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Patterns of industrial conflict 1957-1972 : an international comparison Au Yeong, Chai Yoke 1975

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P A T T E R N S of I N D U S T R I A L C O N F L I C T - 1957-1972: A N I N T E R N A T I O N A L C O M P A R I S O N by Au Yeong Cha i Yoke B . A c c . ( H o n s ) , Univers i ty of S ingapore , 1972 A thesis submitted in partial fulfi lment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Business Admin is t ra t ion . I n t h e -faculty of Commerce and Business A d m i n i s t r a t i o n . We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard. The Univers i ty of Br i t i sh Columbia A p r i l , 1975 In p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s in p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f the r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r an advanced degree at the U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a , I a g r e e that the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e and s t u d y . I f u r t h e r agree t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e c o p y i n g o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y p u r p o s e s may be g r a n t e d by the Head o f my Department o r by h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . It i s u n d e r s t o o d tha t c o p y i n g o r p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l not be a l l o w e d w i t h o u t my w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . Department o f 2075 Wesbrook P l a c e Vancouver, Canada V6T 1W5 - i i -A B S T R A C T Fifteen years ago A . M . Ross and P . T . Hartman published a comparat ive study of str ike activity in fifteen countries with free labour movements , over the years 1900-1956, titled "Changing Patterns of Industrial Conf l i c t " . F r o m their findings they had concluded that there is a withering away of the str ike and a transformation of the str ike f r o m a test of economic strength to br ief demonstrations of protest . The wr i ters further c lass i f ied these fifteen countries into different patterns of industrial confl ict and explained their differences as well as their hypotheses that the str ike i s withering away and is being transformed in terms of the following character is t ics of the industr ial relations sys tem: 1) Organisational stabil ity 1 2) Union leadership confl icts 3) Status of union-management relations 4) Labour pol i t ical activity 5) Role of the State Ross and Hartman also suggested that an "Economic Development Pattern" may be descr ibed with reference to Is rae l , Egypt and other nations where the themes of nat ional ism, ant i -co lonia l ism and central planning are combined in aggressive development p r o g r a m s . They were unable to do so because of the inavailabil i ty of data. The objective of this thesis is to review Ross and Hartman's study in the light of the experiences in the industr ial relations scene since 1956 and our line of inquiry is as fol lows: 1.) A s i m i l a r survey of str ike activity of the same fifteen countries studied by Ross and Hartman is made for the period 1957-1972. - i i i -2) A detailed study of those countr ies found f rom (1) to have a different pattern of confl ict since the previous study, fo l lows, to identify the causes of the new pattern in each country. The p r i m a r y purpose is to establish whether the relationships between str ike activity and the character is t ics of the industrial relations system proposed are va l id . 3) The level of str ike activity and changes in the industrial relations system of three new nations; Israe l , Ma lays ia and Singapore over the period 1948-1957 is the next a rea of research to test Ross and Hartman's observations of an "Economic Development Pa t te rn" . 4) F ina l l y we wil l attempt to improve on the methodology of deriving the various patterns of conf l ic t , which was based on ranges of values a rb i t ra r i l y set . We wi l l use the rule of "the mean of a sample must l ie within the distribution of the population mean of the other samples with which it is grouped", where the population re fers to the pattern of conf l ic t , the s a m p l e , to each country belonging to that pattern and a "t-test" is used to derive the distribution of the population means of each country. F r o m our study, we found that R o s s and Hartman's hypothesis that the str ike i s withering away is not t rue. The data showed both a higher propensity to str ike and greater loss of man-days due to str ikes at the end of the period (1969-1972) than at the beginning (1957-1959). T h e i r hypothesis that the str ike is being transformed is a lso not general ly true as two countr ies , United Kingdom and Italy, are having signif icantly longer average duration of s t r i k e s , and three others , Norway, United States and Canada , st i l l have relat ively long average durat ions. F o u r c o u n t r i e s , U n i t e d K i n g d o m , S w e d e n , I t a l y a n d J a p a n , s h o w e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t p a t t e r n s o f c o n f l i c t d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d i n o u r s t u d y f r o m t h e e a r l i e r o n e . In o u r e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e c h a n g e s a n d d e v e l o p m e n t i n l ihe i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s s y s t e m o f t h e s e c o u n t r i e s , w e f o u n d s t r o n g e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t o n l y o n e o f t h e v a r i o u s e x p l a n a t o r y r e l a t i o n s h i p s p r o p o u n d e d b y R o s s a n d H a r t m a n - t h a t t h e c o n s o l i d a t i o n o f t h e b a r g a i -n i n g s t r u c t u r e i s c o n d u c i v e t o i n d u s t r i a l p e a c e . S e v e r a l o t h e r s w e r e '< r e f u t e d h o w e v e r . O u r s t u d y o f I s r a e l , M a l a y s i a a n d S i n g a p o r e f a i l e d t o c o m e u p w i t h a n E c o n o m i c D e v e l o p m e n t P a t t e r n , w h i c h , h a s l e d u s t o c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e d r i v e f o r e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t b y a r e l a t i v e l y u n d e r - d e v e l o p e d c o u n t r y i n a n i n d u s t r i a l w o r l d n e e d n o t b e t h e o v e r - r i d i n g f a c t o r i n . s h a p i n g i n d u s t r i a l c o n f l i c t a s s u g g e s t e d b y R o s s a n d H a r t m a n . ( - V -T A B L E of C O N T E N T S P A G E . N O . L i s t of Tab les L i s t of Illustrations Acknowledgement I. Introduction 1 II. Review: "Changing Patterns of Industrial Conf l ic t" 6 III. Industrial Conf l ic t : 1957-1972 21 IV. Signi f icant Changes in the Pattern of 34 Industrial Conf l ic t : United K ingdom, Sweden, Italy, Japan. V . New Nations: Is rae l , M a l a y s i a , Singapore 59 V I . C lass i f ica t ion of Countr ies by Pattern of 73 Industrial Conf l ic t VII. Conclusion 80 Bibl iography 83 Appendix 87 - vi -L I S T o f T A B L E S P A G E N O . 1 . D i f f e r e n c e s a n d S i m i l a r i t i e s i n N a t i o n a l S t r i k e P a t t e r n s 1 9 4 8 - 5 6 1 0 2 . F a c t o r s a n d T e n d e n c y S t a t e m e n t s R e l a t i n g t o I n d u s t r i a l C o n f l i c t 1 3 3 . P a t t e r n s o f S t r i k e A c t i v i t y a n d S o m e A s s o c i a t e d F a c t o r s 1 6 4 . I n t e n s i t y o f O r g a n i s a t i o n : A n n u a l A v e r a g e s 2 3 5 . M e m b e r s h i p I n v o l v e m e n t R a t i o : A n n u a l A v e r a g e s 2 4 6 . D u r a t i o n o f S t r i k e s : A n n u a l A v e r a g e s 2 6 7 . F r e q u e n c y o f S t r i k e s : A n n u a l A v e r a g e s 2 7 8 . M e m b e r s h i p L o s s : A n n u a l A v e r a g e s 2 9 9 . T h r e e - Y e a r A n n u a l A v e r a g e s f o r t h e F i f t e e n C o u n t r i e s 3 0 1 0 . D u r a t i o n o f S t r i k e s 6 0 11 o M e m b e r s h i p L o s s 6 1 1 2 . E m p i r i c a l R e s u l t s 7 7 1 3 . " A c c e p t a n c e R e g i o n R u l e " v e r s u s R o s s a n d H a r t m a n ' s R u l e o f C l a s s i f i c a t i o n 7 8 • e . - v i i -LIST of ILLUSTRATIONS P A G E NO. Chart I Membership Involvement - North European Pattern I 35 Chart II Membership Involvement - North European Pattern II 40 Chart III Duration of Strikes - Mediterranean-Asian Pattern 46 Chart IV Membership Involvement - Mediterranean-Asian Pattern 47 Chart V Classification of Countries by v "Acceptance Region" Rule JA p# (kit 78(a) - v i i i — A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T I w o u l d l i k e to thank m y t h e s i s s u p e r v i s o r s , P r o f e s s o r s M . T h o m p s o n and S. H i l l s , f o r t h e i r i n t e r e s t and g u i d a n c e i n m y r e s e a r c h , w i t h o u t w h i c h t h i s s t u d y w o u l d have b e e n q u i t e i n c o m p l e t e . I w o u l d a l s o l i k e to thank M r s . J . W o u l d , f o r g r a c i o u s l y o f f e r i n g to type m y t h e s i s and the e x c e l l e n t j o b d o n e . A t t h i s t i m e , I w i s h to e x t e n d m y s i n c e r e a p p r e c i a t i o n to P r o f e s s o r T h o m p s o n w h o s e h e l p and e n c o u r a g e m e n t have s i g n i f i c a n t l y c o n t r i -b u t e d to m a k i n g m y s h o r t s t a y a t U . B . C . a m o s t f r u i t f u l and v a l u a b l e e x p e r i e n c e . . * * * * * * * * * * * * * I. INTRODUCTION In 1960, Ross and Hartman published a book, Changing Patterns  of Industrial Conf l ic t , in which they submitted that there is a withering away of the str ike and a transformation of the strike f rom a test of economic strength to brief demonstrations of protest. T h e i r hypotheses were based on a comprehensive survey of the strike activity of fifteen countries with free labour movements, covering the years 1900-1956, and in which they had used the following two ratios — membership involvement (number of workers involved as a percentage of union membership) and duration of str ikes (man days lost per s t r iker ) , pr inc ipa l ly , to measure str ike activity. L e s s than a decade la ter , we see an apparently significant resurgence of strike activity al l over the wor ld . Even the North European countries of Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Germany and Netherlands which Ross and Hartman found to have "min imal" str ike activity were reported by E . Kassalow last year as; " B y the mid-f i f t ies and sixties European industrial s y s t e m s , with the exception of France and Italy, have reached a very stable equi l ibr ium. . . . . . . In the past six or seven y e a r s , however, major eruptions and changes have occurred in these industrial relations sys tems . "(1) Of special note is the United Kingdom which was considered in the book as having low industrial confl ict . Her experiences in the last few years have probably dispelled the last of any such impress ions . The objective of this thesis is therefore to review Ross and Hartman's book in the light of these developments. We wil l commence with an attempt to establish whether their hypotheses of the str ike withering away and its transformation are true. T o do th is , a s i m i l a r survey of the same fifteen countr ies , covering the years subsequent to their study - 1957 - 1972 - wil l be made. F r o m their f indings, Ross and Hartman had c lassi f ied these fifteen countries into different patterns of industrial conf l ict , and in the book, had explained these differences as well as the "withering away" of the strike and its transformation in terms of the. following (2") characteristics of the industrial relations system: v . 1) Organisational Stability a) Age of labour movement b) Stability of membership 2) Union Leadership Conflicts a) Factionalism, rival unionism and rival federations b) Strength of Communism in unions 3) Status of Union-Management Relations a) Degree of acceptance by employers b) Consolidation bargaining structure 4) Labour Political Activity a) Existence of labour party as a leading political party b) Labour party governments 5) Role of the State a) Extent of government activity in defining terms of employment b) Dispute settlement policies and procedures We are interested in testing the validity ofthese relationships and we have chosen to focus on those countries which are found to have a different pattern of conflict from the previous study. A detailed examination of these countries would enable us to identify the causes of the new pattern of strike activity in each country and from that establish whether the relationships between strike activity and the characteristics of the industrial relations systems proposed by Ross and Hartman are v sound. We have not studied developments in each of these fifteen countries and have not discussed them in conjunction with Ross and Hartman's proposals because we are not attempting to establish alternative hypotheses to challenge Ross and Hartman's but to see whether they hold in terms of the changes effected in the strike patterns in the period following their study.- 1957-1972. Ross and Hartman had observed in their book that an "Economic Development Pattern" might be described with reference to Israel , Egypt and other nations where the themes of nat ional ism, ant i -colonia l ism and ( 3 ) central planning are combined in aggressive development p r o g r a m s . " , but they were unable to do so because of the tnavailabil ity of data. However, they suggested that in these countr ies , the governments would play a very dominant role in the industrial relations s y s t e m , through, either taking over and running the unions o r completely suppressing them. In this thes is , we have made a study of Israel , together with two other nations -Ma lays ia and Singapore - which are newly independent and have al l the elements in Ross and Hartman's "Economic Development Pa t te rn" , to conf i rm their thoughts on this matter. L a s t l y , we wil l try to improve on Ross and Hartman's methodo-logy used in deriving the var ious patterns of industrial confl ict and their descr ipt ion. In the book, Ross and Hartman had described the pattern in terms of the averages of the two measures — membership involvement and duration of str ikes for the period 1948-1956, and we feel that in addition to the central location of the values (given by the average), we are interested in the dispersion and therefore, the pattern's standard deviations are necessary for a more complete descr ipt ion. We have only attempted a s imple statistical exerc ise Of c lassi fy ing the countries by a "t-test" because of the l imitations of the statistical date (refer Appendix), which otherwise may not stand up to the precis ion of the methodology. However, we feel that this is more sound statistical ly than Ross and Hartman's method which defines the range of values of the two ratios for each pattern quite a r b i -t ra r i l y . It is however not within the scope of this thesis to set up hypotheses of the factors explaining the different patterns thus established as Ross and Hartman did for their study. T h i s is because we feel that it serves no purpose unless we proceed further to quantify the effects of these factors on the str ike pattern. Although Ross and Hartman had established some common character is t ics and relat ionships, they had not shown that they were significant in determining the str ike patterns in each country, nor did they quantify their effects, if any. T h i s thesis wi l l therefore pr incipal ly be a review and up-dating of Ross and Hartman's study, to better understand the possible re lat ion-ships between str ike activity and the industrial relations s y s t e m , rather than building models of industrial conf l ict . The chapter that follows wil l be a review of Ross and Hartman's book, Changing Patterns of  Industrial ConfI ict ,and other related publications s ince . Chapter III wil l survey str ike act iv i ty of the fifteen countries over the period 1957-1972 and test the hypotheses of "the str ike is withering away and is being transformed f rom a test of economic strength to a brief demonstration of protest" . The countries that were found to have significant changes in their pattern of industrial confl ict f r o m Chapter III wil l be analysed in terms of Ross and Hartman's hypotheses of the associations of the industrial relations s y s t e m , in Chapter IV. The new nations, Israe l , Ma lays ia and Singapore wil l be the focus of Chapter V , and in the following chapter , our proposals fo r describing str ike patterns and classi fy ing the countries wil l be d iscussed . Our conclusions wi l l be br ief ly l isted in the final chapter. R E F E R E N C E S 1.) E o M . Kassalow, "Conflict and Co-operation in Europe's Industrial Relations", Industrial Relations, Volume 13, No. 2, May 1974, p. 156. 2) A.M. Ross and P . T . Hartman, Changing Patterns of Industrial Conflict, John Wiley &Sons, N . Y . 1960, p. 64. 3) Ross & Hartman, i b i d . , p. 173. II. R E V I E W : "CHANGING P A T T E R N S of I N D U S T R I A L C O N F L I C T " In their book, Changing Patterns of Industrial Conf l ic t , A . M . Ross and P . T . Har tman analysed str ike activity in 15 countries of North A m e r i c a , E u r o p e , A s i a , A f r i c a and Aus t ra l i a over the period 1900 to 1956, in an attempt to: (a) establish and explain the general trend of activity in the non-Communist wor ld , (b) explore differences in trend and in the meaning of s t r ikes between one country and another, and, (c) show the relation between national patterns of industrial confl ict and certain pr incipal features of the industrial relations sys tem. The authors used ratios in their ana lys is , instead of str ike statist ics of number of s t r i k e s , workers involved and working days lost . T h e i r rationale was that differences in population and size of the labour force must be taken into account for countries to be c o m -parable . Al together , six comparative measures of str ike activity were u s e d , each serving a different purpose. They were: 1) Intensity of Organization (1927-55) Union membership as a percentage of non-agr icul tural employment. 2) Membership Involvement Ratio (1900-56) Number of workers involved in str ikes as a percentage of union membership , designed to show the frequency with which union members were cal led out to s t r ike . 3) Employee Involvement Ratio (1927-56) Ratio of number of workers involved in str ikes and number of non-agricul tural employees, to show degree of p a r t i c i - , pation by the non-agricultural work fo rce . - 7 -4) Duration of Strikes (1900-55) This shows time lost per striker and was derived by dividing the number of workers involved into the number of working days lost. 5) Membership Loss Ratio (1900-56) Ratio of the number of union members (in hundreds) and the number of working days lost to show the average time lost per hundred union workers. 6) Employee Loss Ratio (1927-56) This ratio was designed to show average time lost per hundred non-agricultural workers. Of these, membership involvement ratio and duration of strikes were given prominence in the analysis because it was found that "distinctive patterns of industrial conflict can be described most intelligently in terms of these two measures as they appear to reflect most sensitively the institutional and historical forces at .... ( 1 ) work". The main trends in strike activity established were:-1) Intensity of Organization The average intensity of organisation rose steadily from 22.7% in 1927-29 to 43.5% in 1945-47. Expansion had tapered off in most-countries by the end of World War II, but during the immediate post war period, there was "feverish growth" in Germany, France, Italy and Japan. However, there was a subsequent decline in 3 of these countries - France, Italy and Japan, and also in Finland, and for all the fifteen countries, the average intensity of organisation in 1953 was lower than in 1947. 2) Membership, Involvement There was a general decline in the proportion of union members going on strike. France and Australia were the only exceptions. - 8 -3) Employee Involvement There was no general trend as this ratio varies directly with intensity of organisation as well as membership involvement. In Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, India and South A f r i c a , this ratio had fallen in the post-war as compared to pre-war period, and was attributed to declining membership involvement. In France, Japan, Australia and Finland, however-, there was a significant increase due to more intensive organisation and greater proneness to strike. There was a moderate increase in the U . S . and no s ig-nificant change in the U . K . and Canada, where, though more of the workers were organised, they were less inclined to strike. 4) Duration of Strikes In a majority of the countries, the average duration of strikes in the 1930-47 period was less than in 1900-29 and greater than in 1948-56. Only in Finland and Canada did strikes grow longer after World War II, and in both countries, the post-war strikes have remained much shorter than those that occurred in the early 1900's. 5) Membership Loss There was a "remarkable" decline in man-days of idleness in relation to the number of union members. During the 1920-29 period, at least 2 days per year were lost for every union member in each and country studied/more than eight days per year were lost in Norway, Sweden and Finland. Between 1948 and 1956, however, only India, the U . S . and Finland had two days of idleness annually per union member, while in seven other countries, principally Northern European - Denmark, Netherlands, U . K . , Germany, Norway, Sweden and South A f r i c a , losses per member averaged less than one quarter day. 6) Employee Loss Ratio This ratio, as for employee involvement ratio, is also directly affected by intensity of organisation and again, no useful generalisations could be made except that in the majority of the countries, the-loss in the 1950's is less than during 1927-47when the workers were less organised. - 9 -The primary measures of strike activity used by Ross and Hartman, as already mentioned, were duration of strikes and mem-bership involvement,. The general picture which emerged was a gradual decline in the proportion of union members going on strike during the period studied in most of the countries and a decline in the average duration of strikes in all of the countries. There were however considerable differences among the countries over different time periods, and Ross and Hartman attempted to organise these into countries /various patterns of industrial conflict over the period 1948-55. The authors had considered 1947 "as a convenient point of departure" as the expansion of union membership in proportion to the number of wage and salary earners, appeared to be leveling (2) off after World War II. They were not unique in this consideration as R. Dubih had "viewed the post-war period as discontinuous with the earlier eras, in the realm of labour-management relations" and (3) claimed that most analysts did too. The countries were classified according to whether they have nominal membership involvement ratio (less than 3% annual average), moderate (over 3% and up to 16%) or high (over 16%), and on the basis of low average duration of strikes (less than 5 days), intermediate (5 to 14 days) or high (over 14 days). Table 1 shows the combinations that emerged from this rule. T A B L E 1 D i f f e r e n c e s and S i m i l a r i t i e s i n N a t i o n a l S t r i k e P a t t e r n s 1948-56 M e m b e r s h i p A v e r a g e I n v o l v e m e n t D u r a t i o n C o u n t r y N o m i n a l L o w - I n t e r m e d i a t e D e n m a r k N e t h e r l a n d s U.K. G e r m a n y S o u t h A f r i c a N o m i n a l H i g h N o r w a y S w e d e n H i g h L o w F r a n c e I t a l y J a p a n I n d i a A u s t r a l i a M o d e r a t e / H i g h H i g h U . S . C a n a d a F i n l a n d - n -Ross and Hartman then examined the different countries to find out how, far countries in each group have industrial relations systems with common characteristics. They concluded that, with the exception of South A f r i c a , Australia, and Finland, the four groups of countries represent four patterns of strike activity which were associated with characteristic configurations of labour-manage-ment relations, political structure and government policy. Ross and Hartman attributed their conclusion to the following "leading influences in relative strike activity which were amenable to (4) comparison between one country and another": 1) Organisational Stability a) Age of the labour movement b) Stability of memberships in recent years. 2) Leadership Conflicts in the Labour Movement a) Factionalism, rival unionism and rival federations b) Strength of Communism in labour unions 3) Status of Union-Management Relations a) Degree of acceptance by employers b) Consolidation of bargaining structure 4) Labour Political Activity a) Existence of labour party as a leading political party b) Laboui—party government 5) Role of the State a) Extent of government activity in defining terms of employment b) Dispute settlement policies and procedures. Further, the writers asserted that these influences are "exerted jointly rather than severally, as a configuration rather than as a group of independent variables", and "much depends on how they fit into the total system of industrial relations in each country". - Y d -Any statement that a certain factor is conducive to industrial peace or conflict meant that it has such an effect in the context in which (5) it is typically encountered. The relationship between these factors and strike activity hypothesised by Ross and Hartman were conveniently summarised (6) and tabulated by J . E . T . Eldridge in his book, Industrial Disputes, shown in the Table 2. Eldridge also summarised the explanations offered for different strike patterns, shown in Table 3. A s for the three countries which Ross and Hartman called the "deviant cases" - South A f r i c a , Australia and Finland, these explanations were given: 1) South Africa : Even though South Africa has a weaker divided unionism, relatively little collective bargaining and government hostile to labour, which under the relationships established earlier should result in a high strike rate, the opposite was true. This was largely attributed to the thorough-going repression of the non-white majority practiced by nearly all white groups and particularly by the government. 2) Finland: The economic environment had been too hostile for successful reliance on the political mechanism even though she had a strong labour party, therefore, resulting in high levels of conflict. 3) Australia: In Australia, the weak constitutional powers of the federal government was considered as an off-setting factor to the strong labour party, resulting in high membership involvement. The final conclusion reached by Ross and Hartman was: "There has been a general decline in strike activity through-out the industrialised world and that there will be a withering away of the strike as a primary means of settling industrial disputes. The modern strike is less frequently a trial of economic strength and more often a demonstration of protest, than the strike of previous decades. Even the classical collective bargaining strike is settled more rapidly than it previously was. "(7) - 13 -T A B L E 2 F A C T O R T E N D E N C Y S T A T E M E N T RELATING T O INDUSTRIAL C O N F L I C T 1. Organisational Stability (a) Age of Labour Movement (b) Stability of Union Membership 'Older movements are more likely to have completed their struggles for existence, recognition and security, and to be integrated into their national economics. Once this point has been reached, bargaining machinery can be developed to handle economic issues without frequent work stoppages.' (p.65) 'Pronounced fluctuations are generally conducive to industrial conflict as the unions strive to organise and absorb new members and to settle the most pressing grievances, or struggle to limit their losses and recapture their territory.'(p.65) 2. Leadership Conflicts in the Labour Movement (a) Factionalism, Rival Unionism and Rival Fede rations (b) Strength of Communism in Unions 'The union structure most conducive to the elimination of industrial conflict is a unified national movement with strongly centralised control. Under these conditions the central leadership can consciously substitute other tactics for the strike and can restrain the exercise of power by strong subordinate unions.' (p.66) 'Where the Communist faction has substan-tial strength in the labour movement, strike activity is usually stimulated - particularly the use of massive demonstration strikes. ' (p.66) - 14 -T A B L E 2 (Continued) F A C T O R 3. Status of Union/Manage-rnent Relations  (a) Degree of Accep-tance by Employers (b) Consolidation of Bargaining Structure T E N D E N C Y S T A T E M E N T RELATING T O INDUSTRIAL C O N F L I C T Organisational conflict is minimised where 'employers and unions have attained an acceptable balance of power and prerogatives'. (p.67) 'Multi-employer bargaining is condu-cive to industrial peace.' (p.67) 4. Labour Political Activity (a) Existence of Labour Party as a Leading Political Party (b) Labour Party Governments Labour political action is 'a deterrent to strikes. ' (p. 69) 'If the labour party comes into power the deterrent effect is even stronger.' (p. 69) 5. Role of the State (a) Extent of Govern-ment Activity in Defining Terms of Employment (b) Dispute Settlement Policies and Procedure 'Greater participation by government as entrepreneur, economic planner, guardian of labour, and supervisor of union management relations has been partly responsible for the declining frequency of strikes. ' (p. 69) 'Labour protest against public employ-ment policies or compulsory arbitration awards is more likely to take the form of brief demonstrations than actual trials of economic strength.' (p. 69) T A B L E 2 (Continued) J . E . T . Eld ridge, Industrial Disputes, Routledge & Kegan Paul , London, 1968 p. 2 7 . - 16 -T A B L E 3 •PATTIU<!;S OP STIUKE ACTIVITY AND SOMR ASSOCIATED FACTORS Croups Strike Measures (a) (b) Membership Duration Involvement Orga M isnthnal Stabit Hy Age of Stability Labour of Movement Membersh ip Union leadership conflicts (a) (b) Factionalism Communist Influences Status of Unionf Management Relations (•>) o>> Employers Consolidation Acceptances of bargaining of Unions structure Labour Party activity <-i> (b) Labour Party Labour iwporUmt Government . Rote of State (a) (b) Rerulatio-.is Ir.trrvKnthn of terms of • in C W ' M ' I ' W employment' Uar^iinin^ North European I Low -Nominal Moderate O l d Stable Subdued Weak H i g h l y Widespread Centralised Yes Common C Limited Active North European 11 Nominal Long O l d Stable Subdued Weak Highly Widespread Centralised Yes Common Limi ted Passive Mediterranean Asian H i g h Low Y o u n g (or Reorganised) Unstable Marked Strong Limited Uncommon Consolidation N o t Unified N o Marked Passive . North American Intermediate - H i g h L o n g Fairly Fairly Y o u n g Stable Subdued Weak Widespread 'Decentralised N o N o Limited Mixed S O U R C E : J . E . T . Eldridge, Industrial Disputes, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1968 p. 29. - 17 -In the authors' opinion, the 3 primary reasons that can explain the withering away of the strike were: 1) Employers have developed more sophisticated policies and more effective organisations 2) The state has become more prominent as an employer of labour, economic planner, provider of benefits and supervisor of industrial relations, and, 3) In many countries, the labour movement has been forsaking the use of strike in favour of broad political endeavours. (8) Kerr and Siegel in an earlier study of interindustry pro-pensity to strike had come to a similar conclusion. However, they attributed the decline in strike activity to greater integration of the worker to the rest of society, resulting from the introduction of the automobile, the radio, television, the decasualisation of work,the increasing acceptance of trade unions by employers, by government and by the community at large and the spread of popular education. Ross and Hartman had categorically described their study as a factual investigation, with an attempt to interpret the facts, and not to project the future of industrial conflict. Nevertheless, they made a few predictions; namely, 1) There will not be any impending revival of strike activity in the Northern European countries. 2) Newer countries now attempting to industrialise under forced draft will not have the "historical Western cycle of industrial conflict". The strong probability is that governments will dominate labour-management relations in such countries for the indefinite future, either in close collaboration with the unions or by suppressing them or by taking them over. 3) As a result, these new countries would have a different pattern of strike activity, from the 4 patterns established. 4) A s the current influences on strike activity in the U . S . are - 18 -somewhat mixed, they predict that, a) the volume of industrial conflict may well increase in the short run, b) it will continue to diminish over a longer period of time,and, c) the strike will not wither away in the U . S . as it has done in Northern Europe.(9) Since Changing Patterns of Industrial Conflict, relatively few studies have been done on international strike experiences on such a comprehensive scale. One of these, Measurement of Labour Disputes  and Their Economic Effects, by M . Fisher surveyed strike activity in eleven countries belonging to the Organisation for Economic C o -operation and Development (OECD) over the period 1958-71. The objectiv of this study was "to make a mere thorough examination of the present basis on which dispute statistics are collected by countries and of the (10) costs of disputes, than seemed to have been carried out hitherto". There was little, if any, comparison made among the countries studied, and the only observations of relevance to Ross and Hartman's study seem to be; 1) a fairly general tendency for stoppages to increase towards the end^of the period under review (1958-1971),^ 1^and, 2) stoppages do seem to be more frequent, and more intense, when the pace of inflation is beginning to quicken . . . a (12) definite suggestion of inter-dependency at the macro-level. Shorter and Ti l ly seemed to have made the best follow-up study so far. In their book, Strikes in France: 1830-1938, they compared strike activity of 13 western countries in the 20th century to try and explain changes in the conflict patterns among the countrieson the basis of changes in the political representation of their working classes. They were reluctant to "regard a country's labour relations system as having, in its own right an important independent influence in shaping conflict oss and Hartman did. The writers felt that - 19 -the multiplicity of variables used by Ross and Hartman led,to ad hoc explanations and away from predictive models and proposed that changes in strike activity can be explained by changes in the political system. However, they failed to explain the post-war North-American pattern in the same political context as they did the European countries. They fell back on "historic tradition and national character and custom" (14) to account for the differences thereby contradicting themselves. In so doing, Shorter and T i l l y have shown the weakness of attampting. a single factor explanation of strike activity. Many writers are also of the opinion that strikes are too complex a phenomenon for (15) such predictive models and, therefore, no attempts will be made along such lines in this thesis. Instead, a test of the hypotheses posed by Ross and Hartman of the future of strikes and their rela-tionships with the characteristics of the industrial relations system will be the primary objective. A . M . Ross and P . T . Hartman, Changing Patterns of  Industrial Conflict, John Wiley & Sons, N. Y . , 1950, pp. 12-13. Ibid., p. 15. R. Dubin, "Industrial Conflict: The Power of Prediction", Industrial & Labour Relations Review, 18 (1964/65), p. 353. Ross & Hartman, op. cit. , p. 63. Ibid., pp. 64-55. J . E . T . Eld ridge, Industrial Disputes, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1968, pp. 27-29. C . Kerr & A . Siegel, "The Inter-Industry Propensity to Strike: An Inter national Comparison", in A . Kornhauser, R. Dubin & A . M . Ross Industrial Conflict, N . Y . , McGraw-H i l l , 1954, pp. 189-212. M . Fisher, Measurement of Labour Disputes and Their  Economic Effect, O E C D , P a r i s , 1973, p. 9. Ibid. , p. 215. Ibid., p. 143. E . Shorter & C . T i l l y , Strikes in France: 1830-1938, Cambridge, London, 1974, p. 393. Ibod. , p. 330. Examples: i) A . W . Gouldner, Wildcat Strikes, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1955, p. 65; " A strike is a social phenomenon of enormous complexity which, in its totality, is never susceptible to complete description let alone complete explanation". ii) J . E . T . Eldridge,. op. cit. p. 23; "the concept of an industrial relations system . . . remind us of a whole range Of considerations to bear in mind when trying, to explain strikes". III. INDUSTRIAL C O N F L I C T : 1957- 1972 Ross and Hartman had arrived at their principal conclusions of:^ ' J a) withering away of the strike, and b) transformation of the strike, which in many countries, is no longer a sustained test of economic strength but a brief demonstration of protest, from their findings for 15 countries for the period 1900 - 1956. In this chapter, we will attempt to test the validity of these conclusions by a comparative study of the strike activity of these same countries during the subsequent years, 1957 - 1972. To ensure comparability of the studies, similar sources of statistical data were used as far as possible. However, some changes were made in the use of the strike measures/ratios. In addition to the membership involvement (number of workers involved as a percentage of union membership) and duration of strike (man days lost per worker involved) ratios highlighted by Ross and Hartman, the frequency of strikes (number of strikes per 100,000 non-agricultural employees), as used by Shorter and T i l l y will supplement the 'membership involvement' ratio as an indicator of the propensity to strike. Ross and Hartman had used union membership as the denominator on the basis that union members are in a better position to strike than (3) the unorganized workers. We feel that strikes are by no means confined to organised workers only, and also as the definition of a union member varies so widely among the countries that a worker may be classified as a union member in one country but not another, we should be concerned about a country's strike propensity in terms of its total wage earners. Little importance was attached to the employee involvement and employee loss ratios in deriving the conclusions of the previous study nor were any general trends established. We have thus decided to omit these two ratios from our analysis, but the other two measures-intensity of of organisation (union membership as a percentage of non-agricultural employment) and membership loss (man days lost per 100 union members), will be included. - 22 -A s in the earlier study, the averages over several years will be computed to show the trend. From a brief inspection of the statistics calculated, it is found that, for most of the countries and the measures, there is a decline through the early '60's and a sharp increase in the subsequent years. A s a result averages for the periods 1957-1964 and 1965-1972 are computed and compared against that of 1948-1956. To supplement this, three-year annual averages are calculated to show better the move-ments of the ratios for each country. > Intensity of Organisation (Union membership as a percentage of non-agricultural employment) Refer Table 4 Throughout the period 1957-1972, the average intensity of organisation bad continued to decline from the 1945-47 peak of 43.5% (4) to 32.5% in 1970. Two countries, however, have a continuous increase - Sweden, from 68.0% in 1957 to-75.3% in 1970, and Finland, from 33.5% to 61. 1%. Denmark, Canada and India have an upturn in the late sixties. The United Kingdom also has a significantly higher ratio in 1970, but this was due to a reduction in the non-agricultural employment rather than increased organisation. By this measure, the United Kingdom and Sweden seem to be moving out of line with the other members of their respective groups. Membership Involvement (Number of workers involved as a percentage of union membership) Refer Table 5 There was a general rise in the proportion of members going on strike during the period under study, but especially since the late sixties. This is in contrast to Ross and Hartman's findings for the earlier period, (2) 1948-1956. The only exceptions were the "North European" countries of the Netherlands, Germany, Norway and Sweden, where the ratio seemed to be levelling out. Of special note is the United Kingdom with an average of 12.6% over the period 1957-72 compared to an average of only 5.9% for 1948-56. Under T A B L E 4 - INTENSITY of ORGANIZATION: A N N U A L A V E R A G E S 1954-53 1957-59 1960-62 1963-65 1966-68 1969-72** 1948-56 1957-64 1965-72*** Denmark 57. 3 53. 1 57.1 54. 8 53.0 57. 6 55 .7 56.3 54 .7 Netherlands 40. .4 45. 8 44.4 43. 3 43. 1 41 . 3 41 .9 44.7 42 .3 U . K . 46. 8 45. 5 44.9 45. 1 44. 1 46. 5 47 .8 45. 1 45 .3 Germany 41. 3 36. 0 34.6 33. 6 33.5 33. 0 42 .6 34.9 33 .3 Norway 57. 5 56. 8 55.3 54. 1 51.8 48. 2 56 .8 55.6 50 .3 Sweden 62. 7 66. 3 67. 1 68. 1 68.5 76. 0 60 .5 67. 1 70 .9 France 26. 5 19. 3 19.6 18. 9 18. 1 17- 2 39 .8 19.3 18 .9 Italy 74. 5 64. 0 60.4 57. 8 52.5 44. 8 81 .6 61. 1 50 .8 Japan 40. 9 32. 8 33.9 35. 6 34.8 34. 8 . 45 .2 33.9 34 •9 India 26. 7 23. 6 24.3 20. 8 22.5 23. 3 15 .9 23.4 22 .2 U . S . A . 33. 9 32. 7 30.5 28. 8 28.0 27. 3 31 .8 30.9 27 .8 Canada 32. 9 32. 4 32.4 28. 4 30.8 32. 4 31 .0 30.7 31 . 1 Australia — 60. 9 61 .0 59. 7 55.2 53. 9 63 . 1 60.5 55 .2 Finland 27. 7 33. 3 34.8 36. 7 • 38. 1 55. 8 28 .2 34.7 45 .4 South Afr ica — 13. 2 12.9 13. 2 13.6 13. 8 15 .2 13. 1 13 .7 Total 36.0 35.0 33. 9 33.2 32. 5 * Union membership as a percentage of non-agricultural employment ** Annual averages for three year periods * * * Annual averages for eight year periods - 23 -T A B L E 5 - M E M B E R S H I P I N V O L V E M E N T RATIO: A N N U A L A V E R A G E S 1954-5S 1957-59 1960-62 1963-65 1966-68 1969-72** 1948-56. 1957-64 1965-7S Denmark 3.6 0.8 —'. . 1.1 1.9 4.5 1 .4 3.3 2.7 Netherlands 1.6 0.4 2. 1 1 .3 0.4 2. 1 1.3 1.2 1-1 U . K . • 5.8 8.6 20.3 7.8 11.7 14.9 5.9 12.7 12.6 Germany 5.5 1.3 0.5 1.6 1.4 1 .9 2.6 1.3 1.4 Norway 1.2 1.1. •1.5 ' 0.7 0. 1 0.3 1.2 1.2 0.2 Sweden 6.3 0. 1 0. 1 0. 1 0.4 0.8 0.3 0. 1 0.5 France 50.5 73.9 70.7 86.2 120.7 50.2 62.4 80.4 78. 1 Italy 27.1 20.5 37.4 49.4 53.8 109. 1 35.2 35.5 52.2 Japan 15.5 19.8 16.7 13. 5 9.6 14.7 21. 5 16.7 12.8 India 22.6 26.9 18.8 21 .3 33.6 37.6 37.2 21. 7 33.8 U . S . A . 10. 1 10.4 8.0 8. 1 11.8 15. 1 15.4 8.8 13.3 Canada 4.8 6.7 5. 1 7.8 16.0 16.9 6.3 6.0 15.8 Australia — 15.7 21.8 23.2 23.3 57.0 25.2 20.0 37.8 Finland 11.7 8.9 5.3 9.7 7.4 25.6 13.9 8.8 14.3 South Afr ica — 1.7 0.9 1.0 0.7 0.9 1 .4 1.2 0.8 Total 14.0 . 16.6 15.8 19. 1 24.2 - 15.6 20.0 * Workers involved in strikes as a percentage of union membership ** Annual averages for 3 year periods *** Annual averages for 8 year periods - 24 -- 25 -Ross and Hartman's classification, she should not be in the same group as the other three countries which still fall into the class of 'low member-ship involvement'. In the Mediterranean-Asian group, Japan is the exception. Even though she has a-fall and rise in participation as France, Italy and India, her average has fallen considerably to 12.8% for 1965-72, and which is very much lower than that of the others. A general rise in membership involvement, coupled with a general decline in the intensity of organisation, would mean that the increase in the proportion of members going on strike is deflated. We therefore expect that the frequency of strikes ratio will have a significant upward trend. Duration of Strikes (Man days lost per worker involved) Refer Table 6 Considering the fifteen countries together, the average duration of strikes declined through the early sixties and then started to rise after that, as in the case of the membership involvement ratio. On examining the individual countries however, only Italy, United Kingdom, United States and Canada have such a trend. The others were declining or were quite stable. With reference to the classifications made, the United Kingdom and Italy which had 'low duration' and Sweden which had 'high average duration' are moving towards an 'intermediate' average. Frequency of Strikes (Number of strikes per 100,000 non-agricultural employees) Refer Table 7 The most striking feature is a significant increase in this ratio in almost all the countries in the last four years of the period under study. The two exceptions, India and Canada experienced a similar movement in their frequency of strike ratio earlier, that i s , from 1935-38. On examining the countries in the different groups, it is found that: a) In the 'North European I' group, the United Kingdom is distinctly different. She has an average of 2.52 over the last 18 years, the lowest in any year being 0.91 as compared to the others which averages were less than 0.3. T A B L E 6 - DURATION of S T R I K E S : A N N U A L A V E R A G E S 1954-56 1957-59 1960-62 1963-65 1956-68 1969-72** 1948-56 , 1957-64 Denmark Netherlands U . K . ' Germany 6.9 5. 1 5. 1 8.5 2.3 4.7 7.0 10.2 6.6 4.4 3.0 3.6 7v7 3.0 3..0 5'. 5 1.2 2.7 3.4 2.5 2.6 3.2 8.9 4o9 4.3 7.5 4.3 9.9 4. 1 4.2 4.4 6.3 3.8 2.8 6.1 3.7 Norway Sweden 21.3 15.5 12.4 80.2 31.9 11.6 14.2 15,8 14.2 6.5 14.0 8.3 15.2 22.6 20.8 37.7 14.2 9. 1 France Italy Japan India 1.8 2.9 3.9 9.2 1.4 3.9 4.4 7.9 1.1 4.7 4.2 8.3 1 .4 3.4 2.9 6; 7 1.2 4.5 2.4 10.5 1.5 7.2 2.9 5.5 2.9 2.7 4.9 8.8 1 .4 4. 1 3.9 7.8 1 .3 5.7 2.8 7.5 U . S . A . Canada 14.3 23.0 20. 1 22.3 13.6 15.9 15.0 13.5 15.4 17.0 16.8 18.3 14.6 19.3 9 16. 5 17.7 16. 1 17.3 Australia Finland South Afr ica 2.4 9.9 1.8 1.7 9.5 1.8 1.5 3.5 4.6 1.9 5.9 4.5 1.8 8. 1 3.2 2.5 3.0 1.6 3.2 15.8 2.6 1.6 6.8 3. 7 1.8 4.8 2.1 Total 8.8 8.1 4.9 4.9 6.2 6.8 6.0 6.4 * Working days lost per striker ** Annual averages for three year periods *** Annual averages for eight year periods - 26 -... * T A B L E 7 - F R E Q U E N C Y of S T R I K E S : A N N U A L A V E R A G E S 1957-•59 1960-62 1963-65 1966-68 1969-72** 1948-•56 1957-64 1965-72 Denmark 9* 13 0.36 0.20 0. 12 0.27 0. 14 0.23 0.21 Netherlands 0. 16 0.20 0.21 0.04 0. 13 0. 38 0.20 0.09 U . K . 1. 19 4 .5 0.96 0.94 4.4 1 . 05 2.40 2.70 Germany 0. 42 0.05 0. 14 0.46 — 0. 18 0.28 Norway 0. 18 0. 13 0.06 0.06 o. 10 0. 47 0. 13 0.07 Sweden 0. 05 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.21 0. 15 0.06 0. 12 France 1. 44 1 .45 1.59 1 .21 2.21 2. 58 1.53 1. 78 Italy 1. 96 3. 12 3.45 2.60 3.97 2. 07 2. 82 3.33 Japan 0. 42 0.52 0.47 0.44 0.68 0. 46 0.46 0. 58 India 1 . 11 0.92 0.99 1 .35 1.30 0. 90 1.01 1 .28 U . S . A . o. 70 0.63 0.63 0.70 0.76 1 . 01 0.65 0.73 Canada Q. 54 0.61 0.74 0.94 0.85 0. 57 0.60 0.89 Australia 3. 43 3.33 3.80 3.69 5.41 5. 67 3.49 4. 56 Finland 0. 59 0.39 0.44 0.61 3.32 0. 78 0.51 1 .91 South Afr ica 0. 25 0. 18 0.22 0.19 0. 16 0. 22 0.21 0. 19 Total 0. 81 0.85 0.87 0.84 1.12 0.85 0.85 * Number of strikes per 10,000 non-agricultural population ** Annual averages for three year periods * * * Annual averages for eight year periods - 27 -- 28 -b) Norway and Sweden have extremely low ratios, as expected from their low membership involvement and high intensity of organisation rates. c) Japan has relatively low frequencies, varying between 0.40 and 0.74 with an average of 0.52, while Italy and France have averages of 3. 1 and 1.7 respectively. India too was relatively more strike prone than Japan with 1.2 as the average. Since 1969, Japan's ratio has been very close to the United States and Canada. Membership Loss Refer Table 8 The'Remarkable decline' in man-days lost identified by Ross and Hartman was reversed in a number of countries, namely, United Kingdom, Italy, India, United States, Canada, and Australia. A s these countries together account for more than 90% of the total man-days lost by these fifteen countries, it will not be incorrect to say that there was a general increase in membership loss from 1957 to 1972. The average increased from 0.9 day lost per member in 1957 - 1954 to 1.3 in 1935-72. However, the membership loss in the North European countries, with the exception of the United Kingdom, has fallen to very low levels of less than 0. 1 day lost per member. The United Kingdom on the other hand has risen to about 1 day per member in 1939 - 1972. Japan again differed significantly from the other members of the Mediterranean-Asian group, declining to about 0.4 in 195 5-72 as against 1.2 days for France and 3 days for Italy and India during the same period. Other points to note are the decline in Finland from 3 days lost per member in 1948-53 to 0.3 days in 1935-72, and the sharp increase of more than one and a half times in Australia over the last three years of this study - from 0.4 day to 1. 1. This study has led us to conclude that Ross and Hartman's hypothesis that the strike is.withering away is not true. The trend of strike activity in terms of the four rre asures used, and the intensity of organisation for the fifteen countries in aggregate are shown in Table 9. For all of the 'strike' measures, it can be seen that there has been a significant increase in the 1959 to 1972 period over the 1955-38 period, and except for the duration of strike ratio, the other * T A B L E 8 - M EM B ER SHIP L O S S : ANNUAL A V E R A G E S 1954-56 1957-59 v1960-62 1963-65 1966-68 1969-72** 1948-56 1957-64 1965-72 Denmark 49.8 1.5 96.9 10.9 2.2 7.7 17. 1 37.2 8.3 Netherlands 7. 7 1.5 12.3 3. 1 0.7 9.3 10.4 5.9 4. 1 U . K . 32. 5 58.8 40.0 22.9 32.7 99.8 22.5 38.2 60.9 Germany 18.7 9.5 2.7 9.2 2.2 2.0 15. 1 7.9 2.1 Norway • 19.7 8.3 30.0 13.9 1.4 3.8 16.2 19.4 2.6 Sweden 4.5 1.7 0.5 1.0 5.5 5.4 13.3 1 .2 4.6 France 98.8 105.8 77.2 126.4 181.6 76.5 171.2 111.2 110.9 Italy 73.3 98.4 205.8 167.7 189. 1 545. 1 85.8 162. 7 295.3 Japan 64. 1 86. 1 67.4 39.7 23.5 39.4 110. 1 65.4 35.0 India 159.5 209.3 150.7 145. 7 354.7 372.7 315.2 116.8 332.0 U . S . A . 163.4 212.8 108.0 122. 7 211.4 284. 1 235.6 149.5 222.8 Canada 132. 1 151 .0 86.8 105»7 252.7 282.8 129.7 108. 1 254.7 Australia 26.3 32.0 37.3 38.9 105.6 86.4 31.0 67.4 Finland 91.9 65.4 13.9 102.9 44.0 25.6 579.8 67.9 30.3 South Afr ica - 2.5 5.1 4.4 2. 1 1 06 5.0 4. 1 1.8 Total - 108. 1 81. 1 76.3 117. 1 175.0 - 90.2 129.4 * Working days lost per 100 union members ** Annual averages for three year periods * * * Annual averages for eight year periods - 29 -- R O -T A B L E .9 Three-Year Annual Averages for the Fifteen Countries Years 1957- 1960- 1963- 1966- 1939-1959 1962 1965 1968 1972 Intensity of Organisation 36.0 35.0 33.9 32.9 32.5 Membership Involvement 14.0 16.6 15.8 19.1 24.2 Duration of Strikes 8.1 4.9 4.9 6.2 6.8 Frequency of Strikes 0.81 0.85 0.87 0.84 1.15 Membership Loss . 108.1 81.1 76.3 117.1 175.0 - 31 -averages for 1969-72 are higher than the averages for 1957-59. Their other contention that the strike is being transformed from a test of economic strength to a demonstration of protest in most countries may be more valid, as the average duration of strike has been declining for 11 of the 15 countries. On the other hand, countries which had low duration - United Kingdom and Italy, are having longer strikes and others with long durations - Norway, United States and Canada are not getting shorter strikes. We feel that it is too early to commit ourselves and we should study at least some of these 'deviant' countries in greater depth before any conclusions are drawn. A s for Ross and Hartman's prediction that there will not be a revival of strike activity in the North European countries, the United Kingdom has proved them wrong. They were more fortunate with their prediction of a sustained level of industrial conflict in the United States. In their book, Ross and Hartman had anticipated shifts by coun-tries out of the groups they were classified in. J From this study, in terms of duration of strikes and/or membership involvement, United Kingdom Sweden, and Japan do not fit their respective classes. Italy, while still having 'low duration' had an increasing trend in contrast to the others which were declining. Taking thefrequehcy of strikes ratio into consi-deration, both the United Kingdom and Japan differed from their counter-parts. We feel that a logical development of this paper would be a detailed study of these countries - United Kingdom, Sweden, Italy, Japan, with special attention to the factors used by Ross and Hartman to explain the patterns of strike activity of the different groups. This would lead to an identification of the changes, if any, in the industrial relations system which will account for the changes in the patterns of industrial conflict, as well as a testing of Ross and Hartman's-explana-tions. A more rigorous test, for example an examination of all the fifteen countries studied, will not be undertaken, as our primary interest is not to derive definitive relationships between strike patterns and - 32 -characteristics of the industrial relations system, but to attempt to increase our understanding of it. - 33 -R E F E R E N C E S : 1. Ross & Hartman, Changing Patterns of Industrial Conflict, John Wiley & Sons, N . Y . , 1960, p .6 . 2. E . Shorter & E . T i l l y , Strikes in France: 1830-1968, Cambridge U . Press , 1974, p. 307. "To measure frequency we take the number of strikes per 100,000 non-agricultural active population." 3. Ross & Hartman, op. cit.., p. 11. 4. A s data for 1971 and 1972, for more than half of the countries is not available, their averages would not be meaningful. 5. Ross & Hartman, op. c i t . , p. 173. - 34 -IV. SIGNIFICANT C H A N G E S IN T H E P A T T E R N O F INDUSTRIAL  C O N F L I C T : UNITED KINGDOM, S W E D E N , I T A L Y , J A P A N In this chapter, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Italy and Japan will be considered in turn, commencing with a brief summary of Ross & Hartman's findings of their strike patterns and the writers* explanations. The strike trends for the period 1957-72 will then be described, with the emphasis on the differences from the previous period's pattern and from that of the other countries in their respective groups. An attempt will be made to account for these differences in terms of the changes in the industrial relations system, in the context of the relationships hypothesised by Ross & Hartman. We will draw our conclusions about their hypotheses from the examination of these four countries in the last part. United Kingdom The United Kingdom was grouped together with Denmark, Netherlands, and Germany as having low participation rates and brief strikes from 1948-1956. Such a strike pattern, Ross & Hartman claimed, had emerged from the abandonment of the strike as a tactical instrument by the British labour movement, and which was the outcome of a combination of the age and stability of the unions, the sophistication of employers, the improvement of bargaining machinery, the activities of the government, the political aims of the labour movement and the success of the Labour Party. Among the four countries though, the United Kingdom had the highest membership involvement ratio, and this was attributed to the prevalence of unofficial protest strikes against union leadership by the local which was not found in the others. ^ ' - 35 -CHART I MEMBERSHIP INVOLVEMENT - NORTH EUROPEAN P A T T E R N I iNMARK Workers Involved - (Per Cent) 5 10 15 1948-1956 1957-1964 1965-1972 m rHER-^NDS JITED 7/ MGDOM v - / . •> : R M A N Y Since 195S however, the membership involvement ratio had more than doubled, averaging 12.7% in the 1957-72 period and was especially high from 1968 onwards. Both the frequency of strikes and membership loss ratios have a similar trend. The strikes were still relatively short, averaging 4.0 days lost per striker (1948-56's average was 4.3 days) until 1970-71 when the average shot up to 12.6 days lost per striker. Britain therefore had a substantial increase in industrial conflict since 1957, with more union members striking more frequently, and especially in the 70's when the strikes were prolonged too. In 1965 the Labour government appointed a Royal Commission to study the role of Britain's traditionally voluntarist system of industrial 2 relations in her poor post-war economic record. In 1968 they reported that the trend in Britain's strike activity has been: "1) A general increase in strikes over the last ten years in virtually every industry outside mining. 2) . . . the overwhelming majority of these strikes were both unofficial and unconstitutional. 3) ' That most of them were also small and short. 4) That there has been no similar general increase in the numbers 3 of official/constitutional s tr ikes ." There have been two significant changes in the industrial relations system which was probably responsible for the trend of strike activity. They are, 1) the growth of work-place bargaining within an increasingly ineffective and disordered system of industry-wide formal agreements, 2) government intervention in the economy and the collective bargaining system. - <if -Growth of Local Bargaining The traditional system of wage determination was voluntary indus-try-wide bargaining with most industries covered by national agreements negotiated between an employers' association and one or more unions. These agreements were typically open-ended and quite narrow in scope. However, since 1945 and especially in the 1960's, the structure of collective bargaining was decentralized in response to local issues and 5 worker aspirations not dealt with in national agreements. Local/plant bargains negotiated by plant management and shop stewards have become Q a de facto feature of the collective bargaining system. Accompanying these arrangements was the growth of "unofficial and unconstitutional" strikes at the local without the unions' knowledge or sanctions. It is doubtful that these strikes are protest strikes against the union leadership as Ross and Hartman (R & H) contended, but rather as what Turner called "an interval for bargaining the new price" or a "stimulus to more effective functioning of conciliation procedures" . 7 The growth of local bargaining seems to support R& H's hypothesis that decentralisation of collective bargaining would not be conducive to industrial peace. On the other hand, accepting Turner's argument; it is the inadequate system for setting wages and settling grievances that has contributed to more conflict. Government Intervention The United Kingdom, compared to the other Western countries, had a very poor economic record, especially in the 1950's with a low rate of growth, chronic balance of payments difficulties and very high inflation. In an attempt to solve these problems the government had extended its role in managing the economy with an economic planning program, which included - 38 -Government Intervention (Continued) incomes policies to link money income increases with a rise in national productivity, a labour market policy to improve utilization of man-power and legislations to reduce industrial conflict. The most significant piece of legislation was the British Industrial Relations Act passed in 1971 by the conservative government, which, 8 though it had as one of its objectives, "to curtail strike action", resulted in a most bitter struggle with labour, as evidenced in the sharp increase in strike activity in 1971 and 1972. The whole labour movement under the leadership of the Trade Union Congress (TUC) and with the support of the Labour Party had opposed the Act even before it was enacted and fought it relentlessly. The reason was that the Act will benefit the small weak unions the most and will be the greatest threat to the big strong unions of the T U C 9 with least to benefit. The Act principally constructed from three American laws (Wagner Act 1935, Taft-Hartley Act 1947 and Landum Griffin Act 1959) aimed to reform the collective bargaining system with provisions for the registration of unions, legal enforceability of contracts unless specified otherwise and machinery to regulate who should bargain for workers in particular factories. The effect of this attempt to regulate union-management relationship was contrary to R & H's hypothesis that greater participation by the State would lead to a decline in the frequency of strikes. The T U C in fact had first challenged the Act with instructions to affiliates not to register on pain of suspension. ^® The difference could be that the Act was not part of the system and currently it seems that it may never be as the Labour Government has planned to replace the Act with measures more amenable to the labour ^ 10a movement. It is relevant to note that the preceding Labour Government had attempted to implement fairly similar reforms but backed down against 11 the T U C objections. The question is then, would there be a similar confrontation if the Labour Government had gone ahead. We suggest that - csy -Government Intervention (Continued) it is very likely, but we feel that it is highly improbable that the Labour Government would have taken such action. From this, we submit that the link between a Labour Government and the level of strikes is rather that the government is unlikely to take actions which would induce conflict, and not that the labour movement would reduce strife because of the adverse political effects on the government as R & H have suggested. In the Act , the government had provided for recognition of unions as Royal Commission had reported that there is still wide spread employer resistance to organisation by both blue-collar and especially white-collar unions. Does this mean that even though the U . K . has the oldest labour movement, the basic organising struggle is not ancient history and there-fore the chronological age of the U . K . labour movement is not a significant factor explaining the decline in strike activity? The final point to be considered is , has the British labour movement abandoned the strike as a tactical instrument. The strikes in the railways and the docks in 1972 which threatened to bring the economy to a halt and 13 forced the government to settle in favour of the unions seem to indicate-otherwise. It may be fairer to say that while the labour movement has opted for broad political means, it still retains the strike as its most lethal weapon and will not hesitate to use it when the need arises. Sweden Sweden and Norway differed from the other four North European countries in having long duration of strikes. R & H rationalized that this discrepancy arose from a non-intervention role of the State in collective bargaining in Sweden and Norway as against an active role in the other group. In 1957-72, however, Sweden has been having shorter strikes and its average duration has declined from 22.6 days lost per striker in 1948-56 to 8.3 in 1969-72. Norway did not have such a decline. Another difference between these two countries lies in the intensity of organization. Sweden with the highest rate of organization has a gradual but consistent increase from 63% - 40 -C H A R T II MEMBERSHIP I N V O L V E M E N T - NORTH E U R O P E A N P A T T E R N II DAYS L O S T PER STRIKER 0 10 20 30 40 50 • NORWAY SWEDEN 1948-1955 1957-1964 1965-1972 - 41 -Sweden (Continued) in 1954-55 to 76% in 1970, while Norway's ratio like most of the other countries decline. Another outstanding feature of Sweden strike activity was the extremely low membership involvement ratio (as a result low membership loss ratios) from 1957-68 with the exception of 1966. In fact she had the lowest average among the fifteen countries studied and was considerably lower than Norway too. The almost complete disappearance of the strike before 1966 may be accounted for by the central agreements signed between the employers' 14 (SAF) and workers' (LO) confederations from 1956 onwards. These agreements precede collective bargaining between the employers' asso-ciation and the trade union, setting limits to cost increases resulting from the new contract. The objective was to achieve wage solidarity and there-by reduce the risk of conflict. Although these agreements are formally 'recommendations' only, they have a binding effect in practice. This is because once the parties at industry level have decided to apply a central agreement reached between the S A F and L O , they are bound by a peace 15 obligation that is guaranteed by each central organisation. These central negotiations have come increasingly under strain in the last few-years as a result of: 1) An increasing number of issues other than remuneration have been introduced into the negotiations as a result of the ambition of the central employee organisations to play a greater role in bargai-ning. This has resulted in longer and longer contract texts and increasingly intricate wording which in turn gave rise to difficult 1C problems of application both at industry and at local plant levels. 2) The growth of unionism in the public sector and the failure to co-ordinate negotiations in this sector with the S A F - L O domain. A s a consequence the LO had deliberately prolonged the wage round to forestall getting less favourable terms for its unions - 42 -Sweden (Continued) than the federation, S A C O representing the other sector did. In the 1958/69 and 1970/71 wage rounds, the central agreements were not concluded until several months after the old agreement had expired. ^ In spite of these problems neither party has come up with an accep-table alternative. However, with the social consensus of both union and management on the undesirability of conflict evidenced since the War, it is expected that some agreement will be reached, stabilising the situation before it deteriorates too far. The increase in organisation during the period 1957-72 was largely due to the unionisation of the public sector which had increased by more than 70 per cent and currently accounts for at least one-quarter of the total 18 labour force. This period also saw the emergence of S A C O , the more 19 militant federation of professional unions as a key element in the industrial relations system, especially since 1966. Even though Sweden's public employees had long bargained with the government, it was only in 1966 that full rights to negotiate collective agreements and strike were given to 19a national public employees through legislation. In June 1956, S A C O , in its negotiations with the government for the civil service, forced a slightly better settlement than the LO managed to get in the private sector. When S A C O bargained in August for the teachers, 20 pressure from other union groups, especially T C O , to ensure that S A C O did not repeat its performance resulted in a 'point strike' involving 1200 teachers in selected schools and universities. The government responded by locking out all 20,000 of S A C O ' s teachers which caused S A C O to reta-liate by calling a three-day 'sympathy strike' of most of its high-level personnel in the national government. This was the first serious strike in 21 Sweden in 20 years. The dispute was settled with government mediation. This dispute has significance in several ways. One-is the possible - 4 3 -Sweden (Continued) revival of the strike weapon in Sweden together with the characteristic of long strikes involving a relatively small number of workers being replaced by a show of strength in numbers with short sympathy strikes. The more disturbing outcome to the other union groups is that the govern-ment may be forced to intervene and execute a forced arbitration under such circumstances. That will result in the loss of 'the freedom to make agreements without government intervention', a principle, always con-sidered extremely important by both labour and management. Their fears were realised in 1971, when the government intervened in another strike and lockout affair between S A C O ' s teachers and the employers with an 22 emergency enactment. Since 1966 S A C O ' s negotiations in the public sector have proved to be an important factor in the S A F - L O central negotiations. The LO has always stalled, refusing to specify its terms before S A C O ' s position is established. Not only has this prolonged negotiations but a more impor-tant outcome is that S A C O with less than 5 per cent of the membership of the other two federations (LO and T C O ) , have taken over the leadership in setting wage levels and employment conditions. They have also created a great deal of uncertainty and tension in the Swedish labcui—management relationship. Does this indicate that the 'public unions' will dictate the course of future relations, and they being more militant, at least currently, spells more conflict in the short-run? In addition to the public employees, the blue-collar workers took to the strike too and they together account for the high strike activity in the 70's. In the winter of 1969-70, the mine-workers of the State-owned iron-ore mines went on an unofficial strike for two months over a dispute invol-ving piece-rates. This was another first in Sweden's post-war labour history, and, not long after, similar unofficial strikes occurred in the automobile industry - Volvo and Saab, and at A S E A , a company manufac-23 turing electrical equipment. Principal reasons given were neglect of - 44 -Sweden (Continued) local working conditions by the central union and management negotiations and problems created by the influx of foreign workers (especially Finns), which due to linguistic and cultural barriers made regular labour-manage-24 ment relations machinery for grievances inaccessible. These incidents ; 25 were seen as a challenge to management power at the local level. Even though agreements have been signed between S A F , for the employers, and LO and T C O , for the workers, providing for increased 25 collaboration and consultation between them in 1967, there has been little change in the authority structure or extension of control to the unions. Since the strikes of 1970/1, the Swedish trade unions seem to be looking to the government for legislation to change the principal of managerial prerogative. The government responded in 1973 with 'experimental legis-lation which has established workers' representatives on boards of most 27 enterprises employing more than 100 workers. There has also been much interest in alternative forms of extending control. In summary, the Swedish experience from 1957-72 has further con-solidated R & H's stand on centralisation of the bargaining structure, with the virtual disappearance of the strike until 1966, and a resurgence of strike activity when the public sector started bargaining effectively outside the central agreement. It has also confirmed their explanation for the long strikes, as with government intervention in the public sector disputes, their strikes were protracted. More importantly, it has highlighted the effect of a shared normative system between employers and trade unions on the 'withering' of the strike. So long as there was consensus by the 'conflicting' parties on the priorities of the collective bargaining process, there was peace. It was only with the advent of S A C O , who did not share this attitude that large strikes returned. We feel that this is the key element in an indus- * trial relations system determining the level of strife, and it is from this that the bargaining structure results. - 45 -Italy In the earlier study, the Mediterranean-Asian (Med-Asian) coun-tries of France, Italy, Japan and India differed from the North European countries in having relatively high membership participation rates. They were similar to Denmark, Netherlands, United Kingdom and Germany in having brief strikes. The causes for such a strike pattern were cited as a re-organised labour movement after the War, unstable membership, a disunited labour movement with communist dominance, a weak decen-tralised collective bargaining system, strong employer opposition, ineffective labour parties, prominent government role in the economy and labour market and non-intervention by the government in industrial disputes. The Med-Asian group has been subject to most changes since 1955. Italy and Japan have significantly different strike trends. While the other three countries had a declining average duration of strikes, Italy's strikes were getting longer. A l s o , her ave rage ^ .members hip loss for 1965-72 had increased more than three times over the 1948-55 average while both France and Japan had a reduction. A s for Japan, her participation rates had con-tinued to decline even though she had the lowest averages among the four countries. The other three countries had a distinct upswing from the later 60's. In this section, we shall trace the changes in the Italian indus-trial relations system and leave Japan to the next. From the late fifties, plant level agreements became increasingly important, ending 'the exclusive reliance on collective agreements conclu-28 ded at the national level ' . Though its development was retarded during the recession in 1963-65, there was a remarkable upsurge after the strike wave of 1969. There is now a close network of agreements from virtually political negotiations with the government at the top right down to the formal and informal arrangements between departmental managers and workers' representatives. However, bargaining at these different levels is not co-ordinated, therefore, leaving the unions free to lodge claims at one level 29 after they have been settled at another. Chart III - Duration of Strikes - Mediterranean-. - . -.. Asian Pattern DAYS L O S T PER STRIKER -FRANCE I T A L Y JL 10 15 .jr^E] 1948-1956 |£ :p| 1957-1964 I" ] 1965-1972 J A P A N ; INDIA - 47 -Chart IV - Membership Involvement -Mediterranean-Asian Pattern DAYS L O S T P E R STRIKER F R A N C E ITALY 50 J A P A N •! 100 150 1948-1956 1957-1964 y\'l 1955-1972 j :: —'• |:..:.:r " ' ,: : : i INDIA - 48 -Italy (Continued) Another change lies in the significance attached to the collective agreements, with the parties no longer willing to observe a period of truce and bargaining being liable to be re-opened at any time during the period of the agreement. This means that in practice, agreements are binding 30 on employers but not on the unions. The above developments reflect a change in the workers' power at the plant level. What made this possible was probably the Workers' Charter passed by the government in June 1969 with the purpose of remo-ving obstacles to trade union action at the factory. It provided that representative trade unions should be granted recognition at the workplace and introduced an exceptionally rapid procedure for dealing with disputed cases. It was through the latter provision that the Workers' Charter had the greatest impact, giving rise to a large volume of case-law, nearly 31 all of which was favourable to the unions. Another major development in the labour environment was the appa-rent maturing of the trade union movement reflected in two ways. One was a move towards trade union unity among the three principal federations, namely, the C G I L , CISL and U I L , during the latter half of the 60's. Even though there has not been a merger yet, it reflects in a change in the atti-tudes of these competing bodies to one of greater co-operation, thereby strengthening the labour movement as a whole. The other was the ability of the unions to join forces with the delegates' movement, taking strategic control during the unofficial strikes of 1969. This enabled 'labour' to 32 present a united front which resulted in significant gains. In brief, the Italian labour movement had, through reducing internal conflicts and legislative support, increased its power against management and has reformed the collective bargaining structure. We submit that the labour movement as a result, was strong enough to challenge the economic strength of management, giving rise to a higher average duration of strikes. There was not a corresponding decline in industrial strife as one would expect with a more 'equitable' balance of power. This is probably caused - 49 -Italy (Continued) 33 by management's attitudes as aptly described by G . Guigni: "The inevitability of industrial conflict was regarded in advanced management circles , not any more as an evil but simply as a fact of life, even as a healthy sign, provided only that a few rules of procedure were observed. " Japan From 1948-5S, Japan like Italy had high participation rates and short strikes and they were attributed principally to 'a new, disunited and weak union movement, a decentralised and ineffective bargaining system and a political structure that does not encourage pacification 34 of the labour force' . Since 1956, the average membership involvement ratio has declined from 21.5 per cent in 1948-55 to 12.8 per cent in 1965-- 1972, and there was a corresponding decrease in the membership loss ratio. The average duration of strike is still low. In the last fifteen years, the labour has matured into a force to be reckoned with. There are currently four major national trade union centers in Japan — Sohyo (with a membership of 4.3 million), Domei (member-ship of about 2 million), Churitsuroren (membership of about 1.4 million) 35 and Shinsanbetsu (membership about 74,000). Although policy with regard to collective bargaining varies considerably from one center to another, they have learned to work together, e .g . Sohyo and Churit-36 suroren participate together in their annual spring wage offensive (to be discussed below)- The climax of this working arrangement was a move for the "unification of the labour front in the autumn of 1969 by the federa-37 tions in the private sector" The largest workers' organisation, Sohyo, formed in 1950, had taken an aggressive and militant role in collective bargaining. Their principal development is the policy of Shunto, "Spring wage offensive". This was first launched by its unions in 1955 and later joined by Churit-suroren., These two organisations together accounted for about two-thirds - 50 -Japan (Continued) of the total unionised work force. In early Spring, the industry unions at national level sets different wage goals and strike schedules for its affiliated unions.' These strikes are tinned to rise to a peak which will induce the employers to concede to the strikers' demands a 38 couple of months later. The schedule depends on the size of the unions, with the large oligopolistic enterprises setting the pace; so that the smaller unions can bargain on the basis of their demands and settlements. The annual Spring wage offensive has several implications, the most important being a device to overcome the intrinsic weakness of 39 the enterprise bargaining system. T . Shirai wrote, "In this united drive for wage increases the participating unions co-ordinate their demands and their strikes or other industrial action. Through such concerted efforts, unions in the private sector and the public sector, in big industries and small ones, in growing industries and declining ones can help each other. It thus becomes possible to extend the level of wage increases achieved in enterprises and industries with high productivity to those with lower productivity. " Because this has become institutionalized as a wage fixing practice, the authority and leadership of the national industrial federations as 40 well as the national centres, Sohyo and Domei have increased A l s o , these strikes are part of the collective bargaining process and not the result of a break down as in North America , to elicit a new counter-41 offer from the employer and not to break a dead lock. Therefore they are purely demonstrative and not a test of economic strength. This wage offensive has contributed to a more orderly and peaceful industrial relations environment. A s the date and duration of strikes are synchro-nised among competing enterprises, the serious tensions experienced 42 immediately post-war are eliminated. The reduction in participation rates is probably due to this orderly approach. Actual negotiations were - 51 -and still are at the enterprise level but with the emergence of large oligopolistic companies, collective bargaining is at each local plant level, not enterprise. To ensure uniformity among all plants, consi-derable importance is attached to collective bargaining at the company level by a federation of unions organised within each plant. The same demand for uniformity at the industrial level leads to a stronger influence of national.and industrial organisations over enterprise level 43 bargaining- This may be the start of the consolidation of the bargai-ning structure in the future. At the same time, there has been a change in the power relation-44 ship between the workers and the employers. This is probably due to the unprecedented labour shortage, especially for young school leavers 45 where the demand is five to six times the supply. There has been little unemployment for the last ten years and under—employment has been decreasing year by year. Workers' demands are increasingly focusing on the active promotion of their interests rather than a passive defence and protest. There is a change in the contents of collective bargaining from material benefits to also include broader problems of co-operation and respect for the worker's dignity. Coupled with this is the spread of joint consultation machinery. There is also a change in the role of : the government who is viewed as much a peace-maker as a rule-maker. In conclusion, all these changes indicate a stronger and more unified labour movement, a move towards consolidation of the bargaining structure, greater employer acceptance of unions, especially in the private sector, and greater government participation in collective bargaining which altogether have resulted in a reduced level of industrial conflict. - 52 -A s e x p e c t e d , o u r s t u d y has r a i s e d q u e s t i o n s about s o m e of R o s s and H a r t m a n ' s p r o p o s i t i o n s a s w e l l a s r e i n f o r c i n g o t h e r s . We s h a l l r e v i e w e a c h of the f a c t o r s they c o n s i d e r e d , i n t u r n . O r g a n i s a t i o n a l S t a b i l i t y B r i t a i n , w i t h the o l d e s t l a b o u r m o v e m e n t has shown that " s t r u g g l e s f o r e x i s t e n c e , r e c o g n i t i o n and s e c u r i t y " a r e f a r f r o m c o m p l e t e d , e s p e -c i a l l y among the w h i t e - c o l l a r w o r k e r s and e v e n the b l u e - c o l l a r w o r k e r s . In S w e d e n t o o , w i t h i t s 'enlightened' i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s e n v i r o n m e n t , the p r o f e s s i o n a l s and w h i t e - c o l l a r w o r k e r s have to r e l y on l e g i s l a t i o n to g u a r a n t e e t h e i r r i g h t s . W h i l e i t i s p l a u s i b l e t h a t i n t i m e , l a b o u r u n i o n s may be f u l l y a c c e p t e d , they have not r e a c h e d that stage y e t , e s p e c i a l l y i n the p u b l i c s e c t o r . A p a r t f r o m I t a l y whose m e m b e r s h i p f i g u r e s a r e a l w a y s h i g h l y q u e s -t i o n a b l e , t h e r e has been a s t e a d y i n c r e a s e i n u n i o n m e m b e r s h i p i n the o t h e r t h r e e c o u n t r i e s . In a d d i t i o n , we have not c o m e a c r o s s any l i t e r a -t u r e o r r e c o r d a s s o c i a t i n g f l u c t u a t i o n s i n m e m b e r s h i p w i t h any s t r i k e i n t h e s e c o u n t r i e s d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d . T h e r e f o r e , w i t h o u t any e m p i r i c a l e v i d e n c e , we w i s h to r e f r a i n f r o m c o m m e n t i n g on R & H's c o n t e n t i o n that 46 " p r o n o u n c e d f l u c t u a t i o n s a r e g e n e r a l l y c o n d u c i v e to i n d u s t r i a l c o n f l i c t " . L e a d e r s h i p C o n f l i c t s T h e i n c r e a s e i n u n o f f i c i a l s t r i k e s a t the s h o p - l e v e l i n B r i t a i n have been a m o s t d i s t i n g u i s h i n g f e a t u r e . H o w e v e r T u r n e r a s s e r t e d that m o s t of these u n o f f i c i a l s t r i k e s , l e d b y shop s t e w a r d s w e r e l a t e r s a n c t i o n e d by the u n i o n , and t h e r e f o r e a r e not r e v o l t s a g a i n s t the u n i o n l e a d e r s h i p , a s p u r p o r t e d i n the p r e v i o u s s t u d y . It was a c o n s e q u e n c e of the g r o w t h of s h o p - l e v e l b a r g a i n i n g that r e s u l t e d i n u n c o - o r d i n a t e d wage s e t t l e m e n t s t o g e t h e r w i t h i n e f f e c t i v e c o n c i l i a t i o n o r g r i e v a n c e p r o c e d u r e s . R o s s and H a r t m a n ' s s t a n d on r i v a l f e d e r a t i o n s have found s u p p o r t i n Sweden's e x p e r i e n c e s w i t h the two w h i t e - c o l l a r o r g a n i s a t i o n s S A C O and T C O . T h e t e a c h e r s ' s t r i k e i n 1966 w h i c h was the f i r s t l a r g e one s i n c e W o r l d W a r II r e s u l t e d f r o m e a c h o t h e r ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n to get b e t t e r g a i n s . - 53 -Again in Japan, the greater co-operation of two of the labour federations (representing two-thirds of the total union members) in the Spring wage offensive leading to more orderly and less serious industrial action has reinforced their contention. The communist element which was rife in the Japanese labour movement was "eliminated" in the early 1950's by joint government and 47 employer action. This may have contributed to the success of the Spring wage offensive, which emphasis is on wage gains and reduced conflict. However, the role of the Communists has been played down considerably, even in the strike waves in France in 1968 and in Italy in 1969. Status of Union-Management Relations R & H's claim of widespread employer acceptance of unions in U . K. is closely linked to their stand on the age of the labour movement, with which we have found contention. In Sweden, when the professional unions were fighting for recognition and acceptance, there was very little indus-trial strife. It was only after they were accepted and given some effective countervailing power through legislation in 1966 that the peace was broken. Therefore, we suggest that for industrial peace, employer acceptance is not sufficient - there must be a desire for peace from both conflicting : parties. In Sweden, the strike virtually disappeared from the late fifties until 1966 because both the unions and the employers shared a common desire to avoid conflict at almost any cost and both parties ( S A F and LO) at the national level, especially the union were able to assert control over their rank and file» The professional unions under S A C O , which did not share this attitude were not in position to seriously challenge the employers until they were given the right to strike. Italy is another example. Even though employers have accepted unions, they according to G . Guigni, accept strikes as a necessary part of the system and even considered them desirable. - b 4 -Labour Political Activity The use of the political weapon as an alternative to industrial action is well demonstrated in Italy with bargaining with the government for favourable legislations, e .g . Workers' Charter; in Sweden, where both the LO and T C O have always "worked in close co-operation with the 48 Swedish Social Democratic Party" and of course in Britain. However, we feel that the relationship between the unions and the labour party and/or government is not that of submission or acquiescence by the labour movement as suggested. Probably it works the other way too, as with the Labour government in Britain which had to refrain from legislating the reforms objected to by the labour movement in order to retain the latter's support. Labour's experiences in Italy too seem to suggest a two-way relationship - "union's political activities or bargai-ning with the government. . . o . .opens up prospects for the unions, of relationships with the political parties different from the traditional ones of subjugation together with feed-back to the parties themselves 49 and their leadership." Role of the State The United Kingdom's experiences with the British Industrial Relations Act 1971 has raised the question of whether R & H should have included a condition of acceptance by both labour and management in their statement "that greater participation by the government as supervisor of union-management relations has been partly responsible for the declining frequency of strikes". We feel that this is a significant point in the study of industrial relations as it was the failure of the Conservative government to fully appreciate this that led to the fiasco. Government legislation giving more power to the unions does not necessarily contribute to less conflict, at least in the short run when both sides decide to take it to the test, as in Sweden. - D O -R E F E R E N C E S : 1. A . M . Ross & P. T . Hartman, op. c i t . , pp. 89-90. 2. S . R . Engleman & A . W . J . Thomson, "Experience Under the British Industrial Relations A c t " , Industrial Relations, V o l . 13, No. 2, May 1974, p. 130. 3. W . E . J . McCarthy, "The Nature of Britain's Strike Problem", British  Journal of Industrial Relations, V o l . 8, 1970, p. 231. 4. T . G . Whittingham & B . Towers, "The British Industrial Relations Bi l l -An Analysis" , Relations Industrielles, August 1971, p. 624. 5. H . A . Turner states "(that there is) a growing pre-occupation with security of employment and earnings, and especially a concern for the right to consultation - if not participation - in the exercise of managerial functions insofar as these affect workers' interests", Turner, ,Is Britain Really Strike Prone? Cambridge U . Press , 1969, p.45. 6. R . F . Banks, "British Collective Bargaining: The Challenges of the 1970's", Relations Industrielles, August 1971, p. 7. H . A . Turner, op. c i t . , pp. 22-23. R . F . Banks expressed a similar view, "slow moving dispute settlement procedures also have encouraged unofficial strikes which often resolve issues more quickly than the formal procedures", Banks, ibid. , p. 650. 8. Whittingham & Towers, op. c i t . , p. 624. 9. S . R . Engleman & A . W . J . Thomson, op. c i t . , p. 153. 10. S . R . Engleman & A . W . J . Thomson, i b i d . , p. 134. 10a .S .R . Engleman & A . W . J . Thomson, i b i d . , p. 155. 11. Peter Jenkins, The Battle of Downing Street, London, Charles Knight, 1970. 12. Evidence to the Royal Commission on Trade Unions & Employers' Associations, p. 26. 13. S . R . Engleman & A . W . J . Thomson, op. c i t . , pp. 130, 136-141. 14. Sweden's experiences in the late 40's and early 50's with a decentra-lised system in which each agreement concluded served as a precedent for subsequent negotiations, resulting in significant discrepancies - O O -between the first and the last agreements, had prompted both sides to co-ordinate negotiations. G . Hogberg, "Recent Trends in Collective Bargaining in Sweden", International Labour Review, V o l . 107, March 1973, p. 229. 15. G . Hogberg, i b i d . , pp. 228-229. 16. G . Hogberg, i b i d . , p. 236. 17. G . Hogberg, i b i d . , p. 231. 18. G . Hogberg, i b i d . , p. 227. 19. S A C O differed from the other two workers' organisations, LO and T C O , in its non-socialist philosphy, thereby resulting in a militant attitude towards the government and some of its policies. E . M . Kassalow, "Professional Unionism in Sweden", Industrial Relations, V o l . 8, February 1969, p. 127. 19a. E . M . Kassalow, i b i d . , p. 130. 20. S A C O represented secondary school teachers, university teachers and headmasters principally. T C O represented primary school teachers, some headmasters and a small number of secondary school teachers. E . M . Kassalow, i b i d . , p. 130. 21. E . M . Kassalow, ibid. , p. 133. 22. The law extended agreements which had expired and suspended all direct action, whether planned or already in force. G . Hogberg, op. c i t . , p, 233. 23. D . Wedderburn, "Perspective on Sweden", Personnel Management, V o l . 6, May 1974, p. 38. 24. E . M . Kassalow, "Conflict and Co-operation in Europe's Industrial Relations", Industrial Relations, V o l . 13, No. 2, p. 159. 25. D . Wedderburn, op. c i t . , p. 34. 26. K . O . F a x e n & E . Pettersson, "Labour-Management Co-Ope ration at the Level of the Undertaking in Sweden", International Labour Review, p. 200. 27. D . Wedderburn, op. cit. p. 34. 28. G . Guigni, "Recent Trends in Collective Bargaining in Italy", International Labour Review, V o l . 104, October 1971, p. 310. - 5 7 -29. G . Guigni, i b i d . , p. 326. 30. G . Guigni, i b i d . , p. 326. 31. G . Guigni, i b i d . , p. 318. 32. W. Kendall, "Trade Unions in Italy", European Community, May 1970, p. 19. G . Guigni, op. c i t . , p. 324, "Hitherto, industrial organisation has been the prerogative of management and the union's task has been to bargain over the consequences of any changes in industrial conditions, especially as regards wages. Nowadays, however, they question the whole organisation of work within industry". 33. G . Guigni, op. c i t . , p. 314. 34. A . M . Ross & P . T . Hartman, op. cit. , p. 131. 35. T . Mitsufuji & K. Hagisawa, "Recent Trend in Collective Bargaining in Japan", International Labour Review, V o l . 105, February 1972, p. 143. 36. M . Sumiya, "Contemporary Arrangements: An Overview", in K . Okochi, B . Karsh & S . B . Levine's Workers and Employers in Japan, U . of Tokyo Press , pp. 77-78. 37. T . Mitsufuji & K . Hagisawa, op. c i t . , p. 152. 38. T . Mitsufuji & K. Hagisawa, i b i d . , p. 144. 39» T . Shira i , "Prices and Wages in Japan: Towards an Anti-Inflationary Policy?" , International Labour Review, V o l . 103, p. 238. 4 40. T . Shirai , i b i d . , p . 234. 41. T . Mitsufuji & K. Hagisawa, op. c i t . , p. 144. 42. M . Sumiya, op. c i t . , pp. 77-78. 43. T . Mitsufuji & K. Hagisawa, op. c i t . , p. 152. 44. T . Mitsufuji & K. Hagisawa, i b i d . , pp. 150-151. 45. T . Shirai , op. c i t . , p. 230. 46. Ross & Hartman, op. c i t . , p. 65. - 58 -47. Mo Sumiya, op. c i t . , p. 85 48. E.M. Kassalow, "Professional Unionism in Sweden", op. c i t . , p. 120. 49. G . Guigni, op. c i t . , p. 328. - 59 -V . NEW NATIONS - I S R A E L , M A L A Y S I A and SINGAPORE In this chapter, we will try to test empirically the observation of "an 'Economic Development Pattern' might be described with reference to Israel, Egypt and other nations where the themes of nationalism, anti-colonialism and central planning are combined in aggressive development programs". ^ In addition, we will try to identify the factors of the indus-trial relations system in each of these countries and explain the pattern of conflict. The choice of Malaysia and Singapore together with Israel is solely governed by the availability of data. These two countries, like Israel, were formerly under British rule: Israel became independent in 1948; Malaysia in 1957 as Malaya and later combining with the North Borneo states of Sabah and Sarawak and Singapore in 1963 to form Malaysia; and Singapore was granted internal self-government in 1959. She became an independent nation in 1965 when she broke away from Malaysia. Since, and even before independence, all of these countries have pursued highly centralised, intensive development programmes -both Israel and Malaysia are pursuing a dual program of industrialisation and agrarianisation, while Singapore, which does not have land for agri-cultural purposes, concentrates on industrialisation. Another common trait among them is the high immigrant population,. In Israel, most if not all the Jews were immigrants since the 19th century. At about the same time, the Chinese and Indians were moving into Malaysia and Singapore and today make up more than 60 per cent of the population in both countries. Like the Jews in Israel, they were more economically active and successful than the "native people" and control the labour movement in addition to other things. Looking at the labour statistics from 1948-1972 there are differences among them, especially between Israel and the other two countries, Singapore and Malaysia. The similarities between Singapore and Malaysia stem from their close political, social, cultural and economic ties. In fact, the labour movement was organised as one across these two countries after World War II, - 60 -and it was only after 1959 that labour in Singapore had a 'different 2 leadership'. The most noticeable difference ties in the intensity of organisation - Israel has an average of about 80 per cent since 1959, while Singapore averaged about 35 per cent and Malaysia trailing under 20 per cent. The discrepancy between Singapore and Malaysia is probably due to the more urbanised and concentrated labour force in Singapore which is relatively easier to organise. There has been an increase in membership involvement in strikes in Israel - from a low 3.1 per cent average for 1948-56 to 10.2 per cent for 1965-72. In Singapore and Malaysia, the reverse is true - from over 13 per cent to less than 3 per cent for corresponding 3 periods. Among the three countries, Singapore has a higher average duration of strikes than the other two but for all of them there was a decline from 1957 onwards (See Table 10). Table 10 - Duration of Strikes 1948-56 1957-64 1965-72 Israel 7. 1 10.4 2.6 Malaysia 6. 2 10.3 7.3 Singapore 19. 8 14.9 10.6 Israel had the sharpest drop with the very low average of 2.6 days lost per 100 strikers for 1965-72. The increase in membership involvement in Israel is off-set by the decrease in duration of strikes resulting in a relatively stable membership loss ratio. For Singapore and Malaysia though the combined effect of a decline in both ratios gives effect to a very sharp drop in membership loss (See Table 8). - 61 -Table 11 - Membership Loss 1948-56 1957-64 1965-72 Israel 23 .9 22.5 24.3 Malaysia 131.2 80.8 28 .5 Singapore 187.9 99.8 19.5 The differences between Israel and Malaysia and Singapore immediately raise the possibility that there are other more important factors which shaped the patterns of conflict in these three countries than the drive for economic development, nationalism and anti-colonialism, as suggested by Ross and Hartman. We shall proceed to consider first the development of the labour movement and the industrial relations system of Israel, drawing fronri the study, explanations for their pattern of industrial conflict. We will then make a similar study of Malaysia and Singapore together since both systems are quite parallel, and finally discuss our findings in relation to R & H's explanations for strike patterns. Israel Israel, a post-war nation, has one of the earliest and perhaps most successful labour movements in the world. The unifying force of Israel's labour is the General Federation of Labour, the Histadrut, which was founded as early as 1920 by Jewish immigrants who had been 4 arriving in Palestine since the turn of the century. Since its formation 5 (membership of 4,433 in 1920) it has grown rapidly to a mass organisa-Q tion of 700,000 taxable members. The trade unions affiliated to the Histadrut currently represent about 90 per cent of the labour force, or ,.: about 60 per cent of the adult population.^ In addition to the Histadrut there are three other labour organisations which are purely political 8 labour movements , and two professional organisations representing g doctors and university lecturers not affiliated to the Histadrut. However, 10 it is the Histadrut "that is really decisive for all aspects of labour relations". - 62 -The success of the Histadrut lies in its total involvement 11 in the nation's society and economy, "unknown in any other country" , and which resulted in its crucial role in the development of Palestine 12 and Israel. Apart from trade union activities, the organisation has an economic department (Hevrat Ovdim) which enterprises account for abojt 13 one-quarter of the national employment and the net national product ; a mutual aid department which finances more than half the medical care for over two-thirds of the population and pays most of its workers a second pension, without which their welfare provisions by the State would be quite 14 inadequate and an education and cultural department which has under-taken the massive task of educating its one-quarter million immigrants from such varied origins as the Arab-semitic nations, Europe and America in the social values of their new country. F o r the general membership, it runs a large range of cultural and social activities and some job training 15 courses. Most instrumental in its success is perhaps its political involvement: the Histadrut "is a federation of all political parties, (at 'least seven, with very divergent ideologies) which claim working class 16 interests or working class membership", and these "same political parties have continuously been in power nationally". ^ To retain unity, the Histadrut does not follow one party line but is based on the co-opera-tion of these parties which are often bitterly struggling against one another. A s "the three leading parties have a definite class philosophy based on a unique combination of Zionism and Socialism, it can be said that the Histadrut reflects this philosophy in action at one time Zionism gaining 18 the upper hand, at another S o c i a l i s m . " The Communist Party was "never" of any major consequence. Another unique characteristic which could have contributed to the Histadrut's grip on the labour movement is probably its structural development. The usual historical process - first labour unions and then their federation as a super-structure, is completely reversed in the case - 63 -of the Histadrut. Here first came the federation, which started as mainly an organisation for members of farm collectives and co-opera-tives, and then the unions, in most cases 25 years later. They were called into existence by and through the efforts of the Histadrut when it 19 felt the need for such unions. The result is the almost complete suboi— dination and dependence of these unions - most of them do not have a legal existence, all membership fees are paid to and all expenses and salaries paid by the Histadrut, appointments of union secretaries and all major decisions, including strike action must be confirmed by the Histadrut. There are however unions with greater authority, mainly those which were formed independently and outside the Histadrut and which joined it later on, already fully developed. This is especially true of unions of professional and academic workers which assume grea-ter independence, often defying the authority and discipline of the general 20 Histadrut institutions but they account for only 10 per cent of the labour 21 . force The union structure is built on three levels - Workers' Committee in every plant or establishment, the local union and the national union. There are about 50 national unions affiliated to the His -22 tadrut, organised mostly on an industrial basis - with some by profes-sion or craft and others by place of work. The influence of the Histadrut is however most pervasive through the Workers' Committee and herein 23 lies "the foundation of its power and strength in industry". Although collective agreements are signed by the Histadrut and the national unions, the most important agreements are single-firm 24 agreements signed by the local f irm on the one side and on the other, the Workers' Committee in the firm and the local Labour Council of the Histadrut. These Councils were conceived "as the strong, unitary autho-25 rity on the local level of the general body of the Histadrut" and holds the real power in bargaining. Therefore though collective bargaining is decentralised, the Histadrut is able to ensure its policies are carried out — o t — through the Labour Councils, in contrast to Britain where the trade union branches have very little control over the locals and shop stewards» The relatively low strike activity (low average member-ship involvement and duration of strikes) in Israel is the result of the Histadrut's policy against strikes, with all strike resolutions subject to 26 its confirmation. There are however unofficial strikes, especially 27 in the recent years. The Israeli strike scene is unusual in that staff people use the strike weapon more freely than wage earners and that members of the technical and professional staff use it more than other salary earners. The situation is the result of their opposition to govern-mental attempts to create a unified wages and salaries policy and their greater autonomy vis-a-vis the general body of the Histadrut. While the Histadrut is quite successful in disciplining the wage earners, it exerts 28 little discipline over the white collar workers, and even less over pro-fessional staff. A l s o , "strikes have become as much part of the routine of collective bargaining of the professionals in Israel as of auto-workers 29 in the U . S . A . " because in Israel the right to strike is regarded as a 30 "fundamental human right" and even in national emergency this right is not disputed. Therefore there is no labour legislation restricting the right to strike, especially in the public sector as in Canada, and while the Histadrut may oppose unofficial strikes, it supports in principle the 31 right to strike. The high propensity of the white-collars and professionals to strike probably accounts for the rising membership involvement ratio, as the size of its organised work force has increased relative to the blue-collars. In 1963 the professional, administrative and clerical workers together accounted for 27.7 per cent of total employees but by 1971 the 32 percentage had increased to 41.5. In contrast lockouts are extremely rare. The superior strength and power of the unions at the plant level was further asserted - 65 -by Zweig as "a Workers' Committee could easily force its claims on 33 management, even if they were not reasonable". This has probably accounted for the brevity of most strikes - a show of strength being sufficient to have their demands met, and F . Zweig reported that "most 34 of the strikes are totally successful'!? This is also reflected in the 35 lack of "compulsory arbitration" in Israel. The government did not see the necessity for it probably as between the Histadrut's influence and the unions' power, protracted trials of economic strength would not be likely. We therefore see in Israel a strong centralised labour movement, with a very powerful leadership which exerts considerable influence on the government at the top and at the same time almost com-plete control over its unions, especially the blue-collar workers, a gene-ral policy against strikes co-existing with a philosophy respecting every worker's right to strike, which altogether has resulted in what Ross and Hartman would classify as having low duration of strikes and moderate membership involvement. Malaysia and Singapore The development of the labour movements in Malaysia and Singapore is an entirely different story from that of Israel. Although organi-35 sations with trade union functions had existed since the early 19th century, any semblance of a trade union movement did not emerge until the Japanese 37 occupation of Malaya and Singapore. Immedicately following the Japanese surrender in 1945, the Malayan Communist Party setup the General Labour Union to organise and gain control over existing unions throughout Singapore 38 and Malaya. The Communist controlled labour movement grew rapidly against the British Government's futile efforts to encourage the development of independent trade unions but its success was short-lived. The newly-born labour movement suffered a deadly blow in 1948 when a state of emer-gency was declared in both Singapore and Malaysia to "strengthen the - 66 -government's position in its fight against Communist forces in the jungle 39 and Communist sympathisers in the urban areas". This was immediately followed by wide-spread arrests and detention (of labour leaders) without trial and a feeeze on trade union funds. Most of the trade unions affi l i -ated to the General Labour Union became defunct and trade union mem-bership fell from 400,000 to 42,000 by the end of 1949 in Malaya and from 74,000 to 47,000 in Singapore. The British colonial government, appreciating the need for some central organisation to co-ordinate the activities and render assis-40 tance to unions, initiated the formation of the Singapore Trade Union Congress in Singapore and the Malayan Trade Union Congress in Malaya in 1950. To restrict the powers of the labour movement, these organisations were given "no more power than moral authority and leadership - there was 41 to be no interference in the domestic affairs of the union". The Communist influence soon revived especially in Singa-pore. The result was massive political strike waves from time to time, for example, in 1955, following the formation of the then communist-controlled P. A . P . (People's Action Party) in Singapore in 1954 (member-ship involvement was 41.2 per cent and duration was 35.7), the existing "right-wing" government was challenged; in 1954 in Malaysia, the high membership involvement of 70.2 per cent could be attributed to the general elections and the agitation spearheaded by the Communist Party against the formation of Malaysia. After both countries became self-governing, there was a slight distinction between the two labour movements in its association with the government. The P . A . P . which has been in power in Singapore since 1959 "took over the reins of the Singapore National Trade Union Congress which was later to become the National Trade Union Congress (NTUC)" . There was no such political association between the ruling Alliance Party; (in power since Independence in 1957) and the Malayan Trade Union Congress. In Malaysia, there is therefore no strong labour party. x - Of -Apart from political association there are many s imi lar i -ties in the trade union movement and the industrial relations system in these two countries. Thisis particularly true with regard to the role of the govern-ment in industrial disputes. Both countries have very similar labour 43 legislation, with the principal objective of curbing industrial unrest and very similar provisions to achieve this. While industrial action is recog-nised as a possible result of collective bargaining, there being no provi-sions prohibiting or limiting strikes, the legislations have eliminated almost all possibility of a legal strike. When a trade dispute arises, whether a 44 rights or interest dispute, the Acts provide for conciliation and if it is still unresolved, either party or the Minister of Labour may refer the 45 dispute to arbitration by a statutorily established Industrial Court. The award of the Industrial Court is binding and no strike action is allowed during conciliation or after the dispute has been referred to the Industrial Court. In practice, the employer or the Minister would submit the dispute to the Industrial Court when conciliation fails. There are however unoffi-cial strikes but these legislations coupled with a high unemployment rate in both countries have probably resulted in the low membership involvement rates in Singapore since 1934 and in Malaysia from 1969. The governments too take an active role in defining the terms of employment - each having their respective Employment Act which "contains fairly detailed provisions on rest days, public holidays, hours of work, annual leave, which are matters usually incorporated into a 43 collective agreement". In Malaysia and Singapore, most of the unions are organised by industry, in the former at three levels - local, regional and national and in the latter only two - national and local because of its much smaller area. The unions are very weak at the local levels, because of the reliance on arbitration rather than settlement through collective bargaining with the result that employers make little effort to bargain. They are more effective - 68 -at the regional level, in Malaysia, especially the industrial unions, because of the pattern of awards made by the Industrial Courts. Most of the industries are grouped in industrial development areas over the country and with better communications, the best strategy for unions is to make comparable demands in the same region, thereby increasing the chances of a more favourable award. The same strategy is true at the national level in Singapore. F rom our study we can see a striking contrast between Israel and Singapore and Malaysia. While all three countries have similar social and economic objectives, they have attempted to restrain industrial conflict by very different means. In Israel, directives by the trade union leadership were used but in Singapore and Malaysia, very restrictive legislation existed instead — this being due to a weak labour movement which cannot seriously challenge or influence legislation nor discipline its rank and file, even if it were given the alternative. With reference to R & H's study, Israel's industrial relations system has most of the characteristics of the Scandinavian countries - namely "old and stable labour :movement, subdued union leadership conflicts, ineffective Communist influence, widespread employe acceptance, successful political involvement and passive role of tine govern 4 7 ment in defining terms of employment in collective bargaining." However unlike Norway and Sweden, its bargaining structure is quite decentralised, which coupled with the Histadrut's inability to subject the white collar and professional unions to the same discipline as the blue collar unions, have given rise to a much higher participation rate. This may be partly due to the "fundamental right to strike" philosophy practiced in Israel which is not so evident in other countries. Israel in contrast to Norway and Sweden has very low average duration of strikes. R & H had explained the long average duration - 69 -in Norway and Sweden as the result of the non-intervention policy of the government, which is also true of Israel. We suggest as mentioned before, strikes are brief in Israel because of the relatively superior power of the unions. On the other hand, Malaysia and Singapore have more in common with the Med-Asian pattern of a young and unstable labour move-ment, marked leadership conflicts (especially in Singapore between the socialists and the pro-communists), strong Communist influences, employer resistance to unions, decentralised collective bargaining struc-ture and active government regulation of employment terms and interven-tion in collective bargaining. While Singapore has a successful Labour government since 1959, it is not so in Malaysia. This difference did not seem to have much significance on their strike patterns, both having quite similar trends and levels as measured by membership involvement and duration of strike ratios. Of particular interest is the evidence given in support of R & H's hypothesis on the effect of Communist influence: "where the Communist faction has substantial strength in the labour movement, strike activity is usually stimulated - particularly the use of massive demon-stration strikes ",48 with Singapore-s experiences in 1955, 1961 and 1963 and Malaysia's in 1948 and 1964. Even though these two countries have very similar charac-teristics to R & H's "Med-Asian countries", they do not have their very high participation rates. We feel that this difference lies in a very strong majority government, especially in the last decade, which has been in power since the late 1950's and was able to "discourage" industrial strife by any means at its disposal - from legislation to arrest and detention. - 70 -R E F E R E N C E S : 1. Ross and Hartman, Changing Patterns of Industrial Conflict, John Wiley & Sons L t d . , 1960, p. 173. 2. National Trade Union Congress of Singapore, (NTUC) Why Labour  Must Go Modern, 1969, p. 50. 3. The high ratios in 1963 - 70.2 per cent, and in 1968 were primarily the result of political strikes. In 1963 Malaysia was formed and in 1958, when election campaigns were held, there was a surge of "Communist" strikes in an attempt to topple the government. 4. "Troubles of the Organisation Men" , The Economist, A p r i l 28, 1973, p. 66. 5. F . Zweig, The Israeli Worker, Herzl Press , N . Y . , 1959, p. 241. 6. E . Rosenstein, "Histadrut's Search for a Participation Program", Industrial Relations, V o l . 9, Oct. 1969, p. 170. 7. The Economist, op. cit. , p. 66. 8. F . Zweig, op. c i t . , p. 238o 9. J . Ben-David, "Professionals and Unions in Israel", Industrial Relations, V o l . 9, Oct. 1969, p. 170. 10. F . Sweig, op. c i t . , p. 240. 11. F . Zweig, i b i d . , p. 245. 12. E . Rosenstein, op. c i t . , p. 170. 13. E . Rosenstein, i b i d . , p. 171. 14. The Economist, op„ cit. , p. 67. 15. The Economist, ibid. , p. 67. 16. F . Zweig, op. c i t . , p. 241. 17. E . Rosenstein, op. c i t . , p. 170. 18. F . Zweig, op. c i t . , p. 242. 19. F . Zweig, i b i d . , p. 241. 20. F . Zweig, i b i d . , pp. 253-257. — I \ — 21. J . Ben-David, op. c i t . , p. 48. 22. E . Rosenstein, op. c i t . , p. 171. 23. F . Zweig, op. c i t . , pp. 261. 24. F . Zweig, i b i d . , pp. 135-136. 25. F . Zweig, i b i d . , p. 254. 26. F . Zweig, i b i d . , p. 177. 27. The Economist, op. c i t . , p. 66. 28. F . Zweig, op.cit. , p. 174. 29. J . Ben-David, op. c i t . , p. 59. 30. F . Zweig, op. c i t . , p. 173. 31. The Economist, op. c i t . , p.66. 32. Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1964 - p. 320, 1972 - p. 328. 33. F . Zweig, op. c i t . , p. 269. 34. F . Zweig, i b i d . , p. 177. 35. F . Zweig, i b i d . , p. 177. 36. C . Gamba, The Origins of Trade Unionism in Malaya, Eastern Universities Press L t d - , Singapore, 1962, p. 2. 37. N T U C , op. c i t . , p. 48. 38. C . Gamba, op. c i t . , p. 15. 39. A.Josey, Trade Unions in Malaya, D . Moore, Singapore,. 1959, p. 28 40. NTU,C, op. c i t . , p. 49. 41. A . Josey, op .c i t . , p. 31. 42. N T U C , op. c i t . , p . 49. 43. Malaysia has the Industrial Relations Act 1967 and Singapore has the Industrial Relations Ordinance i960, and Industrial Relations Act (Amendment) 1967. - 72 -44. N T U C , op. c i t . , p . 69. 45. Industrial Relations Act 1967 - Sect. 23; Industrial Relations Ordinance 1950 Sect. 30. 46. N T U C , op. cit. , p . 72. 47. Ross and Hartman, op. c i t . , p. 69. 48. Ross and Hartman, i b i d . , p. 66. V I . CLASSIFICATION of COUNTRIES by P A T T E R N of INDUSTRIAL C O N F L I C T The final concern of this paper is a more precise descrip-tion of the various patterns of industrial conflict. In the previous study, the patterns were on the basis of the averages over a number of years -1948-56, of two measures - membership involvement and duration of strike. We find this inadequate as averages do not show the dispersion or spread of the annual values, and therefore, very different distribu-tions may have fairly similar averages. A s we consider it desirable to know whether the annual values are very consistent around the average or fluctuating greatly, we will use the standard deviation in addition to the average for each of the two measures for each country. Ross and Hartman had classified the countries by low, medium and high ratios, designating the range of values for each class. However, they gave no substantive basis for where they drew the lines, i . e . , what is low, medium or high was an arbitrary decision. We suggest that an improvement would be to consider each pattern of industrial conflict as a statistical population and each country having that pattern, a sample of that population. From the average and standard deviation of each country, for each measure, we can derive the distribution of the population mean - the acceptance region. This acceptance region is then the range of values for the average of any other country, which statistically belong to the same population - the same population. For example, for country A with an average duration of strike of 3.3 days per strike and a standard deviation over the last 16 years of 1.5.; we find that the acceptance region is from 2.2 to 4.4, using a 99 per cent confidence level. This means that country B or any other country would be considered as belonging to the same pattern as country A if its average duration of strike during the same period of time lies between 2.2 to 4.4 In addition to determining whether one country has the same pattern of industrial conflict as another, we can show the relative degree - 74 -of association by the overlap of the acceptance regions. The area of the overlap is the probability that both countries have the same popu-lation mean; therefore, the greater the area, the greater the chances and the closer the association. R & H's approach had not incorporated this point. A complication will arise when two countries fall within the acceptance region of a third but not each other's, for example, the mean of country B falls within the acceptance region of country A and country C is within that of B but not A (See F i g . 1). C B A Figure 1 In this case, the general rule in statistical classification based on "clusters" will be followed and all three countries will be considered to belong to the same pattern, if that can be shown, for example, as in Figure 2. C B A D E Figure 2 Finally from the groups/classes of countries so obtained, we can describe the pattern of each group as the mean and standard devi-ation of all countries in it. - 75 -We will first briefly discuss the methodology of constructing the population distribution or the acceptance region from sample data, and then give the results of applying such technique to our data from 1957 to 1972 of the fifteen countries, first studied by Ross and Hartman and of the new nations, Israel, Malaysian and Singapore. From these figures we will classify the countries into various patterns of industrial conflict and at the same time compare them with the classes which will emerge if R & H's rule is used instead. Methodology Each country (sample) is described by two measures of strike activity (random variables). For each measure, we compute the mean and the standard deviation. Therefore each country can be shown as V ( x a , x b ) , ( s a , s b ) where Y - name of country x - mean « s - standard deviation a - membership involvement) 3 random variables b - duration of strikes .) Assuming the population (pattern) of the random variables is normally distributed, we establish the limits of the acceptance region with the "two-tailed test" for each country from the expression: ^ ± t o C / 2 ' ^ where population mean t m a g n i t u d e of the t distribution deviate which cuts off tail area equal to ^ - level of significance s— = s / n - where s is sample standard deviation and n x is the number of observations Therefore the limits of the acceptance region will be: V (Upper Limit) = + t / p . s_ u x V . (Lower Limit) = Z ^ * - t / o . s_ 1 ^ x Since the number of observations for each random variable is less than 30, we have to use the "t-test" instead of the 1 "standard normal test". A l s o , we will be using a 99 per cent level of confidence (or 1 per cent significance level), i . e . , there is only a 1 per cent probability that the population mean of our sample will fall outside the acceptance limits. Empirical Results Table 12 shows the mean, the standard deviation, the limits of the acceptance region and R & H's classification of both measures of each country for data from 1957 to 1972. From this table, we can derive the groups of countries which meet our classification rule of "the mean of a sample must lie within the distribution of the popula-tion mean of the other samples with which it is grouped", as well as those which conform to R & H's rule. They are as shown in Table 13. By our classification method Singapore and Malaysia do not really fulfill the requirements for their "membership involvement" ratios, but as their discrepancy is only 0.2 per cent, we have placed them together. The other five countries, France, Italy, Australia, India and Japan do not really fit into any of these five groups, nor do they form any group among themselves. A visual presentation of the groups and the relative "assoc-iation" of the countries in each group is shown in Chart V . Using R & H's rule, the groups emerging differed in that Singapore would be in the same group as Norway and Sweden, instead of Malaysia, who will then be grouped with the U . K . Japan will be placed with Israel and Finland, and France, Italy, and India and Australia would be considered as one group. c-c— 1 Table 12 - Empirical Results Membership Involvement Duration of Strikes X s V L V u R & H X s VL VW R & H Denmark 1.8 1 .4 0.6 3. 0 Nominal(N) 2.2 0. 9 1 . .5 2.9 Low(L) Netherlands 1.2 1.5 0 2. ,4 N 3.6 1 . 9 2. 2 5.0 L United Kingdom 10.4 5.4 6.0 14. 8 Medium(M) 5.3 3. 5 2. .6 8.0 M Germany 1.4 1 .4 0.3 2. 5 N 3.8 2. 2 2. 1 5.5 L Norway 0. 7 1 . 1 0 1 . 5 N 12.5 8. 5 6. 0 19.0 Inter(I) Sweden 0.3 0.4 0 0. 6 N 11.7 8. 9 4. 9 18.5 I France 79.5 9.8 49.5 109. 5 High(H) 1.3 1 . 4 0. 2 2.4 L Italy 50. 1 9.0 23. 1 77. 5 H 4.2 1 . 7 2. 9 5.5 L Japan 14.8 5.7 10.9 19. 3 M 3.3 1. 5 2. 2 4.4 L India 26.9 2.4 19.8 .34. 0 H 7.7 3. 0 5. 5 9.9 I U . S . A . 10.7 3.3 8.0 13. 4 M 16.3 5. 9 11 . 9 20.7 H Canada 10.9 5.6 6.8 15. 0 M 17.5 5. 3 13. 6 21.4 H Australia 28.2 16.0 15.9 40. 5 H 1.7 0. 3 1 . 5 1.9 L Finland 9.2 7.8 2.7 15. 7 M 4.8 4. 1 1. 6 8.0 L South Afr ica 1.0 0.6 0.6 1. 4 N 2.9 3. 1 0. 6 5.2 L Israel 7.6 5.0 3.9 1 1. 3 M 3.8 3. 3 1. 3 6.3 L Malaysia 4.5 • 4.5 2.5 6. 5 M 8.8 5. 5 4. 7 12.9 M Singapore 2.3 2.3 1.0 3. 6 N 12.9 9. 7 5. 4 20.4 M Table 13 "Acceptance Region" Rule I Norway Sweden II Denmark II Netherlands Germany South Afr ica III Singapore III Malaysia IV Israel IV Finland United Kingdom V U . S . A . V Canada VI R & H's Rule Norway Sweden Singapore ' Denmark Netherlands Ge rmany SOuth Afr ica United Kingdom Malaysia Israel Finland Japan U . S . A . Canada France Italy India Australia Describing the pattern of industrial conflict of each group as the overall mean and standard deviation of the countries in the group we have the following: - 79 -Membership Involvement Duration of Strikes Mean I. Norway Sweden II. Denmark Netherlands Ge rmany South Afr ica III. Singapore Malaysia. IV. Israel Finland United Kingdom' V . United States Canada 0.5 1.5 3.5 9.0 10.8 Standard Deviation 0.9 1.3 2.4 5.9 4.6 Mean Standard Deviation 12. 1 3. 1 10.8 4.6 16.9 8.3 7.3 8.0 3.6 5.6 From this table, we can see that though Group II has shorter average duration of strikes than Group IV (3.1 as against 4.6), the latter has a narrower distribution, which means that its values are more consistent around the mean. - 80 -VII. CONCLUSION From our survey of the strike activity of the fifteen countries for the period 1957-1972, we conclude that Ross and Hartman's hypothesis that the strike is withering away is not true. The results show both a higher propensity to strike and greater man-days lost through strikes at the end of the period under study (1969-1972) than at the begin-ning (1957-1959). We also find that their hypothesis that the strike is being transformed from a test of economic strength to a brief demonstration of protest is not generally true. Two countries, the United Kingdom and Italy which had 'low' duration of strikes by Ross and Hartman's definition were having longer average durations, while three others, Norway, Canada and the United States still have long average durations. We submit that as shown in the case of the United Kingdom with its railway and dock strikes in 1972 which almost brought the economy to a standstill, the strike as a test of economic strength still remains the most effective weapon for the unions. Though they may opt for broad political reforms as an alterna-tive at times, they will not hesitate to put their economic power to the test whenever they feel necessary. In the case of Italy, short strikes were a result of circumstances rather than choice. However, when the unions felt strong enough to seriously challenge management in extended strikes and saw cause to, they did just that. This resulted in longer average durations of strike in the sixties and seventies. A s for the relationships between strike activity and the characteristics of the industrial relations system hypothesised by Ross and Hartman we found contention with the following: 1) Organisational Stability - Age of Labour Movement The 'struggles for existence, recognition and security' by the unions are found to be far from completed in contrast to Ross and Hartman's proposition, even in the United Kingdom which has the oldest labour movement and especially in the public sector. However these organisation struggles may not be significant in the total strike picture. 2) Status of Union-Management Relations - Degree of Acceptance by Employers  Ross and Hartman hypothesised that organisational conflict is minimised where employers and unions have attained an acceptable balance of power and preroga-tives. We have found that employer acceptance and a balance of power are not sufficient for maintaining industrial peace in Sweden and Italy. In addition to these there must be a desire for peace by both parties. 3) Labour Political Activity The use of political alternatives does not necessarily give rise to a position of submission and acquiescence by the labour movement to the party or government concerned, and therefore is not a deterrent to strike activity as such. Instead we submit that the relation-ship works both ways and conflict is reduced through legislation and other acts favourable to the unions. On the other hand there was strong evidence to support their hypothesis that the consolidation of the bargaining structure is conducive to industrial peace from our analysis of Britain, Sweden and Japan. Our review of Israel, Malaysia and Singapore failed to bring forth an 'Economic Development Pattern'. Therefore, we suggest that the drive for economic development by a relatively under-developed country in an industrialised world need not be the over-riding factor in shaping industrial conflict. Other factors, for example, an established labour movement even before industrialisation as in Israel, maybe the more significant influence. However we do concede that the government plays a very dominant role in the industrial relations system in all the - 82 -three countries, either indirectly by taking over the labour movement as in Israel, or more obviously through legislation as in Singapore and Malaysia. In the last part of this thesis we have tried to present what we consider an improvement to Ross and Hartman's approach in defining strike patterns and have established five patterns of conflict. We have chosen to end this study at this point rather than continue to identify similarities in the industrial relation systems as in the Ross and Hartman study. The principal reason is that we feel that it would be an entirely new area of study. It would be inadequate to merely identify the factors without attempting to quantify the relation-ships or effects of these factors, in combination with each other on the : measures of industrial conflict. Although Ross and Hartman had iden-tified similar factors they have not shown that these were significant in shaping the patterns of industrial conflict, nor did they attempt to quantify the cause and effects. We hope that this thesis will serve a useful purpose in further attempts to construct a model showing the relationships of the factors determining the levels of strike activity. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1) Banks, R . F . , "British Collective Bargaining: The Challenges of the 1970's), Relations Industrielles, August 1971. 2) Bates, R . H . , "Approaches to the Study of Unions and Development", Industrial Relations, Volume 9, 1969, pp. 355-378. 3) Ben-David, J . , "Professionals and Unions in Israel", Industrial  Relations, Volume 5, 1972, pp. 48-66. 4) Derber, M . , "Crosscurrents in Workers Participation", Industrial Relations, Volume 9, October 1969, pp. 117-122. 5) Dubin, R . , "Industrial Conflict: The Power of Prediction", Industrial and Labour Relations Review, Volume 18 (1964-5), pp. 352-363. 6) Eldridge, J . E . T . , Industrial Disputes: Essays in the Sociology of  Industrial Relations, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968. 7) Engleman, S . R . , and Thomson, A . W . 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W. , "Work-Stoppages in the United Kingdom, 1951 - 1964: A Quantitative Study," Bulletin of the Oxford  University Institute of Statistics, Volume 28, 1966, pp. 33-57. - 84 -13) Gamba, C . , The Origins of Trade Unionism in Malaya, Eastern Universities Press L t d . , Singapore, 1962. 14) Guigni, G . , "Bargaining Units and Labour Organisations in Italy", Industrial and Labour Relations Review, Volume 10, 1956-57, pp. 424-439. 15) Guigni, G . , "Recent Trends in Collective Bargaining in Italy", International Labour Review, Volume 104, October 1971. 16) Gouldner, A . W . , Wildcat Strikes, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1955. 17) Government of Malaysia, Industrial Relations Act of Malaysia, 1967. 18) Government of Singapore, Industrial Relations Ordinance of Singapore, 1960, and Industrial Relations Act (Amendment), 1967. 19) Hogberg, G . , "Recent Trends in Collective Bargaining in Sweden", International Labour Review, Volume 107, March 1973, pp. 223-238. 20) International Labour Office, "The Incidence and Duration of Industrial Disputes", International Labour Review, Volume 77, 1958, pp. 455-68. 21) Jenkins, P . , The Battle of Downing Street, Charles Knight, 1970. 22) Josey, A . , Trade Unions in Malaya, D . Moore, Singapore, 1959. 23) Kassalow, E . M . , "Professional Unionism in Sweden", Industrial  Relations, Volume 8, February 1969, pp. 119-134. 24) Kassalow, E . M . , "Conflict and Co—Operation in Europe's Industrial Relations", Industrial Relations, Volume 13, Mo. 2 . , pp. 155-163. 25) Kendall, W . , "Trade Unions in Italy", European Community, May 1970. 26) Kendall, W . , "Trade Unions in France", European Community, June 1970. 27) K e r r , C . and Siegel, A . , "The Inter-Industry Propensity to Strike: An International Comparison", in A . Kornhauser, R. Dubin and A . M . Ross's Industrial Conflict, N . Y . , McGraw-Hil l , 1954, pp. 189-212. 28) Knowles, K . G . S . C . , Strikes, Oxford University Press , 1952. 29) Lester, R » A . , "Reflections on Collective Bargaining in Britain and Sweden," Industrial and Labour Relations Review, Volume 10, 1955-7, pp. 375-401. - 85 -30) Levitt, T . , "Prosperity versus Strikes" , Industrial and Labour  Relations Review, Volume 6, 1952-53, pp. 220-226. 31) McCarthy, W . E . J . , "The Native of Britain's Strike Problem: A Reassessment of the Arguments in the Donovan Report and a Reply to H . A . 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M . and Irwin, E . , "Strike Experience in Five Countries, 1927-47: An Interpretation", Industrial and Labour Relations Review, Volume 4, pp. 323-342. 39) Ross, A . M . and Hartman, P . T . , Changing Patterns of Industrial  Conflict, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1960. 40) Schregle, J . , "Forms of Participation in Management," Industrial  Relations, Volume 9, October 1969, pp. 117-122. 41) Shira i , T . , "Prices and Wages in Japan: Towards an Anti-Inflationary Policy?" , International Labour Review, Volume 103, March 1971, pp. 227-246. 42) Shorter, E . and T i l l y , S . , Strikes in France: 1830-1968, Cambridge University Press , London, 1974. - 85 -43) Sumiya, M . , "Contemporary Arrangements: An Overview " , in K . Okochi, B . Karsh and S . B . Levine's Workers and.Employers  in Japan, University of Tokyo Press , pp. 77-78. 44) Summers, G . W . and Peters,- W . C . , Basic Statistics in Business  and Economics, Wadsworth Press, Belmont, California, 1973. 45) "Troubles of the Organisation Men" , The Economist, A p r i l 28, 1973, pp. 65-58. 46) Turner , H . A . , Is Britain Really Strike-Prone? A Review of the Incidence, Character and Costs of Industrial Conflict, Cambridge: University Press , 1969. University of Cambridge, Department of Applied Economics, Occasional Papers 20. 47) Wedderburn, D . , "Perspective on Sweden", Personnel Management, Volume 6, May 1974, pp. 31-34. 48) Weintraub, A . R . , "Prosperity versus Strikes: An Empirical Approach," Industrial and Labour Relations Review, Volume 19, 1965-66, pp. 231-238. 49) Whittingham, T . C . , and Towers, B . , "The British Industrial Relations B i l l : An Analys is , " Relations Industrielles, August 1971, pp. 620-538. 50) Zweig, F . , The Israeli Worker, Herzl Press , New York, 1959. - a/ -A P P E N D I X Statistical Sources and Limitations A s the primary purpose of this study is to test the hypo-theses proposed by A . M . Ross and P . T . Hartman in their book, "Changing Patterns of Industrial Conflict", similar statistical sources have been used as far as possible. However with improvement in data collection by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the newly-formed O E C D , in adjusting the figures reported by respective governments to a common base, much of the inconsistencies among most of the countries studied, which Ross and Hartman had to put up with, have been eliminated from four of the five basic statistics used. They are member of industrial disputes, workers involved, man-days of idleness (from the ILO Yearbook of Labour Statistics from 1958 - 1973) and non-agricultural employees (from OECD Labour force Statistics 1958-1973). The fifth basic statistic, union membership was obtained as in the previous study, from publica-tions by the government of individual countries where available. Estimates by "experts" of the labour movements were used where these figures are not reported or known to be grossly inaccurate. Thus of the five, union membership is probably the least consistent. The Appendix tables present annual data for each of the original fifteen (Tables A-1 - A-10) and then the other three new countries (Tables B-1 and B-2) covered in this study. Tables A1-5and B-1 present the five basic statistics, Table 6 the intensity of organisation and Tables 7 - 1 0 and B-2 the four comparative measures of strike activity. In the following, the sources of the basic statistics will be specified with a brief summary of their limitations primarily identified by Ross and Hartman and where prejections, interpolations and estimates have been used, they will be identified and described. - 88 -- i i -Strike and Lockout Statistics Data for Tables 1 - 3 were obtained from the Yearbook of Labour Statistics published by the International Labour Organisation for all the countries and the years studied. These figures — number of industrial disputes, number of workers involved and working days lost — refer to actual work stoppages, excluding threats of strikes and lockouts, slowdowns, sabotage and the like. Political strikes were excluded from the figures reported by the national governments concerned where there was a sound basis for exclusion. A s these figures were reported by the national governments, several ambiguities arise in the data, mainly due to:-a) all governments exclude disputes below a certain nominal size but there are variations in this "nominal" rule. b) some countries do not report lockouts, which resulting in actual work stoppages are included in the statistics generally. c) political strikes in economic disguise are more significant,in some countries than in others. d) many countries exclude workers indirectly affected but a few do not and again variations in definitions of these "indirectly-involved" workers to be excluded exist among the countries. Union Membership Statistics The membership figures for all the countries except France and Italy were derived from the annuals, yearbooks or other statistical reports by the respective governments. For France and Italy estimates by W. Kendall in his publications in the European Community, 1970 were used. - as -- iii -Principal shortcomings of this statistic are: a) Inflated membership claims on the part of some unions especially French and Italian. b) incomplete coverage of labour organisations in the reports of some governments. c) Inconsistent definitions of union membership. d) Gaps in the series. T o fil l these gaps, linear interpolations were used to estimate as Ross and Hartman did for their study. Denmark: Statistik Arbog, Copenhagen, Denmarks Statistiske Department. Netherlands: Jaarcijfers Voor Nederland, The Hague, Central Bureau Voor De Statistiek Annual Abstract of Statistics, London, Central Statis-tical Office Statistiches Jarbuk fur die Bunderrepublik Deutschland Statistik Arbok for Norge, Or lo , Statistik Sentralbyra Statistisk Arbok For Sverige, Stockholm, Statistiske 1 Centralbyrau c Estimates for 1964 and 1970 were obtained from W. Kendall's "Labour Unions in France" in European Community. Since 1970 pp. 10-12. Figures for theother years were derived by linear interpolation. United Kingdom: Germany: Norway: Sweden; France: — 3 U — Italy: Estimates for 1934 and 1970 were obtained from W. Kendall's "Labour Unions in Italy" in European Community, July 1970 pp. 20-22. The membership for the other years was esti-mated as in France. India: Statistical Abstract, India, Delhi, Central Statistical Organisation Japan: Japan Statistical Yearbook, Tokyo, Bureau of Statistics Australia: Official Yearbook of the Commonwealth of Australia Finland: Suomen Tilastollinen Vuosikirja, Helsinki, Central Statistical Office Official Yearbook of the Union of South A f r i c a , Pretoria, Bureau of Census and Statistics The membership of figures for 1987 and 1988 were not available and estimated by linear interpolations. Canada: Canada Yearbook, Ottawa, Statistics Canada United Handbook of Labour Statistics, Washington D . C , U . S . States: _ . . _ . , Department of Labour Malaysia: Membership figures from 1957 to 1953 were reported in the Federation of Malaya Annual Report and from 1934 onwards in the Malaysia Yearbook, Department of Statistics, Kuala Lumpur South Afr ica : Singapore: 1957 to 1963 membership figures were published in Colony of Singapore Annual Report and from 1934 onwards in the Singapore Yearbook - y i -- v -Israel: Membership figures for 1949, 1950 and 1953 were obtained from Israel Yearbook and from 1960 onwards, from the General Federation of Labour, Statistical Bulletin of Israel. The years 1951-52 and 1954-1959 were interpo-lated . Non-Agricultural Wage and Salary Earners Ross and Hartman had the most difficulty in getting data for this statistic and many arbitrary rules were used in converting indexes to derive the figures required. In this paper the O . E . C . D . Labour Force Statistics Report had eliminated much of this for the countries studied which belong to the OECD organisation. For the others which do not, the same procedures are undertaken. India: Statistical Abstract, India published series of wage and salary earners in mining and manufacturing. The ratio of the sum of these workers in 1931 and the total number of non-agricultural wage and salary earners was used to construct estimates of the total non-agricul-tural employment. South The figures for 1968 were reported in the Annual Handbook Africa* ' for the Republic of South Afr ica and those for 1972-in the Report of the Department of Labour. The other values were derived by plotting a curve through the values available from 1957 to 1972 Singapore;. The government reports the total number of workmen, shop assistants and clerks employed annually since 1954. The ratio of the sum of these three groups in 1961 and the total number of non-agricultural wage and salary earners in the 1951 census was used to construct estimates of the total non-agricultural employees. - 92 -- v i i -Malaysia: Both the Federation of Malaya Annual Report and the Malaysian Yearbook report wage and salary earners in mining and manu-facturing estimates of the total non-agricultural wage and salary earners were derived using the ratio of the sum of the two industries and the total in the 1961 census. Israel: Israel Statistical Abstract Figures for the other fourteen countries were published in the O E C D Labour Force Statistics. ****** ****** ****** - 93 -U M B E R O F INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES EXHIBIT NO. A-1 Denmark >^ Netherlands United Kingd Germany Norway Sweden France Italy Japan India U . S . A . Canada Australia Finland South Africa T O T A L 14 15 23 82 34 36 19 40 37 22 22 17 48 76 31 35 37 73 48 121 43 24 104 53 60 20 8 11 28 ,99 15 2,854 2,629 2,093 2,832 2,686 2,449 2,068 2,024 .2,354 1,937 2, 116 2,378 3, 116 3,906 2,228 2,497 1,484 56 28 123 196 791 34 27 207 744 39 88 - — 18 16 18 12 19 8 8 3 7 7 7 6 4 15 10 9 . 17 10 17 31 12 10 -24 14 8 26 7 7 41 128 60 44 2,623 954 1,512 1,494 1,963 1,884 2,382 2,281 1,674 1,711 1,675 — 2,480 3,319 4,358 3~,464 1,731 1,937 1,925 2,471 3,502 3,652 4,145 3,841 3, 191 2^387 2,658 3,377 3,788 4, 162 5,598 4,765 827 903 887 1 , 063 1,401 1,299 1,079 1,224 1,542 1,252 1,214 1,546 1,783 i 2,260 2,527 2,498 1,630 1,524 1,531 1,556 1,357 1,491 1,471 2, 151 1,910 2,556 2,815 2,776 .2,627 2,889 2,752 2,912 3,673 3,694 3,708 3,333 3,367 3,614 3,362 3,655 3,953 4,405 4,545 5,045 5, 700 i 5,717 5, 135 5, 100 . 245 259 218 274 287 311 332 343 501 617 522 582 595 542 559 598 1, 103 987 869 1,145. 815 1, 183 1,250 1,334 1,346 1,273 1,340 1,713 2,014 2,738 2,404 2,298 14,984 13,125 12,944 14,500 15,618 16,053 16,658 17,182 16,706 16,461 17,098 ^19,257 22,460 25,608 26,594 25,140 - 94 -WORKERS INVOLVED in INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES - ('000) EXHIBIT NO. A-2 1957 1958 1959 1950 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 J ' 1969 \ 1970 1971 . 1972 Denmark 2 10 6 20 153 10 7 8 14 10 10 29 36 56 6 8 Netherlands 2 5 8 76 9 2 26 9 23 1 1 2 5 12 52 36 United Kingdom 1 ,359 524 646 819 778 4,423 593 883 876 544 734 2,258 1 ,6,!d5 1,801 1, 178 1,734 ' Germany 45 203 22 17 20 79 316 6 6 196 60 25 90 184 536 23 Norway 3 13 2 1 23 1 11 0.2 6.6 1 0.4 0.5 1 3 2.5 1 Sweden 2 0. 1 1 2 0. 1 4 3 2 0.2 29 0. 1 0.4 9 27 63 7 France 2,954 1,112 940 1 , 072 2,552 1,472 2,646 2,603 1,237 3,341 2,824 - 1, 4^4 1, 160 3,234 2,721 Italy 1,227 1 ,383 1 ,900 2,338 2,698 2,910 3,694 3,246 2,310 1,888 2,244 4,862 7,507 ! 3,722 3,891 4,405 Japan 1,555 1,279 1,216 918 1,680 1,518 1,183 1,050 1,682 1, 132 733 1, 163 1,4jl2 1,720 1,896 1,544 India 889 929 694 983 512 705 563 1,003 1,029 1,410 1,490 1,669 1,827 I •j 1,828 1,615 1,593 U . S . A . 1 ,390 2,060 1,880 1,320 1,450 1,230 941 1,640 1 ,550 1,960 2,870 2,650 i 2,480 3,305 3,280 1,700 Canada 81 112 95 49 98 74 83 100 172 412 252 224 i 307 [ 262 240 707 Australia 337 283 237 603 300 354 413 546 475 305 483 720 \ 1,285 1,337 1,326 1,114 Finland 59 14 20 19 45 7 105 27 7 66 27 27 13 202 40 40 South Africa 10 8 4 6 5 2 3 . 5 6 5 4 2 4 4 4 9 T O T A L 9,926 7,835 7,671 8,241 10,324 12,791 10,586 1 1, 126 9,389 11,401 11,732 16,458 19,5' 2: 15, 155 17,712 15,806 - 95 -WORKING DAYS L O S T in INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES - (»000) EXHIBIT NO. A-3 1957 1958 1959 1960 1931 1962 1933 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 Denmark 7 9 18 61 2,308 15 24 18 243 15 10 34 56 101 21 22 Netherlands 7 37 14 467 25 9 38 44 55 13 6 14 22 263 97 United Kingdom 8,412 3,462 5,270 3,024 3,040 5,798 1,755 2,277 2,925 2,398 2,787 4,690 6,846 10,980 13,551 23,909 Germany 1,072 782 62 38 61 451 1,846 17 49 27 390 25 249 93 '4,484 66 Norway 27 60 48 2 423 81 226 1 9 5 5 14 | 22 47 9 12 Sweden 53 15 24 19 2 5 25 34 4 352 0.4 1 i 1 2 i I 156 839 1 1 France 4, 121 1,138 1 ,938 1 , 0 7 0 2,601 1,902 5,992 2,497 980 2,524 4,204 1 ! 1 2,324 1,741 4,388 3,755 Italy 4,619 4, 172 9,190 5,786 9,891 22,716 11,395 13,089 6,993 14,474 8, 568 9,240 - • 1 37,825 1 18,277 14,799 19,497 Japan 5,634 6,052 6,020 4,912 6, 150 5,400 2,770 3, 165 5,669 2,742 1,830 2,841 t 3,634 3,915 6,029 5, 147 India 6,429 7,798 5,633 6,515 4,919 6, 121 3,263 7,725 6,904 13,846 17, 148 17,244 1 19,048 17,175 1 ,655 17,921 U . S . A . 16,500 23,900 69,000 19,100 16,300 18,600 16,100 22,900 23,300 25,400 42,100 49,000 42,900 66,413 47,589 26,000 C anada 1,477 2,817 2,227 739 1,335 1,418 917 1,581 2,350 5, 178 3,975 5,083 7,752 i 6,542 2,867 7,754 Australia 630 440 365 725 607 508 582 91 1 816 732 705 1,079 i ' 1 ,958 2,394 ' 3,069 2,010 Finland 223 45 430 96 41 33 1,380 58 16 122 321 282 : 16 233 2,71 1 473 South Afr ica 13 7 11 5 52 1 1 1 38 17 16 14 5 i 5 5 4 17 T O T A L 46,224 50,734 100,250 4 2 , 5 5 9 47,770 63,058 46,328 54,354 50,327 67, 743 82,062 92,550 I 122,812 • i 128,335 102,108 106,594 1 - 96 -UNION MEMBERSHIP - ('000) EXHIBIT NO. A-4 1957 1958 " 1959 1950 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1956 1957 1968 i 1939 1970 1971 1972 Denmark 742 747 767 802 820 834 849 866 872 873 887 903 '930 1,087 _ Netherlands 1,333 1,332 1,333 1,354 1,399 1,420 1,435 1,471 1,489 1,503 1,517 1,545 1 ,528 1,530. 0 - ... -United Kingdom 9,829 9,639 9,623 9,835 9,916 9,909 9,955 10,101 10,205 10,137 10,061 10,054 10,337 10,041 10,935 -Germany 6,681 6,770 6,714 6,844 6,844 6,902 6,910 •6,961 7,050 7,015 6,889 6,841 6,950 7,174 - -Norway 541 544 541 542 562 555 567 571 574 575 570 574 |582 594 602 604 Sweden 1,775 1,813 1,842 1,879 1,922 1,969 2,013 2,053 2,075 2, 130 2, 112 2,155 2,|410 2,534 - -France .2,240 2,280 2,320 2,360 2,400 2,440 2,480 2,525 2,537 2,549 2,561 2,573 2,|585 2,600 2,400 Italy 6,040 6,080 6,120 6, 160 6,200 6,240 6,280 6,320 6,100 5,880 5,660 5,440 5,)220 5,000 4,000 -Japan 6,606 6,882 7,077 7,516 8,154 8,784 9,270 9,652 10,070 10,308 10,476 10,775 11,!144 11,481 11,684 -India 2,377 3,647 3,923 4,013 3,977 3,682 3,977 4,466 • 3,788 4,392 4,525 4,662 4,797 4,932 - -U . S . A . 17,369 17,029 17,117 17,049 16,303 16,586 16,524 16,841 17,299 17,940 18,367 18,916 19, i 036 19,381 — — Canada 1,386 1,454 1,459 1 ,459 1,447 1 ,423 1,449 1,493 1,589 1,736 1,921 2,010 2,|075 I 2, 173 2,211 2,371 Australia 1,810 1,811 1,851 1 ,912 1,895 1,950 2,004 2,055 2,116.2 2, 124 2,151.3 2, 191 2, 239 2,315 2,437 South Afr ica 415 420 430 440 442 450 467 489 513 523 550 559 587 604 - -Finland 345 348 362, 396 410 447 470 485 506 528 549 559 767 845 930 -T O T A L 59,489 60,796 61,479 62,562 62,691 63,601 64,649 66,349 66,782 68,214 68,796 69,776 - 7 1 . 187 72,290 - -- 97 -N O N - A G R I C U L T U R A L POPULATION 1957 - 1972 - ('000) EXHIBIT NO. A - 5 Denmark Netherlands 1,317 1,340 1,363 1,386 1,433 2,902 2,887 2,946 3,046 3,123 1,480 1,527 1,574 1,625 3,223 3,302 3,388 3,467 1,648 1,671 1,703 1,728 . 1,774 3,508 3,506 3,555 3,668 3,742 1,807 1,873 3,779 3,765 United Kingdom 21,374 21,220 21,379 21,883 22,243 21,883 22,243 22,464 22,497 22,82, 23,129 22,704 22,686 22,511 22,156 2,691 Germany ,8,398 18,619 18,950 19,505' 19,909 20,192 20,433 . 20,700 21,017 21,029 20,365 20,549 2,J ,36 21,650 21,809 21 .'544 Norway Sweden France Italy Japan India U . S . A . Canada Australia Finland South Afr ica T O T A L 952 2,689 11,677 9,461 20,000 13,650 52,894 4,347 2,770 1,032 3,105 948 2,735 962 2,764 11,856 11,880 9,526 ' 9,563 20,996 21,650 14,048 14,324 51,363 53,313 4,380 4,538 983 2,824 12,051 9,953 1,008 2,860 12,241 10,292. 1,026 2,910 1,038 2,969 1,054 2,991 1,072 3,052 1,088 3,131 1,110 3,077 12,503 13,024 10,538 10,846 13,417 13,595 13,760 14,234 10,893 10,586 10,555 10,822 1,124 3, 126 14,366 11,014 1,145 3,189 14,1852 11,220 22,760 23,950 25,220 26,120 27,080 28,170 29,390 30,250 31,140 31, 15,315 16,081 16,611 17,460 18,695 19,480 19,821 20,198 20,416 20, 1,182 1,240 1,318 3,320 3,355 3,385 15,300 15,580 15,881 11,574 11,717 11,575 (390 32,770 34,060 34,520 j704 21,120 21,580 22,500 54,234 54,042 4,644 4,717 55,596 55,702 58,331 60,815 63,955 65,857 67,915 70,284 70,616 70,699 72,764 4,908 5,061 5,287 5,581 5,921 6,126 6,312 6,J545 6,669 6,854 7,139 2,890 1,040 3, 190 2,991 1,104 3,275 3,114 1,178 3,350 3,120 1,173 3,435 3,201 1,247 3,520 3,301 1,230 3,610 3,448 1,361 3,700 3,589 1,399 3,800 3,789 1,422 3,905 3,898 1,446 4,020 4,023 1,432 4, 167 1,484 4,204.9 4,250 4,338 4,466 4,500 1., 549 1 , 572 1, 596 4,360 4,490 4,600.7 166,523 167,038 171,002 176,226 179,627 184,058 188,856 194,378 199,745 205,743 209,709 213,595 218,^48 222,475 225,164 228,654 - 98 -INTENSITY of ORGANISATION EXHIBIT NO. A-6 1957 1958 1959 1960 1951 1962 1963 1954 1965 1966 1967 1968 | 1969 1970 1971 1972 Denmark 56.3 55. 7 56.3 57.8 57.2 55.4 55.6 " 55.0 53.7 53.0 53. 1 53.0 i 53.8 61.3 Netherlands 46.0 56. 1 45.2 44.5 44.8 44.0 43. 5 43.4 . 42.9 42.8 43.3 43.3 41.7 40.9 _ | United Kingdom 46.0 45o4 45.0 44.9 44.6 45.3 44.8 45.0 45.4 44.4 43 o 5 44.3 45.6 44.6 49.4 Ge rmany 35.3 36.4 35.4 35. 1 34.4 34.2 33.8 33.6 33. 5 33.4 33.8 33.3 32.9 33. 1 - -Norway 56.8 57. 1 56.3 55. 1 55.8 55. 1 54.7 54.2 53.6 52. 8 51.4 51. 1 i 50.9 50.3 48.5 43.2 Sweden 66.0 56.3 66.6 66.5 67.2 67.7 67.8 68.6 68.0 68.0 68.6 68.9 75.6 76.3 -France 19. 1 19.2 19.5 19.6 19.6 19.5 19.0 18.9 18.7 18.5 18.0 17.9 i 17.4 17.0 Italy 64. 1 63.8 64.0 61 .9 60.2 59.2 57.9 58.0 57.6 55. 7 52.3 49.4 46.5 43. 1 _ Japan 33.0 32.8 32.7 33.0 34.0 34.8 35.5 35.6 35. 7 35. 1 34.6 34.6 35.2 35.0 34.3 India -~ 26.0 27.4 26.2 24.7 22.2 22.8 20.3 19.4 22.2 22.4 22.8 23.2 23.4 - -U . S . A . 32.8 33.2 32. 1 31 .4 30.2 29.8 29. 1 28.9 28.4 28.1 27.9 27.9 27. 1 27.4 Canada 31.9 33.2 32.2 31 .4 30.7 29.0 28.6 28.2 28.5 29.3 31.4 31.8 31.7 32.6 32.3 33.2 Australia - - 50.9 61.4 60.7 60.9 60. 7 59.6 59.0 55.0 55.2 54.5 53.7 53.4 54.6 Finland 33.5 33.5 32.8 33.7 34.9 35.8 38.3 35.6 36.1 37.2 38.0 39.0 51.7 54.5 61. 1 _ South Afr ica 13.4 13.2 13.1 13. 1 12.9 12.8 12.9 13.2 13.5 13.4 13.7 13.5 13.8 13.8 13.7 13.9 T O T A L 35.7 36.4 35.9 35.5 34.9 34.6 34.2 34. 1 33.4 33.2 32.8 32.7 32.5 32.5 - -- 99 -M E M B E R S H I P I N V O L V E M E N T RATIO 1957 1958 1959 1 9 6 0 1 9 61 1 9 6 2 1 9 3 3 Denmark 0.3 1 .3 0.8 2.5 18.7 1.1 0.8 Netherlands 0. 1 0 .4 0.6 5.6 0.6 0.2 1.8 United Kingdom 13.8 5 .4 6.7 8.3 7.9 44.6 6.0 Germany 0.7 3 .0 0.3 0.2 0.3 1.1 4.6 Norway 0.5 2 .3 0.4 0. 1 4. 1 0.2 1.9 Sweden 0.1 0 . 1 0. 1 0. 1 0. 1 0.2 0. 1 France 132.3 48. 8 40.5 45.4 106.3 60.3 106. 7 Italy 20.3 20. 2 21.0 31.4 37.7 43.2 58.8 Japan 23.6 18. 6 17.2 12.2 20.6 17.3 12.8 India 37.4 25. 5 17.7 24.5 12.9 19. 1 14.2 U . S . A . 8.0 12. 1 11.0 7. 7 8.9 7.4 5.7 Canada 5.8 7. 7 6.5 3.4 6.8 5.2 5.8 Australia ' 18.6 15.( 12.8 31.5 15.9 18. 1 20.6 Finland 17.0 4. 1 5.5 4.9 11.0 0. 1 22.2 South Afr ica 2.3 2.C ) 0.9 1.2 1.1 0.5 0.7 T O T A L • 16.7 12.c 12.5 '13 „ 2 16.5 20. 1 16.4 i ! EXHIBIT NO. A - 7 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 0.9 1.6 1.2 1.2 3.2 3i9 5. 1 0.6 1.6 0.7 0. 1 0.3 ( D :8 3.4 8.7 8.6 5.4 7.3 22.4 16, 1 17.9 10.8 0. 1 0. 1 2.8 0.9 0.4 1 •3 2.6 - -0. 1 0.1 0.2 0. 1 0. 1 0J 1 0.5 0.4 0.2 0. 1 0.01 1.4 0.004 0.02 0.4 1.1 - -103. 1 48.8 131. 1 110.3 — 55.8 44.6 51.4 37.9 32.2 39.7 89.4 143 ! .;8 74.4 _ 10.9 16.7 11.0 7.0 10.8 12.8 15.0 16.2 22.5 27.2 32. 1 32.9 35.8 38 11 I I 37. 1 - -9.7 9.0 10.9 15.6 14.0 13. 0 17. 1 6.7 10.8 23. 7 13. 1 11.1 14. 8 12.0 10.8 29.8 26.6 22.4 14.4 22.5 32.9 57. • 4 59. 1 54.4 5.6 1.4 12.5 4.8 4.8 , 10. 8 23.9 42.0 1.0 1.2 1.0 0.6 0.4 0. 7 0.7 0.7 1.4 16.8 14. 1 16.7 17. 1 « 23.6 4 21.0 - -- 100 -DURATION of STRIKES EXHIBIT NO. A-8 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1983 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 Denmark 2.9 1.0 3. 1 3. 1 15. 1 1.5 3.6 2.3 17. 1 1.5 1.0 1.2 |1 .6 1.8 3.2 2.9 Netherlands 5. 1 7.3 1 .8 6.2 2.9' 4.1 1.4 5.2 2.4 1.1 3.9 3.0 J1 .8 5.0 2.7 — United Kingdom 6.2 6.6 8.2 3.7 3.9 1.3 3.0 2.6 3.3 4.4 3.8 2.1 4. 1 6. 1 ~ 11.5 13.8 Germany 23.7 3.9 2.9 2.2 3.0 5.7 5.8 3.0 7.7 0. 1 6.5 1.0 2.8 0.5 8.4 2.9 Norway 9.7 4.8 22.7 3.4 18.5 73.7 21.4 6.5 14.8 3.7 11.8 27.0 27.0 15.2 3.6 10.3 Sweden 33. 1 187.5 19o9 12.3 21.0 1 .4 8.9 17.9 20.5 12.0 4.4 3.0 12.5 5.8 13.3 1.5 France 1.4 1.0 2. 1 1.0 1.0 1.3 2.3 1.0 0.8 0.8 1.5 !1 .6 i 1.5 1.4 1.4 Italy 3.8 3.0 4.8 2.5 3.7 7.8 9 - 1 4.0 3.0 7.7 3.8 1.9 S5.0 i 15.7 3.8 4.4 Japan 3.6 4.7 5.0 5.4 3.7 3.6 2.3 3.0 3.4 2.4 2.5 2.4 J2.6 if 2.3 3.2 3.3 India 7.3 8.4 8.1 6.6 9.6 8.7 5.8 7.7 6.7 9.8 11.5 10.3 10.4 I j 9.4 1.0 1.1 U . S . A . 1 1.9 1 1.6 36.7 14.5 1 1 .2 15. 1 17. 1 14.0 15.0 13.0 14.7 18.5 < J 17.3 } 20o 1 14.5 15.3 C anada 18.2 25.2 23.4 15.0 13.6 19. 1 1 1.0 15.7 13.7 12.6 15.8 22.7 25.3 25.0 12.0 11.0 Australia 1.9 1.6 1.5 1.2 2.0 1.4 1.4 1.7 1.7 2.4 1.5 1.5 11.5 1.8 2.3 1.8 Finland 3.8 3. 1 21.7 5.0 0.9 4.7 13.2 2.2 2.3 1.8 12. 1 10.5 1.9 1.2 6.7 2.0 South Afr ica 1 .4 0.8 3o 1 0.9 12.4 0.5 3. 1 7.6 2.7 3. 1 4.0 2.4 1.0 1.2 0.8 1.8 T O T A L . 4.7 6.5 13. 1 / 5.2 ' 4.6. 4.9 4.4 4.9 5.4 5.9 7.0 5.6 6.3 8.5 5.8 6. 7 Denmark 0.11 Netherlands 0.13 United Kingdom 1.34 Germany -Norway 0.19 Sweden 0.06 France 2.25 Italy 1 .84 Japan 0.41 India 1.19 U . S . A . 0.69 Canada 0.56 Australia 3.98 Finland 0.85 South Afr ica 0.38 0.11 0.17 0.19 0.16 1.24 0.98 0.80 0.03 0.17 0.19 0.04 0.06 0.80 1.27 2.03 2.01 0.43 0.41 1.08 1.07 0.72 0.70 0.59 0.48 3.42 2.90 0.48 Oo44 0.23 0.14 0.59 0.24 0.40 0.14 1.29 1.21 0.01 0.06 0.12 0.19 0.11 0.04 1.24 1.60 2.48 3.40 0.47 0.58 1.02 0.84 0.61 0.62 0.59 0.61 3.68 2.61 0.37 0.43 0.13 0.24 0.24 0.12 0.07 0.31 11.2 0.93 0.10 0.39 0.08 0.08 0.03 0.08 1.51 1.83 3.47 3.82 0.52 0.41 0.90 0.84 0.65 0.59 0.63 0.66 3. 70 3. 79 0.37 0.54 0.16 0.17 ( EXHIBIT NO. A - 9 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 0.25 0.23 0. 13 0. 13 0. 10 0.28 0.43 0.17 0. 19 0. 16 0. 17 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.26 0.04 0.90 1 .05 0.85 0.91 1 .05 13. 7 1 .74 1 .01 1.15 0.02 0.01 0.98 0.37 0.02 | i 0.04 - - -0.03 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.03 0. 13 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.08 0.02 0.02 0. 13 0.39 0. 18 0.13 1.70 1.23 1.24 1 . 18 i i i 1 .67 2.17 2.80 2. 18 3.53 3.01 2.26 2.46 3.07 ! 3.38 3.60 4.78 4. 12 0.45 0.55 0.43 0.40 0.50 3.56 0.70 0.74 0.72 1 .15 0.98 . 1 .29 1 .39 1.36 1 .27 1 .37 1 .28 1 .29 0.64 0.65 0.69 0.69 0.74 ( ).81 0.81 0.73 0.70 0.65 0.90. 1.04 0.85 0.92 'C i ).91 0.81 0.83 0.84 3.87 3.75 3.36 3.44 4.26 A k83 6.31 5.38 5.11 0.56 0.21 1.05 0.30 0.47 |1 .06 1 .55 5.33 5.32 0.27 0.22 0.25 0. 19 0.13 |C .18 0. 17 0. 15 0. 15 0.88 0.84 0.80 0.82 0.90 1-03 1.15 1.18 1.10 - 102 -M E M B E R S H I P L O S S RATIO 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 Denmark 1.0 1.3 2.4 7.6 281.4 1.7 2.8 Nether lands 0.5 2.8 1.1 34.5 1.8 0.6 2.6 United Kingdom 85.6 35.9 54.8 30.7 30.7 58.5 17.6 Germany 16.0 11.6 0.9 0.6 0.9 6. 5 26.7 Norway 5.0 1 1.0 8.8 0.4 75.3 14.4 39.9 Sweden 3.0 0.8 1 .3 1.0 0. 1 0.3 1.2 F" ranee 183.9 49.9 83.6 45.3 108.4 77.9 241.6 Italy 76.5 68.6 150.2 93.9 159.5 364.0 181.4 Japan 85.3 87.9 85. 1 65.4 75.4 61.5 29.9 India 270.5 213.8 143.7 162.3 123.7 166.2 82.0 U . S . A . 95.0 140.3 403. 1 1.12.0 100.0 1 12. 1 97.4 Canada 106.6 193O7 152.6 50.6 92.3 99.6 63.3 Australia 34.8 24.3 19.7 37.9 32.0 26. 1 29.0 Finland 64. 5 13.0 118.6 24.3 10. 1 7.4 293.3 South Afr ica 3.2 1.5' 2.7 1 .2 14.0 0.2 2.3 T O T A L 77.7 83.5 163.1 68.0 76.2 '99.1 71.7 EXHIBIT NO. A-10 1964 1965 1966 1957 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 2.0 2 . 8 1.8 1.1 3.7 6.0 9.3 - -3.0 3.7 0.8 0.4 0.9 1.4 17.2 - _ - — 22.5 28.7 23.7 27. 7 46.6 66.2 109.4 123.9 — 0.2 0. 7 0.4 5.7 0.4 3.6 1.3 - -0.2 1.5 0.9 0.8 2.4 3.7 7.9 1.5 2. 1 1.7 0.2 16.5 0.02 0.06 4.7 6. 1 -98.9 38.6 199.0 164. 1 — 85.0 67.0 207. 1 114.6 246. 1 151.4 169.8 724.6 365. 5 - — 32.8 56.3 26.6 17.5 26.4 I 32.6 t 34. 1 51.6 -173.0 182.2 315.3 379.0 369.9 397. 1 - I t 348.2 - -136.0 134.7 146.0 229.2 259.0 i 225.4 i ' 342.7 105.9 147.9 298.3 206.9 252.9 1 ' 373.6 i t 301.0 129.7 327.0 44.4 38.6 34.5 32.8 49.3 i 1 i 87.4 103.4 125.9 12. 1 3.2 23. 1 58.4 50.5 21 0 27.6 28.2 -7.7 : 3.2 3.0 2.5 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.6 2.6 81.9 75.4 99.3 119.3 132.6 J 172.5 I 177.5 - -- 103 -A N N U A L LABOUR S T A T I S T I C S - NEW NATIONS Industrial Disputes Workers Involved ('000) Working Days Lost ('000) Union Membership ('00( )) Non-Agric'l Population f'0( Year Israel Malaysia Singapore Israel Malaysia Singapore Israel Malaysia Singapore Israel Malaysia ! Smgaoore Israel Malaysia Singapot 1948 48 181 - 1.5 34.0 8.0 320.5 128.7 _ 75.6 74. U _ 1061 _ 1949 53 29 2 5.2 2.3 - 57.4 5.4 6.6 177.4 41 .3 47 J 3 — 1073 — 1950 70 48 1 9. 1 4.9 - 55.1 37.1 4.7 241.9 54.6 .48 .[6 — 1087 — 1951 76 58 4 9.7 7.4 1.2 114.3 41.4 20.6 270.0 107.2 58 .'3 — 1098 _ • ,1952 94 98 5 14.0 12.8 10. 1 58. 1 44.5 40. 1 297.0 127.9 65 J 8 — 1110 ' 1953 84 48 4 8.8 7.5 8.9 35.4 39.0 47.4 327.6 109.6 73.'6 — 1 123 1954 82 78 8 12. 1 10.0 11.2 71 .9 50.8 135.2 350.0 113.5 76. 5 — 1 135 393.9 1955 87 72 275 9.9 15.4 57.4 54.0 79.9 946.4 376.0 145.7 139. 3 483.5 1 147 385.4 1956 74 213 29 11.5 48.7 12.4 112.8 562.1 454.5 403.0 232.2 157. 2 473.5 1158 395.5 1957 59 1.13 27 3.7 14. 1 8.2 165. 5 219.0 109.3 428.0 222.0 140. 7 538.0 1173 403.5 1958 48 69 22 6. 1 9.5 2.7 87.8 59.2 78.2 455.0 211.6 129. 2 543.2 1186 378.5 1959 51 39 40 5.9 6.9 1.9 31.3 38.5 26.6 482.0 175.6 146.6 565.0 1201 350.3 1960 135 37 45 14.4 4.6 5.9 49.4 41 .9 15.2 500.0 184.6 144. 8 580. 7 1217 346.4 1961 125 58 1 16 26.2 9.0 43.6 122,9 59.7 410.9 523.3 211.8 164. 5 ' 618.9 1232 358. 5 1962 144 95 88 37.6 23.3 6.6 241 .8 458.7 165. 1 552.0 257.5 18.9.b 662.0 1250 364. 5 1963 126 81 47 86. 5 17.8 33.0 128.0 308. 1 388.2 577.4 276. 1 142. 9 696.4 1266 384.6 1964 135 95 39 47.2 226.9 2.5 100.9 509.5 35.9 610.9 323.2 157. 1 764. 8 1286 390. 5 1965 288 53 30 90.2 15. 1 3.4 207.6 154.3 45.8 649. 1 328.3 154. 1 769. 5 1313 405.0 1966 282 64 14 88.6 14.9 1 .3 155.0 1 13.0 44.8 669.9 316.6 141.9 766. 5 1345 423. 1 1967 142 60 10 25. 1 10.6 4.5 58.3 162.2 41 .3 685.5 307. 7 130. 1 726.6 1358 418.0 1968 100 107 4 42. 1 31 .6 0.2 71.8 281.0 11.4 673.0 315.2 125.(5 816.2 1440 405.6 1969 1 14 52 - 44.5 9.2 - ' 102.2 77.7 - • 613.0 331 .5 _ •! 854. 1 1517 390.6 1970 163 26 5 114.9 1.6 1.7 390.3 2.3 2.5 754. 7 347.2 114.3 878.4 1624 430.0 1971 169 52 2 88.3 6.0 1.4 178.6 20.8 5.4 784.7 334. 1 124.! 4 894.0 1740 474. 8 1972 168 73 10 87.3 10.3 3.2 235. 1 34.0 18.2 830.7 341 .6 167. 0 963.0 1914 528. 7 - 104 -M E A S U R E S of ORGANISATION and STRIKE A C T I V I T Y - NEW NATIONS Year Intensity of Organisation Membership Involvement Israel Malaysia Singapore Israel Malaysia Singapore 1948 - 7.1 - — 45.0 1949 — 3.8 - 2.9 5.6 — 1950 — 5. 1 . 3.8 9.0 1951 — 9.8 - 3.6 6.9 2.1 1952 — 1 1.6 - 4.7 10.0 15.3 19*53 — 9.8 - 2.7 6.8 12. 1 1954 — 10.0 19.4 3. 5 8.8 14.6 1955 77.8 12.7 36. 1 2.6 10.6 41 .2 1956 •85. 1 20.2 39.7 2.9 21.0 7.9 1957 79.6 19. 1 34.9 0.9 6.4 5.8 1958 83.8 17.8 34. 1 1.3 4.5 2.1 1959 85.3 14.7 41.8 1 .2 3.9 1.3 1950 86. 1 15.3 41 ,8 2.9 2.5 4.1 1961 84.6 17.3 45.9 5.0 4.2 26.5 1962 84.9 20.7 . 51 .9 6.7 9.0 3.5 1963 82.9 21.8 37.2 15.0 6.4 23.1 1964 79.9 25.3 40.2 7.7 70.2 1.6 1965 84.4 25o 1 38.0 13.9 4.6 2.2 1966 87.4 23.6 33.5 13.2 4.7 0.9 1967 94.3 22.7 31. 1 3.7 3.4 3.5 1968 82.5 21.9 30.9 6.3 10.0 0.2 1969 71.8 21.9 - 7.3 2.8 — 1970 85.9 21.5 28.3 15.2 0.5 1.2 1971 87.8 19.3 26.2 11.3 1.8 1 . 1 1972 86.3 17.8 31.2 10.5 3.0 1.9 EXHIBIT B-2 Duration of Strikes Israel Malaysia Singapore Membership Loss Israel Malaysia Singapore 5o3 9.4 - — 423.9 11.0 2.3 - 32.4 •13. 1 6. 1 7.6 - 22. 8 67.9 9.7 11.8 5.6 17.2 42.3 38.6 35.3 4.2 3.5 4.0 19.6 34.8 60.9 4.0 5.2 5.3 10.8 35.6 64.4 5.9 5.1 12. 1 20.5 44.8 176.7 5.5 5.2 16.5 14.4 54.8 679.4 9.8 11.5 36.7 28.0 242. 1 289. { 44.7 15.5 13.3 38.7 98.6 77.7 14.4 6.2 29.0 19.3 28.0 60.5 5.3 5.6 14.0 6.5 21.9 18. 1 3.4 9.1 2.6 ; 9.9 22.7 10.5 4.7 6.6 9.4 i" 23.5 28.2 249.8 6.4 19. 7 25.0 43.0 178. 1 87.4 1.5 17.3 11.8 ; 22.2 111 .6 271.7 2. 1 2.2 14.4 | 16.5 157.6 22.9, 2.3 10.2 13.5 j 32.0 47.0 29.7 1.8 7.5 34.5 ' 23.3 35.7 31.6 2.3 15.3 9.2 i 8.5 52.7 31.7 1.7 8.9 5.7 i 10.7 89. 1 9. 1 2.3 8.4 - i 16. 7 23.4 3.4 1.4 1.5 | 51.7 0.7 2.1. 2.0 3.5 3.9 j 22.8 6.2 4.3 2.7 3.3 5.7 { 28.3 10.1 10.9 

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