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A preliminary empirical investigation into imperialist theory Dahl, Jeff 1975

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A PRELIMINARY EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION INTO IMPERIALIST THEORY by JEFF DAHL A THESIS SUBMITTED IN THE REQUIREMENTS MASTER PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF FOR THE DEGREE OF OF ARTS i n the Department of POLITICAL SCIENCE We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA September, 1976 © J e f f Dahl, 1975 In presenting th i s thes is in pa r t i a l fu l f i lment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the Un ivers i ty of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the L ibrary sha l l make it f ree l y ava i l ab le for reference and study. I fur ther agree that permission for extensive copying of th is thes is for scho lar ly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representat ives. It is understood that copying or pub l i ca t ion of th is thes is fo r f i nanc ia l gain sha l l not be allowed without my wr i t ten permission. Depa rtment The Univers i ty of B r i t i s h Columbia 2075 Wesbrook Place Vancouver, Canada V6T 1W5 ABSTRACT Th i s study i s a modest a t tempt , from a behav i ou r a l p e r s p e c t i v e , to s o r t out some o f the concep tua l d i f f i c u l t i e s i n the i m p e r i a l i s t l i t e -r a t u r e . Seve ra l ob j e c t i o n s are r a i s e d p e r t a i n i n g to ma rx i s t determin i sm and a l e s s d e t e r m i n i s t i c model i s opted for. The e m p i r i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s of t e s t i n g the whole model m i l i t a t e aga in s t i t i n a s tudy of t h i s s i z e so tha t on l y two important p r o p o s i t i o n s emanating from the model a re t e s t e d ; f i r s t tha t i n t e r a c t i o n s i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system a re rank-dependent, and second, t ha t they a re f e u d a l l y - s t r u c t u r e d . Support f o r these two hypotheses can be found i n the behav i ou r a l l i t e r a t u r e , but the advantage of t h i s s tudy i s t ha t i t o f f e r s an e xp l ana t i on - impe r i a l i sm (w i th r e q u i -s i t e q u a l i f i c a t i o n s ) - f o r these i n t e r a c t i o n r e l a t i o n s h i p s . The r e s u l t s a re f a r f rom c on c l u s i v e ; s e v e r a l problems r ega rd i ng conceptua l ambigu i ty remain . Fu tu re s tudy r e j e c t i n g the ma r x i s t mode of i n q u i r y w i l l have to concen t ra te on f u r t h e r s p e c i f i c a t i o n of an a l t e r n a t i v e model . TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Ab s t r a c t i L i s t of F i g u r e s , Tab les and I l l u s t r a t i o n s i i i I . I n t r o d u c t i o n 1 I I . Impe r i a l i sm - D i s c u s s i o n of Causes i n H i s t o r i c a l P e r s pe c t i v e 4 I I I . Conceptua l C l a r i f i c a t i o n and D e f i n i t i o n s - I r i t r a -Parad igmat i c Convergence 9 IV . S t r u c t u r a l i s m and Impe r i a l i sm 16 V. S ta tus and Power . . . 20 V I . Hypotheses 26 V I I . O p e r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n - The Independent V a r i a b l e s . . . . 29 Dependent V a r i a b l e s 35 V I I I . A n a l y t i c a l Techniques and Re su l t s - Hypothes i s I . . . 38 Hypothes i s I I . . 52 IX . Threa ts to R e l i a b i l i t y and V a l i d i t y 67 X . I n t e r p r e t a t i o n s and Conc lus ions 73 Footnotes . . . . . 78 B i b l i o g r aphy 92 i i O LIST OF FIGURES, TABLES AND ILLUSTRATIONS Page I l l u s t r a t i o n I - A Feuda l Cen te r -Pe r i phe ry S t r u c t u r e 28 Tab les I. Pearson C o r r e l a t i o n C o e f f i c i e n t s Among the Independent V a r i a b l e s . . . . . 40 I I . Examinat ion of P o s s i b l e Time Lag E f f e c t s o f the Independent Power V a r i a b l e s on the Dependent I n t e r a c t i o n V a r i a b l e s 42 I I I . Stepwise Regress ion Re su l t s ' . 44-45 IV . Comb ina to r i a l Regress ion Re su l t s - A l l Combinat ions of Three Independent V a r i a b l e s . 46-48 V. B i v a r i a t e C o r r e l a t i o n s Among the Trade, IGO and D i p l oma t i c M i s s i o n s S i m i l a r i t y Ma t r i c e s . . . 64 F i gu re s I . Sma l l e s t Space Ana l y s t s Trade Con f i g u r a t i o n 1960 . . . . 55-57 I I . SSA D i p l oma t i c M i s s i on s Con f i g u r a t i o n 1960 . . . . . . . 58-60 I I I . SSA IGO Con f i g u r a t i o n 1960 61-63 i i i - 1 -I. INTRODUCTION Inequality has often been c i t e d as a f a c t o r i n f l u e n c i n g behaviour i n s t r a t i f i e d s o c i a l systems. Th e o r e t i c a l i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s scholars have posited r e l a t i o n s h i p s between i n e q u a l i t y of nations and i n t e r a c t i o n , 2 3 aggression , and c o n f l i c t and war . To p a r a l l e l these empirical f i n d i n g s , the focus of i n q u i r y i n the f i e l d has turned, i n the l a s t f i v e years, from the assessment of East-West r e l a t i o n s to that of North-South r e l a t i o n s . This newfound i n t e r e s t seems to have evolved i n i t i a l l y as a r e s u l t of the actions of the OPEC c a r t e l and the consequences of those actions for the more i n d u s t r i a l i z e d countries. Subsequent developments at such gatherings as the fourth UNCTAD Conference, the Seventh S p e c i a l Session of the UN General Assembly on a New World Economic Order, and the recent Habitat Conference on Human Settlements, have h i g h l i g h t e d the p l i g h t of the underdeveloped countries to the extent that the vernacular of development theory appears to b« gain-i n g currency among c o n f l i c t t h e o r i s t s . Beyond the s t a t i s t i c a l a s s o c i a t i o n s , the empirical behavioural l i t e r -ature to t h i s p o i n t , provides the contemporary scholar with l i j t t l e t h e o r e t i c -a l r igour so that the current f a s c i n a t i o n with North-South r e l a t i o n s appears to be f a d i s h and temporary. The normative l a b e l l o o s e l y ascribed to t h i s body of l i t e r a t u r e , to r e f l e c t the nature of the unequal r e l a t i o n s h i p s , i s "dependency theory". I t i s the i n t e n t i o n of t h i s paper to give some body to the current empirical l i t e r a t u r e - to provide a p o t e n t i a l t h e o r e t i c a l explan-a t i o n f o r many of the r e l a t i o n s h i p s found to e x i s t by behaviourally oriented scholars. Of the many forms that North-South dominance-dependence r e l a t i o n -ships can e x h i b i t within the purview of the current body of l i t e r a t u r e known - 2 -as dependency theory, i t i s the i n t e n t i o n of t h i s study to examine one of the oldes t and most c o n t r o v e r s i a l - imperialism. The question may be asked, i n view of the opening remarks about c o n f l i c t , as to why we study imperialism today. To h i s t o r i a n s , imperialism has t r a d i -t i o n a l l y r e f e r r e d to the c o l o n i a l and m e r c a n t i l i s t periods of the eighteenth and nineteenth c e n t u r i e s . Whatever imperialism means (and we s h a l l elaborate on a d e f i n i t i o n p r e s e n t l y ) , i t was seen as a p o t e n t i a l source of c o n f l i c t bet-ween great powers over pres t i g e as in d i c a t e d by t e r r i t o r i a l holdings or as a r e s u l t of competition f o r markets f or the powers' products. I t i s generally recognized i n the academic l i t e r a t u r e , however, that the p o l i t i c a l map of the world has changed considerably since the turn of the century and e s p e c i a l l y since the second World War. While the United Nations began with f i f t y - t w o state members, today i t boasts a membership of approximately one hundred and f i f t y nominally independent s t a t e s . The question which has been asked more and more re c e n t l y i s : have the r e l a t i o n s h i p s between the established states and these newly "independent" states a c t u a l l y changed since the c o l o n i a l period? I t can probably be sa i d without too much argument that they, i n f a c t , have not. The p o t e n t i a l sources of c o n f l i c t , however, may have changed. Since 1648 and the Treaty of Westphalia, nation-states have l a i d l e g a l claim to t e r r i t o r i a l sovereignty, legitimate recourse to violence within t h e i r t e r r i -t ory, and p o l i t i c a l independence. The great powers no longer have l e g a l r i g h t to t e r r i t o r i a l expansion (as most of the world's t e r r i t o r y has been claimed). 5 , 6 I t has been suggested by such recent writers as Magdoff and Jalee that the three basic " r i g h t s " of the l e s s developed states are being v i o l a t e d i n more subtle ways than outright t e r r i t o r i a l hegemony. The posturing of the l e s s developed states in- the l a s t few years however, leads one to suspect that the - 3 -less developed countries are Becoming less tolerant of great power activity and influence within their borders. This development represents a new source of potential confl i c t , The question remains as to whether we can c a l l these developed-less developed relationships imperialistic. Most scholars today perceive im-perialism in a negative, pejorative sense. This suggests that there i s something different about imperialism from other dependency Cor interde-pendence) relationships which can be beneficial to Both parties. For the most part, however, discussions of imperialism, since the word entered the English language, have dealt with causes and have neglected an adequate discussion of definitions Cwhich has thus resulted in vagueness and am-Biguity). This study represents an attempt to c l a r i f y the notion of im-perialism and to test some propositions derived from a theory of imperial-ism. This w i l l require, f i r s t , a review of the literature to date. This review, i t i s hoped, w i l l illuminate the conceptual ambiguity in the l i t e -rature. Specifically, we w i l l try to demonstrate that conceptual ambiguity derives from related implicit ideological and procedural controversies which we w i l l try to make ex p l i c i t . 1 _ if _ II. IMPERIALISM - DISCUSSION OF CAUSES  IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE Most e a r l y non-marxist discussions of imperialism saw imperialism from a psychological standpoint. Schumpeter, i n repudiating the marxists, defines imperialism as "the o b j e c t l e s s d i s p o s i t i o n on the part of a state to u n l i m i t -7 ed f o r c i b l e expansion" which derives from a w a r r i o r - c l a s s s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e . Like the marxists, Schumpeter saw the drive f o r expansion a r i s i n g from the c l a s s structure of s o c i e t y . Others, however, tend to anthropomorphize whole s o c i e t i e s and a t t r i b u t e imperialism to n a t i o n a l i s t i c tendencies. Hayes, f o r example, states that imperialism i s a n a t i o n a l i s t i c phenomenon. " I t ex-pressed a r e s u l t i n g p s y c h o l o g i c a l r e a c t i o n , an ardent desire to maintain or g recover n a t i o n a l p r e s t i g e . " S i m i l a r l y Arendt saw imperialism as a n a t i o n -a l i s t i c expansionist phenomenon but motivated by the desire to f i n d a remedy to problems of over-population and excess c a p i t a l . Since the nation-state was l i m i t e d ( i n the l a t e nineteenth century) by t e r r i t o r i a l boundaries, she had to move outside her bounds f o r c i b l y i n order to r e l i e v e pent-up pressures. Others saw imperialism, s t i l l from a psychological p o i n t of view, as a drive for "power". Raymond Aron, i n using the example of H i t l e r , t r i e s to show that expansion was not motivated by economic reasons but by the desire 10 f o r power. In the same vein Thornton s t a t e s , "what i s being looked at i s 11 power - power i t s e l f , not i t s use." "Imperialism i s l e s s a f a c t than a thought. At i t s heart i s the image of dominance, of power asserted; and 12 power i s n e i t h e r used nor witnessed without emotion." The discussion of imperialism to t h i s point has been rather vague mostly because the scholars reviewed thus f a r are themselves rather vague. - 5 -I t i s not c l e a r that we know much more about imperialism at t h i s point than when we set out. Davis' r a d i c a l c r i t i q u e ( i n r e l a t i o n to the s o - c a l l e d con-servative writers reviewed thusfar) serves to set the stage f o r the more t h e o r e t i c a l l y rigorous marxist w r i t e r s . He asserts that the conservative writers ... can not show the organic connection among events, the r i s e and f a l l of long-run movements, the dynamics of imperialism; and t h i s approach i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of many conservative w r i t e r s . Another technique of conservative t h e o r i s t s i s to define imperialism i n such a way as to avoid the main question. Imperi-alism i n t h e i r terms, i s something innate and therefore inescap-able . . . What S e i l l i e r e and other such t h e o r i s t s omit i s the element of e x p l o i t a t i o n , which i s not i n e v i t a b l e . Davis comes a b i t c l o s e r to the meaning of imperialism when he includes the a n c i l l a r y concept of e x p l o i t a t i o n . His discussion of e x p l o i t a t i o n and i t s place i n the d e f i n i t i o n of imperialism i s consistent with marxist theory to which we now turn. Although influenced g r e a t l y by writers of h i s time ( e s p e c i a l l y Hobson and H i l f e r d i n g ) , Lenin set the stage f o r the current debate by d i s t i n g u i s h -ing t r a d i t i o n a l imperialism from what he c a l l e d the "new imperialism." Lenin's work f i r s t published i n 1917, s i g n a l l e d a new d i r e c t i o n i n marxist thought i n that the conception of i n t e r n a t i o n a l behaviour s h i f t e d from a struggle between the c l a s s e s to a struggle among countries caused i n d i r e c t l y by an i n t e r n a t i o n a l s t r a t i f i e d d i v i s i o n of labour among countries. To Lenin, 14 imperialism was "the monopoly stage of c a p i t a l i s m " . A d e f i n i t i o n of i t , for Lenin, must include the following f i v e features: 1) The concentration of production and c a p i t a l developed to such a high stage that i t created monopolies which play a decisive r o l e i n economic l i f e . 2) The merging of bank c a p i t a l with i n d u s t r i a l c a p i t a l , and the c r e a t i o n , on the b a s i s of t h i s "finance c a p i t a l , " of a f i n a n c i a l o l i g a r c h y . -- 6 -3) The export of c a p i t a l which has become extremely important, as d i s t i n g u i s h e d from.the export of commodities. 4) The formation of i n t e r n a t i o n a l c a p i t a l i s t monopolies which share the world among themselves. 5) The t e r r i t o r i a l d i v i s i o n of the whole world among the greatest c a p i t a l i s t powers i s completed.15 Lichtheim notes that there were four d i f f e r e n t kinds of r e l a t i o n s h i p s which Lenin distinguished: ( l ) National oppression of the s o r t p r a c t i c e d i n the o l d dynastic East European empires before 1914-18; (2) c o l o n i a l i s m of the Anglo-Indian type during and a f t e r the m e r c a n t i l i s t era; (3) " l i b e r a l imperialism," c l a s s i c a l l y represented by the B r i t i s h and subsequently the American drive to throw fo r e i g n markets open to Western c a p i t a l ; (4) the t r a n s f e r of surplus value from the poor countries to the r i c h through trade r e l a t i o n s h i p s which i n p r a c t -i c e discriminate against undeveloped economies.1^ Lichtheim proceeds to state that types ( l ) and (2) have become h i s t o r -i c a l l y outmoded and of the remaining two types, recent emphasis has s h i f t e d 17 from type (3) to type ( 4 ) . Marxist and r a d i c a l scholars posed two a l t e r n a t i v e explanations f o r 18 the r e l a t i o n s h i p Lichtheim has designated "type ( 4 ) . " The f i r s t , represent-ed by writers such as Rosa Luxemburg, has been c a l l e d the underconsumptionist hypothesis. This p o s i t s that the t r a n s f e r of surplus value to underdeveloped countries i s necessitated by a d e c l i n i n g propensity to consume by the workers who are the mass i n s o c i e t y , and therefore a d e c l i n i n g average p r o f i t margin. This phenomenon i s p r e c i p i t a t e d by the tendency toward monopoly c a p i t a l which allows the bourgeoisie to reap higher p r o f i t s than i n a competitive s i t u a t i o n , but n e c e s s a r i l y detracts from the spending power of the worker. The a l t e r n -a t i v e hypothesis, which might be c a l l e d the i n e r t i a hypothesis, s t i p u l a t e s that the t r a n s f e r of surplus value i s necessitated by the nature of c a p i t a l formation and the p r o f i t motive which requires c a p i t a l i s t enterprises to keep expanding and i n c r e a s i n g m a r g i n a l and a v e r a g e p r o f i t s . Moran, f o r i n s t a n c e , e x p l a i n s f o r e i g n i n v e s t m e n t e x p a n s i o n by U.S. f i r m s i n terms o f " i n s t i t u -19 t i o n a l n e c e s s i t y " as opposed t o " p r o f i t a b l e c o n v e n i e n c e " . P r e s e n t day 20 m a r x i s t a n a l y s t s seem to adhere to the l a t t e r approach.. T h i s i s t h e v i e w from what c o u l d be c a l l e d t h e m o n o p o l i s t ' s s i d e o f t h e e q u a t i o n ; t h e dominance r e l a t i o n s h i p . On t h e p e r i p h e r y s i d e , t h e dependency r e l a t i o n s h i p i s seen as i n v o l v i n g e x p l o i t a t i o n and u n e q u a l exchange. The m a r g i n a l bene-f i t s a c c r u e d from exchange go t o t h e m o n o p o l i s t power and t h e r e f o r e the 21 22 "gap between t h e two c o u n t r i e s c o n t i n u e s to grow w i d e r . F r a n k adds t h a t t h e s t r u c t u r e s o f i m p e r i a l i s m , as a r e s u l t , become r i g i d i n t h e un-d e r d e v e l o p e d c o u n t r y w h i c h l e a d s to t h e p e r p e t u a t i o n o f t h e dominance-de-pendence r e l a t i o n s h i p , and t h e g r a d u a l s t a g u a t i o n o f the u n d e r d e v e l o p e d economy. The m a r x i s t a p p r o a c h , o f c o u r s e , assumes the paramountcy o f the. economic r e l a t i o n s h i p s from w h i c h f o l l o w p a r a l l e l p o l i t i c a l , c u l t u r a l , m i l i t a r y and o t h e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s . M a r x i s t t h e o r i e s o f i m p e r i a l i s m have been p r o g r e s s i v e i n t h a t t h e y have o u t l i n e d i m p e r i a l i s m as a p r o c e s s i n some c o n c r e t e t a n g i b l e form. T h i s has a l l o w e d f o r more s o p h i s t i c a t e d c r i t i c i s m and development o f i m p e r i a l i s t t h e o r y p e r s e . Cohen, f o r i n s t a n c e , r enounces m a r x i s t d e t e r m i n i s m by p u r p o r t i n g t o show t h a t the t h i r d w o r l d c o u n t r i e s a c t u a l l y b e n e f i t from the exchange r e l a -t i o n s h i p ( a l t h o u g h perhaps n o t as much as the m o n o p o l i s t power), and t h a t t h e m o n o p o l i s t powers a r e n o t as dependent upon t h i r d w o r l d markets as the m a r x i s t s would have us b e l i e v e . Thus, he d e r i v e s an amorphous p o l i t i c a l " t h e o r y " ( a c t u a l l y a d e f i n i t i o n ) o f i m p e r i a l i s m , where i m p e r i a l i s m i s d e f i n e d as "any r e l a t i o n s h i p o f e f f e c t i v e d o m i n a t i o n o r c o n t r o l , p o l i t i c a l o r econo-23 mic, d i r e c t o r i n d i r e c t , as one n a t i o n o v e r a n o t h e r . " To g i v e c r e d i t where c r e d i t i s due, he does emphasize the a n c i l l a r y c o n c e p t o f e x p l o i t a t i o n (measured i n terms of o p p o r t u n i t y c o s t s o f exchange) as a n e c e s s a r y i n g r e d i -- 8 -ent of a d e f i n i t i o n of imperialism, but he does not go f a r enough towards i n -corporating the concept i n t o a formalized t h e o r e t i c a l s t r u c t u r e . I m p e r i a l i s t nations are said to be motivated by the need f o r p r e s t i g e and power; the r e l a t i o n s h i p between business and s t a t e , so e s s e n t i a l to marxist theory, i s i n f a c t non-existent i n the form claimed by marxists, but imperialism remains nevertheless. While Cohen's c r i t i c i s m of the extension of Lenin's theory by contemporary writers i s good, he does l i t t l e to advance the state of theory beyond h i s conservative predecessors. I t i s not the i n t e n t i o n to b e l i e any of the proposed "explanations" to date, but rather to proceed to extract a workable d e f i n i t i o n of what i m p e r i a l -ism i s . I t i s perplexing to the reader s i f t i n g through the l i t e r a t u r e that he never comes across an attempt to make the concept more e x p l i c i t , and there-fore comes away from the discussion none the b e t t e r than he s t a r t e d , wondering i f the discussants a c t u a l l y knew what they were t a l k i n g about. I t appears that some scholars assume some knowledge by the reader of what imperialism i s before they begin and therefore s t a r t the discussion somewhere " i n the middle". This assumes of course that a l l readers have the same conception of what impe-r i a l i s m i s , which i s most assuredly not the case. The subsequent discussion by the scholar, therefore, serves to add more confusion to the debate by adding yet another approach to the study of the concept. - 9 -I I I . CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION AND DEFINITIONS - INTERPARADIGMATIC CONVERGENCE The examination of imperialism i n a formalized manner i n v i t e s two d i s -t i n c t , but r e l a t e d , paradigmatic controversies. The f i r s t controversy de-velops from the pe j o r a t i v e , normative conceptions of the implications of the i m p e r i a l i s t r e l a t i o n s h i p . The majority of North American scholars, i n ab-sorbing the brunt of the r a d i c a l European and t h i r d world denunciation of the p e r p e t r a t i o n of the i m p e r i a l i s t r e l a t i o n s h i p , exude a d i f f i d e n t a t t i -tude towards the subject. This has l e d to the exclusion of imperialism, i n the North American l i t e r a t u r e , as a pos s i b l e explanation of the consequences of s t r a t i f i c a t i o n i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system and a p o t e n t i a l source of con-f l i c t . The second controversy involves modes of a n a l y s i s . Behaviourists, i n attempting to construct generalized explanations of human behaviour, are reluc t a n t to f o l l o w i n the path of, and to a c e r t a i n extent, have been l e d astray by marxist w r i t e r s on imperialism who confine t h e i r explanations of behaviour to a p a r t i c u l a r h i s t o r i c a l era. This i s to say that behaviourists refute the h i s t o r i c a l argument that behaviour i n d i f f e r e n t time periods i s non-comparable because systemic structures change over time which thus a f -f e c t s human behaviour. This d i s c u s s i o n i s developed i n the following pages. Charles McClelland, i n a now s l i g h t l y dated a r t i c l e , described the evolution of (behavioural) theory i n the f i e l d of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s : a 24 f i e l d i n i t s infancy. He described a d i s c i p l i n e i n i t s e a r l y stages charac-t e r i z e d by entropy. Scholars displayed a propensity to borrow approaches and methods from other, more developed s o c i a l sciences i n an e f f o r t to furt h e r theory, with l i t t l e regard f o r a p p l i c a b i l i t y or for the t h e o r e t i c a l i m p l i c a -tions that would be l o s t i n the t r a n s l a t i o n . As the movement evolved, i t - 10 -stopped to r e f l e c t on i t s e a r l y development. As i t stands now, i t i s beginning to move ahead again much more cau t i o u s l y and with respect f o r the i m p l i c a t i o n s of borrowing. However, e m p i r i c a l , s c i e n t i f i c , behavioural theory i n general, and dependency theory i n p a r t i c u l a r , has been hindered i n i t s progress by a reluctance and ambivalence on the p a r t of scholars to synthesize s c i e n t i f i c and h i s t o r i c a l modes of a n a l y s i s . While e m p i r i c i s t s do profess to be h i s t o r i c a l by v i r t u e of l o n g i t u d i n a l data a n a l y s i s , most of t h e i r work i s i n f a c t "snapshot-type" work which examines only a small p e r i o d i n time. From t h i s , they attempt to construct p r e d i c t i v e theory. L i t t l e a t t e n t i o n i s given to p r i o r h i s t o r i c a l analyses which may have important i n s i g h t s i n t o the r e s u l t s they obtain. A l l too often the excuse of the poor nature of h i s t o r i c a l data, which portends of a f e t i s h f o r data gathering, stands i n the way of rigorous h i s t o r i c a l reasoning. Thus, the problem about which George Modelski lamented many years ago, has not been r e c t i f i e d : . . . e a r l i e r models of p o l i t i c a l s o c i e t y which, without f u l l y analyzing the agrarian and i n d u s t r i a l i n t e r n a t i o n a l system as such, i d e n t i f i e d some of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l i m p l i c a t i o n s of d i f f e r i n g modes of economic and s o c i a l o r g anization. They seem to have been passed over by l a t e r students of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e -l a t i o n s , most of whom were aware of and p a i d a t t e n t i o n to at l e a s t some of the consequences of the i n d u s t r i a l r e v o l u t i o n f o r world p o l i t i c s , but have not treated the subject s y s t e m a t i c a l l y or at length. 5 Imperialism as an h i s t o r i c a l concept, has not been treated adequately, i f at a l l , i n the behavioural l i t e r a t u r e . Knorr contends that "One reason for t h i s s t r i k i n g d i f f e r e n c e v i s - a - v i s Europeans l i e s no doubt i n the t r a -d i t i o n a l reluctance of Anglo-American s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s to generalize about the causation of h i s t o r i c a l events and, without such g e n e r a l i z a t i o n , no theory 2 6 of imperialism i s possible.!' The, discussion thus f a r should not be i n t e r -preted as a harangue on the merits of behavioural research as a behavioural i n v e s t i g a t i o n of imperialism i s possible i n p r i n c i p l e . The c r i t i c i s m l e v e l l e d here against behaviourally-oriented dependency theory pertains to the r e c a l c i -trance on the p a r t of such scholars toward using a vast body of l i t e r a t u r e a v a i l a b l e to them that has been accumulated over many y e a r s . ^ One specula-t i v e explanation that could be put forward f o r t h i s repugnance, l a r g e l y on the part of American scholars, i s that "£wjith the emergence of the world s o c i a l i s t s e ctor, an i d e o l o g i c a l dimension has been added i n which s o c i a l i s t versus c a p i t a l i s t r i v a l r y has transcended i n t r a - c a p i t a l i s t r i v a l r y . " 2 8 F o r the most par t , popular i m p e r i a l i s t theory, beginning with H i l f e r d i n g , Kautsky and Lenin, has been couched i n marxist terms. In an e f f o r t to purge t h e i r analyses of i d e o l o g i c a l b i a s , e m p i r i c i s t s also appear to have forsaken the more palatable methodological ( i . e . h i s t o r i c a l ) aspects of the marxist approach. This, I b e l i e v e , has been a mistake. I t would be i n c o r r e c t , however, to s i n g l e out e m p i r i c i s t s f o r c r i t i c i s m i n a discussion of the state of i m p e r i a l i s t theory. Marxist and l i b e r a l h i s t o -r i a n s a l i k e d i s p l a y a reluctance to put t h e i r arguments i n formal terms. Marcuse, f o r instance, argues i n the n e g a t i v i s t p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r a d i t i o n , against the o p e r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of u n i v e r s a l concepts, of which imperialism i s one This aversion to o p e r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n stems from a confusion of the substantive aspects of the i m p e r i a l i s t r e l a t i o n s h i p at d i f f e r e n t points i n time with the broader r e l a t i o n a l concepts associated with imperialism. E m p i r i c i s t s would argue ( r i g h t l y , I think) that imperialism, as a r e l a t i o n a l s o c i a l concept, transcends h i s t o r i c a l epochs, i n s p i t e of the marxist dictum that imperialism i s a p a r t i c u l a r phase i n h i s t o r i c a l e v o l u t i o n . The l a t t e r statement should not be taken to imply ( i n l i g h t of the previous discussion) that a d e f i n i t i o n of imperialism can be extracted without h i s t o r i c a l r e f e r e n t s . These are necess-- 1 2 -ary i n order to o p e r a t i o n a l i z e a nominal d e f i n i t i o n of imperialism i n terms 3 0 of present-day i n d i c a t o r s . In summary, t h i s study makes the behavioural assumption that forms of behavioural r e l a t i o n s h i p s are trans-epochal. At the same time, contemporary imperialism and i t s forms must be examined e m p i r i c a l l y from the point of view of contemporary h i s t o r i c a l referents and manifestations. As a s o c i a l concept, imperialism p r e c e d e s the nation-state although that i s our primary i n t e r e s t here. Though the manifestation or mechanism of imperialism may change depending on the h i s t o r i c a l circumstance, the s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s encapsulized i n the idea of imperialism do n o t . ^ Thus, while the marxists may be r i g h t (but are probably only p a r t l y r i g h t ) i n i d e n t i f y i n g components of imperialism i n conjunction with the mechanisms of c a p i t a l i s m , they are c l e a r l y wrong i n submitting that imperialism _is_ the highest stage of c a p i t a l i s m . "We must now ask ourselves whether there i s something i n the no-t i o n of "empire" that i s independent of the conceptualization undertaken, at d i f f e r e n t times and f o r d i f f e r e n t purposes"?^ We should now be able to l a y the foundations of a preliminary i n v e s t i g a -t i o n i n t o the nature of imperialism at a l e v e l of abstraction removed from the p a r t i c u l a r circumstances of the present h i s t o r i c a l p e r i o d . This requires a d e f i n i t i o n of imperialism. However, i n most cases, as pointed out e a r l i e r , t h e r e 1 i s a noticable absence of e x p l i c i t n e s s i n the l i t e r a t u r e when i t comes 3 3 to d e f i n i t i o n s . Tom T r a v i s o u t l i n e s s i x d i f f i c u l t i e s which are evident i n the present l i t e r a t u r e : l ) Conceptual ambiguity - the l i t e r a t u r e abounds with various d e f i n i t i o n s of imperialism. While most d e f i n i t i o n s include the notion of dominance, there i s disagreement over the pre-c i s e meaning of t h i s term. Also, there are d i f f e r e n c e s about whether dominance (or dependence) i s a s u f f i c i e n t condition or whether i t must be associated with the concepts of inequal-i t y and/or e x p l o i t a t i o n for imperialism to e x i s t . 3 4 - 13 -2) Conceptual parochiality - most studies seem to restrict their definition of imperialism to a particular dimension, either economic or political. 3) Lack of explicit, operational measures. k) Data access - where attempts are made to measure imperialistic behaviour, the data base is often meager. 4 5) Lack of comparative focus - most studies focus on the imperial-ism of a single country, usually the United States, rather than several countries. 6) I d e o l o g i c a l bias - the study of imperialism seems to be accom-panied by more ideological fervor than work in most other areas of international relations. This study will address itself to these inadequacies. Imperialism is a dominance relationship, but this is not a sufficient definition, as many earlier writers on imperialism had believed, because there are many types of dominance relationships which are not imperialistic „ 35 Marshall Singer draws the analogy to the parent-child relationship. The child is dependent on the parent because he must be, but this does not imply that the parent is exploiting the child. At this point, then, we must part company with writers such as Cohen who define imperialism as any type of 3fi dominance relationship. A second component of imperialism is that the two parties are unequal in some way. Dependence and inequality, however, are still not sufficient con-ditions for imperialism to exist as they still describe many types of dominance relationships. The crux of the definition lies in the interaction process between the dominant entity and the dependent entity. I f the relationship is exploitive, then we may say that we have necessary and sufficient condi-tions for imperialism to exist. T r a v i s , in citing Caporaso, sums up the three components of the definition in the following manner; " ^ Inequality - Ik -r e f e r s to the uneven d i s t r i b u t i o n of an a t t r i b u t e ; dependence to a r e l a t i o n a l i n e q u a l i t y of asymmetrical control of one country by another and e x p l o i t a t i o n 37 to the u n f a i r d i s t r i b u t i o n or tr a n s f e r of values." This d e f i n i t i o n i s adopted f o r purposes of the ensuing enquiry. One contentious aspect of the d e f i n i t i o n i s what we mean by " u n f a i r " . Cohen, Tr a v i s and Caporaso maintain that " u n f a i r " i s a normative term. Cohen states that " here can be no agreement on the empirical question of whether e x p l o i t a t i o n even e x i s t s unless there i s p r i o r agreement or concensus on the 3,8 conceptual question of the relevant normative b e l i e f s . " T r a v i s goes so f a r as to suggest that the i n e q u a l i t y component be dropped from the d e f i n i t i o n , assuming that i n e q u a l i t y and unfairness of exchange are not coneptually r e -l a t e d . A r e l a t i o n s h i p may manifest both a t t r i b u t e e q u a l i t y and e x p l o i t a -t i o n . For example, two people may have an equal amount of food and cl o t h i n g , but judge t h i s d i s t r i b u t i o n to be u n f a i r , given t h e i r d i f f e r e n t p h y s i c a l or psychological needs. S i m i l a r l y , goods may be d i s t r i b u t e d unequally and given unequal personal needs, be judged f a i r (and no n - e x p l o i t a t i v e ) . To t h i s w r i t e r , i t i s the u n f a i r a l l o c a t i o n of goods and not t h e i r a t t r i b u t e i n e q u a l i t y that i s e s s e n t i a l to imperialism, even though, as mentioned above, the two us u a l l y (but not always) c o e x i s t . I t seems pre f e r a b l e , therefore, to exclude a t t r i b u t e i n e q u a l i t y from a conceptual d e f i n i t i o n of imperialism In f a c t , however, as the ensuing discussion w i l l attempt to point out, i n e q u a l i t y , c o n t r o l , and asymmetry are the very essence of imperialism. Travis here d i s t i n g u i s h e s between i n e q u a l i t y of cont r o l i n the asymmetrical r e l a t i o n s h i p and a t t r i b u t e i n e q u a l i t y , while t h i s writer does not (since one 40 of the a t t r i b u t e i n e q u a l i t i e s JLS the i n e q u a l i t y of c o n t r o l ) . Another poi n t to be made about imperialism i s that, formally, i t i s -41 multidimensional. This i s an attempt to be t h e o r e t i c a l l y trans-paradigmatic. We diverge from the marxist view and do not make a commitment to economic - 15 -determinism; but ne i t h e r do we make a f u l l swing of the pendulum backwards and make a commitment to p o l i t i c a l or p s y c h o l o g i c a l determinism as some scholars have done i n the p a s t . Imperialism can occur i n anyone of several dimensions. Galtung's typology of economic, p o l i t i c a l , m i l i t a r y , communica-t i o n , and c u l t u r a l imperialism appears to be more a r b i t r a r y than exhaustive, but the p o i n t i s that imperialism i s not unidimensional. Where the confusion may a r i s e i s that when one nation i s ranked low on one a t t r i b u t e dimension, 42 i t i s u s u a l l y ranked low on the others and v i c e - v e r s a . Marxists i n t e r p r e t t the causal flow as running from the economic dimension to the others. No such commitment i s made here and i t may be some time before our a n a l y t i c techniques are r e f i n e d to the degree that we can examine t h i s hypothesis. - 16 -IV. STRUCTURALISM AND IMPERIALISM I t would be h e l p f u l at t h i s point to draw from s o c i o l o g i c a l theory i n order to put imperialism i n t o a formal a n a l y t i c a l conceptual framework. To the chagrin of many analysts of imperialism, we have no common grounds f o r the examination of the phenomenon. T r a v i s , as noted p r e v i o u s l y , scolds contemporary scholars f o r t h e i r "conceptual p a r o c h i a l i t y " and " l a c k of 43 comparative focus". Johan Galtung provides a formal t h e o r e t i c a l frame-work that appears to s a t i s f y others' a n a l y t i c a l d e f i c i e n c i e s . There are some important d i f f e r e n c e s , to be sure. For example, Galtung's theory i s a s t r u c t u r a l "theory", or to be more p r e c i s e , a set of hypotheses about the structure of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s between and/or among e n t i t i e s i n a ( s t r a -t i f i e d ) s o c i a l system. Thus he denies the contention of many of h i s prece-cessors (Aron, Arendt et a l . ) that imperialism i s psychological i n nature. I t also makes imperialism operational e m p i r i c a l l y , through the concepts of i n e q u a l i t y of exchange, dependence and perhaps e x p l o i t a t i o n , since we are only i n t e r e s t e d i n the consequences of the s t r u c t u r a l r e l a t i o n s h i p rather than the motivations behind i t . I t i s the s t r u c t u r a l a t t r i b u t e s of e n t i t i e s i n a s o c i a l system that are the. "causes" of imperialism. Although motivations, which are i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c and psychological i n nature, can be considered causes of imperialism, i t i s not always true that the motivation to e x p l o i t r e s u l t s i n an e x p l o i t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p ; nor i s i t n e c e s s a r i l y true that the 44 45 i m p e r i a l i s t r e l a t i o n s h i p i s a r e s u l t of the motivation to e x p l o i t . ' On t h i s point Galtung i s i n agreement with the marxist l i n e of reasoning, a l -though he disagrees that i t i s n e c e s s a r i l y only the c a p i t a l i s t system that - 17 -constitutes the structural attribute of the imperialist nations that causes imperialism. To Galtung, imperialism is a dominance relation which imposes a struct-ure on the system of collectivities such that there is inequality in living conditions between the dominant and subordinate constituent parts of the system. He makes a major contribution to the literature when he distingui-shes between the constituent parts of the dominant (center) nation and sub-ordinate (periphery) nation. Previous writers had conceived of the imperial-ist relationship as a relationship between two monolithic entities. To Galtung, imperialism is a system in which there is a harmony of interest (no exploitation) between the center in the center nation and the center in the 46 periphery nation. There is more disharmony of interest (exploitation) 47 within the periphery nation than within the center nation. Galtung defines true interests as opposed to false consciousness of parties in terms of "living conditions." In terms of our definition, dif-ferences in living conditions appear to be a manifestation of unequal ex-change, although i t is unclear from Galtung which way the causal arrow 48 flows. To paraphrase Galtung, exchange is said to be fair and equal be tween the center in the Center and the center in the Periphery, while i t is unequal and unfair between the center in the Center and the periphery in the Pheriphery and the center in the Periphery and the periphery in the Periphery. Exchange is more equal and fair between the center in the Center and the pe-riphery in the Center than i t is between the center in the Periphery and the 49 periphery in the Periphery. The structure is such that: In the Periphery nation . . . the center is more enriched than the periphery . . . however, for part of this enrichment, the center in the Periphery only serves as a transmission belt for value forwarded to the Center nation. This value enters the Center in the center, with some of i t drizzling down to the periphery in the Center. Importantly, there is less disharmony of interest in the Center than in the Periphery, so that the  total arrangement is largely in the interest of the periphery in the Center. i U - 18 -Dynamica l l y speak ing , these r e l a t i o n s are s a i d to de f i n e the mechan-isms of i m p e r i a l i s m , o r , the p r i n c i p l e s of the v e r t i c a l i n t e r a c t i o n r e l a - t i o n and the f e uda l i n t e r a c t i o n s t r u c t u r e . " ^ Ga l tung s t a t e s t h a t : I f the f i r s t mechanism, the v e r t i c a l i n t e r a c t i o n r e l a t i o n , i s the major f a c t o r behind i n e q u a l i t y , then the second mechanism, the f euda l i n t e r a c t i o n s t r u c t u r e i s the f a c t o r tha t ma in ta ins t h i s i n e q u a l i t y by p r o t e c t i n g i t . 5 2 The v e r t i c a l i n t e r a c t i o n r e l a t i o n r e f e r s to an i n t e r a c t i o n r e l a t i o n s h i p between Center and Pe r i phe r y a c t o r s tha t i s h i e r a r c h i c a l . Wh i le Ga l tung i s not c l e a r on what determines the h i e r a r c h y , we s h a l l make the case a t a l a t e r po i n t tha t from t h i s e a r l i e r work, he means tha t the v e r t i c a l r e l a t i o n i s a c o n t r o l r e l a t i o n where the Center a c t o r d i c t a t e s the terms of i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h the p e r i p h e r a l ac ross on the b a s i s o f d i f f e r e n t i a l power and s t a t u s . Four r u l e s d e f i n e the f euda l i n t e r a c t i o n s t r u c t u r e : 1. i n t e r a c t i o n between cen te r and pe r i phe r y i s v e r t i c a l - ^ 2 . i n t e r a c t i o n between pe r i phe r y and pe r i phe r y i s m i s s i ng 3 . m u l t i l a t e r a l i n t e r a c t i o n i n v o l v i n g a l l t h r ee i s m i s s i n g 4 . i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h the ou t s i de works i s monopol ized By the c en t e r , w i t h two i m p l i c a t i o n s : (a) P e r i phe r y i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h o the r Center n a t i o n s i s m i s s i ng (the sphere of i n f l u e n c e n o t i o n ) . (B) Center as w e l l as Pe r i phe r y i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h Pe r i phe r y na t i on s i s missing.->4 The e f f e c t of t h i s s t r u c t u r e on i n t e r a c t i o n , as Ga l tung no t e s , i s p o l i t i c a l i n tha t i t p r o t e c t s the Center aga i n s t the pe r i phe r y a long the l i n e s of " d i v i d e and r u l e . " ' ' " ' In examining these r e l a t i o n s h i p s Between p a r t i e s , i t would he e s s e n t i a l to take i n t o account Both i n t e r - and i n t r a - a c t o r e f f e c t s as each i s a ne ce s -sa ry But not s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n i n demonst rat ing the e x i s t en ce of the concept of i m p e r i a l i s t r e l a t i o n s . I t i s the essence of impe r i a l i sm tha t the i n t e r -a c t i o n i s asymmetric ( i n terms of rewards) i n favour of the cen te r i n the Center and the cen te r i n the P e r i p he r y . Th i s theory of i n t e r a c t i o n Between s t a t e s appears to Be i n t u i t i v e l y s a t i s f y i n g as an i d e a l t ype , But a face v a l i d a t i o n of the theory i n e m p i r i c a l r e f e r ence to i n t e r a c t i o n i n the system r e vea l s tha t the s t r u c t u r e of system as o u t l i n e d i n the theory i s not always apparent . For i n s t a n c e , i t i s - 19 -not d i f f i c u l t to f i n d p e r i p h e r a l i n t e r a c t i o n i n the system, which would appear to i n v a l i d a t e the theory i n a s t r i c t sense (e.g. OPEC, OAU, e t c . ) . This suggests that i n adhering to the structure o u t l i n e d i n the theory, we look merely f o r tendencies i n the designated structure rather than adhering to the theory r i g i d l y . Indeed Galtung i s aware of t h i s p o i n t when he states that: Imperialism i s a question of degree and i f i t i s p e r f e c t i t i s a p e r f e c t instrument of s t r u c t u r a l v i o l e n c e . When i t i s l e s s than p e r f e c t , something must be substituted f o r what i s l o s t i n s t r u c t u r a l violence: d i r e c t v i o l e n c e , or at l e a s t the threat of d i r e c t v i o l e n c e . This i s where the m i l i t a r y type of imperialism becomes so important, since i t can be seen as a p o t e n t i a l to be ac t i v a t e d when the other types of imperialism, p a r t i c u l a r l y the economic and p o l i t i c a l types, show important cracks i n the st r u c t u r e . - 20 -V. STATUS AND POWER Contemporary wri t e r s on the concept of imperialism appear negligent once again i n providing d e f i n i t i o n s of what they mean by dominant (Center) and subordinate (Periphery) nations. They assume i m p l i c i t l y that t h e i r discussion w i l l bear out the obvious di f f e r e n c e s between the two sets of countries. To marxists i t i s c l e a r what denotes the d i f f e r e n c e s - economic assets and capabi-l i t i e s . One who does not follow the marxist l i n e completely, wonders how he can a n a l y t i c a l l y d i s t i n g u i s h the dominant nations and the subordinate nations along other dimensions. A c l e a r e r conception of t h i s a n a l y t i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n can be gleaned from the l i t e r a t u r e although i t i s not always made e x p l i c i t . Such writers as Thornton,^ M o r r i s , W a l l e r s t e i n , " ^ H o l s t i , ^ and Ferry^"*" have i m p l i c i t l y r e f e r r e d to status and power as d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g f a c t o r s bet-ween Center and Periphery s t a t e s . We now proceed to a discussion of power, status, and the r e l a t i o n s h i p between them. Imperialism, as noted above, i s a dominance r e l a t i o n s h i p . As such, power i s perhaps the c e n t r a l concept associated with the concept of imperialism. I t i s , however, an elusive concept to deal with e m p i r i c a l l y . The b e l i e f held by many emminent p o l i t i c a l scholars that the essence of p o l i t i c s i s debate over the e f f e c t i v e d i s t r i b u t i o n of means, or, the capacity to achieve ends ( i . e . power), has spawned a diverse l i t e r a t u r e attempting to elucidate the concept 62 of power. Much of the discussion has taken place within the realm of the e l i t i s t - p l u r a l i s t controversy which deals with the locus of decision-making c a p a b i l i t y and authority i n ( s t r a t i f i e d or p l u r a l ) s o c i a l systems. The e l i t i s t - p l u r a l i s t debate assumes purposive behaviour. The d i f f i c u l t y l i e s i n determining the objects of p u r s u i t ( i . e . s a l i e n t goals) and the d e l i n e a t i o n of the relevant s o c i a l groups i n competition to achieve those goals. This - 21 -boundary problem has t r a d i t i o n a l l y been an important one to power t h e o r i s t s . Parsons notes that; " no c o l l e c t i v i t y , even the nation, . - . stands alone 63 as a t o t a l s o c i e t y since i t i s integrated with norms and values.'• The point i s that to contemporary power t h e o r i s t s outside the f i e l d of i n t e r n a t i o n -a l r e l a t i o n s , the discussion of power must be contextual and c i r c u m s t a n t i a l . Wagner maintains that . . . "Sam has power" i s an incomplete sentence. Just as the statement "Sam can" ought to evoke the r e p l y , "Sam can do what?"; so the statement "Sam has powe^" ought to be followed by the query, "the power to do what?"64 The answer to the l a t t e r p a r t of the complete question, "the power to do what?", i s d i c t a t e d by the contextual aspects of the s i t u a t i o n to which the analyst i s r e f e r r i n g . Thus to Wagner, a theory with power as i t s focus must 65 be "a theory of interdependent decisions i n c o n f l i c t s i t u a t i o n s . " The advantage of looking at p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n s and the groups relevant to those; s i t u a t i o n s i s that i t avoids the problem of the ambiguity of the notion of power as a u n i v e r s a l concept and confines the d e f i n i t i o n of power to the a t t r i b u t e s of the groups i n a p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n . This disadvantage of a contextual d e f i n i t i o n of power, however, i s that i t ignores secular trends i n the expression of power by p a r t i c u l a r goups i n any given s o c i a l system ( i . e . i t i s a h i s t o r i c a l ) . As Marcuse i l l u s t r a t e s i n h i s c r i t i c i s m of the p o s i t i v i s t mode of thought, u n i v e r s a l concepts (which power, and even imper-, 66 i a l i s m are) can r e f e r unambiguously to nothing and yet mean much. This i s a problem that we encounter i n the present discussion of imperialism which i s c l e a r l y an h i s t o r i c a l concept. When we speak of imperialism, we are, as has already been noted, speak-ing of a power (dominance-dependence; superordinate-subordinate) r e l a t i o n s h i p between and/or among groups of nations (or t e r r i t o r i e s p r i o r to World War l i ) - 22 -over an extended peri o d of time. Unlike the p l u r a l i s t - e l i t i s t d e c i s i o n -making t h e o r i s t s , at our general l e v e l of a n a l y s i s ("third-image l e v e l " i n contemporary i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s parlance), we cannot be bound by the contextual a t t r i b u t e s of groups i n any given decision-making s i t u a t i o n . Power, as a concept, must be broadly defined and i n t e r p r e t e d so as to include those general aspects of the i m p e r i a l i s t r e l a t i o n s h i p among states over time. Given t h i s rather elaborate prelude, we can now present a d e f i n i t i o n of power which seemingly r e f l e c t s the i n t e n t of the p r e f a t o r y d i s c u s s i o n . Power then i s generalized capacity to secure the performance of binding o b l i g a t i o n s by u n i t s i n a system of c o l l e c t i v e organiza-t i o n when the o b l i g a t i o n s are l e g i t i m i z e d with reference to t h e i r bearing on c o l l e c t i v e goals and where i n case of r e c a l c i t r a n c e there i s a presumption of enforcement by negative s i t u a t i o n a l sanctions - whatever the a c t u a l agency of that enforcement. This widely accepted generalized d e f i n i t i o n of power, however, was intended to r e f e r only to i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d s o c i a l systems. But f o r power to function as a generalized medium i n a complex system, i . e . to mobilize resources e f f e c t i v e l y f o r c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , i t must be " l e g i t i m i z e d " which i n the present context means that i n c e r t a i n respects compliance which i s the common fa c t o r among our media i s not binding, to say nothing, but i s o p t i o n a l . This, however, i s only p o s s i b l e e f f e c t i v e l y within the range of a s u f f i c i e n t l y s t a b l e , i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d normative order so that the r e q u i s i t e degrees of freedom are p r o t e c t e d . ^ Parsons concludes, on the b a s i s of the evidence of the incidence of war, that power, defined as the m o b i l i z a t i o n of resources e f f e c t i v e l y f o r c o l l e c t -i v e a c t i o n , i s non-existent i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system; war i s counterpro-ductive to e f f e c t i v e c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n and i s evidence of the f a i l u r e of 69 power to work. This conception of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system i s consistent with the l i k e s of.Hobbes, M a c h i a v e l l i and Morgenthau, who see the system as an anarchic one i n a perpetual state of nature (or war). The a l t e r n a t i v e , - 23 -i n the t r a d i t i o n of Grotius and the p o s i t i v e j u r i s t s , i s the conception of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system as an anarchic, but o r d e r l y , s e l f - e n f o r c i n g homeo-s t a t i c system. I m p e r i a l i s t theory i s a part of the l a t t e r t r a d i t i o n as w i l l be shown i n more d e t a i l i n the ensuing d i s c u s s i o n . This involves drawing a connection between the concepts of status and power. Parsons, i n f a c t , recognizes the connection between the status and power but does not see f i t to apply h i s an a l y s i s at the l e v e l of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system: The most serious ambiguity here seems to derive from the assump-t i o n that a u t h o r i t y and i t s attendant power may be understood as implying opposition to the wishes of "lower-order" echelons which hence includes the prerogative of coercing or compelling com-p l i a n c e . Though t h i s i s i m p l i c i t , i t may be that the higher-order a u t h o r i t y and power may imply the prerogative i s p r i m a r i l y s i g n i -f i c a n t as " d e f i n i n g the s i t u a t i o n " f o r the performance of the lower-order echelons. The higher "authority" may then make a deci s i o n which defines terms within which other u n i t s i n the c o l l e c t i v i t y w i l l be expected to act, and t h i s expectation i s treated as binding. ^ I t i s Galtung 1s impression that power i s r e l a t i v e to status i n a s t r a t i -71 f i e d s o c i a l system. To Galtung, an e n t i t y ' s status i s defined by i t s 72 rankings on c e r t a i n s a l i e n t a t t r i b u t e dimensions. Rankings tend to be rank concordant, "a nation that ranks high on one dimension also has a tend-73 ency to rank high on others and vice-versa. I t s power then w i l l be r e l a t i v e to i t s t o t a l configuration across a l l a t t r i b u t e dimensions s a l i e n t to status i n the system. In a p a r t i c u l a r circumstance, one country may be able to influence another that might normally be considered more powerful than i t . But i n terms of t o t a l status configuration, i t may be s a i d that the l a t t e r countries have more t o t a l power. Since we are taking a " t h i r d image" view of the world here, our i n t e r e s t l i e s p r i m a r i l y i n the concept of what we c a l l " t o t a l power" which i s a term meant merely to d i s t i n g u i s h the systemic concept - 24 -74 of power from the case study or issue area usage of the word. The r e l a t i o n s h i p between power and status i s s t i l l not c l e a r . I t may be said that power i s r e l a t e d to both achieved and ascribed status i n some way. A s c r i p t i o n , i n a s t r a t i f i e d s o c i a l system, implies that there are c e r t a i n a t t r i b u t e s which, more than others, are agreed upon by most i f not a l l actors i n the system, to be recognized as the parameters of impor-tance i n the system. Achievement may be defined as having more of an a t t r i -bute or a greater ranking on the a t t r i b u t e dimension recognized as important by the c o l l e c t i v i t y of a c t o r s . We have i n f e r r e d therefore that, i n a sense, power i s what everyone, i n the system recognizes i t to b e . ^ Furthermore, the a t t r i b u t e dimensions are knowahle and o p e r a t i o n a l . The most powerful or Center nations may then be interpreted as those nations having the most 76 status i n the system. We have been s k i r t i n g the issue of the d i f f e r e n c e between power and status. From the previous argument, i t may be said that status i s the rank of a nation with respect to i t s a t t r i b u t e s whereas power i s the exer-c i s e of that rank; the concomitant freedom from r e s t r a i n t i n a c t i n g (foreign p o l i c y decision-making) that i s associated with one's status (keeping i n mind the d i s t i n c t i o n made between power and influence; see footnote 75). The emphasis i n t h i s sense i s on ascribed status. If one country i s ascribed more status, and therefore, i t i t i s recognized or perceived to have more power, then that country w i l l have more opportunity to exercise that status l e g i t i m a t e l y , or without external opposition and with compliance. Achieved status becomes more f u n c t i o n a l than ascribed status when power i s used to "prevent influence being exercised over oneself. Imperialism, conceptually points a r e l a t i o n s h i p between achieved and ascribed status. The more c a p a b i l i t y or achieved status a s t a t e has on - 25 -those dimensions of c a p a b i l i t y deemed to be de s i r a b l e by the majority of actors i n the system, the more status w i l l be ascribed to that s t a t e . Hypothetically, there w i l l be an impetus to enter i n t o exchange r e l a t i o n -ships with that state, or i n other words, nations high on dimensions of achieved status, w i l l tend to i n t e r a c t (an i n d i c a t o r of ascribed status) more than nations of lower status both d i p l o m a t i c a l l y ( p o l i t i c a l l y ) and 78 o r g a n i z a t i o n a l l y . I t w i l l be the purpose of t h i s paper to examine t h i s hypothesis e m p i r i c a l l y . - 26 -VI. HYPOTHESES As t h i s study i s only an attempt at a preliminary empirical enquiry, we w i l l only attempt at t h i s time to t e s t one important part of Galtung's r e n d i t i o n of the theory of imperialism, that i s , i n terms of i n t e r - a c t o r e f f e c t s only, to demonstrate the existence of a v e r t i c a l i n t e r a c t i o n r e l a t i o n and p o s s i b l y go so f a r as to show that a feudal i n t e r a c t i o n structure e x i s t s . While i t may be asserted (even by Galtung himself) that the existence of a Center-Periphery ver-cical i n t e r a c t i o n r e l a t i o n does not imply the existence of imperialism unless i t can also be shown that the same r e l a t i o n a p p l i e s equally to the i n t r a - a c t o r r e l a t i o n s and e f f e c t s , we nevertheless maintain that the v e r t i c a l i n t e r a c t i o n r e l a t i o n i s an i n t e g r a l component of imperialism, which, i f i t can be shown to e x i s t e m p i r i c a l l y i n t e r - n a t i o n a l l y , may be a s t a r t i n g p o i n t f o r future research and t e s t i n g , i n t r a - n a t i o n a l l y . I f i t can be shown a l t e r n a t i v e l y , that the v e r t i c a l i n t e r a c t i o n r e l a t i o n does not e x i s t , then i t may be i n f e r r e d that future research on imperialism may be misleading. Indeed, Galtung admits that "the theory developed above i s too complex i n i t s 79 empirical i m p l i c a t i o n s to be tested i n i t s e n t i r e t y , " so i t would appear that garnering support f o r the assumptions of imperialism, as made e x p l i c i t through s o c i o l o g i c a l theory by Galtung, would be a l i k e l y point of departure towards corroboration of the theory. In a d d i t i o n , few empirical attempts have been made to v e r i f y the theory, or at l e a s t parts of i t , so i t would appear that empirical i n v e s t i g a t i o n of the assumptions i s c a l l e d f o r before we may use the theory to explain substantive issues i n the system. In t h i s sense, the majority of contemporary scholars have put the cart before the horse i n examining the substantive i s s u e s . T h i s attempt i s not viewed as an a l t e r n a -t i v e to those studies already undertaken, but as a complement to them i n the - 27 -80 hopes that i t provides f u r t h e r support f o r them. Two primary hypotheses can now be gleaned from the previous discussion: • Hypothesis (a) - The more power and status a state has, the more i n t e r a c t i o n i t w i l l have i n the system (both h o r i z o n t a l l y and v e r t i c a l l y ) . Hypothesis (b) - The l e s s power and status a state has, the more i n t e r a c t i o n i t w i l l have with one p a r t i c u l a r center nation, and the l e s s i n t e r a c t i o n i t w i l l nave with nations of approximately equal or higher ranking. To be p e r f e c t l y c l e a r , we must r e i t e r a t e that the study does not represent an exhaustive i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n t o the nature of imperialism, but w i l l only attempt to t e s t f o r the existence of a v e r t i c a l i n t e r a c t i o n r e l a t i o n , an i n t e g r a l p art of the theory of imperialism. A l o g i c a l a d d i t i o n to hypotnesis (a) might be that the l e s s power a state has, the l e s s i n t e r a c t i o n i t w i l l have i n the system. Also, i f hypothesis (a) i s true, we may expect to f i n d that nations w i l l tend to have more i n t e r a c t i o n with other nations of higher status than with nations of equal or lower status within the imperial domain defined by hypothesis ( b ) . These assertions are consistent with Galtung"s dictum that i n t e r a c t i o n has a tendency to be rank-dependent. This involves the "third-image" l e v e l assumption that, to a great extent, a state's behaviour i s determined by i t s rank among the hierarchy of states i n the system. Therefore, while we may expect a p a r t i c u l a r state's rank to f l u c t u a t e over time, system structure and i n t e r a c t i o n patterns should not change. I n t e r a c t i o n follows a t t r i b u t e rank-ing s . Galtung notes that there w i l l be much i n t e r a c t i o n between nations of high status, l e s s between one of high status and another of low status, and 81 even l e s s between two nations of low s t a t u s . In terms of o p e r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n , then, we must demonstrate the - 28 -existence of c l u s t e r s of states i n t e r a c t i n g within the system such that there i s a Center nation with a nebula of Peripheral nations around i t where the Center nation acts as a terminal f o r Peripheral i n t e r a c t i o n i n the system. Galtung portrays the i d e a l type i n the following manner: P P 11 12 A Feudal Center-Periphery Structure (Galtung, 1 9 7 1 , p.89) I t becomes a feudal i n t e r a c t i o n structure when p e r i p h e r a l i n t e r a c t i o n to other centers i s mediated through i t s "own" Center and no Periphery-Periphery i n t e r -\ a c t i o n e x i s t s . - 29 -VII. OPERATIONALIZATION - THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES We have established that, formally, imperialism i s an e x p l o i t a t i v e , asymmetrical exchange r e l a t i o n s h i p between Center and Periphery nations (with i t s concomitant i n t r a - n a t i o n a l e f f e c t s ) . The currency of t h i s exchange r e -l a t i o n s h i p i s power as manifested through a state's status or rank i n the system r e l a t i v e to other states on c e r t a i n a t t r bute dimensions. The r e l a -tionship i s economic i n the l i b e r a l sense that the dominant power i s attempt-ing to maximize i t s b e n e f i t from the r e l a t i o n s h i p and i s u s u a l l y able to do so, 82 whereas the weaker state increases i t s dependency as a r e s u l t . We have expressed these systemic r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n hypothetical terms f o r purposes of t e s t i n g , i n order to determine the existence of v e r t i c a l i n t e r a c t i o n , an i n t e -g r a l part of the theory under examination here. The problem now a r i s e s as to how to t r a n s l a t e the nominal hypotheses i n t o measurable e n t i t i e s . The purpose of the operational exercise should be to a r r i v e at empirical i n d i c a t o r s that adequately r e f l e c t the status dimensions s a l i e n t to imperialism. The temporal domain of the study w i l l include the period 1950 to i 9 6 0 . The reason f o r beginning i n 1950 although data was a v a i l a b l e f o r e a r l i e r periods, was to t e s t the hypothesis that imperialism i s s t i l l present i n the s o - c a l l e d " n e o - c o l o n i a l " p e r i o d when the e x p l o i t a t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p i s s a i d to be perpetrated on newly independent states rather than on non-sovereign e n t i -83 t i e s as was hypothesized p r i o r to World War I I . The reason f o r terminat-ing the study i n I960, the a v a i l a b i l i t y of data, i s admittedly rather pragma-t i c . Needless to say, future i n v e s t i g a t i o n s should attempt to extend the temporal domain up to the present. The purpose of introducing the temporal domain at t h i s point i s to contrast i t with the r a t i o n a l e behind the empiri-- 30 -c a l i n d i c a t o r s chosen. We have already pointed out on a couple of occasions that imperialism i s conceived here as being a s t r u c t u r a l r e l a t i o n s h i p that transcends h i s t o r i c a l epochs. I t has also been noted that a t e s t of imperi-alism, being a power r e l a t i o n s h i p based on status, must include empirical i n d i c a t o r s of status that are relevant to the p a r t i c u l a r h i s t o r i c a l era under i n v e s t i g a t i o n . We run the r i s k of c o n t r a d i c t i o n , however, when we draw em-p i r i c a l i n d i c a t o r s that are relevant to periods p r i o r to World War I I i f we i m p l i c i t l y hypothesize that the p e r i o d subsequent to World War I I i s sub-s t a n t i v e l y d i f f e r e n t from the antecedent p e r i o d s . Avoiding a p o s s i b l e contra-d i c t i o n i n choosing a set of i n d i c a t o r s becomes a matter of h i s t o r i c a l onto-logy. I t i s p o s s i b l e that the period subsequent to World War I I i s s u b s t a n t i -a l l y d i f f e r e n t to the period p r i o r to the war i n an evolutionary s o r t of way, but s t i l l p a r t of an o v e r a l l h i s t o r i c a l era i n which status values are common. The t r a n s i t i o n from one system to the other a g r a r i a to industry i s not merely a process i n which more and more states became i n d u s t r i a l , as i t were of t h e i r own v o l i t i o n \ i t i s a change that i s mediated through and powerfully r e i n f o r c e d byg^he i n t e r -n a t i o n a l system, which i t s e l f changes i n the process. I t has been hypothesized that the contemporary state system has i t s 85 roots i n the i n d u s t r i a l r e v o l u t i o n , beginning i n the sixteenth century. Our i n d i c a t o r s can be drawn from those status values attendant to i n d u s t r i a l -ism, of which the nation-state system i t s e l f was a byproduct. . . . a f t e r one member of the agrarian system had demonstrated the f e a s i b i l i t y and also the p r o f i t a b i l i t y of such change i n terms of new power and p r e s t i g e , the competitive functioning of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system ensured that other states would make every e f f o r t to a t t a i n s i m i l a r c a p a b i l i t y i n order to avoid a decline i n s t a t u s . I n d u s t r i a l values began to percolate i n t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l c u l t u r e , and culture i n i t s turn, a f f e c t e d behavior i n yet u n i n d u s t r i a l i z e d s t a t e s . In time i n d u s t r i a l power or a f f i l i a t i o n with i t became a sine qua non of n a t i o n a l s u r v i v a l - that i s , of membership i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system. - 3 1 -t A parsimonious s o l u t i o n to the problem of multiple i n d i c a t o r s of 87 power was attempted. Wallace discusses the disadvantages of unidimension-a l power i n d i c e s . One composite index designed to tap a l l relevant power dimensions s u f f e r s from the i n a b i l i t y to assign weights to each of the com-ponents of the index. On the other hand, a unidimensional index based on one i n d i c a t o r i s l i k e l y to be exclusive of many important dimensions of power. Inclusion of multiple i n d i c a t o r s by disaggregation i s l i k e l y to confuse the r e s u l t s because of l i n e a r dependence of the i n d i c a t o r s on each other. An e f f o r t was made therefore, to choose a p r o f i l e of simple i n d i c a t o r s that would r e f l e c t the i n d u s t r i a l , commercial, and m i l i t a r y dimensions of imperialism. These i n d i c a t o r s w i l l then be combined using multiple s t a t i s t i c a l techniques, to t e s t t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l and multiple e f f e c t s on the dependent i n t e r a c t i o n v a r i a b l e s . Energy consumption was chosen as a measure of i n d u s t r i a l capacity and economic development. Wallace j u s t i f i a b l y r u l e s out such i n d i c a t o r s as gross n a t i o n a l product on the bas i s of the a v a i l a b i l i t y of data, but also r u l e s out energy consumption because i t " t e l l s us l i t t l e about the c a p a b i l i t y 88 of p r e i n d u s t r i a l economies." The post-World War II temporal domain, however, warrants i n c l u s i o n of t h i s index. The r e l a t i v e d i s t r i b u t i o n of energy con-sumption throughout the world during t h i s time period appears to tap the very type of r e l a t i o n s h i p we are seeking to examine, that i s the capacity of the developed states to impose upon the l e s s e r developed ones. Energy consumption i s concentrated among a few nations during the e n t i r e time frame. At a l l times, a small number of nations, numbering fewer than a dozen and u s u a l l y located i n Europe and North America, consume over 80 percent of the commercial energy. Over the 100 year period 1870-1970 , the gap between these "energy r i c h " countries and the remainder of the world increases, r e s u l t i n g i n a hi g h l y and i n c r e a s i n g l y s t r a t i f i e d system. The wide gap also i l l u s t r a t e s the almost, overwhelming problem of - 32 -development for poorer nations. An expansion rate of f i v e percent i n A f r i c a n consumption per c a p i t a over the next kO years w i l l b r ing A f r i c a to the energy consumption per c a p i t a l e v e l of North America i n 1925-In the above quotation, Thompson appears to impute subjugation from d i f f e r e n c e s i n energy consumption ( s t r a t i f i c a t i o n and the problem of develop-ment) . The present study attempts to use the index of energy consumption only as a gross i n d i c a t o r of status d i f f e r e n c e s . Instances of e x p l o i t a t i o n can only be properly investigated using d y a d i c a n a l y s i s which i s beyond the scope and i n t e n t of the present enquiry. The index i s a composite measure i n c l u d i n g the sum of commercial energy consumed annually from a l l sources - c o a l , n a t u r a l gas and hydro, and p e t r o -leum . A second index, s t e e l production (measured i n coal ton equivalents) was used as a measure of i n f r a s t r u c t u r e development. Several marxist writers have hypothesized a r e l a t i o n s h i p between the capacity to produce i r o n and s t e e l , and imperialism. F i r s t , i r o n and s t e e l production enables a country to penetrate other l e s s developed countries and develop t h e i r i n f r a s t r u c t u r e by l a y i n g down r a i l r o a d s , telegraph l i n e s and port f a c i l i t i e s . This i s seen 90 as e x p l o i t i v e because i t i s not done without expected remunerative returns. Secondly, developed countries i n an e f f o r t to maintain t h e i r own i n f r a s t r u c t -ure development, are seen to e x p l o i t l e s s developed countries f o r t h e i r 91 sources of raw materials necessary to the production of i r o n and s t e e l . Other l e s s d o c t r i n a i r e writers have also seen a connection between i r o n and s t e e l production and power. Lichtheim, f o r example a t t r i b u t e s the decline i n power of such countries as B r i t a i n and France to the decline i n i r o n and s t e e l 92 production which i s seen as a stimulus to i n d u s t r i a l development. Inclusion - 33 -of two measures of i n d u s t r i a l capacity ( s t e e l production and energy consumption) i s warranted because i t i s f e l t that they measure two s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t things. Energy consumption i s a measure of r e l a t i v e d i f f e r e n c e s i n development of sta t e s , while s t e e l production measures the capacity to continue to develop (and i n terms of i m p e r i a l i s t theory, at the expense of the l e s s e r developed c o u n t r i e s ) . One problem with the s t e e l index i s that i t may be an i n s e n s i t i v e i n -d i c a t o r at lower ends of the scale ( i . e . those countries who produce l i t t l e or no s t e e l ) . While these countries are important t h e o r e t i c a l l y with regard to i m p e r i a l i s t theory, s t a t i s t i c a l analyses may f a i l to d i s -t i n g u i s h among them and they may tend to depress the magnitude of the r e -s u l t s . Another problem may be that although we d i s t i n g u i s h conceptually between energy consumption and s t e e l production, the two i n d i c e s w i l l probably tend to be c o l i n e a r mathematically, which may also tend to de-press the magnitude of the estimated parameters. This can be determined by b i v a r i a t e c o r r e l a t i o n s between the i n d i c e s . I t was f e l t however, that the two i n d i c e s were s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t conceptually to warrant i n -c l u s i o n of both. I n t e r p r e t a t i o n of r e s u l t s must therefore be n e c e s s a r i l y cautious, bearing i n mind the l i m i t a t i o n s of the data and the s t a t i s t i c a l methods. A t h i r d measure, volume of trade (standardized as a percentage of t o t a l trade i n the system) was chosen, not so much as a measure of i n d u s t r i a l power or commercial capacity, but as a measure of wealth and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l sophis-93 t i c a t i o n of a country. W a l l e r s t e i n remarks that the capacity to trade e f -f i c i e n t l y and the endowment with products i n high demand led to the evolu-t i o n of England and France as the mentors of the modern state system. I t "ensconced and c o d i f i e d a new European d i v i s i o n of labor", and led to a - 34 -" s p e c i a l i z a t i o n i n the new s k i l l s required to run a f i n a n c i a l and commercial 94 focus of the world economy." I t has been hypothesized i n the l i t e r a t u r e on contemporary i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s , that the d i v i s i o n of labour induced by trade r e l a t i o n s h i p s has been extended on a world scale; "trade perpetuates the a r t i f i c i a l i n t e r n a t i o n a l d i v i s i o n of labour between developing countries and metropolitan centers, a d i v i s i o n established by imperial power and main-95 tained by lop-sided trade." Cohen adds that the problem of the underdevel-> oped countries "may be the h i s t o r i c a l head s t a r t of the metropolitan center, which prevents them from breaking e a s i l y into established market patterns or 96 denies them access to most modern advances i n technology." Trade patterns are therefore seen not only as a h i n d r a n c e to economic development, but are also seen i n h i s t o r i c a l perspective, as a h i n d r a n c e to o v e r a l l upward status m o b i l i t y . The adoption of trade volume as a p a r t i c u l a r -l y good i n d i c a t o r of status d i f f e r e n c e s i s supported by Alschuler who sees trade as being representative of i n t e r a c t i o n structures which maintain and 97 e s t a b l i s h i n e q u a l i t i e s between nations. A fourth and f i n a l i n d i c a t o r of achieved status was chosen to represent the m i l i t a r y aspect of imperialism. Winslow, f o r example, states that "we s h a l l use the terms "imperialism" and " m i l i t a r i s m " repeatedly, and i t may as well be s a i d f i r s t as l a s t that they are coeval terms, representing the same general pattern of thought and behavior i n the ordering of human r e l a t i o n -98 ships." Winslow perhaps overstates the case and Galtung i s more accurate i n i d e n t i f y i n g m i l i t a r i s m as a type of imperialism that i s invoked only when other more subtle s t r u c t u r a l r e l a t i o n s of deference and compliance, based on status and power, f a i l to function p e r f e c t l y . The i n d i c a t o r chosen was m i l i t a r y personnel. Some may argue,rightly, - 35 -that the number of personnel does not adequately r e f l e c t the capacity f o r that army to mobilize. As Wallace notes, t h i s index would tend "to i n f l a t e the m i l i t a r y strength of l a r g e , poor nations with sizeable but i n e f f e c t i v e armies," and would tend to deflate the strength of armies that are h i g h l y 99 advanced t e c h n o l o g i c a l l y and have l e s s need f o r manpower. While i t i s true that another i n d i c a t o r such as m i l i t a r y expenditures might have been included as a counter-balancer to the d e f i c i e n c i e s of the m i l i t a r y personnel index, problems of a v a i l a b i l i t y and r e l i a b i l i t y mitigated against i t s i n c l u -s i o n . L o c a l currencies standardized i n terms of American d o l l a r s , f o r ex-ample, do not r e f l e c t the buying power of those currencies i n d i f f e r e n t markets, M i l i t a r y expenditures, therefore, may be no more of an adequate r e f l e c t i o n of strength than personnel. These then, are our measures of achieved status i n the system. We assume that they adequately r e f l e c t the i n d u s t r i a l capacity, i n f r a s t r u c t u r e develop-ment, wealth and organization, and m i l i t a r y strength of a nation. We hypo-thesize that the greater a nation's t o t a l configuration on these i n d i c e s , the more status that nation w i l l be ascribed, or i n other words, the more capable that nation w i l l be, of g e t t i n g nations below i t on the status hierarchy to defer to i t s p o l i c i e s . To r e i t e r a t e , our a n a l y s i s w i l l only attempt to r e -f l e c t i n e q u a l i t y i n the system. Any inferences concerning dependency and e x p l o i t a t i o n on a dyadic basis or i n a general systemic manner, must n e c e s s a r i -l y be speculative, even i f i n t u i t i v e l y s a t i s f y i n g , pending fur t h e r enquiry. We now proceed to a discussion of the dependent i n t e r a c t i o n v a r i a b l e s . Dependent Var i a b l e s Diplomatic r e c o g n i t i o n has often been adduced to be the epitome of status a s c r i p t i o n and influence i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system. Marshall Singer asserts - 36 -that "the most normal channel of influence, of course, has always been the regular diplomatic channel . . . The advisor i s there p r e c i s e l y to exercise influence . . . Very often Powers are perceived i n weaker countries as nearly 100 omnipotent." Cohen adds that, " . . . given the existence of i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n e q u a l i t y and the i n t e r a c t i o n s of s p e c i f i c groups and organizations, imperial c o n t r o l may be imposed d i r e c t l y , through extension of formal p o l i t i c a l sover-eignty; or i t may be accomplished i n d i r e c t l y , through informal diplomatic or 101 m i l i t a r y pressures . . ." The f i r s t i n d i c a t o r of a s c r i p t i o n then, i s d i p l o -102 matic r e c o g n i t i o n . As Singer and Small note, t h i s i n d i c a t o r i s appropriate because i t ( l ) r e f l e c t s a wide range of considerations that are germane to each nation i s f o r e i g n p o l i c y ; (2) i t f i n d s expression i n a s i n g l e behavioural event or decision; and (3) i t i s a d e c i s i o n that leaves a " t r a c e " that i s r e l i a b l y and unambiguously observable and q u a n t i f i a b l e . For purposes of t e s t i n g the f i r s t hypothesis, the score f o r t h i s v a r i a b l e was based on the number of missions received by each s t a t e . Another v a r i a b l e , i n t e r n a t i o n a l governmental organization member, was included as an i n t e r a c t i o n v a r i a b l e that r e f l e c t s ascribed status outside of the formal state apparatus. The more power c a p a b i l i t y or achieved status a state has, the more l i k e l y i t i s that i t w i l l enter i n t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l organi-zations; the more i t w i l l be perceived as being important enough to be i n c l u d -ed. Claude, f o r example, states that "the achievements of i n t e r n a t i o n a l organization include notable gains i n the f i e l d of noncoercive regulatory devices. The agencies of the United Nations system exercise s u b s t a n t i a l i n -103 fluence and c o n t r o l - i n short, power - over the behaviour of states . . ." Of course membership i n an i n t e r n a t i o n a l organization says nothing about the way a state behaves i n that organization. Inclusion of t h i s index implies some (tentative) assumptions about the decision-making process i n the i z a t i o n a l context. S p e c i f i c a l l y i t implies that the most powerful states w i l l be delegated the authority to set the norms of behaviour within the organization, and to construct the organization i n the f i r s t p l a c e . Organski i s i n agreement when he states that The contention that the major i n t e r n a t i o n a l organizations serve p r i m a r i l y as instruments of l e g i t i m a t i o n i s r e i n f o r c e d by the timing of t h e i r appearance at the end of the Napoleonic Wars and a f t e r World Wars I and I I . Each of these periods saw the r i s e of a new dominant nation and s i g n i f i c a n t changes i n the dominant i n t e r n a t i o n a l order. Each was a time when new a t t i t u d e s and new patterns of behavior were being established i n i n t e r -n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s and when the need for l e g i t i m a t i o n was there-fore most acute, a time when the new dominant nation was seeking ways to gain legitimacy f o r i t s own p r i v i l e g e s and power and f o r the power structure i t had come to head.^-®** Summarily, i n operational terms we have hypothesized that the more achieved status a state has i n terms of i n d u s t r i a l capacity, i n f r a s t r u c t u r e development and capacity to develop, wealth and organization, and m i l i t a r y capacity, the more status w i l l be ascribed to i t ; the more i t w i l l be c a l l e d upon to i n t e r a c t i n diplomatic and organization terms. We cannot, to r e i t e r -ate, take t h i s a n a l y s i s further here, as the i m p e r i a l i s t t h e o r i s t s do, and speculate that ascribed status i s used to defer domestic and foreign p o l i c i e s of other l e s s powerful s t a t e s . - 38 -VII I . ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUES AND RESULTS  (a) Hypothesis I The more power and status a state has, the more i n t e r a c t i o n i t w i l l have i n the system (both h o r i z o n t a l l y and v e r t i c a l l y ) . We have stated on occasion that, according to our theory, a state's achieved power c a p a b i l i t y i s not indicated by anyone index, but by a l l i n d i c e s together. I t was thus deemed appropriate to use a multiple v a r i a b l e a n a l y t -i c a l technique that would t e s t the j o i n t e f f e c t s of the independent or p r e -d i c t o r v a r i a b l e s against the. dependent v a r i a b l e s . Ordinary least-squares multiple regression was chosen f o r t h i s purpose. Mu l t i p l e regression provides that the dependent v a r i a b l e be written a l g e b r a i c a l l y as a function of the p r e d i c t o r v a r i a b l e s i n the form Y = a + b.x. + b„x„ . . . b„x„ + u where Y i s the dependent v a r i a b l e , a i s the i n t e r c e p t or constant, where b^ t e l l s us how much of a change i n v a r i a b l e K i s needed to produce a u n i t change i n Y holding a l l others constant, and where u i s the e r r o r term which t e l l s us how much of the variance i n Y i s not explained by the independent v a r i -ables i n the equation. M u l t i p l e regression i s most commonly performed i n an i t e r a t i v e stepwise fashion. This allows f o r the independent v a r i a b l e which explains ( s t a t i s t i c -a l l y ) the most variance i n the dependent v a r i a b l e to be s l o t t e d i n t o the equation f i r s t . A l l the others follow i n descending order of magnitude i n terms of variance explained, u n t i l e i t h e r a l l the v a r i a b l e s are included or a c e r t a i n threshold l e v e l i s reached. A second method of performing multiple regression was also used to act as a check on the deficiencies of the stepwise procedure. Often the amount of variance explained by any one variable in using the stepwise procedure depends upon the point at which i t i s slotted into the equation. One can get different results depending upon the iterative order of the procedure. It i s often possible,using combinatorial regression, to get a f i t of the model which i s significantly better than that achieved by the stepwise pro-cedure. This i s done by regressing a l l combinations of the independent var-iables against the dependent v a r i a b l e s . I t i s possible to obtain better results by excluding those independent variables whioh add l i t t l e to the 2 magnitude of the R of the equation but are s t i l l within the significant threshold level to warrant inclusion i n the stepwise model. Before proceeding to outline the results achieved by the use of these methods, a couple of qualifications must be appended regarding the r e l i a b i l i t y of the methods. There i s the p o s s i i i l i t y that our data violate the assump-tions of the s t a t i s t i c a l method in two ways. F i r s t , i f our independent variables are highly intercorrelated,we encounter a problem known as multi-collinearity which violates the assumption of regression that the variables should be linearly independent. If, i n the data input matrix, the values on the variables have a tendency to be equal or multiples of each other, the result of the analysis tends to reflect error variance as the distinguishing feature between two explanatory variables. Since our explanatory variables are multiple indicators of one concept, they are, by definition, theoreti-cally related, so multicollinearity i s conceivably a problem. This i s borne out by examination of Pearson correlation coefficients among the independent variables for each of the three years included in the study. The implications - ko -of high i n t e r c o r r e l a t i o n w i l l become c l e a r upon close examination of the regression r e s u l t s . TABLE 1 PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS AMONG THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 1950 S t e e l Energy Trade M i l i t a r y S t e e l 1.00 Energy- 1.00(.996) 1.00 Trade .88 .87 1.00 M i l i t a r y •51 .49 .76 1.00 1955 -S t e e l 1.00 Energy • -99 1.00 Trade .8k .8k 1.00 M i l i t a r y .77 .66 .kg 1.00 I960 S t e e l 1.00 Energy .93 1.00 Trade .8k .81 1.00 M i l i t a r y .80 .77 .55 1.00 A second problem that may be encountered when time i s a f a c t o r i n the model, i s a u t o c o r r e l a t i o n . This occurs when the e r r o r term or r e s i d u a l s , are s e r i a l l y c orrelated; i . e . variance' i n the dependent va r i a b l e can be accounted f o r by non-zero c o r r e l a t i o n among the erro r terms over time. This i s u s u a l l y i n d i c a t i v e of a fac t o r being l e f t out of the equation. I f t h i s should be the case, the variance of the estimates would be larger.than they should be ( i . e . our model would appear to f i t much bett e r than i t should), and we would obtain an underestimate of the variance of the standard error of the estimates; our chances of Type I erro r are increased - accepting the model when i t should be rejected.'''^ Steps were taken to minimize the po s s i b l e e f f e c t s of au t o c o r r e l a t i o n i n the present a n a l y s i s . In e f f e c t , three d i f f e r e n t diachronic rather than l o n g i t u d i n a l analyses were performed f o r comparative purposes, to net out time s e r i e s a u t o c o r r e l a t i v e e f f e c t s . Since data on the independent v a r i -ables were c o l l e c t e d only at f i v e year i n t e r v a l s (1950, 1955» i960), they were measured against the independent v a r i a b l e s i n the same year. I t can be questioned as to whether t h i s i s a v a l i d approach. There i s no i n t u i t i v e reason however, that would lead us to believe that power i n any one year would p r e d i c t to i n t e r a c t i o n and a s c r i p t i o n only i n the fut u r e . The achievement of power i s a slow process and not l i a b l e to fl u c t u a t e y e a r l y or even quinquenni-a l l y . Evidence has shown that rank p o s i t i o n s and t h e i r concomitant i n t e r a c t i o n e f f e c t s tend to be quite stable over r e l a t i v e l y short periods of time, such as the temporal domain of t h i s s t u d y . T o be c e r t a i n however, values on the dependent va r i a b l e were co r r e l a t e d against p r i o r values on the independent v a r i a b l e s to t e s t f o r the e f f e c t s of time l a g s . The r e s u l t s are presented i n Table 2. An examination of the r e s u l t s i n Table 2 supports the contention that there are few time s e r i e s e f f e c t s on the i n t e r a c t i o n v a r i a b l e s . We can there-fore s a f e l y say that we should not worry too much about aut o c o r r e l a t i o n due to the time f a c t o r . The b i v a r i a t e a n a l y s i s i l l u m i n a t e s some general trends that might be watched f or i n examining the regression r e s u l t s . Looking at the f a r r i g h t hand column i n a l l cases, trade appears to be the best p r e d i c t o r of i n t e r a c t i o n . - 42 -TABLE 2 EXAMINATION OF POSSIBLE TIME LAG EFFECTS OF THE INDEPENDENT POWER VARIABLES ON THE DEPENDENT INTERACTION VARIABLES Diplomatic Missions (1950) 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 S t e e l •55 •54 •53 •53 •51 Energy- .42 42 .43 • 43 .42 Trade .64 .62 •63 .bl •59 M i l i t a r y .41 .41 .42 •30 •31 Intergovernmental Organizations (1950) S t e e l .26 .26 .26 • 27 • 25 Energy .28 .27 .28 .28 .27 Trade •52 •52 .54 • 56 .54 M i l i t a r y .11 .12 •13 .18 .06 Diplomatic Missions (1955) 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 S t e e l .47 .47 • 45 • 45 .45 Energy .45 .45 .44 .44 .44 Trade .64 .62 .62 •63 .62 M i l i t a r y •34 •32 •31 .29 .27 Intergovernmentel Organizations (1955) S t e e l .21 .21 .20 .22 •23 Energy .28 .27 .27 •27 .27 Trade •55 .54 • 53 •56 .54 M i l i t a r y .15 .13 •13 •13 .11 Diplomatic Missions (i960) S t e e l Energy Trade M i l i t a r y Intergoverumentel Organizations (i960) S t e e l Energy Trade M i l i t a r y 1956 1957 1958 1959 I960 .39 .38 .34 •34 •34 .39 •39 .38 •37 •35 .53 •53 •53 •52 •53 .28 •30 •31 •31 .27 .19 .20 .18 .18 .18 .24 .24 . •23 .22 .23 .52 -52 •52 • 52 •56 .14 .14 .15 .16 .13 - k3 -Secondly, scores on the energy and s t e e l i n d i c e s appear to be very c l o s e . T h i r d l y , the power i n d i c e s do not appear to p r e d i c t well to inter-govern-mental organization as an i n d i c a t o r of i n t e r a c t i o n . The stepwise regression r e s u l t s are presented i n Table 3-Combinatorial regression produced only one d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t that was worthy of noting (Table k). For 1950 with intergovernmental organizations 2 as the dependent v a r i a b l e , an R of .77 was achieved by s l o t t i n g i n energy, s t e e l and trade. This compares with the R of .63 achieved using the stepwise procedure where only trade and m i l i t a r y personnel were s l o t t e d into the equa-t i o n before the tolerance l e v e l was achieved. The difference between these . . . 108 two r e s u l t s was, however, i n s i g n i f i c a n t . Using the s t e e l index severely r e s t r i c t e d the extent of v a l i d inference of the model since many nations produced no s t e e l i n any given.year. The e f f e c t s of t h i s f o r the model are such that the r e s u l t s are severely skewed towards one of the axes, since many scores are zero on one index. Although the zeros are v a l i d scores, they cannot be handled well by the s t a t i s t i c a l technique; the r e s u l t s obtained by i n c l u d i n g the zeros were f e l t to portray a d i s t o r t e d p i c t u r e . The zeros were therefore dropped from the a n a l y s i s , but t h i s amounted to making inferences on the basi s of as few as 3^ observa-tions i n some cases. P a r t i c u l a r l y a f f e c t e d by t h i s procedure are the l e a s t developed countries which are perhaps the most important to the subject under discussion here, since they are most l i k e l y to be those countries most de-pendent on the countries at the upper end of the power continuum. Increas-ing the e f f e c t i v e N to over s i x t y - f i v e by i n c l u d i n g only three power i n d i c e s , did not, however, s i g n i f i c a n t l y a l t e r the r e s u l t s , so the complete r e s u l t s are reported here.. - 44 -TABLE 3 STEPWISE REGRESSION RESULTS Dependent Variable - Diplomatic Missions 1950 R 2 = .9k R 2 ? - R g weight Trade -47 .47 2.31 M i l i t a r y •59 -11 - 1 .03 Energy .85 .26 - 4 . 5 8 S t e e l •94 •09 3-57 - Intergovernmental Organizations 1950 R 2 = .63 R 2 - R 2 jJ weight Trade •32 .32 1 .22 M i l i t a r y •63 .31 - 0 . 8 6 Tolerance Level I n s u f f i c i e n t f o r Further Computation. Dependent Variable - Diplomatic Missions 1955 R 2 = .48 • R 2 2 — R fj weight Trade • 43 .43 1 .01 Energy .48 .05 V> -05 - 0 . 6 6 M i l i t a r y .48 .01 P ; - .05 0 . 0 8 S t e e l .48 .00 p > . 0 5 0.18 - Intergovernmental Organizations 1955 R 2 = .61 R 2 A R 2 pweight Trade -32 .32 1 .32 S t e e l •53 .21 - 3 . 0 1 Energy •57 .04 I . 9 5 M i l i t a r y .61 .03 0 .28 Dependent Variable - Diplomatic Missions i 9 6 0 R 2 = .41 R 2 A R 2 £ weight Trade •31 .31 I . 6 3 S t e e l .38 .07 -1 .01 M i l i t a r y .41 .03 P>. .05 0 . 3 0 Energy .41 .00 p ^ . 0 5 0 .20 - if 5 -TABLE 3 (Contd.) Dependent Variable - Intergovernmental Organizations i960 R 2 = .69 R2 AR 2 pweight Trade .31 .31 I .63 S t e e l .60 .29 -1.79 M i l i t a r y .69 .09 0.53 Energy .69 .00 p .05 0. l8 - 46 -TABLE 4 COMBINATORIAL REGRESSION RESULTS - ALL COMBINATIONS OF THREE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES Dependent Variable - Diplomatic Missions 1950 R = . 44 £ weight Energy -4.92 M i l i t a r y -0.07 p 7 .05 S t e e l 5.44 R 2 = .85 Energy -1.21 M i l i t a r y -1.01 Trade 2.51 R 2 = .61 Energy _3.62 S t e e l 3.31 Trade 0.92 R 2 = .78 M i l i t a r y -0.93 S t e e l 1.09 Trade 2-35 Diplomatic Missions 1955 R 2 = .21 Energy _o .48 p > .05 M i l i t a r y -0.11 p > .03 S t e e l 1.00 p > .05 R 2 = .48 Energy -0.49 M i l i t a r y 0.09 p > .05 Trade 1.25 R 2 = .48 Energy -0.79 P>.05 S t e e l 0.39 P y .05 Trade 0-99 R 2 = .48 M i l i t a r y S t e e l Trade 0.12 -0.49 1.01 P> .05 - k7 -TABLE 4 ( C o n t d . ) Dependen t V a r i a b l e - D i p l o m a t i c M i s s i o n s i960 R 2 = .13 ^ w e i g h t E n e r g y 0.43 p ^ .05 • M i l i t a r y -0.11 p > .05 S t e e l 0.01 p ? .05 R 2 = .34 E n e r g y -031 p > .05 M i l i t a r y 0.05 p 7 -05 T r ade O.78 R 2 = .39 E n e r g y 0.27 p > .05 S t e e l -0.72 Trade 0.95 R 2 = . 41 M i l i t a r y 0.32 p >.05 S t e e l -O.85 T rade 1.11 Dependent V a r i a b l e - I n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l O r g a n i z a t i o n s 1950 2 R = .12 E n e r g y 2.77 v> .05 M i l i t a r y -0.00 p>.05 S t e e l -2.51 P7 - 0 5 E n e r g y n o n - c o n v e r g e n c e M i l i t a r y T r ade R 2 = .77 E n e r g y 4.89 S t e e l - 6 . 14 T rade 1-73 M i l i t a r y S t e e l T r ade n o n - c o n v e r g e n c e - 48 -TABLE 4 (Contd.) Intergovernmental Organizations 1955 2 R = .14 weight 2.19 Energy M i l i t a r y S t e e l Energy M i l i t a r y Trade Energy S t e e l Trade M i l i t a r y S t e e l Trade Energy M i l i t a r y S t e e l Energy M i l i t a r y Trade Energy S t e e l Trade M i l i t a r y S t e e l Trade R = .47 R = .57 R R .54 R = Intergovernmental Organizations i960 .07 .45 R = .61 = .69 0.04 -1.97 -0.75 0.03 1.18 1.52 -2.32 1.23 0.17 -1.01 1.34 0.53 -0.08 -0.25 -0.72 0.09 1.10 0.31 -1.27 1.38 0.54 -1.65 1.65 p> .05 P> .05. P > .05 P> .05 P> . 0 5 P> -05 P> .05 P> .05 P> .05 - 4 9 -2 The magnitudes of the stepwise R go a long way toward confirming the hypothesis that i n t e r a c t i o n i s h i g h l y associated with achieved status or power, but a note of caution should be i n j e c t e d into the d i s c u s s i o n . Tw6 of the trends observed from the b i v a r i a t e a s s o c i a t i o n s appear to have been v e r i -f i e d by the regression model. F i r s t l y trade appears to explain most of the variance i n a l l but a couple of cases. More s p e c i f i c a l l y , although the power ind i c e s appear to have predicted well to i n t e r a c t i o n as i n d i c a t e d by i n t e r -governmental organization membership, which could not have been pre d i c t e d from the b i v a r i a t e c o r r e l a t i o n s , most of the variance i s explained by trade. This i s a l l the more noticeable from the combinatorial regression r e s u l t s when 2 trade was not included i n the equation. The R tended to be very low, i n d i c a -t i n g that the power i n d i c e s , exclusive of trade, do not explain well i n t e r -governmental organization membership. While trade was h i g h l y c o r r e l a t e d with the other i n d i c e s , i t does not appear that the e f f e c t was simultaneous with 2 regard to the independent v a r i a b l e s . Thus, although the magnitude of the R i s h i g h l y s a t i s f a c t o r y , care should be exercised i n g e n e r a l i z i n g too broadly from the r e s u l t s . Although the best r e s u l t s of the combinatorial regression procedure were not s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t from the stepwise procedure, the j u x t a p o s i -t i o n of the two h i g h l i g h t s the problem of m u l t i c o l l i n e a r y . Regressions de-2 letin'g the trade v a r i a b l e have very low multiple R , whereas those i n c l u d i n g 2 the trade variable improve the R g r e a t l y and the other v a r i a b l e s ' influence appears n e g l i g i b l e . M u l t i c o l l i n e a r e f f e c t s have p a r t i c u l a r influence on the j£ weights, the. standardized regression c o e f f i c i e n t s . While the regression c o e f f i c i e n t s are standardized i n terms of the r e l a t i v e d i s t r i b u t i o n of the respective independent and dependent v a r i a b l e s and these could range any - 50 -number standard deviations, the assumptions of regression modelling in-clude that the distributions of the variables should be normal. If the distributions of both the independent and dependent variable are normal, then the weight would not fluctuate beyond the +1 to -1 range and could be interpreted in a manner similar to the Pearson correlation co-efficient. The fact that most of the significant weights l i e out-side the +1 to - A range suggests that the distributions are not normal, but the pattern of fluctuation of the weights (as seen from the com-binatorial regression results) also suggests that multicollinearity is having an inflationary effect on them. Specifically, the steel and energy variables tend to balance each other off, while the trade and military relationships remain relatively stable. One should guard against interpreting a negative weight as indicative of an inverse relationship between the independent and dependent variables, in this case due to the effects of multicol-linearity. We don't , know how wide the confidence intervals are. It appears that the high negative value on the energy index is usually associated with a high positive value on the steel index - 51 -Moreover, i n some cases the sign changes on one value when the value f o r the other i s dropped. C l e a r l y t h i s i s caused by the p a t h o l o g i c a l ( i n t h i s case) e f f e c t s of collinearx-cy. A more r e a l i s t i c estimation of the values of the c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r the s t e e l and energy v a r i a b l e s might De achieved Dy taking the median score between the two values. This would provide a score that i s not a f f e c t e d by the c o l l i n e a r i t y of the two v a r i a b l e s and i s only i n f l a t e d by the e f f e c t s of a non-normal d i s t r i b u t i o n . In any event, the trade v a r i a b l e , which explains most of the variance i n the dependent v a r i a b l e , does not appear to be a f f e c t e d g r e a t l y by exclusion or i n c l u s i o n of other v a r i a b l e s , although i t i s hig h l y i n t e r c o r r e l a t e d with the others. Again, the magnitude of i t s P weight values i s probably i n f l a t e d , but only s l i g h t l y r e l a t i v e to energy and s t e e l . In summary, although we may be j u s t i f i e d i n making f i n e d i s t i n c t i o n s between the conceptual categories i n d i c a t e d by energy, s t e e l and trade, empiric-a l l y they are i n t e r r e l a t e d and non-distinguishable s t a t i s t i c a l l y with any accuracy. Instead of having found i n d i c a t o r s f o r i n d u s t r i a l achievement, i n d u s t r i a l capacity, wealth and organization, i t appears that we have merely tapped an economic dimension per se. Nevertheless, the magnitude of the R a t t e s t s to the importance of the economic dimension of achieved status and power towards i n t e r a c t i o n i n the system and confirms our hypothesis i f only i n a l i m i t e d capacity. The m i l i t a r y dimension as in d i c a t e d by m i l i t a r y personnel, does not fare as well by comparison. What appears to be m i s s i n g from the a n a l y s i s are i n d i c a t o r s of a purely p o l i t i c a l nature. We s h a l l return to the point l a t e r . - 52 -(b) Hypothesis I I The l e s s power and status a state has, the more i n t e r a c t i o n i t w i l l have with one p a r t i c u l a r center nation, and the l e s s i n t e r -a ction i t w i l l have with the nations of approximately equal or higher ranking. The second hypothesis i s designed to t e s t f o r a feudal i n t e r a c t i o n s t r u c t u r e . In order to t e s t f o r t h i s , we need to delineate configurations of i n t e r a c t i o n p a t t e r n s . Smallest Space Analysis (SSA) was cnosen f o r t n i s purpose. SSA i s a data reduction tecnmque that does not require the s t r i c t assumptions of xhe input matrix that i s required of older, techniques such as f a c t o r a n a l y s i s . I t i s non-metric; i t i s s e n s i t i v e only to the rank orderings of the data and not a c t u a l values themselves. Therefore i t i s l e s s susceptible to p o s s i b l e random e r r o r i n the input data. . . . the dimensionality of the output configuration (the number of dimensions or factors) i s u s u a l l y much lower with SSA than with f a c t o r a n a l y s i s ; i n f a c t , SSA always produces the minimum p o s s i b l e dimensionality with the constraints of a permissible " f i t " . A second and somewhat r e l a t e d advantage i s the ease with which the SSA output configuration may be represented s p a t i a l l y . Although the input matrix need not f u l f i l l the requirements of a Euclidean space, the output configuration i s transformed to do so by applying Guttmann's p r i n c i p l e of rank images; the distances between the points i n the output configuration w i l l then f u l f i l l a l l the metric requirements while simultaneously preserving the o r i g i n a l rank order among the points to a very close tolerance. Since a good f i t to most data can be obtained i n very few dimensions, t h i s allows us to represent the underlying r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n the matrix as r e a l distances i n two-or three-dimensional space, g r e a t l y f a c i l i t a t i n g i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . The output w i l l i n f a c t constitute a multidimensional map . ,.109( Furthermore, the use of SSA circumvents the t h e o r e t i c a l - l o g i c a l metric problem implied by the hypothesis. The use of power i n d i c e s implies a d i s c r e t e power continuum; i e.: f o r which there must be a determinate be-ginning point and end p o i n t . A t e s t of Hypothesis I I using a metric technique must l o g i c a l l y begin by s p e c i f y i n g a country or group of countries at the 53 -upper end of the power continuum deemed to be the most powerful. Determining a c u t o f f point matnematically between countries that are dominant and those that are dependent becomes an a p r i o r i t h e o r e t i c a l problem which, since we have no d e f i n i t i v e power c r i t e r i o n , i s unsolvable. S i m i l a r l y , such non-110 111 metric techniques as those used by Brams and Kegley and Wittkopf also require i n i t i a l s p e c i f i c a t i o n of the most powerful or " i n f l u e n t i a l " c o u n t r i e s , and are, to some extent, s e l f - v a l i d a t i n g . The bSA technique, however, arrays states i n terms of r e l a t i v e rank d i f f e r e n c e s from each other, or closeness to each other (depending on the construction of the c o e f f i c i e n t ) . I t i s thus an o r d i n a l measure which requires no s p e c i f i c c r i t e r i o n to d i s t i n g u i s h among c l u s t e r s . The C o e f f i c i e n t of A l i e n a t i o n gives some idea as to how t i g h t l y groups c l u s t e r and the rank image configuration shows the general manner i n which they c l u s t e r , which, with some a p r i o r i t h e o r e t i c a l reasoning (but not to the degree expected by metric techniques), can be i n t e r p r e t e d with ease. The a n a l y s i s was performed i n two steps. In the f i r s t step, dyadic c o e f f i c i e n t s of a s s o c i a t i o n were computed i n order to construct an input matrix f o r SSA. This was done f o r the two dependent i n t e r a c t i o n v a r i a b l e s , intergovernmental organization membership and diplomatic missions, and f o r the best p r e d i c t o r v a r i a b l e , trade, chosen from the preliminary regression a n a l y s i s . Secondly, the data was transformed again so as to a r r i v e at a method f o r comparing the structure of the trade r e l a t i o n s h i p s with those of the diplomatic missions and the intergovernmental organizations. The following three measures of dyadic a s s o c i a t i o n were constructed fo r the three i n d i c e s : _ 54 -^ . . t o t a l number of intergovernmental organization memberships i n common  J ~ t o t a l number of IGOsj_ + t o t a l number I G O S J <^> i j = t o t a l number of diplomatic missions received i n common . . t o t a l amount of trade i n common  / x ^ ~ t o t a l amount of trade by i + t o t a l amount of trade by j The l a r g e r the number, the " c l o s e r " the two nations are on a p a r t i c u l a r dimension and v i c e - v e r s a . fciSA was performed on these data f o r i960 and while a f a i r l y good, but not ex c e l l e n t f i t , was achieved f o r each configura-t i o n i n three dimensions, the system structures of the three r e l a t i o n s h i p s were quite d i s s i m i l a r . Figures one, two,and three i l l u s t r a t e the systemic c o n f i g u r a t i o n . Quite broadly, the r e s u l t s are i l l u s t r a t i v e of a rather i n t u i t i v e notion; that i n t e r a c t i o n tends to be geographically concentrated. Western Europe ( i n c l u d i n g North America) and South America appear to be the most t i g h t l y k n i t b locks. The structure of the r e l a t i o n s h i p s appear to add some support to Galtung 1s notion of a feudal i n t e r a c t i o n s t r u c t u r e . Those regions that one might think would be the most powerful, Western Europe and North America, appear i n most cases to center the i n t e r a c t i o n r e l a t i o n s h i p , while the other countries f a l l i n f a i r l y homogeneous blocks about them. In Galtung's terms then, i n t e r a c t i o n tends to be v e r t i c a l (from the regression r e s u l t s ) ; d i r e c t periphery i n t e r a c t i o n ( i f one conceives of each block of nations as a p e r i p h e r a l e n t i t y ) appears to be missing, and, from the l o c a -t i o n of the Western European nations i n the con f i g u r a t i o n , p e r i p h e r a l i n t e r -a c t i o n appears to have a tendency of being mediated through the center nations. An i n t e r e s t i n g r e s u l t was brought to l i g h t i n the second p o r t i o n of the a n a l y s i s . The data were transformed i n terms of presence or absence of r e -2 55 1 - W. European & N. America 2 - E. Europe 3 - A s i a 4 - A f r i c a 5 - S. America 6 - Middle East 41 3 1 5 4 5 5 1 1 5 1 1 1 11 11 2 2 2 2 3 1 2 3 3 1 3 1 2 3 5 5 4 4 F IGURE 1A SMALLEST SPACE ANALYS IS TRADE CONF IGURAT I JN 1960 (3 DIMENSIONS - COEFF IC IENT OF AL I ENAT ION = . 2 1 ) (DIMENSION 2 VS 1) 3 56 F IGURE IB (DIMENSION 3 VS 1) 3 57 5 3 5 3 1 4 3 3 1 33 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 1 4 4 1 1 5 5 4 6 225 2 FIGURE 1 C (DIMENSION 3 VS 2) 3 2 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5555 5 5 5 5 5 5 2 2 2 4 26 166 3 11 12 56163 3 5613 3 4 1 3 5 3 4 1 F IGURE 2A DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS CONFIGURATION 1960 ( 3 DIMENSIONS - C O E F F I C I E N T OF AL I ENAT ION = . 1 3 ) (DIMENSION 2 VS 1) 3 59 3 5 55 5 55 5 5 5 5 5 5 55 15 63 4 1 1 2 111 11332 33 16 6 13 3 16 46 4 64 4 3 3 3 F IGURE 2B (DIMENSION 3 VS 1) 3 60 3 3 5 3 5 5 3 3 35 5 6 5 4 5 5 11 2 5 51551 5 5 3 3 3 2 3 2 2 5 1611 3 3 61 2 1 6 4 1 4 6 4 4 F IGURE 2C (DIMENSION 3 VS 2) 2 61 F I G U R E 3A I N T E R G O V E R N M E N T A L O R G A N I Z A T I O N C O N F I G U R A T I O N 1 9 6 0 (3 D I M E N S I O N - C O E F F I C I E N T O F A L I E N A T I O N = . 1 2 ) ( D I M E N S I O N 2 V S 1 ) 3 62 FIGURE 3B (DIMENSION 3 VS 1) 3 63 1 1 1 3 1 3 3 3 4 1 3 3 1 3 3 1 3 3 1 1 1 3 3 1 1 1 5 5 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 6 1 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 5 1 1 5 5 5 4 4 6 5 6 6 6 6 6 2 4 4 4 2 4 2 4 4 2 2 4 4 4 2 F I G U R E 3 C ( D I M E N S I O N 3 V S 2 ) -6k -l a t i o n s h i p s ( l and 0), and matrices were constructed to measure the s i m i -l a r i t y of the structures on the three i n d i c e s . For instance, with respect to diplomatic missions, a one was recorded i f two countries had a mission in. common, and a zero i f not. S i m i l a r matrices were set up f o r trade and IGO membership f o r the years 1950j 1955, and i 9 6 0 . The s i m i l a r i t y of the matrices was measured using a Pearson's c o r r e l a t i o n c o e f f i c i e n t . As i n the regression a n a l y s i s , trade i s c o r r e l a t e d against IGO memberships and d i p l o -matic missions. The r e s u l t s are presented i n Table 5« T A B L E 5 i _ _ 1955 I960 Trade - IGO Memberships .18 .21 .15 Trade - Diplomatic Missions .06 - .02 .47 As one can see from the r e s u l t s , the i n t e r a c t i o n structures are quite d i s s i m i l a r . The r e s u l t worthy of note i s the c o r r e l a t i o n between trade and diplomatic missions i n i960 of .4-7. While the c o r r e l a t i o n i s not l a r g e , i t i s h i g h l y s i g n i f i c a n t r e l a t i v e to the other f i g u r e s . I t suggests that while p r i o r to i 9 6 0 , trade patterns tended to be r e g i o n a l l y based, a f t e r i 9 6 0 , they begin to spread out on a more glo b a l s c a l e . This might not be s i g n i f i c a n t i f i t were not for the apparent existence of a feudal i n t e r a c t i o n s t r u c t u r e , but at t h i s point we can only speculate as to causes and e f f e c t s . For i n -stance, the a d d i t i o n of the A f r i c a n countries which became independent i n i960 may have had as much an e f f e c t on the configuration as any change i n the structure of r e l a t i o n s h i p s that may have been caused by the extension of i m p e r i a l i s t r e l a t i o n s h i p s between 1950 and i 9 6 0 . The regional b a s i s of the i n t e r a c t i o n structures also warrants cautious i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Doubtless, there e x i s t i m p e r i a l i s t r e l a t i o n s h i p s within the 65 -structures, but the r e g i o n a l concentration may also be caused by complementarity o f goods f o r trade, technology, inexpensive communication, c u l t u r a l a f f i n i t y , ad i n f i n i t u m . Many intergovernmental organizations, f o r instance, are formed f o r the sole purpose of s o l v i n g r e g i o n a l problems among equals and have no function on a g l o b a l scale (e.g. International J o i n t Commission). Other organizations however, have been touted as prime agents of i m p e r i a l i s t r e -l a t i o n s h i p s on a world s c a l e . The International Bank f o r Reconstruction and Development, because of i t s l i b e r a l economic banking p o l i c i e s , has been 112 attacked as a perpetrator of dependency and e x p l o i t a t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p s . In the same vein other organizations can be seen as mechanisms devised to circumvent the detrimental e f f e c t s of i m p e r i a l i s t r e l a t i o n s h i p s (e.g. Group of 77 and the Organization f o r A f r i c a n U n i t y ) . The point to be made i s that the a n a l y s i s includes many types of r e l a t i o n s h i p s , many of which have a p o t e n t i a l f o r i m p e r i a l i s t r e l a t i o n s h i p s , and others where imperialism would not even be considered an i s s u e . At the systemic aggregate l e v e l , however, we appear to have provided some empirical evidence of feudal i n t e r a c t i o n s t r u c t u r e s . The f a c t that the i n t e r a c t i o n structures are d i s s i m i l a r i s not necessa-r i l y proof negative of the feudal i n t e r a c t i o n structure hypothesis. Upon r e -f l e c t i o n , there i s no reason why the structures should be s i m i l a r across a l l dimensions. The f a c t that they are not, and yet the f i t i s f a i r l y good f o r a l l the configurations with Western Europe and North America at the center, i s a favourable demonstration that there are p o t e n t i a l l y d i f f e r e n t types of imperialism depending upon the type of i n t e r a c t i o n . In summary, the int e n t of the a n a l y s i s has been to provide evidence i n favour of a v e r t i c a l i n t e r a c t i o n r e l a t i o n and a feudal i n t e r a c t i o n s t r u c t -ure at a g l o b a l l e v e l . While t h i s has been done (even i f only to a l i m i t e d -66 -degree), we have adduced no evidence to demonstrate the existence of imperi-a l i s t r e l a t i o n s h i p s , but have only speculated as to the p o t e n t i a l f o r t h e i r existence. The concluding.remarks w i l l r e f l e c t upon further l i n e s of enquiry given t h i s s t a r t i n g p o i n t . - 67 " IX. THREATS TO RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY Before advancing some po s s i b l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of our r e s u l t s and o u t l i n i n g some l i n e s f o r further enquiry, we must address the question of the extent of v a l i d inference from the s t a t i s t i c a l a n a l y s i s . F i r s t l y , one may question the r e l i a b i l i t y of the data. R e l i a b i l i t y r e a l l y only comes in t o question with respect to the trade data. The s t e e l , energy and m i l i t a r y personnel data might be subject to question p r i o r to the temporal domain covered i n t h i s study. In recent times, however, reporting and c o l l e c t i n g techniques have become standardized to the extent that we need not r e l y on several contradictory sources, or sources that we may sus-113 pect are l e s s than accurate. Regarding the trade data, several problems were encountered. I t was never c l e a r whether a colony's trade was included with the trade of i t s mother country before i t s independence. This could account f o r the drop i n percentage t o t a l trade i n the system of some European and North American countries over the period 19^ +5 to i 9 6 0 when a plethora of countries became independent. One always encounters problems when i t comes to standardizing monetary values. The trade values f o r the Eastern European countries, f o r instance, are not pegged to United States currency and are therefore "derived". Their accuracy as true representations may therefore be suspect. A more serious problem a r i s e s when there i s a difference i n the f i g u r e reported as exported by the trader f o r example, and the figu r e reported as imported by the tradee. In such an instance, we turned a b l i n d eye and chose the l a r g e r of the two f i g u r e s . Since a l l of the data was standardized i n terms of proportions - 68 -(hypothesis 11(a)) where r e l i a b i l i t y i s not at issue, and since the raw data was never used, we f e l t that accuracy of reporting did not c o n s t i t u t e a major r e l i a b i l i t y problem. The standardization procedure serves to eliminate or deflate the e f f e c t s of random e r r o r i n the data. Our r e s u l t s may be rendered i n v a l i d or subject to q u a l i f i c a t i o n by v i r t u e of the r e l a t i v e l y short time period chosen f o r the study. No doubt, the a n a l y s i s should be extended into the future (past i 9 6 0 ), and there i s a t h e o r e t i c a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r not examining the pre-World War I I p e r i o d . Nevertheless, the r e s u l t s from analyses performed'at f i v e year i n t e r v a l s may be based on random f l u c t u a t i o n s , as could the whole ten year p e r i o d i t -s e l f . We have demonstrated however, that the status hierarchy and values on the v a r i a b l e s are not subject to change over short periods of time bar r i n g some sort of catastrophe or stepfunction e f f e c t on the nature of the func-t i o n i n g of the system, since the second world war, t h i s has not been the case, so the random err o r e f f e c t s on the data from t h i s source can be assumed to be n e g l i g i b l e . As explained i n the reporting of the regression r e s u l t s , systematic e r r o r exacerbated by a low e f f e c t i v e N was not a problem. The r e s u l t s ob-tained by e l i m i n a t i n g the s t e e l index from the a n a l y s i s (as i n c l u s i o n would reduce the N to a minimum of 34 i n one case) d i d not s i g n i f i c a n t l y a l t e r the r e s u l t s , but increased the e f f e c t i v e N to a minimum of 6 5 . The e f f e c t s of a non-normal d i s t r i b u t i o n of the data are perhaps more ser i o u s . On the s t e e l , energy, and m i l i t a r y personnel data, the raw data was used d i r e c t l y i n the a n a l y s i s . The a n a l y s i s therefore, may be more s e n s i t i v e to the l a r g e r values at the upper end of the power continuum where proportionately most of the power c a p a b i l i t y i s concentrated i n the hands of a few. Minute d i s c r i m i n a t i o n - 69 -at the lower ends of the scales was not the i n t e n t of the a n a l y s i s and there was enough v a r i a t i o n there (except on the s t e e l index) to render t h i s problem minor. The e f f e c t s of i n t e r c o r r e l a t i o n among the independent v a r i a b l e s as a threat to the r e l i a b i l i t y of the regression r e s u l t s have already been discussed. We summarized at that point that the threat was more to the p r e -c i s i o n of the r e s u l t s rather than to the evident trends that could be gleaned from them. In conclusion, the p o t e n t i a l threats to the r e l i a b i l i t y of the data and the analyses do not pose a serious threat to the study r e l a t i v e to p o t e n t i a l problems of v a l i d i t y , now to be assessed. The v a l i d i t y problem can be approached on several l e v e l s . F i r s t , we can ask whether rank-status theory i s a v a l i d approach to the study of im-p e r i a l i s m . Secondly, i f we accept that i t i s , we must ask i f ' o u r research design i s adequate to t e s t the kinds of r e l a t i o n s h i p s d i c t a t e d by the theory. This involves f i r s t l y an examination of the correspondence between the con-cepts and t h e i r empirical i n d i c a t o r s , and secondly, an examination of the l e v e l s of a n a l y s i s problem. The problem of whether rank-status theory i s a v a l i d approach to the study of imperialism i s l e s s a problem of empirical v a l i d i t y , and more a pro-blem of face v a l i d i t y - i n t u i t i v e s a t i s f a c t i o n , or i f one wishes to become so c r y p t i c , f a i t h . Broadly, one must accept the conception of imperialism as a s t r u c t u r a l r e l a t i o n s h i p . To be sure, a l l s o c i a l s c i e n t i f i c research deals with human behaviour. I t i s an attempt to reconstruct and describe the motivations f o r c e r t a i n behaviours. At t h i s l e v e l of a n a l y s i s s o c i a l behaviour i s i n herently p s y c h o l o g i c a l . To accept a conception of imperialism as a s t r u c t u r a l r e l a t i o n s h i p i s , however to circumvent the necessity of a psycho-- 70 -l o g i c a l examination of motivations of p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l s . I t moves up a l e v e l o f a n a l y s i s to the group l e v e l , and d i c t a t e s that the s t r u c t u r a l a t t r i b u t e s of the s i t u a t i o n w i l l set the parameters of behaviour of d i f f e r -ent groups. With regard to i m p e r i a l i s t theory, the range of behaviours i s circumscribed by the structure of the system, namely the s t r a t i f i e d s o c i a l system. We have thus f a r been speaking of "causes" of imperialism. I t may be true that to examine e f f e c t s or consequences, we need to look at the psychological l e v e l of a n a l y s i s because of the e x p l o i t a t i v e nature of the i m p e r i a l i s t r e l a t i o n s h i p . A l t e r n a t i v e l y , i t may be true that imperialism i s only e x p l o i t a t i v e i n a p l u r a l sense; we may be able to speak of e x p l o i t a t i o n at the group l e v e l without having to r e s o r t to an examination of i n d i v i d u a l consequences. Secondly, acceptance of the v a l i d i t y of a rank-status approach to the study of imperialism involves the acceptance of c e r t a i n assumptions about group behaviour i n the s t r a t i f i e d s o c i a l system. Such assumptions include the tend-ency f o r the upper groups to want to maintain the status quo. These assump-tions are based on furt h e r assumptions about how rewards are d i s t r i b u t e d i n the system. We have postulated that rewards are d i s t r i b u t e d on the basis of status and power. Our formulation of the i m p e r i a l i s t r e l a t i o n s h i p therefore has more i n common with the e c o l o g i c a l stream of thought rather than the psychological or s o c i a l p s y c h o l o g i c al stream of thought. To accept such assumptions i s a matter of f a i t h or ontology. To deny such assumptions and concomitant d e f i n i t i o n s i s to deny the empirical v a l i d i t y of the enquiry at the outset, and i s a problem which i s perhaps unresolvable. Assuming that we have c o r r e c t l y described the i m p e r i a l i s t r e l a t i o n s h i p , we turn now to the empirical adequacy of the i n d i c a t o r s of our concepts. I t - 71 -can not be emphasized enough that the empirical approach taken was rather modest, and i f you l i k e , p r i m i t i v e , and that the r e s u l t s are correspondingly modest. We have t r i e d merely to determine an a s s o c i a t i o n , not to s p e c i f y cau-ses or approach p r e d i c t i v e p r e c i s i o n . With regard to p r e c i s i o n , we could have p a r t i c u l a r i z e d or made more so p h i s t i c a t e d our measures of n a t i o n a l power base. For instance, we could have constructed measures that tapped the e f f i -ciency of production, the d i s t r i b u t i o n of the productive e f f o r t among s o c i a l and economic sectors of the nation, or the e f f i c i e n c y of s o c i a l m o b i l i z a t i o n within the n a t i o n . But to a c e r t a i n extent, a l b e i t l i m i t e d and u n s p e c i f i e d , our i n d i c a t o r s have tapped these dimensions i m p l i c i t l y . They have provided us with r e s u l t s enough to confirm or deny our hypotheses at the intended l e v e l of s i m p l i c i t y . I f there i s one major shortcoming of the a n a l y s i s , i t i s the f a c t that the i n d i c a t o r s on the regression a n a l y s i s f a i l e d to tap a p o l i t i c a l dimension of status and power such as c u l t u r a l , geographic or i d e o l o g i c a l c o n t i g u i t y . The SSA emphasized to some extent the multidimensionality of i n t e r a c t i o n patterns; that even though they appear to be feudal, the s t r u c t -ures are d i f f e r e n t . Further analyses should be aimed at d e l i n e a t i n g dimen-sions of i n t e r a c t i o n as p o t e n t i a l l y d i f f e r e n t manifestations of i m p e r i a l i s t r e l a t i o n s h i p s . Including a p o l i t i c a l dimension may have increased the l e v e l of variance explained by the s t a t i s t i c a l techniques. However, we should not expect that i n t e r a c t i o n i n the system i s f u l l y dependent upon status and power r e l a t i o n -ships, and therefore, we should not expect to be able to explain a l l the variance i n the dependent v a r i a b l e s using status and power i n d i c e s . Nor can we expect that the amount of i n t e r a c t i o n explained by power and status r e -l a t i o n s h i p s i s i n d i c a t i v e of i m p e r i a l i s t r e l a t i o n s h i p s . To- examine imperialism at a more than general l e v e l , we must move from the general system l e v e l to the subsystem (even dyadic) l e v e l of a n a l y s i s . In summary, the study i s v a l i d to the l i m i t e d extent that i t was intended to be. We cannot p r e d i c t or explain u n t i l we have described. I t was the i n t e n t i o n of t h i s exercise merely to describe - to provide some empirical corroboration as a prelude to more exhaustive a n a l y s i s . The i n -tent was not to provide precise measures of causation but merely general measures of a s s o c i a t i o n . This has been achieved; i t remains only to o u t l i n e what has to be done. - 73 -X. INTERPRETATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS To begin, i t must be stated that we have proven nothing. We have merely added empirical support to a small p o r t i o n of a l o g i c a l t h e o r e t i c a l s t r u c t u r e . The accuracy of the r e s u l t s was never at issue; s t a t i s t i c a l so-p h i s t i c a t i o n was s a c r i f i c e d i n favour of i n t u i t i v e sense i n l i g h t of the t h e o r e t i c a l s t r u c t u r e . As Lykken notes: ... . i f one considers the supplementary assumptions which would be required to make a theory compatible with the actual r e s u l t s obtained, i t becomes apparent that the f i n d i n g of a r e a l l y strong a s s o c i a t i o n may a c t u a l l y embarrass the theory rather than support i t . The only r e a l l y s a t i s f a c t o r y s o l u t i o n to the problem of corroborating such theories i s that of multiple corroboration, the d e r i v a t i o n and t e s t i n g of a number of separate, quasi i n -dependent p r e d i c t i o n s . The value of any research can be determined, not from the s t a t i s t i c a l r e s u l t s , but only by s k i l l e d , subjective evaluation of the coherence and reasonableness of the theory . . This i s to say only that explained variance does not constitute theory; some-thing else i s s t i l l l e f t to be explained. We can f i n d , i n the behavioural l i t e r a t u r e , studies that lend support to our empirical r e s u l t s . They, i n e f f e c t , stand as multiple corroboration of our r e s u l t s . For example, Rummel finds that the more economically de-veloped a state i s , the more i n t e r a c t i o n i t w i l l have i n the system."*""^ Whereas we have only measured i n t e r a c t i o n i n terms of diplomatic missions and intergovernmental organization memberships, Rummel found the r e l a t i o n -ship to hold f o r t r e a t i e s , mail, t o u r i s t s , emigrants, and student migrations, using export patterns as an independent v a r i a b l e . S i m i l a r studies by McGowan and Chadwick also tend to confirm our results."'""''^ Brams, Deutsch and Russett f i n d p o s i t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p s between trade and other transactions, 118 and former c o l o n i a l t i e s i n the system. This study stands p a r t l y as a r e p l i c a t i o n and confirmation of previous r e s u l t s , but f a c t s as i t were, are of l i t t l e value i n and of themselves. We have attempted to provide an explanation of these s t a t i s t i c a l l y "explained" r e l a t i o n s h i p s . This explanation i s couched i n terms of s o c i o l o g i c a l theory. I t provides that more economically developed and powerful states are high i n t e r a c t o r s because of the status ascribed to them and because of t h e i r a b i l i t y to i n t e r a c t r e s u l t i n g from t h e i r achieved power base. We have s a i d something about unequal exchange r e s u l t i n g from the structure that i s imposed on the system by v i r t u e of these power and status r e l a t i o n s h i p s . When i t came to e m p i r i c a l l y describing the nature of the i m p e r i a l i s t r e l a t i o n s h i p however, we could only speculate about the p o t e n t i a l f o r dependence and e x p l o i t a t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p s to a r i s e from r e l a t i o n s h i p s of unequal exchange at the systemic l e v e l . The next step i n an empirical i n v e s t i g a t i o n must take place at the subsystem or dyadic l e v e l . This becomes apparent when t r y i n g to define or o p e r a t i o n a l i z e the concept of e x p l o i t a t i o n . Galtung speaks of imperialism as a s t r u c t u r a l r e l a t i o n s h i p i n v o l v i n g i n t e r - and i n t r a - a c t o r e f f e c t s . More s p e c i f i c a l l y , more value accrues to the center p a r t i e s by v i r t u e of unequal exchange, than to the periphery p a r t i e s . Our a n a l y s i s has had l i t t l e to say about the exchange of value. Indeed, at the systemic l e v e l , i t makes l i t t l e sense to say that there i s a tendency f o r e x p l o i t a t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p s to p re-dominate, or that i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s have a tendency to be i m p e r i a l i s t . This has been a mistake with marxist theories of imperialism. As Kurth notes, The p r o - c a p i t a l i s t imperative r e t a i n s at l e a s t two important problems. One i s what can be c a l l e d the problem of overprediction: - 75 -the theory would have predicted events that have never occurred. The second i s the problem of overdetermination: other theories 119 can also explain the events and can do so j u s t as well or b e t t e r . Our SSA confirmed that although the i n t e r a c t i o n structures appeared to be feudal, they d i f f e r e d depending on the type of i n t e r a c t i o n . Further enquiry would have to specif y how the structure of the p a r t i c u l a r type of i n t e r a c t i o n r e l a t i o n s h i p i n question prevents the periphery from gaining as much value from the r e l a t i o n s h i p as i t would from an alternate r e l a t i o n s h i p . More to the point, we would have to explain how the center prevents the periphery from entering into that alternate r e l a t i o n s h i p ; i . e . how the dependency structure i s maintained. I t the SSA was corr e c t , t h i s dependency and value exchange a n a l y s i s would have to be done on an i n d i v i d u a l l e v e l , depending upon the type of i n t e r a c t i o n taking p l a c e . But even at the i n -d i v i d u a l l e v e l i t may be d i f f i c u l t i n many cases to determine what i s e x p l o i t a t i v e and what i s not. Caporaso sums up the e x i s t e n t i a l problem well when he states, F i r s t , there i s the problem of supplying c r i t e r i a by which to assess what i s " f a i r " and "equal". Second, there i s the problem, perhaps i n s o l v a b l e , of con-s t r u c t i n g a measure of e x p l o i t a t i o n that i s acceptable both to a Marxian world view as well as to a philosophy nurtured by c l a s s i c a l l i b e r a l economic thought. What I am asking here i s whether there i s a concept (and hence a measure) of e x p l o i t a t i o n that i s transparadigmatic i n that i t r e t a i n s a common meaning i n both perspectives . ... i f t h i s i s so, i t i n e v i t a b l y follows that an empirical t e s t of imperialism i s u n l i k e l y to s a t i s f y members of these two i n t e l l e c t u a l traditions.120 Even at the intraparadigmatic l e v e l , the problem a r i s e s as to how to measure e x p l o i t a t i v e value exchange as a r e s u l t of i n t e r a c t i o n patterns, outside the economic sector. How does one measure u n f a i r p o l i t i c a l , c u l t u r a l and ideo-l o g i c a l exchanges? These types of exchange cannot be measured i n one sing l e consummate transaction as can economic exchanges. The e f f e c t of a powerful nation on the i d e o l o g i c a l character of a weaker nation can only take place over a matter of time. This implies the need f o r more c a r e f u l l o n g i t u d i n a l . h i s t o r i c a l a n a l y s i s i n conjunction with any manipulative techniques such as those used i n the present study. Given these immense conceptual problems, the writings of most contemporary writers on imperialism ( p r i m a r i l y the marxists), pale i n comparison. Since i t would not bode, well to end on such a p e s s i m i s t i c note, we might conclude by emphasizing the need f o r the continuance of studies i n t o the nature of imperialism. Much of the current a t t e n t i o n i n the i m p e r i a l i s t l i t e r a t u r e focuses on the actions of m u l t i n a t i o n a l corporations. C l e a r l y , our study has neglected these, but t h i s can be j u s t i f i e d from the c o n f l i c t theory and peace research point of view. The case may be made that the nation-state i s s t i l l the dominant actor i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system, and furthermore, that the state system i s s t i l l evolving and w i l l continue to evolve f o r some time. The components of the d e f i n i t i o n of imperialism -i n e q u a l i t y , dependence, and e x p l o i t a t i o n - may be seen as f a c t o r s leading to 121 wars and other forms of c o n f l i c t behaviour. s t a t e s have a monopoly on the l e g i t i m a t e means of coercive c o n t r o l which implies the r i g h t to arm f o r "defensive" purposes, a r i g h t not granted to m u l t i n a t i o n a l s . Thus the norm-at i v e i m p l i c a t i o n s of i n e q u a l i t i e s among states should be the primary motivat-ing f a c t o r behind fur t h e r i n v e s t i g a t i o n s i n t o imperialism. I t may be argued that t h i s study shows nothing i n conclusion, but an i n t e r a c t i o n r e l a t i o n s h i p and structure which could be i n t e r p r e t e d i n any one of a number of ways. We can o n l y ~ r e i t e r a t e that given the t o o l s (the l e v e l of s t a t i s t i c a l theory and the r e l i a b i l i t y . o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s data), - 7 7 -t h i s i s a l l we can produce at a r e l i a b l e and v a l i d l e v e l . I n t e r c o r r e l a t i o n s among our i n d i c e s were already playing havoc with our r e s u l t s . Thus problems of s e n s i t i v i t y , r e l i a b i l i t y and v a l i d i t y warrant maintainance of a rather f a c i l e stance at a high l e v e l of a b s t r a c t i o n . Only by o u t l i n i n g the d i f f i -c u l t i e s encountered i n pursuing such a l i n e of enquiry, can we draw up an agenda f o r , and provide a stimulus to future research. FOOTNOTES For example see R. J. Rummel, "Some Empirical Findings on Nations and their Behaviour," World Politics. Vol. 21, 1969. pp. 226-241; S. J. Brams "The Structure of Influence Relationships in the International System," in J. R. Rosenau (ed.), International Politics and Foreign Policy, 2nd ed. New York, Free Press, pp. 589-599; S. J. Brams, "The Search for Structural Order in the International System: Some Models and Preliminary Results," International Studies Quarterly. Vol. 13, 1969- pp. 254-280; K. W. Deutsch, "The Propensity to International Transactions," Political  Studies. Vol. 8, i960, pp. 147-155; K. W. Deutsch, "Toward an Inventory of Basic Trends and Patterns in Comparative and International Politics," American Political Science Review. Vol. 54, i960, pp. 34-5 . ^Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Aggression," Journal of Peace  Research. Vol. 1, 1964. pp.95-119. ?M. D. Wallace, War and Rank Among Nations. Lexington Mass, Lexington Books. 1973; M. D. Wallace, "Power, Status, and International War, 1820-1964," Journal of Peace Research. Vol. 7, 1971. pp. 23-35; Henry Barbera, 'Rich  Nations and Poor in Peace and War. Lexington Mass, Lexington Books. 1973• <*See for example H. M. Wright, The "New Imperialism": An Analysis of  Late Nineteenth Century Expansion. Boston, D. C. Heath and C o . 1 9 6 l , passim; A. P. Thornton,1 Doctrines of Imperialism. New York, John Wiley and Sons. 1965; E. M. Winslow, The Pattern of Imperialism: A Study in Theories of  Power. New York, Columbia U. Press. 1948. ^Harry Magdoff, The Age of Imperialism. New York, Monthly Review Press. 1969. ^Pierre Jalee, Imperialism in the Seventies. New York, The Third Press. 1972. seph Schumpeter in Murray Greene, "Schumpeter1s Imperialism: A Critical Note," in Wright, op.cit. p. 62. ^C. J. H. Hayes, "Bases of a.New Imperialism," in Wright, p. 83. 9H. Arendt, "The Alliance Between Mob and Capital," in Wright, pp. 102-103. '"-'Raymond Aron, "The Leninist Myth of Imperialism and Nazi Imperialism" in, Louis Snyder, The Imperialism Reader: Documents and Readings on Modern  Expansionism. Princeton, N.J., D. Van Nostrand Co. Inc. 1962. p.473.-Thornton, op .cit. p. 6. - 79 -12 Ibid., p. 2. 13 H.B. Davis, "Conservative Writers on Imperialism," Science and  Society, vol. 18, 1954. p. 315. 14 V.I. Lenin, Imperialism; The Highest Stage of Capitalism. New York, Vanguard Press, 1927. p. 192. 15 1  Ibid., p. 194. •^George Lichtheim, Imperialism. Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 1971. p. 134. 1 7 l b i d . , pp. 134-135. 1973. 18 Benjamin Cohen, The Question of Imperialism. New York,. Basic Books, 19 T.H. Moran, "Foreign Expansion as an Institutional Necessity for U.S. Corporate Capitalism: The Search, for a Radical Model," World Politics April, 1973. p. 385. 20 See for example, Magdoff, Jalee, op. cit . , and A.G. Frank, "The Development of Underdevelopment," in Latin America: Underdevelopment or  Revolution. New York. Monthly Review Press, 1969. pp. 3-17. 21 Jalee, chap. I l l , Magdoff, chap. I. 22 Frank, op. cit., passim. 23 Cohen, p. 16. 24 Charles McClelland, "Qn the Fourth Wave: Past and Future in the Study of International Systems," in J.N. Rosenau, V. Davis, and M. East (eds.), Analysis of International Politics. New York, Free Press. 1972. 25 George Modelski, "Agraria and Industria: Two Models of the Inter-national System," in Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba (eds.), The International  System: Theoretical Essays. Princeton, N.J., Princeton U. Press. 1961. p.119. Part of the problem stems from differing ontologies of historical process. For example, Modelski differs from such writers as Wallerstein and Marcuse by isolating social systems at different points in time and comparing them using'a Parsonian. structural-functional analysis. Wa lerstein and Marcuse, however, would deem this type of analysis invalid because of the independence of a social system at one point in time on its circumstances in a previous time period. See Immanual Wallerstein, The Modern World System: Capitalist  Agriculture in the 16th Century. New York, Academic Press. 1974, esp. Intro-duction; and Herbert Marsuse, One Dimensional Man. Boston, Beacon Press, 1964. 26 Klaus Knorr, "Theories of Imperialism," World Politics, vol, 4, 1952. p. 402. 27 At least since 1840 when the term came into common usage in the English language. See Bernard Morris, Imperialism and Revolution. Blooming-ton and London, Indiana University Press, 1973. p. 7. - 8o -28 I b i d . , p. 3 2 . 29Marcuse, pp. 104-120, 149-151. 30 In t h i s vein Caparaso states: The problem here i s to allow f o r t h i s d i v e r s i t y of i n d i c a t o r s without p a r a l y s i n g the theory by appending to i t a set of s i n g u l a r , unique p r o p o s i t i o n s . I think t h i s can be done by d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between the form of imperialism on the one hand, and the mechanisms of imperialism on the other. I w i l l argue that the form of imperialism i s constant . . . However, the p a r t i c u l a r mechanism through which t h i s value t r a n s f e r can take place v a r i e s g r e a t l y . Caporaso, "Methodological Issues i n the Measurement of Inequality, Dependence and E x p l o i t a t i o n , " i n J . Kurth and S. R. Rosen (eds.), Testing Theories of  Economic Imperialism. Lexington,Mass, Lexington Books. 1974. p-94. 3 1 I b i d . 32 Lichtheim, p. 2 5 . 33 Tom T r a v i s , "Toward a Comparative Study of Imperialism," Paper presented f o r d e l i v e r y at the Sixteenth Annual Convention of the In t e r n a t i o n a l  studies A s s o c i a t i o n , Washington, D.C. February, 1975• p . 5 « 34 For example Lichtheim s t a t e s , What we mean when we speak of empire or imperialism i s the r e l a t i o n -ship of a hegemonial state to peoples or nations under i t s c o n t r o l . I t i s p o i n t l e s s to inquire whether i t i s " i n the nature" of t h i s or that form of s o c i a l organization - feudalism, c a p i t a l i s m , s o c i a l i s m or whatever - to encourage or permit external aggression against weaker s t a t e s . The only thing that matters to those concerned i s the actual .possession or l o s s of t h e i r freedom. What counts i s the r e l a t i o n s h i p of domination and subjection, which i s the essence of every imperial regime. Lichtheim, pp . 5 » . 8 , 9• Morris asserts that the term " p e r s i s t s because i t capsulizes the idea of domination and c o n t r o l . The idea i s c l e a r ; the mechanism i s not." • Morris,, p. 7-Thornton adds that Colonialism i s only imperialism seen from below. I t i s that view of the c o n t r o l l e r s which i s held by the c o n t r o l l e d . For not every form of imperialism undergoes the t e s t of being seen and judged from below. Colonialism therefore, as a concept, comes int o being only when the status of subordination i s recognized as unwelcome. Thornton, pp.•6, 13-I t i s not c l e a r from the above " d e f i n i t i o n s " exactly what imperialism i s and i n some cases the ren d i t i o n s appear to be cont r a d i c t o r y . Several questions come to mind; f o r example, i s subjugation equivalent to control? Does - 8 l " c o n t r o l imply e x p l o i t a t i o n ? How do we define e x p l o i t a t i o n ; must i t be f e l t and recognized, or i s i t perpetuated by some sort of f a l s e conscious-ness? Is imperialism equivalent to colonialism?, e t c . 35 Marshall Singer, Weak States i n a World of Powers. New York, Free Press, 1972. p. hi. 7 Cohen, pp. 16, 92. 37 T r a v i s , p. 5 . oo J OCohen, p. 209-39' T r a v i s , p.5. 40 While the concept of e x p l o i t a t i o n i s necessary to a d e f i n i t i o n of imperialism, i t i s a d i f f i c u l t one to deal with e m p i r i c a l l y and has not been treated adequately i n the l i t e r a t u r e (see f o r example Footnote 29). This preliminary exploration, however,, w i l l not have to pursue e x p l o i t a t i o n as a component of imperialism beyond the d e f i n i t i o n a l stage. We w i l l return to i t i n our concluding remarks when we discuss future d i r e c t i o n s of enquiry. ^ XCohen, p. 91; M. Singer, p. 38; Johan Galtung, "A S t r u c t u r a l Theory of Imperialism," Journal of Peace Research, v o l . 8, 1971. p.91« M. Singer, p. 38. 4 3 Galtung, 1971. 44 Caporaso concurs with Galtung's l i n e of reasoning when he po i n t s out that: An a n a l y s i s of motives f a i l s on two counts. I t i s both too broad and too narrow. I t i s too broad because not a l l attempts to domin-ate and e x p l o i t have r e s u l t e d i n domination and e x p l o i t a t i o n . I t i s too narrow because imperialism as a system of dependence, i n e q u a l i t y and e x p l o i t a t i o n can r e s u l t even i n the absence of mo-t i v e s designed to bring these conditions about . . . The danger i s present any time people are not aware of the consequences of t h e i r behavior. Caporaso, p. 9 0 . 4 ^ E t i s at t h i s point that we make a leap i n f a i t h i n accepting Galtung's theory (which i s a c t u a l l y a set of hypotheses rather than a.theory). Tne argument that would ensue between Galtung and h i s predecessors i s a c l a s s i c case of s o c i o l o g i c a l e x i s t e n t i a l i s m found prevalent i n the writings of Durkheim and Weber on holism versus i n d i v i d u a l i s m ; i . e . , we encounter a l e v e l of a n a l y s i s problem. S t r i c t l y speaking, an examination of imperialism should include an examination of d i s p o s i t i o n s to e x p l o i t as causes of imperialism. Durkheim would contend, however, that what i s true at the i n d i v i d u a l l e v e l i s not true at the group l e v e l . Writers such as Aron a t t r i b u t e i n d i v i d u a l motives - 82 -to groups which, alternatively, Galtung would argue i s wrong, given his line of reasoning. Thus the matter of whether one chooses to begin an examination of imperialism at the individual level or at the group level i s a matter of academic ontology; a matter of "f a i t h " . Galtung would argue, and this author would agree, that i t would serve no purpose to examine individual dispositions because imperialism would ultimately re-sult from the actions of groups of individuals whose behaviour as a group would di f f e r from individual behaviours; i.e., from the structure of intra- and intergroup relations. 46 The "Center-periphery" rubric appears to be adapted from Andre Gunder Frank (1969) without the attendant references to the capitalist structure. With respect to Galtung's specific proposition, Jalee (1972, p. 161) follows his reasoning, But again specifies capitalism as the agent of imperialism which Galtung does not do. As an aside, i t i s interesting to compare Jalee and Galtung with Wallerstein's analysis of center—periphery relationships in the sixteenth century. Wallerstein appears to take the position that imperialism was fostered By the inaBility of imperial powers to create indigenous local Bureaucracies i n the colonies (due to costs). This led to an exportation of Bureaucratic expertise from the imperial power to the colony or, there existed what Galtung would c a l l a harmony of interest Between the cC and the cP. Wallerstein, pp. 188-189. 47 This i s Galtung's definition of exploitation. While i t i s clear from the marxist perspecdive what exploitation i s , i t remains unclear in Galtung's analysis. In marxist terms, exploitation refers to the manner in which surplus capital accumulation is distriButed among the classes (i.e., unequally relative todiffferent classes' input into the mode of production). Galtung, on the other hand, defines exploitation simplisti-cally in terms of disharmony of interest, But i t is easy to think of many situations where there is a disharmony of interest which we would not inter-suBjectively evaluate as Being exploitative. Lack of spec i f i c i t y of Galtung's model underlies d i f f i c u l t i e s with the notion of unequal exchange. As with the notion of disharmony of - 83 -interest and exploitation (see footnote 46), he never makes i t clear which types of exchange, i f not a l l types, are considered relevant to the theory of imperialism. In light of this d i f f i c u l t y with conceptual ambi-guity, i t is d i f f i c u l t to operationalize his model. We w i l l , however, make an attempt by putting forward our interpretation of what we think he means. 49 Galtung, 1971, pp. 81-83; structurally, Jalee i s once again in agreement (p. 162). ^Galtung, 1971, p. 84. It seems strange that Galtung would posit that the total arrangement favours the periphery in the Center when i t is usually assumed that the imperialist relationship maintains the status quo in favour of the center of the Center. While i t is not important, i t can be seen through a discussion of status and power (which w i l l be detailed presently), in conjunction with Galtung's theory of aggression (1964), how he arrives at this conclusion. 51 cf. Jalee, p. 150. 5 2Galtung, 1971, p. 89. 53 cf. Jalee, p. 150 54 Galtung, 1971, p. 89. "^An interesting manifestation of this argument is presented by Marcuse: The techniques of industrialization are p o l i t i c a l techniques; as such, they prejudge the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of Reason and Freedom. But as a l l freedom depends on the quest of alien necessity, the realization of freedom depends on the techniques of this conquest. - 84 -Technological r a t i o n a l i t y reveals i t s p o l i t i c a l character as i t becomes the great v e h i c l e of better domination, creating a t r u l y t o t a l i t a r i a n universe i n which societ y and nature, mind and body are kept i n a state of permanent m o b i l i z a t i o n f o r the defense of t h i s universe. Marcuse, p. 18. 56 Galtung, 1971, p. 101. "^Thornton r e f e r s to what i s known i n the s o c i o l o g i c a l l i t e r a t u r e as "ascribed" status and i t s concomitant imp l i c a t i o n s for violence i f i t i s not i n balance with a nation's perceived l e v e l of achieved s t a t u s . . . . most of us p r e f e r to l i v e i n what n o v e l i s t Anthony Powell has c a l l e d an "acceptance world." Only when t h i s acceptance i s with-held, i s recognized as e n t a i l i n g a l o s s of respect, does a "movement" against i t develop, s i m i l a r to the a n t i - c o l o n i a l i s t resentment i n modern nationalism. Thornton, p. 16. He also r e f e r s to the r e l a t i o n s h i p between ascribed status and the use of power: Af t e r Waterloo the world was compelled to accustom i t s e l f . t o the f a c t of B r i t i s h power, since no one had the means of challenging i t . In i n t e r n a t i o n a l as i n domestic a f f a i r s the p r i v i l e d g e s of power were acknowledged to include action and influence; and therefore the question of j u s t i f y i n g t h e i r use did not a r i s e . Thornton, p. 25. 58 Morris, l i k e Thornton, r e f e r s to the dynamic mechanism at work i n a s t r a t i f i e d s o c i a l system based on acceptance of status p o s i t i o n s : The inner l o g i c of domination consists of the f a c t that there i s i n s t a b i l i t y i n any r e l a t i o n s h i p of unequal power. Since the weaker power w i l l not accept i t s i n f e r i o r i t y , the stronger party must ceaselessly concern i t s e l f with the s e c u r i t y of i t s p o s i t i o n . In so doing, the imperial power assumes a s p i r a l of increasing commitments and o b l i g a t i o n s that cannot be a t t r i b u t e d p r i m a r i l y or b a s i c a l l y to economic motives. Morris, p. 39• Morris does much to i l l u s t r a t e the concepts of status and power at work i n the imperial r e l a t i o n s h i p , although there i s some disagreement i n the s o c i o l o g i c a l l i t e r a t u r e as to the source of aggression i n a s t r a t i -f i e d s o c i a l system. Galtung (1964), f o r instance, would disagree that i n -f e r i o r powers must n e c e s s a r i l y not accept t h e i r rank p o s i t i o n . He would further disagree that the source of aggression comes from the top; those wishing to maintain the status quo. Morris i s i n agreement with Weber on the maintenance of the status quo and the use of power, however. - 85 " "^Wallerstein o u t l i n e s some poss i b l e a t t r i b u t e dimensions that are s a l i e n t to power and status r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n an i n t e r n a t i o n a l s t r a t i f i e d s o c i a l system: There are also semiperipheral areas which are i n between the core and the periphery on a s e r i e s of dimensions, such as complexity of economic a c t i v i t i e s , strength of state machinery, c u l t u r a l i n t e g r i t y , e t c . W a l l e r s t e i n , p. 349. 60 H o l s t i attempts to e s t a b l i s h a l i n k between c o n f l i c t theory and development theory through the i m p l i c i t use of the concepts o f power and status: Hence as has often been noted i n the l i t e r a t u r e , many v i s i b l e i n d i c a t o r s of modernity - commercial urban centers, n a t i o n a l a i r l i n e s , heavy i n d u s t r i e s , middle c l a s s suburbs, and a p l e t h o r a of p r i v a t e v e h i c l e s and consumer goods - are promoted l e s s to assuage popular economic expectations than to bring diplomatic influence and prestige to the n a t i o n . K. J . H o l s t i , "Underdevelopment and the Gap Theory of International C o n f l i c t , " American P o l i t i c a l Science Review, v o l . 69, 1975- p. 830. Prestige i s a notion c e n t r a l to many non-marxist writings on imperialism as was evident i n the previous review of the l i t e r a t u r e . In formal s o c i o -l o g i c a l terminology, pres t i g e can roughly be equated with ascribed status, since p r e s t i g e i s a r e l a t i v e term. One gains p r e s t i g e only i n the ezes of others. Influence i s associated with the concept of power, although not equivalent to i t . The a b i l i t y to influence i s r e l a t i v e to the amount of power one has, and i s , i n some measure, also r e l a t i v e to status. There i s , however, much debate i n the power l i t e r a t u r e over operational d e f i n i t i o n s of the a s s o c i a t i o n between influence, status, and power; the r e l a t i o n s h i p i s not e n t i r e l y c l e a r . As was noted i n the opening passage, there has recently been a con-vergence among development and c o n f l i c t t h e o r i s t s . H o l s t i ' s work i s valuable i n t h i s respect as a transparadigmatic exercise; an attempt to broach questions posed by l e f t i s t t h e o r i s t s on c o n f l i c t (broadly conceived) to l i b e r a l t h e o r i s t s on development. 61 Jules Ferry, former French premier, provided evidence of the concepts o f status at work i n f o r e i g n p o l i c y decision-making, when he stated " . . . that i f France r e f r a i n e d from imperialism, she would "descend from the f i r s t rank to the t h i r d or fourth." Jules Ferry, quoted i n Hayes, "Bases of A New National Imperialism," i n Wright (ed.), op. c i t . , p. 85. In t h i s regard see T a l c o t t Parsons, "On the Concept of P o l i t i c a l Power," i n R. B e l l , D. V. Edwards, and R. H. Wagner (eds.), P o l i t i c a l  Power: A Reader i n Theory and Research. New York, Free Press"! 1968. p.251» " 8 6 6 3 I b i d . , p . 271. 6 ^ R . H . Wagner , "The Con c ep t o f Power and t h e S t u d y o f P o l i t i c s , " i n R. B e l l , D. V . Edwards and R. H . Wagner ( e d s . ) , o p . c i t . , p . 4. I b i d . , p . 11 ' M a r c u s e , p p . 1 0 4 - 1 2 0 , 149-151-r P a r s o n s , p . 2 5 7 -* I b i d . , p p . 260-261. G a l t u n g d i s a g r e e s i m p l i c i t l y w i t h P a r s o n s on t h i s p o i n t . I f we a r e i n t e r p r e t i n g G a l t u n g as d e f i n i n g i m p e r i a l i s m a s a p o w e r - s t a t u s r e l a t i o n s h i p , t h e n he must n e c e s s a r i l y d i s a g r e e w i t h P a r s o n s when he i n c l u d e s among h i s t y p e s o f i m p e r i a l i s m , m i l i t a r y , i m p e r i a l i s m . I n f u r t h e r s u p p o r t o f t h i s , see t h e t e x t t o F o o t n o t e 53-P a r s o n s , p . 263. T h i s i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h M a r c u s e ' s ( a nd i m p l i c i t l y , G a l t u n g ' s ) a n a l y s i s o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p o f t h e c o n t e m p o r a r y u n d e r d e v e l o p e d w o r l d t o t h e d e v e l o p e d w o r l d ( i n c l u d i n g t h e Communis t s e c t o r ) . The l a t t e r , Ma r c u s e m a i n t a i n s , s t r u c t u r a l l y d i c t a t e t h e t e rms o f d e ve l opmen t f o r t h e t h i r d w o r l d . M a r c u s e , p p . 46-47. ^ G a l t u n g , 1964; a l s o "Rank and S o c i a l I n t e g r a t i o n : A M u l t i d i m e n s i o n a l A p p r o a c h , " i n J . B e r g e r , M . Z e l d i t c h , and B . A n d e r s o n ( e d s . ) , S o c i o l o g i c a l  T h e o r i e s i n P r o g r e s s . B o s t o n , Hough ton M i f f l i n . 1966. p p . 145-198. 7 2 G a l t u n g , 1964, p . 96. c f . G . L e n s k i , " S t a t u s C r y s t a l l i z a t i o n : A N o n - V e r t i c a l D i m e n s i o n o f S o c i a l S t a t u s , " A m e r i c a n S o c i o l o g i c a l R e v i e w . 1954. p p . 405-413-7 3 G a l t u n g , I966f M . S i n g e r , p . 56. 7 4 I t s h o u l d have become e v i d e n t a t t h i s p o i n t t h a t t h e r e a r e two u s a g e s o f t h e word p o w e r , and i n d i s c u s s i n g t h e c o n c e p t one must d i s t i n g u i s h t h e m . F o r e x amp l e , i t h a s been s a i d t h a t i f we d e f i n e power a s t h e a b i l i t y t o i n f l u e n c e o t h e r s , t h e n we must d e f i n e I s r a e l and N o r t h V i e t n a m a s t h e two most p o w e r f u l n a t i o n s i n t h e w o r l d . To be s u r e I s r a e l and N o r t h V i e t n a m have a g r e a t d e a l o f p u l l i n t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l s y s t e m . Howeve r , we wou l d n o t r e a l l y s a y t h a t t h e y a r e more p o w e r f u l t h a n c e r t a i n o t h e r a c t o r s i n t h e s y s t e m o v e r a l l . I f r u l e s o f d i p l o m a c y and p r o t o c o l d i d n o t m i t i g a t e a g a i n s t t h e m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f power i n r e c o u r s e t o v i o l e n c e , i t i s c l e a r i n most c a s e s who wou l d p r e v a i l i n a c o n f r o n t a t i o n . B u t p l a y i n g w i t h i n t h e r u l e s - 87 -of the game i n order to influence a d e c i s i o n as I s r a e l and North Vietnam have been known to do, i s c l e a r l y a form of power. Several w r i t e r s attempt to circumvent t h i s problem of dual meaning by dismissing e i t h e r power as status or power as influenced as a meaning of power. Mar h a l l Singer, for instance, terms power as o v e r a l l status an "imprecise" way of d e f i n i n g power: If power i s r e l a t i v e and contextual, how then can one speak of "weak" and "powerful" states? One can do so i n the same way one can speak of any r e l a t i v e term i n an absolute sense. When r e l a t i v e terms are used i n an absolute way, they are i n -e v i t a b l y somewhat imprecise. Thus i n a sense every reference i n t h i s work to a group or a state as weak or powerful i s somewhat imprecise. w M. Singer, p. 55 Parsons, on the other hand, dismisses recourse to v i o l e n c e as a form of power and an i n d i c a t i o n that power as influence has f a i l e d to work. In t h i s author's opinion, Parsons and Singer are i n c o r r e c t . I t should be pos-s i b l e to define a word i n two d i f f e r e n t ways depending on the context i n which i t i s used. 7"*Here we must d i s t i n g u i s h Between power and i n f l u e n c e . Influence as used here, would r e f e r to an overt attempt By one actor to modify the Behaviour of another. Power on the other hand, does not have to Be ex-pressed i n overt Behaviour. The power of one nation (as perceived By another) may define the l i m i t s of choice a l t e r n a t i v e s for the other nation i n an exchange r e l a t i o n s h i p . See also footnote 72 on the r e l a t i o n -ship of power and status. 7^The l a s t two sentences must B.e q u a l i f i e d i n c e r t a i n respects. F i r s t , regarding o p e r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n , we have already made much of the f a c t that the suBstantive aspects of the imperial r e l a t i o n s h i p during any h i s t o r i c a l period of time must Be distinguished from what imperialism i s conceptually. To r e i t e r a t e , imperialism as a concept, transcends h i s t o r i c a l eras be manifested d i f f e r e n t l y i n each period. We have also spoken of how impe-r i a l i s m has Been manifested d i f f e r e n t l y since the second world war i n that i t has Become a r e l a t i o n s h i p among states rather than among states and t h e i r respective colonies which are not sovereign. As such, our operational i n d i -cators w i l l r e f l e c t the s atus dimensions s a l i e n t to imperialism i n the temporal domain following the second world war. These i n d i c a t o r s or status dimensions may change should h i s t o r i c a l circumstances change. Second, with respect to the r e l a t i o n s h i p Be ween power and status, i t has Been noted By such wr i t e r s as Michael Wallace, that the two concepts are not always co erminal. He states that status i s multidimensional, that "there are many facets of status and deference Between nations which can scarcely Be suBsumed under the uBric of power" (1973a, p. 5). Those status dimen-sions used here, however, w i l l r e f l e c t imperialism as a power or dominance r e l a t i o n s h i p and therefore, for our purposes, they are coterminal. Marshall Singer (p. 61) includes i n h i s d e f i n i t i o n of power, wealth, organization and status. The contention i n t h i s i n q u i r y , however, i s that wealth and organization are merely d i f f e r e n t dimensions, a l b e i t important dimensions, of status. Singer appears to be using a narrow d e f i n i t i o n of status i n that i t seems he conceives of i t o l y i n terms of ascribed status whereas organization and wealth are.dimensions of achieved status. - 88 -^M. Singer, p. 54. 78 We s p e c i f y p o l i t i c a l (or diplomatic) and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l i n t e r -a c t i o n here although again, Galtung's l a c k of c l a r i t y i n s p e c i f y i n g the model leads to ambiguity i n determining what types of i n t e r a c t i o n s are relevant. See page 65 f o r some implications of t h i s ambiguity i n i n -t e r p r e t i n g the r e s u l t s ( i . e . , p e r i p h e r a l i n t e r a c t i o n i n the OAU). 7 9 G a l t u n g , 1971, p. 101. 80 For example, N.P. G l e d i t s c h , "Trends i n World A i r l i n e Patterns," Journal of Peace Research, v o l . 4, 1967, pp. 366-408; E. 0stgaard, "Factors Influencing the Flow of News," Journal of Peace Research, v o l . 2, 1965, pp. 39-63; J . Galtung and M.H. Ruge, "The Structure of Foreign News," Journal of Peace Research, v o l . 2, 1965, pp. 64-91; T r a v i s , 1975; A p o s s i b l e exception to these e f f o r t s ' l a c k of t h e o r i z i n g i s L. A l s c h u l e r , " S a t e l l i z a t i o n and Stagnation i n L a t i n America," International Studies  Quarterly, v o l . 20, 1976, pp. 39-82. 81 Galtung, 1966; M. Singer, p. 56. 82 Several q u a l i f i c a t i o n s come to mind here. "Economic" i s used i n the broad sense, r e f e r r i n g only to a system of exchange, whether the com-modities being exchanged goods or power. Therefore, i n making t h i s q u a l i -f i c a t i o n , we make no commitment to c a p i t a l i s t determinism. Second, we do not wish to pay t r i b u t e to any form of conspiracy theory i n making the a s s e r t i o n , the consequences of the exchange may be unintended. In f a c t , the theory states that i f the exchange happens to be e x p l o i t a t i v e , i t i s most l i k e l y as a r e s u l t of the s t r u c t u r a l d i f f e r e n c e between the states i n terms of status. The more powerful state i s i n more of a p o s i t i o n to ex-p l o i t ( i . e . , i s more l i k e l y to e x p l o i t by v i r t u e of i t s p o s i t i o n ) . T h i r d , we do not wish, to imply that the exchange r e l a t i o n s h i p i s a zero-sum r e l a t i o n s h i p . C l a s s i c a l l i b e r a l economic theory d i c t a t e s that an exchange should be b e n e f i c i a l to both, p a r t i e s , but i t does not state how the b e n e f i r i s to be d i s t r i b u t e d among the p a r t i e s , nor does i t d i c t a t e that each party should b e n e f i t i n an equal manner. In terms of our theory of imperialism, both p a r t i e s could b e n e f i t , but the Center nation would ben e f i t more than the Periphery nation. Galtung seems to imply, as we have already noted, that t h i s i s a form of e x p l o i t a t i o n . ' 83 T h e o r e t i c a l l y , we do not encounter Galtung's problem of not taking a random sample of secular trends to v e r i f y our hypotheses, since an i m p l i -c i t hypothesis i n our study i s that we have entered a new h i s t o r i c a l period since the second World War ( i . e . , the p r o l i f e r a t i o n of n a t i o n a l i s t s e n t i -ments and new sovereign s t a t e s ) . This i m p l i c i t hypothesis of course assumes that imperialism was present p r i o r to the second World War. ^Slodelski, p. 141. 85 Modelski, W a l l e r s t e i n . 8 6 M o d e l s k i , p.141. - 89 -8 7 W a l l a c e , 1973a, pp. 32-33. 8 8 I b i d . , p. 35. 89 J.C. Thompson, "Energy Consumption as an Indicator of I n d u s t r i a l Growth and National C a p a b i l i t i e s : World Trends 1870-1970," paper pre-pared f o r d e l i v e r y at the Fourteenth Annual Meeting of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Studies A s s o c i a t i o n , Montreal, 1973. p. 43. 90 The Plebs League of London. An Outline of Modern Imperialism, 1922. p. 4. 91 J a l e e , p. 43. 92 Lichtheim, pp. 70, 75, HQ. 93 I t may be that trade i s d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d to diplomatic missions merely because many missions are responsible f o r fo r e i g n trade. We as-sume t h i s i s not a problem however, since we are dealing with ambassador-ships and not consular or trade missions. 94 W a l l e r s t e i n , pp. 198-200. 95 J.F. Rweiyemamu, i n L. Als c h u l e r , p. 48. ^Cohen, pp. 155—56. 97 A l s c h u l e r , p. 49. ^Winslow, p. 3. 99 Wallace, 1973a, p. 36. 1 0 0M. Singer, p. 314. "'"^Cohen, p. 15. 102 J.D. Singer and M. Small, "The Composition and Status Ordering of the International System: 1815-1940," World P o l i t i c s , v o l . 18, 1966. pp. 240-41. 103 I n i s Claude, Swords in t o Plowshares: The Problems and Progress  of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Organization, 3rd ed. New York, Random House,1964. p. 394. 104 A.F.J. Organski, World P o l i t i c s , 2nd ed. New York, A l f r e d A. Knopf, 1968. p. 465. 1 0 5 S e e D.R. Cox and E.J. S n e l l , "The Choice of Variables i n Obser-v a t i o n a l Studies," Applied S t a t i s t i c s , v o l . 23, 1974. pp. 51-59. - 90 -106 J . Johnston, Econometric Methods. New York, McCraw-Hill; 1963. On Autocorrelation, esp. pp. 177-178. ~^'See Barbera, op. c i t . 108 The s i g n i f i c a n c e t e s t between the two procedures c o n s i s t s of , taking the r a t i o of the mean-square err o r of the two equations and looking up the r e s u l t on the F-table using the respective degrees of freedom as parameters. MSE = Q 4?<» Fa,b. b d f b See N. R. Draper and H. Smith, Applied Regression A n a l y s i s . New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1966. pp. 71-72. 109 M. Wallace, " A l l i a n c e P o l a r i z a t i o n , Cross-Cutting, and I n t e r n a t i o n a l War, 1815-1964," Journal of C o n f l i c t Resolution, v o l . 17, 1973- p. 583. 110 Brams, 1969a, 1969b. I l l C. W. Kegley and E. R. Wittkopf, " S t r u c t u r a l C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of International Influence Relationships: A R e p l i c a t i o n Study," In t e r n a t i o n a l  Studies Quarterly, v o l . 20, 1976. pp. 261-299-112 Teresa Hayter, Aid as Imperialism. 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