UBC Theses and Dissertations

UBC Theses Logo

UBC Theses and Dissertations

Information control as a bargaining tactic in social exchange networks Foddy, Margaret Lynn 1975

Your browser doesn't seem to have a PDF viewer, please download the PDF to view this item.

Item Metadata

Download

Media
831-UBC_1975_A1 F63_3.pdf [ 11.16MB ]
Metadata
JSON: 831-1.0100036.json
JSON-LD: 831-1.0100036-ld.json
RDF/XML (Pretty): 831-1.0100036-rdf.xml
RDF/JSON: 831-1.0100036-rdf.json
Turtle: 831-1.0100036-turtle.txt
N-Triples: 831-1.0100036-rdf-ntriples.txt
Original Record: 831-1.0100036-source.json
Full Text
831-1.0100036-fulltext.txt
Citation
831-1.0100036.ris

Full Text

INFORMATION CONTROL AS A BARGAINING TACTIC IN SOCIAL EXCHANGE NETWORKS  by  MARGARET LYNN FODDY B.A., U n i v e r s i t y  o f Saskatchewan,1967  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY  i n the Department of Anthropology  We accept t h i s required  and S o c i o l o g y  t h e s i s as conforming  t o the  standard  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA February, 1975  In presenting this thesis  in partial fulfilment of the requirements for  an advanced degree at the University of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this  thesis  for scholarly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representatives.  It  is understood that copying or publication  of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.  Department of  Soc.-o/.^y  and  The University of B r i t i s h Columbia Vancouver 8, Canada  Date  //  ^ ^ ^ c r y ^ ^ / r  rHtC0C  Cu(  °^ ?  i  ABSTRACT  T h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n i s concerned  w i t h the p r o c e s s by which  social  a c t o r s c o n c e a l i n f o r m a t i o n about the t r u e l e v e l o f t h e i r p r o f i t s i n exchange i n t e r a c t i o n s , so t h a t they may d e v i a t e from a norm o f f a i r n e s s for e q u a l i t y of s u b j e c t i v e p r o f i t s  to the p a r t i e s i n an exchange.  calling  Two  f a c t o r s a r e p o s i t e d t o a c t as c o n s t r a i n t s on the p o t e n t i a l advantage o f information control —  a p r e f e r e n c e by s o c i a l a c t o r s f o r r e l i a b l e  infor-  mation t h a t a l l o w s comparison w i t h exchange p a r t n e r s ; and the a v a i l a b i l i t y of a l t e r n a t i v e exchange p a r t n e r s who do not c o n c e a l t h e i r In this by d i f f e r e n t  resources.  c o n t e x t , we o u t l i n e s i x exchange s i t u a t i o n s c h a r a c t e r i z e d  d i s t r i b u t i o n s o f i n f o r m a t i o n (symmetric and asymmetric),  by d i f f e r e n t numbers o f a l t e r n a t i v e s .  and  One case, i n v o l v i n g asymmetric i n -  f o r m a t i o n and s e v e r a l a l t e r n a t i v e exchange p a r t n e r s , i s s e l e c t e d as t h e focus of t h i s study.  A theory i s c o n s t r u c t e d t o make p r e d i c t i o n s c o n c e r n -  i n g the n a t u r e and d i r e c t i o n of i n i t i a t i o n s o f exchange, the p e r c e p t i o n o f advantage i n i n f o r m a t i o n c o n t r o l , and the l i k e l y success  o f t a c t i c s o f con-  c e a l i n g i n f o r m a t i o n about r e s o u r c e s from p o t e n t i a l exchange p a r t n e r s . The p r e d i c t i o n s a r e s u b j e c t e d to t e s t i n an e x p e r i m e n t a l i n v o l v i n g 336 s u b j e c t s i n 42 experiments. of the p r e d i c t i o n s t h a t :  The r e s u l t s a r e l a r g e l y  study, supportive  1) people who can c o n c e a l t h e i r r e s o u r c e s make  more attempts t o g a i n advantageous exchanges; 2) p e o p l e p r e f e r t o e n t e r exchange t r a n s a c t i o n s i n which they have r e l i a b l e i n f o r m a t i o n about p a r t n e r s ; and 3) people possess which  relatively  d i r e c t more i n i t i a t i o n s of exchange t o o t h e r s who  l a r g e amounts of d e s i r e d r e s o u r c e s .  n e g a t i v e evidence  their  The few cases i n  arose a r e e v a l u a t e d , and a t t e n t i o n i s drawn to  a s p e c t s o f the theory and e x p e r i m e n t a l  d e s i g n i n need o f f u r t h e r i n v e s t i g a t i o n .  ii  TABLE OF CONTENTS  Page Abstract  i  T a b l e o f Contents List  i i  of Tables  i i i  L i s t of Figures  iv  Acknowledgements  v i i  Chapter 1  Introduction  1  2  Theory  39  3  Research Design  77  4  Results  5  E v a l u a t i o n and Suggestions f o r Future  and E v a l u a t i o n o f R e s u l t s  106 148  Research  168  Bibliography  Appendices I  Laboratory  Set-Up  175  II  E x p e r i m e n t a l I n s t r u c t i o n s and Q u e s t i o n n a i r e s ,  Set A  180  III  E x p e r i m e n t a l I n s t r u c t i o n s and Q u e s t i o n n a i r e s ,  Set B  186  IV  P i l o t Work  V  Data R e f e r r e d  VI  Raw Data  192 t o But Not Included  i n Main Text  208 222  iii  LIST OF FIGURES  Page  Figure 3.1  D i s t r i b u t i o n of Resources and  I n f o r m a t i o n i n Set A  89  3.2  D i s t r i b u t i o n of Resources and  I n f o r m a t i o n i n Set B  92  3.3  Summary of F e a t u r e s of E x p e r i m e n t a l Design,  A.l  Main F e a t u r e s of Booths Used i n  A. 2  Initiation  Forms Used i n Set  A. 3  Initiation  Forms Used i n Set B and P i l o t  A.4  Sample of Card Showing Subject h i s Resource Base  177  A. 5  Value Chart Used f o r Set B and  178  A. 6  D i s t r i b u t i o n of Resources and  Sets A and  B  100 175  Experiments  176  A Study  Pilot Information,  P i l o t Set  177  193  LIST OF TABLES  Table 4.1  F r e q u e n c i e s o f i n i t i a t i o n - - t o h i g h and low resource, v i s i b l e s and t o n o n - v i s i b l e s , T r i a l 1, Set A  4.2  F r e q u e n c i e s o f i n i t i a t i o n to b a l a n c e d and unbalanced v i s i b l e s , and t o n o n - v i s i b l e s , T r i a l 1, P i l o t Set  4.3  P r o p o r t i o n s o f Advantageous o f f e r s to v i s i b l e s by v i s i b l e and n o n - v i s i b l e i n i t i a t o r s , T r i a l 1, Set B  4.4  P r o p o r t i o n of h i g h n o n - v i s i b l e s and v i s i b l e s advantageous exchanges, T r i a l 1, Set B l  attempting  4.5  P r o p o r t i o n s o f low n o n - v i s i b l e s and v i s i b l e s advantageous exchanges, T r i a l 1, Set B I I  attempting  4.6  F a i r exchange r a t i o s and o b t a i n e d average exchange f o r i n i t i a t i o n s t o v i s i b l e s , T r i a l 1, Set B  4.7  Average exchange r a t i o s T r i a l 1, Set B  4.8  P r o p o r t i o n o f v i s i b l e s and n o n - v i s i b l e s who want t o r e t a i n covers on r e s o u r c e s o f n o n - v i s i b l e s , T r i a l 1, Set B  4.9  I n i t i a t o r s ' evaluation of l i k e l i h o o d would be a c c e p t e d , T r i a l 1, Set B  4.10  Proportions  of i n i t i a t i o n s  4.11  Proportions  o f o f f e r s to v i s i b l e s ,  4.12  Acceptance of r e a l  4.13  Frequency of i n i t i a t i o n s T r i a l 2, Set A  4.14  Acceptance o f f a l s e  o f f e r s by h i g h n o n - v i s i b l e s , Set B l  4.15  Acceptance o f f a l s e v i s i b l e s , Set BII  o f f e r s by v i s i b l e s  for initiations  offers,  to n o n - v i s i b l e s ,  that t h e i r  to v i s i b l e s ,  ratios  offers  T r i a l 1, Set B  T r i a l 1 and 2, Set A  T r i a l 1, Set A  to v i s i b l e s  and n o n - v i s i b l e s ,  and low non-  V  List  of T a b l e s  (Continued)  Table 4.16  Page Number o f r e a l o f f e r s accepted p e r number r e c e i v e d , visible  r e c i p i e n t s , T r i a l 1, Set A  134  4.17  Acceptance o f r e a l o f f e r s t o v i s i b l e s ,  4.18  Acceptance o f f a l s e o f f e r s by v i s i b l e s ,  4.19  N o n - v i s i b l e s ' p r e f e r e n c e f o r removing c o v e r s , T r i a l 1 and T r i a l 2, Set A  137  4.20  P r o p o r t i o n s o f s u b j e c t s making same type o f c h o i c e ( v i s i b l e s v e r s u s n o n - v i s i b l e s ) on T r i a l s 1 and 2, Set A  138  F a i r exchange r a t i o s and average exchange r a t i o s f o r i n i t i a t i o n s to v i s i b l e s , P i l o t Set, T r i a l 1  196  D i r e c t i o n s of i n i t i a t i o n s on T r i a l 1, by v i s i b i l i t y of i n i t i a t o r s and t a r g e t , P i l o t Set  198  D i r e c t i o n o f i n i t i a t i o n s , T r i a l 2, by v i s i b i l i t y of i n i t i a t o r and t a r g e t , P i l o t Set  199  Acceptance of f a l s e o f f e r s by V i s i b l e s , T r i a l 1, P i l o t Set  200  R e l a t i v e f r e q u e n c i e s o f acceptance o f r e a l o f f e r s on T r i a l 2, by v a l u e p o s i t i o n and v i s i b i l i t y o f i n i t i a t o r and t a r g e t , P i l o t Set  201  Types o f o f f e r s by r e s o u r c e l e v e l i n i t i a t o r , Set A  208  A.1  A.2  A.3  A.4  A.5  A.6  A.7  A. 8  A.9  A. 10  T r i a l 1, Set BI  134  T r i a l 2, Set A  135  and v i s i b i l i t y o f  High n o n - v i s i b l e s ' p e r c e p t i o n o f covers a f t e r T r i a l 1, Set BI  210  Low n o n - v i s i b l e s ' p e r c e p t i o n o f c o v e r s a f t e r T r i a l 1, Set B I I  212  V i s i b l e s ' p e r c e p t i o n o f h a v i n g ri£ c o v e r s , T r i a l 1, Set B  214.  Perceived p r o b a b i l i t y that T r i a l a c c e p t e d , Set A  217  1 o f f e r w i l l be  vi  L i s t of T a b l e s  (Continued)  Table A.11  A. 12  A.13  A.14  Page High n o n - v i s i b l e s ' reasons f o r i n i t i a t i o n s t o v i s i b l e s and n o n - v i s i b l e s , Set BI  218  Low n o n - v i s i b l e s ' and n o n - v i s i b l e s ,  219  reasons f o r i n i t i a t i o n s t o Set B I I  V i s i b l e s ' reasons f o r i n i t i a t i o n s n o n - v i s i b l e s , Set BI  to v i s i b l e s  V i s i b l e s ' reasons f o r i n i t i a t i o n s n o n - v i s i b l e s , Set BII  to v i s i b l e s  visibles  and 220 and 221  vii  ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS  I would l i k e t o express  my indebtedness  t o my s u p e r v i s o r , Dr.  R-A£.H$. Robson, who has given me p r o f e s s i o n a l and p e r s o n a l guidance from the b e g i n n i n g  o f my graduate t r a i n i n g .  I would a l s o l i k e t o acknowledge  the a d v i c e o f the members of my d i s s e r t a t i o n  committee:  Martha F o s c h i George Gray Jean LaPonce Ken.MacCrimmon I am g r a t e f u l t o Don Earner, and e s p e c i a l l y t o my husband, B i l l Foddy, f o r t h e i r s u g g e s t i o n s , mulation  and w r i t i n g o f t h i s  c r i t i c i s m s , and moral support  during the f o r -  dissertation.  I would l i k e t o thank the Canada C o u n c i l f o r p r o v i d i n g  financial  a s s i s t a n c e i n the form of D o c t o r a l F e l l o w s h i p s i n the p e r i o d 1969-73, and the U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Columbia f o r support i n 1968-69.  f o r a Graduate F e l l o w s h i p  CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION  Most people have e x p e c t a t i o n s t h a t s o c i a l exchange t y p i c a l l y i n v o l v e s a t r a d e of e q u a l l y v a l u e d u n i t s . to u n i t s of goods and  However, as the v a l u e a s s i g n e d  s e r v i c e s i s s u b j e c t i v e l y determined,  the p o t e n t i a l f o r s o c i a l a c t o r s to c o n c e a l and them of what i s t r a d e d .  Can  sources they p o s s e s s , and tage?  distort  t h i s l e a d s to  the t r u e v a l u e to  people c o n t r o l i n f o r m a t i o n about the r e -  those they wish to p o s s e s s t o 5  What happens to them i f they t r y ?  t h e i r own  advan-  Is such an advantage l i m i t e d  the case i n which t h e person b e i n g taken advantage of has no These a r e the q u e s t i o n s w i t h which t h i s study i s  to  alternatives?  concerned.  F i r s t , we wish to examine t h e p r o c e s s by which a c t o r s c o n c e a l i n f o r m a t i o n about the t r u e l e v e l of t h e i r p r o f i t s so t h a t they may  i n exchange t r a n s a c t i o n s ,  d e v i a t e from a norm of f a i r n e s s c a l l i n g f o r e q u a l i t y of  s u b j e c t i v e p r o f i t s to the p a r t i e s i n the exchange.  Second, we  are  inter-  ested i n whether s o c i a l a c t o r s d i s p l a y a p r e f e r e n c e f o r exchange r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n which the p a r t n e r does not c o n t r o l i n f o r m a t i o n about h i s p r o f i t s , and  the consequences of such a p r e f e r e n c e .  To t h i s end, we w i l l c o n s t r u c t  a s e t of hypotheses which have t h e i r b a s i s i n the more g e n e r a l t h e o r y of s o c i a l exchange. them to t e s t uation.  We w i l l  then see how  i n an e x p e r i m e n t a l  our i d e a s stand up when we  subject  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of a s o c i a l exchange  sit-  2  . In the p r e s e n t  chapter,  a review w i l l be p r o v i d e d  exchange framework, e l a b o r a t i n g those the p r e s e n t  study.  These w i l l  i n c l u d e the concepts of r e c i p r o c i t y ,  considered  and  resources.  of when an a c t o r i s l i k e l y  under what c o n d i t i o n s he  resources.  t h a t might accrue  c o n t r o l i n f o r m a t i o n about h i s needs and to the q u e s t i o n s  is likely  In t h i s  We  to s u c c e e d w i t h  given  the use of  infor-  In o u t l i n i n g t h i s  latter  for avoid-  f o r exchange  to an exchange know the t r u e l e v e l of each  s h a l l argue t h a t i n the presence of a l t e r n a t i v e s about  whom i n f o r m a t i o n i s a v a i l a b l e , t h i s p r e f e r e n c e on the success  can  A t t e n t i o n w i l l be  i n g u n c e r t a i n t y ' , to argue f o r the e x i s t e n c e of a p r e f e r e n c e  other's p r o f i t s .  context,  to the a c t o r who  w i l l extend a p s y c h o l o g i c a l p r i n c i p l e of a 'preference  r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n which p a r t n e r s  fair-  to d e s i r e advantage i n exchange,  mation c o n t r o l as a t a c t i c f o r g a i n i n g advantage. i s s u e , we  social  concepts from i t t h a t a r e r e l e v a n t to  n e s s , s o c i a l p r i c e s , s u b j e c t i v e p r o f i t , and the advantages w i l l be  of the  p l a c e s severe  constraints  of c o n t r o l l i n g i n f o r m a t i o n to g a i n advantage.  S o c i a l Exchange Theory 1 In the framework of s o c i a l exchange, more a c t o r s i s c o n c e p t u a l i z e d as a m u t u a l l y modities cipants.  and behaviours  t h a t are v a l u e d  i n t e r a c t i o n between two  r e i n f o r c i n g t r a n s f e r of com-  i n s p e c i f i a b l e ways by the  An a c t o r , Person, engages i n g o a l - d i r e c t e d b e h a v i o u r ,  i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h o t h e r s who  is willing  parti-  requiring  are s i m i l a r l y engaged i n meeting t h e i r  To s a t i s f y h i s needs, P e r s o n must f i n d an Other who and who  or  goals.  has what Person wants,  to g i v e i t up i n . r e t u r n f o r something P e r s o n  has.  3  An  Example  Consider  two  s t u d e n t s , P e t e r and O l g a .  but can b a r e l y s c r a p e through Math.  P e t e r i s good a t E n g l i s h ,  Olga, on the other hand, i s a whiz a t  Math, but has never done w e l l at E n g l i s h .  These two  p o s i t i o n to s e t up an exchange r e l a t i o n s h i p .  students are i n a  P e t e r can w r i t e Olga's e s s a y s ,  and Olga can l e t P e t e r copy her Math problems, o r , i f they are more they can h e l p one  another  study.  But how  i n r e t u r n f o r a s e t of Math problems? p e r c e i v e s Olga And  many essays  should P e t e r w r i t e  A l o t w i l l depend on how  bad  to be at E n g l i s h , and on whether she can get h e l p  P e t e r ' s p e r c e p t i o n of these t h i n g s can v a r y .  i n an E n g l i s h c l a s s , and  honest,  Peter  elsewhere.  I f he has never seen  does not know her grades,  Olga may  Olga  be a b l e to  convince P e t e r t h a t she needs l e s s h e l p a t E n g l i s h than he does a t Math, or t h a t i t takes her a g r e a t d e a l of e f f o r t  to h e l p him w i t h Math problems.  If,  i n a d d i t i o n , Olga i s sure t h a t Peter, i s an u t t e r dunce at Math, she  may  have him a t an advantage.  A c c o r d i n g l y , she may  be a b l e to demand a  l o t of h e l p i n E n g l i s h to make i t worth her w h i l e , or to demand some a d d i t i o n a l reward , such as r i d e s to s c h o o l .  Even more than i n economic  ex-  change, where p r i c e s tend to be s t a n d a r d i z e d , the p e r c e i v e d worth of r e sources  (and these may  range from s k i l l s and d e f e r e n c e  to c o n c r e t e goods)  i s something t h a t can be i n f l u e n c e d by how  the a c t o r s p r e s e n t  and what i n f o r m a t i o n they make a v a i l a b l e .  L e t us now  themselves,  review how  theory would d e s c r i b e the i n t e r a c t i o n between a c t o r s such as our students.  exchange imaginary  4  The A c t o r s i n S o c i a l Exchange  Statements making up an.exchange theory o f i n t e r a c t i o n a r e meant to  apply e q u a l l y to both p a r t i e s to a r e l a t i o n s h i p , but i t i s e a s i e r t o  frame the statements i n terms of a f o c a l person, whom we s h a l l c a l l  P.  2 Although  someeexchange t h e o r i s t s  would q u e s t i o n the importance o f g i v i n g  the a c t o r the c a p a c i t y to c a l c u l a t e rewards, c o s t s , and t h e p r o b a b i l i t y o f r e c e i v i n g both, most r e s e a r c h e r s would u s u a l l y employ some model of P as a d e c i s i o n maker (acknowledging t h a t t h e r e a r e many s i m i l a r i t i e s between an exchange and a d e c i s i o n t h e o r e t i c model o f man). maximizer.  P e r s o n i s assumed t o be a  He has s e v e r a l goals or needs, and pursues t h i n g s which g i v e  maximum s a t i s f a c t i o n o f these needs. g e n e r a l problems:  I n t h i s c o n t e x t , P i s f a c e d w i t h two  which needs s h a l l he t r y to s a t i s f y , i n the near f u t u r e ;  and where s h a l l he go t o get t h e t h i n g s he needs.  The f i r s t  i n v o l v e s the  way i n which P a s s i g n s v a l u e t o r e s o u r c e s , and we s h a l l address t i o n below. P's  this  ques-  The second i n v o l v e s a l t e r n a t i v e s , o r o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r meeting  needs, and we s h a l l d e l a y t h i s problem to a l a t e r p o i n t i n the c h a p t e r .  V a l u a t i o n of Resources  For purposes o f d i s c u s s i o n , we w i l l and  two commodities or b e h a v i o u r s  English). resources.  first  c o n s i d e r the a c t o r , P,  X and Y (such as h e l p i n Math and h e l p i n  So l o n g as X and Y can s a t i s f y some of P's needs, they c o n s t i t u t e Reward r e f e r s to r e s o u r c e s  gone i n o b t a i n i n g the reward.  gained;  c o s t s a r e the r e s o u r c e s  We d e s i g n a t e p r o f i t  fore-  as the net r e s u l t when c o s t s  3 are s u b t r a c t e d from rewards.  Because P i s a maximizer, so l o n g as the reward  5  v a l u e o f Y exceeds the c o s t s i n X l o s t i n o b t a i n i n g Y profit  is positive), P w i l l  ( i . e . , so l o n g as h i s  take a c t i o n s to o b t a i n Y.  Such a c t i o n i n d i c a t e s  4 a p r e f e r e n c e f o r Y over  X.  What i s the b a s i s f o r s a y i n g t h a t the rewards to P of Y exceed the c o s t s to him of X?  The  l e a r n e d to need and l i k e  o r i g i n a l source of such v a l u a t i o n s i s t h a t P  c e r t a i n r e s o u r c e s more than o t h e r s , and  much s a t i s f a c t i o n they g i v e .  h e r e w i t h how  P has been s o c i a l i z e d t o need Y more than X, and  gets more reward from Y than X c a r e e r more than m a r r i a g e , a l t h o u g h i t may  w i l l not be  order  them a c c o r d i n g to how and why  We  can  ( a s , f o r example, when we  o r c o f f e e more than t e a ) .  We  concerned thus  say P v a l u e s a w i l l assume t h a t  be d i f f i c u l t to a s c e r t a i n what k i n d s of t h i n g s P wants,  the r e s e a r c h e r , and o t h e r a c t o r s , can f i n d t h i s out by l o o k i n g a t P's behaviour,  has  t o see what he and o t h e r people  a s k i n g P what he v a l u e s .  P e t e r ' s bad  l i k e P have pursued, and  past  by  grades i n Math-would g i v e us an i n -  d i c a t i o n t h a t he would v a l u e h e l p i n Math, and v a l u e i t more than h e l p i n English.  General p r e f e r e n c e o r d e r i n g s based on a h i e r a r c h i c a l o r d e r i n g of  needs are l i k e l y to be r e l a t i v e l y c o n s t a n t f o r the s h o r t run, and may 5 regarded set  as g i v e n .  We  w i l l s i m p l y assume t h a t we  of r e s o u r c e s t h a t P does v a l u e , and  importance.  be  have d i s c o v e r e d a s m a l l  t h a t he ranks each about e q u a l i n  I t i s then p o s s i b l e t o focus on a second s o r t of v a l u e , which  h i n g e s on the q u a n t i t y of a g i v e n r e s o u r c e P has  r e c e i v e d i n the r e c e n t  p a s t , r e l a t i v e to o t h e r r e s o u r c e s . 6 From the p s y c h o l o g y - o f  reinforcement,  we  know t h a t the more P  has  o b t a i n e d of r e s o u r c e Y i n the immediate p a s t , the l e s s v a l u e he w i l l r e c e i v e from s u c c e s s i v e e q u a l increments  of Y.  Our  s t u d e n t P e t e r c o u l d not spend  6  e n d l e s s hours g e t t i n g h e l p on Math problems from O l g a , as he would a l l y become s a t i a t e d . are a s s e s s e d  eventu-  Thus, the rewards t o P of s u c c e s s i v e increments  r e l a t i v e to the amounts of Y a l r e a d y possessed.  of Y  Further, i f P  i s g i v i n g up X ( c o s t s ) to get Y, as h i s s t o r e of X d i m i n i s h e s , s u c c e s s i v e increment's  of X w i l l  c o n s t i t u t e h i g h e r and h i g h e r c o s t s to P.  P will  reach  a p o i n t when the c o s t s of what he i s g i v i n g up w i l l e q u a l the g a i n of the l a t e s t increment  of Y.  When he reaches  t r a d i n g X f o r Y, or v i c e v e r s a .  t h i s p o i n t , he gains n o t h i n g i n  P has reached  an e q u i l i b r i u m , and w i l l  7 s t o p , o r pursue a t h i r d r e s o u r c e .  I t i s a hard  f a c t of l i f e  t h a t P-cannot  have a l l the X, Y, Z, e t c . , t h a t he wants, because r e s o u r c e s a r e l i m i t e d . Since P d e s i r e s s e v e r a l r e s o u r c e s , when he has reached X, he w i l l  g a i n more by d i v e r t i n g h i s a c t i v i t i e s  resource.  Thus, maximum p r o f i t  of r e s o u r c e s .  a c e r t a i n l e v e l of  to o b t a i n i n g another  i s o b t a i n e d by g e t t i n g an optimum  valued  balance  I n the cases of i n t e r e s t to us, he does t h i s by e n t e r i n g  8  intiboexchanges.  Interdependence of P and 0 Exchange t h e o r y makes e x p l i c i t of the events  t h a t a f f e c t P's a b i l i t y  r e c o g n i t i o n o f the f a c t t h a t many  to get what he wants depend on t h e '  9 p r e f e r e n c e and behaviour  of another  actor.  I n the case of P e t e r and O l g a ,  whether P e t e r gets h i s d e s i r e d h e l p i n Math, and how much;,depends on 10 t h e r he can mesh h i s needs and r e s o u r c e s w i t h h e r s .  whe-  I t i s generally  assumed t h a t an exchange t r a n s a c t i o n w i l l o n l y take p l a c e i f b o t h p e r c e i v e , t h a t they w i l l be b e t t e r o f f a f t e r the exchange has taken  parties place  than they were b e f o r e i t . I n other words, they must b o t h r e c e i v e a p o s i t i v e profit.  7  An exchange transaction requires two decisions: P's decision to give up X for Y, and O's decision to give up Y for X.  Once P and 0 decide  they can p r o f i t from an exchange, the basic problem i s to agree on how much p r o f i t each should receive.  I t i s obvious that the basis for exchange l i e s  11 in a difference i n the r e l a t i v e valuation of two parties.  of each of two things by each  We take as given that P and 0 both want X and Y.  verse relationship between the amount of a resource possessed  The i n -  (the resource  base) , and the subjective value of further increments of that resource, describes a value function, mapping one set of values (here, units of resources), into another set (here, subjective rewards and costs to the actors).  The  p a r t i c u l a r value function we have described allows us to assume that the same objective amount of X or Y may have a d i f f e r e n t subjective worth to different actors.  If this were not true, there would be no room for an  increase i n t o t a l subjective value through exchange —  P would gain as much  from having a l o t of X, as from having a balance of X and Y. If we further assume that the actors are aware of the value function by which rewards and costs are evaluated r e l a t i v e to resource base, we have a means of handling the question of the comparison of p r o f i t s i n exchange.  So long as P also knows O's resource base ( i . e . , i n addition to  knowing the value function), he i s able to take the other person's point of view to assess how much 0 w i l l value given increments of X and Y i n an exchange.  This process i s sometimes referred to as empathy, or r o l e taking.  The process of role taking i s made easier for P i f he has had experience i n a position similar to O's, or i f he has had an opportunity to observe similar  8  a c t o r s i n s i m i l a r s i t u a t i o n s to O's.  The  s i m p l e s t case h o l d s  if P  can  assume t h a t 0 v a l u e s t h i n g s i n the same way P does ( i . e . , t h a t 0 i s l i k e 12 P). The more d i s s i m i l a r 0 i s , the l e s s a c c u r a t e P i s l i k e l y to be when 13 he assumes the Other's  p o i n t of view.  I t i s undoubtedly t r u e t h a t a  c e r t a i n amount of e r r o r i s u s u a l l y i n v o l v e d i n P's v a l u e f u n c t i o n , but we i n g how  d e t e r m i n a t i o n of  O's  a r e more i n t e r e s t e d i n the consequences of P's  0 v a l u e s r e s o u r c e s , when he may  or may  not know O's  know-  r e s o u r c e base.  P cannot e a s i l y use r o l e - t a k i n g to determine the l a t t e r , as i t i s more subject  to v a r i a t i o n i n s h o r t time p e r i o d s .  Lack of i n f o r m a t i o n about some-  one's r e s o u r c e base i n t e r f e r e s w i t h the comparison of p r o f i t s and s e t t i n g of terms i n an exchange. the case i n which P's  and O's  Thus, i n t h i s s t u d y , we w i l l b e g i n w i t h  v a l u e f u n c t i o n s a r e known to each o t h e r ,  these v a l u e f u n c t i o n s aret'fche same, except r e s o u r c e s possessed.  the  and  t h a t t h e r e i s complementarity  T h i s case lends i t s e l f  to e x p e r i m e n t a l  control.  w i l l v a r y i s the i n f o r m a t i o n a c t o r s have about r e s o u r c e b a s e s ,  of What  and t h e r e f o r e ,  what would be the r e l a t i v e l e v e l s of s a t i a t i o n f o r d i f f e r e n t r e s o u r c e s . i s i n t e n d e d t h a t the t h e o r y w i l l e v e n t u a l l y be  shown to apply to  It  social  i n t e r a c t i o n s where P and 0 do not n e c e s s a r i l y v a l u e commodities i n the same way,  and  t o s i t u a t i o n s i n which P and 0 must f i r s t 14 value functions. Most exchange r e l a t i o n s h i p s permit profit  to P and 0 v a r i e s .  tive profit  The  d i s c o v e r one  another's  a v a r i e t y of terms, i n which  terms of the exchange can g i v e equal  to b o t h , most of the p r o f i t  to P and  little  subjec-  to 0, o r t h i s  may  f o r P and 0 to have i n f o r m a t i o n about  how  15 be r e v e r s e d .  I t i s important  the  9  much each has o f X and Y, t o determine how f a r t h e other before  the t r a n s a c t i o n c o l l a p s e s  According  can be pushed  ( i . e . , i f P o r 0 r e c e i v e s zero  profit).  to Kuhn, P and 0 w i l l s e t t l e a t a p o i n t mid-way i n the o v e r l a p 16  of t h e i r p r e f e r e n c e s . or e q u i t a b l e  T h i s p r o c e s s i s captured  by the concept o f f a i r ,  exchange.  F a i r Exchange i s No Robbery  While every a c t o r p r e f e r s to g a i n as much as he can i n an exchange, the very  f a c t that both i n t e r a c t a n t s are s t r i v i n g  to get as much as  p o s s i b l e , means t h a t there a r e opposing f o r c e s on any g i v e n P: preferences  P's own  about h i s p r o f i t s l e a d him to attempt t o pay as l i t t l e  as. pos-  s i b l e t o 0 f o r as much as he can get, without l o s i n g the t r a n s a c t i o n . however, has the same p r e f e r e n c e ,  but with regard  t o O's own p r o f i t s , which  can be r e a l i z e d o n l y i f P gets l e s s than, not more than 0. formation,  satisfied  Under f u l l i n -  we expect the r e s u l t to be some s o r t o f compromise.  the n e t e f f e c t o f pushing n e g o t i a t e d  T h i s has  s o c i a l p r i c e s t o a p o i n t where each i s 17  t h a t he i s doing as w e l l as the o t h e r .  'fairness'.  Other,  T h i s p o i n t we  call  Thus, r e c i p r o c i t y and f a i r n e s s a r e n o t seen as moral o b l i g a -  t i o n s on:,the p a r t o f a c t o r s , but r a t h e r as a p r u d e n t i a l r e a l i z a t i o n o f what 18 is  p o s s i b l e and n e c e s s a r y t o accomplish one's g o a l .  get something f o r n o t h i n g expectation  (as m a x i m i z e r s ) , b u t we do n o t u s u a l l y a c t on t h e  that t h i s w i l l occur.  "What Gouldner c a l l s  We would a l l l i k e to  I n a s i m i l a r v e i n , Emerson s t a t e s :  the norm o f r e c i p r o c i t y may be l i t t l e more than the  widespread human r e c o g n i t i o n of the c o n t i n g e n c i e s 19 exchange."  i n t r i n s i c to a l l s o c i a l  10  The  e x p e c t a t i o n of f a i r exchange i s w e l l documented i n the l i t e r 20 a t u r e on e q u i t y . I n a d d i t i o n , s t u d i e s of b i l a t e r a l monopoly show t h a t witLft f u l l  i n f o r m a t i o n , s u b j e c t s tend to a s t a l e m a t e around a f a i r d i v i s i o n 21 of p r o f i t . In these s t u d i e s , s u b j e c t s had no r e s o u r c e base from which to 22  b e g i n making o f f e r s , and  t h e r e f o r e no  that subjects with d i f f e r i n g resource  costs.  A study by W.  Foddy  showed  bases tended to t r a d e i n such a  way  that b o t h p a r t i e s to the t r a n s a c t i o n r e c e i v e d e q u a l s u b j e c t i v e p r o f i t s , f i n e d r e l a t i v e to t h e " r e s o u r c e s  they possessed.  support to the view taken here t h a t P does not  Both of these s t u d i e s simply  a s s e s s outcomes  delend  on  the b a s i s of h i s own enters  p r o f i t s , but t h a t a comparison w i t h O's p r o f i t a l s o 23 into his evaluation. As we have n o t e d , such comparisons w i l l take  i n t o account the n o n - l i n e a r  u n i t , and  r e l a t i o n s h i p between the v a l u e 24  the o b j e c t i v e amounts of such u n i t s .  that i f P can exchange w i t h 0^, l e s s Y, P may  pay  more X to 0^  who  has  a great  than to 0^,  of an  exchange  E m p i r i c a l l y t h i s means d e a l of Y,  and  O 2 , who  y e t both t r a n s a c t i o n s  has  could  meet the c r i t e r i o n of f a i r n e s s . Advantageous Exchange  I t has his  p r o f i t , and,  been suggested, on on  the o t h e r ,  by r e s t r a i n t s of . f a i r n e s s .  'antagonistic cooperation',  We 25  the one  hand, t h a t P s e t s out  t h a t as a p r u d e n t i a l p e r s o n , he  to maximize  is limited  have assumed t h a t exchange i s t y p i f i e d  by  where the a c t o r s must exchange to p r o f i t ,  where the terms o f the t r a n s a c t i o n are i n c o n f l i c t .  T h i s s t r u c t u r e of  but re-  wards i n exchange r e l a t i o n s h i p s encourages i n P a d e s i r e to p r o f i t more than  11  0, s i n c e t h i s i s e q u i v a l e n t to a d e s i r e t o maximize. t h a t people are more uncomfortable 26 than when i t f a v o u r s s e l f . )  (There i s evidence  when an u n f a i r exchange f a v o u r s  Other,  Given t h a t P w i l l mainly have a v a i l a b l e exchange r e l a t i o n s h i p s which tend toward a b a l a n c e of p r o f i t s , what o p t i o n s a r e open to him r e a l i z e h i s d e s i r e t o o b t a i n more" than would be p o s s i b l e on a f a i r exchange?  One  obvious way  of b e h a v i o u r a l products  i s to a f f e c t  strictly  r e a l changes i n the v a l u a t i o n  ( e . g . , P can d e c i d e he r e a l l y does not need Y) , or  changes i n the s c a r c i t y of goods ( f o r example, by l i m i t i n g Other's  of X ) .  to  sources 27  T h i s t o p i c has been d e a l t w i t h i n d e t a i l by o t h e r r e s e a r c h e r s .  I f such r e a l changes are not p o s s i b l e , a r e t h e r e any o b t a i n more than a f a i r exchange would allow? the p e r c e i v e d r a t e s of supply and c e i v e d v a l u e s and affect  demand, P may  be a b l e to a f f e c t  the p e r c e i v e d a v a i l a b i l i t y of r e s o u r c e s .  can c o n t r o l i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t i s used  can'  S i n c e i n d i v i d u a l s a c t on  the p e r c e p t i o n of what i s , i n f a c t , f a i r .  profits  other ways t h a t P  the p e r -  I f so, he c o u l d  T h i s i s p o s s i b l e i f he  to assess the balance- o f s u b j e c t i v e  i n an exchange.  C o n t r o l of I n f o r m a t i o n  The  c o n t r o l of i n f o r m a t i o n as a t a c t i c  comes i s of i n t e r e s t alike. limit  to symbolic  f o r i n c r e a s i n g one's o u t 28 29 interactionists and exchange t h e o r i s t s  Both frameworks are i n t e r e s t e d i n the manner i n which Person a c t s t o the range of behaviours  P most p r e f e r s .  P's  e m i t t e d by 0, so t h a t 0 w i l l do those t h i n g s  shaping of O's  p e r c e p t i o n or d e f i n i t i o n of the s i t u a t i o n  12  f i g u r e s l a r g e among t a c t i c s open to the a c t o r . i n g the  'truth  T h i s may  involve conceal-  about o n e s e l f from o t h e r , w h i l e t r y i n g to d i s c o v e r as much 30 about o t h e r as p o s s i b l e . 1  Advantageous exchange means maximization of outcome i n terms of the b a l a n c e of rewards and c o s t s f o r the i n d i v i d u a l . Maxim i z a t i o n , i n t u r n , i s l i k e l i e s t when the o t h e r ' s outcome v a l u e s f o r v a r i o u s a c t s of yours a r e known to you, but your rewards and c o s t s are not known to him. (Thibaut and K e l l e y , 1959). Peer r e l a t i o n s p r o v i d e a good t r a i n i n g ground f o r l e a r n i n g to c o n c e a l one's rewards. Others should now know how important i t i s to you to have a p a r t i c u l a r b a s e b a l l c a r d , or t h a t you have a d u p l i c a t e of the one you a r e t r a d i n g . Being too eager can r e s u l t i n the o t h e r ' s demanding h i g h e r payment f o r the r e s o u r c e s under h i s c o n t r o l , so t h a t the a b i l i t y to keep one's ' c o o l ' comes to have t a c t i c a l v a l u e f o r the c h i l d . 3 1 Thus W e i n s t e i n c o n c e a l h i s reward and  argues t h a t i n an exchange r e l a t i o n s h i p , i f P  cost l e v e l s  from Other,  then 0 cannot assess what  would c o n s t i t u t e a f a i r exchange, even when 0 knows how X and Y, when he has P's  c e r t a i n amounts of X and Y  value f u n c t i o n ) .  as Emerson, Thibaut  e m p i r i c a l support tage?  How  P a s s i g n s v a l u e to  ( i . e . , even i f he knows  T h i s p r i n c i p l e has been a c c e p t e d by r e s e a r c h e r s  and K e l l e y , S c h e l l i n g , and Kuhn, a l t h o u g h 32 -  for i t i s lacking.  does i t a c t u a l l y work?  w i l l be to e x p l o r e the p r o c e s s  Our  But  i s concealment always an advan-  purpose i n the r e s t of t h i s  chapter  i n more d e t a i l , i n o r d e r to d e l i n e a t e the  I n o r d e r to do t h i s , i t i s f i r s t n e c e s s a r y  the f o l l o w i n g t h r e e a r e a s : profit  such  systematic  c o n d i t i o n s under which t a c t i c s i n v o l v i n g c o n t r o l of i n f o r m a t i o n are to succeed.  can  likely  to f u r t h e r develop  l),_the mechanics of c o n c e a l i n g i n f o r m a t i o n about  i n exchange s i t u a t i o n s ; 2) the importance of a l t e r n a t i v e exchange  r e l a t i o n s h i p s to the p r o c e s s of a r r i v i n g at the d i v i s i o n of p r o f i t t r a n s a c t i o n ; and  3) the d e s i r e by Other f o r i n f o r m a t i o n about P's  in a profits.  13  As we  s h a l l see,  2) and  concealing  information.  Concealing  Profit  3) can s e v e r e l y l i m i t the advantage claimed  for  i n Exchange T r a n s a c t i o n s  L e t us assume t h a t P and 0 have d i s c o v e r e d  that t h e i r  relative  v a l u a t i o n of X and Y are such t h a t an eexchange w i l l p r o v i d e p o s i t i v e p r o fit  to b o t h , and  f u r t h e r , t h a t the o v e r l a p of t h e i r p r e f e r e n c e s  enough to a l l o w more than one  s e t of terms.  i s large  The more P knows about how  v a l u e s X*and Y,  and what amounts of each he has,  compare h i s own  gain w i t h O's,  of X and Y,  t o a n t i c i p a t e the s o r t of terms i n a t r a n s a c t i o n 0 i s  likely his  and  to c o n s i d e r f a i r and  t r u e i n t e r e s t s , he  0  the b e t t e r i s he a b l e to  £0 know the v a l u e 0 w i l l a t t a c h to increments  acceptable.  I f P can at the same time  can argue f o r a l a r g e r share  of the t o t a l  conceal  profit,  as i f i t were the f a i r s o l u t i o n . In the language of n e g o t i a t i o n , we f o r c e d to what B a r t o s  t h a t he  r e c i p r o c a l i n f o r m a t i o n , he  high i n i t i a l is  full  demands, and  to 0.  be  to be met  P can l i m i t 0 to any  1  small concessions  this  o t h e r agreement  I f P i s not hampered by  can adopt a "hard -  symmetric i n f o r m a t i o n , of c o u r s e ,  part i s l i k e l y  to Other.  (P) w i l l not p r o f i t by  than the one y i e l d i n g minimum p r o f i t having  t h a t Other would  c a l l s a ' s o f t ' b a r g a i n i n g p o s i t i o n , because Person  knows the p o i n t of minimum p o s i t i v e p r o f i t p o i n t , by p r e t e n d i n g  can say  Other  strategy, involving 33  in negotiation.  a hard b a r g a i n i n g  Where t h e r e s t r a t e g y on  by an e q u a l l y i n t r a n s i g e n t p o s i t i o n from  Emerson s t a t e s t h a t i f P c o n c e a l s h i s p r o f i t s  P's  0.  from 0, P w i l l  attempt to o b t a i n an advantageous exchange u s i n g whatever means are  avail-  14  a b l e , but he  claims t h a t "...when the p a r t i e s make assumptions or have  knowledge about X (the p r o f i t e q u i t y and  to be s h a r e d ) ,  t h e i r judgements  d i s t r i b u t i v e j u s t i c e e n t e r , probably 34  upon the use of b a r g a i n i n g power." norms of f a i r n e s s i s more l i k e l y  i f t h e r e i s s e c r e c y , because the  of the advantage f o r P i n h a v i n g  gain an u n f a i r p r o f i t .  hard  Cummings, et a l . , and  i n i t i a l b a r g a i n i n g stance by P has  a s p i r a t i o n of h i s opponent, and  does a f a i r s t r a t e g y . formed of P's to  decide what was  formation to  payoffs  P's  about P's  a hard b a r g a i n e r , 35 others  the l e v e l  Of c o u r s e ,  of P's  i n i t i a l bids -  to r e l y on cues e m i t t e d by P  t h i s i s not n e c e s s a r y  about r e s o u r c e s  and  we  will  Because p r o f i t v a r i e s w i t h b o t h rewards and sibilities  f o r P •— he  L e t us examine these  find  f o r P to have an advan-  r e f e r to the concealment of  p r o f i t s to g a i n advantage as  as  assumes t h a t P  tage, so l o n g as he i s the o n l y exchange p a r t n e r a v a i l a b l e to 37 A f t e r Kuhn,  unin-  In the absence of f a c t u a l i n -  i t i s even b e t t e r f o r P i f 0 simply  w i l l suggest f a i r terms, but  of  f o r P than  p r o f i t s , and.the minimum terms of a t r a n s a c t i o n that P w i l l  acceptable.  trying  a l s o found t h a t a b a r g a i n e r  agreement.  r e s o u r c e base, 0 has  infor-  have shown t h a t a  the e f f e c t of l o w e r i n g  f o r v a r i o u s agreements made use  a reasonable  asymmetric  of l e a d i n g to h i g h e r p a y o f f s 36  L i e b e r t , et a l .  possibility  recognized.  mation i s that Other i s not aware t h a t P i s b e i n g  to  restraints  T h i s argues that d e v i a t i o n from  of s a n c t i o n i s lower i f the d e v i a t i o n i s not Another aspect  o p e r a t i n g as  concerning  0.  information  'informational t a c t i c s . '  c o s t s , t h i s suggests two  pos-  can c o n c e a l h i s t r u e rewards, h i s t r u e c o s t , or b o t h .  t a c t i d s i n more d e t a i l .  15  Concealing 0 know 'how important  t r u e rewards:  Weinstein's  idea that P should not l e t  i t i s to him to have a p a r t i c u l a r b a s e b a l l c a r d ' i s  r e l a t e d t o the i d e a t h a t i f P has v e r y l i t t l e Y, any s m a l l amount more w i l l be h i g h l y v a l u e d , and w i l l produce a r e l a t i v e l y l a r g e s u b j e c t i v e reward.-. I f he canconceal h i s l a c k o f Y (and t h e r e f o r e the t r u e v a l u e of Y t o h i m ) , he may be a b l e to get more a b s o l u t e u n i t s o f Y by g i v i n g the i m p r e s s i o n he does not v a l u e Y as much, as i n f a c t he does. much reward P gets from a g i v e n increment g i v e up more Y f o r a given increment w i t h P. exchange.  The t y p i c a l p l o y here  I f 0 does not know how  o f Y, 0 may f e e l t h a t he must,  of X, i n o r d e r to get i n t o  P then ends up w i t h more p r o f i t  that  than does 0 —  interaction  an advantageous  i s to c r e a t e the i m p r e s s i o n o f l e a s t  i n t e r e s t , e x e m p l i f i e d by Tom Sawyer's s k i l l f u l h a n d l i n g of t h e whitewashing.  I n t h i s case, P (Tom) a c t i v e l y engaged i n d e c e p t i o n c o n c e r n i n g the 38  reward v a l u e of whitewashing.  Further, Kelley  claims that "concealing  i n f o r m a t i o n about one's s i t u a t i o n has p o s s i b l e advantages o f s u c c e s s f u l d e c e p t i o n " , because P can delay t h e d e c i s i o n t o d e c e i v e , without away h i s t r u e p o s i t i o n .  I n t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n , we w i l l  of withb'l.dingginformation.  giving  focus on the p r o c e s s  Both w i t h o l d i n g and c o n c e a l i n g i n f o r m a t i o n a r e  used w i t h the same i n t e n t by P —  t o manipulate  O's p e r c e p t i o n s i n a manner  t h a t s e r v e s P's i n t e r e s t s . Concealing true c o s t s :  C o n c e a l i n g the s u b j e c t i v e v a l u e o f rewards  i s not the o n l y way advantageous exchange can o c c u r . true costs.  P may c o n c e a l h i s  The i d e a h e r e i s t h a t i f 0 t h i n k s P has a l o t o f X, i . e . , t h e  commodity 0 i s a s k i n g f o r , t h a t P t h e r e f o r e a s s i g n s r e l a t i v e l y low v a l u e t o 39 an increment o f X. 0 w i l l not f e e l he has t o g i v e up a l a r g e amount of Y  16  (what P wants)_ The  l e s s Y an Other has,  absolute not  know that P has  a l o t of X,  f e e l f r e e to ask g i v e s up.  or can be  for a  f e e l he cannot ask  high  generous.  greater  However, i f 0 does  l e d to b e l i e v e t h a t P has  then even a s m a l l increment of X has  a r e s u l t , Other w i l l  of Y.  the more he w i l l  amount of X r e l a t i v e to the Y he  l i t t l e X, As  to b a l a n c e the exchange, because P can a f f o r d to be  very  s u b j e c t i v e c o s t to  f o r as much X f o r a g i v e n  P again makes an advantageous exchange.  P.  amount  Small boys t r a d i n g hockey  40 cards  will  f r e q u e n t l y use  from someone who has  has  a tactic called  a l o t , and  'begging' —  g i v i n g none i n r e t u r n .  as many cards as the p e r s o n he begs from, but  enough to l e a v e  Thee'begger' o f t e n  a s u c c e s s f u l begger knows  these cards at home.  While the d i s c u s s i o n above has jectively  g e t t i n g cards  comparable u n i t s  (cards  implied that p a r t i e s trade i n  f o r cards,  time f o r time, e t c . ) i n many  cases where the u n i t s are d i s s i m i l a r , i t i s the f i n e what can be  ob-  g i v e n i n exchange f o r what, and  f u n c t i o n of p r i c e s to  de-  from t h i s base can be 41  de-  f i n e d what c o n s t i t u t e s e x c e s s i v e w e a l t h , p o v e r t y , e t c . Having e s t a b l i s h e d our which no  one  has  d e s c r i p t i o n o f exchange r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n  a power advantage, where an e x p e c t a t i o n  e x i s t s , and where t h e r e i s some o p p o r t u n i t y of exchanges t h a t are p e r c e i v e d t u r n our  a t t e n t i o n to the  a c t i o n , as p o i n t e d does w i t h , with,  and  and  out  of f a i r  f o r P to manipulate the  We  kinds  to meet the requirement of f a i r n e s s , we  t a c t i c s t h a t Other can  e a r l i e r , cannot be  employ.  can  An exchange i n t e r -  thought of simply  as something P  t o , Other.pOther i s at the same time t r y i n g to do  t o , P.  exchange  would l i k e to argue t h a t w h i l e p e o p l e w i l l  attempt to work advantageous exchanges when t h e i r r e s o u r c e s  are  something indeed concealed,  17  that the f a i l u r e to provide 0 with information of P's  tactics.  places l i m i t s on the success  This leads us f i r s t to the question of how  alternatives  affect the terms of a transaction. Alternative Exchange  Relationships  So far we have pictured P and 0 i n an isolated dyad;with the poss i b l e exception of romantic love dyads, t h i s i s not a very accurate picture of relationships i n the r e a l world.  Actors usually have more than one  t e n t i a l relationship into which they could enter.  po-  Whether a p a r t i c u l a r Other  i s chosen by P depends on whether P prefers that relationship to alternate transactions.  Since we claim that P assesses exchange relationships i n  terms of his own  p r o f i t , and how  his p r o f i t compares with O's,  the p r i n c i p l e  of maximization of p r o f i t says P w i l l prefer the a l t e r n a t i v e that i s most appealing on these two dimensions.  In any P-0  dyad, P w i l l not have to give  any better terms than he would give i n his next best a l t e r n a t i v e . same l i m i t holds with respect to O's  alternatives.  The  If one party i n a dyad  has more or better alternatives than the other, we say he has a  bargaining  42  advantage, or bargaining  power.  In t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n , however, we  are  not interested i n r e a l power that results from an unequal d i s t r i b u t i o n of alternatives.  Rather, we wish to ask what w i l l happen when P and 0 have  equal numbers of alternatives (some or none), which d i f f e r i n the amount of information  available concerning the resource bases.  Commenting on the f a i l u r e to provide alternatives i n experimental studies of bargaining,  Kelley and  Schenitzki note:  18  I t i s probably most common i n b a r g a i n i n g s i t u a t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g the s t r i c t l y economic ones, t h a t each p a r t y has one or more a l t e r n a t i v e sources w i t h which to d e a l , should he be unable to reach agreement w i t h the p a r t y at hand.43 As soon as t h e r e i s more than one  p o t e n t i a l p a r t n e r , we may  ask what s o r t s  of p e o p l e w i l l be p r e f e r r e d as p a r t n e r s , and what e f f e c t s h i d i n g is likely  to have.  Other's P r e f e r e n c e  Consider  f o r Information  Other, now,  about P  as the f o c a l p e r s o n .  the importance of a l t e r n a t i v e s a p p l i e s w i t h equal t h a t 0 i s unable to c o n c e a l ted  0^)  own  profit  0^),  i n f o r m a t i o n from P.  Other w i l l want to a s s e s s  and  r e l a t i v e to P^  i n terms of how  transaction.  (where P  r  a resource.  ( c a l l him  result,  In e i t h e r r o l e ,  i n the c o n t e x t  known to v a r i o u s P's, little  information.  f o r c e to 0.  We  As an i n i t i a t o r  0  to o f f e r P  r  stipulate (designa-  Other w i l l want to see whether i s paying  excessively  0 w i l l want i n f o r m a t i o n about P.  a v o i d c o n t a c t w i t h those P's  I f he does, t h i s w i l l  from  to ensure a  of asymmetric i n f o r m a t i o n , where O's 0 may  have s a i d about  i s the r e c i p i e n t of an i n i t i a t i o n  much i t i s n e c e s s a r y  As a r e c i p i e n t  What we  p o t e n t i a l t r a n s a c t i o n s i n terms of h i s  he i s b e i n g asked f o r a f a i r t r a d e , or whether he for  resources  As  a  position is  about whom he  has  s u r e l y c o n s t r a i n the advantage  P f i n d s i n concealment. I f people t y p i c a l l y have an e x p e c t a t i o n o f f a i r exchange.yis t h e r e any  b a s i s f o r p r e d i c t i n g t h a t P w i l l a v o i d exchange r e l a t i o n s i n  which he does not know P's  r e s o u r c e base?  t h e r a t r a n s a c t i o n has b e e n / i s  f a i r , he may  I f 0 i s unable to a s s e s s wheassume t h a t P i s c o n s t r a i n e d  19  to a c t f a i r l y , j u s t as 0 i s ; or he may  assume t h a t P, whose p r o f i t s  he  44  cannot see,  i s m o t i v a t e d to d e c e i v e  guess i s e q u a l l y l i k e l y . cases,  0 is likely  Or he may  him;  or he may  assume n o t h i n g .  has no  either  In the l a t t e r  three  to p r e f e r a l t e r n a t e , d i f f e r e n t exchange r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  where he can a s s e s s the b a l a n c e of p r o f i t s . whom 0/  assume t h a t  An  exchange p a r t n e r  about  i n f o r m a t i o n might t u r n out t o be a b e t t e r a l t e r n a t i v e i n  f a c t , i . e . , he might be w i l l i n g to pay  a b e t t e r p r i c e f o r Y.  the l a t t e r were t r u e , 0, /may t h i n k t h a t P has s' / v  sources i n the f i r s t  place.  no  However, i f  reason to c o n c e a l  his re-  While i t seems r e a s o n a b l e to p o s i t a p r e f e r -  45  ence f o r i n f o r m a t i o n , preference  we  would l i k e to have some evidence t h a t such a  does e x i s t , because t h i s i s the b a s i s on which we  information  c o n t r o l has  g a i n i n g and  exchange do not  information,  g i v e any  Studies  have  for  i n the d e s i r e to a v o i d  However, t h e r e are some s t u d i e s c o n c e r n i n g  r a t i o n a l i t y postulates  of b a r -  hard e v i d e n c e f o r a p r e f e r e n c e  though i t s importance i s i m p l i c i t  f a i r exchanges.  the s o r t we  l i m i t s as a t a c t i c a l advantage.  argue t h a t  un-  the v a l i d i t y  i n d e c i s i o n making t h a t i n d i c a t e a p r e f e r e n c e  of  of  described. 46  Research i n i t i a t e d by D a n i e l E l l s b e r g o f t e n p r e f e r a bet guously  has  shown t h a t  subjects  f o r which the p r o b a b i l i t i e s of events are known unambi-  ( r i s k y b e t s ) , t o b e t s f o r which the p r o b a b i l i t i e s of events  outcomes are c o m p l e t e l y unknown ( u n c e r t a i n ) .  T y p i c a l l y , subjects  experiments have t o p r e d i c t which c o l o u r would be a)  an urn w i t h 50 red and  b)  an urn w i t h a t o t a l of 100 tions  (an u n c e r t a i n  50 b l a c k b a l l s  bet).  red and  and  i n these  sampled from e i t h e r :  (risky)  b l a c k b a l l s i n unknown p r o p o r -  20  The  s u b j e c t c o u l d d e c i d e to make e i t h e r bet a or bet b.  He won  c o r r e c t l y p r e d i c t e d the c o l o u r of a b a l l t h a t would be drawn.  $1 i f he Making  the  assumption t h a t the best e s t i m a t e of the p r o p o r t i o n s f o r the second urn i s .5 b l a c k and  .5 r e d , the expected  b i s .5 x $1 = $0.50.  v a l u e f o r a bet on " r e d " i n e i t h e r a or  (Where the expected  v a l u e i s c a l c u l a t e d as the v a l u e 47  o f an outcome times  the p r o b a b i l i t y o f the event  l e a d i n g to the outcome.)  S u b j e c t s should t h e r e f o r e be i n d i f f e r e n t between the two E l l s b e r g and o t h e r s found  t h a t s u b j e c t s tended  urns.  However,  to p r e f e r the bet w i t h  urn i n a, where the p r o p o r t i o n s of r e d and b l a c k were known ( r i s k y ) ,  the and  48  would pay up to $0.36 to a v o i d the u n c e r t a i n b e t . r i s k y a l t e r n a t i v e h e l d even when i t s expected and  the expected  claimed  v a l u e f e l l a b i t below $0.50,  v a l u e o f the u n c e r t a i n bet remained the same.  t h a t the ambiguity  the c o n f i d e n c e a person had  Ellsberg  o f i n f o r m a t i o n a v a i l a b l e about outcomes  v a r i e s w i t h the t y p e , q u a l i t y , amount, and  i n h i s e s t i m a t e s of expected  c o n f i d e n c e i n the e s t i m a t e .  manner the ambiguous a l t e r n a t i v e .  (which  source of i n f o r m a t i o n ) , a f f e c t e d  ambiguous the i n f o r m a t i o n used to c a l c u l a t e expected person's  The p r e f e r e n c e f o r the  value.  The more  v a l u e , the lower  T h i s l e d s u b j e c t s to devalue  the  i n some  While such a c o n s e r v a t i v e e v a l u a t i o n  may  v i o l a t e r a t i o n a l i t y p r i n c i p l e s , i t appears to come c l o s e r to r e p r e s e n t i n g a c t u a l c h o i c e behaviour  i n such s i t u a t i o n s .  E l l s b e r g claimed  g u i t y i s a matter of degree, and w i l l v a r y w i t h how  t h a t ambi-  much i n f o r m a t i o n P  whether i t i s v e r i f i a b l e , whether the source i s t r u s t e d , and  so on.  d i d not attempt to t e s t the r e l a t i o n s h i p between p e r c e i v e d ambiguity these other  variables.  has,  He and  21  E l l s b e r g ' s study p o i n t s to a p e r c e i v e d r e l a t i o n s h i p between the q u a n t i t y and and  O's  q u a l i t y of i n f o r m a t i o n about a l t e r n a t i v e courses of a c t i o n ,  assessment of how  mize h i s g a i n . i f none of P's  an a l t e r n a t i v e w i l l f u r t h e r h i s attempts to maxi-  I t i s not a major e x t e n s i o n of the argument to c l a i m t h a t a l t e r n a t i v e s have w e l l - d e f i n e d p r o b a b i l i t i e s f o r events  ( i . e . , they a r e a l l u n c e r t a i n ) , they may and  v a r y i n the degree of  ambiguity,  t h a t P w i l l p r e f e r the l e a s t ambiguous a l t e r n a t i v e , i . e . , t h a t f o r  which he has r e l a t i v e l y more and b e t t e r i n f o r m a t i o n . The  e x t e n s i o n to s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n i s obvious.  O.'s  information  1  about P's and  r e s o u r c e s and v a l u e f u n c t i o n may  q u a n t i t y , and  not under P's  r e l i a b i l i t y of source.  c e r t a i n l y v a r y i n both Direct  quality  i n f o r m a t i o n , or i n f o r m a t i o n  c o n t r o l , i s l i k e l y to be c o n s i d e r e d l e s s ambiguous than  cues  49 which P i s a b l e to manipulate. about P's  The  l e s s ambiguous 0_^'s i n f o r m a t i o n  r e s o u r c e s , the more c o n f i d e n c e he w i l l have i n both h i s a s s e s s -  ment of the f a i r n e s s  ( r e l a t i v e p r o f i t ) of a t r a n s a c t i o n , and  in his e s t i -  mate o f the p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t a g i v e n i n i t i a t i o n of exchange he makes to P w i l l be a c c e p t e d .  I f the q u a l i t y and  0, 's e s t i m a t e s of the expected show i n h i s b e h a v i o u r ,  q u a n t i t y of i n f o r m a t i o n do  affect  v a l u e of exchange t r a n s a c t i o n s , i t s h o u l d  i . e . , i n h i s i n i t i a t i o n s and acceptances  of exchange.  Under the assumption t h a t 0^ i n i t i a t e s where he a n t i c i p a t e s the b e s t then, o t h e r t h i n g s b e i n g e q u a l , we  expect  profit,  him t o choose an a l t e r n a t i v e w i t h  the l e a s t ambiguous i n f o r m a t i o n , or to seek more i n f o r m a t i o n b e f o r e he ceeds.  0 may  e s t i m a t e t h a t a P w i t h concealed  resources  i s as l i k e l y  proto  be a b e t t e r as a worse p a r t n e r than someone whose r e s o u r c e base i s known,  22  i n the sense t h a t an urn i s as l i k e l y to have more than l e s s than  .5 red b a l l s .  T h i s may  a b i l i t y of an exchange w i t h an  make the i n i t i a l  'unknown' p a r t n e r equal to t h a t of an  two  Even so, the  of the i n f o r m a t i o n about the P w i t h a concealed  w i l l depress  O's  e s t i m a t e of the expected  or  e s t i m a t e of the d e s i r e -  change w i t h a p a r t n e r whose r e s o u r c e base i s known. ambiguity  .5 r e d b a l l s ,  ex-  greater  resource  base  v a l u e of t h a t a l t e r n a t i v e .  If  a l t e r n a t i v e p a r t n e r s seem to d i f f e r o n l y w i t h r e s p e c t to i n f o r m a t i o n  a v a i l a b l e about them, 0 w i l l p r e f e r the exchange r e l a t i o n s h i p where he knows P's  r e s o u r c e base.  In sum,  i t seems t h a t even i f we  t u r n out to  be  wrong i n our assumption t h a t people d e s i r e i n f o r m a t i o n i n o r d e r to compare p r o f i t s , t h e r e may  be a g e n e r a l p r e f e r e n c e ,  independent of comparison, t h a t  a r i s e s from the d e s i r e to assess a c c u r a t e l y the p r o b a b i l i t i e s of outcomes.  T h i s has  i n g i n f o r m a t i o n from We  are now  different  c l e a r i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r P i f he happens to be busy w i t h o l d 0. i n a p o s i t i o n to d e s c r i b e some p o s s i b l e d i s t r i b u t i o n s  of i n f o r m a t i o n a c r o s s a l t e r n a t i v e exchange p a r t n e r s , and  to make p r e d i c -  t i o n s about the f a t e of i n f o r m a t i o n a l t a c t i c s aimed at o b t a i n i n g an advantage.  While our main i n t e r e s t  we w i l l o u t l i n e the cases  i s i n the case of asymmetric  of symmetric i n f o r m a t i o n and  information,  symmetric  ignorance  as w e l l .  The D i s t r i b u t i o n of I n f o r m a t i o n  Across A l t e r n a t i v e s  To s i m p l i f y , l e t us assume t h a t P i s a b l e to c o n c e a l or r e v e a l i n f o r m a t i o n about h i s r e s o u r c e base, and  O's  r e s o u r c e base i s always known  23  unambiguously to o t h e r s .  Then we w i l l  c o n c e p t u a l i z e the two  i n f o r m a t i o n and  a l t e r n a t i v e r d a t i o n s h i p s as dichotomous:  mation about P,  or he may  P and  0 may  have none (except  0 may  have  infor-  f o r cues c o n t r o l l e d by P ) ;  and  each have no a l t e r n a t i v e exchange r e l a t i o n s h i p s , or the same  number of a l t e r n a t i v e s .  To b e g i n , we  they v a r y o n l y i n the amount and  will  say t h a t i f a l t e r n a t i v e s e x i s t ,  type of i n f o r m a t i o n a v a i l a b l e about them  ( i . e . , they do not d i f f e r i n the amount o f p r o f i t can be d i s t i n g u i s h e d . bable  v a r i a b l e s of  success  We  will  of t a c t i c s .  list  they o f f e r ) .  Six  cases  them, making p r e d i c t i o n s about the  Where i t i s r e l e v a n t , evidence  pro-  f o r the p r e d i c -  t i o n s w i l l be n o t e d .  I  The  1.  I s o l a t e d Dyad:  No A l t e r n a t i v e s  Symmetric Ignorance  In t h i s case, P and fits  from a g i v e n t r a n s a c t i o n .  i n f o r m a t i o n about Other, we s u s p i c i o n and  way  0 have ro i n f o r m a t i o n about how  c a u t i o n , and  to a m u t u a l l y  On the b a s i s of the p o s i t e d p r e f e r e n c e  t h a t the b a r g a i n e r s would g r a d u a l l y f e e l 50 agreement.  w i l l t h e r e f o r e d e c i d e to m u t u a l l y  for  their  This does not mean t h a t P and  r e v e a l i n f o r m a t i o n about t h e i r  0  profits.  F i s c h e r found t h a t even i f the s u b j e c t s i n a mixed  motive game were g i v e n the o p p o r t u n i t y c o s t s , they d i d not do so, and by l y i n g and  pro-  would expect the l a c k of i n f o r m a t i o n to c r e a t e  acceptable  K e l l e y , Beckman, and  the other  to r e v e a l t h e i r p r o f i t  t h a t b i l a t e r a l b a r g a i n i n g was  d i s t r u s t of the -information p r o v i d e d  levels  and  characterized  by the o t h e r  person:  24  Open, honest communication a f f o r d s one means by which the n e g o t i a t o r s can a r r i v e at r e a l i s t i c and e q u i t a b l e g o a l s , but each person's hope f o r a g r e a t e r outcome than such communic a t i o n s permit (and h i s e x p e c t a t i o n s t h a t the other person has the same hope) m o t i v a t e s communication t h a t i s not open, honest, or t r u s t e d . ^ 1 The  statement by K e l l e y et a l . suggests t h a t exchange has  t e r i s t i c s t h a t l e a d to p a r t i c u l a r assumptions by P and i . e . , t h a t he w i l l want to get more than a f a i r n e c e s s a r i l y represent 52 Fischer number of p o i n t s . subject with a could p r o f i t  his position  required  share, and  to n e g o t i a t e  P r i o r to n e g o t i a t i o n , the  t h a t he w i l l  experimenter p r o v i d e d  than to s e l f .  Subjects and  d i d not  had  around an  desire f o r information  may  more p r o f i t -  I f l y i n g i s not  advantage e i t h e r  other  profits.  exchange,  the p a r t n e r s w i l l  I f extended n e g o t i a t i o n i s a l l o w e d , s u b j e c t s  p r o b a b l y engage i n attempts to g a i n i n f o r m a t i o n  party, 53  person, h i s s u s p i -  d i s r u p t or i n t e r f e r e w i t h the  cause extended or d i f f i c u l t n e g o t i a t i o n , but  example, by o b s e r v i n g  know f o r  equal d i v i s i o n of  So l o n g as P i s l i m i t e d to exchange w i t h o n l y one  c o n t i n u e to i n t e r a c t .  per-  managed to do b e t t e r than oppon-  a c a p a c i t y t o impose f i n e s f o r non-agreement.  and w i l l l e a d to agreements t h a t v a r y  and  he  In t h i s s i t u a t i o n , s u b j e c t s would l i e about  p o s s i b l e , i t seems t h a t symmetric i g n o r a n c e w i l l not  c i o n and  each  know what the other  c o n s e q u e n t l y , c o u l d not  the minimum l e v e l of reward r e q u i r e d , and ents who  not  to obtain before  c e r t a i n whether a p a r t i c u l a r d i v i s i o n of the t o t a l p a y o f f was a b l e to other  Other,  f o r a share of a f i x e d  'minimum n e c e s s a r y s h a r e ' , which he had  son's minimum n e c e s s a r y share was,  0 about the  honestly.  subjects  from an agreement.  s t r u c t u r a l charac-  probably would  about the opponent, f o r  h i s r e a c t i o n to d i f f e r e n t i n i t i a t i o n s .  25  2.  Symmetric  Information  In our p r e v i o u s d i s c u s s i o n o f how t h e terms o f an exchange a r e a r r i v e d a t i n a dyad, we noted the tendency t o f a i r n e s s , and c i t e d from b i l a t e r a l monopoly s t u d i e s t h a t a c t o r s would tend 54 around an even d i v i s i o n o f p r o f i t s .  Many o f these  to a  evidence  stalemate  s t u d i e s show t h a t sub-  j e c t s w i l l remain i n dyads, and e v e n t u a l l y r e a c h agreement, i f they a r e not 55 g i v e n the a l t e r n a t i v e o f q u i t t i n g , although Kahan found t h a t s u b j e c t s w i l l make use o f a 'no-agreement' o p t i o n when they cannot f i n d a s u i t a b l e 56 compromise, and t h e r e a r e no a l t e r n a t i v e p a r t n e r s . Studies of contrac57 t u a l norm f o r m a t i o n subjects w i l l  i n dyads  show t h a t , l a c k i n g a t t r a c t i v e a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  even remain i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p where theLf . p r o f i t  below t h a t of t h e i r p a r t n e r .  level i s  I t appears on the b a s i s o f such f i n d i n g s ,  t h a t people p r e f e r some agreement t o no agreement, so l o n g as i t i n c r e a s e s the l e v e l o f t h e i r rewards. a statement u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y . and  However, i t would n o t be wise t o accept  such  The u n a v a i l a b i l i t y o f a l t e r n a t i v e p a r t n e r s ,  t h e i m p l i c i t assumption t h a t the t a s k o f b a r g a i n i n g experiments i s t o  reach agreement, p r o b a b l y  i n c r e a s e t h e r a t e s o f agreement above what might  be found i n a ' r e a l w o r l d ' b a r g a i n i n g t a s k .  Even l a b o u r  negotiators,  though they have no a l t e r n a t i v e b a r g a i n i n g p a r t n e r , have t h e no-agreement a l t e r n a t i v e o f s t r i k i n g , and management has the o p t i o n o f l o c k - o u t s . t e g i e s such as these probably  prevent  Stra-  l a r g e d e v i a t i o n from f a i r n e s s when  power o f t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s i s e q u a l . 3.  Asymmetric  Information  Weinstein's to the c o n t e x t  d e s c r i p t i o n o f t a c t i c s f o r advantage i s most a p p l i c a b l e  i n which P knows how 0 p r o f i t s i n a t r a n s a c t i o n , but 0 i s  26,  i g n o r a n t of P's  gain.  Under such c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  a b l e to t a k e advantage of one-sided hard  to get', and  P i s most l i k e l y to  information.  be  He w i l l be a b l e to  'play  to ensure the best p o s s i b l e d e a l f o r h i m s e l f w i t h i n  the  l i m i t s set by Other's minimum p r o f i t . B i l a t e r a l monopoly b a r g a i n i n g e x p e r i 58 ments employing an informed stooge and an i g n o r a n t s u b j e c t , i n d i c a t e t h a t the former can use h i s i n f o r m a t i o n to f o r m u l a t e  a hard b a r g a i n i n g  strategy 59 of p r o f i t . If,  t h a t f o r c e s the i g n o r a n t p e r s o n to lower h i s e x p e c t a t i o n s  i n a d d i t i o n , P c o u l d l i e about h i s p r o f i t , tage would v e r y l i k e l y accrue Nevertheless,  he w i l l s t i l l  60  as i n F i s c h e r ' s study,  to the more informed  an  advan-  member of the dyad.  have to contend w i t h s u s p i c i o n on O's  part.  (It seems p a r a d o x i c a l l y t r u e t h a t the more 0 i s l i k e l y to t r u s t P, as i n the case of c l o s e f r i e n d s , or p o s i t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n of rewards, the l i k e l y P i s to want to get an II  A l t e r n a t i v e s to the Dyad  4.  Symmetric  The profits,  and  less  advantage.)  Ignorance  case i n which n e i t h e r P nor  0 has  i n f o r m a t i o n about the  a l l a l t e r n a t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p s are t y p i f i e d  by  mation, i s l i k e l y to be an aggregate v e r s i o n of Case 1., c u l t y i n f i n d i n g a mutually  acceptable  agreement w i t h one  l a c k of  i n f o r m a t i o n about any  s i t u a t i o n such as t h i s , a r e v e r s e t a c t i c  of g i v i n g out  diffi-  0, would be more  t e n t to which he w i l l do t h i s w i l l depend on the time he has of o b t a i n i n g r e l i a b l e  infor-  except t h a t  l i k e l y to l e a d P to engage i n sampling o t h e r p o t e n t i a l p a r t n e r s .  the p o s s i b i l i t y  other's  The  ex-  a v a i l a b l e , and Others.  In a  i n f o r m a t i o n might  be  27  used, i . e . , P c o u l d d i s t i n g u i s h h i m s e l f as the o n l y person w i l l i n g to honest, and  thereby  secure a t r a n s a c t i o n .  to b e i n g taken advantage o f . Case .4. , a l t h o u g h  There i s l i t t l e  i t does not seem t r i v i a l  a c t i o n , such as the sampling  T h i s o f course l e a v e s him  —  e m p i r i c a l evidence  be open  concerning  the e a r l y stages of  inter-  t h a t goes on a t p a r t i e s , i s p r o b a b l y  of  this  type.  5.  Symmetric  Information  I f P and and to  0 have p e r f e c t i n f o r m a t i o n about each o t h e r ' s  resources  p r e f e r e n c e s , and where t h e r e a r e a v a i l a b l e s u b s t i t u t a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e s 61 the dyad, we  approach the economist's model of pure c o m p e t i t i o n .  Here,  the r a t e s of exchange i n a l l t r a n s a c t i o n s are u n i v e r s a l l y known, t h e r e i s no time p r e s s u r e , a l t e r n a t i v e s a r e a v a i l a b l e and s u b s t i t u t a b l e , and is  l i t t l e room f o r d e v i a t i o n from the f a i r or  'consensus' p r i c e .  there  If P 62  demands more than a f a i r p r i c e , 0 simply moves to another P e r f e c t or f u l l  i n f o r m a t i o n i m p l i e s not o n l y i n i t i a l  alternative.  i n f o r m a t i o n about a l l  P's  r e s o u r c e s , but a l s o an updated i n t e l l i g e n c e of the terms of t r a n s a c t i o n 63 between s i m i l a r P's and O's. 6.  Asymmetric  I f we to  one  Information  accept  the statement t h a t P and  0 are n o r m a l l y not  exchange r e l a t i o n s h i p , the s i t u a t i o n i n which P w i t h o l d s  from 0, but  limited  information  i n which 0 has o t h e r a l t e r n a t i v e s to P about whom he does have  i n f o r m a t i o n , then t h i s s i x t h case i s a c r u c i a l one t i c a l advantage of i n f o r m a t i o n c o n t r o l .  I f P had  f o r examining the t a c d i s c r e t i o n over  infor-  28  mation Others r e c e i v e about him, he can f o l l o w t h r e e courses i) ii)  he can w i t h o l d  i n f o r m a t i o n , g i v i n g o f f a minimum o f cues,  he can engage i n d e l i b e r a t e m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n l i e about how he v a l u e s has  iii)  the r e s o u r c e s  —  simply,  P can  a t stake, and how much he  o f them.  he can be s e l e c t i v e about t h e r e l e a s e o f i n f o r m a t i o n , g i v i n g o u t o n l y those  The  of a c t i o n :  success  items t h a t advance h i s aims.  o f a l l these t a c t i c s n e i i e s c n O's a c c e p t i n g a t f a c e v a l u e  mation t h a t o r i g i n a t e s from P.  ( 0 may f i n d  infor-  i t c o s t l y or impossible to  t e s t P's c l a i m s , o r 0 may n o t have time t o change t o another r e l a t i o n s h i p . ) Because of t h e p o s i t e d p r e f e r e n c e formation,  a c t o r s have f o r unambiguous i n -  and the f a c t t h a t t h e r e o f t e n are a l t e r n a t i v e s a v a i l a b l e t o both  p a r t i e s i n an exchange, we argue t h a t the s u c c e s s i s n o t ensured i n simple The  constant  sum n a t u r e  of informational t a c t i c s  exchange s i t u a t i o n s w i t h asymmetric o f exchange a l s o c a s t s a c o m p e t i t i v e  information. l i g h t on  t r a n s a c t i o n s , and i n t e r a c t a n t s a r e more l i k e l y t o be s u s p i c i o u s o f a p a r t ner's  i n f o r m a t i o n when t h a t person's s e l f  interest  can be f u r t h e r e d by  s k i l l f u l c o n t r o l of information. The  theory  and e x p e r i m e n t a l  d e s i g n developed i n t h e r e s t o f t h i s  d i s s e r t a t i o n a r e addressed t o Case 6. o u t l i n e d above. argued t h a t these persons would n o r m a l l y  Although i t can be  be a b l e t o choose o c c a s i o n s f o r  concealment, and t h a t these o c c a s i o n s w i l l depend on t h e means P has a v a i l able f o r manipulating l a r g e l y unexplored  i n f o r m a t i o n , f o r purposes o f b e g i n n i n g  a study  of a  a r e a , we w i l l s t a r t w i t h a s i t u a t i o n where t h e r e i s  e i t h e r t o t a l or no d i r e c t  i n f o r m a t i o n about P, and d i r e c t  i n f o r m a t i o n about  29  0.  In such a case, P's best hope for advantage rests on the presence of  other P's whose resources are known to 0, and who ask 0 for terms i n exchange that are better than P would get in a f a i r transaction.  (This would  occur i f these other P's had small amounts of resource X (high costs) and/or relatively large amounts of Y (low rewards).) In this context, we w i l l investigate the extent to which Weinstein's claim that people w i l l u t i l i z e concealment to get advantageous exchanges holds, test the strength of a preference for exchanges about which the actor has unambiguous information, and observe the consequences that result from the interaction of the two processes.  If we can find support for our conceptualization of processes  involved i n tactics of exchange for this case, i t should also shed light on the other cases. Of course, most ' r e a l - l i f e ' social exchange relationships are not clear-cut examples of any one of the combinations of alternatives and i n formation we l i s t e d .  Alternatives to a dyad may exist, but i t w i l l involve  some degree of effort and uncertainty to make the alternatives truly a v a i l able.  People rarely have perfect information about other's values and re-  sources, and even less about the transactions going on between members of other dyads —  the actual rates of exchange may become known over time,  as different pairs of actors i n a group engage i n transaction. We  may  expect, that i n the early stages of interaction, an actor who can conceal his true resource position from others w i l l believe that i t i s to his advantage to do so, even i f there are unconcealed potential partners for 0 in the group.  To make such a prediction, i t i s not necessary to assume  that P i s stupid —  the costs to 0 of 'shopping' for and securing preferred  30  a l t e r n a t i v e s may l e a d him t o accept whatever i n i t i a t i o n s he r e c e i v e s , e s p e c i a l l y i f 0 i s pressed f o r time, or has few i n i t i a t i o n s from which t o choose.  I f t h e terms s e t i n t r a n s a c t i o n s i n v a r i o u s dyads a r e n o t immed-  i a t e l y known, P i s n o t u n r e a l i s t i c i f he t h i n k s he may 'get away' w i t h an advantageous exchange. The  connectedness  about a c c u m u l a t i n g ,  o f t h e group and the a v a i l a b i l i t y o f i n f o r m a t i o n  as w e l l as about i n i t i a l r e s o u r c e s , w i l l c l e a r l y have  64 an e f f e c t on the success o f P's t a c t i c s . Because o f t h e p r e f e r e n c e f o r unambiguous i n f o r m a t i o n , we p r e d i c t t h a t a person who conceals h i s p o s i t i o n w i l l  l e a r n through  experience that  the p e r c e i v e d advantage i n asymmetric i n f o r m a t i o n i s n o t n e c e s s a r i l y an advantage at a l l .  Over repeated  i n t e r a c t i o n , as a c t o r s come t o know more  about each o t h e r s ' p r e f e r e n c e s through t h e i r o v e r t b e h a v i o u r , and as conc e a l e d p a r t n e r s get passed we expect  fewer attempts  over f o r those who a r e open about t h e i r  position,  t o use i n f o r m a t i o n c o n t r o l t o g a i n an advantage.  T h i s i s what we mean when we c l a i m t h a t f a i r n e s s i s a r e s u l t o f i n t e r a c t i o n . The p r o c e s s w i l l proceed more q u i c k l y i f group members d i s c u s s t h e terms o f t r a n s a c t i o n s w i t h each o t h e r , but we b e l i e v e t h a t t h e l a c k o f d i r e c t communication  does n o t prevent a g r a d u a l d i f f u s i o n o f i n f o r m a t i o n through  i n t e r a c t i o n , which i n the end w i l l have t h e same e f f e c t . The  t h e o r y and e x p e r i m e n t a l d e s i g n developed  chapters provide a b a s i s f o r t e s t i n g these  predictions.  i n t h e next two  31  FOOTNOTES FOR  CHAPTER 1  1.  Major proponents of the exchange approach i n a s o c i a l p s y c h o l o g i c a l t r a d i t i o n are: R.M. Emerson, "Exchange t h e o r y : P a r t s I and I I ' , i n J . Berger, M. Z e l d i t c h , and B. Anderson, E d i t o r s , S o c i o l o g i c a l T h e o r i e s i n P r o g r e s s , V o l . I I , Boston: Houghton M i f f l i n Co., 1972; J . Thibaut and H.H. K e l l e y , The S o c i a l Psychology of Groups, New York: John W i l e y and Sons, 1959; P.M. B l a u , Exchange and Power i n S o c i a l L i f e , New York: John W i l e y and Sons, 1964; G.C. Homans, S o c i a l Behaviour; Its Elementary Forms, New York: H a r c o u r t , Brace and World, 1961, ( F i r s t e d i t i o n ) ; P. Secord and C. Backman, S o c i a l Psychology, New York: McGraw H i l l , 1974 ( T h i r d e d i t i o n ) . A more economic treatment i s g i v e n by A. Kuhn, The Study of S o c i e t y : A U n i f i e d Approach; London, T a v i s t o c k P u b l i c a t i o n s , 1966.  2.  See,  3.  The f o r m u l a t i o n of rewards, c o s t s and p r o f i t s used i n t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n most c l o s e l y f o l l o w s t h a t of Kuhn, op. c i t . , 1966, pp. 260-271.  4.  Exchange t h e o r i s t s a r e aware of the t a u t o l o g o u s n a t u r e o f such a d e f i n i t i o n of rewards o r r e i n f o r c e m e n t . (What does P p r e f e r ? Whatever he f i n d s rewarding. What does he f i n d rewarding? What he p r e f e r s >' (chooses).) However, i t i s argued t h a t the consequences deduced from a set of statements which i n c l u d e such a t a u t o l o g y a r e not themselves tautologous. F u r t h e r , we assume independent p r i o r knowledge of what P f i n d s r e w a r d i n g . For a d i s c u s s i o n of t h i s i s s u e , see Kuhn, op. cit..; ', p. 275; Homans, op. c i t . , 1961, pp. 42-43. A l s o see R. Burgess and R. Akers, 'Are operant p r i n c i p l e s t a u t o l o g i c a l ? ' , The P s y c h o l o g i c a l Record, 16, 1966, pp. 305-312.  5.  Homans d i s c u s s e s the q u e s t i o n of a g e n e r a l i z e d p r e f e r e n c e order t h a t t r a n s c e n d s momentary s t a t e s of d e p r i v a t i o n i n h i s S o c i a l Behaviour. He makes the p o i n t t h a t a complete o r d e r i n g of needs, and of the r e sources to s a t i s f y them makes l i t t l e t h e o r e t i c a l sense i n some cases ( t h i r s t cannot be more important than hunger, water i s not p r e f e r r e d to f o o d ) , and l i t t l e p r a c t i c a l sense i n o t h e r s (P does not u s u a l l y have the o p p o r t u n i t y of s a t i s f y i n g a l l h i s needs at once, so t h a t an o r d e r i n g over e v e r y t h i n g i s i r r e l e v a n t ) . In a d d i t i o n , many r e s o u r c e s are c a p a b l e of s a t i s f y i n g s e v e r a l needs at once. Homans argues t h a t s i n c e P's p r e f e r e n c e order i s r e l a t i v e l y s t a b l e over the short time p e r i o d s i n v o l v e d i n exchange t r a n s a c t i o n s , and t h a t P must o n l y c o n s i d e r a s m a l l set of needs a t once, t h a t i t i s s a f e t o take as g i v e n and c o n s t a n t h i s g e n e r a l p r e f e r e n c e o r d e r , and to examine the v a r i a t i o n i n v a l u e t h a t d i f f e r e n t amounts of s p e c i f i e d r e s o u r c e s X and Y b r i n g to P. (See pp. 39-49 i n S o c i a l Behaviour f o r a f u l l e r d i s c u s s i o n of these p o i n t s . )  f o r example, Homans, op.  c i t . , 1961;  and  Emerson, op.  c i t . , 1972.  32  6.  For example, see Burgess and Akers, op. c i t . ,  7.  In economics, t h i s i s r e f e r r e d to as the p r i n c i p l e of e q u i m a r g i n a l i t y .  8.  O b v i o u s l y , exchange i s not the o n l y way to o b t a i n r e s o u r c e s . P may be a b l e to produce v a l u e d goods, a l o n e or i n c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h o t h e r s . Such a process o f t e n i n v o l v e s investment of r e s o u r c e s , as when group members put i n e f f o r t to produce a c t i v i t i e s or goods. In t h i s case, t h e r e may be an i n c r e a s e i n t o t a l r e s o u r c e s , or what Kuhn c a l l s r e source p r o d u c t i o n . The r e s o u r c e s produced can then be used i n f u r t h e r exchange, or r e s o u r c e t r a n s f e r . We are c o n f i n i n g our i n t e r e s t to t h e l a t t e r case, which i n v o l v e s g i v i n g up one r e s o u r c e f o r another, w h i l e t o t a l r e s o u r c e s remain c o n s t a n t . Kuhn argues t h a t o n l y r e s o u r c e t r a n s f e r q u a l i f i e s as exchange, but Homans and Emerson t r e a t both forms. See: Kuhn, op. c i t . , pp. 268-69; Homans, op. c i t . , p. 75; and Emerson, op. c i t . , P a r t I I .  9.  T h i s i s a major d i f f e r e n c e between the exchange framework and d e c i s i o n theory. The l a t t e r , as Kuhn n o t e s , does not take i n t o account "whether o p p o r t u n i t i e s l i e i n our own hands, i n t h e n a t u r a l environment, or i n the hands of o t h e r s " . Kuhn, op. c i t . , 1966, p. 317. cit.,  10.  See Emerson, op.  11.  Kuhn, op. c i t . ,  12.  K e l l e y and Thibaut r e f e r t o t h i s as a ' s t e r e o t y p e u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n ' . See: H.H. K e l l e y and J.W. T h i b a u t , 'Group P r o b l e m . S o l v i n g ' ; i n G. L i n d z e y and E. Aronson, E d i t o r s , The Handbook of S o c i a l Psychology, Volume IV, Don M i l l s : Addison Wesley, 1969.  13.  An example of t h i s i s a management r e p r e s e n t a t i v e who can a r r i v e at an i n i t i a l c o n c e p t i o n of how a union n e g o t i a t o r w i l l v a l u e a g i v e n a g r e e ment, because he can make c e r t a i n assumptions about the u n i o n man's v a l u e o r d e r i n g , even though the u n i o n r o l e i s not symmetric to h i s own. Without a r e l i a b l e i n t e l l i g e n c e network, however, i t would be a more d i f f i c u l t t a s k to i n f e r t h e c u r r e n t l e v e l of s t r i k e funds.  14.  Over extended i n t e r a c t i o n s , t h e r e w i l l f r e q u e n t l y a r i s e a s o c i a l s t a n dard t h a t r e f l e c t s what s i m i l a r P's and O's have agreed on as a f a i r p r i c e , and P can use t h i s to h e l p h i s v a l u e comparisons. Social standards a l s o make i t unnecessary to n e g o t i a t e the terms f o r each exchange transaction. Thibaut and K e l l e y note t h a t an important f u n c t i o n of norms i s t h a t they can s u b s t i t u t e f o r the use of s o c i a l power to determine the terms i n s o c i a l exchange. See: Thibaut and K e l l e y , op. c i t . , 1959.  1966,  1972, p.  p.  1966.  59.  323.  33  15.  The range s o l u t i o n s i s bounded by the z e r o p r o f i t p o i n t s o f P and 0, and the number of p o s s i b l e s o l u t i o n s i s r e s t r i c t e d by the d i v i s i b i l i t y of the u n i t s exchanged.  16.  Kuhn, op. c i t . , 1966, pp. 325-332. Kuhn goes i n t o more d e t a i l about c o m p a r a b i l i t y o f u n i t s i n exchange than has been g i v e n h e r e , but he does not d i s c u s s the importance of ' t a k i n g the o t h e r person's p o i n t of view' f o r the comparison o f p r o f i t s .  17.  See: R.M. L i e b e r t , W.P. Smith, J.H. H i l l , and M. K e i f f e r , 'The e f f e c t s of i n f o r m a t i o n and magnitude of i n i t i a l o f f e r on i n t e r p e r s o n a l n e g o t i a t i o n ' , J o u r n a l of E x p e r i m e n t a l S o c i a l Psychology 4_, 1968, pp. 431-444. In t h i s study of n e g o t i a t i o n i n a b i l a t e r a l monopoly game, the authors concluded t h a t "...where b a r g a i n e r s c o n s i d e r e d each o t h e r to be e q u a l s ( i n power and/or s t a t u s ) they f e e l t h a t ( e q u a l i t y of p r o f i t s ) i s the most they can hope f o r , but w i l l t a k e more i f they can get i t . "  18.  An i n t e r e s t i n g d i s c u s s i o n of moral o b l i g a t i o n s as ' p r u d e n t i a l maxims' and t h e i r p l a c e i n Hobbes' L e v i a t h a n i s g i v e n by T. Nagel, 'Hobbes on O b l i g a t i o n ' , P h i l o s o p h i c a l Review, 68, 1959, pp. 68-83.  19.  Emerson, op. c i t . ,  20.  E. B u r n s t e i n and S. K a t z , 'Group d e c i s i o n i n v o l v i n g e q u i t a b l e and o p t i mal d i s t r i b u t i o n s o f s t a t u s ' , Chapter 12 i n C.G. M c C l i n t o c k , E x p e r i mental S o c i a l Psychology, H o l t , R i n e h a r t , and Winston, 1972; R.D. P r i t c h a r d , ' E q u i t y t h e o r y : A r e v i e w and c r i t i q u e ' , O r g a n i z a t i o n a l Beh a v i o u r and Human Performance, 4., 1969, pp. 176-211; M. Patchen, 'A c o n c e p t u a l framework and some e m p i r i c a l d a t a r e g a r d i n g comparisons of s o c i a l rewards', Sociometry, 24^ 1961, pp. 136-156; R. Burgess and J.D. Gregory, 'Equity and i n e q u i t y i n exchange r e l a t i o n s : an e x p e r i mental r e - e x a m i n a t i o n o f d i s t r i b u t i v e j u s t i c e ' , paper read at the annual meetings of the West Coast Conference f o r S m a l l Groups Research, Honol u l u , Hawaii, 1971; and J.S. Adams, ' I n e q u i t y i n s o c i a l exchange', i n L. B e r k o w i t z , ed. , Advances i n E x p e r i m e n t a l S o c i a l Psychology, 2., 1965, New York: Academic P r e s s , pp. 267-299.  21.  L.E. Fouraker, and  22.  W.H. Foddy, 'The f o r m a t i o n o f c l i q u e s i n c o l l e c t i v i t i e s as a consequence of i n i t i a l d i s t r i b u t i o n s o f dimension of w e a l t h ' , Unpublished Ph.D. d i s s e r t a t i o n , U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1972.  23.  There a r e s e v e r a l s t u d i e s which show t h a t comparison a f f e c t s a person's e v a l u a t i o n of outcomes, and h i s subsequent b e h a v i o u r : K.E. Weick and B. N e s s e t , ' P r e f e r e n c e s among forms o f e q u i t y , O r g a n i z a t i o n a l Behaviour and Human Performance, _3, 1968, pp. 400-416; J.P. Sheposh and P.S. G a l l o , 'Asymmetry o f p a y o f f s t r u c t u r e and c o o p e r a t i v e behaviour i n a P r i s o n e r ' s Dilemma Game', J o u r n a l of C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n , 17, 1973,  1972,  p.  61.  S. S i e g e l , B a r g a i n i n g Behaviour, McGraw H i l l ,  1  1963.  34  pp. 321-333; C.G. M c C l i n t o c k , Experimental S o c i a l Psychology, H o l t , R i n e h a r t and Winston, 1972. In a d d i t i o n , e x p l i c i t comparison has been shown t o enhance c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s , i . e . , the d e s i r e t o *do b e t t e r than' someone e l s e . T h i s i s d i s c u s s e d i n the chapter by M c C l i n t o c k , and i n M. Shubik, 'Games of S t a t u s , B e h a v i o u r a l S c i e n c e , 16, 1971, pp. 117129; and i n Fouraker and S i e g e l , op. c i t . , 1963. 1  24.  I t should be noted t h a t a m a r g i n a l u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n i s not the o n l y \aLuation f u n c t i o n that may a p p l y , and the g e n e r a l comments about f a i r ness are not r e s t r i c t e d to such a f u n c t i o n . So l o n g as P and 0 know how each o t h e r v a l u e s t h i n g s , (whatever the f u n c t i o n ) , then i n f o r m a t i o n about an a c t o r ' s c u r r e n t p o s i t i o n w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h i s f u n c t i o n a l l o w s f o r assessment of f a i r n e s s . F i s c h e r , f o r example, used a t h r e s h h o l d f u n c t i o n , whare an a c t o r ' s l e v e l of a s p i r a t i o n (induced by the e x p e r i menter) determined the v a l u e to the s u b j e c t of a g i v e n d i v i s i o n of payoffs. A c t o r s would use i n f o r m a t i o n about a p a r t i c u l a r l e v e l of a s p i r a t i o n to a s s e s s the f a i r n e s s of agreements, and without such i n f o r mation they were unable t o see who p r o f i t e d most, even though the v a l u a t i o n f u n c t i o n was known to both p a r t i e s . See: C.S. F i s c h e r , 'The e f f e c t s of t h r e a t s on an incomplete i n f o r m a t i o n game', Sociometry, 32, 1969, pp. 301-314.  25.  O.J. B a r t o s , Simple Models of Small Group Behaviour, umbia U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1967, p. 268.  26.  P r i t c h a r d , op.  27.  See, f o r example, R.M. Emerson, 'Power dependence r e l a t i o n s ' , American S o c i o l o g i c a l Review, 27_, 1962, pp. 31-41; and H.A. Michener and R.W. Suchner, 'The t a c t i c a l use of s o c i a l power , i n J.T. T e d e s c h i , Ed., The S o c i a l I n f l u e n c e P r o c e s s e s , Chicago: A l d i n e , 1972.  c i t . , 1969;  and Burgess and  New  Gregory, op.  York:  Col-  c i t . , 1971.G  1  28.  For example, E.A. W e i n s t e i n , 'The development of i n t e r p e r s o n a l competence', Chapter 17, i n D. G o s l i n , Ed., Handbook of S o c i a l i z a t i o n , Rand McNalley, 1968; E. Goffman, The P r e s e n t a t i o n of S e l f i n Everyday L i f e , Doubleday Anchor Books, 1959; and P.W. B l u m s t e i n , 'Audience, Machiev e l l i a n i s m , and t a c t i c s of i d e n t i t y b a r g a i n i n g ' , Sociometry, 36, 1973, pp. 346-365.  29.  See f o o t n o t e  30.  Bartos notes t h a t many s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n s have a d u a l n a t u r e — a ' g e t t i n g t o know you' phase, and a ' t a k i n g advantage of you' s t a g e . If P can keep 0 from s u c c e e d i n g i n the f i r s t , he may have a d e c i d e d advantage i n the second. B a r t o s , op. c i t . , 1967, p. 268.  31.  Weinstein,  1.  op.  c i t . , 1968,  p.  767.  35  32.  The supposed advantages of one-sided i n f o r m a t i o n are argued by many r e s e a r c h e r s , but are supported by a n e c d o t a l r a t h e r than s y s t e m a t i c empirical tests. C f . Kuhn, op. c i t . , pp. 334-337 f o r a d i s c u s s i o n of p o s s i b l e t a c t i c s i n b a r g a i n i n g ; a l s o 0. Bartps', 'Towards a r a t i o n a l e m p r i c a l model of n e g o t i a t i o n s ; S o c i o l o g i c a l T h e o r i e s i n P r o g r e s s , V o l . I I , i n J . B e r g e r , M. Z e l d i t c h and B. Anderson, Eds., HHoughton M i f f l i n , Co., 1972; pp. 239-286; and R.E. Walton and R.B. M c K e r s i e , A B e h a v i o u r a l Theory of Labour N e g o t i a t i o n s , New York, McGraw-Hill, 1965.  33.  B a r t o s , op.  34.  R.M. Emerson, 'Power and p o s i t i o n i n exchange networks', Paper p r e s e n ted at n a t i o n a l meetings" of American S o c i o l o g i c a l A s s o c i a t i o n , 1971. Emerson has done some experiments c o n c e r n i n g the e f f e c t s of c o n c e a l ment on w i l l i n g n e s s to use a power advantage, and he notes t h a t when r e l a t i v e p r o f i t s are not v i s i b l e , the more powerful p e r s o n does tend to get more p r o f i t ( i . e . , to use h i s advantage) than when r e l a t i v e p r o f i t s are v i s i b l e . ( P e r s o n a l communication, December 1973).  35.  L.L. Cummings, D.L. H a r n e t t , and W.C. Hamner, ' P e r s o n a l i t y , b a r g a i n i n g s t y l e , and p a y o f f i n b i l a t e r a l monopoly b a r g a i n i n g among European mana g e r s ? , Sociometry, _36, 1973, pp. 325-344. G. Y u k l , ' E f f e c t s of the opponents' '$nij'iaf"offer, c o n c e s s i o n magnitude, and c o n c e s s i o n f r e q u e n cy on b a r g a i n i n g behahaviour', J o u r n a l of P e r s o n a l i t y and S o c i a l Psychology, 1974, 30, pp. 323-335; J.M. C h e r t k o f f and M. Conley, 'Opening o f f e r and frequency of c o n c e s s i o n s as b a r g a i n i n g s t r a t e g i e s ' , J o u r n a l of P e r s o n a l i t y and S o c i a l Psychology, 1967, 1_, pp. 181^-85; 'H^HleKeliey, L.L. Beckman and C.S. F i s c h e r , ' N e g o t i a t i n g the d i v i s i o n of a reward under incomplete i n f o r m a t i o n ' , J o u r n a l of E x p e r i m e n t a l S o c i a l Psychology, J3, 1967, pp. 361-98. S. S i e g e l and L.E. Fouraker, B a r g a i n i n g and Group D e c i s i o n Making, New York: McGraw H i l l , 1960.  36.  L i e b e r t , et a l . , op.  37.  Kuhn, op.  38.  H.H. K e l l e y , 'A classroom study of the dilemmas of i n t e r p e r s o n a l negoW t i a t i o n s ' , i n K. A r c h i b a l d , Ed., S t r a t e g i c I n t e r a c t i o n and C o n f l i c t , U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a P r e s s , B e r k e l e y , 1966, p. 60.  39.  In the sense that a d o l l a r i s worth l e s s to a m i l l i o n a i r e , than to a person on w e l f a r e .  40.  Cummings and H a r n e t t , op. c i t . , 1969, found t h a t a s u b j e c t w i t h a s t e e p l y s l o p i n g u t i l i t y c u r v e , which i s s i m i l a r to having a s m a l l r e s o u r c e base, conceded l e s s d u r i n g n e g o t i a t i o n s than d i d a person w i t h a l e s s - s t e e p c u r v e , i m p l y i n g that i t c o s t s the former more to g i v e up a g i v e n i n c r e ment ( a b s o l u t e amount) of a reward.  c i t . , 1967,  c i t . , 1966,  Chapter  c i t . , 1968, pp.  12.  pp.  431-441.  336-337.  36  41.  For example, people may compare the worth of g i f t s exchanged;the v a l u e to P and 0 of hours spent h e l p i n g another study ( t a k i n g i n t o account how much time each has to spare and how much he needs the h e l p ) ; peop l e a l s o seem to be a b l e to a s s e s s whether someone has a d e q u a t e l y r e turned a f a v o u r , even though the o b j e c t i v e u n i t s (lawn mowing f o r babys i t t i n g , f o r example), are not the same. A l t e r n a t e l y , d i s s i m i l a r commodities may each be equated to a common u n i t , and these u n i t s compared. Money o f t e n s e r v e s the f u n c t i o n of a 'common u n i t ' .  42.  See, f o r example, the d i s c u s s i o n i n Emerson, op. c i t . , 1972, pages 5859; and H.A. Michener and R.W. Suchner, "The t a c t i c a l use of s o c i a l power", i n J.T. T e d e s c h i , Ed., The S o c i a l I n f l u e n c e P r o c e s s e s , Chicago: A l d i n e P u b l i s h i n g Company, 1972, pp. 239-286.  43.  H.H. K e l l e y and D.P. S c h e n i t z k i , ' B a r g a i n i n g ' , Chapter 10 i n C.G. M c C l i n t o c k , E x p e r i m e n t a l S o c i a l P s y c h o l o g y , T o r o n t o : H o l t , R e i n h a r t and Winston, 1972.  44.  There i s some evidence t h a t i n c o m p e t i t i v e s i t u a t i o n s , people tend to assume t h a t 0 i s t r y i n g to get as much as he can, and to l i m i t P's g a i n . (H.H. K e l l e y and A. S t a h e l s k i , ' S o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n bases o f coopera' tors'' and c o m p e t i t o r s ' b e l i e f s about o t h e r s ' , J o u r n a l of P e r s o n a l i t y and S o c i a l Psychology, 16_, 1970, pp. 66-91.) H a r s a n y i suggests t h a t the most common b e l i e f P w i l l e n t e r t a i n about 0 i s t h a t 0 has the same motives as P, and w i l l employ s i m i l a r s t r a t e g i e s . See J . C . , H a r s a n y i , ' B a r g a i n i n g i n i g n o r a n c e of the opponent's u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n ' , J o u r n a l of C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n , 6_, 1962, pp. 29-38.  45.  There c o u l d as e a s i l y be a b i a s toward assuming t h a t P i s s i m i l a r to 0 i n terms of r e s o u r c e base as w e l l as v a l u e f u n c t i o n s .  46.  E l l s b e r g , D., 'Risk, ambiguity, and the Savage axioms', Q u a r t e r l y J o u r n a l of Economics, 7^5, 1961, pp. 643-669; W. F e l l n e r , ' D i s t o r t i o n of s u b j e c t i v e p r o b a b i l i t i e s as a r e a c t i o n to u n c e r t a i n t y ' , Q u a r t e r l y J o u r n a l of Economics, 7_5, 1961, pp. 670-89; J.S. Chipman, ' S t o c h a s t i c c h o i c e and s u b j e c t i v e p r o b a b i l i t y ' , i n D. W i l l n e r , Ed., D e c i s i o n s , Values and Groups, New York: Pergamon P r e s s , I960; and S.W. B e c k e r a n d F.O. Brownson, 'What p r i c e ambiguity? Or the r o l e of ambiguity i n d e c i s i o n making', J o u r n a l of P o l i t i c a l Economy, _72, 1964, pp. 62-73.  47.  I n t r o d u c t i o n s t o d e c i s i o n theory abound. One good example: Wayne Lee, D e c i s i o n Theory and Human Behaviour, New York: John W i l e y and Sons, 1971.  48.  S.W.  Becker and F.O.  Brownson, op. c i t . ,  1964.  37  49.  The i s s u e of the c r e d i b i l i t y of the source of a communication when the source has a v e s t e d i n t e r e s t i s d i s c u s s e d i n : E.E. Jones and J.W. Thibaut, ' I n t e r a c t i o n goals as bases of i n f e r e n c e i n i n t e r p e r s o n a l p e r c e p t i o n ' , i n R. T a g i u r i and L. P e t r u l l o , Eds., Person P e r c e p t i o n and I n t e r p e r s o n a l Behaviour, S t a n f o r d , 1959; and D. Bramel, 'Determinants of b e l i e f s about other p e o p l e ' , Chapter 4 i n J . M i l l s , E x p e r i m e n t a l S o c i a l Psychology , T o r o n t o : C o l l i e r M a c M i l l a n , 1969. There i s evidence that i f the r e c i p i e n t of i n f o r m a t i o n about P b e l i e v e s t h a t P c o u l d p r o f i t from d i s t o r t i o n or s e l e c t i v e r e l e a s e of i n f o r m a t i o n about h i m s e l f , the r e c i p i e n t has l e s s c o n f i d e n c e i n the i n f o r m a t i o n . Thus, i n f o r m a t i o n o u t s i d e P's c o n t r o l i s more l i k e l y to be regarded by the r e c i p i e n t as y i e l d i n g a b e l i e v a b l e p i c t u r e of P's p o s i t i o n . Walton and M c K e r s i e , d i s c u s s i n g the case of l a b o u r n e g o t i a t i o n s , p o i n t out t h a t the use of s p i e s and bugging d e v i c e s i s d i r e c t e d at g e t t i n g a ' t r u e ' p i c t u r e of the opponent's p o s i t i o n , i n d i c a t i n g t h a t t h i s s o r t of i n f o r m a t i o n i s t r u s t e d over P's ' p r e s e n t a t i o n ' of i t . Although ' d i r e c t , v e r i f i a b l e ' cues are not immune to d i s t o r t i o n , we expect the r e c i p i e n t of such cues to have more f a i t h i n them than i f P i s sending the cues h i m s e l f . See: R.E. Walton, and R.B. McKersie, A B e h a v i o u r a l Theory of Labour N e g o t i a t i o n s , New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965, pp. 62-63.  50.  H.H. K e l l e y , L.L. and J.W. T h i b a u t , cit., 1972.  51.  K e l l e y , Beckman and  52.  C.S. F i s c h e r , 'The e f f e c t s of t h r e a t s i n an incomplete i n f o r m a t i o n Sociometry, 32, 1969, pp. 301-314.  53.  Fouraker and  54.  See, f o r example, Fouraker and S i e g e l , op. c i t . , 1963; J.W. Thibaut and C L . Gruder, 'The f o r m a t i o n of c o n t r a c t u a l agreements between p a r t i e s of unequal power', J o u r n a l of P e r s o n a l i t y and S o c i a l Psychology, 11, 1969, pp. 59-65; R.M. Emerson, 'Power and p o s i t i o n i n exchange n e t works', Paper p r e s e n t e d at American S o c i o l o g i c a l A s s o c i a t i o n n a t i o n a l meetings, 1971.  55.  HTHK- K e l l e y and D. S c h e n i t z k i , ' B a r g a i n i n g ' , Chapter 10 i n C.G. McClint o c k , E x p e r i m e n t a l S o c i a l Psychology , T o r o n t o : H o l t , R i n e h a r t and Winston, 1972.  56.  Kahan, J.P., ' E f f e c t of l e v e l of a s p i r a t i o n i n an e x p e r i m e n t a l s i t u a t i o n ' , J o u r n a l of ^ P e r s o n a l i t y and S o c i a l ^Psychology, 8^, pp. 154-59.  Beckman and C.S. F i s c h e r , op. c i t . , 1967; H.H. Kelley op. c i t . , 1969; H.H. K e l l e y and D.P. S c h e n i t z k i , op.  F i s c h e r , op.  S i e g e l , op.  cit. ,  c i t . , 1967,  p.  363. game',  1963.  bargaining 1968,  38  57.  For example, see J.W. T h i b a u t and C. Faucheux, 'The development of cont r a c t u a l norms i n a b a r g a i n i n g s i t u a t i o n under two types of s t r e s s ' , J o u r n a l of E x p e r i m e n t a l S o c i a l P s y c h o l o g y , V o l . 1, 1965, pp. 89-102; J.W. Th'ibaut and C L . Gruder, op. c i t . , 1969; and P. Murdoch and D. Rosen, 'Norm f o r m a t i o n i n an i n t e r d e p e n d e n t dyad', Sociometry, _33, 1970, pp. 264-276. A l s o R.L. Burgess and J.D. Gregory, op. c i t . , 1971.  58.  C h e r t k o f f and Conley, op. c i t . , YukeL, op. c i t . , 1974.  59.  Some s t u d i e s of the r o l e of i n f o r m a t i o n i n b i l a t e r a l monopoly b a r g a i n i n g focus on how i g n o r a n c e o r l a c k of i n f o r m a t i o n about what c o n s t i t u t e s an e q u i t a b l e or f a i r agreement can work to a person's advantage by making him c a u t i o u s about h i s own p r o f i t . G e n e r a l l y , these s t u d i e s have found t h a t i f one person knows what a f a i r agreement i s , and one does n o t , the knowledgeable person w i l l u s u a l l y concede more than an i g n o r a n t one. While t h i s may seem somewhat c o n t r a d i c t o r y to the a r g u ment b e i n g made h e r e , the i g n o r a n t . p e r s o n i n these cases does not seem to have been aware t h a t h i s p r o f i t s were known to h i s p a r t n e r , and f o r t h i s r e a s o n , i s not s u b j e c t to as great a p r e s s u r e to be ' f a i r ' as i s the knowledgeable p l a y e r . However, L i e b e r t et a l . used a s i m i l a r paradigm to the b i l a t e r a l monopoly experiments, and d i d not conclude t h a t i g n o r a n c e n e c e s s a r i l y l e a d s to b l i s s — a knowledgeable p l a y e r c o u l d s u b s t a n t i a l l y a f f e c t the i g n o r a n t Other's e x p e c t a t i o n s as t o how h i g h a p r o f i t he might a c h i e v e . L.L. Cummings and D.L. H a r n e t t , ' B a r g a i n i n g b e h a v i o u r i n a symmetric t r i a d : the r o l e of i n f o r m a t i o n , communication, power-? and r i s k - t a k i n g p r o p e n s i t y ' , Review of Economic S t u d i e s , 36_, 1969, pp. 484-499; D.L. Harnett and L.L. Cummings, ' B a r g a i n i n g b e h a v i o u r i n an asymmetric t r i a d ' , Chapter 2.5 i n B. Lieberman, Ed., S o c i a l C h o i c e , Gordon and Breach S c i e n c e P u b l i s h e r s , 1971; L i e b e r t , et a l . , op. c i t . , 1967. '  ,j  1967;  L i e b e r t et a l . , op. c i t . ,  1967;  60.  F i s c h e r , op. c i t . , 1969.  61.  Kuhn, op. c i t . ,  62.  T h i s does not deny the importance of an a c t o r ' s r e s o u r c e base i n d e t e r mining the p r i c e he w i l l pay f o r Y; what v a r i e s when consensus p r i c e s p r e v a i l i s whether or not P w i l l choose t o e n t e r t r a n s a c t i o n s .  63.  I t may be t h a t i f the s i t u a t i o n i s one of p e r f e c t o f c l o s e to p e r f e c t c o m p e t i t i o n , then a sample of a s m a l l number o f O's w i l l p r o v i d e s t e r e o t y p i c a l i n f o r m a t i o n about a l l , or almost a l l , p o t e n t i a l O's.  64.  An example of how communication and connectedness of group members are n e c e s s a r y f o r norm enforcement i s g i v e n i n the study of ' r e v o l u t i o n a r y c o a l i t i o n s ' , by H.A. Michener and M. Lyons, ' P e r c e i v e d support and upward m o b i l i t y as determinants of r e v o l u t i o n a r y c o a l i t i o n b e h a v i o u r ' , U n p u b l i s h e d paper, U n i v e r s i t y of W i s c o n s i n (undated).  1966,  pp.  375-378.  39  CHAPTER 2 THEORY  For purposes p r e s e n t e d i n Chapter d e c i s i o n maker.  o f c o n s t r u c t i n g a t h e o r y based  1, we w i l l c o n c e p t u a l i z e the s o c i a l a c t o r , P, as a  P i s seen t o choose between a l t e r n a t i v e a c t i o n s , which,  coupled w i t h events  i n the environment, w i l l l e a d t o v a r i o u s outcomes,  h a v i n g s u b j e c t i v e v a l u e t o P. p r o b a b i l i t y between 0.0 P.  on the arguments  The events  and 1.0,  i n the environment o c c u r w i t h  and such p r o b a b i l i t i e s a r e e s t i m a t e d by  To choose between a l t e r n a t i v e s , P i s d e s c r i b e d as comparing the sub-  j e c t i v e l y expected  v a l u e o f each a l t e r n a t i v e , where t h i s SEV i s some  f u n c t i o n of t h e v a l u e o f outcomes, and t h e p r o b a b i l i t i e s o f events l e a d i n g to d i f f e r e n t outcomes.  L e t us apply t h i s to our exchange s i t u a t i o n .  In such a s i t u a t i o n , P i s f a c e d w i t h a s e t of d e c i s i o n s c o n c e r n ing: which o f s e v e r a l a l t e r n a t i v e p a r t n e r s w i l l reward as p o s s i b l e f o r as l i t t l e —  a l l o w him to o b t a i n as much  c o s t as p o s s i b l e  how much o f O's r e s o u r c e P can ask f o r , w i t h o u t r e d u c i n g the p r o b a b i l i t y of a completed t r a n s a c t i o n  —  how much i n f o r m a t i o n P s h o u l d r e v e a l about h i s r e s o u r c e s , and the v a l u e he puts on o t h e r s ' r e s o u r c e s  —  how much P can t r u s t the i n f o r m a t i o n he has about p o t e n t i a l p a r t n e r s .  P's  alternatives  thus i n v o l v e a range of i n i t i a t i o n s o f exchange t h a t he  can make ( i f he i s the i n i t i a t o r ) or d e c i d e t o accept  ( i f he i s the r e c i p i e n t ) ,  40  and  these exchange a l t e r n a t i v e s w i l l vary i n the s i z e and  sources  i n v o l v e d , as w e l l as w i t h the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of p o t e n t i a l  partners.  The  i n choosing him  s i z e of an i n i t i a t i o n made by P determines  v a l u e s and r e s o u r c e s  empathy, e t c . ) to assess how succeed,  and  l i k e l y a given i n i t i a t i o n  r e f l e c t how  P has  cognitive capacity — transactions).  he cannot,  I f P has  P's  of exchange i s to  c h o i c e of a t a r g e t f o r an  ( s u b j e c t to the l i m i t a t i o n s of  d i s c r e t i o n over i n f o r m a t i o n about h i s own  prefer-  r e s o u r c e base, he must a l s o decide whether to w i t h o l d or g i v e i n f o r m a t i o n , and h i s d e c i s i o n w i l l  T h e e p o s s i b l e events  depend on whether w i t h o l d i n g  0 may  value.  i n t h i s s o c i a l context are a c t s e m i t t e d  a c c e p t , or re;pct (or modify) P's  i n i t i a t e exchange h i m s e l f .  initiation  the p r o b a b i l i t i e s of events  U n l i k e a s i t u a t i o n i n which the d e c i s i o n  are under the c o n t r o l of another  are a l s o s u b j e c t to some degree of m o d i f i c a t i o n by P. t e r e s t here are the r e l a t i v e p r o f i t s of P and 0, probability  that 0 w i l l accept P's  o f f e r of exchange.  profit  the t r a n s a c t i o n , w i l l  increases*,0's p r o f i t , and decrease.  context,  a c t o r , and  Of p a r t i c u l a r i n -  and how  f o r P i s to f i n d ways of g e t t i n g i n i t i a t i o n s accepted f a c t t h a t as P's  by  of exchange, and  maker is. f a c e d w i t h an i n d i f f e r e n t n a t u r e , i n a s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n  of  P's  of c o u r s e , c o n s i d e r i n f i n i t e numbers of  i n f o r m a t i o n i s p e r c e i v e d to l e a d to i n c r e a s e d expected  0 may  0,  assessed the v a l u e to him of t r a n s a c t i n g  with available a l t e r n a t i v e partners  Other —  but  (such as d i r e c t knowledge, cues from  a t r a n s a c t i o n be completed.  initiation will  ences and  his profit,  the l e v e l of i n i t i a t i o n , P w i l l use i n f o r m a t i o n a v a i l a b l e to  about O's  out such  type of r e -  they a f f e c t  The  critical  i n the f a c e of  t h e r e f o r e the  the problem the  probability  41  The fits  outcomes of any exchange a r e the a b s o l u t e and r e l a t i v e  to the a c t o r s .  exchanges — or decrease  pro-  Theisoutcomes u s u a l l y change t h e parameters o f f u t u r e  the p r o b a b i l i t i e s of i n i t i a t i o n and acceptance  may i n c r e a s e  as people s a t i s f y t h e i r needs f o r one r e s o u r c e , and t h e d e s i r -  a b i l i t y o f a g i v e n exchange p a r t n e r may change due to comparative ginal u t i l i t y The  o r mar-  reasons. theory p r e s e n t e d i n t h i s c h a p t e r p r o v i d e s a b a s i s f o r making  p r e d i c t i o n s about t h e d i r e c t i o n and type o f i n i t i a t i o n s of exchange t h a t w i l l be made and accepted i n a group of i n d i v i d u a l s i n which t h e r e a r e at l e a s t two v a l u e d r e s o u r c e s d i s t r i b u t e d a c r o s s the members o f the group, and  i n which the d i s t r i b u t i o n of r e s o u r c e s i s n o t f u l l y known to a l l mem-  bers.  To p r o v i d e t h i s b a s i s , the t h e o r y draws on t h r e e p r i n c i p l e s : 1)  maximization  of marginal  utility  2)  comparative  j u s t i c e or f a i r n e s s  3)  the a b i l i t y  to take t h e p o i n t o f view of o t h e r s .  There a r e f o u r main s e c t i o n s i n t h i s c h a p t e r : scope c o n d i t i o n s , assumptions,  d e f i n i t i o n of concepts,  and a s e t o f hypotheses.  O p e r a t i o n a l hypo-  theses a r e p r e s e n t e d w i t h the d e s c r i p t i o n o f the r e s e a r c h conducted t o t e s t the theory i n Chapter  3,  and a r e n o t d e t a i l e d i n t h e p r e s e n t  chapter.  D e f i n i t i o n o f Concepts  S e v e r a l concepts ment o f the t h e o r y .  a r e d e f i n e d here which a r e used i n t h e d e v e l o p -  The l i s t  i s n o t e x h a u s t i v e , b u t i s i n t e n d e d to f i x  the meaning o f the b a s i c u n i t s o f t h e t h e o r y .  42  Resource:  a r e s o u r c e i s any b e h a v i o u r a l , m a t e r i a l o r n o n - m a t e r i a l  com-  modity t h a t i s v a l u e d by i n d i v i d u a l s i n a s p e c i f i a b l e manner, and which  1 can be t r a n s f e r r e d from one i n d i v i d u a l t o another. I n i t i a t i o n o f exchange:  an i n i t i a t i o n o f exchange o c c u r s when a p e r -  son, P, o f f e r s an amount of some r e s o u r c e , say X, t o another in  p e r s o n , 0,  r e t u r n f o r an amount of some other r e s o u r c e , say Y, from 0.  Exchange i n t e r a c t i o n :  an exchange i n t e r a c t i o n occurs when a person P  makes an i n i t i a t i o n o f exchange t o another person 0 and t h i s t i o n o f exchange i s accepted by 0. transaction.)  initia-  ( T h i s i s a l s o r e f e r r e d t o as a  Exchange i n t e r a c t i o n s a r e g e n e r a l l y observed when P i s  s h o r t o f , o r d e s i r e s , some r e s o u r c e Y, notes  t h a t 0 has some o f r e s o u r c e  Y, and t h a t 0 i s s h o r t o f some r e s o u r c e which P p o s s e s s e s . Resource base: possessed  the r e s o u r c e base o f P i s the t o t a l amount of r e s o u r c e s  by P a t a g i v e n time.  (P's wealth.)  base may i n c l u d e s e v e r a l d i f f e r e n t  P's  resource  resources.  S u b j e c t i v e v a l u e to P o f a r e s o u r c e : r e s o u r c e i s the worth o f u t i l i t y  P's t o t a l  the s u b j e c t i v e v a l u e t o P of a  that r e s o u r c e has f o r P.  It reflects  g e n e r a l p r e f e r e n c e o r d e r i n g o f d i f f e r e n t r e s o u r c e s , and h i s c u r r e n t  l e v e l o f s a t i a t i o n f o r these r e s o u r c e s .  D i f f e r e n t i n d i v i d u a l s may have  the same o r d i f f e r e n t p r e f e r e n c e o r d e r i n g s over a g i v e n s e t of r e s o u r c e s , and, Value  o f c o u r s e , they may have d i f f e r e n t function f o r a resource:  l e v e l s of s a t i a t i o n .  the v a l u e f u n c t i o n f o r a r e s o u r c e des-  c r i b e s how much s u b j e c t i v e v a l u e d i f f e r e n t amounts o f a r e s o u r c e to  P.  provide  The s u b j e c t i v e v a l u e s of d i f f e r e n t r e s o u r c e s as c a l c u l a t e d by the  43  v a l u e f u n c t i o n can be compared, i . e . , i n some common u n i t o f v a l u e such as u t i l i t y .  P e o p l e may have s i m i l a r v a l u e f u n c t i o n s even though  they v a l u e d i f f e r e n t r e s o u r c e s , t h a t i s , even i f t h e i r p r e f e r e n c e  2 o r d e r s are not the same. 7.  VaMeeposition  of P on r e s o u r c e X:  the v a l u e p o s i t i o n of P on r e -  source X r e f e r s to the amount o f X which P has at a g i v e n time.  If  the v a l u e p o s i t i o n i s known, the v a l u e f u n c t i o n can be used to assess the s u b j e c t i v e v a l u e of a f u r t h e r increment of X to P. 8.  Net s u b j e c t i v e p r o f i t  to P,\ ( i n an exchange i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h 6jf: the  net s u b j e c t i v e p r o f i t  f o r P i n an exchange i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h 0 i s the  s u b j e c t i v e v a l u e of what 0 g i v e s him (reward), minus the s u b j e c t i v e v a l u e of what he must g i v e t o 0 i n r e t u r n ( c o s t ) . fits will  g e n e r a l l y be r e f e r r e d to as P's p r o f i t , where p r o f i t =  j e c t i v e reward-subjective 9.  Net s u b j e c t i v e p r o -  F a i r exchange:  (sub--  cost).  a f a i r exchange between P and 0 i s one i n which the  subjective profit  to P i s p e r c e i v e d by P and 0 to be e q u a l to the sub-  j e c t i v e p r o f i t o f 0. 10.  Advantageous exchange f o r P-f ( i n an exchange w i t h 0-) : P o b t a i n s an advantageous exchange w i t h 0 when the s u b j e c t i v e p r o f i t the s u b j e c t i v e p r o f i t  11.  Profit  to P exceeds  to 0.  o v e r l a p of P and 0:  the p r o f i t o v e r l a p of P and 0 r e f e r s to  the s e t of p o s s i b l e exchanges between P and 0, of r e s o u r c e s X and Y, i n which P and 0 are a b l e to g a i n a p o s i t i v e p r o f i t .  An exchange o f  q u a n t i t i e s s u c h t h a t P and/or 0 reach e q u a l i t y of m a r g i n a l  g a i n and  44  3  marginal  cost  ( i . e . , an optimum combination  the upper l i m i t of the p r o f i t tus, quo  (no exchange).  can o c c u r ; i f a p r o f i t  o v e r l a p , and  of r e s o u r c e s )  describes  the lower l i m i t i s the  I f P and 0 have no p r o f i t o v e r l a p e x i s t s , any  o v e r l a p , no  combination  sta-  exchange  of p r o f i t s w i t h i n  the o v e r l a p g i v e s each a p o s i t i v e p r o f i t , though not n e c e s s a r i l y an equal p r o f i t . way  D e f i n i t i o n 11  i s i n t r o d u c e d mainly  to p r o v i d e a  of r e f e r r i n g to the f a c t t h a t b o t h g p a r t i e s must b e n e f i t f o r an  change to o c c u r , but w i t h i n t h i s range of agreements, some may more than 0, 12.  shorthand ex-  favour P  and v i c e v e r s a .  Ambiguity of i n f o r m a t i o n :  (about  O's  profit):  ambiguity  of  informa-  t i o n r e f e r s to a q u a l i t y of i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t v a r i e s w i t h the amount, type, r e l i a b i l i t y , to P's  s o u r c e , and c o n s i s t e n c y of i n f o r m a t i o n , g i v i n g r i s e  degree of c o n f i d e n c e  a given transaction.  The  i n h i s estimate  of the expected  d e f i n i t i o n s of ambiguity  and  v a l u e of  confidence  g i v e n t o g e t h e r because, f o r purposes of t h i s t h e o r y , one  are  i s the i n v e r s e  of t b f ; t h e o t h e r .  Scope  Scope C o n d i t i o n s  P r e l i m i n a r y Statement  We ( e a r l y stages vated  are i n t e r e s t e d i n simple  exchange at a g i v e n p o i n t i n time  of exchange r e l a t i o n s h i p s ) , i n which group members are  to g a i n more than o t h e r s i n the group.  The  moti-  scope c o n d i t i o n s must  p r o v i d e f o r a s i t u a t i o n i n which such motives can e x i s t , and where the means  45  to  r e a l i z e a d e s i r e f o r advantage e x i s t s , b u t need not be employed.  advantage i m p l i e s comparison,  As  t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o compare must a l s o be  present. We*argued i n Chapter of  1 that c e r t a i n s t r u c t u r a l  s i m p l e exchange enhance the d e s i r e f o r advantage.  characteristics  The constant 5  sum  n a t u r e o f rewards i n simple exchange makes i t p r o f i t a b l e t o P t o do b e t t e r than Other.  The tendency  f o r simple exchange t o occur among people  with  4  s i m i l a r wealth  levels  ( i . e . , peers),  makes a d e s i r e t o compare f a v o u r a b l y  w i t h one's exchange p a r t n e r l i k e l y , as we b e l i e v e people a r e most to  guage t h e i r success w i t h t h a t o f s i m i l a r o t h e r s .  limit  concerned  I n s h o r t , we do not  the theory t o a s e t o f i n d i v i d u a l s who have ' c o m p e t i t i v e ' p e r s o n a l i t i e s . Scope c o n d i t i o n 1:  Two o r more v a l u e d r e s o u r c e s a r e d i s t r i b u t e d  more than t h r e e members o f a group. one  across  Each o f the members has more o f  r e s o u r c e , X, than some o t h e r r e s o u r c e , Y, or v i c e versa-^and f o r  each member t h e r e e x i s t at l e a s t two other members who have complement a r y v a l u e p o s i t i o n s on X and Y. 'Valued r e s o u r c e s ' means t h a t each member v a l u e s each r e s o u r c e to some 5  extent. Scope c o n d i t i o n 2: function. ble,  Resources a r e v a l u e d a c c o r d i n g to a m a r g i n a l u t i l i t y  T h i s w i l l g e n e r a l l y imply t h a t t h e r e s o u r c e s a r e of a d i v i s i -  m a t e r i a l n a t u r e , and can be accumulated  or s t o r e d by i n d i v i d u a l s ,  6 but t h i s i s . n o t n e c e s s a r i l y the case. Discussion:  The p r i n c i p l e of d i m i n i s h i n g m a r g i n a l u t i l i t y i s e n t e r e d as a  scope c o n d i t i o n , so t h a t we can ensure  the a c t o r s a r e m o t i v a t e d  t o exchange  46  some r e s o u r c e of which they have a l o t , f o r one o f which they have or none.  As noted  i n Chapter  little  1, s u c h a f u n c t i o n makes i t p o s s i b l e f o r  i n d i v i d u a l s - to g a i n s u b j e c t i v e v a l u e v i a exchange, even though t h e r e may be no  i n c r e a s e i n t o t a l r e s o u r c e s d i s t r i b u t e d a c r o s s a group. A diminishing marginal  utility  f u n c t i o n implies that successive  e q u a l a b s o l u t e amounts o f X have d e c r e a s i n g v a l u e t o a g i v e n P. sent purposes,  subjective profit  For pre-  i s t r e a t e d as e q u i v a l e n t t o n e t g a i n i n  7 marginal u t i l i t y .  T h i s i m p l i e s t h a t members p e r c e i v e t h a t exchanges o f  unequal a b s o l u t e amounts of X and Y between P and 0 can s t i l l y i e l d 8 subjective profit  (be f a i r ) .  I n the same way, two d i f f e r e n t  equal  exchanges  (between P and 0^ and P and C^), i n v o l v i n g the same amount o f X f o r d i f f e r e n t amounts o f Y, can b o t h be p e r c e i v e d as Scope c o n d i t i o n 3:  'fair'.  I n d i v i d u a l s know, or can r e a s o n a b l y  i n f e r , the  v a l u e f u n c t i o n d e s c r i b i n g the way i n which a l l o t h e r s i n t h e group v a l u e d i f f e r e n t r e s o u r c e s , b u t know o n l y some of t h e members' c u r r e n t value p o s i t i o n s i n given  resources.  A consequence of Scope c o n d i t i o n 3 i s t h a t i f the v a l u e f u n c t i o n s o f s e l f and other a r e known, members can i n t e r p r e t what c o n s t i t u t e s a f a i r exchange, a s s e s s e d r e l a t i v e t o the r e s o u r c e p o s i t i o n s o f these exchange p a r t n e r s . to  I t s h o u l d be noted, however, t h a t f o r exchanges  o c c u r , whatever t h e i r f a i r n e s s , P and 0 must o n l y be aware o f some  complementarity  of resources... i t i s not necessary  f o r e i t h e r to know  the o t h e r ' s v a l u e f u n c t i o n or r e s o u r c e base. Discussion:  Scope c o n d i t i o n 3 l i m i t s the theory to cases where some com-  p a r i s o n of s u b j e c t i v e p r o f i t  i s possible.  While the scope c o n d i t i o n makes  47  /  an e x i s t e n c e statement admitted  about knowledge of o t h e r s ' v a l u e f u n c t i o n s , i t i s  t h a t the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of such v a l u e f u n c t i o n s i s o f t e n p r o b l e -  m a t i c , and  the q u e s t i o n i s worthy of study i n ' i t s own  right.  However, we  assume t h a t i t i s q u i t e p o s s i b l e f o r members to o b t a i n e s t i m a t e s of o t h e r s ' v a l u e f u n c t i o n s , u s i n g such means a s : —  e x p e r i e n c e w i t h s i m i l a r o t h e r s i n s i m i l a r s i t u a t i o n s , where v a l u e f u n c t i o n s are i n f e r r e d from  —  behaviour.  i f a l l members have the same resons and Y are both needed to perform  f o r v a l u i n g resources  a t a s k ) , P may  (e.g., X  assume t h a t o t h e r s  w i l l have a c e r t a i n v a l u e f u n c t i o n . —  P l e a r n s to a s s o c i a t e a g i v e n context and s t r u c t u r e of rewards w i t h p a r t i c u l a r v a l u e f u n c t i o n (e.g., e l e c t i o n s t y p i c a l l y of  On  a  i n v o l v e some s o r t  threshold function).  the b a s i s of these c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , we  c o u l d a n t i c i p a t e t h a t members w i t h  h i g h l y i d i o s y n c r a t i c v a l u e f u n c t i o n s would be more d i s r u p t i v e to smooth exchange r e l a t i o n s , a t l e a s t u n t i l o t h e r members had had  time to l e a r n  9 their value function. Scope c o n d i t i o n 4:  P t h i n k s t h a t he may  have the o p p o r t u n i t y i n the  f u t u r e to compare H i s p r o f i t s w i t h a l l members of the group, i n c l u d ing  those  f o r whom P does not c u r r e n t l y know v a l u e p o s i t i o n s on  the  r e s o u r c e s i n the group. Scope condition;'5: group i s c o n s t a n t .  The  10  t o t a l a b s o l u t e amount of r e s o u r c e s  i n the  48  Discussion:  T h i s scope c o n d i t i o n , t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e s t i p u l a t i o n of a mar-  ginal u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n , c r e a t e s the  simple exchange.  'antagonistic cooperation  By m a r g i n a l u t i l i t y ,  of a r e s o u r c e  base.  To do the l a t t e r under a c o n d i t i o n of c o n s t a n t  i n c r e a s e i n t o t a l r e s o u r c e s , maximization  get mo IB than o t h e r s i n the group. sons w i l l be motivated  to get a  We  thus  i f he both  a achieves  resource  t o t a l absolute r e As t h e r e i s no  over-  means t h a t i t i s ' b e t t e r ' to  i n c r e a s e the l i k e l i h o o d  ' s t a t u s edge', and  the t a c t i c s they employ to o b t a i n i t .  even  i f he has  adds to h i s t o t a l a b s o l u t e  sources means t h a t 0 must l o s e some a b s o l u t e amount. all  (i.e.,  of X and a l i t t l e of Y ) ; he can g a i n even more u t i l i t y  an optimum b a l a n c e of r e s o u r c e s , and  t y p i c a l of  P can g a i n s u b j e c t i v e u t i l i t y  as he l o s e s some a b s o l u t e net increment lot  1  can t h e r e f o r e  that per-  observe  M o t i v a t i o n i s imposed by the  struc-  11 t u r e of rewards, and does not have to be measured It  beforehand.  can be argued t h a t few s o c i a l s i t u a t i o n s e n t a i l a constant  amount of r e s o u r c e s —  people a r e c o n t i n u a l l y p r o d u c i n g new  r e c e i v i n g r e t u r n s on investments  goods,  and r e g u l a r income, e t c . , and  can then be employed i n simple exchange.  However, f o r any  skills,  a l l of  given  these  ' s l i c e of  time', the t o t a l amount of r e s o u r c e s i s u n l i k e l y to v a r y d r a s t i c a l l y . assume t h a t the e a r l y s t a g e s of an exchange i n t e r a c t i o n , i n which we  We are  12 i n t e r e s t e d , can p r o b a b l y be s a f e l y approximated as constant Scope c o n d i t i o n 6:  sum.  While some members of the group can w i t h o l d  infor-  mation about t h e i r r e s o u r c e l e v e l s , they cannot or do not choose to g i v e out f a l s e i n f o r m a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g the exact s i z e of t h e i r bases.  resource  49  Discussion;  While t h i s may  i n c l u d e d to l i m i t  the t h e o r y , t e m p o r a r i l y , to the p o l a r case i n v o l v i n g  c r e t i o n over i n f o r m a t i o n . should not be d i f f i c u l t formation  seem an e x c e s s i v e l y r e s t r i c t i v e c o n d i t i o n , i t i s dis-  When we have seen what happens i n t h i s case, i t  to extend  the t h e o r y to handle m a n i p u l a t i o n of i n -  ( s e l e c t i v e l y w i t h o l d i n g , d i s t o r t i n g , or  falsifying).  Assumptions  Assumption 1:  I n d i v i d u a l s i n the group are motivated  t o t a l s u b j e c t i v e value of resources i n t h e i r Discussion:  to maximize the  possession.  Because scope c o n d i t i o n 2 imposes a p r i n c i p l e of d i m i n i s h i n g  marginal u t i l i t y ,  each i n d i v i d u a l w i l l a s s i g n l e s s s u b j e c t i v e v a l u e to s u c -  c e s s i v e , equal amounts of a g i v e n r e s o u r c e .  T h i s means t h a t P w i l l o f t e n  o b t a i n more s u b j e c t i v e v a l u e f o r a combination  of two v a l u e d r e s o u r c e s ,  i f he has o n l y one  and  valued i f we  (e.g., a milkshake  than two m i l k s h a k e s ) .  a hamburger may  i t s marginal  be more  As Kuhn s a y s , "maximum s a t i s f a c t i o n i s achieved  c o n t i n u e to take a d d i t i o n a l u n i t s of a good u n t i l  j u s t equals up.  resource  than  i t s marginal  value  c o s t , " where c o s t i s the v a l u e of what P g i v e s  " T h i s s e t of r e l a t i o n s h i p s i s known as the p r i n c i p l e of e q u i m a r g i n a l i t y ,  any v i o l a t i o n of which w i l l s a t i s f y a s m a l l e r want a t the o p p o r t u n i t y c o s t 15 of l e a v i n g a l a r g e r want u n s a t i s f i e d , and Marginal u t i l i t y 1)  thus prevent maximum s a t i s f a c t i o n . "  increases f o r a given P i f :  he o b t a i n s an o p t i m a l combination the s i z e of P's  of d i f f e r e n t v a l u e d  r e s o u r c e base c o n s t a n t  d i f f e r e n t p o s i t i o n on a u t i l i t y  effects, holding  ( i n the sense of moving to a  curve i n an Edgeworth  box);  50  2)  P increases  the t o t a l amount of r e s o u r c e s  moving from one  to another h i g h e r  utility  i n h i s resource  base  (like  c u r v e i n an Edgeworth  box).  In a simple exchange s i t u a t i o n , Assumption 1 i m p l i e s t h a t P w i l l want to o b t a i n as much m a r g i n a l i n c r e a s e of e q u i m a r g i n a l i t y ) ,  f o r as l i t t l e  assumes t h a t P w i l l e n t e r Assumption 2: value  c o s t as p o s s i b l e .  (up to the  profit  to h i m s e l f  constant,  the  profit.  subjective  of an exchange to P i s a f f e c t e d by the s u b j e c t i v e p i r f i t he receives.  point  However i t a l s o  exchanges so l o n g as he makes a p o s i t i v e  Holding  ceives h i s partner 1)  i n a desired resource  per-  P prefers:  an advantageous exchange i n which P's  profit  i s greater  than  O's  profit to 2)  a f a i r exchange  to 3)  an  i n e q u i t a b l e exchange i n which P's  profit  i s l e s s than  O's  profit. Discussion: P's  utility  proviso  Assumption 2 p r o v i d e s  a means f o r i n c o r p o r a t i n g " the i d e a  i s a f f e c t e d by what he  'holding p r o f i t  to h i m s e l f  exchanges xn which P_ gains  of Assumption 1,  profit,  we  Holding  w i l l make a g i v e n P perceives  constant',  two  own  (i.e., for  profit.  that P w i l l transact  admit t h a t P may  Assumption 3:  By adding  enter profit  the  alternative  the same v a l u e ) , i t i s admitted t h a t  g a i n i s a s u b s i d i a r y concern t o P's tion  sees 0 to be g e t t i n g .  that  comparative  Together w i t h the  so l o n g as he o b t a i n s  implica-  a positive  into unfair transactions. to s e l f  constant,  the p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t  i n i t i a t i o n of exchange i s d i r e c t l y  i t to be t h a t h i s i n i t i a t i o n w i l l be  r e l a t e d to how 14 accepted.  P likely  51  Discussion:  From Assumption 1-3,  we  can t e n t a t i v e l y propose t h a t the expec-  ted v a l u e t o P of an exchange w i t h a g i v e n 0 g r a p h i c f u n c t i o n , which g i v e s p r o f i t to 0y  to P pre-eminence over p e r c e i v e d p r o f i t  A l e x i c o g r a p h i c f u n c t i o n r e f l e c t s the i n d i v i d u a l h a n d l i n g a m u l t i -  d i m e n s i o n a l d e c i s i o n problem one dimension p o r t a n t dimension  a t the top of a l i s t  i f he i s i n d i f f e r e n t between two t a n t dimension,  at a time, p u t t i n g the most  im-  of f a c t o r s he w i l l c o n s i d e r ; o n l y  o r more a l t e r n a t i v e s on the most impor-  does he compare them on the next most important, and  Here, a l e x i c o g r a p h i c f u n c t i o n i s proposed first  can be r e p r e s e n t e d as a l e x i c o -  so  on.  t o c a p t u r e the i d e a t h a t P w i l l  c o n s i d e r a l t e r n a t i v e exchanges to f i n d the c l a s s or s e t which o f f e r s  the g r e a t e s t p r o f i t  to P;  i f t h e r e a r e more than one  s e l e c t s on the b a s i s of r e l a t i v e p r o f i t . sent the s u b j e c t i v e l y expected SEV  i n t h i s c l a s s , he  As an approximation,  v a l u e of an a l t e r n a t i v e  (SEV)  then  l e t us r e p r e -  as:  t o P, .= l e x . f ( p e r c e i v e d prob. of acceptance,. • p r o f i t (.Oj > k)  to P;  where (X r e f e r s t o a g i v e n exchange p a r t n e r , k t o the u n i t s i n v o l v e d i n the exchange, and d = +1  i f 0 gets l e s s than P  = 0 i f 0 gets the same as P = -1 i f 0 gets more than The v a l u e of d as +1,  0 and  P.  -1 i s a crude a p p r o x i m a t i o n ,  and would have t o  be r e f i n e d to handle cases i n which P d i s c r i m i n a t e s between how 15 of l e s s p r o f i t  much more  0 receives.  Assumption 4:  I f P has i n f o r m a t i o n about the r e s o u r c e p o s i t i o n s of  o t h e r members, each P can adopt  each other member's p o i n t of view to  d)  52  estimate  .  how much o f one r e s o u r c e  0. c o u l d be induced j  :  t u r n f o r a g i v e n amount of another Discussion: values.  Assumption 4 p r o v i d e s  This i s necessary  to give P i n r e : —  a  resource.  a b a s i s f o r comparison o f s u b j e c t i v e  f o r the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f ' f a i r exchange'.  cause t h e scope c o n d i t i o n s s t i p u l a t e :  1) t h a t a l l members do i n f a c t  the r e s o u r c e s  i n t h e group, and 2) t h a t t h e r e s o u r c e s  to a m a r g i n a l  utility  are valued  Bevalue  according  f u n c t i o n , P can assume t h a t each member w i l l  assign  the same v a l u e t o a g i v e n t o t a l amount of i t . T h i s means too t h a t members w i l l a s s i g n t h e same worth t o an increment of X i f they a r e a t t h e same resource p o s i t i o n .  The e s t i m a t i o n o f the m a r g i n a l  worth o f an increment i s  c a l c u l a t e d a g a i n s t what Other a l r e a d y has; thus t h e p r o v i s o t h a t P must 16 have some i n f o r m a t i o n about O's r e s o u r c e  position.  While P can o f t e n assume t h a t o t h e r s have s i m i l a r v a l u e  functions  to h i s , o r t o i n f e r O's v a l u e f u n c t i o n from the i n t e r a c t i o n c o n t e x t , he cannot make s i m i l a r assumptions about t h e c u r r e n t l e v e l o f O's r e s o u r c e s , as these and  a r e much more s u b j e c t t o v a r i a t i o n .  utilizing  By t a k i n g O's p o i n t o f view,  i n f o r m a t i o n about t h e c u r r e n t l e v e l o f O's r e s o u r c e s , P can  l o c a t e exchange p a r t n e r s w i t h whom he can o b t a i n maximum g a i n a t minimum cost t o h i m s e l f , i . e . , he c a n f i n d Others t o whom a g i v e n increment o f P's resource  valued  i s valued most, and t o whom a g i v e n increment of O's r e s o u r c e i s 17  least  (by 0 ) .  The  converse o f Assumption 4 i s t h a t i f P has no i n f o r m a t i o n  O's r e s o u r c e s , he cannot estimate  O's s u b j e c t i v e p r o f i t  t i o n , and cannot judge t h e l i m i t s o f p r o f i t preferences.  i n a given  about  transac-  o v e r l a p between h i s own and Other's  53  An i m p l i c a t i o n o f Assumption 4 i s t h a t each P knows t h a t an exchange t r a n s a c t i o n which 0 p e r c e i v e s t o be f a i r i s more l i k e l y  t o be en-  t e r e d i n t o by 0, than i s a t r a n s a c t i o n i n which P p r o f i t s more than 0. T h i s serves t o l i m i t to  0.  the range o f t r a n s a c t i o n s . t h a t P w i l l bother  t o propose  In a d d i t i o n , i t informs P o f what 0 would have t o b e l i e v e about an  exchange b e f o r e 0 c o n s i d e r e d  i t attractive.  A f u r t h e r e x t e n s i o n o f Assumption 4 i s t h a t , so l o n g as 0 o b t a i n s a positive profit  i n a given i n i t i a t i o n  of exchange from P, P p e r c e i v e s t h a t  t h e r e i s some p o s i t i v e p r o b a b l i t y t h a t t h e i n i t i a t i o n w i l l be T h i s takes account  accepted.  o f the f a c t ; t h a t , w h i l e 0 i s l e s s l i k e l y t o accept  t i o n s o f exchange from P, the lower h i s p r o f i t  r e l a t i v e t o P, he w i l l  initia- ' never-  t h e l e s s have some l i k e l i h o o d o f e n t e r i n g the t r a n s a c t i o n , so l o n g as he obtains a profit.  The importance o f o t h e r p o t e n t i a l exchange p a r t n e r s i s ob-  vious. Assumption 5:  The g r e a t e r t h e ambiguity  o f i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t P has  about O.'s r e s o u r c e s , t h e l e s s c o n f i d e n c e P has i n h i s e s t i m a t e of t h e 3 8  expected Discussion:  u t i l i t y t o P o f an exchange w i t h 0.. I t ispropojsed'jthat t h e f u n c t i o n f o r P's expected  given exchange w i t h 0  u t i l i t y for a  be weighted by a f a c t o r , C, r e p r e s e n t i n g the c o n f i d e n c e  P f e e l s about h i s e s t i m a t e o f expected the i n f o r m a t i o n he has about 0 .  value  As ambiguity  (as i n Assumption 3 ) , based on of information increases  (depending on t h e q u a l i t y , source, r e l i a b i l i t y , e t c . ) , P's c o n f i d e n c e i n his  assessment or estimate o f the v a l u e o f a g i v e n exchange d e c r e a s e s , and  has  the e f f e c t o f r e d u c i n g t h e estimated  expected  value.  I f we r e p r e s e n t  54  t o t a l c e r t a i n t y as C = 1.0,  the estimate of expected v a l u e w i l l be l e f t  c a l l y u n d i s t o r t e d ; as ambiguity g i v e s l e s s credence  basi-  i n c r e a s e s , the f r a c t i o n C d e c r e a s e s , and  to h i s e s t i m a t e of v a l u e .  ( T h i s f a c t o r i s of  only i f c e r t a i n t y v a r i e s a c r o s s a l t e r n a t i v e s ; o t h e r w i s e , a u n i f o r m t i o n of e s t i m a t e d u t i l i t y would not a l t e r P ' s o r d e r i n g of  P  interest reduc-  alternatives,  and would not a f f e c t our p r e d i c t i o n s of which a l t e r n a t i v e P would choose.) On these c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , we would r e v i s e the f u n c t i o n g i v i n g P ' s  ex-  pected v a l u e f o r an a l t e r n a t i v e to the form: SEV to P ^ Q  k)  =  l  e x  «  f  ( p e r c e i v e d prob. of acceptance ••; p r o f i t  where C takes on v a l u e s from 0,-to 1.0,  and  to P ; d ) )  d i s d e f i n e d as f o r Assumption  3.  It would be more a c c u r a t e to have: SEV t o P .  ,.,=  Q  k  l e x . f (C^3«  j, In  t h i s way,  p e r c e i v e d prob. of acceptance  c o u l d be equal to 1.0  .: p r o f i t t o P ;  C d) 2  i n cases where P i s the r e c i p i e n t  of  an i n i t i a t i o n of exchange ( i . e . , he i s c e r t a i n t h a t , i f he a g r e e s , the t r a n s action w i l l  i n f a c t take p l a c e , and he w i l l make the s t a t e d p r o f i t ) .  We  do not wish to d w e l l on the c o n s t r u c t i o n of an a p p r o p r i a t e f o r m a l model i n this dissertation.  A l e x i c o g r a p h i c r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s mentioned as a p o s s i b l e  means of l i n k i n g the p r o c e s s under study to the more r i g o r o u s body of t h e o r y 18 i n d e c i s i o n making s t u d i e s .  I t a l s o p r o v i d e s a shorthand  notation for  the d e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n f a c i n g the a c t o r s . Let  us c o n s i d e r b r i e f l y j u s t what 'ambiguity  an exchange c o n t e x t .  The  of i n f o r m a t i o n ' means i n  i n f o r m a t i o n a t i s s u e i s t h a t c o n c e r n i n g O's  source l e v e l s , because t h i s , t o g e t h e r w i t h P ' s a b i l i t y of  view, i s what a l l o w s P to e s t i m a t e how  much p r o f i t  transaction; t h i s i n turn l e t s P estimate:  t o assume O's  repoint  0^ makes on a g i v e n  55  1)  how l i k e l y  0 i s t o accept a g i v e n i n i t i a t i o n by P  (probability)  2)  how much 0 p r o f i t s r e l a t i v e t o P , ( d ) , and t h u s , t h e f a i r n e s s o f an exchange.  With r e s p e c t t o 1 ) : p r i o r to a t r a n s a c t i o n , h i s i n i t i a t i o n w i l l be accepted  P's e s t i m a t e o f whether or n o t  i s j u s t an e s t i m a t e —  P cannot  be c e r t a i n  of b e i n g a c c e p t e d , and he does n o t know t h e exact p r o b a b i l i t y o f acceptance and r e j e c t i o n .  He i s f a c e d , i n essence, w i t h an u n c e r t a i n s i t u a t i o n ( p r o 19  b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n f o r events unknown).  As E l l s b e r g argues,  u n c e r t a i n s i t u a t i o n s , P may be a b l e t o a s s i g n s u b j e c t i v e alternative  events.  to the s u b j e c t i v e  on account  t o him t o c a l c u l a t e  f e e l that  i n Chapter  a f t e r making use o f a l l the  subjective  o f t h e q u a l i t y , source, r e l i a b i l i t y ,  estimates of p r o b a b i l i n these e s t i m a t e s ,  and q u a n t i t y o f t h e i n f o r -  The s t u d i e s by E l l s b e r g and o t h e r s mentioned  20 1 compared p r e f e r e n c e s f o r r i s k y and u n c e r t a i n b e t s , and found  t h a t many s u b j e c t s chose the former, 21 pected v a l u e .  even when t h e two b e t s had e q u a l ex-  Thus, i f ( v a l u e x p r o b a b i l i t y = expected v a l u e ) does not  v a r y , some a d d i t i o n a l f o r the r i s k y bet —  f a c t o r must be o p e r a t i n g t o c r e a t e t h e p r e f e r e n c e this Ellsberg attributed  i n an e s t i m a t e o f p r o b a b i l i t y based 22 tion. We argued tended  —  he can put more o r l e s s f a i t h  mation on which i t was based.  p r o b a b i l i t i e s to  of confidence of estimate i s a d d i t i o n a l  estimate of p r o b a b i l i t y  information available i t y , P may s t i l l  The dimension  even i n  to t h e lower c o n f i d e n c e P has  on ignorance o f t h e p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u -  i n the i n t r o d u c t i o n  to a s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n c o n t e x t .  that  these f i n d i n g s  c o u l d be ex-  There a r e many s o c i a l  situations  56  p a r a l l e l t o the u n c e r t a i n bet —  f a c e d w i t h a human opponent, w i t h whom P  has had l i t t l e o r no p r i o r i n t e r a c t i o n , P must a r r i v e a t s u b j e c t i v e of Oj's p r o b a b i l i t y o f a c c e p t i n g P's i n i t i a t i o n . f e r e n t degrees of c o n f i d e n c e  i n h i s estimates,  of i n f o r m a t i o n a v a i l a b l e t o him.  estimates  P i s likely to feel  dif-  depending on t h e ambiguity  The q u e s t i o n o f what k i n d s o f i n f o r m a t i o n  a r e c o n s i d e r e d more o r l e s s ambiguous i s both a t h e o r e t i c a l and an e m p i r i c a l issue.  We do not have a w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d s e t of f i n d i n g s about what  kinds 23  of cues P w i l l t r u s t most i n s o c i a l s i t u a t i o n s , a l t h o u g h have shown t h a t i n f o r m a t i o n c o n t r o l l e d by 0 ( c o n c e r n i n g c o u l d g a i n by m a n i p u l a t i n g 24 Other's motives  such i n f o r m a t i o n .  Jones et a l . 0) i s suspect  S t u d i e s of t h e i n f e r e n c e o f  may e v e n t u a l l y add t o our understanding  of the r e l a t i o n -  s h i p between type o f i n f o r m a t i o n and t r u s t o f such i n f o r m a t i o n .  (Our  argument t h a t t h e s t r u c t u r e o f rewards a f f e c t s the motives o f a c t o r s be extended to c l a i m t h a t the more c o m p e t i t i v e  if 0  will  t h e s t r u c t u r e o f rewards,  the more a c t o r s w i l l be s u s p i c i o u s of i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t comes from 0.) In a d d i t i o n t o f a c t o r s t h a t make P have l e s s c o n f i d e n c e mation, we a l s o know t h a t people process  i n infor-  o n l y a l i m i t e d amount of i n f o r m a -  25 tion,  and wilj. not  t h i s l a t t e r process  seek more so l o n g as they have enough t o proceed.  If  a p p l i e s i n s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n , we can expect a f u r t h e r  b i a s towards p a r t n e r s about whom t h e a c t o r has i n f o r m a t i o n a t hand (as opposed t o those about whom he must f i r s t  acquire information).  The i m p l i -  c a t i o n i s t h a t P w i l l p r e f e r t o make use o f unambiguous i n f o r m a t i o n i f i t i s a v a i l a b l e ; he w i l l , however, use more ambiguous i n f o r m a t i o n i f t h a t i s all  that i s a v a i l a b l e .  57  With r e s p e c t to 2 ) : cannot r e l i a b l y e s t i m a t e O's  0^'s  Without i n f o r m a t i o n about 0 j ' profit  s  resources,  P  i n a g i v e n exchange by means of t a k i n g  p o i n t of view, as he does not know the base a g a i n s t which X i s e v a l u -  ated.  As w i t h an u n c e r t a i n b e t , P may  average the p o s s i b i l i t i e s —  can assume 0 g a i n s more, l e s s , or the same as P, t h a t 0 gains the same. weighting  possible'  'average' guess  Such an e s t i m a t e would have a lower  than i f P knew unambiguously what O's  i n g would a l s o be  the  p r o f i t was.  i n d i c a t e d i f P i s c o n s e r v a t i v e , and  he being  confidence A lower w e i g h t -  makes the  'worst  assumption.  Assumption 6:  P b e l i e v e s 0 w i l l u t i l i z e P's  i n i t i a t i o n s of exchange  as cues to O's  v a l u e p o s i t i o n w i t h r e s p e c t to r e s o u r c e s , when 0 does 26 not have v e r i f i a b l e , unambiguous i n f o r m a t i o n about P's r e s o u r c e s . 27 Discussion:  Kuhn  argues t h a t p e o p l e measure the r e l a t i v e goodness or  badness of a p a r t i c u l a r t r a n s a c t i o n by a) the consensus of what goes on around them, and  b) the p r o p o s a l s  i n the e a r l y stages  of the o t h e r person.  L a c k i n g a consensus  of i n t e r a c t i o n , or l a c k i n g i n f o r m a t i o n about the con-  sensus, the o f f e r s of exchange from Other may  of what 0 c o n s i d e r s a r e a s o n a b l e  price.  be the o n l y i n d i c a t i o n P 28  L i e b e r t , et a l . ,  provided  evi-  dence t h a t "the b i d s of Other a r e used as cues as to the reasonableness one's own  a s p i r a t i o n s " ; and  of h i s opponent's p r o f i t , was the informed  bargainer's  i n d i c a t e d t h a t an i n d i v i d u a l who more i n f l u e n c e d i n h i s own  of  ignorant  goal s e t t i n g  by  offers.  Assumption 6 p r o v i d e s f l u e n c e O's  was  has  f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t P w i l l  t r y to i n -  p e r c e p t i o n of what meets the c r i t e r i o n of a f a i r exchange, i f  58  information i s asymmetric.  If P has information about 0, he can discern  the limits of his and O's profit overlap; so long as P keeps his offers i n this region, P can ask for more than a f a i r exchange would allow, and maintain a positive probability that 0 w i l l perceive i t to be f a i r . Assumption 7: Initiations of exchange are subject to principles of reinforcement:  1) acceptance of an i n i t i a t i o n acts as a positive re-  inforcement; 2) positive reinforcement leads to an increase (repetition) of i n i t i a t i o n s of the same kind, and negative  reinforcement  w i l l lead to a decrease (failure to repeat, change of i n i t i a t i o n ) . Hypotheses The hypotheses w i l l be presented according to the argument made in the f i r s t chapter.  There i t was argued that i n exchange relationships,  P and 0 make comparisons of subjective profits i n exchange through a process of taking the other's point of view, and that this process depended on knowing the resource base of Other.  Exchanges under f u l l information  about resources were argued to approach fairness, or equality of profits assessed i n relation to resource bases.  P could get the best profit to  himself by finding someone who valued highly what P could give him (resource X), and who placed r e l a t i v e l y low value on what P wanted (Y). The f i r s t hypothesis predicts how P w i l l act i f potential partners d i f f e r i n their need for X and Y. The next two hypotheses make predictions about the p o s s i b i l i t y that when information i s asymmetric, P may perceive an advantage i n being able to withold information about his resources that 0 needs to assess the fairness of a proposed exchange transaction. P i s then ex-  59  pected to make i n i t i a t i o n s of exchange that would give him more p r o f i t than 0 ( i . e . , that are unfair to 0).  It was argued that, i n the presence of  alternative P's about whom 0 had information, 0 could express his preference for unambiguous information about his partner by avoiding transactions with a partner whose resource base was not known. The fourth and f i f t h hypotheses make predictions that 0 w i l l show his preference by a) i n i t i a t i n g to persons about whom he has information; and b) accepting or agreeing to i n i t i a t i o n from such persons.  The last hypothesis claims that the net  result of the process outlined above i s that Persons who have tried to gain an advantageous exchange through information control w i l l f a i l to do so, and w i l l decide i n time to make available information about their resource bases. The situation i n which the hypotheses apply i s one where some people have already revealed their resource base and value positions to other members of the group, and some other members have, by choice or c i r cumstance, discretion over information about their value positions. We consider a situation where there are just two different commodities X and Y, valued i n a known and specifiable way, and distributed non-uniformly across the members of the group.  Individuals are seen to have an equal number  of possible alternative exchange partners, so that no one possesses a power advantage by virtue of a greater number of alternatives. Hypothesis 1 Among those members about whose resource bases and value positions P has unambiguous information, P i s most l i k e l y to i n i t i a t e to a person, 0., who P perceives to have the greatest amount of resource Y, and the smallest amount of resource X, relative to Y.  60  H y p o t h e s i s 1 i s based on the f o l l o w i n g argument. 1 i t was  argued t h a t P w i l l  In s i t u a t i o n s s p e c i f i e d by lot. of one  commodity X,  t r y to maximize h i s t o t a l m a r g i n a l  of the r e s o u r c e s  of an increment  and  little  he p o s s e s s e s .  to i n c r e a s e the t o t a l  By d e f i n i t i o n ,  w i l l be s m a l l e r f o r some 0 who low.  the m a r g i n a l has  Y are low,  o f f e r i n g are l a r g e .  i f i t has  Such a person w i l l not o n l y be w i l l i n g  has  a l o t of Y r e l a t i v e  likely  to make i n i t i a t i o n s  accepted,  T h e r e f o r e , we  to these Others.  t h i s implies that  the argument t h a t without  gage i n t h e . r o l e - t a k i n g process  The  P's  to an 0  p r o v i s o "Among those  unambiguous  who  about  information....",  such i n f o r m a t i o n , P cannot  d e s c r i b e d by Assumption 4,  he must g i v e 0 to get an increment  ini-  p r e d i c t t h a t members are more  whose r e s o u r c e bases and v a l u e p o s i t i o n s P has i s made to r e f l e c t  I n conjunc-  to make an  w i l l be g r e a t e r f o r an i n i t i a t i o n  to X.  0  to g i v e up more  as i t i n c r e a s e s h i s v a l u e .  a good chance of b e i n g  s u b j e c t i v e l y expected p r o f i t  l o c a t e an  the  g a i n from the ./\ X which P i s  t i o n w i t h Assumption 3, s t a t i n g t h a t P w i l l be more l i k e l y tiation  utility  By Assumption 4, P can take  and whose m a r g i n a l  Y, but w i l l be anxious to o b t a i n X,  value  a l o t of Y-fy the  p o i n t of view of Others whose r e s o u r c e bases a r e known, and A  a  of another commodity Y, both of which  c o s t s to such an 0 w i l l be r e l a t i v e l y  whose c o s t s  utility.  the scope c o n d i t i o n s , when the a c t o r has  he v a l u e s , he can t r a d e some of X f o r some of Y, to him  In Assumption  en-  to assess what  Y.  29 Discussion:  W.  Foddy  provided  evidence  t h a t P p r e f e r s to i n i t i a t e  o t h e r s w i t h a l a r g e r e s o u r c e base r a t h e r than to those w i t h a s m a l l  to resource  base of a g i v e n commodity, because the s u b j e c t i v e c o s t s f o r 'wealthy' Others  61  for  g i v i n g up r e s o u r c e increments  a restatement we  were s m a l l e r .  of t h i s p r i n c i p l e , except  that:  Hypothesis  1 i s basically  1) i n the p r e s e n t  context,  s h a l l go on to s t a t e a p r i o r p r e f e r e n c e f o r exchange p a r t n e r s about  whom one has  i n f o r m a t i o n ; and  2) Hypothesis  1 g e n e r a l i z e s W.  that P p r e f e r s Others w i t h l a r g e amounts of r e s o u r c e Y,  Foddy's c l a i m  to i n c l u d e the  case i n which a l l members have the same t o t a l wealth..., but d i f f e r e n t of  one  r e s o u r c e to another.  Others w i t h a r e l a t i v e l y  In such a case, P w i l l p r e f e r to i n i t i a t e  g r e a t e r imbalance  of Y over X.  of  P,  p r i c e s w i l l be too h i g h .  A f u r t h e r p o i n t to note i s t h a t i f we Hypothesis  to  Conversely, P w i l l  a v o i d d e a l i n g w i t h someone w i t h a more even b a l a n c e of r e s o u r c e s than because t h i s O's  ratios^  f i n d e m p i r i c a l support f o r  1, we w i l l have a b a s i s f o r p r e d i c t i n g the r e s t of the p r o c e s s  c o n c e a l i n g rewards and c o s t s to g a i n advantage.  That i s , i t w i l l  give  us c o n f i d e n c e i n our c l a i m t h a t P does e v a l u a t e the r e l a t i v e p r o f i t s i n an exchange i n r e f e r e n c e to how  much he and 0 a l r e a d y have of the r e s o u r c e s  b e i n g exchanged. H y p o t h e s i s 2: I f 0 has o n l y ambiguous i n f o r m a t i o n about P's r e s o u r c e base, and P has unambiguous i n f o r m a t i o n about O's r e s o u r c e base, P i s more l i k e l y to make an i n i t i a t i o n of exchange t h a t i s advantageous to P, than when 0 does have i n f o r m a t i o n about P's r e s o u r c e base. Hypothesis 3: In the e a r l y s t a g e s of i n t e r a c t i o n , persons who have the o p p o r t u n i t y to c o n c e a l t h e i r r e s o u r c e bases and v a l u e p o s i t i o n s w i l l p e r c e i v e such concealment to be an advantage. Hypotheses 2 and We  3 are based  on the f o l l o w i n g argument:  have assumed (Assumption  1) t h a t members of the group want to  o b t a i n as much m a r g i n a l p r o f i t as i s p o s s i b l e , and i n a d d i t i o n , to g a i n more 30 p r o f i t i n an exchange than the p a r t n e r gains (Assumption 2 ) . However, by  62  Assumption 4, when P has i n f o r m a t i o n about O's r e s o u r c e s , P i s a b l e t o adopt the g i v e n Other's p o i n t of view to guage how much 0 i s w i l l i n g and able t o g i v e P.  Taking  O's p o i n t o f view makes P r e a l i z e t h a t 0 a c t s a c -  c o r d i n g to Assumptions 1 and 2, j u s t as P does. d i t i o n s of f u l l in  i n f o r m a t i o n would tend  exchange, as t h i s w i l l  tend  w i l l i n g and a b l e t o g i v e up. an exchange formation,  The n e t r e s u l t under con-  to e q u a l i t y of s u b j e c t i v e p r o f i t s  t o be each a c t o r ' s e s t i m a t e  of what 0 i s  By Assumption 3, P i s u n l i k e l y t o i n i t i a t e  t h a t i s u n l i k e l y t o be completed.  Under f u l l  symmetric i n -  exchanges u n f a i r t o e i t h e r p a r t y a r e u n l i k e l y to be completed.  However, i f 0 has o n l y ambiguous o r no i n f o r m a t i o n about P's r e s o u r c e then by Assumption 6, Other i s l e f t  i n the p o s i t i o n o f i n f e r r i n g the p r o f i t  P would make by the k i n d s o f o f f e r s P makes. P t h a t , f o r example,  I f 0 r e c e i v e s an o f f e r from  asks more than i t o f f e r s , 0 cannot know whether P i s  t r y i n g f o r an advantage, or whether P has a r e s o u r c e base t h a t such an o f f e r . exchange  'justifies'  We conclude t h a t i f P does; i n f a c t , make an i n i t i a t i o n of  t h a t i s advantageous  to himself, 0 i s l e s s l i k e l y  to r e j e c t i t  than i f 0 c o u l d s e e , on the b a s i s o f i n f o r m a t i o n about P's r e s o u r c e t h a t the o f f e r was u n f a i r . advantageous  base,  This being  the case, P i s more l i k e l y  base,  t o make  i n i t i a t i o n s when 0 has o n l y ambiguous i n f o r m a t i o n about P's  r e s o u r c e base and v a l u e p o s i t i o n s , as t h e r e i s a g r e a t e r p r o b a b i l i t y o f acceptance.  By Assumption 3, the p r o b a b i l i t y o f a g i v e n i n i t i a t i o n  being  made i n c r e a s e s as the p r o b a b i l i t y o f acceptance i n c r e a s e s . Discussion:  H y p o t h e s i s 2 proposes t h a t t a c t i c s of concealment and decep-  t i o n a r e used when others  a r e u n c e r t a i n about the t r u e c o n d i t i o n s of supply  63  and  demand, and when i t i s c o s t l y o r i m p o s s i b l e  gives out.  I f one v i s u a l i z e s P's i n i t i a t i o n s  by a d e s i r e t o i n c r e a s e h i s g a i n , but s u b j e c t  to t e s t the cues t h a t P  of exchange b e i n g  to f o r c e s t h a t p r e v e n t him  from g a i n i n g as much as he wants, we may t h i n k o f P's a b i l i t y information  about h i s r e s o u r c e s  from a t t e m p t i n g an advantage. a greater proportion  motivated  to withold  as removing one f o r c e t h a t c o n s t r a i n s him The p r e d i c t i o n i n H y p o t h e s i s 2 i m p l i e s  of members whose r e s o u r c e s  advantageous exchanges than w i l l  are concealed w i l l  those whose resource  that  attempt  bases a r e known.  I t can be argued, perhaps, t h a t a p e r s o n would have enough f o r e s i g h t to r e a l i z e t h a t an o f f e r from a person w i t h c o n c e a l e d r e s o u r c e s  would be  r e j e c t e d , so t h a t P w i l l not attempt an advantageous exchange.  Aside  from the counter-argument t h a t t h e lower p r o b a b i l i t y o f acceptance may be b a l a n c e d by the i n c r e a s e —  he may accept P's i n i t i a t i o n  initiations  that:  of exchange,  i f i t i s t h e only one 0 r e c e i v e s .  P a l s o has a l t e r n a t i v e exchange p a r t n e r s , vantageous i n i t i a t i o n  —  p o s s i b l e , i t can be suggested  P i s not c e r t a i n that 0 w i l l r e c e i v e any other and  —  i n profit  and i f he f a i l s w i t h an ad-  to G\ , he i s not excluded from f u t u r e exchange.  P has l i m i t e d c o g n i t i v e c a p a c i t y , and w i l l  focus more on h i s own i n t e n -  t i o n s and a c t s , than on a n t i c i p a t i n g a l l the p o s s i b l e i n i t i a t i o n s all  to  the d i f f e r e n t a l t e r n a t i v e p a r t n e r s . Although the p r e d i c t i o n made i n H y p o t h e s i s 3 f o l l o w s  argument as f o r H y p o t h e s i s 2, i t d i f f e r s tions , rather  i n making a p r e d i c t i o n about p e r c e p -  than about types o f i n i t i a t i o n s .  an advantage i n concealment b e f o r e argue t h a t something which l e a d s  from the same  Members must f i r s t  perceive  they use i t , aid i t seems r e a s o n a b l e t o  to an i n c r e a s e d  p r o b a b i l i t y of obtaining a  64  d e s i r e d outcome i s an advantage.  However, as we noted i n the p r e v i o u s  c u s s i o n , a person w i l l not n e c e s s a r i l y attempt an advantageous  dis-  exchange  when he sees that 0 i s unable to a s s e s s t h e f a i r n e s s o f such an exchange. P might f e e l that t a c t i c s o f advantage work o n l y when used s p a r i n g l y , o r P may see more v a l u e i n e s t a b l i s h i n g a f i r m exchange r e l a t i o n s h i p e a r l y stages of i n t e r a c t i o n .  i n the  I f a member does n o t choose t o make use o f  the p o t e n t i a l advantages -.of concealment, we a r e i n t e r e s t e d i n e s t a b l i s h i n g whether i t i s because he does n o t p e r c e i v e the advantage, o r whether he r e c o g n i z e s the p o t e n t i a l but chooses not t o u t i l i z e i t .  We can s e p a r a t e  the p e r c e p t i o n of an advantage and attempts t o o b t a i n one, by d i r e c t l y  ask-  i n g group members f o r t h e i r o p i n i o n s c o n c e r n i n g the concealment o f i n f o r mation, and by a s s e s s i n g t h e i r p r e f e r e n c e s .  Presumably, those who  either  choose to c o n c e a l , o r c o n t i n u e to c o n c e a l t h e i r r e s o u r c e bases i f g i v e n the o p p o r t u n i t y , a r e i n d i c a t i n g t h a t they p e r c e i v e i t to be i n t h e i r  interest.  There i s t h e p o s s i b i l i t y , t o o , t h a t t h e p e r c e i v e d advantage o f concealment does n o t l i e s o l e l y i n the i n c r e a s e d chances f o r p u t t i n g over an u n f a i r offer. H y p o t h e s i s 4: Members o f a group a r e more l i k e l y to d i r e c t t h e i r i n i t i a t i o n s of exchange t o persons whose r e s o u r c e bases and v a l u e p o s i t i o n s a r e known (through unambiguous i n f o r m a t i o n ) . ^ The argument l e a d i n g t o H y p o t h e s i s 4 i s as f o l l o w s : We made the assumption (Assumption 4) that P w i l l be a b l e t o adopt O t h e r s ' (0^ refelrr^'tDOasjSthfeereGipient'V'hffresf):)/points of view to e s t i m a t e how much a g i v e n r e c i p i e n t w i l l g i v e n amount of X, from P.  g i v e up of one r e s o u r c e Y, i n r e t u r n f o r a  When 0 i s the i n i t i a t o r , then from O's p o i n t o f  view, he can make t h i s k i n d of assessment o n l y i f he has i n f o r m a t i o n about  65  the r e s o u r c e p o s i t i o n s o f d i f f e r e n t P's.  L a c k i n g such i n f o r m a t i o n , 0 can  o n l y guess as to what s o r t o f p r o f i t P i s o b t a i n i n g , and what he would  find  i  acceptable. When 0 compares two a l t e r n a t i v e exchange p a r t n e r s , P^, about whom 0 has unambiguous i n f o r m a t i o n , and P^, about whom he has none, 0 may e n t e r t a i n the hypothesis  t h a t P 2 i s as good a p a r t n e r , a b e t t e r p a r t n e r , o r a  worse p a r t n e r than P^, i n t h a t P^ may have more, l e s s , o r t h e same t o t a l amount o f r e s o u r c e s as P^. t i o n about P 2 '  s  r e s o u r c e base, he w i l l have l e s s c o n f i d e n c e i n whatever  e s t i m a t e o f the expected has  However, by Assumption 5, i f 0 has no i n f o r m a -  v a l u e o f an exchange w i t h P 2 he a r r i v e s a t .  the e f f e c t o f d e p r e s s i n g O's e s t i m a t e s  o f the expected  v a l u e of exchanges  w i t h p a r t n e r s whose r e s o u r c e bases a r e n o t r e l i a b l y known to him. does n o t exclude  the p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t t h e ambiguity-weighted  This  This  e s t i m a t e of  SEV w i t h P 2 can exceed the SEV of an exchange w i t h P^, i f the l a t t e r i s a very u n d e s i r a b l e p a r t n e r . will  However, i t seems r e a s o n a b l e  to predict  frame h i s e x p e c t a t i o n s about these c o n c e a l e d o t h e r s r e l a t i v e t o what  he knows about the p o t e n t i a l p a r t n e r s about whom he has r e l i a b l e 32 tion.  that 0  ( I n f o r m a t i o n under a person's  c o n t a i n e d i n t h e types of i n i t i a t i o n s  informa-  c o n t r o l , i n c l u d i n g the information t h a t p e r s o n makes, i s c o n s i d e r e d  more ambiguous than d i r e c t , v e r i f i a b l e i n f o r m a t i o n . ) that o t h e r t h i n g s b e i n g e q u a l , the weighted expected  We t h e r e f o r e p r e d i c t , value  ( p r o f i t ) i n an  exchange w i t h a p a r t n e r about whom 0 has unambiguous i n f o r m a t i o n w i l l be g r e a t e r than the ambiguity-weighted  expected  profit  p a r t n e r who w i t h o l d s i n f o r m a t i o n about h i s r e s o u r c e s  i n an exchange w i t h "a (as s p e c i f i e d i n scope  66  c o n d i t i o n s 3 and  6).  Together w i t h Assumption 1 t h a t members of the group  seek to maximize s u b j e c t i v e v a l u e of r e s o u r c e s , the f o r e g o i n g argument l e a d s to the p r e d i c t i o n i n Hypothesis  4.  H y p o t h e s i s 5 : I f a member has a c h o i c e of i n i t i a t i o n s from and P^, and the i n i t i a t i o n s are i d e n t i c a l w i t h r e s p e c t to a b s o l u t e amount of r e s o u r c e s o f f e r e d and r e q u e s t e d , and i f the member has unambiguous i n f o r m a t i o n about the v a l u e p o s i t i o n of P , and ambiguous or no i n f o r mation about the v a l u e p o s i t i o n of P 2 , then the member w i l l be. more l i k e l y to accept the i n i t i a t i o n from P^. Hypothesis  5 i s based  on the f o l l o w i n g argument:  (P^ and P 2 are  initiators;  0 i s recipient) I f the group member ( r e f e r to him s i m p l y as 0 ) r e c e i v e s i n i t i a t i o n s of exchange t h a t are i d e n t i c a l except the i n i t i a t o r  (P^ o r P ^ ) , then 0 cannot  b a s i s of p r o f i t and lity fit  to h i m s e l f .  By  decide between the o f f e r s on  the t r a n s a c t i o n goes through w i t h p r o b a b i -  the c h o i c e f u n c t i o n g i v e n w i t h Assumption 5 , i f O's  i s the same f o r both o f f e r s , he w i l l  then a t t e n d to how  compares to what the i n i t i a t o r r e c e i v e s i n the t r a n s a c t i o n . o n l y i n f o r m a t i o n 0 has  the  T h i s p r o f i t i s f i x e d once the o f f e r i s made,  i f he a c c e p t s an i n i t i a t i o n , 1.0.  f o r i n f o r m a t i o n a v a i l a b l e about  about P 2 '  s  own  pro-  his profit Because the  v a l u e p o s i t i o n must be i n f e r r e d from P 2 ' s  i n i t i a t i o n , 0 w i l l have l e s s c o n f i d e n c e i n h i s assessment of the comparison of h i s p r o f i t w i t h t h a t of P 2 , on the grounds t h a t i n f o r m a t i o n under P 2 ' s c o n t r o l i s more ambiguous. source base depresses p e c t to the second two  The  ambiguity  the expected p r o f i t  dimension  of i n f o r m a t i o n about P 2 ' s r e of an exchange w i t h P 2 J i n r e s -  of the l e x i c o g r a p h i c c h o i c e f u n c t i o n ; and when  a l t e r n a t i v e s are i n the same p a y o f f c l a s s w i t h r e s p e c t to O's  own  profit,  he w i l l s e l e c t the a l t e r n a t i v e w i t h the g r e a t e s t expected v a l u e on the dimension  —  thus the p r e d i c t i o n t h a t 0 w i l l s e l e c t the o f f e r from  P . 1  second  67  Discussion:  I f a person were i n d i f f e r e n t between two  such o f f e r s ,  there  might w e l l be a sound b a s i s f o r an a c t o r w i t h c o n c e a l e d r e s o u r c e l e v e l s g a i n an advantage, e s p e c i a l l y i f h i s c o s t s happened to be lower than 33 of P^.  The  fact that P2*  s  concealment d e s t r o y s O's  those  i n d i f f e r e n c e between  otherwise i d e n t i c a l i n i t i a t i o n s l i m i t s the advantage i n concealment, h y p o t h e s i s 5 i s c r u c i a l to the theory,as  jThus,  i t holds constant a l l f a c t o r s  of t y p i c a l i n i t i a t i o n , number o f o f f e r s t o choose from), except i n f o r m a t i o n , and p r e d i c t s t h a t people w i l l  to  (size  that of  opt f o r the a l t e r n a t i v e w i t h  b e t t e r and more i n f o r m a t i o n . I t should be noted t h a t Hypothesis  5 does not deny the  possibility  t h a t i f 0 gets a generous o f f e r from a person w i t h c o n c e a l e d r e s o u r c e s , such t h a t O's it,  net p r o f i t  i s l a r g e r than f o r any o t h e r a l t e r n a t i v e , 0 w i l l  accept  d e s p i t e i t s unknown f a i r n e s s , because i t compares w e l l w i t h at l e a s t  other a l t e r n a t i v e .  one  However, because of the p r e f e r e n c e by a l l a c t o r s to seek  exchanges t h a t p r o f i t  them most, such generous o f f e r s a r e u n l i k e l y .  In a d d i -  t i o n , i f an i n i t i a t i o n from a source whose r e s o u r c e base i s not known to 0 is  the o n l y i n i t i a t i o n 0 r e c e i v e s , he i s l i k e l y ;P  he makes a p o s i t i v e  to accept i t , so l o n g as  profit.  H y p o t h e s i s 6: P's p e r c e p t i o n o f the advantage o f w i t h o l d i n g i n f o r m a t i o n about h i s r e s o u r c e base and v a l u e p o s i t i o n w i l l decrease over r e p e a t e d exchange i n t e r a c t i o n , and P w i l l be more l i k e l y to choose to r e v e a l unambiguous i n f o r m a t i o n about h i s v a l u e p o s i t i o n s - a n d p r o f i t s , than d u r i n g the i n i t i a l stages of i n t e r a c t i o n . :  The  argument l e a d i n g to H y p o t h e s i s  In Assumption 7, i t was  6 i s g i v e n below:  s t a t e d t h a t group members' i n i t i a t i o n s  are--isubject to p r i n c i p l e s of r e i n f o r c e m e n t , such t h a t an acceptance  of an  i n i t i a t i o n a c t s as a p o s i t i v e r e i n f o r c e r , making a g i v e n P more l i k e l y  to  68  to  repeat an i n i t i a t i o n  of a s i m i l a r s o r t to a s i m i l a r p e r s o n ; and such  that  r e j e c t i o n of an i n i t i a t i o n would l e a d the i n i t i a t o r , P, to change h i s o f f e r s , by going to d i f f e r e n t  t a r g e t s , and/or by changing  a d d i t i o n , the r e c e i p t o f i n i t i a t i o n s In Hypothesis initiations  3, i t was  s h o u l d act as a p o s i t i v e  were more l i k e l y  In H y p o t h e s i s  5, i t was  In  reinforcer.  p r e d i c t e d t h a t the persons most l i k e l y  were those whose r e s o u r c e bases  b i g u o u s l y known.  the type of o f f e r .  to r e c e i v e  and v a l u e p o s i t i o n s were unam-  p r e d i c t e d t h a t these same persons  to have t h e i r i n i t i a t i o n s  of exchange a c c e p t e d , i f they  were c o n s i d e r e d b e s i d e an i d e n t i c a l o f f e r from a member w i t h c o n c e a l e d r e sources.  In a d d i t i o n , on the b a s i s of Hypothesis  r e s o u r c e s are more l i k e l y lative  1, members w i t h c o n c e a l e d  to make o f f e r s u n a t t r a c t i v e to the r e c i p i e n t s , r e -  to the o f f e r s made by a member w i t h a s i m i l a r but unconcealed  source base.  Thus, people who  sources a r e more l i k e l y ceed' more.  r e v e a l honest  to complete  i n f o r m a t i o n about  re-  their re-  t r a n s a c t i o n s , i . e . , they w i l l  'suc-  T h i s sequence of p r e d i c t e d e v e n t s , coupled w i t h Assumption  i m p l i e s t h a t a Person who t e r n of acceptances  has  7,  c o n c e a l e d h i s r e s o u r c e s w i l l n o t i c e the p a t -  ( i f i t o c c u r s ) , and by d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , then  t i o n , he w i l l p r o b a b l y conclude t h a t h i s f a i l u r e i n f o r m a t i o n i s behind h i s low r a t e of s u c c e s s .  to p r o v i d e unambiguous P's  c h o i c e of r e v e a l i n g  i n f o r m a t i o n i s thus more l i k e l y a f t e r i n t e r a c t i o n has proceeded time than d u r i n g the e a r l y s t a g e s .  generaliza-  f o r some  The g e n e r a l i d e a i s t h a t p e o p l e  not use i n f o r m a t i o n c o n t r o l as a t a c t i c  will  i f i t does not work, but that s i n c e  a person w i l l  i n i t i a l l y b e l i e v e concealment  l e a r n through  experience.  to be an advantage,  he must  69  In the e a r l y stages  of i n t e r a c t i o n , p e o p l e do not have v i a b l e ,  e s t a b l i s h e d a l t e r n a t i v e p a r t n e r s , and P i s l i k e l y of h a v i n g  to t h i n k t h e r e i s a chance  an advantageous i n i t i a t i o n of exchange accepted.  As  p r o c e e d s , i n f o r m a t i o n about the p r i c e s i n t r a n s a c t i o n s gets (even without of P's  d i r e c t communication), and  r e s o u r c e s , he  transactions. f o r c e d to pay  distributed  even i f 0 does not know the  initially  concealed  his profit  level is  the going p r i c e , or to g i v e i n f o r m a t i o n about h i s v a l u e p o s i 34 the e f f e c t of f o r c i n g h i s p r i c e down.  e x p l i c i t hypotheses are made here c o n c e r n i n g  the  probability  that P w i l l make use of concealment to t r y advantageous exchange, i t was use  i m p l i e d i n Chapter 1 t h a t P would be  least l i k e l y  i n f o r m a t i o n c o n t r o l as a t a c t i c i f he was  group of long s t a n d i n g ; and most l i k e l y was  exchanging w i t h someone who  had  (So l o n g as P can c o n t r o l O's exchange can occur  and  well-connected  to t r y to g a i n an advantage i f he  no r e a d i l y a c c e s s i b l e a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  accessibility  being  suspected  or checked.  to a l t e r n a t i v e s , advantageous  i n groups of l o n g s t a n d i n g —  t h i s moves us i n t o the  realm of r e a l power advantage, beyond the scope of the p r e s e n t i n v o c a t i o n of r e i n f o r c e m e n t  although  to p e r c e i v e  i n a large,  and where P c o u l d manipulate i n f o r m a t i o n w i t h o u t  The  level  can h o l d P to the l e v e l of e s t a b l i s h e d a l t e r n a t i v e  Thus the p e r s o n who  t i o n s , which has No  interaction  p r i n c i p l e s might imply  theory.)  t h a t once P  has  l e a r n e d h i s l e s s o n , he w i l l ne'er more wander from the paths of f a i r n e s s . In the e a r l y stages  of i n t e r a c t i o n  (with new  p e r s o n s , or new  the c o n d i t i o n s t h a t enhance advantageous exchange attempts n e s s , low  i n f o r m a t i o n , l a c k of e s t a b l i s h e d p a r t n e r s )  resources), (low  are p r e s e n t  connectedto some  70  degree,  and we  t h e r e f o r e expect  acknowledge t h a t P cannot While p r o c e s s through  advantageous attempts,  f o r e s e e the e n t i r e course of  e s p e c i a l l y when  we  interaction.  the theory c o u l d be expanded to f o l l o w the  interaction  to the p o i n t where s o c i a l p r i c e s reach a consensus  level,  such an e x t e n s i o n would take us beyond the scope of the r e s e a r c h paradigm, and so we  leave t h i s task f o r future research. The next  s i x hypotheses  chapter p r e s e n t s the r e s e a r c h d e s i g n used to t e s t  presented  above.  the  71  FOOTNOTES FOR  CHAPTER 2  The s p e c i f i c a t i o n of what c o n s t i t u t e s a resource i s not a s e t t l e d i s s u e i n exchange t h e o r y , and f o r p r e s e n t purposes, m a t e r i a l r e s o u r c e s are used f o r s i m p l i c i t y . The problem of d e f i n i n g r e s o u r c e s i s c o m p l i cated by the f a c t t h a t d i f f e r e n t r e s o u r c e s appear to have d i f f e r e n t properties. For example, some r e s o u r c e s can be t r a n s f e r r e d o n l y (e.g., money), w h i l e o t h e r s can be kept and t r a n s f e r r e d at the same time (e.g., expertise). See S. Rosen, 'The comparative r o l e s of i n f o r m a t i o n a l and m a t e r i a l commodities i n i n t e r p e r s o n a l t r a n s a c t i o n s ' , J o u r n a l of E x p e r i mental S o c i a l P s y c h o l o g y , 2_, 1966, pp. 211-226., f o r a d i s c u s s i o n of an i n v e s t i g a t i o n to t e s t the t h e s i s that the owner of v a l u a b l e i n f o r mation would engage i n d i f f e r e n t p r i c i n g b e h a v i o u r than the owner of v a l u a b l e m a t e r i a l commodities. For purposes of t h i s s t u d y , the v a l u e f u n c t i o n i s a m a r g i n a l u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n t h a t s t a t e s t h a t as P gainsSmore of a g i v e n resource X, s u c c e s s i v e standard increments of X are l e s s and l e s s v a l u a b l e . Other f u n c t i o n s might a l s o d e s c r i b e the manner i n which P v a l u e s X: for example, a l i n e a r f u n c t i o n would mean t h a t each s u c c e s s i v e increment of X gave the same added s u b j e c t i v e v a l u e , r e g a r d l e s s of what P had; a t h r e s h o l d f u n c t i o n would mean t h a t P d i d not r e c e i v e any s u b j e c t i v e v a l u e f o r X u n t i l he had an amount k of X, a f t e r which f u r t h e r amounts of X were not any more v a l u a b l e ( e . g . , i f k out of N votes were needed to win an e l e c t i o n . ) " The m a r g i n a l reward/cost reward/cost to P of t h a t Y P a l r e a d y has. See A. P u b l i c a t i o n s , 1966, pp.  of an increment of Y r e f e r s to the s u b j e c t i v e increment, and i s a s s e s s e d r e l a t i v e to how much Kuhn, The Study of S o c i e t y . London: Tavistock 285-86.  See: W.H. Foddy; 'The formation o f c l i q u e s i n c o l l e c t i v i t i e s as a consequence of i n i t i a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of dimensions of w e a l t h ' , Unpublished Ph.D. D i s s e r t a t i o n , U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1971; and R.K. L e i k , R.M. Emerson, and R.L. Burgess, 'The emergence of s t r a t i f i c a t i o n i n exchange networks: An e x p e r i m e n t a l d e m o n s t r a t i o n ' ; Paper p r e s e n t e d at the West Coast Conference f o r Small Group Research, San Diego, 1968. I n s t i t u t e f o r S o c i o l o g i c a l Research, U n i v e r s i t y of Washington, S e a t t l e (Mimeograph). Two d i f f e r e n t r e s o u r c e s are a l l t h a t i s n e c e s s a r y to r e p r e s e n t the a b s t r a c t r e l a t i o n s h i p ; more than two complementary r e s o u r c e s would not change the n a t u r e of the p r i n c i p l e s of the t h e o r y , but i n t r o d u c e comp l i c a t i o n s due to the f a c t t h a t P might need d i f f e r e n t exchange networks (groups of people) to meet h i s needs f o r d i f f e r e n t k i n d s of r e s o u r c e s .  72  6.  B l a u g i v e s an example o f a n o n - m a t e r i a l commodity which may be v a l u e d according to a decreasing marginal u t i l i t y p r i n c i p l e i n h i s d i s c u s s i o n of the exchange of a d v i c e f o r deference among o f f i c e workers. I n a d d i t i o n , o b l i g a t i o n , though n o n - m a t e r i a l , i s o f t e n thought t o be c u m u l a t i v e . See P.M. B l a u , Exchange and Power i n S o c i a l L i f e , New Y o r k : John Wiley and Sons, 1964.  7.  I f P has no X, but s t i l l says he does n o t v a l u e an increment o f X a t a l l , we may i n f e r e i t h e r t h a t i t would take a g r e a t d e a l o f X t o p r o duce any . u t i l i t y f o r P ( p o s i t i v e goods) , i . e . , h i s j u s t n o t i c e a b l e d i f f e r e n c e i s very l a r g e ; o r t h a t P has a n e g a t i v e u t i l i t y f o r X (nega t i v e goods), and w i l l pay to be r i d o f i t . The exchange of goods and b e h a v i o u r to a v o i d u n d e s i r e d b e h a v i o u r from Other i s s i m i l a r to c o e r c i o n , but can be handled i n an exchange framework. See Kuhn, op. c i t . , pp. 361-370.  8.  T h i s c o n d i t i o n e l i m i n a t e s s i t u a t i o n s where i n d i v i d u a l s f e e l c o n s t r a i n e d to g i v e a f i x e d number o f u n i t s of X f o r a f i x e d number.of u n i t s o f Y, r e g a r d l e s s o f the s i t u a t i o n of the p a r t n e r s t o the exchange. Commerc i a l goods are u s u a l l y s o l d f o r the same amount o f money, regardless.-'-of t h e buyer's w e a l t h , and a r e n o t open t o m a n i p u l a t i o n through i n f o r mational t a c t i c s . ( E x c e p t i o n s do e x i s t : S a l v a t i o n Army s t o r e s r e p o r t e d l y charge a c c o r d i n g to the customers' means, a p o l i c y which has o c c a s i o n e d some i n t e r e s t i n g examples o f w e l l - t o - d o people g e t t i n g 'dressed down' i n o l d c l o t h e s f o r a t r i p to the S a l l y Ann.)  9.  An i l l u s t r a t i o n o f such c o n f u s i o n was seen by the author d u r i n g one Hallowe'en. I n r e c e n t y e a r s , c h i l d r e n have begun c o l l e c t i n g money f o r c h a r i t y i n s t e a d o f candy. As they a r e i n s t r u c t e d n o t to take b o t h money and candy, an impasse can r e s u l t when an a d u l t t r i e s to g i v e the c h i l d something which he knows a l l c h i l d r e n v a l u e (candy) t o g e t h e r w i t h money, and the c h i l d r e f u s e s .  - 10.  11.  T h i s c o n d i t i o n c o u l d perhaps be r e p l a c e d by a requirement t h a t i f r e sources a r e i n c r e a s i n g , they do so a t a c o n s t a n t r a t e a c r o s s members. For example, people r e g u l a r l y r e c e i v e i n s t a l l m e n t s o f income (ahdc.consume i t ) , but the comparative r e s o u r c e bases among group members does not change. That i s , the theory p r o b a b l y does n o t have t o be l i m i t e d to e n t i r e l y s t a t i c s i t u a t i o n s i n which t h e r e i s no i n p u t o f r e s o u r c e s . Advantageous exchanges c o u l d s t i l l occur i n a g i v e n t r a n s a c t i o n , but would perhaps have a s m a l l e r e f f e c t on o v e r - a l l r a n k i n g , which i s c a l c u l a t e d over a l o n g e r time. See H.H. K e l l e y and D. S c h e n i t z k i , ' B a r g a i n i n g ' , Chapter 10 i n C.-G. M c C l i n t o c k , Ed., E x p e r i m e n t a l S o c i a l Psychology, H o l t , R i n e h a r t and Winston, 1972, f o r a d i s c u s s i o n of the means o f measuring and m a n i p u l a t i n g m o t i v a t i o n a l v a r i a b l e s i n b a r g a i n i n g experiments.  73  12.  I n an e x p e r i m e n t a l c o n t e x t , i t i s d i f f i c u l t to c o n s t r u c t a t a s k t h a t c o u l d s i m u l t a n e o u s l y i n v o l v e resource p r o d u c t i o n and t r a n s f e r , a l t h o u g h there are p r o b a b l y elements of both i n e n d u r i n g s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  13.  Kuhn, op.  14.  P w i l l not i n i t i a t e an exchange j u s t because i t would b e n e f i t him a l o t , unless he b e l i e v e s there i s some non-zero p r o b a b i l i t y of acceptance. The i s s u e of the weight g i v e n to v a l u e gained as opposed to the p r o b a b i l i t y of g a i n i s t r e a t e d as an e m p i r i c a l i s s u e h e r e , though perhaps one can make two rough assumptions: 1) the more o f t e n P's i n i t i a t i o n s are r e j e c t e d , the more s a l i e n t and t h e r e f o r e the more weight t h a t i s given to the p r o b a b i l i t y of an outcome; 2) . i n the i n i t i a l stages of exchange, P has l i t t l e b a s i s on which to i n f e r the p r o b a b i l i t y of acceptance of h i s o f f e r s , and w i l l tend to be o p t i m i s t i c , i . e . , i n f l a t e the p e r c e i v e d p r o b a b i l i t y of s u c c e s s . P s y c h o l o g i c a l s t u d i e s on b e t t i n g b e h a v i o u r g i v e evidence t h a t peop l e a t t e n d more to the p r o b a b i l i t y of g a i n under some c o n d i t i o n s , and more to the s i z e of g a i n under o t h e r s ; i t a l s o appears that there are i n d i v i d u a l d i f f e r e n c e s w i t h r e s p e c t to how i n d i v i d u a l s weight the two f a c t o r s . See: P. S l o v i c and S. L i c h t e n s t e i n , 'The r e l a t i v e importance of p r o b a b i l i t i e s and p a y o f f s i n r i s k t a k i n g ' , J o u r n a l of E x p e r i m e n t a l Psychol o g y , Monograph Supplement, 1968, No. 3, P a r t 2, pp. 1-18.  15.  A weighted l i n e a r f u n c t i o n (w^ P r o f i t to P + P r o f i t to 0) c o u l d a l s o be used, but r e q u i r e s a more r i g o r o u s l e v e l of measurement of u t i l i t y and p r o b a b i l i t y , and independence of the f a c t o r s . I t would make i t p o s s i b l e to assume t h a t P does i n f a c t c o n s i d e r b o t h h i s own and Other's p r o f i t , and chooses an a l t e r n a t i v e g i v i n g the b e s t b a l a n c e of the two f a c t o r s (so t h a t P may p r e f e r an exchange g i v i n g l e s s p r o f i t to s e l f , i t i f l e t s him get more than some 0, than i n a t r a n s a c t i o n where P gains more h i m s e l f , but 0 gets even more).  16.  T h e o r e t i c a l l y , P s h o u l d be a b l e to take O's p o i n t of view even i f 0 does not have the same v a l u e f u n c t i o n as P, so long as P has an u n d e r s t a n d i n g of that f u n c t i o n ( i . e . , through past e x p e r i e n c e , extended exposure to others w i t h t h a t v a l u e f u n c t i o n , e t c . ) . An i n t e r e s t i n g p o s s i b i l i t y i s t h a t P w i l l f i n d i t much e a s i e r to take O's p o i n t of view when i t i s the same as h i s own; t h i s may h e l p to account f o r why people tend to compete and compare w i t h s i m i l a r Others : the comparisons are more i n t e r p r e t a b l e to P. See P. Hoffman, L. F e s t i n g e r , and D.H. Lawrence, 'Tendencies toward group c o m p a r a b i l i t y i n c o m p e t i t i v e bargaining', Human R e l a t i o n s , 7_, 1954, pp. 141-159; and B. L a t a n e , Ed., 'Studies i n S o c i a l Comparison', Supplement 1, J o u r n a l of E x p e r i m e n t a l S o c i a l Psychology, 1966, f o r a d i s c u s s i o n of c o n d i t i o n s under which people tend to compare w i t h s i m i l a r o t h e r s .  c i t . , p.  286.  74  17.  While i t i s assumed that P adopts the p o i n t of view of o t h e r s towardsh i m s e l f , i t i s not assumed t h a t he takes the p o i n t of view of every o t h e r to a l l p o s s i b l e o t h e r s . While such a procedure might l e t P e s t i mate to whom i n i t i a t i o n s w i l l be made i n the group and the n a t u r e of the i n i t i a t i o n s , we assume i t i s beyond the c o g n i t i v e c a p a c i t y of the a c t o r s to do so.  18.  l e x i c o g r a p h i c f u n c t i o n r e q u i r e s only t h a t P be a b l e to o r d e r h i s p r e f e r e n c e s , not a s s i g n n u m e r i c a l v a l u e s to them. While t h i s i s an advantage i n some ways, i t does not n e c e s s a r i l y y i e l d v a l u e s which can be m u l t i p l i e d by a w e i g h t i n g f a c t o r . C o n s i d e r a t i o n of the most s a t i s f a c t o r y model are premature at t h i s p o i n t , as one must f i r s t e s t a b l i s h the manner i n which the p r o c e s s o p e r a t e s , b e f o r e i t can be s u c c e s s f u l l y modelled.  19.  D. E l l s b e r g , 'Risk, ambiguity and the savage axioms', Q u a r t e r l y of Economics, 7_5, 1961, pp. '643-669.  20.  In a d d i t i o n to the E l l s b e r g a r t i c l e , see a l s o J.S. Chipman, 'Stochast i c c h o i c e and s u b j e c t i v e p r o b a b i l i t y ' , i n D. W i l l n e r , Ed., D e c i s i o n s , Values and Groups, New York: Pergamon P r e s s , 1960; and S.W. Becker and F.O. Brownson, 'What p r i c e ambiguity? o r the r o l e of ambiguity i n d e c i s i o n making', J o u r n a l of P o l i t i c a l Economy, 7_2, 1964, pp. 62-73. These s t u d i e s are reviewed by W. Lee i n h i s book D e c i s i o n Theory and Human B e h a v i o u r , New York: John Wiley and Sons,1971, pp. 119-123.  21.  The c l a i m t h a t the r i s k y and the u n c e r t a i n b e t s have e q u a l expected v a l u e r e s t s on the d e c i s i o n t h e o r e t i c assumption t h a t i f the p r o b a b i l i t y of events i n an u n c e r t a i n bet are c o m p l e t e l y unknown, P's b e s t e s t i m a t e of p r o b a b i l i t y i s the midpoint of a l l p o s s i b l e and e q u a l l y l i k e l y p r o babilities. See Lee, op. c i t . , p. 121.  22.  See E l l s b e r g , op. c i t . , p. 664, f o r h i s 'ambiguity c o r r e c t e d payoff — b a s i c a l l y , P makes an e s t i m a t e of the p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n over e v e n t s , and then steps back and asks h i m s e l f how c o n f i d e n t he f e e l s i n h i s estimate. I f h i s c o n f i d e n c e i s low, he w i l l g i v e more weight to a p e s s i m i s t i c or c o n s e r v a t i v e e s t i m a t e of p r o b a b i l i t i e s . Becker and Brownson, op. c i t . , q u e s t i o n e d the a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s of E l l s b e r g ' s formul a t i o n s , but t h e i r f i n d i n g s support the c l a i m t h a t s u b j e c t s w i l l pay to a v o i d an ambiguous course of a c t i o n when t h a t course of a c t i o n has an expected v a l u e e q u a l to an unambiguous a l t e r n a t i v e . One c o u l d a l s o argue t h a t i t i s not s u b j e c t i v e p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t i s r e v i s e d by P, but r a t h e r h i s e s t i m a t e of u t i l i t y — the main p o i n t b e i n g t h a t somehow, expected u t i l i t y i s lowered i n u n c e r t a i n b e t s .  23.  E.E. Jones, K.J. Gergen, P. Gumpert, and J.W. T h i b a u t , 'Some c o n d i t i o n s a f f e c t i n g the use of i n g r a t i a t i o n to i n f l u e n c e p e r s o n a l ev&uation', J o u r n a l of P e r s o n a l i t y and S o c i a l P s y c h o l o g y , 1, 1965, pp. 613-623;  Journal  1  75  E.E.-.; Jones and J.W. T h i b a u t , ' I n t e r a c t i o n goals as bases of i n f e r e n c e i n i n t e r p e r s o n a l p e r c e p t i o n ' , i n R. T a g i u r i and L. P e t r u l l o , Eds.', . Person P e r c e p t i o n and I n t e r p e r s o n a l B e h a v i o u r , S t a n f o r d r U n S t a n f o r d . U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1959; and D. Bramel, 'Determinants o f b e l i e f s about o t h e r p e o p l e ' , Chapter 4 i n J . M i l l s , ed., E x p e r i m e n t a l S o c i a l P s y c h o l o g y , Toronto: C o l l i e r M a c M i l l a n , 1969. r  24.  See f o o t n o t e 23; a l s o H.H-?.Kelley and A . J . S t a h e l s k i , 'The i n f e r e n c e of i n t e n t i o n s from moves i n the P r i s o n e r ' s Dilemma Game', J o u r n a l of E x p e r i m e n t a l S o c i a l P s y c h o l o g y , 6_, 1970, pp. 401-419, and H.H. K e l l e y , ' A t t r i b u t i o n theory i n s o c i a l p s y c h o l o g y ' , i n D. L e v i n e , Nebraska Symposium on M o t i v a t i o n , U n i v e r s i t y of Nebraska P r e s s , 1967, pp. 192-238.  25.  J.T. L a n z e t t a and V . T v . K a n a r e f f , ' I n f o r m a t i o n c o s t , amount o f p a y o f f , and l e v e l o f a s p i r a t i o n as determinants o f i n f o r m a t i o n s e e k i n g and dec i s i o n making', B e h a v i o u r a l S c i e n c e , 7_, 1962,. pp. 459-73; S. L i c h t e n s t e i n , 'Bases f o r p r e f e r e n c e among three-outcome b e t s ' , J o u r n a l o f E x p e r i m e n t a l P s y c h o l o g y , 69_, pp. 162-169.  26.  I t seems not unreasonable to argue t h a t the i n i t i a t o r o f an i m p r e s s i o n b e l i e v e s the i m p r e s s i o n w i l l be a c c e p t e d a t f a c e v a l u e , even though when the i n i t i a t o r i s at the r e c e i v i n g end, he tends to be more s u s p i c i o u s of a d i s c r e p a n c y between the r e a l and the p r e s e n t e d s e l f . One s e l dom hears a person r e f e r to h i m s e l f as a 'phoney', or as d e l i b e r a t e l y working a d e c e p t i o n on o t h e r s , though we commonly hear p e o p l e v e r b a l i z e s u s p i c i o n s t h a t o t h e r s do t h i s . Support f o r the c l a i m t h a t P i s l i k e l y to b e l i e v e 0 w i l l take h i s o f f e r s at f a c e v a l u e comes from evidence about the e x i s t e n c e of c o g n i t i v e b i a s e s : p e o p l e tend to t h i n k t h e i r attempts t o exchange w i l l be r e c i p r o c a t e d , even i f they do not i n t e n d to do the same; and they expect o t h e r s to behave p o s i t i v e l y toward them even i f they f e e l o r are a c t i n g n e g a t i v e l y toward o t h e r . There i s a d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e s e f i n d i n g s i n E. B u r n s t e i n , ' C o g n i t i v e f a c t o r s i n b e h a v i o u r a l i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e ' , i n J . M i l l s , Ed., E x p e r i m e n t a l S o c i a l Psychology, Toronto: C o l l i e r M a c M i l l a n Co., 1969, pp. 309-340.  27.  Kuhn, op. c i t . , p.  28.  R.M. L i e b e r t , W.P. Smith, J.H. H i l l , and M. K i e f f e r , 'The e f f e c t s of i n f o r m a t i o n and magnitude of i n i t i a l o f f e r on i n t e r p e r s o n a l n e g o t i a t i o n ' , J o u r n a l of E x p e r i m e n t a l S o c i a l P s y c h o l o g y , 4_, 1968, pp. 432-441.  i.  29. 30.  W.H.  330.  Foddy,'op. c i t . ,  1971.  Emerson i s c u r r e n t l y c o n d u c t i n g r e s e a r c h w i t h 5 man groups, v a r y i n g the degree of i n f o r m a t i o n about p r o f i t s i n b a r g a i n i n g dyads w i t h i n a l a r g e r ,. exchange network. R e s u l t s to date show t h a t "Under c o n d i t i o n s o f symbolic; p a y o f f and v i s i b l e e q u i t y , t r a d e agreements o t h e r than (one f o r one) were e x t r e m e l y . r a r e , and when they d i d o c c u r , they,/were l i k e l y to be r e c i p r o -  76  cated." Emerson p r e d i c t e d t h a t when " e q u i t y c o n d i t i o n s are not v i s i b l e , ( s u b j e c t s w i t h a power advantage) w i l l tend to use t h e i r power i n e f f e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g " , i . e . , w i l l not f e e l h e l d to e q u i t a b l e exchanges. See R.M. Emerson, 'Power and p o s i t i o n i n exchange networks', Paper p r e s e n t e d at meetings of American S o c i o l o g i c a l A s s o c i a t i o n , 1971. In a p e r s o n a l communication, Emerson s t a t e d t h a t the t r e n d i n the d a t a was as p r e d i c t e d , but t h a t s u b j e c t s f r e q u e n t l y opted to make p r o f i t s v i s i b l e and to s h a r e (December, 1973). 31.  Scope c o n d i t i o n 6 ensures t h i s i s not t a u t o l o g i c a l by r e q u i r i n g that P be a b l e to i n i t i a t e ? ' t o 0 even i f he does not know O's v a l u e p o s i t i o n — a l l he needs to know i s what r e s o u r c e 0 wants.  32.  See d i s c u s s i o n i n Chapter 1 of the i d e a of a P w i t h c o n c e a l e d r e s o u r c e s making use of a 'model' t r a n s a c t i o n w i t h lower c o s t s and h i g h e r rewards to P.  33.  See d i s c u s s i o n of Case 6 — Chapter 1.  34.  Because the theory does not p r e d i c t t h a t a person who w i t h o l d s i n f o r mation about h i s r e s o u r c e s w i l l never have an i n i t i a t i o n a c c e p t e d (e.g., he may be a c c e p t e d by a person who gets no o t h e r i n i t i a t i o n s ) , t h e r e w i l l be some people who 'succeed' w i t h t a c t i c s of i n f o r m a t i o n c o n t r o l , and o b t a i n an advantage — they a r e l i k e l y to repeat t h e i r b e h a v i o u r . I t i s simply argued t h a t t h e i r average r a t e of s u c c e s s f u l t r a n s a c t i o n s w i l l be below that of persons whose r e s o u r c e p o s i t i o n s and p r o f i t s are unambiguously known. Those people who f a i l i n t h e i r use of i n f o r m a t i o n a l t a c t i c s w i l l be l e s s l i k e l y to c o n t i n u e t r y i n g them. TThey need not a l l conclude that p r o v i s i o n of i n f o r m a t i o n i s necessa'E.yy .— an a l t e r n a t i v e to t h i s might be to l o c a t e 'unpopular' o t h e r s , (e. g. other concealed persons). However, i f a p e r s o n i s unpopular, i t i s u s u a l l y because he ttfakesmana u n d e s i r a b l e exchange p a r t n e r s .  Asymmetric i n f o r m a t i o n ; ^ a l t e r n a t i v e s  t  in  77  CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH DESIGN  To test the hypotheses presented i n Chapter 2, a modification was  made to an experimental paradigm used i n i t i a l l y by W. Foddy i n a study 1  of clique formation i n exchange networks.  A descriptionoqftthe  experi-  mental s i t u a t i o n w i l l be presented f i r s t , including a discussion of the operationalization of variables central to the theory. sign was  The same basic  de-  used for two sets of experiments, and a p i l o t study which i s re-  ported i n Appendix IV.  The two main sets of experiments are described i n  more d e t a i l at the end of this chapter, where attention i s drawn to d i f ferences  i n procedure between them.  The variations i n design were neces-  sary, due to the fact that a s a t i s f a c t o r y operationalization of a l l r e l e vant variables could not be achieved i n one  design.  Description of the Experimental Paradigm The research design centered on a trading game.  Subjects were  provided with supplies of red and green p l a s t i c bingo buttons, and they exchanged one colour for another colour. In each experiment, eight subjects sat behind cardboardebooths which had been arranged on the top of an octagonal table. Appendix I ) .  (See Figure A . l ,  The booths eliminated v i s u a l contact among subjects, while a  mesh-covered window i n the front of each booth allowed subjects to see table i n front of each booth.  the  Each subject had a large p i l e of either red  or green buttons on the table i n front of him,  and a smaller p i l e of the  78  other colour. the buttons  S u b j e c t s c o u l d reach t h e i r buttons  b e f o r e each experiment,  d i d not.  Two  Four o t h e r s had  r e d , a g a i n w i t h covers on two 2 the o t h e r two.  and  a gap at the bottom  The  two  c o l o u r s were d i s t r i b u t e d  so t h a t f o u r s u b j e c t s had  a s m a l l e r number of green.  gan.  through  (Figure A . l ,  booth. A f i x e d amount of b u t t o n s of the two  two  w i t h covers t h a t c o n c e a l e d  from the view of o t h e r s ; f o u r booths had no covers  Appendix I ) . of each  Four of the booths were equipped  Noofurther  of these had  a l a r g e number of r e d  covers over the b u t t o n s  and  complementary p r o f i l e s of many green and of the p i l e s of b u t t o n s , and no covers  r e s o u r c e s were added a f t e r the experiment  l e v e l s of v i s i b i l i t y  of r e s o u r c e s  and  few  on  be-  (covers and no c o v e r s ) ,  the d i f f e r e n t r e s o u r c e p r o f i l e s were randomly a s s i g n e d to the e i g h t  s e a t i n g p o s i t i o n s , and the s u b j e c t s were randomly a s s i g n e d to booths i n 3 each experiment.  A c a r d pinned  i n s i d e each booth  much he had of each c o l o u r ( F i g u r e A.4, During  the experiment,  o f f , and a hanging  t o l d the occupant  how  Appendix 1 ) .  the main l i g h t s  i n the room were switched  lamp p l a c e d over the c e n t e r of the t a b l e .  This  caused  the s u b j e c t s to s i t i n the shadows, but c l e a r l y i l l u m i n a t e d any p i l e s buttons  t h a t were out i n the open.  group members by means of l e t t e r s  Each person c o u l d i d e n t i f y the o t h e r 4 (G, H,  of each booth; an i d e n t i c a l t a g was over t h e i r - r e s o u r c e s a l s o had indicating  of  ...N)  pinned  a t t a c h e d to the o u t s i d e  inside.  Subjects with  covers  a c o l o u r e d t a g on the o u t s i d e of t h e i r  booths,  to o t h e r s the c o l o u r of t h e i r l a r g e p i l e of b u t t o n s . Each booth  F i g u r e s A.2  and A.3,  c o n t a i n e d a s e t of mimeographed i n i t i a t i o n forms  (see  Appendix I ) , and a bowl i n which to send buttons  to  79  another person.  A value chart used to demonstrate that the p r i n c i p l e of  diminishing marginal u t i l i t y applied to the buttons was taped to the inside of each Booth.  CSee Figure A.5, Appendix I.) Subjects were provided with  pencils and paper to make calculations. At  the beginning of each experiment, subjects were asked to l i s t e n 5  to a set of tape recorded instructions.  (See Appendices I I and III.) The  instructions f a m i l i a r i z e d the subjects with the s e t t i n g , indicated the manner i n which they could make exchanges, and acquainted them with the value table.  Subjects were t o l d that they were i n the f i r s t part of a two part  game, and that they would need both colours of buttons f o r the second part, where the two colours would be used f o r completely d i f f e r e n t purposes. (This second part did not take place.) The instructions included extended examples showing how the worth of a given t o t a l of buttons was increased by having some of red and some of green, and how successive equal increments of one given colour were worth less and l e s s , the larger the p i l e a person had of that colour. After the instructions were given, subjects could make an o f f e r of buttons to another subject by f i l l i n g out an i n i t i a t i o n form (Figure A.3, Appendix I ) , i n d i c a t i n g : —  who was sending the o f f e r (the subject's i d e n t i f i c a t i o n l e t t e r )  —  to whom the offer was directed (the l e t t e r on someone else's booth)  —  the amount of one colour that was being offered i n return f o r a stated amount of the other colour.  80  S u b j e c t s were a l l o w e d t o make o n l y one i n i t i a t i o n a t a time, a l t h o u g h they were not r e q u i r e d t o make an i n i t i a t i o n i f they chose n o t to.  I n a d d i t i o n , they c o u l d o n l y accept one o f f e r a t a time  per t r i a l ) , to  even i f they r e c e i v e d more than one.  ( i . e . , one  ( T h i s r u l e was n e c e s s a r y  a l l o w a t e s t of s u b j e c t s ' p r e f e r e n c e s , g i v e n c e r t a i n combinations o f  offers.)  S u b j e c t s knew t h a t they d i d n o t have t o accept any o f t h e o f f e r s  they r e c e i v e d , i f they d i d n o t want t o .  They were l i m i t e d to o f f e r i n g no  more than 100 buttons a t a time, to reduce extreme v a r i a b i l i t y of  o f f e r s s e n t , and t o make s u b j e c t s b e l i e v e the experiment  several t r i a l s . to all  i n the types  would take  No l i m i t s were p l a c e d on what they c o u l d ask f o r , o r agree  g i v e i n r e t u r n f o r an o f f e r .  The l i m i t  of 100 on o f f e r s was u n i f o r m f o r  subjects. The s u b j e c t s put the b u t t o n s b e i n g o f f e r e d i n t h e i r bowls,  w i t h a completed  along  i n i t i a t i o n form, and the bowls and o f f e r s were then p i c k e d  up by the experimenter.  The o f f e r s on t r i a l  1 were e i t h e r d e l i v e r e d t o the  person they were addressed t o o r p r e a r r a n g e d o f f e r s were s u b s t i t u t e d f o r the r e a l o f f e r s and d e l i v e r e d . About t h r e e f e e t from the s u b j e c t s ' t a b l e , t h e r e was a l o n g r e c t a n g u l a r t a b l e , on which were p l a c e d l a r g e wooden s c r e e n s (about 30 i n c h e s t a l l ) i n a haphazard  fashion.  Behind  bowls w i t h completed  i n i t i a t i o n forms, and bowls, o f b u t t o n s made up t o match  the f a l s e i n i t i a t i o n  forms.  g  the screens the experimenter  kept  These were s w i t c h e d f o r the r e a l o f f e r s a f t e r the  experimenter had c o l l e c t e d a l l the s u b j e c t s ' o f f e r s f o r a t r i a l .  Subjects' a t -  t e n t i o n was d i v e r t e d from the d e c e p t i o n by g i v i n g them a q u e s t i o n n a i r e t o f i l l  81  out a f t e r the i n i t i a t i o n s w e r e v c o l l e c t e d ; experimenter was going  and by t e l l i n g  to r e c o r d t h e i r o f f e r s .  the experiments suspected  them t h a t t h e  Only two s u b j e c t s i n a l l  t h a t t h e i r o f f e r s had been i n t e r c e p t e d ; i n f a c t ,  d u r i n g the d e b r i e f i n g , i t was sometimes d i f f i c u l t  t o convince  a subject  that h i s r e a l o f f e r had never been r e c e i v e d by the p e r s o n t o whom he had addressed i t . When s u b j e c t s r e c e i v e d an o f f e r , they c o u l d r e p l y to i t e i t h e r by circling  the word  o r , by c i r c l i n g with for  ' r e j e c t e d ' on the i n i t i a t i o n form ( F i g u r e A.2, Appendix I ) ,  the word  the requested  'accepted',  and then r e p l a c i n g the b u t t o n s  amount o f another c o l o u r .  One t r i a l ,  exchange, c o n s i s t e d o f the sequence b e g i n n i n g  o f f e r , and ending w i t h  with  offered  or o p p o r t u n i t y  the sending  the r e t u r n of the bowls t o t h e i r owners.  of an  No e x p e r i -  6 ment was r u n f o r more than two t r i a l s . Questionnaires initial  were g i v e n to the s u b j e c t s :  1) a f t e r they had made  o f f e r s , but b e f o r e any were d e l i v e r e d , and 2) a f t e r s u b j e c t s had  r e p l i e d t o the f i r s t  i n i t i a t i o n s but b e f o r e  t h e i r r e p l i e s had been d e l i v e r e d .  (See Appendices I I and I I I f o r the q u e s t i o n n a i r e s  t h a t were used.)  The  q u e s t i o n n a i r e s probed s u b j e c t s ' reasons f o r i n i t i a t i o n s and acceptances of o f f e r s , p e r c e p t i o n of the m a r g i n a l for  v a l u e of b u t t o n s ,  concealment of t h e i r own and o t h e r s ' r e s o u r c e s .  and t h e i r  preference  At the end o f each  experiment, s u b j e c t s were d e b r i e f e d and asked n o t to d e s c r i b e the experiment to  anyone. Communication between s u b j e c t s was r e s t r i c t e d t o p r e - w r i t t e n  forms ( F i g u r e s A.2 and A.3 i n Appendix I ) . they  S u b j e c t s were i n s t r u c t e d t h a t  c o u l d not w r i t e a d d i t i o n a l messages, beyond f i l l i n g  i n the b l a n k s on  82  the forms.  The experimenter r e s t r i c t e d her conversation with subjects to  r e p e t i t i o n of instructions i f c l a r i f i c a t i o n was  requested, and reminders  to the subjects to f i l l out t h e i r i n i t i a t i o n forms and questionnaires completely.  The subjects did not appear to be concerned that the experimenter  could see the offers they made, and i t was  clear that the experimenter would 7 make no announcements about the proposed terms of transactions. Operational Definitions and Scope Conditions The theory i n Chapter 2 deals with two or more valued  resources,  X and Y, distributed unevenly i n a group, such that for each member there are at least two others with complementary value positions on X and (Scope condition 1.)  Y.  The resources could be behavioural, material, or  material, but had to be transferable.  non-  In addition, they were to be valued  according to a marginal u t i l i t y function (Scope condition 2), and i t was s p e c i f i e d that group members could know or i n f e r that this value function applied to Others as well as themselves (Scope condition 3).  To meet these  requirements,  two resources were operationally defined as red and green  bingo buttons  (material commodities).  The buttons were given value by  i n s t r u c t i n g the subjects that both colours of buttons would be needed for the second part of the experiment, where the two colours would be used for 8 completely  d i f f e r e n t purposes  (see Appendices II and III for i n s t r u c t i o n s ) .  The buttons had the advantage of being free of i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c associations- -' :  which might cause each subject to value them according to an unknown function that might vary across subjects.  83  The utility  requirement that t h e b u t t o n s  be v a l u e d  according  to a marginal  f u n c t i o n was met through i n s t r u c t i o n s t o t h e s u b j e c t s t h a t t h e worth  of d i f f e r e n t amounts o f buttons c h a r t , on which e q u i v a l e n c e s  was t o be assessed  o f buttons  by r e f e r e n c e to the v a l u e  and v a l u e u n i t s had been s e t a c c o r d -  i n g to the f u n c t i o n a = 1/ b / 2 , where a i s v a l u e u n i t s , and b i s the number of b u t t o n s .  The t o t a l number o f buttons  g i v e n to a s u b j e c t c o n s t i t u t e d h i s  r e s o u r c e base, and the number o f each c o l o u r d e f i n e d t h e v a l u e p o s i t i o n f o r each r e s o u r c e .  The g a i n i n v a l u e u n i t s brought by an a d d i t i o n of a number  of one c o l o u r o f b u t t o n s  c o u l d be c a l c u l a t e d by comparing the e q u i v a l e n t  amount's i n v a l u e u n i t s f o r the p i l e o f buttons a f t e r the a d d i t i o n was made.  Costs  o f t h a t c o l o u r b e f o r e and  i n v a l u e u n i t s c o u l d be c a l c u l a t e d by  comparing the worth i n v a l u e u n i t s of a p i l e b e f o r e of buttons  was g i v e n up.  from rewards.  and a f t e r an increment  Net p r o f i t was the r e s u l t o f s u b t r a c t i n g c o s t s  These c a l c u l a t i o n s were made c l e a r by means of examples.  (Once p r o f i t i s o p e r a t i o n a l l y d e f i n e d , the d e f i n i t i o n s o f f a i r and advantageous exchanges  follow.)  S u b j e c t s were motivated p i l e of b u t t o n s  t o t r a d e because an i n c r e a s e to t h e i r  brought a l a r g e r g a i n than the c o s t i n c u r r e d by g i v i n g up  an e q u i v a l e n t amount from the l a r g e p i l e . t i o n s that a b a l a n c e the game.  small  I t was emphasized i n the i n s t r u c -  of two c o l o u r s had more worth i n the second p a r t o f  I t was a l s o made c l e a r t h a t l a r g e b a l a n c e d  more than s m a l l b a l a n c e d the group was c o n s t a n t ,  piles.  p i l e s were worth  Given that the t o t a l number o f buttons i n  t h i s imposed a c o m p e t i t i v e  orientation; i n addition,  9 s u b j e c t s were t o l d t o do as w e l l as they  could.  The e x p e c t a t i o n o f a s e c -  ond p a r t o f t h e game met t h e c o n d i t i o n t h a t f u t u r e comparison w i t h 10 would occur  (Scope c o n d i t i o n  4).  others  84  The  value  c h a r t had  d i f f e r e n t numbers o f d i f f e r e n t  the advantage of s t a n d a r d i z i n g the worth of c o l o u r e d b u t t o n s , without  about the second p a r t of the game.  In a d d i t i o n , i t met  s p e c i f y i n g that i n d i v i d u a l s c o u l d know the v a l u e were v a l u e d , without  of any  having 11  going  into d e t a i l  Scope c o n d i t i o n  f u n c t i o n by which  to know the r e s o u r c e base and  3,  resources  value p o s i t i o n s  p a r t i c u l a r Other. Scope c o n d i t i o n 6 s t i p u l a t e d that some members of the group c o u l d  w i t h o l d i n f o r m a t i o n about r e s o u r c e s , but would be unable to g i v e out information. condition.  The  covers  over f o u r of the s u b j e c t s ' buttons  These s u b j e c t s were not allowed  resource>?bases to o t h e r s . c o l o u r , and  The  the types of o f f e r s made by  ambiguous.  satisfied  this  to communicate the s i z e of  their  c o l o u r e d tags i n d i c a t i n g the predominant  mation a v a i l a b l e about the p r o f i t s was  false  these s u b j e c t s were the o n l y  they were r e c e i v i n g , and  this  infor-  information  S u b j e c t s were t o l d t h a t persons w i t h covers might have more, 12  l e s s , or the same,  as those w i t h v i s i b l e p i l e s of b u t t o n s ;  t h i s was  tended to c r e a t e doubt about the s i z e and v a l u e p o s i t i o n of the  in-  concealed  resources. On had  no  bases,  covers 13  the o t h e r hand, the p i l e s of buttons  of the f o u r s u b j e c t s  gave unambiguous i n f o r m a t i o n about the s i z e of the  e s p e c i a l l y i n the s e t where the exact numbers of buttons  by v i s i b l e s u b j e c t s was  that  resource  possessed  d i s p l a y e d on a card on the o u t s i d e of the booths  concerned. During  the experiment, these v i s i b l e s u b j e c t s had  to p l a c e  addi-  t i o n s to t h e i r r e s o u r c e bases made through t r a d i n g out on the t a b l e where  85  14 o t h e r s c o u l d see them.  ;iNote:  to  s u b j e c t s w i t h covered buttons  as  visibles. The  to  and  as n o n - v i s i b l e s ; and  to those w i t h no  green buttons  covers  ex-  i n o r d e r to o b t a i n roughly e q u a l s i z e d p i l e s  f o r use l a t e r on i n the experiment.  The  s e l e c t from a s e t of f o u r p o s s i b l e exchange p a r t n e r s , who  complementary to h i s own. for  refer  t a s k f a c i n g each s u b j e c t , then, i n v o l v e d e n t e r i n g i n t o  changes w i t h o t h e r persons red  For e f f i c i e n c y , we w i l l h e n c e f o r t h  The s i t u a t i o n c a l l s  of  a c t o r has,  ha^eresources  f o r a degree of c o o p e r a t i o n  anyone to b e n e f i t , but i n which the terms of the t r a n s a c t i o n are i n  conflict.  In the experiment,  P must d e c i d e which of s e v e r a l a l t e r n a t i v e  o t h e r s to whom he s h o u l d i n i t i a t e .  He has some i n f o r m a t i o n about the r e -  sources of 3 or 4 o t h e r s u b j e c t s , but i s i n the dark about 3 or 4 o t h e r s . I n i t i a l l y , P has for  a c h o i c e i n terms of the number of buttons he w i l l  a g i v e n r e t u r n , and the l e v e l of p r o f i t he o f f e r s to 0 w i l l a f f e c t  chance h i s i n i t i a t i o n w i l l be accepted. of  offer  two  conflicting  t h i s ) , O's  profit  tendencies — decreases  as P's  the  S u b j e c t s would be g e n e r a l l y aware own  profit  i n c r e a s e s (and P p r e f e r s  (and 0 does not p r e f e r t h i s ) .  Thus's?' some b a l -  ance must be s t r u c k such t h a t P asks as much as p o s s i b l e , but does not expose h i m s e l f to c e r t a i n  rejection.  Although P has no  c o n t r o l over how  many o t h e r s i n i t i a t e to  he does not have to take up an i n i t i a t i o n u n l e s s i t s u i t s him. this  i s t r u e f o r the t a r g e t s of h i s i n i t i a t i o n s  given t r i a l no completed  He  Since  t o o , the outcomes f o r a  are u n c e r t a i n , and P can complete a t r i a l w i t h two, transactions.  him,  one,  can have an o f f e r accepted and accept  e i t h e r of these events alone can o c c u r ; o r he may  r e c e i v e no  or one;  initiations  86  and have h i s own r e j e c t e d . four i n i t i a t i o n s  One s u b j e c t can o f c o u r s e r e c e i v e as many as  from those w i t h a complementary c o l o u r .  V a r i a t i o n s i n the Paradigm  The next s e c t i o n s d e s c r i b e the d e t a i l s o f two s e t s of experiments conducted t o t e s t the hypotheses developed i n Chapter 2 . a pilot  study i s i n c l u d e d i n Appendix  i n each s e t . a l l sets.  IV.  A d e s c r i p t i o n of  There were f o u r t e e n experiments:-  The r e s e a r c h paradigm d e s c r i b e d i n t h i s c h a p t e r was used f o r  The v a r i a t i o n s r e s u l t e d as attempts were made to improve the  o p e r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of t h e o r e t i c a l v a r i a b l e s , and t o e l i m i n a t e confounding effects.  However, the changes  cannot be viewed as a developmental  sequence  moving from bad t o good, s i n c e i t t u r n e d out t h a t changes made t o s t r e n g t h e n c e r t a i n a s p e c t s of the experiment weakened o t h e r s . on t h r e e o f the problems  We w i l l comment b r i e f l y  c r e a t e d by the paradigm.  To t e s t H y p o t h e s i s 1,  that P w i l l p r e f e r to i n i t i a t e  to an Other  w i t h a l a r g e amount o f Y r e l a t i v e t o X, i t was n e c e s s a r y t o have a t l e a s t two  l e v e l s of r e s o u r c e base, or two l e v e l s o f v a l u e p o s i t i o n  ( t o t a l num-  b e r s o f b u t t o n s possessed by d i f f e r e n t v i s i b l e s ; b a l a n c e o f r e d and green for different v i s i b l e s ) .  However, t h i s confounded  the t e s t o f H y p o t h e s i s  4,  that v i s i b l e s were the most p r e f e r r e d p a r t n e r s , as i t would not be p o s s i b l e to t e l l i f s u b j e c t s had i n i t i a t e d  t o a v i s i b l e Other because he was v i s i b l e ,  because he had a l o t o f b u t t o n s , or b o t h .  Consequently, i t was n e c e s s a r y  to have a s e t w i t h d i f f e r e n c e s i n r e s o u r c e bases among v i s i b l e s , and a s e t where t h e r e were none.  87  It  was n e c e s s a r y to i n t e r c e p t s u b j e c t s ' r e a l o f f e r s ,  and s u b s t i -  t u t e two i d e n t i c a l i n i t i a t i o n s (one each from a v i s i b l e and n o n - v i s i b l e ) , 15 to check s u b j e c t s ' p r e f e r e n c e s to be done on the f i r s t subjects  as p r e d i c t e d i n H y p o t h e s i s 5.  t r i a l , before  on the b a s i s o f f i r s t  subjects  in  s e t up o b l i g a t i o n s w i t h  i n i t i a t i o n s and a c c e p t a n c e s .  t i o n , however, p r e v e n t e d us from s e e i n g  T h i s had  Such  interven-  i f the ' n a t u r a l ' sequence o u t l i n e d  Chapter 1 ( i . e . , where n o n - v i s i b l e s t r y f o r advantages?.'^ but r e c e i v e few  i n i t i a t i o n s , f a i l t o have t h e i r view that w i t h o l d i n g  information  offers  accepted) d i d i n f a c t  l e a d to the  i s r e a l l y no advantage when Others have  alternatives. Scope-Condition 3 s t i p u l a t e d resource  levels  t h a t s u b j e c t s be i n doubt about t h e  of n o n - v i s i b l e subjects.  I t has been argued t h a t t h e main  s t r a t e g y open to P t o o b t a i n advantage i n t h i s case i s t o a c t 'as i f he c o u l d not a f f o r d For t h i s  t o g i v e up as many b u t t o n s as he would i n a f a i r  t o be a r e a l i s t i c s t r a t e g y , o t h e r members must a t l e a s t  the p o s s i b i l i t y that some o f t h e n o n - v i s i b l e s were ' w e a l t h i e r '  trades  of b u t t o n s .  A problem arose because s u b j e c t s  symmetry i n the d i s t r i b u t i o n visibles.  of r e s o u r c e  Several non-visible subjects  p r o f i l e s among v i s i b l e s and nonmentioned t h a t i t was a 'simple  when a l l the v i s i b l e s had the same r e s o u r c e  profile  subjects  Scope c o n d i t i o n 3 would n o t be met.  that n o n - v i s i b l e s were d i f f e r e n t ,  as the v i s i b l e s y , ,  (and t h i s was a n e c e s 16  s a r y c o n d i t i o n f o r the t e s t o f Hypotheses 4 and 5 ) . created,  as one f o r  tended t o assume  m a t t e r ' . t o guess t h a t the n o n - v i s i b l e s had the same p r o f i l e s  be  entertain  or 'poorer'  than themselves, so that f a i r exchanges would n o t be seen simply one  trade.  U n l e s s doubt  I f the experimenter  could told  and i t was p a t e n t l y obvious t o  88  each n o n - v i s i b l e t h a t lie was n o t d i f f e r e n t , then the experimenter was  lying.  A l t h o u g h i t would have been b e t t e r to make a l l s u b j e c t s a l i k e f o r t h e p u r pose o f t e s t i n g Hypotheses 4 and 5, the simultaneous t e s t i n g of H y p o t h e s i s 2 made t h i s seem unworkable. sources  I t was d e c i d e d  to c r e a t e d i f f e r e n c e s o f r e -  between v i s i b l e s and n o n - v i s i b l e s , and t o e x p l i c i t l y  s u b j e c t s that d i f f e r e n c e s o f some s o r t d i d e x i s t .  i n f o r m the  I t was s t i l l p o s s i b l e t o  s e t t h e r e s o u r c e bases and v a l u e p o s i t i o n s of v i s i b l e s a l l e q u a l  (excepting  complementarity). With these p r e l i m i n a r y c o n s i d e r a t i o n s i n mind, the d e t a i l s o f Sets A and B a r e g i v e n i n the f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n .  Set A  Fourteen  experiments were conducted f o r Set A, w i t h  ing d i s t r i b u t i o n of resources The  and i n f o r m a t i o n  the f o l l o w -  (see F i g u r e 3.1).  t o t a l s of 1630 and 830 were used, because bingo buttons a r e  q u i t e s m a l l , and one needs a p i l e of over 600 t o look n o t i c e a b l y l a r g e enough to t r a d e from.  N o n - v i s i b l e s u b j e c t s had somewhat more i n f o r m a t i o n  than v i s i b l e s u b j e c t s , i n t h a t t h e y . ; C o u l d see t h a t they had an i d e n t i c a l p r o f i l e t o one v i s i b l e s u b j e c t , and the same s i z e o f r e s o u r c e base as two others. N o t e i t h a t i n Set A, s u b j e c t s d i d not know the exact r e s o u r c e b a s e s , b u t only t h a t some p l a y e r s had more buttons  s i z e of o t h e r s '  than o t h e r s .  Thus, an advantageous exchange can be d e f i n e d by the e x p e r i m e n t e r , but the s u b j e c t s c o u l d not know the exact number of buttons  t h a t would s a t i s f y a  F i g u r e 3.1  D i s t r i b u t i o n of Resources and I n f o r m a t i o n i n Set A  Covers Red  Buttons  Green  Buttons  m Hi red visible 1600/30  H i green visible 1600/30  y  JZL Lo r e d visible 800/30  Lo green visible 800/30  F u l l i n f o r m a t i o n about r e s o u r c e base and value p o s i t i o n s -available t o ' ^ f b e r s . Note:  Eaqh s u b j e c t has 4 p o s s i b l e p a r t n e r s : resource p r o f i l e s .  Hi red non-vis 1600/30  H i green non-vis 1600/30  /-I  Lo r e d non-vis 800/30  Lo green non-vis 800/30  No i n f o r m a t i o n about resource base and v a l u e p o s i t i o n s a v a i l a b l e to others. two v i s i b l e and two n o n - v i s i b l e , w i t h complementary-  90  c r i t e r i o n of f a i r n e s s .  I t was  expected  the a c t o r would c o n s i d e r o t h e r  p l a y e r s to be of the same r e s o u r c e l e v e l , o r as h a v i n g more ( o r fewer) r e sources. In by  Set A, the f i r s t  the i n i t i a t o r on the form.  o f f e r s were d e l i v e r e d to the booths No  o f f e r s were d e l i v e r e d u n t i l a l l had  c o l l e c t e d , to a v o i d a f f e c t i n g the o f f e r s of s u b j e c t s who i n i t i a t i o n b e f o r e sending one. the experimenter  been  might r e c e i v e an  B e f o r e d e l i v e r i n g the f i r s t  s e t of o f f e r s ,  had s u b j e c t s complete the Q u e s t i o n n a i r e (see Appendix I I ) ,  h o l d i n g the bowls at a s i d e t a b l e u n t i l tions.  indicated  the s u b j e c t s had  completed  the ques-  A f t e r the t r i a l 1 o f f e r s had been p r o c e s s e d by the s u b j e c t s , the  experimenter  r e t u r n e d the bowls, w i t h buttons  and i n i t i a t i o n  owners, and i n s t r u c t e d the s u b j e c t s to make t h e i r second the experimenter  forms to  offer.  gave them the same q u e s t i o n n a i r e to complete,  their  AAgain and w h i l e  the  s u b j e c t s were o c c u p i e d w i t h i t , switched the r e a l o f f e r s f o r f a l s e ones, a l l d i r e c t e d to v i s i b l e s u b j e c t s .  A l l f a l s e o f f e r s asked  f o r 100 b u t t o n s  the r e c i p i e n t ' s predominant r e s o u r c e , i n r e t u r n f o r 100 buttons t i a t o r ' s predominant r e s o u r c e . the other h i g h v i s i b l e , and  of the  High v i s i b l e s r e c e i v e d bogus o f f e r s  ini-  from  from a h i g h n o n - v i s i b l e ; low v i s i b l e s r e c e i v e d  them from the o t h e r low v i s i b l e and of  of  from a low n o n - v i s i b l e .  c o u r s e , know the r e s o u r c e l e v e l of the n o n - v i s i b l e s o u r c e .  were made w i t h i n r e s o u r c e l e v e l s  to l i m i t  They d i d n o t , The  fake  offers  the number of sources of v a r i a t i o n .  Set B  This set r e a l l y  c o n s i s t e d of two  seven groups of s u b j e c t s i n each.  s u b - s e t s of experiments,  When i t i s n e c e s s a r y  with  to d i f f e r e n t i a t e them,  91  the subsets  w i l l be r e f e r r e d to as B l and B I I .  the two subsets  a r e shown i n F i g u r e  TheVresource p r o f i l e s f o r  3.2.  While i n Set A t h e r e were two h i g h and two low n o n - v i s i b l e s i n each experiment, i n Set B t h e r e were e i t h e r f o u r h i g h or f o u r low nonvisibles.  Since no one knew t h i s , t h e r e i s no c r u c i a l d i f f e r e n c e between  t h e s e , and experiments where h i g h s and lows a r e both p r e s e n t . j e c t s had s i g n s on the o u t s i d e s buttons.  V i s i b l e sub-  of t h e i r booths showing the exact  N o n - v i s i b l e s had c o l o u r e d  number of  tags showing whether t h e i r predominant  r e s o u r c e was r e d o r green. Further 1)  A limit  differences introduced  of f i v e t r i a l s was s t a t e d i n the i n s t r u c t i o n s , t o a t t a c h some  c o s t i n time to e x p l o r a t o r y 2)  i n Set B were as f o l l o w s :  offers.  Only one t r a n s a c t i o n (one t r i a l ) was a c t u a l l y completed  (compared  with  two i n Set A ) . 3)  Subjects  were t o l d t h e r e would be f o u r w i n n e r s , and t h a t these would  be the f o u r who had 'done b e s t ' . 4)  F a l s e o f f e r s asked f o r 110 buttons i n r e t u r n f o r 100 o f f e r e d .  While  t h i s i n c r e a s e s the l i k e l i h o o d o f double r e j e c t i o n s , i t f o r c e s  subjects  to express a p r e f e r e n c e  certainly  f o r the s o u r c e of an o f f e r which does  ( i n the case of a v i s i b l e i n i t i a t o r ) , and may p o s s i b l y  (with the non-  v i s i b l e i n i t i a t o r ) be g i v i n g the r e c i p i e n t a lower p r o f i t  than the  partner. 17 5)  N o n - v i s i b l e s , as w e l l as v i s i b l e s , r e c e i v e d two f a l s e o f f e r s each. This i n t e r f e r e n c e with  the f i r s t s e t of i n i t i a t i o n s made i t i m p o s s i b l e  F i g u r e 3.2  D i s t r i b u t i o n of Resources and I n f o r m a t i o n i n Set B  Red  J  L  Green t-  J  L  Cover |_  /  \ Red  A  vis  n  Red v i s ,  Green v i s .  Green v i s ,  1100G/100R  1100R/100G VISIBLES  Red NV  Red NV„ Green NV, Green NV, 1 • "'2 "'1 1250R/150G 1205G/150R HIGH NON-VISIBLES  /  /  /f  / /  J  / /  /  /  /  /  /  /  /  /  / /  L  /  /  n  Red v i s .  Red v i s ,  Green v i s .  Green v i s .  1100R/100G  1100R/100G VISIBLES  Green NV, Green NV, Red NV, 1 *"2 — 950R/50G 950G/50R LOW NON-VISIBLES  Red NV  93  to c o n t i n u e the experiment 18 ception.  beyond one  t r i a l , without  exposing the  de-  19 In o t h e r r e s p e c t s the procedure was  b a s i c a l l y the same as f o r Set  More e x t e n s i v e q u e s t i o n s were asked  c o n c e r n i n g s u b j e c t s ' reasons  and t a r g e t  of i n i t i a t i o n s , and reasons  f o r acceptance  A. f o r the s i z  and r e j e c t i o n of  offers. The d a t a t h a t r e s u l t from Set B c o n s i s t of r e a l i n i t i a t i o n s s u b j e c t s on T r i a l 1; acceptance acceptance  of p r e - w r i t t e n o f f e r s  of r e a l o f f e r s t o v i s i b l e s ) ; and  by  (and i n Set BI,  the s u b j e c t s ' w r i t t e n comments  about t h e i r p e r c e p t i o n of v a r i o u s a s p e c t s of the  situation.  It should be emphasized t h a t the s t r o n g e s t t e s t of the p r e f e r ence f o r a v i s i b l e exchange p a r t n e r would come from the d a t a f o r v i s i b l e s u b j e c t s i n Set B. tials  They were the o n l y s u b j e c t s who  c o u l d see no  i n r e s o u r c e bases among v i s i b l e p l a y e r s , and who  t a i n about the r e s o u r c e p r o f i l e s of n o n - v i s i b l e o t h e r s . n o n - v i s i b l e , h i g h and evident —  were t r u l y  differenuncer-  For both types of  low, a r e s o u r c e d i f f e r e n t i a l w i t h the v i s i b l e s i s  n o n - v i s i b l e h i g h s have more than v i s i b l e s , and n o n - v i s i b l e lows  i n Set BII have l e s s . P r e d i c t i o n s f o r Experimental  Paradigm  A s h o r t d e s c r i p t i o n of the d a t a generated  from the  experimental  paradigm which w i l l be r e l e v a n t to t e s t i n g each of the hypotheses below. chapter.  A c t u a l r e s u l t s from the experiments  w i l l be presented  i s given  i n t h e next  94  Hypothesis 1:  The p r e d i c t i o n t h a t an a c t o r w i l l p r e f e r t o i n i t i a t e t o an Other who has t h e best the High r e s o u r c e  p r i c e s i m p l i e s t h a t he w i l l o f f e r t o  players or to players with a l a r g e  ance o f one commodity over a n o t h e r .  imbal-  As t h i s h y p o t h e s i s  a p p l i e s o n l y t o v i s i b l e t a r g e t s Set B i s not r e l e v a n t , all  the v i s i b l e s i n Set B had the same t o t a l r e s o u r c e  and  value p o s i t i o n s .  In the l a t t e r , s u b j e c t s (1200  study w i l l a l s o be p r e s e n t e d .  a l l had the same t o t a l number o f  each), and d i f f e r e d o n l y  t i o n s on each c o l o u r .  base  Thus we w i l l use d a t a from Set A, and  some r e s u l t s from the p i l o t  buttons  since  i n the resource  posi-  Some s u b j e c t s were near t o b a l a n c e ,  some were v e r y unbalanced, and r e l a t i v e t o t h e s e v i s i b l e s , the n o n - v i s i b l e s had an i n t e r m e d i a t e  l e v e l of b a l a n c e .  In  both s e t s , t h e h y p o t h e s i s w i l l r e c e i v e support i f t h e majori t y o f i n i t i a t i o n s ^ a r e addressed t o the v i s i b l e s w i t h the best Hypothesis::2:  prices.  To t e s t t h e tendency f o r n o n - v i s i b l e s t o make advantageous exchanges, we s h a l l compare the p r o p o r t i o n s  of non-visibles  and  v i s i b l e s making advantageous i n i t i a t i o n s .  the  ' t y p i c a l ' o f f e r s o f the two groups w i l l be compared, on  the e x p e c t a t i o n  t h a t n o n - v i s i b l e s w i l l make i n i t i a t i o n s  b r i n g more p r o f i t should defined  In a d d i t i o n ,  t o themselves, i f a c c e p t e d .  make t y p i c a l o f f e r s t h a t a r e ' f a i r ' . r e l a t i v e t o the r e s o u r c e  that  Visibles F a i r w i l l be  base o f the exchange p a r t -  /  95  ners.  Data w i l l mainly be from  Set B, where the  confounding  of wealth l e v e l and v i s i b i l i t y d i d not o c c u r , and where subjects  knew the exact s i z e of the v i s i b l e Others'  resource  bases. Hypothesis  3:  Data r e l e v a n t t o whether or not the n o n - v i s i b l e s p e r c e i v e d an advantage i n the c o v e r s w i l l be responses made by  non-  v i s i b l e s on the q u e s t i o n n a i r e g i v e n on T r i a l 1 i n both sets.  In p a r t i c u l a r ,  and d i s a d v a n t a g e s retain of  q u e s t i o n s about the p e r c e i v e d advantages  of the c o v e r s , and  them, a r e r e l e v a n t .  greatest interest,  c o v e r s was  about the d e s i r e to  Again, d a t a from Set B w i l l  because s u b j e c t s ' p e r c e p t i o n of the  more s y s t e m a t i c a l l y probed  i n this set.  Data  from both s e t s w i l l be examined c o n c e r n i n g the i n i t i a l s i r e to r e t a i n  be  the c o v e r s .  In a d d i t i o n , we  s u b j e c t s ' e s t i m a t e s of the p r o b a b i l i t y  de-  can examine  that t h e i r  initial  offers w i l l be a c c e p t e d , t o see whether the n o n - v i s i b l e s ant i c i p a t e any reduced cealment Hypothesis  4:  likelihood  of acceptance  due t o the  con-  of t h e i r r e s o u r c e s .  Set B i s the b e s t t e s t of the p r e f e r e n c e to i n i t i a t e t o someone about whom one has r e l i a b l e i n f o r m a t i o n , as the  visi-  b l e s i n Set B a r e i d e n t i c a l i n t o t a l r e s o u r c e base s i z e ,  and  i n b a l a n c e of r e s o u r c e s .  In a d d i t i o n , t h e i r t o t a l r e s o u r c e  base i s known e x a c t l y by cards on the o u t s i d e of t h e i r  booths.  The r e l e v a n t d a t a are s i m p l y - p r o p o r t i o n s of i n i t i a t i o n s t o  96  v i s i b l e s and n o n - v i s i b l e s , by both v i s i b l e s and n o n - v i s i b l e s . The e x p e c t a t i o n i s t h a t s i g n i f i c a n t l y more than h a l f o f a l l o f f e r s w i l l go t o t h e v i s i b l e s . of  w e a l t h and v i s i b i l i t y  D e s p i t e the confounding  i n Set A, d a t a from these e x p e r i -  ments w i l l a l s o be examined, t o see i f a s i g n i f i c a n t l y greater p r o p o r t i o n of i n i t i a t i o n s v i s i b l e s on T r i a l  2.  S u b j e c t s ' w r i t t e n reasons f o r i n i t i a -  t i o n s w i l l g i v e supplementary responded Hypothesis 5 :  c o n t i n u e t o be addressed t o  evidence t h a t the s u b j e c t s  to v i s i b l e r e s o u r c e s i n t h e manner p r e d i c t e d .  The f a l s e o f f e r s prepared by the Experimenter  to make two  i d e n t i c a l i n i t i a t i o n s , one from a v i s i b l e and one from a nonv i s i b l e , allow a test of the f i f t h  hypothesis.  We expect a  preponderance o f acceptances o f the o f f e r s from a s o u r c e w i t h v i s i b l e resources..  Set B p r o v i d e s the b e s t t e s t o f t h i s  p r e d i c t i o n , as the f a l s e o f f e r s were" g i v e n both t o v i s i b l e s and n o n - v i s i b l e s , and they were r e c e i v e d by p l a y e r s b e f o r e they had completed to  any o t h e r t r a n s a c t i o n s .  I f , i n addition  a simple p r e f e r e n c e f o r v i s i b l e s , n o n - v i s i b l e s  made worse o f f e r s  actually  ( i . e . , o f f e r s t o P t h a t gave P l e s s  profit),  then the r a t e of acceptance o f i n i t i a t i o n s from a n o n - v i s i b l e source would be even lower than i f a n o n - v i s i b l e and a v i s i b l e made i d e n t i c a l o f f e r s to a g i v e n P.  To t e s t t h i s c o n j e c t u r e ,  o f f e r s from Set A, which were d e l i v e r e d on the f i r s t without i n t e r f e r e n c e , w i l l be examined.  trial  97  Hypothesis  6:  I f the n o n - v i s i b l e s ' p e r c e p t i o n of the advantages i n c o v e r s d e c r e a s e s over exchange t r a n s a c t i o n s , we  expect  one p o s s i b l e  r e a c t i o n t o t h e i r p r e d i c t e d f a i l u r e t o be a d e s i r e to r e v e a l i n f o r m a t i o n about t h e i r r e s o u r c e s .  Thus, the d a t a r e l e v a n t  t o t h i s h y p o t h e s i s a r e the s u b j e c t s ' s t a t e d p r e f e r e n c e s  (on  t h e Q u e s t i o n n a i r e ) about r e t a i n i n g or removing the c o v e r s . Set A must p r o v i d e the d a t a h e r e , questioned  'before' and  '. as the n o n - v i s i b l e s were  ' a f t e r ' engaging  i n transactions.  An  i n c r e a s e i n the f r e q u e n c y of subj e c t s d e s i r i n g the c o v e r s o f f can be read as support  f o r the p r e d i c t i o n .  Sample  S u b j e c t s f o r the experiments  were male c o l l e g e s t u d e n t s at the  U n i v e r s i t y of A l b e r t a , Canada, between the ages of 17 and s t u d e n t s were a l l undergraduates, experimenter.  Over 500  who  39 y e a r s .  The  had v o l u n t e e r e d at the request of the  s t u d e n t s from i n t r o d u c t o r y c h e m i s t r y , p h y s i c s , e n g i -  n e e r i n g , a g r i c u l t u r e , commerce and b u s i n e s s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , and s o c i o l o g y courses v o l u n t e e r e d , and o f these, 352 a s s i g n e d to experiments  s u b j e c t s were used.  S u b j e c t s were  on the b a s i s of f r e e time i n t h e i r t i m e t a b l e s .  No  assumptions a r e made about whether the sample i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of a g i v e n population:  the p o s i t i o n taken here i s t h a t the b e h a v i o u r a l p r i n c i p l e s  under i n v e s t i g a t i o n a p p l y t o a l l people, and not s y s t e m a t i c a l l y r e l a t e d i n t h i s study.  t h a t demographic v a r i a b l e s  to the dependent v a r i a b l e s of t h e o r e t i c a l  No p e r s o n a l i t y measures were used as independent  are  interest  variables,  98  because t h e theory presented assumed to o p e r a t e  here i s concerned w i t h v a r i a b l e s which a r e  i n a s i m i l a r way f o r a l l s u b j e c t s .  I t i s conceivable  t h a t p e r s o n a l i t y may i n f l u e n c e t h e development o f an i n d i v i d u a l ' s p r e f e r ence o r d e r i n g f o r r e s o u r c e s governing  —  once t h i s  i s known, however, t h e p r i n c i p l e s  t h e i r exchange behaviour a r e not assumed t o be i d i o s y n c r a t i c . Females were not used as s u b j e c t s , on the expedient  t h a t , although ience with  females v o l u n t e e r e d  at a higher  grounds  r a t e than males, past  exper-  female s u b j e c t s i n d i c a t e d t h a t they do not a c t u a l l y show up as  r e l i a b l y as males. i t was decided  S i n c e t h e experiments r e q u i r e d e i g h t s u b j e c t s a t once,  t o use males t o minimize t h e number o f experiments t h a t  c o u l d not be run f o r l a c k o f s u b j e c t s . occasionally solicited  (As i t was, an e x t r a s u b j e c t was  i n the c a f e t e r i a , i f o n l y seven s u b j e c t s appeared.)  20 Sex  of s u b j e c t s i s thus h e l d  constant.  Because both l e v e l s of the i n f o r m a t i o n v a r i a b l e were r u n s i m u l taneously,  no p r e c a u t i o n s were n e c e s s a r y  f a t i g u e , o f the s u b j e c t p o o l .  t o a v o i d unequal m a t u r a t i o n ,  S u b j e c t s were, requested  or  not t o d e s c r i b e t h e  experiment t o t h e i r f r i e n d s , as knowledge o f t h e hypotheses o r t h e e x p e r i mental m a n i p u l a t i o n results.  of o f f e r s r e c e i v e d d u r i n g t h e game would i n v a l i d a t e the  Subjects  o n l y two s u b j e c t s  appeared t o have honoured t h i s request ( i n the same experiment) suspected  i n t h e main  —  t h e d e c e p t i o n , and  the d a t a from t h i s experiment were d i s c a r d e d . A f i n a l comment should bamade c o n c e r n i n g  t h e comparison o f t h i s  21 paradigm w i t h  those  f r e q u e n t l y used i n s t u d i e s o f b a r g a i n i n g .  most experiments have p r o v i d e d  To d a t e ,  n e i t h e r a l t e r n a t i v e exchange o p p o r t u n i t i e s ,  99  nor a r e s o u r c e base a g a i n s t which f a i r n e s s or e q u i t y can be d e f i n e d i n terms o t h e r than a 50-50 s p l i t not e q u i t y ) .  The p r e s e n t  of money p r o f i t s  experiment attempts to o p e r a t i o n a l i z e such  t o r s , which a r e g e n e r a l l y agreed has  (which r e a l l y r e p r e s e n t s e q u a l i t y ,  to be important.  fac-  Because each s u b j e c t  s e v e r a l a l t e r n a t i v e s , t h e r e i s a l s o no need t o r e q u i r e s u b j e c t s to r e a c h 22  a s e t t l e m e n t w i t h i n dyad b e f o r e they can l e a v e the experiment.  Studies  of b i l a t e r a l monopoly b a r g a i n i n g have been a b l e to f o c u s on the s e q u e n t i a l adjustment of i n i t i a t i o n s and  e x p e c t a n c i e s , and  on the e f f e c t s of  symmetric  23  and a s s y m e t r i c unable  i n f o r m a t i o n f o r the b a r g a i n i n g outcomes,  but have been  to study the f a c t o r s of a l t e r n a t i v e s , and p r e f e r e n c e s f o r c e r t a i n  k i n d s of p a r t n e r s .  Thus, w h i l e the p r e s e n t  the s o c i a l psychology  of b a r g a i n i n g and  study a r o s e i n the c o n t e x t  exchange, the method of  investiga-  t i o n of the phenomena i s d i f f e r e n t , w i t h the t h e o r e t i c a l emphasis on c h o i c e of exchange r e l a t i o n s h i p s , and  i n i t i a l t a c t i c s , r a t h e r than on  i n t e r n a l b a r g a i n i n g i n a p a r t i c u l a r dyad t h a t l e a d s to a s i n g l e and d i v i s i o n of a p a y o f f .  of  the the  solution  F i g u r e 3.3  Summary o f F e a t u r e s o f the Two E x p e r i m e n t a l Sets SET A  SET B  14 experiments  Set  Each experiment had:  Each experiment had:  Each experiment had:  - v i s i b l e s - 2 highs(1630 b u t t o n s ) -2 lows ( 830 b u t t o n s )  - v i s i b l e s - 4 mediums(1200 b u t t o n s )  - v i s i b l e s - 4 mediums(1200 b u t t o n s )  -non-visibles -2 highs(163;0 b u t t o n s ) _ _ „-? lows ( 830 b u t t o n s ) Exact t o t a l s o f v i s i b l e s r e sources n o t d i s p l a y e d .  -non-visibles -4 h i g h s  -non-visibles -4 lows  Exact t o t a l s o f v i s i b l e s ' r e source p i l e s w r i t t e n on cards on s u b j e c t s ' booths.  Exact t o t a l s o f v i s i b l e s ' r e source p i l e s d i s p l a y e d .  F i r s t i n i t i a t i o n not i n t e r c e p ted, d e l i v e r e d to r e a l target, and r e t u r n e d t o i n i t i a t o r ( T r i a l 1). T r i a l 2 i n i t i a t i o n s intercepted, f a l s e offers of 100/100 d e l i v e r e d t o v i s i b l e s only, replies collected.  R e a l o f f e r s d e l i v e r e d to v i s i b l e s o n l y ; r e p l i e s p i c k e d up; o f f e r s of n o n - v i s i b l e s i n t e r c e p t e d , subs t i t u t e d two o f f e r s of 100/110 from v i s i b l e and n o n - v i s i b l e - . T r i a l 1.  T r i a l 1: r e a l o f f e r s o f a l l subj e c t s i n t e r c e p t e d ; two f a l s e o f f e r s to a l l s u b j e c t s o f 100/110.  Questionnaires: a f t e r i n i t i a t i o n s made and p i c k e d up but p r i o r t o d e l i v e r y on T r i a l 1; d u r i n g T r i a l 2, n o n - v i s i b l e s r e p l i e d t o second q u e s t i o n naire.  Questionnaires: after Trial 1 i n i t i a t i o n made; second q u e s t i o n n a i r e a f t e r r e p l i e s to T r i a l 1 offers collected.  Questionnaires: after T r i a l 1 i n i t i a t i o n made; second q u e s t i o n n a i r e a f t e r r e p l i e s to T r i a l 1 offers collected.  Experiment T r i a l 2.  Experiment t e r m i n a t e d a t end of T r i a l 1.  Experiment terminated a t end o f T r i a l 1.  terminated a f t e r  Bl —  7 experiments  (1400 b u t t o n s )  Set  BII —  7 experiments  (1000 b u t t o n s )  101  FOOTNOTES FOR  CHAPTER 3  1.  W.H. Foddy, 'The f o r m a t i o n of c l i q u e s i n c o l l e c t i v i t i e s as a consequence of i n i t i a l d i s t r i b u t i o n s of dimensions of wealth', Unpublished Ph.D. D i s s e r t a t i o n , U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1971.  2.  S. S i e g e l , A.E. S i e g e l , and J.M. Andrews, Choice, S t r a t e g y and U t i l i t y , New York: McGraw H i l l , 1964. S i e g e l . p o s t u l a t e s t h a t the c h o i c e of a response i n p r o b a b i l i t y l e a r n i n g s i t u a t i o n s i s determined by the u t i l i t y of a c o r r e c t response and the u t i l i t y of v a r y i n g c h o i c e , which S i e g e l claimed a r o s e out of boredom. In s o c i a l exchange, more than j u s t the escape from boredom i s achieved by c h o i c e v a r i a b i l i t y — people do not l i k e to i n c u r too many o b l i g a t i o n s w i t h one i n d i v i d u a l , as i t i n c r e a s e s dependence on t h a t person.  3.  T h i s was to e l i m i n a t e s y s t e m a t i c b i a s due to g r e a t e r v i s u a l c e n t r a l i t y of the p e r s o n o p p o s i t e . In W. Foddy's study, t h e r e was a tendency f o r s u b j e c t s to d i r e c t a g r e a t e r p r o p o r t i o n of t h e i r i n i t i a t i o n s t o persons d i r e c t l y opposite. See W. Foddy, op. c i t . , 1971.  4.  To a v o i d a l p h a  5.  For each set of experiments, s u b j e c t s l i s t e n e d to a tape r e c o r d i n g of i n s t r u c t i o n s , and i n Set B but not Set A, read a t r a n s c r i p t of the tape w h i l e i t was p l a y i n g . Subsequent to the f i r s t s e t of experiments, a study conducted by W. Foddy i n d i c a t e d t h a t s u b j e c t s c o u l d r e c a l l more i n f o r m a t i o n from the d u a l p r e s e n t a t i o n of i n s t r u c t i o n s , than they c o u l d i f tape o n l y or t r a n s c r i p t o n l y was used. Because the i n s t r u c t i o n s i n duce some of the main scope c o n d i t i o n s and assumptions, and because i t was important t h a t s u b j e c t s understand them i n the most u n i f o r m and comp l e t e manner p o s s i b l e , i t was a p p r o p r i a t e t h a t Foddy's f i n d i n g s should be a p p l i e d . .Our experiments were a l l conducted by the author, so t h a t b i a s due to the sex of the experimenter i s h e l d c o n s t a n t , though i t i s unknown. See: W.H. Foddy, 'On g e t t i n g through t o some of the people some of the time', Unpublished M a n u s c r i p t , Edmonton: U n i v e r s i t y of A l b e r t a , 1972.  6.  Subjects b e l i e v e d the experiment would c o n t i n u e f o r more than two See d e s c r i p t i o n of the two e x p e r i m e n t a l s e t s f o r d e t a i l s .  7.  I t c o u l d be o b j e c t e d t h a t n o n - v i s i b l e s u b j e c t s were v i s i b l e to the exper imenter, and may have f e l t c o n s t r a i n e d to be ' f a i r ' . Such an o b j e c t i o n has l e s s f o r c e , i f one a c c e p t s the c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of norms as 'prud e n t i a l maxims' r a t h e r than moral r u l e s t h a t make one f e e l g u i l t y i f one b e n e f i t s by b r e a k i n g them. That i s , s i n c e n o n - v i s i b l e s u b j e c t s were not t r a d i n g w i t h the experimenter, the f a c t t h a t she c o u l d see whether or not t h e i r o f f e r s were e q u i t a b l e , would not have a f f e c t e d the p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t the o f f e r would be accepted by the s u b j e c t t o whom i t was d i r e c ted.  preference.  trials  102  8.  The p r o v i s i o n of a v a l u e c h a r t and t h e d e c e p t i o n r e g a r d i n g a second p a r t were deemed n e c e s s a r y , because p r e v i o u s work w i t h t h e paradigm suggested t h a t a p r i n c i p l e of d i m i n i s h i n g m a r g i n a l u t i l i t y would o n l y operate when s u b j e c t s knew why they wanted a r e s o u r c e , and what i t was worth t o them. See W. Foddy, op. c i t . , 1972.  9.  In t h e second s e t , s u b j e c t s were t o l d t h e r e would be f o u r winners. The o b j e c t i o n c o u l d be made t h a t having o n l y one winner would induce more competition. I t was decided t o have f o u r winners, so t h a t s u b j e c t s s t a r t i n g a t a l e s s advantaged p o s i t i o n i n terms o f t o t a l r e s o u r c e base would s t i l l b e l i e v e t h a t they c o u l d 'catch up', and so t h a t these p e o p l e would not g i v e up and l o s e i n t e r e s t i n comparing w i t h o t h e r s . Some comments from s u b j e c t s i n Set A, where t h e r e were l a r g e d i f f e r e n c e s i n w e a l t h , and no winners, i n d i c a t e d t h a t some s u b j e c t s d i d not t r y to make comparisons w i t h p l a y e r s a t a d i f f e r e n t w e a l t h l e v e l . Hoffman, e t a l . , g i v e ' evidence t h a t people cease comparison w i t h a person who i s d o i n g much b e t t e r i n a game, and cannot be 'caught up'. See: P. H o f f man, L. F e s t i n g e r , and D.H. Lawrence, 'Tendencies toward group comparab i l i t y i n c o m p e t i t i v e b a r g a i n i n g ' , Human R e l a t i o n s , 7_, 1954, pp. 141159; see a l s o B. Latane, E d i t o r , 'Studies i n s o c i a l comparison', J o u r n a l of E x p e r i m e n t a l S o c i a l Psychology, Supplement 1, 1966.  10.  There i s a p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t s u b j e c t s w i l l t r a d e w i t h o t h e r s w i t h whom they cannot compare, i n o r d e r t o get ahead of someone they can see, someone w i t h whom they, are comparing p r o f i t s . I n t h i s sense, c o m p a r a b i l i t y r e f e r s to s i m i l a r i t y o f p r o g r e s s towards maximizing t o t a l v a l u e u n i t s ( b a l a n c i n g t h e p i l e s o f b u t t o n s , r a t h e r than t o comparison o f s u b j e c t i v e p r o f i t s f o r a g i v e n exchange)". Hoffman, F e s t i n g e r and Lawrence (op. c i t . , 1954), found t h a t s u b j e c t s p r e f e r r e d t o share p a y o f f s w i t h a non-comparison o t h e r , as a means o f g e t t i n g ahead o f another s u b j e c t w i t h whom they were competing. I t may be t h e case t h a t v i s i b l e o t h e r s were more s a l i e n t c o m p e t i t o r s , s i n c e t h e i r p r o g r e s s toward balanced r e s o u r c e p i l e s c o u l d be watched. There might then be an 'end-game' e f f e c t , w i t h v i s i b l e s u b j e c t s a v o i d i n g exchanges w i t h one another, b u t paying no a t t e n t i o n t o t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t n o n - v i s i b l e p l a y e r s might a l s o be n e a r i n g optimum b a l a n c e o f r e s o u r c e s . The consequence o f t h i s would be t h a t the a l t e r n a t i v e s about which P has r e l i a b l e i n f o r m a t i o n seem so u n d e s i r a b l e , t h a t t h e expected v a l u e o f t h e u n c e r t a i n exchange (with a n o n - v i s i b l e ) i s g r e a t e r i n s p i t e of i t s g r e a t e r ambiguity. Such an e f f e c t i s more l i k e l y i n t h e e x p e r i m e n t a l s i t u a t i o n w i t h f i x e d t o t a l r e s o u r c e s and a c l e a r - c u t f i n a l t a l l y i n g o f winners and l o s e r s . These c o n d i t i o n s may g i v e an u n r e a l i s t i c r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f c o n d i t i o n s found i n ongoing exchange r e l a t i o n s h i p s , where p e o p l e p r o b a b l y a t t e n d more t o t h e i r c u r r e n t exchanges and s h o r t - t e r m comparisons. Where t o t a l r e s o u r c e s i n t h e group a r e s t a t i c , end-game e f f e c t s w i l l occur because i t i s p o s s i b l e f o r a l l to r e a c h e q u i m a r g i n a l i t y of r e s o u r c e s , and have no f u r t h e r m o t i v a t i o n to exchange; i f r e s o u r c e s a r e consumed and renewed (as w i t h s a l a r i e s ) ,  103  or changing (as w i t h a change i n t a s k ) , people p r o b a b l y a t t e n d more to immediate b a l a n c e of p r o f i t s . S i n c e e x p e r i m e n t a l groups a r e s h o r t - t e r m , i t i s d i f f i c u l t to d e s i g n an experiment where f i n a l r a n k i n g s a r e not extremely s a l i e n t . 11.  In the end, i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c a s s o c i a t i o n s and v a l u e s would have to be measured, and p r o v i d e d f o r i n a t h e o r y . At t h i s stage of t e s t i n g g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e s , however, i t i s s i m p l e r t o c o n t r o l f o r such v a r i a b i l i t y , than t o i d e n t i f y a range of v a l u e f u n c t i o n s , and t r y t o i n c l u d e a l l combinat i o n s i n a study.  12.  In the second s e t , they were t o l d t h a t s u b j e c t s w i t h c o v e r s might have more, or l e s s , but d i d not have the same numbers as v i s i b l e s .  13.  Bartos says t h a t P has ' r e l i a b l e knowledge' i f t h e r e i s an unimpeachable a u t h o r i t y which guarantees i n f o r m a t i o n ( i . e . , i m p l y i n g t h a t 0 i s not r e l i a b l e , and a d i s i n t e r e s t e d p a r t y w i l l be looked on as a source of t r u s t e d i n f o r m a t i o n ) . See O.J. B a r t o s , 'Towards a r a t i o n a l e m p i r i c a l model of n e g o t i a t i o n s ' , i n J . Berger, M. Z e l d i t c h and B. Anderson, E d i t o r s , jSoj^icd^j^Lcji^ Houghton, M i f f l i n , Co., 1972, Vol. I I .  14.  Some s u b j e c t s t r i e d to c o n c e a l a d d i t i o n s t o t h e i r p i l e s of b u t t o n s keeping them i n s i d e t h e i r booths.  15.  An o f f e r of 100 b u t t o n s of one c o l o u r f o r 100 buttons of the o t h e r c o l o u r was used i n Set A. In Set B, the f a l s e o f f e r s asked 110 i n r e t u r n f o r 100. To a v o i d s u s p i c i o n , the experimenter v a r i e d the h a n d w r i t i n g on o f f e r s going t o the same person. An o f f e r of 100 f o r 100 was chosen as t y p i c a l , though perhaps an o f f e r a s k i n g more than i t o f f e r e d would have f o r c e d the s u b j e c t to express h i s p r e f e r e n c e more s t r o n g l y , as a one f o r one o f f e r i s 'prominent', and may have aroused l e s s s u s p i c i o n . Because the r u l e s p e r m i t t e d s u b j e c t s to accept o n l y one o f f e r at a time, t h e i r c h o i c e between two i d e n t i c a l o f f e r s from a v i s i b l e and a nonv i s i b l e s o u r c e c o u l d be taken as an i n d i c a t o r of t h e i r p r e f e r e n c e . See: T.C. S c h e l l i n g , The S t r a t e g y of C o n f l i c t , Cambridge: Harvard U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1960. S c h e l l i n g d i s c u s s e s the prominence of some s o l u t i o n s i n games of c o o r d i n a t i o n , s u g g e s t i n g t h a t i f communication i s p r o h i b i t e d , s u b j e c t s choose obvious s o l u t i o n s i n the hope t h a t t h e i r p a r t n e r s w i l l do l i k e w i s e (e.g., meeting a t a c r o s s r o a d s ; d i v i d i n g a d o l l a r 50-50, e t c . )  16.  The b i a s may a l s o e x i s t due t o the e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t much of normal exchange does i n f a c t take p l a c e among p e e r s , d e s p i t e the d e s i r e to exchange w i t h those who have a l o t of r e s o u r c e s . In an e x p e r i m e n t a l p a r a digm s i m i l a r t o the one used here, W. Foddy demonstrated t h a t a l t h o u g h both h i g h and low r e s o u r c e persons made f i r s t i n i t i a t i o n s to h i g h r e source persons, t h e r e was a tendency f o r exchange to s t r a t i f y , w i t h h i g h r e s o u r c e persons t r a d i n g w i t h each o t h e r , and low r e s o u r c e persons by  by  104  d e f a u l t becoming t r a d i n g p a r t n e r s w i t h each o t h e r . T h i s was i n t e r p r e ted as t h e r e s u l t of h i g h r e s o u r c e persons b e i n g a b l e t o o f f e r one anot h e r a h i g h e r p r o f i t compared w i t h t h a t o f f e r e d i n i n i t i a t i o n s from low r e s o u r c e persons. See W.H. Foddy, op. c i t . , 1972. 17.  F a l s e o f f e r s were d i s t r i b u t e d on T r i a l 1. In Set B l , o n l y the nonv i s i b l e s received f a l s e offers. Real o f f e r s were d e l i v e r e d to v i s i b l e s . In Set B I I , a l l s u b j e c t s r e c e i v e d two f a l s e o f f e r s . I t was i n i t i a l l y b e l i e v e d to be i m p o s s i b l e to t r o t out 16 bowls when o n l y 8 were supposed to e x i s t . E x p e r i e n c e i n d i c a t e d t h a t s u b j e c t s d i d not expect to be dec e i v e d , and simply d i d not n o t i c e how many bowls the experimenter c a r r i e d around.  18.  The o n l y r e t u r n p o s s i b l e would have been t o r e j e c t a l l the n o n - v i s i b l e s ' o f f e r s i n Set B l , and a l l o f f e r s i n BII; because the o f f e r s were i n t e r cepted, the o f f e r s s u b j e c t s responded to c o u l d not be g i v e n back t o the supposed sender. The major purpose of Set B was to s e p a r a t e the e f f e c t s of d i f f e r e n t i a l r e s o u r c e p r o f i l e s and v i s i b i l i t y , and to t e s t Hypothesis 5 c o n c e r n i n g acceptances f o r both v i s i b l e s and n o n - v i s i b l e s .  19.  See F i g u r e 3.3  20.  The l i t e r a t u r e on e x p e r i m e n t a l games p r o v i d e s c o n t r a d i c t o r y evidence about sex d i f f e r e n c e s i n game b e h a v i o u r , e s p e c i a l l y c o n c e r n i n g the i s s u e of whether females a r e k i n d e r and more c o o p e r a t i v e , or more c o m p e t i t i v e and s u s p i c i o u s . Vinacke found more c o o p e r a t i v e behaviour among females i n a c o a l i t i o n game, except when c u m u l a t i v e s c o r e s or rank c o n s i d e r a t i o n s were i n t r o d u c e d , at which p o i n t sex d i f f e r e n c e s i n behaviour v a n i s h e d . B i x e n s t e i n , Chambers and W i l s o n (1964) found males p l a y e d more cooperat i v e l y than females i n a P r i s o n e r ' s Dilemma game; Komorita found females more c o o p e r a t i v e than males; and B i x e n s t e i n and W i l s o n (1963), B i x e n s t e i n , Potash and Wilson (1963), and T e d e s c h i , et a l . (1969) found no s i g n i f i c a n t s e x / c h o i c e behaviour c o r r e l a t i o n . The f i n d i n g s about sex d i f f e r e n c e s a r e e q u i v o c a l because sex, which i s a g l o b a l , many-faceted c a t e g o r y , has not been l i n k e d i n a s y s t e m a t i c t h e o r e t i c a l way t o a p a r t i c u l a r s o r t of behaviour or b e h a v i o u r s i n e x p e r i m e n t a l games. Often, r e s e a r c h e r s s t a r t w i t h a commonsense i d e a of how boys d i f f e r from g i r l s , and see i f t h i s d i f f e r e n c e p r e d i c t s a s p e c t s of game b e h a v i o u r . In a d d i t i o n , p e r s o n a l i t y and sex d i f f e r e n c e s a r e not u s u a l l y good p r e d i c t o r s of behaviour u n l e s s the statements employing them are c o n d i t i o n e d by situational variables. In terms of t h i s r e s e a r c h , t h e r e i s no p a r t i c u l a r reason to suspect women are governed by d i f f e r e n t p r i n c i p l e s i n exchange than a r e men, though they may w e l l a s s i g n d i f f e r e n t v a l u e s t o v a r i o u s resources.  a t end of t h i s  Chapter.  For s t u d i e s t h a t attempt to r e l a t e sex r o l e t o game behaviour (mainly i n P r i s o n e r ' s Dilemma), see: D.W. Conrath, 'Sex r o l e and c o o p e r a t i o n i n the game of Chicken', J o u r n a l o f C o n f l i c t Resolution') _16, 1972, pp. 433-442; B. Jones, M. S t e e l e , J . Gahagan, and J . T e d e s c h i , 'Matrix v a l u e s  105  and c o o p e r a t i v e b e h a v i o u r i n the P r i s o n e r ' s Dilemma game', J o u r n a l o f P e r s o n a l i t y and S o c i a l P s y c h o l o g y , 8^, 1968, pp. 148-153; S.S. Komorita, 'Cooperative c h o i c e s i n a P r i s o n e r ' s Dilemma game', J o u r n a l o f P e r s o n a l i t y and S o c i a l Psychology, 2^, 1965, pp. 741-45; V.E. B i x e n s t e i n , N. Chambers, and K.V. W i l s o n , " E f f e c t o f asymmetry i n p a y o f f on b e h a v i o u r i n a two-person, non-zero-sum game', J o u r n a l o f C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n , 8_, 1964, pp. 151-59; B i x e n s t e i n , Potash and W i l s o n , ' E f f e c t s o f l e v e l o f c o o p e r a t i v e c h o i c e by t h e o t h e r p l a y e r on c h o i c e s i n a P r i s o n e r ' s Dilemma Game, P a r t 1', J o u r n a l of Abnormal and S o c i a l Psychology, 66, 1963, pp. 308-13; B i x e n s t e i n and W i l s o n , ' E f f e c t s o f l e v e l o f c o o p e r a t i v e c h o i c e by the o t h e r p l a y e r on c h o i c e s i n a P r i s o n e r ' s Dilemma game, P a r t 2', same j o u r n a l , 67, 1963, pp. 139-47; W.E. Vinacke, 'Sex r o l e s i n a t h r e e person game', Sociometry, 22, 1959, pp. 343-59; W.E. Vinacke, 'Negotiat i o n s and d e c i s i o n s i n a p o l i t i c s game', i n B. Lieberman, S o c i a l Choice, Gordon and Breach S c i e n c e P u b l i s h e r s , 1971, pp. 51-81; T e d e s c h i , J.T., et a l . , ' S t a r t e f f e c t and response b i a s i n t h e P r i s o n e r ' s Dilemma game', Psychonomic S c i e n c e , 11, 1968, pp. 149-50; S. Oskamp and D. Perlman, ' F a c t o r s a f f e c t i n g c o o p e r a t i o n i n a P r i s o n e r ' s Dilemma game', J o u r n a l , of C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n , 9_, pp. 359-74. G a l l o and M c C l i n t o c k sum i t up by s t a t i n g - "A l a r g e number o f s t u d i e s have f a i l e d t o demonstrate any r e l a t i o n s h i p between sex o f t h e p l a y e r s and c h o i c e b e h a v i o u r , " and they l i s t s e v e r a l o t h e r s t u d i e s t h a t l e a d them to t h i s c o n c l u s i o n . See P.S. G a l l o and C.G. M c C l i n t o c k , 'Cooperative and c o m p e t i t i v e b e h a v i o u r i n mixed motive games, ' J o u r n a l o f C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n , 9_, 1965, pp. 68-79. 21.  L^E. Fouraker and S. S i e g e l , B a r g a i n i n g Behaviour, New York: McGraw H i l l Book Co., 1963; C.S. F i s c h e r , 'The e f f e c t s o f t h r e a t s i n an incomp l e t e i n f o r m a t i o n game', Sociometry, 32, 1969, pp. 301-314; H.H. K e l l e y , 'A classroom study i n t h e dilemmas o f i n t e r p e r s o n a l n e g o t i a t i o n s ' , i n K. A r c h i b a l d , Ed., S t r a t e g i c I n t e r a c t i o n and C o n f l i c t , U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a P r e s s , 1966, pp. 49-73; R.M. L i e b e r t , et a l . , 'The e f f e c t s o f i n f o r m a t i o n and magnitude o f i n i t i a l o f f e r on i n t e r p e r s o n a l n e g o t i a t i o n ' , J o u r n a l o f E x p e r i m e n t a l S o c i a l Psychology, 4_, 1968, pp. 431-444. For a review o f the paradigm most f r e q u e n t l y used to study d y a d i c b a r g a i n i n g , see H.H. K e l l e y and D. S c h e n i t z k i , ' B a r g a i n i n g , Chapter 10 i n C.G. M c C l i n t o c k , Ed., E x p e r i m e n t a l S o c i a l Psychology, H o l t , Rinehart and Winston, 1972. 1  22.  For a d i s c u s s i o n o f the i m p l i c a t i o n s o f r e q u i r i n g s u b j e c t s t o r e a c h agreement b e f o r e the experiment-.can t e r m i n a t e , see K e l l e y and S c h e n i t z k i , i b i d . , pp. 306-307.  23.  L.L. Cummings and D.L. H a r n e t t , 'Bargaining b e h a v i o u r i n a symmetric triad: the r o l e o f i n f o r m a t i o n , communication, power and r i s k - t a k i n g p r o p e n s i t y ' , Review o f Economic S t u d i e s , 36, 1969, pp. 484-499; and D.L. Harnett and L.L. Cummings, ' B a r g a i n i n g b e h a v i o u r i n an a s s y m e t r i c t r i a d ' , Chapter 2.5 i n B. Lieberman, S o c i a l Choice, Gordon and Breach S c i e n c e P u b l i s h e r s , 1971.  106  CHAPTER 4 RESULTS AND  EVALUATION OF RESULTS  Introduction  In the f i r s t  two  chapters,  a process was  to maximize v a l u e by o b t a i n i n g an optimum b a l a n c e valued  according  o u t l i n e d i n which P-'sought of r e s o u r c e s  to a p r i n c i p l e of d i m i n i s h i n g m a r g i n a l  utility.  exchanges, he c o u l d get the b e s t terms i n a t r a n s a c t i o n by ner who  low v a l u e on what P wanted ( Y ) .  exchanges which brought him gain a d d i t i o n a l p r o f i t formation success  the b e s t p o s s i b l e p r o f i t , P was  i n o b t a i n i n g advantage was potential, partners  seen to be  The  and  terms i n f a i r motivated  to  P's  l i m i t e d by a p r e f e r e n c e  on  f o r r e l i a b l e i n f o r m a t i o n about the  to l e a r n that w i t h o l d i n g i n f o r m a t i o n was  Chapter 3.  (X),  the f a i r n e s s of a t r a n s a c t i o n .  of anyone w i t h whom they might agree to t r a d e .  the p r e d i c t i o n s , two  fair  through advantageous exchanges, by c o n t r o l l i n g i n -  r e q u i r e d by Other to assess  the p a r t of P's  Beyond s e e k i n g  In  locating a part-  p l a c e d r e l a t i v e l y h i g h v a l u e on what P could g i v e him  relatively  which were  As a r e s u l t , P was  i n f a c t a disadvantage.  resources  expected To  test  s e t s of experiments were developed as d e s c r i b e d i n  p r e s e n t a t i o n of r e s u l t s from these experiments w i l l  f o l l o w the same o r d e r as the p r e s e n t a t i o n of hypotheses i n Chapter 2. e v a l u a t i o n of each h y p o t h e s i s hypothesis, data w i l l  will  i n c l u d e a restatement of the  f o l l o w e d by s p e c i f i c e x p e r i m e n t a l  then be  g i v e n , and  conclusions  formal  p r e d i c t i o n s ; the r e l e v a n t  drawn on the b a s i s of the  An argument f o r the o p e r a t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the v a r i a b l e s has  1 made i n Chapter 3,  and w i l l not be  repeated  The  here.  results. been  107  Many of the p r e d i c t i o n s from the theory depend on the p r i o r d i t i o n t h a t s u b j e c t s v a l u e the r e s o u r c e s a c c o r d i n g to a m a r g i n a l function.  utility  Because the success of the m a n i p u l a t i o n to b u i l d i n t h i s  f u n c t i o n i s so important  value  to the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of r e s u l t s , a t a p p r o p r i a t e  p o i n t s i n the d i s c u s s i o n of the r e s u l t s , we w i l l draw a t t e n t i o n to :  t h a t t h i s c o n d i t i o n was  con-  satisfied.  evidence  T h i s evidence w i l l be summarized a t  the end of the c h a p t e r .  I n i t i a t i o n s to Persons  P e r c e i v e d to be W i l l i n g to Pay  the Best  Prices  Hypothesis 1; Among those members of the group about whose r e s o u r c e bases and v a l u e p o s i t i o n s P has unambiguous i n f o r m a t i o n , P i s most l i k e l y to i n i t i a t e to a person, 0, whom P p e r c e i v e s to have the g r e a t e s t , amount of r e s o u r c e Y, and the s m a l l e s t amount of r e s o u r c e X r e l a t i v e to Y. In the experiments, (red and 1)  green b u t t o n s ) were o p e r a t i o n a l l y d e f i n e d i n two ways:  c o l o u r and  c o l o u r and  of  30 of the o t h e r ( h i g h r e s o u r c e s u b j e c t s ) , or 800' -of one ;  30 of the o t h e r  (low r e s o u r c e  In the P i l o t study, a l l s u b j e c t s had 1200  subjects).  the same t o t a l r e s o u r c e base of  b u t t o n s , i n d i f f e r e n t combinations  value p o s i t i o n s ) .  o f r e d and green  (different  These r e s o u r c e p r o f i l e s are shown i n Appendix IV.  S i n c e the e x p e r i m e n t a l p r e d i c t i o n s f o r these two will  Y  In Set A, some s u b j e c t s had e i t h e r a t o t a l r e s o u r c e base w i t h 1630 one  2)  d i f f e r e n t i a l amounts of r e s o u r c e s X and  sets are d i f f e r e n t ,  we  d i s c u s s each case s e p a r a t e l y . Experimental p r e d i c t i o n  (Set A ) :  A s i g n i f i c a n t l y l a r g e r p r o p o r t i o n of  the i n i t i a t i o n s made to v i s i b l e s w i l l be d i r e c t e d t o h i g h r e s o u r c e  2  visibles.  108  On the f i r s t t r i a l , 80/112 i n i t i a t i o n s were d i r e c t e d to v i s i b l e 3 subjects. The d i r e c t i o n of the i n i t i a t i o n s by b o t h v i s i b l e s and nonvisibles  a r e given i n T a b l e  the i n i t i a t i o n s sent  Table  4.1  4.1.  to v i s i b l e  The t e s t o f t h e h y p o t h e s i s  involves  only  subjects.  Frequencies of I n i t i a t i o n s by Resource L e v e l and V i s i b i l i t y o f I n i t i a t o r , and Resource L e v e l o f V i s i b l e Other (Set A, T r i a l 1)  Initiator  Recipient of I n i t i a t i o n High v i s i b l e Low v i s i b l e Non-visible*  .  Total  High v i s i b l e  18  3  7  28  Low v i s i b l e  13  8  7  28  High NV  16  3  9  28  Low NV  16  3  9  28  Total  63  17  32  112  H : q  Of t o t a l i n i t i a t i o n s  to h i g h v i s i b l e s  *  (n = 80), p r o p o r t i o n o f i n i t i a t i o n s  = proportion of i n i t i a t i o n s  p r o p o r t i o n of i n i t i a t i o n s Z = 6.1 (Z . ent  to v i s i b l e s  to h i g h s was  .79.  t o low v i s i b l e s . Binomial  Obtained  t e s t , one t a i l e d ,  = 1.65, p = .05). R e j e c t H . ' o r  J  High and low n o n - v i s i b l e s looked  the same to i n i t i a t o r s .  Table 4.1 shows t h a t a s i g n i f i c a n t l y  l a r g e r p r o p o r t i o n of i n i -  tiations  t o v i s i b l e s were d i r e c t e d to the h i g h r e s o u r c e  dicted.  Only i n the row f o r low v i s i b l e i n i t i a t o r s i s t h e d i f f e r e n c e not  significant.  Each category  of n o n - v i s i b l e subject  visibles  as p r e -  r e c e i v e d almost t h e same  number o f o f f e r s as the low v i s i b l e s .  The f a c t t h a t some s u b j e c t s  i n i t i a t e to t h e h i g h r e s o u r c e  as expected may simB'ly'b_'lj;e4'due>to'  visibles  d i d not  e r r o r , r e s u l t i n g from the f a i l u r e of the s u b j e c t t o understand t h e f u n c t i o n  109  4 expressed i n the v a l u e c h a r t s . may to  Another p o s s i b i l i t y i s that some s u b j e c t s  have a n t i c i p a t e d the p o p u l a r i t y o f the h i g h v i s i b l e s , and  i n i t i a t e where the u n p o p u l a r i t y of low v i s i b l e s and n o n - v i s i b l e s  expected to guarantee  a h i g h p r o b a b i l i t y of acceptance.  s u i t a b l e data t o t e s t e i t h e r of these i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . t r e n d o f the r e s u l t s does support Hypothesis  the v a l u e to 0 of an increment  We  do not have  However, the main  1 r e s t e d on P's  assessment  of a r e s o u r c e r e l a t i v e to O's  resource  base, the support f o r the f i r s t h y p o t h e s i s g i v e s i n d i r e c t evidence the m a r g i n a l u t i l i t y  m a n i p u l a t i o n was  such a f u n c t i o n , t h e r e was  was  1.  Because the d e r i v a t i o n of Hypothesis of  preferred  on the whole e f f e c t i v e .  that  Without  no reason f o r s u b j e c t s to t h i n k a h i g h r e s o u r c e  person would be any more w i l l i n g to t r a d e than a low r e s o u r c e person. a d d i t i o n , 37% o f i n i t i a t i o n s to h i g h v i s i b l e s asked o f f e r e d , compared w i t h o n l y 23% of o f f e r s to  Experimental p r e d i c t i o n  ( P i l o t set) :  f o r more than  In  they  lows.  A significantly larger  propor-  t i o n of the i n i t i a t i o n s made t o v i s i b l e s w i l l be d i r e c t e d to those wi  5 the g r e a t e s t imbalance  of r e d and green b u t t o n s .  On T r i a l 1, 84/112 o f f e r s were d i r e c t e d to v i s i b l e s . 4.2  Table  shows the d i r e c t i o n of i n i t i a t i o n s made to both v i s i b l e s and  v i s i b l e s , but a g a i n , the t e s t of the h y p o t h e s i s i n v o l v e s o n l y the  nonformer.  110  T a b l e 4.2. F r e q u e n c i e s of I n i t i a t i o n s by Value P o s i t i o n and V i s i b i l i t y o f I n i t i a t o r , and Value P o s i t i o n o f R e c i p i e n t ( T r i a l 1, P i l o t Set)  Recipient of I n i t i a t i o n Unbalanced V i s i b l e Balanced V i s i b l e Non-Visible  Initiator  Total  Unbalanced v i s i b l e  18  6  4  28  Balanced  15  4  9  28  Non-visible*  29  12  15  56  Total  63  22  28  112  H : q  visible  Of t o t a l i n i t i a t i o n s  to unbalanced Obtained  visibles  to v i s i b l e s  (n = 84), p r o p o r t i o n o f i n i t i a t i o n s  = p r o p o r t i o n of i n i t i a t i o n s  p r o p o r t i o n of i n i t i a t i o n s  to unbalanced  to balanced  v i s i b l e s was  visibles. .73.  Bino-  m i a l t e s t , o n e - t a i l e d , Z = 4.8 (Z . = 1.65, p = .05). R e j e c t H . ' ' crit o * N o n - v i s i b l e s combined as no d i f f e r e n c e s i n v a l u e p o s i t i o n s .  The  significantly  h i g h imbalance  g r e a t e r p r o p o r t i o n of o f f e r s to v i s i b l e s w i t h a  of the two c o l o u r s of buttons  extends  t h e support  f o r Hypo-  t h e s i s 1, to the case where s u b j e c t s a l l have the same t o t a l r e s o u r c e b a s e , but d i f f e r e n t  relative  amounts o f X and Y.  Those o f f e r s which were not  made i n the p r e d i c t e d d i r e c t i o n may a g a i n i n d i c a t e v a r i a b l e s u c c e s s o f the m a r g i n a l u t i l i t y m a n i p u l a t i o n , o r an a n t i c i p a t i o n t h a t the p o p u l a r i t y of  the unbalanced  v i s i b l e s would make the o t h e r s u b j e c t s v e r y anxious to  trade. In  a d d i t i o n to the p r e f e r e n c e shown f o r the unbalanced  visibles,  the average number o f b u t t o n s r e q u e s t e d p e r 100 o f f e r e d v a r i e d w i t h t h e  6 v a l u e p o s i t i o n of t h e r e c i p i e n t and i n i t i a t o r .  S u b j e c t s who began n e a r e s t  Ill  to  the optimum of e q u a l numbers of each c o l o u r (those w i t h 850  g r e e n ) , made i n i t i a t i o n s colour  (67) f o r a r e t u r n of 100 buttons  initiations 1100 red  t h a t on average  350  o f f e r e d the fewest b u t t o n s of  one  of the o t h e r c o l o u r , when they made  to p l a y e r s w i t h the l e a s t b a l a n c e d  green and 100  red).  made an average  initiations  red and  resource bases,  S u b j e c t s w i t h a combination  of 900  o f f e r of 82 i n r e t u r n f o r 100 when they  -^to the complementary v i s i b l e , who  O v e r a l l , the o r d e r i n g of the average v i s i b l e <^ n o n - v i s i b l e <^ unbalanced  had  1000  numbereqffered  v i s i b l e ) was  (those w i t h  green and addressed  r e d and  per 100  300  250  asked  green.  (balanced  c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the assump-  t i o n t h a t e q u a l amounts of buttons were v a l u e d d i f f e r e n t l y depending on amounts of each c o l o u r the i n i t i a t o r possessed.  In the comments on  the  the  q u e s t i o n n a i r e , p l a y e r s seemed t o a n t i c i p a t e t h a t s u b j e c t s c l o s e to a b a l a n c e of c o l o u r s would have h i g h e r p r i c e s .  T h i s was  t a t i o n i n f a c t , s i n c e the p l a y e r s w i t h more b a l a n c e d if  they d i d indeed need more b u t t o n s  a reasonable  expec-  r e s o u r c e s a c t e d as  t o b a l a n c e the c o s t to them of  giving 7  some away.  (See Appendix IV f o r other r e s u l t s from the P i l o t  set.)  Advantageous Exchanges  To g a i n more than would be p o s s i b l e on f a i r t r a n s a c t i o n s , a visible  non-  c o u l d o f f e r u n f a i r terms, i h the hope t h a t the r e c i p i e n t would a s -  sume they were f a i r .  A fair  exchange was  d e f i n e d i n Chapter  which b o t h p a r t i e s gained e q u a l p r o f i t s i n v a l u e u n i t s . vantageous exchange i f h i s p r o f i t generous exchange to 0.  exceeded O's,  and  3 as one i n  P o b t a i n e d an  ad-  the r e v e r s e case gave a  The means by which s u b j e c t s c o u l d use the v a l u e  112  chart, together with  i n f o r m a t i o n about t h e s i z e o f r e s o u r c e b a s e s , t o c a l -  c u l a t e p r o f i t s i n v a l u e u n i t s , was d e s c r i b e d i n Chapter 3. For purposes o f p r e s e n t i n g * the r e s u l t s , we d e f i n e an exchange 8  r a t i o as the number o f buttons  o f f e r e d p e r 100 requested.  change r a t i o t e l l s us how many buttons their profits f e r of buttons  t o be e q u a l .  The f a i r ex-  o f one c o l o u r P had t o o f f e r 0 f o r  A f a i r exchange was e q u a l t o a one f o r one t r a n s -  o n l y i f the p a r t n e r s had i d e n t i c a l but complementary  resource  profiles. H y p o t h e s i s 2: I f 0 has o n l y ambiguous i n f o r m a t i o n about P's r e s o u r c e base, and P has unambiguous i n f o r m a t i o n about O's r e s o u r c e b a s e , then P i s more l i k e l y to make an i n i t i a t i o n o f exchange t h a t i s advantageous to P, than when 0 does n o t have unambiguous i n f o r m a t i o n .  F a i r Exchange R a t i o s f o r Set B  At the s t a r t o f the game, low n o n - v i s i b l e s had a s m a l l p i l e o f 50 buttons;  v i s i b l e s had 100 i n t h e i r  150.  The m a r g i n a l  first  opportunity  s m a l l p i l e s , and h i g h n o n - v i s i b l e s had  v a l u e i n c r e a s e o f an increment of 100 b u t t o n s  on t h e  f o r exchange would thus g i v e t h e low n o n - v i s i b l e s more  reward than the o t h e r s .  At the same time, the low n o n - v i s i b l e s ' m a r g i n a l  c o s t s were o n l y s l i g h t l y h i g h e r  than f o r t h e v i s i b l e s and n o n - v i s i b l e s .  Thus, t o be f a i r i n an exchange w i t h a v i s i b l e , a low n o n - v i s i b l e had t o g i v e up more than he requested  (125 f o r 100); on the o t h e r hand, the f a i r  r a t i o between h i g h n o n - v i s i b l e s and v i s i b l e s was 90 f o r 100. 9 ble  p a r t n e r s , an exchange of 100 f o r 100 was f a i r .  Between  visi-  Any r a t i o w i t h a num-  e r a t o r s m a l l e r than t h a t i n the f a i r r a t i o was advantageous t o the i n i t i a t o r .  113  Experimental visibles  prediction:  (who present  A s i g n i f i c a n t l y g r e a t e r p r o p o r t i o n of non-  ambiguous  i n f o r m a t i o n t o Other) , w i l l attempt  advantageous exchanges than w i l l v i s i b l e s u b j e c t s . ' To see whether t h i s p r e d i c t i o n was t r u e i n the experiment, subj e c t s ' exchange r a t i o s were c l a s s i f i e d a c c o r d i n g t o whether they were above (generous),  e q u a l t o , or below  (advantageous) the f a i r r a t i o .  The f a i r and  generous o f f e r s were grouped t o g e t h e r as non-advantageous. the p r o p o r t i o n of advantageous i n i t i a t i o n s  Table 4.3  T a b l e 4.3 shows 10 to v i s i b l e s u b j e c t s .  P r o p o r t i o n s o f Advantageous I n i t i a t i o n s t o V i s i b l e s by V i s i b l e and N o n - v i s i b l e I n i t i a t o r s ( T r i a l 1, Set B) Initiator  H : q  (n)  Nonsyisible  .87  (31)  Visible  .26  (39)  P r o p o r t i o n o f advantageous i n i t i a t i o n s made by v i s i b l e s = p r o p o r t i o n  of advantageous i n i t i a t i o n s made by n o n - v i s i b l e s . t a i l e d , Z = 5.1, (Z . = 1.65, p = .05). crit  Binomial  t e s t , one-  Reject H . o  /  J  On the b a s i s of these d a t a , we would c l a i m s t r o n g support  f o r Hypothesis  2. Because the p o t e n t i a l f o r having by the r e c i p i e n t as ' f a i r ' d i f f e r e d w i l l separate exchange r a t i o  an advantageous o f f e r p e r c e i v e d  f o r the low and h i g h n o n - v i s i b l e s , we  the r e s u l t s f o r Sets B l and B I I .  We have noted  that the f a i r  f o r a t r a n s a c t i o n w i t h a v i s i b l e f o r the low n o n - v i s i b l e s  and h i g h n o n - v i s i b l e s was 125/100, and 90/100, r e s p e c t i v e l y .  D i d they  differ  114  i n t h e i r tendency to make i n i t i a t i o n s which o f f e r e d l e s s than the f a i r amount? T a b l e 4.4 g i v e s the r e s u l t s f o r the h i g h ^ n o n - v i s i b l e s .  T a b l e 4.4  P r o p o r t i o n s o f High N o n - v i s i b l e s and V i s i b l e s Attempting Advantageous Exchanges w i t h V i s i b l e s ( T r i a l \, Set BI) Initiator  H : q  (n)  High n o n - v i s i b l e  .67  (12)  Visible  .21 (19)  p r o p o r t i o n of advantageous i n i t i a t i o n s made by v i s i b l e s = p r o p o r t i o n  of advantageous i n i t i a t i o n s made by h i g h n o n - v i s i b l e s . t a i l e d , Z = 2.55; (Z . = 1.65, p = .05). crxt  Reject H . o  r  Hypothesis  2 i s supported  B i n o m i a l t e s t , one-  J  f o r high n o n - v i s i b l e s .  Note, however,  t h a t a m a j o r i t y (16/28) o f h i g h n o n - v i s i b l e s i n i t i a t e d t o other n o n - v i s i b l e s . Given  t h a t these n o n - v i s i b l e s had t o ask 100 i n r e t u r n f o r an o f f e r of  o n l y 90 to a v i s i b l e , f o r the t r a d e t o be f a i r , i t " i s perhaps not s u r p r i s i n g t h a t so many o f f e r e d t o other n o n - v i s i b l e s . advantageous, o r even a f a i r  The p r o b a b i l i t y o f h a v i n g an  o f f e r accepted by a v i s i b l e may n o t have seemed  h i g h enough, e s p e c i a l l y i f the v i s i b l e s were expected t h e r even t r a d e s o f buttons  t o o f f e r to one ano-  (the f a i r r a t i o i n t h e i r case) .  There was no  v i s i b l e model f o r t h e h i g h n o n - v i s i b l e s t o i m i t a t e which would y i e l d more p r o f i t  them  than t h e i r p a r t n e r , and t h i s aspect o f t h e d e s i g n may have dell  p r e s s e d the r a t e o f i n i t i a t i o n  to v i s i b l e s .  v i s i b l e s who d i d d i r e c t o f f e r s to v i s i b l e s  N e v e r t h e l e s s , those nonl e n d support  t h e i r exchange r a t i o s went below the c o m p a r a t i v e l y change r a t i o o f 90/100.  t o t h e t h e o r y , as  u n a t t r a c t i v e f a i r ex-  115  I t i s more d i f f i c u l t results  to draw c o n c l u s i o n s on the b a s i s of  f o r low n o n - v i s i b l e s (see T a b l e  Table 4.5  4.5).  P r o p o r t i o n s of Low N o n - v i s i b l e s and V i s i b l e s Attempting tageous Exchanges w i t h V i s i b l e s s ( T r i a l 1, Set BII) Initiator Low  o  non-visible  1.00  (19)*  .30  (20)  P r o p o r t i o n of advantageous i n i t i a t i o n s made by v i s i b l e s = p r o p o r t i o n  of advantageous i n i t i a t i o n s made by low n o n - v i s i b l e s . t a i l e d , Z = 4.8, *  Advan-  (n)  Visible H 3?  these  Binomial t e s t ,  one-  . = 1.65, p = .05). Reject H . crit o I n c l u d e s 10 o f f e r s of 100;-: buttons f o r 100 b u t t o n s .  On  (Z  the one hand, they were i n an i d e a l p o s i t i o n  because the f a i r r a t e between v i s i b l e s was  model f o r a t r a d e t h a t was  100  to g a i n advantage,  f o r 100, which p r o v i d e d a 12  to the low n o n - v i s i b l e s ' advantage.  On  the  o t h e r hand, i f the low n o n - v i s i b l e s showed an average exchange r a t i o below 125/100, one  cannot u n c r i t i c a l l y accept  In a game w i t h  'winners'  such as t h i s one,  p l a y e r s would have a r a t i o of 1.25, t h e r e may  'fairly'  s i s t e n t w i t h the p r i n c i p l e else.  i t was  i f i t was t h a t we  f o r the  very u n l i k e l y  even i f they were v i s i b l e .  have been a c e i l i n g on the m a r g i n a l  u n w i l l i n g to a c t  one  t h i s as support  hypothesis. that  any  I t seems  u t i l i t y e f f e c t , with subjects  not i n t h e i r own  favour.  T h i s i s con-  most d i s l i k e i n e q u i t y i f i t favours some-  116  T y p i c a l o f f e r s by  V i s i b i e s s and  In a d d i t i o n  Non-Visibles  to the p r e d i c t i o n of a g r e a t e r  tageous i n i t i a t i o n s by  the n o n - v i s i b l e s , H y p o t h e s i s 2 a l s o i m p l i e s  ' t y p i c a l ' or average i n i t i a t i o n made by change y i e l d i n g more net  profit  f a i r terms.  T h i s measure w i l l  non-visibles  departed from f a i r n e s s .  the  g i v e us an  the two  and  ex-  The  i n d i c a t i o n of the degree to which  T a b l e 4.6  the number a c t u a l l y o f f e r e d .  sub s e t s s are  initiator.  the  other hand, should have proposed  shows the d i f f e r e n c e between  the number t h a t s h o u l d have been o f f e r e d i n r e t u r n 13 trade,  that  them would propose terms of  i n v a l u e u n i t s to the  t y p i c a l i n i t i a t i o n of the v i s i b l e s , on  fair  frequency of advan-  f o r 100  (The  b u t t o n s on  a  data f o r v i s i b l e s i n  combined.)  T a b l e 4.6  F a i r Exchange R a t i o s and Obtained Average Exchange R a t i o s f o r I n i t i a t i o n s to V i s i b l e s , b y - A l l S u b j e c t s ( T r i a l 1, Set B)  Initiator  (n)  H i g h NV  (12)  Visible Low  NV  Interquartile Range  Fair Number  Difference (Obtained-f a i r )  76  (50-100)  90  -14  (39)  96  (83-100)  100  - 4  (19)  85  (67-100)  125  -40  The and  Mean Number offered/100  largest deviations  from f a i r n e s s were made by  t h e i r o f f e r s showed more v a r i a b i l i t y  f i g u r e s cannot p'roperlyrbe  the  than those made by v i s i b l e s .  low  These  g i v e n a r a t i o or i n t e r v a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , but  they p r o v i d e an i n d i c a t i o n of the magnitude of the d e v i a t i o n s The  non-visibles,  average exchange r a t i o of the  low  non-visibles  seems  involved. consistent  w i t h the argument many were a t t e m p t i n g to take advantage of the  covers,  and  117  making o f f e r s t h a t would be assumed to be f a i r by the r e c i p i e n t . it  However,  i s not p o s s i b l e t o know whether the low n o n - v i s i b l e s would have o f f e r e d  more than they requested, had t h e i r r e s o u r c e s been v i s i b l e , when to do so 14 would have made winning  i n the game as a whole i m p o s s i b l e .  S u b j e c t s c o u l d not t e l l what c o n s t i t u t e d a f a i r exchange i f they initiated average  to a n o n - v i s i b l e .  T a b l e 4.7 shows t h a t n o n - v i s i b l e s were on  more generous i n t h e i r i n i t i a t i o n s  to o t h e r n o n - v i s i b l e s , w h i l e  the exchange r a t i o s of the v i s i b l e s were e s s e n t i a l l y initiated  to v i s i b l e s  the same as when they  (94/100 to n o n - v i s i b l e s , compared w i t h --96/100 t o  visibles). T a b l e 4.7  Average Exchange R a t i o s f o r I n i t i a t i o n s 1, Set  Initiator  (n)  High NV  (16)  99  ( 91-100)  Visible  (17)  94  (100-105)  Low NV  ( 9)  91  ( 74-100)  Note:  B)  Mean Number Offered/100  (Trial  Interquartile Range  R e s u l t s from Set A r e l e v a n t t o Hypothesis 15 Appendix V.  Because of the ambiguity  to N o n - V i s i b l e s  2 are g i v e n i n T a b l e A.6,  of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n f o r the i n i t i a t i o n s  from low n o n - v i s i b l e s noted above ( i . e . , a l l of them sent t e c h n i c a l l y advantageous o f f e r s ) , i t i s of i n t e r e s t t o know whether they p e r c e i v e d t h e r e to be an advantage i n h a v i n g covers over t h e i r  buttons.  118  P e r c e i v e d Advantage i n C o n c e a l i n g  Resources  Hypothesis 3: I n the e a r l y stages o f i n t e r a c t i o n , persons who have the o p p o r t u n i t y t o c o n c e a l t h e i r r e s o u r c e bases and v a l u e p o s i t i o n s w i l l p e r c e i v e such concealment to be an advantage. Experimental p r e d i c t i o n s :  We make t h r e e e x p e r i m e n t a l p r e d i c t i o n s f o r  H y p o t h e s i s 3: 1)  More n o n - v i s i b l e s w i l l s t a t e on q u e s t i o n n a i r e s on T r i a l  1 that  p e r c e i v e t h e r e t o be an advantage i n h a v i n g a cover over t h e i r  they  buttons  than w i l l p e r c e i v e covers t o be a d i s a d v a n t a g e . 2)  Non-visibles w i l l  tunity  choose t o r e t a i n the covers i f g i v e n t h e oppor-  to remove them.  3)  N o n - v i s i b l e s w i l l make e s t i m a t e s of t h e p r o b a b i l i t y of acceptance  for  their initiations  bles.  This w i l l  that a r e n o t lower than e s t i m a t e s made by v i s i -  i n d i c a t e t h a t they do n o t t h i n k t h e covers w i l l  fere with t h e i r a b i l i t y In the t h e o r y .  inter-  to make exchanges.  a sense, H y p o t h e s i s  3 i s a checkson  the scope c o n d i t i o n s of  I n a d d i t i o n i t does make the p r e d i c t i o n t h a t n o n - v i s i b l e s  will  s y n t h e s i z e t h e i r d e s i r e to maximise a g a i n , w i t h the o t h e r ' s i n a b i l i t y t o guage n o n - v i s i b l e s ' p r i c e s , and a r r i v e a t the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t c o u l d be used t o advantage.  Hypothesis  3 i s not ' b u i l t  i n ' t o the experiment  i n the same way t h a t the scope c o n d i t i o n s and assumptions  are.  c o u l d j u s t as e a s i l y have p e r c e i v e d the covers as a h i n d r a n c e 1.  Q u e s t i o n n a i r e responses  concealment  Subjects (as some d i d ) .  d e s c r i b i n g advantages o f covers when  s u b j e c t s had d i f f e r e n c e s i n r e s o u r c e base (Set A ) :  I n these  experiments,  only 48 o f t h e 56 s u b j e c t s were asked i f they c o n s i d e r e d the covers t o be an advantage o r disadvantage.  Of t h e s e , 63% ( o r 30/48) s a i d e i t h e r t h a t the  119  covers were an advantage, or t h a t they were more of an advantage than disadvantage. 3.22).  T h i s p r o p o r t i o n i s s i g n i f i c a n t l y g r e a t e r than 0.5  (Z =  Comments on the q u e s t i o n n a i r e mentioned advantages such a s :  can manipulate hoarding  o t h e r s by  the s i z e of my  o f f e r s ; no one  a  "I  can see t h a t I  up or g e t t i n g ahead;' other n o n - v i s i b l e s a r e easy  am  to trade w i t h  as  they get fewer o f f e r s ; I can o f f e r l e s s f o r more; I can compete b e t t e r i f the other guy  does not know my  profits."  A s u b s t a n t i a l m i n o r i t y saw of the reasons  c i t e d were:  the covers to be a disadvantage.  " I have t o make good o f f e r s to get  Some  accepted;  o t h e r s are a f r a i d of c o v e r s ; people p r e f e r to d e a l w i t h those they know; o t h e r s don't t r u s t p l a y e r s w i t h c o v e r s ; o t h e r s are a t t r a c t e d to a l a r g e pile." Of the 30 s u b j e c t s who 14) made i n i t i a t i o n s t r a s t , o n l y 11% made such  saw  the c o v e r s as an advantage, 47%  a s k i n g f o r more buttons  (2/18) of the s u b j e c t s who  than they o f f e r e d .  saw  the covers as a  (or  In condisadvantage  offers. I t i s not p o s s i b l e to d e c i d e from the data whether s u b j e c t s  claimed advantage i n covered d i d not  r e s o u r c e s M l e d to see the d i s a d v a n t a g e s ,  who or  f e e l they were l a r g e enough to outweigh the advantages. When v i s i b l e s had same r e s o u r c e p r o f i l e s  these experiments were asked  (Set B ) :  to d e s c r i b e both advantages and  Subjects i n disadvantages  of c o v e r s , so t h a t i t i s not p o s s i b l e to compare f r e q u e n c i e s of s u b j e c t s 17 saw  mainly  one  o r the o t h e r .  comments made c o n c e r n i n g A.8  i n Appendix  V.)  However, we  the c o v e r s .  who  can summarize the most f r e q u e n t  (These are l i s t e d i n T a b l e s A.7  and  120  Although of the responses  i t was  difficult  to make an unambiguous  classification  to the open-ended q u e s t i o n about the c o v e r s , t h e r e d i d  appear to be two main advantages p e r c e i v e d : a) were.  Others were unable  to assess how  Others were t h e r e f o r e expected  'hard up'  the n o n - v i s i b l e s  to ask f o r l e s s , and be f o r c e d i n t o  g i v i n g more to a n o n - v i s i b l e than they s h o u l d i n a f a i r t r a d e .  (Subjects  used words, l i k e b l u f f i n g , f o o l i n g o t h e r s , p l a y i n g hard  forcing  up b i d s . )  to get,  T h i s advantage f o c u s s e d on the comparison of p r o f i t s on a p a r -  t i c u l a r exchange. b) of p r o g r e s s and  Others were unable toward b a l a n c e .  to the f a c t  not stop  t h a t Others  t o t e l l how  n o n - v i s i b l e s stood i n terms  ( S u b j e c t s r e f e r r e d to t h e i r rank i n the game, c o u l d not see a n o n - v i s i b l e b a l a n c i n g , and  could  him.) While both of these reasons  are r e l a t e d to the s i z e of the r e -  source base, some s u b j e c t s seemed to take a view of the whole experiment i n a s s e s s i n g who  they c o u l d  'beat'  p e c t s of the s i t u a t i o n , and  (reason b ) .  T h i s focused on end-game a s -  to a c e r t a i n e x t e n t , worked i n a d i f f e r e n t  than the advantages c i t e d i n reason a.  That  i s , over  way  the e n t i r e game, low  n o n - v i s i b l e s c o u l d a f f o r d to g i v e up l e a s t , b e i n g f u r t h e s t behind  in total  r e s o u r c e s , and h i g h n o n - v i s i b l e s c o u l d a f f o r d more, h a v i n g a l e a d i n t o t a l r e s o u r c e s of 200 on t h e i r n e a r e s t v i s i b l e opponent. visibles  l i s t e d no  non-  advantages.)  Of the n o n - v i s i b l e s l i s t i n g disadvantages 75%)  (Only 5/56  a g r e a t many s t a t e d t h a t others would  t a n t to t r a d e w i t h n o n - v i s i b l e s .  i n covers  (approximately  ' f e a r the unknown' and be  The p r e f e r e n c e to r e t a i n the c o v e r s  reluc(Table  121  4.8)  would then seem to i n d i c a t e t h a t the advantages outweighed the  advantages,  dis-  a t l e a s t a t t h i s p o i n t i n the game.  V i s i b l e s ' views of h a v i n g t h e i r buttons mented those of n o n - v i s i b l e s .  out i n the open comple-  They focused on the n e g a t i v e aspect t h a t o t h e r s  c o u l d take advantage of knowing the v i s i b l e s ' need, and t h a t b e i n g v i s i b l e p r e v e n t e d them from b l u f f i n g ,  or  ' g e t t i n g away' w i t h a good d e a l .  most f r e q u e n t l y c i t e d advantage f o r the v i s i b l e s was of  The-;  t h a t they were ensured  i n i t i a t i o n s from o t h e r s . In sum,  the p r e d i c t e d advantage of covers was  of both v i s i b l e and n o n - v i s i b l e s u b j e c t s . t h a t p r o f i t was effect  T h i s g i v e s us f u r t h e r  b e i n g a s s e s s e d r e l a t i v e t o r e s o u r c e base.  t h a t Others  i n comments confidence  Comments to the  c o u l d not assess a f a i r p r i c e w i t h a n o n - v i s i b l e ,  r e f e r e n c e t o the a b i l i t y of those w i t h a l o t of buttons not make sense o u t s i d e the context of a m a r g i n a l u t i l i t y 2.  reflected  P r e f e r e n c e f o r r e t a i n i n g the c o v e r s :  vant to the t e s t of Hypothesis  3 i s the response  and  to pay more, would function.  The n e x t measure r e l e -  to a q u e s t i o n a s k i n g each  n o n - v i s i b l e s u b j e c t whether he would l i k e to have the cover removed  from  18 h i s buttons  on T r i a l 3.  I f the covers were not seen as an advantage,  would expect a l a r g e p r o p o r t i o n of s u b j e c t s to want the c o v e r s removed. T a b l e 4.8  shows t h a t t h i s was  not the c a s e .  V i s i b l e s were asked  would l i k e the covers removed from a l l the n o n - v i s i b l e s .  i f they  one  122  Table  4.8  P r o p o r t i o n of V i s i b l e s and ^ N o n - v i s i b l e s who P r e f e r r e d to Ret a i n Covers on Resource P i l e s of N o n - v i s i b l e s ( T r i a l 1, Set B)  Subject  P r o p o r t i o n Wanting Covers L e f t On  High NV  .93  (28)  Low  .79  (28)  .41  (56)  NV  Visible Q@  = 25.26, d.f. = 2,- p <  (n)  .001)  I t should be noted t h a t the r e l a t i v e l y lower p e r c e n t a g e of n o n - v i s i b l e s who  wanted to r e t a i n t h e i r covers  n o n - v i s i b l e s ) i s not  consistent with  'read as f a i r ' . 19  p r o p o r t i o n i n favour of covers is s t i l l v e r y results  93%  f o r high  the view t h a t the lows were i n the  b e s t p o s i t i o n to have advantageous o f f e r s  The  (79% v e r s u s  low  high.  from Set A were very s i m i l a r to those  that more n o n - v i s i b l e s wanted the covers  However, the  off.  above, except  On T r i a l 1, 8/28  n o n - v i s i b l e s , and  9/28  have t h e i r covers  removed i f g i v e n the o p p o r t u n i t y . 20  of the  high  of the low n o n - v i s i b l e s s a i d they would choose to At t h a t time, no  o f f e r s had been d e l i v e r e d to anyone. 3.  Perceived  l i k e l i h o o d of a c c e p t a n c e :  v i s i b l e s were aware t h a t v i s i b l e s would be  Although many  non-  c o n s i d e r e d more d e s i r a b l e ex-  change p a r t n e r s , the n o n - v i s i b l e s d i d not seem to b e l i e v e they would in their i n i t i a t i o n s .  On  the f i r s t  f i v e p o i n t s c a l e , from  'extremely l i k e l y ' to  q u e s t i o n n a i r e , s u b j e c t s i n d i c a t e d on a 'not at a l l l i k e l y ' ,  c e i v e d p r o b a b i l i t y of acceptance of the o f f e r they had 4.9  shows the p r o p o r t i o n s  fail  of s u b j e c t s who  the 21  j u s t made.  checked each of the f i v e  per-  Table categories.  123  T a b l e 4.8  ^ I n i t i a t o r s ' E v a l u a t i o n of L i k e l i h o o d t h a t T h e i r O f f e r s Would be Accepted ( T r i a l 1, Set B)  L i k e l i h o o d of O f f e r B e i n g Accepted Extremely  A l l Types of O f f e r s Visible* High NV Low NV  likely  Advantageous O f f e r s * * Visible High NV Low NV  .07  .07  .07  .07  Or  likely  .52  .61  •57  .23  .69  .50  50-50 chance  .39  .29  .32  .62  .23  .36  Not very l i k e l y Not at a l l ' 1 i \ Not a t a l l l i k e l y  .02  .04  .04  .08  .08  .05  0  0  0  0  Or' '  0  56  28  28  15  13  22  2  2  2  3  2  2  Quite  Total  (n)  Median c a t e g o r y  .09  :  *  V i s i b l e s . S ' from s e t s BI and BII are combined.  **  Advantageous i n i t i a t i o n s i n c l u d e those d e f i n e d as advantageous to v i s i b l e s , and i n i t i a t i o n s to n o n - v i s i b l e s which s i m p l y ask f o r more than they o f f e r e d .  We  can see i n the t a b l e above t h a t n o n - v i s i b l e s were j u s t as  o p t i m i s t i c as the v i s i b l e s visibles  t h a t t h e i r o f f e r s would be a c c e p t e d .  a l s o e s t i m a t e d h i g h e r p r o b a b i l i t i e s of acceptance  which asked f o r more than they o f f e r e d visibles). included  that  for initiations  (median c a t e g o r y 2, v e r s u s 3 f o r  There were few d i f f e r e n c e s by  i n t a b l e ) , except  t a r g e t of the i n i t i a t i o n  the h i g h n o n - v i s i b l e s  tended  for targets  We  do not have f o r comparison  they d i d not choose.  the s u b j e c t s '  by an Other, u n l e s s they chose to i n i t i a t e to  estimates  Although  un-  acceptance  him.  O v e r a l l , the e v i d e n c e from the two s e t s of experiments 3.  estimated  P i l o t work showed t h a t s u b j e c t s were  w i l l i n g or unable to make s e r i o u s e s t i m a t e s of the l i k e l i h o o d o f  s i s t e n t with Hypothesis  (not  to g i v e  h i g h e r p r o b a b i l i t i e s of acceptance by a v i s i b l e t a r g e t , than was by o t h e r i n i t i a t o r s .  Non-  i t c o u l d be c l a i m e d t h a t  i s con-  f o r c i n g the  124  s u b j e c t s t o have covers  d i d n o t mean they wanted them, t h e i r  comments, and  22 d e s i r e to r e t a i n the c o v e r s , g i v e s l i t t l e  support  f o r such a c l a i m .  P r e f e r e n c e f o r I n f o r m a t i o n about Exchange P a r t n e r  While the n o n - v i s i b l e s d i d n o t a n t i c i p a t e a s m a l l e r chance o f h a v i n g t h e i r i n i t i a t i o n s a c c e p t e d , t h e theory p r e d i c t s t h a t t h e r e would be a p r e f e r e n c e by a l l s u b j e c t s f o r v i s i b l e s . Hypothesis 4: Members of a group a r e more l i k e l y t o d i r e c t t h e i r i n i t i a t i o n s of exchange t o persons whose r e s o u r c e bases and v a l u e p o s i t i o n s a r e known through unambiguous i n f o r m a t i o n . Experimental  predictions:  The o p e r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of the f o u r t h hypo-  t h e s i s simply i m p l i e s t h a t v i s i b l e s u b j e c t s w i l l g r e a t e r p r o p o r t i o n of i n i t i a t i o n s 23  receive a  o f exchange than w i l l  significantly  the non-  visibles. R e s u l t s when v i s i b l e s  a l l have same s i z e d r e s o u r c e base (Set B ) :  In Set B, a l l v i s i b l e s u b j e c t s had the same r e s o u r c e bases and v a l u e t i o n s , two w i t h predominantly green b u t t o n s .  r e d p i l e s , and two w i t h a predominance o f  The p r o p o r t i o n o f i n i t i a t i o n s  ments, e s p e c i a l l y  posi-  to v i s i b l e s  those made by o t h e r v i s i b l e s ,  i n these e x p e r i -  allows a t e s t  o f Hypothe-  24 s i s 4 unconfounded by a p r e f e r e n c e f o r h i g h r e s o u r c e p l a y e r s .  The p r o -  p o r t i o n s o f o f f e r s to v i s i b l e and n o n - v i s i b l e s u b j e c t s a r e shown i n T a b l e 4.10.  125  T a b l e 4.10 • P r o p o r t i o n s  of I n i t i a t i o n s  to V i s i b l e s  ( T r i a l 1, Set B)  SET BI Initiator  ( ) n  Visible  .68  (28)  High NV  .43  (28)  1H : q  Proportion  tiations  received  of i n i t i a t i o n s  r e c e i v e d by v i s i b l e s  by h i g h n o n - v i s i b l e s .  = proportion  Binomial t e s t ,  of i n i -  one-tailed:  for  a l l i n i t i a t o r s , Z = .9, (Z . = 1 . 6 5 , p = .05). R e t a i n H . F o r i n i t i a crit o t i o n s by v i s i b l e s , Z = 1.89, p <^ .05; f o r high n o n - v i s i b l e s , Z = .56. n.s.  SET BII Initiator  (n)  Visible  .71  (28),,.  Non-visible  .68  (28X..  2H : q  Proportion  tiations all  of i n i t i a t i o n s  r e c e i v e d by v i s i b l e s  r e c e i v e d by low n o n - v i s i b l e s .  i n i t i a t o r s , Z = 2.9, (Z . crit  =1.65).  = proportion  Binomial t e s t , Reject  of i n i -  one-tailed:  for  2H . o  H y p o t h e s i s 4 i s supported f o r a l l v i s i b l e i n i t i a t o r s , and f o r low non-visible i n i t i a t o r s . and  High n o n - v i s i b l e s , however, d i d not p r e f e r  showed a n o n - s i g n i f i c a n t  tendency to choose n o n - v i s i b l e s .  I t has been noted t h a t the c l e a r e s t t e s t provided  by the data f o r v i s i b l e i n i t i a t o r s .  of Hypothesis  t h a t the e x p e r i m e n t a l d e s i g n was at l e a s t  negative results  f o r the h i g h  non-visibles.  w  a  s  ;TThe s l i g h t v a r i a t i o n s i n the  r e s o u r c e bases and v a l u e p o s i t i o n s of the n o n - v i s i b l e s pect  visibles,  partly  leads  us to s u s -  responsible  f o r the  126  R e c a l l t h a t the h i g h n o n - v i s i b l e s had 150 b u t t o n s .  f o r one  t r a d e of buttons  (which was  of  the f a i r  price  i n a t r a d e between two v i s i b l e s ) , the h i g h n o n - v i s i b l e s r e c e i v e d a  lower  profit  In a one  a small resource p i l e  than t h e i r p a r t n e r s , due to t h e i r l a r g e r m a r g i n a l reward.  In terms  of the c h o i c e model, the v a l u e of an o f f e r a c c e p t a b l e to a v i s i b l e would have had  lower expected p r o f i t  f o r the n o n - v i s i b l e than he would  like;  but  f o r the n o n - v i s i b l e t o get a r e a s o n a b l e p r o f i t , he would have had  ask  f o r more than he o f f e r e d , and r i s k a h i g h e r p r o b a b i l i t y of  E i t h e r way,  the expected  rejection.  v a l u e of such an exchange would compare p o o r l y  w i t h the u n c e r t a i n n o n - v i s i b l e p a r t n e r s , who 25 be u n d e s i r a b l e .  Although  were not known c e r t a i n l y  to the c l a i m t h a t s u b j e c t s c a l c u l a t e d  fits  bases.  due  to  unexpected, the r e s u l t s f o r the i n i t i a t i o n s  these n o n - v i s i b l e s l e n d support r e l a t i v e to t h e i r r e s o u r c e Low  to  n o n - v i s i b l e s i n these experiments  were i n a d i f f e r e n t  to t h e i r very s m a l l non-predominant r e s o u r c e p i l e .  of  pro-  position  From the p o i n t of  view of the t h e o r y , they were i n an i d e a l p o s i t i o n to g a i n advantage by trading with v i s i b l e s .  A one  f o r one  the low n o n - v i s i b l e a h i g h e r p r o f i t likely  swap of buttons w i t h a v i s i b l e  gave  than h i s p a r t n e r , and y e t would seem  to be a c c e p t e d , because i t would compare w e l l w i t h o f f e r s between  visibles.  With t h i s a t t r a c t i v e p o t e n t i a l t r a n s a c t i o n a v a i l a b l e , the  n o n - v i s i b l e s would have l i t t l e  low  reason to r i s k the u n c e r t a i n t y of a t r a d e w i t h  a non-visible. The p r e f e r e n c e of v i s i b l e s support  f o r o t h e r v i s i b l e s i s encouraging  f o r the t h e o r y , because, i n t h e i r case, v i s i b l e and n o n - v i s i b l e  127  t a r g e t s were most l i k e l y  to be c o n s i d e r e d e q u i v a l e n t , except  b i g u i t y of i n f o r m a t i o n a v a i l a b l e about t h e i r r e s o u r c e s . were t o l d some v i s i b l e s had more, and  f o r the  (The  some l e s s , but t h e r e was  am-  visibles no way  of  t e l l i n g which p l a y e r s had which.) O v e r a l l , i n experiments w i t h t h i s paradigm  P i l o t work, and more r e c e n t work conducted found  (Sets A and B, 26  in Australia),  the  i t has been  t h a t the p r o p o r t i o n s o f i n i t i a t i o n s to v i s i b l e s on the i n i t i a l  change o p p o r t u n i t y f a l l  c o n s i s t e n t l y between 68%  and  75%, w i t h  ex-  the s o l e  e x c e p t i o n of the h i g h n o n - v i s i b l e s i n Set B l . Initiations  to V i s i b l e s when they have D i f f e r e n t S i z e d Resource Bases  The lar  r e s u l t s from Set A r e l e v a n t to Hypothesis  to those from Set B.  Although  p r e f e r e n c e f o r v i s i b l e s , was  w i t h the p r e f e r e n c e f o r h i g h r e s o u r c e persons, we  from the f i r s t  to the second t r i a l ,  change from p a r t n e r s of one The i n T a b l e 4.11 Table 4.11  Initiator  r e s o u r c e l e v e l to  simi-  confounded  g i v e the r e s u l t s from Set  A h e r e , to show t h a t the v i s i b l e i n i t i a t o r s maintained visibles  4 were v e r y  a preference f o r  even though they tended  to  another.  gross c a t e g o r i e s of i n i t i a t i o n s on T r i a l s 1 and  2 are g i v e n  below.  P r o p o r t i o n s of O f f e r s to V i s i b l e s Made by V i s i b l e s and v i s i b l e s ( T r i a l s 1 and 2, Set A) Trial 1  (n)  Trial 2  Non-  (n)  Visible  .75  ( 56)  .75  ( 56)  Non-visible  .68  ( 56)  .45  ( 57)*  Total  .71  (112)  .60  (111)  128  T a b l e 4.11 *  (Continued)  One n o n - v i s i b l e made no o f f e r on T r i a l 2.  H : q  Proportion  non-visibles. Z = 4.54,  of i n i t i a t i o n s One-tailed  to v i s i b l e s  = proportions  of i n i t i a t i o n s  t e s t f o r d i f f e r e n c e of p r o p o r t i o n s ,  (Z . = 1.65, p = .05). crxt  Reject J  to  T r i a l 1:  H . o  The i n i t i a t i o n s made on the second t r i a l were not independent of the o f f e r s and acceptances on T r i a l 1. the v i s i b l e s  continued  I t i s c l e a r , however, t h a t w h i l e  to d i r e c t the m a j o r i t y  b l e s , n o n - v i s i b l e s made a change to other  o f t h e i r o f f e r s to the v i s i 28  non-visibles.  We noted i n the d i s c u s s i o n of H y p o t h e s i s 1 t h a t the m a j o r i t y o f initiations bles.  to v i s i b l e s  on T r i a l 1 i n Set A were sent  to h i g h  resource  visi-  Due to the r u l e that each p e r s o n c o u l d a c c e p t o n l y one o f f e r / t r i a l ,  some s u b j e c t s were bound to have t h e i r o f f e r s turned  down.  Though  these  data a r e more r e l e v a n t to a c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f Hypothesis 5, we w i l l show the p a t t e r n of acceptances on T r i a l 1, as they h e l p t i o n of T r i a l 2 i n i t i a t i o n s . visibles  had a h i g h e r  T a b l e 4.12  to e x p l a i n the d i r e c -  T a b l e 4.12 shows that i n i t i a t i o n s made by  r a t e of acceptance.  Acceptance of R e a l O f f e r s  ( T r i a l 1, Set A)  Initiator  R e c i p i e n t ( P r o p o r t i o n of I n i t i a t i o n s Accepted of Number Received) il V 62. "  Visible  .62  (26/42)  .86  (12/14)  .68  (38/56)  Non-visible  .26  (10/38)  .77  (14/18)  .43  (24/56)  Total  129  T a b l e 4.12 (Continued) lH :  Proportions  o  proportion  of i n i t i a t i o n s  tailed  test  Reject  IH . o  J  2H : Q  of i n i t i a t i o n s  from v i s i b l e s  from n o n - v i s i b l e s  f o r d i f f e r e n c e of proportions,  Proportions  of i n i t i a t i o n s  of i n i t i a t i o n s  tailed  f o r d i f f e r e n c e of p r o p o r t i o n s  test  their  tiations  next o f f e r s ?  One-  = 1.65, p = .05)  accepted by n o n - v i s i b l e s = One-  gives n o n - s i g n i f i c a n t  difference.  reijectionn of n o n - v i s i b l e s '  initiations  T a b l e 4.13 shows t h e d i f f e r e n t  on T r i a l 2 i n more  T a b l e 4.13  Z = 3.3, (Z . crit  =  from n o n - v i s i b l e s a c c e p t e d by n o n - v i s i b l e s .  How d i d t h e more frequent affect  accepted by v i s i b l e s .  from v i s i b l e s  proportions  a c c e p t e d by v i s i b l e s  pattern  of i n i -  detail.  Frequency of I n i t i a t i o n s t o V i s i b l e s and N o n - v i s i b l e s , by V i s i b l e and N o n - v i s i b l e I n i t i a t o r s ( T r i a l 2, Set A)  Recipient Low V i s i b l e  Non-visible*  8  12  8  15  7  6  6  7  15  Low NV**  _8  4  15  Total  37  30  44  Initiator High v i s i b l e Low v i s i b l e High NV  High V i s i b l e  *  Non-visible level.  r e c i p i e n t s c o u l d n o t be d i s t i n g u i s h e d i n terms o f r e s o u r c e  **  One low n o n - v i s i b l e made no o f f e r  on T r i a l 2.  130  The within their was  fact own  t h a t the v i s i b l e s  resource l e v e l s  a more important  i n i t i a t e to v i s i b l e s ,  Of those  twice as many switched to a d i f f e r e n t Most of those who  visibility  c o n t i n u e d to visible,  were r e j e c t e d by  c o n t i n u e d to i n i t i a t e to a v i s i b l e ,  visibles  as  visibles  changed to the  visible. The  data from the f i r s t  support Hypothesis ted  to exchange  by T r i a l 2 would i n d i c a t e t h a t  were accepted on T r i a l 1, and who  s t a y e d w i t h the same person.  other  themselves  f a c t o r to them than r e s o u r c e l e v e l .  whose o f f e r s to v i s i b l e s  on T r i a l 1, but s t i l l  d i d not r e s t r i c t  to v i s i b l e s  4.  The  trial,  failure  on the second  and f o r the v i s i b l e s  2,  of n o n - v i s i b l e s to i n i t i a t e as p r e d i c -  t r i a l seemed to be due t o t h e i r  complete t r a n s a c t i o n s w i t h v i s i b l e s  on T r i a l  on t r i a l  1.  failure  We w i l l r e t u r n to  to  this  p o i n t below. Did a s u b j e c t had  the p r e f e r e n c e to accept i n i t i a t i o n s two  identical  i n i t i a t i o n s , one  from v i s i b l e s  h o l d when  from a v i s i b l e , and one  from  a n o n - v i s i b l e source? Hypothesis 5: I f a member has a c h o i c e of i n i t i a t i o n s from two o t h e r s , P^ and P2> and the i n i t i a t i o n s a r e i d e n t i c a l w i t h r e s p e c t to the absol u t e amount of r e s o u r c e s o f f e r e d and r e q u e s t e d , then i f the r e c i p i e n t has unambiguous i n f o r m a t i o n about P^'s r e s o u r c e base, and ambiguous i n f o r m a t i o n about P2*s r e s o u r c e b a s e , he w i l l be more l i k e l y to a c cept the i n i t i a t i o n from P^. Experimental p r e d i c t i o n :  I f Hypothesis  c a n t l y g r e a t e r p r o p o r t i o n of the f a l s e come from v i s i b l e s offer  5 is valid,  then a  o f f e r s which are b e l i e v e d to  w i l l be a c c e p t e d , i n p r e f e r e n c e to the  which the r e c i p i e n t  t h i n k s has  signifi-  identical  come from a n o n - v i s i b l e .  131  Acceptance of o f f e r s when s i z e and s o u r c e o f o f f e r c o n t r o l l e d : (Set B ) :  In Set B l , only n o n - v i s i b l e s u b j e c t s 29  t i o n s on T r i a l 1.  In Set B I I , a l l s u b j e c t s  received received  two bogus  two f a l s e o f f e r s .  For c l a r i t y of d i s c u s s i o n , the two s u b j e c t s w i l l . b e d e a l t w i t h All  initia-  separately.  f a l s e i n i t i a t i o n s asked f o r 110 b u t t o n s , i n r e t u r n f o r 100 o f f e r e d . T a b l e 4.14 shows the p r o p o r t i o n s  of o f f e r s from v i s i b l e s and  non-visibles  accepted by the h i g h n o n - v i s i b l e s .  subjects  r e j e c t e d b o t h o f f e r s were d i v i d e d e q u a l l y between the v i s i b l e  and  who  non-visible categories,  To c a l c u l a t e s i g n i f i c a n c e ,  as t h e r e was no evidence of a p r e f e r e n c e be-  tween the two i n the case o f double r e j e c t i o n s . T a b l e 4.14  Acceptance o f F a l s e O f f e r s by High N o n - v i s i b l e s  O f f e r Accepted From  H : Q  Proportion  Accepted  Visible  .46  Non-visible  .39  Neither  .15  Total  (28)  Proportion  (n)  accepting  v i s i b l e s = proportion  accepting  B i n o m i a l t e s t , Z = .19, (Z • . = 1.65, p = .05) . ' crit  i (Set B l )  non-visibles.  Retain H . o  The n e g a t i v e r e s u l t s f o r the h i g h n o n - v i s i b l e s  c o u l d be seen i n  the same l i g h t as the data f o r H y p o t h e s i s 4, i n which a m a j o r i t y non-visibles  i n i t i a t e d to n o n - v i s i b l e s .  To o b t a i n  of h i g h  a f a i r deal with^a  visi-  b l e , n o n - v i s i b l e s had t o r e c e i v e more from the v i s i b l e than they gave up,  132  and  the f a l s e i n i t i a t i o n s  n o n - v i s i b l e s who  asked them to do the r e v e r s e of t h i s .  r e j e c t e d v i s i b l e s r e f e r r e d to a d e s i r e not  v i s i b l e s have an advantage.  6/11  high  to l e t the  However, the f a c t t h a t the p r o p o r t i o n s  of  acceptance of both v i s i b l e and n o n - v i s i b l e s i s so s i m i l a r , does not  allow  a clear interpretation. In Table  4.15, we  see  t h a t the p a t t e r n of acceptances of  f a l s e i n i t i a t i o n s by low n o n - v i s i b l e r e c i p i e n t s was  different.  the  Again,  the double r e j e c t i o n s were t r e a t e d as g i v i n g no i n f o r m a t i o n f o r or a g a i n s t 30  the  hypothesis.  T a b l e 4.15  Acceptance of F a l s e O f f e r s by V i s i b l e s and Low (Set BII)  P r o p o r t i o n Accepted By Visible Low N o n - v i s i b l e  O f f e r Accepted From Visible  .54  Low  .18  non-visible  Neither 1H : Q  Non-visibles  .61 .  .28  P r o p o r t i o n of v i s i b l e s  .14 .25  accepting v i s i b l e s = proportion accepting  non-  visibles . 2H : q  P r o p o r t i o n of low n o n - v i s i b l e s a c c e p t i n g v i s i b l e s = p r o p o r t i o n  ing n o n - v i s i b l e s . Z = 2.17,  (^ ^ C R  The  T  One-tailed binomial  = 1-65, p = . 0 5 ) .  accept-  t e s t ; f o r 1H  , Z = 2.05; f o r 2H , o o' R e j e c t both n u l l hypotheses.  h i g h r a t e s of double r e j e c t i o n s shown i n T a b l e  4.15  gives  an  i n d i c a t i o n that t h e r e i s a l i m i t to the assumption that P w i l l e n t e r i n t o an exchange so l o n g as he makes a p o s i t i v e p r o f i t .  (In t h i s case,  the  a r i s e s both from the a n t i c i p a t i o n that t h e r e w i l l be w i n n e r s , and  limit  that i t i s  133  not n e c e s s a r y to s e t t l e were requested.) the f a l s e  f o r t r a n s a c t i o n s t h a t o f f e r e d fewer buttons  N e v e r t h e l e s s , a m a j o r i t y of s u b j e c t s d i d a c c e p t one o f  initiations.  Because an o f f e r  of 100 f o r 110 from a v i s i b l e  r e a s o n a b l e i n terms of the f a i r exchange r a t i o  between v i s i b l e s  For  s o u r c e , which might be g i v i n g them l e s s p r o f i t  was  and low  n o n - v i s i b l e s , the l a t t e r had no reason to r i s k a c c e p t i n g an o f f e r visible  than  from a non-  than t h e i r p a r t n e r .  these s u b j e c t s , the p r o p o r t i o h o f o f f e r s a c c e p t e d from v i s i b l e s  was the  h i g h e s t i n Set B. Acceptance trolled : cipient  of o f f e r s when s i z e  (Set A and Set B l ) ;  and s o u r c e o f i n i t i a t i o n not con-  R e a l o f f e r s were g i v e n t o the i n t e n d e d r e -  i n Set A on T r i a l 1, and t o the v i s i b l e s  i n Set B l .  Hypothesis 2 c l a i m e d t h a t n o n - v i s i b l e s would make more o f f e r s asked f o r g r e a t e r p r o f i t for v i s i b l e s ,  1.  received  o f f e r s from v i s i b l e  In Set A, where v i s i b l e  a significantly 31 visibles,  to themselves; i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h the p r e f e r e n c e  i t was expected t h a t both v i s i b l e  would accept more r e a l  and n o n - v i s i b l e s u b j e c t s  initiators  than from n o n - v i s i b l e s .  s u b j e c t s r e c e i v e d 71% of i n i t i a t i o n s ,  l a r g e r p r o p o r t i o n of v i s i b l e  i n i t i a t o r s were accepted by  but not by n o n - v i s i b l e s , who accepted most o f the o f f e r s (26/32).  that  T h i s was shown p r e v i o u s l y i n T a b l e 4.12.  acceptance i s shown i n more d e t a i l  i n the t a b l e below.  they  The p a t t e r n of  134  Table  4.16  Number o f Real O f f e r s Accepted Per Number Received by V i s i b i l i t y and Resource L e v e l o f R e c i p i e n t ( T r i a l 1, Set A)  O f f e r Accepted From  High v i s i b l e  High v i s i b l e  Recipient Low v i s i b l e High NV  11/16  Low NV  2/3  3/3  3/4  Low v i s i b l e  7/13  6/8  3/3  3/4  Non-visible  7/32  3/6  4/5  10/13  25/63  11/17  Total  10/11 ,  16/21  In g e n e r a l , i t seemed t h a t o n l y i f one had a range of c h o i c e , d i d 32 the p r e f e r e n c e f o r v i s i b l e s e x h i b i t i t s e l f . T h i s i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the c h o i c e model p r e s e n t e d attend  to O's p r o f i t  i n Chapter 2, i n which i t was claimed  only i f he c o u l d not decide between two or more a l t e r 33  n a t i v e s on the b a s i s o f p r o f i t 87%  t h a t P would  to h i m s e l f .  Non-visible subjects  accepted  o f the o f f e r s they g o t ; o f the 6 o f f e r s they r e j e c t e d , 5 cases i n v o l v e d  the r e c e i p t o f two o f f e r s a t once, and i n one case, asked f o r g r e a t l y more than he was o f f e r e d .  Over a l l s u b j e c t s who r e c e i v e d  o n l y one o f f e r on the f i r s t exchange o p p o r t u n i t y , 2. truly  I t can be seen i n T a b l e  proportion of i n i t i a t i o n s  Initiator  91% accepted  Visibles i n S e t B I also received i n i t i a t i o n s  directed.  T a b l e 4.17  the n o n - v i s i b l e was  from  that  offer.  as they were  4.17 t h a t they accepted  a larger  visibles.  Acceptance o f R e a l O f f e r s to V i s i b l e s Number o f O f f e r s Received  ( T r i a l 1, Set BI) Proportion  Visible  19  .63  Non-visible  12  .41  Accepted  135  T a b l e 4.17 H . -  o  (Continued)  Proportion  One-tailed p = r  v i s i b l e s = proportion  t e s t f o r d i f f e r e n c e of p r o p o r t i o n s : r f Retain H . o  .05) .  The flects  accepting  higher  the s m a l l e r  accepting  non-visibles.  Z = 1.22,  (Z 5  . =1.65, crit  r a t e of acceptance of n o n - v i s i b l e s i n t h i s set  number of o f f e r s they had  re-  to choose from, as a r e s u l t  of the tendency f o r n o n - v i s i b l e s to i n i t i a t e to other n o n - v i s i b l e s . proportion Set A.  of o f f e r s from v i s i b l e s  Here a g a i n ,  o f f e r , preference  t h a t were accepted i s s i m i l a r to that i n  the acceptances seemed to be a f u n c t i o n of type of  for v i s i b i l i t y ,  and  from which the r e c i p i e n t c o u l d choose. v i s i b l e s , the v i s i b l e always had i t was  a b e t t e r one  in profit  the number of a l t e r n a t i v e o f f e r s For  the seven r e j e c t i o n s of  another o f f e r from a v i s i b l e , and  been completed:(Set A ) :  usually  s e t of t r a n s a c t i o n s  F a l s e o f f e r s were d i r e c t e d to v i s i b l e  the second t r i a l .  non-  to the r e c i p i e n t .  Acceptance of c o n t r o l l e d o f f e r s a f t e r one  i n Set A on  The  The  has  subjects  p a t t e r n of acceptances i s shown i n  T a b l e 4.18.-  T a b l e 4.18  Acceptance of f a l s e O f f e r s by V i s i b l e s ( T r i a l 2, Set  A)  Recipient Initiator  High v i s i b l e  Low  Visible  .64  (18/28)  .60  (17/28)  (35/56)  Non-visible  .36  (10.28)  .36  (10/28)  (20/56)  Reject  .00  ( 0/28)  .04  ( 1/28)  (  both  visible  Total  1/56)  136  H:  Proportion  q  accepting  t a i l e d binomial (Z  . crit  = 1.65,  '  The tical  v i s i b l e = proportion  t e s t f o r d i f f e r e n c e s of p r o p o r t i o n s v  p =  .05).  non-visible.  gives Z =  1.87,  J  t a b l e shows that when the r e c i p i e n t c o u l d choose between  accepted from v i s i b l e s was  a n o n - v i s i b l e , the p r o p o r t i o n  again  a c c e p t e d from n o n - v i s i b l e s .  s i g n i f i c a n t l y greater  Since  the  than the  proportion  false offers controlled for  the i n i t i a t o r , t h i s i s e n c o u r a g i n g s u p p o r t f o r H y p o t h e s i s  the  must be kept i n mind, however, t h a t the T r i a l 2 a c c e p t a n c e s ,  acceptances on the f i r s t  v i s i b l e s who  to  5.  l i k e the T r i a l 2 r e a l offers-?,;, would have been a f f e c t e d by o f f e r s and  iden-  of o f f e r s  tendency f o r the n o n - v i s i b l e s to make o f f e r s more f a v o u r a b l e  It  One-  Reject H . o  o f f e r s from a v i s i b l e and  greater  accepting  opportunity  were accepted on T r i a l 1 by  ' o f f e r s ' t o them on the second t r i a l , may a c t of r e c i p r o c i t y .  A t o t a l of 11/35  the p a t t e r n  f o r exchange.  the same v i s i b l e who  For  of  example,  supposedly  have a c c e p t e d t h a t person as  acceptance on T r i a l 2 i n v o l v e d  an  this  s o r t of r e c i p r o c i t y . Of in  all),  subject  the s u b j e c t s who  o n l y one  accepted n o n - v i s i b l e s on the second t r i a l  case i n v o l v e d acceptance of someone who  on T r i a l 1.  There was  no  visibles had  trial,  to be  and  those who  no  those who  were r e j e c t e d by  c l e a r tendency f o r the p e o p l e who  had  accepted  the  o b s e r v a b l e tendency f o r s u b j e c t s who  cepted n o n - v i s i b l e s on T r i a l 2 to be on the f i r s t  had  (20  i n i t i a t e d to n o n - v i s i b l e s on T r i a l 1, T r i a l 2, or both.)  a visible  accepted  o f f e r e d to a n o n - v i s i b l e p r e v i o u s l y  ac-  non-  (12/20  137  In sum, over the two s e t s of experiments, Hypothesis 5 r e c e i v e s s u p p o r t , except i n the case of t h e h i g h n o n - v i s i b l e s i n Set BI'.  N o n - v i s i b l e s ' Reaction  The  t o the P r e f e r e n c e  for Visibles  p r e d i c t i o n i n the l a s t h y p o t h e s i s depends on the v a l i d i t y  of the p r e v i o u s  hypotheses —  i f n o n - v i s i b l e s d i d not r e c e i v e many  t i o n s , and had few a c c e p t e d , they s h o u l d  initia-  have reached a p o i n t when they  wanted the covers removed. H y p o t h e s i s 6; P's p e r c e p t i o n of the advantage o f w i t h o l d i n g i n f o r m a t i o n about h i s r e s o u r c e base and v a l u e p o s i t i o n w i l l decrease over r e p e a t e d exchange t r a n s a c t i o n s , and P w i l l be more l i k e l y t o choose to r e v e a l unambiguous i n f o r m a t i o n about h i s v a l u e p o s i t i o n and p r o f i t s , than d u r i n g the i n i t i a l s t a g e s o f i n t e r a c t i o n . Experimental p r e d i c t i o n : greater proportion  By the end o f T r i a l 2, a  of n o n - v i s i b l e s w i l l s t a t e t h a t they would l i k e the  covers removed, than the p r o p o r t i o n Results  on T r i a l 1.  f o r s u b j e c t s who completed two exchange t r a n s a c t i o n s :  know t h a t n o n - v i s i b l e s u b j e c t s were not very were unpopular on T r i a l on T r i a l 2. on T r i a l s  T a b l e 4.19  significantly  s u c c e s s f u l i n Set A —  We  they  1, and the experimenter i n t e r c e p t e d o f f e r s t o them  T a b l e 4.19 compares the n o n - v i s i b l e s ' wishes about the covers  1 and 2.  Non-visibles' Preference T r i a l s (Set A)  Subject  f o r Removing Covers on F i r s t  and Second  Number Who Want Cover OFF Trial 1 Trial 2  High n o n - v i s i b l e  8/28  14/28  Low n o n - v i s i b l e  9/28  14/28  138  T a b l e 4.19 H  :  (Continued)  P r o p o r t i o n o f n o n - v i s i b l e s wanting covers o f f on T r i a l  wanting covers o f f on T r i a l t i o n s , Z = 1.54, (Z . crit Although  2.  One-tailed t e s t f o r d i f f e r e n c e of propor-  = 1.65, p = .05).  Retain H o  (p = .06). ^  the change i n p r o p o r t i o n s i s n o t s t a t i s t i c a l l y  cant, the p r o p o r t i o n wanting the covers to  1 = proportion  the second t r i a l .  An examination  signifi-  removed does i n c r e a s e from the f i r s t  o f the p a s t exchanges o f those  wanting the covers o f f showed they were only s l i g h t l y  more l i k e l y  subjects  to have  been r e j e c t e d , o r to have r e c e i v e d noi.offers, than were those v o t i n g to r e t a i n the c o v e r s .  Two t r i a l s may have been too s h o r t a time f o r s u b j e c t s  to l e a r n t h a t the covers were n o t to t h e i r advantage. Removal of the covers failure specific  i s , o f course, n o t the o n l y response t o  to e n t e r i n t o t r a n s a c t i o n s on the f i r s t p r e d i c t i o n s were made concerning  r e j e c t i o n on T r i a l  opportunity.  Although no  the adjustment o f s u b j e c t s to  1, the p r o p e n s i t y to repeat an o f f e r t o the same s o r t o f  t a r g e t was c o n t i n g e n t on the response to the f i r s t  initiation.  This i s  shown i n the t a b l e below.  Table 4.20  P r o p o r t i o n s o f S u b j e c t s Making the Same Type o f Choice versus N o n - v i s i b l e s ) on T r i a l s 1 and 2 (Set A) Response t o I n i t i a t i o n Accepted  To V i s i b l e on T r i a l  1  (n)  (Visibles  on T r i a l 1 Rej e c t e d (n)  Visible initiator  .92  (26)  .56 (16)  NV i n i t i a t o r  .60  (10)  .36 (28)  139  T a b l e 4.20  (Continued) Response to I n i t i a t i o n on T r i a l 1 Accepted Rej ected  To NV  on T r i a l 1  (n)  (n)  Visible initiator  .17  (14)  .50  ( 2)  NV  initiator  .50  (14)  .50  ( 4)  *  Theanumbers i n d i c a t e the p r o p o r t i o n of i n i t i a t i o n .  of s u b j e c t s  These r e s u l t s show t h a t v i s i b l e s u b j e c t s respond to acceptance by the r e i n f o r c e m e n t cepted by .83  was  repeating  a visible.  a n o n - v i s i b l e on T r i a l 1 d i d not  of them switched to a v i s i b l e .  trial  a given  V i s i b l e s who  repeat  They may  sort  d i d indeed appear to  the r e i n f o r c e d b e h a v i o u r , but  acceptance by  success w i t h a n o n - v i s i b l e .  repeating  o n l y when  had  been  ac-  an o f f e r to a n o n - v i s i b l e :  have been encouraged by  their  Acceptance of o f f e r s to v i s i b l e s on the  first  d i d not have such a pronounced e f f e c t on  the n o n - v i s i b l e s  (only  .60  r e p e a t e d to a v i s i b l e ) . Rejection  on  the f i r s t  trial  v i s i b l e to n o n - v i s i b l e t a r g e t s , and t h a t the NV t i o n by  pared w i t h o t h e r s  due  r e c e i v e d by  i t seemed  to a n y t h i n g  initia-  I t seems p l a u s i b l e t h a t  about the cause of t h e i r  adopt remedies that r e l a t e d to the c o v e r s .  f e r r e d that r e j e c t i o n was  In g e n e r a l ,  changes from  to respond to f a i l u r e of an  of the t a r g e t .  the n o n - v i s i b l e s . would g e n e r a l i z e and  vice versa.  s u b j e c t s were more l i k e l y  changing the v i s i b i l i t y  l e d to more frequent  unpopularity,  V i s i b l e s would not have i n -  but how  the p e r s o n they had  w e l l t h e i r o f f e r s cominitiated  to.  140  E v a l u a t i o n of the E f f e c t i v e n e s s of the M a n i p u l a t i o n of the Value  We  have drawn a t t e n t i o n to s e v e r a l p i e c e s of i n d i r e c t  t h a t s u b j e c t s i n the experiments t h a t they took i n t o account  assessed p r o f i t  t h e i r own  Function  evidence  i n value u n i t s , i . e . ,  and o t h e r ' s r e s o u r c e bases i n c a l c u -  l a t i n g the v a l u e of a d d i t i o n s and l o s s e s of b u t t o n s .  The main p o i n t s were  that: 1)  A m a j o r i t y o f i n i t i a t i o n s were made t o s u b j e c t s w i t h r e l a t i v e l y l a r g e amounts of the c o l o u r d e s i r e d by  2)  initiator;  exchange r a t i o s i n the P i l o t s e t v a r i e d a c c o r d i n g to r e s o u r c e of i n i t i a t o r and  3)  the  profile  recipient;  p e r c e i v e d advantages of the covers were d e s c r i b e d i n terms of d e t e r mining p r i c e s i n a t r a n s a c t i o n r e l a t i v e t o need, and t o a b i l i t y up buttons  4)  ( i . e . , s i z e of l a r g e r e s o u r c e  pile);  h i g h n o n - v i s i b l e s i n ,SSet B, whose f a i r exchange r a t i o w i t h was  to g i v e  visibles  below the f a i r r a t i o f o r two v i s i b l e p a r t n e r s , were the o n l y sub-  j e c t s i n a l l the experiments visibles.  who  d i d not show an i n i t i a l p r e f e r e n c e f o r  The most p l a u s i b l e e x p l a n a t i o n f o r such a r e s u l t  n o n - v i s i b l e s would have had  to ask f o r much much more than they o f f e r e d  i n order to get an advantageous exchange.  The p r o b a b i l i t y of  of such o f f e r s would p r o b a b l y be a n t i c i p a t e d to be low, and initiations  to n o n - v i s i b l e s may  In sum,  i s that  have had h i g h e r expected  acceptance  consequently,  value.  i t seems there i s s u f f i c i e n t evidence t h a t the m a r g i n a l  u t i l i t y m a n i p u l a t i o n was  effective.  There were undoubtedly  e x c e p t i o n s , and  the most r e a s o n a b l e e x p l a n a t i o n f o r data t h a t d i d not conform to the hypo-  *  141  theses may be t h a t they can be c o n s i d e r e d as e r r o r r e s u l t i n g from the v a r i a b l e success  i n s a t i s f y i n g the scope c o n d i t i o n s about the s u b j e c t s ' v a l u e  function.  Summary  L e t us b r i e f l y  summarize the f i n d i n g s r e p o r t e d i n t h i s  chapter.  The p r e d i c t i o n s i n the hypotheses were made l a r g e l y i n terms o f expected departures  from a chance d i s t r i b u t i o n o f the types and d i r e c t i o n s o f i n i -  t i a t i o n s made and accepted.  Support  when the data depart s i g n i f i c a n t l y were made c o n c e r n i n g  f o r an h y p o t h e s i s has been c l a i m e d  from a chance r e s u l t , but no p r e d i c t i o n s  the s t r e n g t h o f the r e l a t i o n s h i p s expected,  and i t i s  r e c o g n i z e d t h a t a good d e a l o f v a r i a b i l i t y remains unaccounted f o r .  Never-  t h e l e s s , the p a t t e r n o f r e s u l t s i s g e n e r a l l y i n l i n e w i t h p r e d i c t i o n s . The most s t r i k i n g r e s u l t i s the c o n s i s t e n t l y h i g h p r o p o r t i o n o f s u b j e c t s who both i n i t i a t e d , t o , and accepted sources.  from, p l a y e r s w i t h v i s i b l e r e -  With the s i n g l e e x c e p t i o n of h i g h n o n - v i s i b l e s i n Set B I , be-  tween 2/3 and 3/4 o f f i r s t approximately  i n i t i a t i o n s were addressed  t o v i s i b l e s , and  2/3 o f o f f e r s accepted were from v i s i b l e s , i f a s u b j e c t r e -  c e i v e d two i d e n t i c a l o f f e r s from a v i s i b l e and n o n - v i s i b l e s o u r c e . p r e f e r e n c e h e l d whether v i s i b l e s u b j e c t s a l l had the same s i z e d bases (Set B ) , d i f f e r e n t r a t i o s of r e s o u r c e s but e q u a l t o t a l s or d i f f e r e n t  t o t a l r e s o u r c e bases  (Set A ) .  I t must be kept  This  resource  ( P i l o t set) ,  i n mind, how-  e v e r , t h a t t h e r e was a l s o a c o n s i s t e n t m i n o r i t y who we i n f e r had a p r e f e r ence f o r n o n - v i s i b l e s , by v i r t u e o f t h e i r c h o i c e of n o n - v i s i b l e s . d e s i r e f o r i n f o r m a t i o n about the exchange p a r t n e r appears,  While a  as the t h e o r y  142  p r e d i c t s , t o be an important  determinant  of i n i t i a l  choice of partner, i t  i s c l e a r t h a t o t h e r f a c t o r s were o p e r a t i n g , such as d i f f e r e n t i a l  abilities  of the s u b j e c t s t o s t r a t e g i z e , and to a n t i c i p a t e where the m a j o r i t y o f i n i t i a t i o n s would go i n the group; d i f f e r e n t i a l i n t e r e s t i n comparison w i t h others;  and to some e x t e n t , d i f f e r e n t i a l f a s c i n a t i o n w i t h  of an u n c e r t a i n a l t e r n a t i v e . if  the 'mystery'  (With t h i s l a t t e r f a c t o r , one s u s p e c t s  that  the s t a k e s were h i g h e r , fewer p e o p l e would e x h i b i t a p r e f e r e n c e f o r  mystery.)  As i n many s o c i a l s i t u a t i o n s , t h e experiment was not a p e r f e c t  a b s t r a c t i o n , and c o n t a i n e d c o n f l i c t i n g  f o r c e s which made i t i m p o s s i b l e to  p r e d i c t a c c u r a t e l y f o r a l l i n d i v i d u a l s which f a c t o r s w i l l be o v e r r i d i n g . N e v e r t h e l e s s , the behaviour  and comments  o f the s u b j e c t s gave support to  the c o n v i c t i o n t h a t the theory was a d d r e s s i n g an aspect o f i n t e r a c t i o n that was meaningful  t o the s u b j e c t s .  They tended  to see the covers i n  terms o f p r o v i d i n g a means o f b l u f f i n g , f o r c i n g p r i c e s , and f o r g e t t i n g ahead o f o t h e r s . The  statistically significant  more advantageous i n i t i a t i o n s  tendency o f n o n - v i s i b l e s t o make  than v i s i b l e s  c o n c e r n i n g p e r c e i v e d advantage i n c o v e r s .  i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the r e s u l t s A c o n s e r v a t i v e e v a l u a t i o n o f these  r e s u l t s seems warranted, however, i n l i g h t o f :  the lower p r o p o r t i o n o f  h i g h n o n - v i s i b l e s i n Set B who o f f e r e d to v i s i b l e s ;  the c o n s t r a i n t s against  s u b j e c t s o f f e r i n g more than they requested because they were i n a game; and  the m a r g i n a l  support  f o r Hypothesis  2 i n Set A (see Appendix V ) .  143  FOOTNOTES FOR  CHAPTER 4  1.  In Chapter 3, i t was noted t h a t the two s e t s were not e q u a l l y good t e s t s of a l l s i x hypotheses. For t h i s reason, we w i l l p r e s e n t d a t a f o r each h y p o t h e s i s from the s e t which bears most d i r e c t l y on t h a t h y p o t h e s i s . We w i l l d i s c u s s r e l e v a n t data from the o t h e r s e t where i t g i v e s f u r t h e r i n f o r m a t i o n , o r where the r e s u l t s o f one s e t c o n f l i c t w i t h those of the ether. Some r e s u l t s from the P i l o t s e t d e s c r i b e d i n Appendix IV are g i v e n , when the problems of d e s i g n f o r t h a t s e t do not a f f e c t the r e s u l t .  2.  Hypothesis 1 r e f e r s to i n i t i a t i o n s to v i s i b l e s o n l y ; s u b j e c t s c o u l d not see i f n o n - v i s i b l e s had a l a r g e o r s m a l l p i l e of b u t t o n s .  3.  The p r o p o r t i o n s of i n i t i a t i o n s to h i g h v i s i b l e s on T r i a l 2 w i l l be g i v e n w i t h the d i s c u s s i o n of Hypothesis 4, as they shed l i g h t on the r e l a t i v e importance of v i s i b i l i t y of p a r t n e r and the s i z e of h i s r e s o u r c e base.  4.  A few s u b j e c t s noted d u r i n g d e b r i e f i n g t h a t they had not n o t i c e d the two d i f f e r e n t s i z e s of r e s o u r c e bases.  5.  There were two unbalanced v i s i b l e s i n each experiment: one had 1100 green, 100 r e d ; the o t h e r 1000 r e d , 200 green. Balanced v i s i b l e s had 900 green, 300 r e d ; or 850 r e d , 350 green.  6.  Not a l l s u b j e c t s framed t h e i r o f f e r s i n terms of 100 b u t t o n s . Proposed terms ranged fromJ10 f o r 20, to a h o p e f u l ! 100 f o r 780 i n r e t u r n (Set A ) .  7.  Note: R e s u l t s from the P i l o t Set are g i v e n h e r e , because Sets A-and B d i d not p r o v i d e an o p p o r t u n i t y to t e s t whether s u b j e c t s w i t h an imb a l a n c e i n v a l u e p o s i t i o n were as p o p u l a r as those w i t h l a r g e r e s o u r c e bases. The P i l o t Set was a l s o the o n l y one i n which i t was p o s s i b l e to observe whether the terms of proposed exchanges v a r i e d w i t h the v a l u e p o s i t i o n s of p a r t n e r s .  8.  The r u l e s d i d not permit s u b j e c t s to o f f e r more than 100 b u t t o n s a t a time. However, the numerator of the exchange r a t i o w i l l sometimes exceed 100, and t h i s i n d i c a t e s an i n i t i a t i o n o f f e r i n g more b u t t o n s than were r e q u e s t e d , s t a n d a r d i z e d on the denominator of 100.  9.  The p r o f i t i n v a l u e u n i t s to each type of s u b j e c t i n a t r a d e of 100 b u t t o n s of one c o l o u r f o r 100 of the o t h e r i s shown i n the T a b l e below:  144  Subjective  Gain and  C o s t s * to P f o r a 100/100 Exchange T r i a l 1, Set B  Subject  #• of b u t t o n s i n s m a l l and large piles  increase m value units  H i NV Visible Low NV  150/1250 100/1100 50/9-500  250 290 370  *  C a l c u l a t e d from the v a l u e  costs i n value units  c h a r t , Appendix  87. 100 113  on  net p r o f i t i n value units 162. 190 257  1.  I t can be seen from t h i s t a b l e t h a t the low n o n - v i s i b l e s made c o n s i d e r a b l y more p r o f i t i n v a l u e u n i t s from a one f o r one t r a d e of b u t t o n s , than d i d the v i s i b l e s or the h i g h n o n - v i s i b l e s (257 v e r s u s 190 and 162.5, respectively). Thus, to be f a i r i n an exchange w i t h a v i s i b l e , a low n o n - v i s i b l e would have to g i v e up more than he r e q u e s t e d . 10.  Only i n i t i a t i o n s to v i s i b l e s were c o n s i d e r e d , because f a i r n e s s was not d e f i n e d from the i n i t i a t o r ' s p o i n t of view, i n an o f f e r to a n o n - v i s i b l e .  11.  The advantage t o h i g h n o n - v i s i b l e s may have l a i n elsewhere than i n advantageous i n i t i a t i o n s i n v i s i b l e s . In Set B l , the h i g h n o n - v i s i b l e s c o u l d i n f e r from the i n s t r u c t i o n s that so l o n g as they^kept ahead of the v i s i b l e s , they would most l i k e l y be among the f o u r winners at the end. As they were t o l d t h a t some n o n - v i s i b l e s had more than v i s i b l e s , and some l e s s , they might, on symmetry grounds, t h i n k only one o t h e r nonv i s i b l e was a h i g h . To win, they c o u l d e i t h e r make the s o r t of d e a l s w i t h v i s i b l e s t h a t would not l e t the v i s i b l e improve h i s t o t a l w e a l t h , or they c o u l d d e a l w i t h a n o n - v i s i b l e who might be the same, or g r e a t l y behind in t o t a l r e s o u r c e s . Since they had no i n f o r m a t i o n about nonv i s i b l e s , they c o u l d not make use o f i t to d e c i d e what p r i c e was r e a s o n a b l e ; however, so l o n g as they t r a d e d even amounts of b u t t o n s w i t h n o n - v i s i b l e s , they were l i k e l y to m a i n t a i n t h e i r p o s i t i o n v i s - a - v i s the v i s i b l e s , sinply because they s t a r t e d w i t h more b u t t o n s . In a way, h i g h n o n - v i s i b l e s had a l l the i n f o r m a t i o n they needed to p l a y a winning s t r a t e g y — they b e l i e v e d o n l y one o t h e r v i s i b l e had as much as they did. I f a p e r s o n had enough i n f o r m a t i o n to f e e l s e c u r e t h a t no one would do b e t t e r than he, he would a l s o f e e l f r e e r to take r i s k s , e.g., by t r a d i n g w i t h the n o n - v i s i b l e s , or by t r y i n g to t r a d e w i t h the v i s i b l e s i n such a way t h a t i t gave an advantage to the n o n - v i s i b l e s .  12.  See  13.  O f f e r s were s t a n d a r d i z e d to a r a t i o of X/100, and the mean over a l l r a t i o s f o r a group of N s u b j e c t s was c a l c u l a t e d : n 'fX/10.6V , :>n' where i i s the i n i t i a t o r i = l , 2 ... n. ^ (X/10Q)-••./,£  Footnote  9.  145  14.  In the P i l o t work d e s c r i b e d i n Appendix IV, where some v i s i b l e s had ' f a i r ' exchange r a t i o s g r e a t e r than 100/100, the a c t u a l r a t i o s were lower than the f a i r r a t i o . The average departure from the f a i r r a t i o i n these cases was -.30 (below the f a i r r a t i o ) , c o n t r a s t e d w i t h an average d e p a r t u r e of +.066 (above the f a i r r a t i o ) , when f a i r n e s s c a l l e d on subj e c t s to o f f e r l e s s than they r e q u e s t e d . I f low n o n - v i s i b l e s i n Set B had f o l l o w e d the p a t t e r n of the s u b j e c t s i n the P i l o t s e t , t h e i r average exchange r a t i o would have been 95/100, compared w i t h t h e i r a c t u a l obt a i n e d average r a t i o of 85/100.  15.  In Set A, s u b j e c t s d i d not know the exact number of buttons the v i s i b l e s had, although the h i g h r e s o u r c e v i s i b l e s had p h y s i c a l l y l a r g e r p i l e s of buttons. The r e s u l t s from these s u b j e c t s d i d not support H y p o t h e s i s 2. However, o n l y 63% of the r o n - v i s i b l e s s t a t e d t h a t they p e r c e i v e d the covers to.be an advantage: of t h e s e , 47% made i n i t i a t i o n s which asked f o r more than they o f f e r e d . (See d i s c u s s i o n of H y p o t h e s i s 3.)  16.  See Appendix I I , Q u e s t i o n n a i r e f o r n o n - v i s i b l e s .  17.  See Appendix I I I , Q u e s t i o n n a i r e  18.  See Appendix I I I , Q u e s t i o n n a i r e 3. Note t h a t a l t h o u g h n o n - v i s i b l e s had r e c e i v e d f a l s e o f f e r s by the time the q u e s t i o n n a i r e was a d m i n i s t e r e d , they had not r e c e i v e d r e p l i e s to t h e i r own o f f e r s .  19.  N o n - v i s i b l e s ' reasons f o r wanting the covers l e f t on were b a s i c a l l y the same as t h e i r reasons f o r p e r c e i v i n g the covers to be an advantage. They-,focussed on the a b i l i t y to keep one's p r o g r e s s i n the game a s e c r e t , so t h a t no one would t r y to 'thwart' them, and on b e i n g a b l e to f o r c e more out of another p l a y e r whose need was apparent. The importance of the two senses of advantage — over the game as a whole, and i n s e t t i n g the terms f o r i n d i v i d u a l t r a n s a c t i o n s — i s again i n e v i d e n c e . Both h i g h and low n o n - v i s i b l e s gave s i m i l a r reasons f o r wanting to r e t a i n the c o v e r s . Of the lows who wanted the covers o f f , the main reason appeared t o be the b e l i e f t h a t i f o t h e r s saw how poor they were, they would be p e r c e i v e d to be j u s t i f i e d i n a s k i n g f o r a l a r g e r r e t u r n .  20.  Note: A l l 56 n o n - v i s i b l e s i n Set A were asked about r e t a i n i n g the covers on T r i a l 1 , and 17 o f these wanted them removed i f they were g i v e n the c h o i c e on T r i a l 3. For the 48 s u b j e c t s asked about what they saw the advantages to be, 2/30 c l a i m i n g advantages i n covers s a i d they wanted them o f f ; 12/16 who saw covers as a disadvantage wanted them o f f .  21.  See Appendix I I I , Q u e s t i o n n a i r e  22.  The data from Set A f o l l o w e d e s s e n t i a l l y i n Appendix V, Table A.10.  3.  1. the same p a t t e r n , and are g i v e n  146  23.  P l a y e r s were not c o m p l e t e l y c e r t a i n t h a t any i n i t i a t i o n they made would l e a d to a completed t r a n s a c t i o n . However, expected v a l u e s of exchanges w i t h v i s i b l e s c o u l d be c a l c u l a t e d on the b a i s s of the l e a s t ambiguous s o r t of i n f o r m a t i o n a v a i l a b l e .  24.  Some r e s u l t s from Set A w i l l a l s o be g i v e n , as they demonstrate t h a t the p r e f e r e n c e f o r v i s i b l e s continued beyond the f i r s t t r i a l , even when the s t r o n g p r e f e r e n c e f o r the h i g h v i s i b l e s had d e c l i n e d .  25.  In a d d i t i o n , i f n o n - v i s i b l e s a n t i c i p a t e d t h a t other n o n - v i s i b l e s might r e c e i v e fewer o f f e r s than v i s i b l e s , then an i n i t i a t i o n to a n o n - v i s i b l e might have seemed more l i k e l y to be a c c e p t e d . S u b j e c t s ' reasons f o r i n i t i a t i n g to v i s i b l e s and n o n - v i s i b l e s are l i s t e d i n Appendix V, T a b l e A.11 through A114. Approximately o n e - t h i r d of s u b j e c t s who sent o f f e r s to n o n - v i s i b l e s gave the a n t i c i p a t e d u n p o p u l a r i t y of n o n - v i s i b l e s as the reasons.  26.  A s e t of ten experiments w i t h M> subjects i n each ( i . e . , s i x v i s i b l e s and s i x n o n - v i s i b l e s ) a l l w i t h the same t o t a l r e s o u r c e bases and,, r a t i o s of red to green or green to red, was conducted f o r purposes o u t s i d e the scope of t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n . I n t h i s s e t , 71% of T r i a l 1 i n i t i a t i o n s went to v i s i b l e s . I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note t h a t females d i r e c t e d 77% of t h e i r T r i a l 1 i n i t i a t i o n s to v i s i b l e s , compared to 65% f o r males. :  0  27.  Some p l a u s i b l e e x p l a n a t i o n s next Chapter.  28.  B i n o m i a l t e s t g i v e s Z = 3.63 f o r i n i t i a t i o n s made by v i s i b l e s . The n o n - v i s i b l e s d i d not d i r e c t s i g n i f i c a n t l y more i n i t i a t i o n s to v i s i b l e s on T r i a l 2.  29.  R e a l o f f e r s were d e l i v e r e d t o 2  of these r e s u l t s w i l l be  discussed  i n the  visibles. 2  30.  An9(>, t e s t f o r the t a b l e g i v e s X\ = 9,6,  31.  The r e j e c t i o n of n o n - v i s i b l e s by v i s i b l e s , by type of o f f e r , i s shown i n the t a b l e below: Number R e j e c t e d per Number R e c e i v e d Person R e j e c t i n g O f f e r asks same asks more asks l e s s as o f f e r than o f f e r than o f f e r High v i s i b l e Low v i s i b l e  10/13 0/2  d . f . = 1, p  13/15 2/2  .01.  2/3 1/2  From t h i s t a b l e , i t i s not c l e a r t h a t n o n - v i s i b l e s c o u l d have e n t e r e d i n t o t r a d e s i f they gave up the i d e a of advantageous exchanges, and made f a i r or generous o f f e r s , as even f a i r o f f e r s were f r e q u e n t l y r e j e c t e d .  147  32.  See H.H. K e l l e y and D.P. S c h e n i t z k i , ' B a r g a i n i n g ' , Chapter 10 i n C.G. M c C l i n t o c k , " E d i t o r , E x p e r i m e n t a l S o c i a l Psychology^. H o l t , R i n e h a r t and Winston, 1972, pp. 299sr307, f o r a d i s c u s s i o n of the e x p e r i m e n t a l paradigm most f r e q u e n t l y used f o r s t u d i e s of b i l a t e r a l monopoly b a r gaining.  33.  Of the 7 o f f e r s from n o n - v i s i b l e s a c c e p t e d by the v i s i b l e s , e i t h e r no o f f e r was r e c e i v e d from a v i s i b l e , or the o f f e r from the v i s i b l e asked f o r more than i t o f f e r e d , i . e . , was worse i n terms of a b s o l u t e p r o f i t to P than the one a c c e p t e d . One p e r s o n s a i d he had made a mistake i n a c c e p t i n g a n o n - v i s i b l e (he r e j e c t e d two o f f e r s of 100 f o r 1 0 0 , and gave up 150 f o r 100). Two out of three low v i s i b l e s a c c e p t i n g a nonv i s i b l e r e c e i v e d o n l y that one o f f e r .  148  CHAPTER 5 EVALUATION AND  SUGGESTIONS FOR  FUTURE RESEARCH  T h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n has been concerned w i t h the use of i n f o r m a t i o n c o n t r o l as a t a c t i c f o r o b t a i n i n g advantage i n exchange r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  and  the l i m i t a t i o n s on the s u c c e s s f u l use of such a t a c t i c imposed by a p o s i ted p r e f e r e n c e f o r r e l i a b l e i n f o r m a t i o n about exchange p a r t n e r s . was  A theory  c o n s t r u c t e d to e x p l a i n the p r o c e s s e s o p e r a t i n g i n such a s i t u a t i o n ,  an experiment theory.  As  was  designed t o t e s t a s e t of s i x hypotheses  the t e s t and  r e s u l t s have been p r e s e n t e d i n some d e t a i l ,  i s no need to repeat them h e r e . support  d e r i v e d from  and the  there  Given t h a t the r e s u l t s on the whole gave  f o r the theory i n the e x p e r i m e n t a l c o n t e x t , i t i s a p p r o p r i a t e at  t h i s p o i n t to make a d i f f e r e n t e v a l u a t i o n of the t h e o r y , based  on  other  criteria. At the c o n c l u s i o n of an e x p e r i m e n t a l s t u d y , someone u s u a l l y " W e l l , what does t h i s t e l l us about the r e a l w o r l d ? " tially  r e f e r s to the g e n e r a l i z a t i o n from the study  o u t s i d e the l a b o r a t o r y .  asks:  This question essen-  to s i m i l a r  situations  I f the i n t e r r o g a t o r wwishes to know where e l s e  can f i n d groups of people s i t t i n g around dimly l i t  we  tables trading coloured  tokens, our answer must be not "In poker h a l l s " , nor "At c h i l d r e n ' s p a r t i e s " , but "Nowhere".  I t s h o u l d be c l e a r from the way  s t r u c t e d t h a t we  do not expect  setting directly  to another  acteristics. 1 and K e r v i n :  t h i s study has been  to g e n e r a l i z e from the c o n c r e t e  con-  experimental  concrete s i n g u l a r s i t u a t i o n with s i m i l a r  char-  The view taken here i s s i m i l a r to t h a t expressed by Webster  149  The c o n n e c t i o n between the l a b o r a t o r y and the n a t u r a l s e t t i n g , we c l a i m , i s the t h e o r y . Without the theory t h e r e i s , and i n f a c t t h e r e can be, no l i n k . S p e c i f i c a l l y , the l i n k i s the s e t o f abs t r a c t scope c o n d i t i o n s which t e l l whether the theory can be used to make p r e d i c t i o n s f o r a p a r t i c u l a r s e t t i n g . I f there i s no t h e o r y , and i f t h e r e a r e , t h e r e f o r e , no e x p l i c i t scope c o n d i t i o n s , then no g e n e r a l i z a t i o n of the r e s u l t s of a l a b o r a t o r y study i s permissible. S t r i c t l y s p e a k i n g , t h i s i s a l s o t r u e o f any s t u d y , laboratory or other. We c o n s t r u c t As set  theories with general  statements i n v o l v i n g a b s t r a c t v a r i a b l e s .  i n d i c a t e d above, these a r e made p r e d i c t i v e i n p a r t i c u l a r i n s t a n c e s by a of i n i t i a l  conditions which, together  used to deduce hypotheses.  w i t h t h e a b s t r a c t assumptions, a r e  I n any c o n c r e t e  s i t u a t i o n , experiment o r o t h e r -  w i s e , where i t can be shown that the r e l e v a n t c o n d i t i o n s  a r e met, and t h a t  2 the assumptions o f the theory  apply,  p r e d i c t i o n s can be made.  TThus, the  f i n d i n g s o f a p a r t i c u l a r experiment a r e g e n e r a l i z a b l e through the t h e o r y t o other  s e t t i n g s , n o t by d i r e c t e x t r a p o l a t i o n from an experiment t o the r e a l  world. In this\''view, t h e scope c o n d i t i o n s both p r o v i d e impose l i m i t a t i o n s . the work r e p o r t e d Any  i n this  us l o o k a t the i m p l i c a t i o n s o f such a view f o r study.  e m p i r i c a l s c i e n t i s t , of c o u r s e , wants t o d e v i s e  antecedent c o n d i t i o n s theory  LLet  g e n e r a l i t y and  t h a t have a v a r i e t y o f c o n c r e t e  theories with  i n s t a n c e s , but no  can encompass a l l the w o r l d , o r f o r t h a t m a t t e r , a l l o f s o c i a l be-  haviour.  Our concern has been what p a r t o f s o c i a l b e h a v i o u r t h a t can be  conceptualized  as s o c i a l exchange.  change s i t u a t i o n s i n which:  We f u r t h e r l i m i t e d our i n t e r e s t t o ex-  150  1)  P e o p l e c o u l d o b t a i n complementary commodities from at l e a s t two  others  (Scope c o n d i t i o n 1 ) . 2)  The  resources  were v a l u e d  according  to a m a r g i n a l  utility  function  (Scope c o n d i t i o n 2 ) . 3)  The  value  f u n c t i o n s of i n d i v i d u a l s c o u l d be known or i n f e r r e d , though  i n f o r m a t i o n about c u r r e n t r e s o u r c e plete  holdings  incom-  (Scope c o n d i t i o n 3 ) .  4)  People c o u l d compare p r o f i t s at some stage  5),  T o t a l resources  6)  Some p e o p l e c o u l d c o n t r o l but not  i n the group d i d not  rent resource holdings This admittedly  increase  (Scope c o n d i t i o n 5) .  t r a d i n g red and  Support f o r the e x p e r i m e n t a l  gives us more c o n f i d e n c e  t h a t meet the i n i t i a l  cur-  (Scope c o n d i t i o n 6 ) .  t y p i f i e s o n l y a p a r t of s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n , but  to a v a l u e c h a r t .  on the theory  (Scope c o n d i t i o n 4 ) .  f a l s i f y i n f o r m a t i o n about t h e i r  not so s m a l l a p a r t as groups of s t u d e n t s according  of others might be  conditions.  s i t u a t i o n s to which the theory  We  certainly  green  buttons  p r e d i c t i o n s based  i n p r e d i c t i o n s to o t h e r s i t u a t i o n s w i l l b r i e f l y c o n s i d e r some p o s s i b l e  could be shown to be  r e l e v a n t , and  at  the  same time, suggest where f u r t h e r work i s needed to s p e l l out the a p p l i c a bility 1.  of the  Valued  theory.  complementary r e s o u r c e s  d i s t r i b u t e d i n groups of f o u r or more.  This condition requires l i t t l e  comment, i f one  s o c i a l b e h a v i o u r as exchange, because almost any 3 can be  seen as a r e s o u r c e .  Thus, a f a t h e r who  accepts  a model of  s e r v i c e , good, or sentiment  takes h i s son s k i i n g , i f  the son washes the c a r , can be seen as s i m i l a r i n r e l e v a n t r e s p e c t s dents who  h e l p one  another study,  or c h i l d r e n who  trade hockey c a r d s .  -to s t u Pro-  151  bably  the most d i f f i c u l t problem to r e s o l v e c o n c e r n i n g  of t h i s c o n d i t i o n i s to work out how many d i f f e r e n t in a relationship —  resources are i n v o l v e d  f o r example, do students exchange o n l y h e l p , o r i s  companionship a l s o a reason f o r the r e l a t i o n s h i p ? s u f f i c i e n t t o note  the a p p l i c a b i l i t y  I n a d d i t i o n , i t i s not  t h a t a group has f o u r o r more members, b u t t h a t t h e a l -  t e r n a t i v e exchange p a r t n e r s a r e i n f a c t a v a i l a b l e t o e n t e r exchange t r a n s a c tions. 2.  Marginal u t i l i t y function I t i s a simple matter t o note t h a t the more we get of a r e s o u r c e ,  the l e s s we v a l u e even more o f i t . 1 - I n t u i t i v e l y , t h i s p r i n c i p l e seems to apply to h e l p , d e f e r e n c e , a p p r o v a l , and i n r e v e r s e , to time and e f f o r t  4 g i v e n up.  I t i s much l e s s simple  t o s p e c i f y the p e r i o d s o f time over which  s a t i a t i o n and d e p r i v a t i o n w i l l take p l a c e , and the u n i t s i n which w i l l be o b t a i n e d o r g i v e n up. arbitrarily, i t is difficult or n o t .  resources  Without b e i n g a b l e t o s p e c i f y the u n i t s , even t o know whether t h i s i n i t i a l  c o n d i t i o n i s met  I n a d d i t i o n , some r e s o u r c e s , such as money, or v o t e s , t h a t can be  used as r e s o u r c e s i n exchange, are not always v a l u e d a c c o r d i n g to a m a r g i n a l utility  function.  T h i s seems to imply  t h a t the second i n i t i a l c o n d i t i o n  could be g e n e r a l i z e d t o s p e c i f y o n l y t h a t t h e r e be a d i f f e r e n t i a l v a l u a t i o n of r e s o u r c e s , t o p r o v i d e a b a s i s f o r exchange. 3.  The c o n d i t i o n t h a t i n d i v i d u a l s know o r be a b l e t o i n f e r t h e v a l u e f u n c t i o n s o f o t h e r s seems at once a very l i m i t e d and a w i d e l y a p p l i c a b l e statement. There i s a v a s t a r r a y of people  i n the w o r l d whose v a l u e f u n c t i o n s  we do not know, b u t at the same time, we a r e n o t so l i k e l y  to enter  into  152  exchanges w i t h  them,  f C o n t i n u i n g i n t e r a c t i o n i n exchange r e l a t i o n s h i p s  b u i l d s up a s t o r e o f i n f o r m a t i o n about t h e outcomes t h a t Other has pursued most e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y , the t r a n s a c t i o n s that have g i v e n him the most s a t i s f a c t i o n , and the^ terms of t r a n s a c t i o n s he has agreed t o w i t h with others.  I n a d d i t i o n , people can g e n e r a l i z e t h i s k i n d o f i n f o r m a t i o n to  s i m i l a r others  i n similar situations.  The second p a r t of Scope c o n d i t i o n  3, t h a t p e o p l e do not know how much of a r e s o u r c e the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of the theory i n c l o s e contact probably  o n e s e l f and  are l i k e l y  some o t h e r s  have,limits  to a narrower range o f s i t u a t i o n s .  People,  to know what each o t h e r has; some r e l a t i o n s h i p s  demand f u l l i n f o r m a t i o n , such as i s found i n f a m i l i e s .  Neverthe-  l e s s , a c t o r s o f t e n have d i s c r e t i o n over t h e i n f o r m a t i o n a v a i l a b l e about them, and p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n the e a r l y stages  o f i n t e r a c t i o n i n v o l v i n g new  r e s o u r c e s , p e o p l e w i l l o f t e n n o t be c e r t a i n about t h e r e s o u r c e bases o f potential partners.  (Even i n extended i n t e r a c t i o n s such as the f a m i l y ,  husbands have been known to c o n c e a l  from o t h e r members the s i z e o f t h e i r  incomes.) 4.  Opportunity The  t o compare p r o f i t s  opportunity  t o compare p r o f i t s i n exchanges i s a consequence  of the d i s t r i b u t i o n of i n f o r m a t i o n , which can change.over time. o f t e n occur  t h a t exchange p a r t n e r s  I t may  do n o t know how the o t h e r gains a t t h e  time o f the t r a n s a c t i o n , and t h a t comparison l a t e r becomes p o s s i b l e when one  i s a b l e t o observe the o t h e r ' s  t i o n , what he does w i t h  subsequent r e a c t i o n (e.g., h i s s a t i s f a c -  the p r o f i t , o r what he t e l l s o t h e r s ) .  p o i n t s t o the e a r l y stages  o f exchange r e l a t i o n s h i p s t h a t w i l l  Again,  this  c o n t i n u e , or  to e s t a b l i s h e d ones i n which d i f f e r e n t commodities a r e i n t r o d u c e d .  I f ex-  153  change networks a r e w e l l connected, time, i t i s l e s s l i k e l y  and have e x i s t e d over a l o n g p e r i o d o f  t h a t members would be unable  the time o f the exchange.  t o compare p r o f i t s a t  TT-here a r e e x c e p t i o n s , o f c o u r s e , such as l a b o u r -  union n e g o t i a t i o n s , i n which comparison, o r a t l e a s t , honest  comparison of  outcomes at the time o f b a r g a i n i n g i s d e l i b e r a t e l y avoided by both The  d e s i r e t o compare p r o f i t s seems to t y p i f y a g r e a t many  relationships,  and may l e a d t o i n f o r m a t i o n - g a t h e r i n g where t h e r e i s inadequate to a l l o w 5.  parties.  information  comparison.  T o t a l r e s o u r c e s i n the group c o n s t a n t For s h o r t p e r i o d s o f time, most simple exchange r e l a t i o n s h i p s can  be t y p i f i e d as constant-sum s i t u a t i o n s .  Even i f r e s o u r c e s  i n c r e a s e at regu-  l a r i n t e r v a l s , as i n the case o f income, consumption u s u a l l y ensures  that  the r e s o u r c e bases o f members do n o t a l t e r d r a m a t i c a l l y , and i f they do, it  occurs i n a p r e d i c t a b l e f a s h i o n .  However, the f i f t h scope c o n d i t i o n  r u l e s out the many i n t e r a c t i o n s — i n which people j o i n t l y produce new r e s o u r c e s , or when a d d i t i o n a l amounts o f r e s o u r c e s a r e i n j e c t e d i n t o the group from an e x t e r n a l source.  I n such c a s e s , t h e r e a r e o f t e n enough rewards to  s a t i s f y everyone, and c o o p e r a t i o n and t r u s t a r e more l i k e l y  to p r e v a i l .  Where rewards o f P^and 0 a r e p o s i t i v e l y c o r r e l a t e d , the s h a r i n g o f i n f o r m a t i o n i s more t y p i c a l , s i n c e i t i n c r e a s e s both p a r t i e s ' a b i l i t y 5 and  o b t a i n f u r t h e r rewards.  I n such c a s e s , problems o f f a i r n e s s tend to  i n v o l v e q u e s t i o n s o f p r o p o r t i o n a l r e t u r n s on investments, t i o n s a r e n o t handled  to c o o r d i n a t e ,  and these  by the assumptions of the theory p r e s e n t e d  ques-  i n this  study  154  6.  Some members can w i t h o l d  i n f o r m a t i o n , but not g i v e out f a l s e  informa-  tion I t might a t f i r s t  seem t h a t i n any s i t u a t i o n where P can c o n t r o l  i n f o r m a t i o n , he w i l l , i n a d d i t i o n , g i v e out f a l s e i n f o r m a t i o n that  construes  the s i t u a t i o n t o h i s advantage, r a t h e r than r i s k t h e chance t h a t Other w i l l make assumptions unfavourable s t r a i n t s against f a l s i f i c a t i o n ,  to P.  However, t h e r e a r e many con-  not the l e a s t o f which are s a n c t i o n s meted  out f o r l y i n g , but which a r e n o t a p p l i e d f o r s a y i n g n o t h i n g .  One can a l s o  be s e l e c t i v e i n the r e l e a s e o f i n f o r m a t i o n , so that o n l y t h a t s e r v i n g one's 7 i n t e r e s t i s made a v a i l a b l e .  I f P simply w i t h o l d s  t i o n s made by 0 w i l l o f t e n be f a v o u r a b l e  i n f o r m a t i o n , the assump-  t o P, as when 0 b e l i e v e s everyone  w i l l a c t f a i r l y , o r i f t h e r e a r e norms a g a i n s t s u s p e c t i n g o t h e r motives.  The key to o b t a i n i n g an.advantage probably  lies  people's  i n selecting  8 o c c a s i o n s where the r i g h t assumptions w i l l be made. c o n d i t i o n 6 i s more l i k e l y  to be a p p l i c a b l e to the e a r l y stages  a c t i o n , such as the f e n c i n g t h a t occurs stages  Once a g a i n , Scope of i n t e r -  a t c o c k t a i l p a r t i e s , the e a r l y  o f d a t i n g , or i n r e l a t i o n s h i p s where the members cannot o b t a i n an  immediate independent v e r i f i c a t i o n of the cues g i v e n by P.  (For examplej  l i t t l e b r o t h e r s and s i s t e r s who t e l l s e c r e t s undermine the c o n t r o l o f c r u c i a l i n f o r m a t i o n i n r e l a t i o n s h i p s as d i v e r s e as the.swapping o f hockey c a r d s , and impressing Our  a new b o y f r i e n d . )  i n t e r r o g a t o r may now o b j e c t that t o p r o v i d e  instances f o r  each o f the scope c o n d i t i o n s s e p a r a t e l y does n o t ensure they w i l l i n any given s i t u a t i o n . objection.  a l l hold  There a r e two r e p l i e s t h a t may be made t o such an  155  1. an a b s t r a c t  F i r s t , we would argue t h a t the assessment o f the r e l e v a n c e o f t h e o r e t i c a l formulation  on t h e a b i l i t y  such as t h i s one does n o t r e s t s o l e l y  t o go out and count up a l a r g e number o f c o n c r e t e  meet the assumptions and scope c o n d i t i o n s the n a t u r a l s c i e n c e s o r e t i c a l formulations One  contains  of the t h e o r y .  many i n s t a n c e s  cases  that  1'The h i s t o r y o f  o f seemingly i r r e l e v a n t t h e -  which l a t e r proved t o have important a p p l i c a t i o n s .  reason f o r t h i s seems to be that u n t i l a p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r p r e t i v e frame-  work i s developed f o r a s e t of e v e n t s , we do n o t c h a r a c t e r i z e o r r e c o g n i z e the events as i n s t a n c e s  that f i t t h a t  framework.  In a d d i t i o n , p r o c e s s e s t h a t o c c u r i n f r e q u e n t l y the  (or not at a l l ) i n  ' r e a l w o r l d ' a r e n o t n e c e s s a r i l y unimportant by v i r t u e o f b e i n g  f o r they may p r o v i d e  the occasion  f o r t e s t i n g p r e d i c t i o n s about  p r i n c i p l e s which a r e u s u a l l y confounded w i t h other p r o c e s s e s . strongest is  arguments i n favour  that i t allows  of a r t i f i c i a l i t y  us to e l i m i n a t e  us  underlying  One o f the experimentation  f a c t o r s n o t s p e c i f i e d i n the t h e o r y .  the r e s u l t s w i l l bear u n e q u i v o c a l l y making d i f f i c u l t  i n laboratory  infrequent  Then  on the soundness o f t h e p r o p o s i t i o n s ,  the p r e v a r i c a t i o n t h a t  f i n d i n g support f o r our p r e d i c t i o n s .  'other  f a c t o r s ' may have p r e v e n t e d  The r e s u l t s i n t h e p r e s e n t  study,  f o r example, make i t c l e a r t h a t our p r o p o s i t i o n s a r e n o t adequate t o account f o r t h e b e h a v i o u r o f a l l our s u b j e c t s , and t h a t f u r t h e r r e f i n e m e n t o f t h e  9 assumptions and o p e r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n a r e n e c e s s a r y . A further j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r studying  p r o c e s s e s which may occur  o n l y i n f r e q u e n t l y i s t h a t these p r o c e s s e s can have important and l o n g consequences.  term  I n our c a s e , f o r example, the p r o c e s s o f e s t a b l i s h i n g the  terms o f t r a n s a c t i o n s  to favour  o n e s e l f may occur r a r e l y , because we tend  156  to l e t most of exchange proceed by h a b i t , a c c o r d i n g Nevertheless, acceptable  i f an a c t o r can  2)  The  i n f l u e n c e the i n i t i a l e x p e c t a t i o n s  conditions  together  e r a l of the scope c o n d i t i o n s t i o n s , e i t h e r when a new are n e g o t i a t i n g  i n concrete  typify  We  there i s l o g i c a l l y  We  s e t of resources  f o r which there be  of exchange c o n t e x t s .  have access to i n f o r m a t i o n  the o r g a n i z a t i o n , than would workers who  the  to  employees  about the t r u e  costs  must i n f e r management's employees.  would p r e d i c t t h a t the s u c c e s s of  'games-  manship' ( i n which people.engage i n the s e l e c t i v e r e l e a s e of i n f o r m a t i o n puts them i n a f a v o u r a b l e also  l i g h t ) . w o u l d be  'honest p l a y e r s ' i n the group, who  information.  Unpleasant f e e l i n g s m i g h t  severely  typically  conceal  the s a t i s f a c t i o n he had  constrained released  obtained  i f he d i d not  that  i f t h e r e were  a l l relevant  a r i s e toward a p e r s o n who  from the s e l e c t i v e r e l e a s e of i n f o r m a t i o n ,  no  be  For example,  the ambiguous b a s i s . o f wage o f f e r s p r e s e n t e d to the the theory  are  shown to  used to p r e d i c t t h a t employees would be more w i l l i n g  organizations,  sev-  the e a r l y stages of exchange i n t e r a c -  b e l i e v e the scope c o n d i t i o n s may  share i n d e c i s i o n making and  Again,in  no  have suggested t h a t  accept wage r e s t r a i n t (lower p r o f i t ) i n a company i n which the  t r u e c o s t s on  scope  s e t of a c t o r s are e s t a b l i s h i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p s , or  t y p i c a l of s e v e r a l d i f f e r e n t kinds  borne by  routine  s i t u a t i o n s i s t h a t the s e t of  occur t o g e t h e r .  the p r i c e s of a new  valuations.  might be  of whether a l l our  are not m u t u a l l y e x c l u s i v e , and  reason to expect they w i l l not  theory  about  future.  second r e p l y to the q u e s t i o n  c o n d i t i o n s a r e e v e r met  standard  terms.  terms i n t r a n s a c t i o n s , i t can e x e r c i s e an i n f l u e n c e on  i n t e r a c t i o n w e l l i n t o the  initial  to standard  had  benefitted  a l s o c o n t i n u e to  from the advantage.  ','i'The r e c i p r o c a l  157  t r a d i n g of votes  on i s s u e s of d i f f e r e n t  importance to d i f f e r e n t  i n p o l i t i c a l spheres c o u l d a l s o be an a r e a i n which the theory made p r e d i c t i v e . t r u e c o s t and  For example,muerit e f f o r t  i s probably  reward l e v e l s i n such c a s e s , w h i l e  i n f o r m a t i o n about the Other i s v e r y h i g h .  spent  people could  be  i n concealing  the d e s i r e f o r r e l i a b l e  Other examples i n i n f o r m a l r e -  l a t i o n s h i p s such as d a t i n g networks,people i n c o o p e r a t i v e houses where c o s t s are assessed  r e l a t i v e to w e a l t h , students  h e l p , c o u l d probably~be shown to s a t i s f y 10 t i o n s of the We  the complete s e t of scope condi-.'  theory. w i l l not  continue with  a list  of p o s s i b l e i n s t a n c e s of  t i o n s that c o u l d p o s s i b l y be accounted f o r by mention some i s s u e s which t h i s study Suggestions f o r Future  The  support  degree of c o n f i d e n c e was  still  engaging i n r e c i p r o c a l  the t h e o r y , but w i l l  suggests would m e r i t  further research.  f o r the hypotheses d e s c r i b e d i n Chapter 4 g i v e s us i n the assumptions on which they were based, but We  f o r the f a i l u r e , but  a  there  cannot be c e r t a i n  the assumptions, the hypotheses, or the o p e r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n are  profits  now  Research  a good d e a l of e r r o r i n the p r e d i c t i o n s .  I t was  situa-  i t i s p o s s i b l e to make some r e a s o n a b l e  responsible 11  guesses.  assumed t h a t people are not o n l y concerned w i t h  i n exchange, but a l s o w i t h a comparison of p r o f i t s .  We  their  own  argued t h a t  p e o p l e p r e f e r r e d to g a i n more than o t h e r s , p a r t i c u l a r l y where the t o t a l r e sources  are c o n s t a n t ,  s i n c e a g a i n to 0 i s a l o s s to P.  I t seemed c l e a r i n  the experiments, however, t h a t not a l l s u b j e c t s were i n t e r e s t e d i n comparison of p r o f i t s , and  t h a t i n d i v i d u a l d i f f e r e n c e s i n o r i e n t a t i o n to o t h e r s  may  158  be  an important f a c t o r needing i n v e s t i g a t i o n .  m o t i v a t e d to compare w i t h o t h e r s do so v a r i e s a c r o s s  People are a l l l i k e l y  i n some s i t u a t i o n s , but  i n d i v i d u a l s and  across  to  be  the m o t i v a t i o n  to  s i t u a t i o n s , i n a manner t h a t  needs much more s p e c i f i c a t i o n . We others'  argued t h a t comparison i s s a l i e n t  gains  compare how  and  l o s s e s , but  w e l l he  will  i t i s c l e a r that no one  can  can  observe  systematically  does i n r e l a t i o n to a l l p o s s i b l e p a r t n e r s ,  t e d c o g n i t i v e c a p a c i t y , and of great  f o r p e e r s who  the i n c r e a s i n g c o s t s of doing so.  due  to  limi-  I t would  be  i n t e r e s t to be a b l e to p r e d i c t the subset of o t h e r s w i t h whom P  choose to compare.  Recent s t u d i e s i n s o c i a l comparison theory  could  12 p o s s i b l y provide  p r i n c i p l e s t h a t might be  A further question  cess i n f o r m a t i o n  chart.  made v e r y  others  Even so, some s u b j e c t s  I t must be  value  outcomes.  easy f o r s u b j e c t s by  i n the manner p r e d i c t e d , and  'too much t r o u b l e ' .  i s the  take the p o i n t of view of o t h e r s , i f  b a s e s , to assess how  the experiments, t h i s p r o c e s s was v i s i o n of the v a l u e  theory.  a r i s i n g from the comparison of p r o f i t s  soundness of the assumption t h a t P can he knows t h e i r resource  i n t e g r a t e d i n t o our  d i d not  In  the  pro-  appear to p r o -  some commented t h a t i t  was  admitted t h a t people o f t e n f i n d i t s i m p l e r  to proceed through a p r o c e s s of t r i a l  and  e r r o r , making adjustments i f  something goes wrong, or i f P does not manage to o b t a i n a l e v e l of reward that i s adequate. In a d d i t i o n , terms o f exchange are o f t e n a matter of h a b i t h i s t o r y , and  do not  involve  ( r e g u l a r ) and  continuous n e g o t i a t i o n .  One  and of  the f u n c t i o n s of s o c i a l standards of f a i r n e s s i s to r e l i e v e the a c t o r of chore of n e g o t i a t i n g each encounter a f r e s h , and  any  the  d e c i s i o n s he makes about  159  entering  t r a n s a c t i o n s may  r e l a t e to s e l e c t i n g those whose standard  terms  are a t t r a c t i v e . In s p i t e of the f a c t way,  t h a t r o l e - t a k i n g may  i n most i n t e r a c t i o n , we would argue t h a t :  not occur i n a r o u t i n e  l ) i f the rewards a r e impor-  t a n t to P, o r i f 'something goes wrong', and h i s normal l e v e l of rewards i s d i s r u p t e d , i t w i l l be worth h i s w h i l e to take the p o i n t other new  to r e - a s s e s s  what terms he i s able  or unique r e l a t i o n s h i p s a r e f i r s t  of view of  to get i n an exchange, and 2) when  e s t a b l i s h e d , some n e g o t i a t i o n o f terms  13 f o r the r e l a t i o n s h i p i s r e q u i r e d . ' The widespread p e r c e p t i o n  o f advantage i n c o n c e a l e d r e s o u r c e s  the experiment l e a d s us to b e l i e v e that we of exchange r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  are addressing  manner i n which asymmetric i n f o r m a t i o n  that 0 was  a r t i c u l a t e about the  c o u l d be used to g i v e 0 the impres-  good terms to agree to a t r a n s a c t i o n , at the same time  kept to terms r e f l e c t i n g h i s t r u e needs.  people p e r c e i v e d  a m e a n i n g f u l aspect  Apart from a vague sense t h a t i t i s 'good to  keep one's a f f a i r s p r i v a t e ' , many s u b j e c t s were very  s i o n that P required  in  TT-he f a c t t h a t more  an advantage, than made advantageous o f f e r s , may mean  t h a t the advantage can operate i n d i f f e r e n t ways. periment, one advantage l a y i n p r e v e n t i n g made s e v e r a l t r a n s a c t i o n s . )  others  I t i s also l i k e l y  (For example, from knowing  that  i n the ex-  t h a t P had  t a c t i c s work o n l y i f  used s p a r i n g l y : T a c t i c s ^ a r e h i g h l y , p e r s o n a l , s u b t l e , and evanescent; t h e i r outcome depends on the c o r r e c t (or i n c o r r e c t ) i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of any one o r more o f many b e h a v i o u r a l cues, which may themselves be genuine or p r e t e n d e d ; and the net e f f e c t o f t e n i n v o l v e s such complex i n t e r a c t i o n s as what A t h i n k s B t h i n k s about what A i s thinking.-*-^  160  While i t may mulation process  of how  be  t r u e that t a c t i c s are not used r e g u l a r l y , our  P takes O's  p o i n t of view p r o v i d e s  t h a t goes beyond the s i m p l e  a rationale for this  assumption by many j-researchers t h a t asym-  m e t r i c i n f o r m a t i o n i s somehow a t a c t i c a l advantage. are  I f we  agree t h a t tactics  'evanescent', i t would be d e s i r a b l e to d e v i s e i n d i c e s of the use  t a c t i c s which are more s e n s i t i v e than the simple initiations  t h a t were used i n the p r e s e n t  expect t h a t t a c t i c s of advantage w i l l obtained  —  i f i t i s o n l y necessary  f o r the advantage to c o n t i n u e ,  The  process  to understand why without  of  p r o p o r t i o n s of advantageous  research.  In a d d i t i o n , we  would  only be used u n t i l the advantage i s  to do b e t t e r than Other once i n o r d e r  then tactic's w i l l occur  the s i t u a t i o n r e q u i r e s that the advantage be to be used w i t h g r e a t e r  infrequently.  renewed, we  expect  If  tactics  frequency.  of t a k i n g the p o i n t of view of Other a l s o h e l p s  i n f o r m a t i o n about P's  i n f o r m a t i o n , he  for-  outcomes i s so important  cannot make comparisons.  imental p r e d i c t i o n s concerning i n f o r m a t i o n g i v e s us c o n f i d e n c e  the p r e f e r e n c e  The  support  us  to 0  —  f o r the  exper-  f o r o t h e r s about whom P  i n the assumption t h a t ambiguity of  mation about an a l t e r n a t i v e l e a d s to u n c e r t a i n t y , and  has  infor-  t h a t t h i s reduces  the  expected v a l u e of an a l t e r n a t i v e . We  argued t h a t s u b j e c t s would p r e f e r to have unambiguous  t i o n about a p a r t n e r ' s about some O t h e r s ,  r e s o u r c e s , and  t h a t i f such i n f o r m a t i o n was  t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n would be p r o c e s s e d  about the p r o b a b i l i t y of acceptance of o f f e r s , and exchanges.  Subjects  informaavailable  to make i n f e r e n c e s  the f a i r n e s s of  different  i n the experiments seemed to have b e l i e v e d t h a t  c o u l d d i s c o v e r the n o n - v i s i b l e s ' t r u e p r o f i t s by means of the types o f f e r s the l a t t e r made and  accepted.  they of  However, g i v e n t h a t such i n f e r e n c e s  might be u n r e i l i a b r e ; , they p r e f e r r e d a l t e r n a t i v e s f o r which more c e r t a i n  161  i n f o r m a t i o n was preference  already a v a i l a b l e .  The  extension  of f i n d i n g s c o n c e r n i n g  a  f o r r i s k over u n c e r t a i n t y , to the case of degrees of u n c e r t a i n t y  i n s o c i a l s i t u a t i o n s , seems a p r o m i s i n g  a r e a of i n q u i r y .  I f we  can  even-  t u a l l y d e l i n e a t e the f a c t o r s i n a s i t u a t i o n which l e a d to a g r e a t e r  or  l e s s e r degree of u n c e r t a i n t y , then a s o c i a l c h o i c e model i n c o r p o r a t i n g u n c e r t a i n t y as suggested i n t h i s t h e s i s , would be a c o n t r i b u t i o n . that c o u l d be  i n v e s t i g a t e d i n c l u d e P's  b e l i e f s about O's  Factors  self-interest,  ( f o r example, the tendency of powerless p e o p l e to a t t r i b u t e n e g a t i v e t i o n s to o t h e r s ) ; the v a r i a b i l i t y of i n f o r m a t i o n ,  inten-  ( f o r example, i f i t comes  from s e v e r a l d i f f e r e n t s o u r c e s ) ; the c r e d i b i l i t y o f d i f f e r e n t p e o p l e ,  (for  example, i s i n f o r m a t i o n from h i g h s t a t u s persons more c r e d i b l e than from 15 status persons?).  low  A model which s p e c i f i e d the antecedent f a c t o r s i n f l u -  encing u n c e r t a i n t y would a l s o p r o v i d e a framework f o r p r e d i c t i n g the  con-  d i t i o n s under which w i t h o l d i n g i n f o r m a t i o n c o u l d succeed as a t a c t i c , ( f o r example, when no a l t e r n a t i v e s p r o v i d e  r e l i a b l e i n f o r m a t i o n , or when a l t e r -  n a t i v e s about whom t h e r e i s r e l i a b l e i n f o r m a t i o n are u n d e s i r a b l e on  other  grounds). The  s i x cases  o f . i n f o r m a t i o n and  a l t e r n a t i v e s d e s c r i b e d at  the  end of Chapter 1 c o u l d be a s s i m i l a t e d i n t o the theory by making a l t e r a t i o n s i n the scope c o n d i t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g  the number of a l t e r n a t i v e p a r t n e r s ,  the amount of i n f o r m a t i o n a v a i l a b l e about them. to use  the assumptions i n the theory  and  I t would then be p o s s i b l e  to make p r e d i c t i o n s f o r the s i x c a s e s .  T h i s would have the advantage of i n t e g r a t i n g a somewhat a t h e o r e t i c a l body of work c o n c e r n i n g  i n f o r m a t i o n i n n e g o t i a t i o n i n t o a s i n g l e framework  and  162  extend the c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of b a r g a i n i n g  to i n c l u d e the e f f e c t s of a r e -  source base a g a i n s t which p r o f i t s are c a l c u l a t e d . The ference do not  c o n s i s t e n t m i n o r i t y o f s u b j e c t s who,did not  f o r v i s i b l e s i n the experiments r e q u i r e s some comment. permit an unambiguous ad hoc  w i t h hidden r e s o u r c e s , cases c o u l d be 1)  display a  There may  explanation  of i n i t i a t i o n s  and at l e a s t three ways of a c c o u n t i n g  The to  predata  players  f o r the  negative  pursued: be  Ellsberg,and  i n d i v i d u a l d i f f e r e n c e s i n the avoidance of MacCrimmon,, note that o n l y some s u b j e c t s  uncertainty.  display a prefer-  ence f o r r i s k y over u n c e r t a i n b e t s , when the b e t s have e q u a l expected 16 value.  I n d i v i d u a l d i f f e r e n c e s i n the a b i l i t y  to a n t i c i p a t e the  l i h o o d of h a v i n g an o f f e r accepted might have l e d some s u b j e c t s o f f e r s to the l e s s p o p u l a r n o n - v i s i b l e s ; and  t h e r e may  These f a c t o r s  r e l a t e to d i f f e r e n t components of the d e c i s i o n f u n c t i o n g i v e n  of an exchange w i t h a n o n - v i s i b l e  than t h a t w i t h a v i s i b l e , but  f u n c t i o n was  i t i s not  or the v a l u e  F u t u r e work could e x p l o r e  was  c l e a r which p a r t of  to P of comparison w i t h  the p o s s i b i l i t y of d e v e l o p i n g  c o n c e i v e s of the a c t o r as randomly c o n s i d e r i n g ties —  the  the  a f f e c t e d , i . e . , the p r o b a b i l i t y of a c c e p t a n c e , the w e i g h t -  i n g of u n c e r t a i n t y , 2)  i n Assump-  I n i t i a t i o n s to n o n - v i s i b l e s were taken to i n d i c a t e t h a t  s u b j e c t i v e l y expected v a l u e greater  to d i r e c t  w e l l be i n d i v i d u a l  d i f f e r e n c e s i n the d e s i r e to compare p r o f i t s w i t h o t h e r s .  t i o n 5.  like-  one  0. a model t h a t  of t h r e e  possibili-  that a n o n - v i s i b l e i s b e t t e r , as good, or worse than a v a i l a b l e  v i s i b l e partners.  T h i s might then l e a d to the t w o - t h i r d s  of the  subjects  163  who  on average made o f f e r s to v i s i b l e s ,  represent  those who  the r o n - v i s i b l e s .  i . e . , t h i s p r o p o r t i o n would  b e l i e v e d the v i s i b l e s were as good or b e t t e r than  T h i s would be  i n accordance w i t h E l l s b e r g ' s sugges-  t i o n that s u b j e c t s w i l l p r e f e r r i s k to u n c e r t a i n t y , i f the r i s k y n a t i v e i s estimated  to be as good or b e t t e r than the u n c e r t a i n one.  remaining o n e - t h i r d of the s u b j e c t s who  h o l d the b e l i e f t h a t the  v i s i b l e s would make b e t t e r p a r t n e r s would then account f o r the of s u b j e c t s who  alter-  d i d not  act a c c o r d i n g  to the theory  The  non-  proportion  as i t now  stands.  Such a model would r e q u i r e a more d e t a i l e d d e s c r i p t i o n of the f a c t o r s the a c t o r takes i n t o account i n d e c i d i n g t h a t one 'good' as another, and d e c i s i o n processes 3)  We  alternative is  more s e n s i t i v e methods of measuring the  'as  subjects'  during i n t e r a c t i o n .  can a l s o conceive  of the s u b j e c t s as a s s i g n i n g p o s i t i v e expected  value  to exchanges w i t h both v i s i b l e s and  value  to the former.  O f f e r s may  be  n o n - v i s i b l e s , but  directed i n proportion  a  higher  to the  rela-  t i v e expected v a l u e , i . e . , frequency of i n i t i a t i o n / n = expected v a l u e EV  (visible  ( v i s i b l e ) + EV  partner)  (non-visible)  Ins such a model, a c e r t a i n s m a l l e r p r o p o r t i o n of o f f e r s would be ted to go  to n o n - v i s i b l e s , and  opportunity  f o r exchange.  tasks never show a 100% pected  value,  some of these might be sent on the  Studies  of c h o i c e  c h o i c e of the a l t e r n a t i v e s w i t h  i f s u b j e c t s are given a s e r i e s of  i s compounded by  first  i n p r o b a b i l i t y matching the h i g h e s t  the f a c t t h a t p r o b a b i l i t y and  ex-  choices.  In a l l . t h e s e c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n s , the d i f f i c u l t problem of a s s e s s i n g value  expec-  utility interact  expected —  164  the more d e s i r a b l e a t r a n s a c t i o n t o P, the l e s s l i k e l y cause i t i s u n d e s i r a b l e process,  t o 0.  though i m p r e c i s e ,  i t i s to o c c u r , be-  The l e x i c o g r a p h i c r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e c h o i c e  seems p l a u s i b l e i n l i g h t o f t h e d a t a .  c l e a r that subjects d i d i n fact  consider p r o f i t  I t seems  to s e l f as the most  important  f a c t o r , i n d i c a t e d i n the acceptance of o f f e r s g i v i n g the l a r g e s t p r o f i t , r e g a r d l e s s o f source  (e.g., Set A, T r i a l 1 ) . When p r o f i t  c o n s t a n t , by d e l i v e r i n g f a l s i f i e d o f f e r s , the a b i l i t y with  t o P was h e l d  to compare p r o f i t s  the p a r t n e r seemed to l e a d a m a j o r i t y o f s u b j e c t s t o accept  the v i s i -  bles. In s p i t e of the negative, c a s e s , preference  f o r p a r t n e r s w i t h known r e s o u r c e  i n our e x p l a n a t i o n of the process not  t u r n out to be a s u f f i c i e n t  preference  f o r the p r e d i c t e d  l e v e l s g i v e s up more  confidence  by which concealment o f i n f o r m a t i o n does  t a c t i c t o ensure advantageous exchanges.  The  f o r i n f o r m a t i o n and the i n f e r e n c e s made about those who w i t h o l d  i n f o r m a t i o n , appear to l i m i t partners  the evidence  are a v a i l a b l e .  the success  of such a t a c t i c when a l t e r n a t i v e  I t has a l r e a d y been noted that t h e theory  c o u l d be  extended .to make p r e d i c t i o n s - f o r cases when there a r e no a l t e r n a t i v e s , and i n f o r m a t i o n i s d i f f e r e n t l y d i s t r i b u t e d , and f u t u r e work c o u l d i n v o l v e a systematic  t e s t o f the d i f f e r e n t The  cases.  paradigm used i n t h i s study  i n the use o f i n f o r m a t i o n a l t a c t i c s . r e l e a s e o f i n f o r m a t i o n about r e s o u r c e s  lends i t s e l f  to f u r t h e r research  I n p p a r t i c u l a r , d i s c r e t i o n over the c o u l d be simply v a r i e d , by  the booths w i t h i n d i c a t o r s o f t h e numbers o f d i f f e r e n t c o l o u r e d  equipping  buttons.  These i n d i c a t o r s c o u l d be c o n t r o l l e d by the experimenter o r by the s u b j e c t s .  165  I t i s not n e c e s s a r y more t r i a l s  c o u l d be  that buttons  change hands i n the experiment, and many  run i f i n d i c a t o r s were used to r e c o r d , h o n e s t l y  h o n e s t l y , s u c c e s s i v e changes i n r e s o u r c e bases through exchange. a l s o be p o s s i b l e to v a r y that d e c e p t i o n  or  dis-  I t would  the type of v a l u e f u n c t i o n a c r o s s s u b j e c t s , so  c o u l d occur  concerning  both the s i z e of the base, and  the  value f u n c t i o n . The  f o r e g o i n g d i s c u s s i o n should make i t c l e a r t h a t t h e r e i s scope  f o r f u r t h e r r e s e a r c h based on the t h e o r y , even w i t h i n the p r e s e n t t a l paradigm.  I t s h o u l d a l s o be p o s s i b l e to d e s i g n d i f f e r e n t  experiments  t h a t overcome some of the weaknesses i n the paradigm used i n t h i s such as the confounding of l o n g - and  short-term  g a i n , and  o f c r e a t i n g doubt about the r e s o u r c e bases of concealed  the  experimen-  study,  difficulty  subjects.  Computer  t e r m i n a l s o f f e r a l o t of p o t e n t i a l f o r both r e c o r d i n g the s u b j e c t s '  reac-  t i o n s throughout an e x p e r i m e n t a l  exchange s i t u a t i o n , and  the o t h e r members o f a  Because attempts at advantageous exchange  seem more l i k e l y  'group'.  for simulating  to succeed i f t r i e d o n l y o c c a s i o n a l l y , i t may  be  that  s t u d i e s would f u r t h e r a i d i n the d e l i n e a t i o n of c o n d i t i o n s antecedent attempts by s o c i a l a c t o r s to o b t a i n advantage, and in carrying i t off.  field to  the mechanisms i n v o l v e d  166  FOOTNOTES FOR  CHAPTER 5  1.  M. Webster, J r . , and J.B. K e r v i n , ' A r t i f i c i a l i t y i n e x p e r i m e n t a l s o c i o l o g y ' , Canadian Review of S o c i o l o g y and A n t h r o p o l o g y , 8_, 1971, p. 268.  2.  The process of p r e d i c t i o n i s not so s i m p l e , of c o u r s e , because one theory does not i n c l u d e p r o p o s i t i o n s about a l l the f a c t o r s i n a p a r t i c u l a r c o n c r e t e s i t u a t i o n t h a t may c o n t r i b u t e to and change the v a l u e s t h a t the v a r i a b l e s assume i n t h a t s i t u a t i o n .  3.  See: A. Kuhn, The Study of S o c i e t y : A U n i f i e d Approach, London: T a v i s t o c k P u b l i c a t i o n s , 1966, pp. 260-61.  4.  For example, the v a r i e t y of o c c a s i o n s on which the e x p r e s s i o n c o a l s to Newcastle' i s used, i s testimony to t h i s f a c t .  5.  F r i e n d s p r o b a b l y s e l e c t a c t i v i t i e s t h a t are c h a r a c t e r i z e d by p o s i t i v e l y c o r r e l a t e d rewards,, or i n which those a s p e c t s can be emphasized. In a d d i t i o n , such - a c t i v i t i e s a l s o would generate p o s i t i v e sentiment and f e e l i n g s of f r i e n d s h i p ,  6.  The i s s u e of p r o p o r t i o n a l r e t u r n f o r investments i s u s u a l l y r e f e r r e d to as d i s t r i b u t i v e j u s t i c e or e q u i t y . See, f o r example, G.C. Homans, S o c i a l ! . B e h a v i o u r : I t s Elementary Forms, New York: H a r c o u r t , Brace and World, 1961, pp. 232-264.  7.  P r e s s c e n s o r s h i p i s based on the s e l e c t i v e r e l e a s e of i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t supposedly r e i n f o r c e s a p a r t i c u l a r d e f i n i t i o n of the s i t u a t i o n . I t s e f f e c t i v e n e s s i s p r o b a b l y dependent on whether r e a d e r s s u s p e c t they are b e i n g g i v e n only p a r t of the f a c t s .  8.  P a r a d o x i c a l l y , the d e s i r e for advantage i s l i k e l y to be lower when cond i t i o n s are most f a v o u r a b l e f o r i t s s u c c e s s , as when t r u s t e x i s t s between the p a r t i e s . P would r i s k a l o s s over the l o n g run i f he v i o l a t e d t r u s t , because i t would d i s r u p t the r e l a t i o n s h i p .  9.  A f u r t h e r advantage of making a c o n t r o l l e d t e s t of p r e d i c t i o n s from exp l i c i t assumptions and scope c o n d i t i o n s i s t h a t we then have a b e t t e r i d e a of where the weaknesses l i e . F a c t o r s which have been c o n t r o l l e d or e l i m i n a t e d cannot be blamed f o r n e g a t i v e f i n d i n g s , and t h i s narrows the range of d i r e c t i o n s to take i n r e v i s i n g p r e d i c t i o n s .  'carrying  r  10.  Z e l d i t c h makes the p o i n t t h a t d i s p u t e s about the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of a theory depend f o r t h e i r u l t i m a t e r e s o l u t i o n on d e s c r i p t i v e knowledge of a p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n . However, e x p e r i m e n t a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n can be u s e f u l f o r s t u d y i n g the e f f e c t o f p r o c e s s e s that were n e g l e c t e d or h e l d c o n s t a n t i n the e a r l i e r t e s t s of the t h e o r y , but which seem to be import a n t i n a g i v e n a p p l i c a t i o n . M. Z e l d i t c h , J r . , 'Can you r e a l l y study an army i n a l a b o r a t o r y ? ' , i n A. E t z i o n i , Ed., A ^ S o c i o l o g i c a l Reader i n Complex O r g a n i z a t i o n s , New York: H o l t , R i n e h a r t and Winston, 1969, Second e d i t i o n , pp. 528-539.  167  11.  I n CChapter 3, we addressed the i s s u e of whether we had s u c c e s s f u l l y i n duced a m a r g i n a l u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n f o r the b u t t o n s , and suggested t h a t some e r r o r s i n p r e d i c t i o n c o u l d p r o b a b l y be a t t r i b u t e d t o a f a i l u r e o f the m a n i p u l a t i o n f o r some s u b j e c t s . Our d e s i g n d i d n o t a l l o w us to l o c a t e pi6:sS"'S!iib!jeGfc§ '<&§&; were ..unaffected by the m a n i p u l a t i o n . ' :  12.  See, f o r example, Bibb Latane', E d i t o r , 'Studies i n S o c i a l Comparison', Supplement 1, J o u r n a l o f E x p e r i m e n t a l S o c i a l ^Psychology, 1966.  13.  A mundane example o f t h i s i s the agreement r e q u i r e d about payment when one engages a new b a b y s i t t e r . While t h e r e appears to be a s o c i a l s t a n dard f o r t h e range- o f pay a c c e p t a b l e to both p a r t i e s , terms can v a r y a c c o r d i n g t o a b i l i t y to pay, p e r c e i v e d need of the s i t t e r , and a l t e r n a tives available.  14.  Kuhn, op. c i t . , 1966, p. 337.  15.  See, f o r example, E.E. Jones, K . J . Gergen, P. Gumpert and J.W. T h i b a u t , 'Some c o n d i t i o n s a f f e c t i n g the use o f i n g r a t i a t i o n t o i n f l u e n c e p e r s o n a l e v a l u a t i o n ' , J o u r n a l o f P e r s o n a l i t y and S o c i a l P s y c h o l o g y , 1, 1965, pp. 613-623; and D. Bramel, 'Determinants o f b e l i e f s about o t h e r p e o p l e ' , Chapter 4 i n J . M i l l s , E d i t o r , E x p e r i m e n t a l S o c i a l P s y c h o l o g y , Toronto: C o l l i e r - M a c M i l l a n , 1969; H.H. K e l l e y and A. S t a h e l s k i , ' S o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n bases o f c o o p e r a t o r s ' and c o m p e t i t o r s ' b e l i e f s about o t h e r s ' , J o u r n a l o f P e r s o n a l i t y and S o c i a l P s y c h o l o g y , jL6_, 1970, pp. 66r91; and W. '.! Thorngate, ' P r e d i c t i o n s , A t t r i b u t i o n s , and E v a l u a t i o n s of Behaviour i n Decomposed Games', Unpublished m a n u s c r i p t , U n i v e r s i t y o f A l b e r t a , Department o f Psychology,1974 .  16.  D. E l l s b e r g , 'Risk, ambiguity, and the Savage axioms', Q u a r t e r l y J o u r n a l of Economics, _6, 1961, pp. 643-669; K.R. MacCrimmon, ' D e s c r i p t i v e and normative i m p l i c a t i o n s o f the d e c i s i o n - t h e o r y p o s t u l a t e s ' , i n K. Borch and J . Mossin, E d i t o r s , R i s k and U n c e r t a i n t y , London: M a c m i l l a n , 1968.  17.  Examples o f p r o b a b i l i s t i c c h o i c e experiments a r e : those o f S i e g e l , and of Ofshe and Ofshe. See: S. S i e g e l , A.E. S i e g e l , and J . J . Andrews, C h o i c e , S t r a t e g y and U t i l i t y , New York: McGraw H i l l , 1964. L. Ofshe, and R. Ofshe, U t i l i t y and Choice i n S o c i a l I n t e r a c t i o n , Englewood C l i f f s : P r e n t i c e - H a l l , 1970.  168  BIBLIOGRAPHY  Books  Adams, J.S. I n e q u i t y i n s o c i a l exchange. S o c i a l Psychology, V o l . 2, New York: A r c h i b a l d , K. S t r a t e g i c I n t e r a c t i o n and of C a l i f o r n i a P r e s s , 1966.  I n : Advances i n E x p e r i m e n t a l Academic P r e s s , 1965. Conflict.  Berkeley:  University  B a r t o s , O.J. Towards a r a t i o n a l - e m p i r i c a l model o f n e g o t i a t i o n s . In: S o c i o l o g i c a l T h e o r i e s i n P r o g r e s s , E d i t e d by J . Berger, M. Z e l d i t c h , J r . and B. Anderson. Boston: Houghton M i f f l i n Co., 1972. B a r t o s , O.J. Simple Models o f Small Group Behaviour. U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1967. B l a l o c k , H.M. B l a u , P.M.  Social Statistics.  McGraw-Hill  Exchange and Power i n S o c i a l L i f e .  New  York:  Book Company, New  York:  Columbia  1960.  John W i l e y ,  1964.  Bramel, D. Determinants of b e l i e f s about o t h e r p e o p l e . In: Experimental S o c i a l Psychology, E d i t e d by J . M i l l s . Toronto: Collier-MacMillan, 1969. Bruner, J.S., J . J . Goodnow and G.A. John Wiley and Sons, 1956.  Austin.  A Study of T h i n k i n g .  New  York:  B u r n s t e i n , E. C o g n i t i v e f a c t o r s i n b e h a v i o u r a l interdependence. In: E x p e r i m e n t a l S o c i a l Psychology, E d i t e d by J . M i l l s . Toronto: Collier M a c M i l l a n , 1969. B u r n s t e i n , E. and S. K a t z . Group d e c i s i o n s i n v o l v i n g e q u i t a b l e and o p t i m a l d i s t r i b u t i o n s of s t a t u s . I n : E x p e r i m e n t a l S o c i a l Psychology, E d i t e d by C.G. M c C l i n t o c k . Toronto: H o l t , R e i n h a r t , 1972. Chipman, J.S. S t o c h a s t i c c h o i c e and s u b j e c t i v e p r o b a b i l i t y . In: Decisions, Values and Groups, E d i t e d by D. W i l l n e r , New York: Pergamon P r e s s , 1960. Crano, W.D. and M.B. Brewer. New York: McGraw H i l l ,  P r i n c i p l e s of Research i n S o c i a l 1973.  Psychology.  Emerson, R.M. Exchange t h e o r y : P a r t s I and I I . I n : S o c i o l o g i c a l T h e o r i e s i n P r o g r e s s , Volume I I , E d i t e d by J . Berger, M. Z e l d i t c h , J r . , and B. Anderson. Boston: H o u g h t o n - M i f f l i n , 1972.  169  Fouraker, L.E. and S. S i e g e l . H i l l Book Co., 1963.  B a r g a i n i n g Behaviour.  New York:  Goffman, E. The P r e s e n t a t i o n o f S e l f i n Everyday L i f e . Books, 1959.  McGraw  Doubleday Anchor  H a r n e t t , D.L. and L.L. Cummings. B a r g a i n i n g behaviour i n an asymmetric triad. I n : S o c i a l Choice, E d i t e d by B. Lieberman. Gordon and Breach S c i e n c e P u b l i s h e r s , 1971. Hays, W.L.  Statistics.  New York:  Homans, G.C. S o c i a l Behaviour: Brace and World, 1961.  Holt, Rinehart  and Winston, 1969.  I t s Elementary Forms.  New York:  Harcourt,  Jones, E.E. and J.W. T h i b a u t . I n t e r a c t i o n goals as bases o f i n f e r e n c e i n interpersonal perception. I n : Person P e r c e p t i o n and I n t e r p e r s o n a l Beh a v i o u r , E d i t e d by R. T a g i u r i and L. P e t r u l l o . Stanford: Stanford Univ e r s i t y P r e s s , 1959. K e l l e y , H.H. A t t r i b u t i o n t h e o r y i n s o c i a l psychology. I n : Nebraska Symposium on M o t i v a t i o n , E d i t e d by D. L e v i n e . U n i v e r s i t y of Nebraska P r e s s , 1967. K e l l e y , H.H. A classroom study of t h e dilemmas o f i n t e r p e r s o n a l n e g o t i a t i o n s . In: S t r a t e g i c I n t e r a c t i o n and C o n f l i c t , E d i t e d by K. A r c h i b a l d . Berkeley: U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a P r e s s , 1966. K e l l e y , H.H. and D.P. S c h e n i t z k i . B a r g a i n i n g . I n : E x p e r i m e n t a l S o c i a l Psychology, E d i t e d by C.G. M c C l i n t o c k , Toronto: H o l t , R i n e h a r t and Winston, 1972. K e l l e y , H.H. and J.W. T h i b a u t . Group Problem S o l v i n g . I n : The Handbook of S o c i a l Psychology, Volume IV, E d i t e d by G. L i n d z e y and E. Aronson. Addison Wesley, 1969. Kuhn, A.  The Study o f S o c i e t y .  London:  T a v i s t o c k P u b l i c a t i o n s , 1966.  Lee, W. D e c i s i o n Theory and Human Behaviour. 1971.  New York:  John Wiley  and Sons,  M c C l i n t o c k , C.G. Game behaviour and s o c i a l m o t i v a t i o n i n i n t e r p e r s o n a l s e t tings. I n : E x p e r i m e n t a l S o c i a l Psychology. E d i t e d by C.G.' M c L i n t o c k ^ Toronto:' H o l t , R i n e h a r t and Winston, 1972. ;  MacCrimmon, K.R. D e c i s i o n making among m u l t i p l e - a t t r i b u t e a l t e r n a t i v e s : a survey and c o n s o l i d a t e d approach. Memorandum, RM-4823-ARPA, Rand C o r p o r a t i o n , 1968.  170  MacCrimmon, K.R. D e s c r i p t i v e and normative i m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h e d e c i s i o n theory p o s t u l a t e s . I n : R i s k and U n c e r t a i n t y , E d i t e d by K. Borch and J . Mossin. M a c M i l l a n , 1968. Michener, H.A. and R.W. Suchner. The t a c t i c a l use o f s o c i a l power. I n : The S o c i a l I n f l u e n c e P r o c e s s e s , E d i t e d by J.T. T e d e s c h i . Chicago: A l d i n e P u b l i s h i n g Company, 1972. S c h e l l i n g , T.C. The S t r a t e g y P r e s s , 1963.  of C o n f l i c t .  S i e g e l , S., A.E. S i e g e l and J.M. Andrews. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964. T h i b a u t , J.W. and H.H. K e l l e y . John W i l e y , 1959.  Cambridge:  Harvard U n i v e r s i t y  Choice, Strategy  and U t i l i t y .  The S o c i a l Psychology o f Groups.  New York:  Vinacke, W.E. N e g o t i a t i o n s and d e c i s i o n s i n a p o l i t i c s game. I n : S o c i a l Choice, E d i t e d by B. Lieberman. Gordon and Breach Science P u b l i c a t i o n s , 1971. Walton, R.E. and R.B. McKersie. A B e h a v i o u r a l New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965.  Theory o f Labour  Negotiations.  W e i n s t e i n , E.A. The development o f i n t e r p e r s o n a l competence. I n : Handbook of S o c i a l i z a t i o n , E d i t e d by D. G o s l i n . Rand McNalley, 1968.  Articles  Becker, S.W. and F.O. Brownson. g u i t y i n d e c i s i o n making. pp. 62-73.  What p r i c e ambiguity? o r t h e r o l e o f ambiJ o u r n a l o f P o l i t i c a l Economy, 12_ (1964),  B i x e n s t e i n , V.E., L. Potash and K.V. W i l s o n . E f f e c t s o f l e v e l of cooperat i v e c h o i c e by t h e other p l a y e r on c h o i c e s i n a P r i s o n e r ' s Dilemma game. Part I . J o u r n a l o f Abnormal and S o c i a l Psychology, 66^ (1963), pp. 308313. B i x e n s t e i n , V.E., L. Potash and K.V. W i l s o n . E f f e c t s o f l e v e l o f cooperat i v e c h o i c e by t h e other p l a y e r on c h o i c e s i n a P r i s o n e r ' s Dilemma game. P a r t I I . J o u r n a l o f Abnormal and S o c i a l Psychology, 6i7_ (1963), pp. 139147. B i x e n s t e i n , V.E., N. Chambers and K.V. W i l s o n . E f f e c t o f asymmetry i n payo f f on b e h a v i o u r i n a two-person, non-zero-sum game. J o u r n a l o f Conf l i c t R e s o l u t i o n , £ (1964), pp. 151-159.  171  B l a u , P.M. J u s t i c e i n s o c i a l exchange. pp. 193-206. Blumstein, ing.  S o c i o l o g i c a l I n q u i r y , 3_4  P.W. A u d i e n c e , M a c h i a v e l l i a n i s m , and Sociometry 36 (1973), pp. 346-365.  (1964),  t a c t i c s of i d e n t i t y  bargain-  C h e r t k o f f , J.M., and M. Conley. Opening o f f e r and frequency of c o n c e s s i o n s as b a r g a i n i n g s t r a t e g i e s . J o u r n a l of P e r s o n a l i t y and S o c i a l P s y c h o l o gy, 7_ (1967), pp. 181-185. Conrath, D.W. Sex r o l e and c o o p e r a t i o n i n the game of Chicken. of C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n JJ> (1972), pp. 433-442.  Journal  Cummings, L.L., D.L. Harnett and W.C. Hamner. P e r s o n a l i t y , b a r g a i n i n g s t y l e , and p a y o f f i n b i l a t e r a l monopoly b a r g a i n i n g among European managers. Sociometry 36 (1973), pp. 325-344. Cummings, L.L. and D.L. H a r n e t t . B a r g a i n i n g behaviour i n a symmetric t r i a d : the r o l e of i n f o r m a t i o n , communication, power and r i s k - t a k i n g propensity. Review of Economic S t u d i e s 36 (1969), pp. 484-499. E l l s b e r g , D. R i s k , ambiguity Economics 7_5 (1961), pp.  and the Savage axioms. 643-669.  Emerson, R.M. Power-dependence r e l a t i o n s . 17 (1962), pp. 31-41.  Q u a r t e r l y J o u r n a l of  American S o c i o l o g i c a l Review  F e l l n e r , W. D i s t o r t i o n of s u b j e c t i v e p r o b a b i l i t i e s as a r e a c t i o n to u n c e r tainty. Q u a r t e r l y J o u r n a l of Economics 75 (1961), pp. 670-689. F i s c h e r , C.S. The e f f e c t s of t h r e a t s on an incomplete Sociometry 32 (1969), pp. 301-314.  i n f o r m a t i o n game.  G a l l o , P.S. and C.G. M c C l i n t o c k . C o o p e r a t i v e and c o m p e t i t i v e behaviour i n mixed-motive games. J o u r n a l of C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n 9_ (1965), pp. 6879. H a r s a n y i , J.C. B a r g a i n i n g i n ignorance of the opponent's u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n . J o u r n a l of C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n 6^ (1962), pp. 29-38. Hoffman, P., L. F e s t i n g e r and D.H. Lawrence. Tendencies toward group comp a r a b i l i t y i n competitive bargaining. Human R e l a t i o n s 7 (1954), pp. 141-159. Homans, G.C. S o c i a l behaviour 63 (1958), pp. 597-606.  as exchange.  American J o u r n a l of  Sociology  172  Jones, E.E., K.J. Gergen, P. Gumpert and J.W. T h i b a u t . Some c o n d i t i o n s a f f e c t i n g the use of i n g r a t i a t i o n t o i n f l u e n c e p e r s o n a l e v a l u a t i o n . J o u r n a l of Personal-ity and S o c i a l Psychology 1_ (1965), pp. 613-626. Jones, B., M. S t e e l e , S. Gahagan and J . T e d e s c h i . M a t r i x v a l u e s and coopera t i v e behaviour i n the P r i s o n e r ' s Dilemma game. J o u r n a l o f P e r s o n a l i t y and S o c i a l Psychology j5 (1968), pp. 148-153. Kahan, J.P. E f f e c t of l e v e l of a s p i r a t i o n i n an e x p e r i m e n t a l b a r g a i n i n g s i t uation. J o u r n a l o f P e r s o n a l i t y and S o c i a l Psychology 8^ (1968), pp. 154-159. K e l l e y , H.H., L.L. Beckman and C.S. F i s c h e r . N e g o t i a t i n g the d i v i s i o n of a reward under incomplete i n f o r m a t i o n . J o u r n a l o f E x p e r i m e n t a l S o c i a l Psychology _3 (1967), pp. 361-398. K e l l e y , H.H. and A. S t a h e l s k i . S o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n bases of c o o p e r a t o r s ' and c o m p e t i t o r s ' b e l i e f s about o t h e r s . J o u r n a l of P e r s o n a l i t y and S o c i a l Psychology 16. (1970), pp. 66-91. K e l l e y , H.H. and A . J . S t a h e l s k i . The i n f e r e n c e of i n t e n t i o n s from moves i n the P r i s o n e r ' s Dilemma game. J o u r n a l o f E x p e r i m e n t a l S o c i a l P s y c h o l ogy 6 (1970), pp. 401-419. Komorita, S.S. C o o p e r a t i v e c h o i c e s i n a P r i s o n e r ' s Dilemma game. of P e r s o n a l i t y and S o c i a l Psychology 2_ (1965), pp. 741-745. L a i n g , J.D. and R.J. M o r r i s o n . S e q u e n t i a l games of s t a t u s . S c i e n c e 19 (1974), pp. 177-196. Latanef, B. ( E d i t o r ) . S t u d i e s i n S o c i a l Comparison. of E x p e r i m e n t a l S o c i a l Psychology (1966).  Journal  Behavioural  Supplement 1, J o u r n a l  L a n z e t t a , J.T. and V.T. K a n a r e f f . I n f o r m a t i o n c o s t , amount o f p a y o f f , and l e v e l of a s p i r a t i o n as determinants of i n f o r m a t i o n s e e k i n g and d e c i s i o n making. B e h a v i o u r a l S c i e n c e ]_ (1962), pp. 459-73. L i c h t e n s t e i n , S. Bases f o r p r e f e r e n c e among three-outcome b e t s . of E x p e r i m e n t a l Psychology 69 (1965), pp. 162-169.  Journal  L i e b e r t , R.M., W.P. Smith, J.H. H i l l and M. K i e f f e r . The e f f e c t s o f i n f o r mation and magnitude of i n i t i a l o f f e r on i n t e r p e r s o n a l n e g o t i a t i o n . J o u r n a l of E x p e r i m e n t a l S o c i a l Psychology k_ (1968), pp. 432-441. M c C l i n t o c k , C.G. and S.P. McNeel. P r i o r d y a d i c e x p e r i e n c e and monetary r e wards as determinants o f c o o p e r a t i v e and c o m p e t i t i v e game b e h a v i o u r . J o u r n a l of P e r s o n a l i t y and S o c i a l Psychology J> (1967), pp. 282-294.  173  M c C l i n t o c k , C.G. and S.P. McNeel. Reward and s c o r e feedback as d e t e r m i n a n t s of c o o p e r a t i v e and c o m p e t i t i v e game b e h a v i o u r . J o u r n a l o f P e r s o n a l i t y and S o c i a l Psychology 4_ (1966), pp. 606-613. Murdoch, P. and D. Rosen. Norm f o r m a t i o n i n an i n t e r d e p e n d e n t dyad. metry 33 (1970), pp. 264-276. Nagel, T. 83.  Hobbes on O b l i g a t i o n .  Socio-  Philosophical Review 68 (1959), pp. 68-  Oskamp, S. and D. Perlman. Factors a f f e c t i n g cooperation i n a Prisoner's Dilemma game. J o u r n a l o f C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n 9_ (1965), pp. 359-374. Patchen, M. A c o n c e p t u a l framework and some e m p i r i c a l d a t a r e g a r d i n g comp a r i s o n s o f s o c i a l rewards. Sociometry 24_ (1961), pp. 136-156. P r i t c h a r d , R.D. E q u i t y t h e o r y : A review and c r i t i q u e . O r g a n i z a t i o n a l Beh a v i o u r and Human Performance h_ (1969), pp. 176-211. Rosen, S. The comparative r o l e s o f i n f o r m a t i o n a l and m a t e r i a l commodities in interpersonal transactions. J o u r n a l o f E x p e r i m e n t a l S o c i a l Psychol o g y 2 (1966), pp. 211-226. Sheposh, J.P. and P.S. G a l l o . Asymmetry o f p a y o f f s t r u c t u r e and c o o p e r a t i v e b e h a v i o u r i n a P r i s o n e r ' s Dilemma game. J o u r n a l o f C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n ' 17 (1973), pp. 321-333. Shubik, M.  Games o f s t a t u s .  B e h a v i o u r a l S c i e n c e 1J6 (1971), pp. 117-129.  S l o v i c , P. and S. L i c h t e n s t e i n . The r e l a t i v e importance o f p r o b a b i l i t i e s and p a y o f f s i n r i s k t a k i n g . J o u r n a l o f E x p e r i m e n t a l Psychology, Monograph Supplement No. 3, Part 2 (1968), pp. 1-18. T e d e s c h i , J.T. S t a r t e f f e c t and response b i a s i n t h e P r i s o n e r ' s Dilemma game. Psychonomic S c i e n c e 11_ (1968), pp. 149-50. T h i b a u t , J . and C. Faucheux. The development o f c o n t r a c t u a l norms i n a b a r g a i n i n g s i t u a t i o n under two types o f s t r e s s . Journal of Experimental S o c i a l Psychology 3. (1965), pp. 89-102. T h i b a u t , J.W. and C L . Gruder. The f o r m a t i o n o f c o n t r a c t u a l agreements between p a r t i e s o f unequal power. J o u r n a l o f P e r s o n a l i t y and S o c i a l Psychology 11 (1969), pp. 59-65. Vinacke, E.  Sex r o l e s i n 3 person games.  Sociometry 22^ (1959), pp. 343-360.  Weick, K.E. and B. Nesset. P r e f e r e n c e s among forms o f equity. Behaviour and Human Performance 3_ (1968), pp. 400-409.  Organizational  174  Webster, M. and J . K e r v i n , ' A r t i f i c i a l i t y i n E x p e r i m e n t a l S o c i o l o g y ' , Canad i a n Review o f Anthropology and S o c i o l o g y , 8, 1971, pp. 268-276.  W e i n s t e i n , E.A—,: and P. Deutschberger. T a s k s , b a r g a i n s and i d e n t i t i e s i n social interaction. S o c i a l F o r c e s 42_ (1964), pp. 451-456. Whittemore, I.C. The c o m p e t i t i v e c o n s c i o u s n e s s . S o c i a l Psychology 20 (1925-26), pp. 17-33?  J o u r n a l o f Abnormal and  Y u k l , G. E f f e c t s of the Opponent's i n i t i a l o f f e r , c o n c e s s i o n magnitude, and c o n c e s s i o n frequency i n b a r g a i n i n g b e h a v i o u r . J o u r n a l of P e r s o n a l i t y and S o c i a l Psychology 30 (1974), pp. 232-335.  Unpublished M a t e r i a l '  Burgess, R. and J.D. Gregory. E q u i t y and i n e q u i t y i n exchange r e l a t i o n s : an e x p e r i m e n t a l r e - e x a m i n a t i o n of d i s t r i b u t i v e j u s t i c e . Paper p r e sented at the annual meetings of the West Coast Conference f o r S m a l l Groups Research, H o n o l u l u , H a w a i i , 1971. Emerson, R.M. Power and p o s i t i o n i n exchange networks. Paper p r e s e n t e d at n a t i o n a l meetings, American S o c i o l o g i c a l A s s o c i a t i o n , 1971. Foddy, W.H. The f o r m a t i o n of c l i q u e s i n c o l l e c t i v i t i e s as a consequence of i n i t i a l d i s t r i b u t i o n s of dimensions of w e a l t h . U n p u b l i s h e d Ph.D. D i s s e r t a t i o n , U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Columbia, Canada, 1971. Foddy, W.H. On g e t t i n g through to some of the people some of the time. U n p u b l i s h e d M a n u s c r i p t . U n i v e r s i t y of A l b e r t a , Canada, 1972. L e i k , R.K., R.M. Emerson and R.L. Burgess. The emergence o f s t r a t i f i c a t i o n i n exchange networks: An e x p e r i m e n t a l demonstration. Paper p r e s e n t e d at the West Coast Conference f o r Small Group Research, San Diego, 1968. I n s t i t u t e f o r S o c i o l o g i c a l Research: U n i v e r s i t y ;of Washington, S e a t t l e . Michener, H.A. and M. Lyons. P e r c e i v e d support and upward m o b i l i t y as d e t e r minants of r e v o l u t i o n a r y c o a l i t i o n b e h a v i o u r . Unpublished paper, U n i v e r s i t y o f W i s c o n s i n (undated).  175  APPENDIX I LABORATORY SET-UP  A diagram of t h e booths i s shown i n Fugure A . l  Figure. A. 1  Main f e a t u r e s of booths used i n experiments  View from i n s i d e a v i s i b l e o r n o n - v i s i b l e s u b j e c t ' s  View from o u t s i d e  a visible's  booth  View from o u t s i d e booth  booth  a non-visible's  176  1.  Window covered w i t h loudspeaker mesh. When room was i l l u m i n a t e d from the c e n t e r , s u b j e c t s c o u l d see through t h e i r own s c r e e n t o t h e c e n t e r of t h e t a b l e s , but c o u l d not see through both t h e i r own and another booth's windows.  2.  Card t e l l i n g s u b j e c t what he had t o b e g i n w i t h of b u t t o n s ) .  3.  Subject's  4.  A f o u r i n c h gap allowed of t h e booth.  5.  Card t e l l i n g s u b j e c t he c o u l d not o f f e r more than 100 buttons a t a time, a l t h o u g h he c o u l d ask f o r more than 100, and g i v e more than 100.  6.  Table i n d i c a t i n g the worth o f d i f f e r e n t numbers o f buttons f o r t h e second p a r t of the game. The i n s t r u c t i o n s drew a t t e n t i o n t o t h e f a c t that the t a b l e implies a p r i n c i p l e of d i m i n i s h i n g marginal u t i l i t y .  7.  Card on o u t s i d e o f v i s i b l e s u b j e c t s ' booth, t e l l i n g the exact number o f buttons of each c o l o u r t h a t s u b j e c t s t a r t e d w i t h ( t h i s c o u l d be seen by a l l o t h e r s u b j e c t s around the t a b l e ) .  8.  Coloured t a g on t h e o u t s i d e o f n o n - v i s i b l e s booths; the c o l o u r was t h e same as the c o l o u r o f buttons i n t h a t person's predominant r e s o u r c e p i l e .  9.  An i l l u s t r a t i o n o f t h e c o v e r s non-visible subjects.  F i g u r e A.2  identification letter  ( a l s o on f r o n t of b o o t h ) .  s u b j e c t s t o reach h i s buttons  piled  i n front  t h a t were p l a c e d over t h e r e s o u r c e s o f  I n i t i a t i o n forms used i n Set A  Initiator's letter  Offer directed t o _ _ ( c i r c l e one)  W i l l give  (No.)  red  green  buttons  for  (No.)  red  green  buttons  ( c i r c l e one) Receiver  c i r c l e s one  accepted r e j ected  j  (numbers o f each c o l o u r  (letter)  17.7  F i g u r e A, 3  Initiation  Initiator's  forms used  i n Set B and  in pilot  Offer directed  letter (circle  W i l l give  (No.)  red  for  (No.)  red (circle  study  to  one)  .  green  buttons  green  buttons  one)  RECEIVER CIRCLES  ONE Rej ected  Accepted  o f f e r not good enough ; don't want to d e a l w i t h you  JFigure A.4 i l l u s t r a t e s the card pinned i n s i d e a s u b j e c t ' s booth, ithe number of b u t t o n s he had to b e g i n w i t h . jpjgure A.4  indicating  Card showing t o s u b j e c t h i s r e s o u r c e base.  1600  Red  30 Green  The f o l l o w i n g page shows the v a l u e c h a r t t h a t was pinned i n s i d e each booth. A somewhat d i f f e r e n t c h a r t was used i n Set A, i n which the exact v a l u e s f o r the f u n c t i o n Y = 100  .  X/2  (Y i s v a l u e , X i s number of  buttons)  was used. These v a l u e s were rounded o f f to the n e a r e s t number f o r use i n Set A. In Set B and i n the p i l o t study, the numbers i n the l e f t column were f u r t h e r rounded, so t h a t the s m a l l e s t increment would be 5 v a l u e units.  178  F i g u r e A.5  V a l u e c h a r t used f o r Set B and P i l o t  T o t a l number of buttons of a given colour. (Notice that the increments on t h i s s i d e are a l l equal)  1400 1380 1360 1340 1320 1300 1280 1260 1240 1220 1200 1180 1160 1140 1120 1100 1080 1060 1040 1020 1000 980 960 940 920 900 880 860 840 820 800 780 760 740 720 700 680 660 640 620 600 580 560 540 520 500 480  2590 2575 2560 2545 2530 2515 2500 2480 2460 2440 2420 2400 2380 2360 2340 2320 2300 2280 2260 2240 2220 2200 2180 2160 2140 2120 2095 2070 2045 2020 1995 1970 1945 1920 1895 . 1870 1845 1820 1790 1760 1730 1700 1670 1640 1610 1580 1550  Net worth o f t o t a l number o f b u t t o n s o f a given colour i n value u n i t s f o r the second phase of the experiment. (Notice that the increments on t h i s s i d e a r e s m a l l e r a t the top than a t t h e bottom)  179  F i g u r e A.5  (Continued)  T o t a l number o f buttons o f a given colour. (Notice that the increments on t h i s s i d e are a l l equal)  Base l i n e  zero  460 440 420 400 380 360 340 320 300 280 260 240 220 200 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0  1520 1485 1450 1415 1380 1340 1300 1260 1220 1180 1140 1100 1050 1000 950 900 840 775 710 630 550 450 320  -  Net worth o f t o t a l number o f b u t t o n s o f a given colour i n value u n i t s f o r the second phase o f t h e experiment. (Notice that the increments on t h i s s i d e a r e s m a l l e r a t t h e top than at t h e bottom)  Base l i n e  zero  APPENDIX I I EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS AND  .  QUESTIONNAIRES, SET A  The i n s t r u c t i o n s f o r Set A were a d m i n i s t r e d by means o f c a s s e t t e tape r e c o r d e r . "Hi there.  The f o l l o w i n g i s a t r a n s c r i p t o f the i n s t r u c t i o n s  employed.  Thanks f o r t u r n i n g up to take p a r t i n t h e experiment.  You're g o i n g t o p l a y a game c a l l e d "Exchange and B u i l d " , and as the name suggests, t h e r e w i l l be two p a r t s t o i t . The i n s t r u c t i o n s I ' l l g i v e you now w i l l o n l y be concerned w i t h the f i r s t p a r t , and w e ' l l f o r g e t about the second p a r t u n t i l l a t e r . During t h i s p a r t o f the game, you a r e going t o be t r a d i n g , o r exchanging b u t t o n s w i t h one another, and the o b j e c t o f t h e f i r s t p a r t o f t h e game i s t o b u i l d up t h e s m a l l p i l e o f buttons i n f r o n t o f you, w i t h o u t l o s i n g t o o many b u t t o n s from t h e l a r g e p i l e you have. In o t h e r words, the o b j e c t i s t o i n c r e a s e t h e number of buttons o f which you have t h e l e a s t a t t h e moment w i t h o u t l o s i n g too many b u t t o n s o f the c o l o u r o f which you have t h e most. Now, y o u ' l l need t o do t h i s because i n t h e next p a r t of t h e game the two c o l o u r s a r e used f o r c o m p l e t e l y d i f f e r e n t purposes. You w i l l need buttons o f both c o l o u r s , r e d and green, i n t h e next p a r t ; that i s , both c o l o u r s a r e v a l u a b l e . You w i l l p r o b a b l y have n o t i c e d t h a t h a l f o f you have your p i l e s of buttons out where everyone can see them, w h i l e h a l f o f you have c o v e r s over t h e b u t t o n s . Now t h e covers have been p l a c e d t h e r e so t h a t some o f you w i l l n o t know how many b u t t o n s some o t h e r s have. T h i s does not mean t h a t the people w i t h covers have no buttons — they do. And you can t e l l which c o l o u r they have most o f by t h e t i c k e t on t h e upper r i g h t hand c o r n e r o f t h e i r booths — f o r example, a green t i c k e t means t h a t person has a predominant p i l e of green b u t t o n s , and a s m a l l e r p i l e o f r e d ones. I f y o u ' l l l o o k a t t h e t a b l e on t h e s i d e o f your s c r e e n , you w i l l n o t i c e t h a t t h e r e a r e two columns of f i g u r e s t h e r e . The column of f i g u r e s on the l e f t r e f e r s t o d i f f e r e n t s i z e d p i l e s o f buttons of a g i v e n c o l o u r . The column o f f i g u r e s on t h e r i g h t t e l l s you how much t h e s e d i f f e r e n t s i z e d p i l e s o f b u t t o n s o f a g i v e n c o l o u r w i l l be worth i n the next p a r t o f t h e game. So t h e column on the l e f t t e l l s you how many b u t t o n s , and t h e column on t h e r i g h t i n d i c a t e s v a l u e s . O.K.?  181  Now i f you l o o k c l o s e l y a t the f i g u r e s i n t h e columns, you w i l l n o t i c e t h a t the f i g u r e s on the l e f t i n c r e a s e by 20 a t a time — so they go: 20, 40, 60, 80, and so on r i g h t up t o 1,600. The f i g ures on t h e r i g h t , however, i n c r e a s e i n b i g jumps t o b e g i n w i t h , and t h e jumps get smaller and s m a l l e r as you go from the bottom to t h e top o f t h i s column. Because the f i g u r e s i n the two columns i n c r e a s e ±i d i f f e r e n t ways, the t a b l e t e l l s us two v e r y important t h i n g s . The f i r s t t h i n g i t t e l l s you i s t h a t i f you've a l r e a d y got a l o t o f b u t t o n s o f a g i v e n c o l o u r , 20 more would be worth l e s s t o you than i f you o n l y had a few buttons o f t h a t g i v e n c o l o u r . L e t me show you how t h i s works. Say you had a p i l e of 1,580 green b u t t o n s . You can see t h a t a p i l e of 1,580 green buttons would be worth 2,806 v a l u e u n i t s i n the next p a r t o f the game. Now, i f you got 20 more buttons (green ones), t h i s would b r i n g you up t o 1,600, and a p i l e o f 1,600 b u t t o n s i s worth 2,826; so t h a t you would have gained 20 v a l u e units. In o t h e r words, 20 more green buttons when you've a l r e a d y got 1,580 would be worth 20 v a l u e u n i t s . I f you o n l y had a p i l e of 200 green buttons t o b e g i n w i t h , though, and you got 20 more, you'd f i n d t h a t 200 green b u t t o n s (what you s t a r t e d w i t h ) would be worth 1,000 v a l u e u n i t s i n the next p a r t of the game, and a p i l e o f 220, t h a t i s , t h e 200 p l u s 20 more, i s worth 1,049. So the 20 e x t r a i n t h i s case would be worth 49 v a l u e u n i t s . Rememb e r , when you had 1,580, 20 e x t r a a r e worth 20, but when you've o n l y got 200, 20 e x t r a a r e worth 49. Once a g a i n , t h e f i r s t p o i n t i s t h a t the more buttons you have o f a g i v e n c o l o u r , t h e l e s s worth 20 e x t r a would be. T h i s i s l i k e s a y i n g t h a t $20 i s worth l e s s t o a m i l l i o n a i r e than, say, t o a person on w e l f a r e . The second t h i n g the t a b l e t e l l s you i s t h a t i f you have a l o t of b u t t o n s o f one c o l o u r , and o n l y a few o f the o t h e r c o l o u r , you w i l l a c t u a l l y i n c r e a s e t h e t o t a l worth o f your buttons every time you exchange some o f the b u t t o n s o f which you have most, f o r some o f t h e buttons o f which you have the l e a s t . L e t me show you how t h a t works. I f , say, you had 1,600 green b u t t o n s ; you f i n d they a r e worth 2,826 v a l u e u n i t s i n the next p a r t o f t h e game. O.K.? And i f t h a t was a l l you had, you d e c i d e t o exchange some o f t h e green buttons f o r some o f the r e d b u t t o n s , so t h a t you would end up w i t h 800 green b u t t o n s , and perhaps 800 r e d b u t t o n s . And you f i n d t h a t a p i l e o f 800 green buttons would be worth — w e l l , have a l o o k a t i t on your t a b l e — 2,000 v a l u e u n i t s . So your buttons  182  would now be worth 2,000 v a l u e u n i t s f o r the green p i l e , and 2,000 v a l u e u n i t s f o r the r e d p i l e , so t h a t the t o t a l worth of your red and green b u t t o n s would be worth 4,000 v a l u e u n i t s . Whereas the p i l e of 1,600 green b u t t o n s a l o n e was worth 2,826 v a l u e u n i t s — two p i l e s — one of green and one of r e d , 800 each, would be worth 4,000 v a l u e u n i t s . To emphasize t h i s second p o i n t then, you a c t u a l l y i n c r e a s e the v a l u e o f your b u t t o n s by exchanging. In a d d i t i o n , s i n c e b i g p i l e s a r e of c o u r s e b e t t e r than s m a l l p i l e s , y o u ' l l even be b e t t e r o f f i f you can p i c k up a few b u t t o n s w h i l e you a r e exchanging — t h a t i s , i f you can get the o t h e r s t o g i v e you a few more i n r e t u r n than you have g i v e n them. Of c o u r s e , you may f i n d t h i s d i f f i c u l t t o do as the o t h e r s might not l i k e the i d e a . The t a b l e doesn't c o n t a i n enough d e t a i l f o r you to make p r e c i s e calculations. I t ' s r a t h e r i n t e n d e d to g i v e you an i d e a of how the b u t t o n s a r e v a l u e d . I f you l o o k through your s c r e e n you w i l l n o t i c e a l e t t e r p r i n t e d on the i n s i d e o f your own s c r e e n . T h i s i s to i d e n t i f y you. I ' l l j u s t run through the s t e p s i n v o l v e d i n the s i n g l e opportuni t y f o r exchange now, to g i v e you a b e t t e r i d e a o f what you're going t o do d u r i n g each o p p o r t u n i t y f o r exchange. Remember, you a r e g o i n g to have a number o f t h e s e o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r exchange. F i r s t of a l l , y o u ' l l l o o k through your s c r e e n s to see what the o t h e r s have, or what t h e i r predominant c o l o u r i s , and d e c i d e whether you want to send an o f f e r to.one o f the o t h e r s . Now, you do not have to send an o f f e r i f you don't want t o , O.K.? So t h a t i f you d e c i d e t h a t you want to send an o f f e r , then you'd f i l l out one o f the forms i n f r o n t of you, remembering one t h i n g , t h a t you cannot send an o f f e r o f more than the l i m i t t h a t i s w r i t t e n on the card on the lower bar o f your s c r e e n . While you a r e not a l l o w e d to send an o f f e r of more than 100 b u t t o n s , you may r e q u e s t more than t h i s from o t h e r s , and s h o u l d you be asked f o r more than 100 b u t t o n s , you may agree t o do so. You s i m p l y cannot i n i t i a t e , or b e g i n by o f f e r i n g more than the 100 b u t t o n limit. You can o f c o u r s e ask f o r l e s s than or up t o t h e l i m i t from the p e r s o n you send your o f f e r t o , and g i v e l e s s than or more than the l i m i t i n r e t u r n . Once you've done t h i s , f i l l out the forms, count out the b u t t o n s , and put both the form and the b u t t o n s i n the bowl i n f r o n t of you. When everyone has done t h i s who wants t o , I d e l i v e r a l l the bowls to the people they are addressed to — t h a t i s , to the booth they a r e addressed t o . I t i s c l e a r t h a t w h i l e your bowl i s around at someone e l s e ' s booth, e i t h e r one or more bowls may come around t o you. You can a c c e p t one but o n l y one. I f you a c c e p t an o f f e r , c i r c l e 'Accepted' on  - 183  the form t h a t came w i t h the bowl. Any o t h e r o f f e r s t h a t you r e c e i v e and d e c i d e not to a c c e p t , c i r c l e 'Rejected' on the form t h a t came w i t h them. When everyone has done t h i s , I ' l l ask those who have c i r c l e d 'Accepted' on an o f f e r to take the b u t t o n s t h a t came w i t h t h a t o f f e r , and t o count up the b u t t o n s t h a t they were requested to g i v e i n r e t u r n . Put these b u t t o n s i n the bowl. I w i l l then r e t u r n the bowls to t h e i r owners. And we w i l l then be ready to b e g i n the next o p p o r t u n i t y f o r exchange. I would j u s t l i k e to be c l e a r on one p o i n t : d u r i n g each opport u n i t y f o r exchange, two t h i n g s a r e happening. Somebody might be a c c e p t i n g or r e j e c t i n g an o f f e r from you, and a t the same time you may be a c c e p t i n g an o f f e r from someone e l s e , o r r e j e c t ing o f f e r s . O.K.? Now, those people whose buttons are out i n the open should l e a v e them t h e r e — do not t r y to h i d e them, or h a u l them o f f behind your s c r e e n s . There i s some y e l l o w s c r a t c h paper i n f r o n t of you, i f you want to keep t r a c k of how many b u t t o n s you have. The numbers you a r e b e g i n n i n g w i t h , t h a t i s , the s i z e of your p i l e s , a r e w r i t t e n on a s m a l l card on the lower p a r t of your s c r e e n . The f i r s t p a r t of the game w i l l take more time than the second, and you w i l l have p l e n t y of time to make a l l the exchanges you want. I'd l i k e t o ask you t o o , p l e a s e not to c h e a t . Count out any buttons you a r e o f f e r i n g a c c u r a t e l y and observe the l i m i t s i n making your o f f e r s . O.K.? I f you would j u s t l i k e to l o o k through your screens now, d e c i d e i f you want to send an o f f e r to any of the otheis d u r i n g the f i r s t o p p o r t u n i t y to exchange, we can b e g i n . V e r b a l a d d i t i o n , not i n c l u d e d i n t a p e : You s h o u l d note t h a t some of you have l a r g e p i l e s of b u t t o n s , and some of you have v e r y l a r g e p i l e s . I f you cannot see t h i s , p e r haps i f you l e a n out c l o s e r t o your s c r e e n s , you w i l l get a b e t t e r view of the p i l e s i n f r o n t of the o t h e r s ' booth. Be c a r e f u l that you do not l e a n back and l o o k around at the person on e i t h e r s i d e of you. Any End of  further questions?"  Instructions.  184  Appendix I I :  Set A  Questionnaire given twice to subjects with v i s i b l e resource p i l e s , a f t e r S/s had made o f f e r s on T r i a l 1 and on T r i a l 2, but p r i o r t o d e l i v e r y o f offers.  Your  letter  1.  Who d i d you j u s t make an o f f e r t o ?  2.  What was t h e o f f e r ?  G  H  I  J  K  L  M  red  N  ( c i r c l e one) red  buttons o f f e r e d f o r  buttons  green  green  3.  What a r e your reasons f o r t h e s i z e o f o f f e r you made?  4.  How l i k e l y do you t h i n k he i s t o accept your o f f e r ? ( C i r c l e the p o s i t i o n on the l i n e below t h a t shows how l i k e l y i t i s your o f f e r w i l l be accepted)  / extremely likely  /  /  /  quite likely  50-50 chance  not v e r y likely  What a r e your reasons f o r t h i n k i n g  ;  / not a t a l l likely  this?  Do you t h i n k t h e person you made t h e o f f e r t o i s more l i k e l y than any of the o t h e r s t o accept your o f f e r ? Yes No ( c i r c l e one) I f you s a i d NO, who do you t h i n k i s more l i k e l y  to accept?  Why do you t h i n k t h i s ?  Q u e s t i o n n a i r e g i v e n t w i c e t o s u b j e c t s w i t h n o n - v i s i b l e .resource p i l e s , a f t e r S's had made o f f e r s on T r i a l 1 and on T r i a l 2: p r i o r t o d e l i v e r y o f o f f e r s .  Your  letter  1.  Who d i d you j u s t make an o f f e r t o ?  2.  What was t h e o f f e r ?  G  H  I  J  K  L  red  M  N  ( c i r c l e one) red  buttons o f f e r e d f o r green  buttons green  185  3.  What a r e your reasons f o r t h e s i z e o f o f f e r you made?  4.  How l i k e l y do you t h i n k he i s t o accept your o f f e r ? ( C i r c l e the p o s i t i o n on t h e l i n e below t h a t shows how l i k e l y i t i s your o f f e r w i l l be accepted)  / extremely likely  /  /  /  quite likely  50-50 chance  not v e r y likely  / not at a l l likely  What a r e your reasons f o r t h i n k i n g t h i s ? Do you t h i n k the person you made t h e o f f e r t o i s more l i k e l y than any of the o t h e r s t o a c c e p t your o f f e r ? Yes No ( c i r c l e one) I f you s a i d NO, who do you t h i n k i s more l i k e l y  to accept?  Why do you t h i n k t h i s ? For those o f you who have covers over your b u t t o n s : I f you a r e g i v e n the o p p o r t u n i t y on t h e t h i r d t r i a l t o remove t h e c o v e r s from your b u t t o n s , would you choose t o do so? Yes No ( c i r c l e one)  Questionnaire given to subjects with n o n - v i s i b l e resources, a f t e r o f f e r s had been g i v e n t o v i s i b l e s , T r i a l 2.  false  1.  D i d you see any advantage o r d i s a d v a n t a g e ( c i r c l e one) i n h a v i n g c o v e r s over your b u t t o n s ? What k i n d of advantage o r disadvantage?  2.  What do you t h i n k would be the l o n g term e f f e c t s o f h a v i n g c o v e r s on your b u t t o n s , i f you c o n t i n u e d t o p l a y f o r s e v e r a l t r i a l s ?  No.te:  On t h e q u e s t i o n n a i r e s g i v e n to s u b j e c t s , t h e r e were no r e f e r e n c e s to i d e n t i f y the q u e s t i o n n a i r e s as b e i n g f o r v i s i b l e s o n l y , o r f o r nonr-visibles only. S u f f i c i e n t space was p r o v i d e d f o r r e p l i e s .  186  APPENDIX I I I EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS AND QUESTIONNAIRES USED IN SET B  The  I n s t r u c t i o n s used f o r Set B were a d m i n i s t e r e d  c a s s e t t e tape r e c o r d e r , w h i l e s u b j e c t s read a t r a n s c r i p t Below i s a copy o f the t r a n s c r i p t g i v e n t o each s u b j e c t  by means o f a  of the tape. i n Set B.  Thanks f o r t u r n i n g up t o take p a r t i n t h e experiment. You a r e going t o p l a y a game c a l l e d "Exchange and B u i l d " , and as the name suggests, t h e r e w i l l be two p a r t s t o i t . The i n s t r u c t i o n s I ' l l g i v e you now w i l l o n l y be concerned w i t h t h e f i r s t p a r t , and w e ' l l f o r g e t about t h e second p a r t u n t i l l a t e r . Exchange and B u i l d i s the s o r t of game i n which some o f you may do b e t t e r than o t h e r s . You should t r y to do as w e l l as you can. At the end o f the second p a r t o f the game, t h e f o u r p l a y e r s who have done t h e b e s t w i l l be d e c l a r e d t h e winners. While you may f i n d i t a b i t d i f f i c u l t t o see how w e l l you a r e d o i n g d u r i n g t h i s f i r s t p a r t o f t h e game, you w i l l be a b l e t o see t h i s more c l e a r l y d u r i n g t h e second p a r t . During t h i s p a r t o f t h e game, you a r e going t o be t r a d i n g , o r exchanging b u t t o n s w i t h one another, and t h e o b j e c t s o f the f i r s t p a r t i s t o b u i l d up the s m a l l p i l e o f buttons i n f r o n t of you, without l o s i n g t o o many buttons from t h e l a r g e p i l e you have. In other words, the o b j e c t i s t o i n c r e a s e t h e number o f buttons o f which you have t h e l e a s t a t t h e moment, but not l o s e t o o many o f the c o l o u r o f which you have the most. Now, y o u ' l l need t o do t h i s because i n the next p a r t o f the game the two c o l o u r s a r e used f o r completely d i f f e r e n t purposes. You w i l l need buttons o f both c o l o u r s , r e d and green, i n t h e next p a r t ; t h a t i s , both c o l o u r s a r e v a l u a b l e . You a r e a l l b e g i n n i n g w i t h some r e d and some green b u t t o n s . How many you have of.each c o l o u r i s w r i t t e n on a s m a l l c a r d on t h e lower b a r o f your s c r e e n (inside). As you can see, h a l f o f you have your buttons out where everyone can see them, w h i l e h a l f o f you have covers over your b u t t o n s . I ' l l stop f o r a few seconds w h i l e you l o o k through your s c r e e n s . The p l a y e r s out i n the open have a s i g n on t h e o u t s i d e top o f t h e i r s c r e e n s , t h a t shows you e x a c t l y how many r e d and how many  green buttons they have. The c o v e r s have been p l a c e d on f o u r o t h e r booths so t h a t you w i l l not know how many buttons t h e s e p l a y e r s have. I can t e l l you t h a t none o f these p l a y e r s has a t o t a l w e a l t h of 1,200 b u t t o n s . That i s , one of them has the same number of buttons as the p l a y e r s without c o v e r s — some of them have a l a r g e r t o t a l number of b u t t o n s (more than 1,200), and some have a s m a l l e r t o t a l number ( l e s s than 1,200). You can, however, t e l l which c o l o u r p l a y e r s w i t h c o v e r s have most o f , by the t i c k e t on the upper r i g h t hand c o r n e r of t h e i r booths —- f o r example, a r e d t i c k e t means t h a t p l a y e r has more red b u t t o n s than green ones. I f y o u ' l l l o o k a t the t a b l e on the s i d e of your s c r e e n , you w i l l n o t i c e t h a t t h e r e a r e two columns of f i g u r e s t h e r e . The column of f i g u r e s on the l e f t r e f e r s t o d i f f e r e n t s i z e d p i l e s of buttons of a g i v e n c o l o u r . The column o f f i g u r e s on the r i g h t t e l l s you how much these d i f f e r e n t s i z e d p i l e s o f b u t t o n s o f a g i v e n c o l o u r w i l l be worth i n the next p a r t of the game. So t h e column of f i g ures on the l e f t t e l l s you how many b u t t o n s , and the column on the right indicates values. O.K.? Now i f you l o o k c l o s e l y a t the f i g u r e s i n the columns, you w i l l n o t i c e t h a t the f i g u r e s on the l e f t i n c r e a s e by 20 at a time — so they go 20, 40, 60, 80, and so on r i g h t up t o 1,_600. The f i g u r e s on the r i g h t , however, i n c r e a s e i n b i g jumps t o b e g i n w i t h and the jumps get s m a l l e r and s m a l l e r as you go from the bottom to the top o f t h i s column. Because the f i g u r e s i n the two columns i n c r e a s e i n d i f f e r e n t ways, the t a b l e t e l l s us two v e r y important t h i n g s . The f i r s t t h i n g i t t e l l s you i s t h a t i f you've a l r e a d y got a l o t of b u t t o n s of a g i v e n c o l o u r , 20 more would be worth l e s s t o you than i f ' y o u o n l y had a few b u t t o n s o f t h a t g i v e n c o l o u r . L e t me show you how t h i s works. Say you had a p i l e o f 1,080 green b u t t o n s . You can see t h a t a p i l e of 1,080 green buttons would be worth 2,300 v a l u e u n i t s i n the next p a r t of the game. Now, i f you got 20 more b u t t o n s (green o n e s ) , t h i s would b r i n g you up to 1,100, and a p i l e o f 1,100 b u t tons i s worth 2,320; so t h a t you would have gained 20 v a l u e u n i t s . I f you o n l y had a p i l e o f 200 green b u t t o n s t o b e g i n w i t h though, and you got 20 more, you'd f i n d t h a t 200 green b u t t o n s (what you s t a r t e d w i t h ) i s worth 1,000 v a l u e u n i t s i n the next p a r t of the game, and a p i l e o f 220, t h a t i s , the 200 p l u s 20 more, i s worth 1,050. So the 20 e x t r a i n t h i s case would be worth 50 v a l u e u n i t s Once a g a i n , the f i r s t p o i n t i s t h a t the more b u t t o n s you have of a g i v e n c o l o u r , the l e s s worth 20 e x t r a would be. This i s l i k e s a y i n g t h a t $20 i s worth l e s s to a m i l l i o n a i r e than, say, t o a person on w e l f a r e .  188  The second t h i n g the t a b l e t e l l s you i s t h a t i f you have a l o t of buttons of one c o l o u r , and o n l y a few of the o t h e r c o l o u r , you w i l l a c t u a l l y i n c r e a s e the t o t a l worth of your buttons e v e r y time you exchange some of the buttons of which you have most, f o r some of the b u t t o n s of which you have the l e a s t . L e t me show you how t h a t works. I f , say, you had 1,200 green b u t t o n s : , you f i n d they are worth 2,420 v a l u e u n i t s i n the next p a r t of the game. O.K.? And i f t h a t was a l l you had, you d e c i d e to exchange some of the green b u t t o n s f o r some of the red ones, so you might end up w i t h perhaps, 600 green b u t t o n s , and 600 red ones. And you f i n d that a p i l e of 600 b u t t o n s would be worth — w e l l , have a l o o k on your t a b l e — 1,730 v a l u e u n i t s . So your buttons would be worth 1,730 f o r ^ the green p i l e , and 1,7.30 f o r the. r e d , so t h a t the t o t a l worth of your r e d and green buttons would be 3,460 v a l u e u n i t s . Whereas the p i l e of 1,200 green b u t t o n s a l o n e was worth 2,420, two p i l e s , one of green and one o f red (600 each) would be worth 3,460. To emphasize t h i s second p o i n t then, you a c t u a l l y i n c r e a s e the t o t a l worth o f your b u t t o n s by exchanging. As I w i l l e x p l a i n i n a minute, t h e r e i s n o t h i n g i n the r u l e s t h a t says you have t o t r a d e an equal number of buttons of one c o l o u r f o r an e q u a l number of the o t h e r c o l o u r . Depending on who you a r e t r y i n g to t r a d e w i t h , you may choose to o f f e r more, or l e s s than you want in return. I ' l l j u s t run through the s t e p s i n v o l v e d i n t h e s i n g l e opportuni t y f o r exchange now, t o g i v e you a b e t t e r i d e a o f what you are going to be d o i n g d u r i n g each o p p o r t u n i t y f o r exchange. You w i l l have j u s t f i v e of these o p p o r t u n i t i e s — I ' l l repeat t h a t — five o p p o r t u n i t i e s , t o make t r a d e s . F i r s t o f a l l , y o u ' l l l o o k through your screens to remind y o u r s e l v e s what o t h e r s have, or what t h e i r predominant c o l o u r i s , and d e c i d e who you want to send an o f f e r t o . You do not have to send an o f f e r d u r i n g each o p p o r t u n i t y f o r exchange i f you do not want to. The l e t t e r s p r i n t e d a t the top of your screens a r e to i d e n t i f y you. I f you d e c i d e t h a t you want to send an o f f e r , then f i l l out one of the forms i n f r o n t of you, remembering one t h i n g : you cannot send an o f f e r of more than the l i m i t t h a t i s w r i t t e n on the c a r d on the lower bar of your s c r e e n . T h i s means t h a t you can o f f e r a n y t h i n g up to but not over ,100 at a time. There i s , however, no l i m i t on what you can ' g i v e ' / i n r e t u r n f o r an o f f e r someone makes X O l U € to you. There i s o n l y a l i m i t on how many you can o f f e r at a time.  189  Once you have d e c i d e d what you want to do, f i l l out a form, count out the b u t t o n s , and put both the form and the buttons i n the bowl i n f r o n t of you. When everyone has done t h i s who wants t o , I w i l l d e l i v e r a l l the bowls t o the p l a y e r s they are addressed to — t h a t i s , to the booth they are addressed t o . I t i s c l e a r t h a t w h i l e your bowl i s around at someone e l s e ' s booth, e i t h e r one or more bowls can come around t o you, or perhaps none w i l l . You can accept one but o n l y one. L e t me emphasize t h a t — i f you r e c e i v e more than one o f f e r , at a time, you cannot accept them a l l — you must choose one. I f you accept an o f f e r , c i r c l e 'Accepted' on the form t h a t came w i t h the bowl. Any o t h e r o f f e r s t h a t you r e c e i v e and d e c i d e not to a c c e p t , c i r c l e ' R e j e c t e d ' on the forms that came w i t h them. There i s a l s o a p l a c e f o r you to check a reason f o r r e j e c t i n g an o f f e r . T h i s l e t s you t e l l the person who sent the o f f e r whether you would accept a b e t t e r o f f e r , or whether you have d e c i d e d not to d e a l w i t h him. You may check one o f these reasons i f you wish. P l e a s e do n o t w r i t e any o t h e r messages on the forms. You may r e j e c t a l l the o f f e r s you get i f you choose to do so. I f you happen t o get an o f f e r from the same person you sent one t o , remember t h a t they a r e s e p a r a t e and independent — r e p l y t o t h e o f f e r you r e c e i v e d , and don't worry about the one you s e n t . When everyone has checked t h e i r forms, I ' l l ask those who have c i r c l e d 'Accepted' on an o f f e r t o take the b u t t o n s t h a t came w i t h t h a t o f f e r , and to count out the buttons t h a t they were r e q u e s t e d to g i v e i n r e t u r n . Put these buttons i n the bowl. I w i l l then r e t u r n the bowls to t h e i r owners. And we w i l l then be ready to b e g i n the next o p p o r t u n i t y f o r exchange. T h i s f i r s t p a r t of the game w i l l take more time than t h e second, and you w i l l have enough time to make up t o f i v e exchanges. I'd l i k e t o ask you t o o , p l e a s e not to cheat when you a r e c o u n t i n g out the b u t t o n s , and to observe the l i m i t of 100 on what you can offer. I f you would l i k e t o l o o k through your s c r e e n s now, d e c i d e i f you want to send an o f f e r t o any of the o t h e r s d u r i n g the f i r s t opport u n i t y t o exchange, we can b e g i n . End of i n s t r u c t i o n s ,  Set  B.  190  Appendix I I I :  Set B  Q u e s t i o n n a i r e g i v e n t o a l l s u b j e c t s a f t e r they had made T r i a l 1 o f f e r s . Q u e s t i o n n a i r e No. 1 Your l e t t e r  •  1.  Who d i d you j u s t make an o f f e r t o ?  2.  What was t h e o f f e r ?  G  H  I  J  K  L  M  red  N  ( c i r c l e one) red  buttons  offered  for  buttons  green  green  3.  D i d you o f f e r t o a person w i t h a cover o r without buttons? no c o v e r cover ( c i r c l e one)  4.  Why d i d you choose t h e person you d i d ?  5.  What i s the main reason  6.  How l i k e l y do you t h i n k he i s t o accept your o f f e r ? ( C i r c l e the p o s i t i o n on the l i n e below t h a t shows how l i k e l y you f e e l i t i s t h a t your o f f e r w i l l be accepted)  / Extremely likely  7.  f o r t h e s i z e o f o f f e r t h a t you made?  /  /  quite likely  50-50 chance  What a r e your reasons  a cover on h i s  /  /  not v e r y .likely  not a t a l l likely  f o r thinking this?  Do you know anyone e l s e who would be more l i k e l y t o a c c e p t your YES  offer?  NO  I f you s a i d YES, who do you t h i n k i s more l i k e l y t o a c c e p t ? Why do you t h i n k t h i s ?  Questionnaire f o r subjects with v i s i b l e resource p i l e s , r e p l i e s t o f a l s e o f f e r s on T r i a l 1 were c o l l e c t e d . Q u e s t i o n n a i r e No. 2: Your 1.  delivered  after  Visibles  letter I f you accepted an o f f e r on t h e f i r s t t r a d i n g o p p o r t u n i t y : your main reason f o r a c c e p t i n g t h e o f f e r you d i d ?  What was  191  2.  I f you r e j e c t e d an o f f e r ( s ) on t h e f i r s t main reason f o r doing so?  o p p o r t u n i t y , what was your  3.  There a r e p r o b a b l y advantages and d i s a d v a n t a g e s out i n t h e open. What do you see t o be t h e advantages? What do you see t o be t h e disadvantages?  5.  I f you a r e g i v e n a c h o i c e a f t e r t h e second exchange o p p o r t u n i t y , o f having t h e covers removed from those p l a y e r s who have them, would you choose t o have t h i s done? YES NO ( c i r c l e one)  t o h a v i n g your  buttons  Why?  Questionnaire f o r subjects with n o n - v i s i b l e p i l e s , given a f t e r r e p l i e s to f a l s e o f f e r s on T r i a l 1 were c o l l e c t e d . Q u e s t i o n n a i r e No. 2:  Non-Visibles  Your l e t t e r 1.  I f you accepted an o f f e r on the f i r s t exchange o p p o r t u n i t y : the main reason f o r a c c e p t i n g t h e o f f e r you d i d ?  What i s  2.  I f you r e j e c t e d an o f f e r ( s ) on t h e f i r s t main reason f o r d o i n g s o .  3.  There a r e p r o b a b l y advantages and disadvantages your b u t t o n s . What do you see t o be t h e advantages? What do you see t o be t h e disadvantages?  4.  I f you a r e g i v e n a c h o i c e a f t e r t h e second exchange o p p o r t u n i t y i n t h i s game t o remove t h e covers from your b u t t o n s , would you choose t o do so? YES NO ( c i r c l e one)  o p p o r t u n i t y , what was your  t o having  covers  over  Why? Note:  On t h e q u e s t i o n n a i r e s g i v e n t o s u b j e c t s , t h e r e were no r e f e r e n c e s to i d e n t i f y the q u e s t i o n n a i r e s as b e i n g f o r v i s i b l e s o n l y , o r f o r non^ v i s i b l e s only. S u f f i c i e n t space was p r o v i d e d f o r r e p l i e s .  192  APPENDIX IV PILOT WORK  The r e s u l t s and a n a l y s i s of Set A i n d i c a t e d t h a t changes i n the paradigm were n e c e s s a r y t o e l i m i n a t e the confounding of w e a l t h and v i s i b i l i t y , so t h a t the e f f e c t s of v i s i b i l i t y a l o n e c o u l d be examined. I t a l s o seemed d e s i r a b l e t o ensure more c o n s i s t e n t m o t i v a t i o n i n s u b j e c t s c o n c e r n i n g advantageous exchanges. The v a r i a b i l i t y i n motives i n Set A seemed a t l e a s t p a r t l y due to t h e c o m p l e x i t y o f the i n s t r u c t i o n s , which were import a n t f o r the i n d u c t i o n of scope c o n d i t i o n s , assumptions and independent variables. A f i r s t attempt to remedy the problems of Set A w i l l be d e s c r i b e d b r i e f l y i n t h i s Appendix. A second and more s u c c e s s f u l attempt was p r e s e n t e d as Set B. The r e v i s i o n of the paradigm i n t h i s P i l o t work u n f o r t u n a t e l y i n t r o d u c e d added f a c t o r s that made i t an inadequate t e s t f o r the t h e o r y . These f a c t o r s w i l l be d i s c u s s e d i n the c o n t e x t of the r e s u l t s . The d a t a from the P i l o t study a r e g i v e n h e r e because they were i n f o r m a t i v e i n terms of t h e l i m i t s of t h e t h e o r y , and suggested f u r t h e r r e v i s i o n s that l e d to Set B.  D e s c r i p t i o n of the Experiments  The same p h y s i c a l s e t up was used as i n Set A. T h i s time, i n s t e a d of d i f f e r e n t r e s o u r c e bases, a l l s u b j e c t s had equal s i z e d t o t a l r e s o u r c e bases (1,200 b u t t o n s ) . The r a t i o s of r e d to green v a r i e d a c r o s s s u b j e c t s , so t h a t t h e i r v a l u e p o s i t i o n s on the two r e s o u r c e s were n o t the same, as shown i n F i g u r e A.6. Note t h a t the v a l u e p o s i t i o n s of n o n - v i s i b l e s were d i f f e r e n t from those of visibles. I f the n o n - v i s i b l e s knew they were u n l i k e any v i s i b l e , i t was expected .they would a l s o be u n c e r t a i n about the numbers and r a t i o s of r e d and green possessed by o t h e r n o n - v i s i b l e s . T h e i r v a l u e p o s i t i o n s on the r e d and green b u t t o n s were s e t between those of the unbalanced and the b a l anced v i s i b l e s . I f n o n - v i s i b l e s d i d use t h e i r concealment to 'act l i k e ' the v i s i b l e s , they would have a model, i n t h e b a l a n c e d v i s i b l e s , o f a f a i r o f f e r t h a t asked f o r more b u t t o n s i n r e t u r n f o r l e s s . In a d d i t i o n , the e x p e r i menter c o u l d compare o f f e r s o f n o n - v i s i b l e s w i t h t h o s e of t h e b a l a n c e d v i s i b l e s , to see i f t h e c o n c e a l e d p l a y e r s a c t e d 'as i f they were b a l a n c e d visibles. A v a l u e c h a r t s i m i l a r t o t h a t used  i n Set A was employed  (see Appendix I ) .  F i g u r e A. 6  Red  -  F  Green  I  Cover  I  D i s t r i b u t i o n of r e s o u r c e s  ^  and i n f o r m a t i o n i n P i l o t Set  l  ___ J  /  V. 7j  i  I  J  L  /  I  I Unbalanced Green Visible  Unbalanced Red Visible  Balanced Green Visible  Balanced. <". Red Visible  110G/100R  1000R/200G  900G/300R  850W350G  VISIBLES  NV Red,  NV Red,  NV Green,  950R/250G NON-VISIBLES  NV Green,  950G/250R  "194  V i s i b l e s u b j e c t s had c a r d s on the o u t s i d e of t h e i r booths, showing the exact amount of each c o l o u r i n t h e i r p o s s e s s i o n ; s u b j e c t s were t o l d t h a t the c o l o u r e d tags on the n o n - v i s i b l e s ' booths i n d i c a t e d those p e r s o n s ' p r e dominant c o l o u r , and t h a t the n o n - v i s i b l e p l a y e r s might have more, or l e s s , or the same, as v i s i b l e s . I n s t r u c t i o n s were tape r e c o r d e d and s u b j e c t s were g i v e n a t r a n s c r i p t of the tape t o read as the tape was p l a y i n g . The i n s t r u c t i o n s were e s s e n t i a l l y the same as i n Set B. In a d d i t i o n to the e l i m i n a t i o n of d i f f e r e n c e s i n t o t a l r e s o u r c e bases, d e s c r i b e d above, the major d i f f e r e n c e s of t h i s Set from Set A were: 1)  A time l i m i t was imposed. S u b j e c t s were t o l d t