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The role of international law in US foreign policy decision-making intervention in Grenada & Nicaragua Jenab, Zahra 1991

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THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN US FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING INTERVENTION IN GRENADA & NICARAGUA by ZAHRA JENAB .A., The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Columbia, 19£  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS  in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES ( P o l i t i c a l Science)  We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming t o t h e r e q u i r e d standard  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA October 1991 © Zahra Jenab, 1991  In presenting  this  degree at the  thesis  in  University of  freely available for reference copying  of  department publication  this or  partial fulfilment  of  British Columbia,  I agree  and study.  his  or  her  Department of The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada  (  DE-6 (2/88)  that the  representatives.  may be It  of this thesis for financial gain shall not  permission.  requirements  I further agree  thesis for scholarly purposes by  the  that  advanced  Library shall make it  by the  understood be  an  permission for extensive  granted  is  for  that  allowed without  head  of  my  copying  or  my written  ABSTRACT  Relations  among  states  concepts which comprise existence  of  this  i n t e r n a t i o n a l order. interest  the i n t e r n a t i o n a l  system  helps  by  legal  maintain  basic  legal  system.  some  The  level  of  So long as s t a t e s f e e l t h a t i t i s i n t h e i r  t o a c t according  order i s p r e s e r v e d .  a r e permeated  t o the norms of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law,  When a s t a t e b e l i e v e s , however, t h a t i t i s  t o i t s advantage t o d i s r u p t t h e order, then t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l legal  system  can do v e r y  little  t o prevent  that  state  from  a c t i n g c o n t r a r y t o t h e norm and, f o r i n s t a n c e , r e s o r t i n g t o t h e use o f f o r c e t o a c h i e v e i t s g o a l . The  actions of the United  very s i g n i f i c a n t  S t a t e s , as a major power, a r e  i n t h i s r e s p e c t s i n c e many s m a l l e r c o u n t r i e s  look a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s as a r o l e model. the  United  contradict  States  has  acted  in a  t h e e s t a b l i s h e d norms  determine t o what extent  Yet, i n many cases,  manner  which  of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  international  seems  to  law.  To  law i s a f a c t o r  i n US  p o l i c y making, i t i s best t o focus on the r e l a t i o n s o f t h e US w i t h c o u n t r i e s o f one s p e c i f i c r e g i o n i n order t o a v o i d sweeping generalizations. The r e l a t i o n s h i p o f t h e US w i t h C e n t r a l American c o u n t r i e s  has  always  States  been  sees  numerous  a  matter  itself  as  occasions,  indirectly)  in  interests.  the  the  Central  of  controversy protector  US  has  America  to  of  because these  the  United  states.  intervened  (directly  secure  own  its  On and  perceived  Two of the most r e c e n t examples of US i n t e r v e n t i o n  o c c u r r e d d u r i n g the Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  They a r e :  the  1983  i n v a s i o n of Grenada, and i n t e r v e n t i o n i n Nicaragua from 1981  to  1984. A f t e r the d e c i s i o n s to i n t e r v e n e were made, U n i t e d S t a t e s ' officials close  offered  look  at  legal  these  justifications  explanations,  for  their  however,  actions.  reveals  that  A the  Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n was not t r u l y concerned with the norms and principles  of  i n t e r n a t i o n a l law.  The A d m i n i s t r a t i o n b e l i e v e d  t h a t i t had the m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l power to circumvent i n t o international  l e g a l o b l i g a t i o n s without the  The r e a l r a t i o n a l e f o r the the US had the  interventions  f e a r of  lies  i n the  sanctions. fact  that  o p p o r t u n i t y to t r y to overthrow an a d v e r s a r i a l  regime which was seen as a t h r e a t to hemispheric s e c u r i t y and solidarity.  iv  T A B L E OF CONTENTS  ABSTRACT  i i  ACKNOWLEDGEMENT  V  I.  1  INTRODUCTION  II.  WHAT  III.  INTERNATIONAL  TRADITIONAL  IV.  V.  IS  PRIOR  CASE  VI.  NORM OF  LAW  5  NON-INTERVENTION  11  A. B. C.  I N T E R V E N T I O N UPON I N V I T A T I O N SELF-DEFENCE HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION  19 21 2 6  US A. B. C. D. E.  INTERVENTION IN LATIN AMERICA T H E MONROE D O C T R I N E GUATEMALA CUBA DOMINICAN REPUBLIC THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION  31 32 35 40 4 6 51  STUDIES A. GRENADA B. NICARAGUA  ANALYSIS A.  55 55 72  91 94  GRENADA  1.Safety of US N a t i o n a l s i n Grenada 94 2. J o i n i n g the OECS C o l l e c t i v e S e c u r i t y Forces 98 3. The I n v i t a t i o n by the Governor-General 103 B.  VII.  VIII.  NICARAGUA  110  CONCLUSION  WORKS  CITED  120  OR  REFERRED  TO  126  V  ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS  The completion of t h i s t h e s i s would not have been p o s s i b l e without  the  input  Copithorne. their  I am  busy  advantage  and  of  Professors  Job  honoured t h a t they managed t o f i n d  schedules  of  assistance  their  everlasting  thanks  neverending  c a r e and  to  give  me  the  opportunity  i n v a l u a b l e knowledge are  extended  support.  to  my  and  time to  experience.  family  and  for  in  take My their  1  I.  INTRODUCTION  The the  ever  growing  number  boundaries, regarding  has the  activities. has  increasing  interactions  raised  Recently,  that, the world  and  f o r example,  community — acts  law.  i s u s u a l l y n o t so  relations soon  as  almost  were  integrity comprise concepts,  of  questions  many  acts  the question of  unanimously  contrary  lawfulness  of Kuwait. —  to  and  decided  the  On that  norms  of  blatant  and t h e r e s p o n s e o f o t h e r  states  uniform.  relations  begin,  are  sovereignty,  a r e a few the  and  with  national  But r a r e l y does a s t a t e a c t i n such  because the  Recognition,  along  across  concerns  and l a w f u l n e s s a r e e x t r e m e l y  they  states,  people  lawfulness  v i o l a t i o n o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l law,  Law  of  with respect to Iraq's invasion  Hussein's  international  of  countless  legality  been r a i s e d  Saddam  of  interdependence  modern  of  important i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l one  state  permeated  and  by  a s t a t e g i v e s up  independence.  In  international  society,  system.  legal  i t can  enjoys have  territorial  concepts to  which these  o f i t s autonomy membership  peaceful  as  concepts.  subscribing  a c e r t a i n degree  return, and  By  another,  legal  respecting others'  examples o f t h e b a s i c state  with  in  relations  and the with  2 other s t a t e s . If  states  concepts, about.  then  The  acted  Iraq's  resort  Usually,  maintaining  in  accordance  to  force  with  should  these  not  legal  have  come  primary concern of s t a t e s i s almost always n a t i o n a l  interest.  hand,  always  one  element  i n t e r n a t i o n a l order;  i t may  be  international  i n the  order  to  national  interest  at other times, on the  states' achieve  of  perceived a higher  i n t e r e s t to goal.  is  other  disrupt  Consequently,  s t a t e s accept or r e j e c t law based on t h i s i n t e r e s t .  One  cynical  view t h a t emerges from t h i s h y p o t h e s i s i s t h a t i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i s capable of s u s t a i n i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l order so long as i t i s i n the s t a t e s ' i n t e r e s t t o m a i n t a i n such order. s e t s up the r u l e s of conduct, but acting contrary  t o the norm and  International  law  i t cannot prevent s t a t e s from committing, f o r i n s t a n c e ,  acts  of a g g r e s s i o n when i t i s supposedly t o t h e i r advantage t o do When a  state  such  as  Iraq  norms of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law,  acts  then the  in contradiction s i t u a t i o n may  be  to  so. the  remedied  more e a s i l y than when the U n i t e d S t a t e s or the S o v i e t Union does so.  The  G u l f War  but  the  Soviets  culmination  of  f o r c e d I r a q out of Kuwait r e l a t i v e l y remained  a number of  d e c i s i o n to leave. have a g r e a t e r state's and play  i n Afghanistan smaller  for  pressures  A powerful s t a t e ' s a c t i o n s  years  until  the  l e d them t o  the  (such as the  impact on i n t e r n a t i o n a l law than would a  actions.  importance,  quickly;  US')  smaller  Conversely, p r e c i s e l y because of t h i s power i n t e r n a t i o n a l law  i n the d e c i s i o n of the  US  may  have a  smaller  role  to  about what course of a c t i o n i t  3 should  follow.  To determine whether the above h y p o t h e s i s i s t r u e or not, the  following  discussion  international  law  i s based  plays  a  role  on  the  extent  i n American  decision-making i n v o l v i n g the use of f o r c e .  to  foreign  which policy  Two s p e c i f i c cases  i n v o l v i n g s m a l l C e n t r a l American c o u n t r i e s have been chosen.  By  doing so, c o n c l u s i o n s can be reached r e g a r d i n g US r e l a t i o n s w i t h c o u n t r i e s o f one s p e c i f i c geographic r e g i o n , i n t e r n a t i o n a l law p l a y s The military  cases  that  and the r o l e t h a t  i n those r e l a t i o n s .  have  been  selected  are  the  direct  US  i n v a s i o n of Grenada i n 1983, and the i n t e r v e n t i o n i n  Nicaragua a f t e r the S a n d i n i s t a N a t i o n a l L i b e r a t i o n F r o n t came i n t o power i n 1979.  The cases w i l l be looked  i n terms of the events t h a t l e d t o P r e s i d e n t to intervene. discussed  at i n d e t a i l  Reagan's d e c i s i o n  A l s o , the p a r t i c u l a r s of the i n t e r v e n t i o n w i l l be  thoroughly.  the United  (FSLN)  The i n t e r n a l decision-making p r o c e s s of  S t a t e s , however, w i l l not be analyzed.  After action  was taken, the US government o f f e r e d s e v e r a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n s f o r its  actions.  These w i l l  conclude t o what extent  be  examined  i n t e r n a t i o n a l law p l a y s  decision-making process of the U n i t e d Before  beginning  c a r e f u l l y i n order  the  study  a r o l e i n the  States. of  p r e l i m i n a r y i s s u e s have t o be d i s c u s s e d .  the First,  cases,  i s c r u c i a l t o e x p l a i n what t h i s term means.  several  s i n c e the r o l e  of " i n t e r n a t i o n a l law" i n US decision-making i s being it  to  analyzed,  Second, i t i s  necessary t o r e a l i z e t h a t i n t e r v e n t i o n i s normally and u s u a l l y  4 c o n t r a r y t o t h e norms o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. the norm o f n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n w i l l be looked  For t h i s  reason,  a t i n some d e t a i l .  Next, a review o f t h e long h i s t o r y o f US i n t e r v e n t i o n i n L a t i n America w i l l p r o v i d e a broader framework, i n which t h e cases of Nicaragua and Grenada w i l l  f i t i n easily.  Finally,  cases w i l l be looked a t i n c o n s i d e r a b l e d e t a i l ;  these  two  then t h e l e g a l  j u s t i f i c a t i o n s t h a t were o f f e r e d by t h e Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n r e g a r d i n g each i n t e r v e n t i o n w i l l be d i s c u s s e d .  In both  cases,  the Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n claimed t h a t i t had a c t e d a c c o r d i n g t o the norms and p r i n c i p l e s o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. the  f a c t s and the j u s t i f i c a t i o n s  extent  offered w i l l  A c l o s e look a t show t h e t r u e  t o which norms o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l law were a f a c t o r and  concern i n US  decision-making.  5  n.  W H A T IS INTERNATIONAL LAW?  Before US  d i s c u s s i n g what  role  international  foreign-policy decision-making i n  one  has  this  to  is  define  not  scholar  has  a  what  very  his  task  since  own d e f i n i t i o n a n d  i n  Court  International  of  international  easy  example,  the  Case  the  of  the  S.S.  Justice  law has  played  i n  Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  law  i s .  almost  every  description i n  Lotus  explained  Unfortunately,  of  19 2 7 ,  authority the  term.  the  and For  Permanent  that:  International law governs relations between independent States. The r u l e s of law binding upon States therefore, e m a n a t e f r o m t h e i r own f r e e w i l l as expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law and established i n order to regulate the relations between these c o - e x i s t i n g independent communities or with a v i e w t o a c h i e v e m e n t o f common a i m s . 1  Almost  half  law  "a  as  world  of  p o l i t i c s  The  to  main  " T h e Case 18. 2  World  century  body  considered  at  a  later,  rules  i n  have  which  their the  the  S.S.  Hedley B u l l , The Politics (N.Y.:  binds  relations  status  differences  of  Hedley  of  Anarchical Columbia  defined  states with  and one  international  other  agents  another  and  i n is  law" . 2  between  Lotus,  Bull  these  [1927]  two  definitions  P . C . I . J . ,  ser.  Society: A Study Univ. Press, 1977)  of at  should  A. No.  10  Order 127.  in  6 be  pointed  out.  First,  J u s t i c e d i d not i n c l u d e  t h e Permanent Court  of  International  t h e r e l a t i o n s between non-state a c t o r s  i n i t s d e f i n i t i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law and o n l y c o n s i d e r e d t h e  r e l a t i o n s between independent s t a t e s .  S t a t e s can no longer be  c o n s i d e r e d as t h e o n l y s u b j e c t s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l 19th  century,  international  individuals law.  had no l e g a l  law.  rights  In the  or duties  in  Today, however, i n d i v i d u a l s p l a y a r o l e i n  making and m o d i f y i n g t h e law, and they have a c q u i r e d some degree of  international  legal  personality . 3  Furthermore,  the  importance o f o t h e r non-state a c t o r s should not be i g n o r e d . international personality fulfil  organization,  f o r instance,  under t h e m u n i c i p a l  other  legal  can  enjoy  legal  laws of i t s member s t a t e s and  functions.  Although  the  powers  i n d i v i d u a l s and o t h e r non-state a c t o r s a r e s t i l l q u i t e it  An  of  limited,  i s necessary t o r e a l i z e t h e i r e x i s t e n c e . Bull,  on t h e other hand, f a i l e d  free  will  and independence  law"  the "status  o f law".  of states  national  In such a system, s t a t e s  interests.  i n t h e sense t h a t  and gave  One of t h e b a s i c  i n t e r n a t i o n a l system i s i t s h o r i z o n t a l authority.  t o take i n t o account t h e  structure  "international tenets  of the  of t h e o r e t i c a l  a r e f r e e t o pursue t h e i r  Governments a c t a c c o r d i n g t o t h i s i n t e r e s t  they w i l l  not r e c o g n i z e any norm which  will  M i c h a e l Akehurst, A Modern Introduction to International Law (London: George A l l e n & Unwin L t d . , 1987 6th ed.) a t 70. 3  7 not f u r t h e r t h e i r i n t e r e s t s .  Most of the time, the maintenance  4  of  i n t e r n a t i o n a l order  interest;  only  to that  acknowledged and  or  given i s binding  servanda,  without  and  This  is a  extent are  therefore,  regulation  arbitrarily.  element of  the  norms of  state's  national  international  law  accepted.  Generally, norm  i s an  no  state  i s bound by  i t s consent,  any  though  proposed  consent  once  o r d i n a r i l y cannot be withdrawn a t w i l l r u l e , embodied  fundamental  rule  i n the  of  maxim of  public  pacta  or  sunt  international  law.  There i s one major e x c e p t i o n t o t h i s r u l e which s h o u l d be noted. The  f o r m a t i o n of  consent of a l l of s t a t e s may is  no  customary law  states.  The  does not  require  p r a c t i c e followed  the  expressed  by a s m a l l number  be s u f f i c i e n t t o c r e a t e a customary r u l e i f t h e r e  contradictory  practice.  States  that  do  not  wish  conform w i t h the r u l e must c o n s i s t e n t l y r e j e c t i t from the beginning;  to  established  very  otherwise, t h e i r s i l e n c e would imply acceptance . 5  A s i t u a t i o n may interest  to  break norm  a r i s e when a s t a t e b e l i e v e s an  of  agreement, international  or  to  law.  act For  i t is in i t s  contrary  to  instance,  an the  "There are, i n r e a l i t y , cases i n which a s t r o n g s t a t e f o r c e s a weaker s t a t e i n t o a c c e p t i n g an agreement which i t would not have otherwise entered i n t o . The g e n e r a l law i n t h i s area i s t h a t agreements entered i n t o by f o r c e or c o e r c i o n are not b i n d i n g on the s t a t e s i n v o l v e d . T h i s , however, does not account f o r cases i n which the weaker s t a t e does not make i t obvious t h a t i t had been coerced, or cases i n which t h e r e had been a "trade-off". I t i s beyond the scope of t h i s d i s c u s s i o n t o examine these cases; i t i s c r u c i a l , nonetheless, t o be aware of t h e i r existence. See i b i d , at 134-35 f o r more d e t a i l . 5  law.  See i b i d , a t 25-34 f o r a d e t a i l e d d i s c u s s i o n  of customary  8 government of one  country may  t o guarantee i t s own however, may  use  choose t o invade another i n order  perceived  national security.  l e g a l arguments and  t o the norm of  to  successfully.  i n t e r n a t i o n a l l e g a l system f u n c t i o n s i n such  a  way  that  its  invader,  non-intervention The  justify  exceptions  The  i t sometimes does allow  actions,  states  often  to  give  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n or a p p l i c a t i o n t o c e r t a i n r u l e s .  their  own  Generally,  the  more powerful a s t a t e i s i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l arena, the the  chances  are  that  i t s interpretation w i l l  times  be  higher  accepted  by  others. There rules  and  can  be  no  doubt,  regulations  however,  which  states  that  and  there  other  are  agents  i n t e r n a t i o n a l arena regard as b i n d i n g on one another. existence  of  these  l e v e l of order  "law" one  on the  other  regulations  municipal  force,  i s properly  law  modern s t a t e including  and  or  its  power  i n t e r n a t i o n a l law,  i s that  coercion .  The  6  up to  some  by use  the or  controversy.  i n t e r n a t i o n a l law  so c a l l e d  i n t e r n a t i o n a l law  i s backed  the  I t i s the  maintains  hand, i s a matter of  i t s e s s e n t i a l features  sanctions,  that  in  Whether or not these r u l e s have the  s c h o l a r s have argued t h a t  because "law" of  and  in society.  s t a t u s of law, Some l e g a l  rules  certain  on  the  grounds t h a t  i t i s the  product  difference  i s that  authority threaten  law of to  on the other hand, l a c k s t h i s  i s not  a  of  between  within  the  government, use  force;  property.  S. A. W i l l i a m s and A. L. C. de M e s t r a l , An Introduction to International Law: Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied in Canada (Canada: Butterworths, 1987) a t 6-7. 6  9 The  argument  that  international  law i s , i n f a c t ,  "law"  branches out i n two d i f f e r e n t d i r e c t i o n s .  First,  as K e l s e n  law, even though i t  operates  have argued t h a t  international  i n t h e absence o f a world  sanctions, sanctions  f o r c e and c o e r c i o n . by  individual  members  a c c o r d i n g t o "the p r i n c i p l e o f s e l f - h e l p " . this  argument  sanctions,  asserts that  does r e s t  In the i n t e r n a t i o n a l  7  are applied  government,  s c h o l a r s such  law does  f o r c e or c o e r c i o n .  Hart,  on  society,  of the s o c i e t y  The second branch o f  not n e c e s s a r i l y i n v o l v e f o r example, argues t h a t  the concept o f law as "orders backed by t h r e a t s " i s i n a p p l i c a b l e even t o domestic  law i n a number  of ways . He 8  explains that  t h e r e a r e v a r i e t i e s o f m u n i c i p a l law which c o n f e r l e g a l powers to  adjudicate  or  legislate.  These  cannot  properly  be  c a t e g o r i z e d as law backed by t h r e a t s . The c o n t r o v e r s y on t h e s t a t u s o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l law has l e d to  an  ongoing  resolve.  academic  debate  which  i s very  difficult  to  T h i s debate i s s i g n i f i c a n t t o t h e p r e s e n t d i s c u s s i o n  i n so f a r as i t h e l p s t o e s t a b l i s h the s t a t u s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i n s t a t e s ' decision-making is  truly  "law",  then  the United  always abide by the r u l e s . be h e a v i l y s a n c t i o n e d . is  anything  less  processes. States,  should  I f , on the other hand, i n t e r n a t i o n a l law  than  "law"  (such  as  Hans Kelsen, The General Theory (U.S.A.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1946). H. L. A. Hart, Press, 1961).  f o r example,  A c t i n g c o n t r a r y t o t h e norms should  7  8  I f i n t e r n a t i o n a l law  The Concept  a  code  of  the  of Law  o f morals Law  (Oxford:  and  or  State  Clarendon  10 ethics) , then  every  code, i t should act  time  that  be commended.  i n agreement w i t h  the law;  t h e US  acts  according  to  this  I t i s expected that s t a t e s  will  a code o f m o r a l s o r e t h i c s ,  on  t h e o t h e r hand, i s something t h a t t h e y s u b s c r i b e t o v o l u n t a r i l y . The  following  international international  is  a  relations.  study More  to  the  role  intervene  of  specifically,  law i n t h e r e l a t i o n s o f t h e Reagan  w i t h N i c a r a g u a and Grenada w i l l decisions  of  be e x a m i n e d .  i n Nicaragua  and  the  law  in  role  of  Administration  I f , i n making t h e  Grenada,  the  Reagan  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n c o n c e r n e d i t s e l f w i t h norms a n d r e g u l a t i o n s , t h e n international these  two  l a w was a p a r t o f US d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g , a t l e a s t i n  situations.  however, " i n t e r v e n t i o n " Furthermore,  t h e norm  h a v e t o be l o o k e d  Before  beginning  h a s t o be d e f i n e d  discussion,  i n more p r e c i s e t e r m s .  of non-intervention  a t i n some d e t a i l .  this  and  i t s exceptions  11  III. TRADITIONAL NORM OF NON-INTERVENTION  T o d a y , t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h e norm o f n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n be d i s p u t e d ,  even though the  suggest otherwise. conception  of  an  sovereign  states.  territorially,  occasional practice  the  international Each  and  development  o f s t a t e s may  The norm o f n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n a r o s e f r o m system  external  of the  comprised  state's  powers  interference  encroachment upon t h e s e p o w e r s . of  of  was  should  consensus external success  first  be  that  there  on t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f i n t e r v e n t i o n . policies  of the  of  one  external  a s t a t e engages i n t h i s  state  are  directed  of conduct,  is  at  along  lack  produced  a  definition  of  intervention  in  Intervention  processes  to  achieve  is  the  "manipulation  political  ends  of  in that  a  many the  Every it  the  be  Meyer  political  state's  state's  time  cannot  process which provides a reasonably c l e a r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n term:  of  blocking  said that i t i s t r u l y "intervening" i n another's a f f a i r s . has  with  presented. a  state.  however,  an  review  For instance,  p o l i c i e s of another type  as  In t h i s s e c t i o n , a b r i e f  mentioned  and  defined  seen  norm o f n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n ,  the  equal  were  some e x c e p t i o n s a n d l i m i t a t i o n s t o t h i s n o r m , w i l l be It  cannot  of  the  power  authority  12 structure" .  According  9  "dictatorial state  se .  purposes of  order The  10  von  Glahn,  intervention  means  i n t e r f e r e n c e by one s t a t e i n the a f f a i r s of another  f o r the  existing  to  of  main  e i t h e r maintaining  things", point  rather  that  than mere  can  be  or  changing  the  interference  per  inferred  from  these  d e f i n i t i o n s i s t h a t i n t e r v e n t i o n i s i n o p p o s i t i o n t o the w i l l of the s t a t e t h a t i s the o b j e c t  of such a c t i o n and  the i n t e r n a l nature or c h a r a c t e r  of t h a t s t a t e .  i s d i r e c t e d at There are many  forms which i n t e r v e n t i o n can take i n c l u d i n g , but not l i m i t e d t o , coercion,  m i l i t a r y a c t i o n , and  economic  subversion.  Before the U n i t e d Nations C h a r t e r came i n t o e f f e c t , the main instruments which l i m i t e d the use the  Covenant of  Pact.  The  the  League of  Nations  the  resorting  large  to  amount  force.  of  There  recognized  the  s t a t e s were  Kellogg-Briand  by the  Peace Conference,  freedom were,  circumstances i n which f o r c e c o u l d was  and  Covenant, d r a f t e d i n February 1919  of the League of N a t i o n s of the limited  of f o r c e by  that  states  For  as a means of s e t t l i n g d i s p u t e s .  Commission considerably had  nevertheless, be used.  two  had  still  many  instance, States  in  war  simply  undertook c e r t a i n o b l i g a t i o n s not t o r e s o r t t o war . 11  Ray Political Salvador" 9  Meyer, "The Limits of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law in the Process: The Role of the U n i t e d States in El (Winter 1983) 7 ASILS I n t ' l L. J . 89 a t 90.  Gerhard von Glahn, Law Among Nations: An Introduction Public International Law (N.Y.: Macmillan P u b l i s h i n g Co., a t 160. Emphasis i n c l u d e d . 10  to 1981)  "Covenant of the League of Nations, Preamble (Part I of the T r e a t y of Peace Between the A l l i e d and A s s o c i a t e d Powers and Germany); Martens, 9 N.R.G., 3rd s e r . , a t 323 [hereinafter  The K e l l o g g - B r i a n d the  scope  Article  of  II  Pact  acceptable  of the Pact,  use  of of  1928 was a n a t t e m p t t o force  parties  under  the  narrow  Covenant . 1 2  In  agreed  t h a t the settlement or s o l u t i o n of a l l disputes or c o n f l i c t s of whatever nature or of whatever origin t h e y may b e , w h i c h may a r i s e among t h e m , s h a l l n e v e r be s o u g h t e x c e p t by p a c i f i c m e a n s " . Although certain  war  was  generally  circumstances .  prohibited,  First,  1 4  war  it  remained  outside  the  lawful  span  of  r e c i p r o c a l r e l a t i o n s of the c o n t r a c t i n g p a r t i e s remained Freedom  of  war  contracting significant  was  parties. because,  s t a t e s w h i c h were Second,  War  international policy  incorporate  was a  before  among  lawful  was  as not  contracting  nonetheless,  W o r l d War I I ,  b o u n d by t h e  waged law  and  This,  not  war r e m a i n e d  policy".  preserved  p r o v i s i o n s of the  reaction war  justifiable  1 6  .  as  against  an  and  non-  not  that four  Treaty . 1 5  "international a  violation  instrument  Third,  provision specifically  of  the  lawful.  t h e r e were o n l y  as an i n s t r u m e n t  a  was  in  the  of  Pact  addressing  of  national did  not  self-defence.  Covenant]. The G e n e r a l T r e a t y f o r t h e R e n u n c i a t i o n o f War a s an Instrument of National Policy (the Kellogg-Briand pact of P a r i s ) , 1929 Treaty Series, no. 29. S i g n e d on A u g u s t 2 7 , 1 9 2 8 . 12  1 3  States  I a n B r o w n l i e , International (U.S.A.: Clarendon Press,  Yoram (Cambridge: 14  Law and the Use of Force 1963) a t 7 5 .  Dinstein, IVar, Aggression and G r o t i u s P u b l i c a t i o n s , L t d . , 1988) a t  1 5  Brownlie  (1963),  1 6  Ibid,  89.  at  supra note 13, at  75.  by  Self-Defense 81-83.  14 The  parameters  of  self-defence  were  not  s e t out, and  no  competent body was e s t a b l i s h e d t o determine whether a s t a t e had, in  fact,  acted  i n self-defence.  In s h o r t , many avenues were  open f o r a s t a t e t o i n t e r v e n e i n the a f f a i r s Covenant o f t h e League o f Nations  o f another.  The  and the K e l l o g g - B r i a n d  Pact  were s u c c e s s f u l only as l o n g as t h e major powers remained s t r o n g enough  to  deter  smaller  states  from  unilateral  treaty  d e n u n c i a t i o n and r e s o r t t o armed f o r c e . The  outbreak of World War I I completely  system.  I t was  clear  by  that  time  destroyed  that  a  new  c o l l e c t i v e peace enforcements had t o be i n s t i t u t e d . of  the Western  Allied  states  were  then  of t h e U n i t e d Nations  (UN) i t s e l f  regime of The e f f o r t s  concentrated  d r a f t i n g o f t h e Charter o f t h e U n i t e d Nations,  the o l d  i n the  and t h e c r e a t i o n  as a forum f o r t h e p e a c e f u l  r e s o l u t i o n of c o n f l i c t s . The  prime o b j e c t o f t h e U n i t e d Nations  occurrence just  o f another  ended.  To t h i s  war as d e v a s t a t i n g as t h e one t h a t had aim, the UN had t o r e d r e s s  comings o f t h e p r e v i o u s arrangements. exclusively p o l i t i c a l and humanitarian UN C h a r t e r .  was t o prevent t h e  or m i l i t a r y  the s h o r t -  Peace was no longer an  concern;  social,  economic,  i s s u e s a l l had an important r o l e t o p l a y i n t h e  The "Purposes and P r i n c i p l e s " o f t h e UN i n c l u d e d  the f o l l o w i n g : 1. To maintain i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace and s e c u r i t y 2. To develop f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s among n a t i o n s based on r e s p e c t f o r t h e p r i n c i p l e o f equal r i g h t s and s e l f d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f peoples ...; 3. To achieve i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o - o p e r a t i o n i n s o l v i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l problems of economic, s o c i a l , c u l t u r a l ,  15 or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms f o r a l l w i t h o u t d i s t i n c t i o n as t o r a c e , sex, language, or r e l i g i o n and 4. T o be a c e n t r e f o r h a r m o n i z i n g t h e a c t i o n s of n a t i o n s i n t h e a t t a i n m e n t o f t h e s e common e n d s . 1 7  The U n i t e d N a t i o n s was d e s i g n e d purposes  could  structure  of  be  the  to  co-ordinated Permanent  s e r v e a s a f o r u m where  and  accomplished;  International  Court  also,  of  Justice  u p d a t e d so t h a t s t a t e s c o u l d h a v e an i m p r o v e d means o f disputes  as  an  integral  part  The C o u r t was meant t o of  the  UN .  "optional  weakness  that  the  purely  of  was  resolving  a  of  the  the  Court,  Court.  Article  j u d i c i a l organ"  however, been  the  3 6 of  the  Since  1 9  the  states  Court's  minor  role  contained  the  main s o u r c e  of  Statute  are  states  s t a t e s on a  reluctant  jurisdiction, in  in  Organization.  j u r i s d i c t i o n i n cases over  basis .  relatively  Nations  "principal  which has  accept  ( I C J ) was e s t a b l i s h e d  United  clause"  the  consensual  the  s e r v e as  Court exercises  unconditionally played  of  The S t a t u t e  1 8  so-called the  the  peacefully.  The I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o u r t o f J u s t i c e 1945  these  resolving  the  ICJ  to has  international  disputes. The C h a r t e r o f t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s a l s o c o n t a i n e d a statement  against  the  use  of  force.  Article  2(4)  general  states,  in  full: "charter Charter]. 1 8  Ibid,  1 9  Statute  of  the  Article  United  Nations,  Article  1  [hereinafter  92.  of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Court of J u s t i c e ,  Article  36.  16 A l l Members s h a l l r e f r a i n i n t h e i r i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s from the t h r e a t o r use of f o r c e a g a i n s t t h e t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y o r p o l i t i c a l independence o f any s t a t e , o r i n any other manner i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the Purposes o f t h e United N a t i o n s . 20  The term " f o r c e " , as used i n A r t i c l e 2(4), covers and t r a n s c e n d s the  term  "war";  prohibited.  thus,  measures  short  of  war  are  also  T h i s , along w i t h t h e i n c l u s i o n o f " t h r e a t s " t o use  f o r c e , was a major step forward.  A t f i r s t g l a n c e , i t seems as  though A r t i c l e 2(4) was t h e i d e a l r u l e a g a i n s t t h e use o f f o r c e . But,  there  were  a  number  of  factors  which  undermine  the  e f f e c t i v e n e s s of t h i s a r t i c l e . First, collective  Chapter action  VII of the Charter by  the S e c u r i t y  makes  Council  provision f o r  "to maintain  or  r e s t o r e i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace and s e c u r i t y " when a t h r e a t t o t h e peace  o r an  ambitious task the o u t s e t ,  a c t of aggression  a  very  t o achieve since,  from  21  f o r the Security Council  This  was  i t was obvious t h a t very r a r e l y would t h e permanent  members of t h e C o u n c i l Security  occurs .  Council,  vote unanimously on a r e s o l u t i o n .  therefore,  could  The  not a c t e f f e c t i v e l y as t h e  p r i n c i p a l peacekeeping organ o f the world. A r t i c l e 2(4), realities  of  furthermore, f a i l e d t o take i n t o account t h e  modern  warfare .  g u e r r i l l a movements w i t h i n  22  For  instance,  encouraging  another s t a t e does not f i t i n t o t h e  20  Charter,  A r t i c l e 2(4).  21  Charter,  A r t i c l e 39.  Thomas M. Franck, "Who K i l l e d A r t i c l e 2(4)? Or: Changing Norms Governing t h e Use of Force by S t a t e s " (1970) Am. J . I n t ' l L. 809 a t 812-22. 22  17 c o n v e n t i o n a l category of "armed a t t a c k " . of  Yet, t h i s type of use  f o r c e i s more common today than i s "war"  i n the  traditional  sense. The  l a s t phrase  in Article  2(4)  (namely, "or i n any  other  manner i n c o n s i s t e n t with the Purposes of the U n i t e d  Nations")  has t o be read i n the context of the e n t i r e document.  The  first  and foremost purpose of the UN as s e t out i n A r t i c l e 1 (1) i s t o maintain  international  moreover,  enunciates  peace the  and  security .  The  2 3  determination  of  the  Preamble,  UN  succeeding g e n e r a t i o n s from the scourge of war" .  "to  The  24  save  obvious  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the Charter seems t o be t h a t any t h r e a t or use of f o r c e by s t a t e s a g a i n s t each other i s p r o h i b i t e d . There are, however, s e v e r a l e x c e p t i o n s t o the norm of n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n . The Charter  first and  exception  i t gives  i s set  the  out  in  Security  Chapter  Council  of  VII  of  the  the  UN  the  a u t h o r i t y t o take or t o a u t h o r i z e enforcement a c t i o n . 39 of Chapter  Article  VII p r o v i d e s the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l w i t h the power  t o d e f i n e what a t h r e a t t o peace i s , and t o decide what measures s h a l l be taken i n response. the  S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l can  I t may  seem p e c u l i a r a t f i r s t t h a t  d e f i n e the  T h i s , however, i s the o n l y r e a l i s t i c been taken;  term  "threat to  peace".  approach t h a t c o u l d have  otherwise, each s t a t e would have i t s own  and a consensus would never be reached.  definition  I t should be mentioned  t h a t a s i d e from the a u t h o r i t y g i v e n t o i t i n Chapter V I I , the UN 23  Charter, A r t i c l e  1(1).  24  C h a r t e r , the Preamble.  18 is  prohibited  domestic  under  Article  a f f a i r s o f member  2(7)  from  intervening  i n the  states . 25  Some s c h o l a r s have a l s o argued t h a t when a s t a t e commits a gross breach o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, then o t h e r s have t h e r i g h t t o i n t e r v e n e i n order t o m a i n t a i n a minimum i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r d e r . 26  In  other  words,  members  o f the i n t e r n a t i o n a l  community  may  i n t e r f e r e w i t h t h e i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s of a s t a t e which t h r e a t e n s the i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r d e r .  W i l l i a m s and de M e s t r a l suggest t h a t  i n some cases t h i s argument can be extended of humanitarian people  to  intervention.  substandard  fundamental r i g h t s , individually  or  then  t o cover  When a s t a t e  treatment  and  situations  s u b j e c t s i t s own  denies  them  their  other members of t h e community can,  collectively,  intervene  to  remedy  the  situation . 2 7  There a r e t h r e e other g e n e r a l exceptions non-intervention.  These  need  t o be covered  t o the r u l e of i n more  detail  because they p l a y a major r o l e i n the case s t u d i e s which f o l l o w .  ^ I t was j u s t mentioned t h a t these powers a r e not used v e r y o f t e n o r v e r y e f f e c t i v e l y by the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l . W i l l i a m s and de M e s t r a l , supra note 6, a t 50; von Glahn, supra note 10, a t 162; J . H. L e u r d i j k , Intervention in International Politics (Netherlands: Eisma B. V., P u b l i s h e r s , 1986) a t 60. 26  Williams and de Mestral, supra note 6, Humanitarian i n t e r v e n t i o n w i l l be d i s c u s s e d i n d e t a i l 27  a t 50. later.  19 A.  INTERVENTION UPON INVITATION;  The f i r s t case i s when the l a w f u l government of a s t a t e has f o r m a l l y i n v i t e d the i n t e r v e n o r .  I f t h e r e i s no i n t e r n a l r e v o l t  with the aim of r e p l a c i n g the government, then i t i s j u s t i f i a b l e to  offer  assistance  to that  state.  In t h i s  case,  t h e term  " i n t e r v e n t i o n " l o s e s p a r t of i t s meaning s i n c e i t i s j u s t i f i e d by the consent of the s t a t e a i d e d .  The main requirement f o r t h e  i n v i t a t i o n t o be v a l i d i n t h i s case i s t h a t i t must be extended by  the  legal  representative  representative can e a s i l y  s u f f e r i n g from c i v i l On the other war,  it  is  representative revolt, for  the  be  of  the  state.  identified  i f the s t a t e  legal i s not  conflict.  hand, i f t h e r e  usually  i s a r e b e l l i o n or a domestic  difficult  of the s t a t e .  to  identify  In  this  the  legal  In cases of massive u p r i s i n g or  the government can no longer h o l d people.  The  type  of  itself  situation,  out t o speak the  general  p r i n c i p l e t h a t should be adopted i s t h a t n e i t h e r the government nor  the i n s u r g e n t s  non-intervention interference sovereignty  receive  should  be  foreign aid . 2 8  adopted  i n the i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s  by  A rigid  other  p o l i c y of  countries  of a s t a t e w i l l  and independent e x i s t e n c e .  since  deny i t s  A s t a t e which  accepts  a i d from c o u n t r i e s under the'se circumstances becomes dependent on  that  aid for i t s security  and  ceases  t o be  a  free  0 s c a r Schachter, "The Right of S t a t e s t o Use Armed ( A p r i l . May 1984) 82 Mich. L. Rev. 1620 a t 1642. 28  and  Force"  20 sovereign either  entity .  In  2 9  s i d e would  be  addition,  contrary  to  to  give  the  outside  r i g h t of  f r e e l y choose whatever form of government they In r e a l i t y , however, i n t e r v e n t i o n i n the  support  to  people  to  the like.  internal affairs  of other c o u n t r i e s i s not i n f r e q u e n t i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . In a l a r g e number of circumstances, s t a t e s g i v e a i d t o e i t h e r the  government  serves  as  a  assistance. training  to  or  the  pretext For the  insurrectionists.  for  the  example, rebels  of  overthrow the r u l i n g e l i t e . latter  state  i s being  other  one  side  state  another  may  state  in their  subjected  to  a  form  subjected  insurgents  since  in  most  states  do  not  intervene  on  may  to  s t a t e t o support the o p p o s i t i o n .  a  a l a r g e r c o n f l i c t than was  justified  assistance  to  have  uprising  is  In s h o r t , i t i s a d v i s a b l e in a c i v i l  r e s u l t may  originally  Brownlie (1963), supra note 13,  be  massive  either side  The  intervention.  t o an armed a t t a c k .  otherwise, h e l p g i v e n by a s t a t e t o one s i d e may  and  and  attempt  be t h a t they do not  cases  s u f f i c i e n t t o t o p p l e the government. that  of  need o u t s i d e  overthrow the government, then i t may support,  foreign  to give m i l i t a r y a i d  Such c o u n t e r - i n t e r v e n t i o n  Furthermore, i f the  request  In t h i s case, the government of the  by the f a c t t h a t the s t a t e was  popular  to  intervention  o f f e r equipment  Outside s t a t e s , consequently, are permitted t o t h i s government.  This  at  provoke another be more chaos  intended.  323.  war;  21 B.  SELF-DEFENCE:  Self-defense intervention.  i s another  exception  t o the norm  o f non-  The l e g a l b a s i s f o r such a r i g h t can be found i n  A r t i c l e 51 o f t h e U n i t e d Nations  Charter which p r o v i d e s :  Nothing i n t h e present Charter s h a l l impair t h e i n h e r e n t r i g h t o f i n d i v i d u a l or c o l l e c t i v e selfdefence i f an armed a t t a c k occurs a g a i n s t a Member of the U n i t e d Nations, u n t i l the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l has taken measures necessary t o maintain i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace and s e c u r i t y . Measures taken by Members i n the e x e r c i s e of t h i s r i g h t of s e l f - d e f e n c e s h a l l be immediately r e p o r t e d t o t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l and s h a l l not i n any way a f f e c t t h e a u t h o r i t y and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l under the present C h a r t e r t o take a t any time such a c t i o n as i t deems necessary i n order t o m a i n t a i n or r e s t o r e i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace and security . 3 0  The  meaning o f t h i s a r t i c l e  can best be understood when i t i s  read i n c o n j u n c t i o n with A r t i c l e 2(4) of the C h a r t e r . There a r e s e v e r a l necessary before  a s t a t e can invoke  conditions Caroline  were  case.  best  c o n d i t i o n s which have t o be met  the r i g h t  formulated  of s e l f - d e f e n c e .  by  Daniel  Webster  These i n the  Webster c o n f i n e d s e l f - d e f e n c e t o cases i n which  "the  n e c e s s i t y o f t h a t s e l f - d e f e n c e i s i n s t a n t , overwhelming,  and  leaving  no  deliberation" . 3 1  choice Webster's  of  means,  and  formulation  was  no  moment  quoted  for  i n the  S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l i n 1981 as a u t h o r i t a t i v e customary law. A f t e r bombing a n u c l e a r r e a c t o r i n I r a q i n 1981, I s r a e l claimed  that  'Charter, A r t i c l e 51. (1837), 11 Moore 409. Quoted 1984), supra note 28, a t 1635. 31  i n Schachter  (April/May  it for  had acted  i n self-defence  a nuclear  s t r i k e against  because the r e a c t o r was Israel.  intended  In t h e S e c u r i t y  Council,  members s t a t e d t h a t t h e r i g h t t o use f o r c e i n s e l f - d e f e n c e i s v a l i d o n l y when t h e r e  i s "no moment f o r d e l i b e r a t i o n " . 3 2  Another l i m i t a t i o n on t h e r i g h t o f s e l f - d e f e n c e i s t h a t t h e force  used  by a s t a t e  "proportionate" problem  with  mechanism  was  this  requirement  i s that  f o r deciding  i n fact  judges,  there  whether  proportional  were t o make  be  reasonably The main  i s no e f f e c t i v e  o r not t h e s t a t e ' s  t o the threat.  Even i f  such as an i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o u r t or  such  a finding,  element, any such d e t e r m i n a t i o n character.  must  33  independent o u t s i d e tribunal,  itself  t o t h e danger t h a t i s t o be a v e r t e d .  i n place  response  t o defend  i n view  o f t h e time  would assume an ex post  facto  In s h o r t , t h e r e i s very l i t t l e i n c e n t i v e f o r a s t a t e  to react p r o p o r t i o n a l l y t o the o r i g i n a l threat.  There may be  more t o g a i n from a c t i n g d e c i s i v e l y and s t o p p i n g  t h e aggressor  before t h e c o n f l i c t g e t s completely out of hand. The which  next p o i n t which needs t o be noted i s t h a t t h e a t t a c k  gives  rise  to  the r i g h t  of  self-defence  n e c e s s a r i l y be a g a i n s t a s t a t e ' s t e r r i t o r y . Charter  uses t h e phrase " a g a i n s t  Corfu  Channel  case,  the ICJ held  i n t e g r i t y or  C l e a r l y , t h i s i s a wider  term than t h e " p h y s i c a l " t e r r i t o r y o f a s t a t e . the  not  A r t i c l e 2(4) o f t h e  the t e r r i t o r i a l  p o l i t i c a l independence o f any s t a t e " .  need  that  Furthermore, i n  British  warships,  32  36 UN SCOR (2285-88th mtg.), UN Docs. S/PV 2285-88 (1981).  33  Schachter  (April/May  1984), supra note 28, a t 1637-38.  a t t a c k e d w h i l e e x e r c i s i n g t h e i r r i g h t o f innocent  passage, were  entitled  According  to  return  fire  i n self-defence . 34  Brownlie, A r t i c l e 51 r e f e r s was  inserted  collective  f o r the purpose  defence  external attack. not p r e c l u d e In  treaties  t o "armed a t t a c k "  of c l a r i f y i n g the p o s i t i o n which  a r e only  concerned  phrase  of s e l f - d e f e n c e .  r i g h t of self-defence  of A r t i c l e  with  35  Such a word shows t h a t t h e  i s not based on t h e Charter,  but t h a t i t  law which  and goes a t l e a s t as f a r back as t h e  Many w r i t e r s b e l i e v e t h a t s t a t e s have a r i g h t u n t i l the S e c u r i t y  2(4) .  51 mentions t h e  i s a normal r i g h t o f s t a t e s under i n t e r n a t i o n a l dates the Charter  of  Being s p e c i f i c , i n t h i s sense, A r t i c l e 51 does  the opening  right  self-defence  because i t  t h e broader r i g h t as s e t out i n A r t i c l e  fact,  "inherent"  only  to  Council  Caroline.  t o use f o r c e i n  has a c t e d .  view i s adopted, then A r t i c l e 51, i n e f f e c t ,  pre-  36  If this  i s a l i m i t on t h e  inherent r i g h t of self-defence. Next, t h e concept of c o l l e c t i v e s e l f - d e f e n c e r e q u i r e s some explanation.  Bowett has argued t h a t a r i g h t of c o l l e c t i v e s e l f -  defence " i s merely a combination o f i n d i v i d u a l defence;  rights  of s e l f -  s t a t e s may e x e r c i s e c o l l e c t i v e l y a r i g h t which any o f  ^ C o r f i i Channel Case (Merits)  [1949] I.C.J. Reports, p. 4 a t  30-1. 35  B r o w n l i e (1963), supra note 13, a t 269.  36  von Glahn, supra note 10, a t 132.  them might have e x e r c i s e d  individually*' .  state  can defend  state unless  first  exercised a right of individual self-defence.  another  In other words, no  37  t h e former  could  Professor  von Glahn, on the other hand, d e f i n e s t h e term " c o l l e c t i v e defence"  as "defence,  another  against  have  self-  by one s t a t e o r a group o f s t a t e s , o f  attack" . 38  In t h i s  sense,  collective  self-  defence r e f e r s t o any independent use of armed f o r c e by s t a t e s on b e h a l f o f another s t a t e . The  final  point  which  should  be d i s c u s s e d  i s that the  phrase " i f an armed a t t a c k o c c u r s " may suggest t o some t h a t t h e r i g h t of s e l f - d e f e n c e may be invoked occurred.  o n l y a f t e r the a t t a c k has  I t i s a f a c t , however, t h a t customary law p e r m i t t e d  a n t i c i p a t o r y a c t i o n i n f a c e of imminent danger .  I t i s a very  39  demanding c r i t e r i o n t o expect a s t a t e which i s t h e o b j e c t o f an a t t a c k t o wait  until  i t has a c t u a l l y o c c u r r e d .  the s t a t e may not have the c a p a b i l i t y t o defend It  should  anticipatory  be mentioned,  nevertheless,  By t h a t time, itself.  that  the r i g h t of  s e l f - d e f e n c e i s open t o many o b j e c t i o n s .  the s t a t e has t o e s t a b l i s h the c e r t a i n t y o f t h e a t t a c k . involves  a  determination  of  another  Needless t o say, t h i s i s a very d i f f i c u l t —  state's  First, This  objectives.  i f not i m p o s s i b l e -  D. W. Bowett, Self-Defence in International Law (N.Y.: Manchester U n i v e r s i t y Press, 19 58) c h . 10. A l s o , see Akehurst, supra note 3, a t 224. 37  38  von Glahn, supra note 10, a t 133.  Brownlie (1963), supra note 13, a t 257. Webster r e c o g n i z e d t h i s r i g h t i n the Caroline i f the n e c e s s i t y o f s e l f defence was " i n s t a n t " and overwhelming". See supra note 31. 39  -  task.  Even  when  one s t a t e  can f i r m l y  establish  another  s t a t e ' s i n t e n t i o n t o a t t a c k , t h e l a t t e r has t h e chance t o change i t s mind u n t i l t h e moment t h a t t h e a t t a c k a c t u a l l y t a k e s p l a c e . Furthermore, a s t a t e which wants t o defend i t s e l f has open t o i t many o p t i o n s only  short  of commencing  an a t t a c k .  For example, not  a r e t h e organs of t h e UN competent a t d e a l i n g w i t h these  situations,  but they  were  created  with  exactly  this  idea i n  mind. F i n a l l y , although t h e requirement of p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y i n t h e use  of force  i s relevant  t o the r i g h t of a n t i c i p a t o r y  defence, t h e two a r e not e n t i r e l y compatible.  self-  The f o r c e used,  i n t h i s case, w i l l not be p r o p o r t i o n a l t o t h e t h r e a t s i n c e t h e o r i g i n a l t h r e a t d i d not a c t u a l l y i n v o l v e f o r c e .  The UN Charter,  and t h e s e o b j e c t i o n s , have i n f l u e n c e d s t a t e s t o a s s e r t t h e r i g h t of  anticipatory  first  self-defence  blow may be j u s t i f i e d  less  only  and l e s s . 4 0  S t r i k i n g the  a f t e r appeals t o t h e UN have  proved f u t i l e , and t h e t h r e a t , i f i t were allowed t o be c a r r i e d out,  would  have  completely  destroyed  the s t a t e  rather  than  merely damaged i t . The onus o f proof under these circumstances i s , o f course, on t h e s t a t e t a k i n g pre-emptive a c t i o n . 4 1  40  Brownlie  (1963), supra note 13, a t 260.  41  Williams  and de M e s t r a l ,  supra note 6, a t 49-50.  26 C.  HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION;  There  i s considerable  intervention  support  i s f o r humanitarian  justifiable.  There  classification.  f o r t h e view  purposes,  then  a r e two c a t e g o r i e s which  The f i r s t  that  when  i t may  f i t into  i s when a s t a t e complains  be this  that the  c i t i z e n s o f another s t a t e a r e b e i n g g r o s s l y m i s t r e a t e d i n t h e i r own country and t h a t t h e i r fundamental To impose l i a b i l i t y  r i g h t s a r e being denied.  i n such a case, t h e complainant has t o show  t h a t t h e matter i s not e n t i r e l y w i t h i n t h e sphere o f d i s c r e t i o n which i n t e r n a t i o n a l law regards as s o v e r e i g n t y and t h a t i t does not  fall  exclusively  within  the  domain  of  domestic  jurisdiction . 4 2  The Preamble o f t h e C h a r t e r expresses t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f the  peoples  fundamental  of  t h e world  "to reaffirm  [their]  faith  in  human r i g h t s " and " i n t h e d i g n i t y and worth o f t h e  human person".  There  i s a l s o a commitment " t o ensure  ... t h a t  armed f o r c e s h a l l not be used, save i n the common i n t e r e s t ...". These  statements  strongly  suggest  that  humanitarian purposes i s s t i l l l a w f u l .  t h e use o f f o r c e f o r  The repeated i n t e r e s t o f  the d r a f t e r s o f t h e C h a r t e r i n human r i g h t s i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e use of f o r c e f o r t h e urgent p r o t e c t i o n of such r i g h t s  i s also  authorized. The  42  States  lawfulness  of the i n t e r v e n t i o n  will  depend  on t h e  I a n Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990 4th ed.) a t 552.  by  urgency o f t h e case, the absence o f f e a s i b l e a l t e r n a t i v e s f o r h e l p i n g the v i c t i m s , the p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y o f the c o e r c i o n and  used,  the damage caused t o t h e s t a t e which was t h e o b j e c t o f t h e  operation .  The o p e r a t i o n  43  been  subject  undertake  to  police  operation.  of t h i s d o c t r i n e has almost  abuse.  First,  only  measures  necessary  powerful  to  carry  always  states out  such  can an  Second, the i n t e r v e n t i o n must be f o r t h e l i m i t e d  purpose o f s a v i n g people.  Finally,  the i n t e r v e n i n g s t a t e must  have no s e l f i s h motives. Whether t h e r i g h t t o i n t e r v e n e exists  today  i s open t o debate .  f o r humanitarian Schachter  44  purposes  has s t a t e d  that  governments a r e r e l u c t a n t " t o l e g i t i m i z e f o r e i g n i n v a s i o n i n t h e interest that  of humanitarianism" . 45  i f Article  2(4) i s opened  The main  reason  t o such  i n s t a n c e s o f abuse by powerful s t a t e s may  for this i s  a broad  exception,  increase.  A d i f f e r e n t p o s i t i o n , however, has been taken when a s t a t e has  acted  to protect  i t s own n a t i o n a l s  danger i n another s t a t e .  who were  There a r e v a r i o u s  l i n e s of reasoning  which attempt t o j u s t i f y  such an i n t e r v e n t i o n .  been h e l d  a r e an extension  attack  that  nationals  on them,  itself.  therefore,  If this  view  equates  i s adopted,  an then  i n imminent  First,  i t has  of t h e s t a t e . attack  Any  on t h e s t a t e  intervention  t o save  Myres S. McDougal and W. Michael Reisman, International Law in Contemporary Perspective: The Public Order of the World Community (N.Y.: The Foundation Press Inc., 1981) a t 874. 43  ^Brownlie (1963), supra note 13, a t 34. 45  Schachter  (April/May  1984), supra note 28, a t 1629.  28 n a t i o n a l s abroad may of  self-defence,  simply be seen as a d e r i v a t i v e of the r i g h t  which  is  l e g i t i m i z e d by  Article  51  of  the  Charter. The  Israeli  rescue  e f f o r t s i n Entebbe  are  the  example of a s t a t e a c t i n g t o p r o t e c t i t s n a t i o n a l s . of  the  Israelis  was  a d i r e c t attack  on  the  clearest  The  capture  of  Israel.  state  Furthermore, t h e r e i s no doubt t h a t the I s r a e l i c a p t i v e s were i n imminent purpose  danger. of  saving  interference temporarily  in  self-defence  and  Even  there  though  territorial  be  implied  for was  the  the no  limited political  rescue  integrity  that,  the e x i s t e n c e  mission  of Uganda,  the  of most s t a t e s .  in  For  limited situations,  of the r i g h t t o i n t e r v e n e  to  becomes whether A r t i c l e 51 and the theory  of  can  intervention.  designed  nationals.  i s s u e now  be  I f one  then t h i s q u e s t i o n  believe that  Israelis,  i t may  save one's own  was  with the t a c i t approval  s t a t e s do r e c o g n i z e  w r i t e r s who  the  v i o l a t e d the  reason,  The  rescue  Uganda.  I s r a e l i a c t i o n met this  The  in  support  of  humanitarian  adopts a r e s t r i c t i v e view of A r t i c l e  has  believe  used  t o be answered n e g a t i v e l y .  in a  narrow  i t i s unlawful  Many of  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of  t o use  force to protect  51 the  Article  51  nationals  abroad.  According  t o them, f o r c e can o n l y be used t o p r o t e c t a  state's  nationals  against  l o g i c behind t h i s reasoning  their  own  government .  i s t h a t A r t i c l e 51  46  i s an  The  main  exception  M i c h a e l Akehurst, "Humanitarian I n t e r v e n t i o n " i n Hedley B u l l , ed. , Intervention in World Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984) 95 at 107 [ h e r e i n a f t e r Akehurst i n B u l l ] . 46  to  the  general  r u l e set  out  in Article  2(4).  Exceptions  to  r u l e s have t o be t r e a t e d narrowly i n order not t o undermine the general  rule.  A second l i n e of reasoning may  be presented by a r g u i n g  t h e r e i s a s t a t e of emergency and n e c e s s i t y such t h a t action  i s required .  Although Chapter VII  47  of the  that  immediate UN  Charter  a u t h o r i z e s the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l t o a c t under such circumstances, when l i v e s  of i t s people are  expected t o wait f o r the then, l i v e s may Finally,  be  UN  i n danger, a s t a t e should  measures.  By  i s used  the  right  of  I f A r t i c l e 2(4)  is  lost.  Article  2(4)  i n t e r p r e t e d narrowly, then i t may c e r t a i n purposes does not  integrity  to  support  argued t h a t the use  I f the use  f o r the p r o t e c t i o n of n a t i o n a l s does not i n v o l v e the  i f the  s t a t e which i s the  intervening  state's  object  of the  f o r c e s remain t h e r e be j u s t i f i a b l e .  f o r c e , i n such a case, i s c o n t r a r y  t o the  s t a t e which  intervention.  object  of  the  of  i s not force  separation  intervention,  l i m i t e d time, then i n t e r v e n t i o n may  i s the  force  i n f r i n g e upon the " t e r r i t o r i a l  i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the purposes of the UN.  and  of  or p o l i t i c a l independence" of other s t a t e s , and  of p a r t of the  be  t o take a p p r o p r i a t e  i n t e r v e n t i o n t o save n a t i o n a l s from danger.  for  not  f o r only The use  i n v i o l a b i l i t y of The  of the  Charter,  however, does not s e t out t o p r o t e c t i n v i o l a b i l i t y , but o n l y  Natalino Ronzitti, Rescuing Nationals Abroad M i l i t a r y Coercion and Intervention on Grounds of (Netherlands: Martinus N i j h o f f , P u b l i s h e r s , 1985) a t  a  47  4.  the  Through Humanity  30 t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y and p o l i t i c a l independence of the Such  arguments  humanitarian duration,  are  not  intervention,  constitutes  a  is  convincing limited  in  v i o l a t i o n of  4 8  because  any  scope  and  the  target's  The measures taken w i l l be a g a i n s t  t a r g e t s t a t e ' s wishes, and territory  however  temporary  p o l i t i c a l independence.  state's  fully  state .  for a s p e c i f i c period  occupied  Admittedly, more than the  by  the  of time,  intervener's  state's t e r r i t o r i a l  the that  forces.  inviolability  is  damaged i n such a case.  Clearly, non-intervention The United Nations Charter, drafted states.  for  the  There  intervention.  and A r t i c l e 2(4)  specific are,  As  i s a w e l l - e s t a b l i s h e d l e g a l norm.  reason  however,  was  of  in particular,  maintaining  exceptions  to  the  peace norm  invitation  humanitarian The  by  among  of  non-  seen, the most s i g n i f i c a n t of these  the r i g h t t o take a c t i o n i n s e l f - d e f e n c e , the r i g h t t o upon  was  the  government  of  another  are  intervene  state,  and  intervention.  next  chapter  is  a  historical  survey  of  American  i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t p o l i c i e s i n C e n t r a l America.  The purpose of  f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n i s t o e s t a b l i s h a long and  consistent history  of US i n t e r v e n t i o n i n t h a t r e g i o n . that  Grenada  s i m i l a r cases;  Ibid, at  and  Nicaragua  they are not  1.  were  the  By doing so, i t w i l l be seen chosen  anomalies.  from  a  long  list  of  31  IV:  PRIOR US INTERVENTION IN LATIN AMERICA  During the p a s t century, the r e l a t i o n s h i p t h a t has between  the  US  controversy.  and The  Latin US  sees  c o l l e c t i o n of neighbouring interests.  to  has  itself  as  been the  a  involved  of  of  a  s t a t e s whose s e c u r i t y i s v i t a l t o i t s  S t a t e s as a domineering country  become  matter  protector  Many L a t i n American c o u n t r i e s , on the  see the U n i t e d eager  America  evolved  i n other  states'  other  hand,  t h a t i s always  internal  affairs.  Perhaps i t i s because of t h i s disagreement on the r o l e of the  US  i n L a t i n America t h a t , on numerous o c c a s i o n s , t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p has been put t o a t e s t by US In policy.  fact,  US  i n v a s i o n and i n t e r v e n t i o n .  intervention in Latin  America  i s not  was  new  The US has been t r y i n g , f o r a very long time, t o ensure  the s e c u r i t y of the r e g i o n i n order t o p r o t e c t i t s own vital  a  interests.  As e a r l y as 1845,  engaged i n a war  perceived  f o r example, James K.  with Mexico which ended t h r e e y e a r s  when the US a c q u i r e d o n e - t h i r d of Mexico's t e r r i t o r y .  In  Polk later 1911,  the US government i n t e r v e n e d d i r e c t l y i n the r e g i o n once more t o r e p l a c e B r i t i s h i n f l u e n c e with i t s own. the  US  managed t o g a i n  almost  total  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , communications, and  In the 1930s, moreover, c o n t r o l over  exports.  Guatemala's  These are o n l y a  few  examples  America.  of  a  long  list  of  US  interventions  Each p r e s i d e n t i a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  p o l i c i e s on t h i s t o p i c and  acted a c c o r d i n g  in  Central  presented  its  to a d i f f e r e n t  own plan  of a c t i o n . This which  section provides  have  had  Furthermore,  a  greater  several  cases  e s t a b l i s h a long-standing America. the  a broad overview of those impact  have been  Central  focused  on  These cases are:  i n order  US  Pigs  and the i n v a s i o n of Guatemala i n 1965.  The  the  Bay  w i l l then i n v o l v e an in-depth  study of the two  which are  this  Grenada  main  i n 1983,  focus  and  to  i n t e r v e n t i o n i n Guatemala d u r i n g of  the  America.  p a t t e r n of US i n t e r v e n t i o n i n C e n t r a l  Eisenhower A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ;  Cuba;  on  policies  of  study:  invasion next  in  chapter  p a r t i c u l a r cases  the  US  i n t e r v e n t i o n i n Nicaragua  invasion  by  the  of  Reagan  Administration.  A.  THE  MONROE  The  "Monroe  Monroe, was of  spheres  contained  DOCTRINE;  Doctrine",  announced  in  1823  President  the f i r s t p o l i t i c a l e x p r e s s i o n by the US of the i d e a of three  influence.  Originally,  branches . 49  The  first  the  Monroe  branch  d e c l a r a t i o n t h a t the American c o n t i n e n t would no  J.G. Starke, Introduction Butterworths, 1989 10th ed.) a t 49  by  to International 107.  Doctrine  included longer be  Law  a the  (London:  subject  of f u t u r e  colonization  by the European  powers.  d e c l a r a t i o n arose out of the t h r e a t s t o the Western from  czarist  expanding  Russia  which  i t s claims  Hemisphere  a t the time owned A l a s k a ,  southward  into  the  Pacific  This  and  was  Northwest.  A l s o , the Holy A l l i a n c e o f R u s s i a , A u s t r i a , P r u s s i a , and France was  seen as a t h r e a t .  combined  Furthermore, t h e r e were rumours t h a t a  French-Spanish f l e e t would  sail  t o the New  World  and  r e c a p t u r e t h e newly independent c o u n t r i e s . 50  The second branch of the Monroe D o c t r i n e was a d e c l a r a t i o n of the absence of American i n t e r e s t i n European wars or a f f a i r s . Finally,  and most s i g n i f i c a n t l y ,  the t h i r d  branch c o n t a i n e d a  d e c l a r a t i o n t h a t any attempt by the European powers t o extend their  system t o any p o r t i o n of the American c o n t i n e n t would  regarded as "dangerous" t o the "peace and s a f e t y " of the T h i s d e c l a r a t i o n was  directed  a g a i n s t any  be  US . 51  i n t e r v e n t i o n on the  p a r t of the European powers t o r e s t o r e the a u t h o r i t y of Spain over the L a t i n American c o u n t r i e s which had gained independence w i t h the support o f the US. By the end helped  bring  of the 19th century,  the  US  into  politics  and i d e n t i f i e d  Doctrine  had  become  the  the Monroe D o c t r i n e  mainstream  of  international  the US as a growing world power.  the  basis  f o r the  US  had  claimed  right  The to  Howard J . Wiarda, The Democratic Revolution in Latin America: History, Politics, and U.S. Policy (U.S.A.: Holmes and Meiner P u b l i s h e r s , Inc., 1990) a t 95. 50  S t a r k e , supra note 49, a t 107; Isaak Dore, "The U.S. I n v a s i o n of Grenada: R e s u r r e c t i o n of the "Johnson D o c t r i n e " ? " (Spring 1984) 20 Stan. J . I n t ' l L. 173 at 177. 51  intervene  i n any p a r t o f t h e American c o n t i n e n t  v i t a l i n t e r e s t s were t h r e a t e n e d . that  L a t i n America was a b l e  European  powers  were  kept  among  One outcome o f t h i s c l a i m was  t o t r y t o grow and p r o s p e r at a distance.  century, t h e Monroe D o c t r i n e understanding  i f and when i t s  By  since  t h e mid-2Oth  was transformed i n t o a c o l l e c t i v e  a l l the  American  states  to  preserve  c o n t i n e n t a l s e c u r i t y under t h e a u s p i c e s of t h e O r g a n i z a t i o n o f American S t a t e s against  (OAS).  intervention  A d o c t r i n e t h a t was o r i g i n a l l y d i r e c t e d has now  been  transformed  into  a  theory  justifying i t . Following  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  proclaimed numerous other p o l i c i e s . period  p r i o r to the C i v i l  destiny the  Mexico,  Central  expansion with  into  Great  however,  Ocean,  during the  War, i t was argued t h a t  i t was t h e  northward  America,  Expansion was t o be westward t o into  resulted  i n 1846;  and south Any  52  by a compromise  t h e expansion  i n a war with  country o f o n e - t h i r d  Canada,  and t h e Caribbean .  Canada was checked  Britain  administrations  For i n s t a n c e ,  o f t h e US t o expand.  Pacific  US  Mexico  of i t s national  into  which  toward  northerly settlement  t h e south,  deprived  that  territory.  The most important r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e Monroe  Doctrine  was embodied i n t h e "Roosevelt C o r o l l a r y " t o t h e d o c t r i n e . 5 3  F o r a d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e t h e o r y of "Manifest Wiarda, supra note 50, a t 95-7. 52  In  D e s t i n y " , see /  F e d e r i c o G. G i l , "The Kennedy-Johnson Years" i n John D. Martz, ed., United States Policy in Latin America: A Quarter Century of C r i s i s and Challenge (U.S.A.: Univ. o f Nebraska Press, 1988) 3 a t 4-5. 53  1905, US  P r e s i d e n t Theodore Roosevelt announced t h a t h e n c e f o r t h  would  use  particularly  i t s power i n the  supported  US,  in  the  Roosevelt  region, believed  system t h a t would promote US economic and  US  to  be  constructed.  This  line  i n t e r v e n t i o n i s m because of the need  p r o t e c t the i n c r e a s i n g economic and i n the Caribbean.  order  President  54  i n t e r e s t s had  reasoning  maintain  Caribbean .  t h a t an inter-American political  to  the  s t r a t e g i c stakes of the  As s u r p l u s of c a p i t a l was  accumulating  of to US  i n the  American c o r p o r a t i o n s were i n v e s t i n g more and more i n L a t i n  America.  The  important  b u i l d i n g of  economic and  During important  World  War  the  Panama Canal,  furthermore,  s t r a t e g i c i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the I I , maintaining  o b j e c t i v e of  the  the  status  F r a n k l i n Roosevelt  had  US.  quo  was  an  Administration,  even i f t h i s meant s u p p o r t i n g the most undemocratic governments. This policy nature, was John  Foster  helped  put  of s u p p o r t i n g  s t a b l e regimes, r e g a r d l e s s of  f o l l o w e d w e l l i n t o the Cold War. Dulles  believed  it  action  in  strongly  during  the  S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e  in this 1954  their  policy  and  he  intervention  in  Guatemala.  B.  GUATEMALA;  In the view of the  Eisenhower A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  the  ^Walter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions: The United in Central America (N.Y.: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., a t 37.  interStates 1984)  American system had Administration  t o become an anti-communist a l l i a n c e .  worried  L a t i n American country.  that  communism  In 1953  and  had  1954,  infiltrated  The every  i n p a r t i c u l a r , they  f e a r e d t h a t S o v i e t agents were p l a n n i n g t o subvert Guatemala and turn  i t i n t o a base f o r S o v i e t  Western Hemisphere.  That was  i m p e r i a l i s t operations  the main reason why,  in  i n 1954,  the the  U n i t e d S t a t e s supported the i n v a s i o n of Guatemala by the army of Colonel  Castillo  overthrowing the  Armas from bases  was  led  by  tyrannical  and  and  Honduras,  l e f t i s t government of Jacobo Arbenz Guzman.  Guatemala's repression  i n Nicaragua  h i s t o r y has  been  economic s t a g n a t i o n .  personalist  leaders.  regimes were the  characterized For  by  political  a century,  Guatemala  Arbitrary,  norm, u n t i l  March  excessive,  and  1951,  the  when  f i r s t p e a c e f u l t r a n s i t i o n of power took p l a c e , and Jacobo Arbenz assumed the p r e s i d e n c y .  P r e s i d e n t Arbenz a c c e l e r a t e d the  of change i n Guatemala.  He  55  independent, modern and One  pledged t o c r e a t e  capitalist  economically  state.  of h i s most important undertakings was  In mid-1952, the  an  rate  l e g i s l a t u r e enacted a b i l l  a g r a r i a n reform.  t h a t empowered  the  government t o e x p r o p r i a t e u n c u l t i v a t e d p o r t i o n s of land f o r the purpose of r e d i s t r i b u t i o n . and  modest s i n c e ,  The  reforms, however, were moderate  f o r example, the  e s t a t e s of up t o 67 0 a c r e s ,  reform b i l l  i f at l e a s t two-thirds  Stephen G. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin Foreign P o l i c y of Anti-Communism (U.S.A.: The C a r o l i n a Press, 1988) a t 44. 55  left  untouched  of the  America: Univ. of  land  The North  was c u l t i v a t e d .  Landowners,  5 6  furthermore,  i n t e r e s t b e a r i n g Guatemalan bonds.  were compensated by  The main purpose of these  measures was t o c r e a t e a n a t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l landowners. T h i s modest process of change, n e v e r t h e l e s s , was p e r c e i v e d to For  t h r e a t e n US one  economic and s t r a t e g i c  thing,  the  largest  interests  landowner  i n Guatemala.  i n Guatemala  and  the  c o u n t r y ' s c h i e f p r i v a t e employer was the U n i t e d F r u i t Company o f Boston,  wholly  Massachusetts.  owned  Compania  The  s u b s i d i a r y of  550,000 a c r e s  of land,  Agricola  the U n i t e d  85 percent  de  Fruit  Guatemala,  Company,  a  owned  of which was u n c u l t i v a t e d .  Between 1952 and 1954, the government e x p r o p r i a t e d about 400,000 acres  of  the  approximately  Company's  land.  In  return,  it  offered  $3 an acre i n t h e form of guaranteed t w e n t y - f i v e  year bonds b e a r i n g t h r e e p e r c e n t annual i n t e r e s t . 5 7  On A p r i l Government  20, 1954, the Department of S t a t e presented  of Guatemala with  a formal  claim  for  the  $15,854,849.  The c l a i m had been f i l e d w i t h the Department by U n i t e d F r u i t i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h the e x p r o p r i a t i o n of the l a n d s . Administration  b e l i e v e d , by then,  t h a t what had s t a r t e d  m i d d l e - c l a s s reform e f f o r t had been transformed political  movement  that  threatened  Guatemala and the e n t i r e r e g i o n .  5 6  The Eisenhower  US  as a  into a radical  interests  In a news conference  in  both  on June  I b i d , a t 45.  The $3-an-acre f i g u r e was a r r i v e d a t by t a k i n g U n i t e d F r u i t ' s d e c l a r a t i o n of the v a l u e of t h e land f o r t a x a b l e purposes. United F r u i t r e j e c t e d t h i s v a l u a t i o n , claiming that the land was worth a t l e a s t $75 an a c r e . I b i d , a t 46. 57  38 8, 1954, S e c r e t a r y D u l l e s s t a t e d t h a t although Guatemala wanted to  present  the problem as  r e l a t i n g t o the U n i t e d  one  between  Guatemala  and  the  US  F r u i t Company, the r e a l concern was the  presence of Communist i n f i l t r a t i o n i n Guatemala . 58  P r i o r t o the r e v o l u t i o n i n Guatemala, a number of p u b l i c d e c l a r a t i o n s were made by t h e US government In t h e D e c l a r a t i o n  of S o l i d a r i t y  against  communism.  f o r the P r e s e r v a t i o n  of the  P o l i t i c a l I n t e g r i t y of the American S t a t e s A g a i n s t I n t e r n a t i o n a l Communist  Intervention,  f o r instance,  the American  Republics  d e c l a r e d t h a t " i n t e r n a t i o n a l communism, by i t s a n t i - d e m o c r a t i c nature and i t s i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t tendency i s incompatible concept of American freedom" . 59  Dulles  r e i t e r a t e d the b e l i e f  political constitute  institutions  with the  In another statement, S e c r e t a r y that  domination and  c o n t r o l of  of American s t a t e s by communism  i n t e r v e n t i o n by a f o r e i g n p o l i t i c a l  "would  power and be a  t h r e a t t o the peace of America" . 60  The US government was aware of the f a c t t h a t communists i n Guatemala c o n s t i t u t e d a s m a l l m i n o r i t y .  They b e l i e v e d , however,  "Formal Claims F i l e d A g a i n s t Guatemalan Government" (May 1954) 30 Dep't S t . B u l l . 678 a t 678; "U.S. P o l i c y on Guatemala" (June 1984) 84 Dep't S t . B u l l . 950. 58  " D e c l a r a t i o n of S o l i d a r i t y f o r the P r e s e r v a t i o n of the P o l i t i c a l I n t e g r i t y of the American S t a t e s A g a i n s t I n t e r n a t i o n a l Communist I n t e r v e n t i o n " (March 1954) 30 Dep't S t . B u l l . 420. 59  " I n t e r v e n t i o n of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Communism i n t h e Americas Statement of March 5 by S e c r e t a r y Dulles a t Caracas,Venezuela" (March 1954) 30 Dep't S t . B u l l . 419. 60  that  the m i n o r i t y  b e l i e f was  acted  to gain  government  required  Curtain" .  the o n l y  These developments l e d  62  to believe  that  the s i t u a t i o n i n Guatemala  immediate a t t e n t i o n .  The a c t u a l " i n v a s i o n " when the f o r c e s officer  This  61  t o be the r e c i p i e n t o f a massive shipment o f  arms from behind the "Iron US  of power .  r e i n f o r c e d by the f a c t t h a t Guatemala was  American n a t i o n  the  positions  of Guatemala began on June 18,1954  of Lieutenant  i n e x i l e , crossed  Colonel  Carlos  Armas, an  i n t o Guatemala from Honduras.  army Armas  and h i s 200 f o l l o w e r s were t r a i n e d by the C e n t r a l I n t e l l i g e n c e Agency  (CIA)  limited  i n scope and i t l e f t the Guatemalans unimpressed;  CIA,  however,  i n Honduras . 63  The  invasion  supplemented the a t t a c k  radio broadcasting  from Honduras.  by  itself  was  quite the  the massive use of  T h i s gave the impression t o  Guatemalans t h a t the f i g h t i n g was i n t e n s e and widespread, and i t l e f t a p s y c h o l o g i c a l impact on the p o p u l a t i o n . added  t o the h y s t e r i a by having  city .  Finally,  6 4  on June  i t s pilots  27, Arbenz  fell  The CIA f u r t h e r bomb the  capital  from power and the  Eisenhower A d m i n i s t r a t i o n s u c c e s s f u l l y completed what i t had s e t out t o do. The i n v a s i o n o f Guatemala was s i g n i f i c a n t f o r a number o f "Communist S t . B u l l . 873. 61  Influence  i n Guatemala"  (May  1954)  Ibid. A l s o , "Arms Shipment t o Guatemala from C o n t r o l l e d Area" (May 1954) 30 Dep't S t . B u l l . 835. 6 2  63  M  Rabe, supra note 55, a t 56.  Ibid.  30 Dep't Soviet-  reasons.  First,  US-supported  constitutionally  elected  f o r c e s managed t o overthrow  government  standards, the i n v a s i o n was  of  Guatemala.  "successful".  The  US'  By  a t h r e a t t o American i n t e r e s t s was  Second, p r i o r  1954,  principle (mostly  that  since  system.  The  Monroe D o c t r i n e was  the Americas  European)  different  the  had  influence. the  perceived  situation  threat  War  intervention  II  in  security  the  outside was  from  the  came  Guatemala,  still  order. the  inside  US  intervention  trying to establish a  Through  the  maintained  successful  order  in  the  For these reasons, the o p e r a t i o n i n Guatemala i s one of  the more important episodes of US*  C.  on  i n Guatemala  F i n a l l y , the 1954  o c c u r r e d a t a time when the US was  region.  based  ideas and p r a c t i c e s of a C e n t r a l American country  were the main source of concern.  post-World  removed.  t o be p r o t e c t e d from  The  most  objectives  were achieved and to  the  Cold War  policies.  CUBA:  When F u l g e n c i o B a t i s t a f i r s t came t o power i n t h e 1930s, he was his  thought  of as a p o p u l i s t and  country.  His  wide  base  a n a t i o n a l i s t who of  popular  c o n s i d e r a b l e support from the US which was i n the form of m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e .  could  support  led  States  was  also  no  longer  to  sometimes expressed  In the 1950s, however, he  became more and more r e p r e s s i v e and l o s t a l l h i s support. United  save  able  to  support  such  The an  unpopular  regime.  symbolic move; hostile .  Military  a i d to  Cuba  was  cut  off  in a  and r e l a t i o n s between the two c o u n t r i e s became  As support f o r B a t i s t a was d e c l i n i n g , F i d e l C a s t r o ' s  6 5  r e v o l u t i o n a r y movement was  g a i n i n g more p o p u l a r i t y .  The v i c t o r y of F i d e l C a s t r o ' s g u e r r i l l a f o r c e s i n Cuba on January 1, 1959 follow.  The  was US  a major concern f o r the US was  compelled  r e g a r d i n g C e n t r a l America; no l o n g e r v e r y e f f e c t i v e . the  Soviet  Union  Moscow was  to  develop  i n the y e a r s t o a  new  approach  the p o l i c y of w a t c h f u l w a i t i n g was C o i n c i d e n t a l l y , the f o r e i g n p o l i c y of  underwent a  shift  prepared t o extend  a t almost  the  same time.  a i d to revolutionary  movements  even when they were not of communist o r i g i n , and embarked upon a program  of s u b s t a n t i a l  economic a i d t o the  under-developed  countries . 66  Soon a f t e r the Cuban r e v o l u t i o n , C a s t r o took d e c i s i v e s t e p s to  redistribute  private  owned b u s i n e s s e s , and working  class  land  h o l d i n g s , e x p r o p r i a t e American-  implement  grievances.  policies  Aside  from  designed t o r e d r e s s being  concerned  with  C a s t r o ' s communist p o l i c i e s , the US government was unhappy with the t u r n of events because the American s u f f e r i n g as w e l l .  to  invest  heavily  in  government, and were e v e n t u a l l y the  island's  industries. 65  Wiarda,  ^Gil  was  American b u s i n e s s e s had developed a working  r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the B a t i s t a able  b u s i n e s s community  supra note 50, a t  218.  i n Martz, supra note 53, a t 218.  sugar  and  tourist  Although fashion, sour.  Castro  was  not i n i t i a l l y  by mid-1960, US r e l a t i o n s  regarded  with  in hostile  Cuba had become v e r y  P r e s i d e n t Eisenhower c u t o f f a l l imports from Cuba i n an  attempt t o d i s c o u r a g e This,  however, pushed  China.  Finally,  C a s t r o ' s move towards t h e S o v i e t Union. Castro  President  closer  t o t h e S o v i e t Union and  Eisenhower  decided  t o break a l l  formal t i e s w i t h Cuba and t o end d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s . 6 7  When John F. Kennedy moved i n t o t h e P r e s i d e n t i a l o f f i c e i n January  1961, Cuba's r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e S o v i e t Union were seen  as a s e r i o u s t h r e a t .  T o l e r a t i n g C a s t r o ' s communist  may have been, on t h e i r  own, bearable;  tendencies  t h e main problem was  t h a t he was p r o v i d i n g L a t i n America with a v i a b l e o p t i o n t o t h e democratic  system  t h a t t h e US had supposedly  There was, consequently,  g r e a t domestic  been  pressure  promoting.  on P r e s i d e n t  Kennedy t o a c t q u i c k l y . Upon t a k i n g o f f i c e i n 1961, P r e s i d e n t Kennedy was t o l d o f p l a n s made by t h e CIA, under Eisenhower's d i r e c t i o n , t o stage an i n v a s i o n o f Cuba. 17,  Eisenhower had made t h i s d e c i s i o n on March  1960, and i t had been put i n t o  a c t i o n immediately.  The  r e s u l t was a CIA document, "A Program of Covert A c t i o n A g a i n s t the  Castro  Regime",  which  presented  a  f o u r - p a r t program o f  attack: (1) (2)  " c r e a t i o n o f a r e s p o n s i b l e and u n i f i e d Cuban o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e C a s t r o regime l o c a t e d o u t s i d e Cuba"; "a powerful propaganda o f f e n s i v e " a g a i n s t C a s t r o ;  M i c h a e l J . Kryzanek, U.S. — Latin (N.Y.: Praeger P u b l i s h e r s , 1985) a t 51. 67  American  Relations  43 (3)  c r e a t i o n of a " c o v e r t a c t i o n and i n t e l l i g e n c e o r g a n i z a t i o n w i t h i n Cuba", r e s p o n s i v e to the exile opposition; "the development of a p a r a m i l i t a r y f o r c e o u t s i d e of Cuba f o r f u t u r e g u e r r i l l a a c t i o n " .  (4)  6 8  After  this  focused  document  on how  was  drafted,  administration  they c o u l d harm Castro's  President  Kennedy was  advised  of  officials  regime. this  plan  and  was  told  t h a t the anti-communist r e b e l s were t o be t r a i n e d i n Guatemala and Nicaragua and would invade Cuba from the south a t the Bay  of  Pigs .  p o i n t s t h a t were v i t a l  to  F i r s t , t h a t the C a s t r o regime  was  The  69  CIA  a n a l y s i s showed two  the success of the o p e r a t i o n :  v u l n e r a b l e t o such a s u r p r i s e a t t a c k ; and second, t h a t once the r e b e l s were on  Cuban t e r r i t o r y ,  them  fight.  in  the  considerable The  Furthermore,  a i r support t o the  plan  seemed f l a w l e s s ,  go-ahead.  On A p r i l 17,  a t the Bay  of P i g s .  local  others  militia,  1961,  The  there  would r i s e up  and  the  promised  US  had  join  rebels. and  President  about 1,500  Kennedy gave  the  r e b e l s landed i n Cuba  r e b e l s faced great r e s i s t a n c e from the was  no  local  support  for  them,  and  P r e s i d e n t Kennedy r e f u s e d t o p r o v i d e the a i r cover t h a t had been promised. capture of  The  i n v a s i o n ended d i s a s t r o u s l y w i t h i n hours w i t h the  1,200  of  the  rebels.  The  result,  ironically,  t h a t the C a s t r o regime became even more popular and both w i t h i n and  stronger  was —  o u t s i d e Cuba.  On numerous o c c a s i o n s ,  both p r i o r and a f t e r the i n v a s i o n a t  68  Quoted i n Rabe, supra note 55,  69  Kryzanek, supra note 67,  at  51.  at  129.  the Bay of P i g s , P r e s i d e n t Kennedy  and h i s o f f i c i a l s  insisted  t h a t the US has never had (and never w i l l have) the i n t e n t i o n t o militarily  i n t e r v e n e i n Cuba .  t o Kennedy on A p r i l was  A l e t t e r w r i t t e n by Khrushchev  70  directly  18, on t h e other hand, claimed t h a t t h e US  responsible  f o r and  involved  i n the  invasion . 71  The armed bands t h a t invaded Cuba were prepared, equipped, and armed i n t h e US;  the p l a n e s which bombed Cuban towns belonged  t o the US; and even the bombs themselves were American. Other o f f i c i a l statements took the p o s i t i o n t h a t , although the US has never committed an a c t of a g g r e s s i o n a g a i n s t Cuban  freedom-fighters  sympathy  of the U n i t e d  proposition determine  will  that their  always have  States.  a l l people own  future  The US  should by  have  the support  72  and the  " i s committed t o the the r i g h t  democratic  to  freely  processes",  communism, of course, has never been " i n s t a l l e d by the f r e e vote of i t s p e o p l e " .  Cuba,  and  i n any country  P r e s i d e n t Kennedy took t h i s  image one s t e p f u r t h e r h i m s e l f by speaking of the r e b e l s as a "small  band  of g a l l a n t  Cuban  refugees"  and  "gallant  women f i g h t i n g t o redeem t h e independence of t h e i r  men  and  homeland" . 73  See, f o r example, Kennedy's l e t t e r t o Khrushchev on A p r i l 17 i n "United S t a t e s and S o v i e t Union Exchange Messages i n Regard t o Events i n Cuba" (May 1961) 44 Dep't S t . b u l l . 661. A l s o see Statement of A p r i l 15 by U.S. R e p r e s e n t a t i v e A d l a i Stevenson i n the U.N. i n "U.N. General Assembly Debates Cuban Complaint" (May 1961) 44 Dep't S t . B u l l . 667. 70  7 1  I b i d , a t 662.  7 2  I b i d , a t 664.  73  "The Lesson of Cuba"  (May 1961) 44 Dep't S t . B u l l .  659.  Whatever r e s u l t was  the  US  may  that Castro's  have  said  s t r e n g t h and  after  the  power i n c r e a s e d .  the Kennedy A d m i n i s t r a t i o n r e a l i z e d t h a t i t had both  the  strength  of  the  regime and  Second, when the r o l e of the US became even harder Bay  of P i g s  people's  was  the  First,  underestimated support  of i t .  and the CIA became obvious, i t  t o j u s t i f y the i n t e r v e n t i o n .  episode  invasion,  nothing  short  of  In s h o r t ,  the  a disaster for  the  Kennedy A d m i n i s t r a t i o n . Almost President  one  month  Kennedy  had  proposal.  prior  to  announced  T h i s p o l i c y was  the the  Bay  of  Pigs  invasion,  "Alliance for  Progress"  to a s s i s t democratization  in Latin  America through socio-economic a i d , and thus i n h i b i t the of  communism . 74  communism  —  different.  had The  The not  goals  of  the  changed;  A l l i a n c e was  US  only  one  —  stability  the  of the  means were  The  need t o modify the  America,  and  and  based upon a s e t of  obsolete  social  systems of L a t i n  t o a c c e l e r a t e economic development and  Unfortunately,  policy  o r i g i n s of the program were d e r i v e d  from the  poverty.  anti-  slightly  most noble US  e f f o r t s toward L a t i n America because i t was L a t i n American needs.  and  spread  the US  l a c k e d the adequate  eradicate experience  the r e q u i r e d s k i l l s t o s u c c e s s f u l l y implement a program of  such magnitude, and the A l l i a n c e soon f a i l e d .  Wiarda, supra note 50, at 104-6; at 9-17. 74  53,  G i l i n Martz, supra note  46 D.  DOMINICAN REPUBLIC:  Lyndon Johnson came i n t o o f f i c e i n November o f 1963, a f t e r President  Kennedy's  new  Johnson  toward  domestic  i s s u e s , and t h e momentum f o r change i n L a t i n America  initiated  Administration  assassination.  turned  The  i t s attention  inward  by P r e s i d e n t Kennedy began t o weaken.  When P r e s i d e n t  did  venture i n t o L a t i n American a f f a i r s ,  the  A l l i a n c e f o r Progress g o a l s .  Johnson  i t was not t o f u r t h e r  Rather, h i s main concern was  to prevent t h e communist i n f i l t r a t i o n of the Western  Hemisphere.  The US c o u l d n o t a l l o w t h e emergence o f "another Cuba" a t any cost. 1965  A g a i n s t t h i s backdrop o f b e l i e f s and i d e a s , t h e events o f unfolded. The i n t e r v e n t i o n i n t h e Dominican R e p u b l i c i n 1965 was t h e  f i r s t i n s t a n c e i n r e c e n t h i s t o r y i n which t h e US c a r r i e d an open invasion  o f another  solidarity.  state  i n order  t o preserve hemispheric  The r e v o l u t i o n t h a t deposed t h e r i g h t i s t  regime o f P r e s i d e n t Juan Bosch on A p r i l to  military  24, 1965, was b e l i e v e d  be a t h r e a t t o t h e American c i t i z e n s who were l i v i n g  Dominican  Republic.  President  Johnson  sent  23,000  i n the  American  t r o o p s i n t o t h e Dominican R e p u b l i c t o b r i n g t h e c i v i l war under c o n t r o l and, supposedly, t o ensure the s a f e t y o f t h e Americans l i v i n g i n that country . 75  On Saturday, A p r i l 24, r e v o l u t i o n erupted i n t h e Dominican Michael J . Kryzanek, "The Dominican Intervention Revisited: An A t t i t u d i n a l and O p e r a t i o n a l A n a l y s i s " i n Martz, supra note 53, 135 a t 135 [ h e r e i n a f t e r Kryzanek i n M a r t z ] . 75  R e p u b l i c and elements of the m i l i t a r y overthrew the government. The r e b e l s , however, were themselves d i v i d e d and f i g h t i n g broke out  amongst  Bosch;  them.  others  afternoon,  Some wanted opposed  the  US  did  this  not  to  restore  movement.  intervene,  Until  Wednesday  for  urging  Around 3 p.m.  7 6  who  President  except  r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s t o accept a cease f i r e . day,  former  the  on t h a t  the P r e s i d e n t r e c e i v e d a c a b l e from US Ambassador Bennett had  been  informed  by  the  Dominican  chief  of  police  and  governmental a u t h o r i t i e s t h a t the s a f e t y of US c i t i z e n s c o u l d no longer  be  guaranteed.  Johnson t o order  an  Ambassador  Bennett  urged  President  "immediate" l a n d i n g of American f o r c e s t o  rescue the US n a t i o n a l s . 7 7  On  April  Republic . 78  OAS  28,  400  Marines  T h i s d e c i s i o n was  were c o n t a c t e d .  had  landed  in  the  Dominican  made b e f o r e e i t h e r the UN  In f a c t , i t was  or  the  not u n t i l the f o l l o w i n g day  t h a t the US r e p r e s e n t a t i v e t o the UN,  A d l a i Stevenson,  informed  the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l t h a t P r e s i d e n t Johnson had ordered American troops  to  the  Dominican  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e t o the OAS, the  members of  d i r e c t an appeal  the  OAS  Republic . 79  On  April  30,  the  Ambassador E l l s w o r t h Bunker, met and  asked  the  Council  of  the  OAS  US with to  f o r a c e a s e - f i r e t o a l l s i d e s i n v o l v e d i n the  "U.S. A c t s t o Meet Threat i n Dominican R e p u b l i c " 1965). 52 Dep't St. B u l l . 738 at 744. 76  ""ibid, at  745.  7 8  I b i d , at  738.  7 9  Ibid.  (May  48 conflict . 8 0  By t h a t day, about 2,400 c i t i z e n s of t h e US  and of other  n a t i o n s were evacuated, and about the same number were left  i n the  Dominican  Republic .  Meanwhile,  81  the  OAS  adopted a r e s o l u t i o n c a l l i n g f o r c e a s e - f i r e , and the US i n the Dominican R e p u b l i c had c r e a t e d an i n t e r n a t i o n a l zone  of r e f u g e i n Santo  establish  such  additional  a  zone  battalions  Domingo .  The  82  allowed of  the  about  excuse  President  1,500  men  still had  forces neutral  of having to to  and  send  two  additional  detachments of Marines t o the Dominican R e p u b l i c on May  1.  Statements made by P r e s i d e n t Johnson i n t h e f o l l o w i n g days clearly  revealed  citizens  was  President  the r e a l  no  stated  longer that  goal the  of the US.  dominant  the g o a l  The  issue.  of the US  was  safety  of  Instead,  US the  t o permit the  people o f the Dominican R e p u b l i c " t o f r e e l y choose the path of p o l i t i c a l democracy, The  following  statement.  This  s o c i a l j u s t i c e , and economic day,  on May  time he  element of the r e v o l u t i o n .  2,  the P r e s i d e n t  explicitly  mentioned  The r e v o l u t i o n ,  had begun as a p o p u l a r democratic movement.  progress" . 83  made another the  communist  a c c o r d i n g t o him, I t was  soon taken  over, however, by Cuban-trained Communist c o n s p i r a t o r s who were 8 0  I b i d , a t 740.  8 ,  I b i d , A t 742.  The r e s o l u t i o n was adopted by a vote of 16 t o 0, w i t h 4 a b s t e n t i o n s ( C h i l e , Mexico, Uruguay, and V e n e z u e l a ) . See i b i d , a t 741. 82  8 3  I b i d , a t 74 3.  determined mission  t o lead  the country.  The g o a l  was then s a i d t o be p r e v e n t i n g  o f t h e US i n t h i s  t h e c r e a t i o n o f another  Communist s t a t e i n the Western Hemisphere . 84  President  Johnson  immediately  to  the  instructions  t o land  p o s s i b l e moment .  ordered  2,000  Dominican  extra  Republic.  He  to  proceed  also  issued  an a d d i t i o n a l 4,500 men a t t h e e a r l i e s t  The Johnson A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  85  men  was determined t o  d e s t r o y t h e "Communist c o n s p i r a t o r s " because i f they had s e i z e d power, then t h e p r o c e s s would have been i r r e v e r s i b l e , "declared  p r i n c i p l e s of the OAS" would have been f r u s t r a t e d . 8 6  I t was much e a s i e r f o r the US t o crush under  and t h e  conditions  of c i v i l  disorder  t h e Communist movement  and chaos than  to t r y to  remove an e s t a b l i s h e d regime. The  Dominican  intervention  complex than i s presented here.  was,  of  course,  much  more  The major f a c t o r which c l e a r l y  stands out, however, was the t h r e a t of communism t o hemispheric solidarity.  American f o r c e s were sent t o t h e Dominican  t o i n s u r e t h a t "another Cuba" would not be c r e a t e d , that,  from  here  expansionism. Republic,  on,  the  US  would  stand  A f t e r s i x months, US troops  up left  and t h e r e was a r e t u r n t o normalcy —  Republic  and t o show  to  Communist  t h e Dominican on t h e s u r f a c e  a t l e a s t , s i n c e t h e involvement o f the US i n Dominican a f f a i r s  •"ibid, a t 742. 8 5  "Secretary Discusses Situation 1965) 52 Dep't S t . B u l l . 842.  86  (May  I b i d , a t 746. i n Dominican  Republic".  50 d u r i n g t h e p o s t - i n t e r v e n t i o n p e r i o d appeared t o be low key.  During t h e p r e s i d e n c i e s  o f Nixon and Ford,  l e s s a t t e n t i o n had t o be p a i d t o C e n t r a l America.  comparatively The r e g i o n  was r e l a t i v e l y calm and s e t t l e d and no major c r i s e s developed. The t h r e a t o f S o v i e t expansionism i n L a t i n America was u n l i k e l y , especially  after  Khrushchev's  ouster  i n 1964.  Nixon  and  K i s s i n g e r b e l i e v e d t h a t L a t i n America and A f r i c a were, a t l e a s t f o r t h e time being,  s a f e from S o v i e t i n f i l t r a t i o n .  Nixon knew,  furthermore, t h a t i n t h e wake of t h e Vietnam War, t h e US c o u l d no  longer a c t as s h e r i f f i n t h e world . 87  To c o n s i d e r a b l y can  be s a i d t h a t ,  generally,  w i t h a t two l e v e l s . East-West  aspects,  S t a t e bureaucracy.  s i m p l i f y t h e p o l i c i e s o f Nixon and Ford, i t L a t i n American i s s u e s were d e a l t  I f t h e matter was p e r c e i v e d then  i t was handled  as h a v i n g no  by t h e Department o f  I n d i v i d u a l s who had t h e f u r t h e r a n c e  r e l a t i o n s between c o u n t r i e s as t h e i r h i g h e s t  priority,  o f good and who  were w i l l i n g t o make s u b s t a n t i a l concessions i n order t o assure cordial  r e l a t i o n s would  deal  with  such matters.  I f , on t h e  other hand, t h e i s s u e had Cold War importance, then i t r e c e i v e d the a t t e n t i o n o f K i s s i n g e r and Nixon, and they were not w i l l i n g to  compromise  at a l l . 8 8  LaFeber, supra note "Nixon D o c t r i n e " o f 1969. 87  In t h i s  54.  category,  This  the goal  o f good  policy, i n fact,  was t h e  See M i c h a e l J . F r a n c i s , "United States P o l i c y Toward L a t i n America During t h e K i s s i n g e r Years" i n Martz, supra note 53, 28. at 28-60, f o r a d e t a i l e d d i s c u s s i o n of t h e " K i s s i n g e r Years". 88  r e l a t i o n s with  L a t i n American c o u n t r i e s was  because a t stake was  E.  THE  competition  important  with the S o v i e t Union.  REAGAN ADMINSTRATION:  During h i s p r e s i d e n c y ,  C a r t e r ' s C e n t r a l American p o l i c y was  mostly preoccupied  with human r i g h t s i s s u e s .  believed  US  t h a t the  had  8 9  living  conditions  conservative  reform.  President  a duty t o p r o t e c t  from the a r b i t r a r y power of the s t a t e . the  not very  of One  Central problem  He  Central  Americans  s e t out t o improve  Americans with  Carter  this  through  slow,  p o l i c y was  that  C e n t r a l American c o u n t r i e s were t r a d i t i o n a l l y used t o r e c e i v i n g m i l i t a r y a i d as an i n c e n t i v e t o comply with US demands. however, c o u l d  not  use  military  a i d as  leverage  human r i g h t s v i o l a t i o n s when, i n most cases,  C a r t e r was  in-coming Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n measures t h a t  were f o r c e f u l  such as Nicaragua and  in  a  position  campaign of 1980, of growing M a r x i s t  reducing  Although toward  a c t i n g more d e c i s i v e l y , the  b e l i e v e d t h a t he had  enough with  respect  to  not  taken  countries  Iran.  P r e s i d e n t Reagan was put  for  increased m i l i t a r y  s t r e n g t h l e d t o more human r i g h t s v i o l a t i o n s . the end of h i s p r e s i d e n c y  Carter,  of  determined t h a t he was compromise.  During  not going t o be  the  presidential  Reagan warned t h a t , with r e s p e c t t o the t h r e a t subversion  LaFeber, supra note 54,  i n C e n t r a l America, "[w]e  at  210.  are  the  52 last  domino" .  He  90  Central  America  believed  would  that  inevitably  a  "hands-off"  result  i n an  posture  in  adverse domino  effect. In h i s attempt t o f u r t h e r US pressured  the  international legal  manner t h a t was and  interests, system  b e n e f i c i a l t o the US.  relied  claimed  a  New  broad  Reagan  i n t o changing  in  a  r u l e s were made up,  o l d ones were r e v i s e d or r e i n t e r p r e t e d .  Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  President  right  For i n s t a n c e , of  the  self-defence,  l e s s and l e s s on i n t e r n a t i o n a l bodies such as the UN,  and  p l a c e d heavy emphasis on the r i g h t of a s t a t e t o p r e s e r v e i t s national  interests.  A l l these  claims  led  to  what  can  be  l a b e l l e d as the "Reagan D o c t r i n e " . From one p o i n t of view, the Reagan D o c t r i n e can be viewed as  an  amended  version  Doctrine  declared  ideology  should  Hemisphere.  be  that  of  the  no  f o r e i g n government or  able  to  Monroe  impose  Doctrine.  i t s system  The  Monroe  expansionist  on  the  Western  The Reagan D o c t r i n e takes t h i s d e c l a r a t i o n one  step  f u r t h e r by a s s e r t i n g a r i g h t to g i v e m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e and a i d to  L a t i n American  countries  whose  territorial  integrity  and  p o l i t i c a l independence i s being v i o l a t e d by f o r c e s p e r c e i v e d t o be M a r x i s t  aggressors.  Furthermore,  the  because  assistance  Marxist  governments.  issue  will  be  is  no  given  According  longer to to  mere  containment  insurgencies the  Reagan  opposing Doctrine,  Robert A. F r i e d l a n d e r , "Confusing V i c t i m s and V i c t i m i z e r s : Nicaragua and the R e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of International Law". (Spring/Summer 1985) 14 Den. J . I n t ' l L. and P o l ' y 87 a t 91. 90  communist  ideology per  se  t h r e a t e n s American  security.  The  U n i t e d S t a t e s must, t h e r e f o r e , commit i t s e l f t o r e s i s t i n g S o v i e t and  Soviet-supported  aggression  wherever  i t arises,  r o l l i n g back communism by h e l p i n g anti-communist the  United States f a i l s  worldwide,  then  t o prevent  its allies  and  the  and  to  movements.  If  advance of  neutrals w i l l  communism  r e a l i g n w i t h the  S o v i e t Union. The T h i r d World was war  a g a i n s t communism. US  t o be the c r i t i c a l b a t t l e g r o u n d i n the In the T h i r d World,  critical  to  strategic  America.  Mexican and Venezuelan o i l ,  Caribbean s e a - l a n e s — security. to  put  interests  Central  and  are v i t a l t o US  In o r d e r t o p r e s e r v e i t s s e c u r i t y , Reagan was  a s i d e post-Vietnam  Humanitarian for  the  insecurities  and  rely  willing  on  military  instrument of f o r e i g n p o l i c y .  i n t e r v e n t i o n was Reagan  Latin  the Panama Canal, and the  i f taken c o l l e c t i v e l y —  i n t e r v e n t i o n as a prominent  basis  than  no r e g i o n i s more  Doctrine.  i n i t i a l l y o f f e r e d as a l e g a l It  was  assumed  that  an  undemocratic government i s f a r more l i k e l y t o commit b a s i c human r i g h t s v i o l a t i o n s than a democratic government. Reagan was rather  than  convinced later,  that  i n an  i t i s better effort  to  t o prevent  Thus, P r e s i d e n t  intervene a  sooner,  non-democratic  government from s e i z i n g the r e i n s of power and then p e r p e t u a t i n g i t s e l f by i t s monopoly of armed power a g a i n s t i t s own President  Reagan  put  his  ideas  about  people . 91  humanitarian  Anthony D'Amato, "Nicaragua and I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law: The ^Academic and the R e a l ' " ( J u l y 1985) 79 Am. J . I n t ' l L. 657 a t 660. 91  1  x  intervention Grenada  into action  and Nicaragua.  discussion, decision  i n fact,  i n t h e cases The focus  will  t o intervene  of US  intervention i n  of the remainder  be on t h e Reagan  i n Nicaragua  of  this  Administration's  and Grenada.  These  two  c o u n t r i e s have been chosen as s u b j e c t s o f a more d e t a i l e d study for  s e v e r a l reasons.  First,  i n both cases,  the d e c i s i o n t o  i n t e r v e n e was made by t h e same a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , and t h e cases a r e c l o s e t o each other.  There i s , t h e r e f o r e , a s t r o n g b a s i s f o r  comparison, and v a l i d c o n c l u s i o n s may be drawn. decisions  a r e more r e c e n t  than  others  and they  Second,  these  reflect  more  immediate US p o l i c i e s toward L a t i n America . 92  The  third  reason  f o r focusing  on these  cases  i s t h a t by  s t u d y i n g these two major d e c i s i o n s , a r e l a t i v e l y c l e a r sense o f Reagan's f o r e i g n p o l i c y  toward L a t i n America can be  obtained.  F i n a l l y , s i n c e t h i s i s a d i s c u s s i o n of the r o l e o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l law  i n US decision-making,  one a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . views r e g a r d i n g and  principles  time.  i t i s wise t o c o n f i n e t h e study t o  D i f f e r e n t p r e s i d e n t s may have had d i f f e r e n t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l law o r , more i m p o r t a n t l y , of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law may  have changed  norms  through  Focusing on the Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n a l l o w s one t o reach  a c o n c l u s i o n , a t l e a s t , with r e s p e c t t o one a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  It should be noted that policies of the Bush A d m i n i s t r a t i o n c o u l d not, and should not, be s t u d i e d due t o a l a c k of a v a i l a b l e i n f o r m a t i o n and m a t e r i a l . 9 2  55  V. CASE STUDIES  A.  GRENADA  Grenada was granted independence from B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l r u l e in  1974  1979.  and f u n c t i o n e d under a p a r l i a m e n t a r y government In March 1979, Maurice Bishop's New  the Welfare, Education, and L i b e r a t i o n  until  J o i n t Endeavour f o r  (JEWEL) Movement ousted  then-Prime M i n i s t e r S i r E r i c G a i r y and h i s Mongoose Gang i n a near  bloodless  coup.  Prime  R e v o l u t i o n a r y Government initially,  Minister  Bishop's  People's  expanded s o c i a l s e r v i c e s and, a t l e a s t  seem t o have had a s t r o n g base of p o p u l a r  support.  Bishop and h i s Deputy Prime M i n i s t e r Bernard Coard were t r y i n g to  construct  a  socialist  democracy  t e c h n o l o g i c a l l y backward f o u n d a t i o n . meant  to represent  direction  i n which  a  new  base  the s o c i e t y  on  on  a relatively  weak and  The New JEWEL Movement was life  should  and  signify  advance . 93  the  new  The Bishop  regime, however, i n d e f i n i t e l y suspended e l e c t i o n s , ended freedom of  the  press  and  other  increasingly repressive.  political  and  became  By 1983, t h e r e was s t r o n g evidence of  Selwyn R. Cudjoe, Grenada: P u b l i c a t i o n s , 1984) a t 10. 93  freedoms,  Two Essays  (N.Y.:  Calaloux  t o r t u r e of p o l i t i c a l  p r i s o n e r s and  other human r i g h t s  abuses.  The v i o l a t i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l human r i g h t s standards, however, elicited  little  Caribbean  community .  attention  outside  the  small  94  By 1983, regular  international  Grenada had b u i l t - u p an army of approximately  Cuban-trained  2,500-2,800, battalions . 9 5  and  troops  had  This  and  active  military  an  600  armed r e s e r v e m i l i t i a  plans  build-up  to  add  twelve  exceeded  the  of  more  combined  m i l i t a r y f o r c e s of the s i x other s t a t e s i n the O r g a n i z a t i o n of E a s t e r n Caribbean S t a t e s (the other OECS members are St. V i n c e n t and  the Grenadines,  Kitts/Nevis,  and  furthermore, was  St. L u c i a , Dominica, Antigua/Barbuda, Montserrat).  Grenada's  St.  militarization,  accompanied by the i n c r e a s i n g i n f l u e n c e of the  S o v i e t Union and Cuba i n the s m a l l i s l a n d .  In the 1982  session  of the U n i t e d Nations General Assembly, more than 92 percent of Grenada's v o t e s were c a s t w i t h the S o v i e t b l o c , i n c l u d i n g one of the few votes i n favour of the S o v i e t i n v a s i o n of A f g h a n i s t a n . 96  Cuban a d v i s e r s h e l d p o s i t i o n s i n a l l key  ministries  a c t i v e i n v i r t u a l l y every aspect of the army. r e g u l a r and  9 5  Report  were  In f a c t , i n  1983,  p a r a m i l i t a r y Cuban f o r c e s i n Grenada  J . Norton Moore, "Grenada and the Standard" (Jan. 1984) 78 Am. J . I n t ' l L. M  and  out-numbered  I n t e r n a t i o n a l Double 145.  Ibid.  ^Departments of S t a t e and Defense, Grenada: 15-17 (1983); c i t e d i n i b i d , a t 146.  A  Preliminary  57 the a c t i v e s t r e n g t h of the Grenadan  Army . 97  The approach adopted by Bishop was  hardly  consistent with  the s t r o n g n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t t r a d i t i o n of the members of the OECS the  Although the Bishop regime posed no immediate region,  the  US  was  not  pleased  with  the  threat to  developments.  Grenada's move towards Cuba and the S o v i e t Union was  seen as a  t h r e a t t o US i n t e r e s t s and s e c u r i t y . Prime M i n i s t e r Bishop's p r o - M a r x i s t Deputy  Prime M i n i s t e r  Bernard Coard  regime was  on October  toppled  12,  1983.  s e r i e s of events between October 12 and October 25, 1983 a  decision  by  invade Grenada. and  "order"  detail  was  the United  restored  t h a t m i l i t a r y f o r c e was Sometime d u r i n g  Coard. breaking  placed  A  President  Ronald  A  led to  Reagan t o  By October 30, the i n v a s i o n had been completed, i n the i s l a n d .  o f the events t h a t  Bishop was  States'  by  period  l e d to President  following  is a  Reagan's d e c i s i o n  required.  the  under of  The  night  of October  13,  1983,  Maurice  a r r e s t by a d i s s i d e n t f a c t i o n l e d by political  confusion,  riots,  curfews,  down of a u t h o r i t y and i n c r e a s i n g t h r e a t s t o  civilians  f o l l o w e d Bishop's a r r e s t .  On October 16, the head of Grenada's  army  to  and  announced  i t s Ambassador  Cuba,  Major  Liam  Omo  Cornwall,  i n a r a d i o statement t h a t the army had s e i z e d c o n t r o l  "Excerpts of US P r e s i d e n t Ronald Reagan's T e l e v i s e d Speech on Grenada and Lebanon, on October 27, 1983", r e p r i n t e d i n S. F. Lewis and D. T. Mathews, eds, Documents on the Invasion of Grenada, October 1983 (Puerto R i c o : I n s t i t u t e of Caribbean S t u d i e s , 1984) a t 27.  58  of  the  nation  statement  was  and the  first  d u r i n g the p r e v i o u s detention, On  and  Minister  confirmation  of  19,  three  Minister  circulating  under some form of  members  Jacqueline  country. of  his  Creft),  and  union  c h i l d r e n , when the coup f o r c e s opened f i r e on a crowd  Free Grenada  broadcast  Hudson A u s t i n who  a  actions .  That same day,  99  statement  announced the  by  Army Commander  d i s s o l u t i o n of the  (RMC).  curfew"  The on  RMC  imposed a f i v e day  civilians  which,  in  Since Grenada.  Bishop's coup i n 1979, The  Caribbean was  s e c u r i t y since three  f o u r t h s of a l l US  Military  had  the  same  under house a r r e s t .  the US  perceived  General  "24-hour shoot-on-  reality,  e f f e c t as p u t t i n g the e n t i r e p o p u l a t i o n  Radio  Government  and, the i n s t a l l a t i o n of a s i x t e e n member R e v o l u t i o n a r y  sight  cabinet  At l e a s t eighteen people d i e d , i n c l u d i n g  of Grenadans p r o t e s t i n g t h e i r  Council  This  98  i n charge of the  Bishop,  Education  Bishop .  reports,  two days, t h a t Bishop was  l e a d e r s were executed. women and  Prime  t h a t Coard was  October  (including  deposed  had  as  f e l t uneasy about  c r u c i a l to  America's  o i l imports t r a n s i t  the  area —  t h a t i s , more o i l than t r a n s i t s the S t r a i t of Hormuz .  It  believed,  was  100  satellite  98  that  was  "Chronology"  however,  that  moving  more  (Dec.  1983)  Grenada and  more  had  become  towards  a  Cuban  Moscow  83 Dep't St. B u l l . 86 a t  and  87.  "Norton Moore, supra note 94, a t 14 6. M. Adkin, Urgent Fury: The Lexington Books, 1989) at 109. 100  Battle  for  Grenada  (U.S.A.:  Havana .  Bishop's e x e c u t i o n  101  the US  to act dramatically  inflicting  military  establishing days o n l y , easily  defeat  was  a fleeting  opportunity f o r  i n the Caribbean.  The chance f o r  on  a  rigid  a "democratic" government  and t h i s was  Marxist  would  regime  exist  an o p p o r t u n i t y t h a t  for a  the US  and few  c o u l d not  ignore.  On  October  Washington  13,  an  to discuss  inter-agency  the growing  group  unrest  was  formed  i n Grenada  and  in to  examine t h e p o s s i b l e dangers i t might pose t o the s e c u r i t y o f US c i t i z e n s l i v i n g or s t u d y i n g i n Grenada. group  met  arrest.  again  to  review  The f o l l o w i n g day, t h i s  unconfirmed  reports  of Bishop's  A c c o r d i n g t o Langhorne A. Motley, A s s i s t a n t  Secretary  f o r Inter-American A f f a i r s , the S t a t e Department began t o review the standard e v a c u a t i o n p l a n s f o r Grenada. Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff,  meanwhile,  contingency e v a c u a t i o n p l a n s a  special  inter-agency  102  .  was  The o f f i c e  asked  to  of the  review the  On October 17, Motley c h a i r e d  meeting  to  review  all  available  A p p a r e n t l y , a f t e r the i n v a s i o n , US f o r c e s found p r o o f of Grenada's move towards the S o v i e t Union and Cuba. In a statement t o the U.N. General Assembly on November 2, 1983, Ambassador K i r k p a t r i c k s t a t e d t h a t documents of s e c r e t m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e agreements between Grenada and the S o v i e t Union, Cuba, and North Korea had been found. The agreements were executed between 1980 and 1982, and p r o v i d e d f o r , among other t h i n g s , the t r a i n i n g of Grenadan s o l d i e r s , and the f r e e d e l i v e r y of m i l i t a r y s u p p l i e s t o Grenada. "Ambassador Kirkpatrick's Statement, U.N. S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l , Oct. 27, 1983" (Dec. 1983) 83 Dep't S t . B u l l . 74 a t 77. These documents supposedly proved, a l b e i t a f t e r the f a c t , t h a t US w o r r i e s r e g a r d i n g Grenada's a l l i a n c e w i t h the Communist c o u n t r i e s was j u s t i f i e d . 101  Langhorne A. Motley, "The D e c i s i o n (March 1984) 84 Dep't S t . B u l l . 70 a t 70. 102  to A s s i s t  Grenada"  i n f o r m a t i o n and examine p r e p a r a t i o n f o r a p o s s i b l e e v a c u a t i o n US c i t i z e n s . an  From t h a t day  inter-agency  agencies  forum  participating  forward,  with on  the p l a n n i n g took p l a c e i n  representatives  a daily  basis  the V i c e - P r e s i d e n t were kept informed occurred  of  1 0 3  .  of The  a l l relevant President  and  of a l l developments t h a t  i n these meetings.  On October 18, concern f o r the s a f e t y of American c i t i z e n s in  Grenada had  apparently  peaked  and,  as  a  result,  a  formal  request f o r assurances of the w e l l - b e i n g of the US c i t i z e n s sent t o Grenada v i a Barbados .  The  104  United  S t a t e s , as  was  is its  p o l i c y w i t h s m a l l c o u n t r i e s , d i d not have an embassy i n Grenada and r e l a t i o n s between the two c o u n t r i e s were handled through the U n i t e d S t a t e s Embassy i n nearby Bridgetown, Barbados. day,  Grenada  Americans.  The  responded  to  the  response read,  request  for  the  The  next  safety  of  i n part, that  the i n t e r e s t s of US c i t i z e n s are i n no way t h r e a t e n e d by the present s i t u a t i o n i n Grenada which the M i n i s t r y [of E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s ] hastens t o p o i n t out i s a p u r e l y i n t e r n a l matter . 105  Motley,  however,  assurances,  interpreted this  response  as  containing  no  no c o n c r e t e measures t o safeguard f o r e i g n r e s i d e n t s ,  I b i d . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , no i n f o r m a t i o n i s a v a i l a b l e on which agencies were i n v o l v e d i n these meetings. 1 0 3  I b i d , a t 71. There were about 1,100 US n a t i o n a l s on the i s l a n d , 650 of whom were students a t St. George's U n i v e r s i t y , School of Medicine. 104  1 0 5  Ibid.  "just He  a bland  claimed,  Bridgetown  a s s e r t i o n and  furthermore, attempted  to  a blunt  t h a t on send  slamming  the  two  19th,  Foreign  the  back, and  permitted  not u n t i l  the  US  Service  Grenada t o make an assessment of the s i t u a t i o n . turned  of  1 0 7  .  106  Embassy i n officers  T h e i r plane  t h r e e days l a t e r were US  t o t r a v e l t o the i s l a n d  door" .  to was  officials  The delay i n a s c e r t a i n i n g  the s a f e t y of the Americans on the i s l a n d was  a g r e a t source  of  concern f o r the Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n t h a t d i d not want another Teheran-type hostage  situation.  A second occurrence the  officials  cabinet.  was  State  the  on the 19th murder  of  that considerably  Bishop  and  members  Department r e c e i v e d a warning from  worried of  his  Ambassador  M i l a n D. B i s h (US Ambassador t o Barbados) t h a t the n e c e s s i t y f o r a sudden e v a c u a t i o n the  beginning  evacuation  of  of the  might a r i s e at any time . 108  serious  planning  Americans,  without  Grenadan government, would prove On  Thursday  developments President with  in  October  20,  Grenada  was  for  the the  T h i s day marked possibility  permission  that  of  the  about  the  necessary.  as  more  information  arriving  in  Washington,  the  asked V i c e P r e s i d e n t George Bush t o c h a i r a meeting  National  S e c u r i t y a d v i s e r s reviewing  Subsequent t o t h a t meeting, and  1 0 6  Ibid.  1 0 7  Ibid.  1 0 8  Ibid.  on  the  events t o  the recommendation of  date. that  62 group, the government  made a p u b l i c  concern" a t t h e e v e n t s  109  .  expression  The P r e s i d e n t ,  of i t s "grave  furthermore, d e c i d e d  t o d i v e r t some n a v a l s h i p s , t h a t were headed toward Lebanon, i n the d i r e c t i o n of Grenada.  T h i s was only a p r e c a u t i o n a r y measure  so t h a t  became worse,  i f the s i t u a t i o n  or t h e non-permissive  e v a c u a t i o n of the Americans became i n e v i t a b l e , the US would have the c a p a b i l i t y t o a c t q u i c k l y and d e c i s i v e l y On  October  itself) though  21,  Barbados  (although  1 1 0  .  i t i s not  a  h o s t e d a meeting of the s t a t e s of the OECS. i t i s not  a  member  either,  was  also  S t a t e s was however,  not p r e s e n t a t the meeting;  informed of  the  immediately a f t e r w a r d s .  decisions  Jamaica,  invited  members of the OECS t o be p r e s e n t a t the meeting.  member  The  by  United  P r e s i d e n t Reagan  made by  the  OECS  the  was,  states  Grenada, a member s t a t e o f the OECS, on  the other hand, was not asked t o p a r t i c i p a t e on the b a s i s t h a t it  lacked  discussion  an  apparent  government . 111  After  considerable  (and the v o i c i n g of doubts on the p a r t of Antigua)  F. Ambursley and J . Dunkerley, Grenada: Whose Freedom? (G.B.: L a t i n American Bureau, 1984) a t 77. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , more i n f o r m a t i o n on the d e l i b e r a t i o n s i n t h i s meeting i s not available. 109  110  Lewis and Mathews, supra note 97, a t 20.  M o t l e y , supra note 102, a t 72. Even though Grenada was not i n v i t e d t o t h i s meeting, i t w i l l become s i g n i f i c a n t l a t e r t h a t the O.E.C.S. d i d not suspend Grenada's membership i n t h e O r g a n i z a t i o n . On October 23, the heads of s t a t e of CARICOM (the o v e r a l l Caribbean Community), however, suspended Grenada's membership. See "Statement Prepared f o r P r e s e n t a t i o n B e f o r e t h e House Committee on F o r e i g n A f f a i r s on Nov. 2, 1983 by Deputy S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e Kenneth W. Dam", r e p r i n t e d i n M. Nash L e i c h , "Contemporary P r a c t i c e of the US R e l a t i n g t o I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law" (Jan. 1984) 78 Am. J . I n t ' l L. 200 a t 207. ul  the  Caribbean  states  decided,  because  of t h e i r  inability to  c o n f r o n t t h e m i l i t a r y s t r e n g t h o f Grenada alone, t o request t h e assistance statement decision state  of the United released  t o take  of  events,  by  States,  t h e OECS  Jamaica on  and Barbados . 112  October  25  a c t i o n was made when, a f t e r they  became  "deeply  stated  A that  considering the  concerned"  that  the  s i t u a t i o n would worsen and t h a t t h e r e would be " f u r t h e r l o s s o f life,  personal  injury  and a g e n e r a l  d e t e r i o r a t i o n of public  order" . 113  The next day, October 22, t h e US r e c e i v e d a c o n f i r m a t i o n o f the  OECS r e q u e s t .  reached  Secretary  The message, which came i n from of State  George  Shultz  Barbados,  i n Augusta  a t 2:45  a.m. , and he d i s c u s s e d i t with Robert C. McFarlane ( A s s i s t a n t t o the P r e s i d e n t f o r N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y A f f a i r s ) . later,  Vice President  advisers orders Grenada  half-hour  Bush convened t h e key N a t i o n a l  i n Washington . 114  t o prepare  About  A f t e r that  meeting,  f o r a broader m i s s i o n  i n co-operation  with  Security  Reagan  signed  t o r e s t o r e order i n  t h e Caribbean  forces  1 1 5  .  Until  then, a c c o r d i n g t o Motley, t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n had been p l a n n i n g unilaterally Grenada. 112  by f o c u s i n g  on t h e s a f e t y  of t h e Americans i n  When t h e member s t a t e s of t h e OECS approached them,  Ambursley, supra note 109, a t 80.  "Chronology", supra note 98, a t 88. The complete t e x t o f the OECS statement can be found i n "Grenada: C o l l e c t i v e A c t i o n by t h e Caribbean Peace Force" (Dec. 1983) 83 Dep't St. B u l l . 67. 113  114  Lewis and Mathews, supra note 97, a t 20.  I15  Motley, supra note 102, a t 70.  however, t h e decision-making process s h i f t e d i n t o a m u l t i l a t e r a l mode. That same day, General A u s t i n drew up a statement d e c l a r i n g t h a t t h e RMC was t o be a s t r i c t l y temporary  government, t h a t a  c i v i l i a n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n was t o be appointed w i t h i n twelve hours, and t h a t a team would be appointed t o i n v e s t i g a t e t h e events o f October  19, t h e day o f Bishop's e x e c u t i o n .  T h i s statement was  t r a n s m i t t e d t o Washington and London over the week-end, although neither  government  invasion  116  .  admitted  i t until  after  the  Over the week-end, A u s t i n agreed t o meet w i t h t h e  Premier  of St. Lucia,  October  22, a l l t h e s i g n a l s  John  disposition to negotiate United  receiving  States  117  Compton.  from Grenada p o i n t e d t o a growing  .  officials  Saturday October 22.  From midday on Saturday  finally  They unanimously  reached  the i s l a n d  on  assessed t h e p o s i t i o n o f  those o f f i c i a l s they were a b l e t o meet as " o b s t r u c t i o n i s t " and "unco-operative". functioning  or  No even  forming .  c o n t r a d i c t s t h e statement day.  Furthermore,  coherent 118  government This  seemed  assessment,  to  be  however,  t h a t was made by A u s t i n on t h e same  the Department  of S t a t e r e p o r t e d t h a t  on  October 21, General A u s t i n i n v i t e d a d e l e g a t i o n from Barbados t o look i n t o t h e s a f e t y o f US and U n i t e d Kingdom n a t i o n a l s on the island. U6  The d e l e g a t i o n i n c l u d e d two US diplomats r e p r e s e n t i n g  Ambursley, supra note 109, a t 83.  1 1 7  Ibid.  118  Motley, supra note 102, a t 71.  the Ambassador t o Barbados and a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e t o the High  Commissioner .  On  119  Canadian c i t i z e n s  Sunday October  23,  some B r i t i s h  by  and  as w e l l as a s m a l l number of US s t u d e n t s l e f t  Grenada i n c h a r t e r e d a i r c r a f t , which were i n no way flying  British  Grenadan  authorities  1 2 0  .  If  impeded from  Austin  and  other  o f f i c i a l s had r e a l l y been unco-operative, then i t becomes very d i f f i c u l t t o e x p l a i n or understand these  developments.  On October 23, Ambassador McNeil and General C r i s t s e c r e t l y visited  Barbados,  crisis.  They met  and  carefully  Throughout  and  confirmed  widening  these  meetings,  continued  explored.  island  would  of  the  countries,  e x p l o r e d a l l the i n f o r m a t i o n a v a i l a b l e t o them. Washington  was  informed  in parallel  I t soon not  with  the  became apparent  permit  of  any  Planning f o r peaceful evacuation, other  p o s s i b i l i t y of u s i n g a C u n a r d - l i n e s h i p t h a t was was  scope  w i t h the l e a d e r s of the Caribbean  developments by telephone. however,  the  plans.  i n the v i c i n i t y  t h a t c o n d i t i o n s on  evacuation  by  civilian  Subsequent i n f o r m a t i o n r e v e a l e d t h a t the same Cunard f i r e d a t by Grenadan a n t i - a i r c r a f t  The  aircraft. ship  that  had  been k i l l e d  barracks i n B e i r u t . "'"Chronology", 120  by  was  guns . 121  Sunday n i g h t , P r e s i d e n t Reagan r e c e i v e d news of the 230 marines  the  a bomb t h a t  destroyed  US  their  The d i f f i c u l t i e s and l o s s e s s u f f e r e d by the supra note 98, a t 88.  Ambursley, supra note 109,  a t 84.  Motley, supra note 102, a t 71. Statement by Ambassador Motley, A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y f o r Inter-American A f f a i r s — b e f o r e the House Armed S e r v i c e s Committee on January 24, 1984. 121  US  contingent  in  Beirut  had  already  c r i t i c i s m of the Reagan government.  led  to  much  domestic  The i n v a s i o n of Grenada may  have o f f e r e d a chance to r e s t o r e U n i t e d S t a t e s ' r e p u t a t i o n as a world  power  and  provide  substance  for  the  claim  that  the  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n was combatting the "Soviet-Cuban c o n s p i r a c y " . Late decision"  Sunday to  October 24,  night,  the  respond to the  President  request  of  made  "a  tentative  the OECS .  On Monday  as p l a n s were being made and the f o r c e s  organized,  122  a message a r r i v e d from the Prime M i n i s t e r of Barbados i n f o r m i n g the  United States  from  the  that  he had r e c e i v e d  Governor General  of  a confidential  Grenada,  a s s i s t a n c e t o r e s t o r e o r d e r on the  Sir  island  1 2 3  .  Paul  appeal  Scoon,  The P r e s i d e n t met  i n the afternoon with the S e c r e t a r y of Defence and the and  a t the c o n c l u s i o n of the meeting made "a s o r t of  military  decision"  124  .  The  directive  proceed was signed a t about 6:00 President  Reagan,  of  the  chiefs,  semifinal  President  in a letter  forces order;  in assisting and (2)  to  (1) the  dated October 24,  Lewis and Mathews, Secretary Shultz. Motley,  I25  Motley,  the  of  wrote  at  at  of  the  security law and  at  21.  Statement  at  21.  Again,  1 2 5  .  by  73.  supra note 97,  supra note 102,  conditions  of  to  evacuation of US c i t i z e n s  supra note 97,  supra note 102,  Lewis and Mathews, from S e c r e t a r y S h u l t z . 124  j o i n the OECS c o l l e c t i v e  restoration  facilitate  122  123  to  to  p.m. on October 24.  the Speakers of the House and Senate t h a t the o b j e c t i v e s U n i t e d S t a t e s were:  for  70.  quote  67 It  should  be  pointed  out  that  no  r e q u e s t made by Governor General  reference  Scoon;  made t o S o v i e t or Cuban involvement  was  nor was  made t o any  i n the c r i s i s .  the  reference  These p o i n t s  w i l l be of s i g n i f i c a n c e i n l a t e r s e c t i o n s . After  informing  congressional necessary,  the  British  leadership that  Government  immediate  military  and  the  action  was  Reagan ordered US p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the o p e r a t i o n t o  proceed.  Concern f o r the s a f e t y of the Americans and  f o r the  success of the o p e r a t i o n caused the US t o r e f r a i n from i n f o r m i n g the OAS,  the UN,  action.  and  European a l l i e s  A l s o , the d e c i s i o n was  Union u n t i l  of the d e c i s i o n t o  hidden from Cuba and the S o v i e t  the morning of October 25  so t h a t they  i n t e r f e r e w i t h the success of the o p e r a t i o n On  October 25,  approximately  1,900  l a n d i n g i n Grenada. Navy and with  the US  Jamaica  personnel  127  .  a t about 5:00  The  a.m.  126  .  provided  approximately  599 Americans were evacuated.  on o f f i c i a l US  Citizens  other nations  aircraft  1 2 8  .  71.  Ronald Reagan, " L e t t e r to the Dep't St. B u l l . 68 a t 69. 127  Motley,  300  e v a c u a t i o n of the Americans began.  were a l s o v o l u n t a r i l y evacuated  128  US  Member s t a t e s of the OECS, a l o n g  Barbados,  next day,  by elements of the  of Canada, the U n i t e d Kingdom, East Germany, and  I b i d , at  not  E a s t e r n D a y l i g h t Time,  They were supported  During the h o s t i l i t i e s ,  126  could  US Army and US Marine Corps p e r s o n n e l began  A i r Force. and  take  supra note  102,  at  72.  Congress"  (Dec.  1983)  83  68 On the morning of October 25, landed  in  Grenada,  the  a f t e r US  President  conference, t h a t a c t i o n had  f o r c e s had a c t u a l l y  announced,  been taken.  He  in  a  news  stated that  there  were t h r e e reasons f o r o r d e r i n g t h i s " d e c i s i v e a c t i o n " : First, and of o v e r r i d i n g importance, t o protect innocent l i v e s , i n c l u d i n g up t o a thousand Americans, whose p e r s o n a l s a f e t y i s , of course, my paramount concern. Second, t o f o r e s t a l l f u r t h e r chaos. And t h i r d , t o a s s i s t i n the r e s t o r a t i o n of c o n d i t i o n s of law and order and of governmental i n s t i t u t i o n s t o the i s l a n d of Grenada ... m  Eugenia C h a r l e s , the  OECS,  was  Prime M i n i s t e r of Dominica and secretly  Washington the day alongside as  a  before  success.  information  In  that  revolutionary  activists  a  US  so t h a t she  uncompromising fact,  the  government  c o u l d make an  council  and  was the  answered t h a t  took  power,  of movements "between the and  the  activists'  invasion  anti-communist,  when she  Soviets  takeover i n Grenada, she  conduit"  in  Reagan a t the announcement of the  hard-hitting,  great  flown  Chairperson  asked  to  appearance 130  .  Viewed  she  a any  Cubans were behind  the  i n the  Soviet  i f she  was had  there  return  plane  of  days b e f o r e  was  the  "obviously  Embassies and  t o Grenada" . 131  In  a  known short,  she answered "yes". In an a f t e r n o o n  new  the i s s u e of S o v i e t and  conference, h e l d by  Cuban involvement i n Grenada was  Ronald Reagan, " P r e s i d e n t ' s Remarks, Oct. 25, 83 Dep't S t . B u l l . 67.  ,29  1983)  Secretary  130  Adkin, supra note 100,  at  113.  131  "Chronology", supra note 98,  at  88.  1983"  Shultz, raised  (Dec.  69 again.  Shultz  information  said  that  on whether  although  t h e US  had  o r not t h e S o v i e t s  no  direct  o r Cubans  were  i n v o l v e d i n any way i n t h e overthrow o f t h e Bishop government, the OECS s t a t e s " f e e l t h a t such i s t h e case". however,  that  US  action  was  not based  S h u l t z was a l s o asked about t h e U n i t e d that  t h e US should  not proceed  with  He emphasized,  on t h i s Kingdom  taking  "feeling"  1 3 2  .  recommendation  military  action.  Mrs. Thatcher had s a i d i n Parliament t h a t h e r government a d v i s e d against  t h e US d e c i s i o n and c o u l d  S h u l t z answered by no  longer  a  it.  Secretary  reminding t h e news r e p o r t e r s t h a t Grenada i s  British  independently.  not support  colony,  The US was asked  and  can  t o help,  make  decisions  and because  "each  s t a t e has t o take i t s own d e c i s i o n " , t h e P r e s i d e n t made one f o r the U n i t e d  States  133  .  Democratic l e a d e r s  i n Congress, on October 26, h e l d  the Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n had not complied Resolution"  i n i t s i n v a s i o n of Grenada . 134  that  with t h e "War Powers Under t h e measure,  the P r e s i d e n t would have t o withdraw US t r o o p s w i t h i n s i x t y days unless  he c o u l d  t h e r e longer. there  that  from Congress t o keep them  Since i t was not Reagan's p l a n t o keep t h e t r o o p s  long,  l i t t l e concern.  132  obtain permission  the objection  by t h e Democrats  caused him  As a matter o f f a c t , t h a t same day,  hundreds o f  Lewis and Mathews, supra note 97, a t 30.  " S e c r e t a r y S h u l t z ' s News Conference" (Dec. 1983) 83 Dep't B u l l . 69 a t 71. 133  St.  134  "Chronology", supra note 98, a t 88.  p a r a t r o o p e r s were flown t o Grenada t o b o l s t e r the f o r c e a l r e a d y there. of  By October 28, Admiral Wesley L. McDonald (the commander  US  f o r c e s i n Grenada) s a i d  t r o o p s on the The  island  Governor  US  .  General  p o p u l a t i o n of the the c r i s i s was  1 3 5  t h a t t h e r e were about 6,000  island,  broadcast  a  radio  on October 28,  message  to  the  r e a s s u r i n g them t h a t  almost over and n o t i n g t h a t :  The people of Grenada ... have welcomed the presence of the t r o o p s [of the US/Caribbean s e c u r i t y f o r c e ] as a positive and d e c i s i v e step forward in the r e s t o r a t i o n not only of peace and order but a l s o of f u l l sovereignty . 136  On the same day,  a U n i t e d Nations  by a vote of 11-1  (US veto) with t h r e e a b s t e n t i o n s (Togo, Z a i r e ,  and  the  U.K.),  deeply  Grenada which i t c a l l e d law  and  of  integrity" cessation troops  137  the of  of  deplored  the  armed  intervention into  "a f l a g r a n t v i o l a t i o n of  independence  Grenada. the  Security Council resolution,  It  ,  sovereignty  also  i n t e r v e n t i o n and  called  international  and  for  withdrawal  territorial  the of  immediate  the  foreign  .  F i n a l l y , on November 2, the armed c o n f l i c t came t o an According wounded. 116  were  military 135  t o Motley,  45  Grenadans were k i l l e d ,  and  end.  337  were  Furthermore, 18 US s o l d i e r s were k i l l e d i n a c t i o n , wounded. and  Since  the  r e s i s t a n c e was  c o n s t r u c t i o n personnel,  Ibid, at Motley,  supra note 102,  at  137  "Chronology", supra note 98, a t  by  Cuban  of the approximately  89.  136  led  72. 89.  and  800  Cubans i n Grenada, 24 were k i l l e d and 59 were i n j u r e d  'Motley, supra note 102, a t 70.  72  B.  NICARAGUA;  The  United  complicated was  begun  second that  history  i s of a  are  however, became  the  they more  f i r s t  President with issue in  the  of  Front  National  T.  Undeclared  mentioned,  events  Reagan's  the  period  1984.  prior  to  In  after  He  the  and  First, Reagan's  Finally,  came  States  victory, offered  Walker,  ed.,  War on Nicaragua  as  and although he  Reagan  an 1 3 9  ,  Somoza's  1979.  not  away  to  Cuba  Press,  the  pleased  raise  the Sandinistas:  Westview  During was  strings from  rule  eighteen-  Carter  a i d with  versus  (U.S.A.:  1970's,  he was n o t  had decided  economic  i n  Jimmy  g u e r r i l l a  Somoza's  lives  was  overthrow  the  after  power  revolution,  to  i n  50,000  to  (FSLN)  their  support  around  FSLN  the  1960*s,  unsuccessful;  Nicaragua  and the  Liberation  of pressuring the Sandinistas  W.  into  M a r x i s t s who wanted  and corrupt.  cost  Sandinista  t h e hope  "intervention"  i s 1981 t o  for  popularity  the United  publicly.  139  3.  year  study  the  r e l a t i v e l y  abusive  was d e f e a t e d  The  more  required.  gained  war, which  h a s a much  and l a s t e d  at  government. were  Grenada.  As was p r e v i o u s l y  i n 1961 by s e v e r a l young  a c t i v i t i e s  army  of  i n Nicaragua  Administration  look  Sandinista  Somoza  month  that  concern to t h i s  concise  inauguration  the  than  i n o f f i c e . direct  however,  formed  intervention  by the Carter  term  The  States  the  attached and the  The  1987) a t  S o v i e t Union and  towards the US.  In h i s l a s t week i n o f f i c e ,  however, C a r t e r suspended a l l US economic a i d t o the S a n d i n i s t a s and sent $10 m i l l i o n i n arms and equipment, as w e l l as m i l i t a r y t e c h n i c i a n s , to E l Salvador .  Because U n i t e d  140  p o l i c y i n C e n t r a l America was t h a t time, C a r t e r was In f a l l  1980,  s i g n a l l e d a new leftist  the e l e c t i o n  guerrillas,  Ten  offensive"  in  Liberation  Front  succeed, and fait  of Ronald Reagan as  to  duplicate  The  (FMLN) was  Farabundo  hoping  By January 12, the  success  launched what they c a l l e d  Salvador.  that  offensive a  1981,  "the  Marti  of final  National  i t s o f f e n s i v e would presented  the Salvadoran  clear failure  President  inauguration,  the  P r e s i d e n t - e l e c t Reagan would be  accompli.  pronounced  El  much p u b l i c i t y .  days before Reagan's  hoping  S a n d i n i s t a s i n Nicaragua,  States  not a very c o n t r o v e r s i a l i s s u e a t  a b l e t o do t h i s without  phase.  nineteen  1 4 1  .  As  with  a  government a  result  of  t h i s FMLN f a i l u r e , C e n t r a l America became a " f r o n t - b u r n e r " i s s u e in  American  foreign policy  just  as  Reagan  came i n t o  office.  Even though the C a r t e r A d m i n i s t r a t i o n had expended $1 m i l l i o n i n c o v e r t funds t o o r g a n i z e and b o l s t e r i n t e r n a l o p p o s i t i o n groups in  Nicaragua,  considered support  140  1988)  in  Nicaragua,  to new  manipulate  against  the  Diplomacy: 1981-1987  War  Nicaragua  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n was  at 22-23.  H. S k l a r , Washington's End Press, 1988) a t 53. 141  The  stand  Gutman, Banana  Policy  Shuster,  efforts  insufficient.  a much harder  Roy  Foreign  these  on  Sandinistas  The  Making  (U.S.A.:  Nicaragua  were  going —  of  to  whose  American  Simon  (Boston:  and  South  very  existence  was  perceived  as  a threat  to  US  security  and  hegemony i n the Western Hemisphere . 142  One  of  the  h a r d l i n e r s of  the  Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e Alexander Haig who, National  Security  American w i l l  and  beginning" .  Council, power" and  Haig  143  called  i n e a r l y meetings of the  for  "a  determined  show  "a high l e v e l of i n t e n s i t y a t  ordered  then-State  Department  t o Nicaragua",  open use naval  blockade  p r e s e n t i n g t h i s paper h i s case t h a t the US needed t o go t o  the  144  He  as w e l l as a by  of the  Nicaragua .  the  that  source  against  the  "Taking  t h a t would weigh the p o s s i b i l i t y of  of f o r c e a g a i n s t Cuban s h i p s and p l a n e s ,  of  Adviser  Robert McFarlane t o draw up an o p t i o n s paper, e n t i t l e d the War  was  r e v o l u t i o n i n C e n t r a l America  hoped  (i.e.,  Nicaragua)  would be b o l s t e r e d . Most of the P r e s i d e n t ' s a d v i s e r s ( i n c l u d i n g V i c e P r e s i d e n t George Bush, Joint  Chiefs  Secretary of  b e l i e v e d t h a t any  Staff)  of  Defence Caspar Weinberger,  vetoed  o v e r t use  Haig's  call  to  and  war . 145  the They  of f o r c e w i l l conjure up  images of  "another Vietnam" i n the mind of the p u b l i c , d i v e r t  resources  from more important and  at  jeopardize  b a t t l e f i e l d s i n Europe and the M i d d l e East, the  Administration's  142  Walker, supra note 139,  143  Quote from Haig's memoirs Caveat, p. 129.  22. 1 4 4  Ibid.  1 4 5  Ibid.  at  efforts  to  garner  21. Cited in Ibid,  congressional agenda  146  .  support  It  was  for  its  against  domestic  this  and  backdrop  foreign  of  the  policy "Vietnam  S y n d r o m e " t h a t t h e C I A o p e r a t i o n s emerged a s t h e c e n t r e p i e c e o f a  l o w - i n t e n s i t y warfare  destabilization,  strategy  that  psychological  incorporated  operations,  and  economic  diplomatic  pressures. After  terminating  Administration  began  economic to  assistance  allow  In  1981,  a  Nicaragua,  anti-Sandinista  t r a i n i n g camps t o o p e r a t e o p e n l y i n F l o r i d a , Southwest.  to  group  of  paramilitary  California,  CIA-backed  r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s emerged i n N i c a r a g u a a s " t h e c o n t r a s " . to the operations  and t h e counterParallel  o f t h e C I A , t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n was f o l l o w i n g  a p o l i c y o f imposing economic s a n c t i o n s a g a i n s t  Nicaragua.  F e b r u a r y 1 9 8 1 , a $ 9 . 6 m i l l i o n s a l e o f w h e a t was s u s p e n d e d March,  when  March,  the  million  it  was c o m p l e t e l y  Reagan  the  cancelled  Administration  o f t h e $75 m i l l i o n  1 4 7  blocked  .  1 4 8  until  Furthermore, the  in  remaining  i n foreign aid credits  N i c a r a g u a by t h e p r e v i o u s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  In  $15  extended  to  .  On F e b r u a r y 2 3 , t h e S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t r e l e a s e d a W h i t e P a p e r entitled  Communist  Interference  in  El  Salvador . 149  In  this  P r e s i d e n t R e a g a n , h o w e v e r , d i d a c t o n one o f H a i g ' s recommendations a n d , two days a f t e r t a k i n g o f f i c e , he f r o z e economic a i d t o N i c a r a g u a , and t e r m i n a t e d a l l f i n a n c i a l a i d and a c c e s s t o l o a n s f r o m t h e U . S . See S k l a r , s u p r a n o t e 1 4 1 , a t 6 5 . 1 4 6  1 4 7  Ibid.  E . B . B u r n s , At War in Nicaragua: The Reagan P o l i t i c s of Nostalgia (N.Y.: H a r p e r a n d Row, 1 4 8  the  1 4 9  Sklar,  supra note  141, at 68.  Doctrine  and  1987) a t 3 0 .  paper,  the  Salvador  Administration  and  Nicaragua  set  the  within  agenda  a  cold  by  war  p l a c i n g both context,  El  and  by  e n s u r i n g t h a t mainstream debate would be r e s t r i c t e d t o the means to  be  used  in  achieving  the  a g g r e s s i o n " b e f o r e i t completely later,  on March 9,  against  the  designed  to  Reagan  interdict his  of  first  million  same  time,  Nicaragua,  the  Reagan  that  Two  supplies  were to  El  150  on  Central  authorization to  provide  Administration shipments.  actions  Salvador .  "Presidential Finding an  weeks  supposedly  t o expand i t s o p e r a t i o n s  i n c l u d i n g food  s t a r t of "The  "communist  covert m i l i t a r y  Nicaragua  obtained  f o r the CIA  stopping  got out of c o n t r o l .  Nicaraguan  America" t o Congress and $19.5  of  Reagan a u t h o r i z e d  government  submitted  goal  cut This  P r o j e c t " , as the c o v e r t war  was  off was  151  .  At  the  a l l aid the  to  official  known w i t h i n  the  i n t e l l i g e n c e community. During training  the  s p r i n g of  a t camps run  Honduras, and  other  i n March and  the  were  The  the f i r s t  published  152  the  contras  Cuban e x i l e s  countries.  activity US  by  1981,  .  The  began t o  in Florida,  media was  a l e r t e d of  publicity,  however,  Marlene Dixon and S. Jonas, eds, Nicaragua (U.S.A.: S y n t h e s i s P u b l i c a t i o n s , 1984) at 117. Walker, supra note 139,  at  as w e l l  as  this  accounts of c o n t r a t r a i n i n g i n  150  151  receive  did  Under  not  Siege  23.  S k l a r , supra note 141, at 75. I t should be noted, however, t h a t the f i r s t e x t e n s i v e account of US p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the war a g a i n s t Nicaragua was not p u b l i s h e d u n t i l November 8, 1982 when Newsweek c a r r i e d a s p e c i a l r e p o r t "America's S e c r e t War — T a r g e t Nicaragua". ,52  cause  the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n any worry.  $50,000  t o Argentine  funnelled  military  to the i n c i p i e n t  under one a n t i - S a n d i n i s t a contra  intelligence  contras banner.  l e a d e r s r e f u s e d t o comment  receiving  CIA and/or  sanctioning  Pentagon  In May, t h e CIA p r o v i d e d  as an i n c e n t i v e By t h i s  time,  t o be  to unite  even though  on whether o r not they were  support,  Washington was  t h e e x i s t e n c e of p a r a m i l i t a r y  Nicaraguan e x i l e s i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s In August 1981,  officials  153  training  openly  camps f o r  .  the CIA began t o draw up contingency p l a n s  f o r c l a n d e s t i n e o p e r a t i o n s i n Washington, D.C.  The D i r e c t o r o f  the CIA, W i l l i a m Casey, appointed Duane C l a r r i d g e t o oversee CIA o p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t the S a n d i n i s t a s .  Clarridge joined Assistant  S e c r e t a r y f o r Inter-American A f f a i r s Thomas Enders, General Paul Gorman, and L t . C o l o n e l O l i v e r North t o form a R e s t r i c t e d I n t e r agency Group, a l s o known as t h e "Core Group" . 154  Enders went t o  Managua t o meet with Junta Co-Ordinator D a n i e l Ortega and o t h e r officials.  The major i s s u e  a l l e g e d export of r e v o l u t i o n .  i n these meetings was  Nicaragua's  The Nicaraguans were not a b l e t o  convince Enders t h a t they had no such p l a n s .  Despite the f a c t  t h a t they had c l o s e d down a c l a n d e s t i n e FMLN r a d i o s t a t i o n and curtailed  t h e shipment  of weapons  to  E l Salvador,  t h e US  terminated a l l a i d t o Nicaragua . 155  In November, the Core Group presented an o p t i o n paper t o 153  1 5 4  I55  Walker, supra note 139,  a t 24.  Ibid. S k l a r , supra note 141,  a t 91.  78 the  National  Security Council  f o r c e " which was At  the  same  t o organize  a "500-man commando  approved on December 1 by P r e s i d e n t  time,  Reagan  signed  National  to  create  an  harass  Nicaragua .  exile  paramilitary  The  500-person  157  156  Security  D i r e c t i v e 17 on November 23, a u t h o r i z i n g the CIA million  Reagan .  force  Decision  t o spend  $19.8  i n Honduras  paramilitary  to  force,  combined w i t h a 1,000-man f o r c e being t r a i n e d i n A r g e n t i n a , supposed t o b r i n g about widespread o p p o s i t i o n t o the government. was  to  be  The  f o r c e was  comprised  of  meant t o be  Cuban and  restricted  Nicaraguan  was  Sandinista i n numbers,  exiles,  and  the  primary t a r g e t s were supposed t o be Cuban support s t r u c t u r e s i n Nicaragua  and  arms  supply  A f t e r Reagan's s e c r e t war the House and  April  Sandinistas  and  Salvadoran  w e l l under way,  i n f a c t , a c o v e r t war  By s p r i n g 1982, the  to  guerrillas  Casey r e p o r t e d  1 5 8  .  to  Senate Permanent S e l e c t Committees, i n December,  t h a t t h e r e was,  and  was  lines  June,  the c o v e r t war  going  was  on.  s u c c e s s f u l l y under  were under i n c r e a s i n g p r e s s u r e .  there  159  were  106  contra  attacks  on  way  Between Nicaragua,  Dixon, supra note 150, at 117. Compare with Walker, supra note 139, a t 24: Reagan signed N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y D e c i s i o n D i r e c t i v e 17 on November 23. 156  Walker, supra note 139, a t 6. A l s o see S k l a r , supra note 141, a t 100. According t o the Washington Post, the f i g u r e was e x a c t l y $19,950,000. See Washington Post, Mar. 10, 1985, a t A l , c o l . 5. 157  The CIA p r o p o s a l s a t A10, c o l . 3 .  158  1983,  are  cited  i n Washington Post. May  8,  See the NSC document, "United S t a t e s P o l i c y i n C e n t r a l America and Cuba Through FY 84, Summary Paper", r e p r i n t e d i n New York Times. Apr 7, 1983, at A16, c o l . 1. 159  including sabotages of  economic  targets .  The economic war  160  against Nicaragua was proceeding as planned, as w e l l .  The US by  using i t s central position in the World Bank and Inter-American Development  Bank, had managed to  cut  off  needed m u l t i l a t e r a l loans to Nicaragua . 161  the  however,  out the  private  of  the  reach of  Nicaraguan  sector  aid  the  because  the  loans  government.  government  of  badly  The only loans  were made to Nicaragua were private sector officially  flow  rejected  which were In August,  the  agreements  that  continuing  had  political  motivations designed to d e s t a b i l i z e the country . 162  At the  end of  the  year,  in December,  Congress that the 500-man operation, the  previous  result,  an  program . 164  year,  had grown to  additional  $30  the  CIA informed  o r i g i n a l l y authorized i n  a force  million  was  of  4, 000 .  As a  163  allocated  to  the  The contras had begun d a i l y raids into Nicaraguan  t e r r i t o r y from t h e i r bases in Honduras.  Obviously, the Honduran  government was c l o s e l y co-operating with the CIA.  The raids  also proved that the goal of the contras was not simply to stop the  shipment  of  arms  to  E l Salvador.  Their  position  was  becoming more and more defensive, and i t was becoming clear that t h e i r main objective was to overthrow the Sandinista government. 160  16I  Dixon, supra note 150, at 117.  Walker, supra note 139, at 6.  162  163  Sklar, supra note 141, at 66.  Washinaton Post. May 8, 1983,  164  Ibid.  at A l l , c o l .  1.  80 The support  US  public  of  the  passage by adopted  CIA  did  not  in  this  Congress of the  (by  incorporated  a  vote  by  the  of  approve  of  the  operation.  obvious  The  r e s u l t was  Boland-Zoblocki b i l l  411  Joint  to  nil)  in  Conference  the  role  and the  of December 8  House  Committee.  and  later  This  bill  p r o h i b i t e d the US from g i v i n g a i d t o p a r a m i l i t a r y groups f o r the purposes of overthrowing the Nicaraguan government or promoting a war US  between Nicaragua  and  Honduras . 165  a i d t o the c o u n t e r - r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s On  July  Revolution, proposal  166  .  19,  1983,  Daniel The  on  the  Ortega  Nevertheless,  continued.  anniversary announced  FSLN proposed  that  covert  the  a  of  the  Nicaraguan  six-point  heads of  the  American s t a t e s s t a r t the immediate d i s c u s s i o n of the  peace Central  following  points: 1) A commitment t o end any p r e v a i l i n g s i t u a t i o n of war through the immediate s i g n i n g of a non-aggression pact between Nicaragua and Honduras; 2) The a b s o l u t e end t o a l l s u p p l i e s of weapons by any country t o the f o r c e s i n c o n f l i c t i n E l Salvador so t h a t the people may r e s o l v e t h e i r problem without foreign interference; 3) The a b s o l u t e end t o a l l m i l i t a r y support, i n the form of arms s u p p l i e s , t r a i n i n g , use of t e r r i t o r y t o launch a t t a c k s , or any other form of a g g r e s s i o n , t o forces adverse to any of the Central American governments; 4) Commitments t o ensure a b s o l u t e r e s p e c t f o r the C e n t r a l American people's s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n , and noni n t e r f e r e n c e i n the i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s of each country; 5) The end t o a g g r e s s i o n and economic d i s c r i m i n a t i o n a g a i n s t any country i n C e n t r a l America; and 6) No i n s t a l l a t i o n of f o r e i g n m i l i t a r y bases on C e n t r a l American t e r r i t o r y , and the suspension of New  York Times. Dec  23,  'Dixon, supra note 150,  1982, at  102.  a t A l , c o l . 3.  81 m i l i t a r y e x e r c i s e s i n the C e n t r a l American r e g i o n which i n c l u d e the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of f o r e i g n armies . 167  The U n i t e d Nations was  charged with s u p e r v i s i n g and  compliance with the p r o p o s a l s The  Reagan  proposal The  Administration  because,  Reagan  military  according  Administration  democratization,  s e t f o r t h i n the promptly  to  Motley,  wanted  a  guaranteeing  plan.  rejected i t was  plan  the  "one-sided" . 168  which  dealt  S o v i e t and Cuban a i d t o Nicaragua, and  advisers  in  Nicaragua.  Although  peace  with  foreign  Ortega's  proposal  e x p l i c i t l y s t a t e d t h a t there would be no f o r e i g n m i l i t a r y bases on  any  Central  wanted.  American  A general  the U n i t e d  States  ban  future.  By  10,000  men .  In  expansion  to  emphasize  activities On  now,  the  1 7 1  CIA  September,  12,000 -  $24  was  not  what  Reagan  l i k e t h a t would have p o s s i b l y prevented  mercenary f o r c e had Reagan  15,000 men,  destruction  additional  this  from i n s t a l l i n g m i l i t a r y bases i n the  i n the  169  country,  of  million  vital  was  and  authorized a  shift  economic  appropriated  grown t o a  further  in tactics  targets to  region  1 7 0  .  finance  to An  these  .  September 27,  i n a speech t o the 38th General Assembly  of the U n i t e d Nations,  Ortega t r i e d , once again, t o c o n v i n c e the  1 6 7  Ibid.  Langhorne A. Motley, "Is Peace P o s s i b l e America?" (March 1984) 84 Dep't St. B u l l . 67. 168  169  Washinqton Post. J u l y 14,  170  W a l l S t r e e t J o u r n a l , March 6,  171  Time, A p r i l 23,  1984,  at  1983,  19.  in  Central  a t A l , c o l . 6. 1985,  a t A20,  c o l . 1.  82 United  States  ambitions .  As  172  attack  that  another  it  a matter  did  i n the  Salvador  and  have  of p r i n c i p l e ,  country.  presence  not  He  any  Nicaragua would  acknowledged  region  had  been  Honduras,  and  covertly  expansionary  that  increasing  US  —  i n Costa  never  military  openly Rica.  in El Ortega  concluded by reminding the U n i t e d Nations t h a t Nicaragua had a "right  to  choose  i t s own  internal  system,  i t s own  brand  of  democracy", and t h i s i s "a r i g h t of [the Nicaraguan] people t h a t cannot  be  respected"  negotiated, 173  .  The  by t h i s time —  cannot  be  discussed,  United States —  as was  and  must  be  i t s usual practice  i n s t e a d of l i s t e n i n g t o what Ortega was s a y i n g ,  c r i t i c i z e d him f o r u s i n g the U n i t e d Nations forum f o r propaganda purposes. Not  only  negotiations,  did  the  US  reject  Ortega's  attempts  at  but the f o l l o w i n g month, i n the wake o f the  US  i n v a s i o n o f Grenada, the Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n gave an e x p l i c i t warning t o Nicaragua. the  New  York  Times  A S t a t e Department o f f i c i a l was quoted i n  f o r saying:  " i f [Nicaragua] had any  doubts  about our w i l l i n g n e s s t o use f o r c e under c e r t a i n circumstances, those doubts  should be e r a s e d "  174  .  S h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r , the CIA  i n c r e a s e d the p r e s s u r e on the S a n d i n i s t a government. In  January  harbours —  1984,  Washington  an a c t i o n which  mining  Dixon, supra note 150,  1 7 3  Ibid, at  at  104.  109.  New York Times. Nov.  Nicaragua's  happens t o be an a c t of war  172  174  began  7, 1983,  a t A l , c o l 2.  under  83 international  law.  Reagan  recommendation  o f McFarlane,  approved and  was  even the minor o p e r a t i o n a l d e t a i l s . ports  of Corinto,  through  March  reportedly  Puerto  1984 .  products  of  CIA  briefed  and  variety  the  mining on  on  and  the  approved  Mines were deployed i n the  Sandino,  A  175  the  of  E l Bluff mines  weapons  from  were  Group  January  used, in  most  Langley,  V i r g i n i a , a s s i s t e d by the Mines D i v i s i o n of the US Navy S u r f a c e Weapons  Centre  specialists were  Silver  Spring,  i n Honduras d i d the  deployed  positioned  in  in  o f f the  Nicaragua's coast  of  Maryland.  final  CIA  assembly .  The  176  harbours  from  Nicaragua,  by  a  weapons mines  mother  US  military  ship and  i n t e l l i g e n c e p e r s o n n e l , i n c l u d i n g L a t i n American commandos from t h i r d c o u n t r i e s h i r e d and t r a i n e d by the CIA . 177  The Wall Street  Journal  r e p o r t e d t h a t between February 2 5  and March 28, f i v e i n t e r n a t i o n a l s h i p s h i t mines, w i t h s e r i o u s damage t o a Dutch dredger and a Cuban f r e i g h t e r ; four  s m a l l Nicaraguan  patrol  also, at least  boats were sunk by  the  mines . 178  The A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , however, j u s t i f i e d the mining as an a c t of self-defence.  The  argument  was  that  since  Nicaragua  was  r e s p o n s i b l e f o r some form of a g g r e s s i o n , namely s u p p o r t i n g the g u e r r i l l a s i n E l Salvador, then mining i t s p o r t s was  175  S k l a r , supra note 141, a t 165.  1 7 6  Ibid.  A l s o see New  York Times. June 1, 1984,  an a c t of  a t A4, c o l .  3. New York Times, A p r i l  177  178  16, 1984,  a t A4,  W a l l S t r e e t J o u r n a l , March 6, 1985,  c o l . 5.  a t A20,  c o l . 1.  84 s e l f - d e f e n c e , j u s t l i k e any other use o f f o r c e Nicaragua d i d not r e t a l i a t e ; the  United Nations.  drafted  On A p r i l  a resolution  179  .  i n s t e a d , i t took i t s case t o  4, 1984, t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l  condemning  t h e mining  of the ports of  Nicaragua, a f f i r m i n g t h e r i g h t o f f r e e n a v i g a t i o n and commerce i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l waters, and c a l l i n g f o r a l l s t a t e s t o r e f r a i n from any f u r t h e r h o s t i l e a c t i o n . thirteen  to  abstaining ICJ.  180  .  one  (the US  Nicaragua  By t h e week-end  The vote on the r e s o l u t i o n was vetoed),  with  Great  Britain  then decided t o take i t s case t o t h e of A p r i l  8, t h e news l e a k e d out t h a t  Nicaragua had h i r e d a well-known American  international  lawyer,  Abe Chayes, along w i t h Ian Brownlie, a w e l l - r e s p e c t e d p r o f e s s o r of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law a t Oxford U n i v e r s i t y , t o f i l e  proceedings  a g a i n s t t h e US. Immediately Administration  after announced  receiving that  this  news,  the  i t was withdrawing  Reagan  from t h e  j u r i s d i c t i o n o f the ICJ, f o r a p e r i o d o f two y e a r s , any d i s p u t e s concerning t h e US and C e n t r a l America.  The announcement a l s o  s t a t e d t h a t t h e withdrawal was e f f e c t i v e as of A p r i l 6, 1984 . 181  The  f o l l o w i n g day,  Case  Concerning  Against  Nicaragua  179  as t h e US had expected, Nicaragua f i l e d t h e  Military (Nicar.  and v.  Paramilitary  US)  Activities  In  and  a t The Hague, a s k i n g the Court  S k l a r , supra note 141, a t 166.  Robert A. F r i e d l a n d e r , "Mr. Casey's C o v e r t ' War: The U n i t e d S t a t e s , Nicaragua, and I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law" (Winter 1985) 10:2 U. Dayton L. Rev. 265 a t 284. 180  >  New York Times. A p r i l 9, 1984, a t A l , c o l . 2.  181  85 t o d e c l a r e t h a t the US a c t i o n s had caused g r e a t l o s s o f l i f e and property  in  Nicaragua,  had  essentially  been  aimed  at  overthrowing t h e government, and were c o n t r a r y t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l law . 182  The  Nicar.  v.  US  covered  case  such  actions  as t h e  p r e s i d e n t i a l a u t h o r i z a t i o n o f the c o v e r t a c t i v i t i e s , US m i l i t a r y maneuvers mining  i n Honduras  t h e harbours  aimed  at intimidating  and other  Nicaragua, and  economic t a r g e t s  1 8 3  .  Nicaragua  c h a l l e n g e d US claims o f s e l f - d e f e n c e and charged t h a t US a c t i o n s v i o l a t e d t h e c h a r t e r s of t h e U.N. and t h e O.A.S. as w e l l t h e US Constitution.  Article  15 o f t h e O.A.S. Charter,  f o r example,  states that: No s t a t e o r group o f s t a t e s has t h e r i g h t t o i n t e r v e n e , d i r e c t l y o r i n d i r e c t l y , f o r any reason whatsoever, i n the i n t e r n a l or e x t e r n a l a f f a i r s o f any other s t a t e . The f o r e g o i n g p r i n c i p l e p r o h i b i t s n o t only armed forces but a l s o any other form o f i n t e r f e r e n c e ... The  U.N. Charter,  of course, c o n t a i n s  of  non-intervention.  t h e same b a s i c p r i n c i p l e  The US withdrawal from t h e Court's j u r i s d i c t i o n was w i d e l y denounced as i l l e g a l and unacceptable. Court's compulsory j u r i s d i c t i o n  The US had accepted t h e  i n 1946, and i t had agreed t o  g i v e a six-month n o t i c e i f j u r i s d i c t i o n a l r e c o g n i t i o n were t o be  182  in  The Case  and  Against  Concerning Nicaragua  Military (Nicar. v.  and Paramilitary Activities U.S.), P r o v i s i o n a l Measures,  Order o f May 10, 1984, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 1. 183  S k l a r , supra note 141, a t 169.  86 withdrawn .  The purpose  184  of t h i s p r o v i s o was s p e c i f i c a l l y t o  prevent t h e US from r e j e c t i n g i t s o b l i g a t i o n t o t h e Court i n t h e f a c e o f an unpleasant proceeding.  The withdrawal,  assuming i t  were otherwise v a l i d , would have been e f f e c t i v e s i x months a f t e r i s tender.  I n o t h e r words, the withdrawal c o u l d not immediately  keep t h e Court from h e a r i n g t h e case. The US d e c i s i o n , furthermore, was i r r a t i o n a l s i n c e i n 1980 the  US had gone  holding  American  t o t h e Court hostages.  Court's j u r i s d i c t i o n , it  insisted  that  When Nicaragua  with  a case  against Iran f o r  When I r a n r e f u s e d t o accept t h e  and t h e US r e c e i v e d a f a v o u r a b l e r u l i n g ,  t h e Court's  d e c i s i o n was l e g a l  and b i n d i n g .  went t o Court, however, Ambassador  went so f a r as c a l l i n g  t h e Court  Kirkpatrick  "a s e m i l e g a l , s e m i j u r i d i c a l ,  s e m i p o l i t i c a l body, which n a t i o n s sometime accept and sometimes don't" . 185  The the  Court's d e c i s i o n ,  merits  announced on May 10, d i d n o t reach  o f t h e case.  The Court  issued  a  provisional  r e s t r a i n i n g o r d e r which granted p r o t e c t i o n t o Nicaragua.  I t was  h e l d by a vote o f 14 t o 1 t h a t t h e p a r t i e s i n t h e d i s p u t e must refrain  from  prohibited that  or paramilitary  by i n t e r n a t i o n a l  no a c t i o n  law , 186  I b i d , a t 168.  185  I b i d , a t 170.  activities  and unanimously  o f any k i n d be taken  184  that  that are determined  c o u l d aggravate o r  The US judge c a s t t h e o n l y n e g a t i v e vote. a t 29.  186  182,  any m i l i t a r y  See supra note.  87 widen  the dispute  187  .  By another  unanimous  vote,  t h e Court  mandated t h a t no f u r t h e r a c t i o n be taken by e i t h e r p a r t y t h a t might had  p r e j u d i c e t h e r i g h t s o f t h e other p a r t y u n t i l  a chance t o r u l e  on t h e s u b s t a n t i v e i s s u e s o f t h e c a s e  The US was ordered, i n t e r a l i a , restricting, Nicaraguan  blocking  ports,  t h e Court  or  188  .  t o immediately stop any a c t i o n  endangering  and, i n p a r t i c u l a r ,  access  to  the laying  or  from  of mines . 189  In f a c t , t h e US o n l y stopped t h e mining. A f t e r t h e announcement o f t h i s d e c i s i o n , t h e US presented two  fresh  First,  new arguments  t h e US argued  that,  consent t o t h e compulsory  against  t h e Court's  .  j u r i s d i c t i o n o f t h e Court, t h e r e was The second argument t h a t  presented by t h e US was h i g h l y t e c h n i c a l ,  a s i d e almost immediately.  1 9 0  s i n c e i t had a l r e a d y suspended i t s  no need t o c a r r y t h e case any f u r t h e r . was  jurisdiction  and i t was c a s t  The US claimed t h a t Nicaragua had no  r i g h t t o p l e a d b e f o r e t h e ICJ because i t never f i l e d of r a t i f i c a t i o n t o o f f i c i a l l y  accept t h e Court's  The U n i t e d S t a t e s l o s t on both c o n t e n t i o n s  191  .  instruments  jurisdiction.  By a v o t e o f 15  t o 1 (again, with t h e n e g a t i v e vote o f t h e US judge) t h e Court  1 8 7  I b i d , a t 22.  1 8 8  Ibid.  1 8 9  Ibid.  I n f a c t , a t h i r d argument i n v o l v i n g t h e i n h e r e n t r i g h t o f s e l f - d e f e n c e was a l s o presented. T h i s argument w i l l be d i s c u s s e d i n more d e t a i l i n t h e l a s t c h a p t e r . 190  Nicar. v. U.S., J u r i s d i c t i o n and A d m i s s i b i l i t y , Judgment, of Nov. 26, 1984, p. 1 a t 11-15. m  88 decided on November 26, 1984 t h a t  i t d i d have j u r i s d i c t i o n t o  e n t e r t a i n t h e case brought t o i t by N i c a r a g u a . 192  On June 1, 1984, w h i l e on h i s f l i g h t home from P r e s i d e n t Jose Napoleon  Duarte's  i n a u g u r a t i o n i n E l Salvador, S e c r e t a r y  S h u l t z made a sudden v i s i t t o Managua. top l e a d e r s o f t h e S a n d i n i s t a airport to  1 9 3  .  make  i n c l u d i n g Ortega, a t t h e  A p p a r e n t l y , Reagan had asked t h e S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e t h e stop  i n order  improving  relations  meeting,  Shultz  Nicaraguan America;  junta,  There, he met w i t h t h e  t o explore  the p o s s i b i l i t y  between t h e two c o u n t r i e s  made  support  the  following  f o r rebel  194  .  demands:  guerrilla  groups  of  During t h e an  end t o  in  Central  a r e d u c t i o n o f m i l i t a r y s t r e n g t h t o numbers t h a t would  r e s t o r e a m i l i t a r y balance between Nicaragua and i t s neighbours; and f u l f i l m e n t o f t h e o r i g i n a l S a n d i n i s t a commitment " t o support democratic p l u r a l i s m "  1 9 5  .  Upon r e a c h i n g Washington, however, S h u l t z r e i t e r a t e d t h e Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s i n t e n t i o n t o request an a d d i t i o n a l $21 million Congress  from  Congress  denied  the  t o continue a i d f o r the contras next  month) . 196  At  the  (which  same  time,  i n c i d e n t a l l y , t a l k s c o n t i n u e d with Nicaragua on an ambassadorial  1 9 2  I b i d , a t 54.  193  F r i e d l a n d e r , supra note 180, a t 278.  1 9 4  I b i d , a t 279.  James H. M i c h e l , "U.S. R e l a t i o n s With Honduras Nicaragua" (June 1984) 84 Dep't S t . B u l l . 81 a t 84. 195  196  F r i e d l a n d e r , supra note 180, a t 279.  and  89 level.  It  d i d not  spectre  of  a Nicaraguan Marxist  once  more t o  assistance  have  contras  Use  evidence  began  to  US t o  clandestine  that  raising  again,  and  the  claim  Nicaraguan m i l i t a r y  i n Central America.  in  the  CIA i n the  US.  It  e n t i t l e d Psychological  The m a n u a l c o n t a i n e d  Violence",  start  dictatorship  circulate  booklet,  Warfare.  of  of  the  a manual p u b l i s h e d by t h e  Spanish-language Guerrilla  long for  t o g u e r r i l l a movements  In October, the  take  suggested,  was  a  90-page  Operations  a section,  among  name o f  other  in  "Selective  things,  hiring  p r o f e s s i o n a l c r i m i n a l s t o c a r r y out " s e l e c t i v e j o b s " and a d v i s e d arranging "martyr"  for for  the  death  the  cause  of  1 9 7  .  a  contra  Congress  supporter was  t h a t t h e CIA had behaved i n t h i s manner. from any agency off  1 9 8  .  involved  From t h e n  to  create  apparently  outraged  Funding to the  contras  i n " i n t e l l i g e n c e a c t i v i t i e s " was  on, the  a  cut-  P r e s i d e n t h a d t o o p e n l y a s k f o r money  t o arm a p e o p l e t o f i g h t a g o v e r n m e n t w i t h w h i c h ,  incidentally,  the  The  US s t i l l  maintained  r a i s e d abundant In arguments  the in  jurisdiction  diplomatic relations.  m o r a l and l e g a l  same m o n t h , The to  the  Hague  decide  on  s u b m i s s i o n s were r e j e c t e d Court decided that 1 9 7  Burns,  it did,  questions.  United  that  the  States World  Nicaragua's by t h e  at  presented  Court  claims.  did  several not  A l l of  have these  C o u r t on November 26 when  in fact,  s u p r a n o t e 148,  situation  have  j u r i s d i c t i o n and  the that  58.  I b i d , a t 5 9 . N o r t h , a W h i t e House L i a i s o n t o t h e N . S . C . , took charge of c o o r d i n a t i n g the contras, g i v i n g a d v i c e and h e l p i n g them t o r a i s e more t h a n $20 m i l l i o n i n p r i v a t e f u n d s . 1 9 8  90 the  provisional  effect  1 9 9  .  The  withdrawing  US  from  participate compulsory  measures  issued  State the  Department  proceedings  i n the case  because  200  should  promptly  .  The  remain  in  responded  by  US  would  not  when i t accepted t h e Court's  i n 1946 i t never  "conceived o f such a  r o l e f o r t h e Court i n such c o n t r o v e r s i e s " .  The S t a t e Department  also  jurisdiction  i n May  stated  that  much  of the evidence  Nicaragua's  fault  character.  The US c o u l d  presenting  is  of  such m a t e r i a l  from Warsaw Pact n a t i o n s "  a  highly  not r i s k  that  sensitive i t s national  "before a Court t h a t 201  .  would  establish  intelligence security  includes  by  judges  The US d i d , however, c o n t i n u e i t s  c o v e r t war a g a i n s t Nicaragua.  199  Nicar.  v.  U.S.,  supra note 191.  "U.S. Withdrawal from t h e Proceedings Initiated Nicaragua i n t h e I.C.J." (March 85) 85 Dep't S t . B u l l . 64. 200  Ibid.  by  91  VI.  ANALYSIS  The  d e c i s i o n s of the Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  to intervene  the domestic a f f a i r s of Nicaragua and Grenada have had legal implications. seen  by  the  established  In many ways, US  international norms and  s t a t e possesses the  p r i n c i p l e s of  inherent  governmental p o l i t i c a l  as  contradicting  without  other s t a t e s . acted  to  prejudice  Yet,  and  i t desires.  absent  i n Grenada and  restrain  Every  l e g a l r i g h t t o choose any  institution  regimes  any  form of  Moreover, t h i s of s i z e or  interference  Nicaragua, the U n i t e d  that  it  was  well-  i n t e r n a t i o n a l law.  r i g h t should be a v a i l a b l e t o a l l s t a t e s , r e g a r d l e s s strength,  numerous  a c t i o n i n both cases  community  in  found  from States  ideologically  distasteful. In both cases, the U n i t e d S t a t e s action in self-defence. t o US the US  security;  Grenada, however, was  The  t h a t i t had  government  a  threat  mentioned,  it  is  very  What  acted i n " a n t i c i p a t o r y "  speculated  Nicaragua might someday pose a t h r e a t previously  hardly  taken  and the same can be argued f o r Nicaragua.  argued, i n f a c t , was  self-defence.  claimed t h a t i t had  t o US  difficult  that  Grenada  security. to  As  support  and was such  92 anticipatory self-defence In  the  following  presented  by  the  decisions  to  intervene  discussed  one  legally  sections,  Reagan  by  one.  a c t i o n with  the  the  major in  in  Grenada  and  With  respect  to  t h a t h i s main concern was i n Grenada.  .  Administration  j u s t i f i c a t i o n s were presented.  were l i v i n g  2 0 2  First,  the  presented  the US  Nicaragua  member s t a t e s of  the  of will  three  the  US  had  nationals  taken  who  collective  Organization  of  Eastern  T h i r d , the argument  t h a t the Governor General of Grenada had  invited  t o take a c t i o n .  United  justification First,  be  major  S i m i l a r l y , the d e c i s i o n t o i n t e r v e n e i n Nicaragua was on  the  P r e s i d e n t Reagan s t a t e d  s a f e t y of the US  Second, the  arguments  defence  Grenada,  Caribbean S t a t e s t o prevent f u r t h e r chaos. was  legal  the US  threatened;  States' branched perceived thus,  claimed out  right  into  of  two  self-defence.  different  based This  directions:  i t s national security i n t e r e s t s to  i t acted  in self-defence.  j o i n e d f o r c e s with c o u n t r i e s neighbouring c o l l e c t i v e self-defence.  Finally,  the US  Second, the  be US  Nicaragua and a c t e d i n d e c i s i o n t o withdraw  from the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Court of J u s t i c e (and its  consequent  behaviour  in  the  Court)  has  had  legal  i m p l i c a t i o n s which are worthy of mention. The purpose of t h i s s e c t i o n w i l l be t o s e t out, the arguments used by the US; r u l e s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law 202  See "Self-Defence"  in detail,  and then, t o apply the norms and  t o comment on  i n Chapter I I I .  the v a l i d i t y  of each  93 argument.  Needless t o say, i f the US j u s t i f i c a t i o n s  contradict  norms o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, then the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t should be reached i s t h a t norms o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l law and l e g a l  standards  had  regarding  little  Central  o r no  America.  impact  on determining  US  policy  94  A.  GRENADA;  1. On  Safety of US N a t i o n a l s  t h e morning  of  October  25,  i n Grenada when  announced t h a t American f o r c e s had landed two  basic  reasons  for h i s decision  2 0 3  .  President  Reagan  i n Grenada, he gave  The f i r s t  reason  was  t h a t t h e s e c u r i t y and the l i v e s o f US n a t i o n a l s i n Grenada were in  danger.  The  invasion,  that  justification  Administration humanitarian  been  justified  used  the invasion  this  was  the  There was a g r e a t  issue a t the i n i t i a l  properly,  throughout t h e  intervention  f o r US involvement.  d i s c u s s i o n about t h i s had  maintained,  defence  t o some extent.  stages;  could  main  deal of  and i f i t  have p o t e n t i a l l y  Reagan, however, was  haunted by t h e f e a r o f another Teheran-type hostage s i t u a t i o n , in  which  fanatics. had  t h e US was  powerless  His Administration  Carter's  —  i n a no-win  i n t h e hands  o f a group of  was not going t o g e t caught — s i t u a t i o n that  American l i v e s and r e s u l t i n a g r e a t e r  would  as  jeopardize  loss of prestige.  I n t e r v e n t i o n f o r humanitarian purposes can be j u s t i f i e d i f the most fundamental human r i g h t s of a country's n a t i o n a l s a r e being v i o l a t e d i n another. within  this  category;  The r i g h t t o l i f e , o b v i o u s l y ,  but some commentators argue t h a t  falls i fa  s t a t e ' s n a t i o n a l s a r e being t o r t u r e d , or a r e taken hostage, then  See Reagan, supra note 129.  95 that state i s also j u s t i f i e d  i n intervening  US students i n Grenada, however, was  204  .  The case of the  somewhat d i f f e r e n t because  they were not being t o r t u r e d , nor were they taken  hostage.  I f a s t a t e i s r e q u i r e d t o wait u n t i l the fundamental of i t s c i t i z e n s are a c t u a l l y v i o l a t e d , then i t may t o a s s i s t them a t a l l . hostages  The  i n a b i l i t y of the US  rights  not be a b l e  t o rescue the  i n I r a n supports a view of humanitarian  intervention  which would a l l o w a s t a t e t o i n t e r v e n e i n the f a c e of "imminent" and  "immediate" danger t o p o t e n t i a l hostages.  The  requirement  of the immediacy of a t h r e a t t o human r i g h t s should be s a t i s f i e d once a s t a t e makes a good f a i t h d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t i t s n a t i o n a l s are i n danger. The f a c t s i n Grenada seem t o suggest t h a t t h e r e was no r e a l t h r e a t t o the Americans l i v i n g on the i s l a n d .  The r e a l danger  t o the students e x i s t e d d u r i n g the i n i t i a l phases of the coup, and s i n c e Coard and A u s t i n d i d not t h r e a t e n the s t u d e n t s i n any way  then, t h e r e was  no reason t o b e l i e v e t h a t the s t u d e n t s were  i n danger. Coard and A u s t i n must have been concerned about the s a f e t y of the Americans because they d e s p e r a t e l y sought t o a v o i d g i v i n g the US  a pretext to  week-end, the launch October  a  RMC  In f a c t ,  became aware t h a t  full-scale  24, the RMC  invade.  military  a t one  the  a t t a c k on  US  p o i n t over  was  Grenada.  sent a t e l e x t o the US  the  preparing to On  Monday,  Embassy i n Barbados  F o r example, see Laura Wheeler, "The Grenada I n v a s i o n : Expanding the Scope of Humanitarian I n t e r v e n t i o n " (Summer 1985). 8 B. C. I n t ' l & Comp. L. Rev. 413 a t 42 3. 204  96 urging The  the  US  and  i t s Caribbean a l l i e s  telex stated, i n pertinent  not  to  invade Grenada.  part:  We should view any i n v a s i o n of our country, whether based on the d e c i s i o n of those [Caribbean Community] governments or by t h a t of any other government, as a rude violation of Grenada's s o v e r e i g n t y and of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law .... Grenada has not and i s not t h r e a t e n i n g the use of f o r c e a g a i n s t any country, and we do not have any such aspirations .... [W]e are prepared to hold d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h those c o u n t r i e s i n order t o ensure good r e l a t i o n s and mutual understanding .... We r e i t e r a t e t h a t the l i v e s , w e l l - b e i n g and p r o p e r t y of every American and other f o r e i g n c i t i z e n r e s i d i n g i n Grenada are f u l l y p r o t e c t e d and guaranteed by our government. However, any American or f o r e i g n c i t i z e n i n our country who d e s i r e s t o leave Grenada f o r whatever reason can do so ... . 205  Despite  this  negotiations, following The  plea the  US  for  non-intervention  l e d the  and  requesting  m i l i t a r y i n v a s i o n of Grenada  the  day. Reagan A d m i n s t r a t i o n  argued t h a t  political  authority  had d i s i n t e g r a t e d i n Grenada, t h a t f u r t h e r v i o l e n c e would occur, and  that  the  violent  Americans on the i s l a n d . the r e a s s u r a n c e s , i t s mind and  killings  posed  a  real  threat  P r e s i d e n t Reagan thought t h a t ,  i t would be very  s e i z e hostages.  easy f o r the  RMC  to  the  despite  t o change  He c o u l d not p o s s i b l y r e l y on  the  " S p e c i a l Report: I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law and the U n i t e d S t a t e s A c t i o n on Grenada" (Spring 1984) 18 I n t ' l Law. 331 a t 338-9 ( r e p r i n t e d the t e x t of the t e l e x ) . According t o a New York Times r e p o r t , however, f o r e i g n e r s were r e f u s e d p e r m i s s i o n t o use the a i r p o r t i n order t o leave the i s l a n d (See New York Times. Oct. 26, 1983, at A l , c o l . 6). Other r e p o r t s , on the other hand, i n d i c a t e d t h a t f o r e i g n e r s were able t o leave the i s l a n d i f they so d e s i r e d (New York Times, Oct. 28, 1983, a t A20, c o l s 1-2 [witnesses r e p o r t t h a t a t l e a s t 4 c h a r t e r planes were allowed t o leave]; New York Times, Oct. 29, 1983, at A7, c o l . 3 [Robert Meyers, former d i r e c t o r of Reagan's S o c i a l S e c u r i t y Commission,, l e f t Grenada under normal a i r p o r t p r o c e d u r e s ] ) . 2 0 5  guarantees of a group of people who had j u s t murdered t h e i r own prime m i n i s t e r along w i t h numerous others, children.  Furthermore,  the imposition  i n c l u d i n g women and  of t h e  shoot-on-sight  curfew and t h e c l o s i n g o f t h e a i r p o r t s i n Grenada suggested t h a t events  were  not f o l l o w i n g  a  normal  course.  In f a c t ,  the  sequence o f events bore a bleak resemblance t o what had happened in  Iran. I f t h e US government t r u l y b e l i e v e d t h a t i t s n a t i o n a l s were  not  i n danger and r e s c u i n g  invasion  cannot  be  c a r r i e d any f u r t h e r .  justified  because  and t h e argument  need  n o t be  I f , on t h e other hand, t h e government made  a good f a i t h determination then  them was j u s t an excuse, then t h e  t h a t American l i v e s were i n danger,  of the large  number  of American  nationals i n  Grenada, t h e t h r e a t t o human r i g h t s v i o l a t i o n s was s u b s t a n t i a l . I t may be harder t o j u s t i f y an i n v a s i o n designed t o save o n l y a few  lives;  plausible  i n such  a case  alternative.  l i v e s , nothing  a smaller  operation  But, when t r y i n g t o save  might  be a  over 1 , 0 0 0  s h o r t of an i n v a s i o n may prove s u c c e s s f u l .  Two p o i n t s s i g n i f i c a n t l y d e t r a c t from t h e s t r e n g t h o f t h i s argument.  F i r s t , a shrewd a d v i s e r might have contended t h a t an  i n v a s i o n c o u l d p r e c i p i t a t e t h e very t h i n g t h a t Reagan wanted t o avoid.  Since  Grenada  could  not have  withstood  a military  a s s a u l t by t h e US, t h e only way t h a t t h e m i l i t a r y c o u l d personally  was  t o take  hostages.  Demands  survive  f o r the invasion  f o r c e s t o withdraw, or a t l e a s t f o r t h e RMC's s a f e conduct out  of the country, would be d i f f i c u l t and Second, and solely  concerned  limited-purpose US  more important, about  the  f o r c e s , however, stayed  until  they  were  established. evacuation Secretary  the  addition,  a  Americans,  State  Department  two  The  months,  government did  a  was  not  view Deputy  t o p r o t e c t Americans  by changing domestic p o l i t i c a l order so t h a t US  a l l o w a s t a t e t o use  and  only  t o p r o t e c t the US n a t i o n a l s .  s a f e l y r e s i d e i n Grenada .  .  were genuinely  democratic  i n d i c a t e d t h a t the plan was  207  206  c o u l d have been j u s t i f i e d .  that  as the o n l y way Dam  of  US  refuse  i n Grenada f o r n e a r l y  certain  In  i f the  safety  rescue mission  c o s t l y to  nationals  Rules of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law  could do  not  the r a t i o n a l e of p r o t e c t i n g i t s n a t i o n a l s  t o change p o l i t i c a l s t r u c t u r e s i n other c o u n t r i e s t o b e t t e r s u i t the needs of i t s c i t i z e n s r e s i d i n g i n those c o u n t r i e s . it  should  Grenada was  be  clear  that  the  US  decision  to  send  Hence,  troops  to  not a d i r e c t r e s u l t of concerns about the s a f e t y of  the Americans.  2.  J o i n i n g the C o l l e c t i v e S e c u r i t y Forces of the OECS  The second reason g i v e n i n Reagan's announcement on October One of the g r e a t e s t i r o n i e s of the management of the students' s a f e t y was t h a t the m a j o r i t y were f i n a l l y evacuated under c o n d i t i o n s t h a t were f a r more dangerous than those p r e v a i l i n g before the i n v a s i o n . Ambursley, supra note 109, a t 86. 206  "The s i t u a t i o n i n Grenada", Hearing Before the Senate Committee on F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s , 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1983); i n John Quigley, "The United States Invasion of Grenada: Stranger Than F i c t i o n " (Winter 1986/87) 18 U. Miami Inter-Am. L.. Rev. 231 a t 278. 207  25  was  that  Caribbean further  t h e US  States  chaos"  208  had j o i n e d  collective  .  This  was  the Organization  security related  forces  of  "to  to his third  Eastern  forestall reason of  h e l p i n g t o r e s t o r e democratic i n s t i t u t i o n s i n Grenada. in  1981, t h e OECS T r e a t y  collective  security  contains  provision  2 0 9  within  .  Created  i t s charter a quasi-  Article  8 established the  Defence and S e c u r i t y Committee which c o n s i s t s o f t h e m i n i s t e r s of defence o f t h e member s t a t e s .  T h i s Committee i s r e s p o n s i b l e  to  o f t h e member  t h e heads  o f t h e government  states  2 1 0  .  The  Committee a d v i s e s t h e A u t h o r i t y "on matters r e l a t i n g t o e x t e r n a l defence  and on arrangements  external  for collective  security  against  aggression" . 211  I t i s not c l e a r t h a t t h e OECS T r e a t y contemplates t h e use of armed f o r c e a g a i n s t having  the o b j e c t i v e  a member s t a t e , e s p e c i a l l y an i n v a s i o n of r e s o l v i n g  an i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l o f t h e s t r u c t u r e s of a u t h o r i t y . then, undeniably, t h e OECS acted 208  ultra  struggle f o r  I f t h a t were t h e case vires  i t s treaty  since  Reagan, supra note 129, a t 67.  A r t i c l e 8 provides i n relevant part: The Defence and Security Committee shall have r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r c o o r d i n a t i n g t h e e f f o r t s o f Member S t a t e s f o r c o l l e c t i v e defence and t h e p r e s e r v a t i o n o f peace and s e c u r i t y against external aggression and f o r t h e development o f c l o s e t i e s among t h e Member S t a t e s o f t h e O r g a n i s a t i o n i n matters o f e x t e r n a l defence and s e c u r i t y ... i n t h e e x e r c i s e of t h e i n h e r e n t r i g h t o f i n d i v i d u a l o r c o l l e c t i v e s e l f - d e f e n c e recognized by A r t i c l e 51 o f t h e C h a r t e r o f t h e United Nations.  2 0 9  The heads o f government comprise t h e " A u t h o r i t y " A r t i c l e 6 of t h e OECS .Treaty. 210  2 1 1  A r t i c l e 8(3) of t h e OECS T r e a t y ;  emphasis added.  . See  100 the  aspects  statement  of  cited  the s i t u a t i o n as  giving  i n t e r n a l t o t h a t country.  i n Grenada  rise  to  I t should  (which  concern)  t h e OECS  were  entirely  l o g i c a l l y follow that the  US cannot l e g i t i m i z e i t s i n t e r v e n t i o n by r e l y i n g on an u n l a w f u l OECS request. Some commentators have argued Article  8 i s misleading  .  212  Article  that a l i t e r a l  reading of  3 of t h e OECS T r e a t y  sets  out t h e purposes and f u n c t i o n s of t h e O r g a n i z a t i o n and makes i t c l e a r t h a t they  broadly  include "External Relations",  "Mutual  Defence and S e c u r i t y " , and " [ s ] u c h other a c t i v i t i e s c a l c u l a t e d t o f u r t h e r t h e purposes of t h e O r g a n i z a t i o n as t h e Member S t a t e s may from t o time d e c i d e " .  T h i s broad  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of A r t i c l e  3 may permit t h e use o f c o l l e c t i v e s e l f - d e f e n c e a g a i n s t i n t e r n a l threats.  T h i s argument i s r a t h e r weak, n e v e r t h e l e s s , because i t  i s hard t o imagine t h a t a group of small Caribbean  s t a t e s signed  an agreement i n order t o f i g h t each other. Even i f one succeeds i n e s t a b l i s h i n g t h a t t h e OECS T r e a t y does a l l o w  f o r responses  to internal  aggression  s t a t e s , s e v e r a l other c o m p l i c a t i o n s a r i s e .  among member  For i n s t a n c e , i t i s  not c l e a r a t a l l t h a t t h e T r e a t y contemplates an i n v i t a t i o n t o a m i l i t a r y dominant non-member t o l e a d an i n v a s i o n . the  term  occasions,  "collective  self-defence"  is  used  on  Although numerous  nowhere i s t h e o p t i o n t o i n v i t e o u t s i d e a s s i s t a n c e  a g a i n s t a member s t a t e s t i p u l a t e d .  The U n i t e d S t a t e s i s n o t a  p a r t y t o t h i s T r e a t y and, t h e r e f o r e , l i e s o u t s i d e t h e ambit o f 212  See f o r example, Norton Moore, supra note 94, a t 163-66.  101 its  concerns . 213  At refer  this to  point,  the  those  relative  who  seek t o defend the  military  strength  Caribbean s t a t e s , i f l e f t on t h e i r own, chance a g a i n s t the Cuban-trained m i l i t a r y personnel.  next  objection  decision-making Treaty  states  active  member  decision.  2 1 4  concerns  the  The  procedure  under the OECS p r o v i s i o n s .  .  Since,  of  the  Such a  denied.  s e c u r i t y must be  member  The  asked t o h e l p a group  seemingly i n danger.  s t i p u l a t e s t h a t d e c i s i o n s and  defence and  Grenada.  and equipped Grenadan army and  of s m a l l s t a t e s whose s e c u r i t y was  The  invasion  would not have stood a  The United S t a t e s was  request c o u l d not have been  of  US  technically,  member-states,  for  Paragraph 5 of  the  d i r e c t i v e s pertaining to  consented  OECS,  used  t o unanimously by Grenada  i t s vote however,  was  was  still  required  did  not  the  in  even  an the  invite  Grenada t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n the meeting. The  OECS  members  stated  government i n Grenada and, p a r t i c i p a t e i n the meeting.  that  there  T h i s statement was  o b j e c t i o n s t o the r u l e of unanimity.  one  other  accounts,  no  as a r e s u l t , t h a t country  any  problem:  was  According  to  various  apparent could  not  meant t o remove  There was, sources  however, and  press  o n l y f o u r of the s i x other member s t a t e s voted f o r the  I t should be noted t h a t Barbados and Jamaica, which a l s o p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the i n v a s i o n , are not p a r t i e s t o the T r e a t y , either. 2 1 3  C h r i s t o p h e r C. Joyner, "The United States Grenada" (Jan. 1984) 78 Am. J . I n t ' l L. 131 a t 137. 214  Action  in  102 p l a n t o be c a r r i e d out. St.  Kitts  / Nevis  Some have r e p o r t e d t h a t Montserrat and  abstained,  against the i n t e r v e n t i o n  2 1 5  .  other  reported  In e i t h e r case,  that  they  t h e vote  voted  was not  unanimous, and t h e p l a n should not have been c a r r i e d o u t . There have been i n d i c a t i o n s t h a t t h e US prompted t h e OECS decision,  and t h a t i t a c t u a l l y d r a f t e d t h e w r i t t e n request i n  which t h e OECS asked f o r US m i l i t a r y  i n t e r v e n t i o n i n Grenada.  The  New York Times, f o r i n s t a n c e , r e p o r t e d  the  request  Caribbean  was  "drafted  leaders  by  i n Washington  special  American  on October 30 t h a t  and conveyed emissaries"  216  t o the .  October 23, Ambassador McNeil flew t o Barbados t o c o n f e r  On with  the Prime M i n i s t e r o f t h e Dominican R e p u b l i c and C h a i r p e r s o n o f the OECS, Eugenia C h a r l e s , request .  and g e t her s i g n a t u r e on a w r i t t e n  The US d r a f t i n g o f t h e request  217  own, negate t h e OECS d e s i r e f o r i n t e r v e n t i o n . show a s t r o n g US r o l e i n t h e process request.  More i m p o r t a n t l y ,  of t h e U n i t e d  inherent  such a r i g h t  its  I t does, however,  by which t h e OECS made i t s  i t c a s t s doubts on t h e t r u e motives  States.  Finally, the  does not, on  and most i m p o r t a n t l y , right  of i n d i v i d u a l  i s l i m i t e d t o those  although  s t a t e s do possess  or c o l l e c t i v e  self-defence,  s i t u a t i o n s i n which t h e v i t a l  i n t e r e s t s o f a s t a t e a r e threatened.  The s i t u a t i o n i n Grenada  " S p e c i a l Report", supra note 2 05, a t 343; Joyner, supra note 214, a t 137; New York Times. Oct. 26, 1983, a t A8, c o l . 3; New York Times. Oct. 26, 1983, a t A16, c o l . 6. 2 I 5  New York Times. Oct 30, 1983, a t A20, c o l . l .  216  217  Quigley,  supra note 2 07,  a t 316.  103 was  one of i n t e r n a l concern, and n e i t h e r the Caribbean  nor the US had  any v a l i d  cause t o p a n i c .  states,  I t i s inconceivable  t h a t a s m a l l i s l a n d i n the Caribbean c o u l d pose such a t h r e a t t o the US t h a t the l a t t e r would a c t u a l l y r e s o r t t o In  this  r e s p e c t , the  Caribbean  have been more understandable. Grenadan they  officials  were  t h e r e was  not no  issued  seeking  real  a  community's  But,  concerns  i n that  t o any  218  .  may  case,  e n s u r i n g everyone  confrontation  or imminent t h r e a t  t h a t invaded Grenada.  even  statement  military  war.  In  the that  short,  of the c o u n t r i e s  Simply because t h e r e i s d i s o r d e r or even  a m i l i t a r y coup i n a country, the neighbouring s t a t e s s h o u l d not g i v e themselves establishing  the r i g h t t o i n t e r v e n e f o r the purpose  minimum  public  security,  l e t alone  of r e -  imposing  a  p a r t i c u l a r form of government.  3.  The I n v i t a t i o n by Grenada's  Since the decision-makers  Governor-General  i n Reagan's A d m i n i s t r a t i o n must  have a l l been aware of the f a u l t s and short-comings of t h e s e two justifications  f o r the d e c i s i o n t o invade Grenada, i t i s v e r y  u n l i k e l y t h a t these were the a c t u a l reasons t h a t the was  based upon.  A third  legal  justification  of the a c t i o n i n  Grenada was a l s o presented by the US government. 1983,  decision  On November 2,  i n a testimony b e f o r e the House F o r e i g n A f f a i r s Committee,  Deputy  Secretary  Governor-General 2 1 8  of  State  Kenneth  Dam  revealed  of Grenada, S i r Paul Scoon, had  " S p e c i a l Report", supra note 205,  at  339.  that  the  confidentially  104 t r a n s m i t t e d "an appeal f o r a c t i o n by t h e OECS and other r e g i o n a l s t a t e s t o r e s t o r e order on t h e i s l a n d " If  t h e Governor-General  2 1 9  .  were t h e l e g a l  representative of  the s t a t e , and i f he d i d r e q u e s t m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e , then h i s invitation are,  could j u s t i f y  t h e US d e c i s i o n t o i n t e r v e n e .  nevertheless, several  First,  p o i n t s which  Her Majesty's  the  should be d i s c u s s e d .  t h e 1974 C o n s t i t u t i o n o f Grenada p l a c e d "the E x e c u t i v e  A u t h o r i t y o f Grenada i n t h e Governor of  There  Governor  emergency.  Government . 220  General; The f i r s t  General as r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  V a r i o u s powers were g i v e n t o  f o r example, impression t h a t  he  could  p r o c l a i m an  one gets from  t h e 1974  C o n s t i t u t i o n i s t h a t Scoon probably d i d have t h e l e g a l a u t h o r i t y t o take a c t i o n . In suspended  1979,  when  Bishop  the Constitution  came  to  power,  he  and r e p l a c e d i t w i t h  effectively t h e People's  R e v o l u t i o n a r y Government i n a manner t h a t l i m i t e d t h e Governor General's powers. to  performing  The Governor General's p o s i t i o n was c o n f i n e d  "such  f u n c t i o n s as t h e People's  Government may from time t o time a d v i s e "  221  .  Revolutionary  However, even w i t h  h i s r e s i d u a l powers, t h e Governor General may have been a b l e t o  219  Kenneth Dam Statement  i n Nash L e i c h ,  supra note 111, a t  203. A r t i c l e 57 o f t h e Constitution of Grenada; D e t l e v F. Vagts, " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law Under Time P r e s s u r e : Grading t h e Grenada Take Home Examination" (Jan. 1984) 78 Am. J . I n t ' l L. 169 a t 171. 2 2 0  " D e c l a r a t i o n of Grenada R e v o l u t i o n " , dated March 28, 1979,. People's Law No. 3, i n " S p e c i a l Report", supra note 205, a t 348. 2 2 1  105 authorize  the  intervention.  of a f f a i r s which f o l l o w e d  Furthermore, i n the c h a o t i c  Bishop's murder, Scoon was  a u t h o r i t y l e f t under the C o n s t i t u t i o n and, person who One  had  the  only  t h e r e f o r e , the  only  the power t o a c t .  other  f a c t o r which  lends  credence t o  Scoon d i d have the r i g h t t o take a c t i o n was US,  Barbados, Jamaica, and  authority  to  represents,  effective  act  to  authority.  in  later  political  recognition,  one  behalf  however,  would have hoped.  222  therefore,  Grenada's.  By  served  recognizing  they strengthened t h e i r own of  the  UN,  on  the  other  .  accepted This  not  First,  the  hand,  the i n v a s i o n .  own  needs  have the  made  than  recognition a  critical  appropriate  time. control  been assured by the f o r e i g n m i l i t a r y  Thatcher, however, advised  US,  authority,  g i v e n a f t e r the Governor General's de facto  T h i r d , the Governor General was  as  Their  more  But,  Mrs.  at  been  OECS, the  i f i t had  of the i s l a n d had  extended  Scoon's  have  Second, the  could  Scoon's  of  Governor General's  decision.  that  acceptance  difference i t was  been  the  UN  may  their  claim  recognition  Barbados and Jamaica were a l r e a d y planning recognition,  the  t h a t the OECS, the  even the  Grenada's  some extent,  The as  state  forces.  appointed by Great B r i t a i n .  a g a i n s t the i n v a s i o n and  stated  t h a t the B r i t i s h d i d not wish t o take p a r t i n i t . The  fact that  the  of  Governor  Britain,  and  General that  the  did  not  latter  request did  not  the wish  support to  invade  Great  Grenada  somewhat d e t r a c t s from the v a l i d i t y of Scoon*s request. However, 2 2 2  Ibid.  106 Secretary  Shultz,  i n a news conference on October 25, p o i n t e d  out t h a t Grenada i s an independent s t a t e t h a t no longer needs t o consult  with  Great  Britain  before  making  a  decision.  Furthermore, although t h e B r i t i s h have had "great e x p e r i e n c e " i n the Caribbean, so have t h e Americans.  The Caribbean i s i n t h e  US' neighbourhood, so t h e US has "a very l e g i t i m a t e a f f i n i t y f o r those  people"  223  .  The p e r m i s s i o n  or the consent  B r i t a i n , t h e r e f o r e , was not r e q u i r e d Finally, nothing  recognition  o r very  country. entitled  little  was  about  to recognition  by  the true  situation.  outside state  as t h e de facto,  forces  says  o f events  in a  i f not t h e de  jure,  The RMC was i n s u f f i c i e n t c o n t r o l o f t h e  t o impose a curfew.  Canada contacted in  extended  Great  There i s reason t o argue t h a t General A u s t i n ' s RMC was  government o f Grenada. island  i n this  of  t h e RMC  Also,  t h e US, Great  B r i t a i n and  (as t h e main a u t h o r i t y on t h e i s l a n d )  an e f f o r t t o secure t h e s a f e t y of t h e i r n a t i o n a l s ;  and i t  t h e RMC t h a t sent a t e l e x t o t h e US embassy a s s u r i n g t h e US  government t h a t t h e i r c i t i z e n s would be s a f e . T h i s debate over who had l a w f u l a u t h o r i t y u s u a l l y a r i s e s i n cases  of domestic  strife.  Although  i n Grenada  t h e Governor  General was not t h e l e a d e r o f one o f t h e contending f a c t i o n s i n a  civil  countries rebellion  223  71.  war, t h e s i t u a t i o n should  have remained n e u t r a l .  i s not  "Secretary  was ambiguous  entirely  clear,  enough  that  other  When t h e outcome o f a  the  government  (or a  S h u l t z ' s News Conference", supra note 133, a t  107 r e p r e s e n t a t i v e t h e r e o f ) cannot h o l d i t s e l f out t o speak f o r t h e state  224  .  The Governor General  and t h e RMC both had e q u i v a l e n t ,  colourable claims t o a u t h o r i t y . When P r e s i d e n t Reagan announced t h a t US f o r c e s had landed in  Grenada,  General's  he d i d not mention  request.  anything  State  Department  unequivocally On  t h e Governor  P a r t l y because o f t h i s i n i t i a l s i l e n c e , t h e  news o f t h e i n v i t a t i o n was greeted the  about  has  t h a t a request  still  with not  scepticism. been  able  In f a c t , to  prove  was made p r i o r t o t h e i n v a s i o n  October 27, when t h e Department i s s u e d i t s f i r s t  225  .  statement  r e g a r d i n g a request from Scoon, an e x p l a n a t i o n was o f f e r e d t h a t the a l l e g e d request was not p u b l i c i z e d e a r l i e r because i t f e a r e d f o r t h e s a f e t y o f Scoon, who was taken from h i s r e s i d e n c e t o t h e US warship Guam o f t h e morning o f October 26. This have  been  explanation reports  i s rather  that  hard  t o accept  because  there  Scoon  d i d not make t h e d e c i s i o n t o  request a s s i s t a n c e on h i s own.  Once he was s a f e l y on board t h e  US s h i p Guam, he made a w r i t t e n request, Statements  later  circumspect.  made  by  Scoon  himself  H i s i n t e r v i e w s do not f u l l y  how v o l u n t a r y h i s i n v i t a t i o n was;  prompted by t h e US . 226  have  been  equally  r e s o l v e doubts about  nor i s he c l e a r on whether he  asked f o r a f u l l - s t r e n g t h m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n , o r merely s e c u r i t y  I n t h i s case, the outcome was r e l a t i v e l y c l e a r : the US i n v a s i o n , t h e RMC would have stayed i n power. 224  225  Quigley,  supra note 2 07,  a t 33 0.  226  Ambursley, supra note 109, a t 81.  Without  108 f o r c e s t o perform p o l i c e f u n c t i o n s . Most  importantly  justification,  and c r i t i c a l  t o the v a l i d i t y  i n a t l e a s t two i n t e r v i e w s ,  227  several  hours  this  Scoon s t a t e d t h a t he  asked f o r o u t s i d e h e l p on Sunday n i g h t , October 23 . words, t h e request  of  In other  came two n i g h t s a f t e r t h e OECS d e c i s i o n and  a f t e r Reagan's  provisional decision  t o proceed  with m i l i t a r y a c t i o n .  The d e c i s i o n t o invade was made p r i o r t o  the  being  request  request  and, t h a t  t h e case,  t h e Governor General's  (even i f t h e r e was a v a l i d request) i s i r r e l e v a n t .  Another  argument  which has been  implicitly  presented i n  support o f t h e Governor General's a c t i o n s i s t h a t t h e l e g i t i m a t e government o f Grenada acted  i n i t s own s e l f - d e f e n c e ,  OECS and t h e US acted i n t h e i r r i g h t o f c o l l e c t i v e  and t h e  self-defence.  The b a s i s o f t h i s argument i s t h e assumption t h a t t h e coup t h a t brought t h e RMC t o power was i n s t i g a t e d and supported by Cuba. If  there  is a civil  conflict  and t h e r e b e l s  are r e c e i v i n g  f o r e i g n a i d , then t h e government may ask f o r a s s i s t a n c e .  Since  the RMC was r e c e i v i n g Cuban a i d , i t was p e r f e c t l y l e g a l f o r t h e Governor General t o request There  has been  outside  a considerable  Cuba's involvement i n Grenada. financial  assistance. amount  of information  Cuba, a f t e r a l l ,  on  was p r o v i d i n g  and t e c h n i c a l a i d t o Grenada;  the a i r p o r t a t Point  S a l i n e s was being b u i l t mainly by Cubans;  and t h e r e s i s t a n c e t o  US f o r c e s was l e d by Cuban m i l i t a r y p e r s o n n e l . however, 2 2 7  Secretary  Shultz  admitted  that  Despite  this,  t h e US had no d i r e c t  " S p e c i a l Report", supra note 2 0 5 , a t 346.  109 information coup,  on whether o r not t h e Cubans were i n v o l v e d  although  emphasized "feeling" later  that  2 2 8  .  that  that  the " f e e l i n g " the  that  decision  they  was  not  were.  He  also  based  on  this  That being t h e case, t h e argument cannot be made the rebels  t h e Governor  Also,  US  was  i n the  the  General  Cubans  revolution.  were r e c e i v i n g f o r e i g n  were  was  acting  present  in  a s s i s t a n c e , and  i n Grenada's Grenada  prior  defence. t o the  The Cuban involvement t h a t t h e US was r e f e r r i n g t o  was a l l i n i t i a t e d by Prime M i n i s t e r Bishop h i m s e l f .  I t was not  as i f t h e Cubans were c o v e r t l y s u p p o r t i n g g u e r r i l l a s s e e k i n g t o overthrow t h e government. The Grenadan i n c u r s i o n , t h e r e f o r e , i s s i g n i f i c a n t f o r what d i d not occur. Governor  There was no p r i o r o f f i c i a l  General  on b e h a l f  i n v i t a t i o n by t h e  o f t h e Grenadan Government t o any  party f o r external intervention.  There was no r e c o u r s e taken by  e i t h e r t h e OECS members o r t h e US t o b r i n g t h e matter b e f o r e t h e OAS o r t h e UN f o r p e a c e f u l s e t t l e m e n t . the  initiation  state  attempt  organization because  of humanitarian  One o f t h e c r i t e r i a f o r  intervention  t o achieve a s o l u t i o n through before r e s o r t i n g t o f o r c i b l e  t h e US  authorities  believed  that  would prove f u t i l e i t was no reason t o f a i l For  t h e US,  swift  and d e c i s i v e  mandated  71.  "Secretary  self-help.  Simply  diplomatic  efforts  t o contact  t h e UN.  use of m i l i t a r y  S h u l t z s News Conference", 1  a  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  precedent over f o l l o w i n g t h e course of d i p l o m a t i c  228  that  force  took  channels.  supra note 133, at.  110  B.  NICARAGUAI  The  circumstances of the US  different obvious,  from the  There was point.  Grenada  United  in  States  i n t e r v e n t i o n i n Nicaragua were  several did  ways.  not  First,  overtly  and  invade  most  Nicaragua.  not a d i r e c t US m i l i t a r y presence i n Nicaragua a t Rather, the war  was  fought from Washington.  A  any  second  d i f f e r e n c e i s t h a t , i n t h i s case, the US presented only one main legal  justification  argument  that  was  for put  its  forth  actions: by  the  self-defence.  US  was  that  The  i t s action  a g a i n s t Nicaragua were l e g a l l y j u s t i f i e d under A r t i c l e 51 of the United  Nations  Charter  as  individual self-defence.  actions  of  collective  and/or  Nicaragua had a l l e g e d l y been s u p p l y i n g  g u e r r i l l a groups attempting t o overthrow the governments of E l Salvador and purpose  of  Honduras s i n c e i t s actions  was  1979. to  The  US  interdict  maintained t h a t traffic  i n arms  the and  s u p p l i e s proceeding from Nicaragua t o r e b e l s i n the neighbouring countries. The US claimed region  and  democratic Salvador and the  US,  as  collective  was  t h a t Nicaragua was  trying  to  bring  governments  of  its  Honduras had an  ally  and  self-defence.  the a  down  the  newly  neighbouring  inherent  friend, The  e x p o r t i n g v i o l e n c e t o the  had  countries.  r i g h t to the  government  established  self-defence;  right of  El  to  act  Nicaragua  in was,  furthermore, a source of t h r e a t t o the s e c u r i t y of the US,  which  suggested t h a t US a c t i o n s c o u l d a l s o be j u s t i f i e d by p r i n c i p l e s of  individual  conference they  on  "have  freedom  self-defence. February  an  and  lovers  t o Nicaragua  and  a friend —  the of  of  freedom  229  help  The  stated  Americans  be  ,.." .  g u i l t y of, t h e r e f o r e , was  Reagan  1985,  o b l i g a t i o n to  fighters  Afghanistan  21,  As  where and  in  a  news  believed  that  [they]  can  democracy,  to  from  o n l y a c t t h a t the US  t r y i n g t o help E l S a l v a d o r —  i n defending i t s e l f a g a i n s t  "the  an  was ally  communists".  I f s e l f - d e f e n c e i s d e f i n e d with r e s p e c t t o D a n i e l Webster's formulation  i n the  self-defence instant,  case,  for  applied  to  t h r e a t by  then  must show a " n e c e s s i t y  overwhelming, and  moment  matter)  Caroline  deliberation" the  2 3 0  l e a v i n g no .  Nicaraguan  Nicaragua t o the which  required  an  The case US  self-defence choice  Caroline because  (or any instant  a c t i v i t i e s undertaken by the CIA, over a long p e r i o d of time.  of  a government a l l e g i n g  of means, and formula  there  other  [that i s ]  was  cannot never  no be any  country, f o r t h a t  reflexive  action.  The  f o r i n s t a n c e , were a l l planned  The US government, i n a d d i t i o n ,  had  more than f o u r years t o d e l i b e r a t e about the c h o i c e of means f o r i t s Nicaraguan p o l i c y . p a r t i e s had  There were numerous o c c a s i o n s  the chance t o commence n e g o t i a t i o n s , but the US  never r e a l l y  was  i n t e r e s t e d i n t h i s approach.  "News Conference of February 21" B u l l . 10 a t 11. 229  230 See  where the  Schachter, supra note 31,  ( A p r i l 1985)  at 163 5.  85 Dep't St.  112 It  was c l e a r  from  t h e beginning  that  t h e purpose  o f US  a c t i o n s a g a i n s t Nicaragua had been t o overthrow t h e S a n d i n i s t a government,  o r a t t h e very  change  i t s structure.  regard  by US o f f i c i a l s  news  conference  explicitly uncle", "present  stated  the goal  on that  least,  Public  to force  admissions  were  i n c l u d i n g the President February until  o f US p o l i c y  21,  1985,  had a l l e g e d  i n this  himself.  In a Reagan  government  would be t h a t 231  made  President  the Sandinista  s t r u c t u r e " of t h a t Government .  what Nicaragua  i t t o completely  "says  o f removing t h e  T h i s , o f course, was  t o be t h e US g o a l  from  t h e very  beginning. In  a l l fairness,  i t should  be p o i n t e d  out t h a t  statements were made by Reagan which claimed  that the goal of  the US was not t o overthrow t h e S a n d i n i s t a government. 27,  1983, b e f o r e  i n 1983  On A p r i l  a j o i n t s e s s i o n of Congress, P r e s i d e n t  Reagan  s a i d the following: . .. l e t us be c l e a r as t o t h e American a t t i t u d e toward the Government of Nicaragua. We do not seek its overthrow. Our i n t e r e s t i s t o ensure t h a t i t does not i n f e c t i t s neighbours through the export o f s u b v e r s i o n and violence. Our purpose, in conformity with American and international law, i s t o prevent t h e flow of arms t o E l Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and Costa Rica . 232  These statements, 1983  however, were worth very  because i n  t h e CIA's c o v e r t war a g a i n s t Nicaragua was w e l l under way.  P r e s i d e n t ' s News Conference, a t A10, c o l s . 1,3.  231  1985,  little  Reprinted emphasis added. 232  i n Friedlander,  New  York  supra  note  Times.  Feb. 22,  180, a t 273-4;  113 As  i t was  supplying  mentioned,  US  arms t o neighbouring  "exporting r e v o l u t i o n " . the o t h e r a f f e c t e d defence.  the  c o u n t r i e s and  c o u n t r i e s had  the  The main f a c t u a l problem  in  1986,  the  ICJ  Nicaragua  was,  in effect,  found  inherent r i g h t  of  t o the e a r l y  true  that  months of 1981 . 234  self-  233  .  In the Nicar  support  for  After  the e a r l y  v.  the  235  The  Court added t h a t ,  i f evidence r e a l l y  US  armed a fact  months of  1981, however, evidence of m i l i t a r y a i d from Nicaragua was weak .  and  with t h i s argument i s t h a t  o p p o s i t i o n i n E l Salvador from Nicaraguan t e r r i t o r y was up  was  Under such circumstances, the US  the a l l e g a t i o n s were not e n t i r e l y case  claimed t h a t  existed,  very the  US c o u l d be expected t o have taken advantage of i t i n o r d e r t o f o r e s t a l l or d i s r u p t the t r a f f i c  2 3 6  .  The Court concluded t h a t :  I t i s d i f f i c u l t t o accept t h a t i t [the US] should have c o n t i n u e d t o c a r r y out m i l i t a r y and paramilitary a c t i v i t i e s a g a i n s t Nicaragua i f t h e i r o n l y purpose was, as a l l e g e d , t o s e r v e as a r i p o s t e i n the e x e r c i s e of the r i g h t of c o l l e c t i v e s e l f - d e f e n c e " . 237  I t i s hard t o imagine t h a t Nicaragua was  a b l e t o t r a n s p o r t arms  and equipment without a l e r t i n g the CIA of such There  are s e v e r a l other i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s  activity. i n the US  policy  Carlos Tunnermann Bernheim, "United States Armed I n t e r v e n t i o n i n Nicaragua and A r t i c l e 2(4) of the U n i t e d Nations C h a r t e r " ( F a l l 1985) 11 Yale J . I n t ' l L. 104 a t 131. 233  Nicar. v. U.S., M e r i t s , Judgment of June 27 1986, Reports 1986, p. 1 a t 82. 234  2 3 5  I b i d , a t 84.  2 3 6  Ibid.  2 3 7  Ibid.  I.C.J.  114 which  are  worthy  of  mention.  First,  i n the  documents accompanying the p l a n i n i t i a l l y November 1981,  very  first  approved by Reagan i n  the f o l l o w i n g statement of purpose was  "[To b ] u i l d popular  support  NSC  included:  i n C e n t r a l America and Nicaragua f o r  an o p p o s i t i o n f r o n t t h a t would be n a t i o n a l i s t i c , anti-Cuban anti-Somoza  . ,." .  This  238  purpose  is  in  no  way  and  related  to  i n t e r d i c t i n g the flow of arms. Most  of  the  actions  and  plans  of  the  i r r e l e v a n t t o the flow of arms from Nicaragua. CIA  provided  military  and  financial  support  whose f o r c e s were based i n Costa R i c a — weapons r o u t e s of  the  and  CIA  in Guerrilla had  purposes  239  .  to  Eden  the  Moreover, the  that  the  also  Pastora,  f a r from any p o t e n t i a l overthrow  "Psychological  Warfare" manual which was other  were  For example, the  whose s t a t e d o b j e c t i v e was  Nicaraguan government  Operation the  —  CIA  published  interdiction  of  by  weapons  traffic. Even  i f the  were t r u e , the US  US  a l l e g a t i o n s of Nicaraguan  response was  on a completely  and the requirement of p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y was  arms  shipments  different  severely v i o l a t e d  N i c h o l a s Rostow, S p e c i a l A s s i s t a n t to the L e g a l A d v i s e r , S t a t e s Department of State, has  Wash inert on Post. May  239  Tunnermann Bernheim, supra note 233,  240  See supra note  8,  t r i e d t o argue the  238  1983,  at A l l ,  2 4 0  .  United  contrary  241  .  c o l . 3. at  132.  33.  N i c h o l a s Rostow, "Nicaragua and the Law of R e v i s i t e d " (Spring 1986) 11 Yale J . I n t ' l L. 437. 241  scale  Self-Defense  115 According  t o him,  a d e f e n s i v e use of f o r c e ought t o r e f l e c t  only  what i s necessary t o end the v i o l a t i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law  that  gave r i s e t o the the  r i g h t of s e l f - d e f e n c e .  government of E l Salvador  Thus, US  support f o r  i s a p r o p o r t i o n a l use  of  designed t o d i s c o u r a g e the S a n d i n i s t a s from s u p p o r t i n g movements.  t o g i v e a s s i s t a n c e t o one  i f the o p p o s i t e  by  supplies  242  hand, Mr.  claiming  constituted  a  by .  side i n a c i v i l  that  Rostow takes h i s argument one mining  proportional aiming  to  What he  Nicaragua's  response  deprive  fails  to  i t of accept  A blockade i s an a c t of war right  mercenary  of  army  Nicaragua's country was  economic  243  .  Nicaragua's  the  sources  of  1984 arms these  mining  Nicaragua of  The  regularly and  in  to  the  step  launched  civilian  not a p r o p o r t i o n a t e  US  targets  did  supplies.  t h a t cannot be j u s t i f i e d by the  self-defence which  harbour  i s that  much more damage than merely d e p r i v i n g  claimed  strife  side i s receiving foreign aid.  On the other  shipments  guerrilla  Rostow's argument i s understood t o the p o i n t t h a t i t  i s acceptable  further  force,  US'  creation  of  attacks  against  deep  within  the  the  response, e i t h e r .  Even i f US i n t e r v e n t i o n i n Nicaragua can be j u s t i f i e d based on the legal  f a c t s , US  a c t i o n i n the World Court r a i s e s a number of  implications.  announcement  on  First,  April  withdrawing from the  8,  as 1984  was that  jurisdiction  2 4 2  I b i d , at 4 54.  243  von Glahn, supra note 10,  previously the  of the  US  mentioned, was  ICJ was  at 653-57.  the  immediately ineffective.  116 By so doing, the Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n showed i t s d i s r e g a r d f o r the r u l e s of the Court, and t r i e d t o escape the o b l i g a t i o n t h a t it  had  to  the  other  Clause of the Court. Court  held  override  that  the  s t a t e s which  had  accepted  Optional  In i t s judgment of November 26,  the  US  notification  obligation  of  the  of  United  1984,  withdrawal  States  compulsory j u r i s d i c t i o n of the Court v i s - a - v i s Second, and  the  to  the  "cannot  submit  Nicaragua"  to  244  more i m p o r t a n t l y , the ICJ entered an i n t e r i m  judgment a g a i n s t the US on May an i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n j u n c t i o n .  10,  1984  which had the e f f e c t of  The CIA, nonetheless, continued t o  support the c o n t r a s under the a u t h o r i z a t i o n of the US government and P r e s i d e n t Reagan.  On t h i s alone, the US government was  v i o l a t i o n of the Court's decree. a  policy  and  course  of  The US government p e r s i s t e d i n  action  i n t e r n a t i o n a l law as determined  in  in  wilful  violation  of  by the World Court.  A f t e r the Court made t h i s i n i t i a l d e c i s i o n , the US a t t a c k e d the  Court  on  another  level  j u r i s d i c t i o n of the Court. emphasis  on  the  wording  and  The  of  began  arguing  against  the  government p l a c e d c o n s i d e r a b l e  Article  51  of  the  United  Nations  C h a r t e r and claimed an " i n h e r e n t " r i g h t of s e l f - d e f e n c e .  The  US  s t a t e d t h a t , by h e a r i n g the case on i t s m e r i t s , the Court would be t a k i n g a c t i o n "under the C h a r t e r " . on  the  lawfulness  of the  s e l f - d e f e n c e c l a i m s , the  p r o t e c t e d by A r t i c l e 51 would be  Nicar. a t 54.  244  191,  v. U.S.,  In t u r n , by  pronouncing very  right  impaired.  J u r i s d i c t i o n and A d m i s s i b i l i t y , supra note.  117 I t was f u r t h e r argued  t h a t a d e c i s i o n by t h e Court would  v i o l a t e A r t i c l e 51 s i n c e t h a t p r o v i s i o n p r o v i d e s a r o l e i n such matters o n l y t o the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l .  The US c l a i m e d t h a t t h e  S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l ' s competence was t o t a l any  judicial  impairment The  examination  and e x c l u s i v e so t h a t  of a self-defence  of the self-defence r i g h t  2 4 5  c l a i m would be an  .  Court decided on November 26, 1984, t h a t  jurisdiction Nicaragua . 246  to  entertain  the  case  brought  i t d i d have to  The US Department o f S t a t e immediately  i t  by  released  a statement which s a i d : The Court's d e c i s i o n o f November 26, 1984 ... i s c o n t r a r y t o law and f a c t . With g r e a t r e l u c t a n c e , t h e US has decided not t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n further proceedings i n t h i s c a s e . 247  To  that  day, t h e Department  withdrawing  o f S t a t e had i s s u e d  from the ICJ's compulsory  a  statement  j u r i s d i c t i o n , and another  statement c l a i m i n g t h a t t h e Court d i d not have j u r i s d i c t i o n t o hear the case on i t s m e r i t s .  S i n c e n e i t h e r o f these s t r a t e g i e s  prevented t h e Court from making a d e c i s i o n r e g a r d i n g the case, the US r e f u s e d t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n the proceedings. A c c o r d i n g t o Franck,  t h e US statement  suggested t h a t t h e  I s a a k Dore, "The U n i t e d S t a t e s , S e l f - D e f e n s e and t h e U.N. Charter: A Comment on P r i n c i p l e and Expediency i n L e g a l Reasoning" ( F a l l 1987) 24 Stan. J . I n t ' l L. 1 a t 16. 245  Nicar 191, a t 54. 246  v. US, J u r i s d i c t i o n and A d m i s s i b i l i t y ,  supra  note  "US Withdrawal from t h e Proceedings I n i t i a t e d by Nicaragua i n t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l Court of J u s t i c e " , statement by the U.S. Dep't o f S t a t e , undated, a t 1 (mimeo) . Quoted i n Thomas M. Franck, " I c y Day a t the I.C.J." ( A p r i l 1985) 79 Am. J . I n t ' l L. 379. 247  118 decision  to  conclusions.  withdraw ..from  the  proceedings  was  based  on  two  F i r s t , the US government b e l i e v e d t h a t the Court's  d e c i s i o n s t o date were so b l a t a n t l y b i a s e d as t o f o r e c l o s e the possibility asserted  of  a  fair  248  .  The  government  t h a t the d e c i s i o n of November 26 was  matter of law" and was the  hearing  evidence  and  statement  "erroneous  based "on a misreading and d i s t o r t i o n of  precedent" .  The  249  the supposedly p o l i t i c i z e d ,  US  was  dissatisfied  basic  second  c o n c l u s i o n was  rethinking  multilateral  of  with  anti-Western b i a s of the Court, as  r e v e a l e d by the p r e l i m i n a r y d e c i s i o n s i n the Nicaraguan The  as a  t h a t the US had t o undertake  i t s r e l a t i o n s with  institutions.  case.  The  Reagan  the  Court  and  a  other  Administration  was  convinced t h a t the US c o u l d a c t more s w i f t l y and d e c i s i v e l y i n matters  of  subordinated  national to  a  interest  system  that  if  its  i t could  interests not  were  control  2 5 0  .  not The  d e c i s i o n not t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n the proceedings r e f l e c t e d , more than  anything  else,  Administration.  This  despite  i t s so-called  the was,  determination after  anti-Western  a l l , the  of  the  same  tendencies  Court  There was  that  overwhelmingly  endorsed the US complaint a g a i n s t Iran d u r i n g the hostage of 1980.  Reagan  crisis  no l o g i c a l reason f o r the US t o c l a i m t h a t  the Court c o u l d not make a f a i r d e c i s i o n . The US d e c i s i o n t o withdraw from the proceedings, arguably, 2 4 8  Ibid.  2 4 9  Ibid.  2 5 0  Ibid.  119 was  a mistaken  undercut  strategy.  i t s own  legal  For, by doing so, the US  arguments.  In a way,  the US  ab  initio  admitted  being g u i l t y , even b e f o r e the Court made i t s d e c i s i o n i n The I C J then h e l d t h a t the US was,  1986.  i n f a c t , engaged i n an armed  a t t a c k a g a i n s t Nicaragua through the arming and t r a i n i n g o f the anti-Sandinista declared  the  rebels  US  standards  of  Nicaragua  was  251  guilty  .  The of  international an  judgment of t h e Court p u b l i c l y  acting law.  example of the US  in violation The  covert  wilfully  of was  norms  and  against  disregarding  the  r i g h t s of another s t a t e and i n t e r v e n i n g i n the i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s of t h a t s t a t e .  Nicar  v. US, M e r i t s , supra note 234,  a t 96-98.  120  VII. CONCLUSION  The  Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , as  cases d i s c u s s e d above, was  can  not t r u l y  and p r i n c i p l e s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law.  be  seen  concerned  from  the  two  w i t h the norms  In both s i t u a t i o n s , the US  was determined t o p r e s e r v e US s e c u r i t y by s t o p p i n g the spread of communism i n the Western Hemisphere.  T h i s f e a r of "the domino  e f f e c t " was  a major f a c t o r i n US decision-making.  of  and  Grenada  States  intervention —  1  b e f o r e 1983, a  new  was  —  even  before  the  actual  United  seen from t h i s p o i n t of view.  Well  f o r example, a d i s p u t e arose over the c h a r a c t e r of  international  Grenada. this  Nicaragua  Every a c t i o n  airport  being  In a speech i n March 1983,  built  at  Point Salines  in  Reagan made a r e f e r e n c e t o  airport: Grenada i s b u i l d i n g a new naval base, a new a i r base, s t o r a g e bases and b a r r a c k s f o r t r o o p s , and t r a i n i n g grounds and, of course, one can b e l i e v e t h a t they are a l l t h e r e t o export nutmeg . 252  The  same  Nicaragua. April  27,  attitude  was  clearly  present  i n US  relations  with  In an address b e f o r e a j o i n t s e s s i o n of Congress 1983,  "even worse than  Reagan  said  that  i t s predecessor,  Ambursley, supra note 109,  the  S a n d i n i s t a government,  ... i s h e l p i n g Cuba and  a t 49.  on  the  121 S o v i e t s t o d e s t a b i l i z e our hemisphere" to  253  .  The US was  not g o i n g  j u s t w i t n e s s the d e s t a b i l i z a t i o n of an e n t i r e r e g i o n . A s u c c e s s f u l o p e r a t i o n i n Grenada, furthermore, would have  r e s t o r e d s e l f - r e s p e c t f o r the U n i t e d S t a t e s as f a r as the p u b l i c was concerned. almost  every  combat,  S i n c e the t r a u m a t i c withdrawal from Vietnam, o c c a s i o n where  things  had  i n c i d e n t i n 1975,  gone  US  forces  had  been  u n b e l i e v a b l y wrong.  deployed The  on in  Mayaguez  and the rescue attempt t o rescue the hostages  i n Tehran i n 1980 a r e o n l y two examples from a l i s t o f f a i l u r e s . The r e a l r a t i o n a l e behind the d e c i s i o n t o invade Grenada, t h e r e f o r e , was which met  t o m a i n t a i n US s e c u r i t y by e s t a b l i s h i n g a regime  w i t h the Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s a p p r o v a l .  government  of  Grenada  was  e i t h e r Havana or Moscow. October 27, 1983,  not  supposed  to  get  too  The  new  close  to  In a t e l e v i s e d speech on Grenada, on  Reagan s a i d :  Grenada we were t o l d was a f r i e n d l y i s l a n d p a r a d i s e f o r t o u r i s m . W e l l , i t wasn't. I t was a Soviet-Cuban colony being r e a d i e d as a major m i l i t a r y b a s t i o n t o export t e r r o r and undermine democracy. We got t h e r e j u s t i n time . 254  There  i s no  contras  was  doubt,  moreover,  directed  toward  that  American  creating  an  support  incentive  of  the  for  the  Nicaraguan j u n t a t o modify i t s behaviour and t o begin a d i a l o g u e of  accommodation  with  the  US.  By  fall  1983,  the  junta  was  g i v i n g i n d i c a t i o n s of a w i l l i n g n e s s t o moderate i t s d i f f e r e n c e s  Ronald Reagan, " C e n t r a l America: Defending I n t e r e s t s " (June 1983) 83 Dep't S t . B u l l . 1 a t 3. 253  254  Lewis and Mathews, supra note 97, a t 28.  Our  Vital  122 w i t h the Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n . so caught up i n i t s war  But, by t h a t time, the US  a g a i n s t Nicaragua t h a t i t saw  was  each m i l d  c o n c e s s i o n as an o p p o r t u n i t y t o exact more s t r i n g e n t measures.  Thus,  i t i s clear  Grenadan and strategy.  t h a t the decision-makers,  Nicaraguan  cases,  i n both  were f o l l o w i n g the  the  same b a s i c  They had a chance t o , a t l e a s t , t r y t o overthrow an  a d v e r s a r i a l regime.  Both s i t u a t i o n s occurred a t almost the same  time,  no  so  policy. after  t h e r e was As a matter  the  was  foreign  of f a c t , the l e g a l arguments t h a t emerged similar  i n nature.  arguing t h a t i t had  c o u n t r i e s , and The  that  purpose of the  taken  i t did  action  not  have  i n order any  i n v a s i o n of Grenada,  the  supposedly, states.  should be mentioned, once again, t h a t i n n e i t h e r case  argument  was  interventionist. were  to  selfish  t o e s t a b l i s h the s e c u r i t y of i t s s m a l l neighbouring It  Heavy  In both cases, the US t r i e d t o a l l e v i a t e some of  the p r e s s u r e by  motives.  i n US  p l a c e d on the i n d i v i d u a l and c o l l e c t i v e r i g h t s of  self-defence.  other  f o r a major change  i n t e r v e n t i o n s were very  emphasis was  help  time  receiving  countries.  made In other  military  that  US  policies  words, both and  I t has been suggested  financial  were  counter-  and  Nicaragua  Grenada aid  from  Communist  i n the p r e v i o u s s e c t i o n s t h a t ,  had a c o u n t e r - i n t e r v e n t i o n argument been made, i t probably would not have been a b l e t o withstand c l o s e examination.  However, i t  i s noteworthy t h a t the Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n d i d not even t r y t o present such a case.  What i s c l e a r from these two cases i s t h a t t h e r e has been a steady e r o s i o n o f t h e l e g a l norms governing t h e use o f f o r c e in  t h e r e l a t i o n s o f t h e United  States  with  other  countries.  That the US has the m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l power t o circumvent into  international  legal  obligations  without  fear  i n t e r n a t i o n a l s a n c t i o n i s somewhat beside t h e p o i n t . concern  i s that,  national  leaders  following will  perhaps  norms than they once d i d . t h a t t h e US was widely Nicaragua.  US  behaviour feel  as  a  I t should be mentioned,  criticized  regarding  The main  model,  less constrained  of  other  by t h e s e  nonetheless,  i t s p o l i c i e s toward  T h i s may show t h a t some s t a t e s found the a c t i o n s o f  the US unacceptable and c o n t r a r y t o the norms o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l law.  There i s , as a r e s u l t , very  l i t t l e r e s p e c t f o r t h e US as  a promoter o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. In  terms  Nations,  i t i s impossible  sovereignty, with  of t h e purposes  political  allowing  to  and  the g o a l s  reconcile  of t h e  the  United  commitment  independence, and t e r r i t o r i a l  f o r e i g n f o r c e s t o choose a country's  to  integrity government  structure.  When, f o r i n s t a n c e , US f o r c e s a r e sent i n t o Grenada  to  an  resolve  minute  that  interests  internal  the  US  i n favour  answer a q u e s t i o n  struggle  will  f o r power,  forsake  i t s own  of u n c o n d i t i o n a l  posed  by Franck,  t h e chances a r e national  policy  self-determination. perhaps t h e US  r e s p o n s i b l e f o r " k i l l i n g " A r t i c l e 2 (4 )  255  i s partly  .  The US a t t i t u d e r e g a r d i n g t h e I C J ( i n t h e Nicaraguan 255  Franck, supra note 22.  To  case,  124 in  particular)  withdrawing short  has  from  notice  had  the  serious  Court's  showed t h a t  compulsory  the  United  committed t o r e s o l v i n g d i s p u t e s are b e t t e r served US  will  otherwise.  gladly r e f e r to  emerge a winner — The  ramifications.  First,  jurisdiction  States  i s not  on  seriously  i n such a forum i f i t s i n t e r e s t s The  Court i s a t r i b u n a l t h a t  i t i s c e r t a i n beforehand t h a t  as was  the case i n v o l v i n g the US  i n d i c a t i o n t h a t the  such  ICJ d i d not  the  i t will  and  Iran.  have j u r i s d i c t i o n  to  d e c i d e the case on i t s m e r i t s was  another case of d i s r e s p e c t f o r  the  been,  Court.  Had  this  Court's f u n c t i o n s t r i v i a l cases.  argument  in  fact,  accepted,  would have been reduced to h e a r i n g  The  the  the most  r o l e of the Court i n p e a c e f u l r e s o l u t i o n of  d i s p u t e s would have d e c l i n e d even more. The  main d i f f e r e n c e between the  Nicaragua  was  Grenada, the and  by  United  the  actual  duration  two  of  cases of Grenada  and  intervention.  For  the  d e c i s i o n t o deploy f o r c e s was  November States'  2,  the  armed  had  many  o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o begin n e g o t i a t i o n s with the S a n d i n i s t a s ,  or t o  consider Nicaragua, perceived  reversing a  second  itself  to  The  its  Administration  policies.  case be  Reagan  the  end.  had  years.  on  an  hand,  for  i n Nicaragua,  come t o  days,  other  lasted  intervention  conflict  taken i n t e n  Perhaps  if,  had  been  chosen  in  under  time  constraints  instead  which to  the  act,  of US the  comparison w i t h Grenada would have been more v a l i d . Finally, cases,  i f a g e n e r a l i z a t i o n can  be  made from t h e s e  two  the c o n c l u s i o n t o be drawn i s t h a t s t a t e s tend t o a c t i n .  125 t h e i r own n a t i o n a l the  extent  national  it.  states  interests  accordingly. national  that  interest.  Hence, i n t e r n a t i o n a l law works t o  permit  are deemed  International  i t t o do paramount,  anticipated  perceived  the law may  States,  facto  suffer  i n the two  rationale  to  instances  discussed,  p o l i t i c a l and s t r a t e g i c gains through  overrode d i p l o m a t i c constraints.  When  law may serve l e s s as a r e s t r a i n t on  p o l i c y than as an ex post  For the U n i t e d  so.  considerations  explain  intervention  involving international legal  126  VIII. WORKS CITED OR REFERRED TO  BOOKS:  Adkin,  M. ,  Urgent  Fury:  Lexington Books,  The Battle  for Grenada  (U.S.A.:  1988) .  Akehurst, M i c h a e l , A Modern Introduction to International Law (London: George A l l e n and Unwin L t d . , 1987 6th e d . ) . Ambursley, F. and J . Dunkerley, Grenada: L a t i n America Bureau, 1984).  Whose Freedom?  (G.B.:  Brownlie, Ian, International Law and the Use of Force by States (U.S.A.: Clarendon Press, 1963). 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