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An integrated approach for community hazard, impact, risk and vulnerability analysis : HIRV Pearce, Laurence Dominique Renée 2000

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A N I N T E G R A T E D A P P R O A C H FOR C O M M U N I T Y H A Z A R D , IMPACT, RISK AND VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS: HIRV by L A U R E N C E DOMINIQUE R E N E E P E A R C E B.A., The University of, British Columbia, 1973 M.S.W., The University of British Columbia, 1975 M.A., The University of British Columbia, 1989 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL F U L F I L L M E N T OF T H E REQUIREMENTS FOR T H E D E G R E E OF D O C T O R OF PHILOSOPHY in T H E F A C U L T Y OF G R A D U A T E STUDIES The School of Community and Regional Planning We accept this thesis as conforming t^o^ he required standard. T H E UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH C O L U M B I A December 2000 © Laurence Dominique Renee Pearce, 2000 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. '5-The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada DE-6 (2/88) Abstract The Great Hyogo-Ken Nanbu earthquake, Hurricane Andrew, the Lockerbie air crash, and many other disasters have had terrible impacts on communities around the world. Disasters will continue to occur, and their social, economic, political, and environmental impacts will continue to increase. Communities are becoming increasingly concerned about this and are working to develop disaster management programs to prepare for, respond to, and recover from disasters. Hazard, risk, and vulnerability (HRV) analyses form the basis of disaster management processes; unfortunately, to this point, communities and regional districts have not had access to effective HRV models. This dissertation focuses on HRV analyses that are community-based, and it argues that the goal of such analyses should be to assist communities in developing and prioritizing mitigation strategies for hazard management. It also argues that HRV models should allow for the integration of disaster management and community planning, along with a high degree of public participation. Through a literature review, fourteen key objectives for determining the adequacy of current HRV models are derived. When extant models are measured against these objectives, it becomes clear that the former are deficient in a number of areas. In order to rectify these deficiencies, a new HRV model - the hazard, impact, risk, and vulnerability (HIRV) model is introduced. The HIRV model is developed through extensive use of exploratory studies and (1) incorporates a high degree of public participation, (2) is all-hazard in scope, (3) provides for realistic and practical risk assessment, (4) establishes guidelines for determining vulnerabilities, (5) provides guidelines for determining the potential impacts of a disaster, and (6) provides a method for prioritizing mitigation strategies. The potential effectiveness of the implementation of the HIRV model is evaluated through the use of participatory case studies in the British Columbia communities of Barriere, Taylor, and Kamloops. In short, the HIRV model provides a way for communities and emergency planners to make effective use of existing resources in order to develop comprehensive and practical disaster management programs and to move towards sustainable hazard mitigation. TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT ii LIST OF TABLES xii LIST OF FIGURES xv ACKNOWLEDGEMENT xvi 1. INTRODUCTION 1 1.1. CONSEQUENCES OF INADEQUATE H R V ANALYSIS 3 1.1.1. Summary 9 1.2. THESIS PROBLEM STATEMENT AND THESIS GOAL 10 1.3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 11 1.3.1. Experiential Knowl edge 12 1.3.2. Extant Theory and Research 14 1.3.3. Exploratory Studies 15 1.3.4. Participatory Case Studies 15 1.4. THESIS OUTLINE 16 2. LAYING A FOUNDATION 18 2.1. DEFINITIONS OF DISASTER 19 2.1.1. Lexicology 19 2.1.2. Origin/Cause 19 2.1.3. Characteristics 20 2.1.4. Capacity to Respond 22 2.1.5. A New Definition 22 2.2. DISASTER MANAGEMENT: A PROCESS 24 2.2.1. Definitions of Disaster Management 24 2.2.2. Hazard, Risk, and Vulnerability (HRV) Analysis as Part of Disaster Management 26 2.2.3. Mitigation 27 2.2.4. A Definition of Disaster Management 28 iii 2.3. HAZARD IDENTIFICATION 30 2.3.1. Hazard Classifications 30 2.3.1.1. Impact of Hazard Identification on Emergency Response Plans 33 2.4. RISK 38 2.4.1. A Definition of Risk 40 2.5. VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT 41 2.5.1. An Enhanced Definition of Vulnerability 44 2.6. RISK MANAGEMENT 45 2.6.1. Definitions and Descriptions 45 2.7. DEFINING COMMUNITY AND REGION 51 2.8. SUMMARY 52 . INTEGRATING HAZARD INFORMATION INTO LOCAL DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES 53 3.1. HISTORICAL FACTORS 54 3.1.1. Historical Overview 54 3.1.2. Integration of Community Planning and Disaster Management Planning 58 3.1.2.1. Why Include the Public? 61 3.1.3. Summary 65 3.2. SOCIAL FACTORS 66 3.2.1. Public Apathy 66 3.2.2. Risk Communication 67 3.2.3. A dual and Perceived Risk 70 3.2.4. Risk Acceptance 73 3.3. TECHNOLOGICAL FACTORS 76 3.3.1. Reliability of Scientific and Technological Data 76 3.3.2. Access to Technology 78 3.4. ORGANIZATIONAL FACTORS 80 3.5. POLITICAL FACTORS 82 3.5.1. Awareness 82 3.5.2. Economics 83 3.5.3. Lack of Organized Constituency 85 3.6. SUMMARY OF CHALLENGES 87 3.7. DERIVATION OF THE FOURTEEN KEY OBJECTIVES OF AN ADEQUATE H R V ANALYSIS 89 3.8. SUMMARY 94 4. T H E S T A T E O F H R V A N A L Y S I S 95 4.1. THE SEARCH FOR ADEQUATE MODELS FOR H R V ANALYSIS 96 4.2. REVIEW AND EVALUATION OF EXTANT MODELS FOR H R V ANALYSIS 99 4.2.1. Review ofthe APELL Model for HRV Analysis 99 4.2.1.1. Evaluation ofthe APELL Model for HRV Analysis 100 4.2.2. Review ofthe EPC Model for HRV Analysis 104 4.2.2.1. Evaluation ofthe EPC Model for HRV Analysis 104 4.2.3. Review ofthe FEMA 1 Model for HRV Analysis 106 4.2.3.1. Evaluation ofthe FEMA 1 Model for HRV Analysis 107 4.2.4. Review ofthe FEMA 2 Model for HRV Analysis 109 4.2.4.1. Evaluation of the FEMA 2 Model for HRV Analysis 110 4.2.5. Review ofthe NOAA Model for HRV Analysis 112 4.2.5.1. Evaluation ofthe NOAA Model for HRV Analysis 113 4.2.6. Review ofthe OSLO Model for HRV Analysis 117 4.2.6.1. Evaluation ofthe OSLO Model for HRV Analysis 119 4.2.7. Review ofthe SMUG Model for HRV Analysis 121 4.2.7.1. Evaluation ofthe SMUG Model for HRV Analysis 121 4.2.8. Review ofthe UNDRO Model for HRV Analysis 123 4.2.8.1. Evaluation ofthe UNDRO Model for HRV Analysis 126 4.3. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 129 5. T H E D E V E L O P M E N T O F H I R V : A N I N T E G R A T E D M O D E L F O R C O M M U N I T Y H A Z A R D , I M P A C T , R I S K , A N D V U L N E R A B I L I T Y A N A L Y S I S 131 5.1. A N OVERVIEW OF THE H I R V MODEL 132 5.2. THE OVERALL H I R V PROCESS 136 v 5.2.1. Public Participation in the HIRV Model 136 5.2.1.1. The Size of the HIRV Committee 144 5.2.1.2. Composition of the HIRV Committee 145 5.2.1.3. Implementation of HIRV 147 5.2.2. A Summary of the H1R V Process 153 5.3. THE HAZARD IDENTIFICATION PHASE OF THE H I R V MODEL : 154 5.3.1. Natural Hazards 755 5.3.2. Diseases, Epidemics, and Infestations 755 5.3.3. Person-Induced Hazards 156 5.3.4. A Historical Review of Disasters 156 5.4. THE RISK ANALYSIS PHASE OF THE H I R V MODEL FOR H R V ANALYSIS 158 5.4.1. Dividing the Community Into Zones: A Step Towards Equity 158 5.4.2. Why the Need for Risk Factors ? 7 61 5.4.3. Dealing with Uncertainty. 163 5.5. THE VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS PHASE OF THE H I R V MODEL 168 5.6. THE IMPACT ANALYSIS PHASE OF THE H I R V MODEL 175 5.6.1. Social Impacts 176 5.6.2. Economic and Environmental Impacts 7 78 5.6.3. Political Impacts 752 5.6.4. Completing the Impact Rating 7 84 5.7. THE RISK MANAGEMENT PHASE OF THE H I R V MODEL 187 5.8. OVERCOMING RESISTANCE TO CHANGE 192 5.9. SUMMARY AND OVERVIEW OF HIRV'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE FIELD OF DISASTER MANAGEMENT 195 E X P L O R A T O R Y S T U D I E S : A R E F L E C T I V E E X A M I N A T I O N 198 6.1. STAGE 1: EXPLORATORY STUDIES AT THE CANADIAN EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS COLLEGE 199 6.1.1. Mayors and Elected Municipal Officials Course 199 6.1.2. The Post-Secondary Institution Course 204 6.2. STAGE TWO: EXPLORATORY STUDIES AND WORKSHOPS 205 6.2.1. Search for a Conceptual Framework 205 6.2.2. Exploratory Workshops 206 6.2.2.1. Pre-Workshop Planning 207 6.2.2.2. The Emergency Preparedness Conference Workshop 209 6.2.2.3. The Invitational Workshops : 211 6.2.2.4. The Exploratory Study in the Sooke Electoral District 213 6.2.2.5. The C E P C Workshop 215 6.3. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 218 . PARTICIPATORY CASE STUDIES: ON THE RIGHT PATH? 220 7.1. RESEARCH METHODS 221 7. /. /. Research Design 221 7.1.2. Sampling 222 7.1.3. The Relationship between the Researcher and the Researched 223 7.1.4. Collection 223 7.1.5. Data Analysis 225 7.1.6. Validity 226 7.2. PREPARATORY WORK: INTRODUCING H I R V AND THE WORKSHOP STRUCTURE 227 7.3. A PARTICIPATORY CASE STUDY: BARRIERE AND THE NORTH THOMPSON SUB-REGIONAL DISTRICT 230 7.3.1. Community Profile • 230 7.3.2. Analysis of the Implementation of the HIR V Model 232 7.3.3. Results of the Questionnaire 236 7.4. PARTICIPATORY CASE STUDY: TAYLOR 238 7.4.1. Community Profile 238 7.4.2. Analysis of the Implementation of the HIR V Model 240 7.4.3. Results of the Questionnaire 243 7.5. A PARTICIPATORY CASE STUDY: KAMLOOPS 245 7.5.1. Community Profile 245 7.5.2. Analysis of the Implementation of the HIR V Model 246 7.5.3. Results of the Questionnaire 253 7.6. A PARTICIPATORY CROSS-CASE STUDY ANALYSIS 256 7.7. CONCLUSIONS AND AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 259 8. THESIS S U M M A R Y A N D C O N C L U D I N G R E M A R K S 264 9. B D 3 L I O G R A P H Y 270 A P P E N D I X A T H E P O R T O L A V A L L E Y E X P E R I E N C E 288 A P P E N D I X B R E N N ' S F R A M E W O R K 295 B.l THE SEARCH FOR A FRAMEWORK 296 B.2. RENN'S FRAMEWORK 301 B.2.1. Technical Risk Analyses 303 B.2.2. An Economic Perspective 305 B.2.3. A Psychological Perspective 306 B.2.4. Sociological Perspectives 307 B.3. A SUMMARY OF RENN'S FRAMEWORK AND ITS APPLICATION TO THE H R V PROCESS 312 A P P E N D I X C . A DISCUSSION O F M O D E L S F O R H R V A N A L Y S I S E X C L U D E D F R O M T H E R E V I E W A N D E V A L U A T I O N 314 A P P E N D I X D. C O M P O S I T I O N O F T H E H H * V C O M M I T T E E 319 A P P E N D I X E . H A N D B O O K 328 E . l . FOURTEEN KEY OBJECTIVES FOR A SUCCESSFUL HAZARD, RISK AND VULNERABILITY ( H R V ) ANALYSIS.. 329 E.2. READINGS ON RISK COMMUNICATION, RISK PERCEPTION AND RISK ACCEPTANCE AS THEY RELATE TO HAZARD, RISK AND VULNERABILITY ( H R V ) ANALYSIS 330 E.2.1. Risk Communication 330 E.2.2. Actual and Perceived Risk. 332 E.2.3. Risk Acceptance 334 E.2.4. Bibliography 336 E.3 . HAZARD IDENTIFICATION 338 viii E.3.1. Natural Hazards 338 E.3.2. Diseases, Epidemics and Infestations 340 E.3.3. Person Induced Hazards 342 E. 3.4. Multi Hazards 344 E.4. DEFINITIONS AND DISCUSSIONS OF HAZARDS 345 E.5 . RISK ANALYSIS 358 E . 6. VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT 368 A P P E N D I X F. W O R K B O O K 389 F. l. DEFINITIONS 391 F.2. DISASTER 392 F. 2.1. Disaster management 392 F.3. OTHER MODELS FOR H R V ANALYSES 393 F.4. THE H I R V PROCESS 394 F.5. THE COMMITTEE 395 F.6. OVERVIEW OF THE H I R V MODEL 396 F.7. HAZARD IDENTIFICATION 399 F.7.1. Group Exercise 399 F. 7.2. Definitions and Descriptions 400 F.l.3. Group Exercise 400 F.l.4. Multi-Hazards • 400 F.8. STEP TWO - ORGANIZING THE COMMUNITY 400 F.8.1. Group Exercise - Dividing the Community • 400 F.9. RISK ANALYSIS 4 0 1 F.9.1. Step One - Historical Data 401 F.9.2. Group Exercise - Historical Data 401 F.9.3. Step Two Examining the Factors 401 F. 9.4. Group Exercise - Examining the Risk Factors 402 F.9.5. Step Three Determining the Likelihood of a Disaster Occurring. 402 ix F. 9.6. Step Four - Assessing Certainty 402 F. 9.7. Step Five - Rating Risk 403 F. 10. VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT 403 F. 10.1. Step One- Examining the Vulnerability Factors 403 F.10.2. Group Exercise - Examining the Vulnerability Factors 404 F. 10.3. Step Two Determining the Degree of Vulnerability 404 F. 10.4. Assessing Certainty 404 F.10.5. Rating Vulnerability 405 F . l l . IMPACT ANALYSIS 405 FALL Step One- Examining the Impact Factors 405 F. 11.2. Group Exercise - Examining the Impact Factors 408 F.11.3. Step Two Determining the Degree of Impact 408 F.11.4. Assessing Certainty 409 F.ll.5. Rating Impact 409 F.12. RISK MANAGEMENT 410 F. 12.1. Group Exercise - Completing Risk Management 411 F.13. THE IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE 412 F. 14. RISK ANALYSIS SHEET 417 F.15. VULNERABILITY FACTOR ANALYSIS 418 F. 16. VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT SHEET 419 F.17. IMPACT FACTOR ANALYSIS 420 F . 18. IMPACT ASSESSMENT SHEET 421 F . 19. RISK MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS SHEET 422 A P P E N D I X G T A B L E S A N D R E S P O N S E S T O E X P L O R A T O R Y STUDIES 423 A P P E N D I X H Q U E S T I O N N A I R E 439 A P P E N D I X I I N V I T A T I O N T O H O S T A H I R V W O R K S H O P 445 x A P P E N D I X J I M P L E M E N T A T I O N O F T H E H A Z A R D , I M P A C T , R I S K , A N D V U L N E R A B I L I T Y ( H I R V ) P R O C E S S '. 446 A P P E N D I X K R E S U L T S O F Q U E S T I O N N A I R E S F R O M T H E P A R T I C I P A T O R Y C A S E S T U D I E S . . . 451 A . LIST OF TABLES T A B L E 1: CONCEPT OF DISASTER MANAGEMENT 25 TABLE 2: LIST OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN NATURAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL DISASTERS 35 T A B L E 3: STEPS OF RISK MANAGEMENT 48 TABLE 4: COMPARISON OF FACTORS 90 T A B L E 5: SUMMARY OF EXTANT MODELS FOR H R V ANALYSIS AND THEIR ABILITY TO M E E T THE FOURTEEN K E Y OBJECTIVES OF OF AN ADEQUATE MODEL FOR H R V ANALYSIS 130 TABLE 6: SAMPLE OF A COMPLETED RISK ANALYSIS 133 T A B L E 7: SCALE FOR DETERMINING THE LIKELIHOOD OF A DISASTER OCCURRING DUE TO A SPECIFIC HAZARD .... 133 T A B L E 8: SAMPLE OF A COMPLETED VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS 133 TABLE 9: SCALE FOR DETERMINING THE VULNERABILITY TO A DISASTER OCCURRING FROM A SPECIFIC HAZARD 133 T A B L E 10: SAMPLE OF IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR AIR CRASH 134 T A B L E 11: SCALE FOR DETERMINING THE DEGREE OF IMPACT OF A DISASTER OCCURRING FROM A SPECIFIC HAZARD 134 T A B L E 12: SAMPLE OF COMPLETED RISK MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS 134 T A B L E 13: IMPLEMENTATION OF H I R V PROGRAM 149 T A B L E 14: T H E H I R V PROCESS 151 T A B L E 15: T A B L E OF SCALE USED TO EVALUATE RISK 165 T A B L E 16: SAMPLE OF A COMPLETED RISK ASSESSMENT 166 TABLE 17: K E Y VULNERABILITY FACTORS 170 T A B L E 18: SCALE FOR DETERMINING THE VULNERABILITY TO A DISASTER OCCURRING FROM A SPECIFIC HAZARD 171 T A B L E 19: SUMMARY OF SAMPLE VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS FOR AN EARTHQUAKE FOR A GIVEN LOCATION 173 T A B L E 20: SCALE FOR DETERMINING THE DEGREE OF IMPACT TO A DISASTER OCCURRING FROM A SPECIFIC HAZARD 176 TABLE 21: VULNERABILITIES AND SOCIAL IMPACTS 177 TABLE 22: SAMPLE FROM A SOCIAL IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR AN AIR CRASH IN A GIVEN A R E A 178 T A B L E 23: VULNERABILITIES AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS 179 TABLE 24: SAMPLE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR AN AIR CRASH IN A GIVEN A R E A 179 T A B L E 25: STANDARD INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES FOR THE PURPOSES OF D A M A G E D A T A CLASSIFICATION 180 xii T A B L E 26: VULNERABILITIES AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS 181 T A B L E 27: SAMPLE ECONOMIC IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR AN AIR CRASH IN A GIVEN A R E A 182 T A B L E 28: VULNERABILITIES AND POLITICAL IMPACTS 184 T A B L E 29: SAMPLE POLITICAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR AN AIR CRASH IN A GIVEN A R E A 184 T A B L E 30: SUMMARY OF SAMPLE IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR AN AIR CRASH FOR A GIVEN LOCATION 184 T A B L E 31: ILLUSTRATION OF THE RECORDING OF THE IMPACT ANALYSIS 185 T A B L E 32: SAMPLE OF RISK MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS 187 T A B L E 33: EXAMPLE OF POSSIBLE RESULTS OF RISK AND VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS 188 TABLE 34: NATURAL HAZARDS 339 TABLE 35: DISEASES, EPIDEMICS AND INFESTATIONS 340 TABLE 36: GUIDE TO POTENTIAL DISEASES, EPIDEMICS AND INFESTATIONS 341 T A B L E 37: PERSON INDUCED HAZARDS 343 T A B L E 38: NATURAL HAZARDS CAUSING TECHNOLOGICAL HAZARDS 344 TABLE 39: COURSES FOR MAYORS AND ELECTED MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS, 1991-1996 423 T A B L E 40: A COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF COMMENTS RELEVANT TO THE H I R V APPROACH: T A K E N FROM EVALUATIONS FOR THE MAYORS AND ELECTED MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS COURSES AT C E P C FROM JUNE 1991 TO SEPTEMBER 1995 424 TABLE 41: QUESTIONNAIRE DISTRIBUTED AT MAYORS AND ELECTED MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS COURSE 425 T A B L E 42: RESULTS OF QUESTIONNAIRES DISTRIBUTED AT MAYORS AND ELECTED MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS COURSE 426 T A B L E 43: RESULTS OF QUESTIONNAIRE DISTRIBUTED AT MAYORS AND ELECTED MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS COURSE 19 FEBRUARY 1996 426 T A B L E 44: COMMENTS BASED ON POST-SECONDARY INSTITUTIONS COURSE EVALUATIONS FROM NOVEMBER 1995 427 TABLE 45: LIST OF CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING THE ADEQUACY OF H R V MODELS 428 T A B L E 46: RESPONSES TO QUESTIONNAIRE: EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS CONFERENCE WORKSHOP 430 T A B L E 47: LIST OF PARTICIPANTS FOR THE INVITATIONAL WORKSHOP HELD IN BURNABY, 1 DECEMBER 1997 431 TABLE 48: LIST OF PARTICIPANTS FOR THE INVITATIONAL WORKSHOP HELD IN VICTORIA, 9 DECEMBER 1997 432 TABLE 49: RESPONSES TO QUESTIONNAIRE: PILOT WORKSHOPS IN BURNABY AND VICTORIA 432 T A B L E 50: LIST OF PARTICIPANTS FOR THE WORKSHOP HELD IN SOOKE, 25 M A R C H 1998 433 x i i i T A B L E 51: QUESTIONNAIRES FROM THE ELECTORAL DISTRICT OF SOOKE 435 TABLE 52: LIST OF PARTICIPANTS AT THE C E P C WORKSHOP, 16-17 SEPTEMBER 1998 437 T A B L E 53: RESPONSES TO QUESTIONNAIRES: C E P C WORKSHOP 437 T A B L E 54: FINDINGS FOR BARRIERE WORKSHOP QUESTIONS A , B , AND C ; AND QUESTIONS 1 TO 14 451 T A B L E 55: COMMENTS INCLUDED IN BARRIERE QUESTIONNAIRES 452 TABLE 56: FINDINGS FOR TAYLOR WORKSHOP QUESTIONS A , B , AND C ; AND QUESTIONS 1 TO 14 453 T A B L E 58: FINDINGS FOR KAMLOOPS WORKSHOP QUESTIONS A , B , AND C ; AND QUESTIONS 1 TO 14 455 TABLE 59: COMMENTS INCLUDED IN KAMLOOPS QUESTIONNAIRES 455 T A B L E 60: SUMMARY OF AVERAGES AND MEANS FOR THE WORKSHOPS IN BARRIERE, TAYLOR, AND KAMLOOPS 456 xiv LIST OF F I G U R E S FIGURE 1: NUMBERS OF SIGNIFICANT NATURAL DISASTERS 2 FIGURE 2: T H E DISASTER MANAGEMENT PROCESS 25 FIGURE 3: HAZARD (H) AS A FUNCTION OF MAGNITUDE OVER TIME 126 FIGURE 4: T H E FIVE PHASES OF THE H I R V MODEL 132 FIGURE 5: T H E EFFECTIVE DECISION MODEL OF PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT 140 FIGURE 6: DIVIDING THE COMMUNITY 159 FIGURE 7: SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY RATINGS MODEL (1996) 164 FIGURE 8: DETAILED ILLUSTRATION OF RATING FOR THE FOUR IMPACTS 185 FIGURE 9: DETAILED ILLUSTRATION OF RATING AN ECONOMIC IMPACT 186 FIGURE 10: ILLUSTRATION OF USE OF COLOUR FOR IDENTIFYING THE RISK AND VULNERABILITY OF GIVEN AREAS 191 FIGURE 11: LEWIN'S THREE-STEP M O D E L 193 FIGURE 12: APPROXIMATION OF HOW GROUP 1 DIVIDED THE SOOKE ELECTORAL DISTRICT 214 FIGURE 13: APPROXIMATION OF HOW GROUP 2 DIVIDED THE SOOKE ELECTORAL DISTRICT 215 FIGURE 14: M A P OF BRITISH COLUMBIA INDICATING APPROXIMATE LOCATION OF THOMPSON NICOLA REGIONAL DISTRICT 230 FIGURE 15: M A P OF BARRIERE AND NORTH THOMPSON SUB-REGION 231 FIGURE 16: MAP OF BRITISH COLUMBIA INDICATING 238 FIGURE 17: M A P OF TAYLOR 239 FIGURE 18: M A P OF BRITISH COLUMBIA INDICATING 245 FIGURE 19: M A P OF KAMLOOPS 245 FIGURE 20: DIVISION OF KAMLOOPS BY GROUP A ; 249 FIGURE 21: FLOW CHART OF HAZARD MANAGEMENT 297 FIGURE 22: A SYSTEMATIC CLASSIFICATION OF RISK PERSPECTIVE AS T H E Y APPLY TO H R V ANALYSIS 302 FIGURE 23: MAJOR SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON RISK 308 FIGURE 24: A SYSTEMATIC CLASSIFICATION OF RISK PERSPECTIVE AS IT APPLIES TO H R V ANALYSIS 313 XV Acknowledgements A t times, the development o f a hazard, risk and vulnerability analysis model seems to parallel the development o f a doctoral thesis: there are numerous hazards, risk and vulnerability factors abound, and setting priorities is central to being successful. A s always, many people have contributed to the success o f this thesis, but in particular I would l ike to thank the fol lowing: • Olav Slaymaker, for his confidence in me, his advice, his sense of humour, his sense o f justice, and his encouragement; • Wayne Greene, for his ongoing support over the years, his advice and guidance; • Tony Dorcey, for his sincere and dedicated support, his constructive crit icism, and his efforts on my behalf; • Peter Nemetz, for his support, interest, and attention to detail; • Peter Anderson, for his long-standing support, his advice, and knowledge; • Dianne Newe l l , for her assistance and guidance; • Joanne Richardson, for her unflagging support, her sense o f humour, and editorial acumen; and • Larry Pearce, who was always there for me when I needed h im the most. xv i 1. Introduction For centuries communities have been coping with disasters: thousands died as a result o f the L isbon Earthquake o f 1755 (Ward 1989), and, in 1998, Hurricane M i t ch was responsible for the deaths o f over 10,000 people (United Nations Off ice for the Coordination o f Humanitarian Affairs 1998). In the past two decades, disasters have k i l led some 3 mi l l ion people, affected a further 800 mi l l ion, and caused damage in excess o f US$23 bi l l ion (Kuban 1993). The fol lowing chart, presented by Bruce (1994), was prepared by the Geneva Secretariat for the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction. It clearly illustrates, on an international scale, the increasing number o f natural disasters entailing significant social and economic costs. Significant disasters from natural causes include those in which (1) damage was equivalent to 1 per cent or more o f gross domestic product; (2) more than 1 per cent o f the people o f the country were affected; and/or (3) there were more than 100 deaths. For example, between the years 1988 and 1992 there were sixty-six disasters in which more than 100 people died (see Figure 1). Since this chart was completed, there have been numerous major disasters. The Saguenay F lood o f 1996 was Canada's first bi l l ion-dol lar disaster (Grescoe 1997). Less than two years later, the 1998 ice storm in southern Ontario and Quebec resulted in costs surpassing $1 b i l l ion (Harris 1998). In 1994, the Northridge earthquake, whose epicentre was located in Los Angeles County, k i l led over sixty people and resulted in costs in excess o f US$30 b i l l ion (Pearce and Pearce 1994). Exact ly one year later, in 1995, over 5,000 people were k i l led, and economic losses were estimated to be in excess o f $100 bi l l ion, in the great Hyogo-Ken Nanbu earthquake (Mi le t i 1999). A n d it is not only natural disasters that have caused deaths and resulted in property damage. In 1995 the wor ld was shocked when terrorists released sarin gas in the subways o f Japan and bombed the A l f red P. Murrah Federal Bu i ld ing in Oklahoma. We have also witnessed worldwide concern over the avian f lu in Hong K o n g , the threat o f ebola-l ike viruses in A f r i ca , and mad cow disease in England. Clearly, preparing for and responding to disasters is important; disasters are not aberrant events (Hewitt 1983, Ol iver-Smith 1986). Figure 1: Numbers of Significant Natural Disasters Significant Disasters Based on Damage, Affected Persons & Deaths • Significant Damage • Affected Persons • Num ber of Deaths 1963-67 1968-72 1973-77 1978-82 1983-87 1988-92 Source: (Bruce 1994) Hazard, risk and vulnerability (HRV) analysis was a key component of early defence strategies: who is the enemy? how likely are they to attack? and how is the community most vulnerable to such an attack? Upon determining the answers to such questions, leaders would either set about fortifying their communities and/or entering into peace accords with their perceived enemies. As well as trying to protect themselves against invading armies, for centuries people have attempted to influence nature. For example, Pacific Island natives allegedly sacrificed young women to volcano gods in an attempt to reduce the risk of fatal eruptions. More recently, the US Corps of Engineers built numerous dams, levees, and dykes across the United States to mitigate the impact of riverine flooding. The 1994 and 1995 Mississippi floods demonstrated that natural disasters are not prevented simply by building dykes and levees, and that the building of dykes and levees has actually contributed to the problem (National Wildlife Federation 1998). Communities are now moving homes and businesses out of flood plains rather than trying to control the waters (FEMA 1997). 2 1.1. Consequences of Inadequate HRV Analysis When communities do not have access to an adequate H R V analysis, the consequences are numerous: (1) Without a complete analysis of potential hazards communities are unable to develop effective warning and evacuation systems One o f the best Canadian examples o f the consequences o f the failure to complete an adequate H R V analysis is the 1987 Edmonton tornado. In that year Edmonton suffered devastating losses fo l lowing a category F4 tornado. 1 O n the Friday before the August long weekend, at approximately 1600h, the tornado touched down in the southeast part of the city; then, travell ing northward, it touched down in the industrial sector, f inally concluding its thirty-minute journey at the Evergreen Mob i le Home Park in the northeast part o f the city. Most o f the people who died in the tornado were residents o f this park, which was virtually destroyed. Damages totalled over $149 mi l l ion, twenty-seven people were k i l led, and hundreds more were injured (Wi lson 1988). Pr ior to this tornado, the Ci ty o f Edmonton was touted as one o f the Canadian cities best prepared for dealing with a disaster. It had an emergency plan that had been tested on a regular basis, and it had provided training to responders. Yet it suffered large numbers o f casualties as a result o f this tornado. Why? Whi le Edmonton's H R V analysis included a number of different hazards (e.g., hazardous material spil ls, severe snowstorms, and flooding), it did not include tornadoes. There was no warning and alert system for tornadoes, nor had any training been provided for responders and community residents regarding what to do before, during, and after a tornado. The hazard and risk analysis did not include tornadoes because, despite numerous sightings, no one could remember one ever having affected the city (Wi lson 1988). Emergency planners are wel l aware that, fo l lowing a tornado, mobile home parks suffer terrible damage -so much so that in several communities in the U S "tornado belt" serious consideration has been given to completely banning mobile home parks. One o f the first steps a prepared community takes fo l lowing a tornado warning is to 1 The Fuji ta scale is used to classify the wind speed o f tornadoes. A n F4 rating is applied to a tornado with wind speeds ranging from 333 to 418 kilometres per hour (Grazulis 1993). 3 evacuate these parks. Had the Ci ty o f Edmonton initiated an evacuation o f the park once the tornado was sighted, there is no question that l ives would have been saved. Clear ly, a complete H R V analysis o f potential hazards would have benefited the citizens o f Edmonton. Current planning for the city does include consideration o f tornadoes, and there is now a plan for the evacuation o f mobi le home parks fol lowing a tornado warning (Bruce Wi lson , personal communication). The 1984 Bhopal disaster is arguably one o f best examples of what may occur when a community is i l l -informed about the nature o f the business being conducted within its boundaries and, specif ical ly, o f the potential effects o f leaking toxic gases. Wi th neither warning plans nor evacuation and response plans in place, when the toxic gases escaped from the Un ion Carbide pesticide factory, over 5,000 people were k i l led and more than 600,000 were permanently injured (Cohen 1994). The Un ion Carbide factory was built in 1969 in order to produce "Sev in Technica l , " a paralytic insecticide that was made with imported methyl isocyanate (M IC) . In 1979 Un ion Carbide built an MIC-produc ing facil i ty adjacent to the existing plant, and it was this facil ity that was the source o f the toxic leak 2 . A t first, Un ion Carbide's application for a development permit to bui ld the M I C facil ity was turned down because it failed to meet Bhopal Development P lan regulations. These regulations required hazardous or polluting industries to be located away from residential and heavily populated areas. Nevertheless, Un ion Carbide was able to influence government off icials, who eventually granted it the development permit. Most local residents were unaware o f the increased danger, even though a local journalist began writ ing articles warning o f the danger in 1982. H is concerns, and the contents o f a legal notice served on Un ion Carbide by a local attorney, were categorically and publ ic ly denied by Un ion Carbide off icials. Had Un ion Carbide disclosed the true nature o f its business and the associated dangers to the publ ic, it is doubtful whether the residents would have al lowed the M I C facil ity to be built; at the very least they would have insisted upon the existence o f an elaborate safety plan - one that would have included a community warning and evacuation plan. Had such a plan been in place, many residents could have been spared death and injury. 2 This information is taken from the Amended Class Act ion complaint f i led by Bhopal survivors and vict ims' organizations in the U S federal district cou