n o t h i n g o u t s i d e of d i f f e r e n t d e t e r m i n a t i o n s ; s e c o n d , and c o n s e q u e n t l y , i t n e v e r comes t o a f u l l s t o p anywhere, a b s o l u t e l y t e l l e ne s ' a r r e t e n u l l e p a r t ] , and Is n e i t h e r n e g a t i v i t y nor n o t h i n g n e s s (as i n d e t e r m i n a c y would b e ) . ( D e r r i d a , 1988a: 149)  In  other  accounts  words,  the  simple  simple  ( i n the  crucial  sense  element  that  of  or  a  form  effects,  simple  essence)  of of  and  cannot  of  be  one  anything. its  undecidability relativism.  because  it  the i m p o s s i b i l i t y  negativity,  consisting  deconstruction  importance  constituting  a  undecidability,  e f f e c t s and  of those  indeterminacy,  contained reason  of  f o r both determined  the a b s o l u t e nature a  play  p e r c e i v e d as or,  pure It  is  insistence cannot  of  be  Indeed, and  a  self-  for upon  this the  viewed  R e l a t i v i s m presumes  as a  177 notion  o£  context  validating. always the  contexts  I f , however,  already  inscribed  like  deconstructed  —  own  a l l  as  s e l f - c o n t a i n e d and  contexts  with  p o s s i b i l i t y of t h e i r  relativism,  of  or  what  as  such  they  otherness,  give  way  seen  not,  to  be  i . e . with  then the  concept  of  concepts,  must  be  3 4  philosophical  i t must  are  are  self-  to the  disseminative  play  undecidability. As  will  be  recalled,  Dissemination . . . although producing a n o n f i n i t e number of s e m a n t i c e f f e c t s , c a n be l e d back n e i t h e r t o a p r e s e n t of simple origin . . . nor to an eschatological presence. I t marks an i r r e d u c i b l e and g e n e r a t i v e m u l t i p l i c i t y . The s u p p l e m e n t and t h e t u r b u l e n c e of a c e r t a i n l a c k f r a c t u r e t h e l i m i t of t h e t e x t , f o r b i d d i n g an e x h a u s t i v e and c l o s e d formalization of i t , or at least a s a t u r a t i n g taxonomy o f i t s themes, i t s s i g n i f i e d , i t s meaning. ( D e r r i d a , 1981g: 45)  The  p o i n t i s , i f we  which  are  in  must  acknowledge  or  intimation about  the  3 4  Four.  an  which  closure, that way  See my  no  principle  undecidability unity  can  we  longer think  absolute  and  originary precludes  then  we  "Something think"  any must  i n terms of  self-contained, i f  doubling,  an  possibility follow  i s happening  (Geertz,  concepts  to the  1983a:  d i s c u s s i o n of the concept  up  20).  we  essential of  on  Geertz's  way  we  And  of c o n t e x t  ultimate  think  what  is  i n chapter  178 happening  I s t h a t we c a n no l o n g e r  t o s a y , we  c a n no l o n g e r  self-identical and  defines  assume t h e e x i s t e n c e  consciousness  self-identical the verb  ' t h i n k ' as such —  o r mind w h i c h  thoughts.  (The O x f o r d  t h a t Is  o£ a s i n g u l a r ,  intends  singular  English Dictionary  'to t h i n k ' a s : " i n t e n d , expect.  . . .  form  conception  o f . . . . i n d e p e n d e n t mind.")  R a t h e r , we must be  attentive  to  a  generative  an  essential  heterogeneity,  undecidability. anthropology  And  and  this  close  concept  primordial  disseminative  might  this  look  dissertation.  examination  has done  and  up t o t h i s  by c o n c e p t .  That  back  are absolute  and o t h e r  door.  like  for  deconstruction point  and  —  author  And  homogeneous letting  such m a n i f e s t a t i o n s this  unconsciously relying  guarding  of  anthropology  because such concepts both  presence  is  repressive  of  and  of  what  by  author  to undecidability  and  notions  none o f our  that  against  we  must  of p l e n i t u d e ,  of presence  on v a r i o u s c o n c e p t s  assumptions  principle,  of  i s , i t i n v o l v e s an  An a t t e n t i v e n e s s  c o n s t a n t l y be on g u a r d a g a i n s t totality  play  i t l o o k s l i k e what I have a t t e m p t e d  i n v o l v e s a r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t none o f o u r c o n c e p t s , assumptions,  and  i n general?  t o do t h r o u g h o u t  anthropology  a  what  Well, to begin with,  extremely  openness,  i n by t h e  consciously  or  which a r e r o o t e d i n  fundamental  Importance  a r e , by d e f i n i t i o n oppressive.  to  and i n  They  are  r e p r e s s i v e b e c a u s e t h e y a b s o l u t e l y d e n y t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f an alterity  or o t h e r n e s s  that  i s n o t subsumed w i t h i n n o t i o n s o f  179 unity  and  self-identity  translates Western  to  'primitive' to  and  properly  considered  (and  are)  subservient the  symbolizing  as  t o human  oppositionality  a  of  structured  In such  pair  i s considered  way  the  that  oppositional the  pair  privileged  and  of  itself.  possibility  half  of  i s considered  half  and  the h a l f  a  t o an  of r a d i c a l  Is  to  hence  is  merely  to  underscore  of  been  properly words,  product  of  presence  is  half.  The  hierarchically  structured  t o be a c o r r u p t  v e r s i o n of  t o have  no s t a n d i n g  in  the e s s e n t i a l  of u n d e c i d a b i l i t y , i s not  only  form  and  o r i g i n a r y and a l l -  to  impure  to  o f an o p p o s i t i o n a l  into c o n s i d e r a t i o n , the non-privileged an  a  of  taken be  good  In other  say, because  alterity,  cultures,  s u r e l y cannot  over t h e other  and, t h e r e f o r e ,  That  inferior  l i f e - f o r m s have  concept  closest  men,  (and h e r e  symbolizing  which  encompassing presence i s p r i v i l e g e d non-privileged  people  and i m p u r i t y  to  as  as  as i n f e r i o r  l i f e - f o r m s and so on.  manifestations  which  of white  inferior  to  'civilized'  c o i n c i d e n t a l ) , non-human  hierarchical  various  to  to white  evil  viewed  subservient  (and a r e ) v i e w e d  notions  viewed  are)  (and a r e ) v i e w e d  subservient  Western  p u r i t y and b l a c k  been  repression  Thus t h r o u g h o u t  (and  properly been  abstract  been  subservient  have  properly  traditional  be  hence  this  oppression.  have  c u l t u r e s have  of c o l o u r  hence  women  and  and hence  people  and  into a very concrete  'history'  inferior  —  i t s partner  the e s s e n t i a l  unity  half  i s deemed  and hence of  a  serves  dominating  180 presence favour for  —  a dominating  of t h a t which  example,  evil,  is  presence  which  i s p e r c e i v e d t o be c l o s e s t  in Christian  considered  theology, Satan,  to  be  from  a  fallen  considered  t o be f u r t h e r  only,  f o r God i n him" ( M i l t o n ,  shee  i t is 'civilized'  define be  that  further  created him;  essence; from  man  male  God t h a n  them, and God s a i d  the  fish  the earth,  living  Ch.I,  v.  term  that and  i n such  an i n f e r i o r  ("Hee f o r God  of the essence  of humanity  p r o p e r l y e x p r e s s and are considered to  life-forms  ("26. So God  them.  27. And God b l e s s e d  Be f r u i t f u l  and m u l t i p l y , and  i t : and have d o m i n i o n  over  form  moveth so  upon  on.  the earth"  The  oppositional  point  pairs  of the p r i v i l e g e d  (Genesis,  i s , the  i s always term  non-  s e e n as  and, as such,  s u b j e c t t o abuse and s c o r n . If  mentioned of  are  i n t h e image o f God c r e a t e d he  and subdue  thing  26-27));  privileged  is  them,  women  o f t h e s e a , and o v e r t h e f o w l o f t h e a i r , and o v e r  every  being  t h e embodiment o f angel;  life-forms  c r e a t e d he  unto  Thus,  'primitive'  a r e human  i n h i s own image,  In  1975: 2 8 5 ) ) ;  who most  non-human  and f e m a l e  replenish  peoples  skewed  to i t .  God t h a n a r e men  peoples are considered to partake but  i s always  the  kinds  concrete  c a n be s e e n t o be l o g i c a l  a conceptuality  then  of  that  t h e importance  conceptuality  should  anthropologists,  is itself  oppression  that  I  have  and i n e v i t a b l e e x t e n s i o n s dedicated  to  repression,  o f d e c o n s t r u c t i n g and r e s i t u a t i n g be  considered  but by a l l t h o s e  paramount  who  have  not  been  that  only  by  brought  up  181 within  the  emphasize be  domain  that  destroyed  in  their  of  this  Western  i s not  absolutely  absolute  only  form.  And  and  entailing,  i t does, the  which  i t i s no  contain it  and  i s no  pair  be  that  for  contained  cannot  be  name  contained  opposition  or  one  and  which  allows  I  say  term  to  of be  unity  definition domination. difference fundamental  product  for  a  and  of in  In o t h e r between  or  of  such,  presence  of  an  to  oppositional  by  its  radical  partner,  alterity  clear, radical i.e.  it  and  alterity  is  that  which  of  binary  f o r by  the  logic  (which  is  the  the  possibility  logic  of  a  of  assumption  words, what we fundamental --  the  of  are  which  of  dealing  a  i s seen is,  by  absolute with  heterogeneity latter  but  originary  presence,  incapable  a  certain  because  p r o d u c t o f an  a conceptuality  principle,  homogeneity  as  'certain' conceptuality  an  a  this  i n the presumption of p r e s e n c e )  undecidability, unlike the  destroyed  s i t u a t i o n i n which  dominated  c o n c e p t u a l i t y w h i c h i s s e e n t o be t h e play  must  implies.  accounted  rooted  conceptuality.  notion  undecidability,  Western p h i l o s o p h y  must  deconstruction,  a  of p r i m o r d i a l  trinltarian  nonetheless  for  for  within  and  be  conceptuality  been s u f f i c i e n t l y  for  t h e y must  a l l phenomena, a  such a r e c o g n i t i o n  another  I  acknowledgement of a s i t u a t i o n i n  legitimate  I hope has  of  Again,  Western concepts  this  possible  to a recognition  As is  account  that that  resituatlng  longer  longer  to  leads all  as  to say  —  displacement  thought.  leading  is  the  and  a  to  a  182 conceptuality contained by  a  implies  can  or  never  purely  conceptuality  radical  then  'impure'  contaminated grounding structured resolution  by  and  heretofore  than  again  be  be  other  pairs  a  a conceptuality predicated skewed  acceptable.  Obviously,  the  fundamentally  conceptuality oppression. or, a t l e a s t ,  to  presumptuous  either  of  be  hence  purely  words,  an  if  essential  always  t o be  series  of  which  ultimate  presence.  and m o r a l  i s , quite  of  hierarchically  repression/oppression  upon a n o t i o n  already  incapable  presuppose  What  which  has  outcome o f  o f p r e s e n c e and i t s simply,  no  longer  I am n o t s a y i n g t h a t a r e a l i z a t i o n o f  repressive/oppressive result  in  But I am s a y i n g should  repression/  other  all-encompassing  binarism  will  on  product  been t h e i n e v i t a b l e l o g i c a l  concomitant  that  In  --  and a  within a unific, that  or u n d e c i d a b i l i t y  justified  the  i t is.  and m o r a l i t y a s s u c h must be s e e n  validating  is  self-  t h a n what  the f a c t  definition  their  and  f o r Western thought i n  grounds.  to  oppositional  means  alterity  less  logic  by  closed  other  (and, indeed,  moral  i s seen  undecidability,  this  of  i s nothing  logical  definition  l e a d i n g t o a c o n c e p t u a l i t y which i s  f o r anthropology  oppression  be  by  open and a l w a y s a l r e a d y  recognition  general)  to  Is  and t h e f o r m e r  definition  What  which  result  an  that  end  nature to  of  Western  repression  such a r e a l i z a t i o n  and  could,  i n an end t o t h e u n c o n s c i o u s and  manufacture  and  perpetuation  of  183 repression/oppression unexamined I (and,  that  of c o u r s e ,  hot  of  the  conceptuality Clifford  has  (and,  to  develop  to  the  mindless  What  f o r , as  incumbent  assumption  upon  of  an  anthropologists  o n l y upon a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s )  as  of I  and  assuming  hope  my  easy task  t o work  this  teasing  field Derrida  such  and  within  points  Geertz  falling tease  and back  out  and  i t s cracks  and  developing  s i t u a t i o n s i t i s not  hyper-  unexamined  of  to avoid  c o n s t a n t l y to  out  t o be  an  examination  p o s s i b i l i t i e s inherent  in concrete  say,  is  shown, i t i s no  o l d assumptions)  like  it  dangers  on  fissures.  the  conceptuality.  believe  aware  through  might  possible  out,  Deconstruction, i n the s i n g u l a r , i s not " i n h e r e n t l y " a n y t h i n g a t a l l t h a t might be determinable on the basis of [ l o g o c e n t r i s m ] and of i t s c r i t e r i a . It i s " i n h e r e n t l y " n o t h i n g a t a l l ; the l o g i c of e s s e n c e (by o p p o s i t i o n t o a c c i d e n t ) , of the proper (by opposition to the improper), hence of t h e "inherent" by o p p o s i t i o n t o the e x t r i n s i c , i s p r e c i s e l y what a l l d e c o n s t r u c t i o n has from the start called into question. D e c o n s t r u c t i o n does n o t e x i s t somewhere, pure, p r o p e r , s e l f - i d e n t i c a l , o u t s i d e of its inscriptions in conflictual and differentiated contexts; i t " i s " only what I t does and what i s done w i t h i t , t h e r e where i t t a k e s p l a c e . I t i s [not p o s s i b l e ] to give a univocal d e f i n i t i o n or an adequate description of this "taking place." ( D e r r i d a , 1988a: 141)  look  for  me  184 In  other  will  words,  look  like,  particular because  a p p l i c a t i o n of  what t r a c e s  context  of  a  fundamental  possible  to  f o r me  of to  it  any  apply  applied, but for  and  to  presuppositions  and  James C l i f f o r d and  the  any  given  deconstructive the  field  radically  Thus w h i l e reading  to  their  to  show,  field  situation  word f o r what t h e y it  is  presuppositions  of  inability  project  to  deconstructlve may  indeed  strength approach. appealing every  be  be  this  situation  essential  of  as  of  their  is due  to  found a  with  an  with  the  Although  i t i s very the  the  riddled  e a c h and  openness  much  the If  with  a l l too  each  which  and  multiple  undecidability, every  a  deconstructive  against  assumption.  essential  then  tried  situations  already  an  I have  undeconstructed  i t mitigates on  cannot  potential  of  rest  on  a  weakness  always to  of  that  because  I  imbued  results yet  And  b e c a u s e , as  I believe  a  heterogeneity,  approached  the  utilized  question.  conceptuality.  the  irritating,  temptation  possibilities  they  entirely  Western  than  in  found  already  reading  rather And  it  r e s p e c t i v e l y , and  implications  had  a  s t r a t e g y b e c a u s e t h a t would depend e n t i r e l y  particular  take  situation  not of  c h o s e n c o n c e p t u a l i t y , I c a n n o t s a y what t h e y m i g h t have in  the  this  because  situation.  a deconstructlve  Geertz  the  is  given  what i t  f o l l o w , d e p e n d s upon  respectfulness  t e x t s of C l i f f o r d delineate  deconstruction,  obscurantism,  intense  nature  i t will  which  built-in  and  heterogeneous is  the  situation precludes  an must the  185 possibility, abstract  --  alterity, than  a  this  say, is  radical  radical  which  and  canon a l o n g takes  this  validity  of  evasion  nor  inevitable corollary heterogeneity  rather  homogeneity. the  recognition  essential undecidability, calls re-reading  the  neither  n e c e s s a r y and  deconstruction,  anthropological fieldwork  should  e s s e n t i a l and  e s s e n t i a l and  What  I  Again,  i t i s the  e m p h a s i z i n g an  t h a n an  perhaps  projection.  obscurantism of  or,  resituating with,  of  radical  f o r Is n o t h i n g of  course,  resituating  of  into  the an  less  entire  approach  account."  to We  With r e s p e c t to f i e l d w o r k , i t i s c r u c i a l to look a t the way i n w h i c h f i e l d w o r k e r s a r e now t r a i n e d . At t h e u n d e r g r a d u a t e l e v e l t h e A n t h r o p o l o g y s t u d e n t t a k e s a s e r i e s of c o u r s e s w h i c h e m p h a s i z e t h e h i s t o r y o f t h e d i s c i p l i n e , two or t h r e e c u l t u r e a r e a s ( w h i c h a r e c o n s t i t u t e d by t h e w r i t i n g s o f ' b i g name' a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s ) , methods and t h e o r i e s . A t t h e g r a d u a t e l e v e l t h e s t u d e n t engages In more o f t h e same and t h e n s e t s t o c o n d u c t her f i e l d w o r k -- a f t e r w h i c h she r e t u r n s , w r i t e s up her e x p e r i e n c e s ( c a t e g o r i z i n g them w i t h i n t h e framework of any one of a number o f methods a n d / o r t h e o r i e s ) and Is a c c e p t e d by t h e ' s c h o l a r l y community' ( i n t h e f o r m of a d i s s e r t a t i o n c o m m i t t e e ) on t h e b a s i s of how w e l l she c a r r i e s out t h i s e n t e r p r i s e . Now, a l l of t h i s t r a i n i n g , and t h e final judgement o f t h e s t u d e n t ' s work, a c c e p t s , w i t h o u t q u e s t i o n , the fundamental c o r r e c t n e s s of the Western m e t a p h y s i c a l n o t i o n of p r e s e n c e and a l l t h a t f l o w s t h e r e f r o m . So, whether v a r i a t i o n s on t h e theme o f p r e s e n c e come i n t h e f o r m of T y l o r i a n e v o l u t i o n i s m , Radcliffe-Brownian structure-functionalism, Malinowskinian biopsychological functionalism, L6vi-Straussian structuralism, G e e r t z i a n i n t e r p r e t i s m or C l l f f o r d i a n ' p o s t m o d e r n i s m , ' t h r o u g h o u t her c a r e e r , t h e a n t h r o p o l o g i s t , so f a r f r o m b e i n g e n c o u r a g e d t o examine t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s o f her p r e s u p p o s i t i o n o f p r e s e n c e , n e v e r e v e n becomes aware t h a t she has i t . As a r e s u l t o f t h i s s t u d i e d l a c k of awareness, the d i s c i p l i n e of A n t h r o p o l o g y p r o j e c t s the repression inherent i n Western c o n c e p t u a l i t y onto other peoples and o t h e r c u l t u r e s t h r o u g h i t s a g e n t , t h e a n t h r o p o l o g i s t . And so i t g o e s , A n t h r o p o l o g y and t h e a n t h r o p o l o g i s t c o n s t a n t l y r e p l i c a t i n g and r e i n f o r c i n g e a c h o t h e r t h r o u g h t h e t h o u g h t l e s s a c c e p t a n c e of a c o n c e p t u a l i t y which f u n c t i o n s to r e p r e s s the 'other.' 3 5  In o r d e r t o b e g i n t o r e d r e s s t h i s s i t u a t i o n , d e c o n s t r u c t l v e s t r a t e g i e s must be o f f e r e d as p a r t of t h e c o r e c u r r i c u l a of a l l d e p a r t m e n t s of A n t h r o p o l o g y . I f t h i s were t o be accomplished,  186 must  become  Geertz and  aware  of  and C l i f f o r d )  Tylor)  ways  conceptuality,  i n which  implications  and  This  makes  anthropology  with  the  a l l of  possibility  of  Its  logic  entertains  and  (e.g. Frazer  so  What  foists  on.  notions  desire  to  stumbled view  tell  underdeveloped smugly  does  us  fore-fathers  had  to  simply  so  they  creating  and  itself  as  concerned essential  a l l we  perceive  presumed  found?  as,  an  on  Is i t p o s s i b l e  that  which, i n our  f o r whatever  reasons,  too e a s i l y  essential  and t o o  itself  as  after a  and  heterogeneity/  homogeneity/presence,  What m i g h t we  Is anthropology,  defining  have  logical  I f our a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l fore-mothers  have  on and s o on.  an  put t h e emphasis  u n d e c i d a b i l i t y r a t h e r t h a n an e s s e n t i a l what m i g h t  to  ' p r i m i t i v e ' and h e r / h i s l a c k  inability  peoples  cultures.  the  about  v e r s i o n s o f o u r s e l v e s , we  dismissed?  of  onto the t r a c e of something  other  oppressive  genuinely  h e t e r o g e n e i t y as opposed t o homogeneity? L6vy-Bruhl  assumed  indispensable  What  i f she/he  an  non-Western  liberating,  consequent  contradiction?  so b l a t a n t  repressive/  any  undecidability  and  subtle (e.g.  onto  written concerning the s o - c a l l e d of  so  deconstruction  non-oppressive, other  ever  anthropology  consequences,  that  potentially  sometimes  sometimes e v e r  with  alone  the  still  find?  a l l these  discipline  And  years of which  is  p e r h a p s t h e a n t h r o p o l o g i s t ' s p r o f e s s i o n a l t r a i n i n g c o u l d be a h e l p r a t h e r than a hindrance w i t h r e s p e c t t o e n a b l i n g her t o approach the f i e l d w o r k s i t u a t i o n w i t h a s e n s i t i v i t y t o o t h e r n e s s which has, h i t h e r t o , been d i s c e r n i b l e o n l y as a l a c k .  187 supposedly other,  dedicated  left  no-longer  i n the  and  aimlessly  this"  as  so,  what we  of  look  intone,  done and  will at  to  "0,  I  1963:  The  begin  rather  recognize  and  about  a way than  the  banner  i t .  comprehending half-mad,  who his  ta'en  can  too  I f we  and  little  we  will  old horrors  if  may  i t , then  offer what  on  us we  to  If  have of  simple do  not  creating  and  time,  we  a  the  otherness  them  ourselves.  this  too  and,  reducing  —  all  position  resituating  go  of  not  dp_ r e c o g n i z e  simply  care  or  t o begin a p p r e c i a t i n g the  of  and  t o whether  this  deconstruction  wander  creating  answer,  r e m a i n s as  the  once-but-  only  own  The  recognize  replications  of  of  constantly  same  aged,  112)?  re-working  i t , then  perpetuating under t h e  do  and  king  have  question  Derridean  provide  reflections  an  wretchedness  anthropologists, will  potential  others  a  i s yes.  we,  hard  position  (Shakespeare,  clearly,  describing  never-again-to-be  amid  pathetically  to  apparently,  •postmodernism.'  v  BIBLIOGRAPHY  Adams, R i c h a r d . 1977. 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