UBC Theses and Dissertations

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UBC Theses and Dissertations

The Sarawak National Party and the interpretations of its nationalism 1979

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T H E S A R A W A K N A T I O N A L P A R T Y A N D T H E I N T E R P R E T A T I O N S O F I T S N A T I O N A L I S M by P A U L | K A D A N G anak D I N G G A T B . A . (Hons.), U n i v e r s i t y o f V i c t o r i a , 1 9 7 4 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Department o f P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e ) We a c c e p t t h i s t h e s i s as co n f o r m i n g to the r e q u i r e d s t a n d a r d THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA May, 1 9 7 9 P a u l Kadang anak Di n g g a t , 1 9 7 9 I n p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r an a d v a n c e d d e g r e e a t t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a , I a g r e e t h a t t h e L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e a n d s t u d y . I f u r t h e r a g r e e t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e c o p y i n g o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y p u r p o s e s may be g r a n t e d by t h e Head o f my D e p a r t m e n t o r by h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . I t i s u n d e r s t o o d t h a t c o p y i n g o r p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l n o t be a l l o w e d w i t h o u t my w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . ^ r P o l i t i c a l Science D e p a r t m e n t o f The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a 2075 W e s b r o o k P l a c e V a n c o u v e r , C a n a d a V6T 1W5 June 18, 1979 ABSTRACT T h i s s t u d y f o c u s s e s on the Sarawak N a t i o n a l P a r t y (SNAP) as the p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n sought t o cope w i t h changing c o n d i t i o n s i n s i d e Sarawak and M a l a y s i a . In p a r t i c u l a r , t h e t h e s i s i n v e s t i g a t e s two v a r i e - t i e s of n a t i o n a l i s m and t h e i r usage by SNAP f o r the purpose of s u r v i v a l and e x p a n s i o n . The a c t i v i t i e s and r i s e of SNAP a r e examined over t h r e e h i s t o r i c a l p e r i o d s which spanned from 1961 to 1978. As a p o l i t i c a l p a r t y SNAP f u n c t i o n s i n an e l e c t o r a l l y c o m p e t i t i v e s i t u a t i o n . I t s a r e a of o p e r a t i o n s i s l a r g e l y l i m i t e d to Sarawak, which i s a p l u r a l s t a t e . O u t s i d e the s t a t e i s the f e d e r a l government o f M a l a y s i a . These t h r e e f a c t o r s — e l e c t o r a l c o m p e t i t i o n , Sarawak's p l u r a l i t y , and the f e d e r a l government — p r o v i d e d t h r e e b road u n d e r l y i n g c o n d i t i o n s which h e l p e d shape the p a r t i c u l a r emphasis o f SNAP's n a t i o n a l i s m a t d i f f e r e n t t i m e s . In a d d i t i o n , t h e r e were immediate s t i m u l i which h e l p e d determine SNAP's c h o i c e o f n a t i o n a l i s m . A l t h o u g h SNAP was o f f i c i a l l y a m u l t i - r a c i a l p a r t y , i t i n i t i a l l y r e c r u i t e d most of i t s members from the Dayak community, the l a r g e s t e t h n i c group i n Sarawak. SNAP's l e a d e r s , who came from the Iban e t h n i c s u b - s t r a t u m c l e a r l y i n t e n d e d the Dayaks t o form t h e s t r a t e g i c e t h n i c group i n the s t a t e . The s w i t c h t o t e r r i t o r i a l n a t i o n a l i s m came about as a r e s u l t o f an i n t r a - a l l i a n c e c r i s i s which ended w i t h SNAP's o u s t e r from the government. The advocacy o f t e r r i t o r i a l n a t i o n a l i s m e n a b l e d the p a r t y to r e c r u i t a m u l t i - r a c i a l f o l l o w i n g and i n c r e a s e i t s s u p p o r t . The s a l i e n c e of t e r r i t o r i a l n a t i o n a l i s m c o n t i n u e d u n t i l 1974 a t which time SNAP was i n - v i t e d i n t o power by t h e government. T h i s i n v i t a t i o n , c o u p l e d w i t h t h e down- f a l l o f advocates o f t e r r i t o r i a l n a t i o n a l i s m from the p a r t y ' s l e a d e r s h i p , e n a b l e d SNAP to re-emphasise Dayak n a t i o n a l i s m . i i i TABLE OF CONTENTS Chap t e r Page I. INTRODUCTION 1 I I . DEMOGRAPHIC SETTING . . . . ,. 21 Ch i n e s e Malays Dayaks O c c u p a t i o n I I I . FORMATION OF SNAP 31 Formation o f SUPP and PANAS Dayak R e a c t i o n s The Founders o f SNAP P a r t y O b j e c t i v e s IV. MALAYSIA 55 Fo r m a t i o n o f M a l a y s i a SNAP's R e a c t i o n to M a l a y s i a A c c e p t a n c e A l l i a n c e B u i l d i n g C a b i n e t F o r m a t i o n V. ISSUES AND DAYAK INTERESTS .. 96 B o r n e o n i s a t i o n Language VI. SARAWAK NATIONALISM: MULTI-RACIALISM 118 Land Bumiputera Withdrawal from t h e Sarawak A l l i a n c e Sarawak f o r Sarawakians I V Chapter Page V I I . RE-EMERGENCE OF ETHNIC NATIONALISM 162 Debacle o f 1970 S t a t e P o l i t i c s E l e c t i o n M a n i f e s t o , 1974 B a r i s a n N a s i o n a l E t h n i c N a t i o n a l i s m V I I I . BASES OF SUPPORT 207 Bases o f Support, 1961-1965 E l e c t o r a l Performance, 1963 E x p a n s i o n o f P a r t y O r g a n i s a t i o n SNAP's L e a d e r s h i p E l e c t o r a l Performance, 1970 and 19 74 The 1978 P a r l i a m e n t a r y E l e c t i o n s IX. CONCLUSION 254 BIBLIOGRAPHY 267 LIST OF TABLES M a l a y s i a n P o p u l a t i o n S t a t i s t i c s : E s t i m a t e d P o p u l a t i o n by Regions and Groups, December, 1967 P r o p o r t i o n o f Melanaus and Dayaks i n S e l e c t e d A reas (by p e r c e n t a g e ) , 1 9 6 9 SNAP's Branches E s t a b l i s h e d from 1961 to 1965 by D i v i s i o n s and E t h n i c Areas .. D i s t r i c t C o u n c i l l o r s , i n 1963, C l a s s i f i e d A c c o r d i n g to P a r t y A l l e g i a n c e A lignment o f Dayak C o u n c i l l o r s by P a r t i e s .. SNAP's Branches E s t a b l i s h e d from 1966 to 1968 by D i v i s i o n s and E t h n i c Areas .. R a c i a l Breakdown o f SNAP's Members from 1965 to 1978 R a c i a l Breakdown of SNAP's N a t i o n a l C o u n c i l f rom 1972 to 1978 Sarawak G e n e r a l E l e c t i o n s , 19 70; E l e c t e d S t a t e and P a r l i a m e n t a r y C a n d i d a t e s i n SNAP by E t h n i c Groupings Sarawak G e n e r a l E l e c t i o n s , 1970; G e n e r a l S t a t e R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s by P a r t i e s and E t h n i c Groupings T a b l e s Page 11 C o e f f i c i e n t o f C o r r e l a t i o n o f E t h n i c C o m p o s i t i o n o f S t a t e C o n s t i t u e n c i e s , Showing Votes C a s t f o r Each P o l i t i c a l P a r t y : 1970 .. 235 12 Sarawak G e n e r a l E l e c t i o n s , 1979 and 1974; E t h n i c Breakdown o f SNAP's C a n d i d a t e s 237 13 Sarawak S t a t e E l e c t i o n s , 1974; Votes Cast and Members E l e c t e d by P a r t i e s 238 14 C o e f f i c i e n t o f C o r r e l a t i o n o f E t h n i c C o m p o s i t i o n o f S t a t e C o n s t i t u e n c i e s , Showing Votes C a s t f o r Each P o l i t i c a l P a r t y : 19 74 .. 239 15 P e r c e n t a g e o f E t h n i c C o m p o s i t i o n o f Each C o n s t i t u e n c y and P e r c e n t a g e o f Votes C a s t i n the 1974 E l e c t i o n s f o r Each C o n s t i t u e n c y .. 243 16 Sarawak P a r l i a m e n t a r y E l e c t i o n s , 19 78: Votes Cast and Members E l e c t e d by P a r t i e s 247 17 Sarawak P a r l i a m e n t a r y E l e c t i o n s , 1974 and 1978; SNAP's Votes i n Nine S e l e c t e d C o n s t i t u e n c i e s .. 248 v i i ACKNOWLEDGEMENT T h i s paper would not have been p o s s i b l e w i t h o u t the encouragement and a s s i s t a n c e r e c e i v e d from o t h e r s . My g r e a t e s t debt i s to the members o f my t h e s i s committee. Dr. P a u l Tennant p r o v i d e d encouragement and a d v i c e t h a t l e d to t h e s e l e c t i o n o f the r e s e a r c h t o p i c . Dr. John Wood gave the much-needed guidance d u r i n g the d i f f e r e n t s t a g e s o f r e s e a r c h . P r o f e s s o r R. S. M i l n e p r o v i d e d u s e f u l c r i t i c i s m which l e d to t h e c o m p l e t i o n o f t h i s t h e s i s . A s p e c i a l note o f thanks i s due to s e v e r a l f r i e n d s who went out of t h e i r way to g i v e me a s s i s t a n c e . To Nancy Nasser and Grace Cross f o r t h e i r h e l p i n t y p i n g the v a r i o u s d r a f t s o f t h i s paper, and to Dr. C.L. Lambertson f o r p o i n t i n g o ut my i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s . I a l s o owe a g r e a t d e a l to John and Dale Young whose h e l p has s u s t a i n e d me throughout the cour s e o f my stu d y i n Canada. My thanks a l s o to t h e i n t e r v i e w e e s , the s t a f f o f the Sarawak Muse um and t h a t o f the O f f i c e o f the R e g i s t r a r o f S o c i e t i e s , K u c h i n g , who were generous enough to g i v e me many hours o f t h e i r time. F i n a l l y , to Wendy Kadang w i t h o u t whose s u p p o r t , u n d e r s t a n d i n g , and p a t i e n c e t h i s t h e s i s would not have been completed. CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION This study i s concerned with the nationalism of a party within a p l u r a l society. In concrete terms, the "party" refers to the Sarawak National Party (SNAP) and "society" means Sarawak, and, at a l a t e r stage, Malaysia as w e l l . The s o c i e t i e s are p l u r a l i n the sense that they are c u l t u r a l l y diverse and that t h e i r " c u l t u r a l sections are organised into cohesive p o l i t i c a l sections.""'" What i s a party? The d e f i n i t i o n which has been adopted here i s one used by Ranney and Kendall, who define p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s as "autonomous organised groups that make nominations and contest elections i n the hope of eventually gaining and exe r c i s i n g control of the 2 personnel and p o l i c i e s of government." According to this c r i t e r i o n there i s l i t t l e question that SNAP i s a p o l i t i c a l party: i t was founded and registered as an autonomous body that i s a self-governing and s e l f - regulating unit; i t has i t s own c o n s t i t u t i o n and o f f i c e r s ; and i t l i s t s as one of i t s objectives the goal of e s t a b l i s h i n g a responsible and energetic government f or Sarawak. In the next few pages three sets of factors necessary f o r the analysis of SNAP's own nationalism are introduced; f i r s t , the concept of nationalism i t s e l f , p a r t i c u l a r l y what i t refers to and what i t means to a party; second, the p o l i t i c s of a p l u r a l society, p a r t i c u l a r l y the 2 assumptions which can be made about i t ; and t h i r d , the c o n d i t i o n s p r e v a i l i n g w i t h i n the s t a t e which h e l p t o determine p a r t y a c t i v i t i e s . But f i r s t a b r i e f h i s t o r y o f Sarawak and M a l a y s i a . 3 U n t i l 1963 Sarawak was a B r i t i s h crown c o l o n y . B r i t i s h p r e s e n c e i n the t e r r i t o r y was e s t a b l i s h e d f i r s t by James Brooke, an E n g l i s h a d v e n t u r e r , who a r r i v e d i n K u c h i n g i n 1839. K u c h i n g and the s u r r o u n d i n g r e g i o n a t the time was n o m i n a l l y under the S u l t a n a t e o f B r u n e i . The l o c a l g o v ernor persuaded James Brooke to a s s i s t i n q u e l l i n g a r e b e l l i o n by n e i g h b o u r i n g Dayak t r i b e s . As a reward f o r h i s s e r v i c e s he was made Rajah and was g i v e n the t e r r i t o r y o f what i s known as the F i r s t D i v i s i o n . T h i s was how Sarawak came i n t o b e i n g . Rajah James Brooke expanded h i s dominion by a n n e x a t i o n and p u r c h a s e s . H i s s u c c e s s o r , S i r C h a r l e s Brooke, expanded Sarawak to i t s p r e s e n t b o r d e r s . The end of Sarawak's t e r r i - t o r i a l e x p a n s i o n came i n 1917, a t which time the F i f t h D i v i s i o n was added to Sarawak. S i r C h a r l e s was succeeded by S i r C h a r l e s Vyner Brooke. In 1941, the c e n t e n a r y y e a r o f Brooke r u l e , he a b r o g a t e d h i s a b s o l u t e powers and e n a c t e d a new c o n s t i t u t i o n which e s t a b l i s h e d a q u a s i - c a b i n e t c a l l e d the Supreme C o u n c i l as w e l l as a l e g i s l a t u r e , named the C o u n c i l N e g r i , which the l e g i s l a t u r e had e l e c t e d and to which i t a p p o i n t e d members. A f t e r the Japanese o c c u p a t i o n o f 1942-1945 the Rajah was f a c e d w i t h the problem o f r e c o n s t r u c t i o n . R e a l i z i n g t h a t the t a s k was too immense, he ceded Sarawak to B r i t a i n . To t h i s a c t i o n , t h e r e was some l o c a l o p p o s i t i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y from the Malay community. 3 The c o l o n i a l e r a ended f o r Sarawak i n 1963 when i t was j o i n e d t o g e t h e r w i t h N o r t h Borneo (renamed Sabah), S i n g a p o r e , and Malaya. The new n a t i o n was named M a l a y s i a . S i n g a p o r e s e p a r a t e d from M a l a y s i a i n 1965. Sarawak embraces t h r e e major e t h n i c g r o u p s — C h i n e s e , Malay, and Dayaks. The f i r s t p o l i t i c a l p a r t y t o be o r g a n i s e d i n t h e s t a t e , the Sarawak U n i t e d P e o p l e ' s P a r t y (SUPP), was founded i n e a r l y 1959. Al t h o u g h SUPP was a m u l t i - r a c i a l p a r t y , i t was dominated by the C h i n e s e . Most n a t i v e (Malay and Dayak) l e a d e r s d i d n o t j o i n SUPP and, i n A p r i l , 1960, they formed P a r t y Negara Sarawak (PANAS). The e f f e c t i v e c o n t r o l o f PANAS was i n the hands of Malay l e a d e r s . Sarawak's t h i r d p o l i t i c a l p a r t y , t h e Sarawak N a t i o n a l P a r t y (SNAP), was founded i n A p r i l , 1961 by a group o f Ib a n s , t h e l a r g e s t s u b - s t r a t u m o f the Dayak group. L i k e SUPP, PANAS, and SNAP were m u l t i r a c i a l p a r t i e s . The f o u r t h p a r t y , B a r i s a n Ra'ayat J a t i Sarawak (BARJASA) was formed at t h e end of 1961. BARJASA's membership was o f f i c i a l l y l i m i t e d t o n a t i v e s . P a r t y Pesaka, which l i m i t e d i t s membership t o Dayaks, was formed by another group o f Ibans i n J u l y , 1972. The l a s t p a r t y t o be formed b e f o r e 1963 was the Sarawak Chinese A s s o c i a t i o n (SCA). I t s a p p e a l was m a i n l y t o t h e Chinese o f S i b u . To p r e p a r e f o r t h e t r a n s i t i o n t o s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t , s e v e r a l measures were i n s t i t u t e d by the c o l o n i a l government. F i r s t , t h e f r a n c h i s e was extended t o a l l p e r s o n s over t h e age of twenty-one who were c i t i z e n s or r e s i d e n t s of. Sarawak. S e c o n d l y , t h e s e a t s o f t h e C o u n c i l N e g r i ( t h e l e g i s l a t u r e ) were i n c r e a s e d t o t h i r t y - s i x e l e c t e d and t h r e e nominated 4 members. L a s t l y , Sarawak's f i r s t e l e c t i o n was to be " i n d i r e c t " t h rough a t i e r s y s t e m — a t the base were t w e n t y - f o u r D i s t r i c t C o u n c i l s , f o l l o w e d by f i v e D i v i s i o n a l A d v i s o r y C o u n c i l s (DAC), and f i n a l l y the C o u n c i l N e g r i . In 1963 the v o t e r s o f Sarawak e l e c t e d o n l y d i s t r i c t c o u n c i l l o r s to t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e c o u n c i l s . Above t h i s l e v e l , the coun- c i l l o r s s e l e c t e d among themselves the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s to t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e DACs. These i n t u r n s e n t a s p e c i f i e d number to the C o u n c i l N e g r i . D i r e c t e l e c t i o n s to the l o c a l c o u n c i l were completed i n June 1963, Sarawak's f i r s t government b e i n g formed by the Sarawak A l l i a n c e which was composed o f SNAP, BARJASA, Pesaka, and SCA. 4 Malaya, which i s a l s o v a r i o u s l y known as West M a l a y s i a and P e n i n s u l a r M a l a y s i a , had a l o n g e r p e r i o d o f r e c o r d e d h i s t o r y t h a n Sarawak. F o r i n s t a n c e , an I s l a m i c c i v i l i s a t i o n t h r i v e d i n M a l a c c a b e f o r e the coming o f the Europeans. The e a r l i e s t Europeans to be i n the r e g i o n were the Portuguese, l a t e r s u p p l a n t e d by the Dutch, who were i n t u r n themselves f o r c e d to withdraw a f t e r the E n g l i s h began to a s s e r t t h e i r p r e s e n c e a f t e r they e s t a b l i s h e d themselves i n Penang i n 1786. Two o t h e r s e t t l e m e n t s , namely Mala c c a and S i n g a p o r e , were added to Malaya and t o g e t h e r they came to be known as the S t r a i t s S e t t l e m e n t s . G r a d u a l l y B r i t i s h i n f l u e n c e and power p e n e t r a t e d i n l a n d — t o the s t a t e s of Perak, S e l a n g o r , Pahang and N e g r i S e m b i l a n — w h e r e the B r i t i s h governed through " i n d i r e c t r u l e . " These s t a t e s were p r o v i d e d w i t h B r i t i s h R e s i d e n t s , a l t h o u g h they were t e c h n i c a l l y n o t a d m i n i s t r a t o r s but mere a d v i s o r s t o the s u l t a n s , hence the term " i n d i r e c t r u l e . " To c o - o r d i n a t e 5 a d m i n i s t r a t i o n t hese s t a t e s were " f e d e r a t e d " i n 1895. F u r t h e r , B r i t i s h i n v o l v e m e n t s s p r e a d to o t h e r s t a t e s , namely J o h o r e , P e r l i s , Kedah, and K e l a n t a n , which i n 1914 became the " U n f e d e r a t e d S t a t e s . " A f t e r the Japanese o c c u p a t i o n , which ended i n 1945, the B r i t i s h e s t a b l i s h e d the Malayan Union. O p p o s i t i o n from the U n i t e d Malays N a t i o n a l O r g a n i s a t i o n (UMNO) p r o v e d too g r e a t , however, and on F e b r u a r y 1, 1948, the F e d e r a t i o n o f Malaya was formed. I t c o n s i s t e d o f e l e v e n s t a t e s . Malaya r e c e i v e d i t s independence from B r i t a i n on August 31, 195 7. I n May, 1961, the Malayan Prime M i n i s t e r , Tengku A b d u l Rahman, produced the M a l a y s i a P l a n which i n e f f e c t p r o p o s e d to e x t e n d the f e d e r a t i o n t o i n c l u d e S i n g a p o r e , N o r t h Borneo, and Sarawak. M a l a y s i a was e s t a b l i s h e d on September 16, 1963. N a t i o n a l i s m Amongst the s t u d e n t s o f n a t i o n a l i s m t h e r e i s a g e n e r a l agreement t h a t the term l a c k s a s i m p l e d e f i n i t i o n . L o u i s Snyder c a l l e d i t an " e l u s i v e term.""' Boyd S h a f e r bemoans the " v a r i e d meanings t h a t have been g i v e n the word (and k i n d r e d words) and the r e a l i t i e s and m y t h s — the a t t r i b u t e s ' — t h a t a r e commonly p r e s e n t . " In the end, S h a f e r c o n c l u d e s t h a t " n a t i o n a l i s m i s what the n a t i o n a l i s t s have made i t ; i t i s n o t a f i x e d c o n c e p t but a v a r y i n g c o m b i n a t i o n o f b e l i e f s and c o n d i t i o n s . " Any d e f i n i t i o n must be somewhat a r b i t r a r y . Y e t i t cannot be s a i d t h a t the c h o i c e o f the d e f i n i t i o n here i s t o t a l l y a r b i t r a r y , f o r i t i s i n t e n d e d to s e r v e as a u s e f u l c o n c e p t , i n the e x a m i n a t i o n o f the Sarawak 6 National Party. To th i s end i t i s necessary to determine the sense i n which the word i s employed. According to Carlton Hayes, i n s c i e n t i f i c research the term nationalism can be used i n four ways:^ (a) an actual h i s t o r i c a l process of nation-and-state-building; (b) a theory or an i d e a l ; (c) a set of a c t i v i t i e s , often of a party; (d) a sentiment of pride and loy a l t y . This paper does not propose to examine nationalism as a broad h i s t o r i c a l process, that i s , as a series of changes and events leading to the construction of the state, which i s taken to mean a country or a formal p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y organization of one or more ethnic groups. To do so would require the examination of other parties. Since t h i s paper i s concerned primarily with one pa r t i c u l a r party and i t s r e l a t i o n to nationalism, such an approach i s c l e a r l y beyond i t s scope. I t should be pointed out as well that t h i s paper w i l l not investigate the sentiment of nationalism; that i t , i t w i l l not measure the attitude and consciousness of party members, for such sentiment i s subsumed as part of i t s nationalism. Rather, as the term i s used here, i t refers to the party's theory or princ i p l e s underlying i t s a c t i v i t i e s during the processes of independence and nation-building. As a theory, nationalism may be perceived to be the guideline of party behaviour. In t h i s sense i t may appear to be an antecedent condition, an independent variable which w i l l determine p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s . But for the purpose of analysis, nationalism may be 7 c o n s i d e r e d not as a g i v e n o r a s t a t i c c o n c e p t . R a t h e r , i t i s p e r c e i v e d as a dependent v a r i a b l e which may change a c c o r d i n g t o t h e p r e v a i l i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s w i t h i n t h e s t a t e . The r o o t of n a t i o n a l i s m i s t h e " n a t i o n " , t h a t i s , "an a g g r e g a t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l s u n i t e d by o t h e r , as w e l l as p o l i t i c a l t i e s — t i e s commonly g of r a c e , r e l i g i o n , language, o r t r a d i t i o n . " C e n t r a l t o the d o c t r i n e of n a t i o n a l i s m i s the p r i n c i p l e o f n a t i o n a l s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n , which may be d e f i n e d as " t h e f i g h t of a group of p e o p l e who c o n s i d e r themselves s e p a r a t e and d i s t i n c t from o t h e r t o determine f o r themselves the s t a t e 9 i n which they w i l l l i v e and the form of government i t w i l l have." The European concept of n a t i o n a l i s m i n the n i n e t e e n t h and e a r l y t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y aimed at f i t t i n g p e o p l e w i t h the same c u l t u r e and language i n t o one s t a t e . I n i t s c o l o n i a l m a n i f e s t a t i o n , t h e p r i n c i p l e o f s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n , from which n a t i o n a l i s m d e r i v e d i t s l e g i t i m a c y , was extended t o i m p e r i a l t e r r i t o r i e s which u s u a l l y e n c l o s e d s e v e r a l e t h n i c groups. The term n a t i o n i n t h i s sense i s equated w i t h a c o u n t r y o r n a t i o n - s t a t e . I t does not r e f e r to a s p e c i f i c c u l t u r a l o r e t h n i c community whose members e n j o y e q u a l r i g h t s , i n h a b i t a g i v e n t e r r i t o r y , and o p e r a t e i n a common economic system. I n i t s t e r r i t o r i a l sense the sentiment of n a t i o n a l i s m r e f e r s to t h e " a s p i r a t i o n o f t h e c o l o n i s e d p o p u l a t i o n f o r s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t o f t h e new p o l i t i c a l community whose b o u n d a r i e s were e s t a b l i s h e d by the c o l o n i s e r . " ^ The major c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f t h i s n a t i o n a l i s m i s t h a t i t i s based on t e r r i t o r y ; hence i t i s t e r r i t o r i a l n a t i o n a l i s m , t h e 8 assumption b e i n g t h a t l o c a l l o y a l t i e s a r e s u p p l a n t e d by a b r o a d e r l o y a l t y to t h e s t a t e as a r e s u l t of t h e growths of b u r e a u c r a c y and i n d u s t r y and t h e improvement i n communication. The o t h e r v a r i e t y of n a t i o n a l i s m i s c e n t r e d around the a s p i r a - t i o n s and a s s e r t i o n s of an e t h n i c group. Such a group may be based on what has been termed as " c o n g r u i t i e s of b l o o d , speech, and customs . . But t h i s i s n o t always the c a s e . E t h n i c c o n s c i o u s n e s s " i s s i t u a t i o n a l l y i n d u c e d and determined and t h e r e f o r e u l t i m a t e l y d e f i n a b l e 12 o n l y i n s u b j e c t i v e terms." O b v i o u s l y , not e v e r y e t h n i c group a s s e r t s n a t i o n a l i s t i c demands; but i n e v e r y m u l t i - e t h n i c s t a t e t h e r e e x i s t s the p o t e n t i a l f o r c o m p e t i t i v e n a t i o n a l i s m s which are e t h n i c a l l y based. They c o u l d become "a s e t of s o l i d a r i t y p a t t e r n s . . . which command the l o y a l t y r i v a l i n g i n some s i t u a t i o n s , t h a t which the s t a t e i t s e l f i s a b l e ,13 t o generate.' That i s , i n m u l t i - n a t i o n a l s t a t e s t h e r e e x i s t s the p o t e n t i a l f o r e t h n i c n a t i o n a l i s t groups to c h a l l e n g e t h e a u t h o r i t y of the s t a t e . An example of a c o u n t r y which i s f a c i n g e t h n i c i n s u r g e n t s i s Burma, where t h e Karens and Shans, e t h n i c m i n o r i t i e s , have fough t 14 s i n c e t h e 1960's f o r the r i g h t to secede. In s h o r t , e t h n i c n a t i o n a l i s m i s p o t e n t i a l l y d i s r u p t i v e . There i s , i n e f f e c t , more than j u s t one type of n a t i o n a l i s m . Rupert Emerson, f o r i n s t a n c e , w r i t e s i n an a r t i c l e on A f r i c a t h a t The h e a r t df t h e m a t t e r i s the s i multaneous e x i s t e n c e of a t l e a s t t h r e e major l e v e l s of s o c i a l and p o l i t i - c a l community, and e x i s t e n c e which i n v o l v e s not o n l y l i v i n g s i d e by s i d e , but a l s o s t r o n g l y and r e c i p r o c a l l y i n f l u e n c i n g one a n o t h e r . The t h r e e l e v e l s a r e t h e t r a d i t i o n a l s o c i e t i e s of the p a s t , the c o l o n i a l and 9 c o l o n i a l l y - d e r i v e d s t r u c t u r e s of t h e p r e s e n t , and the s e v e r a l P a n - A f r i c a n a s p i r a t i o n s . 1 5 James Coleman, a g a i n w r i t i n g on A f r i c a , n o t m e r e l y a s s e r t s a s i m i l a r view, he emerges w i t h a schema as w e l l . S i n c e he l i m i t s h i s concept of n a t i o n a l i s m to t e r r i t o r i e s w i t h c o l o n i a l p a s t s , h i s schema i s u s e f u l f o r t h e purpose of u n d e r s t a n d i n g Sarawak and M a l a y s i a n n a t i o n a l i s m s . H i s v e r s i o n of n a t i o n a l i s m , synonomous w i t h the n o t i o n o f t e r r i t o r i a l n a t i o n a l i s m as employed h e r e , r e c o g n i s e s the " v a r i e t y of forms o f s e l f a s s e r t i o n " amongst e x - c o l o n i a l p e o p l e s . The u s e f u l n e s s of Coleman's schema i s t h a t i t i l l u m i n a t e s t h e A f r i c a n s i t u a t i o n by r e c o g n i s i n g the e x i s t e n c e of "modes of s e l f a s s e r t i o n " above and below t e r r i t o r i a l n a t i o n a l i s m . In c e r t a i n s i t u a t i o n s t h e s e n a t i o n a l i s m s ( o r "modes o f s e l f - a s s e r t i o n " o r " s o l i d a r i t y p a t t e r n s " ) are c a p a b l e of becoming independent v a r i a b l e s i n the sense t h a t they a c t as the major d e t e r m i - n a n t s or m o t i v a t i o n s of p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s . I f t h i s i s t r u e , t h e n i t i s u s e f u l t o adapt Coleman's schema t o the Sarawak s i t u a t i o n i n o r d e r 16 t o i l l u m i n a t e t h e p o i n t . The f o c i o f n a t i o n a l i s m may be b r o a d l y c l a s s i f i e d as e t h n i c groups and t e r r i t o r y . Under the e t h n i c h e a d i n g are f o u r s u b - p a r t s , namely l o c a l i t i e s , t r i b e s , s u p e r - t r i b e s , and n a t i o n a l i t i e s . F i r s t , a t the base t h e r e e x i s t d i f f e r e n t l o c a l i t i e s w hich a r e g e o g r a p h i c a l l y s m a l l and which c o n t a i n o n l y a segment of a p a r t i c u l a r t r i b e . One example of a l o c a l i t y i n Sarawak i s the S a r i b a s a r e a , an e n c l a v e i n the Second D i v i s i o n p o p u l a t e d by S a r i b a s Ibans, from which most of SNAP's foun d e r s came. The c o r r e s p o n d i n g sentiment of a r e g i o n o r 10 l o c a l i t y can be termed as " l o c a l i s m . " Second, at the l e v e l above l o c a l i t i e s a r e t r i b e s , d e f i n e d as s m a l l - s c a l e c o l l e c t i v i t i e s w hich share e t h n o - l i n g u i s t i c c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . In Sarawak, examples of t r i b e s a r e t h e I bans, the Kayans, and t h e Kenyahs. N a t i o n a l i s m o r p o l i t i c a l a s s e r t i o n s of t r i b e s such as t h e s e are sometimes p e j o r a t i v e l y l a b e l l e d " t r i b a l i s m . " T h i r d , t h e s e t r i b e s sometimes a c q u i r e a b r o a d e r s o l i d a r i t y p a t t e r n i n t h a t they d e f i n e t h e i r i d e n t i t y and s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s i n terms of a l a r g e r s u p e r - t r i b e . The name f o r the c o l l e c t i v i t y o f t r i b e s l i s t e d above i s "Dayak." The c o r r e s p o n d i n g sentiment and a c t i v i t i e s by which they s t r i v e f o r s e l f - i d e n t i f i c a t i o n and s o l i d a r i t y of t h i s e t h n i c composite i s termed Dayak n a t i o n a l i s m . At t h i s s t a g e t h e r e may e x i s t o t h e r s o u r c e s of e t h n i c n a t i o n a l i s m . In a d d i t i o n t o t h e Dayak community, Sarawak has two o t h e r s , namely the C h i n e s e and th e Malay- Melanau communal groups, each of which has the p o t e n t i a l o f a s s e r t i n g i t s e t h n i c n a t i o n a l i s m . F o r i n s t a n c e , i n the c a s e of t h e Malays and most Melanaus the f o c u s of t h e i r communal a s s e r t i o n may i n c l u d e t h e p e r p e t u a t i o n of the I s l a m i c r e l i g i o n . That i s , a f a c t o r of t h e i r e t h n i c i t y o r e t h n i c n a t i o n a l i s m may be r e l i g i o u s e x p a n s i o n . Given the f a c t t h a t most Dayaks are e i t h e r a n i m i s t s o r C h r i s t i a n s , Muslim p r o s e l y t i s i n g c o u l d w e l l become a c o n t e n t i o u s i s s u e between the Dayaks on the one hand, and t h e Malays and most of the Melanaus on the o t h e r . In s h o r t , i n the p r o c e s s o f s e l f - i d e n t i f i c a t i o n e t h n i c n a t i o n a l i s m may i n v o l v e inter-communal antagonism. Deep se a t e d c l e a v a g e s c e n t e r i n g around such c u l t u r a l p r o p e r t i e s as r e l i g i o n and language c o u l d l e a d t o 11 i n t e r - e t h n i c c o n f l i c t . I t s h o u l d be p o i n t e d out t h a t antagonism between e t h n i c groups need not be permanent. In c i r c u m s t a n c e s where b o t h groups c o u l d b e n e f i t by t h e i r common s o l i d a r i t y , i t i s p o s s i b l e f o r t h e two t o c o l l a b o r a t e , however temporary o r d i f f i c u l t t h i s a c t may t u r n out t o be. I n the case of Sarawak, t h e Malays and Dayaks u t i l i s e t h e f a c t t h a t b o t h a r e n a t i v e s . E t h n i c i d e n t i f i c a t i o n i n t h i s sense i s used t o l e g i t i m i s e c l a i m s f o r p o l i t i c a l and economic advantages. I n t h e case o f Sarawak and M a l a y s i a t h e c o l l e c t i v e name f o r Dayaks, Melanaus, and Malays i s Bumiputera. T h e i r p r i v i l e g e s a r e e n s h r i n e d i n t h e F e d e r a l 17 C o n s t i t u t i o n . There a r e t h e r e f o r e d i f f e r e n t v a r i e t i e s o f e t h n i c s e l f - i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s . E t h n i c i d e n t i t y i s ambiguous, and t h e c h o i c e o f which e t h n i c group a p e r s o n i d e n t i f i e s h i m s e l f may be dependent upon the i s s u e a t hand and the p a r t i c u l a r advantage which a c o u r s e o f a c t i o n would g i v e him. The second c o n c e r n o f n a t i o n a l i s m i s t e r r i t o r y , w hich i s of two s o r t s . The f i r s t i s a c o l o n i a l u n i t , such as Sarawak o r N o r t h Borneo. The c o r r e s p o n d i n g a c t i v i t i e s and sentiment are those o f t e r r i t o r i a l n a t i o n a l i s m . The o t h e r k i n d o f n a t i o n a l i s m emerges when c o l o n i a l t e r r i - t o r i e s a r e u n i t e d under a common a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p o l i t i c a l u n i t . I n the case of Sarawak t h i s u n i t was t h e F e d e r a t i o n o f M a l a y s i a which i n 1963 brought t o g e t h e r t h e two. B r i t i s h c o l o n i e s of N o r t h Borneo and Sarawak, the F e d e r a t i o n of Malaya, and S i n g a p o r e . From t h e p e r s p e c t i v e s o f t h e s e 12 constituent p a r t i e s , the l o y a l t y to the new federation and the acceptance of i t s p o l i t i c a l assertion requires a higher l e v e l of nationalism, defined here as pan-nationalism. How are these d i f f e r e n t types of nationalisms activated? According to Charles Anderson, Fred von der Mehden, and Crawford Young, from the viewpoint of the c i t i z e n the r o l e s e l e c t i o n i s dependent on 18 the c o n f l i c t s i t u a t i o n . C o n f l i c t s which give r i s e to n a t i o n a l i s t i c assertions may hinge upon language p o l i c y , l o c a l i s a t i o n of the c i v i l 19 service, e l e c t o r a l competition, or resource a l l o c a t i o n . Party and Nationalism The discussion above has attempted to i d e n t i f y the relevant v a r i e t i e s of nationalisms. I t has pinpointed where these nationalisms may be found. I t has not, however, t r i e d to speculate on how d i f f e r e n t nationalisms can be activated, and, in a sense, created by a party. This paper does not presume nationalism to be a set of "givens." To do so i s to ignore the r o l e of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s in the r i s e of nationalism. Obviously not a l l v a r i e t i e s of nationalisms owe t h e i r o r i g i n s to p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , but t h i s should not detract from the fact that p a r t i e s can act as v e h i c l e s which i n i t i a t e and stimulate the growth of nationalism. Consider, for instance, the implication for a p o l i t i c a l party 20 when i t s assumed "terminal community" i s merely an ethnographical category or expression i n the sense that i t i s too fragmented to assert 13 i t s communal demands. In t h i s s i t u a t i o n n a t i o n a l i s m cannot be assumed to be a s e t of " g i v e n s . " A f t e r a l l , n a t i o n a l i s m i s a m a t t e r of s e l f - i d e n t i f i c a t i o n : t o t h i s end i t may be h y p o t h e s i s e d t h a t where one f i n d s a p a u c i t y of communal demands and a s s e r t i o n s — t h a t i s , where t h e r e i s an absence of opportune n a t i o n a l i s m which a p a r t y can champion i n o r d e r to a t t r a c t p o l i t i c a l s u p p o r t — t h e p a r t y may c r e a t e i t . The b a s i s of such " c r e a t i v e " n a t i o n a l i s m may be a communal group o r i t may be a t e r r i t o r y . In the case of SNAP, what c o u l d be e x p e c t e d i s t h a t i t might have f o s t e r e d i t s own i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f n a t i o n a l i s m founded, f o r i n s t a n c e , b o t h on t e r r i t o r y (Sarawak) and on community (Dayak). In o r d e r t o e v a l u a t e a p a r t y ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of i t s n a t i o n a l i s m , i t i s n e c e s s a r y to examine i t s a c t i v i t i e s . N a t i o n a l i s m may become a f a c t o r i n a p a r t y ' s p u r s u i t of p o l i t i c a l s u r v i v a l and p o p u l a r i t y . D a n i e l B e l l , i n h i s " E t h n i c i t y and S o c i a l Change", p o i n t s out t h e e f f i c a c y of t h e s e t e r r i t o r i a l and e t h n i c o r i e n t a t i o n s i n such a s i t u a t i o n . He says t h a t e t h n i c i t y . . . i s b e s t u n d e r s t o o d . . . as a s t r a t e g i c c h o i c e by i n d i v i d u a l s who, i n o t h e r c i r - cumstances, would choose o t h e r group memberships as a means o f g a i n i n g power and p r i v i l e g e s . I n s h o r t , i t i s the s a l i e n c e not t h e p e r s o n a which has to be the a x i a l l i n e f o r e x p l a n a t i o n . And because s a l i e n c e may be t h e d e c i s i v e v a r i a b l e , t h e attachment of e t h n i c i t y may f l u s h o r f a d e v e r y q u i c k l y depending on p o l i t i c a l and economic c i r c u m s t a n c e s . 2 1 B e l l i s p r i m a r i l y concerned w i t h e t h n i c n a t i o n a l i s m , but at t h e same time he r e c o g n i s e s the u t i l i t y of " o t h e r group membership" as an 14 avenue by which p o l i t i c a l power may be a c h i e v e d . As c o n d i t i o n s w i t h i n the count r y change, the p a r t y a d j u s t s to new r e a l i t i e s by emphasising c e r t a i n elements o f i t s n a t i o n a l i s m w h i l e s h e l v i n g o t h e r s ; i t may t e m p o r a r i l y r e j e c t one v a r i e t y f o r a n o t h e r . The purpose o f t h i s paper i s to a n a l y s e the n a t i o n a l i s m o f SNAP, p a r t i c u l a r l y the ways i n which t h e n a t u r e o f SNAP's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f i t s n a t i o n a l i s m changed to meet v a r y i n g s i t u a t i o n s . As a v e r y b road h y p o t h e s i s , the problem may be s t a t e d t h u s : SNAP's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f i t s n a t i o n a l i s m changed to meet changing c o n d i t i o n s . The o t h e r f a c t o r n e c e s s a r y f o r the a n a l y s i s o f n a t i o n a l i s m concerns the p o l i t i c s i n the s o c i e t y i t s e l f . I n t h i s c a s e i t i s a p l u r a l s o c i e t y i n the sense t h a t c e r t a i n segments o f the p o p u l a t i o n a r e o r g a n i s e d i n t o d i s t i n c t and p o l i t i c i s e d communal groups. At the r o o t of such a group i s the e x i s t e n c e o f s e n t i m e n t s o r l o y a l t i e s which the p a r t y may have c r e a t e d , s t i m u l a t e d , and a g g r e g a t e d . The p r e s e n c e o f such l o y a l t i e s i s p o l i t i c a l l y i m p o r t a n t because c i t i z e n s o f a p l u r a l s o c i e t y l i k e Sarawak who p o s s e s s such s e n t i m e n t s tend to be r e s p o n s i v e to communal a p p e a l s . T h i s p r o p e n s i t y i s seen to have a d i r e c t b e a r i n g on most p o l i t i c a l p l a n s which aim to e l i c i t p u b l i c s u p p o r t i n a system o f p o l i t i c a l c o m p e t i t i o n such as Sarawak and M a l a y s i a . That i s , the common e x p e c t a t i o n s o f the primacy o f communal c r i t e r i a produces the s e l f - f u l f i l l i n g prophecy o f communa l l y - o r i e n t e d c o m p e t i t i v e s t r a t e g i e s i n v i r t u a l l y a l l walks o f l i f e . 2 2 In t h i s paper an approach f o r p o l i t i c a l s u p p o r t f a l l s under the g e n e r a l r u b r i c o f e t h n i c n a t i o n a l i s m — t h a t i s , as communal o r e t h n i c p o l i t i c a l 15 a s s e r t i o n s . F o r i n s t a n c e , i t has been s a i d t h a t i n a c u l t u r a l l y p l u r a l and e l e c t o r a l l y c o m p e t i t i v e s o c i e t y — o f which Sarawak i s o n e — a s p i r i n g p o l i t i c i a n s tend t o "make a p p e a l s to t h e most e a s i l y m o b i l i s e d 2 3 communal i n t e r e s t s . " I f t h i s i s h y p o t h e s i s e d as a statement o f g e n e r a l tendency, i t may be e x p e c t e d t h a t SNAP's a c t i v i t i e s would show e v i d e n c e o f b e i n g a f u n c t i o n o f e t h n i c demands. I t f o l l o w s t h a t where t h e r e e x i s t s a p a u c i t y of such demands, t h e p a r t y might even c r e a t e them. I t c o u l d be h y p o t h e s i s e d t h a t a p o l i t i c a l p a r t y adapts t o changing s i t u a t i o n s and a c c e l e r a t e s i t s own growth by emphasising d i f f e r e n t v a r i e t i e s o f n a t i o n a l i s m . S i n c e t h e a p p r o p r i a t e v a r i e t y may not have e x i s t e d , a p a r t y might have t o s u p p l y the " m i s s i n g " f a c t o r s . I t might have t o c r e a t e the r i g h t framework ( f o r i n s t a n c e a s t a t e ) o r bases ( f o r example, a myth o f common o r i g i n s and h i s t o r y , and c u l t u r e d i f f e r e n c e s ) . By i n d u l g i n g i n t h i s s o r t o f c r e a t i v e n a t i o n a l i s m a p a r t y might expand i t s p o l i t i c a l c o n s t i t u e n c y . C o n c e i v a b l y , as a p o l i t i c a l p a r t y , SNAP c o u l d take an approach by a r t i c u l a t i n g and a g g r e g a t i n g Iban demands over t h o s e of s i m i l a r s u b - e t h n i c o r t r i b a l u n i t s . Such an o b v i o u s p r e f e r e n c e would i d e n t i f y SNAP as a s u b - e t h n i c p a r t y . SNAP c o u l d a l s o expand i t s scope o f a c t i v i t i e s to Dayaks, t h e e t h n i c c a t e g o r y i n which the Ibans b e l o n g . The o t h e r o p t i o n which i s opened t o i t l i e s i n an a p p e a l to t h e a d d i t i o n a l s u p p o r t o f a l l of t h e e t h n i c groups. The base of m u l t i - e t h n i c s o l i d a r i t y such as t h i s i s no l o n g e r a s o c i a l c a t e g o r y but a common t e r r i t o r y , namely Sarawak. In the M a l a y s i a n c o n t e x t t h i s would mean Sarawak n a t i o n a l i s m . From Sarawak's v i e w p o i n t , 1 6 l o y a l t y t o M a l a y s i a i s p a n - n a t i o n a l i s m . There a r e , t h e r e f o r e , s e v e r a l p o t e n t i a l v a r i e t i e s of n a t i o n a l i s m . C o n d i t i o n s The p r e v a i l i n g c o n d i t i o n s b e h i n d SNAP's v a r i o u s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of i t s n a t i o n a l i s m w i l l be n o t e d i n th e s u c c e e d i n g c h a p t e r s . F o r t h e moment i t i s s u f f i c i e n t t o i l l u s t r a t e what i s meant by the term c o n d i t i o n s . B a s i c c o n d i t i o n s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the development of n a t i o n - a l i s m o r i g i n a t e d from s e v e r a l s o u r c e s . F o r i n s t a n c e , t h e r e may be a change o f s t a t u s f o r t h e t e r r i t o r y . In the case of Sarawak t h i s i n v o l v e d t h e r e d u c t i o n of f u l l s o v e r e i g n t y to a mere component of a f e d e r a t i o n — M a l a y s i a . The a c c e p t a n c e of t h e r e l e g a t i o n of s t a t u s by SNAP then r e q u i r e d a r e - i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of i t s n a t i o n a l i s m i n t h a t SNAP c o u l d no l o n g e r a s p i r e t o be t h e dominant " n a t i o n a l " p a r t y ; b e i n g based s o l e l y i n Sarawak, i t c o u l d a t b e s t hope to be t h e major s t a t e p a r t y , n o t a n a t i o n a l one. As w i l l be seen i n Chapter IV, such a p r o s p e c t was p a r t l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r SNAP's o p p o s i t i o n t o M a l a y s i a . Most i m p o r t a n t , SNAP's u l t i m a t e a c c e p t a n c e of t h e M a l a y s i a P l a n i n d u c e d i t to d e f i n e and to c l a r i f y t h e t h r u s t o f i t s n a t i o n a l i s m so t h a t SNAP became even more o p e n l y p r o t e c t i v e of t h e Dayaks and t h e i r i n t e r e s t s than they were b e f o r e t h e M a l a y s i a p r o p o s a l . The second c o n d i t i o n may emerge from what can be termed as a c r i s i s i n which a p a r t y f a c e s c o m p e t i t i o n w i t h i n t h e g o v e r n i n g c o a l i t i o n o r i s a c t u a l l y o u s t e d from power. In such a s i t u a t i o n a 17 r e - i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of a p a r t y ' s t h e o r y of n a t i o n a l i s m may form an e f f e c t i v e propaganda s t r a t e g y to a t t r a c t p o l i t i c a l sympathy. In o t h e r words, a r e - d e f i n e d n a t i o n a l i s m can h e l p a p a r t y t o f o c u s on i s s u e s i n a way t h a t can g e n e r a t e support from t h e c i t i z e n s . From t h i s p e r s p e c t i v e , the i n c o r p o r a t i o n of a n a t i o n a l i t y ' s o r even a community's i n t e r e s t s i s s e l f - s e r v i n g . I t m a t t e r s , t h e r e f o r e , which groups r e c e i v e the a t t e n t i o n of t h e p a r t y , f o r t h i s s e l e c t i o n i n d i c a t e s which groups a p a r t y a s p i r e s to r e p r e s e n t . In the case of SNAP, t o the degree t h a t i t a r t i c u l a t e s Dayak i n t e r e s t s and r e c e i v e s Dayak s u p p o r t , i t may be s a i d t o be a Dayak p a r t y . The t h i r d g e n e r a l c o n d i t i o n i s the o p p o s i t e of t h e second one i n t h a t i n s t e a d of b e i n g t h r e a t e n e d w i t h e x p u l s i o n t h e p a r t y i s i n v i t e d i n t o power. The problem f o r a p a r t y i n such a s i t u a t i o n i s t h a t t h i s e x i s t i n g n a t i o n a l i s m , which might have had a r emarkable s u c c e s s i n drawing p o l i t i c a l s u p p o r t , may now become a s t u m b l i n g b l o c k . The v e r y government which has been s u b j e c t e d t o i t s c r i t i c i s m s now s u ddenly emerges as a p o t e n t i a l p a r t n e r . I n s h o r t , changing c o n d i t i o n s a g a i n demand a r e - i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of i t s n a t i o n a l i s m . SNAP was f a c e d w i t h j u s t such a s i t u a t i o n i n l a t e 1974. I t s r e l a t i o n s to t h e i n v i t a t i o n and t h e subsequent treatment of i t s n a t i o n a l i s m a r e d i s c u s s e d i n Chapter V I I . 18 S t r u c t u r e o f t h e T h e s i s The r e s t o f t h e t h e s i s i s d i v i d e d i n t o seven c h a p t e r s . Chapter I I e l a b o r a t e s on the p l u r a l n a t u r e of Sarawak's s o c i e t y . I t a l s o b r i n g s i n t o p e r s p e c t i v e the m i n o r i t y s i t u a t i o n of t h e Iban e t h n i c group i n the M a l a y s i a n f e d e r a t i o n . SNAP's e t h n i c n a t i o n a l i s m c r y s t a l l i s e s around a number of i s s u e s . The f o r m a t i o n s of SNAP and t h e two p a r t i e s w hich preceded i t a r e d i s c u s s e d i n Chapter I I I . Chapter IV i s devo t e d t o the M a l a y s i a P l a n and SNAP's r e a c t i o n s to t h e f o r m a t i o n of the f e d e r a t i o n and t r a c e s SNAP's a c t i v i t i e s as i t t r i e d t o f o r g e an a l l i a n c e w i t h o t h e r p a r t i e s and as i t h e l p e d t o form Sarawak's f i r s t e l e c t e d government. Chapter V d i s c u s s e s B o r n e o n i s a t i o n and language, two o f t h e i s s u e s which dominated p o l i t i c a l and communal i n t e r e s t s f o r s e v e r a l y e a r s a f t e r independence. In Chapter VI t h e emergence o f SNAP's m u l t i - r a c i a l i s m a r e d i s c u s s e d ; the reappearance o f e t h n i c n a t i o n a l i s m i s the t o p i c o f Chapter V I I ; and Chapter V I I I i s devoted t o SNAP's bases of support and t h e growth of i t s o r g a n i z a t i o n . The l a s t c h a p t e r summarises the f i n d i n g s o f t h i s study. F o o t n o t e s t o Chapter I. 19 ..1. A l v i n Rabushka and Kenneth S h e p s l e , P o l i t i c s i n P l u r a l S o c l e i t e s : A Theory of Democratic I n s t a b i l i t y (Columbus, Ohio: C h a r l e s E. M e r r i l l , 1972), p.21. What they mean i s t h a t i n p o l i t i c s c u l t u r a l groups u s u a l l y c o a l e s c e around t h e i r own o r g a n i s a t i o n s . Where t h e r e i s more than one o r g a n i s a t i o n per group, c o m p e t i t i o n c o u l d o c c u r between the p a r t i e s f o r c o n t r o l o f the group. 2. A u s t i n Ranney and W i l l m o o r e K e n d a l l , Democracy and the American P a r t y System (New York: H a r c o u r t , B r a c e , 1956), p.85. 3. B e f o r e t h i s Sarawak was r u l e d by t h e Rajahs Brooke. F o r an e x c e l l e n t account o f the Brooke d y n a s t y , see Steven Runciman, The White Rajahs (Cambridge: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1960). 4. For a cogent account of Malaya up t o 1957 see R.S. M i l n e and Diane K. Mauzy, P o l i t i c s and Government of M a l a y s i a (Vancouver: U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia P r e s s ) , pp.1-43. 5. L o u i s L. Snyder, The Dynamics of N a t i o n a l i s m ( P r i n c e t o n : D. Van Nos- t r a n d , 1964), p . l . 6. Boyd C. S h a f e r , N a t i o n a l i s m : Myth and R e a l i t y (New York: H a r c o u r t , b r a c e , 1955), p.7. 7. C a r l t o n J.H. Hayes, E s s a y s on N a t i o n a l i s m (New York: M a c m i l l a n , 1926), pp.5-6. 8. R o y a l I n s t i t u t e o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , N a t i o n a l i s m (London: Frank Cass and Co., 1963), p.17. 9. J . P i a n o and R. O l s o n , The I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s D i c t i o n a r y (New York: H o l t , R i n e h a r t , and Winston, 1969), p.121. 10. Crawford Young, P o l i t i c s i n the Congo ( P r i n c e t o n , New J e r s e y : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1965), p. 234. 11. C l i f f o r d G e e r t z , "The I n t e g r a t i v e R e v o l u t i o n : P r i m o r d i a l Sentiments and C i v i l P o l i t i c s i n t h e New S t a t e s , " i n C l i f f o r d G e e r t z , e t . , O l d S o c i e t i e s and New S t a t e s (New York: F r e e P r e s s , 1963), p.109. 12. James D. Coleman, " T r a d i t i o n and N a t i o n a l i s m i n T r o p i c a l A f r i c a , " op. c i t . , p.11. I n o t h e r words, a p e r s o n b e l o n g s t o a p a r t i c u l a r e t h n i c group when t h a t p e r s o n i d e n t i f i e s w i t h t h a t group. In t h i s way e t h n i c i t y depends on s e l f - i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ( C y n t h i a E n l o e , E t h n i c Con- f l i c t and P o l i t i c a l Development [Boston: L i t t l e Brown and Co., 1973], P.15). 13. C h a r l e s W. Anderson, F r e d R. von der Mehden, and Crawford Young, I s s u e s of P o l i t i c a l Development (Englewood C l i f f s : P r e n t i c e H a l l , I n c . , 1967), p.17. 20 14. F o r o t h e r i n s t a n c e s of s e p a r a t i s t movements see, f o r example, Walker Connor, " S e l f D e t e r m i n a t i o n : The New Phase", World P o l i t i c s V o l . XX, No. 1 (October, 1967), p.52; Walker Connor, "The P o l i t i c s o f Ethno- n a t i o n a l i s m " , J o u r n a l o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , V o l . XXVII, No. 1 (1973). 15. Rupert Emerson, " N a t i o n - B u i l d i n g i n A f r i c a " , i n K a r l W. D e u t s c h and W i l l i a m J . F o l t z , edd., N a t i o n - b u i l d i n g (New York: A t h e r t o n P r e s s , 1966), p.97. 16. James P. Coleman, " T r a d i t i o n and N a t i o n a l i s m i n T r o p i c a l A f r i c a " , op. c i t . , p.9. 17. As o f 1971 Malay p r i v i l e g e s were extended t o o t h e r n a t i v e s i n the Borneo s t a t e s . F e d e r a l p o l i t i c i a n s have t r i e d h a r d t o persuade Dayak l e a d e r s t o t h i n k of themselves as Bumiputeras. See, f o r i n s t a n c e , Sarawak T r i b u n e , November 13, 1974. 18. U s i n g a f i c t i t i o u s Ibo townsman as an example, they p o i n t e d out t h a t he p r o b a b l y v o t e d f o r the n a t i o n a l c o a l i t i o n government d u r i n g the 1974 N i g e r i a n g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n . In a n o t h e r s i t u a t i o n , g i v e n here as the d i s p u t e over the non-implementation of wage p o l i c i e s by the government, the same man may have p r o t e s t e d a g a i n s t t h e government ( C h a r l e s W. Anderson, F r e d von der Mehden, and Crawford Young, I s s u e s of P o l i t i c a l Development, op. c i t . , pp.62-63). T h i s i l l u s t r a t e s t h e p e r s o n a l dimen- s i o n o f e t h n i c i t y and the a m b i g u i t y of e t h n i c i d e n t i f i c a t i o n t h a t a r i s e s from a m u l t i p l i c i t y o f r o l e s . I n the case of Sarawak, f o r i n s t a n c e , a Bidayuh or a Melanau who has c o n v e r t e d t o the I s l a m r e l i g i o n may c a l l h i m s e l f a Malay. But i n o t h e r c i r c u m s t a n c e s he may s t i l l d e s c r i b e him- s e l f as a B i d a y u h or Melanau or whatever e t h n i c group t o which he o r i g i n a l l y b e l o n g e d . 19. C h a r l e s W. Anderson, F r e d von der Mehden, and Crawford Young, op. c i t . , pp.64-66. 20. To quote Rupert Emerson, a t e r m i n a l community i s one " t h a t when the c h i p s a r e down, e f f e c t i v e l y commands men's l o y a l t y " (Rupert Emerson, From Empire t o N a t i o n (Cambridge, Mass.: H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1960), pp.95-96. 21. D a n i e l B e l l , " E t h n i c i t y and S o c i a l Change," i n Nathan G l a z e r and D a n i e l Moynihan, edd., E t h n i c i t y : Theory and E x p e r i e n c e (Cambridge, Mass.: H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1975), p.171. 22. Robert Melson and Howard Wolpe, " M o d e r n i z a t i o n and t h e p o l i t i c s of communalism: a t h e o r e t i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e , " American P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e Review, V o l . LXIV, No. 4 (December, 1970), p.1115. 23. I b i d . , p.1122. 21 CHAPTER I I DEMOGRAPHIC SETTING Demography Sarawak i s a s t a t e o f M a l a y s i a . B e f o r e Sarawak's own demography i s e x p l o r e d i t i s imp o r t a n t to have an i d e a o f M a l a y s i a ' s own e t h n i c c o m p o s i t i o n , some i n d i c a t i o n o f which can be seen from i t s p o p u l a t i o n s t a t i s t i c s . T a b l e 1 below d i v i d e s M a l a y s i a i n t o two r e g i o n s . Under the name o f West M a l a y s i a a r e the f o l l o w i n g s t a t e s : J o h o r e , Kedah, K e l a n t a n , M a l a c c a , N e g r i Sembilan, Pahang, Perak, P e r l i s , S e l a n g o r , and Trengganu. B e f o r e the f o r m a t i o n o f M a l a y s i a they were known as Malaya. The second r e g i o n i s made up o f the Borneo s t a t e s o f Sabah and Sarawak. They f a l l under the l a b e l o f E a s t M a l a y s i a . T a b l e l 1 M a l a y s i a n P o p u l a t i o n S t a t i s t i c s : E s t i m a t e d P o p u l a t i o n by Regions and E t h n i c Groups, December 1967 A l l Groups Malays Chinese I n d i a n s & P a k i s t a n i s Others W. M a l a y s i a 8,655,299 4,351,021 3,157,423 957,944 188,911 Sabah 590,660 145,000 145,000 - 300,660 Sarawak 902,841 163,022 296,977 - 442,842 E. M a l a y s i a 1,493,501 308,022 441,977 - 743,502 T o t a l 10,148,800 4,659,043 3,599,400 957,944 932,413 Note: I n the Borneo s t a t e s o f Sabah and Sarawak I n d i a n s and P a k i s t a n i s numbered l e s s than 10,000. 22 I n t h e t a b l e above, the Dayak p o p u l a t i o n o f Sarawak has been grouped under the l a b e l " O t h e r s " t o g e t h e r w i t h I n d i a n s and P a k i s t a n i s . At j u s t o v e r 440,000, the " o t h e r s " made up o f o n l y 4.3% o f M a l a y s i a ' s t o t a l p o p u l a t i o n . Sarawak The l a s t census o f p o p u l a t i o n t a k e n when Sarawak was s t i l l a Crown Colony o f G r e a t B r i t a i n was i n June 1960. D u r i n g t h a t time the p o p u l a t i o n was 744,529. Two y e a r s l a t e r , over a p e r i o d p u n c t u a t e d by t h e f o r m a t i o n o f the Sarawak N a t i o n a l P a r t y and the p r o p o s a l f o r the F e d e r a t i o n o f M a l a y s i a , the p o p u l a t i o n was c a l c u l a t e d a t 776,990. 2 Broken down i n t o t h r e e c o n s t i t u e n t c u l t u r a l groups, the Sarawak p o p u l a t i o n f o r 3 the y e a r 1960 was as f o l l o w s : P e r c e n t a g e E t h n i c Group P o p u l a t i o n o f T o t a l C h i n e s e 229,154 30.8 Dayak 333,291 44.8 Malay 129,300 17.4 Melanau 44,661 5.9 The remainder of the p o p u l a t i o n was 6,492, c o n s i s t i n g o f " o t h e r non- i n d i g e n o u s " (0.9%) and 1,631 Europeans ( 0 . 2 % ) . Chinese B o l s t e r e d by i m m i g r a t i o n s from C h i n a — 1 9 , 0 0 0 e n t r i e s were r e c o r d e d between 1935 and 1 9 3 9 — t h e Chi n e s e p o p u l a t i o n grew u n t i l by 1960 i t was a p p r o x i m a t e l y e q u a l to t h a t o f the Sea Dayaks o r Ibans. I n 1960 the n u m e r i c a l c o m p o s i t i o n o f the Chinese was as f o l l o w s : 23 D i a l e c t Group Number Cantonese 17,432 Foochow 70,125 Hakka 70,221 Henghua 8,278 Hokkien 28,304 Hylam 5,717 Teochew 21,952 Other Chinese 7,125 T o t a l 229,154 W i t h i n the f i v e d i v i s i o n s o f Sarawak, the F i r s t and T h i r d were p o p u l a t e d by a p p r o x i m a t e l y the same number of C h i n e s e at s l i g h t l y l e s s than 100,000. The F o u r t h and Second D i v i s i o n s had over 24,000 and 12,000 r e s p e c t i v e l y , w h i l e t h e F i f t h D i v i s i o n had n e a r l y 3,000. Malays A d e f i n i t i o n w hich seems to be g a i n i n g c u r r e n c y c h a r a c t e r i s e s a Malay as a p e r s o n who uses t h e Malay language and b e l o n g s o r adheres t o 4 the Muslim r e l i g i o n and f o l l o w s Malay customs. Thus, f o r i n s t a n c e , i f a Dayak adopts the Mohammedan r e l i g i o n he i n v a r i a b l y becomes a Malay as w e l l . The i n f u s i o n o f new Malays i n t h i s manner, p a r t i c u l a r l y from the Melanau-Dayak community, was most n o t i c e a b l e from 1949 t o 1960, d u r i n g which the Malay group grew by o v e r 33 p e r c e n t . Over the y e a r s the Malays have " c o a l e s c e d i n t o a p a l p a b l e s o c i a l c a t e g o r y , i n c l u d i n g most but n o t a l l Muslims, which has l o n g f u n c t i o n e d as a f o r c e of g r e a t importance The p r o c e s s o f drawing c o n v e r t s i n t o t h i s s o c i a l group 24 had two d i r e c t consequences. By 1970 the Melanaus had come t o be i n c l u d e d as Malays. The Melanaus b o l s t e r e d t h e Malay p o p u l a t i o n so t h a t by 1970 t h e Malays comprised 24.9 per c e n t of Sarawak's p o p u l a t i o n — a jump from 17.5 per c e n t , which had been t h e case t e n y e a r s b e f o r e . In 1960, t h e Dayaks outnumbered b o t h the C h i n e s e and Malays. They a r e d e f i n e d as non-Muslim n a t i v e s , a c a t e g o r y which c o v e r s at l e a s t t e n " t r i b a l " groups of which t h e Ibans (Sea Dayaks), B i d a y u h s (Land Dayaks), Kenyahs, Kayans, K e l a b i t , and Muruts were the most numerous. I n 1960 the Dayak p o p u l a t i o n was as f o l l o w s : Dayaks Dayak Community Number P e r c e n t a g e of T o t a l Dayaks Sea Dayak (Iban) Land Dayak (Bidayuh) Other Dayaks 237,741 57,619 37,931 71 17 12 T o t a l 333,291 100 The "Other Dayaks", which i n 1960 made up a mere 12 p e r c e n t of the t o t a l Dayak p o p u l a t i o n , were d i s t r i b u t e d as f o l l o w s : 25 Persons B i s a y a h 2,803 Kedayan 7,207 Kayan 7,899 Kenyan 8,093 K e l a b i t 2,040 Murut 5,214 Pun an 4,669 Others 6 T o t a l 37,931 The Dayaks a r e by no means a homogeneous group. G e n e r a l l y they i n h a b i t the u p - r i v e r a r e a s , t h e s o - c a l l e d u l u ; t h e y p r a c t i c e a s h i f t i n g c u l t i v a t i o n i n h i l l r i c e and m o s t l y l i v e i n l o n g houses. They have v e r y l i t t l e e l s e i n common: they have no common language o r c u l t u r e , and, a l t h o u g h they l i v e i n t h e u l u a r e a s , each group i s g e n e r a l l y s e c l u d e d i n i t s own t e r r i t o r i a l domain, where i t p r a c t i c e s i t s own l i f e - s t y l e . C o m p a r a t i v e l y , t h e Chin e s e e t h n i c group showed the f a s t e s t r a t e of growth. From 1947 to 1960 t h e i r p e r c e n t a g e i n c r e a s e was 57.9. The i n c r e a s e i n o t h e r e t h n i c groups f o r t h e same p e r i o d were as f o l l o w s : Community Malay 32.7 Melanau 25.6 p.ayaks 29.3 O c c u p a t i o n The o t h e r p o i n t which s h o u l d be e s t a b l i s h e d i s t h a t t h e s e c u l t u r a l groups predominate d i s t i n c t economic o c c u p a t i o n s . 26 Malays. Most o f t h e Malays a r e f i s h e r m e n and f a r m e r s . As the towns i n Sarawak grew, t h e Malays have managed t o s u p p l y the demands f o r f o o d by these urban c e n t e r s . I n 1960 over h a l f of t h e f i s h e r m e n i n Sarawak were Malays. T h e i r second o c c u p a t i o n i s f a r m i n g ( t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y of swamp a r e a s has a l l o w e d them t o c u l t i v a t e wet padi.), rubber t a p p i n g , and l o g g i n g . A l l i n a l l , a g r i c u l t u r a l p u r s u i t s a ccounted f o r 72.4 p e r c e n t o f t h e Malay w o r k - f o r c e i n 1960. Chi n e s e . Perhaps the most s i g n i f i c a n t o c c u p a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f t h e Chinese i s t h e i r predominance i n t h e commercial l i f e o f t h e Colony. I n 1960, 83.7 p e r cent o f a l l t h o s e who were engaged i n commerce were Ch i n e s e . F u r t h e r , they a l s o extended t h e i r preponderance i n t o manu- f a c t u r i n g , where they l e d a t 57.5 p e r c e n t ; b u i l d i n g and c o n s t r u c t i o n (49.3 p e r c e n t ) , t r a n s p o r t and communications (58.7 p e r c e n t ) , and s e r v i c e s (50.5 per c e n t ) . Another n o t a b l e f e a t u r e o f t h e Ch i n e s e i s t h e i r e x t e n s i v e involvement i n a g r i c u l t u r e . In r e l a t i o n to o t h e r communities they p r o v i d e d a mere 14.3 per c e n t o f t h e t o t a l a g r i c u l t u r a l workers i n 1960, but w i t h i n t h e Chin e s e community i t s e l f more Chinese (50.5 p e r cent) were employed i n a g r i c u l t u r a l p u r s u i t s than i n any o t h e r s e c t o r s . F urthermore, most o f them were f a r m e r s ; t h a t i s , they were a g r i c u l t u r a l e n t r e p r e n e u r s whose l i v e l i h o o d was geared t o s a t i s f y the demands of t h e urban a r e a s . Some were v e g e t a b l e growers whose p r o d u c t s were consumed m a i n l y by t h e c i t y d w e l l e r s . O t h e r s were pepper p l a n t e r s and rubber t a p p e r s . 27 Dayaks. U n t i l t h e l a t e 1950's, few Dayaks were i n v o l v e d i n any s y s t e m a t i c way w i t h t h e economic l i f e o f t h e urban a r e a s . Such i s o l a t i o n was, of c o u r s e , hot due m e r e l y to t h e p h y s i c a l d i s t a n c e s and poor communication systems which d i s c o u r a g e d t r a v e l l i n g t o t h e " b a z a a r s " , but a l s o to t h e f a c t t h a t t h e low y i e l d of h i l l p a d i f a r m i n g o f t e n d i d not c r e a t e s a l e a b l e s u r p l u s e s . As a consequence, the Dayak economic i s o l a t i o n was almost t o t a l . They had no cash crop u n t i l the advent of rubber p l a n t i n g ; by 1960 o n l y 7.34 per cent of t h e e c o n o m i c a l l y a c t i v e Dayaks were rubber t a p p e r s . T a b l e 2 7 P r o p o r t i o n o f Melanaus and Dayaks i n S e l e c t e d Areas by P e r c e n t a g e s O c c u p a t i o n Dayaks Melanaus Lo g g i n g .7 6.5 F i s h i n g .2 7.2 Rubber 7.3 22.9 S m a l l h o l d i n g s 88.6 48.0 N o n - a g r i c u l t u r a l j o b s 3.2 15.2 T o t a l 100.0 100.0 N. 163241 N. 17712 Most Dayaks i n 1960 were engaged i n p r i m i t i v e a g r i c u l t u r e , e k e i n g out a l i v e l i h o o d by o p e r a t i n g s m a l l farms and gardens. In t h i s they f i t W o l f ' s d e s c r i p t i o n o f p e o p l e i n p r i m i t i v e economies who " c o n t r o l t h e i r own l a b o u r and i t s p r o d u c t s f o r t h e c u l t u r a l l y d e f i n e d e q u i v a - g l e n t goods and s e r v i c e s of o t h e r s . " 28 Melanaus. At 44,661 the Melanaus c o n s t i t u t e d o n l y 5.9 p e r cent of Sarawak's t o t a l p o p u l a t i o n i n 1960. They are a c o a s t a l p e o p l e whose " t e r r i t o r y " i s the a r e a west of S a r i k e i , S i b u , and B i n t u l u . T h e i r p r o x i m i t y to t h e s e a , c o u p l e d w i t h exposure t o t h e s e towns, means t h a t p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y more Melanaus than Dayaks were drawn i n t o t h e urban economy. A l t h o u g h no e x a c t d a t a i s a v a i l a b l e , a h i g h p r o p o r t i o n (75 p e r c e n t ) of the Melanau p o p u l a t i o n a r e Muslims. There a r e a l s o some C h r i s t i a n Melanaus. At t h i s s t a g e of the paper i t i s n e c e s s a r y to n o t e t h a t t h e Melanaus are a d i s t i n c t p e o p l e . In the p a s t decade, however, i t has become f a s h i o n a b l e f o r an i n c r e a s i n g number o f Melanaus to c a l l t h emselves Malays, so t h a t by 1970 i t was not u n u s u a l f o r Melanaus to be c a t e g o r i s e d as Malays. F o r the purpose o f t h i s p a p e r , t h e Melanau group w i l l be c o n s i d e r e d as p a r t of t h e Malay community. I n summary, i t may be s a i d t h a t the C h i n e s e a r e t h e most a c t i v e and advanced e t h n i c group i n t h e s t a t e , s i n c e they dominate the commercial l i f e o f t h e c o l o n y . C o n c e n t r a t e d p r i m a r i l y i n the urban a r e a s and t h e s u r r o u n d i n g t e r r i t o r i e s , they a r e a b l e t o u t i l i s e more of the s o c i a l s e r v i c e s than e i t h e r t h e Malays or Dayaks, who a r e m a i n l y r u r a l c i t i z e n s . Occupying t h e l e a s t a c c e s s i b l e p a r t s o f t h e c o u n t r y a r e t h e Dayaks. They are a l s o e c o n o m i c a l l y the most p r i m i t i v e . The t h i r d group i s the Malays. A c o a s t a l p e o p l e , t h e y have managed t o i n c r e a s e the s i z e o f t h e i r p o p u l a t i o n by t h e p r o c e s s of r e l i g i o u s c o n v e r s i o n s . T h e i r prime o c c u p a t i o n s a r e f i s h i n g and r i c e c u l t i v a t i o n , a l t h o u g h a s i z e a b l e 29 segment o f t h e i r w o r k - f o r c e have become l a b o u r e r s . I n 1960 t h e Malays were at t h e peasant stage of economic development f o r i n c r e a s i n g l y they had been a b l e t o become ^ a r t o f t h e urban economy by p r o v i d i n g man-power and f o o d s u p p l i e s . The Malays a r e t h e r e f o r e more advanced than t h e Dayaks, but d e f i n i t e l y i n f e r i o r t o t h e C h i n e s e i n r e g a r d t o t h e i r economic l i f e . F o o t n o t e s t o Chapter I I 30 1. T h i s t a b l e i s adapted from the one p r o v i d e d by M i l t o n J . Esman, A d m i n i s t r a t i o n and Development i n M a l a y s i a ( I t h a c a : C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1969), p.18. Other w r i t e r s on M a l a y s i a have s i m p l y c l a s s i f i e d the Dayaks under the g e n e r i c name of " M a l a y s i a n " . See, f o r i n s t a n c e , Gordon Means, M a l a y s i a n P o l i t i c s (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1976), p.294. Thus not o n l y i s the Dayak p o p u l a t i o n o f Sarawak s m a l l i n comparison t o o t h e r e t h n i c groups, t h e r e a l s o appears t o be some c o n f u s i o n as t o which c a t e g o r y they b e l o n g . 2. Sarawak Government, Sarawak Year Book 1962 (Kuching: Government P r i n t e r , 1962), p.11. 3. The f i g u r e s which appear i n t h e r e s t o f t h i s c h a p t e r were c a l c u l a t e d from those p r o v i d e d i n the o f f i c i a l census r e p o r t of 1960. See L.B. Jones, Sarawak: Report on the Census P o p u l a t i o n (Kuching: Govern- ment P r i n t e r , 1962). 4. A Malayan was a c i t i z e n o f the F e d e r a t i o n of Malaya r e g a r d l e s s o f the e t h n i c group he be l o n g e d t o . A M a l a y s i a n i s a c i t i z e n o f M a l a y s i a . E t h n i c a l l y , he might be a Malay, C h i n e s e , I n d i a n , Dayak or any o t h e r group (Tan S r i Mohamed S u f f i a n b i n Hashim, An I n t r o d u c t i o n to t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n o f M a l a y s i a [ K u a l a Lumpur, 1972], pp.247-249, c i t e d i n R.S. M i l n e and Diane K. Mauzy, P o l i t i c s and Government i n M a l a y s i a [Vancouver: U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Columbia P r e s s , 1978], p . l ) . 5. Robert P r i n g l e , Rajahs and R e b e l s : The Ibans o f Sarawak under Brooke Rule 1841-1941 ( I t h a c a : C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1970), p.19. 6. The Dayaks m o s t l y p l a n t p a d i t o su p p o r t themselves. I n c o n t r a s t t o the method u s u a l l y p r a c t i s e d i n Southeast A s i a where p a d i c u l t i v a t i o n i s equated w i t h wet or swamp p a d i , the Dayaks p l a n t h i l l p a d i . T h e i r r i c e i s t h e r e f o r e o f the d r y v a r i e t y . Another d i f f e r e n c e i s t h a t h i l l p a d i has a h i g h e r p r o t e i n c o n t e n t than wet p a d i . The n e g a t i v e a s p e c t of h i l l p a d i f a r m i n g i s t h a t i t i n v o l v e s t h e s l a s h i n g and b u r n i n g of the v e g e t a t i o n . The p r a c t i c e o f s l a s h and burn i n t u r n exposes the l a n d t o e r o s i o n and l o s s o f s o i l n u t r i e n t s . T h i s r e s u l t s i n the farmer h a v i n g t o s h i f t t h e l o c a t i o n o f h i s farm from y e a r t o y e a r , hence the name " s h i f t i n g c u l t i v a t i o n " . On Dayaks" a g r i c u l t u r a l p u r - s u i t s , p a r t i c u l a r l y t h o s e o f the Ibans, see: Derek Freeman, Report on the Iban (London: The A t h l o n e P r e s s , 1970); V.H. S u t l i v e , "From Longhouse t o P a s a r : U r b a n i s a t i o n i n Sarawak, E a s t M a l a y s i a " (Ph.D. d i s s e r t a t i o n , U n i v e r s i t y o f P i t t s b u r g , 1972). 7. The term s m a l l h o l d i n g s r e f e r s t o i n d i v i d u a l l y owned and m a i n t a i n e d farms and market-gardens. T h e i r p r o d u c t s , i n t h e case of t h e Dayaks, were f o r home consumption. 8. E r i c R. Wolf, Peasants (Englewood C l i f f s , New J e r s e y : P r e n t i c e H a l l , 1966), p.3. 31 CHAPTER III FORMATION OF SNAP The formation of the Sarawak National Party, which had i t s o f f i c i a l inauguration on A p r i l 10, 1961, was a response to a number of p o l i t i c a l developments, each of which was produced by the promise of self-government. The f i r s t was the emergence of two p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , both of which, though avowedly m u l t i - r a c i a l , were seen to be dominated progressively by two ethnic groups. The second, e s s e n t i a l l y a by- product of the f i r s t development, was the lack of unity among the Dayaks and t h e i r leaders. The t h i r d development was the f a i l u r e of the educated Dayaks, e s p e c i a l l y those i n the c i v i l s e r v i c e , to keep abreast of the p o l i t i c a l endeavours of other ethnic groups and to form a party which they could dominate. These three developments culminated i n a c r i s i s of sorts f o r the Dayaks, because the established p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , dominated as they were by the Chinese and Malays, threatened to s p l i t the Dayak communities. What made t h i s problem p a r t i c u l a r l y acute was that neither the t r a d i t i o n a l leaders nor the educated " e l i t e " among the Dayaks was moved to stop t h i s trend, which was i n e f f e c t a dismemberment of t h e i r people. In this respect the entry of SNAP into the Sarawak p o l i t i c a l scene was an attempt to stem the fragmentation of the Dayaks by u n i t i n g them under i t s own banner. 32 Formation o f SUPP and PANAS A t u r n - a r o u n d i n o f f i c i a l p o l i c y w i t h r e g a r d t o p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n p r e c i p i t a t e d a s e r i e s of p o l i t i c a l developments i n Sarawak. The Brookes, who handed Sarawak, a l b e i t u n w i l l i n g l y , " ' " over t o t h e B r i t i s h Crown i n 1946 were c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y i n t o l e r a n t o f p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s . U n t i l t h e l a t e 1950's the C o l o n i a l O f f i c e c o n t i n u e d t o su p p r e s s p o l i t i c a l movement i n the s t a t e . However, f a c e d w i t h t h e p r o s p e c t o f i n e v i t a b l e independence f o r Sarawak, t h e C o l o n i a l Government i n s t i t u t e d a p o l i c y change from s u p p r e s s i o n t o encouragement of p o l i t i - c a l movements. Not a l l Sarawakians were a b l e t o b e n e f i t from t h i s r e v e r s a l o f o f f i c i a l p o l i c y . Indeed, t h e o n l y p e r s o n known to have b e n e f i t e d from the p o l i c y change was an urban C h i n e s e named Ong Kee H u i , who r e c e i v e d p r i v a t e encouragement from the Governor, S i r Anthony A b e l l . 2 I n 1956 Ong had been one o f t h e i n i t i a t o r s of a p o l i t i c a l p a r t y which had f a i l e d t o d e v e l o p because of u n f a v o u r a b l e o f f i c i a l r e s p o n s e and n a t i v e i n d i f f e r e n c e . In June 1959, t o g e t h e r w i t h Stephen Yong and Song T h i a n Cheok, he founded t h e f i r s t r e g i s t e r e d p o l i t i c a l p a r t y , the Sarawak U n i t e d P e o p l e s ' P a r t y (SUPP). I t was t o be "non-communal i n c h a r a c t e r w i t h emphasis on l o y a l t y t o Sarawak and u n i t y o f a l l 3 r a c e s . " Ong Kee Hui, a c a r e e r businessman who had done a s t i n t as a c i v i l s e r v a n t w i t h the Department o f A g r i c u l t u r e , was t h e Chairman, Stephen Yong, a lawyer, was t h e S e c r e t a r y G e n e r a l . Sarawak's f i r s t 33 party was thus led by the Chinese. S i g n i f i c a n t l y , Malay reaction was cool. The Malays, probably mindful of t h e i r small numbers, sought from the beginning to unify the i r own people. This desire was c l e a r l y fundamental to the Malay National Union (MNU), the most prominent organization the Malays had. Mohammad Bakri, the President of MNU, for example, stated that i f i t 4 became necessary his "union would j o i n the party (SUPP) as one unit". The Secretary General of MNU, Ikhwan Zainie, took an even more extreme view by rejecting the very p r i n c i p l e of a m u l t i - r a c i a l membership when he said, " i t would be much better for each community to form a National Union, such as the Chinese, Malay, Dayak, and Indian National Unions, and eventually merge to form an Alliance l i k e that i n the Federation of M a l a y " . W i t h the MNU throwing i t s weight against direct membership in the SUPP, a few Malays decided to j o i n the party. The temporary advantage of being the only party in the state manifested i t s e l f i n the SUPP's a b i l i t y to develop into a well organised p o l i t i c a l machine which enlisted Chinese members en masse.^ Further, when the SUPP contested some seats in the l o c a l government elections of 1959 i t drew even native (that i s , Malay and Dayak) support. Largely because of the success of the SUPP, the Malays decided to form their own p o l i t i c a l organization. Their leaders i n t h i s endeavour were Kuching-bred urban Malays who, by sheer proximity to 34 t h e Kuching-based SUPP, d i r e c t l y f e l t t h e e n c r o a c h i n g s t r e n g t h o f the Ch i n e s e . I n t h i s the t i m i n g o f t h e Malay l e a d e r s was f o r t u n a t e , f o r t h e C o l o n i a l Government had become i n c r e a s i n g l y d i s e n c h a n t e d w i t h the SUPP, s i n c e t h e P a r t y had been i n f i l t r a t e d by communists. So concerned were t h e a u t h o r i t i e s w i t h the Communist t h r e a t i n s i d e t h e SUPP t h a t a few weeks b e f o r e i t s i n a u g u r a t i o n t h e Governor d e c l a r e d h i s doubt t h a t " p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s at t h e p r e s e n t s t a g e o f development w i l l s p e l l f a s t e r p r o g r e s s i n t h i s s m a l l c o u n t r y . . . . I n s h o r t , t h e Malay l e a d e r s d e c i d e d t o a c t when the SUPP a c t u a l l y began to r e c r u i t Malayan p e o p l e as members and when the C o l o n i a l Government was i n c r e a s i n g l y l o s i n g i t s e n t h u s i asm f o r t h e p a r t y . The t a s k o f f o r m u l a t i n g a c o u n t e r s t r o k e f e l l on Abang Haj i Mustapha who, by h i s i n f l u e n c e and p o s i t i o n , was the most p o w e r f u l g Malay i n Sarawak. He h e l d t h e p o s t o f Datu Bandar, t h e h i g h e s t p o s i t i o n i n t h e Malay l e a d e r s h i p h i e r a r c h y . He was a l s o a member of the C o u n c i l N e g r i , t h e l e g i s l a t i v e body o f Sarawak, as w e l l as a member of the Supreme C o u n c i l , i t s q u a s i - c a b i n e t . Moreover, the Datu Bandar was t h e Government A d v i s o r f o r N a t i v e A f f a i r s . W i t h the s u p p o r t o f those p o l i t i c i a n s who d i d not j o i n the SUPP he launched the P a r t y Negara Sarawak (PANAS) b a r e l y t e n months a f t e r t h e SUPP was o r g a n i s e d . PANAS was a M a l a y - l e d p a r t y ; i t was a l s o dominated by the Kuching c l i q u e o f t h e Malay community, w h i l e t h e S i b u group remained detached. The Datu Bandar became i t s Chairman; h i s b r o t h e r , 35 Abang Othman, was the S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l . Dayak R e a c t i o n s Of a l l t h e r e s p o n s e s of b o t h the Dayak t r a d i t i o n a l l e a d e r s and the educated e l i t e , the most i m p o r t a n t was t h a t none of them e x h i b i t e d any d e s i r e t o form t h e i r own p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i s a t i o n dominated by the Dayaks. T h i s l a c k o f concer n was a l s o t h e r e a c t i o n o f t h e Sarawak Dayak N a t i o n a l A s s o c i a t i o n (SDNU) , whose members i n c l u d e d most o f t h e educated Dayaks i n Sarawak. The SDNU would be t h e f i r s t l o g i c a l p l a c e f o r Dayak n a t i o n a l i s m to be s t i m u l a t e d because i t was the a s s o c i a t i o n f o r the Dayak i n t e l l i g e n t s i a . However, when the SUPP was formed, t h e SDNU chose t o i g n o r e i t , c l a i m i n g t h a t at t h a t j u n c t u r e a s t a t e - w i d e p o l i t i c a l p a r t y was too premature t o contemplate. I t s P r e s i d e n t , Mr. Edward Brandah, a prominent c i v i l s e r v a n t and o b v i o u s l y a h i g h l y r e g a r d e d Dayak p e r s o n a l i t y i n the Kuching a r e a , o f f e r e d an o p i n i o n p r o b a b l y r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f t h e Dayaks i n the c i v i l s e r v i c e at t h e time. I t i s s t i l l t o o premature f o r t h e whole of Sarawak t o form any p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s . At t h i s s t a t e we s h o u l d c o n c e n t r a t e on t h e edu- c a t i o n o f our younger g e n e r a t i o n and r a i s i n g t h e s t a n d a r d of l i v i n g f o r a l l communities.9 Thus, from the b e g i n n i n g t h e most p o t e n t Dayak o r g a n i z a t i o n , one which had the p o t e n t i a l t o c o u n t e r e f f e c t i v e l y the p o l i t i c a l i n i t i a - t i v e s o f t h e Chinese i n the SUPP, chose t o emasculate i t s e l f . The apparent d i s d a i n o f t h e SDNU f o r p o l i t i c s stemmed from the 36 f a c t t h a t t h e b u l k o f i t s members were c i v i l s e r v a n t s , a group r e l u c t a n t t o t r a d e the s e c u r i t y of t h e i r c a r e e r s f o r the rough and ':. tumble o f p o l i t i c a l l i f e . Moreover, s i n c e t h e m a j o r i t y o f them were i n f a c t c l e r i c a l workers, few, i f any, had any knowledge o f the o p e r a t i o n and maintenance o f a p o l i t i c a l p a r t y . Another f a c t o r was the d i m i n u t i v e s i z e o f t h e SDNU i t s e l f . Not o n l y was i t s m a l l , i t was a l s o i n s u l a r i n t h a t , b e i n g l i m i t e d t o K u c h i n g , i t s i n f l u e n c e d i d not permeate i n t o t h e Dayaks, most o f whom r e s i d e d i n t h e u l u , t h e i n t e r i o r and t h e upper r e a c h e s of t h e s t a t e . Thus the t r a d i t i o n a l i s o l a t i o n o f t h e SDNU i t s e l f from i t s s u p p o r t e r s i n the u l u , t h e l a c k of e x p e r t i s e on the p a r t of i t s members i n p a r t y o r g a n i z a t i o n , and t h e i r g e n e r a l r e l u c t a n c e t o drop t h e i r c a r e e r s i n f a v o u r of p o l i t i c s a c c o u n t e d not o n l y f o r t h e r e f u s a l o f t h e Dayak educated e l i t e t o j o i n any of t h e e x i s t i n g p a r t i e s , but a l s o t h e r e f u s a l t o form a Dayak-based one. The o t h e r group o f Dayaks which c o u l d be e x p e c t e d t o form an e t h n i c based p a r t y c o n s i s t e d o f t h e t r a d i t i o n a l l e a d e r s , men who e x e r c i s e d c o n s i d e r a b l e p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e . Such men were Temenggong Jugah, t h e paramount C h i e f o f t h e Ib a n s , Temenggong Oyong Lawai J a u , the o v e r a l l head o f t h e Kenyahs, Kayans, K e l a b i t groups, and Pengarah M o n t e g r a i , t h e most prominent Iban i n t h e Second D i v i s i o n . I n a d d i t i o n , t h e i r i n f l u e n c e was f u t h e r r e i n f o r c e d by the f a c t t h a t t h e y were members of t h e C o u n c i l N e g r i and t h e Supreme C o u n c i l . No o t h e r 37 Dayaks e x e r c i s e d as much i n f l u e n c e as t h e s e t h r e e men b e f o r e 1961. I f any group of Dayaks was c a p a b l e of " d e l i v e r i n g " memberships to a p o l i t i c a l p a r t y , t h i s was i t . T h e i r p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s were ob s e r v e d w i t h i n t e r e s t by t h e Dayaks because, b e i n g t r a d i t i o n a l l e a d e r s as w e l l as l e g i s l a t i v e i n s i d e r s , t h e y p r o v i d e d t h e source o f l e a d e r s h i p which a t t h i s s t a g e was u n c h a l l e n g e d w i t h i n " t h e Dayak communities. I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t the emergence of th e SUPP d i d n o t a c t as a c a t a l y s t amongst the Dayak l e a d e r s t o form a Dayak p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i s a t i o n , a f a i l u r e which a l l o w e d t h e SUPP and PANAS t o r e c r u i t Dayak members and d i v i d e t h e i r communities. Of the Dayaks who j o i n e d the SUPP, one was a Kenyah, Tama Weng Tinggang Wan; a n o t h e r was an Iban, Jonathan Banggau Renang; b o t h were budding businessmen and i m p o r t a n t Dayak l e a d e r s . By and l a r g e , however, among the p o l i t i c a l l y a c t i v e Dayak l e a d e r s t h e tendency at t h e time was to support PANAS. I t s prime movers were not Dayaks but M a l a y s , whose o b j e c t i v e was to defend t h e i r own communal i n t e r e s t s a g a i n s t the SUPP. Why, t h e r e f o r e , was Edward J e r a h , one-time p r e s i d e n t o f t h e SDNU, among the e a r l i e s t to s u p p ort PANAS? The answer i s p r o b a b l y t h a t he wanted t o j o i n f o r c e s w i t h h i s f e l l o w n a t i v e s i n warding o f f t h e encroachment o f the SUPP i n t o t h e Dayak communities. Thus under the banner of PANAS, w h i l e t h e Malays worked t o b o l s t e r t h e i r p o s i t i o n i n the Malay communities, he c o u l d do t h e same i n the Dayak communities. The p r o s p e c t o f u n i t i n g t h e i r own p e o p l e under the n o m i n a l l e a d e r s h i p o f 38 PANAS may have c o n v i n c e d t h e t r a d i t i o n a l D a y a l l e a d e r s t o j o i n the p a r t y , f o r t h e Datu Bandar succeeded i n g a i n i n g the support o f Temenggongs Jugah and Oyong Lawai J a u , Pengarahs S i b a t , M o n t e g r a i , and Penghulus Hang and Umpau. The c h o i c e of PANAS as opposed t o SUPP seemed t o have been made because t h e l a t t e r was l e s s a t t r a c t i v e . I n the f i r s t p l a c e the SUPP was Chinese-dominated and t h e r e was a g e n e r a l f e a r t h a t , b e i n g b e t t e r o r g a n i s e d and more a g g r e s s i v e ( a t l e a s t e c o n o m i c a l l y ) , t h e C h i n e s e were u n l i k e l y to r e l i n q u i s h o r even t o share e q u a l l y the c o n t r o l of the p a r t y . I n t h e second p l a c e , b o t h the Dayaks and t h e Malays had i n common an i n t e n s e i n t e r e s t i n N a t i v e R i g h t s and such m a t t e r s as law, custom, and l a n d . By j o i n i n g PANAS t h e y hoped t o make a common cause a g a i n s t any p o s s i b l e encroachment by t h e Chinese i n th e s e a r e a s . ^ F i n a l l y , PANAS was more l i k e l y t o a l l o w the Dayaks t o dominate the p a r t y apparatus and d e c i s i o n making s i n c e t h e Malays were n u m e r i c a l l y i n f e r i o r . F o r t h e Dayak communities the r e f u s a l o f t h e i r l e a d e r s to o r g a n i s e t h e i r own p o l i t i c a l p a r t y l e d t o f u r t h e r d i v i s i o n w i t h i n them- s e l v e s as t h e two p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s scrambled f o r Dayak members. The d i v i s i o n was, o f c o u r s e , n ot i n t o o r g a n i s e d groups: at t h i s s t a t e p a r t y a f f i l i a t i o n was l a r g e l y made by i n d i v i d u a l e f f o r t . N o n e t h e l e s s , t h e y c o u l d be d i v i d e d i n t o t h r e e d i s t i n c t groups. The f i r s t one, t y p i f i e d by Tama Weng, were t h o s e Dayaks who a l i g n e d t h e m s e l v e s w i t h the Chinese under t h e SUPP. The second were t h o s e who were 39 persuaded t o j o i n PANAS by, f o r example, t h e i r l o y a l t y t o t h e Dayak c h i e f s o r t h e i r anti-Chinese-SUPP s e n t i m e n t s . Q u i t e a p a r t from these groups were t h o s e among t h e Dayaks who p r e f e r r e d n e i t h e r Chinese n o r Malay l e a d e r s h i p . To them, t h e Dayaks p o s s e s s e d t h e i r own l a t e n t , i f as y e t u n a r t i c u l a t e d , i n t e r e s t s which n e i t h e r t h e SUPP n o r PANAS c o u l d hope t o r e p r e s e n t because t h e y were l e d by non-Dayaks. I t was from t h i s group o f Dayaks t h a t SNAP emerged. In t h i s s ense, t h e r e f o r e , t h e f o r m a t i o n o f SNAP was a m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f e t h n i c n a t i o n a l i s m . On the one hand, e t h n i c n a t i o n a l i s m was a f a c t o r t h a t l e d to t h e f o r m a t i o n of SNAP; i t cannot be d e n i e d t h a t t h e sense o f f r u s t r a t i o n among Ningkan and h i s group a t t h e c o n t i n u i n g f r a g m e n t a t i o n o f t h e Dayaks and t h e impending dominance o f t h e Malays and C h i n e s e prompted them t o form the p a r t y . On the o t h e r hand, e t h n i c n a t i o n a l i s m was an o b j e c t i v e of SNAP i n t h a t t h e p a r t y was o r g a n i s e d i n o r d e r t h a t the t r e n d towards Dayak f r a g m e n t a t i o n c o u l d be r e v e r s e d and t h a t a Dayak n a t i o n c o u l d be s o l i d i f i e d . The Founders"'"''' The prime movers behind the f o r m a t i o n o f SNAP were a c o r e of seven men o f s t r i k i n g l y s i m i l a r o r i g i n and backgrounds. They were J.S. T i n k e r , Edward H o w e l l , Stephen Kalong Ningkan, Edwin H o w e l l , Matthew Dana, J u l i n anak N y i p a o f Sebuyau and D a v i d U s i t . In a d d i t i o n to t h e s e seven f i g u r e s were two B r i t i s h - b o r n S h e l l workers who a c t e d 40 as u n p a i d c o n s u l t a n t s and who were i n s t r u m e n t a l i n d r a f t i n g t h e p a r t y ' s f i r s t c o n s t i t u t i o n . Mr. J.S. T i n k e r , t h e p a r t y ' s f i r s t chairman, was born i n Betong. He r e c e i v e d h i s e d u c a t i o n i n Saba, a v i l l a g e a few m i l e s from Betong town, and i n Simanggang, t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c e n t e r f o r Sarawak's Second D i v i s i o n . In t h e 1920's, h a v i n g f i n i s h e d h i s f o r m a l e d u c a t i o n , he j o u r n e y e d to B r u n e i where he found work as a S h e l l employee. S u b s e q u e n t l y he e n l i s t e d as a c i v i l s e r v a n t , under the Brooke Raj and i t s war-time s u c c e s s o r (1941-45), the Japanese. I t was d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d t h a t he a c h i e v e d t h e apex of h i s c a r e e r when he s e r v e d as a D i s t r i c t O f f i c e r . F o l l o w i n g t h e w i t h d r a w a l of the Japanese and a f t e r an i n t e r i m p e r i o d of r u l e by the B r i t i s h M i l i t a r y A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , Sarawak became a Crown Colony. The new a d m i n i s t r a t i o n chose t o i g n o r e T i n k e r ' s war-time c o l l a b o r a t i o n , and he was a l l o w e d t o c o n t i n u e h i s s e r v i c e i n the L e g a l Department. By the t i m e SNAP was formed, he was i n h i s s i x t h y e a r of r e t i r e m e n t . D i r e c t l y under T i n k e r were two V i c e - C h a i r m e n : Edward Howell and L i o n e l K e t i t . B o t h men had spent a good p a r t o f t h e i r l i v e s away from Borneo. Howell was educated i n S i n g a p o r e , f i r s t , a t S t . Andrews and l a t e r , at t h e R a f f l e s I n s t i t u t e . K e t i t too had spent some ti m e i n S i n g a p o r e , where he a t t e n d e d t o h i s f a m i l y b u s i n e s s from 1933 t o 1945. A f t e r t h a t he worked i n Betong f o r t h e Food C o n t r o l Department b e f o r e making h i s way to B r u n e i , where he was employed by the S h e l l 41 O i l u n t i l h i s r e s i g n a t i o n i n 1961. SNAP's f i r s t S e c r e t a r y G e n e r a l was Ningkan, who i n time was to develop i n t o t h e p a r t y ' s major t a c t i c i a n . L i k e T i n k e r , Ningkan had worked f o r t h e Japanese as a p o l i c e o f f i c e r . From 1947 u n t i l August 1959, he taught i n Betong, h i s home town. That same y e a r he f o l l o w e d t h e f o o t s t e p s of so many o t h e r Dayak men from h i s a r e a by moving to B r u n e i to l o o k f o r work. As g e n e r a l l y was the case w i t h such men, he s e r v e d under S h e l l , but i n s t e a d o f b e i n g a l a b o u r e r o r c l e r k , Ningkan found a j o b as a h o s p i t a l a s s i s t a n t . In March 1961, he, l i k e L i o n e l K e t i t , r e s i g n e d h i s p o s i t i o n i n o r d e r to h e l p found SNAP. Ningkan h i m s e l f had a h i s t o r y o f community s e r v i c e , p a r t i c u l a r l y among the Dayak e n c l a v e s i n the o i l - r i c h t r i a n g l e o f L u t o n g , M i r i and S e r i a w h ich s t r a d d l e s the b o r d e r between B r u n e i and Sarawak. I t was i n S e r i a t h a t Ningkan founded t h e Dayak A s s o c i a t i o n and where f o r t h e y e a r s 1955-1956 and 1958-1959 he was the s e c r e t a r y f o r t h e S h e l l Dayak Club. Other members of t h e C e n t r a l Committee were D a v i d U s i t , Matthew Dana, A z a r i a s Malong, Andrew Bunga and Edwin H o w e l l . David U s i t was a businessman i n the then B r i t i s h Colony of N o r t h Borneo (Sabah) i n the e a r l y 1940's. As f o r Matthew Dana, a f t e r h i s e d u c a t i o n i n Betong he t r a v e l l e d t o Malaya and S i n g a p o r e , where he worked f o r some t i m e . Edwin Howell was an e n g i n e e r w i t h Sarawak's P u b l i c Works Department; Andrew Bunga had a l o n g c a r e e r , l i k e T i n k e r and Ningkan, working as a S h e l l employee i n S e r i a . 42 From t h e above account i t i s c l e a r t h a t t h e s e men had much i n common. A l l were m o b i l e and self-made. T r u e , none of them were p a r t i c u l a r l y s u c c e s s f u l f i n a n c i a l l y , but i n s o f a r as they had j o u r n e y e d away from home i n p u r s u i t o f work they were q u i t e u n l i k e most o t h e r 12 Dayaks of t h e i r g e n e r a t i o n . More than the common f e a t u r e o f t h e i r m o b i l i t y , however, t h e s e men shared a s i m i l a r o r i g i n ; n o t o n l y were a l l I b ans, t h e y a l s o came from t h e same S a r i b a s a r e a , whose major c e n t e r was Betong. In a d d i t i o n , a l l had r e c e i v e d a t l e a s t p a r t o f t h e i r e d u c a t i o n i n Betong, s p e c i f i c a l l y at S t . A u g u s t i n e ' s S c h o o l , where t h e y had been b a p t i s e d and c o n f i r m e d as A n g l i c a n s . Ningkan and h i s group were m o b i l e , a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c which s e t s them a p a r t from the m a j o r i t y o f Dayaks. G e o g r a p h i c a l l y t h e i r p l a c e of employment was i n v a r i a b l y away from home, and s o c i a l l y they had advanced from the p r e - p r e s e n t s o c i e t y o f t h e long-house l e v e l t o t h e c o s m o p o l i t a n l i f e o f t h e urban environment. I t i s c l e a r t h a t not o n l y was t h e c o r e group o f SNAP's l e a d e r s from the Dayak group but a l s o t h a t t h e y a c t u a l l y emerged from t h e Iban s e c t i o n — t h a t i s , from one s u b - u n i t of t h e Dayak c o l l e c t i v i t y . The Dayak group, a t t h i s t i m e , was t h e i r " t e r m i n a l community" t h e l a r g e s t community t h a t when the c h i p s a r e down, e f f e c t i v e l y commands 13 men's l o y a l t y . " T r u e , t h e t h r e e e x i s t i n g p a r t i e s r e c r u i t e d members from s e v e r a l communal groups, but i n v a r i a b l y one group dominated a p a r t i c u l a r p a r t y . Thus i n t h e case o f t h e SUPP, though 43 m u l t i - r a c i a l , i t was C h i n e s e based; PANAS, Malay; and SNAP, Dayak. The c o m p e t i t i o n o f p a r t y l e a d e r s h i p , however, need not be t h e d e f i n i t i v e c r i t e r i o n as to whether SNAP was r e a l l y a n a t i o n a l i s t group. T h i s type o f l e a d e r s h i p w i t h i t s common and narrow o r i g i n i s no t an a b e r r a t i o n amongst n a t i o n a l i s t s s i n c e i n p o l y e t h n i c c o l o n i e s i t i s not u n u s u a l t o have n a t i o n a l i s t p a r t i e s which d e f i n e t h e i r aims and p o l i c i e s i n terms o f w i d e r t e r r i t o r i a l u n i t , y e t a r e c l e a r l y spearheaded by members of one o r o t h e r o f the s t r a t e g i c e t h n i e , f o r example, the K i k u y u i n Kenya, the Javanese i n I n d o n e s i a , o r the Baganda i n Uganda.1^ In o t h e r words, i t i s p o s s i b l e t o be a n a t i o n a l i s t and a communal p a r t y a t t h e same t i m e — i f t h a t p a r t y succeeds i n g a i n i n g p o l i t i c a l d o m i n a t i o n e i t h e r by c o n v e r t i n g , i n t h i s c a s e , t h e Dayaks i n t o a s t r a t e g i c e t h n i c group o r by s u c c e s s f u l l y a p p e a l i n g t o c r o s s - e t h n i c s u p p o r t . O b j e c t i v e s The g e n e r a l g u i d e l i n e s o f SNAP's a c t i v i t i e s , i t s i d e o l o g y , can be found i n i t s "Aims and O b j e c t s " . T y p i c a l l y t h e s e a r e g e n e r a l s t a t e ments, but at t h e same time they a r e r e v e a l i n g i n t h a t they h e l p to p r o v i d e i n s i g h t s i n t o the p o l i t i c a l p e r s u a s i o n o f i t s l e a d e r s and the d i r e c t i o n - i n which they seek t o l e a d the p e o p l e of Sarawak. In terms of i t s n a t i o n a l i s m , i t s i d e o l o g y i n c o r p o r a t e s the two o r i e n t a t i o n s — t e r r i t o r i a l and e t h n i c — w h i c h i n v a r y i n g degrees have 44 been i n s t r u m e n t a l i n d e t e r m i n i n g p a r t y a c t i o n s . E a r l y i n i t s e x i s t e n c e t h e p a r t y p u b l i s h e d a document e n t i t l e d "SNAP's Aims and O b j e c t s " . T h i s statement r e v e a l s much of i t s n a t i o n a l i s t i d e o l o g y , a l t h o u g h at t h a t time t h e g i s t o f i t s p o l i t i c a l d o c t r i n e was somewhat obscu r e d by the l a b e l . The p a r t y ' s Aims and O b j e c t s were 1. To promote the p o l i t i c a l advancement of t h e i n h a b i t a n t s of Sarawak w i t h the aim of a c h i e v i n g s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t and u l t i m a t e independence. 2. To ensure freedom o f speech and r e l i g i o n and p a r t i c u l a r l y to s e c u r e the b l e s s i n g s of l i b e r t y . 3. To e s t a b l i s h a r e s p o n s i b l e and e n e r g e t i c government based on p a r l i a m e n t a r y democracy. 4. To promote economic and c u l t u r a l development of t h e i n h a b i t a n t s of Sarawak and p a r t i c u l a r l y to improve the earning-power of the i n d i v i d u a l and t h e r e b y to r a i s e t h e s t a n d a r d of l i v i n g . 5. To s a f e g u a r d the i n t e r e s t s and w e l f a r e o f t h e n a t i v e p e o p l e s and the i n h a b i t a n t s of Sarawak i n g e n e r a l and e s p e c i a l l y to p r o t e c t t h e r i g h t s of t h e i n d i v i d u a l . 6. To promote the l e a g u e of f r i e n d s h i p and r a c i a l ^ harmony of a l l r a c e s and to i n s p i r e a l l p e r s o n s w i t h a s p i r i t o f c o o p e r a t i o n , s e l f - r e l i a n c e and honest endeavour.15 There i s e v i d e n c e to i n d i c a t e t h a t SNAP e x h i b i t e d t e r r i t o r i a l n a t i o n a l i s m . P r o o f t o t h i s e f f e c t i s found i n i t s l i s t of "Aims and O b j e c t s " , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the f i r s t g o a l i n which the p a r t y b l u n t l y s t a t e s t h a t i t seeks to "promote the p o l i t i c a l advancement of the i n h a b i t a n t s of Sarawak w i t h the aim of a c h i e v i n g s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t and u l t i m a t e i n d e p e n d e n c e . " ^ 45 The importance o f the p r i n c i p l e o f t h e i d e o l o g y o u t l i n e d above l i e s i n the f a c t t h a t t h i s a s p e c t o f t e r r i t o r i a l n a t i o n a l i s m p e r f o r m s a major f u n c t i o n , namely l e g i t i m a t i o n : i . e . , t h e m o r a l a c c e p t a n c e by the c i t i z e n s o f i t s p a r t i c u l a r d o c t r i n e t h a t the n a t i o n o r s t a t e as d e f i n e d by the n a t i o n a l i s t s themselves s h o u l d r e c e i v e such r i g h t s as autonomy, o r s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t . The p r o p o s i t i o n s o f t h e d o c t r i n e i t s e l f has been a d e q u a t e l y summarised by Anthony Smith, who o b s e r v e s t h a t t h e y appear i n evey n a t i o n a l i s t movement or p a r t y — i n c l u d i n g , presumably, SNAP. A c c o r d i n g t o Smith the groundwork i n the n a t i o n a l i s t argument runs as f o l l o w s : 1. The w o r l d i s n a t u r a l l y d i v i d e d i n t o n a t i o n s , each of which has i t s p e c u l i a r c h a r a c t e r and d e s t i n y ; 2. the n a t i o n i s the s o u r c e o f a l l p o l i t i c a l power, and l o y a l t y to i t o v e r r i d e s a l l o t h e r l o y a l t i e s ; 3. i f t h e y w i s h t o be f r e e , and t o r e a l i s e t h e m s e l v e s , men must i d e n t i f y w i t h and b e l o n g t o a n a t i o n ; 4. g l o b a l freedom and peace a r e t h e f u n c t i o n s of the • l i b e r a t i o n and s e c u r i t y o f a l l n a t i o n s ; 5. n a t i o n s can o n l y be l i b e r a t e d and f u l f i l l e d i n t h e i r own s o v e r e i g n s t a t e s . 1 7 The f i r s t and perhaps t h e b a s i c f e a t u r e o f SNAP's t e r r i t o r i a l n a t i o n a l i s m , t h e n , c o n c e r n s t h e i s s u e of s o v e r e i g n t y . SNAP, of c o u r s e , advocated t h a t t h e Crown Colony of Sarawak would, as a m a t t e r o f r i g h t , advance to the s t a t u s o f a s o v e r e i g n n a t i o n - s t a t e , t h a t i s , as a l e g i t i m a t e 18 c o u n t r y . The c h o i c e of s o v e r e i g n t y , o r " u l t i m a t e independence", as a g o a l was c r i t i c a l t o t h e p a r t y ' s n a t i o n a l i s m f o r i t p r o v i d e d t h e 46 b a s i s t o l e g i t i m i s e , i . e . , t o ensure a m o r a l a c c e p t a n c e , f o r t h e e x e r c i s e of a u t h o r i t y . No disagreement a p p a r e n t l y e x i s t e d over the p r i n c i p l e of independence s i n c e the c o l o n i a l power had i n d i c a t e d i t s 1 9 d e s i r e t o d e p a r t from the r e g i o n . I n i t s t u r n SNAP a c c e p t e d as f a c t t h a t , t h r o u g h t h e c o u r t e s y of Great B r i t a i n , Sarawak would a t some p o i n t become a s o v e r e i g n n a t i o n . The o t h e r a s p e c t of SNAP's n a t i o n a l i s m was i t s concept of n a t i o n - b u i l d i n g , t h a t i s , i t s s e a r c h to s e c u r e the l o y a l t y and commitment of the c i t i z e n r y of t h e s t a t e . In i t s p r e s c r i p t i o n f o r t e r r i t o r i a l s o l i d a r i t y SNAP c l e a r l y sought to d i f f u s e p o t e n t i a l f l a s h p o i n t s of c o n f l i c t , p a r t i c u l a r l y t h o s e i n w h i c h e t h n i c p r i d e and l o y a l t y were at s t a k e . I t r e j e c t e d t h e n o t i o n of a " m e l t i n g - p o t " n a t i o n a l i t y i n which a common and Sarawak-based c u l t u r a l group w i t h i t s own d i s - t i n c t i v e h i s t o r y i s n u r t u r e d . I n o t h e r words, t h e p a r t y r e j e c t e d the i d e a l t h a t t e r r i t o r y , c u l t u r e and c i t i z e n s h i p be f u s e d . On the i s s u e o f n a t i o n a l i t y , t h a t i s , t h e l e g a l s t a t u s of c i t i z e n s h i p , t h e p a r t y ' s p o s i t i o n was t h i s : a l l t h e i n h a b i t a n t s of Sarawak were e n t i t l e d t o t h i s s t a t u s . As f u l l c i t i z e n s they s h o u l d be g i v e n such b a s i c r i g h t s as the freedom of speech and r e l i g i o n . More- ove r , as i n h a b i t a n t s of Sarawak t h e y were e n t i t l e d t o t h e i r own economic and c u l t u r a l development as w e l l . On t h e communal l e v e l each group was e n t i t l e d t o r e t a i n i t s own badges o f c u l t u r a l i d e n t i t y such as r e l i g i o n , language, and c u l t u r e . 47 T h i s r i g h t i s emphasised i n the p a r t y ' s "Aims and Objects",- i n w h i c h SNAP promised t o "ensure the freedom of speech and r e l i g i o n , and 20 p a r t i c u l a r l y t o s e c u r e t h e b l e s s i n g s of l i b e r t y . " F u r t h e r , i n i t s f o u r t h g o a l SNAP committed i t s e l f t o t h e promotion o f the c u l t u r a l development o f Sarawakians, a c l e a r i n d i c a t i o n t h a t t h e p a r t y would no t seek t o d i s c r i m i n a t e w i l l i n g l y a g a i n s t any of t h e component e t h n i c members. I n s h o r t , t h e f o u r t h g o a l i d e n t i f i e d a t l e a s t one dimension of SNAP's p o l i c y of m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m . I n t r o d u c e d as p a r t of t h e f i f t h g o a l was another a s p e c t o f i t s m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m p o l i c y . To SNAP the r i g h t s o f b e i n g a Sarawak n a t i o n a l were c i r c u m s c r i b e d by an o v e r r i d i n g p r o v i s i o n so t h a t one segment, the n a t i v e s , o f the s t a t e would by law e n j o y c e r t a i n p r i v i l e g e s . T h i s p a r t i c u l a r p o s i t i o n o f t h e p a r t y i s found i n O b j e c t No. 5 , i n which 21 SNAP proposed t o " s a f e g u a r d t h e i n t e r e s t s and w e l f a r e o f t h e n a t i v e s . " C h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y i t was vague on the k i n d s of s a f e g u a r d s i t would ad v o c a t e . Indeed, h a v i n g s t a t e d i t s p o s i t i o n , t h e p a r t y seemed eager t o de-emphasise i t s importance f o r i t promised a l s o t o p r o t e c t t h e r i g h t s o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l , i n c l u d i n g t h e C h i n e s e . The p o i n t which i t had e s t a b l i s h e d h e r e , however, was t h a t SNAP not o n l y endorsed the growth of each c u l t u r e — D a y a k , C h i n e s e , and M a l a y s — a s b u i l d i n g b l o c k s o f the s t a t e , but as w e l l s i n g l e d out a group o f them as e n t i t l e d t o p r i v i l e g e s . At t h i s p o i n t t h i s group i s r e f e r r e d t o as " n a t i v e s " , a term which a l s o i n c l u d e d Malays. In p r a c t i c e , however, when SNAP's 48 l e a d e r s u t i l i s e d the term, they meant o n l y Dayaks, a p o i n t which SNAP's a c t i v i t i e s c o n f i r m e d . F o r i n s t a n c e , i t o r g a n i s e d o n l y i n Dayak areas and, as has been seen, i t s l e a d e r s emerged from t h e Dayak 22 community, s p e c i f i c a l l y the Iban group. The o t h e r p a r t y w i t h Iban l e a d e r s h i p was Pesaka. I t was formed 23 i n June, 1962, by a c o t e r i e o f t r a d i t i o n a l Iban l e a d e r s from the T h i r d D i v i s i o n . The o r i g i n a l l e a d e r s were Penghulu (now Dat u k ) , F r a n c i s Umpau, and Pengarah Banyang. I n i t s f o r m a t i o n i t had the su p p o r t o f most o f the Penghulus from the T h i r d D i v i s i o n . Soon a f t e r the p a r t y was formed, the paramount-chief o f the Ibans, Temenggong Jugah, was persuaded to r e s i g n from PANAS and to l e a d Pesaka. 24 The purpose o f Pesaka was to form a "common and u n i t e d f r o n t " w i t h o t h e r Dayaks i n Sarawak, t h a t i s , i t would u n i t e Ibans, Kenyahs, Kayans, and Bidayuh t r i b e s under i t s l e a d e r s h i p . I n i t i a l l y , a t l e a s t , i t had l i m i t e d i t s memberships to Dayaks o n l y . Thus i n c o n t r a s t t o SNAP which a c c e p t e d a m u l t i - r a c i a l membership from the b e g i n n i n g , Pesaka was a t one time a p u r e l y Dayak o r g a n i s a t i o n . H i s t o r i c a l l y the Dayaks were a d i v i d e d p e o p l e . The much l a r g e r Iban t r i b e a t one time r a i d e d and p l u n d e r e d the t e r r i t o r i e s o f the n e i g h b o u r i n g Bidayuh and Kayan groups. Under the r e i g n o f Rajah S i r C h a r l e s Brooke, the Ibans themselves f o u g h t a g a i n s t each o t h e r when the Rajah employed Ibans from the Second D i v i s i o n f o r h i s f i e l d 25 f o r c e i n a s e r i s o f p u n i t i v e e x p e d i t i o n s a g a i n s t the T h i r d D i v i s i o n . 49 The i n t e n t o f t h e Rajah, of c o u r s e , was t o p a c i f y the t e r r i t o r y which he had j u s t a c q u i r e d from t h e S u l t a n o f B r u n e i . Peace e v e n t u a l l y came, but the a n i m o s i t i e s between the Iban groups of the two d i v i s i o n s remained. Given such sentiment i t was h a r d l y s u r p r i s i n g t h a t i n s t e a d o f a c c e p t i n g the l e a d e r s h i p o f t h e Ibans from t h e Second D i v i s i o n i n SNAP, the Ibans of t h e T h i r d D i v i s i o n embarked on a p o l i t i c a l p a r t y o f t h e i r own c a l l e d Pesaka anak Sarawak. Thus i n a r e a l sense, SNAP and Pesaks were c o m p e t i t o r s f o r t h e same r e s e r v o i r o f e t h n i c s u p p o r t . In summary, t h e n , i t may be s a i d t h a t the e a r l i e s t p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s which p r e c e d e d SNAP were dominated by the C h i n e s e and Malays r e s p e c t i v e l y . I n i t i a l l y Dayak r e a c t i o n s t o the f o r m a t i o n o f p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s were e i t h e r t o a v o i d p o l i t i c s a l t o g e t h e r o r t o j o i n the SUPP or PANAS. The most prominent Dayak l e a d e r s , t h e p a r l i a m e n t a r y i n s i d e r s , j o i n e d the M a l a y - l e d PANAS, p r o b a b l y b e l i e v i n g t h a t they and the Malays c o u l d e n t e r i n t o a common cause i n t h e d e f e n c e of n a t i v e r i g h t s , then dominate the n u m e r i c a l l y i n f e r i o r Malays a t a l a t e r d a t e . In a d d i t i o n , t h e r e was a t h i r d group of Dayaks who founded SNAP and whose u n d e r l y i n g o b j e c t i v e was to stem t h e f r a g m e n t a t i o n of t h e Dayaks and t o use t h e Dayak group as a s t r a t e g i c c o r e from which to g a i n power. The Dayak community formed t h e l a r g e s t v o t i n g b l o c i n Sarawak and, b e i n g n a t i v e s , they were a p r i v i l e g e d group as w e l l . The problem was t h a t i t was n o t a homogeneous community, b e i n g composed of s e v e r a l s u b - e t h n i c groups h a v i n g d i f f e r e n t s e n t i m e n t s and l o y a l t i e s . 5 0 In the few months of 1961 b e f o r e the M a l a y s i a p r o p o s a l became P u b l i c , SNAP was e x p r e s s i n g e t h n i c and t e r r i t o r i a l n a t i o n a l i s m s . The two o r i e n t a t i o n s , though c o n c e p t u a l l y d i s t i n c t , were a t t h i s time complementary to each o t h e r . What made t h i s seem p o s s i b l e was t h e s i z e o f SNAP's assumed base group, the Dayaks, who c o n s t i t u t e d n e a r l y 44% of Sarawak's p o p u l a t i o n . Presuming t h a t i t became a b l o c under SNAP, th e Dayaks c o u l d put SNAP i n government. I n t h i s sense the Dayak c o l l e c t i v i t y had t h e p o t e n t i a l of b e i n g t h e s t r a t e g i c e t h n i c group and SNAP, the o n l y Dayak based p a r t y then e x i s t i n g , was i n a f a v o u r a b l e p o s i t i o n to a t t r a c t Dayak s u p p o r t . Such e t h n i c p r e f e r e n c e i s n o t c o n t r a d i c t o r y to t h e p a r t y ' s concept o f m u l t i - r a c i a l membership. Rather, i t i l l u s t r a t e s an a s p e c t of i t s p o l i c y r e l i a n c e on an e t h n i c c o r e as the f o u n d a t i o n f o r t h e b u i l d i n g b l o c k of t h e Sarawakian s o c i e t y . I t s h o u l d be n o t e d t h a t t h e Malays i n Sarawak, a l t h o u g h a l s o p a r t of the group l o o s e l y termed " n a t i v e s " , were n u m e r i c a l l y i n f e r i o r and t h e r e f o r e c o u l d e x e r t l i t t l e i n f l u e n c e . T h e i r weak p o s i t i o n was t o change a f t e r M a l a y s i a , but even then they d e r i v e d t h e i r s t r e n g t h t h r o u g h t h e i n f l u e n c e of t h e F e d e r a l Government. T h i s means t h a t f o r SNAP the e t h n i c c o r e i s the Dayak, the dominant e t h n i c group from whence i t s l e a d e r s emerged. T r a n s l a t e d i n t o t h e Sarawak s i t u a t i o n , t h e r e f o r e , an e t h n i c t e r r i t o r i a l - n a t i o n a l i s m i s a Dayak-led a s p i r a t i o n f o r Sarawak n a t i o n h o o d . The problem w i t h the Dayaks as a p o l i t i c a l f o r c e was t h a t 5 1 w h i l e t h e y c o n s t i t u t e d the m a j o r i t y o f Sarawakians, t h e i r s o l i d a r i t y remained u n r e a l i s e d . Not o n l y were they d i v i d e d i n t o s u b - e t h n i c 2 6 groups but t h e i r l a r g e s t component, the Ibans, were s p l i t i n t o two major groups c e n t e r i n g around SNAP and Pesaka. T h e i r d i v i s i o n was based on l e a d e r s h i p . W hile SNAP was l e d by a self-made e l i t e , Pesaka was headed by a group o f t r a d i t i o n a l l e a d e r s who were a l s o p a r l i a m e n t a r y 27 i n s i d e r s . S i n c e n e i t h e r group appeared w i l l i n g t o f o l l o w the o t h e r , the Iban community was t h e r e f o r e s a d d l e d w i t h a problem o f l e a d e r s h i p s u c c e s s i o n . The r e l a t i o n s h i p between the two c o n t e n d i n g e l i t e s i s of some i n t e r e s t . Though c o o p e r a t i o n between them was p o s s i b l e — i f t h e s i t u a t i o n would b e n e f i t b o t h p a r t i e s — i t would be i n h e r e n t l y u n s t a b l e . F o o t n o t e s t o Chapter I I I 52 1. The t r a n s f e r o f power from the Brookes t o the C o l o n i a l Government met w i t h o p p o s i t i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y from the Malay community and the h e i r p r e sumptive t o the Rajah, Anthony Brooke. See, f o r i n s t a n c e , R o y a l I n s t i t u t e of I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , Sarawak: P o l i t i c a l and Economic Background (London: mimeographed, 1957), pp.2-5. 2. M i c h a e l B. L e i g h , The R i s i n g Moon: P o l i t i c a l Change i n Sarawak (Sydney: Sydney U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1974), p.13. 3. Sarawak T r i b u n e , March 5, 1959. 4. I b i d . 5. I b i d . 6. P a r t o f the r e a s o n f o r t h i s was i t s s u c c e s s i n g e t t i n g the s u p p o r t of Chinese c l a n a s s o c i a t i o n s . C.A. L o c k h a r d , " L e a d e r s h i p and Power w i t h i n t h e Chinese Community o f Sarawak", J o u r n a l o f Southeast A s i a n S t u d i e s (L970-1971), p.212. 7. M i c h a e l B. L e i g h , The R i s i n g Moon: P o l i t i c a l Change i n Sarawak, op. c i t p.14. 8. "Datu" i s a h e r e d i t a r y t i t l e i n Sarawak and Sabah. T h i s s h o u l d not be c o n f u s e d w i t h "Datuk" or "Dato" (and t h e v a r i a n t s such as "Dato S r i " ) which a r e t i t l e s awarded by a s t a t e and, f o r a p e r i o d o f t i m e , the F e d e r a l Government. Today, a f e d e r a l "Datuk" c a r r i e s t h e t i t l e "Tan S r i " . Above "Datuk" or "Tan S r i " i s another f e d e r a l t i t l e c a l l e d "Tun" I t i s a l s o " n o n - h e r e d i t a r y " a n d i s c o n f e r r e d o n l y by the Yang D i p e r t u a n Agung, the K i n g . S e v e r a l s t a t e s i n M a l a y s i a s t i l l use "Dato", which i s the o l d s p e l l i n g f o r "Datuk". I n t h i s paper i t i s employed when approp r i a t e . (R.S. M i l n e and Diane K. Mauzy, P o l i t i c s and Government i n M a l a y s i a [Vancouver: U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Columbia P r e s s , 1978], p . v i i i . ) The Dayaks do not have any h e r e d i t a r y t i t l e s . T h e i r l e a d e r s h i p h i e r a r c h y was an i n v e n t i o n of t h e Brookes (Robert P r i n g l e , R ajah and - R e b e l s : The Ibans of Sarawak under Brooke R u l e 1841-1941 [ I t h a c a : C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1970], p. ). O r i g i n a l l y , t h e Dayaks had o n l y " T u a i Rumah", l i t e r a l l y the head of each longhouse, the Dayak community d w e l l i n g which can range from s e v e r a l t o over one hundred f a m i l i e s . For a d m i n i s t r a t i v e purposes t h e Second Rajah, S i r C h a r l e s Brooke, i n t r o d u c e d a s u p e r i o r l e v e l o f l e a d e r s h i p above the " T u a i Rumah c a l l e d "Penghulu" whose j u r i s d i c t i o n u s u a l l y extended over one or more r i v e r v a l l e y s . Above the "Penghulu", was "Pengarah". At the apex of the h i e r a r c h y was the rank of "Temenggong", the p a r a m o u n t - c h i e f . In 1963 t h e r e were o n l y two "Temenggongs" i n Sarawak. They were Jugah anak B a r i e n g and Oyong Lawai J a u . W h i l e the former was the "Temenggong of the Ibans, the l a t t e r was t h e paramount-chief of the Kayans, Kenyahs and K e l a b i t s . 53 9. Sarawak T r i b u n e , March 5, 1969, c i t e d by L e i g h , op. c i t . , p.12. Mr. Brandah was awarded the t i t l e "Datuk" by th e Ningkan government. He i s now l i v i n g i n r e t i r e m e n t i n K u c h i n g . A l t h o u g h h i s s o n - i n - l a w C h a r l e s Ingka was a c t i v e i n SNAP and l a t e r P a j a r , the Datuk remains a p o l i t i c a l t o t h i s day, p r e f e r r i n g i n s t e a d t o devote h i s time t o the A n g l i c a n Church. P a j a r , a n a t i v e p a r t y , was formed i n 1977 by A l i i Kawi, who was a s e n i o r p o l i c e o f f i c e r b e f o r e he e n t e r e d p o l i t i c s . 10. T e n s i o n s between the N a t i v e s and the C h i n e s e have l e d to some b l o o d - l e t t i n g . The e a r l i e s t l a r g e s c a l e c l a s h between the two groups o c c u r - r e d i n 1857 i n the a f t e r m a t h of a C h i n e s e r e b e l l i o n a g a i n s t the Brooke R a j . The r e b e l s were Hakka Ch i n e s e g o l d - m i n e r s from Bau, t h e o n l y l a r g e Chinese c o l o n y i n Sarawak. The C h i n e s e sacked K u c h i n g , the c a p i - ; . t a l , on F e b r u a r y 18, 1857, and n e a r l y k i l l e d t h e Rajah h i m s e l f . Rajah James Brooke managed t o g a t h e r a l o y a l i s t f o r c e c o n s i s t i n g m a i n l y o f Skrang Ibans. Soon the C h i n e s e were d r i v e n o v e r the b o r d e r t o Indo- n e s i a n Borneo (Robert P r i n g l e , Rajahs and R e b e l s : The Ibans of Sarawak under Brooke Rule 1841 t o 1941 [ I t h a c a : C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1970], p.106). In 1967, i t was w i d e l y rumoured t h a t the Dayaks o f I n d o n e s i a had waged a war a g a i n s t the C h i n e s e i n t h e P o n t i a n a k r e g i o n . 11. The i n f o r m a t i o n f o r t h i s s e c t i o n was taken from N e l s o n Kudu, Sarawak N a t i o n a l P a r t y : i t s H i s t o r y , O r g a n i s a t i o n , and L e a d e r s h i p ( K u c h i n g : Sarawak N a t i o n a l P a r t y , 1973). In a d d i t i o n , Datuk Ningkan p r o v i d e d some background i n f o r m a t i o n on h i m s e l f d u r i n g an i n t e r v i e w i n June, 1976. See a l s o M i c h a e l L e i g h , " P a r t y F o r m a t i o n i n Sarawak," I n d o n e s i a , No. 9 ( A p r i l , 1970), pp.189-224. 12. Another d i s t i n g u i s h i n g f e a t u r e was t h e f a c t t h a t they b e l o n g e d t o a c l u s t e r of Ibans from the S a r i b a s , Second D i v i s i o n , who had s e r v e d the Japanese d u r i n g t h e Second World War and who, as a consequence, had g e n e r a l l y f a l l e n i n t o d i s f a v o u r w i t h the B r i t i s h . I f t h e i r war-time a c t i v i t i e s were viewed as a c t s of a n t i - c o l o n i a l i s m w i t h t h e o b j e c t o f o v e r t h r o w i n g the Brooke R a j , i t i s p o s s i b l e t o view t h e i r war-time c o l - l a b o r a t i o n as a c t s o f opportune c o - o p e r a t i o n w i t h a " l i b e r a t i n g " power. 13. Rupert Emerson, From Empire to N a t i o n (Cambridge, Mass.: H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1960), pp.95-96. 14. Anthony Smith, " I n t r o d u c t i o n : The F o r m a t i o n of N a t i o n a l i s t Movements," i n Anthony Smith, ed., N a t i o n a l i s t Movements (London: The M a c m i l l a n P r e s s , 1976), p.5. 15. Sarawak T r i b u n e , A p r i l 11, 1961. 16. See O b j e c t i v e One of SNAP's "Aims and O b j e c t s " on page 37. 17. Anthony Smith, " N a t i o n a l i s m : a Trend Report and B i b l i o g r a p h y " C u r r e n t S o c i o l o g y , V o l . XXI, No. 3 (1973), p.10. 18. See O b j e c t i v e One of SNAP's "Aims and O b j e c t s " on page 37. 19. See, f o r i n s t a n c e , Sarawak Government, "The Government Paper on M a l a y s i a and Sarawak", Sarawak G a z e t t e , V o l . LXXXVIII (January, 1962), p.9. 54 20. See O b j e c t i v e Two of SNAP's "Aims and O b j e c t s " on page 38. 21. See O b j e c t i v e F i v e o f SNAP's "Aims and O b j e c t s " on page 38. 22. By l a t e 1965 as r e l a t i o n s w i t h i t s a l l i a n c e p a r t n e r s and the f e d e r a l government d e t e r i o r a t e d SNAP began t o r e c r u i t non-Dayak members, p a r t i c u l a r l y C h i n e s e . 23. Sarawak T r i b u n e , June 18, 1962. 24. I b i d . , J u l y 20, 1962. 25. On t h e Brookes' p u n i t i v e e x p e d i t i o n s and subsequent peace agreements see: Robert P r i n g l e , op. c i t . ; S teven Runciman, The White Rajahs: A H i s t o r y o f Sarawak from 1941 to 1946 (Cambridge: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1960). 26. To i l l u s t r a t e t h e p o i n t , t h e Kayans t r a d i t i o n a l l y b e l i e v e d t h a t the Ibans, one-time enemies, were a c t u a l l y descended from worms (Jerome Rousseau, " E t h n i c I d e n t i t y and S o c i a l R e l a t i o n s i n C e n t r a l Borneo," i n J u d i t h Nagata, ed., C o n t r i b u t i o n s t o A s i a n S t u d i e s , V o l . V I I (1975), p.45. 27. The tendency f o r such e l i t e s t o compete has been n o t e d by M a u r i c e Duverger, P o l i t i c a l P a r t i e s , t h e O r g a n i s a t i o n and A c t i v i t y i n the Modern S t a t e (London: Methuen & Co., 1955) pp.xxxiv-xxxv. 55 CHAPTER IV MALAYSIA The F o r m a t i o n o f M a l a y s i a On May 27, 1961, Tengku Abdul Rahman, the Prime M i n i s t e r o f Malaya, c a l l e d f o r a c l o s e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g between Malaya, S i n g a p o r e , and the t h r e e t e r r i t o r i e s o f B r i t i s h B o r n e o — B r u n e i , Sarawak and North Borneo. H i s remarks, which s e t i n motion the p o l i t i c a l f o r c e s t h a t were to t r a n s f o r m t h e s e t e r r i t o r i e s i n t o a l e g a l n a t i o n - s t a t e , M a l a y s i a , a r e worth q u o t i n g i n p a r t . Sooner o r l a t e r she /Malaya7 s h o u l d have an under- s t a n d i n g w i t h B r i t a i n and the pe o p l e s o f S i n g a p o r e , North Borneo, B r u n e i and Sarawak. I t i s premature f o r me to say now how t h i s c l o s e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g can be brought about but i t i s i n e v i t a b l e t h a t we s h o u l d l o o k ahead to t h i s o b j e c t i v e and t h i n k o f a way whereby t h e s e t e r r i t o r i e s can be brought c l o s e r t o - ge t h e r i n a p o l i t i c a l and economic c o - o p e r a t i o n . 1 On economic and c u l t u r a l grounds the i d e a o f a M a l a y s i a n f e d e r a t i o n made good sense s i n c e the f i v e t e r r i t o r i e s had much i n common. They had a common c u r r e n c y . S i n g a p o r e s e r v e d as the main commercial c e n t r e f o r the f i v e t e r r i t o r i e s c o n c e r n e d . Malay and/or E n g l i s h were t h e i r l i n g u a f r a n c a . I n a d d i t i o n they had a common p a t t e r n o f a d m i n i s - t r a t i o n d e v e l o p e d by the B r i t i s h . The Tengku's p r o p o s a l was w e l l timed. The B r i t i s h , who s t i l l c o n t r o l l e d the Borneo t e r r i t o r i e s , were f a v o u r a b l e to t h e i d e a . F o r example, Mr. M a c M i l l a n , then the B r i t i s h prime m i n i s t e r , d e c l a r e d the 56 f o l l o w i n g June t h a t the Tengku's p r o p o s a l m e r i t e d the w i d e s t d i s c u s s i o n . I n t e n t on r e s e t t i n g i t s s i g h t s on European i n t e g r a t i o n , Mr. M a c M i l l a n ' s C o n s e r v a t i v e government was anxi o u s f o r a phased w i t h d r a w a l o f B r i t i s h a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and m i l i t a r y r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s from the Sou t h e a s t A s i a n r e g i o n . The S i n g a p o r e government, which by t h i s time had g a i n e d the Tengku's c o n f i d e n c e , r e c e i v e d h i s p r o p o s a l f a v o u r a b l y , and i n d e e d had evoked i t by p o i n t i n g to the t h r e a t o f a l e f t - w i n g t a k e o v e r i n an independant S i n g a p o r e . I n S i n g a p o r e the q u e s t i o n o f a merger was r e s o l v e d by means o f a referendum i n which o v e r s e v e n t y p e r c e n t o f those who v o t e d i n d i c a t e d t h a t they were pro-merger. In Malaya, P a r l i a - ment passe d a motion o f s u p p o r t f o r the concept i n October 1961. R e a c t i o n i n Borneo was mixed; " t h e r e has been a good d e a l o f 2 c o n f u s i o n and m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g o v e r merger p r o p o s a l s " , wrote one commentator. I n 1961 one o f the t e r r i t o r i e s was B r u n e i , a B r i t i s h p r o t e c t o r a t e , t h e o t h e r two b e i n g Sarawak and N o r t h Borneo, both Crown c o l o n i e s . A t t h a t time, "a f e d e r a t i o n o f j u s t the Borneo t e r r i t o r i e s was a b i g g e r concept than most Borneans c o u l d a c c o m m o d a t e — f a r l e s s an 3 a f f i l i a t i o n w i t h far-away Malaya and S i n g a p o r e . " In these t e r r i - t o r i e s o p p o s i t i o n to M a l a y s i a came from a " U n i t e d F r o n t " o f p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s . T h i s a n t i - M a l a y s i a f r o n t c o n s i s t e d o f the Sarawak U n i t e d P e o p l e s ' P a r t y (SUPP), l e d by Ong Kee H u i , B r u n e i ' s P a r t y Ra'ayat, headed by A.M. A z a h a r i and t h e No r t h Borneo's U n i t e d N a t i o n a l Kadazan O r g a n i z a t i o n (UNKO) c h a i r e d by Donald Stephens. When the Tengku announced t h a t he was g e n e r a l l y o p t i m i s t i c about s u p p o r t from Borneo f o r h i s p r o p o s a l the U n i t e d F r o n t q u i c k l y r e p l i e d t h a t the B r i t i s h government s h o u l d be a d v i s e d t h a t so f a r as the wishes o f the people i n the t h r e e t e r r i t o r i e s a r e a s c e r t a i n a b l e , any p l a n i n accordance w i t h the pronouncements made by Tengku Abd u l Rahman i n B r u n e i and Sarawak would be t o t a l l y u n a c c e p t a b l e to the peo p l e o f the t h r e e t e r r i t o r i e s . ^ The overwhelming i n i t i a l r e j e c t i o n a g a i n s t the i d e a o f a merger was not to c o n t i n u e , however. A f t e r t h e i r i n i t i a l g e s t u r e s o f o p p o s i t i o n , s e v e r a l i m p ortant l e a d e r s r e v e r s e d t h e i r s t a n d , p a r t i c u l a r l y the Datu Bandar o f Sarawak, who l e d the P a r t y Negara Sarawak (PANAS), and Donald Stephens o f UNKO. Wh i l e the former kept a low p r o f i l e , even a f t e r h i s p u b l i c d e c l a r a t i o n o f s u p p o r t f o r M a l a y s i a , the l a t t e r became an a c t i v e proponent o f the M a l a y s i a P l a n . Donald Stephens' i n i t i a l o p p o s i t i o n was due to h i s u n f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h the p l a n i t s e l f , and to h i s b e l i e f t h a t a Borneo f e d e r a t i o n was a t r u l y v i a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e to the Tengku's p l a n . That he was soon to change h i s s t a n d was l a r g e l y the r e s u l t o f p e r s u a s i v e work by the B r i t i s h who co n v i n c e d Stephens o f the danger o f a weak Borneo f e d e r a t i o n i n a r e g i o n o f t u r m o i l . I n a d d i t i o n to the e x t e r n a l t h r e a t s which c o u l d d e v e l o p i n t o problems o f s e c u r i t y , B r i t i s h Borneo a l s o f a c e d the p o s s i b i l i t y o f domestic communist i n s u r g e n c y . G i v e n these problems, the B r i t i s h f e l t t h a t Sarawak and N o r t h Borneo would b e s t become p a r t s 58 of the proposed M a l a y s i a n f e d e r a t i o n where two t e r r i t o r i e s would be p r o t e c t e d i n a common defence system. O p e r a t i n g i n the g e n e r a l l y f a v o u r a b l e atmosphere c r e a t e d by the good r e c e p t i o n to the merger, the l e a d e r s from t h e f i v e t e r r i t o r i e s a greed on the e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f a M a l a y s i a S o l i d a r i t y C o n s u l t a t i v e Committee (MSCC) to be c h a i r e d by Donald Stephens. C h i e f l y the o b j e c - t i v e s o f the MSCC was to " c o l l e c t and c o l l a t e views and o p i n i o n s c o n c e r n i n g the c r e a t i o n o f M a l a y s i a . . . " , as w e l l as " t o promote and e x p e d i t e the r e a l i z a t i o n o f M a l a y s i a . " To t h i s end the committee met f o u r t i m e s , the l a s t o f which was on Febr u a r y 3, 1962. I t s memorandum to the Cobbold Commission was b e l i e v e d to have r e f l e c t e d the consensus of t h e d e l e g a t e s from t h e f i v e t e r r i t o r i e s . ^ An Anglo-Malayan Commission, the Cobbold Commission, had been p r o v i d e d f o r i n the MacMillan-Tengku agreement o f November 23, 1961. Gi v e n the t a s k s o f i n q u i r i n g i n t o the p r o p o s a l on the s p o t and making recommendations, the Cobbold Commission u t i l i s e d the r e p o r t o f the MSCC as a guide f o r q u e s t i o n s and compromises. I t a r r i v e d on the scene In Feb r u a r y 1962, and c o n f i n e d i t s s u r v e y to Sarawak and No r t h Borneo, where i t s v i s i t l a s t e d a mere two months. The m a j o r i t y o f the p e o p l e , i t 9 co n c l u d e d , s u p p o r t e d M a l a y s i a . In J u l y 1963, the S u l t a n o f B r u n e i d e c i d e d a g a i n s t j o i n i n g the F e d e r a t i o n , b ut, t h i s s e t b a c k a s i d e , M a l a y s i a was i n c h i n g towards r e a l i t y . P o i n t s on i n d i v i d u a l and s t a t e m a t t e r s r a i s e d by the Cobbold Commission 59 were b e i n g s o r t e d out by the I n t e r - G o v e r n m e n t a l Committee o f Malaya and t h e two Borneo c o l o n i e s , c h a i r e d by L o r d Lansdowne. I t was the Lansdowne Commission which worked o u t the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l arrangements o f the new f e d e r a t i o n , thus e a s i n g the e n t r y o f t h e two c o l o n i e s . " ^ In Sarawak the p a r t l y a p p o i n t e d l e g i s l a t u r e , the C o u n c i l N e g r i , v o t e d on March 8, 1963, to j o i n the M a l a y s i a n f e d e r a t i o n . ^ A s i m i l a r r e s u l t was r e a c h e d by the L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l o f N o r t h Borneo on March 13. On J u l y 9, 1963, the d o c u m e n t — t h e London A g r e e m e n t — w h i c h e s t a b l i s h e d the f e d e r a t i o n , was f i n a l l y s i g n e d . I t p r o v i d e d f o r the c r e a t i o n o f the f e d e r a t i o n on August 31 o f the same y e a r . SNAP's R e a c t i o n to M a l a y s i a The Tengku's p r o p o s a l caught SNAP's l e a d e r s by s u r p r i s e . True, such an i d e a had been p r o p o s e d b e f o r e — f r o m as f a r back as 1949 by the 12 B r i t i s h and a g a i n i n 1955. But the p e r i o d i c emergence o f the concept had always been f o l l o w e d by u l t i m a t e r e j e c t i o n . P r i o r to May 1961, t h e r e had been l i t t l e e v i d e n c e to i n d i c a t e t h a t the p r o p o s a l a t t h i s time was r e a l l y a s e r i o u s move by the Tengku. None o f the Borneo l e a d e r s , f o r i n s t a n c e , were c o n s u l t e d o r i n f o r m e d i n advance. Such a l a c k o f c o u r t e s y and s e n s i t i v i t y a r o u s e d the s u s p i c i o n i n SNAP t h a t the M a l a y s i a P l a n would be f o i s t e d on the c i t i z e n s w i t h o u t the a p p r o v a l o f the c o l o n i e s c o n c e r n e d and may have c o n t r i b u t e d to the p a r t y ' s subsequent d e c i s i o n to oppose the c o n c e p t . Soon a f t e r the U n i t e d F r o n t was formed, 60 SNAP announced i t s s u p p o r t d f the body i n r e s i s t i n g the M a l a y s i a P l a n . The p a r t y was b a r e l y t h r e e months o l d a t the ti m e . In r e j e c t i n g the M a l a y s i a P l a n , SNAP r e l i e d h e a v i l y on i t s n a t i o n a l i s t argument t h a t Sarawak would as a m a t t e r o f r i g h t r e c e i v e f u l l i ndependence. The p a r t y c h a r g e d t h a t the proposed f e d e r a t i o n was p o l i t i c a l l y r e t r o g r e s s i v e i n n a t u r e and would deny Sarawak i t s s t a t e h o o d ; t h a t i s , to agree to the M a l a y s i a P l a n was to s a n c t i o n ;the r e d u c t i o n o f Sarawak's a s p i r a t i o n o f b e i n g a f u l l s o v e r e i g n power to t h a t o f a mere s t a t e . L a t e i n 1961, a p p a r e n t l y alarmed a t the momentum of the p l a n , Ningkan a g a i n v o i c e d h i s o p p o s i t i o n and t h i s time even i m p l o r e d the B r i t i s h f o r h e l p . To the s u p p o r t e r s o f the M a l a y s i a P l a n we say: 'No merger w i t h M a l a y a . We want to a c h i e v e s e l f - government and u l t i m a t e independence a l l o u r s e l v e s . We want to remain i n the B r i t i s h Commonwealth. We are not communists. We a r e Sarawak p a t r i o t s . We e a r n e s t l y r e q u e s t t h e B r i t i s h government t o p r o t e c t us as w e l l as h e l p us to s t e e r our s h i p i n the r i g h t d i r e c t i o n . ' 1 3 C l e a r l y , one o f the b a s i c reasons f o r SNAP's o p p o s i t i o n was the f e a r t h a t t h e proposed merger would permanently a r r e s t Sarawak's p r o g r e s s towards p o l i t i c a l m a t u r i t y . The b e l i e f i n a r i g h t to s o v e r e i g n t y i s the v e r y groundwork o f the d o c t r i n e o f n a t i o n a l i s m . The l e a d e r s o f SNAP c o n s i d e r e d t h a t as p a t r i o t s i t "would be f a t a l to the honour and i n t e g r i t y o f the c o u n t r y to h e s i t a t e i n p r o t e s t i n g a g a i n s t the p l a n a t , . . „14 t h i s j u n c t u r e . F u r t h e r to the argument, the l e a d e r s o f SNAP b e l i e v e d t h a t 61 o p p o s i t i o n to M a l a y s i a was a s i g n o f l o y a l t y t o Sarawak. Those s u p p o r t i n g M a l a y s i a , they contended, "seem to have no l o y a l t y to t h i s c o u n t r y . In a d d i t i o n to t h e i r p a t r i o t i s m , t h e i r l o v e f o r Sarawak, and t h e i r b e l i e f t h a t Sarawak s h o u l d r e c e i v e independence was t h e i r c o n v i c t i o n t h a t t h i s g o a l was w i t h i n r e a c h . SNAP l e a d e r s were s a t i s f i e d t h a t not o n l y s h o u l d Sarawak become a s o v e r e i g n s t a t e but t h a t i t c o u l d become one. A g a i n , to quote Ningkan: S i n c e we a r e g i v e n the o p p o r t u n i t y t o r u n the show o u r s e l v e s , why s h o u l d we r e f u s e i t and l e t o t h e r p e o p l e r u n i t f o r us? We s h o u l d be proud to see Sarawak be r e c o g n i s e d as a n a t i o n , and n o t as a s t a t e w i t h i n M a l a y s i a . 1 6 I f the f i r s t l i n e o f argument c e n t e r e d around the d o c t r i n e o f s t a t e h o o d , the second was the f e a r o f b e i n g dominated by M a l a y a . A c c o r d i n g to t h i s argument the M a l a y s i a P l a n was n o t o n l y more than a t h r e a t e n e d d e n i a l o f p o l i t i c a l m a t u r i t y f o r Sarawak, but a l s o an e x e r - c i s e o f i m p e r i a l e x p a n s i o n by Malaya. That i s , the r i s k o f b e i n g a s t a t e o f M a l a y s i a — a s opposed to not b e i n g one a t a l l — w a s t h a t i t would l e a v e Sarawak open to a c o n s t a n t i n f u s i o n o f economic, p o l i t i c a l , and c u l t u r a l i n f l u e n c e s from M a l a y a . In the o p i n i o n o f p a r t y l e a d e r s , most o f whom were brought up i n A n g l i c a n m i s s i o n s c h o o l s , i f t h e r e was ever any c o u n t r y w i t h which Sarawak s h o u l d have had such a c l o s e a s s o c i a t i o n , i t was B r i t a i n . Ningkan h i m s e l f p o i n t e d out t h a t Sarawak would remain i n the B r i t i s h Commonwealth a f t e r independence."^ 62 SNAP's e t h n i c c o n c e r n was one f e a t u r e which seemed t h r e a t e n e d by Malayan i m p e r i a l i s m . Under the p r oposed f e d e r a t i o n the most v u l n e r a b l e group would not be the Malays o f Sarawak, f o r they s h a r e d b r o a d c u l t u r a l s i m i l a r i t i e s w i t h the Malays of Malaya, nor would i t be the C h i n e s e , f o r Malaya had a p o w e r f u l and l a r g e Chinese p o p u l a t i o n . Thus d i s c o u n t i n g s t r o n g r e g i o n a l . l o y a l t y , f o r these two groups the M a l a y s i a p r o p o s a l was an o p p o r t u n i t y f o r c l o s e r communal a s s o c i a t i o n . U n f o r t u n a t e l y f o r the Dayaks, no such o p t i o n e x i s t e d s i n c e t h e r e were no Dayaks i n Malaya. F o r them t h e i r o n l y home was Sarawak. Ningkan a l l u d e d to t h i s f a c t when he s a i d t h a t he was " p r o f o u n d l y c e r t a i n t h a t the g r e a t m a j o r i t y o f p e o p l e s i n t h i s c o u n t r y do not want to s e l l t h e i r 18 one and o n l y home—Sarawak." The o t h e r a s p e c t o f t h i s f e a r stems from the p r a c t i c a l i t i e s o f p o l i t i c s . SNAP w i t h i t s Dayak base n a t u r a l l y s t o o d a b e t t e r chance of b e i n g the dominant p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i s a t i o n i f Sarawak remained detached from the f e d e r a t i o n , s i n c e the Dayaks, i t s base group, c o n s t i t u t e the m a j o r i t y i n the s t a t e . T h i s g e n e r a l l y good p r o s p e c t c o n t r a s t e d w e l l w i t h the p o s s i b l e f a t e o f the p a r t y i n M a l a y s i a ; s i n c e the Dayaks would c o n s t i t u t e a v e r y s m a l l m i n o r i t y i n the proposed f e d e r a t i o n , SNAP would appear to be.permanently condemned to b e i n g a m i n o r i t y and p a r o c h i a l p a r t y even i f i t s h o u l d s u c c e e d i n u n i t i n g the Dayaks, as w e l l as a s p r i n k l i n g of Malays and C h i n e s e . In s h o r t , the p r o s p e c t o f b e i n g a d i m i n u t i v e o r g a n i s a t i o n based i n Sarawak ( " j u s t a s t a t e w i t h i n M a l a y s i a " as Ningkan had s a i d ) was c l e a r l y an u n a t t r a c t i v e one. 6 3 At the e t h n i c l e v e l t h e r e was f e a r t h a t the M a l a y s i a n f e d e r a t i o n would i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e Malay d o m i n a t i o n , which would then be m a n i f e s t e d i n such areas as r e l i g i o n , language, e d u c a t i o n , and c u l t u r e . I n such a s i t u a t i o n i t would be d i f f i c u l t to c u l t i v a t e the s o l i d a r i t y o f the Dayaks, much l e s s to a t t r a c t C h i n e s e and Malay s u p p o r t . The l a s t dimension o f t h i s f e a r of d o m i n a t i o n was a t the s t a t e l e v e l . "How c o u l d i t be gu a r a n t e e d , " Ningkan s a i d , " t h a t Sarawak would t r u l y have e q u a l v o i c e i n the r u n n i n g o f M a l a y s i a ? " I f t h i s c o u l d n o t be a r r a n g e d , "would i t the n be p o s s i b l e f o r Sarawak to s a f e g u a r d i t s i m m i g r a t i o n laws, c i t i z e n s h i p , and s t a t e s o v e r e i g n t y , and a l l o t h e r <• 19 ma t t e r s we /jSNAPj i n t e n d z e a l o u s l y to keep f r e e ? " I n summary, i t may be s a i d t h a t SNAP's o p p o s i t i o n to M a l a y s i a was based on two o b j e c t i o n s . F i r s t , t h a t the f e d e r a t i o n would deny Sarawak's deserved r i g h t to independence. Second, t h a t the f e d e r a t i o n c o u l d f u s e the Dayaks i n t o a Malay m e l t i n g p o t — a n o t i o n which c o n j u r e d up the i d e a o f a s s i m i l a t i o n o r c u l t u r a l g e n o c i d e . C e r t a i n l y , the Dayaks would c o n s t i t u t e a m i n o r i t y i n the new f e d e r a t i o n and as such c o u l d not be ex p e c t e d to become the s t r a t e g i c e t h n i c group. The i m p l i c a t i o n o f t h i s f o r SNAP was t h a t i t would have to f o r f e i t i t s a s p i r a t i o n o f becoming the dominant p a r t y of a t r u l y independent s t a t e . L a s t l y , SNAP was concerned about the conduct o f p o l i c y d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g w i t h i n the f e d e r a l s t r u c t u r e , about the p r o s p e c t o f b e i n g a p a r t n e r h a v i n g e q u a l power w i t h the r e s t o f the s t a t e s . 64 Acceptance SNAP's o p p o s i t i o n to M a l a y s i a p e r s i s t e d i n t o the e a r l y p a r t o f 1962; i t was not u n t i l March t h a t i t s l e a d e r s gave i n . Ningkan who announced the s w i t c h a f t e r a meeting i n Betong, Second D i v i s i o n , gave no d e f i n i t e r e a s o n e x c e p t to admit to the " v i t a l n e c e s s i t y o f the 20 r e a l i z a t i o n o f M a l a y s i a . " Why d i d SNAP change i t s p o l i c y and a c c e p t M a l a y s i a ? S e v e r a l f a c t o r s were r e s p o n s i b l e . The f i r s t o f these was the i s s u e o f communism. F o r SNAP, which c o n s i d e r e d i t s e l f r i g h t - w i n g , the t h r e a t o f communism to Sarawak was a c o n s t a n t i r r i t a t i o n , a p o t e n t i a l v u l n e r a b i l i t y which i n the end weakened i t s r e s o l v e to f i g h t the M a l a y s i a p r o p o s a l . The p a r t y p e r c e i v e d i t s anti-communist p o s t u r e to be an im p o r t a n t p a r t of i t s p a r t i c u l a r n a t i o n a l i s t d o c t r i n e . T h i s was made c l e a r by Ningkan i n J u l y 1961 when he d e c l a r e d t h a t h i s p a r t y would "never be 21 s y m p a t h e t i c w i t h the Reds." With such an uncompromising v i e w p o i n t the p a r t y was i n c r e a s i n g l y p e r t u r b e d by mounting government r e v e l a t i o n s o f communist s u b v e r s i o n i n Sarawak. T h i s was one o f the u n d e r l y i n g a n x i e t i e s o f SNAP's l e a d e r s as they m u l l e d o v e r the p r o s p e c t o f b e i n g independent; a l o n e Sarawak might f a l l v i c t i m t o a communist e n g i n e e r e d t a k e o v e r . A t the same time, proponents o f M a l a y s i a changed t h e i r l i n e o f argument f o r the cause o f the f e d e r a t i o n to emphasise the t h r e a t o f communism i n the r e g i o n . The p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f B r i t i s h Borneo i n the proposed f e d e r a t i o n had been e x p l a i n e d as a way f o r the 65 n a t i v e s o f Borneo ( t h e Dayaks and Malays) to r e i n f o r c e n u m e r i c a l l y the Malays o f Malaya so t h a t w i t h i n M a l a y s i a an e t h n i c b a l a n c e between Chi n e s e and non-Chinese c o u l d be a f f e c t e d . They were t h e r e f o r e u n w i l l i n g to commit themselves to a cause i n which they would not b e n e f i t . With the i n c r e a s e d exposure o f communist t h r e a t n o t o n l y i n Malaya and S i n g a p o r e , but a l s o i n Sarawak, they were now g i v e n an o p p o r t u n i t y to r e - a p p r a i s e the M a l a y s i a P l a n i n a p o s i t i v e l i g h t . The t h r e a t o f communism was a p o w e r f u l argument which h i g h l i g h t e d a major danger to the s t a t e and government o f an independent Sarawak. The M a l a y s i a P l a n o f f e r e d an o p p o r t u n i t y o f common d e f e n c e a g a i n s t t h i s menace. I t c o u l d be s a i d , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t i n a c c e p t i n g the M a l a y s i a P l a n , Ningkan was s e e k i n g the most p r a c t i c a l way f o r Sarawak to s u r v i v e as a s t a t e . I t i s i n t h i s c o n t e x t t h a t Ningkan r e f e r r e d to M a l a y s i a as a " v i t a l n e c e s s i t y " i n h i s a c c e p t a n c e . The second f a c t o r c e n t e r e d on t h e t h r e a t o f Malay d o m i n a t i o n , not o n l y on Sarawak as a f u n c t i o n i n g s t a t e b u t a l s o on the Dayaks as a p e o p l e . T h i s f e a r o f s u b j u g a t i o n , as s t a t e d above, was one o f the fundamental reasons f o r SNAP's o p p o s i t i o n to M a l a y s i a . By January 1962 SNAP had s o f t e n e d i t s s t a n d c o n s i d e r a b l y , r e t r e a t i n g from complete r e j e c t i o n to c o n d i t i o n a l a c c e p t a n c e i n which the p a r t y sought s a f e g u a r d s and c o n c e s s i o n s . The o b j e c t o f g e t t i n g c o n c e s s i o n s was e v i d e n t i n the p a r t y comminique t h a t emanated from a s p e c i a l meeting h e l d i n Betong on January 18, 1962, when SNAP d e c l a r e d t h a t "the Sarawak 66 N a t i o n a l P a r t y ' s door i s opened f o r n e g o t i a t i o n s on the concept o f 22 M a l a y s i a . We suggest t h a t t h i s s h o u l d be d e a l t w i t h by a referendum." When by March SNAP gave up i t s f i g h t i t d i d so o n l y a f t e r demanding a number o f s a f e g u a r d s f o r Sarawak, s a f e g u a r d s which were d e s i g n e d to i n s u l a t e the s t a t e as much as p o s s i b l e from the f e d e r a l government. These proposed s a f e g u a r d s were p r e s e n t e d to the Cobbold Commission, which had been s e t up to " a s c e r t a i n the views of the p e o p l e s o f N o r t h 23 Borneo and Sarawak" on the M a l a y s i a P l a n . Perhaps the most i m p o r t a n t f a c t o r and one which f i n a l l y c o mpelled SNAP to f a l l i n l i n e was t h e momentum o f the M a l a y s i a P l a n i t s e l f . By l a t e 1961 and e a r l y 1962 as s u p p o r t began to mount f o r the p r o p o s a l and o r g a n i s a t i o n s e s t a b l i s h e d to push - f o r i t s cause, SNAP found i t s e l f s h unted a s i d e from the p r o c e e d i n g s and t h r e a t e n e d w i t h i s o l a t i o n . Worse, c o n t i n u e d r e s i s t a n c e to t h e concept o f M a l a y s i a might even push the p a r t y i n t o the p o s i t i o n o f p a r l i a m e n t a r y o p p o s i t i o n a f t e r Independence Day. P a r t y o f f i c i a l s f e a r e d t h a t , s h o u l d t h i s happen, SNAP would w i t h e r away s i n c e i t would be d e v o i d o f rewards and patronage commonly a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the government o f the day. I s o l a t i o n then, was viewed as a dangerous s i t u a t i o n ; f a c e d w i t h t h i s p r o s p e c t the l e a d e r s o f the p a r t y c o n c l u d e d t h a t they had no c h o i c e but to a c c e p t the p r o p o s a l . SNAP's p r o t e s t a t i o n s had l i t t l e i f any impact on the r e s t o f Borneo's p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s . In J u l y 1961, the M a l a y s i a S o l i d a r i t y 67 C o n s u l t a t i v e Committee (MSCC) was formed i n o r d e r t h a t the p r o p o s a l c o u l d c o n t i n u e to be d i s c u s s e d and the r e a l i z a t i o n o f M a l a y s i a e x p e d i t e d . Bornean l e a d e r s were prominent i n t h i s body: i t s Chairman was Donald 24 Stephens and t h e d e l e g a t i o n from Sarawak had e i g h t members. They were Yeo Cheng Hoe, Ong Kee H u i , Temenggong Jugah, Pengarah M o n t e g r a i , Datuk Abang H a j i Openg, L i n g Beng Siew, James Wong and Remigus D u r i n . None o f them were i n any way a s s o c i a t e d w i t h SNAP. Perhaps because i t was e x c l u d e d from the o n l y important d e b a t i n g body, SNAP f a i l e d to a c t as a c a t a l y s t f o r a n t i - M a l a y s i a s e n t i m e n t . I t s e x c l u s i o n from t h i s body meant t h a t i t was n o t a b l e to i n t r o d u c e i t s views f o r m a l l y , much l e s s sway t h e MSCC to i t s d i r e c t i o n . As l a t e as December 1961 an o p p o r t u n i t y a p p a r e n t l y e x i s t e d , f o r u n c e r t a i n t i e s about t h e p l a n s t i l l abounded. At t h a t time no consensus was r e a c h e d i n the MSCC as d e l e g a t e Yeo Cheng Hoe o b s e r v e d a f t e r one o f i t s meetings i n K uching: What t r a n s p i r e d i n those /Kuchxng7 debates seems to have caused g r e a t e r c o n f u s i o n i n the minds o f our p e o p l e here.25 There was t h e r e f o r e a p r o l o n g e d p e r i o d o f ambivalence about M a l a y s i a , a s i t u a t i o n which SNAP c o u l d not e x p l o i t s i m p l y because i t was n o t a member of the MSCC. In f r u s t r a t i o n , i t s l e a d e r s were reduced to v i l i f y i n g M a l a y s i a s u p p o r t e r s , a c c u s i n g them o f h a v i n g "no l o y a l t y t o 26 t h i s c o u n t r y ... no f a i t h i n themselves SNAP was even o u t - manoeuvred by PANAS, whose Chairman c l a i m e d t h a t t w o - t h i r d s o f the n a t i v e s had by t h e n g i v e n t h e i r s u p p o r t to the p l a n . SNAP, which 68 c o n s i d e r e d the f i g u r e i n f l a t e d , o b j e c t e d v i g o r o u s l y . Whether the o p i n i o n s of the two p a r t i e s were ev e r c o n s i d e r e d s e r i o u s l y by the MSCC may never be known. What happened, however, was t h a t a t the end o f i t s meetings i n K u c h i n g the MSCC r e s o l v e d to s u p p o r t M a l a y s i a . SNAP's o p p o s i t i o n began to f a l t e r a t t h i s p o i n t . In a s p e c i a l meeting i n Betong, convened i n January 1962, the p a r t y condemned the MSCC as h a v i n g "no mandate ... and t h e r e f o r e t h e i r a c c e p t a n c e of the 27 p l a n c o u l d not be t a k e n f o r g r a n t e d . " N o n e t h e l s s s , a f t e r t h i s , SNAP conceded t h a t i t s door was now open f o r n e g o t i a t i o n s on the c o n cept o f M a l a y s i a . F u r t h e r e v i d e n c e o f the momentum o f the M a l a y s i a P l a n was, i n a d d i t i o n to t h e MSCC's work, the p r o g r e s s of the Cobbold Commission. I t was a Commission of I n q u i r y e s t a b l i s h e d by the B r i t i s h and Malayan governments and one which t r a v e r s e d the whole o f Sarawak, f i r s t t o u c h i n g Limbang, i t s northern-most t i p , then on to the Rejang B a s i n . The i t i n e r a r y was such t h a t by the time the Rejang was c o v e r e d , the t r e n d of Sarawak's o p i n i o n on M a l a y s i a c o u l d have been e s t a b l i s h e d . The i m p l i c a t i o n f o r SNAP was t h i s : s i n c e most Dayaks r e s i d e d i n the 28 Rejang B a s i n , i t g r e a t l y m a t t e r e d which way i t i n c l i n e d . To d i f f e r from the Rejang Dayaks was not o n l y to s p l i t the Dayak p e o p l e s but a l s o to become a m i n o r i t y o v e r any i s s u e s i n c e the Rejang Dayaks c o n s t i t u t e the m a j o r i t y o f t h i s e t h n i c group. T h i s s i t u a t i o n was a p p l i c a b l e to the M a l a y s i a i s s u e . An overwhelming v o t e o f c o n f i d e n c e 69 f o r M a l a y s i a i n the Rejang was bound to have an i m p o r t a n t e f f e c t on SNAP, s i n c e to c o n t i n u e i t s . o p p o s i t i o n to the p l a n a t t h i s time was to break-away from the Rejang Dayaks and to r i s k e x a c e r b a t i o n o f the t r a d i t i o n a l r i v a l r i e s between the two peoples o f the Rejang and S a r i b a s , SNAP's h e a r t l a n d . S i n c e SNAP's o b j e c t i v e was to u n i t e the Dayaks under i t s l e a d e r s h i p , i t was t h e r e f o r e u n w i l l i n g to cause t h i s k i n d o f s p l i t . In t h i s r e s p e c t o v e r the M a l a y s i a i s s u e , a t l e a s t , SNAP would have to 29 f o l l o w the l e a d g i v e n by the Rejang Dayaks. The d i r e c t i o n i n which t h e s e Dayaks would go was made c l e a r even b e f o r e the Cobbold Commission a r r i v e d i n Sarawak. On Feb r u a r y 15, f i f t y - o n e c h i e f s from the Rejang met i n S i b u , the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c e n t r e f o r t h e T h i r d D i v i s i o n , where they d e c l a r e d t h e i r s u p p o r t f o r Malaysia."'' They had t h e i r c o n d i t i o n s , o f c o u r s e , and t h e i r r e s o l u t i o n s , known as the K a p i t R e s o l u t i o n s , were p r e s e n t e d to the Cobbold Commission on March 19. The impact o f the move by t h e s e c h i e f s was t a k e n as i m p o r t a n t by t h e Cobbold Commission which a l l o w e d t h a t T h i s was an e x p r e s s i o n o f o p i n i o n t o which we a t t a c h v e r y g r e a t w e i ght. The 51 C h i e f s a t the c o n f e r e n c e t o g e t h e r were s a i d to r e p r e s e n t some 112,000 Iban-Dayaks out o f a t o t a l o f n e a r l y 238,000 and many d e l e g a t i o n s o f Iban Dayaks who came b e f o r e us a t d i f f e r e n t c e n t r e s c o n f i r m e d t h a t they s u p p o r t the K a p i t R e s o l u t i o n s . . . . 31 The move by t h e s e c h i e f s on SNAP was p i v o t a l . A f t e r the F e b r u a r y 15 meeting, SNAP f i n a l l y conceded d e f e a t , a l t h o u g h t h i s was n o t 70 announced u n t i l March 2. On t h a t same day i t p u b l i s h e d i t s own l i s t o f s a f e g u a r d s f o r the s t a t e o f Sarawak. On March 26, when the Cobbold Commission a r r i v e d i n Betong, Ningkan l e d a d e p u t a t i o n o f SNAP members. I t was here t h a t SNAP's c o n d i t i o n s f o r a c c e p t a n c e o f the M a l a y s i a P l a n were p r e s e n t e d . They a r e : (1) The Head o f S t a t e o f Sarawak s h o u l d be c a l l e d Rajah, who must be of t h e i n d i g e n o u s p e o p l e , and be e l e c t e d by the p e o p l e of t h e c o u n t r y ; (2) The Supreme Head o f the S t a t e of the F e d e r a t i o n o f M a l a y s i a s h o u l d be nominated by r o t a t i o n ; (3) Each Head o f S t a t e i n M a l a y s i a s h o u l d be e l i g i b l e f o r n o m i n a t i o n as the Yang D i p e r t u a n Agong o f the F e d e r a t i o n ; (4) There s h o u l d be no a l t e r a t i o n o f the b o u n d a r i e s of any s t a t e , e s p e c i a l l y t h o s e between Sarawak, B r u n e i , and N o r t h Borneo; (5) The p r e s e r v a t i o n o f customary r i g h t s s h o u l d remain the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f the S t a t e ; (6) The p r o t e c t i o n o f l a n d r i g h t s s h o u l d remain the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f the S t a t e ; (7) E n g l i s h s h o u l d remain the o f f i c i a l language, not o n l y i n Sarawak but a l s o i n t h e F e d e r a t i o n o f M a l a y s i a f o r a t l e a s t f i f t e e n y e a r s ; (8) The E n g l i s h language s h o u l d remain as the medium o f i n s t r u c t i o n i n s c h o o l s . The s t u d y o f o t h e r languages s h o u l d h o t be p r e v e n t e d ; (9) As Malay would be the n a t i o n a l language i n M a l a y s i a , Iban s h o u l d t h e r e f o r e be one o f the secondary languages e s p e c i a l l y i n Sarawak; (10) E x p a t r i a t e o f f i c e r s s h o u l d remain u n t i l o r u n l e s s s u i t a b l e l o c a l p e o p l e were found to r e p l a c e them; (11) Powers r e s e r v e d f o r the S t a t e s h o u l d not be changed w i t h o u t b e i n g agreed upon by t h e S t a t e ; (12) Immigration 71 s h o u l d be under the c o n t r o l o f the S t a t e ; (13) Development s h o u l d be a c c e l e r a t e d but s u b j e c t to the agreement o f the S t a t e ; (14) The i n d i g e n e o u s p e o p l e s s h o u l d have a f a i r s h a r e o f government employment; e n j o y i n g the same p r i v i l e g e s and h a v i n g a f a i r s h a r e o f o v e r s e a s t r a i n i n g and s c h o l a r s h i p s ; (15) A l l s t a t e s s h o u l d have e q u a l o p p o r t u - n i t i e s i n r e g a r d to e d u c a t i o n ; (16) The M a l a y s i a n C o n s t i t u t i o n s h o u l d guarantee t h a t a l l p e r s o n be e q u a l l y e n t i t l e d to freedom o f c o n s c i e n c e and t h e r i g h t to p r o f e s s , p r a c t i c e and propagate r e l i g i o n f r e e l y ; (17) Sarawak s h o u l d have adequate r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n the F e d e r a l government; (18) The S t a t e s h o u l d be p r o v i d e d w i t h c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s a f e g u a r d s ; (19) Each S t a t e s h o u l d have a f a i r c o n t r i b u t i o n o f manpower to the armed f o r c e s ( t h e Army, Navy, and Air::Force) o f t h e F e d e r a t i o n 32 of M a l a y s i a . SNAP the n f a c e d M a l a y s i a by s t a t i n g s e v e r a l c o n d i t i o n s and s a f e g u a r d s which i t tended to c o n s i d e r no l o n g e r n e g o t i a b l e . Not t h a t the p a r t y was u n w i l l i n g to c o n s i d e r f u r t h e r forms of changes, but any amendments were to be m u t u a l l y agreed upon by both s i d e s . C e r t a i n l y i t r e g a r d e d the terms of Sarawak's e n t r y as beyond the power o f the f e d e r a l government to change u n i l a t e r a l l y . At f i r s t , the terms concerned i s s u e s o f communal and s t a t e i n t e r e s t s . S p e c i f i c a l l y , they r e l a t e to language (Iban, i t s h o u l d be a n a t i o n a l language) and p r i v i l e g e s . S e condly, SNAP was now concerned about the p l a c e o f Sarawak w i t h i n t h e F e d e r a t i o n . A number of i s s u e s were i n v o l v e d which seemed 72 to s u g g e s t t h a t SNAP was i n t e n t on i n s u l a t i n g the S t a t e and t h e r e f o r e the Dayaks from f e d e r a l i n t e r v e n t i o n . I t demanded t h a t Sarawak r e t a i n j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r customary r i g h t s , l a n d , i m m i g r a t i o n , and development, and t h a t i t s h o u l d have e d u c a t i o n a l o p p o r t u n i t i e s e q u a l to t h a t o f o t h e r s t a t e s . T h i r d l y , SNAP made i t c l e a r t h a t i t s l o y a l t y t o the F e d e r a t i o n was c o n d i t i o n a l on f e d e r a l g o o d w i l l to keep the terms o f Sarawak's e n t r y . In an i n c i d e n t o f unwarranted f e d e r a l i n t e r f e r e n c e , i t c o u l d be e x p e c t e d t h a t the p a r t y would r e s i s t o r even u n d e r t a k e the u l t i m a t e p r o t e s t by a d v o c a t i n g s e p a r a t i o n . G i v e n the s i t u a t i o n , SNAP- f e d e r a l r e l a t i o n s c o u l d be expected to be a c r i m o n i o u s as M a l a y s i a underwent the p r o c e s s o f m o d e r n i s a t i o n and n a t i o n b u i l d i n g . A l l i a n c e B u i l d i n g The M a l a y s i a P l a n was an imp o r t a n t i s s u e , b u t once p a r t y l e a d e r s had a c c e p t e d i t they were eager to move on to the next problem: the f o r m a t i o n o f government. T h e i r p r e f e r e n c e , o b v i o u s l y , was f o r SNAP to c o n s t i t u t e t h e o n l y r u l i n g p a r t y , but e a r l y i n 1962 t h i s d i d not seem 33 p o s s i b l e . The p a r t y was f a r too s m a l l and too weak to mount an e l e c t o r a l campaign through the t h r e e - t i e r e d e l e c t o r a l system from t h e d i s t r i c t l e v e l to the D i v i s i o n a l A d v i s o r y C o u n c i l (DAC) and f i n a l l y to the l e g i s l a t u r e , the C o u n c i l N e g r i . I t was c l e a r , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t i f SNAP was to be i n power a t a l l i t would have to be i n c o a l i t i o n . Ningkan worked e a r l y towards t h i s end. T w e n t y - s i x days a f t e r he 73 had a c c e p t e d the M a l a y s i a P l a n , on March 27, 1962, he announced t h a t 34 h i s p a r t y would form an a l l i a n c e w i t h BARJASA "very soon". T h i s was a s i g n i f i c a n t o v e r t u r e , p a r t i c u l a r l y s i n c e he c o u l d have c o u r t e d PANAS, another r i g h t - w i n g and p r o - M a l a y s i a p a r t y . But a t t h a t time PANAS was re g a r d e d the g r e a t e r t h r e a t o f the two because o f the preponderance o f Dayak members i n i t s o r g a n i s a t i o n . As w e l l , PANAS had many t r a d i t i o n a l Dayak l e a d e r s , such as Temenggong Jugah, the paramount c h i e f o f the Ibans, Pengarah M o n t e g r a i , h i s l i e u t e n a n t i n the Second D i v i s i o n , and Temenggong Oyong Lawai Jau, the paramount c h i e f o f t h e Kayans and Kenyahs. These men were not o n l y communal l e a d e r s b u t members of the C o u n c i l N e g r i as w e l l . At t h a t time they appeared s a t i s f i e d w i t h t h e i r p o s i t i o n ; whatever the r e a s o n , PANAS r e f u s e d to e n t e r i n t o any p o l i t i c a l a l l i a n c e . Ningkan p r o f e s s e d to f a v o u r the p r i n c i p l e but e x p l a i n e d t h a t " s i n c e the s u b j e c t had not been d i s c u s s e d b e f o r e , i t has to be l e f t i n abeyance u n t i l such time when members had unanimously a g r e e d to 35 the p r o p o s a l . " PANAS' r e c a l c i t r a n c e was t i m e l y s i n c e SNAP's l e a d e r s l o o k e d upon PANAS's members, p a r t i c u l a r l y the Bidayuh Dayaks, as f a i r game f o r d e f e c t i o n s . I n c o n t r a s t BARJASA l a c k e d i m p o r t a n t Dayak s u p p o r t e i t h e r i n terms o f l e a d e r s o r pockets o f f o l l o w e r s and was t h e r e f o r e more a t t r a c t i v e than PANAS. D e s p i t e h i s e a r l y optimism, Ningkan was to be d i s a p p o i n t e d by the r e s u l t s o f h i s i n i t i a t i v e . SNAP and BARJASA r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s met a t the end o f June "but n e g o t i a t i o n s f l o u n d e r e d when SNAP demanded two- 74 t h i r d s o f a l l o f f i c e s and c o n t r o l on the b a s i s o f t h e i r c l a i m e d 36 membership", an i n d i c a t i o n t h a t i t s l e a d e r s would not g i v e way t o Malay d o m i n a t i o n l i g h t l y . By the end o f June, SNAP was f a c i n g something o f a c r i s i s . The p o l i t i c a l a l l i a n c e which i t had c u l t i v a t e d s i n c e March had f a i l e d to m a t e r i a l i s e . Worse, Ningkan appeared to have l o s t the i n i t i a t i v e s i n c e i t appeared t h a t BARJASA and PANAS were moving c l o s e r . The appearance came c l o s e r to r e a l i t y when the l a t t e r announced l a t e i n June t h a t i t was p r e p a r e d " t o work out a f e a s i b l e agreement w i t h any r i g h t - w i n g p a r t y 37 t h a t had d e c l a r e d i t s s u p p o r t f o r the f o r m a t i o n o f an a l l i a n c e . " BARJASA was q u i c k to o f f e r i t s c o n g r a t u l a t i o n s to PANAS; and the p r o s p e c t o f a Malay dominated a l l i a n c e , w i t h i t s s t r o n g Dayak component (at the time) which c o u l d i s o l a t e SNAP w i t h i t s 50,000 o r more c l a i m e d members, seemed c l o s e to r e a l i t y . Faced w i t h t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f a Malay-dominated A l l i a n c e , Ningkan next t u r n e d to the n a s c e n t P a r t y Pesaka Anak Sarawak ( P e s a k a ) . Formed the same month (June) t h a t the SNAP-BARJASA n e g o t i a t i o n s had b r o k e n down, Pesaka was l e d by T h i r d D i v i s i o n Iban c h i e f s . The founders were Penghulu F r a n c i s Umpau, Pengarah Banyang, and Penghulu Chundi. Upon announcing t h e i r i n t e n t i o n t o form a p o l i t i c a l p a r t y , b o t h Pengarah Banyang and Penghulu Umpau,', who were to become Pesaka's chairman and s e c r e t a r y - g e n e r a l r e s p e c t i v e l y , warned t h a t u n l e s s the Dayaks " c o u l d p r e s e n t a common and u n i t e d f r o n t , t h e y w o u l d be c o m p l e t e l y overwhelmed.' 75 I t s h o u l d ne n o t e d t h a t t h e statement was i n t e n d e d as j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t h e f o r m a t i o n of Pesaka, which was i n t e n d e d t o be w h o l l y Dayak. What Ningkan d i d was to i n t e r p r e t t h e i r p o l i t i c a l r h e t o r i c so t h a t t h e " u n i t e d f r o n t " Pesaka t a l k e d about c o u l d become a r e a l i t y — a SNAP- Pesaka a l l i a n c e . To SNAP such an a l l i a n c e had a p r a c t i c a l a t t r a c t i o n . For once t h e Dayaks had a chance n o t o n l y to p r e s e n t themselves as a u n i t e d o r g a n i s a t i o n but a l s o t o work towards the r e a l i z a t i o n o f Dayak dominance i n Sarawak. T h i s was d e s i r a b l e from SNAP's n a t i o n a l i s t o u t l o o k f o r here the Dayaks from SNAP's e t h n i c base, t o g e t h e r w i t h o t h e r Dayaks from Pesaka, would be i n c o n t r o l . I f SNAP c o u l d not draw a l l Dayak su p p o r t t o i t s e l f , then t h e p r e f e r a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e was to e n t e r i n t o an a l l i a n c e w i t h t h e o t h e r Dayak p a r t y to p o o l t h e i r s t r e n g t h . The second advantage was t h a t such an arrangement would a f f o r d SNAP a d d i - t i o n a l means by which to h o l d on t o i t s t e r r i t o r i a l g a i n s . The a p p e a l of the t r a d i t i o n a l Dayak l e a d e r s was s t i l l c o n s i d e r a b l e t o c o n v e n t i o n - bound Dayaks. I n o r d e r t o p r e v e n t d e f e c t i o n s SNAP t h e r e f o r e needed t o r e a c h an u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h Pesaka n o t t o poach on i t s t e r r i t o r y . For t h i s r e a s o n a SNAP-Pesaka a l l i a n c e would have been i d e a l , s i n c e i t s v e r y p r e s e n c e would u n d e r s c o r e such an agreement. On J u l y 8, l e s s than one month a f t e r Pesaka was founded, over one h u n d r e d - d e l e g a t e s of the two p a r t i e s met i n Betong where t h e y agreed i n p r i n c i p l e on the f o r m a t i o n of a SNAP-Pesaka a l l i a n c e . To f a c i l i t a t e 76 n e g o t i a t i o n s , a Pesaka l e a d e r , Temenggong Oyong Lawai J a u , was r e c r u i t e d as the V i c e - P r e s i d e n t of t h e b i - l a t e r a l " C o u n c i l of A l l i a n c e " . By September, i t was hoped, n e g o t i a t i o n s would have been completed and SNAP and Pesaka would have formed t h e p i l l a r s of a system from which SNAP "would seek t o form a l l i a n c e w i t h a l l o t h e r r i g h t - w i n g p a r t i e s i n 39 Sarawak", Ningkan was a g a i n to be d i s a p p o i n t e d a t t h e outcome, but t h e problem c e n t e r e d n o t on SNAP but Pesaka. Banyang and Umpau e f f e c t i v e l y s c u t t l e d t h e move towards an a l l i a n c e by d e n y i n g t h a t t h e Temenggong had any a u t h o r i t y t o r e p r e s e n t Pesaka. They p r o t e s t e d t h a t they themselves d i d n o t know what was meant by Ningkan's " C o u n c i l o f A l l i a n c e " , and d e c l a r e d t h a t "no s i n g l e member of Pesaka anak Sarawak 40 has the a u t h o r i t y to a c t a t t h i s stage on b e h a l f o f t h e p a r t y . . . " . Thus, w i t h the r o l e o f t h e p r o - A l l i a n c e Temenggong undermined, and Pesaka i n c l e a r d i s a r r a y , the momentum t o e f f e c t an i n t r a - e t h n i c a l l i a n c e was a g a i n t e m p o r a r i l y l o s t . Pesaka's d i s o r g a n i s a t i o n c o u l d be e x p l a i n e d by i t s u n r e s o l v e d l e a d e r s h i p q u e s t i o n : i t had y e t t o l u r e i t s e x p e c t e d l e a d e r , Temenggong Jugah, away from PANAS. U n t i l h i s assumption o f power c o u l d be arr a n g e d any e f f o r t to c o n s t r u c t an a l l i a n c e had t o be d e f e r r e d . By l a t e August, Jugah was f i r m l y ensconced i n h i s new p o s i t i o n and e a r l y the n e x t month, Ningkan was a b l e t o announce t h a t SNAP's a l l i a n c e w i t h P a r t y Pesaka anak Sarawak would be e s t a b l i s h e d f i r s t a f t e r which an a l l i a n c e w i t h a l l r i g h t - w i n g p a r t i e s would f o l l o w . 4 1 77 Ningkan's statement c o n f i r m s t h a t , a l t h o u g h h i s b e l i e f i n Dayak u n i t and h i s d e s i r e t o e f f e c t a Dayak a l l i a n c e accounted f o r much of SNAP's a c t i v i t i e s d u r i n g t h e m i d d l e o f 1962, t h e r e was a secondary o b j e c t i v e , an u m b r e l l a a l l i a n c e which would i n v o l v e PANAS, BARJASA, and t h e SCA, which were t h e p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s of o t h e r communal groups. Thus, t h e v e r y month t h a t SNAP was n e g o t i a t i n g w i t h Pesaka, Ningkan was a l s o w a i t i n g f o r BARJASA t o respond t o h i s "terms 42 and c o n d i t i o n s " . I n t h i s r e s p e c t SNAP's p o l i c y was t o c o - o p e r a t e w i t h o t h e r p r o - M a l a y s i a p a r t i e s , but i n 1962 i t s p r i o r i t y was c l e a r : Dayak-based p a r t i e s must f i r s t be g i v e n a chance t o u n i t e . That, t h e SNAP-Pesaka a l l i a n c e was t o fade i n t o limbo was due, not t o t h e l a c k of g o o d w i l l on the p a r t o f SNAP, but t o r a t h e r t o i n d e c i s i o n on the p a r t o f Pesaka, t o inadequate o r g a n i s a t i o n , and t o i n s u f f i c i e n t f u n d s . F i n a l l y , the straw t h a t broke t h e camel's back, so t o speak, was t h e d r i v e by o t h e r p r o - M a l a y s i a p a r t i e s t o form an a l l i a n c e around t h e i s s u e of t h e F e d e r a t i o n . Ningkan's i n s i s t e n c e t h a t a SNAP-Pesaka a l l i a n c e be formed f i r s t , was due not o n l y t o h i s b e l i e f t h a t such a u n i t y was e s s e n t i a l t o ensure Dayak d o m i n a t i o n ; i t was a l s o t o h i s response t o the t h r e a t of e x t e r n a l i n t r u s i o n i n t o Sarawak p o l i t i c s . I n p a r t i c u l a r t h e r e was concern about Malayan i n t e r v e n t i o n which would a s s i s t t h e Chinese and Malays, l e a v i n g t h e Dayaks I s o l a t e d . At t h a t t i m e , such an event seemed l i k e l y , f o r t h e f o r m a t i o n o f t h e Sarawak Chi n e s e A s s o c i a t i o n 78 (SCA) was I n s p i r e d by the Malayan C h i n e s e A s s o c i a t i o n (MCA). On September 6, 1962, t h e l a t t e r ' s s e c r e t a r y - g e n e r a l , T.Y. Tan, c o n f e s s e d t h a t t h e two p a r t i e s were " e x p l o r i n g the p o s s i b i l i t y of b r i n g i n g t h e 44 MCA and SCA t o g e t h e r " . L i k e w i s e , e a r l y i n J u l y 1962, r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h e U n i t e d Malays N a t i o n a l O r g a n i s a t i o n (UMNO) were c o n f e r r i n g w i t h PANAS on the p r o s p e c t of f o r m i n g an a f f i l i a t e p a r t y i n Sarawak, t o be c a l l e d t h e U n i t e d M a l a y s i a N a t i o n a l O r g a n i s a t i o n , a group w i t h which o t h e r Sarawak r i g h t - w i n g o r g a n i s a t i o n s such as SNAP and Pesaka c o u l d j o i n . UMNO's f a v o u r i t e p r o t e g e i n Sarawak was t h e r e f o r e a f e l l o w - M u s l i m p a r t y . Faced w i t h the p r o s p e c t of meeting c h a l l e n g e s of communally based a f f i l i a t e p a r t i e s , Ningkan's r e a c t i o n was to u n i t e SNAP and Pesaka, a r g u i n g t h a t f o r t h e Dayaks, a n c i e n t r i v a l r i e s s h o u l d n o t be 45 a l l o w e d to d i v i d e them. I n mid-September 1962, t h e s i t u a t i o n was as f o l l o w s : t h e l e a d e r s of SNAP and Pesaka were s t i l l t r y i n g t o cement t h e i r p a r t i e s i n t o an o p e r a t i n g p o l i t i c a l a l l i a n c e — m u c h t o the c o n s t e r n a t i o n o f PANAS, BARJASA, and SCA. U n t i l t h e two Dayak p a r t i e s were s a t i s f i e d t h a t t h e t h r e a t o f e x t e r n a l i n t e r v e n t i o n from Malaya had ceased t o e x i s t , t h e y would remain adamant t h a t t h e y be g i v e n t h e chance to form t h e i r own communal a l l i a n c e f i r s t . At t h i s p o i n t t h e B r i t i s h and t h e Malayans i n t e r v e n e d . They "were s t i l l a n x i o u s to have a l l major e t h n i c groups r e p r e s e n t e d i n a 46 u n i t e d p r o - M a l a y s i a f r o n t a g a i n s t t h e SUPP", and as a r e s u l t o f t h e i r p r e s s u r e , PANAS, BARJASA, and t h e SCA agreed t h a t 79 a l l the s o - c a l l e d r i g h t - w i n g p a r t i e s — P A N A S , BARJASA, SNAP, SCA, and P e s a k a — s h o u l d come t o g e t h e r f i r s t and t h r a s h out t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e s which they have, so as to have a b e t t e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of each o t h e r . When t h i s had been completed, an a l l i a n c e o f a l l s h o u l d t a k e p l a c e as soon as p o s s i b l e . ^ C l e a r l y t h e Malayans had g i v e n up on t h e n o t i o n of e x t e n d i n g t h e i r p a r t i e s t o Sarawak and thus p a v i n g the way f o r s e r i o u s n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h SNAP and Pesaka. On O ctober 22, 1962, i t was announced t h a t a "Sarawak U n i t e d F r o n t " (SUF) had been f o r g e d from the p a r t i e s . I t l i s t e d f o u r o b j e c t i v e s : (a) t o u n i t e a l l r a c e s to work f o r t h e harmony and p r o s p e r i t y of t h e c o u n t r y ; (b) t o work f o r the r e a l i z a - t i o n o f M a l a y s i a p r o v i d e d t h a t adequate s a f e g u a r d s would be o b t a i n e d f o r Sarawak; (c) t o form ah a l l i a n c e among a l l the p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s h a v i n g s i m i l a r aims and o b j e c t i v e s i n Sarawak; (d) t o c o o p e r a t e w i t h and a s s i s t the I n t e r - G o v e r n m e n t a l Committee and i t s Sub-Committees i n t h e i r p r e s e n t n e g o t i a t i o n s f o r terms a c c e p t a b l e to Sarawak i n t h e 48 p a r t i c i p a t i o n of M a l a y s i a . As a bona f i d e member o f t h e F r o n t , SNAP had agreed to t h e s e o b j e c t i v e s . G i v e n SNAP's co n c e r n f o r a s t r o n g Sarawak w i t h i n the F e d e r a t i o n i t was p r o b a b l e t h a t t h e second and f o u r t h o b j e c t i v e s , which r e s p e c t i v e l y d e a l t w i t h " s a f e g u a r d s " f o r t h e s t a t e and terms " a c c e p t a b l e t o Sarawak", would have r e c e i v e d Ningkan's eager endorsement. S i m u l t a n e o u s l y , Ningkan c o n t i n u e d t o pursue h i s SNAP-Pesaka a l l i a n c e ; on October 22, t h e same day t h a t t h e SUF was formed, t h e 80 a l l i a n c e between t h e two Dayak-based p a r t i e s was a l s o made p u b l i c . I t was c a l l e d the Sarawak N a t i o n a l A l l i a n c e . The immediate consequence of t h e f i r s t m e e t ing, a t which p a r t y o f f i c e r s were e l e c t e d , was s i g n i f i c a n t , f o r on t h e b a s i s of o f f i c e r s a l l o t t e d to each p a r t y , SNAP 49 c l e a r l y emerged as the j u n i o r p a r t n e r . They were as f o l l o w s : Of the f o u r o n l y Ningkan was a SNAP f u n c t i o n a r y . S i n c e Ningkan h i m s e l f p r e s i d e d over the meeting, which was "conducted i n a f r i e n d l y and c o r d i a l atmosphere',',"'^ i t was e v i d e n t t h a t SNAP had r e a d i l y a l l o w e d Pesaka a t l e a s t n u m e r i c a l l y to dominate t h e new o r g a n i s a t i o n . SNAP's v o l u n t a r y a c q u i e s c e n c e may have been an example of d e f e r e n c e f o r the t r a d i t i o n a l p o s t s of t h e s e men; more i m p o r t a n t , i t i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e SNAP chairman gave way i n o r d e r t o e f f e c t a Dayak a l l i a n c e , even a t t h e c o s t of a c c e p t i n g a second s p o t . Ningkan was c l e a r l y e c s t a t i c a f t e r the agreement, but added some words of c a u t i o n : Y e t d e s p i t e Ningkan's v a l i a n t words, t h e SNAP-Pesaka a l l i a n c e was more apparent than r e a l . With t h e e l e c t i o n of t h e o f f i c e b e a r e r s i t appeared t h a t SNAP was indeed w orking. But as i t t u r n e d o u t , t h e i r e l e c t i o n s were the crowning p o i n t o f t h e whole e x e r c i s e . Beyond t h i s , P r e s i d e n t Deputy Chairman Chairman S e c r e t a r y G e n e r a l Temenggong Jugah (Pesaka) Pengarah M o n t e g r a i (Pesaka) Penghulu Umpau (Pesaka) Stephen Ningkan (SNAP) We must u p h o l d and m a i n t a i n i t s /JSNAP'sJ s o l i d a r i t y i n o r d e r t h a t i t w i l l become a s t r o n g f o u n d a t i o n o f our p o l i t i c a l emer- gence ... Without u n i t y among us we s h o u l d become u t t e r l y down-trodden and /TiaveJ no f u t u r e . 5 1 81 52 n o t h i n g had been a c h i e v e d . By November 1962, t h e SNA had c e a s e d t o e x i s t as a f o r m a l b u r e a u c r a t i c body. So f a s t d i d t h e o r g a n i s a t i o n fade i n t o limbo t h a t t h e r e was n o t even time t o make i t a l e g a l a l l i a n c e — n o one had b o t h e r e d t o r e g i s t e r i t . I n a way t h i s was u n f o r - t u n a t e , f o r at t h a t time b o t h p a r t i e s had agreed i n p r i n c i p l e on some p r o v i s i o n s f o r t h e i r c o n s t i t u t i o n . Had such a document m a t e r i a l i s e d i t would p r o b a b l y have formed t h e b a s i s f o r an i n s t i t u t i o n w hich would s t r i v e f o r Dayak u n i t y w i t h a u t h o r i t y over such m a t t e r s as p o l i t i c a l s t r a t e g y , language, r e l i g i o n , and customs. In the absence o f such a body, an i n f o r m a l a l l i a n c e grew up between t h e two p a r t i e s . T h i s form o f a l l i a n c e had one major f l a w , however: the c o n t i n u a t i o n of such an arrangement, was c o n t i n g e n t upon t h e good f a i t h of i n d i v i d u a l l e a d e r s . By 1965, when Temenggong Jugah was r e p l a c e d by Thomas Kana, a r i v a l of Ningkan, as the major t a c t i c i a n i n Pesaka, t h e a l l i a n c e began t o w i t h e r . In c o n t r a s t , t h e advent o f the Sarawak U n i t e d F r o n t marked not o n l y the decay of the SNU but a l s o a more i n t e n s e l e v e l o f c o - o p e r a t i o n between the f i v e p r o - M a l a y s i a n p a r t i e s i n p r e p a r a t i o n f o r t h e coming g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n s . From SNAP's s t a n d p o i n t , b e i n g p a r t of a m u l t i - p a r t y e l e c t o r a l machine was an a c c e p t a b l e way to ensure t h a t i t would a l s o be p a r t of t h e n e x t government. Moreover, as a r i g h t - w i n g a s s o c i a t i o n t h e SUF's s t a n d on communism was s a t i s f a c t o r y . On t h e day t h a t i t was formed, t h e S U F — w h i c h was l a t e r c a l l e d t h e Sarawak A l l i a n c e (SA) — p r o m i s e d t o p r o t e c t Sarawak i n p a r t i c u l a r , and M a l a y s i a i n g e n e r a l , from the scourge of communism. 82 L a s t l y , SNAP was a b l e t o be s a t i s f i e d w i t h the SA because of what i t d i d n o t d o — s p e c i f i c a l l y t h e SA d e c i d e d n ot t o i n v i t e Malayan p a r t i e s i n t o Sarawak and not t o e s t a b l i s h a f f i l i a t e p a r t i e s . That SNAP was a n x i o u s t o p r e v e n t Malayan p a r t i e s from t a k i n g r o o t s i n Sarawak was c o n s i s t e n t w i t h i t s n a t i o n a l i s t s e n t i m e n t — i t s f e a r o f e x t e r n a l i n t e r v e n t i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y of a k i n d from w h i c h the Dayaks might not b e n e f i t . T h i s was why SNAP sought t o oppose the MCA and UMNO o v e r t u r e s i n Sarawak. From SNAP's s t a n d p o i n t , t h e n , t h e SA was a s a t i s f a c t o r y a r r a n g e - ment. T r u e , i t t o o k Malayan and B r i t i s h g u i d ance t o e s t a b l i s h t h e l o o s e p o l i t i c a l a l l i a n c e , but t h e Malayans had a c t e d w i t h t a c t and diplomacy. Moreover, t h e n a t u r e o f Malayan i n t e r v e n t i o n , i n c o n t r a s t to i t s f i r s t p a r t i s a n attempt t o e n t e r Sarawak p o l i t i c s , was p e r c e i v e d t h i s time by SNAP as i m p a r t i a l . F u r t h e r m o r e , w i t h t h e p r e s e n c e of t h e S A — i n p l a c e o f p o l i t i c a l branches o f t h e Malayan A l l i a n c e — w h i c h was 5 4 c o n t r o l l e d t o t a l l y by Sarawakians, t h e p r o s p e c t o f u n i n v i t e d medd- l i n g from t h e f e d e r a l government was d i m i n i s h e d g r e a t l y . In s h o r t , f e d e r a l c a p a c i t y f o r underhanded i n t e r v e n t i o n i n p o l i c y i m p l e m e n t a t i o n s w i t h i n Sarawak appeared t o have been c i r c u m v e n t e d . As f a r as SNAP was con c e r n e d , t h i s was a welcome development, a p r o o f f i n a l l y t h a t the f e d e r a l government was amenable to s t a t e m i n o r i t y u r g i n g s . I n n u m e r i c a l terms SNAP d i d n o t dominate t h e l e a d e r s h i p o f t h e SA. The c o m p o s i t i o n o f t h e l e a d e r s h i p was as follows:"'"' 83 P o s i t i o n Name P a r t y E t h n i c Group Chairman T. Jugah Pesaka Dayak V i c e - c h a i r m e n L.Y. Tan SCA C h i n e s e L.H. Yuen PANAS Chine s e P. M o n t e g r a i Pesaka Dayak T.H. Bujang BARJASA Malay S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l S.K. Ningkan SNAP Dayak F i n a n c i a l O f f i c e r L.B. S iew SCA C h i n e s e P u b l i c i t y O f f i c e r K. Menon SNAP I n d i a n I t may be s a i d , however, t h a t Ningkan and Menon (who was m a r r i e d t o a Dayak woman and who l i v e d i n t h e Second D i v i s i o n ) c o n t r o l l e d t h e o p e r a t i o n s of the p a r t y ; Ningkan was s e c r e t a r y - g e n e r a l , and Menon was p u b l i c i t y o f f i c e r . Both o f f i c e s d e a l t w i t h the d i s s e m i n a t i o n o f i n f o r m a t i o n from t h e Sarawak A l l i a n c e . F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e SA chairman was a charming man, but s i n c e he l a c k e d f o r m a l e d u c a t i o n , Ningkan was soon a b l e t o a s s e r t h i s i n f l u e n c e i n such a r e a s as p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s and implement at i o n . SNAP, r e p r e s e n t e d by Ningkan, p l a y e d a s i g n i f i c a n t p a r t i n d r a f t i n g t h e Sarawak A l l i a n c e ' s e l e c t i o n m a n i f e s t o , a r o l e which ensured t h a t t h e r e s u l t i n g campaign l i t e r a t u r e o f b o t h t h e SA and SNAP were complementary. Indeed, s i n c e SNAP's m a n i f e s t o a n t e - d a t e d t h a t o f the Sarawak A l l i a n c e by s i x months, i t c o u l d have been t h e p r o t o t y p e f o r the l a t t e r ' s document. C e r t a i n l y on most i s s u e s t h e r e were wide a r e a s of agreement. F o r i n s t a n c e , on e d u c a t i o n SNAP p l e d g e d t o r e v i s e the e d u c a t i o n p o l i c y and work towards a minimum o f s c h o o l - l e a v i n g age o f 16. I t /SNAP7 w i l l /work t67 enhance / the e d u c a t i o n / f a c i l i t i e s i n e v e r y way.^6 84 The Sarawak A l l i a n c e i n i t s t u r n , e l a b o r a t e d on t h e same p r i n c i p l e when i t s m a n i f e s t o was f i n a l l y p u b l i c i s e d on June 4, 1963. While SNAP mer e l y proposed to r e v i s e t h e e d u c a t i o n p o l i c y t h e Sarawak A l l i a n c e made c o n c r e t e p r o p o s a l s — n a m e l y to (a) p r o v i d e f r e e , com- p u l s o r y p r i m a r y e d u c a t i o n ; (b) i n t r o d u c e p o s t p r i m a r y e d u c a t i o n , w i t h some a g r i c u l t u r a l o r t e c h n i c a l t r a i n i n g , up t o t h e age o f 15 y e a r s ; and (c) expand secondary e d u c a t i o n , and lower t h e f e e s f o r secondary e d u c a t i o n , i f p o s s i b l e . ^ The o v e r a l l impact of such marked congruence o f p o l i c y i s s u e s was t h a t t h e SA's p o l i t i c a l p l a t f o r m was h a r d l y d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from t h a t o f SNAP's. The c o n s i s t e n t f a c t o r s b e h i n d SNAP's a c t i v i t i e s were e t h n i c i t y and t h e p u r s u i t o f power. E t h n i c i t y m a n i f e s t e d i t s e l f i n i t s e f f o r t s a t a l l i a n c e b u i l d i n g , t h a t i s , i t s c h o i c e of a l l i a n c e p a r t n e r s . Thus, i t a v o i d e d PANAS and SUPP because b o t h had l a r g e segments o f Dayak members which the p a r t y was eager t o a t t r a c t — o b v i o u s l y t h e t a s k would be much e a s i e r i f t h e two p a r t i e s were not f e l l o w a l l i a n c e members. BARJASA AND SCA were c o n s i d e r d as a p p r o p r i a t e p a r t n e r s because they d i d not have any l a r g e p o c k e t s o f Dayak members, a l t h o u g h t h e y had non-Dayak l e a d e r s l i k e PANAS and SUPP. The o t h e r d i m e n s i o n of e t h n i c i t y was i n SNAP's e f f o r t t o come to terms w i t h Pesaka, the o t h e r Dayak-based p a r t y . The method chosen was t h a t of a f o r m a l t a c t i c a l a l l i a n c e and, when t h a t f a i l e d , an i n f o r m a l one. 8 5 C a b i n e t F o rmation 5 8 The G e n e r a l E l e c t i o n of 1963 i s d i s c u s s e d more f u l l y i n Chapter V I I I . F o r the moment i t i s s u f f i c i e n t t o n o t e t h a t t h e Sarawak A l l i a n c e emerged v i c t o r i o u s w i t h a t o t a l o f 23 out of 36 s e a t s i n the s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e ( t h e C o u n c i l N e g r i ) . W i t h i n the Sarawak A l l i a n c e the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f e l e c t e d r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s was uneven: Pesaka had e l e v e n , SNAP s i x , BARJASA f i v e and SCA one. No p a r t y had a b s o l u t e c o n t r o l , t h e r e f o r e , and t h e q u e s t i o n of l e a d e r s h i p was thrown i n t o t h e open. That i s , the Sarawak A l l i a n c e may have been an e f f e c t i v e o r g a n i s a t i o n w i t h which to c o n t e s t t h e G e n e r a l E l e c t i o n , but i n the absence of a dominant p a r t y which would be a c c e p t e d as t h e l e a d i n g o r g a n i s a t i o n o f t h e Sarawak A l l i a n c e , t h e r e was i n t r a - A l l i a n c e c o m p e t i t i o n f o r t h e p o s i t i o n of l e a d e r s h i p , namely the o f f i c e o f C h i e f M i n i s t e r . T h i s c o n t e s t p r o v i d e d f o r SNAP and Pesaka an i n s t a n c e i n w hich e t h n i c i t y was t h e b a s i s f o r p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n . Ningkan's emergence as the C h i e f M i n i s t e r o f Sarawak was a p r o d u c t of h i s own p o p u l a r i t y , t h e n e a r absence of c o m p e t i t o r s , and the support g i v e n him by Pesaka and l a t e r t h e Sarawak A l l i a n c e . H i s own p a r t y , SNAP, was important a l s o ; but at t h i s j u n c t u r e SNAP merely p r o v i d e d an o p e r a t i n g base from which he was r e c o g n i z e d t o have come. As SNAP's s e c r e t a r y - g e n e r a l he was i t s major t a c t i c i a n and r e p r e s e n - t a t i v e who was empowered t o e n t e r i n t o n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h o t h e r p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s . S i n c e SNAP was o n l y the second l a r g e s t p a r t y i n the Sarawak A l l i a n c e , i t would have been d i f f i c u l t i f not i m p o s s i b l e 86 f o r Ningkan to r i s e t o t h e top w i t h o u t t h e a s s i s t a n c e of Pesaka and t o a degree of BARJASA and t h e SCA. I n o t h e r words, s i n c e SNAP d i d not c o n t r o l the l e g i s l a t u r e , i t had t o have the support of o t h e r A l l i a n c e members, p a r t i c u l a r l y o f Pesaka. Such support d i d m a t e r i a l i s e . A f t e r a p e r i o d o f c o n t i n u i n g c o o p e r a t i o n between the two Dayak p a r t i e s , SNAP and Pesaka e n t e r e d 59 i n t o an u n d e r s t a n d i n g of mutual a s s i s t a n c e by which SNAP would back Jugah's quest f o r the p o s t of Governor w h i l e P e saka would s u p p o r t SNAP and N i n g k a n 1 s p u r s u i t of t h e C h i e f M i n i s t e r ' s o f f i c e . In a d d i t i o n , SNAP was t o c o n c e n t r a t e at t h e s t a t e l e v e l , w h i l e Pesaka would r e s t r i c t i t s e l f t o t h e f e d e r a l l e v e l o f p o l i t i c s . Thus, j u s t as t h e two p a r t i e s had d i v i d e d Sarawak i n t o r e s p e c t i v e a r e a s of o p e r a t i o n , they now a l l o t t e d t h e m s e l v e s s p e c i f i c l e v e l s of government. There were t h r e e c a n d i d a t e s f o r t h e o f f i c e o f C h i e f M i n i s t e r . D e s p i t e the f a c t t h a t t h e SUPP was o u t s i d e t h e Sarawak A l l i a n c e , the B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n backed SUPP's chairman, Ong Kee H u i , 60 as C h i e f M i n i s t e r . Ong, i t s u g g e s t e d , would p r e s i d e over a grand c o a l i t i o n of the Sarawak A l l i a n c e , PANAS, and SUPP. T h e i r sugges- t i o n was r e j e c t e d by t h e Sarawak A l l i a n c e , which c o u l d not a c c e p t Ong as C h i e f M i n i s t e r . The r e a l a r e n a of s t r u g g l e was w i t h i n t h e Sarawak A l l i a n c e i t s e l f . I t was here t h a t Ningkan's advantage became e v i d e n t , f o r q u i t e a p a r t from b e i n g SNAP's p r i m a r y o p e r a t i v e , he had d e v e l o p e d i n t o an e x t r e m e l y important f u n c t i o n a r y of t h e Sarawak A l l i a n c e . 87 That p a r t y , a d m i t t e d l y , was o n l y a l o o s e a s s o c i a t i o n of f o u r d i s p a r a t e elements, but t h e f a c t s were t h a t i t had t h e m a j o r i t y i n the l e g i s l a t u r e and t h a t Ningkan was i t s s e c r e t a r y - g e n e r a l , r e s p o n - s i b l e f o r i t s o p e r a t i o n s . The chairman of t h e SA was Temenggong Jugah, who was, as a f e l l o w Dayak and a Pesaka member committed t o s u p p o r t i n g Ningkan as C h i e f M i n i s t e r . Ningkan's p r i m a r y c h a l l e n g e r f o r t h e p o s t was Abdul Rahman Y a k u b . ^ A major l e a d e r o f BARJASA, he was a l s o an e x e c u t i v e member o f t h e Sarawak A l l i a n c e . He was thus much l i k e Ningkan i n t h a t he had a p a r t y f o r a base and was an A l l i a n c e e x e c u t i v e . H i s advantage was t h a t he was a c a d e m i c a l l y more q u a l i f i e d , b e i n g a t r a i n e d l a w y er; he a l s o e n j o y e d t h e b a c k i n g o f the Malayan government. In t h e end, Ningkan pro v e d too s t r o n g f o r Rahman Yakub t o d i s l o d g e . F o r one t h i n g , Ningkan had the support of b o t h Dayak p a r t i e s . G i v e n the predominance o f SNAP and Pesaka i n t h e Sarawak A l l i a n c e , o n l y the c a n d i d a t e who r e c e i v e d t h e i r b a c k i n g had a r e a l i s t i c chance of becoming t h e C h i e f M i n i s t e r : t h i s i n d e e d was the dominant f a c t o r b e h i n d Ningkan's emergence. For a n o t h e r , he had t h e support o f t h e SCA, t h e o n l y Chinese-based p a r t y i n t h e Sarawak A l l i a n c e . S e c ondly, Ningkan enjo y e d a p e r s o n a l v i c t o r y as w e l l : he had won h i s seat i n t h e 1963 G e n e r a l E l e c t i o n s . By m i d - J u l y h i s p o s i t i o n had improved, f o r he had been e l e c t e d as member of t h e Second DAC, and from t h a t body i n t o t h e C o u n c i l N e g r i . Ningkan's 88 s t r i n g o f e l e c t o r a l v i c t o r i e s was by no means u n i q u e , f o r at t h i s time he showed the same r e c o r d as t h i r t y - t h r e e o t h e r C o u n c i l N e g r i members. But the f a c t t h a t he managed t o be e l e c t e d s t r e n g t h e n e d h i s c a n d i d a c y j u s t as Abdul Rahman Yakub's was weakened by h i s e l e c t o r a l d e f e a t . In the p o s t - e l e c t i o n days, t h e r e f o r e , Yakub's o n l y r e a l s t r e n g t h was the support he r e c e i v e d from the f e d e r a l p o l i t i c i a n s who a t t h a t time had n e i t h e r power no r r e a l i n f l u e n c e , s i n c e t e c h n i c a l l y , t h e r e were f o r e i g n e r s . They d i d t r y to i n t e r v e n e , but i t was a lame e f f o r t w hich b a c k f i r e d . On June 25, 1963, t h e S t r a i t s Times, q u o t i n g an unnamed s o u r c e , l e a k e d t h e news t h a t Rahman Yakub would be Sarawak's C h i e f M i n i s t e r . Ningkan's r e a c t i o n was prompt. Annoyed, he c a l l e d t h e l e a k "absurd and r i d i c u l o u s " , and warned a g a i n s t o t h e r " m a l i c i o u s 62 s t u f f " b e i n g s p e c u l a t e d upon i n the f u t u r e . The day t h a t the Sarawak A l l i a n c e was d e c l a r e d t h e winner of the G e n e r a l E l e c t i o n s , i t s e x e c u t i v e s met i n S i b u t o d i s c u s s the f o r m a t i o n of Sarawak's f i r s t government. F o l l o w i n g a two-day d e l i b e r a - t i o n , i t was announced t h a t Ningkan was the Sarawak A l l i a n c e ' s unanimous c h o i c e as C h i e f M i n i s t e r . Upon h i s s e l e c t i o n , Ningkan was d u l y a p p o i n t e d to the o f f i c e o f C h i e f M i n i s t e r by t h e Governor. The p lacements of c a b i n e t p o r t f o l i o s were made by the Sarawak A l l i a n c e 63 C o u n c i l w i t h B r i t i s h a d v i c e . The f o l l o w i n g appointments were made: Stephen Kalong Ningkan (SNAP), C h i e f M i n i s t e r James Wong (SNAP) Deputy C h i e f M i n i s t e r Abdul T a i b Mahmud (BARJASA), M i n i s t e r of Communications and Works 89 Dunstan Endawie (SNAP), M i n i s t e r f o r L o c a l Government Teo K u i Seng (SCA), M i n i s t e r of N a t u r a l Resources Awang H i p n i b i n P e n i g i r a n Annu (BARJASA), M i n i s t e r of S t a t e G.A.T. Shaw ( B r i t i s h e x p a t r i a t e ) , S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e B.A. Hepburn ( B r i t i s h e x p a t r i a t e ) , F i n a n c i a l S e c r e t a r y P.E.H. P i k e ( B r i t i s h e x p a t r i a t e ) , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l Ningkan's c a b i n e t was e t h n i c a l l y b a l a n c e d : e x c l u d i n g B r i t i s h e x p a t r i a t e s , the t h r e e major e t h n i c groups had two members each i n the c a b i n e t . F u r t h e r , i t may be o b s e r v e d t h a t Pesaka was e x c l u d e d , as a r r a n g e d by the Ningkan-Jugah agreement. S i n c e Pesaka c o n s t i t u t e d t h e l a r g e s t s i n g l e b l o c i n the Sarawak A l l i a n c e , i t s a l l e g i a n c e became c r i t i c a l t o the s u r v i v a l o f the government. I n the c a s e of the Ningkan a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , i t would s u r v i v e as l o n g as the Ningkan-Jugah agreement endured. Summary SNAP's p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e Sarawak A l l i a n c e was an alignment which e n a b l e d i t to share power w i t h the o t h e r p a r t i e s . From the b e g i n n i n g i t sought to f o r g e Dayak s o l i d a r i t y t h r o u g h a f o r m a l Dayak- based p a r t y to be known as the Dayak N a t i o n a l A l l i a n c e . T h i s body, however, f a i l e d t o f u n c t i o n and i n i t s d i s a p p e a r a n c e , SNAP and Pesaka s e t t l e d f o r an u n d e r s t a n d i n g of m u tual a s s i s t a n c e , f o l l o w e d by a d i v i s i o n o f t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e a r e a s of o p e r a t i o n . T h e i r u n d e r s t a n d i n g was e v i d e n t i n t h e f o l l o w i n g i n s t a n c e s : (a) a r e a s of i n f l u e n c e — SNAP was t o c o n c e n t r a t e i n t h e Second and F i r s t D i v i s i o n s w h i l e Pesaka was to l i m i t i t s a c t i v i t i e s i n t h e T h i r d D i v i s i o n ; (b) p o s t s — SNAP would support Jugah's b i d f o r t h e p o s i t i o n o f Governor i n r e t u r n 90 f o r Pesaka's b a c k i n g of Ningkan as C h i e f M i n i s t e r ; and (c) SNAP was t o c o n c e n t r a t e at t h e s t a t e l e v e l w h i l e Pesaka was to o p e r a t e at the f e d e r a l one. T h i s , t h e n , was the e x t e n t of Dayak u n i t y i n t h e e a r l y days of independence. I t s h o u l d be s t r e s s e d t h a t t h e modus v i v e n d i between t h e two Dayak p a r t i e s concerned t h e d e l i n e a t i o n o f p o s t s and t e r r i t o r i e s which a f f e c t e d b o t h o r g a n i s a t i o n s . They were m a t t e r s which the p a r t i e s were then f a c e d w i t h . The weakness of t h i s intra-communal arrangement was t h a t t h e m a t t e r s i n v o l v e d o t h e r s o u r c e s o f power which were a b l e t o v e t o t h e i r d e c i s i o n s . Thus, i n t h e case o f Jugah's b i d f o r t h e p o s t 64 of Governor, t h e i r common agreement was n u l l i f i e d by t h e C e n t r a l G o v e r n m e n t — t h a t i s , problems not e n t i r e l y of t h e i r own making began to weaken t h e i r u n i t y . More i m p o r t a n t , the two p a r t i e s f a i l e d or n e g l e c t e d t o r e a c h any agreement on s u b s t a n t i t i v e i s s u e s common t o t h e i r e t h n i c group, such as language, Dayak p r i v i l e g e s , and l a n d . The absence o f any comprehensive agreement on t h e s e i s s u e s l e d t o t h e r i s e o f c o n t e n d i n g p o s i t i o n s b e i n g expounded by the two p a r t i e s . C o m p e t i t i o n between the Dayak-based p a r t i e s , SNAP and Pesaka, d i d not s u r f a c e u n t i l e a r l y 1965. When i t d i d , the immediate s t i m u l u s was p a r t y - b u i l d i n g . Here t h e i s s u e s of language, Dayak p r i v i l e g e s , and l a n d were important i n t h a t t h e y c r y s t a l l i s e d t h e p o l i t i c a l p e r s u a - s i o n s o f the l e a d e r s o f SNAP and Pesaka and i l l u m i n a t e d the c o m p e t i t i o n between t h e two p a r t i e s . That i s , i n s t e a d o f becoming 91 t h e f o c i o f i n t r a - e t h n i c s o l i d a r i t y , t h e s e i s s u e s became p o i n t s o f disagreement i n which SNAP and Pesaka sought to " o u t - b i d " i n t h e i r s t r u g g l e f o r p o l i t i c a l s u p p o r t . F o o t n o t e s t o Chapter IV 92 1. W i l l a r d Hanna, The For m a t i o n o f M a l a y s i a (New York: American U n i v e r - s i t i e s F i e l d S t a f f , 1964), p.7. See a l s o J.M. G u l l i c k , M a l a y s i a and i t s Neighbours (London: R o u t l e d g e , 1967), p.28. 2. T.E. Smith, " P r o p o s a l s f o r M a l a y s i a " , The World Today, 18 (May, 1962), p.197. 3. P e t e r Boyce, M a l a y s i a and S i n g a p o r e i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l Diplomacy; Documents and Commentaries (Sydney: Sydney U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1968) p. 5. 4. I b i d . 5. Sarawak T r i b u n e , J u l y 31, 1961. 6. J.M. G u l l i c k , M a l a y s i a and I t s Neighbours (London: R o u t l e d g e , 1967), p. 61. 7. Smith, op. c i t . , p.199. 8. H.F. Armstrong, "The T r o u b l e d B i r t h o f M a l a y s i a " , F o r e i g n A f f a i r s , V o l . 41 (1962-63), p.682. 9. G u l l i c k , op. c i t . , p.87. 10. On September 26, 1962, sev e n t e e n months a f t e r t h e Tengku's M a l a y s i a p r o p o s a l , t h e C o u n c i l N e g r i met. But i t was not t o d i s c u s s t h e p l a n ; i t was t o approve i t i n p r i n c i p l e . When Mr. ( l a t e r Datuk) James Wong o b j e c t e d t h a t t h e body was b e i n g p r e s e n t e d w i t h a f a i t a c c o m p l i , he was t o l d t h a t " i f [the Honourable Member] f e l t t h i s way ... t h e r e a r e pr o c e d u r e s o f t h i s C o u n c i l by which t h e y can f o r c e the Government's hand ...." (The A t t o r n e y - G e n e r a l , C o u n c i l N e g r i Debates, September 26, 1962, p.380, c i t e d by Edwin Lee, Sarawak i n the E a r l y S i x t i e s , Number F i v e : S i n g a p o r e S t u d i e s on Borneo and Malaya [ S i n g a p o r e : U n i v e r s i t y of S i n g a p o r e , 1964], p.40). 11. I b i d . 12. See f o r i n s t a n c e , M.N. S o p i e e , "The Advocacy o f M a l a y s i a b e f o r e 1961" Modern A s i a n S t u d i e s , V o l . 7, No. 4 (1973), pp.717-723; R.S. M i l n e and Diane K. Mauzy, P o l i t i c s and Government i n M a l a y s i a (Vancouver: U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Columbia P r e s s , 1978), pp.44-76; M.N. Sop i e e , From Malayan Union t o Si n g a p o r e S e p a r a t i o n (Kuala Lumpur: U n i v e r s i t y of Malaya P r e s s , 1974). 13. Sarawak by the Week, 50/61, December 10-December 16, 1961, p.4. 14. I b i d . 15. I b i d . 93 16. Ibid. 17. Ib i d . 18. Sarawak Tribune, July 31, 1961. 19. Sarawak by the Week, 42/61, October 15-0ctober 21, 1961, p.11. 20. Sarawak Tribune, March 2, 1962. 21. Sarawak Tribune, July 31, 1961. In a statement to the press, Ningkan refuted the Tengku's charge that those who were opposed to Malaysia were communists. "SNAP", Ningkan continued, "was a r i g h t wing [party which would] ... never become a communist party." 22. Sarawak by the Week, 3/62, January 14-January 20, 1962, p.3. 23. Report of the Commission of Enquiry, North Borneo and Sarawak, Lord Cobbold, chairman (Kuching: Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1962), p . v i . This body became commonly known as the Cobbold Commission. None of i t s members were from Sarawak. 24. I b i d . , p.86. 25. S t r a i t s Times, December 20, 1961, p.13. 26. Sarawak by the Week, 50/61, December 10-December 16, 1961, p.11. 27. Ibid. 3/62, January 14-January 20, 1961, p.4. 28. The Rejang i s the longest r i v e r i n Sarawak. The acquiescence of the Rejang Dayaks to the Malaysia plan was a grave disappointment to SNAP. 29. Several sources within SNAP confirmed t h i s . 30. Report of the Commission of Enquiry, North Borneo and Sarawak (Lord Cobbold, chairman) op. c i t . , p.9. Note that SNAP had suggested a referendum as the proper way to determine the wishes of Sarawakians. In t h i s instance the Cobbold Commission chose to r e l y on the c o l l e c - t i v e wishes of these penghulus as representative of the a t t i t u d e of the Rejang Dayaks. Since these headmen only met for one day i n the Kapit bazaar, they could not be expected to be conversant with the Malaysia plan and i t s implications. 31. Ibid ., p.43. 32. I b i d . , p.72. See also Sarawak Tribune, March 28, 1962. In contrast to the population of the Dayaks i n the Rejang, the Saribas region had only 14,000 members. SNAP's founders came from the Saribas area. Obviously the Saribas i s the le s s s i g n i f i c a n t of the two regions. 33. For instance, i n mid-1962 i t s claimed membership stood at 50,000, les s than that of PANAS. See i b i d . , June 12, 1962. Both figures were probably i n f l a t e d . 94 34. I b i d . , March 28, 1962. 35. I b i d . , June 12, 1962. 36. M i c h a e l L e i g h , The R i s i n g Moon: P o l i t i c a l Change i n Sarawak (Sydney: Sydney U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1974), p.52. 37. Sarawak T r i b u n e , June 28, 1962. In the same month when Pesaka was formed, SNAP's p r i o r i t y was s w i t c h e d from b u i l d i n g an i n t e r - e t h n i c a l l i a n c e between SNAP and BARJASA t o an i n t r a - e t h n i c one between SNAP and Pesaka. 38. I b i d . , June 18, 1962. 39. I b i d . , August 29, 1962. 40. I b i d . , J u l y 21, 1962. The speed i n which Ningkan t r i e d t o f o r g e an a l l i a n c e h e r e and t h e e x c l u s i o n of the Rejang Iban l e a d e r s from h i s " C o u n c i l o f A l l i a n c e " p r o b a b l y r e s u l t e d i n i n c r e a s e d mutual d i s t r u s t between t h e two Dayak l e a d e r s h i p c l i q u e s o f the S a r i b a s and Rejang. 41. I b i d . , September 7, 1952. 42. I b i d . , August 29, 1962. 43. I b i d . , June 27, 1962. 44. S t r a i t s Times, September 7, 1962. 45. Margaret R o f f , The P o l i t i c s o f B e l o n g i n g : P o l i t i c a l Change i n Sarawak and Sabah ( K u a l a Lumpur: O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1974), p.121. Ningkan a l s o argued t h a t the two Dayak p a r t i e s which i n 1962 c l a i m e d t o have a t o t a l o f 100,000 members, c o u l d dominate t h e p o l i t i c s o f Sarawak. 46. I b i d . , p.125. 47. I b i d . , September 7, 1962. 48. I b i d . , October 22, 1962. 49. I b i d . , October 23, 1962. 50. I b i d . 51. I b i d . 52. T h i s was to be r e p l a c e d by an i n f o r m a l a l l i a n c e — a gentleman's a g r e e - ment between Jugah and Ningkan, t h e two p r i n c i p a l o p e r a t o r s b e h i n d Pesaka and SNAP r e s p e c t i v e l y . 53. I b i d . , November 30, 1962. Another worry of t h e proponents o f t h e Sarawak A l l i a n c e was the p o s s i b i l i t y of t h e p r o - M a l a y s i a p a r t i e s s p l i t t i n g t h e i r v o t e s i n the g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n s s c h e d u l e d f o r the m i d d l e o f 1963. See Sarawak T r i b u n e , October 18, 1962. 95 54. The e x c l u s i o n of Malayan p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n Sarawak was a major ob- j e c t i v e o f SNAP. 55. Sarawak T r i b u n e , January 22, 1963. 56. I b i d . 57. I b i d . , June 4, 1963. 58. See, f o r i n s t a n c e , "Report on the G e n e r a l E l e c t i o n s , 1963" Sarawak G a z e t t e LXXXIX, 1266 (August 31, 1963), pp.174-192. For an e x c e l l e n t account of th e 1963 G e n e r a l E l e c t i o n see K.J. Ratnam and R.S. M i l n e , The Malayan P a r l i a m e n t a r y E l e c t i o n o f 1964 ( S i n g a p o r e : U n i v e r s i t y of Malaya P r e s s , 1967), pp.266-311. See a l s o M i c h a e l L e i g h , The R i s i n g Moon, op. c i t . , pp.51-72. 59. There i s no common o p i n i o n between the two s i d e s as t o when t h i s under- s t a n d i n g was a c t u a l l y r e a c h e d . A c c o r d i n g t o v a r i o u s s o u r c e s i n SNAP i t was not reached u n t i l e a r l y 1964 ( b e f o r e t h a t c o o p e r a t i o n between them was on an ad hoc b a s i s ) . Even then i t was not a f o r m a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g but a gentleman's agreement between Temenggong Jugah and Ningkan. Pesaka-SNAP c o o p e r a t i o n thus r e s t e d on t h e g o o d w i l l o f two men. See f o o t n o t e 49. Y e a r s l a t e r , i n June 1976, the two major Pesaka l e a d e r s , Temenggong Jugah and Thomas Kana, were to deny t o t h i s s t u d e n t t h a t t h e r e was such an u n d e r s t a n d i n g . 60. M i c h a e l L e i g h , The R i s i n g Moon, op. c i t . , p.78. 61. S t r a i t s Times, June 25, 1963, c i t e d i n L e i g h , The R i s i n g Moon, op. c i t . , p.79. 62. Sarawak T r i b u n e , June 27, 1963. 63. B r i t i s h i n f l u e n c e extended beyond t h i s s t a g e . Three e x p a t r i a t e s were r e t a i n e d i n the Supreme C o u n c i l ( c a b i n e t ) and one of them, G.A.T. Shaw, the s t a t e s e c r e t a r y , was p a r t i c u l a r l y c l o s e t o Ningkan. For an account of c a b i n e t f o r m a t i o n i n Sarawak see M.B. L e i g h , "The Development of P o l i t i c a l O r g a n i z a t i o n and L e a d e r s h i p i n Sarawak, E a s t M a l a y s i a " (Ph.D. d i s s e r t a t i o n , C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y , 1971), pp.138-140. 64. Temenggong Jugah's i d e a of who was t h e c u l p r i t r e s p o n s i b l e f o r h i s f a i l u r e t o become the Governor seemed t o have changed over the y e a r s . In June 1976 he i n f o r m e d t h i s s t u d e n t t h a t t h e p e r s o n t o be blamed was Ningkan, s i n c e i t was t h r o u g h h i s behest t h a t he (Jugah) agreed t o o f f e r h i s c a n d i d a c y . But i n the p e r i o d f o l l o w i n g t h e Malayan v e t o Jugah c l e a r l y blamed the C e n t r a l Government. Such was h i s anger t h a t he was ready t o r e v e r s e h i s support f o r M a l a y s i a , op. c i t . ; see, f o r i n s t a n c e , i b i d , p.140. 96 CHAPTER V ISSUES AND DAYAK INTERESTS It i s necessary to note from Chapter IV that although SNAP r e l i e d heavily on t e r r i t o r i a l nationalism, a f a c t manifested by i t s espousal of the p r i n c i p l e of self-determination, a more s a l i e n t nationalism i n i t s campaign against Malaysia and i t s subsequent a c t i v i t i e s was i t s ethnic (Dayak) nationalism. True, l i t t l e was s a i d or admitted p u b l i c l y about the fa c t o r of e t h n i c i t y , but the fac t remained that the Dayaks formed SNAP's primary community, the st r a t e g i c group which could put SNAP i n a dominant p o s i t i o n i s Sarawak. The party opposed Malaysia because i t threatened to deny the Dayaks t h e i r p o t e n t i a l f o r hegemony; i n this case the p r i n c i p l e of s e l f - determination merely provided a convenient public reason. Chapter V deals with two issues i n which SNAP was involved. The purpose of the chapter i s to confirm the salien c e and the development of ethnic nationalism. Again, other factors w i l l come into play: as w i l l be seen, SNAP employed technical c o n s t i t u t i o n a l arguments, but beyond t h i s , the party acted to defend and a r t i c u l a t e Dayak i n t e r e s t s . 97 B orneon i s at ion Borneonisation was a f a i r l y straightforward idea. I t referred to the replacement i n the c i v i l service of B r i t i s h expatriates by l o c a l Bornean o f f i c e r s . I t was a process which entailed f i r s t , the i n f u s i o n of l o c a l t a l e n t into the c i v i l s e r v i c e , and second, the concomitant departure of expatriates. The p r i n c i p l e of Borneonisation had wide acceptance. The Malaysia S o l i d a r i t y Consultative Committee (MSCC), led by Donald Stephens of Sabah, not only endorsed the p r i n c i p l e of Borneo- n i s a t i o n but also suggested that i t s implementation be l e f t to the states concerned. Moreover, the MSCC recommended that state control over Borneonisation be c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y safeguarded."*" Concern over the issue i n Borneo was recognised by the Cobbold Commission which recommended that Borneonisation of the p u b l i c services should proceed as quickly as po s s i b l e . Every e f f o r t should be made to encourage B r i t i s h o f f i c e r s to remain i n the service u n t i l t h e i r places can be taken by q u a l i f i e d people from the Borneo t e r r i t o r i e s . ^ In i t s turn, the Inter-Governmental Committee (IGC), which was charged with c o n s t i t u t i n g the terms of the federation, u l t i m a t e l y gave the state government considerable leeway i n determining how fa s t or how 3 slow Borneonisation i n the state c i v i l service should be. This was because the IGC "saw the process of replacing expatriates by l o c a l 98 o f f i c e r s i n somewhat r a t i o n a l formal terms; i t considered l o c a l expectations of tenure, and the need to programme the handover so as 4 not to destroy the e f f i c i e n c y of the services." I t was l e f t to the state government concerned through i t s Public Service Commission, which in the case of Sarawak was chaired by Ningkan, to reconcile these "expectations" and to produce the "programmes". In practice, therefore, the IGC actually put Ningkan i n the position of deciding what posts in Sarawak were ready to be Borneonised. What the IGC Report did not do was to rule out the prospect that c i v i l servants from West Malaysia or Malaya would f i l l federal, as opposed to state, positions in the states. The admittance of Malayan c i v i l servants into Sarawak would hasten the departure of expatriates who were holding positions which were now under federal j u r i s d i c t i o n i n the state. That i s , although the IGC gave Borneonisation the status of " f i r s t p r i o r i t y " , i t did not provide "any absolute guarantee that no Malayan would be appointed to any federal posts i n the Borneo states"."' The IGC seemed to accord Ningkan the position of deciding what posts in Sarawak were ready to be Borneo- nised. In practice Ningkan did not enjoy such an overriding power over Borneonisation. Part of the reason was from the fact that the c i v i l service i n Sarawak were under two l i s t s — f e d e r a l and state. The problem for Ningkan was that although the IGC Report recognised the j u r i s d i c t i o n of his government over Borneonisation i t did not rule out the prospect of c i v i l servants from Malaya procuring federal 99 jobs i n Sarawak. Indeed, Malayan c i v i l servants did move into federal and state jobs i n Sarawak, although i t should be pointed out that the actual number was small and that most were in the fe d e r a l service. In short, Ningkan's p o s i t i o n was weakened by the ambiguity of the IGC Report. Compounding the t e c h n i c a l issue of what the IGC a c t u a l l y stated, Ningkan's actual authority on Borneonisation was "further weakened by p o l i t i c a l pressure from the fe d e r a l government. Eager to see the removal of the expatriates and t h e i r influence from Sarawak, the federal government exerted pressure on Ningkan to accelerate t h e i r removal. Again, Ningkan found himself at odds with the fe d e r a l government; while the former favoured the hasty release of expatriates, the l a t t e r was convinced of the merits of t h e i r gradual removal. Disagreements also centred on the questions of replacements. The f e d e r a l govern- ment not only i n s i s t e d that Malayans be e l i g i b l e as replacements, but also appeared to favour, i n order of preference, Sarawak Malays, Sarawak Dayaks, and Sarawak Chinese. Ningkan, i n contrast f e l t that Malayans should be excluded from jobs 1 in the state. Further he c l e a r l y favoured Dayaks as the prime contenders to replace departing expatriates. Barely four months a f t e r the inception of Malaysia, Borneo- n i s a t i o n i n both state and f e d e r a l services was to become a b i t t e r and protracted p o l i t i c a l issue i n which the Ningkan administration 100 was p i t t e d against both the Sarawak Government Asian O f f i c e r s Union (SGAOU) and the federal government. SNAP's p o s i t i o n on Borneonisation was made cl e a r i n August 1962, at which time i t conceded that Borneo- n i s a t i o n should proceed, but at the same time, that i t was concerned about the q u a l i t y of replacement. It said that the " e f f i c i e n c y and i n t e g r i t y of the pu b l i c service must be maintained i n a high p i t c h , and that the "present serving Expatriate O f f i c e r s should not be discouraged from remaining i n the Public Service as long as t h e i r services are required."^ The Ningkan government l a r g e l y retained the views which his party held; he endorsed Borneonisation but f e l t that competent and acceptable replacements would have to be found before B r i t i s h expat- r i a t e s could be i n v i t e d to depart so that the e f f i c i e n c y and i n t e g r i t y of the public service would not suffer i n the process. Here then g was the core of Ningkan's public argument. Ningkan's resolve to f i n d competent and acceptable replacement meant that Borneonisation was of necessity slow and del i b e r a t e . The term "competent" i s self-explanatory, but "acceptable" needs further elaboration because i t .has p o l i t i c a l overtones. I t means that in fi n d i n g a replacement, the r i g h t candidate would not only have to be competent, but of the acceptable ethnic kind as w e l l . Milne and Ratnam had t h i s to say about Borneonisation at t h i s l e v e l : \ 101 There was in fact p r o v i s i o n f or the protection of Natives i n the new Sarawak and Sabah co n s t i t u t i o n s drawn up at the time of Malaysia. But the protec- t i o n was not complete; beyond i t s l i m i t s , the quicker the expatriates were removed the greater the chances that a Chinese would be appointed to a vacancy. However, i f the expatriates' departures could be slowed down a l i t t l e , the time could be used to t r a i n a Native to f i l l the post. Even inside- the category of "Natives" there were c o n f l i c t s between the claims of d i f f e r e n t ethnic groups. In Sarawak, f o r example, since the days of the Brookes the Malays had been t r a d i t i o n a l l y more prominent than other Natives i n the c i v i l service.9 Thus, domestically Borneonisation had become a p o l i t i c a l issue i n which communal i n t e r e s t s were at stake. . The motive behind the gradual approach which both SNAP and Pesaka advocated meant a lease of time which would allow q u a l i f i e d Dayaks to take o v e r . ^ The other motive was to ensure a period of B r i t i s h tutorship. SNAP has always accepted as a matter of course a continuing r e l a t i o n s h i p between Great B r i t a i n and i t s representatives and Sarawak, even i f the l a t t e r were to become independent. Indeed, i t was the b e l i e f of i t s core leaders that such a r e l a t i o n s h i p should be s u f f i c i e n t to guide and guard Sarawak as a p o l i t i c a l l y independent nation-state. Great B r i t a i n , they f e l t , would ensure that Sarawak would remain a v i a b l e independent country and, convinced of t h i s , they were quick to re j e c t Malaysia: "When Sarawak has attained independence she £too] w i l l remain i n the B r i t i s h C o m m o n w e a l t h . A f t e r t h e i r acceptance of Malaysia, the party s t i l l advocated a strong B r i t s h bias. 102 In Sarawak, Ningkan's most vocal c r i t i c s were SGAOU and the opposition p a r t i e s , PANAS and SUPP. In the main they found that Borneonisation had gone far too slowly. Thus, for instance, Ong Kee Hui of the SUPP concluded in.February 1964, that "so f a r what has occurred or f a i l e d to occur i n the process of Borneonisation of the public 12 service has not given people much confidence i n the government". Abang Othman of PANAS was even more scathing i n his attack. He charged, without substantiating his remarks, that "what has happened since Malaysia Day i s that instead of r e l i n q u i s h i n g some of the l e s s senior posts to l o c a l o f f i c e r s , we see the reverse happening. Young and inexperienced expatriate o f f i c e r s have been promoted, even overpassing 13 senior l o c a l o f f i c e r s " . The most consistent attack on the way Ningkan handled the Borneonisation issue came from SGAOU. Not s a t i s f i e d with Ningkan's slow speed of Borneonisation or his explanat ion, the Union e n l i s t e d the help of the fed e r a l government. I t was Tun Razak himself, then the Deputy Prime Min i s t e r , who discussed the issue of Borneonisation and SGAOU's complaints with Ningkan. The Chief Minister's reaction to the fede r a l government's i n i t i a t i v e was one of displeasure. He apparently informed Razak that i n Sarawak the process of replacing the expatriates was a c t u a l l y f a s t e r than that i n the Malaysian states, thus implying that the Deputy Prime Minister had no j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r pointing the federal finger, so to speak, at Sarawak. It was his hope, Ningkan 103 remonstrated, that there be "no further accusations from the Federal 14 Government on the matter". On i t s own SGAOU continued to press the i s s u e . ^ It was an exasperated Ningkan who scolded the Union i n mid-1965: I f i n d your proposals and indeed your interference i n matters which do not concern your Union e n t i r e l y unacceptable .... I t r u s t there w i l l be no further occasion when your Union steps beyond the bounds of i t s proper functions.16 Ningkan's commitment to a slow rate of Borneonisation also raised the i r e of the federal government, which was convinced that the influence of the expatriates i n Sarawak was pervasively harmful. The p o s i t i o n of the f e d e r a l government was that the expatriates be encouraged to leave and that replacements could be e i t h e r from Sarawak or West Malaysia. Declared the Prime M i n i s t e r , i f the B r i t i s h continue to run the administration of the country, when can the people of Sarawak claim to be independent? Although the B r i t i s h f l a g i s no longer flown i n the country, many B r i t i s h o f f i c e r s are s t i l l administering and holding key appointments i n the Government. I, therefore, asked that Sarawakians should replace them; i f there i s none a v a i l a b l e , then we in Malaya could come to a s s i s t . I 7 Ningkan was opposed to the suggestions of the federal government. It was h i s view that B r i t i s h presence i n Sarawak was advantageous f o r Sarawakians and the expatriates were therefore welcome to stay u n t i l the appropriate Sarawak-born replacements could be found. He rejected the contention that Sarawak was s t i l l under undue B r i t i s h 1 0 4 influence. In h i s r e t o r t to the Prime Minister he sai d , "The Public Service i s no longer serving under a C o l o n i a l Government; i t i s no longer there to carry out c o l o n i a l p o l i c i e s . Today, even the expatriate o f f i c e r s who remain i n the Service have had to r e a l i z e that they are now carrying out the p o l i c i e s made by the people themselves through the 1 8 elected representatives." In r e j e c t i n g any hasty withdrawal of the expatriates, Ningkan i n e f f e c t was e s t a b l i s h i n g a case f o r a slow rate of Borneonisation. More than that, he was r e j e c t i n g the Tengku's o f f e r of Malayan bureaucrats for service i n Sarawak. In order to achieve a gradual implementation of Borneonisation, however, Ningkan needed a p l a u s i b l e basis f or h i s argument. He was convinced that he had found t h i s i n the IGC Report. Ningkan's t a c t i c was therefore to r e l y on a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l underpinning, s p e c i f i c a l l y the provisions provided by the IGC Report which he regarded as the 1 9 conditions for Sarawak's entry into Malaysia. Hence his defence of the IGC Report. But, as has been pointed out, the IGC Report did not preclude the p o s s i b i l i t y of Malayans serving i n the state. In other words, although Ningkan wanted to keep Malayan c i v i l servants out of Sarawak, the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n s which he offered were inadequate. Unable to block t h i s loophole completely, Ningkan sought to r e s t r i c t the number of Malayan born o f f i c i a l s i n the state to the minimum. Again, he referred to the IGC Report: The State Government of Sarawak intends to see the terms of the Inter-Governmental Committee Report are s t r i c t l y observed i n Borneonisation 105 and that Malayanisation would be r e s i s t e d . . . . As a r e s u l t of t h i s p o l i c y , the opportunities for Sarawakian o f f i c e r s i n terms of promotion are immense.20 The term Malayanisation implies at l e a s t some degree of takeover of the c i v i l service by Malaysians born i n Malaya; i t s usage betrays Ningkan's general suspicion of Malayan presence and intentions i n Sarawak. Resistance to Malayanisation means that i n Sarawak no Malayan-born c i v i l servants should take over any senior p o s i t i o n s (even those under fe d e r a l j u r i s d i c t i o n ) from departing expatriates. This i s important, f o r i t meant that neither Ningkan nor SNAP had retreated from the "stand on Malaysia" of August 1962. At that time the party not only endorsed Borneonisation, but also i n s i s t e d that p o s i t i o n s under f e d e r a l j u r i s - d i c t i o n i n Sarawak be f i l l e d by Sarawakians. Cle a r l y Ningkan was determined to r e s i s t any c a l l for an accelerated programme of Borneonisation for such an approach, as has been pointed out above, would put the Dayaks at a disadvantage since at that time very few Dayaks were q u a l i f i e d to f i l l the posts held by expatriates. I t could be s a i d , therefore, that Dayak nationalism was p a r t l y responsible for Ningkan's p o s i t i o n on Borneonisation. The other determinant of Ningkan's p o s i t i o n stemmed from the other orientation of SNAP's nationalism. Manifested by Ningkan's insistence that Malayan-born c i v i l servants be excluded from Sarawak, t h i s aspect of i t s nationalism was c l e a r l y t e r r i t o r i a l , f o r SNAP's argument was based on the provisions of the IGC Report. For SNAP, here, the r o l e 106 of the expatriates had been extended from a communal purpose to a regional concern. Expatriates were a valuable source of manpower i n helping Ningkan to insulate Sarawak against f e d e r a l encroachment. That i s , the expatriates were not only u s e f u l i n tutoring p o t e n t i a l Sarawak candidates, but also i n occupying these c i v i l service posts and therefore denying them to Malayans. It was not u n t i l e a rly 1966 that Ningkan f i n a l l y agreed to 21 accelerate the departure of the e x p a t r i a t e s — a n d even then only on the terms which he had prescribed. F i r s t , i t was to be Borneonisation. To ensure t h i s , he had created the Sarawak Borneonisation and E s t a b l i s h - ment Committee, which be chaired, "to f i l l a l l top posts with l o c a l 22 o f f i c e r s " . Second, i t was to be cautious and programmatic i n character: Borneonisation was to be planned and executed with care, 23 "not...haphazardly", he asserted. At t h i s point, Ningkan's p o s i t i o n encountered problems. Hitherto, Ningkan was able to follow a f a i r l y independent p o l i c y in implementing Borneonisation, l a r g e l y because of h i s strong c o n s t i t u - t i o n a l argument and because, since he did not i n s t i t u t e many changes, the f i n a n c i a l outlays were small. With the new phase of Borneonisation, Ningkan also i n s t i t u t e d various developmental projects. I t would appear that Ningkan was ready to demonstrate the v i a b i l i t y of his contention that Sarawak could and should implement Borneonisation on i t s own. In t h i s , however, Ningkan badly miscalculated, for' h i s J 107 projects needed f i n a n c i a l backing which Sarawak was unable to r a i s e 24 by i t s e l f . His only recourse was to turn to the federal leaders for f i n a n c i a l assistance. But by this time the federal government had had serious r i f t s with Ningkan over other issues and was convinced that Ningkan had to be removed from power. Ningkan's intransigence over Borneonisation, rooted as i t was i n Dayak and Sarawak i n t e r e s t s , was a major obstacle to the f e d e r a l objectives of nation-building, that i s , of developing p o l i t i c a l consensus and administrative co-ordination between West and East Malaysia. In a very r e a l sense, the squabble over Borneonisation was a clash between two competing nationalisms. Language Before SNAP's p o s i t i o n on language i s examined, i t i s necessary to explain the a p p l i c a t i o n of the term national as opposed to o f f i c i a l language. The e s s e n t i a l difference between the two l i e s i n t h e i r usage: a national language would be taught i n the schools of the country, as would also the o f f i c i a l one, but there the s i m i l a r i t y ends, for only the o f f i c i a l language could be used i n o f f i c i a l communications — t h a t of the courts, o f f i c e s , and correspondence between the d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s of government. Under A r t i c l e 161 of the Constitution of Malaysia, Parliament was empowered to terminate the use of English as i t s o f f i c i a l language i n 1967 i n West Malaysia. Elected representatives from Sarawak, Singapore, and Sabah were s t i l l allowed to use English 108 i n the Federal Parliament u n t i l 1973. Further, E n g l i s h was to be used i n Sabah and Sarawak as t h e i r o f f i c i a l language at l e a s t up to 1973, and a f t e r that time, u n t i l t h e i r respective l e g i s l a t u r e s decided o t h e r w i s e . ^ SNAP did not e s t a b l i s h a p o s i t i o n on language u n t i l March 1962. The immediate s t i m u l i was the party's impending acceptance of the Malaysia plan and the concomitant need to e s t a b l i s h conditions and safeguards. On the matter of language, the party f e l t that "English should remain the o f f i c i a l language not only i n Sarawak but also i n 2 6 the Federation of Malaysia for at least f i f t e e n years." The choice of E n g l i s h and the condition contained therein was regarded by party leaders as evidence that they had adopted a nati o n a l Malaysian outlook, since E n g l i s h was used i n both B r i t i s h Borneo and Malaya. To them, at l e a s t , t h i s was an important concession, a s a c r i f i c e on t h e i r part since being Iban themselves, there was l i t t l e doubt that by t h i s time they were t i l t i n g towards the preservation and perpetuation of the Iban language i n Malaysia. SNAP soon introduced a number of additions to i t s p o s i t i o n . Since the f i r s t p u b l i c a t i o n of i t s safeguards, i t had time to process the feedback from party members. I t was l i k e l y that t h e i r d i s s a t i s - f a c t i o n was responsible f o r the i n c l u s i o n of a clause demanding that Iban be one of the n a t i o n a l languages. The new p o s i t i o n was as follows; While i t i s generally and 'strongly f e l t by the majority of people that IBAN should be one of the 109 n a t i o n a l languages of Malaysia, the subject i s best solved...(by) the f u l l y elected represen- t a t i v e s of the National L e g i s l a t i v e Council of State Parliament.27 This new addition, which r e f l e c t e d the wishes of i t s supporters, high- l i g h t e d the concern in the state for the s u r v i v a l of the Dayaks, p a r t i c u l a r l y the Ibans, within the federation. I t was an expression of the primordial sentiments of party leaders and supporters which emerged out of the fear among the Ibans that t h e i r d i s t i n c t i v e c u l t u r e , of which t h e i r language was one f a c e t , might be d i l u t e d or even inundated by the i n f u s i o n of things Malay into Sarawak. The advantage in having Iban as a n a t i o n a l language was that i t would have been learned and used i n the schools of the state, c l e a r l y the best way of perpetuating the Iban language. In short, SNAP's inten t i o n was not to spread the language to the rest of Malaysia, but merely to ensure i t s s u r v i v a l within Sarawak. In t h i s way t h e i r a s p i r a t i o n could be reconciled with t h e i r need f o r an acceptable Malaysia. The second part of SNAP's language p o s i t i o n was more uncompro- mising than i t s demand i n March. While previously i t had i n s i s t e d that E n g l i s h should be retained for at least f i f t e e n years, i t now argued that there be no time l i m i t . The Constitution of the new federation must guarantee that E n g l i s h i s the o f f i c i a l language of Sarawak for a l l purposes...without l i m i t a t i o n of time. The continuation of E n g l i s h as an o f f i c i a l language as i t i s today i n Malaya should not be imperatively discontinued i n the new federation of Malaysia. 28 110 Given the fa c t that SNAP wanted to r e t a i n the use of Eng l i s h i n - d e f i n i t e l y and to perpetuate the growth of Iban, the subsequent c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p rovision on language was something of a disappointment. The Inter-Governmental Committee (a) established Malay as the sole o f f i c i a l and n a t i o n a l language; (b) r e s t r i c t e d the use of Eng l i s h to ten years a f t e r independence, although in East Malaysia E n g l i s h might be used u n t i l 1973 or beyond, depending on the decision of the Council Negri; and (c) dismissed the notion that Iban be made into a n a t i o n a l 29 language i n Sarawak. The Ningkan government considered i t s e l f bound by the IGC Report and defended the document as i t passed through the Council Negri i n September, 1963. Less than a year l a t e r a dispute erupted over language between the two l e v e l s of government. By July 1964, the Director of Dewan Bahasa dan Pustake, Tuan Syed Nasir bin Ismail, was proposing that Malay be used as the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n i n a l l schools and as the only o f f i c i a l language i n 30 1967. This seemed to suggest that the f e d e r a l government was prepared to throw aside the IGC Report. Dayak reaction to the fed e r a l i n i t i a t i v e was immediate. The Sarawak Dayak National Union (SDNU) warned that "as f a r as Sarawak i s concerned, such steps, instead of unifying the various races as he /jNasir7 had claimed, would destroy 31 r a c i a l harmony .. . and dampen the s p i r i t of the Dayaks The Ningkan administration was therefore buffeted on one side by pressure from the f e d e r a l government, which regarded i t s language programme as I ' l l a c r i t i c a l f e a t u r e o f n a t i o n - b u i l d i n g , and on the o t h e r by the SDNU and SNAP, b o t h of which f e a r e d t h a t such a programme would l e a d t o t h e demise of the Iban language and e v e n t u a l l y the Dayak c u l t u r e as w e l l . In r e sponse t o the f e d e r a l government, Ningkan promised t h a t he "would speed up t h e t e a c h i n g o f Malaya i n our s c h o o l s ... as soon as 32 p o s s i b l e ...." C l e a r l y he was r e j e c t i n g N a s i r ' s p o s i t i o n . To r e i n f o r c e h i s p o i n t he d e c l a r e d t h a t " E n g l i s h w i l l c o n t i n u e as a 33 medium of i n s t r u c t i o n i n our s c h o o l s . " H i s j u s t i f i c a t i o n was a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l one; he e x p l a i n e d t h a t h i s language p o l i c y was i n l i n e w i t h t h e recommendation of the I n t e r - G o v e r n m e n t a l Committee. In subsequent d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h the f e d e r a l government he e v i d e n t l y c o n v i n - ced them t h a t the l a c k o f f a c i l i t i e s and o f t e a c h e r s of Malay d i c t a t e d t h a t Sarawak be exempted from the n a t i o n a l programme proposed by N a s i r . In August 1964, Ningkan c o n f i d e n t l y d e c l a r e d t h a t We a r e n o t r u s h i n g t h e p r o c e s s of l e a r n i n g the N a t i o n a l Language. The M a l a y s i a n Government r e c o g n i s e s our s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t s i n the m a t t e r and the s p e c i a l d i f f i c u l t i e s which a p p l y here.34 Ningkan wanted a slow development and was d r a g g i n g h i s f e e t about heeding f e d e r a l p l a n s . B e s i d e s , he argued, t h e s t a t e l a c k e d t h e f a c i l i t i e s f o r t h e k i n d of programme which the f e d e r a l government had 35 i n mind. F e d e r a l p r e s s u r e c o n t i n u e d to mount, however, and a 3 6 r u n n i n g b a t t l e ensued between the two l e v e l s of government. There were t h e r e f o r e t h r e e a s p e c t s of Ningkan's language p o s i t i o n : 112 the i n f u s i o n of Malay, the future of E n g l i s h , and the future of Iban. Evidently Ningkan t r i e d to negotiate a place for Iban, a form of recognition so that the language could be taught in schools. The f e d e r a l government's reaction was to deny that there was such a thing as an Iban language. Early i n May 1966, as r e l a t i o n s between h i s administration and the f e d e r a l government became progressively worse and SNAP's working r e l a t i o n s h i p with i t s A l l i a n c e partners was on the point of breaking, Ningkan departed from his administration's language p o l i c y . Hitherto, the focus of his attention had been to exempt Sarawak from the National Language programme, to push for the cause of Englsh and Iban. Then without consulting his cabinet he sought to exempt the whole of Malaysia from the programme. His argument was that the introduction of the "National Language i n West Malaysia and l a t e r 37 i n East Malaysia" would be an "uneven exercise" for i t would put the l a t t e r at a disadvantage. He continued, I f e e l that t h i s uneveness i s not a good thing for our n a t i o n a l unity. I t can set up unwanted and unnecessary s t r a i n s and stresses between the Borneo states and the r e s t of Malaysia .... What I would l i k e to see, therefore ... would be that ... any changes that are to be made would be considered for the whole of Malaysia u n t i l 1973.38 Ningkan's object was c l e a r l y to modify the f e d e r a l p o l i c y on n a t i o n a l language and perhaps defer i n d e f i n i t e l y the f u l l use of Malay as an 39 o f f i c i a l language. The second point was his insistence that 4 0 "English would continue to be used for many purposes." The impor- tance of his suggestion was not only i n h i s temerity i n attempting to 113 influence n a t i o n a l p o l i c y , an act which earned him the enduring h o s t i l i t y of the fe d e r a l government, but also the fac t that i t was designed to e l i c i t favourable response i n Sarawak. In i t s e l e c t i o n campaign during the 1969-70 general e l e c t i o n , when i t was i n opposition SNAP again i n s i s t e d on the " l i b e r a l use of other languages. The Engl i s h language 41 should ... be retained ... for o f f i c i a l use" u n t i l the Council Negri decided otherwise. The intended e f f e c t of SNAP's language p o l i c y was to help create a groundswell of support i n SNAP's favour. When SNAP advocated the use of Iban, i t could be said that the party was making a 42 d i r e c t appeal f o r support from t h i s sub-ethnic group. Likewise, when SNAP argued against the f e d e r a l government f o r the continued use of English, i t was p a r t l y to i n c i t e Sarawak pat r i o t i s m . Summary The two issues of Borneonisation and language indi c a t e the importance of SNAP's nationalism. The party's insistence that both the rate of Borneonisation and the introduction of Malay i n Sarawak should be delayed r e f l e c t e d the concern of party leaders that a hurried implementation of these two p o l i c i e s would put the Dayaks at a disadvantage. By 1965 r e l a t i o n s within the Sarawak A l l i a n c e began to show more s t r a i n s . P o l i c y issues again formed the overt centres of these i n t r a - A l l i a n c e wranglings. As w e l l , such i n f i g h t i n g could also be interpreted as the struggles for po s i t i o n s of advantage within the A l l i a n c e i t s e l f and for mass support inside Sarawak. In the succeeding pages two other issues w i l l be examined: these are land and native p r i v i l e g e s . Of the two, the question of land received greater p u b l i c attention i n 1965. In terms of SNAP's nationalism, i t s p o s i t i o n on land indicated a time when the party began to emphasise Sarawak nationalism. F o o t n o t e s t o Chapter V 115 .1. M a l a y s i a S o l i d a r i t y C o n s u l t a t i v e Committee, "Memorandum on M a l a y s i a , " i n Report o f t h e Commission o f E n q u i r y , N o r t h Borneo and Sarawak, L o r d Cobbold, chairman, (Kuching: Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1962), p.85. 2. I b i d . , p.35. My emphasis. 3. Report of the I n t e r - G o v e r n m e n t a l Committee, L o r d Lansdowne, chairman, (Kuching, Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1963), p.25, h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d to as t h e IGC Report. The IGC was charged w i t h working out the c o n s t i - t u t i o n a l arrangements f o r t h e new f e d e r a t i o n i n c l u d i n g such m a t t e r s as s a f e g u a r d s f o r the s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t s of t h e new s t a t e s (Sabah and Sarawak), r e l i g i o n , e d u c a t i o n , p o s i t i o n o f i n d i g e n o u s groups and con- t r o l over i m m i g r a t i o n and c i t i z e n s h i p . 4. R.S. M i l n e and K.J. Ratnam, M a l a y s i a -- New S t a t e s i n a New N a t i o n : P o l i t i c a l Development i n Sarawak and Sabah i n M a l a y s i a (London: Frank Cass, 1974), p.34. 5. I b i d . , p.37. See a l s o t h e IGC Re p o r t , Annex B, paragraphs 5-13 and 30. 6. Sarawak T r i b u n e , August 31, 1962, p.6. I t a l s o added t h a t a l l f e d e r a l p o s t s i n Sarawak, t h a t i s , t h o s e p o s i t i o n s i n the c i v i l s e r v i c e which f a l l under f e d e r a l j u r i s d i c t i o n , must be f i l l e d by Sarawak born c i t i z e n s . 7. I b i d . 8. From a statement t o the p r e s s on December 31, 1965. See f o r i n s t a n c e , Sarawak T r i b u n e , January 1, 1966, p . l . Ningkan a l s o s a i d t h a t "we can- not ask t h e e x p a t r i a t e s t o go f o r no r e a s o n and a l t h o u g h t h e government i s a c c e l e r a t i n g B o r n e o n i s a t i o n , the p r o c e s s must go s t e p by s t e p . " 9. R.S. M i l n e and K.J. Ratnam, M a l a y s i a — N e w S t a t e s i n a New N a t i o n , op. c i t . , p.34. 10. That t h e Dayaks were b e h i n d o t h e r e t h n i c groups i n l i t e r a c y was w e l l known. F o r i n s t a n c e , i n 1957 98% of Ibans were I l l i t e r a t e , and 93% of B idayuhs. In c o n t r a s t , o n l y 66% o f Chinese were i l l i t e r a t e and 85% o f a l l Malays. These f i g u r e s were compiled from Noakes, J . L . , The 1947 P o p u l a t i o n Census Report o f Sarawak and B r u n e i (Kuching: Government P r i n t e r , 1950), c i t e d by L i a n g Kim Bang, Sarawak 1941- 1957 ( S i n g a p o r e : U n i v e r s i t y o f S i n g a p o r e , 1964), p.8. 11. Sarawak T r i b u n e , J u l y 31, 1961. 12. I b i d . , F e b r u a r y 28, 1964. 13. I b i d . 14. Sarawak T r i b u n e , September 25, 1964. 116 15. I b i d . , May 12, 1965. 16. S t r a i t s Budget, September 23, 1964, p.2. C i t e d i n James O n g k i l i , M o d e r n i z a t i o n i n E a s t M a l a y s i a , ( J u a l a Lumpur: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y . P r e s s , 1970), p.35. 17. Sarawak T r i b u n e , J u l y 5. 18. I b i d . , J a n u a r y 13, 1964. 19. The IGC Report was a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l framework f o r the new f e d e r a t i o n . I t c o n t a i n e d s a f e g u a r d s t o p r o t e c t Borneo i n t e r e s t s i n M a l a y s i a . I n the c a s e o f B o r n e o n i s a t i o n , t h e recommendation t h a t the p r o c e s s s h o u l d go s l o w l y c o i n c i d e d w i t h Dayak i n t e r e s t s which c o n s i d e r e d a slow r a t e of B o r n e o n i s a t i o n as a way of " r e s e r v i n g " p o s t s f o r t h e Dayaks. 20. Sarawak T r i b u n e , January 13, 1964. See a l s o i b i d . , J u l y 5, 1966. 21. Ningkan m a i n t a i n e d c l o s e c o n t a c t w i t h Temenggong Jugah o f Pesaka d u r i n g the p e r i o d . On B o r n e o n i s a t i o n , a t l e a s t , Dayak u n i t y was main- t a i n e d . See f o r i n s t a n c e , Sarawak T r i b u n e , March 31, 1966. 22. Sarawak T r i b u n e , A p r i l 1, 1968. Ningkan complained however, t h a t i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of B o r n e o n i s a t i o n would s t i l l t a ke some time even i f the f e d e r a l government was w i l l i n g t o f u n n e l i n t h e n e c e s s a r y funds. I b i d . , A p r i l 3, 1966. 23. I b i d . 24. The IGC Report r e c o g n i s e d t h e c o n d i t i o n s of underdevelopment i n Sarawak and Sabah. Under S e c t i o n 24(7) i t recommended t h a t Sarawak r e c e i v e a n n u a l g r a n t s from the C e n t r a l Government. The F e d e r a l C o n s t i t u t i o n s p e c i f i e s under S e c t i o n 109 o f the F e d e r a l C o n s t i t u t i o n , t h e F e d e r a l Government i s to make t o each s t a t e two g r a n t s c a l l e d c a p i t a t i o n g r a n t s and g r a n t s t o m a i n t a i n the roads o f t h e s t a t e s . P a r t IV o f the Tenth Schedule p r o v i d e s f o r an an n u a l g r a n t of $5,800,000 f o r Sarawak. F u r t h e r , from 1964 t o 1968 Sarawak was t o r e c e i v e a t o t a l o f 59 m i l l i o n d o l l a r s . ( M a l a y s i a , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l ' s Chambers, The F e d e r a l C o n s t i t u - t i o n ( K u a l a Lumpur: Government P r i n t e r 1963), a r t . 161). The C e n t r a l Government t r i e d t o use i t s f i n a n c i a l l e v e r a g e t o i n f l u e n c e the c o u r s e of B o r n e o n i s a t i o n . (James O n g k i l i , M o d e r n i s a t i o n i n E a s t M a l a y s i a 1960-1970 ( K u a l a Lumpur: O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1971), p.39). 25. M a l a y s i a , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l ' s Chambers, The F e d e r a l C o n s t i t u t i o n , op. c i t . , a r t . 161. 26. Sarawak T r i b u n e , March 2, 1962. 27. Sarawak T r i b u n e , August 31, 1962. The p o i n t t h a t Iban s h o u l d be the n a t i o n a l language was o n l y one o f t h e c o n c e s s i o n s which t h e p a r t y de- manded f o r Sarawak. The I n t e r - G o v e r n m e n t a l Committee began i t s work i n August of 1962. 28. I b i d . 117 29. IGC R e p o r t , S e c t i o n s 28 and 30. 30. Sarawak T r i b u n e , J u l y 21, 1964. The Tengku, f o r h i s p a r t , d i d n o t do much t o a l l y the f e a r s of the Borneo p e o p l e s when he s t a t e d t h a t t h o s e who had not mastered Malay by 1967 were d i s l o y a l t o M a l a y s i a . A f t e r a l l , t h e Tengku reasoned, " i t t a k e s a c h i l d l e s s than t h r e e y e a r s t o q u a l i f y i n Malay and i t s h o u l d take an a d u l t h a l f t h a t time t o do s o j " ( S t r a i t s Times, June 14, 1964). 31. Sarawak T r i b u n e , J u l y 21, 1964. L i k e t h e Ningkan government, the SDNU saw the IGC Report as the p r o t e c t o r o f Sarawak's s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t s . The SDNU warned t h a t "what may be a c c e p t a b l e t o t h e Malaysan s t a t e s may not and cannot be t a k e n f o r g r a n t e d as b e i n g good f o r Sarawak." 32.. Sarawak T r i b u n e , J u l y 22, 1964. 33. I b i d . 34. Sarawak T r i b u n e , August 20, 1964. 35. I b i d . , August 9, 1964. Language was one of t h e i s s u e s which c o n t r i - buted to the a c r i m o n i o u s r e l a t i o n s between the two l e v e l s of g o v e r n - ment. Other i s s u e s i n c l u d e t h e r o l e of e x p a t r i a t e s and s e c u r i t y . At t h i s time SNAP and Pesaka b o t h managed t o m a i n t a i n a u n i t e d f r o n t and from time t o time the p o s s i b i l i t y o f a merger was d i s c u s s e d and pub- l i c i s e d . Over the language i s s u e , Jugah was q u i c k t o s i d e w i t h N i n g - kan, s a y i n g t h a t "one cannot expect r e s u l t s o v e r n i g h t and one cannot expect r e s u l t s w i t h o u t t h e means of t e a c h i n g (See f o r i n s t a n c e , i b i d . , August 21, 1964.) 36. I b i d . , August 20, 1964. The f e d e r a l p o s i t i o n over language and educa- t i o n was t h a t Sarawak s h o u l d d e v elop a l o n g p a r a l l e l l i n e s and t h a t Sarawak s h o u l d not be l e f t b e h i n d i n th e f i e l d o f e d u c a t i o n . These a r e from the s t atements made by the F e d e r a l M i n i s t e r o f E d u c a t i o n , K h i r J o h a r i , i n K uching. (See t h e i b i d . , F e b r u a r y 18, 1965.) See a l s o the i s s u e of F e b r u a r y 21, 1965. 37. Sarawak T r i b u n e , May 3, 1966. 38. I b i d . 39. The D i r e c t o r of Dewan Bahasa dan P u s t a k a , Syed N a s i r , r e j e c t e d N i n g - kan' s p l e a , s a y i n g t h a t , "we (West M a l a y s i a ) cannot w a i t f o r Borneo t o c a t c h up." See t h e S t r a i t s Times, May 4, 1966. 40. I b i d . , May 3, 1963. 41. I b i d . , A p r i l 30, 1969. 42. In c o n t r a s t , t h e p a r t y which was supposed to r e p r e s e n t t h e Dayaks i n the government f a i l e d t o e s t a b l i s h any p o s i t i o n on the f u t u r e use or r o l e o f t h e Iban language. T h i s was P a r t y Pesaka. U n l i k e SNAP i t sup- p o r t e d the use of Malay as the s o l e N a t i o n a l Language. (See, f o r i n s t a n c e , i b i d . , F e b r u a r y 26, 1969.) 118 CHAPTER VI SARAWAK NATIONALISM: MULTI RACIALISM By the middle of 1965 SNAP had been i n power f or less than two years. But as w i l l be seen, i n t r a - a l l i a n c e schism and competitive party-building soon threatened to i s o l a t e the party and put i t at a disadvantage r e l a t i v e to other members of the Sarawak A l l i a n c e . How SNAP reacted to these challenges, that i s , how i t re-interpreted i t s nationalism, i s the subject of th i s chapter. To i l l u s t r a t e the change i n SNAP's nationalism three factors w i l l be examined. These are the matters of land and the placement of the Bumiputeras (natives) i n Sarawak. The t h i r d , and most important f a c t o r was i n fac t that the SNAP party had given up hope of act i n g i n concert with i t s fellow-Dayak party, Pesaka, through an a l l i a n c e . The conviction that a SNAP-Pesaka c o l l a b o r a t i o n was no longer possible l e d the leaders of SNAP to try to " n e u t r a l i s e " Pesaka by expanding d i r e c t i y into Pesaka areas. In doing so SNAP was hoping to draw away support from Pesaka. In short, SNAP was challenging Pesaka f o r Dayak support. Further, as w i l l be seen, SNAP sought to r e c r u i t Chinese and Malay members. A f t e r that the paper w i l l r e l a t e SNAP's formal downfall followed by a discussion on the emergence of i t s t e r r i t o r i a l (or Sarawak) nationalism. 119 Land"*" The evaluation of land "reforms" was begun well before Ningkan took over the o f f i c e of Chief Minister. For instance, the c o l o n i a l government, mindful of the increasing demands f o r land ownership by the burgeoning Chinese population, had a c t u a l l y set up a Land Committee i n 2 1962. I t was this committee which recommended that natives be allowed 3 to "dispose of t h e i r land subject to the approval of the Resident". The s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h i s proposal was that i t would have allowed the Chinese to buy land much more e a s i l y . From the beginning Ningkan offered no resistance against e f f o r t s to transform the recommendations into law. A f t e r a l l , both the Sarawak A l l i a n c e and SNAP had expressed support for such a measure. To i l l u s t r a t e : SNAP on January 3, 1963, had i n d i c a t e d i t s support f o r such a plan, even to the point of declaring that i t would, i f elected, "give land to the l a n d l e s s " whether Chinese or not. Further, the Sarawak A l l i a n c e expressed s i m i l a r arguments. In i t s manifesto i t supported the p r i n c i p l e of a l l o c a t i n g " s u f f i c i e n t land to farmers",—again with- 4 out any apparent misgivings about the i n c l u s i o n of Chinese. However, when the proposal was brought before the A l l i a n c e Council, Pesaka and Bumiputera voiced opposition, claiming that i t did not contain enough safeguards for the natives. According to Pesaka and Bumiputera the proposed l e g i s l a t i o n would make the a l l o c a t i o n of land to non-natives too easy. Whether Pesaka and Bumiputera were correct i n t h e i r 120 assessment i s not important. What i s s i g n i f i c a n t , however, was the emergence of a b a t t l e l i n e within the SA between those, namely SNAP and the SCA,"* who favoured the Land B i l l s and, by as s o c i a t i o n , a set of genuinely m u l t i - r a c i a l p o l i c i e s , and those opposed to the B i l l s such as Pesaka and BARJASA*' who sought to discriminate against the Chinese and to protect the natives under an umbrella of p r i v i l e g e s . As Ningkan pressed on with h i s land proposal, opposition mounted which brought i n t o question not only Ningkan's premise of equal opportunities ( i . e . SNAP's multi-racialism) f o r a l l Sarawakians, i n - cluding the righ t to own land, but also his leadership as w e l l . To supplant Ningkan, BARJASA and Pesaka agreed to resign from the Sarawak A l l i a n c e , a move which would have s c u t t l e d Ningkan's government — a n d , together with PANAS formed the "Native A l l i a n c e " . ^ Ningkan averted p o l i t i c a l defeat by withdrawing the land l e g i s l a t i o n which deprived h i s opponents of a major point around which to r a l l y against him. In addition, he survived because he succeeded i n r e t a i n i n g the support of Temenggong Jugah, the leader of Pesaka who could not yet 9 bring himself to topple a fellow Dayak. Lacking i n issue and the support of Temenggong Jugah, the Native A l l i a n c e was dropped. The t a b l i n g of the land l e g i s l a t i o n i n the face of opposition from BARJASA and Pesaka s i g n a l l e d that SNAP was now prepared to implement m u l t i - r a c i a l p o l i c i e s ; i n e f f e c t this acted as a s i g n a l that SNAP was now w i l l i n g to welcome Chinese members. SNAP had always 121 opened i t s door to non-natives (Chinese), but u n t i l i t s show of i n i t i a t i v e i n the land l e g i s l a t i o n i t was unable to o f f e r the Chinese any incentives. Consequently, i t s e f f o r t s to r e c r u i t Chinese members had only produced l a c k l u s t r e r e s u l t s . That i s , before i t openly advocated the land l e g i s l a t i o n , the Chinese had l i t t l e reason to support SNAP. Now i n the new land l e g i s l a t i o n SNAP had found an issue which would be popular with the land-hungry Chinese. In other words, the Land B i l l s demonstrated that SNAP's commitment to m u l t i - r a c i a l p o l i c i e s extended beyond routine pronouncements. The proposal i n e f f e c t signaled to Chinese Sarawakians that the party was well disposed to- ward t h e i r i n t e r e s t s — t h e only native-based party to be s o — a n d was therefore worthy of t h e i r support. Sponsorship of the Land B i l l s , then, was on i n d i c a t o r of SNAP's re j e c t i o n of apparently discriminatory concepts against the Chinese. This f a c t also became evident when Ningkan urged that the word Bumiputera be eliminated."^ The term Bumiputera i s a Malay word meaning "son of the s o i l " . In pr a c t i c e i t describes a native who, by v i r t u e of being one, i s e n t i t l e d t o c e r t a i n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i v i l e g e s over such matters as custom and language."""^ The idea was therefore s i m i l a r to SNAP's o r i g i n a l concept of safeguarding the i n t e r e s t s of natives which i t expressed i n 1961. The fundamental difference between the two conceptions l i e s i n the b e n e f i c i a r i e s . Had the Dayaks been numerically superior i n Malaysia they could i n e f f e c t 122 define the terms:of p r i v i l e g e to t h e i r advantage. Such a course would have been possible, f o r instance, had Saraxvak been a sovereign state, and SNAP, being a Dayak party, could be expected to l e g i s l a t e laws which would favour the Dayaks. But within Malaysia the Dayaks were not a majority, a fac t which meant that neither they nor t h e i r party (whether SNAP or Pesaka) would ever be i n a p o s i t i o n to determine the nature of p r i v i l e g e s according to t h e i r i n t e r e s t s . That i s , from t h e i r point of view, the concept of Bumiputera p r i v i l e g e s was defined by the Malays to serve Malay i n t e r e s t s . Since the Dayaks were d i s t i n c t from the M a l a y s — i n r e l i g i o n , language, custom, and culture — t h e y , the Dayaks, should not at this time be subsumed under the Bumiputera umbrella. According to SNAP the Dayaks should remain a d i s t i n c t ethnic group. Underlying the party's objection to the extension of the term Bumiputera to include Dayaks was the suspicion that t h i s would be a step toward a s s i m i l a t i o n . By late;.'1965, when SNAP was openly courting non-natives (the Chinese) as members and pa r t y - f i n a n c i e r s , i t was i n need of some 12 tangible p o l i c i e s as incentives f o r new members to espouse. In this respect the federal concept of Bumiputera or native p r i v i l e g e s , was a good one to attack because i n p r a c t i c e the Chinese would be victimised, and i n a d i f f e r e n t sense the Dayaks as we l l , by the advent of Bumiputera p r i v i l e g e s . In November 1965, Ningkan thus stated h i s case: 123 A l l Malaysians are "sons of the s o i l " . In the r o l e of nation-building no one needs to be reminded constantly of one's r a c i a l o r i g i n ....13 It was h i s hope, he said, that the word Bumiputera would soon d i s - appear. I t could be s a i d , then, that f a r from becoming u n i - r a c i a l i n tendency, championing as they did the cause of the natives, the party at that time continued to espouse m u l t i - r a c i a l p o l i c i e s . The other part of i t s response following the c r i s i s of 1965 was to continue and to expand party support along a multi-ethnic l i n e ; indeed, i t embarked on a party-building campaign which sought the support of a l l ethnic groups i n Sarawak. Such a p o l i c y was of course i d e o l o g i c a l l y consistent, but at the time i t s r e a l s i g n i f i c a n c e was that i t afforded SNAP a method by which to circumvent the SNAP- Pesaka understanding of non-interference. SNAP could not challenge Pesaka for o f f i c i a l l y they were s t i l l together i n the A l l i a n c e , but as the c r i s i s of 1965 showed, SNAP's future was contingent upon the continued support of Pesaka and i t s leader. As r e l a t i o n s between the two Dayak parties deteriorated, SNAP's need to be independent of Pesaka therefore became more pressing. In a very r e a l sense SNAP's recruitment of Chinese and, to a l e s s e r extent, Malay members was an e f f o r t to compensate f o r the l o s s of support that would occur should Dayak s o l i d a r i t y between Pesaka and SNAP f a i l to endure at some future date. In other words, SNAP's m u l t i - r a c i a l i s m was part of an 124 e l e c t o r a l strategy designed to reduce SNAP's dependency on Pesaka and, ultimately, to gain a majority i n the l e g i s l a t u r e . Beginning from early 1966, SNAP accordingly began to open a seri e s of urban branches with m u l t i - r a c i a l membership. The most celebrated of these was i n Kuching, where Ningkan had secured the open support of a prominent Chinese businessman, Datuk Wee Hood Teck. It was Datuk Wee who brought the long-term plans into focus when he declared, on the day the branch was opened, that Although the general elections would not be held u n t i l 1969, i t i s not too early to prepare f o r i t / _ s i c 7 by disseminating t h e i r (SNAP) party's manifesto and r e c r u i t i n g members.15 Consistent with SNAP's advocacy of m u l t i - r a c i a l i s m during the post 1965 period, l a t e r , when i n opposition, the party vehemently p r o t e s t e d ^ against P a r t i Bumiputera's "Directive No. 8" signed by Taib Mahmud, a top P a r t i Bumiputera leader who was also an Assistant Federal Minister. The document declared We ... i n P a r t i Bumiputera cannot be forced to give away Malays seats to Pesaka fa Dayak party7. Our basic objective was to unite the Malays and Bidayuhs ... we oppose any one who becomes the tool to s p l i t our race.17 The row between Pesaka and Bumiputera at t h i s time concerned the a l l o c a t i o n of seats for the e l e c t i o n due early i n 1969. The o r i g i n a l agreement entered by the members of the Sarawak A l l i a n c e was for the three p a r t i e s to contest and to campaign i n t h e i r respective 125 areas; for t h i s purpose Pesaka was a l l o c a t e d 22 seats, Bumiputera 15, and SCA 11. This arrangement would not only have kept the A l l i a n c e i n t a c t by denying any one party the chance of achieving the majority of seats; i t also would have made each of the three p a r t i e s b a s i c a l l y u n i - r a c i a l . Thus Pesaka would have been mainly Dayak, and SCA Chinese. Parti^-Bumiputera's base would have been expanded to what Taib Mahmud c a l l e d above "our race", that i s , a mix of Melanaus, Malays and Bidayuhs. The problem was that Party Pesaka had r e c r u i t e d Malay members. Pressed to f i n d acceptable constituencies f o r i t s Malay candidates, Pesaka then i n s i s t e d that i t be allowed to contest any seat i t deemed necessary. For SNAP, the importance of D i r e c t i v e No. 8 was that here was the f i n a l and documented i n d i c a t i o n of what the party had suspected: P a r t i Bumiputera represented communal chauvanism of which the objective ultimately was to assimilate the Dayaks into the Malay mould under the guise of native unity. For i t s part SNAP concentrated on p o l i c y and c o n s t i t u t i o n a l issues and offered i t s p r e s c r i p t i o n s as Sarawak's solutions f o r the problems of the state. This strategy was to broaden SNAP's appeal to a pan-Sarawak base. At one point Ningkan even appeared to repudiate SNAP's objective of safeguarding native i n t e r e s t s when he condemned SNAP's opponents as agitators f o r "communal s u p e r i o r i t y 18 • and d i s t i n c t i o n . " The reasonable i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of this statement was that i t intended to h i g h l i g h t SNAP's s i n c e r i t y towards the Chinese — t h a t i s , as a d i r e c t appeal f o r support from the Chinese community 126 since i n r e j e c t i n g the notion of communal p r i v i l e g e s Ningkan i m p l i - c i t l y accepted non-natives as equal. The time i n which t h i s statement was made, June 1966, was important for this was the period when SNAP was embarking on i t s party-building campaign and r e c r u i t i n g members from a l l ethnic groups. I t should be noted that Ningkan's statement was not a c a l l for the abandonment of native p r i v i l e g e s , at l e a s t not i n a permanent way. Indeed, i t would be accurate to say that SNAP advocated both p o l i c i e s simultaneously. Chronologically, i t was even before SNAP's withdrawal from the A l l i a n c e that i t emphasised m u l t i - r a c i a l i s m , p a r t i c u l a r l y i f i t s l i s t e n e r s were urban dwellers, who were most Chinese. For i t s r u r a l members, SNAP s t i l l advocated Dayak causes, such as the need for a Ministry of Dayak A f f a i r s . For both groups the party also brought i n the danger of federal intervention. Implied here was the threat of Malay expansionist communalism, that i s , of being overwhelmed by Malay culture and language. Obviously, i t s anti-Malay bias could not be expected to e l i c i t much sympathy from the Malay community i n Sarawak. Withdrawal from the Sarawak A l l i a n c e Another factor which aroused the i r e of his opponents p e r s i s t e d a f t e r the 1965 c r i s i s . This was the question of Ningkan's leadership. In the succeeding months a f t e r July 1965, his opponents s h i f t e d t h e i r attack against Ningkan: he was faulted not only because he and SNAP 127 espoused m u l t i - r a c i a l p o l i c i e s , but also because he personally had various shortcomings which required h i s removal from the o f f i c e of Chief Minister. The focus on Ningkan's p e r s o n a l i t y — h e was alleged to be hot-tempered and polygamous—allowed h i s opponents to separate him from h i s supporters. The object was to:.isolate the man and to bring to the fore those i n SNAP who were w i l l i n g to cooperate with the rest of the Sarawak A l l i a n c e and the federal government. From th i s viewpoint, this was a r e a l i s t i c recourse, since within SNAP there were those such as Dunstan Endawie who were les s intransigent, and therefore more cooperative than Ningkan on p o l i c y issues. Secondly, such attacks on Ningkan's shortcomings gave those who were undecided cause to jump on the anti-Ningkan bandwagon while s t i l l g i v i ng SNAP the option of remaining i n the Sarawak A l l i a n c e . In p a r t i c u l a r this recourse was taken by Temenggong Jugah, a p i v o t a l centre of influence, who i n time concluded that Ningkan was u n f i t to lead. As the major leader of Pesaka, Temenggong Jugah was inc r e a s i n g l y d i s t r e s s e d at Ningkan's m u l t i - r a c i a l p o l i c i e s , since from Pesaka's viewpoint the Chief Mini s t e r ought to have done more f o r natives, p a r t i c u l a r l y the Dayaks. The behihd-the-scene opponent to Ningkan from the 1965 Cabinet c r i s i s was the federal government, made uneasy by Ningkan's m u l t i - r a c i a l p o l i c i e s which appeared to accord the Chinese equal opportunities i n defiance of the Bumiputera s t i p u l a t i o n of the federal government. In addi t i o n Ningkan was inc r e a s i n g l y adamant about executing what he 128 c a l l e d "Sarawak s o l u t i o n s " to the state problems. I t was Ningkan's argument that i n formulating h i s state p o l i c i e s over such issues as land and language, primary consideration should be given to Sarawak's own conditions. Since such outlook was state-centred they were often at variance with those of the federal government whose aim i t was to develop p o l i c i e s designed f o r nation-building. Ningkan's p r o v i n c i a l i s m was therefore becoming increasingly unpalatable to the federal govern- ment . Subsequent to the f i r s t c r i s i s (mid-1965) neither Pesaka nor BARJASA were again w i l l i n g to give Ningkan t h e i r f u l l support. By t h i s 21 time Thomas Kana was f u l l y entrenched as Pesaka's top t a c t i c i a n . I t was he, for instance, who engineered Pesaka's expansion into the Batang A l ( i n Lubok Antu D i s t r i c t ) area of the Second D i v i s i o n , thereby f i n a l l y breaking Pesaka's informal ''alliance" with SNAP. I t was during this foray into the Batang A i that Ningkan p h y s i c a l l y clashed with one of Pesaka's party workers, an incident which f i n a l l y convinced 22 Temenggong Jugah that the Chief Minister must be ousted. Within Ningkan's Supreme Council wranglings over p o l i c y matters increased. Unlike the period preceding the f i r s t c r i s i s , by early 1966 Pesaka was s o l i d l y against him. Worse s t i l l , the federal government, which hitherto had adopted a s u r r e p t i t i o u s r o l e i n t r y i n g to unseat Ningkan, was now openly against him. When f i n a l l y i n mid-1966 the Sarawak A l l i a n c e was divided into two camps; only SNAP and, f o r a 129 while, the SCA, remained unshaken i n t h e i r support of the Chief Minister. Within the forty-two member l e g i s l a t u r e , those against 23 Ningkan numbered twenty. The rebels were l e d by Taib Mahmud, the state Minister of Telecommunications and Works, and Thomas Kana, the Secretary-General for Pesaka. Both were consistent adversaries of Ningkan and SNAP since the abortive attempt to unseat the Chief Minister i n 1965. Further, as i n 1965, the followers of Thomas Kana and Taib Mahmud were now once again declaring t h e i r support f o r them. It appeared that the r e v o l t of 1966 was a repeat of the one i n 1965. One major difference was the f a c t that i n contrast to 1965, Ningkan l o s t the c r i t i c a l support of Temenggong Jugah, who was somehow convinced quite early that a majority of the Council Negri members, twenty-three out of forty-two, were now a c t u a l l y against Ningkan. The other d i f f e r e n c e was the overt and a c t i v e role of the Federal Government on the side of the rebels. Pa r t l y to underscore t h e i r determination and partly- to ensure unity i n t h e i r ranks the rebels were flown to Kuala Lumpur on June 13. Together they had signed a l e t t e r which expressed "no confidence" i n Ningkan and which they had submitted to the Federal Government. That was enough: for the Federal Government to c a l l f o r the Chief Minister's resignation. Quoting A r t i c l e 7(1) of the Sarawak Consti- tution the. Prime Minister c a l l e d on the Governor of Sarawak, Tun Abang H a j i Openg, to ask Ningkan to resign. Ningkan refused and 130 instead indicated that he would convene a scheduled meeting of the Council Negri on June 14 with his twenty-one supporters, which had by now included the SUPP and some PANAS members. From the Malaysian c a p i t a l and with federal support, Thomas Kana announced that the twenty rebels would boycott the meeting of the l e g i s l a t u r e . The Council Negri thus met without the rebels to disrupt the proceedings. There were s i x members from SNAP, two from PANAS, three from SCA, f i v e from SUPP, one from Machinada, one Independent, and three ex- o f f i c i o members. At the meeting four b i l l s were passed and f o r t y - f i v e questions answered without any dissenting vote. I t appeared that Ningkan was able to carry on governing i n the face of opposition from the rebels and the Federal Government. His opponents countered by f l y i n g the rebels back to Kuching together with representatives of the national A l l i a n c e i n order to demand Ningkan's resignation and to submit the name of Penghulu Tawi S l i as the new Chief M i n i s t e r . As i f to demonstrate the coercive power held by the federal a u t h o r i t i e s , they were also accompanied by the Inspector General of P o l i c e , and the Director of Special Branch. On the basis of the l e t t e r of "no confidence", the federal a u t h o r i t i e s on June 17 managed to persuade the Governor to dismiss Ningkan and h i s cabinet and to appoint Tawi 24 S l i as Chief M i n i s t e r . The i n t r u s i o n of federal power was received with indignation i n SNAP. Ningkan's dismissal provoked reactions from outside the 131 party where there were those who were sympathetic to the party's contention that Federal complicity i n the c r i s i s was u n j u s t i f i e d , since the Sarawak A l l i a n c e was a " f u l l y autonomous body r e g i s t e r e d i n Sarawak and only a f f i l i a t e d to the Malaysian A l l i a n c e i n Kuala 25 Lumpur". Convinced that he would be reinstated by the courts, Ningkan capitulated i n order, he explained, to "avert any possible trouble ... and to s t i c k to a peaceful and c o n s t i t u t i o n a l approach to the settlement of the dispute regarding the o f f i c e of the Chief 26 M i n i s t e r of Sarawak". On June 20, three days a f t e r Penghulu Tawi S l i had become the de facto Chief Minister, Ningkan vacated h i s o f f i c i a l residence, the Panggau Libau. In bringing the matters to court, Ningkan kept a l i v e the issue of who was Chief Minister. Consequently, the c r i s i s did not end i n July, 1966. By September the struggle between SNAP and Ningkan on the one hand and the Federal Government, Sarawak A l l i a n c e , and Tawi S l i on the other, had reached a new l e v e l of i n t e n s i t y . In order to a r r i v e at an understanding of SNAP's p o s i t i o n i n the long-drawn c r i s i s , i t i s necessary to o u t l i n e the sequence of events. Soon a f t e r h i s dismissal by the Governor, Ningkan f i l e d a s u i t against the Head of State i n which i t contended the l e g a l i t y and legitimacy of the d i s m i s s a l . Ningkan argued that under the Sarawak Const i t u t i o n a "no confidence" motion or l e t t e r i n the Council Negri need not lead to the removal of the Chief Minister from o f f i c e . On July 1, he f i l e d 132 another s u i t i n which he sought to r e s t r a i n the Tawi S l i and h i s cabinet from acting as ministers. Ningkan thus fought i n the court and outside of i t i n his attempt to survive as Chief Minister. But outside the court he committed a t a c t i c a l blunder which i n the end contributed to the party's i s o l a t i o n . On July 3, SNAP withdrew from the Sarawak A l l i a n c e . As a consequence of th i s move, i t s l a s t remaining a l l i e s i n the government switched t h e i r support away from SNAP. Three days a f t e r SNAP's withdrawal the SCA announced i t s support f o r the new government and soon a f t e r some members of the b a d l y - s p l i t PANAS also declared t h e i r support f o r Tawi S l i . During the preliminary hearings on Ningkan's s u i t s which were heard i n the High Court of Borneo on August 22 and 25, Chief J u s t i c e E.R. Harley scheduled a hearing for August 29. This act i n e f f e c t made the i d e n t i t y of the Chief M i n i s t e r sub j u d i c e . Thus, when the Council Negri met the next day, on August 26, the Speaker adjourned the meeting a f t e r only several minutes but not before noting that he did not know who was the l e g a l Chief M i n i s t e r . A c o n s t i t u t i o n a l impasse had thus developed i n Sarawak. A f t e r hearing the case the Chief J u s t i c e handed down his judgement on September 7, i n which he reinstated Ningkan as Chief M i n i s t e r . For a while, at l e a s t , Ningkan appeared to hold the i n i t i a t i v e . A l l that remained to be done, i t seemed, was f o r him to regain the confidence of the Council Negri. Since h i s defeat was assured i n the l e g i s l a t u r e he was under- 133 standably reluctant to face the house. What he needed was time i n order to persuade at l e a s t some rebels to support him and thereby regain a majority i n the Council Negri. His advantage rested on the fa c t that according to the Sarawak Constitution, the Governor summons the Council Negri to meet only on the advice of the cabinet. In short, i t appeared that so long as the Council Negri did not meet he would continue as Chief M i n i s t e r . Further, so long as he was able to communicate with at l e a s t f i v e of the rebels and win t h e i r confidence, there was a chance f o r him to survive a vote of "no confidence" i n the Council Negri. SNAP leaders f e l t that at the worst Ningkan could continue as Chief M i n i s t e r by simply advising the Governor that the Council Negri be dissolved and a general e l e c t i o n be held. Thus, as f a r as Ningkan was concerned, he could simply wait u n t i l e i t h e r the rebels broke ranks or he advised the Governor to dissolve the Council Negri. His t a c t i c had one major flaw, how- ever, f o r c r i t i c a l to the success of h i s method was the assumption that the court would decide i n his favour and that the court's decision was not n u l l i f i e d by a higher authority, such as the Federal Government, or over-turned by a higher court. The Federal Government, f o r i t s part, continued to work against Ningkan. To i s o l a t e the l e g i s l a t i v e insurgents from Ningkan and to ensure t h e i r l o y a l t y to Tawi S l i , the rebels were c o r r a l l e d once more from t h e i r temporary sanctuaries i n Kuching and were flown to 134 to Kuala Lumpur. On September 6 they were flown back to Kuching and were thus i n town to hear Ningkan's reinstatement the next day. The Chief Justice's v e r d i c t , at l e a s t temporarily, resolved the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l impasse, but i t did not provide a s o l u t i o n to the p o l i t i c a l stalemate since Ningkan was unable to contact and urge the rebels to defect. Convinced that Ningkan could not be persuaded to resign or to convene a meeting of the Council Negri, where he would have to face a vote of "no confidence" and be forced out of o f f i c e , the Federal Government declared a state of emergency on September 15. Subsequently, i t amended the Sarawak Const i t u t i o n which gave the Governor powers to convene the Council Negri and to dismiss the Chief M i n i s t e r at the d i r e c t request of the majority of Council Negri members. On September 23, the Council Negri met and a "no confidence" motion was formally passed against Ningkan and his second cabinet. Ningkan was dismissed the next day. In theory, at l e a s t , SNAP could have elected to support the new government, thereby even earning re-entry into the A l l i a n c e . This could have happened had Ningkan been replaced by Endawie, f o r instance. At one point there was indeed an attempt within SNAP to make Endawie the party leader; but, convinced that such a takeover at this time would wreck the party and destroy the chance of a t t r a c t i n g new supporters, he refused. Ningkan therefore continued as leader. One i t became cl e a r that Ningkan would r e t a i n the .leadership, there 1 3 5 was l i t t l e chance of r e c o n c i l i a t i o n with the rest of the Sarawak 27 A l l i a n c e . The f i r s t reason involved personal pride; a f t e r h i s ouster he could not very well support the government which had j u s t ejected him. The second reason, and p o l i t i c a l l y the more s i g n i f i - cant one, involved the c o n f l i c t of values between the two sides. As a n a t i o n a l i s t party which was committed to democracy SNAP considered Ningkan's"ousting as an underhanded exercise which lacked c o n s t i t u - t i o n a l i t y since i n the opinion of party leaders, the rule of due process of law had not been f u l l y applied. Thus, soon a f t e r h i s ouster, Ningkan i n i t i a t e d l e g a l proceedings against the new government. SNAP explained that u n t i l the courts decide otherwise, Penghulu Tawi S l i i s only a pretender to the o f f i c e of the Chief Minis t e r of Sarawak. Although the Prime Minis t e r said i n Kanowit that the removal of Datuk Stephen Kalong Ningkan was done l a w f u l l y , the Sarawak National Party and most people i n Sarawak, and indeed Malaysia cannot agree with the Prime Minist e r that Penghulu Tawi S l i ' s Government has been lawfully formed when the very question as to whether Penghulu Tawi S l i has been l a w f u l l y 2g appointed Chief M i n i s t e r of Sarawak i s sub j u d i c e . The t h i r d reason why SNAP did not support the new government was because to do so would mean having to compromise on another of i t s n a t i o n a l i s t p r i n c i p l e s : m u l t i - r a c i a l i s m . I t was this aspect of SNAP's P o l i t i c a l Manifesto, and the attendant willingness to accord the non- natives (of Sarawak that i s , the Chinese)a measure of economic freedom greater than i t s major partners i n the Sarawak A l l i a n c e would have 136 tolerated, a fact which prompted PANAS, BARJASA, and Pesaka to form the "native a l l i a n c e " i n 1965. Thus, before SNAP could become acceptable to the new c o a l i t i o n , i t would need to modify i t s p o l i c y of m u l t i - r a c i a l i s m . Since SNAP regarded m u l t i - r a c i a l i s m as a c r i t i c a l incentive to a t t r a c t non-Dayak support, i t was loath to throw away a valuable aspect of i t s p o l i c i e s . The fourth basis of i t s objection was the composition of the new government, primarily the dominance of Muslims i n i t . At f i r s t glance, the opposite appeared to be true. Numerically, at l e a s t , the new government was maintained not by a Muslim organisation, but by Pesaka, a Dayak-based party. But seen from SNAP's viewpoint, Pesaka's p a r t i c i p a t i o n was l a r g e l y symbolic. I t was not that Pesaka was unimportant to the new government; indeed, because of i t s numerical strength i n the Council Negri, Pesaka's support was c r i t i c a l i f only to maintain the new organisation. To underscore this point the new Chief Minister came from Pesaka. To SNAP, however, Pesaka's p a r t i c i - pation xjas merely a s e l f - s e r v i n g manoeuvre, f o r i t s leaders lacked the resolve to pursue e i t h e r the i n t e r e s t s of the Dayaks or those of Sarawak within the federal set-up. L a s t l y , as a state-centered party, SNAP believed that Sarawakians should enjoy self-government with respect to state p o l i t i c s , free from any interference from outside sources. The major target here was the federal government's p o t e n t i a l for manipulation and i n t e r - 137 ference, a p o s s i b i l i t y which SNAP had feared from the beginning. In 1966 this suspicion festered into b i t t e r resentment against the federal govenment when i t v i o l a t e d what SNAP considered as the proper conduct of st a t e - f e d e r a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s . The object of l i m i t i n g federal capacity to influence state p o l i t i c s was to create within Sarawak a strong m u l t i - r a c i a l i d e n t i t y d i s t i n c t from that of other states within the Malaysian federation. With reference to i n t r a - A l l i a n c e a f f a i r s . i n Sarawak, i t was SNAP's contention that the Sarawak A l l i a n c e was an autonomous body. As such the federal govern- ment had no power to intervene i n i t s a f f a i r s . To protest such intervention and to draw support from s i m i l a r l y enraged Sarawakians, SNAP formally withdrew from the A l l i a n c e i n July 1966. The party explained that In view of the undemocratic and unconstitutional and d i c t a t o r i a l actions taken by the Grand A l l i a n c e i n Kuala Lumpur whereby only two parties of the Sarawak A l l i a n c e , namely, Pesaka and BARJASA were consulted about the removal of the Chief M i n i s t e r of Sarawak, Datuk Stephen Kalong Ningkan and the nomination of another Chief Min i s t e r to replace him, and that no consulta- tions were made at a l l with the other three component partners i n the Sarawak A l l i a n c e , namely SNAP, PANAS and SCA, the Sarawak National Party therefore has no option but to withdraw from the Grand A l l i a n c e i n Kuala Lumpurv29 In accusing the federal government of unconstitutional and d i c t a t o r i a l actions, SNAP c l e a r l y aimed at e x p l o i t i n g the c r i s i s , to turn i t into a c a t a l y t i c event by which i t would draw widespread notice and 138 sympathy. Its announced withdrawal simply highlighted the drama. Thus, by the time SNAP was ousted from power i t had i d e n t i f i e d i t s e l f with two themes. The f i r s t was i t s m u l t i - r a c i a l p o l i c i e s which contended.that the c i t i z e n s of Sarawak, i r r e s p e c t i v e of race, should have received equal treatment under the laws of Sarawak and Malaysia. The second theme was the party's a n t i - f e d e r a l sentiments; to this end the federal Grand A l l i a n c e was viewed as an oppressive organi- s a t i o n which was p a r t i a l to Malays, p a r t i c u l a r l y those o r i g i n a t i n g from West Malaysia. Sarawak for Sarawakians I f there was a s i n g l e slogan which came to represent SNAP's nationalism i n the period a f t e r SNAP's withdrawal, i t was the catch- phrase "Sarawak f o r Sarawakians". . Ever since the term was f i r s t employed i t has always been associated with the party's p o s i t i o n with regard to Malaysia. F i r s t employed i n October 1961, the term was used at a time as n a t i o n a l i s t i c demand that Sarawak ought to receive sovereign status. Though Sarawak was then a colony of Great B r i t a i n , the target of the slogan was not the re t r e a t i n g c o l o n i a l power, but the Malaysia propo- s a l which sought to deny.Sarawak i t s independent status. That i s , the slogan "Sarawak f o r Sarawakians" was an a s s e r t i o n f o r s e l f - government and independence as well as the r e j e c t i o n of the Malaysia 139 Plan. I t expressed a sentiment that was not so much a n t i - B r i t i s h , f o r B r i t a i n had indicated i t s desire to confer independence to Sarawak, but anti-Malaya, the perpetrator of the Malaysia Plan. In time SNAP was to give up i t s opposition to the proposal. But t h i s did not lead to the abandonment of any l i n g e r i n g a s p i r a t i o n f or separate nationhood for Sarawak. When the slogan was revived i n the l a t t e r h a l f of 1966, i t was again directed at the Malaysia i s s u e . This time, however, there was a s h i f t i n meaning. In 1961 the slogan stood for independence. From 1966 onwards, owing to p r e v a i l i n g conditions, i t became more ambiguous, i t s meanings multi-faceted. Depending on the time, and to an extent the audience, the slogan sometimes meant a c a l l f o r j u s t treatment by the federal government, 30 as an expression of protest. I t could also stand for separation, p a r t i c u l a r l y when the l i s t e n e r s were Dayaks. In other words, the difference was i n degree: separation here was the most extreme of i t s nationalism continuum while the b e l i e f i n "proper" treatment, of equal status, provided the other extreme. SNAP's concern about the conduct of federal-state r e l a t i o n s and the r i g h t to secede can be traced from the beginning. I t was SNAP which, worried about the guarantees f o r an equal voice i n the running of Malaysia; i t was also SNAP (and independently Pesaka as well) which demanded that the r i g h t to separate be incorporated into 31 the C o n s t i t u t i o n of Malaysia. I t was hardly s u r p r i s i n g that i n 140 1966, party leaders protested vigorously when federal interference proved instrumental i n Ningkan's downfall and the party's f a l l from power. SNAP's reaction grew even more extreme, when the federal government involved i t s e l f more deeply by mid-September 1966. At that time the High Court of Borneo had reinstated Ningkan as Chief M i n i s t e r . Once i n o f f i c e , Ningkan immediately c a l l e d f o r a general e l e c t i o n i n an e f f o r t to re-constitute the Council Negri, while h i s opponents demanded an immediate meeting of the e x i s t i n g Council Negri. From SNAP's point of view i t had much to gain from such an e l e c t i o n . This course of a c t i o n was congruous with the party's b e l i e f i n parliamentary democracy. In the second place i t was a t a c t i c a l exer- cise through which Ningkan could avoid defeat by having to c a l l the much wanted s i t t i n g of the l e g i s l a t u r e . At that moment Ningkan's opponents had increased t h e i r group to a majority of twenty-five i n the forty-two member l e g i s l a t u r e . More important, from the perspective of i t s nationalism an e l e c t i o n that centered on separation as a core issue might possibly catapult SNAP into a majority p o s i t i o n — a v i c t o r y which could be interpreted as a mandate for separation. As f a r as SNAP was concerned, an e l e c t i o n having such a r e s u l t could constitute an acceptable reason fo r separation. Ningkan himself made this strategy c l e a r i n d e t a i l i n g h i s "State P o l i c y " soon a f t e r his reinstatement i n 32 September, 1966. When the government refused him permission to 141 use of the state's radio f a c i l i t i e s , Ningkan was forced to disseminate his "State P o l i c y " by the newspapers, which were less widespread and therefore less e f f e c t i v e than the radio. Regarding the e l e c t i o n Ningkan said that he support/ed/ the provision of the Bangkok Agreement which c a l l s f or the reaffirmation of t h e i r /Sarawak's_7 decision to enter Malaysia by the people of Sarawak.33 According to Ningkan's argument the means for such a reaffirmation, one that would also solve the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l impasse i n Sarawak, was 34 a general e l e c t i o n . The c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c r i s i s r e f e r r e d to here was Ningkan's r e f u s a l to c a l l the Council Negri into session. This was within h i s power to do since he was the Chief M i n i s t e r . The problem f o r him was that the federal government and twenty-five members of the Council Negri demanded that a s i t t i n g be held. Ningkan's c a l l f o r an e l e c t i o n thus heightened the tension created by the confrontation between his government on the one hand and the rebels and the federal government on the other. In i t s response the federal government ignored Ningkan's formula fo r secession. But i t s subsequent action indicates that i t was c l e a r l y concerned. Claiming that i t did not want the s i t u a t i o n to escalate into disorder which the l o c a l communists might foment even further, the federal government on September 15, declared a State of Emergency. The declaration was within the power of the federal a u t h o r i t i e s to issue. Under A r t i c l e 150 of the Federal Constitution 142 the Yang Dipertuan Agung, on the advice of the Central Government, may.issue a Proclamation of Emergency i f he i s " s a t i s f i e d that a grave emergency ex i s t s whereby the security or economic l i f e of the 35 Federation or any part thereof i s threatened ...." Explained Tun Razak, who was acting Prime Minister, ...a serious s i t u a t i o n has developed i n Sarawak i n the l a s t few days and therefore we have to take action. The c r i s i s i n Sarawak poses a serious threat to the security of the State and of Malaysia as a whole. There i s a communist menace and how there i s p o l i t i c a l i n s t a b i l i t y and uncertainty ... the s i t u a t i o n can get out of hand.36 SNAP condemned the f e d e r a l intervention as a breach of f a i t h ; the power to amend or suspend the Constitution of Sarawak, i t protested, 37 belongs to the people of Sarawak. S i g n i f i c a n t l y , the party refrained from further public statements about secession. The reason was not that the party had suddenly renounced i t s e c e s s i o n i s t intent but that during the period of emergency such a c a l l would surely lead to r e p r i s a l s such as detention of party leaders. This form of sanction would surely c r i p p l e SNAP as a w e l l - functioning party. The f i r s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the slogan "Sarawak fo r Sarawakians" i s , then, that i t suggested secession. Through 1967 and even to 1968, as SNAP spread to the Rejang Basin, Pesaka's stronghold, and as i t opened more urban branches, SNAP's f i e l d workers r e l i e d at l e a s t on separation as an issue to a t t r a c t new party members. Thus, for instance, when the Federal Minister of Land and Mines, Datuk 143 Abdul Rahman Yakub, charged that Ningkan was attempting "to get the 38 state to break away from the Malaysian federation", the party again refused to deny i t , a lack of response which indicated that SNAP indeed favoured the idea. Why then would the party not admit i t ? The answer i s simple: to preach secession i s an act of s e d i t i o n for which i t s leaders could be arrested. Under normal circumstances t h i s would be a dangerous undertaking: i t was more so i n 1967 when Sarawak was i n a state of emergency. At a time when the party was undergoing a period of massive expansion, arrests of t h i s s o r t were 39 not welcomed. Moreover, the party has always been committed to c o n s t i t u t i o n a l means. With t h i s guideline i n mind, i t can be s a i d that although SNAP's nationalism was manifested by i t s support f o r the cause of separation, the party's ideology which eschews violence s e r v e r e l y l i m i t e d i t s option only to c o n s t i t u t i o n a l means. Among the Dayaks at l e a s t , SNAP's long-term target had always been state autonomy, but withdrawal from Malaysia as f a r as the party was concerned would only occur through the process of negotiations a f t e r , f o r instance, a c l e a r vote against Malaysia i n an e l e c t i o n or through a referendum. Since the "Emergency" s i t u a t i o n made open advocacy of separation impractical as a r a l l y i n g cry i n order to gain support, SNAP concentrated i t s p u b l i c i t y campaign on the oppressive aspect of the federal intervention. 40 In SNAP's judgment the declaration of the "Emergency" was unwarranted 144 and based on a "very i s o l a t e d and flimsy evidence of a small gathering 41 . . . o f i r r e s p o n s i b l e persons i n Kuching .... Also i t was SNAP's view that the IGC Report, the London Agreement of 1963, and the Cobbold Commission Report were t r e a t i e s which provide the basis f o r the conduct of r e l a t i o n s between state and federal governments and the framework f or the Co n s t i t u t i o n of Sarawak. The "Emergency" which suspended the Constitution i n SNAP's viewpoint contravened the s p i r i t and l e t t e r of these " t r e a t i e s " . In short, with the tampering of the State Constitution, the federal government had reduced Sarawak to the unequal p o s i t i o n of a "neo-colony", and therefore deserved to be 42 challenged. Without openly i n s t i g a t i n g separation, SNAP worked toward i t i n piecemeal fashion. In th i s instance i t s nationalism was direct e d at an external target. Another feature of "Sarawak f o r Sarawakians" was SNAP's objective of b u i l d i n g a "dynamic, progressive and peaceful m u l t i - r a c i a l Sarawakian 43 s o c i e t y . . . . " SNAP was not engaging i n the r e i t e r a t i o n of a p o l i t i c a l cliche''when i t said that i t wanted such a society i n Sarawak, because central to that objective was the notion that Sarawak ought to have a society d i s t i n c t from that of the Malaysian whole. Part of SNAP's n a t i o n a l i s t sentiment was a conviction that the federal government was e s s e n t i a l l y a negative force which i n v a r i a b l y i n t e r f e r e d with Sarawak's a f f a i r s . In order to b u i l d a Sarawakian society i t was therefore necessary to i s o l a t e Sarawak as much as possible 145 from the central government and i t s i n f l u e n c e . As the party explained, We ^Sarawakiansjhave no other land. Sarawak i s our home and there i s nothing too b i g or too much to s a c r i f i c e f or her defence against the e v i l forces t r y i n g to dominate and destroy her .... Her economic and p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y s h a l l be her greatest s e c u r i t y . This can only be achieved when i t i s r e a l i s e d that Sarawak i s for the Sarawakians.^4 From SNAP's viewpoint, p a t r i o t i s m meant not only love f o r Sarawak but also an a n t i - f e d e r a l sentiment. A Sarawakian society could not be b u i l t 45 properly i f the federal government was allowed to "dominate" the s t a t e . The other p r e r e q u i s i t e for such a society was a strong state government. In SNAP's view the Sarawak A l l i a n c e under Tawi S l i was a weak administration. For instance, i n the case of the "Emergency" i t was c l e a r that i n i t s subservience to the federal government, the Sarawak A l l i a n c e f a i l e d to "preserve, honour and defend the State 46 C o n s t i t u t i o n . " Underlying t h i s a s s e r t i o n was the b e l i e f that i n the process of nation b u i l d i n g the SA would be e i t h e r unwilling or unable to r e s i s t federal d i r e c t i v e s , and therefore i t would be inherently incapable of r e a l i s i n g a dynamic and separate Sarawakian society. In contrast to the SA, SNAP considered i t s e l f as a " n a t i o n a l i s t party which would 47 always oppose any attempt to s e l l out the i n t e r e s t of our s t a t e . " The problem with the SA, SNAP contended, was that i t had become a tool f o r federal manipulation of state a f f a i r s . The other conception of SNAP's Sarawakian p o l i c y was that i t would 146 be m u l t i - r a c i a l . It means that instead of favouring one p a r t i c u l a r c u l t u r e , r e l i g i o n , or custom the government would encourage the growth of Sarawak's d i f f e r e n t ethnic groups. Since the federal government considered the Malay culture, r e l i g i o n , and language as composites of examplary Malaysian i d e n t i t y , SNAP's m u l t i - c u l t u r a l i s m was opposed to 48 the p o l i c y of the federal government. In th i s way SNAP's argument for m u l t i - c u l t u r a l p o l i c i e s served i t s anti-Malay sentiment. Further, , 49 SNAP s m u l t i - r a c i a l i s m gave the party a d i r e c t appeal to the d i f f e r e n t ethnic groups i n Sarawak i n that SNAP gave them the opportunity to perpetuate t h e i r own culture, while the SA and the central govern- ment threatened Sarawakians with a s s i m i l a t i o n , or at l e a s t a push f o r a "Malayanised" Sarawak. Thus while the SA was depicted as a too l which threatened Sarawak's communal groups, SNAP presented i t s e l f as t h e i r saviour which therefore deserved t h e i r support. This was the major i n t e r p r e t a t i o n f o r SNAP's argument that "Sarawak's i d e n t i t y must be preserved at a l l cost, and l e t no one deny us of th i s heritage."""^ L a s t l y , SNAP's conception of i t s Sarawakian society contained a general proposal f o r economic p o l i c i e s . Again, the federal framework was viewed as a d e b i l i t a t i n g f a c t o r and i s o l a t i o n from the federal government was considered a p r e r e q u i s i t e . As Ningkan explained, There i s always the Constitution of Sarawak with which we work for the achievement of i t s economic, s o c i a l , and p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y , not only f o r us today,but also f o r generations to come.51 14 7 With SNAP out of o f f i c e , the main objective of i t s nationalism came to include not only the determination of p o l i c y orientations and the appraisal of governmental measures to see whether an ethnic group would benefit more or l e s s , but also the recruitment of support'which would put the party back i n power. That i s , espousal of i t s nationalism served to mobilise p o l i t i c a l sympathy from as wide a base as pos s i b l e . Although i t s t i l l championed Dayak i n t e r e s t s , i t had extended i t s a c t i v i t i e s to include non-native ones as w e l l . Hence i t s multi- r a c i a l i s m . Hitherto SNAP had concentrated mainly on Dayaks; i n 1965 i t s h i f t e d to Sarawakians, and ostensibly at l e a s t Dayak i n t e r e s t s were overshadowed by those of Sarawak. Evidence indicates that i n s h i f t i n g i t s strategy SNAP struck a 52 sympathetic chord among non-Iban/non-Dayak Sarawakians. In January 1967 i t won a by-election ( f o r a d i s t r i c t council seat) i n Pelagus, an area within Pesaka's heartland. In March i t won another e l e c t i o n i n Lawas, F i f t h D i v i s i o n , with a Chinese candidate. In January 1968, i t won s t i l l another one i n Limbang. SNAP therefore won a l l the elections i n 1967 and 1968. 5 3 The immediate re s u l t s of SNAP's party b u i l d i n g were encouraging. With finances r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e from such tycoons as Wee Hood Teck of Kuching, James Wong of Limbang, and less openly from those within the SCA i n Sibu as w e l l , more urban branches were set up. In October 1966, one branch was set up ( i n B i n t u l u ) ; i n November two more (Kampong 148 Gi t a , and Tatau), while i n December i t opened up branches i n the major towns of the Third D i v i s i o n (Sibu, Binatang, Kanawit, Kapit, Song, and S a r i k e i ) . By June 1967 SNAP had established i t s e l f i n M i r i , the l a s t major town without a SNAP branch. Emboldened by SNAP's e l e c t o r a l v i c t o r i e s , and organisational resurgence, Ningkan began to press f o r a general e l e c t i o n . The l i f e of the e x i s t i n g Council Negri would not expire u n t i l August 1968. But Ningkan and other leaders of SNAP were convinced that SNAP had increased i t s popular appeal and that there existed a state-wide back- lash against the state and federal governments over the dismissal of Ningkan and the suspension of the Sarawak Constitution. They were therefore eager to have a general e l e c t i o n , preferably i n 1967 or, at the l a t e s t , i n 1968. Ningkan l e d the rest of SNAP's leaders i n condemning the A l l i a n c e leaders f o r having "no respect f o r the law... the very d i c t a t o r i a l kind who w i l l i n pursuit of t h e i r personal gains 54 rule against the wishes of the majority." Otherwise, Ningkan reasoned, they would have arranged f o r a general e l e c t i o n to seek a new mandate. Pa r t l y to underscore t h i s point and p a r t l y to protest the i l l e g a l i t y of the new government, SNAP's Council Negri walked out of a meeting of the l e g i s l a t u r e on June 6,1967. When asked to explain SNAP's decision to-boycott the s i t t i n g of the Council Negri, James Wong said that the r e a l issue was whether Datuk Ningkan was s t i l l the Chief Minister, a matter which remained to be decided 149 by the Federal Court of Malaysia. U n t i l the matter was cleared, he said, the A l l i a n c e "ministers" had "no r i g h t to present b i l l s and palm themselves o f f as . " m i n i s t e r s . T h e Federal Court rejected Ningkan's contention that the Federal Parliament did not have the power to pass the Emergency Act of 1966, which empowered the Governor of Sarawak to dismiss Ningkan as Chief Minis t e r should he refuse to resign as Chief M i n i s t e r a f t e r a vote of "no confidence" against the Government i n the Council Negri. Ningkan launched a f i n a l appeal to the Privy Council i n London which recommended that i t be dismissed. The 5 6 conclusion of the l e g a l process was i n October, 1968, two years a f t e r Ningkan's ouster. Ningkan's appeal was based on h i s contention that a s i t u a t i o n of emergency which threatened the s e c u r i t y of the state had not existed. Ningkan thus applied a narrow meaning to the word emergency. In dismissing Ningkan's appeal, Lord MacDermott of the J u d i c i a l Committee of the Privy Council s a i d that "the natural meaning of the word /emergency7 i t s e l f was capable of covering a wide range of si t u a t i o n s and occurrences, in c l u d i n g such diverse events as wars, famine, earthquakes, floods, epidemics and the collapse of c i v i l government.""^ He further said that Ningkan had f a i l e d to e s t a b l i s h h i s (Ningkan's) assertion that a s i t u a t i o n of emergency had not ex i s t e d . The prolonged l e g a l proceedings served SNAP's i n t e r e s t . The court case helped the party to focus on the high-handed nature of federal intervention, the court case helped to arouse an a n t i - f e d e r a l sentiment. 150 Further, since the matter was sub judice, an apparently i l l e g a l Tawi S l i government was a boon for SNAP's f i e l d workers. I t gave credence to the party's argument that the new government was l e d by opportunists who cared l i t t l e f o r the law. By the time the matter was s e t t l e d by the Privy Council the momentum of SNAP's expansion was well underway. The reaction of the A l l i a n c e was to persuade SNAP to return to the government. The party rejected the o f f e r , pointing out that i t and the SA were "poles apart, e s p e c i a l l y on matters of i n t e r e s t to Sarawak 58 and her people." Party leaders were hopeful that SNAP's mu l t i - r a c i a l p o l i c i e s and strong stand against the federal government would be a popular platform from which to contest the general e l e c t i o n s . F i n a l l y , i t should be noted that by 1968, SNAP was showing signs that i t had shelved the notion of separation. The f i r s t s i g n a l came on February 18. Although separation remained as an objective, i t was never an all-consuming a s p i r a t i o n except f o r a very b r i e f period l a t e i n 1966, when Ningkan suggested that Sarawakians be allowed to r e a f f i r m t h e i r desire to remain i n Malaysia. A f t e r that the leaders of SNAP were pre-occupied with the b u i l d i n g of the party's organisation and preparing f o r the coming general e l e c t i o n s . The party leaders made no attempt to disassociate themselves with any break-away attempts u n t i l September 29, when Ningkan denied that the slogan "Sarawak f or Sarawakians" contained any sentiments or reference that were anti-Malaysia. He added, 151 I...as leader of SNAP declare on behalf of a l l our members our unswerving l o y a l t y to the Nation ....59 On January 13, 1969, Ningkan reaffirmed this new l i n e . SNAP, he s a i d , i s irrevocably committed to a f u l l support of Malaysia and i n f a c t i t always has been i n s p i t e of the unfounded insinuations made by c e r t a i n unscrupulous and dishonest propagandists from the A l l i a n c e Party i n t h e i r f u t i l e e f f o r t s to d i s c r e d i t the p a r t y . 6 0 The motive behind the new l i n e i s f a i r l y easy to e s t a b l i s h . SNAP's loud assertion of l o y a l t y was made with the coming e l e c t i o n i n mind. In t h i s instance, e l e c t o r a l exigency which might involve c o a l i t i o n b u i l d i n g a f t e r the votes had been cast became a factor i n modifying SNAP's nationalism. Here the pursuit of e l e c t o r a l o f f i c e moderated the c e n t r i - fugal force of Ningkan's provincialism.. SNAP's affi r m a t i o n of l o y a l t y was i n e f f e c t a message to i t s p o t e n t i a l a l l i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y those who might have been sympathetic to SNAP's concern f o r the rights of the state but who were uneasy at the l a t t e r ' s apparent f l i r t a t i o n with separatism. Amongst those who- might have been i n t h i s p o s i t i o n was Pesaka. As Dayaks, i t s leaders might be expected to have close a f f i n i t y with t h e i r Dayak counterparts i n SNAP—enough at l e a s t to form the foundation for the next government. The major disagreement between the two parties at t h i s time was that while Pesaka's c h i e f t a i n s were more t r u s t i n g of the designs of the federal government, SNAP's leaders perceived them as p o t e n t i a l l y damaging to the p o l i t i c a l process of the s t a t e . Thus, while SNAP was rumored to be contemplating separation, Jugah announced 152 that Pesaka would never allow the state to break away. In this respect Ningkan's subsequent declaration of l o y a l t y to Malaysia was a t a c t i c to gain Pesaka's confidence, which would be necessary i f they 63 were to form the government. In a d d i t i o n SNAP's message of l o y a l t y was di r e c t e d at the fed e r a l government. As an exchange for a hands-off p o l i c y by the federal government during the coming elections and the period following, SNAP would o f f e r to Malaysia i t s unreserved l o y a l t y . Obviously the party was concerned that an unfriendly c e n t r a l government could not only complicate s t a t e - f e d e r a l r e l a t i o n s , but i t feared that i n the event that SNAP should constitue the government, the Central Government might obstruct i t s assumption of o f f i c e . This was c l e a r l y expressed by the party i n 1969: The present Sarawak A l l i a n c e Party i s accepted and recognised...as the legitimate adminis- t r a t i o n by the Central Government.... What we do ask i s that the Central Government gives the Sarawak National Party the same recognition when we form the Government with a clear mandate from Sarawakians....64 S ummary The salience of SNAP's Sarawakian nationalism, which was most evident i n the party's p o s i t i o n on the land l e g i s l a t i o n , was i n c i t e d by an i n t r a - A l l i a n c e competition between member p a r t i e s to improve t h e i r respective e l e c t o r a l machines. The thrust of the i n i t i a t i v e s taken by 153 SNAP's partners, such as the proposal for an UMNO-backed Bumiputera party or a Pesaka-BARJASA "Native A l l i a n c e " , had threatened to exclude SNAP arid i n doing so to put i t at a disadvantage. In t h i s respect the t a b l i n g of the land l e g i s l a t i o n only further d e s t a b i l i s e d the Sarawak A l l i a n c e . Federal complicity i n i n t r a - A l l i a n c e a f f a i r s and the opportune a l l i a n c e which l a t e r coalesced around the r e b e l l i n g Pesaka and BARJASA parties resulted i n the ouster of SNAP's Stephen Kalong Ningkan as Chief M i n i s t e r i n 1966. That same year the party withdrew from the Sarawak A l l i a n c e l a r g e l y because i t was no longer welcome i n the new government, and SNAP was l e f t without power. Moreover, had i t remained in s i d e the A l l i a n c e , there was the p o s s i b i l i t y that i t would have been overshadowed and replaced by the more powerful Pesaka as the Dayak-based party. In contrast, being i n the opposition gave SNAP the opportunity to i n c i t e and to e x p l o i t whatever pan-Sarawak popular resentment was generated against the new administration and the federal government by Ningkan's downfall. In short, the p r e v a i l i n g conditions had changed against SNAP and the party reacted by changing the emphasis of i t s nationalism. The n a t i o n a l i s t i c features which were s a l i e n t during this period were, as noted above, i t s anti-Malayan sentiment, which also implicated federal collaborators i n the state, namely members of the r u l i n g Sarawak A l l i a n c e . SNAP's nationalism also expressed i t s e l f on p o l i c y issues. On Sarawak a f f a i r s , SNAP advocated the p o l i c y of m u l t i - r a c i a l i s m and on s t a t e - f e d e r a l r e l a t i o n s 154 the party contended that the federal government should abstain from purely state a f f a i r s . Incorporated under the slogan "Sarawak f or Sarawakians", t h i s nationalism served to a t t r a c t support f o r the expansion of SNAP's branch organisation on a state-wide basis and f o r the formation of an e l e c t i o n platform. It should be noted that the slogan had been associated with s e p a r a t i s t a s p i r a t i o n s which SNAP evidently harboured. But i n the l a t e 1960's party leaders were unprepared to tackle such an explosive issue. Consequently the object i v e was deferred to an i n d e f i n i t e date, and SNAP loudly pro- claimed i t s l o y a l t y to Malaysia. In short, the objectives of i t s nationalism, which were characterised mainly by i t s m u l t i - r a c i a l i s m and anti-federalism, were to r e c r u i t support, and put the party back i n power. 155 Footnotes to Chapter VI 1. Sarawak has an area of about 48,000 square miles, three quarters of which i n 1962 were s t i l l primary f o r e s t . At that time land was c l a s - s i f i e d into the following categories: Mixed Zone Land, an area of 4,600 square miles which may be alienated to any Sarawakians; Native Area Land of 2,600 square miles which was under native customary tenure; Native Customary Land which covered a l l land under native customary tenure and which became Mixed Zone Land or Native Area Land a f t e r t i t l e was given; Reserved Land which included Crown land and parks and I n t e r i o r Area Land which covered land not under the four categories. See Great B r i t a i n , Sarawak: Report for the Year 1962 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery O f f i c e , 1963), pp.50-52. 2. At that time the administration of land i n Sarawak was under the Land Code, f i r s t introduced i n 1958. A l l land was vested i n the Crown and a native was regarded as a licensee of the Crown. A l i e n a t i o n of land to a Mixed Zone Land c l a s s i f i c a t i o n was the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the Land and Survey Department. In 1960 the area of land under t h i s c l a s s i f i - cation was 4,400 square miles. By 1962 only 200 square miles were added, which was evidently not s a t i s f a c t o r y to the Chinese. 3. Under the new proposal, the system of land c l a s s i f i c a t i o n was to be abolished. The administration of the sale of land was to have been through l o c a l committees composed of appointed o f f i c i a l s and headmen. The Resident, the chief administrative o f f i c e r i n each of Sarawaks f i v e d i v i s i o n s , would have to approve each sale, however. For a text of a speech given by Mr. Teo Kui Seng, Minister f o r Natural Resources, over Radio Malaysia (Sarawak) on the new Land Code see Sarawak Tribune, February 22, 1964. 4. Ningkan considered the recommendations of the land l e g i s l a t i o n b e n e f i - c i a l f o r Sarawakians i n general. For the Chinese i t would mean the a v a i l a b i l i t y of more land and for the Dayaks, who he curiously c a l l e d the "communities of h i l l padi" the recommendations would lead to more intensive forms of land settlement schemes with modern amenities such as e l e c t r i c i t y and medical dispensaries. Ningkan professed to see l i t t l e problem i n the Dayaks r e l i n q u i s h i n g any land which they didn't immediately need. For Ningkan's explanation see i b i d . , March 17, 1966. 5. The Minister for Natural Resources, Teo Kui Seng, whose j u r i s d i c t i o n included land, was from the Sarawak Chinese Association (SCA). By February 1965 t h i s ministry was making good i t s promise to ali e n a t e more land to non-natives. For instance, out of 47 l o t s between f i v e to 20 acres for c u l t i v a t i o n i n the F i r s t D i v i s i o n , only two were r e - served for natives. Mr. Teo may have pushed for Chinese i n t e r e s t s within the Ningkan administration, but i t was Ningkan, for the Chief Minister, who had to shoulder the ultimate r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . .6. In i t s annual general meeting held i n March 1965, BARJASA argues that natives should have s p e c i a l p r i v i l e g e s i n such areas as education and the c i v i l service. See i b i d . , March 22, 1965. 156 7. A major proponent of the "Native A l l i a n c e " , Taib bin Mahmud, who was a state Minister from BARJASA, explained that "the Native A l l i a n c e " could "work better (than a m u l t i - r a c i a l party such as SNAP) among the various races i n Sarawak by p u l l i n g together r a c i a l groups which had common problems and i n t e r e s t s at heart." See i b i d . , May 15, 1965. 8. BARJASA and Pesaka l e g i s l a t o r s had resolved to block the B i l l s i f they were presented i n the Council Negri. These were the Land Adjudication B i l l , the Land A c q u i s i t i o n B i l l , and the State Land and Registration B i l l . 9. Though Temenggong Jugah favoured the proposed "Native A l l i a n c e , " he regarded the i n c l u s i o n of SNAP as a necessary condition. 10. S t r a i t s Times, November 17, 1965. 11. While A r t i c l e 29 of the IGC Report recommended and A r t i c l e 161A of the Constitution of Malaysia gave the Borneo natives t h e i r " s p e c i a l p o s i - t i o n , " they did not specify f u l l y what t h i s was supposed to have i n - volved. The i n i t i a t i v e to draw the l e g i s l a t i o n and execute the law was l e f t l a r g e l y to the Chief Ministers of the two states. While he was the Chief Minister, Ningkan would not press for any l e g i s l a t i o n , evidently because to do so meant that he would have to recognise the s p e c i a l - p o s i t i o n s of Bumiputeras. His successor, Tawi S l i of Pesaka, was too timid to assert native r i g h t s . This was a cause of much f r u s - t r a t i o n i n h i s own party: once, i n a hardly v e i l e d threat to the Chief Minister, Pesaka demanded that A r t i c l e 29 of the IGC Report be " f u l l y implemented". See the Sarawak Tribune, A p r i l 8, 1969. 12. In 1965 Ningkan's apparent r e j e c t i o n of Bumiputera p r i v i l e g e s and h i s r e f u s a l to extend them to the Dayaks were not w e l l received by the Sarawak Dayak National Union (SDNU). In a memorandum to the Chief Minister early i n 1965 the SDNU protested that i t was not f a i r that a f t e r Malaysia had been established the Dayaks were not treated on equal footing with the Malays of Malaya (Sarawak Dayak Nation Union, "Memorandum to the Honourable the Chief Minister of the State Govern- ment of Sarawak i n (sic) the matters of C o n s t i t u t i o n a l (sic) General Safeguards, Special P r i v i l e g e s and P r e f e r e n t i a l Treatment given to the Dayaks" (Kuching: typewritten, March 12, 1965), p.7). 13. S t r a i t s Times, November 17, 1965. 14. See Chapter Eight for an account of SNAP's growth. Other Chinese businessmen were active i n t h e i r support for SNAP. Perhaps the most prominent was Wee Boon Ping, (no r e l a t i o n to Dato Wee). A f t e r Ningkan's downfall i n 1966, they continued to support SNAP, apparently on the conviction that Ningkan would be reinstated as Chief Minister by the courts, and that they would receive favours from the party i n return. A f t e r the Privy Council decided against Ningkan, t h e i r open support subsided with the notable exception of Datuk James Wong's. Both Datuk Wee and Wee Boon Ping resigned from SNAP l a t e r i n 1968. 15. Sarawak Tribune, June 3, 1966. 157 16. Angered by the document which they considered as r a c i s t i n character, SNAP leaders repeatedly demanded Taib Mahmud's dismissal. 17. Sarawak Tribune, November 17, 1968. P a r t i Bumiputera's expansionist communalism echoed the Prime Minister's argument made over two years back. In a v i s i t to Santubong, Sarawak, i n March 1966, the Tengku had argued for Malay unity: "The other races w i l l laugh at us," he s a i d , " i f we are not united" ( i b i d . , March 2, 1966). 18. I b i d . , June 3, 1966. 19. Consequently, although SNAP was not t o t a l l y devoid of Malay supporters, t h e i r presence had always been minimal. SNAP's Malay supporters were concentrated i n three c l u s t e r s ; Kuching, Sibu, and Limbang. In Kuching the Chief SNAP operative was Abang Othman who chose SNAP at the d i s s o l u t i o n of PANAS i n 1966. In Sibu the l o c a l Malay leader was Ainnie bin Dhoby. In Linbang i t was Awang Bungsu. A l l were once parliamentarians. What they had i n common was t h e i r i n a b i l i t y to get along with P a r t i Bumiputera's leaders. 20. Ningkan's actions were remarkably s i m i l a r to that of h i s counterpart i n Sabah, Donald Stephens. Both men enjoyed close t i e s with expat- r i a t e o f f i c e r s and both d i s l i k e d f e d e r a l intervention i n the a f f a i r s of t h e i r respective states. As a consequence, the f e d e r a l government was to consider t h e i r leaderships unacceptable. Another reason which did not endear Ningkan to the fed e r a l government was the f a c t that he was sympathetic to Singapore and Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew's concep- t i o n of m u l t i - r a c i a l i s m . 21. Thomas Kana, who i s a Dayak, was a medical dresser i n Seria. He returned to Sarawak at Temenggong Jugah's behest i n February 1965. His immediate objective was to r e b u i l d Pesaka which had stagnated in t o a s h e l l organization a f t e r 1963. 22. Temenggong Jugah's momentous decision was p r e c i p i t a t e d by an incident which was to become known as the "Mason A f f a i r " . A l f r e d Mason was working for Party Pesaka and was a major fig u r e i n the party's attempt to e s t a b l i s h a foothold i n the Lubok Antu area of the Second D i v i s i o n . This u n i l a t e r a l move by Pesaka angered Ningkan who a l l e g e d l y injured A l f r e d Mason by choking him at the throat. The incident took place i n Simanggang, immediately a f t e r Pesaka's i n i t i a l i n c ursion into Lubok Antu. On Temenggong Jugah's view of the "Mason A f f a i r " (Sarawak T r i - bune , September 14, 1966). Ningkan's version was that he had merely rested h i s hand on Mason's neck and that Mason's in j u r y was due to Ningkan's occult powers (R.S. Milne and K.J'. Ratnam, Malaysia — New States in"a New Nation (London: Frank Cass, 1974), p.448). 23. The immediate incident was Ningkan's dismissal of h i s Minister of Com- munication and Works, Taib Mahmud, who had been gathering support with- i n the Sarawak A l l i a n c e against Ningkan. Following Taib Mahmud's d i s - missal, other ministers resigned and the 20 dissident members, i n c l u - ding Taib Mahmud himself, flew o f f to Kuala Lumpur from where they de- manded Ningkan's resignation. One key f i g u r e i n SNAP who was distressed 158 by the imminent break within the Dayak ranks was Datuk Dunstan Endawie, a SNAP Vice-President and Council Negri Member from Krian. He and Edmund Langgu, SNAP's Secretary-General and Member of Parliament from Saratok, consulted t h e i r constituents from the Kalaka d i s t r i c t . Datuk Endawie was rumoured to be ready to defect at t h i s time, but that he stayed with SNAP was probably at the urging of the voters from h i s constituency. 24. Sarawak Tribune, June 18, 1978. See also: Gordon Means, Malaysian P o l i t i c s , (London: In a New Nation, op. c i t . , p.226. 25. S t r a i t s Budget, September 14, 1966, c i t e d i n Michael Leigh, The Rising Moon: P o l i t i c a l Development i n Sarawak. (Sydney: Sydney Uni v e r s i t y Press, 1974), p.104. 26. - Sarawak Tribune, June 29, 1966. See also Footnotes No. 55 and 56. 27. I b i d . , August 9, 1967. 28. I b i d . , July 4, 1967. 29. Ibid ., July 3, 1967. 30. The notion of state autonomy remained an objective of the party u n t i l i t joined the government i n 1976. It had always been seen as the u l - timate target, however, not n e c e s s a r i l y as an urgent goal which over- rides a l l others. The apparent case i n which Singapore was ejected from the federation i n 1965 was probably not l o s t on Ningkan. In standing up to the f e d e r a l government he may have wished to have Sarawak ejected from the federation. 31. See Report of the Commission of Enquiry, North Borneo and Sarawak, Lord Cobbold, chairman (Kuching, Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1962), p.18. SNAP's view that Sarawak should be free to withdraw from Malay- s i a was shared by Temenggong Jugah who even submitted a personal memo- randum to the Cobbold Commission. See, for instance, Sarawak Tribune, March 20, 1962. 32. Sarawak Tribune, September 14, 1966. 33. Ibid. 34. The "Bangkok Agreement" which i s formally known as The Agreement to Normalise Relations Between the Republic of Indonesia and Singapore ended the period of confrontation between the two countries. A r t i c l e I of the Agreement states i n f u l l : "The Government of Malaysia i n order to resolve the problems between the two' countries a r i s i n g out of the formation of Malaysia, agree to a f f o r d the people of Sabah and Sarawak who are d i r e c t l y involved, an opportunity to r e a f f i r m , as soon as p r a c t i c a b l e , i n a free and democratic manner through General E l e c - t i o n , t h e i r previous decision about t h e i r status i n Malaysia." See Franklin B. Weinstein, Indonesia Abandons Confrontation: An Inquiry into the Functions of Indonesian Foreign P o l i c y (Ithaca: C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1969), pp.93-94. 159 35. Malaysia, Attorney General's Chambers, The Federal Constitution, (Kuala Lumpur: Government P r i n t e r , 1963), p.94. See a l s o : R.S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, P o l i t i c s and Government i n Malaysia, (Vancouver: Univ e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia Press, 1978), p.43; Harry E. Groves, The Constitution of Malaysia (Singapore: Malaysia Publications Ltd., 1964), p.222. 36. Sarawak Tribune, September 16, 1966. 37. I b i d . , September 20, 1966. 38. The Minister s p e c i f i c a l l y accused SNAP of t r y i n g to work out an a l - l i a n c e with the SUPP, which had never accepted Malaysia. I b i d . , July 5, 1967. During the e l e c t i o n campaign i n 1969, the leaders of Party Pesaka claimed that SNAP's executives had not declared t h e i r "unequi- vocal support" for Malaysia, ( i b i d . , May 4, 1969). 39. Given SNAP's a s p i r a t i o n for an independent Sarawak, there was no doubt that had the federal government forced Sarawak out of Malaysia as i t did with Singapore, the party would have consented. 40. On the r o l e of the federal government and i t s major operative Syed Kechik i n staging the declaration of the Emergency and Ningkan's sub- sequent downfall, see Bruce Ross-Larson, The P o l i t i c s of Federalism: Syed Kechik i n East Malaysia (Singapore: by the author, 195-b Penang Road, Singapore 9, 1976), pp.34-53. The State of Emergency was pro- claimed under A r t i c l e 150 of the Federal Constitution (R.S. Milne and Diane K. Maiizy, P o l i t i c s and Government i n Malaysia, op. c i t . , p.42. 41. Several sources claim that the demonstration was stage-managed i n order that a state of emergency may be declared. There i s no conclusive evidence to corroborate t h i s a l l e g a t i o n . 42. According to the party's argument, Sarawak joined Malaysia on the under- standing that only Sarawak could amend the Sarawak Constitution. (Sarawak Tribune, September 20, 1966.) 43. SNAP used the slogan to s t i r up support. The audience i n t h i s instance was l a r g e l y Malay; the occasion was the opening of a party branch — the Ikatan Tujoh Branch. I t s membership was l a r g e l y Malay ( i b i d . , May 1, 1967). 44. Sarawak Tribune, A p r i l 19, 1967. 45. The Party continued: "Sarawak's i d e n t i t y must be preserved at a l l costs ... l e t no one including the f e d e r a l government deny us of (sic) t h i s heritage." (Sarawak Tribune, A p r i l 19, 1967.) 46. I b i d . , May 1, 1967. 47. I b i d . , J u l y 6, 1967. 160 48. Ningkan was not alone i n h i s stand i n favour of m u l t i - r a c i a l i s m . Be- fore the ouster of Singapore from the federation, i t s Prime M i n i s t e r , Lee Kuan Yew, a strong proponent of a "Malaysian Malaysia" i n which neither the nation nor the state would be i d e n t i f i e d with or defined by any p a r t i c u l a r communal group. A s i m i l a r viewpoint was held by Donald Stephens, Sabah's f i r s t Chief Minister. See for instance: Nancy Fletcher, The Separation of Singapore from Malaysia (Ithaca: Co r n e l l University Press, 1969), p.58; Margaret Roff, "The Rise and Demise of Kadazan Nationalism," Journal of Southeast Asian History, Vol. 10, No. 2 (September 1969), p.338. 49. Sarawak Tribune, May 15, 1967. 50 I b i d . , A p r i l 19, 1967. 51. Ibid., May 1, 1967. 52. See Chapter Eight for an account of SNAP's expansion and performance. 53. Section 21(3) of the Sarawak Constitution provides that the Council Negri has a maximum l i f e of f i v e years following i t s e l e c t i o n . Since the l a s t General Elections were completed i n July 1963 and the recon- s t i t u t e d Council Negri f i r s t sat i n August of the same year, i t follows that the l a t e s t time for a General E l e c t i o n to be held was August 1968. See Great B r i t a i n , Malaysia: Agreement Concluded Between the United Kingdom of Great B r i t a i n and Northern Ireland, the Federation of Malaya, North Borneo, Sarawak and Singapore (London: Her Majesty's Stationery O f f i c e , 1963). 54. Sarawak Tribune, March 4, 1967. 55. Ibid., June 7, 1967. 56. Sarawak Tribune, October 6, 1968. 57. Ibid. 58. A f t e r SNAP's withdrawal from the Sarawak A l l i a n c e i n led by Ningkan, resolved that SNAP would contest the own. Overtures from the Sarawak A l l i a n c e that could party's return were therefore c o n s i s t e n t l y rebuffed. i b i d . , June 7, 1967. 59. I b i d . , September 29, 1968. 60. I b i d . , January 14, 1969. 61. Ningkan was quick to t r y and e x p l o i t apparent d i s u n i t y within the Sarawak A l l i a n c e . For instance, when the A l l i a n c e was threatened with a r i f t following Temenggong Jugah's open complaint that bias i n the allotment of development projects by P a r t i Bumiputera's ministers r e - sulted i n the Dayaks being denied t h e i r f a i r share, Ningkan promptly showed his support of the Temenggong's p o s i t i o n . Declaring that SNAP 1966, party leaders, el e c t i o n s on i t s have led to the See, for instance, 161 would not r e j o i n the Sarawak A l l i a n c e , Ningkan made i t obvious that he would welcome co l l a b o r a t i o n with Pesaka.. (I b i d . , October 28, 1967.) 62. Ibid. 63. In t h i s SNAP was successful. A f t e r the 1970 general e l e c t i o n s , Pesaka's leaders such as Thomas Kana and Temenggong Jugah indicated t h e i r preference for an a l l i a n c e with SNAP. However, they were un- able to enforce d i s c i p l i n e within t h e i r own party. As a r e s u l t , de- fect i o n s to the P a r t i Bumiputera camp eventually ended i n the Pesaka r e j o i n i n g the new government led by P a r t i Bumiputera. 64. Sarawak Tribune, January 6, 1969. 162 CHAPTER VII THE RE-EMERGENCE OF ETHNIC NATIONALISM Introduction This chapter seeks to e s t a b l i s h the factors which determined the r e v i v a l of SNAP's ethnic nationalism. F i r s t to be discussed i s the debacle of 1970, when SNAP was excluded from the r u l i n g c o a l i t i o n , and the e f f e c t which i t had on the a t t i t u d e of party leaders. This i s followed by an examination of state p o l i t i c s and w i l l centre on two themes: the acceptance of the n a t i o n a l Malaysian approach to nation b u i l d i n g and state development, and SNAP's response to the evident emasculation of Dayak leaders i n the Sarawak C o a l i t i o n Government (SCG). L a s t l y , the chapter w i l l chronicle the formation of Barisan Nasional and explain how SNAP's subsequent entry into the government r was consistent with the readoption of i t s Dayak native nationalism. The Debacle of 1970 The outcome of the 1970 general e l e c t i o n s was a disappointment to SNAP. Hoping to achieve a simple majority, i t had f i e l d e d f o r t y - seven candidates i n the f o r t y - e i g h t state constituencies and twenty- three of the a v a i l a b l e twenty-four parliamentary seats. The outcome 163 was t h e r e f o r e something o f a let-down, f o r SNAP won o n l y twelve s e a t s . To be i n t h e government, t h e p a r t y would have t o j o i n a c o a l i t i o n . SNAP was c l e a r l y eager t o become a p a r t o f t h e new a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . At one p o i n t i t even proposed an a l l - p a r t y government,"'" which would mean t h e i n c l u s i o n o f P a r t i B umiputera, whose l e a d e r s ' mutual a n t i - p athy f o r Ningkan was w e l l known. F u r t h e r , P a r t i Bumiputera had a h i s t o r y o f c l o s e a l l i a n c e w i t h the f e d e r a l government which, seen from SNAP's p r o v i n c i a l o u t l o o k , was a s e r i o u s f a u l t . I t was t h e r e f o r e s t r o n g e v i d e n c e o f how much SNAP l e a d e r s a s p i r e d t o be p a r t o f the new government when they suggested t h a t they would c o - o p e r a t e even w i t h P a r t i Bumiputera. What SNAP r e a l l y wanted was a Dayak-based government w i t h Chinese s u p p o r t . That i s , i t p r e f e r r e d a SNAP-Pesaka-SUPP a l l i a n c e , which would have been s u f f i c i e n t f o r a m a j o r i t y i n the C o u n c i l N e g r i but s m a l l enough t o e x c l u d e t h e c h a u v a n i s t i c and Malay-dominated P a r t i Bumiputera. N e g o t i a t i o n s to t h i s end were a p p a r e n t l y s u c c e s s f u l and r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s from SNAP and Pesaka d u l y g a t h e r e d at Temenggong 2 Jugah's house on J u l y 7 b e f o r e p r o c e e d i n g a c r o s s r i v e r t o t h e Governor's A s t a n a t o announce t h a t t h e y had formed a government. Unknown to the l e a d e r s of SNAP, and e v i d e n t l y t o Jugah and Kana o f Pesaka as w e l l , w h i l e on group o f t h e SUPP was h o l d i n g t a l k s w i t h SNAP, another was at t h e t a i l - e n d o f a b a r g a i n i n g s e s s i o n w i t h the l e a d e r s of P a r t i Bumiputera and r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f t h e f e d e r a l 164 government. At that time the SUPP was needed by both SNAP and i t s r i v a l , P a r t i Bumiputera. That i s , for the SUPP the question was not whether i t would be in the next government but rather which party i t preferred as a partner. I t s choice was P a r t i Bumiputera, p r i m a r i l y because i t had "reservations about a SUPP-SNAP-Pesaka government...." I t had also been antagonised by the coolness which SNAP had shown towards i t s overtures for working together during the 1966 cabinet c r i s i s , and to possible arrangements for the two p a r t i e s not opposing each other during the 1969-1970 el e c t i o n s .... Furthermore, i f the only Malay party was excluded, might there not be a fear of Malay violence?^ These considerations, and others, persuaded the SUPP to a l l y i t s e l f with P a r t i Bumiputera, with the SCA as a j u n i o r partner. Their combined strength was 26, j u s t enough to constitute the majority, although i t lacked Dayak representation. Assisted by a worker from the f e d e r a l government and led by the P a r t i Bumiputera, the new 4 group immediately sought to redress t h i s shortcoming. From P a r t i Bumiputera's point of view, Pesaka was c l e a r l y preferable to SNAP, i f only because Pesaka was already i n the A l l i a n c e and i t s leaders had a more s a t i s f a c t o r y working r e l a t i o n s h i p with t h e i r counterparts i n P a r t i Bumiputera. The problem was that Pesaka did not consider i t s membership i n the old Sarawak A l l i a n c e binding on i t s p o s t - e l e c t i o n alignment. Had i t done so i t would not have courted SNAP and SUPP so assiduously. Besides, the prime 165 t a c t i c i a n f o r Pesaka, Thomas Kana, not only objected to Bumiputera leader as the Chief Minister but aspired to the post himself. The problems of Pesaka's r e c a l c i t r a n c e and Dayak representation did not endure, however, for when Pesaka exhibited signs of obstinacy, P a r t i Bumiputera simply bypassed i t s top echelon and approached Pesaka's elected members on an i n d i v i d u a l basis. One such member, Penghulu Abok J a l i n of Bin t u l u , was ensnared on July 7, j u s t i n time f o r the announcement of the formation of the government. For h i s trouble he was awarded a cabinet portfolio."' Faced with breaches of d i s c i p l i n e and further disarray within i t s ranks, Pesaka capitulated and on July 8, Temenggong Jugah announced that Party Pesaka i s d e f i n i t e l y within the A l l i a n c e and f u l l y supports the C o a l i t i o n Government headed by the new Chief M i n i s t e r , Datuk P a t t i n g g i H a j i Rahman Yakub. 6 With Pesaka i n , the problem of Dayak representation was solved and SNAP once again became odd party out. The f a i l u r e of a SNAP-Supp c o a l i t i o n to m a t e r i a l i s e had two important consequences. F i r s t , the "defection" of the SUPP e f f e c t i v e l y undercut Ningkan's strategy f o r c o a l i t i o n , which was also to include both Pesaka and the SCA. In the opinion of SNAP's leaders, t h e i r party's exclusion from the c o a l i t i o n was needless. The SUPP was i n the p o s i t i o n of being wanted by both SNAP and Bumiputera as a c o a l i t i o n partner. The differ e n c e between the two was that while SNAP consented to have Bumiputera i n an a l l - p a r t y c o a l i t i o n , 166 Bumiputera refused to have SNAP as a partner. In other words, had the SUPP chosen SNAP the r e s u l t would have been a f i v e - p a r t y govern- ment composed of SNAP, Pesaka, SUPP, Bumiputera and SCA. As i t was the SUPP's choice of Bumiputera ended i n only a four-party government: SNAP was kept out of the c o a l i t i o n . SUPP's choice of P a r t i Bumiputera therefore led to the exclusion of SNAP from the government. Further, the double-cross of July added a good measure of personal humiliation. The top leaders of SNAP and Pesaka had donned formal a t t i r e p r i o r to meeting the Governor to announce the formation of t h e i r "government". When, therefore, they were informed that the SUPP had reneged on th e i r verbal commitment of support, they were n a t u r a l l y enraged. As Ningkan mildly out i t , Everything was agreed on July 6.... I am surprised and sad to see the SUPP leaders changing t h e i r stand. 7 Unlike the SCA and Pesaka leaders, whose consolation was to become part of the new c o a l i t i o n — a l t h o u g h the SCA did not have any cabinet seats—SNAP's chiefs were to remain i s o l a t e d and without power as Opposition Members of the Council Negri. That i s , the opportunism of the SUPP leaders, which put SNAP at a disadvantage, earned the SUPP leaders the l a s t i n g enmity of t h e i r counterparts i n SNAP. To r e c a p i t u l a t e , i t should be pointed out that SNAP had been out-manoevered i n i t s bid for p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n government; i t s " t e r r i t o r i a l n a t i o n a l i s t " strategy for an a n t i - f e d e r a l front lay i n 167 shambles a f t e r the unexpected withdrawal of the SUPP. Of equal importance was the embittered a t t i t u d e of i t s leaders toward the SUPP and i t s Chinese c h i e f s . A major consequence of the conviction of SNAP's executives that the SUPP leadership could not be r e l i e d upon was the re-emergence of e t h n i c i t y as the s a l i e n t nationalism. It should be pointed out that although SNAP's m u l t i - r a c i a l i s m was gradually de-emphasised, SNAP did not abandon i t s m u l t i - r a c i a l membership. I f anything, SNAP's antagonism to the SUPP greatly encouraged the party (SNAP) to woo supporters away from the SUPP. For instance, possible defections to SNAP from the SUPP were those party members who were opposed to t h e i r leaders f o r giving up the r o l e as opposition party. As the only remaining opposition party, SNAP was i n a good p o s i t i o n to pick up those disgruntled voters—who were mainly Chinese—from the SUPP. If t h i s were true, and SNAP was able to a t t r a c t Chinese voters, then the party's performance i n the 1964 general e l e c t i o n would show an increase of Chinese supporters f o r SNAP.8 During the period following the 1970 general e l e c t i o n , SNAP t r i e d to modify i t s m u l t i - r a c i a l approach. Up to 1970 the fundamental purpose of i t s nationalism was par t y - b u i l d i n g , which was necessary i f SNAP was to be a,serious contender f o r p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l . SNAP's leaders made adroit use of t h e i r d ifferences with the f e d e r a l government and the r e s u l t i n g acrimonious r e l a t i o n s h i p 168 was interpreted by the party as defence of state r i g h t s and Dayak aspirations against the c e n t r i p e t a l tendencies of the f e d e r a l government. That i s , before and during the 1970 general e l e c t i o n SNAP had r e l i e d on Sarawak nationalism to a t t r a c t support, and part of t h i s nationalism was i t s a n t i - f e d e r a l sentiment. However, t h i s strategy had two negative consequences. It may have stimulated Sarawak nationalism and awakened Dayak s e l f - i d e n t i f i c a t i o n and consciousness, but i t also earned SNAP ( p a r t i c u l a r l y i t s leader, Datuk Ningkan) the h o s t i l i t y of the fe d e r a l government. As the r e s u l t s of the events following the 1970 general e l e c t i o n showed, fed e r a l disfavour u l t i m a t e l y worked against SNAP. Following the 1970 e l e c t i o n , therefore, SNAP gradually sought to modify i t s a n t i - f e d e r a l image i n an attempt to gain acceptance. Further, the party broadened i t s attention from purely Sarawakian a f f a i r s to Malaysian concerns. In contrast to i t s v i r u l e n t attacks on the fede r a l government before or during the general e l e c t i o n s , i t s c r i t i c i s m s a f t e r the p o l l s were muted, even c o n c i l i a t o r y . For instance, on September 9, 1970, the leaders of the party l e t i t be known that SNAP supported the n a t i o n a l ideology, the 9 Rukunegara, an intimation which suggested that SNAP hoped to put to re s t , however temporarily, the charge that i t was a sepa r a t i s t party. The modification of i t s m u l t i - r a c i a l approach also became evident i n March 1971 during the passage of the Constitution (Amendment) B i l l of 1971. From the Dayak perspective, the most important parts of 169 the l e g i s l a t i o n were the amendments to A r t i c l e s 153 and 161A"'"'"' which made the natives of Borneo equal i n status to the Malays. SNAP supported the Government when the vote was taken on the Constitution (Amendment) Bill."'""'" Not a l l of SNAP's a c t i v i t i e s were apparently as d e f e r e n t i a l toward the Central Government. For instance, i n a move which appeared to be directed against the Government, i t sought closer contact with 12 other opposition p a r t i e s . For a moment i t was even w i l l i n g to consider a "united f r o n t " i n order to e s t a b l i s h a common ground for co-operation between the opposition p a r t i e s . The fact that SNAP considered such a " f r o n t " ought not be taken as a sign that SNAP was now more h o s t i l e to the Central Government than before. Rather, i t should be seen as an attempt by the party to see whether such a co l l a b o r a t i o n could serve the Dayaks better. As i t was, no p o l i c y agreements could be reached and the proposed "united f r o n t " f a i l e d to m a t e r i a l i s e . The other consequence was the s p l i t among the Dayaks into SNAP and Pesaka supporters, which was l a r g e l y the r e s u l t of personal r i v a l r i e s and p o l i c y disagreements. B a s i c a l l y , before 1970, while Pesaka favoured native unity based on Malay and Dayak s o l i d a r i t y with the support of the Central Government, SNAP wanted a multi-ethnic c o a l i t i o n under a s i n g l e p o l i t i c a l party, namely SNAP i t s e l f . With t h e i r leaders unable to agree on t h i s issue or work together, Dayak 170 d i s u n i t y p e r s isted. The implication of t h i s s p l i t f o r SNAP i s examined below. State P o l i t i c s I t was, not remarkably, i n Sarawak that changing conditions had a more d i r e c t and immediate impact on the fortunes of the party. F i r s t , the r u l i n g c o a l i t i o n government had begun to encourage defections from SNAP. As a r e s u l t of government pressure and enticements, some 13 defections did occur. The most notable were the p o l i t i c i a n s : i n May 1971, two of SNAP's members i n the Council Negri, Kundai Ngareng and Ngelambong Bangau, crossed the f l o o r to j o i n Pesaka; four months l a t e r an Iban Member of Parliament, Penghulu Abit, followed s u i t i n 14 the Dewan Ra'ayat. By the end of 1971 i t appeared that Pesaka was successfully u t i l i s i n g i t s p o s i t i o n as the Dayak party i n govern- ment and was beginning to a t t r a c t Dayak members—the actual number was never published—from SNAP, which saw l i t t l e opportunities or rewards i n continuing to support SNAP i n opposition. The morale of SNAP's leaders at. t h i s time was so low, i t was alleged, that they were prepared to " c l u t c h at any s t r a w " ^ to prove that they merited the continuing support of party members. I t would appear that beginning from 1971 the government had some success i n causing defections from SNAP. Conceivably, c e t e r i s paribus, t h i s trend would l i k e l y have continued. 171 However, other v a r i a b l e s did not remain constant, f o r by March 1972, the s i t u a t i o n i n Sarawak had begun to change, something which ul t i m a t e l y worked i n SNAP's favour. In a move designed to forge native unity, P a r t i Bumiputera and Pesaka announced that they would merge into a single organisation. The concept of such a merger was f i r s t mooted i n 1968, although the o r i g i n of Pesaka-Bumiputera a l l i a n c e could be traced back to the 1965 abortive "Native A l l i a n c e " . The prime movers apparently belonged to the P a r t i Bumiputera; but since i n 1968 Pesaka was s t i l l considering some form of Dayak-based 16 co l l a b o r a t i o n with SNAP, Parti-Bumiputera's overture made no progress. By 1970, i n the period immediately a f t e r the general e l e c t i o n s , Pesaka was i n fact working toward an a l l i a n c e with SNAP and SUPP and only moved back to the c o a l i t i o n government when t h i s ' e f f o r t was undermined. Subsequently, the idea of a Pesaka-Bumiputera merger was again revived and by September 1972 Pesaka f i n a l l y gave i n . " ^ E a rly i n 1973 the two p a r t i e s merged to become the Pesaka- Bumiputera Bersatu (PBB). The merger between the two p a r t i e s was an important phase i n the p o l i t i c a l development of the state: i t represented a trend to al i g n Sarawak p a r t i e s along ethnic l i n e s . In the case of the PBB the alignment meant the fusion of two native p a r t i e s i n the Sarawak State Government. The Iban-based Pesaka symbolised Dayak p a r t i c i p a t i o n while the P a r t i Bumiputera represented the Malay-Melanau group. In 172 as f a r as the two communal p a r t i e s were united to e f f e c t native s o l i d a r i t y , i t could be said that e t h n i c i t y i n t h i s case was at the l e v e l above communalism. The r a t i o n a l e for the existence of the PBB was that the natives (Malays and Dayaks), or Bumiputeras, had c e r t a i n aspirations and i n t e r e s t s which required t h e i r common s o l i d a r i t y . Yet i n r e a l i t y there, were important basic d i f f e r e n c e s — l a n g u a g e , r e l i g i o n , customs, and t r a d i t i o n — w h i c h the two p a r t i e s sought to represent. Indeed, about the only areas on which the two groups could be expected to agree were the p r i n c i p l e of native p r i v i l e g e s , and t h e i r opposition to some Chinese traders and businessmen. Even here 18 there was no t o t a l agreement. C l e a r l y , for the Bumiputeras the parts were greater than the sum. In t h i s sense, "native" s o l i d a r i t y was a contrived development—an example of e t h n i c i t y the objective of which for that time was to prop up a convenient union of two p o l i t i c a l leaderships. The major point which should be made i s that the merger consolidated the primacy of the Muslim (Malay-Melanau) group. Muslim pre-eminence i n the PBB was evident from the very beginning. For instance, i t was P a r t i Bumiputera which i n i t i a t e d the merger. Also i n the e l e c t i o n s of the PBB executive p o s i t i o n s , the symbolic post of President was awarded to the congenial, but uneducated, Temenggong Jugah, while the important o f f i c e of Secretary-General belong to Datuk Patinggi Abdul Rahman Yakub. His nephew, Datuk Amar Taib 173 Mahmud, was Vice-President. Datuk Patinggi Abdul Rahman Yakub's post and h i s Chief Ministership t e s t i f i e d to the fact that the PBB and the administration was dominated by Muslims. With the formation of PBB, the governing p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s were reduced to three: PBB, SUPP, and SCA. The l a t t e r two were predomin- 20 antly Chinese and u n t i l July 1974 existed as separate organisations. This formal d i v i s i o n among ,the Chinese did not endure, however. Their common experience i n the C o a l i t i o n Government was convincing evidence that the two groups could work together. Indeed, the u n i f i c a t i o n of the two p a r t i e s would only be a formal recognition of e x i s t i n g Chinese co-operation. The immediate impetus for a move toward a single Chinese party was the coming of the 1974 general e l e c t i o n s , scheduled for the month of August. As the date drew nearer, pressure increased to streamline the Chinese p a r t i e s into one organisation. In J u l y 21 1974, the much weaker SCA was dissolved. Party leaders of the now defunct SCA, however, were s p l i t on t h e i r new a f f i l i a t i o n s . The majority, including the most prominent men such as Datuk Ling Bing Siong and Datuk Chia Chin Shin, were admitted to the SUPP. Others, sensing greater opportunities in the Bumiputera camp, sought membership i n the PBB. Prominent among these were Cheng Yew Kiew and Ting Ming Kiong, whose entry was f a c i l i t a t e d . b y t h e i r conversion to the Islamic r e l i g i o n . With the breaking up of the SCA the Chinese were brought under a single organisation; The Sarawak C o a l i t i o n 174 Government (SCG) and i t s successor the Sarawak State Government were thus dichotomised into native and non-native p a r t i e s . U n t i l 1979 the new Chief M i n i s t e r , Datuk Rahman Yakub, had a long and amicable personal r e l a t i o n s h i p with the f e d e r a l government. For instance, i t was fede r a l p o l i t i c i a n s who t r i e d (and f a i l e d ) to make him Chief Minister i n 1963. Following h i s defeat at the p o l l s during the same year he served at the f e d e r a l l e v e l , holding such varied posts as Assistant Minister of National and Rural Development, Assistant Minister of J u s t i c e , and f i n a l l y Minister of Education, before h i s resignation i n 1970 to become Sarawak's Chief M i n i s t e r . During h i s s t i n t i n f e d e r a l p o l i t i c s , he was a major fig u r e as an arc h i t e c t of Malay dominance and as the conduit of information on 22 Sarawak. Since h i s assumption of power i n 1970, Abdul Rahman Yakub had made i t cl e a r that he intended to spearhead the inte g r a t i o n of Sarawak into the federal framework. He explained that nationalism was an "ideology to unite us Malaysians. It transcend/ecL? r a c i a l o r i g i n s [and] r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s . . . . • Unless we regard ourselves f i r s t and 23 foremost as Malaysians...this country w i l l d i s i n t e g r a t e . " Not s u r p r i s i n g l y , h i s government approved of the e f f o r t by the Central Government to b u i l d Sarawak along i t s own fede r a l nation-building programme. I t co-operated with the Central Government when the l a t t e r , i n the pursuit of na t i o n a l s o l i d a r i t y , c a l l e d f o r the development 175 of a "native based" culture and of "national unity through Bahasa 24 Malaysia", the National Language. While the theme of n a t i o n a l s o l i d a r i t y originated with the Central Government, and within Sarawak, i t was the Rahman Yakub government which was charged with implementing i t . The strong-willed Chief M i n i s t e r , unlike Ningkan, enjoyed the f u l l support of federal p o l i t i c i a n s , and he tended to overshadow his own state-cabinet ministers who, because they were i n government, were regarded as communal representatives. To the degree that the Chief Minister was able to advocate and execute p o l i c i e s which were p a r t i a l towards the Malays then, t h i s would have demonstrated the lack of effectiveness on the part of the Dayak or Chinese cabinet ministers as ethnic representatives. The Rahman Yakub government's p a r t i a l i t y may be i l l u s t r a t e d by a number of i t s a c t i v i t i e s . One instance of t h i s p o l i c y innovation was the r e l i g i o u s conversions to the Islam r e l i g i o n among the Dayaks 25 and Chinese. SNAP's concern for r e l i g i o u s freedom dated back to the party's inception i n 1961. But u n t i l 1970 there had been no cause for alarm, since both the Ningkan and Tawi S l i governments adopted a tolerant a t t i t u d e toward r e l i g i o u s p r a c t i c e s . In 1970, however, the new government began to encourage Muslim p r o s e l y t i s i n g i n Sarawak. In response, SNAP l a r g e l y advocated a more tolerant approach. I t i n s i s t e d that i n Sarawak there should -be r e l i g i o u s freedom, and i t protested what i t saw as maltreatment by the a u t h o r i t i e s of 176 26 C h r i s t i a n missionaries i n the Borneo states of Sabah and Sarawak. On r e l i g i o n , then, SNAP's p o s i t i o n was based on the p r i n c i p l e of 27 r e l i g i o u s t o l e r a t i o n . Here i t s platform stood as an a l t e r n a t i v e to the fire-and-brimstone evangelism of the Muslim-led SCG. Another example of a measure which favoured the Malays and which e l i c i t e d communal reaction was the government's attempt to f o s t e r youth unity i n Sarawak. In order to achieve t h i s objective, an organisation c a l l e d Sabrekas was formed. E x i s t i n g youth organisations, some f i v e hundred i n t o t a l number, were i n v i t e d to "merge t h e i r respective 28 organisations" into Sabrekas, apparently a f t e r they had conducted or imposed t h e i r own d i s s o l u t i o n . Several youth organisations, notably the Sarawak Youth Council, the Gabungan Kelab Malay.u Sarawak, and the Bidayuh Youth Club did merge with Sabrekas. But the only major Dayak youth body, the Sarawak Dayak Youth Association (SDYA) pointedly refused. The SDYA i s an organisation f o r young Dayaks and most of i t s members are c i v i l servants. Its r e f u s a l to j o i n Sabrekas was symptomatic of the f e e l i n g of d i s t r u s t which i t s members f e l t toward the government. In t h i s p r e v a i l i n g mood of suspicion the SCG (and i t s successor, the Sarawak Barisan Nasional /J5BN7 increased Dayak 29 anxiety by i n s t i t u t i n g further changes. When these p o l i c i e s are taken together i t becomes obvious that l i k e the Razak government at the federal l e v e l , the Rahman Yakub government favoured the Malays. Where the government acted to look a f t e r Dayak i n t e r e s t s , the 177 actual execution e l i c i t e d more apprehension than s a t i s f a c t i o n . For instance, the M a j l i s Adat I s t i a d a t (MAI), was a government body created at the suggestion of Temenggong Jugah i n order to modernise Dayak 30 customs and laws. But when i t was f i n a l l y formed, MAI was l e d by Temenggong Jugah himself, who, since he was p r e l i t e r a t e , was c l e a r l y unable to understand the complexities involved i n the c o d i f i c a t i o n and standardisation of native laws. Further, since he had e a r l i e r announced h i s i n t e n t i o n to r e t i r e from p o l i t i c s , his appointment suggested a form of p o l i t i c a l patronage and the o f f i c e seemed to be a sinecure. Furthermore, the body's j u r i s d i c t i o n extended to the Malays and there was suspicion i n SNAP that the o l d Temenggong would be unable to prevent the i n f u s i o n of Malay customs and laws into the Dayak arena. That i s , there was concern that Temenggong Jugah would r e a l l y be presiding over the beginning of the a s s i m i l a t i o n or "Bumiputerisation" of the Dayaks. Under the p r e v a i l i n g mood of Dayak skepticism, public complaints by the Pesaka wing of the PBB only demonstrated t h e i r diminishing role and helplessness. Thus when Datuk Tawi S l i , the l a s t Dayak Chief M i n i s t e r and an important PBB personality, openly complained that the Second D i v i s i o n was lagging behind other areas i n development a l l o c a t i o n s , 31 he was probably c o r r e c t . But the irony of the s i t u a t i o n was that he corroborated SNAP's contention that Dayak leadership i n the BN was i n e f f e c t u a l . Amid mounting c r i t i c i s m , Dayak leaders i n the government t r i e d to defend the record of the administration. Datuk A l f r e d Jabu, 178 the government leader i n the Second D i v i s i o n and Deputy Chief Minister, attempted to d i s p e l c r i t i c i s m s directed at Sabrekas. Temenggong Jugah, i n the middle of 1973, i n s i s t e d that the government was f a i r , a theme which h i s son, Leonard L i n g g i , the M i n i s t e r with 32 Special Functions, was to repeat at a l a t e r date. The net r e s u l t was that the Dayak group i n the government appeared more as apolo- g i s t s f or the Yakub administration and less as e f f e c t i v e communal representatives. I f t h i s were so, the d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n of the Dayaks (and Chinese) at the performance of the C o a l i t i o n Government should have manifested i t s e l f i n an increase of support f o r SNAP i n the next general e l e c t i o n (1974). Before discussing t h i s e l e c t i o n , two features need to be pointed out. Within SNAP the immediate impact of Dayak d i s - content was f e l t i n two ways. F i r s t , a f t e r the debacle of 19 70, Ningkan's personal grip on the party began to loosen. It was not that he was t o t a l l y a utocratic, for i n a d d i t i o n to Ningkan himself, others such as Dato James Wong and Edmund Langgu who, as Vice-Chairman and Secretary-General of the party respectively, also shared power. But beginning from 1970, other figures were drawn into the inner c i r c l e . Two of these were Datuk Dunstan Endawie and Joseph Balan Seling. Datuk Endawie i s a veteran p o l i t i c i a n whose attachment to Dayak unity i s well known. Balan Seling i s a Kenyah from the Baram area of the Fourth D i v i s i o n . He i s a c l e r i c who received h i s t r a i n i n g i n 179 A u s t r a l i a . In 1967 he resigned his p o s i t i o n within the Borneo Evangelical Church i n order to help to set up SNAP's branch apparatus 33 i n the Baram, and i n 1970 was elected to the Council Negri. The other consequence of Dayak discontent which worked to SNAP's advantage was the i n f l u x of the Dayak i n t e l l i g e n t s i a into the party. SNAP ce r t a i n l y did not monopolise the a l l e g i a n c e of a l l educated Dayaks. Those who ultimately joined the PBB were A l f r e d Jabu, Stephen Wan Ullok and Leonard L i n g g i , a l l u n i v e r s i t y graduates. What was important here was that SNAP i t s e l f , because or .in s p i t e of being i n the opposition, was able to a t t r a c t promising f i g u r e s . Two of the most famous were Daniel Tajem and Leo Moggie. Daniel Tajem i s an Iban from Sebuyau, Second D i v i s i o n . He received h i s l e g a l t r a i n i n g i n New Zealand and presently serves as the President of the Sarawak Dayak National Union. Leo Moggie i s a Third D i v i s i o n Iban who joined SNAP on the eve of the 1974 general e l e c t i o n s . Well-educated, he obtained his M.A. degree from the University of New Zealand. In the early 1970's he studied i n the United States where he received h i s M.B.A. i n Management. His work i n the Sarawak C i v i l Service included a s t i n t as a D i s t r i c t O f f i c e r , and l a t e r as the D i r e c t o r of the Borneo l i t e r a t u r e Bureau. He also worked i n the Chief Minister's O f f i c e i n Kuching. P r i o r to h i s r e s i g n a t i o n i n 1974, he had been the Deputy 34 General Manager of the Borneo Development Corporation. Leo Moggie was therefore an " i n s i d e r " i n the c o r r i d o r of government bureaucracy. 180 In explaining h i s resignation from a promising career i n the C i v i l Service, he made two observations which SNAP was to use i n i t s e l e c t i o n campaign. F i r s t , the Dayaks (the " r u r a l people") had gained very l i t t l e from the implementation of the New Economic P o l i c y . Further, i n a statement which seemed to t y p i f y the Dayaks' a n t i - a s s i m i l a t i o n mood of the time, Moggie added that: "Malaysia i s a m u l t i - r a c i a l nation, Sarawak i s a m u l t i - r a c i a l s t a t e . No race should dominate or attempt to dominate any other race, i f the aim i s to 35 unite the people." Moggie's attack on the government's economic and c u l t u r a l p o l i c i e s was only a prelude to those which party workers mounted l a t e r during the e l e c t i o n campaign. E l e c t i o n Manifesto, 19 74 36 From i t s Manifesto of August 14, 1974, i t was c l e a r that SNAP i n presenting i t s view was s t r i v i n g f o r consistency. Several major points were contentious and with which the party was i d e n t i f i e d were r e i t e r a t e d by SNAP. F i r s t , there was the "conditions" of Sarawak's entry into the federation, the terms of which, SNAP stressed, should be followed. SNAP believed i n honouring the s p i r i t and the l e t t e r of the London Agreement which brought about by the Recommendations the Inter-Goverrimental Committee Report, whereby Sarawak achieved i t s independence i n Malaysia from B r i t a i n .... Second, SNAP repeated i t s stand on the Co n s t i t u t i o n of Sarawak and that 181 of Malaysia as w e l l . The party said that SNAP has been the champion of the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l f i g h t e r ( s i c ) . We stand to uphold and defend the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l rights of the people of Sarawak and Malaysia. We believe that the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l umbrella of our State and Nation must be i n v i o l a b l e and sacred and that any changes i n the provisions of our Constitution must have the consent of our people ^through a 7 referendum. Third, SNAP remained unrepentant i n i t s advocacy of "Sarawak f or Sarawakians." It maintained that the p o l i c y of Sarawak f or Sarawakians, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n respect to p r i o r i t i e s for both State and Federal posts, and promotion i n the c i v i l s e r vice, and also i n other f i e l d s as enshrined i n the London Agreement when Sarawak became independent within Malaysia. SNAP also believed i n Malaysia f o r a l l Malaysians.. L a s t l y , the party stood steadfast on i t s p o l i c y of m u l t i - r a c i a l i s m . I t argued that "Sarawak can only survive i n Malaysia i f the people subscribe to our t r a d i t i o n a l r a c i a l harmony, right down to the grass- root l e v e l . " SNAP, then, was consistent i n i t s advocacy of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l positions i n order to delimit the federal capacity to meddle i n Sarawak's p o l i t i c s . Lt also retained i t s m u l t i - r a c i a l p o l i c i e s . Ostensibly at l e a s t , SNAP's Sarawak's nationalism remained unmodified; but i n 1974 there were additions which i n e f f e c t a l t e r e d the emphasis of SNAP's nationalism. Unlike 1970, when these c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and pol i c y issues (which are l i s t e d above) dominated SNAP's e l e c t i o n platform, i n 19 74 the party resurrected other aspects of i t s p o l i c i e s 182 which indi c a t e a r e v i v a l of ethnic nationalism. The most notable of these were native rights and r e l i g i o u s freedom; the government was considered vulnerable here i n that i t s records were characterised, respectively, by neglect of the Dayak community r e l a t i v e to other communal groups, and the p r o l i f e r a t i o n of Muslim missionary a c t i v i t i e s : The former put the Dayaks at a disadvantage and the l a t t e r threatened both the Dayaks and the Chinese. Also, i n repudiation of i t s p o s i t i o n i n 19 70, SNAP accepted the p r i n c i p l e of p r i v i l e g e s f o r Bumiputeras, thus making the party more acceptable to Dayaks, Malays, and the federal government. I t said that "although SNAP /was] committed to a m u l t i - f a c i a l p o l i c y " , i t would "subscribe to the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l provision whereby the s p e c i a l p r i v i l e g e s of the natives /were7 en- 37 shrined i n order to help the under-privileged natives." If i n 1970 SNAP had de-emphasised these subjects during the general e l e c t i o n , i t was also hampered by the problem of providing convincing e v i d e n c e — l a r g e l y because the government programmes (or th e i r absence) were yet to be noticed and f e l t d i r e c t l y by the populace. By 19 74 the s i t u a t i o n had changed, hence the elevation of these two issues. L a s t l y , during the l a s t general e l e c t i o n s , SNAP did not attack the communist menace i n the state i n 1974. Since most of the communist t e r r o r i s t s i n Sarawak were Chinese, the absence of statements c r i t i c a l of the communists was bound to e l i c i t favourable response from the Chinese voters; While SNAP was by no means pro-communist, 183 the new approach indicated a willingness to accommodate the t e r r o r i s t s , 38 probably i n the form of an amnesty arrangement. Barisan Nasional In addition to the anti-SUPP mood of party leaders and the lack of e f f e c t i v e Dayak representation i n government, the t h i r d f actor which f a c i l i t a t e d SNAP's re-emphasis on native nationalism i n the second h a l f of the 1970's was a p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e of the federal government. S p e c i f i c a l l y this was the c o a l i t i o n s which l e d to the formation of Barisan Nasional (BN) or National Front governments at the state and 39 federal l e v e l s . In order to explain the concept of the BN government and the consequence which i t had on SNAP, i t i s necessary to review b r i e f l y Malaysia's national p o l i t i c s a f t e r the general e l e c t i o n s of 1969. Whereas i n Sarawak and Sabah voting took weeks to conduct, i n West Malaysia the procedure was completed i n one day. Following the counting of votes i n 1969 i t was cl e a r that although the r u l i n g A l l i a n c e — w h i c h then consisted of UMNO, MCA, and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC)—had maintained i t s dominance, i t had also suffered 40 severe losses. Victory marches held on May 12 i n Kuala Lumpur by the opposition p a r t i e s l e d to a r e t a l i a t o r y procession being scheduled for the 13th by UMNO leaders and t h e i r Malay supporters. Would-be marchers were attacked, a l l e g e d l y by Chinese crowds, and r a c i a l 184 r i o t m g ensued. The Yang Dipertuan Agung (the Paramount Ruler of Malaysia) declared a state of nationa l emergency and Parliament was suspended. The nation was ruled by an eight-man National Operations Council (NOC) 42 for the duration of the emergency. Convinced of the need to create a national consensus, the NOC i n i t i a t e d a few measures designed to achieve peace and order. One of these was the adoption of the 43 national ideology, the Rukunegara; another was the proposals to ban discussions on s e n s i t i v e issues and to redress the r a c i a l imbalance i n the economic sectors of the nation. The intent of these proposals was to perpetuate Malay p o l i t i c a l control i n Malaysia. The NOC's l i f e was terminated on February 20, 1971 and Malaysia 44 returned to parliamentary democracy. Under Tun Razak as Prime Minister, UMNO continued to dominate the federal government. Following the NOC's recommendations, the C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Amendments and Sedit i o n Acts were passed i n 1971 and public as well as parliamentary discussions on the following were prohibited: "(1) the s p e c i a l p o s i t i o n of the Malays and other indigenous groups, (2) Malay as the o f f i c i a l language, (3) the sovereignty of the Malay sultans and the King, and 45 (4) the c i t i z e n s h i p rights of the immigrant communities." For the Dayaks of Sarawak the Co n s t i t u t i o n a l Amendment was a turning point i n that as natives there were granted the same status and p r i v i l e g e s as the Malays of Malaysia. In theory at l e a s t the opportunities 185 which were now opened to them i n the c i v i l s e rvice, development projects, and business were greatly enhanced. The problem which pe r s i s t e d was how to translate these opportunities into r e a l i t y . One way of looking at the federal overture to SNAP a f t e r 1974 was that, following the Dayak r e j e c t i o n of the PBB as t h e i r representa- t i v e s , since the Dayaks showed preference f o r SNAP as t h e i r party, i t was only r i g h t that the party should be afforded the opportunity to operate within the BN framework. In addition to promoting l e g i s l a t i v e changes, the Razak government was also rebuilding the r u l i n g c o a l i t i o n . That i s , i n addition to f o s t e r i n g Malay control of the country, the Razak adminis- t r a t i o n was also intent on expanding i n t e r - e t h n i c co-operation beyond the pre-1969 l e v e l . Thus, i n addi t i o n to UMNO's previous partners, the f r a c t i o u s MCA and MIC, other p a r t i e s were i n v i t e d to form a wider c o a l i t i o n government, the Barisan Nasional. I n i t i a l l y , BN governments were established at the state l e v e l : Penang was the f i r s t s tate, where the new c o a l i t i o n government formed i n February 19 71 involved the r u l i n g Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia; i n Perak the BN government was established i n May with the opposition People's Progressive Party (PPP) . Several months l a t e r the Malay extremist P a r t a i Islam which governed Kelantan and which had members i n the states of Trengganu, Kedah, and Perak, agreed i n p r i n c i p l e to form 46 BN governments at both the state and federal l e v e l s . 186 B e f o r e 1975 SNAP remained i g n o r e d and i s o l a t e d w h i l e the v a r i o u s governments (both f e d e r a l and s t a t e ) o r M a l a y s i a were r e s t r u c t u r e d under the B.N.: a t t h a t time the newly-found p r i n c i p l e o f c o a l i t i o n - m a k i n g a t the b r o a d e s t p o s s i b l e l e v e l d i d n o t app l y t o SNAP, as a p p a r e n t l y n e i t h e r the s t a t e n o r the f e d e r a l government c o n s i d e r e d SNAP a n e c e s s a r y p a r t n e r . There were two p o s s i b l e reasons f o r t h i s . One was t h a t b o t h governments found SNAP's l e a d e r s h i p o b j e c t i o n a b l e . The a n t i p a t h y between Ningkan on_one s i d e and Tun Razak, the Prime M i n i s t e r o f M a l a y s i a , and Datuk P a t i n g g i A b d u l Rahman Yakub, the C h i e f M i n i s t e r o f Sarawak on the o t h e r , was w e l l known. The o t h e r r e a s o n was t h a t the BN may have sought a n o t h e r e l e c t i o n o p p o r t u n i t y i n which t o c h a l l e n g e and demolish SNAP. But i f SNAP was not an a c c e p t a b l e c a n d i d a t e f o r government b e f o r e the g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n o f 1974, the s i t u a t i o n was r e v e r s e d a f t e r t h a t t i m e . The e x a c t date o f the f i r s t f e d e r a l o v e r t u r e to SNAP may n e v e r be known. What i s c l e a r was t h a t i t was the f e d e r a l government which i n i t i a t e d the move and the s t a t e government w h i c h a c q u i e s c e d . Soon a f t e r the g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n i n 1974 the f e d e r a l government put out f e e l e r s to the p a r t y 47 to j o i n the c o a l i t i o n . Thus, the concept o f the BN u l t i m a t e l y worked i n SNAP's f a v o u r . What prompted the change i n f e d e r a l o u t l o o k ? A l t h o u g h t h i s q u e s t i o n i s not c e n t r a l to the s u b j e c t o f t h i s t h e s i s i t i s n e c e s s a r y to s p e c u l a t e on t h r e e f a c t o r s . The f i r s t was the r e s u l t s o f the 1974 187 general el e c t i o n s themselves. Contrary to what the BN may have expected SNAP did not disintegrate at the p o l l s i n 1974; i t won 18 out of 48 seats i n the Council Negri, s i x more than i t s previous performance i n 1970. The s i g n i f i c a n c e of the growth i n the party's strength was not l o s t on the fe d e r a l p o l i t i c i a n s who regarded the r i s e i n SNAP's strength with apprehension. Such show of support must have been s t a r t l i n g to the government observers since they had openly commented that SNAP would win only f i v e seats at the most. In t o t a l votes SNAP had 109,092 compared to 142,348 f o r the PBB-SUPP fr o n t . C l e a r l y SNAP had become too important a factor i n state p o l i t i c s to be ignored. In addition to t h i s impressive t o t a l of votes, SNAP was c l e a r l y the party which most Dayaks, and a large minority of Chinese, preferred to support. What t h i s meant was that the Pesaka wing of the PBB could no longer pretend to represent the Dayaks. I f t h i s speculation i s v a l i d , then i t could be said that the i n c l u s i o n of SNAP i n the BN was to a f f o r d the Dayaks t h e i r mean- i n g f u l representation. In the l i g h t of rati o n a l e f o r the BN's own e x i s t e n c e — i t hoped to include a l l major groups i n the c o u n t r y — t o deny representation from the Dayaks would have been an inconsistent act. An added reason f o r the federal show of concern was the growing d i v i s i o n between the two major groups i n Sarawak. The nu- meri c a l l y i n f e r i o r Malays, as the general e l e c t i o n s of 1970 and 1974 both confirmed, chose to support P a r t i Bumiputera and i t s successor, 188 the PBB, while the Dayaks l a r g e l y voted for SNAP. "By the end of 1974 the differences between the Malays and Dayaks were serious enough to warrant a major e f f o r t by Razak to salve the apprehensions of the 48 Dayaks." In short, the decision to i n v i t e SNAP i n 19 74 should be seen as an e f f o r t to stem further cleavage between the two groups by having them share power i n the BN. The l a s t f a c t o r was the problem of security f o r Sarawak and the p o s s i b i l i t y that should SNAP be l e f t languishing i n the opposition, i t s extremist elements might indulge i n a n t i - s t a t e a c t i v i t i e s . P u b l i c l y and p r i v a t e l y SNAP's leaders eschew violence, but prolonged i s o l a t i o n i n the r o l e of the opposition might encourage SNAP's extremists to abandon established party p r i n c i p l e s and ( t a c i t l y or a c t i v e l y ) to support Sarawak's own communist group, the Pasokan Rakyat G u e r i l l a 49 Kalimantan Utara (PARAKU). I t should be stated that there was no tangible evidence of actual anti-government a c t i v i t i e s conducted by SNAP's members. From the point of s e c u r i t y , therefore, SNAP's p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the BN should be seen as a way of f o r e s t a l l i n g t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y . The advantage of the party being i n the BN was that t h e i r leaders would be i n a p o s i t i o n to employ Malaysia's resources ( f o r instance, i n development and business a l l o c a t i o n s ) as incentives to r e t a i n the l o y a l t y or party members to the state-nation. 189 Ethnic Nationalism On March 31, 19 76, Datuk Dunstan Endawie i n a radio speech informed the state that, following the unanimous decision of SNAP's National Council of March 21, 1976 the party has decided i n p r i n c i p l e to be one of the component parties within the Barisan Nasional both at the state and federal l e v e l s of government.50 Why did SNAP agree to j o i n the government? The obvious answer was provided by Datuk Endawie himself. "The decision" he said, " i s i n l i n e with the h i s t o r i c a l background of the Sarawak National Party as a p o l i t i c a l organisation," i n that l i k e any other p o l i t i c a l party, SNAP's major goal was "to form the government of the country...on i t s own or .. . /_as7 a part of a government alliance....""'"'' Datuk Endawie's announcement d i d not come e a s i l y f o r the party since the fed e r a l i n v i t a t i o n f o r SNAP to enter the BN generated a party-wide discussion. SNAP's leadership was divided into two groups on the issue: those centered around Ningkan and who were opposed to j o i n i n g the BN, and those who coalesced around Datuk Endawie and Leo Moggie were i n favour of i t . The seriousness of this d i v i s i o n was such that the party's Annual General Meeting, normally held i n January of each year, 52 was deferred i n 1975 to July. This time Ningkan was v i r t u a l l y alone i n his p o s i t i o n , at le a s t i n the party's Central Executive Committee. Other party leaders, dismayed at his intransigence and aware of his d i f f i c u l t r e l a t i o n s h i p with the BN's leadership, were 190 convinced that i t was time for him to r e t i r e as party president. On July 28, during the annual general meeting of SNAP's General 53 Assembly, he was voted out of o f f i c e . With h i s ouster the major hurdle to SNAP's entry was cleared. Less obvious than Datuk Endawie's 54 p u b l i c explanation were several other reasons. The f i r s t was SNAP's desire to ensure e f f e c t i v e Dayak representation. By 1976 i t had been out of the policy-making-arena for over ten years; within that period i t had witnessed the progressive decay and f i n a l l y the disappearance by merger of the only other Dayak party i n Sarawak, the Party Pesaka. SNAP's forced absence from the government meant that the Dayak community had been represented by Party Pesaka; as long as Pesaka remained i n government, therefore, there was the p o s s i b i l i t y that i t (not SNAP) could work e f f e c t i v e l y f or the Dayaks. However, Pesaka lacked the leadership and cohesion to dominate the Sarawak government and to pursue Dayak causes. This was true even when Pesaka had numerical strength, as had been the case under the Tawi S l i government (1966-70). Since i t held f i f t e e n out of twenty-five seats i n the A l l i a n c e , i t could have been expected that Pesaka would have pushed for Dayak i n t e r e s t s . C e r t a i n l y the opportunity for this purpose seemed r i g h t . For one thing, i t was i n the government and with i t s numerical strength it.was expected to implement p o l i c i e s i n language, culture, and development which could benefit the Dayaks. For another, 191 Pesaka was now i n competition with SNAP for Dayak s u p p o r t — a fa c t which should have been s u f f i c i e n t incentive f o r i t to push for Dayak causes. Pesaka was not able to do t h i s , however. Its leaders were e i t h e r unwilling or unable to take the i n i t i a t i v e . The Tawi S l i government simply wallowed i n general i n e r t i a and almost by default the much smaller P a r t i Bumiputera a c t u a l l y l e d the Sarawak A l l i a n c e . Worse, a f t e r Datuk Patinggi Abdul Rahman Yakub became Chief Minister, Pesaka's influence declined even further. A f t e r January 21, 1973, Pesaka simply ceased to function as a separate e n t i t y when i t merged with P a r t i Bumiputera. From SNAP's viewpoint the occasion was merely a formal recognition of P a r t i Bumiputera's dominance. With the fusion of the two pa r t i e s , even the symbol of Dayak representation had disappeared. By j o i n i n g the government SNAP was t r y i n g to re-assert Dayak presence and to e x p l o i t the opportunities o f f e r e d . In the long run, there might even be the p o s s i b i l i t y that SNAP might promote Dayak u n i t . In 1976, not w i l l i n g to provoke the s e n s i b i l i t i e s of Malay and Chinese leaders i n the BN, SNAP leaders explained that the purpose for j o i n i n g the BN was to work for native unity. This may have been true: The Dayak and the Malays had i n t e r e s t s i n common which required t h e i r s o l i d a r i t y . But i t should also be noted that the unity of the Dayak communities has always been a primary target of SNAP. Being i n the BN enhanced the prospect of f i n d i n g common ground with other Dayaks, who, for the time being, were s t i l l i n e i t h e r the SUPP or 55 the PBB. 192 The t h i r d motive was the desire by SNAP's leaders to undercut, or at l e a s t to moderate, what they considered as extremism i n the state government. The zeal with which the Muslim leaders of the state government had favoured the Malay community was obvious even to Temenggong Jugah from as f a r back as 1967. Such bias 'persisted into the early 19 70's, with the Chief M i n i s t e r increasingly p r e f e r r i n g h i s 56 Malay advisers to, for instance, Dayak ones. Such practices c o n t r i - buted to the image that Dayak leaders within the government were i n e f f e c t u a l and the Dayak community neglected. By j o i n i n g the govern- ment SNAP leaders thought that they could f i g h t more e f f e c t i v e l y on behalf of the Dayaks for development a l l o c a t i o n s , education b e n e f i t s , and other projects which they would now have the r i g h t to dispense. The fourth motive concerns the s u r v i v a l of the party i t s e l f . Not only did the thrust of the state Barisan Nasional hurt the Dayaks, i t was beginning to hamper SNAP as w e l l . F i r s t , there was concern that the funds of the party might become exhausted. In the past, businessmen such as Datuk Wee Hood Teck and Datuk James Wong had been instrumental i n financing the party. The A l l i a n c e government and i t s successor, the Barisan Nasional, therefore sought to dry up these sources of funds. In the case of Datuk Wee, pressure was exerted by the A l l i a n c e leaders on him to leave SNAP. The federal Minister of Finance, Tan Siew Sin, for instance, advised that he should not only leave SNAP but j o i n the SCA as w e l l . Evidently under pressure 193 Datuk Wee withdrew h i s membership on October 15, 1968. As a consequence, SNAP " l o s t most of i t s f i n a n c i a l underpinning.""'^ That v i r t u a l l y l e f t Datuk James Wong as the major f i n a n c i e r of the party. Unlike Datuk Wee, whose open d a l l i a n c e with SNAP l a s t e d some twenty- eight months, Datuk James Wong's involvement was as early as i t was prominent. At the time of the 1963 e l e c t i o n s , James Wong was an Independent; but following his nomination to the Ningkan cabinet, he joined SNAP. Thereafter he remained entrenched as a Vice-Chairman of the party. U n t i l the takeover i n 19 75 of the new leadership, he was always i n the inner decision-making group. Datuk James Wong's deep involvement meant that, unlike Datuk Wee, who seemed to consider h i s p a r t i c i p a t i o n as a business gamble, he was v i r t u a l l y impervious to the pressure of p o l i t i c a l patronage. As a r e s u l t , the method employed to " n e u t r a l i s e " him was d i f f e r e n t : he was charged with a breach of s e c u r i t y regulations. On October 30, 1974, Datuk James Wong, along with f i v e other party functionaries, was arrested under the "preservation of Public Security (Detention) Regulation (1962)" for h i s alleged involvement i n a c t i v i t i e s against the national i n t e r e s t . In February 1975, l e g a l proceedings were i n i t i a t e d to free him and on March 7, the High Court i n Kuching, r u l i n g that h i s detention was unlawful, ordered him released. Moments l a t e r , however, he was re-arrested under the "Internal Security Act (1967)". Datuk James Wong was to remain i n detention u n t i l January 19 76, 194 several weeks before SNAP was to announce p u b l i c l y i t s d e c i s i o n to j o i n the, government. The possible removal of Datuk James Wong as f i n a n c i e r and party leader by means of i n d e f i n i t e detention was a serious threat to SNAP. In the f i r s t place the spectre of acute f i n a n c i a l shortage was now d i s t i n c t l y v i s i b l e , f o r as long as he was i n custody he could not d i r e c t the financing of the party. In the second place, continued detention was viewed as bad for the morale of party workers. For these reasons party leaders were concerned. Thus protested P a t r i c k Anek Uren, a Bidayuh M.P. from Bau: " I f the detention of Datuk James Wong i s /JEntented7 to c r i p p l e SNAP, surely that i s the wrong way to 59 go about i t . " P a r tick Anek was correct i n i d e n t i f y i n g the government's motive f o r holding Datuk James Wong i n custody, but h i s p r e d i c t i o n that the party would not succumb was a public show of f a l s e bravado. Of immediate importance, however, was that the continued detention of Datuk James Wong was a factor i n convincing SNAP's leaders to soften t h e i r opposition and to j o i n the Barisan Nasional. The party d i d not admit to this f actor d i r e c t l y , probably because to have done so would have smacked of c a p i t u l a t i o n . However, i t did h i n t that the Datuk James Wong A f f a i r was a f a c t o r when i t admitted that "various steps were taken by SNAP to secure the release of Datuk Wong and other SNAP members detained under the same c h a r g e . G i v e n the fact that the federal government was i n v i t i n g SNAP to j o i n the Barisan 195 Nasional, the detention was to demonstrate to party leaders that Datuk James Wong could be held i n d e f i n i t e l y and to show that SNAP could be bled dry of funds as a r e s u l t . In other words, the s i g - n i f i c a n c e of the James Wong arre s t and detention was a display of coercive persuasion by the f e d e r a l government. I f t h i s were indeed the case, then SNAP probably demanded Datuk James Wong's release as a condition f o r j o i n i n g the Barisan Nasional. I f SNAP's decision to j o i n the Barisan Nasional was influenced by the fear among i t s leaders that i t s f i n a n c i a l l i f e l i n e ( i n the person of James Wong) was threatened, there was also concern about what the f e d e r a l government might do next. For instance, the government might postpone future elections i n d e f i n i t e l y , e i t h e r by invoking the Internal Security Act or by intervening m i l i t a r i l y . In such a s i t u a t i o n , SNAP would eventually be damaged as a functioning party without any immediate prospect of returning to power. In short, out of power SNAP was exposed to further p o l i t i c a l l y motivated harrassments, and i n d e f i n i t e stay i n the p o l i t i c a l cold, both of which i t could remedy should i t j o i n the government. One of SNAP's major concerns was i n the economic f i e l d : i t centered on the party's b e l i e f that they could do much more f o r the r u r a l people, who formed the bulk of i t s supporters, should they j o i n the government. The party f e l t that i t could influence the p o l i c y decisions much more e f f e c t i v e l y as a component of the government. 196 Of immediate concern i n t h i s area was the Third Malaysia Plan, the purpose of which was, among other things to reduce the incidence of poverty i n the r u r a l areas throughout the country...among padi c u l t i v a t o r s , rubber small holders.... 61 Since the Third Malaysia Plan was due to be launched i n July, the party f e l t that SNAP should time i t s entry to ensure that i t had a voice i n the a l l o c a t i o n of projects and development. At the core of this economic motive was the b e l i e f that the Dayaks had been d i s c r i - minated against—although perhaps not deliberately—when i t came to such a l l o c a t i o n s . As Leo Moggie pointed out, The i n t e r e s t of the Dayak community has not been s u f f i c i e n t l y considered i n the imple- ^ mentation of p o l i c y i n the State of Sarawak. Thus, when SNAP was i n v i t e d . t o j o i n the Barisan Nasional, party leaders sought to ensure more funds for r u r a l development. In part, t h e i r i n sistence stemmed from t h e i r conviction that these areas were neglected. In part also, they recognised that these were the areas which had co n s i s t e n t l y supported SNAP; increased development a l l o c a t i o n s i n this case were immediate and tangible rewards for past (and future) support. As i t was, one of the reasons that negotiation of SNAP's entry was so protracted was that the party i n s i s t e d on greater concessions for r u r a l development. The party apparently s u c c e s s f u l l y demanded from the Members, of Parliament the authority to award annual grants for • > 3 - > - 63 r u r a l development. 197 It has been suggested above that SNAP's conditions for j o i n i n g the BN were the release of Datuk James Wong and other party members from detention and the authority of Malaysia's Members of Parliament to award c e r t a i n annual grants for development purposes i n t h e i r constituencies. Another condition of entry was that SNAP would r e t a i n 64 i t s i d e n t i t y and m u l t i - r a c i a l membership. To do otherwise was to become u n i - r a c i a l , which would have meant that SNAP would have existed as a t o t a l l y Dayak organisation. This was c l e a r l y unacceptable to SNAP. True, the party was eager to emphasise and to a r t i c u l a t e Dayak i n t e r e s t s , but t h i s did not necessarily mean the abandonment of i t s hard-won m u l t i - r a c i a l following. In other-words, the salience of i t s nationalism need not be made at the expense of i t s p o l i t i c a l strength. As the general elections of 19 74 showed, SNAP was able to a t t r a c t the support of a sizeable Chinese minority. The party leaders were unwilling to "parcel o f f " i t s Chinese members to, say the Chinese- based SUPP. Further, i t did not wish to merge with the PBB. By re- t a i n i n g i t s m u l t i - r a c i a l membership the party would be i n a good p o s i t i o n to r e s i s t any proposal for such a merger. 198 Footnotes to Chapter VII 1. When t h i s f a i l e d and the new government was announced on July 7 with- out SNAP being included, the party nominated one of i t s members as a minister i n the C o a l i t i o n Government (Sarawak Tribune, December 19, 1970). 2. They had met a l l day on July 6 to discuss the formation of a govern- ment. 3. R.S. Milne and K.J. Ratnam, Malaysia—New States i n a New Nation (London: Frank Cass, 1974), p.238. They also expressed the point that the Federal Government had threatened not to l i f t the state of emer- gency i n Sarawak i f SUPP had chosen SNAP as opposed to Bumiputera as a partner ( i b i d . ) . See also, Stanley Bedlington, Malaysia and Singapore: the B u i l d i n g of New States (Ithaca: C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1978), p.58. 4. This was Syed Kechik, a lawyer and emissary of the Federal Government. His base was Kota Kinabalu, the c a p i t a l of Sabah. But during the period immediately a f t e r the 1970 general e l e c t i o n he was i n Sarawak where he worked to ensure that Ningkan did not become chief minister (Bruce Ross-Larsen, The P o l i t i c s of Federalism: Syed Kechik i n East Malaysia [Singapore: by the author, 195-b Penang Road, Singapore 9, 1976]). 5. He was made Minister of Youth and Culture.' The ministry was c l e a r l y one of the less important m i n i s t r i e s . 6. Sarawak Tribune, July 9, 1970. 7. Bob Reece, "Unlikely A l l i a n c e , " Far Eastern Economic Review, July 16, 1970, p.7. 8. See pages 174-194. 9. The Rukunegara was a document which incorporated the underlying elements of the nation's p o l i t i c a l philosophy. Written as i t was a f t e r West Malaysia's disastrous r i o t s which followed the general e l e c t i o n s of 1970, the document defined the framework within which Malaysian p o l i t i c s were to be conducted. 0. Although i t was recognised that the natives of Borneo were to enjoy s p e c i a l rights there had never been any successful attempt to specify what they were. 11. K a r l von Vorys, Democracy without Consensus (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press), p. 422. 1 9 9 12. In part t h i s involved closer co-operation with Sabah p o l i t i c i a n s who shared SNAP's apprehension at the growth of Muslim influence and fed e r a l penetration i n t h e i r respective state. I n i t i a l attempts by SNAP to e s t a b l i s h a common front with these Sabah p o l i t i c i a n s dated as far back as 1967. At that time the party contacted Donald Stephens, Sabah's f i r s t .Chief M i n i s t e r , and Peter Mojuntin, a young Kadazan c a t h o l i c . In 1967 SNAP's e f f o r t came to naught, but during the post-1970 period i t renewed i t s e f f o r t once again. Peter Mojuntin, i n p a r t i c u l a r , was anxious that a united front be presented to stem the t i d e of Muslim conversion i n both states. For SNAP's c a l l for a united opposition see Sarawak Tribune, February 19, 1971; for Mojuntin's re a c t i o n see Bedling- ton, Malaysia and Singapore, op. c i t . , p.161. In part also, SNAP sought to assert i t s presence at the fed e r a l l e v e l . I t agreed i n p r i n c i p l e to a common minimum programme for the opposition p a r t i e s , for instance. Meetings were held with Pekemas, Democratic Action Party (DAP), and Marhaen which were from West Malaysia, and the Union of Sabah Peoples' Party (USAP), led by Peter Mojuntin. However, by July, 1973, negotiations had run aground as a r e s u l t of d i s - agreements over what language p o l i c y was to be adopted (Sarawak Tribune, J u l y 27, 1973). 13. In September, 1971, eighty-three members of the party from E n g k i l i l i de- fected to Pesaka. This was the largest group known who had l e f t SNAP during t h i s time. Their change of allegiance was probably the r e s u l t of work done by Pesaka's l o c a l representative, Simon Dembab Maja, who served at t h i s time as the member of Council Negri and as Deputy Chief Minister ( i b i d . , September 15, 1971). 14. When asked why he had l e f t SNAP, Kundai Ngareng explained that i n the past h i s community (Bidayuh) had been neglected and i t s aspirations and needs unrealised. With t h i s p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the government the "benefits due to us [Bidayuhs]" could be procured, he said (Sarawak Tribune, May 27, 1971). Penghulu Abit was a Member of Parliament from Kapit i n the Rejang basin. The same month that he resigned from SNAP (June 1971), an important SNAP functionary i n the Rejang area, Ajan Nabau, followed him into Pesaka. 15. I b i d . , November 16, 1971. 16. The idea of a merger between SNAP and Pesaka had been discussed i n t e r - mittenly when both p a r t i e s were i n government and even following SNAP's ouster i n 1966. But u n t i l 1970 there was apparently no r e a l impetus for both p a r t i e s to co-operate. When they f i n a l l y did agree to collaborate and formed the foundation of a Sarawak government, the i n i t i a t i v e had f a l l e n to P a r t i Bumiputera, SUPP, and the Central Government. Represen- t a t i v e s from these p a r t i e s engineered the formation of the Abdul Rahman Yakub government which Pesaka joined l a t e r . With Pesaka's departure, Iban s o l i d a r i t y was formally broken for the second time around. 17. Negotiations were completed at t h i s time, although the formal act of merger was not announced ( i b i d . , September 3, 1972). 18. There i s no organisation which deals s p e c i f i c a l l y with the implementa- 2 0 0 t i o n of native p r i v i l e g e s i n such areas as the Sarawak c i v i l s ervice and the state's economy. More importantly, there i s no governmental body that defines and distinguishes the p r i v i l e g e s of the Malays and Dayaks. The only governmental body which may yet play t h i s r o l e i s the M a j l i s Adat I s t i a d a t , but at the present i t i s charged with the standardisation of native laws and customs, not to delineate, implement, or i n t e r p r e t Dayak and Malay p r i v i l e g e s . 19. Sarawak Tribune, July 9, 1973. O 20. The existence of the two p a r t i e s r e f l e c t e d the basic d i v i s i o n within the Chinese community. The SUPP i s Kuching-based and i s led by powerful Chinese f a m i l i e s from the Hokkein group. The SCA was Sibu-based and was supported by Foochow and Teochew communities. For an account of i n t r a - communal p o l i t i c s i n Sarawak's Chinese community i n the 1960's, see Craig A. Lockhard, "Leadership and Power within the Chinese Community of Sarawak," Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 2, No. 2 (September, 1970), pp.210-217. 21. Sarawak Tribune, July 9, 1974. The creation of one Chinese party for Sarawak did not prevent i n t e r n a l squabbling i n the SUPP's leadership. Following the 1978 parliamentary general e l e c t i o n , Datuk Ling Being Siong who had led the SCA at the time of i t s d i s s o l u t i o n and who had joined the SUPP, was expelled by SUPP's Central Committee for unspeci- f i e d reasons. He himself resigned from the SUPP on July 25, 1978, a f t e r explaining that he had o r i g i n a l l y joined the SUPP only at the behest of the Chief M i n i s t e r , Datuk Rahman Yakub. He added that he was leaving the party because i t s leadership was "unable to exert i t s e l f s u f f i c i e n t l y to repair a breach of party d i s c i p l i n e by committing i t s e l f wholehear- tedly to the cause of Malaysian Chinese unity within the framework of nati o n a l unity and independence." (Sarawak Herald, July 29, 1978; Borneo Post, July 29, 1978). Datuk Ling did not explain what he meant by the breach of d i s c i p l i n e . 22. In 1967 he had supported the National Language B i l l . On July 10, 1969, as Federal Minister of Education, he announced a new education p o l i c y i n which the medium of i n s t r u c t i o n was to be Malay, the National Language. This was an important change of p o l i c y and the abrupt and strong-willed manner i n which the minister had i n s t i t u t e d the change annoyed even his cabinet colleagues (Karl von Vorys, Democracy Without Consensus (Prince- ton: Princeton U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1975), pp.396-398. 23. Sarawak-Tribune, A p r i l 25, 1972. 24. Speaking at the opening of the Malaysian Parliament on February 22, 1971, the Yang Dipertuan Agung (Paramount Ruler) outlined the government's programme for the 1970's. High on the l i s t of p r i o r i t i e s was what was termed as "na t i o n a l harmony". What t h i s e n t a i l e d became clear the next day when the government tabled the C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Amendment B i l l i n which the entrenchment of Malay dominance was proposed as a p r e - r e q u i s i t e for the National A l l i a n c e leadership i n ensuring n a t i o n a l unity. In Sarawak the major thrust of the Sarawak C o a l i t i o n Government was to integrate Sarawak in t o Malaysia. See, for instance, Sarawak Tribune, January 24, 1971. 201 25. Under the Federal Constitution, Islam i s the n a t i o n a l r e l i g i o n but the states of Sarawak and Sabah were to enjoy freedom of r e l i g i o n . This proviso did not prevent Muslim chief ministers i n the Borneo states from a c t i v e l y working to convert non-Muslims to Islam, however. In Sabah while Tun Mustapha was Chief M i n i s t e r such conversions occurred en masse. In addition, many C h r i s t i a n missionaries were expelled from the state. (Stanley Bedlington, Malaysia and Singapore, op. c i t . , pp.138-139.) 26. Late i n 1970 SNAP c a l l e d f o r a Commission of Inquiry on r e l i g i o u s prosecutions i n Sarawak (Sarawak Tribune, December 20, 1970). 27. There i s evidence to ind i c a t e that SNAP struck a sympathetic chord among Sarawakians here. Early i n January 1973, evidently not s a t i s f i e d with the progress of r e l i g i o n i n the state, the Sarawak C o a l i t i o n Government (or the Sarawak State Government) announced that i t would co-ordinate the dakwah (missionary) a c t i v i t i e s of Muslim workers. However, enough communal resentment had surfaced that by September the government had to back-track and deny that i t was p r a c t i c i n g r e l i g i o u s d i s c r i m i n a t i o n against non-Muslim organisations. 28. Malay con t r o l was evident from the s t a r t . The Chief Minister was made President of Sabrekas, and another Malay, S a f r i Awang Z a i d e l l , and executive i n the Chief Minister's O f f i c e , was the Secretary-General. The purpose of Sabrekas was to " i n s t i l l i n i t s members a sense of devotion and undivided l o y a l t y to Malaysia" (Sarawak Tribune, A o r i l 1, 1973). 29. For instance, the Red Cross was changed to Red Crescent. The crescent i s a symbol of Islam. Further, as part of Sarawak's celebration to mark i t s tenth year of independence, the well-known state f l a g was replaced by another, which, except for the order i n colours, resembled the Gzechoslovakian f l a g . Cynics at the time remarked quite u n f a i r l y that the "Y" pattern of the f l a g stood for Yakub, the name of the Chief Minister. For an account of Sarawak's tenth anniversary celebrations, see i b i d . , August 31, 1973. 30. Its purpose was to "promote the l o c a l adat law, customs, t r a d i t i o n s , and culture of the Natives of Sarawak" with the view to reduce these into a uniformed and standardised code form and become Native Customary Laws and Customs. Sarawak M a j l i s Adat Istia d a t "Information on the Estab- lishment and Functions of the M a j l i s Adat I s t i a d a t , " Kuching, Sarawak: typewritten, undated p.3. 31. Sarawak Tribune, June 11, 1973. 32. Ibid ., A p r i l 10, 1974. 33. He i s s t i l l an ordained minister (The Vanguard, November 2, 1976). In the parliamentary e l e c t i o n of 1974 Balan Seling defeated Stephen Wan Ullok, a lawyer, i n the Baram constituency. 34. Ibid. 35. Sarawak Tribune, July 18, 1974. 202 36. The information for t h i s and the following pages was provided by SNAP's Headquarters, Juching. During the e l e c t i o n period i n 1974 SNAP c i r c u - lated i t s Manifesto i n the form of a l e a f l e t . For a f u l l text, i b i d . , August 14, 1974 37. Ibid. 38. Most of Sarawak communist elements came from the Chinese community. Th* presence of communist t e r r o r i s t s has always been interpreted by some party leaders as signs of Chinese discontent, not so much as a true front of n a t i o n a l l i b e r a t i o n . 39. See, f o r instance, Syed Hussein Alatas "The P o l i t i c s of C o a l i t i o n i n Malaysia." Current History Vol. 63 (July-December 1972), pp. 271-277. See also R.S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, "Malaysia Today," Current History, Vol. 65 (July-December, 1972), pp. 262-2 75; R.S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, P o l i t i c s and Government i n Malaysia, op. c i t . , pp. 185-228. 40. In West Malaysia the r u l i n g A l l i a n c e could only obtain 66 parliamentary seats out of 103, whereas previously (in 1964) i t had captured 89 out of 104 seats. In percentage terms, the A l l i a n c e received 48.5% of the t o t a l votes i n 1969, while the opposition had a t o t a l of 51.6%. See K.J. Ratnam and R.S. Milne, "The 1969 Parliamentary E l e c t i o n i n West ' Malaysia," P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , Vol. XLIII, No. 2 (Summer 1970) p.220; R.K. V a s i l , The Malaysian General Elections of 1969 (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1972); K a r l von Vorys, Democracy Without Consensus, op. c i t . , pp.249-308. 41. In addition to Selangor [where Kuala Lumpur was situated before the creation of the Federal T e r r i t o r y ] disturbances also ensued i n the f o l - lowing states: Penang, Perak, Nengri Sembilan, Malacca, Johore, and Trengganu. By the government's own admission there were a t o t a l of 196 deaths and 259 injured. Government of Malaysia, The May 13th Tragedy, a Report (Kuala Lumpur: National Operations Council, 1969) pp.88-90. For other accounts of the r i o t s , see John Slimming, Malaysia: Death of a Democracy (London: John Murray, 1963); Goh Cheng Taik, The May Thirteenth Incident and Democracy i n Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1971). 42. The Chief of the NOC was Tun Abdul Razak, then Malaysia's Deputy Prime Minister. U n t i l h i s resignation on September 22, 1970, the Prime Minister was s t i l l Tenku Abdul Rahman, but following h i s departure, Tun Abdul Razak was appointed by the Yang Dipertuan Agung i n h i s stead. 43. See, f o r example: R.S. Milne, "National Ideology and Nation-Building i n Malaysia," Asian Survey, Vol. 10, No. 7 (July, 1970) pp.563-573; Syed Hussein Alatas, "The Rukunegara and the Return of Democracy" P a c i f i c Community (Tokyo), Vol. 2, No. 4 (July, 1971) pp.800-808. 203 44. The Malaysian Parliament met on February 23, 1970, some twenty months a f t e r the declaration of emergency. The return to democracy was somewhat tempered by the fact that as the p r i c e of the return to democracy, the A l l i a n c e demanded r e s t r i c t i o n s on the discussion of c e r t a i n s e n s i t i v e subjects. 45. Marvin L. Rogers, "Malaysia and Singapore: 1971 Developments," op. c i t . , p. 169. See also K a r l von Vorys, Democracy Without Consensus, op. c i t . , pp. 386-438. 46. On the formation of the Barisan Nasional governments see: Syed Hussein Alatas, "The P o l i t i c s of C o a l i t i o n i n Malaysia," op. c i t . , pp. 271-277; M.G.G. P i l l a i , "A Wider A l l i a n c e , " Far Eastern Economic Review, June 3, 1972, p. 13; M.G.G. P i l l a i , "A National Front", i b i d . , December 30,1972, pp. 22-23; Harvey Stockwin, "Variations on the Status Quo," i b i d . , August 16, 1974, pp. 28-29. The best analysis of the Barisan Nasional i s by R.S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, P o l i t i c s and Government i n Malaysia, op. c i t . , pp. 123-228. 47. So circumspect was the approach to SNAP that i t i s not known who was contacted f i r s t . The reason f o r such care may have been because the federal p o l i t i c i a n s were only too aware of Datuk Ningkan's v o l a t i l i t y . True, since 1969 Ningkan had shown c e r t a i n w illingness for a rapprochement with federal p o l i t i c i a n s , but there was no certainty that he would have supported the overture to j o i n the BN. Based on the proximity of SNAP's Members of Parliament to the federal p o l i t i c i a n s , i t seemed l i k e l y that the members of SNAP's parliamentary caucus were approached f i r s t . Regardless of who was f i r s t , contact among the most ardent supporters of the idea that SNAP j o i n the BN was Leo Moggie and, from the state l e v e l , Datuk Dunstan Endawie. They are SNAP's Secretary-General and President respectively. From the government's side the proponents were Ghazali Shafie, Minister of Home A f f a i r s , Ghafar Baba, NB's Secre- tary General, and UMNO's Vice-President, and Taib Mahmud, the present M i n i s t e r of Defence. Both men held discussions with SNAP's leaders i n Sarawak. That Taib Mahmud was a major figure i n arranging for SNAP to j o i n the BN might appear as a surprise to those who were aware of the blood r e l a t i o n s h i p between him and the Chief Minister. Taib Mahmud i s a nephew of Datuk Rahman Yakub. He was known to be distressed at the strong-willed manner i n which the Chief Minister was governing the state. Indeed, a f t e r the 1974 general el e c t i o n s i t was rumoured that Taib Mahmud was w i l l i n g to challenge Datuk Rahman Yakub for the p o s i t i o n of Chief M i n i s t e r i n the state. The Federal Government and SNAP were reportedly w i l l i n g to support Taib Mahmud. However, nothing came out of t h i s alleged p l o t . 204 48. M.G.G. P i l l a i , "Malaysia," Asia 1965 Year Book, (Hong Kong: Far Eastern Economic Review, 19 75), p. 215. 49. Composed mostly of Sarawakian Chinese, PARAKU owes i t s o r i g i n to the communist g u e r i l l a s of the early 1960's. A l l i e d with Indonesian armed forces regulars and "volunteers" the communists formed a f i e l d force named the Tentera Nasional Kalimantan Utara (TNKU). I t was the TNKU which coordinated and executed the Borneo operations of President Sukarno (of Indonesia) p o l i c y of "Confrontation", the name given f o r h i s armed campaign to destroy Malaysia. Following Sukarno's downfall, General Suharto took over power i n Indonesia and by 1966 "Confrontation" had been t e r - minated. With the advent of peace between Malaysia and Indonesia, the Indonesian armed forces turned against t h e i r former a l l y , who by now had reformed i t s e l f into PARAKU. Thus by 1967 PARAKU had found i t s e l f attacked from both sides of the border i n Borneo. However, i t was not u n t i l 1974 that they agreed to an amnesty; and even then only j u s t over 500 g u e r i l l a s took the opportunity to return home. Although estimates vary, at l e a s t that many may s t i l l p refer to wage war from the jungle. The l i t e r a t u r e on "Confrontation" i s voluminous. The best work i s by J.A.C. Mackie, Kronfrontasi: the Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute 1963-1966 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 19 74; other works include R. Snow J r . , "A Comparative Analysis of Confrontation as an In- strument of Indonesian Foreign P o l i c y " (Ph.D. d i s s e r t a t i o n , Uni- v e r s i t y of Washington, 1973); H. Warhawsky, "From Confrontation to Cooperation" (Ph.D. d i s s e r t a t i o n , University of Arizona, 19 74). On communist and g u e r i l l a a c t i v i t i e s i n Sarawak see, f o r instance: J. van der Kroef, "Communist g u e r i l l a war i n Sarawak," World Today, Vol. 20 (January-December, 1964), pp. 50-60; M.G.G.Pillai, "Sarawak: Putting Trust to Test," Far Eastern Economic Review, March 25, 1974, pp. 28-29. 50. Excerpts from the tr a n s c r i p t of a speech given by Datuk Endawie over Radio Malaysia, Sarawak, March 31, 19 76. See also Sarawak Vanguard, A p r i l 1, 1976. 51. Ib i d . 52. Tra Zehnder, a member of SNAP's Central Executive Committee, who served at one time as a member of the Council Negri, informed this student that another reason f o r the delay of the meeting was that SNAP had d i f f i c u l t y i n getting enough funds f o r the purpose. 205 53. Edmund Langgu, who had served as Secretary General from 1963 agreed to step down as SNAP's Secretary General. He also t r i e d to convince Datuk Ningkan to r e l i n q u i s h his p o s i t i o n as the party's Chairman, but the crusty party leader refused. When the resul t s of the competition f o r the post of SNAP's President came out, Ningkan received only 39 votes while h i s challenger, Datuk Endawie, had 96. 54. The information f o r th i s section was provided by Edmund Langgu, who remained as a member of SNAP's Executive Committee a f t e r stepping down as i t s Secretary General. In 1975 when SNAP was considering the federal i n v i t a t i o n to j o i n the BN, he was serving as Leader of the Opposition i n the Malaysian Parliament. 55. How quickly t h i s could happen, of course, depends p a r t l y on the a c t i v i t i e s of the SUPP and PBB. For instance, i n July, 1978, the Chief Minister, Datuk Rahman Yakub, l e t i t be known that he intended to apply f o r the PBB's admission to UMKO, the dominant Malay p o l i t i c a l organisation i n Malaysia. I t was rumoured that Datuk Rahman was keenly aware of support which the federal govern- ment was giving to Pajar, a new native based party formed i n 1977. By moving closer to UMNO, i t was reported that Datuk Rahman thought that he could r e - e s t a b l i s h good r e l a t i o n s with the Central Government once again. Many PBB Dayal leaders were rumoured to be against t h i s move. Those i n E n g k i l i l i and Simanggang threatened to resign from the PBB and j o i n SNAP. 56. Datuk Abdul Rahman Yakub's strong-willed a t t i t u d e i r k e d even federal p o l i t i c i a n s . See, for instance, K. Das, " R e c o n c i l i a t i o n of Sorts," Far Eastern Economic Review, November 26, 1977; K. Das, "The Resignation that Never Was," Ibid., October 27, 19 78. 57. Michael B. Leigh, The Rising Moon, op. c i t . , p. 118. 58. The charges against Datuk James Wong and his fellow detainees were never made p u b l i c . According to some sources, the alleg a t i o n s against him centered on his p o s i t i o n regarding Brunei's c l a i m to the F i f t h D i v i s i o n of Sarawak. Datuk James Wong, who has extensive business connections with the B r i t i s h protectorate of Brunei, had refused to condemn the Brunei claim, an act which the Chief Minister, Datuk Rahman Yakub, brought into the open frequently p r i o r to the general elections of 1974. Based on Datuk Rahman's Yakub a l l e g a - tions then, the charge against Datuk James Wong was that he was working against the national i n t e r e s t since he has refused to condemn the Brunei claim. On Datuk Rahman Yakub's a l l e g a t i o n s , see Sarawak Tribune, A p r i l 1, 1976. 206 59. Sarawakian Digest, Vol. 2, No. 1 (March, 1976), p. 6. The Sarawakian Digest i s the p u b l i c i t y organ of the Sarawak National Party. 60. Ibid. 61. See, for instance, P h i l i p Bowring, "Malaysia: : No Time for Socialism," Far Eastern Economic Review, July 30, 19 76. 62. Sarawakian Digest, Vol. 2, No. 1 (March, 19 76), p. 5. See also, Sarawak Tribune, July 18, 1974. 63. According to one source, a Member of Parliament has the authority to dispense up to $50,000 annually for development projects within h i s own constituency; members with m i n i s t e r i a l rank may award up to $100,000. 64. Datuk Endawie hinted that t h i s was an issue during the talks about SNAP j o i n i n g the BN. Upon announcing SNAP's acceptance, he made i t c l e a r that SNAP would remain as a separate multi- r a c i a l organisation. (Excerpt from a speech over Radio Malaysia, Sarawak, on March 31, 19 76). 207 CHAPTER VIII BASES OF SUPPORT Bases of Support 1961-1965 SNAP's bases of sources of support l i e i n the appeal and popularity of the party and the ethnic composition of i t s leaders, members, and representatives. To a r r i v e at a sound conclusion, what should be examined are the party's membership, the development of i t s branch organisation, and i t s performance during e l e c t i o n s . The information from these three categories should provide a r e l i a b l e i n d i c a t i o n of SNAP's ethnic and regional sources of support. In researching the information on SNAP's membership, i t has not been possible to a r r i v e at an exact f i g u r e . The reason f o r t h i s i s because the concept of party membership i n Sarawak i s nebulous; that i s , i t i s not uncommon for voters to j o i n more than one party. In short, the pra c t i c e of multiple party membership i s quite widespread. The d i r e c t i m p l i c a t i o n of t h i s sort of p r a c t i c e on data gathering i s that membership l i s t s provided by p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , including SNAP, are i n v a r i a b l y u n r e l i a b l e . In addition, SNAP i t s e l f has published from time to time only the t o t a l s of i t s claimed membership. At no point has i t offered f o r scrutiny any ethnic breakdown of i t s party membership. 208 In examining the development of party branches throughout Sarawak, the aim i s to e s t a b l i s h a pattern which would suggest that SNAP was organising i n , say, Dayak areas more than anywhere e l s e . The l a s t two sets of evidence (on membership and branch development) are useful to i n d i c a t e SNAP's ethnic and regional sources of support. The other set of evidence i s SNAP's e l e c t o r a l performance. During t h i s period there was only one state-wide e l e c t i o n i n Sarawak. A f i n d i n g from the e l e c t o r a l r e s u l t s which shows that SNAP received the bulk of i t s support from the Iban community of the Dayak group points to the conclusion that, judged s o l e l y by i t s performance, SNAP was not so much an ethnic party, as a sub-communal or an Iban one. Obviously at t h i s stage i t had yet to become an all-Sarawak party. Evidence of Size As a party SNAP only r a r e l y published i t s t o t a l membership. The e a r l i e s t knowninstance was on March 27, 1962, a year a f t e r i t s inauguration, when i t s leaders, appearing before the Cobbold Commis- sion gave the party's membership at 46,000.""" In i t s turn the Commission questioned the accuracy of the f i g u r e , saying that "based on information from r e l a i b l e sources... the active membership 2 probably f a l l s s u b s t a n t i a l l y short of t h i s f i g u r e . " Regardless of 209 whether the fig u r e was i n f l a t e d or not, SNAP released another one 3 three months l a t e r , t h i s time elevating i t to 50,818. By September 4 1962 i t claimed that i t s following had r i s e n to 62,000. Since the figure was probably i n f l a t e d , i t i s of l i t t l e use f o r the purpose of anal y s i s . Furthermore, the party did not indic a t e any ethnic break- down of i t s members. This may have been the p o l i c y of the party; that SNAP refused to furnish any ethnic breakdown of i t s members i s understandable, given the discrepancy between i t s goal of m u l t i - r a c i a l membership—confirmed by i t s C o n s t i t u t i o n — a n d the r e a l i t y at the time of the well-known Dayak preponderance amongst i t s membership. To supply an ethnic breakdown of i t s members was to give documentation to t h i s discrepancy, something i t s leaders were loath to do. Thus, when a newspaper alleged that SNAP was a c t u a l l y an Iban party, Ningkan an g r i l y r etorted that i t was multi-racial.."' Another i n d i c a t o r of the basis of party support i s derived from the growth of party branches. The v a l i d i t y of th i s evidence i s based on the premise that as a party SNAP would organise i n areas which i t wished to represent and where i t hoped to receive support most e a s i l y . Based on the presumption that i n a p l u r a l society a party would organise f i r s t i n i t s own terminal community where ethnic p o l i t i c a l leaders (Iban i n t h i s case) could expect the primordial sentiments of the Iban to be translated into p o l i t i c a l support, then SNAP could 210 be expected to e s t a b l i s h branches f i r s t i n Iban areas. In t h i s way the formation of a branch i n a p a r t i c u l a r area may be seen as part of a consistent p o l i t i c a l strategy of mobilizing p o l i t i c a l support where i t would most l i k e l y a r i s e . The table below seeks to e s t a b l i s h the evidence that SNAP consistently sought support from Dayak areas, p a r t i c u l a r l y Iban and to a l e s s e r extent, Bidayuh ones. From the table below two conclusions may be drawn. F i r s t , the spread of SNAP's branches began i n the Second D i v i s i o n , centering around the Saribas region, homeland of i t s founders, then on to parts of the F i r s t , Fourth and F i f t h D i v i s i o n s . Second, and more important, these branches were established i n Dayak areas, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the Iban- Dayak and r u r a l t e r r i t o r i e s . C l e a r l y f or the f i r s t h a l f of the 1960's SNAP avoided the coast, predominated by the Malays, and the urban centres populated by the Chinese. Obviously SNAP preferred to.:.organise i n Iban and Bidayuh areas. In c e r t a i n places SNAP was i n c l e a r competition with the other two p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s . For instance, by 1962_ both the SUPP and PANAS had created t h e i r respective enclaves of support within the Bidayuh community. What i s indicated by the Table below i s that SNAP attached a r e a l importance to the necessity of a t t r a c t i n g Bidayuh's support. Among the f i r s t two branches, two were i n Bidayuh areas. In 1965, of the four branches established that year, two were Bidayuh ones. If SNAP's objective at the time was to popularize i t s e l f i n the SNAP's branches e s t a b l i s h e d from 1961 to 1965 by D i v i s i o n s and E t h n i c Areas Branch D i v i s i o n Date E t h n i c a r e a Saka Second Apr. 10, 1961 Iban Lower Paku Second May 15, 1961 Iban Debak Second June 20, 1961 Iban Stunggang F i r s t Aug. 30, 1961 Bidayuh P i c h i n g F i r s t Aug. 21, 1961 Bidayuh U l u Undop Second Aug. 3, 1961 Iban Samu, Paku Second Sep. 2, 1961 Iban Dau Second Sep. 21, 1961 Iban T a r a t F i r s t Sep. 21, 1961 ' Iban S e r u p a i , T a t a u F o u r t h Oct. 8, 1961 Iban Tap, B i n t u l u F o u r t h Oct. 6, 1961 Iban Pendan F o u r t h Oct. 11, 1961 Iban Sebangat F o u r t h Oct. 14, 1961 Iban Lutong F i f t h Oct. 29, 1961 Iban Merdang F i r s t Oct. 27, 1961 Iban Tebedu F i r s t Oct. 24, 1961 Bidayuh Sg. Tenggang F i r s t Oct. 6, 1961 Iban Batu Empat Second Oct. 14, 1961 Iban Upper Limbang F i f t h Dec. 14, 1961 Iban Lower Limbang F i f t h Dec. 5, 1961 Iban Pad eh Second Feb. 12, 1962 Iban B r i t / N i b o n g F i f t h Mar. 30, 1962 Iban Sematong F i r s t Mar. 27, 1962 Iban Sabelak Second Mar. 25, 1962 Iban L. Sebuyau Second Mar. 28, 1962 Iban L. Rimbas Second May 5, 1962 Iban Pantu Second May 25, 1962 Iban U. Rimbas Second May 24, 1962 Iban U. Sebuyau Second May 22, 1962 Iban U. Mukah F o u r t h J u l y 27, 1962 Iban S e b u t i F o u r t h J u l y 20, 1962 Iban U. Oya F o u r t h Aug. 14, 1962 Iban Ng. Tamin F o u r t h Aug. 16, 1962 Iban L. B a l i n g i a n F o u r t h Aug. 7, 1962 Iban M. B a l i n g i a n F o u r t h Aug. 5, 1962 Iban U. B a l i n g i a n F o u r t h Aug. 1, 1962 Iban Sg. T e l i a n F o u r t h Aug. 9, 1962 Iban U. Anap F o u r t h Sep. 8, 1962 Iban Ng. Drau Second Sep; 9, 1962 Iban Mukah F o u r t h Dec. 15, 1962 Iban Awek Second Dec. 12, 1962 Iban T i n j a r F o u r t h Dec. 22, 1962 Iban K l u a Second Dec. 12, 1962 Iban M. T e l i a n F o u r t h Dec. 15, 1962 Iban Spak Second J a n . 1, 1962 Iban L. Skrang Second J a n . 18, 1962 Iban Simanggang Second Feb. 1, 1963 Iban M. Embawang Second Feb. 1, 1963 Iban Melupa Second Feb. 3, 1963 Iban U. K r i a n Second Feb. 8, 1963 Iban Ng. Drau Second Feb. 3, 1963 Iban Tungkah Dayak F i r s t Feb. 15, 1965 Bidayuh Skudup Chupak F i r s t Feb. 24, 1965 Bidayuh Lundu F i r s t Oct. 30, 1965 Iban Lubok Antu F i r s t Nov. 5, 1965 Iban 212 Dayak communities, as the case appears to be, i t s e f f o r t had mixed r e s u l t s . SNAP was only successful i n c e r t a i n Iban and Bidayuh communities. In accordance with the Ningkan-Jugah understanding, which established the spheres of influence f o r SNAP and Pesaka, SNAP was forbidden to expand into the Rejang Basin of the Third D i v i s i o n , where most Dayaks resided. This was a serious shortcoming i n that as long as the Rejang remained impenetrable, SNAP's dream of communal s o l i d a r i t y remained unrealized. E l e c t o r a l Performance The t h i r d evidence of support f o r SNAP was i n i t s e l e c t o r a l performance. This w i l l give an i n d i c a t i o n of support which SNAP received from the d i f f e r e n t ethnic groups, p a r t i c u l a r l y the Dayaks and th e i r sub-communal parts. The aim here i s to i d e n t i f y the ethnic background of SNAP's elected representatives. The general elections of 1963 were made possible through an accelerated programme of e l e c t o r a l and c o n s t i t u t i o n a l changes designed to equip Sarawak for self-government. The c o n s t i t u t i o n a l document was the Sessional Paper No. 2 of 1961, E l e c t o r a l and Co n s t i t u t i o n a l Advance, which was introducted before the Council Negri on November 1, 1961. I t was t h i s paper which extended universal franchise to a l l persons over the age of twenty-one. With the advent of the Malaysia proposal an Order-in-Council was published i n 213 May 1963 increasing to t h i r t y - s i x the number of elected representatives, as w e l l as providing f o r a m i n i s t e r i a l government. The e l e c t i o n , however, was not a d i r e c t one. The procedure used was the "three t i e r system of e l e c t i o n i n Council Negri through D i s t r i c t Councils and D i v i s i o n a l Advisory Councils."^ The actual p o l l i n g was staggered, a necessary measure, given the d i f f i c u l t i e s created by rough t e r r a i n and inadequate f a c i l i t i e s . I t began i n the middle of June and ended i n mid-July. The o v e r a l l r e s u l t of the e l e c t i o n was encouraging f o r the A l l i a n c e , i f only because i t attracted 137 out of 429 seats. Within the A l l i a n c e i t s e l f the d i s t r i b u t i o n of elected c o u n c i l l o r s i s shown i n Table 4. Table 4 D i v i s i o n a l Advisory Councillors C l a s s i f i e d According to Party Allegiance, July, 1963 D i v i s i o n Parties BARJASA PESAKA SNAP SCA TOTAL F i r s t 8 2 8 1 19 Second 8 1 31 0 40 Third 10 43 0 3 56 Fourth 4 1 10 0 15 F i f t h 5 0 2 0 7 Total 35 47 51 2 137 From the table above, SNAP's leading p o s i t i o n — i t had a t o t a l of f i f t y - 2 1 4 one c o u n c i l l o r s out of a t o t a l of 137 for the A l l i a n c e — i s quite c l e a r . The e l e c t i o n of these c o u n c i l l o r s was a prelude to the struggle f o r control of each d i s t r i c t council which were scheduled to meet early i n July to e l e c t among themselves members to the D i v i s i o n a l Advisory Council (DAC). The DAC formed the second of three t i e r s of the e l e c t i v e government i n the state; and a party which gained co n t r o l of a DAC had the r i g h t to nominate the a l l o t t e d members to the Council Negri, the uppermost t i e r i n the e l e c t i v e government. Since the s t a t e - l e g i s l a t o r s were thus selected from each of the f i v e DACs, having actual control over a DAC became c r i t i c a l to a l l p a r t i e s . A f i g h t soon arose over the control for the DAC's, and, since only h a l f of the D i s t r i c t Councils were dominated by any one of the pa r t i e s , the other h a l f remained contested r i d i n g s i n which indepen- dents could t i p the balance. SNAP gained t h i r t y - t h r e e D i s t r i c t Council seats, independents who had switched bringing i t s t o t a l to e i g h t y - f i v e . For the purpose of t h i s paper the composition of this group becomes important, f o r i t indicates what type of support SNAP was rec e i v i n g at the time. Two important points should be noted at this stage. The f i r s t i s among SNAP supporters were a s p r i n k l i n g of non-Dayaks, a fac t which proves that i t was not a uni-ethnic organisation. The second point concerns the preponderance of Dayaks within SNAP. The table following l i s t s the number of Dayak 215 c o u n c i l l o r s and those aligned with SNAP and the Pesaka, SNAP's only serious r i v a l f or the allegiance of the Dayaks. Q Table 5 Alignment of Dayak and Non-Dayak D i s t r i c t Councillors by P o l i t i c a l Parties (July 1963) Parties Ethnic Groups Dayak Non-Dayak SNAP 78 (43.8) 7 (2.8) Pesaka 63 (35.4) 2 (0.8) Other Parties and Independents 37 (20.8) 242 (96.4) Total 178 (100) 251 (100) Note: A l l percentages i n the table are rounded to the nearest decimal point. From the above table i t can be seen that, although SNAP was openly m u l t i - r a c i a l i n membership, i t was able to a t t r a c t only less than h a l f of Dayak d i s t r i c t c o u n c i l l o r s . S l i g h t l y more than a t h i r d of Dayak c o u n c i l l o r s supported Pesaka, the rest being divided among other parties (SUPP, PANAS, BARJASA and Independents). By Divisions 9 SNAP's strength i n August 1963 was as follows: D i v i s i o n Councillors F i r s t 10 Second 37 Third 13 Fourth 19 F i f t h 6 216 Also of note i s the source of i t s support within the Dayak community i t s e l f . This i s not immediately d i s c e r n i b l e from the table, but the f a c t i s that i n a l l Divisions except the F i r s t , SNAP's co u n c i l l o r s were mostly Ibans. I f SNAP was ever to create a t r u l y Dayak base, the support of non-Ibans would be c r i t i c a l , f o r within the Dayak community the largest sub-units a f t e r the Ibans were the Bidayuhs, Kenyahs, and Kayans. Altogether they accounted f o r 29 per cent of the Dayak population, th e i r support was therefore necessary for a party which aspired to represent the Dayaks. In 1963 those Dayaks who did not support SNAP originated from two d i s t i n c t i v e c l usters of Ibans and non-Ibans. Included i n the l a t t e r category were the majority of the Bidayuhs of the F i r s t D i v i s i o n and the Kenyahs and Kayans of the Third and Fourth D i v i s i o n s . That i s , most non-Iban Dayaks did not support SNAP i n 1963. Based on this finding, SNAP's claim to be a Dayak party, l e t alone a Sarawak national party with support from a l l ethnic groups, had l i t t l e foundation i n f a c t . The table also suggests the extent to which SNAP received Iban support. I f the Ibans were s i g n i f i c a n t l y s p l i t for whatever reason, then this would indi c a t e that SNAP's appeal was narrow indeed. In 1963 the Ibans were divided i n t h e i r l o y a l t i e s . Those who withheld t h e i r support from SNAP were from the Ulu A i and the Rejang River basins. Their evident reluctance to support SNAP may have been a 217 carry-over from the time i n the 19th Century when t h e i r ancestors had engaged i n wars against the Saribas Ibans, the ancestors of SNAP founders. By 1963 the concomitant bad blood was reduced to mere mutual suspicion, but that was evidently s u f f i c i e n t to prevent the Ibans from unit i n g under one p o l i t i c a l organisation, Thus, while the Ibans of the Ulu A i joined the Malay-led BARJASA, the Rejang Ibans followed t h e i r leaders into Pesaka. With such paucity of support from the two Iban regions, SNAP's strength was l i m i t e d to the Batang Lupar and Kalaka D i s t r i c t s of the Second D i v i s i o n and, to some extent, to Mukah of the Third and B i n t u l u and Subis of the Fourth D i v i s i o n . S i g n i f i c a n t l y , these areas had previously received an i n f l u x of Iban emigrants from the Second D i v i s i o n . " ^ The conclusion which should be made from the e l e c t o r a l r e s u l t s i s that i n 1963 less than h a l f of Dayak support was given to SNAP. As w e l l the party's basis of support was narrow since i t was l a r g e l y confined to the Ibans—and even here i t was by no means unanimous. In 1963 SNAP was primarily a Second D i v i s i o n Iban party; as indicated by the narration above, i t f a i l e d to win the confidence of the Ulu A i and the Rejang Ibans as we l l as the majority of other Dayak groups such as the Bidayuhs, Kayans, and Kenyahs. Expansion S i g n i f i c a n t l y , from 1963 to 1965 the expansion of SNAP's branches was almost at a s t a n d s t i l l . Only s i x branches—Kuching, 218 E n g k i l i l i , Lubok, Antu, Mukah, and Skedup Chupak were opened during that period. One reason f o r this lack of a c t i v i t y was the f a c t that the o f f i c i a l jobs of SNAP's party leaders f u l l y preoccupied t h e i r time and afforded them l i t t l e opportunity for p a r t i s a n party a f f a i r s . More important, however, was the f a c t that SNAP was circumscribed i n i t s expansion p o s s i b i l i t i e s by the Pesaka-SNAP agreement not to encroach on each other's t e r r i t o r i e s . As long as that agreement la s t e d , therefore, SNAP was mainly confined to the F i r s t and Second Divisions while Pesaka was free to operate i n the Third D i v i s i o n with i t s large Dayak population. The problem f o r SNAP was that within i t s a l l o t t e d area, the establishment of i t s branches among the Dayak communities was mostly completed by 1963. At that time t h i r t y branches out of the grand t o t a l of for t y - e i g h t were concentrated i n the Second D i v i s i o n . Thus, by 1963 SNAP had almost reached the t e r r i t o r i a l l i m i t prescribed by i t s agreement with Pesaka. What made th i s s i t u a i t o n unsatisfactory from SNAP's point of view was that i t only had s i x Council Negri members. More- over, so long as the agreement with Pesaka was i n force, i n the next elections SNAP had l i t t l e prospect of increasing i t s share of elected representatives. The assumption which t h i s paper makes i s that SNAP being a p o l i t i c a l party, i t s desire to b u i l d and to maintain e l e c t o r a l support was an ever pressing need. Since the general e l e c t i o n s were 219 expected f o r 1967 or 1968, as the date came nearer, p o l i t i c i a n s and parties increasingly sought to improve and expand t h e i r e l e c t o r a l machinery. As the expected date came closer co-operation within the r u l i n g a l l i a n c e became more and more strained as partie s began to compete and to improve t h e i r respective performance. This objective was a s i g n i f i c a n t underlying consideration, but alone that pressure could not have accounted for the apparent haste with which SNAP undertook to add new branches. At the end of 1965, while SNAP was i n government, the party abruptly resumed i t s expansion a c t i v i t i e s . The immediate impetus for SNAP's sudden: i n t e r e s t i n party-building was that i t was forced to respond to an i n t r a - A l l i a n c e challenge, namely BARJASA's and Pesaka's recruitments, of the Bidayuhs i n the F i r s t D i v i s i o n . Since SNAP regarded BARJASA as a Malay party and Pesaka as an i n t e r l o p e r which was defying the Ningkan-Jugah under- standing, i t s in t e r v e n t i o n at this time c l e a r l y indicates that i t (SNAP) regarded BARJASA and Pesaka's i n i t i a t i v e s as an i n t r u s i o n into i t s preserve. The occasion of SNAP's int e r v e n t i o n deserves mention, for i t indicates the extent of SNAP's nationalism at the time. In an u n o f f i c i a l v i s i t , to the Bidayuhs kampongs ( v i l l a g e s ) along the Simanggang-Serian Road (Maong, Skedup, Chupak, T i j i r a k , and Sidanau), Datuk Endawie, the Minis t e r f o r Local Government and the party's Vice-Chairman urged the Bidayuhs to l o i n SNAP. While he r e i t e r a t e d that SNAP was a m u l t i - r a c i a l party which was not 220 a s s i m i l a t i o n i s t i n i t s p o l i c y , and which s t o o d f o r t h e s e p a r a t e e x i s t e n c e , i . e . , the " e n t i t y o f a l l r a c e s , D a t u k Endawie a l s o i n - t r o d u c e d a n o t h e r element o f SNAP's p o l i c y — t h a t i t would p r o t e c t m i n o r i t y i n t e r e s t s and condemn r a c i a l d o m i n a t i o n . The theme o f t h i s message was c l e a r : the m i n o r i t y i n t e r e s t s b e l o n g to the Dayaks. As f a r as Datuk Endawie was concerned, the Dayak p e o p l e s were one and t h e r e f o r e i n d i v i s i b l e . The Land (Bidayuhs) and Sea (Ibans) Dayaks, he s a i d , resemble a f r u i t t r e e which has many r o o t s but one t r u n k which produces the same l e a v e s and f r u i t . 1 2 I f the m i n o r i t y i n t e r e s t s b e l o n g e d to the Dayak p e o p l e , from what d i r e c t i o n , then, d i d the dominant t h r e a t emanate? To SNAP t h e r e were two s o u r c e s : the c h a l l e n g e from w i t h i n Sarawak, p a r t i c u l a r l y from those opposed to the p a r t y ' s p o l i c y of m u l t i - r a c i a l i s m , and from o u t - s i d e the s t a t e , e s p e c i a l l y the f e d e r a l government w i t h whom the p a r t y has had some p o l i c y d i f f e r e n c e s . Datuk Endawie's response was a s i g n i f i c a n t s t e p i n t h a t f o r the f i r s t t i m e s i n c e SNAP had become a member o f the government a p a r t y spokesman came out i n s u p p o r t o f e t h n i c s o l i d a r i t y , now d e f i n e d as the u n i t y and p o l i t i c a l a s s e r t i o n s o f Dayaks. On the s u r f a c e , the f e a t u r e o f e t h n i c u n i t y amongst the Dayaks seemed to c o n t r a d i c t the p a r t y ' s p o l i c y o f m u l t i - r a c i a l i s m . T h i s was not the case, however, s i n c e a u n i f i e d and dominant e t h n i c community c o u l d espouse i t s 221 version of the " n a t i o n a l " Sarawakian p o l i c i e s . That i s , Datuk Endawie's approach f e l l w ithin the confines of SNAP's m u l t i - r a c i a l i s m . The other point which should be made here i s that with SNAP pushing to compete for support amongst the Bidayuh people, the party had served notice that i t would no longer tolerate any e f f o r t by non- Dayaks (Chinese or Malays) to "poach" on Dayak t e r r i t o r i e s as a means of b o l s t e r i n g t h e i r respective party membership. The other stimulus f o r SNAP's party b u i l d i n g came from within the Dayak community—namely the threat of Party Pesaka. Early i n 1965 active leadership of the party was transferred from Temenggong Jugah to Thomas Kana who, l i k e Ningkan, had spent considerable time i n Brunei as a medical dresser. Kana embarked upon an aggressive expansion programme for Pesaka, obviously i n a n t i c i p a t i o n of the general e l e c t i o n s believed scheduled for 1967 or 1968. Pesaka's i n i t i a t i v e created d i f f i c u l t i e s for SNAP i n that Pesaka's emissaries, l e d by Penghulu ( l a t e r Pengarah) Jinggut and A l f r e d Mason, were directed to promote Pesaka's cause into the Second Divisio n , which did not encroach on SNAP's t e r r i t o r y , since Penghulu Jinggut's delegation concentrated t h e i r e f f o r t i n the Lubok Antu area which, although i t had an Iban preponderance, gave support to BARJASA i n 1963. In Lubok Antu, which was yet to have a SNAP branch, Pesaka ' started i t s own with the assistance of Tutong anak Ningkan who, l i k e Mason, had j u s t defected from BARJASA. Encouraged by this 2 2 2 success Pesaka next established a branch i n Roban of the Kalaka D i s t r i c t , i n the area within SNAP's heartland. C l e a r l y the Ningkan- Jugah agreement of non-intervention was being u n i l a t e r a l l y v i o l a t e d by Pesaka. With the pact no longer binding, SNAP considered i t s e l f free to r e t a l i a t e . S t a r t i n g from la t e 1966 SNAP was to expand the Rejang Basin, 13 Pesaka's country. Datuk Ningkan himself contacted SNAP sympathizers from the Iban area; they had come to Kuching when he had been ousted early i n the same year. But the person who was responsible for much of SNAP's success i n the Rejang was Edmund Langgu, the M.P. for Saratok, who was then SNAP's secretary-general. I t was h i s c o n s t i - tuency which Pesaka d i r e c t l y threatened when i t formed a branch i n Roban. As early as 1964, Edmund Langgu had made s u r r e p t i t i o u s contacts with the Dayaks i n the Mukah and Balingian areas of the Fourth D i v i s i o n as a contingency l e s t SNAP should expand there. A f t e r the c r i s i s of 1966 these people were sought out again i n order to b u i l d up support. In the Rejang Basin i t s e l f , Langgu helped to e s t a b l i s h the Kapit branch where Kenneth Kanyan Koh was being groomed as a possible contender f o r leadership i n the region. Kenneth Kanyan comes from a prominent Iban family: his father, Temenggong Koh, was Temenggong Jugah's predecessor as the paramount-chief of the Ibans. In Song, Edmund Langgu contacted Ngelambong Bangau, a charter member of the party from hi s Seria days, and i n Kanowit the 223 l o c a l supporter was C o u n c i l l o r Matthew Simon. SNAP branches were established i n both areas. The ease with which SNAP expanded into the Third D i v i s i o n may be explained by the fa c t that the party's secretary-general was given carte blanche to operate i n the region and, untrammeled by d i r e c t i v e s , he d e l i b e r a t e l y sought r e l i a b l e 14 Ibans as l o c a l party workers. In summary, then, SNAP's expansion, which began i n 1965, took place as a reaction to an i n t r a - A l l i a n c e competition i n party- b u i l d i n g which i t s e l f had been p r e c i p i t a t e d by the prospect of the general el e c t i o n s believed scheduled f o r 1967 or 1968. Reacting to t h i s challenge, the parties had scrambled to improve t h e i r respective e l e c t o r a l machines."'"'' In 1965 most of SNAP's e f f o r t s had been dire c t e d at winning the support of the Ibans and Bidayuhs i n r e t a l i a t i o n against BARJASA's i n i t i a t i v e s . Of the four branches established that year, three were i n the Bidayuh region. The fourth branch, opened a f t e r Pesaka's foray into the area, was i n the Lubok Antu D i s t r i c t . The year which was momentous for SNAP, then, was 1965. This was the year i n which i t s uneasy c o l l a b o r a t i o n with Pesaka f i n a l l y gave way to competition as both partie s expanded themselves. The next year, remarkable because of another cabinet c r i s i s or, more p r e c i s e l y , a recrudescence of the c r i s i s which begain i n 1965, should be considered as part of this i n t r a - A l l i a n c e competition. SNAP was ousted 224 by a native a l l i a n c e between BARJASA and Pesaka with a d d i t i o n a l support wooed from a s p l i n t e r group i n PANAS. In l a t e 1965 SNAP began to seek support from a l l Sarawakians with the object of creating a genuinely m u l t i - r a c i a l party. By the next year i t had established a t o t a l of nineteen branches, ten of which were i n non-Dayak areas. The year 1965 saw a new trend i n SNAP's party b u i l d i n g : the party had not only increased the number of i t s branches but i t had also i n s t i t u t e d a major s h i f t by d i r e c t i n g i t s e f f o r t f o r the f i r s t time to Chinese and Malay 17 areas. Two points emerge from Table 6. The f i r s t i s that from 1966 the party accelerated the party-building programme begun i n 1965. The year 1966 saw the establishment of Chinese and Malay branches. The second point i s that by the end of 1968 SNAP had established the l a s t of i t s branches. Out of a t o t a l of 103 branches, 82 had been found i n predominantly Dayak areas. SNAP had 11 branches i n Malay-dominated t e r r i t o r i e s and a t o t a l of ten i n Chinese sections. Part of the reason for the predominance of branches i n Dayak areas was the fact that, being inhabitants of Sarawak's r u r a l areas, they had a poor system of communication and SNAP had to e s t a b l i s h more branches i n t h e i r areas (fewer i n Chinese and Malay sections) i n order to remain i n contact with Dayak party members. But this aside, the major f a c t o r for the concentration of branches was that the Dayaks formed SNAP's terminal community. Table 6 SNAP's Branches established from 1966 to 1968 by Div i s i o n s and Ethnic Areas 225 Branch D i v i s i o n Date Ethnic Area E n g k i l i l i Second Mar. 7, 1966 Iban Kuching F i r s t May 27, 1966 Chinese Lubok Antu Second July 22, 1966 Iban Limbang Proper F i f t h July 25, 1966 Chinese Upper Limbang F i f t h Aug. 8, 1966 Murut/Bisayah Bint u l u Proper Fourth Oct. 24, 1966 Chinese Kg. Gita F i r s t Nov. 1, 1966 Malay Tatau Fourth Nov. 8, 1966 Iban Upper Tatau Fourth Nov. 10, 1966 Iban Kapit Third Dec. 5, 1966 Iban Kanawit Third Dec. 11, 1966 Iban Mekir, Sarekei Third Dec. 19, 1966 Iban Sarekei Proper Third Dec. 19, 1966 Chinese Ikatan Tuj oh F i r s t Dec. 21, 1966 Malay Kg. Datu, Sibu Third Dec. 21, 1966 Malay Julau (Wak) Third Dec. 29, 1966 Iban Binatang Third Dec. 5, 1966 Chinese Sibu Third Dec. 11, 1966 Chinese Song Third Dec. 15, 1966 Chinese S i o l Kandis F i r s t Jan. 1, 1967 Chinese Pakan Third Feb. 1, 1967 Iban Entanggor F i r s t Feb. 1, 1967 Iban Saberang Ulu F i r s t Feb. 27, 1967 Malay Kedap, Upper F i r s t Mar. 17, 1967 Bidayuh R i i h Tabekang F i r s t Mar. 17, 1967 Bidayuh Daro Third Apr. 19, 1967 Malay La was F i f t h Apr. 19, 1967 Kenyan/Kayan T j . Bundong F i r s t May 10, 1967 Malay Sg. Anap Fourth June 5, 1967 Iban Kg. Murut F i r s t June 7, 1967 Bidayuh M i r i Fourth June 22, 1967 Chinese Kg. Beladin Second July 3, 1967 Malay Kg. Benuk F i r s t July 5, 1967 Bidayuh Spaoh Melayu Second Aug. 10, 1967 Malay Jagoi F i r s t Aug. 15, 1967 Bidayuh B a l a i Ringgin F i r s t Sep. 14, 1967 Iban Kg. Baru, Serian F i r s t Sep. 21, 1967 Bidayuh Machan Third Oct. 19, 1967 Iban Batu Danau F i f t h Nov. 7, 1967 Iban Marudi Fourth Aug. 5, 1967 Kenyah Debak Proper Second Dec. 16, 1967 Chinese Bario Fourth Feb. 6, 1968 Kelabit Pusa Second Feb. 7, 1968 Malay Kg. Buntal F i r s t May 14, 1968 Malay Kabong Second July 15, 1968 Malay Sampun/Grungang F i r s t Oct. 17, 1968 Bidayuh T i n j a r , Baram Fourth Dec. 12, 1968 Iban 226 Leadership Another useful i n d i c a t o r of SNAP's support at d i f f e r e n t times i s suggested by the composition of i t s Central Executive 18 Committee (CEC). I n i t i a l l y the CEC was wholly Iban, but i n the second year of i t s existence an Indian who had married an Iban from Betong was inducted as P u b l i c i t y O f f i c e r . In the next couple of years the leadership remained very much the same, but by 1964 two Chinese were added to the CEC and the following year yet another. Thus by 1965, though SNAP's CEC was s t i l l an Iban pre- serve i t had an i n f l u e n t i a l Chinese component. In 1966, i n a change that was also r e f l e c t e d i n the growth of i t s branches, SNAP increased the number of CEC non-Ibans to two Malays and f i v e Chinese. By 1969, the year that the general e l e c t i o n was suspended, the c o n s t i t u t i o n of the CEC was 62% Dayak, 17% Malays, 19% Chinese, and 2% "Others". A f t e r the 19 70 general e l e c t i o n s , the party acted to stream- l i n e i t s organisation. In p a r t i c u l a r , i t s to—heavy. CEC was d r a s t i c a l l y cut from the o f f i c i a l figure of 77 to 12. The reduction i n the s i z e of the CEC was i n s t i t u t e d to make i t more manageable than previous ones. Since the new body was to be elected f or a period of three years instead of a one-year period as with previous CECs, the costly p r a c t i c e of holding annual general meetings was 227 also avoided. In a sense, apart from the numerical reduction i n the composition of the CEC an the introduction of the National Council, l i t t l e else appeared to have changed. Dayaks s t i l l predominated, and Chinese and Malays were represented i n both bodies. 19 Table 7 Racial Breakdown of SNAP's CEC Members from 1965 to 1978 Period Ethnic Groups Dayaks Malays Chinese Others Total 1965-•66 15 (83.3) - - 3 (16 .7) - 18 (100) 1966-•67 21 (70.0) 2 (6.7) 7 (23 .3) - 30 (100) 1967-•68 32 (64.0) 7 (14.0) 11 (22 .0) - 50 (100) 1968-•69 29 (61.7) 8 (17.0) 9 (19 .2) 1 (2 .1) 47 (100) 1969-•70 44 (57.1) 11 (14.3) 21 (27 .3) 1 (1 • 3) 77 (100) 1970-•71 41 (56.9) 11 (15.3) 19 (26 .4) 1 (1 .4) 72 (100) 1971-•72 41 (58.6) 11 (15.7) 17 (24 .3) 1 (1 .4) 70 (100) 1972-•75 7 (58.3) 2 (16.7) 2 (16 .7) 1 (8 • 3) 12 (100) 1975-•78 10 (83.4) 1 ( 8.3) 1 ( 8 .3) - 12 (100) Note: The figures i n brackets denote percentages. Below the CEC was the National Council which was created i n 20 19 72 as part of SNAP's reorganisation. 228 Period 20 Table 8 R a c i a l Breakdown of SNAP's National Council from 1972 to 1978 Ethnic Groups Dayaks Malays Chinese Others Total 1972-75 25 (64.1) 7 (17.9) 6 (15.4) 1 (2.6) 39 (100) 1975-78 26 (66.6) 3 ( 7.7) 9 (23.1) 1 (2.6) 39 (100) In another sense there were important changes, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the fluc t u a t i o n s of ethnic strengths i n the CEC. For two reasons, the p i v o t a l year was 1970. F i r s t , i t marked the general e l e c t i o n s which re s u l t e d i n the "1970 Debacle" and which, i n i t s turn, l e d to the h o s t i l i t y of SNAP's leaders against t h e i r counterparts i n the SUPP. Second, i t appeared that a f t e r 1970 the antagonism of party leaders permeated even to the delegates of SNAP's general assemblies—at least when i t came to the e l e c t i o n of CEC members. This " s p i l l - o v e r " e f f e c t mani- fested i t s e l f i n the diminishing proportions of Chinese members being elected to the CEC. This trend i s evident i n Table 7. For instance i n 1969, before the general e l e c t i o n s , Chinese members had reached a high of 27.3 per cent of SNAP CEC f o r the period 1969 to 1970. A f t e r the elections the Chinese proportion declined s t e a d i l y so that by 19 78 i t was at i t s lowest point, 8.3 per cent, since the active recruitment of Chinese membership began i n the middle of the 1960's. In contrast Dayak and Malay members rose gradually, although the proportion of the l a t t e r declined during the period 19 75 to 19 78 — t h a t i s , the period 229 a f t e r the 19 74 general e l e c t i o n s . The data for SNAP's National Council also revealed a decline i n the Malay sector for the period 1975 to 1978. In contrast to the decline i n the number of Chinese members of the CEC, there was a r i s e i n the Chinese percentage from the ethnic breakdown of the National Council: i n the 1972-1975 period the Chinese proportion was 15.4% but f o r the succeeding period (1975 to 1978) the figure was 23.1%. What the r i s e seems to i n d i c a t e was that although SNAP's antagonism to the SUPP resulted i n the reduction of the Chinese proportion i n the all-important CEC, the party was w i l l i n g to accommodate i t s Chinese s u p p o r t e r s — a l b e i t , by concentrating t h e i r representatives i n the less powerful National Council. Further, i t should be pointed out that the Dayak group retained i t s preponderance i n both the CEC and the National Council. In a d d i t i o n to SNAP's Central Executive Committee, another t i e r of SNAP's leadership was i t s branch organisation. In contrast to the CEC, elections to the executive committees of party branches were not on an annual b a s i s . For the year 1974 the ethnic composition of SNAP's branch executives was as follows: Dayak 1532 (81.7%) Malay-Melanau 2 74 (14.6%) Chinese 69 ( 3.7%) In addition, from a t o t a l of 1532 Dayak members, only 178 (11.3%) 230 possessed the t r a d i t i o n a l leadership status of Tuai Rumah or Penghulu. The information here indicates not only the preponderance:of Dayak members i n i t s branch organisation, but also the dominance of non- t r a d i t i o n a l Dayak leaders as branch executives. Several points emerged from the survey of SNAP's leadership.. F i r s t , there was the persistence of Dayak dominance. In the periods when SNAP emphasised Dayak s o l i d a r i t y , which were before 1966 and a f t e r 1975, the proportions of Dayaks i n the CEC was very high, at over 83 percent. In the intervening years, when SNAP advocated multi- ra c i a l i s m , there was an i n f u s i o n of Malays and Chinese into i t s organi- s a t i o n . The i n f l u x of non-Dayaks into SNAP was r e f l e c t e d by the composition of i t s CEC where, i n 1970 to 1971 f o r instance, the Dayak proportion dropped to i t s lowest l e v e l ever, at 56.9 percent. The rest of the CEC was composed of Chinese and Malay members. Secondly, a f t e r 1975 the control of the party s h i f t e d from the Saribas Ibans to those from the Krian and the Rejang areas. Concurrent with the transfer of power was the renewed emphasis on Dayak s o l i d a r i t y . L a s t l y , i t should be noted that the ascendency of the new group did not lead to a r e j e c t i o n of SNAP's m u l t i - r a c i a l membership. Indeed, as was evident i n the negotiations f o r SNAP's entry into the BN, the party was determined to r e t a i n i t s non-Dayak support. To this end, the d i s - enchantment of SNAP's leaders with the Chinese-based SUPP a f t e r 19 70 only contributed to t h e i r determination to keep, not to abandon, SNAP's e x i s t i n g Chinese and Malay members. 231 E l e c t o r a l Performance 1970 and 1974 SNAP's clamour f o r a general e l e c t i o n began i n 1966 at a time when the Ningkan administration was faced with a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c r i s i s . A f t e r i t s withdrawal from the Sarawak A l l i a n c e SNAP repeatedly demanded an e l e c t i o n . In Sabah, which entered Malaysia at the same time as Sarawak, just such an e l e c t i o n was held i n A p r i l of 1967. But i n Sarawak, the e l e c t i o n date was delayed to a point where a consti-- t u t i o n a l amendment had to be passed i n the Dwwan Raayat i n order that the state e l e c t i o n s be held at the same time as the parliamentary 21 ones. The ostensible reason f o r the delay was a bureaucratic one i n that the Malaysian E l e c t i o n Commission Report took time to prepare and was not presented to Parliament u n t i l May 1968. The leaders of SNAP, however, were convinced that the delay was an attempt to a f f o r d 22 the badly-divided Sarawak A l l i a n c e time to shore up i t s own support. As had been the case i n 1963, the d i f f i c u l t t e r r a i n meant that the elections had to be staggered over a period of several weeks, whereas i n West Malaysia they took place i n one day. Thus when f e s t e r i n g d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with the e l e c t o r a l r e s u l t s i n West Malaysia broke out 23 into r a c i a l r i o t s , the el e c t i o n s i n Sarawak had hardly begun. The aftermath of the r i o t s was than an "Emergency" was declared and executive control of government assumed by a National Operations Council (NOC), which had c i v i l and m i l i t a r y members. One of the f i r s t 232 acts of the NOC was to suspend the e l e c t i o n s i n Sarawak and Sabah. The suspension was a f i n a n c i a l s t r a i n to SNAP, which had to 24 rely on private donations to run i t s organisation; i n addition, i t was probably p o l i t i c a l l y damaging since the delay also meant that the Sarawak A l l i a n c e was given even more time to reorganise. More- over, since the suspension of elections also brought a ban on campaigning, SNAP was robbed of a potent veh i c l e by which the party had disseminated i t s ideas. By contrast, the Sarawak A l l i a n c e , being a s s i s t e d by the federal government, was neither short of funds nor affected unduly by the suspension. Indeed, f o r Sarawak electors the very act of suspending the e l e c t i o n s demonstrated the s u p e r i o r i t y of the federal government, an act which undoubtedly caused many voters to reappraise t h e i r support for SNAP. The general elections were f i n a l l y reset for June 1970, but the ban on campaigning remained. SNAP's e l e c t o r a l performance i n the state e l e c t i o n s was disappointing i n that i t f a i l e d to achieve even a simple m a j o r i t y — with i t s twelve seats i t needed t h i r t e e n more to do so. Moreover, the party's t o t a l vote was much smaller than i t s p u b l i c i z e d membership. In 1970 SNAP claimed that i t had 10