UBC Theses and Dissertations

UBC Theses Logo

UBC Theses and Dissertations

Terms for Canadian doctors : language and sociology, ethnosemantics and ethnomethodology Eglin, Peter Anthony 1975

Your browser doesn't seem to have a PDF viewer, please download the PDF to view this item.

Notice for Google Chrome users:
If you are having trouble viewing or searching the PDF with Google Chrome, please download it here instead.

Item Metadata

Download

Media
831-UBC_1975_A1 E35_5.pdf [ 5.99MB ]
Metadata
JSON: 831-1.0100051.json
JSON-LD: 831-1.0100051-ld.json
RDF/XML (Pretty): 831-1.0100051-rdf.xml
RDF/JSON: 831-1.0100051-rdf.json
Turtle: 831-1.0100051-turtle.txt
N-Triples: 831-1.0100051-rdf-ntriples.txt
Original Record: 831-1.0100051-source.json
Full Text
831-1.0100051-fulltext.txt
Citation
831-1.0100051.ris

Full Text

TERMS FOR CANADIAN DOCTORS: LANGUAGE AND SOCIOLOGY, ETHNOSEMANTICS AND ETHNOMETHODOLOGY by PETER ANTHONY EGLIN B.A., U n i v e r s i t y College London, 1968 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY i n the Department of Anthropology and Sociology We accept t h i s thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA May, 1975 I n p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r a n a d v a n c e d d e g r e e a t t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a , I a g r e e t h a t t h e L i b r a r y s h a l l m a k e i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e a n d s t u d y . I f u r t h e r a g r e e t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e c o p y i n g o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y p u r p o s e s may b e g r a n t e d b y t h e H e a d o f my D e p a r t m e n t o r by h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . I t i s u n d e r s t o o d t h a t c o p y i n g o r p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l n o t b e a l l o w e d w i t h o u t my w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . D e p a r t m e n t T h e U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a V a n c o u v e r 8, C a n a d a i i ABSTRACT In tryi n g to discover the nature of c u l t u r a l competence, ethno-semantics leaves out of account the judgemental or i n t e r p r e t i v e work of a society's members, and that neglect i s f a t a l to i t s programme. This c r i t i c a l thesis i s the nub of the d i s s e r t a t i o n . The l a t t e r i s constructed as an argument, and i s organized i n two parts as follows. The f i r s t part i s programmatic. A f t e r an i n t r o d u c t i o n (Chapter One), three kinds of sociology are introduced and formally described (Chapter Two). Ethnosemantics and ethnomethodology are cast as "gramma-t i c a l " and " i n t e r p r e t i v e " sociology r e s p e c t i v e l y (Chapter Three). This enables us, i n pursuing a methodological c r i t i q u e of ethnosemantics from a p o s i t i o n based i n ethnomethodology (Chapter Four), to draw conclusions about sociology (Chapter F i v e ) : insofar as " p o s i t i v i s t i c " sociology pre-supposes "grammatical" sociology which presupposes " i n t e r p r e t i v e " sociology, then (1) " p o s i t i v i s t i c " explanation i s not, i n p r i n c i p l e , superior to commonsense explanation, (2) an adequate sociology needs be i n t e r p r e t i v e , and (3) ethnosemantics, i n engaging i n what ethnomethodology c a l l s "con-s t r u c t i v e a n a l y s i s " , f a i l s to be an adequate sociology. The second part i s empirical. The argument i s now pursued i n terms of data from a study of terms for Canadian doctors. A f t e r an i n t r o -duction (Chapter S i x ) , the methods and r e s u l t s of the ethnosemantic part of the study are presented (Chapter Seven). These r e s u l t s are then c r i -t i c a l l y examined i n the l i g h t of an ethnomethodological a n a l y s i s of the i i i interviews which generated them (Chapter E i g h t ) . I t i s concluded (Chapter Nine) that ethnosemantics, i n r e l y i n g on the very competence i t i s t r y i n g to e x p licate, f a i l s to make that resource a topic, and thereby f a i l s to render an adequate analysis of i t s intended object. In contrast, ethno-methodology provides both the missing analysis and an account of ethno-semantics' f a i l u r e . X V TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract x i L i s t of Tables v L i s t of Figures v i Acknowledgements v i i Part One - Programmatics: The Adequacy of Ethnosemantics and Ethnomethodology as T h e o r e t i c a l Sociologies Attempt-ing to Account f o r C u l t u r a l Competence Chapter One: Introduction to Part One 1 Chapter Two: How Sociology 1000 Presupposes Sociology 2000 Which, i n Turn, Presupposes Sociology 3000 5 Chapter Three: Ethnosemantics as a Kind of Sociology 2000 and Ethnomethodology as a Kind of Sociology 3000 18 Chapter Four: Leaving Out the Interpreter's Work: A Methodological C r i t i q u e of Ethnosemantics Based on Ethnomethodology 29 Chapter Fi v e : Conclusion to Part One 58 Part Two'- Data: Using the Same Ma t e r i a l , an Ethnosemantic Study, and an Ethnomethodological Study, of C u l t u r a l Competence Chapter Six: Introduction to Part Two 61 Chapter Seven: Terms for Canadian Doctors - Ethnosemantics 64 Chapter Eight: Terms f o r Canadian Doctors - Ethnomethodology 77 Chapter Nine: Conclusion to Part Two 91 L i t e r a t u r e Cited 94 Appendix 117 V LIST OF TABLES Table I One Line From the Chart of Reference Terms fo r Lawyers 64 Table II Chart of Reference Terms for Canadian Doctors 68 Table I II Code of Semantic Dimensions 70 v i LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1 The Semiotic Triangle i n Ethnosemantics 34 Figure 2 P a r t i a l Taxonomy of Terms for Canadian Doctors 73 v i i ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This thesis resembles a hot-house plant. Though grown i n s o i l prepared by Werner Conn, i t s sowing, taking root and coming to f r u i t i o n are the work of Roy Turner. He nourished i t with a unique blend of humour, technology, i n t e l l e c t and music. It took shape i n seminars at h i s house with, mostly, Bergen, B i l l , Bruce, Deanna, Gary, John, Rudi and Wes. Outside, i t was stimulated with drafts poured by Martin Meissner, and with caustic doses of Reg Robson. Down at the "lab" i t was watched over by, mostly, B i l l and Fran, Don, H e i d i , Lothar, Martha, Peg, Reg, Swani and S y l v i a . To a l l these for a l l t h i s go many, many thanks- e s p e c i a l l y to Roy. I would l i k e to thank Jay Powell and E l v i Whittaker for t h e i r help. Appreciation of a l e s s personal sort i s due the residents, f a c u l t y and secr e t a r i e s of that medical department at the h o s p i t a l i n the large Wes-tern Canadian c i t y i n which I gathered data - for c h e e r f u l l y enduring the somewhat tedious interviewing. I am gr a t e f u l to Bob Boese for p r a c t i c a l help i n th i s matter. Thanks also to the informant from Richmond. F o r _ i n t e l l e c t u a l excitement I am delighted to acknowledge; the works of Harold Garfinkel ("the [documentary] method [of int e r p r e t a t i o n ] can be c i t e d as a prominent part of the work that persons engage i n whereby they maintain themselves and each other as the same persons"), of Ludwig Wittgenstein, and of Yehoshua B a r - H i l l e l . v i i i I thank the Canada Council f o r three years good money; I wish i t had been four. For c r u c i a l help at other times I am indebted to the U.B.C. Awards O f f i c e , the Bank of Montreal (S.U.B., U.B.C. branch), and some excellent f r i e n d s . Gale LePitre and Sharon H e f l i n did the typing, Bob Fru the p r i n t i n g , a l l at short notice, with ki n d l i n e s s and without fuss. As the d i s s e r t a t i o n represents the end of my formal education, i t i s f i t t i n g to speak of my parents. My fe e l i n g s towards them are, l i k e those of most chi l d r e n to t h e i r parents I would think, coloured with ambi-valence. But f o r that pe c u l i a r s e l f - s a c r i f i c e , however confused or mystifying, that so many parents seem to make for t h e i r c h i l d r e n , and which my parents made for me for education, I o f f e r overdue and g r a t e f u l thanks. I c h e e r f u l l y bear f i n a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h i s piece. TO MY WIFE AND SON "Whereof one cannot speak, PART ONE PRO GRAMMATICS:  THE ADEQUACY OF ETHNOSEMANTICS AND ETHNO- METHODOLOGY AS THEORETICAL SOCIOLOGIES ATTEMPTING TO ACCOUNT FOR CULTURAL COMPETENCE l a CHAPTER ONE  INTRODUCTION TO PART ONE Broadly conceived, t h i s work i s about the best way to do soc i o -logy. Narrowly conceived, i t s subject matter i s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . We require of a c e r t a i n kind of product - a kind of c l a s s i f i c a t i o n - that i t address the process of i t s production - the a c t i v i t y of c l a s s i f y i n g . Since, i n Chapter Two, we propose some c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s of our own, here, for c l a r i t y ' s sake, we suggest a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of c l a s s i f i c i a t i o n s - (1) th e o r e t i c a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s , (2) f o l k c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s , and (3) h e u r i s t i c c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s . (1) In science, c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s are held to a r i s e properly only from theories - as the types into which some concept divides or, i f the concept enters i n t o a hypothesis and i s interpreted, as values of a v a r i -able. The properties of such c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s - exhaustiveness, exclusive-ness... - are contrasted s p e c i f i c a l l y with those of (2) f o l k c l a s s i f i c a -tions, the properties of which are looser and less well-defined. However, these l a t t e r may be and have been studied i n t h e i r own r i g h t - Conklin's massive bibliography, Folk C l a s s i f i c a t i o n (1972), l i s t s over f i v e thousand items. The f o l k category can be said to subsume the t h e o r e t i c a l category, the l a t t e r being the "property" of one kind of f o l k - s c i e n t i s t s . Taxono-mies, paradigms and trees are names of some of the kinds of c l a s s i f i c a t i o n studied by cognitive anthropologists - such semantic arrangements are the formal subject matter of ETHNOSEMANTICS. This essay i s about the short-2 comings of ethnosemantics as a kind of sociology. (3) H e u r i s t i c c l a s s i f i c a -tions are pragmatic devices serving some p r a c t i c a l purpose at hand. They hold no s i g n i f i c a n c e beyond that purpose. I t may well be acknowledged that a l l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s , of whatever kind, have t h i s feature. I t i s part of the argument of this essay that this observation i s c r u c i a l rather than t r i v i a l . As pegs on which to hang the argument we propose two h e u r i s t i c c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s : of facts - "brute" and " i n s t i t u t i o n a l " ; of kinds of sociology - "1000", "2000", and "3000". These are used, l i k e the formal devices of Wittgenstein's Tractatus, as steps on the ladder of an argument - as we ascend we p u l l up the ladder behind us. "Brute" and " i n s t i t u t i o n a l " are defined i n Chapter Two. By "1000" we intend sociology modelled on the natural sciences, and known by such l a b e l s as " p o s i t i v i s t i c " , " l o g -i c a l e m p i r i c i s t " , "hypothetico-deductive", "deductive-nomological".... By "2000" we intend those sociologies which are taken up with actors' meanings conceived as some kind of map, and which are known by such l a b e l s as "grammatical", "symbolic ( i n t e r a c t i o n i s t ) " , " c u l t u r a l code".... By "3000" we intend " i n t e r p r e t i v e sociology", distinguished by such terms as "pragmatic", "members' methods", "procedures", "phenomenological".... It can be seen how these kinds of sociology p a r a l l e l our kinds of c l a s s i -f i c a t i o n . Sociology 1000 i s included i n t h i s work p r i n c i p a l l y because i t ' s d i f f i c u l t to leave i t out. Our main i n t e r e s t i s i n Sociology 2000 and Sociology 3000 - s p e c i f i c a l l y those versions of each known as ETHNO-1 SEMANTICS and ETHNOMETHODOLOGY. 3 Using the " f a c t s " dichotomy Chapter Two characterizes the three kinds of sociology i n terms of the d i f f e r e n t formal objects that each seeks to explain, and i n terms of the d i f f e r e n t modes of explanation employed by each. This i s done within the context of an argument intended to demonstrate the s u p e r i o r i t y of i n t e r p r e t i v e sociology over the other kinds. Ethsem and ethmeth are then introduced i n Chapter Three as kinds of grammatical and i n t e r p r e t i v e sociology r e s p e c t i v e l y . Chapter Four elaborates the argument of Chapters Two and Three i n the form of a methodological c r i t i q u e of ethsem from the point of view of ethmeth. In i t s own terms ethsem i s seen to generate s u c c e s s f u l l y both data and r e -s u l t s , despite the acknowledged problem of context or of "abstracting from pragmatics". But i n terms of ethmeth that success i s seen to depend on a course of i n t e r p r e t i v e work that remains- unexplicated and i n e x p l i c a b l e within the ethsem "paradigm". The conclusion i s drawn, i n Chapter Five, that the only adequate sociology i s that which takes account of such i n t e r p r e t i v e work. FOOTNOTES Being unwieldy, both terms are abbreviated frequently throughout the d i s s e r t a t i o n . Ethnosemantics becomes ethsem, and ethnomethodology becomes ethmeth. CHAPTER TWO HOW SOCIOLOGY 1000 PRESUPPOSES SOCIOLOGY 2000  WHICH, IN TURN, PRESUPPOSES SOCIOLOGY 3000 Introduction In Speech Acts (1969) Searle, following Anscombe (1958), uses the terms "brute" and " i n s t i t u t i o n a l " to d i s t i n g u i s h two kinds of f a c t s . Examples of brute fa c t s are recorded i n the statements, "This stone i s next to that stone", and "I have a pain". At f i r s t blush these are records of simple sense experiences, requiring no " s o c i a l " knowledge for th e i r understanding: One might say they share the feature that the concepts which make up the knowledge are e s s e n t i a l l y p h y s i c a l , or, i n i t s dual-i s t i c version, either physical or mental (Searle, 1969: 50). Examples of i n s t i t u t i o n a l facts are a v a i l a b l e i n "Ms. Jones married Mr. Smith", "Liverpool beat Leeds 5-2", and "Montgomery saluted". In these cases more i s involved than simple sense experiences. Here, knowledge of a d i f f e r e n t kind i s required for an adequate understanding: There i s no simple set of statements about physical or psy-chological properties or states of a f f a i r s to which the statements of fact s such as these are reducible (Searle, 1969: 51).1 Sociology 1000, Sociology 2000 and Sociology 3000 d i f f e r accord to what i t i s they conceive requires accounting f o r , and how i t i s that that accounting should be done. For each, datum and methodology come to-gether i n a p a r t i c u l a r kind of abstract object that becomes the topic of 6 explanation. For Sociology 1000 the abstract object i s the REGULARITY, for Sociology 2000 i t i s the (CONSTITUTIVE) RULE, and for Sociology 3000 i t i s the INTERPRETATION. These objects can be represented as sentences con-taini n g brute and i n s t i t u t i o n a l f a c t s , as follows (where i n d i v i d u a l lower-case l e t t e r s stand for brute f a c t s , i n d i v i d u a l upper-case for i n s t i t u t i o n a l facts) : (1) [REGULARITY] If Y then Q. (2) [CONSTITUTIVE RULE] In context Z, x counts as Y. (3) [INTERPRETATION] Find any lower-case l e t t e r to be Z, and see that i n context Z, x counts as Y. Our thesis i s that i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s are the proper object of s o c i o l o g i c a l explanation. Our procedure i s to give an example of each sentence ( i n the context of the kind of sociology which employs each), and to show that the use of r e g u l a r i t i e s depends upon the use of rules 2 which themselves depend upon the use of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . Sociology 1000 - R e g u l a r i t i e s and Theories Sentence (1) above stands for synthetic, c o n d i t i o n a l statements t y p i c a l l y found as hypotheses derived from deductive theories. In s o c i -ology this i s c h i e f l y the province of the experimental study of small groups. The c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of sociology-on-the-natural-science-model and of the structure of a s c i e n t i f i c explanation are well-known from innumerable introductory textbooks. We w i l l take them as read. A " u n i v e r s a l " statement of (1) would be, f o r example, 7 (4) "When task groups are d i f f e r e n t i a t e d with respect to some status c h a r a c t e r i s t i c external to the task s i t u a t i o n , t h i s d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n determines the observable power and pres-tige order within the group, whether or not the external c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s are rela t e d to the group task" (Berger, Cohen and Z e l d i t c h , 1966: 31). A "si n g u l a r " statement of this kind would be, f o r example, (5) "In 3-man A i r Force crews, p i l o t s were more i n f l u e n t i a l than gunners i n a r r i v i n g at a group p r o j e c t i v e s t o r y " (Cohen, 1966: 5 ) . 3 Such statements express empirical r e g u l a r i t i e s . The process of explanation consists of l o g i c a l l y d e riving them from a set of axioms and d e f i n i t i o n s , and subjecting them to empirical t e s t . They are made t e s t -able by being put through a f i l t e r of correspondence rules and operational d e f i n i t i o n s (Schrag, 1967: 363). The output i s a sentence l i k e (6) I f y then q. Continuing with our example, an instance of a correspondence r u l e would be (7) "Air force rank i s a status c h a r a c t e r i s t i c " (Cohen, 1966: 6). That i s , an observational term, " a i r force rank", i s posited as an i n d i c a -tor of the t h e o r e t i c a l concept, "status c h a r a c t e r i s t i c " . The operational version of a i r force rank (say, the verbal response to the interviewer's question, "What i s your rank?") would then be the brute fa c t y. Our argument i s that the t h e o r e t i c a l concepts i n r e g u l a r i t i e s are 4 i n s t i t u t i o n a l facts (Y,Q), and that the apparatus of correspondence rules and operational d e f i n i t i o n s used to reduce these to brute facts (y,q) can be represented as a set of c o n s t i t u t i v e rules on the model of sentence (2) - for example, 8 (8) In context Z, y counts as Y. In terms of our example, ( 9 ) In the context of the status-differentiation-and-power theory or research programme (Z) , the answer to the r e -searcher's question "What i s your rank?" (y) counts as (the respondent's) status c h a r a c t e r i s t i c (Y). By formulating i t t h i s way we can say that " p o s i t i v i s t i c " s o c i -ology's object of explanation - the r e g u l a r i t y - i s underlain by (one or more) c o n s t i t u t i v e r u l e s . This i s the point of t h i s section. The point of saying i t becomes clearer i n the following sections, and i s stated i n 5 Chapter Five, the conclusion to Part One. Sociology 2000 - C o n s t i t u t i v e Rules and Grammars Constitutive rules (Searle, 1969: 33-42) t e l l what i t i s b i t s of the brute world w i l l count as i n terms of some human i n s t i t u t i o n , given 6 some context. They are to be distinguished from "regulative r u l e s " , " i n s t r u c t i o n s " , "precept r u l e s " and the l i k e (Black, 1962 [1958]: 109-115; Hayek, 1963: 334-335; Ganz, 1971). Following sentence (2), an example of a c o n s t i t u t i v e r u l e i s (10) In the game of c r i c k e t (Z), h i t t i n g - t h e - b a l l - f u l l - p i t c h -across-the-boundary-line (x) counts as "a s i x " or " s i x runs" (Y). Such rules turn the brute world into the s o c i a l world, mere be-haviour into meaningful action, nature into culture. In t h i s fashion we can say that . . . ' i n s t i t u t i o n s ' are systems of c o n s t i t u t i v e r u l e s . Every i n s t i t u t i o n a l fact i s underlain by a (system of) rule(s) of the form '[x] counts as Y i n context C (Searle, 1969: 51-52). 9 To give an account of some feature of the s o c i a l world i s , by this approach, to state the rules which provide for the orderliness of the phenomenon: The rules account for the r e g u l a r i t i e s i n exactly the same way that the rules of f o o t b a l l account for the r e g u l a r i t i e s i n a q game of f o o t b a l l , and without the rules there seems no account-ing f o r the r e g u l a r i t i e s " ( S e a r l e , 1969: 53). Some of these rules w i l l be c o n s t i t u t i v e rules and, i n general, the con-s t i t u t i v e rules determine the other rules (Searle, 1969: 69). I t i s s l i g h t l y misleading to say that rules are simply the "ob-j e c t " of explanation. Just as r e g u l a r i t i e s partake of the function of explaining by p r e s c r i b i n g a r e l a t i o n s h i p between two or more v a r i a b l e s , so rules are themselves part-explanation-of-the-data as w e l l as part-formulation-of-the-data. That i s , they are both explanatory t o o l and explanatory object. Nevertheless, there i s more to the analysis of i n s t i t u t i o n a l facts than the mere pro v i s i o n of one or two r u l e s . As Searle's account of promises shows (1969: 63), a number of rules are required, so r a i s i n g the question of the r e l a t i o n between them. The ordering of rules i n a grammar i s analogous to l o g i c a l a nalysis within a 7 theory. Grammar stands to r u l e , then, as theory stands to r e g u l a r i t y . The constitutive-rule-and-grammar conception f i t s well c e r t a i n kinds of sociology; they are being glossed here as Sociology 2000. Eth-nographies of occupations, professions and i n s t i t u t i o n s such as emanated from Chicago a f t e r 1945, Goffman's work, and symbolic interactionism w i l l stand being formulated i n terms of a c o n s t i t u t i v e - r u l e s account. Chapters Five and Six of Wieder's (1975) study of the convict code i n a halfway 1 0 house provide a p a r t i c u l a r l y f i n e example of such an ana l y s i s , though he 8 does not make e x p l i c i t use of these terms. The body of work at issue i n this d i s s e r t a t i o n i s ethnosemantics. In Chapter Three we argue that t h i s rigorous form of semantic ethnography i s a kind of Sociology 2 0 0 0 . I t s semantical rules w i l l be recast as con-s t i t u t i v e r u l e s . Before that the case must be made for claiming that con-s t i t u t i v e rules are underlain by i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . We proceed by attacking the phrase " i n context Z" that forms the f i r s t part of a c o n s t i t u t i v e r u l e . The Problem of Context (In Searle's. Account of Promises) There arises the problem with c o n s t i t u t i v e rules of how we are to take the phrase " i n context Z". S p e c i f i c a l l y , how does this come to be a c a p i t a l - l e t t e r , i n s t i t u t i o n a l f a c t i n the f i r s t place? We want to argue that the problem of context i s c r u c i a l ; that a s p e c i f i c a t i o n of context i s not a v a i l a b l e simply by inspection; that i t s formulation out of brute f a c t s i s not d i f f e r e n t from that of other i n s t i t u t i o n a l f a c t s ; that this being so, co n s t i t u t i v e rules depend themselves on an underlying operation which we s h a l l c a l l " i n t e r p r e t a t i o n " . We s h a l l proceed by way of Searle's account of promises. In order to d e l i m i t the object to be explained Searle finds i t necessary to "[ignore] marginal, f r i n g e , and p a r t i a l l y defective promises"; to "confine [his] discussion to f u l l blown e x p l i c i t promises and ignore promises made by e l l i p t i c a l turns of phrase, h i n t s , metaphors"; to "ignore promises made i n the course of u t t e r i n g sentences which contain elements 11 i r r e l e v a n t to the making of the promise"; to "deal...only with c a t e g o r i c a l promises and ignor[ej hypothetical promises"; to "simply assume the e x i s -tence of grammatically well-formed sentences"; to have i t as a condition that "Normal input and output conditions obtain" where that includes "such things as that the speaker and hearer both know how to speak the language; both are conscious of what they are doing; they have no physical impedi-ments to communication, such as deafness, aphasia, or l a r y n g i t i s " , and where communication i s serious and l i t e r a l ("I contrast 'serious' u t t e r -ances with play acting, teaching a language, r e c i t i n g poems, p r a c t i c i n g pronunciation, etc., and I contrast ' l i t e r a l ' with metaphorical, s a r c a s t i c , etc.") (Searle 1969: 55, 56, 57). In short, Searle i s •...going to deal only with a simple and i d e a l i z e d case. This method, one of constructing i d e a l i z e d models, i s analogous to the sort of theory construction that goes on i n most sciences ....Without abstra c t i o n and i d e a l i z a t i o n there i s no systemati-zation (1969: 56). 9 In other words, i n order to say what w i l l count (x) as the object of a n a l y s i s , a "promise" (Y), Searle has to do an enormous amount of WORK to specify the context (Z). That i s , i n order to carry out his analysis i n terms of c o n s t i t u t i v e rules and the l i k e he has to employ a c o n s t i t u t i v e r u l e to define h i s object; and i n employing the r u l e he cannot take the context as given but must formulate i t i n such " i n s t i t u t i o n a l f a c t " terms as "serious", " l i t e r a l " . . . . In t h i s way he shows that there i s no escape from the recourse to i n s t i t u t i o n a l f a c t s , f a c t s which themselves r e l y on 10 further c o n s t i t u t i v e r u l e s . 12 To advance c o n s t i t u t i v e rules as explanation i s then to trade on one's readers' a b i l i t y to "see what one means" given that there i s an i r r e d u c i b l e , unspecifiable element i n the rules themselves. The r u l e s , that i s , require i n t e r p r e t i n g . Sociology 3000 - Interpretations and Interpretive Accounts To "see what one means" i s to do understanding. A n t i c i p a t i n g the section on ethnomethodology i n Chapter Three, we can say that ...a common understanding, e n t a i l i n g as i t does an 'inner' temporal course of i n t e r p r e t i v e work, necessarily has an oper-a t i o n a l structure (Garfinkel, 1967b: 31). We propose to characterize the operational structure of i n t e r p r e t i v e work as the reading (giving and receiving) of i n s t r u c t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s or, simply, of i n s t r u c t i o n s . Sentence (3) i s our model of an i n s t r u c t i o n . An example would be, loosely put, (11) See that what's-going-on-here (c) i s a quarrel (Z), and hear, i n the context of the quarrel (Z), utterance (x) as an i n s u l t (Y). Note the imperative form, the frank i n c l u s i o n of an unspecified move (from c to Z), and the incorporation of a c o n s t i t u t i v e r u l e . Another example would be (12) Find t h i s (g) to be an alphabet-learning book (Z), and see that i n the context of an alphabet-learning book (Z), the display-of-a-capital-letter-B-on-one-page-and-the-picture-of-a-"bear"-on-the-facing-page (x) counts as (some-thing l i k e ) "B f o r BEAR" (Y). That i s , the notational displays on the pages are i n s t r u c t i o n s for the read-ing, and not simply the reading i t s e l f . The same "picture-of-a-bear" i n 13 another kind of book could be read as "M .for MAMMAL" or as "H for HUNTER", 11 and so on. Such i n s t r u c t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s (or interpretings) are the s t u f f of Sociology 3000 or, a s , i t may be c a l l e d , i n t e r p r e t i v e sociology. They are, on t h i s view, what i s to be accounted for i n the s o c i a l world. They are also' a model of the (explanatory) account. Datum and account have the same structure. Put d i f f e r e n t l y , what i s being said i s that (1) the s t u f f of the s o c i a l world - what f i l l s up s o c i a l space - i s i n s t r u c t i o n s , and (2) any account of such (a set of) i n s t r u c t i o n s i s i t s e l f , an i n s t r u c t i o n . Or, another way, the phenomena to be accounted for are accounts (because that i s what i s "out there" s o c i a l l y speaking), and any account of such accounts i s i t s e l f , of course, an account. In t h i s way any account ( i n the form of sentence (3)) also accounts for i t s own p o s s i b i l i t y . I t i s i n this sense a further instance of the same phenomenon.for which i t i s an account. Something of this sort i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of so-called " r e f l e x i v e s o c i o l o g i e s " (Heap and Roth, 1973) . I t has been put t h i s way: The s p e c i f i c character of ordinary language i s this r e f l e x i v i t y . From the viewpoint of formal language we can also say that o r d i -nary language i s i t s own metalanguage (Habermas, 1972: 168). We may put i t yet another way. For the purpose of making sense (Kjolseth, 1972), what s o c i a l actors provide for themselves and for each other i n t h e i r utterances and actions are displays of meaningful items and not merely the items themselves (Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970: 344; Goffman, 1959: 65). The displays are characterized here as " i n s t r u c t i o n s " or as "containing" i n s t r u c t i o n s for i n t e r p r e t i n g the items. Finding the i n s t r u c -14 t i o n i n the display requires using some other i n s t r u c t i o n from some other display i n some other place at some other time. But the form of the i n -structions remains the same - "Find any small l e t t e r to be Z, and see that i n context Z, x counts as Y". The process i s continuous, recursive, and as such conforms, we believe, to the views of the l a t e r Wittgenstein (1958). As one Wittgenstein i n t e r p r e t e r puts i t , For we never reach a point where an ex i t must be made from the maze of words. Admittedly, i f a verbal explanation i s given at one point, i t i s only successful i f at some other point a con-nection with things i s already understood; and at some points i t i s more natural not to o f f e r more words. But at no point i s an exit obligatory (Pears, 1965 [1951]: 280). The process depends on displayed items (or uttered p a r t i c u l a r s ) being themselves meaningful, while possessing also an "open horizon" or "sur-plus of meaning" (Garfinkel, 1961: 61). Since any use w i l l have some meaning (at t r i b u t e d to i t ) , the device of di s p l a y i n g i n s t r u c t i o n s which point to the required meaning allows the actor to go "beyond the informa-t i o n given" (Bruner , 1957) to the proposed sense. "Pointing" i s a l l that i s possible, however; and pointing i s context-dependent, which means that what i s being pointed at i s never ultimately decidable. Therefore, whatever sense i s made i s good enough only u n t i l further i n t e r p r e t a t i o n through further i n s t r u c t i o n s renders i t obsolete, or puts i t i n question, or whatever. Conversations, including interviews, are obvious candidates for de s c r i p t i o n of this kind (Wieder, 1970: 133). They are also the s t o c k - i n -trade of ethmeth. In Chapter Three, af t e r presenting ethsem as a kind of Sociology 2000, we s h a l l show how ethmeth i s a case of Sociology 3000. This w i l l provide a context f o r the c r i t i q u e of ethsem i n Chapter Four. 15 FOOTNOTES Similar sorts of d i s t i n c t i o n s are being made i n the "molecular - molar" (from Barker; see Turner, 1966: 266) and "behaviour - a c t i o n " (from Weber; see Wilson, 1970a: 698; 1970b: 58) p a i r s of sociology; the "observer - actor" (see, for example, Cohn, 1962, 1964, 1967, 1969) and " e t i c - emic" (Pike, 1967: 37-72) pairs of anthropology and l i n -g u i s t i c s ; and the "appresenting term - appresented term" (from Husserl; see Schutz, 1962 [1955]: 294-297) and i t s derived "actual-observed-appearances-of-an-object - object-that-is-intended-by-the-particular-actual-appearances" (Garfinkel, 1963: 194) pairs of phenomenology and ethnomethodology. The " b r u t e - i n s t i t u t i o n a l " d i s t i n c t i o n i s introduced i n order to argue for the existence and importance of i n s t i t u t i o n a l f a c t s i n s o c i o l o g i c a l explanation. That, i n the end, there may be no such things uas brute f a c t s , that brute facts are assimilable to i n s t i t u i o n a l f a c t s , i s an opinion we share. Thus we are aware of what Wittgenstein might say about the purported brute-fact status of "I have a pain". Another example would have made the point, however. As stated i n Chapter One, we agree with Wittgenstein about the use of ladders. One outcome of the abortive Encyclopaedia of U n i f i e d Science project was the i n f u s i o n of semiotical concepts into American philosophy of science.. Morris introduced Carnap ( B a r - H i l l e l , 1964) to the Peircean t r i o - syntax, semantics, pragmatics - and these came to characterize d i f f e r e n t segments of a deductive explanation. "Syntax" r e f e r r e d to the purely formal r e l a t i o n s among axioms and theorems; "semantics" subsumed the correspondence rules that provided observational content for those t h e o r e t i c a l concepts' that were to be tested; "pragmatics" dealt with the mechanics and procedures of actual experimentation (Carnap, 1942: 10). As a f i r s t approximation i t would be true to say that (1) Sociology 1000, as champion of deductive explanation, engages i n a l l three areas of a c t i v i t y , but sees semantics and pragmatics as subservient to syntactics (Schrag, 1967; Popper, 1968: 61) - regular-i t i e s are the output of the syntactic component of the theory; (2) Sociology 2000 i s b a s i c a l l y an exercise i n semantics; and (3) Sociology 3000 i s the inchoate d i s c i p l i n e of pragmatics (Weinreich, 1966: 50; Helmer, 1970), where that i s conceived as basic to any work of a semantic or syntactic kind (Carnap, 1939: 166). Though neither (4) nor (5) i s i n c o n d i t i o n a l form as given, i t i s f a i r l y obvious that they could be rendered so without loss of meaning. For " u n i v e r s a l " and "singular", see Popper (1968: 59-77). "Sentence" and "statement" are being used rather loo s e l y i n this discussion -pace B a r - H i l l e l (1970: 165, 195^197, 213, 217, 280-285, 364-369). The same i s true of "use", "sense" and "meaning" l a t e r i n the chapter. 16 4. In this case the " i n s t i t u t i o n " i s "science" or "experimental sociology" or the p a r t i c u l a r research programme or theory - or, better s t i l l , the relevant " d i s c i p l i n a r y matrix" (Kuhn, 1974). That i s , while the theor-e t i c a l terms of " p o s i t i v i s t i c " science and sociology have no necessary r e l a t i o n s h i p to categories that are meaningful to the population being studied, they are nevertheless "meaningful" (only p a r t i a l l y determined [ B a r - H i l l e l , 1970 (1969): 200]) to the community of s c i e n t i s t s using them. They are i n s t i t u t i o n a l facts i n t h i s sense. They are reducible ( i n p r i n c i p l e ) to "physical or psychological properties or states of a f f a i r s " only through the elaborate battery of rules and d e f i n i t i o n s which we formulate as c o n s t i t u t i v e r u l e s . Searle (1969: 51) gives the inverse square law as an example of a paradigm of knowledge con-s i s t i n g only of brute f a c t s . In terms of our a n a l y s i s , such concepts i n physics as " f o r c e " and "mass" are, rather, i n s t i t u t i o n a l facts of science. We appreciate that this i s an area of controversy i n the philosophy of science. See, for example, the papers i n Suppe (1974), and the paper by E l l i o t (1974). 5. I t might be objected at t h i s point that the adequacy of the " p o s i t i -v i s t i c " t h e o r i s t ' s rules and d e f i n i t i o n s i s judged by, among other c r i t e r i a , the r e s u l t s of the empirical t e s t . However, i t can be shown that c o n s t i t u t i v e rules are required here to t r a n s l a t e the array of experimental r e s u l t s (brute f a c t s ) i n t o the research findings ( i n s t i t u -t i o n a l f a c t s ) ; for " i t i s always possible to say that the experimental r e s u l t s are not r e l i a b l e , or that the discrepancies between the experi-mental r e s u l t s and the theory are only apparent and that they w i l l disappear with the advance of our understanding" (Popper, 1968: 50, c f . 107 fn*3). One must, however, turn to Garfinkel (1967a [1962]: 95-96, 100-103), Kuhn (1970a: 13-16; 1970b: 238-239) and E l l i o t (1974) for an appreciation of what i s implied by the condition Popper des-c r i b e s . See also B a r - H i l l e l (1970 [1969]: 200) and McCarthy (1973: 370). 6. In view of h i s expressed i n t e n t i o n (1969: 15) to follow Chomsky (1957, 1965) by taking his ( S e a r l e ' s ) " i n t u i t i o n s " as the basic data, i t i s not c l e a r whether Searle views the x-term i n the c o n s t i t u t i v e r u l e (sentence (2)) as a brute f a c t ; (compare page 56 for example). Since the issue i s complicated and takes us beyond the confines of this a l -ready wide discussion, s u f f i c e i t to say that our conception may depart from Searle's on this point. 7. Chomsky has made th i s claim throughout h i s work, though not without r e t o r t (Chomsky, 1970a; 1970b; Black, 1970). The r e l a t i o n i s analogy only. 8. A f u l l e r account of Wieder's study i s given i n (our) Chapter Six. 17 Compare Hempel (1952), Nagel (1952), and Schutz (1962 [1954]). On i d e a l i z a t i o n i t has been remarked, "In a search for r i g o r the ingenious p r a c t i c e i s followed whereby utterances are f i r s t transformed i n t o i d e a l expressions. Structures are then analyzed as properties of the i d e a l s , and the r e s u l t s are assigned to actual expressions as t h e i r p r o p e r t i e s " (Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970: 339). Searle i s not disturbed by t h i s s tate of a f f a i r s : " c e r t a i n i n s t i t u -t i o n a l concepts...will appear i n the analysans as well as i n the analysandum; I am not attempting to reduce i n s t i t u t i o n a l facts to brute f a c t s ; and thus there i s no r e d u c t i o n i s t motivation i n the analy-s i s " (1969: 56). He i s content to rest on h i s l i n g u i s t i c i n t u i t i o n s . While i n one sense we can agree with that, the question a r i s e s , which Searle does not address, of the source of his a b i l i t y to sort out the "simple and i d e a l i z e d case" from the welter of real-world "complica-t i o n s " . Such a b i l i t y cannot be simply l i n g u i s t i c . We come to t h i s i n Chapter Eight. We owe the bear example to Roy Turner, though i t s formulaic v e r s i o n i n terms of sentence (12) i s our own. This s e c t i o n on i n s t r u c t i o n s i s h e a vily indebted also to chapters seven and eight of Wieder (1975) . These chapters are p a r t i a l l y reprinted i n Wieder (1974: 159-172). 18 CHAPTER THREE  ETHNOSEMANTICS AS A KIND OF SOCIOLOGY 2000,  AND ETHNOMETHODOLOGY AS A KIND OF SOCIOLOGY 3000 Ethnosemantics as a Kind of Sociology 2000 Ethnosemantics deals with c o l l e c t i o n s of terms sharing a common feature of meaning: examples are kinship terms, colour terms, plant terms and animal terms. Such c o l l e c t i o n s form semantic domains. The core of an ethnosemantic d e s c r i p t i o n of a domain i s a set of semantical r u l e s . Such a r u l e states the conditions under which a given term names a given object. This b r i e f d e s c r i p t i o n of ethsem w i l l stand u n t i l the f u l l e r treatment of Chapter Four i s given. Our aim i n t h i s s ection i s to p o s i t ethsem as a kind of Sociology 2000, by showing that semantical rules are c o n s t i t u t i v e r u l e s . This stratagem w i l l enable us, i n c r i t i c i z i n g ethsem i n the r e s t of the d i s s e r t a t i o n , to be thereby o f f e r i n g a c r i t i q u e of a kind of socio-logy at the same time. We lead into t h i s s e c t i o n by way of games. When i t comes to providing an i l l u s t r a t i v e example of th e i r 1 approach, a wide range of modern th e o r i s t s turn to games. This i s true of Rawls (1955), Wittgenstein (1958), Moore and Anderson (1960), Garfinkel 2 • (1963), Hockett (1968), Searle (1969) and Goodenough (1969, 1970). In the next section we s h a l l consider Garfinkel's treatment. Here our i n t e n -t i o n i s to note the p a r a l l e l treatment of games by the author of " c o n s t i t u -t i v e r u l e s " (Searle, following Rawls [1955: 25-29]) and by a father of ethsem (Goodenough). 19 Each distinguishes his intended object of d e s c r i p t i o n (rules) from mere s t a t i s t i c a l r e g u l a r i t i e s i n game play. For Goodenough, follow-ing Leach, the l a t t e r are the province of the s o c i a l anthropologist, the 3 former that of the c u l t u r a l anthropologist: Suppose we had the Philadelphia Eagles as an object of inq u i r y . A s o c i a l anthropologist would concentrate on the d i f f e r e n t o f f e n -s i v e and defensive formations he sees the Eagles employ i n actual play and would assess the way the i r use apparently functions with respect to t h e i r a b i l i t y to win f o o t b a l l games....A c u l t u r a l anth-ropologist, on the other hand, would concentrate on the things one  has to know i n order to be able to play f o o t b a l l or understand i t as a spectator (1969: 330; emphasis added). Goodenough refers to Atkins and Curti s (1968), who write By 'game r u l e s ' we mean here game-defining r u l e s , i n the sense of those sets of r e l a t i v e l y f ixed conventions by which p a r t i c u l a r games are given t h e i r basic structure or c o n s t i t u t i o n (213; emphasis added). and concludes himself ...a game i s nothing but a miniature and highly formalized c u l -ture (Goodenough, 1970: 105). 4 In almost i d e n t i c a l fashion (though neither r e f e r s to the other) Searle contrasts a brute-fact d e s c r i p t i o n of a game of f o o t b a l l with one directed at the i n s t i t u t i o n a l facts which constitute the game. This i s worth quoting i n f u l l . Leittus imagine a group of highly trained observers describing an American f o o t b a l l game i n statements only of brute f a c t s . What could they say by way of description? Well, w i t h i n - c e r t a i n areas a good deal could be said, and using s t a t i s t i c a l techniques c e r t a i n 'laws' could even be formulated. For example, we can imagine that a f t e r a time our observer would discover the law of p e r i o d i c a l c l u s t e r i n g : at s t a t i s t i c a l l y regular i n t e r v a l s organisms i n l i k e colored s h i r t s c l u s t e r together i n a roughly c i r c u l a r fashion (the huddle). Furthermore, at equally regular 20 i n t e r v a l s , c i r c u l a r c l u s t e r i n g i s followed by l i n e a r c l u s t e r i n g (the teams l i n e up for the play) , and l i n e a r c l u s t e r i n g i s f o l -lowed by l i n e a r interpenetration. Such laws would be s t a t i s t i c a l i n character, and none the worse for that. But no matter how much data of t h i s sort we imagine our observers to c o l l e c t and no mat-te r how many inductive generalizations we imagine them to make from the data, they s t i l l have not described American f o o t b a l l . What i s missing from t h e i r description? What i s missing are a l l those concepts which are backed by c o n s t i t u t i v e r u l e s , concepts such as touchdown, o f f s i d e , game, points, f i r s t down, time out, etc., and consequently what i s missing are a l l the true statements one can make about a f o o t b a l l game using those concepts. The missing statements are p r e c i s e l y what describes the phenomenon on the f i e l d as a game of f o o t b a l l . The other de s c r i p t i o n s , the descriptions of the brute f a c t s , can be explained i n terms of the i n s t i t u t i o n a l f a c t s . But the i n s t i t u t i o n a l f a c t s can only be ex-plained i n terms of the c o n s t i t u t i v e rules which underlie them (Searle, 1969: 52). Both Searle and Goodenough go on to say that i n these respects languages and cultures are l i k e games. Adequate de s c r i p t i o n of languages and cultures must take account of the i n s t i t u t i o n a l facts which constitute them, for ...speaking a language i s performing acts according to c o n s t i -t u t i v e rules (Searle, 1969: 52; see also 12 and 37), and ...what i s a language i f not a set of standards for human con-duct of a p a r t i c u l a r kind? (Goodenough, 1970: 108).5 Recall the form of a c o n s t i t u t i v e rule (where i n d i v i d u a l lower-c l e t t e r s stand f o r brute f a c t s , upper-case for i n s t i t u t i o n a l f a c t s ) : (2) In context Z, x counts as Y. A semantical rule states, f o r example, that "mother", as an American k i n -ship term, denotes that c l a s s of objects having the simultaneous features, 6 " f i r s t generation above ego", "female", " l i n e a l " . 21 This can be rewritten as (13) In the context of the semantic domain of American kinship terms, the c o l l e c t i o n of feature components, " f i r s t gener-ation above ego", etc., counts as the taxonomic concept conventionally l a b e l l e d as "mother". We can abstract from t h i s to (14) In domain (K), c o l l e c t i o n of feature components (m) counts as taxon (M). Using Pike's (1967) terminology, which Goodenough adopts (1970: 108ff.), as does ethsem i n general, we can reduce (14) to 7 (15) In domain (K), e t i c fact(s) (m) count as emic fact (M). The p a r a l l e l of (15) with (2) should now be c l e a r . I f (2) i s the general form of a c o n s t i t u t i v e r u l e , then semantical rules (15) are c o n s t i -8 t u t i v e rules i n the f i e l d of ethnosemantics. I f c o n s t i t u t i v e rules are the hallmark of "grammatical sociology", that i s Sociology 2000, then ethsem i s a kind of Sociology 2000. If t h i s i s so, then ethsem i s both subject to the c r i t i q u e of Sociology 2000 already offered ( i n Chapter Two), and a vehi c l e f or further c r i t i c i s m of the l a t t e r through c r i t i c i s m done on i t . Setting up ethsem i n t h i s way has been the point of t h i s section. Ethnomethodology as a Kind of Sociology 3000 Our purpose i s to reproduce the r e l a t i o n of ethsem to Sociology 2000 i n the r e l a t i o n of ethmeth to Sociology 3000, so that i n using ethmeth to c r i t i c i z e ethsem ( i n the rest of the di s s e r t a t i o n ) we are at the same time arguing about the merits of two kinds of sociology. As i n the previous section, we enter the discussion v i a games. Searle's account again provides 22 the f o i l . Whereas Searle and Goodenough had f o o t b a l l i n common, Searle and Garfinkel have chess i n common. Like Searle (1969: 33-42), Garfinkel (1963) develops h i s notion of " c o n s t i t u t i v e " ( q u a l i f y i n g "order" and "expectancies") i n r e l a t i o n to games l i k e chess, and then extends the analysis to s o c i a l action i n general. Given the d i s j u n c t i o n between brute and i n s t i t u t i o n a l facts or, as he puts i t , between the "actual-observed-appearances-of-an-object and the-object-that-is-intended-by-the-particular-actual-appearances" ( G a r f i n k e l , 1963: 194), then i t i s the function of c o n s t i t u t i v e or "basic" rules to "frame the set of possible events of play that observed behaviors can s i g n i f y " 9 (195). More generally, A sign c o r r e c t l y corresponds to a referent i n terms of the assumed c o n s t i t u t i v e order that i t s e l f defines 'correct cor-respondence' (195) . So f a r t h i s i s l i t t l e d i f f e r e n t from e i t h e r Searle's or Good-enough's account (cf. also G a r f i n k e l , 1967c: 140 f f . ) . But Garfinkel con-tinues that he has been "unable to f i n d any game whose acknowledged rules are s u f f i c i e n t to cover a l l the problematical p o s s i b i l i t i e s that may a r i s e " (199): I suggest that one i s i n the area here of the game's version of the 'unstated terms of contract', c o n s i s t i n g perhaps of one more rule that completes every enumeration of basic rules by bringing them under the status of an agreement among persons to play i n accordance with them, a rule which formulates the l i s t as an agreement by the f i n a l ' f i n e l y printed' acknowledgement, 'et cetera' ( 1 9 9 ) . 1 0 The "et cetera" clause i s one of a family of considerations which Garfinkel c a l l s "ad hoc" considerations; the other members of the family are "unless", " l e t i t pass" and "factum v a l e t " . 23 These considerations are quite generally found when profes-sionals - s o c i o l o g i s t s , anthropologists, l i n g u i s t s , whosoever - make use of i n s t r u c t i o n s , formulas, r u l e s , and the l i k e . There i s always an i m p l i c i t a d d i t i o n a l section to such state-ments, one that might be headed: ' p r a c t i c a l advice to whomso-ever might seek to insure the usefulness of the i n s t r u c t i o n s (formulas, etc.) to analyze the s i t u a t i o n s ' . . . . 'Et c e t e r a 1 r e f e r s to the piece of i m p l i c i t p r a c t i c a l advice that runs: 'Read i t l i k e t h i s , and so f o r t h ' , i . e . , to see the ru l e , i f you understand the ru l e , you presumably can recognise other circumstances and cases of i t s a p p l i c a t i o n without a l l of them being stated here (Garfinkel, 1972 [1966]: 312). The et cetera clause corresponds to the " i r r e d u c i b l e , unspecifiable e l e -ment" i n r u l e s , as noted i n Chapter Two. I t i s a way of saying that there i s a gap between any rule and (a s p e c i f i c a t i o n of) behaviour which i s i n accordance with that r u l e . Recognition of t h i s led to our formulating of i n s t r u c t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s on the model of sentence (3) i n the pre-vious chapter. Those parts of sentence (3) co n s i s t i n g of the words "Find" and "see that" are the s p e c i f i c counterpart of the et cetera clause; the imperatives of the i n s t r u c t i o n are the answer to the openendedness of the clause. So f ar the ethmeth l i t e r a t u r e contains no i n s t r u c t i o n s of t h i s s o r t . Approximations are'to be found i n the work of conversational analysts. Sacks o f f e r s the following "members' maxim" at one point: Select that [membership categorization] device that exclu-s i v e l y describes the set of persons at hand, and use that de-vi c e on them (Sacks, 1966, quoted i n Speier, 1970: 205). Turner has " i f an utterance can be read as an instance of an utterance-type, then so hear i t " (forthcoming: [ms.] 7). Note the imperative form and the unspecified move, but note also the absence of e x p l i c i t l y incor-24 11 porated c o n s t i t u t i v e r u l e s . Conversational " r u l e s " such as these are posited as resources on which t a l k e r s draw, and as norms to which they o r i e n t , i n the conduct of t a l k . They are not f u l l y - f l e d g e d i n s t r u c t i o n s of the kind we propose. Nevertheless, from these i n c i p i e n t i n s t r u c t i o n s , from the et cetera clause, and from c e r t a i n general statements to follow, i t i s c l e a r that ethmeth i s part of the same enterprise we have glossed as i n t e r p r e -t i v e sociology. At i t s very heart i s the notion, derived from Mannheim (1952), of the "documentary method of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n " : The method consists of t r e a t i n g an actual appearance as 'the document of', as 'pointing to', as 'standing on behalf o f a presupposed underlying pattern. Not only i s the underlying pattern derived from i t s i n d i v i d u a l documentary evidences, but the i n d i v i d u a l documentary evidences, i n t h e i r turn, are interpreted on the basis of 'what i s known' about the under-l y i n g pattern. Each i s used to elaborate the other (Ga r f i n k e l , 1967a [1962]: 78; see also 1956: 192-195; 1961: 57-59; 1967a [1964]: 39-40). Whereas we mean t h i s quote to point i n a general way to our model of an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , the following quotation speaks to the notion of d i s p l a y : In the p a r t i c u l a r s of h i s speech a speaker, i n concert with others, i s able to gloss those p a r t i c u l a r s and i s thereby meaning something d i f f e r e n t than he can say i n so many words . . . . I t i s not so much ' d i f f e r e n t l y than what he says' as that whatever he says provides the very materials to be used i n making out what he says (Garfinkel and Sacks, 19 70: 344). "Making out" equals "making sense" equals " i n t e r p r e t i n g " equals "doing understanding". Ethnomethodology's p a r t i c u l a r focus on understand-ing or i n t e r p r e t i n g has s e t t l e d on speaking as i t s prime subject: Not a. method of understanding, but immensely various methods of understanding are the professional s o c i o l o g i s t ' s proper and h i t h e r t o unstudied and c r i t i c a l phenomena. Their multitude i s 25 indicated i n the endless l i s t of ways that persons speak [ " i r o n i c a l l y , . . . m e t a p h o r i c a l l y , . . . c r y p t i c a l l y , . . . n a r r a t i v e l y , . . . i n a questioning or answering way,...and the r e s t " (29)] (Gar-f i n k e l , 1967b: 31, emphasis added within the bracket; c f . Witt-genstein, 1958: para. 133). The "way of questions and answers" i s the favoured way of ethnosemantics. In the next chapter the ethmeth p o s i t i o n on ru l e s , i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , ques-tions and answers i s brought to bear c r i t i c a l l y on ethsem's use of those very same ideas. 26 FOOTNOTES We mean here actual games l i k e chess and f o o t b a l l , and not the e n t i -t i e s of mathematical game theory. Fillmore's review (1969) of Hockett's (1968) c r i t i q u e of Chomsky d i s -cusses t h e i r differences i n terms of the properties of games. The issue i s quite c l o s e l y related to that being treated here. We appreciate that many anthropologists would f i n d t h i s a c o n t r o v e r s i a l way to d i s t i n g u i s h s o c i a l and c u l t u r a l anthropology. In the recent past the d i f f e r e n t d i s c i p l i n e s i n v e s t i g a t i n g language have been remarkably immune from each other's influence. Goodenough sa i d , "I have sought to avoid entanglement i n general semantic theory" (1956: 216; c f . Lounsbury, 1968: 221). The separate development of ethsem and Chomskyan l i n g u i s t i c s (traced i n E g l i n , 1972; see also Hymes, 1964a; Keesing, 1972; Black, 1974: 555) i s well-known. While Hymes, from the anthropological s i d e , has addressed himself to a sympathetic c r i t i q u e of Chomsky and to the incorporation of the l a t t e r ' s work i n an enlarged s o c i o l i n g u i s t i c s (Hymes, 1972, 1973, 1974), work i n l i n g u i s -t i c semantics has tended to neglect anthropological semantics (Nida's and Lyons' texts being notable exceptions), u n t i l very recently (see now Leech, 1974). With those philosophers of language who have drawn from Chomsky the s i t u a t i o n i s worse. Thus Katz can say i n 19 74 (personal communication) that the reason "I don't discuss anthropological semantics, ethnoscience, ethnosemantics, etc. [ i n h i s 1972], i s that I don't know very much about them." S i m i l a r l y , B a r - H i l l e l writes (personal communication, 1972), "I was not, to my shame, aware of the large ethnological and anthropological l i t e r a t u r e dealing with topics I had known mostly from a ph i l o s o p h i c a l point of view." This may be over-modest since he himself berates Katz for not showing "any awareness of the importance of semantic f i e l d s " (1970 [1969]: 186). About relevant work i n philosophy ethsem, apart from a few book re-views, has been equally l a c k a d a i s i c a l (though T y l e r [1969d] i s an excep-t i o n ) . Thus kins h i p , biotaxonomy and e s p e c i a l l y colour terms (see, f o r example, Pears, 1965 [1953]; Wittgenstein, 1958; Harrison, 1972) have been extensively discussed by philosophers of language, i n addi-t i o n to general issues i n semantic theory. But one looks i n vain f or signs of them i n ethsem. Wittgenstein's name, f o r example, does not occur i n Tyl e r ' s anthology (1969a). In Nida's comprehensive text (1964) he i s mentioned peremptorily i n an introductory note on the.contribution of symbolic l o g i c i a n s . Frake (1961) quotes two words from the Blue And  Brown Books, t h i s t i t l e being one of two Wittgenstein l i s t i n g s i n Conklin's massive bibliography (1972). He i s not to be found i n 27 D'Andrade 1s review (1972b), nor i n Black's compendious review (1974). (Indeed the l a t t e r , under "Philosophical Approaches" [536-541], gives a nod to Collingwood, Quine, Carnap and Reichenbach, but no " l i n g u i s t i c n a t u r a l i s t s " [ B a r - H i l l e l , 1970 (1969): 192] are mentioned.) Colby, alone, i t seems, does not f a i l to include Wittgenstein. His admirable survey (1966) mentions "family resemblance" (7; c f . Weinreich, 1966: 206), "language game" (12 fn. 21), and even manages a quote (16). But when he says of Levi-Strauss' transformational models and Chomsky's generative grammar that "Basic to these new developments [the paper was completed i n 1964] i s the idea of ru l e s , i n many respects s i m i l a r to Wittgenstein's treatment (1953 [1958])" (10), one begins to wonder. None of the foregoing should be read as high-handed denunciation of p a r t i c u l a r authors or of whole f i e l d s . One can only be immensely g r a t e f u l f o r , f o r example, B a r - H i l l e l ' s " v a l i a n t and by now successful e f f o r t to r a i s e the l e v e l of discussion of language" (Harman, 1973: 150). But, i n c a l l i n g a ttention to t h i s otherwise parlous state of a f f a i r s , we are thereby c a l l i n g f o r an end to i t . It should be noted that T y l e r (1973) has deplored t h i s s i t u a t i o n i n s o c i o l i n g u i s t i c s i n general. 5. Compare the following - "The study of culture i s thus the study'of normative categories and the r e l a t i o n s among them j u s t as the study of language i s " (Kay, 1966a: 106; emphasis added). For further i n c i s i v e remarks on the "normative" feature of ethsem see Wieder (1970: 118, 120). 6. The empirical adequacy of t h i s d e f i n i t i o n (from Wallace and Atkins, 1960: 61-62) i s not at issue here. For a review of the varying semantic analyses of American kinship terms, including that of Goodenough himself (1965), see Wordick (1973). 7. The "emic-etic" d i s t i n c t i o n was introduced i n footnote one of Chapter Two. 8. Indeed, Searle says "the semantic structure of a language may be re-garded as a conventional r e a l i z a t i o n of a s e r i e s of sets of underlying c o n s t i t u t i v e r u l e s " (1969: 37), and "The rules of semantics are...con-s t i t u t i v e , for acting i n accordance with them constitutes performing such i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts as promising, making statements, g i v i n g orders and so on" (1967: 125). Since ethsem attempts to r e s t r i c t i t s e l f to locutionary meaning (Austin, 1962) or p r o p o s i t i o n a l acts (Searle, 1969: 24ff. ; Rosaldo, 1974: 155), we need to rewrite Searle's statement as "the rules of (ethno-)semantics are... c o n s t i t u t i v e , f o r acting i n accor-dance with them constitutes performing minimally adequate r e f e r e n t i a l (or propositional) acts". Searle's semantic theory goes well beyond that of ethsem at t h i s point (1969: 25), and i n a d i r e c t i o n which we 28 applaud (Turner, 1970a; 1970b). But both remain linked i n terms of c o n s t i t u t i v e r u l e s , and these are the focus of our c r i t i q u e . Foot-note one on page 36 of Speech Acts suggests that Searle might object to our equating of semantical and c o n s t i t u t i v e r u l e s , but he does not develop the point. 9. C l e a r l y there are important differences between phenomenology, repre-sented here by G a r f i n k e l , and l i n g u i s t i c philosophy, represented by Searle. The reader i s i n v i t e d , however, to entertain the p a r t i c u l a r s i m i l a r i t y suggested here. Beyond that, see Roche's (1973) important contribution on t h i s matter, Heap's remarkable doctoral d i s s e r t a t i o n (1975) and, again, footnote one of Chapter Two. 10. Our claim here - that what Garf i n k e l i s saying i s that something more than a c o n s t i t u t i v e - r u l e s account i s necessary for an adequate account of a game l i k e chess - i s not countered, we think, by Searle's foot-note one on page 34 of Speech Acts; that i s , that included i n "the rules of the game" are such rules as that each side i s committed to t r y i n g to win. Garfinkel's notion, l i k e Wittgenstein's (1958), i s more r a d i c a l - as we t r y to show further on i n the text. 11. For some useful c r i t i c a l remarks on conversational analysis as ethno-methodology, see Coulter (1973) and Blum and McHugh (1971: 98-99). For further examples of "members' maxims", see Kuhn (1970b: 239). 29 CHAPTER FOUR LEAVING OUT THE INTERPRETER'S WORK: A METHODOLOGICAL CRITIQUE OF ETHNOSEMANTICS BASED ON ETHNOMETHODOLOGY The member of the s o c i e t y uses background expectancies as a scheme of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n (Garfinkel, 1967a [1964]: 35). The common behaviour of mankind i s the system of reference by means of which we i n t e r p r e t an unknown language (Wittgenstein, 1958: para. 206; c f . C i c o u r e l , 1967: 119 f n . 20). In some respects, [ethnomethodology] i s the counterpart within sociology of ethnographic semantics and ethnoscience....Ethno-graphy and ethnomethodology share a methodological stance i n that both give primacy to e x p l i c a t i n g the competence or know-ledge of members of a c u l t u r e , the unstated assumptions which determine t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of experience (Gumperz and Hymes, 1972b: 301). Introduction In t r y i n g to discover the nature of c u l t u r a l competence ethno-semantics leaves out of account the judgemental or i n t e r p r e t i v e work of a society's members, and that neglect i s f a t a l to i t s programme. This c r i t i c a l thesis i s the nub of the work and of t h i s chapter. It derives from Garfinkel and, more i m p l i c i t l y , from the l a t e r Wittgenstein. The 1 chapter i s organized as follows. Ethnosemantics (Sturtevant, 1964; Colby, 1966; T y l e r , 1969a; Conklin, 1972) i s characterised by s p e c i f y i n g i t s goals i n terms of i t s theory of culture. Its borrowings from semiotic are made e x p l i c i t i n order to provide a point of departure for the c r i t i q u e . The l a t t e r has 30 two parts - an i n t e r n a l c r i t i q u e drawing on work within the f i e l d , f o l -lowed by a c r i t i q u e from ethnomethodology (Gar f i n k e l , 1967a). Two tacks are taken throughout. The one centers on data gathering, the other on the semantic arrangements that form the r e s u l t s . T h e i r respective i n t e r -nal problems - the problem of abstracting from pragmatics, and the problem of context - reduce, under the gaze of ethmeth, to instances of i n d e x i c a l -i t y . Ethsem 1s a b i l i t y to produce orderly r e s u l t s i s reviewed by ethmeth as a case of the accomplishment of s o c i a l order. Ethnosemantics Goals and theory of culture The long-term goal of ethsem i s to explicate an i n t u i t i o n - the i n t u i t i o n that some things are appropriate, some things not. It i s im-p l i c i t l y assumed that a l l people have such an i n t u i t i o n , but that the "things" vary c u l t u r a l l y . It i s assumed that people can and do, i n a routine, everyday way, make judgements as to appropriateness of things. Such a b i l i t y to make judgements constitutes "competence". The judgement i s the observable evidence of the unobservable i n t u i t i o n . The model of the judging " i s not: ' i f a person i s confronted with stimulus X, he w i l l do Y,' but: ' i f a person i s i n s i t u a t i o n X, performance Y w i l l be judged appropriate by native actors'" (Frake, 1964a: 133) . An ethnosemantic explanation would provide a theory that predicts judgements given s i t u a t i o n and event. Put d i f f e r e n t l y , the theory supplies 31 the "appropriate" reading to an event given the s i t u a t i o n . "The 'theory' here i s not so much a theory of culture as i t i s theories of cultures, or a theory of de s c r i p t i o n s " (Tyler, 1969c: 5, emphasis added to "theory of 2 descr i p t i o n s " ; c f . Werner, 1969: 336, and Kay, 1966a: 112-113). The proximate goal of ethnosemantics i s to provide what i s seen as a v i t a l input to that theory - an account of the taxonomic semantics of the language of the culture i n question. It i s assumed that members of a culture share c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s of the world; that such c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s are a pre r e q u i s i t e f o r communication, for meaningful behaviour, for com-petent judging of appropriateness (Black, 1969) ; and that these c l a s s i -f i c a t i o n s are l a r g e l y encoded i n the semantic system of the language (Frake, 1962: 75). The world-view of ethsem can be described, then, as follows. By in v e s t i g a t i n g the semantics of a language, a culture's cognitive categor-ies w i l l be revealed. Cognitive categories, i n systematic form, make that culture's c u l t u r a l code (Kay, 1966a; 1970). Each competent member knows the code. Knowledge of the code i s a pr e r e q u i s i t e for appropriately i n t e r -preting (Frake, 1964a: 133; Conklin, 1968: 174) what i s going on i n the society. Interpretation i s the basis for action and i n t e r a c t i o n . In summary, and i n the words of Goodenough's c l a s s i c paper, ethsem i n the long run seeks, for any society, to explicate i t s culture where ...a society's culture consists of whatever i t i s one has to  know or believe i n order to operate i n a manner acceptable to  i t s members, and do so i n any ro l e that they accept f o r any one of themselves (Goodenough, 1957: 167, emphasis added; c f . 1963: 284 f n . 5, 257-265). 32 so that the ...test of such a model as would r e s u l t from an ethnosemantic i n v e s t i g a t i o n would require one to answer the question: 'Mow would the people of some other culture expect me to behave i f I were a member of t h e i r c u l t u r e ; and what are the rules of ap-propriate behaviour i n t h e i r culture?' [Tyler, 1969c: 5] (Turner, 1970b: 5; c f . Wallace, 1962: 351). Our question i s : can the proximate endeavour of semantic d e s c r i p t i o n accom-p l i s h the long-term goal of culture e x p l i c a t i o n , of discovering "whatever i t i s one has to know or believe i n order to operate i n a manner acceptable 3 to [a society's] members"? Semiotic background Conceptually and methodologically, ethsem has drawn on semiotic (Morris, 1938, 1946; see Wieder, 1970), s t r u c t u r a l l i n g u i s t i c s ( i n c l u d i n g Whorf, .1956, and Pike, 1967; see Hymes, 1970a, and Keesing, 1972), and cognitive psychology (Bruner, Goodnow and Austin, 1956; Bruner, 1957; see Wieder, 1970). We s h a l l concentrate on semiotic because to a large extent the relevant concepts i n s t r u c t u r a l l i n g u i s t i c s and cognitive psychology are subsumable under semiotical concepts. Thus, i n t h e i r founding empirical papers (Goodenough, 1956; Lounsbury, 1956), and accompanying programmatic statements (Lounsbury, 1954, 1955; Goodenough, 1957 [written 1954]), Goodenough and Lounsbury d i s -cuss the t r i o of significatum, designatum and denotatum, pointing out the p a r a l l e l s i n s t r u c t u r a l l i n g u i s t i c s : d i s t i n c t i v e feature, phoneme, a l l o -phone respectively. This i s a l l well-known (Wallace and Atkins, 1960: 67; Lounsbury, 1968: 223-224; Keesing, 1972), and continues to be ce n t r a l i n t h e i r work (Goodenough, 1965, 1967, 1968, 1970; Lounsbury, 1964; Sc h e f f l e r and Lounsbury, 1971; but c f . Huddleston, 1974). 33 The p a r a l l e l t r i o from cognitive psychology - c r i t e r i a l a t t r i -bute, category, and i n f i n i t e - a r r a y - o f - d i s c r i m i n a b l e - s t i m u l i - i s referred to i n the work of Frake and Conklin (for example, Frake, 1962, and Conklin, 1962), and has been c r i t i c i z e d by Wieder (1970). We s h a l l not elaborate on t h e i r or h i s remarks. "Significatum", "designatum" and "denotatum" are elements i n the semiotic t r i a n g l e ( F i g . 1), bound together i n the r e l a t i o n of s i g n i f i c a t i o n . In ethsem, s i g n i f i c a t i o n i s given a s t r i c t l y r e f e r e n t i a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n by way of the sign "lexeme". Moreover, reference i t s e l f i s r e s t r i c t e d to denotation; ( i n addition to previous references, see Lyons [1963: 4], and Hymes [19 70b: 111]). Ethnosemantic r e s u l t s consist of the mapping of l e x -emes on s i g n i f i c a t a . The mappings take the form of semantical rules (such as the one we proposed for "mother" i n Chapter Three). Extrapolations from these r e s u l t s are made, on the one hand to statements about cognitive s t r u c -ture, and on the other hand to statements about s o c i a l structure (Tyler, 1969b: X; Colby, 1966: 8). A second set of terms borrowed from semiotic i s the t r i o we i n -troduced i n footnote two of Chapter Two - syntactics (or syntax), semantics and pragmatics (for example, Werner, 1966, and Black, 1969: 187 fn. 7). According to Goodenough's ea r l y statement (modified only s l i g h t l y i n l a t e r work [1970: 111-112]), "Much of d e s c r i p t i v e ethnography i s i n e v i t -ably an exercise i n d e s c r i p t i v e semantics" (1957: 173; c f . Lounsbury, 1955: 159; 1956: 158-159; Morris, 1964: 60-62). Following Morris (1938: 35) there has been deliberate abstracting from pragmatics, the pragmatic ( i n -34 FIGURE 1 THE SEMIOTIC TRIANGLE IN ETHNOSEMANTICS DOMAIN SIGNIFICATUM (semantical rule) LEXEMIC SYMBOL-DESIGNATUM DENOTATUM Sources: Peirce, 1932; Morris, 1938; Lyons, 1968: 404; F r i e d r i c h , 1971; Sche f f l e r and Lounsbury, 1971: 3-12. 35 eluding " s o c i o l o g i c a l " [Morris, 1938: 30]) factors to be brought i n l a t e r under the assumption that the "analysis of the semantic structure of a sys-tem enables us to form hypotheses regarding s o c i a l behaviour" (Lounsbury, 1956: 184; c f . Conklin, 1964: 47; Black and Metzger, 1965: 163-164 fn. 5; 4 Kronenfeld, 19 73). This postulated order f o r t h e i r study - syntactics f i r s t , semantics second, pragmatics t h i r d - i s something we s h a l l want to question ( i n the s p i r i t i f not the l e t t e r of Hymes' crusade [for example, 1964b: 6, 9-10]). A t h i r d set of terms, l e s s e x p l i c i t l y acknowledged but also Peirce's (1932), i s the t r i o , icon, index, symbol (Burks, 1949). Good-enough, i n the 195 7 paper, ignores i n d e x i c a l signs, throws i c o n i c signs to s t r u c t u r a l l i n g u i s t i c s ( s y n t a c t i c s , c f . Jakobson, 1971 [1965]: 350), and takes non-iconic signs f or the ethnosemantic programme. But he c l e a r l y means, by "non-iconic", "symbolic" where symbolic signs r e f e r by conven-t i o n . As F r i e d r i c h notes i n h i s 1971 review, echoing Jakobson (1971 [1965]: 357; see also 1956, 1971 [1957], and Lounsbury, 1960), R e l a t i v e l y l i t t l e attention has been paid to what Peirce c a l l e d 'iconic and i n d e x i c a l signs' (1971: 170; also, forthcoming: [ms.] fn. 7). That i s understated. However, while ethsem has busied i t s e l f with the semantic structure of lexemic symbols, ethmeth, quite separately, has developed a sophisticated discussion of i n d e x i c a l signs and of pragma-t i c s , to both of which we s h a l l return. The fourth borrowing from semiotic i s the notion of "type of discourse". In the hands of Charles Morris, the sphere of pragmatics -3 6 that i s , the r e l a t i o n between the sign-user or i n t e r p r e t e r and the signs he uses, or, i n more dynamic terms, that f i e l d comprising the judging acts of i n t e r p r e t e r s (cf. Weinreich, 1966: 150; Werner, 1966: 44; Bar-H i l l e l , 1970 [1954]) - was r e i f i e d i n t o a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of "types of d i s -5 course". That idea c a r r i e d over into ethsem as the notion of "domain" (Conklin, 1962: 130; Lyons, 1963: 84; Wieder, 1970: 113 fn. 6), that bounding context from which any lexeme i n the domain drew i t s sense (Lyons, 1968: 427) by contrast with the other members of the domain (Louns-bury, 1956: 161-162; Conklin, 1962: 124; Kay, 1966b: 20; T y l e r , 1969c: 8; S c h e f f l e r and Lounsbury, 1971: 11). See F i g . 1. The c r i t i q u e w i l l not address e x p l i c i t l y the notion of domain. The l a t t e r ' s t e c h n i c a l problems have been noticed by those within the f i e l d ( e s p e c i a l l y the biotaxonomists), and by those marginal to i t ( f o r example, Schneider, 1969; McClaran, 1971: 6). More importantly, an eth-nomethodological c r i t i q u e has been done by Wieder (19 70: 113-114, 120, 129-131; but c f . also Frake, 1964a: 140-141). However, c r i t i c i s m of i t w i l l be i m p l i c i t i n the section on ethmeth. Internal C r i t i q u e of Ethnosemantics The data-gathering operation - abstracting from pragmatics I f t h e i r programmatics are to be believed ethnosemanticists pro-ceed i n general i n d u c t i v e l y (Goodenough, 1957: 168; 1965: 287 fn. 3; Sturtevant, 1964: 100). To the extent that the i n d u c t i v i s t programme i s followed, however, i t i s l o g i c a l l y bound to f a i l . "This c r u c i a l point i s 37 the tautology that we cannot name a cla s s without naming i t " (Pears, 1965 [1953]: 335; c f . " I t i s impossible to cross the gap between language and things without r e a l l y crossing i t " [Pears, 1965 (1951): 271]; c f . also Kaplan and Manners, 1972: 182-184). Nevertheless, ethnographers such as Metzger, Williams, Black (1963) and Frake have devised impeccable disco-very procedures f o r doing the impossible. To i l l u s t r a t e and elaborate the argument l e t us look c l o s e l y at the "Tenejapa" h a l f of Black and Metzger (1965), and compare i t with S i v e r t s ' l i t t l e - n o t e d report (1966/67) on the same project. According to Black and Metzger (1965) , The e l i c i t i n g h e u r i s t i c s t a r t s of necessity with Western cate-gories, but the ethnographer can discard t h i s p o s i t i o n once he has an i n i t i a l set of responses, and from then on every-thing he does depends on the l a s t thing he did. The boun-daries of the system he explores are revealed as he proceeds (141-142; see also Williams, 1966: 14). (a) The cost of t r y i n g to be presuppositionless i s the necessity of s t a r t -ing with one's own categories. Thus a/en at t h e i r most inductive and open-ended they must f i l l the s l o t i n the question "'what i s an i n t e r -esting question about ?'" (146). (b) In the sample of e l i c i t i n g given i n the body of the paper i t i s not at a l l c l e a r that "everything [the ethnographer] does depends on the l a s t thing he d i d " . For example, i n a sequence of questions concern-ing the events following a murder the ethnographer "leads" the whole time. This i s most blatant at the point, following questions on the disposal of the body, at which he goes on to ask, quite suddenly, "'What does the k i l l e r do i f he i s smart? 1" (153). 38 (c) In fact i t i s only by introducing these u n s o l i c i t e d questions that boundaries are established at a l l . The Tenejapa data are s u f f i c i e n t to show that, to the extent that the inductive procedure i s r i g o r -ously followed, to that extent the task i s endless. That i s , there i s no sign of system closure or domain-boundedness i n these data except at those points where the ethnographer "steps i n " . As noted i n another study, "simply requesting informants to be more and more s p e c i f i c r e s u l t s i n greater and greater informant v a r i a b i l i t y " (D'Andrade, 1972a: 33). Unfortunately, the impression conveyed i n the paper of inductive method and "clean e l i c i t i n g i s misleading: However, what I have outlined here i s merely an i d e a l p i c t u r e of the e l i c i t i n g s i t u a t i o n exposing i n a somewhat abbreviated fashion the main features of an interview routine and the basic operations involved. Departures from t h i s model are c e r t a i n l y countless. Steps are sometimes taken i n a d i f f e r e n t order. This i s to say, that while the e l i c i t i n g process i n i t s e l f i s  highly informal and rather casual at times, i n v o l v i n g a l l kinds  of s t i m u l i , circumlocutions and prodding, the basic check re-garding FIR [Frame-Term-Response]-stability i s always adhered to ( S i v e r t s , 1966/67: 329, emphasis added; c f . Williams, 1966: 16; Keesing, 1967: 11; Manning, 1973). 6 So much for "formal e l i c i t i n g " . S i v erts reveals other i n t e r -esting features of the i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n c l u d i n g the methodological notions of "context-free u n i t s " and "conditioned response". The l a t t e r i s "the re s u l t of an agreement between anthropologist and informants upon a native-language sequence" (327, emphasis added). That i s , what the inves-t i g a t o r and informant bring o f f as an i n t e r a c t i o n a l accomplishment - "agree-ments" - i s translated by the i n v e s t i g a t o r into a "conditioned response". 39 Q-R's are modelled on S-R's (Black and Metzger, 1965: 142; c f . Hymes, 1966: 26; Moerman, 1968: 164; Ep l i n g , 1967: 261; but see - with reference to Epling - S c h e f f l e r and Lounsbury, 1971: 142). The same t r a n s l a t i o n work i s necessary when the in v e s t i g a t o r has to accommodate the informant's "tendency to respond not only to the question at hand but to anticipated questions, indeed not unlike exchanges  i n ordinary conversations" ( S i v e r t s , 1966/67: 330, emphasis added). In-vestigators who have used the interview method cannot have f a i l e d to make the previous observation; yet i t i s r a r e l y acknowledged - and when acknow-ledged, rarely seen as t h e o r e t i c a l l y important. Thus, The constraints of t h i s method, p a r t i c u l a r l y on highly a r t i c u -l a t e informants, i s considerable. Almost every question we asked was answered by a t e x t l e t instead of a l i s t . The most i n t e r e s t i n g information was often i n the parts of the answer which was l e a s t expected (Perchonock and Werner, 1969: 238; c f . Berreman, 1972: 580). While we must be gr a t e f u l to Siverts for perhaps the only account that approximates what a c t u a l l y occurs i n ethnosemantic interviewing - an 7 ethnography of the ethnographer (Berreman, 1966: 350) - that account i n -v i t e s the three following conclusions: (1) the method of formal e l i c i t i n g i s not imbued with the systematic rigour i t i s elsewhere claimed to have; (2) such l i g h t thrown on actual interviewing p r a c t i c e s reveals the problems and practices of t r y i n g to overcome the contextedness of the enterprise, that i s , the problem of abstracting from pragmatics; (3) we may s e r i o u s l y question the value of the r e s u l t i n g ethnography - "a voluminous log-book of FTR-sequences" ( S i v e r t s , 1966/67: 329) - e s p e c i a l l y since how "these categories are a c t u a l l y manipulated i n s o c i a l l i f e i s beyond the scope of the procedure i t s e l f " (332). 40 More i s made of " i n t e r a c t i o n a l accomplishment" and " t r a n s l a t i o n work" i n the section on ethmeth, where they are seen to be of c r i t i c a l i n t e r e s t . For now, i t i s hoped that t h i s i n t e r n a l c r i t i q u e of the data-gathering operation provides grounds for agreeing with Carnap that If we are concerned with a h i s t o r i c a l l y given language [a nat-u r a l language], then pragmatical d e s c r i p t i o n comes f i r s t and then we may go to semantics (Carnap, 1939: 166; 1942: 13; c f . Kecskemeti, 1952: 73; Spang-Hanssen, 1954: 26; B a r - H i l l e l , 1970 [1954]: 70; Helmer, 1970: 733). The semantic arrangement - the problem of context Having gathered the data, the ethnosemanticist analyzes them. The end-product of the analysis i s a semantic arrangement - taxonomy, paradigm, tree, etc. - which, according to various c r i t e r i a , gives'an adequate semantic d e s c r i p t i o n of the data. In the famous Bu r l i n g debate of the mid-sixties (Burling, 1964a, 1964b; Frake, 1964b; Hymes, 1964d; Hammel, 1964; Wallace, 1965), i t was pointed out that there are l o g i c a l l y many correct semantic descriptions of any given l e x i c a l set. I f i t i s not assumed that there has to be one " c o r r e c t " s o l u t i o n only (Hymes, 1967: 633), but that, i n p r i n c i p l e , two or more or a l l solutions may be "correct", then what i s the status of these variants? Is i t that there i s a common core with subcultural modifications of the boundaries, or a ce n t r a l model with f u l l y - f l e d g e d , a l t e r n a t i v e subcultural systems, or a system where a l l variants are equally "correct" ( c f . Goodenough, 1963: 262; 1965: 259; T y l e r , 1969c: 5; Wallace, 1970a: 23-36; Sankoff, 1971)? For our purposes t h i s i s the most important issue a r i s i n g from the Burling debate. 41 Recall that descriptions of cognitive representations on the one hand, and s o c i a l representations on the other, are the two poles of c u l -t u r a l competence towards which ethsem has seen i t s e l f as moving. Let us take some not-so-recent writings of Wallace and T y l e r as representative of mainstream ethsem analyses, Wallace's being dir e c t e d more at cognitive matters, Tyl e r ' s more at s o c i a l ones. With the emphasis on T y l e r ' s pro-gress, l e t us assess those w r i t i n g s ' implications f o r the endeavour to discover "whatever i t i s one has to know or b e l i e v e i n order to operate i n a manner acceptable to [a society's] members". From h i s r e l a t i o n a l analysis of American kinship terminology, which analysis he claims has cognitive-psychological r e a l i t y , Wallace con-cludes : Kin terminologies may be reckoning devices, l i k e systems of weights and measures, whose u t i l i t y depends more on i n t e r n a l coherence and convenience of c a l c u l a t i o n than on t h e i r f i t with the s o c i a l system (Wallace, 1970b: 152, emphasis added). That i s , s o c i a l - s t r u c t u r a l relevance of terminological analysis i s quite l i m i t e d . His s i n g l e , powerful, elegant and p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y r e a l s o l u t i o n i s , i n Wallace's view, a reckoning device such as a person might employ in s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n , rather than a model of what constrains h i s s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n . Despondent conclusions of a related sort are recorded by D'Andrade et a l . (1972). In contrast to Wallace, T y l e r has been t r y i n g to pin down h i s structures to the s o c i a l world, s a c r i f i c i n g a single model f o r empirical s e n s i t i v i t y . He declares i n a 1966 paper that, because of i t s inadequate 42 treatment of v a r i a t i o n , that branch of ethnosemantics c a l l e d "formal a n a l y s i s " ...does not provide the minimum information for deciding who w i l l be c a l l e d what i n any kinship system ( c f . also Swartz 1960: 397; Hymes 1964b: 26; 1964c: 97-98) (1966a: 694). 8 Therefore, 1 w i l l attempt to r e l a t e terminological v a r i a t i o n to the contexts i n which terms of reference are used (694; c f . 1966b: 515; Good-enough, 1965: 287 fn. 12; P e l t o , 1966: 201; Berreman, 1972). What T y l e r finds i s that there ...are many contextual factors to be taken into consideration. Among these are: s o c i a l s e t t i n g , audience composition, sex and age of speaker/hearer, and - most d i f f i c u l t of a l l - something that might be c a l l e d the speaker's inte n t i o n (704-705; c f . F i l l -more, 1966: 220; Rosaldo, 1972: 84; Sankoff, 1972: 563). The a r t i c l e was reprinted i n T y l e r (1969a) and again, with s l i g h t r e v i -sions, i n Gumperz and Hymes (1972a). In the revised version i s added, The important point i s that t h i s chapter demonstrates the p o s s i -b i l i t y of extending formal rules to these contextual f a c t o r s . It i s not an argument against the v a l i d i t y of formal analysis; rather, i t i s an argument for the extension of formal analysis to include extra-genealogical factors ([1966a] 1972: 268; c f . Basso, 1972). Ty l e r i s advocating the importance of v a r i a t i o n by context but proposes an extension of the e x i s t i n g method to deal with i t . (In contrast, but following from the same sort of observations, Sankoff proposes a quantita-t i v e approach to handling v a r i a b i l i t y [1971:' 391.]..) However, while that paper was going through r e p r i n t i n g s , T y l e r himself was moving to a more r a d i c a l p o s i t i o n . In h i s 1969 paper, "A formal science", he has the following. The slogan that meaning varies with context i s a form of h o l i s -t i c argument. Like Hegelian holism i t i s workable only i f i t can be demonstrated that contexts are f i n i t e . Note also that i f rules of use are to incorporate contextual features, i t i s not even possible to formulate rules unless contexts are f i n i t e . It does not need demonstration to prove that the t o t a l physical surroundings or context of any utterance are never exactly the same on two d i f f e r e n t occasions. Thus, contexts cannot be f i n i t e . This i s the paradox of the contextual theory. Since the notion of context v i o l a t e s the idea of r u l e , we cannot properly speak of meaning as a rule of use. Yet, since humans do seem to take contextual features into account, they must have some means of es t a b l i s h i n g equivalencies among non-identical contexts (1969d: 75; c f . Goodenough, 1956: 197 fn. 5). If what T y l e r says i s true, then i t undermines h i s own method (1966a) of dealing with contextual v a r i a t i o n . I f rules are to b u i l d i n contextual f a c t o r s , but context cannot be s p e c i f i e d , then the programme cannot be c a r r i e d on. Moreover, i t i s no use saying, with Hymes, that form (lexeme) and context mutually determine meaning (1962: 19; 1964c: 97-98), or, i n Frake's terms, act and s i t u a t i o n (1964a: 133), for the problematic terms -"context", " s i t u a t i o n " - are l e f t unexplicated (Wieder, 1970: 119-120). 9 Tyler ' s point undermines the whole ethnosemantic enterprise. This discussion of Wallace and T y l e r has been at pains to show that: (1) insofar as a unitary, c o g n i t i v e l y v a l i d model i s achieved, s o c i a l - s t r u c t u r a l s i g n i f i c a n c e i s lost;and (2) i n s o f a r as context i s allowed to operate, to that extent the enterprise loses i t s e l f i n the attempt to pin down elusive context. S o c i a l structure as semantic arrangement disap-pears i n an i n f i n i t y of contexts. (The reader w i l l r e c a l l Chapter Two. We have here recapitulated f o r ethnosemantics the argument about context made against c o n s t i t u t i v e - r u l e accounts i n the t h i r d section of that chap-t e r . ) 44 It i s at t h i s point that the ethmeth treatment of " i n d e x i c a l i t y " must be introduced i n support of Peirce's i n s i g h t into that idea's i n d i s -p e n s a b i l i t y and u t t e r pervasiveness. For the "irremediable elusiveness of context" i s one way of c h a r a c t e r i s i n g the "utter pervasiveness of index-i c a l i t y " (Peirce, 1932: 172; Wells, 1967: 104; Luckmann, 1972: 31). And, secondly, that ethsem nevertheless achieves " r a t i o n a l " r e s u l t s raises i n a new way the concomitant "problem of s o c i a l order": how s o c i e t a l members (such as semantic ethnographers) e s t a b l i s h "equivalencies among non-identical contexts,''? I t i s time to s h i f t perspective. C r i t i q u e From Ethnomethodology The demonstrably r a t i o n a l properties of i n d e x i c a l expressions and i n d e x i c a l actions i s [ s i c ] an ongoing achievement of the organized a c t i v i t i e s of everyday l i f e ( G a r f i n k e l , 1967b: 34). Introduction Recall that the goal of the ethnosemantic programme i s to e x p l i -cate culture where culture i s knowledge - "whatever i t i s one has to know or believe i n order to operate i n a manner acceptable to [a society's] mem-bers"' The goal of ethmeth i s e s s e n t i a l l y the same ( c f . Garfinkel's d e f i -n i t i o n of "competence" [1967a (1964): 57 fn. 8; see C i c o u r e l , 1970: 147; P h i l l i p s o n and Roche, 1971: 34; Mehan, 19 72: 1; Moerman, 1969':4465; Gumperz and Hymes, 1972b]). We are saying that ethsem cannot reach that goal by pursuing semantic ethnographies. We are now proposing that ethmeth i s better equipped for success. A clue to the d i f f e r e n c e i s that both the 45 obstacles i n the way of ethsem and i t s "accomplishments" are instances of the very phenomena which constitute ethmeth's topic and domain of inquiry. This part of the chapter w i l l recast those problems as that t o p i c , and discuss the topic i n terms of the ethmeth ideas of " i n d e x i c a l i t y " and "ac-complished s o c i a l order". Ethsem reformulated i n terms of ethmeth Accounts of d a t a - e l i c i t i n g and of semantic analysis such as the ones already discussed d i s c l o s e , when adequately reported, two pervasive c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s which we s h a l l present as a c o n t r a d i c t i o n : (1) impossibility of obtaining r e s u l t s ; (2) r e s u l t s obtained. The contradiction i s removed by adding " l o g i c a l " to (1), and " f o r - a l l -practical-purposes" to (2). The c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s are now (la) l o g i c a l impossibility of obtaining r e s u l t s ; (2a) r e s u l t s obtained f o r - a l l - p r a c t i c a l - p u r p o s e s . These descriptions are meant as summary glosses of the c r i t i c a l points made, and other features noticed*about ethnosemantics i n the pre-vious sections: (la) ( i ) The problem of abstracting from pragmatics; ( i i ) The problem of context. (2a) (i) "Agreements" between ethnographer and informant ( S i v e r t s ) ; ( i i ) People's a b i l i t y to e s t a b l i s h "equivalencies among non-identical contexts" ( T y l e r ) . 46 For ethnosemanticists (Tyler [1969d] excepted) ( l a ) ( i ) and ( i i ) are not, of course, seen as l o g i c a l problems but as methodological ones. They are problems for which the s o l u t i o n i s methodological innovation and/or the subsuming of more pragmatic information under semantic d e s c r i p t i o n (Berreman, 1972: 584 fn. 5). (2a)(i) and ( i i ) are merely taken f o r granted. For ethmeth, however, (la) and (2a) are the two sides of the In-dex i c a l coin, the currency of which i s u n i v e r s a l . The observations gath-ered under (la) are instances of " i n d e x i c a l i t y " . The observations gathered under (2a) are instances of "accomplished s o c i a l order". For ethmeth the problem which provides i t with a programme i s : given i n d e x i c a l i t y , how i s 10 s o c i a l order possible? Said about language t h i s becomes: how i s i t that ...coherent conversations are produced despite (1) the non-grammaticality of utterances, (2) the absence of shared, meanings, (3) the n o n - l i t e r a l n e s s of meanings, and (4) the i n d e x i c a l i t y of utterances? (Crowle, 1971: IV). We s h a l l now elaborate on i n d e x i c a l i t y and accomplished s o c i a l order, t y i n g i n aspects of ethnosemantics on the way. 11 I n d e x i c a l i t y - the l o g i c a l impossibility of r e s u l t s Indexical or occasional expressions are those whose ...sense cannot be decided by an auditor unless he knows or assumes something about the biography and the purposes of the speaker, the circumstances of the utterance, the previous course of the conversation, or the p a r t i c u l a r r e l a t i o n s h i p of actual or p o t e n t i a l i n t e r a c t i o n that e x i s t s between user and auditor. . . The expressions do not have a sense that remains i d e n t i c a l through the changing occasions of t h e i r use (G a r f i n k e l , 1967a [-1964]: 40; also 1961: 60; 1967b: 4-7; 1967d: 179-180; Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970: 348-350). 47 (It should be c l e a r how t h i s d e s c r i p t i o n p a r a l l e l s , yet goes well beyond, Tyler's l i s t of "contextual f a c t o r s " quoted i n the previous section.) Indexical expressions are to be contrasted with s o - c a l l e d objective (con-text-free) expressions. Any i n v e s t i g a t i v e inquiry - science, ethsem, or-dinary conversation - which i s "directed at achieving...agreement among ' c u l t u r a l colleagues'" (Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970: 349) exh i b i t s profound concern for the "nuisances of i n d e x i c a l s " , seeking to remedy them by sub-s t i t u t i n g objective expressions for them. Such 'methodological' concerns are accompanied by a prevalent recommendation that terms, utterances, and discourse may be c l a r i f i e d , and other shortcomings that consist i n the properties of i n d e x i c a l expressions may be remedied by r e f e r r i n g them to 't h e i r s e t t i n g ' ( i . e . , the f a m i l i a r recommendations about the 'decisive relevance of context') (Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970: 349-350). The r a d i c a l , not to say dramatic, point of ethmeth,for ethsem i s the one that follows: •'' n°t only does no concept of context-in-general e x i s t , but  every use of 'context' without exception i s e s s e n t i a l l y i n d e x i - c a l ( G a r f i n k e l , 1967b: 10, emphasis added). This has the consequence, f o r instance, that a l l rules - semanti-c a l r u l e s , componential d e f i n i t i o n s , contextual rules ( T y l e r ) , c o n s t i t u t i v e rules (Searle, 1969) - are inadequate i n i s o l a t i o n to subsume s p e c i f i a b l e sets of objects or actions. They needs r e l y on something external to them for t h e i r sense - some language-game, some form of l i f e , some "what anyone knows" (Garfinkel, 1967a [I960]: 275). But, more than that, any defining d e s c r i p t i o n of the language-game has the same problem i t s e l f - every use of "context" i s e s s e n t i a l l y i n d e x i c a l . Domains, therefore, as the would-be 48 language-game of ethsem (Colby, 1966: c f . the second paragraph on p. 7 with p. 12 fn. 21), w i l l not mechanically prescribe the ri g h t meaning of t h e i r member terms. Let us cast t h i s i n terms of the semiotic t r i a n g l e introduced e a r l i e r . According to ethsem a word (lexeme) r e f e r s to an object (denotatum) or class of objects (designatum) i n terms of a set of necessary and s u f f i -c ient conditions ( s i g n i f i c a t a ) ; where a term i s polysemous the association of word-conditions-objects i s r e l a t i v e to some domain ( S c h e f f l e r and Louns-bury, 1971: 11). The question arises however, of how members decide which domain i s relevant on any occasion of the use of some term (Wieder, 1970: 120). Domains do not solve the problem of context. They merely push i t one step back. But, as i s being argued, one step back i s no step anywhere. There i s no so l u t i o n i n th i s d i r e c t i o n . Recommendations to secure more information on the s i t u a t i o n or s e t t i n g are beset with the same problem (Handel, 1969: 10; Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970: 338). In t h i s l i g h t , then, . . . t r y i n g out the knowledge [that i s , the ethnosemantic r e s u l t s ] . . . i n ' r e a l ' , non-interview s i t u a t i o n s . . . [ o n the assumption that] ...when some responses (events) do not occur as predicted from e l i c i t e d information the ethnographer can discover the a d d i t i o n a l determinants of response-variation which had not been encountered i n interview (Black and Metzger, 1965: 164 f n . 5; c f . Black, 1969: 169, 186-187 fn. 3). w i l l only r a i s e the question of the contextualization of those (non-inter-view) events (Ga r f i n k e l , 1967b: 6). The ethmeth c r i t i q u e asks for the nature of the grounds by which i t i s supposed that events i n non-interview s i t u a t i o n s bear some e l u c i d a t i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p to events i n interview s i t u a -49 t i o n s . As w i l l become c l e a r below those grounds reside i n common-sense methods of reasoning, not s c i e n t i f i c ones. For now i t i s s u f f i c i e n t to note that the problem of abstracting from pragmatics and the problem of context reduce to the problem of how to remedy i n d e x i c a l expressions. Accomplished s o c i a l order - r e s u l t s f o r - a l l - p r a c t i c a l - p u r p o s e s The question i s : how do members produce s o c i a l order given the 12 problem of i n d e x i c a l i t y . There can be no doubt that, despite i n d e x i c a l i t y being an inescapable feature of ethnographic i n q u i r i e s , ethsemists rou-t i n e l y discover an orderly world, which provides orderly r e s u l t s - r e s u l t s , moreover, which are independent of i n v e s t i g a t o r , method and informant: ...the data offered r e f l e c t r e g u l a r i t i e s which must be taken account of. These are r e g u l a r i t i e s among conditions which pro-duce r e g u l a r i t i e s i n informants' responses. Data of t h i s nature, while requiring some ordering such as we have provided i n the sample, i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n free...data of t h i s kind has [ s i c ] a structure of i t s own, about which inv e s t i g a t o r s may agree re-gardless of t h e i r t h e o r e t i c a l i n t e r e s t s and without regard e i t h e r to other kinds of material they may wish to use to expand the data or to further a n a l y t i c operations they may wish to perform upon i t (Metzger and Williams, 1966: 390, emphasis added). How i s such s o c i a l order possible? We s h a l l o u t l i n e i n a paragraph how ethmeth would formulate the order question and what answer i t would give; then we s h a l l l i s t ten places where ethsem achieves order using i t s theore-t i c a l and methodological apparatus to gloss over the underlying i n t e r p r e t i v e 13 work. ft 50 Ethsemists f i n d s o c i a l order jin the world, independent of t h e i r accounts of i t . In contrast, ethmeth trea t s s o c i a l order as an accomplish-ment of s o c i e t a l members, such as ethsemists, and sees that order as a feature of the accounting by which i t i s t o l d . Where ethsem sees data r e g u l a r i t i e s or investigator/informant correspondence as " i n t e r p r e t a t i o n f r e e " or, more r i s k i l y , as "agreement", ethmeth sees such expressions as glosses for i n t e r p r e t i v e work which remains to be explicated. I t s question would be "what i s the work for which [ [ i n t e r p r e t a t i o n free]] i s that work's accountable gloss?" (Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970: 352). The "how" of such findings of order i s ethmeth's topic of i n v e s t i g a t i o n . Its claim i s that the " f i n d i n g " and the " t e l l i n g " are the same (Gar f i n k e l , 1967b: 1; 19 74 [1968]: 17; c f . Attewell, 1974). I t provides a general formulation of such i n t e r p r e t i v e work i n terms of the "documentary method of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n " . Since the documentary method i s not one but many methods, ethmeth's f i e l d of inquiry l i e s open. (This point was made, without s p e c i f i c reference to ethsem, i n Chapter Three.) The question of s o c i a l order becomes, then, a matter of the work by which, i n our case, ethsemists produce order i n t h e i r data and i n t h e i r r e s u l t s . What i s the extent of that work i n ethsem theory and practice? (1) Let us take notice f i r s t of an absence - an absence i n pub-l i s h e d accounts of ethnosemantic studies of what takes place between the research's conception and the s t a r t of e l i c i t i n g . Intended to discover "whatever i t i s one has to know or b e l i e v e . . . " such accounts leave out 51 how the ethnographer him/herself learns to ask questions, hear answers, what questions to ask, and what answers to ignore. It therefore occurs that the i n v e s t i g a t o r frequently must ele c t among a l t e r n a t i v e courses of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and inquiry to the end of deciding matters of f a c t , hypothesis, conjecture, fancy, and the rest despite the fact that i n the c a l c u l a b l e sense of the term 'know' he does not and even cannot 'know' what he i s doing p r i o r to or while he i s doing i t . F i e l d workers, most p a r t i c u l a r l y those doing ethnographic and l i n -g u i s t i c studies i n settings where they cannot presuppose a knowledge of s o c i a l structures, are perhaps best acquainted with such situations....Nevertheless, a body of knowledge of s o c i a l structures i s somehow assembled....How...? (Garfinkel 1967a [1962] : 77-78). It i s true that the e l i c i t i n g routines and s t r a t e g i e s of Metzger and Co. were designed out of some appreciation of t h i s problem. But t h i s common-sense so l u t i o n - engaging i n more research (formal e l i c i t i n g ) to decide what had been learned previously (unsystematically) - only raises the problems of formal e l i c i t i n g . We made the same argument about the r e l a t i o n s h i p between interview s i t u a t i o n s and non-interview s i t u a t i o n s at the end of the l a s t section on i n d e x i c a l i t y . (2) Desirous of "discerning how people construe t h e i r world of experience from the way they t a l k about i t " (Frake, 1962: 74), the formal e l i c i t e r s (for example, Black, 1969: 172-174) f i n d i t ...necessary to i n s t r u c t the construing member to act i n accordance with the investigator's i n s t r u c t i o n s i n order to guarantee that the i n v e s t i g a t o r w i l l be able to study t h e i r usages as instances of the usages the i n v e s t i g a t o r has i n mind (Gar f i n k e l , 1967a [1964]: 70). Such i n s t r u c t i o n of informants i s our second to-be-noted feature of ethsem (cf . Hale, 1966: 808). Motivated by a desire f o r rigour i t can lead to 52 such strange notions as requiring informants "to ignore any possible scene of the questioning" (Black, 1969: 173). This i s part of the work of making out the members of the studied society as what Garfinkel c a l l s "judgemental" or " c u l t u r a l dopes" (1967a [1964]: 66-71; c f . Cicourel's "dummy" [1970: 160]). The " c u l t u r a l dope" i s made out i n these further features of ethsem: (3) the t r e a t i n g (hearing) of informants' responses as non-problematic answers-to-questions (Ga r f i n k e l , 1967a [I960]: 266-267; 1967a [1962]: 92), no notice being taken of the work required to do that "hearing"; (4) t r e a t i n g such "answers" as "conditioned responses" (as d i s -cussed i n the section on the data-gathering operation); (5) portraying "agreements" as the "demonstrable matching of substantive matters" (G a r f i n k e l , 1967b: 30); (6) "portraying the usages of the member of a language community as...culture bound [and t h i s includes the s i t u a t i o n a l v a r i a n t ] " (Garfinkel, 1967a [1964] : 71) ; (7) "construing the p a i r i n g of appearances and intended object - the p a i r i n g of 'sign' and 'referrent' [ s i c ] - as an association [see Goodenough, 1956: 195.]"(Garfinkel, 1967a [1964]: 71); (8) assuming "that an invoked shared agreement on substantive matters explains a usage" (Ga r f i n k e l , 1967b: 28); (9) t r e a t i n g the properties of common understandings or common culture 53 ...as precoded entries on a memory drum, to be consulted as a d e f i n i t e set of a l t e r n a t i v e meanings from among which one was to s e l e c t , under predecided conditions that s p e c i f i e d i n which of some set of a l t e r n a t i v e ways one was to understand the s i t u -a t i o n upon the occasion that the necessity for a decision arose (Garfinkel, 1967a [1964]: 41). In a l l these cases "a procedural d e s c r i p t i o n of such symbolic  usages i s precluded by NEGLECTING THE JUDGEMENTAL WORK OF THE USER" (Garfi n k e l , 1967a [1964]: 71, emphasis and upper-case added). "User" refers not only to the subject or informant, but to the anthropologist as w e l l . I f the previous points have emphasized the informant's (neglected) judgemental work, the following feature h i g h l i g h t s that of the i n v e s t i g a -t o r . (10) S t a b i l i t y of response across informants i s a favourable i n d i c a t o r i n the eyes of the ethsemist. Recall S i v e r t s ' (1966/67) asser-t i o n that "the basic check regarding FTR [Frame-Term-Response]-stability i s always adhered to" (329). On noting informants' tendency "to respond not only to the question at hand but to anticipated questions, indeed not unlike exchanges i n ordinary conversations" (330), he asks, "Is such a reaction ruining the whole argument about s t a b i l i t y . . . . " Not quite. Repeating the interview at some l a t e r date with another informant would produce a s i m i l a r s i t u a t i o n , we hold, since the 2nd. ethnographer and informant are supposed to follow the rules of the game (331) . But, we may ask, what game _is i t that has as a feature tendency-to-respond-not-only-to-the-question-at-hand-but-to-anticipated-questions? What are the rules of that game (Garf i n k e l , 1967a [1964]: 70; Wittgenstein, 1958)? These questions are not addressed by ethsem, but i t s e l i c i t i n g and analysis 54 are predicated on answers to them. Answers are made, but t a c i t l y , common-s e n s i c a l l y . Common-sense work i s at the heart of the ethsem enterprise. We have already taken note of the unexplicated grounds by which formal e l i c i t i n g i s said to elucidate unsystematic questioning, by which non-interview events are said to elucidate interview events. Here again we must point to the common-sense work which provides for seeing "second" interviews with "second" informants as "checks" on " f i r s t s " ( c f . B r i c k e r , 1974). These are a l l forms of Tyler's more general n o t i c i n g of people's a b i l i t y to e s t a b l i s h "equivalencies among non-identical contexts" (where "people", of course, includes ethnographers). How i s i t done? "How are events being analyzed so that they appear as connected?" (Zimmerman and Wieder, 1970: 290). What i s the judgemental work of the user? We gave general answers to t h i s question i n the sections on Sociology 3000 and ethmeth i n Chapters Two and Three r e s p e c t i v e l y . In the l a t t e r , for example, we described the documentary method of i n t e r p r e -t a t i o n . Beyond t h i s we must turn to "empirical materials to see i n t e r p r e -t i v e work i n action. This we do i n Part Two. 55 FOOTNOTES A version of t h i s chapter w i l l appear i n Semiotica (forthcoming). The chapter has benefitted immensely from two papers: f i r s t , of course, Wieder's c r i t i q u e of the sign theories i n ethnosemantics (1970; see also Turner, 1970b); and, second, Helmer's programmatic paper on a pragmatically-oriented, non-Hymesian sociology of language (1970; see also K j o l s e t h , 1972: 53). Both Wieder's c r i t i q u e and our's are ethno-methodological (as i s Cicourel's [1967]). Whereas Wieder draws out the absurd models of man and society i m p l i c i t i n the sign theories of Goodenough and Lounsbury and of Frake and Conklin, we focus on the methodological assumptions and practices of ethsem i n transforming "brute" events into "data" and "data" into " r e s u l t s " ( cf. Sankoff, 1971: 405). Consequently, more attention i s given here to the work of Metzger, Williams and Black. Black and Metzger's (1965) study of Tene-japa and American "law" terms i s of p a r t i c u l a r importance, since i t provides the model f o r the ethnosemantic analysis reported i n Chapter Seven. Frake's sentence appears to be the only attempt to provide a ( r e l a t i v e -l y ) e x p l i c i t formula for the dependent v a r i a b l e i n ethsem. In sharp contrast to Frake (1964a: 133), Kay, alone, claims the p o s s i b i l i t y of p r e d i c t i n g actual behaviour as opposed to verbal judgements (1970: 28). By the mid-sixties Chomskyan rhet o r i c - " s t r u c t u r a l d e s c r i p t i o n " , "reading", "competence", grammar as p r e d i c t i v e theory - was well i n evidence i n ethsem (for example, Durbin, 1966; Kay, 1966a; Werner, 1966). The notion of a " c u l t u r a l grammar" i s widespread (for example, Conk-l i n , 1968: 174; Colby, 1975). Keesing (1972) i s a useful reminder of the differences between ethsem and transformational generative grammar (cf . Hymes, 1970a). See footnote four of Chapter Three for further references on t h i s . For l i n g u i s t i c semantics of the Katz-Fodor v a r i e t y three "no's" have already been recorded (Helmer, 1970; K j o l s e t h , 1972; Coulter, 1973). Our c r i t i q u e of ethsem i s of a piece with these papers. In p r a c t i c e , that v a r i a t i o n of r e s u l t p e r s i s t i n g a f t e r the completion of semantic analysis has t y p i c a l l y , been cast into the "garbage bucket of pragmatics" (Bentley, 1945: 40) or, de gustibus, into the "prag-matic wastebasket" ( B a r - H i l l e l , 1971; see also Lyons, 1968: 420; Helmer, 1970: 733-734, 743; Garfinkel and Sacks, 19 70: 350, quoted below i n the section on " i n d e x i c a l i t y " ) . We have traced the course of t h i s r e i f i c a t i o n through Morris' work i n the longer manuscript from which t h i s chapter i s drawn ( E g l i n , 1972). 56 6. Lest the intent of the c r i t i q u e be mistaken l e t i t be s a i d that i t i s to the c r e d i t of Metzger and Co. that they attempted to formulate ex-p l i c i t discovery procedures i n the i n t e r e s t s of rigour, publicness and r e p l i c a b i l i t y . This way problems are more e a s i l y seen, t h e i r sources more exactly located ( c f . Chomsky's view of the value of pre-Chomskyan s t r u c t u r a l l i n g u i s t i c s [for example, 1968: 19-20]). Indeed Black has s a i d , i n response to an e a r l i e r version of t h i s chapter, that she "couldn't agree more that (some of) the p a r t i c u l a r data presented [ i n the 1965 paper] were inconsistent with the procedure" (personal commun-i c a t i o n , 1974). Those others, who, l i k e Metzger and Co., hawnot i n fact proceeded i n d u c t i v e l y , have done a double d i s s e r v i c e i n (1) w r i t i n g i n an obfus-cating inductive format for h e u r i s t i c purposes (Lounsbury, 1956: 171; Wallace, 1961: 459; T y l e r , 1969a; see Keesing, 1967: 11), at the same time as acknowledging the muddiness of the waters - "aided by some ad-vance knowledge of what to look f o r " (Lounsbury, 1956: 168; c f . 1953: 406); "The discovery of c u l t u r a l l y relevant components requires some advance knowledge of what to look f o r " (Colby, 1966: 9); "Fieldwork and analysis should be c a r r i e d out simultaneously" (Tyler, 1969b: X); "a great deal depends on the interviewer's f a m i l i a r i t y with the culture and willingness to reorganize e a r l i e r formalizations i n the l i g h t of l a t e r i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s " (D'Andrade, 1972a: 32); "The features were thus derived i n d u c t i v e l y , based on a d e t a i l e d scrutiny of the data and on i n t u i t i o n s gained from f i e l d research" ( S e i t e l , 1974: 52) - while (2) not examining t h e i r methods or showing how they d i d i t ( c f . Berreman, 1966: 351). Remarks such as these (even when elaborated [Paul, 1953]) show only that they, l i k e t h e i r subjects, r e l y on the "documentary method of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n " and, l i k e t h e i r subjects, take that method f o r granted (cf . Berreman, 1966: 352). In contrast, the work of the formal e l i -c i t e r s allows us to begin at least to examine that method. 7. Contrast the c a l l s for (1) an "ethnography of ethnography" (Berreman, 1966: 350; Conklin, 1968: 175), (2) "ethnographies of i n t e r r o g a t i o n " (Grimshaw, 1969: 21), and (3) a " s o c i o l o g i c a l pragmatics" (Morris, 1938: 30; Carnap, 1942: 10) with the actual work that has been done along these l i n e s by ethnomethodologists - for example, (1) Stoddart (1974), Katz (1975), Wieder (1975), (2) Crowle (1971), Cicourel (forthcoming) and (3) Garfinkel (1967a) and E l l i o t (1974) r e s p e c t i v e l y . See footnote f i v e of Chapter Two. 8. We have corrected the references to Hymes i n the T y l e r quote, and re-l e t t e r e d them according to the ordering adopted here. T y l e r argues ... the same point, i n opposition to Buchler (1964: 781), i n h i s 1966b, and again i n h i s 1969f. 57 9. In the next section we give ethmeth's account of the point T y l e r i s making. It i s i n t e r e s t i n g that T y l e r himself has been moving towards ethmeth (personal communication, 1972; 1973). 10. It w i l l become c l e a r that t h i s i s not being asked i n the sense i n which Denzin asks i t , the sense which i s c r i t i c i z e d by Zimmerman and Wieder (1970: 294; c f . G a r f i n k e l , 1967a [1964]: 74 f n . 13). 11. Other than i n the writings of ethnomethodologists, the notion of "index" can be found, pe r s i s t e n t but l a r g e l y untreated, and under various names, i n semiotic, philosophy and l i n g u i s t i c s (Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970; B a r - H i l l e l , 1970 [1969]: 198-199). Here i s just a sample of references, i n c l u d i n g a couple from sociology and anthropology: Peirce (1932: 143, 170-172), Morris (1938: 17-25), Dewey (1946), Reichenbach (1947: 4-6), Burks (1949), Kecskemeti (1952: 75-78), B a r - H i l l e l (1970 [1954, 1963, 1969]), Jakobson (1956: 61, 66; 1971 [1957]: 131; 1971 [1965]: 346-347, 357-358), Lounsbury (1960: 123), Szasz (1961: 115-116), Weinreich (1966: 154-158; 1968: 166), Fillmore (1966: 220), Wells (1967: 104), Lyons (1968: 275-281), F r i e d r i c h (19 71: 170), Bauman (1973: 5). Garfinkel and Sacks (1970) d e t a i l i n d e x i c a l i t y ' s i n t e l l e c t u a l h i s t o r y i n philosophy and l o g i c , i n c l u d i n g the discussions by Husserl, Russell and Goodman. I t s treatment i n semiotic since Peirce has been given elsewhere ( E g l i n , 1972). B r i e f l y , Morris, who found i t i n Peirce, l o s t i t between Foundations Of The Theory of Signs (1938) and Signs,  Language and Behavior (1946) , i t s absence continuing into ethsem through Goodenough's discussion of signs i n h i s foundational 1957 paper (as already stated). This was written i n the same year (1954) that B a r - H i l l e l published "Indexical expressions", and at about the same time that Garfinkel coined the term "ethnomethodology" (G a r f i n k e l , 1974 [1968]). "I use the term 'ethnomethodology' to r e f e r to the i n v e s t i g a t i o n of the r a t i o n a l properties of inde x i c a l expressions and other p r a c t i c a l ac-tions as contingent ongoing accomplishments of organized a r t f u l practices of everyday l i f e " ( G a r f i n k e l , 1967b: 11; c f . 1972: 309). 12. We put i t t h i s way, understanding the "problem" to be an a n a l y t i c (as opposed to a concrete) one. We do not mean to suggest that, for members i n t h e i r u n r e f l e c t i v e everyday a c t i v i t y , i n d e x i c a l i t y presents troublesome problems. ("Member" includes ethnosemanticists (ethsemists) as p r a c t i c i n g professionals.) However, for t h i s member, the resolu-t i o n proposed here remains an unhappy one. 13. Ethnographers' methods f or " t e l l i n g " t h e i r work as adequate ethnography have been documented at length i n a recent doctoral d i s s e r t a t i o n by Stoddart (1975) . Katz has treated s i m i l a r issues i n h i s recent doctoral d i s s e r t a t i o n (Katz, 1975). We w i l l not discuss these matters here. 58 CHAPTER FIVE  CONCLUSION TO PART ONE Using the d i s t i n c t i o n between brute and i n s t i t u t i o n a l facts we distinguished three kinds of sociology by t h e i r objects of explanation. " P o s i t i v i s t i c " sociology (Sociology 1000) seeks to explain r e g u l a r i t i e s by theories. "Grammatical" sociology (Sociology 2000) seeks to explicate c o n s t i t u t i v e rules i n grammars. Interpretive sociology (Sociology 3000) seeks to account f o r i n s t r u c t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s through i n t e r p r e t i v e accounts ( c f . Coulter, 1974: 104). The f i r s t enterprise depends upon the second enterprise which depends upon the t h i r d . Into t h i s scheme we i n -troduced two approaches the goal of which i s an adequate d e s c r i p t i o n of c u l t u r a l competence - ethnosemantics and ethnomethodology. By i d e n t i f y i n g semantical and c o n s t i t u t i v e rules we cast ethsem as a kind of "grammatical" sociology. Because of the documentary method and the et cetera clause we proposed that ethmeth i s a kind of i n t e r p r e t i v e sociology. We presented a d e t a i l e d methodological c r i t i q u e of ethsem from ethmeth. Ethsem f a i l s i n r e l a t i o n to ethmeth j u s t as "grammatical" sociology f a i l s i n r e l a t i o n to i n t e r p r e t i v e sociology - they neglect the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a l foundations of t h e i r grammatical r u l e s . A number of conclusions can be drawn - (1) about s c i e n t i f i c sociology, (2) about s o c i o l i n g u i s t i c (semantic) theory, and (3) about both i n terms of the immediate subject of t h i s work, ethno-semantics . 59 (1) As has been said before (Sacks, 1963; Zimmerman and Po l l n e r , 1970; Wilson, 1972; E l l i o t , 1974), s c i e n t i f i c explanation and de s c r i p t i o n has no " l o g i c a l " or i n - p r i n c i p l e s u p e r i o r i t y over commonsense explanation and d e s c r i p t i o n . Our model of an i n s t r u c t i o n i s a formula for the opera-t i o n of commonsense. By showing that i n s t r u c t i o n s underlie c o n s t i t u t i v e rules which underlie r e g u l a r i t i e s , we hope to have shown, admittedly i n -d i r e c t l y , that commonsense work i s foundational f o r the p r a c t i c e of science, s p e c i f i c a l l y s c i e n t i f i c sociology. This i s the "point" referred to at the end of the section on Sociology 1000 i n Chapter Two. (2) While i t i s true that " L i n g u i s t i c forms, whether morphemes or l a r g e r constructions, are not t i e d to unique chunks of semantic r e f e r -ence l i k e baggage tags" (Frake, 1962: 77), i t w i l l not do, we contend, to say that . . . i t i s the use of speech, the s e l e c t i o n of one statement over another i n a p a r t i c u l a r s o c i o l i n g u i s t i c context, that points to the category boundaries on a culture's cognitive map (Frake, 1962: 77). That i s , i t w i l l not do to say that and mean by i t that such s e l e c t i o n i s domain-governed. As we saw i n Chapter Four domains do not solve the prob-lem of context. Furthermore, i t i s no improvement to p a r t i t i o n use accord-ing to s o c i o l i n g u i s t i c context ( s i t u a t i o n , speech community, c l a s s , d i a -l e c t , s t y l e , r e g i s t e r , code, channel, e t c . ) . The same problem which bedevils domain dogs a l l such "pragmatic" f a c t o r s . As we have argued throughout, an adequate s o c i o l o g i c a l pragmatics needs be i n t e r p r e t i v e . (3) Both these points are present i n the c r i t i q u e of ethsem i n Chapter Four. The nub of t h i s c r i t i q u e i s that ethsem leaves out of 60 account the i n t e r p r e t i v e work of s o c i e t a l members, incl u d i n g that of i t s own p r a c t i t i o n e r s . In the l i g h t of ethmeth, ethsem i s another case of "constructive a n a l y s i s " (Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970: 340). Its i n t e r n a l problems of abstracting from pragmatics and of context (except i n Ty l e r ' s r a d i c a l sense) reduce to one of s u b s t i t u t i n g objective f or i n d e x i c a l expres-sions. In Garfinkel's terms, seeking such s u b s t i t u t a b i l i t y provides con-s t r u c t i v e analysis with i t s i n f i n i t e task (Garfinkel and Sacks, 19 70: 339, 349). I t s achievement of orderly r e s u l t s i s shot through with " p r a c t i c a l s o c i o l o g i c a l reasoning"; that i s , i n common with a l l conventional s o c i a l -science data extraction from speech (Cicourel, 1967: 119), i t r e l i e s on common-sense methods of making sense for accomplishing i t s e l f as r a t i o n a l . It r e l i e s on the very competence which-it i s seeking to discover and des- c r i b e , but, unlike ethnomethodology, does not make that resource a topic (Turner, 1970a: 117; Zimmerman and P o l l n e r , 1970). Rather than standing over against the world for which they are said to account, i t s r e s u l t s are further elaboration of that world, a production rooted i n that world. As such ethnosemantics becomes another case for ethnomethodological inves-t i g a t i o n - i n v e s t i g a t i o n aimed at "discovering whatever i t i s one has to know...." Such an i n v e s t i g a t i o n i s the subject of Part Two. PART TWO DATA; USING THE SAME MATERIALS, AN ETHNOSEMANTIC  STUDY, AND AN ETHNOMETHODOLOGICAL STUDY, OF CULTURAL COMPETENCE 61a CHAPTER SIX  INTRODUCTION TO PART TWO To give body to the argument of Part One, two empirical studies done by the author are presented. The f i r s t study i s a conventional eth-sem i n v e s t i g a t i o n , the second an ethmeth inquiry into the f i r s t . The study by Black and Metzger (1965) of American lawyer terms provided the model f o r our ethsem study - on terms for Canadian doctors. The ethmeth o l i t e r a t u r e provided many examples of the analysis of conversational mat-e r i a l s (Douglas, 1970; Sudnow, 1972; Turner, 19 74) - we r e l y mostly on Cicourel's (forthcoming) study of the taking of medical h i s t o r i e s by doc-t o r s . The strategy of turning a conventional study on i t s head has been used before - i n d i s s e r t a t i o n s by Wieder (1975 [1969]) and Crowle (1971). Mention of them w i l l help place t h i s part of the present work i n the con-text of a relevant l i t e r a t u r e . Wieder conducted a "participant-observation" study of a halfway house. He formulated i t as ...embarking on a t r a d i t i o n a l ethnography of a normative culture and then turning...attention to the production of that ethnography as an accomplishment (19 75: [ms.] 20). On the basis of lengthy observation and formal and informal interviews with s t a f f and residents, he "discovered" a set of maxims - the "convict code". At the l e v e l of a t r a d i t i o n a l ethnography the code was h i s r e s u l t s . It consisted of rules that any member to that s e t t i n g would need to know 62 to act appropriately i n the s e t t i n g . That i s , the code was a grammar. At t h i s l e v e l the study i s an example of Sociology 2000. However, by "stepping back" and looking now at h i s own and others' formulating of, invoking of, and appeal to, the code as an i n t e r p r e t i v e device, he came to see that What s o c i o l o g i s t s describe as the convict code i n t h e i r wri-tings i s one further .instance of the product which re s u l t s from the pra c t i c e s of ' t e l l i n g the code'. Such accounts have the same l o g i c a l status that ' t e l l i n g the code' has i n the very s e t t i n g s i n which the code i s t o l d . . . . Thus, ' t e l l i n g the code', and any p a r t i c u l a r instance of formu-l a t i n g the code, e x h i b i t s , rather than describes or explains, the order that members achieve through t h e i r p ractices of show-ing and t e l l i n g each other that p a r t i c u l a r encountered features are t y p i c a l , regular, orderly, coherent, motivated out of con-siderations of normative constraint, and the l i k e (Wieder, 1975: [ms.] 235-236, emphasis added). More simply, Instead of 'predicting' behaviour, [a code] rule i s a c t u a l l y employed as an i n t e r p r e t i v e device...[but i s ] experienced as p r e d i c t i v e (Wieder, 1975: [ms.] 202-203, emphasis added). This looks back to the conclusion of Part One and forward to the conclu-sion of Part Two. In contrast to Wieder's use of the ethnographic method, Crowle's work focused on the experimental method - s p e c i f i c a l l y , the post-experi-mental interview. He conducted a series of conventional experiments and tape-recorded the post-experimental interviews. At one l e v e l these pro-cedures gave conventional results on the s o c i a l - p s y c h o l o g i c a l topic i n question - the e f f e c t s of evaluation apprehension and commitment on con-fession of p r i o r information by f u l l y informed subjects. In these terms the study i s a case of Sociology 1000. 63 However, he then reviewed the (transcribed) interviews as s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n s i n t h e i r own r i g h t . He found that, i n order to maintain the sense of the questions, interviewers routinely deviated from the "standar-dized" interview s c r i p t . It seems safe to conclude that standardization...of the i n t e r -view could only be achieved by v i o l a t i o n s of some of the basic rules of s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n [for example, c u t t i n g o f f an ' i n t e r -ested speaker'] (Crowle, 1971: 40). He concludes further, Thus i n doing our experiment we r e l i e d on various i m p l i c i t , unexplicated and i n t u i t i v e a b i l i t i e s of the p a r t i c i p a n t s - they were resources of the experiment, i n the same way as the labora-tory and the stimulus materials were resources - the experiment would not have worked without them (Crowle, 1971: 57). Our study resembles Wieder's study i n being an ethnography. It resembles Crowle's study by focusing on interviews. It resembles both by having two parts, where the second part i s a re-analysis of the f i r s t part. Chapter Seven describes the ethsem study and o f f e r s i t s conventional re-s u l t s - an i n c i p i e n t grammar of the domain of doctors' terms. Chapter Eight then d e t a i l s the i n t e r p r e t i v e work by which those r e s u l t s were achieved i n the course of the interviews and analysis which generated them. Chapter Nine concludes. 64 CHAPTER SEVEN  TERMS FOR CANADIAN DOCTORS - ETHNOSEMANTICS Af t e r a b r i e f d e s c r i p t i o n of the Black and Metzger study of American lawyer terms (the Lawyers Study),we s h a l l present the methods and r e s u l t s of our study of doctors' terms (the Doctors Study). The Lawyers Study Six hours of interviews with one informant, a law student, pro-duced a chart of t h i r t y - s i x lawyer terms each defined by a se r i e s of values on three major dimensions. For example, Table I reproduces one l i n e of Table I of the Lawyers Study - the chart of lawyer terms. TABLE I ONE LINE FROM THE CHART OF REFERENCE TERMS FOR LAWYERS TERM DIMENSIONS Kind of term Settings Kinds of p r a c t i c e 1.1 2.1 2.2 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 Defense Lawyer B BC AB AcB Ab A Aa C Source: Black, Mary B., and Duane Metzger, "Ethnographic d e s c r i p t i o n and the study of law", p. 157. 65 When translated from the code of dimensions and t h e i r values which accom-panies the table, the l e t t e r s i n the table mean that When a lawyer (law student) c a l l s a person a 'defense lawyer', he i s using a term - that i s d e s c r i p t i v e of the man's p r a c t i c e (B on 1.1); - that i s not used on court proceedings, but may be said about a lawyer on a case, and also where no p a r t i c u l a r case i s i n -volved (B and C, on 2.1); - that i s used when the speaker i s t a l k i n g to other lawyers; also when he i s t a l k i n g to nonlawyers (A and B, on 2.2); The referent of the term: - (3.1) may be s p e c i a l i z i n g i n criminal work (B), or else i n the area of c i v i l p r a c t i c e c a l l e d 'insurance .law' (Ac); - (3.2) does a l o t of t r i a l work, representing defendants (Ab); - (3.3) has c l i e n t s who r e t a i n h i s services i n d i v i d u a l l y (A); - (3.4) appears i n t r i a l court to do h i s work (Aa); - (3.5) has an independent pra c t i c e (C) (Black and Metzger, 1965: 161). Such an account was not, however, to be taken as f i n a l r e s u l t s . The chart represents a stage i n the e l i c i t i n g - a n a l y s i s - v a l i d a t i o n process. It i s neither the complete corpus of frames, terms, and responses by which the information was obtained, nor a f i n a l elegant analysis of minimal differences i n c r i t e r i a governing s e l e c t i o n of lawyer reference.terms. It i s simply a working device constructed by the ethnographer i n the f i e l d at a point i n the e l i c i t i n g where a systematic v a l i d a t i o n of data was de-s i r e d (Black and Metzger, 1965: 156). (The Doctors Study was c a r r i e d to a s i m i l a r stage.) The process of e l i c i t i n g - a n a l y s i s - v a l i d a t i o n consisted of (1) learning appropriate native-language questions (for example, "what kinds of l e g a l p r a c t i c e are there?") , (2) presenting these question frames to the informant, systematically s u b s t i t u t i n g the lawyer terms i n the frame ( f o r example, "Does the Attorney General press l i t i g a t i o n ? " , "Does the defense lawyer press l i t i g a t i o n ? " "Does the [X]....?"), and (3) determining the minimal set of questions that w i l l discriminate a l l the terms. 66 The Doctors Study was e s s e n t i a l l y a r e p l i c a t i o n of the Lawyers Study as described here. The Doctors Study E l i c i t i n g Over a period of a year and a h a l f the author made several v i s i t s to the Paediatrics Department of the Faculty of Medicine of a large Western Canadian u n i v e r s i t y . The department i s situated i n a large c i t y h o s p i t a l . There he conducted formal interviews with three informants, and informal interviews with two informants, one informant being i n both groups. The seven or eight hours of t a l k were tape-recorded, and the bulk of them tran-scribed. The informants were doctors. A l l but one were p a e d i a t r i c s p e c i a l -i s t s , the one being a resident. As a p a r t i a l test a further interview was recorded much l a t e r i n the home of a general p r a c t i t i o n e r . The f i r s t informal interview was directed at discovering relevant questions and ascertaining the rough boundaries of the domain. A second, formal interview with the same informant furnished a f a i r l y d e f i n i t e c o l -l e c t i o n of terms and some possible dimensions on which they varied. Further formal interviews with d i f f e r e n t informants were done to check s t a b i l i t y of responses, to encounter possible v a r i a t i o n , and to enlarge the corpus. The main e l i c i t i n g device was the question-frame, "What kinds of [X] are there?". Responses became the terms i n new frames. In t h i s way, 67 following the formal e l i c i t i n g method, an attempt was made to exhaust the taxonomic i n c l u s i o n r e l a t i o n s among the c o l l e c t i o n . "What i s t h i s a d i v i -sion according to?" was one frame used to e l i c i t dimensions of d i f f e r e n c e . As with the Lawyers Study, the e l i c i t i n g , v a l i d a t i o n and analysis occurred as a continuous process. The r e s u l t s obtained are displayed i n the following section. Results Table II gives the p r i n c i p a l (ethnosemantic) r e s u l t s of the Doctors Study, and i s modelled on Table I of the Lawyers Study. Table III i s the key to the symbols i n Table I I , the Lawyers Study again providing the model. With two sets of exceptions the dimensions and values given i n Table II I are s u f f i c i e n t to uniquely discriminate a l l the terms i n Table I I . "Gastroenterologist", for example, i s distinguished from "haematologist" by a d i f f e r e n t value on the dimension "system of the body"; the f i r s t of the two terms indicates a s p e c i a l t y i n the i n t e s t i n a l t r a c t , the second i n blood. The f i r s t set of exceptions i s the group of " t r a i n i n g " terms -resident, interne, etc. D e t a i l s are not given i n the tables but these terms vary according to the stage reached i n t r a i n i n g towards a s p e c i a l t y ; they are marked by years spent and exams passed. Synonyms form the second set of exceptions. "Doctor" and "physician 1" appear to be synonymous within the medical domain, though c e r t a i n p r a c t i t i o n e r s on the margins of the med-i c a l profession - optometrists, chiropractors, osteopaths - seem to warrant that l a b e l by some. "Nephrologist" and " r e n o l o g i s t " are synonymous, as are "general p r a c t i t i o n e r " and "family physician". TABLE IL CHART OF REFERENCE TERMS FOR CANADIAN DOCTORS 1 2 3 KIND OF TERM KIND OF WORK BASIS OF SPECIALTY physician 1. A 0 0 doctor A 0 0 physician 2. Be B o. surgeon Be A 0 general p r a c t i t i o n e r Bb B or 0 Ga family physician Bb B or 0 Ga public health doctor C B Gb p s y c h i a t r i s t C B D neonatologist C B Bb pe r i n a t o l o g i s t C B Ba p a e d i a t r i c i a n C B Be i n t e r n i s t C B Bd g e r i a t r i c i a n C B Be c a r d i o l o g i s t C B Aa dermatologist C B Ah. gastroenterologist C B A i endocrinologist C B Aj nephrologist C B Ak renologist C B Ak neurologist C B Ac p h y s i a t r i s t C B Ae rheumatologist C B ? r e s p i r o l o g i s t C B Ab haematologist C B Am Continued TABLE II (Continued) CHART OF REFERENCE TERMS FOR CANADIAN DOCTORS 1 2 3 KIND OF KIND OF BASIS OF TERM WORK. SPECIALTY anaesthetist C B Ea r a d i o l o g i s t C B Eb pathologist C B F o b s t e t r i c i a n C A Ba gynaecologist C A C ophthalmologist C A Ad ur o l o g i s t C A Ag otolaryngologist C A Af cardiovascular surgeon C A Aa thoracic surgeon C A Ab neurosurgeon C A Ac orthopaedic surgeon C A Ae p l a s t i c surgeon C A Ah i n t e r n Ba 0 0 resident Ba 0 0 fellow Ba 0 0 c e r t i f i c a t e Ba 0 0 "0" Not relevant 70 TABLE III CODE OF SEMANTIC DIMENSIONS KIND OF TERM A general term d e s c r i p t i v e of a l l persons who have passed t h e i r medical exams B d e s c r i p t i v e of "p o s i t i o n i n the profession" or " l e v e l of prac-t i c e " a i n t r a i n i n g b i n general p r a c t i c e c s p e c i a l i s t C d e s c r i p t i v e of s p e c i a l t y KIND OF WORK A "operates" B does not "operate" BASIS OF SPECIALTY A system of the body a heart b chest c b r a i n d eyes e bones f ear, nose and throat g urinary t r a c t h external parts i i n t e s t i n a l t r a c t j hormone system k. kidneys m blood B age a foetus and new borns b new borns c c h i l d r e n d adults e the old C sex (women) D mental/physical dualism (mental) E technology a anaesthetizing b X-rays F live/dead tissue (dead) G pr i v a t e / p u b l i c health a private b public 71 The l a s t two provide an i n t e r e s t i n g case of the " c r e a t i v i t y " or "p r o d u c t i v i t y " (Frake, 1962: 78) within t h i s system of terms. "Physician 2" i s a cover term f o r a l l those doctors i n medical rather than s u r g i c a l s p e c i a l t i e s . The movement within the profession to make general or family p r a c t i c e into a medical s p e c i a l t y i s marked by the coinage of the new term, "family physician", "physician" being the term i n d i c a t i n g the desired s t a -tus. Why, when public health became a s p e c i a l t y , the term "public health physician" did not a r i s e requires a d i f f e r e n t explanation. That public health does not enjoy the s o c i a l status of the other medical s p e c i a l t i e s i s no doubt related to i t s p r a c t i t i o n e r s being known as "public health doctors". More generally, further terms can be created i n at l e a s t three ways. (1) Combining s p e c i a l t y names produces such forms as "p a e d i a t r i c c a r d i o l o g i s t " and "haematological pathologist". (2) A s p e c i a l t y name can be combined with one of a number of more general terms: general general p a e d i a t r i c i a n general surgeon general pathologist (cf. general h o s p i t a l ) primary care primary care p a e d i a t r i c i a n anatomical anatomical pathologist ambulatory ambulatory p a e d i a t r i c i a n adolescent adolescent p a e d i a t r i c i a n diagnostic diagnostic r a d i o l o g i s t therapeutic therapeutic r a d i o l o g i s t (3) P a r t i c u l a r l y i n the f i e l d of research (laboratory medicine) s p e c i a l t i e s are spawned by combining "medical" with the name of the relevant science -72 "medical biochemist", "medical m i c r o b i o l o g i s t " , "medical g e n e t i c i s t " . . . . Though immunology i s a science, " c l i n i c a l immunology" i s yet a c l i n i c a l medical s p e c i a l t y rather than a laboratory medical s p e c i a l t y . We have not drawn on this d i s t i n c t i o n i n specifying the dimensions of Tables I I and I I I ; our goal there was merely to discriminate a l l the terms (while preserving the emic [Pike, 1967] d i s t i n c t i o n s ) . However, we have included i t i n the taxonomy shown as Figure 2. Many of the terms have a h i e r a r c h i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p that i s use-f u l l y presented i n the form of a taxonomic diagram. Several points about Figure 2 require comment. (1) There i s the problem of e s t a b l i s h i n g " l e x -emes". Taken s t r i c t l y , Conklin's c r i t e r i o n for i d e n t i f y i n g a lexeme -that " i t s meaning cannot be deduced from i t s grammatical s t r u c t u r e " (Conklin, 1962: 121) - would mean that only "doctor", "physician", "sur-geon" and the t r a i n i n g terms are true lexemes (suggestive though that may be). The meaning of terms l i k e " c a r d i o l o g i s t " , for example, i s p r e d i c t -able from a knowledge of (the meaning of?);the morphemes "cardio", "logo", and " i s t " . However, as Frake points out, a form such as [ c a r d i o l o g i s t ] " i s a standard segregate l a b e l whose function i n naming cannot be d i s t i n -guished from that of forms l i k e [surgeon]" (1962: 78). For this reason we l e t the s p e c i a l t y names displayed i n Figure 0T2e stand as lexemes. (2) However, not a l l taxa, or s l o t s i n the taxonomy, are l a b e l l e d with a lexeme (even so broadly defined). Non-lexemic terms are i d e n t i f i e d on the diagram by quotation marks. For example, though i t s labels are non-lexemic, or semantically endocentric (Conklin, 1962: 121, 132), the FIGURE 2 PARTIAL TAXONOMY OF TERMS FOR CANADIAN DOCTORS (Mgdical).. Doctor/Physician " S p e c i a l i s t " Physician Surgeon i 1 1 n "Lab. Phys." " C l i n i c a l Phys." (Surgeon?) i l i r~i—i i i i i i i i i i i i i i I i GP Pa PH PS Nn Pe P I Ge C D G E Np N Ph 0 Gy Ot U Op R In ? ? GP General P r a c t i t i o n e r Pa Pathologist PH Public Health Doctor Ps P s y c h i a t r i s t Nn Neonatologist Pe Pe r i n a t o l o g i s t P Paediat r i c i a n I Int e r n i s t Ge G e r i a t r i c i a n C C a r d i o l o g i s t D Dermatologist G Gastu@enterologist E Endocrinologist Np Nephrologist N Neurologist Ph P h y s i a t r i s t 0 O b s t e t r i c i a n Gy Gynaecologist Ot Otolaryngologist U Urologist Op Ophthalmologist R Resident In Interne d i s t i n c t i o n between "laboratory physician" and " c l i n i c a l p h y s i c i a n " i s important i n that i t i s drawn by the Royal College of Physicians and Sur-geons of Canada with respect to the examination of candidates; i t also r e f l e c t s a differ e n c e of emphasis as between "the care of pa t i e n t s " ( c l i -n i c a l s p e c i a l t i e s ) and the "study of disease per se" (laboratory s p e c i a l -t i e s ) . Whether " s p e c i a l i s t " i s lexemic or not i s both moot and of l i t t l e import for this work. (3) In common with taxonomies from other domains (Conklin, 1962 132) the medical taxonomy has terminal taxa (that i s , those at the lowest l e v e l of the taxonomy) which are lexemic, plus a host of non-lexemically l a b e l l e d categories below the l e v e l of the terminal taxa. The names f o r these are formed i n the combinatorial ways already described. (4) Not a l l taxa are uniquely l a b e l l e d . The domain of medical doctors has the f a m i l i a r problem of the same term occurring at d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s of the taxonomic hierarchy. "Physician" i s both a permissible cover term for the domain, contrasting with the names of other professional wor-kers (lawyer, teacher...), and a class of s p e c i a l i s t , contrasting with "surgeon". (5) Some terms contrast at d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s . "Surgeon", f o r example, contrasts with "physician" at i t s own l e v e l , and with "resident" at the terminal l e v e l . The d i f f e r e n t kinds of contrast within a taxonomic hierarchy have been ably discussed by Kay (1966b; 1971). (6) While the discriminations portrayed i n this semantic arrangi ment are ones attested to by informants' responses, t h i s p a r t i c u l a r formula-75 t i o n i s the author's. I t i s not clear to what extent any s i n g l e informant "knows" the domain quite i n t h i s way. The question i s thus raised of the psychological r e a l i t y or cognitive v a l i d i t y of such an a n a l y s i s . This i s an abiding concern both of (ethno-)semantics (for example, Wallace, 1965) and of l i n g u i s t i c s (for example, on Chomsky, Hockett, 1968: 42,and Lyons, 1970: 24-25) . I t i s an issue of importance to the argument of t h i s work, but not i n the form addressed by these w r i t e r s ; we take i t up i n the next chapter. One seemingly important d i v i s i o n i s not shown on the taxonomy. I t i s the t r i p a r t i t e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n - i n t e r n i s t / p a e d i a t r i c i a n / g e n e r a l sur-geon. This was put forward by two informants. In an ethnomodel, or i n f o r -mant diagram (Conklin, 1964) drawn by one of them, these three categories occupied a "cent r a l p o s i t i o n between" general p r a c t i t i o n e r s and more s p e c i a l -ized s p e c i a l t i e s . By "between" i s meant that i n the informant's scheme of things the domain of medicine was organized i n the form of a "treatment route" - from g.p.s (supported by para-medics) to s p e c i a l i s t s (supported by laboratory and s u b - s p e c i a l t i e s ) . The "general s p e c i a l t i e s " - i n t e r n a l medicine, p a e d i a t r i c s , general surgery - occupy the middle region, supposed-l y r e ceiving patients from g.p.s and dispatching them,where necessary, to more s p e c i a l i z e d doctors. Any c l i n i c a l - m e d i c a l s p e c i a l i s t could, without cont r a d i c t i o n , also c a l l him/herself an i n t e r n i s t ( i f dealing mostly with adults) or a paediatric [X] ( i f dealing mostly with c h i l d r e n ) . Unlike the "true" or "sub-" s p e c i a l i s t s , the i n t e r n i s t , general p a e d i a t r i c i a n and gen-e r a l surgeon pra c t i c e i n most or a l l systems of the body. 76 This d i v i s i o n may attach only to h o s p i t a l settings and to those who p r a c t i c e there. The g.p. who served as informant did not reproduce th i s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , e i t h e r spontaneously or when asked. In addition, there i s the s p e c i a l t y , recognised by the Royal College (1973) but not o f -fered by informants, of general pathology. I t includes a l l the d i v i s i o n s of laboratory medicine, and thereby would seem to share the status of the three terms already discussed. I t should be stressed again that, as with the Lawyers Study, the r e s u l t s presented are not the " f i n a l r e s u l t s " . Not a l l terms i n the corpus are presented (for example, " s y p h i l o l o g i s t " , " o n cologist"). The set of dimensions and values i s not the most parsimonious that could be devised, nor the most elaborate - the system-of-the-body components l i s t e d i n Table I I I are merely glossed rather than given f u l l extensions. No attempt has been made to s p e c i f y "core" terms and generative rules for pre d i c t i n g the other terms. We would concur with S c h e f f l e r and Lounsbury that analyses such as those given here are " l i t t l e more than simple ethno-graphic statements" (1971: 143). Nevertheless, as with the Lawyers Study, the r e s u l t s are a "ver-s i o n " of f i n a l r e s u l t s , being i n our case adequate for our purposes. The question remains, of course, whether or not r e s u l t s of any kind, f i n a l or otherwise, ever avoid being always and only "adequate for some purpose". This issue w i l l be treated i n the next chapter. 77 CHAPTER EIGHT  TERMS FOR CANADIAN DOCTORS - ETHNOMETHODOLOGY The great bulk of s o c i o l o g i c a l and anthropological data i s gained through t a l k . These d i s c i p l i n e s may be unique i n knowing next to nothing about this t h e i r p r i n c i p a l research method. The interview i s the standard 1 form of the ta l k i n g method. Ethnosemantics i s known for that interview 2 method c a l l e d formal e l i c i t i n g . Chapter Four contained a c r i t i q u e of f o r -mal e l i c i t i n g , a c r i t i q u e done at one remove from data. The present chap-ter r e v i s i t s that c r i t i q u e , only now i n terms of data. The previous chapter presented r e s u l t s based on data gained from interviews i n which an attempt was made to use formal e l i c i t i n g . The interview talk was seen and used as a data-generating device. In contrast the present chapter considers that t a l k as a conversation. Given c e r t a i n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of conversation we r a i s e questions about the status of the ethnosemantic r e s u l t s of the previous chapter. Given the mind-bending nature of conversational and " i n d e x i c a l " a n a l y s i s , what we o f f e r here i s a serie s of remarks rather than a f i n i s h e d product: "our work i s now both too empirical to 'follow from' a theory of society and too young to propose one" (Moerman, 1972: 198). At l e a s t two kinds of c r i t i c a l material can be found i n the i n t e r -view t r a n s c r i p t s . (1) Reading "on the surface", as an ethnosemanticist might do, we can f i n d numerous substantive " v a r i a t i o n s " , " i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s " and "doubtful data". These items can be treated i n two ways: (a) i n terms 78 of them we could engage the ethsemist i n a debate directed at the repair of the o r i g i n a l a n a l y s i s ; (b) we could, however, see those "problems" as pointing to the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of ( f i n a l ) repair of that a n a l y s i s . We s h a l l try to i l l u s t r a t e t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i n what follows. (2) Reading "below the surface" we can discover another order of data to do with the structure of t a l k i t s e l f . At t h i s l e v e l what appears on the surface as mere v a r i a t i o n receives some motivation. We s h a l l try to i l l u s t r a t e this a lso. Some Data 3 Following ethnosemantic precedent I sought f i r s t to e s t a b l i s h the existence of a domain, to discover a meaningful and productive question about the domain, and to use such a question to generate a l i s t of terms with which to begin e l i c i t i n g proper. The Appendix contains a t r a n s c r i p t of the f i r s t part of the f i r s t interview. In discussing the t r a n s c r i p t s I s h a l l be making i m p l i c i t comparison with the e l i c i t i n g displayed i n Black and Metzger (1965: 147-153), and with the hypothetical exchanges given i n Frake (1962) and Tyler (1969c: 12). "Before We S t a r t " Notice that, i n keeping with a l l ethnosemantic discussion, the beginning of the interview i s absent. The work of introduction, arranging of seating, plugging-in of recorder, mutual sizing-up of ethnographer and informant - a l l t h i s goes, l i t e r a l l y , without saying. The same i s true of 79 the work that produced the occasion p r i o r to i t s happening - the phone-c a l l s , explanations, date-settings. Here i s part of my f i r s t f i e l d note. We walked over to King's o f f i c e where I was introduced. Boxer l e f t . "Explained" my status and the project to Tom King. He wanted to know what I would do with the information. I talked about "seman-t i c space" and assured him that no c o n f i d e n t i a l information was involved. In using the term "names" I was heard as meaning per-sonal names. Corrected that. He phoned Doug Race i n the I.C.N., told him I was a graduate student doing a paper or something, i n "language-semantics", and he used the term " s t a t i s t i c s " to explain the nature of the r e s u l t s . Then he t o l d me about Doug's rounds and said I could see Doug at 2:00 p.m. that afternoon.... Got to I.C.N, at 2:10 p.m Race doing rounds. By 2:25 p.m. he had f i n i s h e d , we had found a room, plugged i n tape recorder, switched on l i g h t , found out how to make recorder work, and were ready to go. I explained who I was (grad. student, d i s s e r t a t i o n ) and what I wanted': that I was interested i n the "world of medi-cine" and wanted to get into that by way of the names for the d i f -ferent kinds of what Tom King c a l l s " s p e c i a l t i e s " . The point of this i s that the interview between ethnographer and informant does not take place i n a s o c i a l vacuums. I n t e r a c t i o n a l work by the ethnographer i s necessary to gain access to the interview s e t t i n g . Such work throws into r e l i e f the already organized scenes of the l i v e s of the informants. The ethnographer i s constrained to provide an account of his presence, i d e n t i t y and proposed a c t i v i t y . Not only i s the ethnographic exercise conducted from within the society (Turner, 1970a: 177), but the society l i m i t s what can be discovered about i t . In the case of a ( s o c i a l - s c i e n t i f i c ) interview, the ethnographer's account of himself to the informant must include some version of what the interview i s to be about. One i n e v i t a b l y , as an i n t e r a c t i o n a l necessity, structures the f i e l d p r i o r to i n v e s t i g a t i n g i t . The ethnographer's desire to avoid imposing an a l i e n structure on the native domain remains an i d e a l 80 only. Not that i t i s ever f i n a l l y c l e a r what the interview i s or was " a l l about". "Rather ethnographer and informant r e l y on each other to t a l k against a background of some version of "what i t ' s a l l about". "What i t ' s a l l about" i s an unspoken resource of the encounter. This reappears below. 4 L i s t s There i s a tension i n the ethnosemantic f i e l d s i t u a t i o n between avoiding predetermining the domain, and i n s t r u c t i n g the informant how to answer. Both are recommended (Black, 1969) . In the l a s t s e c t i o n of Chap-ter Four we drew on Garfinkel's remarks about how i t i s ...necessary to i n s t r u c t the construing member to act i n accor-dance with the investigator's i n s t r u c t i o n s i n order to guarantee that the investigator w i l l be able to study th e i r usages as i n -stances of the usages the i n v e s t i g a t o r has i n mind (Garfinkel, 1967a [1964] : 70). I encountered this phenomenon i n trying to cope with the informant's i n i t i a l response to my opening question (Appendix, (1)): (2). I: Yeah, I guess so. I read this as an i n v i t a t i o n f o r a c l a r i f i c a t i o n . Now how i s c l a r i f y i n g to be done other than by further specifying what I want to f i n d out? As ethnoseman-t i c i s t I know that, operationally, I have found a domain i f the informant can produce a l i s t i n response to a "What kinds of [x] are there?" question. And, presumably, that i s an issue that one should be able to s e t t l e independently o mentioning that a l i s t i s what i s wanted; f o r , a f t e r a l l , the informant can a l ways f a i l to produce a l i s t . 81 But what does the production of a l i s t t e l l ? That the informant i s unpacking a cognitive arrangement i n h i s head which requires only the r i g h t question for i t s e l i c i t a t i o n ? Or i s i t rather that the informant i s e x p l o i t i n g his own "methodological" a b i l i t y to "do" a l i s t , since that i s what I said I wanted? Compare a shopping l i s t . Would i t be c o r r e c t to i n f e r that, because a member can construct a shopping l i s t , the items on the l i s t are mentally stored i n some fashion corresponding to the structure of the l i s t ? I propose, rather, that l i s t s are always and only produced for some purpose, th e i r structure speaking to the occasion for which they are produced, at the same time as c o n s t i t u t i n g that occasion. Not knowing quite what I want, the informant exploits his list-making capacity to produce a candidate answer-to-my-question. In so doing he provides for himself a device for generating more l i s t a b l e s - "doctors connected with" (12). He shows he can do a l i s t : ...subjects, i n complying with the investigator's demands and answer-ing h i s questions,may be doing no more, i n e f f e c t , then demonstrating the i r agreement (with the investigator) that such questions and oper-ations are answerable and/or permissible, as the case may be (Epling, 1967: 261). Formulating and Emergent Meaning In abstracting from utterance (12) such l a b e l s as "public health", "psychiatry" and "surgery", I (as ethsemist) am not only ignoring the "con-t r o l " of those items by the phrase "doctors connected with", but am f a i l i n g to appreciate t h e i r status as not simply "precoded e n t r i e s on a memory drum" but as elements i n a formulation of the f i e l d - a formulation rounded off 82 by the concluding words, "primarily when you say the d i f f e r e n t kinds of physicians, that's primarily-what i t means". What one finds i n the trans-c r i p t s - both i n t h i s case and i n others to be presented - i s that both parties are engaged i n what we s h a l l c a l l "formulating-and-waiting". This i s i n contrast to what i s presupposed of respondents by both t r a d i t i o n a l -s o c i o l o g i c a l and ethnosemantic interviewing p r a c t i c e s : The t r a d i t i o n a l view of interviewing provides for a l o g i c of questions and answers that standardizes the output....The f o r -mat i s seen as an obvious way to e l i c i t stored information. How stored information i s organized and how access i s to be made i s not defined as a serious problem. The researcher as-sumes the respondent w i l l be presented with 'normal' speaking intonation, standardized syn t a c t i c structures, and standardized topics as indexed by the same l e x i c a l items.... The organization of stored experiences, however, may require d i f f e r e n t formats and subroutines for th e i r e l i c i t a t i o n . The respondent's monitoring of h i s or her own output and the i n t e r -viewer's reactions, provides a feedback that can tri g g e r o f f other items of stored information that a standardized... question can block. Participants usually begin an interview with vague conceptions of what i s going to happen. They begin to assume common meanings that emerge i m p l i c i t l y and e x p l i c i t l y over the course of the interview. These emergent meanings provide an i m p l i c i t working background that can help c l a r i f y the p a r t i c i -pants' questions and answers. This negotiated c l a r i f i c a t i o n  process occurs i n a l l interviewing....But these negotiated ex- changes do not become part of the data base used for making i n - ferences r e f l e c t e d i n the findings (CicoureiL, forthcoming: [ms. ] 3-4, emphasis added). What the l i s t w i l l come to include develops over the course of the interview. A f t e r the f i r s t formulation (utterance (12)) comes a second based on paediatrician/surgeon/internist ((20)-(26)). What can be made of these i s subject to r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n the l i g h t of the surprise e l i c i t e d by my suggesting he be as exhaustive as he can: 83 (54) I: Oh r e a l l y ? (55) E: Yeah. 5 (56) I: Oh my l o r d . At t h i s point he introduces the term " s p e c i a l i s t " together with a systems-of-the-body d i v i s i o n as adevice to organize the f i e l d : (66) I: ...so that every system of the body you can think of uh you could f i n d a s p e c i a l i s t . . . . 'Eater s t i l l , (120) I: ...I I guess r e a l l y you can't exclude I don't know how vast you want to go uh there's uh many doctors who many M.D.s who deal exclusively with research. I guess you'd have to put them i n there I'm sure there's more.... Throughout I am responding with "uhuh", and i n that powerful way helping to produce what I_ came to formulate as a l i s t - a l i s t that became my "data", data for which the semantic arrangements proposed i n Chapter Seven are the anal y s i s . V a l i d a t i o n and V a r i a t i o n In what we might c a l l the "ethnosemantic f i e l d p r a c t i c e ideology", a f i r s t interview i s properly seen as an exploratory tapping of the rough out l i n e s of the domain. Controlled e l i c i t i n g i s a feature of subsequent i n -terviews i n which the ethnographer probes deeper. Interviews with d i f f e r e n t informants then provide v a l i d a t i o n and v a r i a t i o n . At best t h i s account obscures at l e a s t the following features of such interview occasions. Only for the ethnographer i s any subsequent interview a "second" to a previous " f i r s t " , or a " t h i r d " to a previous "second", and so 84 on. For each d i f f e r e n t informant the encounter with the ethnographer i s 6 for him or her a "new" occasion. I t may turn out to be a " s o l e " encounter - not a " f i r s t " since there i s no "second" for i t to be a " f i r s t " to. Only for the ethnographer i s a d i f f e r e n c e a " v a r i a t i o n " from the norm, or a term heard twice a "confirming" instance. Rather than being a method for d i s c o -vering shared knowledge, ethsem must presuppose shared knowledge i n order to 7 f i n d i t . One tack that can be taken i n a c r i t i q u e of ethsem i s to c i t e cases which do not f i t the proposed semantic arrangement. So, for example, I can produce from my data the l a b e l "ophthalmologist" and the following utterances: E: Would you say an ophthalmologist was a kind of physician? I: (4) An ophthalmologist might be more of a physician or more of a surgeon but b a s i c a l l y he would be more of a physician. According to the Royal College, however, ophthalmology i s a s u r g i c a l s p e c i a l t y . (Notice how I c i t e the Royal College as an authority - j u s t as a member would! This i s taken up below.) Also, I can c i t e the "diagnostic proce-dures" that a neonatologist performs that can be glossed as "minor surgery" - though being physicians they are not supposed to operate. S i m i l a r l y , general p r a c t i t i o n e r s w i l l perform caesarian sections i f no o b s t e t r i c i a n i s a v a i l a b l e . A public health doctor may be a (licensed) general p r a c t i t i o n e r ; a h o s p i t a l resident may be a g.p., though i t i s not allowed; and so on. To argue thus, however, i s to engage the semantic ethnographer on hi s or her own ground. The i d e o l o g i c a l response i s to improve the analysis by bringing the " v a r i a t i o n " into the model. This can be done under the auspices of such statements as 85 Variants are not mere deviations from some assumed basic or-ganization; with t h e i r rules of occurrence they are the organiza- t i o n (Tyler, 1969c: 5). V a r i a t i o n that cannot be accommodated in t h i s way can be accounted f o r i n terms of a domain's "fuzzy boundaries" or i n terms of " p r o b a b i l i s t i c con-si d e r a t i o n s " , and the l i k e . The ultimate weapon i s to invoke the compe-tence/performance d i s t i n c t i o n and treat "performance" as a r e s i d u a l cate-gory or wastebasket f o r unexplained v a r i a t i o n . Analysis c a r r i e d out under these assumptions assimilates "appro-p r i a t e " use of a term to (semantically) " c o r r e c t " use. What the work of conversational analysts has shown, and which i s i n i t s e l f a commonplace observation, i s that the "correctness" of a use i s not a necessary, or for many purposes a sanctionable, c r i t e r i o n of appropriate use (Moerman, 1972: 199) . (1) A: Do you want a coffee? B: No, I've j u s t eaten. (2) (Sign a d v e r t i s i n g book sale) BOOKS AND PAPERBACKS These n a t u r a l l y occurring events were "noticed" by me under a viewing r u l e derived from ethsem. They c l e a r l y contradict simple taxonomic r e l a t i o n s that one might propose for the domains of "eating ( ? ) " and "books". Yet no sooner i s one confronted with them than one i s elaborating the sense of the items and the occasions i n which they (might have) occurred i n order to render those uses p l a u s i b l e ( c f . Fillmore, 1973: 285 f n . 3). This a c t i v i t y  i s members' work. Members r e l y on each other to f i n d a r u l e ( i n s t r u c t i o n -86 Chapter Two) with which to "see" the items as "rule-governed", "orderly", "regular", and thereby ordinary and unnoticeable (Wieder, 1970: 134). While, under some supposed "objective" standard, I could c u l l from my interview data contradictory uses of terms, i n doing so I would be f a i l i n g to see that f o r both informant and ethnographer such uses raised no problems of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . I t i s not that "correctness" i s never im-portant, but that i t s being important for some purposes and not for others i s p r e c i s e l y what i s true about i t . "Correctness" i s always "correctness-f o r - a l l - p r a c t i c a l - p u r p o s e s " . I t i s e s s e n t i a l to r e a l i z e that 'true' and ' f a l s e ' , l i k e 'free' and Unfree', do not stand for anything simple at a l l ; but only for a general dimension of being a r i g h t or proper thing to say as opposed to a wrong thing, i n these circum-stances, to t h i s audience, for these purposes and with these intentions (Austin, 1962: 144) .8 For many p r a c t i c a l purposes correctness i s not only not important, 9 but to i n s i s t on i t i s to be seen as incompetent. For other purposes the issue matters. Thus, The American Medical Association recently has been engaged i n a running argument with the Department of Commerce to decide whether the p r a c t i c e of medicine i s a trade or a profession (Bram, 1955: 46). In a l e t t e r to a newspaper concerning labour r e l a t i o n s and withdrawal of services by housemen (residents and interns) i n the h o s p i t a l s of the pro-vince, an i n t e r n writes, 'Interns are not doctors but students working to become doctors'. This statement i s a misrepresentation of the f a c t s . Mr. Brown has misled the media and the p u b l i c by f a i l i n g to discriminate between the terms doctor (MD) and licensed physician. As the 87 r e g i s t r a r of the College of Physicians of [Province X] can confirm, a l l interns i n [Province X] are doctors having graduated from approved u n i v e r s i t i e s . Is an osteopath a doctor? "Yes", says one informant. "No", says the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of Canada. Compare the 1974 Canada Income Tax F i l i n g Guide, paragraph 49, Medical Expenses: The following are the types of expenses you may claim: (a) payments to a h o s p i t a l or q u a l i f i e d medical p r a c t i t i o n e r , d e n t i s t or nurse (the expression 'medical p r a c t i t i o n e r ' i n -cludes a q u a l i f i e d chiropractor, C h r i s t i a n Science p r a c t i t i o n e r , naturopath, optometrist, osteopath, p o d i a t r i s t or therapeutist); (b) (19). The point of these examples i s not that any p o s i t i o n i s (going to be i n the end) the one-and-only r i g h t one. The point i s that here we have members defining terms and appealing to reasonable grounds to support t h e i r d e f i -n i t i o n s because i t matters. I t i s not that another member i s not e n t i t l e d to formulate another d e f i n i t i o n and invoke reasonable grounds f o r i t s adoption. Rather, we are saying that what one can f i n d i n the world are  members doing ethnographies f o r each other (Ga r f i n k e l , 1967b: 10) f o r some p r a c t i c a l purpose. For the i n t e r n , the Royal College and Revenue Canada, 10 who gets to be c a l l e d "doctor" i s at some time, on some occasions, and for some purposes an important and consequential matter. What medical informants supply f o r semantic ethnographers, and with the production of which the ethnographer collaborates, are ethnogra- phies for the d i s i n t e r e s t e d i n q u i r e r . They are "off-the-top-of-my-head", "offhand", "I've-never-really-done-this-before", "we-don't-know-often-among-ourselves-what-we-mean-by-the-designations-of-such-and-such", "that's-r e a l l y - o f - v a l u e - t o - y o u - i s - i t ? " ethnographies. I t i s clear that what i s 88 good enough for a s o c i a l - s c i e n t i f i c interview i s not necessa r i l y adequate for deciding employment status and wage scales. What w i l l pass'muster i n a half-hour (interview-) conversation between rounds w i l l not s a t i s f y the Royal College. Indeed i t i s the l a t t e r ' s s p e c i f i c business to s t i p u -l a t e what-counts-as-a-kind-of-(medical)-X. And because i t i s known to be i t s business i t i s not necessa r i l y the (important) business of anybody else. Their business can and does go on i r r e s p e c t i v e , i n an important sense, of terminology. 89 FOOTNOTES 1. This i s not to say that s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s do not know how to i n t e r -view. On the contrary, they are (often) experts. I t i s that very knowledge which has provided for the large s o c i o l o g i c a l l i t e r a t u r e on "the interview" - a l i t e r a t u r e bent l a r g e l y on the improvement of the interview as a research tool ( c f . Manning, 1967; for the "medical stu-dent" case see Becker, 1956). But what i t i s we know i n knowing how to interview i s l a r g e l y unknown. For knowing how to interview derives from knowing how to t a l k . Only i n the l a s t decade or so has talk been studied systematically - by Sacks, Schegloff, Turner,Jefferson and others. 2. Though not the only t a l k i n g method i n ethsem, i t i s the most i n t e n -dedly rigorous one. While notice must be taken of Frake's disclaimer - "Let me emphasize.... that I do not believe an adequate ethnography can be produced from a record only of what people say, most e s p e c i a l l y i t cannot be produced from a record only of what people say i n a r t i f i -c i a l interviewing contexts removed from the scene of t h e i r ordinary c u l t u r a l performances" (1964a: 133) - i t must be said that i t i s not clear (1) how "anything more" would improve on the interview product, nor (2) how that "anything more" i s i t s e l f done. See the s e c t i o n on i n d e x i c a l i t y i n Chapter Four. 3. In t a l k i n g about myself as interviewer i t seems more natural to use " I " than the "we" used heretofore. 4. This s e c t i o n on l i s t s has been r i c h l y informed by a conversation with Dr. W.W. Sharrock. 5. Here i s a s i m i l a r case from another interview. (In a sequence of questions aimed at f i n d i n g out the mean-ing of the s p e c i a l t y terms) E: Obstetrician? I: (5) uhm (4) women's diseases and the d e l i v e r y of c h i l d r e n mothers E: Gynaecologist? I: UhnI suppose (draws i n breath quickly) you're going to s p l i t i t l i k e that then you'd c a l l an o b s t e t r i c i a n uhm one who would d e l i v e r babies and you'd c a l l the gynae-c o l o g i s t a s p e c i a l i s t i n women's diseases. 90 6. Or perhaps an " i n t e r r u p t i o n " , "delay", " i n t e r e s t i n g i n t e r l u d e " or whatever. 7. Notice, further, that i n abstracting categories from h i s utterances I, the naive'ethnographer, am the one who i s deciding what i s a good answer and what can be taken from such an answer. Somewhat i n reverse I depend, at the same time, on his understanding what I am about so that I can then t r e a t h i s answers as naive, as "conditioned responses". 8. In contrast, compare Black (1969: 187 f n . 7). 9. See the studies reported i n Garfinkel (1967a [1964]). 10. By " c a l l e d " we mean "referred to as", not (necessarily) "addressed as". 91 CHAPTER NINE  CONCLUSION TO PART TWO To give substance to the argument of Part One we have presented i n Part Two an ethnosemantic study and an ethnomethodologicalcritique of that study. The c r i t i q u e was of ethsem's method of d e r i v i n g data from t a l k . We suggested that terms functioned i n t a l k i n ways that make i t impermissible to abstract them as l i s t s under the assumption that the l i s t , once ordered, represents a cognitive map of some s o r t . Rather i t i s more nearly true that that abstracting depends i t s e l f on the very c u l t u r a l com-petence i t i s attempting to e x p l i c a t e . This leaves the question of what to make of the semantic arrangements, such as the chart and taxonomy i n Chapter Seven, that form ethnosemantic r e s u l t s . Simply put, From the standpoint of ethnomethodology these apparently de-f i n i t i v e d escriptions appear as i d e a l i z a t i o n s of what members are doing when they employ categories and c r i t e r i a (Wieder, 1970: 134). What one has to know or b e l i e v e i n order to operate i n a manner acceptable to a society's members are j u s t such methods as " i d e a l i z i n g " , "abstracting", "formulating" and the l i k e . This i s not to say that terms do not have "stock uses" (from Ryle, quoted i n Turner [1970a: 186]). Rather, i t i s to say that the choice of one term over another i s not done from some d e f i n i t e c o l l e c t i o n , or from a c o l l e c t i o n organized i n a semantically well-formed way. Such c o l l e c t i o n s and t h e i r arrangements are, instead, the accom-plished productions of s k i l l e d ethnographers such as medical doctors and other anthropologists. 92 While the s p e c i f i c topic of this work has been the p r a c t i c e , r e s u l t s , and assumptions about language c h a r a c t e r i z i n g one approach i n anthropology known as ethnosemantics, we have hoped to speak also to soc-iology generally. Rather than attempt to summarize the whole d i s s e r t a t i o n l e t me conclude with a recommendation. It i s t h i s . Sociology must r e -discover philosophy - not the crude p o s i t i v i s m of c e r t a i n brands of the philosophy of science, but the philosophy of language, and perhaps pheno-menology. The reason i s simply t h i s : both the data ( i n huge part) and the theoriess of sociology are l i n g u i s t i c e n t i t i e s . We s h a l l return once more to ethsem to elaborate the point, then leave the l a s t word to Witt-genstein. As a footnote to her uncompromising ethnosemantic analysis of the Ojibwa taxonomy of " l i v i n g things", Black says she prefers ...to leave the arguments as to whether 'the world' exists i n the data, i n the ethnographer's d e s c r i p t i v e a n a l y s i s , or i n the language used by one or the other, to the philosophers' o f f i c e s and behavioural science graduate seminars, where such matters are of consequence. While these decisions may be basic to what an ethnographer does, the experience of confronting the 'raw' material and learning from i t something you had not known before need not wait upon t h e i r r e s o l u t i o n (1969: 187 f n . 4). The l a s t sentence quoted i s unexceptionable. But given ethsem's theory of language and perception (Chapter Four), one may ask how i t could pro-vide for "learning...something you had not known before" (where now Black i s the n a t i v e ) . A conclusion of t h i s work i s that an adequate account of' that process would needs invoke something l i k e the documentary method of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . This, as can be seen, reintroduces " p h i l o s o p h i c a l " ques-93 tions into the conduct of empirical work. Such questions cannot be l e f t to the philosophers' o f f i c e s and graduate seminars. Conversely, the l a t e r Wittgenstein's philosophy of language and the writings of Garfinkel may be characterized as contributions to an "ethnography of thinking", an enterprise that i s both ph i l o s o p h i c a l and empirical. This kind of philosophy i s surely not something a mature science or s c i e n t i s t needs to be separated from. Rather the opposite. Throughout I have been addressing an issue that i s caught w e l l i n these words: I t i s Wittgenstein's l a t e r doctrine that outside human thought and speech there are no independent, objective points of sup-port, and meaning and necessity are preserved only i n the l i n g u i s t i c practices which embody them. They are safe only because the practices gain a c e r t a i n s t a b i l i t y from r u l e s . But even the rules do not provide a fixed point of reference, because they always allow divergent i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . What r e a l l y gives the practices t h e i r s t a b i l i t y i s that we agree i n our int e r p r e t a t i o n s of the r u l e s . We could say that this i s fortunate, except that this would be l i k e saying that i t i s fortunate that l i f e on earth tolerates the earth's natural atmos-phere. What we ought to say i s that there i s as much s t a b i l i t y as there i s . This extreme anthropocentrism produces a strange e f f e c t on people. They f e e l that i t goes too f a r , and that i t ought to be possible to stop at some e a r l i e r point, as Wittgenstein himself had done i n the Tractatus. But where? (Pears, 1971: 168) . 94 LITERATURE CITED Reprint information i s given for many items though I have not t r i e d to be exhaustive. Where an a r t i c l e was reprinted i n one of the following books I have used an abbreviated reference for the c o l l e c t i o n : F-ishmanij.1968 = J.A. Fishman (ed.), Readings i n the sociology of language. The Hague: Mouton. Manners & Kaplan, 1968 = R.A. Manners and David Kaplan (eds.), Theory i n anthropology: a sourcebook. Chicago:, A-ldine. Tyler, 1969a = Stephen A. Tyler (ed.), Cognitive anthropology. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Ans comb e, G.E.M. 1958 "On brute f a c t s . " Analysis 18: 69-72. Atkins, John R. and Luke Curt i s 1968 "Game rules and the rules of c u l t u r e . " Pp. 213-234 i n I.R. Buchler and H.G. Nu t i n i (eds.), Game theory i n the behavioral sciences. Pittsburgh: U n i v e r s i t y of Pittsburgh Press. Attewell, Paul 1974 "Ethnomethodology since G a r f i n k e l . " Theory and Society 1: 179-210. Austin, John L. 1962 How to do things with words: the:.=William Jamesslectures delivered at Harvard U n i v e r s i t y i n 1955. (Edited by J.O. Urmson.) New York: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press. B a r - H i l l e l , Yehoshua 1964 Language and information: selected essays on t h e i r theory and ap p l i c a t i o n . Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley. 1970 "Indexical expressions". Pp. 69-88 i n Y. B a r - H i l l e l , Aspects (1954) of language. Jerusalem: Magnes Press. ( O r i g i n a l l y published i n Mind 63: 359-379 [1954].) 1970 "Can i n d e x i c a l sentences stand i n l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n s ? " Pp. 112-(1963) 115 i n Y. B a r - H i l l e l , Aspects of language. Jerusalem: Magnes Press. ( O r i g i n a l l y published i n Phi l o s o p h i c a l Studies 14: 87-90 [1963].) 95 B a r - H i l l e l , Yehoshua 1970 "Universal semantics and the philosophy of language: quandaries (1969) and prospects". Pp. 182-201 i n Y. B a r - H i l l e l , Aspects of l a n -guage. Jerusalem: Magnes Press. ( O r i g i n a l l y published i n Jaan Puhvel (ed.), Substance and structure of language. Ber-keley and Los Angeles: U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a Press, 1969, pp. 1-21.) 1970 Aspects of language: essays and lectures on philosophy of language, l i n g u i s t i c philosophy and methodology of l i n g u i s t i c s . Jerusalem: Magnes Press; Amsterdam: North-HoHand. 1971 "Out of the pragmatic wastebasket". L i n g u i s t i c Inquiry 2: 401-407. Basso, Keith 1972 "Ice and t r a v e l among the Fort Norman Slave: f o l k taxonomies and c u l t u r a l r u l e s . " Language i n Society 1: 31-49. Bauman, Zygmunt 1973 Culture aiidpraxis. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Becker, H.S. 1956 "Interviewing medical students." American Journal of Sociology 62: 199-201. Bentley, A.F. 1945 "On a c e r t a i n vagueness i n l o g i c I I . " Journal of Philosophy 42: 39-51. Berger, Joseph, Bernard P. Cohen and Morris Z e l d i t c h 1966 "Status c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and expectation s t a t e s . " Pp. 29-46 i n J . Berger, M. Z e l d i t c h and B. Anderson (eds.), S o c i o l o g i c a l theories i n progress. Volume one. Boston: Houghton M i f f l i n . Berreman, G.D. 1966 "Anemic and emetic analyses i n s o c i a l anthropology." American Anthropologist 68: 346-354. 1972 "S o c i a l categories and s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n i n urban India." American Anthropologist 74: 567-586. Black, Mary B. 1963 "On formal ethnographic procedures." American Anthropologist 65: 1347-1351. 1969 " E l i c i t i n g f o l k taxonomy i n Ojibwa." Pp. 165-189 i n Stephen A. Tyler (ed.), Cognitive anthropology. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 96 Black, Mary B. 1974 " B e l i e f systems". Pp. 509-577 i n John J . Honigmann (ed.), Handbook of s o c i a l and c u l t u r a l anthropology. Chicago: Rand McNally. Black, Mary B. and Duane Metzger 1965 "Ethnographic des c r i p t i o n and the study of law." Pp. 141-165 in Laura Nader (ed.), The ethnography of law. (American Anth-ropologist 66 [3] Part 2, s p e c i a l publication.) Menasha, Wis-consin: American Anthropological Association. (Reprinted i n Ty l e r , 1969a, pp. 137-165.) Black, Max 1962 "The analysis of r u l e s . " Pp. 95-139 i n M. Black, Models and (1958) metaphors. Ithaca, New York: C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y Press. ( O r i -g i n a l l y published as "Notes on the meaning of 'r u l e ' " , i n Theoria 24: 107-126, 139-161 [1958].) 1970 "Comment." Pp. 452-461 i n R. Borger and F. C i o f f i (eds.), Explanation i n the behavioral sciences. London: Cambridge University Press. Blum, A.F. and Peter McHugh 1971 "The s o c i a l a s c r i p t i o n of motives." American S o c i o l o g i c a l Re-view 36: 98-109. (Reprinted, with addendum, i n P. McHugh, S. R a f f e l , D.C. Foss and A.F. Blum, On the beginnings of s o c i a l inquiry. London and Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 19 74, pp. 21-46.) Bram, Joseph 1955 Language and society. New York: Random House. Bric k e r , V.R. 1974 "Some cognitive implications of informant v a r i a b i l i t y i n Zinacanteco speech c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . " Language i n Society 3: 69-82. Bruner, J.S. 1957 "Going beyond the information given." Pp. 41-70 i n J.S. Bruner (ed.), Contemporary approaches to cognition: a symposium at the Un i v e r s i t y of Colorado. Cambridge: Harvard Uni v e r s i t y Press. Bruner, J.S., J . J . Goodnow and G.A. Austin 1956 A study of thinking. New York: John Wiley. 97 Buchler, I.R. 1964 "Measuring the development of kinship terminologies: scalogram - and transformational accounts of Crow-type systems." American Anthropologist 66: 765-788. Burks, A.W. 1949 "Icon, index, and symbol." P h i l o s o p h i c a l and Phenomenological Research 9: 673-689. Burli n g , Robbins 1964a "Cognition and componential a n a l y s i s : God's truth or hocus-pocus." American Anthropologist 66: 20-28. (Reprinted i n Man-ners and Kaplan, 1968, pp. 514-519; and i n T y l e r , 1969a, pp. 419-428.) 1964b "Rejoinder." American Anthropologist 66: 120-122. (Reprinted i n Manners and Kaplan, 1968, pp. 521-523.) Carnap, Rudolf 1939 Foundations of l o g i c and mathematics. (International Encyclo-paedia of U n i f i e d Science, Vol. 1, No. 3.) Chicago: Univer-s i t y of Chicago Press. (Parts 1 and 2 reprinted i n J.A. Fodor and J . J . Katz [eds.], The structure of language. Englewood C l i f f s , New Jersey: P r e n t i c e - H a l l , 1964, pp. 419-436.) 1942 Introduction to semantics. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard Uni v e r s i t y Press. Chomsky, Noam 1957 Syntactic structures. The Hague: Mouton. 1965 Aspects of the theory of syntax. Cambridge, Massachusetts: M.I.T. Press. 1968 Language and mind. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World. (Enlarged e d i t i o n , New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972.) 1970a "Problems of explanation i n l i n g u i s t i c s . " Pp. 425-451 i n R. Borger and F. C i o f f i (eds.), Explanation i n the behavioral s c i -ences. London: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press. 1970b "Reply." Pp. 462-470 i n R. Borger and F. C i o f f i (eds.), Explan-ati o n i n the behavioral sciences. London: Cambridge Univer-s i t y Press. C i c o u r e l , A.V. 1967 "Kinship, marriage, and divorce i n comparative family law." Law and Society Review 1(2): 103-129. 98 C i c o u r e l , A.V. 1970 "The a c q u i s i t i o n of s o c i a l structure: towards a developmental sociology of language and meaning." Pp. 136-168 i n J.D. Douglas (ed.), Understanding everyday l i f e . Chicago: Aldine. ( O r i -g i n a l l y published i n I t a l i a n i n 1968; English version reprinted i n A.V. C i c o u r e l , Cognitive sociology. Harmondsworth: Pen-guin, 1973, pp. 42-73.) n.d. "Interviewing and memory." Theory and Decision (Forthcoming). Cohen, Bernard P. 1966 "On the construction of s o c i o l o g i c a l explanations." Unpub-l i s h e d paper presented at the annual meetings of the American S o c i o l o g i c a l Association, Miami, F l o r i d a . Cohn, Werner 1962 "Is r e l i g i o n universal? Problems of d e f i n i t i o n . " Journal f o r the S c i e n t i f i c Study of R e l i g i o n 2: 25-33. 1964 "What i s r e l i g i o n ? An analysis f o r c r o s s - c u l t u r a l comparisons." Journal of C h r i s t i a n Education 7: 116-138. 1967 " ' R e l i g i o n ' i n non-Western c u l t u r e s . " American Anthropologist 69: 73-76. 1969 "On the problem of r e l i g i o n i n non-Western c u l t u r e s . " Inter-nat i o n a l Yearbook of the Sociology of Religion 5: 7-19. Colby, B.N. 1966 "Ethnographic semantics: a preliminary survey." Current Anthropology 7: 3-17. 19 75 "Culture grammars." Science 187: 913-919. Conklin, H.C. 1962 "Lexicographical treatment of f o l k taxonomies." Pp. 119-141 i n F.W. Householder and Sol Saporta (eds.), Problems i n l e x i -cography. (International Journal of American L i n g u i s t i c s 28 [2] Part IV; Indiana Un i v e r s i t y Research Center i n Anthropology, Fo l k l o r e , and L i n g u i s t i c s , P u b l i c a t i o n 21.) Bloomington: Indiana U n i v e r s i t y . (Reprinted i n Fishman, 1968, pp. 414-433; and i n T y l e r , 1969a, pp. 41-59.) 1964 "Ethnogenealogical method." Pp. 25-55 i n Ward Goodenough (ed.), Explorations i n c u l t u r a l anthropology. New York: McGraw-Hill. (Reprinted i n T y l e r , 1969a, pp. 93-122.) 1968 "Ethnography." International Encyclopaedia of the S o c i a l S c i -ences 5: 172-178. 99 Conklin, H.C. 19 72 Folk c l a s s i f i c a t i o n : a t o p i c a l l y arranged bibliography of contemporary and background references through 19 71. New Haven: Yale U n i v e r s i t y , Department of Anthropology. Coulter, J e f f 1973 "Language and the conceptualization of meaning." Sociology 7: 173-189. 1974 "The ethnomethodological programme i n contemporary sociology." The Human Context 6: 103-122. Crowle, A.J. 1971 Post experimental interviews: an experiment and a s o c i o l i n -g u i s t i c a n a l ysis. Department of Sociology, U n i v e r s i t y of C a l -i f o r n i a , Santa Barbara: unpublished doctoral d i s s e r t a t i o n . D'Andrade, R.G. 1972a "A pro p o s i t i o n a l analysis of U.S. American b e l i e f s about i l l -ness." Department of Anthropology, University of C a l i f o r n i a , San Diego: unpublished ms. 19 72b " C u l t u r a l b e l i e f systems." Report to the National I n s t i t u t e of Mental Health Committee on So c i a l and C u l t u r a l Processes. D'Andrade, R.G., N.R. Quinn, S.B. Nerlove and A.K. Romney 1972 "Categories of disease i n American-English and Mexican-Spanish. 1 1 Pp. 9-54 i n A.K. Romney et a l . (eds.), Multidimensional s c a l i n g . Volume I I : Applications. New York: Seminar Press. Dewey, John 1946 "Peirce's theory of l i n g u i s t i c signs, thought, and meaning." Journal of Philosophy 43: 85-95. Douglas, Jack D. (ed.) 1970 Understanding everyday l i f e : toward the reconstruction of soc-i o l o g i c a l knowledge. Chicago: Aldine. Durbin, Marshall 1966 "The goals of ethnoscience. 1 1 Anthropological L i n g u i s t i c s 8(8): 22-41. E g l i n , Peter 1972 "Ethnosemantics and ethnomethodology." Department of Anthro-pology and Sociology, U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia: unpub-l i s h e d ms. 100 E l l i o t , Henry C. 1974 " S i m i l a r i t i e s and differences between science and common sense." Pp. 21-26 i n R. Turner (ed.), Ethnomethodology. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Epling, P.J. 1967 "Lay perception of kinship: 37: 260-280. a Samoan case study." Oceania Fillmore, 1966 1969 C.J. 1973 " D e i c t i c categories i n the semantics of 'come' of Language 2: 219-227. "Review of The state of the art by C F . Anthropologist 71: 711-713. Hockett. Foundations American "A grammarian looks to s o c i o l i n g u i s t i c s . " Pp. 273-287 i n R.W. Shuy (ed.), S o c i o l i n g u i s t i c s : current trends and prospects. (Report of the twenty-third annual round table meeting on l i n -g u i s t i c s and language studies, Monograph Series on Languages and L i n g u i s t i c s , No. 25, 1972.) Washington, D.C: Georgetown Uni-v e r s i t y Press. Frake, CO. 1961 1962 1964a 1964b "The diagnosis of disease among the Subanun of Mindanao." American Anthropologist 63: 113-132. (Reprinted i n D. Hymes [ed.], Language i n culture and society. New York: Harper and Row, 1964, pp. 193-214.) "The ethnographic study of cognitive systems." Pp. 72-85 i n Thomas Gladwin and W.C. Sturtevant (eds.), Anthropology and human behaviour. Washington, D.C: Anthropological Society of Washington. (Reprinted i n Fishman, 1968, pp. 434-446; and i n Manners and Kaplan, 1968, pp. 507-514; and i n T y l e r , 1969a, pp. 28-41.) "Notes on queries i n ethnography." Pp. 132-145 i n A.K. Romney and R.G. D'Andrade (eds.), T r a n s c u l t u r a l studies i n cognition. (American Anthropologist 66 [3] Part 2, s p e c i a l publication.) Menasha, Wisconsin: American Anthropological Association. (Reprinted i n T y l e r , 1969a, pp. 123-137.) "Further discussion of B u r l i n g . " American Anthropologist 66: 119. (Reprinted i n Manners and Kaplan, 1968, p. 521; and i n T y l e r , 1969a, p. 432.) 101 F r i e d r i c h , Paul 1971 "Anthropological l i n g u i s t i c s : recent research and immediate prospects." Pp. 167-184 i n Richard J . O'Brien, S.J., (ed.), L i n g u i s t i c s : developments of the s i x t i e s — v i e w p o i n t s for the seventies. (22nd annual round table, Monograph Series on Languages and L i n g u i s t i c s , No. 24, 1971.) Washington: George-town U n i v e r s i t y Press. n.d. "The l e x i c a l symbol and i t s r e l a t i v e non-arbitrariness." In M.D. Kinkade (ed.), C.F. Voegelin f e s t s c h r i f t . L i s s e : Peter de Ridder Press (Forthcoming). Ganz, J.S. 1971 Rules: a systematic study. The Hague: Mouton. Garfi n k e l , Harold 1956 "Some s o c i o l o g i c a l concepts and methods for p s y c h i a t r i s t s . " P s y c h i a t r i c Research Reports 6: 181-195. 1961 "Aspects of the problem of common-sense knowledge of s o c i a l s t r u c tures." Pp. 51-65 i n Transactions of the fourth world congress of sociology. Volume 4: The sociology of knowledge. (Edited by Kurt Wolff.) International S o c i o l o g i c a l Association. "A conception of, and experiments with, ' t r u s t ' as a condition of stable concerted actions." Pp. 187-238 i n O.J. Harvey (ed.), Motivation and s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n . New York: Ronald Press. "The r a t i o n a l properties of s c i e n t i f i c and common sense a c t i -v i t i e s . " Pp. 262-283 i n Harold G a r f i n k e l , Studies i n ethno-methodology. Englewood C l i f f s , N.J.: P r e n t i c e - H a l l . ( O r i -g i n a l l y published i n Behavioural Science 5: 72-83 [I960]; and i n N.F. Washburne [ed.], Decisions, values and groups. V o l -ume 2. New York: Pergamon, 1962, pp. 304-324.) 1967a "Common sense knowledge of s o c i a l structures: the documentary (1962) method of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n lay and professional fact f i n d i n g . " Pp. 76-103 i n Harold G a r f i n k e l , Studies i n ethnomethodology. Englewood C l i f f s , New Jersey: P r e n t i c e - H a l l . ( O r i g i n a l l y pub-l i s h e d i n J.M. Scher [ed.], Theories of the mind. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962, pp. 689-712.) 1963 1967a (1960) 1967a "Studies of the routine grounds of everyday a c t i v i t i e s . " Pp. (1964) 35-75 i n Harold G a r f i n k e l , Studies i n ethnomethodology. Engle-wood C l i f f s , New Jersey: P r e n t i c e - H a l l . ( O r i g i n a l l y published i n S o c i a l Problems 11: 225-250 [1964].) 1967a Studies i n ethnomethodology. Englewood C l i f f s , - New Jersey: P r e n t i c e - H a l l . 102 G a r f i n k e l , Harold 1967b "What i s ethnomethodology?" Pp. 1-34 i n Harold G a r f i n k e l , Studies i n ethnomethodology. Englewood C l i f f s , New Jersey: P r e n t i c e - H a l l . 1967c "Passing and the managed achievement of sex status i n an ' i n t e r -sexed' person, part 1." Pp. 116-185 i n Harold G a r f i n k e l , Stu-dies i n ethnomethodology. Englewood C l i f f s , New Jersey: P r e n t i c e - H a l l . 1967d " P r a c t i c a l s o c i o l o g i c a l reasoning: some features i n the work of the Los Angeles Suicide Prevention Center." Pp. 171-187 i n E.S. Shneidman (ed.), Essays i n s e l f - d e s t r u c t i o n . New York: Science House'. 1972. "[Discussion]." Footnote 3 on p. 312 of Harold G a r f i n k e l , (1966) 1972. ( O r i g i n a l l y published i n W. Bright [ed.], Sociolihguisfeie<:. t i c s . The Hague: Mouton, 1966, pp. 322-323.) 1972 "Remarks on ethnomethodology." Pp. 309-324 i n J . J . Gumperz and D. Hymes (eds.), Directions i n s o c i o l i n g u i s t i c s . New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 1974 "The o r i g i n s of the term 'ethnomethodology'." Pp. 15-18 i n (1968) R. Turner (ed.), Ethnomethodology. Harmondsworth: Penguin. (Excerpted from R;. H i l l and K.S. Crittenden [eds.], Proceedings of the Purdue symposium on ethnomethodology. Purdue Univer-s i t y : Purdue Research Foundation, 1968, pp. 5-11.) Ga r f i n k e l , Harold and Harvey Sacks 1970 "On formal structures of p r a c t i c a l actions." Pp. 337-366 i n J.C. McKinney and E.A. T i r y a k i a n (eds.), T h e o r e t i c a l sociology. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. Goffman, Erving 1959 The presentation of s e l f i n everyday l i f e . Garden C i t y , New York: Doubleday Anchor. ( O r i g i n a l l y published i n 1956). Goodenough, Ward 1956 "Componential analysis and the study of meaning." Language 32: 195-216. 1957 " C u l t u r a l anthropology and l i n g u i s t i c s . " Pp. 167-173 i n P.L. Garvin (ed.), Report of the seventh annual round table meeting on l i n g u i s t i c s and language study. (Monograph Series on Lan-guages and L i n g u i s t i c s , No. 9, 1957.) Washington, D.C: Georgetown University Press. (Pre-published i n B u l l e t i n of the Phi l a d e l p h i a Anthropological Society 9 [3]: 3-7 [1956]; re-printed i n D. Hymes [ed.], Language i n culture and society. New York: Harper and Row, 1964, pp. 36-39.) 103 Goodenough, Ward 1963 Cooperation i n change. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 1965 "Yankee kinship terminology: a problem i n componential analy-s i s . " Pp. 259-287 i n E.A. Hammel (ed.), Formal semantic analy-s i s . (American Anthropologist 67 [5] Part 2, s p e c i a l p u b l i c a -tion.) Menasha, Wisconsin: American Anthropological Associa-t i o n . (Reprinted i n T y l e r , 1969a, pp. 255-288.) 1967 "Componential a n a l y s i s . " Science 156: 1203-1209. 1968 "Componential a n a l y s i s . " International Encyclopaedia of the S o c i a l Sciences 3: 186-192. 1969 "Frontiers of c u l t u r a l anthropology: s o c i a l organization." Proceedings of the American P h i l o s o p h i c a l Society 113: 329-335. 1970 Description and comparison i n c u l t u r a l anthropology. Chicago: Aldine. Grimshaw, A.D. 1969 "Language as obstacle and as data i n s o c i o l o g i c a l research." S o c i a l Science Research Council, Items 23 (2): 17-21. Gumperz, J . J . and D e l l Hymes (eds.) 1972a Directions i n s o c i o l i n g u i s t i c s : the ethnography of communica-t i o n . New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 1972b " [ E d i t o r i a l i n t r o d u c t i o n to] Remarks on ethnomethodology by Harold G a r f i n k e l . " Pp. 301-309 i n J . J . Gumperz and D. Hymes (eds.), Directions i n s o c i o l i n g u i s t i c s . New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Jurgen Knowledge and human i n t e r e s t s . (Translated by Jeremy J . Shapiro.) London: Heinemann. ( O r i g i n a l l y published i n German i n 1968.) Hale, Kenneth L. 1966 "Review of Handling unsophisticated l i n g u i s t i c informants by Alan Healey." American Anthropologist 68: 807-808. Hammel, E.A. 1964 "Further comments on componential a n a l y s i s . " American Anthro-pologist 66: 1167-1171. Habermas, 1972 104 Handel, Warren 1969 " I n d e x i c a l i t y . " Department of Sociology, U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r -n i a , Santa Barbara: unpublished ms. Harman, G.H. 1973 "Review of Aspects of language by Y. B a r - H i l l e l . " Synthese 36: 150-152. Harrison, Bernard 19 72 Meaning and structure: an essay i n the philosophy of language. New York: Harper and Row. Hayek, F.A. 1963 "Rules, perception and i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y . " Proceedings of the B r i t i s h Academy 48: 321-344. Heap, James 19 75 Figuring out grammar: features and practices of e x p l i c a t i n g normative order. Department of Anthropology and Sociology, U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia: unpublished doctoral d i s s e r -t a t i o n . Heap, James and P.A. Roth 1973 "On phenomenological sociology." American S o c i o l o g i c a l Review 38: 354-367. Helmer, John 1970 "The sociology of language." Pp. 727-752 i n International days of s o c i o l i n g u i s t i c s . (Second i n t e r n a t i o n a l congress of s o c i a l sciences of the L u i g i Sturzo I n s t i t u t e , 1969.) Rome. Hempel, C.G. 1952 "Symposium: problems of concept and theory formation i n the s o c i a l sciences (Ernest Nagel and C a r l G. Hempel)." Pp. 65-86 i n Science, language and human r i g h t s . (American Ph i l o s o p h i c a l A s s o c i a t i o n , Eastern D i v i s i o n , V o l. 1.) P h i l a d e l p h i a : Uni-v e r s i t y of Pennsylvania Press. Hockett, C F . 1968 The state of the a r t . The Hague: Mouton. Huddleston, Rodney 19 74 "Componential a n a l y s i s : the sememe and the concept of d i s t i n c -tiveness." Canadian Journal of L i n g u i s t i c s 19: 1-17. Hymes, D e l l 1962 "The ethnography of speaking." Pp. 13-53 i n Thomas Gladwin and W.C. Sturtevant (eds.), Anthropology ahd human behaviour. Wash-ington, D.C: Anthropological Society of Washington. (Re-printed i n Fishman, 1968, pp. 99-138.) 105 Hymes, D e l l 1964a "Directions i n ( e t h n o - ) l i n g u i s t i c theory." Pp. 6-56 i n A.K. Romney and R.G. D'Andrade (eds.), T r a n s c u l t u r a l studies i n cog-n i t i o n . (American Anthropologist 66 [3] Part 2, s p e c i a l p u b l i -cation.) Menasha, Wisconsin: American Anthropological Associa-t i o n . 1964b "Introduction: toward ethnographies of communication." Pp. 1-34 i n J . J . Gumperz and D. Hymes (eds.), The ethnography of communication. (American Anthropologist 66 [6] Part 2, s p e c i a l publication.) Menasha, Wisconsin: American Anthropological Association. (Reprinted i n part, i n P.P. G i g i o l i [ed.], Language and social context: selected readings. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972, pp. 21-44.) 1964c "A perspective for l i n g u i s t i c anthropology." Pp. 92-107 i n Sol Tax (ed.), Horizons of anthropology. Chicago: Aldine. 1964d "Discussion of Burling's paper." American Anthropologist 66: 116-119. (Reprinted i n Manners and Kaplan, 1968, pp. 519-521; and i n T y l e r , 1969a, pp. 428-431.) 1966 "Discussion of Hoenigswald." P. 26 i n William Bright (ed.), S o c i o l i n g u i s t i c s . (Proceedings of the U.C.L.A. S o c i o l i n g u i s -t i c s Conference, 1964.) The Hague: Mouton. 1967 "Why l i n g u i s t i c s needs the s o c i o l o g i s t . " S o c i a l Research 34: 632-647. 1970a " L i n g u i s t i c method i n ethnography." Pp. 249-325 i n P.L. Gar-vi n (ed.), Method and theory i n l i n g u i s t i c s . The Hague: Mouton. 1970b " L i n g u i s t i c theory and the functions of speech." Pp. 111-144 i n International days of s o c i o l i n g u i s t i c s . (Second interna-t i o n a l congress of s o c i a l sciences of the L u i g i Sturzo I n s t i -tute, 1969.) Rome. 19 72 "Review of Noam Chomsky by John Lyons." Language 48: 416-427. 1973 "Toward l i n g u i s t i c competence." (Texas working papers i n socio-l i n g u i s t i c s , No. 16.) Austin: Department of Anthropology, Un i v e r s i t y of Texas. 1974 Foundations i n s o c i o l i n g u i s t i c s : an ethnographic approach. Ph i l a d e l p h i a : U n i v e r s i t y of Pennsylvania Press. 106 Jakob s on, Roman 1956 "Two aspects of language and two types of aphasic disturbances." Pp. 53-82 i n Roman Jakobson and Morris H a l l e , Fundamentals of language. 1s-Gravenhage: Mouton. (Reprinted, s l i g h t l y abbre-viated, as "The cardinal dichotomy i n language", i n R.N. Anshen [ed.], Language: an enquiry into i t s meaning and function. New York: Harper and Bros., 1957, pp. 155-173.) 1971 " S h i f t e r s , verbal categories and the Russian verb." Pp. 130-(1957) 147 i n Roman Jakobson, Selected writings. Volume 2. The Hague: Mouton. ( O r i g i n a l l y from Cambridge, Massachusetts: Russian language project, Department of Sl a v i c Languages and L i t e r a t u r e s , Harvard University.) 1971 "Quest f o r the essence of language." Pp. 345-359 i n Roman (1965) Jakobson, Selected writings. Volume 2. The Hague: Mouton. ( O r i g i n a l l y published i n Diogenes 51: 21-37 [1965].) Kaplan, David and R.A. Manners 1972 Culture theory. Englewood C l i f f s , New Jersey: P r e n t i c e - H a l l . Katz, B.A. 19 75 The production of an ethnography: some methodological and substantive issues for analyzing s o c i a l s e t t i n g s . Department of Anthropology and Sociology, U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia: unpublished doctoral d i s s e r t a t i o n . Katz, J . J . 1972 Semantic theory. New York: Harper and Row. Kay, Paul 1966a "Ethnography and theory of c u l t u r e . " Bucknell Review 14(2): 106-113. (Reprinted, with 1969 addendum, by Bobbs-Merrill: A-426.) 1966 "Comments on Colby." Current Anthropology 7: 20-23. (Re-printed, with addendum, i n T y l e r , 1969a, pp. 78-90.) 1970 "Some t h e o r e t i c a l implications of ethnographic semantics." Pp. 19-31 i n Ann Fischer (ed.), Current d i r e c t i o n s i n anthro-pology. ( B u l l e t i n of the American Anthropological Association 3 [3] Part 2.) Washington: American Anthropological Associa-t i o n . 1971 "Taxonomy and semantic contrast." Language 47: 866-887. Kecskemeti, Paul .. 1952 Meaning, communication, and value. Chicago: U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago Press. 107 Keesing, R.M. 1967 "Two models for ethnoscience research." Unpublished paper presented at Brandeis U n i v e r s i t y Anthropology Colloquium. 19 72 "Paradigms l o s t : the new ethnography and the new l i n g u i s t i c s . " Southwestern Journal of Anthropology 28: 299-332. Kjo l s e t h , Rolf 1973 "Making sense: natural language and shared knowledge i n under-standing." Pp. 50-76 i n J.A. Fishman (ed.), Advances i n the sociology of language. I I : selected studies and a p p l i c a t i o n s . The Hague: Mouton. Kronenfeld, D.B. 1973 "Fanti kinship: the structure of terminology and behaviour." American Anthropologist 75: 1577-1595. Kuhn, T.S. 1970a "Logic of discovery or psychology of research?" Pp. 1-23 i n Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (eds.), C r i t i c i s m and the growth of knowledge. London: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press. 1970b "Reflections on my c r i t i c s . " Pp. 231-278 i n Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (eds.), C r i t i c i s m and the growth of knowledge. London: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press. 1974 • "Second thoughts on paradigms." Pp. 450-482 i n F. Suppe (ed.), The structure of s c i e n t i f i c theories. Urbana, I l l i n o i s : Uni-v e r s i t y of I l l i n o i s Press. Leech, Geoffrey 1974 Semantics. Harmondsworth: Penguin.-Lounsbury, F.G. 1953 " F i e l d methods and techniques i n l i n g u i s t i c s . " Pp. 401-416 i n A.L. Kroeber (ed.), Anthropology today: an encyclopaedic i n -ventory. Chicago: Un i v e r s i t y of Chicago Press. 1954 "Meanings of 'meaning'". Pp. 171-177 i n C.E. Osgood and T.A. Sebeok (eds.), P s y c h o l i n g u i s t i c s . (Journal of Abnormal and S o c i a l Psychology 49 (4) Part 2; Indiana University Publications i n Anthropology and L i n g u i s t i c s , Memoir 10.) Washington, D.C: American Psychological Association; Baltimore: Waverly Press. (Enlarged e d i t i o n , Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965.) 1955 "The v a r i e t i e s of meaning." Pp. 158-164 i n R.H. Weinstein (ed.), Report of the s i x t h annual round table on l i n g u i s t i c s and l a n -guage teaching. (Monograph Series on Languages and L i n g u i s t i c s . No. 8, 1955.) Washington, D.C: Georgetown U n i v e r s i t y Press. 108 Lounsbury, F.G. 1956 "A semantic analysis of the Pawnee kinship usage." Language 32: 158-194. 1960 " S i m i l a r i t y and contiguity r e l a t i o n s i n language and i n c u l -ture." Pp. 123-128 i n R.S. H a r r e l l (ed.) , Report on the tenth annual round table meeting on l i n g u i s t i c s and language studies. (Monograph Series on Languages and L i n g u i s t i c s , No. 12, 1959.) Washington, D.C. : Georgetown U n i v e r s i t y Press. 1964 "The s t r u c t u r a l analysis of kinship semantics." Pp. 1073-1085 i n Proceedings of the ninth i n t e r n a t i o n a l congress of l i n g u i s -t i c s . The Hague: Mouton. (Reprinted i n T y l e r , 1969a, pp. 193-212.) 1968 "One hundred years of anthropological l i n g u i s t i c s . " Pp. 150-225, 256-264 i n J.O. Brew (ed.), One hundred years of anthro-pology. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard Un i v e r s i t y Press. Luckman, Thomas 1972 "Review of Understanding everyday l i f e edited by Jack Douglas." Contemporary Sociology 1: 30-32. Lyons, John 1963 Structural semantics: an analysis of part of the vocabulary of Plato. Oxford: Blackwell. 1968 Introduction to t h e o r e t i c a l l i n g u i s t i c s . Cambridge: Cambridge Univ e r s i t y Press. 1970 "Introduction." Pp. 7-28 i n J . Lyons (ed.), New horizons i n l i n g u i s t i c s . Harmondsworth: Penguin. Mannheim, Ka r l 1952 "On the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Weltanschauung." Pp. 33-83 i n Karl Mannheim, Essays on the sociology of knowledge. (Edited by Paul Kecskemeti.) London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. ( O r i -g i n a l l y published i n German i n 1921/22.) Manning, P.K. 1967 "Problems i n i n t e r p r e t i n g interview data." Sociology and S o c i a l Research 51: 302-316. 1973 "Fieldwork and the 'new ethnography'." Unpublished paper pre-sented to the Association of S o c i a l Anthropologists, St. John's College, Oxford. McCarthy, Thomas 1973 "On misunderstanding 'understanding'." Theory and Decision 3: 351-370. 109 McClaran, Marlys 1971 "Post taxonomic l i n g u i s t i c s and ethnographic d e s c r i p t i o n . " Unpublished paper presented at the annual meetings of the Amer-ican Anthropological Association, New York. Mehan, Hugh 1972 "Language using a b i l i t i e s . " Language Sciences 22: 1-10. Metzger, Duane and Gerald Williams 1966 "Some procedures and results i n the study of native categories: T z e l t a l 'firewood'." American Anthropologist 68: 389-407. Moerman, Michael 1968 "Being Lue: uses and abuses of ethnic i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . " Pp. 153-169 i n J . Helm MacNeish (ed.), Essays on the problem of t r i b e . (Proceedings of the 1967 annual spring meeting of the American Ethnological Society.) Seattle and London: Univer-s i t y of Washington Press. (Reprinted as "Accomplishing e t h n i -c i t y " i n R. Turner [ed.], Ethnomethodology. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974, pp. 54-68.) 1969 "A l i t t l e knowledge." Pp. 449-469 i n S.A. T y l e r (ed.), Cog-n i t i v e anthropology. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 1972 "Analysis of Lue conversation: providing accounts, f i n d i n g breaches, and taking s i d e s . " Pp. 170-228, 435-439 i n D. Sudnow (ed.), Studies i n s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n . New York: Free Press. Moore, O.K. and A.R. Anderson 1960 " A u t o t e l i c f o l k models." S o c i o l o g i c a l Quarterly 1: 203-216. Morris, Charles W. 1938 Foundations of the theory of signs. (International Encyclopaedia of U n i f i e d Science, Vol. 1, No. 2.) Chicago: U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago Press. 1946 Signs, language and behaviour. New York: P r e n t i c e - H a l l . 1964 Signification and s i g n i f i c a n c e s study of the r e l a t i o n s of signs and values. Cambridge, Massachusetts: M.I.T. Press. Nagel, Ernest 1952 "Symposium: problems of concept and theory formation i n the s o c i a l sciences (Ernest Nagel and Carl G. Hempel)." Pp. 43-64 i n Science, language and human r i g h t s . (American Philosophi-c a l A ssociation, Eastern D i v i s i o n , V ol. 1.) P h i l a d e l p h i a : U n i v e r s i t y of Pennsylvania Press. 110 Nida, E.A. 1964 Toward a science of t r a n s l a t i n g : with s p e c i f i c reference to p r i n c i p l e s and procedures involved i n b i b l e t r a n s l a t i n g . Leiden: E.J. B r i l l . Paul, B.D. 1953 "Interview techniques and f i e l d r e l a t i o n s h i p s . " Pp. 430-451 i n A.L. Kroeber (ed.), Anthropology today: an encyclopaedic inventory. Chicago: U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago Press. Pears, D. 1965 (1951) 1965 (1953) 1971 "Universals." Pp. 267-281 i n Anthony Flew (ed.) , Logic and language; f i r s t and second s e r i e s . Garden C i t y , New York: Doubleday Anchor. ( O r i g i n a l l y published i n Phi l o s o p h i c a l Quar-t e r l y 1: 218-227 [1951].) "I n c o m p a t i b i l i t i e s of colours." Pp. 330-341 i n Anthony Flew (ed.), Logic and language; f i r s t and second s e r i e s . Garden C i t y , New York: Doubleday Anchor. ( O r i g i n a l l y published i n Anthony Flew [ed.], Logic and language; second s e r i e s . Oxford: B a s i l Blackwell, 1953, pp. 112-122.) Wittgenstein. London: Fontana/Collins. Peirce, C.S. 1932 Collected papers. Volume 2. (Edited by Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss.) Cambridge: Harvard U n i v e r s i t y Press. Pe l t o , P.J. 1966 "Cognitive aspects of American k i n terms." American Anth-ropologist 68: 198-201. Perchonock, Norma and Oswald Werner 1969 "Navajo systems of c l a s s i f i c a t i o n : science." Ethnology 8: 229-242. some implications f o r ethno-P h i l l i p s o n , Michael and Maurice Roche 1971 "Phenomenology, sociology and the study of deviance." Unpub-l i s h e d paper presented at the annual meetings of the B r i t i s h S o c i o l o g i c a l Association. Pike, K.L. 1967 Language i n r e l a t i o n to a u n i f i e d theory of the structure of human behaviour. The Hague: Mouton. Popper, K.R. 1968 The l o g i c of s c i e n t i f i c discovery. Second English e d i t i o n . London: Hutchinson. ( O r i g i n a l l y published i n German i n 1934.) I l l Rawls, John 1955 "Two concepts of r u l e s . " P h i l o s o p h i c a l Review 64: 3-32. Reichenbach, Hans 1947 Elements of symbolic l o g i c . New York: Macmillan. Roche, Maurice 1973 Phenomenology, language and the s o c i a l sciences. London and Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Rosaldo, M.Z. 1972 '"Metaphors and f o l k c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . " Southwestern Journal of Anthropology 28: 83-99. 1974 "Review of Speech acts by John Searle." American Anthropolo-g i s t 76: 153-155. Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of Canada 1973 Regulations and requirements of s p e c i a l t y t r a i n i n g r e l a t i n g to the examinations (medicine and the medical s p e c i a l t i e s ) . Sacks, Harvey 1963 " S o c i o l o g i c a l d e s c r i p t i o n . " Berkeley Journal of Sociology 8: 1-16. 1966 The search for help: no one to turn to. Department of Sociology, U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a , Berkeley: unpublished doctoral d i s s e r t a t i o n . Sankoff, G i l l i a n 1971 "Quantitative analysis of sharing and v a r i a b i l i t y i n a cognitive model." Ethnology 10: 389-408. 1972 "Cognitive v a r i a b i l i t y and New Guinea s o c i a l organization: the Buang Dgwa." American Anthropologist 74: 555-566. S c h e f f l e r , H.W. and F.G. Lounsbury 1971 A study i n s t r u c t u r a l semantics: the Siriono kinship system. Englewood C l i f f s , New Jersey: P r e n t i c e - H a l l . Schneider, D.M. 1969 "Componential a n a l y s i s : a state-of-the-art review." Paper prepared i n advance for p a r t i c i p a n t s i n symposium on "Cogni-t i v e studies and a r t i f i c i a l i n t e l l i g e n c e research," March 2-8, 1969, at the U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago Center for Continuing Edu-ca t i o n . Schrag, Clarence 1967 "Philosophical issues i n the science of sociology." Sociology and So c i a l Research 51: 361-372. 112 Schutz, A l f r e d 1962 "Concept and theory formation i n the s o c i a l sciences." Pp. (1954) 48-66 i n A. Schutz, Collected papers 1: the problem of s o c i a l r e a l i t y . (Edited by M. Natanson.) The Hague: Martinus N i j h o f f . ( O r i g i n a l l y published i n Journal of Philosophy 51: 257-273 [1954].) 1962 "Symbol, r e a l i t y , and soc i e t y . " Pp. 287-356 i n A. Schutz, (1955) Collected papers 1. The Hague: Martinus N i j h o f f . ( O r i g i n a l l y published i n L. Bryson et a l . [eds.], Symbols and society. New York: Harper, 1955, pp. 135-202.) Searle, J.R. 1967 "Human communication theory and the philosophy of language: some remarks." Pp. 116-129 i n F.E.X. Dance (ed.), Human com-munication theory. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 1969 Speech acts: an essay i n the philosophy of language. Cam-bridge: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press. S e i t e l , Peter 1974 "Haya metaphors f o r speech." Language i n Society 3: 51-67. S i v e r t s , Henning 1966/6 7 "Report on ethnographic procedures." Folk 8/9: 325-334. Spang-Hanssen, Henning 1954 "Recent theories on the nature of the l i n g u i s t i c s i g n . " Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Copenhague 9: 3-142. Speier, Matthew 19 70 "The everyday world of the c h i l d . " Pp. 188-217 i n J.D. Douglas (ed.), Understanding everyday l i f e . Chicago: Aldine. Stoddart, Kenneth 1974 "Pinched: notes on the ethnographer's l o c a t i o n of argot." Pp. 173-179 i n R. Turner (ed.), Ethnomethodology. Harmonds-worth: Penguin. 1975 Encountering fieldwork: perspectives on the s o c i o l o g i c a l eth-nography, i t s programme, problems and products. Department of Sociology, U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a , Santa Barbara: unpublished doctoral d i s s e r t a t i o n . Sturtevant, W.C. 1964 "Studies i n ethnoscience." Pp. 99-131 i n A.K. Romney and R.G. D'Andrade (eds.), Transcultural studies i n cognition. (Amer-ican Anthropologist 66 [3] Part 2, s p e c i a l publication.) Menasha, Wisconsin: American Anthropological Association. (Reprinted i n Manners and Kaplan, 1968, pp. 475-500.) 113 Sudnow, David (ed.) 1972 Studies i n s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n . New York: Free Press. Suppe, Frederick (ed.) 1974 The structure of s c i e n t i f i c theories. Urbana, I l l i n o i s : Uni-v e r s i t y of I l l i n o i s Press. Swartz, J . 1960 " S i t u a t i o n a l determinants of kinship terminology." Southwestern Journal of Anthropology 16: 393-397. Szasz, T.S. 1961 The myth of mental i l l n e s s . New York: Harper. Turner, Roy 1966 "Functional analysis and the problem of r a t i o n a l i t y : a note on the dilemma of the actor as observer." Inquiry 9: 262-273. 1970a "Words, utterances and a c t i v i t i e s . " Pp. 169-187 i n J.D. Doug-l a s (ed.), Understanding everyday l i f e . Chicago: Aldine. (Reprinted i n R. Turner [ed.], Ethnomethodology. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974, pp. 197-215.) 1970b "Talk about mental i l l n e s s . " Unpublished paper presented at the annual meetings of the Canadian Sociology and Anthropology Asso c i a t i o n , Winnipeg, Manitoba. 1974 (Ed.) Ethnomethodology: selected readings. Harmondsworth: Penguin. n.d. "Utterance p o s i t i o n i n g as an i n t e r a c t i o n a l resource." In R.J. Wilson (ed.), Ethnomethodology, l a b e l l i n g theory and deviant behaviour. London and Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul (Forth-coming) . T y l e r , Stephen A. 1966a "Context and v a r i a t i o n i n Koya kinship terminology." American Anthropologist 68: 693-707. (Reprinted i n T y l e r , 1969a, pp. 487-503; and, s l i g h t l y revised, i n J . J . Gumperz and D. Hymes [eds.], Directions i n s o c i o l i n g u i s t i c s . New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972a, pp. 253-269.) 1966b "Whose kinship reckoning? Comments on Buchler." American Anthropologist 68: 513-516. 1969a (Ed.) Cognitive anthropology. New. York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 1969b "Preface." Pp. IX-X i n T y l e r , 1969a. 114 T y l e r , Stephen A. 1969c "Introduction." Pp. 1-23 i n T y l e r , 1969a. 1969d "A formal science." Pp. 65-80 i n S.A. T y l e r (ed.), Concepts and assumptions i n contemporary anthropology. (Southern Anth-ropological Society Proceedings, No. 3.) Athens: U n i v e r s i t y of Georgia Press. 1969e (Ed.) Concepts and assumptions i n contemporary anthropology. (Southern Anthropological Society Proceedings, No. 3.) Athens: Un i v e r s i t y of Georgia Press. 1969f "The myth of P: epistemology and formal a n a l y s i s . " American Anthropologist 71: 71-79. 1973 "Review of S o c i a l anthropology and language edited by Edwin Ardener." Department of Anthropology, Rice U n i v e r s i t y : un-published ms. Wallace, A.F.C. 1961 "On being j u s t complicated enough." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 47: 458-464. 1962 "Culture and cognition." Science 135: 351-357. 1965 "The problem of the psychological v a l i d i t y of componential analyses." Pp. 229-248 i n E.A. Hammel (ed.) , Formal semantic analysis. (American Anthropologist 67 [5] Part 2, s p e c i a l pub-l i c a t i o n . ) Menasha, Wisconsin: American Anthropological Asso-c i a t i o n . (Reprinted i n T y l e r , 1969a, pp. 396-418.) 1970a Culture and p e r s o n a l i t y . Second e d i t i o n . New York: Random House. 19 70b "A r e l a t i o n a l analysis of American kinship terminology: an example of r e l a t i o n s between process and structure i n cognition." Pp. 145-153 i n P.L. Garvin (ed.), Cognition: a multiple view. New York: Spartan Books. (Also i n American Anthropologist 72: 841-845 [1970].) Wallace, A.F.C. and John R. Atkins 1960 "The meaning of kinship terms." American Anthropologist 62: 58-80. (Reprinted i n T y l e r , 1969a, pp. 345-369.) Weinreich," U r i e l 1966 "On the semantic structure of language." Pp. 142-216 i n J.H. Greenberg (ed.), Universals of language. Second e d i t i o n . Cam-bridge, Massachusetts: M.I.T. Press. ( O r i g i n a l l y published i n 1963,) 115 Weinreich, U r i e l 1968 "Semantics and semiotics." International Encyclopaedia of Social Science 14: 164-169. Wells, Rulon 1967 " D i s t i n c t i v e l y human semiotic." S o c i a l Science Information 6: 103-124. Werner, Oswald 1966 "Pragmatics and ethnoscience." Anthropological L i n g u i s t i c s 8 (8) : 42-65. 1969 "The basic assumptions of ethnoscience." Semiotica 1: 329-338. Whorf, B.L. 1956 Language, thought and r e a l i t y : selected writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf. (Edited with an introduction by J.B. C a r r o l l . ) Cambridge, Massachusetts: Technology Press of M.I.T. Wieder, D.L. 1970 "On meaning by r u l e . " Pp. 107-135 i n J.D. Douglas (ed.), Understanding everyday l i f e . Chicago: Aldine. 1974 " T e l l i n g the code." Pp. 144-172 i n R. Turner (ed.), Ethnometh-odology. Harmondsworth: Penguin. (Excerpted from D.L. Wieder, 1975.) 1975 Language and s o c i a l r e a l i t y : the case of t e l l i n g the convict code. The Hague: Mouton. ( O r i g i n a l l y a doctoral d i s s e r t a t i o n , Department of Sociology, U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a , Los Angeles, 1969.) Williams, Gerald 1966 " L i n g u i s t i c r e f l e c t i o n s of c u l t u r a l systems." Anthropological L i n g u i s t i c s 8 (8): 13-21. Wilson, Thomas P. 1970a "Conceptions of i n t e r a c t i o n and forms of s o c i o l o g i c a l explana-t i o n . " American S o c i o l o g i c a l Review 35: 697-710. 1970b "Normative and i n t e r p r e t i v e paradigms i n sociology." Pp. 57-79 i n J.D. Douglas (ed.), Understanding everyday l i f e . C hi-cago: Aldine. 19 72 "The regress problem and the problem of evidence i n ethnometh-odology." Department of Sociology, Un i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a , Santa Barbara: unpublished ms. 116 Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1958 Phil o s o p h i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n s . (Translated by G.E.M. Anscombe.) Second e d i t i o n . Oxford: B a s i l Blackwell. ( O r i g i n a l l y pub-l i s h e d i n 1953.) Wordick, F.J.F. 1973 "Another view of American k i n s h i p . " American Anthropologist 75: 1634-1656. Zimmerman, Don H. and Melvin Pollner 1970 "The everyday world as a phenomenon." Pp. 33-65 i n H.B. Pepin-sky (ed.), People and information. New York: Pergamon Press. (Adapted, with minor re v i s i o n s , i n J.D. Douglas fed.], Under-standing everyday l i f e . Chicago: Aldine, 1970, pp. 80-103.) Zimmerman, Don H. and D.L. Wieder 1970 "Ethnomethodology and the problem of order: comment on Denzin. 1 Pp. 285-295 i n J.D. Douglas (ed.), Understanding everyday l i f e . Chicago: Aldine. 117 APPENDIX TRANSCRIPT OF FIRST PART OF FIRST INTERVIEW Compared with the standard of t r a n s c r i b i n g that i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of pub-l i s h e d pieces of conversational a n a l y s i s , the following i s a r e l a t i v e l y rough t r a n s c r i p t i o n . These are the t r a n s c r i b i n g conventions used: E Ethnographer I Informant / Point at which i n t e r r u p t i o n occurs // Point at which overlapping of current speaker's utterance by next speaker's occurs [ t [uhuh] I n t e r j e c t i o n by other speaker (Pause) Metaconversational i n s t r u c t i o n (( )) Talk u n i n t e l l i g i b l e to tr a n s c r i b e r word Stress _ word_ Said d e l i b e r a t e l y , almost s t a c c a t o - l i k e Gap between words indicates small pauses (5) Number of seconds pause Speakers t a l k i n g simultaneously (1) E: I'm not sure what you uhm c a l l a l l the d i f f e r e n t kinds of what I c a l l physicians. I don't know i f l i k e i f I asked you uhm what are kinds of physicians would that be a sensible question? (2) I: Yeah I guess so. (3) E: I mean you could you produce a uh a l i s t of a of answers to that? (Pause) Or would/ (4) I : Yeah no 1/ (5) E: would woulda nother term be you know (6) I: yeah that's rig h t that's a good question. [uhuh] I could pro-pose an answer. 118 (7) E: (8) (9) E: (10) (11) E: (12) I: (13) E: (14) I: (15) E: (16) I: (17) E: (18) I: O.K. Well could we s t a r t there? Sure. O.K. Uhm (Pause)/ I'm not going to write j u s t uhm uh now I say there's an answer and i t ' s hard to say but I think there are d i f f e r e n t kinds of physicians uh phy-s i c i a n s to me mean anybody who has gone through medical school [uhuh] and has got a degree i n medicine [uhuh] and uh uh j u s t applies to d i f f e r e n t f i e l d s i n that c e r t a i n l y some connected with public health [uhuh] doctors connected with public health, doctors connected with psychiatry, doctors connected with surgery, uhm doctors connected with general p r a c t i c e , and uh s p e c i a l i s t s i n the f i e l d uh who c a l l e d consultants [uhuh] p r i m a r i l y when you say the d i f f e r e n t kinds of physicians that's p r i m a r i l y what i t means. Uhuh well uhm where do you f i t into that yourself? Well as you mean as resident? Yeah o.k. Uhm hahaha as a resident I don't know r e a l l y where I f i t into that i n that uh i t ' s part of a t r a i n i n g program to become ja. certaln, KiB.d_of_ phx si ci ail u n o n e that I you know choose to be uhm Uhuh I don't know I couldn't I I myself don't c l a s s i f y myself yet as a physician i n that I don't do anything uh I don't do primary care I ju s t uh 119 (19) E: Uhuh well when you do do something uhm what would be the other kinds of things you could have done had you i f you hadn't chosen what you what you w i l l do? (20) I: Oh I see well l i k e uhm I don't know when I o r i g i n a l l y f i n -ished medical school I had my choice of doing various things [uhuh] uh becoming various what I say various types of physicians (21) E: yeah (22) I: and uh uh the choice which I picked uh uh was between uh surgeon becoming a surgeon (23) E: uhuh (24) I: becoming a p a e d i a t r i c i a n (25) E: uhuh (26) I: or becoming a uhm what they c a l l an i n t e r n i s t or you know uh connected going through a s p e c i a l t y connected with i n t e r n a l medicine. (27) E: uhuh (28) I: There's so many f i n e grades l i k e you know the l i k e uh uh p a e d i a t r i c i a n i s a type of physician (29) E: uhuh (30) I: uh an i n t e r n i s t i s a type of physician uh and then within within these two categories you can also s p l i t them up I would think uhm you have p a e d i a t r i c c a r d i o l o g i s t and p a e d i a t r i c hematologist/ (31) E: [o.k. (32) I: [and p a e d i a t r i c nephrologist (33) E: can I just write those down? 120 Yeah. O.k. uh t h i s within uh what category was? Paedi a t r i c s Within p a e d i a t r i c s // you have what which i s the one I chose yeah uh you'd have uh c a r d i o l o g i s t uhuh probably (slurred) j u s t at the beginning your whole l i s t you'd have what you'd c a l l your general p a e d i a t r i c i a n uhuh whooo i t i s does sort of uh consultant work and also does primary care medicine uhuh uhm and a f t e r that and then you have your p a e d i a t r i c s p e c i a l i e s (sic) cardiology uh (whispered) s p e c i a l i s t uh cardiology, nephrology uh hematology uh gastroenterology uhm (aside) now we're getting down where I have to, uh neonatology ha uh and there uh there there's more uhm l e t me think Try and be as exhaustive as you can Oh r e a l l y / Yeah. 121 (56) I: Oh my l o r d uhm well l e t me see uhm i f i f you're gonna just s t i c k to ex i t i t ' s hard to be exhaustive i n that you have var-ious f i e l d s l i k e you can cover every system of the body (57) E: uhuh (58) I: i n which there are s p e c i a l i s t s i n that f i e l d some of them are s p e c i a l i s t s only i n pae d i a t r i c s and some are s p e c i a l i s t s uh i n ju s t that f i e l d and cover both paediatrics and adult medicine so l i k e an ear nose and throat s p e c i a l i s t (59) E: uhuh (60) I: uhm you would get to see a c h i l d but he'd be an ear nose and throat s p e c i a l i s t who'd cover both c h i l d ren ( s i c ) and adults (61) E: uhuhuh uhuh (62) I: uhm and I don't know of any p a e d i a t r i c ear nose and throat s p e c i a l i s t s (63) E: uhuh uh (64) I: uhm uh you have ophthalmologists some uh deal p r i m a r i l y with children (65) E: [uhuh (66) I: [ i n ophthalmology some and but most of them cover both ch i l d r e n and uh adults and j u s t about every ruddy system of the body you can think of there are pa e d i a t r i c surgeons also which uh i s a sort of i s a s p e c i a l group of pa e d i a t r i c s [uhuh] uhm uh connec-ted with the f i e l d of surgeon and they deal only surgery and an pae d i a t r i c s so that every system of the body you can think of uh 122 (67) E: (68) I: (69) E: (70) I: (71) E: (72) (73) E: (74) I: (75) E: (76) I: (77) E: (78) U (79) E: (80) I: (81) E; (82) I: (83) E: (84) I: you could f i n d a s p e c i a l i s t uh uh whether i t ' s i n that whether he deals with p a e d i a t r i c s only or whether he has both paedia-t r i c s and uh adult medicine, [uhuh [uhm there are uhm uh orthopaedics p a e d i a t r i c orthopaedics uh uh and we do have s p e c i a l i s t s just connected with paediatrics i n that f i e l d uhm there are uh u r o l o g i s t s . p a e d i a t r i c u r o l o g i s t s now I I get you now (( )) but uhm yeah uhm see what I was roughly d i v i d i n g i t up into i s systems of the body. Yes well o.k. do you want to give me uhm those? systems of the body?// roughly divided up into?/ yeah E: yeah O.k. i f you i f you sort of divide i t into what s p e c i a l t i e s uhm uh there are for paediatrics or for anybody [ yeah yeah [ r e a l l y there are ear nose and throat right ear nose and throat eyes ophthalmologists uhuh there's uh i f you j u s t going from the head down uhuh there's uhm uh neurosurgeons and neurologists which are two d i f f e r e n t groups uhuh neurosurgeons and neurologists uhm there's uhm I don't know how you'd c a l l them uhm uh r e s p i r o l o g i s t s 123 (85) I: haha (86) E: or uh people who deal with s p e c i f i c a l l y r e s p i r a t o r y diseases (87) E: uhuh (88) I: there i s uhm c a r d i o l o g i s t s as I mentioned deal with uh diseases of the cardiovascular system (89) E: uhuh (90) I: there i s uhm gastroenterologists (91) E: uhuh (92) I: deal with uh disorders of the i n t e s t i n e s and bo uh lavernum and s t u f f there i s nephrologists deal with the uh kidney (93) E: uhuh (94) I: there's u r o l o g i s t s that deal with the lower parts of the urinary t r a c t uhm they might not l i k e that they they deal with the whole urinary t r a c t but uh uhm there are uhm uhm as I mentioned ortho-pods orthopaedics deals with the s k e l e t a l and musculature abnor-m a l i t i e s uh there i s dermatologists deal with the skin (95) E: uhuh (96) I: uhm oh my goodness uhm (Pause) I wou I uh think I've run out uhm (97) E: o.k.// i f you think of any (98) I: I would say that (99) E: i f you think of anything else (100) I: yeah (101) E: I ' l l j u s t put i t on o.k. Right now uh as you were sss I i n f e r from what you were saying that uhm i n pa e d i a t r i c s you could s p e c i a l i s p e c i a l i z e i n any of these? or any of these could s p e c i a l i z e i n // paediatrics? 124 (102) I: any of those could s p e c i a l i z e i n p a e d i a t r i c s (103) E: uhuh (104) I: r i g h t (105) E: r i g h t (106) I: as a p a e d i a t r i c i a n uh/ (107) E: i t ' s a d i f f e r e n t set of i t ' s a d i f f e r e n t c l a s s i f i c a t i o n then than t h i s one that you you've j u s t given me (108) I: i t ' s i t ' s a l i t t l e d i f f e r e n t uh but r e a l l y as a p a e d i a t r i c i a n i f I chose I could s p e c i a l i z e i n any of those (109) E: uhuh (110) I: but the the only problem i s i s i f I say wanted to become uh pae-d i a t r i c u r o l o g i s t (111) E: uhuh (112) I: the amount of t r a i n i n g which I'd have to go through to reach that would be u n r e a l i s t i c . (113) E: uhuh uhuh uhm uhm i f I wasn't uh a pae p a e d i a t r i c i a n uhm what mi what might I be? wi not not without reference to t h i s section (114) I: 0k. o.k. wi without reference to to that uh oh you might add to that also uhm an obvious one endocrinologist uh uhm uhm well i f i f you forget about pae d i a t r i c s you could go uhm uh into i n (( )) my l o r d oh no that's o.k. uhm uh you could go into i n t e r n a l medicine (115) E: o.k. (116) I: uhm you could go into surgery uhm uh you could go into psychia-t r y and you know eh again within within i n t e r n a l medicine you 125 can [yeah] roughly d i v i d e yourself up l i k e that also uhm not to that extent but j u s t about uhm (117) E: and you s a i d public health before (118) I: public health righ t public health uhm l e t me see uhm you can go into uh uh there are various f i e l d s of laboratory medicine uh you know connected with uh various doctors who deal with the uh both the i n v e s t i g a t i v e laboratory b a c t e r i o l o g i s t an uhm v i r o l o g i s t and and various things which roughly categorized into laboratory medicine (119) E: uhuh (120) I: uhm there's pathology uhm and I I guess r e a l l y you can't exclude I don't know how vast you want to go uh there's uh many doctors who many M.D.s who deal e x c l u s i v e l y with research I guess you'd have to put them i n there I'm sure there's more uhm (121) E: Is general p r a c t i c e a cat category? (( )) (122) I: Yeah general p r a c t i c e yeah i s c e r t a i n l y uhm gee (123) E: o.k. (124) I: I I can't r e a l l y offhand think of any more 

Cite

Citation Scheme:

        

Citations by CSL (citeproc-js)

Usage Statistics

Share

Embed

Customize your widget with the following options, then copy and paste the code below into the HTML of your page to embed this item in your website.
                        
                            <div id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidgetDisplay">
                            <script id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidget"
                            src="{[{embed.src}]}"
                            data-item="{[{embed.item}]}"
                            data-collection="{[{embed.collection}]}"
                            data-metadata="{[{embed.showMetadata}]}"
                            data-width="{[{embed.width}]}"
                            data-media="{[{embed.selectedMedia}]}"
                            async >
                            </script>
                            </div>
                        
                    
IIIF logo Our image viewer uses the IIIF 2.0 standard. To load this item in other compatible viewers, use this url:
https://iiif.library.ubc.ca/presentation/dsp.831.1-0100051/manifest

Comment

Related Items