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The diplomacy of developing states in international organizations : |b a comparison of the strategies… Ralph, Michael 1979

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THE DIPLOMACY OF DEVELOPING STATES IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: A COMPARISON OF THE STRATEGIES USED BY THE LDCs IN UNCTAD AND IN UNCLOS III by MICHAEL RALPH B.Sc. University of The West Indies, 1977 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Department of P o l i t i c a l Science) We accept t h i s thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA July 1979 (c^ Michael Ralph, 1979 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make i t freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of P o l i t i c a l Science The University of British Columbia 2075 Wesbrook Place Vancouver, Canada V 6 T 1W5 August , 1979 i l ABSTRACT This study analyses the types of strategies which characterise the diplomatic behaviour of developing states at the United Nations. The behavioural patterns of these states are observed within the two selected m u l t i l a t e r a l conference environments, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) . These i n s t i t u -tions are responsible f o r bargaining about and debating issues r e l a t i n g to many of the v i t a l problems of developing states. Thus, a f a i r l y representative view of the United Nations diplomacy of developing states can be obtained. Though the concentration of this inquiry i s on the diplomatic behaviour and methods of the selected group of states, the success or f a i l u r e of the strategies used i s beyond the scope of this study. The purpose i s not to assess the impact of the diplomatic behaviour of developing states on decision-making at the United Nations l e v e l , but rather to understand the emergence of the strategies and the factors which support or hinder t h e i r use. To understand the mechanics of the diplomacy of developing states and the i n s t i t u t i o n a l and other factors which a f f e c t them, the comparative method i s used i n the main parts of th i s study. The requirements of the comparative method makes th i s method apt for i i i examining the differences in i n s t i t u t i o n a l f a c t ors i n UNCTAD and UNCLOS III and how these a f f e c t the str a t e g i e s which are used i n both forums. The comparative method requires that things compared be s i m i l a r enough to belong to the same species but d i f f e r e n t i a t e d by other c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . Commonalities of the selected i n s t i t u -t i ons derive from the fact that they both encompass the UN conference environment i n which a p a r t i c u l a r set of actors conduct t h e i r diplomacy. They are set apart by the s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e s . i n t h e i r i n s t i t u t i o n a l structures, the issues they deal with, and the factors which a f f e c t group formation within them. The sources used for t h i s study are documentary and secondary materials. The data c o l l e c t e d from documentary sources are supple-mented with those from academic and t h e o r e t i c a l sources. In the main parts of the study the empirical data are compared with the t h e o r e t i c a l assumptions. The s i m i l a r i t i e s and diff e r e n c e s are noted, following which the r e p e t i t i v e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and strategies of developing state diplomacy are outlined. The inquiry examines changes i n the nature of the global and the i n s t i t u t i o n a l diplomatic environment which i n e v i t a b l y impinge on, and determine the types of, st r a t e g i e s and pr a c t i c e s that evolve. Other impermanent factors that a f f e c t diplomatic methods and stra t e g i e s are the nature of the actors and the extent to which t h e i r bargaining strength or lack of strength support or hinder the iv s t r a t e g i e s used. The nature of the issues likewise a f f e c t s the diplomacy of developing states. For example, i n the Law of the Sea Conference sessions when the issues being debated are rela t e d to j u r i s d i c t i o n over ocean space, countries which possess common geographical features very often share common perspectives on what norms should be established. Thus developed and l e s s developed countries (having common geographical features) frequently group together to cosponsor j o i n t proposals or j u r i s d i c t i o n a l matters. In UNCTAD countries which share common economic a t t r i b u t e s and c a p a b i l i t i e s likewise often share common perspectives on how issues a f f e c t i n g t h e i r economic well-being may be solved. In terms of shares of economic a t t r i b u t e s and c a p a b i l i t i e s , there are wide d i s p a r i t i e s between developed and l e s s developed countries. This very often, leads to c o n f l i c t i n g perspectives of remedial p o l i c i e s to be pursued. These factors combined with others underlie the tendency for countries i n the bargaining environment to p o l a r i s e according to t h e i r share of economic wealth. In t h i s l a t t e r case the predominant form of group alignment follows the pattern of developed versus less developed countries. V TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER Page I INTRODUCTION 1 Purpose and Scope of the Study .. .. .. .. 2 D e f i n i t i o n s and Abbreviations 3 II THE DIPLOMATIC ENVIRONMENT: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SOME FEATURES OF THE SELECTED INSTITUTIONS 7 The Origin and Evolution of UNCTAD .7 The O r i g i n and Evolution of UNCLOS III .. .. 17 A Comparison of Some Main Features of The Selected I n s t i t u t i o n s .. .. .• 25 III DIPLOMATIC STRATEGIES OF THE GROUP OF 77 .. .. 30 The Strategies Most C h a r a c t e r i s t i c of Group of 77 Diplomacy: A Comparison of Their Use i n the Two I n s t i t u t i o n s 30 Choice of Forums 31 Group Formation and Other Group A c t i v i t i e s .. 35 The Use of J o i n t Representation .. .. .. •. 35 Promotion of Group Cohesiveness 39 Pre-conference Preparation 39 Seizing the I n i t i a t i v e . . 43 The Use of S k i l l e d Representatives 45 Use of the S e c r e t a r i a t 47 The Use of Symbolic Speeches and Rhetoric .. 50 IV CONCLUSION 54 Summary of Some Main Factors A f f e c t i n g the Diplomacy of Less Developed States .. .. 54 BIBLIOGRAPHY 60 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION Many developing countries have attained formal l e g a l independence, but are s t i l l t r y i n g to lessen t h e i r economic and p o l i t i c a l dependence and by so doing achieve a greater measure of genuine independence. In t h i s quest for development, they are forced to deal with a growing number of i n t e r n a t i o n a l problems. These include the increasing complexities of i n t e r n a l trade, finance and other issues such as those r e l a t i n g to i n t e r n a t i o n a l maritime matters. In order to f i n d s a t i s f a c t o r y ways of resolving these problems, they seek an increased r o l e i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l decision-making. At the United Nations, developing countries have for a long time sought changes in the economic i n s t i t u t i o n s where decision-making mechanisms were not always con-ducive to t h e i r i n t e r e s t s . They were p a r t l y successful with the formation of the permanent machinery of the United Nations Conference of Trade and Development (UNCTAD) which has become l a r g e l y Third World oriented. In the area of the use of the oceans and d e l i m i t a t i o n of j u r i s -d i c t i o n over ocean space, developing countries seek to influence the formation of the emerging regime, p a r t i c u l a r l y those under discussion at the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference (UNCLOS I I I ) . Their intention i s to influence the bargaining and decision-making machinery of UNCLOS I I I , so that i t may become more representative of t h e i r p o l i c y objectives. 2 This study analyses the str a t e g i e s that developing states use i n the m u l t i l a t e r a l conferences i n UNCTAD and UNCLOS I I I . In the main parts of t h i s study these strategies are i d e n t i f i e d , the rati o n a l e underlying t h e i r use i s discussed and the factors that support or hinder t h e i r use are analysed. Purpose and Scope of the Study. More s p e c i f i c a l l y , the objectives of t h i s study are to examine and analyse the strategies used to pursue the issues normally negotiated i n the two forums. In UNCTAD, the issues are those r e l a t i n g to trade, a i d , monetary and developmental problems. In UNCLOS I I I , the issues are those r e l a t i n g to j u r i s d i c t i o n over and use of ocean space. Another re l a t e d aim i s to examine the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c features of the two i n s t i t u t i o n s , and to compare and contrast the factors within them that e i t h e r enhance or hinder the use of any s p e c i f i c s trategies by the developing states. In r e l a t i o n to the str a t e g i e s used i n UNCTAD, the time period that t h i s study encompasses i s mainly from i t s inception i n 1964 to 1976. On occasion, however, a few references have been made to more recent developments to emphasize the continuity of some s t r a t e g i e s . The period selected i n UNCLOS I I I i s mainly from 1973, when the f i r s t UNCLOS III Conference was convened, to 1976. Here again a few references are made to more recent developments for the sake of emphasis. The research i s organized around the following s p e c i f i c questions. 3 (1) Why did developing countries seek to pursue t h e i r p o l i c y objectives and i n t e r e s t s i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l organizational forums rather than through other means? (2) Why did they pursue these objectives i n some organizations rather than i n others? For example, why did they not u t i l i z e the already e x i s t i n g economic organizations rather than agitate for the formation of UNCTAD? ( 3 ) How did they pursue t h e i r objectives; what str a t e g i e s did they use? (4) How did they f o s t e r and maintain a u n i f i e d p o s i t i o n on c e r t a i n issues? The data sources include: (1) United Nations documents of -a) relevant General Assembly meetings, b) relevant Sessions of UNCTAD and c) relevant Sessions of UNCLOS I I I ; (2) addresses of some p a r t i c i p a n t s of these Sessions; ( 3 ) l i t e r a t u r e on diplomatic p r a c t i c e in general and other relevant material. The sources l i s t e d above comprise the empirical and t h e o r e t i c a l foundation of t h i s study. D e f i n i t i o n s and Abbreviations. The terms "developing countries" or less developed countries (LDCs) as used i n t h i s study pertains to 4 the newly independent l a r g e l y n o n - i n d u s t r i a l i z e d states. These are also usually referred to as underdeveloped or Third World States. These terms are used synonymously i n t h i s study. For the most part, states which are referred to by these names, are of the L a t i n American, Caribbean and Afro-Asian regions. The word 'diplomacy' also needs c l a r i f i c a t i o n . T r a d i t i o n a l and contemporary writers have used i t i n a v a r i e t y of ways. The word has been used synonymously with negotiation and foreign p o l i c y . I t i s also used to r e f e r to the ways i n which negotiations are conducted: In t h i s study 'diplomacy' i s used i n t h i s l a t t e r sense, and the process of diplomacy i s analysed i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l conference environments selected f o r t h i s study. The emphasis i s therefore on conference diplomacy. Contemporary writers such as Kaufmann and Wright have used the word diplomacy i n a s i m i l a r sense. By reference to the Oxford Engl i s h Dictionary, Kaufmann defines 'diplomacy' as the process of negotiation by which i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s are managed and the methods used to adjust these relations."'" With t h i s perspective of diplomacy, Kaufmann l a t e r defines conference diplomacy as That part of the management of r e l a t i o n s between governments and of r e l a t i o n s between governments and intergovernmental organizations that takes place i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l conferences. 2 1. Johan Kaufmann, Conference Diplomacy (Leyden: S i j t h o f f , 1968) p. 21. 2. Ib i d . 5 Quincy Wright uses the word 'diplomacy', i n very much the same way, as a process. Thus according to Wright, Diplomacy more than e i t h e r war or law, proceeds by a process of action and reaction. I n i t i a l plans, general p r i n c i p l e s and customary rules are adapted and modified u n t i l at the end those r e l i e d upon by both p a r t i c i p a n t s have been r a d i c a l l y altered.3 The 'Group of 77' i s another term that needs c l a r i f i c a t i o n I t r e f e r s to a group of developing states which usually represent t h e i r i n t e r e s t s j o i n t l y i n the two selected forums. The emergence of the Group can be traced to the autumn session of the 1963 United Nations General Assembly Meeting. At f i r s t the Group comprised the 75 countries which co-sponsored a j o i n t declaration i n 1963 requesting that the forthcoming 1964 Geneva Conference on Trade and Development deal with c e r t a i n s p e c i f i c issues. These issues included i n t e r n a t i o n a l trade, monetary issues and rela t e d problems such as the improvement of United Nations i n s t i t u t i o n a l arrangements responsible f o r these issues. At the inaugural meeting of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development the group had increased to 77. Writing about the group, Gosovic remarks that, 3. Quincy Wright, "The Role of International Law i n Contemporary Diplomacy," Diplomacy i n a Changing World, ed., by S. D. Kertesz and M. A. Fitzsimons (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1959) p. 56. 6 The Group of 77 was born as an ad hoc group of c o - s p o n s o r s . but soon evolved into a permanent instrument to systematically a r t i c u l a t e the demands of the developing countries A A f t e r UNCTAD I, this c o a l i t i o n of developing states retained the name Group of 77. The abbreviations UNCTAD and UNCLOS III are used respectively to r e f e r to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. The abbreviation UN i s used henceforth i n t h i s study to r e f e r to the United Nations. Other acronyms used to represent the names of UN agencies include IMF, for the International Monetary Fund, IBRD, f o r the International Bank f o r Reconstruction and Development and ECOSOC, for the Economic and S o c i a l Council. In other cases where acronyms are used, the f u l l term or name i s written when f i r s t mentioned followed by the accepted acronym i n parentheses. Thereafter, only the acronym i s used. 4. Branislav Gosovic, UNCTAD: C o n f l i c t and Compromise (Leiden: S i j t h o f f , 1972) p. 272. 7 CHAPTER II THE DIPLOMATIC ENVIRONMENT - A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SOME FEATURES OF THE SELECTED INSTITUTIONS The O r i g i n and Evolution of UNCTAD There are a number of factors which led to the establishment of UNCTAD i n 1964. Two of the most fundamental were the process of decolonization, which led to a rapid growth in themembership of the UN, and the inadequacies of the UN agencies e x i s t i n g at that time. In the l a t e f i f t i e s and early s i x t i e s there was a steady increase of new members i n the UN as former c o l o n i a l t e r r i t o r i e s achieved t h e i r independence. This development led to the formation of new and dominant ma j o r i t i e s on questions such as the economic and p o l i t i c a l underdevelopment of the new states. The problems of underdevelopment included d e c l i n i n g p r i c e s f or primary commodities, high cost of manufactured goods, and inadequate bargaining s k i l l s and expertise of LDCs to negotiate su c c e s s f u l l y with more developed countries. T r a d i t i o n a l l y , negotiation with developed countries concerning these issues was pursued mainly through b i l a t e r a l channels, and at times through issue s p e c i f i c i n t e r e s t groups of states. Developing countries, however, found that these arrangements did not r e s u l t i n many solutions 8 that were s a t i s f a c t o r y to them. They argued that though the developed countries often expressed the willingness to extend some f i n a n c i a l assistance to them, i n most instances b i l a t e r a l projects involved too many stringent conditions. Other problems that faced them derived from the trading arrange-ments they had with developed countries. Through these arrangements, developed countries offered access to p r e f e r e n t i a l markets and lower t a r i f f s to primary commodity producers. However, the primary commodity producers complained that these arrangements ensured continuous supplies to developed countries at the lowest possible prices and provided no l a s t i n g benefits to them. They argued that these problems were worsened by a sharp decline i n the "terms of trade",- f o r example. They supported the view that the prices of primary commodities were declining sharply, while the prices of imported manufactured goods were consistently increasing. These factors together l e d to an increasing tendency among developing countries to pursue solutions to t h e i r problems at various other l e v e l s of decision-making. Besides the formation of regional and other s p e c i f i c issue groups, developing countries sought solutions at the m u l t i l a t e r a l decision-making forums of the UN. Early UN m u l t i l a t e r a l projects did not, however, receive the necessary support from a l l members of the organization. For example, the f i r s t major UN aid project f o r developing countries, the Special Fund f o r Economic Development (SUNFED), had to be abandoned because 9 of a lack of support from the more developed countries."' Despite early UN f a i l u r e s such as these, the developing countries s t i l l looked to the i n s t i t u t i o n f o r a s o l u t i o n to t h e i r problems. This commitment to the i n s t i t u t i o n derived from the f a i l u r e of b i l a t e r a l , regional and other arrangments, as well as from the f a c t that developing states f e l t that the i n s t i t u t i o n could help them i n pursuing t h e i r quest for economic independence, j u s t as i t had helped them i n gaining c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and l e g a l independence. As the Third World countries agitated for the reform of i n t e r -national trading and other economic arrangements, the need f o r change i n the UN agencies responsible for economic matters became increasingly apparent. The UN system had to become more oriented to the problems of developing countries. Agencies such as IBRD, the IMF, ECOSOC and otherswere seen as the forums i n which these problems could be tackled. However, these i n s t i t u t i o n s became g increasingly unacceptable to developing countries. These i n s t i t u t i o n s , from the point of view of developing countries, were i n the hands of the t i t a n s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l finance and trade. They were viewed therefore as mere extensions of "Wall Street!' diplomacy. x Attempts on the part of the developing states to i n i t i a t e major reforms 5. John G. Hadwen and J . Kaufmann, How United Nations Decisions Are  Made (Leyden: S i j t h o f f , 1960) pp. 85-111. 6, See Gosovic, UNCTAD: C o n f l i c t and Compromise, pp. 3-4. 10 i n these i n s t i t u t i o n s seemed f u t i l e . For example, there was a major controversy over the r o l e of the General Agreement on T a r i f f s and Trade (GATT). The developing countries argued that the system of i n t e r n a t i o n a l trade as i t had become i n s t i t u t e d i n GATT, was biased i n favour of the more developed countries. They considered i t unfair that the Agreement should be based on r e c i p r o c a l t a r i f f s between a l l members. They found t h i s quid pro quo arrangement unacceptable because i t vested a greater amount of power i n the hands of the big trading nations. As far as developing countries were concerned, GATT produced too many inj u r i o u s or i n e f f e c t i v e r e s u l t s . They therefore increased t h e i r a g i t a t i o n f o r i n s t i t u t i o n a l reform. The arguments of developing countries f or a new i n s t i t u t i o n i n the f i e l d of trade and development, and f o r i n s t i t u t i o n a l changes elsewhere were opposed by the developed countries. The l a t t e r argued that the e x i s t i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s l i k e GATT were quite capable of dealing with the problems of finance, trade and development. While this debate progressed, the global economic system was changing and new problems were constantly being added to already e x i s t i n g ones. Some new problems included the adverse e f f e c t s on the Third World states of the growth of technology i n the more developed countries. For example, a major problem f o r developing countries was the competition which t h e i r natural products faced from synthetics and substitutes. These problems were further exacerbated by s t o c k p i l i n g and surplus disposal by the major i n d u s t r i a l countries. In addition, the primary commodity exporting countries faced regional 11 and i n t e r n a l problems. There was a lack of coordination of t h e i r production and marketing p o l i c i e s . And worse yet, many of these countries lacked the long-range s t r u c t u r a l requirements for the d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n of production, as a means of avoiding the dependence on the export of primary commodities. The a g i t a t i o n by Third World countries for i n s t i t u t i o n a l change was reinforced by the r i s e of the non-aligned movement. The Belgrade Conference of 1961 and other follow-up conferences helped developing countries to be more aware of world economic trends and to i d e n t i f y broad common in t e r e s t s i n areas such as trade, finance and development. At the end of the sixteenth session of the UN General Assembly i n 1963, the developing countries introduced two d r a f t resolutions c a l l i n g f o r action i n the f i e l d of i n t e r n a t i o n a l trade and s t r e s s i n g the need f o r new i n t e r n a t i o n a l meetings and conferences i n order to seek solutions. These proposals were supported i n 1963 by the non-aligned conference of developing countries held i n Cairo. The Cairo Declara-t i o n recommended that developing countries protect t h e i r common i n -terests within GATT as well as cooperate to strengthen the economic and s o c i a l a c t i v i t i e s of the UN. The p a r t i c i p a n t s came out strongly i n favour of holding an i n t e r n a t i o n a l economic conference under the aegis of the UN, preferably i n 1963, to discuss a l l " v i t a l questions" r e l a t i n g to i n t e r n a t i o n a l trade, primary commodity trade and economic r e l a t i o n s between developed and developing countries. These e f f o r t s 12 eventually l e d to the dec i s i o n by the UN to convene the UN Conference on Trade and Development i n early 1964. At th i s f i r s t UNCTAD conference the machinery and i n s t i t u t i o n a l arrangements for a permanent organization complete with s e c r e t a r i a t were devised. The debate between the proponents (the developing countries) and the opponents (the developed countries) was long, tedious and complex, i n v o l v i n g many compromises and setbacks. The developing countries managed to succeed i n getting UNCTAD established, only by holding a common p o s i t i o n and getting a majority d r a f t r e s o l u t i o n passed for the creation of th i s new i n s t i t u t i o n . The new i n s t i t u t i o n represented a p a r t i a l success of Third World group unity and provided an i n s t i t u t i o n a l forum i n which new strategies associated with group representation could be t r i e d and tested. At UNCTAD I i n 1964, i t was unanimously agreed that UNCTAD be established as an organ of the UN General Assembly. The permanent machinery of UNCTAD established s h o r t l y afterwards, included two main d e l i b e r a t i v e organs and two main administrative o f f i c e s . The main d e l i b e r a t i v e organs are the t r i e n n i a l conferences and the Trade and Development Board. The main administrative o f f i c e s are the O f f i c e of the Secretary-General and the S e c r e t a r i a t . General Assembly r e s o l u t i o n 1995 (XIX) of December 1964, st i p u l a t e d that the conferences be convened at a venue set by the General Assembly at l e a s t every three years. The purpose of these conferences i s to review and coordinate trade p o l i c i e s , to negotiate and implement new p r i n c i p l e s and p o l i c i e s . Accordingly, a f t e r the inaugural Conference of UNCTAD I at Geneva i n 1964, UNCTAD II was convened i n New Delhi i n 1968, UNCTAD III i n Santiago i n 1972, UNCTAD IV i n Nairobi i n 1976, and recently UNCTAD V i n Manila i n 1979. UNCTAD I emphasised development through trade. The Secretary-General at that time, Raul Prebisch, presented a report to the Conference e n t i t l e d "Toward a New Trade P o l i c y f or Development". This report c a l l e d for the res t r u c t u r i n g of the e x i s t i n g rules and conventions of in t e r n a t i o n a l trade and finance, so that they may be more responsive to global needs, p a r t i c u l a r l y , to the needs of development.^ In accordance with these views, new p r i n c i p l e s f o r commodity trade were recommended. Contrary to the l i b e r a l view of economic thought which i n s i s t e d on equal treatment for exporters and importers,the p r i n c i p l e s of UNCTAD placed the accent on the fundamental i n e q u a l i t y between developed and the less developed nations. The 1964 and 1968 Geneva and New Delhi conferences l a i d the groundwork for future commodity arrange-ments to be based on s p e c i a l clauses allowing for exemption from duties and other l e v i e s . In addition, at these conferences' there were prolonged discussions on the problem of s t a b i l i z i n g world prices of a g r i c u l t u r a l commodities, so that fluctuations could stay within accepted l i m i t s . Another fundamental p r i n c i p l e of UNCTAD was to guide 7. UNCTAD, "Towards a New Trade P o l i c y for Development": Report by  the Secretary-General of UNCTAD (E/Conf. 46/3, 1964). 14 the prices of t r o p i c a l producers to "remunerative" l e v e l s compared to the prices they paid for imports. A subject of major importance at the deliberations of the second UNCTAD conference at New Delhi i n 1968 was the need for the improve-ment of the i n s t i t u t i o n a l machinery of the conference. A f t e r t h i s conference, the UNCTAD Board, the major policy-making organ of the i n s t i t u t i o n met i n September 1969 to discuss some of the suggestions made at the conference. Some of these suggestions concerned the question of i n s t i t u t i o n a l improvement. This matter was considered of great importance and discussed at length. In order to lessen the du p l i c a t i o n of functions between UNCTAD and GATT, the Secretary-General of UNCTAD was authorised to "maintain regular contact and consultation with the Director-General of GATT". I t was f e l t that this step would help the two i n s t i t u t i o n s to explore further p o s s i b i l i t i e s of j o i n t coordinated g action. A d d i t i o n a l l y the Board recommended that the General Assembly should designate UNCTAD as a " p a r t i c i p a t i n g organization" of the UN Development Programme (UNDP). The major objective of th i s d ecision was to make UNCTAD more e f f e c t i v e i n the promotion of technical aid to less developed countries. UNCTAD I I I , held at Santiago i n 1972 continued discussions and negotiations of the major issues raised at the two previous conferences, 8. "Meeting of the Trade and Development Board, September 1969", Journal of World Trade Law 4 (January-February 1970), pp. 77-80. 15 in addition to other new agenda items. By the end of i t s f i r s t three conferences UNCTAD had several achievements to i t s c r e d i t , but was s t i l l f a r from changing the i n t e r n a t i o n a l economic system r a d i c a l l y . In the area of commodities i t had negotiated the International Cocoa Agreement s u c c e s s f u l l y and renegotiated the agreements on sugar, wheat and t i n . In r e l a t i o n to trade, UNCTAD had i n i t i a t e d a generalised system of preferences. This system has now become part of the t a r i f f structures of v i r t u a l l y a l l developed member countries. In addition, i n r e l a t i o n to aid and finance, i t helped to secure agreement on 9 objectives and aid targets from the developed countries. The fourth conference, UNCTAD IV held at Nairob i i n 1976, was convened i n the wake of the s i x t h and seventh s p e c i a l sessions of the UN General Assembly. These sessions were held in 1974 and 1975. The si x t h session, which commenced i n 1974, was prompted by the o i l c r i s i s of 1973. At t h i s session, a Programme of Action f o r the establishment of a new International Economic Order was adopted. The programme was adopted by consensus despite strong reservations expressed by the United States, Japan and several members of the EEC. At the Seventh S p e c i a l Session, held i n 1975, the United States adopted a more c o n c i l i a t o r y mood and put forward a number of proposals f o r the improve-9. UNCTAD, New Directions and New Strategies f o r Trade and Development: Report by the Secretary-General of UNCTAD to UNCTAD IV. (Geneva, TD/183/Rev. 1, 1976). 16 ment of the trading and f i n a n c i a l p o s i t i o n of LDCs. These sessions were not organized to reach d e t a i l e d agreements on s p e c i f i c p o l i c y measures, but rather to suggest broad guidelines for measures to be negotiated subsequently. As a r e s u l t , many of the issues r a i s e d at the s p e c i a l sessions were continued at UNCTAD IV. For example, at this conference work continued i n the f i e l d of commodity r e l a t i o n s within the guidelines recommended at the Seventh Special Session. Progress was made i n this area, and the conference eventually accepted an Integrated Programme f o r Commodities (IPC), proposed by the Group of 77. There were s i x main objectives of the IPC. These were the creation of a serie s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l b u f f e r stocks, a system of indexation, a common fund f o r financing the stocks, m u l t i l a t e r a l long-term supply contracts, compensatory finance against f l u c t u a t i o n s i n export earnings, the expansion of processing and d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n within the les s developed countries. UNCTAD IV made advances i n other p o l i c y areas. I t endorsed a wide-range programme to strengthen the technological c a p a b i l i t y of the developing countries and set out the modalities f o r the negotiation of a code of conduct f o r the transfer of technology. In s p i t e of a l i m i t e d measure of progress i n dealing with the issues and problems of development, a l l UNCTAD conferences are 10. UNCTAD, An Integrated Programme for Commodities (Geneva, TD/B/C.1/166) December 1964. 17 characterised by a great deal of f r u s t r a t i o n and obstacles to agree-ment. These drawbacks derive from a number of complex and i n t e r -r e l a t e d f a c t o r s . For example, though many resolutions and programmes of action are proposed at the conferences, only a small percentage of these stand any chance of being implemented because of t h e i r recommendatory nature and the presence of counter proposals from delegates with opposing views. So f a r the success of negotiations and the subsequent implementation of the decisions of these have been l i m i t e d . A d d i t i o n a l l y , though both developed and less developed countries sometimes agree on what measures should be taken to improve the i n t e r n a t i o n a l environment of trade and development, there are usually deep disagreements between them about the substantive measures and s p e c i f i c steps to be taken to ensure and promote progress. The Origin and Evolution of UNCLOS III The importance of the Law of the Sea Conference (UNCLOS III) to developing countries i s a t t r i b u t a b l e to many diverse f a c t o r s . One of the motivations underlying the p o l i c i e s . of Third World countries i n UNCLOS III was the desire to seek l e g i t i m i z a t i o n (from credible i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s ) f o r t h e i r u n i l a t e r a l p o l i c i e s . The increasing trend of u n i l a t e r a l i s m that preceded the UNCLOS III conferences caused serious j u r i s d i c t i o n a l problems and affe c t e d the a b i l i t y of countries to provide themselves with valuable sea resources found 18 o f f t h e i r coasts. For some developing countries, this created a serious shortage of food. Among the u n i l a t e r a l claims to o f f shore rights were claims of 3 miles, 12 miles, 30 miles, 100 miles, 150 miles and 200 miles. These claims constituted attempts to r e t a i n control over what were often highly c o n f l i c t i n g , overlapping and c o n t r o v e r s i a l t e r r i t o r i a l sea areas and contiguous zones. Most of these claims had started i n an e a r l i e r period, before UN mechanisms were established to deal with maritime issues. For example, following the "Truman Proclamation" of 1945, through which the United States pursued i t s u n i l a t e r a l i s m , there were a number of s i m i l a r claims by other countries. Most of these were by developing states, p a r t i c u l a r l y those i n L a t i n America. One of the major motivations behind the claims of Third World countries was the desire to include valuable f i s h i n g grounds and submerged ocean resources within t h e i r j u r i s d i c t i o n a l boundaries. The primary motive for the L a t i n American States to increase t h e i r maritime j u r i s d i c t i o n appears to have been concern over actual and anticipated foreign f i s h i n g of t h e i r c o a s t s . H What was true f o r the L a t i n American and Caribbean states was equally true f o r a number of other developing states, such as the coastal Afro-Asian States. Where the motive was not primarily to protect f i s h i n g resources, . i t was to protect claims to i s l a n d t e r r i t o r i e s and 11. See Barry Buzan, Seabed P o l i t i c s , (New York: Praeger, 1976), p. 11. 19 mineral o i l resources. E x p l o i t a t i o n of the l a s t set of resources became increasingly more pla u s i b l e and less c o s t l y , e s p e c i a l l y with the discovery of new technologies and the spread of foreign investment from developed countries. Encouraged by these developments, states i n Asia and A f r i c a l i k e those i n L a t i n America made increasing off-shore claims. The claimants included Cambodia, Thailand, and South Vietnam. These states made extensive and overlapping claims into the Gulf of Siam. South Korea, Japan, Taiwan and China made s i m i l a r c o n f l i c t i n g claims to large areas of the Yellow and East China Seas. Meanwhile i n A f r i c a , Gabon added a 50 mile f i s h i n g zone to i t s 100 mile t e r r i t o r i a l sea. Likewise, South Vietnam, Iran, Morocco, Senegal and Iceland 12 added f i s h i n g zones to t h e i r t e r r i t o r i a l seas. A l l these claims occurred before or during the early stages of UNCLOS I I I , which was convened i n 1973. Before the Law of the Sea Conferences, the Inter-American Council of J u r i s t s (IACJ), established as a part of the Organization of American States (OAS), was occupied with the l e g a l i t y of the r i s i n g t i d e of u n i l a t e r a l claims. It had a vested i n t e r e s t i n determining the legitimacy of these claims because most of the La t i n American states involved i n the controv e r s i a l claims were members of the OAS. Several sessions of the IACJ were thus held to discuss these j u r i s d i c t i o n a l matters and to avoid an es c a l a t i o n of c o n f l i c t . Progress was slow, however. Thus the new claims 12. Ibid., p. 122 and p. 194. 20 remained as a formidable challenge to i n t e r n a t i o n a l l e g a l jurisprudence. The le s s developed countries, e s p e c i a l l y those i n L a t i n America, were n a t u r a l l y concerned with these developments, e s p e c i a l l y since they were seeking means of gaining legitimacy f o r t h e i r claims. They therefore held a serie s of m u l t i l a t e r a l regional conferences outside the auspices of the UN for the purpose of forging common maritime p r a c t i c e s . Following each conference there, were declarations of t h e i r positions with respect to the issues discussed. These a c t i v i t i e s were not seen as an end i n themselves but as a way of inf l u e n c i n g the c o d i f i c a t i o n process at the UN l e v e l . These states sought to go to the UN conferences with as many regional m u l t i l a t e r a l arrangements as pos s i b l e . Other factors r e l a t i n g to developments i n marine technology and ocean a c t i v i t y made the approaching UN conferences of c r i t i c a l importance to a l l le s s developed countries. Some of these were of p a r t i c u l a r importance. 1) There were f i r s t of a l l the s t e a d i l y increasing v a r i e t y and i n t e n s i t y of ocean a c t i v i t i e s , i n c l u d i n g f i s h i n g and shipping a c t i v i t i e s . Buzan, f o r example, notes that the tonnage of world shipping had r i s e n s t e a d i l y i n s i z e , r e f l e c t i n g an annual increase of 8 percent from 1950 to 1958; and the tonnage of the world f i s h catch escalated 13 from 21.1 m i l l i o n metric tons i n 1950 to 36.7 metric tons i n 1959. 13. Ibid., p. 34. 21 2) The development of technology i n the developed countries led to concern by LDCs about the e f f e c t s on them of naval research, marine science research and new technologies for d r i l l i n g offshore o i l . 3) The developments taking place i n the UN concerning trade, finance and other developmental problems of LDCs, and the formation of UNCTAD were r e f l e c t e d i n the Law of the Sea negotiations. The emergence of the Group of 77 s i g n a l l e d the era of greater cooperation of Third World countries i n presenting j o i n t proposals. This trend was not l i m i t e d to economic forums such as UNCTAD but to a l l major UN m u l t i l a t e r a l forums. 4) Another development of s i g n i f i c a n t importance to Third World countries was the Pardo proposal. This proposal was made by Arvid Pardo, the UN Ambassador of Malta, on his own i n i t i a t i v e and on behalf of his country. At the August 1967 session of the UN General Assembly, he stated: In view of the rapid progress i n the development of new technologies by the technologically advanced countries, i t i s feared...that the seabed and the ocean fLoor underlying the Seas beyond present national j u r i s d i c t i o n w i l l become progressively and competitively subject to national appropriation and use. This i s l i k e l y to r e s u l t i n the m i l i t a r i z a t i o n of the accessible ocean f l o o r through the establishment of fixed m i l i t a r y i n s t a l l a t i o n s and in the e x p l o i t a t i o n of resources of immense p o t e n t i a l benefit to the world, for the national advantage of the technologically developed countries. 14. Ibid., p. 67. 22 Pardo concluded with a proposal that the seabed and ocean f l o o r beyond national j u r i s d i c t i o n be designated as "a common heritage of mankind", and further that the resources of this area be banned from appropriation by prospecting states. As an a l t e r n a t i v e , he proposed that the material and f i n a n c i a l resources that could be acquired from the area be used mainly to promote the development of poor countries. Further, he suggested that the area be reserved for peaceful purposes only and that an i n t e r n a t i o n a l agency be established to regulate, supervise and cont r o l a l l a c t i v i t i e s i n the area. An analysis of the proposal made by Buzan i s worth examining. In addition to other e f f e c t s , he notes that the proposal - gave an immense momentum to the idea of a common heritage of mankind by l i n k i n g i t to the needs and i n t e r e s t s of the developing countries; - also placed the issue squarely i n the context of developed versus developing country i n t e r e s t s , and thereby established or greatly helped to e s t a b l i s h , alignment on the issue that might other-wise have evolved i n d i f f e r e n t or at le a s t i n l e s s stark forms; - r a i s e d the v i s i o n of a new type of i n t e r n a t i o n a l organization that would give economic benefits and p o l i t i c a l power to the develop-ing countries as a means of re s t o r i n g the balance between them and developed countries and - raised a banner against technological imperialism of both the 23 economic and the m i l i t a r y v a r i e t y around which the developing countries could r a l l y with r e l a t i v e e a s e . ^ These factors i n combination with the others mentioned e a r l i e r l e d to the major role which Third World countries were to play i n UNCLOS I I I , i n d i v i d u a l l y as well as through the instrumentality of the Group of 77. So f a r the UN has organized three conferences on the Law of the Sea which have dealt progressively with various ocean matters. The F i r s t Conference was held i n 1958. I t adopted four conventions: these dealt with the t e r r i t o r i a l sea and the contiguous zone, the high seas, f i s h i n g and the conservation of the l i v i n g resources of the high seas and the continental s h e l f . This conference as well as the Second Conference of 1960, f a i l e d to define the l i m i t s of the t e r r i t o r i a l sea and the f i s h i n g zone.^ The Third UN Conference (UNCLOS III) held sessions i n New York i n 1973, i n Caracas i n 1974, i n Geneva i n 1975, three times i n New York i n 1976 and 1977, and once more i n Geneva and New York i n 1978. The task 15. Ibid., p. 68. 16. United Nations, Second United Nations Conference on The Law of  the Sea 1960 (New York, A/Conf. 62/WP 10, 1960). 24 the conference set by the General Assembly i n 1973 i s "to adopt a convention dealing with a l l matters r e l a t i n g to the Law of the Sea.""*"^ Following an i n i t i a l session i n 1973 on organizational and procedural matters, the conference devoted i t s f i r s t substantive session i n 1974 mostly to general debate and a f i r s t attempt to reduce the plethora of proposals to manageable proportions. In 1975 the main Committee Chairmen produced the f i r s t "single negotiating text," s e t t i n g out i n treaty language, provisions to be used as a basis for negotiations on most points considered f o r i n c l u s i o n i n a convention. The o f f i c e r s of the conference revised this text i n 1976 and again i n 1977, i n the l i g h t of the r e s u l t s of negotiations. The 1977 text i s known as the "informal composite negotiating text" (ICNT). Current work i s based on the ICNT. UNCLOS III has three main committees. The F i r s t Committee focusses on the i n t e r n a t i o n a l seabed regime and machinery; the Second Committee on general aspects of the Law of the S ea; the Third Committee on the marine environment, marine s c i e n t i f i c research and the development and transfer of marine technology. 17. United Nations, Third United Nations Conference on the Law of  the Sea Vol. I (New York, A/Conf. 62/1, 1973). 25 A Comparative Analysis of Some Features of the Selected I n s t i t u t i o n s There are important differences i n the role of the Group of 77 i n UNCLOS III and i n UNCTAD. The nature of each i n s t i t u t i o n a f f e c t s the pattern of group formation within i t and the pattern of group formation i n turn a f f e c t s the ro l e of the Group of 77. In UNCLOS I I I , Third World and developed countries have c o n f l i c t i n g views on issues such as who should ex p l o i t the "common heritage" (for example the minerals on the deep seabed) and how the resources should be d i s t r i b u t e d . Despite these differences i n outlook, both developing and developed countries are sometimes drawn into the same a l l i a n c e s on other issues. Common i n t e r e s t s and expected solutions i n this l a t t e r case derive from common geographical a t t r i b u t e s . Thus r e f e r r i n g to the group of coastal states, Johnson and Zacher remark, While developing states are members of th i s group, developed countries such as Canada, A u s t r a l i a , New Zealand and to an extent the United States f a l l into i t .18 In contrast to the above s i t u a t i o n , the relevant economic a t t r i b u t e s of states i n UNCTAD serves to pola r i z e them into d i s t i n c t groups of developed and less developed states. Among these a t t r i b u t e s are type of industries established, commodities exported and type of technology and l e v e l of i n f r a s t r u c t u r a l development attained. Since there i s 18. B. Johnson and M. Zacher, Canadian Foreign P o l i c y and the Law  of the Sea (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1977) p. x v i i . 26 more commonality among less developed countries i n r e l a t i o n to these a t t r i b u t e s , they share s i m i l a r i n t e r e s t s , expectations of benefits and other factors favourable to j o i n t representation. Thus the group structure i n UNCTAD i s more r i g i d . In UNCLOS III i t i s much more f l u i d , and therefore states tend to form d i f f e r e n t a l l i a n c e s depending on what issues are being negotiated at a p a r t i c u l a r time. Other differences i n the nature of the i n s t i t u t i o n s r e l a t e to the developments which p r e c i p i t a t e d t h e i r emergence and the amount of autonomy they possess. For example, UNCTAD was founded i n 1964 through an agreement reached at the 1964 Geneva UN Conference on Trade and Development. UNCLOS III i n contrast was one of a series of Law of the Sea Conferences, following the 1958 and 1960 conferences. UNCTAD was formed i n an atmosphere of North/South confrontation and Third World assertiveness against both East and West. UNCLOS I I I evolved out of e a r l i e r conferences dominated by a majority of l a r g e r nations. This l a t t e r point has s i g n i f i c a n t implications regarding the attitu d e of states toward the forums and th e i r willingness to make compromises. Formally, there are s t r i c t mechanisms of control over UNCTAD. Being an organ of the UN General Assembly, i t i s supposed to report annually to the General Assembly through the Economic and So c i a l Council (ECOSOC). Its Secretary General i s appointed by the UN and i t s 27 budget i s financed through appropriations from the large UN budget. Despite these attempts to control i t , UNCTAD possesses a great deal of autonomy. This i s a fact very well documented by researchers such 19 as Nye and Gosovic. In pr a c t i c e , UNCTAD works independently of ECOSOC. I t has achieved a great deal of independence because i t has i t s own s e c r e t a r i a t located i n Geneva away from the main c o n t r o l l i n g center of the UN i n New York. In addition, separate budgetary provisions were established where contributions could be made d i r e c t l y to the UNCTAD budget. This l a t t e r fact means a great deal i n terms of enhanced autonomy, more e f f i c i e n t d a i l y administration and greater f l e x i b i l i t y of the i n s t i t u t i o n . In contrast, UNCLOS III i s more of an extension of the UN General Assembly. There i s no Secret a r i a t , Secretary General, separate budget, or any of the other i n s t i t u t i o n a l apparatuses present i n UNCTAD. Thus, UNCLOS III i s merely a conference w r i t large while UNCTAD i s a permanent i n s t i t u t i o n euphemistically dubbed a conference. The UNCTAD Secretariat serves as a research arm for the less developed countries, thus helping them to plan common strategies and draft proposals and resolutions. In UNCLOS III there are no such aids. No s p e c i a l services are provided to the same extent as i n UNCTAD and there i s no sin g l e source of expertise and s k i l l s that developing countries can r e l y on. 19. See, f o r example, Gosovic, UNCTAD: C o n f l i c t and Compromise, p. 185; and J . Nye, "UNCTAD: Poor Nations Pressure Group", Anatomy of Influence, ed., by Cox & Jacobson (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973) pp. 334-369. 28 Functions of the I n s t i t u t i o n s . Both bodies serve as public forums fo r bargaining and formulating agreements or conventions. Most of these are subject to r a t i f i c a t i o n by member countries. In terms of providing services for members such as the c o l l e c t i o n of data on the subject of the conferences, UNCTAD i s i n a better p o s i t i o n to do t h i s (through i t s Secretariat) than i s UNCLOS I I I . UN General Assembly Resolution 1955 (XXV) empowers UNCTAD to i n i t i a t e action, where appropriate, i n cooperation with the competent organs of the UN for the negotiation and adoption of the m u l t i l a t e r a l l e g a l instruments i n the f i e l d of trade. So f a r , UNCTAD has had some li m i t e d success i n negotiations. The 1966 and 1967 Cocoa Agreements and the 1968 sugar agreements are two of a series of commodity agree-ments negotiated s u c c e s s f u l l y . UNCLOS III debates proposals concerning Law of the Sea issues. The main objective i s to formulate a general Law of the Sea convention through consensus. As stated e a r l i e r i n th i s chapter, the task set by the General Assembly i n 19 73 was for p a r t i c i p a n t s to "adopt a convention dealing with a l l matters r e l a t i n g to the Law of the Sea". The process of decision-making, as set out i n the rules of procedure of the conference, provides for d e f e r r a l of votes on substantive questions to permit e f f o r t s to resolve differences. I t c a l l s f o r a "c o o l i n g - o f f " period p r i o r to any vote on a substantive matter, during which the President or Chairman of the session would seek 29 "to f a c i l i t a t e the achievement of general agreement" on the point or points of issue. If no further agreement i s reached and unless a further deferment i s decided on, there would f i r s t have to be a determination by the same majority as i s required by substantive decisions, "that a l l e f f o r t s at reaching a general agreement have been exhausted". Only then can a vote on a substantive issue take 20 place. In UNCTAD s i m i l a r mechanisms for seeking consensus are being i n s t i t u t e d . 20. United Nations, Rules of Procedure for the Third United Nations  Law of the Sea Conference. (New York, A/Conf. 62/2 1973). 30 CHAPTER III DIPLOMATIC STRATEGIES OF THE GROUP OF 77 The Strategies Most C h a r a c t e r i s t i c of Group of 77  Diplomacy. Comparison of t h e i r Use i n the Two I n s t i t u t i o n s The s t r a t e g i e s of the less developed countries i n the Group of 77 are c r u c i a l to an understanding of t h e i r pattern of diplomatic behaviour. Just as important are the reasons underlying the preference of these countries f o r pursuing t h e i r p o l i c y objectives i n the two selected forums, rather than through other e x i s t i n g means of decision-making. The analysis of t h i s chapter i s organized around s p e c i f i c questions pe r t a i n i n g to these two broad general considerations. These questions are: 1) Why i n general did developing countries seek to pursue t h e i r p o l i c y objectives and i n t e r e s t s i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l organizational forums rather than through other means? 2) Why did they pursue these objectives i n some organizations rather than i n others? For example, why did they not u t i l i z e the already e x i s t i n g economic organizations rather than agitate for the formation of UNCTAD? 3) How did they pursue t h e i r objectives; what strategies did they use? 4) How did they f o s t e r and maintain a u n i f i e d p o s i t i o n on c e r t a i n issues? The answers to the f i r s t two questions r e l a t e to the choice of forums. LDCs chose the forums they saw most l i k e l y to promote t h e i r 31 p o l i c y objectives. The answers to the t h i r d and fourth questions r e l a t e to strategies such as the formation of groups, pre-conference a c t i v i t i e s , the use of the S e c r e t a r i a t , the use of r h e t o r i c and the making of symbolic speeches. These strategies and some factors associated with t h e i r use are elaborated below. Choice of Forums The s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h i s issue derives from the fact that UNCTAD and UNCLOS III were preferred to other decision-making and bargaining environments which existed. In the case of UNCTAD, as stated i n Chapter II, there already existed economic i n s t i t u t i o n s for dealing with developmental, trade and monetary issues. These included GATT, the IMF, ECOSOC and others. In addition, there were u n i l a t e r a l , b i l a t e r a l , regional and other means of bargaining outside of the UN. These means by themselves, however, did not prove very v i a b l e to the LDCs for pursuing t h e i r i n t e r e s t s and problems. For example, i n a d d i t i o n to the reasons discussed i n Chapter II (pp. 7-17) u n i l a t e r a l , b i l a t e r a l and regional means of bargaining were l i m i t e d i n scope and focussed only on a small number of s p e c i f i c issues. A d d i t i o n a l l y , early UN i n s t i t u t i o n s were not oriented towards dealing with Third World concerns i n a s a t i s f a c t o r y manner because of such factors as t h e i r normative or i e n t a t i o n s , t h e i r membership structure, 32 t h e i r voting mechanisms and other rules of procedure. For instance, the normative and p o l i c y orientations on which th rules and operations of GATT, ECOSOC and other early UN i n s t i t u t i o n s are based, are those deriving from c l a s s i c a l l i b e r a l economic thought. The founding members of GATT, f o r example, held that rules and p o l i c y p r e s c r i p t i o n s should apply to a l l members on an equal and r e c i p r o c a l b a s i s . Thus the rules and p o l i c i e s were applied to developed and developing countries a l i k e regardless of the fact that many of the p o l i c i e s that benefitted the developed countries d i d not favour the i n t e r e s t s of the LDCs. Under the rules of GATT, for example, the LDCs were committed to o f f e r developed countries an equivalent t a r i f f concession for every t a r i f f reduction they received from the l a t t e r . The rules of the IMF and other economic i n s t i t u t i o n s were supportive of those i n GATT. These i n s t i t u t i o n s were a l l committed to the " l i b e r a l i z a t i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l trade" and were "system preserving 21 rather than system challenging or reforming." LDCs thus f e l t a growing sense of f r u s t r a t i o n with these rules and the i n s t i t u t i o n a l systems that maintained them, They therefore agitated for wide ranging reforms. However, the membership structure and voting mechanisms of thes 21. Susan Strange, "IMF, Monetary Managers" Anatomy of Influence ed., Cox and Jacobson, p. 263. 33 early i n s t i t u t i o n s , l i m i t e d the LDCs from having any d i r e c t impact on decision-making. As l a t e as 1958, only a small number of LDCs were members of the UN and i t s agencies. This, among other factors, l e d to the trend f o r executive and other administrative posts of UN agencies to be f i l l e d by representatives of developed countries. Power and influence i n the decision-making forums of these i n s t i t u t i o n s were i n the hands of the i n d u s t r i a l l y advanced countries who were responsible f o r e s t a b l i s h i n g them i n the f i r s t place. Later, when LDCs became members of the i n s t i t u t i o n s , the voting structures and rules of procedure l i m i t e d t h e i r a b i l i t y to change basic i n s t i t u t i o n a l mechanisms. For example, i n the IMF and World Bank voting power was weighted according to a member's quota of f i n a n c i a l contribution to the i n s t i t u t i o n . Since the LDCs contributed very l i t t l e finances, t h e i r voting power remained minimal. E f f o r t s by LDCs aimed at reforms met with strong resistance from the developed countries. One reason for t h i s , was the fac t that the developed countries benefited from the i n s t i t u t i o n s as they were, and therefore had more f a i t h i n the e x i s t i n g system than i n the often uncoordinated and sometimes c o n f l i c t i n g formulae f o r change suggested by the LDCs. Despite t h i s resistance to change by some developed countries the LDCs continued to advocate for reforms. As they became more u n i f i e d they coordinated t h e i r e f f o r t s to a greater extent than previously, and were eventually instrumental i n the formation of 34 UNCTAD, a new i n s t i t u t i o n f o r trade and developmental issues. Because of t h e i r involvement i n the formation of UNCTAD's i n t e r n a l structure, the mechanisms were such that LDCs could p a r t i c i p a t e i n bargaining and negotiations at the highest l e v e l s . They therefore ensured that the p r i o r i t i e s of the i n s t i t u t i o n were dire c t e d towards seeking solutions for the developmental problems that most s e r i o u s l y a f f e c t e d them. The combination and i n t e r r e l a t i o n of a l l these factors contribute to the preference by LDCs to pursue t h e i r p o l i c y objectives i n UNCTAD. In the case of Law of the Sea issues, LDCs gravitated towards the UN forum, because apart from i t s other attractions they f e l t that i t could help them to gain l e g i t i m i z a t i o n f o r u n i l a t e r a l and regional p o l i c i e s pursued outside of the UN. Gradually the LDCs saw the opportunity for using t h e i r unity and the strategies they perfected i n the economic f i e l d to influence the formation of the new rules f o r bargaining and negotiation,that were constantly evolving i n UNCLOS. The Group of 77's pre-conference meetings p r i o r to UNCLOS III were used to emphasize the linkages between Law of the Sea issues and Trade and Developmental issues. The need f o r the maintenance of Group unity i n both UNCTAD and UNCLOS III was repeatedly emphasised. These matters, for example, were of primary concern at the Group of 22 77's "Second M i n i s t e r i a l Meeting" at Lima i n November 1971. The 22. See UNCTAD, Declaration of P r i n c i p l e s of Action Programme of  Lima, by the Group of .77. (TD/143, 1971). 35 i n t e r r e l a t i o n of these factors underlie the commitment of LDCs to pursue t h e i r p o l i c y objectives through the UN Law of the Sea conference sessions. Group Formation and Other Group A c t i v i t i e s International conferences l i k e UNCTAD and UNCLOS I I I have become characterised by various i n t e r e s t and negotiating groups of countries. The group of countries which has almost become a permanent i n s t i t u t i o n by i t s e l f i s the group of LDCs, or the Group of 77. Group represen-t a t i o n by the LDCs f a c i l i t a t e s the use of several group strategies which help to maximise the impact of these countries i n the bargaining environment. Thus whenever possible at these m u l t i l a t e r a l conferences, the LDCs use j o i n t representation and seek to promote group cohesiveness and impact. In order to achieve these objectives they use such s t r a t e g i e s as pre-conference preparation, s e i z i n g the i n i t i a t i v e and using as representatives of the group those members most knowledgeable, s k i l l e d , and interested i n the issues on the agenda. The Use of J o i n t Representation In UNCTAD the LDCs seek to work through the Group of 77 to devise a common p o s i t i o n pertaining to the issues on the agenda i n order to confront and bargain with other p a r t i c i p a n t s with positions opposed to t h e i r s . Ultimately t h e i r objective i s to provide the transformation of t h e i r demands into agreed i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i c y 36 through t h e i r c o l l e c t i v e lobbying. The concerted use of the strategy of j o i n t representation to the extent that i t has been used i n UNCTAD and UNCLOS I I I , i s a r e l a t i v e l y new phenomenon at i n t e r n a t i o n a l conferences. The presence of a c o a l i t i o n as large as the Group of 77 at these conferences was a gradual development. Previously, because of the lack of unity among the r e l a t i v e l y l i m i t e d number of developing countries at i n t e r n a t i o n a l conferences, the developed countries used the e x i s t i n g system to th e i r advantage. These countries maintained t h e i r dominance and influence, by using their.resources to play o f f developing countries one against the other. Changes i n the global system such as the decolonization process, the i n f l u x of new nations, into the UN system, the non-aligned conferences and the increasing contact of Third World states with each other led to the consistent use of c o l l e c t i v e action by LDCs. The p o l a r i z a t i o n of UNCTAD into groups f o r e l e c t o r a l purposes reinforced t h i s trend. The members of UNCTAD are divided into four l i s t s of states for e l e c t o r a l purposes. These are l i s t s A, B. C and D. The A l i s t contains l e s s developed countries mainly of the L a t i n American region. The B l i s t contains developed states such as B r i t a i n , the US, Canada, the EEC countries, the Nordics and the Netherlands. The C l i s t contains l e s s developed countries such as Burma, Malaya, Malawi and others i n the Afro-Asian regions. The D l i s t contains countries i n the s o c i a l i s t block such as the USSR, Albania and others. 37 The countries i n the Group of 77 are the less developed countries i n the A and C l i s t s . In UNCLOS I I I , the LDCs seek to use the strategy of j o i n t representation i n order to promote t h e i r p o l i c y objectives through j o i n t proposals. They do this e s p e c i a l l y when the i n t e r e s t s of other groups of states are opposed to t h e i r s . This strategy i s however, less e f f e c t i v e i n UNCLOS, because of the tendency of the LDCs to s p l i t t h e i r ranks and j o i n other groups except when bargaining on c e r t a i n s p e c i f i c issues. On issues where the i n t e r e s t s and goals of LDCs are s i m i l a r to those of developed and other groups of states, LDCs often j o i n these groups i n d r a f t i n g and co-sponsoring j o i n t proposals. However, where there i s a c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t between the objectives of a large number of LDCs and those of developed states the LDCs represent t h e i r i n t e r e s t s j o i n t l y through the Group of 77. For instance, at the 1974 Caracas Session of the F i r s t Committee i n UNCLOS I I I , c o n f l i c t i n g i n t e r e s t s between LDCs and developed states emerged i n the area of the control and management of deep seabed resources. There were also c o n f l i c t i n g i n t e r e s t s on the r e l a t e d issue of the scope and powers of the proposed International Ocean Authority. Most developed states favoured the e x p l o i t a t i o n of the non-living resources of the seabed by transnational enterprises and other private i n t e r e s t s . They were therefore opposed to a strong i n t e r n a t i o n a l regime that might l i m i t or severely regulate t h e i r access to the deep seabed. LDCs on the other hand favoured a strong 38 i n t e r n a t i o n a l Seabed Authority which had the power to secure exclusive control over the e x p l o i t a t i o n of l i v i n g and non-living 23 resources. At th i s session, the Group of 77 submitted a j o i n t seabed proposal of LDCs (on the power of a proposed seabed a u t h o r i t y ) , which s t i p u l a t e d general conditions of access to deep seabed 24 resources. The use of the strategy of j o i n t representation by the Group of 77 was evident i n other instances at UNCLOS I I I , where there was a commonality of in t e r e s t s among LDCs. This strategy i s by f a r one of the most important of the strategies used by the Group of 77. I t enables the Group to fos t e r the s o l i d a r i t y of LDCs and f a c i l i t a t e s the use of the other strategies analysed here. Group unity i s e s p e c i a l l y d i f f i c u l t at times because of the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c features of the Group of 77. Unlike other smaller groups of the past, which coalesced around a l i m i t e d number of common t r a i t s , the Group of 77 r e f l e c t s a large amalgam of states of varying l e v e l s of economic resources, vast p o l i t i c a l , i d e o l o g i c a l , geographical and c u l t u r a l d ifferences. The s o l i d i f y i n g factors that sustain group cohesiveness include the shared i n t e r e s t among members i n moving out of t h e i r peripheral p o s i t i o n i n the world economy, and a common expectation of increased b e n e f i t s . 23. United Nations, O f f i c i a l Records: Third UN Conference of the Law of the Sea (A/Conf. 62/C.1/L.3, 1974). 24 See, United Nations, Conditions of E x p l o i t a t i o n of the Deep Seabed. Prepared by the Group of 77 (A/Conf. 62/C.l/L.7,1964) . 39 Promotion of Group Cohesiveness The LDCs seek to promote group cohesiveness by pre-conference group and intra-group meetings, by forging consensus among members f o r group p o l i c i e s , by is s u i n g j o i n t declarations and by peer group appeals to members of the importance of maintaining their unity. Group cohesiveness i s promoted as a means of maintaining unity, j o i n t repre-sentation and greater bargaining power. S p e c i f i c strategies and supporting techniques used to maintain group unity are discussed further below. Pre-conference Preparation The Group of 77 uses pre-conference meetings, at group and various sub-group l e v e l s , as a prelude to conference negotiations. This i s done i n order to i r o n out c o n f l i c t s of i n t e r e s t among group members, to enlighten members about the t e c h n i c a l i t i e s of agenda items, and generally to keep members informed and committed to broader group goals. A d d i t i o n a l l y other techniques are used at these meetings to forge and maintain group unity. These include e f f o r t s by group leaders to devise programmes and proposals which promise the maximum benefits to as many group members as possible and e f f o r t s to maintain peer pressure on d i s s a t i s f i e d members to encourage them to support group p o s i t i o n s . At a broader l e v e l , group leaders work continuously to promote general consensus among members f o r the acceptance of new p r i n c i p l e s and rules of i n t e r n a t i o n a l economic r e l a t i o n s . A d d i t i o n a l l y , i n order to harmonize 40 objectives and p o l i c i e s with other supportive groups such as the non-aligned movement and the members of the group based i n New York, regular intra-group meetings are convened. In attempts to minimise c o n f l i c t among members of the group, at times "trade o f f s " or bartering between members becomes necessary. "Trade o f f s " usually center around agreements by the la r g e r group to support the positions of sub-groups i n exchange f o r f u l l support by the l a t t e r f o r broader Group of 77 proposals. For instance the Group of 77's proposal f o r an Integrated Program f o r Commodities (discussed i n greater d e t a i l i n Chapter I I ) , generated some intra-group c o n f l i c t . There were disagreements between L a t i n American and other countries on this issue. For example, Columbia, B r a z i l , and other L a t i n American countries were not e n t i r e l y convinced of the appropriateness of the common fund for financing commodities h i s t o r i c a l l y characterised by s t r u c t u r a l over production.... Columbia had not opposed the resolution, on the understanding that / l a t e r j . . . i t would be possible to argue the case for excluding coffee from the l i s t . 2 5 Other LDCs who stood to lose i n some s p e c i f i c area through the implemen-t a t i o n of the IPC were promised compensation against losses, by the Group of 77. Another area i n which the support was gained from d i s s a t i s f i e d members was i n the case of the Group's proposal of a Generalised System of Preferences (GSP). The Group again promised 25. See UNCTAD, Report of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development on i t s Fourth Session (Geneva, TD/217), 1976) pp. 98-99. 41 s i m i l a r compensation to' p o t e n t i a l losers i n this case. In UNCLOS I I I , the Group of 77 found this strategy of forging consensus by arranging "trade o f f s " d i f f i c u l t to pursue. This i s mainly because of the differences i n objectives of LDCs deriving from t h e i r d i s t i n c t i o n s i n geographical features. When group i n t e r e s t s are not i n t h e i r favour, some LDCs tend to leave the group and seem to co-sponsor resolutions with other states which possess a s i m i l a r i t y of geographical features. Since the issues negotiated i n UNCLOS III do not always lend themselves to the system of bartering developed i n UNCTAD, the Group of 77 often found t h e i r e f f o r t s to keep the group united much more d i f f i c u l t . Besides providing the opportunity for pursuing strategies l i k e bartering or arranging compensation for d i s s a t i s f i e d members, pre-conference meetings provide the opportunity for the Group of 77 to make i t s members more informed of the s p e c i f i c s of agenda items. Data ava i l a b l e from the UNCTAD Secr e t a r i a t and other sources i s disseminated and discussed and sometimes used with the aid of the Se c r e t a r i a t s t a f f to draft j o i n t proposals. LDCs frequently produce declarations a f t e r these meetings delineating t h e i r positions on s p e c i f i c agenda items of the approaching Conference. For example, declarations and programmes of a c t i o n were produced a f t e r the Group of 77's pre-conference meetings held at A l g i e r s i n 1967 i n preparation 26. Ibid. 42 for UNCTAD I I ; at Lima i n 1971 i n preparation f o r UNCTAD I I I ; at Manila i n 1976, i n preparation for UNCTAD IV, and at Arusha i n 1979 i n 27 preparation for UNCTAD V. Besides discussing issues pertaining to UNCTAD at these meetings, the LDCs discuss the agenda items of approaching Law of the Sea sessions. In order to p u b l i c i s e t h e i r positions r e l a t i n g to these issues, the LDCs use the same technique they use i n r e l a t i o n to UNCTAD issues. They produce declarations and resolutions delineating t h e i r i n t e r e s t s , objectives and proposed solutions, For example, at the pre-conference meeting at Lima i n November 1971, besides discussing UNCTAD issues, the LDCs discussed Law of the Sea issues pertaining to the e x p l o i t a t i o n of the deep seabed. This was part of t h e i r pre-conference a c t i v i t i e s f o r the approaching January 1972 session of the Seabed Committee. The Seabed Committee was the UN preparatory body for UNCLOS I I I . One of the documents produced at the 1971 Lima meeting of the Group of 77 emphasized the Group's commitment to helping coastal states to protect 28 t h e i r marine resources. Discussions of Law of the Sea issues also take place at sub-group l e v e l s of the Group of 77. Sub-group meetings held by LDCs p r i o r to UNCLOS III include the meeting of the Central American and Caribbean states held i n June 1972, the Law of the Sea Seminar of A f r i c a n States also held i n June 1972 and the OAU Heads of State meeting of June 1973. A l l of these meetings aimed at informing LDCs of agenda items at forthcoming 27. See UNCTAD, Conference Documents (TD/180, vols. I-IV,1973); (TD/217, 1976) and (TD/236, 1979). 28. See, A. Oda, The International Law of Ocean Development. (Leiden: Sijthoff,1972) pp. 362-364, and Buzan, Seabed P o l i t i c s , p. 185. 43 conference sessions and attempts to forge common p o l i c i e s among them. These meetings a l l produced declarations or resolutions concerning the common positions adopted by the LDCs i n r e l a t i o n to agenda items. Other pre-conference preparations of the Group of 77 include attempts by group representatives to co-opt and persuade other groups of states to support the po l i c y objectives of the "77" or to j o i n the group i n co-sponsoring s p e c i f i c d r a f t proposals. Taken together a l l the a c t i v i t i e s of the group discussed i n th i s sub-section help to promote group cohesiveness and reinforce group unity. Seizing the I n i t i a t i v e The LDCs seek to seize the i n i t i a t i v e at conferences, e s p e c i a l l y when they have previously worked out a comprehensive proposal that i s mutually b e n e f i c i a l to a majority of the members i n the group. In order to focus a t t e n t i o n on these proposals and to ensure maximum discussion of t h e i r p o l i c y objectives, they s t r i v e early i n the negotiations to a t t r a c t and maintain the i n t e r e s t of as many p a r t i c i -pants as po s s i b l e . At UNCTAD L f o r example, i n order to focus a t t e n t i o n on the nature of the proposed economic i n s t i t u t i o n envisaged by LDCs, Burma, Ghana, Indonesia, N i g e r i a and Syria presented a draft r e s o l u t i o n on the type of i n s t i t u t i o n a l machinery that LDCs favoured. This draft according to one observer, 44 l e d to negotiation on the nature of the i n s t i -t u t i o n and gradually s h i f t e d the focus on th i s question, making i t the most important issue on the agenda.29 The various declarations produced at the pre-conference meetings of the Group of 77 are c i r c u l a t e d , e i t h e r before the s t a r t of the conference or i n i t s early stages. This serves to draw at t e n t i o n to LDCs objectives and therefore reinforces the a b i l i t y of group representatives to seize the i n i t i a t i v e . Thus at UNCTAD II of 1968, the "Charter of A l g i e r s " produced at the 1967 pre-conference meeting of the Group of 77, was c i r c u l a t e d f o r t h i s purpose. S i m i l a r l y , at UNCTAD III of 1972, the same technique was used i n the case of the "Declaration and Programme of Action" of the 1971 Lima pre-conference meeting. At UNCTAD V of 1976, there was the "Manila Declaration of Programme of Action" of the Manila 1976 pre-conference meeting, and at UNCTAD V of 1979, there was the "Arusha Programme f o r C o l l e c t i v e Self-Reliance" produced at the Arusha pre-conference meeting of 1979. In UNCLOS I I I , the same techniques are used by the LDCs to seize the i n i t i a t i v e . The LDCs follow up any impact gained from pre-conference declarations by t r y i n g to be f i r s t to submit proposals to the general conference or i t s preparatory committees. For example, at the 1973 Caracas session of the F i r s t Seabed Committee, 29. Gosovic, UNCTAD: C o n f l i c t and Compromise, pp. 38-39. 45 the Jamaican delegation sought to present a separate proposal, but the Group of 77 quickly presented a more coordinated and representa-t i v e proposal. The Group's strategy caused the Jamaican proposal to be relegated to obscurity. The Group of 77's proposal "dominated the proceedings". Agreement on i t marked a big step forward for the LDCs, since i t gave the Group of 77 "the i n i t i a t i v e " i n the pro-ceedings. The Group's proposal gained the backing of more than two-thirds of the p a r t i c i p a n t s and was accepted as the basis of negotiation. Later i n the proceedings, though, the United States (US) disagreed with some paragraphs i n the text, the US dr a f t presented s h o r t l y afterwards was oriented towards the general arguments i n the d r a f t , • „ r „ 30 by the Group of 77. The Use of S k i l l e d Representatives The LDCs use the best q u a l i f i e d representatives i n order to put forward group positions competently and persuasively and to dr a f t proposals that (as f a r as possible) includes the mutual benefits and i n t e r e s t s of a l l members i n the group. Among the more competent in d i v i d u a l s are those on the Board of UNCTAD or those from countries with the i n s t i t u t i o n s , s k i l l and expertise i n r e l a t i o n to a p a r t i c u l a r issue. Representatives, of the Group are often from "one of the key 31 countries within the Group (for example, B r a z i l , India, Iran)," 30. Buzan, Seabed P o l i t i c s , pp. 224-225. 31. Robert L. Rothstein, Global Bargaining. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979) p. 4. 46 though delegates from less powerful countries, f o r example Jamaica or Tanzania also get opportunities for representing the Group. In bargaining i n the two forums, the Group of 77 choose d i f f e r e n t spokesmen according to t h e i r knowledge and competence with respect to the agenda item being discussed. In reference to t h i s point Gosovic, for example, states that i n UNCTAD, Ceylon has always been i n the forefront on matters of financing. S p e c i a l i z a t i o n i s that much more important i f r e l a t e d to a country's s p e c i f i c economic i n t e r e s t . . . C h i l e , B r a z i l , India and the UAR are prominent on shipping, Afghanistan and B o l i v i a on landlocked countries, ^ Argentina and Uruguay on temperate zone products. At Group meetings and sub-group meetings, the LDCs use a system of r o t a t i n g chairmanships. At each session of these meetings a delegate from a d i f f e r e n t country chairs the meetings. In cases where a delegate i s nominated at random to chair a meeting pertaining to an issue outside of his competence, he performs the duties of chairman for the more general part of the proceedings. A f t e r this stage of the meeting, he delegates the Chairmanship to a substitute Chairman who i s s p e c i a l l y q u a l i f i e d i n the topic on the agenda. The substitute chairman usually has greater competence i n answering questions and explaining the complexities of the issue i n question. 32. Gosovic, UNCTAD, C o n f l i c t and Compromise, p. 277. 47 An example of the use of the more s k i l l e d representatives i n UNCLOS I I I , i s the use by the LDCs of L a t i n American delegates as spokesmen on issues r e l a t i n g to the e x p l o i t a t i o n of the seabed. These delegates are chosen because of t h e i r knowledge and i n t e r e s t i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r issue. Likewise, A f r i c a n and Asian representatives of the Group serve as spokesmen on issue pertaining to landlocked states. The i n t e r e s t and knowledge of these members i n the problems of land-locked states derive from t h e i r own landlocked geographical p o s i t i o n . Use of the S e c r e t a r i a t In support of the group strategies discussed above, the LDCs maximise the use of the UNCTAD S e c r e t a r i a t . They use Secretariat help p a r t i c u l a r l y to aid them i n devising e f f e c t i v e and comprehensive proposals that promise the maximum benefits to as many group members as p o s s i b l e . The aid of the S e c r e t a r i a t i s e s p e c i a l l y c r u c i a l when the issue i s very technical or complicated. In these instances, countries i n the group often lack the expertise, time and data a v a i l -able to the professionals of the S e c r e t a r i a t . A d d i t i o n a l l y , i n the negotiating process, S e c r e t a r i a t o f f i c i a l s are best able to defend LDCs objectives within t h e i r sphere of competence. Their job at the S e c r e t a r i a t exposes them to the s t a t i s t i c s and other data relevant to these. Furthermore, they are often more aware i n advance of the '•48 • opposing states' positions on p a r t i c u l a r issues. Secretariat s t a f f have proven very r e l i a b l e i n formulating sound proposals (on behalf of the LDCs), grounded i n hard s t a t i s t i c a l and other empirical data. In reference to the use of the Secretariat s t a f f by the LDCs, Rothstein states, f o r example, that the s t a f f plays the c e n t r a l r o l e i n devising a programme that promises as many benefits as possible to as many countries as possible. Only the s t a f f has the legitimacy and the exper-t i s e to perform t h i s f u n c t i o n — t o provide the common p o l i c i e s that the u n i f i e d Group w i l l promote. Given the l i m i t e d expertise within many developing countries governments (and e s p e c i a l l y within the delegates assigned to UNCTAD), s t a f f perceptions of what the Group of 77 ought to seek and s t a f f decisions on how to package a set of demands are very c r i t i c a l . 3 3 The Group of 77 maintains constant, contact with the Secretariat of UNCTAD and makes use of s e c r e t a r i a t services and f a c i l i t i e s not only for assistance i n d r a f t i n g proposals but for convening pre-conference meetings. The s t a f f proves very u s e f u l i n providing the venue for the Group's pre-conference meetings, and i n providing services at these meetings. The l a t t e r include providing documents, researches and evaluative reports on the progress of the programmes and negotiations i n UNCTAD. In addition, the LDCs use the se c r e t a r i a t s t a f f as the i n i t i a t o r s of action and as mediators. In t h e i r r o l e as i n i t i a t o r s , the s t a f f 33. R. L. Rothstein, Global Bargaining, p. 198. 49 give prominence and c r e d i b i l i t y to LDCs proposals. In t h e i r role as mediators, the s t a f f are more adept at resolving deadlocks with other delegates. As i n i t i a t o r s the s e c r e t a r i a t s t a f f i s most useful i n delineating broad general objectives f o r the Group of 77. The opening statements of s t a f f papers at Conferences, often correspond with s p e c i f i c goals of the Group of 77, sometimes d e l i b e r a t e l y and at other times because of s i m i l a r perspectives on trade and development. The representatives of the Group often use this opportunity to submit proposals couched i n the language used by the s t a f f . This gives such proposals an a i r of relevance and c r e d i b i l i t y . The Secretary-Generals of UNCTAD have been most e f f e c t i v e as i n i t i a t o r s of LDCs proposals. Thus i n an analysis of the role of the Secretary-General i n UNCTAD, Nye ( i n reference to Raul Prebisch, the f i r s t Secretary-General of UNCTAD), makes the following observation, Prebisch achieved h i s e f f e c t by c a t a l y z i n g an inchoate set of ideas prevalent among less developed countries, into a clear doctrine and then t i r e l e s s l y repeating i t i n fluent, moving speeches that r e f l e c t e d his honesty and conviction....For the 1964 conference, Prebisch's '•" . personal a n a l y t i c a l report proved to be almost the only one constantly r e f e r r e d to and used as a basis for discussion by the delegates.^4 LDCs appeal to the s e c r e t a r i a t s t a f f to act as mediators and brokers when there i s an impasse or deadlock i n negotiations. In t h e i r role as brokers and mediators s e c r e t a r i a t o f f i c i a l s may chair the 34. Nye, "UNCTAD: Poor Nations Pressure Group", Anatomy of Influence, ed., Cox and Jacobson, p. 350. 50 meetings of small contact groups formed to work out compromises between the LDCs and other states. The strategy of maximizing the use of the Secretariat i s more applicable i n UNCTAD than i n UNCLOS I I I , because of the Group of 77's closeness to the UNCTAD Sec r e t a r i a t . In UNCLOS I I I there i s no Sec r e t a r i a t , and the Group i s far l e s s close to the United Nations Secretariat which i s the general organizing body of UNCLOS I I I . The Use of Symbolic Speeches.and- Rhetoric The LDCs seek to use dramatic and m o r a l i s t i c speeches i n order to focus attention on t h e i r problems and t h e i r proposals for remedial action. In addition, t h i s strategy serves to contribute to group cohesiveness by providing a common r a l l y i n g point f or LDCs. Thus, throughout the conferences some of the statements contained i n these m o r a l i s t i c speeches serve as a common reference point and a broad framework against which s p e c i f i c issues could be v i s u a l i z e d . Common themes emphasized i n these speeches include the emphasis on the need for a "new i n t e r n a t i o n a l Economic Order"; an " i n t e r n a t i o n a l Development Strategy", f or the " c o l l e c t i v e s e l f - r e l i a n c e of developing countries" and the need for the ocean and deep seabed resources to 35 be regarded as "the common heritage of mankind". This strategy 35. See, UNCTAD Documents (E/Conf. 46/3, 1964); TD/183/Rev. 1, (TD/217, 1976), and (TD/236) and Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, documents (A/Conf. 62/23,1974); (A/Conf. 62/C. 1/L. 7) and (A/Conf. 62/C.2/L.36). 51 i s common i n the pre-conference period but i s also used on an ad  hoc basis, sometimes i n f r u s t r a t i o n when group objectives and proposals are repeatedly opposed by others and when there i s danger of l o s i n g group support. At UNCLOS I I I , this strategy i s common e s p e c i a l l y at the opening and c l o s i n g stages of the sessions. The "Pardo Proposal" (discussed i n Chapter I I ) , i d e n t i f i e d symbolic goals and a common r a l l y i n g point for LDCs. Generally, the declarations made at the pre-conference meetings are examples of attempts by the LDCs to p u b l i c i s e t h e i r positions and gain the widest possible support for these. In general, most strategies used by the LDCs are c a r e f u l l y planned. Some of these however, though c a r e f u l l y planned i n some instances, are used on an ad hoc basis i n other instances. For example, i n addi t i o n to p u b l i c i s i n g LDCs preferences by moving speeches and appeals, symbolic speeches are used when there i s a stalemate i n the bargaining process. This strategy i s also used as a means of generating peer group pressure on d i s s a t i s f i e d members. Other strategies such as s e i z i n g the i n i t i a t i v e , using s k i l l e d representatives and others analysed i n th i s chapter are likewise sometimes used without p r i o r planning. Despite this f a c t , however, they are used i n most instances f o r the achievement of s p e c i f i c goals planned before hand. A d d i t i o n a l l y , the strategies such as pre-conference preparation and the use of the UNCTAD Secr e t a r i a t were i n i t i a l l y chosen and retained because they are e s s e n t i a l to the operation of the Group of 77 as a representative of the large number of LDCs within i t . Without a knowledge of the possible c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t s among members or without the opportunity to inform members of the comp-l e x i t i e s of technical agenda items, group representation would be v i r t u a l l y impossible. These factors along with the others discussed above make these two strategies among the most important, e s p e c i a l l y for maintaining group unity and cohesiveness. 5 3 CHAPTER IV CONCLUSION SUMMARY OF MAIN FACTORS AFFECTING THE DIPLOMACY OF DEVELOPING STATES Conference diplomacy, as defined i n the introduction of t h i s study, i s the process by which negotiation i s pursued within conferences, and the methods by which the r e l a t i o n s between states are adjusted. This study has focussed on the diplomatic behaviour of developing states i n the Group of 77, with s p e c i a l reference to the selected forums, UNCTAD and UNCLOS I I I , and the issues negotiated i n them. The m u l t i l a t e r a l diplomacy of le s s developed countries i s analysed with s p e c i a l emphasis on the strategies that characterise t h e i r behaviour i n the conference environment. M u l t i l a t e r a l conference diplomacy has been an unprecedented and e s s e n t i a l development to changes i n the global environment, the UN environment and the p r i o r i t y of the issues i n these environments. New norms i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s and the increasing importance of the m u l t i l a t e r a l conference f a c i l i t a t e the development of con-ference diplomacy. These new rules were p r e c i p i t a t e d by changes i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system such as the sharp decline in the number of c o l o n i a l t e r r i t o r i e s and consequently an increase i n the number of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y independent countries. However, the continuing 54 economic and p o l i t i c a l dependence of the newly independent countries aggravated t h e i r low l e v e l subsistence and generated a number of problems which threatened t h e i r very existence. LDCs found that solutions to these problems were d i f f i c u l t and sometimes impossible to pursue only through u n i l a t e r a l , b i l a t e r a l , regional and other lim i t e d means of decision-making outside the UN system. For these and other reasons mentioned e a r l i e r i n t h i s study ( i n the analysis i n Chapter I I ) , they displayed an increasing tendency to r e l y on the UN and i t s agencies to p u b l i c i s e t h e i r problems and seek solutions to these. The i n s t i t u t i o n a l system at the UN l e v e l was, however, sometimes unfavourable to the LDCs. Thus i n the case of trade and re l a t e d economic matters they agitated f o r a new i n s t i t u t i o n . As a r e s u l t , UNCTAD, an i n s t i t u t i o n more sympathetic to Third World problems was formed. At conference sessions dealing with Law of the Sea issues LDCs sought to use the strategies they developed and perfected i n UNCTAD. The environment and nature of the issues were,however, somewhat d i f f e r e n t i n Law of the Sea i n s t i t u t i o n s . This made the use of the group strategies (practised i n UNCTAD) f a r less e f f e c t i v e i n t h i s context. In UNCLOS I I I , for instance, LDC states and developed states often became members of the same group when bargaining and seeking to resolve some issues. Yet when bargaining on other issues,they were 55 i n opposing groups. Despite the a d d i t i o n a l number of LDCs which become involved i n Law of the Sea negotiations, group formation did not always follow the pattern of develped versus developing countries as i n UNCTAD. In UNCLOS I I I , there was the tendency for countries to i d e n t i f y with others which shared common geographical features, when the issue was related to the geographical c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s they shared. For example, i n r e l a t i o n to the d e l i m i t a t i o n of national maritime j u r i s d i c t i o n a l boundaries, coastal states favour wide boun-daries extending as f a r as possible out into the ocean. On the other hand landlocked states favour narrower boundaries for coastal states because they .hope for as large a share as possible of the resources of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l seas. Thus, i n regard to t h i s and other r e l a t e d issues the positions of coastal developed and developing countries are often opposed to those of landlocked countries. Thus i t i s mainly i n r e l a t i o n to issues less relevant to the geographical c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of states and more relevant to economic considerations, that group formation i n UNCLOS I I I tends to be s i m i l a r to the pattern i n UNCTAD. This f l e x i b i l i t y of a l l i a n c e s makes attempts by the Group of 77 to try to maintain group unity on a l l issues i n UNCLOS I I I , v i r t u a l l y impossible. In contrast to the Law of the Sea i n s t i t u t i o n a l system, the i n s t i t u t i o n a l system of UNCTAD emerged at one of the high points of what has become l a r g e l y known as the North/South debate. 56 The debate started during the 1950's and reached a high point during the 1960's with the establishment of UNCTAD. It continued i n the 1970's reaching other high points such as during the 1972-73 Arab o i l embargo and the 1974 and 1975 Sixth and Seventh Special Sessions of the UN General Assembly. This debate was characterised by arguments, confrontation and moving, impassioned speeches denouncing the systems underlying the global economic order, and emphasising the need f o r reforms and r a d i c a l changes. Many of these appeals emanated from forums such as the non-aligned conferences and from analyses by Third World scholars. One of these scholars was Raul Prebisch, who l a t e r became the f i r s t Secretary General of UNCTAD. These factors combined encouraged LDCs to i d e n t i f y with each other and to group together to pursue common strategies i n UNCTAD. The i n t e r n a l structure of UNCTAD and some of i t s rules of procedure encouraged the formation of groups aligned along l i n e s of 36 developed versus developing states. These factors made j o i n t representation and group strategies much more conducive to i t s d e l i b e r a t i v e environment. A f i n a l comment may be made of LDCs st r a t e g i e s . These strategies are not l i k e l y to be permanent or unchangeable. For example, some of the main facors which led to t h e i r use as stated at the 36. See pp. 36-37. 57 beginning of t h i s chapter, were changes i n the nature and charac-t e r i s t i c s of the global and UN environments, the p r i o r i t y of issues and the nature of actors i n these. With further changes i n these and other determining fa c t o r s , adaptations and further modifications i n LDCs strategies can be expected. Recent trends i n d i c a t e some of the factors that could become instrumental i n future changes i n the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the Group of 77, and i n the strategies used by LDCs. For example, the growing power of OPEC states, has caused serious sporadic c o n f l i c t s among states i n the Group of 77. These c o n f l i c t s usually center around how the OPEC states use t h e i r bargaining strength and the determination of OPEC to keep the issue of o i l o f f the agenda of UNCTAD Conferences. OPEC states i n s i s t on pursuing t h e i r " o i l diplomacy" l a r g e l y outside of the UN system. This meets with the disapproval of many LDC states, e s p e c i a l l y those which stand to lose much by OPEC's diplomacy. The disagreements between OPEC states and other developing states can lead to serious c o n f l i c t s and d i s u n i t y , which i n turn may threaten the very existence of the Group. At the most recent conference of UNCTAD, held at Manila from May to June 1979, the matter of the i n c l u s i o n of o i l negotiations on the agenda of the conference arose. On this occasion there was an a l t e r c a t i o n between L a t i n American states and OPEC states about t h i s matter. The OPEC states maintained t h e i r objection to keeping the subject of o i l on the agenda of the 58 conference. L a t i n American and other Third World states which are severely affected by r i s i n g f u e l costs f e l t that such a c r u c i a l matter merited discussion at the Conference. The matter however, was unresolved, thus i t was not included on the agenda. Another disagreement s i m i l a r i n some aspects to the l a t t e r arose at UNCTAD V. A r i f t developed between Group of 77 states and the developed states. The developed states indicated a strong preference for discussing issues such as protectionism i n GATT. If these c o n f l i c t s p e r s i s t or increase i n magnitude, they are l i k e l y to a f f e c t further changes i n the diplomacy of LDCs. For example, i f there i s no agreement on the forum i n which issues l i k e protectionism or o i l may be discussed, there could be a breakdown of the e n t i r e process of negotiation between developed countries and LDCs. On the other hand, i f the issues are negotiated i n UNCTAD, the diplomatic behaviour of LDCs as analysed i n th i s study, may pe r s i s t longer. If issues such as protectionism are discussed i n GATT or elsewhere, the pattern of LDCs behaviour and the strategies they use w i l l most l i k e l y be modified to s u i t the change of i n s t i t u t i o n a l environment. 59 BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. United Nations Publications United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.. Report of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. (E/3799, 1964) United Nations Conference on Trade and Development P r o v i s i o n a l Agenda. (E/Conf. 46/1, 1964) Report to the Secretary General: The Signi f i c a n c e of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. (E/Conf. 46/140, 1964) Towards a New Trade P o l i c y f o r Development: Report by the Secretary-General of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development to UNCTAD I. (E/Conf. 46/3, 1964) New Directions and New Structures for Trade and Development: Report by the Secretary-General of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development to UNCTAD IV . (TD/183/Rev. 1, 1977) Proceedings of the United Nations Conference and Development. Third Session, Santiago 1972, Vols. I-IV. (TD/180, 1973) Evaluat ion of the Fourth Session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development: Report by the Secretary-General of UNCTAD to the General Assembly. (E/5870, 1976) Report of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-ment on i t s Fourth Session. (TD/217, 1976) United Nations Conference on Trade and Development: An Integrated Programme for Commodities. (TD/B/C. 1/166, 1976) United Nations Conference on Trade and Development: Declaration and P r i n c i p l e s of Action Programme of Lima by the Group of 77. 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International A f f a i r s No. 2 A p r i l 1977. Cox & Jacobson. ed., Anatomy of Influence. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973. Cordovez, D. "The Making of UNCTAD I n s t i t u t i o n a l Background and L e g i s l a t i v e History." Journal of World Trade Law, No. 1, 1967. Curzon, Gerald. M u l t i l a t e r a l Commercial Diplomacy. London: Michael Joseph, 1965. Friedeberg, A.S. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development of 1964. Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press, 1969. Gardner, R.N. & M i l l i k a n , M.F. ed., The Global Partnership. New York: Praeger, 1968. Gosovic, B. UNCTAD: C o n f l i c t and Compromise. Netherlands: S i j h t o f f , 1972. Hagras, K.M. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. New York: Praeger, 1965. Hamlin, D.L.B. ed., Diplomacy i n Evolution: 30th Couchiching Conference. Toronto, Uni v e r s i t y of Toronto Press, 1961. I k l e , F. How Nations Negotiate. New York: Harper & Row, 1964. Johnson B. & Zacher, M. ed., Canadian Foreign P o l i c y and the Law of the Sea. Vancouver: University of B r i t i s h Columbia Press, 1977. Juda, Lawrence. Ocean Space Rights: Developing U.S. P o l i c y . New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975. Kaufmann, Johan,; Conference Diplomacy. New York: Oceana, 1968. Kaufmann, Johan. How U.N. Decisions are Made. New York: Oceana, 1965. 62 Kay, David. The New Nations i n the United Nations 1960-1967. New York: Columbia Un i v e r s i t y Press, 1970. Kertesz, Stephen and Fitzsimons, M.A. ed., Diplomacy i n a Changing World. Notre Dame, Univ e r s i t y of Notre Dame Press, 1959. Mi h a i l o v i c , S. "Confrontation Without Real S i t u a t i o n s : Second UNCTAD." Review of International A f f a i r s 19, March, 1969. "An Interpretation of the Geneva Proceedings Part I . " Ocean Development and International Law. Vol. 3, No. 4, July-August, 1975. 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