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Contesting modernism : communities and the pacific salmon revitalization plan Robertson, Stephen 1999

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CONTESTING MODERNISM: COMMUNITIES AND THE PACIFIC SALMON REVITALIZATION PLAN by STEPHEN ROBERTSON B.S.W., The University of Victoria, 1984 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SOCIAL WORK in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (School of Social Work) We accept this thesis as corrforming to the reqijjred standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA April 1999 ©Stephen Robertson, 1999 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department^ oi ^>OCfr^([ l/L^fry, The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada Date DE-6 (2788) Abstract This thesis explores the role for social work in addressing government policies that threaten the sustainability of small coastal communities. The response of government and industry to the globalization of trade and resource degradation is at odds with the needs of people. Utilizing a case study methodology the development and implementation of the Pacific Salmon Revitalization Plan is explored. This department of fisheries plan to rationalize the fishery was highly contested on the grounds that it took jobs out of small coastal communities. It was accused of benefiting the large fishing corporations and the urban based fishing fleet, which had the capital to profit from the plan. Concentrated opposition from coastal communities, fishers, advocacy groups and academics was unsuccessful in changing the plan. The assumptions of modernism - expert knowledge, scientific rationality and orthodox economics - as well as distorted communications, were postulated to be behind this lack of success. A post modern analysis suggests that a successful challenge to the plan would have incorporated the local knowledge of fishers and coastal communities within a process of fair and equitable public discourse aimed at reaching intersubjectively mediated understanding. For social work this demonstrates the need to work conjointly with communities and affected groups to identify the modernist assumptions on which policy decisions are based and develop locally derived alternatives to these assumptions. And most importantly, that the focus of social change efforts be on demanding a process for discussion and decision-making that ensures that the concerns of effected individuals will be fairly addressed. i i T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S Abstract ii Table of contents iii Table of figures v Acknowledgements vi Introduction 1 THESIS S T A T E M E N T 6 M E T H O D O L O G Y 7 Data collection 7 Documentation 8 Interviews 8 Methods of analysis 9 Validity issues 9 Contextualizing the Pacific Salmon Revitalization Plan 10 T H E O R E T I C A L C O N T E X T 10 The modern /postmodern debate 10 Shifting paradigms 21 The change process 22 PARTICIPATION A N D C O M M U N I C A T I O N 25 Communicative action 27 The force of better argument 29 Ideal speech acts 30 Communicative competence 31 Ideal speech situations 32 The practice of participation 32 S U M M A R Y 34 H ISTORICAL C O N T E X T : A BRIEF SOCIAL H ISTORY OF T H E BRITISH C O L U M B I A FISHERIES 36 The Salmon Fishery: Significant developments leading to the Pacific Salmon Revitalization Plan 42 T H E D A V I S P L A N 42 T H E C O M M I S S I O N O N PACIFIC FISHERIES POLICY : T H E P E A R S E REPORT 43 T H E F I S H E R M A N ' S REPORT 45 T H E F R A S E R R I V E R S O C K E Y E P U B L I C R E V I E W B O A R D 48 S U M M A R Y 49 The Pacific Salmon Revitalization Plan 51 PACIFIC A R E A R E G I O N A L C O U N C I L WORKSHOP 51 PACIFIC R O U N D T A B L E 53 United Fishermen and Allied Workers Union organized vote on buyback and stacking. 56 T H E PACIFIC S A L M O N R E V I T A L I Z A T I O N P L A N : A N N O U N C E M E N T OF T H E P L A N 56 Reaction to the announcement of the plan 58 Responses from the Community 59 Moratorium on stacking announced. 61 T H E BRITISH C O L U M B I A JOB PROTECTION COMMISSION 62 PACIFIC S A L M O N R E V I T A L I Z A T I O N P L A N R E V I E W P A N E L 65 The Vote on License Stacking. 70 i i i Analysis 73 THEMES ARISING FROM THE CASE STUDY 77 Who owns the fish? Private property versus common property 79 Who controls the fishery? Stakeholders versus citizens 82 Management of the fishery: Professional management versus local knowledge 86 Economics: Market fishery versus a social fishery 88 Challenging modernist assumptions 91 PARTICIPATION AND COMMUNICATION 92 Assumption number one 92 Assumption number two 93 Assumption number three 99 CONSULTATIVE PROCESSES: FRIEND OR FOE 100 CLAIMSMAKING 101 Lessons to be learned: Implications for social work practice 104 Conclusions 110 Bibliography 113 Appendix 1 Time Line 124 SIGNIFICANT EVENTS PRIOR TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PACIFIC SALMON REVITALIZATION PLAN 124 Planning process leading to the Pacific Salmon Revitalization Plan 124 Pacific Salmon Revitalization Plan 124 Appendix 2 126 PRINCIPLES FOR FISHERIES MANAGEMENT 126 Appendix 3 127 OPTIONS FOR COMMERCIAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT 127 Appendix 4 129 INFORMATION AND BRIEFS SUBMITTED TO THE PACIFIC SALMON REVITALIZATION REVIEW PANEL AND ACCESSED THROUGH INFORMATION AND PRIVACY LEGISLATION 129 Briefs from Organizations 129 Briefs from Individuals 129 Briefs from public bodies 130 iv Table of Figures Communicative Action Acknowledgments I would like to take this opportunity to thank my family for their support, encouragement and understanding through the course of my graduate studies and, in particular, during the writing of this thesis. As a part-time student, work and outside commitments seriously distracted me from the task of completing my thesis in a timely fashion. As a result it seemed to become a never to be completed but always present project, interfering with evenings, weekends and holidays, times typically spent in family activities. Without the understanding of my family and their willingness to allow me this time I could not have completed this task. I must give special thanks to my wife Sybil for her patience and her critical reading and editing of the text. Her support was invaluable in helping me to focus my ideas and remain optimistic. Thank you. vi Introduction British Columbia is a province whose wealth has been built upon the value of its natural resources. This wealth has contributed to social well-being by making social expenditures possible. However, resource overexploitation has put into question the continuing viability of these resources. Indeed, the push towards ever-greater capital accumulation continues without recognition of this reality and with minimal questioning of current practices of resource extraction. It has been argued that current resources are not able to support both increasing capital accumulation and a sustainable society (Anton, 1995; Rogers, 1995). This is observable in the nature of the challenges facing the pacific fisheries. The west coast fishery has been affected by: questionable management practices, overfishing, habitat destruction and, arguably, by global climate change. The impact of a decline in fish stock on the small coastal communities of British Columbia is considerable. Not only direct employment is affected, so are related jobs on shore in packing plants, in boat yards and with suppliers of equipment and fuel. The viability of communities heavily dependent on the fishery is particularly at stake. The problem is compounded by government cutbacks in social programs. Furthermore, the forces of globalization have created a rationalization of the industry, which has resulted in severe implications for employment. In attempting to address these issues, resource dependent communities have advocated industrial practices that ensure their survival and for a role in decisions that affect them. In addition, the environmental movement has questioned the sustainability of our current use of natural resources and therefore pressured for more environmentally sound industrial practices. An increasing demand for public accountability is pressuring government and industry to adopt new methods for public input and to explore new resource management techniques. A Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) report entitled Outlook for Canada's Pacific Commercial Salmon Industry, notes that one of the forces of change in the fisheries is the 1 growing "public demand for an open process for public resource management (1995a: 2)." Government and industry have often responded to the demand for community involvement and sustainable industry with modernist solutions. These are often designed not to respond to public concerns but to protect the interests of capital. Industry solutions are characterized by the movement of capital and operations from one country to another and by corporate amalgamations. Technology replaces labour in an attempt to reduce costs and maximize profits. The net results for labour and the environment are serious (Teeple 1995, Anton 1995). Government utilizes public consultations, impact assessments and the language of conservation and sustainability to mitigate public concerns by allowing controlled discourse directed towards pre-selected conclusions. The result is to ensure the continuation of corporate profits and the legitimization of government practices. In this process, people, communities and ways of life are lost in the drive for continuing capital growth. Small resource based communities are disappearing. With them goes a way of life and local knowledge that cannot be recovered. We, as a society, have some decisions to make regarding our future. Is it to be dictated by the modernist ideal: where progress and success are measured in economic terms? Or conversely, are we to embark on a more humanist course where the priority is maintaining sustainable communities and lifestyles, where the views of communities are sought and respected, and where peoples and communities are allowed to participate in the decisions that affect them and their futures? The salmon fishery and the communities on British Columbia's West Coast provide an ongoing example of the conflict between the interests of capital and those of people and communities. A recent policy initiative by DFO, the Pacific Salmon Revitalization Plan (PSRP), has resulted in a controversy that illustrates this conflict. Furthermore, it exemplifies the great difficulties that communities have in combating and presenting alternatives to continued capital expansion. 2 The Pacific Salmon Revitalization Plan was ostensibly established to "address long-standing problems of fleet overcapacity, stock conservation and management of the fishery" (Pacific Salmon Revitalization Plan Review Panel, 1996:3). The development and implementation of this plan generated extreme controversy and opposition. Fishers, environmental groups, fishing communities and the provincial government all expressed concerns that the plan would result in the decimation of small coastal communities and their ways of life. These groups saw family-owned boats, small coastal ports and the industries that supported them as the greatest potential losers. In aboriginal communities, which were already facing endemic levels of unemployment, the loss of a few fishing vessels or jobs would result in even greater hardships. Concerns were also raised about increasing corporate concentration and continuing over-capitalization of the fleet. According to its critics, the plan clearly favored the large fishing companies - those with the financial resources to take advantage of the changes the plan proposed. It failed to meet the needs of fishers, fishing dependent communities and conservation of the fish stocks. Those opposing the plan called for modifications that would make the plan focus on the preservation of fish stocks, the small boat fisheries and coastal communities. They believed this would lead to the beginning of a sustainable fishery and sustainable communities. While the opposition was able to generate considerable public support and attention to the plight of the fishery, they were ultimately unable to generate substantive changes to the plan. Writing in a book that explores the roles for social workers in a world threatened by ecological destruction, Frank Tester suggests that: "The movement of individuals, families and communities to active involvement in affecting developments [which]... interfere with human development and survival on the planet must become an essential focus of social work practice (1994:77)." Active involvement of individuals, families and communities demands that social workers become aware of the process of societal change and the structures that maintain and 3 support policy and practices destructive to human well-being. A policy development such as the Pacific Salmon Revitalization Plan, is one example of how government policies can impact negatively on families and communities. It is policies such as this that need to become a focus for social work practice. In addition, if such policies are to be opposed, it is essential that social workers develop an understanding of the social and economic dynamics opposing and supporting change. The impasse that faces communities is mirrored by the struggle that challenges social work as a profession. Do social workers work to maintain and enhance human well-being within the present structures of society, or do they instead work for structural change? Social work has sustained these two competing views of society, a conventional view and a critical view (Mullaly, 1993; Carniol, 1987). The conventional view, held by the majority of social workers, concerns itself with the plight of individuals and groups within their social environment. Within this proscribed view the social worker assists people to fulfill "their life tasks, alleviate distress, and realize their aspirations and values" (Pincus and Minahan, 1973:9). In doing this, he/she does not question the capitalist social order, but maintains an orientation that focuses on the individual within their social context. This is comparable with the current institutional view of coastal communities. Their plight is presented as an unfortunate event where we as a society must do all we can in assisting their adjustment to this new reality. Typically, this means retraining programs, relocation assistance, adjustment counseling and government assistance; that is, the utilization of programs and policies that maintain social control and the dominance of capital over people. This is the position taken throughout the PSRP; individuals and communities are assisted in adjusting to the advancement of capital. Critical social work questions the capitalist social order, believing that human need cannot be adequately met within the current institutional structure. As Carniol (1987:6) notes, 4 "many social problems are aggravated or, indeed, created by the political, economic, and social conditions organized under the wide-ranging umbrella of the state." Mullaly (1993) believes that specific social, economic and political beliefs correspond with a critical approach to social work. The social beliefs of this perspective are humanistic and value all individuals as equals who are integrally connected with community. The economic beliefs of a critical social work value the person over the economic, the equitable distribution of resources and ultimately the primacy of human well-being. Finally, political beliefs in this view are based on the rights and responsibilities of people to participate in decisions that affect them and to have equity in the political process. This system of beliefs and values forms the basis for social workers to work with communities in identifying structural barriers to sustainability and methods to overcome them. Social workers in community must look beyond the immediate issue confronting the community, to the underlying values and beliefs of the economic and political systems. The destruction of the natural environment and the consequent effects on communities must be understood not as the failure of specific management policies and industrial practices, but as the logical consequence of the capitalist system of material and cultural production. The social worker, then, must work with communities to uncover the structures of power that underlie the modern capitalist system. This requires that we broaden the parameters of social work inquiry to include the domains of economics and industry and their impact on human communities. Otherwise, we contribute to the notion that the responsibility for social failure lies with the individual rather than the structure of society. Hoff and McNutt (1994:2) explain that, "the global economic crisis challenges the structural function of social welfare as a bolster of contemporary economic systems, which externalize - that is, fail to account for - the social and environmental costs of economic activity and which are grounded upon the logic of unremitted growth." They challenge social workers to accept the notion of human-environment 5 interdependency, the scientific evidence of global environmental collapse and to develop a vision of human development based on the principle of sustainability'. It is only as social workers and others involved in social development demand a social accounting for the costs of production that the potential of a sustainable world can be realized. Thesis statement Throughout the development and implementation of the Pacific Salmon Revitalization Plan two distinct points of view can be identified. One supports a modernist belief in technological efficiency and market economics, advocating a reduction in the fishing fleet and the privatization of the resource. The alternative view, critical of modernist assumptions and beliefs, advocated the consideration of community interests and that of small vessel owners. This latter view, though widely supported, was not successful in generating fisheries policy supportive of these beliefs. It is my thesis that the modernist assumptions governing the fishery and distorted communicative processes prevented the realization of these alternative viewpoints. 'The concept of sustainability, properly articulated, is a direct challenge to the modernist idea of progress. Sustainability in the context of community development includes social, economic and ecological sustainability (Nozick, 1992). The United Nations' World Commission on Environment and Development (1987:9) defined sustainable development as that "which ensures the needs of the present are met, without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs." This definition was expanded by the Sustainable Rural Communities Committee, (1991:6) who describe sustainable development as "a system that secures effective participation in decision making, provides for solutions that arise from disharmonious development, and is flexible and has the capacity for self-correction.... a production system that respects the obligation to preserve the ecological base for the future while continuing to search for new solutions (Quoted in Shaffer, 1995: 145). Rogers (1995), however, cautions that the concept of sustainability has most often been utilized as a justification for continuing development, and contends that sustainability fails to problematize modern economics. That is, the concept of sustainability has been straightjacketed by a modernist interpretation and has not been allowed to develop as an alternative to development. This would suggest that a new term replace 'sustainability', one that problematize development. For the purposes of this thesis, however, I will continue to use 'sustainability' as adopted by the Sustainable Rural Communities Committee, rather than engage in a search for a new terminology. 6 Methodology The research methodology for this thesis is the case study. Case study is a method that has been employed in a wide variety of academic disciplines. Units of analysis range from the individual, family and organizations to programs or processes (Mariano, 1993). "As a research endeavor, the case study contributes uniquely to our knowledge of individual, organizational, social and political phenomena.... The case study allows an investigation to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real life events - such as individual life cycles, organizational and managerial processes, neighbourhood change, international relations and the motivations of industry (Yin, 1984: 14)." Yin (1984) defines the case study as an investigation of current phenomena within its context, utilizing various sources of evidence, and where the boundaries between the phenomena and the context are not evident. Bromely (1986) contends that a case study must be viewed from the standpoint of its ecological context; it's physical, social, cultural and symbolic environments. This case in context view is a suitable research framework for this thesis. The history of the fishery and the assumptions of a liberal democracy, contextually bind policy development, such as the PSRP, making the holistic approach inherent to the case study an appropriate framework. Data collection In keeping with the principles of case study methodology, I employed a number of data collection methods. I sought data from three principal sources. The primary source of data were documents produced by the Department of Fisheries and Oceans that relate to the development and implementation of the Pacific Salmon Revitalization Plan. Secondary sources were external documents such as the newspapers, minutes of the 'Round Table' discussions with industry representatives, correspondence with related players such as the United Fishermen and Allied 7 Workers Union and the West Coast Sustainability Association. The tertiary source of data is from semi-structured interviews with individuals knowledgeable of the plan. Documentation A primary focus on documentation was utilized, as it provides the clearest record of what was actually done. Marshall and Rossman (1995:85) note that a "review of documents is an unobtrusive method, one rich in portraying the values and beliefs of participants in the setting". A s much documentation as possible relating to the Pacific Salmon Revitalization plan was sought in order to gain a clear understanding of the process. There are also some major limitations to this approach. Not all considerations wi l l have been officially documented. A s with many large organizations dissenting or politically inopportune opinions are often silenced. The overall accessibility of documents may also be limited or may not be available to the public. Access through the freedom of information legislation was undertaken to attempt to overcome this limitation and a great deal of useful information was obtained in this manner. Interviews The interview technique used varies depending on the degree of control and type of information required. Bernard (1994) suggests a continuum of interview structures. Four points on this interview continuum are identified: informal, unstructured, semi-structured and structured interviews. For the purpose of this research, a semi-structured interview format was used. This format was chosen as it provides some structure to the interview while at the same time allowing for the flexibility to follow leads and to go in unanticipated directions (Bernard, 1994). The structure is necessary to contain the discussions within the parameters of the study. 8 Methods of analysis The literature on case studies outlines two strategies for the analysis of data, Mariano (1993:324) identifies these as: 1) developing a case description (whether purely descriptive or exploratory); 2) employing the theoretical propositions on which the study is based to explain the case. For this research project 1 will be employing the later of these strategies. The Pacific Salmon Revitalization Plan and the documents and interview material were analyzed as they became available. This allowed for the use of the analysis to instruct and guide the continuing collection of the data (Maxwell, 1996; Mariano, 1993). I sought to both understand the context of the case study and its relationship to the content. Validity issues To ensure maximal validity of my finding, I have used a variety of different data collection strategies. This process, known as triangulation (Maxwell, 1996), reduces the risk of chance associations and systemic bias. 9 Contextualizing the Pacific Salmon Revitalization Plan The importance of context to a case study design is noted in the literature (Yin, 1984; Bromely, 1986). It is not the case under investigation that is of relevance to the case study but the case in the context of real life. A critical social work approach also calls for an understanding of, and attention to, context (Mullaly, 1993). In this case study it is the Pacific Salmon Revitalization Plan, in the context of its history and the socio-political contexts of post-industrial capitalism, that are relevant. Theoretical Context The modern / postmodern debate The conflicts depicted by the Pacific Salmon Revitalization Plan can be seen as reflecting differing beliefs on how society functions. Those supporting the plan adopted a viewpoint that advances rational planning and scientific knowledge reflective of modernism. Those opposing the plan called for an approach to fisheries management and decision-making more in keeping with sustainable economic development and sustainable communities, a view in keeping with the postmodern belief in plurality and the insurrection of subjugated knowledge. The study of these two theoretical constructs provides a base for deconstructing the events of the Pacific Salmon Revitalization Plan. Modernism is a term that describes theories in philosophy, science, economics and planning - to name a few - that claim to have universal explanatory power. These theories can generally be perceived as: "positivistic, technocentric, and rationalistic, universal modernism has been identified with the belief in linear progress, absolute truth, the rational planning of ideal social orders, and the standardization of knowledge and production (Harvey, 1990:9)." 10 Modernism encompasses the belief that human emancipation and betterment can be accomplished through the application of rational thought and scientific knowledge. Nature can be understood and controlled by science for the benefit of humanity. Modernism embraced the 'idea of progress' and the belief that the application of science and the scientific methodology would lead to a progressively better world (Pollard, 1968). Enlightenment would be achieved through continuing progress based in technical and scientific rationality. This would lead to individual and social emancipation, people would be freed from ignorance, order would replace disorder, science would dominate superstition and poverty and violence would be eliminated (Harvey, 1990; Leonard, 1997). This belief in modernist logic came to dominate not only the physical sciences, but also the social sciences and economics. The atrocities of the twentieth century, the experiences of Auschwitz, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, shattered the optimism surrounding modernity (Harvey, 1990; Lyotard; 1993). The domination of nature resulted in the domination and oppression of human beings. Rather than leading to human betterment, the beliefs of modernism were resulting in the enslavement of people to the idea of progress. The emancipatory potential of modernism was overshadowed by its commitment to universalizing meta-narratives, which contained within them the roots of oppression. Postmodernism developed as a criticism of modernism and offered a way of describing a world of multiple realities. It claims that the universalizing themes of modernism (rational planning, expert knowledge, large-scale bureaucracy, and orthodox economics) are obsolete and need to be replaced by a plural interest in diversity and choice. In contrast to modernism, it "privileges heterogeneity and differences as liberating forces in the redefinition of cultural discourse, fragmentation, indeterminacy and intense distrust of all universal or 'totalizing' discourses (Harvey, 1990:9)." Postmodernism celebrates difference by challenging the sameness of modernism. In overtly simplistic terms, postmodernism calls for the resurrection of local 11 knowledge, local culture and pluralistic interests in choice and diversity. The modern/postmodern debate is complex. Theorists associated with the Frankfurt School, notably Horkheimer and Adorno - and later Habermas - attempted to reconstruct the enlightenment project of human emancipation from within modernism. Postmodern theorists, most notably Lyotard and Foucault, rejected the notion that emancipation could be achieved from within modernism and believed that the project of enlightenment had failed. What these constructs provide is a method to look at and attempt to understand a world of complexities. My intention here is to present the basic theoretical constructs of this debate, as a foundation for critical examination of modern capitalism and the Pacific fisheries. In constructing a critical understanding of modernity/postmodernity, in relation to the Pacific fishery, the recent work of three Canadian theorists was influential in shaping and expanding my understanding. John Ralston Saul's, The Unconscious Civilization (1995b), Robert Wright's, Economics, Enlightenment and Canadian Nationalism (1993) and Gary Teeple's, Globalization and the Decline of Social Reform (1995) all provide a uniquely Canadian critique of late capitalism. Together these works help to create a more complete understanding of the dominant theoretic tradition currently holding sway in Canadian society. A complete analysis of these works will not be presented here. Instead, I will highlight their major contributions to an understanding of society today. All three authors present a critical examination of modern Canadian society and culture with their own different but complementary perspectives. Teeple (1995) critiques capitalism and examines the disintegration of the welfare state in an increasingly globalized world. Saul (1995) looks at the loss of the individual as the legitimating source in democratic society. He sees the failings of modern society as linked to deterioration in communication and participation. Wright (1993) is critical of the role of orthodox economics as a dominant and dominating force in the ideology of modernism. He proposes that the present orthodoxy be challenged by an 'insurrection 12 of subjugated knowledge'. Together the authors capture a vision of society controlled by economic interests and the pursuit of scientific rationality that leaves little room for social considerations and human emancipation. I will begin with a look at the work of Gary Teeple (1995) who provides a critical analysis of capitalism. He maps the transformation of society from nation state to the immersion of globalized capital and supra-national organizations. He notes that the 1980s were a pivotal decade in the history of capitalism, marked by the arrival of global capitalism and an unrestrained growth of the economic power of private property. Global capitalism is the result of the gradual erosion of "national, cultural and linguistic barriers to, and the global homogenization of, production, distribution and exchange (ibid: 138)". It marks the decline of nationally-based economic development. All forms of public and state property are seen as restrictions to the accumulation of capital, as is the welfare state and worker organizations. The restrictions on capitalism brought in as a compromise to the excesses of capitalism, during the post-war period of economic expansion, most notably the Keynesian welfare state, have come increasingly under the attack. The role of the State as a controlling operant against the boom and bust cycles of capitalism is one of the casualties. "With the coming of global capitalism the pressure to overcome these [State imposed] restrictions has increased as the opportunities for accumulation have approached certain limits; at the same time, the globalization of capital has provided the possibilities for surmounting or overthrowing many of these political and economic restrictions to increased accumulation (ibid: 131)." As the opportunities for capital expansion have been limited by environmental degradation, depleted resources and governmentally imposed restrictions, capital is forced to look to other avenues for increasing accumulation. Globalization temporarily solves this problem. Capital moves to areas of less restriction and/or applies pressure for current restrictions 13 to be eliminated. The power of the nation state to protect the environment and ensure the health and safety of its citizens is eroded by this expanded capitalist power. Under global capitalism there is a universalized attack on public property and a policy of advancing private property rights. In asserting the dominance of private property all other forms of property are marginalized. The modernist assumption of universal truths supports the premise that all property belongs in the hands of capitalist enterprise. It is the unlimited expansion of rights to capitalist ownership of property that are at the heart of the free market system. The promotion of private property rights is a way of gaining access to all forms of property that are not now private property and to make private property pre-eminent in relation to other rights that might fetter its operation. State-owned land, services, and corporations could all in theory be reduced to private property; and government regulations, including employment standards and workers' rights, could be subordinated to the rights of capitalist private property....In effect, those without ownership of the means of production are increasingly denied their rights if those rights are not attached to some form of proprietorship, (ibid: 79) This can be observed in many forms. Governments are increasingly turning publicly owned resources and services over to private enterprise, on the assumption that they will be better managed. Publicly owned and cooperatively managed resources, such as the fishery, have been privatized on the east coast of Canada (Rogers, 1995) and the west coast fishery is under threat of privatization. The rationale for this move is that a lack of ownership rights in the fishery is leading to an overharvesting of the stocks. Garrett Hardin (1977) who termed it the "tragedy of the commons" advanced this belief. Marchak (1991) and Rogers (1995) assess that Hardin incorrectly identified 'common property' as unmanaged property, instead of recognizing the communal management responsibility. What Hardin observed with the "tragedy of the commons" Marchak (1991) asserts, is the result of the commodification of resources, followed by private property rights pushing aside the rights of the community. The way that community rights have been obscured is an example of modernism's intolerance for difference and demonstrates the power of the ideology of private property. Teeple (ibid) notes that the expanding nature of capitalist power is not the result of 14 practices of particular political parties but of the systemic changes in the structure of society and the practices of modernism. These changes in public policy are no mere ideological impositions, able to be reversed with the election of different parties; they are, rather, the political reflection of the present transformation in the mode of production and the decline of nationally based economic development. They reflect the demand for new forms of production and the global market accompanied by the undermining of modes of resistance to national capital by working classes and the changes of the conditions that once allowed for national compromises between capital and labour, (ibid: 5) Globalism decreases the power of nation states and of worker organizations to assert control in the affairs of capital. The configuration of the labour market no longer corresponds to that of the capital market. Capital is now more or less freed from the constraints of national boundaries while labour has retained its national, cultural and linguistic characteristics. Labour, within the global economic reality, is less able to resist the dehumanizing nature of capitalism and nations have their abilities to set policies that protect their cultural heritage, social welfare and employment practices, challenged by unrestrained capital. John Ralston Saul (1995b) examines modernity from the standpoint of the individual within democracy. He laments the demise of democracy based on individualism2 and the rise of what he terms corporatism3. He determines that corporatism, based as it is on rationality, is the dominant ideology of our times. "The acceptance of corporatism", he notes, "causes us to deny 2Saul is critical of the current western conception of individualism. He sees this view as overly narrow and in keeping with selfishness. Individualism, for him, encapsulates the idea of self-knowledge and consciousness where the individual understands their relatedness to their 'environment. It is formulated on the concept of disinterest and participation in society. 3What Saul (1995b) refers to as corporatism fits within what has been discussed in terms of modernity. Like modernity, the central principle of corporatism is rationality. Saul claims that the origins of corporatism were based on a "rejection of citizen-based democracy and the desire to react in a stable way to the industrial revolution" (ibid.: 90). To simplify it, corporatism is a system where legitimacy has been transferred from individuals to interest based groups, where the distinction between private and public is obscured or obliterated and private enterprise takes on responsibilities normally reserved for public bodies. As Saul (1995a :74)) outlines: "In the place of the democratic idea of individual citizens who vote, confer legitimacy and participate to the best of their ability, individuals in the corporatist state are reduced to the role of secondary participants. They belong to their professional or expert groups - their corporations - and the state is run by ongoing negotiations between those various interests." Corporatism presents itself as knowledgeable, professional and efficient - the rational approaches - while it characterizes democracy as 15 and undermine the legitimacy of the individual as citizen in a democracy. The result of such a denial is a growing imbalance which leads to our adoration of self-interest and our denial of the public good (ibid: 2)". Unrepresentative groups have replaced the individual as the source of legitimization in society, but these corporate interest groups speak for themselves and their backers, not for the public good. A society that is citizen based is structured on the collective disinterest of its members, unlike a corporatist society that is based on vested interest groups4. Within corporatist society, the democratic potential of the individual is supplanted by groups claiming special interest status, (the Fraser Institute, the National Council on Business Interests etc.), but who are not representative of the public. These groups represent interests that are specific to the group and are not necessarily generalizable to the public good. Saul notes that the very idea of public good is "vaporized" within the corporatist vision of society. Public debate without the involvement of citizens becomes a contest between groups advocating differing interests. "Indeed one of the difficulties faced by citizens today is making sense of what is presented as material for public debate, but is actually no more than the formalized propaganda of interest groups (ibid: 64)." Saul calls for the re-involvement of a disinterested public to contest corporatism. In doing so he places a great deal of faith in the possibility of rational government and advances the concept of the detached rational individual. While Saul can be accused of adopting a inefficient, subject to whims, unmanageable and potentially corrupt. 4Saul's focus on individualism and criticism of special interest groups is problematic. What does Saul mean by special interest groups? I believe that Saul is referring to a concern that arises when citizens fail to fulfill their legitimizing roles vis-a-vis the government in democratic society. He notes that government will continue to exist. The question is, whose government? In corporatist society, Saul sees that this legitimizing role has been taken over by interest groups; groups that have no broad-based public representation. What Saul seems to be identifying is the modernist preoccupation with expertise. The Fraser Institute, for example, presents itself as expert' in the socio-political arena and has been successful over the years in promoting the ultra-right agenda. Similar groups are also representative of the left. Problematic as this representation is, I believe that what is important here is Saul's insistence that what is needed is a broader-based public involvement that goes beyond the interests of particular groups and instead focuses on the broader social good. This will be demonstrated in the case study, where the focus on different interest groups in the fishery excludes a consideration of the broader community. Even when some of these groups may be supportive of the 'common good', when they are forced to first support their individual interests, the 16 'romanticized' view of society, he does rightly bring our attention to the diminishing role of the individual as the legitimizing force in democracy. The role of the State in corporatist society becomes one of mediating between interest groups. Saul notes the example of the fisheries, where the competing interests of market forces have resulted in the decimation of the stocks. He states that governments have been unable to impose long-term solutions in these situations because of their commitment to interest mediation, as opposed to the maintenance of the public good. Only enormous public effort, he speculates, can sometimes have an effect on the power of special interest groups, but this is usually short lived and inconsequential compared to the power of the corporatist structure. "The effects of corporatism are so invasive", he maintains, "that the strategy of the citizenry should be to change not the policies in place but the dynamics (ibid: 179)." The power of corporatism, then, cannot be challenged within the hegemonic structures of power; it is the way power and decision-making is structured that needs to be changed to reflect the interests of the people. For Saul, this is accomplished through a critical self-knowledge and conscious social action; through the development and valuing of criticism. He concludes by noting that: Equilibrium, in the western experience, is dependent not just on criticism, but on non-conformism in the public place. The road away from the illusions of ideology towards reality is passable only if that anti-conformism makes full use of our qualities and strengths in order to maintain the tension of uncertainty. The examined life makes a virtue of uncertainty. It celebrates doubt, (ibid: 194) Here equilibrium is the balancing of the public good, which in turn is dependent on the cultivation of uncertainty and doubt. Corporatism, he contends, cannot survive when confronted by a doubting public. Wright's (1993) analysis of modernity is based on a critique of economics. He documents the domination of economics by two predominant axioms, scientific rationality and individual self-interest. He discusses orthodox economics as being dominated by three evolving interest of the 'common good' goes unrepresented in corporatist society. 17 perspectives: classical, neoclassical, and Keynesian, each reaching "different conclusions about the relationship between economic variables and about the appropriate role of government in capitalist society (ibid: 3 ) . " He describes the science of orthodox economics as one where "economists extract from reality in order to isolate and analyze a limited number of variables (ibid: 4)." This scientific approach to explaining economics Wright sees as problematic and one that has lead to ambiguity concerning the boundaries encompassed by economic theory. These boundaries, he asserts, intersect only a small part of lived reality, but have been exponentially expanded by economic theorists. Economists, while maintaining an aura of scientific correctness, have attempted to explain more and more of human experience, outside of the very limited bounds of a measurable, rational science. To do so, they have, of necessity, ignored as irrelevant, all but a limited number of variables. What Wright describes here is the universalizing tendency inherent in modernism to monism and reductionism. Wright notes that one of the primary axioms of orthodox economics is the belief that people are endowed with free will and are not shaped by events and history. He notes that a major failing of orthodox economics, and modernism, is its failure to account for phenomenal features: features shaped by history, environment and existing economic and social realities. This failure, he notes, is becoming more pervasive and problematic as a result of technological innovation and globalized economies. He concludes that these constitute major flaws in economic reasoning and significantly effect the ability of economics to contribute to a meaningful dialogue on society. He proposes a remedy for this flawed process. Utilizing the analysis of Michel Foucault, he suggests that accepted ways of knowing have become dominated by the axioms of scientific rationality and individual self-interest. In the process, knowledge that does not meet this level of scientism has been subjugated, pushed outside of the limits of debate. Out of the cacophonous tangle of reality the apparently harmonious threads that represent modernity are grasped for guidance. Civilization is given precedence over nature, reason over intuition, space over time, self over community, order over disorder. By severing the tense relationship between these polarities, one also severs the opportunity to comprehend the truth. 18 (ibid: 83) The axioms of modernism have subjugated the dialectical relationships that exist in the real world of gestalt experience. The modernist 'threads' then, create an understanding of social reality that fails to constitute the gestalt of experience. It is only through the juxtaposition of modernist logic with subjected knowledge, that a cogent understanding of reality can be formulated. The remedy exists in a reconstitution of subjugated knowledge to confront orthodoxy. This insurrection of subjugated knowledge has to occur through an acknowledgment and reification of the dialectical structure, of both universal and local knowledge, ensuring that both are entered into public debate. Wright, in providing a critique of economics, demonstrates the pervasive power of economic theory to limit the range of debate to a consideration of the axiomatic knowledge of modernism. He then provides a construct for moving beyond the limitations of modernism by adopting a postmodern belief in difference. In its simplest terms, this new construct suggests that the dialectical nature of both universal and local subjugated knowledge must be included in our attempts to understand the real world. This supposition builds on the postmodern rejection of universalized metanarratives, such as those posed by orthodox economics, and suggests that the phenomenological nature of human endeavor must be accounted for. As such, it questions the dominance of experts and expert knowledge as sufficient, thereby recognizing the importance of non-expert knowledge. This challenges the modern belief in scientific rationality and the sanctity of the expert, recognizing them as two extremes confronted by their dialectic opposites, intuition and local knowledge. This, in turn, points out the importance of being open to public debate that is respectful of dialectical understanding. All three authors, discussed above, are critical of the current polity. They describe the subjugation of individuals and nations to the dictates of global economics. They describe a society dominated by capital and interest groups, driven on by the idea that progress is measured 19 in terms of economic gain. They all acknowledge the domination of society by beliefs and concepts that conform to a modernist view of progress. The work of these authors, points to the need to re-examine how decision-making occurs in society, how the needs of people can be placed in front of the needs of capital, how a disenfranchised public can participate in a meaningful way in the decisions that affect them. This is no simple task. Both Saul and Teeple outline some of the difficulties to be overcome. As Saul points out, public debate has degenerated into a contest between interest groups and itself needs to be reconstructed, so as to reestablish the power of the individual as citizen in democratic society. Teeple discusses the shifting of real power from governments to global corporations and the resultant decline of nationally based economic power, where the rights of corporate private property exceed the collective rights of individuals and the state. This difficulty is emphasized by Marchak (1991: 267) who remarks that: Political activity, meaning public participation in determining mutual restraints and choosing the means by which both private and public interests are to be realized, is itself severely constrained - indeed, virtually precluded - when the global economy is outside the range of debate. Public participation, in democracy, cannot be an effective method of changing the balances of power so long as the very issues - global capitalism, as represented by unfettered free markets, corporate private property, and privileged interest groups - are not entered into the public debate. This finding would suggest that so long as the meta-narratives of modern society are outside the range of debate, the best that political activity and public debate can hope to achieve is to problem-solve within the hegemonic structure of society. As Rogers (1995) observes, solving the problems of modern society may involve more than solving problems. It may also involve solving history. I take this to imply that both the historical context of society needs to be questioned as well as the historically-based structure of society. To extrapolate these findings to the case under investigation and more broadly, to social work, would suggest that an 20 essential component in the change process, is to identify the beliefs inherent to modernism that act as philosophical blinders to structural change, and adopt strategies to combat these. Shi f t ing paradigms What is advocated here is a change in the priorities of society, from those in keeping with a modernist conception of how the world works, to one supporting the postmodern. The movement from a modern conception of the fisheries, to a postmodern view supporting sustainable development, entails a shift in our conception of development. The conflict in the fishery is over which paradigm most accurately reflects our present reality and future aspirations. Kuhn (1970) cautions that shifting paradigms is not an easy task. He notes the power of paradigms. That they have an 'a priori' claim, a status prior to that of shared rules and assumptions: that is, changing paradigms is more than a change in the rules and assumptions contained within a paradigm. Kuhn (ibid: 11) further notes that a decision to change or reject a paradigm is "always simultaneously the decision to accept another, and the judgments leading to that decision involve the comparison of both paradigms with nature and with each other." This is reflective of Wright's' insistence of a need for a dialectical approach, where both universal and subjugated knowledge are entered into the debate and support the discursive nature of change processes. Furthermore, we need to be aware of the power of language, as language exists within a determined context. As Giroux (1990, quoted in Leonard, 1997: xv) writes, "every paradigm has to create its own language because the old paradigms often produce, through their use of language, particular forms of knowledge and social relations that serve to legitimate specific relations of power." Language, then, has a tendency to be paradigm specific and the language of one paradigm cannot be transferred to another without bringing with it the context of the old. This would suggest that in working to bring about structural change, a new corresponding 21 language must also be developed. To talk about development, conservation, and sustainability" for example, is to adopt terms that already contain a modernist interpretation and therefore act as a resistance to paradigmatic change. The change process The oneness of the global market is united in its commitment to the pursuit of the ideals of modernity: progress through scientific rationality and order. It is a commitment constructed in the interests of national and international elites: a class project of universal dimensions. The multitudinous Other (workers, the poor, subordinated women, subjects of racism, oppressed cultural groups) confront this hegemonic Oneness with uncertainty and ambivalence. The ambivalence arises from a crucial contradiction; on the one hand the desire, even at least partially manufactured through market seduction, for the material benefits which the market brings, and the other, the alienation, cultural losses and subordination which market domination also involves. The uncertainty flows from profound doubts about what kinds of resistance to the negative effects of global market forces are possible. (Peter Leonard, 1997: 25-26) The barriers to change, as Leonard notes, are significant. Both institutions and individuals are resistant to change and to shifting the structures of power. For the individual, the decision to fight for change comes at a cost. It involves personal struggle to overcome the ambivalence predicated by the marketplace; to decide that change is possible and desirable. Drover and Kerans (1992, 1993) outline the process that individuals enact in order to work for change and make socio-political claims to the resources of society6. They identify three interdependent components to the process of making claims: making claims public, praxis, and collective action. Claims, they speculate, arise out of the dissatisfaction that individuals experience in the private sphere and that through a collective level of private dissatisfaction are articulated by groups, who are then able to name their needs publicly, thus transforming problems identified in the private sphere into publicly articulated issues. This is the process of 5See footnote #1. 6I will describe this in a very simplified format. The intent here is not to provide a detailed description of the claimsmaking process. Instead it is to outline some of the basic steps in the change process and identify 22 praxis, a dynamic process involving the individual and the collective, struggling to find common ground to present a unified claim. Once a unified claim has been articulated, collective action can be taken. The group challenges the cultural norms and the social context in order to be heard. The collective expression of issues needs to gain public recognition and acceptance in order to enter into the arena of public debate. In framing these claims, claimants need to be cognizant of the hegemonic legitimating power of the institutions that have led to their subjugation and strategize on how they will overcome them. The success of the claimants at this stage is dependent on two variables; the willingness of the hegemonic institutions to recognise the claimants and the nature of the claim. If the institutional order of meaning has not been sufficiently differentiated so as to accommodate the social identity of those making the claim, they must engage in a struggle for this recognition. Groups struggle to establish new rules of public discourse, such that their identity is recognized, thus the political struggles which arise from such claims are not simply conflicts over who will control economic and social resources; they are also over the power to give meaning to the world by defining legitimate participants, issues, alternatives and alliances. (1993: 9-10) Thus the hegemonic order seeks limits to the legitimacy of claimants. Dover and Kerans remark that in making claims, you must proceed on the assumption that "claims are made, at the everyday level of experience, against institutions which confront claimants with patterned inequality and oppression (ibid: 22-23)." The limits of institutional responses to demands for change are on the one hand acceptance, and on the other, outright rejection. The institutional response relates to its need to maintain the hegemonic order. Demands or claims that do not challenge this order are much more readily accepted than those that do. Hegemonic institutions act to defend themselves from demands that threaten their power and structure. Claims that are not accepted are rationalized as not fitting and, therefore, challenging the accepted order and are marginalized. This marginalization can be aimed at the structural barriers to achieving change. 23 claim, the grounds for the claim and at the claimants themselves. For example, "if the hegemonic group is successful in withholding all legitimacy from the new claim, then the claim will be reframed so that it presents no challenge to the existing institutional order (ibid: 24)." In this case the grounds for the claim are rejected. "In general, exclusion of claims from public discourse is possible by so managing the public discourse that the categories emerging in the claims are denied validity (ibid: 255)." On the other hand, if some legitimacy is granted to the claim, this will be accomplished at the cost of reframing the claim and/or the identity of the claimant group, so as to cause the least disruption to the established order. Claims may also be denied or reframed on the basis of the orthodox economic belief in the scarcity of resources. Claims may be denied on the basis that society does not have the necessary resources to realize the claim or that the resources are already fully utilized. The process of claimsmaking can be summarized as the coming together of individuals to formulate claims for a better life, against the hegemonic institutions of modernism. This is a struggle that is dialogical in nature. It involves questions of legitimacy. Can the group gain power with the institutional structure so as to be heard and recognized as a legitimate participant? Drover and Kerans (ibid) speculate that the more the claimsmaker challenges the hegemonic order of meaning, the greater the resistance to change and the greater the challenge to the legitimacy of the claim. As can be seen with the protest movement, many groups have had to go to extremes to gain legitimacy or, conversely, to demonstrate their lack of legitimacy. In making claims, groups challenge the knowledge framework of institutions, institutions of the state and those of knowledge, such as economics. These challenges are dialogical in nature and require that participants to the claimsmaking process enter into an exchange of views and beliefs, with those holding power to actualize the claim; an exchange based on the ability of claimants to effectively communicate their claim and to participate in a process of determining the claim's legitimacy. 24 Participation and Communication More and more the decision maker and affected parties engaged in solving ... problems are recognizing that traditional decision making strategies are insufficient. Often heavily shaped by scientific analysis and judgment, these kinds of decisions are vulnerable to two major critiques. First, because they de-emphasize the consideration of affected interests in favor of "objective" analyses, they suffer from a lack of popular acceptance. Second, because they rely almost exclusively on systematic observations and general theories, they slight the local and anecdotal knowledge of the people most familiar with the problem and risk producing outcomes that are incompetent, irrelevant, or simply unworkable. (Renn, Webler and Wiedemann, 1995:1) Renn, Webler and Wiedemann (1995) are referring to the failures of modernism to allow for a diversity of needs and interests in decision-making. They believe that citizen participation can be a tool for overcoming these deficits. They suggest the potential for citizen participation to be fair and equitable exists in finding consensus and sharing power. At the same time, they point out the pitfalls of participation, in particular, the need to clarify the goals of participation. Is citizen participation sought to invest in the power of collective collaboration or, conversely to provide a perception of public support for policy implementation? Kemp notes that, "in the main, public inquiries rather serve to legitimize the actions and interests of dominant groups in advanced society. Outcomes of public hearings are rarely objective, rational, and egalitarian; they are manipulated to further the interests of both state and capital. (1985: 177)" While Kemp continues to advance the modernist view of participation as objective and rational, as opposed to a forum for legitimating diverse viewpoints, his caution serves to exemplify that public participation does not in and by itself insure that the public good is served. Public participation then, can be formulated to advance two very different outcomes. This leads us to question the legitimacy of public process and the degree to which it 25 allows for a free and open discourse aimed at reaching collectively formed decisions7. It suggests a need to examine the process of public participation as it is realized in democracy and decision-making. If we accept the proposition advanced by Pateman (1970) that participation is a cumulative educational process, we must also accept that for this to occur the process itself must be empowering and self-reinforcing for the participants. Rousseau believed that: "Once the participatory system is established...it becomes self-sustaining because the very qualities that are required of individual citizens, if the system is to work successfully, are those that the process of participation itself develops and fosters (ibid: 71)." For the participatory process to be fair and equitable, recognition and balancing of power differentials between participants must occur. Power needs to be understood in a number of different ways including; economic power, technical/scientific power, political power, racial power and gender-based power. An equality of power needs to exist for there to be equity in the decision-making process. While it cannot be expected that all persons participate fully in all areas of social life, this option needs to be available to them. Participation will usually occur in those areas of life that are of particular interest and relevance to the individual. An understanding of participation requires further exploration of the concepts of free and equal communications and the process by which participants communicate with one another to reach understanding. Communication in Participation Rousseau advanced the idea that for participation to occur, citizens need to assemble as equal, independent persons, with some form of interdependent relationships to each other. Rousseau believed that economically, no one individual should be so advantaged as to be able to 7It is important to note that the Pacific Salmon Revitalization Plan developed through a process of 26 buy another's voice. If groups or organized associations were to take part in participation, he believed that these should be as numerous as possible and equal in political and economic strength (Pateman, 1970). While Rousseau lived in a very different time than our own, his emphasis on equality, and free and equal discourse, continues to be a basis for critical thinking regarding political processes. Renn, Webler and Wiedemann remark that, "one of the simplest and yet essential results that emerge from the review of public participation literature is that public participation must be fair and competent (1995:9)." The proposition that participatory discourse requires equity of economic and political power provides a starting point for the further examination of communication. Communicative action Jurgen Habermas'8 theory of communicative action provides a practical model for further exploring power and equity in communication. Habermas differentiates between two processes that occur in communication. He labels these strategic action and communicative action. Strategic actions occur where "one actor seeks to influence the behavior of another by means of threats of sanction or the prospect of gratification in order to cause the interaction to continue as the first actor desires (Habermas, 1993: 58)9." Conversely, in communicative action "one actor seeks rationally to motivate another by relying on the illocutionary binding/bonding effect (bindungsejfekt) of the offer contained in his speech act (ibid.)." Habermas maintains that it is only through communicative action that agreement free from coercion can been reached. He consultation with fishers and was later critiqued in two public processes. 8Habermas is a modernist social philosopher committed to the emancipatory struggle for human freedom and well-being. While he is critical of most of the grand narratives that underlie modernism, he believes that the elimination of all meta-narratives is unrealistic. For Habermas, understanding and consensus can only be obtained through rationally based, undistorted communications. Habermas' goal is to reconstruct the emancipatory project of modernity based on communicative rationality rather than on instrumental rationality. The debate between the modern and the postmodern is complex. Indeed some postmodern thinkers such as Lyotard, have questioned their earlier total rejection of modernism. For an in-depth discussion see: Hoesterey, 1991; Rorty, 1991 and Harvey, 1990. 27 believes that the central process in the continuance of the human species lies in our ongoing ability to engage in interpersonal communicative actions with the aim of reaching intersubjectively mediated understandings. He summarizes this as follows: I call interactions communicative when the participants coordinate their plans of action consensually, with the agreement reached at any point being evaluated in terms of the intersubjective recognition of validity claims. In cases where agreement is reached through explicit linguistic processes, the actors make three different claims to validity in their speech acts as they come to an agreement with one another about something. Those claims are claims to truth, claims to Tightness, and claims to truthfulness, according to whether the speaker refers to something in the objective world (as the totality of existing states of affairs), to something in the shared social world (as the totality of the legitimately regulated interpersonal relationships of a social group), or to something in his own subjective world (as the totality of experiences to which one has privileged access) ... in communicative action one actor seeks rationally to motivate another by relying on the illocutionary binding/bonding effect {bindungseffekt) of the offer contained in his speech act. (ibid: 58) Communicative action entails a process by which interpersonal speech acts are subjected to claims of validity by other participants in discourse. These claims are open to be accepted or challenged by listeners. Habermas (1987) refers to four different speech acts; communicative speech acts, constantive speech acts, regulative speech acts and representative speech acts. It is on the basis of these speech acts that undistorted communication and the satisfaction of validity claims is based. (See figure 1) 9Accent in the original. 28 Figure 1 Communicative Action World of action linguistic objective social subjective Type of communicative act explicative cognitive obligations expressive Speech acts communicative constantive regulative representative Aspects/ Goals understandability reaching understanding coordinating action socializing actors Function dialogue transmission of culturally stored knowledge fulfillment of norms/social integration formation of personality structure Validity claim comprehensibility prepositional truth normative Tightness sincerity/ truthfulness Such claims to validity are introduced when a hearer questions the comprehensibility, truthfulness, Tightness, or sincerity of a communicative utterance. When a validity claim is not accepted it is debated, criticized, defended, then revised or restated. Claims to validity can be solved through authority, force, or rationality - the force of better argument. It is only through the force of better argument that claims can be resolved free from distortion and coercion. The force of better argument The existence of distorted communications operationalized through the use of force or authority are evident everywhere. Forester (1993) notes we must believe, however, that communication free from unnecessary distortions is possible. Without the belief that undistorted communications are possible, claims that programs are necessary or that technological ventures are harmful to the environment, could not be understood as having the potential for truthfulness. It is not that all communications are free from distortion that is of central importance, it is that the potential for reaching undistorted agreement based on the force of better argument exists. By '"Adapted from Habermas (1987) and Pusey (1987). 29 emphasizing the 'force of better argument', Habermas does not posit that such a position actually exists in an a priori state but that by fulfilling certain guidelines - those contained in ideal speech - fair and unfettered discourse can be realized (Habermas, 1993). Focusing on the 'force of the better argument' provides a normative base for evaluating human interaction. Three essential components are necessary for the force of better argument to be realized. These are: ideal speech acts, communicative competence and ideal speech situations. While it must be recognized that these components form only a very small part of Habermas' complex theory of communicative action, they do provide the beginnings of a framework for understanding discourse and for looking at fairness and equity in participation. In addressing the components of the force of better argument, the purpose is not to explore in-depth Habermas' theory but to formulate a meta-criteria for evaluating communication in participation. Ideal speech acts. Ideal speech is based on the resolution of speech acts and their respective claims to validity. These speech acts operate within the communicative realities of everyday life; the objective world about us, the social world of our relationships with other people, and the subjective world of our own feelings and desires. (Figure 1 depicts the relationship between speech acts, world of action and related claims to validity.) Habermas (1987, 1993) discusses four speech acts communicative, constantive, regulative and, representative. Communicative speech acts make claims to validity based on their comprehensibility, that the utterance is understandable and linguistically proper. For example, communicative speech acts insure that participants speak the same language or have translation available and that the terminology used is defined and understood by all participants. Constantive speech acts make claims to validity based on the truth or correctness of statements representing existing states of affairs. This requirement is to ensure that no view is exempt from consideration. An example of constantive 30 speech is, 'twenty-five persons attended the hearing' (verifiable fact). Regulative speech acts make claims to validity based on normative Tightness. That is, claims that are appropriate or legitimate in relation to commonly held values, beliefs and norms. An example of this form of statement would be, 'the salmon fishery is important to the economic health of the community' (normative convention). Representative speech acts make claims to validity based on the sincerity of an assertion with respect to one's own subjectivity. It is clear from what the speaker is saying that he or she believes it to be true for them. For example, 'because of the Pacific Salmon Revitalization Plan I can no longer make a living from the fishery' (personal expression). Speech acts represent the essential claims made in everyday conversation and discussion. Habermas notes: "The fact that a speaker can rationally motivate a hearer to accept... an offer is due not to the validity of what he says but to the speaker's guarantee that he will, if necessary, make efforts to redeem the claims that the hearer has accepted (1993:58)." Essential to speech is the agreement that any utterance made by a speaker is open to challenge. Any statement must fall into one of the categories noted. The validity of the statements must be verifiable to the satisfaction of all participants. Where claims cannot be immediately verified they are subject to discourse and argumentation aimed at reaching understanding and agreement. Communicative competence. Communicative competence refers to the speaker's ability to utilize language in the creation of mutual understanding and agreement, to recognize different claims to validity and to act on the redemption of these claims. If communicative actions result in the production of mutual understanding, they are said to be communicatively competent. For this to occur a participant in discourse must be committed to reaching understanding and be open to hearing the views and beliefs of all other participants to the discourse. 31 Ideal speech situations. Ideal speech situations, for Habermas, are necessary for the conduct of communication free from coercion. These are conditions intended to ensure that "the consensus that emerges from practical discourse serves generalizable, not specific interests (Kemp, 1985:186)." For consensus to be reached through the force of better argument, it is necessary that all participants have equal opportunity to initiate and perpetuate statements based on all four speech acts. They must be able to provide explanations and interpretations that ensuring that all viewpoints are evaluated in keeping with constantive speech acts. They must also have the opportunity to make or contest claims with respect to regulative speech acts and, finally, explore feelings, attitudes and sincerity of self, in keeping with representative speech acts (Kemp, 1985; Webler, 1995). Habermas recognizes that the conditions of ideal speech are 'counterfactual' and do not realize themselves in actual discourse. Instead they demonstrate the emancipatory potential inherent in language. They are presented as a set of rules for discourse and ultimately for examining the discursive potential in citizen participation initiatives. In speaking of rules, Habermas is not referring to a set of irrevocable conditions, but to a 'form' in which to present intuitively known presuppositions about speech. They are to be realized to a degree, and subject to the particularities of the social context and to the limitations of time and space (Habermas, 1993). The practice of participation The force of better argument, contained in Habermas's theory of communicative action, provides meta-criteria for the evaluation of participatory initiatives. To extrapolate what this means in practical terms, for participation to be fair and equitable, the following assumptions can be made11. "Webler (1995) and Kemp (1985) have utilized a similar schema. 32 1. All persons wishing to participate must has equal opportunity to do so. 2. Every participant must have the equal opportunity to present and challenge arguments based on the four claims to validity: comprehensibility, propositional truth, normative Tightness, and sincerity. 3. In reaching agreement participants must have equal opportunity to determine how claims will be redeemed. Communication must be relatively undistorted and free from domination. Habermas through his normative theories of social society and discourse, offers a framework for evaluating and conceptualizing human interaction. His theory of communicative action and concept of the force of better argument, have been used to look at citizen participation processes within the environmental movement (Renn, Webler and Wiedemann, 1995) (Hager, 1995) (Kemp, 1985) within the public planning process (Forester, 1993) and in the area of social impact assessment (Dietz, 1987). For social workers and others interested in citizen participation, communicative action offers a method for both assessing participatory initiatives and as a blueprint for advocating for participatory initiatives that have increased potential for a full and equal discourse. An understanding of citizen participation arises out of the macro-level analysis of democratic theory. Participation serves either to maintain the stability of the socio-political order, or as a medium for social change. In the former instance, participation becomes a process of legitimating the decision-making process, in the latter, an opportunity for change. Social change, based on citizen participation can, however, only be realized where a fair and equitable process is in place. 33 Summary Within the framework of modernity, disenfranchised individuals and groups make claims to the resources of society. These claims exist in a world threatened by ecological collapse, economic values that prioritize capital over people and declining power of national governments. Of necessity, they challenge the established hegemonic order. In turn, the hegemonic order attempts to maintain control through limiting debate, delegitimizing the participation of particular factions of society and through recourse to the strength of the modernist paradigm. In this conflict, both institutions and claimants struggle for legitimacy in the 'public eye'. Where institutions are unsuccessful in their attempts to limit debate or require increased legitimacy to pursue their goals, formats for public input are designed. Similarly, where the public believe that they are not being 'heard' by institutions, they make demands for public consultation. Clearly, two very different expectations of public process exist: one that envisions public process as one more strategy of hegemonic control; and the other, as an opportunity for full public debate, where the resultant decision-making is based on a fair and equitable consideration of the views presented. Within the development and implementation of the Pacific Salmon Revitalization Plan, it is suggested that a consideration of this nature did not occur and that the received ideas of modernism limited debate and prevented the considerations of alternatives to hegemonic control. Wright (1993) suggests a 'remedy'. He proposes that the modernist orthodoxy be confronted by the resurrection of subjugated universal and local knowledge; that is, knowledge that has been "buried and disguised by the orthodox social sciences," not because of its inferiority, but because it fails to meet the modernist demands for scientism (ibid: 41). Wright, utilizing the work of Foucault, defines universal knowledge as knowledge that relates to the "overriding principles of human endeavor" and local knowledge as knowledge that relates to "individual experience as confined in time and space (ibid: 41)." Habermas (1987) argues that 34 the one predominant principle of human interaction is the need for undistorted communications aimed at reaching agreement. He believes that without undistorted communications the struggle for human betterment is severely constrained. It is suggested that the possibility of undistorted communications, as advanced by Habermas' force of better argument, provides a grounding for the realization of subjugated local knowledge. To apply Wright's idea of local knowledge to the current situation of the fishery would suggest that local knowledge is that held by individuals and members of coastal communities on the fishery and the needs of their communities. This line of reasoning would suggest that a successful challenge to the modernist orthodoxy governing the fishery would require that the local knowledge of fishers and coastal community members be presented in a form respectful of the 'rules' of argumentation contained in the theory of communicative action. 35 Historical Context: A Brief Social History of the British Columbia Fisheries In this section I provide a brief overview of the changing social fabric of the West Coast of Canada, a map of the progression of modern society and it's effect on coastal life. This is to demonstrate the importance that the fishery has had for coastal persons. I show how over the years, this reliance on the fishery has changed to reflect changing times and changing concepts of who owns the fish. This changing nature of the fishery has resulted in the disruption of communities and lifestyles, as people and industries respond to these changes. Within this context, the Pacific Salmon Revitalization Plan becomes one in a long line of events that have shaped the fishery and now threaten the continuance of coastal communities. The coastal fisheries in British Columbia have been a source of food and commerce as far back as the oral and written history of the coast is available. The richness of coastal First Nations heritage is a direct result of the ready availability of the wide and diverse source of food. George Woodcock (1990:5) notes, "the abundance of fish and other products, which they learnt to preserve, not only gave their life a stability usually found only in agrarian societies. It provided a superfluity of goods, so the peoples of the coast were able to spend their winters developing and sustaining a rich ceremonial life and the arts that served it". The fishery was incorporated in the social, spiritual and economic life of the community. It formed the backbone that allowed for the development of a rich trading culture up and down the coast and into the interior of the province. Villages were located close to the supplies of fish and the rhythm of life was tied to the cycles of the salmon. Access to the fishery was controlled by the villages and managed for the benefit of the people and the stocks. The First Nations people would take only as many fish as they required and no part was wasted (ibid.). With the coming of the European setters, the trading of salmon became a vital link between the two peoples. For the Europeans, trade with the First 36 Nations for fish was the link to survival and their ability to explore and settle the coastal areas. "The post required some 25,000 salmon for its annual sustenance.... every effort, including bartering beaver and the most valuable trading articles, was adopted to encourage the Indians to set more weirs and string more nets....for survival, salmon was essential... (Ormsby 1958:46)." For the Europeans, the exploitation of the fish resource soon equaled the economic importance of the fur trade. The role of First Nation people in the fishery changed dramatically within a few generations of European contact. Meggs (1991: 11) writes: One generation of native Indian fishermen was the indispensable guarantor of the fur trader's survival. The next was forced to defend - sometimes by force - the salmon spawning beds and their right to harvest their runs as they had for centuries; people whose fathers and mothers could recall the arrival of the first Europeans spent the summers gillnetting or toiling in canneries. The third generation found its fishing rights denied and its right to work in the new salmon industry put in question. The advancement of the Europeans into the fishery redefined the concept of property rights and disputes over the ownership of the fish; it signified the beginning of the end of a cooperative fishery. The arrival of the Europeans also brought about significant changes in populations and communities on the coast. It has been estimated that the First Nations population prior to the arrival of the Europeans was in excess of 50,000 (Woodcock, 1990). However, the disease of small pox wiped out entire villages; others left their ancestral homes to follow the jobs and wealth promised by industrialization. By 1935, the coastal population of First Nations persons had fallen to 15,000 (Woodcock, 1990). While native populations were decimated, the turn of the century brought about an ever-increasing coastal population of non-native persons. Small towns, fish and cannery camps, whaling stations, logging camps and mining towns sprung up along the coast to 'harvest' British Columbia's rich resources. Many of these were short-lived communities built around non-renewable resources such as mining. One example, Anyox, reached a population of 2500 by the 37 middle of the 1920's and, by 1932, was uninhabited because of resource depletion and falling demand (Peterson, 1976). The pulp and paper town of Ocean Falls, with a population approaching 3000, suffered a similar fate in the 1970s as a result of falling pulp prices and the pressures of global economics. By the 1920s, upwards of eighty canneries were operating along the coast, each conveniently located near the fishing grounds. A fleet of steamers operated to supply the coastal settlements with their needs. Not all the needs of the camps could be supplied in this way and small settlements and farms were started to support these endeavors (Peterson, 1976). Many of the small coastal towns that presently exist had their beginnings as fishing or logging camps. Many more settlements have ceased to exist. Changes in the means of production, technological advance along with resource depletion and changing market conditions began to drastically effect coastal communities. Many small fishing stations were eliminated by the advent of gasoline-powered fish boats. This technological advancement allowed fishers to range further from their home base and not be limited to selling to only one cannery. Later, the introduction of the packer boats with onboard freezers allowed fishers to range even further afield and enabled canneries to become more centralized. No longer were fishers and canneries limited to the immediate proximity of the fishing grounds. Small villages and farms that once supported and were supported by the fishery disappeared, as did the fleet of steamers that provided services to these settlements. The coast's human landscape was again changing to meet the demands of capitalist enterprise as it strove to maximize the new technology's promise of increased economic efficiency. It is the drive for economic gain that has created much of the conflict in the fishery. The history of fisheries in B.C. is one that depicts the efforts of capitalist enterprise to gain ownership of the fisheries from coastal people, coastal communities and fishers. Meggs (1991:2) comments: "It is more than coincidence that every public controversy about conservation of B.C. salmon - in 38 1893, 1900,1928, 1968, 1982 and again in 1990 - was accompanied by massive corporate concentration and new measures to control access to the resource." He documents the attempts by the cannery owners at the turn of the century, to restrict the right to fish exclusively to vessels owned by the canneries. This restriction was advanced out of an apparent concern that overfishing would result if the number of independent fishers was not limited; a transparent attempt to maintain monopoly control and forward the modernist ideology of private ownership of resources. Attempts to control the resource and profit by it highlight the development of the industry. The exclusion of First Nations and Japanese people from the fishery for much of the first half of the twentieth century, the rhetoric of overfishing, and conservation as a means of controlling entry to the fishery, the concerted attempts to dismantle the United Fishermen and Allied Workers Union, are all demonstrative of this attempt to control the fishery and to ensure the maximization of profits. Over the years the fishery has seen a gradual modernizing of the fleet; larger vessels replacing smaller, allegedly less efficient, boats. The modernist belief in science and technology coupled with orthodox economic beliefs pushed this trend towards large technologically advanced vessels. Because these improvements were capital intensive, a greater catch was needed to economically sustain the industry. This became a vicious circle, whereby market-based economics and increased technological innovation drove the need for larger catch capabilities and this, in turn, necessitated better technology to ensure larger catches and hence even greater financial investment. This overcapitalization is central to many of the difficulties currently being experienced in the fishery (Glavin, 1996). As vessels became larger, with increased capacity, increasing state control and management of the fishery became necessary. Larger vessels were able to capture large numbers of fish, over a wide area, and without careful management, the potential for endangering the stocks was very high (Rogers, 1995). This demonstrates a concomitant process where modernist solutions create problems that only modernism can solve. 39 The State's role in the fishery increased dramatically, especially during the post-war years of 1945-50 (Marchak, 1987). In the 1950s, the management of the fishery took on a scientific approach. The emerging field of fishery biology became the driving force for fisheries management in Canada (Glavin, 1996; Marchak, 1987; Meggs, 1991). This new scientific approach advocated maximum sustainable yield from the resource (Pearse, 1982). Scientific measurement and prediction attempted to ensure that the maximum number of fish was harvested without destroying the reproductive capacity of the stocks (Rogers, 1995). It marked the beginning of expert knowledge and scientific rationality that was to direct the future management of the fishery. Resource economists later joined the fisheries biologists, bringing with them an emphasis on the economics of resource extraction. The fishery was a resource like any other that should be harvested/extracted with maximum efficiency and minimum cost. They challenged the maximum sustainable yield approach on the basis of its cost and shifted the determination of allowable catch to include the economic health of the industry as well as the biological sustainability of the stocks (Rogers, 1995). This shift to a scientific approach operated to further enhance corporate interest and control of the fishery. The growth of a scientific model of fisheries management greatly increased the level of public expenditure invested in the fishery. A Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) (1995c,) discussion paper notes that in 1994-95 the total management cost of the pacific fishery was 180 million dollars'2. Of this total, approximately "49 million ... can be directly related to managing the salmon resource (1995c,)'3." This can be compared with 15.5 million in total revenues collected from the fishery by DFO, 3.4 million of which came from commercial salmon license fees. These facts point to the limits of modern scientific management. The costs of l2This total cost is broken-down into three areas; policy and administrative support costs account for 20.3 percent of the total; fisheries management costs account for 65.2 percent, included in this are the costs of the aboriginal fisheries that account for 13.6 percent of the total; other activities, such as ocean sciences and small craft harbours account for 14.5 percent of total costs. l3This total includes the salmon enhancement project that accounts for 29.6 million of this total. 4 0 managing for the consequences of capitalist production outweigh the economic benefits to the state. They also speak to the extent the State has been willing to go to facilitate capital accumulation. The paper goes on to note that the 1995-96 federal budget significantly reduced the department's budgets and that this necessitates a rethinking of the approach to managing the fishery. A University of British Columbia fisheries biologist Carl Walters, commented that "the fisheries has become a pathetic drain on public resources, almost certainly costing the public more than it returns in terms of employment and social benefits ("To save our salmon, privatize its future" The Vancouver Sun. July 26, 1996:A19). This brief history of the pacific fishery shows how the progressive infringement of modernist values and beliefs came to dominate the fishery. Scientific management replaced communal management of the fish resource. Private ownership replaced community ownership. The people most closely tied to the fish resource were excluded from meaningful participation in deciding the future of the fishery. This battle between the interests of capitalist enterprise and coastal communities is not a new phenomenon but, as has been shown, dates back to the turn of the century. 41 The Salmon Fishery: Significant developments leading to the Pacific Salmon Revitalization Plan The struggle between a modernist (capitalist) view of the fishery - one where science, technology and economic rationalism play a role - and the idea of a community-based resource is illustrated by the following reports: the Davis Plan (1969), the Royal Commission on Pacific Fisheries Policy (1982), the Fisherman's Report (1991) and the Fraser River Sockeye Public Review Board (1994). The Davis Plan In 1969, DFO attempted to reduce the number of salmon licenses, thereby reducing pressure on the salmon stocks, increasing the economic viability of the fleet and allowing for the more effective management of the resource (Glavin, 1996; Meggs, 1991; Pearse, 1982); measures that parallel those now advanced by the Pacific Salmon Revitalization Plan. Under the Davis Plan, the number of vessels was frozen, limiting participation in the fishery to those who could demonstrate a past dependency on the fishery. The fleet was further reduced through a system of vessel buy-backs and retirements. In addition, vessels needed to demonstrate that they were maintaining an average annual production of $5000 to maintain a license (Pearse, 1982). The result of the Davis Plan was the reduction of the small boat fleet and the overcapitalization and increased catch capacity of the larger vessels. The plan did nothing to achieve conservation objectives as fewer vessels took more fish. Instead, the plan resulted in the loss of thousands of jobs, the majority of fish plants on the north coast closed and corporate control of the fishery increased (Meggs, 1991; Glavin, 1996: Cruickshank, 1991). The overall result of the Davis plan was to forward the concept of an economically rationalized fishery intent on extracting the resource at the least cost, a theme that is continued by Peter Pearse as the 42 Commissioner on Pacific Fisheries Policy. The Commission on Pacific Fisheries Policy: The Pearse Report In 1981, resource economist Peter Pearse was commissioned under the Inquires Act (1970), to "make recommendations concerning the condition, management and utilization of the fisheries of the Pacific coast of Canada" insuring that "fish resources and their use make the highest possible contribution to the economic and social development of the people of Canada (Pearse, 1982: 267-268)." This focus on the economic contribution of the fishery became the dominant theme in the report. Many acknowledgments were made of the social implications of fishing policy reform but no clear direction was provided on how social interests would be protected within an economically driven fishery. Pearse commented on the shortcomings of the DFO's consultative mechanisms. "With few exceptions," he notes, "most commentators are distressingly critical of the consultative process, describing it in such terms as an 'exercise in frustration', 'window dressing' and a 'dialogue of the deaf (ibid: 220)." Pearse finds that the most troublesome shortcoming was the widespread perception that consultations were not seriously sought, or listened to. He notes with dismay, that many of the consultative processes are undermined by lobbying, through direct representation to the Minister and/or senior DFO staff and, further, that the vested interests of participants, particularly in high level consultations, paralyzes the process. While Pearse raises concerns about the quality of DFO consultations, it is interesting to note that he himself seems to have little regard for consultation. Pearse confessed to a House of Commons committee that "he could have written his report without holding even an hour of public hearings (Meggs 1991: 221)." He seems to take the elitist view that consultations be structures not to empower the population but to subdue them to the more considered opinions of experts. 43 These are factors that distort communications, leading to agreement being reached through strategic, not communicative, actions. Communicative processes, in this milieu, become meaningless in the face of high level manipulations. Instead of being part of the solution they become, instead, part of the problem. Three major directions can be condensed from Pearse's exhaustive report. First, his primary concern is for the economic efficiency of the industry, that it come to resemble and function as an orthodox business enterprise. His concern was not for the social economic benefit to the maximal number of persons but rather that the resource be harvested in as efficient a manner as possible, provide the greatest possible return to government, incur the least possible cost in terms of management expense and provide fishers with an average Canadian income. He notes that the "manpower engaged in the fishery should receive incomes, on the average taking one year with another, comparable to those of workers with similar skills in other industries in western Canada, and that those who invest capital should earn a rate of return comparable to that of other industries with comparable riskiness (ibid: 77)." A workable fishery, for Pearse, is one that provides a comparable return on investment with other industry and yields appropriate 'resource rents' to the federal government. Second, he clearly identifies the failings of the government to effectively manage the fishery. He emphasizes that there is an "overriding need for a coherent policy for the Pacific fisheries, a framework that would eliminate the ambiguities, contradictions and confusions of the past (ibid: 259)." He further notes that: "working with insufficient knowledge of stock sizes and population dynamics, under heavy pressure from completing groups of fishermen, and with inadequate control over fishing activity, management has in many respects been reduced to a series of desperate attempts to meet the demands of vocal user groups without visibly destroying the resource (ibid: 37)." Pearse argued, that DFO was distracted from the tasks of managing the stocks because of its involvement with competing user demands and recommended that energies 44 be refocused on scientific management, away from social management. Third, Pearse equated the problems of stock depletion and the poor economic performance of the fishery with treating the resource as common property. He further noted that, "the free enterprise system depends on someone having control over all the means of production, including natural resources, and ensuring that they are used in the most profitable way. Common property resources have no place in the market system of economic organization; indeed, common property is repugnant to the principles of a market economy (ibid: 77-78)." It is the common property ideology, Pearse asserted, that has lead inevitably to the vast overcapitalization of the fleet. Pearse recommended a licensing system that moves away from the understanding of the fishery as a public resource, to one that is ownership based. Pearse presents an orthodox approach to the fishery. He identifies the problem of fleet overcapacity not in terms of oversubscribed technological ability, but rather as the need of fisheries managers to focus on scientific management of the stocks, not on social management such as ensuring the equitable distribution of stocks. Economically, he sees a need to define the fishery as a private property resource without regard for the distribution of benefits. His approach moves the fishery away from a resource intended to socially benefit communities, lifestyles and relationships -the maximum number of people - to one defined by economic considerations alone. The Fisherman's Report A commission of inquiry into licensing and related policies of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, The Fisherman's Report. (1991) also known as the Cruickshank report, presented a grass-roots alternative to existing DFO proposals and philosophy. Sponsored by the United Fishermen and Allied Workers Union (UFAWU) and small fish processors, it was conducted in response to a DFO (1989) proposal entitled Vision 2000. The Cruickshank report 45 was conducted to present an alternative to this proposal. It was formulated on the premise of protecting and enhancing the fishery for all. The report was based on the belief that the Pacific fishing industry was built on a solid commonly held resource base, and that if managed appropriately, with an emphasis on salmonoid enhancement and habitat protection, the fishers of today would be able to pass on a healthy industry, "not to the highest bidder, but to the next generation of fishermen (Cruickshank, 1991: 108)." A restructuring of the industry was advocated that would focus on ensuring the sustainability of the fishery and of coastal communities. It proposed a fee schedule reflective of the value of each fisherman's catch, rather than a set rate, and a licensing scheme that would ensure commercial licenses were held only by those who actually fished, eliminating armchair fishers who rented or leased their license. Fishing dependent communities expressed concern to the commission, that DFO licensing policies would lead to the eventual downfall of their communities. Cruickshank identified with these concerns, noting that the "erosion of coastal fishing leads to collapse of communities and high unemployment, particularly among Native fishermen. It also affects the entire fishery, since fish buying stations, ice suppliers, fuel outlets, provision services or repair facilities cannot service the fleets if they are located only in major cities (ibid: 99-100)." A prime concern of the commission, was to prevent this erosion by ensuring the "economic and social viability of British Columbia's fishing-dependent communities be protected and expanded (ibid: 100)." To accomplish this, a shift of thinking was needed; all user groups and government needed to recognize, the commission maintained, that the objective of economic activity was the "maximum common welfare to be derived from it (ibid: 100)." The commission also raises the issue of consultation with both industry and the public. The concerns raised by coastal communities, that they were not consulted on changes in the fishery that would affect them, were addressed. Cruickshank proposed a system where a seat on 46 the senior DFO advisory board, the Pacific Area Regional Council, be reserved for an appointee representing rural communities and reporting back to the Regional Districts. He proposed that in this way, the views of coastal communities would be heard without creating a whole new layer of consultative mechanisms. Also recommended, were improvements to the consultative arrangement between industry and government. A major weakness in this relationship, he identified, was the inability of industry to speak with a single voice on broad areas of policy reform. He recommended that a single agency, representative of all industry groups, be formed to work together in constructing a industry vision for the salmon fishery. He saw this as a way of eliminating the influence peddling, noted earlier by Pearse, that interfered with the process of reaching agreement on fisheries issues. Cruickshank believed that the realization of his proposals would "lead to the prosperity of fishing-dependent coastal communities. There will be renewed strength and incentives for fishermen and their families to remain in rural towns and villages. Young fishermen will have improved opportunities to enter the industry and contribute (ibid: 107)." As Cruickshank notes fishers are trustees, not owners of the resource, and their obligation is not to sell the resource to the highest bidder but to maintain a healthy fishery for the next generation. The Cruickshank report represents a major attempt by predominantly small-scale fishers and processors to present an alternative vision of the fishery. It challenges the modernist concept of economic progress and suggests that community economic sustainability must be a primary consideration in fisheries policy. This vision of the fishery was a direct challenge to the economic philosophy of Pearse and DFO. It placed the well-being of fishing communities at the forefront of economic consideration, along with that of the smaller fishers, thereby posing a direct challenge to orthodox economic practices. 47 The Fraser River Sockeye Public Review Board The Fraser River Sockeye Public Review Board, also known as the Fraser commission, was initiated in response to discrepancies between the predicted and actual returns of sockeye salmon to the Fraser River basin in 1994. Of the 19.1 million sockeye predicted to return to the Fraser River only 3.1 million were estimated to reach the river. The Board found that much of the reason for this discrepancy and near disaster lay in the 1992/93 DFO Pacific Region reorganization. The department was faced with large budget cuts, resulting in cuts to staffing levels and to the resources to manage the fishery. It is noted that the "department was left in charge without clear lines of accountability or necessary tools to enforce its regulations with any credibility (Fraser River Sockeye Public Review Board, 1994: xii)." In theoretical terms, the board found that the scientific rationality on which the management of the fishery was based, and on which the safety of the stocks depended, was incapable of fulfilling its mandate in fiscally conservative times. Expert knowledge was found to have limitations. Modernist assumptions concerning the ability of science to manage and predict nature are bound by certain limits. This is demonstrated here by the inability of society to afford, in financial terms, the cost of scientific management. Of primary importance here are the recommendations the Board made for DFO to plan for the future of the fishery. They recommended a public 'watchdog' be established to guard the public interest and that DFO engage in a consultation process with the fishing industry "We recommend that DFO take immediate steps to initiate a process of planning for the future of the fishery, addressing all critical problems affecting conservation and sustainability through an ongoing consultative form. Among the problems to be considered would be over-capitalization, user group allocation and ensuring equitable treatment under [the] law (ibid: 79)" and that "industry participants in the salmon fishery and DFO work together to investigate means of dealing with excessive fishing capacity (ibid: 81)." 48 In short, the commission identified with the need to protect the public interest - defined in terms of conservation and State - imposed control of the fleet. Their recommendations attempted to reimpose the liberal compromise between capital and the public interest that had characterized the social welfare state. The State would accept the role of mediating between competing capital interests, insuring that the public was protected. Consultation and decision-making would focus on solving specific problems related to the fishery, but the right of capital to the fishery would remain unchallenged. Summary The four reviews of the fishing industry, documented above, demonstrate the nature of the continuing conflict and indecision in the fishery. The push to universalize the economic structure of the fishery was evident and responsible for much of the conflict in the fishery. The directions for the industry, pursued by DFO, were often at odds with the wishes of the majority of fishers and reflected an affinity with the 'needs' of big business and economic progress. The needs of communities and any meaningful role for communities in deciding the future of the fishery was ignored. The success of consultative mechanisms, each seemingly intended to correct the problems of the last, but which soon became just as troubled, is reflected throughout the history of the fishery. Not just the reviews documented above were reflective of the tension and lack of trust between DFO and fishers but also the day to day relationships and consultations that occurred between these reviews (See Meggs 1991). Two opposing views of how the fishery could benefit society are presented. It was noted in The Fisherman's Report, that the industry needs to be managed to ensure that the "objective of any economic activity is the maximum common welfare to be derived from it (Cruickshank, 1991: 100)." While this sounds very similar to Pearse's mandate (1981: 3), "that fish resources and their use make the highest possible contribution to the economic and social development of 49 the people of Canada," it is reflective of a very different perspective. Pearse's interpretation of this appears to be based on a utilitarian vision of the greater good for all the people of Canada, interpreted as the maximum net financial return to government and to corporate owners, where management costs are kept to a minimum and the fish are harvested as efficiently as technologically possible. Cruickshank's position fulfills more of a contractarian objective of distributive justice, (Rawls, 1971) with a focus on the fishing industry as a sustainable resource for coastal fishing communities. The fishers themselves, however, are often caught somewhere in the middle of these two positions with one foot in the door of capital materialism and the other in the promise of sustainable coastal communities. It is into this context, industry over community, big industry over small, consultative processes that are ignored or dismissed by both sides, and a climate of intense distrust, that the consultations leading to the development of the Pacific Salmon Revitalization Plan occurred. A postmodern critique of modernism would predict these conflicts as the logical outcome of a reliance on the metanarratives of scientific rationality and orthodox economics, both having failed to allow for the development of a free and equal discourse on the fishery. The breakdown in communications and intense levels of distrust are the result of distorted communications, where the participants have not been able to rectify the validity of each others claims and where real decision-making occurs behind closed doors. Habermas (1983) has noted, that where claims to validity cannot be realized, communicative action is replaced by strategic action; that is, where attempts to reach agreement are dominated by coercion, manipulation and intimidation. It is from within this historic context that the Pacific Salmon Revitalization Plan develops as the most recent attempt to rationalize14 the fishery. 1 4The need to rationalize the fishery is emphasised in the Davis plan, the Pearse report and the Fraser River Sockeye Public Review Board. This term itself speaks to the modernist approach to fisheries management. To rationalize the fishery is to make it rational, scientific and measurable. As Pearse has suggested, the fishery has to be made and understood like all other industry, its otherness repressed to fit the modern capitalist model. 50 The Pacific Salmon Revitalization Plan In 1995-96 the Pacific Salmon Revitalization Plan, became the most recent attempt by the federal Department of Fisheries and Oceans, to regulate and control the fishing industry. The revitalization plan began with the recognition that the salmon stocks were dwindling, the fleet over-capitalized with excessive catch capacity, and the management of the fishery in disarray. Following on the recommendations of the Fraser Report, a consultative forum of stakeholders in the Pacific salmon fishery was convened to identify ways to address the current 'crisis in the fishery'. Pacific Area Regional Council workshop In the early spring of 1995, DFO, in partnership with the Pacific Area Regional Council (PARC), the senior advisory council to the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans, initiated a process for examining future directions for the west coast fishery. The stated aim was to "reach agreement on the fundamental problems facing the commercial fishing industry; to identify the issues and options that need to be further analyzed in dealing with the fleet capacity issue and to establish a formal roundtable process for developing recommendations to the minister on fisheries management reforms to be implemented in 1996 (PARC, 1995:1)." The Fraser report, pressures from corporate interests and the need for DFO to substantially reduce its costs, all contributed to this most recent examination of the commercial fishery. Individuals were invited to participate in the PARC workshop for their "wisdom, knowledge and involvement with the commercial salmon industry (PARC, undated letter: 1)." In total, 40 participants attended the two day workshop on April 20 and 21, 1995. This select group included representatives from the primary gear types - seiners, gillnetters and trailers - the United Fishermen and Allied Workers Union (UFAWU), corporate fishing interests and DFO 51 staff. There were no representatives from fishing dependent communities or fishing dependent industry in these communities. DFO, while stating it had no preconceived solutions to the problems of the fishery, presented a set of principles on which any recommendations would be evaluated. Fishing industry participants were encouraged to identify fleet management reforms that would meet the DFO identified guiding principles of conservation, industry viability and partnership15. It was stipulated that any plans to change the fishery would need to conform with these principles. These principles set a standard that clearly placed the focus on economics and management practices. Sound business principles and a self-reliant fishery were to be the key determinates of 'industry viability'. This reflects the commitment of DFO to economic determinism, that the economically fittest should survive. A self-reliant fishery would be self-managing, allowing for a substantial reduction in management cost incurred by the department and ensuring the best use of the resource economically (DFO, 1996a; 1995b). The principle of 'partnership', meant a shared vision for the fishery developed with stakeholders. This seems to imply that stakeholders would have an equal role in the decision-making process. While it is not made explicit who these stakeholders are, it is noted that, "managers and stakeholders will share joint responsibility for sustainable fisheries including management costs, decisions, and accountability (1995b: 6)." Partnership, then, comes to mean a shared ownership of the resource, with DFO as manager and licensed fishers owning the rights of harvest. The PARC workshop sets the tone for what is to follow. Participation was limited to those claiming a special and vested interest in the fishery - stakeholders - and options for the future of the fishery were limited to those adhering to DFO's predetermined criteria. While the DFO stated that it had no preconceived solutions to the problems of the fishery, its guiding 52 principles created a different reality. The language of the principles created an illusion of inclusion and openness, while distinctly narrowing how these problems could ultimately be solved and who were to be legitimate participants to the decision-making process. Pacific Roundtable In keeping with the goals of the Regional Council Workshop, the Pacific Policy Roundtable was formed in September 1995. In his opening letter to the participants, Brian Tobin, Minister of Fisheries and Oceans (Canada, July 6, 1995), laid out his expectations of the process. He noted that he was relying on the fishing industry's recommendations for changes to the commercial salmon fishery that would put the industry on a "sound financial footing" and that these recommendations would be assessed in keeping with the guiding principles of conservation, industry viability and partnership. He advised, that he would consider the recommendations of the roundtable in constructing a revitalized fishery, but further advised that if they could not reach agreement, he would unilaterally impose a restructuring plan. DFO and the minister believed that the composition of the roundtable was representative. The Minister commented that "considerable attention was paid to achieving an appropriate balance in representation (1995:1)." The roundtable included representatives from DFO, the Government of British Columbia, the UFAWU, aboriginal groups, processors, members of PARC and representatives from all three gear types. Many were, however, excluded. The UFAWU (1996:13-14) noted that: Seine crews were permitted only two out of dozens of panel advisors. Packer vessels, owners and crews, went entirely unrepresented. There were no community representatives. Plant workers had no representatives. There was no place for representatives of environmental organizations.16 Attempts were made both from outside the roundtable and from within to broaden the level of 1 5 See appendix #2 53 participation. The troll panel (Report of the Troll Panel, undated), recommended that representatives of community groups from each of the seven geographic areas on the coast have a representative at the table. A paper submitted to the seine panel outlining the need for community involvement, also called for greater inclusion. "Of utmost importance is that community consultation, at all levels, must take place so that people are aware of what recommendations are being put forward to the Minister of Fisheries....Our first concern must be the resource, secondly, coastal communities totally reliant on the commercial fishery (Watkins, 1995:1)." Attempts to change in the level of participation also came from outside of the roundtable. Rose Davidson, chair of the Coastal Communities Network, stated that the network and the town of Ucluelet, sent requests to newly appointed Minister of Fisheries and Oceans, Fred Mifflin and Louis Tousignant, Regional Director General for the DFO, that she be able to sit at the roundtable as a community representative. She never received a response (Coastal Communities Network, 1996). B.C. First Nations requests for inclusion were also rebuffed. "When the First Nations of BC questioned why they were not represented at the Pacific Round Table, we were assured that it would not be addressing issues that affected our interests as aboriginal fishers.... As the minutes of the Pacific Round Table make clear, this has not been the case (BC First Nations' Round Table on Fisheries, 1995:52)." In spite of these requests the composition of the roundtable was unchanged. The roundtable met for three, two-day sessions beginning September 28, 1995 and culminating on December 6, 1995. DFO presented participants with a description of the problems in the fishery, emphasizing that the costs and complexities of managing the resource, coupled with fiscal restraint from government, necessitated the revitalization of the fishery. Participants were provided with a limited list of options17 - constructed by DFO - that along with the 16Format in original. 17See appendix #3 5 4 'guiding principles' of conservation, industry viability and partnership, were to form the basis for discussions at the roundtable and subsequent recommendations to the minister. By controlling the debate in this way, opportunities for the realization of alternative view points was limited. The process undertaken in the roundtable was a form of claimsmaking as outlined earlier. What is evidenced here, is the limiting of public discourse so that claims that challenged the hegemonic structure were excluded. With this information the intent of the roundtable can be questioned. Was it a device to seek the input and knowledge of fishers or a method of gaining increased acceptance for what would be an unpopular policy? While some form of joint decision-making occurred, the power to set the parameters of the participatory venture and ultimately, to make the final decision, rested with DFO and the government. A lack of trust and goodwill between the DFO and fishers hampered the process of reaching agreement on how the fishery would be revitalized. In the final report of the roundtable to the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans, it is noted that: "At the end of the 1995 season there is no confidence in the state of the relationship between the commercial sector and DFO (DFO, 1995f: 1)." The troll panel notes this distrust. "We trollers know from recent experiences that agreements reached through consultations with the Department of Fisheries and other gear sectors are not always fulfilled (DFO, 1995c: 10)." The final report to the Minister contains a confusing array of recommendations and suggestions including a main report, minority reports, reports from the Native fishers, the (UFAWU) and the West Coast Sustainability Association. The roundtable was divided on the issues of area allocations, single gear licensing and license stacking. The primary areas that they were able to agree to were: a government funded buy-back, the need for better habitat protection, and increased funding for salmon enhancement. The consensus that the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans had sought from the roundtable did not materialize, thus opening the way for an unilaterally imposed solution. 55 United Fishermen and Allied Workers Union organized vote on buyback and stacking Given the lack of trust between fishers and DFO, the UFAWU had requested the federal government hold a vote on license stacking and buy-back. When the government refused this request, the UFAWU organized a vote on their own (Hogben, 1996). This vote was open to all commercial fishers. In total 1,097 fishers, both union and non-union and representing 20% of all fishers voted 91 % in favor of a federally sponsored buy-back while 9% voted in favor of stacking (Sarti, 1996)." The union, according to union organizer John Sutcliffe, was concerned that in spite of the fact that all the gear panels at the roundtable recommended against stacking, DFO was determined to proceed with this option. This clearly demonstrates the level of distrust between fishers and DFO. It shows how traditional power-based decision-making processes, marred by strategic actions, fail to satisfy validity claims to truth and sincerity. In this model of consultation and decision-making, views that challenge the established order are subjugated. The Pacific Salmon Revitalization Plan: Announcement of the plan The Pacific Salmon Revitalization Plan (PSRP) was announced by the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans, Rear Admiral Fred Mifflin, on March 29, 1996 (DFO: 1). Mifflin described the plan as necessary to ensure the conservation of the resource and to "provide the opportunity for the long-term economic viability and competitiveness of the commercial salmon industry, one that provides reasonable incomes to those who rely on the fishery for their livelihood." He noted that the revitalization plan allowed for a "more co-operative and effective approach to fisheries management, and a strategy to permit the industry to assume greater responsibility for its own future". 56 The overall goal of the plan was to halve the number of fishing vessels operating in the fishery. The plan outlined three distinct strategies towards achieving this: license retirement, area and single gear licensing and license stacking. The license retirement program, (buyback) would result in the removal of a vessel from the salmon fleet. The salmon license would be retired along with the employment opportunities that the vessel once supported. Under area licensing the coast was divided into different areas each requiring a separate license - two areas for seiners and three areas for gillnetters and trollers. Similarly, single gear licensing necessitated a separate license for each gear type used. Additional licenses, to facilitate fishing more than one area or gear type, were to be obtained through license stacking. License stacking allowed for one fisher to purchase the license of another fisher and 'stack' this license on his vessel, allowing him to fish more than one area or more than one gear type. These measures were highlighted by DFO as not only reducing the size of the fishing fleet, but also, increasing the manageability of the fishery and decreasing associated costs to DFO. It is instructive to note that the plan, proposed by Mifflin, is virtually identical to a fleet reduction prescription proposed by the Fisheries Council of B.C. (FCBC), representing the major fisheries corporations. In a report entitled, The financial problems of the pacific coast fishery and some policy remedies it was stated that: FCBC, therefore, proposes that D.F.O. implement an area and gear licensing policy in the salmon fisheries, with 2 or possibly 3 areas created for each gear type. A salmon license would permit a vessel to fish in one area by one gear type. The policy must permit vessel owners to buy existing license from those who wish to retire, and permanently place the resulting license on the one vessel. (Fisheries Council of British Columbia, 1993:2) Given the corporatist power of the FCBC and concerns about the fairness and competence of the roundtable process, this again raises the question of strategic action, based on dominance and coercion, displacing the communicative potential inherent in the roundtable process. 57 Reaction to the announcement of the plan. The announcement of the PSRP was met with immediate opposition. The Globe and Mail, Vancouver Sun, and Province newspapers, all ran stories depicting fishers reactions to the plan. The most contentious element, as reported in the media, was the call for license stacking. Additional concerns were voiced focusing on corporate concentration (Fulton, 1996), the impact of the plan on coastal communities (Hume, 1996a) the upward pressure this will place on license prices (Pynn & Simpson, 1996) and the failure of the plan to address the overcapacity of the fleet (Hume, 1996a). In a review of the local and national media for April and May, 1996, thirty-six articles, were found on the plan, all of which were highly critical of the plan and its' effects on coastal communities. The media sought out not only fishers but academics, fisheries specialists and former DFO employees, to present a concerted attack on the plan. This media attention speaks to the success of the opposition groups, in gaining public attention and sympathy, and in making their claims public. In his March 29, 1996 press release (DFO, 1996b), the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans, noted that the changes contained in the PSRP were drawn from the recommendations of industry in the roundtable process. Later on April 17 he noted, that the plan was based on a consensus reached by the roundtable and was a plan "for the industry by the industry and of the industry (Hume, 1996b)". Members of the roundtable contested this view. On April 22, 1996 twenty-seven participants of the roundtable group responded in a letter to the Vancouver Sun and the Minister, disagreeing with this analysis (Pacific Salmon Alliance, 1996a). Further, the UFAWU Vice-president, Dennis Brown notes that, "virtually none of the recommendations the union made to the roundtable committee were incorporated into the plan announced by Mifflin (Simpson and Fong, 1996)." Twenty-seven retractors out of the 70 that participated in the roundtable, signifies a major legitimization problem for DFO. DFO attempted to control for these challenges, by denying the legitimacy and validity of 58 those opposing the plan. Toursignant, the Director General, "categorized his detractors into camps - 'those who don't have all the facts, those who rely on others for their opinions, muckrakers and professional critics, and those representing organizations concerned about loss or gain of membership (Pynn, 1996)."' Further, DFO was joined by the FCBC in attempting to discredit those opposing the plan by denying the claim that certain groups were excluded. The FCBC maintained: "latter day suggestions that various interest groups were not represented at the Roundtable are ludicrous (FCBC, 1996: 5)." Minister Mifflin claimed that "contrary to what critics of the plan have claimed the Roundtable was an open and broad consultation process.... Early in the process, the membership of the Roundtable was expanded in response to requests for specific representation from coastal communities (private correspondence between Fred Mifflin and the Masset Community Adjustment Committee, 1996: 2)." In these ways government and corporate concerns attempted to undermine those opposing the plan. Responses from the Community. The community responded with what union organizer, Frank Cox, called the most uniform and wide-spread opposition to fishing policy that he has ever seen. Fishers, he noted, have very diverse views and are difficult to organize, but the majority now spoke with a unified voice. The UFAWU organized a protest march on the Vancouver offices of the DFO for April, 17, 1996. Several hundred persons marched on the Vancouver office, surrounding it with fishing nets and bringing downtown Vancouver to a standstill (Hume, 1996b). On April 12, 1996, a coalition of 40 individuals and groups representing First Nations, academics, labour, environment, community groups and the fishing industry, formed the Pacific Salmon Alliance in response to the PSRP (Pacific Salmon Alliance, 1996). It called for the withdrawal of the plan and for an open and inclusive process for fisheries management. Other organizations also formed in response to the PSRP and a number of existing organizations came out firmly against the plan. 59 All were active in raising public awareness of the issues surrounding the salmon fishery and the impacts that the plan would have on small fishers and coastal communities. They wrote letters to the local media, arranged discussion forms, and wrote briefs on how the fishery could be better managed to meet the needs of small fishers, coastal communities and ensure the continuation of the stocks. The Coastal Communities Network18, a society representing the nine coastal Regional Districts of British Columbia (population of 410,000) and committed to the sustainability of coastal communities, expressed its opposition to the plan. The network requested the support of municipal and city councils in considering a resolution calling for the removal of the PSRP and for a "new, transparent, inclusive process for planning in partnership to achieve healthy salmon stocks, healthy habitat, a healthy industry, and healthy communities (Coastal Communities Network, 1996:1)." A majority of the councils responded by passing this resolution and forwarding the results to the minister. This demonstrates the wide spread opposition to the PSRP and the concern of coastal communities for the effect of the plan on their communities. It shows the success of claimants opposing the plan in gaining public support, a step that Drover and Kerans (1993) view as an essential element in the claimsmaking process. The numerous players now claiming an interest in the fishery, is that multitudinous 'Other' confronting the hegemonic oneness of the modernist institution. It demonstrates the strength of the opposition that can occur when modernist institutional frameworks attempt to assert control in a postmodern reality of diverse interests. No longer is the fishery solely the jurisdiction of the traditional players, government and industry, many others have also seen their link to the fishery and were demanding inclusion. DFO responded to these demands through attempts to discredit them and deny their legitimacy. Later, The Coastal Communities Network, as was discussed earlier, had made an unsuccessful attempt to get representation at the fisheries roundtable. 60 as we shall see, the attempt was to limit the claim and reframe it outside of a context that included diverse interests and within the traditional modernist context of the fishery. Moratorium on stacking announced. On May 9, 1996, Minister of Fisheries and Oceans Fred Mifflin announced modifications to the Plan. These modifications followed a series of meetings with industry participants, native leaders, environmental groups and community representatives. "Mr. Mifflin reiterated his firm commitment to the basic elements of the plan;" area licensing, single gear licensing and license stacking while conceding minor modifications (DFO, 1996c:l). The modifications announced related primarily to issues of catch allocation and to a short-term ban on the stacking of licenses. But, it must also be noted, that while a moratorium on stacking was announced, this was not to begin for almost a month, allowing those who wished to stack ample time to do so. While these concessions are relatively minor, they speak to the success of the plans opponents in raising their concerns about the plan and having them recognized. Drover and Kerans (1993) have noted that where the hegemonic power is unable to withhold the legitimacy of claims, it will reframe the claims or limit claims in such a way as to cause the least disruption to the established order. This appears to have been an attempt to accomplish such an objective, while the minister met with concerned groups and listened to their viewpoints, he made only minor, time limited concessions that left the intent of the plan intact and the demands of communities for an inclusive, transparent process thwarted. The British Columbia Job Protection Commission In response to growing pressure from groups such as the Coastal Communities Network, and recognizing the soon to be held provincial election, the province of B.C. began to take a 61 more active interest in the fishery. At one time going as far as to threaten to sue the federal government if the plan went ahead. In addition to calling for greater provincial jurisdiction over the fishery, the government requested an examination of the impacts of the PSRP on coastal communities. The B.C. Job Protection Commission19 was requested by the provincial government to "assess the impacts on coastal communities of the reduced salmon harvests and attendant changes in management, and the federal fleet rationalization strategy (ARA, 1996: 1.1)." The study was to provide recommendations to the provincial government on the adjustments needed to address the impacts of the plan. In conducting this study, approximately 400 individuals were interviewed over a 100-day period. These included industry participants from the sport and commercial sectors, community leaders, aboriginal organizations and representatives of the federal and provincial governments. While the study solicited the opinions of these individuals, it did not offer a forum for the dialogical exchange of information aimed at reaching agreement. Participants were able to express themselves and their concerns to the investigators but not to inter-subjectively challenge the views and beliefs of others. The report generated by this study, Fishing for Answers: Coastal Communities and the BC Salmon Fishery. (ARA, 1996) outlines many of the potential social and economic impacts of the plan on the fishery and coastal communities. The mandate of the study was not, however, to re-envision the plan, but instead to identify it's impacts and outline alternatives to alleviate these impacts. In doing this, the authors outline both industry-wide impacts of the PSRP, as well as its impacts on communities. At the time Fishing For Answers, was written, the RSRP had resulted in a decline of 1173 vessels out of a pre-plan total of 4,367. This had resulted in the loss of 2,750 direct skipper 1 9The Job Protection Comission (JPC) was established by the Government of British Columbia to assist small businesses who were experiencing financial difficulty. The JPC does not provide financial assistance, but works with employers and creditors to rework financial terms and to ensure the continuing viability of 62 and crew jobs. No jobs were lost, however, in the processing sector. The report found that under the PSRP the "same amount of fish is being caught and processed (ARA: 15-4)." The plan had reduced the size of the fleet, but it had failed to address the concerns of overcapacity. In analysing the job loss figures, the study found that while the greatest actual job loss was highest in Greater Vancouver, this accounted for less than 1% of the community employment, whereas in small coastal communities the jobs lost accounted for up to 42% of the community employment base. Even more concerning, was the finding that the opportunities for new employment in these small communities was greatly limited. For these communities fishing had been a way of life for many generations. It was more than a way of earning a living, it was a distinct cultural identity. The report's authors note the different ways that vessel owners and crew members were treated under the PSRP. It was the license holders alone who were considered to have a right to the fishery and the right to profit by the sale of a fishing license. License holders were compensated at fair market value for their license while crew members, shore workers and suppliers received no compensation. The investment of communities and crew members was not financial in the traditional capitalist understanding, but was an investment of labour and lifestyle. As they note, the impact on communities is.considerably more than simply a loss of jobs. It is also the effect of this loss on families and communities. The failure of the plan to address this reflects the modernist conception of private property, as outlined earlier by Teeple (1995), where the encroachment of private property rights acts to negate the rights of non-property holders, by placing all the emphasis on property ownership. Private property then, maintains the illusion that those affected and deserving of government assistance, are those with ownership rights. Again the narrow modernist conception of affected interests, as defined by late capitalism, creates real limits to the the business. For this study the JPC contracted with the A R A Consulting Group to carry out the research. 63 participation and consideration of interests outside of the capitalist order. The Coastal Communities Network, (1996d: 1) commented in its response to the interim report of the Job Protection Commission: "If the so-called PSRP, as many critics claim, does little to reduce fishing capacity and over-investment, then how will this affect the fish stocks in the long-run and how, in turn, will this affect the long-term future of the fishing dependent economy and jobs in coastal communities?" They recommended that the terms of reference of the commission be expanded to include the effect of the plan on fish stocks and the long-term viability of coastal communities. In questioning the tenets of the plan, the network was challenging the commission to broaden its approach and better address the needs of communities. It invited the commission to look beyond the modernist proscriptive analysis of the plan's impacts. This invitation, however, was not accepted, and the final report of the commission, Fishing for Answers, does not address the concerns raised by the network. The report made a number of recommendations, all relating to lessening or mitigating the impacts of the PSRP, but not changes to the plan itself. While these recommendations are commendable, in their own right, they are reflective of a proscriptive approach to mitigating the effects of the plan, rather than proposing changes reflective of the diversity of viewpoints and opinions they had heard. The report is weak in a number of critical areas; it fails to document the impacts of the plan on coastal communities beyond a simple numerative analysis of the job losses. This observation is seconded by the Coastal Communities Network (July, 1996), who observe that the report was mandated to focus on coastal community impacts but provides very little actual analysis of the communities and how a restructured industry will effect their economic viability. The report also does not specifically address issues of how the fishery could be restructured or directly address itself to many of the concerns raised at the time the PSRP was announced. 64 Pacific Salmon Revitalization Plan Review Panel Flowing from the Memorandum of Understanding entered into by the federal and provincial governments on July 16, 1996, the two governments announced on September 11 1996 a review into the impacts and possible improvements to the Pacific Salmon Revitalization Plan (DFO, 1996d). A tripartite panel consisting of a federal appointee, Michael Francino, a provincial appointee, Bill Lefeaux-Valentine, and an independent chairperson agreed to by both governments, John Fryer, formed the Pacific Salmon Revitalization Plan Review Panel (PSRPRP). The mandate of the panel was to assess the short and long term impacts of the plan, recommend appropriate adjustment measures, and propose improvements to the Plan (PSRPRP, 1996). Minister Mifflin noted that "the panel will be reviewing thoroughly the impacts of the plan, in consultation with interested groups, including stakeholders, clients and communities.... The review will provide us with the necessary information to respond appropriately to the needs of those affected, and enable us to make improvements if required (DFO, 1996d:l)." The review was hailed as a victory by the media, groups representing coastal communities, fishers and the province. Corky Evans, the provincial minister responsible for fisheries noted: "Now people who depend on the fish resource for a living will be able to provide constructive input to a review of the plans impacts, and help build a sustainable fishery on which they can build their future (British Columbia, 1996)." Contrary to these high expectations, the Terms of Reference for the panel allowed for only minor improvements "in the context of the ongoing implementation of the plan (PSRPRP : 28)." No attempt appears to have been made to clearly advertise the limitations of the panel and participants were left to assume that the panel could, in fact, recommend substantial changes to the plan. The panel traveled to 22 communities, meeting with 1,700 people over a ten-week period and receiving numerous reports and written submissions. In writing and researching this thesis all 65 of these reports and submissions were examined, including the hand written notes of the British Columbia appointee to the Panel.20 Of the 41 briefs reviewed, 4 are in favor of the plan, 30 are opposed to the plan or some significant portion of it, while the remaining 7 are ambiguous or clearly in support of some other endeavor (i.e. fish farming). Most of the briefs simply call for the abolishment of the plan or some part of it. Issues around license stacking and the need to consider coastal communities in any plan to reduce the fleet predominate. Many briefs addressed DFO's concerns about the management of the fleet and proposed that the knowledge of local fishers be utilized to combat the inefficiencies of expert knowledge. A couple of briefs contained more detailed proposals on how the fishery could be managed differently. The most notable of these briefs was from the Pacific Salmon Alliance (PSA). In their report Salmon: Building a Sunrise Industry (1996), they present a proposal for a sustainable fishery. Backing-up their arguments with reference to international treaties recognizing the rights of fishing dependent communities, they effectively construct an alternative vision for the fisheries. They focused on the need to address the issues of overcapacity and overcapitalization as the first steps to creating a sustainable fishery and allowing for the conservation and the preservation of coastal fisheries. To do this they advocated a significant reduction in the seine fleet, a sector that has increased dramatically since the Davis plan. They demonstrated how the seine fleet representing approximately 17% of the fleet captured over half of the available fish. The Alliance clearly advocated for the small boat fishery and links between local habitats, local communities and resource users. They called for a fair and equitable process of consultation and decision-making involving all affected interests. Contrasting the direction proposed by the Pacific Salmon Alliance, is that identified by Garvey and Giammarinno (1996). At the request of the panel they were to examine the level of Access to the material was obtained through Information and Privacy Branch British Columbia Ministry of Finance and Corporate Relations. See appendix 4 66 corporate concentration in the fishery. This was in direct response to the frequent reports by those opposing the plan that the plan benefited corporations and would result in increased corporate control over the fishery. The study took a non-critical approach and interpreted the direction taken by the plan as beneficial to the furtherance of capitalist interests. It reported that corporate concentration was not a factor in the commercial salmon fishery (ibid.). Taking an orthodox approach to economics, the authors, looked strictly at issues of vessel ownership as a measure of the degree of corporate concentration. They identified, but did not problematize, the fact that many fishers obtained financing for a second license directly from the major processors who then maintained control of the vessel. The authors identified the issue in the fisheries, not as corporate concentration, but as the problems that some parties faced raising funds in the capital marketplace. These two very different approaches show the range of debate that was possible during the PSRPRP. The panel process, however, did not facilitate discussion of the options, but instead demanded that participants present their views directly to the panel. It prevented the Pacific Salmon Alliance, and other groups, from being able to defend their proposals and to challenge proposals, such as that presented by Garvey and Garmmarino. The panel format works against reaching inter-subjectively mediated understandings. It forces participants to adopt the strongest positions possible knowing that they will not have the opportunity to enter into dialogue. Tangled Lines (1996), the report generated by the PSRPRP, is disappointing. Given the scope of the inquiry, as delineated in the terms of reference, the panel had the mandate, unlike that of the Job Protection Commission, to suggest improvements to the plan. Unfortunately the panel itself was very divided. Media reports noted that a great deal of conflict existed between the provincial and federal representatives (Hume, 1996c; O'Neil, 1996). This conflict delayed the release of the report and affected the recommendations it was to make. These conflicts and biases worked against those making representation to the panel. 67 As has already been noted, panel processes have serious shortcomings in that they fail to provide a forum for dialogue. These shortcomings are increased when panel members own views and biases prejudge the outcome and/or exclude certain views. The federal representative, appointed from the department of finance, was said to be opposed to any fundamental changes to the plan and wanted the report to focus exclusively on a compensation package (O'Neil, 1996; PSA, 1996d; Yaffe, 1996e). In making this observation, however, the media and the groups challenging the PSRP failed to go beyond a superficial discussion of the conflicts on the panel. How a panel that should, in theory, be impartial and unbiased, was, in practice, so politicized, is not raised. The result is a report mired by bias and politics that fails to represent the views of fishers and others that made presentations to the panel. In their report, the panelists noted that "three quarters of the public consultations focused on...area and single gear licensing, stacking, the buy-back and their impact on coastal communities (PSRPRP, 1996: 11)" and "stacking was the single most controversial topic (ibid: 13)." The report however, fails to address these issues in more than a cursory way, noting only that two diametrically opposing positions on fleet reform were advanced; those who accepted the plan and those who did not. They provide no insight into the positions of those opposed to the plan and the validity of their concerns. There is also no reference in the report to the short and longer-term impacts of the plan on communities and individuals, as called for in the Memorandum of Understanding. The report simply provides a very cursory discussion of the conflicts in the fishery, followed by a list of twenty-three recommendations. The hundreds of presentations and reports submitted to the panel, which could have opened the door to further discussions and change within the fishery, are not addressed. The most controversial topic heard by the panel was over the issue of license stacking. Unfortunately, this was also the item that most divided the panel members and they were unable to come to a consensus position. Eventually three different recommendations were made. All 68 three panelists advocated a vote be held on license stacking by license holders. The provincial representative recommended that an immediate vote on stacking; the federal representative recommended that a vote be held in two years and that stacking continue up until that point; the independent member recommended a vote in one year's time and that stacking be permitted to continue only until the start of the 1997 fishing season. Not surprisingly, none of the panelists were able to break away from the modernist private property ideology and support the interests of communities and other non-license holders to a publicly-owned resource. The panel's task was a huge one and in parts unachievable. The possibility of conducting an assessment of the short and long-term impacts of the PSRP, in less than three months, was an unrealistic expectation and one that was clearly not fulfilled. Not only did the size of the task hamper the panel's ability, but the composition of the panel itself biased what the panel could achieve from the very start. Given the history of the fishery it is not surprising that the panel found a great lack of trust between the participants. They noted that, "simmering beneath the surface of almost all of the Panel's discussions on salmon, beyond the labyrinthine complexity and numbing technological details of salmon management, is a basis lack of trust amongst all players - government, industry, gear types, communities and the many people dependent on B.C.'s salmon fishery (ibid: 20)". What is unfortunate is that the panel, through its division and lack of action, reinforces this distrust. People expected that the panel would hear their viewpoints and give them full consideration, but this did not occur. The Vote on License Stacking. On January 9, 1997, Minister of Fisheries and Oceans, Fred Mifflin, announced his acceptance of the Panel's report and of the recommendation that a vote on stacking be held in November 1997. In the meantime, he noted, the moratorium on stacking would be lifted. Furthermore, he announced a federal/provincial fund to support some of the Panel's 69 recommendations. These included habitat restoration, salmon enhancement, a credit access program for gill and troll fishers, for the purposes of stacking, and an early retirement program for fishers between the ages of 55 and 64. As can be seen, DFO continued its push towards stacking, not only was the vote postponed but a credit program was initiated that would encourage additional stacking. Ironically, Mifflin also committed to "ensuring continued integrity in the consultation process, and establishing a specific consultative mechanism so that everyone can have a say (DFO, 1997b: 1)." Part of this commitment to an enhanced consultative process was a commitment to establish a Pacific Resource Conservation Council in keeping with the recommendations of the Fraser report and the Review Panel. This body was to consult with the public on an ongoing basis and recommend measures for "conservation of the resource and its habitat (DFO, 1997b: 2)." It is notable, and consistent with DFO practice, that the Minister while failing to recognize the legitimate voices of those opposing the PSRP, simultaneously committed himself to an enhanced consultative process. The Pacific Salmon Alliance, the Coastal Communities Network, the United Fishers and Allied Workers Union (UFAWU) and the province of British Columbia were united in their condemnation of Mifflin's postponement of the vote until November, 1997. All four had advocated strongly, since the release of the Review Panel Report, for an immediate vote. The Coastal Communities network (1997) condemned Mifflin for "refusing to heed the advice and warnings from coastal communities all over British Columbia." They noted that giving fishers credit to purchase additional licenses would lead to the further inflation of license prices and increasing capitalization of the fleet. The UFAWU president, John Radosevic, commented that "it just shows once again that the Department of Fisheries and Oceans just isn't prepared to listen to the people of B.C. (UFAWU, 1997)." Furthermore, on February 6, 1997, Mr. Jack Fraser, Member of Parliament for Sannich-Gulf Islands, addressed the House of Commons on the issue 70 of license stacking. In January, when the Minister lifted the moratorium on license stacking, he stacked the deck in favor of large fishing operations with deep pockets. They can afford to buy the additional licenses, assuring themselves the lion's share of the catch....By delaying the vote on stacking until November, the Minster assures himself an affirmative response because only those who buy into his expensive plan will be eligible to vote. (Hansard) The vote had, in effect, become inconsequential, most recognized that the outcome was relatively assured. On December 19, 1997 the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans, David Anderson21, announced that a vote on license stacking would be held "by individual license holders eligible to vote (D.F.O., 1997d: 1)." He commented: "I want to hear the views of individual license holders in the commercial salmon fishery on whether to continue with license stacking. Various groups have expressed their opinions to me over the last few months. This vote will allow them to make their views known (D.F.O., 1997d: 1)." The Minister went on to clarify that, licenses stacked prior to the vote would be respected regardless of the outcome. Consequently, the vote on stacking becomes almost meaningless; those who have stacked retain the right to their stacked licenses regardless of the outcome of the vote. This demonstrates that in spite of the conflict over the provision of stacking, the hegemonic group was successful in withholding all legitimacy for the claim that stacking be removed, and as a result the claim was reframed in a way that presented no challenge to the institutional order. On February 5, 1998 David Anderson announced the results of the vote on stacking. Of the 2,702 votes returned, a 74% response rate, 73% of fishers voted to retain license stacking DFO, 1998: 1). Given the opposition to the plan this result may seem surprising, yet when the systematic limiting of those with a right to vote, the length of time since stacking was first addressed as an issue and, the continued refusal to deal with this issue fairly are considered, it should come as no surprise. Those who had stacked up to this point in time would retain their 71 stacked licenses. Those who had not stacked would be left in the disadvantaged position of not having stacked while discarding the option of doing so in the future. The vote was conducted among license holders, those who had elected to stay in the fishery and had either already stacked licenses, were contemplating stacking, or had determined that they could make a viable living within the constraints of the plan. 2 1 David Anderson was the third Minister of Fisheries and Oceans to have responsibility for the PSRP. 72 A n a l y s i s The historical development of the west coast fishery corresponds to the advancement of modernity. The explosion of canneries along the coast, once numbering more than eighty, came at the time of industrialization in Europe, when a readily available and easily transportable food source was required to feed an increasingly urbanised population. With the advance of modern society and the advent of globalization, the face of the fishery changed. The greatest share of the salmon is now taken by increasingly large vessels using the latest technological advancements. Smaller vessels are being pushed out of the fishery. The fish plants are disappearing. Fish, once processed in Canada, are now transported raw to the United States for processing, under new rules governing international trade and globalizing economies. A s in the past, communities that depend on the fishery have little say in the direction that the fishery takes, even when decisions directly impact the continuing viability of those communities. Social workers need to be concerned about the relative powerlessness of communities to influence changes that effect their futures. Globalization and resource depletion directly effects the health of communities and the health of their citizens. Jobs are lost, traditional ways of life are threatened and the viability of communities, both socially and economically is called into question. Understanding what prevents the needs of communities from being recognized and validated is an important step in advocating for sustainable communities. What appears as a common theme throughout the history of the fishery and the development and implementation of the P S R P , is the conflict around large capital, small independent fishers and the fishing dependent communities. The forces of globalization and economic-centered fishing policies are pushing small fishers, and the communities they are mutually dependent on, out of the fishery. The fight to maintain communities and an independent sustainable fishery is failing. The P S R P was implemented in spite of the concerted opposition of 73 the Province of British Columbia, the majority of communities in coastal B.C., environmental groups and many fishers. Given the strength of the opposition to the PSRP, how is it that this policy continued to be implemented? To understand this, it is important to first analyze the information obtained through the case study in order to discover the true intent of the plan. Clearly, concerns for conservation, overcapitalization and reducing the overcapacity of the fleet, identified in the Fraser Report and the Pacific Regional Council Workshop, failed to be addressed in the PSRP. The plan has been shown to neither protect stocks, nor decrease the capacity of the fleet. Given this, what alternative explanations are possible? One of the major factors noted in the announcement of the plan was the importance of economic considerations. As Minister Mifflin noted, the plan was to provide for the long-term economic viability of the fishery and reasonable incomes for fishers (DFO 1996b :1). This statement can be interpreted in a number of different ways. Undoubtedly, many in the industry are making a substandard living from fishing, but as one fisher noted "economic viability is none of DFO's business (ARA: G-32)". Indeed, he has a point. As one union representative remarked, "why is there the concern, the government intervention in the fishery, when there is no concern when shoestores, restaurants and others close? Why should DFO care if someone can live on $15,000 a year in the north (ibid: G-33)?" Since when is government concerned whether a businessperson is making a good living? Another way to look at the question of economic viability is from the vantage point of corporate interest. Is the question of economic viability tied to the orthodox economic principle advanced by Pearse that the fish be harvested in the most cost-effective manner possible? Throughout the history of the fishery and in the PSRP, the push for economic rationalization is evident. The Fisheries Council of British Columbia (1996) had, for example, pushed for a lowering of the costs of capture, in order to compete in the global market place; a goal that 74 appears to have been supported by DFO throughout the PSRP. One motivation of government may have been a concern about the drain of Employment Insurance Benefits. It has been shown (ARA, 1996) that a substantial amount of the average fishers yearly income is derived from employment insurance (EI). The enactment of the plan would initially put more fishers on EE but these would either find work or move over to the provincially funded Income Assurance Program once EI benefits had ended. However, changes made to EI in 1996/97 would have reduced fishers' ability to collect benefits regardless. As of 1997, fishers eligibility would be determined by income, as opposed to the number of weeks worked. This move in itself might have reduced the number of fishers able to collect benefits and the total amount payable by government. This leaves two remaining explanations. First, the cost of managing the fishery was noted by DFO at the roundtable to be a serious consideration. They proposed that a smaller fleet would be easier and less costly to run. Furthermore, a smaller more economically efficient fleet would result in a greater financial return to the federal government in terms of taxes. Pearse (1982), in his report, was noted as favoring a system which would see the least 'effort' employed to catch the allocated stocks and provide the greatest return on the rents from the fishery to government. In addition, one of the guiding principles forwarded by DFO, partnership, called for a sharing of the management costs, currently carried by DFO, between the department and licensed fishers. Second, the issue of corporate control and the possible complicity between industry and government needs to be considered. The case study clearly reveals that one of the fundamental tenets of modernism - that corporations seek to gain greater control over resources - is evident through the history of the west coast fishery. Numerous factors point in this direction. While Garvey and Giammarino (1996) found that corporate concentration was not a factor in the PSRP, their analysis is questionable. Corporate concentration is more than just who owns the boats, but also, who controls access to the resource and access to knowledge. It was 75 noted earlier, that the proposal presented by the Fisheries Council of B.C. (1993) was very similar to the PSRP. This would support the assertions, made by many, of the link between DFO and the largest fishing corporations. Both Meggs (1991) and Glavin (1996) in their studies of the B.C. fishing industry note that there is a continuous movement of senior DFO staff to the large fishing and processing firms. This is further emphasized by David Ellis, a community fisheries planner, in his brief to the Standing Committee on Fisheries and Oceans (1998:6). The available evidence clearly indicates that George Weston Ltd., more than any other firm, has a policy of working with, and then hiring, top ranking personnel from within the Department of Fisheries and Oceans. These DFO personnel have carried key institutional knowledge with them, which has been used by this firm to lobby, and ultimately control, the DFO. These former DFO employees are now involved in allocation and negotiation processes that divide the valuable fish stocks between the corporate seiners and the 'small boat' fleets of trollers and gillnetters. This demonstrates that corporate control must be viewed from a broader context than that employed by Garvey and Giammarino (1996). Corporate concentration must also be understood in respect to the way corporations gain control of essential knowledge and are able to unfairly influence the decision-making process. While the concerns that the plan was driven by the need for a cost efficient method of managing the fishery, on the part of government, and the pressures from large industry for greater control over the resource cannot be proven, there is a strong case to support this view. Certainly these are not rationales that would have been supported by most fishers or the general public, as appropriate rationales for restructuring the fishery. As one fish processor noted: "DFO holds up conservation as the Holy Grail for their actions but it doesn't make sense (ARA G-30)." He speaks here of the ways that language is distorted, how the term 'conservation' was promoted to support a plan that in actuality had little to do with conservation. From the standpoint of those opposing the plan, it would have been important to look for and attempt to understand the rationale behind the plan. To fight the plan, as many did, on the 76 grounds of its' failure to address conservation, the overcapacity of the fleet and its' effects on coastal communities, is misdirected and fails to address the underlying intent of the plan. Instead, a challenge to modernist management practices, economics and corporate control would have more closely addressed the issues, beyond the purely superficial facade of conservation constructed by DFO. By obscuring the intent of the plan, DFO effectively prevented those opposing the plan from communicatively engaging in argumentation aimed at reaching agreement. For social workers involved in social change, this highlights the necessity of analyzing the intent of policy initiatives and their underlying structural supports throughout the change process. Challenges to the PSRP could not be effectively made without understanding the goals of the plan and the vision of a rationalized fishery that they represented. Themes Arising from the Case Study An analysis of the Pacific Salmon Revitalization Plan brings to the forefront numerous issues: the relationship between habitat destruction and declining salmon numbers, questions of the equitable allocations of salmon between gear sectors, and the continuing economic viability of the fishing industry, to name a few. While these are important issues, this thesis focuses on the issues that directly affected the ability for alternative voices to be heard; alternative voices from within the fishing industry as well as those of communities and others affected by the changes to the fishery. This relates directly to the role of social workers as agents of social change, whose function it is to work with individuals and communities to present alternative voices for change. An analysis of the themes identifies the forces working for and against change. By identifying these forces the social worker is able to develop more effective strategies for change. What has become apparent, both through examining the history of the fishery and the development and implementation of the plan, is that alternatives contrary to economic determinism and the precepts of modernism have been ignored. The institutionalized order has 77 been successful in ignoring, deflecting and reframing, calls for a fishery that protects the interests of communities and small scale fishers. A true dialogue over the future of the fishery has not emerged in spite of, or possibly because of, the many 'public' inquiries and studies that have been conducted regarding the state of the fishery. These inquiries have taken power away from the public by a reliance on expert knowledge and the subjugation of the local knowledge of communities and fishers. A number of themes that point to the modernist domination of the fishery are revealed in the case study. These themes are expressed here along with polemical equations depicting the range of options for the fishery. In keeping with Wright's (1993) proposition, it is suggested that these have dialectical structures. The oppositional elements of the dialectic are on one side, the modernist conception, governing the present day fisheries policy, and on the other, ideas and knowledge that has been subjugated. I will argue that the 'received' modernist conception acted as a significant barrier to these alternatives being heard; the dominance of the modernist ideal prevented the actualization of the dialectical nature of the options from being exposed. A further examination of this argument would suggest that to combat the dominating power of the modernist ideology, both sides in this dialectical relationship must have equal and fair opportunity to be openly considered and debated (Wright, 1993; Habermas, 1993; Friedmann, 1987). Four primary themes and their corresponding polemics are articulated here. First, the issue of resource ownership: are the fish common property or the exclusive property of license holders? Second, is the related theme of who controls the fishery, the stakeholders or citizens representing the public good? Third, I consider the economics of the fishery as expressed in the conflict between a market-based fishery and a social fishery. Fourth, I address the theme of management of the fishery; professional management versus comanagement. By analysing the themes and the degree to which the dialectic became a part of the dialogue concerning the future 78 of the fishery, the social worker is able to assess how well alternative visions have been expressed and plan accordingly. The role for the social worker, as change agent, is to first identify the dynamics supporting and opposing change and then work with individuals and groups to expose local knowledge. In keeping with the construct proposed by Wright, (1993) how successful the groups opposing the PSRP were in presenting local knowledge would directly effect their ability to challenge the structures of modernism. Who owns the fish? Private property versus common property. Historically, fish have been seen as 'common property' but as the State granted licenses to particular groups and disallowed other groups from exercising the right to fish, the fishery moved in the direction of a private property resource. This became further entrenched when fishers were permitted to sell that right, as has been the case in B.C. since 1968 (Marchak). (The 1968 Davis Plan, gave fishers the right to sell or trade their license to fish.) Marchak further notes that the State's "inconsistent attempts to conserve the resource have been frustrated by its' prior commitment to a process of private accumulation rights and by its' own dissemination of a "common property" ideology (Marchak, 1987 :30)." The State is therefore caught in a paradox of its own making. It has increasingly sold the rights to the fishery and propagated the ideology of private property, while simultaneously attempting to retain control of the resource through licensing and other restrictions. Raymond Rogers (1995) comments on the debate over common property. Writing on the Atlantic fisheries, he describes a process whereby the fisheries moved from common property to public property and more recently to private property. This movement he stipulates, was the attempt to universalize industrial practices to the fishery. He outlines how this worked. Because fisheries managers and policy-makers held that modern market economy was "normal business" practice and because the one component in the fishery that did not fit the "normal business" model was the lack of private property rights, the chronic problems in the 79 fishery were ultimately blamed on the lack of property rights. In other words, the problems in the fishery were attributed to the fact that it was not capitalist enough. Therefore most of the policy initiatives in the fishery were focused on implementing a comprehensive regulation of public property, followed by the granting of private property rights.... This privatized market-based approach is seen as a more efficient way of solving the fishery's problems than the regulatory approach which is expensive for governments and causes conflicts between the private and public sector. (1995: 59) This approach to the "problems" of common property was revealed by UBC resource economist Peter Pearse, in his 1983 Royal Commission report on Pacific fisheries policy. He wrote that because fish were assigned no particular owner they were open to exploitation without responsibility. He termed this the 'tragedy of the commons,'22 with the expected effect being over-fishing, economic crisis and stock depletion. He argued that private property rights would bring with them responsibility for the maximal utilization of the resource. Others have noted the strength and value of a common property approach (Marchak, 1987; Pinkerton, 1989, 1996; Greer, 1993; Dale, 1989). Greer (1993) notes that the problems of common property in the fishery exist because the salmon are shared by thousands of users belonging to differing user groups, commercial fishers, aboriginal peoples and sports fishers. He suggests that "these fundamental common property problems cannot be solved unless solutions remove the need to compete for shares and unlocke (sic) the potential for co-operation between stakeholders. Common property problems can be solved without privatizing the fish, but rather by making the commons work through co-operative, community based management (ibid: 3)." The issue at stake here is that fisheries managers are intent on furthering the private property ideology, an ideology that does not consider communities and public utility. The social costs in terms of loss of community, increased family stress and an increasing demand on social support programs is not taken into account. This demonstrates a need for social workers to 22See discussion of the private property ideology (p. 14). What Hardin has referred to as 'the tragedy of the commons' is based on a misunderstanding about how the commons was managed. Rogers (1995: 124-125) notes that "common property is repeatedly mistaken for what would better be described as open access capitalism." 'Common property' became a problem when competing capitalist interests vied for control of 80 become actively involved in this kind of debate ensuring that social costs are accounted for. The movement to the further entrenchment of a private property ideology goes largely unchallenged through the development, implementation and review of the PSRP. Both fishers and government pushed the private property ideology. This can be seen in the trading of increased rights to the fishery in exchange for greater rights and responsibilities for the management of the resource. This shows an acceptance of the modernist economic philosophy that ownership and good stewardship are intricately linked and marks an attempt to move the fishery to a normal business, as predicated by the modern market economy. For communities, the movement to a private property ideology represents a serious threat to their demand for a voice in the fishery and for recognition that the needs of communities must be a central consideration in the formulation of fishing policy. From the perspective of social work the dominance of a private property ideology raises concerns about social justice and how the rights of communities to decide their futures are protected. In fact, the private property ideology has already largely excluded communities. An example of this can be seen around the issue of license stacking. The primary concern that communities had with the PSRP was the effect that license stacking and buyback would have on the smaller vessels that traditionally fished out of their communities. This concern was validated by the Job Protection Commission report which found that stacking and buyback had removed 42% of the economic base from the village of Ahoushat (ARA, 1996). Communities were given no say on this issue, the right to decide the future of the fishery and by extension the viability of coastal communities belonged to license holders. In this way the social context which governed the management of 'common property' has been replaced by the special interests of property owners to the exclusion of community interests. The solution of market capitalism has been to universalize modern forms of exchange public lands and resources. 81 related to the fishery and suggest that communities purchase a share in the fishery to protect their interests. This is the advice offered by Garvey and Giammarino (1996) in their report of corporate concentration to the PSRPRP. They note that, "if communities value the presence of a fishery sufficiently highly they will be willing and able to purchase the required licenses (ibid: 24)." In this way the concerns of communities are redefined as problems of access to capital and their willingness to finance purchasing a share of the fishery. Throughout the PSRP, the belief in a privately owned fishery is continually advocated while the belief in a common property fishery received minimal support. A number of groups referred to the fishery as a common property resource, a resource that must be protected in the public interest, (Pacific Salmon Alliance, 1996c; Coastal Communities Network, 1996c) but fail to clearly formulate this as an alternative to capitalist private property. W h o c o n t r o l s the f i s h e r y ? S t a k e h o l d e r s v e r s u s c i t i z e n s . Following from the issue over common property, is the related aspect of who is included in decisions that relate to the fishery. In the discussion above, it was argued that a move away from a common property value took power out of the hands of local communities and placed it in the hands of resource 'owners'. Throughout the case study the language used to refer to legitimate claimants in the fishery was that of 'stakeholder' and this inevitably meant license holders. Terry Glavin notes that: "allowing 'stakeholders' in fisheries management decisions degenerates into a simple, 'rational' matter of allowing the players who have the biggest investments (the players with the biggest "stake") to wield the greatest influence in fisheries management decisions - decisions that become increasingly less likely to serve the public interest or the long term interests of sustainability (1996: 139)." The use of the concept of stakeholder, then, promotes or allows for the conception that some people or organizations have a greater 82 stake in the fishery than others do. Within the boundaries of capitalism this greater stake is measured in terms of capital investment. Therefore, it can be extrapolated that those with the greatest capital investment should have the greatest say in fisheries decisions. This is evident throughout the case study; crewmembers, shoreworkers and communities are denied a role in deciding the future of the fishery. In addition, fishers who sold their licenses, many because they could not afford a second license that they believed necessary for their survival in the revitalized fishery, were denied the right to vote on license stacking. They were no longer stakeholders. Thus, a publicly shared resource becomes increasingly under the control of industry; governmental authority is passed from publicly accountable bodies to companies accountable only to their shareholders. The issues central to a discussion on stakeholder and citizen rights, are the rights of citizens and communities to a say in decisions that effect their futures. In corporatist society these rights are supplanted by those of capital and corporate interests. The value of the resource is not measured in terms of the net benefits incurred to society as a whole, but in terms of the maximum returns to industry. Communities within this frame of reference are facilitators of capital accumulation with no inherent right to control over the resource. For social workers engaged in community economic development, it has been suggested, that sustainable communities are those that have some measure of control over decision-making on economic developments (Shaffer, 1995). Social workers need to work with communities in redefining how development occurs and how community resources are managed. The lack of control over resources leaves communities more vulnerable to changing market conditions with predictable consequences for the community. Under the PSRP, communities attempted to challenge this modernist belief. Rose Davidson elucidates the interest of communities in the fishery. In a letter concerning her experiences at a fisheries meeting, Rose who is the Chairperson of the Coastal Communities 83 Network writes: Both groups [processors and fishers] queried why I was there at all. I reminded them that coastal communities have an extensive capital investment in industry and that the livelihoods of more than just fishermen and companies depended on a healthy industry. I added that communities were fed up with decisions that effect their social and economic stability being made by outsiders and would not tolerate a repeat of past experiences. We (communities) were not looking for control of the industry but we wanted to be involved in the decision-making process. (Coastal Communities Network, 1996e:2) What Rose appears to be advocating for, is exactly what Saul (1995) has called for in the reinvention of a citizen-based society. Throughout the history of the fishery, however, communities and those not directly involved in the fishery have been excluded from the consultative process. Their demand for a voice in economic developments that effect them has been largely ignored by policy makers and fishers. Social work, as a professional body, has also failed to identify this as an issue and advocate on behalf of communities. As was remarked in the report to the Job Protection Commission "communities feel that they are not treated as full stakeholders by DFO in any of its processes, yet they must bear the repercussions of DFO policies (ARA: 16-3)." A part of the problem in seeking inclusion can be seen as the result of failing to problematize the term stakeholders. We need to consider terms such as 'stakeholder' from within the contextualized language of modernism and cannot assume that we can redefine the terms of that language. What Giroux (1992) explicates, is the power of language to withstand challenges to its reified context. This is particularly true with challenges to language from outside of the hegemonic interest. The term stakeholder can be postulated as belonging to the language of modernism and capital expansionism, it signifies a relationship between power and capital and not simply the right of inclusion that communities demanded. The use of the term stakeholder, in relationship to the interests of communities, is reflective of how potentially self-defeating language can be adopted by groups that have been marginalized, in an attempt to fit within the dominate discourse. By adopting the language of the 84 dominant discourse, communities invite two possibilities: one, they are rejected as not fitting the appropriate mold to be considered as stakeholders - as occurred in the PSRP - or, second, they are granted the rights of stakeholder and become one of many stakeholders, advocating in their own self-interest. In doing the later, they lose the opportunity to be seen as possessing a right different than other stakeholders, they place themselves on an equal footing with the needs of capital. Communities are not 'stakeholders', their demand was that public resources be used for the betterment and continuance of the larger public, for the principles of redistributive justice to govern resource decisions. The Coastal Communities Network (1996e: 2) articulates this belief. Communities have resolved that they need a greater involvement in fisheries in order to guarantee security and stability for their local economies. B.C. coastal communities have been rocked the past decade by radical changes in how we exploit our coastal resources in mining, fishing and forestry. Without sustainable harvesting of our natural resources and without some of the economic benefits accruing to adjacent areas, coastal communities will not be sustainable. The argument for a wider inclusion of those considered to have an interest in the fishery was made repeatedly during the roundtable process. These calls for greater inclusion were repressed. It was not until after the implementation of the PSRP that communities were accepted as having a role. Pressures from the public had forced DFO to begin recognizing the legitimacy of communities as participants in the fishery. This participation was, however, limited to that of observer not as a full participant. While coastal communities experienced some success in having their claims heard, the hegemonic order responded as Drover and Kerans predicted (1992; 1993) by limiting or reframing the claim in a way that created the least disruption to the hegemonic order. M a n a g e m e n t o f the fishery: Professional management versus loca l knowledge. From an analysis of the data, I would argue that one of the primary motivations for restructuring the fishery, from the perspective of DFO, was to make the fishery more 85 manageable. DFO had been hit by significant cuts to its funding and by its own admission was unable to effectively manage the fleet. Ron Macleod (1995: 57), a former Director with DFO, comments that "the reduction in the Pacific Region budgets that commenced in 1989/90 has had a devastating impact on DFO's capability to properly conserve and protect coastal fish resources." This is compounded by the unique characteristics of Pacific salmon, that render the issues of stock allocations and effort controls problematic and expensive to determine (Fraser, 1995; May, 1996; Pearse, 1983). DFO proposed, at the roundtable, that it would experience significant cost reductions with a reduced fleet. They stated that a reduced fleet, through buyback and stacking, would result in the most 'professional' fishers remaining in the fleet, those best able to provide reliable data to assist with stock management. This position seems to presume that economic power and stock-harvesting potential is equitable with professionalism and professionalism with conservation. It supports the modernist belief in expert knowledge and professionally-based decision-making. This is the same system, based on expert knowledge that has been highly criticized for its' inability to manage the fishery. "The plan continues with a management system driven by an unaccountable, urban-based bureaucracy that has repeatedly demonstrated that it is not only out of touch with fishers and communities, but heavily influenced by large fish processors' corporate lobby (Coastal Communities Network 1996c: 11)." An alternative position to expert knowledge suggests that it is the connection to local communities that affords the potential of conservation through community-based management. In other words, conservation requires a community in which to realize itself. This community has to have the capacity to resist the resourcist categories of modern economy, both for humans as well as the rest of nature. Conservation can only begin in the implicit recognition of membership in a socially-viable community. (Rogers 1995: 20) Rogers' assertion is that a local knowledge, understanding and interest in the continuation and viability of the fishery is essential. Evelyn Pinkerton (1996), a Simon Fraser University social 86 anthropologist, outlined many advantages of locally-based fisheries management. She noted that, both the costs of management and conservation can be positively influenced by the utilization of local knowledge. "The plan is a policy failure if short-term economic goals drive from the fleet the very actors who are in the best positions to promote conservation through ecosystem monitoring and protection (ibid: 2)." These actors are those with a connection to local stocks and conditions, with a long-term interest in the local fishery. The connection of these same coastal communities to the fisheries resource brings with it extensive, firsthand knowledge of habitat conditions, enhancement opportunities, the impact of various user groups on the resource and the effect of DFO policies on the fish and the communities that depend on them. Coastal Communities also have a long term interest in sustaining and enhancing the salmon resource due to their economic and environmental link to the fishery. For these reasons, and the need to better manage salmon stocks with limited DFO field staff, it is crucial that coastal communities play a more active role in the management of the fisheries resource and derive an equitable share of the benefits generated from these resources. (Masset Community Adjustment Committee, 1996 :Appendix B) These assertions challenge the professionally-based expertise advocated by DFO and the policy that a more professionally and ultimately urban-based fish industry is in the best position to assist with stock management. The argument for the utilisation of local knowledge and fish management skills has been advocated since at least the time of the Cruickshank Report (1991). However, it has never obtained a level of acceptance where it has become a part of the ongoing debate regarding the future of the fishery. Coastal communities, fishers and academics raised the issue during the development and implementation of the PSRP but it never became a part of the legitimized debate. Economics: Market fishery versus a social fishery. A theme that was maintained throughout the case study, was the conflict between a view of the fishery based on market driven economics and a view formulated on a sustainable locally-based fishery. This conflict can be expected within a capitalist democracy. "The reason is 87 straightforward: the free market and democracy represent in principle two contradictory forms of resource allocation in society (Teeple, 1995: 122 Italics in original)." The free market represents allocations based on private property, while democracy implies the administration of 'distributive justice,' (Rawls, 1971) in the determination of economic activity. Capital in a free market acts to gain control of the market, and thereby security of allocation; this has become even more pronounced with the globalization of trade. The conflict then is between preserving capital and preserving social equity. The push from government and some of the industry (most notably the Fisheries Council of British Columbia), was for an industry able to compete in the international marketplace. In its brief to the PSRPRP, the Fisheries Council (1996) noted that two recent economic events have created the need for significant change in the industry. First, is the reduced share of world markets from 14% to 6% in the last ten years, as a result primarily of farmed fish. This reduction in market share, they claim, has come along with declining world prices for salmon due to farmed fish and a glut of salmon on the international market. Second, is the end, in 1989, of the prohibition on exporting unprocessed salmon. This resulted in "plant closures, corporate alliances and mergers being the tools that reduced the processing industry to levels that reflect the new regulatory, international trade and global market situation (ibid: 3)." The Council argues that these changes have had a serious economic impact on the industry, forcing it to restructure to remain viable. To remain viable in the global marketplace they require an abundant supply of fish at low cost. In their brief they note that 60% of their costs go to the purchase of the fish. It is therefore in their capital interests to work to decrease the cost of capture. The market place view espouses that the most economical methodology be utilized to harvest the stocks. This is the direction that the fishery has been moving since 1968. As has been discussed in earlier sections, the size of the fleet has decreased over this period while its catch capacity has increased. The majority of this increased catch capacity is with the seiner fleet. An 88 example of the capacity differential can be seen in the relationship between the number of vessels and the dollar value of the catch. For example, in 1994, the seine fleet of 506 vessels landed $57.3 million worth of fish while the gillnetters and trailers with a combined total of 3723 vessels landed $136.9 million (DFO, 1995e). On a per vessel basis, then, the seine fleet had a landed value exceeding three times that of the small boat fleet. Thus, from a market perspective, the most economical fishery would be a fishery dominated by seiners. While a movement towards a seine dominated fishery is not advocated as such by the DFO, this would be the logical outcome of a rationalized fleet. If stacking were to proceed to its logical conclusion "this could eventually lead to a fleet profile of 244 seine boats and 513 combination gillnet-troll boats (Pacific Salmon Alliance 1996c: 13)." Clearly, this market place view advocates that the resources of society be structured to ensure the greatest return to capitalist enterprise. The alternate claim from communities and groups opposed to the plan, was for a fishery that would support coastal communities and locally-based fishers. Community after community in their submissions to the review panel spoke of the importance of the fishery to their communities. The Campbell River Chamber of Commerce noted: "many small operators have a significant role to play in the economy of their communities and their relative reduction in numbers will have an impact on smaller coastal communities (1996:3)." Communities clearly understood this and called for a fishery that would insure that the resource benefited locally based fishers. Their demand was for redistributive justice - that the resources of society be utilized to benefit the maximum number of people. This vision of the fishery has clearly been opposed by those in support of the plan. The Pacific Salmon Alliance note that one member of the Review Panel commented frequently on his opposition to the idea of a social fishery. During the hearings of the Impact Review Panel, one member consistently expressed the opinion that the small boat fleet was a "social fishery" and that opposition to the plan on the basis of its impact on this fleet was based on "ideological" and not on economic reality. The panel member described the Pacific salmon industry as a "social fishery" and explained that 89 the Pacific Revitalization Plan would make the fishing fleet more viable and a "market-oriented" fishery. (Pacific Salmon Alliance, 1996e: 14) The Pacific Salmon Alliance (1996) raised objections to what they rightly saw as a false dichotomy between a social fishery and a market fishery. They argue that the social and economic cannot be separated and that there is increasing international recognition for the rights of indigenous peoples and local fishing communities in the allocation of fisheries resources. Evelyn Pinkerton (private conversation) noted that senior DFO staff had commented to her that the DFO was no longer in the business of supporting a social fishery. One is left with the question, what is a social fishery? Is it any conception of the fishery that considers people, communities and not exclusively economic factors as defined by a 'market oriented fishery'? From the facts outlined through the case study this view certainly deserves considerable support. This is reflective of Wright's (1993) critique of orthodox economics outlined earlier. He laments that the current practice of economics is unable to account for the needs of people, but is driven by an attempt to extrapolate from pure theory to explain the gestalt of economic experience. In doing this social interests are excluded from the equation. The societal outcomes of a social versus a market fishery are unexplored. Both have potential costs for society; a fishery that meets social goals may require some subsidization in terms of employment benefits, for example, but the outcome is a healthier community. A market fishery, conversely, may reap a financial return to government but the associated cost resulting from the displacement of a large number of fishers will be high and the outcome an unhealthy subsidized lifestyle. Social workers advocating for local economic development need to outline these costs and present arguments that challenge the narrow view of orthodox economics. Challenging modernist assumptions. The four themes depicted above are demonstrative of the breadth of debate and 90 understanding possible within the fishery and reflect a clash between modernist and postmodernist vantage-points. Within the debate and conflicts about the PSRP the alternative vision to reified modernist claims is not articulated by a strong unified voice. While the Coastal Communities Network and the Pacific Salmon Alliance did present strong alternative positions, the majority of fishers opposed the plan for many different individualized reasons. Most opposed the plan on the basis of the stacking provision and how this would effect them and their ability to continue to earn a living from the fishery. They failed, however, to connect this to a breakdown in the capitalist mode of production. While the alternative claims representing local knowledge, did not make a clear and unified claim against the precepts of modernism, it is argued that if the claims had been articulated in an arena of fair and competent discourse, many fishers would have been empowered to make the connection between their private troubles and the broader public issues. The development of praxis that Drover and Kerans (1993) propose is an essential part of claimsmaking would then have had greater opportunity to develop. In keeping with the proposition forwarded by Wright (1993) it is suggested that the resurrection of local knowledge, as expressed in the themes counter arguments, needed to be combined with universal knowledge, as contained in Habermas' theory of communicative action. A successful challenge to the modernist hegemony in the fishery, necessitated not only the realization of subjugated local knowledge, but also of universal knowledge that would allow for a fair and equitable communicative process to facilitate the development and realization of subjugated local knowledge. Participation and Communication Central to a dialectical exchange of ideas is the need for a process of participation, a 91 means of bringing people together in a forum that allows for the fair and equitable exchange of views aimed at reaching agreement. Utilizing the three assumptions extrapolated from Habermas's theory of communicative action, I will now review the opportunities for participation and consultation that were available during the development and implementation of the Pacific Salmon Revitalization Plan. These were the Pacific Policy Roundtable (roundtable) on the renewal of the commercial Pacific salmon fishery, the review commissioned by the Job Protection Commission (JPC) and the Pacific Salmon Revitalization Plan Review Panel (PSRPRP). Assumption number one. Assumption number one stipulated that, all those wishing to participate must have the equal opportunity to do so. The Pacific Roundtable represented a limited opportunity for participation. It was restricted to individuals representing special interests in the fishery, the stakeholders. The roundtable comprised seventy stakeholders 'hand-picked' by DFO and the Pacific Regional Council, for their knowledge, wisdom and involvement in the commercial fishery. However, many individuals and groups were excluded from this process. Some of these were identified by the UFAWU (1996). It would appear that this exclusion was not the result of error or oversight but calculated, based on a modernist (capitalist) conception of who were rightful participants in the fishery. Attempts by specific parties at the roundtable and by the Coastal Communities Network, for increasing the participation at the roundtable were unsuccessful. Both the study conducted by the JPC and the PSRPRP invited participation from all interested parties. Each panel traveled widely, visiting the majority of fishing communities and actively soliciting information and viewpoints. Many formats were available for participants to present information to the panels; written submissions, private interviews and public meetings 92 were utilised. The only note that can be made, counteracting this, is that some persons supportive of PSRP felt unable/unwelcome to attend the public meetings, due to the overwhelming opposition to the plan that was expressed at these times. Assumption number two. Assumption number two states that, every participant must have the equal opportunity to present and challenge arguments based on the four claims to validity: comprehensibility, prepositional truth, normative Tightness and sincerity. Participants to the JPC and PSRPRP processes were unable to fulfill any of the four speech acts. The satisfactions of validity claims are based on the ability to both present and challenge statements in a dialogical format. Both of these processes only offered the participants the opportunity to present arguments and challenge the arguments of others monologically, but not to engage in dialogue aimed at reaching agreement. Furthermore, under the PSRPRP, persons representing the official position of DFO and/or the minister, were not a part of the public hearing process. While the panel did meet with them privately, they did not present or defend the official position in a public format. In spite of this limitation, I will nevertheless look at how validity claims can assist in the understanding of how these processes functioned from the standpoint of communicative action. Validity claims to comprehensibility relate to the ability of participants to communicate competently with one another. To what degree were they able to make their arguments understood and understand the arguments of others? From the roundtable process there is no direct information to either support or refute that this assumption was met. It can be assumed that the majority of participants shared a common 93 language and were, given their experience in the fishery, able to utilize fisheries terminology and understand, from a technical standpoint, the claims of others. On the other hand, many fishers have limited formal education (ARA, 1995) and would not necessarily have expressed themselves in the same rational scientific way as others. Those persons representing the 'gear tables' at the 'policy table' may have not been able to frame their arguments as effectively as the academic, DFO managers and company executives, who represented the majority at the policy table. At both the JPC and the PSRPRP there is no indication that communicative speech acts were not fulfilled. A variety of formats (written, group presentation, individual meeting) were provided. This facilitated the realization of communicative speech acts. Validity claims to prepositional truth ensure that claims make a true and correct statement representative of existing states of affairs, ensuring that no view, in the long term, is excluded from consideration and debate. Within the roundtable process, participants were able to present and challenge claims within set parameters. At the opening of the roundtable process, DFO presented both a list of conditions that any plan would need to adhere to and a list of options for restructuring the fleet (DFO, 1995c). These effectively limited the expression of constantive speech acts by containing discussion to this limited list of options. These exclusive options ensured that others were systematically repressed. Absent from the options presented were those that represented a model of co-operative fisheries management and a meaningful role for communities in the fishery. The minutes of the gear sectors and the main policy table show a consideration of the options presented by DFO, but no others are documented23. ' It is important to note that DFO chaired the roundtable process and resisted suggestions from participants for a neutral mediator. 94 Within the JPC survey and the PSRPRP hearing participants were able to and did present truth claims and challenge the truth claims of others, but this did not involve participants seeking agreement through argumentation. Rather than having opportunity to debate and contest claims participants submitting their truth claims to the panel and thus, challenges to the truth of DFO's assertion that corporate concentration is not a factor in the fishery, went undebated. The resolution of competing truth claims was left to the 'wisdom' of the panel members. During the PSRPRP, certain arguments were not presented and defended and others, while presented to the panel, were omitted from the final report of the panel. Detailed proposals for changing the structure and management of the fishery are not addressed or commented on in any way in the report presented to government. It can be argued that while the process did not allow for the communicative expression of validity, this was further hindered by the failure of the panel to communicate the breadth of the arguments it had heard. Validity claims to normative Tightness relate to the opportunity for all participants to command and oppose, permit and forbid arguments in keeping with a culturally relevant normative context. Within the roundtable process, participants were limited in the expression of regulative speech acts. DFO, for example, had presented a list of defacto principles and options under which the roundtable was to operate. In doing so, it presented no "feasibility studies, economic assessments and environmental impact studies" to substantiate the fit between its principles and options, and how these would accomplish the goals of the PSRP. For example, the goal of reducing the overcapacity of the fleet articulated at the roundtable is clearly not realized in the PSRP. Both the studies of the JPC and the PSRPRP were open processes that allowed participants to freely present arguments. From the PSRPRP, in particular, there is a wealth of 95 information to suggest that alternative views were well represented and articulated at the panel's hearings. Unfortunately, these hearings were designed in such a way that participants were unable to freely challenge and debate the claims of others. In fact, the chief architect of the PSRP - DFO - was not even present at the panel hearings to present and defend its positions. Far from enhancing the quality of the dialogue by direct involvement, DFO chose to play an entirely different role in relation to the panel. One of the DFO economists who had been most closely involved in the development of the PSRP, Stephen Wright, was assigned to accompany federal panelist, Mike Francino. At first the provincial panelist, Bill Lefeaux-Valentine was also accompanied by an analyst from the B.C. Fisheries Secretariat but this did not last. Mr. Wright apparently never openly took part in discussion in public meetings. However, Norman Dale, the coordinator for the panel in an interview, noted (personal communication) that on many occasions after a public meeting, as the panel, he and Stephen Wright departed, Mr. Wright would present without having been asked rebuttals of speakers who had been especially critical of the PSRP. This allowed a DFO 'insider' to give a very privileged, inaccessible refutation without, of course the opportunity for a reply by speakers. On one occasion, when the panel was holding a direct meeting with the West Coast Sustainability Association, the representatives of those groups requested that Mr. Wright leave. Mike Francino refused to meet unless Mr. Wright was present. On another occasion, later in the process, when Mr. Francino directly informed Mr. Wright that he was not needed at a particular meeting, Mr. Wright traveled to the meeting anyways explaining that those were his orders from the Regional Director (N. Dale personal communication). Thus DFO declined to engage in communication that might have led to fundamental consideration of underlying issues, but kept a close watch and used privileged access to the panel to covertly try to limit the effects of oppositional viewpoints. The PSRPRP also, hampered the ability of some claimants due to poor notice of meetings and the short time period between when the panel was announced and when it began its 96 work. As one participant remarks, "the 'information package' was released on September 17, 1996. It has been poorly distributed and 7 days later you are here in a major East Coast Vancouver Island community!! This incredibly short lead time does not allow for an appropriately researched response to an EXTREMELY poorly advertised meeting (Shepherd, 1996: 2)." If participants do not have adequate notice to prepare their responses they will be hampered in their ability to realize regulative speech acts. Validity claims to sincerity relate to the opportunity for participants to express feelings, attitudes and intentions and have these claims challenged by other participants. The level of sincerity with which DFO approached the roundtable has been challenged on many fronts. With respect to the goal of shared responsibility, one participant noted the following. "True partnership involves all parties to the shared responsibility in developing, with the aid of an impartial facilitator, a plan that can be achieved through mutually monitored communication and effort and respect of the other participants to the process (Shepherd, 1996: 2)." Furthermore, the West Coast Sustainability Association (1996: 36) remarks that: "Considering that over the past 37 years there has been a Royal Commission, four other commissions, and countless Committees and workshops wrestling with the complex problem of fleet rationalization, it is beyond comprehension that the sponsors could expect the Roundtable process to succeed. Six days of plenary discussions over a three month period, given the complexity of the issues, is a design for failure." Both of these statements question the sincerity of DFO to listen to and respect the views of fishers on the complex issues of fleet restructuring and not proceed with some previously conceived plan. In both the JPC and PSRPRP participants were able to express, monologically, their feelings, desires and intentions. In the public hearings, fishers and others expressed with great intensity their feeling of hope for the fishery and their anger at DFO. Most briefs, likewise, 97 expressed a sincerity of intent and a desire to create a workable vision for the future of the fishery. What can be questioned, with respect to the PSRPRP is the sincerity of the panel to consider the views of fishers. All three panel members were political appointees chosen, I would suggest, for their adherence to the views of the provincial and federal governments. This is especially apparent with the federal appointee who was noted to hold a strong position that no changes be made to the plan. Given this reestablished bias, the views of fishers not contained within these narrow confines were not considered. Sincerity would also suggest that the purpose of a participatory venture be clearly and correctly identified. The stated purpose of the PSRPRP was to review the impacts of the plan and recommend improvements within the context of the plans implementation (PSRPRP, 1996). This somewhat ambiguous purpose was not clearly communicated to the participants. A reading of the objectives and principles of the plan would suggest that the purpose of the panel was to identify impacts of the plan and offer suggestions for fine tuning the plan, not to recommend significant changes to the plan. Given the submissions to the panel, it is evident that the participants did not understand this. Assumption number three Assumption number three states that, in reaching agreement, participants must have equal opportunity to determine how claims not redeemed through intersubjectively mediated understanding will be resolved. The roundtable operated on the assumption that it had some limited decision-making power. Agreement reached at the roundtable that adhered to the principles of conservation, industry viability and partnership were to be considered. This was an ambiguous definition of the 98 decision-making power of the table and granted DFO the presumed legitimacy to base any decisions it made on the roundtable. For example, stacking was rejected as an option at the roundtable. Given the undefined decision-making process, DFO could claim the rejection of stacking on the basis that it failed to fulfill the principle of industry vitality. With the JPC and the PSRPRP, no delineation is made of how recommendations would be arrived at. It may be presumed that recommendations arising from a review process would be based on the findings of the study. But this is not the case with the PSRPRP. Many of the suggestions made to the panel do not appear in the report, and on the issue of stacking they were unable to come to a unified recommendation. The lack of a fair and equitable process of argumentation aimed at reaching agreement is evident throughout the RSRP. The communicative processes that occurred and the subsequent decisions, when analyzed in terms of the assumptions articulated above, were based on systematic distortions of communications. From this it can be determined that the legitimacy for the decision to proceed with the PSRP was not achieved through the force of better argument, but through distorted communications. The result is, as Habermas predicts, that the interests served are not generalizable interests - the interests of society - but specific interests - the interests of capital and of State control. Consultative Processes: Friend or Foe Throughout the case study, many reviewers (starting with Pearse) have questioned the consultative processes that DFO utilized. The proceeding section outlining the systematic distortions to the consultative processes during the PSRP, give validity to these concerns. The Masset Community Adjustment Committee (1996:1) summed up their frustrations with the consultative process as follows: 99 The community has been trying to develop a constructive and effective dialogue with DFO on these issues. Disappointingly, DFO's intent in establishing an effective dialogue has been minimal to non-existent. Letters go unanswered, recommendations, including those from DFO's own field staff, go unanswered. There is also a long history of multi-level consultation processes which yield policies that are consistently unreflective of stakeholder consensus. These reflections on the consultative process are common in the submissions to the Review Panel and are noted in the ARA report Fishing for Answers, as well as in the earlier reports by the Fraser River Sockeye Public Review Board (1995) and Pearse (1982). Community groups and disaffected fishers have been highly critical of the nature of consultations with DFO and have demanded greater inclusion and a role in decision-making. Throughout the history of the commercial fishery in British Columbia there has been no lack of public inquiry and investigations into the industry. But this process, as noted earlier, has not resulted in a dialogical exchange or a sharing of ideas. Instead, the focus has been on 'experts' seeking out the opinions of concerned parties, most often those designated as stakeholders and in the process producing controversial reports and/or recommendations that do not further the public utility or for that matter the overall interests of the industry. This is stated by Dale: The format of a Royal Commission invites the Commissioner to project his framing of the problem into the policy arena; it certainly does not encourage discourse among parties that could help them find new integrative frames. Appealing to the "wise man" seems easier and more conclusive that having opponents meet in an intensive retreat. But in the end, trying to solve what already have been recognized as "people conflicts," involving competing interests, values, and understandings in this quasi-judicial manner seems unpromising. At such tribunals, parties are encouraged to state their case in the strongest terms possible to impress their frames upon the "judge." (1989: 63-64). Dale's observations are equally applicable within the current context of the PSRP where the positions of the parties became entrenched in an adversarial battleground. One result of this is that an exchange of ideas between participants, where collaborations and compromise can be obtained through dialogue, is prevented from occurring. The result, in most situations, is that the decisions of the "wise man" will never be acceptable to all parties. This has been demonstrated 100 by the responses to the Davis Plan, the Pearse Report and the PSRP, all which were highly contested by fishers and others concerned about the fishery. A second result of this approach is that it tends to favour the status quo and/or the interests of the dominant group, to which the "wise man" usually belongs. While this approach, rooted as it is in modernist rationality, clearly has appeal to governing bodies - it is controllable, time limited and predictable - it rarely results in solutions that receive wide support (Friedmann, 1987). Both inquiries resulting from the PSRP reveal the failings of an expert approach. The competing interests and ideologies of the participants did not get debated or advanced through the public discourse. Any opportunity for creating understanding was lost in the entrenchment that occurs in a quasi-judicial forum. The result is that the interests of the status-quo are preserved. As has been shown in this study, it is not the interest dominated industry groups, such as the Fisheries Council of British Columbia, that have contested the lack of participation, distorted communications and corporate interference, it is small fishers, communities and the fishers union. Claimsmaking I have already described how the ideological tenets of modernism and distorted communicative processes prevented the realization of claims contrary to the PSRP. I will now further this understanding by examining how successfully claims were formulated and collectively expressed. In reviewing the PSRP from the perspective of claimsmaking, two successes are evident. First, the success of those opposing the PSRP in developing their claim, and second, the success that DFO experienced in limiting this claim. The case study demonstrates that those opposing the PSRP were very successful in making their claims public and in gaining public support. They successfully involved the government of B.C. and the majority of coastal communities, and for a period of time were 101 featured daily in the media. They achieved some success: they were able to receive a brief moratorium on stacking and the commitment of DFO to review the plan through the PSRPRP. In struggling for recognition the claimants needed to overcome significant barriers. First, they required recognition of the nature of their claim. On the surface level, the nature of the claim was for the removal of the RSRP or certain aspects of the plan (stacking). This claim was recognized by DFO and by the larger public. On a deeper level, the nature of the claim was for an alternative vision of the fishery which incorporated a recognition of the role of coastal communities and valued their sustainability. While select groups were able to forward this claim, it in no way represented a unified claim from the opposition. This claim, if recognized, would have represented a challenge to the hegemonic order. In identifying with the less threatening claim, DFO was able to deny legitimacy to this more significant claim. Second, the claimants needed to be recognized as legitimate. License holders were recognized as legitimate claimants and had been included in the discussions at the roundtable and the continuing debate about the PSRP. Communities, environmental groups and non-license holders, however, were denied recognition as legitimate participants. DFO challenged the legitimacy of groups opposing the plan. The Director General of DFO, for example, had characterized those opposing the plan as "muckrakers and professional critics (Pynn, 1996)." In another tactic, the Fisheries Council of British Columbia denied that communities had ever been excluded. "Latter day suggestions that various interest groups were not represented at the roundtable are ludicrous (1995:5)." DFO's actions continued to indicate that the fishery was owned by the license holders under the management of DFO. Drover and Kerans (1993) note that hegemonic institutions act to protect themselves against claims that threaten their structure and power, by denying the legitimacy of the claimant and/or the legitimacy of the claim. Throughout the history of the fishery, DFO has been successful in limiting claims through the power of its authority and 102 through recourse to scientific expertise. More recently this authority and expertise has been questioned. Fishers and other groups have demanded a greater say in the operation of the fishery. One of the ways that DFO appears to have accommodated this demand has been to engage in public consultation processes. To maintain power and authority, it has, of necessity, constructed public discourse in ways that deny the validity of claims that threaten the institution (Drover and Kerans: 1993). The roundtable demonstrates how consultations can be structured to maintain the hegemonic order. One way that DFO, either by intent or default, controlled claims, was by making it necessary that the claimsmakers maintain a consistent unified claim over an extended period of time. The development of the plan began in April 1995 and the final vote on stacking was not taken until January 1998. This time frame makes it extremely difficult to maintain vocal, newsworthy opposition. This was further exacerbated by the panel hearings into the plan. The review panel created the illusion and expectation that serious consideration was being given to alternative views and that amendment to the plan was possible. As has been demonstrated, this was a serious misconception. Energies were directed at providing information and argumentation to the panel and away from public debate for a four month period of time. By the time the panel's recommendations had been responded to by government almost nine months had passed since the plan was announced. During this time, many fishers were forced to make economic and occupational decisions based on the realities of the fishery. At this point they were, out of their own need for survival, less engaged in attempts to combat the plan. 103 Lessons to be learned: Implications for social work practice Working within the traditional social structures, social workers have most often accepted that continued capital expansion was 'normal business practice' and, in fact, desirable. In doing so, however, they failed to critically analyze the effect of this on human populations and, in particular, on marginalized groups. This has meant that much of social work practice, especially within the confines of the State bureaucracy, has focused on ameliorating the negative aspects of modernism24 by assisting individuals, families and communities to adapt to changing social and economic realities. The problems posed by globalization, environmental destruction and resource depletion, not to mention an increasing unwillingness of society to pay the costs associated with buffering the excesses of capitalism are resulting in a crisis situation for individuals and communities. Clearly, human emancipation and betterment through reliance on expert knowledge, rational management and orthodox economics is failing. Social workers must adopt a more critical approach to practice. This implies a need to move away from the role of repairing the negative effects of capitalism. Instead the social worker must develop a questioning approach that is critical of the modernist assumptions behind many policy initiatives and social work practices (Leonard, 1994). Social workers have an important role to play in assisting communities to solve the conflict created by the juxtaposition of their needs with the imperatives of modernism. However, the social worker must first become more aware of the historical and cultural dimensions 24Peter Leonard (1993) remarks that modern meta-narratives can also be interpreted as having a positive relation to social work practice. He advocates "a critical socialist perspective on modernity, rather than the reactionary tendencies of postmodernism (ibid: 60)." He argues for the furtherance of the idea of universal human need in the same way that Drover and Kerans (1993) have argued for a universal understanding of human well-being. A practical application of universal meta-narratives to social work practice is through reference to United Nations conventions and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This is an approach taken by the Pacific Salmon Alliance (1996c) who in advocating for a community based fishery made reference to UN agreements, to which Canada was a signatory and requested the government live up to the commitments it had made in the international arena. This is a potentially powerful tool for social workers and social action groups to use in holding government accountable. 104 underlying this conflict. As was shown through the case study, the history and culture of coastal communities and their ongoing relationship with DFO and capitalist industry, demonstrate a distinct relationship. Analyzing this relationship, ideally through forming participatory alignments with affected individuals and groups, can be a powerful method for social workers in uncovering hidden 'truths'. It will enable them to discover commonly held issues and mobilize community action. In focusing on culture and history, the social worker is also able to draw attention to what is local and particular. This will assist in building a counter argument to the universalizing categories of modernism. One of the most basic of social needs is having a means of providing for one's self, family and community. This is becoming a struggle in small resources based communities where there are few opportunities for employment outside of resource extraction. Modernist logic that replaces people with more technologically efficient means of resource extraction, providing marginal incomes for the many, with extravagant incomes for the few, has serious implications for both the individual and society. It suggests a role for social workers in advocating for appropriate technologies and methods of economic production that focus on meeting local needs. From a community development perspective, this suggests that the social worker promote sustainable economic development. Shaffer (1995: 150) believes that this necessitates "changing perceptions and choices regarding community resources, markets, rules, and decision-making capacity." For the social worker this could mean working with community groups to develop new ideas about how the resources of the community are used and advocating for more inclusive forms of decision-making. For social work education, this thesis suggests that social workers be taught a critical approach to economics and economic theory. The PSRP was forwarded, to a large degree, on economic assumptions concerning the relationship between a privately owned and managed fishery, and financial returns on resource rents to government. The supposition behind this was 105 that private ownership would ensure that fish were captured at the lowest possible cost, with minimal cost to government in terms of management and therefore both capital enterprise and government coffers would benefit. The approach that social work needs to bring to this narrow analysis is a measure of the real costs of such policies, both social and economic. To accomplish this, social workers need to be knowledgeable of economic theory in order to effectively analyze the economic assumptions behind policy developments and to translate this understanding to affected populations. Furthermore, I would recommend that social workers be more aware of the seductive potential of language. This suggests that language use and/or the adoption of certain terms needs to be critically examined. For example, what did the terms conservation and partnership, as used in the PSRP, mean? Were they understood to mean the same thing by the different parties? Do they have ascribed meanings that cannot be easily changed? The term stakeholder is an example of a word with strongly ascribed meaning. The failure of communities to look critically at how they used this word prevented them from effectively identifying that their claim to the fishery was fundamentally different from the claims made by individuals.25 Social workers need to look critically at how language is constructed and used by the hegemonic order. Where language is inscribed with meaning that supports or maintains the established order, social workers need to assist in the identification of alternative words or phrases to more clearly identify the needs of communities. Social work collectively needs to re-establish strong links with social movements. Where was the voice of social work in opposing the PSRP, a development that certainly has many social implications? The B.C. Association of Social Workers was not one of the concerned groups that contested the plan. Was this because social work has adopted the modernist agenda and is more concerned with acting as a buffer to the excesses of capitalism or is it caught in the narrow 106 confines of professionalism, disconnected from a social justice perspective as some would suggest (McNutt and Hoff, 1994; Mullaly, 1993)? As a collective body, social workers can more effectively call for policies and practices that support the redistribution of the resources of society to the greatest number of people. The importance of collective action by social workers cannot be ignored. Further implications can be drawn from this thesis regarding the roles for social workers in citizen participation. The failure of participation as a means to advance the interest of affected populations is evident throughout the development and implementation of the PSRP. I suggested earlier that participation has the potential to either legitimate questionable policies, as in the PSRP, or to provide a forum for the legitimization of local knowledge. In advocating for the latter outcome, social workers can take on a number of roles at both the level of organizing participation and in working with individuals and groups at the participant level. At the organizational level, social workers can advocate for participatory ventures that maximize the opportunities for participants to have their view heard and validated. The assumptions drawn from Habermas' theory of communicative action offer one option for guiding the development of participation. Using the three assumptions as a meta-criteria for fair and equitable participation, the social worker can work to design a process that realizes these assumptions, to the largest degree possible. Furthermore, for social workers engaged at the organizational level there is the issue of who should participate. Fair and equitable public participation necessitates that consideration be given to all persons wishing to take part. How these persons are identified can be problematic. For the roundtable, participants were chosen by a top down process, where those organizing the initiative attempted to define who the legitimate participants were. As was shown in the case study this system of selection was problematic, institutionalized biases excluded many potential 2 5 Seepage 81. 107 contributors. Conversely, groups both within and external to the roundtable attempted to exercise what has been called a bottom-up approach (Thomas, 1995); that is, where the initial participants decide on whom else should be involved. Within the RSRP, a bottom-up approach would have allowed the inclusion of communities and community interests. This approach challenges policy makers to adopt an alternative worldview, one that is more respectful of local knowledge and which releases some of the decision-making power to the participants. At the participant level, this thesis points to a number of issues for the social worker to focus on. First, a very early question that must be addressed is: what is to be done with the consultation that citizens give and how will decisions be made? The literature on participation suggests that this is often not clearly addressed (Kubiski, 1992; Renn, Webler and Wiedemann, 1995). Where participants are not going to have full participation in decision-making, it is important that the structure of decision-making be clearly outlined at the beginning and throughout the process so that false expectations are not created. During the consultations in the PSRP, the structure of decision-making was not clearly outlined - with the result that many individuals and groups were left with false hopes about what changes their participation could effect. The result is that people are discouraged from further participation (Pateman, 1970). Social workers need to raise this issue with others in preparing for participation and make it an essential demand before engaging in consultation. During the PSRP, many of the participants spoke about the changes they wished to see to the plan, but generally these demands were not constructed in a way that suggested alternatives to the modernist assumptions governing the fishery. This suggests a further role for social work in preparing individuals and groups for participation. If we are to accept that challenges to universal modernism are to come from a resurrection of local knowledge, social workers have a potential role to take in assisting participants to identify local knowledge and formulating it as a challenge to dominating practices. 1 0 8 It is clear that more research is needed. The long term effect of the PSRP on individuals and communities needs to be assessed. Approximately 3000 jobs were lost as a result of the plan in 1996 alone (ARA, 1996). What has become of these individuals and their families and how has this loss effected communities? The PSRP advocated a economically rationalized fishery that would incur the least cost to the taxpayer and the greatest financial return for industry and government. How has this compared with the actual costs to individuals, families and communities - measured in terms of employment insurance and B.C. Benefits - not to mention the associated costs in terms of family disruption, increases in domestic violence, drug and alcohol dependency and depression? A valid role for social work is to document these differences and to point out the real costs to society. McNutt and Hoff (1994) propose that social work as a profession needs to begin to focus on research conducted around examining societal outcomes. Social work must begin to take seriously the effects on human well-being of environmental problems and resource degradation. It is not only the direct effects of these factors on human populations that is of concern, but also the associated costs as capitalist enterprise attempts to compensate. We must promote the connection between healthy communities and healthy people. Practices that disrupt the health of communities and economic considerations that fail to consider all of the costs must be challenged. 109 Conclusions A cold reality has awoken communities up and down the coast to the fact that there is no support for rural based public policy in this country. The hinterland is expendable. (Coastal Communities Network, 1996c:4) Coastal communities and small fishers have lost an important struggle to retain a fishery that provides economically and culturally for coastal people. Economically, many who once fished out of small coastal ports are unable to continue earning a livelihood from fishing. More than just the individual fishing families are effected. This loss translates to a significant reduction in the economic viability of many communities. Culturally, a way of life is being engulfed by the sameness of undifferentiated modernism. The distinct cultural richness of coastal fishing communities is being lost. This is not just a cultural loss in some romantic anthropological sense, but the loss of a connection between nature and humanity. An important question for social workers and others involved in community development, needs to center on how we can support and maintain communities, ensuring that their natural resource base is utilised for the distribution of economic benefits to the local community. This is a goal that creates a direct challenge to current practices where the economic returns go for the benefit of a privileged few who have ownership rights to the resource. In advocating for change of this magnitude, social workers and the communities they work with face the resistance of institutions, both governmental and industrial, who will attempt to maintain the hegemonic order. In this thesis, I postulated that the failure of those opposing the PSRP to achieve significant modifications to the plan - in the interests of the redistribution of economic and social benefits - resulted from a dominance of modernist assumptions, in tandem with patterns of distorted communications. It has been demonstrated how the basic precepts of modernism -orthodox economic practices, expert knowledge and an adherence to technological innovation -110 have dominated the fishery, not only during the PSRP but throughout the modern history of the industry. Consultative processes that provided an opportunity for fishers and DFO to work together, in creating a future for the fishery, have been marred by distrust, conflict, corporate interference and distorted communications. Others, affected by fisheries policies - crew members, shoreworkers, ancillary industries and coastal communities - have had little or no say in fisheries policies that directly effect their well-being. Both the received ideas of modernism and distorted communications prevented the realization of a new policy for the salmon fishery, one that accounted for the needs of coastal communities. The single greatest failure in the PSRP was the lack of a fair and equitable process of reaching agreement on a new direction for the fishery. Eloquent arguments for the preservation of coastal communities and analysis of economic viability are all meaningless without a process by which these claims can be fairly debated. Indeed, public participation as a means of determining how public and private interests are to be defined is of little effect, so long as the universalizing categories of modernity - global capitalism - are excluded from the debate. From a social mobilization/social change perspective, the value of public participation processes need to be critically evaluated. To what degree does public participation act to protect global capitalism and hegemonic institutions from questions of legitimacy? Can participation be structured to further the interests of redistributive justice? If these questions cannot be answered in the affirmative, then collective action through social protest must become the tool of the social activist. Even with social protest, however, the ultimate recourse must be to discourse. As Habermas (1993) has stipulated, intersubjectively mediated understandings are at the root of all human endeavor in social society. With this understanding, the role of social protest is redefined, not as a tool for changing policies and practices, but for determining the rules of public discourse. Who is to be included? What issues are open for debate? How is debate to be structured and ultimately, how will decisions be made on claims that cannot be intersubjectively 111 mediated? 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Beverly Hills: Sage publications. 122 A p p e n d i x 1 T i m e L ine Significant events prior to the implementation of the Pacific Salmon Revitalization Plan 1969 Davis Plan- Limited entry licensing introduced. 1977 Sinclair Report- Review of licensing policy. 1977 Salmonoid enhancement program introduced. 1982 The Commission on Pacific Fisheries Policy. 1985 Pacific Salmon Treaty with the United States. 1991 Cruickshank Report-Review of licensing policy. 1992 Aboriginal Fishing Strategy. 1995 Fraser Report. Planning process leading to the Pacific Salmon Revitalization Plan April 1995 Pacific Regional Workshop. Sept. 1995 Roundtable process begins. Dec. 1995 Final report of the Roundtable submitted to DFO. Jan. 1996 U F A W U organizes vote on stacking. Pacific Salmon Revitalization Plan Jan. 23, 1996 Dr. May appointed to by Minister of Fisheries and Oceans to study and make recommendations on intersectoral allocation issues. March 29 1996 Pacific Salmon Revitalization Plan announced. April 04 1996 Information package mailed to fishers. April 12 1996 Coastal Communities conference. April 17 1996 Fishers march on downtown Vancouver in protest. May 09 1996 Modifications to Plan announced. May 24 1996 Deadline for permanent gear and initial area selection. May 24 1996 Deadline for buyback 1 bid submissions. June 04 1996 Deadline for changes to area selection. June 14 1996 Buyback 1 results announced. June 19 1996 Job Protection Commission study begins. June 30 1996 Deadline for stacking submissions under stacking moratorium. July 03 1996 Deadline for buyback 2 bid submissions. July 15 1996 Federal-provincial Memorandum of Understanding announced. July 16 1996 Buyback 2 results announced. Sept. 06 1996 Pacific Salmon Revitalization Plan Review Panel begins. Oct. 03 1996 New fisheries Act tabled. Dec. 1996 Pacific Salmon Revitalization Plan Review report Tangled Lines released. 123 Dec. 00 1996 Report on intersectoral allocations: Altering Course released. Jan. 09 1997 Government responds to the Pacific Salmon Revitalization Plan Review report. April 16 1997 Canada-British Columbia Agreement on the Management of Pacific Salmon Fishery Issues. April 25 1997 Credit program for commercial salmon license holders implemented. Dec. 19 1997 License stacking vote for the salmon fishery announced. Jan. 00 1998 Vote on stacking. Feb. 05 1998 Results of License stacking vote announced. 124 Appendix 2 Principles for Fisheries Management Conservation Fish resources and habitat will be managed to ensure conservation. Harvest levels will be set to meet or exceed baseline escarpment targets. The fishery will be managed to ensure optimum abundance and diversity of the natural endowment. Fishing effort will be regulated to provide a more manageable fleet and to reduce the risk of over harvesting. The management system will be designed to provide timely and accurate information on catch, including age structure and species composition, and effort. Industry Viability Fishery planning, policy and regulations will achieve a better balance between the resources and those that depend on the fishery. To ensure the best use of the resource, the fishery should be managed to be economically viable and organized around sound business principles. The fishery of the future should contribute to the Canadian economy on a self-reliant basis. Partnership A shared vision for the Pacific fisheries will be developed with stakeholders to guide effective stewardship of fish resources. Collective issues in resource husbandry, habitat management, enhancement and harvest sharing will be addressed through cooperative efforts. Fisheries managers and stakeholders will share joint responsibility for sustainable fisheries including management costs, decisions, and accountability. (PARC, 1995:2) 125 Appendix 3 Options for Commercial Fisheries Management The primary purpose of the roundtable was to examine options for revitalizing the fishery. With respect to this goal D.F.O. presented a list of options for discussion. These options were initially provided for the Pacific Regional Council Workshop in a document entitled Options for Commercial Fisheries Management (DFO, April 1995). Included in this document was a determination of the advantages and disadvantages for each of the approaches discussed. These options included: • Effort controls. These are controls that limit the fleet's ability to catch the fish. Such controls already exist in the industry and these would extend these controls. These would include more limited openings and a wide range of gear and area restrictions. Participants noted that effort controls by themselves could not accomplish the goals of the Roundtable and that effort controls would have to be considered in conjunction with other management options. • Area licensing. This concept would see the coast divided into a number of geographic areas where a specific license would be required to fish that area. Possibilities included up to three different areas. Currently a salmon license grants access to the entire coast. • Single gear licensing. A single gear license would allow a fisher to fish using only one gear type. Currently a seine license allows the licensed vessel to fish all three gear types while the other licenses permit the use of gillnet and troll. This restriction would have the greatest impact on the combination gillnet/troll vessels who would be required to select one of the gear types. • Double licensing. This would require any vessel to acquire two licenses in order to fish. Double licensing is not currently practiced by the salmon fleet but has been used to regulate 126 other fisheries. The system would work by requiring that a second license be purchased from another fisher who would then lose the right to fish. • Individual quotas. Under this option each license holder would be able to catch a predetermined portion of the total allowable catch. • Multiple licensing. Multiple licensing also called stacking would be used in conjunction with area licensing, single gear licensing and individual quotas. Under this scheme licenses to fish more than one designated area, more than one gear type and/or more than one quota could be purchased from another vessel owner whereby decreasing the overall size of the fleet. It is interesting to note that one of the advantages of this approach as identified by DFO is that multiple licensing could result in the most experienced professional fishers in the fishery and that as a consequence fisheries managers would receive better cooperation. Does this equate the financial ability to purchase additional licenses and consequentially make the most economic use of the fishery with being a 'good' fisherman? • Industry-funded license retirement. A license buy-back funded by the fishing industry through increased royalties, landing taxes etc. This option would see the reduction of the fleet to a predetermined size over time. • Owner/operator restriction. While not directly related to reducing the fleet or capacity this option would ensure that only the license owner/vessel operator could fish. These options formed the basis of discussions at the Roundtable and appear with little revision from that presented at the Pacific Regional Council Workshop here or in the Roundtable's final reports to the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans. 127 Appendix 4 Information and Briefs submitted to the Pacific Salmon Revitalization Review Panel and accessed through Information and Privacy Legislation Briefs from Organizations B.C. Salmon Farmers Association B.C. Wildlife Foundation Campbell River and District Chamber of Commerce Central Vancouver Island Native Fishers Coastal Communities Network Comox valley Fishing industry Council Fisheries Council of British Columbia Greenpeace Howard Parish and Associates Kyuquot Sound Salmon Inc. Meadows Marine Surveyors Northwest Marine institute Northwest Transportation Corridor task force Pacific Salmon Alliance Pacific Seafood Council Southwinds Fishing Limited Tofino Business Association United Fishermen and Allied workers Union Briefs from Individuals Alan Pattinson Bisaro Keevil Charles H. Mcfee Dr. Evelyn Pinkerton Edward Newfield Frank Sherpard Greg Taylor Jermey Maynard Robert Kreutziger 128 Briefs from public bodies City of Prince Rupert Clayoquot Sound Central regional Board Comox Economic Development Society District of Campbell River District of Port Hardy Ka:'yu:'k'+'h7che Kitatsoo Band Council Masset Community Adjustment community Regional Economic Development Commission- Port McNeil Village of Alert Bay Village of Zeballos 129 

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