THE SECURITISATION OF HUMANITARIAN MIGRATION by SCOTT D. WATSON M.A., University of Waterloo, 2000 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Political Science) THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA ' July 2006 © Scott D. Watson, 2006 Abstract The different responses of Canada and Australia to the arrival of asylum seekers present an interesting puzzle for IR scholars. M y analysis analyzes how the use of the coercive capacity of the state against refugees and asylum seekers has come to be regarded as essential in some liberal democratic states while in others these policies remain unacceptable? Using a focused case comparison between Canada and Australia, I show that discursive practices of influential societal and political actors construct the identity of refugees and the receiving state in such a way that makes certain policy choices acceptable to state leaders. In cases where the securitising discourse constructs refugees as the primary referent object of a security threat and the receiving state as a responsible humanitarian international citizen, state leaders adopt policies consistent with norms of the international refugee regime. In cases where this discourse is challenged, societal actors attempt to reconstruct the identity of refugees as security threats to the receiving state. When these securitising attempts are successful, state leaders more readily adopt policies designed to 'protect' the state rather than refugees. To support these conclusions, I employ discourse and textual analysis during three notable refugee 'crises' in each state. In the Australian case, the three crises are: the 1979 Indo-Chinese boat people exodus, the 1992 boat arrivals and the 2001 Tampa affair. In Canada, 1 examine the 1979 Indo-Chinese boat people exodus, the 1986-1987 boat landings and the 1999 boat arrivals. In all six crises, humanitarian and communitarian securitising discourses reconstructed the identity of asylum seekers, their home states and the receiving states, limiting policy options available to state leaders. M y findings have important broader theoretical and practical implications. Theoretically, my work contributes to a better theoretical understanding of the conditions under which the coercive capacity the state can be employed; also, the dissertation makes a significant contribution to understanding the role of discursive practices in limiting policy options and has important practical implications for the media and societal leaders in influencing/challenging the securitising attempts of state leaders. u Table Of Contents A B S T R A C T ii T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S i i i List O F T A B L E S vi A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T S '. vii C H A P T E R O N E : T H E S E C U R I T I S A T I O N O F H U M A N I T A R I A N M I G R A T I O N 1 F R A M E W O R K 10 C H A P T E R Two: M E T H O D . 21 I D E N T I F I C A T I O N O F S E C U R I T I S A T I O N A T T E M P T S ( R E F U G E E C R I S E S ) 24 S I T E O F A C C E S S T O D I S C O U R S E : 26 C A T E G O R I E S O F D I S C O U R S E 28 A D D I T I O N A L S I T E S O F D I S C O U R S E ( R E ) P R O D U C T I O N 34 C H A P T E R T H R E E : L I T E R A T U R E R E V I E W A N D C O M P E T I N G P E R S P E C T I V E S 36 G L O B A L I S T T H E O R Y 41 W O R L D S Y S T E M S 44 N E T W O R K T H E O R Y 46 C H A L L E N G E S 49 S T A T I S T A P P R O A C H E S 51 M A R K E T T H E O R Y : 52 L I B E R A L S T A T E S 54 D E M O C R A T I C S T A T E S 56 C H A L L E N G E S ; 58 C O N C L U S I O N ...60 C H A P T E R F O U R : S E C U R I T Y A N D I M M I G R A T I O N 63 T H E D E B A T E 65 S T A T E - C E N T R I C S E C U R I T Y S T U D I E S 67 D E E P E N E R S • 70 C O N S T R U C T I V I S M A N D S E C U R I T I S A T I O N 76 T H E S E C U R I T I S A T I O N P R O C E S S I N S T A T E S 82 T Y P O L O G Y O F S E C U R I T I S A T I O N 86 P R O B L E M S A N D S O L U T I O N S 88 S E C U R I T I S E D M I G R A T I O N D I S C O U R S E S 91 S E C T O R S O F R I S K : 93 S E C T O R S O F T H R E A T F R O M H U M A N I T A R I A N M I G R A T I O N ..99 C O N C L U S I O N S 103 C H A P T E R F I V E : T H E R E L A T I O N S H I P B E T W E E N S T A T E S A N D R E F U G E E S 104 R E F U G E E S A S I N T E R N A T I O N A L A C T O R S 106 N O R M S O F T H E R E F U G E E R E G I M E 115 N O N - R E F O U L E M E N T r. 117 L E G A L P R O C E S S I N G O F C L A I M S : 119 N O N - A R B I T R A R Y D E T E N T I O N 120 N O N - P U N I S H M E N T B A S E D O N M O D E O F E N T R Y 123 R E F U G E E S A N D T H E I N T E R N A T I O N A L S Y S T E M 125 R E F U G E E - P R O T E C T O R S A N D R E F U G E E S . . . . . 134 C O N C L U S I O N S 140 i i i C H A P T E R S I X : C A N A D A . . . 143 C A S E O N E : T H E 1979 I N D O - C H I N E S E B O A T E X O D U S 143 D O M I N A N T D I S C O U R S E A N D S E C U R I T I S A T I O N 144 D I S C U R S I V E C H A L L E N G E 146 T A B L E 6.1 H U M A N I T A R I A N M E D I A C O N T E N T : J U N E 2 1 - J U L Y 18 ,1979 156 I M P L E M E N T A T I O N O F E X T R A O R D I N A R Y M E A S U R E S 156 L E G I T I M I Z A T I O N A N D T H E S E C O N D S E C U R I T I S A T I O N 160 T A B L E 6.2 H U M A N I T A R I A N M E D I A C O N T E N T : J U L Y 1 8 - A U G 31 ,1979 165 T A B L E 6.3 P U B L I C O P I N I O N P O L L S : S U M M E R 1979 167 C A S E T W O : 1986 A N D '87 B O A T A R R I V A L S 168 D O M I N A N T D I S C O U R S E A N D T H E 1986 A R R I V A L S 169 T A B L E 6.4 H U M A N I T A R I A N M E D I A C O N T E N T : A U G 1 3 - O C T 7,1986 173 C O M M U N I T A R I A N C H A L L E N G E 175 T H E C O M M U N I T A R I A N - S E C U R I T I S A T I O N : 1987 ...178 T A B L E 6.5 H U M A N I T A R I A N M E D I A C O N T E N T : J U L Y 1 1 - O C T 31 ,1987 :.185 I M P L E M E N T A T I O N O F E X T R A O R D I N A R Y M E A N S 188 L E G I T I M I Z A T I O N S T A G E 190 C A S E T H R E E : T H E 1999 I N C I D E N T S 195 C O M M U N I T A R I A N S E C U R I T I S I N G D I S C O U R S E : T H E 1999 B O A T A R R I V A L S 197 T A B L E 6.6 H U M A N I T A R I A N M E D I A C O N T E N T : J U L 2 1 - S E P 30 ,1999 200 I M P L E M E N T A T I O N O F E X T R A O R D I N A R Y M E A N S 205 L E G I T I M I Z A T I O N : 207 C O N C L U S I O N S 211 C H A P T E R S E V E N : A U S T R A L I A 216 C A S E O N E : T H E I N D O - C H I N E S E R E F U G E E C R I S I S O F 1979 216 D I S C U R S I V E C H A L L E N G E . , 220 T A B L E 7.1 H U M A N I T A R I A N M E D I A C O V E R A G E : 1979 231 T H E H U M A N I T A R I A N S 231 I M P L E M E N T A T I O N O F E X T R A O R D I N A R Y M E A S U R E S 233 C O M M U N I T A R I A N - S E C U R I T I S A T I O N 238 L E G I T I M I Z A T I O N : 241 C O N C L U S I O N 245 C A S E T W O : T H E T W O S E C U R I T I S A T I O N S O F 1992 247 C O M M U N I T A R I A N - S E C U R I T I S A T I O N 249 T A B L E 7.2 M I G R A T I O N M E D I A C O N T E N T : J A N U A R Y - M A R C H 1992 251 I M P L E M E N T A T I O N O F E X T R A O R D I N A R Y M E A S U R E S 257 H U M A N I T A R 1 A N - S E C U R I T I S A T I O N O F T H E A S Y L U M S E E K E R S 260 T A B L E 7.3 M I G R A T I O N M E D I A C O N T E N T : M A R C H - A U G U S T 1992 265 L E G I T I M I Z A T I O N 265 C A S E T H R E E : T H E 2001 T A M P A C R I S I S 271 D I S C U R S I V E C H A L L E N G E 273 I M P L E M E N T A T I O N O F E X T R A O R D I N A R Y M E A N S 281 H U M A N I T A R I A N C H A L L E N G E A N D L E G I T I M I Z A T I O N 285 T A B L E 7.4 N E W S P A P E R E D I T O R I A L C O V E R A G E : A U G 1 5 - O C T 15,2001 285 T A B L E 7.5 L E T T E R S T O T H E E D I T O R : A U G 1 5 - O C T 15,2001 286 L E G I S L A T I O N 287 R E C O N S T R U C T I N G I D E N T I T Y 288 C O - O P T I N G H U M A N I T A R I A N I S M 290 C O N C L U S I O N S 297 iv C H A P T E R E I G H T : C O N C L U S I O N 301 T H E S E C U R I T I S A T I O N P R O C E S S 304 E R O S I O N O F N O R M S A N D T H E S T U D Y O F S E C U R I T I S A T I O N 318 T H E S T A T E A N D S E C U R I T Y 326 O T H E R U N I T S I N IR: R E F U G E E S A S A C T O R S 329 S E L E C T E D B I B L I O G R A P H Y 334 N E W S P A P E R A R T I C L E S A N D L E T T E R S 334 P R I M A R Y S O U R C E S 351 S E C O N D A R Y S O U R C E S 352 v List of Tables Table 6.1 Humanitarian Media Content: June 21 -July 18, 1979 156 Table 6.2 Humanitarian Media Content: July 18-Aug 31, 1979 165 Table 6.3 Public Opinion Polls: Summer 1979 167 Table 6.4 Humanitarian Media Content: Aug 13- Oct 7, 1986 173 Table 6.5 Humanitarian Media Content: July 11 -Oct 31, 1987 185 Table 6.6 Humanitarian Media Content: July 21 - Sept 30, 1999 200 Table 7.1 Humanitarian Media Coverage: 1979 231 Table 7.2 Migration Media Content: January-March 1992 251 Table 7.3 Migration M e d i a Content: March-August 1992 265 Table 7.4 Newspaper Editorial Coverage: Aug 15-Oct 15, 2001 285 Table 7.5 Letters to Editor: Aug 15-Oct 15, 2001 286 vi Acknowledgements This dissertation could not have been completed without the support of a great many people. I am grateful for the contributions of those who have commented on this project at various stages, including Brian Job, Catherine Dauvergne, Mark Zacher, Paul Evans, Dan Hiebert, Christian Joppke, Mark Miller and Paul Marantz. Richard Price has supervised this project from its inception. During this process, he has constantly challenged me to engage with competing academic 'discourses', and has helped me work through puzzles that seemed unsolvable. I greatly appreciate his intellectual honesty and his attention to methodological rigour. I would also like to thank the participants in forums where versions of this work was presented: the International Relations Colloquium at the University of British Columbia, the Canadian-Comparative Workshop at the University of British Columbia, the International Relations Reading Group at the Australian National University, the 2006 meeting of the International Studies Association in San Diego, and the 2006 meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association in Toronto, I would also like to acknowledge the generous financial support from the University of British Columbia Graduate Fellowship Program, the Canadian Consortium on Human Security, the Canadian Consortium on Asia-Pacific Security, and the Frederic Soward Memorial Fellowship. Lastly, I could not have completed this project without the support of friends and family. I would like to thank my parents for their love and support, and for starting me on this path years ago. I am profoundly grateful to my wife, Alicia, who has donned numerous hats throughout this process: research assistant, transcriber, financier, motivator; but mostly, incredible life partner. v i 1 Chapter One: The Securitisation of Humanitarian Migration How has humanitarian migration become cast as a security threat in liberal democratic states? With the ratification and implementation of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the establishment of a permanent international body devoted to the protection of refugees (UNHCR), signatory states, including almost all western liberal states, signaled a commitment to offer protection to those fleeing persecution in their home states. Yet, in some of these states, asylum seekers have increasingly been cast as a threat to the state rather than the object of persecution in need of protection. This project is aimed at understanding how this changing perception of refugees and asylum seekers has occurred and how to explain divergent refugee protection policies in western liberal states. Given the western liberal democracies' common commitment to the protection of human rights and the near universal ratification and implementation of the refugee convention, it is surprising and puzzling that there is significant divergence in the border control and refugee protection policies of these states. A cursory glance at border control policies in many liberal states reveals that a growing number have demonstrated a willingness to use all means necessary to prevent the arrival and admission of asylum seekers, even in the face of international criticism. For example, the governments of the United States, Italy and Australia have all, at one time, instructed their naval forces to intercept and forcibly return boats carrying asylum seekers to states where their protection is not guaranteed. The government of Australia has even excised parts of the Australian territory to ensure that asylum seekers do not get access to the state and the 1 legal obligations dictated by the international refugee regime and its domestic legislation. Even the Canadian government has, at times, attempted to authorize the use of force against people seeking asylum. This is surprising because Canada has been regarded as generous toward asylum seekers, evidenced by the UNHCR awarding the Nansen Medal to the Canadian people for their efforts in the protection of refugees, the only such time this has happened. This project addresses how liberal states have shifted from viewing asylum seekers as a humanitarian issue to one of a security threat to the state, and how this has altered refugee policy. While we are living in an era where thinking about immigration as a security threat has become increasingly common, the question animating this thesis is an intriguing puzzle since, historically, the association of asylum seeking as a threat to the state has not been the predominant view. During the Cold War, the protection of individuals fleeing from communist and fascist regimes was seen as a form of power, ' essentially enhancing the security of the receiving state by undermining the moral legitimacy of the home state.1 Even today, the treatment of asylum seekers as a threat to the state is not a universal phenomenon. Many states continue to honour the obligations imposed by the refugee regime, and grant protection to those seeking asylum. However, there is genuine concern that this response is no longer the norm. An increasing number of liberal states are adopting more restrictive policies aimed at reducing the number of asylum seekers who gain access to the state. As the European Union embarks on a process of harmonizing asylum procedures, there is a reasonable expectation that refugee ' Loescher, G i l . 2003. " U N H C R at Fifty: Refugee Protection and W o r l d Polit ics." in Problems of Protection: The UNHCR, Refugees, and Human Rights, edited b y . N . G . Steiner, Mark and Loescher, G i l . N e w York : Routledge. 2 2 protection will suffer. Canada and the United States have also toyed with the idea of harmonizing asylum policy, and there is every indication that this is unlikely to produce more generous policies toward refugees and asylum seekers. Many of the existing explanations that have been offered to account for similarities and differences between immigration control policies ignore humanitarian migration and international obligations toward asylum seekers. These explanations have focused instead on economic and family reunification immigration, and have identified a number of important factors that set liberal states apart from one another, including: the role of ethnic and business interest groups, the role of liberal courts, the effects of globalization, as well as geo-political realities. These explanations will be examined in greater detail in the third chapter, but it is important to note here that these theories have provided important insight into the forces that influence immigration control policies, but ultimately fail in a number of respects. The first weakness is an inability to account for the difference in state policies toward different types of migration: economic, family and humanitarian. As noted earlier, the entire category of humanitarian migration is all but ignored, while discrimination against particular ethnic, linguistic, racial, religious, and sexual groups within each type of immigration is left unexplained. These explanations have also failed to account for how certain policies have come to be regarded as essential for the security of some states, while in others these same policies are regarded as unbefitting of a humanitarian state. I argue that in order to understand the general approach to immigration control that liberal democratic states take, as well as particular i 2 Brennan, Frank. 2003. Tampering With Asylum: A Universal Humanitarian Problem. St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, Levy, and Carl. 2005. "The European Union after 9/11: The Demise of a Liberal Democratic Asylum Regime?" Government and Opposition 40:26-59. 3 idiosyncratic policies, one needs to examine the discursive practices that take place within these states surrounding the issue of border control and societal identity. The subject of immigration control policy is a large and daunting subject, one that I cannot hope to cover in its entirety in this study. As such, 1 have chosen to explore one area of immigration control that seems to have attracted the least attention from scholars, yet a great deal of attention from states: humanitarian migration. I have chosen to examine this topic for two reasons. The first was the seemingly contradictory implementation of border control policies designed to deter and detain humanitarian migrants by self-proclaimed liberal, democratic, humanitarian states. The second reason for studying this was the lack of attention the securitisation of humanitarian migration has received in the political science literature. I should clarify here some of the terminology in use. For the purposes of this study, I have broken the phenomenon of immigration into two broad categories. The term immigration refers to the general phenomenon of the movement of people across international borders for economic or family reunification purposes. Thus, the term immigrant will refer to someone who seeks to enter a state by appealing to the economic self-interest of the state or to the rights of family reunification for those already admitted to the state. I distinguish the phenomenon of humanitarian migration from this general phenomenon of immigration based on the values appealed to by individuals seeking entrance; fully aware that the reasons for migration are often complex, interrelated and difficult to differentiate in many circumstances. Drawing on Dauvergne's definition, I employ the term "humanitarian migrant" to refer to someone who seeks permission to enter a state by appealing to the compassion of the host state, and bases his or her claim 4 7 on the notion that denying entrance would contravene some sense of common humanity. Like Dauvergne, the humanitarian migrant distinction that I employ includes both refugees and asylum seekers. I use the term refugees when referring to those whose refugee claims have been processed and have been recognized either as refugees under the terms of the 1951 Convention or as persons in need of protection based on humanitarian grounds not explicitly included in the 1951 Convention but included in a state's domestic legislation. I use the term asylum seekers when referring to those who have not yet been granted or denied official refugee status but have entered or seek to enter a state to begin assessment under that states' humanitarian migration determination process. Furthermore, 1 employ the term 'unauthorised migration' to denote the crossing of an international border without the permission of the receiving state and for reasons not yet clear, whether it be for humanitarian considerations, employment or family reunification. The issue of unauthorized humanitarian migration is particularly important because it is an issue that will continue to confront liberal states as long as there exists such a large disparity between the first and third world, between North and South, in terms of wealth and security. It is generally accepted that international migration moves from areas of high political, social, or economic insecurity to areas that migrants perceive as having less insecurity.4 By virtue of their relative affluence and the myriad political, social, and economic rights bestowed upon their residents, liberal democratic states tend to be perceived as areas that have significantly lower levels of insecurity. As such, there 3 Dauvergne, Catherine. 2005. Humanitarianism, Identity, and Nation: Migration Laws of Australia and Canada. Vancouver: UBC Press. 4 Heisler, Martin and Layton-Henry, Zig. 1993. "Migration and the Links between Social and Societal Security." in Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda, edited by B. W. Buzan, O; Kelstrup, M and Lemaitre, P. London: Pinter Publishers. 5 is presumed to be a high demand upon these states to admit migrants seeking increased levels of political, social and economic security. In 2004, the UNHCR reports that there were 9.2 million refugees worldwide, with an additional 10 million persons of concern, primarily internally displaced persons. For many, this illustrates that close to 20 million people worldwide suffer'from high levels of insecurity, and who have an interest in moving to areas with greater security. As such, the pool of potential humanitarian migrants is staggeringly large. Remarkably, of the 20 million potential humanitarian migrants, just 528,000 asylum seekers (2.6%) made their way to western liberal states in Europe or North America in 2004.5 That a mere fraction of the world's most insecure people attempt to enter western liberal states may indicate that these states need not fear mass refugee influxes as most people in the world would prefer to remain in or near their home state, in anticipation of quick return. However, the small number of refugees and asylum seekers who find their way to the west may simply demonstrate the effectiveness of border control policies and the difficulty of international travel. While it is not clear how many of these refugees would seek protection in the advanced western liberal states were there no controls in place to prevent this possibility, for many, it is obvious that the protections offered by liberal states are in high demand. The perceived high demand for admission to western liberal states has allowed political and societal leaders to generate fear over a potentially large influx of refugees. The issue of cross border movement is relevant not simply because there are strong push and pull forces encouraging international migration that cannot be alleviated without a drastic change in the international economic system and the disparity between 5 UNHCR. 2004. "Global Refugee Trends." UNHCR, Geneva. 6 North and South, but also because the movement of people across borders has the potential to affect the economic and security interests of states and societies. The prominence of recent terrorist activities has highlighted the potential security risks that immigration poses for states and has forced the topic to the forefront of many states' security agendas. The link between migration and terrorism, while not particularly strong, has nonetheless attracted a great deal of attention from the media, academics and policy makers alike. Despite the fact that the number of terrorist attacks are at their lowest levels since 1969 and claim far fewer lives per year than traffic accidents,6 fears of terrorist activity heavily influence national security agendas and border control strategies of most liberal states. To this end, concerted efforts have been made to identify all immigrants and to monitor and control the activities of immigrants who are suspected of supporting terrorist networks. Diaspora populations have long garnered the attention of both home and host states, as they are often perceived as being a primary source of insecurity.7 That the issue of immigration has been cast as a security concern in many states should come as no surprise. The changes brought about by the end of the Cold War have produced a whole host of new issues being placed onto national and international security agendas. For many advocates of including these new security threats, such as environmental degradation and human trafficking, in national security agendas, it is troubling that states have, as of yet, not been able to produce an effective international response. Part of the reason for this failure is that political and societal leaders, and the general public, have had very different responses toward these new security threats. The variation in state responses toward potential security issues, like that toward humanitarian 6 State, U.S. Department of. 2004. "Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003." Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Washington D.C. 7 King, Charles and Melvin, Neil. 2000. "Diaspora Politics." International Security 24:108-39. 7 migration, is not unique to these new threats. Even traditional military threats like terrorism, weapons proliferation and 'rogue' states have produced differing responses among states. Unfortunately, the traditional security studies community has made little effort, and has had little success, to explain variations in state responses to potential threats. Constructivist approaches to international relations have begun to address this gap in the security literature, by showing how cultural differences impact both what is perceived as Q threatening and what responses are appropriate. This study embarks from the constructivist position, employing securitisation theory to address how humanitarian migration has been cast as a threat in western liberal states. Jn addition to the purported link with terrorism, the issue of immigration raises further security concerns by the connection to trafficking in drugs, arms and people. As a result, the international movement of people has become the focus of domestic and international crime control agencies. Besides the military-security concerns, there is some evidence that immigration also brings with it a number of other short term ills for host societies, including increased social welfare costs, and negative economic, cultural and social consequences.9 While these ills seem to be short term, they are often exaggerated, and have gathered currency in many media institutions and the general population.10 Given the current international political climate and the attention given to the potential Jepperson, Ronald; Wendt, Alexander and Katzenstein, Peter. 1996. "Norms. Identity and Culture in National Security." in Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, edited by P. Katzenstein. New York: Columbia University Press. 9 Hanson, Gordon, Kenneth Scheve, Matthew Slaughter, and Antonio Spilimbergo. 2002. "Immigration and the U.S. Economy: Labour Market Impacts, Illegal Entry and Policy Choices." in Immigration Policy and the Welfare System, edited by T. Boeri, G. Hanson, and B. McCormick. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1 0 Papademetrious, Demitrios. 1997. "Migration." Foreign Policy 109:15-32. 8 negative effects of immigration it is likely that international migration will remain on the security agenda for some time. Despite its resurgence as a security issue since the end of the Cold War, the concern with cross-border migration is not a post-Cold War phenomenon. Control over the territorial boundaries of the state and the power to define the community that qualifies for its protection, has been regarded as an essential condition of state sovereignty. Shaw argues that as early as the 1933 Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, a clearly defined territory and a permanent population were considered minimal conditions of statehood." Since at least the early 1900's, and likely much earlier, the defining characteristic of state sovereignty, as well as a key condition for international recognition, has been the effective control over a particular territory and people. Thomas Biersteker notes that the norms of state recognition and the definitions of state, sovereignty and territory have changed over the course of the last century,, which has resulted in the reduced salience of physical territory and significance of borders. However, Biersteker observes that the one issue area in which borders remain as important as ever is in the movement of people.12 The primacy given to the control of cross-border migration reveals that this particular facet of state sovereignty has changed very little over the course of the past century. The issue of cross-border movement is important because states continue to treat it as such. This project is relevant theoretically because it explores the challenges to border control that have occupied a central role in our conceptions of sovereignty since the Treaty of Westphalia. The issue also bears practical relevance because of the impact " Shaw. Malcolm. 1997. International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1 2 Biersteker, Thomas. 2002. "State, Sovereignty and Territory." in Handbook of International Relations, edited by W. R. Carlsnaes, T and Simmons, B: Sage Publications. 9 states' border control pol ic ies have on the internat ional refugee regime and on refugees themselves. The erosion o f the internat ional refugee regime could be devastat ing i n that i t w o u l d l i m i t the abi l i ty o f states to w o r k together to solve internat ional problems. Though the erosion o f the refugee regime w o u l d not necessarily be a negative development i f i t were supplemented by national pol ic ies that enhanced protect ion o f refugees; such a development seems remote, i f not absurd, g iven the current c l imate regarding refugee protect ion. A s states v io late the spir i t and the letter o f the refugee regime by enacting more restr ict ive pol ic ies, refugees have less oppor tun i ty to f lee persecution, potent ia l ly pu t t ing at r isk the l ives o f m i l l i ons o f people wor ldw ide . T o prevent such a ca lami ty , i t is essential to understand how restr ict ive pol ic ies have become acceptable in some l iberal states; and it is even more essential to understand h o w in other l iberal states, calls fo r greater restrict ions on asylum seekers have been unsuccessful . Framework i n this project , I show h o w humani tar ian migrants have been constructed both as threatened by the state and, al ternat ively, as a threat to the state. I argue that these t w o p r imary construct ions o f asy lum seeker ident i ty have narrowed the range o f pol ic ies deemed acceptable in l iberal democrat ic states. D r a w i n g on the insights o f securi t isat ion theory as developed by the Copenhagen school, I show that po l i t i ca l and societal leaders engage in discursive contestation regarding the ident i ty o f asy lum seekers and the rece iv ing state. These alternative representations a im to restrict the range o f po l i cy choices avai lable to pol i t ica l leaders by either por t ray ing the asy lum seekers as deserving o f the protect ion o f the state or as a source o f insecuri ty fo r the state. Successful ly por t ray ing the asy lum seekers in one fashion over another, c ircumscribes the po l i cy 10 options deemed acceptable for policy makers, and encourages the implementation of policies that are consistent with the identity constructions of the dominant discourse. The range of acceptable migration policies within a particular polity is shaped by, and reflective of, constructions of the national identity, particularly as it pertains to the creation of the membership of that community. For this reason, I have chosen to use two liberal, democratic, capitalist, settler states - Canada and Australia, for the empirical analysis in this project. Their identity as wealthy, liberal, democratic, capitalist states situate them in similar positions internationally. Of critical importance is that both states are refugee receivers and have historically demonstrated similar commitments to refugee protection, as illustrated by their refugee resettlement programs and financial support for the UNHCR - the international body devoted to the protection of refugees. On the other hand, both states have economic and political interests in maintaining the current international system, with its focus on state sovereignty and its concomitant restrictions on trans-border movement. While the above description is applicable to most western liberal states, Canada and Australia make useful comparison because they share important historical similarities in their approach to nation building, most notably with regard to their emphasis on immigration and the historical contestation over the exclusion and later inclusion of non-European populations. Recent turns in both states to a multicultural national identity further mark their useful comparison, as it is illustrative of a turn away from a traditional means of marking national identity based on racial, ethnic or religious characteristics. Furthermore, both Canada and Australia rely heavily on the admission of humanitarian migrants to bolster key aspects of their national identity, particularly their 11 role as good international citizens and as humanitarian actors. The admission of refugees has provided both states with the opportunity to contribute to resolving international crises in a demonstrative way, increasing their international profile as important and relevant actors. Lastly, Canada and Australia present a strong case comparison because it is not self-evident that either state faces an objective threat from unauthorized humanitarian migration. Both are geographically isolated from refugee-producing states; Australia by virtue of being an island state separated from its less stable neighbors by a long, perilous boat journey. Canada's only land border is with the U.S., which is generally considered not to be a refugee-producing state. It, too, is separated from less stable neighbors by significant bodies of water. While Canada and Australia each face unique geopolitical circumstances, one would be hard pressed to argue that either faced a significant threat from the arrival of large numbers of humanitarian migrants. Looking at the sheer numbers of asylum arrivals supports the contention that neither state faces a significant threat from asylum seekers. In 2004, France faced an inflow of over 58,500 asylum seekers, the U K - 40,200, Germany - 35,600, and the U.S. 13 - 27,900. Canada and Australia faced inflows of 25,800 and 3,300 respectively. This represented less than 11% and 2% of the number of asylum seekers finding their way into the advanced industrial democracies. Clearly, Canada and Australia face a much smaller 'risk' of being inundated with unwanted asylum seekers than do other liberal democracies. In comparison with each other, Canada would seem to be at far greater 'risk' that Australia. Since Australia implemented its harsh border control policies in 1 3 UNHCR. 2004. "Global Refugee Trends." UNHCR, Geneva, and OECD. 2003. "International Migration." 12 2001, it receives, on average, between an eighth and a fifth of the number of asylum seekers that Canada does. Even prior to the 2001 crackdown, between 1992 and 2001, Canada, on average, faced three times as many asylum seekers, with over 286,300 asylum seekers, than Australia, which faced an inflow of 94,200.14 Assuming all asylum seekers carry the same associated risks, based on these numbers we would expect that Canada faces a far greater security risk from asylum seekers than does Australia. It may be the case that all asylum seekers do not carry the same level of risk. Perhaps asylum seekers entering Australia and/or Canada present a greater risk to the state, in terms of terrorist or criminal activity. Again the evidence does not support such a conclusion. A number of studies examining the incarceration rates of native-born and foreign-born in Australia clearly indicate that the foreign-born do not pose a greater threat to society than do native Australians. These studies have concluded that native-born Australians engage in criminal activity at significantly higher rates than the foreign-born. 1 5 There is also evidence that unauthorized humanitarian migration into Australia does not pose a significant terrorist threat. Between 2000 and 2002, Australia's security organization, the ASIO, checked 5,986 unauthorized arrivals to assess whether or not they constituted a direct or indirect threat to Australia; they found that not one constituted such a threat.16 Similarly, numbers from Canada indicate that there is very little difference between the foreign-bom population in the two states in terms of criminal activity. 1 4 Ibid. 1 5 Francis, Ronald. 1981. Immigrant Crime in Australia. St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, and Flazelhurst, Kathleen. 1987. Migration, Ethnicity and Crime in Australian Society. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, Lynch, James and Rita Simon. 2002. Immigration the World Over. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Mukherjee, Satyanshu. 1999. Ethnicity and Crime. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 1 6 Brennan, Frank. 2003. Tampering With Asylum: A Universal Humanitarian Problem. St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press. 13 Surveys in Canada in 1989 and 1991 reveal that the proportion of foreign-born in the general prison population was 10.3% and 11.9% respectively; this was at a time when the entire population was 18.9% foreign born. 1 7 Lynch and Simon conclude that, similar to Australia, immigrants in Canada have had a lower rate of criminality than the native-born consistently over the last forty years. Based on these 'objective' standards of security risk there is no reason to conclude that either Canada or Australia face an objective threat from asylum seekers, or that Australia faces a greater risk than Canada. Yet in both states, political actors have attempted to securitise humanitarian migration. Furthermore, these attempts have been more successful in Australia. Using these two states for the empirical analysis of the securitisation of humanitarian migration provides an opportunity to show how, in the absence of objective security risks, humanitarian migration is treated as a greater threat in one state than another. My comparison of Canada and Australia builds on an established scholarly literature devoted to the comparison of the migration policies of these two states. However, this project differs in that the aim is not to provide an explanation for the historical evolution and divergence of their immigration policies or migration law, though it makes a significant contribution to this end. Rather, this analysis focuses on crisis periods when the national community has confronted the issue of humanitarian migration. The results of the securitising attempts have, in some cases, permanently altered the migration laws of the state, and as such, are an important moment in the development of the state's migration laws and national identity. In other instances, the policies advocated 1 7 Lynch, James and Rita Simon. 2002. Immigration the World Over. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. 1 4 and introduced in response to a particular crisis have not had a permanent impact on the state's migration law, and have been reversed through a process of desecuritisation or counter-securitisation. However, in such instances these securitising attempts continue to impact the migration laws of the state, as they become part of the national discourse on the state's identity; consequently, as important to understanding how humanitarian migration becomes securitised, it is equally important to understand how political and societal leaders have resisted securitising attempts. So while examining migration law is informative and important, it misses crucial elements of policy and law making whereby certain laws and policies are deemed unacceptable and remain outside the realm of possible actions by the state. By examining specific refugee crises, I identify the ways in which political and societal leaders draw on established national symbols and myths to shape the discourse on humanitarian migrants to achieve a particular policy response to the current crisis. In each state, I examine three humanitarian migration crises. Starting with the premise that crises are socially constructed, I identify migration crises by whether or not influential political, societal and media actors in that state regard it as a crisis. Whether an issue is regarded as a crisis is indicated by the overall level of attention generated by the topic within the political community, as illustrated by the number of debates on the topic in Parliament or by public pronouncements by political leaders, as well as by overall media coverage devoted to the topic. Thus, in periods of crisis, there is a significant increase in media attention to the issue and an increase in attention given to the issue by influential members of the political and societal elite. 15 In this study, I employ an in-depth discourse analysis of three humanitarian migration crises in each state. Since the Second World War, I have identified four humanitarian migration crises in Canada: refugee resettlement after the Second World War, the 1979 Indo-Chinese refugee crisis, the 1986-1987 boat arrivals, and the 1999 boat arrivals. I have also identified two other possible crises, including the Hungarian refugee resettlement and the debate on humanitarian migration post-9/11. Of the six crises, 1 have chosen to examine the Indo-Chinese refugee crisis, the 1986-1987 boat arrivals, and the 1999 boat arrivals. In Australia, I identified seven refugee crises since WWII:, refugee resettlement after the Second World War, the Vietnam exodus in 1975-1976, the 1979 Indo-Chinese refugee crisis, the 1990 Chinese student refugee resettlement, the 1992 Cambodian/Chinese arrivals, the 1999 refugee debates and the 2001 Tampa crisis. I have chosen to examine three crises: the 1979 Indo-Chinese refugee crisis, the 1992 Cambodian/Chinese arrivals and the 2001 Tampa crisis. I have chosen to examine these six crises because they are well documented, they are comparable both between and within the two states under examination, and because they provide variation in the referent objects of securitisation and in the levels of success. The theory of securitisation advanced in this project has relevance beyond the short time frames examined, and could be applied in a genealogical fashion to immigration policy generally to explain the gradual shift away from racial immigration criteria toward economic criteria and family reunification. The theory is also applicable beyond the two countries under examination; for instance it could be used to illuminate the U.S. response to Muslim immigrants since 9/11, the rise of anti-immigrant parties in 16 the E U and to the current debate over undocumented Mexican workers in the U . S . Furthermore, it has the potential to make contributions far beyond the immigration policy area, and could help illuminate issues areas such as humanitarian intervention, environmental change, securing resource supplies, as well as intra- and inter-state war. This project is divided into two sections: the first theoretical, the second empirical. The first section, which is composed of chapters two, three, four and five, focuses on the theoretical terrain covered in this project. Chapter two contains discussion of methodological issues. In that chapter, I further explore the meaning of the term 'discourse', and explain how the textual analysis I employ in this study fits into the Foucauldian approach to discourse. I explain how dominant discourses are recognized and how I have categorized the texts under analysis based on their construction of the referent object of security and the legitimate security provider. Chapter three examines competing theoretical accounts of migration policy, and addresses the weaknesses and shortcomings of these accounts. My work seeks to build on the insights provided by the various globalization and statist accounts, most notably by identifying the situations under which the normal operating politics of immigration policy-making cease to operate. I argue that international and domestic constraints against restrictive immigration policies are less constraining when political and societal leaders move the issue of migration out of normal politics and into the security realm. By doing so, these securitising actors are able to present policy prescriptions that would otherwise be unacceptable during periods of normalcy. Having shown how the identification of a security threat impacts the operation of normal politics, in chapter four I turn to the security literature devoted to international 1 7 m i g r a t i o n . In this chapter, I show the histor ical association between m i g r a t i o n and national security, and seek to problematize this association. T h e dominant neo-realist approach to security has been resistant to the i n c l u s i o n o f m i g r a t i o n i n the field o f security studies, defending the tradit ional terrain o f security studies. Other realists have al l too q u i c k l y sought to inc lude migrat ion as one o f the most s ignif icant p o s t - C o l d W a r security challenges, and have sought to alert p o l i c y makers to this new and g r o w i n g threat. O n the other end o f the spectrum, cr i t ica l security and h u m a n security approaches have sought to undermine the exc lus ive focus on state security, and have encouraged alternative approaches to the study and practice o f security. In this chapter, I introduce a constructivist approach as a ' m i d d l e way", one that e m p i r i c a l l y examines the broadening and w i d e n i n g o f the practice o f state security; and e m p i r i c a l l y demonstrates the adopt ion o f alternative security frameworks. B u i l d i n g o n securit isation theory, I show the three-stage process o f securitisation, whereby p o l i t i c a l actors construct a condi t ion o f security threat and cris is . T h e fifth chapter closes out the theoretical component o f the project, and serves as the theoretical heart o f the work . In this chapter, I show h o w the creation o f the international refugee regime served to construct refugees as distinct actors i n the international system. T h i s ' h u m a n i t a r i a n ' construction o f refugee identity served as one element i n the emerging rivalry i n the international system between the two great powers f o l l o w i n g the Second W o r l d W a r . Constructed b y the western capitalist states, refugee identity was constructed i n such a w a y to serve as a f o r m o f m o r a l p o w e r for these states, and to de- legi t imize their fascist and c o m m u n i s t rivals. T h e refugee regime served to construct the identity o f states i n the international system and created a set o f norms 18 .guiding the treatment of those seeking refuge. These norms formed the basis of the international refugee regime, and as such provide a guide by which to assess the 'normal' response to refugees and asylum seekers. With the rising number and changing character of asylum seekers, and the demise of the international rivalry that had sustained the regime, the norms of this regime itself have been open to challenge by domestic securitising actors seeking to reconstruct the identity of refugees and receiving states. Chapters six and seven are devoted to the empirical analysis of the securitisation of humanitarian migration in Canada and Australia. Examining three securitisation attempts in each case, these chapters demonstrate the multiple types of securitisation, the three stages of the process, the central actors in the process, and the conditions under which securitisation is successful. I examine the policy choices that the competing discourses made available to policy makers, and which policies were rendered unacceptable as a result of the securitisation attempts. Some of the crises examined in these two chapters have garnered very little scholarly attention, and as such the material covered in these chapters breaks new ground. Others have been studied and documented extensively by others, and this study has benefited immensely from their work. None of these existent works have approached these events from the theoretical lens employed by this project. As such, the empirical analysis in this work provides novel and interesting contributions to understanding these events. In the concluding chapter, I review the contribution that this project has made to our understanding of the securitisation process, as well as to immigration policy more generally. Lastly, I identify a number of key theoretical questions that this project raises as a result of its theoretical and empirical advances. Understanding how political and 19 societal leaders can re-construct events and actors as a threat to the state forces us to re-consider the role of power and systemic factors in the.implementation and sustenance of international norms, the impact of domestic political structures and agents on international politics, and, the impact of the globalization process on the realm of traditional national politics. Before turning to these issues, the following chapter deals with how this study is conducted. 20 Chapter Two: Method This study employs a discourse analysis of six humanitarian migration crises, in which securitising actors sought to challenge the dominant discourse constructing the relationship between the state and humanitarian migrants. During these periods, 1 will examine the discourse pertaining to humanitarian migration to show how alternative discourses arose to challenge the dominant humanitarian discourse that shaped, and was shaped by, the international refugee regime. According to securitisation theory, windows of opportunity, or events that are plausibly portrayed as a security threat, arise that allow securitising agents to present a community of individuals as threatened. In examining a few historical incidents during which securitising attempts were made, it is possible to show how the discursive practices of influential political, societal and media leaders impacted the policy options available to the ruling elite. In Canada, I examine the Indo-Chinese boat people crisis of 1979, the east coast boat arrivals of 1986-1987 and the west coast boat arrivals of 1999. In Australia, I examine the Indo-Chinese refugee crisis of 1979, the 1992 refugee crisis and the 2001 Tampa Crisis. In each of these cases, I analyze the discourse concerning the events associated with the crisis as contained in prominent daily newspapers. This study engages in the analysis of discourse in two senses of the term. First, I critically examine discourse as understood from a Foucauldian perspective; as productive of the identities, behaviours, 18 feelings and conditions of life that are considered normal. From this perspective, I engage in the critical analysis of discourse on refugee and asylum policy to uncover the 1 8 There are various interpretations of the Foucauldian definition of discourse, this definition is taken from various sources including: Gee, James Paul. 1999. An Introduction to Discourse Analysis: Theory and Method. London: Routledge. and Price, Richard M . 1997. The Chemical Weapons Taboo. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 21 power relations that produce, and are re-produced by, the 'normal' discourse structuring the relationship between the state and asylum seekers; that is largely the subject of Chapter Five. Second, in Chapters Six and Seven, I engage in conventional discourse analysis, by studying the content and grammar of textual materials, to reveal how those in a position of authority speak 'security'. Thus, the discourse analysis undertaken in this study has two components: 1) a critical component to identify actors empowered by the current discourse on refugees and asylum seekers, and 2) a conventional component to identify how these actors use the language of security to alter/maintain the existing discourse. My analysis of discourse follows on the growing body of international relations scholarship that has engaged in this type of research. The growth in critical discourse analysis in IR has produced an established set of principles for the examination of discourse. Milliken, in her explanation of the methodology of discourse analysis, notes that discourse analysis is based on three primary commitments. First, discourse constructs social realities that serve to distinguish relationships between objects and thereby establish a relation of power between the two objects, with one being privileged.1 9 Second, discourse is productive and reproductive of the things defined by the discourse. This means more than simply creating a language for analyzing and classifying phenomena; discourses make intelligible some ways of being in and acting toward the world and of operationalizing a particular 'regime of truth', while excluding other possible modes of identity.20 Price, one such scholar to engage in this type of research, supports such a claim by asserting that discursive practices legitimize certain behaviours 1 9 Milliken, Jennifer. 1999. "The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods." European Journal of International Relations 5:225-54. 2 0 Ibid. 22 and conditions of life as normal and politicize others.21 Third, discourse analysis is directed toward identifying dominating discourses that are changeable and historically contingent.22 To support these basic tenets regarding the role of discourse, there are a number of methods of engaging in discourse analysis. Milliken identifies the use of predicate analysis as one of the primary research methodologies. Predicate analysis focuses on the language practices of the verbs, adverbs and adjectives that attach to nouns. For example, Price, in his examination of the chemical weapons taboo, uses predicate analysis when he identifies the predicates typically attached to such weapons, including: barbaric, immoral, 23 horrible and inhumane. Milliken claims that the predications of a noun construct the object named as a particular sort of thing, with particular features and capacities.24 I engage in predicate analysis to identify the predicates attached to asylum seekers, the receiving state, the home state and, in some cases, transit states. Alongside the predicate analysis, I also employ a metaphorical analysis method, since much of the discourse on asylum seeking is structured in metaphorical terms. Gee has observed that discourse is often structured in metaphorical terms, and that metaphors 25 are a rich source for understanding the dominant discourses in particular cultures. Milliken notes that to engage in metaphor analysis, the researcher establishes metaphors used regularly in the language practices of groups or societies to make sense of the 2 1 Price, Richard M . 1997. The Chemical Weapons Taboo. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 2 2 Milliken, Jennifer. 1999. "The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods." European Journal of International Relations 5:225-54. 2 3 Price, Richard M . 1997. The Chemical Weapons Taboo. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 2 4 Milliken, Jennifer. 1999. "The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods." European Journal of International Relations 5:225-54. 2 5 Gee, James Paul. 1999. An Introduction to Discourse Analysis: Theory and Method. London: Routledge. 23 world. One notable use of metaphor analysis is Campbell's work on American foreign policy, in which he identifies the body/medical metaphors commonly applied by states to 9 7 groups identified as threats." According to Milliken, the researcher then abstracts from the particular metaphors to create a theory of metaphorical categorization that accounts for the central models or themes of the metaphors. We will see in this study that metaphors employing the themes of war, such as invasion and armadas, and natural disasters, such as swamping and flooding, are common in the discourse on asylum seekers. This has the effect of equating asylum seekers with the source of danger in the metaphors, i.e. floods and enemy combatants. This study engages in the analysis of predicates and metaphors attached to asylum seekers and the receiving state during six periods of securitisation in two states. During each crisis, I categorized each separate news piece (articles, editorials, letters to editor) based on the predicates and metaphors employed to depict the asylum seeker, his home state and the receiving state. Prior to describing how I classified the discourses under examination, I explain the choice of securitising attempts. Identification of Securitisation Attempts (Refugee Crises) As was noted in the previous section, I examine three securitisation attempts in both Canada and Australia: six in total. By examining the discourse surrounding these events (as presented in the newspaper coverage of these crises), I identify how the discourse impacted the response of the ruling elite. In Canada, I examine the 1979 Indo-Chinese crisis, the 1986-87 Sikh and Tamil boat arrivals off the east coast of Canada and the 1999 Chinese boat arrivals off the west coast of Canada. In Australia, I examine the 2 6 Ibid. 2 7 Campbell, David. 1992. Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 2 4 1979 Indo-Chinese crisis, the 1992 Chinese and Cambodian boat arrivals, and the 2001 Tampa crisis. These cases were selected for a variety of reasons. First, in these cases it was possible to identify the beginnings of the securitisation process. A l l of the cases under examination had notable precipitating events; which, in the parlance of securitisation theory, made the alleged threat plausible. Consequently, it was possible to identify the dominant discourse and relevant actors prior to, and subsequent to, the precipitating events. Of course, precipitating events alone do not signal the occurrence of a securitisation attempt. Many events that may plausibly be constructed as threatening are not, and it is possible that some securitisation attempts may occur without a notable precipitating event. Second, these cases were the most well-documented of securitisation attempts regarding humanitarian migration in the public record; making it possible to more fully observe the process of securitisation. A l l of the cases under examination generated a significant amount of attention and public debate; which was registered, in this study, by the tone and magnitude of newspaper coverage. The increased amount of discursive activity debating the identity and actions of the asylum seekers and the receiving state not only made these events ideal cases of securitisation to examine; it signaled that the media played a key role in the process itself and that there was some debate or contestation over the interpretation of events. Lastly, the cases selected for examination in this study vary in the types of securitisation, and in the level of success of the securitisation attempts. Importantly, the crises were not selected based on the response of political leaders to the increased debate associated with the crisis. This would essentially be the discourse analysis equivalent of 25 s e l e c t i n g o n the d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e . B e c a u s e the c l a i m o f s e c u r i t i s a t i o n t h e o r y is that d i s c u r s i v e p r a c t i c e s (the p r o c e s s o f s e c u r i t i s a t i o n ) m a k e c e r t a i n p o l i c y o p t i o n s a v a i l a b l e to p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s , it i s i m p o r t a n t to n o t o n l y s t u d y c a s e s w h e r e the o u t c o m e ( s u c c e s s f u l s e c u r i t i s a t i o n ) is o b s e r v e d , but a l s o cases w h e r e s e c u r i t i s a t i o n f a i l e d o r w a s o n l y p a r t i a l l y s u c c e s s f u l . A d o p t i n g th is a p p r o a c h to the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f s e c u r i t i s a t i o n d o e s h a v e a n u m b e r o f d r a w b a c k s , a n d m a y m i s s i m p o r t a n t a n d i n t e r e s t i n g event s ; i n c l u d i n g s e c u r i t i s a t i o n a t t empts that are so w e a k , e i t h e r b e c a u s e the threat w a s i m p l a u s i b l e o r b e c a u s e the s p e a k e r d i d n o t h o l d a s u f f i c i e n t l y a u t h o r i t a t i v e p o s i t i o n , that t h e y f a i l to g e n e r a t e a n y k i n d o f p u b l i c r e s p o n s e . A l s o , it m a y m i s s s e c u r i t i s i n g m o v e s that are i n i t i a t e d a n d n e g o t i a t e d a m o n g s t the p o l i t i c a l e l i te i n secret a n d w i t h o u t e n g a g i n g the m e d i a o r the 28 p u b l i c i n g e n e r a l . T h o u g h s u c h o c c u r r e n c e s a p p e a r to b e r a r e , t h e y m a y h e l p r e f i n e o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the s e c u r i t i s a t i o n p r o c e s s a n d , as s u c h , w a r r a n t f u r t h e r s tudy . Site of Access to Discourse M y d i s c o u r s e a n a l y s i s i n v o l v e s a s e a r c h f o r pat terns i n the c o m m u n i c a t i v e acts o f i n f l u e n t i a l p o l i t i c a l , s o c i e t a l a n d m e d i a a c t o r s . In th is s t u d y , the p r i m a r y s ite o f a c c e s s to these c o m m u n i c a t i v e acts is the p r i n t - n e w s m e d i a , p r i m a r i l y , p r o m i n e n t d a i l y n e w s p a p e r s . T h e c o n t e n t o f n e w s p a p e r c o v e r a g e i n c l u d e s a v a r i e t y o f f o r m s o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n , o r c o m m u n i c a t i v e acts , n a m e l y : ar t i c l e s , e d i t o r i a l s a n d letters to the ed i tor . E a c h o f these t y p e s p e r f o r m s d i f f e r e n t a c t i o n s b a s e d o n t h e i r s o c i a l f u n c t i o n . M u l t i - m o d a l t h e o r y o f l a n g u a g e sees a l l c o m m u n i c a t i v e acts as h a v i n g three o v e r a r c h i n g s o c i a l f u n c t i o n s : representational — to r e p r e s e n t s o m e a s p e c t o f the w o r l d ; orientational -2 8 For an example of this process of securitisation see: Hettne, Bjorn and Elisabeth Abiri. 1998. "The Securitisation of Cross-Border Migration: Sweden in the Era of Globalizatioin." in Redefining Security: Population Movements and National Security, edited by N. Poku and D. Graham. Westport: Praeger. 26 to establish relations between those who are communicating; and organizational - to organize the communication as text, compose it in such as way that it is-coherent and cohesive.29 Newspaper content provides an excellent window into the production and re-production of discourses within society because the types of communicative acts it contains vary in the representational and orientational aspects.30 The newspaper article's orientational function is to present the author of the article as the neutral deliverer of factual information. Content of articles is presented as fact; the author presents the official or authoritative version of events. In this orientation, the reader is a consumer of facts about 'reality' provided by the article's author(s). Editorials have a different orientational function. They position the author as a persuasive, informed and legitimate actor who is trying to convince the reading public how to interpret the facts presented in news articles. The reader is a consumer of editorial content, but is oriented as a more engaged and critical consumer of the content. Lastly, letters to the editor orient the reader in relation to how their fellow citizens or the public at large interprets the 'reality' presented through news articles. Each serves a critical function in the construction of discourse, through the use of particular predicates and metaphors. The independent examination of each form of newspaper content helps the researcher establish which representations are dominant in society, and which actors are most influential in the construction of discourse. In the sixth and seventh chapters of this study, I present the breakdown of newspaper content based on the type of articles (its orientational focus) and on the discourse advocated by the author (its representational orientation). The findings 2 9 Burn, Andrew and David Parker. 2003. Analyzing Media Texts. London: Continuum. 3 0 For the most part, my analysis does not address the organizational aspect of news content and is more concerned with what the organization of newspapers presents to readers. 27 are presented as the percentage of each type of article (article, editorial, letter) that was categorized as a particular discourse. The number of pieces advocating a particular representation (displayed in tables as a percentage of total coverage) was used to approximate the 'prominence' of each discourse in that state during the time period under examination. Categories of Discourse As noted earlier, I categorized each news piece based on its representation of the referent object and the security provider. In essence, this meant classifying how each piece constructed the identity of the asylum seeker, his home state and the receiving state. As is discussed in further detail in Chapter Five, I classified texts as one of three types31 of securitised discourse: humanitarian, communitarian, and international. It is important to note here, that the process of securitising humanitarian migration necessarily involves a contestation between two or more securitising discourses. Essentially, either the migrants are securitised in a humanitarian manner, communitarian manner or international manner. Because of the nature of unauthorised humanitarian migration, it proved difficult for actors to engage the topic without drawing on some type of securitised discourse. Articles, editorials and letters to the editor that used terms emphasizing the victimhood of the asylum seeker or the generosity of the receiving state, were categorized as humanitarian. The following list indicates the various nouns substituted for asylum seekers that were categorized as a humanitarian representation: refugees, castaways, boat people , fugitives of tyranny, the unwanted, humanity, debris, freedom swimmers, 3 1 Though in Chapter Five I identify five types of securitisation, only three are expressed in my cases 3 2 In 1979, by 1992 in Australia the term had neutral or derogatory connotations 28 survivors, women/children, displaced, the weak and victims. In many cases, newspapers employed neutral nouns to refer to the asylum seekers, such as: asylum seekers, migrants, arrivals; or by the number of arrivals (i.e. the 172) or the nationality of the asylum seekers (i.e. Asians, Chinese, Tamils). Thus, in addition to analyzing the noun alternatives for the term 'asylum seeker', I categorized the discourse based on the predicates attached to such nouns to further signify the nature of the discourse. Predicates attached to these nouns that were categorized as humanitarian include variations of: forsaken, forgotten, miserable, fleeing, escaping, survived, rescued, saved, displaced, persecuted, oppressed, tragic, anguished, desperate, fearful, terrified, hopeless, and homeless. The securitising discourses also produced and re-produced the identity of the states involved: the asylum seekers' home state and the receiving state. Predicates attached to the home states that were categorized as humanitarian depicted the state as: embroiled in civil war, bloody, genocidal, troubled, murderous, a killing ground, violators of human rights, and unsafe. Lastly, the competing discourses also used predicates to construct the identity of the host state or society. The humanitarian discourse portrayed the host state as: compassionate, humanitarian, sympathetic, generous, proud, a good international citizen, warm, caring, receptive, responsive and Christian3 3. Additionally, the humanitarian discourse drew on several powerful humanitarian metaphors. The most prominent was the Holocaust. The use of this metaphor was done through references to the asylum seekers as victims of an Asian Holocaust or as Jews of 3 3 While depictions of the home state as Christian was used in both communitarian and humanitarian securitised discourses, the humanitarian use portrayed the responsibility of Christians in a cosmopolitan manner, meaning it required the Christian state to provide protection. Used in a communitarian manner, it depicted the Christian character of society as threatened by the admission of non-Christian populations. 29 the East; alternatively, leaders of their home state were depicted as Nazi's or the equivalent of Hitler. These metaphors drew on the failures of the western powers in responding to the Holocaust by incorporating the Evian Conference34 or the fate of the St. Louis 3 5 into the discourse. Other humanitarian metaphors included the nation as a 'nation of refugees', the flight of Jesus into Egypt, and, in Canada, the Komagata Maru. 3 6 Conversely, the nouns categorized as communitarian-securitised were either neutral (as listed in the previous section), with communitarian-securitised predicates, or terms that explicitly challenged the asylum seekers' refugee claims. The nouns classified as communitarian included some form of the following: criminals, terrorists, illegals, guerillas, aliens, human bombs, spies, louts, tourists, and, in Australia, rorters. Predicates attached to these nouns that identified the asylum seeker as a threat to the receiving state include some variation of: danger, mystery, illegal, violent, a plague, dubious, illicit, causing mayhem, lying, causing the disintegration of society, bringing racial friction, bogus, fraudulent, motivated by economics, throwing children overboard and over-breeding. x Additionally, the communitarian-securitised discourse used certain predicates that portrayed the receiving state as the object of security; using predicates such as: threatened, swamped, on the brink of collapse, unable to take care of its citizens, a soft The Evian Conference was an international Conference that convened in Evian, France in July, 1938. The conference was called to deal with the fate of Jewish refugees fleeing Germany. While 32 nations were represented, the conference was a failure. Most states in attendance refused to resettle large numbers of Jewish refugees, and delegates at the conference even failed to pass a resolution condemning Hitler's actions. Some claim the failure of the Evian Conference emboldened Hitler to implement the Final Solution. 3 5 The St. Louis was a ship carrying close to 950 Jewish refugees that had fled from Germany in 1939. It requested entry to several countries, including Cuba, the U.S. and Canada, all of which refused to accept the passengers. The ship returned to Europe, where a number of the refugees were accepted in Holland, England and France. Most passengers died in the Holocaust. 3 6 The Komagata Maru was a ship that departed from Hong Kong carrying mostly Sikh immigrants that arrived on the west coast of Canada in May, 1914. The purpose of the voyage was to challenge the exclusion clauses of Canada's (and Britain's) immigration policy. After a two-month standoff, 24 of the estimated 400 passengers were accepted, the rest were forcibly turned away. Its passengers eventually disembarked in India, where 20 or so were killed by British troops in the Budge Budge Riot. 30 touch, blackmailed, held hostage, tricked, and manipulated. Predicates that challenged the asylum seekers' claim regarding their home state were categorized as communitarian-securitised, and include variations of: safe, poor, different, alien, underdeveloped, and foreign (containing different values from the receiving state). Metaphors categorized as communitarian include both war and flood metaphors, and were categorized as such only when the object of the metaphor was one of the states under examination (Canada or Australia). War metaphors depicted the arrival of asylum seekers as an invasion, a campaign and an offensive, and their means of arrival as an armada or flotilla. Consistent with the war metaphor, the receiving state was depicted as defending the state, engaging in a standoff, and refusing to retreat. Similarly, the flood metaphor depicted the arrival of the asylum seekers as a: flood, flow, tide, wave, tsunami and deluge. The receiving state was depicted as being swamped, flooded, and washed out. In this metaphor, the policies of the receiving state were depicted as having opened the floodgates or having ignored early warnings. Lastly, the international-securitised category was distinguished from the humanitarian and communitarian discourse based on the referent object of security and the security provider. The international securitised discourse employed the same metaphors as described in the previous paragraphs, but applied them to a third state. Thus, the metaphors were applied to a state outside the state in which the discourse was situated. The international-securitised discourse also depicted the asylum seekers in a slightly different manner. They were depicted as victims of their home state, but not in the same manner as the humanitarian discourse. As noted in the previous section, the humanitarian discourse depicted the home state as a refugee-producing state, but one that 31 could not control the exodus of refugees. Unlike the humanitarian discourse, in the international discourse, the home state was depicted as intentionally creating the refugee flow; predicates attached to the home state included variations of: expelled, forced, extorted, robbed, bribed, allowed to leave, profited, earned, gained, exported, trafficked, sent and rid society of undesirables. The international securitised discourse also depicted the refugee policy as an intentional strategy on the part of the home state, using predicates such as: deliberate, intentional, target, invade, weaken, undermine, and flood. The international-securitised discourse constructed the international community as the appropriate security provider. Predicates categorized as international-securitised depicted the solutions advanced as: international, political (as directly opposed to humanitarian), cooperative, at the source, and sharing the burden. This discourse depicted the primary state (the state in which the discourse took place) in relation to its position to others, using predicates as: join others, follow the lead, cooperate with, along with others, have contributed to, be part of, share international burden, and, do its part. Focusing on the predicates and metaphors used to construct discourses, my analysis of newspaper coverage focuses primarily on the representational function of communicative acts: how the contents of newspapers represent some "aspect of the world. To do this, I classified all articles, editorials and letters to the editor in each text source based on the prominent forms of representation: humanitarian-securitised, communitarian-securitised or, in one case, international-securitised. 1 classified the content of the newsprint sources based upon the use of predicates and metaphors that identified the primary referent object of security and the appropriate security provider. As noted in the previous sections, securitised discourses employ a large number of predicates 3 2 to depict the actors they seek to identify and most are used in a straightforward manner, such as 'asylum seekers may be terrorists' or 'we must behave in line with our identity as a humanitarian state'. Unfortunately, not all are so straightforward. Oftentimes, similar themes or predicates are employed in multiple discourses. Additionally, predicates are often employed in a contradictory manner or in counterintuitive fashion. The use of irony and sarcasm complicate the matter further, and force the discourse analyst to not simply 'count' predicates to establish dominant discourses, but to analyze the context in which they are used. Additionally, as noted earlier, the aim of news articles is to provide facts about reality in a neutral manner; to do so, most news articles present both sides of the story. The articles under examination in this study follow this structure and therefore often contain multiple discourses; they identify numerous referent objects and security providers. Despite this common practice, news articles tend to favor one interpretation, or one side of the story, as the official and accepted interpretation of events. This interpretation is often presented first and is given most of the space. Competing accounts are usually presented last, citing less authoritative figures.37 Letters to the editor and editorials are less complicated, as they clearly attempt to persuade readers of one interpretation of events; rarely identifying multiple referent objects or security providers. To establish the dominant discourse, each news piece was categorized based on the dominant representation depicted in the piece. This was determined by which representation was most prominent; based on the general tone of the piece, total space devoted to one representation over another, the positioning of the competing discourses in the piece, and the importance and influence of the authorities cited to support each representation. A l l newspaper pieces contain some ambiguity and there is room for 3 7 Reah, Danuta. 2002. The Language of Newspapers. London: Routledge. 33 interpretation; yet Reah notes that there are clear signals as to what messages are dominant and that newspapers have proven to be interpreted fairly consistently across a number of studies.38 1 am confident that my reading and categorization of each news piece is accurate and is consistent with the conclusions that would be drawn by any reasonable reader. Furthermore, my method of categorization makes the discourse analysis undertaken in this study reliable and replicable. When the nouns, predicates and metaphors attached to a particular representation (humanitarian, communitarian or international) was the predominant mode of representation in a given news piece, that news piece was classified accordingly. In cases where multiple representations were presented more or less equally, the news piece was classified based on which representation occurred first (in the headline or opening paragraph). Additional Sites of Discourse (Re) Production To further support the patterns identified in the textual analysis of newspaper articles, editorials and letters to the editor, I have examined Parliamentary speeches and debates, transcripts of radio interviews, and conducted expert interviews. Rather than relying on a single discursive source, such as debates or a single newspaper, Milliken suggests the examination of multiple language texts produced by different people/organizations presumed to be authorized speakers/writers of a dominant discourse. For this study, in addition to the examination of five newsprint media sources covering the ideological, economic and geographical divisions within each state, I examine the texts/speeches produced by state leaders, primarily those of the governing and primary opposition party. Other text/speech sources such as: talkback radio shows; senior military 34 officers; bureaucrats; NGO's; and foreign political leaders, are included when relevant, i.e. when they have entered into the public discourse. Milliken notes that establishing a discourse through predicate or metaphorical analysis is insufficient; it is important to explain how this discourse produces the world. She argues that this has been done in three ways in the international relations literature: foreign policy studies, international relations theory and international diplomacy/organization. Foreign policy studies address discursive productivity by analyzing how an elite's regime of truth made possible certain courses of action by a state 39 while excluding other possibilities as unintelligible. International relations theory focuses on how academic knowledge fuses with policy-makers to make up a dominant intellectual/policy perspective. International diplomacy/organization focuses on how diplomatic interchanges and organizational knowledge contribute to the discursive production of authorities and experts and their networks.40 For this study, I will primarily be using the foreign policy studies approach to show how the elite's 'regime of truth' made possible certain courses of action. Milliken claims, and rightly so, that this type of analysis relies on counter-factual reasoning about how, i f the significative system and its objects had been different, a different policy might have been possible. By comparing two cases, this study has a stronger basis than strictly counter-factual reasoning. By examining two cases that cover the same issue, it is plausible to claim that different policy choices are possible when the significative systems are different. 3 9 Milliken, Jennifer. 1999. "The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods." European Journal of International Relations 5:225-54. 4 0 Ibid. 35 Chapter Three: Literature Review and Competing Perspectives Scholars working on immigration and border control issues have succeeded in identifying a number of important factors influencing state responses to migration. These include the role of courts, ethnic groups, historical ties between sending and receiving states and geopolitical factors. These factors figure prominently in distinct theoretical approaches to the study of. immigration policy such as globalization theory, world systems theory and liberal states theory.41 Some of these theories, in addition to explaining the source of immigration policy, aim to provide an explanation for the failure of control policies.4 2 Others provide an explanation of the unique policy choices of individual states.43 Common to many of these theoretical approaches is a conviction that the state no longer controls its borders. Such conclusions are largely based on the discrepancy between the stated policy objectives of governments in their efforts to restrict unwanted immigration, and the unintended and ineffective outcomes of these policies. This discrepancy has been referred to as the immigration gap.4 4 The argument, in short, is that i f a state increases the number of border guards to stop illegal immigration, but the number of illegal immigrants continues to rise, then clearly the policies have failed and the state has demonstrated an inability to control its borders. 4 1 Castells, Manuel. 1989. The Informational City. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, and Jacobsen, David. 1996. Rights Across Borders. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, and Sassen, Saskia. 1996. Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization. New York: Columbia University Press. 4 2 Freeman, Gary. 2001. "Client Politics or Populism? Immigration Reform in the United States." in Controlling a New Migration World, edited by V. a. J. Guiradon, C. London: Routledge, Joppke, Christian. 1998. "Why Liberal States Accept Unwanted Immigration." World Politics 50:266-93. 4 3 Hansen, Randall. 2002. "Globalization, Embedded Realism and Path Dependence: the Other Immigrants to Europe." Comparative Political Studies 35:259-83. 4 4 Hollifield, James. 2000. "The Politics of International Migration." in Migration Theory, edited by B. a. Hollifield. New York: Routledge. 36 This study does not specifically address whether or not states can control their borders, though its findings provide insight into this debate. I argue that the debate over whether or not states control their borders is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of control. Control, like security, is socially constructed through discursive practices. There are no objective criteria by which control can be measured; rather control is assessed against socially constructed and politically debated criteria. As such, state leaders provide evidence of control, often based on arrest rates and successful deportations, to show that the state maintains control of cross border movement; while segments of the media and other societal actors provide evidence indicating the state's lack of control of cross border movement, such as numbers of illegal migrants or visa over-stayers. Consequently, the debate over whether the state has control over its borders is primarily a debate between state and societal leaders over the acceptable criterion of what counts as control. In arguing that the state no longer controls its borders, the globalist arguments are, in fact, claiming that state policy cannot impact the flow of international migration. Contrary to such claims, I will show that states are not merely bystanders subject to the push and pull forces of migration, but that state policy actually impacts these forces. Once the issue of migration has become securitised, most western democratic states have the means necessary to significantly alter the flow of international migration and, in so doing, provide evidence for the claim that it has re-established control over its borders. My claim, that discursive practices grant policy makers the means to address a threat, challenges the common assumption of the immigration literature that immigration policy and its effectiveness is determined by non-discursive means. Based on the research 37 of immigration scholars, many have concluded that states lack the tools to effectively manage international migration. My basic claim is that how an issue is framed limits the range of policies available to policy makers. Failure to implement policies that effectively manage migration does not indicate that the state is incapable of doing so, but rather, that the policies are not available based on the current discursive framework. Those who question whether states have the means to counter unwanted immigration base this on the assumption that the policies states have implemented to restrict unwanted immigration represents the full range of tools available to them. In this study, I show that the processes they describe as limiting the state's ability to control immigration are contextual and changeable, and that states have demonstrated an ability to manage immigration flows once the issue has been framed as a security threat to the state. There are two broad theoretical perspectives through which scholars have grappled with immigration policy and the constraints that states face regarding their ability to manage it effectively. Randall Hansen refers to these two approaches as the globalization and the embedded realist theses.45 While I have adopted Hansen's use of the term 'globalization' to describe one school of thought regarding immigration control, 1 have not adopted the 'embedded realist' term. For the purposes of this project, the term 'embedded realism' may create an unnecessary association with the more encompassing realist or neo-realist theory of international relations, whose approach regarding constraints on the ability of states to control immigration differs markedly from other theories included under Hansen's 'embedded realist' umbrella. Instead, I have adopted the term 'statist approach'. This approach claims that rationally motivated nation-states 4 5 Hansen, Randall. 2002. "Globalization, Embedded Realism and Path Dependence: the Other Immigrants to Europe." Comparative Political Studies 35:259-83. 38 have an interest in restricting certain types of immigration, but that there are institutional constraints limiting this aim. 4 6 In the case of asylum seekers and refugees, there exist international and domestic constraints that limit the effectiveness of governments to restrict this particular type of immigration. The statist approach insists on the primacy of the state in the international system and in the determination of domestic and foreign policy, including border control and immigration policy. The globalization literature, while still maintaining a focus on the state, claims that the primacy of the state has eroded due to international structural change. In essence, globalization scholars claim that states and societies have become increasingly enmeshed in worldwide systems and networks of interactions.47 This has diminished the ability of the state to act autonomously and, as such, a state acts based on its involvement in the international community, out of economic considerations or ideological commitments to human rights. While these two broad approaches offer competing accounts of migration control policies, neither is uniform in its assertions. The statist approach differs not only in the varying accounts of the ability of the state to overcome institutional constraints as it attempts to manage immigration, but also in the key actors who affect policy. So, too, the globalization approach does not provide one account of immigration policy, but rather, presents a number of theories that make claims on how much globalization has affected the ability of states and also whether this represents a positive development or not. As a result of these differences, neither general theoretical perspective has been able to Held, David and McGrew, A . 2000. "The Great Globalization Debate." in The Global Transformations Reader, edited by D. a. M . Held, A . Cambridge: Polity Press. 39 provide a political theory of immigration. It is not my purpose in this study to settle the ongoing debate between these competing theoretical perspectives. Rather I seek to address an area of immigration policy formation that has been overlooked in the current debate both within and between these approaches. Before placing my work within the general debate, it is important to provide a short summary of what existing theories have to say regarding state efforts to manage immigration. Globalization scholars have been among the most active political scientists studying new security threats, including border control and immigration policy. The term 'globalization' has become a highly misunderstood and overused concept; it has been used to account for many changes that have occurred in the international system. The general thrust of the globalization argument is that international interaction in the economic and political sphere has restricted the ability of states to act unilaterally or effectively. Scholars have shown how this increased interaction has contributed to the diminished capacity of states to implement policies affecting the environment, . international trade, currency, border control and the use of force.49 Globalization theory as used in this study includes such varying theoretical perspectives as globalist theory, world systems theory, and network. theory.50 These theories can be loosely lumped together as globalization theories as they share certain common tenets; namely, that increased interaction, movement and interdependence between states and societies have limited the ability of states to enact effective border 4 8 Hollifield, James. 2000. "The Politics of International Migration." in Migration Theory, edited by B. a. Hollifield. New York: Routledge. 4 9 Hurrell, Andrew. 1994. "A Crisis of Ecological Viability? Global Environmental Change and the Nation-State." Political Studies 42:146-65, Sassen, Saskia. 1996. Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization. New York: Columbia University Press, Simmons, P.J. and deJonge, C. 2001. "Managing Global Issues: Lessons Learned." Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 5 0 Massey, Douglas. 1993. "Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal." Population and Development Review 19. 4 0 control policies. These theories share the claim that increased interaction has had two effects: 1) it has altered state interests with regard to immigration and 2) it has diminished the capacity of states to unilaterally manage immigration into the state. While these are two central tenets, it is important to note that there exist different causal mechanisms involved in these varying theories that I have crudely lumped under globalization theory. Globalist Theory The globalist theory of immigration is largely associated with Saskia Sassen. For Sassen, significant elements of immigration and border control policy have shifted from states to supranational institutions that serve to limit the policy choices that are available to states.51 Primarily this has occurred within the European context, as there has been a significant shift in defining immigration policy to the EU and the European Court of Human Rights. Outside of Europe, Sassen notes that an increasing number of bilateral and multilateral agreements remove policy-making decisions out of state hands; however, the shifts seen in other parts of the world are far less robust than the shift that has occurred in the European context.- According to Sassen, the emergence of an international human rights regime has impacted the identity and interests of states. States that identify with the protection of human rights have altered their policies toward immigration and refugee movements. This move has been due to the incompatibility of having the increasingly free movement of goods, services and capital coupled with a seemingly contradictory control over the movement of labor. For the globalist school, the shift from the nation-state's management of immigration to supra-national bodies is viewed almost exclusively as a positive 5 1 Sassen, Saskia. 1998. "The defacto Transnationalizing of immigration policy." in Challenge to the Nation State, edited by C. Joppke. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 5 2 Ibid. 41 development. They associate it with an overall increase in human rights acceptance and the expansion of an international society based on the free movement of peoples, goods, capital and ideas. The near universal acceptance of the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol attests to the credibility of the globalist argument. In the cases examined in this study, it is clear that the international refugee regime has impacted the border control policies of both Canada and Australia. Both states have demonstrated a commitment to the resettlement of refugees and to work with international organizations like the UNHCR and the IOM to that end. This study presents an ideal opportunity to test the strength of the globalist argument. Based on the globalist theory, we would expect to find that a significant divergence in refugee policy is due to a significant difference in the states' devotion to universal human rights and to the strength and number of universal human rights agreements that they have ratified. We expect a divergence of policies between those who have ratified human rights agreements, particularly the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol, and those who have not. The globalist theory is not particularly suited to explain the divergence in policies between states that show little variation in terms of their devotion and adherence to the principles of universal human rights, as measured by ratification of human rights agreements. Canada and Australia have both ratified the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol, and both are represented on the Executive Committee responsible for refugee rights issues. These states are both signatories to a host of other human rights treaties that impact the treatment of asylum seekers, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Organization for Migration, the Convention Against Torture and the Covenant on the Protection of the 4 2 Rights of Children. Clearly, both Canada and Australia show an equally shared commitment to universal human rights based on the agreements they are party to. The globalist argument faces significant problems. The first such issue is an over-reliance and oversimplification of the EU as a model. While the movement of people within the E U indicates an erosion of national borders, the hardening of the exterior borders of the EU indicates a strong sense of 'other'. The erosion of identities within Europe may indicate a general trend toward the erosion of national identities, but it may also indicate the creation of a larger identity with a strong sense of 'self and 'other', with less salutary implications for immigration than that implied by globalist theory. There are strong indications that the harmonization of asylum policy in Europe has actually resulted in less generous protection offered to refugees, and an increased restrictiveness of border controls rather than increasing the level of protection for refugees as expected under the globalist approach.53 The second problem has been the failure to show in any systematic way that states respond to an international human rights regime rather than to their own domestic liberal ideology. For many liberal states, their domestic obligations toward refugees and asylum seekers are significantly more demanding than those imposed by international agreements. We would expect that in states where it was the international human rights regime that was restricting the policy options of states rather than domestic values, that the commitments created by the international standard would be a greater imposition than that imposed by domestic legislation. In the case of Australia, we see that efforts have been made to restrict access to domestic protections that expand on its actual 5 3 Brerman, Frank. 2003. Tampering With Asylum: A Universal Humanitarian Problem. St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press. 4 3 international obligations. The ability of states to interpret the international refugee regime as stringently or as loosely as they see fit makes it less binding than the globalist approach portrays. A third problem facing the globalist school concerns multilateral and bilateral immigration agreements that do not. advance the human rights regime. A number of these agreements exist to either keep populations from leaving their state or to have them repatriated, such as the Orderly Departure Program, the Comprehensive Plan of Action and the 1994 and 1995 U.S.-Cuba migration agreements. The rise of safe third country agreements also indicates a regression of refugee rights. A final problem facing the globalist school is to provide evidence that the shift to supra-national authorities is actually occurring worldwide and that such a shift is meaningful or irreversible. The fact that both Canada and Australia appear equally committed to human rights, yet exhibit variation in their policies toward asylum seekers, does not lead to a complete dismissal of the globalist argument. It is not clear that the international human rights and refugee treaties that Canada and Australia are party to have had a similar impact on these states' border control policies. This leads to a slight modification of the globalist argument. While adherence to human rights agreements has shaped the immigration policies of many states, the implementation of these agreements is often contingent upon domestic interpretations of their obligations and particularly upon socially constructed perceptions of national identity and threat. World Systems World systems theory differs from the globalist school in both the causal mechanisms affecting states' management of immigration and its view of such change. 44 World system theorists argue that advanced capitalist economies rely on reserves of accessible and inexpensive labor to function.54 According to this theory, a system of international migration provides this cheap labor and as such is purposefully maintained by capitalist states. Furthermore, the expansion of capitalism into peripheral, non-capitalist states creates conditions contributing to international migration.55 Initially created through the colonization process and then sustained by the international trade regime, the capitalist system spread around the globe as production sought out new markets, resources and cheap labor. The changes that capitalization heaped upon these societies caused massive social disruption and forced much of the local population off the land. The physical and ideational connections needed to link the capitalist core with the capitalizing periphery paved the way for these displaced populations to migrate to the core.5 6 According to world systems theory, international migration is not so much the problem, but is both a symptom of capitalist expansion and a means to maintain access to cheap labor. In other words, the capitalist states' primary interest is in maintaining an immigration system that benefits the advanced capitalist states. Meaningful change to this immigration system would require a significant alteration of the world economic structure. Based on the world systems theory, we would expect all capitalist states that benefit from immigration to create and adopt policies most likely to maintain the immigration system from which they benefit. In many ways, the cases used in this study 5 4 Cornelius, Wayne. 1998. "The Structural Embeddedness of Demand for Mexican Immigrant Labor: New Evidence from California." in Crossings: Mexican Immigration in Interdisciplinary Perspectives, edited by Suarez-Orozco. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 5 5 Castells, Manuel. 1989. The Informational City. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 5 6 Massey, Douglas. 1993. "Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal." Population and Development Review 19. 45 support such a claim. The increasing importance of economic migration in Canada and Australia show how these two states use the immigration system to their advantage. However, the fact that both these states still encourage family reunification and humanitarian migration suggests that there are more factors at work than mere economic considerations. Additionally, we would expect states that benefit so clearly from the current migration system to display equal concern for the control and maintenance of that system. Yet the policies implemented to deal with international migration in Australia exhibit a far greater concern with control than in Canada, suggesting that economic 57 factors alone cannot explain efforts to maintain control of international migration. In addition to being unable to explain variation between capitalist states in their efforts to maintain and control the immigration system, world systems theory faces other problems. The biggest problem is to empirically support their claims, not only with regard to the nature of the capitalist core and the non-capitalist periphery, but also with regard to assumptions about the forces of immigration. Perhaps the most fundamental problem facing the world systems theory is its oversimplification of state identity. It relies on an unsupportable claim that the identity and interests of the state is determined solely by its economic system - capitalism. This rather simplistic view of states overlooks the multiple identities of states and how these might impact immigration policy. Network Theory Unlike the globalist or world systems theory, network theory argues that immigration occurs because of established non-state migration systems. Network theory 5 7 Dauvergne, Catherine. 2005. Humanitarianism, Identity, and Nation: Migration Laws of Australia and Canada. Vancouver: UBC Press. 4 6 actually includes a number of theories including path dependence, network theory, and institutional theory. These theories argue, much like world systems theory, that migration flows were initiated by colonial connections or capitalist expansion. The difference between world systems theory and network theory is that the international migration system is maintained by non-state actors rather than by the activities of capitalist states. This version of the international migration system argues that immigration continues CQ despite state attempts to stop or control these flows. This can occur for a variety of reasons, including the creation of immigrant networks linking two societies, the rise of pro-immigration institutions or industries operating both domestically and internationally, or the declining costs of iterated migration that make immigration between a core and periphery continuous and relatively stable. Networks and immigration industries are created and sustained by global cultural interchange, facilitated by improved transport and the proliferation of print and electronic media.5 9 While the central arguments offer subtle differences, at their core, network theory claims that increased contact and migration between two societies creates links that lead to further migration between these two societies. Network theory improves on globalist and world systems theories, because it offers an explanation for the idiosyncrasies of the immigration populations of different states. The strength of these approaches is that they can account for the particular categories of immigration and the variance within each category.60 Thus the large Turkish population in Germany and Algerians in France can only be understood through understanding the unique connections between the 5 8 Massey, Douglas. 1993. "Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal." Population and Development Review 19. 5 9 Castles, Stephen and Miller, Mark. 2003. The Age of Migration. New York: Pelgrave MacMillan. 6 0 Hansen, Randall. 2002. "Globalization, Embedded Realism and Path Dependence: the Other Immigrants to Europe." Comparative Political Studies 35:259-83. 47 immigrant-sending and immigrant-receiving state. These migration systems are relatively stable; however, network theory concedes that it is possible for flows and patterns to change. These changes occur due to social change, economic fluctuations or political upheaval, rather than state policies.61 The problem with network theory is that it is apolitical - it ignores the role of the state. Links between societies are frequently attributed to activities of the state in times past, but little attention is paid to how the state can impact these links and networks in the present. Additionally, network theory tends to underestimate the role of the state in the creation of new connections and networks, and fails to account for why and when states act to break up these networks. The strength of network theories is that they incorporate the unique historical processes that have affected immigration in each state. They account for the rise of migration industries and institutions that have an interest in maintaining particular migration flows. Thus, immigration policy is best understood in relation to the strength of the migration industry, (i.e. lawyers, agents, recruiters) operating in the region and within the state itself. However, based on this theory, it is difficult to provide any expectations on how states facing strong migration networks would react. We might expect that states facing a strong, well-established migration industry are likely to adopt restrictive policies aimed at controlling migration. However, it is equally plausible that states with strong migration networks are unable to adopt such restrictive policies. Clearly, because network theory largely ignores the role of the state, it provides no testable hypothesis concerning the state. However, it does create an expectation that state policies do not impact migration flows. Border control policies 6 1 Massey, Douglas. 1993. "Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal." Population and Development Review 19. 48 adopted by states faced with strong migration networks are less likely to be able to impact established migration patterns. Australia and Canada provide an interesting test case. Though difficult to test, there seem to be equally strong migration networks and active migration industries operating in both states. The average annual intake of foreign nationals per. ten thousand population is higher in Australia than Canada. Over the period 1962-1991, Australia averaged 81 foreign national intakes per ten thousand population per year, versus 62 for Canada.62 These relatively high numbers have resulted in a high migrant stocks living in these states; in 1996, the migrants stock was 23.4% of Australia's population and 15.5% of Canada's.63 Based on these numbers, we would expect greater network strength in Australia due to the higher migrant stock living in that state; however, we find that Australia has successfully reduced the inflow of unauthorized asylum seekers, even those from societies with strong connections in Australia. Challenges Those who subscribe to the various strands of the globalization theses have not made it entirely clear whether globalization has reduced the policy choices available to states, or whether the process of globalization has reduced the ability of state control policies to impact cross border movement. There are indications that both arguments are being made. Sassen argues that political and economic globalization has limited the policy options available to states in their efforts to manage international migration.64 Castles and Miller argue that state policies have limited impact on preventing or reducing " Money, Jeanette. 1997. "No Vacancy: the Political Geography of Immigration Control in Advanced Industrial Countries." International Organization 51:685-720. 0 3 OECD. 2003. "International Migration." 6 4 Sassen, Saskia. 1996. Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization. New York: Columbia University Press. 49 international migration. Most globalization scholars agree that globalization has forced states to adopt immigration policies that serve to enhance international trade or particular international relationships at the expense of national security interests and domestic calls for restriction. Accordingly, these theories claim that short of drastic international economic change, there is little states can do to curtail international migration once these processes have begun. While the various strands of the globalization theories do provide valuable insight into immigration and border control policy, they cannot account for the variation in the border control policies among states that are capitalist, that subscribe to universal human rights and that house strong migration networks. There are significant difficulties with the general globalization argument. The forces of globalization, such as increased economic interdependence, the spread of human rights and the spread of capitalism, have exerted pressure on states to accept higher levels of particular types of international migration, but not others. The problem is that these theories have ignored the forces of fragmentation that globalization produces alongside the forces of unification. The hardening of identities and the securing of borders that fragmentation produces, even in liberal democracies, undermine the globalization theorists' position(s) that its humanitarian or economic interests alone determine the interests of a state. Overall, these theories provide important insight into how particular state identities, interests and activities have affected international migration; however, they fail to sufficiently problematise state identity. In most cases, these theories replace the static vision of the state supplied by neo-realist theory with a static vision of their own. Reducing the state to its economic interests or to its commitment to international human rights ignores the competing identities and interests 6 5 Castles, Stephen and Miller, Mark. 2003. The Age of Migration. New York: Pelgrave MacMillan. 50 within states. As noted earlier, the globalization thesis also fails to account for variation in immigration policies, particularly within the advanced, capitalist, liberal core. This study contends that the international refugee regime constructed the relationship between states and humanitarian migrants, constituting refugees and asylum seekers as relevant actors in the international system. I argue that the implementation of the refugee regime has not eradicated or weakened the state's control of its borders. Rather, I argue that the international refugee regime formed part of a larger international structure designed to maintain the state as the primary actor in international affairs and in setting immigration and border control policy. Furthermore, I argue that the construction of unauthorized migration as a security issue leads to the 'trumping' of international humanitarian obligations and capitalist economic interests. In many cases, these security concerns override the economic benefits of global trade and commerce and the established links between emigrant-producing and immigrant-receiving states. Despite its weaknesses, the various strands of globalization theory have made significant contributions to the immigration literature, contributions this thesis intends to build on. Globalization theory has shown that there are strong international constraints against state attempts to restrict unauthorized migration. However, it is important to demonstrate that the success that the spread of international human rights has had in influencing refugee and asylum policy is neither fixed nor irreversible. Statist Approaches The statist approach describes a number of theories that claim that rationally motivated nation states seek to restrict particular types of immigration, but that they face certain domestic institutional constraints against doing so. Included in this school of 51 thought are market theory, liberal state theory, and democratic state theory. While they can all be classified as statist approaches, they differ in terms of what interests states act on and how much states are actually constrained from acting. Market Theory The various strands of market theory shape our basic understanding of the process and motivations for international migration. Like world systems theory, market theories identify states based on their economic position in the world, which then forms their interests and needs. Market theory contends that international migration occurs as a result of pull rather than push factors associated with the maintenance of the capitalist system, and focuses on the pull factors that advanced industrial states have on the populations of less industrially advanced states. Basic market theory argues that high unemployment and low wages at home, combined with employment and higher wages abroad, encourage individual workers or families to migrate.66 Receiving states benefit from this low cost labour, while sending states benefit from exporting excess labour and from remittances. According to this theory, the market itself essentially manages levels of migration. A more nuanced version of this argument, referred to as dual market theory, claims that industrial states have a built-in demand for immigrant labour due to structural inflation, 67 motivational problems, labour supply and economic dualism. This built-in demand means that employers are forced to recruit labor from less-developed states, without 68 increasing wages for this type of work or disrupting the social employment hierarchy. 6 6 Todaro, Michael. 1976. International Migration in Developing Countries. Geneva: International Labour Office. 6 7 Piore, Michael. 1979. Birds of Passage: Migrant Labor in Industrial Societies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 6 8 The social hierarchy of employment implies that there are normative claims regarding the worth of certain types of work. Individual's identity and self-worth are often defined by their employment and thus are unwilling to take certain jobs. Immigrants fill this void in the labor market because they are unaffected 52 These market theories contribute to our understanding of immigration by showing how the market influences the type of immigration that states want, and acts as a pull mechanism inducing large numbers of migrants to seek entrance into wealthy states. However, it has less to say about refugees or those who are pushed from their home states for non-economic related reasons. In many cases, the widespread acceptance and prevalence of the market theory of migration offers an opportunity for those seeking to limit humanitarian migration by describing them as economic migrants. It is important to note the limitations that market theory has, particularly in its treatment, or lack thereof, of non-economic migration. Like world systems theory, we would expect that border control policies will reflect market needs and that states would have an economic interest in maintaining an immigration system that benefits their states economically. Thus, market theory explains nicely why states bring in low cost laborers and highly educated foreign nationals, but has little to say about why particular states prefer certain races or permanent migration rather than temporary workers. Neither does it adequately explain the role of the market in influencing levels of humanitarian migration. Based on market theory, we would expect states to restrict all types of immigration, even humanitarian, when the market requires it, i.e. when unemployment is high. Scholars have noted recently that this central tenet of market theory is questionable, as migration no longer seems to mirror the business cycle and unemployment trends.69Ultimately, market theory fails to account for state efforts to restrict migration when the market does not require it. Thus during the by the societal norms associated with such work in that particular society and because as emigrant workers they fall into a higher place in the labour hierarchy in their home state. (Massey et al, 1993) 6 9 Colin, D'Vera. 2004. "Area Immigration Booming." Pp. 01 in Washington Post. Washington. November 23,2004 53 economic downturn of the early 1990's, it was hardly surprising to see Australia enact policies aimed at reducing the number of economic migrants, as well as refugees and asylum seekers who had access to the socio-economic benefits of the state. What cannot be explained is why, once the economy recovered, restrictions against asylum seekers were not lifted as they were for other types of migrants. In fact, restrictions increased during the 1990's while the economy continued to improve. Nor does it explain why Canada's immigrant and refugee intake went largely unchanged in the face of economic downturn during the same time period. Like other theories that attribute a single identity and interest to states, market theory fails to take into account states' humanitarian interests as well as their security concerns. Liberal States Much of the political science literature that deals with border control has focused on the unique domestic political processes that occur within a liberal state that serves to limit its immigration policy options. The liberal states approach contends that policy makers are forced to consider how immigration policy may affect migrant rights. The argument is that courts in liberal states protect and expand migrant rights, often against the wishes of the state. The courts are essentially treated as an autonomous actor within the state, acting to constrain the legislative and executive branches as they attempt to restrict immigration. Liberal state theorists argue that liberal states have been unable to implement policies that would restrict unwanted immigration due to activist and 70 autonomous legal systems. These authors have argued that states have in fact enacted restrictive legislation in an effort to restrict unwanted immigration but have been 7 0 Hollifield, James. 2000. "The Politics of International Migration." in Migration Theory, edited by B. a. Hollifield. New York: Routledge, Joppke, Christian. 1998. "Why Liberal States Accept Unwanted Immigration." World Politics 50:266-93. 54 thwarted by the courts, who over the course of the last half-century, have gradually extended many rights to non-citizens - including unwanted and unauthorized immigrants. This theoretical approach has relied heavily on a few case studies where policies aimed at restricting immigration are overturned by the courts. In such cases, the judiciary has overruled restrictive legislation as either unconstitutional or in violation of universal human rights.71 Liberal state theory, as presented, tends to overstate the autonomy of the courts. Few would argue that courts are completely autonomous and as free to overturn legislation as this brief outline of the theory implies. As seen in Australia, the executive and legislative branches are not helpless in the face of the judiciary and do maintain the power necessary to implement restrictive policies i f they choose to. Thus, while the liberal state theorists have shown how the courts have influence on policy makers, they concede that autonomous liberal courts are unlikely to overturn immigration restrictions when they are a matter of national security, or have come at a high political cost to policy makers. It is this important caveat that this study seeks to explore. The claim that courts are unlikely to act in matters of national security indicates that the autonomy and interests of the court are contextual and changeable. It illustrates the power that 'national security' has, particularly for those who wield the power to determine what qualifies as an issue of national security. Based on the liberal courts argument, we would expect that states that have succeeded in implementing restrictive immigration laws do not have autonomous judiciaries. Our case studies provide a good test of the hypothesis as both Canada and 7 1 Joppke, Christian. 1998. "Why Liberal States Accept Unwanted Immigration." World Politics 50:266-93, —. 2001. "The Legal-Domestic Sources of Immigrant Rights: the U.S., Germany and the EU." Comparative Political Studies 34:339-66. 7 2 Joppke, Christian. 2001. "The Legal-Domestic Sources of Immigrant Rights: the U.S., Germany and the EU." Comparative Political Studies 34:339-66. 55 Australia have liberal activist judicial branches. The difference is that Australian governments have actively attempted to remove the judiciary from border control issues and from reviewing refugee decisions, and have even attempted to keep asylum seekers 73 ignorant of their rights and out of contact with migration lawyers. Canada has attempted to limit the scope of judicial review on asylum decisions, but has not gone to the extent that Australia has to keep the courts out of border control policy or to deny migrants their rights. Some have argued that this is due to the existence of a Charter of Rights and Freedoms in Canada, and the lack of an equivalent in Australia. While this has no doubt played a role in the policies each state has adopted, there are means by which the Canadian authorities could bypass the Charter to ensure that border control remains in the hands of the executive branch. This cannot be explained by the existence of the Charter itself, but I propose, is due to the fact that the Canadian government has not attempted to remove the courts from the refugee process because attempts to construct refugees and asylum seekers as an existential threat to the state have failed. Democratic States The democratic state theory claims that interest group politics plays an important role in democratic states, particularly with regard to immigration. Business groups, humanitarian agencies and ethnic interests-all act as special interest groups who influence the immigration policies of democratic states. Scholars who examine immigration control from the democratic state perspective, claim that these interest groups have prevented democracies from restricting immigration flows, or from adopting policies that would 7 3 Brennan, Frank. 2003. Tampering With Asylum: A Universal Humanitarian Problem. St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press. 56 make such a goal more likely. The thrust of the argument is that the costs and benefits of immigration are unevenly distributed in society, with the benefits of immigration going to a small group who are extremely vocal and powerful, and who lobby hard for more open immigration. The costs of immigration, meanwhile, are greatly spread out, thus reducing the salience of the issue to those bearing its costs. 7 5 The concentration of benefits allows these particular groups to mobilize and influence election outcomes as well as the policy-making of their elected leaders. The communities who favor immigration are typically ethnic minority groups, faith-based and humanitarian-based charitable groups, and the business community who prospers from the type of labor that is typically provided by immigrants. According to this approach, it is the ability of these groups to influence national policies in democratic states that determines immigration control policy. From the domestic political approach, the contest over immigration control policy is between the states' policy makers responding to the anti-immigration public on one hand and the domestic pro-immigration influences on the other. The ongoing contest between these two groups constitutes the 'normal' political discourse on immigration control policy in democratic states. This theoretical approach does not conclude that pro-immigration forces always succeed and that democratic, liberal states are on a trajectory toward increasingly open immigration systems. Scholars who focus on the domestic political processes in liberal democracies note that the resistance to immigration restriction is not irreversible. 7 6 7 4 Freeman, Gary. 2001. "Client Politics or Populism? Immigration Reform in the United States." in Controlling a New Migration World, edited by V . a. J. Guiradon, C . London: Routledge, Money , Jeanette. 1997. " N o Vacancy: the Poli t ical Geography of Immigration Control in Advanced Industrial Countries." International Organization 51:685-720. 7 5 Freeman, Gary. 1995. "Modes of Immigration Politics in Liberal Democratic States." International Migration Review 29:881-902. 7 6 Joppke, Christian. 1998. " W h y Liberal States Accept Unwanted Immigration." World Politics 50:266-93. 57 Based on the democratic states theory, we would expect democratic states with large pro-immigration ethnic and business groups and large numbers of humanitarian organizations to have less restrictive immigration control policies. As noted earlier, migrant stock is actually higher in Australia. Thus, we expect that there would be more pro-immigration interest group pressure. This is not the case. Pro-immigrant groups are much more active in Canada, supporting the democratic states theory that immigration control policy is limited by interest groups. This is an important finding and one that encourages the examination of the processes by which pro-immigrant groups are more active in Canada than in Australia, when we would not expect this given the larger number of immigrants per capita living in Australia. Thus, the difference must reflect how immigrant groups are encouraged to become involved in Canadian immigration policy making, or perhaps conversely, how immigrant groups have influenced, or are discouraged from becoming involved in, Australian immigration policy making. Thus, my work does not seek to replace the democratic states theory, but rather to work alongside it to explain how certain groups have been excluded from immigration policy discourse. Challenges While the statist approaches provide a good understanding of the normal political discourse on immigration control policy that takes place within liberal democracies, their central claim that these processes have rendered policy makers incapable of impacting the flow of unwanted immigration is problematic. The first problem with this claim is its reliance on the immigration gap as its primary evidence that restrictive policies have failed. Scholars, such as Peter Andreas, have astutely observed that the existence of the 58 immigration gap should not too readily be used to assert that states are incapable of managing immigration. He argues that the apparent ineffectiveness of state efforts to restrict unwanted immigration might not be due to the inability of states to restrict immigration, but that these measures are implemented to appease public demand for immigration control, with full knowledge that these measures will be largely ineffective.77 Andreas claims that to appease the general public, political leaders make an effort to appear to be doing everything in their power to prevent unwanted immigration. All the while they enact ineffective policies in an effort to either appease the domestic constituents who demand increased immigration or to abide by ideological commitments to less restrictive immigration. Thus, those who cite policy failure as evidence of state incapacity, neglect that policy failure may be an intentional strategy; an effort to balance fhecompeting interests and identities within states. The second problem is that those who make these claims assume that the processes they describe are unchangeable. Statist scholars describe the ordinary process of immigration policy making, but have overlooked instances where security concerns have suspended or over-ridden the ordinary political process. Thus, the internment of Japanese in Canada during WWII or detention of Muslim men after 9/11 in the United States is ordinarily incomprehensible from the statist perspective, but when put in a security context is possible. Similarly, the statist approaches have neglected the difference between policy makers attempting to address immigration through the ordinary political process and policy makers being granted the right to use extraordinary means to prevent a security threat. This study will show that in some cases, policy makers have 7 7 Andreas, Peter. 2000. Border Games: Policing the U.S. - Mexico Divide. London: Cornell University Press, and Joppke, Christian. 2001. "The Legal-Domestic Sources of Immigrant Rights: the U.S., Germany and the EU." Comparative Political Studies 34:339-66. 59 sidelined the ordinary political process and have used extraordinary means to manage unwanted immigration to rather successful ends. This thesis explains how this happens. Lastly, these theories assume that identities and interests are given. Most treat political leaders as rational actors who follow the strategy most likely to keep them in power. Interest groups and courts are also assumed to have a static identity and interest. They neglect that these actors have multiple identities and interests that are contextual and changeable. I argue that i f immigration becomes securitised, these groups are unlikely to act solely and always as these theories predict. Conclusion A s the preceding sections demonstrate, globalization and statist approaches to understanding border control policies inadequately explain changes and variation in border control policies aimed at humanitarian migration. The factors they identify as influencing policy creation and implementation are contextual and based on discursive practices, rather than static national interest. Ultimately, this project concludes that some liberal democratic states have begun to implement policies that cannot be understood within the current explanations. Just as these theories fail to account for the internment of Japanese in Canada during World War Two, they fail to account for the forcible return and lengthy detention of asylum seekers, particularly children. Defenders of the statist and globalization explanations explored in the previous section, might explain that when faced with a threat, the normal operating rules of immigration control policy are temporarily suspended until the threat passes. For instance, Christian Joppke, in explaining the role o f liberal courts, provides such an argument when he states that courts are unlikely to overrule restrictive legislation when it 60 is a matter of national security. What is of crucial importance, is to understand how security threats are constructed, rather than treating them as objective, observable facts that then suspend the normal operating constraints of globalization and liberal democratic politics. In essence, the constraints can be overcome by the actions of influential members of the political and societal elite constructing migration as a security threat for a political end, one of which may be to circumvent the normally operating constraints against restricting migration. The security literature is essentially based on this premise, arguing that during times of emergency, the state must enact extreme measures to defend itself against a threat. However, the security literature is divided between those who argue that security threats are knowable, objective facts and those who argue that security threats are socially constructed. The fundamental claim of this study is that governments do not simply, respond automatically to objective conditions of threat, but that threats are constructed through discursive practices. Campbell makes such a claim with regard to the Cold War. He states, "it is not possible to explain the cold war by reference to the objective threat said to reside in the Soviet Union". 7 9 The same can be said with regard to variations in border control policy among liberal states - it is not possible to explain it simply by reference to objective threats resident in those who cross borders. In the following chapter, I examine how security scholars have attempted to deal with migration issues. In highlighting the ongoing debate between traditional realist 7 8 Joppke, Christian. 2001. "The Legal-Domestic Sources of Immigrant Rights: the U.S., Germany and the EU." Comparative Political Studies 34:339-66. 7 9 Campbell, David. 1992. Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 61 security scholars and their cr i t ical counterparts, w h o advocate the abandonment o f the study and pract ice o f state securi ty; I in t roduce a construct iv ist approach, as taken f r o m the Copenhagen school, to show h o w migra t ion has been cast as a security issue, both f r o m a state security perspective and a human security perspective. In do ing so, I contr ibute to the ongo ing debate by engaging w i t h state pract ice, but also b y reveal ing alternative practices o f security. 62 Chapter Four: Security and Immigration In the i n t r o d u c t o r y c h a p t e r , I i n t r o d u c e d the c e n t r a l p u z z l e that th is s t u d y a d d r e s s e s ; n a m e l y , h o w u n a u t h o r i z e d h u m a n i t a r i a n m i g r a t i o n h a s c o m e to b e v i e w e d as a threat i n l i b e r a l states that are s i g n a t o r y to the i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e f u g e e r e g i m e ; a n d , h o w w e c a n e x p l a i n v a r i a t i o n i n the i m m i g r a t i o n c o n t r o l p o l i c i e s that t h e y a d o p t . T h e p r i m a r y g o a l o f th is s t u d y is to a d v a n c e o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f h o w s o c i e t i e s a n d g o v e r n m e n t s c o n s t r u c t s e c u r i t y threats a n d h o w this i m p a c t s p o l i c y c h o i c e s . In d o i n g so , th i s p r o j e c t h a s i m p o r t a n t i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the s t u d y o f s e c u r i t y , as w e l l as m a k i n g a m o d e s t c o n t r i b u t i o n to the s t u d y o f i m m i g r a t i o n c o n t r o l p o l i c y . T h e p r o b l e m o f h o w a n i s sue , s u c h as u n a u t h o r i z e d h u m a n i t a r i a n m i g r a t i o n , h a s b e c o m e cast as a s e c u r i t y threat p l a c e s m y r e s e a r c h i n the m i d s t o f a n o n g o i n g d e b a t e w i t h i n the s e c u r i t y s tud ie s l i t era ture . T h i s c h a p t e r e x p l o r e s th is debate , a n d a r g u e s that a c o n s t r u c t i v i s t a p p r o a c h , b a s e d o n d i s c u r s i v e p r a c t i c e s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h s e c u r i t i s a t i o n , p r o v i d e s a n a l t e r n a t i v e to e n t r e n c h e d c a m p s o f rea l i s t a n d p o s t m o d e r n c r i t i c a l s e c u r i t y s tud ie s s c h o l a r s . I s h o w that c u r r e n t f o r m u l a t i o n s o f the s e c u r i t i s a t i o n p r o c e s s s u f f e r f r o m a n u m b e r o f w e a k n e s s e s ; these are the w e a k n e s s e s that m y e m p i r i c a l e x a m i n a t i o n o f the p r o c e s s a d d r e s s e s . T h e l i n k b e t w e e n m i g r a t i o n a n d s e c u r i t y is c e r t a i n l y n o t a n e w p h e n o m e n o n ; n e i t h e r b o r d e r c o n t r o l p o l i c i e s n o r r e f u g e e p o l i c i e s h a v e e v e r b e e n c o m p l e t e l y d i v o r c e d f r o m s e c u r i t y c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . T h e d i s c o u r s e s o n i m m i g r a t i o n i n b o t h C a n a d a a n d A u s t r a l i a h a v e r e f l e c t e d m i l i t a r y , p o l i t i c a l , e c o n o m i c , e n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d s o c i e t a l s e c u r i t y c o n c e r n s i n v a r y i n g d e g r e e s t h r o u g h o u t the h i s t o r i e s o f these states. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , the c u r r e n t t r e a t m e n t g i v e n to i m m i g r a t i o n i n the f i e l d o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s d o e s n o t r e f l e c t the l o n g - s t a n d i n g a s s o c i a t i o n b e t w e e n i m m i g r a t i o n a n d s e c u r i t y . A s a resu l t , 63 i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s t h e o r y h a s r e m a i n e d f o c u s e d o n w h e t h e r o r n o t the t o p i c o f i m m i g r a t i o n b e l o n g s i n the f i e l d o f s e c u r i t y s tud ies at a l l ; c o n s e q u e n t l y , it h a s c o n t r i b u t e d v e r y l i t t le to u n d e r s t a n d i n g h o w d i s c o u r s e s o n i m m i g r a t i o n a n d s e c u r i t y h a v e i m p a c t e d the p o l i c i e s that l i b e r a l d e m o c r a c i e s h a v e e n a c t e d to d e a l w i t h u n a u t h o r i z e d h u m a n i t a r i a n m i g r a t i o n . A s n o t e d i n the last c h a p t e r , w i t h a f e w n o t a b l e e x c e p t i o n s , l i k e M y r o n W e i n e r , the i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s l i t era ture h a s h a d v e r y l i t t le to s a y r e g a r d i n g i m m i g r a t i o n p o l i c y at a l l . T h e s c h o l a r s o f the C o p e n h a g e n s c h o o l a n d o t h e r s e c u r i t i s a t i o n theor i s t s h a v e a t t e m p t e d to a d d r e s s th i s s h o r t c o m i n g , a n d h a v e p r o v i d e d s o m e i n s i g h t i n t o h o w c e r t a i n t y p e s o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l m i g r a t i o n h a v e , a n d c a n b e , c o n s t r u c t e d as a s e c u r i t y threat , a n d h o w this a f fec t s m i g r a t i o n c o n t r o l p o l i c y . D e s p i t e the i m p o r t a n t c o n t r i b u t i o n s o f the C o p e n h a g e n s c h o o l to o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f i m m i g r a t i o n a n d s e c u r i t y , the t h e o r y a n d c o n c e p t s that t h e y h a v e d e v e l o p e d r e m a i n s o m e w h a t u n c l e a r a n d u n d e r s t u d i e d . T o f i l l i n s o m e o f the h o l e s i n the t h e o r y , 1 set o u t a f r a m e w o r k f o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g w h a t is i n v o l v e d i n the s e c u r i t i s a t i o n o f a n i s s u e i n the s e c o n d s e c t i o n o f the c h a p t e r . T o p r e s e n t a c l e a r e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the s e c u r i t i s a t i o n p r o c e s s , I e x p a n d o n the e x i s t i n g t h e o r y o f s e c u r i t i s a t i o n b y c l e a r l y i d e n t i f y i n g d i f f e r e n t t y p e s o f s e c u r i t i s a t i o n , the s tages o f s e c u r i t i s a t i o n , the c e n t r a l a c t o r s i n v o l v e d a n d the c o n s e q u e n c e s o f s e c u r i t i s i n g . H a v i n g e x p l o r e d the t h e o r e t i c a l t e r r a i n o f the C o p e n h a g e n s c h o o l ' s s e c u r i t i s a t i o n t h e o r y , I w i l l s h o w h o w o n e c o u l d r e c o g n i z e s e c u r i t i s a t i o n a t t e m p t s , a n d w h e n s u c h a t t empts are s u c c e s s f u l . E x a m i n i n g the d i s c u r s i v e p r a c t i c e s o f s e c u r i t i s a t i o n , I e m p l o y a p r e d i c a t e a n a l y s i s to s h o w h o w c o m p e t i n g d i s c o u r s e s c o n s t r u c t a n d r e - c o n s t r u c t state a n d a s y l u m s e e k e r i d e n t i t y , a n d i n d o i n g so , l i m i t the r a n g e o f p o l i c y o p t i o n s a v a i l a b l e to the r u l i n g e l i te . S i n c e m y thes i s asserts that 64 pol ic ies formulated and i m p l e m e n t e d to deal w i t h unauthorized humanitarian m i g r a t i o n i n both A u s t r a l i a and C a n a d a are best expla ined b y discurs ive practices, it is essential to p r o v i d e an explanat ion o f h o w the securit isation process w o r k s , and w h e n it can be regarded as successful . The Debate T h e current debate i n A n g l o - A m e r i c a n security studies concerning the m e a n i n g o f security emerged w i t h the end o f the C o l d W a r . K e y articles i n the f ie ld o f security studies, written as the C o l d W a r came to a close, ca l led for a reexaminat ion o f the f ie ld 80 and the term. T h e early cal ls for redef in ing security argued i n favor o f the i n c l u s i o n o f environmenta l , resource and demographic issues . 8 1 T h e relat ively recent emergence o f the debate ( p o s t - C o l d W a r ) does not mean that the connect ion between these issues and security is new; historians such as W a r r e n Z i m m e r m a n assert that migrat ion has been 82 seen as a security threat throughout history dat ing back to b i b l i c a l t imes. His tor ians have argued that the m i g r a t i o n o f peoples has drast ical ly altered the course o f history, either through the spread o f d isease 8 3 or through ass imi lat ion. Throughout history and i n m a n y states, societies and other forms o f p o l i t i c a l co l lect iv i t ies , migrants have often been portrayed and perceived as a threat. Y e t despite the histor ica l association o f m i g r a t i o n and security threats, the security studies literature that emerged f o l l o w i n g W o r l d W a r T w o , largely avoided the topic. H o l l i f i e l d attributes this lack o f attention to the predominant pos i t ion o f R e a l i s m and n e o - R e a l i s m that v i e w e d i m m i g r a t i o n as a matter o f 8 0 Matthews, Jessica Tuchman. 1989. "Redefining Security." Foreign Affairs 68:171-7, Nye, Joseph and Sean Lynn-Jones. 1988. "International Security Studies: A Report of a Conference on the State of the Field." International Security 12:5-27, Ullman, Richard. 1983. "Redefining Security." International Security 8:129-53. 8 1 Matthews, Jessica Tuchman. 1989. "Redefining Security." Foreign Affairs 68:171-7. 8 2 Zimmerman, Warren. 1995. "Migrants and Refugees: A Threat to Security?" in Threatened Peoples, Threatened Borders, edited by Teitelbaum, M and Weiner, Myron. New York: W.W. Norton & Company. 8 3 McNeill, William H. 1977. Plagues and Peoples. New York: Doubleday. 65 low politics and security a matter of military threats. Similarly, Ole Waever argues that this separation of migration and security is contextual and reflects the Western security concerns of the Cold War. According to Waever, because Western states had strong cohesion and legitimacy internally, they were less likely to be destabilized from within, 85 and thus, security became focused on the high politics of external military threats. This was not the case with the Soviet bloc states that lacked internal legitimacy, and that faced threats from within, as well as from the western states. For the Soviet bloc states, migration remained an important part of the security agenda. The practice of security, and the scholarly literature devoted to the topic, reflected the strength of the state. However, with the end of the Cold War, international migration has returned to a prominent position within the discussion of security, even in the western states. This, of course, has not occurred without significant debate with the security studies field. For many, the reason for forcing new issues, like immigration, onto the security agenda has been to provide a prima facie case that these issues are indeed security threats, and to force states to deal with them. However, the end of the Cold War did more than just force scholars and academics to address new security issues, it rendered security as an essentially contested concept. The traditional conceptions of security and threats to security that dominated during the Cold War period no longer held true. As a result, the field of security studies has been in major upheaval. In the course of reformulating and redefining security, security scholars have been forced to come to terms with what Hollifield, James. 2000. "The Politics of International Migration." in Migration Theory, edited by Brettel and Hollifield. New York: Routledge. 8 5 Waever, Ole. 1995. "Securitization and Desecuritization." in On Security, edited by R. Lipschutz. New York: Columbia University Press. 8 6 Buzan, Barry. 1991. People, States and Fear. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 66 Krause and Williams have termed the 'broadening' and 'deepening' of security. 'Broadening' refers to the inclusion of a wider range of potential security threats than simply military threats, including issues such as the environment, international migration and water and food scarcity. 'Deepening' refers to moving levels of reference from a state-centric focus, either down to the individual level or up to regional or global security. Thus, much of the debate has been focused on the referent object of security and appropriate security subjects. A cursory glance at how scholars have responded to these changes reveals that the field is divided into two major camps: those who resist 'deepening' but debate 'broadening', and those who seek to deepen and broaden the agenda. State-Centric Security Studies Those who have resisted the efforts to deepen the agenda of security studies have sought to retain the state as both the referent object of security and the primary security provider. These scholars have responded to the ongoing calls for the 'deepening' of the security field by either ignoring the challenge, or by articulating why the state should maintain this privileged position. For the most part, they take a communitarian position by arguing that the state remains the most effective tool for ensuring the security of individuals, by dividing them up into self-determining communities with contractual oo obligations between the citizens and the state. Essentially, security for individuals is 89 guaranteed by their citizenship of a particular state, so long as the state itself is secure. Walzer best articulates this communitarian position by arguing that the existence of rights 8 7 Krause, Keith; and Michael Williams. 1996. "Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods." Mershon International Studies Review 40:229-54. 8 8 Ibid. 8 9 Mutimer, David. 1999. "Beyond Strategy: Critical Thinking and the New Security Studies." in Contemporary Security and Strategy, edited by C. Snyder. London: MacMillan. 67 and the provision of security can only be understood in the context of these individuals' collective decision to set up a government that can grant such rights.90 Thus, not only is the state the most capable of defending individual security; reference to rights and security makes no sense outside of a state context. However, within this group there is an ongoing debate about the 'broadening' of security, or the type of security subjects that should be included in the discussion of state security. Neo-realists prefer to hold on to the traditional military-security viewpoint, rejecting new non-military issue areas as security issues. Ayoob states that security, as understood from this traditional perspective, is based on two assumptions: first, the threat to a state's security arises from outside its borders and second, these threats are primarily military in nature and usually require a military response.91 Many neo-realists argue that non-military security threats do not represent a security threat as understood from the 92 state-as-referent-object security standpoint. Accordingly, security studies should be reserved for studying the use of military force. From such a context, arms races, deterrence, offense-defense balance, and the balance of threats between the major world powers should remain the focus of security studies. However, even those who have attempted to maintain the military as the exclusive subject of security have conceded important conceptual ground. In order to deal with anomalies not explained by traditional balance of power theory, some scholars have argued that states balance against 9 0 Walzer, Michael. 1984. Spheres of Justice. New York: Basic Books. 9 1 Ayoob, Mohammed. 1995. The Third World Security Predicament: State-Making, Regional Conflict and the International System. Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers. 9 2 Dorff, Robert. 1994. "A Commentary on Security Studies for the 1990's as a Model Core Curriculum." International Studies Notes 19:23-31, Levy, Marc. 1995. "Is the Environment a National Security Issue?" International Security 20:35-62. 9 3 Mearsheimer, John. 1994. "The False Promise of International Institutions." International Security 19:5-49, Walt, Stephen. 1991. "The Renaissance of Security Studies." International Studies Quarterly 35:211-39. 68 perceptions of threat. The introduction of caveats like band-wagoning and balancing against perceptions of threat rather than power essentially conceded that ideational, rather that strictly material, factors play an important role in the study of security.94 While these concessions have expanded the conceptual ground within the narrow military-security realm, it has yielded little ground with regard to the question of who the dominant actors are, and what the dominant subjects are, in the security field. Attempts within the state-centric camp to expand the concept of security to include non-military security threats like immigration has faced entrenched opposition from neo-realists who have, since Waltz's important work outlining the theory, held a near monopoly on defining security within the English-language security studies field. The privileged position that the neo-realists have accorded to military security has not only been a product of the dominance of neo-realism. It may also be a product of our understanding of the state-building process in the west. Making war and protecting citizens and/or subjects from military threats has been the fundamental building block at the core of the nation-state building process.95 It should come as no surprise, therefore, that the activities of the state's security apparatus have been devoted to providing security from military threats. However, the exclusive focus on military threats has come under fire from those studying security. The end of the Cold War, the well documented decline Jepperson, Ronald; Wendt, Alexander and Katzenstein, Peter. 1996. "Norms, Identity and Culture in National Security." in Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, edited by P. Katzenstein. New York: Columbia University Press, and Katzenstein, Peter. 1996. "Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on International Security." in Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, edited by R. W. Jepperson, Alexander and Katzenstein, Peter. New York: Columbia University Press. 9 5 Poggi, Gianfranco. 1978. The Development of the Modern Nation State. Stanford: Stanford University Press, and Tilley, Charles. 1990. Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1992. Cambridge: B. Blackwell. 69 in the instances of interstate war, and the post-Cold War rise in ethno-nationalist and intrastate conflict all contributed to a reexamination of the epistemological and ontological basis of neo-realist scholarship, which privileged the study of military security threats.97 As a result of this challenge, a number of scholars have responded by expanding the realm of security subjects to incorporate previously excluded issues such as the environment, immigration, economic development, and weak states. However, these issues seem to fit rather uncomfortably into the concept of state security. This problematic fit has occurred because it is not clear whether these issues represent a unique, non-military threat to the state and its citizens; or, whether they actually have the potential to present a military threat to the state. While most argue that these non-military threats represent unique threats to different sectors of state security, scholars such as Homer-Dixon and Weiner have argued that environmental issues and migration may 98 contribute to military threats, such as intrastate and interstate conflict. While the ongoing debate within the state-centric camp has forced a defense of the state and a softening of the boundaries of security, the far more serious challenge to the concept and study of security is from those seeking to deepen the agenda. Deepeners The most significant efforts to deepen the concept of security beyond the state-centric focus have come from alternative approaches to security, such as critical security 9 6 Mueller, John. 1989. Retreat from Doomsday: the Obsolescence of Major War. New York: Basic Books, —. 2001. "Does War Still Exist?" in The Waning of Major War. University of Notre Dame. April 6-8 9 7 Krause, Keith; and Michael Williams. 1996. "Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods." Mershon International Studies Review 40:229-54. 9 8 Homer-Dixon, Thomas. 1994. "Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases." International Security 19:5-40, Weiner, Myron. 1995. "International Migration and Security." Oxford: Westview Press 70 studies and human security. Both approaches are deepeners, but do so from a normative basis, in that they ultimately argue that security should not be state-centric, and should focus on individuals, women, children etc. Critical security scholars have focused on how privileging one referent object produces and reproduces social reality, supporting the political projects of some while opposing others." Paradoxically, critical security studies has focused a great deal on the negative impact of the practice and study of state security, rather than studying practices of security that are not actually state-centric. As such, critical security scholars have spent much time and spilled much ink analyzing how current state-centric security practices silence particular groups; consequently, the field of critical security studies is incredibly varied in its approach to security. Feminist scholars have focused on how the current study and practice of security impacts and silences women, while other critical security scholars have shown how the practice of security has contributed to the captivity of individuals to the project of state security. The deepening efforts of many critical security scholars has focused on advocating an emancipatory approach to security, which places individual humans as the ultimate referent object of security.100 The most significant problem with the critical security studies approach has been its inability to show what an alternative approach to security would look like, and how it would interact with state security. This has been the project of human security scholars. The seminal 1994 UNDP report advanced the concept of human security, noting that it differed from traditional 9 9 Mutimer, David. 1999. "Beyond Strategy: Critical Thinking and the New Security Studies." in Contemporary Security and Strategy, edited by C. Snyder. London: MacMillan. 1 0 0 Booth, Ken. 1991. "Security and Emancipation." Review of International Studies 17:313-26, Wyn-Jones, Richard. 1995. "Message in a Bottle? Theory and Practice in Critical Security Studies." Contemporary Security Policy 16:315. 71 approaches to security in four key ways: it is universal, interdependent, easier to ensure through prevention and is people-centered.101 The recommendations of the UNDP report challenged the state-centric version of security, yet it was aimed at state practice, and encouraged states to adopt two changes in their approach to security: from an exclusive stress on territorial security to a greater stress on people's security, and from security through armaments to security through sustainable development.102 Like traditional state-centric approaches to security, there is significant debate within the Human Security field concerning the breadth of the concept. The Human Security Report notes that proponents of human security agree that the protection of individuals remains the primary goal of security, though there are significant differences over what developments should be addressed within the human security framework. The framers of the Human Security Report advanced a narrow approach to human security, focusing on violent threats to individuals and communities, rather than a broad approach that encompasses economic insecurity and threats to human dignity. 1 0 3 Despite these differences, human security advocates have challenged the role of the state as the primary referent object of security and as the sole legitimate provider of security. They were among the first to observe that inter-state conflict is not the primary threat facing most individuals and that for many, enhancing state security actually threatens individual security. However, unlike critical security scholars, human security scholars do maintain a place for the state in the provision of security. One of the central claims of the 1994 UNDP report was that living in a society that protects individuals' human rights is one of 1 0 1 UNDP. 1994. "Human Development Report 1994." United Nations Development Programme, New York. 1 0 2 I b i d . 1 0 3 Centre, Human Security. 2005. "The Human Security Report 2005." 72 the most important aspects of human security, and it specifically cited transition to democracy and changing the ratio of military to social spending in states as important steps in providing human security;104 consequently, there is a significant gulf between critical security studies and the human security camp regarding the role of the state in the provision of security. Despite this, critical security studies and human security represent the most significant challenge to the state-centric vision of security. Their criticisms have focused on two primary issues: first, in the face of 'broadening' the security agenda, it is impossible to retain the state as the primary referent object; and secondly, states have failed to provide security on their own terms. They assert that any normative claims for privileging the state are untenable because military violence from other states represents such a small part of the threat individuals face.105 Both approaches maintain that the practice of state security can, or does, place individuals at greater risk, and consequently, that it is no longer tenable to hold onto the traditional terms of security. Furthermore, they assert that states have not been terribly successful in providing security for their own citizens, and in some cases states are the main cause of individual and communal insecurity.106 Without being able to provide security to its citizens, states have lost their 107 claim to being the primary referent object of security as well. UNDP. 1994. "Human Development Report 1994." United Nations Development Programme, New York. 1 0 5 Poku, N ; and D Graham. 1998. "Redefining Security for a New Millennium." in Redefining Security: Population Movements and National Security, edited by N. a. G. Poku, D. Westport: Praeger. 1 0 6 Buzan, Barry. 1991. People, States and Fear. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, and Mutimer, David. 1999. "Beyond Strategy: Critical Thinking and the New Security Studies." in Contemporary Security and Strategy, edited by C. Snyder. London: MacMillan. 1 0 7 Poku, N; and D Graham. 1998. "Redefining Security for a New Millennium." in Redefining Security: Population Movements and National Security, edited by N. a. G. Poku, D. Westport: Praeger. 73 In addition to showing how issues like water supplies, food scarcity, natural resource supply, international terrorism, trafficking in drugs, arms and people, and weak states represent a greater threat to individuals than international war, alternative security approaches contend that states are unable to unilaterally deal with these threats: The new security issues require more than the traditional military response to security threats, they require international cooperation and new non-militaristic responses. The unique challenges that these threats pose accentuate the inability of states to handle the problem. As such, alternative security scholars have sought new referent objects of security, and to gain the resources typically devoted to security threats; but they have sought to remove them from state control, particularly the military. As it pertains to immigration and border control policy, this approach to security privileges individuals fleeing violence and insecurity as a result of the state's attempt to increase its security. It encourages the analyst and the practitioner to consider how protection offered to individuals, such as refugees, could be enhanced. The ongoing debate in security studies has a strong objectivist element. Scholars who seek to broaden and deepen the concept of security often do so in an effort to convince relevant actors that a particular development represents an objective threat to a given referent object; consequently, additional resources devoted to combating the potential threat are warranted.108 This has been a strategy associated with those advocating the inclusion of the environment in the broadened security agenda, but some have also applied this to international migration. They have argued that states must view 1 0 8 Krause, Keith; and Michael Williams. 1996. "Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods." Mershon International Studies Review 40:229-54, Mutimer, David. 1999. "Beyond Strategy: Critical Thinking and the New Security Studies." in Contemporary Security and Strategy, edited by C. Snyder. London: MacMillan. 74 migration as a security threat because of the potential social and political upheaval that migrations have on societies. Scholars such as Zimmerman, Weiner and Huntington claim that migrations have historically been the source of grave security threats leading to the downfall of states and empires. According to this view, states must appreciate how threatening migration is and must take great pains to manage it, or in some cases, prevent it. From this perspective, ignoring the potential security threat that migration poses would be sheer folly. As such, securitising the issue is viewed as a positive step in that states would devote greater resources to preventing migration. As the previous section has shown, alternative approaches to security have attempted to show that certain state practices of security represent an objective threat to certain populations. They, like their state-centric counterparts, make an objectivist claim that because a certain issue is actually a greater threat, it should be the focus of security. Objectivist claims about whether international migration is or is not a threat a security threat, ignores the role of discursive practices and identity construction in the formulation of security threats. My analysis demonstrates that the treatment of migration as a threat to security is not a constant throughout history nor is it in all states and societies. I argue that many states have not constructed migration as a threat to the state and a few have even constructed migration as essential for providing security for the state; namely, modern day Israel, as well as traditional settler states such as Australia, Canada and the United States. Similarly, the opposite claim that migration is not a security issue ignores the devastating impact that migration can have on particular groups of people, including expelled populations such as refugees, and targets of forced migrations, such as the Armenians, Kurds or Tibetans have been. This project 75 d e m o n s t r a t e s that m i g r a t i o n c a n b e c o n s t r u c t e d i n a n u m b e r o f w a y s : as a s e c u r i t y t h r e a t t o v a r i o u s r e f e r e n t o b j e c t s , i n c l u d i n g states a n d i n d i v i d u a l s , b u t a l s o as a m e a n s o f p r o v i d i n g s e c u r i t y o r e v e n as a n o n - s e c u r i t y i s s u e . Constructivism and Securitisation T h e c o n s t r u c t i v i s t a p p r o a c h , w h i c h h a s e m b r a c e d m a n y o f t h e i n s i g h t s o f c r i t i c a l s t u d i e s 1 0 9 , h a s c o m e to w e i g h i n o n m a n y o f t h e s e c o n t e s t e d p o i n t s a n d h a s m a d e a n u m b e r o f v i t a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s to t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d s t u d y o f s e c u r i t y . H u y s m a n s a r g u e s that t h e c o n d i t i o n o f s e c u r i t y d o e s n o t r e f e r to a n e x t e r n a l , o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y b u t r a t h e r t h r o u g h t h e e n u n c i a t i o n o f s e c u r i t y c o n s t i t u t e s a ( i n ) s e c u r i t y c o n d i t i o n . " 0 T h u s , a c c o r d i n g to H u y s m a n s , s e c u r i t y i s a p e r f o r m a t i v e f o r c e , r a t h e r t h a n b e i n g m e r e l y d e s c r i p t i v e o f a n o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y . " 1 W a e v e r a l s o c o n t e n d s that s e c u r i t y i s a s p e e c h ac t ; i t i s t h e n a m i n g o f s o m e t h i n g as a s e c u r i t y t h r e a t that m a k e s i t s o . T h u s , t h i s c o n s t r u c t i v i s t a p p r o a c h a s s e r t s that s e c u r i t y i s t h e p r o d u c t o f p o l i t i c a l d i s c u r s i v e p r a c t i c e s , a n d i s n o t r e d u c i b l e t o o b j e c t i v e a s s e s s m e n t s o f m a t e r i a l r i s k . S e c u r i t y i s t h e p r o d u c t o f h i s t o r i c a l s t r u c t u r e s a n d p r o c e s s e s , a n d o f s t r u g g l e s o f p o w e r w i t h i n states a n d s o c i e t i e s . " 3 T h e C o p e n h a g e n s c h o o l , w h i c h h a s d o n e m u c h o f t h e w o r k d e v e l o p i n g t h e c o n c e p t o f s e c u r i t i s a t i o n , h a s h e l p e d d e v e l o p a d i s c u r s i v e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f s e c u r i t y b y f o c u s i n g o n t h e p r o c e s s o f s e c u r i t i s a t i o n . S e c u r i t i s a t i o n t h e o r y , as f o r m u l a t e d b y B u z a n a n d W a e v e r , p o s i t s that a c o n d i t i o n o f s e c u r i t y e x i s t s w h e n a n i s s u e i s p r e s e n t e d as p o s i n g a n e x i s t e n t i a l t h r e a t to a r e f e r e n t 1 0 9 Price, Richard M . and Chris Reus-Smit. 1998. "Dangerous Liaisons? Critical International Theory and Constructivism." European Journal of International Relations 4:259-94. 1 1 0 Huysmans, Jef. 1998. "Security! What do you Mean? From Concept to Thick Signifier." European Journal of International Studies 4:226-55. 1 , 1 Ibid. ' 1 1 2 Waever, Ole. 1995. "Securitization and Desecuritization." in On Security, edited by R. Lipschutz. New York: Columbia University Press. 1 1 3 Lipschutz, Ronnie. Ibid. "On Security." 76 object (traditionally, but not necessarily, the state). The special nature of the security threat justifies the use of extraordinary means to handle these threats."4 By invoking 'security', a representative of the referent object declares an emergency situation, and claims the right to use whatever means are necessary to block that development."5 The term existential threat does not imply a universal standard, but rather one that varies with the particular character of the referent object in question."6 Thus, the defining conditions of existence will vary across different referent objects, and therefore, so too will the nature of existential threats. For example, states require different things to survive than individual humans, and as such the developments that represent an existential threat to each will differ dramatically. Furthermore, the extraordinary means implemented to counteract the threat depends on the security provider appealed to by the representative of the referent object. For example, an aboriginal Australian in identifying a threat to himself or his family could appeal to a number of security providers, including his extended family, the Aboriginal community, the Australian state or an international body. This explanation of security is somewhat vague and under specified, but the positive side of this is that it leaves room for an array of issues to which security can be applied, for multiple referent objects besides the state, and potentially for multiple security providers. According to securitisation theory, securitisation occurs when political or societal leaders claim that a particular issue threatens the existence of the referent 1 1 4 Buzan, B, O Waever, and J de Wilde. 1998. "Security: A New Framework for Analysis." Boulder: Lynne Reinner 1 1 5 Waever, Ole. 1995. "Securitization and Desecuritization." in On Security, edited by R. Lipschutz. New York: Columbia University Press. 1 1 6 Buzan, B, O Waever, and J de Wilde. 1998. "Security: A New Framework for Analysis." Boulder: Lynne Reinner 7 7 object, and appeal to a security provider to implement extraordinary means to protect the referent object. Waever and Buzan's introduction of the securitisation approach based on discursive practices has made a significant contribution to the debate over the 'broadening' and 'deepening' of security agendas. In addressing the issue areas that are included as security issues, the Copenhagen school argues that security threats are constructed by securitising actors addressing a particular audience. In essence, they have argued that the topics that can be considered as security threats are not merely the product of academic exercises but are determined by the discourse within political communities. These scholars have in essence contextualized the discourse by changing the discussion from 'is x a threat?' to ' why or how is x constructed as a threat at this historical time in this particular states/societies?' In doing so, the Copenhagen school has moved the debate away from a normative argument on whether or not certain subjects should be considered as part of security to provide an explanation for how certain issues come to be constructed as security threats. This is not to say that the Copenhagen school makes no normative assertions about securitisation; for they have been clear in their criticisms of those who attempt to broaden the concept of security, as though such a development were a positive step. They have made it clear that they favor working toward the desecuritisation of most issues. Buzan and Waever state that security should be seen as a negative, as a failure to deal with issues as normal politics." 7 However, the Copenhagen school does not make normative claims about the role of the state as a referent object or the individual subjects that are constructed as threatening. 1 , 7 Ibid. 78 This approach to security has been interpreted by many critical theorists as resisting the 'deepening' of the security agenda because it favors the state as the basic referent object of security. This is not the case. The Copenhagen school takes a historically contextual position on this. Waever argues that throughout most of the modern era, the state has been privileged as the primary referent object of security. This should not be confused with favoring the state as the referent object as realists do. The Copenhagen school concludes that the state is not the only referent object of security but that during a particular historical period it has enjoyed primacy. In other historical periods, the state was not a referent object of security or was only one among a number of competing referent objects - including religion, city, region, and language group. Weldes supports such a view of securitisation when she states that "national security is not rejected as either outmoded or in need of transcendence; instead it is taken seriously as an 118 important historical resolution to central problems of political life". Furthermore, the securitisation school argues that in the current historical period we may be experiencing a shift away from state security to societal security - particularly in the European context.119 Because the Copenhagen school's conception of security as a speech act requires a recognized, legitimate actor capable of declaring security and one who has the means to carry through the act of securing the object against the threat, at the current time, the state remains the primary security provider. The Copenhagen school essentially adopts 1 1 8 Weldes, Jutta. 1996. "Constructing National Interests." European Journal of International Relations 2:275-318. 1 1 9 Buzan, Barry. 1993. "Introduction: the Changing Security Agenda in Europe." in Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe, edited by O. B. Waever, B; Kelstrup, M and Lemaitre, P. London: Pinter Publishers, Waever, O.; Buzan, B;Kelstrup, M and Lemaitre, P. 1993. "Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe." Copenhagen: Center for Peace and Conflict Research 79 Weber's depiction of the modern state, because in most western liberal states, the state maintains a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence; consequently, the state is regarded as the only legitimate security provider. An important move that the Copenhagen school has all but ignored, but that features prominently in the human security literatures, is that the state is capable of providing security for referent objects other than itself or its citizens. In other words, while the state remains as the primary legitimate security provider, the referent objects on behalf of whom the state acts, have, and can, expand beyond its own borders. Privileging the state as the provider of security does not mean privileging it as a referent object of security. It is clear that the process of securitisation as described by Waever focuses on political communities, states in particular; in doing so, it rejects the move made by critical theorists/human security theorists to change the referent object of security to individuals. Buzan defends this position by claiming that attempts to securitise individuals or humanity as a whole are unlikely to be successful. He claims that mid-level communities, like states, societies, or ethnic groups, are more easily securitised than narrower or broader referents like individuals or humanity as a whole. Buzan claims that this is the case because these social communities elicit strong 'we' feelings and permit an easily identified 'other'. This makes it much easier for these social communities to be constructed as referent objects. This claim should not be regarded as a complete departure from the critical approach. Even security as understood by Ken Booth, whose work was seminal in arguing for the individual as the ultimate referent object of security, relied on groupings 1 2 0 Buzan, Barry. 2001. "Human Security in International Perspective." in Asia Pacific in the New Millennium. Kuala Lumpur: ISIS Malaysia. 80 of humans as important to understanding security.121 For a particular grouping of humans to be relevant, they must be categorized in the way by which they are constrained or threatened. " Thus, the securitisation approach need not be concerned with maintaining the state as the primary referent object of security, but in understanding how groupings of individuals, including states, construct threats to their group. Because of this position, the theory of securitisation travels well from the state as the primary referent object of security to other potential referent objects, including societies, which they see as a potential challenger to the state security concept. In identifying society as a competing referent object to the state, the securitisation school has adopted the move made by critical theorists to shift the referent object away from the state. By introducing societal security as an alternative to state security as a means of illuminating security threats that do not seem to fit the state security logic, the securitisation approach establishes the plausibility that referent objects, like security issues, are socially constructed. The Copenhagen school's use of securitisation has done little to assuage the concerns of the critical theorist, though they have actually made a more important move than is often credited to them. The Copenhagen school has introduced an approach to security that identifies potential security issues and the referent objects to which they refer. In doing so, this constructivist approach has presented a serious challenge to the realists who wish to maintain a strictly military view of security, and even to those neo-realists who attempt to widen the concept of security without expanding the potential referent objects of security. However, the securitisation school has not abandoned the military aspects of security nor the issues for which the state remains the primary referent 1 2 1 Booth, Ken. 1991. "Security and Emancipation." Review of International Studies 17:313-26. 1 2 2 Mutimer, David. 1999. "Beyond Strategy: Critical Thinking and the New Security Studies." in Contemporary Security and Strategy, edited by C. Snyder. London: MacMillan. 81 object. They have provided a theory that encompasses the traditional views of security while opening space for the study of non-military security threats, non-state referent objects and even, though they do not go that far, to non-state security providers. For the critical theorists, the securitisation approach shows that the expansion of referent objects does have some limits. They have shown that certain security subjects seem to fit with particular referent objects more easily than others and that the success of these attempts to securitise particular issues depends on a security provider capable of actually acting against the threat. The Securitisation Process in States In this section I examine the process of securitisation, drawing on the work of Buzan and Waever. I identify some of its key weaknesses, and outline the contributions of this project to securitisation theory. By identifying securitisation attempts and employing a discourse analysis of the process, as done in this study, I present a revised version of securitisation that aims to be both clearly presented and empirically informed. Buzan argues that successful securitisation has three components: existential 123 threats, emergency action and effects on interunit relations by breaking free of rules. The identification, and naming, of existential threats has played a fundamental role in the Copenhagen school's approach to the securitisation process. Ole' Waever, in defining security as a speech act, essentially argues that in the identification of existential threats, (in the naming of something as a threat) influential leaders take the issue out of the realm of normal politics; this involves a decision, a 'breaking of the rules' and a suspension of 1 2 3 Buzan, B, O Waever, and J de Wilde. 1998. "Security: A New Framework for Analysis." Boulder: Lynne Reinner 82 normal politics. 1 2 4 From this perspective, it almost appears that Waever presents securitisation as a tool used by rationally motivated actors to achieve some political end. As such, political and societal leaders essentially decide to securitise an issue or not, and that decision is based on political considerations and has political consequences. The problem is that too strong a focus on the actual speech act tends to reinforce a rationalistic view, or as Michael Williams describes it, a 'too-decisionistic' approach.125 Williams notes that "looking for singular and distinct acts of securitisation leads one to misperceive processes through which a situation is gradually intensified and rendered susceptible to securitisation".126 Williams explains that the speech act of naming an existential threat is both the 'primary reality' of securitisation and an expression of its existence. " Another way to understand this is that the act of declaring something a security threat is both the expression or culmination of a process and an act in and of itself.1 2 8 Thus, the identification of existential threats appears to be a process, rather than a singular event in the securitisation process. According to Buzan and Waever, speech acts have three facilitating conditions: a demand internal to the speech act of following the grammar of security, the social conditions regarding the position of authority for the securitising actor and features of the alleged threats that either facilitate or impede 129 securitisation. In other words, the first condition is a speech act (or acts) that follows the grammar of security. It constructs a plot whereby a development is presented as an 1 2 4 Williams, Michael. 2003. "Words, Images, Enemies: Securitisation and International Politics." International Studies Quarterly 47:511 -31. 1 2 5 Ibid. 1 2 6 Ibid. 1 2 7 Ibid. 1 2 8 Ibid. 1 2 9 Buzan, B, O Waever, and J de Wilde. 1998. "Security: A New Framework for Analysis." Boulder: Lynne Reinner 8 3 existential threat, identifies a point of no return and a possible way out. 1 3 0 The second condition involves the social capital of the enunciatbr, who must be in a position of authority.131 The last condition is that the development must identify objects that are generally held to be threatening. Not all developments are equally plausible as threats, and, as such, the success of the securitising move depends on the plausibility of the threat; in addition to the social position of the securitising actor and the language used. One factor that influences the plausibility of the threat is intentionality. According to Waever, existential threats are intentional and are fundamentally about a contest of wills. Waever states that security is about the efforts of one will to override the sovereignty of 13^ another. _ Thus, the object identified as the threat must be imbued with intention in the naming of the threat. This leads to Buzan and Waever's second aspect of securitisation: emergency action. Waever argues that to enact emergency action, the security provider must have: a) a sufficiently repressive apparatus, b) ideological cohesion in the core group that allows the apparatus to be mobilized and c) the legitimacy to use it that avoids the escalation of public opposition. The sufficiently repressive apparatus need not be strong enough to actually eliminate the threat, but rather, must be seen to be the appropriate apparatus to deal with the threat. When the state is appealed to as the security provider, the ruling elite enacts emergency measures by invoking the repressive apparatus of the state, typically the military or police forces; or engages in coercive diplomatic measures toward other states, such as sanctions. 1 3 0 Ibid, pp 33 ™Ibld-1 3 2 Waever, Ole. 1995. "Securitization and Desecuritization." in On Security, edited by R. Lipschutz. New York: Columbia University Press. Pp 63. 1 3 3 Ibid. 84 The second and third conditions that Waever identifies imply that speech acts need to fall on receptive ears, both in the 'core group' and the general public. In fact, Buzan and Waever explicitly state that for successful securitisation, the audience must accept the claim that a development represents an existential threat.134 As was noted in the previous section, there are three conditions that impact the likelihood that the speech act naming the existential threat will be accepted by the 'relevant audience'. Presumably the audience includes both the public and the core group, though it is not clear who that is. Buzan and Waever argue that in liberal democracies there is a need to argue one's 135 case, since securitisations can never only be imposed. They state that in a democracy, it must be argued in the public sphere why a situation constitutes security.136 In making these claims, it is clear that Buzan and Waever believe that the public is an important element in the success of securitising attempts. Less clear, is the claim that ideological cohesion in the core group is necessary for the use of emergency action. Just who may qualify as a member of 'the core group' is one of theory's major problems, and an issue this project aims to address. Once the public and core group (political actors who control the repressive apparatus of the state), accept the securitising claim, state leaders are able to implement extraordinary action to counteract the threat. According to Buzan and Waever, the implementation of emergency action must have an effect on interunit relations by breaking the normal political rules of the game. The examples they provide include secrecy, levying taxes, conscription, placing limitations on otherwise inviolable rights, or focusing the society's energy on a certain 1 3 4 Buzan, B, O Waever, and J de Wilde. 1998. "Security: A New Framework for Analysis." Boulder: Lynne Reinner 1 3 5 Ibid. 1 3 6 I b i d . 85 task. Understanding what qualifies as emergency measures requires an understanding of the 'normal' political rules governing the behaviour of the security provider. More fundamentally, it also involves an effect on interunit relations that requires identifying the basic units whose relationship is being altered, as well as the norms and rules that typically govern their interactions. In a successful case, securitisation will alter the relations between two states, or between a state and another relevant group such as terrorists, criminals, polluters, refugees etc. In such an instance, the securitisation would imply that the rules and norms governing their interactions have changed. The purpose of this criterion is to move beyond political rhetoric to show that the process actually impacts the relationship between these units. Thus, it is not enough to show that the ruling elite have named something a security threat, of have even enacted legislation to deal with it; for successful securitisation to have taken place it is essential to show that the normally operating rules within a society or state have been broken, and that its relationship to the unit causing the threat has been altered. Typology of Securitisation According to the theory of securitisation, it is the security provider that breaks the rules governing the relationship between the threatened and threatening objects. In Buzan and Waever's formulation, the security provider is often synonymous with the referent object itself. Thus when states and societies are identified as the referent object of security, it is assumed that they are also the security provider. This is problematic for the Copenhagen school, as it unnecessarily limits the range of referent objects and security providers in their analysis of securitisation. They essentially identify two types of securitisation based on the primary referent object: state and societal. By limiting the 8 6 study of securitisation to these types, Buzan and Waever ignore securitisation attempts where representatives of the threatened referent object appeal to another security provider other than the referent object itself. The empirical analysis of the practice of security supports a much larger range of potential securitising moves, based on referent objects and security providers. I have identified five types of securitisation: humanitarian, communitarian, international, cosmopolitan, and societal. Securitising attempts in which representatives of the state are appealed to as the primary security provider include humanitarian- and communitarian-securitisation. The traditional understanding of state security is encapsulated in the communitarian-securitisation category, in which someone claiming to be a representative of the state, or the political community encompassed by the state, appeals to the government of that state to provide security against an existential threat; often though not always, a foreign, external, military threat. A humanitarian-securitisation on the other hand, involves a group or individual claiming to represent a foreign, sub-state referent object appealing to those who control the security mechanisms of the state to provide security on their behalf. Completely ignored by Buzan and Waever, are securitising attempts that appeal to security providers beyond the referent object itself, such as humanitarian-securitisations. Yet, in many cases, securitising actors appeal to foreign governments, the international community or some conglomeration of states to provide security for a threatened referent object. In an international-securitisation, the representative of an individual state or group of states appeals to the international community to provide security for the threatened state. This type of securitisation encapsulates processes whereby formal treaties exist for 87 such action, such as collective security, as well as processes whereby previous agreements providing for this type of securitisation do not exist. There are also cosmopolitan-securitisation attempts, in which representatives of a non-state feferent object appeal to the international community to provide security on behalf of the threatened non-state referent object. Where Buzan and Waever have made an important contribution is in identifying securitisation attempts in which non-state entities are identified as both the referent object of security and the legitimate security provider. As such, societal securitisation involves the representative of a sub-state entity appealing to that sub-state entity to provide security on its behalf. Representatives of threatened referent objects may, and often do, appeal to a variety of security providers, though they are not necessarily appealing for the same type of action to be taken. The provision of security will look different depending on which security provider is acting. While this study focuses primarily on the actions of political leaders, the extraordinary measures they implement will vary depending on the type of securitisation. The extraordinary measures called for by a humanitarian-securitisation will differ dramatically from the extraordinary measures called for by communitarian-securitisation. Problems and Solutions The theory of securitisation remains at a high level of abstraction making it difficult to understand or to implement in an empirical analysis of the process. It remains unclear whether the speech act initiates the process of securitisation or represents the culmination of the process, as Williams claims. This is made all the more difficult 88 because the presentation of the process by Buzan and Waever fails to take into account that there are multiple speech acts identifiable in most cases of securitisation, and, as becomes evident in the cases examined in this study, multiple paths and strategies for securitisation. One other indeterminacy is that it is unclear whether the implementation of extraordinary means is the endpoint of the process. Buzan and Waever seem to imply that once extraordinary measures have been implemented, the issue has become securitised, and that the only option at that point is to engage in desecuritisation - a process that suffers from an even greater dearth of theorization and empirical examination. In my empirical analysis, I demonstrate that the primary response to a securitisation attempt is rarely desecuritisation, but rather counter-securitisation. To remedy these shortcomings and indeterminacies, I have reformulated the securitisation process, as presented by Buzan and Waever, into three specific stages. The first is the discursive challenge, in which securitising agents attempt to convince the security provider to implement extraordinary measures by challenging the discourse that currently structures the relationship between units. It begins with a securitising agent, claiming to speak as a representative of the referent object, identifying an existential threat; in effect, positing an alternative potential relationship between the units. Securitising agents ultimately seek to convince the security provider, in most cases the governing party that controls the coercive forces of the state, of the legitimacy of their claim. They may do so by directly appealing to the members of the government, or indirectly, by attempting to influence other agents with greater influence. Security providers on the other hand, once they have adopted the securitising discourse, attempt to gain the support of political opponents who could in the future challenge their position as 89 security provider. Once the security provider is satisfied that they have attained an adequate level of cohesion, they implement extraordinary measures to deal with the threat. The second stage is the implementation of extraordinary means. In Buzan and Waever's formulation, the implementation of extraordinary measures is often presented as a singular act that is the culmination of the securitisation process. I argue that the implementation stage can occur gradually, with the incremental escalation of measures taken to counter the threat. One reason for doing so is for the government to maintain cohesion among the ruling elite, and reduce opposition from their traditional political opponents. In other instances, escalation occurs rapidly, forcing potential opponents to make an immediate, public stand, either in support of, or in opposition to, the securitisation. The final stage of the process is the legitimization stage. While Buzan and Waever note that securitisation requires legitimacy, it is not clear how this is attained or when it occurs in the process. Addressing this gap is one of the chief theoretical contributions of this thesis. I show that attempts to legitimize securitisation occur after the initial implementation of extraordinary means, when opposition to the securitisation is voiced. In many instances, opposition to securitisation takes the form of counter-securitisation, where influential societal or political actors identify another referent object as threatened, either by the emergency measures implemented by the security provider to counteract the initial threat, or. by some other development. In other instances, opposition to the securitisation takes the form of desecuritisation, where political leaders question the original securitisation claim in reference to the arguments initially used to initiate the 9 0 securitisation attempt. The legitimization of securitisation is essential to the continuing escalation of extraordinary means. The ruling elite, and societal actors who support them, engage in two distinct methods to legitimize their response. The first is legislative changes. These changes make the extraordinary measures already implemented legal and beyond challenge. In essence, the legislative changes alter the existing rules governing the relationship between the state and the other unit; in this case - asylum seekers. The second strategy is the silencing of dissent. The government and its social and political allies attempt to silence those who continue to challenge the securitised discourse. The silencing of dissent can be accomplished through a number of discursive tools, such as labeling the dissenters, constructing the perception of a supportive public, limiting media coverage and continued re-construction of the other units' identity. Importantly, employing discursive analysis, I identify how the process of securitisation can fail during both the initial discursive challenge, as well as in the legitimization stage. The three-stage approach incorporates many of the elements identified by Buzan and Waever as crucial to successful securitisation, but presents it in a less abstract manner, that makes it possible to more readily identify and trace the process. It shows that the implementation of extraordinary means is not the endpoint of the process, but rather, ushers in a period of intensive discursive practices during which further 'speech acts' occur in an effort to legitimize the process. Securitised Migration Discourses Securitisation theory takes its principal claims from the general constructivist approach to international relations, particularly the discursive branch of this approach, which, according to one author, has become one of the most active and interesting areas 91 in the study of international relations. The discursive approach claims that discursive practices create norms and expectations that influence the range of possible actions available to actors. Securitisation builds on this general framework by asserting that the discursive act of securitisation produces the behavior of state leaders in that it creates an expectation that the government will take specific actions against a threat. As was noted at the conclusion of the previous section, successful securitisation requires not only a change in discursive practices indicated by the naming of existential threats, it also involves an invocation of emergency action and noticeable effects on interunit relations indicated by breaking free of the rules of 'normal' politics in a democratic polity (that is, not invoking the use of force).1 3 9 This is not that different from most academic work that focuses on discursive practices. While much of the focus is on identifying dominant discourses, these scholars have shown how the discursive practices of actors constrains their actions, in the development and use of particular weapons or the choice of military strategy.140 Similarly, applying such an approach to the issue of asylum seeking requires detailed examination of the discourse(s) pertaining to asylum seeking, as well as the extraordinary measures used to deal with them. Milliken notes that dominant discourses give objects certain "taken-for-granted qualities and attributes" and relates them to other objects.141 A prime example is Richard Price's study of the discourse on chemical weapons. Throughout the history of the discourse on chemical weapons, states 1 3 8 Milliken, Jennifer. 1999. "The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods." European Journal of International Relations 5:225-54. 1 3 9 Buzan, B, O Waever, and J de Wilde. 1998. "Security: A New Framework for Analysis." Boulder: Lynne Reinner 1 4 0 Kier, Elizabeth. 1996. In Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, edited by P. Katzenstein. New York: Columbia University Press, Price, Richard M . 1997. The Chemical Weapons Taboo. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1 4 1 Milliken, Jennifer. 1999. "The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods." European Journal of International Relations 5:225-54. 9 2 that used them were constructed in different periods as technologically advanced, as uncivilized, or as weak.1 4 2 Price's work demonstrates how the discourse on chemical weapons constructed both the identity of states that used chemical weapons, as well as those that did not. However, in the discourse relating to chemical weapons, states are not the only objects that are given qualities and attributes and related to other objects. Other objects, such as terrorist organizations, sub-state armed groups who use chemical weapons, and individuals, such as scientists or army commanders, that help with the proliferation of these types of weapons, could also be included in such discourse. Similarly, the discourse on asylum seekers constructs a number of objects with certain emotions, characteristics and intentions: including asylum seekers, receiving and sending states, smugglers, economic migrants and 'genuine' refugees. Traditionally, these objects have been portrayed differently within the two primary securitised discourses regarding asylum seekers: humanitarian and communitarian. Arguing that the discourse surrounding asylum seeking has become dominated by security does not in and of itself provide complete clarification of the referent object of the discourse. The multitude of discourses on immigration and asylum seeking often causes confusion over what referent object is actually being threatened: the economy, identity of society, the environment, asylum seekers, the international system or the state. A cursory examination of the discourses on immigration quickly reveals that the issue of international migration is addressed in multiple sectors of security discourse. Sectors of Risk Buzan and Waever place the discourse on migration in the sphere of societal security because of its potential threat to the identity of a society. For them, society is 1 4 2 Price, Richard M . 1997. The Chemical Weapons Taboo. Ithaca: Cornel l University Press. 93 about identity, the self-conception of communities and of individuals identifying themselves as member of a community.1 4 3 Thus, threats to identity come in the form of a challenge to the existing identity of that society. Migration is one of the common issues that have been viewed as a threat to societal security, along with horizontal competition, vertical competition and possibly depopulation. Migration presents a threat to the identity of a society because an influx of a foreign population could cause a shift in the ethnic, religious or linguistic composition of the society.1 4 4 Of course, in such a case, whether or not migration poses a threat to the society depends on how the identity of immigrants and that society has been constructed. Buzan and Waever state that whether migrants or rival identities are securitised depends on whether the holders of the collective identity take a closed or open-minded view of how their identity is constituted and maintained.145 A brief examination of the Canadian and Australian cases reveals that identities need not be constructed in a closed manner as such, and that migration can play varying roles regarding the security of any given society. While migration represents a threat to societal security, the delineation between societal, political and military security often breaks down, and each of these concepts fails to capture the multiple ways migration can be presented as a threat to a society. Jef Huysmans has explored the connection between migration and security in the European context and has noted that immigration in Europe has been presented as a threat to societal, political and military security through three key mutually constituting social 1 4 3 Buzan, B, O Waever, and J de Wilde. 1998. "Security: A New Framework for Analysis." Boulder: Lynne Reinner 94 practices: internal security, cultural security and the security of the welfare state. Huysmans' discussion of cultural security resembles Buzan and Waever's assertion that migration can be constructed as a threat to the identity of social communities, particularly by collectivities whose identity is narrowly defined. However, as Huysmans observes, migration has been presented as threatening to European society.in other ways as well. The European concern with internal security has come to associate the freedom of movement within Europe with a potential vulnerability to the free movement of illegal migrants and asylum seekers, and potentially, terrorists; hence, migration has been connected with the security of the Europeanization process itself. To prevent a return to the Europe of the early 1900's, which produced two cataclysmic conflicts, the E U project is constructed as necessary for the provision of security in Europe. This means that any development that threatens the progress of the EU, such as migration, is a security threat. Huysmans also notes the connection between migration and the security of the welfare state, and focuses on the question of 'who has a legitimate right to welfare provisions'. 1 4 7 With the welfare state forming such an essential component of European identity, the viability of the welfare state is considered an essential component of national and European identity. The scarcity of social goods contributes to the construction of asylum seekers and immigrants as rivals to national citizens, both in the labor market and in the distribution of social welfare benefits.148 Huysmans' examination of the securitisation of migration in Europe, and Buzan and Waever's discussion of societal security, reveals that security threats are often 1 4 6 Huysmans, Jef. 2000. "The European Union and the Securitisation of Migration." Journal of Common Market Studies 38:751-77. 95 constructed in complex ways, with multiple discourses and social practices contributing to the securitised discourse. Migration, in particular, demonstrates the complexity of security discourses and the practices that sustain these discourses. Migration fits into the discussion of security in various sectors and in various roles. For settler societies like Canada and Australia, the discourse on migration reflects a number of concerns, often overlapping sectors and, at times, contradicting one another. Thus, in these societies we do see migration portrayed as Buzan and Waever portrayed migration, as a potential threat to the identity of a society caused by a changing composition of that society; and also as Huysmans portrayed migration, as a threat to internal security, cultural security and to the welfare state. Yet, in both of these states, there are competing and contrasting discourses on immigration. In settler states, like Canada and Australia, permanent migration has, in fact, been portrayed as essential to the long-term survival of the state. Their small populations and large landmasses have formed an integral part of the discourse on immigration and national security since the founding of these states. Additionally, the decline in natural population growth associated with increases in economic prosperity has meant that these states have come to rely on migration to sustain or increase their population, as well as their wealth. This discourse on migration overlaps both societal security concerns and a communitarian (military-political) security concern. This discourse was originally formulated around the perception that these states faced a threat from their larger, potentially expansionist neighbors - the U.S. for Canada, Japan and China in the case of Australia. Thus, the fear of having a small population has been partly spurred on by the fear of military takeover by more powerful (presumably because of their larger i 96 population) states. The need for a larger population has continued in the discourse on immigration, despite the reduced military threat that these states face from their neighbors. 1 The discourse on immigration need not be limited to potential military threats to the state. In Australia, and now emerging in the U.S., the discourse on migration has been expanded to include it as another threat to the environment. There is a growing linkage in these states between population increase, from immigration, and the increasing stress on the environment caused by human activity. The association between migration and environmental stress is fertile ground for research on how discursive practices affect perceptions of security threats. The discourse on migration often reflects security concerns in multiple sectors of state security, but it is most often and most clearly enunciated as a potential threat to the identity of society. As was noted in the introductory chapter, explaining the empirical cases selected for this study, we have seen this discourse in Canada and Australia, both of whom have adopted racially defined immigration programs to reduce the number of non-British and later, non-European immigrants. Their perception of the peril of allowing Asian, (particularly Chinese) immigration is well documented. In both cases, non-white migration had been portrayed as a threat to the European character of the society. The discourse defending the restrictions against allowing immigration of particular races coincides with the discourse heralding large-scale permanent migration as essential to the survival of the state. So we see in these cases a fine example of two distinct discourses on migration, carried on simultaneously in distinct sectors that produced a unique policy 9 7 outcome - high levels of permanent migration that were highly restrictive along racial and ethnic lines. Throughout their histories, Canada and Australia have represented ideal cases for studying the discourse on immigration from a societal security standpoint, primarily because these discourses and practices changed dramatically over the course of their histories. As noted earlier, a military threat from the U.S. no longer plays a role in the immigration policies of Canadian governments, yet they continue to espouse high levels of permanent migration to provide for both economic and political security. In Australia, the Yellow Peril is no longer a prominent term in migration discourse and recent levels of migration from Asian states is significant, despite ongoing concerns regarding the identity of Australian society. More interesting perhaps has been the eventual change in the racially and ethnically defined immigration programs. With the eventual acceptance of official multi-culturalism in both states, their racially defined immigration programs ceased. Once the identity of these states changed from one of protecting a distinctly white, Northern European identity to one of multi-culturalism, immigration from non-British or European states was permitted at much higher levels. As their identity changed, so did the types of migration seen as presenting a threat to the society. As a result, the permanent migration policies of Canada and Australia reflect their multi-cultural identities as they aim to attract migrants from many parts of the world. The purpose of this discussion has been to demonstrate that there are multi-sectoral discourses converging on the issue of migration and that each of these discourses change over time. The discourse on permanent migration addresses different referent 98 objects than does the discourse pertaining to Chinese or Caribbean immigration. As will be shown in this study, the discourse on asylum seekers is distinct from the discourse on immigration, and it addresses multiple sectors of security, including the political security sector. Sectors of threat from Humanitarian Migration According to Waever, political security is about the organizational stability of the social order; it is made up of nonmilitary threats to sovereignty.149 He ultimately concludes that political threats are made to 1) the internal legitimacy of the political unit or 2) the external recognition of the state. Asylum seeking can be constructed as a challenge to both the internal legitimacy of the political unit and the external sovereignty of the state. It challenges internal legitimacy by calling into question the ability of the state to 'control' its borders, a fundamental aspect of state sovereignty. Asylum seekers provide an additional challenge to liberal states because signatory states are forced by international obligation and the domestic legal system to adjudicate the claims of asylum seekers. During the period of time it takes to decide on the claim, they must provide them protection and basic welfare provisions. As a result of their status as asylum seekers, states have less power to do with them what they want, presenting a potential challenge to the sovereignty of the state. Asylum seekers can also undermine external sovereignty i f their presence indicates a failure on the part of states to control their borders. The inability to control borders may be more than just a loss of international prestige; it may invite unwanted interference from other states, from neighbours attempting to stop cross border movements or from those involved in a war on drugs or a war on terror in which 99 controlling the movement of people across certain borders is essential. Again, this is highly unlikely given the small numbers that reach most advanced western states, but the potential exists and can be seen in the discourse on asylum seekers and illegal immigrants. What is most noticeable by now is that asylum seeking represents a threat predominantly within the political sphere, even when their numbers are sufficiently low. These numbers are low partially because of the control mechanisms that the economically advanced states exert over the international movement of people. Thus, any development that could undermine this system of control could be constructed as a political threat. Unauthorized humanitarian migration is often portrayed as undermining this system of control, because those who enter a state without permission have successfully circumvented that state's control mechanisms. Furthermore, asylum seekers can represent a threat to the sovereignty of the home state as well. In cases where the home state sought to prevent the departure or escape of asylum seekers, their successful arrival in another country signals a lack of control of its borders. Thus, asylum seeking and illegal immigration are constructed as a threat primarily within the political security sector because they represent a non-military challenge to the sovereignty of individual states. Authorized migration does not threaten the political sector of security, because it is controlled by the receiving state. It may threaten the economy, the identity of the host society, the environment or the sovereignty of the home state, but it is rarely presented as threatening the sovereignty of the receiving state. This discussion regarding the sector in which the discourse on asylum seeking is concerned serves to focus the examination of the discourse surrounding unauthorized 100 humanitarian migration. Having identified that the political and societal sectors are the primary sector of security discourse concerning unauthorized humanitarian migration, it is easier to identify the dominant discourse as well as the referent object in the securitisation process. Thus, we expect that a securitised discourse on asylum seekers will be concerned primarily with the sovereignty of the state and/or the identity of society as threatened. It is possible that various actors associated with asylum seeking will be portrayed as a security threat to the state, including refugee-producing states, those who transport asylum seekers or asylum seekers themselves. It is not necessary for asylum seekers themselves to be identified as the risk to the state for the issue of unauthorized humanitarian migration to be securitised. Thus, we will see that in some cases those that carry asylum seekers to the state are portrayed as migrant smugglers, with all the qualities and attributes associated with such a term, rather than as someone helping refugees escape persecution. Asylum seekers may also be portrayed as a threat to the state as criminals or terrorists. They may also be portrayed as a threat, not explicitly to the state but to 'genuine' refugees. In such a case, refugees are portrayed as the victims of asylum seekers, who have 'jumped the queue' and taken their spot in the host state. While the use of such predicates portray refugees as the victim, the label of a 'queue jumper' implies a threat to the state as well. The queue jumper label has a number of negative connotations: that the person has no respect for law and order in his or her new home state, and that he or she has no sense of fairness. It is implied that people who do these things or who act in 101 this way, cannot be one of us and that letting them into the state would threaten the values of society. This securitised discourse has not been the dominant mode of representation for refugees and asylum seekers. As the following chapter demonstrates in greater detail, since the implementation of the international refugee regime following the Second World War, the dominant discourse pertaining to refugees and asylum seekers has been humanitarian in character. As noted earlier, a humanitarian-securitisation does not portray unauthorized humanitarian migrants as a threat to the state. Rather, humanitarian migrants are portrayed as victims in need of the state's protection. Essentially, the humanitarian discourse is a securitised discourse, though one which embodies a deepening of the security discourse, i.e. human - not state - security with specific individuals and communities identified as the primary referent object of security, while maintaining the state as the primary actor responsible for the provision of security. Prem Rajaram argues that a humanitarian presentation of refugees portrays them as helpless and lost, a portrayal that he critiques as intentionally ignoring the voices of the displaced. 1 5 0 It is not my intention to support this representation of the refugee, but to study the political effects of such a representation maintaining or losing dominance in the discourse on unauthorized humanitarian migration. Taking a more critical approach, Rajaram explores other possible representations that would incorporate refugee voices and which would, he argues, lead to the empowerment of refugees and would likely result in greater protection. This study tends to take a more pessimistic approach, fearing that Rajaram, Prem Kumar. 2002. "Humanitarianism and Representations of the Refugee." Journal of Refugee Studies 15:247-64. 102 the discourse on refugees is more likely to take a turn toward communitarian-securitisation than it is to incorporating refugee voices into a
UBC Theses and Dissertations
The securitisation of humanitarian migration Watson, Scott D. 2006
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