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The arms control calculus : factors affecting the susceptibility of military instruments and activities… Purver, Ronald Gordon 1974

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THE ARKS CONTROL CALCULUS: F a c t o r s A f f e c t i n g the S u s c e p t i b i l i t y of M i l i t a r y I n s t r u m e n t s and A c t i v i t i e s to I n t e r n a t i o n a l Regulation. by RONALD GORDON PURVER B.A., U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a , 1 9 7 3 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n t h e Department of POLITICAL SCIENCE We accept, t h i s t h e s i s a.s c o n f o r m i n g t o t h e rea. a i r e d s t a n d a r d  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA October,  1974  In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representatives.  It is understood that copying or publication  of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.  Department of  POLITICAL SCIENCE  The University of British Columbia Vancouver 8, Canada  OCTOBER 10,1974  ABSTRACT A r e a l i s t i c assessment of t h e p r o s p e c t s of arms c o n t r o l must t a k e i n t o account  the f u l l  range of " f a c t o r s a . f f e c t i n g t h e  s u s c e p t i b i l i t y o f m i l i t a r y i n s t r u m e n t s and a c t i v i t i e s t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e g u l a t i o n . " What arms c o n t r o l t h e o r y p r e s e n t l y l a c k s i s t h e e x p l i c i t and s y s t e m a t i c a n a l y s i s of t h e s e k e y f a c t o r s , in  g e n e r a l and a p p l i e d t o s p e c i f i c c a s e s . T h i s p a p e r o f f e r s a  t y p o l o g y of such f a c t o r s , drawn f r o m t h e e x i s t i n g body o f arms c o n t r o l t h e o r y , and a p p l i e s i t t o a c o n c r e t e h i s t o r i c a l the Soviet-American 1972.  case—  S t r a t e g i c Arms L i m i t a t i o n T a l k s o f 1969-  I t i s hoped t h e r e b y t o throw l i g h t on both t h e i n i t i a t i o n  and s u c c e s s o f n e g o t i a t i o n s , and t h e s p e c i f i c f o r m w h i c h  agree-  ments a r e l i k e l y t o t a k e — t h a t i s , t h e t y p e s of weapons systems o r a c t i v i t i e s most s u s c e p t i b l e t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e g u l a t i o n , and why. The d i v e r s i t y and abundance of c o n c e i v a b l e f a c t o r s , t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e g e n e r a l p a u c i t y of "hard d a t a " a v a i l a b l e , c a u t i o n s a g a i n s t a p r e m a t u r e attempt ous c o m p a r a t i v e  at p r e c i s e q u a n t i f i c a t i o n or r i g o r -  a n a l y s i s . I n s t e a d , f o r t h e moment, t h e method  must be u s e d as a mere g u i d e t o t h e deeper u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f given h i s t o r i c a l  phenomena.  The f a c t o r s f a l l i n t o f o u r b r o a d c a t e g o r i e s : (1) t h e " n a t u r e of t h e system ( i n s t r u m e n t o r a c t i v i t y ) t o be r e g u l a t e d ; " (2) t h e " c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f t h e s t r a t e g i c l a n d s c a p e ; "  (3) t h e  " c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of t h e p o l i t i c a l e n v i r o n m e n t ; " and ( 4 ) "the " n a t u r e of t h e arms c o n t r o l system e n v i s a g e d . " The  initial  - iii a n a l y s i s and  the  ( 1 ) , ( 2 ) , and  -  subsequent case study c o n c e n t r a t e on  ( 4 ) , viewed as c o n s t a n t s , promoting or  e f f o r t s toward agreement r e g a r d l e s s political gotiations owe  successful  conclusion  more t o q u i t e t r a n s i t o r y p o l i t i c a l  of g i v e n  ne-  of g i v e n agreements  may  underlying  any  shape  provide  the  impetus. possible  t o compare the r e l a t i v e s a l i e n c y  of the f a c t o r s i d e n t i f i e d , the  case study approach caji be  t o generate g e n e r a l hypotheses r e l e v a n t ways i n which SALT may discussed.  on the  the l a t t e r w i l l  content of agreements reached, i f not  While i t i s not  are  holding  circumstances than to  of t h e s e more " i n t r i n s i c " v a r i a b l e s . Yet the form and  hindering  of the alignment of domestic  i n t e r e s t s at a g i v e n moment. The or the  categories  t o t h i s end.  used  First,  the  be an a t y p i c a l example of arms c o n t r o l  Then, c o n c l u s i o n s  detailed analysis  are  t e n t a t i v e l y advanced, based  of SALT, w i t h r e s p e c t  t o : (1) the  en-  hancement of s t r a t e g i c s t a b i l i t y as a prime c r i t e r i o n f o r r e g u l a t o r y e f f o r t s ; (2) the  costs  of weapons systems as an  increa-  s i n g l y s a l i e n t f a c t o r ; ( 3 ) "the decreased concern with, problems of v e r i f i c a t i o n ; ries; field,  (4) the  (5) the p o s s i b i l i t y  importance of " p a r i t y " between a d v e r s a of " t r a d e - o f f s " w i t h i n  as w e l l as from o u t s i d e  d i s p a r i t i e s i n the  of i t ; (6) the  cost-effectiveness  achieved.  of r a p i d  offense; technological,  of mutual i n t e r e s t s i n  arms c o n t r o l among p o l i t i c a l a d v e r s a r i e s ; r e s t r a i n t s most l i k e l y t o be  armaments  s i g n i f i c a n c e of  of defense and  ( 7 ) the not n e c e s s a r i l y n e g a t i v e i n f l u e n c e development; ( 8 ) the apparent s t r e n g t h  the  and  ( 9 ) the type  of  - iv Analysis of the "factors a f f e c t i n g the s u s c e p t i b i l i t y of m i l i t a r y instruments and a c t i v i t i e s to i n t e r n a t i o n a l regulat i o n " may he useful i n explaining the success or f a i l u r e of past e f f o r t s , i d e n t i f y i n g areas of l i k e l y or possible future agreement, and assessing the prospects  of p a r t i c u l a r proposed  mea.sures. Ultimately, by drawing upon a. s u f f i c i e n t l y large number of case studies, i t nay be possible to develop more rigorous (perhaps even quantitatively-based)  theory.  - V -  TABLE OF CONTENTS  INTRODUCTION  »  1.  PART I  ..  4.  I . N a t u r e o f t h e System t o he R e g u l a t e d .. I I . C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the S t r a t e g i c Landscape........ I I I . C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the P o l i t i c a l Environment..... I V . N a t u r e o f t h e Arms C o n t r o l S y s t e m E n v i s a g e d  47.  PART I I I.  6. 23. 30. 39.  SALT: F a c t o r s A f f e c t i n g  the I n i t i a t i o n  I I . ABM's III. Offensive Missiles I V . T h e N a t u r e o f t h e SALT I A g r e e m e n t s  of N e g o t i ations ..  47. 69. 81. 88. 99.  CONCLUSION  . 104.  FOOTNOTES BIBLIOGRAPHY I . Arms C o n t r o l II.  S.A.L.T  Theory  108. 113.'  - vi -  ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would l i k e t o express my a p p r e c i a t i o n t o Mark Zacher and O l e H o l s t i , who guided me through t h e p l a n n i n g s t a g e s of t h i s paper; and t o Dan M i d d l e m i s s and K a l H o l s t i , f o r t h e i r helpful criticisms  of t h e f i r s t  draft.  INTRODUCTION A d i s t r e s s i n g l y large proportion t u r e on arms c o n t r o l and  of the  existing l i t e r a -  d i s a r m a m e n t — a p a r t from p u r e l y  c a l or j o u r n a l i s t i c s t u d i e s — i s confined  histori-  e i t h e r to exposing  and  l a m e n t i n g the m a n i f e s t shortcomings of p a s t measures or a g r e e ments; o r t o f o r m u l a t i n g much r e g a r d Little  p o l i c i e s , without  t o the r e a l i s t i c chances of t h e i r "being  e f f o r t has  i d e n t i f y i n g and t i a t i o n and t i o n . The  " i d e a l " programs and  been devoted e x p l i c i t l y and  implemented.  s y s t e m a t i c a l l y to  a n a l y z i n g the key v a r i a b l e s a f f e c t i n g the  s u c c e s s of attempts a t i n t e r n a t i o n a l "arms" r e g u l a -  l a c k of such a n a l y s i s , c r u c i a l t o any  realistic  assessment of the l i m i t a t i o n s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l a c t i o n , p a r t l y account f o r the s u r f e i t concerning  ini-  the  v o i d i n theory.  By  an attempt t o h e l p f i l l  definition  ( " i n t e r n a t i o n a l " and  the  apparent  "regulation"),  concerned w i t h measures of u n i l a t e r a l  ment, whether v o l u n t a r y without; nor  cynicism  subject.  T h i s paper r e p r e s e n t s  i t w i l l not be  of d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t and  may  disarma-  or (as a t V e r s a i l l e s ) imposed from  ( d i r e c t l y , t h a t i s ) w i t h the v e r y  j e c t s of " t a c i t " arms c o n t r o l and  war  important  limitation.  Our  sub-  analysis  s h a l l be r e s t r i c t e d t o those agreements reached as the r e s u l t of two  or more independent and  valent  on the  s e l f - r e l i a n t P a r t i e s (the  i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l p l a n e of  a d u l t s " ) f r e e l y n e g o t i a t i n g and  bargaining  equi-  ".consenting  on a b a s i s of mutual  * Which i s n o t t o say t h a t some of the same v a r i a b l e s w i l l be a p p l i c a b l e i n b o t h a r e a s .  not  - 2 respect  and  e q u a l i t y . We  s h a l l a l s o assume a c e r t a i n degree of  "genuineness" on the p a r t i n t o such n e g o t i a t i o n s  of the  and  states  concerned i n  a g r e e i n g t o a b i d e by  t i o n s , the presumption b e i n g t h a t  entering  such l i m i t a -  i n i t s absence t h e r e can  be  no hope whatsoever f o r " s u c c e s s f u l " measures of arms c o n t r o l . I t i s the l a t t e r w i t h which we non  of arms c o n t r o l n e g o t i a t i o n s The  paper w i l l  of the  the  phenome-  se.  parts. Part  I i s a general  e x i s t i n g body of arms c o n t r o l  " f a c t o r s a f f e c t i n g the  ments and  concerned, not  per  comprise two  d i s c u s s i o n , based on the  the  are  theory,  s u s c e p t i b i l i t y of m i l i t a r y i n s t r u -  a c t i v i t i e s to i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e g u l a t i o n . "  In P a r t  i n d i v i d u a l f a c t o r s i d e n t i f i e d i n the p r e c e d i n g  II  section  w i l l be a p p l i e d t o a c o n c r e t e h i s t o r i c a l case, namely the v i e t - A m e r i c a n S t r a t e g i c Arms L i m i t a t i o n T a l k s  So-  of 1969-1972  the agreements which, they spawned. Throughout, we  w i l l focus  b o t h the f a c t o r s i n f l u e n c i n g the  i n i t i a t i o n of arms c o n t r o l  gotiations  a l s o b e a r upon the  (given  t h a t t h e s e may  of subsequent r e g u l a t i o n ) , and  and on ne-  prospects  the q u a l i t i e s of p a r t i c u l a r  m i l i t a r y "systems" which a f f e c t t h e i r s u s c e p t i b i l i t y t o a g r e e ment. I t i s assumed t h a t much the tive i n either c a s e — f o r  same f a c t o r s w i l l be  example, the h i g h c o s t  systems g e n e r a l l y ,  and  system; the  to s t r a t e g i c s t a b i l i t y  threat  racing" i n general,  and  the  the  exorbitant  the  of weapons  p r i c e - t a g of a g i v e n of u n r e g u l a t e d "arms  d e s t a b i l i z i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of  p a r t i c u l a r type of weapon. Consequently, no made i n P a r t  opera-  attempt w i l l  a  be  I t o d i s t i n g u i s h between those f a c t o r s a f f e c t i n g  initiation  of n e g o t i a t i o n s ,  and  those s h a p i n g t h e i r  ultimate  - 3 success.  In d e a l i n g with, a p a r t i c u l a r case study as i n P a r t I I ,  however, i t becomes c o n v e n i e n t t o make such a d i s t i n c t i o n — a s we  w i l l by  c o n s i d e r i n g s e p a r a t e l y the i n i t i a t i o n  of SALT  and  the s p e c i f i c agreements r e a c h e d t h e r e i n . The  typology  of v a r i a b l e s p r e s e n t e d  i n P a r t I w i l l be used  merely as a guide t o the deeper u n d e r s t a n d i n g of a g i v e n  his-  t o r i c a l phenomenon, n o t as a framework s u s c e p t i b l e t o e i t h e r p r e c i s e q u a n t i f i c a t i o n or r i g o r o u s comparative a n a l y s i s . Any attempt at the l a t t e r would be  s e l f - d e f e a t i n g i n view of  b e w i l d e r i n g a r r a y of c o n c e i v a b l e  f a c t o r s and  the g e n e r a l  c i t y of "hard d a t a " on the s u b j e c t a v a i l a b l e at the time. Yet tematic  i t may  the pau-  present  be hoped t h a t , however u n s o p h i s t i c a t e d , a  sys-  a n a l y s i s such as f o l l o w s w i l l prove more u s e f u l than  the h a p h a z a r d — t h o u g h u n d e n i a b l y e n t h u s i a s t i c and tioned—expositions  w i t h which we  well-inten-  a r e , s a d l y , most f a m i l i a r .  PART I The v a r i o u s " f a c t o r s a f f e c t i n g the s u s c e p t i b i l i t y of t a r y i n s t r u m e n t s and a c t i v i t i e s can be grouped  regulation"  i n t o a t l e a s t f o u r broad c a t e g o r i e s : ( 1 ) the  "nature of the system (2)  to i n t e r n a t i o n a l  mili-  ( i n s t r u m e n t or a c t i v i t y ) t o be r e g u l a t e d ; "  the " c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the s t r a t e g i c l a n d s c a p e ; " ( 3 ) the  " c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the p o l i t i c a l environment;" "nature of the arms c o n t r o l system  and  ( 4 ) the  e n v i s a g e d . " Each of t h e s e  c a t e g o r i e s embodies a l l t h r e e of the t r a d i t i o n a l  " l e v e l s of  a n a l y s i s , " i . e . the s y s t e m i c , the n a t i o n - s t a t e , and the  indivi-  d u a l . F o r example, the "nature of the system t o be r e g u l a t e d " can r e f e r t o t h e ( i n d i v i d u a l l y - p e r c e i v e d ) moral  repugnance  a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the use of a p a r t i c u l a r type of weapon; t o i t s utility,  i n terms of n a t i o n a l g o a l s ; or t o i t s e f f e c t upon the  i n t e r n a t i o n a l b a l a n c e of power. S i m i l a r l y , the tics  of the p o l i t i c a l  environment"  "characteris-  i n c l u d e the g e n e r a l t e n o r of  r e l a t i o n s between s t a t e s , i n terms o f t r u s t o r h o s t i l i t y ; r e l a t i v e power and  the  i n f l u e n c e of domestic b u r e a u c r a c i e s i n v o l v e d  i n n a t i o n a l d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g ; and the p e r s o n a l i t i e s and p o s i t i o n s of key i n d i v i d u a l  predis-  decision-makers.  The t r e n d i n the most r e c e n t l i t e r a t u r e on arms c o n t r o l has been t o f o c u s a t t e n t i o n upon the " b u r e a u c r a t i c p o l i t i c s " a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the p r o c e s s and w i t h g i v e n a c c o r d s .  Indeed,  * See, f o r example, Newhouse ( 1 9 7 3 ) ; and Chayes ( 1 9 7 2 ) , who w r i t e s : " I t i s p r o b a b l y f a i r t o say t h a t t h e p r i n c i p a l r e a s o n arms c o n t r o l agreements take so l o n g t o n e g o t i a t e and are n o t more f a r - r e a c h i n g i s not so much the d i f f i c u l t y of one s i d e c o n v i n c i n g t h e o t h e r as the need f o r each s i d e t o generate a b'road base of agreement and acceptance w i t h i n i t s own ( c o n t . )  - 5 domestic  i n - f i g h t i n g and  a prime determinant  j o c k e y i n g over "disarmament" i s s u e s i s  of outputs i n t h i s , as i n any o t h e r , a r e a  of p u b l i c p o l i c y . While c r u c i a l t o the u n d e r s t a n d i n g of a g i v e n d e c i s i o n , however, such a f o c u s poses f o r m i d a b l e , i f n o t p e r a b l e , problems f o r a b s t r a c t a n a l y s i s . One  insu-  can speak o n l y i n  v e r y g e n e r a l terms of the r e l a t i v e s t r e n g t h and i n f l u e n c e of v a r i o u s b u r e a u c r a c i e s , c o n s t i t u e n c i e s , or i d e o l o g i e s , f o r i n s t a n c e , u n l e s s one f o c u s e s upon a p a r t i c u l a r h i s t o r i c a l  case.  On the o t h e r hand, c e r t a i n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of weapons or of t h e i r d i s t r i b u t i o n throughout example, may  the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system, f o r  be c o n s i d e r e d as c o n s t a n t s ,  promoting  or h i n d e r -  i n g e f f o r t s toward agreement r e g a r d l e s s of the alignment  of  domestic p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t s a t a g i v e n moment. I t i s upon such f a c t o r s t h a t the b u l k of t h i s s e c t i o n w i l l be c o n c e n t r a t e d . The d i s t i n c t i o n corresponds r o u g h l y t o t h a t between more n a r r o w l y n a t i o n a l i s t i c g o a l s and the i n t e r e s t s of the w o r l d community as a whole. The maxim t h a t an i n t e r n a t i o n a l agreement i s e f f e c t i v e o n l y t o the extent t h a t i t r e f l e c t s t h e c o n t i n u i n g mutual i n t e r e s t of a l l the major p a r t i e s suggests t h a t the e f f o r t t o i d e n t i f y and fit  e l a b o r a t e areas of common concern and bene-  i s n o t w i t h o u t m e r i t . And, w h i l e k e e p i n g i n mind the i n h e r e n t  l i m i t a t i o n s of the " r a t i o n a l - a c t o r " model of f o r e i g n p o l i c y , must not l o s e s i g h t of the f a c t t h a t domestic debate  one  i s conduc-  t e d l a r g e l y on the b a s i s of a l l e g e d l y r a t i o n a l a n a l y s i s of the ( c o n t . ) and a l l i e d p o l i c y m a k i n g e s t a b l i s h m e n t s . " ( 1 ) * S t r i c t l y s p e a k i n g , of c o u r s e , i t i s the p e r c e p t i o n s of t h e s e " c o n s t a n t s " by the a c t o r s concerned t h a t m a t t e r s .  - 6 " n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t . " To the extent  t h a t such i s the c a s e ,  t h a t the debate i s a t a l l r e l e v a n t t o the p o l i c y - m a k i n g  and  process,  the " r a t i o n a l - a c t o r " model r e t a i n s a c e r t a i n v a l i d i t y . I . NATURE OF THE The  first  SYSTEM TO BE REGULATED.  category  of v a r i a b l e s may  i n t u r n be broken down  i n t o a number of components, t h r e e of which r o u g h l y  correspond  t o what are u s u a l l y understood t o be the primary o b j e c t i v e s of arms c o n t r o l : (1) t o reduce the l i k e l i h o o d of war (2) t o m i t i g a t e i t s s e v e r i t y and  breaking  out;  consequences when i t does;  and  (3) to reduce the economic burden of the arms r a c e . The  corres-  ponding v a r i a b l e s a r e : (1) the e f f e c t of the p a r t i c u l a r  system  upon s t r a t e g i c s t a b i l i t y ;  (2)  the magnitude or n a t u r e  s t r u c t i o n associated with  i t ; and  (3)  of the  de-  i t s monetary c o s t .  E f f e c t Upon S t r a t e g i c S t a b i l i t y Most p o p u l a r has  s u p p o r t . f o r g e n e r a l and  complete disarmament  been founded upon the r a t h e r s i m p l i s t i c b e l i e f t h a t by  l i s h i n g armaments, the r e s o r t t o war i m p o s s i b l e , and  could thereby  be  e t e r n a l peace thus ensured. T h i s view  misses the p o i n t , of c o u r s e , cannot be reduced without  t h a t the war  corresponding  abo-  rendered completely  p o t e n t i a l of s t a t e s  reductions  example, t h e i r l e v e l s of i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n and  in, for  social  organiza-  t i o n . More sober proponents of arms c o n t r o l have been  satisfied  * C f . C o l i n Gray: "To escape from the b l i n d a l l e y of a n a l y s i n g the c u r r e n t phase of the arms debate i n the U n i t e d S t a t e s exc l u s i v e l y i n terms of b u r e a u c r a t i c p o l i t i c s , i t i s n e c e s s a r y t o ascend t o the g r e a t e r a r i d i t y of ' r a t i o n a l a c t o r ' s t r a t e g i c a n a l y s i s . . . . i t i s c e r t a i n l y p o s s i b l e to describe f a i r l y (cont.)  - 7 with, t h e f o l l o w i n g arguments l i n k i n g disarmament t o the  en-  hancement of i n t e r n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y : t h a t t h a t p r o p o r t i o n of h o s t i l i t y and d i s t r u s t accounted f o r by the mere presence  of  t h r e a t e n i n g a r s e n a l s would t h e r e b y d i s s i p a t e ; t h a t , i n s o f a r as it  depends on the sheer a v a i l a b i l i t y  of weapons and the magni-  tude of r e s o u r c e s a l r e a d y i n v e s t e d i n them, the g e n e r a l w i l l i n g n e s s of s t a t e s t o go t o war w i l l be reduced; t h a t l o n g e r p e r i o d s of m o b i l i z a t i o n w i l l p r o v i d e g r e a t e r o p p o r t u n i t y f o r attempts  a t r e c o n c i l i a t i o n t o be undertaken  and v o i c e s of r e -  s t r a i n t t o be h e a r d ; and f i n a l l y , t h a t wars f o u g h t a t a lower level  of t e c h n o l o g i c a l s o p h i s t i c a t i o n or w i t h much s m a l l e r a r -  s e n a l s are l i k e l y t o be l e s s d e s t r u c t i v e and c o s t l y . the case f o r g e n e r a l and complete As the l a t t e r has appeared  So  rests  disarmament.  p r o g r e s s i v e l y l e s s capable of  a t t a i n m e n t , however, the "arms c o n t r o l " s c h o o l has ga,ined a s c e n dancy.  E f f o r t s have, a t v a r i o u s t i m e s , come t o be devoted more  ( c o n t . ) s t a n d a r d l i n e s of i n s t i t u t i o n a l argument...as r e f l e c t i n g a s e v e r e l y bounded r a t i o n a l i t y . . . . [However,"] 'Where you s t a n d depends upon where you s i t ' s h o u l d be the b e g i n n i n g of a n a l y s i s ; i t s h o u l d not be viewed as a statement charged w i t h much e x p l a n a t o r y power c o n c e r n i n g p o l i c y r e s u l t a n t . P o l i c y i s n o t j u s t the p r e d i c t a b l e r e s u l t a n t of a w e i g h i n g (by whom? I s the p r o c e s s l e a d e r l e s s ? ) of the complex b a l a n c e of i n t e r e s t i n v e i g h i n g or a d v o c a t i n g on a p a r t i c u l a r i s s u e . I t i s t r u e t h a t t o be the s t a n d a r d - b e a r e r of a more or l e s s p l a u s i b l e argument i s o n l y one among the f a c t o r s t h a t w i l l be weighed by the p o l i c y judge, but i t i s a f a c t o r of no mean importance." (2) * T h i s may not always be the case, of c o u r s e . In Andre B e a u f r e ' s words, " i t i s important not t o f o r g e t t h a t wars f o r m e r l y conducted w i t h v e r y p r i m i t i v e weapons have l e d t o the massacre of e n t i r e p o p u l a t i o n s and t h a t c u r r e n t l y p r o l o n g e d c o n f l i c t s f o u g h t w i t h v e r y simple weapons a t the g u e r r i l l a l e v e l l e a d t o c o n s i d e r a b l e d e s t r u c t i o n and l o s s e s . " (3) ** The two terms, "arms c o n t r o l " and "disarmament", a r e used i n t e r c h a n g e a b l y throughout t h i s essay, a l t h o u g h they have occ a s i o n a l l y been c o u n t e r p o i s e d i n the e x i s t i n g l i t e r a t u r e . The l a t t e r term_ suggests an a c t u a l r e d u c t i o n i n t h e l e v e l f ( " G o n t v )  - 8 c l o s e l y t o the a b o l i t i o n o r r e s t r i c t i o n of p a r t i c u l a r t y p e s of weapons or m i l i t a r y "systems." And the c r i t e r i a f o r s e l e c t i o n have o f t e n been r e l a t e d t o t h e s t a b i l i t y o f the " s t r a t e g i c l a n c e " o r "balance of p o w e r " — i n  ba-  o t h e r words, t o the l i k e l i h o o d  of war b r e a k i n g out. Such has been the case n o t a b l y a t the time of the World Disarmament Conference i n t h e e a r l y lQSO's,  and  throughout the p e r i o d s i n c e the mid-rig!?©* s. The d e l e g a t e s t o t h e World Disarmament Conference r e c o g n i z e d t h a t c e r t a i n t y p e s of armaments, which they chose t o  call  " a g g r e s s i v e , " were of g r e a t e r u t i l i t y t o the o f f e n s e than t o t h e d e f e n s e . The was  e x i s t e n c e of such weapons i n n a t i o n a l a r s e n a l s , i t  reasoned, c o n t r i b u t e d m a t e r i a l l y t o t h e danger of war  by  o f f e r i n g b o t h t h e p r o s p e c t of a r e l a t i v e l y q u i c k and easy v i c t o r y , and a c e r t a i n advantage  t o the p a r t y which s t r u c k  first.  Were such weapons a b o l i s h e d , i t was hoped, t h e r e l a t i v e advantage a c c r u i n g t o t h e defense would s e r v e t o r e s t r a i n any p o t e n tial  a g g r e s s o r and thus t o f o r e s t a l l the outbreak of war,  at  l e a s t i n s o f a r as t h e l a t t e r i s r a t i o n a l l y determined. Heavy b i l e a r t i l l e r y , l a r g e tanks, b a t t l e s h i p s , a i r c r a f t submarines,  mo-  carriers,  bombers, and c h e m i c a l and b a c t e r i o l o g i c a l weapons  were a t one time o r a n o t h e r s i n g l e d out as b e i n g e s s e n t i a l l y ( c o n t . ) of armaments of a s t a t e (though i t has n o t always been used e x c l u s i v e l y i n t h i s s e n s e ) ; the f o r m e r — w h i c h might b e s t be c h a r a c t e r i z e d as any c o n s c i o u s o r p u r p o s e f u l a t t e m p t — w h e t h e r u n i l a t e r a l o r m u l t i l a t e r a l , t a c i t or e x p l i c i t , peacetime or wart i m e — t o p l a c e r e s t r i c t i o n s upon m i l i t a r y f o r c e s or a c t i v i t i e s — i s much b r o a d e r i n scope and may be c o n s i d e r e d t o subsume a l l measures of "disarmament." "Arms c o n t r o l s c h o o l " , however, r e f e r s t o t h a t body of commentators which has - s h i f t e d emphasis from g e n e r a l and complete disarmament t o more modest (and hopef u l l y , hence p r a c t i c a b l e ) arms l i m i t a t i o n s .  " a g g r e s s i v e . " ^ The t i o n , and  key  c r i t e r i a seemed t o be m o b i l i t y , p r o t e c -  s t r i k i n g power, which, when "combined-to t h e h i g h e s t  degree," were "more n e a r l y i n d i s p e n s a b l e t o the a t t a c k i n t a c t i c s , s t r a t e g y , and  grand s t r a t e g y .  t i o n , " wrote M a r i o n Boggs, "...the  n J  "In t h e o r e t i c a l  defense d i s p o s e s  especially  of s t r i k i n g power and p r o t e c t i o n , to a l e s s e r extent t y , w h i l e the o f f e n s e possesses  m o b i l i t y and  concep-  of m o b i l i -  s t r i k i n g power, and  p r o t e c t i o n t o a l e s s e r degree." The  t h e s i s t h a t weapons c o u l d be c l a s s i f i e d a c c o r d i n g t o  degree of i n n a t e " a g g r e s s i v e n e s s " met cism,  of c o u r s e .  with considerable  skepti-  I t would seem more c o r r e c t t o say t h a t a g i v e n  weapon or type of weapon might be employed e i t h e r o f f e n s i v e l y d e f e n s i v e l y , as the most innocuous m i l i t a r y instrument  or  ( a metal  s h i e l d , f o r example) c o u l d be used a g g r e s s i v e l y , or a t l e a s t s e r v e a g g r e s s i v e p u r p o s e s . As Quincy Wright puts i t : "While t h e s h i e l d would o r d i n a r i l y be spoken of as d e f e n s i v e and t h e sword as o f f e n s i v e , i t i s c l e a r t h a t even i n t h i s simple t i n c t i o n i s r e l a t i v e . The  case the  s h i e l d i n c r e a s e s the o f f e n s i v e e f f e c -  t i v e n e s s of t h e sword, and the sword can be used t o p a r r y w e l l as t o c u t o r t h r u s t . "  one  as  I n s t r a t e g i c terms, defense on  f r o n t might be used t o a i d and abet a g g r e s s i o n t h i s was  on another  one front;  of the arguments of Prance a t the Conference,  i n g German d e s i g n s upon h e r a l l i e s t o the e a s t . Indeed, the c i s e determination  dis-  fearpre-  of what c o n s t i t u t e d an " a g g r e s s i v e " weapon,  * E.g. Hans Morgenthau: "Weapons a r e n o t a g g r e s s i v e or d e f e n s i v e by n a t u r e , but a r e made so by the purpose they s e r v e . " ( 8 )  B 10 and  -  which p a r t i c u l a r systems f e l l w i t h i n t h a t  major o b s t a c l e t o the  s u c c e s s of the  c a t e g o r y , proved a  Disarmament C o n f e r e n c e .  Not  s u r p r i s i n g l y , perhaps, each p a r t i c i p a n t  tended t o downplay  "aggressive" characteristics  major weapons systems,  of i t s own  w h i l e emphasizing those of i t s r i v a l s what has  been a p t l y  guments t o f o l l o w  d e s c r i b e d as q  the  D e s p i t e the  the  or p o t e n t i a l  rivals,  encountered i n  been ca-lled, i n t h e o r y i t remains b a s i c a l l y sound. As  conceivable that  and  profitable  t h e r e are  capable of b o t h o f f e n s i v e the  s u c c e s s of the  mine the son;  1  conclusion."  has  Boggs  cannot  cerbe  Again: " i t i s  c e r t a i n armaments which, even though and  d e f e n s i v e use,  attacking  d e f e n d i n g s t a t e . " " ' "The 1  it  p r e s e n t stage of m i l i t a r y development,  t a i n weapons e x i s t w i t h o u t which a g g r e s s i v e p o l i c y 10 c a r r i e d to a r a p i d  ar-  flag."  great p r a c t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s  " i n the  in  "tendency of t e c h n i c a l  a p p l y i n g t h i s " q u a l i t a t i v e p r i n c i p l e " of disarmament, as  p o i n t s out,  the  state  c o n t r i b u t e more t o  than t o the  problem," she  states,  a b s o l u t e c h a r a c t e r of a weapon, but  t o d i s c o v e r whether or not  the  the  " i s not  deter-  t o make a  offensive  predominate, whether a weapon i s more u s e f u l  s u c c e s s of to  compari-  potentialities i n a t t a c k or i n  de-  12 fense."^ The tegic  p r e o c c u p a t i o n of the  s t a b i l i t y was  also  arms c o n t r o l  characteristic  p e r i o d . A g a i n , e f f o r t s came t o be d e s i g n e d t o reduce t e n s i o n s and All-out  war  between the  considered highly  community w i t h  of the  post-World War  devoted c h i e f l y t o measures  f o r e s t a l l the  outbreak of  Great Powers, i n the n u c l e a r age,  unlikely;  stra-  a premeditated, s t r a t e g i c  war. was  assault  II  - 11  -  by one n u c l e a r Power upon another a b l e . N e v e r t h e l e s s , i t was  deemed p r a c t i c a l l y  f e a r e d such a war  unthink-  might be  initiated  e i t h e r a c c i d e n t a l l y o r , under c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s , d e l i b e r a t e l y , i n one  of the f o l l o w i n g ways: (1) i f an a t t a c k e r c o u l d be r e a -  s o n a b l y s u r e of e s c a p i n g r e t a l i a t i o n i n k i n d , or a t l e a s t t h a t measure of r e t a l i a t i o n out of a l l p r o p o r t i o n t o the g a i n s t o be had;  conceivable  (2) i f a s t a t e c o n s i d e r e d i t s e l f t o be i n immi-  nent danger of an a l l - o u t a t t a c k , and p e r c e i v e d an advantage i n striking first and sult  ("pre-empting"), so as t o reduce i t s own  damage  c a s u a l t i e s or b l u n t t h e a t t a c k a l t o g e t h e r ; or (3) as t h e r e of m e c h a n i c a l  or human f a i l u r e — f o r  example, of a f a u l t y  warning system, an a c c i d e n t a l l a u n c h , or the a c t i o n s of m a d — o r at l e a s t i r r a t i o n a l — m e n . A number of i n t e r n a t i o n a l a c c o r d s have been reached w i t h a view t o r e d u c i n g t h i s type of danger, a l t h o u g h most such measures—such  as t h e p r o t e c t i o n of r e t a l i a t o r y f o r c e s , and  command-and-control p r o c e d u r e s — h a v e been t a k e n  improved  unilaterally.  The h o t - l i n e agreement between the S o v i e t Union and the U n i t e d S t a t e s was  i n t e n d e d t o h e l p a v e r t the a c c i d e n t a l or " m i s c a l c u -  l a t e d " i n i t i a t i o n ofrya s t r a t e g i c exchange. The n u c l e a r non-prol i f e r a t i o n t r e a t y — i n s o f a r as i t was c a t a l y t i c war,  motivated  by the f e a r of  degraded command-and-control s a f e g u a r d s ,  l e s s - r e s p o n s i b l e d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g — w a s a measure of t h i s  and type.  A l l attempts t o p r e v e n t l o c a l c o n f l i c t s from s p r e a d i n g and l a t i n g i n t o " c e n t r a l " ones a l s o f a l l under t h i s c a t e g o r y , c o u r s e , as do p r o p o s a l s f o r the "disengagement" of  escaof  opposing  f r o n t - l i n e f o r c e s i n p a r t i c u l a r l y t e n s e areas of the  world.  - 12 It  i s symptomatic of t h e o v e r r i d i n g c o n c e r n w i t h s t r a t e g i c  s t a b i l i t y d i s p l a y e d by "arms c o n t r o l l e r s " s i n c e t h e m i d - 1 9 5 0 ' s t h a t one of t h e f i r s t  s u b j e c t s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l d i s c u s s i o n a f t e r  the s h e l v i n g of e a r l y postwar p l a n s f o r g e n e r a l and complete armament was "the p r e v e n t i o n  of s u r p r i s e attack." This t o p i c  became p a r t i c u l a r l y prominent a f t e r t h e advent of t h e ICBM, its  dis-  d r a s t i c a l l y - r e d u c e d warning time and v i r t u a l  once a i r b o r n e . Suddenly i t became c o n c e i v a b l e o r " might be capable of s i m u l t a n e o u s l y  with  invincibility  t h a t an " a g g r e s s -  w i p i n g out a l l o r most  of h i s v i c t i m ' s s t r a t e g i c m i s s i l e s and bombers on t h e ground and  thus,  i n one l i g h t n i n g s t r o k e , of v i r t u a l l y f o r c i n g i t s  surrender. breaking  Given such a p o t e n t i a l , i t seemed, t h e danger of war  out was enhanced on a t l e a s t t h r e e  making an a g g r e s s i v e tive; attack  counts: (1)  t h a t of  p o l i c y more f e a s i b l e and, hence, a t t r a c -  ( 2 ) t h e n e c e s s i t y of automatic response t o p e r c e i v e d ( a "launch-on-warning" p o l i c y ) , which i n c r e a s e d t h e  chances of a c c i d e n t ; and ( 3 ) t h e h e i g h t e n e d d e s i r a b i l i t y of pre-empting a t h r e a t e n e d  a t t a c k , which l i k e w i s e i n c r e a s e d t h e  chances of " m i s c a l c u l a t i o n " by e i t h e r s i d e and made major  cri-  ses t h a t much more unbearable and p o t e n t i a l l y e x p l o s i v e . Such c o n s i d e r a t i o n s l e d F r a n c e t o propose t h e a b o l i t i o n of "guided m i s s i l e s " a l t o g e t h e r . Less ambitious schemes c a l l e d f o r t h e s t a t i o n i n g of o b s e r v e r s  at launching  s i t e s , t o g i v e added  warning time; l i m i t a t i o n s on t h e numbers of m i s s i l e s to deprive  them of a c o u n t e r f o r e e  permitted,  c a p a b i l i t y ; and a v a r i e t y of  " p a s s i v e " measures t o p r o t e c t t h e r e t a l i a t o r y f o r c e s of each s i d e . I n t h e end, m u l t i l a t e r a l  e f f o r t s came t o nought and  - 13 s t r a t e g i c s t a b i l i t y was  -  temporarily preserved  by  unilateral  actions. As the d o c t r i n e of "mutual d e t e r r e n c e " d e s t r u c t i o n " became e n s h r i n e d the 1 9 6 0 ' s , what had and  assured  i n the s t r a t e g i c l e x i c o n d u r i n g  e a r l i e r been a q u e s t i o n of  " d e f e n s i v e " armaments r e s o l v e d i t s e l f  s t r i k e " and  or "mutual  "aggressive"  i n t o one  of  "first-  " s e c o n d - s t r i k e " c a p a b i l i t y . In a sense, the  c i p l e behind  the d i s t i n c t i o n was  prin-  the same: weapons systems of  g r e a t e r o f f e n s i v e than d e f e n s i v e u t i l i t y were i n h e r e n t l y d e s t a bilizing,  i n t h a t they  i n c r e a s e d the chances of war.  t e c t e d i n t e r c o n t i n e n t a l b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s came t o be  Thus unproconsidered  "provocative" s i n c e , being h i g h l y vulnerable to attack themselv e s , the o n l y use  t o which they c o u l d l o g i c a l l y be put was  p a r t of a f i r s t - s t r i k e ; w h i l e m i s s i l e s i n hardened s i l o s ,  as or  a i r b o r n e bombers, or submarine-launched b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s were all  capable  of " r i d i n g out" a f i r s t - s t r i k e and  inflicting  suffi-  c i e n t damage i n r e t a l i a t i o n t o d e t e r the p o t e n t i a l a g g r e s s o r from a t t a c k i n g i n the f i r s t p l a c e . The  avoidance of war  assumed t o be  i n the i n t e r e s t  n u c l e a r age),  the l i m i t a t i o n or a b o l i t i o n of  weapons was  being  of a l l s i d e s ( e s p e c i a l l y i n the "first-strike"  viewed as a l e g i t i m a t e concern of arms c o n t r o l nego-  tiations. ^ 1  In a n o t h e r sense, of c o u r s e , the t r a d i t i o n a l between " o f f e n s i v e " and once s t a t e s had "balance  " d e f e n s i v e " had  distinction  l o s t a l l meaning. F o r ,  come t o r e l y f o r s t r a t e g i c s t a b i l i t y upon a  of t e r r o r " ( t h a t i s , the mutual h o l d i n g - h o s t a g e  c i v i l i a n p o p u l a t i o n s ) , any  attempt t o l i m i t  of  c i v i l i a n damage or  - 14  -  c a s u a l t i e s (by means of massive s h e l t e r programs or ABM's, f o r example) became d i s r u p t i v e and u n d e s i r a b l e , t h r e a t e n i n g s i v e i n t e n t i o n s and  itself  aggres-  s u b j e c t t o l i m i t a t i o n or p r o h i b i t i o n .  Magnitude or Nature of D e s t r u c t i v e n e s s U n d e r l y i n g a,ll of the mass movements f o r the "banning" of "the Bomb" s i n c e the dawn of the atomic age has been the  reali-  z a t i o n of the t e r r i b l e , unprecedented d e s t r u c t i v e power of the new  weapons. Never b e f o r e have men  bility  possessed  of v i r t u a l l y a n n i h i l a t i n g t h e i r own  the m i l i t a r y  capa-  k i n d . More than  any-  t h i n g e l s e , i t i s t h i s f a c t which i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r "disarmament" i t s e l f b e i n g c o n s i d e r e d at times p r a c t i c a l l y  synonymous,  i n the p u b l i c ' s eye, w i t h " n u c l e a r disarmament." I t i s t h i s f a c t , t o o , which has  i m p e l l e d governments t o expend the  est amount of t h e i r arms c o n t r o l e f f o r t the q u e s t i o n of n u c l e a r weapons Hopes have been aroused  s i n c e World War  greatI I upon  alone. ^ 1  t h a t t h e i r t a s k might be made  e a s i e r by v i r t u e of the g r e a t d i s p r o p o r t i o n between the  destruc-  t i v e power of the weapons and the p r a c t i c a l uses t o which they might be put. t h e i r use  ;  N u c l e a r powers have a common i n t e r e s t i n a v o i d i n g  so l o n g as t h e t h r e a t e n e d  d e s t r u c t i o n exceeds beyond • an a l l measure the c o n c e i v a b l e g a i n s t o be had. I r o n i c a l l y , then, * See, f o r example, L o u i s J . H a l l e , who w r i t e s : "The development of the i n s t r u m e n t s of war beyond the p o i n t where they have any p o l i t i c a l u t i l i t y or f e a s i b i l i t y i n a c t i v e use must c e r t a i n l y be r e g a r d e d as a permanent f a c t o r t e n d i n g t o d e p r i v e the r e s o r t t o g e n e r a l war of i t s former l e g i t i m a c y . " (15) And, i t might be added, t e n d i n g t o i n c r e a s e support f o r t h e i r a b o l i t i o n or l i m i t a t i o n . ** In Donald Brennan's words, " i t would seem t h a t each s i d e i s l i k e l y t o be a b l e t o i n f l i c t f a r more damage on t h e ( c o n t . )  - 15  -  t h e i r overwhelming power may  r e n d e r them p r a c t i c a l l y  as i n s t r u m e n t s  c e r t a i n l y of w a r f a r e . At the same  of diplomacy;  obsolete  time, however, i t enhances both t h e i r u t i l i t y as weapons of l a s t r e s o r t , the t h r e a t e n e d use direst  of c i r c u m s t a n c e s ;  of which might appear c r e d i b l e i n the  and t h e i r s t a t u s as weapons of p r e s t i g e ,  a k i n d of p a s s p o r t t o g r e a t n e s s  i n the modern w o r l d .  Even schemes of l e s s than complete n u c l e a r disarmament have been r a t i o n a l i z e d on the grounds of r e d u c i n g t h e extent of the d e s t r u c t i o n accompanying a p o s s i b l e w a r . ^ I f n u c l e a r war 1  come, i t has been argued, one  can a t l e a s t hope t h a t i t w i l l  l i m i t e d , by r e s t r i c t i o n s on the a b s o l u t e s i z e of the a r s e n a l s , i f by no  i s to be  available  o t h e r means.  The u n i v e r s a l abhorrence of n u c l e a r weapons owes a good d e a l as w e l l , however, t o the q u a l i t a t i v e n a t u r e tial  poten-  d e s t r u c t i o n , as i l l u s t r a t e d so g r a p h i c a l l y i n t h e r u i n s of  Hiroshima  and Nagasaki,  and l o n g - r u n dered  of the  f o r example. I n p a r t i c u l a r , t h e  immediate  e f f e c t s of e x c e s s i v e r a d i a t i o n exposure a r e c o n s i -  i n t o l e r a b l e byproducts  of war  by t h e w o r l d  community.  Indeed, t h e use of n u c l e a r weapons v i o l a t e s almost  every  p r e c e p t r e l a t i n g t o armaments which has been e n s h r i n e d i n the "laws of war."  T r a d i t i o n a l l y , i n t h e words of one a u t h o r , i t has  been "a fundamental p r i n c i p l e . . . t h a t the c h o i c e of means of i n 17 j u r i n g an enemy i s not u n l i m i t e d . "  R e s t r i c t i o n s have been l a i d  down i n two cognate a r e a s : a g a i n s t "inhumane" weapons, those ( c o n t . ) o t h e r i n a g e n e r a l war t h a n e i t h e r would f i n d a t a l l j u s t i f i e d by t h e o r i g i n a l o b j e c t i v e s of the c o n f l i c t , whichever s i d e s u f f e r e d the g r e a t e r a b s o l u t e damage." (18)  - 16  -  which cause i n j u r i e s s u p e r f l u o u s t o the m i l i t a r y n e c e s s i t y of r e n d e r i n g an opponent hors de combat ( t h a t i s , which cause necessary  s u f f e r i n g " ) ; and  a g a i n s t the i n d i s c r i m i n a t e use  weapons on combatants and non-combatants a l i k e . On b o t h n u c l e a r weapons must be c l a s s e d among the g r e a t e s t of I t was  "unof  counts,  offenders.  the concern f o r the "inhumanity" of the wea.pon  which l e d t o the p r o h i b i t i o n of dumdum b u l l e t s by the Hague Conference  of I899,  and which was  the 1925  Geneva P r o t o c o l and  chemical  and  at l e a s t p a r t l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r  subsequent e f f o r t s t o  restrict  b i o l o g i c a l ( o r b a c t e r i o l o g i c a l ) warfare.  c e n t l y , weapons of e x c e s s i v e f i r e p o w e r , weapons," d e l a y e d - a c t i o n f u s e s , and  chemical  More r e -  sprays,  the l i k e have been  "area  identi-  f i e d as p a r t i c u l a r l y " i n d i s c r i m i n a t e ; " and napalm, white phosphorus and  o t h e r i n c e n d i a r y weapons, h y p e r v e l o c i t y r i f l e s  and  a n t i - p e r s o n n e l bombs as e s p e c i a l l y "inhumane," i n s t r u m e n t s  of  19 warfare.  Napalm and  i n an October 1972  o t h e r i n c e n d i a r y weapons were s i n g l e d out  r e p o r t of the U.N.  Secretary-General  because  of the i n t e n s e p a i n f u l n e s s of i n j u r i e s caused by them, the p h i s t i c a t e d medical  resources  demanded f o r t h e i r p r o p e r  ment, the l e n g t h y p e r i o d of r e c o v e r y and  treat-  required f o r survivors,  the h i g h p r o b a b i l i t y of permanent d e f o r m i t y , 20  v a r i o u s t o x i c and  so-  asphyxiating side-effects.  as w e l l as  In i t s words:  "when judged a g a i n s t what i s r e q u i r e d t o put a s o l d i e r out m i l i t a r y a c t i o n , much of the p o n s , i s . . . l i k e l y t o be Not  i n j u r y caused by i n c e n d i a r y 21 superfluous."  a l l of the common o b j e c t i o n s on h u m a n i t a r i a n  a r e completely, l o g i c a l ,  of c o u r s e .  I t i s not  of wea-  grounds  certain that,  - 17  -  g i v e n t h e c h o i c e between b e i n g v a p o r i z e d by a n u c l e a r  explosion  and d y i n g a slow death of "normal" b u l l e t wounds, t h e r a t i o n a l man  would opt f o r t h e l a t t e r . I n p a r t i c u l a r , t e a r gas and o t h e r  n o n - l e t h a l c h e m i c a l agents have been defended as more humane than more c o n v e n t i o n a l weapons, a l t h o u g h t h e y f a l l under t h e same r u b r i c as dreaded CBW  weapons i n t h e p o p u l a r mind.  A t h i r d c r i t e r i o n f o r p r o h i b i t i o n which has been suggested i n r e c e n t y e a r s i s an " e c o l o g i c a l " one: t h a t of t h e damage i n - 22  f l i c t e d upon the n a t u r a l environment.  Concern about t h i s  issue  has been s p u r r e d by t h e massive use of c h e m i c a l d e f o l i a n t s i n I n d o c h i n a , as w e l l as by t h e h e i g h t e n e d p u b l i c c o n s c i o u s n e s s of e c o l o g i c a l problems g e n e r a l l y . A somewhat r e l a t e d f a c t o r i s what might be termed t h e "harmful s i d e - e f f e c t s " a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the "deployment" lient  of a g i v e n "system." T h i s was p a r t i c u l a r l y s a -  i n t h e case of atmospheric n u c l e a r t e s t i n g , where p u b l i c  concern about r a d i a , t i o n l e v e l s and p o s s i b l e g e n e t i c damage p r o v i d e d much of the impetus f o r c o n t r o l s . I t a l s o a p p l i e s , w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o p o s s i b l e r a d i a t i o n l e a k a g e or a c c i d e n t a l detonat i o n , t o t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of n u c l e a r weapons i n t o any new ronment; or t o any a c t i v i t i e s  envi-  i n t e r f e r i n g with other, n o n - m i l i -  t a r y , uses of an a r e a ( s u c h as the e x p r o p r i a t i o n of v a s t  expanses  of the open ocean f o r m i s s i l e f i r i n g ranges or n a v a l maneuvers, for  example).  Monetary Cost A c c o r d i n g t o Hedley B u l l , pure economics c i e n t and the most simple of t h e arguments  i s "the most an-  for  disarmament,"  - 18  -  as w e l l as b e i n g t h e most important m o t i v a t i o n f o r attempts a t arms c o n t r o l p r i o r t o World War mental Study of War,  I.  J  Quincy Wright, i n h i s monu-  n o t e d t h a t "Disarmament movements have been  common a,fter g r e a t wars when c o u n t r i e s were n e a r l y bankrupt and 24 wished t o save money,"  H  1899  He a t t r i b u t e s t h e c a l l i n g of t h e  Hague Peace Conference by C z a r N i c h o l a s I I t o the l a t t e r * s b e i n g " a d v i s e d by h i s m i n i s t e r of f i n a n c e t h a t h i s exchequer c o u l d n o t s t a n d the s t r a i n of m a i n t a i n i n g c o m p e t i t i o n w i t h Ger25 many i n making r a p i d - f i r e f i e l d a r t i l l e r y . "  J  Of more r e c e n t  v i n t a g e , t h e s e r i e s of n a v a l l i m i t a t i o n s n e g o t i a t e d d u r i n g t h e i n t e r - w a r p e r i o d has been a t t r i b u t e d i n p a r t t o the u n w i l l i n g n e s s of key p a r t i e s , f o r economic r e a s o n s , t o pursue an arms 26 race.  And c l e a r l y , many of t h e l e s s important s i g n a t o r i e s o f  the  N o n - P r o l i f e r a t i o n T r e a t y were a t l e a s t p a r t l y m o t i v a t e d by  the  r e a l i z a t i o n t h a t t h e c o s t i n v o l v e d i n an independent n u c l e a r  c a p a b i l i t y was  s i m p l y beyond t h e i r means.  As B u l l p o i n t s o u t , a l l weapons procurement  decisions are  c o n s t r a i n e d by economic f a c t o r s , i n s p i t e of t h e importance of m i l i t a r y s e c u r i t y t o t h e n a t i o n and t h e g e n e r a l p r i o r i t y 27 ded defence over "opulence." U.S.  of  Even f o r superpowers l i k e t h e  and t h e S o v i e t Union, c e r t a i n measures,  effective c i v i l  accor-  such as a t r u l y  defence system, w h i l e perhaps w i t h i n t h e r e a l m  t e c h n i c a l f e a s i b i l i t y , a r e r u l e d out p a r t l y on account of  t h e i r p r o h i b i t i v e c o s t ( a l s o , of c o u r s e , i n t h e example g i v e n , because of i t s e f f e c t s upon t h e q u a l i t y of day-to-day  life),  l e s s e r powers a r e s i m i l a r l y d e n i e d t h e p r i v i l e g e even of o n l y competing w i t h t h e world's armament l e a d e r s .  - 19  -  At the same t i m e , many a u t h o r s warn a g a i n s t that a reduction  the f a l s e hope  i n m i l i t a r y expenditures w i l l n e c e s s a r i l y  company the c o n c l u s i o n  ac-  of arms c o n t r o l agreements, p o i n t i n g  out  t h a t v e r i f i c a t i o n p r o c e d u r e s (as i n the case of n u c l e a r t e s t i n g , f o r example) may  w e l l prove as c o s t l y as the system or  p r o h i b i t e d — i n a d d i t i o n t o what has law  that  been d e s c r i b e d  as  activity "the  iron  every o r g a n i z a t i o n s t r i v e s t o m a i n t a i n or i n c r e a s e i t s  budget."  2 8  Politico-Military  Utility/Reliability  Sometimes arguments a g a i n s t  a m i l i t a r y a u t h o r i z a t i o n on  grounds of economy succeed o n l y when b u t t r e s s e d doubts c o n c e r n i n g  the u t i l i t y and/or r e l i a b i l i t y  b e i n g proposed. In o t h e r f o r c e s i n b e i n g a l o n e may  cases,  the  by a d d i t i o n a l of whatever i s  doubts about the u t i l i t y  of  s u f f i c e t o engender a w i l l i n g n e s s  d i s c u s s t h e i r mutual l i m i t a t i o n — a s w i t h v a r i o u s p a s t  to  proposals  f o r the r e c i p r o c a l " b o n f i r e " d e s t r u c t i o n of o b s o l e s c e n t  weapons,  29 for  example. The  s i g n i f i c a n c e of almost every s u c c e s s f u l disarmament  measure has  been a s s a i l e d on the grounds t h a t whatever was  h i b i t e d e i t h e r had been c o n s i d e r e d  ceased t o be m i l i t a r i l y u s e f u l or had  so. Thus i t i s claimed  g e n e r a l l y r e f r a i n e d from u s i n g p o i s o n  by  tions.-^  0  The  Chinese and  r a t h e r than through any p a r t i a l nuclear others  some t h a t s t a t e s have the  i n support of m i l i t a r y  e t h i c a l or l e g a l  t e s t ban  never  gas m a i n l y because of  t a c t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s i n v o l v e d i n i t s use operations,  pro-  t r e a t y was  inhibi-  greeted  by  the  w i t h the c o n v i c t i o n t h a t atmospheric t e s t i n g  - 20 had  ceased t o he  of g r e a t  -  importance t o the powers concerned;  or a t the v e r y l e a s t c o u l d , without much d i f f i c u l t y , he  ade-  quately  possible  s u b s t i t u t e d by underground e x p l o s i o n s .  I t was  t o agree on r e d u c i n g b a t t l e s h i p s t r e n g t h at the Washington Conference  of 1922,  p e r t s had  a s s e r t s Hans Morgenthau, because m i l i t a r y  ex-  come t o the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t the f u t u r e l a y w i t h  ligh-  32 ter  and  speedier  T r e a t y had no  ships.  The  sponsors of the N o n - P r o l i f e r a t i o n  i n t e n t i o n of f r e e l y d i s s e m i n a t i n g n u c l e a r weapons,  p o i n t out the c r i t i c s . A n t a r c t i c a was l a r l y s t r a t e g i c or e n v i r o n m e n t a l l y  never considered p a r t i c u -  hospitable to m i l i t a r y  v i t i e s . The  Seabed D e n u c l e a r i z a t i o n T r e a t y  "equivalent  t o one  ground." ^ And  so  acti-  i s d e s c r i b e d as  being  p r o h i b i t i n g the b o l t i n g of a e r o p l a n e s t o on.  A c t u a l l y , the  " d e s i r a b i l i t y " of a g i v e n system i s based  a r a t h e r complex c a l c u l u s of c o s t , r e l i a b i l i t y , the functionally-comparable  systems, b u r e a u c r a t i c  on  existence  i n t e r e s t s , and  f o r t h , which d e f i e s a l l attempts a t p r e c i s e measurement of effect  the  of so  the  or s i g n i f i c a n c e of a c o n t r o l arrangement. In many cases  "military u t i l i t y , "  s t r i c t l y d e f i n e d , has  little  b e a r i n g on  the  f i n a l d e c i s i o n whether or not t o proceed w i t h a programme o r d e p l o y a system ( t h e American ABM ple). ^  Conversely,  system b e i n g a c l a s s i c exam-  a n e g o t i a t e d l i m i t a t i o n may  m e a n i n g f u l even i n the absence of any  w e l l prove  evidence of such  "utili-  ty." F i n a l l y , a weapons system or g i v e n c o n f i g u r a t i o n of f o r c e s * F o r a p e r s u a s i v e argument i n defence of such t r e a t i e s , Hedley B u l l (1970), pp. 149-150, 152.  see  - 21 can be p o l i t i c a l l y a d v a n t a g e o u s — i n  terms of " s t a t u s " or d i p l o -  matic i n f l u e n c e — e v e n without being, i n the s t r i c t e s t m i l i t a r i l y u s e f u l . Looking at the f i e l d  sense,  of disarmament as a  whole, i t goes almost without s a y i n g t h a t ( i n i t s b r o a d e s t sense) the " p o l i t i c a l " u t i l i t y —in  of weapons or of armed f o r c e s  a system of i n t e r n a t i o n a l "anarchy," marked by sharp  flicts,  i n which " n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y " may  commodity—constitutes  a prime  con-  be a r e l a t i v e l y s c a r c e  ( i f not the p r i m a r y ) o b s t a c l e t o  any c o n t r o l s . Thus the g e n e r a l s u s c e p t i b i l i t y of a weapon or a c t i v i t y t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e g u l a t i o n may in  s a f e l y be s a i d t o v a r y  inverse proportion with i t s p o l i t i c o - m i l i t a r y  utility.  S u s c e p t i b i l i t y to V e r i f i c a t i o n Perhaps no a s p e c t of arms c o n t r o l has been more e x h a u s t i v e ly  canvassed i n t h e postwar l i t e r a t u r e t h a n the t e c h n i c a l  bility  feasi-  of v e r i f y i n g compliance w i t h v a r i o u s k i n d s of measures.  The v e r i f i c a t i o n problem  seems t o have come almost f u l l  circle  s i n c e the n a v a l c o n f e r e n c e s of the 1920's and 1930*s. Then, i t has been p o i n t e d out, t h e r e was  v i r t u a l l y no problem  whether or not a b a t t l e s h i p was  under c o n s t r u c t i o n , , f o r example,  c o u l d be v e r i f i e d  e a s i l y enough t h r o u g h t r a d i t i o n a l  means; f u r t h e r m o r e , t h e i n j u r e d p a r t y would have a  at a l l :  intelligence sufficiently  l o n g time t o r e c o v e r b e f o r e any r e a l damage had been done; and a few more s h i p s on one s i d e or t h e o t h e r was n o t l i k e l y t o a l t e r the b a l a n c e of power d r a s t i c a l l y i n any case. N u c l e a r weapons were something to  e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t , however: s m a l l enough  make the t a s k of d e t e c t i o n h i g h l y p r o b l e m a t i c ; and  powerful  - 22 enough t h a t a v e r y few c o u l d q u i t e p o s s i b l y upset t h e g l o b a l 35 balance. F o r many y e a r s East-West disarmament n e g o t i a t i o n s s t r u n g on t h e q u e s t i o n b i t i o n of n u c l e a r  were ham-  o f v e r i f y i n g compliance w i t h t h e p r o h i -  weapons, each s i d e f e a r i n g t h a t t h e o t h e r  would m a i n t a i n a s e c r e t s t o c k p i l e i n r e s e r v e , surance" p u r p o s e s . S i m i l a r l y ,  i f only f o r " i n -  t h e S o v i e t Union's I960  proposal  t o e l i m i n a t e a l l s t r a t e g i c d e l i v e r y v e h i c l e s - ^ was opposed on the grounds t h a t i t would n o t be p o s s i b l e t o p r e v e n t c i v i l c r a f t from b e i n g  c o v e r t l y converted i n t o nuclear  air-  bombers. Re-  c e n t l y , however, t h e remarkable c a p a b i l i t i e s of s a t e l l i t e r e c o n n a i s s a n c e have g r e a t l y s i m p l i f i e d t h e t a s k o f v e r i f y i n g most kinds  of arms c o n t r o l agreements. I n most c a s e s ,  verification  need n o t be c o m p l e t e l y f o o l p r o o f ; al.1 t h a t i s r e q u i r e d i s t h e c a p a b i l i t y of d e t e c t i n g a m i l i t a r i l y - s i g n i f i c a n t program o f whatever k i n d . B e f o r e e n t e r i n g i n t o an agreement, t h e p a r t i e s concerned must examine: t h e t e c h n i c a l f e a s i b i l i t y  of e v a s i o n ;  the degree t o which i t might a f f e c t t h e m i l i t a r y b a l a n c e , and whether i r r e p a r a b l y o r f o r how l o n g ; and t h e i n t e r e s t s i n and propensity  towards e v a s i o n  of t h e other p a r t i e s , t a k i n g i n t o  account t h e l i k e l y p e n a l t i e s of such an a c t i o n — a l l estimates subject  t o an u n p r e d i c t a b l e  degree of  of these  misperception  which causes them h a b i t u a l l y t o be c a l c u l a t e d on t h e b a s i s of the  "worst p o s s i b l e The  case."  t e c h n i c a l f e a s i b i l i t y of v e r i f y i n g an agreement i s n o t  always as c r u c i a l a m a t t e r as i t i s sometimes made out t o be, of c o u r s e . I t d i d n o t prove s u f f i c i e n t t o b l o c k  achievement  - 23 of a ban on b a c t e r i o l o g i c a l weapons, f o r example, i n s p i t e of the m a n i f e s t i m p o s s i b i l i t y of v e r i f y i n g e i t h e r t h e i r p r o d u c t i o n and  storage or the d e s t r u c t i o n  of e x i s t i n g s t o c k s . Here, as p e r -  haps i n t h e case of p o i s o n gas, i t may be t h e fea.r of r e c i p r o c a l use  ( g i v e n widespread p o t e n t i a l  capabilities)—together  with i t s 37  questionable m i l i t a r y u t i l i t y — w h i c h  are the deciding  T h i s merely i l l u s t r a t e s t h e g e n e r a l p o i n t  t h a t mutual  factors. self-  i n t e r e s t i n r e s t r a i n t may under c e r t a i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s s e r v e t o o b v i a t e t h e need f o r r i g o r o u s II.  verification.  CHARACTERISTICS OF THE STRATEGIC LANDSCAPE.  D i s t r i b u t i o n o f C a p a b i l i t i e s Among S t a t e s P r o b a b l y t h e most important of t h e f a c t o r s f a l l i n g the  " s t r a t e g i c l a n d s c a p e " c a t e g o r y i s t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of capa-  bilities,  o r t h e e x i s t e n c e of d i s p a r i t i e s i n power and/or t e c h -  n i c a l expertise,  among s t a t e s . How i s i t p o s s i b l e  the  interests  the  l e a s t ? Or i s i t r e a l l y n e c e s s a r y ? The  neral  to reconcile  of t h e most p o w e r f u l and advanced with those of  relationship  of f o r c e s  between any two s t a t e s ,  i n ge-  o r w i t h r e s p e c t t o a p a r t i c u l a r type of m i l i t a r y system,  may be expressed i n one of t h e f o l l o w i n g predominance of one s i d e sibility  ways: (K)  unassailable  over t h e o t h e r , i n which case t h e p o s -  of c o m p e t i t i o n i s so s l i g h t t h a t  t o arms c o n t r o l side  within  i t poses no o b s t a c l e  agreements; (2) temporary s u p e r i o r i t y  of one  over t h e o t h e r , conducive t o sharp c o m p e t i t i o n w i t h i t s  a t t e n d a n t problems f o r arms c o n t r o l ;  and (3) approximate p a r i t y  - 24 between the two the  s i d e s , a l s o conducive t o "arms r a c i n g " but  same time p r o v i d i n g g r e a t e r  "Unassailable considered  -  predominance" and  as f u n c t i o n s  at  opportunities f o r regulation. "temporary s u p e r i o r i t y " are here  of the s u b j e c t i v e i m p r e s s i o n s of  the  " i n f e r i o r " s i d e as t o i t s m i d d l e - or l o n g - r u n c a p a b i l i t i e s  vis-  a-vis i t s r i v a l . Of s e l f no  c o u r s e , the r e l a t i o n s h i p of m i l i t a r y f o r c e s i s by i t sure g u i d e t o a s t a t e ' s b e h a v i o u r , b e i n g tempered above  a l l by p o l i t i c a l c o n d i t i o n s , both domestic and t h e l e s s , other t h i n g s b e i n g  equal,  i t may  external.. Never-  p l a y an important r o l e  i n d e t e r m i n i n g the a c c e p t a b i l i t y of proposed l i m i t a t i o n s t o parties The  concerned. c h i e f problem i n a s i t u a t i o n of " u n a s s a i l a b l e  predomi-  nance" i s undoubtedly the l a c k of i n c e n t i v e on the p a r t of dominant power t o r i s k favourable be  the  obtained  jeopardizing (or i n f a c t abdicate)  the its  p o s i t i o n , unless  t h e r e are compensatory b e n e f i t s t o  i n other areas.  Where temporary s u p e r i o r i t y i s the  c a s e , the l e a d i n g power i s u s u a l l y d r i v e n t o m a i n t a i n i t s l e a d , w h i l e i t s a d v e r s a r y s t r i v e s t o equal or surpass i t . P a r i t y lead to a s i m i l a r competition, other  e s p e c i a l l y i f one  s i d e or  i s u n s a t i s f i e d w i t h the p o l i t i c a l s t a t u s quo,  i t s v e r y n a t u r e more p o l i t i c a l l y a c c e p t a b l e ,  but  the i s by  as a s t a t e of p e r -  manent i n f e r i o r i t y i s l i k e l y t o be l e s s d e f e n s i b l e f o r one than the d e c l i n e from s u p e r i o r i t y t o p a r i t y i s f o r the  power," which, by r e d u c i n g  side  other.  P a r i t y of f o r c e s i s assumed conducive t o arms c o n t r o l a l s o account of i t s presumed c o n n e c t i o n  may  on  w i t h a s t a b l e "balance of  the t h r e a t of war,  may  improve  the  -  political  c l i m a t e f o r such n e g o t i a t i o n s . F i n a l l y , the  s u p e r i o r s i d e may threat  -  2 5  formerly  he more i n c l i n e d t o make c o n c e s s i o n s by  of a renewed arms r a c e , w h i l e the f o r m e r l y  the  inferior  ceases t o be m o t i v a t e d by the f e a r of n e g o t i a t i n g from a p o s i t i o n of weakness. When d e a l i n g w i t h n u c l e a r a r s e n a l s  of the v a s t n e s s of  t h o s e of the Superpowers, of c o u r s e , the i t y " and  concepts of  "superior-  " i n f e r i o r i t y , " as w i t h those of " o f f e n s i v e " and  f e n s i v e , " l o s e much of t h e i r meaning. D e t e r r e n t second-strike  value  "de-  or  c a p a b i l i t y , as p r e v i o u s l y mentioned, becomes  more c r i t i c a l than sheer numbers of weapons. There comes a p o i n t at which any  f u r t h e r increment i n " s t r e n g t h "  is practi-  c a l l y u s e l e s s , except perha.ps f o r p s y c h o l o g i c a l purposes, s t r u c t i v e c a p a c i t y beyond t h i s p o i n t b e i n g p o p u l a r l y " o v e r k i l l . " A Power which has r e n t " has of any  i n e f f e c t achieved  discrepancies  achieved  de-  dubbed as  such a "minimal  deter-  p a r i t y with i t s r i v a l s , i n spite  i n absolute  numbers of weapons.  It  been suggested t h a t , i n the case of C h i n a f o r example, the tainment of such a c a p a b i l i t y might be  has at-  s u f f i c i e n t t o induce i t s 39*  e n t r y i n t o s e r i o u s arms c o n t r o l n e g o t i a t i o n s . Where t e c h n i c a l s k i l l s and  c a p a b i l i t i e s are w i d e l y  scat-  t e r e d throughout the w o r l d , i t i s n a t u r a l l y more d i f f i c u l t t o * The same may have been t r u e f o r the S o v i e t Union. Walter C. Clemens n o t e s t h a t " A l l the U.S.-Soviet a c c o r d s s i n c e 1 9 5 8 (the moratorium on n u c l e a r t e s t i n g ) have been concluded a g a i n s t a backdrop of mutual d e t e r r e n c e , even though S o v i e t s t r a t e g i c f o r c e s have g e n e r a l l y been weaker than American. The f i r s t p r o m i s i n g moves toward arms c o n t r o l took p l a c e i n 1 9 5 5 , i . e . , at the v e r y moment the USSR f i r s t a c q u i r e d numb e r s of l o n g - r a n g e bombers capable of d e l i v e r i n g n u c l e a r weapons t o the U n i t e d S t a t e s , t h e r e b y g i v i n g the USSR ( c o n t . )  - 26 a c h i e v e agreement on c o n t r o l measures, t h e chances of t h e l a t t e r v a r y i n g perhaps d i r e c t l y  ( i n inverse proportion)  w i t h t h e number  of p a r t i e s whose i n t e r e s t s must "be taken i n t o account and adberence g a i n e d .  I t i s t h i s simple p r i n c i p l e which l i e s behind t h e  oft-expressed  f e a r t h a t f u r t h e r p r o l i f e r a t i o n of n u c l e a r  w i l l destroy  whatever chances of c o n t r o l p r e s e n t l y  thermore, when desired'  exist. Fur-  t h i r d - p a r t y adherence cannot be g a i n e d ,  the n e g o t i a t i o n of agreements i s l i k e l y t o be b o t h more c a t e d and l e s s p r o d u c t i v e ,  as t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of o u t s i d e  u p s e t t i n g an agreed b a l a n c e i n an u n p r e d i c t a b l e point  weapons  compliforces  f a s h i o n a t some  i n t h e f u t u r e must be taken i n t o account, as w e l l as t h e  danger posed i n d e p e n d e n t l y by these f o r c e s t o e i t h e r one of t h e original parties. Several  other  " s t r a t e g i c landsca/pe" f a c t o r s may be b r i e f l y  mentioned, among them the e x i s t e n c e tionally-comparable the  and r e l a t i v e c o s t s of f u n c -  systems. T h i s i s i n t i m a t e l y connected w i t h  " m i l i t a r y u t i l i t y " f a c t o r previously discussed,  and more o r  l e s s speaks f o r i t s e l f . Where a p a r t i c u l a r m i l i t a r y system, p r o posed or i n b e i n g ,  has a f u n c t i o n a l c o u n t e r p a r t  whose c o s t  pares n o t u n f a v o u r a b l y with, i t s own ( t a k i n g i n t o account "political  com-  such  c o s t s " as p u b l i c o p i n i o n and t h e autonomous "momentum"  ( c o n t . ) f o r t h e f i r s t time a t e r r o r weapon t o d e t e r e x t e r n a l a t t a c k . " (40) * C f . W.K.H.Panofsky: "the s u r e s t way t o f r u s t r a t e t h e p r o g r e s s of arms c o n t r o l n e g o t i a t i o n s i s t o invoke an e x c e s s i v e amount of ' l i n k a g e ' and t o i n v o l v e an e x c e s s i v e number of c o n f e r e e s . In f a c t ' l i n k a g e ' o r an o v e r l y l a r g e forum have a t times been demanded by p a r t i c i p a n t s i n arms c o n t r o l n e g o t i a t i o n s i n o r d e r d e l i b e r a t e l y t o i n h i b i t p r o g r e s s without o v e r t l y assuming t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r d o i n g s o . " (41.)  - 27  -  towards arms c o n t r o l ) , then i t i s , q u i t e be made the  subject  s i m p l y , more l i k e l y  of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e g u l a t i o n .  to  Thus atmos-  pheric  n u c l e a r t e s t s were done away w i t h , without too much s a c -  rifice  on the p a r t  f e a s i b i l i t y and  of t h o s e c o n d u c t i n g them, because of  c a p a b i l i t i e s of underground t e s t i n g . And  c o n s i d e r a b l e p o t e n t i a l s t r a t e g i c advantages of seabed proved no of the  obstacle  missiles  cognate advantages of SLBM's. Some would argue t h a t  c i p l e and  comprehended under the  made t o s u f f e r a s i m i l a r f a t e , but,  reasons ( p r i m a r i l y the b u r e a u c r a t i c involved), The  such has  rate  not  proved t o be  of t e c h n o l o g i c a l  f o r a number of  i n t e r e s t s of the the  m  fixed  same p r i n -  services  case.  development i s another s t r a t e g i c  " e n v i r o n m e n t a l " f a c t o r worth m e n t i o n i n g , which f i g u r e s  A point  the  t o agreement on t h e i r p r o h i b i t i o n , i n view  l a n d - b a s e d ICBM's s h o u l d be  nently  the  promi-  numerous a n a l y s e s of the p r o s p e c t s of arms c o n t r o l . . sometimes made i s t h a t where t e c h n o l o g y i s r a p i d l y  changing, i t becomes more d i f f i c u l t r e l a t i v e power" of weapons^  2  and  to "accurately  assess  thus t o c a l c u l a t e on the  the basis  of approximate p a r i t y . Perhaps more i m p o r t a n t l y , agreements i n one  a r e a ma.y  vations  be  i n the  s e r i o u s l y undermined by new  technological  same or a cognate a r e a . I n any  problem i s undoubtedly the  g e n e r a l f e e l i n g of  case, the  inno-  major  uncertainty  * Thus Hedley B u l l devotes an. e n t i r e c h a p t e r t o "The Problem of Continuous I n n o v a t i o n " i n h i s C o n t r o l of the Arms Race, f o r example. About the o n l y d i s s e n t i n g view on the s i g n i f i cance of t h i s f a c t o r i s t h a t of C o l i n Gray, who a r g u e s : "The r e c o r d of the i n t e r w a r y e a r s would seem t o demonstrate t h a t arms c o n t r o l tends t o be s u b v e r t e d by p o l i t i c s r a t h e r than by t e c h n o l o g y . New t e c h n o l o g i c a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s w i l l induce weapon d e s i g n e r s t o improve upon the s t a t e of the a r t , but — g i v e n the p o l i t i c a l w i l l — a s p e c i a l or a r e g u l a r ( c o n t . )  - 28  -  generated, which exacerbates the tendency  to "worst-possible-  c a s e " t h e o r i z i n g and tends t o i n h i b i t any k i n d of a g r e e m e n t . ^ Another problem, d i s t i n c t from t h e r a t e of t e c h n o l o g i c a l development though not e n t i r e l y u n r e l a t e d , i s r e p r e s e n t e d by what might be c a l l e d t h e asymmetries i n opposing  force-struc-  t u r e s and s t r a t e g i e s . As Hans Morgenthau p o i n t s out, once d i s arming Powers have agreed f o r c e s , t h e r e remains  on a c e r t a i n o v e r a l l r e l a t i o n s h i p of  the d i f f i c u l t  t a s k of f o r m u l a t i n g " s t a n -  dards t o be a t t a i n e d a c c o r d i n g t o which d i f f e r e n t t y p e s  and  q u a n t i t i e s of armaments a r e t o be a l l o c a t e d t o d i f f e r e n t n a t i o n s w i t h i n the agreed r a t i o . " ^ How s h i p s w i t h submarines?  can one p o s s i b l y compare b a t t l e -  m i s s i l e s w i t h i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n s ? or r e -  s e r v e s w i t h r e g u l a r f o r c e s ? The p r o l i f e r a t i o n of d i s p a r a t e t y p e s of  weapons systems (and s t r a t e g i e s , t o o , which c o m p l i c a t e s  matters s t i l l f u r t h e r ) tends t o be aggravated by r a p i d l o g i c a l development, of c o u r s e , but t h e b a s i c problem to  the simple f a c t  technoowes more  of d i f f e r i n g g e o g r a p h i c a l p o s i t i o n s , r e s o u r - 45  ces, ing  and d e f e n s i v e needs.  The a t t e n d a n t d i f f i c u l t y  and comparing f o r c e - l e v e l s has plagued many n e g o t i a t i o n s ,  from the World Disarmament Conference Mutual has  of measur-  of t h e 1930*s t o t h e  and B a l a n c e d F o r c e R e d u c t i o n s t a l k s of the 1970's. I t  even l e d t o s u g g e s t i o n s t h a t as a f i r s t s t e p towards d i s -  armament, t h e major Powers might c o n s i d e r s t a n d a r d i z i n g t h e i r s t r a t e g i c f o r c e s t o the p o i n t where meaningful comparisons ( c o n t . ) r e c o n v e n i n g of an a r m s - c o n t r o l c o n f e r e n c e s h o u l d be a b l e t o accommodate new weapon p o t e n t i a l s . " (46) T h i s f a i l s t o address i t s e l f t o the fundamental, u n d e r l y i n g problem of u n c e r t a i n t y , however.  could  be made.'*  1  Overall and  d i s p a r i t i e s i n the  offense are  a l s o an  vironment. When the the  case s i n c e the  cost-effectiveness  important p a r t  of the  a b i l i t y t o a t t a c k may  defense  arms c o n t r o l  o f f e n s e i s supreme, as has dawn of the m i s s i l e age,  of  en-  a p p a r e n t l y been  concern over v u l n e r -  spur e f f o r t s a/fc i n t e r n a t i o n a l  regulation  w i t h g r e a t e r f o r c e than under o t h e r c i r c u m s t a n c e s . F u r t h e r ,  the  r e c e n t apparent acceptance of mutual s e c o n d - s t r i k e c a p a b i l i t y by  the  S u p e r p o w e r s — w h i c h may  mitation  by p r o m o t i n g the  to a successful  t i o n of the  deterrence"—is  p r i m a r i l y , a r e s u l t of the first  opponent's r e t a l i a t o r y f o r c e s ) . And  cheaper o f f e n s i v e  missiles  technical  strike (involving neutraliza-  which d e f e n s i v e m i s s i l e systems c o u l d  states  i n t e r e s t s of arms l i -  concept of " f i n i t e  undoubtedly p a r t l y , i f not obstacles  f u r t h e r the  contributes  be  the  "saturated"  ease w i t h by much  t o the w i l l i n g n e s s  of  t o p r e c l u d e the former by mutual agreement.  F i n a l l y , the terms of the b e a r upon the  structure  of the  i n t e r n a t i o n a l system, i n  g e n e r a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of power and  influence,  may  p r o s p e c t s of arms c o n t r o l . I t i s d i f f i c u l t t o  however, which of the most commonly c i t e d t y p e s of  say,  international  systems are most conducive t o i t . In h i s balance-of-power model Morton K a p l a n s t r e s s e s , t i v e s of war  and  among o t h e r t h i n g s ,  the u n i v e r s a l  the l i m i t e d  a p p l i c a t i o n of the  rules-of-war, -  which, suggest h i g h l y f e r t i l e thermore, the  f a c t that  absence of deep i d e o l o g i c a l c l e a v a g e s  a l l i a n c e s are  A  R  grounds f o r arms c o n t r o l .  presumed t o m i l i t a t e i n f a v o u r of agreement. On the  objec-  constantly  shifting  the  49  Furmight  be  o t h e r hand,  lends a  -  30  -  c e r t a i n amount of i n s t a b i l i t y t o t h e p i c t u r e which might p r e j u d i c e attempts t o e x p l i c i t l y d e f i n e and i n s t i t u t e , continuance  o f , g i v e n power b a l a n c e s .  Operation  or ensure t h e  of t h e s o -  50 c a l l e d "unseen hand" need f o r e x p l i c i t  might, of c o u r s e ,  obviate e n t i r e l y the  agreements. 51  Under t h e " l o o s e b i p o l a r " system as p o s i t e d by K a p l a n  ,  wars would ( i n t h e absence of t h e t h r e a t of a n u c l e a r c o n f l a g r a t i o n ) tend t o be u n l i m i t e d , with  total  e l i m i n a t i o n of t h e r i -  v a l b l o c t h e u l t i m a t e g o a l r a t h e r than p r e s e r v a t i o n of t h e s y s tem.  While i d e o l o g i c a l antagonism might f u r t h e r h i n d e r n e g o t i -  a t i o n s , however, t h e f a c t t h a t t h e major m i l i t a r y powers had coalesced  i n t o j u s t two b l o c s might s i m p l i f y m a t t e r s  a b l y , depending of course system. And t h e r e l a t i v e l y  consider-  on t h e degree of " l o o s e n e s s "  of t h e  s t r o n g presence of a s u p r a n a t i o n a l  a c t o r , t o g e t h e r w i t h a number of m e d i a t i n g  s t a t e s (however  m i l i t a r i l y i n s i g n i f i c a n t ) , might p r o v i d e t h e n e c e s s a r y  impetus  towards c o n t r o l . It i s rather p o i n t l e s s t o speculate  on t h e t e n d e n c i e s of  u n i v e r s a l and h i e r a r c h i c a l systems, as t h e p r i m a r y a c t o r i n b o t h cases would by d e f i n i t i o n be a b l e t o impose v i r t u a l l y it  anything  d e s i r e d on t h e system as a whole. I n s o f a r as t h e l a t t e r i s  c h a r a c t e r i z e d by a n o t a b l e absence o f c o n f l i c t , o f c o u r s e ,  arms  c o n t r o l arrangements (imposed from above) would seem t o be a l o g i c a l concomitant. I I I . CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT. In d i s c u s s i n g t h e p o l i t i c a l f a c t o r s a f f e c t i n g arms c o n t r o l  - 31 we  should  d i s t i n g u i s h between the i n t e r - s t a t e and  the  domestic  arenas; between t h o s e p o l i t i c a l c o n d i t i o n s w i t h i n a s t a t e which cause i t t o seek n e g o t i a t i o n s , and  those between s t a t e s which  permit the s u c c e s s f u l c o n c l u s i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l agreements. International The  Relations  c r i t i c a l n a t u r e of e x t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l c o n d i t i o n s i s  a t t e s t e d t o by a l l w r i t e r s on arms c o n t r o l . sist  on the a b s o l u t e  the f a c e of c o n t i n u e d while  Some, however, i n -  u n a t t a i n a b i l i t y of m e a n i n g f u l agreements i n hostility  between the p a r t i e s concerned  o t h e r s t a k e a more sanguine view and m a i n t a i n  that  such  agreements can be reached i n s p i t e of u n d e r l y i n g p o l i t i c a l tagonism. The  argument of the f i r s t  mined i f taken t o i t s l o g i c a l  implying,  c o n c l u s i o n , s i n c e , were p e r f e c t t h e r e simply  would be  agreements; what they seem t o  I t has  litical  even been p o i n t e d  it.  be  conflict  the  out t h a t a c e r t a i n amount of  po-  i s indispensable f o r a s i t u a t i o n to a r i s e i n  which arms c o n t r o l i s deemed n e c e s s a r y and p r i o r i t y ded  no  t h e n , i s t h a t meaningful arms c o n t r o l per se i s but  a chimera. Most a u t h o r s a g r e e , however, t h a t such i s not case.  an-  group i s s e r i o u s l y under-  peace and harmony t o r e i g n among men, need whatsoever f o r e x p l i c i t  ,  Without p o l i t i c a . 1 c o n f l i c t ,  duly  accor-  presumably, t h e r e would  * In Hedley B u l l ' s words: " u n l e s s the p o l i t i c a l c o n d i t i o n s f o r arms c o n t r o l are p r e s e n t , the q u e s t i o n of what method or procedure i s a p p r o p r i a t e i n arms c o n t r o l n e g o t i a t i o n s , and the q u e s t i o n how the t e c h n i c a l problems i n v o l v e d i n arms c o n t r o l can be s o l v e d , are of minor importance, and attempts t o s o l v e them i n a b s t r a c t i o n from p o l i t i c a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s are of no s i g n i f i c a n c e . " (53) ** See, f o r example, Hans Morgenthau: " p o l i t i c a l s e t t l e m e n t must precede disarmament. Without p o l i t i c a l s e t t l e m e n t , disarmament has no chance f o r s u c c e s s . " (54)  - 32 "be no arms; and without arms, c e r t a i n l y no arms c o n t r o l . At anot h e r l e v e l , a n e a r - h o l o c a u s t or d i s a s t r o u s c l a s h of arms may  he  h e l p f u l i n p r o v i d i n g the n e c e s s a r y s t i m u l u s t o s e r i o u s n e g o t i a t i o n s , as the F i r s t World War  may  he s a i d t o have l a i d  the  groundwork f o r the spate of i n t e r - w a r c o n f e r e n c e s or the Cuban M i s s i l e C r i s i s f o r the S o v i e t - A m e r i c a n and  '70's.  a c c o r d s of the 1960*s  5 5  At the same t i m e , i t must be a d m i t t e d t h a t many of the problems commonly deemed " t e c h n i c a l " do i n f a c t stem from underl y i n g p o l i t i c a l disagreement  or h o s t i l i t y , and are more suscep-  t i b l e t o n e g o t i a t i o n and compromise than t o s c i e n t i f i c lae.  S i n c e no v e r i f i c a t i o n scheme can be 100%  a c c u r a t e , an  ment of t r u s t must i n e v i t a b l y e n t e r i n t o any c o n t r o l ment.  And  formuele-  arrange-  " t r u s t " i s pre-eminently a " p o l i t i c a l " f a c t o r i n  the w o r l d of n a t i o n s . What we of t r u s t  are p r i m a r i l y concerned w i t h , t h e n , i s the  degree  or h o s t i l i t y c h a r a c t e r i z i n g t h e g e n e r a l r e l a t i o n s h i p  between the s t a t e s i n v o l v e d , which, i n t u r n depends on the  exis-  t e n c e , s t r e n g t h , and c h a r a c t e r of o u t s t a n d i n g c o n f l i c t s between them, as w e l l as a h o s t of o t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s r a n g i n g from * C f . Hedley B u l l : "The problems of d e f i n i t i o n (what i s an e f f e c t i v e ? what a m i l i t a r y a e r o p l a n e , hea,vy gun, tank? e t c . ) are not i n f a c t t e c h n i c a l problems, but matters of b a r g a i n i n g . I n o t h e r words, what the n e g o t i a t o r s have t o agree on i n c o n s i d e r i n g , f o r example, the l i m i t a t i o n of t a n k s , i s not what i s a tank, but what they can agree t o c a l l a tank. T h i s i s a p o l i t i c a l q u e s t i o n , not a t e c h n i c a l one." (56) ** C f . W a l t e r Clemens: "Though arms c o n t r o l a c c o r d s a r e h e l d t o depend upon mutual i n t e r e s t f o r t h e i r d u r a b i l i t y , even the a c t of e n t e r i n g i n t o the n e g o t i a t i n g p r o c e s s r e q u i r e s a modicum of t r u s t on each s i d e . " (57}  -  33  h i s t o r i c a l antagonism t o sheer r a c i s m . Where the n e c e s s a r y d i t i o n s a r e l a c k i n g , p r e s s u r e and/or guarantees agency or a g e n c i e s , such as t h e U.N., (in  from an o u t s i d e  the n o n - a l i g n e d "bloc, or  t h e case of r e g i o n a l c o n f l i c t s ) t h e Superpowers, f o r exam-  ple,  may  tibility of  con-  "be r e q u i r e d . The r e l e v a n t f a c t o r s h e r e are the of the p a r t i e s t o o u t s i d e p r e s s u r e and the  o u t s i d e guarantees.  lity  suscep-  feasibility  The l a t t e r f a c t o r depends on the c a p a b i -  and w i l l i n g n e s s of such o u t s i d e a c t o r s t o impose a  upon the p r o t a g o n i s t s , i f n e c e s s a r y ,  solution  or t o compensate f o r any  u p s e t t i n g of t h e agreed arrangements. I t s h o u l d not be assumed t h a t the world's  5  g r e a t e s t Powers n e c e s s a r i l y remain immune t o  the i n f l u e n c e of t h e f i r s t  f a c t o r , which may  take, the form, f o r  example, of "world p u b l i c o p i n i o n " f a v o u r i n g broad measures of disarmament. On the o t h e r hand, the concern •  c o n t i n u e d v i a b i l i t y of guarantees pal  p a r t i e s may  extended  of a l l i e s them by t h e  over t h e princi-  a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t the p o s s i b i l i t y of agreed l i -  m i t a t i o n s between the l a t t e r , depending, among o t h e r t h i n g s , on t h e i r w i l l i n g n e s s t o s u b o r d i n a t e t h e i r own of  their  i n t e r e s t s t o those  client-states.  A f i n a l important  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of t h e e x t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l  environment i s the e x i s t e n c e of i s s u e s upon which from o t h e r areas of n e g o t i a t i o n may  "trade-offs"  be f e a s i b l e — e s p e c i a l l y i n  cases where o u t s i d e p r e s s u r e i n f a v o u r of l i m i t a t i o n s i s e i t h e r n o n - e x i s t e n t or i n e f f e c t i v e . Such i s s u e s must be b o t h important  relatively  ( r o u g h l y comparable t o those of the arms p o l i c y under  c o n s i d e r a t i o n ) and,  of c o u r s e , " n e g o t i a b l e . " As few  t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s are as g r e a t as those of defence  other na-  policy,  - 34 however, i t might he p o s t u l a t e d possible  only with respect  arms c o n t r o l . In any  that  such t r a d e - o f f s may  he  t o the l e s s s i g n i f i c a n t measures of  c a s e , t h i s f a c t o r would seem t o assume a  f a i r l y broad r e l a t i o n s h i p of i n t e r a c t i o n between the  parties  concerned. Asymmetry i n N e g o t i a t i n g A subdivision  Styles  of the  "political  groups those f a c t o r s r e l a t i n g t o the a t i o n s which may  environment" c a t e g o r y a c t u a l conduct of  have a b e a r i n g on t h e i r u l t i m a t e  t h i s r e g a r d , arms c o n t r o l n e g o t i a t i o n s those undertaken i n any  are no  other issue-area,  c e r t a i n amount of t e c h n i c a l p r e p a r a t i o n , "good f a i t h , " and  so on.  One  success.  In  d i f f e r e n t than  success r e q u i r i n g a diplomatic  skill,  p a r t i c u l a r f a c t o r which s h o u l d  mentioned, however, h a v i n g r e c e i v e d ture c r i t i c a l  negoti-  much emphasis i n the  be  litera-  of SALT I , i s the p o s s i b l e asymmetry i n the nego-  t i a t i n g s t y l e s of the p a r t i c i p a n t s i n arms c o n t r o l t a l k s . I f one  s i d e adopts a p r i m a r i l y  type s t a n c e , w h i l e the issues  ( t o t a k e an  l o g u e des the  o t h e r f o c u s e s e x c l u s i v e l y on  be t o t a l l y u n p r o d u c t i v e (as was  case w i t h the S u r p r i s e  a c c o r d may  A t t a c k Conference of 1958)  agreement at a l l .  apparently or, a l -  consequent asymmetries embodied i n the  prove more p r e j u d i c i a l t o the  the n e g o t i a t i o n s  technical  extreme example), then the r e s u l t i n g d i a -  sourds may  t e r n a t i v e l y , the  political/competitive/bargaining-  final  o r i g i n a l purposes of  than would the f a i l u r e t o have reached  an  - 35 -  Asymmetry i n D o m e s t i c P o l i t i c a l Regime Y e t a n o t h e r "asymmetry" f a c t o r i s t h a t d e a l i n g w i t h t h e n a t u r e o f t h e d o m e s t i c p o l i t i c a l regime o f t h e n a t i o n s i n v o l v e d . The  argument h a s been made t h a t d e m o c r a t i c  of t h e i r g r e a t e r r e s p o n s i v e n e s s  s t a t e s , by v i r t u e  t o p u b l i c o p i n i o n , a r e more  s u s c e p t i b l e t o disarmament "propaganda" and t o a p p e a l s  above  t h e heads o f t h e i r l e a d e r s f o r s u b s t a n t i v e c o n c e s s i o n s  during  n e g o t i a t i o n s . I n s o f a r as one s i d e may c o n s e q u e n t l y t o be a t an u n f a i r d i s a d v a n t a g e ,  feel  itself  and a d j u s t i t s n e g o t i a t i n g  s t r a t e g y a c c o r d i n g l y ( i n a more c o n s e r v a t i v e o r l e s s f l e x i b l e d i r e c t i o n ) , t h i s may have an a d v e r s e e f f e c t upon t h e o v e r a l l p r o s p e c t s f o r arms c o n t r o l . A g a i n , t o o , t h e r e r e m a i n s t h e danger of asymmetries i n an a c c o r d n e g o t i a t e d f r o m p o s i t i o n s o f l e s s t h a n e q u a l s t r e n g t h . And t h i s f a c t o r a l s o h a s i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r t h e v e r i f i c a t i o n q u e s t i o n , a s w i l l be d i s c u s s e d s h o r t l y under the heading of "nature  o f t h e arms c o n t r o l s y s t e m . "  Domestic P o l i t i c s Whatever t h e d i p l o m a t i c c l i m a t e , t h e impetus t o w a r d s arms c o n t r o l must, i n t h e f i n a l a n a l y s i s , come f r o m w i t h i n t h e s t a t e i t s e l f . A f a v o u r a b l e c o n j u n c t i o n of domestic i n t e r e s t s or a t l e a s t t h e advocacy of key decision-making  b o d i e s and p e r s o n a -  l i t i e s i s an a b s o l u t e n e c e s s i t y . Such advocacy ma.y be b a s e d on a wide r a n g e o f c o n s i d e r a t i o n s a p a r t f r o m t h o s e d e s c r i b e d i n S e c t i o n I w i t h reference t o t h e "primary  o b j e c t i v e s " o f arms  c o n t r o l . I t may be " p o l i t i c a l " i n t h e n a r r o w sense o f p a n d e r -  -  36 -  i n g t o p u b l i c o p i n i o n o r d i v e r t i n g a t t e n t i o n from s e r i o u s domest i c problems, o r " p o l i t i c a l " i n t h e w i d e r sense o f promoting detente or seeking  s t r a t e g i c advantage; i t may be b u r e a u c r a t i c ,  i n t h e sense of s e r v i n g t o p r e s e r v e  or enhance t h e power o f a  p a r t i c u l a r governmental o r g a n i z a t i o n ; or i t may be i d e o l o g i c a l , i n which case t h e r e l a t i v e s t r e n g t h of p a c i f i s t , militarist,  or i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s t  isolationist,  sentiment w i l l l a r g e l y d e t e r -  mine t h e outcome. Under whatever c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  t h e importance  of t h e m i l i t a r y t o n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y , and of n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y to the nation, predisposes  a g a i n s t t h e i m p o s i t i o n o f undue r e -  s t r i c t i o n s on m i l i t a r y a c t i v i t i e s . Not s u r p r i s i n g l y , t h e m i l i tary or m i l i t a r y - i n d u s t r i a l  establishment  ( w i t h i n which Hedley  B u l l i n c l u d e s "the armed f o r c e s , t h e armaments i n d u s t r i e s , t h e m i l i t a r y branches of s c i e n c e and t e c h n o l o g y and o f government, [and]] t h e s e t t l e d h a b i t s of mind of those who t h i n k about  stra-  (-O  tegy and d e f e n c e "  ) i s commonly viewed as t h e c h i e f  obstacle  t o arms c o n t r o l . Obviously,  t h e range of p o s s i b l e v a r i a b l e s i s t o o g r e a t t o  b e a r any but t h e most g e n e r a l i z e d a n a l y s i s . Some r a t h e r p r i m i t i v e e f f o r t s a t an o v e r a l l s y n t h e s i s have been made, however, by  scholars attempting  t o a s s e s s t h e "arms c o n t r o l - m i n d e d n e s s "  of p a r t i c u l a r s t a t e s such as t h e S o v i e t Union and C h i n a . I n t h e i r study of Chinese disarmament p o l i c y H a l p e r i n and P e r k i n s , f o r example, i d e n t i f y two d i s t i n c t  elements as b e i n g  components of a " g e n e r a l p h i l o s o p h y "  of arms c o n t r o l :  i n g t h e use of m i l i t a r y f o r c e as a p o l i t i c a l  necessary (1)"view-  instrument,  one  which can and s h o u l d be c o n t r o l l e d by p o l i t i c a l means;" and ( 2 )  - 37  -  "the n o t i o n t h a t there<-<is a c o o p e r a t i v e  as w e l l as a  competitive  element i n the n a t u r e of the m i l i t a r y f o r c e s of p o t e n t i a l  ene-  59 mies."  To t h e s e might he added a number of o t h e r s :  z a t i o n t h a t arms c o n t r o l can be a "non-zero sum  the  reali-  game," t h a t i s ,  t h a t b o t h or a l l p a r t i e s t o an agreement can g a i n from i t , and not n e c e s s a r i l y d i f f e r e n t i a l l y the  "perception  are r e s p o n s i b l e  and  or at the  r e c o g n i t i o n by  f o r c e s i n the  t r o l agreements o f v a l u e  expense of each  each government t h a t  other  other; there  c o u n t r y t h a t fa.vor arms con-  to both s i d e s " ^ ; r e c o g n i t i o n that  a l t e r n a t i v e of u n r e s t r i c t e d growth i n armaments does not  the  neces-  s a r i l y promise t o enhance n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y ; where an arms r a c e is  i n progress,  the p e r c e p t i o n  t h a t the  other  r e q u i s i t e combination of c a . p a b i l i t i e s and deployment which t h r e a t e n s f o r c e s , and  t o upset the  side possesses  w i l l t o match any  the new  e x i s t i n g b a l a n c e of  t h e r e b y t o r e n d e r i l l u s o r y the attainment of a more  than ephemeral s u p e r i o r i t y  t o nuclear-armed  ad-  v e r s a r i e s , the r e j e c t i o n of a f i r s t - s t r i k e c a p a b i l i t y as a  de-  s i r a b l e object all-purpose  ; with regard  of n a t i o n a l p o l i c y ; and  " d e v i l theory"  f i n a l l y , r e j e c t i o n of  a n a l y s i s of an  which sees b e h i n d h i s every move and  the  opponent's i n t e n t i o n s ,  every p r o p o s a l  an  ill-  c o n c e a l e d b i d f o r u n i l a t e r a l advantage. * Donald G.Brennan n o t e s t h a t d e s p i t e v i g o r o u s arms programs on both s i d e s of the " I r o n C u r t a i n " , " t h a t p a r t of our n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y t h a t i s measured by our a b i l i t y t o guarantee n a t i o n a l s u r v i v a l i n a l l i t s v a r i o u s senses has undergone a p r e c i p i t o u s d e c l i n e i n r e c e n t y e a r s " (61) and "the a b s o l u t e n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y (measured i n the same sense of t h e i r a b i l i t y t o guarant e e n a t i o n a l s u r v i v a l ) of the S o v i e t Union has a l s o undergone a p r e c i p i t o u s d e c l i n e s i n c e 1946." (62) ** T h i s i s expressed i n a s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t form by Morton Kapl a n , t o the e f f e c t t h a t "Where n e i t h e r s t a t e appears t o be i n a, p o s i t i o n t o a c q u i r e a s u b s t a n t i a l advantage over the (cont.)  - 38 T h i s "brings us t o be  t o a n o t h e r , more g e n e r a l p o l i t i c a l  c o n s i d e r e d , namely the  of a s t a t e . I t i s not states,  -  overall foreign policy  s u r p r i s i n g , perhaps, t h a t  content w i t h the  international  status  factor  orientation  "satiated"  quo  and  seeking  t o p r e s e r v e i t , s h o u l d welcome agreements which reduce the fensive  c a p a b i l i t i e s of s t a t e s  n a t i o n s s h o u l d be agreements. t u r e of the  at l e a s t as  nor  that  may  unsatisfied  adamant i n opposing such connected w i t h the  of f o r c e s ) ,  since  r e l a t i v e capastatus  seek t h e r e b y t o p e r p e t u a t e i t s dominance. The  i s t Power i n any  given c o n f l i c t r e l a t i o n s h i p  revision-  i s simply  not  s a t i s f i e d with a mere "balance of power," i n which  case d i f f e r e n t i a l r e s t r i c t i o n s may ceded (depending on the w i l l i n g n e s s servative  the  even a r e v i s i o n i s t Power  of i t s opponents, j u s t as a proponent of the  l i k e l y t o be  na-  agreement, however ( e s p e c i a l l y i t s e f f e c t upon  pursue arms c o n t r o l as a means t o reduce the  bilities quo  equally  This factor i s intimately  existing relationship may  generally;  of-  state(s)  t o do  s e t t l e m e n t worked out  so)  have t o be  imposed or  con-  or c a p a b i l i t y of the  con-  or some k i n d  of o v e r a l l  s i m u l t a n e o u s l y w i t h the  i n a paper on arms c o n t r o l  i n the A r a b - I s r a e l i  Jabber s t r e s s e s  the n e c e s s a r y " p r o v i s i o n  f o r challenging  the  status  q u o — s u c h as  political  controls.  Thus,  c o n f l i c t , Puad  of n o n - v i o l e n t means diplomatic  negotiations,  ( c o n t . ) o t h e r e i t h e r by means of the economic r e s o u r c e s i t i s c a p a b l e of d i v e r t i n g t o m i l i t a r y p r o d u c t i o n or by v i r t u e of p o l i t i c a l s e d u c t i o n , the s t a t e s would seem t o have a j o i n t i n t e r e s t i n what f o r want of a b e t t e r term i s o f t e n c a l l e d s t r a tegic s t a b i l i t y . " (63) * Evan Luard warns t h a t "The rudimentary measures...already i n t r o d u c e d between the U n i t e d S t a t e s and the S o v i e t Union may b e . . . o n l y a r e f l e c t i o n of the growing common i n t e r e s t as s t a t u s quo superpowers, r a t h e r „than an independent ( c o n t . )  -39 arbitration, that  a  or l e g a l  the  ultimate  IV.  NATURE OF The  trol  posited, of  to  the  channels  THE  to  rather  course, to  resolved  and  not  ultimate  speak of the  is  the  of  "nature  of the  others  success  of a  of  states  to  or  applied evasion  being  environment  agree-  are r e f e r r i n g ,  future at  con-  consideration  agree to  hypothetical  over i n t o implementation  in  o f arms c o n t r o l  " s y s t e m e n v i s a g e d " we  willingness  arms  this  a particular state  of  stage  will  of whatever  af-  agreement  reached.  one,  most  namely the  type  important  tion  on  measure of  the  arms r a c e .  on  definitional  ceiling  on  reduction  e x i s t i n g armaments; a  pre-  "non-armament"; o r a q u a l i t a t i v e r e s t r i c -  arms c o n t r o l f i e l d  strictions  of t h e s e f a c t o r s i s a  of r e s t r a i n t s imposed, whether a  e x i s t i n g armaments; a  ventative  the  sure  i t s satisfaction.  l e s s important  same c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  Among t h e  of  quite  so much a m a t t e r  i t i s no  proposed arrangement, a p u r e l y  carry  to  of f a c t o r s , the  Still,  the  doubtful  ARMS CONTROL SYSTEM ENVISAGED.  than given,  conclusion  yet  however, u n l e s s  envisaged," i s d i f f e r e n t from the  invention.  fairs;  I t i s somewhat  exchange m i l i t a r y power f o r  alone,  being  category  m e n t s . When we of  willing  settlement  final  system  as  adjudication."^  s t a t e w o u l d be  such non-violent  -  It i s a generally that  weapons y e t  to  accepted p r i n c i p l e i n  i t i s f a r easier to l e g i s l a t e be  built  or a c t i v i t i e s  yet  re-  to  ( c o n t . ) c o n t r i b u t i o n t o r e d u c i n g t e n s i o n b e t w e e n them. T h e y g i v e no i n d i c a t i o n w h e t h e r s i m i l a r a g r e e m e n t s , c o v e r i n g new a n d r i s i n g p o w e r s w h i c h s h a r e no s u c h common i n t e r e s t , may be a t t a i n a b l e . " (65)  be  undertaken  than on f o r c e s o r deployments i n b e i n g . Such r e a s o n -  i n g has been used i n defence  o f t h e A n t a r c t i c , Outer  Space,  N u c l e a r N o n - P r o l i f e r a t i o n , L a t i n American N u c l e a r - F r e e  Zone,  and Seabed D e n u c l e a r i z a t i o n t r e a t i e s , f o r example. Two c o n t r i b u t o r y f a c t o r s may be c i t e d :  (1) t h e problem of v e s t e d  inter-  e s t s , t h e s t r e n g t h of which i s l i k e l y t o v a r y a c c o r d i n g t o t h e degree of e f f o r t and r e s o u r c e s a l r e a d y expended on a p a r t i c u l a r program; and (2) t h e f a c t t h a t , as Abram Chayes p o i n t s o u t , i t i s much e a s i e r f o r t h e p o t e n t i a l v i o l a t o r of an agreement " t o r e p l i c a t e e x i s t i n g a c t i v i t i e s a t a h i g h e r r a t e o r i n a new* 66  s e t t i n g " than t o embark on an e n t i r e l y n o v e l program. words: "Modest o r token as opposed t o z e r o c e i l i n g s s i m p l i f y t h e problems of expansion As w e l l as i n c r e a s i n g concern  In h i s  greatly  and deployment a f t e r  breach."  over t h e l i k e l i h o o d of e v a s i o n ,  adequate v e r i f i c a t i o n a l s o may be more p r o b l e m a t i c i n t h e case of "modest-or t o k e n " c e i l i n g s , where p r e p a r a t i o n s f o r can be r e l a t i v e l y  expansion  e a s i l y c o n c e a l e d . Thus t h e s u s c e p t i b i l i t y of  a system t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e g u l a t i o n may i n a sense be s a i d t o v a r y i n v e r s e l y w i t h t h e stage of i t s development and/or ment — w i t h  deploy-  t h e n o t a b l e e x c e p t i o n of c o n t r o l s over pure r e -  s e a r c h , which a r e s c a r c e l y f e a s i b l e i n view of t h e v e r i f i c a t i o n * But t h e s e f a c t o r s may be o f f s e t , depending on t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s of t h e case, by s e v e r a l o t h e r s : t h e l a c k of g e n e r a l p u b l i c i n t e r e s t i n developments y e t t o be undertaken o r even planned; and t h e p o s s i b l e l a c k o f t h e o r e t i c a l knowledge, which may make s t a t e s h e s i t a n t t o n e g o t i a t e about t h e a r e a concerned.  - 41 problem.  -  The l a t t e r a l s o l a r g e l y e x p l a i n s why  i t i s generally  believed easier to l e g i s l a t e quantitative r e s t r i c t i o n s qualitative  ones.  Success i n n e g o t i a t i n g an agreement may i n v e r s e l y w i t h the comprehensiveness  be assumed t o .vary  of the measures proposed  as w e l l — a l t h o u g h i t has been suggested t h a t may  than  comprehensiveness  sometimes a i d i n f a c i l i t a t i n g the t a s k of v e r i f i c a t i o n , i n  cases where i t i s e a s i e r t o d e t e c t the t o t a l absence  of m i l i t a r y  a c t i v i t y than t o d i s c r i m i n a t e among numerous d i s p a r a t e systems. The  o t h e r f a c t o r s i n t h i s c a t e g o r y f a l l under one  h e a d i n g s : the n a t u r e of the v e r i f i c a t i o n and/or procedure e v i s a g e d ; and the e f f e c t  of  two  enforcement  of the c o n t r o l system upon  the r e l a t i v e c a p a b i l i t i e s and s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t s of the p a r t i e s . The v e r i f i c a t i o n problem  i s found i n one form or another  under a l l f o u r main c a t e g o r i e s . Thus, a l t h o u g h a p a r t i c u l a r weapon may,  by i t s n a t u r e , be more or l e s s s u s c e p t i b l e t o v e r i f i -  c a t i o n , the v e r i f i c a t i o n requirements of an agreement a l s o  de-  pend on the s t a t e of p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s between the p a r t i e s concerned  (and t h e r e f o r e the extent t o which they may  be a b l e  t o " t r u s t " each o t h e r ) and the degree t o which e v a s i o n of v a r i o u s magnitudes might  a f f e c t the s t r a t e g i c b a l a n c e (which i s i n  t u r n dependent upon the n a t u r e of the l a t t e r , the a b s o l u t e s i z e of opposing f o r c e s  , and so on). But whatever the p u r e l y t e c h -  n i c a l requirements  of adequate  v e r i f i c a t i o n , i t i s the  political  * A v e r y s m a l l number of m i s s i l e s on each s i d e might l e n d i t s e l f t o i n s t a b i l i t y , f o r example, i f a m a r g i n a l v i o l a t i o n t h e r e b y c o u l d have a d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e e f f e c t on the s t r a t e g i c b a l a n c e . In p r i n c i p l e , t h i s was r e c o g n i z e d by Boggs. (68)  - 42  -  a c c e p t a b i l i t y of such measures t o those  upon whom they w i l l  p e r a t e which counts the most. No m a t t e r how possibilities  of g u a r d i n g  n e a r l y f o o l p r o o f the  a g a i n s t e v a s i o n , they w i l l not  i n them-  s e l v e s be adequate t o ensure an agreement, even when o t h e r d i t i o n s are favourable, w e l l as e c o n o m i c a l l y  con-  i f they are not p o l i t i c a l l y v i a b l e (as  f e a s i b l e ) . The  ment p r o v i s i o n s i n t e n d e d  o-  same h o l d s t r u e f o r  t o a p p l y i n the  event of  enforce-  evasion.  In g e n e r a l , the l i k e l i h o o d of a c o n t r o l arrangement found p o l i t i c a l l y a c c e p t a b l e  may  be s a i d t o v a r y  the degree of i t s " i n t r u s i v e n e s s " upon n a t i o n a l  being  i n v e r s e l y with, sovereignty.  Thus measures a f f e c t i n g n o n - s o v e r e i g n t e r r i t o r i e s such as  the  h i g h seas, A n t a r c t i c a , and Outer Space have an advantage from the s t a r t . And  s a t e l l i t e reconnaissance  i s r e v e a l e d as a p a r t i -  c u l a r l y a p p r o p r i a t e means of v e r i f i c a t i o n , i n view of i t s "low p r o f i l e . " Of  course,  "national sovereignty" being a r e l a t i v e  term, i n t e r p r e t e d d i f f e r e n t l y from s t a t e t o s t a t e , makes f o r some d i f f i c u l t y . What one P a r t y c o n s i d e r s an i n f r i n g e m e n t v e r e i g n t y may  not be c o n s i d e r e d  t e n t , by i t s opponent. T h i s may and n a t u r e may  of i t s s o -  so, or at l e a s t t o the same  ex-  i n t u r n be r e l a t e d t o the form  of the domestic p o l i t i c a l regime.  Similarly, a state  o b j e c t on p r i n c i p l e t o e n t r u s t i n g s u p r a n a t i o n a l b o d i e s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r v e r i f i c a t i o n and/or enforcement. In  with  general,  * S o - c a l l e d " c l o s e d s o c i e t i e s " b e i n g assumed t o be l e s s w i l l i n g t o expose t h e i r i n n e r workings and p o p u l a t i o n t o the o u t s i d e w o r l d , i n t h i s manner, t h a n more "open" ones. When d e a l i n g w i t h n e g o t i a t i o n s between such d i s s i m i l a r s o c i e t i e s , a f u r t h e r problem i s c r e a t e d by the asymmetries i n advantage t o be g a i n ed by such exposure. The " c l o s e d s o c i e t y " w i l l have l i t t l e or no m a n i f e s t need and hence i n c e n t i v e t o p r e s s f o r such p r i v i l e g e s , i n view of the v e r y "openness" of i t s opponent, w h i l e i t s own s e c r e c y c o n s t i t u t e s a m i l i t a r y a,sset and potential., bargaining-chip. (69)  - 43 the g r e a t e r the magnitude and the l e s s l i k e l y  c o m p l e x i t y of such arrangements,  they are t o e l i c i t  P a r t i e s as a whole. And  as we  support from the  have p r e v i o u s l y mentioned, the  c o s t of the c o n t r o l system i n c e r t a i n cases may  well  t h a t of whatever i s b e i n g p r o h i b i t e d , which i s not i t may  not  interested  exceed  t o say  that  be worthwhile i n terms of enhancing s e c u r i t y .  In de-emphasizing the need f o r complex  institutionalized  c o n t r o l s , Abra.m Chayes s t r e s s e s the s e l f - e n f o r c i n g n a t u r e of  any  70 arms c o n t r o l agreement,  g i v e n the i n t e n s e  t i f i c a t i o n " w i t h i n the b u r e a u c r a c i e s t o generate p o w e r f u l p r e s s u r e s  " n e g o t i a t i o n and  ra-  of each s i d e which "tends  f o r compliance." A c c o r d i n g  to  Chayes, At l e a s t t h r e e i n t e r r e l a t e d phenomena c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e s e p r e s s u r e s : (1) by the time the t r e a t y i s adopt e d , a broad consensus w i t h i n governmental and p o l i t i c a l c i r c l e s w i l l be a r r a y e d i n support of the d e c i s i o n ; (2) meanwhile, p r i n c i p a l c e n t e r s of p o t e n t i a l c o n t i n u i n g o p p o s i t i o n w i l l have been n e u t r a l i z e d o r assuaged, though o f t e n by means of c o n c e s s i o n s t h a t s i g n i f i c a n t l y modify the substance of the p o l i c y ; and (3) many p f f i c i a l s , l e a d e r s of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n or regime and opponents as w e l l , w i l l have been p e r s o n a l l y and p u b l i c l y comm i t t e d t o the t r e a t y , c r e a t i n g a k i n d of p o l i t i c a l imp e r a t i v e f o r the s u c c e s s of the p o l i c y . (71) Roger F i s h e r adopts a somewhat s i m i l a r approach, n o t i n g  four  " f o r c e s which t e n d t o b r i n g about governmental compliance: f e a r of r e t a l i a t o r y a c t i o n , f e a r of the  e f f e c t on p u b l i c o p i n i o n ,  moral views of government o f f i c e r s , and  institutional  the  resistance  72 to breaking what must be  rules."'  These are a l l i n a d d i t i o n , of c o u r s e , t o  considered  the pure s e l f - i n t e r e s t  as the prime bulwark of any  agreement:  of each of the P a r t i e s i n r e a c h i n g  i t in  -  the f i r s t  44  -  p l a c e . As F i s h e r p u t s i t , "Governments comply w i t h  t r e a t i e s and o t h e r i n t e r n a t i o n a l r u l e s a s they do w i t h t u t i o n s and o t h e r domestic r u l e s by a p r o c e s s  consti-  of composite  self-  r e s t r a i n t . .. .a t r e a t y , l i k e an egg, i s kept from g e t t i n g smashed by t h e e n l i g h t e n e d by a n y t h i n g  inside  Excessive  self-interest it."  ,  of those who d e a l w i t h i t , n o t  J  concern w i t h f o r m a l  "enforcement measures," t h a t  i s , w i t h s a n c t i o n s t o be a p p l i e d i n case of v i o l a t i o n , i s a l s o d e p l o r e d by Chayes, who reminds us t h a t t h e c h i e f d e t e r r e n t t o such a c t i v i t y w i l l  i n e v i t a b l y be t h e u n i l a t e r a l r e a c t i o n s of t h e  o t h e r P a r t i e s , i n p a r t i c u l a r t h e i r p o s s i b l e r e p u d i a t i o n of t h e agreement and t h e g e n e r a l worsening of r e l a t i o n s w i t h them which might be expected. F i n a l l y , t h e g r e a t bogey of. almost a l l p a s t proposals  disarmament  and n e g o t i a t i o n s has been t h e p u r s u i t of u n i l a t e r a l  advantage of one s o r t o r a n o t h e r , r e a l or imagined, by one s i d e or t h e o t h e r , o r b o t h . I t i s s a i d , f o r example, t h a t one of t h e reasons t h e S o v i e t s c o u l d n o t agree t o t h e Baruch P l a n was t h e u n i l a t e r a l i n t e l l i g e n c e advantages i t would have accorded t h e 75 United States. succeed u n l e s s  Many authors  s t r e s s t h a t t a l k s cannot hope t o  each s i d e g i v e s up any i d e a of u s i n g them t o g a i n  some k i n d of u n r e c i p r o c a t e d advantage over t h e o t h e r , whether i t be s t r a t e g i c o r simply p o l i t i c a l i n n a t u r e . Perhaps i t s h o u l d be * See a l s o Robert R.Bowie, who s t a t e s t h a t "the p a r t i e s t o any arms c o n t r o l w i l l have t o depend u l t i m a t e l y on s e l f - h e l p — on t h e i r own s t r e n g t h and t h a t of t h e i r a l l i e s — t o p r o t e c t themselves a g a i n s t any p o t e n t i a l v i o l a t o r " (76) and " s e l f h e l p w i l l be t h e p r i n c i p a l s a n c t i o n " (77); and Thomas S c h i l l i n g : "the main s a n c t i o n of an a r m s - c o n t r o l agreement fjis} the e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t each w i l l a b s t a i n o n l y i f t h e o t h e r does." (78)  - 45 added: This  "unless  i s not  must he other;  so  such advantage can  to  say  only that  a d v a n t a g e s and  certain Talks  from  outside  embodied the  i n Part  given negotiations m e n t s may  owe  I as or the  I. Nevertheless,  mental the  or  typology  of the  t a l k s were u n d e r t a k e n to achieve  while  over  the  total  the  relative  "package,"  out.  an  attempt  to  explain  o f f a c t o r s which, we course,  the  have  holding  of g i v e n  of  agree-  a g o o d d e a l more t o q u i t e t r a n s i t o r y p o l i t i c a . 1  sized  trol,  side  that  successful conclusion  t h a n t o any  possible  agreement  S t r a t e g i c Arms L i m i t a t i o n  a g u i d e l i n e . Of  circumstances i n Part  be  opponent."  military-strategic  balance  Soviet-American  of 1969-1972, u s i n g t h e  one  i n the  strictly  approximately  of the  of a g i v e n  satisfied  r e m a i n d e r of t h i s p a p e r w i l l aspects  the  masked f r o m t h e  component  e a c h P a r t y must he  at l e a s t  constructed  why  he  to avoid favouring  disadvantages  i n c l u d i n g those  The  tha.t e v e r y  s t r u c t u r e d as  s p h e r e , do  -  not  on  agreement others.  situational  "successes"  more i n t r i n s i c  we  hope t o throw l i g h t  i n the on  v a r i a b l e s empha-  first  place,  c e r t a i n measures  and  helped  ( d e f i n e d i n terms of f o r m a l  to  both  why  i t  o f arms  What f a c t o r s , i n t e r m s o f  "constants,"  on  con-  environ-  determine  accords)  was  both  and  the  * T h i s may be t o o " u n i t a r y a c t o r " a p e r s p e c t i v e on t h e p r o b l e m , however. D i f f e r e n t groups w i t h i n a s t a t e a r e l i a b l e t o agree t o t h e same p o l i c y f o r d i f f e r e n t r e a s o n s , i n w h i c h c a s e u l t i m a t e " s u c c e s s " may d e p e n d more on t h e r e l a t i v e s t r e n g t h a n d i n f l u e n c e o f s u c h g r o u p s t h a n on a n y p r e c o n c e i v e d "master p l a n " f o r m u l a t e d and p u t i n t o e x e c u t i o n by a m o n o l i t h i c l e a d e r s h i p . T h u s , f o r example, even t h o u g h c o n s e r v a t i v e a c q u i e s c e n c e i n n e g o t i a t i o n s may h a v e b e e n p r e d i c a t e d i n i t i a l l y on t h e h o p e f o r u n i l a t e r a l a d v a n t a g e , more m o d e r a t e ( c o n t . )  -  46  -  " f a i l u r e s " * of the t a l k s ? Nowhere do we  assume t h a t a g i v e n f a c t o r ( s u c h as  concern  f o r s t r a t e g i c s t a b i l i t y ) has operated w i t h equal f o r c e upon both P a r t i e s t o the t a l k s . Some f a c t o r s may  have weighed l e s s h e a v i l y  on one P a r t y t h a n on the o t h e r ; some, i n d e e d , may  have  influen-  ced o n l y one P a r t y a t a l l . Thus, the paper cannot be f a u l t e d has been t h e approach  of U.S.  (as  arms c o n t r o l l e r s t o the T a l k s ) f o r  i g n o r i n g p o s s i b l e asymmetries i n the i n t e r e s t s of the  two  s t a t e s , and s u s t a i n i n g a s u p e r f i c i a l "mirror-image" of S o v i e t concepts and m o t i v a t i o n s . I n f a c t , stract  collective  "states" being highly  ab-  e n t i t i e s composed of m u l t i f a r i o u s a g e n c i e s or  agents p u r s u i n g m u l t i f a r i o u s u l t i m a t e "motives" ( i f , even l e s s fathomable  (and o f t e n c o n f l i c t i n g ) ends,  i n d e e d , we may  speak i n such terms) are  than t h o s e of i n d i v i d u a l men.  p r o a c h does not i n i t s e l f t i o n s take p l a c e , or how ever, i t does a t l e a s t  their  a d e q u a t e l y e x p l a i n why  I f our  ap-  given n e g o t i a -  s p e c i f i c agreements a r e r e a c h e d , how-  suggest p o s s i b l e avenues f o r n e g o t i a t i o n  and throw c o n s i d e r a b l e l i g h t upon t h e i r l i k e l i h o o d of s u c c e s s , once the u n d e r l y i n g impetus  i s p r e s e n t and o p e r a t i n g .  ( c o n t . ) elements may e v e n t u a l l y win out. ** See p.5. *** N e g o t i a t i o n s need not be so d e f i n e d ; t h e y may be c o n s i d e r e d " s u c c e s s f u l " i n terms of mutual g o a l s even w i t h o u t produc i n g f o r m a l a c c o r d s — b y enhancing s t a b i l i t y t h r o u g h the c l a r i f i c a t i o n and p o s s i b l e convergence of s t r a t e g i c concepts and p o l i c i e s , f o r example. ( 7 9 ) C o n v e r s e l y , they may prove u l t i m a t e l y " u n s u c c e s s f u l " , even i f they do r e s u l t i n a f o r mal t r e a t y , when t h e l a t t e r f a v o u r s one P a r t y over another and c o n s e q u e n t l y l e a d s t o d e s t a b i l i z a t i o n . * Here r e f e r r i n g t o p r o p o s a l s which, though advanced d u r i n g the course of n e g o t i a t i o n s , were r e j e c t e d by one s i d e or the other.  - 47  -  PART I I I . SALT; FACTORS AFFECTING THE  INITIATION OF  NEGOTIATIONS.  A g r e a t number of d i v e r s e r a t i o n a l e s ha.ve been put t o e x p l a i n the w i l l i n g n e s s t a l k s , b e g i n n i n g i n 1969,  of the two  Superpowers t o engage i n  on the mutual l i m i t a t i o n of t h e i r  s t r a t e g i c armaments. They range a l l the way w i t h the  stability  of the  from genuine c o n c e r n  s t r a t e g i c balance, to a  sham c o n c o c t e d f o r the b e n e f i t of w o r l d o p i n i o n * g a i n i n g u n i l a t e r a l advantage by forces  i s no  sure way  other  we  side's  or s t a l l i n g i n as we  of d i v i n i n g a s t a t e ' s  t e n t i o n s , much l e s s i t s m o t i v a t i o n s ,  s h a l l forego  have  "true" i n discussion  Superpowers' " r e a l " purposes i n f a v o u r of examining  possible influence  of t h o s e f a c t o r s which we  b e i n g i n some sense i n t r i n s i c f e a t u r e s c u l u s . We  same time r e c o g n i z i n g  l i k e l y t o be  impelled  by  of any  arms c o n t r o l  In h i s defence of the  rank i n  by  day  and  corresponding which i t r e p their relative  basis.  SALT I agreements b e f o r e the U.S.  g r e s s , Henry K i s s i n g e r r e p e a t e d l y i n t e g r a l component of a new  interest-groups  contradictory,  v a r y on an almost day  cal-  government i s  a melange of m o t i v a t i o n s  r e s e n t s . Many of t h e s e w i l l be s t r e n g t h may  crudely  and  as  suggested r a t i o n a l e s , w h i l e  the f a c t t h a t any  t o the wide range of i n t e r e s t s and  the  have i d e n t i f i e d  s h a l l thus a v o i d ha.ving t o compare and  terms of p l a u s i b i l i t y the v a r i o u s at the  t o attempts at  time i n which t o s u r p a s s them. S i n c e ,  mentioned, t h e r e  of the  transparent  e i t h e r f r e e z i n g the  i n t o a p o s i t i o n of permanent i n f e r i o r i t y ,  order to gain  forward  s t r e s s e d t h a t t h e y were but  general  Conan  framework of more r e l a x e d  - 48  -  r e l a t i o n s between the S o v i e t Union and  the U n i t e d S t a t e s .  It'  i s . q u i t e p o s s i b l e t h a t on both s i d e s , arms c o n t r o l p e r se subordinated dership  t o the  overarching  i n t e r e s t s of the p o l i t i c a l  i n a c h i e v i n g or s u s t a i n i n g d e t e n t e ,  be a t t r i b u t e d t o a complex web t e r e s t e d i n determining,  t o be consummated and  lea-  which i n t u r n might  of m o t i v a t i o n s .  What we  however, i s t h a t , g i v e n the  are i n initial  p r e d i s p o s i t i o n towards n e g o t i a t i o n s , what f a c t o r s h e l p e d it  was  shaped the form and  content  enable  of  the  p a r t i c u l a r agreements which were reached? E f f e c t Upon S t r a t e g i c S t a b i l i t y Much of the d i s c u s s i o n of the r e g u l a t e d " w i l l be  "nature of the system t o  d e f e r r e d u n t i l c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the  d u a l t y p e s of weapons i n v o l v e d , of course. we  may  the h o r i z o n tional  indivi-  In g e n e r a l , however,  mention, w i t h r e g a r d t o s t r a t e g i c s t a b i l i t y , t h a t  prime m o t i v a t i o n  of the t a l k s was  of a number of new  be  a  undoubtedly the presence  systems t h r e a t e n i n g the  "balance of t e r r o r " between the Superpowers. On  side, a r a p i d buildup  of p a r t i c u l a r l y potent  seemed t o promise the  "counterforce"  SS-9  c a p a b i l i t y of  on  tradithe  Soviet  missiles effectively  d e s t r o y i n g American Minuteman ICBM's i n t h e i r s i l o s . On both, s i d e s , but  e s p e c i a l l y the American, the l e a p - f r o g g i n g  of m u l t i p l e i n d e p e n d e n t l y - t a r g e t e d s i m i l a r l y appeared t o j e o p a r d i z e d e t e r r e n t . And, initial  a l t e r the  r e - e n t r y v e h i c l e s (MIRV's) each o t h e r ' s f i x e d l a n d - b a s e d  perhaps most i m p o r t a n t l y ,  deployment of ABM  technology  systems by  overall offensive-defensive  the development  each s i d e t h r e a t e n e d  and to  d i s p a r i t y on which, the  - 49 s t r a t e g i c b a l a n c e was considerations—so  -  w i d e l y b e l i e v e d t o r e s t . How  vital  i n the  eyes of the  n i t y " — a c t u a l l y a f f e c t e d the key difficult general  t o say,  but  there  much t h e s e  "arms c o n t r o l commu-  decision-ma.kers on each s i d e i s  is little  doubt t h a t t h e y f u e l e d  the  impetus towards n e g o t i a t i o n s .  Magnitude or Nature of In view of the  Destructiveness  sonewhat meagre r e s u l t s of the t a l k s , and  the f a c t t h a t n e i t h e r of the P a r t i e s seems t o have s e r i o u s l y enterta.ined the p o s s i b i l i t y f o r c e s , one  of actua.1 r e d u c t i o n s  in existing  might argue t h a t concern f o r the l e v e l and n a t u r e of  d e s t r u c t i o n a t t e n d a n t upon a n u c l e a r war p r o m i n e n t l y among t h e i r m o t i v a t i o n s .  d i d not  While not an immediate c o n -  s i d e r a t i o n , however, such concern o b v i o u s l y p r i n c i p l e of the t a l k s and  f i g u r e very  u n d e r l a y the whole  the urgency w i t h which they were p u r -  sued, p r o v i d i n g much of the impetus seemingly based on considerations,  such as t h a t of p r e s e r v i n g  other  strategic stability.'  Monetary Cost Another m o t i v a t i o n i n the l i t e r a t u r e  which has  received considerable  on SALT (the s t r e n g t h  of which i s h o t l y  puted, however) i s economic. Economic m o t i v a t i o n s  on the S o v i e t  g i v e n the g r e a t e r p r o p o r t i o n  devoted by the  years,  of r e s o u r c e s  dis-  were deemed by  some o b s e r v e r s t o be p a r t i c u l a r l y s a l i e n t  t o defense and  emphasis  e s p e c i a l l y t o s t r a t e g i c f o r c e s i n the  side, Soviets  preceding  as w e l l as p e r e n n i a l l y growing demands f o r consumer  goods. Among the more s p e c i f i c  evidence which has  been c i t e d  by  - 50 Kremlinologists sing  emphasis  logies the  to  i n support  i n the l a t t e r  insure  apparent  of t h i s v i e w has sixties  optimum u s e  increase  at  a g r e a t e r r a t e than  of  downward r e v i s i o n s o f  increa-  on w o r k i n g o u t new  of r e s o u r c e s  of defense  b e e n : "The  for military  expenditure  growth of the  Soviet  economic g o a l s  methodopurposes,  during this GNP,  f o r the  the  period  necessity  eighth  Five-Year  (1966-70) a n d t h e l o n g d e l a y i n d r a w i n g up t h e n e x t  Plan  Plan  (1971-75), a s w e l l a s B r e z h n e v ' s c a u s t i c c r i t i c i s m o f S o v i e t economic p e r f o r m a n c e a t the  c l o s e o f 1969  when t h e  SALT were  8l begun."  A f t e r a comprehensive a n a l y s i s of the  Thomas W o l f e , w h i l e n o t i n g t h e t o be  given  to  c a u t i o u s l y concludes:  that  economic p r e s s u r e s  years  increased preference  SALT and  "Although  have helped  both  t o k e e p them t h e r e  tegic  policy  ture."  i n the  been the past, nor  to b r i n g the  they  likely  economic  of S o v i e t  t o be  view  Soviet  t h r o u g h more t h a n  prime determinant are  (1971-  Plan  subscribe to the  o f n e g o t i a t i o n s , i t a l s o seems t o m e . . . t h a t  s i d e r a t i o n s have not  two constra-  i n the  fu-  8 2  The budget  economic c o s t  i n general  through the  was  o f new  weapons s y s t e m s and  commentary  o f U.S.  1972. ^ J o s e p h I . C o f f e y  cites  8  c o r d i n g t o w h i c h "49 defense  spending  low."  of the  p e r h a p s t h e most p e r s i s t e n t theme Congressmen d u r i n g the  F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s Committee r e v i e w  too  I do  involved,  apparently  consumer goods i n t h e n i n t h F i v e - Y e a r  75),  Union to the  issues  per  t o be  cent  an  of the  running  Senate  SALT I a g r e e m e n t s i n  opinion p o l l  o f M a r c h 1971  of the American p e o p l e  t o o h i g h and  defense  o n l y 11  "More i m p o r t a n t l y , " w r i t e s C o f f e y ,  per "59  cent per  ac-  believed thought i t cent  of  the  - 51 c o l l e g e - e d u c a t e d and n e a r l y 55 p e r cent of the groups  contended t h a t defense spending was  those e l i t e s  middle-income  too h i g h ; i n s h o r t ,  on whom Congressmen depend most and t o whose wishes  t h e y respond most r e a d i l y a r e p o t e n t i a l l y i n fa.vor of arms cont r o l . " ^ A d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f f i c i a l s a r e f o n d of p o i n t i n g out i n 8  defense t h a t the m i l i t a r y ' s share of t o t a l government spending 85  has "been d e c l i n i n g i n r e c e n t y e a r s \ J  ses  t h a t the g r e a t e s t  increa-  i n defense c o s t s have "been due t o pay r a i s e s and o t h e r p e r -  sonnel b e n e f i t s ^ ; and t h a t , as John Newhouse p u t s i t , "perform8  ance w i t h r e g a r d t o spending on s t r a t e g i c weapons has been r e a s o n a b l y good," compared w i t h t h a t devoted t o g e n e r a l - p u r p o s e forces.  N e v e r t h e l e s s , he n o t e s : "the s m a l l e r sums spent  America's n u c l e a r d e t e r r e n t r e p r e s e n t a f a r  on  more-conspicuous— 88  hence d i s t u r b i n g — i t e m i n the c l o u d e d p u b l i c view." G e n e r a l l y s p e a k i n g , the tremendous i n c r e a s e i n c o s t s of i  s t r a t e g i c systems  i n r e c e n t y e a r s — w h i c h have seen the p r o j e c t e d  p r i c e of some i n d i v i d u a l u n i t s , such as m i s s i l e submarines, ceed the sum  ex-  of $1 b i l l i o n , f o r e x a m p l e — h a s undoubtedly added,  t h r o u g h p u b l i c o u t c r y and the concern of economy-minded ments, t o the impetus towards  SALT. A n a l y s t s c o n t i n u a l l y  governcaution  t h a t any s a v i n g s r e s u l t i n g from arms c o n t r o l agreements a r e  like-  l y merely t o be ploughed r i g h t back i n t o o t h e r , u n r e s t r i c t e d m i l i t a r y programs a c c o r d i n g t o Chayes*  " i r o n law" of b u r e a u c r a -  t i c b u d g e t i n g . T h i s both, i g n o r e s the f a c t t h a t most such s a v i n g s w i l l be i n terms backs  of new  costs foregone, r a t h e r than a c t u a l c u t -  i n e x i s t i n g expenditures  , and does not o b v i a t e , of  * An i d e a of what these c o s t s might have been i n the SALT ( c o n t . )  -  52  -  c o u r s e , the v e r y r e a l e f f e c t s of p r e s s u r e s  r e s u l t i n g from  the  mere p e r c e p t i o n of f u t u r e sa.vings, r e g a r d l e s s of i t s v a l i d i t y . Politico-Military The  Utility  military utility  l e n g e d , has  of s t r a t e g i c arms, a t one  d u r i n g the n u c l e a r age  time  unchal-  come under c o n s i d e r a b l e  ques-  t i o n i n g , as mentioned e a r l i e r . Under the d o c t r i n e of n u c l e a r t e r r e n c e , the a c t u a l use  of su6h weapons would, p a r a d o x i c a l l y ,  s i g n i f y t h e i r very f a i l u r e . rent value  Nevertheless,  c o n s t i t u t e s an u n q u e s t i o n a b l y  advantage, and many s t a t e s c o n t i n u e arms w i t h point  de-  considerable p o l i t i c a l  t h e i r ultimate  significant  deter-  strategic  t o endow s t r a t e g i c  nuclear  s i g n i f i c a n c e , whether from  the  of view of d i p l o m a t i c b a r g a i n i n g or of pure p r e s t i g e . A l l  of t h e s e f a c t o r s t e n d t o m i l i t a t e a g a i n s t m e a n i n g f u l on the development and  restrictions  deployment of s t r a t e g i c arms. That  SALT were p o s s i b l e i n s p i t e of them i s g r e a t e r t e s t i m o n y modesty of the a n t i c i p a t e d l i m i t a t i o n s t h a n t o any  the to  the  sudden change  ( c o n t . ) case was g i v e n by P r e s i d e n t Nixon a t a news c o n f e r e n c e on June 29,1972, i n which he d e c l a r e d , c i t i n g v a r i o u s S o v i e t " p l a n s " and "programs" i n the ABM, ICBM, and SLBM f i e l d s : " i f we had not ha.d an arms c o n t r o l agreement, a l i m i t a t i o n of ABM's and a temporary l i m i t a t i o n f o r 5 y e a r s on c e r t a i n c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s of o f f e n s i v e weapons, I w o u l d — a n d I a,m s a y i n g t h i s c o n s e r v a t i v e l y — h a v e had t o ask the Congress of the U n i t e d S t a t e s t o approve an i n c r e a s e i n the defense budget f o r n u c l e a r s t r a t e g i c weapons of a t l e a s t $15 b i l l i o n a y e a r on a c r a s h p r o gram." (90) Of c o u r s e , the P r e s i d e n t ' s s e l f - a s s u r a n c e t o the c o n t r a r y , t h e r e i s simply no t e l l i n g what d i r e c t i o n S o v i e t programs might have t a k e n i n the absence of SALT. Chairman of the J o i n t C h i e f s o f S t a f f A d m i r a l Moorer c l a r i f i e d Nixon's c l a i m somewhat when he admitted b e f o r e the Senate Armed S e r v i c e s Committee t h a t t h e s e c o s t e s t i m a t e s were based on t h e c o n t i n gency " t h a t the S o v i e t s b u i l t up t o the t o t a l extent of t h e i r c a p a b i l i t i e s " ( 9 1 ) — a v e r y dubious p r o p o s i t i o n , a t b e s t (but not f o r that. any.. reason why U.S. programs would not have been based on i t ) . * A c c o r d i n g t o the "mutual a s s u r e d d e s t r u c t i o n " d o c t r i n e , ( c o n t . )  - 53 i n t h e c o n c e p t i o n h e l d by t h e two P a r t i e s tico-military utility  of t h e o v e r a l l p o l i -  of t h e weapons.  Susceptibility to Verification As varies  t h e s u s c e p t i b i l i t y t o v e r i f i c a t i o n of s t r a t e g i c arms s i g n i f i c a n t l y depending on t h e type of weapons system  under c o n s i d e r a t i o n , until  discussion  of t h i s f a c t o r w i l l be l e f t  later.  D i s t r i b u t i o n of C a p a b i l i t i e s Among  States  Under t h e " s t r a t e g i c landsca/pe" c a t e g o r y we have what i s widely believed  t o have been t h e most s i g n i f i c a n t f a c t o r a f f e c -  t i n g the Soviet  d e c i s i o n t o e n t e r i n t o m e a n i n g f u l arms c o n t r o l  negotiations—their United States  achievement of approximate p a r i t y w i t h t h e  i n s t r a t e g i c power. Of c o u r s e , " p a r i t y " i s an ex-  t r e m e l y s l i p p e r y term, much l i k e i t s more v e n e r a b l e r e l a t i v e , the  "balance of power," which tends t o be i n t e r p r e t e d  vastly  d i f f e r e n t l y depending on which s i d e of t h e f e n c e one i s s i t ting.  I t s American d e t r a c t o r s  implying  i n s i s t that  "true"  parity—  a s t a b l e b a l a n c e of f o r c e s — c a n n o t be equated w i t h  sheer e q u a l i t y of numbers o r of d e s t r u c t i v e  p o t e n t i a l , where one  ( c o n t . ) a t l e a s t . Proponents of " d a m a g e - l i m i t a t i o n " o r o f a n u c l e a r w a r - f i g h t i n g c a p a b i l i t y would c o n t e s t t h i s judgment, of course. * Perhaps t h e b e s t d e f i n i t i o n of " p a r i t y " i s t h a t g i v e n by W a l t e r C.Clemens: " e q u i v a l e n c e — n o t p r e c i s e e q u a l i t y — o f opposing f o r c e s , such t h a t each s i d e can a c c o m p l i s h compara b l e r e s u l t s , e.g., d e s t r u c t i o n of a c e r t a i n p e r c e n t a g e o f c i v i l i a n o r m i l i t a r y t a r g e t s i n a second s t r i k e . " (92) ** R e f e r r i n g t o t h o s e who deny i t s d e s i r a b i l i t y , n o t n e c e s s a r i l y i t s existence.  - 54 i s comparing an one.  Often,  "will"  e s s e n t i a l l y s t a t u s quo  the argument c e n t e r s  or d e t e r m i n a t i o n ,  Power w i t h a  on the q u e s t i o n  revisionist  of n a t i o n a l  which are r i g h t l y c o n s t r u e d  as  being  a t l e a s t as e q u a l l y important i n d i c a t o r s of a s t a t e ' s power as more m a t e r i a l  c a p a b i l i t i e s . But  f u n d a m e n t a l l y , i t i s argued t h a t  the r e v i s i o n i s t  s t a t e , assumed almost by d e f i n i t i o n t o be  the  more a g g r e s s i v e  i n n a t u r e , must be  less  constrained  by n o t h i n g  than s u p e r i o r f o r c e , i f i t i s t o be d i s s u a d e d from embarking - Q  upon an a d v e n t u r i s t  course of a c t i o n .  "3  J  Proponents of the" p a r i t y  concept as a p p l i e d t o East-West r e l a t i o n s , on the s t r e s s the  e s s e n t i a l l y conservative  n a t u r e of S o v i e t  i n g t h a t t h e y are i n f a c t a p p r e c i a b l y the U n i t e d i t y and  States.  greater  Further,  o t h e r hand, goals,  deny-  more r a d i c a l than those of  the g e n e r a l  technological  o v e r a l l r e s o u r c e - b a s e of the Americans  superiorare  * See, f o r example, C o l i n Gray, who w r i t e s : "Great g e o p o l i t i c a l i n s i g h t i s not r e q u i r e d t o p e r c e i v e t h a t a s t a t u s quo, oceanempire superpower needs more raw s t r a t e g i c power t h a n does a d i s s a t i s f i e d h e a r t l a n d superpower." (94) ** See, f o r example, the t e s t i m o n y of Robert C.Tucker b e f o r e the Senate F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s Committee: "the S o v i e t Union, t o o , i n a c e r t a i n sense i s an o l d e s t a b l i s h e d s t a t u s power.... Sometimes i n the heat of d i s c u s s i o n s we tend t o t a k e i t too much, at i t s own, so t o speak, i d e o l o g i c a l f a c e v a l u e as a c o u n t r y committed t o r e v o l u t i o n s . We must remember t h a t t h i s r e v o l u t i o n i s 55 y e a r s o l d and t h a t at 55 most r e v o l u t i o n s are middle aged. And t h a t i s i n many ways t r u e of the R u s s i a n r e v o l u t i o n . I t i s a country which, w h i l e i n c e r t a i n r e s p e c t s i t i s s t i l l a c t i v e l y involved i n increasing i t s influence i n the w o r l d , and we have a l l t a l k e d about t h a t , we are a l l v e r y much aware of t h a t , but i n c e r t a i n o t h e r ways has a s t a t u s quo t o p r o t e c t , p a r t i c u l a r l y the s t a t u s quo i n Europe. In c e r t a i n ways i t i s a c o n s e r v a t i v e sta,te and we have t o l e a r n t o t h i n k i n t h o s e terms. I n c e r t a i n ways the major problems t h a t the S o v i e t government f a c e s today are due t o i t s c o n s e r v a t i s m , i t s u n w i l l i n g n e s s t o l i b e r a l i z e i t s p r e s e n t laws, t o a b o l i s h the c e n s o r s h i p , t o democratize a r e a s of s o c i e t y , and t o r e s t r u c t u r e the l o n g s t a n d i n g e s t a b l i s h e d s i n g l e p a r t y system. C o n s e q u e n t l y , I don't t h i n k the image of the o l d e s t a b l i s h e d s t a t i c U n i t e d S t a t e s c o n f r o n t e d with a c t i v i s t i c dynamic Sov i e t Union i s a v e r y a c c u r a t e r e f l e c t i o n of the r e a l i t y (cont.')  - 55  TV  adduced as hedges i n t h e i r But  the c o n t r o v e r s y  favour.  runs even deeper than t h i s . In terms of  m i l i t a r y hardware a l o n e , t h e r e i s c o n s i d e r a b l e disagreement o v e r the r e l a t i v e s t r a t e g i c s t r e n g t h of the two  Superpowers. One  side  argues t h a t the S o v i e t l e a d i n numbers of l a u n c h v e h i c l e s and t o t a l d e l i v e r a b l e megatonnage or "throw weight" s i g n i f i c a n t advantage. The  g i v e s them a  o t h e r s i d e i n s i s t s t h a t t h i s i s more  than o f f s e t by American s u p e r i o r i t y i n numbers of  independently-  t a r g e t e d warheads, not t o mention i t s t e c h n o l o g i c a l l e a d i n most f i e l d s and  c e r t a i n geographical  advantages. One  c a l c u l a t i o n of  r e l a t i v e s t r e n g t h based on the concept of " e q u i v a l e n t megatonnage," claimed t o be "the measuring r o d used by the Pentagon i n ( c o n t . ) of our i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p . " (95) A c c o r d i n g t o a study of S o v i e t f o r e i g n p o l i c y by Jan P . T r i s k a and David D . F i n l e y , most Western a n a l y s t s view the S o v i e t p r o p e n s i t y f o r r i s k - t a k i n g as "low and the S o v i e t a t t i t u d e toward r i s k - t a k i n g as c o n s e r v a t i v e , d e f e n s i v e , and c a u t i o u s . " (96) W a l t e r Clemens m a i n t a i n s t h a t " S o v i e t e x t e r n a l b e h a v i o r , at l e a s t s i n c e S t a l i n ' s death i n 1953, has g e n e r a l l y been consonant w i t h an i d e n t i f i a b l e h i e r a r chy of v a l u e s . . . . s c a l e d i n the f o l l o w i n g rank o r d e r : 1. The s e c u r i t y of the r u l i n g e l i t e ( s ) w i t h i n the USSR and the l e g i t i m i z a t i o n of t h e i r regime and i d e o l o g y ; 2.The s e c u r i t y of the Sov i e t s t a t e ; 3»Maintenance and s t r e n g t h e n i n g of S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e i n a r e a s of E a s t e r n Europe and Outer M o n g o l i a t h a t have come under p a r t i a l or complete S o v i e t c o n t r o l ; 4.Rapid i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n of the S o v i e t economy and improvement over time i n the l i v i n g standards of the S o v i e t people; 5 . L e s s t a n g i b l e and much l e s s important than the f i r s t f o u r g o a l s , maintenance and s t r e n g t h e n i n g of S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l Communist movemerit and the T h i r d World." (97) Only the l a t t e r g o a l c o u l d be c o n s t r u e d as a t a l l " r e v i s i o n i s t " i n n a t u r e . Of c o u r s e , t h i s does not answer the o b j e c t i o n t h a t S o v i e t f o r b e a r a n c e may have been due p r i m a r i l y t o h i t h e r t o overwhelming American s t r a t e g i c s u p e r i o r i t y . But i t i s s i g n i f i c a n t , i n t h i s r e g a r d , t h a t , as Clemens p u t s i t , "The h i s t o r i c a l r e c o r d suggests t h a t most Sov i e t a c t i o n s t h r e a t e n i n g t o world peace have r e s u l t e d from a p e r c e i v e d sense of m i l i t a r y i n f e r i o r i t y r a t h e r than p a r i t y or s u p e r i o r i t y " ( 9 8 ) — a g a i n , t o be f a i r , no n e c e s s a r y i n d i c a t i o n of f u t u r e p o l i c y . * S e c r e t a r y of Defense L a i r d ' assured the" Senate F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s Committee: "we have technology which i s , I b e l i e v e , ( c o n t . )  - 56 i t s s e c r e t s t u d i e s t o o b t a i n a s i n g l e f i g u r e f o r t h e t o t a l des t r u c t i v e c a p a b i l i t y of n u c l e a r weapons of v a r i e d s i z e s , " p u t s a f i g u r e of 4,000 on t h e R u s s i a n a r s e n a l by mid-1977 ( e x p i r y date o f t h e SALT I agreement on o f f e n s i v e m i s s i l e s ) , compared w i t h 4,450 f o r t h e U . S . " . R e g a r d l e s s of t h e t e c h n i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n s which might be made, however (and i t i s nowhere suggested t h a t S o v i e t and Amer i c a n f o r c e s l e n d themselves t o v e r y an i n e s c a p a b l e  easy comparison), i t i s  f a c t t h a t t h e p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s h i p on b o t h  s i d e s , as w e l l as w o r l d o p i n i o n a t l a r g e , has come t o accept t h e v a l i d i t y o f t h e n o t i o n of " p a r i t y " as c h a r a c t e r i z i n g p r e s e n t - d a y Superpower s t r a t e g i c r e l a t i o n s .  As we have p r e v i o u s l y  stressed,  numbers of n u c l e a r m i s s i l e s o r warheads i n excess of those r e q u i r e d f o r an a s s u r e d  second-strike  c a p a b i l i t y become r a t h e r  meaningless i n themselves. N e v e r t h e l e s s , controversy  over whether t h e l e a d e r s  t h e r e has been f u r t h e r  of t h e two s t a t e s a r e i n  ( c o n t . ) from 18 t o 24 months ahead of t h e S o v i e t Union....we do have a s u p e r i o r p o s i t i o n as f a r as t e c h n o l o g y i s concerned. That i s t h e r e a s o n why I am c o n f i d e n t t h a t t h e d i s p a r i t y i n numbers t h a t e x i s t s i n t h e o f f e n s i v e agreement does n o t p r e v e n t us f r o m m a i n t a i n i n g s u f f i c i e n c y as f a r as our d e t e r r e n t i s conc e r n e d . " (100) See a l s o t h e a n a l y s i s o f t h e o v e r a l l "balance of power" i n Clemens (1973), pp. 25-29. ** Even t h i s h o l d s t r u e o n l y where m i s s i l e s a r e concerned, f o r the b a l a n c e i s t i p p e d d r a s t i c a l l y i n t h e other d i r e c t i o n ( f r o m a S o v i e t l e a d o f 2.7 m i l l i o n pounds t o an American one of 25.9 m i l l i o n pounds)(101) i f t h e U.S. s t r a t e g i c bomb e r f o r c e i s brought i n t o t h e p i c t u r e . * That t h i s p e r c e p t i o n i s grounded l e s s i n m a t e r i a l r e a l i t y t h a n i n symbolic s t r e n g t h i s suggested most r e c e n t l y by a study of o f f e n s i v e m i s s i l e s undertaken by t h e Stockholm I n t e r n a t i o n a l Peace R e s e a r c h I n s t i t u t e . Based on a mathematical a n a l y s i s of t h e v a r i o u s f a c t o r s — s u c h as megatonnage, a c c u r acy, number o f warheads, and " h a r d e n i n g " o f m i s s i l e s i l o s — a f f e c t i n g t h e c o u n t e r f o r c e c a p a b i l i t i e s of t h e two s i d e s , i t concludes t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s has a v i r t u a l l y u n a s s a i l a b l e l e a d over t h e S o v i e t Union i n t h i s a r e a by a margin of about  - 57 f a c t content w i t h p a r i t y , i . e . a r e w i l l i n g t o l i v e w i t h i t and have g e n u i n e l y ceased a t t e m p t i n g t o a t t a i n o r r e t a i n a s i g n i f i cant degree o f s u p e r i o r i t y . I t may be assumed, of c o u r s e , t h a t h a b i t u a l l y c o n s e r v a t i v e m i l i t a r y p l a n n e r s w i l l n e v e r be s a t i s f i e d w i t h a n y t h i n g l e s s than " f i r s t p l a c e . " However, t h i s i s a q u e s t i o n t o which we s h a l l r e t u r n l a t e r when d i s c u s s i n g t h e political  environment of SALT.  How t h e mutual p e r c e p t i o n o f p a r i t y a f f e c t e d t h e two s i d e s ' d e c i s i o n t o engage i n SALT i s c o n s i d e r a b l y l e s s Even those who b e l i e v e t h a t t h e Russians i t y acknowledge t h a t t h e i r attainment  controversial.  seek u l t i m a t e s u p e r i o r -  o f p a r i t y may have h e l p e d  induce them t o e n t e r i n t o n e g o t i a t i o n s , i f f o r no o t h e r  reason  than t o s t a l l f o r time. Others i n s i s t t h a t , p a r i t y b e i n g a t i m e honoured g o a l of S o v i e t s t r a t e g i c p o l i c y , t h e i r apparent ness t o a c c e p t i t was genuine.  willing-  Thus Senator Cooper o f t h e U.S.  Senate F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s Committee d e c l a r e d t h a t : " f o r almost  30  y e a r s every deployment we have made has been matched by an e q u i v a l e n t deployment and t h e o n l y agreements we have reached have 102 been on t h e b a s i s of p a r i t y . "  M a r s h a l l Shulman t o l d t h e Com-  m i t t e e : "What made t h e p r e s e n t agreements p o s s i b l e was n o t t h a t t h e R u s s i a n s were i n t i m i d a t e d by our b a r g a i n i n g c h i p s , but t h a t they came c l o s e enough t o e l i m i n a t i n g t h e i r p r e v i o u s s t r a t e g i c ( c o n t . ) f i v e t o one ( 1 0 3 ) — e v e n without t a k i n g i n t o account s t r a t e g i c bombers. A c c o r d i n g t o t h i s r e p o r t , "even i f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s undertakes a b s o l u t e l y no new strategic-weapons-improvement programmes from now on and t h e S o v i e t Union completes, a t t h e f a s t e s t p o s s i b l e r a t e , t h e maximum improvement o f t h e land-based m i s s i l e f o r c e p o s s i b l e under t h e p r e s e n t c i r c u m s t a n c e s , d i c t a t e d by t h e 1972 SALT I i n t e r i m agreement on o f f e n s i v e m i s s i l e s , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s w i l l s t i l l have an advantage both i n K/N £counterf o r c e ] v a l u e and i n number of r e - e n t r y v e h i c l e s g o i n g ( c o n t . ) -  -  inferiority  58  -  so t h a t they no l o n g e r needed t o f e a r t h a t a f r e e z e  would l e a v e them a t a permanent disadvantage." '' 102  K r e m l i n o l o g i s t , Roman K o l k o w i c z ,  And another  testified:  The S o v i e t Union has now a c h i e v e d t h i s long-sought o b j e c t i v e — s t r a t e g i c p a r i t y with the United States. H a v i n g climbed t h i s p l a t e a u , t h e S o v i e t l e a d e r s began t o pursue p o l i c i e s aimed a t s t r a t e g i c arms l i m i t a t i o n t a l k s , SALT. I submit, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t an i n d i s p e n s a b l e p r e c o n d i t i o n f o r SALT was t h e S o v i e t achievement of a t l e a s t s t r a t e g i c p a r i t y , so t h a t they c o u l d e n t e r i n t o the n e g o t i a t i o n s from a p o s i t i o n of s t r e n g t h and p o l i t i c a l e q u a l i t y . (105) On t h e American s i d e , t h e S o v i e t achievement s e r v e d n o t i c e t h a t the o n l y a l t e r n a t i v e t o arms c o n t r o l was a new and more c o s t l y q u a n t i t a t i v e arms r a c e . Had t h e S o v i e t s c o n t i n u e d  their  buildup,  the consequent t h r e a t t o t h e American d e t e r r e n t would have r e q u i r e d a response i n k i n d . F o r a l l of those r e a s o n s d i s c u s s e d i n P a r t I (pp. 24-25), t h e n ,  i t would seem t h a t t h e attainment  of s t r a t e g i c p a r i t y ( a t l e a s t  s y m b o l i c a l l y ) was c r u c i a l t o t h e  s u c c e s s f u l i n i t i a t i o n of SALT. The  d i s t r i b u t i o n of t e c h n i c a l s k i l l s and c a p a b i l i t i e s  throughout t h e remainder o f t h e world posed no s i g n i f i c a n t lems i n t h e c o n t e x t  prob-  of SALT I , d e s p i t e r e c e n t concern over n u -  c l e a r p r o l i f e r a t i o n and premature t a l k o f a Moscow-Peking-Washington strategic  " t r i a n g l e . " While p r o l i f e r a t i o n may u l t i m a t e l y  pose c o n s i d e r a b l e problems f o r s t r a t e g i c arms l i m i t a t i o n s , as a result  e i t h e r of s i g n i f i c a n t r e d u c t i o n s i n t h e e x i s t i n g  arsenals  ( c o n t . ) i n t o t h e 1980s." (106) I t p r e d i c t s t h a t " p a r i t y " i n c o u n t e r f o r c e c a p a b i l i t i e s w i l l n o t be a t t a i n e d , i f a t a l l , u n t i l "sometime i n t h e e a r l y 1990s." (107)  - 59  -  of the Superpowers or of tremendous i n c r e a s e s i n those  of  the  l e s s e r n u c l e a r s t a t e s , the i n c r e d i b l y v a s t d i s p a r i t y i n power "between the two  groups at the p r e s e n t  the need f o r S o v i e t - A m e r i c a n  time e f f e c t i v e l y  obviates  s o l i c i t i n g of t h i r d - p a r t y adher^  ence o r a l t e r n a t i v e l y compensation a g a i n s t p o s s i b l e e x t e r n a l t h r e a t s ( w i t h the p o s s i b l e e x c e p t i o n Asymmetry i n F o r c e - S t r u c t u r e  of ABM's, t o be  discussed).  and S t r a t e g y ; Rate of T e c h n o l o g i c a l  Development The  asymmetry i n f o r c e - s t r u c t u r e and  s i d e s was was  s t r a t e g y of the  c e r t a i n l y o p e r a t i v e i n the case of SALT. The  two  problem  l a r g e l y bypassed, however, by c o n c e n t r a t i n g on those  forces  i n which m e a n i n g f u l comparisons c o u l d i n f a c t be made, such as SLBM's and  ICBM's, and  i g n o r i n g those w h i c h would have  considerably greater d i f f i c u l t y , and  presented  such as forward-based systems  I R / M R B M ' S t a r g e t e d on t h e opposing s i d e ' s f o r c e s . * In e f -  f e c t , the n e c e s s i t y of a l l o c a t i n g armaments w i t h i n an r a t i o was  postponed by  agreed  e s s e n t i a l l y merely f r e e z i n g deployments  at t h e i r c u r r e n t l e v e l and  i n t h e i r current configuration. Simi-  l a r l y , the problems of r a p i d t e c h n o l o g i c a l development were l a r g e l y sidestepped,  by k e e p i n g p r i m a r i l y t o q u a n t i t a t i v e r e -  s t r i c t i o n s on weapons, r a t h e r than q u a l i t a t i v e ones. I f anyt h i n g , l e a p - f r o g g i n g technology t a l k s by t h r e a t e n i n g new  and  may  have g i v e n a boost  c o s t l y innovations  to  the  in existing  systems. * F o r some i m a g i n a t i v e proposed s o l u t i o n s t o the FBS see S t r a t e g i c Survey 1972, pp. 14-16.  problem,  -.60  -  D i s p a r i t i e s i n the C o s t - E f f e c t i v e n e s s of Defense and  Offense  As p r e v i o u s l y mentioned, the d i s p a r i t i e s i n the c o s t - e f f e c t i v e n e s s of defense and  o f f e n s e may  he h e l d l a r g e l y r e s p o n s i b l e  for  both general  and  t h e Superpowers' a c q u i e s c e n c e i n mutual s e c o n d - s t r i k e  bility.  concern about the danger of* n u c l e a r weapons capa-  I n s o f a r as t h a t i s the case, t h e n , t h i s " s t r a t e g i c l a n d -  scape" f a c t o r , t o o , may  be  s a i d t o have c o n t r i b u t e d t o the  ini-  t i a t i o n of SALT. S t r u c t u r e of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l System F i n a l l y , the a c c e l e r a t e d l o o s e n i n g of the b i p o l a r s t r u c t u r e of w o r l d power i n r e c e n t y e a r s may prospects  have served t o enhance the  of SALT, by f o c u s i n g a t t e n t i o n on the common i n t e r e s t s  of the Superpowers i n warding o f f o u t s i d e t h r e a t s t o t h e i r  se-  c u r i t y or (more l i k e l y ) i n f l u e n c e . Thus the S o v i e t concern  with  t h e i r "Chinese f r o n t ' has 1  been adduced by many o b s e r v e r s  to  be  an important f a c t o r i n f l u e n c i n g t h e i r w i l l i n g n e s s t o engage i n l i m i t a t i o n s with  the U n i t e d S t a t e s .  mentioned i s the m a n i f e s t list  camp", a p p a r e n t l y  general  d i s u n i t y e x i s t i n g w i t h i n the " c a p i t a -  b e l i e v e d by  some S o v i e t s t o p e r m i t a  r e l a x a t i o n of m i l i t a r y p r e p a r e d n e s s . S i m i l a r l y , the  v i o u s bankruptcy of t h e i r p r e v i o u s w o r l d communist movement may tude.  Another f a c t o r sometimes  conception  of a  ob-  "monolithic"  have s o f t e n e d the American  atti-  - 61  -  Degree of T r u s t or H o s t i l i t y Between the P a r t i e s We now  t u r n t o the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the p o l i t i c a l  onment which may  have "been i n s t r u m e n t a l i n b r i n g i n g about  t a l k s . The most important of these i s , of c o u r s e , the new rit  of d e t e n t e which has c h a r a c t e r i z e d S o v i e t - A m e r i c a n  envirthe spi-  relations  d u r i n g the p a s t decade. T h i s d e t e n t e has been a f r a g i l e t h i n g , and has been marked not so much by enhanced t r u s t between the two governments on a day-to-day which "sudden, massive  b a s i s as by the d i s r e p u t e i n t o  a t t a c k " s c e n a r i o s have f a l l e n and by the  growing awareness of a s u b s t a n t i a l body of mutual  interests,  among which the c o n t r o l of s t r a t e g i c arms i s one. I t remains  a  v e r y b u s i n e s s l i k e r e l a t i o n s h i p , t o be s u r e , but without i t s r e l a t i v e degree  of r e l a x a t i o n i t i s h a r d t o c o n c e i v e of SALT ever  having taken p l a c e . S u s c e p t i b i l i t y to Outside Pressure; F e a s i b i l i t y antees  of O u t s i d e Guar-  A p a r t from i n t e r n a l l y - d e r i v e d p r e s s u r e s f u e l i n g the d r i v e f o r detente and p r o d u c i n g f a v o u r a b l e "atmospheric" the Superpowers may  conditions,  have been i n f l u e n c e d by the weight  of t h e i r  p l e d g e s a t the time of the N u c l e a r N o n - P r o l i f e r a t i o n T r e a t y , f o r m a l l y embodied w i t h i n i t s terms, " t o pursue n e g o t i a t i o n s i n good f a i t h on e f f e c t i v e measures r e l a t i n g t o c e s s a t i o n of the n u c l e a r arms r a c e a t an e a r l y date and t o n u c l e a r disarmament." ( A r t . V I ) ^ I n s o f a r as t h i s pledge was 1 0  deemed c r u c i a l t o t h e i r  * C f . W a l t e r Clemens: " D i f f i c u l t t o c u l t i v a t e , c o m p l i c a t e d t o n u r t u r e , d e t e n t e i s a f r a g i l e f l o w e r easy t o t r a m p l e . " (HO)  - 62  -  e f f o r t t o d i s s u a d e p o t e n t i a l members from j o i n i n g the n u c l e a r c l u b ; g i v e n t h e extreme importance a c c o r d e d Superpowers; and t o the extent $hat they may  t h i s e f f o r t by  the  have been p r e s s u r e d  by key n o n - s i g n a t o r i e s of the T r e a t y t o make good t h e i r promise i n exchange f o r adherence,  i t may  be viewed as  illustrating  a c e r t a i n " s u s c e p t i b i l i t y of the P a r t i e s t o o u t s i d e p r e s s u r e . " On the d e b i t s i d e , the ( r e a l or imagined) concern  of NATO a l l i e s  over t h e c o n t i n u e d c r e d i b i l i t y of t h e American "extended d e t e r r e n t " may  have s e r v e d t o r e s t r a i n the l a t t e r ' s i n i t i a t i v e s some-  what and,  i n p a r t i c u l a r , explains i t s r e f u s a l to consider f o r -  ward-based systems, capable  of s t r i k i n g S o v i e t home t e r r i t o r y ,  as  " s t r a t e g i c " weapons s u s c e p t i b l e t o n e g o t i a t i o n w i t h i n SALT. F i n a l l y , the h i g h l y s e n s i t i v e n a t u r e  of the s u b j e c t - m a t t e r  of  SALT, t o g e t h e r w i t h the v a s t d i s p a r i t y i n power between the P a r t i e s and any  o t h e r c o n c e i v a b l e i n t e r n a t i o n a l a c t o r or  t i o n of a c t o r s , rendered  the f e a s i b i l i t y  of an agreement p r a c t i c a l l y  E x i s t e n c e of O u t s i d e The areas  of o u t s i d e  coali-  guarantees  nil.  Trade-Offs  e x i s t e n c e of i s s u e s upon which t r a d e - o f f s from  of n e g o t i a t i o n might have been f e a s i b l e was  other  not r e a l l y  a  f a c t o r i n SALT I , i n view of the g r e a t s u c c e s s w i t h which the * A c c o r d i n g t o E l i z a b e t h Young, w r i t i n g i n 1972, " s e v e r a l of the n e a r - n u c l e a r s i g n a t o r i e s of the NPT ( i n c l u d i n g Japan and West Germany) have made i t q u i t e c l e a r t h a t they would r a t i f y the T r e a t y o n l y when they were s a t i s f i e d t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s and the S o v i e t Union were a c t u a l l y i n p r o c e s s of c u r b i n g the s t r a t e g i c arms r a c e . " ( I l l )  - 63 P a r t i e s managed t o i n s u l a t e t h e i r t a l k s from a l l extraneous matt e r s . C l e a r l y , they f e l t tance  deserved t o he c o n s i d e r e d  t h e i r own may  t h a t n e g o t i a t i o n s of such h i g h on t h e i r own  m e r i t s , and  imporon  m e r i t s a l o n e . A p o s s i b l e , though u n v e r i f i e d e x c e p t i o n  have been the t a c i t r e f u s a l of the S o v i e t Union (because of  i t s f e a r of a n u c l e a r i z e d Germany) t o e n t e r i n t o n e g o t i a t i o n s 112 b e f o r e attainment  of the N u c l e a r N o n - P r o l i f e r a t i o n T r e a t y .  However, i t s h o u l d be  s t r e s s e d t h a t t h i s example i s drawn from  the p e r i o d p r i o r t o the s t a r t i n v a s i o n of C z e c h o s l o v a k i a , t h e i r opening). formative  An  of a c t u a l n e g o t i a t i o n s ( t h e S o v i e t  f o r t h a t m a t t e r , s e r v e d t o postpone  attempt was  made by P r e s i d e n t Nixon d u r i n g  the  p r e - t a l k stage t o have the arms l i m i t a t i o n s l i n k e d t o  the r e s o l u t i o n of o u t s t a n d i n g  Soviet-American  world  soon, unceremoniously, dropped.'  at l a r g e ,  but t h i s was  c o n f l i c t s i n the  In f a c t , the t a l k s themselves were so w e l l i n s u l a t e d t h a t A m e r i can  e s c a l a t i o n of the war  i n Southeast A s i a , i n c l u d i n g a t t a c k s  S o v i e t s h i p p i n g , s a t u r a t i o n bombing of N o r t h Vietnamese and  cities,  the m i n i n g of Haiphong harbour, f a i l e d t o d i s r u p t them i n  their critical final  stages.  Asymmetry i n N e g o t i a t i n g S t y l e s A word s h o u l d be s a i d at t h i s p o i n t about the a l l e g e d a s y mmetry i n the n e g o t i a t i n g s t y l e s of the two (as e x p l a i n e d  s t a t e s , given that  e a r l i e r ) such a f a c t o r c o u l d c o n c e i v a b l y p l a y  i n f l u e n t i a l r o l e and has been a key  element i n the  * See h i s news conference of January 27, house (1973), pp. 140-141. •  1969,  criticism  cited in  New-  an  on  - 64 w i t h i n the U n i t e d the c o n t e n t i o n  States  -  of SALT I . * The  of W i l l i a m R.  Van  Cleave b e f o r e  Government O p e r a t i o n s Committee t h a t "The SALT...was p r i m a r i l y a n a l y t i c a l and approach p r i m a r i l y p o l i t i c a l . The if  latter is typified the U.S.  Senate  American approach t o  t e c h n i c a l , and  United  by  the  Soviet  S t a t e s viewed SALT as  i t were a s c i e n t i f i c - a n a l y t i c a l m a t t e r . The  Soviets  regarded  113 it  as a p o l i t i c a l  process."  In f a c t , t h e r e was  ample evidence  of t e c h n i c a l s o p h i s t i c a t i o n on both s i d e s , as w e l l as due t i o n t o the p o l i t i c a l / b a r g a i n i n g a s p e c t s the U n i t e d S t a t e s — h o w e l s e i s t o be the  "bargaining  atten-  of the n e g o t i a t i o n s  explained  the c u r r e n c y  c h i p s " argument among s u p p o r t e r s  of new  by of  military  programs, the f o c u s upon p o s s i b l e arms c o n t r o l " t r a d e - o f f s , " and the c l o s e and  p e r s i s t e n t involvement of the h i g h e s t  a u t h o r i t y i n each of the two  states?  Asymmetry i n Domestic P o l i t i c a l The American c r i t i c s try  i n domestic p o l i t i c a l  Regime  of SALT I a l s o argue t h a t the systems gave the S o v i e t s an  vantage p r e j u d i c i n g a t r u l y b a l a n c e d outcome of the It lic  i s claimed,  on the  one  hand, t h a t U.S.  asymme-  unfair  be  hands were t i e d by pub-  the p r o v i s i o n s of the  a s i m p l e r m a t t e r f o r the S o v i e t s t h a n f o r the  Nevertheless,  ad-  negotiations.  o p i n i o n d u r i n g the course of the n e g o t i a t i o n s ; on the  t h a t v i o l a t i n g or c i r c u m v e n t i n g may  executive  other,  agreements Americans. ^ 1 1  a b a l a n c e d assessment of the SALT I agreements  h a r d l y concedes them t o be a l o p s i d e d u n i l a t e r a l v i c t o r y f o r * As C o l i n Gray p u t s i t , "Western and E a s t e r n arms c o n t r o l l e r s may be p l a y i n g f u n d a m e n t a l l y d i f f e r e n t n e g o t i a t i n g games." (115)  - 65 the S o v i e t s , and  t h e r e i s no reason  c r a t i c tendency towards s t r i c t i s any  less prevalent  t o b e l i e v e t h a t the  conformity  with  bureau-  their provisions  i n the S o v i e t system. T h i s does n o t ,  of  c o u r s e , a f f e c t the a d d i t i o n a l argument of the c r i t i c s t h a t p o s s i b l e p u b l i c "euphoria" the agreements may  induced  i n h i b i t the U n i t e d S t a t e s from p u r s u i n g  pendent arms programs n e c e s s a r y s t a b i l i t y . But  anything,  f o r the maintenance of  of  inde-  strategic  the l a t t e r seems r a t h e r f a r - f e t c h e d , i n view of  the t r a d i t i o n a l s t r e n g t h and if  by the s u c c e s s f u l c o n c l u s i o n  r e s i l i e n c y of m i l i t a r y  the danger i s p r o b a b l y  cency over the p r e s e n t  interests;  g r e a t e r t h a t p u b l i c compla-  v e r y l i m i t e d agreements or a c c e p t a n c e of  the m i l i t a r y ' s view t h a t preparedness s h o u l d be r e d o u b l e d hedge a g a i n s t t h e i r v i o l a t i o n may  as  h i n d e r the achievement of  a fur-  t h e r , more s i g n i f i c a n t measures of arms c o n t r o l . Domestic P o l i t i c a l The  Factors  domestic p o l i t i c s a s s o c i a t e d with  have been w e l l covered haps the b e s t case,  the i n i t i a t i o n of SALT  i n various published accounts ( f o r per-  example, see John Newhouse's C o l d Da,wn). In  any  debate on the i s s u e s (as opposed t o naked b u r e a u c r a t i c i n -  t e r e s t s , which saw  the m i l i t a r y and  ranged a g a i n s t an ad hoc  i t s supporters p r e d i c t a b l y  arms c o n t r o l c o a l i t i o n ,  of the f e n c e ) drew p r i m a r i l y upon the f a c t o r s we  on both  sides  have a l r e a d y  d i s c u s s e d , i n p a r t i c u l a r the f e a r s f o r s t r a t e g i c s t a b i l i t y the a n t i c i p a t e d c o s t s of a new  arms r a c e .  I n the  end,  and  the  * There i s c o n s i d e r a b l e c o n t r o v e r s y i n the West over the quest i o n of S o v i e t a c c e p t a n c e of key concepts h e l d d e a r l y by American a r m s - c o n t r o l l e r s , such as eschewal of a f i r s t - ( c o n t . )  - 66 v o i c e of a c c o m m o d a t i o n — o r perhaps i t was o n l y mutual r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t t h e o t h e r s i d e was w i l l i n g and a b l e , i f n e c e s s a r y , t o s u s t a i n t h e c o s t s — s e e m s t o have p r e v a i l e d , though n o t without severe r e s t r i c t i o n s upon t h e n a t u r e  of t h e l i m i t a t i o n s n e g o t i -  ated. As f o r t h e " g e n e r a l p h i l o s o p h y " of arms c o n t r o l d i s c u s s e d i n P a r t I — a , s u b j e c t which c o u l d e a s i l y f i l l  as many pages as  t h i s e n t i r e e s s a y — s u f f i c e i t t o say t h a t t h e r e i s ample  evidence  t h a t a l l o f t h e p r i n c i p l e s enumerated above a r e shared by i n f l u — e n t i a l groups w i t h i n both c o u n t r i e s .  The most important  such  p r i n c i p l e may w e l l be t h a t of mutual r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e a b i l i t y and w i l l i n g n e s s of each t o match t h e o t h e r ' s s t r a t e g i c  deploy-  ments; t h i s i s t h e view of P a u l C.Warnke: In my view, t h e reason t h a t t h e S o v i e t Union and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s have been a b l e t o n e g o t i a t e and have been a b l e t o r e a c h an agreement i s because each s i d e has had t o r e c o g n i z e t h e o t h e r s i d e ' s t e c h n i c a l p o t e n t i a l . Each s i d e must r e c o g n i z e t h a t i t i s n o t capable of a c h i e v i n g any s o r t o f meaningful advantage i n t h e s t r a t e g i c weapons f i e l d u n l e s s t h e o t h e r s i d e i s w i l l i n g t o concede t h a t advantage, and n o t h i n g i n t h e h i s t o r y of t h e arms r a c e i n d i c a t e s any such concess i o n o r any such p r o s p e c t of one d r o p p i n g out of t h e competition i f the competition continues. Neither s i d e need l e t t h e o t h e r one g a i n an a p p r e c i a b l e a d vantage and n e i t h e r s i d e w i l l . (116) Thus t h e acceptance  of p a r i t y may be n o t so much a m a t t e r of  c h o i c e , as of a c q u i e s c e n c e  i n what appears t o be i n e v i t a b l e .  (cont.) s t r i k e c a p a b i l i t y or of s t r a t e g i c " s u p e r i o r i t y ; " a c q u i escence i n "mutual a s s u r e d d e s t r u c t i o n ; " d e v a l u a t i o n o f t h e p o l i t i c a l u t i l i t y of s t r a t e g i c power; t h e a c t i o n - r e a c t i o n model of t h e arms r a c e ; and t h e v i r t u e s o f " s t r a t e g i c s t a b i l i t y . " The b u l k o f t h e evidence i n d i c a t e s t h a t much i n t e r n a l disagreement e x i s t e d w i t h i n p o l i c y - m a k i n g c i r c l e s i n t h e S o v i e t Union ( a s i t d i d w i t h i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s ) ; but t h a t a s i z a b l e and ( c o n t . )  - 67 We have a l r e a d y mentioned the f e a r s expressed by some on the American  s i d e t h a t the S o v i e t s may n o t have r e a l l y a c c e p t e d  t h e p r i n c i p l e of p a r i t y , o r of mutual and may  second-strike  capability,  i n f a c t be c o n t i n u i n g t o pursue a course aimed a t some 117  k i n d of f i r s t - s t r i k e c a p a b i l i t y .  Even i f the l a t t e r  remains  o u t s i d e of t h e i r g r a s p , however, some contend t h a t mere m a r g i n a l n u m e r i c a l s u p e r i o r i t y ( o r even p a r i t y ) may w h i l e a t the same time d i s c r e d i t i n g the U.S. w o r l d , t h a t t h e y may  so embolden them,  i n the eyes of t h e  r e v e r t t o the k i n d of a g g r e s s i v e "forward"  s t r a t e g y c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of t h e i r e a r l y postwar f o r e i g n Undoubtedly, t h e s e concerns about the opponent's  policy.  willingness to  a c c e p t p a r i t y (and i t s concomitant of s t a b i l i t y ) have been m i r r o r e d by a n a l y s t s on the S o v i e t s i d e . The l a t t e r may  be r e a d i n g  more t h a n i s warranted i n t o the f r e q u e n t statements of American m i l i t a r y men  and s t r a t e g i s t s e x t o l l i n g t h e v i r t u e s of a  first-  s t r i k e c a p a b i l i t y . I t i s t r u e t h a t P r e s i d e n t Nixon and members of h i s A d m i n i s t r a t i o n were l o a t h t o use the p r e c i s e term t y , " s u b s t i t u t i n g f o r i t the more n e u t r a l one of cy,"  "pari-  "sufficien-  and p e r s i s t e d i n c h a r a c t e r i z i n g American power as b e i n g  "second t o none," r a t h e r than merely the approximate equal of ( c o n t . ) i n f l u e n t i a l body of o p i n i o n had i n d e e d , t o a remarkable degree, a p p r o p r i a t e d concepts from t h e American s t r a t e g i c and arms c o n t r o l l e x i c o n . (119) * F o r evidence on the S o v i e t s i d e , see e s p e c i a l l y C a l d w e l l (1971) ;tHolloway (1971); and Kahan (1972)', pp. 417-418. ** C f . Joseph I . C o f f e y : "arms c o n t r o l agreements w i t h the USSR . . . s i m p l y r e p r e s e n t a mutual r e c o g n i t i o n of r e a l i t y , which i s that meaningful s t r a t e g i c s u p e r i o r i t y i s not p o s s i b l e . " (120)  - 68 the S o v i e t ' s .  Nevertheless,  , as w e l l as a c q u i e s c e n c e "assured  i n mutual s e c o n d - s t r i k e c a p a b i l i t y o r  destruction"—has  the p r e s e n t  t h a t a rough measure of " p a r i t y " —  been e n s h r i n e d  w i t h i n t h e bounds of  agreements, f o r as l o n g as they l a s t ,  seems i n c o n -  xa  trovertible.  Several witnesses  b e f o r e t h e U.S. Senate F o r e i g n  R e l a t i o n s Committee p o i n t e d out t h a t , i f t h e S o v i e t s have i n deed gained  any p s y c h o l o g i c a l edge from t h e m a r g i n a l  s u p e r i o r i t y granted  numerical  them by t h e SALT agreement on o f f e n s i v e  m i s s i l e s , i t w i l l have been due p r i m a r i l y t o t h e a l a r m i s t * R e s u l t i n g i n such t o r t u o u s exchanges b e f o r e t h e Senate F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s . Committee as t h e f o l l o w i n g : S e n a t o r AIKEN. F i r s t , does t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n b e l i e v e t h a t we were a b l e t o n e g o t i a t e these agreements because we have what t h e M a n s f i e l d - S c o t t r e s o l u t i o n c a l l s a defense p o s t u r e second t o none? Is that r i g h t ? ' S e c r e t a r y ROGERS. Y e s , s i r , t h a t i s r i g h t . S e n a t o r AIKEN. We have a defense p o s t u r e second t o none and does t h e S o v i e t Union a l s o b e l i e v e t h a t i t must negot i a t e from a p o s i t i o n of s t r e n g t h ? S e c r e t a r y ROGERS. W e l l , I would assume so, y e s , S e n a t o r . S e n a t o r AIKEN. A t t h e next round of n e g o t i a t i o n s which n a t i o n do y o u t h i n k w i l l have t h e g r e a t e s t s t r e n g t h from which t o n e g o t i a t e ? S e c r e t a r y ROGERS. W e l l , I t h i n k i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o a n swer t h a t q u e s t i o n . We b e l i e v e we a r e second t o none. I am sure t h a t t h e S o v i e t Union f e e l s t h a t i t i s s t r o n g and i s a b l e t o n e g o t i a t e from a p o s i t i o n of s t r e n g t h ; so we e n t e r , assuming t h e Congress supports us on t h e r e q u e s t s we a r e making, c e r t a i n l y g e n e r a l l y supports u s — I don't mean t o every item, but we g e t g e n e r a l s u p p o r t — t h e n I would t h i n k we would b o t h e n t e r t h e second phase o f t h e SALT t a l k s from a p o s i t i o n of r e l a t i v e , s t r e n g t h . S e n a t o r AIKEN. I t w i l l be of equal s t r e n g t h . S e c r e t a r y ROGERS. W e l l , as I s a y , I h e s i t a t e t o say e q u a l . We c e r t a i n l y a r e b o t h i n a s t r o n g p o s i t i o n . We t h i n k we a r e . We don't t h i n k t h e r e i s anyone ahead of u s , p u t i t t h a t way. (121) F o r an e q u a l l y b e f u d d l e d d i s c u s s i o n of t h e " s u f f i c i e n c y " conc e p t , see t h e same H e a r i n g s , p.21. ** I n Wolfgang P a n o f s k y ' s words, "The T A B M ] t r e a t y i s e q u i v a l e n t t o a j o i n t d e c l a r a t i o n t h a t mutual d e t e r r e n c e ( c o n t . )  - 69 utterances  -  of t h o s e i n the U n i t e d  States  c a l l i n g f o r a more v i -  gorous arms program. Discussion  of the f a c t o r s f a l l i n g under the c a t e g o r y of  " n a t u r e of the arms c o n t r o l system" w i l l be d e f e r r e d a f t e r a n a l y s i s of the  until  i n d i v i d u a l r e s t r i c t i o n s and l i m i t a t i o n s  of the agreements, by which time t h e i r p r e c i s e parameters w i l l have become c l e a r e r . I I . ABM'S. The Treaty great  o n l y permanent agreement t o come out  of SALT I was  a  on the L i m i t a t i o n of A n t i - B a l l i s t i c M i s s i l e Systems. I n c o n t r a s t t o the I n t e r i m Agreement on O f f e n s i v e M i s s i l e s ,  t h i s was  a t r u l y comprehensive and  d i d i t l i m i t ABM's t o two s i d e ( A r t . I l l ) , but  airtight  s i t e s of 100  document. Not  only  m i s s i l e s each on each,  i t a b s o l u t e l y f o r b a d e the  development,  t e s t i n g , or deployment of sea-, a i r - , space-, o r mobile  land-  based v a r i e t i e s of such systems ( A r t . V ) , which were b r o a d l y f i n e d t o i n c l u d e any  "system t o c o u n t e r s t r a t e g i c b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e s or t h e i r elements i n f l i g h t  t r a j e c t o r y " ( A r t . I I ) (thus  comprehending s o - c a l l e d " e x o t i c " ABM's, based on f u t u r e nologies—such  de-  tech-  as l a s e r s — n o t r e q u i r i n g m i s s i l e i n t e r c e p t o r s ) .  ( c o n t . ) i s the s t r a t e g i c p o l i c y of b o t h the U.S. and the USSR and i m p l i c i t l y d e n i e s the u s e f u l n e s s of a n u c l e a r w a r - f i g h t i n g strategy." (122) * See," f o r example, the t e s t i m o n y of former A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y of Defense f o r I n t e r n a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y A f f a i r s , ^ P a u l C.Warnke: " I t can g i v e them a p o l i t i c a l advantage i f , and o n l y i f , we appear t o concede i t t o them by d e p r e c i a t i n g our own strength." (123) ** But t h e r e seems t o be some ambiguity h e r e , as I n i t i a l e d Statement "E" of the "Agreed I n t e r p r e t a t i o n s " p r o v i d e s f o r f u t u r e n e g o t i a t i o n s " i n the event ABM systems based ( c o n t . )  - 70  -  A l s o p r o h i b i t e d were the attainment t i p l e warhead c a p a b i l i t y f o r ABM  of a " r a p i d r e - l o a d " or mul-  launchers  ( A r t . V ) ; the u p g r a -  d i n g of c o n v e n t i o n a l a n t i - a i r c r a f t m i s s i l e s , l a u n c h e r s , r a d a r s t o an ABM any  or  c a p a b i l i t y ( A r t . V I ) ; the f u t u r e deployment of  " r a d a r s f o r e a r l y warning of; s t r a t e g i c b a l l i s t i c  missile  a t t a c k except  a t l o c a t i o n s a l o n g the p e r i p h e r y of i t s n a t i o n a l  t e r r i t o r y and  o r i e n t e d outward"(Art.VI);  and the t r a n s f e r t o  o t h e r s t a t e s or o u t s i d e of the n a t i o n a l t e r r i t o r y of ABM  systems or t h e i r components or t e c h n o l o g y . ( A r t . I X ;  I n i t i a l e d Statement "G" two  the  t o be c e n t e r e d on the P a r t y ' s  ( o r " N a t i o n a l Command A u t h o r i t y " , i n the j a r g o n ) ,  and t h e o t h e r i n i t s ICBM f i e l d s . The  r a d a r s p e r m i t t e d i n each  case were s p e c i f i e d as t o exact number, t y p e , and Thus we  and  of the "Agreed I n t e r p r e t a t i o n s " ) Of  s i t e s p e r m i t t e d , one was  capital city  and  of the P a r t i e s  can see t h a t the ABM  T r e a t y was  q u a l i t a t i v e i n n a t u r e . I t s primary  size.(Art.Ill)  both q u a n t i t a t i v e  significance lay in i t s  c o d i f i c a t i o n of the p r i n c i p l e of "mutual a s s u r e d d e s t r u c t i o n , " i . e . , the a b s o l u t e v u l n e r a b i l i t y of each s i d e t o the  other's  o f f e n s i v e n u c l e a r f o r c e s ; the p e r p e t u a l h o l d i n g hostage of the c i v i l i a n p o p u l a t i o n s of t h e two without Effect tion  s t a t e s . I t was  a p r i n c i p l e not  i t s opponents, however. on S t r a t e g i c S t a b i l i t y ; Magnitude or Nature of D e s t r u c -  The  initial  deployment and  imminent expansion  of  ABM  ( c o n t . ) on o t h e r p h y s i c a l p r i n c i p l e s and i n c l u d i n g components capable of s u b s t i t u t i n g f o r ABM i n t e r c e p t o r m i s s i l e s , ABM l a u n c h e r s , or ABM r a d a r s a r e c r e a t e d i n the f u t u r e . "  - 71 systems on both, s i d e s were p r o b a b l y  the .greatest s i n g l e spur t o  SALT, t h r e a t e n i n g as they d i d both d i s r u p t i o n of t h e s t r a t e g i c b a l a n c e and a c o s t l y new arms r a c e . Thus t h e preamble t o t h e ABM T r e a t y "that  s t a t e d , among o t h e r t h i n g s , t h e P a r t i e s ' c o n v i c t i o n  e f f e c t i v e measures t o l i m i t a n t i - b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s y s -  tems would be a s u b s t a n t i a l f a c t o r i n c u r b i n g t h e r a c e i n s t r a tegic  o f f e n s i v e arms and would l e a d t o a decrease i n t h e r i s k  of outbreak of war i n v o l v i n g nuclear.weapons." ABM's were viewed as a t h r e a t t o t h e s t a b i l i t y of t h e s t r a t e g i c b a l a n c e i n a t l e a s t t h r e e ways. (1) By c a s t i n g i n t o doubt t h e a b i l i t y of a s t a t e t o e f f e c t i v e l y d e l i v e r i t s r e t a l i a t o r y blow a g a i n s t an aggressor,  they wpuld i n c r e a s e t h e i n c e n t i v e of e i t h e r p a r t y  i n a c r i s i s t o pre-empt. (2) A t t h e same time, t h e y would enhance t h e p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f a s u c c e s s f u l f i r s t - s t r i k e by i n c r e a -  s i n g t h e number of enemy m i s s i l e s which c o u l d s a f e l y be a l l o w e d t o s u r v i v e such an a t t a c k .  (3) And f i n a l l y , they promised r e -  newal of an i n t e n s i v e o f f e n s i v e - d e f e n s i v e arms r a c e , i n which the  s i d e f e e l i n g i t s e l f a t a disadvantage with  respect  t o ABM's  would seek t o overcome i t s i n f e r i o r i t y through sheer numbers of o f f e n s i v e v e h i c l e s , i n t h e hopes t h e r e b y of " s a t u r a t i n g " t h e d e f e n s e . Apart general  from t h e economic c o s t s of such a c t i o n , t h e  c l i m a t e of u n c e r t a i n t y t h e r e b y c r e a t e d , as w e l l as t h e  h e i g h t e n e d chances of a c c i d e n t  o r command-and-control  failure  (which, must be assumed t o v a r y w i t h t h e a b s o l u t e number of weapons a v a i l a b l e ) , would bode i l l  for rational strategic calcula-  tion. The  paradox i s t h a t w h i l e  e f f e c t i v e l y promoting one of t h e  - 72 traditional the a  goals  o f arms c o n t r o l ,  o u t b r e a k o f war,  a ban  c o g n a t e p u r p o s e , by  and  higher  one  nevertheless  ly its  civilian  defensive  change t h e  on ABM's a t t h e  ensuring  threat  same t i m e  a g r e a t e r degree of d e s t r u c t i o n  o c c u r r i n g . The  was  ABM  i n comparison with  p e r f e c t e d to the  that  of n u c l e a r  event  i s , a f t e r a l l , an  b e y o n d d o u b t and  of t h e i r  of  jeopardizes  c a s u a l t i e s i n the however u n l i k e l y  whole f a c e  populations  r e d u c t i o n of the  weapon. I f i t c o u l d be  reliability  unfavourable  -  of  essentialpoint  where  i t s c o s t - e f f e c t i v e n e s s not of the  offense, i t could  s t r a t e g y , by  freeing  civilian  " m u t u a l h o s t a g e " s t a t u s . T h o s e who  favour  s u c h a d e v e l o p m e n t h a v e become known a s members o f t h e  "damage  limitation"  propo-  s c h o o l , as  distinct  from the  more o r t h o d o x  124. nents  of  "assured  tinguished has  scientists  much t o  terror,"  destruction." and  i n theory.  The  and  existing  i t d o e s mass s l a u g h t e r i n t h e  deterrence  should  sible  Somewhere a l o n g  one.  arms c o n t r o l e x p e r t s ,  commend i t s e l f  i m p l y i n g as  T h e y i n c l u d e a number o f  fail,  i s without the  question  line,  their  event  a morally  and  duction;  of a t r a d e - o f f between t h e  seems  manifest  war  re-  abso-  unavoidable.  Given course,  that  would  made b e t w e e n damage l i m i t a t i o n  lutely  of  reprehen-  however, a c h o i c e  two  view  "balance  seem t o h a v e t o be some k i n d  dis-  the  limited  effective  "area  impossibility.  not  dispute  for  a l l time  this;  sophistication defense" Most  what t h e y  of the  gued, however, t h a t  of p r e s e n t  against  o p t i o n of  i s the  strategic  of  i n c o m i n g ICBM's i s a  "damage l i m i t a t i o n " object to  technology,  supporters  apparent  defense.  foreclosing  I t can  e v e n were t e c h n i c a l c a p a b i l i t i e s  do  be  quite  ar-  - 73 adequate, t h e consequent r e d u c t i o n i n l e v e l s of d e s t r u c t i o n would s t i l l n o t "be worth t h e p r i c e of t h e g r e a t l y i n c r e a s e d chances ( a c c o r d i n g t o fundamental d e t e r r e n c e t h e o r y )  of such  wars "breaking out i n t h e f i r s t p l a c e . Furthermore, i t i s h i g h l y u n l i k e l y t h a t t h e ABM c a p a b i l i t i e s of t h e p r o t a g o n i s t s w i l l dev e l o p on a p e r f e c t l y symmetrical the t e m p t a t i o n first-strike  b a s i s , i n t h e absence of which  on t h e p a r t of t h e l e a d i n g Power t o l a u n c h a  i n a moment of severe c r i s i s might be s i m p l y t o o  g r e a t t o r e s i s t . Though, l e s s of a " q u i c k - f i x " s o l u t i o n , a more a c c e p t a b l e way of g r a d u a l l y e r o d i n g t h e "balance  of t e r r o r " and'  r e p l a c i n g i t by a more humane system would be simple mutual and b a l a n c e d r e d u c t i o n s i n t h e numbers of o f f e n s i v e m i s s i l e s — t h e i n c e n t i v e f o r which s h o u l d be enhanced by t h e p r o h i b i t i o n  of  ABM's. There i s a l s o a s c h o o l of thought tween " a r e a - d e f e n s e "  which d i s t i n g u i s h e s be-  ABM*s, f r e e l y acknowledged t o be d e s t a b i -  l i z i n g ; and s o - c a l l e d " h a r d - p o i n t " ABM's, which, i t i s c l a i m e d , i n t h e i r r o l e of p r o t e c t i n g t h e f i x e d land-based  d e t e r r e n t of  each s i d e , would s e r v e t o enhance s t r a t e g i c s t a b i l i t y . tive  " h a r d - p o i n t " ABM defense  Effec-  i s w i d e l y b e l i e v e d t o be more  * I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o note t h a t t h e n a t i o n a l c a p i t a l a r e a ABM systems p e r m i t t e d by t h e T r e a t y were a l s o r a t i o n a l i z e d on t h e grounds of s t a b i l i t y . As S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e Rogers put i t : "ABM coverage a t t h e n a t i o n a l c a p i t a l s w i l l permit p r o t e c t i o n f o r t h e n a t i o n a l command a u t h o r i t y a g a i n s t a l i g h t a t t a c k , o r an a c c i d e n t a l o r u n a u t h o r i z e d l a u n c h of a l i m i t e d number of m i s s i l e s , , and thus decrease t h e chances t h a t such an event would t r i g g e r a n u c l e a r exchangei I n a d d i t i o n , i t w i l l buy some time a g a i n s t a major a t t a c k , and i t s r a d a r s would h e l p t o p r o v i d e v a l u a b l e warning." (125) See a l s o t h e testimony of Ambassador Gerard C.Smith i n t h e same H e a r i n g s , pp. 53-54.  - 74  -  t e c h n o l o g i c a l l y f e a s i b l e than the a r e a p r o t e c t i o n The major problem h e r e , however, l i e s one's opponent t h a t a " h a r d - p o i n t " ABM  variety.  1 2  ^  i n a l l a y i n g the f e a r s of does not i n f a c t  possess  a r e a - d e f e n s e c a p a b i l i t i e s ( e s p e c i a l l y where the ICBM's b e i n g p r o t e c t e d a r e l o c a t e d i n the v i c i n i t y of " c o u n t e r - v a l u e " t a r g e t s ) , or c o n s t i t u t e a p o t e n t i a l base on which t o b u i l d an a r e a 127 defense network. port  of the U.S.  Both such r a t i o n a l e s were p r o f f e r e d i n supA d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s o r i g i n a l request f o r a "Safe-  guard" system o s t e n s i b l y i n t e n d e d p r i m a r i l y t o defend Minuteman m i s s i l e s i t e s . In i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s , where appearances  often  count f o r as much as r e a l i t y , i f one s i d e merely b e l i e v e s t h a t its  opponent has o r might have such a c a p a b i l i t y , then the con-  sequences f o r s t r a t e g i c s t a b i l i t y would be e q u a l l y as grave as if  i t were i n f a c t  Monetary  true.  Cost  Another of the c h i e f drawbacks of ABM i n the debate on the U.S. t h e l a t e 1960's was  defense h i g h l i g h t e d  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s proposed program i n  i t s sheer f i n a n c i a l c o s t . I n i t i a l  estimates  put a t no l e s s than $50 b i l l i o n the p r i c e - t a g of a " t h i c k " a r e a defense system f o r the U n i t e d S t a t e s , and w o r r i e d members of the Senate F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s Committee p o i n t e d out t h a t , g i v e n a v e r age c o s t over-runs on e x i s t i n g weapons systems  of from 220 t o  700 p e r c e n t , the u l t i m a t e f i g u r e c o u l d r e a c h the t r u l y g e r i n g neighbourhood  of $400 b i l l i o n .  While the l a t t e r  w e l l have proven w i l d l y exaggerated, even A d m i n i s t r a t i o n mates i n the t e n s of b i l l i o n s  stag-  of d o l l a r s were more than  might esti-  sufficient  - 75 to  s t r i k e t e r r o r i n t o t h e h e a r t s of economy-minded  Congressmen  and provoke outrage among t h e p u b l i c a t l a r g e , i n view o f t h e q u e s t i o n a b l e u t i l i t y of t h e system. As i s w e l l known, p l a n s for  such a comprehensive network were soon d i s c a r d e d ( o r a t  l e a s t put i n c o l d s t o r a g e ) , and t h e Pentagon was f o r c e d t o a c c e p t a much-emasculated  system, re-named " S a f e g u a r d . "  N e v e r t h e l e s s , U.S. s a v i n g s on p r o j e c t e d programs made p o s s i b l e as a r e s u l t  of t h e ABM T r e a t y have been p r i v a t e l y  esti-  mated a t as h i g h as $4.3 b i l l i o n p e r y e a r f o r t h e p e r i o d from f i s c a l 1973 t o f i s c a l 1 9 7 9 . S e c r e t a r y the  f i g u r e a t $9.9 b i l l i o n ,  of Defense L a i r d put  i n 1968 p r i c e s , f o r t h e e n t i r e p e r i o d  t h r o u g h t h e y e a r 198l."^° Comparable  s a v i n g s f o r t h e S o v i e t Union  have a p p a r e n t l y n o t been estimated p u b l i c l y . I t s h o u l d be remembered t h a t t h e s e e s t i m a t e s c o m p l e t e l y n e g l e c t t h e v a s t e x p e n d i t u r e s on new o f f e n s i v e m i s s i l e s and o t h e r countermeasures which the  two s i d e s would h a v e . f e l t compelled t o deploy, had t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e ABM programs been a l l o w e d t o c o n t i n u e unabated ( s e e pp.51-52), as w e l l as t h e t e n s ( o r perhaps hundreds) of b i l l i o n s of  d o l l a r s f o r t h e " t h i c k " ABM systems which might  inevitably  131 have f o l l o w e d .  J  U t i l i t y / R e l i a b i l i t y ; Harmful S i d e - E f f e c t s The American p u b l i c might n o t have so o b j e c t e d t o t h e p r o j e c t e d c o s t s of t h e " t h i c k " ABM system had i t been c o n v i n c e d of both i t s u t i l i t y and r e l i a b i l i t y . nical  S e r i o u s doubts about t h e t e c h -  c a p a b i l i t y o f t h e system t o knock down incoming ICBM's,  i n view of t h e r e l a t i v e l y simple and i n e x p e n s i v e countermeasures  - 76 which would s u r e l y he ly  -  deployed, t o g e t h e r with the  danger of mere-  stimulating a self-defeating defensive-offensive  numbers of m i s s i l e s ( i n which the  offense  the advantage, by v i r t u e of i t s g r e a t e r  was  r a c e i n crude  assumed t o have  economy), combined, how-  ever, t o c a s t doubt t h a t such a system would a c t u a l l y f u l f i l i t s i n t e n d e d purpose and  serve t o enhance U.S.  s e c u r i t y . A somewhat  r e l a t e d f a c t o r , h a v i n g t o do w i t h the p o s s i b l e h a r m f u l e f f e c t s of the  system once deployed, was  p o s i t i o n t o a r e a - d e f e n s e ABM  embodied i n p u b l i c  on the grounds of the  might cause, t h r o u g h h i g h - a l t i t u d e n u c l e a r cities  i t was  threat  of r a d i a t i o n l e a k a g e and  "metropolitan  ABM  op-  damage i t  b u r s t s , t o the  supposed t o p r o t e c t ; as w e l l as the  f i r i n g s . There was  side-  very  ever-present  a c c i d e n t a l explosions  or  mis-  a l s o the f a c t t h a t , i n Newhouse's words, s i t e s were f e a r e d  by p e o p l e l i v i n g next door t o the  as p o t e n t i a l l i g h t n i n g rods  sites."  1^2 J  S u s c e p t i b i l i t y to V e r i f i c a t i o n V e r i f i c a t i o n d i d not pect  represent  much of a problem w i t h r e s -  t o the l i m i t a t i o n s ' o n ABM's. In t e s t i f y i n g b e f o r e a Sub-  committee of the U.S.  Sena,te F o r e i g n  Relations  Herbert' S c o v i l l e mentioned the n e c e s s i t y radars,  deploying  extensive lity ty  of ABM  of b u i l d i n g . c o m p l e x  l a r g e numbers of m i s s i l e s , and  t r a i n i n g exercises  1970,  Committee i n  as f a c t o r s e n s u r i n g  carrying the  out  susceptibi-  systems t o v e r i f i c a t i o n , as w e l l as the i m p o s s i b i l i -  of c l a n d e s t i n e l y u p g r a d i n g a n t i - a i r c r a f t m i s s i l e defenses  i n t o an ABM lity  network. He  of the U.S.  may  a l s o have been c o u n t i n g on the  t o compensate f o r any  v i o l a t i o n s once  abi-  detected,  - 77  -  as e v i d e n c e d by h i s a s s e r t i o n t h a t "Such a program would d o u b t e d l y be .detected  w i t h p l e n t y of l e a d t i m e t o  c o u n t e r measures t o p e r m i t p e n e t r a t i o n U n i t e d S t a t e s a l r e a d y has p e n e t r a t i n g an ABM  s y s t e m , and  incorporate  of .such a system.  d e v e l o p e d and  un-  The  t e s t e d MIRV's c a p a b l e of  t h e s e c o u l d be d e p l o y e d i n an  emergency much more r a p i d l y t h a n a S o v i e t ABM. 33 A l t h o u g h nl  r e s e r v a t i o n s have s i n c e been made by some c r i t i c s of t h e as t o t h e t e c h n i c a l c a p a b i l i t i e s  of v e r i f y i n g  as t h o s e on r a p i d r e - l o a d c a p a b i l i t y , t h e u p g r a d i n g of c o n v e n t i o n a l  such p r o h i b i t i o n s  l a r g e ABM-type r a d a r s ,  air-defense  governments i n v o l v e d a p p a r e n t l y  facilities -^,  doubts about  traditional  g e n c e - g a t h e r i n g a c t i v i t i e s i n d e t e c t i n g any m i l i t a r i l y c a n t programs i n v i o l a t i o n of t h e a c c o r d s .  men  intellisignifi-  Congress-  that:  ...we a r e c o n f i d e n t t h a t n a t i o n a l means of v e r i f i c a t i o n are s u f f i c i e n t t o monitor the numerical l i m i t a t i o n s of t h i s agreement. We s t u d i e d t h i s p r o b l e m i n g r e a t d e t a i l b e f o r e we e n t e r e d n e g o t i a t i o n s , and d e t e r m i n e d f o r each, c a t e g o r y of weapon t h e m a r g i n of e r r o r t h a t we t h o u g h t our c o l l e c t i o n systems had and what we c o u l d do t o r e a c t once we f o u n d out t h a t t h e r e had been a v i o l a t i o n . I n each of t h e s e c a s e s , we f o u n d t h a t t h e m a r g i n was w e l l w i t h i n t o l e r a b l e l i m i t s . I n t h i s c a s e , howe v e r , where we a r e d e a l i n g w i t h numbers, we a r e c o n f i d e n t t h a t t h e n a t i o n a l means of v e r i f i c a t i o n a r e s u f f i c i e n t t o g i v e us t h e h i g h e s t degree of c o n f i d e n c e t h a t t h i s agreement w i l l be l i v e d up t o , o r t h a t we w i l l know i t a l m o s t i m m e d i a t e l y i f i t i s n o t l i v e d up to. (135) One  the  Thus Henry K i s s i n g e r  t o t h e Agreements as a w h o l e — a s s u r e d U.S.  a t a b r i e f i n g i n J u n e , 1972,  and  the  1  e n t e r t a i n e d few  e f f e c t i v e n e s s of s a t e l l i t e s u r v e i l l a n c e and  —referring  Treaty  member of t h e Senates-Foreign R e l a t i o n s Committee, i n  - 78 exasperated response t o a p a r t i c u l a r l y b e l l i g e r e n t c r i t i c , s t a t e d t h a t " o u r p e o p l e who h a n d l e t h o s e t h i n g s c l a i m t h a t o u r p r e s e n t d e t e c t i o n system i s s u p e r i o r t o o n - s i t e  inspection." ^ 1  That was t h e c l o s e s t t h e p u b l i c ever came t o b e a r i n g  about t h e  s u b s t a n c e o f t h e Committee's c o m p l e t e l y " s a n i t i z e d " s e s s i o n w i t h t h e D i r e c t o r o f t h e C.I.A., d e a l i n g w i t h v e r i f i c a t i o n 1^7 b x l i t x e s , on June 20,1972. ' I t i s d i f f i c u l t t o q u e s t i o n J  capasuch  a s s e r t i o n s , o f c o u r s e , because o f t h e h i g h l y c l a s s i f i e d n a t u r e of t h e r e l e v a n t d a t a . However, t h e f a c t t h a t one o f t h e c h i e f obs t a c l e s t o a MIRV ban was a l l e g e d t o be t h e i n f e a s i b i l i t y o f 1 ^8 adequate v e r i f i c a t i o n  , w h i l e a p r o h i b i t i o n on s i m i l a r l y  m u l t i p l e - w a r h e a d - a r m e d ABM's was a l l o w e d  t o s l i p by v i r t u a l l y  u n n o t i c e d , would seem t o i n d i c a t e t h a t a s s u r a n c e r e s t e d , i n t h e l a t t e r c a s e , on s o m e t h i n g o t h e r t h a n f o o l p r o o f t e c h n i c a l lities. D i s t r i b u t i o n o f C a p a b i l i t i e s Among  capabi-  States  In the " s t r a t e g i c landscape" category, the only  factors  d i r e c t l y i m p i n g i n g on ABM's i n p a r t i c u l a r have t o do w i t h t h e " d i s t r i b u t i o n o f c a p a b i l i t i e s among s t a t e s . " W h i l e t h e U.S. may have h a d a c e r t a i n l e a d o v e r t h e S o v i e t U n i o n i n ABM 139 gy,  J  consonant w i t h i t s g e n e r a l  such d i s p a r i t i e s i n t h i s regard  technolo-  t e c h n o l o g i c a l s u p e r i o r i t y , any were a p p a r e n t l y  insufficient to  have c o n s t i t u t e d a s t u m b l i n g b l o c k t o agreement, as t h i s f a c t o r as a n e g a t i v e i n f l u e n c e i s nowhere mentioned i n a c c o u n t s o f t h e n e g o t i a t i n g h i s t o r y of t h e Treaty.  Both s t a t e s had a l r e a d y  un t o d e p l o y ABM's, and may be assumed t o have had  beg-  considerable  - 79 testing  experience  w i t h such, systems. In t h i s sense they might  be s a i d t o have reached  some degree of " p a r i t y . "  the l a c k of such c a p a b i l i t i e s by t h i r d - p a r t i e s ,  Furthermore, r e i n f o r c e d by  the n o n - p r o l i f e r a t i o n p r o v i s i o n s of the T r e a t y , made t h e t a s k of a c h i e v i n g agreement t h a t much e a s i e r . T h i s i s not t o say t h a t the i n c i p i e n t n u c l e a r c a p a b i l i t i e s of C h i n a , B r i t a i n , France  d i d not pose an o b s t a c l e t o s p e c i f i c ABM  restrictions  ( s u c h as a " z e r o " mode-) by l e n d i n g a c e r t a i n v a l i d i t y of both needs and  Asymmetry i n F o r c e - S t r u c t u r e and  two tect  states.  Strategy  asymmetry i n the f o r c e - s t r u c t u r e and  s i d e s ( i n t h a t the o r i g i n a l S o v i e t ABM i t s c a p i t a l r e g i o n , t h a t of the U.S.  s t r a t e g y of the  was one  intended to  pro-  of i t s ICBM  f i e l d s ) posed a problem o n l y i n s o f a r as i t was deemed n e c e s s a r y ,  ( i n terms  c a p a b i l i t i e s ) t o the arguments of "damage  l i m i t a t i o n " proponents w i t h i n the two  The  and  consequently  a p p a r e n t l y s o l e l y f o r t h e sake of symmetry,  t o a l l o w each s i d e t o b u i l d a second s y s t e m — i n  which i t had  h i t h e r t o expressed  little  o r d e r t o match  the o t h e r ' s f i r s t  one.  Disparities  or no  interest ^" —in 1  0  i n the C o s t - E f f e c t i v e n e s s of Defense and  Intimately related  t o the q u e s t i o n of " m i l i t a r y  Offense utility,"  * There remains c o n s i d e r a b l e d i f f e r e n c e of o p i n i o n over the d a m a g e - l i m i t a t i o n c a p a b i l i t i e s of the systems p e r m i t t e d under the ABM T r e a t y ( a t l e a s t w i t h i n the S o v i e t U n i o n ) , w i t h some o b s e r v e r s emphasizing t h e i r adequacy i n d e a l i n g w i t h the r e l a t i v e l y u n s o p h i s t i c a t e d and l i g h t a t t a c k s of which the l e s s e r n u c l e a r Powers a r e deemed c a p a b l e , and o t h e r s s t r e s s i n g the ease with, which they might be ( c o n t . )  - 80 t h i s " t e c h n i c a l " f a c t o r may all  have been t h e most i n s t r u m e n t a l of  i n i n d u c i n g the apparent acquiescence  o f t h e two Powers i n  mutual s e c o n d - s t r i k e c a p a b i l i t y or "assured thus  d e s t r u c t i o n , " and  ( i n d i r e c t l y ) t h e i r w i l l i n g n e s s to severely r e s t r i c t  ABM  s y s t e m s . As P a u l Warnke put i t : " t h e ABM t r e a t y . c o n s t i t u t e s realistic  r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e f a c t t h a t no p h y s i c a l d e f e n s e  any known o r f o r e s e e a b l e t e c h n o l o g y c l e a r a t t a c k of any  s i g n i f i c a n t s i z e . " ^ " These s e n t i m e n t s  nuwere  1  echoed l a t e r by S e n a t o r tee:  i s availa.ble against a  on  Cooper of t h e F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s Commit-  " I t h i n k the t r e a t y i t s e l f  i s testimony to the f a c t that 14-2  b o t h c o u n t r i e s know t h e y can e a s i l y overcome an ABM  system." ^  Former S e n a t o r  J o s e p h S . C l a r k was  dict:  Agreement i s a f r a u d because t h e m i l i t a r y  "The  ABM  a l i t t l e harsher i n h i s ver-  of b o t h c o u n t r i e s know t h a t t h e ABM work under b a t t l e  leaders  will in a l l likelihood  not  conditions. 43 n l  Domestic P o l i t i c s Of t h e p o l i t i c a l  f a c t o r s , we  s h a l l mention j u s t  a d d i t i o n t o t h o s e understood, t h r o u g h o u t t h e p r e c e d i n g  two—in discus-  s i o n , of c o u r s e — o n t h e A m e r i c a n s i d e : t h e enhanced i n t e r e s t t h e g e n e r a l p u b l i c i n t h e i s s u e due t o t h e c i v i l  defense nature  of t h e p r o p o s e d system's m i s s i o n ( a s w e l l as t o i t s l o c a l e ) ; the f a c t t h a t the only m i l i t a r y s e r v i c e w i t h a strong tic  i n t e r e s t i n ABM's was  of  and  bureaucra-  t h e Army, whereas t h e A i r F o r c e  and  ( c o n t . ) overcome, e i t h e r by s a t u r a t i o n o r t h r o u g h r e l a t i v e l y s i m p l e t e c h n i c a l c o u n t e r m e a s u r e s . I n any c a s e , a c c o r d i n g t o John Newhouse, t h e r e i s l i t t l e doubt t h a t t h e i n i t i a l S o v i e t ABM system was i n t e n d e d " t o p r o t e c t Moscow f r o m p r i m i t i v e C h i n e s e n u c l e a r weapons." (144)  - 81  -  Navy might on the c o n t r a r y have been expected t o d i s p l a y a  no-  t a b l e l a c k of enthusiasm f o r i t , i n view of the t h r e a t which deployment by the o t h e r s i d e would have posed t o the s u c c e s s f u l fulfilment may  of t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e o f f e n s i v e s t r a t e g i c m i s s i o n s .  be t r u e t h a t , as John Newhouse p o i n t s out, m i l i t a r y  It  solida-  r i t y normally  tends t o c o a l e s c e when i t comes t o the q u e s t i o n  p r o c u r i n g new  systems, the i n d i v i d u a l s e r v i c e s e x p e c t i n g mutual  support  i n t h i s r e g a r d . However, i t i s d i f f i c u l t  to avoid  of  the  presumption t h a t , when i t came t o the c r u n c h at SALT, t h i s f a c tor  may  ha.ve been i n f l u e n t i a l i n a c c o u n t i n g  of t h e J o i n t C h i e f s of S t a f f i n the  f o r the  acquiescence  restrictions.  On the S o v i e t s i d e , where s t r a t e g i c defense has a l l y been a h i g h p r i o r i t y  item, i t was  an e n t i r e l y  tradition-  different  s t o r y . There the p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s h i p showed c o n s i d e r a b l y more s t r e n g t h i n o v e r r i d i n g the g e n e r a l p r e d i s p o s i t i o n s of m i l i t a r y establishment, ry  ^  J  although  again, i n t e r - s e r v i c e r i v a l -  ( c e r t a i n l y , the competing demands of the  f o r c e s ) ^ may 1  III.  their  general-purpose  have p l a y e d a r o l e of some k i n d .  OFFENSIVE MISSILES. Considerably  l e s s comprehensive i n scope, though by  means l e s s complex, was  no  the second of the agreements produced  by  SALT I , the " I n t e r i m Agreement...on C e r t a i n Measures With Resp e c t t o the L i m i t a t i o n of S t r a t e g i c O f f e n s i v e Arms." T h i s a f f e c t e d b o t h the ICBM and  accord  SLBM components of the s t r a t e g i c  f e n s i v e f o r c e of each s i d e , but not t h e i r hea.vy bombers, MRBM's, or forward-based systems; and was  IR/  even more n o t a b l y  of-  - 82 deficient  -  i n q u a l i t a t i v e , as opposed t o q u a n t i t a t i v e , r e s t r i c -  t i o n s upon the o f f e n s i v e arms r a c e . What i t d i d p r o v i d e f o r  was,  e s s e n t i a l l y , n o t h i n g more than a f r e e z e on m i s s i l e l a u n c h e r s  and  b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e submarines (SSBN's) at the number then d e p l o y ed or under c o n s t r u c t i o n ( A r t s . I and  I I I ) , that i s , at  1,054  ICBM's, 710  SLBM's, and  44  submarines f o r the U.S.;  ICBM s, 950  SLBM's, and  62  submarines f o r the S o v i e t Union  f  t o c o l t o the I n t e r i m Agreement). were p r o h i b i t e d from c o n v e r t i n g "heavier"  ones ( A r t . I I )  In a d d i t i o n , the two  1,618 (Pro-  sides  e x i s t i n g " l i g h t " ICBM's i n t o  , or " s i g n i f i c a n t l y " i n c r e a s i n g (by X  more than 10-15  and  H  p e r c e n t ) the s i z e of t h e i r s i l o s  date such " h e a v i e r " m i s s i l e s ) . T h i s had  the  effect  *K  ( t o accommoof f r e e z i n g  the number of "heavy" m i s s i l e s , which o n l y the S o v i e t s possessed,, at 3 1 3 . c h i e f  defect  of the Agreement l a y i n i t s f a i l u r e  t o p r o h i b i t the MIRVing of i n d i v i d u a l m i s s i l e s , by which  process  the number of n u c l e a r warheads i n each a r s e n a l c o u l d be m u l t i p l i e d many t i m e s ,  as w e l l as improvements i n  accuracy.  E f f e c t Upon S t r a t e g i c S t a b i l i t y The  prime reasons f o r r e s t r i c t i n g o f f e n s i v e n u c l e a r m i s -  s i l e s were the  same as those f o r c o n t r o l l i n g n u c l e a r weapons  * The o n l y s p e c i f i c numbers mentioned i n the Agreement appeared i n i t s P r o t o c o l and a p p l i e d t o SLBM's and m i s s i l e submarines. T h i s was because the S o v i e t Union r e f u s e d t o p u b l i c l y v e r i f y the number of i t s ICBM's i n comparison w i t h U.S. intelligence estimates. (148) ** The p r e c i s e p h r a s i n g of the r e s t r i c t i o n , as understood by the U.S., was a m a s t e r p i e c e of gobbledegook. A c c o r d i n g t o t h e i r u n i l a t e r a l statement of May 26, 1972, appended t o the Agreement, "The U n i t e d S t a t e s would c o n s i d e r any ICBM h a v i n g a volume s i g n i f i c a n t l y g r e a t e r than t h a t of ( c o n t . )  -  g e n e r a l l y : the suffered  8 3  -  hope of r e d u c i n g the  i n the  a latent factor  event of war i n the  destruction  (though, t h i s may  case of SALT); and  a c o s t l y and  p o t e n t i a l l y d e s t a b i l i z i n g new  was  would i n e v i t a b l y f o l l o w ,  believed  reaction  c y c l e , the  o t h e r . The  in a familiar  "heavy" S o v i e t SS-9  f o r the  s t a b i l i t y , and  b r a n c h of the  Minuteman l a n d - b a s e d vulnerability—in  SLBM's—posed a t h r e a t  b e l i e v e d — o r purportedly  doubts as t o the  to  believed—in  s u r v i v a b i l i t y of even j u s t  existing "strategic  t r i a d " would be  however, and  the  one  s u f f i c i e n t to expression  c a p a b i l i t y " came t o be used synonymously w i t h  counter-ICBM c a p a b i l i t y . SLBM's were t r e a t e d i n d u l g e n c e (except i n s o f a r  1  0  to a i r ba,ses  because t h e i r s m a l l e r  reduced a c c u r a c y (at l e a s t f o r the  n e n t l y u n s u i t a b l e as  w i t h much g r e a t e r  as they posed a t h r e a t  or command-and-control n e t w o r k s ) ^ and  pay-  s h o u l d perhaps alone have been s u f f i c i e n t r e a s o n  cause d e s t a b i l i z i n g c o n d i t i o n s , "first-strike  to t h e i r own  of bombers and  side  m i s s i l e , whose l a r g e  l a t t e r , t h e i r inherent  them. I t was  that  of one  action-  in-  comparison with t h a t  U.S.  arms r a c e which i t  Americans, i n p a r t i c u l a r , were w o r r i e d about the  ICBM's."'"^^ As  the  attempt to a/vert  the  c a p a c i t y made i t a t h r e a t  to p r o h i b i t  have been more of  the  threatened s u p e r i o r i t y  be  over  t r o d u c t i o n of the load  which would  p r e s e n t ) made them  -151* c o u n t e r f o r c e weapons.  A l s o on  size emi-  the  ( c o n t . ) the l a r g e s t l i g h t ICBM now o p e r a t i o n a l on e i t h e r s i d e t o be a heavy ICBM." N e i t h e r " s i g n i f i c a n t l y . . . g r e a t e r " nor " l i g h t ICBM" were anywhere d e f i n e d , however! *** I n i t i a l e d Statement "H" and Common U n d e r s t a n d i n g "A" of the "Agreed Interpretations." * In NewhouseJs words: "A s t a b l e s t r a t e g i c weapon s h o u l d be c a p a b l e of d e l a y e d response; i t s h o u l d be i n v u l n e r a b l e ; and i t s h o u l d be unambiguously d e p r i v e d of what i s c a l l e d a. f i r s t s t r i k e , or d a m a g e - l i m i t i n g , c a p a b i l i t y . Put differently,(cont.)  agenda were such developments as MIRV's, which, once a  suffi-  c i e n t l y h i g h a c c u r a c y were a c h i e v e d , would a l s o c o n s t i t u t e a t h r e a t t o the f i x e d land-based b i l e land-based  d e t e r r e n t of each s i d e ; and  mo-  ICBM's, c h a r a c t e r i z e d as d e s t a b i l i z i n g because 152  of the d i f f i c u l t y bilities  of v e r i f y i n g t h e i r numbers  and hence capa-  ( i n terms of f i r s t - s t r i k e p o t e n t i a l ) . As we have  however, c e r t a i n of these items land-based The  J  m i s s i l e s ) escaped  answer why  may  ( n o t a b l y MIRV's and  seen,  mobile  l i m i t a t i o n , while others d i d not.  l i e p a r t l y i n the r e l a t i v e c a p a b i l i t i e s  the two  s t a t e s , as w e l l as i n the n a t u r e  reached  in toto.  of  of the agreements  S u s c e p t i b i l i t y to V e r i f i c a t i o n With, r e s p e c t t o v e r i f i c a t i o n , Yie have a l r e a d y n o t e d  how  sheer numbers of m i s s i l e s were deemed h i g h l y s u s c e p t i b l e t o the " n a t i o n a l t e c h n i c a l means of v e r i f i c a t i o n " ( i . e . , p r i m a r i l y t e l l i t e and a e r i a l r e c o n n a i s s a n c e )  p r o v i d e d f o r i n the SALT  agreements. In t h i s c o n n e c t i o n i t might be mentioned t h a t the ABM  T r e a t y and  sa-  both  I n t e r i m Agreement p r o h i b i t e d the P a r t i e s from  " i n t e r f e r i n g " w i t h such v e r i f i c a t i o n a c t i v i t i e s or u s i n g  "deli-  b e r a t e concealment measures" t o reduce t h e i r e f f e c t i v e n e s s ( A r t . X I I of the ABM  T r e a t y ; A r t . V of the I n t e r i m Agreement). C o n s i -  d e r a b l y l e s s c e r t a i n , however, was  the c a p a . b i l i t y of the  Par-  t i e s t o u n i l a t e r a l l y d e t e c t q u a l i t a t i v e developments i n o f f e n s i v e m i s s i l e weaponry. With, r e g a r d t o MIRV's, f o r example, i t ( c o n t . ) i t s h o u l d not be a b l e t o disarm some p o r t i o n of the o t h e r s i d e ' s f o r c e s , or d i m i n i s h them a p p r e c i a b l y . " (153) P r e sent-day SLBM's f i t a l l of these c r i t e r i a . '  - 85 was to  -  suggested t h a t even o n - s i t e i n s p e c t i o n might be v e r i f y a ban,  away and  as m u l t i p l e warheads c o u l d be  then f i t t e d  inadequate  s e c r e t l y stored  on t h e i r l a u n c h v e h i c l e s at a moment's  no-  "154tice.  V e r i f i c a t i o n of such weapons b e i n g t h u s i n f e a s i b l e a t  the p r o d u c t i o n  or deployment s t a g e s , the o n l y hope l a y i n con-  t r o l l i n g them d u r i n g t h e i r t e s t i n g phase, b e f o r e they had c e r t i f i e d s u f f i c i e n t l y r e l i a b l e and Once such time had  been  a c c u r a t e f o r deployment.  passed (as i t had,  f o r the Americans at  by the time of the I n t e r i m Agreement), the Powers would no ger be a b l e t o depend on the t e c h n i c a l f e a s i b i l i t y a ban.  lon-  of v e r i f y i n g  V e r i f i c a t i o n of a mobile l a n d - b a s e d m i s s i l e p r o h i b i t i o n  was  a f a r s i m p l e r m a t t e r , i t b e i n g n o t e d t h a t d e t e c t i o n of  one  s u c h weapon i n the f i e l d would c o n s t i t u t e p r o o f  tion.  least,  just  of v i o l a -  1 5 5  Politico-Military The  Utility  unquestioned m i l i t a r y u t i l i t y  of MIRV's r e p r e s e n t e d  a  f u r t h e r o b s t a c l e t o agreement on t h e i r p r o h i b i t i o n ; a more c o s t e f f e c t i v e means of d e l i v e r i n g n u c l e a r weapons c o u l d s c a r c e l y be 156 devised. kill  J  Still,  one might, argue, the e x i s t i n g degree of  embodied i n the n u c l e a r a r s e n a l s of each, s i d e makes the  added d e s t r u c t i v e power i n h e r e n t i n MIRV's q u i t e  superfluous,  e s p e c i a l l y c o n s i d e r i n g t h a t the t h r e a t which they were ly  over-  designed  original-  t o c o u n t e r — A B M s y s t e m s — h a s been e l i m i n a t e d  by  mutual agreement. Such r e a s o n i n g seems q u i x o t i c i n the f a c e * John Newhouse p o i n t s out t h a t MIRVing Minuteman i s not only unnecessary, but may p o s s i b l y prove p o s i t i v e l y h a r m f u l : " t h e r e seems l i t t l e sense i n spending $6 b i l l i o n t o modify a ( c o n t . )  - 86 of the  sheer dynamism of m i l i t a r y t e c h n o l o g y and  counterforce  r o l e , however.  their possible  7  D i s t r i b u t i o n of C a p a b i l i t i e s Among S t a t e s In terms of the d i s t r i b u t i o n of c a p a b i l i t i e s , approximate p a r i t y i n o v e r a l l o f f e n s i v e s t r e n g t h may in  be  e f f e c t a t the time of SALT s i n c e , as we  s a i d t o have been have p r e v i o u s l y n o t e d ,  a l t h o u g h the S o v i e t s m a i n t a i n e d s u p e r i o r i t y i n numbers of m i s s i l e s and  "throw-weight," the Americans had  numbers of warheads and general U.S.  was  not a t a c o n s i d e r a b l e  but, more i m p o r t a n t l y , l o n g h a u l , was  as  t o say t h a t  disadvantage i n not h a v i n g  the an  m i s s i l e c o n s t r u c t i o n , as d i d the S o v i e t s t h e i r p o t e n t i a l c a p a b i l i t y , over the  at l e a s t the match of the l a t t e r — a n d i t i s not  completely  r e a l i z e d t h i s and U.S.  " e q u i v a l e n t megatonnage," as w e l l  t e c h n o l o g i c a l s u p e r i o r i t y . T h i s i s not  on-going program of new  being  a c l e a r e r margin i n  naive  t o suggest t h a t the S o v i e t s may  acted accordingly.  t e c h n o l o g i c a l l e a d may  have  As f o r MIRV's, the wide  have indeed  constituted a  stumbling  b l o c k , w i t h the Americans u n w i l l i n g t o r e l i n q u i s h i t and S o v i e t s at l e a s t  the  e q u a l l y as averse t o b e i n g f r o z e n i n t o a p o s i -  t i o n of permanent i n f e r i o r i t y .  The  r e s u l t was  t h a t the  U.S.,  ( c o n t . ) weapons system t h a t one day w i l l be v u l n e r a b l e , hence u n s t a b l e . Indeed, i f Minuteman i s v u l n e r a b l e , p u t t i n g MIRV's on more than h a l f of them s h o u l d only i n c r e a s e any t e m p t a t i o n Moscow would have t o e l i m i n a t e the f o r c e i n a c r i s i s s i t u a t i o n . In s h o r t , the MIRV's merely i n c r e a s e the 'bonus' the a d v e r s a r y gets by s t r i k i n g f i r s t . " (158) * As Henry K i s s i n g e r put i t , with r e f e r e n c e t o SLBM's, "The U n i t e d S t a t e s was i n a r a t h e r complex p o s i t i o n t o recommend a submarine d e a l s i n c e we are not b u i l d i n g any and the S o v i e t s were b u i l d i n g e i g h t or n i n e a y e a r , which i s n ' t the most b r i l l i a n t b a r g a i n i n g p o s i t i o n - I would recommend p e o p l e t o (cont.)  ,  - 87 w h i l e p r o p o s i n g a ban on MIRV's, a t t a c h e d t h e c l e a r l y  unaccep-  t a b l e (and under t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , t e c h n i c a l l y p o i n t l e s s ) p r o v i s o of o n - s i t e i n s p e c t i o n ; and t h e S o v i e t s responded  by  sugges-  t i n g a c o m p l e t e l y u n v e r i f i a b l e (and hence, from t h e American 1 5 9  p e r s p e c t i v e a t l e a s t , e q u a l l y u n a c c e p t a b l e ) p r o d u c t i o n ban. C l e a r l y , n e i t h e r s i d e was v e r y i n t e r e s t e d i n l i m i t i n g MIRV's a t t h i s stage of t h e game. N e i t h e r s i d e had a p p a r e n t l y y e t deployed a l a n d - m o b i l e 1 f\C\  ICBM system problem,  , so d i s p a r i t i e s i n t h i s case posed no p a r t i c u l a r  except t h a t , g i v e n t h e USSR's g e o - s t r a t e g i c p o s i t i o n as  a p r e d o m i n a n t l y l a n d - b a s e d Power, such m i s s i l e s would be of greater benefit T h i s might  or u t i l i t y t o them than t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s .  account f o r t h e g r e a t r e l u c t a n c e they d i s p l a y e d a t  SALT even t o d i s c u s s such r e s t r i c t i o n s .  I t may a l s o p a r t l y  e x p l a i n why i t was found i m p o s s i b l e t o s i n g l e out l a n d - b a s e d ICBM's as p r o m i s i n g c a n d i d a t e s f o r t o t a l p r o h i b i t i o n 162 t h e i r inherent v u l n e r a b i l i t y ) .  ( i n view of  But such c o n s i d e r a t i o n s b e l o n g  more i n t h e c a t e g o r y of asymmetrical  e f f e c t s upon t h e i n t e r e s t s  of t h e two s i d e s of t h e p a r t i c u l a r arms c o n t r o l system  i n ques-  t i o n ( t o be examined s h o r t l y ) . Domestic P o l i t i c s Of p o l i t i c a l f a c t o r s , we might merely what we s a i d w i t h r e g a r d t o ABM's. F i r s t  s t a t e t h e converse of  ( i n the United States  ( c o n t . ) f i n d themselves i n . " (I63) As Newhouse p u t s i t : "the honors i n an open r a c e f o r s t r a t e g i c advantage s h o u l d go t o t h e f a s t e s t h o r s e on t e c h n o l o g y ' s t r a c k — t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . Nobody knows t h a t b e t t e r than ( c o n t . )  - 88 at  least),  field  interest  was  of o f f e n s i v e m i s s i l e s ,  customed nor  public  to l i v i n g  as u b i q u i t o u s  which  A g r e e m e n t was  NATURE OF two  of c e i l i n g s  THE  isolation  sible  f o l l o w - o n a g r e e m e n t s ) . They  the for  package,  Interim example, rather  each o t h e r ( n o r , f o r t h a t m a t t e r , from were, a f t e r  involving trade-offs  across  ies,  such as  left  t h e " n a t u r e o f t h e arms c o n t r o l the  involving,  factors to-  than  them.  ting  until  These  within  r e a c h e d a t SALT I c a n n o t be v i e w e d  total  same t o t a l  two  SALT I AGREEMENTS.  agreements from  of  of  t h e A i r F o r c e , whose com-  i n ensuring that  on  and  the question  i n t h e number o f e x i s t i n g m i s s i l e s  mere i m p o s i t i o n  The  a part  have been;  i r r e s i s t i b l e j. a t l e a s t  n o t more c o m p r e h e n s i v e ,  reductions  I V . THE  quite  "visible"  of the i n t e r e s t s  e s t a b l i s h m e n t s of both s t a t e s .  gether undoubtedly played  the  would  expensive. Second,  t h e Navy a n d  b i n e d w e i g h t must h a v e b e e n  actual  systems  drove t o the h e a r t  very powerful services,  military  a r e n e i t h e r as h i g h l y  a s m a s s i v e ABM  are considerably l e s s  so a r o u s e d i n t h e  w h i c h p e o p l e ha.ve l o n g become a c -  with; which  offensive missiles  the  not n e a r l y  individual  a l l , a part  of various kinds  t y p e s o f weapons a n d  posof the cut-  even b r o a d c a t e g o r -  " d e f e n s i v e " a n d " o f f e n s i v e . " That system"  in  i s why  we  category of  have factors  end.  ( c o n t . ) t h e s o l d i e r s and d i p l o m a t s o f t h e S o v i e t U n i o n . " (I64) * * * F o r a p a r t i c u l a r l y i l l u m i n a t i n g d i s c u s s i o n , s e e Newhouse (1973), e s p e c i a l l y p p . 179-184.  - 89 Type  o f R e s t r a i n t s Imposed  To  begin  with,  of r e s t r a i n t s or  on-going  ces; and  -  have p r e v i o u s l y emphasized, the  i m p o s e d were i n t h e n a t u r e  deployments, r a t h e r than  as w e l l a s , mobile  a s we  i n certain  land-based  cases  of c e i l i n g s  actual  ( s u c h as  ABM's), what m i g h t  be  termed  was  l o n g on  although  did  embody c e r t a i n  those  on t h e  mainly  size  merely  important and  qualitative  "preventative  I n t e r i m Agreement t h e ABM  restrictions  power of r a d a r s ) . B o t h a c c o r d s  to sanctify  the  s t a t u s quo,  for-  sea-, a i r - , space-,  the  quality,  existing  reductions i n  m e a s u r e s o f non-armament." I n a d d i t i o n , q u a n t i t y , s h o r t on  on  type  at l e a s t  Treaty  (such  as  served  as f a r as  165 n u m b e r s were c o n c e r n e d , more e x p l i c i t , ter  case,  in this  s e r v i n g as  I n t e r i m Agreement b e i n g r a t h e r  regard, than  on t h e A m e r i c a n  a p p r o p r i a t i o n s had its  the  been  side,  t h e ABM  T r e a t y . In the  a system f o r which  justified  primarily  on t h e  a b a r g a i n i n g - c h i p i n SALT,  was  c o n t i n u e , t h o u g h perha.ps t r u n c a t e d ( t o what d e p e n d i n g on how funded one  — i n  hostile  s y s t e m was  sites—if  Congress).  legitimized;  d e p l o y m e n t s t h e S o v i e t s may  p e r m i t t e d , as the American  fense; even  a basically  e x i s t i n g ABM  further was  by  many a d d i t i o n a l  case,  an NCA  i n t h e S o v i e t one,  expressed  f o r t u n a t e form  interest of  "mutual  the  allowed  other  of  to  at  a l l —  have  been  side,  planned.  Ea.ch s i d e  additional  site  ( N a t i o n a l Command A u t h o r i t y ) ABM—in  w h i c h i t had  to the n e g o t i a t i o n s . A t r u l y  education,"  the  i t i s u n c l e a r what  b o n u s , an  a hard-point  prior  grounds  any—would  have had  a k i n d of perverse  Congressional  extent—if  On  lat-  i t m i g h t be  surmised,  denot unfrom  - 90  -  t h e arms c o n t r o l p o i n t of v i e w I W i t h r e g a r d t o o f f e n s i v e m i s s i l e s , i t i s t r u e t h a t an p a r e n t l y dynamic S o v i e t program wa,s s e e m i n g l y a r b i t r a r y f i g u r e of 2,358.  s u c c e s s f u l l y h a l t e d at However, U.S.  apthe  Administra-  t i o n c l a i m s of h a v i n g f o r e s t a l l e d f u t u r e S o v i e t deployments of i 67** a t l e a s t 3,200 m i s s i l e s a r e p r o b a b l y e x a g g e r a t e d , as some 168 c r i t i c s contend.  They p o i n t out t h a t t h e S o v i e t momentum had  s l o w e d down c o n s i d e r a b l y by t h e t i m e of t h e SALT I s i g n a t u r e s , f r o m a p r e v i o u s a v e r a g e r a t e of about 250 new 169 SLBM's p e r y e a r .  J  ICBM's and 128  As one w i t n e s s t o l d t h e U.S.  new  Senate F o r e i g n  R e l a t i o n s Committee, " I t i s n o t t e c h n i c a l l y i m p o s s i b l e f o r them t o b u i l d a t t h e r a t e of 200 ICBMs p e r y e a r , but i n f a c t t h e r e have been no new and  s t a r t s on ICBM l a u n c h e r s f o r about n i n e months,  i n t h e p r e c e d i n g y e a r t h e r e were o n l y 80 l a u n c h e r s  construc-  1 7 0  t e d o r begun." As f o r "heavy" m i s s i l e s , " i n f a c t t h e S o v i e t s had o n l y s t a r t e d 25 new l a r g e ICBM l a u n c h e r s s i n c e A u g u s t , _ 1 7 1 * * * . , 1969." ' C e r t a i n l y , t h e r e i s no r e a s o n t o b e l i e v e t h a t S o v i e t deployments would n e c e s s a r i l y ha.ve c o n t i n u e d a t t h e p r e v i o u s * A l t h o u g h t h e S o v i e t s a r e a l l o w e d up t o 1,618 ICBM's and 950 SLBM's (making a t o t a l of 2,568 m i s s i l e s i n a l l ) , i n c r e m e n t s i n SLBM s t r e n g t h above t h e t h e n - c u r r e n t l e v e l ( d e p l o y e d or u n d e r c o n s t r u c t i o n ) of about 740 m i s s i l e s were r e q u i r e d t o be o f f s e t by t h e r e t i r e m e n t of o l d e r ICBM's o r SLBM's ( A r t . I l l and t h e P r o t o c o l t o t h e I n t e r i m A g r e e m e n t ) , making an a d j u s t e d t o t a l of 2,358 p e r m i t t e d . J u s t a n o t h e r example of t h e sometimes B y z a n t i n e s t r u c t u r e of t h e Agreements! ** I n h i s p r e s s c o n f e r e n c e of June 29, 1972, President Nixon m e n t i o n e d p o s s i b l e t o t a l s of 90 m i s s i l e - f i r i n g submarines and 2,600 l a n d - b a s e d ICBM's. (172) He a l s o a l l u d e d t o S o v i e t " p l a n s " f o r 1,000 ABM's w i t h i n f i v e y e a r s . *** A c c o r d i n g t o W a l t e r Clemens, "some members of t h e U.S. neg o t i a t i n g team b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e K r e m l i n s i m p l y a g r e e d t o c e i l i n g s which already represented i t s u l t i m a t e t a r g e t s . " (173) George W.Rathjens e x p r e s s e d s i m i l a r s e n t i m e n t s (cont.)  - 91  -  h i g h r a t e f o r the f u l l f i v e y e a r s covered by the Agreement, a l though i t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t cut-backs of  d u r i n g the l a t t e r  stages  SALT were prompted a t l e a s t i n p a r t by the p r o s p e c t s of a  s u c c e s s f u l c o n c l u s i o n t o the n e g o t i a t i o n s . These o b s e r v a t i o n s a r e n o t a t a l l meant t o d e t r a c t from the h i s t o r i c or  importance  g e n e r a l s i g n i f i c a n c e of the SALT I agreements, but r a t h e r  merely  t o i l l u s t r a t e f u r t h e r why  i t may  have been p o s s i b l e t o  r e a c h agreement on them and not on more comprehensive measures. Nature of the V e r i f i c a t i o n and Enforcement P r o v i s i o n s With r e g a r d t o the n a t u r e of the v e r i f i c a t i o n p r o v i s i o n s , i t may  be mentioned t h a t the S o v i e t Union,  s t e a d f a s t l y r e f u s e d t o permit any 1 74. t i e s or t e r r i t o r y . lite  1  true to t r a d i t i o n ,  o n - s i t e i n s p e c t i o n of f a c i l i -  ^ H a p p i l y , however, " n o n - i n t r u s i v e " s a t e l -  r e c o n n a i s s a n c e and  other u n i l a t e r a l " n a t i o n a l  technical  means" were deemed by both P a r t i e s as adequate f o r the  purposes  of v e r i f y i n g f u l f i l m e n t  of the SALT I o b l i g a t i o n s . The  formal  "enforcement p r o c e d u r e "  of the Agreements remained s k e l e t a l  vague ( t h e r e b y p r o b a b l y enhancing t i n g of the e s t a b l i s h m e n t (nevertheless a " f i r s t "  and  their acceptability), consis-  of a S t a n d i n g C o n s u l t a t i v e Commission  i n Soviet-American  strategic  relations)  empowered t o " c o n s i d e r q u e s t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g compliance o b l i g a t i o n s assumed and r e l a t e d s i t u a t i o n s which may dered ambiguous," and so o n . ( A r t . X I I I of the ABM  be  with  the  consi-  Treaty; Art.VI  ( c o n t . ) b e f o r e the Senate F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s Committee: " I t would not be s u r p r i s i n g i f those i n the K r e m l i n defend the agreement on grounds almost i d e n t i c a l t o those used h e r e , i . e . t h a t i t w i l l not p r e v e n t t h e i r d o i n g a n y t h i n g t h a t would be done i n i t s absence." (175)  - 92 of t h e I n t e r i m Agreement) As h a s become c u s t o m a r y , t h e r i g h t o f each P a r t y t o w i t h d r a w f r o m e i t h e r a c c o r d  " i f i t decides  that  e x t r a o r d i n a r y e v e n t s . . . h a v e j e o p a r d i z e d i t s supreme i n t e r e s t s " was r e c o g n i z e d , s u b j e c t t o s i x months' n o t i c e ( A r t . X V  of t h e  ABM T r e a t y ; A r t . V I I I of t h e I n t e r i m A g r e e m e n t ) . E f f e c t Upon R e l a t i v e C a p a b i l i t i e s and S e c u r i t y I n t e r e s t s F i n a l l y , we come t o t h e f a c t o r w h i c h , i n t h e h e a t o f t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s t h e m s e l v e s , may w e l l have p l a y e d t h e most t i a l r o l e of a l l :  influen-  t h e p e r c e i v e d e f f e c t of t h e c o n t r o l system  upon t h e r e l a t i v e c a p a b i l i t i e s and s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t s o f t h e P a r t i e s ; o r t h e a t t e m p t e d a t t e n u a t i o n of u n i l a t e r a l a d v a n t a g e . Among a " C a t a l o g u e o f O b j e c t i v e s and P r i n c i p l e s " on s t r a t e g i c arms l i m i t a t i o n dra.wn up by t h e U.S. and approved by t h e S o v i e t U n i o n i n J a n u a r y 1969 was t h e maxim t h a t "The l i m i t a t i o n and r e d u c t i o n i n s t r a t e g i c armaments s h o u l d be so b a l a n c e d  that neither  s i d e c o u l d o b t a i n any m i l i t a r y advantage and t h a t s e c u r i t y s h o u l d be a s s u r e d  e q u a l l y f o r both, s i d e s . V i e w e d  i n t h i s l i g h t , and  beca.use of t h e e s s e n t i a l asymmetries i n f o r c e - s t r u c t u r e and s t r a t e g i e s o f t h e two s i d e s , t h e n e g o t i a t i n g p r o c e s s becomes one o f c o n t i n u a l t r a d e - o f f s o r " b a l a n c i n g " among r e s t r i c t i o n s ,  designed  so as t o a v o i d b e n e f i t t i n g one s i d e d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y more t h a n the  other. Some a n a l y s t s have drawn up t a b l e s p u r p o r t i n g t o show t h e  r e l a t i v e a d v a n t a g e s and d i s a d v a n t a g e s  t o each P a r t y ,  together  w i t h t h e m u t u a l a d v a n t a g e s ( i t b e i n g assumed t h a t t h e r e a r e no s i g n i f i c a n t mutual disadvantages),  o f t h e SALT I agreements.  -  The  93  -  proponents of the l a t t e r , n a t u r a l l y enough, tend t o  p l a y a b i a s towards the mutual or middle p a r t of the  dis-  spectrum;  t h e i r d e t r a c t o r s , on the American s i d e , emphasize the a l l e g e d l y overwhelming advantages they a c c o r d t o the S o v i e t s . The view i s r e p r e s e n t e d  by S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e Rogers, who  first  told  the  Senate F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s Committee: "In m a t t e r s i n v o l v i n g the c e n t r a l s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t s of two  g r e a t powers, any  t i o n agreement must r e s p o n d t o each, s i d e ' s i n t e r e s t  arms l i m i t a or i t w i l l  not l a s t v e r y l o n g . Both s i d e s must g a i n from SALT or n e i t h e r 177 does."  The  second view i s perhaps b e s t  e x e m p l i f i e d by  one  P h y l l i s S c h l a f l y , r e p r e s e n t i n g the " N a t i o n a l A s s o c i a t i o n of America," who pact  maintained  b e f o r e the Committee t h a t " T h i s  i s the most dangerous, disadvantageous and  the U n i t e d S t a t e s has degrading  agreement has  by a. n a t i o n which was war."  ever s i g n e d . No  devious  Pro  SAL document  more unequal, cra/ven  and  ever been s i g n e d by any n a t i o n , except  defeated  i n war  or about t o be d e f e a t e d  in  1 7 8  We  have a l r e a d y examined and  r e j e c t e d the c o n t e n t i o n , i n  our d i s c u s s i o n of the " p a r i t y " concept, t h a t the m a r g i n a l i o r i t y i n numbers of m i s s i l e s granted  super-  the S o v i e t s c o n s t i t u t e s a  s i g n i f i c a n t advantage f o r them. I t might be n o t e d i n t h i s  regard  t h a t , with, r e s p e c t t o submarines and SLBM's i n p a r t i c u l a r , Soviet numerical  l e a d was  explicitly  g r a p h i c a l advantages of the U.S. allowed  the l a t t e r t o m a i n t a i n  s t a t i o n at any  one  intended  t o o f f s e t the  which otherwise  would have  a g r e a t e r number of boats  time r e g a r d l e s s of p a r i t y i n o v e r a l l  on  the geo-  - 94  -  numbers. As D r . K i s s i n g e r t o l d U.S.  Congressmen  on June 15, 1972,  "because of t h e d i f f e r e n c e i n geography and b a s i n g , i t has been estimated  t h a t t h e S o v i e t U n i o n r e q u i r e s t h r e e submarines f o r  two of o u r s t o be a b l e t o keep an e q u a l number on  station."  1 7  ^  But t h e p r i n c i p a l " t r a d e - o f f " of SALT I was between d e f e n s i v e s t r a t e g i c weapons (ABM's), t h e p r o h i b i t i o n of w h i c h was apparently  of g r e a t e r c o n c e r n t o t h e S o v i e t s t h a n t o t h e A m e r i -  c a n s ; and o f f e n s i v e s t r a t e g i c m i s s i l e s , where t h e s i t u a t i o n  was  r e v e r s e d . Throughout t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s t h e A m e r i c a n s i d e made i t c l e a r t h a t i t would be w i l l i n g t o r e s t r i c t t h e f o r m e r o n l y i f t h e S o v i e t s a g r e e d t o some k i n d of l i m i t a t i o n s as w e l l upon t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e o f f e n s i v e a r s e n a l s , and p a r t i c u l a r l y upon "heavy" ( i C B M - k i l l i n g ) m i s s i l e s . The end r e s u l t was t h e s i m u l t a neous s i g n i n g of two agreements, w i t h more comprehensive r e s t r i c t i o n s upon o f f e n s i v e m i s s i l e s t o f o l l o w . The i n j u n c t i o n t o ext e n d t h e scope of t h e I n t e r i m Agreement,  implied i n i t s very  name, was embodied t h r o u g h o u t t h e a c c o r d s , f r o m t h e preambles of b o t h t h e ABM T r e a t y and I n t e r i m Agreement, w h i c h a v e r r e d  that  "the l i m i t a t i o n of a n t i - b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s y s t e m s , as w e l l as c e r t a i n a g r e e d measures w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e l i m i t a t i o n of s t r a t e g i c o f f e n s i v e arms, would c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e c r e a t i o n of more f a v o r a b l e c o n d i t i o n s f o r f u r t h e r n e g o t i a t i o n s on l i m i t i n g  stra-  t e g i c arms;" t h r o u g h A r t i c l e X I of t h e ABM T r e a t y , by w h i c h P a r t i e s undertake t o continue  "The  active negotiations f o r limitations  on s t r a t e g i c o f f e n s i v e arms;" t o A r t i c l e V I I of t h e I n t e r i m Agreement, w h i c h added t h a t "The o b l i g a t i o n s p r o v i d e d f o r i n t h i s . . . A g r e e m e n t s h a l l n o t p r e j u d i c e t h e scope o r terms of t h e  -95  foe  l i m i t a t i o n s on s t r a t e g i c o f f e n s i v e arms which may i n the  course of f u r t h e r n e g o t i a t i o n s , " and  same Agreement which f l a t l y d e c l a r e d :  aim  A r t i c l e VIII  " I t i s the  the P a r t i e s t o conduct a c t i v e f o l l o w - o n  worked of  objective  negotiations  out the of  with, the  of c o n c l u d i n g £ more complete measures l i m i t i n g s t r a t e g i c  o f f e n s i v e arms\...as soon as p o s s i b l e . " I t was  perhaps most  dra-  m a t i c a l l y e v i d e n c e d , however, by a u n i l a t e r a l statement of  U.S.  Ambassador Gerard C.Smith, appended t o the Agreements, t h a t "The  U.S.  Delegation  negotiations  should  b e l i e v e s t h a t an  o b j e c t i v e of the  be t o c o n s t r a i n and  follow-on  reduce on a l o n g - t e r m  b a s i s t h r e a t s t o the s u r v i v a b i l i t y of our r e s p e c t i v e s t r a t e g i c r e t a l i a t o r y f o r c e s . . . . I f an agreement p r o v i d i n g f o r more comp l e t e s t r a t e g i c o f f e n s i v e arms l i m i t a t i o n s were not w i t h i n f i v e y e a r s , U.S.  supreme i n t e r e s t s c o u l d be  achieved jeopardized.  Should t h a t o c c u r , i t would c o n s t i t u t e a b a s i s f o r withdrawal from the ABM States  Treaty."  ( U n i l a t e r a l Statement "A"  of the  Delegation)  I t was  l a r g e l y a t t e n t i o n t o the p o s s i b i l i t y  which l a y behind the demand i n the U.S., MIRV's, and  first,  of t r a d e - o f f s f o r ABM's and  t h e n , f o l l o w i n g the c l o s e of SALT I , f o r the  r a t e d development of a number of new ULMS/Trident, and  Washington not  Administration  claimed  proceeded w i t h i t s "Safeguard" ABM  would not have been a b l e t o garner whatever S o v i e t did—although  * See,  exchange between S e c r e t a r y  as  i n the  that  had  program, i t concessions  such a l l e g a t i o n s cannot be proven, of  for_j3xa,mple, the  accele-  s t r a t e g i c systems (such  the B - l bomber) as " b a r g a i n i n g - c h i p s "  n e g o t i a t i o n s . Many i n the U.S.  it  United  course.  L a i r d ^cont.)  - 96 More i m p o r t a n t l y , however, t h a t such r e a s o n i n g can i n t h e f i n a l a n a l y s i s prove c o u n t e r p r o d u c t i v e i s p a t e n t l y obvious, theory U.S.  of arms r a c e s .  ( i f n o t f a t a l ) t o arms c o n t r o l  i f one a c c e p t s t h e g e n e r a l a c t i o n - r e a c t i o n As M a r s h a l l Shulman put i t b e f o r e t h e  Senate F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s Committee: The d i f f i c u l t y w i t h t h e b a r g a i n i n g c h i p t a c t i c i s t h a t i t d e f l e c t s a t t e n t i o n from t h e m e r i t s of t b e a r gument as t o whether we g e n u i n e l y need t h e weapons s y s tems advocated, and i n s t e a d of i n t i m i d a t i n g t h e Russ i a n s , r e q u i r e s them t o f o l l o w our l e a d . Had we n o t begun t o deploy a Safeguard system, t h e r e would have been no need f o r t h e p r e s e n t t r e a t y , and t h e number of ABM l a u n c h e r s would have been c o n s i d e r a b l y l e s s than t h e two hundred f o r each s i d e p r o v i d e d under t h e t r e a t y . Had t h e R u s s i a n s n e v e r t h e l e s s p e r s i s t e d i n m o d e r n i z i n g t h e i r G a l o s h system around Moscow, we c o u l d have d e c i ded what i f any a c t i o n on our p a r t t h i s r e q u i r e d ; i t i s u n l i k e l y t h a t we would ha.ve been saddled with, t h e k i n d of a system which t h e b a r g a i n i n g c h i p l o g i c has bequeathed u s . S i m i l a r l y , our MIRV deployment, r a t h e r than encouraging a p o s i t i v e a t t i t u d e toward arms l i m i t a t i o n on t h e R u s s i a n s i d e , compels them t o match, our MIRV t e c h n o l o g y sooner or l a t e r . And when they do, we w i l l both, be worse o f f than i f we had been a b l e t o a v e r t the MIRV c o m p e t i t i o n .  I n a s i m i l a r v e i n , S t a n l e y Hoffmann t o l d t h e Committee: An agreement on ABM was reached, l e s s because we met R u s s i a ' s c h a l l e n g e and launched our own program, than because both s i d e s r e c o g n i z e d t h a t t h e c o s t s were ( c o n t . ) and Senator F u l b r i g h t i n t h e F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s Committ e e h e a r i n g s , pp. 109-110; a l s o t h e judgment of M a r v i n L . G o l d b e r g e r that. " I t i s d i f f i c u l t , i f n o t i m p o s s i b l e , t o a s s e s s t h e r o l e p l a y e d by Safeguard as a b a r g a i n i n g c h i p i n t h e SALT t r e a t y . " (181) * Which might be summed up as f o l l o w s : A l t h o u g h n o t a l l arms r a c e s r e s u l t from p e r c e i v e d c h a l l e n g e s t o s e c u r i t y , and no arms r a c e need be e x p l a i n e d s o l e l y o r even p r i m a r i l y as an a c t i o n - r e a c t i o n c y c l e of c o m p e t i t i v e deployments, o t h e r f a c t o r s — s u c h as t h e i n h e r e n t dynamism of m i l i t a r y t e c h n o l o g y , b u r e a u c r a t i c and domestic p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t s i n (cont.)  - 97  -  out of p r o p o r t i o n w i t h the v a l u e of these systems. The I n t e r i m Agreement on o f f e n s i v e weapons was reached even though, we had no on-going ICBM program, and the S o v i e t s , who r e s i s t e d f o r a l o n g time the i n c l u s i o n of n u c l e a r submarines and SLBM i n t o the a g r e e ment, gave i n even though we have not launched T r i d e n t y e t . To be s u r e , i n c e n t i v e s t o agreements a r e n e c e s s a r y , but the t h r e a t of l a u n c h i n g a major program i f no agreement i s reached, coming from a n a t i o n t h a t i s i n so many r e s p e c t s s t i l l ahead i n s o p h i s t i c a t e d t e c h nology and q u a l i t a t i v e performance, can be j u s t as p o w e r f u l , and f a r more e f f e c t i v e , i n g e t t i n g r e s u l t s , at a lower l e v e l of a b s u r d i t y than a c t u a l e s c a l a t i o n . Otherwise, we s h a l l n e v e r break out of the v i c i o u s c i r c l e which c o n s i s t s of l a u n c h i n g a dubious program i n o r d e r l a t e r t o be a b l e t o c l a i m as a p o l i t i c a l breakthrough and as a v i c t o r y of common sense an agreement t h a t merely r e s t r i c t s the f u r t h e r waste of r e s o u r c e s on such a program. The P r e s i d e n t has c o r r e c t l y p o i n t e d out t h a t the new o f f e n s i v e weapon programs were recommended p r i o r t o SALT. T h i s throws a r a t h e r i n t r i g u i n g l i g h t on SALT. We have o b t a i n e d from the R u s s i a n s curbs i n a r e a s , i n c l u d i n g the SS-9, where they, not we, have ongoing p r o grams and where had they r e f u s e d l i m i t a t i o n s , we c o u l d not have caught up w i t h them d u r i n g the next f i v e y e a r s . But we have a v o i d e d curbs i n the a r e a s where we wanted t o expand anyhow, so as t o s t a y ahead of them. T h i s i s q u i t e a c o m p e t i t i v e achievement, but i t suggests not so much, the triumph of the b a r g a i n i n g - c h i p t h e o r y — a f t e r a l l , our b i g g e s t c h i p i s the MIRV, which remains u n r e g u l a t e d — a s the c e r t a i n t y t h a t the S o v i e t s w i l l indeed f e e l t h a t they have t o c a t c h up w i t h us i n a l l the a r e a s , i n c l u d i n g MIRV, t h a t are l e f t open i n the race. (182) F i n a l l y , Senator  Edward Kennedy warned: "We  have c o n s i s t e n t l y  f a i l e d t o r e c o g n i z e t h a t a b a r g a i n i n g c h i p i s good so l o n g as ( c o n t . ) arms expansion, and what has been c a l l e d "a g e n e r a l p r e sumption of i n t e n s e c o m p e t i t i o n from the o t h e r s i d e r a t h e r than ...the a d v e r s a r y ' s s p e c i f i c a c t i o n s ( o r i n a c t i o n ) " (183)—may ( i n t h e contemporary w o r l d , at l e a s t ) be viewed as c o n s t a n t s , p e r p e t u a l l y s u b j e c t t o a g g r a v a t i o n (and s i g n i f i c a n t l y so) through the a c t i o n - r e a c t i o n phenomenon. That i s , p o l i t i c a l p r e s s u r e s on one s i d e brought about as a r e s u l t of these other f a c t o r s w i l l t e n d t o be v a l i d a t e d and c o n s i d e r a b l y r e i n f o r c e d w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o p e r c e i v e d deployments on the o t h e r s i d e .  - 98  -  i t i s n o t p l a y e d . Once p l a y e d , i t s o n l y e f f e c t i s t o r a i s e  the  s t a k e s , and t h a t has been t h e e f f e c t of our use of n u c l e a r  bar-  g a i n i n g c h i p s , each t i m e t h e s t a k e s have been r a i s e d and  each  t i m e t h e s e c u r i t y of a l l n a t i o n s has been endangered."" ' ^ 1  8  There would seem t o be some k i n d of "happy medium" between l e a v i n g o n e s e l f c o m p l e t e l y na,ked i n n e g o t i a t i o n s and a new  provoking  arms r a c e , of a c h i e v i n g a b a r g a i n i n g advantage w h i c h i s  n o t so o v e r p o w e r i n g as t o s t i m u l a t e c o m p e t i t i v e deployments on the other s i d e . r e m a i n s t o be  Whether s u c h a p o i n t can be r e a c h e d  i n SALT I I  seen.  * D r . K i s s i n g e r d e m o n s t r a t e d an a c u t e u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h i s d i lemma a t h i s C o n g r e s s i o n a l b r i e f i n g of June 15, 1972. (185) The s t a n d a r d s o l u t i o n i s t o h a l t o n - g o i n g programs a t t h e r e s e a r c h and development s t a g e , a v o i d i n g t h e a c t u a l d e p l o y ment of systems as l o n g as p o s s i b l e , but t h i s t e n d s t o be def e a t e d by t h e autonomous momentum of s u c h a c t i v i t i e s , as w e l l as by l e g i t i m a t e c o n c e r n over t h e l e a d - t i m e s i n v o l v e d . A v a r i a t i o n on t h e theme i s t h e s u g g e s t i o n of Jerome H.Kalian tha/t " p l a c i n g c o n s t r u c t i o n f u n d s ' i n escrow'...can be e q u a l l y e f f e c t i v e i n supporting a strong n e g o t i a t i n g posture without d e t r a c t i n g f r o m t h e u l t i m a t e v a l u e of t h e agreements b e i n g s o u g h t . " (186)  - 99  -  CONCLUSION The the  p r e c e d i n g a n a l y s i s makes no  pretensions to being  d e f i n i t i v e account of the m o t i v a t i o n s behind SALT I and  agreements, or a sure guide t o f u t u r e mains, q u i t e the  either  s i m p l y , an  SALT l i m i t a t i o n s . I t  examination of p o s s i b l e  s u s c e p t i b i l i t y of s t r a t e g i c arms, and  missiles  weapons, the  even c o n s i d e r a t i o n s h i s t o r i c destiny a l l played a part possibly  offensive  We  can  concern f o r s t r a t e g i c s t a b i l i t y , the  desire f o r a broadly-based of p e r s o n a l p r e s t i g e ,  on the p a r t  final  t o the f i e l d  N e v e r t h e l e s s , a few  tentative  costs  s u r v i v a l , or  leaders  concerned—  outcome. But  rank i n importance such d i s p a r a t e  say,  detente—perhaps  political  of the n a t i o n a l  i n p r o d u c i n g the  conclusions applicable  re-  affecting  of ABM*s and  i n p a r t i c u l a r , to i n t e r n a t i o n a l regulation.  f o r example, t h a t the of new  factors  its  how  f a c t o r s , and  can  one  thus dra.w  of arms c o n t r o l as a whole? o b s e r v a t i o n s might be  advanced  w i t h a view toward e x p l o i t i n g t o i t s f u l l e s t the p o t e n t i a l of c a s e - s t u d y approach t o i l l u m i n a t e t h e o r e t i c a l c o n c e r n s . The t e g i c Arms L i m i t a t i o n  T a l k s of 1 9 6 9 - 7 2 were chosen f o r  Stra-  analysis  because of t h e i r contemporaneity, t h e i r i n n a t e s i g n i f i c a n c e  in  comparison w i t h p r e v i o u s measures of arms c o n t r o l , the l a r g e of c r i t i c a l l i t e r a t u r e which they ha,ve g e n e r a t e d , and bility  of d e t a i l e d a n a l y s i s  of the  w i t h which they d e a l t . S t i l l ,  the  the  body  availa-  i n d i v i d u a l m i l i t a r y systems  the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t  .been an a t y p i c a l example of arms c o n t r o l  they may  have  s h o u l d be t a k e n i n t o  account. In the f i r s t ceivable)  place,  u n l i k e most p r e v i o u s (and  i n d e e d , con-  "disarmament" n e g o t i a t i o n s , ^ t h e y were e s s e n t i a l l y  - 100 b i l a t e r a l . Not  -  o n l y d i d j u s t two  s t a t e s choose t o i n v o l v e them-  s e l v e s i n the n e g o t i a t i o n s b u t — b e c a u s e of the g r e a t d i s p a r i t y i n power between them and the r e s t of the w o r l d — n e i t h e r p a r t i c i p a t i o n of o u t s i d e a c t o r s was  r e q u i r e d nor  b i g u o u s . On the bility  one hand, as we  consequences am-  have p r e v i o u s l y n o t e d , the  feasi-  the a b s o l u t e number  of r e l e v a n t a c t o r s ; on the other hand, the l a c k of v e r y  bility  from w i t h o u t ,  strong  t o g e t h e r with, the u n a v a i l a -  of e f f e c t i v e o u t s i d e g u a r a n t e e s , makes the t a s k of a c h i e -  v i n g agreement more d i f f i c u l t  than under o t h e r  (where an i n t e r n a t i o n a l body such as the U.N., Great  lat-  of n e g o t i a t i o n s are somewhat  of c o n t r o l s should v a r y i n v e r s e l y with  c o n c i l i a t o r y pressures  direct  c o u l d the  t e r ' s independent a c t i o n s be v e r y i n f l u e n t i a l . The of t h i s f a c t o r f o r the success  the  Powers, can f u l f i l  circumstances or a consortium  of  both r o l e s ) .  Second, SALT I i n v o l v e d the c o l l a b o r a t i o n of what many s e r v e r s c o n s i d e r t o be two  ob-  essentially "satiated," "conservative,"  or "mature" Powers, n e i t h e r one  d e s i r o u s of immediate fundamental  change i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s t a t u s quo,  and  both c o n s c i o u s — t o  a  d e g r e e — o f the t h r e a t posed humanity's f u t u r e by the awesome a r s e n a l s at t h e i r d i s p o s a l . I t simply may  be too much t o expect  s i m i l a r r e s t r a i n t from l e s s " r e s p o n s i b l e " s t a t e s , between  staun-  c h l y " c o n s e r v a t i v e " and r a b i d l y " r e v i s i o n i s t " ones, or on anyt h i n g approaching a u n i v e r s a l s c a l e w i t h i n a  resource-scarce  world. F i n a l l y , SALT I d e a l t with, weapons whose m i l i t a r y and t i c a l / d i p l o m a t i c u t i l i t y had  poli-  come under some a t t a c k i n r e c e n t  y e a r s . I t i s l e s s c e r t a i n t h a t s t a t e s would be amenable t o  - 101  -  r e s t r i c t i n g more " p r a c t i c a l " or " s e r v i c e a b l e " armaments and litary  mi-  activities.  Of c o u r s e ,  s i g n i f i c a n t as i t was,  SALT I r e p r e s e n t e d  but  a  s m a l l step on the road t o e f f e c t i v e l i m i t a t i o n of s t r a t e g i c arms, let  alone r e d u c t i o n or t o t a l a b o l i t i o n of them. Some c r i t i c s  of  the n e g o t i a t i o n s have gone so f a r as t o suggest t h a t , by v i r t u e of the p e r s u a s i v e n e s s  of the b a r g a i n i n g - c h i p  have proven p o s i t i v e l y c o u n t e r p r o d u c t i v e  argument, they  t o such  efforts.  But what i s the a l t e r n a t i v e ? I t must be hoped t h a t , i n the run a t l e a s t , a continuous b e g i n t o bear f r u i t 1 RR  process  may  long  of s t r a t e g i c arms c o n t r o l w i l l  i n terms of b o t h mutual and u n i l a t e r a l  re-  straint. The  f o r e g o i n g r e s e r v a t i o n s a s i d e , what does the SALT case  suggest about the t a r y instruments  " f a c t o r s a f f e c t i n g the s u s c e p t i b i l i t y of and  a c t i v i t i e s to i n t e r n a t i o n a l regulation"?  B r i e f l y s t a t e d : (1) The  e a r l i e r tendency of "arms c o n t r o l l e r s " t o  f o c u s upon s t r a t e g i c s t a b i l i t y as a prime c r i t e r i o n i s and  apparently  mili-  confirmed  r e i n f o r c e d ; ( 2 ) the c o s t of major weapons systems  seems t o be becoming an i n c r e a s i n g l y s a l i e n t f a c t o r i n the "arms c o n t r o l c a l c u l u s ; " (3) v e r i f i c a t i o n of the f u l f i l m e n t t i o n s does not  of o b l i g a -  appear t o be as g r e a t an o b s t a c l e t o agreements  as i n the r e c e n t p a s t ;  ( 4 ) crude " p a r i t y " i n the o v e r a l l s t r a t e g  g i c s t r e n g t h of a d v e r s a r i e s i s seen as c r u c i a l t o t h e i r ness t o e n t e r t a i n l i m i t a t i o n s ;  willing-  ( 5 ) asymmetries i n the f o r c e -  * There i s much evidence f o r t h i s on the American s i d e , but the S o v i e t s may not have "bought" the b a r g a i n i n g - c h i p argument t o the same e x t e n t . Wolfgang Panofsky, w r i t i n g i n the S p r i n g , 1973, i s s u e of Survey, n o t e s : "There i s no evidence t h a t ( c o n t . )  - 102 s t r u c t u r e and s t r a t e g y  of a d v e r s a r i e s  seem eminently  t o t r a d e - o f f s w i t h i n t h e armaments f i e l d , from o u t s i d e tiveness  susceptible  as w e l l as ( p o s s i b l y )  of i t ; ( 6 ) o v e r a l l d i s p a r i t i e s i n t h e c o s t - e f f e c -  of defense and o f f e n s e , f a v o u r i n g  c i a l t o the w i l l i n g n e s s  of s t a t e s t o l i m i t  the l a t t e r ,  seem c r u -  "defensive"  weapons;  (7) t h e r a p i d i t y of t e c h n o l o g i c a l , development, w h i l e r e m a i n i n g l a r g e l y an "unknown" f a c t o r , may n e v e r t h e l e s s the p r o s p e c t s f o r arms c o n t r o l by i n d u c i n g and  sense of f u t i l i t y  apparently  perpetual  s e r v e t o enhance  a. s t a t e of weariness  i n p u b l i c s and t h e i r governments over t h e p r o c e s s of r e p l a c i n g i n c r e a s i n g l y c o s t l y  weapons systems a t a f a s t e r and f a s t e r r a t e ; ( 8 ) SALT p r o v i d e s a r e a f f i r m a t i o n of t h e p r i n c i p l e t h a t two s t a t e s , though deeply r i v e n by p o l i t i c a l ously  antagonism and c o n t i n u i n g  i n many a r e a s , can n e v e r t h e l e s s  t o compete v i g o r -  perceive  sufficient  mutual  i n t e r e s t i n a t t a i n i n g s i g n i f i c a n t measures of arms c o n t r o l , and finally  (9) i n c o n f o r m i t y w i t h t r a d i t i o n a l  expectations,  quanti-  t a t i v e c e i l i n g s on weapons a r e more l i k e l y t o be agreed upon than e i t h e r q u a n t i t a t i v e r e d u c t i o n s  i n e x i s t i n g arsenals  or r e -  s t r i c t i o n s on q u a l i t a t i v e d e v e l o p m e n t s — t h o u g h t h e q u a l i t a t i v e w a l l may w e l l have been p a r t i a l l y breached w i t h t h e ABM  Treaty.'  We have a b s o l u t e l y f o r s w o r n any i n t e n t i o n s o f comparing t h e r e l a t i v e s a l i e n c y of t h e f u l l  range of f a c t o r s d i s c u s s e d  I and, as a r e s u l t , i t i s i m p o s s i b l e  i n Part  t o make any v e r y c e r t a i n  ( c o n t . ) t h e S o v i e t s have e i t h e r reduced o r expanded t h e i r o f f e n s i v e programmes as a r e s u l t o f SALT-I." (189)  - 103  -  p r e d i c t i o n s as t o f u t u r e measures of s t r a t e g i c arms c o n t r o l . p o s s i b l e SALT I I agenda i s n e v e r t h e l e s s a f u l l  one,  and  The  i t might  he u s e f u l t o a p p l y the framework e l u c i d a t e d i n t h i s paper i n o r d e r t o i d e n t i f y the areas  of l i k e l y  or p o s s i b l e agreement, and  t o a s s e s s the p r o s p e c t s of i n d i v i d u a l m e a s u r e s — s u c h as c o n t r o l s on s t r a t e g i c ASW  a c t i v i t i e s and a n t i - a i r c r a f t  bombers, forward-based  defenses,  systems, and l a n d - m o b i l e  heavy  ICBM's—being  s u c c e s s f u l l y n e g o t i a t e d . S i m i l a r l y , the f a c t o r s i d e n t i f i e d i n P a r t I might be r e t r o s p e c t i v e l y a p p l i e d t o e a r l i e r attempts a t arms c o n t r o l of v a r i o u s k i n d s , w i t h the u l t i m a t e i n t e n t i o n of d e v e l o p i n g more: r i g o r o u s (perhaps  even q u a n t i t a t i v e l y a b a s e d )  theory. The one  t a s k i s rendered  extremely  hazardous by o p e r a t i o n of  of the l a s t - m e n t i o n e d f a c t o r s — t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of an  i n f i n i t e v a r i e t y of c r o s s - c u t t i n g t r a d e - o f f s , even from o u t s i d e of the arms c o n t r o l f i e l d . N e v e r t h e l e s s , i f t h i s has  almost areas essay  demonstrated the v a l u e of such a. framework i n e x p l a i n i n g how  g i v e n agreements a r e reached  and how  t h e i r e s s e n t i a l parameters  are f i x e d , i n g r e a t e r depth than a l e s s s t r u c t u r e d approach might have a f f o r d e d , then i t w i l l have s e r v e d i t s purpose. At t h i s stage i n the development of arms c o n t r o l t h e o r y , more ambitious  would c l e a r l y be premature.  anything  - 104  -  FOOTNOTES 1 Chayes(l972),pp.919-920. 2 Gray(l973),PP.273-274. 3 Beaufre(1968),p.28. 4 Boggs(l941),p.60. 5 Ibid.,p.71. 6 Ibid.,pp.84-85. 7 Q.Wright(l965),P.806. 8 Morgenthau(1973),p.401. 9 Boggs(l941),p.46. 10 I b i d . , p . 8 l . 11 Ibid.,pp.82-83. 12 I b i d . , p . 8 3 . 13 S e e , f o r example,Strachey(l967),p.206. 14 H e n k i n ( 1 9 6 l ) , p p . 6 - 7 . 15 H a l l e ( l 9 7 3 ) , p . 2 2 . 16 E . g . P e r l e ( l 9 7 3 ) , p . l 2 2 . 17 Stockholm I n t e r n a t i o n a l Peace R e s e a r c h I n s t i t u t e ( 1 9 7 3 ) , p. 132. ( h e r e a f t e r "SIPRI") 18 Brennan(196l),p.30. 19 SIPRI(1973),pp.132-133. 20 I b i d . , p . l 4 0 . 21 I b i d . 22 I b i d . , p . ! 3 7 . 23 B u l l ( 1 9 6 1 ) , p p . 1 2 - 1 3 . 24 Q.Wright(1965),p.798. 25 I b i d . 26 Morgenthau(1973),pp.390-391. 27 Bull(196l),pp.18-19. 28 Chayes(1972),p.942. 29 C o f f e y ( 1 9 7 1 ) , p . l 3 4 . 30 B a r n e t ( l 9 6 0 ) , p . l 2 4 ; K i n g ( l 9 6 l ) , p . 9 4 . 31. B u l l ( 1 9 6 1 ) . p . 1 0 8 ; B u l l ( 1 9 7 0 ) , p . 1 4 9 ; Aron(1967),pp.653-654. 32 Morgenthau(1973),p.398. 33 Young(1972),p.l34, 34 Newhouse(1973),pp.77-101. 35 Aron(1967),pp.645-646. 36 Clemens(1973),p.H. 37 Bull(196l),pp.124-125. 38 Cf.Morgenthau(1973),p.404. 39 Barnett(1972),pp.263-267; C o f f e y ( 1 9 7 1 ) , p . l 6 3 . 40 Clemens(1973),p.59. 41 Panofsky(1973a),p.l60. 42 Barnet(1960),p.4o. 43 E.g.Ibid.,pp.47-48; Holsti(1967),p.382. 44 Morgenthau(1973),p.395. 45 I b i d . 46 Gray(1974a),p.228. 47 Abt(1963),p.398. 48 Kaplan(1969),pp.295-296. 49 Ibid.,p.295.  - 105  -  50 Ibid.,p.296. 51 Ibid.,pp.296-298. 52 B u l l ( 1 9 6 l ) , p p . 9 - 1 0 ; G r i f f i t h s ( 1 9 7 1 ) , p . 6 7 2 . 53 B u l l ( 1 9 6 l ) . p . 6 5 . 54 Morgenthau(1973),p»396; see a l s o Ansberry(196g),p.46. 55 See the d i s c u s s i o n i n Clemens(1973),pp.71-72. 56 B u l l ( 1 9 6 l ) , p . l l 8 . 57 Clemens(l973),pp.12-13. 58 B u l l ( 1 9 6 l ) , p . 7 . 59 H a l p e r i n and P e r k i n s ( 1 9 6 5 ) , p . l 6 l . 60 Clemens(1973),p.69. 61 Brennan(196l),p.29. 62 I b i d . , p . 3 0 . 63 Kaplan(1973),p.8. 64 J a b b e r , Not -By War Alone(ND;NPfr. 65 Luard(1968).p.195. ~ 66 Chayes(l972),PP.943-944. ? Ibid.,p.969. 68 Boggs(1941),p.l4,fn.26. 69 Wiesner (1961),p.208. 70 See a l s o Henkin(1964),pp.29-30. 71 Cha.yes(1972) ,p.920. 72 R . P i s h e r ( 1 9 6 l ) , p p . 5 9 - 6 0 . 73 I h i d . , p . 5 7 . 74 Chayes(1972),p.957. 75 B a r n e t ( I 9 6 0 ) , p . 2 4 . 76 Bowie(196la),p.67. 77 I b i d . , p . 7 0 . 78 S c h e l l i n g ( 1 9 6 l ) , p . l 7 4 . 79 S c h e l l i n g and H a l p e r i n ( 1 9 6 1 ) , p . 8 5 . 80 U.S.Senate F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s Committee(1972),pp.395, 400. ( h e r e a f t e r "SFRC") 81 Wolfe(1973),p.24. 82 I b i d . , p . 2 8 . 83 SFRC(1972).passim. 84 Coffey(1973),pp.66-67. 85 See S e c r e t a r y Rogers b e f o r e SFRC(1972),p.l7. 86 See S e c r e t a r y L a i r d b e f o r e SFRC(1972),pp.92-94. 87 Newhouse(1973),p.63. 88 I b i d . 89 Kahan(1972),p.209. 90. Nixon(1973) , p . 7 H . 91 U.S.Senate Armed S e r v i c e s Committee(1972),p.542. 92 Clemens(1973),p.l59,fn.9. 93 K i n t n e r ( l § 6 7 ) » f o r example. 94 Gray(1972-73) ,p'.il29; see a l s o Clemens(1973) , p p . x x i i , l . 95 SFRC(1972),pp.157-158. 96 S o v i e t F o r e i g n P o l i c y , 1 9 6 8 , q u o t e d i n Clemens(1973),PP»3-4. 97 I b i d . , p p . 4 « 5 . 98 I b i d . , p . 8 . 99 " M i s s i l e Numbers Game",New York Times a r t i c l e r e p r i n t e d i n SFRC(1972),pp.46-47. 100 Ibid.,pp.72-73. 6  - 106 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134  -  S t r a t e g i c Survey 1972,p.17. SPRC(1972),p.»». SIPRI(1974),P-22. SPRC(1972),p,140. Ibid,.p.143. SIPRI(1974),pp.25-26, Ibid.,p.28. E.g.Roman K o l k o w i c z , i n SFRC(1972),p,143; Joshua(1973),pp. 239-240; SIPRI(1973),p.45; Caldwell(1971),pp.13,20; Wolfe (1970),p.5. SPRC(1969),p.303. Clemens(1973),pp.xxiv. Young(1972),p.223. Newh.ouse(1973) ,p.l04. U.S.Senate Government O p e r a t i o n s Committee(1973) ,p.-201. E.g.Van Cleave(1973),pp.326-327. Gray(1974),p.1146. SPRC(1972),p.l82. K i n t n e r and P f a l t z g r a f f ( 1 9 7 3 ) , p p . 2 9 6 - 2 9 7 , f o r example. Newhouse(1973),P.10. See e s p e c i a l l y Caldwell(1971),Holloway(1971),and Kahan(1972), pp.417-418. Coffey(l971),PP.160-161. SPRC(1972),p.l8. SPRC(1972),p.358. I b i d . , p . l 8 5 ; see a l s o p . l 8 l . Newhouse(1973),pp.9-10. SPRC(1972),p.6. E.g.see Newhouse(1973),pp.79-80. See Kahan(1972),p.4l8. SPRC(1969),p.46. A l t o n H.Quanbeck a.nd B a r r y M.Blechman,"Tbe Arms A c c o r d t E v e r y one G a i n s " , i n n t h e Washington Post,June 4 , 1 9 7 2 ; r e p r i n t e d i n SPRC(1972),p.31. Quoted i n The Defense Monitor.June 30,1972; r e p r i n t e d i n SFRC(1972),p.27«. See Rogers,SPRC(1972),p.5. Newhouse(1973),p.l50. SPRC(1970),pp.231-232. : S e e , f o r example,the q u e s t i o n s submitted by S e n a t o r C h a r l e s H. P e r c y t o Ambassador G e r a r d C.Smith,SPRC(197 ),PP«54-55; and the t e s t i m o n y of S e n a t o r James L . B u c k l e y , S P R C ( 1 9 7 2 ) , pp. 2  258-259-  135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144  SFRC(1972),p.404. S e n a t o r Sparkman,in:SFRC(1972),p.339. SFRC(1972),p.57. . . E.g.Kah.an(1972) ,p.422,fn.22. Clemens(1973),p.24. P a n i f s k y ( 1 9 7 3 a ) p . l 6 5 ; and SFRC(1972),p.373. Ibid.,p.l78. Ibid.,p.254. Ibid.,p.272. Newhouse(1973),p.l64; see a l s o p.184. f  - 107  -  145 See Panofsky(1973a.) ,p. 163; and Newbouse(1973),pp.3-4. 146 Wolfe(1970),p.2. 147 P a u l Warnke i n SFRC(1972),p.l79. 148 See s t a t e m e n t s o f W o l f g a n g P a n o f s k y and R i c h a r d L . G a r w i n , Ihid..p.371. 149 Newhouse(1973),p.21. 150 See Kahan i n SPRC(1972),p.424. 151 Newhouse(1973),p.30. 152 I h i d . , p p . 2 6 , 1 2 4 . 153 I h i d . , p . 2 0 . 154 S c o v i l l e i n SPRC(1970),pp.228-229; S c o v i l l e ( 1 9 7 4 ) , p . 5 5 ; Garwin(1973),p.lll. 155 S c o v i l l e i n SFRC(1970),p.223; D r . K i s s i n g e r i n SFRC(1972),p. 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167  168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187  412.  Newhouse(1973),pp.28,76. Ihid.,p.28. Ihid..p.31. Ihid.,p.183. See t e s t i m o n y o f Ambassa.dor G e r a r d C.Smith,SFRC( 1972) ,p. 38. Newh.ouse(1973) ,p.26. I b i d . , p . I 8 4 ; and Ka,h.an(1972) ,p.426. Newhouse(1973),p.259. Ibid.,p.59. See,for example,SFRC(1972),pp.55,145,148,276. S e e , f o r e x a m p l e , S e n a t o r S y m i n g t o n , I b i d . , p . l 6 ; and Ka,han(1972), p.428. The D e f e n s e M o n i t o r , J u n e 30,1972; r e p r i n t e d i n S F R C ( 1 9 7 2 ) , p.277. E . g . W i l l i a m R.Van C l e a v e , i n U.S.Senate Government O p e r a t i o n s Committee(l973),pp.219-220 and 234. The D e f e n s e M o n i t o r , o p . c i t . , p . 2 7 4 . S F R C U 9 7 2 ) ,p.3«4. Ibid..p.347. Nixon(1974) , p . 7 H . Clemens(1973),p.25. Newhouse(1973),p.l74. SFRC(1972),p.302. Quoted i n Newhouse(1973),p.l39. SFRC(1972),p.l0. Ibid.,p.324. Ibid.,p.401. Ibid.,p.140. Ibid.,p.348. Ibid.,p.l94. Clemens(1973),p.l02. SFRC(1972),p.252. Ibid.,p.411. Ibid.,p.217. G r a y ( 1 9 7 4 b ) , p . l l 4 7 and ( 1 9 7 3 ) , p p . 2 7 1 , 2 8 9 ; S I P R I ( 1 9 7 3 ) , p p . 49-50.  188 C f . G r i f f i t h s ( 1 9 7 1 ) , p p . 6 4 4 - 6 4 5 . 189 P a n o f s k y ( 1 9 7 3 a ) , p . l 6 5 .  - 108 BIBLIOGRAPHY I.  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"Rethinking Nuclear Strategy", i n : Orbis, vol.17 ( W i n t e r 1974), pp. 1145-1160.'  H a l p e r i n , M o r t o n H., D e f e n s e S t r a t e g i e s f o r t h e S e v e n t i e s . t o n : L i t t l e , B r o w n and Company, 1970.  Bos-  H o l l o w a y , D a v i d , " S t r a t e g i c Concepts and S o v i e t P o l i c y " , i n : S u r v i v a l , v o l . 1 3 no.11 (November 1971), pp. 364-369. H o i s t , Johan J . , " C o m p a r a t i v e U.S. and S o v i e t D e p l o y m e n t s , Doct r i n e s , and Arms L i m i t a t i o n " , i n : K a p l a n ( e d . ) , o p . c i t . , pp.  53-95.  I n t e r n a t i o n a l I n s t i t u t e f o r S t r a t e g i c Studies, S t r a t e g i c Survey 1971. London: The I . I . S . S . , 1972. vey 1972.  London: The  I.I.S.S. ,  . 1973.  . strategic  J o s h u a , W y n f r e d , "SALT and,the M i d d l e E a s t " , i n : K i n t n e r P f a l t z g r a f f ( e d s . ) , op . ' c i t . , pp. 237-254.  Surand  Kahan, Jerome H., " L i m i t e d Agreements and Long-Term S t a b i l i t y : A P o s i t i v e View Toward SALT", r e p r i n t e d i n : SFRC, pp. 416429.  - 115  -  K a p l a n , M o r t o n A., "SALT a,nd t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l System", i n : K a p l a n ( e d . ) , o p . c i t . , pp. 1-25. Kemp, G e o f f r e y , a n d I a n Smart, "SALT and European N u c l e a r F o r c e s " , i n K i n t n e r and P f a l t z g r a f f ( e d s . ) , o p . c i t . pp. 199-236. t  K i n t n e r , W i l l i a m R., "The U n c e r t a i n S t r a t e g i c B a l a n c e i n t h e 1970's", i n : Arms C o n t r o l and N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y , v o l . 1 (1969), pp. 25-40. K i n t n e r , W i l l i a m R., and R o b e r t L . P f a l t z g r a f f , J r . , ( e d s . ) , SALT: I m p l i c a t i o n s f o r Arms C o n t r o l i n t h e 1970Vs. U n i v e r s i t y o f P i t t s b u r g h P r e s s , 1973. . 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