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UBC Theses and Dissertations

The case for experimental evolution in development planning Mack, Bruce Howard 1976

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THE CASE FOR EXPERIMENTAL EVOLUTION IN DEVELOPMENT PLANNING by Bruce Howard Mack B.A., U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Columbia, 1969 B . S c , U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Columbia, 1974 THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE 1 n THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES SCHOOL OF COMMUNITY AND REGIONAL PLANNING We accept t h i s t he s i s as conforming to the requi red standard The U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia September, 1976 (c) Bruce Howard Mack, 1976 In p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f the r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r an advanced degree a t the U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a , I a g r ee t h a t the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e and s t u d y . I f u r t h e r agree t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e c o p y i n g o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y pu rpo se s may be g r a n t e d by the Head o f my Department o r by h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . -It i s u n d e r s t o o d t h a t c o p y i n g o r p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l not be a l l o w e d w i t h o u t my w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . Department o f CoI^I^LCCA.//v /ta^'ST^/' rf* The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Co lumb ia 2075 Wesbrook P l a c e Vancouver, Canada V6T 1WS Date J^ s>X 1/ t ?7<* THE CASE FOR EXPERIMENTAL EVOLUTION IN DEVELOPMENT PLANNING THESIS ABSTRACT This t he s i s revea l s some major weaknesses in development s t r a t e g i e s based p r i m a r i l y on economic growth and suggests the development record can on ly be improved s i g n i f i c a n t l y by adopt ing a process o f exper imental evo lu t ion. The obvious s t a r t i n g po in t i s d e f i n i n g and d e s c r i b i n g development. Development is def ined as n e i t h e r more nor les s than the improvement of i n d i v i d u a l and s o c i a l w e l f a r e , and the f i r s t chapter draws on some of the s o c i a l s c i e n c e s ' l i t e r a t u r e in an attempt to desc r ibe i n d i v i d u a l and s o c i a l development. While t h i s d e s c r i p t i o n i s f a r from d e f i n i t i v e , severa l t e n t a t i v e conc lus ions may be drawn. I nd i v idua l s have a wide v a r i e t y of needs, from the ba s i c p h y s i o l o g i c a l and p sycho log i ca l to those higher needs f o r f u l f i l l m e n t . These needs are s a t i s f i e d in va ry ing degrees by the s o c i a l system (or the s o c i a l d e l i v e r y systems). There i s no evidence that one type of s o c i a l system performs be t te r over a l l than any o the r . The components of the s o c i a l system, the subsystems have a complex (and as yet poor ly understood) interdependence and i n t e r a c t i o n , such that d i s -rupt ion of one subsystem is l i k e l y to produce ( l a r g e l y unforeseen) r a m i f i c a t i o n s throughout the rest of the s o c i a l system. Beyond the few ba s i c p h y s i o l o g i c a l needs, economic a c t i v i t y s a t i s f i e s few of the needs and many economic a c t i v i t i e s i n h i b i t or even prec lude many needs ' s a t i s -f a c t i o n . And f i n a l l y , any i n t e r ven t i o n which s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i s r u p t s the s o c i a l system i s l i k e l y to be coun te r -p roduc t i ve , as the reduced systemic performance gene r a l l y negates the b e n e f i t s der i ved from the i n t e r v e n t i o n . i i For these reasons i t i s suggested there i s l i t t l e j u s t i f i c a t i o n fo r s o c i a l evangel ism or mimicry and that d i s r u p t i v e s t r a t e g i e s n e c e s s a r i l y have ant i -deve lopmenta l consequences. Economic growth i s ne i t he r c o s t l e s s nor p r i c e l e s s . The economic eva lua t i on s o f the l a s t two decades of 'development ' e f f o r t s bear out t h i s c onc l u s i o n , that the development record f o r the Th i r d World has been d i s appo i n t i n g and less than adequate, and that the major cause was unan t i c i pa ted s o c i e t a l repercuss ions . Th is appears to have been the case whether the s t r a t e g i e s were e x p l i c i t l y d i s r u p t i v e or (as was more gene ra l l y the case) i n adve r t en t l y so. There a r e , however, o ther reasons f o r the poor record as w e l l . The t r a d i t i o n a l ' b a r r i e r s to develop-ment 1 , and numerous ex te rna l o r una l t e r ab l e f a c t o r s (comparative advantages, e s t ab l i s hed markets, demand and supply l i m i t s , the 'development o f under-development ' ) each c o n t r i b u t e in va ry ing degrees to c i r cumsc r i be the economic growth p o t e n t i a l of each country. These c on s t r a i n t s f u r t h e r weaken the case f o r economic growth s t r a t e g i e s that requ i re easy access to open markets and to l i m i t e d resources. It i s recognized that a concerted e f f o r t i s necessary to reduce these ex te rna l b a r r i e r s to economic growth, to more e q u i t a b l y d i s t r i b u t e the w o r l d ' s resources and income. It is a l s o necessary to develop, at t h i s t ime, a developmental process that may be a p p l i e d in any country , w i t h i n these c o n s t r a i n t s . The process must seek to determine the l e ve l of s o c i a l performance w i t h i n the s o c i e t y , because every s o c i e t y has both s t rengths and weak-nesses—and most have more s t rengths than weaknesses. It must invo lve the people in determining the l e ve l of performance and in d e f i n i n g t h e i r own s o c i a l g oa l s , because on ly they can l e g i t i m a t e l y do i t and because the involvement i s in i t s e l f developmental. The i n t e r ven t i o n must be designed i i i to mainta in the l e ve l of performance in non-target subsystems (minimize d i s r up t i on ) and i t must be f l e x i b l e , s u i t a b l e f o r m o d i f i c a t i o n as problems a r i s e . These o b j e c t i v e s are f a c i l i t a t e d by experiments small in s ca le and scope. F i n a l l y the process must inc lude monitor ing and e v a l u a t i o n , not on ly of the ta rget subsystem, but of the whole s o c i a l performance. This i s necessary to permit adjustments to the s t r a t e g y , to ensure there are no negat ive impacts in o ther i n s t i t u t i o n s , and to improve our understand-ing o f s o c i a l system behav ior , a p r e r e g u i s i t e f o r more e f f i c i e n t development s t r a t e g i e s . TABLE OF CONTENTS Page INTRODUCTION 1 CHAPTER 1 1.0 De f in ing the Development Objec t i ve s 6 CHAPTER 2 2.0 The Record 20 2.1 The Economic Growth Record 20 2.2 The Development Record 26 CHAPTER 3 3.0 The Reasons f o r the Poor Record 34 3.1 Causes of the Poor Growth Record 34 3.2 Causes of the Poor Development Record 44 CHAPTER 4 4.0 De f in ing the Problem of P lanning f o r Development 53 4.1 I d en t i f y i n g Performance D e f i c i e n c i e s 53 4.2 The Problem of Change 54 4.3 I d e n t i f y i n g the Causes o f D e f i c i e n c i e s 56 4.4 Designing Appropr ia te S t r a teg i e s 57 CHAPTER 5 5-0 Toward a St rategy f o r Development 59 5.1 The Role o f the I n te rna t i ona l Community 59 5.2 The Role of the Development Planner 62 BIBLIOGRAPHY V ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Several people gave generously o f t h e i r time and ideas. I would l i k e to acknowledge in p a r t i c u l a r the a s s i s t ance and adv ice of p ro fes so r s C.S. Belshaw, S.D. B u t t - F i n n , H. Hightower and D. Webster. Two i n d i v i d u a l s deserve s pec i a l mention. I would l i k e to thank P ro fe s so r I r v ing K. Fox and my w i f e , L i l l i a n , f o r t h e i r encouragement and support that went f a r beyond the scope of t h i s paper. The d e f i c i e n c i e s that remain in t h i s work are e n t i r e l y my own respons i b i 1 i t y . 1 INTRODUCTION Planners have been concerned w i t h cond i t i on s in the Th i rd World f o r some t ime, and cons iderab le e f f o r t has been expended to improve what have gene ra l l y been viewed as u n s a t i s f a c t o r y l e ve l s of l i v i n g there . Despite the e f f o r t , however, and some change, there has not been comparable improve-ment. Development p lann ing i s now at a c r i t i c a l s tage. There i s s u f f i c i e n t in format ion a v a i l a b l e to eva lua te , i f on ly g r o s s l y , the record over the l a s t two decades. The record has not been good. There are now, in a d d i t i o n to most of the problems that e x i s t e d p r i o r to the concerted p lann ing i n t e r v e n t i o n s , exacerbated problems of increased i n e g u i t i e s , of a l i e n a t i o n and unemployment, of 1 homelessness 1 . And growing popu lat ions add pressure to the present problems. So planners must look c r i t i c a l l y at past s t r a t e g i e s , must f i n d t h e i r weaknesses, and must develop new s t r a t e g i e s which o f f e r more promise o f success. Th is t h e s i s i s a c o n t r i b u t i o n t o that task. I brought to t h i s study severa l pe rcep t i on s , wh ich, given the s t a te o f my knowledge (and even the s t a te of knowledge in these f i e l d s ) may be l i t t l e more than b i a se s . F i r s t , i s the d i screpancy I perce ived between the rea l wor ld and our d e s c r i p t i o n s o f i t . The d e s c r i p t i o n s (by no means the on ly ones, but the ones upon which p o l i c i e s are genera 11y based) descr ibe the death and d i sease and wretched poverty of these areas. S o c i a l , demographic and economic i n d i c a t o r s i nc lude f i g u re s on death r a te s , b i r t h r a t e s , hea l th f a c i l i t i e s , educa t i on , n u t r i t i o n , hous ing, t r an spo r -t a t i o n and communication s e r v i c e s , income, sav ings , investment, consumption and output . Hardly s u r p r i s i n g l y , the d e s c r i p t i o n of the Th i rd World s o c i e t i e s based on these types of in format ion i s dismal indeed in comparison w i t h the more a f f l u e n t c o u n t r i e s . ( i n t e r e s t i n g l y , the U.N. records deaths by var ious communicable diseases p reva lent in the t r o p i c s , but not by heart 2 d i sease, lung cancer, or car a c c i d e n t s ) . It i s not d i f f i c u l t to specu late that i f s o c i a l i nd i c a t o r s could inc lude happiness o r s e c u r i t y o r mental hea1th--perhaps the most important c r i t e r i a of a l l - - t h e ranking o f s o c i e t i e s might be very d i f f e r e n t . A l l t h i s t he s i s manages to do is to show t h i s pe r cep t i on , that there i s much of va lue in most s o c i e t i e s , that no one s o c i e t y has demonstrated i t s s u p e r i o r i t y , and that apprehensions that much of value in o ther s o c i e t i e s w i l l be l o s t unless new s t r a t e g i e s are found, i s shared by o the r s . My second b ias i s a s t rong , a p r i o r i s u sp i c i on of models and g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s . The Th i rd World i s not an e n t i t y . Beyond being the count r i e s other than the i n d u s t r i a l i z e d West or East , i t de f i e s d e s c r i p t i o n . Even per c a p i t a incomes are not u n i v e r s a l l y low, p a r t i c u l a r l y s i n ce O.P.E.C. has shown i t s s t r eng th . Resources vary, c a p i t a l v a r i e s , popu la t ion pressures vary. Most impor tan t l y , s o c i a l systems vary. Ma las ia and B r a z i l are hard ly in the same c l a s s as Chad; India i s unique aga in . How can a s t r a tegy that invo lves u rban i z a t i on apply equa l l y among the Yoruba in N i g e r i a , w i t h t h e i r urban t r a d i t i o n s and in parts of East A f r i c a , where even v i l l a g e s were scarce? My i n i t i a l i n ten t to examine the a p p l i c a b i l i t y o f var ious models- - the Japanese, the B r a z i l i a n , the As ian c i t y - s t a t e s , the Chinese, the Russian and the Western was s h o r t - l i v e d . Dore, (1971) s u c c i n c t l y o u t l i n e s the l i m i t a t i o n s o f the Japanese exper ience as a model f o r o ther c o u n t r i e s . The same would have to be done f o r each o f the o ther models, each r equ i r i n g a d e t a i l e d a n a l y s i s of the s o c i a l system and the wor ld s i t u a t i o n as i t changed in response to i d e n t i f i a b l e development pressures . But that i s on ly the beg inn ing . For what count r i e s would any such model apply or be inappropr ia te ? I f the B r a z i l i a n model (were i t viewed as worthy of im i t a t i on ) were a p p l i c a b l e to A r gen t i na , would i t be to Ch i l e ? Models are not i nhe ren t l y dangerous, but they must be based on 3 adequate e m p i r i c a l knowledge. The s imple f a c t i s our knowledge o f s o c i a l system behav ior and performance i s inadequate to j u s t i f y t h e i r use. F i n a l l y , I harbour the s u sp i c i on that many of the ba s i c assumptions behind development e f f o r t s are f a l s e . It is o f t en assumed we know the course of s o c i a l evo lu t i on - -we used to t a l k of ' p r i m i t i v e ' and ' c i v i l i z e d ' s o c i e t i e s where we now use 'underdeveloped ' o r ' d e ve l op i n g ' and ' deve loped ' or 'modern ' . I f development i s de f i ned , as i t must be, as the improvement o f i n d i v i d u a l and s o c i a l w e l f a r e , I s t r ong l y suspect many o ther s o c i a l systems are more developed than are those of the Western, i n d u s t r i a l i z e d c o u n t r i e s . Al1 we can say about s o c i a l e vo l u t i o n at t h i s po int i s that i t has been d ivergent e v o l u t i o n . Development planners ought to seek what each s o c i e t y can learn from o the r s , in terms of i t s o b j e c t i v e s . We cannot assume economic growth i s c o s t l e s s . The changes i t causes, sometimes n e c e s s a r i l y , have costs and they may be h i gh . Nor can we assume economic growth is p r i c e l e s s , that no cost of s o c i a l d i s r u p t i o n o r i n d i v i d u a l anx ie ty is too great to counter the b e n e f i t s to be der ived from economic growth. I nd i ca t ions of s o c i a l mala i se in the a f f l u e n t count r i e s may i n d i c a t e the costs are p r o h i b i t i v e . I nd i ca t ions of the high costs and gene r a l l y small and o f ten n e g l i g i b l e b e n e f i t s in the Th i rd World may i n d i c a t e some resources ought to be r e - a l l o c a t e d to more important development e f f o r t s w i th b e t t e r c o s t - b e n e f i t r a t i o s in s o c i a l terms. These views may be l i t t l e more than b i a se s , but t h i s paper does show that much of the bas i s f o r economic growth or development s t r a t e g i e s is on no more s o l i d ground. What, then, does t h i s paper hope to accomplish? Drawing on the s o c i a l sc iences l i t e r a t u r e , I t r y to get an understanding of what is invo lved in i n d i v i d u a l and s o c i e t a l development. Knowledge in t h i s area i s f a r from complete, but i t i s po s s i b l e to gain some i n s i gh t s i n t o human needs and the ways in which s o c i e t i e s accommodate, s a t i s f y , or f r u s t r a t e these needs. Development s t r a t e g i e s must be based on t h i s understanding, and the process must prov ide f o r the improvement of that understanding. In look ing at the weaknesses o f present s t r a t e g i e s severa l opt ions were open. A case study cou ld have been examined, but, even w i th the costs o f doing the ana l y s i s (and a complete one would be impos s i b l e ) , i t could but show in t h i s case the s t r a tegy f a i l e d or was i napp rop r i a te . And hundreds and perhaps thousands of such s tud ie s have been done. A l t e r n a t i v e I could have d i scussed each type of s t r a t e g y , attempt ing to expose i t s under l y ing assumptions or l i m i t a t i o n s . But an exhaust i ve study would have been impos s i b l e - - the l i t e r a t u r e is s imply too va s t . A l s o , there a l ready e x i s t , in severa l ba s i c books on 'development ' or economic growth, adeguate d e s c r i p t i o n s o f enough s t r a t e g i e s to g ive anyone i n t e r e s t e d i n the f i e l d a f a i r understanding of the nature, i f not the a c tua l substance, o f most sets o f s t r a t e g i e s . I f e l t i t was j u s t i f i a b l e , t h e r e f o r e , to d i scuss types of s t r a t e g i e s rather than s p e c i f i c p r o j e c t s . It was a l s o expedient to draw on aggregates of exper ience more than s p e c i f i c p r o j e c t eva l ua t i on s and t h i s may be j u s t i f i e d by the remarkable consensus that emerged. Observat ions and eva lua t i on s of the development exper ience over the l a s t two decades, by authors from the extreme r i gh t to f a r l e f t , are s u r p r i s i n g l y c o n s i s t e n t . Based on these ob se rva t i on s , i t i s ev ident new approaches to development are necessary. It w i l l be necessary to change the wor ld market and c r e d i t systems to a l l ow ( l e t a lone encourage) the more e g u i t a b l e d i s t r i b u t i o n of resources and incomes. Of prime concern in t h i s t h e s i s , however, i s the nece s s i t y to adopt a developmental process that recognizes the inadeguacies of our understanding of s o c i a l performance and behav ior , o f i n d i v i d u a l needs and t h e i r s a t i s f a c t i o n ; that can be app l i ed de sp i te 5 these inadequacies and can improve our understanding; and that can be adopted to meet the changing s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s . Such an approach, at t h i s time must be h i gh l y exper imenta l and must have research as a major com-ponent. It i s a process , not a s p e c i f i c , a l t e r n a t i v e development s t r a t e g y , for any e x p l i c i t s t r a tegy at t h i s time would be premature. To paraphrase Mishan, (1967), i f t h i s approach appears weak f o r lack o f q u a n t i f i a b l e ev idence, the f a u l t l i e s more w i t h the s t a te o f our knowledge than w i t h the argument. The time has come to char t a new course in development p l ann ing . Th is t he s i s suggests the d i r e c t i o n ; the course w i l l f o l l o w from t ha t . CHAPTER 1 DEFINING THE DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES 6 Development i s the improvement of i n d i v i d u a l and s o c i a l we l f a re o r the improvement o f s o c i a l system performance. It i s s u b j e c t i v e . O b j e c t i v e , q u a n t i f i a b l e parameters may be examined to help i nd i c a te development (or, in s t a t i c terms, s o c i a l performance). The U.N. p re sen t l y records seventy-three such i nd i c a to r s - - i n comes , n u t r i t i o n , hea l th ( a c t u a l l y d i s ea se s ) , l i t e r a c y l e v e l s , e t c . — b u t these i n d i c a t o r s may not c o r r e l a t e s i g n i f i c a n t l y w i t h performance or may even c o r r e l a t e n e g a t i v e l y . Many components o f we l f a r e may be q u a n t i f i e d , but many more may not - -happ ines s , s e c u r i t y , s e l f - e s t eem, s a t i s f a c t i o n - - a n d these unmeasurable components are perhaps more c r i t i c a l to w e l f a r e and hence to any quest ions of development. Development, as def ined by Webster ' s and as gene r a l l y used, has a connotat ion of ' be t te rment ' o r ' improvement 1 . Development, then, l i k e any value-dependent term, i s in the eyes of the beholder . Growth, or any other change, may o r may not be developmental. Increased systems complex-i t y may be o b j e c t i v e and v a l u e - f r e e (Be'lshaw, 1970, 1972), but i n s o f a r as i t i s , i t cannot be used as a d e f i n i t i o n o f development wi thout begging the quest ion of whether increased systems complex ity n e c e s s a r i l y i nd i ca te s an improvement in s o c i a l performance. Th i s u n j u s t i f i e d assumption is not uncommon in the s o c i a l sc iences l i t e r a t u r e (see, f o r example, Chodak, 1973)- Whether the d e f i n i t i o n i s very p r e c i s e — a l eve l of development i s equ i va len t to a c e r t a i n per c ap i t a income—or s imply imposes a set of values which may not be u n i v e r s a l l y a c c e p t a b l e — c o n d i t i o n s o f Pareto improvement o r Pareto o p t i m i z a t i o n — i t t r i e s to de f i ne f o r another what h i s percept ion of improvement is or ought to be. In some s o c i e t i e s , a development o b j e c t i v e might conce ivab ly be a more e q u i t a b l e d i s t r i b u t i o n of w e l f a r e . The costs of t h i s to some segments of s o c i e t y may decrease t h e i r w e l f a r e , but there may be, nonethe less , marked s o c i e t a l development. 7 S o c i e t a l development i s , then, a s u b j e c t i v e term, l i k e improvement or betterment. The o b j e c t i v i t y of va r i ous components of i t do not a l t e r i t s ba s i c s u b j e c t i v i t y . Do more cars and f r i d ge s mean more development? Or h igher incomes but fewer happy marriages? Th is paper cannot, and w i l l not attempt t o , answer t ha t gue s t i on . In f a c t , i t w i l l argue that on ly the members of the s oc i e t y may l e g i t i m a t e l y eva luate t h e i r l e ve l of s o c i a l system performance and the degree to which changes in i t are developmental. It may be p o s s i b l e , however, to i d e n t i f y some of the under l y ing i n d i v i d u a l needs f o r s e l f - f u l f i l l m e n t . I nd i v i dua l development, s e l f - f u l f i l l m e n t or s e l f a c t u a l i z a t i o n i s the process o f s a t i s f y i n g one ' s p h y s i o l o g i c a l and p s ycho l og i ca l needs. Soc i a l development i s the process of c r e a t i n g an environment conducive to i n d i v i d u a l development. Maslow (1968, 1971, and Goble, 1970) i d e n t i f i e s b a s i c (or " d e f i c i e n c y " ) n eed s - - phy s i o l o g i c a l needs f o r a i r , water , food, s h e l t e r , s l eep , and sex, and p sycho log i ca l needs f o r s a fe t y and s e c u r i t y , love and "be long ingness " and se l f - e s teem and esteem by o the r s . Maslow argues that these needs are h i e r a r c h i c a 1 - - t h a t the p h y s i o l o g i c a l needs must be met before the i n d i v i d u a l is able to attempt to s a t i s f y needs f o r s a f e t y and s e c u r i t y , which must in turn be s a t i s f i e d before (or are more ba s i c than) the need f o r love and belong ingness, which must precede esteem g r a t i f i c a t i o n . F a i l u r e to s a t i s f y these needs, he c l a ims , causes phy s i ca l or p sycho log i ca l i l l n e s s ; s a t i s f a c t i o n of them prevents or cures the i l l n e s s , and a hea l thy person, by d e f i n i t i o n , has s a t i s f i e d h i s ba s i c needs. Having s a t i s f i e d h i s ba s i c needs, the i n d i v i d u a l i s prepared to grow, to s a t i s f y h i s growth needs. These needs, f o r t r u t h , goodness, beauty, a l i v e n e s s , i n d i v i d u a l i t y , p e r f e c t i o n , nece s s i t y , complet ion, j u s t i c e , o rde r , s i m p l i c i t y , r i chnes s , p l a y f u l n e s s , e f f o r t l e s s n e s s , s e l f s u f f i c i e n c y , and meaningfulness are 8 n o n - h i e r a r c h i c a l and, in many cases, i n t e r r e l a t e d . F i n a l l y , need s a t i s -f a c t i o n depends on the ex te rna l environment, the p recond i t i on s f o r s a t i s -f a c t i o n being freedom, j u s t i c e , o r d e r l i n e s s and cha l lenge o r s t i m u l a t i o n . Maslow's h i e r a r chy of needs should not be cons idered an exhaust i ve l i s t i n g , nor is there n e c e s s a r i l y any great mer i t in h i s termino logy. For example, c u r i o s i t y and c r e a t i v i t y (on which Maslow and others put cons ide rab le emphasis) could be viewed as separate needs ra ther than as express ions o f the needs f o r t r u t h , beauty, i n d i v i d u a l i t y , meaningfulness, p e r f e c t i o n s , complet ion, and p l a y f u l n e s s . The h i e ra r chy i t s e l f could be ques t ioned. There are probably innumerable examples of i n d i v i d u a l s p l a c i ng h igher value on less ba s i c needs—even to the point o f f o r f e i t i n g l i f e i t s e l f f o r h igher va lue s—and of i n d i v i d u a l s (and s o c i e t i e s ) e s t a b l i s h i n g a h i e ra r chy of the ( non - h i e r a r ch i c a l ) growth-needs. How un i ve r s a l is the h i e ra r chy presented by Maslow? How un i ve r s a l are these needs themselves? How compat ib le or complementary are the needs? The i m p l i c a t i o n that i n d i v i d u a l s s u f f e r i n g from m a l n u t r i t i o n or d isease o r lack of s a f e t y are unable to (or u n w i l l i n g to) s a t i s f y o ther " h i g h e r " needs, l i k e l ove , s e l f - e s teem or t ru th i s at best ques t i onab le . A l s o , i n d i v i d u a l s o r c u l t u r e s may p lace g rea te r emphasis on, f o r example, complet ion than on, say, p l a y f u l n e s s - t h e P ro te s tan t e t h i c o f l i v i n g to work and the e q u a l l y widespread e t h i c of working to l i v e . It can be seen that these needs, r e f l e c t i n g Maslow's view of man and h i s methodology are a l l "good" needs. What of the need to dominate, to acqu i re and possess, to win? It may be po s s i b l e to draw a d i s t i n c t i o n between human needs and goa l s . Goals may be def ined as the man i f e s t a t i on of the need, the o b j e c t i v e by which the i n d i v i d u a l attempts to s a t i s f y h i s under l y ing need. Goals are very l a r g e l y c u l t u r a l l y determined, w h i l e needs may or may not 9 be. For example, the 'needs ' t o dominate, to a cqu i r e , or to win may be goals fo s te red by a c u l t u r e to s a t i s f y the needs f o r s tatus or s e l f - e s t eem. Theologians and ph i losophers have debated i n c o n c l u s i v e l y f o r m i l l e n i a whether man is b a s i c a l l y good or e v i l . P s ycho log i s t s and other s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s have to some extent undermined t h i s argument by suggest ing he has the capac i t y f o r both, sub ject to the s o c i a l environment, but s o c i a l development e f f o r t s are s t i l l subject to such ep i t he t s as ' u t o p i a n ' or ' n a i v e ' i f they f a i l to conta in man's ' n a t u r a l ' tendencies toward compet i t i on , dominance, power and s e l f - i n t e r e s t . A l l i n d i v i d u a l s s t r i v e fo r s e l f - f u l f i l l m e n t in a s o c i a l c o n t e x t - - i t i s the s o c i a l context that determines the c r i t e r i a f o r esteem and s t a t u s . So, where i n d i v i d u a l s are rewarded f o r ach iev ing success i n compet i t i ve s i t u a t i o n s , f o r a t t a i n i n g and e x e r c i s i n g power, and where sanct ions are weak aga inst neg lect o f s o c i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , behav ior d i r e c t e d toward ach iev ing acceptance and s ta tu s w i l l be markedly d i f f e r e n t (though n e i t h e r more nor less ' n a t u r a l ' ) than behav ior d i r e c t e d toward the same needs s a t i s f a c t i o n in a s o c i e t y w i t h more s oc i a11y^o r i en ted , co -ope ra t i ve norms. Before e xp l o r i n g these s o c i e t a l d i f f e r e n c e s , there i s another fea tu re of the set of i n d i v i d u a l needs that has i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r s o c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n . Man appears to have c o n f l i c t i n g needs. He apparent ly needs s e c u r i t y and o r d e r l i n e s s from h i s s o c i e t y . He a l s o needs cha l lenge or s t i m u l a t i o n . Much o f the 'development ' (economic growth) e f f o r t d i scussed in Chapter 2 was d i r e c t e d toward i n c rea s i ng the l e v e l of cha l lenge and s t i m u l a t i o n , o s t e n s i b l y to increase innovat ion and change. Kenneth Arrow (1963) got the Nobel P r i z e f o r showing, mathemat i ca l l y , you c a n ' t p lease everyone a l l the t ime. Soc i a l systems, however, need not be r e s t r i c t e d to such s imple choi ces . At what point does s e c u r i t y and o r d e r l i n e s s render the cha l lenge or s t i m u l a t i o n i n e f f e c t i v e ? How much cha l lenge may e x i s t before i n s e c u r i t y reaches unhealthy l e ve l s ? Ought we be t h i n k i n g in such general terms of o p t i m a l i t y , or i s i t p o s s i b l e to prov ide d i ve r se o p p o r t u n i t i e s , perhaps o f f e r i n g cha l l enge , the s t i m u l a t i o n f o r c r e a t i v i t y in one sec to r (perhaps the economic) wh i l e r e t a i n i n g a degree of o r d e r l i n e s s , s t a b i l i t y and secu r -i t y in another s ec to r ( f o r example, the fami l y or community s t r u c t u r e ) ? Perhaps i t i s not so much o f a dilemma as i t f i r s t appears. The i n d i v i d u a l requ i res a degree of s t a b i l i t y from which to grow and to which to return i f o ther s t re s se s become too g rea t , but he a l s o requ i res the oppo r tun i t y to expand, to meet cha l lenges and develop h i s p o t e n t i a l . Nyerere (1974) c a l l s f o r the necessary change to f r ee people from pover ty , ignorance and d i sease and from e x p l o i t a t i o n , oppress ion and sub-s i s t ence l i v i n g , yet he recognizes that a degree of s t a b i l i t y i s necessary to achieve that change. In address ing t h i s i ssue o f s o c i e t i e s ' r o l e in i n d i v i d u a l f u l f i l l -ment, Benedict developed the concept of s o c i e t a l synergy. Benedict (1970) argues there can be severa l "ground p l an s " f o r s o c i e t i e s which can be s t a b l e and v i a b l e , i n c l ud i n g h i gh l y i nequ i t ab l e ones, so long as there is some recogn i t i on o f mutual b e n e f i t to members of the s o c i e t y . The "ground p l an s " appear to be les s important than the s o c i a l arrangements w i t h i n these broader s t r u c t u r e s . Values and norms are a major component of the s o c i a l arrangements that can, in e f f e c t , make or break a s o c i e t y . S y n e r g i s t i c arrangements are those that advantage the i n d i v i d u a l and the group by the same a c t i o n . "From a l l comparative mate r i a l the conc lus ion that emerges i s that s o c i e t i e s where nonaggression is conspicuous have s o c i a l orders in which the i n d i v i d u a l by the same act and at the same time serves h i s own advantage and that of the group" (Bened ict , 1970). S o c i a l systems and arrangements where c o n f l i c t and aggress ion are high generate h o s t i l i t y , resentment, and envy and high l e v e l s of i n s e c u r i t y ( i f c o n f l i c t produces winners , i t a l s o produces lo ser s ) and hence f a i l u r e . I n secu r i t y and f a i l u r e are ha rd l y conducive to se l f - e s teem and other needs s a t i s -f a c t i o n and i n d i v i d u a l f u l f i l l m e n t . The concept of s o c i a l synergy and the a l t e r n a t i v e developmental mechanisms of co -opera t i on and compet i t ion are obv iou s l y c l o s e l y r e l a t ed and are c e n t r a l , e i t h e r e x p l i c i t l y or i m p l i c i t l y , to many development o r i en t ed d e c i s i o n s . It has been ev ident f o r some time not on ly that d i f f e r e n t s o c i e t i e s have d i f f e r e n t l e ve l s o f cooperat ion and compet i t ion but that some s o c i e t i e s are b a s i c a l l y cooperat i ve and others b a s i c a l l y compet i t i v e , though none are l i k e l y to be e x c l u s i v e l y one or the other (Mead, 1937). Engu i r i e s i n t o the r e l a t i v e advantages of cooperat ion over compet i t ion per se as ba s i c s o c i a l mot ivat ions a re , as y e t , i n c o n c l u s i v e , though there are i n d i c a t i o n s " t h a t human p o t e n t i a l s are wasted due to the environmental c u l t i v a t i o n of compet i t ion and aggress ion as opposed to cooperat ion and the s o c i a l s i de of man's nature. For those who do not win f a i l to develop the degree of i n f l uence or the f e e l i n g s of worthiness necessary to make c o n t r i b u t i o n s in s o c i e t i e s where agg res s ion , i n d i v i d u a l -ism and compet i t ion are s anc t i oned " ( B u t t - F i n n , 197*0. If t h i s is the case, i f aggres s ion, i n d i v i d u a l i s m and compet i t i on c on t r i bu te to low synergy and low synergy r e s t r i c t s the capac i t y of a s o c i a l system to s a t i s f y i t s members, why do such systems not on ly e x i s t but appear to f l o u r i s h and even dominate o the r , more s y n e r g i s t i c systems? Two arguments help e x p l a i n t h i s d i f f i c u l t y . Recent p sycho log i ca l game experiments appear to support Mead's concern that cooperat i ve behav ior has l i t t l e to p ro tec t i t aga ins t 'advancing groups w i t h compet i t i ve v a l u e s ' . Compet i t ive behav ior tends to fo rce cooperat i ve i n d i v i d u a l s and groups to adopt compet i t i ve behav ior f o r t h e i r own s u r v i v a l , even in s i t u a t i o n s in which cooperat i ve behav ior  would be more appropr ia te ( Bu t t - F i nn , 1974). The handshake may have a few defences against the sword, and may be f o r ced , f o r s u r v i v a l , to take up the sword, but that i s weak evidence that the sword is u l t i m a t e l y s upe r i o r in ach iev ing s o c i a l o b j e c t i v e s . Dominances, t he re f o re , may not be an appropr ia te c r i t e r i o n f o r e va l ua t i n g s o c i a l systems. It appears from t h i s that low l e v e l s of synergy may prec lude many or even most members of a s o c i e t y from deve lop ing themselves, that s o c i a l synergy may be a c ond i t i o n of s o c i e t a l development. That being the case, development e f f o r t s which have tended to reduce synergy may be i nhe ren t l y an t i - deve lopmenta l . It is t he re fo re imperat ive that the concept o f synergy be app l i ed to the development process , and that the t r a n s f e r of technology and compet i t i ve values be examined more c r i t i c a l l y . Synergy may be p l o t t e d on a development mat r i x w i th a measure of the l e ve l o f technology, or f o r example, per c a p i t a income. Each may be seen as a c o n t r i b u t o r to the s a t i s f a c t i o n o f p h y s i o l o g i c a l and p s ycho l og i ca l needs. (As the appropr iateness of the technology is more re 1 e v a n t - - i . e . a very high l e ve l o f technology may a c t u a l l y a l i e n a t e i n d i v i d u a l s — b u t harder to assess , per c a p i t a income has been used as an a l t e r n a t i v e i n d i c a t o r . ) On t h i s s i m p l i s t i c ma t r i x , development would be seen as a movement toward the t h i r d quadrant. There are numerous other c r i t e r i a of development which d i f f e r e n t s o c i e t i e s may choose to employ. I nd i v i dua l freedom, f o r example, as conceived in Western democratic ideology may be a p recond i t i on (as Maslow suggests) o r i t may be perce ived d i f f e r e n t l y and valued much less by some other s o c i e t i e s . The point being s t re s sed in t h i s t h e s i s , however, i s that some of the c r i t e r i a on which cons ide rab le developmental e f f o r t i s based, may not warrant a high p r i o r i t y . An increase in synergy may be more developmental than an increase in per c a p i t a incomes and an 13 PER CAPITA INCOME LOW HIGH HIGH B 1 F SYNERGY 4 E LOW increase in per c a p i t a incomes, at the expense of synergy i s very l i k e l y to be ant i -developmenta1. To serve as i l l u s t r a t i o n s , though synergy has not been measured and the po s i t i o n s are gues t i onab le , a few count r i e s have been p l o t t e d on the mat r i x . A. Peoples Republ ic of Ch ina: per c a p i t a income, 1973, $270.; appears to have a high l e ve l of synergy, i f reports of worker and peasant p a r t i c i p a t i o n , of egual o p p o r t u n i t i e s to c r ea te , inno-vate and undertake t r a i n i n g are t r ue . Further development may (depending on the Chinese percept ions o f t h e i r needs) regu i re an increase in some other areas--perhaps i n d i v i d u a l freedom, or mate r i a l we l l be ing - -but that cannot be determined o b j e c t i v e l y . B. Ghana: per c a p i t a income, 1973, $300.; l i k e many ' t r a d i t i o n a l ' s o c i e t i e s , appears to have a high l e ve l of synergy, r e f l e c t e d in such th ings as s too l lands ( pub l i c ho ld ing o f l and ) , extended f am i l y r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s and support . Care must be taken to mainta in t h i s synergy as other developmental concerns are addressed. C. H a i t i : per c a p i t a income, 1973, $130.; per c a p i t a incomes are lower and oppress ion probably worse here, but much of feudal L a t i n America and at l ea s t parts of India belong in t h i s guadrant. It i s dangerous to confuse ' C w i t h ' A ' or ' B ' . 14 D. Japan: per c a p i t a income, 1973, $3,630.; whether Japanese ' c o l l e c t i v e compet i t i on ' o r ' synergy w i t h i n small groups ' i s more developmental than Western i n d i v i d u a l i s m is d i f f i c u l t to determine. I have p laced i t h igher because the i n d i v i d u a l appears to de r i v e cons iderab le support from h i s group, though there i s a l s o s i g n i f i c a n t pressure to c o n t r i b u t e to the group. E. The United S t a te s : per c a p i t a income, 1973. $6,200.; probably the epitome o f the P ro te s tan t E t h i c and rugged i n d i v i d u a l i s m , though i t is f o l l o w i n g other a f f l u e n t count r ie s in i nc rea s i ng i t s concern f o r p u b l i c w e l f a r e . I ts low leve l of synergy may prec lude many i n d i v i d u a l s from developing themselves, making i t , by t h i s c r i t e r i o n , an underdeveloped country . F. Bu lga r i a: per c a p i t a income, 1973. $1 ,590.; and G. Greece: per c a p i t a income, 1973, $1,870. B u l g a r i a and Greece were c a r e f u l l y chosen to compare l e ve l s of s o c i a l performance between two c o u n t r i e s , East and West, w i th comparable pre-W.W.I I h i s t o r y , geography, popu l a t i on , resources, technology and incomes (Apel and Strumpel , 1976). F ive hundred i n d i v i d u a l s were in terv iewed in each country . I nequa l i t y and p a r t i c u l a r l y i n s e c u r i t y in Greece were much higher and con t r i bu ted to h i gher l e v e l s of apprehension about the fu tu re and general d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n . In Bu l g a r i a where v i r t u a l l y everyone i n t e r -viewed e i t h e r worked f o r the s t a t e or was a farmer, there was a much h igher l e ve l o f s a t i s f a c t i o n and a high l e ve l of conf idence in the f u t u r e . No Bu l ga r i an s , but 17 percent of the Greeks f e l t they were worse o f f than a decade p r e v i o u s l y ; the Greeks had g reate r job m o b i l i t y and h igher expec ta -t i o n s , but low job s a t i s f a c t i o n . "The strong d i f f e r ence s in the sense of w e l l - b e i n g between Bu lgar ians and Greeks po int out the importance of i n te rpe r sona l and in ter tempora l comparisons. Large d i f f e r e n t i a l s of income and wea l th , and unsteady employment, p r i c e s ( i n f l a t i o n ) , and i n d i v i d u a l consumption l e v e l s (due to s i ckness and d i s a b i l i t y ) , are cha r a c t e r -i s t i c of the Greek exper ience. A move toward e q u a l i t y and c o n t i n u i t y in the d i s t r i b u t i o n of rewards may we l l be appropr i a te in a deve lop-ment s t r a tegy that t r i e s to respect the l i m i t s of contemporary man's capac i t y f o r coping w i t h s o c i a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n and change." (Apel and Strumpel, 1976) From t h i s i t appears the s o c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n in B u l g a r i a c on t r i bu te s more to the i n d i v i d u a l ' s w e l l - b e i n g than does that in Greece. While 15 B u l g a r i a , l i k e China, may lack other developmental c r i t e r i a , i t does appear to have a high l e ve l of synergy. From t h i s i t i s ev ident that s o c i a l e v o l u t i o n has taken severa l paths. It is egua l l y apparent that no one s o c i a l system, and p a r t i c u l a r l y the a f f l u e n t west, has a c l a im to the r i gh t path. This e vo l u t i ona r y argument can be pursued f u r t h e r . One of the most ba s i c assumptions under-l y i n g current development e f f o r t s is the b e l i e f , the misconcept ion, that s o c i a l e v o l u t i o n can be and has been eva lua ted . H i s t o r i a n s are no doubt appa l led by the frequency wi th which h i s t o r i c a l arguments are presented without an h i s t o r i c a l pe r s pec t i v e , much as b i o l o g i s t s react to " e v o l u t i o n a r y " ana log ie s . The assumption that e vo l u t i ona r y s o c i a l experiments can be c o n c l u s i v e l y eva luated in a pe r i od o f at most a couple of cen tu r i e s t o t a l l y ignores the evidence o f s o c i a l h i s t o r y and na tu ra l h i s t o r y . Yet t h i s assumption i s so p r e v a l e n t , very few i n d i v i d u a l s quest ion such e p i t h e t s as "deve loped " and "underdeveloped" and ask i f there i s any more j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r such terms now than at the time of the anc ient empires of China, Egypt, or Middle America. It i s not pessimism to recognize that other s o c i a l systems and indeed other s pec i e s , have f l o u r i s h e d and vanished. I am not p r e d i c t i n g man's e x t i n c t i o n , nor that of h i s Western socio-economic system. I am echoing Dubos' (1966) concern that our rate of s o c i a l change may o u t s t r i p our c apac i t y to adapt, yet that our a b i l i t y to adapt may mask chron ic and l a ten t problems u n t i l the u l t imate to l e rance po int i s reached. Cont inu ing wi th t h i s e vo l u t i ona r y argument: d i v e r s i t y i s a nece s s i t y f o r a d a p t a b i l i t y and e v o l u t i o n a r y success. Our gene t i c d i v e r s i t y prov ides a high but nonetheless l i m i t e d degree of a d a p t a b i l i t y , being v i r t u a l l y unchanged s ince Cro-Magnon times (Dubos, 1966). L o g i c a l l y t h i s may be extended to s o c i a l systems—both i n t e r - and i n t r a s o c i e t a l d i v e r s i t y . Compet i t ive s o c i e t i e s tend to f e a t u r e , among o ther th ings a s i n g l e success s ca l e (Mead, 1937), a fea tu re which, bes ides d i s c r i m i n a t i n g aga in s t those without the appropr ia te a p t i t u d e , may l i m i t the s o c i e t i e s ' adapt ive a b i l i t y . G l o b a l l y , the cen t r a l theme of t h i s paper i s the r e j e c t i o n o f attempts to impose an as yet poor ly eva luated s o c i a l system on other s o c i a l systems. Part o f the r a t i o n a l e f o r t h i s p o s i t i o n i s the consequent loss o f d i v e r s i t y and a l t e r n a t i v e approaches. B r i e f l y summarizing to t h i s p o i n t , i t i s suggested there are i n d i c a t i o n s that man has a v a r i e t y of needs which must be s a t i s f i e d f o r h i s development and f u l f i l l m e n t . These needs may have a h i e r a r c h i c a l o r d e r i n g - - s a t i s f a c t i o n o f " h i g h e r " needs may be depen-dent on the p r i o r s a t i s f a c t i o n of more " b a s i c " needs. These needs may be u n i v e r s a l , inherent in a l l men, though obv iou s l y f r u s t r a t e d in many (or most). Whether t h i s p a r t i c u l a r set of needs, or the h i e ra r chy in which Maslow has p laced them, are un i ve r s a l however, i s not o f c r i t i c a l import-ance. One may p r e f e r to t h i nk in more general terms o f the un i ve r sa l "need f o r p o s i t i v e e f f e c t (which) is not a product of c u l t u r a l c o n d i t i o n -ing but unde r l i e s i t . " (Goldschmidt, 1959). What i s c r i t i c a l i s the r ecogn i t i on that at l e a s t some of these needs are common to a l l men, that most, i f not a l l these needs can on l y be s a t i s f i e d by s o c i a l arrangements, and that many o f these needs appear to have l i t t l e connect ion w i t h economic l e v e l s beyond the b a s i c n e c e s s i t i e s f o r s u r v i v a l . D i f f e r e n t s o c i a l systems appear to have d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s o f s yne rgy— d i f f e r e n t c a p a c i t i e s to s a t i s f y or f r u s t r a t e these i n d i v i d u a l needs. It appears that s o c i e t y must not on ly p rov ide the s t i m u l a t i o n o r cha l lenge f o r c r e a t i v i t y and development but i t must a l s o prov ide the s e c u r i t y and s t a b i l i t y upon which a l l i n d i v i d u a l s depend to some degree. How much s t imu l a t i o n ? How much s t a b i l i t y ? How does one induce synergy? C l e a r l y there is too l i t t l e in format ion a v a i l a b l e at t h i s time to design the pe r f ec t s o c i a l system. I t i s p o s s i b l e such a time w i l l never a r r i v e . There i s , however, enough evidence to warrant the se r ious g u e s t i o n -ing of attempts to model one s o c i e t y on another, p a r t i c u l a r l y where the in tent and/or e f f e c t i s d i s r u p t i o n o f the e x i s t i n g s o c i a l system. Such d i s r u p t i o n g r e a t l y increases s o c i e t a l s t i m u l a t i o n but a l so v i r t u a l l y destroys s t a b i l i t y and the necessary s e c u r i t y i t p rov ided. In the absence o f adeguate measurements o f i n d i v i d u a l and s o c i a l w e l f a r e , such attempts are even more suspect. L o g i c a l l y , i t would appear that s o c i a l systems w i t h low l e ve l s of synergy or low l e v e l s o f we l f a r e might learn from those w i th high l e ve l s of synergy and w e l f a r e , ra ther than those w i th low l e ve l s of technology o r per c a p i t a (monetary) income attempt ing to mimic those w i t h h igher , i f as i t i s suggested, synergy c o r r e l a t e s mores c l o s e l y w i t h w e l f a r e than income does. But s o c i a l systems d i f f e r from one another in numerous ways. I nd i v idua l and s o c i e t a l va lues may d i f f e r , and the p h y s i c a l , c a p i t a l and human resources upon which s o c i e t y draws d i f f e r . Consequently d i f f e r e n t subsystems have d i f f e r e n t s ta tus and impact in the s o c i a l system. There i s a l s o l i t t l e ev idence one s o c i a l system i s s upe r i o r to another and even les s understanding of how one s o c i e t y might be changed to improve i t s performance in d e l i v e r i n g w e l f a r e . These two f ac t s put severe l i m i t s on the a b i l i t y to t r an spo r t exper ience between s o c i a l systems w i t h any degree o f r e l i a b i l i t y w i thout ex ten s i ve i nqu i r y i n to subsystem i n t e r -ac t i on in both s o c i e t i e s and leave l i t t l e j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r s o c i a l evange-l i sm or mimi c ry . To b r i e f l y summarize, development i s the improvement in a s o c i e t y ' s performance, an increase in the needs ' s a t i s f a c t i o n of the members of the s o c i e t y . A p r i o r i t y must presumably be g iven to the un i ve r sa l s a t i s -f a c t i o n of the d e f i c i e n c y needs to some minimal l e v e l . The l e v e l o f 18 s o c i a l performance (what i s more commonly c a l l e d i t s l e ve l of development) i s the extent to which the s o c i e t y provides f o r the ba s i c needs of al1 i t s members and prov ides an environment conducive to the widespread r e a l i z -a t i o n of t h e i r growth needs. Where a s o c i e t y cannot prov ide f o r t h i s s a t i s f a c t i o n nor prov ide such an environment, e i t h e r through inadeguate resources, o r gan i z a t i on or technology or through i negu i t ab l e d i s t r i b u t i o n of these, such that some members of s o c i e t y are s a t i s f i e d wh i l e others are not, that s o c i e t y i s underdeveloped. The a b i l i t y of a s o c i e t y to s a t i s f y i t s members' d e f i c i e n c y and growth needs depends on severa l f a c t o r s . The economic resources and output are important, p a r t i c u l a r l y in meeting d e f i c i e n c y requirements. However, an environment of freedom, j u s t i c e and o r d e r l i n e s s , w i t h a mix of both s t i m u l a t i o n and s t a b i l i t y , appears to be egua l l y necessary f o r development, p a r t i c u l a r l y once the d e f i c i e n c y needs are met. S o c i a l synergy may, i n a d d i t i o n , be a p r e r e g u i s i t e to development, f o r where l e v e l s o f synergy are low, some members of s o c i e t y s a t i s f y t h e i r needs a t the expense of o ther members. Where some members have the oppor-t u n i t y f o r development b locked in t h i s way, the s o c i e t y cannot be con-s idered developed. F i n a l l y , the s a t i s f a c t i o n of the var ious phy s i ca l and p sycho log i ca l d e f i c i e n c y needs and the var ious growth needs depend on the performance of the e n t i r e s o c i a l system. No one subsystem can prov ide f o r such d i ve r se need. To remain hea l thy , t h e r e f o r e , a s o c i e t y must f unc t i on as an i n teg ra ted system, and no one subsystem ought to a t t a i n a dominant p o s i t i o n . In many c a p i t a l i s t c o u n t r i e s , f o r example, the pre-eminance o f the economic system has reduced the e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f o ther i n s t i t u t i o n s , l i k e the f a m i l y . In o ther s o c i e t i e s the pre-eminance o f , f o r example, r e l i g i o u s i n s t i t u t i o n s , may i n h i b i t the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the economic system. Development, in sho r t , is a h o l i s t i c concept, which can only be assessed by the q u a l i t a t i v e e va l ua t i on of the var ious components by the members of each s o c i e t y . The ana l y s i s which fo l l ows i s an attempt to assess the extent to which the a v a i l a b i l i t y of the economic resources has increased and, more impor tan t l y , the extent to which they and other s o c i a l outputs have increased the w e l l - b e i n g of the members of s o c i e t i e s in the Th i rd Wor ld. 20 CHAPTER 2 THE RECORD Insofar as most of the development e f f o r t has focussed on ach iev i ng economic growth on the assumption that e i t h e r economic growth is deve lop-mental or that i t prov ides the wherewi tha l ! to s a t i s f y needs and thus achieve development, we w i l l look at that component of the record f i r s t . 2.1 The Economic Growth Record Measuring economic growth, as de f ined by Lewis (1955) as s imp ly , "growth of output per head o f p o p u l a t i o n " presents enough problems in i t s e l f , p a r t i c u l a r l y in non-market or non-monetized systems, to l i m i t s e r i o u s l y the value of measures of gross na t i ona l product. At t h i s p o i n t , however, t h i s convent iona l measurement w i l l be used, not so much to compare the abso lute or even r e l a t i v e l e v e l s o f economic output among s o c i e t i e s as to i n d i c a t e the changes in l e v e l s of output . This may be j u s t i f i a b l e f o r three reasons: f i r s t , i f the record of development is to be assessed, and much of the e f f o r t was d i r e c t e d toward i nc rea s i ng economic growth, i t i s on ly f i t t i n g that the assessment inc lude an ana l y s i s of the e f f e c t of that e f f o r t in terms o f i t s o b j e c t i v e s . Second, GNP, de sp i te i t s l i m i t a t i o n s and the general acceptance of those l i m i t a t i o n s by economists, i s used as a convenient short-hand (with the i n e v i t a b l e apology) "because i t i s the best a v a i l a b l e " , by economists, planners and dec i s ion -makers . T h i r d , and t h i s may be a weak argument, as most of the development e f f o r t has been app l i ed to inc rease economic growth, one might expect the g rea te s t amount o f improvement in that s e c t o r . A low l e ve l of economic growth, then, may be taken to i n d i c a t e a low l e ve l of development, which i s much more d i f f i c u l t to measure than economic growth. It i s not imposs ib le , of course, that the s t r a t e g i e s designed to promote growth, though f a i l i n g in t h a t , d id produce other developmental changes. The problem of assess ing t h i s growth 21 i s even more d i f f i c u l t than measuring i t . An assessment of the growth s t r a t e g i e s and e f f o r t s requ i res some measure of the input to that e f f o r t . How much has been spent to s t imu l a t e Th i rd World economic growth? Foreign a i d i s e a s i l y measured--A8.7 b i l l i o n from the West in 1973 (U.N., 197Aa)--but how e f f i c i e n t l y is i t used? Who gets i t ? Magdoff (1969), Frank (1969), and Bauer (197 1*), among o the r s , argue conv i nc i ng l y that much a i d is d e l i b e r a t e l y an t i - deve lopmenta l , c r e a t i n g indebtedness and economic dependence, i n h i b i t i n g l o ca l deve lop-ment. A f u r t h e r $12 b i l l i o n of p r i v a t e c a p i t a l , l a r g e l y in d i r e c t i n v e s t -ment, f lowed in to the Th i rd World from the West in 1973, but i t s impact on na t i ona l economic growth i s no e a s i e r to assess. How much was used to e s t a b l i s h s u b s i d i a r i e s to supply parent companies, or to assemble and market e s s e n t i a l l y f i n i s h e d products , pe rm i t t i n g co rpora t ions to avo id taxes? How much p r o f i t was l o s t to the parent co rporat ions ? To t h i s combined i n f u s i on o f $20.7 b i l l i o n (from the West, in 1973), would have to be added s i m i l a r i n fu s i on s from the s o c i a l i s t coun t r i e s and a l l i n t e r n a l growth and development budgets. The i n t e r n a l monies would inc lude those f o r a g r i c u l t u r e , p u b l i c c o rpo r a t i on s , subs id ie s of var ious types f o r l o c a l or e x p a t r i a t e e n t e r p r i s e s , and po r t i on s of budgets f o r hea l th se r v i ce s and f a c i l i t i e s , educat ion , f ami l y p lanning and po s s i b l y even part of the m i l i t a r y ' s or m i n i s t r y o f f o re i gn a f f a i r s ' . The t o t a l investment must be cons iderab le (est imated at $170 b i l l i o n in 197^ (Powers, 1975)). C a l c u l a t -ing the f i g u r e is d i f f i c u l t enough—using i t in a meaningful way to assess the e f f i c i e n c y of growth s t r a t e g i e s would be imposs ib le . Any assessment of the e f f o r t a pp l i ed to Th i rd World economic growth must the re fo re be very gene ra l ; any pretence of e m p i r i c a l r e l i a b i l i t y i s u n j u s t i f i e d in the presence of so many unanswered (and unanswerable) gues t ions . E f f i c i e n c y cannot be assessed. We are l e f t , then, w i th e f f e c t i v e n e s s . Measuring the e f f e c t of t h i s e f f o r t i s ha rd l y les s d i f f i c u l t . Obv ious ly , w i t h the d i v e r s i t y o f s o c i a l systems, there can be no con t r o l s ub j e c t s , so i t is imposs ib le to determine the amount of growth or deve lop-ment, the extent o f unsolved problems, had no e x p l i c i t s t r a t e g i e s been employed. Burma re jec ted s t r a t e g i e s of economic growth, but i t was (and is ) one o f the few food expo r te r s . (Burma's GNP per c a p i t a increased an annual average of 0.7 percent from 1965 to 1973-) It would not be p o s s i b l e , on the bas i s of the Burmese exper ience , to es t imate where a p a r t i c u l a r s o c i e t y would be had i t not fo l l owed p a r t i c u l a r growth s t r a t e -g i e s . Eva luat ing long-term and shor t - te rm investment is d i f f i c u l t and gene ra l l y over looked by measuring change—ch i l d r en in s choo l , number o f telephones or doctors per 1,000 persons, n u t r i t i o n and disease l e v e l s , w i t h GNP per head the major s i n g l e measure o f success. An investment in educat ion o r i n f r a s t r u c t u r e , not yet r e f l e c t e d in increased GNP, may nonetheless be s i g n i f i c a n t . On the other hand, how e f f i c i e n t is an investment in educat ion or i n f r a s t r u c t u r e in r a i s i n g GNP? To suggest economic growth can be f a i r l y appra i sed w i th these long-term investments not taken i n t o account i s perhaps m i s l ead ing . However, in s p i t e of the d i f f i c u l t i e s of i d e n t i f y i n g , measuring and weighing the components of economic growth, the development e f f o r t f o r the Th i rd World has been gene r a l l y eva luated and there appears to be a f a i r l y broad consensus on severa l important p o i n t s . F i r s t , the o v e r a l l rate o f economic growth in the Th i rd World has been d i s a p p o i n t i n g . Not on ly d id the F i r s t Development Decade (the '60 's) f a i l to produce the "minimum 5 percent growth ta rge t set f o r developing c o u n t r i e s , " the aggregate rate represented no improvement over the 195^ +-1964 growth ra te and many count r i e s a c t u a l l y exper ienced negat ive growth in per c a p i t a income (U.N., 1967)- More recent f i g u re s (World Bank At 1 as, 1975) i n d i c a t e there has s t i l l been no improvement. From 1965 to 1973, of 39 As ian c o u n t r i e s , t en , or 26 percent , had a negat ive average annual growth rate of GNP per c a p i t a . Th is was up from 1 (18 percent) f o r the 1960 to 1973 pe r i od . Almost 50 percent of these count r i e s had per c a p i t a GNP growth rates below 2 percent per year from 1965 to 1973. In A f r i c a and South America i t was hi percent and hi percent of the coun t r i e s r e s p e c t i v e l y w i th annual averages below 2 percent , i n c l u d i n g , in A f r i c a another 8 nat ions (15 percent of the 53) w i th negat ive per c a p i t a growth and another one in South America. This too was worse than the 1960 to 1973 pe r i od . In c o n t r a s t , none of the 39 market economies of Europe had a per c ap i t a growth rate below 2 percent over e i t h e r o f these pe r iods . These d i f f e r e n c e s mask the wide d i f f e r e n c e s among T h i r d World c o u n t r i e s . Th i r teen coun t r i e s (with popu lat ions over one m i l l i o n each) had per c a p i t a average annual growth rates above 5 percent from 1965 to 1973: N i g e r i a , L ibyan Arab Repub l i c , Japan, Republ ic o f Korea, I ran, Republ ic of China, Saudi A r a b i a , Hong Kong, I s r a e l , S ingapore, Dominican Repub l i c , B r a z i l and Papua New Guinea. Of these, three (Libyan Arab Repub l i c , Japan and I s rae l ) have per c a p i t a incomes (1973) above $3,000 and can hard ly be cons idered poor (though of course they may be under-developed) and another three ( N i g e r i a , Iran and Saudi Arabia) are major o i l producers. There is noth ing wrong w i t h producing o i 1 , but i t i s some-th ing of a bonanza which i s not p a r t i c u l a r l y r e l a t e d to the success o r f a i l u r e o f growth s t r a t e g i e s . Indeed, N i g e r i a , from 1960 to 1965 ( p r i o r to producing o i l ) had an average annual drop in GNP per c a p i t a o f h percent. Even among the remaining seven, however, there were some spec tacu l a r i nc reases . Singapore average an annual per c ap i t a GNP increase of S.h percent from 1965 to 1973; Korea, 8.7 percent ; Taiwan, 7-3 percent , and B r a z i l 6.0 percent. 2k These successes are even more impress ive (and the f a i l u r e s somewhat understandable) given the gene ra l l y high rate of popu la t ion inc rease. The e f f e c t of popu la t ion increase w i l l be exp lo red f u r t h e r in Chapter 3, but i t i s worth not ing here that the average popu la t ion increase from 1962 to 1972 in the Th i rd World was 2.5 percent . This obv iou s l y cuts deeply i n to any increases in GNP. Even the na t i ona l averages mask wide d i f f e r e n c e s w i t h i n c o u n t r i e s . S p a t i a l and s e c t o r a l d i f f e r e n c e s in per c a p i t a income increases d i f f e r w ide ly and a study o f k3 Th i rd World coun t r i e s (non-communist) i n d i c a t e s t h a t , w i t h few except ions , the d i f f e r e n c e s are widest where rates o f na t i ona l economic growth are h i ghe s t . (Adelman and M o r r i s , 1973-) As economic growth proceeds, " t h e p o s i t i o n o f the poorest kO percent t y p i c -a l l y worsens in both r e l a t i v e and abso lu te terms" (my emphasis; Adelman and Mo r r i s , 1973 and a l s o Powers, 1975). Exc lud ing I s rae l and Japan, which both have per c ap i t a incomes above $3,000 (1973), on ly the Republ ic o f Korea, Singapore and Taiwan (of non-communist count r i e s ) have managed to combine economic growth w i th an equ i t ab l e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f increased i ncomes. With these few excep t i on s , then, the record revea l s almost 50 percent of the Th i r d World count r i e s ba re l y i nc rea s ing t h e i r average per c ap i t a incomes, i n c l ud i ng almost 20 percent w i th decreased per c ap i t a incomes. And these f i g u r e s , f o r 1965 to 1973, are worse, not b e t t e r than f o r the previous decade. In a d d i t i o n , the p rover ty w i t h i n most count r i e s i s i n c r ea s i n g , as most o f the increased income i s r e s t r i c t e d to the top 5 or 10 percent of the popu la t i on and is concentrated in the urban areas (Adelman and Mo r r i s , 1973)-On top o f t h i s g ene ra l l y poor record, the Th i rd World has accumu-l a t ed a debt of some 130 b i l l i o n d o l l a r s from the i n d u s t r i a l i z e d West. 25 The e f f e c t o f t h i s debt, i s t h a t , by 1966 " approx imate ly kk percent o f a i d f l ow ing from the advanced to the underdeveloped count r i e s was needed to f inance past deb t . " (Magdoff, 1969). I have not addressed the i s sue of the widening gap d i r e c t l y , because, as f a r as economic growth per se i s concerned, i t i s r e a l l y a f a l s e i s sue. The reason i s obv ious . If a country has a per c a p i t a income o f $400 a year ( l i k e South Korea) and even manages to increase i t by an i n c r e d i b l e 10 percent a year , per c ap i t a income increases on l y $40. In comparison, i f per c a p i t a income i s $3,000, a modest 2 per cent increase b r i ng s $60 more. If each maintains that growth rate f o r f i v e year s , per c ap i t a income w i l l have increased in the poorer by $2*»4 and in the r i c h e r by $312. Even growing f i v e times f a s t e r i s n ' t f a s t enough. If the ob jec t o f economic growth e f f o r t s has been to reduce, i f not e l i m i n a t e , poverty in the Th i rd World and to enable a l l people to enjoy comparable l e v e l s o f economic w e l l - b e i n g , they have not on l y f a i l e d (which, given the magnitude o f the task , i s c e r t a i n l y understandable) but more impor tant l y , they have l o s t ground. A f i f t h of the count r i e s are worse o f f ; h a l f are hard l y b e t t e r o f f ; and the ranks of the poor, both in abso lute numbers and p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y , are growing. These are sweeping g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s . There a re , as noted, a few except i on s . But there e x i s t s , from the f a r l e f t (Frank, 1969) through the intermediate t e chno l og i s t (Schumacher, 1973; Ca r r , 1976) to the l i b e r a l economists (Myrdal, 1975; Adelman and Mo r r i s , 1973) and even to the extreme r i g h t (Farmer, 1972), a s u r p r i s i n g consensus that the record has not been good enough, that new approaches must be found. The sub ject of t h i s t h e s i s , and i t is argued the ob jec t of deve lop-ment p lann ing , goes beyond economic growth. That Singapore and B r a z i l have had s u b s t a n t i a l increases in GNP per c a p i t a , wh i l e China (at 4.6 26 percent annua l l y , 1965 to 1973) has had a sma l le r i nc rease , and Cuba even a decrease (minus 0.7 over that p e r i o d ) , says very l i t t l e about the development in each country. Despite the g reate r d i f f i c u l t y in measuring and even d e f i n i n g development, i t is t he re fo re necessary to attempt to assess the changes in s o c i a l performance in the Th i rd World to determine the extent o f the impact o f developmental s t r a t e g i e s on o v e r a l l development c r i t e r i a . 2.2 The Development Record Before at tempt ing to eva luate the development record , two po in t s must be emphasized. F i r s t , the d i s t i n c t i o n used here between economic growth and development is not a sharp one. There are developmental concerns out s ide the scope of economics as i t is g ene r a l l y a p p l i e d , but there i s a l s o an area o f o ve r l ap . Some types o f economic growth are l i k e l y to be developmental in almost any s o c i e t y . Food p roduc t i on , f o r example, i s at once economic and developmental. That i t i s introduced here, rather than above, i s not to suggest i t i s an i napp rop r i a te concern o f economics, but that i t i s a type o f economic output of cons iderab le developmental s i g n i f i c a n c e . Second, i t must be re-emphasized that development i s s u b j e c t i v e . I have attempted to desc r ibe the nature o f development by i n d i c a t i n g some of the f a c t o r s r e l a t e d to i t - - t h e var ious types of needs people may have and the ways s o c i e t i e s s a t i s f y those needs. How the needs are expressed, the r e l a t i v e values attached to them, the ways s o c i e t i e s s a t i s f y or f r u s t r a t e them has not been and l i k e l y can not be determined u n i v e r s a l l y . However, that does not mean we know nothing of development. It should be po s s i b l e to use t h i s very general d e s c r i p t i o n of the nature of develop-ment to g ro s s l y assess development. M a l n u t r i t i o n , m o r t a l i t y rates and 27 mental i l l n e s s are probably un i ve r s a l c r i t e r i a . L i t e r a c y may be; l e v e l s o f se l f - e s teem and s a t i s f a c t i o n , being s e l f - a s s e s s e d , are d e f i n i t e l y ; something l i k e i n d i v i d u a l freedom, or p r i vacy may be less so (though they may be w ide l y f r u s t r a t e d , un i ve r sa l needs). This assessment then , i s of n e ce s s i t y , gross. Whether increased rea l wages can compensate f o r i n -creased mental i l l n e s s can on l y be determined s u b j e c t i v e l y . So what can be sa id o f the development record over the l a s t two decades? Tota l food product ion has increased wor ld wide, in both the a f f l u e n t and Th i rd World regions (U.N., 1974). The rate of i nc rease , however, has dropped s i g n i f i c a n t l y in a l l regions except A f r i c a . From 1952 to 1962 a l l regions but A f r i c a (at 2.2 percent annua l ly ) increased food product ion by over 3 percent annua l l y , and West A s i a had a 3.4 percent growth r a te . From 1962 to 1972 the rate of increase f o r a l l regions was down to 2.7 percent annua l l y , except L a t i n America and West A s i a , where i t was down to 3-1 and 3.0 percent r e s p e c t i v e l y . (The 2.7 percent annual increase was an improvement on l y in A f r i c a . ) Th is rate of increase has, however, been i n s u f f i c i e n t . Over these two decades, the increase in per c a p i t a food product ion dropped in every region except North America and A f r i c a , and wor ld wide, the 1962-1972 product ion increase f e l l behind the popu lat ion inc rease . With the decreased product ion in 1973, in A f r i c a and West A s i a , the w o r l d ' s per c a p i t a food product ion f o r that year was below the 1961 -1965 average. And the FAO (1966) reported that the 1965-1966 per c ap i t a product ion in the Th i rd World was "no b e t t e r than before W.W.I I". In s p i t e o f t h i s f a i l u r e to increase per c a p i t a food supply, the wor ld s t i l l consumes enough food and p ro te i n to s a t i s f y everyone ' s ba s i c needs ' Every region consumes more than enough p r o t e i n ( A f r i c a and the As ian P a c i f i c had the lowest consumption at 141 percent the regu i red amount (1970), which inc ludes a 10 percent a 1lowance fo r 28 household wastage). A l though the wor ld food energy consumption i s j u s t adequate (101 p e r cen t ) , there are reg ional imbalances. In 1970, on ly L a t i n America had an average consumption above the energy requirement (106 percent) in the T h i r d World. The As ian planned economies consumed on ly 88 percent t h e i r energy requirement, wh i l e the other poor regions ranged from 93 to 97 percent. Food product ion and average consumption are les s r e l i a b l e i n d i c a t o r s of development than are l e v e l s of m a l n u t r i t i o n or undernourishment, f o r " these f i gu re s conceal large i n e q u a l i t i e s in l e v e l s of food consumption among var ious socio-economic groups as we l l as w i t h i n i n d i v i d u a l f a m i l i e s " (U.N., 1974). One- in -e i ght people, 300 to 500 m i l l i o n , s u f f e r from too l i t t l e food (undernourishment), wh i l e 1-in-2, or 1,600 m i l l i o n s u f f e r from p ro te i n d e f i c i e n c y or m a l n u t r i t i o n (Dumont and Ros ie r , 1969). The wor ld s i t u a t i o n has improved on ly s l i g h t l y in t h i s regard s i nce the Second World War, and that has been due l a r g e l y to imports from the more a f f l u e n t count r i e s and a few successes in the Th i rd World, notab ly Mexico, Taiwan, and the Sudan (MM l i kan and Hapgood, 1967). It may be argued, as i t was w i t h economic growth g e n e r a l l y , that j u s t keeping pace w i th the r i s i n g popu lat ion i s something of an achievement. However, w i th m a l n u t r i t i o n the "b i gge s t s i n g l e c o n t r i b u t o r to c h i l d m o r t a l i t y in developing c o u n t r i e s " (U.N. 1974), w i th lower product ion increases in most reg ions , i n c l ud i ng the major expor t i ng c o u n t r i e s , w i th the i nc rea s i ng s c a r c i t y of new lands a v a i l a b l e fo r c u l t i v a t i o n , and w i t h l i t t l e promise of a slower popu la t ion i nc rea se , the f u t u r e looks b l e a k e r , not b e t t e r . If that p r o j e c t i o n i s to improve, the development record must improve. M o r t a l i t y rates have cont inued to dec l i ne in the Th i r d World. L i f e expectancy has increased to an average 53-9 years (from under 30 j u s t two decades ago), w i t h a reg ional range from 41.3 years in West 29 A f r i c a to 64 years in both the Car ibbean, and M ic rones ia and P o l y n e s i a . Infant m o r t a l i t y and i n f e c t i o u s d i seases , both of which are cons idered l a r g e l y p reventab le , remain f a i r l y h i gh , in s p i t e of the dramatic o v e r a l l improvement. The increase in rea l wages i s another economic index o f deve lop-mental concern. The f i gu re s f o r many count r i e s are not p a r t i c u l a r l y r e l i a b l e and o f ten r e f e r on ly to manufacturing wages, but a few c o u n t r i e s — the Republ ic of Korea, Hong Kong, C h i l e , B r a z i l , Ecuador, Tanzania and Zambia--appear to have had s i g n i f i c a n t improvement, of near o r above 5 percent annual averages from 1965 to 1972. " Fo r most other developing c o u n t r i e s , the rea l wage increases have been e i t h e r modest or absent. It i s d i s t u r b i n g t h a t , f o r about one t h i r d of the count r i e s l i s t e d (9 of 28), the l e v e l o f rea l wages in manufacturing dec l i ned over t h i s p e r i o d " ( U . N . , 197^). Another d i s t u r b i n g f ea tu re i s the f l u c t u a t i o n s . Ecuador ' s increase from 1965 to 1968 averaged on ly 2.4 percent , but jumped to a 12.8 percent average 1968 to 1972. Peru ' s went from a negat ive 2.3 percent to a hea l thy 5-8 percent average. Ghana, however, went the other way, i t s 6.3 average 1965 to 1968 dropping to a negat ive 1.0 percent average from 1968 to 1972. The general poor record and the i n s e c u r i t y of even some of the s i g n i f i c a n t increases suggest there is cons ide rab le room f o r improvement in t h i s s ec to r as w e l l . L i t e r a c y rates have cont inued to improve, w i th more than three quarters of adu l t s in L a t i n America l i t e r a t e , more than h a l f in the market economies of A s i a and over one qua r te r in A f r i c a , in 1970. L i t e r a c y r a te s , however, are more an i n d i c a t i o n o f exposure to s choo l i ng than to the developmental ro le of educat i on . There can be l i t t l e doubt that by i nc rea s i ng the i n d i v i d u a l ' s c a p a b i l i t i e s l i t e r a c y per se i s developmental. However, where educat ion ra i se s u n r e a l i s t i c e xpec ta t i on s , where i t degrades the t r a d i t i o n a l va lues , occupat ions and l i f e s t y l e s , i t may not be develop-mental at a l l . L i t e r a c y rates themselves cannot i n d i c a t e the extent to which educat ion has l i b e r a t e d o r f r u s t r a t e d i n d i v i d u a l s w i t h i n t h e i r s o c i -e t y , but i t can i n d i c a t e the success a s o c i e t y has had in d i s t r i b u t i n g t h i s at l e a s t p o t e n t i a l l y l i b e r a t i n g i n f l uence . Levels of personal s a t i s f a c t i o n do not c o r r e l a t e w i th incomes in c r o s s - na t i ona l s t u d i e s , but they do s i g n i f i c a n t l y w i t h i n s o c i e t i e s (Strumpel, 197$). Inequ i tab le d i s t r i b u t i o n of incomes can, then be seen as ant i -deve lopmenta1. The record over the l a s t two decades i n d i c a t e s that economic growth, p a r t i c u l a r l y high growth r a t e s , have con t r i bu ted to t h i s problem. Income i n e q u a l i t i e s , ra ther than d i m i n i s h i n g , have become exacerbated, and most notably in count r i e s w i th high growth r a te s , l i k e B r a z i l and Mexico. " Indeed, i t has become c l e a r that economic growth i t s e l f . . . i s one o f the prime causes o f income i n e q u a l i t y . " (Adelman and Mo r r i s , 1973). In many cases the poor are not on ly poorer in r e l a t i v e terms, which i n h i b i t s s o c i a l and p sycho log i ca l development, but are even poorer in abso lute terms, to the po int o f i n h i b i t i n g p h y s i o l o g i c a l deve lop-ment as m a l n u t r i t i o n increases (Powers, 1975). Examples l i k e China and Tanzania i n d i c a t e the growing i n e q u a l i t y i s not i n e v i t a b l e , but they remain the except ions to the general case. The assessment of the development record in terms of p s ycho log i ca l development i s even les s p r e c i s e . C r o s s - c u l t u r a l comparisons o f mental d i so rder s are extremely u n r e l i a b l e , but the U.N. (197*0 concludes that there is d e f i n i t e l y an increase in mental d i so rder s in both the r i c h and poor c o u n t r i e s . Mazrui (1970) argues c r ime, c o r r u p t i o n , nepotism and s e l f - i n t e r e s t are " p o l l u t i n g " the p o l i t i c a l systems of A f r i c a . Scholars apparent ly no longer debate whether t r a d i t i o n a l s o c i e t i e s wi11 d i e , but how (Fox, 1975). 31 The type of in format ion requ i red to assess the development record adequately is that c o l l e c t e d by M i t c h e l l (1972) in Hong Kong and other Southeast As ian c i t i e s . By i n te r v i ew ing a c r o s s - s e c t i o n a l sample o f four thousand in Hong Kong, and a f u r t h e r two thousand in each o f Bangkok, Singapore, and urban Ma lay s i a , and one thousand in T a i p e i , M i t c h e l l was ab le to ob t a i n an i n d i c a t i o n o f p sycho log i ca l w e l l - b e i n g in these areas. At the time of the study Hong Kong had a per c a p i t a GNP growth rate over 7 percent a year , and a growth in rea l wages almost as h igh . In a d d i t i o n , there had been no s i g n i f i c a n t immigration f o r over a decade, though the popu la t ion was s t i l l growing at over 2 percent a year . The study revealed cons ide rab le v a r i a t i o n between c i t i e s , so g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s are dangerous. As most o f the a n a l y s i s focussed on Hong Kong, i t w i l l be used t o g ive an i n d i c a t i o n of developmental concerns and t h e i r s t a t e there . Most people (59 percent) worry a great deal ( t h e i r own assessment); 33 percent are unhappy; 21 percent have a low o r very low s e l f esteem (0 or 1 on a 0 to k s c a l e ) ; kk percent f e e l they are unhealthy p h y s i c a l l y ; 53 percent of 18 to 2k year o lds have a high l e ve l of h o s t i l i t y , and even in those over 55, 33 percent have a high l e v e l ; 36 percent f ee l they are worse o f f than t h e i r parents (though 31 percent f ee l t h e y ' a r e b e t t e r o f f ) ; 39 percent have lower occupat iona l s ta tus than t h e i r parents ; on ly 16 percent see an oppor tun i t y f o r success in t h e i r career (compared w i th a s u r p r i s i n g 71 percent in Bangkok); d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h t h e i r personal achievement i s h i gh , kl percent; w i th t h e i r l i v i n g s i t u a t i o n , 32 percent ; f o r 30 percent "noth ing g ives s a t i s f a c t i o n " ( " c h i l d r e n " was second w i th 2k p e r cen t ) ; and f i n a l l y , 53 percent f ee l they cannot con t r o l the course o f the i r 1i f e . This i s not presented as a t y p i c a l case. It may be, but e g u a l l y , i t may be a t y p i c a l . The f i nd i n g s from the rest o f M i t c h e l l ' s study i n d i c a t e wide v a r i a t i o n e x i s t s and that l e v e l s of performance are not c o n s i s t e n t . (Singapore had the h ighest l e v e l s of h o s t i l i t y and low s e l f esteem, but a l s o the h ighest l e ve l o f upward, i n t e r gene r a t i o na l m o b i l i t y and the lowest l eve l of d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i th the l i v i n g s i t u a t i o n . ) The l e ve l s o f s o c i a l performance must inc lude a weighing of these f a c t o r s . For example, in Singapore, do the acceptab le l i v i n g cond i t i on s compensate f o r the low se l f -es teem? A l s o , i t must be noted that t h i s i s a measure o f performance, not development (though the measures o f perce ived m o b i l i t y suggest t h a t , f o r many, the s i t u a t i o n is not improving). The pauc i t y of data , however, ought not obscure the v a l i d i t y of the argument. In some areas, p a r t i c u l a r l y death c o n t r o l , there has been sub-s t a n t i a l progress. In other areas, the improvement i s f a r less gene ra l . Severa l count r i e s have increased t h e i r per c ap i t a income con s i de rab l y ; a handful have managed to r e f l e c t that in improved rea l wages and in increases f o r the poor. The na t i ona l averages, however, h ide the preva lent i n e q u i t i e s of incomes and food consumption w i t h i n most Th i rd World c o u n t r i e s . But our concern goes beyond t ha t , to the poor ly documented evidence of s o c i a l d i s r u p t i o n and unres t . If i t i s t rue that i n d i v i d u a l development depends on a reasonably secure and p r e d i c t a b l e s o c i a l system and that most s o c i e t i e s have evolved to provide an at leas t min imal l y acceptab le l e ve l of performance, then i t must be argued, on l o g i c a l grounds i f not e m p i r i c a l , that the recognized t r a n s i t i o n (or death) of many s o c i a l systems w i l l have pronounced, antidevelopmenta1 repercuss ions . U n t i l more e m p i r i c a l work i s done, the case cannot be made much s t ronger than t h i s . Th*ere i s some evidence that development i s not o ccu r r i n g or is o c cu r r i n g on ly very s l ow l y , and that some decreases in performance are a l s o e v i den t . There i s sub-s t a n t i a l l y less evidence that what economic growth has occur red in the Th i rd World has con t r i bu ted to development. As the e f f e c t s of rap id s o c i a l change reach the vast r u ra l popu la t i on s , the problems rather than the successes are l i k e l y to become more p reva l en t . CHAPTER 3 THE REASONS FOR THE POOR RECORD Ne i ther the record of economic growth nor that of development has been impress ive. Both reveal some success but on the whole the s i t u a t i o n today i s l i t t l e be t t e r than two decades ago. The record of economic growth appears to be worsening, not improving and there are i n d i c a t i o n s , though not as conc re te , that t h i s i s a l s o the case w i t h development. There i s a l s o concern that the problems are i n c r ea s i n g , that without a change of course the downward t rend w i l l cont inue and perhaps a c c e l e r a t e . This chapter w i l l attempt to e xp l a i n the reasons f o r these f a i l u r e s . Jus t as we found d i f f e r e n t s o c i e t i e s have d i f f e r e n t mixes of problems, o r s i m i l a r problems but d i f f e r i n g i n t e n s i t i e s , i t w i l l become ev ident here that even s i m i l a r problems can have a v a r i e t y of causes. 3.1 Causes o f the Poor Growth Record Where the economic growth record i s assessed in terms o f per c a p i t a i nc rease s , obv iou s l y the rate of popu lat ion growth i s important. The average annual r a te o f popu la t ion increase in the T h i r d World from 1965 to 1973 was 2.5 percent , up on ly s l i g h t l y from the previous f i v e years . Some of the lowest rates were in the West As ian count r i e s w i th the h ighest increases in per c a p i t a GNP (Singapore averaged 1.8 percent ; Korea, 1.9). Taiwan, however, increased at 2.8 percent annua l l y . In none o f these cases would an average or even above average rate of increase in popu la t ion have negated t h e i r per c a p i t a income ga in s . Th is i s a l s o t rue o f the o i l producers, most of which had popu lat ion growth rates above 3 percent (though Saudi A r a b i a ' s was only 1.7) • Popu la t ion increases were most c r i t i c a l , in t h i s sense, where increases in GNP were much lower. Most A f r i c a n and L a t i n American count r i e s had popu la t i on increases above 2 percent and many above 3 percent a year from 1965 to 1973- But there doesn ' t appear to be much c o r r e l a t i o n between rates o f increase o f popu-l a t i o n and of GNP, w i t h i n these areas . Cuba has one of the lowest rates o f popu lat ion increase (.1.8 pe r cen t ) , yet had a per c a p i t a loss of income (minus 0.7 percent a n n u a l l y ) . Venezue la ' s popu lat ion growth (3.3 percent) cut i t s per c a p i t a GNP increase to a 1.3 percent average, but Ivory Coast, w i th the f a s t e s t growing popu la t ion (h.0 percent a year) maintained a 3-0 percent increase in per c ap i t a income. Had i t he ld popu la t ion growth at 2 percent o r l e s s , i t would have j o i n e d the few w i t h a 5 percent or b e t t e r per c a p i t a GNP average inc rease . As there probably a r e n ' t any count r i e s a c t u a l l y short of people, what t h i s means i s s imply that a lower popu lat ion growth rate would make a h igher GNP per c ap i t a growth rate that much e a s i e r . It may a l s o mean many coun t r i e s d id w e l l to have even a small per c a p i t a income inc rease . But i t is not the on l y cause of low GNP per c a p i t a increases—many count r i e s would s t i l l have inadequate increases i f popu lat ion increases were c o n t r o l l e d at 1.5 percent a year. There are severa l e x te rna l f a c t o r s which impede economic growth in the Th i rd World. I have a l ready r e f e r r ed to the burden of debt s e r v i c i n g , which takes some kh percent of f o r e i gn a i d . But the burden i s g reate r than s imply the amount to be repa id . The a i d o f ten has s t r i n g s a t tached. Equipment has to be purchased from the donor country, b ind ing the r e c i p i e n t to a leve l o f technology which may not be appropr ia te and to a s u p p l i e r of parts who demands hard cur rency. And the debt s e r v i c i n g requ i res hard currency. The r e c i p i e n t is then forced to invest in export a c t i v i t i e s to ob ta in t h i s cur rency, l i m i t i n g h i s opt ions of growth s t r a t e g i e s . The l i m i t a t i o n s on the opt i on s may be more than academic. Whether the "development of underdevelopment" (Frank, 1969) or merely the pre se rva t i on of an e x p l o i t i v e systems i s the general case, i t i s ev ident that most o f the Th i r d World i s at a ser ious disadvantage in the wor ld market (de Souza and P o r t e r , 197*0- The o i l producers are a major except ion but Stern and Tims ' (1976) ana l y s i s suggests the oppo r tun i t y f o r producers o f o ther major primary commodities to form s i m i l a r c a r t e l s i s very l i m i t e d . The argument that exports are e s s e n t i a l to prov ide the f o r e i c a p i t a l , equipment and ideas necessary f o r "development" (Ca i r nc ro s s , 1962) i s undermined by the worsening terms of trade f o r most primary pro-ducers. Yet t h i s very worsening of terms of trade increases the need f o r a i d to mainta in the balance o f payments (de Navarrete and G r i f f i n , 1972). The primary producers (aga in, exc lud ing the o i l producers) are then caught in a v i c i o u s c i r c l e — t h e y must export to repay loans and acqu i re goods and s e r v i c e s , yet they must borrow to o f f s e t the decreas ing purchas ing power o f t h e i r e xpo r t s . Magdoff (1969) e s t imates the per c a p i t a ex te rna l purchasing power o f exports in L a t i n America has been reduced to about one t h i r d the 1928 l e v e l ! R idker (1976) f i nd s the h igher p r i c e s f o r petroleum and food have excerbated the problem s ince 1972. But there are other reasons as w e l l . Pr imary products , e s p e c i a l l y a g r i c u l t u r a l , have been subject to f l u c t u a t i o n in p roduc t i on , t o o f ten s t i f f compet i t ion from other Th i rd World c o u n t r i e s , and to unce r ta i n t y and i n s t a b i l i t y as demand f l u c t u a t e s or drops w i th s y n t h e t i c s u b s t i t u t e s . And r a r e l y can they compete, in p r i c e , w i t h the imported secondary and t e r t i a r y goods and s e r v i c e s . Yet to argue f o r a s h i f t to secondary and t e r t i a r y exports i s to underestimate the d i f f i -c u l t i e s of break ing i n to the wor ld market. Many m u l t i n a t i o n a l co rpora t ions p r o h i b i t t h e i r s u b s i d i a r i e s o r l i cencees from expor t i ng products to a t h i r d country (Magdoff, 1969; Business Week, 1975). Most coun t r i e s have h igher t a r i f f s on processed goods than on unprocessed, reducing the 37 i n cen t i ve f o r poor count r i e s to process products p r i o r to expor t . Even wi thout these b a r r i e r s , i t is o f ten d i f f i c u l t f o r a f l e d g l i n g indus t ry to compete aga ins t w e l l - e s t a b l i s h e d marketing systems, which have not on ly the product to s e l l , but a l so the means to r e t a i n access to the market. If the concept of comparative advantage i s app l i ed to t h i s access to mar-k e t s , i t may dampen the optimism seen f o r even some resource r i c h T h i r d World c o u n t r i e s . The rate of growth of wor ld market demands may a l s o c i r cumsc r i be the rate o f growth f o r e x p o r t - o r i e n t e d a c t i v i t i e s . Jus t how many more count r i e s w i l l be ab le to s e l l p l a s t i c d o l l s or cocoa or cars? Much o f the growth in Taiwan, Korea and Hong Kong was due to a s h i f t of a c t i v i t y from Japan as Japan moved in to products w i th h igher re tu rn s . If these count r ie s are able to move up the product ion s c a l e , o ther poorer count r i e s may b e n e f i t from that s h i f t . If wages increase too much the re , o ther coun t r i e s may enter the market more c o m p e t i t i v e l y . But the po int i s t h i s — most o f these product ion s h i f t s , due to changes in technology or demand, o r i g i n a t e in the i n d u s t r i a l i z e d c o u n t r i e s , and they a re , to the Th i rd World, f o r t u i t o u s . Much of the growth of i n d i v i d u a l count r i e s then, is due to a s h i f t i n g and shar ing of e x i s t i n g markets. This l i m i t s the p o t e n t i a l f o r g loba l growth and ( in the context of the e x i s t i n g world market system) p a r t i c u l a r l y f o r widespread economic growth in the Th i r d World. Th is is not to suggest demand i s f i x e d , but that i t i s not l i k e l y to increase f a s t enough f o r many count r i e s to have s i g n i f i c a n t l y increased output . In the sho r t - te rm then, much of one ' s increase must be ano the r ' s l o s s . In the long-term, t h i s shar ing w i t h i n u l t i m a t e l i m i t s to growth may be more c r i t i c a l . Perhaps the l i m i t s to g loba l economic growth have not been d e f i n i t e l y determined. It is nonetheless c l e a r that the wor ld does have a l i m i t e d supply of non-renewable resources and a l i m i t e d capac i t y to produce renewable ones. A l l the i n d u s t r i a l i z e d a f f l u e n t nat ions consume a d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e share of these resources. The United S t a te s , f o r example, consumes k2 percent of the w o r l d ' s aluminum consumption, hk percent of i t s c o a l , 28 percent of i t s i r o n , 63 percent of i t s na tu ra l gas and 31 percent o f i t s petroleum (Meadows, 1972). The U.S., under-populated by i n d u s t r i a l i z e d nat ion standards, even over-consumes oxygen, consuming 40 percent more than i t generates. This r a i s e s the very b a s i c ques t ion o f where the na tu ra l resources to support the i n d u s t r i a l growth of the Th i rd World are to come from. There appear to be, then, numerous ob s tac le s to s i g n i f i c a n t increases in i n d u s t r i a l output f o r a la rge number of c o u n t r i e s . That a few have been succes s fu l may be more of a b a r r i e r than model f o r other c o u n t r i e s . Jus t how impenetrable these b a r r i e r s a re , of course, depends on severa l f a c t o r s : the resources r equ i r ed , the demand f o r the product, the compet i t ion f o r the market, the degree of autonomy in product ion and market ing. From t h i s i t i s apparent that a t l ea s t some of the causes of the poor record are beyond the con t ro l o f the Th i rd World count r i e s and t h a t , unless the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community takes steps to remove some of these b a r r i e r s , the record may not be able to improve s u f f i c i e n t l y . There are a l s o the t r a d i t i o n a l " b a r r i e r s to development". Economic growth may be expressed as a f unc t i on of the inputs to p roduc t i on : c a p i t a l , labour, na tu ra l resources, technology and some composite (often denoted ' U ' ) of the s o c i a l environment i n c l ud i n g va lues , o r g a n i z a t i o n , lega l systems and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , e t c . Any b a s i c t e x t on economic development d i scusses these; the perce ived d e f i c i e n c i e s in the Th i rd World are gene ra l l y r e f e r r e d to as " b a r r i e r s to development". D i f f e r e n t authors r e f l e c t t h e i r own exper ience and percept ions by p l a c i n g more or less emphasis on p a r t i c u l a r b a r r i e r s , but each is undoubtedly a c u l p r i t in some c i rcumstances , 39 but i s equa l l y u n l i k e l y to be so in a l l c i rcumstances. Capita] i s in short supply f o r much o f the Th i rd Wo r l d - - i n f ac t most d e f i n i t i o n s of i t are based on c a p i t a l accumulat ion—and i t i s a necessary i ng red ien t f o r most growth endeavours, but i t is c e r t a i n l y not a s u f f i c i e n t input . Indeed, one of the major disappointments of the l a s t few decades has been the poor record in s p i t e o f the c a p i t a l i n f u s i o n s . C a p i t a l , in and o f i t s e l f , w i l l not produce the e l u s i v e s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g growth. The Middle East bears witness to tha t , wh i l e some major a id r e c i p i e n t s , l i k e Indo-n e s i a , apparent ly have d i f f i c u l t y u t i l i z i n g a l l the c a p i t a l . S i m i l a r l y , an i l l i t e r a t e , u n s k i l l e d , u n d i s c i p l i n e d , undernourished, or unhealthy labour fo rce may r e s t r i c t the nature, type and rate o f economic a c t i v i t y and growth. Adelman and Morr i s (1973) a t t r i b u t e much of the success of Korea, S ingapore, and Taiwan to t h e i r g ene ra l l y h igher l e v e l s of educat ion . This category may a l s o inc lude other a t t r i b u t e s of the human r e s o u r c e — e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l s k i l l s and mo t i v a t i on , and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l o r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a b i l i t y . There is a general consensus that much of the f a i l u r e o f the growth record i s d i r e c t l y a t t r i b u t a b l e to d e f i c i e n c i e s in t h i s necessary s o f t -wa re , the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e capa-b i l i t i e s of many s o c i e t i e s . (Waterston, 1969; de Navarrete and G r i f f i n , 1972; Adelman and Mor r i s , 1973; and N i eho f f , 1969). Some count r i e s o f the Fourth World, the very poorest c o u n t r i e s , may have been hampered (and undoubtedly w i l l cont inue to be hampered) by an inadequate resource base. Chad, Mal i and N ige r , f o r example, are not on ly w i thout marketable m ine ra l s , t h e i r c l i m a t e , s o i l and water supp l i e s are inadequate f o r even subs i s tence a g r i c u l t u r e wi thout w ide-spread m a l n u t r i t i o n and undernourishment. Fo r tunate l y few count r i e s have such abso lute resource d e f i c i e n c i e s , but many others w i t h l a r ge r popu-l a t i o n s , o ve r - t ax or tax to the l i m i t , t h e i r resource base, leav ing l i t t l e 40 o r no surp lus on which to b u i l d . These f a c t o r s — the popu lat ion e x p l o s i o n , the ex te rna l market con-s t r a i n t s , the g loba l resource l i m i t s , and i n t e r na l d e f i c i e n c i e s of c a p i t a l , na tu ra l resources and human resources — to var ious degrees in d i f f e r e n t c o u n t r i e s , have f r u s t r a t e d the economic growth e f f o r t . While a few count r i e s have overcome these obs tac le s to a cons ide rab le degree, most have not. Indeed, the nature of some of the o b s t a c l e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y wor ld supply l i m i t s and the l i m i t e d and on ly s l owly growing demand, suggests that most count r i e s w i l l not be ab le to overcome these c o n s t r a i n t s and that the success o f one country reduces the chances o f success of another. But success in terms of economic growth i s not an abso lute measure. Wi th in these g loba l supply and demand l i m i t s there i s probably con s i de r -able room f o r i nc rea s ing economic output . And there i s d e f i n i t e l y the p o s s i b i l i t y o f improving economic growth in the T h i r d World by reducing some of the present i n e q u i t i e s . Given t h i s p o t e n t i a l , w i t h i n the above c o n s t r a i n t s , why has the economic growth record been so poor? The s t r a t e g i e s employed f o r the most part were i napp rop r i a te . F i r s t , the s t r a t e g i e s f a i l e d to address the major b a r r i e r s . Second, they were not adapted to l o ca l c o n d i t i o n s . T h i r d , they f a i l e d to cons ide r s o c i a l system responses. Very b r i e f l y , t h i s set of s t r a t e g i e s , taught and p r o f f e r ed u n t i l the l a t e 160 1s and e a r l y '70 1s, was based upon such concepts as lead ing s e c t o r s , e x p o r t - l e d growth, v i c i o u s c i r c l e s , th re sho ld s , and cumulat ive causa t i on , growth poles and growth cen t re s . It i s s u c c i n c t l y embodied in K a h l ' s (1968) d e c l a r a t i o n : " Fo r the development ( s i c ) process to occur , a surp lus must be made a v a i l a b l e f o r c a p i t a l investment. Fac to r i e s must be b u i l t , mines sunk, farm machinery and f e r t i l i z e r s bought. C i t i e s must be c reated as centres o f i ndus t ry and as sources o f jobs to absorb the excess popu la t ion from ru r a l a reas . A l s o , highways, r a i l r o a d s , s choo l s , and h o s p i t a l s have to be c o n s t r u c t e d . " As w i l l be seen below, however, even some ru r a l development schemes f e l l i n t o some of these p i t f a l l s . Where many o f the c o n s t r a i n t s and i n h i b i t i n g f a c t o r s are e x t e r n a l , investments in e x p o r t - o r i e n t e d i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n may b r i n g small r e tu rn s . Many f l e d g l i n g i n du s t r i e s even have d i f f i c u l t y competing in t h e i r domestic market. Where popu lat ion growth exceeds the economic growth c a p a c i t y , d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y la rge investments to increase economic output may be very i n e f f i c i e n t . Nor is the argument that popu la t ion con t r o l is ou t s i de the scope of development p lanning o r even economic p l ann ing , j u s t i f i a b l e . An eng ineer may not be a g e o l o g i s t , but he i s re spons ib le f o r ensur ing h i s b r idge w i l l s tand. If the bear ing c apac i t y i s i n s u f f i c i e n t e i t h e r a f i rme r substratum must be found o r the design must be a l t e r e d . S t r a teg i e s based on i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n f a i l e d at l ea s t in part because they d i d not address the f a c t o r s which l i m i t e d the market p o t e n t i a l of the product. C a p i t a l i n f u s i o n s , without removing the s t r i n g s o r cond i t i on s o f s e r v i c i n g ( p a r t i c u l a r l y in hard cu r rency ) , may have con t r i bu ted more to indebted-ness and dependence than to growth. The f a i l u r e to adapt s t r a t e g i e s to the l o ca l cond i t i on s i s of course r e l a t e d , i n so fa r as some of the l o ca l cond i t i on s may be b a r r i e r s to growth (though bear ing in mind at the same t ime, they may be agents of development) Adelman (1961) went so f a r as to argue t h a t , because the s o c i e t y ' s technology, c u l t u r e , o r g an i z a t i on and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n were d i f f i -c u l t to measure and t h e i r c o n t r i b u t i o n to output was d i f f i c u l t to quan t i f y they could not "even in p r i n c i p i e . . . b e p laced on a f oo t i n g equ i va len t to that o f the phy s i ca l i n p u t s . " Even in p r i n c i p l e ? Th is approach has proven c o s t l y . Frankel (1975) found the techno log ies employed in water supply and treatment were o f ten i napp rop r i a te , making costs h igher than necessary and i n c rea s i n g the inc idence and durat ion of maintenance problems. Schumacher (1973) argues conv i nc i ng l y that the inappropr lateness of much o f our t e c h -nology goes f a r beyond water supply systems. Waterston (1969) and o t h e r s , as mentioned above, found the s t r a t e g i e s i nappropr i a te f o r the type (and perhaps even l e ve l ) o f o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c a p a b i l i t i e s . They argue that the s i n g l e major cause o f the poor record was the i n a b i l i t y to implement the s t r a t e g i e s . Whi le I would caut ion against such a g e n e r a l i z a t i o n , and draw a t t e n t i o n to the o ther f a c t o r s which, in some c i rcumstances, might have been as c r i t i c a l , i t is nonetheless c l e a r t h i s was a major problem. N ieho f f (1969) and Weiner (1972) f i n d s u b s t a n t i a l l y the same reasons f o r f a i l u r e in var ious types of ru ra l development. Very s imply , i f the c u l t u r e or the t e c h n o l o g i c a l , o r g a n i z a t i o n a l or a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c a p a b i l i t i e s cou ld not o r would not adapt to the s t r a t e g i e s , and the s t r a t e g i e s were not adapted to them, implemen-t a t i o n would be fraught w i th problems and f a i l u r e s would not be uncommon. F i n a l l y , in f a i l i n g to cons ider the impacts o f economic growth on the system, some high and unproduct ive costs were i n cu r r ed . Many have argued qu i t e e x p l i c i t l y f o r s o c i a l d i s r u p t i o n : "By d i s r u p t i n g the s ta tu s quo, they g ive peoples and economies a chance to spurt ahead under new management by a f re sh e l i t e o f ambit ious s o c i a l c l i m b e r s . " (Erasmus); "Where c o n f l i c t is absent, we can be c e r t a i n that development does not o c c u r . " (Friedman, 1969); and u rban i z a t i on is e s s e n t i a l to development" because " i n the r e l a t i v e l y impersonal and fragmented s e t t i n g o f urban l i f e the a l l - embrac i n g bonds o f t r a d i t i o n a l community systems are d i f f i c u l t to m a i n t a i n " (Adelman and M o r r i s , 1973). Others s imply e x t r a p o l a t e from the assumption that to " d e v e l o p " (and we are s t i l l t a l k i n g in terms of economic growth), o ther poorer s o c i e t i e s must become " e x a c t l y l i k e the r i c h , 43 " e x a c t l y l i k e the r i c h , economica l ly and c u 1 t u r a l 1 y . . . ( r e q u i r i n g ) the t o t a l modern izat ion and i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n of the economy. In the process , the l o ca l c u l t u r e d i s s o l v e s " (Farmer, 1972; A l so Fo s te r , 1973; and Inkeles and Smith, 1974). The developmental cost s of the r e s u l t an t d i s r u p t i o n may be e x h o r b i -t a n t , but even the economic cos t s can be p r o h i b i t i v e . El-Shakhs (1974) and J u l i u s Nyerere (1974) f i n d the costs o f ma in ta in ing order and s t a b i l i t y and p rov i d i ng the bare minimum of u t i l i t i e s and s o c i a l s e r v i ce s in urban areas very h i gh , and at the expense o f n a t i ona l growth and development and at the expense o f the r u r a l poor. As s o c i a l d i s r u p t i o n worsens (as more i n d i v i d u a l s leave t h e i r communities, as changing values and hab i t s weaken s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s which prov ide "economic" s o c i a l f unc t i on s l i k e care of the s i c k , aged, o r unemployed) the costs to the p u b l i c s ec to r w i l l i ncrease p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y . Yet even now the se rv i ce s o f f e r e d by the p u b l i c sec to r are inadequate and "any meaningful improvement...would invo lve an a l l o c a t i o n o f resources which goes beyond the capac i t y of the economy o f most c o u n t r i e s " (U.N., 1974). Growth s t r a t e g i e s designed to r a i s e the l e v e l of the poor to that o f the r i c h are probably f u t i l e - - t h e g loba l l i m i t s to growth must prec lude them. The growth record was poor, however, even though those more or les s f i x e d l i m i t s have not been reached. This was due in large part to an i napp rop r i a te a l l o c a t i o n of the l i m i t e d resources a v a i l a b l e . There were var ious d i r e c t causes of the poor r e c o r d : - - t h e e s t a b l i s h e d p o s i t i o n of the a f f l u e n t count r i e s in the wor ld market; the i n equ i t ab l e d i s t r i b u t i o n of resources among and w i t h i n c o u n t r i e s ; the popu lat ion e x p l o s i o n ; and numerous s o c i a l and environmental d i f f e r e n c e s which g ive d i f f e r e n t s o c i e t i e s d i f f e r e n t p o t e n t i a l s f o r and obs tac le s to growth. Had p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y more resources been a l l o c a t e d to r e c t i f y i n g these causes as they app l i ed in each s i t u a t i o n , the record may have been s i g n i f i c a n t l y b e t t e r . kk But economic growth must be p laced in the context o f s o c i a l develop-ment. For many s o c i e t i e s , probably f o r most, some economic growth w i l l be an important component o f development. ( i t i s q u i t e po s s i b l e development in some of the more a f f l u e n t count r i e s may requ i re negat ive economic growth.) There are probably no s o c i e t i e s in which development w i l l be e x c l u s i v e l y (and perhaps not even l a r ge l y ) through economic growth. The f o l l ow i n g s e c t i on i nd i ca te s some types of economic a c t i v i t y have decreased, rather than increased s o c i a l performance. 3-2 Causes o f the Poor Development Record There are four b a s i c reasons f o r the poor development record. F i r s t , there are na tu ra l s t re s se s which may s t r a i n the s o c i a l system and reduce i t s performance. Second, the s o c i a l systems have been the ta rget or v i c t i m of var ious ex te rna l i n f l uences which have s i m i l a r l y s t r a i n e d them and reduced performance. T h i r d , many s o c i e t i e s have expended resources f o r which they have rece ived l i t t l e in return and have f a i l e d t o , or been unable t o , expend adequate resources to enhance development. F i n a l l y , some s o c i e t i e s may have i n t e r na l weaknesses that have rendered them incapable o f making the necessary adaptat ions in response to the var ious s t r e s s e s . For each area in which performance has not improved, each s o c i e t y i s l i k e l y to have a d i f f e r e n t mix o f reasons or the r e l a t i v e importance of the causes wi11 vary. Jus t as popu lat ion increase was a major f a c t o r in l i m i t i n g per c ap i t a GNP growth, i t o u t s t r i pped the increased food p roduc t i on , so that per c ap i t a food product ion increased in most poor regions by on ly 0.2 percent annua l l y from 1962 to 1972. Popu la t ion increases have a l s o s t r a i n e d land tenure systems, p a r t i c u l a r l y in the over -popu lated areas of south A s i a . This pressure on the land has l i k e l y been an important f a c t o r in encouraging 45 mig ra t ion to urban cen t re s , which in turn has had impacts on the s o c i a l system. The d i f f e r ence s in rates of popu la t ion growth d i scussed above, and the d i f f e r ence s in a v a i l a b l e resources mean the ser iousness o f popu la t ion growth as an i n h i b i t o r of development va r i e s con s i de rab l y . In parts of West A f r i c a and L a t i n America the resources are capable of s u s t a i n i n g a much l a r ge r popu la t i on . This is not the case in India nor Bangladesh, nor in the resource poor count r i e s o f the Fourth World. It would probably be a safe g e n e r a l i z a t i o n , though, that in any Th i r d World country a lower rate of popu la t ion increase would increase the chances o f and rate of development. Important as that po int i s , however, i t ought not be a l lowed to overshadow some of the other causes of underdevelopment. Despite the n e g l i g i b l e increases in per c ap i t a food p roduc t i on , we have seen that product ion has not been the major c u l p r i t in f a i l i n g to reduce m a l n u t r i t i o n . " I t is paradox ica l that p r o t e i n - c a l o r i e m a l n u t r i t i o n is widespread in a wor ld that apparent ly produces more than enough p ro te i n f o r each o f i t s i n h a b i t a n t s " (U.N., 197*0 . Not on ly the wor ld , but each region produces more than enough p r o t e i n . " M a l d i s t r i b u t i o n i s the cen t r a l f a c t in under-development" (de Souza and P o r t e r , 1974). Ch ina, w i th a quar te r o f a l l mankind, appears to have e l im i na ted s t a r v a t i o n and m a l n u t r i t i o n . Other count r i e s have had comparable increases in p roduc t i on , but the more e q u i t a b l e d i s t r i b u t i o n w i t h i n China is probably the major f a c t o r in i t s success. The unequal d i s t r i b u t i o n between d i f f e r e n t socio-economic c l a s se s accounts f o r the m a l n u t r i t i o n throughout the Th i rd World, in the face o f adequate supp l i e s (UN, 1974). Unequal access to resources a f f e c t s more than d i e t . Strumpel (1976) has found d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i th one ' s income and p o s i t i o n in l i f e c o r r e l a t e s more c l o s e l y w i th r e l a t i v e poverty than w i t h abso lute poverty . H i s t o r i c a l l y 46 the l e v e l s o f i nequ i t y have dropped somewhat a f t e r the pronounced i n i t i a l i nc reases . In the more a f f l u e n t c o u n t r i e s , the l eve l appears to have s t a b i l i z e d , at a l eve l w e l l below that o f many Th i r d World c o u n t r i e s , and p a r t i c u l a r l y those exper ienc ing the most rap id growth (Powers, 1975)-Whether the i n e q u i t i e s w i l l decrease in those count r i e s as we l l i s a moot po i n t . The planner must ask to what extent t h i s t rend i s necessary or d e s i r a b l e . The comparison o f Bu l g a r i a and Greece (Apel and Strumpel, 1976) suggests i t i s ne i t he r necessary nor d e s i r a b l e , and the successes o f China and Cuba appear to support t h a t . Inequ i tab le d i s t r i b u t i o n of resources i s the cause of much o f the p o l i t i c a l unrest in the Th i rd World, though other causes are a l s o important (El-Shakhs and Obudho, 1974; Mazru i , 1970; de Souza and P o r t e r , 1974). The d i s t i n c t i o n between cause and e f f e c t , in what can amount to v i c i o u s c i r c l e s , i s d i f f i c u l t and perhaps meaningless. The p o l i t i c a l unrest and i n s t a b i l i t y has hampered development e f f o r t s (Rosser, 1972), and is a l s o the r e su l t o f inadequate development, p a r t i c u l a r l y in urban areas. The problems a s soc i a ted w i t h the rap id u rban i za t i on in the Th i rd World, the high degree o f primacy of urban centres and the inadequacies o f i n f r a s t r u c t u r a l support are well-known and w e l l documented (Breese, 1969; Rosser, 1972; El-Shakhs and Obudho, 1974, and o t h e r s ) . The economic burden t h i s places on the country has a l ready been d i s cu s sed . There i s some evidence i t a l s o l i m i t s development in other areas. Even in the l a r g e l y urbanized coun t r i e s there appear to be high p sycho log i ca l costs to urban l i f e s t y l e s and, conver se ly , many develop-mental a t t r i b u t e s of the v i l l a g e community l i k e the s t a b i l i t y , o rder , and s e c u r i t y i t prov ides and the sense o f belonging and involvement i t a f f o rd s (Almond, 1971; B u t t - F i n n , 1971 and Berger, Berger and K e l l n e r , 1973)- Where the c u l t u r e has not had time to adapt to t h i s major s h i f t of hi community, the i n d i v i d u a l i s in a quandary torn between two c o n f l i c t i n g sets o f values which demand incompat ib le behav iora l responses ( G r i n d a l , 1972; Gutk ind, 1970; Mazru i , 1970). Whi le many welcome t h i s change and accept the c o n f l i c t as i n e v i t a b l e (Erasmus, 1961; Fo s te r , 1973; Gutk ind, 1970; U l l r i c h , 1975), others are more s e n s i t i v e (Mair , 1969, and 1972; G r i n d a l , 1972) or more pragmatic (Nyerere, 1969; U.N. 1974; World Bank, 1975). The welcoming of t h i s s o c i a l c o n f l i c t , in the absence o f any. evidence that i t is necessary, and in the presence o f reduced s o c i a l performance, can on ly be based on an u n j u s t i f i a b l e e t hnocen t r i c b i a s . The increased inc idence o f mental d i so rder s i s a t t r i b u t a b l e to " t h e c o n f l i c t s and c o n t r a d i c t i o n s inherent in rap id s o c i a l change, u rban i z a t i on and the d i f f i c u l t i e s in adapt ing to the urban s t y l e of l i f e , crowding, the increased pace and s t re s s o f l i f e , changing s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e s and a growing p ropo r t i on o f o l d persons " (U.N., 1974). The ra te of t h i s s o c i a l change in most o f the Th i rd World i s unprecedented in the h i s t o r y of s o c i a l e v o l u t i o n . If t h i s rap id rate o f change (of which u rban i za t i on i s but a pa r t , i n c l ud i n g the emergence o f new e l i t e s , new values and new s o c i a l a r range-ments which extend w e l l beyond the urban centres) does have s i g n i f i c a n t d i s r u p t i v e and anti-deve1opmenta1 impacts, two quest ions must be asked in t h i s ana l y s i s of the reasons f o r the poor development record. F i r s t , to what extent are these agents of change i n e v i t a b l e and second, to what extent are they autonomous, o r are they the r e s u l t o f o ther f a c to r s ? Causation i s extremely d i f f i c u l t to prove in any dynamic system. Given the d i v e r s i t y of s o c i a l systems and the environments they are i n , i t i s doubtfu l that the causat i ve f a c t o r s would be u n i v e r s a l . In s p i t e o f t h a t , i t ought to be po s s i b l e to i d e n t i f y and d i s cus s some of the causes, recogn iz ing that they may vary in importance in d i f f e r e n t s o c i e t i e s . Popu lat ion growth i s perhaps the one i n e v i t a b l e f a c t o r . ( i t too was the re su l t o f d e l i b e r a t e a c t i o n s , but i n so fa r as few would cha l lenge the moral nece s s i t y of r e t a i n i n g and improving programmes to reduce m o r t a l i t y r a t e s , f o r p r a c t i c a l purposes, i t w i l l remain a given u n t i l or unless b i r t h rates drop comparably.) Popu la t ion growth has in turn put pressure on other resources besides food, which has con t r i bu ted to pressures encouraging mig ra t ion to urban cent re s . Other f a c t o r s have con t r i bu ted to the rap id rate of u r b a n i z a t i o n . The c o l o n i a l , export o r i e n t e d , primary c i t i e s have cont inued to serve t h i s a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and commercial r o l e , cont inu ing to grow and e x p l o i t at the expense o f na t i ona l development (de Souza and P o r t e r , 1974). This view may be a l i t t l e extreme. Several count r i e s do have in te rmed ia te c i t i e s , l i k e Ghana, N i ge r i a and India and some have even e s t a b l i s h e d new na t i ona l a d m i n i s t r a t i v e cen t re s : Ind ia , B r a z i l , N i g e r i a . For the most p a r t , though, s t r a t e g i e s o f i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n , of hea l th care through h o s p i t a l s , of h igher educat ion , or of expanding a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , have a l l con t r i bu ted to the rap id u r b a n i z a t i o n . A s soc i a ted w i t h t h i s concent ra t i on of a c t i v i t y is the domination of the in format ion f l ow. The values t r a n s f e r r e d through the media, whether l o ca l or f o r e i g n , are l a r g e l y urban. The l i f e s t y l e s po r t rayed , the a c t i v i t i e s descr ibed (and p r o f f e r e d ) , have an urban cha rac te r which is found h i gh l y a t t r a c t i v e , although the r e a l i t i e s may be markedly d i f f e r e n t ( G r i n d a l , 1972). Va lue -laden educat iona l programmes that turn out (unemployed) c l e r k s , that teach Greek and L a t i n and Romantic Eng l i sh l i t e r a t u r e instead o f the l o ca l language, a g r i c u l t u r e and technigues o f problem ana l y s i s d i r e c t people away from t h e i r communities, where they cou ld c o n t r i b u t e , to urban areas where they j o i n the unemployed o r under-employed. This va lue t r a n s f e r i s g r e a t l y f a c i l i t a t e d by the "myth of underdevelopment". The content ion of t h i s t he s i s is that much of the "underdevelopment" o f the Th i rd World i s an e thnocen t r i c b i a s . That t h i s b i a s , t h i s percept ion of s u p e r i o r i t y and i n f e r i o r i t y , has been more or less s u c c e s s f u l l y transposed to many in the Th i rd World does not make the myth a r e a l i t y . The e f f e c t of t h i s myth has been the widespread acceptance and emulat ion of Western values and l i f e s t y l e s , without an adequate assessment of the costs invo lved in such a h o i i s t i c change. Another po s s i b l e set o f causes f o r the poor development record i s the inherent i n a b i l i t y o f the e x i s t i n g s o c i a l system to adapt and to adapt to the var ious causes of s t r e s s . There are three cond i t i on s which could be respons ib le f o r t h i s . F i r s t , as Dubos (1966) suggests, the rate o f change may be beyond human adapt ive c a p a c i t i e s . If t h i s i s t rue in the i n d u s t r i a l i z e d wo r l d , where t echno l og i ca l change i s so r a p i d , i t i s ha rd l y l i k e l y to be less t rue in s o c i e t i e s in which the rate of s o c i a l change is unprecedented. Perhaps no s o c i e t y could handle the amount of s t re s s imposed by the var ious f a c t o r s . The s o c i a l system may inc lude s i g n i f i c a n t ant i -deve lopmenta l components. These may be c u l t u r a l a t t r i b u t e s such as a caste- sys tem or an e l i t e w i t h cons iderab le i n t e r e s t in the s ta tus guo. Brecher (1971) suggests India has such an e l i t e , and i t i s probable that much of feudal L a t i n America and southern A f r i c a does as w e l l . Where the e l i t e has s u f f i c i e n t power to block development e f f o r t s , and uses that power to mainta in i t s p r i v i l e g e d p o s i t i o n , development i s u n l i k e l y to occur . However, even where the rate of change i s not beyond man's adapt ive capac i t y and where the s o c i a l system is not he ld back by ant i -development components, i t may s t i l l be unable to marshal 1 i t s resources to respond p o s i t i v e l y to s t r e s s . Our knowledge of s o c i a l system behavior and our a b i l i t y to engineer s o c i a l systems i s qu i t e l i m i t e d — w e do not understand the s o c i a l l ea rn i ng process. This f a c t , combined w i t h the common d e f i c i -enc ies in so f t -ware d i scussed above, can g r e a t l y l i m i t the capac i t y of a s o c i a l system to respond to change and to develop. F i n a l l y , i t i s suggested a major cause of the poor development record has been the pauc i t y of resources that have been a l l o c a t e d to deve lop-ment e f f o r t s . No s o c i e t y has un l im i t ed resources and much of the Th i r d World has severe resource c o n s t r a i n t s . Where these resources have been a l l o c a t e d to i n d u s t r i a l growth or to attempt ing to r e c i t f y some o f the problems a r i s i n g from "exp lod ing c i t i e s in non-exploding economies" (de Souza and P o r t e r , 1974), there have been inadequate resources a v a i l -able to develop, i n i t i a t e and support development programmes. Of the more a f f l u e n t c o u n t r i e s , on ly four spent les s than 10 percent of the GNP on s o c i a l s e c u r i t y in 1970; Japan (5-7 pe r cen t ) , A u s t r a l i a (8.2 pe r cen t ) , Iceland (9.0 percent) and the United States (9.7 pe r cen t ) . Most a l l o c a t e d 15 to 20 percent to s o c i a l s e c u r i t y . Of the few coun t r i e s from the Th i r d World l i s t e d , I s rae l spent 9-7 percent o f i t s GNP on s o c i a l s e c u r i t y but the re s t were a l l below 5 percent , most spending about 3 percent . Th is small investment and the lack of adequate a d m i n i s t r a t i v e i n f r a s t r u c t u r e make " t he e a r l y p r o v i s i o n of cash b e n e f i t s to the ru ra l popu lat ion f o r cont ingenc ies such as d i s a b i l i t y , o l d age, or the death of the breadwinner u n l i k e l y " (U.N., 1974). The absence of adequate s o c i a l s e c u r i t y f o r such cont ingenc ies was the major focus o f concern and apprehension in Greece and l a r g e l y accounted f o r the d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s of s a t i s f a c t i o n between Greece and Bu l g a r i a (where adequate p r o v i s i o n does e x i s t ) (Apel and Strumpel, 1976). The inadequate o r g a n i z a t i o n a l , a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and problem s o l v i n g capac i t y o f some o f these s o c i e t i e s has been blamed f o r much of the f a i l u r e of the economic growth record. It has a l s o l i k e l y been a c o n t r i b u t o r to the poor development record. The improvement o f t h i s capac-i t y w i l l depend to a con s i de rab l e degree on investment in app rop r i a te educat iona l programmes. Yet the market economies of the Th i r d World spent on ly 3-2 percent of t h e i r GNP on educat ion in 1970, i n c rea s i ng an average o f about 3 percent a year s i nce 1960. In comparison, the more a f f l u e n t count r i e s spent 5-4 percent of t h e i r GNP on educat ion and had increased i t an average of almost 5 percent a year s i nce 1960 (U.N., 197*0. Rural development and b i r t h con t r o l need more a t t e n t i o n and more resources, but the heavy investments in o ther s e c t o r s , p a r t i c u l a r l y economic growth (though the m i l i t a r y takes s u b s t a n t i a l p ropor t ions in some c o u n t r i e s ) , and the preoccupat ion w i th economic growth as an instrument of s o c i a l development, have re legated these fundamental developmental concerns to a secondary and inadequate p r i o r i t y . In the l a s t 5 o r 6 years r u ra l development has rece ived i nc reas ing a t t e n t i o n and support. If development is to occur , comparable a t t e n t i o n and support must be given to programmes i d e n t i f y i n g and r e c t i f y i n g these o ther problems, d e f i c i e n c i e s or sources o f s t r e s s . It i s e v i den t , and extremely important to recogn i ze , tha t t h i s l i s t i n g of causes i s l a r g e l y s p e c u l a t i v e and that there are some notab le except ions to t h i s general d e s c r i p t i o n . China is the most outs tand ing example o f a Th i rd World country that has managed to overcome most of these b a r r i e r s . Whether a s o c i a l r e v o l u t i o n i s as necessary in other count r i e s is que s t i onab le , though in some, l i k e H a i t i or southern A f r i c a , i t may we l l be. In any case, China has s i g n i f i c a n t l y reduced i t s b i r t h r a te , v i r t u a l l y exc luded exogenous i n f l u e n c e s , removed an ant i -deve lopmenta l e l i t e and, perhaps most impor tant l y , expended cons ide rab le resources in educat ion and o r g a n i z a t i o n . It appears t h i s more balanced approach to development has not de t rac ted from the economic growth, but made i t p o s s i b l e . I am not suggest ing, however, that the Chinese exper ience i s to be emulated. It would probably be i napprop r i a te in many s o c i e t i e s . The po int being made is t h i s : the investment and expendi ture in programmes of i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n and urban improvement, at the expense of investment in development has produced ne i t he r much economic growth nor much deve lop-ment. The planners and the decis ion-makers must analyse the development record o f t h e i r s o c i e t y , determin ing the c o n t r i b u t i o n of the var ious f a c t o r s d i scussed here in the context o f that s o c i e t y . The case o f China s imply under l ines the f a c t that few o f the causes, except perhaps the natu ra l resource l i m i t a t i o n s , are una l t e r ab l e and that an appropr ia te s t r a t e g y , focuss ing on the major d e f i c i e n c i e s and i t s causes, may be cause f o r opt imism. So what is invo lved in f i n d i n g an appropr i a te set of s t r a t e g i e s ? CHAPTER k DEFINING THE PROBLEM OF PLANNING FOR DEVELOPMENT 53 For a v a r i e t y o f reasons, then, development s t r a t e g i e s p red i ca ted on economic growth have f a i l e d to produce e i t h e r s a t i s f a c t o r y economic growth or development—indeed, in many c ircumstances the s t r a t e g i e s appear to have c on t r i bu ted to a decrease in s o c i a l performance. I f these s t r a t e g i e s have been found want ing, and i f there remain developmental problems, i t i s c l e a r new s t r a t e g i e s must be found. This search f o r new s t r a t e g i e s must focus on three ba s i c problems. 4.1 I d e n t i f y i n g Performance D e f i c i e n c i e s Soc i a l performance and development are s u b j e c t i v e . They a re , and must be c u l t u r a l l y r e l a t i v e and c u l t u r a l l y de f i ned . The ana l y s i s of the development record in the prev ious chapter i s based on a gross d e s c r i p t i o n of the nature o f development, using the types of c r i t e r i a that are l i k e l y to be u n i v e r s a l l y re levant but which may be weighed d i f f e r e n t l y by d i f f e r e n t c u l t u r e s . The f i r s t step in the search f o r a s t r a tegy must be the i d e n t i -f i c a t i o n of the problems in terms o f the needs and a s p i r a t i o n s of the mem-bers of the s o c i e t y . High i n fan t m o r t a l i t y r a te s , the prevalence of preventab le d iseases and m a l n u t r i t i o n , e i t h e r present o r a n t i c i p a t e d in the face o f growing popu lat ions are ser ious problems f a c i ng much of the Th i rd World. However, d i f f e r e n c e s between coun t r i e s are great on each of these and there are o ther candidates f o r a t t e n t i o n . Incomes are g ene r a l l y low, w i th 650 m i l l i o n people in " ab so l u t e pove r t y " , earn ing less than $50 per year ; adu l t l i t e r a c y rates are a l s o low. P o l i t i c a l unrest or f a c t i o n a l i s m or crime may be s i g n i f i c a n t b a r r i e r s to development which the development planner and the dec i s ion-maker must be prepared to address. These are but examples to which numerous o the r i n d i c a t o r s of s o c i a l performance could conce ivab ly be added. They are introduced here merely to i n d i c a t e the range of developmental problems, to suggest percept ions of one c u l t u r e may not apply in another and that percept ions based on an aggregated wor ld view may be u n r e a l i s t i c in any p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n . Where phy s i ca l d e f i c i e n c y needs are not being met some p r i o r i t y must presumably be g iven to these. But even that is not a s imple case. At what po int i s undernourishment less of a problem than, f o r example, i n fan t m o r t a l i t y from other causes? There a re , in a d d i t i o n , the p s ycho log i ca l d e f i c i e n c y needs. Where se l f - e s teem and s t a tu s are low, f o r example, in some m ino r i t y groups (or even oppressed m a j o r i t i e s ) , i s t h i s less of a developmental problem than some undernourishment? How important is the need f o r " p o s i t i v e e f f e c t " ? These guest ions can on l y be answered by the members o f the s o c i e t y in que s t i on . To develop s t r a t e g i e s w i thout t h e i r percept ions in mind is to run the se r ious r i s k of m i sa1 loca t i ng the l i m i t e d resources f o r development, one o f the f a c t o r s c o n t r i b u t i n g to the poor development record to date . k.2 The Problem o f Change The i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f problems d i scussed above deal t w i th performance in a s t a t i c s t a t e . S oc i a l systems, however, are dynamic systems. Change, though not development, i s i n e v i t a b l e , though the rate and d i r e c t i o n of change may vary cons ide rab ly between s o c i e t i e s and over t ime. It may be argued, t h e r e f o r e , that even in the absence of se r ious performance d e f i c i e n c i e s , the development planner has an onerous task in i d e n t i f y i n g the developmental problems. The development planners r o l e in t h i s capac i t y i s to regu la te , as f a r as po s s i b l e both the rate o f change that i n d i v i d u a l s and t h e i r s o c i a l system may react and adapt wi thout loss o f performance, and the d i r e c t i o n of change, that i t i s c on s i s t en t w i t h the 55 s o c i e t a l o b j e c t i v e s and i s , in f a c t , developmental . I suggest, though on ly the performance eva l ua t i on recommended above could prove, that the development o f some s o c i e t i e s may f i t more e a s i l y in t h i s ' p rob lem a v o i d -i n g ' category than in the 'problem s o l v i n g ' , though i t must be s t re s sed no s o c i e t y i s l i k e l y to f i t who l l y in one o r the o the r . Ghana (and some of the other well-endowed West A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s ) , Cuba, China and very l i k e l y severa l other coun t r i e s may have more cause to worry about change than about present problems. S o c i a l performance, as we have seen, is a very complex aggregate which depends on the equa l l y complex i n t e r a c t i o n s o f the s o c i a l system that have evolved over long pe r i od s . It is probable, t h e r e f o r e , that j u s t as the vast m a j o r i t y of mutations in organisms tend to be ha rmfu l , most s o c i e t a l change i s l i k e l y to have i n i t i a l negat ive e f f e c t s . Not a l l change i s unde s i r ab l e , and in any case, i t i s i n e v i t a b l e , but the ra te and d i r e c t i o n may not be beyond some degree of c o n t r o l . The types o f problems one might a n t i c i p a t e are d e f i c i e n c i e s s i m i l a r t o those d i scussed above. C l e a r l y , even where m a l n u t r i t i o n i s not p r e sen t l y a problem, i t may, in the face o f growing popu l a t i on s , become a problem. Popu lat ion pressures may a l so c rea te land tenure and land use c o n f l i c t s . There may be grounds f o r concern about a weakening sense of f a m i l i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and i t s attendant problems. A s h i f t from or a l t e r e d s tatus o f t r a d i t i o n a l occupat ions and l i f e s t y l e s may not be u n i v e r s a l l y welcomed. In s ho r t , we cannot assume that being d i f f e r e n t from us i s a problem, o r that becoming more Westernized i s not a problem. The i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of developmental problems must inc lude both the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f e x i s t i n g performance d e f i c i e n c i e s and the assessment o f the impact o f a n t i c i p a t e d change on s o c i a l performance. Each s o c i e t y i s l i k e l y to have a mix o f these d e f i c i e n c i e s and a n t i c i p a t e d problems, yet have l i m i t e d resources w i th which to address them. The p r i o r i t i e s , l i k e the e va l ua t i on o f performance, can on ly be e s t a b l i s h e d by the members o f each s o c i e t y . 4.3 I d en t i f y i n g the Causes o f D e f i c i e n c i e s Having i d e n t i f i e d o r a n t i c i p a t e d the performance d e f i c i e n c i e s of concern, the causes must be i d e n t i f i e d . Aga in , t h i s i s s e l f - e v i d e n t , yet too f r equen t l y a problem i s s imply assumed to have a p a r t i c u l a r cause. M a l n u t r i t i o n i s a case in p o i n t . For coun t r i e s w i th poor s o i l , poor c l ima te or a popu lat ion exceeding the l and ' s c a r r y i n g c a p a c i t y , l i k e Chad o r Hong Kong, more food i s needed. Th i s can on l y come from ou t s i de sources. This problem is d i f f e r e n t from the more general case o f a country which i s u n d e r u t i 1 i z i n g i t s resources, which i s capable of producing more food. Most Th i rd World count r i e s f i t t h i s category. In a d d i t i o n , however, we have found that most m a l n u t r i t i o n , in every reg ion , is not the r e s u l t of inadequate supply but o f unequal d i s t r i b u t i o n . And even where supply i s s ho r t , i s the problem one o f p roduc t i on , p rocess ing or storage? Is the poor d i s t r i b u t i o n due to s po i l a ge , t r a n s p o r t a t i o n and marketing problems or to s o c i a l c l a s s i n e q u a l i t i e s ? Is popu la t ion growing f a s t e r than product ion and d i s t r i b u t i o n systems can provide for ? Do these systems f a l l behind because o f poor c rops , poor techn iques, poor equipment— inadequate hardware, or because of o r g a n i z a t i o n a l , a d m i n i s t r a t i v e or c u l t u r a l f a c t o r s — t h e software necessary f o r problem s o l v i n g and implementation? Where domestic resources cannot s a t i s f y the s o c i e t a l needs, what r e s t r i c t s access to wor ld supp l i e s ? World markets that requ i re hard cur rency , that can only be earned through unfavorable t r ad i ng b a r r i e r s , have not been conducive to Th i r d World development. Or has the s o c i e t y been unable to take advantage of marketable resources? The wor ld market 57 system may be l a r g e l y out s ide the con t r o l of any one s o c i e t y ; the e x p l o i t a -t i o n o f a v a i l a b l e resources is l a r g e l y w i t h i n i t s c o n t r o l , as is (presumably) popu la t ion con t ro l which may be the cause of var ious problems. Other i n f l uences may be harder to c a t e g o r i z e . The s t r e s se s caused by the i n t r oduc t i o n of a l i e n va lues , l i f e s t y l e s or occupat ions may undermine the e x i s t i n g system. But where, u l t i m a t e l y , do these in f luences come from, how are they introduced i n to the soc ie ty ? Some may be s p i n - o f f s of s p e c i f i c developmental s t r a t e g i e s : by-products of a va lue - laden educat iona l programme or of an i n d u s t r i a l e n t e r p r i s e , f o r example. Others may be media borne--images in magazines, newspapers, f i l m o r on rad io can have cons ide r -able impact. E l i t e s mimicing o the r c u l t u r e s may themselves be mimicked. The problems are numerous and v a r i e d , the causes are c e r t a i n l y no less so. k.k Designing Appropr ia te S t r a teg i e s The s t r a t egy , to be s u c c e s s f u l , must be appropr i a te to both the problem and the cause (or causes) of the problem. Chad and Mal i w i l l probably have to look to the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community fo r a s s i s t ance in the p r o v i s i o n o f food. Countr ies depending on exports may have to look to the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community f o r improved terms of t r ade . I n t e n s i f i c a t i o n may invo l ve high y i e l d crops, i r r i g a t i o n and f e r t i l i z e r s ; p roces s i ng , s torage, and d i s t r i b u t i o n may have to improve. Where a growing popu la t ion is p u t t i n g an excess i ve demand on the product ion and d i s t r i b u t i o n systems, an appropr ia te s t r a tegy might inc lude cons ide rab le investment in popu la t i on c o n t r o l . It may be found an i n d i r e c t cause may a f f e c t severa l areas. Problem s o l v i n g techniques and o r g an i z a t i on may be a weakness which f r u s t r a t e s attempts to increase p roduc t i on , exped i te d i s t r i b u t i o n and address other areas of s o c i a l performance. Educat iona l programmes 58 designed to develop such a b i l i t i e s may prove a va luab le investment. Where s t re s se s to the system o r i g i n a t e e x t e r n a l l y , i t may be necessary to screen them more c a r e f u l l y . This may be f e a s i b l e p a r t i c u -l a r l y f o r s p e c i f i c development p ro jec t s or p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e s . Where the s t re s se s enter more d i f f u s e l y , such as through the media, i t may be more appropr ia te to u t i l i z e resources to counter such i n f l u e n c e s . Obvious ly where domestic programmes are found to produce such s t r e s s e s , they ought to be reviewed c r i t i c a l l y . The mass media has con s i de rab le s o c i a l i z i n g p o t e n t i a l , a f a c t e x p l o i t e d more f o r p r i v a t e gain than p u b l i c good in most c o u n t r i e s . Where s o c i a l performance i s d e f i c i e n t in s a t i s f y i n g p sycho log i ca l needs, or where the system is under s t r e s s from c o n f l i c t i n g va lue s , p u b l i c use o f the mass media may be a v a l uab l e , e f f i c i e n t , and necessary s t r a t e g y . With the range of problems and the causes o f these problems i t should be apparent that the combinations f o r which s t r a t e g i e s must be designed are con s i de rab le . But i t i s not even po s s i b l e to c l a im a s i n g l e problem w i t h a s i n g l e cause has a s i n g l e , opt imal s o l u t i o n . The s t r a tegy i t s e l f must be seen in the context of the s o c i a l system. If there i s one po int to s t r e s s , which has too f r equen t l y been ignored, i t is that the s t r a t e g i e s , the s o l u t i o n s , are themselves agents o f change, causes o f s t r e s s . The i r app rop r i a tenes s , then, depends on t h e i r e f f i c i e n c y in s o l v i n g the ta rget problems ( t h e i r a p p l i c a b i l i t y to the problems and t h e i r causes) and, as impor tan t l y , t h e i r tendency to promote development, or at l e a s t minimize negat ive change. CHAPTER 5 TOWARD A STRATEGY FOR DEVELOPMENT 59 The task, t h e r e f o r e , Is to e s t a b l i s h a developmental process in accord w i th the po ints that have been ra i sed above: i) I t must s t r i v e to enhance i n d i v i d u a l we l f a r e and s o c i a l performance though at present our knowledge o f the un i ve r -s a l i t y o f human needs and our measures of s o c i a l performance are g r o s s l y inadequate, i i ) It must begin w i th and work w i t h the l o ca l env i ronment—the na tu ra l and e s p e c i a l l y the human, f o r any undue d i s r u p t i o n i s c o s t l y and an t i -deve lopmenta l . i i i ) The process i t s e l f ought to be developmental. People ought to f ee l invo lved in shaping t h e i r f u tu re and t h e i r f u tu re ought to take shape at a pace at which they and t h e i r s o c i e t i e s can adapt, iv) It must inc lude endeavours to e l i m i n a t e the exogenous impediments to development. Such a process must invo lve re search , e v a l u a t i o n , p o l i c y formation and implementation on two f r o n t s . 5.1 The Role o f the I n te rna t i ona l Community While there may be some mer i t in many count r i e s i n c rea s i ng t h e i r l e ve l o f s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y , i t i s probably d e s i r a b l e and, in any case, necessary, to recognize the interdependence o f na t i on s . Many count r i e s s imply do not have the resources to support t h e i r popu l a t i on . Most coun t r i e s requ i re the resources o r markets o f others to mainta in or increase t h e i r economic output, and fo r much of the Th i rd World, an increase in economic output cou ld probably be an important c o n t r i b u t o r to development. A s i n g l e country might be able to undertake the research 60 to determine how, why and to what extent var ious ex te rna l f a c t o r s impede i t s development, o r the amount of a s s i s t ance i t would requ i re f o r i t s development. But i t could not, u n i l a t e r a l l y , formulate and implement p o l i c i e s de r i ved from tha t . As much of the success o f the development e f f o r t wi11 depend on such p o l i c i e s , i t i s imperat ive that the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community address these i s sues . Ju s t as i t would be presumptuous to d e c l a r e , a p r i o r i , what a p a r t i c u l a r s o c i e t y ought to do to develop, p r e c i s e l y what the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community ought to do must be based on s u f f i c i e n t research to i d e n t i f y more c l e a r l y the nature of the var ious problems and the ways the problems can be redressed. However, p a r t i c u l a r a t t e n t i o n must be focussed on the f o l l o w i n g i s sues : i ) P rov id ing resources f o r the Fourth World. There appears to be l i t t l e these extremely poor and resource d e f i c i e n t coun t r i e s can do to markedly improve t h e i r own s i t u a t i o n . (R idker, e t . a l . , 1976), yet t h e i r s i t u a t i o n of poverty , m a l n u t r i t i o n and impending s t a r v a t i o n f o r many, is a g loba l concern and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , i i ) R e d i s t r i b u t i n g resources, markets and economic a c t i v i t y to the Th i rd World. Th is w i l l probably invo lve decreas ing consumption in the a f f l u e n t c oun t r i e s , " f r e e i n g " a i d r e c i p i e n t s and l i c e n c e e s , encourag ing, rather than d i s -couraging the p roduc t i on , p rocess ing and marketing of Th i r d World commodities, w i t h terms of trade designed to augment the r e d i s t r i b u t i o n . The " f r e e i n g " o f a i d r e c i p i e n t s may requ i re a s h i f t to " n o - s t r i n g s " m u l t i - l a t e r a l a i d , repayable in any currency. As " s o f t " cu r renc ie s accumulate in the more a f f l u e n t c o u n t r i e s , products of the Th i rd World may become more a t t r a c t i v e , in turn s t i m u l a t i n g growth the re . i i i ) Withdrawal of support f o r t y rann ie s or e l i t e s b l ock i ng development. Only the members of the s o c i e t y can determine whether the e l i t e prevents development, but an entrenched e l i t e , w i t h ex te rna l support in p a r t i c u l a r may be very d i f f i -c u l t to d i s l odge , iv) Re f r a i n i ng from the impos i t ion of v iews, va lues , and s t r a t e -g i e s . The i n t e r n a t i o n a l community, and e s p e c i a l l y those invo lved in development e f f o r t s , must s t r i v e to increase our understanding o f the value and l eg i t imacy of d i ve r se s o c i a l systems and must encourage s o c i e t i e s to de f i ne and pursue t h e i r own o b j e c t i v e s , v) P rov id i ng a s s i s t a n c e , where po s s i b l e and where needed, to he lp the members o f s o c i e t y achieve the o b j e c t i v e s they have de f i ned . I am not suggest ing the w o r l d ' s wea l th could be (nor should be) r e d i s t r i b u t e d ove rn i gh t . The opt imal degree of r e d i s t r i b u t i o n and ra te of r e d i s t r i b u t i o n may never be determined. The po in t i s , a s h i f t i s probably necessary to enable many s o c i e t i e s to develop. S i m i l a r l y , i t would be naive to expect ub iqu i tous values could be conta ined. However, i t should be p o s s i b l e , and i t may be necessary, to again e f f e c t a s h i f t ra ther than a t o t a l change. Dropping such terms as modern izat ion , developed and un- (or under-) developed as they are c u r r e n t l y being used would be but a s t a r t . Encouraging and support ing the search f o r l o ca l o b j e c t i v e s would f a c i l i t a t e t h i s s h i f t . Whether these issues are the most c r i t i c a l or not i s not the important po i n t ; whether the types o f remedies I have a l l uded to are re levant or workable matters l e s s . The important po int i s that development of the Th i r d World depends upon the response of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community. The most appropr ia te response 62 w i l l requ i re a g rea te r understanding than I can b r i ng to the s ub j e c t . It w i l l a l s o requ i re an unprecedented l eve l o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l determinat ion and co - ope r a t i on . 5.2 The Role o f the Development Planner The second f r on t on which underdevelopment must be fought i s the domestic f r o n t . Th is s e c t i on might as a p p r o p r i a t e l y be l a b e l l e d 'The ro le of i n t e r n a l s t r a t e g i e s ' . Chapter k o u t l i n e s the tasks that deve lop-ment p lann ing must undertake. It must f i r s t i d e n t i f y the performance d e f i c i e n c i e s . As I have s t re s sed throughout t h i s paper, the e v a l u a t i o n o f s o c i a l performance and the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f i t s d e f i c i e n c i e s can on ly be done l e g i t i m a t e l y by the members of the s o c i e t y . The p l anne r ' s r o l e in t h i s i s to ensure d i ve r se i n t e r e s t s w i t h i n the s o c i e t y have the oppor tun i t y to c o n t r i b u t e to the e va l ua t i on and the fo rmu la t i on of s o c i a l ob jec t i ves. In a n t i c i p a t i n g the e f f e c t s o f change, the planner can draw on h i s understanding of s o c i a l system performance and on exper iences e l s e -where. At present, t h i s capac i t y i s very l i m i t e d : i t i s hoped, as t h i s developmental process proceeds and our understanding o f s o c i a l systems and t h e i r responses to change improves, the p l anne r s ' c apac i t y to con-t r i b u t e w i l l increase co r re spond ing l y . However, i t must again be l e f t to the members of the s o c i e t y to judge whether the a n t i c i p a t e d change is developmental o r not. The ana l y s i s o f the problems, present and a n t i c i p a t e d , is l a r g e l y the p l anne r s ' r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . On the bas i s of t h i s a na l y s i s of the problems and t h e i r causes, a l t e r n a t i v e s t r a t e g i e s must be des igned. These may have to be innovat i ve o r they may be der i ved from exper iences e lsewhere. It i s important that the planner present a l t e r n a t i v e s , f o r these too must be e v a l u a t e d and s e l e c t e d on t h e b a s i s o f l o c a l p e r c e p t i o n s and o b j e c t i v e s . T h i s p r o c e s s has t h r e e i m p o r t a n t i m p l i c a t i o n s . F i r s t , t h e r e must be s u b s t a n t i a l i n v e s t m e n t i n r e s e a r c h . Re sea rch i s needed t o e v a l u a t e s o c i a l p e r f o r m a n c e , i d e n t i f y s t r e n g t h s and weakne s s e s , and e s t a b l i s h s o c i e t a l o b j e c t i v e s . E q u a l l y s p e c i f i c r e s e a r c h i s r e q u i r e d t o d e v e l o p a p p r o p r i a t e s t r a t e g i e s , s t r a t e g i e s t h a t may r e q u i r e t e c h n o l o g i c a l o r s o c i a l i n n o v a t i o n . And more g e n e r a l r e s e a r c h i s n e c e s s a r y t o improve o u r u n d e r -s t a n d i n g o f s o c i a l s y s t em b e h a v i o r , t h e i n t e r a c t i o n s o f sub sy s tems and t h e i r r e spon se s t o s t r e s s and change . Second , as b o t h an o b j e c t i v e and a n e c e s s a r y f e a t u r e o f the d e v e l o p -ment p r o c e s s , t h e l e a d e r s h i p must be i n t e r n a l . P a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the p r o c e s s i s i n i t s e l f d e v e l o p m e n t a l . I f t he p r o c e s s i n v o l v e s them as s u b j e c t s , not i n t h e s o c i a l s c i e n c e s sense o f t h e ' o b s e r v e d 1 , b u t i n F r e i r e ' s (1968) s en se , the ' a c t o r s ' , i t engender s c o n f i d e n c e , s e l f - e s t e e m and c r e a t i v i t y , i n c r e a s i n g t he i n d i v i d u a l ' s c a p a c i t y f o r ' p o s i t i v e e f f e c t ' . But i n t e r n a l l e a d e r s h i p i s a l s o n e c e s s a r y t o l e g i t i m i z e the p r o c e s s and t o en su r e i t s r e s p o n s i v e n e s s t o l o c a l needs . To improve the g u a l i t y and expand t h e ba se o f t he l e a d e r s h i p , l i k e l y p r e r e q u i s i t e s f o r ' s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g d e v e l o p m e n t ' , an e a r l y deve lopment o b j e c t i v e might be the deve lopment o f t he human r e s o u r c e , p a r t i c u l a r l y i t s o r g a n i z a t i o n a l and p r o b l e m - s o l v i n g c a p a b i l i t i e s . The p r o b l e m o f l e a d e r s h i p a l s o r a i s e s t h e d i f f i c u l t q u e s t i o n o f how t y r a n n i e s o r l e a d e r s h i p w h i c h f r u s t r a t e s deve lopment e f f o r t s can be h a n d l e d . A b r i e f d i g r e s s i o n t o e x p l o r e t he p l a n n i n g i m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h i s i s j u s t i f i a b l e . I t must f i r s t be empha s i zed t h a t o p p r e s s i o n must be p e r c e i v e d by members o f the s o c i e t y . An o u t s i d e r may c o n s i d e r an e l i t e o p p r e s s i v e bu t t h e members o f the s o c i e t y may t o l e r a t e i t , a c c e p t i t o r t h e y may no t even p e r c e i v e t h e o p p r e s s i o n a t a l l . The Wes te rn v i e w o f many communist count r i e s may f i t t h i s d e s c r i p t i o n . However, where the members o f the s o c i e t y f i n d the e l i t e oppres s i ve , and t h e i r development thwarted by i t , as in South A f r i c a , i t becomes a development concern of major p r opo r t i on s . Un fo r tuna te l y , the scope f o r development p lann ing in such c ircumstances i s l i m i t e d . I f noth ing short o f r e vo l u t i on w i l l remove the e l i t e , i t i s the on ly s o l u t i o n . Yet r e vo l u t i on s are r e a l l y beyond p lann ing . The A l g e r i a n r e vo l u t i on may be more a p t l y c a l l e d a r e b e l l i o n , f o r i t d id l i t t l e but exchange a l o ca l e l i t e f o r a f o re i gn one. The Russian produced a g rea te r t r an s fo rmat i on , but i t i s not c l e a r i t has f u l f i l l e d i t s r e v o l u -t i ona r y o b j e c t i v e s . China appears to have come c l o s e r to i t s goal than e i t h e r A l g e r i a or the Sov ie t Union, but even there great u n c e r t a i n t i e s remain. So much o f a r e v o l u t i o n depends on a few p e r s o n a l i t i e s and h i s t o r i c a l a c c i den t , i t i s doubtfu l that the u n c e r t a i n t i e s can be s i g n i -f i c a n t l y reduced. A p lanner, qua p lanner, can probably do l i t t l e (though he may choose to act as an i n d i v i d u a l ) . The on ly course open may be to remove as much support as p o s s i b l e from the l eade r sh i p , as recommended above under the r o l e o f the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community. The dilemma of p lann ing f o r development in an ant i -development environment w i l l not be so lved e a s i l y . F i n a l l y , to return to the development process , the process must be e x p e r i m e n t a l - - i t must be e x p l i c i t l y recognized that any development s t r a tegy is an experiment. In the f i r s t chapter i t was suggested that the i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n o f the West, w i t h i t s u rban i z a t i on and nuc lear f a m i l i e s , i s a s o c i a l experiment (indeed a poor ly assessed one at t h a t ) : planned s t r a t e g i e s f o r the Th i rd World are no less so. That being the case, i t would seem reasonable to des ign the s t r a t e g i e s as exper iments. Exper imentat ion imp l ie s the end r e s u l t is unknown or at l ea s t in some doubt. And exper ience in development has i nd i ca ted unforeseen problems do i n e v i t a b l y a r i s e (Hirshman, 1963). No more than i t would be wise to jump (or push another) i n to unknown water , i t is not reasonable to under-take large sca le exper iments. I f the course i s unc lear and problems are c e r t a i n , the experiment ought to be designed to minimize d i s r u p t i o n and maximize f l e x i b i l i t y . This may be approached in two ways. The s ca l e of the experiment i s important. I n t roduct ion of a new crop, r equ i r i n g new techn iques, w i th which the producer, d i s t r i b u t o r , and consumer are u n f a m i l i a r i s l i k e l y to have more problems than i n t r oduc i ng improved techniques f o r a f a m i l i a r crop. The a b i l i t y to monitor and assess the progress of the experiment i s a l s o e a s i e r i f the s c a l e is smal l and t h i s in turn f a c i l i t a t e s f l e x i b i 1 i t y - - t h e f i n e tuning that may be necessary. There may be problems w i t h the new crop, w i th the new equipment or m a t e r i a l s , w i th the necessary s k i l l s or w i t h i n the marketing system. Where severa l d i f f i c u l t i e s a r i s e i t is d i f f i c u l t to i d e n t i f y and co r rec t the c r i t i c a l ones, and perhaps as important, i t i s d i f f i c u l t to mainta in support f o r the programme. Where on ly the technology changes, adaptat ions can be made in i t as problems a r i s e . The s c a l e may a l s o be r e s t r i c t e d s p a t i a l l y , i n t roduc ing the change in one l o c a l e , adapt ing and improving i t there before app ly ing i t to other areas. Again the a b i l i t y to assess the programme, and i t s impacts i s f a c i l i t a t e d and the costs of the programme, the e v a l u a t i o n , and the adaptat ions are l ower—as i s the cost of f a i l u r e , i f the s ca l e is smal1. Not un re la ted to the ques t ion o f s c a l e , but d i s t i n c t from i t , i s the scope of the change and i t s r e l a t i o n to the s o c i a l system. Economic development need not n e c e s s a r i l y produce s o c i a l change. I f the introduced change is compatible w i th the e x i s t i n g system, i f i t i s development w i t h i n the system, there do not appear to be the repercuss ions throughout the s o c i a l system, that accompany d i s r u p t i v e changes ( Ep s te i n , 1971). Based 66 on the research i n t o s o c i a l performance, exper imental changes may be introduced i n to those subsystems most in need o f improvement, w i t h care being taken to minimize the e f f e c t s on other subsystems. U n t i l now, without t h i s necessary i n fo rmat i on , the scope of the change has not been r e s t r i c t e d - - i n d e e d , as was i n d i c a t e d above, i t was o f ten argued that the g rea te r the change, the g rea te r the s p i l l o v e r e f f e c t , the g rea te r the d i s -r u p t i o n , the b e t t e r . As our understanding o f s o c i a l system behaviour improves, as our a b i l i t y to p r e d i c t changes in other subsystems and t h e i r i n t e r a c t i o n s improves, i t may be po s s i b l e to undertake more complex s o c i a l exper iments. At p resent , i t would be f o o l i s h or c a l l o u s to take such ac t i on in most cases, where the problems o f s o c i a l performance are not sy s temic . A r c h i t e c t s appear to be l ea rn ing to des ign in harmony w i th the na tu ra l s e t t i n g , to change as l i t t l e as p o s s i b l e . It is time planners adopted t h i s approach as w e l l . Once razed, the s o c i a l system, l i k e the e c o l o g i c a l system is almost imposs ib le to r e s u r r e c t . And man's c rea t i on s have yet to match the product of m i l l e n i a of e v o l u t i o n . Having thus designed an exper iment, as smal l in s c a l e and scope as po s s i b l e (given the nature and urgency of the problem) and d i r e c t e d as c l o s e l y as po s s i b l e to the s p e c i f i c performance d e f i c i e n c y , the implemen-t a t i o n and outcome must be monitored, eva luated and mod i f i ed . It cannot be expected that the p r e l im i na r y s tud ie s w i l l permit the design o f the pe r f ec t exper iment, nor that i t cou ld be implemented without problems. Mon i tor ing and eva l ua t i on the re fo re i s e s s e n t i a l to a l l ow m o d i f i c a t i o n s o f the s t r a t e g y , to improve performance. Due to the i n t e r a c t i o n of sub-systems, i t i s imperat ive that the moni tor ing and e va l ua t i on be as broad in scope as the i n i t i a l research, f o r i t cannot be assumed that an improved performance in the target s e c to r i nd i c a te s a succes s fu l experiment. 67 Unforeseen compl i ca t i on s may reduce performance in other s e c t o r s . Th is f o l l ow-up research has another important f u n c t i o n , besides improving the s t r a tegy and i t s performance. Over time t h i s research in to s o c i a l system behav ior , observ ing system response to l i m i t e d i n t e r -vent ions , ought to markedly improve our understanding of s o c i a l system behav io r . The cumulat ive e f f e c t o f such understanding w i l l be an increased p r e d i c t i v e c a p a c i t y , f a c i l i t a t i n g the design of f u tu re exper iments, In the absence o f t h i s research (which i s e f f e e t i v e 1 y impaired by the nature of the s t r a t e g i e s p re sen t l y employed), very l i t t l e i s learned from our f a i l u r e s . S t rategy design remains t he re f o re l i t t l e more than e i t h e r mimicry or t r i a l - a n d - e r r o r , n e i t he r of which has proved p a r t i c u l a r l y succes s fu l and n e i t h e r o f which has prov ided a base f o r fu tu re success. The development process, then, must be a l ea rn ing process as w e l l , f o r our present knowledge i s inadequate to j u s t i f y anything e l s e . Several c r i t i c i s m s o f t h i s approach are a n t i c i p a t e d . While the tex t ought to conta in the r e b u t t a l , I wi11 t r y to address these arguments d i r e c t l y . I have emphasized the l i m i t a t i o n s to our understanding and the consequent need f o r research. It may be argued that t h i s developmental process may move too s lowly to meet the urgency of the problems or that the quest f o r understanding may produce a p a r a l y s i s of i n d e c i s i o n . That ought not be the case. The t r a d e - o f f between research and ac t i on i s always a d i f f i c u l t one and the r i gh t mix depends on three f a c t o r s : i ) the s e v e r i t y and urgency of the problem; i i ) the a n t i c i p a t e d r i s k s a s soc ia ted w i th the course of a c t i o n ; and i i i ) the cos t s o f i nc rea s ing our understanding, of research. 68 Where the problem i s very se r i ous and urgent — fo r example a na tu ra l catastrophe l i k e an earthquake o r severe drought — the r i s k of d i s r u p t i o n i s r e l a t i v e l y less s i g n i f i c a n t — h i g h e r r i s k s can be j u s t i f i e d . S i m i l a r l y , where the proposed i n t e r v e n t i o n appears to have l i t t l e attendant r i s k , i t may be j u s t i f i a b l e to t r a d e - o f f the costs o f a d d i t i o n a l research to reduce the a l ready low r i s k f o r the b e n e f i t s of e a r l i e r a c t i o n . Where the costs o f research are h i gh , and perhaps the prospects of i t s bene f i t s low or very d i s t a n t , i t may be p r e f e r ab l e to undertake the small s c a l e exper imenta t i on . The amount o f p r i o r research w i l l vary in each c i rcumstance. I would suggest, however, that the degree of urgency in much of the Th i rd World is not nea r l y so great as many of the economic i n d i c a t o r s suggest. O v e r - a l l , many such s o c i e t i e s have f a i r l y h igh l e v e l s of s o c i a l performance. It would the re fo re be u n j u s t i f i a b l e to take the high r i s k o f poor ly researched a c t i o n in such cases. Mishan (1967) draws an apt analogy of the s o c i a l system as a c a r . Being an economist, of course the engine i s the economic system, wi th economists being p r i m a r i l y concerned w i t h the eng ine ' s performance and the ways to diagnose and tune i t . An engine that w i l l d r i v e a car at 100 mph., however, ought not be the p l a n -ne r s ' major concern. One hundred mph in the wrong d i r e c t i o n i s ha rd l y progress 1 F i r s t and foremost, the development process ought to ensure the car is on the r i gh t road, heading in the d i r e c t i o n the occupants want to go. In the e a r l y ' 6 0 ' s , Hirschman (1963) was o p t i m i s t i c about the prospects f o r development. Whi le problems would i n e v i t a b l y a r i s e , the "H i d i ng Hand" (some deus ex machina composite of man's technology, invent iveness and a d a p t a b i l i t y ) would j u s t as i n e v i t a b l y save the s i t u a t i o n . Caut ion , we were t o l d , was not to be s t r e s s e d — a c t ion was regu i red , the problems would be so lved as they arose. W e l l , the problems 69 arose, but the Hand too o f ten has remained h i d i n g . The planner may need f a i t h and hope, but h i s success w i l l depend more on h i s s ub s tan t i ve a t t r i -butes. To r e i t e r a t e , unforeseen problems w i l l i n e v i t a b l y a r i s e . I n i t i a l research can serve to reduce such s u r p r i s e s , f o l l ow-up research can serve to i d e n t i f y those problems before they become s e r i o u s , and the s m a l l - s c a l e experiements both reduce the complex i ty and magnitude of the problems, and f a c i l i t a t e adjustments to reduce them. F i n a l l y , i t may be argued that t h i s process of development through exper imental e v o l u t i o n i s s o c i a l eng ineer ing as much as any other s t r a tegy and f u r t h e r , i t does not produce the growth which the people of the Th i rd World want. P lanner s , of course, are always open to charges of p l a y i ng god. The extent to which i t i s v a l i d , however, depends on the extent to which the planner sees the people as ob jec t s rather than as s ub j e c t s . Where they are the s ub j e c t s , the a c t o r s , and the planner prov ides h i s s k i l l s to s a t i s f y t h e i r needs, he is ne i t he r eng ineer ing t h e i r s o c i e t y nor p l ay i ng god. His s o c i a l eng ineer ing could only be j u s t i f i e d i f in f a c t he knew the an swe i—cou ld say which s o c i a l system were b e t t e r . That is not poss-i b l e ; g iven that performance i s a s u b j e c t i v e e v a l u a t i o n , i t i s l o g i c a l l y imposs ib le . To the extent the people are invo lved in the development process , then, they, not the p lanner , are eng ineer ing t h e i r s o c i e t y . To argue that the cho ice has been made, that w i th a few except ions l i k e Nyere, the Th i r d World leaders have opted f o r economic growth i s to make two dubious assumptions. F i r s t , i t i s to assume an e x p l i c i t d e c i s i o n has been made. It i s ha rd l y more necessary that i t has been made in the Th i r d World than that i t was made in B r i t a i n two cen tu r i e s ago. It has happened. The i n e r t i a of the wor ld economic system has caught up the new coun t r i e s , as much as the o l d . Admi t ted l y , many leaders have e x p l i c i t l y endorsed s t r a t e g i e s of rap id i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n and even of s o c i a l d i s r u p t i o n . 70 Much of the e l i t e is there p r e c i s e l y because i t has adopted such s t r a t e g i e s . But the second assumption i s more c l e a r l y f a l s e and more cen t r a l to t h i s thes is . That i s the assumption that the Th i rd World has adopted s t r a t e g i e s o f i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n and economic growth i n a p e r f e c t , r a t i o n a l manner ( j u s t as consumers are r a t i o n a l , u t i 1 i t y max imizers ) . This i s not to suggest the adoption was i r r a t i o n a l , but rather n o n - r a t i o n a l , in the sense that i t could not weigh the costs aga ins t the b e n e f i t s , when on ly the b e n e f i t s were on d i s p l a y . We are a l l part of G a l b r a i t h ' s "seduced p u b l i c " , buying goods we don ' t need or want w i t h money we don ' t have. Part o f the p l anne r s ' task is to reveal the hidden co s t s . 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