UBC Theses and Dissertations

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UBC Theses and Dissertations

Psychological realism and the simulation theory of belief attribution Woudzia, Lisa Ann 1997

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P S Y C H O L O G I C A L R E A L I S M A N D T H E S I M U L A T I O N T H E O R Y OF BELIEF ATTRIBUTION by LISA A N N W O U D Z I A  B . A . , The University of British Columbia, 1983 M . A . , The University of British Columbia, 1986 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN P A R T I A L F U L F I L L M E N T OF T H E REQUIREMENTS FOR T H E D E G R E E OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in T H E F A C U L T Y OF G R A D U A T E STUDIES (Department of Philosophy) We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard  T H E UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH C O L U M B I A  April 1997  (T^Lisa Ann Woudzia, 1997  In  presenting this  degree  at the  thesis  in  University of  partial  fulfilment  of  of  department  this thesis for or  by  his  or  requirements  British Columbia, I agree that the  freely available for reference and study. I further copying  the  representatives.  an advanced  Library shall make it  agree that permission for extensive  scholarly purposes may be her  for  It  is  granted  by the  understood  that  publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without permission.  Department The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada  DE-6 (2/88)  head of copying  my or  my written  A b s t r a c t  The  presumption  psychology  has  arguments  like  theories  of  content  demise of  one's  beliefs  of  the  falsity  the  of  adoption  the folk in  the  traditional psychology that  this  raised  by  of  can  is  be  plausible  alternative  that  the  is  of  Burge and o t h e r s  who,  of  of  using  internalistic  determination  least  in  part,  individualism  would  think,  with  psychological  of upon  comes the  the  demise  realism.  defending psychological  maintained,  This  *theory  it  theory'  states  are  argued  based  represents theory',  that  is  This  realism  the  argued,  which  and p s y c h o l o g i c a l  alternative can  Burge  the  at  *simulation  a theory It  Tyler  philosophy  supervenience.  a theory.  view,  theory. a  demise  psychological  rather than  represents that  of  one  the  Putnam a g a i n s t  out  an approach to  realism  ascriptions  by  demise  and,  comes t h e  within  depends,  the  supervenience,  Psychological  process  points  With  represents  light  challenged  t h o s e used by H i l a r y  supervenience  thesis in  been  factors.  of  individualism  meaning,  of  external  of  claims  upon  of  an a l t e r n a t i v e  to  states  claims are  simulation  the  traditional  accommodate  the  externalist  i i  that  kind  which  a  to  without  through  sacrificing  that posits theory  view  realism.  and  concerns  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS  Abstract  Table  of  Contents  Acknowledgement  C h a p t e r One Introduction  C h a p t e r Two The E x t e r n a l i s t  Challenge  Chapter Three Realism, Instrumentalism, Folk Psychology  Chapter Four S i m u l a t i o n and the Attribution  Reference  List  Realism  and the  Context-Bound  Chapter Five Knowledge, T h e o r i e s ,  Chapter Six A u t i s m and the  to  Information,  Simulation  Theory  Theory  Nature  and  of  of  Belie  Processes  Acknowledgement  I am g r a t e f u l t o my S u p e r v i s o r , K a t e T a l m a g e , f o r h e r d i r e c t i o n , c r i t i c a l c o m m e n t s , a n d m a t t e r o f f a c t a t t i t u d e a b o u t my a b i l i t y to complete t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n . T h a n k y o u a l s o t o Tom P a t t o n f o r h i s i n s i g h t f u l a n d d i p l o m a t i c comments a n d f o r h i s p r o m p t n e s s i n reading a n d r e t u r n i n g my w o r k , and t o Earl Winkler for his s u p p o r t a n d f o r a g r e e i n g t o b e a c o m m i t t e e member d e s p i t e his extremely busy schedule at t h i s time. A l t h o u g h I am c o m p l e t i n g my d e g r e e a t t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a , t h e f i r s t h a l f o f my P h . D . s t u d e n t c a r e e r w a s s p e n t a t the University of Western Ontario. The members of that p h i l o s o p h y department were a l l v e r y e n c o u r a g i n g . I am g r a t e f u l especially to Ausonio Marras who continued to offer both encouragement and a d v i c e on p h i l o s o p h i c a l m a t t e r s after I had left. I also wish to thank my h u s b a n d , Chris Lundquist, for his u n w a v e r i n g f a i t h i n my a b i l i t i e s a n d my s o n D a n i e l f o r simply being himself and giving me perspective. Thank you to my parents, Angelica and Percy Woudzia, who have always been generous i n both t h e i r emotional a n d f i n a n c i a l s u p p o r t o f my e d u c a t i o n and t o John Woudzia f o r h i s encouragement. Finally, t h a n k y o u t o my s i s t e r , C a t h y N i d o s k i , a n d my f r i e n d s , Leslie H o l d e r a n d K i m T r e m b l a y , f o r t h e i r f r i e n d s h i p a n d i n t e r e s t i n my pursuit.  iv  Chapter  One  I n t r o d u c t i o n  This  thesis  is  psychological take  to  be  exist?  If  about  states  the like  the  causes  so,  in  of  what  beliefs our  and  perhaps  philosophers,  would  agree  they  behaviour,  the  cause  brain  or  central  psychological persisted  for  challenges drawn  the  that  attention  to  factors  that  are  states,  this  view  I will  be  and  the  relevant is  system.  fifty put  to  existence  of  psychological  the  existence  of  intentional  will  not,  however,  been  assumed.  relationship these be  put  Thus, is  issues, to  defend  use.  a  not  I  will  number o f This  is,  been  most  or  attributions of  either  view  states. as  of  defense  insofar That  as  is,  causes  of  for  the  realism.  philosophically  introduction  1  will  be  are has  however,  to  who  have  environmental psychological or  revision.  I will I  will  defend defend  behaviour.  order  technical devoted  in  and  assumed In  that  based  mind/brain relationship that  non-  people  philosophers  scientific  Most  of  prevalent Due,  us  desires  exist,  by  argue  necessary  majority  physically  That  has  states  the  are  of  behaviour?  forth  this  the  cause  and  so.  our  defend  most  or  now i n n e e d  concerned  that  years  social, to  intentional  and d e s i r e s  they  view  of  Do b e l i e f s  larger  beliefs  that  This  been  desires  they  even  that  last  have  Do  an  nervous  realists.  and  status  behaviour.  sense?  philosophers,  do  ontological  that  I has  mind/brain to  address  terms  will  primarily  to  explaining these technical preliminary  Firstly,  to  what  the  is  terms  central  this  arguments  mind/brain  assume  is  assumed  b y many p h i l o s o p h e r s  i.e., to  correct  not  the  a  soul  this  how m e n t a l Since  type  that  have  am  i f  one be  is  is  of  causal  it  force,  be  are  by  have  we  are  been  apparent  g a i n e d wide  ability  to  Thus b e h a v i o u r i s m , exorcised Once  it  problems advocated  the was  positions  proposed  acceptance  in their  analyse for  *ghost  the  example, in  the  recognized  an a l t e r n a t i v e  by p h i l o s o p h e r s  was  such  2  confident  that  as  mental  over time  the  was  Smart,  find  states.  by  the  last  fifty  because of  Gilbert  The t y p e  J.J.C.  to  demonstrated  behaviourism  as  not  our  based  a compelling view  proposed.  mind  in  in physically  machine',  that was  mind  The  ghostly'  motivated  is  that  states.  acceptable  It  years  least,  states.  This  philosophical  the  and cause p h y s i c a l  nature of  various  been  physicalist, at  x  has  explain  since  longstanding.  a  states  the  is  It  people  definition  a p h y s i c a l l y based understanding of  motivation  most  physical  not  we  are  cannot  are and  to  posits  mental  with  states ontology  that  states  analysis  that  committed,  course  that  thesis.  referring?  states with  could interact  based  I  must  these  ghostly  scientifically states  of  the  relationship  which  one  of  mental  Since  states  these  mental  of  dualism of  states.  physical,  to  then  identity  problem with or  and  dualist,  token  and a d d r e s s i n g matters  their terms.  because  Ryle  put  fraught  identity  it it.  with  theory,  U.T. Place,  and  David  Armstrong,  analysis  was  intentional came  the  such, the  view  belief  the  P.  role,  the  physical P  in  role  tomorrow,  of  me  conceive  the  that  today  a  philosophers  that  P was,  variety  belief  of  embrace  a  new  role  that  any  mental  state  the  that  version, states,  played  the  could  fulfil  role may  belief  any of  the  type  the  play  of  belief  the  same  i n me now a n d  state  is  the  Regardless  best  way  functionalism of  be  must  fact,  with  as  to  thing  P i n y o u now.  version  and,  something  in  play the  brain  functionalism  P and whatever  things  the  include  science  For  identified  will  play  on  of  be  state  the  nature  to  that  another  of  else.  if  not  by  autonomous  belief  X will  did  functionalism,  P cannot  or state  the  an  to  belief  and  role  is  anything  functionalism,  of  offered  the  One b r a i n  play the  whether  of  however,  state.  that  Y will  role  belief  analysis  according  of  Since,  to  especially  and  psychology  P,  role  promising,  sensations  the  reduced  causal  causal  that  be  to  With  that  that  the  looked  limited  states.  cannot  fulfil  also  to  enabled  physicalism:  token  physicalism.  Token talk  physicalism of  states, with  mental each  some  amazingly variety world,  of the  is  or  the  simple other fact  that  psychological  instance  token  thesis  of  a  physical and  that  state.  obvious  types we  of  mental  idea.  things  cannot  although  states  to  state  is  It Just  with  reduce  3  is, as  cannot  talk  of  reduce  physical  in  fact  in  hindsight,  is  which the  we  we  the  identical  case  interact  concepts  of  an  with in  one  a  the type  of  thing to  referred states is  a  the  to  by t h e  is  Civic  some e n t i t y  is  in fact us  good  pickup. same  the It  way,  physical  does  brain  is  that  with  some  of  I me  but  the  I  token  token a  that  was  identity  identity  Since  investigate  Civic  my  or  usual  bought  a  state  theory  my c a r .  of  is  the  is  that was It  thus  type  a  In the  framework  of  the  or  entity  is  My b e l i e f  is  of  with  that  I  some  it  in  not  that  is  a  physical  believing likely  much w e a k e r  identity  that  not  even  proposal  than  theory.  what,  at  least,  true  must  propose the  Honda.  believing.  at  whether  and  at  would  hardly a theory  doesn't  a  state  one  not  mileage  identical  is  it  which  types  state  theory  of  pickup.  physics  any  supposition  state  example,  there  was  entity.  of  token  and t h a t  of  it  find  car  with  good  great  conceptual  state  the  that  mental  stuff  d e s c r i p t i o n would  with  us  the  for  has  level  can't  the  that  behaviourism or  statement  true.  it  the  description  when  wisely  at  But t h a t  each  (the  and  a physical thing  we  bought  My c a r ,  mileage  tell  that  physical  when  state  even  mean t h a t identical  physics.  Honda  imply that  I  either  is  mirror  us  The  of  great  a  fact  tell  us  not  describable  terms would not  tell  in fact  my c a r  is  the  state) ,  chose  are  gets  car  not  wisely  physical  does not  level  wouldn't  level  identical chose  that  that  that  mental,  the  physics  i d e n t i c a l w i t h my c a r .  tell  the  at  no d o u b t t h a t  is  of  concepts  describable  Honda  There  concepts  be any  conceptual  4  a l l . if  Actually, It  is  more  the like  physicalism  reductions  one  frameworks  is  can't match  appropriately. argument  Other  for  the  functionalism physicalism ruling the  out  doesn't  the  might  if  1980,  has  functionalism,  of  the  state  in  which  functionalism physical,  pain  The  than  a  no  truth  of  role For  of the  matter  that  terms,  functionally  there  specified  opens up t h e  possibility  other  might  not  every  mental  pains  nothing  the  the  token  is  state.  specification is  is  of  there  playing  rather  functional  there  truth  role  creature  identical  been  Since  After  it  identify  a l l ,  soul  is with  to  the  some  noted  entities the  is  one  to  above,  supervene we  mind  and  here  it's no  that be"  even  (Block  are  level  that  not  that  true  we  level,  of  the  it  must  we e n d u p  the  are  the  where  states.  states.  5  And t h i s ,  is  be  with  causal  body.  physical  brain  event  physicalism  explanation  physical  assume  event.  that  supervenience, on  will  physical  if  with  the  that  saying  and  at of  view  token  psychological  tokens  with  is  amounts  as  the  discussion  concerned  with  between  relationship said  then,  supposed,  interaction  of  the  the  a  ghostly'  are  guarantee  non-physical  "In  are  physicalism.  some  state:  So  physicalism,  with  is  physicalism,  fact  true. x  token  in  181).  Token in  P  it  pains  our  of  according to  that  state.  soul  belief  even  the  be  a  identification  functionalist, defines  truth  since,  belief  than  the  token mental  For current  physical The  concerned  states  physical  to  identity states purposes we  level,  are the  brain  state  level,  there  can  there  cannot  Mental  exist  type  Y  iff  this  iff  their  (1987,  30).  Thus,  some c h a n g e physical  nature  theory  however,  describe and it  Jaegwon  Kim's  aim  also  supervenience  to  deny  dualism  is  the not  if  one  So,  in particular,  supervene  whenever  without  on  their  their minds  i n mental asserts  the  than  relationship  the  token  of  dependence.  he  first  the  thesis  supervenience those  is  false  to  is  option  of  mental  then  6  in  does,  between  in  the  the  theory fact  was  notion  of  asserts  nothing  a commitment  to  supervenience.  to  assumes t h a t  It  psychophysical  who p r o f e s s  committed  about  physicalist  This  of  the  without  identity  applied  a  differ"  no more  of  of  brain  state  thesis.  existence an  states  stronger  when  be  X  a  since  physicalism and,  also  that  that  among  Jerry  on s t a t e s  not  formulate  would  X supervene  but  states.  states.  token  notion  identity,  brain  upon p h y s i c a l  that  states  than the  thus  (1982)  token  identity  assert  token is  than  not  part,  states  better  Thus,  are  no c h a n g e  nature  the  to  supervenience.  To  the  that  Supervenience  mental  is  captures  supervenience  token  and  physical  because  stronger  state. of  mental  organisms  c a n be  in  not  type  differ  means,  are  among Y s t a t e s .  of  there  This  difference  brains  identity  mental  no  in brain  states  "States of  states  states  that  dependent  difference  psychological  the  way: is  level.  states  thus,  there  corresponding  base  mental  are,  it  the  brain  exist  states  Fodor puts  is  deny  the  dualism is  states. order  to  If  truth  of  false,  it  one  assumes  maintain  that  mental  states  states  are  supervene they  not  to  being  cases case  of of  mind as  the  and  we  because  we  Examples  of  that  if  assume  course,  nature  mental  consider  less  let's  not  false,  dualism  is  do  exist.  don't  exist.  states  however,  the  do  is  that  they  mental  they  states  that  of  If  dualism  mental  anti-realists,  view  the  of  that  by  is  commits  much  less  straightforward  consider  concepts  that  our  use  decided to didn't  witches  concepts  in  a  simple  have  within  were  view  as  beyond r e v i s i o n .  instances  demonic  of  (1984, and  these  They had t o  psychoses  of  possession:  7  in  our  have,  the  mental.  discussions over  the  refer 43-45)  to  cases.  were be  various  Since  example,  We  kinds  we  did  the  e m b e d d e d was abandoned.  them  anything.  for  phlogiston.  of  course  a b a n d o n . We a b a n d o n e d  framework w i t h i n which t h e s e concepts they  we  we  about  actually  Churchland of  example  anti-realism we  they  Paul  clearest  concepts  to  concepts  revise  the  in science,  found  the  is  mind  analogous  cited  include  as  is,  assuming  o r an a n t i - r e a l i s t ,  materialism  advancement  simply  that  henceforth  of  realized.  anti-realism.  Eliminativists  of  of  Before  philosophy  the  then,  position,  a realist  physically  position  analysis  realists  Eliminative the  the  the  straightforward.  be  physically,  We s h a l l  is  is  one's  must  physical,  exist.  Anti-realism  one  the  Realism  Whether  they  realized  upon  cannot  false.  exist  not whole  mistaken  W h a t we once  now  viewed  That witches exist was not a matter of any c o n t r o v e r s y . One w o u l d o c c a s i o n a l l y s e e them i n a n y c i t y o r hamlet, engaged i n i n c o h e r e n t , p a r a n o i d , o r e v e n m u r d e r o u s b e h a v i o u r . B u t o b s e r v a b l e o r n o t , we eventually decided that witches do n o t e x i s t . We concluded t h a t the concept o f a w i t c h i s an element i n a c o n c e p t u a l framework t h a t m i s r e p r e s e n t s so b a d l y t h e phenomena t o w h i c h i t was s t a n d a r d l y a p p l i e d that literal application of the notion should be permanently withdrawn....The concepts of folk psychology—belief, desire, fear, sensation, pain, joy, and so on—await a s i m i l a r f a t e , a c c o r d i n g t o the view a t i s s u e . ( C h u r c h l a n d , 1 9 8 4 , 44)  C h u r c h l a n d would deny t h e t h e s i s o f p s y c h o p h y s i c a l because,  according to eliminative materialism, there  things  as  anything. false.  beliefs Thus,  Notice  and d e s i r e s false. based  and  the  that  don't  desires,  thesis this  exist  of  is  so  they  can't  psychophysical  different  from  on t h e d e n i a l  basis  of  what  of he  phlogiston,  supervene  on  supervenience  is  saying  the  of  the truth  failure  sees  as  of  of  type  identity  historical  and on t h e b a s i s  supervenience.  the  significance  one  could  of  reject  argue  that  his  parallels  o f what  Thus,  arguments  failure  choice  progress  psychological explaining  the  of  has  framework  beliefs  he sees  as the  and p r e d i c t i n g  of  type-type  in  fact  actually behaviour.  a  One c o u l d d e n y  identifications,  other of  and one  and t h a t  pretty  f o r e l i m i n a t i v i s m seem t o be a m a t t e r 8  eliminativism  made  In  and  explanatory  parallels,  been  on  basis  witches  one c o u l d r e j e c t  historical  is  on the  like  is  conclusion  He a r g u e s  theory,  by r e j e c t i n g C h u r c h l a n d ' s v i e w s on t h e s e m a t t e r s .  for  that  psychophysical supervenience  because  poverty of folk psychology.  folk  a r e no s u c h  Churchland does not argue t o the e l i m i n a t i v i s t  the  could  supervenience  good  our  theory  words,  the  perspective.  Some  people  compelled defend  find  by  logic  realism,  those  defending  caused  much  If  abandon  the  type  to  there  is  a  what  It  individual  using  philosophy  of  has  are  external  of  One  is  not  concerned  to  standardly  presented  by  factors  psychological  be  own  problem?  have  not  generally  mental this  is  challenged  what  at  is  a  form  compel that,  in  that, role a  token  of  by t h e that are  the  Burge  contents  s t i l l  and  argue  And  least  show  seemed  language  Tyler  the  play  realism  in  not  physically  weakest  language.  to  It  supervenience  meaning  that  does  us  to  although  realm through behaviourism  Externalists  determined  will  its  mental  been  the  is  on  the  Even  mind,  individualism' ,  the  that  problem.  purpose  not.  those  materialism  the  theory,  hold  determinants  Our  is  *externalism'.  attitudes  do  Among  arguments  materialism  challenged.  the  the  others  them.  eliminative  identity  us  called  accept  naturalize  allow  been  to  then,  realism,  couldn't  persuasive,  concern.  eliminative  we  them  at  by  least  But  calls  view of  to  the  in  the  x  anti-  propositional  external of  a  has  some  external  what  determining  viable  of  corollary  regardless in  realized.  claims  one's  part  do  physicalism  (1979)  of  identity  or  position.  factors. type  1  of  content, That  is,  E x t e r n a l i s m ' i s c o m m o n l y u s e d t o name t h e p o s i t i o n a t i s s u e within the philosophy of language. Burge i s more specifically c o n c e r n e d w i t h p s y c h o l o g y and w i t h the problems w i t h the t h e o r y o f individualism with psychology. I d o n ' t , however, see any r e l e v a n t reason f o r not u s i n g the terms i n t e r c h a n g e a b l y i n our discussion here. 1  x  9  realism  can  be  maintained  contents  of  my  mental  states. the  Before  of  the  based  is  how t h i s  focused  upon  often  exactly  like  in  *water'  on Twin  Earth  does the  liquid  called  Earth  has x  The  chemical composition  it,  Next  we  an  are  and oceans  to  the  to  respect  or  bodily  let's  review  Putnam's objects  is  is  but  are  one.  only  People  full  of  those  Burge's  externalism  of  the  world. view  experiment. a  planet  The  In  liquid  To a b b r e v i a t e , water  on  however,  on  Earth  it,  Twin  they  his is  called  we  Earth  respect,  is  that  chemical composition  XYZ, while  the  are  an e x t e r n a l i s t  consider  on E a r t h .  differ.  consider  replica  Everything  does 0scar2 0scar2  done,  the  than shall  is in  H 0. 2  which  drink XYZ,  sprinkle their  lawns  etc.  exact  Earth.  facts.  a different  Earth  water(te)  us  water'  *water'  with  Twin  every  say  lakes  brain  all  Burge (1979).  Twin E a r t h thought  Putnam a s k s  their  my  not  externalism  r e t o l d in support of  experiment  and  of  about  thought  water  that  be  and T y l e r  social  facts  P u t n a m ' s now v e r y f a m i l i a r  on  on  might  brands  Putnam (1975)  upon s c i e n t i f i c  The s t o r y most  fact  supervene  influential  defended by H i l a r y  is  the  arguments.  most  externalism  states  we c o n s i d e r  externalist  Two  despite  have  of  an  inhabitant  himself,  Oscar1  (Earth  (Twin E a r t h O s c a r ) . backgrounds  a  or  of  Earth,  doppleganger, Oscar)  does  Being exact  histories  10  Oscar, living  and  says,  replicas,  including  who on  has Twin  so  too  Oscarl  and  relationships  with  people  that has  and  could  knowledge  go  for  a different says,  that is  world,  accomplishments,  look q u a l i t a t i v e l y exactly any  who  the  of  chemistry.  a glass  of  extension "I  sure  that  and,  could  difference  in  different because  Oscars'  uttered  word has  This  is  compositions  in  before  1750,  either  the  planet, things  glass  water",  of  extension  was  discovered  the  Burge o f f e r s stories  to  x  water'.  x  arthritis'.  of  when  water  because as  of  most the the  than  on t h e  even  when  in  brand of  another,  there  account means  example meaning  the of  11  by  their  0scar2,  respective  not  knowledge  of  whether  two  planets of  sure  only  differ.  water  was  have  s t i l l  could  no as  go  one  for  was  the the  Thus,  known  knew  it  the  something  uttered on  for  on  meant a  cold  it,  the  after  we  composition.  e x t e r n a l i s m and he h a s  story  0scar2  one  depend upon n a t u r a l  familiar  with  of  then  chemical  a word  regardless  though  different  sure  Given  would  "I  "I  water."  water'  composition  said,  them  cold  could  extension  0scar2  they  which don't  In  x  everyone's  and  a different  Burge's  understanding  of  difference  tell  Oscarl  chemical  just  word  says,  of  meaning from  of  that  etc.,  one  uttering  of  replicas  them  The  is  glass  Putnam c l a i m s ,  Oscarl  different  a  different  but  chemical  to  he  Oscar1  different  exact  by  a  true,  knowledge  for  internal  and n e i t h e r  Now w h e n  hence,  go  meaning.  when  the  planets.  is  same  c o l d water",  Oscar1 and Oscar2 a r e  nothing  the  interests,  involves  subject  seems  *a r t h r i t i s '  his  own  kind  terms  the  concept  to  and  have is  a  like of  good  suffering  pain  in  his  Daniel,  correctly  believes, years, than  thigh.  for  that the  example,  the  his  cancer  of  than  perfectly  rational  Daniel  in  his  getting  worse  and  thigh.  The  arthritis  in  the  his  things has  his  wrists  liver,  intelligent In  it  fingers is  etc.  he  Daniel  is to  can  carry  He  with  thinks  that  for  worse  better  conversations  addition,  him  from a r t h r i t i s  and  that  call  arthritis.  suffered  ankles, the  about  we'll  have on  people he  has  that  the  and  he  is  complains now  explains joints  thigh.  complaint  him  and t h a t  to  say  his  experiencing  to  Daniel  that  that  it  is  accepts  that  he  arthritis arthritis  not  the is  arthritis  possible doctor's  in  his  is  an  to  have  word  experiencing  is  and  pain  in  thigh.  In the  counterfactual  Daniel's the  of  in  doctor  doctor  inflammation  he  question,  thigh.  the  his  and  arthritis.  visits  corrects  that  in  in  many  arthritis  arthritis  arthritis  person  believes  arthritis  regarding  The  time  learned  history he  doctor  that  experiencing between  visits  about  conversations  is  situation  exactly the  arthritis  that  the  same a s  physician. in  the  arthritis  arthritis  Daniel-a  (actual  in  is  He h a s  the he  At the  getting  asks  explained  same w a y ,  regarding a r t h r i t i s . his  Burge  to  worse  and  thigh,  there  is  world)  and  Daniel-cf  he that no  up  until  beliefs,  carries  moment  consider,  above  same  his  12  us  on the says he  he same  to  the  is  now  difference  (counterfactual  world). world,  We a r e x  but  fact  In  , the  does  begins  that  arthritis and or  the  case  the  like  rheumatoid  ailment.  x  the  externalism  runs in  appears  to  depend  than  upon  we h a p p e n t o  part  take  professionals,  the  states x  some it  tell  us  for in  but  arthritis,  the  ailments.  The  arthritis  and  a  except to  with  we  x  means.  13  experts,  kind.  have  Daniel-cf  a  physical of  the  else  general  Twin by  Earth  factors  example  whose  conventionally  mean w h a t it  to  Burge's  What  underlying natural  "I  something  Putnam's  thoughts  factors.  this  counterfactual  determined in  from  consequence  refers  that  the  internal  means  is  In  thought,  i n the  but  meaning  or  D a n i e l - a and  is  as  error.  their  which  through  what  to  of  conclusion  Arthritis'  social  upon  an  utterance  reflected  that  by  regarding  Burge's  The c o n c l u s i o n ,  right  counterfactual  inflammation  made  different  individual,  determined  rather  not  is  this  rheumatoid  has  tharthritis',  experiment, to  of  an  claim  not.  of  is  mean  entirely,  external  has  environment.  doesn't  to  in  treatment.  historical  social  situation  is  his  Daniel  he  that  refer  variety  content  difference  thought  a  i n my t h i g h " ,  external,  not  correct  case  individual  however,  discuss  actual  is  to  not  to  counterf actual story  does  refers  thus  in  imagine,  arthritis'  joints, doctor  to  content  arthritis' take  it  the is  means  to  mean  Conventionally,  in this  case  medical  Burge p o i n t s not  depend  nor  does  "The  out  on u s i n g  it  intuitively  can  understands"  of  experts.  get  under  to  a  He  attribute  79).  brisket,  the  in  the  any  as  case state  the  subject  cites  clavichords,  claim:  where or  it  event  is  whose  incompletely  various  examples  and  legal  the  does  *a r t h r i t i s ' ,  following  a mental  that  He  a p p l i c a t i o n and  same t y p e  makes  way  notion  (1979,  beef  argument has wide  on  possible  involves  sofas,  the  an example  depend  argument  content  that  including  notion  of  a  contract.  Putnam  and  examples  Burge  of  by f a c t o r s different meaning  the  how t h e outside  brands or  anything realism  because  of  remain the  of  internal  token  physicalism  of  how  is  If  mental  the  It  events is  difficult  the to  can  me  to  be  convincing  be  influenced  meaning must  the  of  important content  the  contents  of  a n d we  seems  that  can  indeed  can  of  whether  determined  by  threatens  external  are  we  then left  now  be  do n o t  need  a  physical the  remain  brain,  supervene  supervenience  once  again new  with  on and the  explanation  events.  identity  If  factors,  an i n d i v i d u a l ' s  beliefs  form of  14  of  right,  false  how we  is  is  Externalism  because  states  is  issue  clearly  mind/brain supervenience.  vary  weakest  see  to  individual.  externalism are  of  attitude  denial  factors,  problem.  supervenience it  its  same t h e n  states.  seem  i n d i v i d u a l . Although these are  the  beliefs  brain  mind/body  the  externalism,  of  of  what  determination of  outside  the  offer  propositional  contents  while  both  But  theory,  optimistic  about  if then this  project. seems  Unless  that  we  we  can  have  come  no  up  choice  with but  some  to  alternative  deny  realism  idea  it  about  the  mental.  Although 91),  some  don't  finding beliefs mental with  philosophers,  think  a  that  states,  is  most  which t h i s  Stephen  naturalizing  physicalist  and d e s i r e s ,  notably  s t i l l  do.  conviction  As  2  is  to  of  mental  justify a  held,  (1996,  intentionality,  understanding necessary  Stich  that  is,  states  like  r e a l i s m about  those  testimony Stich  168-  to  quotes  the  strength  Fodor:  i f i t i s n ' t l i t e r a l l y t r u e t h a t my w a n t i n g i s c a u s a l l y responsible for my reaching, and my itching is causally responsible for my scratching, and my b e l i e v i n g i s c a u s a l l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r my s a y i n g . . . i f none of that is literally true, then practically anything I believe about anything i s f a l s e and it's the end of the w o r l d . (1990, 156)  Of  course  but  he  Fodor the  Fodor  is and  is  s t i l l others  serious  proposal  individualist mental  states  characteristically about  his  have  attempted  by  externalism.  problem posed  A  being  that view into  is of two  to  consistent psychology types:  point. come  with is  broad  to  overdramatic  This up  with  being a  and  narrow.  the  the  case  solution  supervenience separate  here,  and  content  Broad  to  an of  content  Examples o f t h e s e p h i l o s o p h e r s a r e l i s t e d by S t i c h (1996) and i n c l u d e B l o c k (1986), Devitt (1990), Dretske (1981; 1988), F i e l d ( 1 9 7 8 ) , F o d o r (1984; 1987; 1 9 9 0 ) , L o a r ( 1 9 8 1 ) , L y c a n ( 1 9 8 8 a ) , M i l l i k a n (1984), Papineau (1987), Schiffer(1982) , Stalnaker (1984). 2  15  includes  external  what  is  internal  case  that  to  whereas  i t  is  psychology  is  since  i t  is  those  content  Thus,  violated  not violated  claimed,  narrow  the individual.  supervenience  contents, further  factors  narrow  although  in  f o r narrow contents  are the contents  includes  the  i t  case  contents. that  only  is  of  the  broad  And, i t  is  are important  to  on the b a s i s  o f w h i c h we  behave.  Assume, author  f o r example,  o f Emma b u t I h a v e  Furthermore, and  I know t h a t  I thoroughly  like  to  read  something  ask  that  read  the clerk  tell  i t  I  that  f o r something  informs  me t h a t  reaction  request did  the  my d e s i r e  for  book.  I  would  would  first  a bookstore and o f Emma. I am  since  by Austen.  I  t o s e e who I  didn't  r e p e a t my  o f Emma a n d t h e c l e r k  clerk  a n d my b e h a v i o u r  she i s  then  o f Emma.  u p o n my u n d e r s t a n d i n g  book  that I  confused  i s the author  of asking  is the  Sensibility  I check  Austen  a  and  but that  a n d when  something  that  Austen  by the author  by the author  the fact  o f my b e h a v i o u r  Sense  o f Emma. I e n t e r  a n d somewhat  wanted  was d e p e n d e n t  not include  cause was  to  Jane  I  Jane  I had decided  books  and Prejudice  am s u r p r i s e d  the clerk  that  Emma i s a n e x c e l l e n t  i t .  she has any books  request  My  reading  of Austen's  h a n d e d a c o p y o f Pride wrote  heard that  from t h e author i f  know  Jane Austen wrote  enjoyed  another  I don't  of  of  x  repeating  Austen',  the author  my  which  o f Emma.  The  f o r a b o o k b y t h e a u t h o r o f Emma  by  16  the  author  of  Emma. B r o a d l y  construed,  of course,  construed,  that  author  Emma i s  of  behaviour  i t  i s , construed  that  of  i n broad  construe have For  content,  the  individual,  is  distinction, there  seems that  to  we b e h a v e . will  didn't  is  of psychology  then,  which  upon  depends  a difference this,  in  things  i t  seems  is  have i t  e x p l a i n my  narrowly  construed my s t a t e  my b e h a v i o u r . unclear  seems is  I f we  why I my  that  would  request.  only  going  on  Frege's  on  narrow in  the  to  sense  itself,  is  sense/reference  appeal.  and reference.  not a  reason  as narrow contents o f my b e h a v i o u r  me,  depend is  We c a n n o t  on  upon  anything  explained  by  This  does  about  the broad  n o t mean  that  by using narrow contents. my b e h a v i o u r piece  is  best  meaning  of information  17  whose  that  basis  example narrow  fact  is  I t s i m p l y means,  that  suppose  that I  i n broad I didn't  I  missed  or reference  my b e h a v i o u r  explained  to  like  the  deny  But i t  i n t h e above  A u s t e n w a s t h e a u t h o r o f Emma m e a n s  *Austen'.  t h e added  to  repeated  what  between  my b e h a v i o u r  significant  with  i t  would  a r e such  realize  that  not explain  broadly,  based  the  I know, t h e  i n . I f we c o n s t r u e  a n d why I  something  me,  be  c e r t a i n l y h a s some i n t u i t i v e  That  explained  mind  The explanation  not,  content.  of  o f what  attempting  claimed,  but narrowly  relevant.  me t h a t  there  is  When  i t will  content  analysis,  that  terms  surprised  the purposes  This  i t  i n terms  we s h o u l d b e i n t e r e s t e d  my s t a t e  been  only  not Austen.  will,  content mind  t h e a u t h o r o f Emma i s A u s t e n ,  thus  of best  i t seems t o  meaning realize  terms that  Austen  was  terms  of  I  that  is,  fact,  act  or  do  I  basis  appeal  the  and  broad  content. content  It  enable  How c a n  of  of  not of  as  to  broad  a  to  because does  way.  broad the  allow his  the  has  am  mean  a  way,  criteria. of  In  narrow  individual  her  bearing  in  I  not In  notion  or  maintain  and  beliefs  meaning. initial  to  when Since,  intuitive  supervenience,  to  the  offer a  relevant  to  meaningful  those  reveals  is  of  theory  it  is  of  meaning  problem  is:  meaning then if  it  cannot  propositional ascriptions  18  if  it  the  This narrow  defending  inclusion  of  explanation  such  ever  not  why n a r r o w  to  include  attitudes  while is  with  how c a n a n  depend  meaning  states.  approach  question  sometimes  claimed that  belief  the  is  a straightforward reason  defensible The  It  a  determining  contents  me,  content  between  content.  to  to  of  narrow  difference  relevant  ascriptions meaning  Austen,  meaningful  contents  us  But  explained  further.  realism.  be  a  contents  narrow  be  is  in  understood of  appears  behaviour  the  the  seems  cannot  about  does  psychological  it  broad content  if  of  is  psychological  of  the  determining  distinction,  facts  problem with  terms of  to  Austen  between  content  relevant  of  are  difference  and a t h e o r y  some  is  mistake.  below,  would  in  of  a  according  investigating  discussed  making  meaningful  idea  it  Emma. My b e h a v i o u r  narrow content  contents  however,  The  is  that  the  those  think  explain  is  on  worth  not  of  like  ignorant  that  as  content  author  something  mistaken that  the  be  content? correct  upon b r o a d c r i t e r i a ,  but  the  contents  correct  then  do  not?  And i f  i n what s e n s e  our ascriptions  a r e we a b l e  cannot  to maintain realism  be  about  psychology?  If  my b e h a v i o u r  believed,  when  Emma, t h a t Austen,  i t  capture  f o r a copy for a  of  this  explained of  beliefs,  that  she  intending  to  statements didn't  of  know  to  which  i t ,  was b o r n  also  refer  i t  wrote  I  i t  facts  content partly given  of  narrowly,  about  determined that  how d o e s  I asked  about  about  however,  whom  seems there  since  of  thing  to  to  of  I  a r e many even  which about  have  I  true  though  I  someone a n d was  o f my b e l i e f s  am u n a w a r e  of  know  me, I was  a clergyman  cannot  I was I  I was r e f e r r i n g t o  I f the contents  o f any facts  19  f o r t h e book,  i t  the content  o f my b e l i e f  clear  F o r example,  t o me t h a t  by any f a c t s  the content  look  the contents of  whom t h e o n l y  Emma. T h u s ,  But i f  I am u n a w a r e  how t o  known  Park.  not  t h e a u t h o r o f Emma, t h e y  my b e l i e f .  cannot  than  a t a l l . A l t h o u g h I may n o t h a v e  i n 1 7 7 5 , was t h e d a u g h t e r  determined  these  is  account,  of  those  am u n a w a r e .  t h e a u t h o r o f Mansfield  we  other  I  how  someone  seems  If  that  by the author  t o determine  then  t o someone  ( o r he)  by saying  by an author  content.  I was r e f e r r i n g t o A u s t e n when to refer  a book  book  of the individual  c a n be meaningful  intending  who  is  on t h e narrow psychology  meaning  individual's  that  are  asked  was a s k i n g  outside  contents  is  I  is unclear,  the  factors the  I  i n the bookstore  o f any o f  be p a r t o f t h e  my b e l i e f  is not  am u n a w a r e , the author  any meaning  then,  o f Emma,  a t a l l ? The  problem,  then,  from  broad and,  are  the left  them  or  It  is  with  stand.  then,  as  of  is  some  they  explaining  not  a  but  is  a  revisionist  proposal.  this  as  we  about  how  to  the  way  contents  whether  currently beliefs.  intentional  narrow as  individualist analyse it  they  now  for  the  the  proposal  current  should  describes  to  we  understand  inappropriate  Stalnaker  i n response  so,  ordinary  are  The  narrow  done  of  our  they  about  Robert  have  notion  behaviour.  claim  the  individual or  stand,  s u p p o r t i n g narrow contents in  we  that not  proposal  psychology,  separate  once  other  are  now  we  beliefs  agreed  concepts  Thus,  purposes  about  about  generally  psychological  how  secondly,  realism  realism  is  firstly  be.  folk  It  the  is  move  externalist  a of  points  way:  The revisionist response makes a negative and a positive claim. The negative claim is that no systematic explanatory theory of behavior will be tenable unless it is individualistic. The positive claim is that although ordinary intentional p s y c h o l o g i c a l c o n c e p t s a r e not i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c as they s t a n d , t h e y c a n b e r e v i s e d i n a way t h a t r e n d e r s t h e m i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c while preserving the basic structure of i n t e n t i o n a l explanation. (1989, 289)  Stalnaker claims.  Jerry  concerned and  the  then  to  Fodor, defend  positive  instrumentalist claim.  discusses who in  rather Stich  is  defending  endorses  this  claims.  And Stephen  who  thesis,  Daniel than  a  realism,  Dennett,  20  recently  rejecting  the  defends  realist,  (who h a s  and  who  both is  defends  these  position the  I  negative  considered the  changed h i s  am  an  positive mind)  and  the  C h u r c h l a n d s have defended  the  positive  claim which i s  eliminative  materialist  granted  that  realism  is  what  the  just  Stalnaker to  "factor  mental  the  state"  negative claim  out  that  it  the  claim  viable  science  defend  a particular version  realism.  Just  compatible must  of  how  with  address  the  must  it  the  is  and  that  then,  two  of  is,  of  it  supervenience  often  contribution'  to  an  In  as  fact,  Since  be  true of  I  I  for  which  for  individualism is the  both  the  to  I do n o t  be  need  realism the  central  the  negative  i n order to  psychological  out  intentional  psychology  behaviour,  fact,  made  reject  reject  narrow content  in  taking  is  that  denial  been  anti-realist,  it  explanation of  have  easy  claims.  individualism  their  rejecting  presupposes).  agree.  positive  with  truth  as  ^organismic I  (We  the  isn't  (p.289).  and  consistent  requires  that  negative claim while  position.  negative  argues  the  to  defend can  issue issue  a  be  that of  I  this  thesis.  There  are,  realism been in  i n response  discussing  narrow  revised shall  to  construed.  above,  contents  is  to  assume,  the is  to  the  defense  externalist to  only  accommodate  pursue,  ascriptions  to  routes  this  claim  claims.  claim that  and  that  fact. that  current The  with  U n d e r s t a n d i n g how p s y c h o l o g y  21  psychological  One, t h a t  psychology  is  we  is,  mental  option, as  have  interested  psychology  second  psychology  concerned  of  can  the  be  one  I  our  everyday  states,  broadly  c o u l d be  concerned  with  broadly  construed  behaviour of  the  Philip  role  of  a  simple  the  John  and  a  less  between the respective  content  radical  McDowell  the  and the  responses to  determines  say,  It  the  (broad)  accommodates  the  will  in  (1986)  that  in  our  put  a  issue  see  option.  less  views  mutually accepted The  claim that  less  context  is  i n terms  the  psychological  radical  of  reconception  "Introduction"  the  They  a science  ascriptions.  more r a d i c a l  content.  as  involve  their  option.  position  as  be d e f e n s i b l e  environment  radical  the  and s h o u l d be b r o a d ,  they  task.  external  and  be d e f e n d i n g ,  partly  and s t i l l  Thought and Context"  radical  will  not  Pettit  "Subject, a  is  states  position  ascription  The  to of I is  distinction  found i n  claim that radical partly  their  context  response, determines  by:  regarding the environment, social and p h y s i c a l , as straightforwardly external to a realm of context-free psychological facts. I n t h e more r a d i c a l r e s p o n s e , in c o n t r a s t , t h e n o t i o n o f c o n t e x t u n d e r g o e s a s h i f t . We can no longer regard the social and physical environment as s i m p l y s u r r o u n d i n g the psychological subject. R a t h e r , we h a v e t o accept that contextual f a c t s i n e x t r i c a b l y permeate the f i e l d of p s y c h o l o g i c a l investigation, e v e n when w h a t i s u n d e r s t u d y i s the psychological o r g a n i z a t i o n o f an i n d i v i d u a l . (1986, 14)  Pettit  and  objection to  to  protect  theorizing  McDowell the a about  less  also  offer  radical  conception  the  following  as  a  v e r s i o n which uses narrow  of  individualistic  context-independent  22  mental  potential contents  psychology  states:  as  . . . i f we leave the communal environment,...out of c o n s i d e r a t i o n , . . .then our p i c t u r e w i l l contain nothing a t a l l t h a t i s r e c o g n i z a b l e as t h e s u b j e c t o f m e n t a l s t a t e s . . . . t h e r e w i l l be no o b v i o u s r e a s o n i n t h a t c a s e to accept t h a t the f i n d i n g s of such a d i s c i p l i n e would have any c o n s t i t u t i v e r e l e v a n c e t o t h e m i n d . From t h i s standpoint, the p o s t u l a t i o n of narrow content'. . . w i l l look like a self-deceptive attempt to conceal the disappearance of the cognitive subject from the picture. (1986, 14) x  This  objection  discuss  that  oneself a  as  rests  to  mean  I  posed  reject by  part,  we  external are  the  part  of  is  required  essential because The  it  exclude is  one  for  to  is  because  contents  If  it  is  is  me  I  that or  if  and  one  endorse  then at  to  McDowell  must  by  this  regard  we  It  we  do  isn't  this  of  part,  the  out  is  the  in  those  that  is,  part  that  that is  is  shared  individualistically.  bracketing out,  broad  states.  view  meaning. And  s h a r e d and i t  not  in  problem  it  c l e a r what narrow c o n t e n t  exclude  psychological  the  bracketing  part  is  of  meaning depends,  being bracketed out  it  sort  solving  that  least  externally,  once  left.  Pettit  word,  route  understanding—the  that,  a  agreed  factors,  determined  is  that  by  communication because  mental of  view  a norm w h i c h c a n o n l y be u n d e r s t o o d  b r a c k e t i n g out  w h a t we h a v e  seems  It  meaning t h a t  is  problem  clear  It  to  to  narrow  externalism.  upon  factors  the  3  the  something  responsible  communal c o n t e x t .  that  on  content  And s i n c e  r e a l i s m about p s y c h o l o g i c a l s t a t e s  this  we the  isn't is.  thereby question  approach  will  They see this view as offered by one reading of Wittgenstein's reflections on r u l e following and h i s argument against the p o s s i b i l i t y of a p r i v a t e language (p.10). 3  23  not  give  us  interested causal that  the  in  i.e.,  analysis  and t o  mark  of  mental  about  something'  been  definition,  determined  not  on  about  a state  my b e l i e f the  that  the  of  that  x  we  by  only  world.  water  exclude  cause  is  it  It  is  what  broad  is it  these  states.  to  meaningful  be  a  could  content,  seems t o  So  an  *about  imply are,  if  a by  a  narrow  internal  state,  on t h e  water.  We  distinguishing  states.  that  being  contents  about  about  be  of  be  Narrow  clear  wet'  But  quality  internal must  our behaviour.  something  world.  are as  of  to  we  understood  states  the  about  that  states  Brentano,  by  true  nature  fact,  external  narrow r e a d i n g ,  once  In  anything,  the  that  the  But being  to  It's  psychological  noted,  mental.  is  exhaust  or  connection  content  states  something.  has  the  not  want.  psychological  those  does  hold  be  we  analysing  states,  commonly  results  broad  It  is  reading,  not  be  about.  It  the  states  can't  clear,  seems  to  be  me  about  anything.  The  attempts  the  pattern  I  believe i.e.,  about  and,  based  discuss that  narrow  reasoning  that  the  that if  upon  this  is  not  they  unclear,  comments  proposed:  proposes  that  have  clear  narrow content.  been  Fodor  is  contents I  arguments  it  Stalnaker's  have  Dennett.  of  define  that  give,  be  to  don't  just  offer what  generally  pursued. fail  In  of  those  defense  accounts of  reason  of  claim  narrow  Fodor is  could  and s h o u l d  this  Jerry  narrow content  24  the  narrow content cannot  on two  Nonetheless,  for  psychology  follow  to  be  and  I  I be  not will  contents Daniel  understood  in  terms  truth v  of  a r e l a t i v i z i n g of  conditions  notional  worlds'  believing  the  With t h i s  Dennett  content  of  of  Stalnaker Fodor  that x  is  belief  these  itself  connection  extensional  believed  rather,  a believer  in  effect, the  content to  identity  seems  that  Twin  to  the  criterion'  for  water  is  is  cases  and  idea  of  would  be  is  wet'.  proposing in  believer's  me,  and e x t e n s i o n , He  x  I  and a context  Fodor's  Earth  content.  the  and  that  content  changing our notion of  correctly describes  that  between  we  but,  it  introduces  doppleganger  l i k e Fodor,  accounts,  argues,  Dennett  when  not,  content  claims  connection  thing  c o n n e c t i o n between  my  r e l a t i o n between  which the  Neither  context. wherein  same  a  alternative of  to  the  the an  virtue  beliefs.  satisfactory.  account don't  is  empty.  break  the  they  just  relativise  for  the  following  argues narrow  content:  . . . t h e r e ' s something about t h e r e l a t i o n between T w i n E a r t h and Twin-Me i n v i r t u e of which h i s 'water't h o u g h t s a r e a b o u t X Y Z e v e n t h o u g h my w a t e r thoughts are not. Call this condition that's satisfied by (Twin-Me T w i n - E a r t h ) condition C. Similarly, there m u s t b e s o m e t h i n g a b o u t t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n me a n d E a r t h i n v i r t u e o f w h i c h my w a t e r - t h o u g h t s a r e a b o u t H 0 e v e n t h o u g h my T w i n ' s ' w a t e r ' - t h o u g h t s are not. C a l l t h i s c o n d i t i o n C ' . . . . S h o r t o f a m i r a c l e , i t must be t r u e t h a t i f an o r g a n i s m s h a r e s t h e n e u r o p h y s i c a l c o n s t i t u t i o n o f my T w i n and satisfies C, it follows t h a t i t s t h o u g h t s a n d my T w i n ' s t h o u g h t s s h a r e t h e i r truth c o n d i t i o n s . . . . B u t now we h a v e a n extensional i d e n t i t y c r i t e r i o n f o r mental contents: Two t h o u g h t contents are i d e n t i c a l only i f they e f f e c t the same mapping of thoughts and contexts onto truth conditions. ( F o d o r , 1987, 48) 2  25  Stalnaker mapping also a  rightly points  from  argues  context that  substantive  thoughts  doesn't  really  Fodor's  that  offer  the  external  the  b e l i e v e r were t h e only  to  conditions Stalnaker He  asks  miles  say  that  that  are  from  to  a  truth  Fodor  conditions  that  the  such  the  same  same,  the  truth  of  that  barn.  and the  content  to  has  We a r e  to  except  thus h i s is  same  place  counterpart doesn't  instead  three  miles  from  have t h i s a  it  He is  believers  (p.295).  of  same:  determined  has  that  out  Fodor  neurophysical state  suppose  located  the  of  them"  content  property of  is  that  a  if  narrow  i n w h i c h he  how  that  are  a counterfactual situation at  fact  would be t h e  is  us  specified.  points  determining  the  tell  states  He s i m p l y  Fodor's  he  the  mappings"  conditions  relevant  not  c a n be  internal  an argument.  suppose  does  argument "obscures  parody  a burning  that  determine  w o r l d were  offers  us  onto  hypothesis  contain  is  out  further  "That  by  the  (p.295). criterion.  being  three  that  there  a c o u n t e r p a r t who  there  is  no  barn  and  property. His counterpart  snow-covered  chicken  coop.  Now t h e r e i s p r e s u m a b l y s o m e t h i n g a b o u t t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n my c o u n t e r p a r t a n d h i s world in virtue of which he i s t h r e e m i l e s from a s n o w - c o v e r e d c h i c k e n c o o p e v e n t h o u g h I am n o t . Call this condition C. Similarly, there is something about the relation b e t w e e n me a n d my w o r l d i n v i r t u e o f w h i c h I am t h r e e m i l e s f r o m a b u r n i n g b a r n , e v e n t h o u g h my c o u n t e r p a r t i s n o t . C a l l i t C ' . . . . S h o r t o f a m i r a c l e , i t must be t r u e t h a t a n y o n e i n t h e l o c a t i o n t h a t b o t h I a n d my c o u n t e r p a r t a r e i n i n o u r r e s p e c t i v e w o r l d s w o u l d be three miles from a snow-covered chicken coop i f c o n d i t i o n C o b t a i n e d and t h r e e m i l e s from a b u r n i n g barn i f condition C o b t a i n e d . (1989, 295-296)  26  The  problem  external from  a  burning  burning intrinsic function contexts,  expressed.  for  claim  narrow  that  is  thought  his"  obtains.  give  an  content  is  (1987,  just  To say  partly  express  in  their  in  function  that  miles  to  51).  in  a  can  be  used  wet  is  defense  dependent  is  of  saying  anchored to  narrow  on  context  27  was  the  pick  the  an  he out  unique  is wet us It  when when  with  the  seems  to  condition C or  context  content.  But,  2  leaves  that  way  of  H 0 is wet  anchoring conditions.  content  to  be  semantic  c o n d i t i o n XYZ  however,  onto  English,  factors.  truth  of  in  hypothetical is  some  can  sentence  and the  way  some  The o n l y  a sentence  a  content.  that  condition  This,  that  relational  truth  51).  from  be mapped  the  another  that  the  believe  external  English  miles  that  something  it  meaning o f  determine the  argument is  to  determined by  yields  to  C  is  think  (1987,  7  certain  three  three  are  narrow thought t h a t water  that  how t o  is  up on i t  "via  anchored  this  sneak  expressions  my c o n t e x t  me t h a t  content  And the  to  of  how t h o u g h t s  if  identified with  not  anchored  puzzle  c a n be  is  some  to  narrow  contents  narrow  individual  content  properties....the  reason  broad,  x  to  being  thus determine the  partly  that  no  determine  language.  example,  does  will  the  location  identified with  is  there  such that  reason  And  about  Earth-based  no  property of  We c a n o n l y  talk  is  s h o u l d be  is  that  relational  and w i l l  admits  location  then  There  property of that  every  obtain,  barn.  the  barn.  can  that  location  determines  we  is  conditions  intrinsic  Fodor  here  After whole  is  not  a l l ,  to  that  point  of  the  Putnam/Burge s t o r i e s . anchored  gets  substantive given  there  some n a r r o w c o n t e n t  the  which Fodor  broad  has  content  not,  it  that is  a  seems t o  me,  arguments.  are  to  map  contexts  onto  how s u c h c o n t e n t s c a n h a v e is  some  condition  will  obtain.  Furthermore, the  be  obtain,  contained  Putnam,  for  Fodor's  view  referent, (1988,  becomes  for  mapping  could  is  n a r r o w c o n t e n t s c o n t a i n w i t h i n t h e m some s p e c i f i c a t i o n  they  clear  then  hypothesis  explicit  Unless how  and  That there  example,  how  43).  does  in  that  not whole  narrow claims  a  not  any meaning.  And p r o p o s i n g  that  that,  obtains  idea  if  it  he is  could  how  that  contents  that  function  conditions  illuminate  narrow content  such  is  C such  truth  this  is  mapping  in  certain  the  from  will  function  to  understand,  function be  a  mapping  difficult  doesn't a  the  it  of  grasp. given  context  speaker's  to  head  4  "Ausonio Marras (1989) d e f e n d s F o d o r ' s p o s i t i o n and claims that Fodor's view i s defensible on t h e b a s i s o f t h e f a c t t h a t he relies o n h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l t h e o r y o f m i n d (RTM) . I t is the i n t e r n a l sentences, which are considered b e l i e f s because of t h e i r i n t e r n a l f u n c t i o n a l r o l e , that are the things that get anchored i n a context. I t seems t o me, h o w e v e r , t h a t t h i s w i l l n o t a n s w e r t h e problem of how narrow contents, even if they are internal sentences, get anchored. Marras a l s o supplements F o d o r ' s account by c l a i m i n g t h a t i t might be p o s s i b l e t h a t n a r r o w c o n t e n t s c a n be e x p r e s s e d by o r d i n a r y t h a t c l a u s e s by u s i n g m e t a - l i n g u i s t i c descriptions. It seems t o me, however, that meta-linguistic descriptions c a n o n l y be u s e d in those cases like Twin Earth where we already know that s u p e r v e n i e n c e h a s f a i l e d f o r t h e r e g u l a r a s c r i p t i o n s a n d we k n o w w h a t s o r t o f t h i n g i s h e l d i n common b e t w e e n E a r t h a n d T w i n E a r t h — in this case the phenomenological properties of the stuff inhabitants of both planets refer to as water'. Without this i n f o r m a t i o n , we w o u l d n ' t k n o w w h a t t h e m e t a - l i n g u i s t i c a s c r i p t i o n x  28  As  we  shall  above  see  analysis  psychological  in of  narrow  realism  have  changed  that  narrow content  a  defense  Fodor's away  me  contents.  If  talking  determined we  are  brain  a  world  it  And  will  as  I  me,  Pettit  we h a v e n o s u b j e c t . others,  do  talk  we  he  in  doing  once  This  psychology  such  remove  the  external  McDowell  no  with move it  states  or  will  be  contents  we  are  partly  contribution,  out,  but  with  without  interacting  psychology.  to  because  we  states  point  to  claim  his  n a r r o w contents,  Without a subject, have  is  brain  and  and  does  again,  t a l k i n g about  with  of  claim  with  states  not  his  unnecessary  agree  about  to  defense  doesn't  but  disagree,  either  we  the  and t h e r e f o r e  O n c e we s t a r t  If  He  narrow contents.  meaningful  subsequent  content  realism,  can  seems t o  and w i t h  I  interested  externally.  states.  While  on  angle.  narrow  superfluous  has,  approached  another  about  contents.  about  Fodor  contents,  defend  one  are  two,  from  emphasis  we  left,  meaning,  to  that  about  talking  is  realism.  the  to  are  mind  attempts  from  seems  his  of  chapter  with  5  s h o u l d be a b o u t . And g i v i n g m e t a - l i n g u i s t i c a n a l y s e s o f e v e r y t e r m used i n our a s c r i p t i o n would r e s u l t in a regress i n which any m e a n i n g f u l t e r m g e t s a n a l y z e d o u t . F o r d e t a i l s on t h i s argument see L o a r , 1988, p.130. Of c o u r s e , had F o d o r ' s suggestion worked, t h i s would not have been the case. Since for Fodor, narrow contents w o u l d be * a n c h o r e d ' a n d we c o u l d n o t e s c a p e c o n t e x t , our a s c r i p t i o n s would be a b o u t n a r r o w c o n t e n t s , b u t w o u l d be e x p r e s s e d i n t e r m s o f b r o a d contents. M e a n i n g and t h e s u b j e c t w o u l d n o t be l o s t on F o d o r ' s account s i n c e the l i n k between the p e r s o n ' s i n t e r n a l s t a t e and the s t a t e o f t h e w o r l d i s p a r t o f the a n a l y s i s . Once a g a i n , however, how t h e individual internal state of a person can contain a f u n c t i o n w h i c h maps c o n t e n t o n t o c o n t e x t a n d t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s i s a mystery. 5  29  Fodor's of  proposal  narrow content  effect  remains  the  properties  "...nowhere fix  evaluable is  a  upon  or  the  (1987,  internal  some  determine,  of  object  solution  the  I  will  beings,  end  up  Dennett  in  best  to  its tasks  world i n which  the  fixed.  which  are  to  which  a  real  be  the  developed  same  is  It  is  unclear  it  is  best  given  excellently.  system by  looking  notional  facts  Dennett  world.  kind  like  of  coming to  non-relational  the  narrow content  has  and t r y i n g  suited.  In doing  These  contents:  relative  physical  ourselves.  problem of the  his  must  suited.  whose p u r p o s e  functions  a  to  worlds  in  content  To e x p l a i n  narrow  environment  world—in which,  exercise  narrow  are  the  would  Dennett's  an i n d i v i d u a l and d e c i d i n g what  which  we a p p l y t h i s  states are  reconception  function  contexts.  environment  upon  for  the  properties  Notional  based  the  the  individual is  a world—a notional now,  states  gadget  characteristics,  us  fixed that  The  a notional  internal  actual  state  antique  of  a  contexts.  that  different  semantic  154).  which that  different  idea  on  function.  our  written  system's  environment, grown up"  it  depended  suggests  the  of  of  in  throughout  introduces  semantically  world to  mappings  same  he  semantic  the  some k i n d  alternatively,  position  we  narrow content  as  different  proposal,  at  for  so  We  imagine  apparent  to  suggests  that  we c o m e u p  with  because  my t w i n  Referring  to  and  human  says:  Such organisms have internal structure and d i s p o s i t i o n a l t r a i t s so r i c h i n i n f o r m a t i o n about the e n v i r o n m e n t i n w h i c h t h e y g r e w u p t h a t we c o u l d in p r i n c i p l e say: this organism is best suited f o r an environment i n which there i s a c i t y c a l l e d Boston, i n  30  w h i c h t h e o r g a n i s m s p e n t i t s y o u t h . . . . W e w o u l d n o t be able to d i s t i n g u i s h Boston from Twin E a r t h Boston, of course, but except for virtually indistinguishable v a r i a t i o n s on a theme, o u r e x e r c i s e i n n o t i o n a l w o r l d f o r m a t i o n would end i n a unique s o l u t i o n . (1987, 157)  Dennett  then  says  theoretically believed about  in  important  there So,  that is  in  in  course  because  it  one  himself  say  that  a  myth,  reveals  content,  Dennett would  of  would  is  there  may  no f a c t  notional  of  the  matter  world A,  world B his  he d o e s seem t o the  state  is  is,  without picture.  environment.  be  best  John's state  state  will  suggesting that suited  bringing In  about w h i c h one  for  have  simply  Stalnaker  so, puts  we it  by  be  is  have  another  of  are this  looking the  being  i f  have  many  the one  a one  to  considered  go an  notional and  content  which  that one.  right  content.  we c a n d e t e r m i n e  considerations  doing  will  but  how,  would match any p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l s t a t e  notional  the  He  is  narrow  it.  instrumentalist.  this myth,  determinate  finding  worlds  that  and  Still, worlds  internally,  that  external  world  into  neutral  about  the  way:  Dennett's project might be seen as an attempt to eliminate the context-dependence by d e f i n i n g content r e l a t i v e t o an a b s o l u t e l y n e u t r a l c o n t e x t t h a t i s free of a l l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s about the e x t e r n a l e n v i r o n m e n t . But on the causal informational account of representation, informational content is essentially r e l a t i v e to a range of a l t e r n a t i v e p o s s i b i l i t i e s that are determined by general facts about the causal structure of the world in which the organism functions, (p.27)  I of  agree  with  narrow  Stalnaker  content  that  that  Dennett  Dennett  has  gives 31  a  problem.  depends  upon  The there  account being  some  context-neutral  world  that  is  neutral  d o e s n ' t mean t h a t be  put  world case  in  terms  or the that  external  the  world  suited  to  internal that  that the  states  began  the  the  in  causal  is  (or  the  not  virtue  cannot  wet  if  of  we  this  be  306). is  were of  with  external  to  states  a  contain it  what  has  with  with  32  a  will  kind but  of  the  it  it  suited a  system  is  but  to  best only  particular  to  that  suited  not  that we  we are  state  for?  virtue  and  world  internal  in  the  would  if  of  states  Earth  How,  is  account,  may b e  we  the  best  "It  The problem i s  what  upon which  notional  belief  content.  the  be  internal  that  information,  in  exercise:  construct  world  is  something  w o r l d , d o we t e l l  determine  relationships  belief  it  internal  well  can the  in part,  For example,  to  If  those  equally  that  determines  that  a>possible  which  itself  1989,  is  world  on  but  exercise,  misinformation)  usefulness  example  order  internal  is  notional  The i s s u e  state.  world  a  Earth,  depends,  between E a r t h and Twin E a r t h .  excluding the is  in  thus,  means  representor,  (Stalnaker  upon  distinguish  state,  the  water  of  be  state  internal  notional  information  and,  your  conceived  Twin  internal  then  of  that  Earth  your  the  may  context-neutral.  state  information  belief  based  is  and  internal  internal  representor"  Twin  your  There  Earth  completely  whether  relationships  contain  the  of  world  contain  causal  it's  world.  between  world determines  what  the  notional  of  environment.  The the  There  are,  shall  not,  Stalnaker claim  of  however, when  that  ignore  course,  he  no  his  reasonable  relation  any  proposal  how  any  his  about  any his  the  others  of  can  Psychological  realism,  it  of  content.  I  agree  Dennett  content  can  must  do  Since I  as  the  basis  seems  to  me,  must  I  with  the  if  we  properties  this  simply  work  6  with  result  historical  (p.306).  narrow content  proposal  narrow here.  believer's  environment  such  for  discussion  notion  about  to  proposals  discuss  concludes  information  and  other  is  do  for  what  not  see  psychology.  find  its  defense  elsewhere.  The  more  defend  radical  realism  psychological preserve doing  option, by  so  attributions.  is  abandoning The  maintain  it  interaction  beliefs  addition, states  of  that  has  but  it  seems  the  subject  with  seems  supervene  on  that  if  to  argued,  behaviour  physical  not  abandon  states  the  you  are  permeate  the  of  cost  abandoning  allow  us  to  abandoning the  causal  abandoning first  idea  to  we  abandon  i n the  is  contents  of  thereby  realism  you  that  cost to  it,  facts  therefore  does  is  put  narrow me  and  the  claiming psychological it  defend  however,  And  been  McDowell  contextual  we  alternative,  supervenience,  and  If  supervenience.  for  Pettit  accepting  supervenience,  psychology.  basis  as  place.  that  left  the In  mental  with  two  See, for example, Ned B l o c k , "An A d v e r t i s e m e n t for a S e m a n t i c s f o r P s y c h o l o g y " , i n Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 10. For a c r i t i q u e on t h i s view, as w e l l as on a n o t h e r of Fodor's v e r s i o n s o f n a r r o w c o n t e n t , s e e H i l a r y P u t n a m ' s Representation and Reality, MIT P r e s s , Cambridge M a s s . , 1988. 6  33  unattractive discussed  options:  earlier,  dualism or eliminative supervenience  identity  theory  and,  includes  mental  states  reconciliation and it  is  the  here.  of  focus  thus,  the  The response  in  the  any  with  rest  to  must  externalism  of  the  weakest  the  thesis  second  form  physicalist  supervenience  realism of  is  m a t e r i a l i s m . As  a  an that  Since  complex  I will  concern,  of  story  hold. is  was  not  the issue  deal  however,  is  with  fairly  straightforward.  The manner i n w h i c h I d e f i n e d misleading  and  individual  supervenience.  properties  supervene  the  claim  physical to  be  not to  of  states  true  outside  a view  in  properties  of  the  reproduced  in  some  original different physical  world mental  of  the  how  be  world, new  would  properties  properties  mental  are  on  the  is  true.  physical  if  those  in  states  the  reproduced. the  same.  34  mental  agreeing  to  physical  supervene  is,  on  one  need  supervene  upon  properties.  physical  to  supervenience  That  given  mental  limited  on  can  somewhat  that  without  properties  hold that  be  however,  One c a n h o l d  to  world,  also  it  was  supervene  Mental  body.  supervene  simply  claim,  properties  or body.  specifying  do  would  can  e a r l i e r was  discussion  properties  particular,  they  My  on p h y s i c a l  brain  without  know t h a t  One  mental  the  know w h a t ,  such  oversimplified.  that  properties  supervenience  all  the  To  physical  properties  properties There  new w o r l d g i v e n  could that  hold  were  of not all  the be the  This  response  leads The  to  assumes t h a t  either  response  dualism or  claims  deny  supervenience.  that  any k i n d  Stich  (1996,  world,  call  although our  it  An  eliminative  in  denying  makes  is  no h i s t o r y , thinks  because  is  that  of  their  supervene  on  deny  response  kind  just  a few the  world  properties.  the  Caesar,  may  L a u r e n c e has no b e l i e f s not worry us: supervene genuine the  on  properties  surely bills  does in  Whether argument  not  the  for  do  $100  globally that  (1996,  there  are  that  Thus is  be,  no  Laurence  but  do n o t  from on  real  in  in Wl  should  globally  of  being in  the  the  as  the  connected  Picassos  But  supervene  but,  with  Stich claims,  no  b i l l .  ago  a  intentional  property  are  Stephen  Wl)  fact  and that  physical,  Picassos  a  and  it  $100  187).  analogy  Stich  to  dismiss  the  chapter.  properties  (there  real  the  next  way  properties—the  a  not  follow  with  of  example  being  our world"  supervenience in  physical  Picasso,  that  about Caesar. T h i s ,  " T h e r e a r e lots  property of  these  whatever  deny  Imagine  relationship  he  to  to  seconds  about J u l i u s Caesar because  way  be  not  same p h y s i c a l l y  a  historical  need  realism.  can have thoughts right  correct.  argument.  such  physical  would  for  of  exactly  in  supervenience  materialism is  required  this  it  to  i n d i v i d u a l i s m one  alternative  supervenience  He  cannot  charge that  W l , w h i c h was c r e a t e d  has  properties,  that  186-189)  world.  world,  of  it  the  offers  worry  realism At this  is  constitutes  about  something  point,  35  the I  a  good  enough  incompatibility will  discuss  I s i m p l y wanted t o  of  further  note  that  there  are  different  supervenience situation  in  materialism. how,  if  causal  which  not, the  The r e a l  states we  of in  only  supervenience itself,  choices  problem,  lead  are  and one  to  is  that  of  is  false,  can cause behaviour.  And f o r  require  no  less  interaction.  36  than  that  dualism or  however,  supervenience  individual  psychological psychology,  does  kinds  such  an  denying a  forced  eliminative explaining intentional  realism  about  explanation  of  Chapter The  E x t e r n a l i s t  A s we s a w  content about  of  however,  want  of  Burge to  Fodor  by t h e s e  are  Standardly  supervenience on the  desires it of  is  follows:  is  can  don't  strong  the  has  to  with  In  basis  of  my b e l i e f s  possible  beliefs  such  The  contents of  first  desires. premise  intentional  disparity,  Stich  (1996)  thesis  the  arguments  careful  attention.  to  arguments  work  conclusion  that  as to  causal  beliefs mean it  i n me. be  If  that  be  realism  and  the  they  form  case  and  are not, in  argument entails  then terms  is  that  s t a t e s be p h y s i c a l l y r e a l i z e d w i t h i n  37  of  that  beliefs  for  on  desires.  some  those  accounted  elementary  efficacy  that  to  and d e s i r e s ,  The is  realism  this  their  and  order for  f o r my b e h a v i o u r t o  and  of  to  philosophers,  of  warrant the  interpreted  true.  apparent  receive  the  regard  i n a denial of  project  any  that  externalism.  states  be  with  and Stephen  reality  must  appears  maintained,  will  enough  physical  been  be  think  R e a l i s m  contemporary  the  must be p h y s i c a l l y r e a l i z e d  not  my  I  intentional  this  it  both  incompatible  asserts of  Since  it  view  this  (1995),  philosophers  however,  not  behaviour  Despite  Jerry  that  it,  result  (1979),  least,  Realism  act  states.  of  externalist  prominent  view  is  of  face  three  Ultimately,  realism  on t h e  P s y c h o l o g i c a l  least  the  at  t o  states will  maintain both.  presented  I  type  intentional  at  defend  or,  any  intentional  Tyler  C h a l l e n g e  i n Chapter One,  acceptance  Two  as the the  individual.  Without  this  one's beliefs  and d e s i r e s  premise  the  is  intentional realized false.  within  Although  externalist  realism. Fodor,  must  the  to  on  realized,  but  do  Stich  not  will  In the  me,  consider  "Life  premise which that  warrant  offers  seems t o  a  have  two.  the  Fodor  the  generalized of  would  accept  are  are  made  responses  that of  view  the  defy  the  asserts  premise  one  and  one. would  that not  there  in  the are  physically accidental  premise  two.  ultimately,  it  narrow contents.  We  first.  chapter  reconcile  computational semantics.  abandoned h i s  false.  that  he  i r r e l e v a n t or  claim  Content?", to  premise  is  entails  argument by q u a l i f y i n g  acceptability  F o d o r ' s arguments  time  denying  states  occasions  to  same  by  accept  of  position  the  of  physically  realism  attempts  argument  these  attempts  at  second  r e a l i s m must be  the  Burge  intentional  depend on t h e  Fodor  be  that  supervenience  since  false,  to  would  force  Without Narrow  Expert,  is  say  contents  necessarily  that  in,  combination  w i t h what he c a l l s to  hand,  the  Individual  is  this  that  or  supervenience  reject  legitimately  o r h e r b e h a v i o u r . The  fully  appear up  not  claim  then  end  other  in  occasions  and  not  minimize the  made  his  individual.  would  He w o u l d  attempt claim  an  and denies  on  cause  and s u p e r v e n i e n c e  this  conclusion  are  conclusion  supervenience  could  externalist  states  The  we  two  The  externalist  Elm  Recall  and  examples  Fodor does not  on n a r r o w c o n t e n t s .  38  of  claim  that  the  narrow  contents  acknowledge  that  being  meaning  intentional that  looks  leaves  response perhaps  the  the  This,  nothing with  like  a  behaviour  them  in  is  folk  another  argued,  we  thought  psychology  not  the  that  does  intentional  contents  at  p a r t by  least  words,  in they  narrow.  Broad  sensitive Fodor's  to in  alternative  (externalist)  Fodor's contents  type  what  us  examples  against  one w i t h a  states have  Thus  we  to  be  of  would  the  external  factors,  Expert"  explained  in  of  meaningful  be  determined  not  in  rather  other than  contents  individual. is  a  of  contents  goes on w i t h i n t h e  on  conceive  individual;  narrow  It  explanations  as  ascription  broad  how t o  outset.  important to  considered  of  the  meaning.  contents  outside  at  psychology  But  are since  u p o n how n a r r o w  we w i l l  now  consider  m a i n t a i n r e a l i s m and accept  broad  contents.  according the  count  realism in psychology,  view  position  experience  be  is  the  such  "The Elm and t h e  contents can give his  involve  because  includes  only  focus  not  needn't  of  Behaviour w i l l  factors  would  what  to  against  would  bereft  is  count  leaves it  examples  examples  they  intentional  psychology.  way  but  I  narrowly construed psychology, of  externalist  externalist  individualistic,  states.  one  to  is to  that  broad  problems and,  although  thus,  that  we  criteria, are  we  poses  in  s t i l l  indicated  externalism  39  may  in  fact  determine  don't the  no s e r i o u s  actually  Twin  Earth  threat  to  realism. that  "What  7  I  am g o i n g  have been supposed t o  content are,  won't  on  meet  Fodor The  presents  possible;  2)  theories,  and;  are  which  3)  twins  between shown  the that  really s t i l l  narrow  is  28).  arguments in  are  against  There  cases  are  experts the  needn't any.  the  twin  Putnam's example of  use  and,  s t i l l  of  as  Fodor takes about  Fodor's  cases:  are  nomologically  do n o t  accidents. to  be  impugn o u r  twin  of  twins  These  cases  genuine  invokes these  1)  nomologically  apparent cases  not  experts  type  not  such,  and not out  is  that  other  turn  worry  Despite  twins  a  examples  distinction  arguments t o  cases  because  reassurance,  have there  however,  I'm  worried.  Fodor's  first  argument i n w h i c h he  H 0/XYZ  story  is  2  seems t o that  of  content  so-called twins.  aren't  construal  maybe  using  we  an e x t e r n a l i s t  So  are accidents  because  considerations  unconvincing.  nomologically possible  involve  the  explanation  There  but they  show t h a t  this:  psychological  used  possible,  is  of  three  story  2  argue  purposes  (1994,  H 0/XYZ  that  the  balance,  superfluous"  of  to  it  me, is  is  not it  points  out  nomologically possible  an argument.  empirically  Granted,  possible  for  is  the broad  the not  fact  that  the  news n o r ,  s t o r y does not contents  to  it  show vary  Actually, Fodor doesn't use the word *r e a l i s m ' in his d i s c u s s i o n s a n d I am i n t e r p r e t i n g h i m i n t h i s w a y . W h a t h e s e e s h i m s e l f as r e c o n c i l i n g i s the i n t e n t i o n a l i t y o f p s y c h o l o g i c a l laws w i t h the c o m p u t a t i o n a l / i n f o r m a t i o n p r o c e s s i n g model of mind. See The Elm and The Expert, MIT P r e s s , 1994. 7  40  between  me  and  conceptually vehicle we  for  appears point  In  be  with  he  arguing  asks  us  to  examples seem t o  we  as  use.  me t o  the  cases  what  His  are  such,  must  the  his  I  do  Twin  is  easy  see  however,  to  Fodor's  Although  how  a  Once  enough  examples.  possible  this  first  Fodor goes cases,  it  on  nothing  point.  occur  and must of  it  is  is  possibility.  arguments.  Since,  it  story  2  don't  first  that  H 0/XYZ  bound  apparently  that  shows  conceptual  earth  examples  discount  The  possibility,  upon t h i s  those  simply  what?  an a r g u m e n t .  depends  consider  it  examples  these  presented  that  to  possible  nomologically  says  so  conceptual  c a n be t a k e n as  deal  else  the  against  to  But  i n t r o d u c i n g us  nomologically  arguments  to  doppleganger;  possible.  understand  find  my  what  are  not  he  examples  accidents,  be  claims by  the  case  cannot  Fodor in  be  the laws  fiat:  I t c a n ' t b e a l a w t h a t t h e k i n d s among w h o s e instances I regularly fail t o d i s t i n g u i s h when I a p p l y C a r e very generally indistinguishable i n respect of their causal properties. For, if they were, they would constitute a functional higher level kind, and it w o u l d be r e a s o n a b l e t o s a y t h a t C i s t h e c o n c e p t of t h a t f u n c t i o n a l k i n d . . . . I t c a n ' t even be a law t h a t K l a n d K2 a r e v e r y g e n e r a l l y i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e i n t h e i r effects on me. I f t h e y w e r e , then, ceteris paribus, t h e r e w o u l d b e a subject-relative functional kind of w h i c h K l t o k e n s a n d K2 t o k e n s a r e b o t h i n s t a n t i a t i o n s . (1994, 31)  But  this  admits  is  is  exactly  the  conceptually  case with the possible.  41  H 0/XYZ 2  example  that  Fodor  If  the  contents  external impact  factors  upon  secure.  me  The  stone'.  a  C  there  is  not  what  of  content.  fact  a  may b e  T h i s was it  there  not  lead  functional  C is  of  may  to  be  I  the  curious  not  conceptual why  Fodor  no  functionally  terms  as  not  Mark  lead  to  be u s e d  of  even  the  is  the  precious  K l and  K2  to  the  conclusion  It's  true  kind, i n the  but  that that's  ascription  Putnam examples.  bother  are  causal  C  green  both  is  relevant  their  take  kind.  had an  which  that  functional  point  would  of  upon  point  and j a d e i t e ,  conclusion  what w i l l  not  externalist  functional  some s u b j e c t - r e l a t i v e  depend  the  in  such  does  C,  and which have  mistakenly  certainly  and t h a t ' s  apply  jade  the  kind,  subject-relative  exactly is  C,  I  then  indistinguishable  Furthermore, that  instances  that  when  w h i c h I am u n a w a r e  that  does  of 8  state,  subconsciously,  generally  concept  my  between K l and K 2 , e . g . ,  properties,  be  of  fact  distinction very  of  to  discount  In the  I have i n t e r p r e t e d F o d o r ' s "very g e n e r a l l y i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e " as b e i n g more i n c l u s i v e t h a n " i m p o s s i b l e t o d i s t i n g u i s h " a n d , in doing so, I have assumed t h a t t h e j a d e / j a d e i t e c a s e w o u l d be an example o f the f o r m e r . Perhaps F o d o r ' s p o i n t i s b e t t e r understood i n t h e s t r o n g e r s e n s e , as seems t o be i n d i c a t e d by h i s s t a t e m e n t o f what he t h i n k s h i s o p p o n e n t s w o u l d n e e d t o show: " . . . y o u w o u l d h a v e t o show t h a t : I t i s n o m o l o g i c a l l y p o s s i b l e t h a t t h e r e a r e c r e a t u r e s f o r which i t i s n o m o l o g i c a l l y i m p o s s i b l e t o d i s t i n g u i s h between as a n d jbs, b u t o f w h i c h a n e x t e r n a l i s t t h e o r y o f c o n t e n t i s r e q u i r e d t o say t h a t they have the concept A but d o n ' t have the concept B . " If, however, we do interpret Fodor's "very generally indistinguishable" in this way, t h e n any arguments he attempts cannot get o f f t h e g r o u n d s i n c e we a r e n o l o n g e r t a l k i n g about k i n d s w h o s e i n s t a n c e s I f a i l t o d i s t i n g u i s h . I f i t i s impossible to d i s t i n g u i s h , t h e n t h e r e i s no s e n s e i n w h i c h t h e r e a r e two k i n d s o f things. 8  42  Putnam example seems  here  anyhow.  they the  would  Fodor's  one  since  the  functional  pain,  other  of  don't are  simply  because  make  of  the  and  refers  point  water(twin  to  given,  one  distinct  of  H 0  while  is  making  distinct  If  this  Fodor's  c o u l d always  tokens  of  that  are  equivalent. rest  is 2  Fodor  they  the  being  same  it  example  conclusion  that  the  tokens  distinguish  both  they  different  * rheumatoid  belong  ailment'  the A  is book  simply  applied  higher  of  in to or  higher  the  as  order  the  physical  two  and the  higher  anything  shapes,  I  pain don't  order that  in  is  my  are  thigh  functional a  in  both  functional  distinguish  causes  or  based,  objects  they  higher order a  an  functional  Although the  my t h i g h ,  43  order  from  and  functional  and  although  the  order  objects  colours  And  arthritis  higher  abstracts  both part of  arthritis  both  that  between  properties.  corkscrew.  from  of  ailments.  functional  a  part  properties  and a r e thus  of  different  the  functionally  a concept  me may b e  concept  the  denying  would  rheumatoid  on t h e  corkscrews  of  I  non-functional  rather front  is  are  actually  they  of  concept  force  when  concept.  although  concept  simply  apparently  are  but  seems t h a t  on any example  two  the  water(earth)  equivalent  this  since  concept  aching  example,  impossibility  c o n c e p t s b e c a u s e one  in  they  nomological  accepting  XYZ. It  position,  that  Thus,  to  its  not  distinct  result  superfluous, claim  is  Putnam  refers  concepts  of  functionally  s t i l l  other  he  the  are  are  here  that  In  earth)  because  is them  concept  rheumatoid  pain.  So  when  concept higher  think,  *arthritis' order  between  course  in this  then  effects  they  functional actually But  he  about that  very  the  point  that  an he  it  properties  broad  of  but  is  closely  the  basis  of  an i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c a l l y based  these  cases  to  thoughts,  for  of  thoughts  ruled  that  jade  order  fail  to  distinguish  I  fail  to  distinguish  a  in  their  subject-relative be  view  fine  if  he  informational  semantics,  associated  with  and broad and  semantic one of  the  that,  properties  is  going  twin  semantics,  idea  to  of  argue  cases  on  the  I don't  see  how  out.  informational example,  higher  semantics.  types  these  the  distinguish  the  would  possibility  of  is  of  basic  the  the  I  Fodor,  Unless  be  of  are e x t e r n a l i s t i c  theories,  This  don't  individualist  is  thigh",  indistinguishable  against  According  if  Fodor's  holds  my  metal.  t r u t h and d e n o t a t i o n .  can  I  part  things  generally  The view  i f  made w i t h  distinguishable,  says  semantical  are  are  in  ailment'.  And  they  example  and defended  w h i c h he  thoughts  things  This  not.  to  concept.  making C , a c c o r d i n g to  held  according  arthritis  *rheumatoid  of  last  kind.  does  means  cars,  are  on me,  have  and  concept  are very generally them  "I  functional  lampposts  functional  Of  I  are can  semantics,  according to  about  jade  because  be  relied  upon  they to  Fodor,  are the  cause.  9  jade kinds  Now,  if  A c t u a l l y Fodor uses the example of dogs i n h i s e x p l a n a t i o n , b u t I wanted t o use an example h e r e t h a t more e a s i l y i l l u s t r a t e s an externalist p o i n t . T h e p o i n t c o u l d b e made w i t h d o g s , i n a case 9  jadeite  can  also  according to include they to  cause,  are  Arthritis  kinds of  but  if  water  because  to  cause  also  include XYZ.  pointed  with  out  in  a l l  his  rheumatoid jadeite. truth it  its  causal used in  kinds.  is  is  and the  x  only role  it  it  in  affecting that  where is  the  on t h i n k e r s t h a t  where someone's dog example, but I t h i n k  is  the  x  determines  the  Water  of  because  of  does  jade'  of  x  way,  (or a  a kind  to  does  be  a l l  include  not  sensitive  i.e.,  level  to  won't  in  do.  terms  that  it  of can  functional  distinguish  the  Putnam  not i n c l u d e  i n terms of  meaning o f  must  water'  thinkers)  higher  that relied  that  does  to  must  water'  x  to  thoughts  c a n be  describing it  this  upon  thoughts  problem  going  regularly fails of  must  Arthritis'  meaning  is  speakers  role  then,  jade'  relied  XYZ a l s o  same  meaning of  described  causal  of  arthritis'  way  be  meaning of  the  C constitutes  one  if  the  this  if  argue  cases  then  can  kinds  but  i.e.,  meaning of  x  arthritis  example:  the  informational semantics  to  If  are  then  this  example,  and d e n o t a t i o n ,  But  kind  of  ailments,  If  meaning of  meaning  cause,  thoughts  a r t h r i t i s c a n be r e l i e d upon  the  they  jade  about  One f i n a l  thoughts,  include XYZ, the  not  be  water  the are  that  then  c a n be r e l i e d upon t o  problem  cause  rheumatoid ailment  thoughts  upon  The  to  thoughts  rheumatoid ailments.  about  water  upon  thoughts  any  arthritis  include  relied  informational semantics,  jadeite.  are the  cause  be  between  its  concept  effect  for  that  t h o u g h t s a r e r e l i a b l y c a u s e d by w o l v e s , for t h e example o f j a d e i s more s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d . 45  kind  then  we  externalist make.  role  to  we w a n t  fail  be  examples,  Causal  according  So,  won't  our  to  to  able  such  as  doesn't  claim that  it  is  respect  least,  of  their  that  respect  a higher  functional  possible  to  of  then,  It  that i n terms me  by s t i p u l a t i o n ,  I  a  law?  law  If  then,  would  to  accepting of  a  the  truism.  however,  true  I  see  do  least  no  to  in  fact, If  two  are  are  level of  see  of  no  twin  twin  functional  may  concept  it  is  not  things  are  including  the  indistinguishable, them.  them  For i f  is  affected  affect  require  at me.  But  not  this  in  because  kinds,  J  but  of  can  a way n o t be  is  this  I  least  me in such  that  cases.  cases  at  they  the  that  o n me,  or,  them. How c a n t h i s  between cases  not  distinguish  that  generally  properties  differentially  twin  existence  I  they  regularly  are  C is  effects  two things  there  Since  kind, me,  I  and a l t h o u g h  law.  their  have  that  existence  C  my d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  between  higher  the  we  at  kinds  causal  o n me,  a  believe  the  then  things,  indeed,  deny  relating  is  me to distinguish it's  that  that  role,  fail  i n which they  to allow  claim  will  one  as  their  seems t o  of  to  two  distinguish  of  it  distinguish  only  above,  apply  functional  kind.  causing  respect  distinctions  semantic  I  effects  level  deny  indistinguishable effect  the  a law t h a t  when  in  of  those  exhaust  indistinguishable  constitute  make  examples.  distinguish  in  to  not  case  a we  anything  simply  because  twin cases would r e s u l t  i n the  denial  no  it  a  rationale  reason for  to  ruling  46  deny out  that  twin  is  cases.  law,  Following that  his  there  cases  s t i l l  don't  accidents, we  have  causal  Fodor  is  and  as  encountered specimen Since, uses  has  jade"  the  term  jade.  But,  is  Fodor  that  to  claims  since  be  impugn h i s  these  regarded  theory.  stipulations  case  twins  as  Although  relating  become  when  they  in  exactly  he  refers  jadeite  accidental  to  to  clearer  on  jade  from  jadeite  jade they  and  same  jadeite,  failure  fact  that  it's  no  B a  fine  when  he  refers  Johnny  only  has  states.  Johnny A  B  has  encountered  psychology  is  Johnny  x  "What  jadeite,  while  our  there  such  physical  Johnny A has  want  because  Johnny  think,  the  the  out  *Johnny A ' and  jadeite,  Since  ruled  encountered  Fodor,  don't  generalizations.  distinguish  to  and t h a t  a n d we  from  only  only  be  named  yet  are  to  jade  jadeite  according  jade  but  worthwhile to  encountered  jade  encountered  can't  imagine  Johnny B has  only  accidental  is  laws,  are  two  distinguish  Let's  however,  Fodor's  be  twins,  they  jade/jadeite  to  only  of  of  don't  I think i t  the  A  they  can't  argument.  considers  Johnny  what  laws,  rejected  accident  accidental.  the  such,  properties,  of  some c a s e s  follow  t h o s e who f a i l  B'.  to  are  already  Fodor's  for  stipulations  to  law t h a t  an a c c i d e n t  capture says  that  you they  don't.  The  problem  is  that  jade  in  respect  indistinguishable certainly  they  are  and of  jadeite their  indistinguishable  47  in  are  very  causal terms  generally  properties of  their  and  effects  on t h e fail  Johnny t w i n s .  to  distinguish  generally is  an  If  we do t h i n k  things  it  indistinguishable,  example  Furthermore,  of  this  while  it  is  it's  because  a l a w t h a t w h e n we  those  then  the  case  not  an  example  law,  may b e  that  accidental  of  that  two  jade of  fact  is  relevant  both  twins  have  Johnny  A  lovely  specimen  jade in  is  while  same the  viewing of  a  "What a  other  has  lovely  state,  not  depend upon a n y t h i n g  For  Fodor,  kind  of  causal the  two  thing  it  properties  causal  of  takes  by  dispositions  determined it  by is  the  the  specimen  of  one  has  only  jadeite,  this  Imagine  that  jade  and  and  thinks  viewing jade".  made  statement.  jadeite.  a  "what  a sample  The twins true  This  a of  are  statement  outcome  does  accidental.  kinds  be  things  that  to  causal  not because  of  because  kinds  contents  of  apply  of  are  are  the  s t i l l  a d i s t i n c t i o n drawn between  that  says  it  is  on  determined.  them. of  One's the  to  do the  to  be  one  with  the  basis  the  be  constituted  dispositions  things  in  are  question.  two t h i n g s — t h e r e ' s them—the  of  Informational  c a u s a l p r o p e r t i e s and t h e r e  distinguish  48  taken  anything to  since  properties of  things  one's concepts  if  can't  both  B is  Thus,  you  of  jadeite  A has  story.  jadeite  false  those  properties  semantics one's  a  the  Johnny  but  distinct cannot  of  while  made  of  samples  sample  jade",  physical  if  outcome  encountered  and t h i n k s  the  the  are  accident.  Johnny  jade and Johnny B has o n l y e n c o u n t e r e d to  and an  encountered not  things  is  no  law  distinction  is  accidental. for  this  It  seems  and u s i n g  when  two  effects  Thus,  things  are  is  accident. from  even  doesn't  sense that  in  if  we  that  his  it  those  two  things  my  failure  for  stipulation  fact  I  they  as that are  to  argued  If  it  two  would  it  the  no  that  are  outset  it  can't  be  things,  two  their things, failure  follow.  If  stipulation. seems t o  weren't  we  Even it  actually  to  can  account  say  I  some  distinguishable.  The  fact  distinguishable  does  not  explain  the  an a c c i d e n t .  We  must  that be  accident.  there  it  me t h a t  failure  a  that  in  a n d my  to  things  things,  somehow an  part his  be  case  two  things  is  from  the  the  are  two  at  distinguish  accidental  be  two  account  because  actually  distinguishable,  between  away b y c a l l i n g  problem,  fail  there  to  between  stipulation,  follow.  failure  The  not  indistinguishable  follows  somehow,  these  I  the  it  accept  for  which  distinguish  when  distinguish  those  entail  has  stipulated that  generally  anything  order to  to  actually  necessarily  In  failed  Fodor  informational semantics  He t a k e s  distinguishable for.  of  are  me.  two  then,  fail  things  on  follows  truth  I  those an  that  informational semantics  that  those  me  conclusion.  Fodor assumed t h e  law  to  can't  Our t h e o r i e s  do need  to  failures.  I  have  when  I  presented fail  to  this  is  a truism.  49  is  primarily  distinguish  indistinguishable  argued that  it,  in  their  And even  with  things  it  is  effects  on  me.  if  we  grant  the not In this  and agree  that  there  distinguishable, accident.  I  it  Fodor's attempt  At  this  point  we  reckoned state  rely  on  with:  that  to  cases,  takes but  indistinguishable  a  I  all  failure  think  it  tell  to  us  think  the  have  the  and  am  in  between  these  since  where  we d o n ' t  between k i n d s of  have  things,  in  fact  and the experts.  way  don't  that  if  see we  the  but  the  how t h i s want  supervenience  to  must  is  do  the  be  we  an answer  maintain true  between  care  50  to  a is  the  be  think  In the  have, cases  by like  difference  h e l p us  out.  He c l a i m s  beech  on  and  For that  an  elm  by c o n s u l t i n g  the  we c a n  tell  it  is  the  experts.  our p r o b l e m . The problem  psychological and  tell  whether  consult  to  to  I  they  forward.  difference  we d o n ' t care  to  experts  straight  difference  time  w h e n we  is  to  remain  however,  (33-34).  expertise  we d e f e r  i n w h i c h we t e l l  Most of  difference  I  tell  can  conditions"  the  t h e s e c a s e s F o d o r ' s argument we  states  the  concepts,  when  distinguishing  these,  problem  functionally  insists,  truth  a  purposes,  individuation  different  is  for  computational  content  assumption,  is  a  I'm  in  Broad  beech....  an  eliminated  meaning,  I  elm  one  are  is  this  involving deferential  intents  from  I  things  cases.  himself  to  my  problem  but  twin  cases  i n which the  that  big  discount  "...when to  follow  how  experts  is,  sense  in general,  Fodor  twin  another  know  semantics  for  where  is  doesn't  don't  informational  difficult  it  realism, hard  to  is  individual see  how  supervenience case  c a n be  illustrates  properties physical  of  this  one  my  state  properties.  true  because  The f a c t  state I  i n f o r m a t i o n a n d become  able  to  make  am  unaware  I  supervene  upon  of  however,  distinction,  the  the  think  we  fact  Fodor  need  may  be  not  right  care  cases  in  which  individual  cases  are  may  distinction  In  the  chapter  an  concept  example Daniel  arthritis.  His  to  Fodor  whether  reason  so  is  or  she  Burge  that  seeking  51  or  we the  out  a  to  pain  me,  an  to are  these  however, the  right  does  care  render  in  his was  the  there  physical  doctor  is  point  but  thereby  in  this  have  his  made  reviewed  not  cases.  when o n e  her  state  behaviour  that  has  not  upon h i s  not  false,  seems  does  about  these  limits  out  does  about  agreeing  does  distinguish  for  he  It  seek  that  will  Furthermore,  doing  by  it  my  semantic  my b e l i e f  care  about  is  he  of  concerned  as  upon  the  suggests  supervenience  be wrong.  to  are  insofar  supervenient  fails  we  semantic  properties  make  psychology.  expert,  given  don't  the  distinction  don't  concerned  about.  about  and s t i l l  consults  person's  care  I  be  don't  this  Fodor I  beech/elm  inclined,  contents  if  Since  we  one  state.  about  am s o  distinguishing  that  cases  irrelevant  the  since  o n my b e h a v i o u r .  psychology  that  my p h y s i c a l  irrelevant,  effect  fact  The  supervenient  information I  when  and  be  if  the  true.  appears that  cannot  lack  that  it  can,  change  that  where  is  I  to  I  externalism  instance  belief  nothing  in  if  the  state.  the thigh  not  last from  that  he  wasn't  sure  and  sought  he  what  out  he m i g h t have arthritis  he h a d .  from a  affected  he  arthritis since  his in  his  he c a n ' t  medication,  his  the  does  distinguish  the  with  if  his  his  it  case  not  with  supervene  affected  distinction  he  by h i s  he  to  him  belief  upon h i s  took  belief.  wouldn't  tell  matter  did  Daniel's  suppose  his  couldn't  between a r t h r i t i s and a  we  was  Perhaps  thigh  Daniel  pain,  problem  problem.  pain in his  In t h i s  thigh  and  knew w h a t  help  rheumatoid  behaviour is  make  he  although  behaviour.  ailment,  to  Thus,  general  rheumatoid  able  for  even begun t r e a t i n g  and i t  state  expert  medication.  arthritis  has  an  He t h o u g h t  that brain  general  arthritis Had he  been  taken  the  have  medication.  Once  Daniel  doesn't  has  have  arthritis  spoken  with  arthritis  medication.  in  *arthritis'  is.  In  know  as  the  doctor  learn  that  believe an  beliefs knows  arthritis  that  expert  further  it  cannot  not  change  about  arthritis  nothing  about  more  fact  could occur  does  represented behave  as  within  him.  rationally  details  and  about  occur  that  his  one's  the  of  in  he  ever  he  may  may s t i l l  Consultation  determined are  the  will  while  content  no  by  of  help  to  his  beliefs  but  the  with  Daniel's  facts  way  may  he  understand  he  thigh,  stomach.  that  taking  fully  and  that  beliefs,  52  may n o t  arthritis  expert  light  stops  that  one's fact  he  realizes  unlikely  in  partly  The in  is  about  in  and he  thigh  he s t i l l it  the is  doctor  his  However,  what  much  the  that  he  physically make by  Daniel  revealing  supervenience  of  semantics factors seems the  simply  to  because  externalist  problems  posed  hasn't  tell  us  Burge  to  Fodor his  is  it  is  or  that  intentional as  the  that  this  view  more  to  internal  information.  remain good  in  point  by  shown  Fodor  that  enough t o  attempts  the  manner  plows  Frege  type  we  realism.  on  don't  Unless,  have  to  of  And i t  rule  out  suggests.  consider I  the  believe  to  worry  externalism of  It  examples  he  to  cases,  grant that  individualism  about  the  animal's  being  individual's  claims  cases  shift  course,  is  that about s t i l l  Burge  can  "According  to  isn't.  this  mind,  mental  no n e c e s s a r y  individual's  gains  dismissed  at  not  i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c psychology.  cases  be  characterizes  there  even  twin  psychological  individualism  the  the  to  does  subject  point against  and t h a t  why  person's  the  sufficiently  twin cases  factors  deferential  cannot  although  a threat  the  me t h a t  accidents  Thus,  he  external  me t h a t  seems t o as  upon  physical view and  is  of  or  is  (and  those  natures events)  events  kinds  social  mistaken  of are  all  of  such  held  and  could  specified constant"  53  and  the  that  "...a  He  (and  4).  of  then  vary, perhaps  non-intentionally (1986,  the  person's  (counterfactually) functional  a  that  nature  environments."  physical,  history,  individualistically,  mental  states  states  individual's  phenomenological)  follows:  o r deep i n d i v i d u a t i v e r e l a t i o n between  in  states  the  as  and  While  Fodor  and I  have  assumed  i n d i v i d u a l i s m about content c a n n o t be r e a l i s t s realism,  out  individualistic  and  to  be  the  one's  intentional  held  constant.  is  at  issue  is  upon  to  that  accept  to  revise  the  why  it  should  be  The p r o b l e m w i t h  without  we our  elimination  can't  not  we  psychological are  non-  to  my p u r p o s e  determine  grant  anti-  relevant,  reason  be here  whether  Burge's  claim  it  that  internal conditions Burge's  claim  this  that  non-individualistic  are  arthritis point.  What  psychology  as  warrants  the  compatible with non-individualism. If used  and  is  not  of  we m u s t  psychology, nevertheless  purely  that  language  language,  in  discourse,  claim  the  individualistic,  psychology. good  a  maintains  individualism  have  while  must  And then  reasons,  we be  if  we  showing  individualistic.  this  line  revise  revisions of  to  no  an i l l u s t r a t i o n o f  sense  Burge's  are  is  reviewed  Burge's  or  psychology is  it  but  let's  language  discourse  about  if  be  as  common  revisionistic  Since  point,  whether  the  in  there  already  realism is  refinement  even  have  not  Burge assumes  could vary while  practiced  that  link  that  realism,  state  then  accept  will  with  We  conclusion that  a  argues  externalism  o r somehow  explanations  w h i c h he t a k e s t o  currently  we  that  externalist  compatible  example  false  about psychology.  challenge  can  is  unless  about psychology,  points  revisionistic  that  of  reasoning,  psychology  amounting  psychology  to  in what  it the  me,  is  appropriate  might  altogether  54  seems t o  appear (in  that  manner  to  favour  be  an of  neurophysiology, realism  is  for  example),  thereby  psychology  as  warranted.  currently  individualistic  this  and  entail  replaced  realism  don't  really  continue  to  wants more  view  exist, as  than  it  that  is  though  this.  they  and  Burge  "I  no  is  merely  any  other  Instead with  have  of  seen  heuristic,  sense"  even  if  we  right  w h e n we  reflects  are  that  threatening  realism.  the  point  face  appropriate (or  it  in  and  instrumental is  use  intentional reason  to  us  that  psychology  is  desires  for  clear  it  itself  entails  beliefs  the  render  does not A l l  it  for  the  externalism  point  accept  this  But  Burge c l a i m s  practice  the  the  usefulness  or  do.  useful  in  although  sound  considering  current  in  non-  it  other  arguing  individualistic  psychology  and  both  to  Burge  makes  of  constructions,  believe or  that  second  compatibility that  the  s h o w why we s h o u l d a c c e p t  accept  to  that  is  this  class  in  8).  anti-individualism, to  true  instrumentalistic,  (1986,  explicitly  individualists  it  states.  In d i s c u s s i n g  that-clauses  use  i f  is  useful  interpreted says:  is,  its  intentional  the  act  that  by n e u r o p h y s i o l o g y ) ,  about  instrumentalism,  demonstrate  revising  i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c manner w o u l d weaken obsolete,  not  That  practiced  that  does  intentional  in  One the  their  state  not  55  Or one  upon  the  However,  contents  the  argue  individualist's  and deny r e a l i s m .  view.  force  supervenience  need  is  realism  anti-individualism  psychology,  concerning  of  or  onus  of  is  of no  for point.  can simply  and  is it the  less  revising One  can  acknowledge  the  force  of  the  point  about  current  practice  Burge  instead  denies  not  deny  Burge:  realism.  "So i f  determinants  on  brain  attitudes  as  argument  can,  brain  The  not  problem  causally  that  thing how  is  a  separate  is  they  are  to  must  be  alternative  is  put  taken  to  be  a  among  expression  x  not  basis  of  x  by  among  supervene  propositional response:  its  "This  head.  determinants  open-ended  as  supervene  on  behavior'  what  it  it  Since of  our  ever), our  supervene  out  is  seems  our  on  conditions.  56  we  and  brain on  our  to  the  we  environmental we may n o t  require.  of  for can  it  is  picking  out  unless are  be  How  behaviour,  basis  causal  responsible  behaviour  for  their  that  to  Burge,  individuate  of  causally  responsible is  basis  possible  is  to  if  relations  psychology of  that  the  their  According  causally  is  on  that  determinant  pick  not  however,  thing'  is  is  as  our  on  the  is  do  of  conditions,  efficacious? that  are  attitudes,  which  turned  way  as  to  take  does  13).  but on the  we  be  this  be t r e a t e d  do  issue.  point  Burge,  the  to  individualist's  determinants  for  what  and t h e r e f o r e  attitudes  (1986,  individuating  something  It  on  point  think,  this  social)  behaviour,  of  behaviour,  I  all  states"  (including  force  opinion  the  The  (where  properties,  an  psychology.  attitudes  propositional  the  of  propositional  states,  have  b e h a v i o u r a l l y i r r e l e v a n t . " And h i s  propositional  since  the  The  states.  behavior'  in  not  propositional attitudes  the  x  and  it's  just  environmental  Burge the  offers  an  lungs.  analogy  He  points  nothing causally local  states  chemically  in  such  processes  and  to  body  and  the  had  it  they  are  are  functional them  no  efficacious is  not  the  Earth  his  would  get  accounted  prone  to  case mental  that  terms  on  of  the  neural  the  basis  effects  of  differently external  57  and  with  no  except  as  in  a  such i n my  way  brain.  respiration,  go,  this  less  makes  then,  It  to  it  Twin  simply  differences  environment.  or  causally  Earth  affected. the  he  states  experiment from  of  the  environmental  or  causally  sort  mental  of  should  Daniel-a  inside,  although  state  firings  moved be  Thus,  my  same  digestive,  dealing  sub-events  reasoning  lungs  (say,  my m e n t a l brain,  the  different  be  16).  "If  the  a  thought  the  on  of  Burge's  would  supervenient  individuated  the  the  we  individuated in  like  In  state  not  causal  if  my  upon the  so  themselves.  for  are  partly and,  of  affects not  we w o u l d n o t  states  that  are  function  affects  grant  of  respiration  in  (1986,  state  causally  them:  surfaces  and events"  causally  are  the  would it  of  embedded  and  we  compose  different  attitudes,  factors  less  that  were  supervenient  individuated  they  from the  attitudes)  My p r o p o s i t i o n a l  although  that  regulatory),  affects  breathing  sub-events  events  states  (propositional that  way  (same  nothing  causally  the  entirely  or  same b i o l o g i c a l that  that  surfaces)  an  immunological,  grants  a  described  upon  b r e a t h i n g e x c e p t as  my l u n g s ,  chemical back  out  affects  of  individuated  based  are  Psychology means  of  which  that  is  assumes  explaining mental  essential.  today of  is  is  my  Jane  Smith's  Jane  attitudes,  an  not  responsible  we  impact  me  to  which  In  the  the  my  out  behaviour  to  since  I  of  that  belief  happens  in  picked  the  case  manner  belief  of  sub-events of  the  is  the  me  explanation  is.  individuate  to  legitimate  the  behaviour  an e x p l a n a t i o n  an  case of  the  for  ascribing  as  are  assumes t h a t  birthday,  birthday  upon  as  early, 45th  attitudes  ascribing  serve  serve  u n l i k e the  which  And i t  although  Smith's  when  have  state  office  will  in  behavior.  Thus  Wednesday,  way  propositional  Wednesday w i l l  leaving  today  that  that  fall  on  don't  a  know  propositional  respiration,  state  we  are  talking  causal  powers  we  can  attribute  or  description  the  about  may  to  that  pick  out,  state.  The a  way  we  individuate,  particular  causal  sub-event  powers  of  particular  star  irrelevant  to  objects  events  and  or  when  we  powers  of  the  events  under  by  the  talk  of  that  just  causal exist  about  or  irrelevant  the  x  In  powers, or  events,  to  we  of  we not  pick  evening  such  cases our  are of  to out  star' there  the a is are  descriptions  interested the  objects  in or  description.  attitudes  of  attitude  propositional  is  use  whether  powers.  causal  Compare p r o p o s i t i o n a l the  we  independently  objects  a certain  as  morning s t a r '  star's  physical  respiration  event  *the  that  the  according to is  58  not  Burge.  individuated  The in  content  terms  of  its  physical  composition.  propositional x  thing'  picks  out  state, is  or  attitudes,  state  that  this  like  the  for  causal  particular  beliefs,  star  any  can  at  least  Intentional  contexts  referential  terms.  But  perhaps  do  Burge  individuation  cases, not  did  would  not  be  intentional Burge's  context  own  maintain that of  behaviour  except  as  changing  it  types  would of  ruled  examples.  that  nothing  causally  affects  contexts  the  may r e q u i r e  states  59  to  that  affects of  contents  of  co-  manner  of  altering  Burge  the  consider wants  to  determinants  my m e n t a l  how we  to  properties.  let's  my b r a i n .  change  co-  terms w i t h i n  a r e among t h e  causally  us  belief  any  So  a  comes  Perhaps  out.  While but  it  causal  that  of  respiration,  substitution  Recall  propositional attitudes and  the  just  sub-events  when  co-referential  be  again  different  that  intend  of  and  case of  acceptable.  i n d i v i d u a t i o n by s u b s t i t u t i o n  by  context,  for  this  picked out  by  changes  is  c a n be  changes  allow  It  description.  out  description  descriptor  or  star  seems  underlying  determines  unlike the  it  some  about  that  the  evening  picked  some  be  attitude  state  on  realists  composition.  co-referential  be  the  This  saw,  descriptions,  changing in  must  composition,  the  just  are  propositional  role.  and  we  just  referential  we  s t i l l  depending  star  But as  be  if  a particular physical  morning  can't  which,  the  descriptions,  respiration. it  has  there  particular physical  responsible  different  that  But  So  state  although  individuate  a  particular  mental  thoughts  or  affected state.  my  brain  beliefs  we be  properties.  the  question  that  and have the  causal  however,  the  externalism since  we  externalism psychology  On  Burge's  doctors to  two  as  I  causal  issue  whether  is  not  of  the to  properties  of  it  according  mental  due  is  to  properties  have  different  true  that  content  to  of  their  may causal  arthritis  are with would  the  causal  trying  to  realism  about  determine  example,  thighs.  Daniel-a  their In  the  fears order  can  same. same  the  psychology, causal  and that for  60  be  properties  determine  the  we  and t h i s  w o u l d be t h e are  If  then  beliefs  properties  true,  been,  and D a n i e l - c f  properties  and r e p o r t  their  the  straightforward.  Daniel-a  causal is  affected  according  my  content  this  causal  not  true,  Burge t h a t  state  and the  causally  and  same?  is  is  affected  but  is  *a r t h r i t i s ' has  changed,  it at  nothing  state  distinguish  the  attribute  causally  mental  has  has  has  indistinguishable  Are  externalism  the  question  that  nevertheless  with  nor  The  tharthritis  of  we  thoughts)  nothing  attitude  causal,  state.  The  and  The l a b e l l i n g  anything  (whether  *tharthritis'  propositional  the  state  we  assume  are  in  in  the  means, On t h i s by  that  agreement same of  brain  course,  reasoning,  stipulation.  are  the  same.  But  compatibility we m u s t  If  of  consider  how  properties.  Daniel-cf their Burge's  go  to  see  their  arthritis  has  spread  rejection  of  the  individualist that and  point  psychology  to  would  Daniel-cf's  different  arthritis  in  his  his  in  belief  would  be  while  the  the  that  thigh.  different seems  to  If  me,  arthritis  of  in  Psychology  given  to  belief  to  state not be  because  the  by p s y c h o l o g y  to  offering  be from  science  science are  when  of  not  of of  a  the  not  an  61  to  see  is, of  it the  work  as  an  that  he  had  (as  Burge's  it  content  of  the  example  offers  a  doesn't,  it  description  relevant  offer  co-referential for  If  in  for  behaviour  behaviour.  thigh  does  psychology  a  the  explanation  describing brain  causally  his  causes  in  doctor  going  belief  of  work  cause  distinct the  would  as  has  had t h a r t h r i t i s  and the  not  the  in  of  different  work  does  see  then psychology  substitution  terms  the  itself  being  not  he  he  me t h a t  psychology  example,  would  to  be has  incorrect  to  behaviour  and  behaviour  work  as  take  is  for  is  to  he  that  arthritis  that  them  that  seems  going  behaviour,  there  Thus  It  analysis  Daniel-a's  takes  believes  had  case  f o r the  example)  he  believed  the  thigh  doesn't  me,  underlying  supposed  is  behaviour.  by the  particular to  he  Daniel-a's his  It  that  to  believes  of  Daniel-cf's  Tharthritis,  Daniel-cf's  seems  this  committed  explanation  either.  for  explanations  behaviour.  assumed  believed  that  Burge  correct.  behaviour  upon  causes  Daniel-cf  is  Daniel-a's  w o u l d be  that  find  Furthermore Daniel-a  Daniel-cf  he  same  Daniel-a  while  thigh.  should  the  Recall  things.  explanation  doctor  his  for  we  attribute  thigh  his  while  explanation  secure  behaviour.  believing  tharthritis  be  the states  of  some  belief. but  is  descriptions  psychology  cannot  be  the  science  of  behaviour.  explanation  of  Daniel-a's  Daniel-cf's  behaviour,  Thus,  behaviour  psychology  since is  must  the  psychological  different take  from  them t o  that  be  of  causally  different.  Although,  as  respiratory a n d we out  can  the  case  a  Burge's  list  case  of  When  and d e s i r e s ,  that  are  belief  belief the  exists  widespread  the  the  can  thing to  view  are p o s i t s  hypothesized  we  the  at  here, lungs in  and that  it.  at  requires  the  state  advancing that  least,  is  we  belief  is  The o n l y  is  the  an are  what  psychology  theory.  out  we a  at  the  conditions to  pick  in  more t h a n  the  this.  a belief  with  states  like  psychological  time  folk  in that the  to  positing  same  that  of  environment,  simply pick  We a r e  This,  the  same  time  hypothesis saying  that  what  the  do a c c o r d i n g theory  evidence  behaviour  and  that  we h a v e that  to  it  for is  explain.  respiratory  look  location  to  of  are  in its  psychology  comes  the  are.  existence  With  we  individuation  individuating descriptions  we d o n ' t  it  describing  contents  beliefs  in  psychology  beliefs  the  of  s y s t e m embedded  realism  description.  our  p a r t l y upon e n v i r o n m e n t a l  a variety  beliefs,  we  example,  system depends  same p h y s i c a l  of  In the  per  system and our  point I  can  at  the  see,  i n d i v i d u a t i o n of  lungs  is  for.  in  terms  of  causal  the  body.  The s c i e n t i f i c  62  and  ask  We c a n  role  or  in  what  then  the  this  decide  terms  approach to  of  lungs,  physical to  the  refer lung's  individuating  the  lungs  terms that  of  concerned  relational  there  belief  is  directly  the  theory  thing.  and  that  determine  to  beliefs  do  the  we  cannot  not  not  be  change  the  cause. of  belief,  Again,  and i f  however,  describing  respiratory  system  approach,  seems t o  it  Assume t h a t that  he  we a r e  believes  state,  whatever  buying  cheese  has  a different  then  the  that  Mickey it  is,  Mickey  belief.  is  is  a  more  to  is  a  the  the  same  because  beliefs, cause  of  they  behaviour but  are  regard to  the  description,  you  you change  to  be  the  the  science  analogy  with  the  smoothly.  But  this  question.  state  mouse,  rather than,  63  we  case  theory,  belief,  the  causally  He b e l i e v e s  the  context  the  the  describing  come  to  psychology  is  psychology  to  is  Since  descriptions  the  through  begs  it.  that  beliefs  by  describing a brain  state  for  me,  in  in  beliefs  there  in  relativism with  we t a k e  go  folk  you change  states,  may  that  beliefs  you change  if  brain  If  thing  individuate  individuated  allowed.  and say  relative  takes  descriptions  not  of  simply  descriptions,  about  same  posits  determined by those is  at  specified  individuating or  accept  are  is  individuate  and the  psychology  are  to  determination  contents  If  going  which  different  can point  one  beliefs  and the  them.  we  if  role  What i s  are  words,  contents  causal  beliefs,  come  other  Belief  belief  and  observe  In  individuation  that  how we  pointing  beliefs.  with  factors.  nothing  and h e r e ' s  can't and  is  and  that  responsible  say,  that  w h e n we s a y  dog  Mickey  food. is  of  Peter  that  brain  for  Peter's  Twin  Peter  a twmouse  and  is  caused by t h i s  accept that  the  is  state  a n d b u y some  place,  Peter,  no  other  behaviour are  differently.  belief  twin  response  that  because,  since  their  it.  any,  brain  the  same  same  brain  of  How  Peter's they  belief, have  powers  causal  state  1 1  .  we  1 0  ,  is  a  that  we  We  same  then, the  causal  the  But that  only  is  to  is  that  way  assume  what  at  we  least  w h e n we  a  can  are  trying  on t h e a  in  mouse' We h a v e of  different thing? is  The  blocked  on t h e  know  they  the  way  a  same  that  list  is  powers  we  of  know,  other  beliefs  brain  describing  don't  that  basis  that  they  describe to  the  prove.  model where  variety  to  state  the  causes  Mickey  no  individuated the  as  describing.  have  know,  we  we a r e  brain  simply  x  are  the  the  that  belief  If  same  so  describes  the  powers  theory,  the  We a r e is  state  i n psychology requires,  psychology  same.  it.  can  we h a v e n ' t  causal  have  Realism  if  is  belief,  The problem  description  individuating belief,  the  w h e n we a s c r i b e t h e  what,  cheese.  r e s p i r a t o r y system,  identified with twin Peter's  to  of  go  identified with Peter's  causes  first  to  analogy with the  cheese-buying the  belief  of  folk  beliefs  E v e n t h o u g h we h a v e ascribed the belief to Peter that *Mickey i s a mouse' and t o Twin P e t e r t h a t M i c k e y i s a twmouse' because we wanted to explain their cheese buying behaviour, remember t h a t , a c c o r d i n g t o B u r g e , t h e b e l i e f s a r e n ' t i n d i v i d u a t e d on t h a t b a s i s . They a r e i n d i v i d u a t e d , i n p a r t , by t h e i r s o c i a l and e n v i r o n m e n t a l c o n t e x t . T h a t i s why t h e y c o u n t a s d i f f e r e n t b e l i e f s . 1 0  x  The f a c t t h a t P e t e r and Twin P e t e r b o t h buy cheese does not s u s t a i n t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e y a r e i n s t a t e s w i t h t h e same c a u s a l p o w e r s . C h e e s e - b u y i n g b e h a v i o u r c a n b e c a u s e d b y many d i f f e r e n t s t a t e s . T h e o n l y way t h e v i e w t h a t t h e y h a v e t h e s a m e c a u s a l p o w e r s c a n b e s u s t a i n e d i s i f we a l r e a d y k n o w t h a t t h e y ' r e i n t h e same brain state. 1 1  64  we  are  list  listing a  a variety  variety  of  different  the  we  believed or  might  that  he  Psychological  realism  different  causes,  not  denoted entities  that  requires  can  that  and  his  of  may  only  be  psychology  be  right.  a  Daniel-cf  own  disagree as  position.  that  doing  state  be  about of  when  which  only  one  matter  we  can  be  For  the  of  psychological  the  we  different  on c o n t e x t ) .  real,  so  causes.  that  individuating  holding Since  the  psychology different  he  these states  about  context  would  He w o u l d d i s a g r e e ,  explanations  being  different  that  be  rather,  entails  would i n t e r p r e t  beliefs.  believes  attribution.  what  In  fact  psychology  Danielthis is  non-  relevant  to  with  claim that  that  the  the  the  underlying  is  belief the  causes  different.  When p s y c h o l o g y does  competing  one  fact  in  me,  he  tharthritis  and to  that  to  believes.  individualistic,  are  to  he had  we  thereby  saying  but  (depending  Realism be  by  flu,  seems are  beliefs  must  it we  by  there  Burge would not a  assumes,  are  When D a n i e l - a w e n t  he b e l i e v e d  had the  a n d when  we  behaviour  explanations  there  posited  explanations  he  explanations  by a v a r i e t y  Daniel  behaviour.  this  believed  competing  offering  offer  causes of explain  explanations  explanations,  he had a r t h r i t i s o r t h a t  perhaps  are  different  different  identifying doctor  of  it  take  offers  itself  to  a belief  as  be o f f e r i n g  65  an e x p l a n a t i o n the  cause  of  the  of  behaviour,  behaviour  or  to  be  offering  is  causally  a  context-relative  responsible  for  r e a l i s m about psychology same  physical  mediate,  into  the  critical states  underlie, states—if  vary  the  that  the  been  different  claim,  that  fact,  is  While  Burge does  since is  is  psychology  the  arguments with  to  brain  as  requires  properties relation  of  stay  psychology  as  the  then  p r a c t i c e d does  about psychology  requires  it,  that  invoke  Burge's  different,  that  is  is have  not  and,  a in  false  He  he  does  not  supervenience  is  simply  claims  that  the  onus  s h o u l d be r e v i s e d . the  If  explanations  it  causes of  b e h a v i o u r and  not  may  while  psychology  vary to  which  should  require the  the  they be  causal bear  revised.  above  then perhaps psychology  66  view  psychology  of  that  states  not  are  those  could  non-individualistic,  genuine  underlying same,  and  enter  conjecture.  denial  assumption  descriptions the  that  that  in  why p s y c h o l o g y  for behaviour are the  context-relative  states  were  realism  is  principle different  features  17).  psychology.  practiced  the  in  involving  (1986,  states  the  in  demonstrate  may  individualism is  that  realism  person  metaphysical  that  which  "The  an i n d i v i d u a l ' s b e l i e f s  required for  argue  state  B u r g e ? He s a y s t h a t :  generalizations  of  his  it  a  with  intentional  ways"  of  compatible  environmental  more t h a n  psychology  on o t h e r s  offers  what  nothing  compatible  given  a  Is  transactions  of  none  unless  about  any  in  appropriate  claim  offer  with  explanatory  in  behavior?  agree  the  individuation in  to  transactions  or  intentional  the  description  but  a If  realism  should  not  be  revised.  truth  about  s t i l l  be t h e  It  may b e  Whether looks  Although the  way  to  do  survives  now  of  the  would  or  how  it  reflect  posits,  way t o  do  the  it  may  psychology.  psychology.  does  it  not  entities  instrumentally effective  only  realism  like  explanations  non-existence  most  the  its  not  is  depend  upon  practiced.  It  what  psychology  depends  upon  what  assumptions  are required for realism.  Psychological realism,  the  it,  me,  in  face  of  psychology  and  causes  requires that  requires,  are  to  cannot  be I  behaviour, If  context,  then  hasn't  the  Typically  went  the  explanations  and  I went t o  that  the  is  to  not  cause  of  real.  because  clear  behaviour,  as-the its  the how  realism  I  believed  I  believed  because  explanation  explanation does  explanation  relativism  It  appears  in  to  are be  psychology  that I  count  that  of  cause it  with  change  must  be of  of  with  leaving behaviour  refers  to  or  to  be  behaviour.  and  maintain  doctor  change  reveal  explanations  Psychological  explanation  not  the  causes  doctor  the  cannot  it's  positions.  are  the  psychological  explanation  nevertheless  to  my b e l i e f  does  realism  alternative although  It  changed  denoting  psychological  the  out.  individuates  as  psychology  context.  something  If  seems t o  context-relative.  I had a r t h r i t i s or  I had t h a r t r i t i s . my  count  either  that  it  on  agree  the with  67  understood  Burge's is  objects Burge's  contention  relative, posited contention  that  we by  can those  that  our  explanations that  are  academic  psychology  cannot  get  Unlike  Burge,  the  along  effect  a  Like for  the  realism  is  different physical we  Stephen  variety  pick  of  because  out  and  intentional  must  Stich  doctrine.  else  held  we  should,  in  in  led  fact,  and  be  be  individualists  to  that of  defense point,  burden  our  denying  Fodor  realism  must  that of  the  thinks about  It  philosophers,  that claims  or  is  intentional that,  intentional  looked  about  as  a  that  with  that  Fodor,  that  is  like  the  a  will very  anything  conclusion,  intentional  a  denying  irrealism  irrealism  it  is  physically  believes  irrealism  concerned  68  if  the  intentional  be  seems  quite  deny  that  the  intentional  demand  psychological  doesn't  themselves  properties.  is  context-  however,  Burge  to  behaviour.  thinks  states.  The  state  causal  very  of  physical/intentional  naturalized  He  relativism  point.  argument  thesis  other  to  Burge.  psychology.  His  contents  agrees  radical  starting  we  the  causes  the  descriptions.  have  many  for  and t h a t  an  case  168-91)  believe  for  the  the  the  intentional  this  belief  with  result.  of  results  the  represented along  Fodor  different  supervenience  to  (1996,  Stich's  both  upon  I  folk  need  c a n be t h e  refer  of  despite  misses  supervenience  realization  simply  true  and  enterprise  the  burden  Stich  misguided. from  feel  how i t  do  relative  assumptions  psychology  show j u s t  t r u t h of  successful  is  the  explanations  Burge,  a  s t i l l  realism  revised  context  the  I  Putting  upon Burge t o relative  however,  and  is  without  that  explanation. propose  socially  we  irrealism.  But, to  Stich  claims,  naturalize  there  the  is  no  reason  intentional  to  think  will  that  result  the  in  failure  intentional  irrealsim.  Stich  rejects  all  agree  with  also  rejects  Burge  one  in  that  is  or  because  thinks  determination doppleganger physical world  Caesar Earth Julius  of  with was  into  Caesar  claims depend are  are  that on  many  the  it  not  can  is  when  because  only  we  moments  causally  he  exactly  the  be  the  he  thinks  same  same  Thus,  in  is  we  think  linked  imagine and, to  the  same  having "Julius  that  thus,  Julius  my  bodily  the  are not  ago  false  same  exactly  as all  to  we s t i l l  can  in  although  the  each  but  global  matter  exactly  situated  false of  contents. in  he  claim  properties  be  be  This  is  o n l y does  Twin  while  my  C a e s a r my  not.  doesn't  properties  will  descriptions,  are  false  truth  state  contents  This  himself is  it  respects.  and  existence  taking  supervenience  in  same  thoughts  world  historical  physical  Roman".  came  respects,  Earth  I'm  the  doppleganger's  After  that  Twin as  Thus,  The  another  intentional  on  state  thoughts  given  psychological  of  i n terms  supervenience.  physical  intentional  supervenience.  i n d i v i d u a l supervenience  that,  all  he  of  global  supervenience this  forms  of  to for  have  established  intentional  matter  anyhow  supervenience.  whose  realism  69  we  that  properties, since  He p o i n t s wouldn't  global  Stich  realism out deny  then  doesn't  that but  there that  don't  supervene on p h y s i c a l p r o p e r t i e s .  and  genuine  a  $100  bill  s o m e t h i n g may h a v e our it  newly wasn't  since the  created  examples  same  Twin  of  right  the  Earth  notion  place.  We  no P i c a s s o s  it's  conclude  from  the  $100  not  and the  of  being  don't  or  p.187).  $100  conclude  of  really bill  genuine  bills.  denial  (1996,  being a  physical properties  p a i n t e d by P i c a s s o  part  really  the  as  He c i t e s  is  from  In the  Even  as  a  though  a Picasso  on  Picasso  because  c a n n o t be  genuine  that  this  it  come  that  same w a y ,  supervenience  Picasso  that  from  there  we  are  shouldn't  there  are  no  beliefs.  It  seems  to  reassuring by  the  me  about the  failure  about  Picassos  would  ever  but  not  that  of  lack  realism  It  in  part,  certainly  Picasso  a  Picasso  is  arrangement  certain  emotions  significant  factor  its of  or in  to  is  our  the  are  say  realism  ask  why  we  intentional  states  analogies  don't  i n t e n t i o n a l depends, causal  part  properties. colour  in  on  people  determining  70  to  fact, realism  doubted  We n e e d  not  that  and  thoughts  in  unnecessary for realism unless  that  causal lines  never  Stich's  r e a l i s m about  right  physical  bills.  Picassos.  on p r o p e r t i e s  seems  We h a v e  not,  intentional  r e a l i s m about  supervenience  we a l r e a d y g r a n t t h a t least  $100  question  about  are  t h r e a t posed to  genuine  into  demonstrate that  of  analogies  supervenience.  and  call  Stich's  properties.  of  what  The a is  whether  at  makes  power  canvas  of  to  the evoke  apparently something  a  is  a a  Picasso.  But  having  sufficient  to  properties  came  the  only  being  can  Picasso.  Being  condition  of  not  Picasso  to  is  same c a n b e inflation  has  have  feed  about the  for  a  bill  to  are  Thus,  genuine  ran wild  different  a  I  with week.  of  painting  b i l l .  the  $100  supervene  for  the  powers  b i l l .  is  one to  supervene  a  And  is the  the  reason,  $100  bill  than  it  worth  only  A  Picasso  some  same  will  Again,  to  of  week's  there  physical  other  associated  tomorrow  a  on  that  even necessary.  If,  it  by  sufficient  surprising.  tomorrow,  Regardless,  a  failure  not  tomorrow  painted  typically  the  causal  Picasso.  properties  aren't  not  actually  a  was  the  purchase  it,  is  is  itself  causal  can  it  is  those  is  is  $100  with  if  the  they  Picasso  thing  causal  properties  the  genuineness  $100  only  Picasso.  my f a m i l y  i f  similar  sufficient,  today  for  painting  even  a  properties  that  Picasso  not  economy  While  myself  the  not  our  for  or  So  distinctly  today.  by  physical  said  whether  Picasso,  s t i l l  on  in  groceries to  a  of  of  thing  causal  Picasso  same  properties  supervene  a  How t h e  those  factor  painted  the  properties  Picasso.  be  being  Picasso  would  only  have  causal  acquire  paintings.  causal bad  to  a  determining  Something  does  the  of  allow  no  me  question  failure  properties  of  is  not  surprising.  The  failure  would not bills, their  the  of  mental  states  be s u r p r i s i n g i f , causal  existence.  properties If  the  like of  with Picasso mental  causal  71  on  physical  paintings  states  and  $100  s t a t e s were i r r e l e v a n t  properties  of  the  belief  to  that  *Santa  i s  would  coming  i t  s t i l l  i n t e n t i o n a l we  The  can  can  w i t h o u t  d i d n ' t He  took  whether  the  be  t o  s c i e n c e  p s y c h o l o g y me  t h a t  cannot, are  v a r y  i n  we  o f i s  b o t h  anyone f a c t ,  S t i c h  S t i c h  does,  arguments  i n  b e l i e f s The  the  would  same  the  and,  accept  b e i n g  r e a l l y  f a c t ,  does  the  we  t o  c a u s a l  case,  accept  the  72  the  r i g h t  t h a t Burge  us  the  i s  l a t t e r  not p o i n t  b e l i e f s we  i s  c a u s a l  t h i s  are  can  have  t h i n k s  t h a t  s c i e n t i f i c .  I t  seems  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  r e a l i s m  p r o p e r t i e s  b e l i e f s  perhaps  t h i s  i n t e n t i o n a l  me  seen,  m a i n t a i n  the  i r r e l e v a n t .  change  o f  we  Burge  before  t h i s  the  t h a t  powers.  now  A c c e p t i n g  have  change mean  Presumably  seems  we  can may  i t  acknowledge  t h a t  we  p r o p e r t i e s  t o  t h a t  b e l i e f .  c a u s a l  as  wants  the  c a u s a l l y  a n t i - i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c and who  c h a n g i n g  c a u s a l  i f  o f  whether  i n d i v i d u a t e  b e l i e f .  t h i s ,  c o n t e x t ask  q u e s t i o n  accept.  the  w h i c h  were  d i f f e r e n t ,  to  t h a t  b e l i e f s  the  In  w i t h o u t  s t a t e ,  which  were  q u e s t i o n  the  t h a t  w i t h  accept  odd  changing  remain  t h a t  T h i s  sake",  an  b r a i n  c o n t e x t .  can  b e l i e f s  i r r e l e v a n t .  whether  w i t h  Burge  I f  the  eve'  b e l i e f ?  demonstrated  t h a t  accept  l i k e  p r o p e r t i e s  imply  mean  t h a t  i r r e l e v a n t .  t o  to  C h r i s t m a s same  w i t h o u t  a s s o c i a t e d  something would  c a u s a l  b e l i e f  p r o p e r t i e s  seems  b e l i e f  t o  w i l l  i t  on the  examples  t h i s  i t  as  c h a n g i n g  the  take  causes  no  the  e x t e r n a l i s t  change  v i s i t  e x i s t  s t a t e s ,  change  b e l i e f  to  we  o f  s h o u l d  c o n s i d e r  c l a i m .  o b j e c t i o n  p r o p e r t i e s  and are  g r a n t s , not  " f o r  c a u s a l l y  efficacious: can  see,  it  intentional that  "Would would  which  physical  state of  ends  back  narrow move  narrow  psychology notion  as  of  the  proposal  about  hence,  narrow  ancestry  no  the  of  there though  is of  its  it  laws  to  me  longer  any  cannot  Stich  advocating once  talking no  and  of  internal,  that  since  historical  the  we  about  reasonable  environmental  be  causal  them  psychology.  play  accepted  as  essential example  existence,  supervene  yet  He  the on  role out  to of  its  doesn't  behaviour  of  no  however,  a  the  the  that the  evolutionary  the  virus.  about  is  laws  Using  So,  which  supervene it  of  argues  imply  laws.  being  something  it  have  does not  that  that  73  could  in  argues  its  properties  Stich,  a  Stich points  properties.  we  supervenience  cannot  concerning  doesn't  we  given  chapter,  and t h a t  without  f a i l u r e of  another  as  Ultimately then,  no  proposal  For,  current,  seems  are  about  of  is  the  last  it  far  psychology.  because  virus  physical  are  we  worry  the  on  the  then,  content  science  the  no d o u b t  current  in  a l l .  So  a "narrow" s u r r o g a t e  (p.183).  ignore  HIV v i r u s ,  HIV v i r u s  have  began  at  find  supervene  argued  properties  analogy of  easy to  intentional  that  intentional  is  can  catastrophe?  catastrophe  contents,  states  separately  the  I  philosophers  and,  major  organisms" we  content  intentional  a  a  currently practiced  factors,  Most  be it  the  As  be  does  where  content. to  not  property,  property  up  this  on  we its  likely  that  HIV v i r u s  even  current physical  state:  Though t h e d e t a i l s a r e s t i l l t o be worked o u t , i t is p l a u s i b l e t o assume t h e r e is a law-like connection between i n f e c t i o n by t h e HIV v i r u s and t h e d e a t h o f certain cells that p l a y an i m p o r t a n t r o l e in the immune system. ...But if the c u r r e n t worry were correct, t h e n t h e r e c o u l d be no s u c h l a w , because b e i n g i n f e c t e d by the HIV v i r u s i s not a p r o p e r t y t h a t supervene's on an organism's current, internal, physical state. ...Analogously, the fact that intentional properties do not supervene on the c u r r e n t , i n t e r n a l , p h y s i c a l s t a t e s of organisms does not e n t a i l that i n t e n t i o n a l properties cannot play a r o l e i n laws. (1996, 184)  The  problem  and  the  the  with  $100  people  to  virus.  to  nothing  we  have be  these  people  to  on  not  case  the  its  belief, of  Beliefs  with its  are  have  history,  beliefs  properties.  not  beliefs. not  is  clear  that  they  understood If  those  causal  explain  behaviour,  view of  beliefs  as  we m u s t  reject  to  that  those  illness  people. virus.  we  away  are  be  states  properties we  the  left  posited  74  the  to  change  must  beliefs.  the  In  there of  the  causal  the no  will virus  this  is  property  The s t a n d a r d behaviour.  certain and  change  posited to  have  virus will  explain  with  some  originally  Again,  with.  of  causal  and d e a t h .  powers.  are  r e a l i s m about  case  its  people  The e x i s t e n c e  take  causal entities  on  Nevertheless,  causal  either  Picasso  the  t h a n was  near future,  we  the  In  depend  longer  causes  what  with  medication which allows  claim  its If  as  earlier.  not  years  i n the  the  longer  or  does  our  on  same  examined  fifteen  effects  who  the  now h a v e  h o p e f u l l y sometime  depends  view  we  The HIV v i r u s c u r r e n t l y  longer  a  is  existence  that  ten  does  future,  s t i l l  its  live  analogy  examples  The f a c t  expected  of  bill  HIV v i r u s ,  powers.  this  causal  beliefs  our  no  standard  explain behaviour,  But the the  point of  HIV v i r u s  Stich s  example  7  is  another  because  of  the  example  of  a case  where  The  problem  have  laws.  connected causal the  failure  the  properties  John  has  even  has  a  are  i n agreement  are  virus  that  assuming  moments  ago  have the knew  way  as as  with  the  death  of  with  that  law  thus,  seemed  If  were  to  we  HIV v i r u s  call  in  cause  the  do n o t  the  there  it  were  came that  his  virus  that  while  death  causes  into  law  of  the  any  that  cells,  the on  example,  as  John's.  We  HIV v i r u s ,  because  we  same  into  existence  John  has  Earth  a  few  does  not  Nevertheless,  same to  current  behave  in  John's  we w o u l d n o t death  of  we may  if  we  physical  in  certain cells,  laws  can  Twin  Twin  the  we  an  on  HIV v i r u s .  exactly  as  would s u p e r v e n e  and h i s t o r i c a l f a c t o r s  enter  a  that  realism  fails,  certain  the  the  i n Twin John,  virus  deny  intended  doppleganger  just  virus  found  remained a l i v e that  if  exactly  Earth the  was  simply  o r g a n i s m . Assume, f o r  be c a l l e d t h e  The n o n - p h y s i c a l , s o c i a l the  the  we w o u l d e x p e c t  John's.  law  of  physically  John  John,  same c e l l s a  and,  not  don't  It  that  and J o h n ' s  Twin  we  is  t h a t we c a n ' t  that  Twin  infection  is  is  history to  that  state  virus  where  is  though supervenience  associated  the  case  supervenience.  current physical state  that  it  example  of  HIV v i r u s  in this  the case yet  accept  certain  same the those that  cells.  associated  1 2  with  discover.  T h i s , o f c o u r s e , assumes t h a t t h e e n v i r o n m e n t and a l l o t h e r p h y s i c a l c o n d i t i o n s o n T w i n E a r t h a r e e x a c t l y t h e same a s o n E a r t h . We m e a n t o r u l e out p o s s i b i l i t i e s such as the a i r being of a q u a l i t y s u c h t h a t t h e c e l l s d o n ' t d e t e r i o r a t e i n t h e same w a y . 1 2  75  Stich  offers  a  of  law  money  economics.  out  property money  of  on  current  least  any  as  the  In  We c a n ' t  exist  that  he  that  for  not  recognize.  The  resorts  narrow  to  in  of  our  worries  failure  About  runs  not  deeper  at in  human  begs  a case  the  where  properties  to  supervene  on  not  upon p s y c h o l o g i c a l  realism  supervenience I  agree  with  support than  of  Stich's  analogies,  content  and the  fact  76  is  on  thus of  are  laws  based  intentional  this do  there  on  place.  f a i l u r e of  however,  problem  need  depends  about  to  example  any  physical  first  This  are  an example  laws  of  no r e a s o n  however,  example  on  the  state  Whether  Stich's as  good  law d r a w i n g o n l y  are  i n the  the  is  (p.184).  there  economics  realism.  physical  economics  money.  is  b e i n g good and bad  economics,  supervene  since  neither  money.  whether  psychological  presents, the  of  economics  He t h i n k s t h a t  problem  analogies  to  "Plainly,  But t h i s  mistaken"  which  drives  depend on t h e  laws  generalizations  misplaced.  think  do  that  thinks  a  as  cite  properties,  or  is  like.  law,  b a d money  internal,  operation  regard  that  demonstrate  pose  in  that  properties of  properties  fact,  question.  Stich  law  Greshem's  argues:  current,  contentious  with  *laws'  Stich  HIV v i r u s ,  laws  behaviour  physical  claims  wampu, a n d t h e  physical  psychology.  laws  law  the  Greshem's  like  actually  The  He c i t e s  b e i n g money n o r t h e  that  not,  example.  circulation.  banknotes,  suppose  the  of  supervene  coins,  does  another  that  Stich  there  does  not  Stich.  his  the  are  The  claims. seems  fact are  to  that so  I  he  many  philosophers a  serious  idea  It  the  the  is,  I  can be that  problem  that  which  think,  to  is  strongly  we  the  reconciled I  will  seems  to  intuitions  that  is  Burge  realism  psychology,  want the  to  argue  me,  able  is  motivations  an  reality  how for  through  alternative  next.  77  to  seems t o  far  support be  apart  realism and  one  is the for  Stich  thinks an  intuitions by  claiming  through,  minimizing  the that  realism.  our  beliefs  the  I  At  desires least  of  whole of  how  believe,  unwillingness  and  framework.  Fodor  force  illustration  maintain behind  of  supervenience  widely.  argues  also  to  also  vary  of  of  evidence  It  by  and  It  be  physical within  failure  externalistic  maintain  that  the  illustration  matter  in  that  a deep one.  unnecessary.  however, abandon  or  a good  psychology  externalism  it  problem is  on t h i s  debate  is,  responses  attempts  what  do think  who  to  can  be  this  is  Chapter Realism,  Instrumentalism,  According Fodor,  to  the  Burge  chapter  and the  psychological were  at  arguments their  argue,  is  is  I  realism  in  the  face  of  the  states it,  be  But,  aside  to  assume  that  the  of  causal 1 3  is  the  states  that  that  place.  beliefs  from S t i c h  only  of  posits  which,  in  with  the  are  should,  to  to  the mind  I is  theory. is  a  about of  at  about  leads  of  those  that  realism  in  the  form  philosophers  leads  assumption  the  raised  from concerns  turn,  with  psychology  and d e s i r e s  supervenience  Fodor,  psychology  in  about  and B u r g e ,  not  framework,  folk  folk  this  situate  right  concerns  Concerns  with  to  that  are  but  by  maintain  trouble  not  The  idea  distinguished  relevance It  framework.  In  fact,  Stich, The  attempts  work.  in  failure  assumption  denial  and a l l .  their  rejects  like  we c a n ,  Psychology  the  didn't  a n d B u r g e was  further,  first  that  after  intentional  efficacy.  realism.  Stich  Folk  chapter,  realism  Burge  right  right  argue  the  that  Theory of  last  argue  with  that  of  will  psychological on  one  because  by  the  and t h a t  theory,  and  the  save  I will  but  within  of  to  partially  arguments,  a theory It  next  presented  arguments will  Stich  realism  least  and the  arguments  and  Three  the least  causal do  the  denial  denial that  tend  of folk  See, for example, Block (1986), Devitt (1990), Dretske (1981; 1 9 8 8 ) , F i e l d ( 1 9 7 8 ) , Fodor (1984; 1987; 1990a, 1990b), L o a r (1981) , L y c a n ( 1 9 8 8 ) , M i l l i k a n ( 1 9 8 4 ) , P a p i n e a u ( 1 9 8 7 ) , Schiffer (1982) , S t a l n a k e r ( 1 9 8 4 ) . 1 3  78  psychology  is  a theory,  supervenience  so  What  be  I  will  alternative arguing  examine These  in  our  will  of  of  we  the  posited,  the  externalist notion  What  is  an  causal  generalizations the  capacity  with  mental  with  one  who be  are  smiling  unhappy;  by of  and  persons  to  be  who  the  of  the  of  the  is  is  is  is  a  theory.  the  actual  comparison belief  analysis  with  of  the  chapter  folk  not  re-  a  a  of  to  that  psychology, rather  than  undermined  with  a  review  set  of  laws at  statements  have  general  like  with  the  persons  hungry  by  a command o r ,  interactions  happy;  begin  by of  theory.  possess  things  of  assumed  however, a  as  next  of  an  reasons  and an  in  of  externalist  beliefs,  states  begin,  These  the  existence  psychology'  are  denial  will  discussion  states  their  of  conception  all  I  psychology  argue  of  and i n c l u d e tend  folk  induction,  psychology  w h i c h we  the  adoption  further  existence  Let's  the  force  a  the  command.  is  are  of  will  *folk  states  another  there  efficacy  folk  for  I  of  concerns.  meant  the  alternative  reality  that  to  problem of  we f i n d  psychology.  problem of  *behaviour' .  wherein  the  the  the  adopt  then,  folk  the  that  realism.  involve  rejecting  an a p p r o a c h t o  to  conception  approach to  notion  of  realism  whole  argue,  for,  addition  reasons  our  when  arguing  against  possibility of  devastating  conception  that  arguments  I will  tend  who to  least, to  behaviour  following: are make  angry  or  do and  persons tend  to  attempts  to  obtain  food;  result  in  persons  P,  psychology, posits angry  will  as  believing  yelling  According  to  some  If  the  these  are  states  Thus  the  with  beliefs  replaced with this this  is  explain  behaviour.  the  depends  false,  there  This  is  the  theory  are  of  that  Q  will  Q.  Folk  behaviour.  States  posited  the  upon t h e is  no  like  to  of  It  being  explain  And  since  to  these of  the  the  foresee  force  beliefs they  will  framework. Quine,  theory.  a  than  that  eliminative much  which  and  states,  maintain  h e l d by the  neurophysiology,  explanatory  of  truth  reason  position  and n o t h i n g more, better  existence  eliminativists  greater  desires.  posits  about  theory,  raining  a  it  that  grabbing your umbrella.  framework  much  and  theoretical  is  P and b e l i e v e  bring  philosophers,  exist.  materialists.  states  or  that  to  it's  theoretical,  theory  framework,  to  that  of  they  a  states  behaviour  if  desire  attempt  viewed  mental or  who  better  will  posit  states  like  desires  are  be e l i m i n a t e d  f o r example,  puts  and it  way:  If there is a case for mental events and mental states, i t must be j u s t t h a t t h e p o s i t i n g o f them, like the positing of molecules, has some indirect systematic e f f i c a c y i n the development of t h e o r y . But if a c e r t a i n organization of theory is achieved by thus positing distinctive mental states and events b e h i n d p h y s i c a l b e h a v i o u r , s u r e l y a s much o r g a n i z a t i o n could be achieved by positing merely certain c o r r e l a t i v e p h y s i o l o g i c a l s t a t e s and e v e n t s instead. (1960, 264)  80  Although theory,  eliminative the  view  eliminativists beliefs  of  is  beliefs  commonly  a theory.  that  responsible  desires. person of  a  This It  evidence  of  belief  relevancy, in  their  This  which  this  is  standardly view  would  held  we  view,  view  that  I  ascribe  of  that  threatens  beliefs  away have  to  effect  source  of  properties. properties  irrelevant  based  and first  an  no  causal  states  If  as  causal the  are  maintain,  experiences.  we  reason  that  within  externalism  their  is  and  b e h a v i o u r we  then  make m e n t a l  r e m a i n no  posited  explained  show  existence  theory  their  person  save  to  a  that  when  person  or  psychology  that  that  framework,  states  their  why,  as  argues  we  saw  in  in  favour  ultimately  needed  why  Burge  position,  rather  who  to  want  explain  popular  on  and,  their  continue  to  if  causal believe  existence.  is  theory,  in  to  first  appears  is  means  discounted,  would thus  there  explicitly a  is  it  entities  third  ignores  mental  irrelevant,  our  a  conceptual  Externalism, are  is  currently  folk  This  the  a  of  that  this  for  totally  faulty  is  view  experience  i.e.,  others  It  not  structure  held.  to  applying  realism.  is  are t h e o r e t i c a l  and d e s i r e s  is  the  espouse,  and d e s i r e s  theory,  materialism  supervenience.  needs  than  revise The  of  to  simply  the the  to  it  view  talk give  about an  in  seems  81  folk  narrow  argument  light to  chapter,  that  claiming that  psychology onus,  last  me,  the of is  Stich, psychology contents.  to onus the  on  who  And  defend is  on  his those  failure  Burge  to  is  of show  how,  if  supervenience  relevancy this a  is  is  false,  can be m a i n t a i n e d .  to  reject  the  A n d , as  first  both  realism  I will  argue,  assumption  that  and the  folk  causal  way t o  do  psychology  is  theory.  The  view  that  folk  psychology  everyone.  The  view  that  others  is  based that  *simulation  theory'.  I  shall  mental  states  process  that  undergo  environmental  mental thus  state.  theory  at  draws  I  consider, psychology  on  don't  result  of  that  we  others  whereby of  our  first  consider is,  in  just  Suppose  newspaper  the  other  so  a n d we  will  motivations of  the we  of  a  ourselves  aside The  us  doing  in  their theory,  from  their  simulation  Before  enable  The  when  basis  theory  others.  for  to  simulate'  the  states  states  that  the  x  by  known a s  place  experiences.  a theory  is  on  granted  theory'.  claims  unlike  why a r e - e v a l u a t i o n  I  to so.  our conception  turn  to  maintain We  will  of  folk  order.  accept  externalism  possible?  theory  favour of  behaviour of  our  x  not  mental  mentally  mental  person  how s u c h  the  do  theory, of  is  of  theory  we we  the  existence  of  will  is  to  e x p l a i n i n g the  explanation  realism,  Why  the  known a s  simulation  context  theory  arguing in  The s i m u l a t i o n  assumes  usefulness  the  we  a  ascriptions  is  be  The  ascribe  the  our  on a t h e o r y  alternative  is  that  headline  the that  conclusion  that  psychological  appears  to  realism  is  be  a  not  t o m o r r o w when y o u p i c k e d u p y o u r m o r n i n g read,  "Philosophers  82  Prove  Beliefs  Don't  Exist".  Would you b e l i e v e  beliefs?  me t h a t  we  would  if  no m a t t e r be  in  and  notions  of  folk  false,  we  would  fictions.  Even  irrational  not  this  does error  s t i l l  do  i n o u r manner o f than  in and  prove that  that  looking  looking  for  for  behaviour,  granting  that  way  beliefs.  attributions  of  belief,  terms  of  systems.  Of  do e x i s t .  the  use  in  there  is  way  our  no  of  I  to  be of  lives  on  in  my  office,  could  anyhow,  attempt  the to  basis  your  work,  But  position  for  either  or  be  reject  interpret  behaviour,  exist.  we  do  evidence  evidence perhaps  understand  Perhaps we  beliefs  in  my  your short,  Perhaps  we a r e m a k i n g s o m e s o r t  affecting  attributing  not  in  peculiar  and p r e d i c t i o n o f  entities  the  this  contrary,  were demonstrated  entering  some  seems  possible.  not  however,  Rather  it  illusory  does  of  having  It  the  beliefs  abandon  very  that  to  others  interactions  behaviour  rationally  indicate,  beliefs.  know  others?  given  that  they  the  I  to  to  stop  intentional  to  if  in the  Interpretation be  unable even  interpret as  prove  of  intending  interpretation  But  would you  understanding  not  left  all  we a r e  directed,  are  though  and  behaviour.  we  your  as  does  be  basing  interpreting  stop  psychology  knowingly  would  you d i d ,  evidence  goal  itself  right,  example,  to  thinking,  this  I'm  what  unable  being  course  If  Would you s t o p a t t r i b u t i n g b e l i e f s  to  their  it?  the for  83  the  fact most  of of  we one  the  of  tactical  existence  beliefs  as  should  begin  another  that,  it  of  causal  is  by by  through  our  part understand  each  other, the  In  should  truth  the  last  realism Burge  of  in  folk  chapter  I  of  his  a  what  Hume  This,  at  of  induction.  at  least  review  Since  argued  been  solved  by  Hume  experience  appears Nelson  rise  as  to  approach to  what  but  do,  Those  who  argue  that  establish as  so  not  object to  that  obvious  the  to  descriptive we  that  is  be t h e  me t h a t  cases,  put  regard to  the  notion  induction,  that  that  involved  position  Goodman w i t h  justify  that  however,  of  concepts  notion of  and  Perhaps, types  to  complained  does  induction  as  problem'  ^Hume's In  his  habits the  the  valid.  they  I  for  beliefs.  failing  problem of  Hume's  describe it  to  the  of  itself  a  enough in  what  f o r w a r d by the  of  problem  belief  I will  is  briefly  here.  why we  to  for  certain  of  seems t o  himself.  give  existence  psychology  in  reality  the  referring  justification  Burge  what  arguments  that  and the  do i s ,  it  resilient  Goodman's  Goodman have  as  by  of  justification.  we  least,  and defended  sort  anti-individualism.  described  warrant granting the  we d o .  some  criticized  constitute of  as  psychology  merely  description to  taken  light  had  doesn't  be  claim  of  it  or  answer  on  to  process  that  84  actually  been  regularities Hume o f f e r e d  in a  He  described  what  basis  it  is  problem  of  induction  the is  philosophers  induction.  not  Most p h i l o s o p h e r s  interpreted  had  expectation,  problem of do  that  Hume a s  to  justify  saw t h i s simply  valid.  it  or  objection  redescribing  the of  problem rather than attempting to x  Hume's problem' r a t h e r than  Goodman c l a i m s that  the  a p p r o a c h Hume t o o k about  was,  there  and  logic  he  that in  w h i c h no  is  fact, is  one  answer  Hume's  it.  H e n c e , we  speak  solution.  n o t h i n g wrong w i t h Hume's a p p r o a c h  solving the  the  problem.  He c l a i m s  same a p p r o a c h we t a k e  questions  our  in  that  deductive  justification:  The p o i n t is that rules and p a r t i c u l a r inferences a l i k e are j u s t i f i e d by b e i n g brought i n t o agreement w i t h e a c h o t h e r . A r u l e i s amended i f i t y i e l d s an i n f e r e n c e we a r e u n w i l l i n g t o a c c e p t ; a n i n f e r e n c e is rejected i f it violates a r u l e we a r e u n w i l l i n g t o amend. The p r o c e s s o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s t h e delicate one o f m a k i n g m u t u a l a d j u s t m e n t s between r u l e s and accepted inferences; and i n the agreement achieved l i e s the o n l y j u s t i f i c a t i o n needed f o r e i t h e r . (1983, 64)  This  is  equally  the  process  well,  we  use  according to  w h i c h Goodman i l l u s t r a t e s not with the regularities, lawlike. find  1 4  with  fact  that  but  Goodman,  to  through his  logic  and  induction.  famous  *grue'  it  applies  The p r o b l e m , example,  we b a s e o u r i n d u c t i v e p r e d i c t i o n s o n  that  "Regularities  them anywhere"  deductive  we are  (1983,  cannot  say  which  where  you  find  regularities them,  and  you  is  past are can  82).  "Grue" i s a p r e d i c a t e which a p p l i e s t o a l l t h i n g s examined b e f o r e t j u s t i n case they are green and t o o t h e r t h i n g s j u s t in c a s e t h e y a r e b l u e . When I e x a m i n e t h e e m e r a l d i n f r o n t o f me I f i n d t h a t i t i s green and t h i s h o l d s f o r a l l the o t h e r emeralds I examine t o d a y . Thus, by i n d u c t i o n I c o n c l u d e t h a t a l l emeralds a r e g r e e n . The problem i s t h a t the e v i d e n c e t h a t I used t o c o n f i r m the hypothesis that a l l emeralds are green also appears to confirm the hypothesis t h a t a l l emeralds are grue. Subsequent to t , however, a l l e m e r a l d s c a n n o t be g r u e . A l t h o u g h o n l y one o f t h e h y p o t h e s e s i s c o r r e c t I appear t o have e q u a l e v i d e n c e f o r b o t h . 1 4  85  The p r o b l e m of me t o  present  find,  or  if  (according that  a similar  to  can  desires can  more  case  runs,  our of  of  of  arguments. perhaps  And  this  describing  justification. a n d we  do u s e  perhaps  be  both  in  chapter  fact  to  better  treatment  is  the  beliefs  approach  describes  as  in  the  of  that  one,  he  in  if  we  doesn't  externalism  is  to  generally  86  take  inferences  used  give  in  the  reasoning,  some s o r t  of  predictions  behaviour.  it  ascriptions as  and e x p l a i n s A n d , as much  regarded  as  can  analogous  descriptions.  and s u c c e s s f u l . appear  the  we  belief  in detail  we  could imply that  make a c c u r a t e  are  we  we  itself  treat  of  imply that  and e x p l a i n  of  If  our  inductive  operates  anti-individualistic  It  with  induction—they  how p s y c h o l o g y  reasoning.  the  and  behaviour than  case  problem  understood  of  that  beliefs  being  predict  the  concepts  reasoning  does  then,  however,  necessarily  or b e l i e f s . of  the  match up w i t h  induction to  to  me,  cannot  *entities'  attributing  doesn't  process  We do u s e  Burge's  Hume's  type  just  to  to  impossible  and d e s i r e s ,  inductive  don't  we  find,  abandon  seems of  to  seems  If  logically  and e x p l a n a t i o n s  practice  the  is  should  practice  beliefs,  abandon  it  induction.  beliefs  It  s h o u l d abandon our i n f e r e n c e s should  if  we  our arguments  our everyday  of  attribution  arguments)  altogether. our  belief  that  as  our notions  i n our p r e d i c t i o n s  conclusions  of  externalist  abandon  abandon  to  looks  reasoning  and d e s i r e  no  it  some  match up w i t h  belief  justification  indeed  traditional  or  the  Burge how  it  discussed  notice a  to  of  threat  the to  realism  and  that  themselves  having  Regardless  of  it  seems t o  those to  deny  whether  me t h a t  arguing the  this  for  the  is  the  practice  of  inductive  can  abandon.  If  our theory  theory some  we  cases,  accept  are as  a  false  is  know  justified basic  in  psychology,  but  do  not  Many  us  to  philosophers  have,  and,  in  fact  that  is  accordance  premise  we d o u s e to  be  the  not  of  affairs  justification  something  like  not  p e r h a p s we s h o u l d r e j e c t  the  us  induction  that  and  question  where a  we  do  fact  that  light  of  are,  in  is  how  do  we  use  it.  If  we  postulate,  supervenience to  cause  it  we  theoretical  how we c a n m a k e in  a  Burge,  is  will  realism  us  not  to the  is  about abandon  sense  of  notion  the  fact  that  type  of  they  states.  in  fact,  followed  p r a c t i c a l l y not with  is  than  fact  state  as  threatening  behave  on b r a i n  it  of  The  the  interpret  we  cases  not  this  consider  cause  that  to  that  use  rather  find  appropriate because,  it  so.  those  supervene  Granting  a  to  do  doing  but  The t r u t h o f  is  then  behaviour,  interesting  beliefs  way  induction t e l l s  we  in  psychology.  that  of  that  truth,  explain  It  usually  externalism.  right  reasoning,  induction,  justified  beliefs  of  a s c r i p t i o n takes place  appropriate.  justify  since  k n o w we  that  to  the  realism  taking a description  state  possible  force  is  when i n t e n t i o n a l practice  for  possible  Goodman's view  beliefs granted  to  explain  rather  87  this  on  to  give  induction,  and p r e d i c t  than  a  up  route. beliefs  taking  behaviour  conclusion  to  the as be  challenged, of  how we u s e  contexts note  is  offers  than  however,  mental  and items  abstracta world'  and what d e t e r m i n e s  has  ism s e r i o u s the  like,  to  exempt  offers  context  this  than  (1987, an  stance  an  view, of  and c l a i m s  think  the  from  a  illuminating  and  (and  like  *f u r n i t u r e  statements  certain  Although  are  of  some  are  familiar  Dennett's  vs  i n s t r u m e n t a l ism  that  conceptualization  within of  folk  the  is  context  psychology,  that  of  an  this  other  physical true  would  only  standard  position  one  of  being  intentional  convincing  s t i l l  "My ism  centres  the  1 5  rather  that—in  that  Of  believe,  that:  since  of  I  instrumentalist  beliefs  given  psychology.  adopt with r e g a r d to  I  in  existence.  realists  part  72).  content  workings  label  attributed in  them  their  investigations  bound n a t u r e of p s y c h o l o g i c a l a t t r i b u t i o n s , the  realism  believe  the  labelled  upon  prove t h e i r  drawn from f o l k p s y c h o l o g y )  rather  literality"  been  He r e g r e t s  and i n b e i n g  we  efforts  D e n n e t t whose i n t e n t i o n a l  realist.  gravity  of  their  a convincing explanation of  a  view  focused  r a t h e r t h a n on a t t e m p t i n g  whatever  if  have  beliefs  Daniel  Dennett,  is  they  dogs  of  stance on  the  question him.  I  alternative not  be  the  case.  Dennett's *i n t e n t i o n a l stance' view i s t h a t in order to p r e d i c t a n d e x p l a i n o n e a n o t h e r ' s b e h a v i o u r we t a k e t h e stance t o w a r d them t h a t t h e y have b e l i e f s and d e s i r e s . D e n n e t t l i s t s t h r e e principles that we follow when we approach each other as i n t e n t i o n a l systems: a system's b e l i e f s are those i t ought to have given its perceptual capacities, its epistemic needs and its biography; a system's d e s i r e s are those i t ought to have, given i t s b i o l o g i c a l n e e d s a n d t h e m o s t p r a c t i c a b l e means o f s a t i s f y i n g them a n d ; a s y s t e m ' s b e h a v i o u r w i l l c o n s i s t o f t h o s e a c t s i t would be r a t i o n a l f o r an agent w i t h t h o s e b e l i e f s and d e s i r e s t o perform (1987, 49). 1 5  88  If  it's  true  belief  or  should  begin  around  that  stop  with  are  2)  reject false. of  we  call  assumption  1)  is  instrumentalism with  acceptance can't  of  assumption  of  of  x  but  We  have  mental arises  been state  the  assumption  maintains  is,  that  specifiable be  weight folk  But i f  is  behaviour  supervenient  2)  good is  issue for  label.  If  then  I  problem  realism  vs.  would  is  His  reason  one  he  rejects  a  the  within the  added  the  the  to  plainly  assumption.  believe,  rejects  the  reason  just  of  1)  on  example,  behaviour  one  psychology.  is  second I  that  explain  the  event,  overcome  folk psychology.  second  not  instrumentalist'  can s t i l l  reconceptualizing the  but  me  to  then while  Dennett,  work  to  assumption  Daniel  and  that:  there  only assumption 2),  first  the  behaviour,  with  that  we  assumed  itself  that  of  is  posited  argue  notion  exist  seems  it  is  the  am s u g g e s t i n g , do  It  no l o n g e r p r e s s i n g ,  individualistically supervenience  and  first  the  1)  will  I  beliefs  because  entities  remains.  the  escape  picture  I  one r e j e c t s  supervenience  that  *behaviour'  individual.  If  agree  problem  r i d of  then,  supervenience.  theoretical  what  physical  a  psychology  premise  like  is  p r a c t i c a l l y get  folk  the  problems  beliefs  can't  using  supervenience  and  we  physical  problem  of  reconceptualized the i n d i v i d u a l i s m  to  the  rationale  will  begin  the  for  discussion  assumption.  operating that  with  causes  when two d i f f e r e n t  the  understanding  behaviour. beliefs  89  The  result  of  belief  supervenience i n the  as  a  problem  same b r a i n  state  and  cause  have in  the  causal  a  same  efficacy,  physical  reasoning  behaviour,  is  then  change that  individualistic  states  also  work  behaviour.  That  attempting  to  once  arthritis  case.  to  again,  support  the  yet  state  differences  in their  be  outdoors  Oscarl  as  walking  Twin E a r t h , walking Same case,  0scar2  moving  holding the  twrain,  physical  states,  but  a n k l e c o u l d be d e s c r i b e d as  are taking place  he  could  when x  not  both  his  90  Burge's been  in  non-  the  same and  them b e c a u s e o f  the  for  example,  we  could  water  is  In  about  H 0  on  He c o u l d  be  in  the the  the  rain.  in  his  behaviour.  and b r a i n be  2  arthritis  pain  arthritis'  behaviour cannot  both  describe  not  rain.  walking  e x a c t same p h y s i c a l m o t i o n s  in Daniel-cf,  context.  manner  i n the  t a l k i n g about  be  physical  to  be  are  jbehaviour are  and  talks  as  of  we  easily  behaviour. he  construals  just  since  be w a l k i n g  worked  and  same  this  attitude  upon t h e  They c o u l d ,  while,  that  example  of  could  behaviours  different  behaviour  But even though the  have  the  with  behaviour  me,  could  in  reflected  problem  the  Earth  umbrellas,  rain  would not  as  Twin  0scar2  belief  propositional  seems t o  environments.  i n the  Daniel-a's  it  different  in  of  of  be  arguments  ascriptions  and  be  The  understand  that  Oscarl  we m i g h t a s c r i b e  walking  we  examples  view  and b o t h  state.  must  individualistic  Putnam's  Both  individualistic. brain  what  contents  in belief  construals  against  is,  the  externalist  e x p l a i n depends,  Consider,  used  brain  same  against  if  a change  in  the  since  states  described  as  talking  behaviour  These  about is  described  examples,  notions  arthritis,  of  it  as  behaviour  in  we  describing  be  supervenience violated  of  since  individuals. since  what  context what but  1 6  ,  There  as  may  than be  behaviour  motions  as  a  grant  it  we  cases  in  which  someone  bodily  motions.  appropriate someone  that  the  cases, for  each  real  motion  is  Thus not  physical debatable, upon  not  context  motions,  we  is  depend  problem is  bodily  if  example,  on  claim is  may  the  twin.  supervene  motion  about  taint  individuals  even t h i s  the  His  the  whether  relative,  we  are  s t i l l  question  about  behaviour.  what  is  for  certainly  since  thing.  specify  can  both  physical  bodily  talk  In  thing  particular bodily  when  be  an  exercise  things  a  about  behaviour, more  bodily  I will  may  same on  we  bodily motions,  Although I think that  whether  talking  the  such  intentionally  terms. of  no  tharthritis.  general,  i n terms  behaviour  counts  counts  in  is  about  suggested,  individualistic behaviour  would  be  and,  described the  there  talking  might  behaviour  since  is  described exist  did  the  answer  to  is  doing,  will  or  "She's  response doing,  to  for  i n terms  outside  of  moving  What c o u n t s a s r a i s i n g y o u r same when c o n s i d e r e d b y a t e a c h e r o f f i c e r i n the l i n e of duty. 1 6  91  query  example.  that  the  a  her  a  involve  arms  up  about  and  what  Generally,  make r e f e r e n c e  i n d i v i d u a l and,  to  this  nothing down", type  of  however, events being  or the  hands, f o r example, i s not the i n a c l a s s r o o m as by a p o l i c e  case,  the  context  description  relative  belief  states.  In  of  to  thing.  off  same  and  asks  fishing", it. to as  "What's  If  cause  is  she her  raised  cause Mary  of  because she's  the  behaviour  obviously  in  going  case  her  fishing  same  issues  the  amount  and  drive  "She's  going  a  reason  o r she  for  desires  i n the  of  to  that  car  gives  c a n be d e s c r i b e d  the  same  behaviour  reply,  and  the  reference  the  The  behaviour  to  in  the  get  doing?"  off  then  subject  sometimes  and the  describes  fishing.  the  it  is  were  John observes  Sam,  She's d r i v i n g go  that  fact,  behaviour  both  behaviour  concerns  description the  of  same  way  supervenience  apply.  This  example  often  illustrates  bound up  determine  in  which  what  and  behaviour.  John enters  sink.  replies, drain." the  He  mental  the the state.  the  the  time  person Thus,  is  at  as  for  correct  the  least  working the  She  down  the  with  ^fixing  as  the  the  ring'  at  time  the  has  under  sink?"  same  some c a s e s ,  92  of  causes  the  behaviour  we  the  associated  correctly  how  of  dropped  while  is  description  Fixing I  belief  unclear  Janet  ring.  described  ascribing in  count  exactly  is  is  the  doing?  looking  it  and sees  my  Since  to  movements  be x  you  for  behaviour  behaviour  to  kitchen  t  with  belong  are  bodily  problem.  *behaviour'  states  looking  associated of  call  ones  the  at  further  "What a r e  I'm  may  description  whether  asks:  Although  movements  Whether  which  "No,  sink'  we  mental  behaviour  the  a  other  bodily t, is  depends understood  correctly  one not. upon the  ascribing  the of  behaviour the  upon of  person  we  upon c o r r e c t l y  behaving. and b e l i e f s  external  conditions,  on t h e  behaviour expect  is  If  is  no  if  ascriptions  contextual factors  factors,  could  provide fishing.  this  then,  the  case,  behaviour that  we  it  if  no folk  movement  then  about  partly  In  determined  by  longer  supervenience  beliefs  is  as  as  is  our  is  solved realism  93  exists  a  theory and  our  it  a  is in  belief.  It  of  a  brain  could  never  off  to  go  theory  of  built the  in.  case  seems t o  behaviour,  realism  concerning  acceptable  While  as  those  ascriptions  driving  violated  a problem for  psychology  of  is  ignoring  legs,  psychology  beliefs  false.  could be,  Mary's  behaviour  supervenience  in  reason.  Mary's  of  folk  that  very  of  explanation  problem  solid  this  the  behaviour,  of  realism  and never  on  and  and i n d i v i d u a l i s m i s are  should  behaviour,  behaviour v i a  assumption  is  about  of  the  why  supervenient  an e x p l a n a t i o n  understand  since  be  remiss  for  basis  determined  individual,  rejecting  are not,  depend  the  also  be  behaviour  adequate  on  would  of  If  behaviour,  we  is  false  behaviour  states  explain  an  of  Brain  explanations  are  violated  then  w h e n we g i v e  beliefs.  state  is  to  realism  for  state  behaviour  partially  upon the  supervenience  belief  conditions.  behaviour  justification  of  behaviour  external  grant  because supervenience fact,  determined  then  of  we  and  are  of  a s c r i b i n g the  determinations  supervenient  cause  individualism there  basis  not  the  individual?  of  If  beliefs  partially  If  depends  In of me, the  concerning  behaviour.  Perhaps, notion  however, of  our  folk  of  folk  the  to  belief.  is  be  at  things  that  we  would  is  unclear  is  not  folk  explain  as  But  unclear  the  should  we  are  with  concerns  i n e x p l a i n i n g w h e n we u s e  why  of it  around and e x p l a i n positing  of  Why it? of  If  the  beliefs  general  If  in  this  that that  sorts  of  beliefs.  but  at  existence  94  a l l ,  something  something  to  the  explain  of it  to  case  to  a  theory  understand though,  it  behaviour ultimately  have  to  b e h a v i o u r were makes  as  the  since  w h i c h we  just  terms  then  order  is  behaviour  posit the  more  beliefs  species.  concept  in  humans a n d a n i m a l s  and  would p o s i t  explain.  of  anyhow.  psychology  these  is  theory  and d e t e r m i n e d  interested  behaviour  of  part  another  really  a  attempting  we a r e  jboth  is  replace  is  they  folk  and  psychology  behaviour,  them h e r e  not  trouble  existence  relativity  are  much  behaviour  what  the  simply  psychology  folk  and i f  context  of  psychology  P e r h a p s we  b o d i l y movements the  in folk  o r s h o u l d be a t t e m p t i n g  an e x p l a n a t o r y  the  is  validity  with  movements  then  it  of  theory.  behaviour  b o d i l y movements  posit  also  of  is  If  to  the  considerations  part  theory.  another  then  consider  of  are  in question.  escape  understand  theory  must  with  of  behaviour  trying  We c o n s i d e r e d  issue  let's  the  itself  may  of  Both  is  a theory  they  sorts  false  it  folk psychology  although  But  a  itself,  explain.  are  above  behaviour  theory  with  the  is  psychology  supposed  If  of  that  demonstrating  our concept  psychology  something  to  that  concept  theory  than  belief,  demonstrate as  rather  sense.  turn clear,  And  if  this  were  the  whether  the  But,  we  as  itself  It  thing have  not  may  be  interested  in  instead  the  also  posited  discussed,  first  been  is  the  states  by  not  choosing  practically physically  not  get  a  between  some  really  of  exits.  behaviour  represented  of of  the  as posit  is  physically,  a  theory. anything,  is  not  of  the  onto a  is  skill  threatened  95  in  materialists.  If  physically, not  as  physically,  a  which  the  instead  of  seems of  non-  conception  psychology  by t h e  the  dilemma  existence of  within  theory,  apparent  or  focus is  are  the  folk  fact,  is  result folk  but  individualistically  of  and  This,  be  movement,  charade  psychology,  If  a  should  c a n u n d e r s t a n d how,  folk  is  positing  bodily  behaviour,  But  entities,  we  of  psychology  and h o l d i n g  be  whole  that  one  folk  application  beliefs  as  eliminative  foothold.  impossible,  and d o e s n ' t  result  of  not  what  and b e l i e f s  abandoning  psychology  existence  investigate  the  something  conceptualization  eliminativists  that  concept  specifiable,  the  it  should  and b o d i l y movements.  suggested  is  we  abandon  individualistically  theory  to  existence  b o d i l y movement  specifiable  folk  sense  explain  and  individualistically  of  to  that  place  We s h o u l d  including  behaviour  the  make  the  however,  explaining  on b r a i n  has  would  have  just  behaviour.  psychology,  what  we  suggested, in  as  it  clear.  behaviour  not  case,  is  not  something  a  like  ability,  then  the  fact  they  are  specifiable.  that  At  this  point,  abandon the be  however,  view  suggested,  of  use  points  of out  folk  agrees  belief  (1987,  true 72).  stronger some  of  than the  will  we  the  position  either  but  There  are,  of  of  these.  difficulties our  that  of  we  these  with  The  dispense Daniel  the  with  Dennett  in  "Some  view and  that others  question  of  were  calculation"  himself  have  may  dilemma.  falsehoods,  Dennett  not  it  instrumentalism:  interactions  ourselves to  as  claims  accepting  everyday  According  our  instruments  Since  need  Perhaps,  fictionalism,  mere  one  practically  theoretical  The  concern  answer  can't  endorsed  false  instrumentalism.  will  that  a theory.  statements are useful  that  in  as  varieties  nor  instrumentalism we  few  have  maintained  suggested  psychology  that  a  certain theoretical  neither  be  ascriptions.  however,  instrumentalists  have  may  instrumentalism  instrumentalist our  it  defends  already weaker with  is  discussed  versions one  Dennett's  of  another,  variety  of  Dennett:  ...people r e a l l y do have b e l i e f s a n d d e s i r e s o n my version of folk psychology, j u s t as t h e y really do have c e n t r e s o f gravity. Do I t h e n g r a n t t h a t the a t t r i b u t i o n s of b e l i e f and d e s i r e s under the adoption of t h e i n t e n t i o n a l s t a n c e c a n be t r u e ? Y e s , b u t you w i l l m i s u n d e r s t a n d me u n l e s s y o u g r a n t t h e following are also true: (1) The gravitational attraction b e t w e e n t h e e a r t h a n d t h e moon i s a f o r c e t h a t acts between two points: the two bodies' centers of g r a v i t y . (2) Hand c a l c u l a t o r s a d d , s u b t r a c t , m u l t i p l y and d i v i d e . . . . I t i s arguable t h a t each of these i s a u s e f u l , o v e r s i m p l i f y i n g falsehood; I would r a t h e r say t h a t e a c h i s a t r u t h o n e m u s t u n d e r s t a n d with a grain of salt. (1987, 72,73)  It  looks  us  to  as  though Dennett's  escape  our  dilemma  form of  since  it 96  instrumentalism  seems  that  on  his  might view  allow if  we  are in  rational believing  constructs as  in believing  are  to  his  centre  and  say  is,  of  expect  similar  cannot  belief us  is  appears  to  physical  it's  to  theoretical just  earlier  with  to  ascribe  no  basis  be  "there  something  to  as  is  physical  This  behave  in  answered.  and say  raining".  continue  rational  purposes  raised  there  point  that to  I  know  something  one  are  continuing  ascriptions  to  for  to  for  a  to  no  it  does if  not  these  one  is  gravity.  It  in  things Dennett  the  indicates  of  While  the  of  gravity  that it  instead  97  we  seems  eliminate  the are  that  like  respond fact not it  is  thing  we that  enterprise  for  posits,  might  other  we  and  gravity,  realized  philosophers  He may c l a i m t h a t  while  centres  or neurophysiological  suggesting  the  to  physically  centres  exist.  point.  be drawn between b e l i e f s  comes  some of  to  occupied  our  because  searching  disanalogy.  has  for  don't  his  be  centre  states  gravity  When  some b e h a v i o u r a l  search  gravity,  a distinction  there  Furthermore,  are  his  gravity.  belief  proves  is  however,  searching  of  point  in  we  we a r e  explanatory  concern  though  such  gravity  and  The  gravity,  exist.  corresponds  to  for  irrational  centres don't  even  of of  rational  gravity",  "there  it  There  of  predictive  being  cannot  Centres  desires.  states  one  things  and  reality  as  make  serve  our  intentional physical  beliefs.  that  beliefs  regard  Just  in  in centres  that  that  equivalent decades,  equally  a  ridiculous. the  theory  centres this  i n one  does not  of  of just  case  indicate  we a  ridiculous  for  us  to  states.  If  be  were  to  reply  him.  I  think,  with  further  beliefs  of  the  to  prove  If it  to  true either  states  we  equivalents. theory  In  of  order  what  folk  to  would  for  of  intentional  prove that  why  or  that  is  this  confirm happen  and  then  theory  predicted  the  in  create  the  theory  those  actually  the  why  equivalents to  of  this  is  framework  we  should  be  is  able  the  o n l y way t o  do  physical  equivalents  to  exist  What  is  circumstances  physical  claimed  one  circumstances  it  such  gravity  gravity,  If  requires  folk psychology  then  consider  occurs.  to  question  answer  that  don't  case?  of  matter to  though  exist  there  Let's  various  is  as  inclined  our conceptual  a theory  there  be  physical  into  looks  the  me,  theory is  It  psychology?  theory  right  would  need  seems t o  the  false.  posit  But  searching  built  I  that we  psychology or  way  think  wherein  folk  this  And, i t is  psychology  theory.  the  equivalents  however,  I  been  motivation  a  is  have  and d e s i r e s .  folk  this  physical  in  investigation.  philosophers  that  for  1 7  Dennett  agree  searching  does  the  first.  could  predict  according to  by  see the  if  to  what theory  the the is  A s Tom P a t t o n h a s p o i n t e d o u t t o m e , c e n t r e s o f g r a v i t y a r e locations w h i c h i s why a s e a r c h f o r p h y s i c a l e n t i t i e s t o identify w i t h c e n t r e s o f g r a v i t y seems r i d i c u l o u s . What I a r g u e b e l o w is that the only reason that a search for physical equivalents of beliefs does not seem equally ridiculous is because of our u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f them as t h e o r e t i c a l e n t i t i e s . I b e l i e v e t h a t this way o f c o n c e i v i n g o f m e n t a l s t a t e s i s m i s g u i d e d a n d t h a t , j u s t l i k e location, a belief, understood in experiential terms, is not a posit in a theory. 1 7  98  confirmed.  If  theory,  proven  is  theory  does  gravity  exist.  on  the  order  to  explain  the  scientific  anti-realist doesn't true  and or  that  is,  gravity  between adequacy  the of  x  it  claim  is  it  very  accept  adequate  even  questions  about  theory  that  of  x  predicted  by  the  a  true the  is  have  accepting  and a c c e p t i n g  the  that  how  it  sort  of  We h a v e  to  of  be  could  a  this  like  be is  in  wrong, not  in  question.  does  exist  theory  theory from  theory  There i s ,  some  force  theory.  the  about  properties  useful the  say  gravity'.  some  gravity  though 1 8  the  Our t h e o r y  that  a  of  there  would  different  is  part  wrong  posited  is  Proving  exists  were  force  that  that  exist.  is  a different  say  exists.  Actually, theory. Gravity t a k e n t o be t h e doesn't exist. 1 8  this  actually  the  have  least  immediately  calling  non-existence  may  may  we  phenomena.  least,  gravity  empirically  that  or  what  know t h a t  are  and  what  however,  anti-realist  we  at  then  that  we  or  if  don't  We s a y  certain  will  even  we  which  of  theory,  But  since  realist  actually  theory  theory  basis  Or, at  the  force  existence  question.  A  this  this  force  but  false.  operation,  about  not  occur,  We s a y  in  theory  does  not  doesn't  operates. force  it  but  of  proving  however, truth  existence  a  is  a the  realist  gravity  anti-realist  the  that  the  the  gravity  gravity  Both of  while  is  true  will  deny  distinction  or of  empirical gravity.  i t seems odd t o s a y t h a t gravity exists' is a explains such and s u c h ' i s what i s standardly t h e o r y and t h i s c o u l d be t r u e e v e n i f gravity x  99  Now  let's  question of  the  here are  consider at  issue  theory,  that  jealous  whether, he's will  all  become  concerns, disprove beliefs set  then or  he  test  hypotheses  by  there  But  disprove place.  the  causal  and  natures  of  causal  and  but  entities.  be  or Just  as  of  and  the  theory,  beliefs  and d e s i r e s  explain  behaviour.  case  true  window  or when  that were  is  and  our  we  our  prove the  or  first  existence  have  attributes  folk  simply posits  100  could  about  of the  Our concern here  beliefs  that  we  of  psychology  to in  the  and  whether  either  he  theory  what  desires  theory  view  see  just  assume  of  our  gravity,  and  hypotheses  the  are  theory  it's  these  of  with  and d e s i r e s .  the  the  believes  If  nothing  existence  And, according to  the  and he  fact,  do  the  nature that  with  open  aspects  instead  test  of  not  a p r o b l e m . We c o u l d p r o v e  beliefs  tests  content  relationships  window.  in  tests  The  We a r e  example,  in  predictions  This,  of  of  cool  i n the  make  desires.  for  will  disconfirm  those b e l i e f s  not with the desires  to  be  sorts  desires  John  would not  correct.  sorts  and  partners  the  existence  These  beliefs  equal,  conditions,  these  poor  states.  concerning the  generalizations  opening  confirm  were  beliefs the  prefers  and d e s i r e s .  up  does.  make  being  cool  intentional  concerned whether,  people else  and  questions  of  whether  not  warm b e c a u s e  from  theory  about  We a r e  psychology  differs  the  concerned true.  folk  in  and  to  beliefs  desires  psychology that  is  is  theory  as a to  T h e way t o cause  prove that  behaviour  behaviour.  will  result  assumes  test  a l l this  whether pain  causes  people  that  Sam l e f t  rejection there  of  the  it  exists.  by  someone  for  case there and this  existence  1 9  that  people  that to  the  is, prove  same  because  the  whom t h e y is  care  hypothesis  mental  to  is  arise.  states.  any  that  is  their we  to  pain  does  not  hypothesize we  and  assume beg  or  disprove,  it  if  we  people  sad,  who a r e  saddened.  these  exist  is  is  that the  does  hypothesize  saddened by  Sam i s  can  seeing  doesn't  rejection  they  causal  wince,  in  way,  our  already  it  are  of  of  so  something c a l l e d  None  cause  doing  J i l l ' s  not  This hypothesis  deeply  That  do  desires  if  he was  that  an a s s u m p t i o n t h a t  emotion of  which claims  that  and  people  hypothesis  In  they  it  example,  causes  out  early  because  an e m o t i o n c a l l e d s a d n e s s .  another hypothesis  cause  sets  party  for  wince,  entities  testing  h i m , we a r e h y p o t h e s i z i n g t h a t  exists  exists  this  that  by  and  pain  as  certain beliefs  observing  to  on  this  by  While  what  pain  So,  equal,  hypothesis wince.  assume  done  exist  testing.  being  about  be  exist  show  behaviours  entities  they  question  that  certain  are  else  can't  to  a b o u t how p o s s e s s i n g  the  we  and d e s i r e s  obviously  this  in  that  properties that,  is  But  generalizations  beliefs  is  that based  rejected Again,  * sadness'  sufficient  cases always  in  tests  to the  assumed.  A r e a l i s t m i g h t s a y t h a t , t h r o u g h o u r t e s t s , we p r o v e t h a t p a i n causes people t o w i n c e , whereas an a n t i - r e a l i s t might say t h a t we c o n f i r m t h e t h e o r y t h a t p a i n c a u s e s p e o p l e t o w i n c e a n d t h a t such c o n f i r m a t i o n counts towards the e m p i r i c a l adequacy of the theory, but not the l i t e r a l t r u t h of the theory. In e i t h e r case, however, the prior q u e s t i o n of whether there exists an entity p a i n ' is not addressed. 1 9  x  101  The  only  way,  entities are  posited  that  by  we  folk  beliefs  things  that  and d e s i r e s .  desires  as  looking  for  maintaining  entities  is  right,  our  anything p h y s i c a l because p a r t l y by s o c i a l ,  Eliminativists false  the  appears there  is  be  no  intentional that the  it  theory  exist.  argue  sense  in  states that  are  be  With  it  gravity  questions  of  been t r y i n g  in  contents  even we  we  We h a v e if  we  do  be r e q u i r e d .  now  It  to  we  match  that  in  seen, with  that  factors.  for  the  theory, that  the  fact  aspects  the  is  this  claiming  certain  appears to  up  our  psychology  examined  prove  and  are determined  folk  just  of  start  have  non-physical  justified  not  exist  justification  confirm  s t i l l  there  beliefs  confirmation of  are  there  justify  A n d , as  of  the  that  us  to  can't  of  concepts  forces  of b e l i e f s  The  than the  our  order  theory  exist.  which  of  entities  be r e q u i r e d  that  true.  seems  realism  about  theory  states.  the  that  conception of  ascriptions  if  exist.  true  supervenience  I've  other  More seems t o  questions  that don't  that,  seems  the  make s u r e  with  h i s t o r i c a l or otherwise  entities  to  the  existence  make s u r e  the a  the  to  somehow  in  of  for is  equivalents  existence  externalism  up  seems t h a t  physical the  test  We n e e d t o  match It  posited  can  psychology  physical equivalents.  physical  if  then,  the to  to  be  the  about  truth  or  the  case  that  existence  confirmation of  demonstrate  above  102  is  that  we of the this  can  separate  gravity  from  theory.  What  does not  seem  to  be  the  theory  case  view.  realism,  with  When  what  theory  of  psychology cause  states.  of  recall  force  this  the  There  equivalents don't  some  is  of  physical  confirmed  or  experiments,  of  is  in  question of  But  gravity.  you  But i f  you  and  of  things  likely  be  whether  the  On t h e theory  psychology  part  is  the  again.  with  103  and,  in  mental  of the  theory.  There is  we  tables  in  how  basis the  exist  is  and q u a r k s ,  finding is  of  our  theory a  of  separate  existence.  chairs about  it  that  gravity  about  anti-realist  label  physical  our  of  the  and  sort  understand  theory on  We  for  would r e s u l t  really  some  about  looking  because  included electrons  they  posits  on what y o u r e q u i r e f o r  an  folk  a n d how  theory  our views  like  of  phenomena.  a  of  theory  theory.  modified  in  but  behaviour  our  gravity  depends  only  would  since  confident  whose answer  ontology,  gravity  any manner t h a t  question  include  up  the  about  certain  no  disconfirmed are  for  whether  states  once  come  Whether c e n t r e s  you  gravity  and  thing.  we  without  not  the  states  theory  intentional  mental  folk  mental  responsible  gravity.  If  of  of  the  or  possible.  that  theory  states  centres  exist  a  is  right,  is  case  behaviour,  *gravity'  operates.  they  case  are  entities  is  mental  that  force  It  existence  keep  issue  properties  explain  So t h e  at  the  according to  psychological  theory  not  about the  to  can't  Let's  is  behaviour.  attempting  You  the  states  about  posited  it  is  talk  generally  of  the  view  we  is  generalizations existence  intentional  in  your  centres  then  of  perhaps  you  would  your  include  view  realist  on  centres  about  There  are  the  up w i t h a t h e o r y  it  basis  of  seems  it  is  of  we  finding  the  must  for  find  physical  as  to  seems  a  to  me  and c e n t r e s  further  that  x  with  is  a  one  grain  grant  that  it  of  within is  (rather  than  certain  causal  itself  that  forces.  to  the  us  to  gravity  a good  the  part of  that  it's  think,  theory  theory  properties),  t h e o r y c a n be c o n f i r m e d i s  i f  then  the  a  taking  come  some  our  theory, sort  of  confirm forces  conception for  on  This, in  theory  these  between one.  the  means  of  folk  something  that the  beliefs  And I  about  would  them as that  framework  beliefs beliefs only  and  truths  this  since  desires in  the  and agree  and d e s i r e s  sense  we a r e a s s u r e d o f  104  for  and  world.  are  however,  theory  a theory that a  be  ascriptions.  analogy  don't  be  search  Dennett's is  the  in order to  Finding  Again,  forces  I  can  states'  there  Thus,  intentional  salt'.  you  of  responsible  in  ought  can understand statements  of  sustainable  our  however,  We m o d i f y o u r t h e o r y  But a c c o r d i n g to  these  that  desires  operate.  and e x p e r i e n c e  physical.  justify  are  *i n t e n t i o n a l  behaviour.  theory  entities,  that  a p p r o a c h we  theory  something  psychology  It  the  responsible  theory,  forces  folk psychology.  part  forces  is  as  forces  a b o u t how t h e y  me,  of  of  these  Regardless,  gravity.  our experiments  to  analyses  gravity.  gravity of  sorts  We l a b e l  of  of  theory  some  behaviour.  the  centres  which  view if  we  exist have this  existence  of  some  physical  desires. *with  things  There  a grain  is of  that  no  we  room  can  in  the  and  folk  psychology  desires  particular just  as  exist.  realism  folk  psychology  claim  that  behaviours, beliefs  X,  we  belief  then,  belief  must  assume  that  earlier,  the  P  and  same  grant the  granting the  If  this  a  cause  of  theory  must  that  be  assumed.  that  then,  it  seems  Q.  existence  of  of  to  for  of  the  And  against  that the  existence  order  to  know  have  assume,  as  I  the  existence  are  of  behaviour  to  must  behaviour,  b e h a v i o u r we  theory  particular  Q cause  we  gravity,  simply  people  Also  exists. count  in  that  that  claim  as  the  Thus,  beliefs  only  cause  theory,  desire  itself  existence  existence  the  possible  arguments t h a t the  desires  test  desire  the  understood  and  claim  b e h a v i o u r s . And  however,  to  it's  the  claims  confirmation of  best  P and the  that the  is  that  a n t i - r e a l i s m about  If,  so  also  the of  discussed  if  we  of are  justified  beliefs.  w e r e w h a t was m e a n t b y t h e  theory  and  existence  claim that  particular  the  beliefs  in order  against  in  beliefs  for  we a s s u m e  psychology  entities.  behaviour  count  to  a  desires  course,  going  is  the  beliefs  the  particular  that  theory  includes the  folk  questions  about  and  whether  a theory  with r e a l i s m vs  the  from  much i f  and d e s i r e s  case  we c a n s e p a r a t e  is  Perhaps  beliefs  i n the  theory  call  salt'.  B u t p e r h a p s we a r e a s s u m i n g t o o that  legitimately  me,  105  claim that attempts  to  folk  psychology  disprove  it  is  would  centre the  around proving i t s  generalizations  anti-realists  generalizations  the  possibility  to  are  of  concerned  The  been  which it  is  I,  for  not  the  a  with  the  theory  theory states  of  against  is  folk  folk  of  is  a  The problem i s  that  a theory.  Dennett's  the  we  of  to  folk  It  is  folk  states  theory  part  of  states exist.  avoid  the  106  believe  identifiable in  the the  psychology  is  not  but are  is  of  in  on  Thus,  the  or  has  that  the  existence  begging  position  argued  psychology,  the  conceptual  believe  have  of  the  he d o e s n ' t  does  which mental  accepting  are  theory  psychology  with  as  I  posited  position  within  he  states.  reduction.  possible  but  intentional  with  is  general,  behaviour.  without if  in  concerned  entities  against  Dennett  psychology.  in  with  intentional  possibility  by  concerned  are  am i n a g r e e m e n t .  states,  behaviour  the  must,  the  that  construal,  that  theory  arguments  advanced part,  of  i n s t r u m e n t a l i s m because  of  psychology  we  And the  behaviour  cause  They  these  generalizations of  The  in entities physically equivalent  generalizations  about  elimination.  existence  the  be  rarely  psychology.  folk psychology  theory  even  with  intentional  theory  are  false,  of  position  supervenience,  its  however,  Furthermore, i f  to  realizations  most  been u n d e r s t o o d as  prove  advocate  folk  false.  physical  that  framework o f  a  of  arguments  position  generally  not  explain behaviour.  have  not  discussions,  the  They  did  would  philosophical  generalizations  rather posited.  that  As  of  we c a n n o t  a  folk accept  entities.  question,  is  intentional  theory  the  it  have  And some  independent entities  ground  exist.  from  We  cannot  predictions  of  within  this  scenario.  If  accept  you  existence mental  the  the  of  theory,  states,  as  and  must  psychology  Within  as  a  point  Dennett i f  our to  does,  you  is  not  you  must  accept your  framework  theory  Dennett's  that  the  an  accept  the  existence  of  through  conceives  view  the  option  But Dennett  that  the  in  position  must be t r u e .  the  claim  successes  view  justify  Thus supervenience  supervenience.  justify  Dennett's  states,  you  to  simply  theory.  mental  physicalism.  which  appears  denies  of  folk  to  be  inconsistent.  Within  an  alternative  Dennett's  view  conception and  we h a v e  just  question  like of  significant really  do  true are  find only  trying  great  beliefs  we  whether Just  b e c a u s e we c a n ' t consider physical  i f to  the  like  really  we  sense.  have  gravity  wouldn't find  of  prove.  107  of  folk  and  beliefs exist  is  however,  alternative of  or  becomes  throwing  within. a  The as  calculators  intelligence  not  gravity  multiply.  psychology  beliefs  beliefs  centres  suggest  signs  of  On a n  we h a v e  do  of  equivalents  psychology,  subtract  eliminating  existence  folk  of  add,  centres  as  of  deal  just  calculators  add.  wouldn't  can't  a  whether as  calculators we  makes  conception  out  our  within,  because  we  But  this  is  theory  that  we  An a l t e r n a t i v e c o n c e p t i o n o f to  maintain realism, then,  folk  psychology  generalizations say  of  the  traffic,  Jack's that  Jack  it  that I  he  went  states  or  acts  tested. off  of  God.  This  must  the  the  theoretical  The  theory  applying is  true  than It  a  theory.  to  an  we f i r s t  me  observe  I'm not  am o n l y  that  he  by  mental  A or  B or cause  in  Thus  about  A or is  rather  cause  of  B or  be C,  that  not  than  the  I  avoid  t h e o r y must  theory  for  when  cause  behaviour is  order  the  to  the  state  C,  that  that  wanted  suggested by the  that can  that  we p o s i t  i n the we we  sense  can't help  brain  not  what  theory  even  which behaviours  we  ascribe  to  explain  one that  help but are  are  see  see  applying  hypothesize  a t h e o r y when  a theory  to  decide  108  I  people  are  it  This  rather at  as  a l l .  having  engaging  involved  was c a u s e d  a belief  belief.  to  in  where  which mental s t a t e .  ascribe  which  as  steps that  belief  beliefs  people two  we  behaviour.  we p o s i t  but  not  beliefs  particular  b e h a v i o u r and h y p o t h e s i z e  and t h e n next  using  when  beliefs  Conceptually, there  a mental state  maintain  testable.  s u g g e s t e d by t h e by  to  sense  hypothesis  granted  We p o s i t  not  Neither  behaviour.  the  because  Which b e l i e f s  claims  sense  another but  beliefs.  I  early  That b e l i e f s be  able  us  postulates.  theory  i n the  seems  then  ground.  in  caused  caused  be  empirically  home  The h y p o t h e s i s  b e h a v i o u r was  get  are  am p r e s e n t i n g  Jack's  to  theory  b e h a v i o u r was  example.  gets  would s t i l l  a  makes  psychology that would allow  b e h a v i o u r . The h y p o t h e s i s  Jack's  for  is  folk  by But  Jack;  Is  folk  psychology  standardly the  crudely  desires  cause  applying theory with a  a  and  simply  when  we  theory  that  behaviour  attention  or s k i l l  of  is  view  states to behaviour; do.  we  am r i g h t ,  of  folk  the  then  we a r e n o t  are  According  simply to  the  that  then  perhaps  when  do  we  it's  is  it?  actually somehow  positing  cognitively  simulation  not  via  cognitive  If  beliefs  up  According  of  ascribe  a  currently  behaviour  type  not  come  If  is  theorizing. we  and  using  which  a  that,  may b e  what  of  be  are  beliefs?  explanations  of  to  beliefs  Simulation theory'.  of  been  a n d we  how  beliefs,  result  has  understood  (we  psychology  c a l l e d the our  is  by  it  b e h a v i o u r and  behaviour  by  way  however,  caused  caused  of  theory  rather than a type  correct,  others  the  is  the  standardly  a theory  is  are  in  explanations)  theory,  states  capacity  they  is  simulation  intentional  I  behaviour  theory  is  explain  between  that  alternative  If  Not  been  put,  behaviour.  idea  the  has  psychology  decide  receiving  then?  folk  theory  to  It  the  The  to  theory  understood.  case that  very  a  this  type  intentional to  explain  perceiving  what  theory:  ...human b e i n g s are a b l e to p r e d i c t and e x p l a i n each others' a c t i o n s b y u s i n g t h e r e s o u r c e s o f t h e i r own minds to s i m u l a t e the p s y c h o l o g i c a l a e t i o l o g y of the a c t i o n s o f o t h e r s . S o , i n s t e a d o f b e i n g t h e o r i z e r s , we a r e s i m u l a t o r s . We a r e m e n t a l s i m u l a t o r s , n o t i n t h e s e n s e t h a t we m e r e l y s i m u l a t e m e n t a t i o n , but i n the sense that we u n d e r s t a n d others by u s i n g our own mentation i n a process of simulation. (Davies and Stone 1995b, 3)  109  The  focus  of  the  vs  the  psychology between  a n d how  focus  has  developmental cases  in  to  appropriately to  studies  theory  of  similar  Although the  The as  lower  those  the  is  it  an  d a t a c a n be  has  theory,  the  conceptualizing for  demise  follow.  one,  well  it  if of  If  in  how to  of  psychology  110  in  their the  children beliefs  being they  control  paid do  groups  usually  that  presenting  is  is  at  on  with  as an  mental after  claim  least  that  so  by e i t h e r  more r e c e n t  externalism  there  how  ascribe  explained  psychology  present  poorly  debate  the  Rather,  intelligence.  seems  is in  our a s c r i p t i o n s  integrity  and  it.  of  explains  attention  traditional  however,  Thus,  of  the  integrity  examining  comparison  in  view  to  folk  phenomena  better  to  deal  equally well  fared very  assumption,  hope  of  each  ability  autism  in  empirical  view.  is  with  tasks  of  of  relationship  save  certain  theory  the  the  may h e l p  addition  a great  levels  traditional  necessarily  their  participating  simulation such  theory  theory  on t h e  or  explaining  In  others,  type  not been  realism  suddenly  children  mind  matter  much o f  to  simulation  Proponents  how  quite  on  or  upon  phenomena.  gain  has  simulation  of  the  attitude  been  light  on  theory  psychology.  psychological appear  theory  propositional  psychology the  literature  far,  theory.  proposal  a challenge  is  true,  we  know  as  to is  and the our  it  does  not  alternative  way  of  states, a l l .  perhaps  there  That  the  simulation  eliminative  materialist  Shaun N i c h o l s , it  is  this  theory  route  who e x a m i n e  presented  by  does  pose  is  an  alternative  evident.  and c r i t i q u e the  Robert  Gordon  Stephen  to  the  Stich  and  simulation theory  and A l v i n  Goldman,  explain  as it  way:  The c e n t r a l p r e m i s e i n the e l i m i n a t i v i s t ' s argument i s that neuroscience (or connectionism or cognitive s c i e n c e ) i s on t h e v e r g e o f d e m o n s t r a t i n g p e r s u a s i v e l y that folk psychology is false. But i f Goldman and Gordon are r i g h t , they w i l l have p u l l e d the r u g out from under the e l i m i n a t i v i s t s . F o r i f what underlies our ordinary explanatory p r a c t i c e i s not a theory at all, then obviously it c a n n o t be a r a d i c a l l y false theory....Gordon and Goldman c l a i m t h a t the theory w h i c h p o s i t s a t a c i t l y known f o l k p s y c h o l o g y i s itself radically false, s i n c e t h e r e a r e much b e t t e r ways o f e x p l a i n i n g p e o p l e ' s a b i l i t i e s t o i n t e r p r e t and p r e d i c t b e h a v i o u r . (1995b, 124-25)  While  it  can't  be  may b e a  positive of  radically  side,  just  justification  conception positing putting  is  myself  by  experiencing  justified  folk  but  I  you,  only  the  the  within  we  simulation  believing  in  psychology  theory,  in  must  theory  but  by,  because  can  the  to  be  simulation  made theory  ill  not  a theory  If  restore this  manner are  it the  sense  alternative  of  s t i l l  on  our  behaviour  understand  same c o n t e x t - b o u n d  case  a  Beliefs I  can  your  in  is  demonstrate,  beliefs.  understand  i n your p o s i t i o n .  behaviour,  for  if  false  how  in  beliefs  order  that  correct,  of  In  clear  not  by  speaking,  explanations  your  behaviour  beliefs.  that  folk  psychology  conception,  we m u s t  is gain  a  better  understanding of  theory. of  an  I  would l i k e  alternative  psychology  is  within  theory  which  We  the  we m u s t  began  result  that  behaviour  itself  not  beliefs  order  We  have  a resolution  problem  the is  of  to  review  for  it  to  within  it  is  We  solved  was  not of  a conclusion  only  if  behaviour  The f a c t  beliefs  we  are  behaviour. violates way  to  supervenience, distinguish  associated down t h e  Furthermore,  beliefs.  street  is  justified in  doesn't  cause-associated Whether J a n e ' s for  a  the  seem t o beliefs  on t h e  To  behaving,  than  already  as  attributed  beliefs.  rather If  112  one  is  is  about  context-  questioning they  are  not  existence  of  behaviour  any  principled  from  1  behaviouris  moving,  offering  running  running  associated  just  that  that  behaviour or  b e h a v i o u r depends  someone  its  b e h a v i o u r when s h e  jog'  solution  realism  that  be  a  theory  behaviour  we a r e  fact  to  the  showed  that  fact  a perceived threat' view  The  i n assuming the  addition to  there  Agoing  the  as  that  theory  despite  of  not  arises  lead to  we a s s u m e ,  basis  problems  theory.  that  the  that  problems  which  the  supervenient,  several these  within  r e a l i s m about behaviour. But i f on t h e  case  concluded  bound n a t u r e , existence  the  satisfactory.  supervenient.  simulation  requirements  simulation  individualistically realized will as  be  supervenience  be  by  the  identified  arguments.  analysis not  proposed  framework and  solution  upon  being  in  problem could  the  is  however,  externalist  depended  also  theory  the  the  supervenience but  justified.  with  of  first,  theory  find  what  a  from  beliefs. we  theory  have of  behaviour, clear  offering  how t h a t of  cause.  not  explain for  a  state.  We  which  wanted  the  an  a  fresh  what  that  we  It  is  the  from  that  do  we  another other  are  on t h a t  words,  place, able  the  is  basis  and  that  the  what  by  of  the  to  She  she  the  is  to  going  intentional behaviour  may b e or  jogging  because  in practice of  as  posit  this  shape  she  we s e e m  behaviour  from  explanandum  to our  be no p r i n c i p l e d the  solved.  because basis  of  fact  beliefs  way from  is  and  simulating  113  their  your  of  offered  is  existence  of  context-bound  we  don't  know  on  behaviour-associated irrelevant.  that  relevant.  failure  beliefs,  of  the  that  is  the  The s o l u t i o n  existence  distinguish  distinctions is  part of  an  problem of  the  on t h e  to  not  a problem.  satisfactory  these  in  separating  experience  cause-associated  make  get  appears to  perspective  challenged  first  we  beliefs  be  her  state.  descriptions  to  beliefs  to  it's  count  Jane t h a t  Although  threating realism is  never  basis  our  appears  simulation  in  both.  Theoretically,  satisfactory.  nature  or  to  behaviour, there  this.  is  wants  as  would  explanation  intentional  she  air,  separate of  for  further  example,  i.e.  beliefs  of  ask  supervenience above,  say  then  to  the  to  count  what  can  explanation  From  knows  we d e c i d e  behaviour,  beliefs  attributed  some  doing  what  one  of  beliefs  already  for  able  If  what  and  how  cause  have  explanations of  clear  the  we  involves  because,  be  behaviour  behaviour. jog,  as  person decides  description It's  beliefs  we  What  The  understand is  states,  relevant, by  fact one in  putting  myself  in  think,  not  beings  your  to  proposes states, of  the  we  are  share the  x  other,  imagining the  conditions  our  since simply  The  the  is  are  of  other  who  The  another  not  same s t a t e s . of  of  what  b o t h human  a  result,  x  the  because  being  c a s e we d o n ' t mental  mental  situation  off-line',  actually  we  theory  positing  into  you  have  states,  in to  it, know  we  simply  the  aspect  states.  whether  says  that  considered of  about  are  considered  and  to  any t r u t h t o  exist that  beliefs  and p r e d i c t i n g  can  i n the of  now,  other  could  legitimately  114  it  realist  call all  disappears exist.  They  behaviour.  this  view.  seems  to  Dennett  things  distinguish  a  on  way t h a t  Thus Dennett  himself  actually  accommodated  realism  realism  abstracta.  is  beliefs  explaining  nothing  label  there  theoretical  arguments  is  of  as  by  as  than  In t h i s  ascription  know  simulation  ourselves  rather  lumped t o g e t h e r ,  instrumentalist Burge,  one  to  and,  ways.  projecting'  psychological  There  sorts  am a b l e  b u t b e c a u s e we a r e  similar  context  o u r means  questions  gravity.  the  that  not  appropriately with  x  problem of  externalist  question  I  physiologies,  understand  those  theory it  speak,  and i n a manner r e f e r r e d t o  experience'  of  we  in  b u t b y somehow  Finally,  to  similar  world  that  experiencing the  so  by a p p l y i n g any t h e o r y ,  who  react  place  like  beliefs  The  me,  suggests, centres  from  of  these  finally  escape  himself  a  along,  be  the  realist.  could  also  comfortably psychology  In t h i s within  maintain his as  chapter the  realism  about  case  with  and  realism  of  a  to  of  induction,  simulation  the  concepts,  point  accommodate psychology presents  theory  this  externalist not  plausible  the  claims  force  concepts,  abandon  we  can't  analogously be  in  my  allow  us  simulation  to  that  even  can  considered  us  and t h a t ,  am r i g h t  theory  folk  chapter,  if  to  theory  the  arguments,  be  abandoned.  alternative  chapter.  115  the  to  arguments  so  to  maintain  theory  receives  simulation theory  and  theory  and  it  is  the  the  simulation focus  of  the  is can  then r e a l i s m and i n t e g r i t y How  to  seeking  non-empirical grounds. A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  alternative  need a  in  I  of  theory.  shouldn't If  conception  externalist  concepts  we  the  the  simulation  theory  these  existence.  about  plausible  the  their  if  the  the  psychological  s u p p o r t on i n d e p e n d e n t more  by  within  argued that  folk  dispense  demonstrate far,  I have  framework  practically the  described  position  in  theory next  Chapter S i m u l a t i o n  The  t h e  simulation  theory. do  and  so  When we on  the  C o n t e x t  claims  ascribe  beliefs  of  ascribing  of  behaviour.  B u t w h e n we  manner  that  theory,  is  information,  The  same.  not  The  partially  N a t u r e  that  folk  Folk  states  B e l i e f  to  to  is  explain  to  we  not  a  we d o  not  s t i l l  the  and  states  hypotheses  ourselves  is  others  psychology  According  forming  A t t r i b u t i o n  psychology  intentional  theoretical.  project  o f  and d e s i r e s  theory.  ascribe  than  we  do  predict so  in  a  the  simulation  by  processing  into  the  other's  2 0  externalist  psychological  a  intentional  rather  circumstance.  Bound  theory  basis  Four  arguments  states  contents  point  can vary while of  determined  one's by  out the  that brain  psychological  external  or  the  contents  states  states  remain  are  environmental  at  of the  least  factors.  The term p r o j e c t i o n ' r e f e r s t o p l a c i n g o n e ' s s e l f i n the situation of the other. When t h i s is done, one is not simply i m a g i n i n g h e r s e l f as b e i n g i n t h e o t h e r ' s s h o e s , so t o s p e a k , but i s i m a g i n i n g h e r s e l f as b e i n g the o t h e r . I t i s d i f f e r e n t from the e x p l i c i t e x e r c i s e o f i m a g i n i n g what you would do i f y o u were i n h e r shoes. 2 0  Imagine, f o r example, t h a t y o u r f r i e n d M i k e j u s t won a m i l l i o n dollars. When p r o j e c t i n g you wouldn't imagine that y o u won a million dollars, but rather that y o u w e r e M i k e a n d y o u won a million dollars. Within this projection you *experience' the b e l i e f s t h a t Mike would experience except t h a t s i n c e you are not actually in the circumstance, since it is an imagined or s i m u l a t e d ' world i n which you are Mike winning a m i l l i o n d o l l a r s , the e x p e r i e n c e s you have a r e r e f e r r e d t o as o f f l i n e ' . They a r e on a d i f f e r e n t t r a c k than n o n - p r o j e c t i o n based beliefs. x  x  116  Supervenience realism  is  believe  that  Burge  is  violated  claimed  realism  and Dennett, through  psychology  is  my  a  be is  possible  the  concern  that  simulation  consider  the  particular  further this  context  of  clarification  end  I  I  will  of  the  is  the  subject  for  this  of  autism,  a  Unlike  option  is  that  realism,  and  do  that  so,  theory of  only folk  I  is  in  the  concerns  to  realism some  order.  studies I  am  need  however,  framework.  invoke  we  against  First,  externalist  we u s e  to  couple  alternative  issue  of  concern  developmental  the  studies  simulation  autism, normal  is  a  and shed  The  x  To that  will  are  then  answered  intentional  and  conducting rather the  the  than  original  some f u r t h e r  states  belief  and U t a F r i t h , task  in  children with  117  which Down's  studies  realism  in  motivation  light  Sally-Anne Experiment'  Leslie  false  children  those  illustrate  theory  our purposes.  for  differences  do  by Simon B a r o n - C o h e n , A l a n study  I  relevant.  explaining  behind  of  us  theory.  review  explanations  the  psychology,  Dennett,  notion  arguments  simulation  on s i m u l a t i o n t h e o r y  Although  this  the  enables  simulation  briefly  idea  causally  and  supervenience.  defend  externalist  show t h a t  are  psychological  Burge  that  of  to  theory  the  the  Like  believe  is  inspired  and t h a t  result,  theory.  ultimate  the  a  without  rejection  claiming  within  as  impossible.  however,  available  Since  to  and,  on  the  conducted  experts  in  children syndrome,  the with all  with  a  mental  belief  which  age  is  of  above  three,  were  asked  to  identify  a  false:  We u s e d t w o d o l l s . S a l l y and Anne, and a c t e d out a little scenario: S a l l y has a basket and Anne has a box. S a l l y has a m a r b l e and she p u t s i t i n h e r b a s k e t . She t h e n g o e s o u t . Anne t a k e s o u t S a l l y ' s m a r b l e a n d puts it i n h e r box w h i l e Sally is away. Now S a l l y comes b a c k a n d w a n t s t o p l a y w i t h h e r m a r b l e . A t t h i s p o i n t we a s k t h e c r u c i a l q u e s t i o n : *Where w i l l S a l l y look for her m a r b l e ? ' . . . T h e f a i l u r e of the autistic children to understand S a l l y ' s b e l i e f i s . . .remarkable, because they a c t u a l l y h a d a much h i g h e r m e n t a l age t h a n the o t h e r c h i l d r e n . I n t e l l e c t u a l l y t h e y were a b l e t o s o l v e a g r e a t many l o g i c a l p r o b l e m s . (Frith, U. 1989, 160-61)  The  children  belief  that  marble  in  look the  in  marble  study  failed  to  marble  box,  was  the even  in of  at  noted age  the  by the  three  identify  the  fail is  in  to  attribute  the  basket.  children with though box.  mind i s  inspired  that  children  autism  box,  state  was  Perner  the  the  the  Sally's  with  an  Sally  They  relevant earlier  older  false  had  don't to one  developmental and  autism no seem  where by  to  Sally  Since say way to she  the  Anne  that  false  put  Sally  will  knowing  that  understand  that  will  This  of  look.  H e i n z Wimmer a n d  differences  children.  The  the  between three  Josef normal  year  olds  belief:  . . . c h i l d r e n w e r e s h o w n a p u p p e t c h a r a c t e r , M a x i , who p u t h i s c h o c o l a t e i n a b o x a n d w e n t o u t t o p l a y . N e x t t h e y saw M a x i ' s mother t r a n s f e r the c h o c o l a t e t o the cupboard w h i l e M a x i was s t i l l o u t . W h e r e w i l l M a x i l o o k f o r t h e chocolate when he r e t u r n s ? F i v e y e a r o l d s r e s p o n d e d : i n t h e b o x ; a response t y p i c a l of adults. Children of three, however, i n d i c a t e d t h e c u p b o a r d , where t h e y t h e m s e l v e s b e l i e v e d it t o b e . So t h r e e y e a r o l d s h a v e n o t f u l l y m a s t e r e d t h e art of b e l i e f ascription.  118  T h i s t h r e e y e a r o l d phenomenon i s q u i t e r o b u s t , and a p p l i e s e v e n t o t h e i r own p r e v i o u s f a l s e b e l i e f s ( A s t i n g t o n and G o p n i k , 1 9 8 8 ; Wimmer a n d H a r t l , 1 9 9 1 ) . S h o w n a c l o s e d c a n d y box, c h i l d r e n express the b e l i e f that there are candies i n s i d e . The box i s open and s e e n t o c o n t a i n o n l y p e n c i l s . The children are then asked what they had originally t h o u g h t was i n s i d e . Three year olds t y p i c a l i n s i s t that they thought t h e r e were p e n c i l s , whereas f o u r and f i v e y e a r o l d s a d m i t t h a t t h e y t h o u g h t t h e r e was c a n d y . (Goldman, A l v i n 1995a, 193)  The  studies  three  and  mind.  That  c a n be  children is,  explained  by  or  be.  that  one The  these  theorize  about  mental  ability.  Since  the  intellectual those  studies  second  of  the  autism  type  in  is  consistent  do  with  Another  one  a  theorize  what  or  to  that  with  simulation  theory  119  been  to  look  that  that's as  an  to  ability of  skill  lacking  been  fact  things,  In  in  children lack  of  behavioural deficits  to  Since  this would  fact,  the  raised  that  or  other  f a v o u r a b l y on  has  pretend.  pretending,  has  about other  the  autism.  particular  interpreted  sort not  reflect  more s i g n i f i c a n t  child  lack  are  is  is  caused  be  autism  point  an a b i l i t y  the  also  other  to  behaviour  belief  some  interpretation  lack  be  the  not  of  an o b j e c t  will  by  could  but  and are a b l e  imagining with  studies  it  theory  include  that  one  a  that  even  p a r t i c u l a r appear to  diagnosing  of  saw  c h i l d r e n under  developed says  knows  else,  states,  second  also  pretend play note  in  may  one  last  children  not  that  children  interpretation.  defense with  skills  have  that  something  where  will  indicating  that,  indicating that  theory  unless  object it  a  as  someone  where  lack  and  moved  the  autism  beliefs  such  for  with  they  examples by  i n t e r p r e t e d as  a  simulation  deficit predict:  would  is  a be  . . . o u r access to the thought of others i s not through the a p p l i c a t i o n of a p r i m i t i v e but e f f e c t i v e theory, as a d v o c a t e s o f t h e * t h e o r y - t h e o r y ' o f f o l k p s y c h o l o g y suppose, but through a kind of internal, largely spontaneous, re-enactment t h a t a l l o w s us t o imagine o u r s e l v e s i n some r o u g h a p p r o x i m a t i o n t o t h e s i t u a t i o n of another. I n s o i m a g i n i n g , we t e n d t o a c q u i r e , in i m a g i n a t i o n , t h e b e l i e f s and d e s i r e s an a g e n t would most likely have in that situation, and those imaginary b e l i e f s and d e s i r e s have consequences i n the shape o f f u r t h e r p r e t e n d b e l i e f s and d e s i r e s as w e l l as p r e t e n d d e c i s i o n s t h a t mimic the b e l i e f s , desires and d e c i s i o n s t h a t would f o l l o w i n the r e a l c a s e . And a l l o f t h i s happens as an i n i t i a l c a u s a l consequence of the initial imagined state, and not by the application of any folk theory of mind, which s i m u l a t i o n i s t s t h i n k would have t o be so c o m p l i c a t e d t h a t i t c o u l d n o t p l a u s i b l y be c r e d i t e d t o any b u t t h e most sophisticated among u s . (Gregory Currie 1995, 158)  Given  this  does  the  new work,  According partially  framework,  to  let's  the  X believes  then  when  line  beliefs  If  I  simulate  he  has  I  is  in  since  I  Daniel. attribute  the  consider  the  context  X to are  in  his  actual subject  In  the  case to  Twin  him the  and  the Earth  thought  the  to  he  doctor  true  in  the  120  x  water  I  claims.  believes  If  conditions, the  off-  conclude  belief  wet',  0scar2 then  that  will  determinations  simulate is  is  believing.  counterf actual  contextual if  theory  conditions.  I will  off-line  that  is  external  my  case,  than  believes,  and  same  X  by e x t e r n a l  what  subject  thigh  what  i n w h i c h he  determine  also  rather  externalist  arguments,  D a n i e l who g o e s t o  am  to  imagination  p a r t i a l l y determined  have  arthritis  false  by t h e  simulate I  now  externalist  determined  what  where  my  be  case as and off-  line  belief  will  and  *water'  will  But  perhaps  simulation  I  determine  through is  not  the  be  subject  refer  what  to  clear  wrong  you  Thus  in  it  it  a type  is  s t i l l  that  P,  What  do n o t  isn't  an  which  of  state  on  my c a r  months  have  privileged  with  his  and,  hypothesis  you.  to  ascribe  hypothesis  of  is  a theory.  won't since to  of  to  an  can  start I  this  I  have  i.e.,  of  just  one  information. looks  been  121  to the be  correct  in some  behaviour. of  nature  won't put  the  way  in  start.  I  In order  to  about  do.  of  oil  hood.  I  your  I  the  neglectful  P  shown t o  driving  under the  is  hold  and the  haven't  able  that  something  state  sense  that  your  it  this  an e x p l a n a t i o n  I  only  any  to  am  My c a r  because  my m e c h a n i c  that  you,  than  may b e  c a n be I  It's  wrong:  in I  that  If  claimed,  belief  that  as  rather  is  c l a r i f y both the  am t h e  required.  response  intentional  be  is  you a c t u a l l y  cause  state  2  may b e  the  that  to  the  H 0) .  sense  The  is  state  may h e l p  access  hypothesis,  to  intentional  basis  it  i n what  a statement  another  than  you b e l i e v e  hypothesis is  attributions  for  the  or  analogy  that  to  it  than  conditions  simulation  then,  clear  come  of  an  an  the  believe six  I  an a t t r i b u t i o n  such  a theory  intentional  The f o l l o w i n g status  how  in that  attribute  behaviour  further  through  not  contextual  (XYZ r a t h e r  goes  my a s c r i p t i o n s  you,  intentional  of  is  of  ascribing  twater  same  how my c l a i m a b o u t w h a t  regardless  false.  the  believe  that  belief  to  theory  application  an h y p o t h e s i s . to  be  in  it  car,  I  come He  up  comes  putting  oil  in  my c a r .  Although  we  the  same  hypothesis  the  simulation theory,  behaviour access  is  to  didn't  it.  It  in  that  my c a r  may i n f a c t  I  behaved  as  knew a b o u t  he  the  into.  type  of  and  it  necessary  the  context  It  is,  forgot  to  engaged then  in  when  been the there It  may  although  these  in  enough  and it  that  would  the  that  it  that  I  be P.  d i d n ' t put  surmise  would b e l i e v e  that  and  it he  is  that  my  the  oil was  false  know  in why  that  But the I  I  way that  that  put o i l  something why  my  been  car the  122  so  that  was  wrong  wouldn't case  that  were  run because  P.  wrong?  no  is  i n my c a r  John  hypothesis  believed  already  if  car won't an  o i l  Theory  in  P.  to  there  turn  the  that  although I forgot  have  put  not based upon t h e o r y .  be  was  like  because  that  way t h a t  to  that  to  to  John's  access to  that  out  same  more  didn't  false  turn  that  start  out  oil  been  be  I  reached  According  much  won't  believed  me t o  hypotheses  that  have  mechanism  for  behavior X because  case  was  oil  to  is  is  an h y p o t h e s i s  put  is  because  he  surmise  p r o j e c t e d he  however,  start.  l i k e my m e c h a n i c ' s  start  both  circumstances I have p r o j e c t e d myself  knowledge  f o r me t o  P  car  may i n f a c t  the  necessary  I  is  we  hypothesis  that  turned out  not  not  it  i n my c a r  P fits  methods,  the  my  d i d because  that  is  that  and i t  oil  to  belief  won't  have  the b e l i e f This  the  than  my c a r d i d n ' t s t a r t John  my a c c e s s  by  it  different  why my c a r w o n ' t  hypothesis  put o i l  hypothesis  about  caused  the  used  that  What It  i n the damage with  start. John  I  John  happens  might  have  car,  that  resulted.  my  starter  Similarly, would  have  believed into,  that  history  behaviour  X in  example,  According explain  this  may  he  his  had  case,  just  fully  and  engaged  in  represented hypothesis.  theory  I  do so  to  Thus in  that  that  P  I  myself  of  would  John's  not  be,  saying  cause  of  thus,  he  John's  in  theoretical  knowledge;  between  the  theory  their  claims  John's  experiencing  didn't  like  may t u r n  to  cats  P had  that  P  attributions are  cat  John  thus  been is  to  myself  that is  the  a  project  that  I  out  and  My c l a i m  context  they  to  example,  to  believed  failure  attempt  for  It  believed  room'.  into  by  So,  fail  context.  have  and  state,  that  the  myself  allergic  he if  would  cases  is  his  that  he  observe  conversation.  X because  claim  I  leaving  experiencing.  may,  represent  quickly  mental  John  room.  x  when  John's  the  the  projected  by p r o j e c t i n g  bored with  the  it  X is  by  fully  but  belief  actually  behaviour  hypothesis  failures  is  however,  to  the  behaviour  entered  I  some i m p o r t a n t e l e m e n t s  behaviour  simulating  what  circumstances  case.  behaviour  explain  the  that  John's  c o m p a n y a n d was be  so  simulation  and  off-line'  the  neglected  assume  to  position x  given  my p r o j e c t i o n  personal  For  P,  as  not are  failures  an I an not in  imagination.  The  difference  theory,  then,  hypothesis P.  In  that  addition,  is  in  John's  theory of  b e h a v i o u r X was  however,  according  123  to  how  and we  the  arrive  caused by the the  simulation at  belief  simulation  the that  theory,  it's as  not being  John P  just  caused  that  can  that  is  cause  I  by  what  explain the  I  I  behaviour  simulate  cause  of  belief  believe,  through experiencing When  P  the  all  causal  and  behaviour  that  but  X at  the  John  John's  John's  is  because  fact  properties  It  is  P, the  Here there  car  privileged  there  isn't  theory,  That I  Although  that  the  do  much  not  experience  in  of  oil  that  learn the  causal  and  is  experienced  2)  that is  P caused  not P  only  thing  nor  falsifiable that  1)  John's  the  that that  the  is  such. is  not  For  belief  that  P caused  on  it  a  that  can  is  part  as  John's  evidence  that of  a  the  of  that  in  it  is  belief  is  The  that belief  theory the  that  it  belief X. it  The is  simulation, X.  I  entity  theory  behaviour  behaviour  the  distinct  a causal  that  cause  with  I  simulation,  theory  theoretical,  the  which  something  P is  entity  the  as  simulation  an  as  car.  X is  that  P.  fact  learn, to  that  the  For the  P  124  to  during  the  just  belief  X ; a n d 3)  considered based  know  behaviour  X. is  I  experienced  an e n t i t y  there  to  damage  The b e l i e f  behaviour  may b e  that  it  that  through  access  When,  belief  a disanalogy  behaviour  P can cause  that  statement  belief  P  is  had  theory.  There  that  theoretical  that  cause  that  as  I  may c a u s e  properties.  that:  The b e l i e f  car,  P can  belief  its  P;  my  through  from  theoretical  have  oil  lack  belief  I  simulate  experience  manner  understand John's behaviour. example.  the  instance  I  the that  of  I  this  when  that  something  experience  behaviour.  in  a is  Let's  now  error Twin  may f i t Earth  thought  the  i f  I  simulate is  wet',  than  his  of  a  when  refers  lack  belief.  of  But  of  the  The  beauty  knowing  it  conditions. H 0 2  and  present  I  is  is  a  the  it  affecting  simulation will  we  view  interact  an  purposes,  it  doesn't  simulate  you,  I  on  Twin wet',  because  the  wrong  attribute  not  aware  cases  that  in  most  affect of  the  our a b i l i t y  are  actually  people of  the  matter  are.  subjecting  beliefs  my  What  aware  for  for  whom be  those  whom w a t e r  joints. what  the  matters  off-line  to are  will of  of  not  t i m e w h e n we  particular  really  125  belief.  is  inflammation  am  place  is  sometimes we a r e  refer  belief.  with  determination  be  is  i n t e r a c t i n g with people  we  will  determination of  however,  of  the  case,  attribute  because  him  to  *water  In t h i s  We d o  the  wrong  0scar2  how  in  will  fail  the  that  will  S i n c e most  is  belief  I  water'  that  twater.  the  not,  we a r e  x  to  belief  however,  belief  is  determination  is,  and  fact  problem.  view  consider  I claimed that  off-line  may,  simulating, not  and  and a t t r i b u t e  i r r e l e v a n t whether  That  of  I  2  correct belief.  for  my  include the  and on t h i s  the  H 0).  arthritis  conditions when  fully  that  conditions  and not t o  with people  conditions  shared,  water  conditions  the  interacting the  of  then  attribute  conditions  the  attribute  to  this  wrong b e l i e f s all  I  example  Oscar2 and a t t r i b u t e  context  my s i m u l a t i o n d o e s n ' t  water'  Earth  picure. Recall  (XYZ r a t h e r  then  Twin  same c o n t e x t u a l  properly in  Earth, x  our  *water  the  twater  myself If  case,  to  to  into  that  subject to  return  For  is our  precise is  beliefs  that to  those the  If  same  to  conditions  I  simulate  context,  simulate will  fail  simulate your  part is  the  not  will  a question is,  even of  social,  most  part,  the  have  those shared  that  In  placed myself  that  i n which the  in  belief  I will  completely i n which  in  never  to  pursue  private  individual  facts  is  external at  the  have  this  facts,  which  is  of  context,  the  same your  determines  The  of form  relevant  are,  And the  belief.  be  for  What  behave  will  the  outweighed  another.  we w i l l  belief my  that  why we  beliefs.  to  because  significance,  u n d e r s t a n d i n g one same  able  determinations  point.  some  fail  facts  facts  apparently t y p i c a l l y  determines  context  at  be  i n your context  individual  I  in  determination,  any b e a r i n g on meaning  basis  context  areas  myself  those  do  given  myself  the  fact,  include  they  successful  and on t h e  manner  I have  place  important  Whether  if  same  which  are  we n e e d  is  in  to  extent  always  important ways  fail  or f u l l y place  your context  the  extent that  i n my a t t r i b u t i o n .  significance  the  the  am u n a w a r e .  point  by  to  I  context  y o u fully  I of  the  you,  then  context  which  to  context.  when  your  I  same  in  is the  manner  the  same  2 1  N o t i c e t h a t t h i s w i l l r e m a i n t r u e even on an i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c type of theory of meaning. If, f o r e x a m p l e , when y o u w e r e t a u g h t t h e word c a t ' , what you were a c t u a l l y p o i n t i n g a t and l a b e l l i n g was a p i g , t h e m a n n e r i n w h i c h t h e e n v i r o n m e n t c o n t r i b u t e s t o t h e m e a n i n g o f * c a t ' f o r y o u w o u l d s t i l l b e t h e same a s i t w o u l d b e f o r me i f I am s i m u l a t i n g y o u , p l a c i n g m y s e l f i n y o u r c o n t e x t . Of c o u r s e , i n s u c h a c a s e , s i n c e most p e o p l e do n o t l e a r n t h e meaning of *cat' i n such a manner, t h i s i s not a shared e x t e r n a l f a c t and I w i l l l i k e l y f a i l a t my s i m u l a t i o n . 2 1  x  126  The in  contents part  on the  physically your  of  behaviour  always  beliefs  my b e l i e f s  contents  has  thus  have  (off-line) raining  what  and  not  be to  you  behaviour  that  you  don't  Twin  Earth,  serve  in  external  not  affect  may  even If  2 2  is  water  damage  simulation  given  will  get  explain  am  myself  factors  aren't  my  be  ability  the  to  case  that  am s i m u l a t i n g  you,  The  represented  criteria  for  of  behaviour  to  being  your context  the  which  facts.  context  leaking,  I  yours,  always  I  an e x p l a n a t i o n  physically  your  that  determined.  as  by e x p e r i e n c i n g  want  a full  fully  experience.  roof  fetching  it  and e x t e r n a l  myself  your  that  fact,  like  which don't  beliefs  does  just  I understand and  I would experience  internal  placed  of  determined.  from b e i n g  contents that both  however,  fact  In  fully  beliefs  changed  includes  the  determined,  factors  basis  you.  also  of  be  represented  not  will  the  Since,  the  to  are  will  external  off-line,  your b e l i e f s  belief  of  on  physically  ascribe  I  basis  represented.  experiencing  If  my b e l i e f  then  If  you  I  will  I  are  will on  explain  your s i t u a t i o n in  your  include  house. this  experience Earth,  your and If  fact  it's  bucket-  surmising  you  are  and I  on  will  On Daniel Dennett's view, for example, meaning and intentional state content are not always fully determined. On Dennett's view, the external factors that determine content are teleological, e v o l u t i o n a r y f a c t o r s . He t a l k s a b o u t ^ m o t h e r n a t u r e ' determining content. But, i n some c a s e s , it is not c l e a r that m o t h e r n a t u r e i n t e n d e d o n e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n r a t h e r t h a n a n o t h e r . When two i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , o r two a s s i g n m e n t s o f c o n t e n t , are equally u s e f u l t h e r e may a c t u a l l y b e n o a n s w e r t o w h a t s o m e t h i n g really means. O n e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n may b e a s r i g h t a s a n o t h e r a s l o n g as both have e q u a l u t i l i t y . 2 2  127  explain fail  that  to  don't  project  explanation  that  for  example,  you  of  what  you  I  you  concerned  about  explanations content  you  might not  If  simulate  danger  not that  the  I mentioned  earlier,  belief a  in  it  which  of  I  to  do  must  fail  of  seems t o  fail  a n d we  the  simulate  not  affect  make  a  cookie  and  someone.  When  a n d we b r i n g  to  is  have  because  young you  If,  and  told  don't  know  What y o u fact  are  that  that  the  although  is  relevant  there  is  always  child  fully  our  expect  simulate  fully, the  this  to  the  as  to  built at  the  128  in  us  child  to  do  stop  the make  information  initially.  In  is  these  someone's  have  supermarket  of  simulation  understanding  the  the  understand  our  assumptions  as  personal  histories  b e a r more p i e c e s o f to  But,  determination  effort  be  case that  such  such  the  will  content.  happens  difficulty  crying  to  conscious  w h e n we  cases,  The  I the  it  often  i n many c a s e s  types  failed.  you  that.  belief  be most  were r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e  it  Earth  The  fully,  than those that  behaviour,  since  states,  If  incorrect.  illustrates  context  Of c o u r s e ,  becomes e x p l i c i t  of  is  about  house.  situation,  Twin  damage.  upon b r a i n  determination  we  content.  behaviour  on  that  twater  your  histories,  difference  the  the  which  individual  damage  say  your  your  behaviour  substituted  areas  to  in  is  in  behaviour.  significant  areas  water  concerned  supervene  of  into  might  not  be  explanations  do  you  rather,  cannot  want  your  are  damage  fully  don't  observed  is  twater  myself  my e x p l a n a t i o n  *water'  I  want  somehow handed  crying  but  a he  doesn't.  You must t h e n  to  You  cry.  ascription cooled  from  this  are  concerned  isn't  because  distinct, crying  as  is  was  Putnam.  arguing  of  context  those  crying  for  one  is  distinct  a  that  warm  and  treat  that  is  cookie  the  is  I  to  is  causing  you the  change desire  In  of  him your  to  be  on  concerning  by  problem' for  ascription  The  be  the  simulate in  fact  existence  causal  your your  of  b e h a v i o u r was cause  of  you basis  of  such and  distinct  efficacy.  context  that  from  Burge  behaviour  causally  as  belief  environmentally  of  fails  distinct  examples  of  We  represented  because  the  these  T E , the  twater  in order  supervene  your  concern.  b e i n g h e l d p u r e l y on t h e  explanation  context  *The s u p e r v e n i e n c e  but  i n terms  are  your  for  physically  conditions.  properly  cause  cause  would s u r e l y  one  whether  conditions  is  which  overheated,  my  y o u d i d n ' t want  beliefs  in  demonstrated  since  E , the  that  cases  distinguished  unless  since  a  from  was  damage.  beliefs  case  environmental  what  environmental  must  very  for  of  anything  c a n be  incorrect  that  desire  The q u e s t i o n  contents  water  it's  type  with  external,  cases  the  the  because  ascribe of  that  a b o u t what  down.  But  not  notice  actually think  I  will  that  be  these  significant. you d i d n ' t  your  am  behaviour  In  want was  damage.  is  t h a t we m u s t a b a n d o n r e a l i s m o v e r  beliefs  brain  states  water  are  to  have  and  examples  129  Twin  causal Earth  where  efficacy examples  belief  they of  contents  don't  supervene  examples  are  contents  that  efficacy. exercise  simulate  If  I  don't  and I  perhaps,  is  planet  about by  the  his  Earth  it  refers  to  define  Of  might content  John,  aspect  John(te)  if  I  that's or  rule  John's  twin  the  belief  have  causal by  will of  am t o  would not  if  the  also  his  ascribe  have  x  then  130  on  water'.  the  he  is  planet  or  his  planet. what  nobody  on  the  must  A l t h o u g h we may  also  lived  external a n d when  be  correct  if  is his  c o m m u n i t y , we k n o w  changed  Since the  be  between  water  on h i s  that  Earthlings  the  will  our community won't  grabbed a bucket  he d i d n ' t want w a t e r damage.  about  substance  as  context  I  i n accordance with  experts  term  have  water  twater.  i m p l i c i t assumption,  a  But  about  difference  water'  the  this  the  x  linguistic  course,  change.  know t h e  called  be  about  thinks  by  out  use  he  Earthlings just  determining  simulation  do  the  demonstrated  will  and b e l i e v e s  nature of  would  Earthlings.  this  is  belief  doesn't  when  when t h e y  include  this  that  where  states  my b e l i e f s  him a  community,  that  won't  that  stuff  precise  n o t k n o w how t o  Twin  to  he behaves  assumption  Whatever the  it  ascribe  and t w a t e r ,  thinking  brain  efficacy  John(te),  Although John himself  implicit  claiming  situations  on  this  am  simulation.  fully  clear  have  I  of  supervene  they  I  water  states.  examples  don't  If  wrong.  brain  also  That of  on  that  include on  Twin  conditions I  simulate  represented  in  my  belief.  his  belief  were  i m p l i c i t assumption  that about  'water'  is  having  such  Living  thing  told  they  were  s t i l l  for  his  way  and  twater".  "I  different true  the  thought, Once  he to  want  "I  wonder  does  this,  think,  twater  "I  don't  the  thought  thought,  he  would  caused  substance  H 0 for  that brain  want w a t e r  would not  with  to  be  stop  which  he  rain.  But then,  to  grab a  the  caused  go  and wonder has  had  no  why  he  stop  and wonder whether  There  agreement  that  the  different the  be  rain,  is  if  he  saw  the  rather In  than order  rather  than  belong  to  thought  first  from the  thought  thought thought  ' A ' and the  131  planted  that  bucket.  would  that  is  'twater  second thought  the he a he  crazy.  dripping' is  him  about  Or perhaps going  a is  Rather  think  h e was  'water  in  upon h a v i n g  experience.  to  Call  the  to XYZ.  he  have  somehow  caused  a  refers  damage", to  same  the  changes.  simply  would be  is  the  sees  water  state  twin  would not  example,  is  the  through  beliefs  2  he w o u l d have  were  than caused by s e e i n g  be  his  damage",  If,  if  it  'water'  'water'  distinction.  much  when h e  that  hold  and h i s  dripping  states,  belief  have  pretty  saw r a i n  determines to  John(te)  is  brain  water  John(te).  l i n g u i s t i c community, an Earthbound community. T h i s  unless  rather  a  for  'twater'  simply would not  water  same  indeed  Even i f  when t h e y  have  him  makes  John(te) don't  for  John(te)  that  the  assumption about  strange  'water'.  in  environment  consciously rain  that  him to  be  Earth,  advance  so  only  for  in  implicit  would  Twin  twater,  possible  The  belief  as  since  from the  assumption about  been  roof  a  on p l a n e t  implicit had  different  is  dripping'.  ' B ' . W h a t I am  claiming  is  that,  possible  for  John(te)  anyone  else  in  encountered  explain of  his  the  Furthermore,  dripping  went  differently other  house  Let's  rather  arthritis,  the  If  another does  If  dripping  I  I  would  w o u l d go v i s i t  the  had be  a  I  pain  alarmed. If,  my  Just  h.  it  would  thigh like  a  that is  explain have to  why  behaved something  substance run out  from of  the  light  of  this  an i n f l a m m a t i o n  which  the  explanation  2 3  in  in  not  community,  referred  example  however,  would  substance  would  a r t h r i t i s was in  thought  itself,  damage.  nor  in  2  I  he  or  A,  that  not  heard of  H 0, the  in  is  ever  linguistic  thought  arthritis  doctor.  that  belief  water  neither  to  John(te)  his  it  appropriate  f r o m my r o o f  worry about  Burge's  an  not,  bucket. of  has  thought  B is  within  I d i d n ' t know t h a t and  have  thought  does.  since  referred  but the  content  it  was  did  a  A  community he  thing  roof,  intervention,  thought  Thought  grab  than  consider  joints  the  what  planet  analysis. the  to  to  if  than  another  of  behaviour.  from  John(te)  have  John(te)  refers  divine  linguistic  John's behaviour,  *water'  of  to  type  if  his  short  I  thought  Burge's  content  of  example, my  of was I  belief  O n e way i n w h i c h i t w o u l d b e p o s s i b l e f o r J o h n ( t e ) t o h a v e a water thought is if he had s u d d e n l y , during his sleep, been somehow transported to Earth. He w o u l d h a v e no i d e a he is on a n o t h e r p l a n e t . Imagine t h a t he l o o k s a t t h e r o o f f r o m w h i c h w a t e r i s d r i p p i n g . I n t h i s c a s e what he i s t h i n k i n g must be t h a t there i s water d r i p p i n g from the r o o f . He m u s t b e t h i n k i n g a water' rather than a *twater' thought because the external environment determines the content of h i s thought. T h e o n l y way h e c o u l d b e t h i n k a t w a t e r t h o u g h t on E a r t h i s i f he e x p l i c i t l y distinguished between water and t w a t e r and E a r t h and Twin E a r t h . In t h i s case, however, the u n d e r l y i n g b r a i n s t a t e s are a l s o distinguishable. 2 3  x  x  132  was  about  likely  not  be  I  have  doctor. point.  doctors  by  our  not me  I have  differ,  my  the  would  that x  in  the does  I  explain  thus  conditions supervene external  far  on  refers  to  conditions  the  explain remains  see  in  my  that  thigh I  have  in  I  the  believe  conditions  work  in  doctor  the  about  situation  be  something  like  serious  condition  in  a general  so  conditions,  external  the  could  cases  same,  doesn't  only  rheumatoid  behaviour  counterfactual  would  should  belief  the  my  situation  these  my  a  that  my  a the I  thigh.  rheumatoid c o n d i t i o n ,  it  behaviour.  considered  brain  not  of  one  arthritis  case  In the  see  illustrate  general  Given  explanation  would  go  counterf actual  have  go  I  implicit belief  actual  wouldn't  not  to  that  but because the  kind  having  here  This  state  some  my  would  and t h a t  and  I  condition,  counterfactual  same.  that  My b r a i n  had  the  remain the  explanation  arthritis'  not  We h a v e  I  in  actual  rheumatoid ailment.  thought if  the  arthritis  appropriate  example  conditions.  thigh  case.  probably  conditions  X ' i n my t h i g h ,  A  I  implicit belief  belief  case.  counterfactual  But  the  in  counterfactul  general  states  my b e h a v i o u r  tharthritis  and  differing  both  rheumatoid  Burge's  serious  in  while  explains  more  modified  brain  however,  that  general  concerned,  for serious  are  held  that  a  u p o n my h o l d i n g t h e  ailments be  so  My b e h a v i o u r  depends visit  tharthritis,  causal  points  efficacy  states. that  three  Firstly,  determine  133  in  favour  even  though  when  I  the  of  external  they  simulate  content  of  your  don't you  the  belief  also  determine  possible  the  for  different  an  built  that  On t h e  right  use  implicit  are  the  context  have  even  if  situation, if  we  this had  or the  assume  other  belief  twin  belief  resulting same  alternative a  belief  about  than  tharthritis  grab in  medical  her  help  brain  thigh  I  is  wet',  consciously  thought  that  I  must  make t h e ^twater  is  for  when  be  If  and  I  distinction Thus,  134  not  take  because Because  concepts  for  the  rest  content. could we  a  this  unlikely  that  he  If  run  about  rather  the  ascribe  John  would  belief  about  I ascribe  this  plant  John the  and then  the  even  aspirin  a thought  same  So,  roof  beliefs  our  ascribe  somehow  had  we  Thirdly,  different.  his  to  of  imagine  w o u l d be  an  just  someone i n t h e  we  Mary  if  it's  the  when  from  ascribe  conditions  same b e h a v i o u r .  ascribe  ascribing  wet'.  it  the  if  would we  of  of  we  and  John,  dripping  she  explanation  conditions.  as  someone,  would cause  determined by o u r c o n t e x t . *water  us  which  states  Earth  an  an e x p l a n a t i o n  contents  not by  alternative  in  to  bucket  since  as  is  determined  external  b e h a v i o u r would be  twater a  an  way  in  belief  the  possible  with  some  as  it  is  Secondly,  serve  the  not  were  the  serve  same e x t e r n a l  that  is  therefore,  which  s a m e way f o r  it  referring belief  rather  seek  a  there  alternative  by the  i n the  community,  to  can't  assumption  linguistic to  belief,  explanation.  belief  determined  and,  simulation model,  into  an a l t e r n a t i v e  the  mine  conditions,  we a r e b o t h c o n s t r a i n e d of  of  alternative  external  your behaviour. are  content  than  content  thought H 0, 2  to  'twater  is that  unless  John is  the wet'  to  John  his  this  thought  There  is  won't he  one  discussion  explain  would behave  more  in  point  the  last  behaviour.  Recall  'behaviour'  was  If  no s e n s e  there  is  we  in  occurs  and  partially conditions different Thus,  system,  determine that  on Twin  on  the  indeed  I wouldn't  which  as  that the  this  drink  draws  context-bound  concluded  in  then the  it the the  in  the  the  were XYZ.  on  nature  of  then  behaviour  be t h e  the  the  being  environmental  behaviour w i l l  the  of  of  of of  'belief.  conditions  belief.  may a l s o  be  as  environment  performed by  same  2 4  our  concept  concept  context  context  p a r t i a l l y determine  belief,  If  i n w h i c h we c a n u n d e r s t a n d s o m e m o v e m e n t  we v i e w  intentional  it.  considered,  same t r o u b l e  unless  it  be  chapter  that  i n the  drinking  differently.  to  'behaviour' which  his  an  that  environmental  If  we a s c r i b e  a  reinterpreted.  E a r t h we w o u l d u n d e r s t a n d J o h n ( t e ) ' s  behaviour  as  If our explanations are causally s i g n i f i c a n t , as realism r e q u i r e s , we s h o u l d n ' t b e a b l e t o s u b s t i t u t e t h e b e l i e f t h a t P f o r t h e b e l i e f t h a t Q where P i s a water t h o u g h t and Q i s a twater thought. Given the v i o l a t i o n of supervenience, there is nothing to prevent this substitution on the theory theory but, on the simulation theory, it is not possible to substitute b e c a u s e we ascribe beliefs in a context. 2 4  So s i m u l a t i o n t h e o r y w i l l a l l o w u s t o c o u n t d i f f e r e n t explanations as causally different because they will individuate different u n d e r l y i n g causes i n d i f f e r e n t contexts. T h i s i s not to say that differences in explanations will always count as causally significant. T h e r e may b e t w o d i f f e r e n t , context-bound ways in which to individuate the same cause. Whether two different e x p l a n a t i o n s i n d i v i d u a t e t h e same c a u s e i s d e t e r m i n e d b y e x t e r n a l , c o n t e x t u a l c o n d i t i o n s . J u s t how t h i s d e t e r m i n a t i o n i s a c h i e v e d is not the problem of concern i n t h i s t h e s i s . Explaining, in those c a s e s w h e r e we a g r e e t h a t t h e r e i s a d i f f e r e n c e — s u c h a s i n the case of water and twater—how that difference c a n be causally s i g n i f i c a n t when s u p e r v e n i e n c e i s v i o l a t e d i s t h e p r o b l e m . 135  x  fetching  Earth  a  pail  to  twater  we w o u l d u n d e r s t a n d i t  damage b e h a v i o u r ' . to  avoid  Since  as  there  person  are  part  cannot are  behaving  of  the  states  sense.  It  the  seems  to  causes  the  as  a  at  contents change  even  when  have  shown t h a t  beliefs. this  I  each  contents  other  through simulation. may  nature  of  to  rejection  the  be  in  water  deciding  and what  Therefore,  despite  the  more  are  fact  the  to  we  since  we  that  causes  the  makes  distinct  distinguish  supervenience.  of  why  explaining  sense  how  aspects  p r i n c i p l e reason way.  we  c a n be  are  the  Supervenience  If  this  rejected  behaviour w i l l of  and  not  that  the  not  the  r e a l i s m about  136  for  above  our method  accepted  point  as  in  is  of  we  about  demonstrate  considerations, of a  understanding theory  the  first  but  is  three  context-bound  we p r e v i o u s l y h a v e beliefs.  then  realism  then the  about  insofar  behaviour  represented,  application  the  lead,  change  considerations  accept  is  a  required  above  accept  in  efficacious,  physically  is  to  through  causally  result  not  the  order  also  not  points  no  if  would  that  In  must  is  behaviour  distinguishing  makes  supervenience  believe  one  that  beliefs  content  conclusion.  however,  me  avoid  on  ends.  of  in  the  is  avoid violating  both  the  our  to  whereas  environment and i n t e n t i o n s  behaviours,  same,  a pail  no p r i n c i p l e f o r  behaviour in this  actually  than to  violated  If  it  of  behaviour',  fetching  the  there  distinct  are  behaviours,  part  belief,  i n t e r p r e t the  explaining  brain  are  x  is  d i s t i n g u i s h what a s p e c t s o f  the  damage  discussed,  If  we  understand  one  another  than through simulation, beliefs as  being  yours  although same  the  contents  is  not  explain  we  assumption  is  that  this  what  We make  dripping  from  because  it  problem and the is  dripping  would theory to  theory  the  the some  be s u b s t i t u t e d .  causes  of  objective  discovered  through  cause  explain  have  are  there  brain  experience.  by The  137  is  must  On  the  the  same  understand  a  no  constrained the  Thus belief  behaviour  some  states  'water  X.  It  can  it  becomes  that  the  X because than  a  on  it the  thing  physical  explanations  cause but  has  do  'twater  remain the  theory,  criterion  that  objective  the  in  external  without  theory  since  built  by  belief  behaviour  posited  different  posited  the  we  experiencing One m u s t  then  by  them.  representation  simulation  Although the  thing  from  c a n be no c a u s a t i o n  the  correct  determined  represented.  can  we  there  behaviour  is that  physical  Since  Within  as  will  r o o f  conditions  behaviour  d i s p r o v e d when t h e  different  explain behaviour,  can't  is  or  behaviour  such  r o o f  be  simulated  same is  rather  behaviour.  positing  physically  view.  representation.  are  may  theory  a b o u t my  theory  behaviour.  causes  we  theory  a  of  a  the  abstract  belief  explain  by  explain  and a  of  point  theory  to  to  the  first  beliefs  order  claims  is  from  require  our  belief  beliefs  conditions.  the  an e x p l a n a t i o n  how t h e  posit  If  having  basis  determined  conditions  view  the  the  or  of  in  those  theory  contents  If  irrelevant.  conditions,  theory  and  constrained  is  understand  then  on  same, is  not  something  changed  from  not  violating  supervenience  experience  different  of  those b e l i e f s  whether  are  distinct  Our  second  contents for  us  of  as  that  by  implicit about  perhaps,  by  is  planet  by  stuff  that  that's  nature  when t h e y  not  to  violate  possible  arthritis  ^arthritis'.  she  theory,  would  argue  need  to  this  use  a the  Earth  thinking  for  it  more  substance  X  I  what  explicitly.  point  water  we  is that  what on  is  this  X Y Z . Thus  We  in  since  When s h e  thinks  community  compatible  my  couldn't  belief  a theory  or  planet.  tharthritis  her  are  planet  this  like  this  the  assumption  nobody  water',  belief.  something  138  on  be  because  on t h i s  that  with  assumption  is  about  have  way  necessarily  assumption.  this  about  x  the  same  i m p l i c i t assumption,  behaviour have  that  the  implicit  water'  term  they  assumption  experts  implicit  Mary t o  but  think x  state,  contents  The  the  Mary,  implicit  simulationist  by  out  Mary's  is  The  of  twin  called  or  her  for  in  implicit  we  we  regardless  assumption  determined  The  when  community,  explain  are  violated.  to  well  use  then  If  explanations.  implicit  be  refers  equally  the  ascribe  would r u l e  would  experience.  same b r a i n  legitimate  to  it  thigh'  about  is  belief  on t h e  theorist.  would  precise  the  violating  our community would not  that  ascribing  it's  the  this  as  we  possible  recall,  Whatever the  well  of  theory  assumption  t h i n k i n g about  clear  rest  not  water,  as  concepts  the  it's  supervene  regarding  for the  rejected is  the  not  b e l i e f s through simulation,  beliefs  point  to  means  with  a  theorist  If  we  what I  when  of  to  has we  the  same  utter  meaning  theory, beliefs  by  this  The  by  experts,  of our  the  so  to  to to  one's  universe,  ascriptions  to  what  we  now t h e  beliefs the  has  utilize show  this  or  don't  be  one.  how  Furthermore,  others,  we w o u l d  of  of  we  we  the  when  basis  If  explain need  to  Thus,  in  in  defense are  contents  are  human r a c e , if  we  all  a  the  contents  show w h e t h e r  country,  say  determinants  point  exactly  to  you  content  to  what  decide  on t h e  context,  just  etc.  of  environment.  in  would need or  that  behaviour,  meaning of  would  change  There  the  meaning  A n d how  beliefs  need  she  the  on t h e  theorist  that  of  are  have  or  to  to  be  know  theory.  third  framework.  point  depends  Unless  one  cannot  force  the  point  been  of  caused  *it's  by  raining'  ascribe  belief,  it  would  already  accepting accepted  the  twin  lost.  Since  the  is  thus  beliefs  upon  ascribe  anything is  also  you have  context  we  when  based  would is,  as  we p o s i t  meaning.  theory  That  physics in  of  explanation  assuming  enough  If  know  positing  she  determined  changed  to  of  sentence?  experiencing  the  determined.  correct  has  theory  realism,  for  different?  are  for  same  need  we  know a n y order  are  we  behaviour  the  theory  determinants  the  environment  of  a  construct  g r o u n d s w o u l d we h a v e  say  the  were  in  a very  through  not  have  his  because  of  the  John(te),  the  twin b e l i e f  could not  have  environment,  to  simulationist  to  simulation  139  that  belief  odd t h i n g  been  the  for  the  John(te)  and  explain  we the  belief to  that  hold.  ascribed behaviour  If this of  grabbing  a  behaviour  bucket, like  belief  would  begins  with  than  from  belief, and  theory, could  cause  within  a  case,  cause  Our  final  behaviour  no  point is  understand of  one  induction.  regularities is  part,  apply  and b e l i e f s ,  another. We're  in  even though  that  the  the  from we  do.  the If  I  we  right  am t o  we  are  as the  sure  doing the how  we're not  use  circumstances. as  distinct  How we a r e  itself  construct  140  not  a  theory  is  with  there how  the  and,  to  some  induction  for  With  the  most  beliefs,  its  cause.  in  distinguish but  it's  k n o w how  we This  behaviour  must  we  case  distinguish  clear, I  focus  whether  that  describe  is  of  distinguish  of  from  able  powers.  its  s u r e when  induction  the  nature  fact,  we  they  about  and  analogy  case  that  causal  so,  the  simulation  talking  in  rather  twin  claim  view  a  one  being  with  same  such  theory,  in  the  the  legitimately  manner.  behaviour  to  other  however,  a  regardless  for  and t h u s ,  we c a n  of  case  do,  again  not  behaviour  cause-inclusive  we  then  Recall  Nonetheless,  If,  simulation  method  s t i l l  that  non-individualistic  If  is  cause  the  about  experiences.  perceive  fully  about  claimed  same  the  If  some  something  the  route  the  somehow true  talking  principle  it  posits  unlike  be  I  basis  physically  from o t h e r s  justified.  and  with  between b e h a v i o u r in  the  behaviours.  consistent  some  on  then,  explained  behaviour.  alternative  we m u s t  subjective  exists  is  have Thus,  different  different  entity,  help.  context,  actual is  would  beliefs  thing  there  it for  a  that  same  upon  running  ascribed  if  the  but  a  the  clear this  is  done.  lack  of  manner  It  is  If being  is  simulate able  only  part  violated. be  I  the  This  is  entities  been  of  that  are  supervenience  the  states  but  of  to  judge  He  didn't  contents  not  imply  This  is  order  ideas  explain of  to  beliefs  it  claim  that  that  attempted  here  substitutions  of  to  on  this  of  I  violated  the  of  the  have  on  the  contents  violation  realism.  beliefs  of  Beliefs  and you  theory  to  objective  fails.  theory,  simulation  he  didn't  even  be  are  possible dependent It  this  w h i c h were  141  that  change though  alternative  compatible. although  to  are me  was  examples  externally  the  s t i l l  that  explanations  efficacy  through  from which  they  seems  legitimate  their causal  demonstrate  any  and r e a l i s m are  behaviour.  they  offer  folk psychology  context  of  contents  fact  rejection  could  behaviour a demonstration of I  in  are taken  be  same.  are  explanations  The  cannot  some  realism  is  externalism  how  beliefs  efficacious,  on  way.  theory.  violated,  a  same  non-context-bound  explain  theory theory of  that  the a  that  to  contents  true  it  supervenience  fact  since,  Change t h e  from the  legitimate  is  may r e m a i n t h e  his  that  the  causally  T h e p r o b l e m w i t h B u r g e was perspective  theory  posited  that  s t i l l  behaviour.  the  supervenience  does  behaviour.  brain  are  theory  beliefs  cause  a result  do  behaviour in  theory  supervenience  arguing  simply  identify  theory  that  If  simulation  I  a problem for  of  phenomena.  to  you,  in of  required. in  which  determined  and  did  not  that  if  supervene the  content, One  on b r a i n  b e h a v i o u r c a n n o t be  then  explains  Accepting  the the  contents  the  line  we  do  but  understand  ourselves. to  the  I  if  seems  folk  that  terms and, set in  of  it's  it  of  the a  new  the  that  sense,  since  same way a s it's  not  is  correct,  both  to  perhaps that  we  notion of  the  mental  even  to  concept  belief,  if  is  supposed  to  have  belief. is  shown  externalist  142  it's give  that  and  our  belief  is in  abandonment  follow  the  example  we d o we  Finally,  I  argued in  the  theory  simulation  theory  considerations  is  are,  a  a theory  if  false up  non-supervenient  be  open  induction  folk psychology to  be  reasons.  of  of  them  arguments  if  concept  should  of  states,  should  i n d e s c r i b i n g what use  upon  psychology  several  justification  the  then  folk  externalist  Second,  the  force.  depends  we  for  the  either  experiencing  that  the  Thirdly,  behaviour  of  hope  sense,  theory.  notion  I  of  was  not.  another's  theory,  the  chapter  this  is  to  case,  it  does  by  causal  however,  perspective  our  what  In  a  justifying  clear  other  same  p r a c t i c a l l y impossible  b y Goodman a n d a c c e p t some  the  chapter  analogous  resistance  being  in  a false  as  have  the  last  notions.  treated  its  this  by,  would be  psychological  perhaps best  not  regarding  folk psychology  like  explained equally well  conceptualization  them in  p r o h i b i t e d . My c l a i m  reasoning,  theorize  argued  demonstrate it  not  suggestion  Firstly,  of  alternative  wherein we  do  were  behaviour while  this  accepting  states  of.  do  not  pose  a  threat  to  realism  in  psychology  since  it  is  built  simulation theory that our a t t r i b u t i o n s are context remains,  however,  a  maintain realism i f token  A  theory Burge's  allow  lung  chapter  Let's  shall  call  I  Twin  Earth  except  example  will  on E a r t h  In  his  supervenient them.  100  cut  points  the  chemically  put  into  say  a digestive  which the the  another  kind  of  purpose,  we i n d i v i d u a t e l u n g s that  the  body  a  out  that  in  powers  143  we  served  we w o u l d n o t  causal  is  to  way, of  can  are  not  simulation  be  found  in  discussed  in  perspective  of  is  as  was  the  advance that  the a  way  we  same  of  Earth.  are  living  about  the  sub-events  of  call  take call a  they  that  partly place. our  the  if  lungs,  does not are  compose  So  them l u n g s .  lungs  are  upon  different  however, the  that  events  depends  events  and  we  body.  such  lungs  entities  in this  the  advanced hypotheses  physical  physical  of  in  open  There  entities.  assume  described  i n d i v i d u a t e the  how  contents  Earth  years  we  i n which people  on  is,  believe  exists  into  bound.  of  from the  Sister  require that  Burge  or  which  example  Earth".  had never  belief  realism  example,  individuated  lungs,  to  maintain  not  in  that  it  issue  acceptance  are  environment  that  that  but  T h e w a y we  the  states  the  consider the  also  example,  respiration  to  "Sister  i n a time  human a n a t o m y ,  how  respiration  two.  what  of  us  and  clarify  any p h y s i c a l  illustration will  to  we a r e g r a n t i n g t h a t  identical with  good  The  need  right  our were  purpose, The  fact  lead  affected  us by  our  individuation.  way  of  that  them  they  physical  in  matter  physical  thing  same,  so  too  Let's  assume  theory about  view,  bringing air never  some  physical of  as  their  Now we  seen  'lungs'.  to  physical  properties  be  the  theory.  The  that body. we  lungs  are  that  entities  be that  know those  o r where are  same.  to  is  the  theory  a  theory  responsible  assume  also  that  the  2 5  the  causally  sure  can  properties.  theory  B u t we m u s t can't  We  properties  in  that  there  correspond lungs  we  exists  to  what  is  in  we  terms  role.  same  Earth  and  exactly  the  science  has  advanced  further  surgery  and  autopsies.  We a s k  to  and  thing  Our o n l y u n d e r s t a n d i n g of  Sister  corresponding  physical  another  exist.  according  and or  they  for their causal  the  a  have  t h e m a n d we  beliefs  the  lungs  to  like  and c l a i m s  entity  causal  go  posits  into  if  we  properties  the  causal  lungs,  are  We k n o w  physical  you c a l l  the  because  We c a n p o i n t  terms.  located,  that  breathing  think  what  is  is  are responsible  should  have  of  certain  properties  argued,  lungs.  physical  have  doesn't  for  I  i n d i v i d u a t i n g the  describe  It  This,  physically  our  idea  of  find as  that on  than  Earth,  ours.  whether  lungs.  although  If  everything  Sister  They  have  they  discovered  they  say  'yes'  is  Earthling performed anything and  point  O f c o u r s e , t h e c a u s a l p r o p e r t i e s may n o t h a v e a n o p p o r t u n i t y t o be e x h i b i t e d i n a d i f f e r e n t e n v i r o n m e n t . The i m p o r t a n t p o i n t i s that the fact that the same physical thing would be named d i f f e r e n t l y i n another context, does n o t a f f e c t i t s c a u s a l powers in this context. 2 5  144  out  some  physical  vindicated. But  now  simply  system  be  physical  is  will  x  no'  reponsible through  inclined  differences  our  lungs  say  theory  x  different,  seems t o  to  think  and  respiration' context-bound,  ways  no  of  the  story  with  regard  We h a v e  out  that  beliefs  order  there we  for  is  posit  our  something that  can  t h a t we a r e a s s u m i n g t h e y view,  we  are  in  the  with  regard  order  Burge's analogy  the  same  regard  state to  with  lungs,  actually  same  are  regard we  to  be  physical  cause.  currently for  theory  state to to  lungs. work.  to  must  145  as  regard  to  must  And i n o r d e r as  some  we  as  to  me,  we  them  the  for  in as  turn  with  the  things  simulation  beliefs be  are  must  up  the  two  we w e r e  it  matches  or  thing.  posited  vindicated  This  beliefs have  same  p h y s i c a l l y cause  with  some  things  theory,  But a c c o r d i n g to  case  simply  beliefs  that  is the  be  seems  a  to  lungs.  it  is  state with regard  it  Earthlings  the  same  no  call  must  to  i n the  to  psychology  that  are  currently  In  folk  referring  is  such  think,  epideration'  there  were t h e  there  are  been  lungs.  They  and S i s t e r  there  has  about  but  this  to  causes.  that  if  According  above  view  x  air  that  wouldn't  and  that  example.  me t h a t  ourselves  mistaken  us in  for  either  our theory  be r e a l i s t s  tell  skin,  between  was  the  that  taking  a n d r e s p i r a t i o n . W h a t we  that  feel  and  for  the  epideration'. It  x  might  that  we  have good reason to  they  absorbed  process we  We w i l l  assume  separate  thing,  the us  currently  independent  as  we  case  in  to  be  are way  in  with of  identifying  beliefs.  The  simulation  theory  is  based  on  this  assumption.  The  simulation theory  others  is  based  claims  on  argued  that  individuation. beliefs means the  and  of  you  case,  there  is  the  argued,  aside  no  other  has  of  a  causal  a  from been Thus  beliefs,  mistake. way  if  in  cause.  case  not  have  posits  them  is  by  beliefs  theorizing.  of  factors  conflated you  then  causation. posited  as  as  they  like  have  you  the  that no  change  cause  of  individuation  are viewed  by  the  the  imagined  lungs  the  entities,  then  identifying be  with  view  we  If  conflating  If,  must  the  We  thought.  causation  accept  theory,  to  absolute,  not  relative  environment.  The  simulation  simply posits have  of  identifying  first  a  theory  means,  person  identifying properties,  does  in a theory.  do  our  are  change  theory,  individuation to  have  which  i n the  than  of  are t h i n k i n g by e x p e r i e n c i n g the  I  desires  and c a u s a t i o n theory  But,  content  behaviour,  rather  individualists  identifying  belief  our a s c r i p t i o n s  simulation  u n d e r s t a n d what o t h e r s Burge  that  If  independent beliefs  and  experience.  the  descriptions  idea that of  view  the  simulation theory  of  beliefs  descriptions  desires.  If  psychological  not  we  do  states  We in  and  of  independent  our i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of  content  can  vary  146  with  is  right,  as we  causal  powers,  them  through  identify fact  desires  have of  a  their  those  context  means  is  causal  states no  of  via  longer  problematic. having  We c a n  the  belief  brain  to  P'.  and  Let's  begun the  to  belief  are  explanation  of  it  c a n be  If  we  our  the  same,  a l r e a d y know t h a t  differently  to  its  the  the  existence  I  am i n t h e  by  of  is  and,  the  something if sing,  the  I  can is  same  causal be  an  right,  individuate be  quite  different  account in  identify  that  is  it  described  am s i t t i n g  and I  If  context.  can  I can  and  begun  the  our  in order to  thing  room i n s t e a d ,  147  have  is  we  it  window.  simulation theory  exists,  that  has  P  This  f r o m me o r  it  hence,  a  to  up  that  to  me  me  get  the  belief  as  causes  to  I  same  psychological  that  and  relative  to  me  call  the  belief  up and c l o s e  For example,  next  causes  belief  I will  thing  and  the  context.  a man n a m e d J o h n who b e g i n s  If  is  which  with  music.  P  powers  other  across  the  an e n t i t y  on  phenomenon.  get  is  some  man s i t t i n g  then  can  If  that  same  exists  states  how  causal  depending  from p o s i t i n g  the  simply  in exactly  the  my d o p p l e g a n g e r brain  an e x p l a n a t i o n  P  that  causes her to  my b e h a v i o u r ?  reference  that  belief  that  who i s  what  Q ' . Realism about  My d o p p l e g a n g e r ' s  though  properties  by  state  now i s  exactly  my b e l i e f  This  however,  even  that  my b e l i e f  that  rain.  window.  false,  ^belief  that  say  I'm e x p e r i e n c i n g  experiencing  the  t w r a i n and t h i s  it's  psychological  My d o p p l e g a n g e r ,  is  requires  behave.  close  state  that  her state  states  has  this  state  calls  the  it.  For example, x  identify  now  faintly  a  for room  John  as  causing  hear  some  music,  I  music  or  etc.  It  our  could I  could  seems  position  where  we  causal with  can  seems  trying  to  to  John  cause  If  man  is  a  be  the  explain. of  radio,  that,  if  or  we  to  and  is  can  like  man i n  the  behaviour,  the  that  next  theory,  out  we  room  even  the  next  the  phenomenon  seems  exist  to  be  aren't  or  a man i n  beliefs  a  position  but  of  case  with  our  where  the  voice,  first  John  case  whether  but  the  pick  of  low  simulation  like  room,  cause a  second in  next  with  theory,  is  sure  is  the  theory  explanation  We a r e n ' t  the  also  the  John the  best  woman  beliefs  we  named  a  being  accept  we a c c e p t  beliefs  a  there  a  respect  description.  whether  the  me  see  whether  room  to  to  a man n a m e d J o h n a s  posit  with  respect  sure  posit  we  are  and  are  the  best  explanation.  Our  theory  when  we  about  look  in  theory  of  brain,  we f i n d  look our we  cause  the  next  beliefs  i n the theory  meant  the  will x  be  John'  t h i n g was  we  find  not  brain  offering state  was the  was  f o r us a  we  of  the  equivalent then  relativized  a  if, the or  say  that  the  148  named we  belief  that  simply  In the  the by  if,  John.  look  say  description  description for  man  vindicated  Our  in P.  the  If  we  e v e n a man n a m e d S a m ,  music. to  be  when  We c a n n o t  relativized  cause  responsible  to  a radio,  false.  will  find  vindicated  a  to  music  equivalent  proven  a physical  legitimate  were  be  room and f i n d  physical don't  the  room,  a physical  next  by  will  of  x  belief the of  behaviour  that  of  whatever  same w a y , that  belief  when  P,  it  is  that  P'  we  whatever in  what  physical  question.  If  the  simulation  experience across  them.  the  my s i m u l a t i o n  can  I  can say  I  the  can  say  the  it  was  can  individuated  as  or  the  are  ways.  talking  know  a  see  me,  it I  by  the  of  descriptions environmental  was  John's  is  existence;  when  an o f f - l i n e  we  sitting  John  and t h e n ,  now.  that  are  context.  perspective.  or  I  singing.  explaining  manner  that  same  thing.  It  through  We  fit  is  no  in  the  of  belief  across  the  a  only  As  me  because that  those  beliefs  claims  make  problem  149  with  or  the  we  already using  historical  perfect  can  P that we  we the  we  individuate  social  of  P,  if  a  long  and  Thus,  to  on  variety  that  belief  a  we k n o w we  from  belief  however,  here  Earth.  that  in  behaviour  raining'  know  the  Slovenia,  your  on Twin  ways.  was  refer.  relative  There  its  the  I experience  Burge's  are  of  it  in both cases,  sitting  is,  we c a n  we  explanation  the  variety  f r o m me,  if  twraining'  man  a  individuate  descriptions  exist,  in  across  belief  is  the  also the  its  same  other  music  John,  descriptions  I'm h a v i n g  beliefs  the  can  that  John,  what t h e s e  know t h a t  of  the  x  John and o n l y because  know t o  this  fit  variety  experience  in  beliefs,  John  experience  man s i t t i n g  experience  about  descriptions  posit  where  posit I  them  For example,  *the b e l i e f  off-line  don't  them m y s e l f  the  Jonko.  of  Earth  case  Then  cause  was  variety be  don't  you.  room w i t h it  I  experience  individuate  man i n  me.  we  the  existence.  of  that  right,  also  I experience  behaviour,  I  is  is  from  John's  With b e l i e f s ,  I  This  table  experience  your  theory  sense  violation  or from of  supervenience is  no  problem  'John' the  on  even  is,  kind  of  that  there  x  a  say  cannot  simply  a  case  of  state,  but  what  state.  But  simulation theory  If  belief  belief  we  have  and  we of  the  disanalogy  when  we  next  human b e i n g  about a  belief.  why  a man, the  positing  using is  We an  exist posit  over  a n d we  must  is  we  its  raining'  raining. don't  of  a  disanalogy  theory does  stronger require  have  might  simply and  that  it  brain  state  also  refer  makes  further  supervenience  150  no  the  P . We  We  can  person  who  18,  etc.  We  of  a l l ,  we  belief  man  named  do  not,  to  may it  realism.  to  a  brain  we  can't  this in  the  Other  refer  be  is,  to  case  John,  in  like.  way  about  disanalogy  demonstrates for  a man,  men.  of  a  we  a  know  But the  right,  We t h i n k  know w h a t  descriptions  we  than  We a l s o  First  posit  for  what  know i n a d v a n c e w h a t o n e w o u l d l o o k that  name  know  to  age  belief.  name  that  an a d u l t  the  example  theory  a  there  P.  one.  more a p p r o p r i a t e .  theory  the  other  referring  a  of  a belief  r o o m o r we c a n p o s i t  a male  is  of  as  than  that  and p o s i t i n g  ways  just  between p o s i t i n g  positing of  other  belief  are  variety  states  evidence  men  since  this  have  that  its  other  evidence  We k n o w  that  theory  supervenience  is.  posit  beliefs,  the  of  existence  same  just  further.  x  or  This  than  violation  a certain  we  the  goes  say  the  are  female  rather  brain  John  man'  thing  something.  on  a man n a m e d J o h n ,  cannot  than  of  a man i n t h e  not  contents  because  for  positing  posit  the  however,  know w h a t  the  of  existence  There  belief  John,  description  is  of  brain  favour  of  why  the  The c l a i m o f  individualism is  unless  are  that  they  our  cannot  be  physically  explanations  of  substituted  for  contents  that  of  explanation  the  addition, efficacy the  the of  the  can  exist  refer  context.  second  first  type  of  view,  rather can't  have  context,  simulation than even  belief  and  with  same  see  to  of  pick  out  and w i t h  we  haven't a  as  the  the  151  efficacy  change.  In  by  given  the  context,  accept  that  claim that relative  exist  theory  to  first  we a as  theory  they  Only  on  the  description  of  the  contexts  result  And o n l y  entities  is  on  in the  previously  descriptions,  that  entity.  with  the  posited  belief  beliefs.  without  context,  The  entities.  positing  Since  within  beliefs  the  begin  behaving  it  are  a v a r i e t y of  as  experienced  that  entities.  of  someone  contents.  cannot  of  the  use  we  we  in different  existence  theory  theory  then  alternative  already  On t h e  failure  existence  wherein the  with  entities,  the  remain the the  we  is  contents  explained  which, within the  theory,  argued  these  state.  is  behaviour  have  contents  contents  explanations.  will  I  invoke  the  descriptions  c a n we l e g i t i m a t e l y  vary  the  as  cause  which invoke  however,  simulation  view  once  states to Unless,  What  same b r a i n  the  explanations  to  of  of  with  and then as  granted, will  the  first  denial  lost  can't  that  explanations  experiential  them  On  explanations the  as  to  experiences exist  refer.  behaviour  is  brain  beliefs  represented.  upon the  efficacy  contents  beliefs  On  supervene  that  already a  belief,  substitutions  contents  In  fact,  we  attributing but  rather  based  upon  physical The  belief  first  If  realizations is  abstracted  never  identified  treat  within  theories  chemistry  way  that  off  the  we  need  ground,  within  or  biology,  to  grant  the  a  not  physical  begin to  to  i n o r d e r even  grant  it  P and the  realism  is  accepts  the  which i n the  last  desire  ruled idea  posits  talk  that  beliefs  bodies  of  about to  possible.  state  the  Q caused  of  in  the  to  a  explain  explored the reconceive  granted  psychology. that X.  same  to  get  before We n e e d  the  belief  Psychological only  theory  of  to  if  one  behaviour  behaviour.  alternative folk  the  be  arguments is  In  biology  behaviour  psychology  theories  for  hypothesis  folk  treat  option.  must  a science  test  we  exist  externalist  to  an  beliefs  and d e s i r e s  is  as  is  by  two c h a p t e r s ,  alternative  that  that  out  psychology realism  existence  we c a n e v e n  The  with  are  place.  we  that  from context  We h a v e ,  this  idea.  as  non-  psychology  theoretical .  If  the  analysis  no  longer  I have p r e s e n t e d  internally inconsistent.  externalism  at  labelled  instrumentalist,  realism  an is  the  same  justified,  Michael  Friedman  in  way:  this  is  or  explains  time.  at it  correct,  O n e can m a i n t a i n r e a l i s m  And  it  the  152  although  seems  least  Burge's position  to  me  Dennett that  possible,  issues  I have  on  his this  been  has  is and  been  claim  to  picture.  confronting  ...the problem with contemporary psychology (and philosophy) is not that i t t r i e s to give theoretical reductions or explanations of human cognitive activities. There is no objection to theoretical reductions i n the a b s t r a c t . . . . T h e problem, r a t h e r , is the direction of the reduction. Contemporary psychology tries to explain individual cognitive a c t i v i t y i n d e p e n d e n t l y f r o m social cognitive activity, and then t r i e s t o g i v e a micro reduction of social cognitive activity—that is, the use of a public language—in terms of a p r i o r theory of individual c o g n i t i v e a c t i v i t y . T h e o p p o s i n g s u g g e s t i o n i s t h a t we f i r s t look f o r a theory of s o c i a l a c t i v i t y , and then t r y t o g i v e a macro r e d u c t i o n o f i n d i v i d u a l c o g n i t i v e activity—the activity of applying concepts making judgements, and so f o r t h — i n terms o f o u r p r i o r s o c i a l t h e o r y . . . . F r o m t h i s point of view, the primary problem with contemporary cognitive psychology—along with much e l s e i n l i n g u i s t i c s , p h i l o s o p h y o f l a n g u a g e , and p h i l o s o p h y o f m i n d — i s a commitment t o i n d i v i d u a l i s m . Perhaps it is time we turned away from this commitment. (1981, 15-16)  What  I  hope  that  our  to  it  the  reluctant  would  to  of  theoretical.  individualism that  folk  upon  a theory.  our  We h a v e  fear  is  only  a  denial  within  the  intentional accept  of  realism. context  states that  intentional  we  to  abandon  pursue  understanding  one  another.  legitimately  include  the  much  the  study  view  explain does  were n o t  need  more  of  the  no l o n g e r  Our s c i e n c e  153  of  to  states  seems  once  This  psychology  it  free  is  based  is  in  individualism is  be  been  chapters  that  explain behaviour,  will  has  two  fear  that  me,  last  psychology  to  to  the  the  O n c e we  matter,  in  abandon i n d i v i d u a l i s m because of  however,  attributions  to  view  result  justified,  subject  demonstrated  commitment  commitment t o been  have  for  indeed simply  is  have made  necessary.  avenues  and  will  a up  And,  individualism  behaviour  social  the  behaviour  fruitful of  that  we to  then  historical  influences  involved  the  know t h a t  brain  states  study  much  more  of  theory that every  theory  we  will  piece  view be  of  attributions cause  than and  of  intentional  b o d i l y movement.  that  fact.  2 6  individualism,  destined  to  continue  psychology  we  do.  Psychology  Unless however, to  states.  we it  attempt  We  is  the  abandon  the  seems to  to  me  vindicate  Do e x t r o v e r t s c o m p l e t e name r e c o g n i t i o n t a s k s m o r e q u i c k l y t h a n i n t r o v e r t s ? A r e p e o p l e w i t h i n d o o r j o b s more l i k e l y t o be h o m e b o d i e s ? D o e s a g e make a d i f f e r e n c e t o s a t i a t i o n t i m e o n c o l o u r recognition tasks? Does e d u c a t i o n make a d i f f e r e n c e ? Accepting psychology as a theory at the level of these types of generalizations i s d i f f e r e n t from t a k i n g i t t o be a t h e o r y that, for example, extroverts exist. Or t h a t a phenomenon called satiation' exists. I n o r d e r t o t e s t t h e s e s t a t e m e n t s , one must assume t h e e x i s t e n c e o f e x t r o v e r t s and s a t i a t i o n . And i n o r d e r t o t e s t w h e t h e r my a s c r i p t i o n t o y o u o f t h e b e l i e f t h a t a c a d e m i c s a r e generally lousy drivers is correct (which I w o u l d l i k e l y do by a s k i n g y o u ) , I must assume t h a t b e l i e f s exist. 2 6  x  154  C h a p t e r Knowledge,  Once in  it  was  T h e o r i e s ,  pointed  determinations  state content,  threatened.  face  of  are  the  the  states  it  states.  the  posited  of  the  I  have  reject  identifying  not  the  of  instead, ascribed  P r o c e s s e s  must  meaning  and  we  that If  intentional  denial  play  to  the  kind  to  of  propositional  role  realism in  the  which were c o n s i d e r e d  begins  with  and  succeed. to  the  It  other  the  succeed  reality the  to  play  to  place,  then  the  results  in  supervene  behaviour  cannot  than  in  assumption  predict  guarantee  taken  first  a  intentional  uphold realism  explain  are  i n the  of  causal,  believe  in  failure  of  the  denial  entities.  can, we  however,  are  using  there  is  states,  attitudes of  to  grounds  beliefs  those  states.  a  to  no  entities  that  to  that  cannot  are  beliefs  propositional  lead  and  factors  of  on s u p e r v e n i e n c e  that  notion  three  attribute  causal  argued  intentional  of  of  existence  the  of  attempts  realism  there  role  existence  the  constructs  If  the  ascriptions  a  we  depends  theoretical  external  concerns,  chapter,  theoretical  because  that  Despite  externalist  second  that  of  I n f o r m a t i o n ,  t r a d i t i o n a l views regarding p s y c h o l o g i c a l  were  the  out  F i v e  realism  a  theory  some  then to  maintain  the  picture attitudes  155  that  when  we  independent failure  supervene about  realism  the  of  if  ascribe  means the  states  attitudes.  It  drew  individuate  in the  of  content  on b r a i n  Burge  we  does  leads,  which  the  cause  of  behaviour  and  different  environments.  putting of  an  forward  cause  view  alternative  dedicated  to  the  can  be  Since  depends,  alternative  review t h i s be  that  at of  individuated  the  acceptance  least folk  in  part,  clarification  of  the  view  upon the  psychology,  i n more d e t a i l .  differently  we  chapter,  and  defense  the  theory  I  am  acceptance  however,  This  in  should  then,  of  will  simulation  theory.  In  introducing  simulation three will  theory,  most be  Stich  the  debate Martin  troubling  reviewed  along with  Goldman  and R o b e r t Gordon  present  detailed  made  simulation  clarify  further  addition  to  the  and  in  spite  the  objections  defensible  2 7  of  Davies  to  as  theory.  simulation fact  that  the  a  it  discussed for  Folk  by  to  Tony  the  simulation was  views  against  the  The  of  aim  theory  and  to  raised  by  and  Stone's  The  Stich  to  is  the  that  These  2 7  Stephen by  Alvin  Nichols  have is  been  both that,  to in  maintain realism,  Stich  Theory  out  and  review  Stone,  discussion  Psychology:  theory.  demonstrate  maintaining simulation  the  point  forward  claims this  and  r a i s e d by  put  would a l l o w us  Davies  theory  Stone  representative,  objections  and  and  fourth that  Taking  arguments  reasons  "Introduction"  Davies  objections  and Shaun N i c h o l s .  by  between  and N i c h o l s there  are  and  other  theory.  found  of  in  Mind  their  Debate,  B l a c k w e l l , O x f o r d , 1995a, 1-44. A l l o f t h e o t h e r a r t i c l e s d i s c u s s e d in t h i s chapter are, unless otherwise noted, also found i n e i t h e r t h e a b o v e o r D a v i e s a n d S t o n e , ( e d s ) , Mental Simulation:Evaluations and Applications, Blackwell, Oxford, 1995b. 156  Stich  and  Theory" offers those  Nichols  by "a  begin  claiming bold  their  that  the  challenge"  philosophers  "Simulation  proposal  to  supporting  paper,  the the  of  or  Tacit  simulation  received  view.  simulation  theory  Speaking  theory  they  of  say:  If these philosophers are right, two enormously important consequences w i l l follow. F i r s t , of course, the dominant explanatory strategy in cognitive science, the strategy that appeals to internally r e p r e s e n t e d k n o w l e d g e s t r u c t u r e s , w i l l be shown t o be m i s t a k e n i n a t l e a s t one c r u c i a l c o r n e r o f o u r m e n t a l lives. And i f it is mistaken there, then perhaps t h e o r i s t s e x p l o r i n g o t h e r c o g n i t i v e c a p a c i t i e s c a n no longer simply take the strategy f o r granted. (1995b, 124)  The  second  concerned for  with.  eliminative  psychology then  it  right, the  is  despite  be  this  is  is  that  be  a  the  the the  materialism  raised  is  by  based idea  theory.  objections  that  central  and the  false  one  upon  Thus,  externalists,  have  premise  that  raised  we  the  if if  by  it  in  been  the  that  is  a  simulation  the  argument  notion not  folk  theory,  theory  eliminativists  psychological  more  realism  is and  would  possible.  point  abbreviated arguments. Theory"  It  a theory  cannot  issues  s t i l l  At  consequence  to  in  their  S&N)  However,  (1995a,  have  in his  191-206),  the  characterization  and  Nichols:  paper  of  not  Stich yet  reply,  and  Nichols  begun  "In Defense  to of  present the  A l v i n Goldman a l r e a d y t a k e s  simulation  157  theory  as  (hereafter their  Simulation issue  presented  by  with Stich  The implication seems to be that opting for the s i m u l a t i o n t h e o r y o v e r t h e t h e o r y t h e o r y would be an abandonment o f t h e p r e v a i l i n g p a r a d i g m o f cognitive s c i e n c e . And t h a t sounds l i k e m u t i n y . In f a c t , choice o f s i m u l a t i o n t h e o r y w o u l d n o t be a r a d i c a l d e p a r t u r e from f a m i l i a r paradigms i n c o g n i t i v e science. It is true that a great deal of cognitive science f i t s the knowledge-rich p a r a d i g m s t r e s s e d by S&N. B u t . . . [ t ] h e r e is also a substantial tradition that posits knowledgepoor p r o c e d u r e s , i . e . p r o c e s s e s o r h e u r i s t i c s t h a t a r e r e l a t i v e l y s i m p l e o r c r u d e , and do n o t depend on q u i t e so r i c h a s e t o f r u l e s o r so complex a knowledge b a s e . The simulation theory fits this tradition fairly comfortably. (1995a, 192-193)  Goldman  cites  examples  Amos T v e r s k y a n d D a n i e l  Goldman has S&N's  addressed  claim that  important  procedures  are be to  inferential  Kahneman i n  and perhaps  simulation  consequences  procedures wouldn't  if  of  routinely  shocking, attribute  at  defense  attempted  theory  follow.  heuristics  That  invoked least,  intentional  is  to  to  this  since cognitive  find  states.  that It  claim.  by 2 8  t o n e down p a r t  correct  is, in  of  proposed  two  of  enormously  knowledge-poor science, we  would,  use of  it such  course,  Kahneman a n d T v e r s k y b e l i e v e t h a t r a t h e r t h a n r e p r e s e n t i n g r u l e s o r knowledge s t r u c t u r e s as complex as p r o b a b i l i t y c a l c u l u s , we use heuristics. Goldman (p.77) discusses *anchoring and adjustment' and representativeness'. Rather than going through c o m p l e x c a l c u l a t i o n s , p e o p l e may s o m e t i m e s b e g i n t h e i r p r o b a b i l i t y e s t i m a t e s w i t h an ' a n c h o r ' , w h i c h i s d e t e r m i n e d c o n t e x t u a l l y , and t h e n a d j u s t upward o r downward. The r e p r e s e n t a t i v e n e s s ' heuristic i s used t o determine p r o b a b i l i t i e s by c o n s i d e r i n g the degree to which an e v e n t o r p r o p e r t y i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f the c l a s s t o which i t b e l o n g s . Thus a l t h o u g h i t i s n o t p o s s i b l e f o r any c o n j u n c t i o n t o be more p r o b a b l e t h a n e i t h e r o f i t s c o n j u n c t s , s u b j e c t s r o u t i n e l y violate this rule given certain types of scenarios. F o r example, s u b j e c t s r a t e t h e p r o b a b i l i t y o f a p a r t i c u l a r woman, L i n d a , about whom t h e y h a v e b e e n g i v e n d e t a i l s o f h e r p a s t , b e i n g a f e m i n i s t a n d a bank t e l l e r as h i g h e r t h a t the p r o b a b i l i t y o f h e r b e i n g a bank teller. ( T v e r s k y a n d Kahneman 1983) 2 8  x  x  158  s t i l l  be  rather  of  great  than  applying  consequence  That  importance  pointed  a out  by  central  premise  arguments  w o u l d be  rendered  S&N s a y ,  important thesis. it  an  And a l t h o u g h to  argument  in  goal  not  is  manner  in  me  favour to  theory  psychological to  seems  Thus,  to  theory,  we  of  defend make  outset,  however,  simulation  mentioned  of  theory  the  does  it  been  but  we  do  second  Goldman.  materialist me,  just  It  is  this  addressing  in  this  Goldman o r S&N,  actually  theory.  The  seems t o  by e i t h e r  consequence  Even  rather  if  works one's  to  as  an  ultimate  determine  ascriptions,  r a t i o n a l l y to  itself  speak  certainly in one  of  not  result and  are  to  the  fact  maintain our  other  proposal.  159  not  favour their  introduction the  reasons  After in  based one  in  was  their  seriously.  preferable there  by  consequence.  have  discussed  us  what  the that folk  whereas e l i m i n a t i v i s m would r e q u i r e  it  it  is,  important we  is  eliminative  irrelevant  in  irrational  paribus,  not  intentional  should  consider  ceteris  S&N i s  may e n a b l e  although  that is  assumed.  realism,  listed  behaviour  been  simulation  actually  do  has  this  S&N h a v e ,  to  as  not  me t h a t  motivated what  it  ascriptions  abandon them,  theory.  this  that  that  w h i c h we  simulation  that  enormously  consequence  seems  know  theory,  the  as  to  a l l ,  the upon  that  simulation  intention, to we  should  conclusion false  for  it  simulation  an e x p l a n a t i o n  does.  grounds  of  us  that  be of our  premises  is,  I  at  the  supporting  the  As  said  S&N  quote  following theory:  from  argument  in  "To a p p l y  anomalous 'anomalous also  Gordon,  the  precocity". precocity  quoting  7  an  unpublished  favour alleged Thus  of  paper,  simulation  common-sense  they  argument.  refer They  to  as  offering  theory theory  this  expand  over  theory  would  demand  argument  upon  the  the  as  point  the by  Goldman:  C h i l d r e n seem t o d i s p l a y i n t e r p r e t i v e s k i l l s b y the age o f f o u r , f i v e o r s i x . I f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s indeed g u i d e d by l a w s o f f o l k p s y c h o l o g y , t h e l a t t e r must be known ( o r b e l i e v e d ) by t h i s age. Are such c h i l d r e n s o p h i s t i c a t e d enough t o r e p r e s e n t such p r i n c i p l e s ? And how, e x a c t l y , w o u l d t h e y a c q u i r e them? One possible mode o f acquisition is cultural transmission (e.g. b e i n g t a u g h t them e x p l i c i t l y by t h e i r e l d e r s ) . T h i s i s clearly out of the question though, since only p h i l o s o p h e r s have even t r i e d t o a r t i c u l a t e the laws, and most c h i l d r e n h a v e no e x p o s u r e t o philosophers. Another possible mode of acquisition is private construction. Each child constructs the g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s f o r h e r s e l f , perhaps t a k i n g c l u e s from v e r b a l e x p l a n a t i o n s o f b e h a v i o u r which she h e a r s . But i f t h i s c o n s t r u c t i o n i s supposed to occur along the lines of familiar modes of scientific theory c o n s t r u c t i o n , some a n o m a l o u s t h i n g s m u s t t a k e place. F o r one t h i n g , a l l c h i l d r e n m i r a c u l o u s l y c o n s t r u c t t h e same n o m o l o g i c a l p r i n c i p l e s . T h i s i s w h a t t h e (folk-) theory theory o s t e n s i b l y i m p l i e s , s i n c e i t imputes a s i n g l e f o l k psychology to everyone. In normal cases of hypothesis c o n s t r u c t i o n , however, d i f f e r e n t s c i e n t i s t s come u p w i t h d i f f e r e n t t h e o r i e s . (1995b, 80)  S&N  agree  represent  that the  the laws  impressive  feat.  example  an  of  structures similarly  fact of  But,  folk they  impressive  that  that  impressive  but  are  psychology go  feat  underlie  children  a  on t o of  by  this  kind.  nonetheless  160  this  argue,  child's  exist.  able  this  to  acquire  early is  not  They c i t e  age  is  the  and an only  knowledge  linguistic  ability  as  generally  accepted  to  This  point  S&N  is  (1995a,  partially 193-194).  complexity  issue  the  theory.  theory  agree  that  folk  which  has  been  concession. from  what  mind  for  picture  a  way  or  has  sort "This  how  where  internal  x  could take  of  form  learning type  heuristic"  (1995a,  194).  theory  being  correct,  made  model  of  in  an  of  acquisition  of  seems refute do n o t  rejecting folk  only  is  the  as  the  then, the  being  a  away  or  toward  also  of  F u r t h e r m o r e , some standard theory  in  some  notes:  take  or  a  the  simulation  although  that  from  chemistry  structure  possibility  of  learned  off-line  demonstrate  away  As Goldman  could  that  knee',  moving  involved,  it  to  making  moving  knowledge  But  against  philosophy  history  component.  the  S&N s e e m  are  the  to  that  mother's  we  also  learn  heuristic:  It  they  of  are  innate  simulation theory.  terms  we  mechanism.  argument does not  problem f o r the are  of  response  actually  within  psychology  purpose'  *at  are  construction  special  his  since  model,  assumed  folk  fact,  acquired  c h i l d r e n might  special  this  in  from t h i s  of  in  conceded  S&N  S&N g r a n t ,  a  that  not  been  theory  the  is  that,  is  Goldman  a knock-down argument  assumed,  theory  to  special-purpose form  widely  the  similar  of  psychology  As  it  present  standardly  of  astronomy  not  He c l a i m s  time.  by  However,  I n m o v i n g away  2 9  some  a  does  conceded  S&N s h o w  the  it  theory  poses  any  concessions construction  psychology.  G o l d m a n q u o t e s P a u l C h u r c h l a n d f r o m Matter and Consciousness as an example o f the s t a n d a r d view: " A l l o f us l e a r n (the folk psychological) framework at mother's knee, (as we learn our language), a n d i n s o d o i n g we a c q u i r e t h e common s e n s e c o n c e p t i o n o f what c o n s c i o u s intelligence i s . . . I t embodies the accumulated wisdom o f thousands o f g e n e r a t i o n s ' a t t e m p t s t o u n d e r s t a n d how we humans w o r k " ( 1 9 8 8 , 59). 2 9  161  In  their  "Introduction" to Davies  Debate,  appropriate  to  me,  to  is  about  standard on  conception  Stone  view  seems  drawing  and  relevant views  into  able  to  something,  puts  the  view  a  something...then tacit)  use  provide (1995,  of  a  of  we  present  by  This  point  Simon  wherein make  avoided can  tacit in  be  we  this  thought  principles  description  of  a  device,  and Stone  is  discussion,  under  it  discussion  Blackburn,  that  our  enough t o  that a  anytime  theory.  "If  as  that  it  out,  of  that  when  Mind  point  way: of  of  They  claim use  Theory of  construction.  of  Davies  issue  theory.  set  275).  some  the  The  t h e o r y must be s t r o n g  we  be  the  a  theory  notion  to  as  made  knowledge  collapsing do  to  on  Psychology:  discuss  something  arguments of  Folk  we  could, is  we  good  tacit  in  also  are  Blackburn  are  making  avoid  at  (very  principle,  good  at  it"  continue:  I f our c o n c e p t i o n of ( t a c i t ) knowledge of a t h e o r y is a s w e a k a s t h i s , t h e n we f a c e t h e p r o s p e c t o f a n e a r l y collapse between the theory theorist and the s i m u l a t i o n t h e o r i s t . F o r , an a d v o c a t e o f the view t h a t our f o l k - p s y c h o l o g i c a l p r a c t i c e i s u n d e r p i n n e d by an a b i l i t y would have l i t t l e d i f f i c u l t y i n a g r e e i n g t h a t t h e r e c a n be a t h e o r e t i c a l d e s c r i p t i o n o f a p r a c t i c a l a b i l i t y — j u s t so l o n g as the a b i l i t y i n q u e s t i o n has structure to be articulated, which our folk psychological a b i l i t y surely h a s . . . . S o , the claim that f o l k - p s y c h o l o g y i s a t h e o r y must be s t r o n g e r t h a n t h e claim that our folk-psychological practice can be g i v e n a t h e o r e t i c a l d e s c r i p t i o n . (1995a, 7)  One  of  theory  the  ways  more  psychology theories.  to  robust and  This  make is  the to  scientific analogy  is  claim  that  propose  an  knowledge, what  is  162  folk  psychology  analogy our  commonly  is  between  paradigm thought  of  a  folk  case when  of we  talk  about  discussed out,  it  one  Familiar points  in  of  relied  robustness would  be  the  of  way  describes  the  is  and  complexity  to  x  So,  if  it  knowledge.  feel  psychology  are  the  analogy  empirical  theories  to  were  taught.  to  example,  science  folk  subject  scientific  for  pointed  actively  tend  just  psychological  scientific  be  have  Goldman  folk  be  persons 7  Stone the  however,  analogy  notion to  also  of  is  a  are.  pain more  case  to  S&N  at like  that  S&N  maintain  the  theory,  anyhow.  theory  don't  Their  in  the  point  rules  of  possibility  of  in  comparison,  very  out  some  grammar,  learning. simple  The and  for  rely  attempt way  draw on an a n a l o g y w i t h  the  alternative  to  damage ,  above,  instead  of  acquire  B u t we  As  acquire  other  as,  that  theory.  there  problems.  knowledge  trivializing  that  such  view  we  appear  professional  the  we  have  hypotheses.  discussed  scientific  that  not  a  disanalogies.  not  bodily  than  some  was  Davies  the  being  way t h a t  does  recent  upon  case  does  platitudes  definitions  are,  same  it  as  serious  the  psychology  evaluation  out  the  be  i n the  Furthermore,  As  psychology  of  cannot  knowledge Folk  folk  perhaps  the avoid  Blackburn  linguistics.  example, of  to  that  disanalogies  rules  on  here.  seem  folk  to  But The rule  psychology  amenable  to  some  explanation:  The c o m p l e x i t y o f t h e s p e a k e r / h e a r e r ' s t a s k seems t o r u l e out p u t a t a t i v e a l t e r n a t i v e e x p l a n a t i o n s , s u c h as explanations in terms of general learning rules. B u t , i n what s e n s e would a f o l k - p s y c h o l o g i c a l theory show c o m p a r a b l e r i c h n e s s and s o p h i s t i c a t i o n ? Here, 163  there seems to be a serious disanalogy with linguistics. For f o l k psychology i s often thought to have a s i m p l e and homely c o n t e n t (hence, the epithet 'folk'). Once i t s p r i n c i p l e s are a r t i c u l a t e d , they seem t o be o b v i o u s . (1995a, 9)  Notice which  that  this  It  looks  sophisticated four  or  so  as  requires  once e x p l a i n e d ,  child or,  with the  rules  the  level  if  the  of  folk  could  the  but,  complexity assumption weakness  of  complexity,  of is  an  it  knowledge of  of  a tacit  the  first  complicated  question  whether required  behaviour,  understanding  seems,  least,  is  in  of  theory.  a to  but  and  child make it  concepts  The  concepts,  g r a m m a r , w h i c h a r e much more c o m p l e x .  But  does  just  that  complex  for  of  folk  one  that  psychology  could  that  the  it  claim  theory  could  held t a c i t l y  since  there  two  rationale, presents,  is  in  it  be  they  case  is  a  seems  to  164  could  that  difference  of  folk  result  of  me,  an  be  held  is?  s a m e way a s  our r a t i o n a l e case  issue  too  grammar  the  a vast  the  which  of  the  are  that  i n the  theories,  weaker  Isn't  is  by  case  r e a l l y matter?  This  is  the  l i k e l y be r e a d i l y u n d e r s t o o d  a young a d u l t .  to  the  is  the  would the  G o l d m a n made  not  way  respond  psychology  we  positing  at  learn  psychology  grammar,  the  that  linguistics  explanations  that  complexity  to in  that  point  with  folk  and o f f e r  principles  children  One  of  analogy  possess  could,  an o l d e r  tacitly  so  complicated  involved  opposite  though  could  about  the  the  enough  five  predictions not  just  S&N i n t r o d u c e d  place.  of  is  in  the  theory  of  the  theory  of  level  of  the  f o r making such psychology. the  differences  important  an  This in  disanalogy  with If  grammar. The d i s a n a l o g y  we  is  argue  justified  complexity the  case  folk be  that  a  the  the  folk  we  But,  at  should least  for  with  is  this  a  to  facie,  tacit be  this  point.  non-trivial  grammar,  positing  expect prima  Blackburn's  psychology  analogy  prime motivator  grammar,  psychology.  important to  claim that  through  is  of  the  is  then  if  theory  in  the  case  doesn't  with  seem  to  case.  Gordon  makes  complexity  the  is  further,  very  important  according  to  the  behaviour  is  explained  underlie  theory  our mental  stronger for  theorists, by  folk  point  that  folk  psychology  our competence  psychology—the  attributions  the  in  lack  since,  predicting  principles  and e x p l a n a t i o n s  of  of  that  behaviour:  Theory t h e o r i s t s generally assume t h a t the laws of folk psychology can be formulated i n terms of the c o m m o n - s e n s e m e n t a l v o c a b u l a r y . T h e y must a s s u m e t h i s i f t h e y h o l d , a s m o s t s e e m t o , t h a t t h e common s e n s e theory implicitly defines these terms. Generative grammarians, on the other hand, have no such compunctions about introducing a technical vocabulary....Analogy: It's a l l r i g h t to say that to catch a ball c h i l d r e n have to solve differential equations, as l o n g as t h i s d o e s n ' t e n t a i l t h a t they have to understand differential equations. (1995b, 177-178)  Thus the is  no  accident.  technical our  lack of  conflict  in  cannot with  of  the  vocabulary of  Grammarians have  vocabulary since  competence  theorists  complexity  the  they  grammar  introduce idea  no  do n o t  is  a  technical  that  problem  our 165  folk  in  introducing  claim that  folk terms  what  grammar. since  understanding  psychology  of  explains  But  doing  a  theory so  would  behaviour  is  based  upon  an  especially theory.  can  really  technicality  could  claiming  of  the  of  his  tacit  "...given  the  it,  knowledge  a  summarize  the  *anomalous  the  to  that  of  an  that  the  to  that  is  not  outrageous  of  of  the  of  grammar. The t h e o r y  of  and  x  five  level  of  simply  by  to  apply  most  predict the  theory  because is  concept point  provide  that  of  and  child  concept  Stone  needs  this  that  it  or  understanding  belief,  (1995a,  requirement as  the  of  although  mechanisms  argument  technical  argument  required to  also  use"  people,  four  between h a v i n g a body of  lines  precocity'  of  at  representative  Davies  theory  S&N a r g u e as  theory  by which  processing put  make  As  distinction theory  to  children  line  concept'  theory  many  stands.  is  claim  the  theory.  the  young  accept  could  and  u n d e r s t a n d a more  the  not  psychology  be  Goldman  theory,  appropriately u t i l i z i n g the  information  Let's  a  Gordon's  not  tacit  nonetheless  now  are  do  They  is  using  to  understand to  it  they  folk  whether  understand  which  and  behaviour.  access  is  respond  theorists'  doesn't  at  that  concepts  of  young c h i l d r e n , c o u l d not  The q u e s t i o n  years  S&N  understanding  the  explain of  he  five  has  no  defined,  he  on t h e out,  basis  however,  knowledge an  enable  account  that  body  and of of  15).  so  far.  Gordon  children  would  have  to  possess  the  psychological  theory.  of  sounds  argument  folk  applying a complicated especially  grammar i s  166  highly  given  the  complicated,  and  theory example yet  we  accept a  that  tacit  tacit a  theory.  theory.  view  folk  of  Folk  tacit  most  given  theory  our  as  belief.  And s i n c e  mental  vocabulary,  is  is  not  theory  belief,  just  could  be  grammar seems t o not  as  lack  of  of  defines  with  complexity.  In  psychology  but  the  view  that  concepts  the  an u n d e r s t a n d i n g  a  force  compelling  behaviour,  that  such  also  o n l y r e l y on f o l k  predict  the  like  might  respond  to  understanding  folk  psychological  practice,  of  terms of  like  of  the  the  Thus,  one  can  use  with  that  the  can the  note  an  account  child,  successful analogy  on  with  demonstrated a more  theory  that  of  a  this how  false  grammar the  robust  Blackburn  concepts  the  is  the  theory  sense  The  tacit  that of  167  of  folk  latter  that  upon  belief  is  concluded s t i l l  accessed. of  belief,  addition,  the  the  without  S&N, t h e y  S&N  psychology than  folk  depend  concept  limitations,  theory  discusses.  In  in  discussion  knowledge  task?  its  of  position  understand the  has  not  between  engaging  only the  concept  the  belief  and  is  does  belief.  the  view  it  latter  of  who d o e s n ' t  how  offers  concept if  distinguishing  claiming that  that  the  by  psychological  and  understanding  us  this  concern  former.  owe  case  of  upon an u n d e r s t a n d i n g  it  upon a  S&N a r g u e ,  relative  to  based  necessary.  S&N  is  the  theorists  dependent  is  complexity  its  ability  ability  is  the  theory,  psychology,  explain  psychology,  But while  a  addition, to  our grammatical behaviour  is  trivial  How be  since  the  have  not  a  theory  sense  of  It  seems t o  have  not  fact,  closed  as  issues  in  we  and  response. next  me t h a t  defense  and  have  the  explanations means,  know  and  claim  for  don't  our  for  the can  also  theory of  issue  in  thing  w h i c h was of  this  seen  same  response  d o o r on t h e  questions  The  issue,  the  in their  3  be  know  about  the  anomalous  said,  raised  that  of  theory  theory,  is  G o l d m a n a n d G o r d o n , S&N  discussion,  a  theory it  precocity.  number are  seems  to  by S&N. L i s t e d  as  S&N c l a i m t h a t  behaviour are  S&N °,  to  'cognitively they  laws  are that  our  of  other  raised me, an  govern  a  in  of  the  argument  predictions  penetrable'.  sensitive  In  to  What  what  system.  we S&N  that:  I f we a r e m a k i n g p r e d i c t i o n s o n t h e b a s i s o f a s e t of l a w s o r p r i n c i p l e s , a n d i f t h e r e a r e some u n e x p e c t e d aspects of the system's behaviour that are not c a p t u r e d by our p r i n c i p l e s , then our p r e d i c t i o n s about t h o s e a s p e c t s o f t h e s y s t e m ' s b e h a v i o u r s h o u l d be l e s s accurate. Theory based p r e d i c t i o n s are s e n s i t i v e to w h a t we k n o w a n d d o n ' t k n o w a b o u t t h e l a w s t h a t g o v e r n the system; they are c o g n i t i v e l y p e n e t r a b l e . . . . I f we can find cases in which the ignorance about the w o r k i n g s o f o n e ' s own p s y c h o l o g y l e a d s p e o p l e t o m a k e m i s t a k e s i n p r e d i c t i n g what t h e y , o r o t h e r s i m i l a r l y s i t u a t e d people, would do, i t w i l l provide yet another reason to think that the o f f - l i n e simulation theory is untenable. (1995b, 150)  °The t e r m was m e a n i n g , i t seems t o 3  and  Cognition:Toward  actually i n t r o d u c e d by Zenon P y l y s h n . His me, i s a l i t t l e d i f f e r e n t . I n h i s Computation  a Foundation  for Cognitive  Science,  he  says  "The r a t i o n a l l y e x p l i c a b l e a l t e r a b i l i t y o f a c o m p o n e n t ' s b e h a v i o u r i n response t o changes i n g o a l s and b e l i e f s i s what I r e f e r t o as cognitive penetrability" (1984, 133). Thus, if a component's b e h a v i o u r i s a l t e r e d b y new b e l i e f s t h e n i t i s p e n e t r a b l e . I f the system is 'dumb', non-penetrable or, as Fodor (1983) says, ' e n c a p s u l a t e d ' , t h e n i t p r o c e e d s t o do w h a t e v e r i t does r e g a r d l e s s o f a n y new b e l i e f s o r g o a l s t h a t t h e l a r g e r s y s t e m may h a v e . T h e differences between P y l y s h y n ' s meaning and S&N's d o n ' t , however, matter f o r our present purposes. 168  S&N  then  claim  examples three  that  cases  we  that  In  first  the  are  were  opinion  preferred  article  number  the  of  the  and Ross  In  the  ticket ticket  1980,  is  tickets  of  choose  seller  those  who w e r e  their  ticket  asked  an average  that trait,  once she  we  It  tickets  are  a  to  article  subjects  in  and  Ross.  part  has  found  as  a l l  to  that  actually  demanded  handed t h e i r  of  example  $8.67  cited  subject  will  is  continue  to  imagine for  ticket. out  in  a  choose  a  set  a  out  that,  although  identical,  subjects  preferable  (Nisbett  a  of  $1.96  next  back,  the  and Ross  believe  that this  in  who b u y  for  them  choice  chose than in  subjects  136).  demonstrated  she  has in  the  choice  the  even  the  when  t h o s e who  1980,  the  choose  day  price  while  S&N c o n c e r n s  169  actually  T h o s e who h a d n o  convinced to  someone  Some p e o p l e  the  higher  ticket.  (Nisbett  by  Others  tickets  much  that  $1.00.  that,  buy the  asked an average  a  Ross  three In  taking  asked  table  and  tickets  turns  attempted  own  final  of  are a  were  right-most  lottery  want.  their  The  from  as  by N i s b e t t  pretense  Nisbett  s i m p l y handed  they  out  cite  and R o s s .  ourselves  subjects  clothing  example  selling  are  the  clothing  the  They  207).  second  office  under  articles.  common.  imagine  carried  survey,  articles to  to  actually  of  are  c o n d u c t e d by N i s b e t t  asked  study,  consumer  tended  cases  using experiments  studies  all  such  a  fact  particular the  face  of  overwhelming  evidence  convinced  an  fake  by  suicide  continue simply  to  possess exhibit degree  notes  this  x  (Nisbett  these  in  S&N,  surprising  attributing the  should  to  if  us.  i n the  on  what  the  If  our theory  reply  argument. (1995a, what  subjects is  and  Gordon  202-203) calls  are also  cites  is  told  she  to  she  that  does  an even  tell will was  really  observers  to  is  she  not  theory  did  the  use  w h e n we  Ross  on  were  also  greater  by  subjects  our  folk  that  we  But,  in fact,  we  our  judgements  psychological  objections  to  be  which the  impenetrability'  theory.  wrong.  S&N's  problems, is  when  We  two  170  is,  studies.  will  *imaginative  ourselves  and  we b a s e  there  when  the  judgements  and  they  we  of do.  the  Ross,  our  methodological  but  simulation  Nisbett  subjects  us,  imagined  describe,  because  discusses,  correct  be s u r p r i s i n g t o  then  way a s  then  example,  a n d do s o  described  do  subject  ability  third-person  really  we d o n o t  wrong,  There  Gordon  we  states,  will  for  a  175-179).  p r e d i c t what t h e  S&N c l a i m t h a t  once  the  that  simulation  If  same  do n o t .  his  1980,  the  has  she  and  perserverence'  Nisbett  should accurately  In  study  circumstances  react  after  addition,  intentional  the  she  Thus,  ones,  s t u d i e s would not  situations  simulate  a  In  that  even  and Ross  results  of  of  belief  to  contrary.  real  this  skill.  According  are  from  subject  this  the  experimenter  believe  the  to  line  of  Goldman  problem  (1995b,  of  175-  176). the  To i l l u s t r a t e  Muller-Lyer  his  point  he  uses  the  analogy  of  imagining  illusion:  . . . v i s u a l i z e two s t r a i g h t l i n e s o f e q u a l l e n g t h , one j u s t a b o v e t h e o t h e r . One o f t h e l i n e s h a s a r e g u l a r arrowhead at each end, the other has an inward p o i n t i n g a r r o w h e a d a t e a c h e n d . Now, which line is longer?...There are two problems. One is methodological: It's silly to ask 'Which line is l o n g e r ? ' b e c a u s e I s t i p u l a t e d t h a t t h e two l i n e s are of egual length. S u p p o s e we a s k 'Which l i n e looks l o n g e r ? ' T h e r e i s s t i l l no r e a s o n t o t h i n k w e ' l l get the illusion going. T h a t ' s because of the second p r o b l e m w h i c h may b e c a l l e d t h e p r o b l e m o f imaginative impenetrability. Even i f v i s u a l imagery i s a p r o d u c t of the v i s u a l - p e r c e p t i o n system running o f f - l i n e , it is surely going to bypass s o m e stages of visual processing, e s p e c i a l l y e a r l y stages—and the i l l u s i o n may o r i g i n a t e a t o n e o f t h e s e s t a g e s . ( 1 9 9 5 b , 1 7 5 - 1 7 6 )  Thus,  the  methodological  we  imagine  ourselves  is  that  are  we  actual example,  that  in the  to  lines  identical.  the  the  to  chose  In  the  argues  second that  we  and i t  items  the  either  those  studies more  is  It  this  on t h e  example,  garments case  a  In  the  of  S&N t h a t  up by N i s b e t t  and  information  are  told,  are  identical.  i n w h i c h we a r e  in  stage that  stage  accounts  Ross  than the  the  first  This  told  is  that  w h e n we a r e a s k e d t o  particular  the  imagine  of  cognitive  for the  preference  right.  involving  imagined s i t u a t i o n  experimental condition and, thus, flawed.  suggestion  less We  may b e t h a t  bypass  set  or  studies.  Muller-Lyer  situation,  processing  the  clothing  analogous are  in  given  subjects  problem with the  experimental  the is  lottery just  once  situation 171  too  again, one  tickets,  Gordon  f a r from the the  real  methodology  experiences  is  either  choosing time  lapse  price not  the  ticket  takes  when  receiving  a ticket  and the  compare  ticket.  time  role  if  the  of  did  a  previously  a  decision  chosen  is  ticket.  of  points  chose  numbers you d i d  out  the  for  choosing  or  S&N a s k u s  to  We a r e  further  ticket  chose  then  asked  discrepancies.  you  a particular  the do  a p e r s o n who  a p e r s o n who d i d n o t .  a  we  experience  role  about  scenario  In a d d i t i o n ,  the  ticket,  made  imagining the  n o r d o we  roles,  Goldman  you  In  lapse  in both  them.  that  chosen  then  a p r e v i o u s l y chosen  ourselves  notes  and  the  this  imagine  to  receiving  place  selling  experience  or  would  likely  He have  reason:  In a r e a l c a s e t h e r e w o u l d be t i c k e t s with actual numbers, and you would d e l i b e r a t e l y r e f l e c t on t h o s e n u m b e r s a n d p o s s i b l y come u p w i t h some ^ g r o u n d s ' f o r p r e f e r r i n g one o f t h e numbers t o t h e o t h e r s . But i f you c a s u a l l y imagine y o u r s e l f i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n , you would not exert the same deliberation and reflectiveness. (1995a, 203)  In  the  final  information particular is  false.  example  we  receive  task  like  Since  understand  why  we it  we  about  telling don't  problems  impenetrability.  The  can't  immediately  be that  impenetrability  told  at  ourselves, fake  ever  wouldn't  methodological  beliefs  are  persist.  they  problem  to  are is  172  as  being from  example  problem  persevere  the  that  and design  of is if the  the  good real  information  problems  false  that  outset  notes  the  This  methodological  expected  such  suicide  believe  and  the  at  ones,  one  presents  a  can both  imaginative that one  clearly is  told  imaginative  assumes  that  the  mechanism t h a t  is  responsible  a l s o be t r i g g e r e d by m e r e l y  The  truth  correct  of  in  simulation our  experimental situations with  the  there  expectation but  simulation  theory,  it  there  which the  theory  situations.  where  are  is  also  has  its  the  will  be  inherent  we  is  not  about  some  that  beliefs  does  This  some  difference  perserverence  feigned  assumptions  situation,  Gordon,  for  should  true  require  that  be  outcome  of  of  able  to  As  is  177).  course  in  problem  simulate but  pointed  is  a not  out  phenomena  and s i m u l a t i o n  are  certain  simulation,  psychological  between r e a l i t y  must  we  methodological  because  of  beliefs  (Gordon 1995b,  true  shortcomings.  types  of  by for  crucial:  To imagine drinking six m a r t i n i s d o e s n ' t make one drunk, not even off-line. Here simulation is i n a d e q u a t e , and an independent source of knowledge is i n d i s p e n s a b l e . T h a t ' s a s h o r t c o m i n g o f simulation, but i t i s n ' t a shortcoming of the simulation theory. It is a virtue of the theory that simulation fails to p r e d i c t phenomena t h a t o u r common-sense belief-desire psychology f a i l s t o p r e d i c t . (1995b, 176)  S&N's  examples,  theory.  In  suggested subject  then,  fact,  above is  they by  faulty,  do  not  may  Gordon. then  the  (running off-line)  In  for  order  determined format  in  by  the  answer  information  which  the  even If  processes  refute  the  provide  the  input  to  result  be  right,  must  also  information  difference. 173  some  information  will  to  truth  is  be  the  of  simulation  support provided  decision  i n an i n c o r r e c t the right.  presented  inputs In  as to  is the  makinganswer.  which  are  addition,  the  will  also  make  a  A  further  point  sometimes  exist  captured theory  on  by  this  issue  influences  simulation.  must  allow  personalities,  for  different on  seen,  is  case  everything can  be  cases  not  where  we  to  of  to  with  There  are  before it  a  to  anomalous  is  the  that  what  we  govern  some p i e c e s  of  this  for  precocity. theory  our know the  of  of  folk  don't  behaviour  to  other's  know  about  174  just  requires  that  does  I  has fail  we  it  'cognitively are  our does  however,  further  issue  a  ability  not,  penetrability  behaviour the  our  This below.  to  penetrability.  S&N, what is  in  theory  like  the  taken  distinction.  would  last  person  expect,  we  be d i s c u s s e d  on the  are  where  theory  cognitive  of  we  have  we  person  This  cognitive  psychology  that  non-  simulation  points  According  for  we c a n s u p p l e m e n t  will  position  and  would  a  be  different  particular  we  cases  theory.  further  predictions and  that  accepting  S&N's  of  cannot  of  As  a  There  (simulation)  theory  in as  addition,  of  48).  when  theory/theory  issue  me t h a t  just  such  differences  couple  consequences  In  notion  simulation  leaving  seems  that  the  individual  And,  which  thinking  making  examples  behaviour.  undermine the issue of  be  of  simulation  simulate,  will  reject  simulate  another.  cannot  drug,  predictions need  by  Heal.  idea  (1995,  decision  Jane  making  the  styles  that  by  "Replication  for  thinking"  affects  simulated  particular  not  the  that  says:  somewhere  influences  made  decision  Heal  rational it  on  is  raise  Firstly, has  some  discussed:  means  to  say  penetrable' sensitive  laws  of  psychology  attempting  to  predict.  to that  Recall  that  Gordon, of  the  i.e.,  response  that  of  S&N t o  the  p r e d i c t i n g b e h a v i o u r on t h e  f o l k psychology would demonstrate  claim  that  grammar,  since  the  from being  made  up  of  believes equal,  that  that  able  represented  and  a  Ross  in  is  s t i l l  rejected opted  owe  for  an  will  to  as  one  will  a  choose  theory  of  four  desires  are to  tacit  stated  given  x  to  year  being  choice that  the  are  some  simply  not  predict theory.  above  is  X and  else  S&N, t h e r e  that  our  was  Z' . According to  of  account  scientific analogy  science where  choose  of  model with  our a b i l i t y  situations  that  failure  such  theory  assumed,  everything  Our f a i l u r e  the  a  preclude  someone  then,  about  the  we h a v e  theory.  like  of  and  be  certain But  why  represented  between object  several which  is  represented?  psychological  people  a  it  *If  psychology  people  be  us  the  professional any  on  objects,  the  for  account some  based  as, X,  Goldman  basis  like  does not  according  folk  our t a c i t  not  in  bring  just  The t h e o r y ,  such  examples, of  tacit,  it.  by  anomalous p r e c o c i t y ,  complex  result  generalization  right-most'  is  is  use  a generalization  identical  S&N  to  Z will  generalizations  would  it  person w i l l  and  outcomes  theory  generalizations  that  Nesbitt  the  fact  olds  claim  to  theory of  hypothesis  grammar.  answer  we  we  would  given  an  A  and  array  175  not  others. have  an h y p o t h e s e s of  identical  They  have  and  have  model  correctly  not  may s i m p l y test  testing  scientific  questions  principles model,  acquisition.  would  regarding On  the  encountered  regarding  how  objects.  We  a c q u i r e our knowledge But on t h e we u s e  grammar m o d e l ,  or  access  represent  If  S&N's  view  at  work  innate would  is  that  as  an  work t o  Our f a i l u r e  experiments theory  tacitly  and not  others.  The  focus  of  analogy  of  grammar  and  and Ross is  wrong  to  is,  my  the our  too"  it  is  r e q u i r e an e x p l a n a t i o n  seems  failure  (1995b,  the to  folk  to  it  some  point of  we  pieces  however,  theory  152).  of  others,  or  cognitive  structure need  to  me, is  folk  of  why  of  why  remains  in  expected fact  the  a just  the  easy to  upon  results  that  our our  and  not  Nesbitt  and  On  the  explain  why  the of  of  theory the  the of  Nesbitt  psychology  predictions folk  is  mechanism  issue  "[w]hen o u r f o l k  that  what  generalizations  the  with  3 1  special-  explained.  so  psychology  module  psychology  easily not  know  psychological  predict  The  of  or  learning  subjects  S&N c l a i m t h a t be  kind  a special-purpose  simulate  second  to  some  then  3 2  some  it  and not  knowledge  represented  experiments.  wrong,  such  account,  have  is  innate  represent  hypotheses.  generalizations.  there  a n d why o r how  theory we  false  learning mechanism,  others. Ross  such  we s t i l l  and c o n f i r m i n g  some g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s  we w o u l d  purpose  through testing  will  psychology  be can  T h i s would be odd g i v e n t h a t t h e y a r e a r g u i n g t h a t folk p s y c h o l o g y i s c o g n i t i v e l y p e n e t r a b l e . T h i s w o u l d be where i t w o u l d be i m p o r t a n t t o d i s t i n g u i s h t h e i r m e a n i n g f r o m P y l y s h y n ' s . 3 1  These o p t i o n s , which I c i t e d e a r l i e r i n t h i s chapter, are suggested by Goldman, along with the option of the off-line s i m u l a t i o n h e u r i s t i c (1995a, 194). 3 2  be  wrong,  it  disanalogy sometimes theory  seems  with  the  make  is  to  theory  then  determine  attempt  to  Of c o u r s e ,  is  something  be  considered  If  we  all  grammar,  wrong.  mistakes  the  us  this  is  not  serious  do  indeed  because  our  the  be  it  must  we  to  or  It kinds  first  is  the  when  begins  to  rules.  yesterday  sentence,  false  the  theory  we f i n d  the  that  string  individuals  etc.  typically  do,  errors  Since it  is  are  in  of  make  by  damage,  explained  of  performance m a l f u n c t i o n brought on  we  are  by the  of  the not  theory the  is  theory  made.  y o u n g c h i l d r e n who m a k e g r a m m a t i c a l  for  use  that  cannot  we h y p o t h e s i z e  although  individual  errors  a  there  it  *Yellow  hold  if  we  terms  case of  appears, of  fact  but  language  explained  grammar t h a t  mistakes  brain  e x p l a i n what  responsible  mistakes.  or  with  words  all  and  m i g h t be b e h i n d what  grammatical  Furthermore,  cognitive illness  of  a  that  these  be  string  theory of  occasion,  of  rules  s t u d y w h a t we d o  s o m e t i m e s make m i s t a k e s ,  h o l d must e x p l a i n t h e  The e x c e p t i o n  child  what t h e  constituted  but that  or  developed  similar  quite  A l t h o u g h we  grammar, l i n g u i s t s  that  not  on  some k i n d  is  mistakes,  Instead  grammatical.  fatigue  grammar.  we a l l d o c o n s i s t e n t l y  would  we t a c i t l y  that  that  outside'  conclusion  of  some o f  thought  did  words  another  wrong.  rules  went  presents of  grammatical  In studying the  do.  me,  example,  such the  as past  177  that  all  children  overregularization. tense,  he  or  she  make  When  will  the  begin  adding 'he  'ed'  goed  cases, rule  child  theory  is  not  the  grow  it  to  the  the  of  and  the if  are  is,  rule, we  have  to  use  a  them  to  to  sentence  explain  and  from  teach  what  they  s t i l l ,  of  form  would  like be  not  As  And,  'she  the  be  the  proper  disappears.  things  a  problem.  examples  would  the  a p p l i c a t i o n of  say  it  to  The problem  grammatical error  continued  these  fact,  imitate  performance more  in  In  attempt  but with the  to  like  instructions  rule.  a  things  And,  theory.  explicit  the  exposed  that  saying  wrong'.  using  again,  this  all  it  asking  theory,  are  start  So when p a r e n t s  s t i l l  It  supermarket', would  to  doed  override  rule.  with the  theory.  didn't,  theory  children  grammar by  older  application  and w i l l  'she  seems t o  correct  of  if  or  c h i l d r e n tend  however,  they  that  disobey  the  rules  store'  seems  to  the  i r r e g u l a r verbs  the  the  parents  say,  to  it  of  to  goed  one  our  considered  a  mistake.  This  does  not  psychology. tacit that,  It  theory  both  seems  that,  can  is  same t h e o r y ,  folk  to  same  tacit it  false  psychology that  competence  we and  be  contain  nevertheless,  psychology  the  appear  is  the in  we  how  need we  a theory to need  to  If  somehow or  It  seems  a  posit  178  to  a  tacit  theory  folk are  all  of  folk  psychology, simply  our  me  some o f tacit  the  come  why we  loses  posit  of  that  holds.  all  unclear  with  case  principles  information. is  the  everyone and  case  theory to  wrong of  that  to the  its  force  theory  to to  the  represent view  i f  but folk  represent  come  theory  our  we  that claim  explain explain  our our  incompetence. theory is  Or,  becomes  difficult  Another  at  even  to  more  by  drive  simulation  is  compares  like  describes shoes'.  of  a  to in  react,  bridges.  distinction  and  one  must have that  of  acquisition  the  analogy  simulation  (1995a,  18)  knowledge  to  be  is  knowledge  (Daniel  himself  of  with  the  grammar  Dennett a  of  *putting  argues needs  Davies  that  and  Stone  oneself  of  in  the be  that  is  order  to  object  100).  simulation, into  this  to  issue  between t h e o r y - d r i v e n s i m u l a t i o n  and  in  how  he  which  he  else's  how t h e the  or  Dennett  somebody  determine  he  organized  and wondering  pertaining  consider  that  1987,  bridge  i n order to  some t h e o r y  theory  must  wind blowing with mental  terms  he  the  Stone  theory  the  Dennett  to  and  and  imagining  would r e a c t  would  Davies  simulating  something  issue  pressing  objection  discussed  she  the  sustain.  common  the  least,  bridge  engineering  in  terms  of  a  process-driven  simulation.  Simulation, driven.  a  case  conceded  the  given  economy  recession  recession. driven  is  An example  simulating into  it  But mental  way. of  or  It  mental  relevantly  is  of  by Goldman by a  simulation by  simulation, then,  and  country.  anything  driven  similar,  Davies  without  179  The  does  not  rather  the any  85)  Stone  c a n be  is  of  computer  off-line  process if  (1995b,  a  work  in  than  inputs  knowledge  this  theory.  are  the of  computer  does  isomorphic  theory  not  go  with  a  theoryIn same  theory,  the or the  simulator  can  states  the  as  process.  order  to  my  know  a  to  own  bed.  system.  information, you  will  right  be  theory  The  final  the  last  of  Of  such  course,  one  differences should  whether  that  we  input, I  will  as  it  Critics  should  s t i l l  relevant  input  a  I  I  to not  But,  come  in this  is  along  that  there  other,  in  some  particular belief,  180  into  isn't  In  to  entering set  the  account  and the  the  person  differences decide  beliefs  I  it  the  similar  to  to  theory.  with  theory  always  order  lecture  information.  simulator,  pretend  up  order  are  relevant a  lines  one must t a k e  be  through  case,  about  in  have  will  the  prepare  in  a.m.,  don't you  a  would  2:00 I  all  how  bridges,  that  input  will  being the  use  force of  end  similar  know  it's  know  a complaint  Since  to  that  need  I  and which  need  wind  I'm m i s s i n g — i t ' s  place,  the  to  your novel,  don't  argue  first  and  I  I  consider is  order  a  i n f o r m a t i o n and run i t  tomorrow,  simulating.  are  given  similar,  through  and e n g i n e e r i n g  your behaviour.  insofar  oneself  in  certain  finished  you  between o n e s e l f , is  goes  that  do  if  that  presenting  objection  differences  I  just  relevantly  human p s y c h o l o g y .  as  simulation.  between  would  or she  a  simply input that  s i m u l a t i o n up i n t h e  whom  you  of psychology  one  to  about physics  prediction of  any  into  I  or  true  react  and y o u ' v e  theory  same, he  it's  would  what  tired,  know  going  bridge  the  because  although  some t h e o r y  to  you're  up w i t h  system  Thus,  particular require  come  and  order  already  which desires to  know  need  to  know w h e t h e r that  gaze  to  this,  response'  inward looks try by  will  be  to  to  the  his  may n o t  the  outcome  capture  in  whether  the  than  ^personality'  I  input  information,  it  is  relevance  required.  In  fact  us  one  theory what of  we  the  view is  is  this  succeed we  have  in his solved  it  not  is  This  difficult  for  181  so  for  kind to  of  clear  do  not  differences x  inner'  or  relevant  the  relevant  is  Theory  problem  theory  fact,  to  his  inadequately  a  how  computer  we  input  process.  in  about  Once t h a t  of  try  situation  these  either  more  we  his  that  inputting  the  problem,  t y p i c a l l y do  into  situation. by  rather we  Rather,  gaze'  look  When  some t h i n g s  fail in  poses  since  x  but  perspective.  some  we  issue  relevant.  most  his  for  If  placed ourselves of  may b e  But accounting  because  issue  his  direction  does not  states,  behaving.  from  differences. when  and  ourselves  there  accounting  or  tell  Putting  world  information,  theory  person  *the  simulation  motives from  call  b e h a v i o u r we d o n o t  the  our s i m u l a t i o n .  different  adequately  of  work because  about  that  environment,  situation.  always  and Stone  is  person's  understand  his  situation,  the  20),  understand a piece  t r y i n g to  is  which Davies  (1995a,  discover  outward to  understand  be  important to  belief.  The response of  it  done, is  not  for  the  could  has  scientists  or  ever  proven in  to  their  attempts The  to  design  a  computer  problem is  known as  Simulationists  admit,  generalizations secondary will  'personality behaviour  inductively shortcut  based  whose use  engagement this  what  Stone,  in  role  such time  that  used,  Max to  that  3 3  that  we  'Max i s  a  might  go  the  they  is  to  intelligible  might  night to  just  play  me o n l y  simulation"(1995a,  21).  only  understand  as  owl',  That  a we  bed.  a  based  is,  simulationists: is  making.  inductively  but  generalization  mental  decision  in predicting behavior.  as  according  human  problem.'  however,  information  traits',  like  and  use  model  frame  sometimes  and h e u r i s t i c  sometimes  Davies  are  'the  to  to  predict  According "Use  to  of  the  shortcut—and derivatively Goldman  a  upon  puts  it  way:  I am n o t saying, it should be emphasized, that s i m u l a t i o n i s t h e only method used f o r i n t e r p e r s o n a l mental ascriptions, or for the prediction of behaviour. Clearly, there are regularities about behaviour and individual differences that can be learned purely inductively. If Jones always greets p e o p l e w i t h a s m i l e whereas Brown g r e e t s them w i t h a grunt, their acquaintances can form appropriate expectations without using simulation....The s u g g e s t i o n , t h e n , i s t h a t s i m u l a t i o n i s an i n t e n s i v e l y used heuristic, and one on which interpretation fundamentally rests. Inductive or nomological i n f o r m a t i o n i s n o t w h o l l y a b s e n t , b u t i s much s p a r s e r  Jane Heal d i s c u s s e s the frame problem f o r the t h e o r y t h e o r y i n " S i m u l a t i o n , T h e o r y and C o n t e n t " (1996, 81-85) She a r g u e s : "The t h e o r y - t h e o r i s t i s c o m m i t t e d t o t h e c l a i m t h a t we h a v e — t a c i t l y at l e a s t — s o l v e d an e x t r e m e l y i m p o r t a n t p r e c u r s o r t o t h e Frame P r o b l e m in Artificial Intelligence, namely the problem of providing a g e n e r a l t h e o r y of r e l e v a n c e . And t h i s c l a i m i s h i g h l y improbable" (p.81). 3 3  182  than the folk-theory 1995b, 83)  Thus, not  although  necessary,  the  first  these  theory as  the  place.  does  sometimes  critics  Furthermore,  of  inductively  constitutive  of  psychological  others.  these  This  types  type  of  of  reasoning.  Allowing for  to  the  psychology.  The s i m u l a t i o n t h e o r y has to  me,  view the  has  of  posed  some  folk psychology.  serious  of  There  are,  empirical least the  course,  one  for  many  example,  studies area of  that  the  data  the  required  are the  It  In f a c t ,  the  I will  studies  that  to  seems  results argue have  pose  it  theory  any  seems theory  objections serious.  over me once  i n the been  or  inductive  simulation  to  any  rules  and,  the  exchanges  would  theory.  the  most  be  from  not  force  to  in  sense  what  is  does  discussed  detailed  is  would  any  simulation  objections  3 4  what  least,  theory  the  here  empirical study,  from  at  challenges  demonstrate.  simulation theory.  of  I believe  other  in  involve  is  it  simulation going  generalizations  not  of  I have  picture,  clear  or,  that  force  (Goldman,  generalizations  does  type  get  not  theory  A l l  the  strong explanatory  simulation theory that  are,  is  inductive  this  explanatory  to  based  theory  principles  threat  of  it  alleges.  enter  argued,  types  distinguish  approach  to  There  theory.  what  the  that,  in  again  favour  next  at  chapter  conducted  with  The d e b a t e s o v e r t h e e m p i r i c a l r e s u l t s c a n be f o u n d i n t h e s a m e a r t i c l e s t h a t h a v e b e e n u n d e r d i s c u s s i o n h e r e . S e e e s p . S&N and Gordon and Goldman. 3 4  183  children  with  simulation  For  the  The  theory  is  aim  Since,  beliefs is  on  desires  to  are  based  not  open  upon  process.  are  existence  a  open  to  to  since what  are  as  folk  rather  case  folk  than  based  the  by  case  inputs  the  a  the  theory.  theoriticity. beliefs  theory,  and their  theoretical  basis,  veracity  and t h i s  run  of  a  their  is  through  the  belief  and  simulation,  the  states  psychological  in  upon  were  process  refute  of  discussed,  psychological  from  of  simulation  to  of  attributions  we h a v e a  the  entities  denial  challenges  on  result  these  the  our  of  concerned  posited  via  correct  the  plausibility  defense  are  process  dispute the  a  we  view,  Of c o u r s e ,  of  as  realism  upon  whether  But  desire  insofar  the theory.  thesis,  and d e s i r e s  based  is  theory  this  simulation  considerations. s t i l l  the  uphold  the  existence  is  of  required  that  demonstrate  over  purposes  theory view  autism  of  states  is  never  in  question.  The  theory  basis  theory  of  a  considered Nichols. the  found, that  tacit  two  of  Their  theory  of  theorists  to  is  that  folk the  view  of  are  that  representatives the  there  general  answer,  we u n d e r s t a n d o n e  psychological  grammar t h a n  however, there  view  theory. of  theory theory  that  is  a professional are  s u c h a s why t h e  184  that  We  that  it  with  this  remain  tacit  theory  for  on  have  view, is  scientific  problems  questions  another  the here  Stich  and  more  like  theory. analogy the  includes  We and  theory false  principles, theoretical and f i n a l  how  we  acquire  knowledge.  chapter,  the  the  theory,  A s I now h o p e problems  for  here.  185  to the  and  how  we  demonstrate, theory  theory  access i n the do n o t  the next end  C h a p t e r A u t i s m  This  thesis  realism that  we  can  other  that,  theory  is  the take  to  be  theory.  I  field  on  autism.  Autism  independent  etiology.  however, social  view.  one more o f  last  to  the  the  study  the of  developmental  characteristics  definitions skills, an  not  that  defining  is  rather  complete  aversion  to  that  the  to  simulation and  found  theory.  realism,  will  focus  favour  the  diagnosed on in  At  the  with  from  with a  focus  basis  of  of  its  basis  are.  field  as  perseverative  to  Typically,  impairments  and  I  simulation theory  the  be,  on what  on t h e  following:  creativity  change;  and  problems might  characteristics  186  the  psychology,  agreement  and  work  externalism,  simulation  than  would i n c l u d e the  communication  with  simulation  chapter  for  adopted,  don't  psychological  evidence  disability  is  the  reasons  is  considered  some o f  final  good  we  psychological  theory  realism  believe  chapter  what  This  examine  central  abilities;  the  to  incompatibility with  There  the  defending  reasons  we c o n s i d e r e d  theory  of  of  that  simulation  main o b j e c t i o n s  a tragic  number  what  In  the  its  of  is  the  show  making r e a l i s m compatible  will  the  if  to  Theory  from i t s  with  theory  attempt  maintained  right.  from  an  S i m u l a t i o n  means  same t i m e ,  aside  been  t h e  proposed  good  problems  a  be  aside  have  the  has  and  S i x  in  imagination behaviour  including  perseverative  language  perceptual  abnormalities  American  Psychiatric  Organization, autism  also  unable  to  lack  over  When  those  mind'  in  all  idea of  studying  people  with  simulation  theory cases  synonym  for  ability  to  that use  the of  ascribe has  'theory  'theory  been of  of  whether  what  or  as  an  ability  or  as  of  central as  of  mind'  skill  relevance,  relevant  is  the  at  do  not  children  there  of  mind'  mind'  with  and  are  has  been  deficiency  not least  idea  always as  'folk  may  in  indicates,  an  best  until  that  intend  opposed  is  not  this  has  recently.  perhaps  it  is  to  be  to  used  the  as  if  as  or the  a the  case  field.  rather,  that  of  I n many,  is  understood  issue  'theory  psychology'  Thus i t  advance  is  a  attribution.  states.  term  of  terminology  or  in  lack  theory  state  lacking is  a  theory  decided  is  1979; Health  concepts  particular  about  they  intentional  issue  viewed  talk  the  'concept  mental states,  this  intentional  the  the  issue  the  of  to  World  and  others.  autism  themselves  most,  the  autism  committing  not  that  sensory  (Wing and G o u l d ,  shown t h a t  of  intentional  ;  3 5  1987;  s t u d i e s have  understanding  the  many o r  various kinds  Since  an  echo1alia  Association,  attribute  excitement explain  1987).  of  and  The  that  the  a  theory  been  viewed  What h a s this  been  lack  of  'Echolalia' is simply the production of language which 'echoes' what t h e speaker has heard. For example, if you ask Johnny, 'How a r e y o u ? ' , he w o u l d r e s p o n d w i t h 'How a r e you?'. Echolalia can also be more c o m p l e x than this as when delayed e c h o l a l i a i s u s e d . T h e e n v i r o n m e n t a l c u e s may t r i g g e r a p p r o p r i a t e language b e c a u s e t h e c h i l d i s e c h o i n g s o m e t h i n g t h a t he has h e a r d i n t h e p a s t i n t h e p r e s e n c e o f t h e same e n v i r o n m e n t a l s t u m u l i . 3 5  187  understanding  or  underlies  explains  and  behavioural on  this  ability  issue,  with  false  autism  on  ability  children these that  but  do  mental  the  is  those  abnormalities significant  that  whatever  to  explain  Given  this  state  am g o i n g  a  theory  with to  to  of the  autism  predict  people  of  autism  as  if  in  the  field  it  has  been  abnormalities  of  autism.  capacity  explain  fail  to  to  ascribe  cause  the  other of  of  explaining  false  beliefs  the  However,  lack  it  at  argue  of  results.  that at  lack these  Others  the  in  a  is belief  a the  highly tasks  and d e s i r e s  to  behaviour.  at  and  role  children  indicative  the  Some  succeed  ability  grant  ascribe  is  the  of  even  that  to  so.  itself  agree  mind/ability  lack  is  not  to  do n o t  things  proceed  one  central  with  it  or  of  argue  doing  not  do  tend  reason,  for  and  But,  not  theory  mind,  is  failure  They  the  issue  and  a  their  of  who  autism  the  that  agreement.  attributable  or  instead  mind  of  others  some o f  problems  of  is  reason  important  is  with autism.  motivation.  theory  psychologists  theory/ability  I  tasks  no  a  but  that  states  communication  complete  ability  see  of  social,  not  of  the  an  behaviour  for  lack  they  processing  abnormal  and,  a  the  think  belief  lack  states,  central  even  but  is  example,  possess  tasks, while  to  of  intentional  found i n people  there  for  ascribe  much  abnormalities  psychologists,  of  to  least  to  behaviour  188  of  study  granted that  partially Granting,  ascribe on  the  that  the  autism lack  of  responsible  then,  intentional basis,  of  the  that  for  people  states  and  question  I  will a  be p u r s u i n g i s  theory  There  or  are  lack  an  that  I  an  whether  ability believe  reasons  to that  and not  already  been  given  pursue  this  reason  engage  missing as not  a type in  is  in  of  in  lack  some  examine as  the  autism.  as  cited  it  simulation  deficiency  it  but  on in  it  by P a u l  the  tests  the  as  I  will  Alan  to  with  what  autism  they  not,  are  however, autism  ability  the  do is  Since does  arguments and  Leslie's  and  will view,  further  tendencies  in  i n comparison  with  explanations  of:  their  understanding;  non-mentalistic  189  not  simulation  be examined  considered  have  will  point  Leslie. will  an  pretend-play  this  is  is  absent.  discuss  support  mentalistic in  from  first  view I  The  completely  deficiencies  regard  is  pretend.  theory theory,  theorizing  chapters  claim  data  by  of  this  that  autism  using  children with  to  proposed  with  for  view  This  the  be  are  people  to  theory w i l l  theory  other  not  view,  other  we  with The  f a i l u r e of  Harris  explains  theory.  what  since  is  that  a  people  since  ability  claim  of  the  sounds  the  alternative  The t h e o r y  variability  understood  Second,  simulate.  simulation  representative  insofar  the  an  who  and  supports  to  as  there  and s t u d i e s  best  my a r g u m e n t s  here.  pretending,  deficient,  support  is  that  than  cases  last  further  certainly  not  the  ability  completely  rather  Since  pretend-play  an  lack  believe  typical  a theory.  straightforward  are  why I  simulate  ability  to  they  ability.  several  involves  what  areas;  lack  of  autistic  preferences  for narrowly focused  aversion  change  Studies have  to  in  fact-based  environment  and d i s r u p t i o n  examining pretend-play a b i l i t i e s  shown  that  autistic  children  are  p r e t e n d p l a y w i t h t o y s compared w i t h of  the  same  verbal  Cohen,  1987;  Lewis  may  suggest  the  same s t u d i e s  it  was  play the  a  suggest that  consistently  idea  lacking  that  found  motivation,  because of  to  engage  pointed  out  (1993,  are  a  clearly  person  history,  may is  who  has  interest  you  what  in  you could  It  is in  not  the  any  year,  ask  such  But, is  an  as also  this  findings  from  For  example,  more  as  pretend  evidence  to  for  imagine,  in toys Paul  is  simply  and  other  Harris  lacking  interest to  be  in  has areas  for  what  in  numbers  manifested  a  person to date  be  with able  falls  or in  studying calendars  example,  a person  own,  children.  particular  190  in  Baron-  c h i l d r e n are  interest  show  for  engage  its  case.  ability  autistic  uncommon  a  on  elicits  Perhaps the  likely  dates,  autism  1984;  other  and r i t u a l i s t i c ways s u c h as  dates.  day,  autism  interest  memorizing an  than  lack of  to  While,  c o u l d be t a k e n  imagination  interesting  routine.  to  Ungerer,  not  pretend-play.  231),  with  this  unimaginative  in  is  rather  their  and  prompting  children. This  people,  example,  that  likely  imagine,  this  of  autistic  in children with  less  1988). to  in children with autism.  unmotivated,  While  inability  and  retarded or normal c h i l d r e n  (Sigman  and Boucher,  simple  from a u t i s t i c  that  ability  topics;  or  autism to  tell  on.  For  day Christmas f e l l  on  in  1934  you. to  and t y p i c a l l y w i t h i n  A child  tell  an apparent  would not  is  also  be  of  A child  about  nothing  same  facts  about  of  content  area,  suggests  or  play  the  s t i l l  deficient.  that  to  when  they  swimming  pool,  were  also  have  very  or  the  is  as  cotton  accurate  wool in  the  a  are  more  not  snow  assessing  191  him.  enable in  imaginative  the  the  evidence (Harris  extent  suggests absent,  children  a  blue  (Harris what  a the  are  it  is  able  to  serviette  1993, dolls  of  that  object-substitution.  treating  as  to  pervasive"  completely  involves  with  we11-demarcated  prompting  autistic  to the  although  now d i s c u s s , by  an  repeat  activities  apparent to  show  enough  human i n t e r a c t i o n ,  is  problems  may  "Thus  confined  elicited  prompted,  no  way:  we s h a l l  imagine  not  about  may w a n t  converse  related  that  area of  and  you  thus  playful  p r e t e n d - p l a y when t h e p r e t e n s e example,  time  in  is  example,  he  fought.  obsess they  able  but  were  to  tell  be  fought,  which  corvettes  difficulties  that  ability  for  implies  Furthermore,  pretend  cars,  is  children  their  in  area  engage  namely the  that  231).  seems  subject  to  autistic  while  It  a  were  children  every  could  i n h i s t o r y might  areas  red  cars  hypothesis  poverty  the  those by  in  but  he  y o u a b o u t why t h e y  subject  imaginative  motivational  tell  autistic  else  children  creative,  1993,  a minute,  interest  interested  talk  motivated  to  for  details  interest.  autistic  able  common  particular  Being  than  y o u when c e r t a i n h i s t o r i c a l b a t t l e s  likely It  with  less  For as  a  232).  They  could  see,  although they findings with  were n o t  suggest  some k i n d s  that  of  one  object  as  she  were  person  hand,  a  they  share,  have  another  person"  as  pretense  with  autism,  Again,  this  children since states this  which  is  states  have  and no  even  sees.  On t h e  belief  they  be  they  a  attributed  It  seems,  capable  that  to  imagine to  are  problem or  understanding.  other not  doll as  or long  children  is  not  that  but  that  simulate  area  of  to  intentional  a  about  There  knowledge  pretend  have  pretend  a  that  theoretical  don't  i f  it.  unable  they can't  the  as  do  states,  of  the  doll  to  then,  intentional  It  s u g g e s t e d by H a r r i s , children  is  this  play without  higher  and  treat  in  about  theory  of  something  of  however,  an  is,  interpretation.  autistic  pretend  they  can  a  lacking is  because  states  alternative  abilities.  Perhaps  "They  treat  restricted are  difficulties  can  232).  unable  These  they  to  are  belief.  have  others:  is  indicate  are  not  imagining  involve  may  autism  in  prompting,  autism  but  acts  1993,  doesn't  inability  they  alternative  in  (Harris  area.  intentional  that  belief  finding  intentional  The  difficulty  with  and  talks,  p e r h a p s what t h e y one  play  object,  who  given  with  their  pretend  that  understanding false  children  another  whether  the  good a t  order,  are  and w i t h  deficient  deficiency prompting,  that  accounts  their  including intentional  192  in  lack  of  state,  which  I  agree,  their  planning  for their ability  is  to  lack  of  engage  pretend-play,  and  their  rigidity  explaining between  when  this  two  they  planning  types  of  do  engage  deficiency  in  Harris  pretend-play. makes  a  In  distinction  actions:  . . . a c t i o n s t h a t c a n be g u i d e d by s t a n d a r d o r h a b i t u a l schemas evoked by t h e c u r r e n t c o n t e x t , and t h o s e t h a t must be g u i d e d by a s p e c i f i c p l a n s p e c i a l l y f o r m u l a t e d f o r t h e t a s k . . . . , some a c t i o n s r e q u i r e t h a t a f a m i l i a r or h a b i t u a l schema, n o r m a l l y evoked by the current c o n t e x t , s h o u l d be s e t a s i d e so t h a t g u i d a n c e c a n be a c h i e v e d i n s t e a d by a t e m p o r a r y , i n t e r n a l l y - f o r m u l a t e d plan. Autistic children, it will be claimed, have special difficulties in over-riding external or h a b i t u a l c o n t r o l i n t h i s autonomous, p l a n f u l f a s h i o n . (1993, 233)  When  a  from  external  cues  i n the  and  typical  to  over  for  actual  the  child  store  although nothing She w i l l  use  a box  cereal  of  milk.  planning the in on  children with schemas  little  up  her  shift  the  items to  from of  the  autism:  example,  such  is  as  the  the  is  the  pretend.  A  doll  that  she  has  planning  pretend that purchasing  takes to  she  food  a  her  is  in  items,  a rubber duck to  represent  a loaf  is  to  of  the  bread and a controlling  child  missing,  autistic  current  193  it  unrelated  environment  what  shift  scenario.  scenario is  are  a  suggests t h i s  represent  "...the by  pretend  that  is  Initially  internal  home e n v i r o n m e n t  scenario  evoked  the  and  there  c h i l d to to  scenarios for  play  control.  girl  baby  or blocks  direction  planning of  the  i n the  of  prompt the  She may,  with  pretend  eventually,  sets  unrelated  This or  that  But  in  locus  prompt the  environment.  grocery  of  internal  example.  and  engages  environment  a stroller  baby,  a  child  child  context,  the  controlling  Harris is  jug  more  and  has  claims, reliant great  difficulty  in  responses rides  according  those  Support  deliberately  schemas"  for  autistic  this  children  Rogers  poorly  on  disabled  (1991)  The  was  that  successful  at  attempt  do  a  makes  to  on  sort  performed  the  next  hypothetical  in  that  children were  area  that  have  her  behaviour  plan  the  next  that  as  with  been  or  over-  were  previous  according even  to  task.  If  colour the  example.  t h i n k i n g ahead  to  what  will  in  other  These  suggested  the  consequences  failures  in by  shifting the  they  for  of  demonstrate strategies  environment  were would  of  one's  that  3 6  after  imagining actions autistic  from those  and  the  Hanoi'  happen  that  a  Autistic  of  words,  by  repeat  point  *Tower  and  for  they  the  involves,  learning  to  on  It  perform  accounted  though  shape,  Pennington  with  tend  with  Studies  autism  poorly  move.  done  and  compared  c h i l d r e n would  to  especially  has  problem-solving.  children  task  according  that  and Ozonoff,  on t h e  things  difficulty  initially  of  differences  situation  situation.  or  conceived  work  tasks  successful  sorting so  in  Autistic  problem which requires one  the  problem-solving  strategy  children  found  showed  errors.  was  internally  and Hofman (1990)  perseverative  task  is  in  children.  to  an  his  (p.234).  view  conducted by P r i o r and  to  guiding  they  that are  T h e T o w e r o f H a n o i p r o b l e m r e q u i r e s t h e c h i l d t o move d i s k s f r o m two o t h e r p e g s o n t o a t h i r d i n o r d e r o f s i z e t o f o r m a t o w e r . I n moving t h e d i s k s t h e c h i l d must r e s p e c t t h e r u l e t h a t t h e l a r g e r d i s k s c a n n o t be p l a c e d upon t h e s m a l l e r ones i f t h e g o a l s t a t e is t o be a c h i e v e d . The o b j e c t i s t o a c h i e v e t h e g o a l s t a t e i n as few moves as p o s s i b l e a n d , h e n c e , s u c c e s s r e q u i r e s t h e a b i l i t y t o t h i n k ahead o r p l a n . 3 6  194  unable  to  imagined  In  guide  view  can  done  by  to  be  we t a k e  in  into  who  down  further  (Wing 1978;  terms  of  future  is  exactly  as  a  as  the  offers  same.  exactly  soon  the  for  Harris'  an  This  each  make-believe, children  with  is  true  when  leaves  the  an  time  and  the  to  8 year  she  she  table  even  appears  of  The q u e s t i o n s same  These  of  example  but  the  she  for  play  survey  1979).  pretend-play  waitress  the  are  competence  where  Harris be  and Gould  and r e p e t i t i v e .  cases  to  takes  some  support  epidemiological  Wing  settings,  inflexible  account  scenario  breaks  be old  pretends  asks  and  the  make-believe unless  she  is  prompted.  seems  then,  that autism  on  a  simple  children  with  requires  further sophistication  repetitiveness, internal,  or  with autism  or  the  fail.  with autism is for  in  tasks,  wide-ranging  structured  pretends  she  the  despite  sophisticated.  orders  It  in  that  autism remains  the  behaviour  problem-solving  and Gould  show  especially  these  found  Wing  studies  girl  current  contexts.  addition  quite  their  planning,  are  the  able  These  to  pretend.  of  of  of  suggest the  a theory  195  mind.  degree, pretense  flexibility  and n o n -  of  the  scenario  contexts, view  simulate, of  limited the  non-existent  findings  than  a  But once  control  l a c k i n g an a b i l i t y t o rather  and to  i n terms  shift  imagining  level  that  which i s  to  children the  child  required  Harris  describes  two  different  levels  of  simulation.  At the simpler level, the c h i l d holds the current, actual situation constant, but imagines a different i n t e n t i o n a l s t a n c e t o w a r d some a s p e c t o f t h a t c u r r e n t r e a l i t y . A t t h e more complex l e v e l , t h e c h i l d d o e s n o t hold the current context constant, but instead imagines a h y p o t h e t i c a l s i t u a t i o n that c o n f l i c t s with what is c u r r e n t l y known t o be the case, and then proceeds to imagine a different intentional stance toward that h y p o t h e t i c a l r e a l i t y . (1993, 239)  The on  data the  shows  first  distinction  that  autistic  level thus  and  children aside  the  pass  fail  nicely  and p r o b l e m - s o l v i n g  those  accounts  tasks:  shows  that  they  situation....By  in  that  second  level  that  the  that  they  An  of  on  explain  is  what  is  their  seems t h a t  do  not  the  not  (1993, in  Harris'  that  the  based  pretend-play autistic  child a  is  239). any  to  set  conflicting  conflict  required is  on  instead  that  tasks  second.  tasks  require  contrast,  is  the data  imagine  c h i l d r e n pass but  found  with  in  lacking  failures  the  w h e n we a t t e m p t children  the  children fail"  simulation  ^metarepresentation' it  for  on  pass  apparent Thus,  of  required in a l l  the  the  tasks  the  tasks  fail.  alternative  view  autistic  autistic  based  and t o  hypothetical tasks  usually  "Scrutiny of  current situation  the  children  to  what in  on  is  children false  view developed  simulation theory explain  autism  perhaps  both  and t h e i r  the  with  belief  most  autism  tasks.  by A l a n L e s l i e view  is  the  imaginative  failure  196  the  on  prevalent that  This  would is  (1987).  most  the While  natural  one  deficiencies  of  certain  mental  state  concept  related  together  these  capacity  for  tasks,  two  the  pretence  When  talking  about  not  he  second agent  of  talks  that  The  the  imaginary glob  agent  mud i n  front  (pretending)  that  an  (the  mud).  autism cannot They  to  Leslie  rejects  of  the  of  led  of  reality,  a  if  of  Johnny  pie, way  theory  the  true  about  of  autism  produce metarepresentations.  module  representations words,  simulation  is  an  have  theory.  innate  197  the  the  thoughts  He  for  the  the  the  who  and  the  an an  b)  an  that  related  the  to  the  attitude aspect  is  that  So  people  sort  of  autism with  described  about  proposes  specialized  responsible  and c o n t a i n s  of  is  relationship  holding  is  of  in is  to  pretends  Johnny i s of  Leslie  components,  an  by  in other  impaired  consists  to  hypothesis  known  of  aspect  normal  structure which  two  component  ties  ability  the  consciously  proposition  involving  metarepresentations  to  specification  him i s  pie'  the  normal  c a p a c i t y were  consists  example,  Leslie's  the  theory The  For  the  cannot,  thoughts.  module.  a)  form mental  having  modular  a  also  'metarepresentation',  first  is  is  inability  above.  The  view  claimed that  This  this  typically  and  situation.  'it  is  mind.  about  is  second  proposition  reality  of  constituting  compound.  is.  Leslie  reflection  A metarepresentation one  between  a  theory  an i n f o r m a t i o n - p r o c e s s i n g d a t a  something  subject.  is  a theory  mechanisms  autism.  theory  deficiencies.  employ and develop that  Leslie's  someone  instead  theory  of  deployment  a  mind of  t h e o r y of mind i n f o r m a t i o n .  Setting  aside  view  for  are,  in  The to  the  innate,  a moment, fact,  not  the  that  consequences  for  me t o  that  on t h e she  pot  I  the  I  do  need it  at  a l l ,  over  and myself  this  constitutes  that,  at  let's  grant  sort.  I  I don't  must,  autism, fact,  the  absence children  in  that  it  then,  of  in  d o now t h a t  represent and  pot  and  sense,  of  the with  of  accounts  has  I  order  realized  am S u s a n ,  i f  the  I  pot  off  the  But i n  and the  boiling  does  that  heat.  Of  order  for  pot  boiling  over.  Whether  clear. not.  to pot  can p r e d i c t  It But  seems for  metarepresentation  which focus  to  now, of  a  upon a l a c k  of  of  children  metarepresentation discussed  for  might  198  she  in  metarepresentation.  simulation,  tasks,  So  what  able  inflexibility this  judge  be  not  it  arguments,  claims  certain  is  to  must  Susan  the  something  be.  consciously.  constitute  Harris'  level  over,  In doing t h i s  this  capable  and  might  the  theory.  imagine  case  I  Leslie's  metarepresentations'  x  state  take  of  simulation  the  boiled  and  Susan  does be  w h i c h he in  must  conflict  second  over.  Leslie's  abilities are  fact  metarepresentation  think that  planning  I  the  imagining that  any o f  being  least  has  his  aspect  i n a b i l i t y to  Susan might  kitchen  do  with  imagined  boil  the not  in  stove  to  knowledge  me t h a t  the  not  would do,  run to  course,  is  that  what  s t o v e were  will  me t o  on  what  is  of  predict  the  imagine  simulate  case  the  seems t o  inconsistent  i n a b i l i t y to be  it  modular,  the be  by  failure viewed  view.  Harris,  with In the  of  autistic  as  another  perspective on the to  on the  'Tower of  of  Hanoi'  'metarepresent'  pegs and d i s k s in  metarepresentational  a future  situation.  planning  thinks  children  can't  metarepresent can't  it  more  that  What  is  ability  to  simulate  metarepresentational  the  theory,  theory  children  Leslie talks so  to  is  that,  (whether  problems  lack  of  a  or  attribute  intentional  claims  can  nothing  be  that  the  the  mechanism,  deploys  metarepresentation  the  children mechanism German  and  that  that 1995,  it  results 129).  a  is  as  theory  the in  either  way,  this  is  the  whether autistic  they  can't  because for  a  they  current  lack  of  an  caused  the  as  by  suggested  i n a b i l i t y of  simulation, believes  of  mind  early  failure  does  199  lack  metarepresentational  He  children  Why  on  be  by  autistic  states.  account.  specialized  could  claim that  knowledge  for  the  or  metarepresentational  characterized  to  of  failure  offers  relevant  causes  body  responsible  about  they  because  isn't  a  oneself,  metarepresent  The i s s u e  is  himself  adds  imagine  failure  s i m u l a t i o n and  Harris  can't  relevant  the  takes the  illuminating to  they  purposes.  not  of  a r e now a n d a s  that  or  imagine.  problems),  attributed to  v i e w as more e x p l a n a t o r y depends  simulate  or  they  view  is  or  simulate  as  Whether one  ability  that  Thus the  data structure consisting board  metarepresentational one  p r o b l e m c o u l d be  the  on the  system.  but  that  module  of  normal  in  growth  autistic think  he  doing is  (ToMM),  development  Leslie  that there  in  being  process  a  that normal  of  this  (Leslie  and  that  the  metarepresentational  system  simulation?  He  claims  accommodate  simulation,  knowledge-free. deploy  the  knowledge tacit,  It  is  deploy  such  hypothesis  that  that  German  claim  be  German a p p e a r s i m p l y t o  an  it  has  possibility then  alternative.  of  theory  vs  the  First,  if  we  making  inferences  are,  simulation  are  using based  a  point  however,  theory  to  theory  then  on  a of  "To  required of  the  the  theory  descriptions  it  a  where  one's  account and  over  less-than-  one  132).  of  of  Leslie utilizes  of  and or  inferences  simulation theory  aspects  the  the  as  theory  consider.  it's  information.  200  are  operate  "makes  two  systems  simulation  (1995,  of  of  knowledge:  metarepresentations  abandoned the There  a  to  if  to  states,  structure  Goldman's  ^simulation'"  order  128).  account,  assume t h a t  that  the  view,  claim,  entirely  in  abilities  inferences  happens  not  existence  of  1995,  that  they  the  than  certainly  intentional  bodies  to  theory  can  is  claims  sensitive  as  that,  in  additional  abilities  that  ascribe  Leslie  knowledge-and-ability  the  and  believes  radical,  accepts  believes  Goldman's  This,  to  he  and German  requires  metarepresentations.  simulation  constitute  is  Alvin  he  mind.  (Leslie  and  simulation  of  systems,  inferencing  Leslie  that  themselves  characterizing  view,  ToMM  because  theory  representations)"  In  is  understood  the  but  required,  representation  (e.g.,  that  better  metarepresentations  innate  fully  is  true  But  that  it's  we  will  certainly  be not  clear is  that  if  inference  necessarily  reasoning  is  it  a  is  the  not  a  store  sufficient aspect  theory  of  to  that  that  access  about what desires,  do  and  circumstances conclude  that  According such  in  to  store  of  position  window.  This  this  is  theory of  does.  If  and  we  Does  as I  the  very  to  would  this  it  is  process  warm,  his  simply  ourselves.  he  involves I  may  201  says  and  to  John  in  be is  general,  try  to  alter  we  would  discomfort.  need  will  to  Since to  of  any  ourselves  in  we use  the  in  it  my  the  open fact  don't  inference?  around  access  likely  basis  inference look  to  beliefs  Since  a  stored  appears  simulate  unnecessary involve  have  discomfort,  we d o n o t  that  we  they  is  order  theory  that,  and  r e a c h e d on the  do  process  am t o o  We  us  their  relieve  conclude is  theory  open.  one  accessing in  and John  tells  relieve  try  is  theory  if  conditions,  hot  one  theories,  that  one  the  uncomfortable  to  fact  a  of  example,  will  simulation theory,  o u r own c a s e ,  others.  insofar  will  For  be  aspect  then  certain  psychology be  conclusion  what in  to  the  that  inferential  to  information that  window  information.  John's  is  window,  room i s  the  order  John  the  the  do g i v e n  folk  like  The o t h e r  it,  while  something  hypothesis  open  the  and  not  an  for  information.  will  that  uncomfortable  see  theoretical  people  i.e.,  I  will  the  uncomfortable  people  as  a conclusion  In other words,  condition  reach  John  come t o  condition.  theoretical  predict we  used to  using a theory.  a necessary  relevant  using  is  use  i n the  Well,  the that any case  perhaps  own  case,  room,  see  it the  window a n d , inference  in order to in  window w i l l mind  to  this  Admitting  to  this  the  the  simulation  not  justify  in  order  base  our  theory.  order  to  tacit  or  children develop theory cases  talk  in  not,  when  store,  the  theory  of  then  this  whether  state fact  Have I  used  opening  the  any t h e o r y  of  in  that  imply that  Leslie's fare  be  thesis,  the  is  the  is  may b e  that  theorists we  required  the  against  we  theory  will As  theory  main concern  is  established  by  not  theory  in  a matter  of  cases  theoretical  explaining  does  psychology.  sometimes use  there  If  is  make  It  however,  the  states  theory  used.  the  in  which  information deficits  module the  of  didn't  simulation  admit  that  there  don't  need  an  are  innate  one?  theorists  metarepresentations  in  theory.  folk  which  any b e t t e r  simulation may  or  we  does not  knowledge  ascriptions,  So  me,  theory  mind  intentional  why p o s i t  simulation  need  seems t o the  cases  or modular.  autism,  which  some of  the  p r o p e r l y does not even  I don't  it.  that  Sometimes,  of  are  purpose  does not  innate  states.  there  intentional  with  knowledge  While  is  theory  it  into  theory  Furthermore, the  we d o u s e is  out,  it  make  concern.  collapse  realism of  If  inferred  but  inference,  on  open  inference.  mental  For the  the  have  to  and German's c l a i m t h a t  ascribe  correct.  whether a  theory  points  of  of  inferences  Goldman is  use  I  decide  room c o o l e r ,  type  Leslie  to  off,  process?  make t h e  make  cool  would not  (Harris  202  object  to  the  idea  and Kavanaugh, 1993),  of  there  are of  others  who w o u l d .  metarepresentaions  that  Leslie he  means  a  by  Decoupled those  she  would  is  if  that  will  "bring  why w h e n we  really a  any a c t u a l not  voices  down"  decoupled  from  nor  their  however,  should  they  that  the  receive,  representational collapse. was,  at  people  least with  in  autism  understanding fact,  Currie  part,  mental  metarepresent  points  inferences  when  out we  semantics special  of  not  in  although  203  we  he  be  that  the  same  case,  inferences one  that  inner Gregory  pretense  or  that  system  and  pretense  symbols Currie  do n o t  in  may  he  The reason  because  are  argues require,  to  avoid  although L e s l i e ' s  theory  response  theory  What  example,  it.  is  with  many p e o p l e  pretending  to  expect  treatment  difficulties  on L e s l i e ' s  are  For  the  Furthermore,  concepts,  that,  412)  is  expression.  representational  meanings.  developed  have  but  theory  representational  something  where  ordinary  view  properties  normal  coming from  (1987,  metarepresentation  particular  decoupled  case.  the  talk  expressions.  o r make t h e  the  to  Leslie's  semantic  pretend  undermine  crashing  a  a  telephone  involves  (1995),  in  were  of  the  the  of  is  same e x p e c t a t i o n s  banana i s  does  it  disregard have  to  aspect  'decoupling'  would  it  a  hear  pretending  central  the  expressions  This  pretend  would o b j e c t  'metarepresentation'  we d o n o t h a v e t h e we  A  calls  expressions  context.  s t i l l  offers.  something  as  F u r t h e r m o r e t h o s e who d o n ' t o b j e c t  of  to  order  the  fact  that  pretense  and  with  with  autism  can,  in  metarepresentation.  may  something  not to  make be  the  the  same  case  as  when  something  symbols a r e ,  actually  at  least  is  the  in part,  case,  the  normal  explanatory of  semantics  of  pretend behaviour:  It is the fact that I imagine, exactly, that the p i l e o f s n o w i s a man, r a t h e r t h a n a h o u s e , t h a t e x p l a i n s why I s t i c k a p i p e i n h i s m o u t h r a t h e r t h a n a t t e m p t , say, to form a p r o t o - r o o f f o r him. M a n ' means the same t h i n g t o me w h e n I i m a g i n e t h e s n o w p i l e t o b e a man a s i t d o e s w h e n I t h i n k t o m y s e l f , concerning a r e a l man, T h a t man i s d r i n k i n g w i n e . ' (Currie 1995, 154) x  x  Currie  goes  on  meanings  to  track  the  in  of  to  items  in  the  i n her cup,  pretend  real  if  we  the  the  then pretends  to  doesn't  child  have  wouldn't  between w a t e r b e i n g wet  didn't  imaginary context  For example,  *water'  water,  the  that  complicated connections  such contexts.  water  explain  spill the  be  we  between  child  could  things  pretends it,  same  able  assign  to  the  same  not  keep  that  that  then wipe semantic make t h e  occur  there it  is  up.  If  content  as  connections  and s p i l l a b l e and something you can  wipe  up.  Next that  Currie  considers  Leslie describes  fact  doesn't  the  apply to  semantic  desire  then the  same d e c o u p l i n g s h o u l d o c c u r w i t h d e s i r e .  water  in  desire. w h i c h he that  is the  water cup.  A child has  whether  does  the  in  the  But  the  not  desire  the  metarepresenting  cup  same  wipe  that  treatment  or  up  it  I  can  deviance after  204  an  same way  involves  desire  decoupling  that  there  occur  an o v e r t u r n e d cup Currie  expression  it  I can pretend  doesn't  contain water. of  degradation  i n the  to  there  If  that  applies  that  pretense.  the  is  be  with about  concludes x  deviant'  depends,  not  on  attitude  is  case  belief  of  whether  taken  it  toward the  may  not  imagining.  On  deficit  in  imagination,  ability  to  desire.  be  Leslie's  is  metarepresented,  on  content.  W h a t may b e d e v i a n t  deviant  in  account, one  But t h i s  but  it  not  developed  in  case  seems  should is  the  also the  of  that  have case  if  a  in  the  desire  or  one  has  deficit  with  what  in  a the  children  with  autism.  Leslie's  theory  deficiencies states to  and  i n autism of lack  Leslie's  involves  of  theory,  both  referential  just  opacity  pretense  exhibit  referential  if  I  do n o t  attribute  with  b,  also  the case  and desire  a  I  is  Leslie  you the  identical is  and  First  f.  If  that  and i t  is  according  both  this  of  and  155).  that then  if  it  is  belief  that  desires  also  It's  case that  and  involve  is  decoupling,  beliefs  which  attribution  attributions  the  intentional  due,  belief  1995,  joint  metarepresent  with  (Currie  the  ascribe  because  order  true  a is  that  identical  pretend  that  b is  f.  And i t ' s  true  belief  that  a is  f,  and a i s  identical  you b e l i e v e  if I simply with  to  criterion for  assume t h a t  that  b  f,  thereby  to  inability  problem  the  explain  Both are  decoupling  opacity  a is  cannot  that  is  to  a b i l i t y to  claims  The  criterion.  I pretend that I  an  part  pretend.  situations  this  with b,  to  involve  exhibit  if  to  opacity.  referential  lack of  ability  decoupling.  pretense  not  was  b,  I  that  b is  believe  or desire  do  necessarily  not  referential  205  opacity  f.  But,  that  that  it  is  a is f,  believe  determines  or when  something first is  x  should  and  be  second  decoupled'  decoupled,  order  from  Leslie's  representations,  the  first,  is  joint  two  deficiencies  areas  of  metarepresent the  same do  theory  view  our  not  The  is  states  problem its  in  of  is  is  normal  due  not  semantic  to  is,  the  subject  or  pretence?  desire,  the  view,  a  with  content is  to  lack  the  of  to  the  the  related  accounting  for  attributions, offered  an  tendencies. lack  of  the the  The s i m u l a t i o n  in  the  x  of  the  problem  the  autistic also  sense,  representation of  the  156). of  That  belief,  seem t o  have  e x c e p t when in  addition  and mental  presented  by  facts  abilities  problem.  Let's  it to  Harris and  about that  a  state  characteristics  explains  solving  imagination.  way  don't  in  attribute  1995,  imagination view  to  seen  relationship  by  with  simulation  have  the  Furthermore,  Hanoi'  206  of  experience  the we  (Currie  autism  theory  theory  of  to  children  ability  the  in Leslie's  in  But  content  with  other  Tower of  of  ability  also  As  ability  but  to  simulation  and  lack  pretence.  of  should  focused.  of  deficiencies  explanation  planning  demonstrated  of  the  contrast,  subject  Children  attitude  lacks  relationship  problem with metarepresenting, comes  the  In  a  content,  attitude  order  w o u l d p r e d i c t more t h a n  and b e l i e v i n g .  narrowly  Harris'  second  for  one  problems.  much more  the  cannot account  one  then  desiring  these  view thus  It  If  imagination,  have  examination  mental  to  in  problems  autism  in autism.  deficiency.  where  between  lost.  The m e t a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l / d e c o u p l i n g the  distinction  the were  now t u r n  to  consider  some  further  data  on  the  abilities  of  children  with  autism.  The  simulation  better that  account  is  mental  in  states. with  are  why t h e r e  understanding  example,  a  discussed or  examples  in  understanding  experiences.  with  Peter  in  autism  provides  comes  to  c h i l d r e n have  no  to  it  be  the  c h i l d r e n are children  and not  have  no  people  case.  successful succeed  others.  difficulties,  may  vary  Hobson c o n c l u d e s  than  autism,  normal  their  (in  the  different 101). that Cohen have  in  ability  for  in  their  from h i s  study,  the  a  doll),  nor  viewpoints  i n the  people 1991; a very  of  children  may v a r y Harris  in  difficult  with  autism  fail  viewpoint did  have  simple  time  no  recognition  game o f  also  1990).  are  more  of  they  'subject'  to  coordinate  (Hobson  no  understanding  desires as  with  false  we  difficulty  and preferences know, belief  understand  207  deficient  another  fail  impaired  hide-and-seek"  But,  to  of  of  visuospatial  s u b j e c t s were not markedly  indicate  form  to  children  their  "The a u t i s t i c  Autistic  children  autistic  children  perspectives: in  that  in  Studies  which compared normal c h i l d r e n w i t h c h i l d r e n w i t h a d i a g n o s i s infantile  a  understanding  when  something  states  me,  the  autistic  Autistic  that  to  autism  autistic  tasks.  children with  seems  variance  wanting  where  related  it  above,  some p s y c h o l o g i c a l  that  perceptual  is  children  believing  mind  shown  by  A s was  other  certain  have  of  hypothesis,  demonstrated  trouble There  theory  the  autistic  1984,  (Baronchildren  tasks.  Almost  impact  of  all  second-  order  beliefs,  Ozonoff right is  et  i.e.,  al.  1991).  and p r o g r e s s  acheived  beliefs  by  These  about  beliefs  findings  in understanding  means  of  simulation.  But  they  distinguish  among m e n t a l  an  don't  (Baron-Cohen  make  sense  sense  states  Harris  and a s c r i b i n g mental  increasingly  make  i f  1989;  all  complex  if  of  your  which  states  process  account  are  is  of  doesn't  referentially  opaque.  Children  with  theorize. children  with  a  into  Let's  Sally her  marble.  Sally  away,  box.  Where w i l l  photograph t e s t  belief  is  photograph  The marble  is  a s k e d where  i n the  on t h i s  in  her  comes  back  to  were g i v e n  to  maps  task are  has  She  a  to  false  (Barontold  box.  then  marble  wants  and  the Sally  goes  out.  and puts  play  with  it her  look?  Sally  placed  is  r e p l a c e d by a camera and  face  from the  so  the  basket  to  the  perform better false  the  down  photograph the  and the  Anne  Sally's and  ability  belief  basket.  out  test  children  and  by a photograph of  moved  autism actually olds  is  The  of  false  false  basket  Anne t a k e s  she  replaced  the  lack  belief  involved  1985). a  general  false  review  puts  Now S a l l y  a  tests  has  she  show the  Frith  which is  to  These  On t h e  The  not  first  and  story:  marble  While  autism.  Leslie,  following has  do  Analogue t e s t s  photographs. Cohen,  autism  marble  marble i s  child box  i n the can't  and the  located.  Sally's basket. see child  People  than normal f o u r and a h a l f  map t a s k  208  (Leslie  and T h a i s s  it. is  with year-  1992).  In  addition,  when  inferential  judgements  in stories events,  normal  and a h a l f  both  on  Leslie's  The r e a s o n , is  not  modular  It  is  obvious in  attribute of  Frith this  can  to  one  results  and the  view,  are  make rather than  explainable  simulation  explainable  theory  In  The  kind  is  theory.  on L e s l i e ' s  view  but  because  it  would  account  for  uses  children failure  why  to  with does  is  is  a  not,  the  in  209  theorizing,  itself,  not  cannot  mind  problem  problem would  holds  a  (e.g., fail  in  imply  what  he  other  But  selective that  in  modular  these  modular view.  of  with  information, in  a  theory  hand,  the  Leslie  are  is  a modular v e r s i o n  processing  his  areas  other  takes  of  children  simulation  deficiency  support autism  the  the  theorist  autistic  processing  the  of  of  do w i t h  also  theory  lack  it  on  Because  is  simulation  non-mental  example,  others.  the  to  that  central  missing  for  in  it  for  clear  and not  he  nothing  unless  of  The  ability  theory,  one,  not  is  of  something  theory  some  what  has  is  be  fact,  theoretical  it  If  it  lack  theorizing  discrepancy  account  that  the  in  theory  abilities.  states  fact,  domain  also  simulation  theory.  where  areas. fact  this  1989),  view,  are  theory  since  mental  In  theory  autism  These  view  they  theorizing  predict.  explain the  a  the  deficiency  surprising. would  theory  that  is  how  would c l a i m t h a t  lack  to  with autism again perform better  year-olds.  theory  it  required  view.  discrepancy  to  people  however,  because  is  involving mechanical or behavioural  than mental four  reasoning  the  their they  are is  missing that  does  if  is  are  to  in  preference to  other  for  These  is  The f a c t  the  autism fact  autism most  of  to  that  is,  find  imagine  future  a  or  would  unknown b u t  it  L o r n a Wing  and J u d i t h  of  of  a triad  classically  are  255).  autistic.  the  of  the if  lack  topics  have  pursued by be  a  situations,  theory  children result  of  the  activities to  is  not  "If  autistic  autism  in their  frightening  in  lack:  with it  their  they  available  people  a are  difficulty  simulation  that  are  and they  of  imagination,  if  that  children  topics  the  simply not  And  general.  cannot  natural  that  environments. because  it  unimaginable.  Gould  3 7  in  interest  abilities  something  impairments  It  view  data  or d i s r u p t i o n of  and c o n s i s t e n c y  is  must be m o d u l a r .  Autistic  like  hypothetical  because  us  of  environment  failure  signal  tells  a n d b o r i n g may s i m p l y  interesting 1996,  it  fact-based  imaginative  would p r e f e r r o u t i n e  change  theory  we f i n d  tedious  bottom,  (Currie  A  theory  explanations  that  we h a v e  people"  they  view,  autism.  in their  obvious  be  at  us  with  A l l this  theory  characteristics,  find  correct.  the  domain.  narrowly focused,  theorizing,  with  that  characteristics  children  any change  routines.  in  support  two  prevalent  averse  theory  you h o l d a theory  nothing  There  a  (1979)  have  discovered  i n c h i l d r e n who h a v e  The t r i a d  includes  been  the  presence  diagnosed  impairments  of  as  social  The classic' autism label is contrasted with other labels taken to identify different forms o f a u t i s m such as Asperger's Syndrome o r f r a g i l e X syndrome. Not a l l c h i l d r e n w i t h t h e s e latter 3 7  x  210  competence,  communication  discussed,  the  simulation theory  and d e f e n s i b l e theory  clear  however,  just  that  concepts, in  explanation  theory,  impairment  as  is  this  of can  well  children  it  skills  as  between  the  lines'  expressions feelings  or  or  understand  when  other  thought,  them,  simply does not  are  the  skills.  behaviour  trouble  explains  is  as  have  and  impossible. is  going  areas  with  or  of it's  mental  impairments  a b i l i t y to  speaking  The  Since  their  indications  communicating  two  theory.  Without the  someone  u n d e r s t a n d what  we  a more n a t u r a l  other  have  that  virtually  offer  simulation  autism  communication and s o c i a l  to  As  impairment i n pretending.  explain  difficulty  pretending.  appears  the  the  with  and  see  of  'read facial  underlying  socializing,  as  The a u t i s t i c  person  on.  Uta F r i t h  we  explains:  T h e s a m e a u t i s t i c c h i l d who c a n u n d e r s t a n d v e r y w e l l why a c u s t o m e r p a y s t h e s h o p k e e p e r , o r why a p e r s o n jumps o u t of the way o f a falling rock, may not u n d e r s t a n d why a p o l i t e g u e s t d e c l i n e s a f u r t h e r o f f e r o f f o o d w h e n h e i s s t i l l h u n g r y ; why a n e m p l o y e e who wishes to be promoted g i v e s flowers to the boss's secretary; why a s c h o o l g i r l c o m p l a i n s o f a stomach a c h e w h e n e v e r s h e h a s n o t d o n e h e r h o m e w o r k ; o r why a toddler exaggerates his hurt by crying when his b r o t h e r pushed him. (1989, p.176)  Both  the  simulation  and  communicative  understanding of then  will  diagnoses  not  will  be  theory  and t h e o r y  impairments  intentional related  display  to  autistic  of  states.  theory the  explain  basis  a  The d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  explanations  of  characteristics. 211  of  the  these  social  lack  of  question  impairments  but  will  be  which  understanding works I  to  believe  have  that  other the  theory  argued  in  is  not  ability  to  simulate  states  to  others of  b o u n d means have  this  theory,  much  have  to  to  at  by  the we  states  that  root have  worry about  the  with  more  that  that  I have it  and,  defending  realism  of a  is  demonstrated  recommend  is  lack  explanation  associated  externalist  i n d i v i d u a t i n g them.  I do b e l i e v e  have  theory  thesis  then  definitively  and which  the  of also  autism.  natural  and  regard.  jeopardized is  explains  characteristics  this  mental of  states  simulation  in  states  existence  better  intentional  explain  inclusive  I  of  theory  arguments.  of  While  I  demonstrated being  psychological  of  don't  truth  If  of  the  mental  identifying  independent  that  intentional  our a s c r i p t i o n s means  the  212  about  of  take  to  simulation  it  appears  case,  realism  contextmyself  the  that the  our  the  we  to  don't  anymore.  REFERENCES  American Psychiatric Statistical Manual of Washington, DC.  Association (1987). Mental Disorders, 3rd  Baron-Cohen, S. (1987). Journal of Developmental  B a r o n - C o h e n , S. (1991). c a u s e s e m o t i o n ? " , Child  Diagnostic and Revised Edition,  "Autism and Symbolic Psychology, 5, 139-48.  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