Open Collections

UBC Theses and Dissertations

UBC Theses Logo

UBC Theses and Dissertations

The arms control calculus : factors affecting the susceptibility of military instruments and activities… Purver, Ronald Gordon 1974

Your browser doesn't seem to have a PDF viewer, please download the PDF to view this item.

Notice for Google Chrome users:
If you are having trouble viewing or searching the PDF with Google Chrome, please download it here instead.

Item Metadata

Download

Media
831-UBC_1974_A8 P87.pdf [ 7.64MB ]
Metadata
JSON: 831-1.0099939.json
JSON-LD: 831-1.0099939-ld.json
RDF/XML (Pretty): 831-1.0099939-rdf.xml
RDF/JSON: 831-1.0099939-rdf.json
Turtle: 831-1.0099939-turtle.txt
N-Triples: 831-1.0099939-rdf-ntriples.txt
Original Record: 831-1.0099939-source.json
Full Text
831-1.0099939-fulltext.txt
Citation
831-1.0099939.ris

Full Text

THE ARKS CONTROL CALCULUS: F a c t o r s A f f e c t i n g the S u s c e p t i b i l i t y of M i l i t a r y Instruments and A c t i v i t i e s t o I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e g u l a t i o n . by RONALD GORDON PURVER B.A., U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1 9 7 3 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n the Department of POLITICAL SCIENCE We accept, t h i s t h e s i s a.s conforming t o the rea. a i r e d standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA October, 1974 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of POLITICAL SCIENCE The University of British Columbia Vancouver 8, Canada OCTOBER 10,1974 ABSTRACT A r e a l i s t i c assessment of the prospects of arms c o n t r o l must take i n t o account the f u l l range of " f a c t o r s a . f f e c t i n g the s u s c e p t i b i l i t y of m i l i t a r y instruments and a c t i v i t i e s t o i n t e r -n a t i o n a l r e g u l a t i o n . " What arms c o n t r o l theory p r e s e n t l y l a c k s i s the e x p l i c i t and systematic a n a l y s i s of these key f a c t o r s , i n g e neral and a p p l i e d t o s p e c i f i c cases. T h i s paper o f f e r s a typology of such f a c t o r s , drawn from the e x i s t i n g body of arms c o n t r o l t h e o r y , and a p p l i e s i t t o a concrete h i s t o r i c a l c a s e — the Soviet-American S t r a t e g i c Arms L i m i t a t i o n T a l k s of 1969-1972. I t i s hoped thereby t o throw l i g h t on both the i n i t i a t i o n and success of n e g o t i a t i o n s , and the s p e c i f i c form which agree-ments are l i k e l y t o t a k e — t h a t i s , the types of weapons systems or a c t i v i t i e s most s u s c e p t i b l e t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e g u l a t i o n , and why. The d i v e r s i t y and abundance of conceivable f a c t o r s , t o g e t h e r w i t h the general p a u c i t y of "hard d a t a " a v a i l a b l e , c a u t i o n s a g a i n s t a premature attempt at p r e c i s e q u a n t i f i c a t i o n or r i g o r -ous comparative a n a l y s i s . I n s t e a d , f o r the moment, the method must be used as a mere guide t o the deeper understanding of given h i s t o r i c a l phenomena. The f a c t o r s f a l l i n t o f o u r broad c a t e g o r i e s : (1) the "na-t u r e of the system (instrument or a c t i v i t y ) to be r e g u l a t e d ; " (2) the " c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the s t r a t e g i c landscape;" (3) the " c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the p o l i t i c a l environment;" and ( 4 ) "the "nature of the arms c o n t r o l system envisaged." The i n i t i a l - i i i -a nalysis and the subsequent case study concentrate on categories (1), (2), and (4), viewed as constants, promoting or hindering e f f o r t s toward agreement regardless of the alignment of domestic p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t s at a given moment. The holding of given ne-got i a t i o n s or the successful conclusion of given agreements may owe more to quite t r a n s i t o r y p o l i t i c a l circumstances than to any of these more " i n t r i n s i c " v a r i a b l e s . Yet the l a t t e r w i l l shape the form and content of agreements reached, i f not provide the underlying impetus. While i t i s not possible to compare the r e l a t i v e saliency of the f a c t o r s i d e n t i f i e d , the case study approach caji be used to generate general hypotheses relevant to t h i s end. F i r s t , the ways i n which SALT may be an a t y p i c a l example of arms control are discussed. Then, conclusions are t e n t a t i v e l y advanced, based on the d e t a i l e d analysis of SALT, with respect to: (1) the en-hancement of s t r a t e g i c s t a b i l i t y as a prime c r i t e r i o n f o r regu-l a t o r y e f f o r t s ; (2) the costs of weapons systems as an i n c r e a -s i n g l y s a l i e n t f a c t o r ; (3) "the decreased concern with, problems of v e r i f i c a t i o n ; (4) the importance of " p a r i t y " between adversa-r i e s ; (5) the p o s s i b i l i t y of " t r a d e - o f f s " within the armaments f i e l d , as well as from outside of i t ; (6) the s i g n i f i c a n c e of d i s p a r i t i e s i n the cost-effectiveness of defense and offense; (7) the not n e c e s s a r i l y negative influence of r a p i d technological, development; (8) the apparent strength of mutual i n t e r e s t s i n arms control among p o l i t i c a l adversaries; and (9) the type of r e s t r a i n t s most l i k e l y to be achieved. - i v -Analysis of the "factors affecting the susceptibility of military instruments and ac t i v i t i e s to international regula-tion" may he useful in explaining the success or fa i l u r e of past efforts, identifying areas of l i k e l y or possible future agreement, and assessing the prospects of particular proposed mea.sures. Ultimately, by drawing upon a. su f f i c i e n t l y large number of case studies, i t nay be possible to develop more rigorous (perhaps even quantitatively-based) theory. - V -TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION » 1. PART I .. 4 . I . Nature of t h e System t o he R e g u l a t e d .. 6 . I I . C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the S t r a t e g i c Landscape........ 23 . I I I . C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the P o l i t i c a l Environment..... 30. IV. Nature of the Arms C o n t r o l System E n v i s a g e d 39 . PART I I 4 7 . I . SALT: F a c t o r s A f f e c t i n g the I n i t i a t i o n of N e g o t i -a t i o n s 4 7 . I I . ABM's 6 9 . I I I . O f f e n s i v e M i s s i l e s 81. IV. The Nature of the SALT I Agreements .. 8 8 . CONCLUSION 9 9 . FOOTNOTES . 104. BIBLIOGRAPHY I . Arms C o n t r o l Theory 108. I I . S.A.L.T 113.' - v i -ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would l i k e to express my appreciation to Mark Zacher and Ole H o l s t i , who guided me through the planning stages of t h i s paper; and to Dan Middlemiss and Kal H o l s t i , f o r t h e i r h e l p f u l c r i t i c i s m s of the f i r s t d r a f t . INTRODUCTION A d i s t r e s s i n g l y large proportion of the e x i s t i n g l i t e r a -ture on arms con t r o l and disarmament—apart from purely h i s t o r i -c a l or j o u r n a l i s t i c s t u d i e s — i s confined e i t h e r to exposing and lamenting the manifest shortcomings of past measures or agree-ments; or to formulating " i d e a l " programs and p o l i c i e s , without much regard to the r e a l i s t i c chances of t h e i r "being implemented. L i t t l e e f f o r t has been devoted e x p l i c i t l y and systematically to i d e n t i f y i n g and analyzing the key v a r i a b l e s a f f e c t i n g the i n i -t i a t i o n and success of attempts at i n t e r n a t i o n a l "arms" regula-t i o n . The l a c k of such a n a l y s i s , c r u c i a l to any r e a l i s t i c assessment of the l i m i t a t i o n s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l a c t i o n , may p a r t l y account f o r the s u r f e i t of disillusionment and cynicism concerning the subject. This paper represents an attempt to help f i l l the apparent void i n theory. By d e f i n i t i o n ( " i n t e r n a t i o n a l " and " r e g u l a t i o n " ) , i t w i l l not be concerned with measures of u n i l a t e r a l disarma-ment, whether voluntary or (as at V e r s a i l l e s ) imposed from without; nor ( d i r e c t l y , that i s ) with the very important sub-je c t s of " t a c i t " arms control and war l i m i t a t i o n . Our analysis s h a l l be r e s t r i c t e d to those agreements reached as the r e s u l t of two or more independent and s e l f - r e l i a n t P a r t i e s (the equi-valent on the i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l plane of ".consenting adults") f r e e l y n e g o t i a t i n g and bargaining on a basis of mutual * Which i s not to say that some of the same va r i a b l e s w i l l not be applicable i n both areas. - 2 -respect and equality. We s h a l l also assume a c e r t a i n degree of "genuineness" on the part of the states concerned i n entering i n t o such negotiations and agreeing to abide by such l i m i t a -t i o n s , the presumption being that i n i t s absence there can be no hope whatsoever f o r "s u c c e s s f u l " measures of arms c o n t r o l . I t i s the l a t t e r with which we are concerned, not the phenome-non of arms con t r o l negotiations per se. The paper w i l l comprise two parts. Part I i s a general discussion, based on the e x i s t i n g body of arms control theory, of the "factors a f f e c t i n g the s u s c e p t i b i l i t y of m i l i t a r y i n s t r u -ments and a c t i v i t i e s to i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e g u l a t i o n . " In Part I I the i n d i v i d u a l f a c t o r s i d e n t i f i e d i n the preceding section w i l l be applied to a concrete h i s t o r i c a l case, namely the So-viet-American S t r a t e g i c Arms Li m i t a t i o n Talks of 1969-1972 and the agreements which, they spawned. Throughout, we w i l l focus on both the f a c t o r s i n f l u e n c i n g the i n i t i a t i o n of arms con t r o l ne-g o t i a t i o n s (given that these may also bear upon the prospects of subsequent r e g u l a t i o n ) , and the q u a l i t i e s of p a r t i c u l a r m i l i t a r y "systems" which a f f e c t t h e i r s u s c e p t i b i l i t y to agree-ment. I t i s assumed that much the same f a c t o r s w i l l be opera-t i v e i n e i t h e r c a s e — f o r example, the high cost of weapons systems generally, and the exorbitant p r i c e - t a g of a given system; the threat to s t r a t e g i c s t a b i l i t y of unregulated "arms racing" i n general, and the d e s t a b i l i z i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of a p a r t i c u l a r type of weapon. Consequently, no attempt w i l l be made i n Part I to d i s t i n g u i s h between those f a c t o r s a f f e c t i n g the i n i t i a t i o n of negotiations, and those shaping t h e i r ultimate - 3 -success. In dealing with, a p a r t i c u l a r case study as i n Part I I , however, i t becomes convenient to make such a d i s t i n c t i o n — a s we w i l l by considering separately the i n i t i a t i o n of SALT and the s p e c i f i c agreements reached th e r e i n . The typology of v a r i a b l e s presented i n Part I w i l l be used merely as a guide to the deeper understanding of a given h i s -t o r i c a l phenomenon, not as a framework susceptible to e i t h e r precise q u a n t i f i c a t i o n or rigorous comparative a n a l y s i s . Any attempt at the l a t t e r would be s e l f - d e f e a t i n g i n view of the bewildering array of conceivable f a c t o r s and the general pau-c i t y of "hard data" on the subject a v a i l a b l e at the present time. Yet i t may be hoped that, however unsophisticated, a sys-tematic analysis such as follows w i l l prove more useful than the haphazard—though undeniably enthusiastic and w e l l - i n t e n -t i o n e d — e x p o s i t i o n s with which we are, sadly, most f a m i l i a r . PART I The various "factors a f f e c t i n g the s u s c e p t i b i l i t y of m i l i -t a r y instruments and a c t i v i t i e s to i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e g u l a t i o n " can be grouped in t o at l e a s t four broad categories: ( 1 ) the "nature of the system (instrument or a c t i v i t y ) to be regulated;" (2) the " c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the s t r a t e g i c landscape;" (3) the " c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the p o l i t i c a l environment;" and (4) the "nature of the arms control system envisaged." Each of these categories embodies a l l three of the t r a d i t i o n a l " l e v e l s of a n a l y s i s , " i . e . the systemic, the nation-state, and the i n d i v i -dual. For example, the "nature of the system to be regulated" can r e f e r to the ( i n d i v i d u a l l y - p e r c e i v e d ) moral repugnance associated with the use of a p a r t i c u l a r type of weapon; to i t s u t i l i t y , i n terms of n a t i o n a l goals; or to i t s e f f e c t upon the i n t e r n a t i o n a l balance of power. S i m i l a r l y , the " c h a r a c t e r i s -t i c s of the p o l i t i c a l environment" include the general tenor of r e l a t i o n s between states, i n terms of t r u s t or h o s t i l i t y ; the r e l a t i v e power and influence of domestic bureaucracies involved i n n a t i o n a l decision-making; and the p e r s o n a l i t i e s and p r e d i s -p o s i t i o n s of key i n d i v i d u a l decision-makers. The trend i n the most recent l i t e r a t u r e on arms control has been to focus a t t e n t i o n upon the "bureaucratic p o l i t i c s " associated with the process and with given accords. Indeed, * See, f o r example, Newhouse ( 1 9 7 3 ) ; and Chayes ( 1 9 7 2 ) , who writes: " I t i s probably f a i r to say that the p r i n c i p a l reason arms con t r o l agreements take so long to negotiate and are not more far-reaching i s not so much the d i f f i c u l t y of one side convincing the other as the need f o r each side to generate a b'road base of agreement and acceptance within i t s own (cont.) - 5 -domestic i n - f i g h t i n g and jockeying over "disarmament" issues i s a prime determinant of outputs i n t h i s , as i n any other, area of p u b l i c p o l i c y . While c r u c i a l to the understanding of a given de c i s i o n , however, such a focus poses formidable, i f not i n s u -perable, problems f o r abstract a n a l y s i s . One can speak only i n very general terms of the r e l a t i v e strength and influence of various bureaucracies, constituencies, or ideologies, f o r i n -stance, unless one focuses upon a p a r t i c u l a r h i s t o r i c a l case. On the other hand, c e r t a i n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of weapons or of t h e i r d i s t r i b u t i o n throughout the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system, f o r example, may be considered as constants, promoting or hinder-ing e f f o r t s toward agreement regardless of the alignment of domestic p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t s at a given moment. I t i s upon such f a c t o r s that the bulk of t h i s section w i l l be concentrated. The d i s t i n c t i o n corresponds roughly to that between more narrowly n a t i o n a l i s t i c goals and the i n t e r e s t s of the world com-munity as a whole. The maxim that an i n t e r n a t i o n a l agreement i s e f f e c t i v e only to the extent that i t r e f l e c t s the continuing mutual i n t e r e s t of a l l the major p a r t i e s suggests that the ef-f o r t to i d e n t i f y and elaborate areas of common concern and bene-f i t i s not without merit. And, while keeping i n mind the inherent l i m i t a t i o n s of the " r a t i o n a l - a c t o r " model of f o r e i g n p o l i c y , one must not lose sight of the f a c t that domestic debate i s conduc-ted l a r g e l y on the basis of a l l e g e d l y r a t i o n a l a n a lysis of the (cont.) and a l l i e d policymaking establishments."(1) * S t r i c t l y speaking, of course, i t i s the perceptions of these "constants" by the actors concerned that matters. - 6 -"national i n t e r e s t . " To the extent that such i s the case, and that the debate i s at a l l relevant to the policy-making process, the " r a t i o n a l - a c t o r " model r e t a i n s a c e r t a i n v a l i d i t y . I. NATURE OF THE SYSTEM TO BE REGULATED. The f i r s t category of v a r i a b l e s may i n turn be broken down in t o a number of components, three of which roughly correspond to what are usually understood to be the primary objectives of arms c o n t r o l : (1) to reduce the l i k e l i h o o d of war breaking out; (2) to mitigate i t s s e v e r i t y and consequences when i t does; and (3) to reduce the economic burden of the arms race. The corres-ponding v a r i a b l e s are: (1) the e f f e c t of the p a r t i c u l a r system upon s t r a t e g i c s t a b i l i t y ; (2) the magnitude or nature of the de-s t r u c t i o n associated with i t ; and (3) i t s monetary cost. E f f e c t Upon St r a t e g i c S t a b i l i t y Most popular support.for general and complete disarmament has been founded upon the rather s i m p l i s t i c b e l i e f that by abo-l i s h i n g armaments, the resort to war could thereby be rendered impossible, and eternal peace thus ensured. This view completely misses the point, of course, that the war p o t e n t i a l of states cannot be reduced without corresponding reductions i n , f o r example, t h e i r l e v e l s of i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n and s o c i a l organiza-t i o n . More sober proponents of arms control have been s a t i s f i e d * Cf. C o l i n Gray: "To escape from the b l i n d a l l e y of analysing the current phase of the arms debate i n the United States ex-c l u s i v e l y i n terms of bureaucratic p o l i t i c s , i t i s necessary to ascend to the greater a r i d i t y of ' r a t i o n a l actor' s t r a t e g i c a n a l y s i s . . . . i t i s c e r t a i n l y possible to describe f a i r l y (cont.) - 7 -with, the f o l l o w i n g arguments l i n k i n g disarmament to the en-hancement of i n t e r n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y : that that proportion of h o s t i l i t y and d i s t r u s t accounted f o r by the mere presence of threatening arsenals would thereby d i s s i p a t e ; that, i n s o f a r as i t depends on the sheer a v a i l a b i l i t y of weapons and the magni-tude of resources already invested i n them, the general w i l l -ingness of states to go to war w i l l be reduced; that longer periods of m o b i l i z a t i o n w i l l provide greater opportunity f o r attempts at r e c o n c i l i a t i o n to be undertaken and voices of r e -s t r a i n t to be heard; and f i n a l l y , that wars fought at a lower l e v e l of technological s o p h i s t i c a t i o n or with much smaller ar-senals are l i k e l y to be l e s s destructive and c o s t l y . So r e s t s the case f o r general and complete disarmament. As the l a t t e r has appeared progressively l e s s capable of attainment, however, the "arms c o n t r o l " school has ga,ined ascen-dancy. E f f o r t s have, at various times, come to be devoted more (cont.) standard l i n e s of i n s t i t u t i o n a l argument...as r e f l e c t i n g a severely bounded r a t i o n a l i t y . . . . [However,"] 'Where you stand depends upon where you s i t ' should be the beginning of a n a l y s i s ; i t should not be viewed as a statement charged with much expla-natory power concerning p o l i c y r e s u l t a n t . P o l i c y i s not just the pre d i c t a b l e r e s u l t a n t of a weighing (by whom? Is the process leaderless?) of the complex balance of i n t e r e s t inveighing or advocating on a p a r t i c u l a r issue. I t i s true that to be the standard-bearer of a more or l e s s p l a u s i b l e argument i s only one among the f a c t o r s that w i l l be weighed by the p o l i c y judge, but i t i s a f a c t o r of no mean importance." (2) * This may not always be the case, of course. In Andre Beaufre's words, " i t i s important not to forget that wars formerly con-ducted with very p r i m i t i v e weapons have l e d to the massacre of enti r e populations and that currently prolonged c o n f l i c t s fought with very simple weapons at the g u e r r i l l a l e v e l lead to considerable destruction and l o s s e s . " (3) ** The two terms, "arms c o n t r o l " and "disarmament", are used i n -terchangeably throughout t h i s essay, although they have oc-c a s i o n a l l y been counterpoised i n the e x i s t i n g l i t e r a t u r e . The l a t t e r term_ suggests an actual reduction i n the l e v e l f ( " G o n t v ) - 8 -c l o s e l y to the a b o l i t i o n or r e s t r i c t i o n of p a r t i c u l a r types of weapons or m i l i t a r y "systems." And the c r i t e r i a f o r s e l e c t i o n have often been r e l a t e d to the s t a b i l i t y of the " s t r a t e g i c ba-lance" or "balance of power"—in other words, to the l i k e l i h o o d of war breaking out. Such has been the case notably at the time of the World Disarmament Conference i n the early lQSO's, and throughout the period since the mid-rig!?©* s. The delegates to the World Disarmament Conference recog-nized that c e r t a i n types of armaments, which they chose to c a l l "aggressive," were of greater u t i l i t y to the offense than to the defense. The existence of such weapons i n n a t i o n a l arsenals, i t was reasoned, contributed m a t e r i a l l y to the danger of war by o f f e r i n g both the prospect of a r e l a t i v e l y quick and easy v i c -t o r y , and a c e r t a i n advantage to the party which struck f i r s t . Were such weapons abolished, i t was hoped, the r e l a t i v e advan-tage accruing to the defense would serve to r e s t r a i n any poten-t i a l aggressor and thus to f o r e s t a l l the outbreak of war, at l e a s t i n s o f a r as the l a t t e r i s r a t i o n a l l y determined. Heavy mo-b i l e a r t i l l e r y , large tanks, b a t t l e s h i p s , a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r s , submarines, bombers, and chemical and b a c t e r i o l o g i c a l weapons were at one time or another singled out as being e s s e n t i a l l y (cont.) of armaments of a state (though i t has not always been used ex c l u s i v e l y i n t h i s sense); the former—which might best be characterized as any conscious or purposeful attempt—whether u n i l a t e r a l or m u l t i l a t e r a l , t a c i t or e x p l i c i t , peacetime or war-t i m e — t o place r e s t r i c t i o n s upon m i l i t a r y forces or a c t i v i t i e s — i s much broader i n scope and may be considered to subsume a l l measures of "disarmament." "Arms control school", however, r e -f e r s to that body of commentators which has -shifted emphasis from general and complete disarmament to more modest (and hope-f u l l y , hence p r a c t i c a b l e ) arms l i m i t a t i o n s . "aggressive."^ The key c r i t e r i a seemed to be m o b i l i t y , protec-t i o n , and s t r i k i n g power, which, when "combined-to the highest degree," were "more nearly indispensable to the attack i n t a c -t i c s , strategy, and grand s t r a t e g y . n J "In t h e o r e t i c a l concep-t i o n , " wrote Marion Boggs, "...the defense disposes e s p e c i a l l y of s t r i k i n g power and protection, to a l e s s e r extent of m o b i l i -t y , while the offense possesses m o b i l i t y and s t r i k i n g power, and protec t i o n to a l e s s e r degree." The t h e s i s that weapons could be c l a s s i f i e d according to degree of innate "aggressiveness" met with considerable s k e p t i -cism, of course. I t would seem more correct to say that a given weapon or type of weapon might be employed e i t h e r o f f e n s i v e l y or defensively, as the most innocuous m i l i t a r y instrument (a metal s h i e l d , f o r example) could be used aggressively, or at l e a s t serve aggressive purposes. As Quincy Wright puts i t : "While the s h i e l d would o r d i n a r i l y be spoken of as defensive and the sword as offensive, i t i s c l e a r that even i n t h i s simple case the d i s -t i n c t i o n i s r e l a t i v e . The s h i e l d increases the offensive e f f e c -tiveness of the sword, and the sword can be used to parry as well as to cut or t h r u s t . " In s t r a t e g i c terms, defense on one f r o n t might be used to a i d and abet aggression on another f r o n t ; t h i s was one of the arguments of Prance at the Conference, f e a r -in g German designs upon her a l l i e s to the east. Indeed, the pre-c i s e determination of what constituted an "aggressive" weapon, * E.g. Hans Morgenthau: "Weapons are not aggressive or defensive by nature, but are made so by the purpose they serve." ( 8 ) B 10 -and which p a r t i c u l a r systems f e l l within that category, proved a major obstacle to the success of the Disarmament Conference. Not s u r p r i s i n g l y , perhaps, each p a r t i c i p a n t tended to downplay the "aggressive" c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of i t s own major weapons systems, while emphasizing those of i t s r i v a l s or p o t e n t i a l r i v a l s , i n what has been a p t l y described as the "tendency of t e c h n i c a l a r -q guments to fo l l o w the f l a g . " Despite the great p r a c t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s encountered i n applying t h i s " q u a l i t a t i v e p r i n c i p l e " of disarmament, as i t has been ca-lled, i n theory i t remains b a s i c a l l y sound. As Boggs points out, " i n the present stage of m i l i t a r y development, cer-t a i n weapons e x i s t without which aggressive p o l i c y cannot be 10 c a r r i e d to a r a p i d and p r o f i t a b l e conclusion." Again: " i t i s conceivable that there are c e r t a i n armaments which, even though capable of both offensive and defensive use, contribute more to the success of the attacking state than to the success of the defending state." 1" 1' "The problem," she states, " i s not to deter-mine the absolute character of a weapon, but to make a compari-son; to discover whether or not the offensive p o t e n t i a l i t i e s predominate, whether a weapon i s more useful i n attack or i n de-12 f e n s e . " ^ The preoccupation of the arms control community with s t r a -t e g i c s t a b i l i t y was also c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the post-World War II period. Again, e f f o r t s came to be devoted c h i e f l y to measures designed to reduce tensions and f o r e s t a l l the outbreak of war. A l l - o u t war between the Great Powers, i n the nuclear age, was considered highly u n l i k e l y ; a premeditated, s t r a t e g i c assault - 11 -by one nuclear Power upon another deemed p r a c t i c a l l y unthink-able. Nevertheless, i t was feared such a war might be i n i t i a t e d e i t h e r a c c i d e n t a l l y or, under c e r t a i n conditions, d e l i b e r a t e l y , i n one of the f o l l o w i n g ways: (1) i f an attacker could be rea-sonably sure of escaping r e t a l i a t i o n i n kind, or at l e a s t that measure of r e t a l i a t i o n out of a l l proportion to the conceivable gains to be had; (2) i f a state considered i t s e l f to be i n immi-nent danger of an a l l - o u t attack, and perceived an advantage i n s t r i k i n g f i r s t ("pre-empting"), so as to reduce i t s own damage and c a s u a l t i e s or blunt the attack altogether; or (3) as the r e -s u l t of mechanical or human f a i l u r e — f o r example, of a f a u l t y warning system, an accidental launch, or the actions of mad—or at l e a s t i r r a t i o n a l — m e n . A number of i n t e r n a t i o n a l accords have been reached with a view to reducing t h i s type of danger, although most such mea-s u r e s — s u c h as the protection of r e t a l i a t o r y f o r c e s , and improved command-and-control procedures—have been taken u n i l a t e r a l l y . The h o t - l i n e agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States was intended to help avert the accidental or "miscalcu-l a t e d " i n i t i a t i o n ofrya s t r a t e g i c exchange. The nuclear non-pro-l i f e r a t i o n t r e a t y — i n s o f a r as i t was motivated by the f e a r of c a t a l y t i c war, degraded command-and-control safeguards, and le s s - r e s p o n s i b l e decision-making—was a measure of t h i s type. A l l attempts to prevent l o c a l c o n f l i c t s from spreading and esca-l a t i n g into " c e n t r a l " ones also f a l l under t h i s category, of course, as do proposals f o r the "disengagement" of opposing f r o n t - l i n e forces i n p a r t i c u l a r l y tense areas of the world. - 12 -I t i s symptomatic of the ov e r r i d i n g concern with s t r a t e g i c s t a b i l i t y displayed by "arms c o n t r o l l e r s " since the mid - 1 9 5 0 's that one of the f i r s t subjects of i n t e r n a t i o n a l discussion a f t e r the shelving of early postwar plans f o r general and complete d i s -armament was "the prevention of surprise attack." This t o p i c became p a r t i c u l a r l y prominent a f t e r the advent of the ICBM, with i t s d r a s t i c a l l y - r e d u c e d warning time and v i r t u a l i n v i n c i b i l i t y once airborne. Suddenly i t became conceivable that an "aggress-or" might be capable of simultaneously wiping out a l l or most of h i s victim's s t r a t e g i c m i s s i l e s and bombers on the ground and thus, i n one l i g h t n i n g stroke, of v i r t u a l l y f o r c i n g i t s surrender. Given such a p o t e n t i a l , i t seemed, the danger of war breaking out was enhanced on at l e a s t three counts: (1) that of making an aggressive p o l i c y more f e a s i b l e and, hence, a t t r a c -t i v e ; (2) the necessity of automatic response to perceived attack (a "launch-on-warning" p o l i c y ) , which increased the chances of accident; and (3) the heightened d e s i r a b i l i t y of pre-empting a threatened attack, which likewise increased the chances of "miscalculation" by eithe r side and made major c r i -ses that much more unbearable and p o t e n t i a l l y explosive. Such considerations l e d France to propose the a b o l i t i o n of "guided m i s s i l e s " altogether. Less ambitious schemes c a l l e d f o r the s t a t i o n i n g of observers at launching s i t e s , to give added warning time; l i m i t a t i o n s on the numbers of m i s s i l e s permitted, to deprive them of a counterforee c a p a b i l i t y ; and a v a r i e t y of "passive" measures to protect the r e t a l i a t o r y forces of each side. In the end, m u l t i l a t e r a l e f f o r t s came to nought and - 13 -s t r a t e g i c s t a b i l i t y was temporarily preserved by u n i l a t e r a l actions. As the doctrine of "mutual deterrence" or "mutual assured destruction" became enshrined i n the s t r a t e g i c l e x i c o n during the 1 9 6 0 ' s , what had e a r l i e r been a question of "aggressive" and "defensive" armaments resolved i t s e l f into one of " f i r s t -s t r i k e " and "second-strike" c a p a b i l i t y . In a sense, the p r i n -c i p l e behind the d i s t i n c t i o n was the same: weapons systems of greater offensive than defensive u t i l i t y were inherently desta-b i l i z i n g , i n that they increased the chances of war. Thus unpro-tected i n t e r c o n t i n e n t a l b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s came to be considered "provocative" since, being highly vulnerable to attack themsel-ves, the only use to which they could l o g i c a l l y be put was as part of a f i r s t - s t r i k e ; while m i s s i l e s i n hardened s i l o s , or airborne bombers, or submarine-launched b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s were a l l capable of " r i d i n g out" a f i r s t - s t r i k e and i n f l i c t i n g s u f f i -c ient damage i n r e t a l i a t i o n to deter the p o t e n t i a l aggressor from attacking i n the f i r s t place. The avoidance of war being assumed to be i n the i n t e r e s t of a l l sides ( e s p e c i a l l y i n the nuclear age), the l i m i t a t i o n or a b o l i t i o n of " f i r s t - s t r i k e " weapons was viewed as a legitimate concern of arms control nego-t i a t i o n s . 1 ^ In another sense, of course, the t r a d i t i o n a l d i s t i n c t i o n between "o f f e n s i v e " and "defensive" had l o s t a l l meaning. For, once states had come to r e l y f o r s t r a t e g i c s t a b i l i t y upon a "balance of t e r r o r " (that i s , the mutual holding-hostage of c i v i l i a n populations), any attempt to l i m i t c i v i l i a n damage or - 14 -ca s u a l t i e s (by means of massive s h e l t e r programs or ABM's, f o r example) became di s r u p t i v e and undesirable, threatening aggres-sive intentions and i t s e l f subject to l i m i t a t i o n or p r o h i b i t i o n . Magnitude or Nature of Destructiveness Underlying a,ll of the mass movements f o r the "banning" of "the Bomb" since the dawn of the atomic age has been the r e a l i -z a t ion of the t e r r i b l e , unprecedented destructive power of the new weapons. Never before have men possessed the m i l i t a r y capa-b i l i t y of v i r t u a l l y a n n i h i l a t i n g t h e i r own kind. More than any-thin g else, i t i s t h i s f a c t which i s responsible f o r "disarma-ment" i t s e l f being considered at times p r a c t i c a l l y synonymous, i n the public's eye, with "nuclear disarmament." I t i s t h i s f a c t , too, which has impelled governments to expend the great-est amount of t h e i r arms control e f f o r t since World War I I upon the question of nuclear weapons alone. 1^ Hopes have been aroused that t h e i r task might be made easier by v i r t u e of the great disproportion between the destruc-t i v e power of the weapons and the p r a c t i c a l uses to which they might be put. ; Nuclear powers have a common i n t e r e s t i n avoiding t h e i r use so long as the threatened destruction exceeds beyond • an a l l measure the conceivable gains to be had. I r o n i c a l l y , then, * See, f o r example, Louis J.Halle, who writes: "The development of the instruments of war beyond the point where they have any p o l i t i c a l u t i l i t y or f e a s i b i l i t y i n a c t i v e use must cer-t a i n l y be regarded as a permanent f a c t o r tending to deprive the r e s o r t to general war of i t s former legitimacy." (15) And, i t might be added, tending to increase support f o r t h e i r a b o l i t i o n or l i m i t a t i o n . ** In Donald Brennan's words, " i t would seem that each side i s l i k e l y to be able to i n f l i c t f a r more damage on the (cont.) - 15 -t h e i r overwhelming power may render them p r a c t i c a l l y obsolete as instruments of diplomacy; c e r t a i n l y of warfare. At the same time, however, i t enhances both t h e i r u t i l i t y as weapons of l a s t r e s o r t , the threatened use of which might appear c r e d i b l e i n the d i r e s t of circumstances; and t h e i r status as weapons of p r e s t i g e , a kind of passport to greatness i n the modern world. Even schemes of l e s s than complete nuclear disarmament have been r a t i o n a l i z e d on the grounds of reducing the extent of the destruction accompanying a possible war. 1^ I f nuclear war i s to come, i t has been argued, one can at l e a s t hope that i t w i l l be l i m i t e d , by r e s t r i c t i o n s on the absolute s i z e of the a v a i l a b l e arsenals, i f by no other means. The u n i v e r s a l abhorrence of nuclear weapons owes a good deal as w e l l , however, to the q u a l i t a t i v e nature of the poten-t i a l destruction, as i l l u s t r a t e d so g r a p h i c a l l y i n the ruins of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, f o r example. In p a r t i c u l a r , the immediate and long-run e f f e c t s of excessive r a d i a t i o n exposure are c o n s i -dered i n t o l e r a b l e byproducts of war by the world community. Indeed, the use of nuclear weapons v i o l a t e s almost every precept r e l a t i n g to armaments which has been enshrined i n the "laws of war." T r a d i t i o n a l l y , i n the words of one author, i t has been "a fundamental p r i n c i p l e . . . t h a t the choice of means of i n -17 j u r i n g an enemy i s not unlimited." R e s t r i c t i o n s have been l a i d down i n two cognate areas: against "inhumane" weapons, those (cont.) other i n a general war than e i t h e r would f i n d at a l l j u s t i f i e d by the o r i g i n a l objectives of the c o n f l i c t , whichever side suffered the greater absolute damage." (18) - 16 -which cause i n j u r i e s superfluous to the m i l i t a r y necessity of rendering an opponent hors de combat (that i s , which cause "un-necessary s u f f e r i n g " ) ; and against the indiscriminate use of weapons on combatants and non-combatants a l i k e . On both counts, nuclear weapons must be classed among the greatest of offenders. It was the concern f o r the "inhumanity" of the wea.pon which l e d to the p r o h i b i t i o n of dumdum b u l l e t s by the Hague Con-ference of I899, and which was at l e a s t p a r t l y responsible f o r the 1925 Geneva Protocol and subsequent e f f o r t s to r e s t r i c t chemical and b i o l o g i c a l (or b a c t e r i o l o g i c a l ) warfare. More r e -cently, weapons of excessive firepower, chemical sprays, "area weapons," delayed-action fuses, and the l i k e have been i d e n t i -f i e d as p a r t i c u l a r l y " i n d i s c r i m i n a t e ; " and napalm, white phos-phorus and other incendiary weapons, hypervelocity r i f l e s and anti-personnel bombs as e s p e c i a l l y "inhumane," instruments of 19 warfare. Napalm and other incendiary weapons were singled out i n an October 1972 report of the U.N. Secretary-General because of the intense painfulness of i n j u r i e s caused by them, the so-p h i s t i c a t e d medical resources demanded f o r t h e i r proper t r e a t -ment, the lengthy period of recovery required f o r survivors, and the high p r o b a b i l i t y of permanent deformity, as well as 20 various t o x i c and asphyxiating s i d e - e f f e c t s . In i t s words: "when judged against what i s required to put a s o l d i e r out of m i l i t a r y a c t i o n , much of the i n j u r y caused by incendiary wea-21 p o n s , i s . . . l i k e l y to be superfluous." Not a l l of the common objections on humanitarian grounds are completely, l o g i c a l , of course. I t i s not c e r t a i n that, - 17 -given the choice between being vaporized by a nuclear explosion and dying a slow death of "normal" b u l l e t wounds, the r a t i o n a l man would opt f o r the l a t t e r . In p a r t i c u l a r , tear gas and other non-lethal chemical agents have been defended as more humane than more conventional weapons, although they f a l l under the same ru b r i c as dreaded CBW weapons i n the popular mind. A t h i r d c r i t e r i o n f o r p r o h i b i t i o n which has been suggested i n recent years i s an " e c o l o g i c a l " one: that of the damage i n -- 22 f l i c t e d upon the n a t u r a l environment. Concern about t h i s issue has been spurred by the massive use of chemical d e f o l i a n t s i n Indochina, as well as by the heightened public consciousness of ec o l o g i c a l problems generally. A somewhat r e l a t e d f a c t o r i s what might be termed the "harmful s i d e - e f f e c t s " associated with the "deployment" of a given "system." This was p a r t i c u l a r l y sa-l i e n t i n the case of atmospheric nuclear t e s t i n g , where public concern about radia,tion l e v e l s and possible genetic damage pro-vided much of the impetus f o r contr o l s . I t also a p p l i e s , with reference to possible r a d i a t i o n leakage or accidental detona-t i o n , to the introduction of nuclear weapons into any new envi-ronment; or to any a c t i v i t i e s i n t e r f e r i n g with other, non-mili-t a r y , uses of an area (such as the expropriation of vast expanses of the open ocean f o r m i s s i l e f i r i n g ranges or naval maneuvers, f o r example). Monetary Cost According to Hedley B u l l , pure economics i s "the most an-cient and the most simple of the arguments f o r disarmament," - 18 -as well as being the most important motivation f o r attempts at arms con t r o l p r i o r to World War I. J Quincy Wright, i n h i s monu-mental Study of War, noted that "Disarmament movements have been common a,fter great wars when countries were nearly bankrupt and 24 wished to save money," H He a t t r i b u t e s the c a l l i n g of the 1899 Hague Peace Conference by Czar Nicholas I I to the l a t t e r * s being "advised by h i s minister of finance that h i s exchequer could not stand the s t r a i n of maintaining competition with Ger-25 many i n making r a p i d - f i r e f i e l d a r t i l l e r y . " J Of more recent vintage, the s e r i e s of naval l i m i t a t i o n s negotiated during the inter-war period has been a t t r i b u t e d i n part to the u n w i l l i n g -ness of key p a r t i e s , f o r economic reasons, to pursue an arms 26 race. And c l e a r l y , many of the l e s s important si g n a t o r i e s of the N o n - P r o l i f e r a t i o n Treaty were at l e a s t p a r t l y motivated by the r e a l i z a t i o n that the cost involved i n an independent nuclear c a p a b i l i t y was simply beyond t h e i r means. As B u l l points out, a l l weapons procurement decisions are constrained by economic f a c t o r s , i n s p i t e of the importance of m i l i t a r y s e c u r i t y to the nation and the general p r i o r i t y accor-27 ded defence over "opulence." Even f o r superpowers l i k e the U.S. and the Soviet Union, c e r t a i n measures, such as a t r u l y e f f e c t i v e c i v i l defence system, while perhaps within the realm of t e c h n i c a l f e a s i b i l i t y , are rul e d out p a r t l y on account of t h e i r p r o h i b i t i v e cost ( a l s o , of course, i n the example given, because of i t s e f f e c t s upon the q u a l i t y of day-to-day l i f e ) , l e s s e r powers are s i m i l a r l y denied the p r i v i l e g e even of only competing with the world's armament leaders. - 19 -At the same time, many authors warn against the f a l s e hope that a reduction i n m i l i t a r y expenditures w i l l n e c e s s a r i l y ac-company the conclusion of arms control agreements, p o i n t i n g out that v e r i f i c a t i o n procedures (as i n the case of nuclear t e s t i n g , f o r example) may well prove as c o s t l y as the system or a c t i v i t y p r o h i b i t e d — i n addition to what has been described as "the i r o n law that every organization s t r i v e s to maintain or increase i t s budget." 2 8 P o l i t i c o - M i l i t a r y U t i l i t y / R e l i a b i l i t y Sometimes arguments against a m i l i t a r y authorization on the grounds of economy succeed only when buttressed by a d d i t i o n a l doubts concerning the u t i l i t y and/or r e l i a b i l i t y of whatever i s being proposed. In other cases, doubts about the u t i l i t y of forces i n being alone may s u f f i c e to engender a willingness to discuss t h e i r mutual l i m i t a t i o n — a s with various past proposals f o r the r e c i p r o c a l "bonfire" destruction of obsolescent weapons, 29 f o r example. The s i g n i f i c a n c e of almost every successful disarmament measure has been a s s a i l e d on the grounds that whatever was pro-h i b i t e d e i t h e r had ceased to be m i l i t a r i l y u s e f u l or had never been considered so. Thus i t i s claimed by some that states have generally r e f r a i n e d from using poison gas mainly because of the t a c t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s involved i n i t s use i n support of m i l i t a r y operations, rather than through any e t h i c a l or l e g a l i n h i b i -tions.-^ 0 The p a r t i a l nuclear t e s t ban t r e a t y was greeted by the Chinese and others with the conviction that atmospheric t e s t i n g - 20 -had ceased to he of great importance to the powers concerned; or at the very l e a s t could, without much d i f f i c u l t y , he ade-quately substituted by underground explosions. I t was possible to agree on reducing b a t t l e s h i p strength at the Washington Con-ference of 1922, asserts Hans Morgenthau, because m i l i t a r y ex-perts had come to the conclusion that the future l a y with l i g h -32 t e r and speedier ships. The sponsors of the Non-Proliferation Treaty had no i n t e n t i o n of f r e e l y disseminating nuclear weapons, point out the c r i t i c s . A n t a r c t i c a was never considered p a r t i c u -l a r l y s t r a t e g i c or environmentally hospitable to m i l i t a r y a c t i -v i t i e s . The Seabed Denuclearization Treaty i s described as being "equivalent to one p r o h i b i t i n g the b o l t i n g of aeroplanes to the ground." ^ And so on. A c t u a l l y , the " d e s i r a b i l i t y " of a given system i s based on a rather complex calculus of cost, r e l i a b i l i t y , the existence of functionally-comparable systems, bureaucratic i n t e r e s t s , and so f o r t h , which defies a l l attempts at precise measurement of the e f f e c t or s i g n i f i c a n c e of a control arrangement. In many cases " m i l i t a r y u t i l i t y , " s t r i c t l y defined, has l i t t l e bearing on the f i n a l decision whether or not to proceed with a programme or deploy a system (the American ABM system being a c l a s s i c exam-p l e ) . ^ Conversely, a negotiated l i m i t a t i o n may well prove meaningful even i n the absence of any evidence of such " u t i l i -t y . " F i n a l l y , a weapons system or given configuration of forces * For a persuasive argument i n defence of such t r e a t i e s , see Hedley B u l l (1970), pp. 149-150, 152. - 21 -can be p o l i t i c a l l y advantageous—in terms of "status" or d i p l o -matic i n f l u e n c e — e v e n without being, i n the s t r i c t e s t sense, m i l i t a r i l y u s e f u l . Looking at the f i e l d of disarmament as a whole, i t goes almost without saying that ( i n i t s broadest sense) the " p o l i t i c a l " u t i l i t y of weapons or of armed forces — i n a system of i n t e r n a t i o n a l "anarchy," marked by sharp con-f l i c t s , i n which "national s e c u r i t y " may be a r e l a t i v e l y scarce commodity—constitutes a prime ( i f not the primary) obstacle to any contr o l s . Thus the general s u s c e p t i b i l i t y of a weapon or a c t i v i t y to i n t e r n a t i o n a l regulation may s a f e l y be sai d to vary i n inverse proportion with i t s p o l i t i c o - m i l i t a r y u t i l i t y . S u s c e p t i b i l i t y to V e r i f i c a t i o n Perhaps no aspect of arms control has been more exhaustive-l y canvassed i n the postwar l i t e r a t u r e than the t e c h n i c a l f e a s i -b i l i t y of v e r i f y i n g compliance with various kinds of measures. The v e r i f i c a t i o n problem seems to have come almost f u l l c i r c l e since the naval conferences of the 1920's and 1930*s. Then, i t has been pointed out, there was v i r t u a l l y no problem at a l l : whether or not a b a t t l e s h i p was under construction,,for example, could be v e r i f i e d e a s i l y enough through t r a d i t i o n a l i n t e l l i g e n c e means; furthermore, the injured party would have a s u f f i c i e n t l y long time to recover before any r e a l damage had been done; and a few more ships on one side or the other was not l i k e l y to a l t e r the balance of power d r a s t i c a l l y i n any case. Nuclear weapons were something e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t , however: small enough to make the task of detection highly problematic; and powerful - 22 -enough that a very few could quite p o s s i b l y upset the global 35 balance. For many years East-West disarmament negotiations were ham-strung on the question of v e r i f y i n g compliance with the p r o h i -b i t i o n of nuclear weapons, each side f e a r i n g that the other would maintain a secret s t o c k p i l e i n reserve, i f only f o r " i n -surance" purposes.Similarly, the Soviet Union's I960 proposal to eliminate a l l s t r a t e g i c d e l i v e r y v e h i c l e s - ^ was opposed on the grounds that i t would not be possible to prevent c i v i l a i r -c r a f t from being c o v e r t l y converted into nuclear bombers. Re-cently, however, the remarkable c a p a b i l i t i e s of s a t e l l i t e r e -connaissance have greatly s i m p l i f i e d the task of v e r i f y i n g most kinds of arms control agreements. In most cases, v e r i f i c a t i o n need not be completely foolproof; al.1 that i s required i s the c a p a b i l i t y of detecting a m i l i t a r i l y - s i g n i f i c a n t program of whatever kind. Before entering into an agreement, the p a r t i e s concerned must examine: the t e c h n i c a l f e a s i b i l i t y of evasion; the degree to which i t might a f f e c t the m i l i t a r y balance, and whether i r r e p a r a b l y or f o r how long; and the i n t e r e s t s i n and propensity towards evasion of the other p a r t i e s , taking into account the l i k e l y penalties of such an a c t i o n — a l l of these estimates subject to an unpredictable degree of misperception which causes them h a b i t u a l l y to be cal c u l a t e d on the basis of the "worst possi b l e case." The t e c h n i c a l f e a s i b i l i t y of v e r i f y i n g an agreement i s not always as c r u c i a l a matter as i t i s sometimes made out to be, of course. I t did not prove s u f f i c i e n t to block achievement - 23 -of a ban on b a c t e r i o l o g i c a l weapons, f o r example, i n s p i t e of the manifest i m p o s s i b i l i t y of v e r i f y i n g either t h e i r production and storage or the destruction of e x i s t i n g stocks. Here, as per-haps i n the case of poison gas, i t may be the fea.r of r e c i p r o c a l use (given widespread p o t e n t i a l c a p a b i l i t i e s ) — t o g e t h e r with i t s 37 questionable m i l i t a r y u t i l i t y — w h i c h are the deciding f a c t o r s . This merely i l l u s t r a t e s the general point that mutual s e l f -i n t e r e s t i n r e s t r a i n t may under c e r t a i n circumstances serve to obviate the need f o r rigorous v e r i f i c a t i o n . I I . CHARACTERISTICS OF THE STRATEGIC LANDSCAPE. D i s t r i b u t i o n of C a p a b i l i t i e s Among States Probably the most important of the f a c t o r s f a l l i n g within the " s t r a t e g i c landscape" category i s the d i s t r i b u t i o n of capa-b i l i t i e s , or the existence of d i s p a r i t i e s i n power and/or tech-n i c a l expertise, among states. How i s i t possible to r e c o n c i l e the i n t e r e s t s of the most powerful and advanced with those of the l e a s t ? Or i s i t r e a l l y necessary? The r e l a t i o n s h i p of forces between any two states, i n ge-ne r a l or with respect to a p a r t i c u l a r type of m i l i t a r y system, may be expressed i n one of the fo l l o w i n g ways: (K) unassailable predominance of one side over the other, i n which case the pos-s i b i l i t y of competition i s so s l i g h t that i t poses no obstacle to arms con t r o l agreements; (2) temporary s u p e r i o r i t y of one side over the other, conducive to sharp competition with i t s attendant problems f o r arms co n t r o l ; and (3) approximate p a r i t y - 24 -between the two sides, also conducive to "arms racing" but at the same time providing greater opportunities f o r regulation. "Unassailable predominance" and "temporary s u p e r i o r i t y " are here considered as functions of the subjective impressions of the " i n f e r i o r " side as to i t s middle- or long-run c a p a b i l i t i e s v i s -a-vis i t s r i v a l . Of course, the r e l a t i o n s h i p of m i l i t a r y forces i s by i t -s e l f no sure guide to a state's behaviour, being tempered above a l l by p o l i t i c a l conditions, both domestic and external.. Never-th e l e s s , other things being equal, i t may play an important r o l e i n determining the a c c e p t a b i l i t y of proposed l i m i t a t i o n s to the p a r t i e s concerned. The chief problem i n a s i t u a t i o n of "unassailable predomi-nance" i s undoubtedly the lack of incentive on the part of the dominant power to r i s k jeopardizing (or i n f a c t abdicate) i t s favourable p o s i t i o n , unless there are compensatory benefits to be obtained i n other areas. Where temporary s u p e r i o r i t y i s the case, the leading power i s usually driven to maintain i t s lead, while i t s adversary s t r i v e s to equal or surpass i t . P a r i t y may lead to a s i m i l a r competition, e s p e c i a l l y i f one side or the other i s u n s a t i s f i e d with the p o l i t i c a l status quo, but i s by i t s very nature more p o l i t i c a l l y acceptable, as a state of per-manent i n f e r i o r i t y i s l i k e l y to be l e s s defensible f o r one side than the decline from s u p e r i o r i t y to p a r i t y i s f o r the other. P a r i t y of forces i s assumed conducive to arms control also on account of i t s presumed connection with a stable "balance of power," which, by reducing the threat of war, may improve the - 2 5 -p o l i t i c a l climate f o r such negotiations. F i n a l l y , the formerly superior side may he more i n c l i n e d to make concessions by the threat of a renewed arms race, while the formerly i n f e r i o r ceases to be motivated by the fear of negotiating from a p o s i -t i o n of weakness. When dealing with nuclear arsenals of the vastness of those of the Superpowers, of course, the concepts of "superior-i t y " and " i n f e r i o r i t y , " as with those of "offensive" and "de-f e n s i v e , " lose much of t h e i r meaning. Deterrent value or second-strike c a p a b i l i t y , as previously mentioned, becomes more c r i t i c a l than sheer numbers of weapons. There comes a point at which any f u r t h e r increment i n "strength" i s p r a c t i -c a l l y useless, except perha.ps f o r psychological purposes, de-s t r u c t i v e capacity beyond t h i s point being popularly dubbed as " o v e r k i l l . " A Power which has achieved such a "minimal deter-rent" has i n e f f e c t achieved p a r i t y with i t s r i v a l s , i n s p i t e of any discrepancies i n absolute numbers of weapons. I t has been suggested that, i n the case of China f o r example, the a t -tainment of such a c a p a b i l i t y might be s u f f i c i e n t to induce i t s 39* entry i n t o serious arms control negotiations. Where t e c h n i c a l s k i l l s and c a p a b i l i t i e s are widely scat-tered throughout the world, i t i s n a t u r a l l y more d i f f i c u l t to * The same may have been true f o r the Soviet Union. Walter C. Clemens notes that " A l l the U.S.-Soviet accords since 1 9 5 8 (the moratorium on nuclear testing) have been concluded against a backdrop of mutual deterrence, even though Soviet s t r a t e g i c forces have generally been weaker than American. The f i r s t promising moves toward arms control took place i n 1 9 5 5 , i . e . , at the very moment the USSR f i r s t acquired num-bers of long-range bombers capable of d e l i v e r i n g nuclear weapons to the United States, thereby g i v i n g the USSR (cont.) - 26 -achieve agreement on control measures, the chances of the l a t t e r varying perhaps d i r e c t l y ( i n inverse proportion) with the number of p a r t i e s whose i n t e r e s t s must "be taken into account and adber-ence gained. I t i s t h i s simple p r i n c i p l e which l i e s behind the oft-expressed f e a r that f u r t h e r p r o l i f e r a t i o n of nuclear weapons w i l l destroy whatever chances of control presently e x i s t . Fur-thermore, when desired' t h i r d - p a r t y adherence cannot be gained, the negotiation of agreements i s l i k e l y to be both more compli-cated and l e s s productive, as the p o s s i b i l i t y of outside forces upsetting an agreed balance i n an unpredictable fashion at some point i n the future must be taken into account, as well as the danger posed independently by these forces to eithe r one of the o r i g i n a l p a r t i e s . Several other " s t r a t e g i c landsca/pe" f a c t o r s may be b r i e f l y mentioned, among them the existence and r e l a t i v e costs of func- tionally-comparable systems. This i s intimately connected with the " m i l i t a r y u t i l i t y " f a c t o r previously discussed, and more or l e s s speaks f o r i t s e l f . Where a p a r t i c u l a r m i l i t a r y system, pro-posed or i n being, has a f u n c t i o n a l counterpart whose cost com-pares not unfavourably with, i t s own (taking into account such " p o l i t i c a l costs" as pu b l i c opinion and the autonomous "momentum" (cont.) f o r the f i r s t time a t e r r o r weapon to deter external attack." (40) * Cf. W.K.H.Panofsky: "the surest way to f r u s t r a t e the progress of arms control negotiations i s to invoke an excessive amount of 'linkage' and to involve an excessive number of conferees. In f a c t 'linkage' or an overly large forum have at times been demanded by p a r t i c i p a n t s i n arms control negotiations i n order d e l i b e r a t e l y to i n h i b i t progress without overtly assuming the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r doing so." (41.) - 27 -towards arms c o n t r o l ) , then i t i s , quite simply, more l i k e l y to be made the subject of i n t e r n a t i o n a l regulation. Thus atmos-pheric nuclear t e s t s were done away with, without too much sac-r i f i c e on the part of those conducting them, because of the f e a s i b i l i t y and c a p a b i l i t i e s of underground t e s t i n g . And the considerable p o t e n t i a l s t r a t e g i c advantages of seabed m i s s i l e s proved no obstacle to agreement on t h e i r p r o h i b i t i o n , i n view of the cognate advantages of SLBM's. Some would argue that f i x e d land-based ICBM's should be comprehended under the same p r i n -c i p l e and made to s u f f e r a s i m i l a r f a t e , but, f o r a number of reasons ( p r i m a r i l y the bureaucratic i n t e r e s t s of the services involved), such has not proved to be the case. The rate of technological development i s another s t r a t e g i c "environmental" f a c t o r worth mentioning, which f i g u r e s promi-nently m numerous analyses of the prospects of arms control.. A point sometimes made i s that where technology i s r a p i d l y changing, i t becomes more d i f f i c u l t to "accurately assess the r e l a t i v e power" of weapons^ 2 and thus to c a l c u l a t e on the basis of approximate p a r i t y . Perhaps more importantly, agreements i n one area ma.y be s e r i o u s l y undermined by new technological inno-vations i n the same or a cognate area. In any case, the major problem i s undoubtedly the general f e e l i n g of uncertainty * Thus Hedley B u l l devotes an. entire chapter to "The Problem of Continuous Innovation" i n h i s Control of the Arms Race, f o r example. About the only disse n t i n g view on the s i g n i f i -cance of t h i s f a c t o r i s that of C o l i n Gray, who argues: "The record of the interwar years would seem to demonstrate that arms control tends to be subverted by p o l i t i c s rather than by technology. New technological p o s s i b i l i t i e s w i l l induce weapon designers to improve upon the state of the a r t , but — g i v e n the p o l i t i c a l w i l l — a s p e c i a l or a regular (cont.) - 28 -generated, which exacerbates the tendency to "worst-possible-case" t h e o r i z i n g and tends to i n h i b i t any kind of agreement.^ Another problem, d i s t i n c t from the rate of technological development though not e n t i r e l y unrelated, i s represented by what might be c a l l e d the asymmetries i n opposing f o r c e - s t r u c - tures and s t r a t e g i e s . As Hans Morgenthau points out, once d i s -arming Powers have agreed on a c e r t a i n o v e r a l l r e l a t i o n s h i p of f o r c e s , there remains the d i f f i c u l t task of formulating "stan-dards to be attained according to which d i f f e r e n t types and quantities of armaments are to be a l l o c a t e d to d i f f e r e n t nations within the agreed r a t i o . " ^ How can one po s s i b l y compare b a t t l e -ships with submarines? m i s s i l e s with i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n s ? or r e -serves with regular forces? The p r o l i f e r a t i o n of disparate types of weapons systems (and s t r a t e g i e s , too, which complicates matters s t i l l f u r t h e r ) tends to be aggravated by r a p i d techno-l o g i c a l development, of course, but the basic problem owes more to the simple f a c t of d i f f e r i n g geographical p o s i t i o n s , resour-- 45 ces, and defensive needs. The attendant d i f f i c u l t y of measur-ing and comparing f o r c e - l e v e l s has plagued many negotiations, from the World Disarmament Conference of the 1930*s to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions t a l k s of the 1970's. I t has even l e d to suggestions that as a f i r s t step towards d i s -armament, the major Powers might consider standardizing t h e i r s t r a t e g i c forces to the point where meaningful comparisons (cont.) reconvening of an arms-control conference should be able to accommodate new weapon p o t e n t i a l s . " (46) This f a i l s to address i t s e l f to the fundamental, underlying problem of uncertainty, however. could be made.'*1 Overall d i s p a r i t i e s i n the cost-effectiveness of defense  and offense are also an important part of the arms con t r o l en-vironment. When the offense i s supreme, as has apparently been the case since the dawn of the m i s s i l e age, concern over vulner-a b i l i t y to attack may spur e f f o r t s a/fc i n t e r n a t i o n a l regulation with greater force than under other circumstances. Further, the recent apparent acceptance of mutual second-strike c a p a b i l i t y by the Superpowers—which may f u r t h e r the i n t e r e s t s of arms l i -mitation by promoting the concept of " f i n i t e d e t e r r e n c e " — i s undoubtedly p a r t l y , i f not p r i m a r i l y , a r e s u l t of the t e c h n i c a l obstacles to a successful f i r s t s t r i k e ( i n v o l v i n g n e u t r a l i z a -t i o n of the opponent's r e t a l i a t o r y f o r c e s ) . And the ease with which defensive m i s s i l e systems could be "saturated" by much cheaper offensive m i s s i l e s contributes to the willingness of states to preclude the former by mutual agreement. F i n a l l y , the structure of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system, i n terms of the general d i s t r i b u t i o n of power and influence, may bear upon the prospects of arms c o n t r o l . I t i s d i f f i c u l t to say, however, which of the most commonly c i t e d types of i n t e r n a t i o n a l systems are most conducive to i t . In h i s balance-of-power model Morton Kaplan stresses, among other things, the l i m i t e d objec-t i v e s of war and the u n i v e r s a l a p p l i c a t i o n of the rules-of-war, - A R which, suggest h i g h l y f e r t i l e grounds f o r arms c o n t r o l . Fur-thermore, the absence of deep i d e o l o g i c a l cleavages might be presumed to m i l i t a t e i n favour of agreement. On the other hand, 49 the f a c t that a l l i a n c e s are constantly s h i f t i n g lends a - 30 -c e r t a i n amount of i n s t a b i l i t y to the p i c t u r e which might p r e j u -dice attempts to e x p l i c i t l y define and i n s t i t u t e , or ensure the continuance of, given power balances. Operation of the so-50 c a l l e d "unseen hand" might, of course, obviate e n t i r e l y the need f o r e x p l i c i t agreements. 51 Under the "loose b i p o l a r " system as posited by Kaplan , wars would ( i n the absence of the threat of a nuclear c o n f l a -gration) tend to be unlimited, with t o t a l elimination of the r i -v a l bloc the ultimate goal rather than preservation of the sys-tem. While i d e o l o g i c a l antagonism might f u r t h e r hinder n e g o t i -ations, however, the f a c t that the major m i l i t a r y powers had coalesced into just two blocs might s i m p l i f y matters consider-ably, depending of course on the degree of "looseness" of the system. And the r e l a t i v e l y strong presence of a supranational actor, together with a number of mediating states (however m i l i t a r i l y i n s i g n i f i c a n t ) , might provide the necessary impetus towards c o n t r o l . I t i s rather p o i n t l e s s to speculate on the tendencies of universal and h i e r a r c h i c a l systems, as the primary actor i n both cases would by d e f i n i t i o n be able to impose v i r t u a l l y anything i t desired on the system as a whole. Insofar as the l a t t e r i s characterized by a notable absence of c o n f l i c t , of course, arms control arrangements (imposed from above) would seem to be a l o g i c a l concomitant. I I I . CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT. In discussing the p o l i t i c a l f a c t o r s a f f e c t i n g arms control - 31 -we should d i s t i n g u i s h between the i n t e r - s t a t e and the domestic arenas; between those p o l i t i c a l conditions within a state which cause i t to seek negotiations, and those between states which permit the successful conclusion of i n t e r n a t i o n a l agreements. International Relations The c r i t i c a l nature of external p o l i t i c a l conditions i s attested to by a l l writers on arms c o n t r o l . Some, however, i n -s i s t on the absolute u n a t t a i n a b i l i t y of meaningful agreements i n the face of continued h o s t i l i t y between the p a r t i e s concerned , while others take a more sanguine view and maintain that such agreements can be reached i n s p i t e of underlying p o l i t i c a l an-tagonism. The argument of the f i r s t group i s s e r i o u s l y under-mined i f taken to i t s l o g i c a l conclusion, since, were perfect peace and harmony to reign among men, there simply would be no need whatsoever f o r e x p l i c i t agreements; what they seem to be implying, then, i s that meaningful arms control per se i s but a chimera. Most authors agree, however, that such i s not the case. I t has even been pointed out that a c e r t a i n amount of po-l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t i s indispensable f o r a s i t u a t i o n to a r i s e i n which arms control i s deemed necessary and p r i o r i t y duly accor-ded i t . Without politica.1 c o n f l i c t , presumably, there would * In Hedley B u l l ' s words: "unless the p o l i t i c a l conditions f o r arms con t r o l are present, the question of what method or procedure i s appropriate i n arms con t r o l negotiations, and the question how the t e c h n i c a l problems involved i n arms cont r o l can be solved, are of minor importance, and attempts to solve them i n abstraction from p o l i t i c a l circumstances are of no s i g n i f i c a n c e . " (53) ** See, f o r example, Hans Morgenthau: " p o l i t i c a l settlement must precede disarmament. Without p o l i t i c a l settlement, disarmament has no chance f o r success." (54) - 32 -"be no arms; and without arms, c e r t a i n l y no arms c o n t r o l . At ano-ther l e v e l , a near-holocaust or disastrous clash of arms may he h e l p f u l i n providing the necessary stimulus to serious negotia-t i o n s , as the F i r s t World War may he sai d to have l a i d the groundwork f o r the spate of inter-war conferences or the Cuban M i s s i l e C r i s i s f o r the Soviet-American accords of the 1960*s and '70's. 5 5 At the same time, i t must be admitted that many of the problems commonly deemed " t e c h n i c a l " do i n f a c t stem from under-l y i n g p o l i t i c a l disagreement or h o s t i l i t y , and are more suscep-t i b l e to negotiation and compromise than to s c i e n t i f i c formu-l a e . Since no v e r i f i c a t i o n scheme can be 100% accurate, an e l e -ment of t r u s t must i n e v i t a b l y enter into any control arrange-ment. And " t r u s t " i s pre-eminently a " p o l i t i c a l " f a c t o r i n the world of nations. What we are p r i m a r i l y concerned with, then, i s the degree  of t r u s t or h o s t i l i t y c h a r a c t e r i z i n g the general r e l a t i o n s h i p  between the states involved, which, i n turn depends on the e x i s -tence, strength, and character of outstanding c o n f l i c t s between them, as well as a host of other considerations ranging from * Cf. Hedley B u l l : "The problems of d e f i n i t i o n (what i s an e f -f e c t i v e ? what a m i l i t a r y aeroplane, hea,vy gun, tank? etc.) are not i n f a c t t e c h n i c a l problems, but matters of bargain-ing. In other words, what the negotiators have to agree on i n considering, f o r example, the l i m i t a t i o n of tanks, i s not what i s a tank, but what they can agree to c a l l a tank. This i s a p o l i t i c a l question, not a t e c h n i c a l one." (56) ** Cf. Walter Clemens: "Though arms control accords are held to depend upon mutual i n t e r e s t f o r t h e i r d u r a b i l i t y , even the act of entering into the n e g o t i a t i n g process requires a modicum of t r u s t on each side." (57} - 33 h i s t o r i c a l antagonism to sheer racism. Where the necessary con-d i t i o n s are l a c k i n g , pressure and/or guarantees from an outside agency or agencies, such as the U.N., the non-aligned "bloc, or ( i n the case of regional c o n f l i c t s ) the Superpowers, f o r exam-ple , may "be required. The relevant f a c t o r s here are the suscep- t i b i l i t y of the p a r t i e s to outside pressure and the f e a s i b i l i t y  of outside guarantees. The l a t t e r f a c t o r depends on the capabi-l i t y and willingness of such outside actors to impose a s o l u t i o n upon the protagonists, i f necessary, or to compensate f o r any upsetting of the agreed arrangements. I t should not be assumed5 that the world's greatest Powers n e c e s s a r i l y remain immune to the influence of the f i r s t f a c t o r , which may take, the form, f o r example, of "world p u b l i c opinion" favouring broad measures of disarmament. On the other hand, the concern of a l l i e s over the • continued v i a b i l i t y of guarantees extended them by the p r i n c i -pal p a r t i e s may adversely a f f e c t the p o s s i b i l i t y of agreed l i -mitations between the l a t t e r , depending, among other things, on t h e i r w i llingness to subordinate t h e i r own i n t e r e s t s to those of t h e i r c l i e n t - s t a t e s . A f i n a l important c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the external p o l i t i c a l environment i s the existence of issues upon which " t r a d e - o f f s "  from other areas of negotiation may be f e a s i b l e — e s p e c i a l l y i n cases where outside pressure i n favour of l i m i t a t i o n s i s e i t h e r non-existent or i n e f f e c t i v e . Such issues must be both r e l a t i v e l y important (roughly comparable to those of the arms p o l i c y under consideration) and, of course, "negotiable." As few other na-t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s are as great as those of defence p o l i c y , - 34 -however, i t might he postulated that such trade-offs may he possible only with respect to the l e s s s i g n i f i c a n t measures of arms c o n t r o l . In any case, t h i s f a c t o r would seem to assume a f a i r l y broad r e l a t i o n s h i p of i n t e r a c t i o n between the p a r t i e s concerned. Asymmetry i n Negotiating Styles A subdivision of the " p o l i t i c a l environment" category groups those f a c t o r s r e l a t i n g to the actual conduct of n e g o t i -ations which may have a bearing on t h e i r ultimate success. In t h i s regard, arms control negotiations are no d i f f e r e n t than those undertaken i n any other issue-area, success r e q u i r i n g a c e r t a i n amount of t e c h n i c a l preparation, diplomatic s k i l l , "good f a i t h , " and so on. One p a r t i c u l a r f a c t o r which should be mentioned, however, having received much emphasis i n the l i t e r a -ture c r i t i c a l of SALT I, i s the possible asymmetry i n the nego- t i a t i n g s t y l e s of the p a r t i c i p a n t s i n arms control t a l k s . I f one side adopts a p r i m a r i l y p o l i t i c a l / c o m p e t i t i v e / b a r g a i n i n g -type stance, while the other focuses e x c l u s i v e l y on t e c h n i c a l issues (to take an extreme example), then the r e s u l t i n g d i a - logue des sourds may be t o t a l l y unproductive (as was apparently the case with the Surprise Attack Conference of 1958) or, a l -t e r n a t i v e l y , the consequent asymmetries embodied i n the f i n a l accord may prove more p r e j u d i c i a l to the o r i g i n a l purposes of the negotiations than would the f a i l u r e to have reached an agreement at a l l . - 35 -Asymmetry i n Domestic P o l i t i c a l Regime Yet another "asymmetry" f a c t o r i s t h a t d e a l i n g with the na-t u r e of the domestic p o l i t i c a l regime of the n a t i o n s i n v o l v e d . The argument has been made t h a t democratic s t a t e s , by v i r t u e of t h e i r g r e a t e r responsiveness t o p u b l i c o p i n i o n , are more s u s c e p t i b l e t o disarmament "propaganda" and t o appeals above the heads of t h e i r l e a d e r s f o r s u b s t a n t i v e concessions d u r i n g n e g o t i a t i o n s . I n s o f a r as one s i d e may consequently f e e l i t s e l f t o be at an u n f a i r disadvantage, and a d j u s t i t s n e g o t i a t i n g s t r a t e g y a c c o r d i n g l y ( i n a more c o n s e r v a t i v e or l e s s f l e x i b l e d i r e c t i o n ) , t h i s may have an adverse e f f e c t upon the o v e r a l l p rospects f o r arms c o n t r o l . Again, t o o , t h e r e remains the danger of asymmetries i n an accord n e g o t i a t e d from p o s i t i o n s of l e s s than equal s t r e n g t h . And t h i s f a c t o r a l s o has i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the v e r i f i c a t i o n q u e s t i o n , as w i l l be d i s c u s s e d s h o r t l y under the heading of "nature of the arms c o n t r o l system." Domestic P o l i t i c s Whatever the d i p l o m a t i c c l i m a t e , the impetus towards arms c o n t r o l must, i n the f i n a l a n a l y s i s , come from w i t h i n the s t a t e i t s e l f . A f a v o u r a b l e c o n j u n c t i o n of domestic i n t e r e s t s or at l e a s t the advocacy of key decision-making bodies and persona-l i t i e s i s an abso l u t e n e c e s s i t y . Such advocacy ma.y be based on a wide range of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s apart from those d e s c r i b e d i n S e c t i o n I w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o the "primary o b j e c t i v e s " of arms c o n t r o l . I t may be " p o l i t i c a l " i n the narrow sense of pander-- 36 -ing to public opinion or d i v e r t i n g a t t e n t i o n from serious domes-t i c problems, or " p o l i t i c a l " i n the wider sense of promoting detente or seeking s t r a t e g i c advantage; i t may be bureaucratic, i n the sense of serving to preserve or enhance the power of a p a r t i c u l a r governmental organization; or i t may be i d e o l o g i c a l , i n which case the r e l a t i v e strength of p a c i f i s t , i s o l a t i o n i s t , m i l i t a r i s t , or i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s t sentiment w i l l l a r g e l y deter-mine the outcome. Under whatever circumstances, the importance of the m i l i t a r y to n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y , and of na t i o n a l s e c u r i t y to the nation, predisposes against the imposition of undue r e -s t r i c t i o n s on m i l i t a r y a c t i v i t i e s . Not s u r p r i s i n g l y , the m i l i -t ary or m i l i t a r y - i n d u s t r i a l establishment (within which Hedley B u l l includes "the armed force s , the armaments i n d u s t r i e s , the m i l i t a r y branches of science and technology and of government, [and]] the s e t t l e d habits of mind of those who think about s t r a -(-O tegy and defence" ) i s commonly viewed as the chief obstacle to arms c o n t r o l . Obviously, the range of possible v a r i a b l e s i s too great to bear any but the most generalized a n a l y s i s . Some rather p r i m i -t i v e e f f o r t s at an o v e r a l l synthesis have been made, however, by scholars attempting to assess the "arms control-mindedness" of p a r t i c u l a r states such as the Soviet Union and China. In t h e i r study of Chinese disarmament p o l i c y Halperin and Perkins, f o r example, i d e n t i f y two d i s t i n c t elements as being necessary components of a "general philosophy" of arms c o n t r o l : ( 1 )"view-i n g the use of m i l i t a r y force as a p o l i t i c a l instrument, one which can and should be c o n t r o l l e d by p o l i t i c a l means;" and (2) - 37 -"the notion that there<-<is a cooperative as well as a competitive element i n the nature of the m i l i t a r y forces of p o t e n t i a l ene-59 mies." To these might he added a number of others: the r e a l i -z a t i o n that arms control can be a "non-zero sum game," that i s , that both or a l l p a r t i e s to an agreement can gain from i t , and not n e c e s s a r i l y d i f f e r e n t i a l l y or at the expense of each other; the "perception and recognition by each government that there are responsible forces i n the other country that fa.vor arms con-t r o l agreements of value to both s i d e s " ^ ; recognition that the a l t e r n a t i v e of u n r e s t r i c t e d growth i n armaments does not neces-s a r i l y promise to enhance na t i o n a l s e c u r i t y ; where an arms race i s i n progress, the perception that the other side possesses the r e q u i s i t e combination of ca.pabilities and w i l l to match any new deployment which threatens to upset the e x i s t i n g balance of f o r c e s , and thereby to render i l l u s o r y the attainment of a more than ephemeral s u p e r i o r i t y ; with regard to nuclear-armed ad-v e r s a r i e s , the r e j e c t i o n of a f i r s t - s t r i k e c a p a b i l i t y as a de-s i r a b l e object of n a t i o n a l p o l i c y ; and f i n a l l y , r e j e c t i o n of the all-purpose " d e v i l theory" analysis of an opponent's intentions, which sees behind h i s every move and every proposal an i l l -concealed b i d f o r u n i l a t e r a l advantage. * Donald G.Brennan notes that despite vigorous arms programs on both sides of the "Iron Curtain", "that part of our n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y that i s measured by our a b i l i t y to guarantee nation a l s u r v i v a l i n a l l i t s various senses has undergone a pre c i p i t o u s decline i n recent years" (61) and "the absolute n a t i o n a l se-c u r i t y (measured i n the same sense of t h e i r a b i l i t y to guaran-tee n a t i o n a l s u r v i v a l ) of the Soviet Union has also undergone a prec i p i t o u s decline since 1946." (62) ** This i s expressed i n a s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t form by Morton Kap-l a n , to the e f f e c t that "Where neither state appears to be i n a, p o s i t i o n to acquire a substantial advantage over the (cont.) - 38 -This "brings us to another, more general p o l i t i c a l f a c t o r to be considered, namely the o v e r a l l f o r e i g n p o l i c y o r i e n t a t i o n of a state. I t i s not s u r p r i s i n g , perhaps, that " s a t i a t e d " states, content with the i n t e r n a t i o n a l status quo and seeking to preserve i t , should welcome agreements which reduce the of-fensive c a p a b i l i t i e s of states generally; nor that u n s a t i s f i e d nations should be at l e a s t as equally adamant i n opposing such agreements. This f a c t o r i s intimately connected with the na-ture of the agreement, however ( e s p e c i a l l y i t s e f f e c t upon the e x i s t i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p of f o r c e s ) , since even a r e v i s i o n i s t Power may pursue arms con t r o l as a means to reduce the r e l a t i v e capa-b i l i t i e s of i t s opponents, just as a proponent of the status  quo may seek thereby to perpetuate i t s dominance. The r e v i s i o n -i s t Power i n any given c o n f l i c t r e l a t i o n s h i p i s simply not l i k e l y to be s a t i s f i e d with a mere "balance of power," i n which case d i f f e r e n t i a l r e s t r i c t i o n s may have to be imposed or con-ceded (depending on the willingness or c a p a b i l i t y of the con-servative state(s) to do so) or some kind of o v e r a l l p o l i t i c a l settlement worked out simultaneously with the c o n t r o l s . Thus, i n a paper on arms control i n the A r a b - I s r a e l i c o n f l i c t , Puad Jabber stresses the necessary "provision of non-violent means  f o r challenging the status quo—such as diplomatic negotiations, (cont.) other e i t h e r by means of the economic resources i t i s capable of d i v e r t i n g to m i l i t a r y production or by v i r t u e of p o l i t i c a l seduction, the states would seem to have a j o i n t i n -t e r e s t i n what f o r want of a better term i s often c a l l e d s t r a -t e g i c s t a b i l i t y . " (63) * Evan Luard warns that "The rudimentary measures...already i n -troduced between the United States and the Soviet Union may be...only a r e f l e c t i o n of the growing common i n t e r e s t as status quo superpowers, rather „than an independent (cont.) - 3 9 -a r b i t r a t i o n , or l e g a l a d j u d i c a t i o n . " ^ I t i s somewhat d o u b t f u l t h a t a s t a t e would be w i l l i n g t o exchange m i l i t a r y power f o r such n o n - v i o l e n t channels a l o n e , however, u n l e s s q u i t e sure of the u l t i m a t e s e t t l e m e n t b e i n g r e s o l v e d t o i t s s a t i s f a c t i o n . IV. NATURE OF THE ARMS CONTROL SYSTEM ENVISAGED. The f i n a l c a t e g o r y of f a c t o r s , the "nature of t h e arms con-t r o l system e n v i s a g e d , " i s d i f f e r e n t from the o t h e r s i n b e i n g p o s i t e d , r a t h e r than g i v e n , not so much a matter of environment as of i n v e n t i o n . S t i l l , i t i s no l e s s important a c o n s i d e r a t i o n t o the c o n c l u s i o n and u l t i m a t e success of arms c o n t r o l a g r e e -ments. When we speak of t h e "system e n v i s a g e d " we a r e r e f e r r i n g , of c o u r s e , t o the w i l l i n g n e s s of s t a t e s t o agree t o a p a r t i c u l a r proposed arrangement, a p u r e l y h y p o t h e t i c a l f u t u r e s t a t e of a f -f a i r s ; y e t the same c o n s i d e r a t i o n s a p p l i e d a t t h i s stage w i l l c a r r y over i n t o implementation or e v a s i o n of whatever agreement i s r eached. Among the most important of t h e s e f a c t o r s i s a d e f i n i t i o n a l one, namely the t y p e of r e s t r a i n t s imposed, whether a r e d u c t i o n of e x i s t i n g armaments; a c e i l i n g on e x i s t i n g armaments; a p r e -v e n t a t i v e measure of "non-armament"; or a q u a l i t a t i v e r e s t r i c -t i o n on the arms r a c e . I t i s a g e n e r a l l y a c c e p t e d p r i n c i p l e i n t h e arms c o n t r o l f i e l d t h a t i t i s f a r e a s i e r t o l e g i s l a t e r e -s t r i c t i o n s on weapons y e t t o be b u i l t or a c t i v i t i e s y e t t o be ( c o n t . ) c o n t r i b u t i o n t o r e d u c i n g t e n s i o n between them. They g i v e no i n d i c a t i o n whether s i m i l a r agreements, c o v e r i n g new and r i s i n g powers which share no such common i n t e r e s t , may be a t t a i n a b l e . " ( 6 5 ) undertaken than on forces or deployments i n being. Such reason-i n g has been used i n defence of the A n t a r c t i c , Outer Space, Nuclear Non-Proliferation, L a t i n American Nuclear-Free Zone, and Seabed Denuclearization t r e a t i e s , f o r example. Two c o n t r i -butory f a c t o r s may be c i t e d : (1) the problem of vested i n t e r -ests, the strength of which i s l i k e l y to vary according to the degree of e f f o r t and resources already expended on a p a r t i c u l a r program; and (2) the f a c t that, as Abram Chayes points out, i t i s much easier f o r the p o t e n t i a l v i o l a t o r of an agreement "to r e p l i c a t e e x i s t i n g a c t i v i t i e s at a higher rate or i n a new* 66 s e t t i n g " than to embark on an e n t i r e l y novel program. In h i s words: "Modest or token as opposed to zero c e i l i n g s g r e a t l y s i m p l i f y the problems of expansion and deployment a f t e r breach." As well as increas i n g concern over the l i k e l i h o o d of evasion, adequate v e r i f i c a t i o n also may be more problematic i n the case of "modest-or token" c e i l i n g s , where preparations f o r expansion can be r e l a t i v e l y e a s i l y concealed. Thus the s u s c e p t i b i l i t y of a system to i n t e r n a t i o n a l regulation may i n a sense be said to vary in v e r s e l y with the stage of i t s development and/or deploy-ment — w i t h the notable exception of controls over pure r e -search, which are scarcely f e a s i b l e i n view of the v e r i f i c a t i o n * But these f a c t o r s may be o f f s e t , depending on the circum-stances of the case, by several others: the lack of general public i n t e r e s t i n developments yet to be undertaken or even planned; and the possible l a c k of t h e o r e t i c a l knowledge, which may make states hesitant to negotiate about the area concerned. - 41 -problem. The l a t t e r also l a r g e l y explains why i t i s generally believed easier to l e g i s l a t e q uantitative r e s t r i c t i o n s than q u a l i t a t i v e ones. Success i n neg o t i a t i n g an agreement may be assumed to .vary in v e r s e l y with the comprehensiveness of the measures proposed as w e l l — a l t h o u g h i t has been suggested that comprehensiveness may sometimes a i d i n f a c i l i t a t i n g the task of v e r i f i c a t i o n , i n cases where i t i s easier to detect the t o t a l absence of m i l i t a r y a c t i v i t y than to discriminate among numerous disparate systems. The other f a c t o r s i n t h i s category f a l l under one of two headings: the nature of the v e r i f i c a t i o n and/or enforcement  procedure evisaged; and the e f f e c t of the control system upon  the r e l a t i v e c a p a b i l i t i e s and s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t s of the p a r t i e s . The v e r i f i c a t i o n problem i s found i n one form or another under a l l four main categories. Thus, although a p a r t i c u l a r wea-pon may, by i t s nature, be more or l e s s susceptible to v e r i f i -c a t i o n , the v e r i f i c a t i o n requirements of an agreement also de-pend on the state of p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s between the p a r t i e s concerned (and therefore the extent to which they may be able to " t r u s t " each other) and the degree to which evasion of var-ious magnitudes might a f f e c t the s t r a t e g i c balance (which i s i n turn dependent upon the nature of the l a t t e r , the absolute s i z e of opposing forces , and so on). But whatever the purely tech- n i c a l requirements of adequate v e r i f i c a t i o n , i t i s the p o l i t i c a l * A very small number of m i s s i l e s on each side might lend i t -s e l f to i n s t a b i l i t y , f o r example, i f a marginal v i o l a t i o n thereby could have a disproportionate e f f e c t on the s t r a t e g i c balance. In p r i n c i p l e , t h i s was recognized by Boggs. (68) - 42 -a c c e p t a b i l i t y of such measures to those upon whom they w i l l o-perate which counts the most. No matter how nearly foolproof the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of guarding against evasion, they w i l l not i n them-selves be adequate to ensure an agreement, even when other con-d i t i o n s are favourable, i f they are not p o l i t i c a l l y v i a b l e (as well as economically f e a s i b l e ) . The same holds true f o r enforce-ment provisions intended to apply i n the event of evasion. In general, the l i k e l i h o o d of a control arrangement being found p o l i t i c a l l y acceptable may be sa i d to vary i n v e r s e l y with, the degree of i t s "intrusiveness" upon n a t i o n a l sovereignty. Thus measures a f f e c t i n g non-sovereign t e r r i t o r i e s such as the high seas, A n t a r c t i c a , and Outer Space have an advantage from the s t a r t . And s a t e l l i t e reconnaissance i s revealed as a p a r t i -c u l a r l y appropriate means of v e r i f i c a t i o n , i n view of i t s "low p r o f i l e . " Of course, "national sovereignty" being a r e l a t i v e term, interpreted d i f f e r e n t l y from state to state, makes f o r some d i f f i c u l t y . What one Party considers an infringement of i t s so-vereignty may not be considered so, or at l e a s t to the same ex-tent, by i t s opponent. This may i n turn be r e l a t e d to the form and nature of the domestic p o l i t i c a l regime. S i m i l a r l y , a state may object on p r i n c i p l e to entrusting supranational bodies with r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r v e r i f i c a t i o n and/or enforcement. In general, * So-called "closed s o c i e t i e s " being assumed to be l e s s w i l l i n g to expose t h e i r inner workings and population to the outside world, i n t h i s manner, than more "open" ones. When dealing with negotiations between such d i s s i m i l a r s o c i e t i e s , a f u r t h e r problem i s created by the asymmetries i n advantage to be gain-ed by such exposure. The "closed s o c i e t y " w i l l have l i t t l e or no manifest need and hence incentive to press f o r such p r i v i -leges, i n view of the very "openness" of i t s opponent, while i t s own secrecy constitutes a m i l i t a r y a,sset and potential., bargaining-chip. (69) - 43 -the greater the magnitude and complexity of such arrangements, the l e s s l i k e l y they are to e l i c i t support from the interested P a r t i e s as a whole. And as we have previously mentioned, the cost of the c o n t r o l system i n c e r t a i n cases may well exceed that of whatever i s being prohibited, which i s not to say that i t may not be worthwhile i n terms of enhancing s e c u r i t y . In de-emphasizing the need f o r complex i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d c o n t r o l s , Abra.m Chayes stresses the s e l f - e n f o r c i n g nature of any 70 arms control agreement, given the intense "negotiation and r a -t i f i c a t i o n " within the bureaucracies of each side which "tends to generate powerful pressures f o r compliance." According to Chayes, At l e a s t three i n t e r r e l a t e d phenomena contribute to these pressures: (1) by the time the t r e a t y i s adop-ted, a broad consensus within governmental and p o l i t i -c a l c i r c l e s w i l l be arrayed i n support of the decision; (2) meanwhile, p r i n c i p a l centers of p o t e n t i a l continuing opposition w i l l have been n e u t r a l i z e d or assuaged, though often by means of concessions that s i g n i f i c a n t l y modify the substance of the p o l i c y ; and (3) many p f f i c i a l s , leaders of the administration or regime and opponents as w e l l , w i l l have been personally and p u b l i c l y com-mitted to the t r e a t y , c r e a t i n g a kind of p o l i t i c a l im-perative f o r the success of the p o l i c y . (71) Roger F i s h e r adopts a somewhat s i m i l a r approach, noting four "forces which tend to b r i n g about governmental compliance: f e a r of r e t a l i a t o r y a c t i o n , f e a r of the e f f e c t on public opinion, the moral views of government o f f i c e r s , and i n s t i t u t i o n a l resistance 72 to breaking r u l e s . " ' These are a l l i n a d d i t i o n , of course, to what must be considered as the prime bulwark of any agreement: the pure s e l f - i n t e r e s t of each of the P a r t i e s i n reaching i t i n - 44 -the f i r s t place. As Fi s h e r puts i t , "Governments comply with t r e a t i e s and other i n t e r n a t i o n a l r u l e s as they do with c o n s t i -tutions and other domestic rule s by a process of composite s e l f -r e s t r a i n t . .. .a t r e a t y , l i k e an egg, i s kept from g e t t i n g smashed by the enlightened s e l f - i n t e r e s t of those who deal with i t , not by anything i n s i d e i t . " , J Excessive concern with formal "enforcement measures," that i s , with sanctions to be applied i n case of v i o l a t i o n , i s also deplored by Chayes, who reminds us that the chief deterrent to such a c t i v i t y w i l l i n e v i t a b l y be the u n i l a t e r a l reactions of the other P a r t i e s , i n p a r t i c u l a r t h e i r p o s s i b l e repudiation of the agreement and the general worsening of r e l a t i o n s with them which might be expected. F i n a l l y , the great bogey of. almost a l l past disarmament proposals and negotiations has been the pursuit of u n i l a t e r a l advantage of one sort or another, r e a l or imagined, by one side or the other, or both. I t i s said, f o r example, that one of the reasons the Soviets could not agree to the Baruch Plan was the u n i l a t e r a l i n t e l l i g e n c e advantages i t would have accorded the 75 United States. Many authors stress that t a l k s cannot hope to succeed unless each side gives up any idea of using them to gain some kind of unreciprocated advantage over the other, whether i t be s t r a t e g i c or simply p o l i t i c a l i n nature. Perhaps i t should be * See also Robert R.Bowie, who states that "the p a r t i e s to any arms con t r o l w i l l have to depend ultimately on s e l f - h e l p — on t h e i r own strength and that of t h e i r a l l i e s — t o protect themselves against any p o t e n t i a l v i o l a t o r " (76) and " s e l f -help w i l l be the p r i n c i p a l sanction" (77); and Thomas S c h i l -l i n g : "the main sanction of an arms-control agreement fjis} the expectation that each w i l l abstain only i f the other does." (78) - 45 -added: " u n l e s s such advantage can he masked from the opponent." T h i s i s not t o say tha.t every component of a g i v e n agreement must he so s t r u c t u r e d as t o a v o i d f a v o u r i n g one s i d e over the o t h e r ; o n l y t h a t each P a r t y must he s a t i s f i e d t h a t the r e l a t i v e advantages and d i s a d v a n t a g es embodied i n the t o t a l "package," i n c l u d i n g those from o u t s i d e the s t r i c t l y m i l i t a r y - s t r a t e g i c sphere, do a t l e a s t a p p r o x i m a t e l y b a l a n c e out. The remainder of t h i s paper w i l l be an attempt t o e x p l a i n c e r t a i n a s p e c t s of the S o v i e t - A m e r i c a n S t r a t e g i c Arms L i m i t a t i o n T a l k s of 1969-1972, u s i n g the t y p o l o g y of f a c t o r s which, we have c o n s t r u c t e d i n P a r t I as a g u i d e l i n e . Of c o u r s e , the h o l d i n g of g i v e n n e g o t i a t i o n s or the s u c c e s s f u l c o n c l u s i o n of g i v e n a g r e e -ments may owe a good d e a l more t o q u i t e t r a n s i t o r y p o l i t i c a . 1 c i r c u m s t a n c e s than t o any of the more i n t r i n s i c v a r i a b l e s empha-s i z e d i n P a r t I . N e v e r t h e l e s s , we hope t o throw l i g h t on b o t h why the t a l k s were undertaken i n the f i r s t p l a c e , and why i t was p o s s i b l e t o a c h i e v e agreement on c e r t a i n measures of arms con-t r o l , w h i l e not on o t h e r s . What f a c t o r s , i n terms of e n v i r o n -mental or s i t u a t i o n a l " c o n s t a n t s , " h e l p e d t o determine b o t h the " s u c c e s s e s " ( d e f i n e d i n terms of f o r m a l a c c ords) and the * T h i s may be too " u n i t a r y a c t o r " a p e r s p e c t i v e on the problem, however. D i f f e r e n t groups w i t h i n a s t a t e a r e l i a b l e t o agree t o the same p o l i c y f o r d i f f e r e n t r e a s o n s , i n which case u l -t i m a t e " s u c c e s s " may depend more on the r e l a t i v e s t r e n g t h and i n f l u e n c e of such groups than on any p r e c o n c e i v e d "master p l a n " f o r m u l a t e d and put i n t o e x e c u t i o n by a m o n o l i t h i c l e a -d e r s h i p . Thus, f o r example, even though c o n s e r v a t i v e a c q u i -escence i n n e g o t i a t i o n s may have been p r e d i c a t e d i n i t i a l l y on the hope f o r u n i l a t e r a l advantage, more moderate ( c o n t . ) - 4 6 -" f a i l u r e s " * of the ta l k s ? Nowhere do we assume that a given f a c t o r (such as concern f o r s t r a t e g i c s t a b i l i t y ) has operated with equal f o r c e upon both P a r t i e s to the t a l k s . Some f a c t o r s may have weighed l e s s h e avily on one Party than on the other; some, indeed, may have i n f l u e n -ced only one Party at a l l . Thus, the paper cannot be f a u l t e d (as has been the approach of U.S. arms c o n t r o l l e r s to the Talks) f o r ignoring possible asymmetries i n the i n t e r e s t s of the two states, and sustaining a s u p e r f i c i a l "mirror-image" of Soviet concepts and motivations. In f a c t , "states" being highly ab-s t r a c t c o l l e c t i v e e n t i t i e s composed of mu l t i f a r i o u s agencies or agents pursuing mu l t i f a r i o u s (and often c o n f l i c t i n g ) ends, t h e i r ultimate "motives" ( i f , indeed, we may speak i n such terms) are even l e s s fathomable than those of i n d i v i d u a l men. I f our ap-proach does not i n i t s e l f adequately explain why given negotia-tions take place, or how s p e c i f i c agreements are reached, how-ever, i t does at l e a s t suggest possible avenues f o r negotiation and throw considerable l i g h t upon t h e i r l i k e l i h o o d of success, once the underlying impetus i s present and operating. (cont.) elements may eventually win out. ** See p.5. *** Negotiations need not be so defined; they may be considered "succe s s f u l " i n terms of mutual goals even without produ-cing formal accords—by enhancing s t a b i l i t y through the c l a r i f i c a t i o n and possible convergence of s t r a t e g i c concepts and p o l i c i e s , f o r example. (79) Conversely, they may prove ultimately "unsuccessful", even i f they do r e s u l t i n a f o r -mal t r e a t y , when the l a t t e r favours one Party over another and consequently leads to d e s t a b i l i z a t i o n . * Here r e f e r r i n g to proposals which, though advanced during the course of negotiations, were rejected by one side or the other. - 47 -PART II I. SALT; FACTORS AFFECTING THE INITIATION OF NEGOTIATIONS. A great number of diverse r a t i o n a l e s ha.ve been put forward to explain the willingness of the two Superpowers to engage i n t a l k s , beginning i n 1969, on the mutual l i m i t a t i o n of t h e i r s t r a t e g i c armaments. They range a l l the way from genuine concern with the s t a b i l i t y of the s t r a t e g i c balance, to a transparent sham concocted f o r the benefit of world opinion* to attempts at gaining u n i l a t e r a l advantage by either f r e e z i n g the other side's forces into a p o s i t i o n of permanent i n f e r i o r i t y , or s t a l l i n g i n order to gain time i n which to surpass them. Since, as we have mentioned, there i s no sure way of d i v i n i n g a state's "true" i n -tentions, much l e s s i t s motivations, we s h a l l forego discussion of the Superpowers' " r e a l " purposes i n favour of examining the possible influence of those f a c t o r s which we have i d e n t i f i e d as being i n some sense i n t r i n s i c features of any arms control c a l -culus. We s h a l l thus avoid ha.ving to compare and crudely rank i n terms of p l a u s i b i l i t y the various suggested r a t i o n a l e s , while at the same time recognizing the f a c t that any government i s l i k e l y to be impelled by a melange of motivations corresponding to the wide range of i n t e r e s t s and interest-groups which i t rep-resents. Many of these w i l l be contradictory, and t h e i r r e l a t i v e strength may vary on an almost day by day basis. In h i s defence of the SALT I agreements before the U.S. Con-gress, Henry K i s s i n g e r repeatedly stressed that they were but an i n t e g r a l component of a new and general framework of more relaxed - 48 -r e l a t i o n s between the Soviet Union and the United States. I t ' is. quite possible that on both sides, arms control per se was subordinated to the overarching i n t e r e s t s of the p o l i t i c a l l e a -dership i n achieving or sustaining detente, which i n turn might be a t t r i b u t e d to a complex web of motivations. What we are i n -terested i n determining, however, i s that, given the i n i t i a l p r e d i s p o s i t i o n towards negotiations, what f a c t o r s helped enable i t to be consummated and shaped the form and content of the p a r t i c u l a r agreements which were reached? E f f e c t Upon St r a t e g i c S t a b i l i t y Much of the discussion of the "nature of the system to be regulated" w i l l be deferred u n t i l consideration of the i n d i v i -dual types of weapons involved, of course. In general, however, we may mention, with regard to s t r a t e g i c s t a b i l i t y , that a prime motivation of the t a l k s was undoubtedly the presence on the horizon of a number of new systems threatening the t r a d i -t i o n a l "balance of t e r r o r " between the Superpowers. On the Soviet side, a r a p i d buildup of p a r t i c u l a r l y potent SS-9 m i s s i l e s seemed to promise the "counterforce" c a p a b i l i t y of e f f e c t i v e l y destroying American Minuteman ICBM's i n t h e i r s i l o s . On both, sides, but e s p e c i a l l y the American, the leap-frogging technology of multiple independently-targeted re-entry v e h i c l e s (MIRV's) s i m i l a r l y appeared to jeopardize each other's f i x e d land-based deterrent. And, perhaps most importantly, the development and i n i t i a l deployment of ABM systems by each side threatened to a l t e r the o v e r a l l offensive-defensive d i s p a r i t y on which, the - 49 -s t r a t e g i c balance was widely believed to r e s t . How much these c o n s i d e r a t i o n s — s o v i t a l i n the eyes of the "arms control commu-n i t y " — a c t u a l l y a f f e c t e d the key decision-ma.kers on each side i s d i f f i c u l t to say, but there i s l i t t l e doubt that they fueled the general impetus towards negotiations. Magnitude or Nature of Destructiveness In view of the sonewhat meagre r e s u l t s of the t a l k s , and the f a c t that n e i t h e r of the P a r t i e s seems to have s e r i o u s l y enterta.ined the p o s s i b i l i t y of actua.1 reductions i n e x i s t i n g f o r c e s , one might argue that concern f o r the l e v e l and nature of destruction attendant upon a nuclear war did not f i g u r e very prominently among t h e i r motivations. While not an immediate con-s i d e r a t i o n , however, such concern obviously underlay the whole p r i n c i p l e of the t a l k s and the urgency with which they were pur-sued, providing much of the impetus seemingly based on other considerations, such as that of preserving s t r a t e g i c s t a b i l i t y . ' Monetary Cost Another motivation which has received considerable emphasis i n the l i t e r a t u r e on SALT (the strength of which i s h o t l y d i s -puted, however) i s economic. Economic motivations were deemed by some observers to be p a r t i c u l a r l y s a l i e n t on the Soviet side, given the greater proportion of resources devoted by the Soviets to defense and e s p e c i a l l y to s t r a t e g i c forces i n the preceding years, as well as p e r e n n i a l l y growing demands f o r consumer goods. Among the more s p e c i f i c evidence which has been c i t e d by - 50 -K r e m l i n o l o g i s t s i n support of t h i s view has been: "The i n c r e a -s i n g emphasis i n the l a t t e r s i x t i e s on working out new methodo-l o g i e s t o i n s u r e optimum use of r e s o u r c e s f o r m i l i t a r y purposes, the apparent i n c r e a s e of defense e x p e n d i t u r e d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d at a g r e a t e r r a t e than growth of the S o v i e t GNP, the n e c e s s i t y of downward r e v i s i o n s of economic g o a l s f o r the e i g h t h F i v e - Y e a r P l a n (1966-70) and the l o n g d e l a y i n drawing up the next P l a n (1971-75), as w e l l as Brezhnev's c a u s t i c c r i t i c i s m of S o v i e t economic performance at the c l o s e of 1969 when the SALT were 8l begun." A f t e r a comprehensive a n a l y s i s of the i s s u e s i n v o l v e d , Thomas Wolfe, w h i l e n o t i n g the i n c r e a s e d p r e f e r e n c e a p p a r e n t l y t o be g i v e n t o consumer goods i n the n i n t h F i v e - Y e a r P l a n (1971-75), c a u t i o u s l y c o n c l u d e s : "Although I do s u b s c r i b e t o the view t h a t economic p r e s s u r e s have h e l p e d b o t h t o b r i n g the S o v i e t Union t o t h e SALT and t o keep them t h e r e through more than two y e a r s of n e g o t i a t i o n s , i t a l s o seems t o me...that economic con-s i d e r a t i o n s have n o t been th e prime determinant of S o v i e t s t r a -t e g i c p o l i c y i n t h e p a s t , n o r are they l i k e l y t o be i n the f u -t u r e . " 8 2 The economic c o s t of new weapons systems and of the defense budget i n g e n e r a l was perhaps the most p e r s i s t e n t theme r u n n i n g through the commentary of U.S. Congressmen d u r i n g the Senate F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s Committee review of the SALT I agreements i n 1972.8^ Joseph I . C o f f e y c i t e s an o p i n i o n p o l l of March 1971 a c -c o r d i n g t o which "49 p e r cent of the American pe o p l e b e l i e v e d defense spending t o be too h i g h and o n l y 11 p e r cent thought i t too low." "More i m p o r t a n t l y , " w r i t e s C o f f e y , "59 per cent of the - 51 -college-educated and nearly 55 per cent of the middle-income groups contended that defense spending was too high; i n short, those e l i t e s on whom Congressmen depend most and to whose wishes they respond most r e a d i l y are p o t e n t i a l l y i n fa.vor of arms con-t r o l . " 8 ^ Administration o f f i c i a l s are fond of p o i n t i n g out i n defense that the m i l i t a r y ' s share of t o t a l government spending 85 has "been d e c l i n i n g i n recent years J\ that the greatest i n c r e a -ses i n defense costs have "been due to pay r a i s e s and other per-sonnel b e n e f i t s 8 ^ ; and that, as John Newhouse puts i t , "perform-ance with regard to spending on s t r a t e g i c weapons has been rea -sonably good," compared with that devoted to general-purpose f o r c e s . Nevertheless, he notes: "the smaller sums spent on America's nuclear deterrent represent a f a r more-conspicuous— 88 hence d i s t u r b i n g — i t e m i n the clouded p u b l i c view." Generally speaking, the tremendous increase i n costs of i s t r a t e g i c systems i n recent years—which have seen the projected p r i c e of some i n d i v i d u a l u n i t s , such as m i s s i l e submarines, ex-ceed the sum of $1 b i l l i o n , f o r example—has undoubtedly added, through p u b l i c outcry and the concern of economy-minded govern-ments, to the impetus towards SALT. Analysts c o n t i n u a l l y caution that any savings r e s u l t i n g from arms control agreements are l i k e -l y merely to be ploughed r i g h t back into other, u n r e s t r i c t e d m i l i t a r y programs according to Chayes* " i r o n law" of bureaucra-t i c budgeting. This both, ignores the f a c t that most such savings w i l l be i n terms of new costs foregone, rather than actual cut-backs i n e x i s t i n g expenditures , and does not obviate, of * An idea of what these costs might have been i n the SALT (cont.) - 52 -course, the very r e a l e f f e c t s of pressures r e s u l t i n g from the mere perception of future sa.vings, regardless of i t s v a l i d i t y . P o l i t i c o - M i l i t a r y U t i l i t y The m i l i t a r y u t i l i t y of s t r a t e g i c arms, at one time unchal-lenged, has during the nuclear age come under considerable ques-t i o n i n g , as mentioned e a r l i e r . Under the doctrine of nuclear de-terrence, the actual use of su6h weapons would, paradoxically, s i g n i f y t h e i r very f a i l u r e . Nevertheless, t h e i r ultimate deter-rent value constitutes an unquestionably s i g n i f i c a n t s t r a t e g i c advantage, and many states continue to endow s t r a t e g i c nuclear arms with considerable p o l i t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e , whether from the point of view of diplomatic bargaining or of pure p r e s t i g e . A l l of these f a c t o r s tend to m i l i t a t e against meaningful r e s t r i c t i o n s on the development and deployment of s t r a t e g i c arms. That the SALT were possible i n s p i t e of them i s greater testimony to the modesty of the a n t i c i p a t e d l i m i t a t i o n s than to any sudden change (cont.) case was given by President Nixon at a news conference on June 29,1972, i n which he declared, c i t i n g various Soviet "plans" and "programs" i n the ABM, ICBM, and SLBM f i e l d s : " i f we had not ha.d an arms control agreement, a l i m i t a t i o n of ABM's and a temporary l i m i t a t i o n f o r 5 years on c e r t a i n c l a s s i f i c a -t i o ns of offensive weapons, I would—and I a,m saying t h i s con-s e r v a t i v e l y — h a v e had to ask the Congress of the United States to approve an increase i n the defense budget f o r nuclear s t r a -t e g i c weapons of at l e a s t $15 b i l l i o n a year on a crash pro-gram." (90) Of course, the President's self-assurance to the contrary, there i s simply no t e l l i n g what d i r e c t i o n Soviet programs might have taken i n the absence of SALT. Chairman of the J o i n t Chiefs of S t a f f Admiral Moorer c l a r i f i e d Nixon's claim somewhat when he admitted before the Senate Armed Services Committee that these cost estimates were based on the contin-gency "that the Soviets b u i l t up to the t o t a l extent of t h e i r c a p a b i l i t i e s " ( 9 1 )— a very dubious pr o p o s i t i o n , at best (but not f o r that. any.. reason why U.S. programs would not have been based on i t ) . * According to the "mutual assured destruction" doctrine,(cont.) - 53 -i n the conception held by the two P a r t i e s of the o v e r a l l p o l i -t i c o - m i l i t a r y u t i l i t y of the weapons. S u s c e p t i b i l i t y to V e r i f i c a t i o n As the s u s c e p t i b i l i t y to v e r i f i c a t i o n of s t r a t e g i c arms var i e s s i g n i f i c a n t l y depending on the type of weapons system under consideration, discussion of t h i s f a c t o r w i l l be l e f t u n t i l l a t e r . D i s t r i b u t i o n of C a p a b i l i t i e s Among States Under the " s t r a t e g i c landsca/pe" category we have what i s widely believed to have been the most s i g n i f i c a n t f a c t o r a f f e c -t i n g the Soviet decision to enter i n t o meaningful arms control n e g o t i a t i o n s — t h e i r achievement of approximate p a r i t y with the United States i n s t r a t e g i c power. Of course, " p a r i t y " i s an ex-tremely s l i p p e r y term, much l i k e i t s more venerable r e l a t i v e , the "balance of power," which tends to be interpreted v a s t l y d i f f e r e n t l y depending on which side of the fence one i s s i t -t i n g . I t s American detractors i n s i s t that "true" p a r i t y — implying a stable balance of f o r c e s — c a n n o t be equated with sheer equality of numbers or of destructive p o t e n t i a l , where one (cont.) at l e a s t . Proponents of "damage-limitation" or of a nu-c l e a r war-fighting c a p a b i l i t y would contest t h i s judgment, of course. * Perhaps the best d e f i n i t i o n of " p a r i t y " i s that given by Walter C.Clemens: "equivalence—not precise e q u a l i t y — o f opposing f o r c e s , such that each side can accomplish compar-able r e s u l t s , e.g., destruction of a c e r t a i n percentage of c i v i l i a n or m i l i t a r y targets i n a second s t r i k e . " (92) ** R e f e r r i n g to those who deny i t s d e s i r a b i l i t y , not neces-s a r i l y i t s existence. - 54 -i s comparing an e s s e n t i a l l y status quo Power with a r e v i s i o n i s t one. Often, the argument centers on the question of n a t i o n a l " w i l l " or determination, which are r i g h t l y construed as being at l e a s t as equally important i n d i c a t o r s of a state's power as more material c a p a b i l i t i e s . But fundamentally, i t i s argued that the r e v i s i o n i s t state, assumed almost by d e f i n i t i o n to be the more aggressive i n nature, must be constrained by nothing l e s s than superior f o r c e , i f i t i s to be dissuaded from embarking - Q "3 upon an adventurist course of a c t i o n . J Proponents of the" p a r i t y concept as applied to East-West r e l a t i o n s , on the other hand, stress the e s s e n t i a l l y conservative nature of Soviet goals, deny-ing that they are i n f a c t appreciably more r a d i c a l than those of the United States. Further, the general technological superior-i t y and greater o v e r a l l resource-base of the Americans are * See, f o r example, C o l i n Gray, who writes: "Great g e o p o l i t i c a l i n s i g h t i s not required to perceive that a status quo, ocean-empire superpower needs more raw s t r a t e g i c power than does a d i s s a t i s f i e d heartland superpower." (94) ** See, f o r example, the testimony of Robert C.Tucker before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: "the Soviet Union, too, i n a c e r t a i n sense i s an old established status power.... Sometimes i n the heat of discussions we tend to take i t too much, at i t s own, so to speak, i d e o l o g i c a l face value as a country committed to revolutions. We must remember that t h i s r e v o l u t i o n i s 55 years old and that at 55 most revolutions are middle aged. And that i s i n many ways true of the Russian r e v o l u t i o n . I t i s a country which, while i n c e r t a i n respects i t i s s t i l l a c t i v e l y involved i n i n c r e a s i n g i t s influence i n the world, and we have a l l talked about that, we are a l l very much aware of that, but i n c e r t a i n other ways has a status quo to protect, p a r t i c u l a r l y the status quo i n Europe. In cer -t a i n ways i t i s a conservative sta,te and we have to l e a r n to think i n those terms. In c e r t a i n ways the major problems that the Soviet government faces today are due to i t s conservatism, i t s unwillingness to l i b e r a l i z e i t s present laws, to a b o l i s h the censorship, to democratize areas of society, and to r e -structure the long standing established s i n g l e party system. Consequently, I don't think the image of the old established s t a t i c United States confronted with a c t i v i s t i c dynamic So-v i e t Union i s a very accurate r e f l e c t i o n of the r e a l i t y (cont.') - 55 -TV adduced as hedges i n t h e i r favour. But the controversy runs even deeper than t h i s . In terms of m i l i t a r y hardware alone, there i s considerable disagreement over the r e l a t i v e s t r a t e g i c strength of the two Superpowers. One side argues that the Soviet lead i n numbers of launch v e h i c l e s and t o t a l d e l i v e r a b l e megatonnage or "throw weight" gives them a s i g n i f i c a n t advantage. The other side i n s i s t s that t h i s i s more than o f f s e t by American s u p e r i o r i t y i n numbers of independently-targeted warheads, not to mention i t s technological lead i n most f i e l d s and c e r t a i n geographical advantages. One c a l c u l a t i o n of r e l a t i v e strength based on the concept of "equivalent megaton-nage," claimed to be "the measuring rod used by the Pentagon i n (cont.) of our i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p . " (95) According to a study of Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y by Jan P.Triska and David D.Finley, most Western analysts view the Soviet propensity f o r r i s k - t a k i n g as "low and the Soviet a t t i t u d e toward r i s k - t a k i n g as conservative, defensive, and cautious." (96) Walter Clemens maintains that "Soviet external behavior, at l e a s t since S t a l i n ' s death i n 1953, has generally been consonant with an i d e n t i f i a b l e h i e r a r -chy of values.... scaled i n the f o l l o w i n g rank order: 1. The se-c u r i t y of the r u l i n g e l i t e ( s ) within the USSR and the l e g i t i m i -z a t i o n of t h e i r regime and ideology; 2.The se c u r i t y of the So-v i e t state; 3»Maintenance and strengthening of Soviet influence i n areas of Eastern Europe and Outer Mongolia that have come under p a r t i a l or complete Soviet c o n t r o l ; 4.Rapid i n d u s t r i a l i z a -t i o n of the Soviet economy and improvement over time i n the l i -v i n g standards of the Soviet people; 5.Less tangible and much l e s s important than the f i r s t four goals, maintenance and streng-thening of Soviet influence i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l Communist move-merit and the T h i r d World." (97) Only the l a t t e r goal could be construed as at a l l " r e v i s i o n i s t " i n nature. Of course, t h i s does not answer the objection that Soviet forbearance may have been due p r i m a r i l y to h i t h e r t o overwhelming American s t r a t e g i c s u p e r i o r i t y . But i t i s s i g n i f i c a n t , i n t h i s regard, that, as Clemens puts i t , "The h i s t o r i c a l record suggests that most So-v i e t actions threatening to world peace have r e s u l t e d from a perceived sense of m i l i t a r y i n f e r i o r i t y rather than p a r i t y or s u p e r i o r i t y " ( 9 8 )—again, to be f a i r , no necessary i n d i c a t i o n of future p o l i c y . * Secretary of Defense Laird' assured the" Senate Foreign Rela-t i o n s Committee: "we have technology which i s , I believe,(cont.) - 56 -i t s secret studies to obtain a single f i g u r e f o r the t o t a l de-s t r u c t i v e c a p a b i l i t y of nuclear weapons of varied s i z e s , " puts a f i g u r e of 4,000 on the Russian arsenal by mid-1977 (expiry date of the SALT I agreement on offensive m i s s i l e s ) , compared with 4,450 f o r the U.S.". Regardless of the t e c h n i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n s which might be made, however (and i t i s nowhere suggested that Soviet and Ame-r i c a n forces lend themselves to very easy comparison), i t i s an inescapable f a c t that the p o l i t i c a l leadership on both sides, as well as world opinion at la r g e , has come to accept the v a l i d i t y of the notion of " p a r i t y " as c h a r a c t e r i z i n g present-day Superpower s t r a t e g i c r e l a t i o n s . As we have previously stressed, numbers of nuclear m i s s i l e s or warheads i n excess of those r e -quired f o r an assured second-strike c a p a b i l i t y become rather meaningless i n themselves. Nevertheless, there has been f u r t h e r controversy over whether the leaders of the two states are i n (cont.) from 18 to 24 months ahead of the Soviet Union....we do have a superior p o s i t i o n as f a r as technology i s concerned. That i s the reason why I am confident that the d i s p a r i t y i n numbers that e x i s t s i n the offensive agreement does not prevent us from maintaining s u f f i c i e n c y as f a r as our deterrent i s con-cerned." (100) See also the analysis of the o v e r a l l "balance of power" i n Clemens (1973), pp. 25-29. ** Even t h i s holds true only where m i s s i l e s are concerned, f o r the balance i s tipped d r a s t i c a l l y i n the other d i r e c t i o n (from a Soviet lead of 2.7 m i l l i o n pounds to an American one of 25.9 m i l l i o n pounds)(101) i f the U.S. s t r a t e g i c bom-ber force i s brought i n t o the p i c t u r e . * That t h i s perception i s grounded l e s s i n material r e a l i t y than i n symbolic strength i s suggested most r e c e n t l y by a study of offensive m i s s i l e s undertaken by the Stockholm In-te r n a t i o n a l Peace Research I n s t i t u t e . Based on a mathematical analysis of the various f a c t o r s — s u c h as megatonnage, accur-acy, number of warheads, and "hardening" of m i s s i l e s i l o s — a f f e c t i n g the counterforce c a p a b i l i t i e s of the two sides, i t concludes that the United States has a v i r t u a l l y unassailable lead over the Soviet Union i n t h i s area by a margin of about - 57 -f a c t content with p a r i t y , i . e . are w i l l i n g to l i v e with i t and have genuinely ceased attempting to a t t a i n or r e t a i n a s i g n i f i -cant degree of s u p e r i o r i t y . I t may be assumed, of course, that h a b i t u a l l y conservative m i l i t a r y planners w i l l never be s a t i s -f i e d with anything l e s s than " f i r s t place." However, t h i s i s a question to which we s h a l l return l a t e r when discussing the po-l i t i c a l environment of SALT. How the mutual perception of p a r i t y a f f e c t e d the two sides' d e c i s i o n to engage i n SALT i s considerably l e s s c o n t r o v e r s i a l . Even those who believe that the Russians seek ultimate superior-i t y acknowledge that t h e i r attainment of p a r i t y may have helped induce them to enter into negotiations, i f f o r no other reason than to s t a l l f o r time. Others i n s i s t that, p a r i t y being a time-honoured goal of Soviet s t r a t e g i c p o l i c y , t h e i r apparent w i l l i n g -ness to accept i t was genuine. Thus Senator Cooper of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee declared that: " f o r almost 30 years every deployment we have made has been matched by an equi-valent deployment and the only agreements we have reached have 102 been on the basis of p a r i t y . " Marshall Shulman t o l d the Com-mittee: "What made the present agreements possible was not that the Russians were intimidated by our bargaining chips, but that they came close enough to eliminating t h e i r previous s t r a t e g i c (cont.) f i v e to one (103)—even without taking into account s t r a -t e g i c bombers. According to t h i s report, "even i f the United States undertakes absolutely no new strategic-weapons-improvement programmes from now on and the Soviet Union completes, at the f a s t e s t possible rate, the maximum improvement of the land-based m i s s i l e force possible under the present circumstances, dictated by the 1972 SALT I interim agreement on offensive m i s s i l e s , the United States w i l l s t i l l have an advantage both i n K/N £counter-force -] value and i n number of re-entry v e h i c l e s going (cont.) - 58 -i n f e r i o r i t y so that they no longer needed to fe a r that a freeze would leave them at a permanent disadvantage." 1 0 2'' And another Kremlinologist, Roman Kolkowicz, t e s t i f i e d : The Soviet Union has now achieved t h i s long-sought o b j e c t i v e — s t r a t e g i c p a r i t y with the United States. Having climbed t h i s plateau, the Soviet leaders began to pursue p o l i c i e s aimed at s t r a t e g i c arms l i m i t a t i o n t a l k s , SALT. I submit, therefore, that an indispensable precondition f o r SALT was the Soviet achievement of at l e a s t s t r a t e g i c p a r i t y , so that they could enter into the negotiations from a p o s i t i o n of strength and p o l i -t i c a l e q uality. (105) On the American side, the Soviet achievement served n o t i c e that the only a l t e r n a t i v e to arms control was a new and more c o s t l y q u a n t i t a t i v e arms race. Had the Soviets continued t h e i r buildup, the consequent threat to the American deterrent would have r e -quired a response i n kind. For a l l of those reasons discussed i n Part I (pp. 24-25), then, i t would seem that the attainment of s t r a t e g i c p a r i t y (at l e a s t symbolically) was c r u c i a l to the successful i n i t i a t i o n of SALT. The d i s t r i b u t i o n of t e c h n i c a l s k i l l s and c a p a b i l i t i e s throughout the remainder of the world posed no s i g n i f i c a n t prob-lems i n the context of SALT I, despite recent concern over nu-c l e a r p r o l i f e r a t i o n and premature t a l k of a Moscow-Peking-Wash-ington s t r a t e g i c " t r i a n g l e . " While p r o l i f e r a t i o n may ul t i m a t e l y pose considerable problems f o r s t r a t e g i c arms l i m i t a t i o n s , as a r e s u l t e i t h e r of s i g n i f i c a n t reductions i n the e x i s t i n g arsenals (cont.) into the 1980s." (106) I t pr e d i c t s that " p a r i t y " i n counterforce c a p a b i l i t i e s w i l l not be attained, i f at a l l , u n t i l "sometime i n the early 1990s." (107) - 59 -of the Superpowers or of tremendous increases i n those of the l e s s e r nuclear states, the i n c r e d i b l y vast d i s p a r i t y i n power "between the two groups at the present time e f f e c t i v e l y obviates the need f o r Soviet-American s o l i c i t i n g of t h i r d - p a r t y adher^ ence or a l t e r n a t i v e l y compensation against possible external threats (with the possible exception of ABM's, to be discussed). Asymmetry i n Force-Structure and Strategy; Rate of Technological  Development The asymmetry i n force-structure and strategy of the two sides was c e r t a i n l y operative i n the case of SALT. The problem was l a r g e l y bypassed, however, by concentrating on those forces i n which meaningful comparisons could i n f a c t be made, such as SLBM's and ICBM's, and ignoring those which would have presented considerably greater d i f f i c u l t y , such as forward-based systems and IR/MRBM'S targeted on the opposing side's f o r c e s . * In e f -f e c t , the necessity of a l l o c a t i n g armaments within an agreed r a t i o was postponed by e s s e n t i a l l y merely f r e e z i n g deployments at t h e i r current l e v e l and i n t h e i r current configuration. Simi-l a r l y , the problems of r a p i d technological development were l a r g e l y sidestepped, by keeping p r i m a r i l y to q u a n t i t a t i v e r e -s t r i c t i o n s on weapons, rather than q u a l i t a t i v e ones. I f any-thing, leap-frogging technology may have given a boost to the t a l k s by threatening new and c o s t l y innovations i n e x i s t i n g systems. * For some imaginative proposed solutions to the FBS problem, see S t r a t e g i c Survey 1972, pp. 14-16. -.60 -D i s p a r i t i e s i n the Cost-Effectiveness of Defense and Offense As previously mentioned, the d i s p a r i t i e s i n the c o s t - e f f e c -tiveness of defense and offense may he held l a r g e l y responsible f o r both general concern about the danger of* nuclear weapons and the Superpowers' acquiescence i n mutual second-strike capa-b i l i t y . Insofar as that i s the case, then, t h i s " s t r a t e g i c land-scape" f a c t o r , too, may be said to have contributed to the i n i -t i a t i o n of SALT. Structure of the International System F i n a l l y , the accelerated loosening of the b i p o l a r structure of world power i n recent years may have served to enhance the prospects of SALT, by focusing attention on the common i n t e r e s t s of the Superpowers i n warding off outside threats to t h e i r se-c u r i t y or (more l i k e l y ) influence. Thus the Soviet concern with t h e i r "Chinese front 1' has been adduced by many observers to be an important f a c t o r i n f l u e n c i n g t h e i r willingness to engage i n l i m i t a t i o n s with the United States. Another f a c t o r sometimes mentioned i s the manifest d i s u n i t y e x i s t i n g within the " c a p i t a -l i s t camp", apparently believed by some Soviets to permit a general r e l a x a t i o n of m i l i t a r y preparedness. S i m i l a r l y , the ob-vious bankruptcy of t h e i r previous conception of a "monolithic" world communist movement may have softened the American a t t i -tude. - 61 -Degree of Trust or H o s t i l i t y Between the P a r t i e s We now turn to the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the p o l i t i c a l e n v i r -onment which may have "been instrumental i n bringing about the t a l k s . The most important of these i s , of course, the new s p i -r i t of detente which has characterized Soviet-American r e l a t i o n s during the past decade. This detente has been a f r a g i l e t h i n g , and has been marked not so much by enhanced t r u s t between the two governments on a day-to-day basis as by the disrepute in t o which "sudden, massive attack" scenarios have f a l l e n and by the growing awareness of a su b s t a n t i a l body of mutual i n t e r e s t s , among which the control of s t r a t e g i c arms i s one. I t remains a very busin e s s l i k e r e l a t i o n s h i p , to be sure, but without i t s r e l a -t i v e degree of r e l a x a t i o n i t i s hard to conceive of SALT ever having taken place. S u s c e p t i b i l i t y to Outside Pressure; F e a s i b i l i t y of Outside Guar- antees Apart from i n t e r n a l l y - d e r i v e d pressures f u e l i n g the drive f o r detente and producing favourable "atmospheric" conditions, the Superpowers may have been influenced by the weight of t h e i r pledges at the time of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, formally embodied within i t s terms, "to pursue negotiations i n good f a i t h on e f f e c t i v e measures r e l a t i n g to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament." ( A r t . V I ) 1 0 ^ Insofar as t h i s pledge was deemed c r u c i a l to t h e i r * Cf. Walter Clemens: " D i f f i c u l t to c u l t i v a t e , complicated to nurture, detente i s a f r a g i l e flower easy to trample." (HO) - 62 -e f f o r t to dissuade p o t e n t i a l members from j o i n i n g the nuclear club; given the extreme importance accorded t h i s e f f o r t by the Superpowers; and to the extent $hat they may have been pressured by key non-signatories of the Treaty to make good t h e i r promise i n exchange f o r adherence, i t may be viewed as i l l u s t r a t i n g a c e r t a i n " s u s c e p t i b i l i t y of the P a r t i e s to outside pressure." On the debit side, the ( r e a l or imagined) concern of NATO a l l i e s over the continued c r e d i b i l i t y of the American "extended deter-rent" may have served to r e s t r a i n the l a t t e r ' s i n i t i a t i v e s some-what and, i n p a r t i c u l a r , explains i t s r e f u s a l to consider f o r -ward-based systems, capable of s t r i k i n g Soviet home t e r r i t o r y , as " s t r a t e g i c " weapons susceptible to negotiation within SALT. F i n a l l y , the h i g h l y s e n s i t i v e nature of the subject-matter of SALT, together with the vast d i s p a r i t y i n power between the P a r t i e s and any other conceivable i n t e r n a t i o n a l actor or c o a l i -t i o n of actors, rendered the f e a s i b i l i t y of outside guarantees of an agreement p r a c t i c a l l y n i l . Existence of Outside Trade-Offs The existence of issues upon which trade-offs from other areas of negotiation might have been f e a s i b l e was not r e a l l y a f a c t o r i n SALT I, i n view of the great success with which the * According to E l i z a b e t h Young, w r i t i n g i n 1972, "several of the near-nuclear signatories of the NPT ( i n c l u d i n g Japan and West Germany) have made i t quite c l e a r that they would r a t i f y the Treaty only when they were s a t i s f i e d that the United States and the Soviet Union were a c t u a l l y i n process of curbing the s t r a t e g i c arms race." ( I l l ) - 63 -P a r t i e s managed to i n s u l a t e t h e i r t a l k s from a l l extraneous mat-t e r s . C l e a r l y , they f e l t that negotiations of such high impor-tance deserved to he considered on t h e i r own merits, and on t h e i r own merits alone. A p o s s i b l e , though u n v e r i f i e d exception may have been the t a c i t r e f u s a l of the Soviet Union (because of i t s f e a r of a nuclearized Germany) to enter into negotiations 112 before attainment of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. However, i t should be stressed that t h i s example i s drawn from the period p r i o r to the s t a r t of actual negotiations (the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, f o r that matter, served to postpone t h e i r opening). An attempt was made by President Nixon during the formative p r e - t a l k stage to have the arms l i m i t a t i o n s l i n k e d to the r e s o l u t i o n of outstanding Soviet-American c o n f l i c t s i n the world at l a r g e , but t h i s was soon, unceremoniously, dropped.' In f a c t , the t a l k s themselves were so well insulated that Ameri-can escalation of the war i n Southeast A s i a , i n c l u d i n g attacks on Soviet shipping, saturation bombing of North Vietnamese c i t i e s , and the mining of Haiphong harbour, f a i l e d to disrupt them i n t h e i r c r i t i c a l f i n a l stages. Asymmetry i n Negotiating Styles A word should be said at t h i s point about the alleged asy-mmetry i n the n e g o t i a t i n g s t y l e s of the two states, given that (as explained e a r l i e r ) such a f a c t o r could conceivably play an i n f l u e n t i a l r o l e and has been a key element i n the c r i t i c i s m * See h i s news conference of January 27, 1969, c i t e d i n New-house (1973), pp. 140-141. • - 64 -within the United States of SALT I . * The l a t t e r i s t y p i f i e d by the contention of William R. Van Cleave before the U.S. Senate Government Operations Committee that "The American approach to SALT...was p r i m a r i l y a n a l y t i c a l and t e c h n i c a l , and the Soviet approach p r i m a r i l y p o l i t i c a l . The United States viewed SALT as i f i t were a s c i e n t i f i c - a n a l y t i c a l matter. The Soviets regarded 113 i t as a p o l i t i c a l process." In f a c t , there was ample evidence of t e c h n i c a l s o p h i s t i c a t i o n on both sides, as well as due atten-t i o n to the p o l i t i c a l / b a r g a i n i n g aspects of the negotiations by the United States—how else i s to be explained the currency of the "bargaining chips" argument among supporters of new m i l i t a r y programs, the focus upon possible arms con t r o l " t r a d e - o f f s , " and the close and p e r s i s t e n t involvement of the highest executive authority i n each of the two states? Asymmetry i n Domestic P o l i t i c a l Regime The American c r i t i c s of SALT I also argue that the asymme-t r y i n domestic p o l i t i c a l systems gave the Soviets an u n f a i r ad-vantage p r e j u d i c i n g a t r u l y balanced outcome of the negotiations. It i s claimed, on the one hand, that U.S. hands were t i e d by pub-l i c opinion during the course of the negotiations; on the other, that v i o l a t i n g or circumventing the provisions of the agreements may be a simpler matter f o r the Soviets than f o r the Americans. 1 1^ Nevertheless, a balanced assessment of the SALT I agreements hardly concedes them to be a lopsided u n i l a t e r a l v i c t o r y f o r * As C o l i n Gray puts i t , "Western and Eastern arms c o n t r o l l e r s may be p l a y i n g fundamentally d i f f e r e n t n e g o t i a t i n g games." (115) - 65 -the Soviets, and there i s no reason to believe that the bureau-c r a t i c tendency towards s t r i c t conformity with t h e i r provisions i s any l e s s prevalent i n the Soviet system. This does not, of course, a f f e c t the a d d i t i o n a l argument of the c r i t i c s that pos-s i b l e public "euphoria" induced by the successful conclusion of the agreements may i n h i b i t the United States from pursuing inde-pendent arms programs necessary f o r the maintenance of s t r a t e g i c s t a b i l i t y . But the l a t t e r seems rather f a r - f e t c h e d , i n view of the t r a d i t i o n a l strength and r e s i l i e n c y of m i l i t a r y i n t e r e s t s ; i f anything, the danger i s probably greater that p u b l i c compla-cency over the present very l i m i t e d agreements or acceptance of the m i l i t a r y ' s view that preparedness should be redoubled as a hedge against t h e i r v i o l a t i o n may hinder the achievement of f u r -ther, more s i g n i f i c a n t measures of arms c o n t r o l . Domestic P o l i t i c a l Factors The domestic p o l i t i c s associated with the i n i t i a t i o n of SALT have been well covered i n various published accounts ( f o r per-haps the best example, see John Newhouse's Cold Da,wn). In any case, debate on the issues (as opposed to naked bureaucratic i n -t e r e s t s , which saw the m i l i t a r y and i t s supporters p r e d i c t a b l y ranged against an ad hoc arms control c o a l i t i o n , on both sides of the fence) drew p r i m a r i l y upon the f a c t o r s we have already discussed, i n p a r t i c u l a r the fears f o r s t r a t e g i c s t a b i l i t y and the a n t i c i p a t e d costs of a new arms race. In the end, the * There i s considerable controversy i n the West over the ques-t i o n of Soviet acceptance of key concepts held dearly by American arms-controllers, such as eschewal of a f i r s t - (cont.) - 66 -voice of accommodation—or perhaps i t was only mutual recogni-t i o n that the other side was w i l l i n g and able, i f necessary, to sustain the costs—seems to have p r e v a i l e d , though not without severe r e s t r i c t i o n s upon the nature of the l i m i t a t i o n s n e g o t i -ated. As f o r the "general philosophy" of arms control discussed i n Part I — a , s u b j e c t which could e a s i l y f i l l as many pages as t h i s e n t i r e e s s a y — s u f f i c e i t to say that there i s ample evidence that a l l of the p r i n c i p l e s enumerated above are shared by i n f l u — e n t i a l groups within both countries. The most important such p r i n c i p l e may well be that of mutual recognition of the a b i l i t y and w i l l i n g n e s s of each to match the other's s t r a t e g i c deploy-ments; t h i s i s the view of Paul C.Warnke: In my view, the reason that the Soviet Union and the United States have been able to negotiate and have been able to reach an agreement i s because each side has had to recognize the other side's t e c h n i c a l poten-t i a l . Each side must recognize that i t i s not capable of achieving any sort of meaningful advantage i n the st r a t e g i c weapons f i e l d unless the other side i s w i l -l i n g to concede that advantage, and nothing i n the h i s t o r y of the arms race i n d i c a t e s any such conces-sion or any such prospect of one dropping out of the competition i f the competition continues. Neither side need l e t the other one gain an appreciable ad-vantage and neither side w i l l . (116) Thus the acceptance of p a r i t y may be not so much a matter of choice, as of acquiescence i n what appears to be i n e v i t a b l e . (cont.) s t r i k e c a p a b i l i t y or of s t r a t e g i c " s u p e r i o r i t y ; " acqui-escence i n "mutual assured destruction;" devaluation of the p o l i t i c a l u t i l i t y of s t r a t e g i c power; the action-reaction model of the arms race; and the v i r t u e s of " s t r a t e g i c s t a b i l i t y . " The bulk of the evidence i n d i c a t e s that much i n t e r n a l disagreement existed within policy-making c i r c l e s i n the Soviet Union (as i t did within the United States); but that a s i z a b l e and (cont.) - 67 -We have already mentioned the fears expressed by some on the American side that the Soviets may not have r e a l l y accepted the p r i n c i p l e of p a r i t y , or of mutual second-strike c a p a b i l i t y , and may i n f a c t be continuing to pursue a course aimed at some 117 kind of f i r s t - s t r i k e c a p a b i l i t y . Even i f the l a t t e r remains outside of t h e i r grasp, however, some contend that mere margi-n a l numerical s u p e r i o r i t y (or even p a r i t y ) may so embolden them, while at the same time d i s c r e d i t i n g the U.S. i n the eyes of the world, that they may revert to the kind of aggressive "forward" strategy c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of t h e i r early postwar f o r e i g n p o l i c y . Undoubtedly, these concerns about the opponent's willingness to accept p a r i t y (and i t s concomitant of s t a b i l i t y ) have been mir-rored by analysts on the Soviet side. The l a t t e r may be reading more than i s warranted in t o the frequent statements of American m i l i t a r y men and s t r a t e g i s t s e x t o l l i n g the v i r t u e s of a f i r s t -s t r i k e c a p a b i l i t y . I t i s true that President Nixon and members of h i s Administration were l o a t h to use the precise term " p a r i -t y , " s u b s t i t u t i n g f o r i t the more neutr a l one of " s u f f i c i e n -cy," and p e r s i s t e d i n c h a r a c t e r i z i n g American power as being "second to none," rather than merely the approximate equal of (cont.) i n f l u e n t i a l body of opinion had indeed, to a remarkable degree, appropriated concepts from the American s t r a t e g i c and arms control l e x i c o n . (119) * For evidence on the Soviet side, see e s p e c i a l l y Caldwell (1971) ;tHolloway (1971); and Kahan (1972)', pp. 417-418. ** Cf. Joseph I.Coffey: "arms control agreements with the USSR ...simply represent a mutual recognition of r e a l i t y , which i s that meaningful s t r a t e g i c s u p e r i o r i t y i s not possib-l e . " (120) - 68 -the Soviet's. Nevertheless, that a rough measure of " p a r i t y " — , as well as acquiescence i n mutual second-strike c a p a b i l i t y or "assured d e s t r u c t i o n " — h a s been enshrined within the bounds of the present agreements, f o r as long as they l a s t , seems incon-xa t r o v e r t i b l e . Several witnesses before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee pointed out that, i f the Soviets have i n -deed gained any psychological edge from the marginal numerical s u p e r i o r i t y granted them by the SALT agreement on offensive m i s s i l e s , i t w i l l have been due p r i m a r i l y to the alarmist * Resulting i n such tortuous exchanges before the Senate For-eign Relations. Committee as the fo l l o w i n g : Senator AIKEN. F i r s t , does the Administration believe that we were able to negotiate these agreements because we have what the Mansfield-Scott r e s o l u t i o n c a l l s a defense posture second to none? Is that r i g h t ? ' Secretary ROGERS. Yes, s i r , that i s r i g h t . Senator AIKEN. We have a defense posture second to none and does the Soviet Union also believe that i t must nego-t i a t e from a p o s i t i o n of strength? Secretary ROGERS. Well, I would assume so, yes, Senator. Senator AIKEN. At the next round of negotiations which nation do you think w i l l have the greatest strength from which to negotiate? Secretary ROGERS. Well, I think i t i s d i f f i c u l t to an-swer that question. We believe we are second to none. I am sure that the Soviet Union f e e l s that i t i s strong and i s able to negotiate from a p o s i t i o n of strength; so we enter, assuming the Congress supports us on the requests we are making, c e r t a i n l y generally supports u s — I don't mean to every item, but we get general support—then I would think we would both enter the second phase of the SALT t a l k s from a p o s i t i o n of relative, strength. Senator AIKEN. I t w i l l be of equal strength. Secretary ROGERS. Well, as I say, I hes i t a t e to say equal. We c e r t a i n l y are both i n a strong p o s i t i o n . We think we are. We don't think there i s anyone ahead of us, put i t that way. (121) For an equally befuddled discussion of the " s u f f i c i e n c y " con-cept, see the same Hearings, p.21. ** In Wolfgang Panofsky's words, "The T A B M ] t r e a t y i s equiva-l e n t to a j o i n t d eclaration that mutual deterrence (cont.) - 69 -utterances of those i n the United States c a l l i n g f o r a more v i -gorous arms program. Discussion of the f a c t o r s f a l l i n g under the category of "nature of the arms control system" w i l l be deferred u n t i l a f t e r a n a lysis of the i n d i v i d u a l r e s t r i c t i o n s and l i m i t a t i o n s of the agreements, by which time t h e i r precise parameters w i l l have become c l e a r e r . I I . ABM'S. The only permanent agreement to come out of SALT I was a Treaty on the L i m i t a t i o n of A n t i - B a l l i s t i c M i s s i l e Systems. In great contrast to the Interim Agreement on Offensive M i s s i l e s , t h i s was a t r u l y comprehensive and a i r t i g h t document. Not only did i t l i m i t ABM's to two s i t e s of 100 m i s s i l e s each on each, side ( A r t . I l l ) , but i t absolutely forbade the development, t e s t i n g , or deployment of sea-, a i r - , space-, or mobile land-based v a r i e t i e s of such systems (Art.V), which were broadly de-f i n e d to include any "system to counter s t r a t e g i c b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s or t h e i r elements i n f l i g h t t r a j e c t o r y " ( A r t . I I ) (thus comprehending s o - c a l l e d " e x o t i c " ABM's, based on future tech-n o l o g i e s — s u c h as l a s e r s — n o t r e q u i r i n g m i s s i l e i n t e r c e p t o r s ) . (cont.) i s the s t r a t e g i c p o l i c y of both the U.S. and the USSR and i m p l i c i t l y denies the usefulness of a nuclear war-fighting strategy." (122) * See," f o r example, the testimony of former Assistant Secretary of Defense f o r International Security Affairs,^ Paul C.Warnke: " I t can give them a p o l i t i c a l advantage i f , and only i f , we appear to concede i t to them by depreciating our own strength." (123) ** But there seems to be some ambiguity here, as I n i t i a l e d Statement "E" of the "Agreed Interpretations" provides f o r future negotiations " i n the event ABM systems based (cont.) - 70 -Also p r o h i b i t e d were the attainment of a "rapid re-load" or mul-t i p l e warhead c a p a b i l i t y f o r ABM launchers (Art.V); the upgra-ding of conventional a n t i - a i r c r a f t m i s s i l e s , launchers, or radars to an ABM c a p a b i l i t y (Art.VI); the future deployment of any "radars f o r early warning of; s t r a t e g i c b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e attack except at l o c a t i o n s along the periphery of i t s n a t i o n a l t e r r i t o r y and oriented outward"(Art.VI); and the t r a n s f e r to other states or outside of the n a t i o n a l t e r r i t o r y of the P a r t i e s of ABM systems or t h e i r components or technology.(Art.IX; and I n i t i a l e d Statement "G" of the "Agreed Interpretations") Of the two s i t e s permitted, one was to be centered on the Party's c a p i t a l c i t y (or "National Command Authority", i n the jargon), and the other i n i t s ICBM f i e l d s . The radars permitted i n each case were s p e c i f i e d as to exact number, type, and s i z e . ( A r t . I l l ) Thus we can see that the ABM Treaty was both q u a n t i t a t i v e and q u a l i t a t i v e i n nature. I t s primary s i g n i f i c a n c e l a y i n i t s c o d i f i c a t i o n of the p r i n c i p l e of "mutual assured destruction," i . e . , the absolute v u l n e r a b i l i t y of each side to the other's offensive nuclear forces; the perpetual holding hostage of the c i v i l i a n populations of the two states. I t was a p r i n c i p l e not without i t s opponents, however. E f f e c t on S t r a t e g i c S t a b i l i t y ; Magnitude or Nature of Destruc- t i o n The i n i t i a l deployment and imminent expansion of ABM (cont.) on other p h y s i c a l p r i n c i p l e s and i n c l u d i n g components capable of s u b s t i t u t i n g f o r ABM interceptor m i s s i l e s , ABM laun-chers, or ABM radars are created i n the f u t u r e . " - 71 -systems on both, sides were probably the .greatest s i n g l e spur to SALT, threatening as they did both d i s r u p t i o n of the s t r a t e g i c balance and a c o s t l y new arms race. Thus the preamble to the ABM Treaty stated, among other things, the P a r t i e s ' conviction "that e f f e c t i v e measures to l i m i t a n t i - b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e sys-tems would be a sub s t a n t i a l f a c t o r i n curbing the race i n s t r a -t e g i c offensive arms and would lead to a decrease i n the r i s k of outbreak of war i n v o l v i n g nuclear.weapons." ABM's were viewed as a threat to the s t a b i l i t y of the s t r a t e g i c balance i n at l e a s t three ways. (1) By cas t i n g into doubt the a b i l i t y of a state to e f f e c t i v e l y d e l i v e r i t s r e t a l i a t o r y blow against an aggressor, they wpuld increase the incentive of either party i n a c r i s i s to pre-empt. (2) At the same time, they would en-hance the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of a successful f i r s t - s t r i k e by i n c r e a -sing the number of enemy m i s s i l e s which could s a f e l y be allowed to survive such an attack. (3) And f i n a l l y , they promised r e -newal of an intensive offensive-defensive arms race, i n which the side f e e l i n g i t s e l f at a disadvantage with respect to ABM's would seek to overcome i t s i n f e r i o r i t y through sheer numbers of offensive v e h i c l e s , i n the hopes thereby of "saturating" the defense. Apart from the economic costs of such action, the general climate of uncertainty thereby created, as well as the heightened chances of accident or command-and-control f a i l u r e (which, must be assumed to vary with the absolute number of wea-pons a v a i l a b l e ) , would bode i l l f o r r a t i o n a l s t r a t e g i c c a l c u l a -t i o n . The paradox i s that while e f f e c t i v e l y promoting one of the - 72 -t r a d i t i o n a l g o a l s of arms c o n t r o l , r e d u c t i o n of the t h r e a t of the outbreak of war, a ban on ABM's at the same time j e o p a r d i z e s a cognate purpose, by e n s u r i n g a g r e a t e r degree of d e s t r u c t i o n and h i g h e r c i v i l i a n c a s u a l t i e s i n the however u n l i k e l y event of one n e v e r t h e l e s s o c c u r r i n g . The ABM i s , a f t e r a l l , an e s s e n t i a l -l y d e f e n s i v e weapon. I f i t c o u l d be p e r f e c t e d t o the p o i n t where i t s r e l i a b i l i t y was beyond doubt and i t s c o s t - e f f e c t i v e n e s s not u n f a v o u r a b l e i n comparison w i t h t h a t of the o f f e n s e , i t c o u l d change the whole f a c e of n u c l e a r s t r a t e g y , by f r e e i n g c i v i l i a n p o p u l a t i o n s of t h e i r "mutual hostage" s t a t u s . Those who f a v o u r such a development have become known as members of the "damage l i m i t a t i o n " s c h o o l , as d i s t i n c t from the more orthodox propo-124. n e n t s of " a s s u r e d d e s t r u c t i o n . " They i n c l u d e a number of d i s -t i n g u i s h e d s c i e n t i s t s and arms c o n t r o l e x p e r t s , and t h e i r view has much t o commend i t s e l f i n t h e o r y . The e x i s t i n g "balance of t e r r o r , " i m p l y i n g as i t does mass s l a u g h t e r i n the event t h a t d e t e r r e n c e s h o u l d f a i l , i s without q u e s t i o n a m o r a l l y r e p r e h e n -s i b l e one. Somewhere a l o n g the l i n e , however, a c h o i c e would seem t o have t o be made between damage l i m i t a t i o n and war r e -d u c t i o n ; some k i n d of a t r a d e - o f f between the two seems abso-l u t e l y u n a v o i d a b l e . Given the l i m i t e d s o p h i s t i c a t i o n of p r e s e n t t e c h n o l o g y , of c o u r s e , e f f e c t i v e " a r e a d e f e n s e " a g a i n s t incoming ICBM's i s a m a n i f e s t i m p o s s i b i l i t y . Most "damage l i m i t a t i o n " s u p p o r t e r s do not d i s p u t e t h i s ; what they o b j e c t t o i s the apparent f o r e c l o s i n g f o r a l l time of the o p t i o n of s t r a t e g i c defense. I t can be a r -gued, however, t h a t even were t e c h n i c a l c a p a b i l i t i e s q u i t e - 73 -adequate, the consequent reduction i n l e v e l s of destruction would s t i l l not "be worth the p r i c e of the greatly increased chances (according to fundamental deterrence theory) of such wars "breaking out i n the f i r s t place. Furthermore, i t i s hi g h l y u n l i k e l y that the ABM c a p a b i l i t i e s of the protagonists w i l l de-velop on a p e r f e c t l y symmetrical b a s i s , i n the absence of which the temptation on the part of the leading Power to launch a f i r s t - s t r i k e i n a moment of severe c r i s i s might be simply too great to r e s i s t . Though, l e s s of a " q u i c k - f i x " s o l u t i o n , a more acceptable way of gradually eroding the "balance of t e r r o r " and' rep l a c i n g i t by a more humane system would be simple mutual and balanced reductions i n the numbers of offensive m i s s i l e s — t h e incentive f o r which should be enhanced by the p r o h i b i t i o n of ABM's. There i s also a school of thought which distinguishes be-tween "area-defense" ABM*s, f r e e l y acknowledged to be destabi-l i z i n g ; and s o - c a l l e d "hard-point" ABM's, which, i t i s claimed, i n t h e i r r o l e of pro t e c t i n g the f i x e d land-based deterrent of each side, would serve to enhance s t r a t e g i c s t a b i l i t y . E f f e c -t i v e "hard-point" ABM defense i s widely believed to be more * It i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note that the na t i o n a l c a p i t a l area ABM systems permitted by the Treaty were also r a t i o n a l i z e d on the grounds of s t a b i l i t y . As Secretary of State Rogers put i t : "ABM coverage at the n a t i o n a l c a p i t a l s w i l l permit protection f o r the n a t i o n a l command authority against a l i g h t attack, or an accidental or unauthorized launch of a l i m i t e d number of missiles,, and thus decrease the chances that such an event would t r i g g e r a nuclear exchangei In addition, i t w i l l buy some time against a major attack, and i t s radars would help to provide valuable warning." (125) See also the testimony of Ambassador Gerard C.Smith i n the same Hearings, pp. 53-54. - 74 -t e c h n o l o g i c a l l y f e a s i b l e than the area protection v a r i e t y . 1 2 ^ The major problem here, however, l i e s i n a l l a y i n g the fears of one's opponent that a "hard-point" ABM does not i n f a c t possess area-defense c a p a b i l i t i e s ( e s p e c i a l l y where the ICBM's being protected are located i n the v i c i n i t y of "counter-value" t a r -g e ts), or constitute a p o t e n t i a l base on which to b u i l d an area-127 defense network. Both such r a t i o n a l e s were prof f e r e d i n sup-port of the U.S. Administration's o r i g i n a l request f o r a "Safe-guard" system ostensibly intended p r i m a r i l y to defend Minuteman m i s s i l e s i t e s . In i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s , where appearances often count f o r as much as r e a l i t y , i f one side merely believes that i t s opponent has or might have such a c a p a b i l i t y , then the con-sequences f o r s t r a t e g i c s t a b i l i t y would be equally as grave as i f i t were i n f a c t true. Monetary Cost Another of the chief drawbacks of ABM defense h i g h l i g h t e d i n the debate on the U.S. Administration's proposed program i n the l a t e 1960's was i t s sheer f i n a n c i a l cost. I n i t i a l estimates put at no l e s s than $50 b i l l i o n the p r i c e - t a g of a " t h i c k " area-defense system f o r the United States, and worried members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee pointed out that, given aver-age cost over-runs on e x i s t i n g weapons systems of from 220 to 700 per cent, the ultimate f i g u r e could reach the t r u l y stag-gering neighbourhood of $400 b i l l i o n . While the l a t t e r might well have proven w i l d l y exaggerated, even Administration e s t i -mates i n the tens of b i l l i o n s of d o l l a r s were more than s u f f i c i e n t - 75 -to s t r i k e t e r r o r i n t o the hearts of economy-minded Congressmen and provoke outrage among the public at large, i n view of the questionable u t i l i t y of the system. As i s well known, plans f o r such a comprehensive network were soon discarded (or at l e a s t put i n cold storage), and the Pentagon was forced to accept a much-emasculated system, re-named "Safeguard." Nevertheless, U.S. savings on projected programs made pos-s i b l e as a r e s u l t of the ABM Treaty have been p r i v a t e l y e s t i -mated at as high as $4.3 b i l l i o n per year f o r the period from f i s c a l 1973 to f i s c a l 1 9 7 9 . S e c r e t a r y of Defense L a i r d put the f i g u r e at $9.9 b i l l i o n , i n 1968 p r i c e s , f o r the entire period through the year 198l."^° Comparable savings f o r the Soviet Union have apparently not been estimated p u b l i c l y . I t should be remem-bered that these estimates completely neglect the vast expendi-tures on new offensive m i s s i l e s and other countermeasures which the two sides would have.felt compelled to deploy, had t h e i r respective ABM programs been allowed to continue unabated (see pp.51-52), as well as the tens (or perhaps hundreds) of b i l l i o n s of d o l l a r s f o r the "t h i c k " ABM systems which might i n e v i t a b l y 131 have followed. J U t i l i t y / R e l i a b i l i t y ; Harmful Side-Effects The American public might not have so objected to the pro-jected costs of the " t h i c k " ABM system had i t been convinced of both i t s u t i l i t y and r e l i a b i l i t y . Serious doubts about the tech-n i c a l c a p a b i l i t y of the system to knock down incoming ICBM's, i n view of the r e l a t i v e l y simple and inexpensive countermeasures - 76 -which would surely he deployed, together with the danger of mere-l y stimulating a s e l f - d e f e a t i n g defensive-offensive race i n crude numbers of m i s s i l e s ( i n which the offense was assumed to have the advantage, by v i r t u e of i t s greater economy), combined, how-ever, to cast doubt that such a system would a c t u a l l y f u l f i l i t s intended purpose and serve to enhance U.S. s e c u r i t y . A somewhat r e l a t e d f a c t o r , having to do with the possible harmful s i d e -e f f e c t s of the system once deployed, was embodied i n public op-p o s i t i o n to area-defense ABM on the grounds of the damage i t might cause, through h i g h - a l t i t u d e nuclear bursts, to the very c i t i e s i t was supposed to protect; as well as the ever-present threat of r a d i a t i o n leakage and accidental explosions or mis-f i r i n g s . There was also the f a c t that, i n Newhouse's words, "metropolitan ABM s i t e s were feared as p o t e n t i a l l i g h t n i n g rods 1^2 by people l i v i n g next door to the s i t e s . " J S u s c e p t i b i l i t y to V e r i f i c a t i o n V e r i f i c a t i o n did not represent much of a problem with r e s -pect to the l i m i t a t i o n s ' o n ABM's. In t e s t i f y i n g before a Sub-committee of the U.S. Sena,te Foreign Relations Committee i n 1970, Herbert' S c o v i l l e mentioned the necessity of building.complex radars, deploying large numbers of m i s s i l e s , and c a r r y i n g out extensive t r a i n i n g exercises as f a c t o r s ensuring the s u s c e p t i b i -l i t y of ABM systems to v e r i f i c a t i o n , as well as the i m p o s s i b i l i -ty of clandestinely upgrading a n t i - a i r c r a f t m i s s i l e defenses into an ABM network. He may also have been counting on the a b i -l i t y of the U.S. to compensate f o r any v i o l a t i o n s once detected, - 77 -as evidenced by h i s a s s e r t i o n t h a t "Such a program would un-doubtedly be .detected w i t h p l e n t y of l e a d time t o i n c o r p o r a t e counter measures t o permit p e n e t r a t i o n of .such a system. The U n i t e d S t a t e s a l r e a d y has developed and t e s t e d MIRV's capable of p e n e t r a t i n g an ABM system, and these could be deployed i n an emergency much more r a p i d l y than a S o v i e t ABM. n l33 Although r e s e r v a t i o n s have s i n c e been made by some c r i t i c s of the Treaty as t o the t e c h n i c a l c a p a b i l i t i e s of v e r i f y i n g such p r o h i b i t i o n s as those on r a p i d r e - l o a d c a p a b i l i t y , l a r g e ABM-type r a d a r s , and the upgrading of c o n v e n t i o n a l a i r - d e f e n s e f a c i l i t i e s 1 - ^ , the governments i n v o l v e d a p p a r e n t l y e n t e r t a i n e d few doubts about the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of s a t e l l i t e s u r v e i l l a n c e and t r a d i t i o n a l i n t e l l i -gence-gathering a c t i v i t i e s i n d e t e c t i n g any m i l i t a r i l y s i g n i f i -cant programs i n v i o l a t i o n of the accords. Thus Henry K i s s i n g e r — r e f e r r i n g t o the Agreements as a w h o l e — a s s u r e d U.S. Congress-men at a b r i e f i n g i n June, 1972, t h a t : ...we are c o n f i d e n t t h a t n a t i o n a l means of v e r i f i -c a t i o n are s u f f i c i e n t t o monitor the numerical l i m i t a -t i o n s of t h i s agreement. We s t u d i e d t h i s problem i n great d e t a i l before we entered n e g o t i a t i o n s , and determined f o r each, category of weapon the margin of e r r o r t h a t we thought our c o l -l e c t i o n systems had and what we c o u l d do t o r e a c t once we found out t h a t t h e r e had been a v i o l a t i o n . I n each of these cases, we found t h a t the margin was w e l l w i t h i n t o l e r a b l e l i m i t s . I n t h i s case, how-ever, where we are d e a l i n g w i t h numbers, we are con-f i d e n t t h a t the n a t i o n a l means of v e r i f i c a t i o n are s u f -f i c i e n t t o g i v e us the h i g h e s t degree of confidence t h a t t h i s agreement w i l l be l i v e d up t o , or t h a t we w i l l know i t almost immediately i f i t i s not l i v e d up t o . (135) One member of the Senates-Foreign R e l a t i o n s Committee, i n - 78 -exasperated response t o a p a r t i c u l a r l y b e l l i g e r e n t c r i t i c , s t a t e d t h a t "our people who handle those t h i n g s c l a i m t h a t our present d e t e c t i o n system i s s u p e r i o r t o o n - s i t e i n s p e c t i o n . " 1 ^ That was the c l o s e s t the p u b l i c ever came t o b e a r i n g about the substance of the Committee's completely " s a n i t i z e d " s e s s i o n w i t h the D i r e c t o r of the C.I.A., d e a l i n g w i t h v e r i f i c a t i o n capa-1^7 b x l i t x e s , on June 20,1972. J' I t i s d i f f i c u l t t o q u e s t i o n such a s s e r t i o n s , of course, because of the h i g h l y c l a s s i f i e d nature of the r e l e v a n t data. However, the f a c t t h a t one of the c h i e f ob-s t a c l e s t o a MIRV ban was a l l e g e d t o be the i n f e a s i b i l i t y of 1 ^ 8 adequate v e r i f i c a t i o n , w h i l e a p r o h i b i t i o n on s i m i l a r l y multiple-warhead-armed ABM's was allowed t o s l i p by v i r t u a l l y u nnoticed, would seem to i n d i c a t e t h a t assurance r e s t e d , i n the l a t t e r case, on something other than f o o l p r o o f t e c h n i c a l c a p a b i -l i t i e s . D i s t r i b u t i o n of C a p a b i l i t i e s Among S t a t e s I n the " s t r a t e g i c landscape" category, the only f a c t o r s d i r e c t l y i mpinging on ABM's i n p a r t i c u l a r have t o do w i t h the " d i s t r i b u t i o n of c a p a b i l i t i e s among s t a t e s . " While the U.S. may have had a c e r t a i n l e a d over the S o v i e t Union i n ABM t e c h n o l o -139 gy, J consonant w i t h i t s general t e c h n o l o g i c a l s u p e r i o r i t y , any such d i s p a r i t i e s i n t h i s regard were apparently i n s u f f i c i e n t t o have c o n s t i t u t e d a stumbling b l o c k t o agreement, as t h i s f a c t o r as a ne g a t i v e i n f l u e n c e i s nowhere mentioned i n accounts of the n e g o t i a t i n g h i s t o r y of the Treaty. Both s t a t e s had a l r e a d y beg-un t o deploy ABM's, and may be assumed t o have had c o n s i d e r a b l e - 79 -t e s t i n g experience with such, systems. In t h i s sense they might be s a i d to have reached some degree of " p a r i t y . " Furthermore, the lack of such c a p a b i l i t i e s by t h i r d - p a r t i e s , r e i n f o r c e d by the n o n - p r o l i f e r a t i o n provisions of the Treaty, made the task of achieving agreement that much easier. This i s not to say that the i n c i p i e n t nuclear c a p a b i l i t i e s of China, B r i t a i n , and France did not pose an obstacle to s p e c i f i c ABM r e s t r i c t i o n s (such as a "zero" mode-) by lending a c e r t a i n v a l i d i t y ( i n terms of both needs and c a p a b i l i t i e s ) to the arguments of "damage l i m i t a t i o n " proponents within the two states. Asymmetry i n Force-Structure and Strategy The asymmetry i n the force-structure and strategy of the two sides ( i n that the o r i g i n a l Soviet ABM was intended to pro-t e c t i t s c a p i t a l region, that of the U.S. one of i t s ICBM f i e l d s ) posed a problem only i n s o f a r as i t was consequently deemed necessary, apparently s o l e l y f o r the sake of symmetry, to allow each side to b u i l d a second system—in which i t had h i t h e r t o expressed l i t t l e or no i n t e r e s t 1 ^ " 0 — i n order to match the other's f i r s t one. D i s p a r i t i e s i n the Cost-Effectiveness of Defense and Offense Intimately r e l a t e d to the question of " m i l i t a r y u t i l i t y , " * There remains considerable difference of opinion over the damage-limitation c a p a b i l i t i e s of the systems permitted under the ABM Treaty (at l e a s t within the Soviet Union), with some observers emphasizing t h e i r adequacy i n dealing with the r e l a t i v e l y unsophisticated and l i g h t attacks of which the l e s s e r nuclear Powers are deemed capable, and others s t r e s s i n g the ease with, which they might be (cont.) - 80 -t h i s " t e c h n i c a l " f a c t o r may have been the most i n s t r u m e n t a l of a l l i n i n d u c i n g the apparent acquiescence of the two Powers i n mutual s e c o n d - s t r i k e c a p a b i l i t y or "assured d e s t r u c t i o n , " and thus ( i n d i r e c t l y ) t h e i r w i l l i n g n e s s t o s e v e r e l y r e s t r i c t ABM systems. As P a u l Warnke put i t : "the ABM t r e a t y . c o n s t i t u t e s r e a l i s t i c r e c o g n i t i o n of the f a c t t h a t no p h y s i c a l defense on any known or f o r e s e e a b l e technology i s availa.ble a g a i n s t a nu-c l e a r a t t a c k of any s i g n i f i c a n t s i z e . " 1 ^ " These sentiments were echoed l a t e r by Senator Cooper of the F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s Commit-tee : " I t h i n k the t r e a t y i t s e l f i s testimony t o the f a c t t h a t 14-2 both c o u n t r i e s know they can e a s i l y overcome an ABM system." ^ Former Senator Joseph S.Clark was a l i t t l e h a rsher i n h i s v e r -d i c t : "The ABM Agreement i s a f r a u d because the m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s of both c o u n t r i e s know t h a t the ABM w i l l i n a l l l i k e l i h o o d not work under b a t t l e c o n d i t i o n s . n l 4 3 Domestic P o l i t i c s Of the p o l i t i c a l f a c t o r s , we s h a l l mention j u s t t w o — i n a d d i t i o n t o those understood, throughout the p r e c e d i n g d i s c u s -s i o n , of c o u r s e — o n the American s i d e : the enhanced i n t e r e s t of the general p u b l i c i n the i s s u e due t o the c i v i l defense nature of the proposed system's m i s s i o n (as w e l l as t o i t s l o c a l e ) ; and the f a c t t h a t the only m i l i t a r y s e r v i c e w i t h a s t r o n g bureaucra-t i c i n t e r e s t i n ABM's was the Army, whereas the A i r Force and (cont.) overcome, e i t h e r by s a t u r a t i o n or through r e l a t i v e l y simple t e c h n i c a l countermeasures. In any case, a c c o r d i n g t o John Newhouse, t h e r e i s l i t t l e doubt t h a t the i n i t i a l S o v i e t ABM system was intended "to p r o t e c t Moscow from p r i m i t i v e Chinese n u c l e a r weapons." (144) - 81 -Navy might on the contrary have been expected to d i s p l a y a no-table lack of enthusiasm f o r i t , i n view of the threat which deployment by the other side would have posed to the successful f u l f i l m e n t of t h e i r respective offensive s t r a t e g i c missions. I t may be true that, as John Newhouse points out, m i l i t a r y s o l i d a -r i t y normally tends to coalesce when i t comes to the question of procuring new systems, the i n d i v i d u a l services expecting mutual support i n t h i s regard. However, i t i s d i f f i c u l t to avoid the presumption that, when i t came to the crunch at SALT, t h i s f a c -t o r may ha.ve been i n f l u e n t i a l i n accounting f o r the acquiescence of the J o i n t Chiefs of S t a f f i n the r e s t r i c t i o n s . On the Soviet side, where s t r a t e g i c defense has t r a d i t i o n -a l l y been a high p r i o r i t y item, i t was an e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t story. There the p o l i t i c a l leadership showed considerably more strength i n o v e r r i d i n g the general p r e d i s p o s i t i o n s of t h e i r m i l i t a r y establishment, ^ J although again, i n t e r - s e r v i c e r i v a l -ry ( c e r t a i n l y , the competing demands of the general-purpose f o r c e s ) 1 ^ may have played a r o l e of some kind. I I I . OFFENSIVE MISSILES. Considerably l e s s comprehensive i n scope, though by no means l e s s complex, was the second of the agreements produced by SALT I, the "Interim Agreement...on Certain Measures With Res-pect to the L i m i t a t i o n of S t r a t e g i c Offensive Arms." This accord a f f e c t e d both the ICBM and SLBM components of the s t r a t e g i c of-fensive force of each side, but not t h e i r hea.vy bombers, IR/ MRBM's, or forward-based systems; and was even more notably - 82 -d e f i c i e n t i n q u a l i t a t i v e , as opposed to q u a n t i t a t i v e , r e s t r i c -t i o n s upon the offensive arms race. What i t did provide f o r was, e s s e n t i a l l y , nothing more than a freeze on m i s s i l e launchers and b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e submarines (SSBN's) at the number then deploy-ed or under construction (Arts.I and I I I ) , that i s , at 1,054 ICBM's, 710 SLBM's, and 44 submarines f o r the U.S.; and 1,618 ICBM fs, 950 SLBM's, and 62 submarines f o r the Soviet Union (Pro-t o c o l to the Interim Agreement). In a d d i t i o n , the two sides were pro h i b i t e d from converting e x i s t i n g " l i g h t " ICBM's into "heavier" ones (Art.II) , or " s i g n i f i c a n t l y " increasing (by X H *K more than 10-15 percent) the s i z e of t h e i r s i l o s (to accommo-date such "heavier" m i s s i l e s ) . This had the e f f e c t of f r e e z i n g the number of "heavy" m i s s i l e s , which only the Soviets possessed,, at 3 1 3 . c h i e f defect of the Agreement l a y i n i t s f a i l u r e to p r o h i b i t the MIRVing of i n d i v i d u a l m i s s i l e s , by which process the number of nuclear warheads i n each arsenal could be m u l t i -p l i e d many times, as well as improvements i n accuracy. E f f e c t Upon S t r a t e g i c S t a b i l i t y The prime reasons f o r r e s t r i c t i n g offensive nuclear mis-s i l e s were the same as those f o r c o n t r o l l i n g nuclear weapons * The only s p e c i f i c numbers mentioned i n the Agreement appeared i n i t s Protocol and applied to SLBM's and m i s s i l e submarines. This was because the Soviet Union refused to p u b l i c l y v e r i f y the number of i t s ICBM's i n comparison with U.S. i n t e l l i g e n c e estimates. (148) ** The precise phrasing of the r e s t r i c t i o n , as understood by the U.S., was a masterpiece of gobbledegook. According to t h e i r u n i l a t e r a l statement of May 26, 1972, appended to the Agreement, "The United States would consider any ICBM having a volume s i g n i f i c a n t l y greater than that of (cont.) - 8 3 -generally: the hope of reducing the destruction which would be suffered i n the event of war (though, t h i s may have been more of a l a t e n t f a c t o r i n the case of SALT); and the attempt to a/vert a c o s t l y and p o t e n t i a l l y d e s t a b i l i z i n g new arms race which i t was believed would i n e v i t a b l y follow, i n a f a m i l i a r a c t i o n -r e a c t i o n c y c l e , the threatened s u p e r i o r i t y of one side over the other. The Americans, i n p a r t i c u l a r , were worried about the i n -troduction of the "heavy" Soviet SS-9 m i s s i l e , whose large pay-load capacity made i t a threat to t h e i r own Minuteman land-based ICBM's."'"^^ As f o r the l a t t e r , t h e i r inherent v u l n e r a b i l i t y — i n comparison with that of bombers and SLBM's—posed a threat to s t a b i l i t y , and should perhaps alone have been s u f f i c i e n t reason to p r o h i b i t them. I t was b e l i e v e d — o r purportedly b e l i e v e d — i n the U.S. that doubts as to the s u r v i v a b i l i t y of even just one branch of the e x i s t i n g " s t r a t e g i c t r i a d " would be s u f f i c i e n t to cause d e s t a b i l i z i n g conditions, however, and the expression " f i r s t - s t r i k e c a p a b i l i t y " came to be used synonymously with counter-ICBM c a p a b i l i t y . SLBM's were treated with much greater indulgence (except i n s o f a r as they posed a threat to a i r ba,ses or command-and-control networks) 1^ 0 because t h e i r smaller s i z e and reduced accuracy (at l e a s t f o r the present) made them emi--151* nently unsuitable as counterforce weapons. Also on the (cont.) the l a r g e s t l i g h t ICBM now operational on e i t h e r side to be a heavy ICBM." Neither "significantly...greater" nor " l i g h t ICBM" were anywhere defined, however! *** I n i t i a l e d Statement "H" and Common Understanding "A" of the "Agreed Inter p r e t a t i o n s . " * In NewhouseJs words: "A stable s t r a t e g i c weapon should be ca-pable of delayed response; i t should be invulnerable; and i t should be unambiguously deprived of what i s c a l l e d a. f i r s t -s t r i k e , or damage-limiting, c a p a b i l i t y . Put d i f f e r e n t l y , ( c o n t . ) agenda were such developments as MIRV's, which, once a s u f f i -c i e n t l y high accuracy were achieved, would also constitute a threat to the f i x e d land-based deterrent of each side; and mo-b i l e land-based ICBM's, characterized as d e s t a b i l i z i n g because 1 5 2 of the d i f f i c u l t y of v e r i f y i n g t h e i r numbers J and hence capa-b i l i t i e s ( i n terms of f i r s t - s t r i k e p o t e n t i a l ) . As we have seen, however, c e r t a i n of these items (notably MIRV's and mobile land-based m i s s i l e s ) escaped l i m i t a t i o n , while others did not. The answer why may l i e p a r t l y i n the r e l a t i v e c a p a b i l i t i e s of the two states, as well as i n the nature of the agreements reached i n toto. S u s c e p t i b i l i t y to V e r i f i c a t i o n With, respect to v e r i f i c a t i o n , Yie have already noted how sheer numbers of m i s s i l e s were deemed highly susceptible to the "national t e c h n i c a l means of v e r i f i c a t i o n " ( i . e . , p r i m a r i l y sa-t e l l i t e and a e r i a l reconnaissance) provided f o r i n the SALT agreements. In t h i s connection i t might be mentioned that both the ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement pro h i b i t e d the P a r t i e s from " i n t e r f e r i n g " with such v e r i f i c a t i o n a c t i v i t i e s or using " d e l i -berate concealment measures" to reduce t h e i r effectiveness (Art. XII of the ABM Treaty; Art.V of the Interim Agreement). Consi-derably l e s s c e r t a i n , however, was the capa.bility of the Par-t i e s to u n i l a t e r a l l y detect q u a l i t a t i v e developments i n offen-sive m i s s i l e weaponry. With, regard to MIRV's, f o r example, i t (cont.) i t should not be able to disarm some portion of the other side's f o r c e s , or diminish them appreciably." (153) Pre-sent-day SLBM's f i t a l l of these c r i t e r i a . ' - 85 -was suggested that even on-site inspection might be inadequate to v e r i f y a ban, as multiple warheads could be s e c r e t l y stored away and then f i t t e d on t h e i r launch v e h i c l e s at a moment's no-"154-t i c e . V e r i f i c a t i o n of such weapons being thus i n f e a s i b l e at the production or deployment stages, the only hope l a y i n con-t r o l l i n g them during t h e i r t e s t i n g phase, before they had been c e r t i f i e d s u f f i c i e n t l y r e l i a b l e and accurate f o r deployment. Once such time had passed (as i t had, f o r the Americans at l e a s t , by the time of the Interim Agreement), the Powers would no l o n -ger be able to depend on the t e c h n i c a l f e a s i b i l i t y of v e r i f y i n g a ban. V e r i f i c a t i o n of a mobile land-based m i s s i l e p r o h i b i t i o n was a f a r simpler matter, i t being noted that detection of just one such weapon i n the f i e l d would co n s t i t u t e proof of v i o l a -t i o n . 1 5 5 P o l i t i c o - M i l i t a r y U t i l i t y The unquestioned m i l i t a r y u t i l i t y of MIRV's represented a f u r t h e r obstacle to agreement on t h e i r p r o h i b i t i o n ; a more cost-e f f e c t i v e means of d e l i v e r i n g nuclear weapons could scarcely be 156 devised. J S t i l l , one might, argue, the e x i s t i n g degree of over-k i l l embodied i n the nuclear arsenals of each, side makes the added destructive power inherent i n MIRV's quite superfluous, e s p e c i a l l y considering that the threat which they were o r i g i n a l -l y designed to counter—ABM systems—has been eliminated by mutual agreement. Such reasoning seems quixotic i n the face * John Newhouse points out that MIRVing Minuteman i s not only unnecessary, but may p o s s i b l y prove p o s i t i v e l y harmful: "there seems l i t t l e sense i n spending $6 b i l l i o n to modify a (cont.) - 86 -of the sheer dynamism of m i l i t a r y technology and t h e i r possible counterforce r o l e , however. 7 D i s t r i b u t i o n of C a p a b i l i t i e s Among States In terms of the d i s t r i b u t i o n of c a p a b i l i t i e s , approximate p a r i t y i n o v e r a l l offensive strength may be said to have been i n e f f e c t at the time of SALT since, as we have previously noted, although the Soviets maintained s u p e r i o r i t y i n numbers of mis-s i l e s and "throw-weight," the Americans had a c l e a r e r margin i n numbers of warheads and "equivalent megatonnage," as well as general technological s u p e r i o r i t y . This i s not to say that the U.S. was not at a considerable disadvantage i n not having an on-going program of new m i s s i l e construction, as did the Soviets , but, more importantly, t h e i r p o t e n t i a l c a p a b i l i t y , over the long haul, was at l e a s t the match of the l a t t e r — a n d i t i s not being completely naive to suggest that the Soviets may have r e a l i z e d t h i s and acted accordingly. As f o r MIRV's, the wide U.S. technological lead may have indeed constituted a stumbling block, with the Americans u n w i l l i n g to r e l i n q u i s h i t and the Soviets at l e a s t equally as averse to being frozen i n t o a p o s i -t i o n of permanent i n f e r i o r i t y . The r e s u l t was that the U.S., (cont.) weapons system that one day w i l l be vulnerable, hence unstable. Indeed, i f Minuteman i s vulnerable, p u t t i n g MIRV's on more than h a l f of them should only increase any temptation Mos-cow would have to eliminate the force i n a c r i s i s s i t u a t i o n . In short, the MIRV's merely increase the 'bonus' the adversary gets by s t r i k i n g f i r s t . " (158) * As Henry K i s s i n g e r put i t , with reference to SLBM's, "The United States was i n a rather complex p o s i t i o n to recommend a submarine deal since we are not b u i l d i n g any and the Soviets were b u i l d i n g eight or nine a year, which i s n ' t the most b r i l -l i a n t bargaining p o s i t i o n - I would recommend people to (cont.) - 87 -while proposing a ban on MIRV's, attached the c l e a r l y unaccep-table (and under the circumstances, t e c h n i c a l l y p o i n t l e s s ) pro-v i s o of on-site inspection; and the Soviets responded by sugges-t i n g a completely u n v e r i f i a b l e (and hence, from the American 1 5 9 perspective at l e a s t , equally unacceptable) production ban. C l e a r l y , neither side was very inte r e s t e d i n l i m i t i n g MIRV's at t h i s stage of the game. Neither side had apparently yet deployed a land-mobile 1 f\C\ ICBM system , so d i s p a r i t i e s i n t h i s case posed no p a r t i c u l a r problem, except that, given the USSR's geo-strategic p o s i t i o n as a predominantly land-based Power, such m i s s i l e s would be of greater benefit or u t i l i t y to them than to the United States. This might account f o r the great reluctance they displayed at SALT even to discuss such r e s t r i c t i o n s . I t may also p a r t l y explain why i t was found impossible to si n g l e out land-based ICBM's as promising candidates f o r t o t a l p r o h i b i t i o n ( i n view of 162 t h e i r inherent v u l n e r a b i l i t y ) . But such considerations belong more i n the category of asymmetrical e f f e c t s upon the i n t e r e s t s of the two sides of the p a r t i c u l a r arms control system i n ques-t i o n (to be examined s h o r t l y ) . Domestic P o l i t i c s Of p o l i t i c a l f a c t o r s , we might merely state the converse of what we said with regard to ABM's. F i r s t ( i n the United States (cont.) f i n d themselves i n . " (I63) As Newhouse puts i t : "the honors i n an open race f o r s t r a t e -gic advantage should go to the f a s t e s t horse on technology's t r a c k — t h e United States. Nobody knows that better than (cont.) - 88 -a t l e a s t ) , p u b l i c i n t e r e s t was not n e a r l y so aroused i n the f i e l d of o f f e n s i v e m i s s i l e s , which people ha.ve l o n g become a c -customed t o l i v i n g w i t h ; which are n e i t h e r as h i g h l y " v i s i b l e " n o r as u b i q u i t o u s as massive ABM systems would have been; and which are c o n s i d e r a b l y l e s s expensive. Second, the q u e s t i o n of o f f e n s i v e m i s s i l e s drove t o the h e a r t of the i n t e r e s t s of two v e r y p o w e r f u l s e r v i c e s , t h e Navy and the A i r F o r c e , whose com-b i n e d weight must have been q u i t e i r r e s i s t i b l e j. a t l e a s t w i t h i n the m i l i t a r y e s t a b l i s h m e n t s of both s t a t e s . These f a c t o r s t o -g e t h e r undoubtedly p l a y e d a p a r t i n e n s u r i n g t h a t the I n t e r i m Agreement was not more comprehensive, i n v o l v i n g , f o r example, a c t u a l r e d u c t i o n s i n the number of e x i s t i n g m i s s i l e s r a t h e r than the mere i m p o s i t i o n of c e i l i n g s on them. IV. THE NATURE OF THE SALT I AGREEMENTS. The two agreements reached a t SALT I cannot be viewed i n t o t a l i s o l a t i o n from each o t h e r ( n o r , f o r t h a t matter, from pos-s i b l e f o l l o w - o n agreements). They were, a f t e r a l l , a p a r t of the same t o t a l package, i n v o l v i n g t r a d e - o f f s of v a r i o u s k i n d s c u t -t i n g a c r o s s i n d i v i d u a l t y p es of weapons and even broad c a t e g o r -i e s , such as " d e f e n s i v e " a n d " o f f e n s i v e . " That i s why we have l e f t the "nature of the arms c o n t r o l system" c a t e g o r y of f a c t o r s u n t i l the end. ( c o n t . ) the s o l d i e r s and d i p l o m a t s of the S o v i e t Union." (I64) *** F o r a p a r t i c u l a r l y i l l u m i n a t i n g d i s c u s s i o n , see Newhouse (1973), e s p e c i a l l y pp. 179-184. - 89 -Type of R e s t r a i n t s Imposed To b e g i n w i t h , as we have p r e v i o u s l y emphasized, the type of r e s t r a i n t s imposed were i n the n a t u r e of c e i l i n g s on e x i s t i n g or on-going deployments, r a t h e r than a c t u a l r e d u c t i o n s i n f o r -c e s; as w e l l as, i n c e r t a i n cases (such as s e a - , a i r - , space-, and mobile l a n d - b a s e d ABM's), what might be termed " p r e v e n t a t i v e measures of non-armament." In a d d i t i o n , the I n t e r i m Agreement was l o n g on q u a n t i t y , s h o r t on q u a l i t y , a l t h o u g h the ABM T r e a t y d i d embody c e r t a i n important q u a l i t a t i v e r e s t r i c t i o n s ( s u c h as those on the s i z e and power of r a d a r s ) . Both a c c o r d s s e r v e d m a i n l y merely t o s a n c t i f y the s t a t u s quo, a t l e a s t as f a r as 165 numbers were concerned, the I n t e r i m Agreement b e i n g r a t h e r more e x p l i c i t , i n t h i s r e g a r d , than t h e ABM T r e a t y . In the l a t -t e r c a s e , on the American s i d e , a system f o r which C o n g r e s s i o n a l a p p r o p r i a t i o n s had been j u s t i f i e d p r i m a r i l y on the grounds of i t s s e r v i n g as a b a r g a i n i n g - c h i p i n SALT, was a l l o w e d t o c o n t i n u e , though perha.ps t r u n c a t e d ( t o what e x t e n t — i f a t a l l — depending on how many a d d i t i o n a l s i t e s — i f a n y — w o u l d have been funded by a b a s i c a l l y h o s t i l e C o n g r e s s ) . On the o t h e r s i d e , the one e x i s t i n g ABM system was l e g i t i m i z e d ; i t i s u n c l e a r what f u r t h e r deployments the S o v i e t s may have had planned. Ea.ch s i d e was p e r m i t t e d , as a k i n d of p e r v e r s e bonus, an a d d i t i o n a l s i t e — i n t h e American case, an NCA ( N a t i o n a l Command A u t h o r i t y ) de-f e n s e ; i n the S o v i e t one, a h a r d - p o i n t A B M — i n which i t had not even expressed i n t e r e s t p r i o r t o the n e g o t i a t i o n s . A t r u l y un-f o r t u n a t e form of "mutual e d u c a t i o n , " i t might be surmised, from - 90 -the arms c o n t r o l p o i n t of viewI With regard t o o f f e n s i v e m i s s i l e s , i t i s t r u e t h a t an ap-p a r e n t l y dynamic S o v i e t program wa,s s u c c e s s f u l l y h a l t e d at the seemingly a r b i t r a r y f i g u r e of 2,358. However, U.S. A d m i n i s t r a -t i o n c l a i m s of h a v i n g f o r e s t a l l e d f u t u r e S o v i e t deployments of i 67** at l e a s t 3,200 m i s s i l e s are probably exaggerated, as some 168 c r i t i c s contend. They p o i n t out t h a t the S o v i e t momentum had slowed down c o n s i d e r a b l y by the time of the SALT I s i g n a t u r e s , from a previous average r a t e of about 250 new ICBM's and 128 new 169 SLBM's per year. J As one witness t o l d the U.S. Senate F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s Committee, " I t i s not t e c h n i c a l l y i m p o s s i b l e f o r them t o b u i l d a t the r a t e of 200 ICBMs per y e a r , but i n f a c t t h e r e have been no new s t a r t s on ICBM launchers f o r about nine months, and i n the p r e c e d i n g year there were only 80 launchers c o n s t r u c -1 7 0 t e d or begun." As f o r "heavy" m i s s i l e s , " i n f a c t the S o v i e t s had only s t a r t e d 25 new l a r g e ICBM launchers s i n c e August, _ 1 7 1 * * * . , 1969." ' C e r t a i n l y , t h e r e i s no reason t o b e l i e v e t h a t S o v i e t deployments would n e c e s s a r i l y ha.ve continued at the previous * Although the S o v i e t s are allowed up t o 1,618 ICBM's and 950 SLBM's (making a t o t a l of 2,568 m i s s i l e s i n a l l ) , increments i n SLBM s t r e n g t h above the then-current l e v e l (deployed or under c o n s t r u c t i o n ) of about 740 m i s s i l e s were r e q u i r e d t o be o f f s e t by the r e t i r e m e n t of o l d e r ICBM's or SLBM's ( A r t . I l l and the P r o t o c o l t o the I n t e r i m Agreement), making an a d j u s -t e d t o t a l of 2,358 p e r m i t t e d . J u s t another example of the sometimes Byzantine s t r u c t u r e of the Agreements! ** In h i s press conference of June 29, 1972, P r e s i d e n t Nixon mentioned p o s s i b l e t o t a l s of 90 m i s s i l e - f i r i n g submarines and 2,600 land-based ICBM's. (172) He a l s o a l l u d e d t o S o v i e t " p l a n s " f o r 1,000 ABM's w i t h i n f i v e y e a r s . *** A c c o r d i n g t o Walter Clemens, "some members of the U.S. ne-g o t i a t i n g team b e l i e v e d t h a t the K r e m l i n simply agreed t o c e i l i n g s which a l r e a d y represented i t s u l t i m a t e t a r g e t s . " (173) George W.Rathjens expressed s i m i l a r sentiments (cont.) - 91 -high rate f o r the f u l l f i v e years covered by the Agreement, a l -though i t i s possible that cut-backs during the l a t t e r stages of SALT were prompted at l e a s t i n part by the prospects of a successful conclusion to the negotiations. These observations are not at a l l meant to detract from the h i s t o r i c importance or general s i g n i f i c a n c e of the SALT I agreements, but rather merely to i l l u s t r a t e f u r t h e r why i t may have been possible to reach agreement on them and not on more comprehensive measures. Nature of the V e r i f i c a t i o n and Enforcement Provisions With regard to the nature of the v e r i f i c a t i o n p r o v i sions, i t may be mentioned that the Soviet Union, true to t r a d i t i o n , s t e a d f a s t l y refused to permit any on-site inspection of f a c i l i -1 74. t i e s or t e r r i t o r y . 1^ Happily, however, "non-intrusive" s a t e l -l i t e reconnaissance and other u n i l a t e r a l "national t e c h n i c a l means" were deemed by both P a r t i e s as adequate f o r the purposes of v e r i f y i n g f u l f i l m e n t of the SALT I obl i g a t i o n s . The formal "enforcement procedure" of the Agreements remained s k e l e t a l and vague (thereby probably enhancing t h e i r a c c e p t a b i l i t y ) , consis-t i n g of the establishment of a Standing Consultative Commission (nevertheless a " f i r s t " i n Soviet-American s t r a t e g i c r e l a t i o n s ) empowered to "consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and r e l a t e d s i t u a t i o n s which may be c o n s i -dered ambiguous," and so on.(Art.XIII of the ABM Treaty; Art.VI (cont.) before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: " I t would not be s u r p r i s i n g i f those i n the Kremlin defend the agreement on grounds almost i d e n t i c a l to those used here, i . e . that i t w i l l not prevent t h e i r doing anything that would be done i n i t s absence." (175) - 92 -of the I n t e r i m Agreement) As has become customary, the r i g h t of each P a r t y t o withdraw from e i t h e r accord " i f i t decides t h a t e x t r a o r d i n a r y events...have j e o p a r d i z e d i t s supreme i n t e r e s t s " was r e c o g n i z e d , s u b j e c t t o s i x months' n o t i c e (Art.XV of the ABM Treaty; A r t . V I I I of the I n t e r i m Agreement). E f f e c t Upon R e l a t i v e C a p a b i l i t i e s and S e c u r i t y I n t e r e s t s F i n a l l y , we come t o the f a c t o r which, i n the heat of the n e g o t i a t i o n s themselves, may w e l l have played the most i n f l u e n -t i a l r o l e of a l l : the p e r c e i v e d e f f e c t of the c o n t r o l system upon the r e l a t i v e c a p a b i l i t i e s and s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t s of the P a r t i e s ; or the attempted a t t e n u a t i o n of u n i l a t e r a l advantage. Among a "Catalogue of O b j e c t i v e s and P r i n c i p l e s " on s t r a t e g i c arms l i m i t a t i o n dra.wn up by the U.S. and approved by the S o v i e t Union i n January 1969 was the maxim t h a t "The l i m i t a t i o n and r e -d u c t i o n i n s t r a t e g i c armaments should be so balanced t h a t n e i t h e r s i d e could o b t a i n any m i l i t a r y advantage and t h a t s e c u r i t y should be assured e q u a l l y f o r both, s i d e s . V i e w e d i n t h i s l i g h t , and beca.use of the e s s e n t i a l asymmetries i n f o r c e - s t r u c t u r e and s t r a -t e g i e s of the two s i d e s , the n e g o t i a t i n g process becomes one of c o n t i n u a l t r a d e - o f f s or " b a l a n c i n g " among r e s t r i c t i o n s , designed so as t o a v o i d b e n e f i t t i n g one s i d e d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y more than the other. Some a n a l y s t s have drawn up t a b l e s p u r p o r t i n g t o show the r e l a t i v e advantages and disadvantages t o each P a r t y , together w i t h the mutual advantages ( i t being assumed t h a t t h e r e are no s i g n i f i c a n t mutual disadvantages), of the SALT I agreements. - 9 3 -The proponents of the l a t t e r , n a t u r a l l y enough, tend to d i s -play a bias towards the mutual or middle part of the spectrum; t h e i r detractors, on the American side, emphasize the a l l e g e d l y overwhelming advantages they accord to the Soviets. The f i r s t view i s represented by Secretary of State Rogers, who t o l d the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: "In matters i n v o l v i n g the c e n t r a l s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t s of two great powers, any arms l i m i t a -t i o n agreement must respond to each, side's i n t e r e s t or i t w i l l not l a s t very long. Both sides must gain from SALT or neither 177 does." The second view i s perhaps best exemplified by one P h y l l i s S c h l a f l y , representing the "National Association of Pro America," who maintained before the Committee that "This SAL pact i s the most dangerous, disadvantageous and devious document the United States has ever signed. No more unequal, cra/ven and degrading agreement has ever been signed by any nation, except by a. nation which was defeated i n war or about to be defeated i n war." 1 7 8 We have already examined and rejected the contention, i n our discussion of the " p a r i t y " concept, that the marginal super-i o r i t y i n numbers of m i s s i l e s granted the Soviets constitutes a s i g n i f i c a n t advantage f o r them. I t might be noted i n t h i s regard that, with, respect to submarines and SLBM's i n p a r t i c u l a r , the Soviet numerical lead was e x p l i c i t l y intended to o f f s e t the geo-graphical advantages of the U.S. which otherwise would have allowed the l a t t e r to maintain a greater number of boats on s t a t i o n at any one time regardless of p a r i t y i n o v e r a l l - 94 -numbers. As D r . K i s s i n g e r t o l d U.S. Congressmen on June 15, 1972, "because of the d i f f e r e n c e i n geography and b a s i n g , i t has been estimated t h a t the S o v i e t Union r e q u i r e s t h r e e submarines f o r two of ours t o be able t o keep an equal number on s t a t i o n . " 1 7 ^ But the p r i n c i p a l " t r a d e - o f f " of SALT I was between defen-s i v e s t r a t e g i c weapons (ABM's), the p r o h i b i t i o n of which was apparently of g r e a t e r concern t o the S o v i e t s than t o the Ameri-cans; and o f f e n s i v e s t r a t e g i c m i s s i l e s , where the s i t u a t i o n was reverse d . Throughout the n e g o t i a t i o n s the American s i d e made i t c l e a r t h a t i t would be w i l l i n g t o r e s t r i c t the former only i f the S o v i e t s agreed t o some k i n d of l i m i t a t i o n s as w e l l upon t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e o f f e n s i v e a r s e n a l s , and p a r t i c u l a r l y upon "heavy" ( i C B M - k i l l i n g ) m i s s i l e s . The end r e s u l t was the s i m u l t a -neous s i g n i n g of two agreements, w i t h more comprehensive r e s t r i c -t i o n s upon o f f e n s i v e m i s s i l e s t o f o l l o w . The i n j u n c t i o n t o ex-tend the scope of the I n t e r i m Agreement, i m p l i e d i n i t s very name, was embodied throughout the accords, from the preambles of both the ABM Treaty and I n t e r i m Agreement, which averred t h a t "the l i m i t a t i o n of a n t i - b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e systems, as w e l l as c e r t a i n agreed measures w i t h respect t o the l i m i t a t i o n of s t r a -t e g i c o f f e n s i v e arms, would c o n t r i b u t e t o the c r e a t i o n of more f a v o r a b l e c o n d i t i o n s f o r f u r t h e r n e g o t i a t i o n s on l i m i t i n g s t r a -t e g i c arms;" through A r t i c l e XI of the ABM Tr e a t y , by which "The P a r t i e s undertake t o continue a c t i v e n e g o t i a t i o n s f o r l i m i t a t i o n s on s t r a t e g i c o f f e n s i v e arms;" t o A r t i c l e V I I of the I n t e r i m Agreement, which added t h a t "The o b l i g a t i o n s p r o v i d e d f o r i n this...Agreement s h a l l not p r e j u d i c e the scope or terms of the - 9 5 -l i m i t a t i o n s on s t r a t e g i c offensive arms which may foe worked out i n the course of f u r t h e r negotiations," and A r t i c l e VIII of the same Agreement which f l a t l y declared: " I t i s the objective of the P a r t i e s to conduct active follow-on negotiations with, the aim of concluding £ more complete measures l i m i t i n g s t r a t e g i c offensive arms\...as soon as p o s s i b l e . " I t was perhaps most dra-m a t i c a l l y evidenced, however, by a u n i l a t e r a l statement of U.S. Ambassador Gerard C.Smith, appended to the Agreements, that "The U.S. Delegation believes that an objective of the follow-on negotiations should be to constrain and reduce on a long-term basis threats to the s u r v i v a b i l i t y of our respective s t r a t e g i c r e t a l i a t o r y f o r c e s . . . . I f an agreement providing f o r more com-plet e s t r a t e g i c offensive arms l i m i t a t i o n s were not achieved within f i v e years, U.S. supreme i n t e r e s t s could be jeopardized. Should that occur, i t would constitute a basis f o r withdrawal from the ABM Treaty." ( U n i l a t e r a l Statement "A" of the United States Delegation) It was l a r g e l y attention to the p o s s i b i l i t y of trade-offs which l a y behind the demand i n the U.S., f i r s t , f o r ABM's and MIRV's, and then, f o l l o w i n g the close of SALT I, f o r the accele-rated development of a number of new s t r a t e g i c systems (such as ULMS/Trident, and the B - l bomber) as "bargaining-chips" i n the negotiations. Many i n the U.S. Administration claimed that had Washington not proceeded with i t s "Safeguard" ABM program, i t would not have been able to garner whatever Soviet concessions i t d i d — a l t h o u g h such a l l e g a t i o n s cannot be proven, of course. * See, for_j3xa,mple, the exchange between Secretary L a i r d ^cont.) - 96 -More importantly, however, that such reasoning can i n the f i n a l a n a l y s i s prove counterproductive ( i f not f a t a l ) to arms control i s patently obvious, i f one accepts the general action-reaction theory of arms races. As Marshall Shulman put i t before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee: The d i f f i c u l t y with the bargaining chip t a c t i c i s that i t d e f l e c t s a t t e n t i o n from the merits of tbe a r -gument as to whether we genuinely need the weapons sys-tems advocated, and instead of i n t i m i d a t i n g the Rus-sians, requires them to follow our lead. Had we not be-gun to deploy a Safeguard system, there would have been no need f o r the present treaty, and the number of ABM launchers would have been considerably l e s s than the two hundred f o r each side provided under the tre a t y . Had the Russians nevertheless p e r s i s t e d i n modernizing t h e i r Galosh system around Moscow, we could have d e c i -ded what i f any action on our part t h i s required; i t i s u n l i k e l y that we would ha.ve been saddled with, the kind of a system which the bargaining chip l o g i c has bequeathed us. S i m i l a r l y , our MIRV deployment, rather than encouraging a p o s i t i v e a t t i t u d e toward arms l i -mitation on the Russian side, compels them to match, our MIRV technology sooner or l a t e r . And when they do, we w i l l both, be worse of f than i f we had been able to avert the MIRV competition. In a s i m i l a r vein, Stanley Hoffmann t o l d the Committee: An agreement on ABM was reached, l e s s because we met Russia's challenge and launched our own program, than because both sides recognized that the costs were (cont.) and Senator F u l b r i g h t i n the Foreign Relations Commit-tee hearings, pp. 109-110; also the judgment of Marvin L.Gold-berger that. " I t i s d i f f i c u l t , i f not impossible, to assess the r o l e played by Safeguard as a bargaining chip i n the SALT t r e a t y . " (181) * Which might be summed up as follows: Although not a l l arms races r e s u l t from perceived challenges to se c u r i t y , and no arms race need be explained s o l e l y or even p r i m a r i l y as an action-reaction cycle of competitive deployments, other f a c -t o r s — s u c h as the inherent dynamism of m i l i t a r y technology, bureaucratic and domestic p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t s i n (cont.) - 97 -out of proportion with the value of these systems. The Interim Agreement on offensive weapons was reached even though, we had no on-going ICBM program, and the Soviets, who r e s i s t e d f o r a long time the i n -c l u s i o n of nuclear submarines and SLBM int o the agree-ment, gave i n even though we have not launched Trident yet. To be sure, incentives to agreements are neces-sary, but the threat of launching a major program i f no agreement i s reached, coming from a nation that i s i n so many respects s t i l l ahead i n sophisticated tech-nology and q u a l i t a t i v e performance, can be just as powerful, and f a r more e f f e c t i v e , i n g e t t i n g r e s u l t s , at a lower l e v e l of absurdity than actual e s c a l a t i o n . Otherwise, we s h a l l never break out of the v i c i o u s c i r c l e which consists of launching a dubious program i n order l a t e r to be able to claim as a p o l i t i c a l breakthrough and as a v i c t o r y of common sense an a-greement that merely r e s t r i c t s the f u r t h e r waste of resources on such a program. The President has c o r r e c t l y pointed out that the new offensive weapon programs were recommended p r i o r to SALT. This throws a rather i n t r i g u i n g l i g h t on SALT. We have obtained from the Russians curbs i n areas, i n -cluding the SS-9, where they, not we, have ongoing pro-grams and where had they refused l i m i t a t i o n s , we could not have caught up with them during the next f i v e years. But we have avoided curbs i n the areas where we wanted to expand anyhow, so as to stay ahead of them. This i s quite a competitive achievement, but i t suggests not so much, the triumph of the bargaining-chip t h e o r y — a f t e r a l l , our biggest chip i s the MIRV, which remains unregulated—as the c e r t a i n t y that the Soviets w i l l indeed f e e l that they have to catch up with us i n a l l the areas, i n c l u d i n g MIRV, that are l e f t open i n the race. (182) F i n a l l y , Senator Edward Kennedy warned: "We have co n s i s t e n t l y f a i l e d to recognize that a bargaining chip i s good so long as (cont.) arms expansion, and what has been c a l l e d "a general pre-sumption of intense competition from the other side rather than ...the adversary's s p e c i f i c actions (or i n a c t i o n ) " (183)—may ( i n the contemporary world, at l e a s t ) be viewed as constants, perpetually subject to aggravation (and s i g n i f i c a n t l y so) through the a c t i o n - r e a c t i o n phenomenon. That i s , p o l i t i c a l pressures on one side brought about as a r e s u l t of these other f a c t o r s w i l l tend to be v a l i d a t e d and considerably reinforced with reference to perceived deployments on the other side. - 98 -i t i s not p l a y e d . Once p l a y e d , i t s only e f f e c t i s t o r a i s e the s t a k e s , and t h a t has been the e f f e c t of our use of n u c l e a r b a r -g a i n i n g c h i p s , each time the stakes have been r a i s e d and each time the s e c u r i t y of a l l n a t i o n s has been endangered."" 1' 8^ There would seem t o be some k i n d of "happy medium" between l e a v i n g oneself completely na,ked i n n e g o t i a t i o n s and provoking a new arms r a c e , of a c h i e v i n g a b a r g a i n i n g advantage which i s not so overpowering as t o s t i m u l a t e c o m p e t i t i v e deployments on the other s i d e . Whether such a p o i n t can be reached i n SALT I I remains to be seen. * D r . K i s s i n g e r demonstrated an acute understanding of t h i s d i -lemma at h i s Congressional b r i e f i n g of June 15, 1972. (185) The standard s o l u t i o n i s t o h a l t on-going programs at the r e s e a r c h and development stage, a v o i d i n g the a c t u a l deploy-ment of systems as l o n g as p o s s i b l e , but t h i s tends t o be de-f e a t e d by the autonomous momentum of such a c t i v i t i e s , as w e l l as by l e g i t i m a t e concern over the lead-times i n v o l v e d . A va-r i a t i o n on the theme i s the suggestion of Jerome H.Kalian tha/t " p l a c i n g c o n s t r u c t i o n funds ' i n escrow'...can be e q u a l l y e f -f e c t i v e i n s u p p o r t i n g a s t r o n g n e g o t i a t i n g posture without d e t r a c t i n g from the u l t i m a t e value of the agreements being sought." (186) - 99 -CONCLUSION The preceding analysis makes no pretensions to being e i t h e r the d e f i n i t i v e account of the motivations behind SALT I and i t s agreements, or a sure guide to future SALT l i m i t a t i o n s . I t r e -mains, quite simply, an examination of possible f a c t o r s a f f e c t i n g the s u s c e p t i b i l i t y of s t r a t e g i c arms, and of ABM*s and offensive m i s s i l e s i n p a r t i c u l a r , to i n t e r n a t i o n a l regulation. We can say, f o r example, that the concern f o r s t r a t e g i c s t a b i l i t y , the costs of new weapons, the desire f o r a broadly-based detente—perhaps even considerations of personal pres t i g e , p o l i t i c a l s u r v i v a l , or h i s t o r i c destiny on the part of the n a t i o n a l leaders concerned— a l l played a part i n producing the f i n a l outcome. But how can one p o s s i b l y rank i n importance such disparate f a c t o r s , and thus dra.w conclusions applicable to the f i e l d of arms control as a whole? Nevertheless, a few t e n t a t i v e observations might be advanced with a view toward e x p l o i t i n g to i t s f u l l e s t the p o t e n t i a l of the case-study approach to illuminate t h e o r e t i c a l concerns. The S t r a -t e g i c Arms Li m i t a t i o n Talks of 1969-72 were chosen f o r analysis because of t h e i r contemporaneity, t h e i r innate s i g n i f i c a n c e i n comparison with previous measures of arms c o n t r o l , the large body of c r i t i c a l l i t e r a t u r e which they ha,ve generated, and the a v a i l a -b i l i t y of d e t a i l e d analysis of the i n d i v i d u a l m i l i t a r y systems with which they dealt. S t i l l , the p o s s i b i l i t y that they may have .been an a t y p i c a l example of arms control should be taken in t o account. In the f i r s t place, unlike most previous (and indeed, con-ceivable) "disarmament" negotiations,^they were e s s e n t i a l l y - 100 -b i l a t e r a l . Not only did just two states choose to involve them-selves i n the negotiations but—because of the great d i s p a r i t y i n power between them and the r e s t of the w o r l d — n e i t h e r the d i r e c t p a r t i c i p a t i o n of outside actors was required nor could the l a t -t e r ' s independent actions be very i n f l u e n t i a l . The consequences of t h i s f a c t o r f o r the success of negotiations are somewhat am-biguous. On the one hand, as we have previously noted, the f e a s i -b i l i t y of controls should vary i n v e r s e l y with the absolute number of relevant actors; on the other hand, the lack of very strong c o n c i l i a t o r y pressures from without, together with, the unavaila-b i l i t y of e f f e c t i v e outside guarantees, makes the task of achie-ving agreement more d i f f i c u l t than under other circumstances (where an i n t e r n a t i o n a l body such as the U.N., or a consortium of Great Powers, can f u l f i l both r o l e s ) . Second, SALT I involved the c o l l a b o r a t i o n of what many ob-servers consider to be two e s s e n t i a l l y " s a t i a t e d , " "conservative," or "mature" Powers, neither one desirous of immediate fundamental change i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l status quo, and both c o n s c i o u s — t o a d egree—of the threat posed humanity's future by the awesome a r -senals at t h e i r d i s p o s a l . It simply may be too much to expect s i m i l a r r e s t r a i n t from l e s s "responsible" states, between staun-chly "conservative" and r a b i d l y " r e v i s i o n i s t " ones, or on any-thin g approaching a universal scale within a resource-scarce world. F i n a l l y , SALT I dealt with, weapons whose m i l i t a r y and p o l i -t i c a l / d i p l o m a t i c u t i l i t y had come under some attack i n recent years. It i s l e s s c e r t a i n that states would be amenable to - 101 -r e s t r i c t i n g more " p r a c t i c a l " or "serviceable" armaments and mi-l i t a r y a c t i v i t i e s . Of course, s i g n i f i c a n t as i t was, SALT I represented but a small step on the road to e f f e c t i v e l i m i t a t i o n of s t r a t e g i c arms, l e t alone reduction or t o t a l a b o l i t i o n of them. Some c r i t i c s of the negotiations have gone so f a r as to suggest that, by v i r t u e of the persuasiveness of the bargaining-chip argument, they may have proven p o s i t i v e l y counterproductive to such e f f o r t s . But what i s the a l t e r n a t i v e ? I t must be hoped that, i n the long run at l e a s t , a continuous process of s t r a t e g i c arms control w i l l begin to bear f r u i t i n terms of both mutual and u n i l a t e r a l r e -1 RR s t r a i n t . The foregoing reservations aside, what does the SALT case suggest about the "factors a f f e c t i n g the s u s c e p t i b i l i t y of m i l i -t ary instruments and a c t i v i t i e s to i n t e r n a t i o n a l regulation"? B r i e f l y stated: (1) The e a r l i e r tendency of "arms c o n t r o l l e r s " to focus upon s t r a t e g i c s t a b i l i t y as a prime c r i t e r i o n i s confirmed and apparently r e i n f o r c e d ; ( 2 ) the cost of major weapons systems seems to be becoming an i n c r e a s i n g l y s a l i e n t f a c t o r i n the "arms control c a l c u l u s ; " (3) v e r i f i c a t i o n of the f u l f i l m e n t of o b l i g a -tions does not appear to be as great an obstacle to agreements as i n the recent past; ( 4 ) crude " p a r i t y " i n the o v e r a l l s t r a t e g gic strength of adversaries i s seen as c r u c i a l to t h e i r w i l l i n g -ness to entertain l i m i t a t i o n s ; ( 5 ) asymmetries i n the f o r c e -* There i s much evidence f o r t h i s on the American side, but the Soviets may not have "bought" the bargaining-chip argument to the same extent. Wolfgang Panofsky, w r i t i n g i n the Spring, 1973, issue of Survey, notes: "There i s no evidence that (cont.) - 102 -structure and strategy of adversaries seem eminently susceptible to trade-offs within the armaments f i e l d , as well as (possibly) from outside of i t ; ( 6 ) o v e r a l l d i s p a r i t i e s i n the c o s t - e f f e c -tiveness of defense and offense, favouring the l a t t e r , seem cru-c i a l to the willingness of states to l i m i t "defensive" weapons; (7) the r a p i d i t y of technological, development, while remaining l a r g e l y an "unknown" f a c t o r , may nevertheless serve to enhance the prospects f o r arms control by inducing a. state of weariness and sense of f u t i l i t y i n publics and t h e i r governments over the apparently perpetual process of re p l a c i n g i n c r e a s i n g l y c o s t l y weapons systems at a f a s t e r and f a s t e r rate; ( 8 ) SALT provides a re a f f i r m a t i o n of the p r i n c i p l e that two states, though deeply r i v e n by p o l i t i c a l antagonism and continuing to compete v i g o r -ously i n many areas, can nevertheless perceive s u f f i c i e n t mutual i n t e r e s t i n a t t a i n i n g s i g n i f i c a n t measures of arms c o n t r o l , and f i n a l l y (9) i n conformity with t r a d i t i o n a l expectations, quanti-t a t i v e c e i l i n g s on weapons are more l i k e l y to be agreed upon than e i t h e r q u a n t i t a t i v e reductions i n e x i s t i n g arsenals or r e -s t r i c t i o n s on q u a l i t a t i v e developments—though the q u a l i t a t i v e wall may well have been p a r t i a l l y breached with the ABM Treaty.' We have absolutely forsworn any intentions of comparing the r e l a t i v e s a l i e n c y of the f u l l range of f a c t o r s discussed i n Part I and, as a r e s u l t , i t i s impossible to make any very c e r t a i n (cont.) the Soviets have e i t h e r reduced or expanded t h e i r o f f e n -sive programmes as a r e s u l t of SALT-I." (189) - 103 -p r e d i c t i o n s as to future measures of s t r a t e g i c arms c o n t r o l . The p o s s i b l e SALT II agenda i s nevertheless a f u l l one, and i t might he u s e f u l to apply the framework elucidated i n t h i s paper i n order to i d e n t i f y the areas of l i k e l y or possible agreement, and to assess the prospects of i n d i v i d u a l measures—such as controls on s t r a t e g i c ASW a c t i v i t i e s and a n t i - a i r c r a f t defenses, heavy bombers, forward-based systems, and land-mobile ICBM's—being s u c c e s s f u l l y negotiated. S i m i l a r l y , the f a c t o r s i d e n t i f i e d i n Part I might be r e t r o s p e c t i v e l y applied to e a r l i e r attempts at arms control of various kinds, with the ultimate i n t e n t i o n of developing more: rigorous (perhaps even quantitativelyabased) theory. The task i s rendered extremely hazardous by operation of one of the last-mentioned f a c t o r s — t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of an almost i n f i n i t e v a r i e t y of c r o s s - c u t t i n g t r a d e - o f f s , even from areas outside of the arms control f i e l d . Nevertheless, i f t h i s essay has demonstrated the value of such a. framework i n explaining how given agreements are reached and how t h e i r e s s e n t i a l parameters are f i x e d , i n greater depth than a l e s s structured approach might have afforded, then i t w i l l have served i t s purpose. At t h i s stage i n the development of arms control theory, anything more ambitious would c l e a r l y be premature. - 104 -FOOTNOTES 1 Chayes(l972),pp.919-920. 2 Gray(l973),PP.273-274. 3 Beaufre(1968),p.28. 4 Boggs(l941),p.60. 5 Ibid.,p.71. 6 Ibid.,pp.84-85. 7 Q.Wright(l965) ,P .806. 8 Morgenthau(1973),p.401. 9 Boggs(l941),p .46. 10 I b i d . , p . 8 l . 11 Ibid.,pp.82-83. 12 Ibid.,p.83. 13 See,for example,Strachey(l967),p.206. 14 Henkin(196l),pp.6-7. 15 Halle(l973),p.22. 16 E.g.Perle(l973),p.l22. 17 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute(1973), p. 132. (hereafter "SIPRI") 18 Brennan(196l),p.30. 19 SIPRI(1973),pp.132-133. 20 Ibid.,p.l40. 21 I b i d . 22 Ibid.,p . ! 3 7 . 23 Bull(1961),pp.12-13. 24 Q.Wright(1965),p.798. 25 I b i d . 26 Morgenthau(1973),pp.390-391. 27 Bull(196l),pp.18-19. 28 Chayes(1972),p.942. 29 Coffey(1971),p . l 3 4 . 30 Barnet(l960),p.l24; King(l96l),p . 9 4 . 31. Bull(1961).p.108; Bull(1970),p.149; Aron(1967),pp.653-654. 32 Morgenthau(1973),p.398. 33 Young(1972),p.l34, 34 Newhouse(1973),pp.77-101. 35 Aron(1967),pp.645-646. 36 Clemens(1973),p.H. 37 Bull(196l),pp.124-125. 38 Cf.Morgenthau(1973),p.404. 39 Barnett(1972),pp.263-267; Coffey(1971),p . l 6 3 . 40 Clemens(1973),p.59. 41 Panofsky(1973a),p.l60. 42 Barnet(1960),p.4o. 43 E.g.Ibid.,pp.47-48; Holsti(1967),p.382. 44 Morgenthau(1973),p.395. 45 I b i d . 46 Gray(1974a),p.228. 47 Abt(1963),p.398. 48 Kaplan(1969),pp.295-296. 49 Ibid.,p.295. - 105 -50 Ibid.,p.296. 51 Ibid.,pp.296-298. 52 Bull(196l),pp . 9-10; Griffiths(1971),p.672. 53 Bull(196l).p . 6 5 . 54 Morgenthau(1973),p»396; see also Ansberry(196g),p.46. 55 See the discussion i n Clemens(1973),pp.71-72. 56 B u l l ( 1 9 6 l ) , p . l l 8 . 57 Clemens(l973),pp.12-13. 58 Bull(196l),p.7. 59 Halperin and Perkins(1965),p.l6l. 60 Clemens(1973),p.69. 61 Brennan(196l),p.29. 62 Ibid.,p.30. 63 Kaplan(1973),p.8. 64 Jabber, Not -By War Alone(ND;NPfr. 65 Luard(1968).p.195. ~ 66 Chayes(l972),PP.943-944. 6 ? Ibid.,p.969. 68 Boggs(1941),p.l4,fn.26. 69 Wiesner (1961),p.208. 70 See also Henkin(1964),pp.29-30. 71 Cha.yes(1972) ,p.920. 72 R.Pisher(196l),pp.59-60. 73 Ihid.,p . 5 7 . 74 Chayes(1972),p.957. 75 Barnet(I960),p.24. 76 Bowie(196la),p.67. 77 Ibid.,p.70. 78 Schelling(196l),p.l74. 79 S c h e l l i n g and Halperin(1961),p.85. 80 U.S.Senate Foreign Relations Committee(1972),pp.395, 400. (hereafter "SFRC") 81 Wolfe(1973),p.24. 82 Ibid.,p.28. 83 SFRC(1972).passim. 84 Coffey(1973),pp.66-67. 85 See Secretary Rogers before SFRC(1972),p.l7. 86 See Secretary L a i r d before SFRC(1972),pp.92-94. 87 Newhouse(1973),p.63. 88 I b i d . 89 Kahan(1972),p.209. 90. Nixon(1973) ,p . 7 H . 91 U.S.Senate Armed Services Committee(1972),p.542. 92 Clemens(1973),p.l59,fn.9. 93 Kintner(l§ 6 7 )» f o r example. 94 Gray(1972-73) ,p'.il29; see also Clemens(1973) , p p . x x i i , l . 95 SFRC(1972),pp.157-158. 96 Soviet Foreign Policy,1968,quoted i n Clemens(1973),PP»3-4. 97 Ibid.,pp .4«5. 98 Ibid.,p . 8 . 99 " M i s s i l e Numbers Game",New York Times a r t i c l e reprinted i n SFRC(1972),pp.46-47. 100 Ibid.,pp.72-73. - 106 -101 S t r a t e g i c Survey 1972,p.17. 102 SPRC(1972),p.»». 103 SIPRI(1974),P-22. 104 SPRC(1972),p,140. 105 Ibid,.p.143. 106 SIPRI(1974),pp.25-26, 107 Ibid.,p.28. 108 E.g.Roman Kolkowicz,in SFRC(1972),p,143; Joshua(1973),pp. 239-240; SIPRI(1973),p.45; Caldwell(1971),pp.13,20; Wolfe (1970),p.5. 109 SPRC(1969),p.303. 110 Clemens(1973),pp.xxiv. 111 Young(1972),p.223. 112 Newh.ouse(1973) ,p.l04. 113 U.S.Senate Government Operations Committee(1973) ,p.-201. 114 E.g.Van Cleave(1973),pp.326-327. 115 Gray(1974),p.1146. 116 SPRC(1972),p.l82. 117 Kintner and Pfaltzgraff(1973),pp.296-297, f o r example. 118 Newhouse(1973),P.10. 119 See e s p e c i a l l y Caldwell(1971),Holloway(1971),and Kahan(1972), pp.417-418. 120 Coffey(l971),PP.160-161. 121 SPRC(1972),p.l8. 122 SPRC(1972),p.358. 123 Ibid.,p.l85; see also p . l 8 l . 124 Newhouse(1973),pp.9-10. 125 SPRC(1972),p.6. 126 E.g.see Newhouse(1973),pp.79-80. 127 See Kahan(1972),p.4l8. 128 SPRC(1969),p.46. 129 Alton H.Quanbeck a.nd Barry M.Blechman,"Tbe Arms AccordtEvery-one Gains",innthe Washington Post,June 4,1972;reprinted i n SPRC(1972),p.31. 130 Quoted i n The Defense Monitor.June 30,1972; rep r i n t e d i n SFRC(1972),p.27«. 131 See Rogers,SPRC(1972),p.5. 132 Newhouse(1973),p.l50. 133 SPRC(1970),pp.231-232. : 134 See,for example,the questions submitted by Senator Charles H. Percy to Ambassador Gerard C.Smith,SPRC(197 2),PP«54-55; and the testimony of Senator James L.Buckley,SPRC(1972), pp. 258-259-135 SFRC(1972),p.404. 136 Senator Sparkman,in:SFRC(1972),p.339. 137 SFRC(1972),p.57. . . 138 E.g.Kah.an(1972) ,p.422,fn.22. 139 Clemens(1973),p.24. 140 Panifsky(1973a) fp.l65; and SFRC(1972),p.373. 141 Ibid.,p . l 7 8 . 142 Ibid.,p.254. 143 Ibid.,p.272. 144 Newhouse(1973),p.l64; see also p.184. - 107 -145 See Panofsky(1973a.) ,p. 163; and Newbouse(1973),pp.3-4. 146 Wolfe(1970),p.2. 147 P a u l Warnke i n SFRC(1972),p.l79. 148 See statements of Wolfgang Panofsky and R i c h a r d L.Garwin, Ihid..p.371. 149 Newhouse(1973),p.21. 150 See Kahan i n SPRC(1972),p.424. 151 Newhouse(1973),p.30. 152 Ihid.,pp.26,124. 153 Ihid.,p.20. 154 S c o v i l l e i n SPRC(1970),pp.228-229; S c o v i l l e ( 1 9 7 4 ) , p . 5 5 ; G a r w i n ( 1 9 7 3 ) , p . l l l . 155 S c o v i l l e i n SFRC(1970),p.223; D r . K i s s i n g e r i n SFRC(1972),p. 412. 156 Newhouse(1973),pp.28,76. 157 Ihid.,p.28. 158 Ihid..p.31. 159 Ihid.,p.183. 160 See testimony of Ambassa.dor Gerard C.Smith,SFRC( 1972) ,p. 38. 161 Newh.ouse(1973) ,p.26. 162 I b i d . , p . I 8 4 ; and Ka,h.an(1972) ,p.426. 163 Newhouse(1973),p.259. 164 Ibid.,p.59. 165 See,for example,SFRC(1972),pp.55,145,148,276. 166 See,for example,Senator Symington,Ibid. ,p . l 6 ; and Ka,han(1972), p.428. 167 The Defense Monitor,June 30,1972; r e p r i n t e d i n SFRC(1972), p.277. 168 E.g.William R.Van C l e a v e , i n U.S.Senate Government Operations Committee(l973),pp.219-220 and 234. 169 The Defense Monitor,op.cit.,p.274. 170 SFRCU972) ,p.3«4. 171 Ibid..p.347. 172 Nixon(1974) ,p.7H. 173 Clemens(1973),p.25. 174 Newhouse(1973),p.l74. 175 SFRC(1972),p.302. 176 Quoted i n Newhouse(1973),p.l39. 177 SFRC(1972),p.l0. 178 Ibid.,p.324. 179 Ibid.,p.401. 180 Ibid.,p.140. 181 Ibid.,p.348. 182 Ibid.,p.l94. 183 Clemens(1973),p.l02. 184 SFRC(1972),p.252. 185 Ibid.,p.411. 186 Ibid.,p.217. 187 Gray(1974b),p.ll47 and (1973),pp.271,289; SIPRI(1973),pp. 49-50. 188 C f . G r i f f i t h s ( 1 9 7 1 ) , p p . 6 4 4 - 6 4 5 . 189 Panofsky(1973a),p.l65. - 108 -BIBLIOGRAPHY I. Arms C o n t r o l Theory Aht, C l a r k C , "Disarmament as a S t r a t e g y " , i n : J o u r n a l of Arms  C o n t r o l , v o l . 1 no.4, pp. 387-402. An s b e r r y , W i l l i a m P., Arms C o n t r o l and Disarmament: Success or  F a i l u r e ? B e r k e l e y : McCutchan P u b l i s h i n g C o r p o r a t i o n , 19&9. Aron, Ra.ymond, Peace and War: A Theory of I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a - t i o n s . New York and Washington: F r e d e r i c k A.Praeger, 1967. Bar n e t , R i c h a r d J . , " I n s p e c t i o n : Shadow and Substance", i n : Barnet and F a l k ( e d s . ) , S e c u r i t y i n Disarmament. P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1965, pp. 15-36. who Wants Disarmament? Boston: Beacon P r e s s , I960. B a r n e t , R i c h a r d J . , and R i c h a r d A . F a l k ( e d s . ) , S e c u r i t y i n D i s - armament . P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1965. B a r n e t t , A.Doak, "A N u c l e a r C h i n a and U.S. Arms P o l i c y " , i n : K i n g C.Chen ( e d . ) , The F o r e i g n P o l i c y of Ch i n a . Roseland, N.J.: East-West Who? I n c . , 197?, pp. 257-276. Be a u f r e , Andre, "Some R e f l e c t i o n s on the Problem of Arms Con-, t r o l " , i n : Arms C o n t r o l and Disarmament, v o l . 1 (1968), pp. 27-41. B l a c k e t t . P.M.S., "Steps Toward Disarmament", i n : M e n d l o v i t z ( e d . ) , L e g a l and P o l i t i c a l Problems of World Order. New York: The Fund f o r E d u c a t i o n C o n c e r n i n g World Peace Through World Law, 1962, pp. 559-575. B l o o m f i e l d , L i n c o l n P., The U n i t e d N a t i o n s and U.S. F o r e i g n  P o l i c y . Boston: L i t t l e , B r o w n and Co., 1967. Boggs, Marion W., Attempts To D e f i n e and L i m i t 'Aggressive* A r - mament i n Diplomacy and S t r a t e g y . The U n i v e r s i t y of M i s s o u r i S t u d i e s , v o l . 16, n o . l . Columbia: U n i v e r s i t y of M i s s o u r i , 1941. B o t h w e l l , Frank E., "Arms C o n t r o l — T E e I n i t i a t i v e I s Ours", i n : D a v i d H . F r i s c h ( e d . ) , Arms R e d u c t i o n : Program and I s s u e s . New York: The Twe n t i e t h Century Fund, 1961, pp. 13-18. B o u l d i n g , Kenneth.-E., "The U n i v e r s i t y , S o c i e t y , and Arms Con-t r o l " , i n : J o u r n a l of Arms C o n t r o l , v o l . 1 no.4 (1963), pp. 5 5 2 - 5 5 7 . - 109 -Bowie, Robert R., "Arms c o n t r o l and U n i t e d S t a t e s f o r e i g n p o l i -cy", i n : Henkin ( e d . ) , Arms C o n t r o l : Issues f o r the P u b l i c . Englewood C l i f f s : P r e n t i c e - H a l l , 1961, pp. 49-75. • "Basic Requirements of Arms C o n t r o l " , i n : Brennan ( e d . ) , Arms C o n t r o l , Disarmament, and N a t i o n a l Se- c u r i t y . New York: George B r a z i l l e r , 1961, pp. 43-55. Brennan, Donald G. ( e d . ) , Arms C o n t r o l , Disarmament, and N a t i o n - a l S e c u r i t y . New York: George B r a z i l l e r , 1961. . " S e t t i n g and Goals of Arms C o n t r o l " , i n : I b i d . , pp. 19-42. B u l l , Hedley, "Arms C o n t r o l : A S t o c k t a k i n g and Prospectus", i n : I n s t i t u t e f o r S t r a t e g i c S t u d i e s , Problems of Modern S t r a - tegy. New York and Washington: Praeger P u b l i s h e r s , 1970, pp. 139-158. . The C o n t r o l of the Arms Race: Disarmament and Arms C o n t r o l i n the M i s s i l e Age. London: Weidenfeld and N i c o l s o n , 1961. . "The Scope f o r Super-Power Agreements", i n : ..Arms C o n t r o l and N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y , v o l . 1 (1969), pp. 1-23. C a r r , Edward H a l l e t t , I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s Between the Two World Wars (1919-1939). London: Macmillan and Co., 1965. • The Twenty Years' C r i s i s , 1919-1939: An I n t r o d u c t i o n t o the Study of International R e l a t i o n s . New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964. C a r t e r , B a r r y , "What Next i n Arms C o n t r o l ? " , i n : O r b i s , vol.17 n o . l ( S p r i n g 1973), pp. 176-196. Chayes, Abram, "An I n q u i r y i n t o the Workings of Arms C o n t r o l Agreements", i n : Harvard Law Review, vol . 8 5 no.5 (March 1972), pp. 905-969. Claude, I n i s L . , J r . , Swords I n t o Plowshares: The Problems and  Progress of I n t e r n a t i o n a l O r g a n i z a t i o n . ( 3 r d ed.,rev.) New York: Random House, 1964. C o f f e y , J . I . , S t r a t e g i c Power and N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y . U n i v e r s i t y of P i t t s b u r g h P r e s s , 1971. Coser, Lewis, " P e a c e f u l Settlements and the Dysfunctions of Se-cr e c y " , i n : J o u r n a l of Arms C o n t r o l , v o l . 1 no.4 (1963), pp. 340-347. Craven, John P., "The Design of Weapons Systems f o r an Arms Con-t r o l Environment", i n : J o u r n a l of Arms C o n t r o l , v o l . 1 n o . l (1963), pp.. 14-17. - 110 -Dean, A r t h u r H., T e s t Ban and Disarmament; The Path of N e g o t - i a t i o n . New York and London: Harper and Row, 1966. Dougherty, James E., Arms C o n t r o l and Disarmament: The C r i t i c a l  I s s u e s . Washington: The C e n t e r F o r S t r a t e g i c S t u d i e s , Georgetown U n i v e r s i t y , 1966. . " I n t r o d u c t i o n " , i n : Dougherty and Lehman ( e d s . ) , Arms C o n t r o l F o r the L a t e S i x t i e s . P r i n c e t o n : D. Van Nostrand Company, I n c . , 1967, pp. x x i - x l v i i . Edwards, D a v i d V., Arms C o n t r o l i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s . New York: H o l t , R i n e h a r t and Winston, 1969. E t z i o n i , A m i t a i , The Hard Way t o Peace: A New S t r a t e g y . New York: C o l l i e r Books, 1962. F a l k , R i c h a r d A., " I n s p e c t i o n , T r u s t , and S e c u r i t y • d u r i n g Dis-r armament", i n : B a m e t and F a l k ( e d s . ) , o p . c i t . . pp. 37-49. F e l d , Bernard T.. " I n s p e c t i o n Techniques of.Arms C o n t r o l " , i n : Brennan ( e d . ) , o p . c i t . , pp. 317-332. . "The Summer Study on Arms C o n t r o l " , i n : F r i s c h ( e d . ) , o p . c i t . . pp. 3-12. F i s h e r , A d r i a n S., "Outlawry of War and Disarmament", i n : R e c u e i l des c o u r s . I I (1971), pp. 389-412. F i s h e r , Roger, " C o n s t r u c t i n g R u l e s That A f f e c t Governments", i n : Brennan ( e d . ) , o p . c i t . , pp. 56-67. Frank, Jerome D., S a n i t y and S u r v i v a l : P s y c h o l o g i c a l A s p e c t s of  War and Peace". New. York: V i n t a g e Books, 1967. Gray,. C o l i n S., "The Urge to Compete: R a t i o n a l e s f o r Arms Ra-c i n g " , i n : World P o l i t i c s , vol.26 no.2 (January 1974), pp. 207-233. G r i f f i t h s , F r a n k l y n , " T r a n s n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s and Arms C o n t r o l " , i n : I n t e r n a t i o n a l J o u r n a l , vol.26 no.4 (Autumn 1971), pp. 64O-F74I H a l l e , L o u i s J . , "Does War Have A F u t u r e ? " , i n : F o r e i g n A f f a i r s , vol . 5 2 n o . l (October 1973), pp. 20-34. H a l p e r i n , Morton H.,;, Con temporary M i l i t a r y S t r a t e g y . Boston: L i t t l e , B r o w n and Company, 1967. H a l p e r i n , Morton H., and Dwight H . P e r k i n s , Communist China and  Arms C o n t r o l . New York: F r e d e r i c k A.Praeger, 1965. - I l l -Henkin, Louis ( e d . ) , Arms C o n t r o l : Issues f o r the P u b l i c . E n g l e -wood C l i f f s: P r e n t i c e - H a l l , 1961. - . "The C i t i z e n ' s I n t e r e s t i n t h e ' C o n t r o l of Armaments", i n : Henkin ( e d . ) , o p . c i t . , pp. 1-17. . "Disarmament—The Lawyer's I n t e r e s t s " , i n : Lyman M.Tondel,Jr. ( e d . ) , Disarmament: Background Papers and  Proceedings of the F o u r t h Hammarsk.jbTd Forum. Dobbs F e r r y , N.Y.: Oceana P u b l i c a t i o n s , 1964, pp. 1-42. H o l s t i , K.J., I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s : A Framework f o r A n a l y s i s . Englewood C l i f f s : P r e n t i c e - H a l l , 1967. Jabber, Fuad, Not By War Alone: Curbing the A r a b - I s r a e l i Arms  Race.. Chicago: A d l a l Stevenson I n s t i t u t e Working Paper 15. K aplan, Morton A., " V a r i a n t s on S i x Models of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l System", i n : James N.Rosenau ( e d . ) , I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s  and F o r e i g n P o l i c y : A Reader i n Research and Theory. New York: The Free P r e s s , 1969, pp. 291-303. K i n g , James E . , J r . , "Arms C o n t r o l and U n i t e d S t a t e s S e c u r i t y " , i n : Henkin ( e d . ) , o p . c i t . , pp. 76-111. K i n t n e r , W i l l i a m R., "Arms C o n t r o l and N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y : A Ca-v e a t " , i n : Dougherty and Lehman ( e d s . ) , op. c i t . . pp. 31-42.' K i s s i n g e r , Henry A., The N e c e s s i t y f o r Choice: Prospects of A- merican F o r e i g n P o l i c y . Garden C i t y : Anchor Books, 1962. • Nuclear Weapons and F o r e i g n P o l i c y . Garden C i t y : Doubleday Anchor Books, 1958. K i s s i n g e r , Henry A. ( e d . ) , Problems of N a t i o n a l Strategy:A Book  of Readings. New York: F r e d e r i c k A.Praeger, 1965. K h o r r , K l a u s , " S u p r a n a t i o n a l Versus I n t e r n a t i o n a l Models f o r GCD", i n : Barnet and F a l k ( e d s . ) , o p . c i t . , pp. 384-410. K y b a l , D a l i m i l , "The Role of S t a b i l i z e d Deterrence", i n : F r i s c h . ( e d . ) , o p . c i t . , pp. 135-153. L e f e v e r , Ernest W., "The New Arms-Control Consensus", i n : L e f e -v e r ( e d . ) , Arms and Arms C o n t r o l . New York: F r e d e r i c k A. Praeger, 1962, pp. i x - x v i i . Lehman, J . F . , J r . , " I n t r o d u c t o r y Remarks", i n : Dougherty and Leh-man ( e d s . ) , o p . c i t . , pp. i x ~ x i i . Luard, Evan, C o n f l i c t and Peace i n the Modern I n t e r n a t i o n a l Sys- tem. Boston: L i t t l e , B r o w n and Company, 1968. - 112 -Luard, Evan, Peace and Opinion. London: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1962. May, M i c h a e l M., S t r a t e g i c Arms Technology and D o c t r i n e under Arms  L i m i t a t i o n Agreements. Center of I n t e r n a t i o n a l S t u d i e s , Woodrow Wilson School of P u b l i c and I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y . Research Monograph No.37, October 1972.' Melman, Seymour, The Peace Race. New York: B a l l a n t i n e Books, 1961. M e n d l o v i t z , Saul H. ( e d . ) , L e g a l and P o l i t i c a l Problems of World  Order. New York: The Fund For Education Concerning World Peace Through World Law, 1962. Morgenstern, Oskar, The Question of N a t i o n a l Defense. New York: Vintage Books, 1961. Morgenthau, Hans J . , P o l i t i c s Among Nat i o n s : The S t r u g g l e f o r Power and Peace (5th ed.). New York: A l f r e d A.Knopf, 1973. Organski, A.F.K., World P o l i t i c s (2nd ed.). New York: A l f r e d A. Knopf, 1968. P h e l p s , John B.. "On the Role of S t a b i l i z e d Deterrence", i n : F r i s c h ( e d . ) , o p . c i t . , pp. 83-90. Pugh, George E., " R e s t r a i n t s , S t r a t e g y , and Arms C o n t r o l " , i n : O r b i s , v o l . 7 no.2 (Summer 1963), pp. 209-225. Ranger, Robert, "Arms C o n t r o l W i t h i n a Changing P o l i t i c a l Con-t e x t " , i n : I n t e r n a t i o n a l J o u r n a l , vol.26 no.4 (Autumn.1971), pp. 735-752. S c h e l l i n g , Thomas C., "Communication, B a r g a i n i n g and N e g o t i a -t i o n " , i n : Arms C o n t r o l and N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y , v o l . 1 (1969),, pp. 63-72. ._—. "Managing.the Arms Race", i n : K i s s i n g e r ( e d . ) , o p . c i t . , pp. 361-375. . " R e c i p r o c a l Measures f o r Arms S t a b i l i z a -t i o n " , i n : Brennan ( e d . ) , o p . c i t . , pp. 167-186. .' The S t r a t e g y of C o n f l i c t / New York: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1963. S c h e l l i n g , Thomas C , and Morton H.Halperin, S t r a t e g y and Arms  C o n t r o l . New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1961. S i n g e r , J.David, Deterrence, Arms C o n t r o l , and Disarmament: To- ward a S y n t h e s i s i n N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y P o l i c y . Ohio S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1962. -113 -Spingarn, Jerome H., New Approaches t o Disarmament. F o r e i g n Po-l i c y A s s o c i a t i o n — W o r l d A f f a i r s Center Headline S e r i e s , no. 151, January-February 1962. S t e i n , E r i c , "Impact of New Weapons Technology on I n t e r n a t i o n a l La.w: S e l e c t e d Aspects", i n : R e c u e i l des cours, I I (1971), pp. 223-388. Stockholm I n t e r n a t i o n a l Peace Research I n s t i t u t e , "The P r o h i b i -t i o n of Inhumane and I n d i s c r i m i n a t e Weapons", i n : World  Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1973. Stockholm: Almqvist and W i k s e l l , 1973, pp. 132-152. Stone, Jeremy J . , "Arms C o n t r o l : Where I s I t ? " , i n : Arms C o n t r o l  and Disarmament, v o l . 1 (1968), pp. 111-117. Stra;ehey, John, On the P r e v e n t i o n of War. London: Macmillan, 1967. S z i l a r d , Leo, "'Minimal D e t e r r e n t ' v s . S a t u r a t i o n P a r i t y " , i n : K i s s i n g e r ( e d . ) , o p . c i t . . pp. 376-391. T e l l e r , Edward, "The F e a s i b i l i t y of Arms C o n t r o l and the P r i n -c i p l e of Openness", i n : Brennan ( e d . ) , o p . c i t . , pp. 122-137. Washington Center of F o r e i g n P o l i c y Research, "Arms C o n t r o l and Other Approaches t o S t a b i l i t y " , i n : L e f e v e r ( e d . ) , o p . c i t . , pp. 1-12. W e l l s , Donald A., The War Myth. New York: Pegasus, 1967. Wiesner, Jerome B., "Foreword" and "Comprehensive A r m s - L i m i t a t i o n Systems", i n : Brennan ( e d . ) , o p . c i t . , pp. 13-16; 198-233. Wright, S i r M i c h a e l , Disarm and V e r i f y : An E x p l a n a t i o n of the  C e n t r a l D i f f i c u l t i e s and of N a t i o n a l P o l i c i e s . New York: F r e d e r i c k A.Praeger, 1964. Wright, Quincy, "Co n d i t i o n s f o r S u c c e s s f u l Disarmament", i n : J o u r n a l of Arms C o n t r o l , v o l . 1 (1963), pp. 38O-386. — . A Study of War (2nd ed.). Chicago and London: The U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago P r e s s , 1965. Young, E l i z a b e t h , A F a r e w e l l t o Arms C o n t r o l ? Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1972. I I . S.A.L.T. Bowie, Robert R., "The B a r g a i n i n g Aspects of Arms C o n t r o l : The SALT Experience", i n : K i n t n e r and P f a l t z g r a f f ( e d s . ) , SALT: I m p l i c a t i o n s f o r Arms C o n t r o l i n the 1970's. U n i v e r -s i t y of P i t t s b u r g h P r e s s , 1973, pp. 127-140. - 114 -C a l d w e l l , Lawrence T., S o v i e t A t t i t u d e s t o SALT. A d e l p h i Papers,, Number Seventy-Five. London: I n s t i t u t e f o r S t r a t e g i c S t u d i e s , 1971. Clemens, Walter C.,Jir., The Superpowers and Arms'Control: From  Cold War t o Interdependence. L e x i n g t o n , Mass.: Lexington Books, 1973. C o f f e y , J . I . , "American I n t e r e s t s i n the L i m i t a t i o n of S t r a t e g i c Armaments", i n : K i n t n e r and P f a l t z g r a f f ( e d s . ) , o p . c i t . , pp. 55-94. Dougherty, James E., "SALT and the Future of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Po-l i t i c s " , i n : I b i d . , pp. 337-368. Garwin, R i c h a r d , "Superpower Postures i n SALT: An American View", i n : Morton A.Ka,plan ( e d . ) , SALT: Problems and P r o s - p e c t s . Morristown, N.J.: General L e a r n i n g P r e s s , 1973, pp.' 1 -25. Gray, C o l i n S., "The Arms Race I s About P o l i t i c s " , i n : F o r e i g n  P o l i c y , no.9 (Winter 1972-73), pp. 117-129. . "Of B a r g a i n i n g Chips and B u i l d i n g B l o c k s : Arms C o n t r o l and Defence P o l i c y " , i n : I n t e r n a t i o n a l J o u r n a l , vol.28 no.2 ( S p r i n g 1973), pp. 266-296. . " R e t h i n k i n g Nuclear S t r a t e g y " , i n : O r b i s , vol.17 no.4 (Winter 1974), pp. 1145-1160.' H a l p e r i n , Morton H., Defense S t r a t e g i e s f o r the S e v e n t i e s . Bos-to n : L i t t l e , B r o w n and Company, 1970. Holloway, David, " S t r a t e g i c Concepts and S o v i e t P o l i c y " , i n : S u r v i v a l , vol.13 no.11 (November 1971), pp. 364-369. H o i s t , Johan J . , "Comparative U.S. and S o v i e t Deployments, Doc-t r i n e s , and Arms L i m i t a t i o n " , i n : Kaplan ( e d . ) , o p . c i t . , pp. 53-95. I n t e r n a t i o n a l I n s t i t u t e f o r S t r a t e g i c S t u d i e s , S t r a t e g i c Sur- vey 1971. London: The I.I.S.S., 1972. . . s t r a t e g i c Sur- vey 1972. London: The I.I.S.S. , 1973. Joshua, Wynfred, "SALT and,the Middle E a s t " , i n : K i n t n e r and P f a l t z g r a f f ( e d s . ) , op . ' c i t . , pp. 237-254. Kahan, Jerome H., " L i m i t e d Agreements and Long-Term S t a b i l i t y : A P o s i t i v e View Toward SALT", r e p r i n t e d i n : SFRC, pp. 416-429. - 115 -Kaplan, Morton A., "SALT a,nd the I n t e r n a t i o n a l System", i n : Kaplan ( e d . ) , o p . c i t . , pp. 1-25. Kemp, Geoffrey,and Ian Smart, "SALT and European Nuclear F o r c e s " , i n K i n t n e r and P f a l t z g r a f f ( e d s . ) , o p . c i t . t pp. 199-236. K i n t n e r , W i l l i a m R., "The U n c e r t a i n S t r a t e g i c Balance i n the 1970's", i n : Arms C o n t r o l and N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y , v o l . 1 (1969), pp. 25-40. K i n t n e r , W i l l i a m R., and Robert L . P f a l t z g r a f f , J r . , ( e d s . ) , SALT:  I m p l i c a t i o n s f o r Arms C o n t r o l i n the 1970Vs. U n i v e r s i t y of P i t t s b u r g h P r e s s , 1973. . "The S t r a t e -g i c Arms L i m i t a t i o n Agreements of 1972: I m p l i c a t i o n s f o r I n t e r n a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y " , i n : I b i d . , pp. 385-406. Newhouse, John, Cold Dawn: The St o r y of SALT. New York: H o l t , Rinehart and Winston, 1973. Nixon, R i c h a r d M., P u b l i c Papers of the P r e s i d e n t s of the Uni t e d  S t a t e s : R i c h a r d Nixon, C o n t a i n i n g the P u b l i c Messages, Speech^ es, and Statements of the P r e s i d e n t , 1972. Washington: U.S. Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1974.' Panofsky, Wolfgang, "From SALT I t o SALT I I " , i n : Survey, vol.19 no.2 ( S p r i n g 1973), pp. 160-174. . "The Mutual-Hostage R e l a t i o n s h i p between America and R u s s i a " , i n : F o r e i g n A f f a i r s , v o l . 5 2 n o . l (Octo-ber 1973), pp. 109-118. P e r l e , R i c h a r d , "Superpower Postures i n SALT: The Language of Arms C o n t r o l " , i n : Ka/plan ( e d . ) , op. c i t . , pp. 119-135* P f a l t z g r a f f , Robert L . , J r . , "The R a t i o n a l e f o r .Superpower Arms C o n t r o l " , i n : K i n t n e r and P f a l t z g r a f f ( e d s . ) , o p . c i t . , pp. 3-20. S c a l a p i n o , Robert A., "The American-Soviet-Chinese T r i a n g l e : I m p l i c a t i o n s f o r Arms C o n t r o l " , i n : I b i d . , pp. 141-166. S c o v i l l e , H e r b e r t , J r . " M I R V C o n t r o l i s S t i l l P o s s i b l e " , i n : S u r v i v a l , vol.16 no.2 ( M a r c h - A p r i l 1974), pp. 54-59. . Toward a S t r a t e g i c Arms L i m i t a t i o n Ag- reement. New York: Carnegie Endowment f o r I n t e r n a t i o n a l Peace, 1970. S c o v i l l e , H e r b e r t , J r . , et a l . , " S t r a t e g i c Forum: the SALT Agree-ments", i n : S u r v i v a l , vol.14 no.5 (September-October 1972), pp. 210-219. - 116 -Shulman, Marshall D., "Comment", i n : Survey, vol.19 no.2 (Spring 1973), pp. 160-174. Staar, Richard F., "Comment", i n : I h i d . , pp. I83-I87. Stockholm International Peace Research I n s t i t u t e , Offensive Mis- s i l e s . Stockholm Paper 5. Uppsala: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1974. . "Strategic Arms Li m i t a t i o n " , i n : World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Year- hook 1973. Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1973* PP' 1-101. United States House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Af-f a i r s . Agreement on L i m i t a t i o n of St r a t e g i c Offensive Wea- pons (Hearings, 1972). Washington: U.S. Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1972. United States Senate, Committee on Armed Services, M i l i t a r y Im- p l i c a t i o n s of the Treaty on the Limitations of A n t i - B a l l i s - t i c M i s s i l e Systems and the Interim Agreement on L i m i t a t i o n  of S t r a t e g i c Offensive Arms (Hearings, 1972). Washington: U.S. Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1972. Committee on Foreign Relations, Nonproli-f e r a t i o n Treaty,Part 2 (Hearings, 1969). Washington: U.S. Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , I969. — . S t r a t e g i c Arms L i m i t a t i o n Agreements (Hearings, 1972). Washington: U.S. Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1972. Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and Organization, ABM,  MIRV, SALT, and the Nuclear Arms Race (Hearings, 1970). Washington: U.S. Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1970. Subcommittee. on Intern a t i o n a l Organization and Disarmament A f f a i r s , S t r a - t e g i c and Foreign P o l i c y Implications of ABM Systems, Part I (Hearings, 1969). Washington: U.S. Government P r i n t i n g Of-f i c e , 1969. Committee on Government Operations, Sub-committee on National Security and International Operations, International Negotiation,Part 7 (Hearing, 1972). Washingtpns: U.S. Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1973•' Van Cleave, William R., "Implications of Success or F a i l u r e of SALT", i n : Kintner and P f a l t z g r a f f (eds.), o p . c i t . , pp. 313-336. . "The SALT Papers: A Torrent of Verbiage or a Spring of C a p i t a l T r u t h s ? i n : - Orbis-,- v o l . 17 no.4 - 117 -(Winter 1974), pp. 1396-1401. Wolfe, Thomas W., "Soviet Approaches to SALT", i n : Problems of  Communism, vol.19 no.5 (September-October 1970), pp. 1-10. . "Soviet Interests i n SALT", i n : Kintner and P f a l t z g r a f f (eds.), o p . c i t . . pp. 21-54. 

Cite

Citation Scheme:

        

Citations by CSL (citeproc-js)

Usage Statistics

Share

Embed

Customize your widget with the following options, then copy and paste the code below into the HTML of your page to embed this item in your website.
                        
                            <div id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidgetDisplay">
                            <script id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidget"
                            src="{[{embed.src}]}"
                            data-item="{[{embed.item}]}"
                            data-collection="{[{embed.collection}]}"
                            data-metadata="{[{embed.showMetadata}]}"
                            data-width="{[{embed.width}]}"
                            data-media="{[{embed.selectedMedia}]}"
                            async >
                            </script>
                            </div>
                        
                    
IIIF logo Our image viewer uses the IIIF 2.0 standard. To load this item in other compatible viewers, use this url:
https://iiif.library.ubc.ca/presentation/dsp.831.1-0099939/manifest

Comment

Related Items