UBC Theses and Dissertations

UBC Theses Logo

UBC Theses and Dissertations

Populism and the Reform Party Clough, Derrick C. 1994

Your browser doesn't seem to have a PDF viewer, please download the PDF to view this item.

Item Metadata


831-ubc_1994-0379.pdf [ 1.19MB ]
JSON: 831-1.0099091.json
JSON-LD: 831-1.0099091-ld.json
RDF/XML (Pretty): 831-1.0099091-rdf.xml
RDF/JSON: 831-1.0099091-rdf.json
Turtle: 831-1.0099091-turtle.txt
N-Triples: 831-1.0099091-rdf-ntriples.txt
Original Record: 831-1.0099091-source.json
Full Text

Full Text

POPULISM AND THE REFORM PARTY by DERRICK C. B.A.,  CLOUGH  The University of British Columbia,  1991  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Department of Political Science) We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA June 1994 Copyright 1994 Derrick C.  Clough  In presenting this thesis  in  partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department  or  by  his  or  her  representatives.  It  is  understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.  (Signature)  Department of The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada Date  DE.6 (2/88)  /14  Abstract  This  thesis  endeavours  to  Reform Party’s ‘populism’ to  characterize  the  answer  the  consist of?”  nature  of  the  question,  “What  does  the  An attempt is made herein  Reform  Margaret Canovan’s typology of populisms.  Party’s  populism via  The analysis concludes  that the Reform Party manifests the characteristics of two of the different  seven  identifies. political” Manning  kinds  of  populist  phenomena  that  Canovan  It is found, on the one hand, that through his “antirhetorical  evinces  a  orientation,  certain  “politicians’ populism.”  form  of  Reform  Party  what  Canovan  leader refers  Preston to  as  On the other hand, it is posited that the  party’s policies vis a vis federal bilingualism, multiculturalism and  immigration  programs  reflect  “reactionary populism.”  ii  Canovan’s  conception  of  Table of Contents  Abstract  ii  Table of Contents  iii  Preface  iv  Introduction  1  Part One  Towards an Understanding of Populism: Canovan’s Typology Farmers’ Radicalism Intellectual Agrarian Socialism Peasant Movements Populist Dictatorship Populist Democracy Reactionary Populism Politicians’ Populism  4 7 8 9 10 12 13 15  Part Two  What the Reform Party is Not  17  Part Three  The Reform Party, Politicians’ Reactionary Populism  Populism,  and  29  Summary & Conclusion  67  List of Sources  70  iii  Preface  The prospective reader of  this  thesis  is hereby apprised of  author’s membership in the Reform Party of Canada. attraction  to the Reform Party,  briefly stated,  the  The author’s  consists  in the  party’s zeal for the reform of Canada’s criminal justice system and for  the  implementation  of  reform’s  designed  to  address  appropriate urgency Canada’s ever-growing fiscal crisis.  iv  with  Introduction  While one can only speculate about what metaphors future political historians will use to describe Canada’s recent election,  federal general  it is probably safe to assume that the word “watershed”  will be employed as often as any.  Indeed, the 1993 election seems  to have presided over more than its share of noteworthy and unusual Among them, after nine long years in opposition,  political events.  the Liberals were returned to the government benches with their largest majority in forty years. retained  only nine  of  the  New Democrats, on the other hand,  forty-three  Parliament’s dissolution and thus  seats  that  they held at  for the first time in  failed,  their thirty-year history as a party, to win enough seats in order to qualify for official-party privileges in the House of Commons. The election also served to underscore the disbandment of the tacit federal  electoral  alliance  between  Quebec  Mulroney-era Progressive Conservatives.  nationalists  and  the  The Conservatives, having  failed to “deliver the goods” as promised by their former leader, surrendered  all  but  one  of  their  Quebec  seats  electoral battle with the relentless Bloc Quebecois.  in  a  hopeless  Astonishingly  enough, Quebec was among the more Conservative-friendly regions of the  country  on  election  day:  west  of  the  Conservatives failed to win a single seat.  Ottawa  River,  the  Atlantic Canada was  hardly more generous, allowing the Conservatives to carry only one constituency.  the party suffered an electoral  Needless to say,  collapse of unprecedented magnitude.  The election also witnessed the tensely anticipated rise of the Reform Party of Canada.  Aside from its modest but encouraging 1  performance in Ontario, where it won one constituency and finished second to the Liberals in fifty-six others, a  combined  five  seats  Manitoba  from  the Reform Party took  and  and  Saskatchewan,  a  stunning forty-six of the fifty-eight seats in Alberta and British To  Columbia.  the  put  metaphorical  obligatory  party’s terms,  electoral as  one  in  achievements  watched  the  the  returns  on  election night, it was as if a seemingly innocuous spark, caused by the  of  tumbling  pebbles  few  a  on  the  Canadian  blew  shield,  westward, igniting what became a full-fledged prairie fire; burning with greater intensity as it blazed across the prairies and into the  the  foothills,  Rocky Mountains,  fire  completely  subsumed the  forests  of  the  and did not burn itself out until it reached the  beaches of the West Coast.  To equate the Reform Party’s electoral performance with the rapid spread of fire is to draw attention to the party’s ostensibly populist  character.  predecessors  -  Credit League, Reform  Party  Like  most notably,  its  western  Canadian  the Progressive movement,  populist the Social  and the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation acquired  a  large  mass  membership  and  formation in 1987,  steadily and rapidly.  Since  the party’s membership has grown  As of October 1990,  stood at approximately 50,000,  the  attained  widespread popularity relatively soon after its inception. the party’s  -  the party’s membership  only 10,000 fewer than the federal  Liberal Party’s membership total.’ By early 1992,  the Reform Party  ‘Kenneth Whyte, “Under Attack: Suddenly the Major Parties Have Discovered the RPC,” Act of Faith, Terry O’Neill, ed. (Vancouver: B.C. Report Books, 1991), p.110. 2  over  possessed  100,000  2 members.  Indeed,  the  Report  group  of  western newsmagazines, the party’s most vociferous supporter within the Canadian media,  has designated the party “the fastest-growing  political movement  in Canadian history.” 3  Having now achieved a  decisive electoral breakthrough on short order,  the Reform Party  will undoubtedly be considered among the movements listed above in the works of future students of western Canadian populism.  Meanwhile, as far as current students and analysts of western Canadian populism are concerned, presented some difficulty.  the Reform Party has apparently  While most commentators seem to agree  or assume that the party is in some sense populist, case,  as  Steve Patten points out,  it remains the  that very few have engaged in  “any sustained theoretical discussion of what it means to refer to 4 the Reform Party as a populist party.”  This thesis adheres to the prevailing analytical orthodoxy in assuming that the Reform Party is populist.  At the same time, this  thesis attempts to mitigate the offence to rational analysis that such  an  populist  assumption presents label  endeavours,  that  the  therefore,  Reform  Party  to delineate the  Sidney Sharpe and Don 2 Manning and the Rise of the Books, 1992), p.1. 0’Neill, 3  seeking  by  Braid, Reform  to now  give meaning  to  wears.  thesis  This  the  Reform Party’s populist  Preston Storming Babylon: Party (Toronto: Key Porter  front cover.  Steve Patten, “Populist Politics? A Critical Re-Examination 4 of ‘Populism’ and the Reform Party’s Populist Politics.” A paper prepared for presentation to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Ottawa, June 6-8, 1993, p. . 1 3  An attempt will be made to characterize the party’s  character.  populism by means of Margaret Canovan’s typology of populisms. 5  The following analysis consists of three main sections.  The  first section outlines the basic contours and purpose of Canovan’s typology.  The second specifies which among Canovan’s various types  of populism the Reform Party would not appear to represent. final  section  attempts  provide  the  location within Canovan’s typology,  and,  to  party with  a  The  definitive  in the process,  offers a  perspective on what the party’s populism consists of.  I.  Towards an Understanding of Populism: Canovan’s Typoloqy  Any analysis that endeavours to delineate the populist character of something must first of all recognize that the term “populism” is notoriously  to  difficult  difficulty arises  work  from the  with.  As  fact that  Canovan  explains,  the  “the term is exceptionally  vague and refers in different contexts to a bewildering variety of 6 Aside from the Russian narodnichestvo and the American phenomena.” People’s Party of the late nineteenth century classics of populism” political George  phenomena  Wallace  and  -  the “acknowledged  the label “populist” has been attached to  as  diverse  the  “white  Canovan, Margaret 5 Jovanovich, 1981).  -  as  Peronism,  backlash,”  Populism  lbid., p.3. 6 4  (New  direct  Jimmy  York:  democracy,  Carter’s  Harcourt  1976  Brace  Presidential  7 Maoism and Ronald Reagan. campaign, 8 What accounts  for the considerable licence that has  thus been taken with the  Peter Worsley provides the following answer: Populism, as  term?  opposed to conservatism or socialism,  “is not part of a shared,  more inclusive tradition as far as the subjective orientation of the  actors  is  concerned.  analytical one.” 9 Thus,  Its  typological  status  is  solely an  relatively unencumbered by the weight of  historical or ideological baggage, the term has been freely imposed by observers,  and appropriated freely by the observed.  The main goal of Canovan’s landmark work is to bring a degree of clarity  (and perhaps sanity)  to the debates on the meaning of  populism that have been raging for years within academic circles. Rather  than  simply  imposing  her  own  “single  definition” of what populism is, or should be sparked the debates in the first place  -  -  essentialist  the approach that  Canovan proposes to work  within the confines of the debates by constructing a typology of populisms  that  corresponds  with what  she  sees  as  the  two main  academic approaches to the study of populism.’ 0 “One broad way of thinking  about  populism,”  she  explains,  “stresses  its  agrarian  character and takes a sociological approach toward its roots and  lbid. 7 Populism and Democratic Thought David Laycock, 8 Canadian Praries, 1910 to 1945 (Toronto: University of Press, 1990), p.14. lbid. 9 ‘°Canovan, p.12. 5  in the Toronto  ’ 1 significance.”  Using  this  approach  as  a  guide,  Canovan  establishes a category heading entitled “Agrarian Populisms,” under which  lists  she  farmers’  three  different  types  radicalism, peasant movements,  2 socialism.’  Under  a  second  main  of  populist  phenomena:  and intellectual agrarian  heading,  labelled  “Political  Populisms,” Canovan arranges four more or less distinct varieties of populism: populist dictatorship, populist democracy, reactionary populism, populist  politicians’  and  phenomena  is  3 populism.’  said to  reflect  This  second  the primary  group  of  of  the  focus  other main analytical approach to the study of populism, where “the emphasis.. .is much less upon any particular socioeconomic base or setting,  and  specifically, ‘populism’  much  more  upon  political  within this second school,  have  in  mind  is  a  4 characteristics.”  More  “what those who talk of  particular  kind  of  political  phenomenon where the tensions between the elite and the grass roots loom large.” 5  Due to their differing analytical populism  yield  remarkably  dissimilar  foci,  the two schools of  groupings  of  political  “Ibid., p.8. One of the more prominent variants of this approach views populism “as the characteristic response of the independent commodity producer, or the agrarian petit-bourgeoisie, to the threat of capitalist modernization.” See J.F. Conway, “Populism in the United States, Russia, and Canada: Explaining the Roots of Canada’s Third Parties,” Canadian Journal of Political Science, XI:I (March 1978), p.108. Canovan, p.13. 2 ‘ lbid. 3 ‘ Ibid., 14  p.9.  lbid. 5 ‘ 6  phenomena,  although some overlap inevitably 16 occurs. Each of the  sub-species of populism that fall under Canovan’s main headings is summarized separately below.  1.  Farmers’ Radicalism  Farmer’s radicalism can be defined in general as an expression of political protest by an agrarian petit-bourgeoisie experiencing acute  socioeconomic  insecurity  due  to  commodity production and marketing. instances  of  farmers’  political  tradition which  control their own destiny,  associated with  More specifically, historical  radicalism led  problems  feature  farmers  to  “a  clash  expect  to  between be  able  a to  and their actual economic thraldom to  17 The American People’s outside corporate and financial interests.” Party and  the  Junker-led German agrarian movement,  both of  the  l890s, and the Depression-era Social Credit League and Cooperative Commonwealth 8 radicalism.’ agricultural substantial  Federation, Each  rank  movement  commodity government  as  classic  arose  prices  in  and/or  intervention  as  examples times  drought, a  means  of  of  depressed  and of  farmers’  proposed  alleviating  lbid 6 ‘ Ibid., 17  . 0 p.10  Canovan inexplicably omits from her 100-5. lbid., 8 ‘ pp. discussion of farmers’ radicalism any mention of the Canadian Progressive movement of the years 1910 to 1925. The movement would appear to represent a paradigm case of farmers’ radicalism. See Paul Sharp, The Agrarian Revolt in Western Canada (Minneapolis: and W.L. Morton, 1945); University of Minnesota Press, Progressive Party in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1950) 7  production and marketing problems.  The interventionist measures  that were favoured included government control of railways, grain elevators and storage, and credit. this type of populism,  “One of the notable features of  indeed,” writes Canovan,  “is that it seems  invariably to include calls for extensive government intervention in the economy coming from people who own property.  2.  Intellectual Agrarian Socialism  Examples of this sub-species of agrarian populism include the policy  orientation  of  the  Nyerere  regime  in  ideals of the Russian narodnichestvo of the  Tanzania, 18705.20  and  the  Essentially  a phenomenon of feudal or tribal societies in the early phases of capitalist modernization, populism of this genre seeks to pre-empt the  upheaval  and  dislocation  of  the  modernization  process  by  embracing the ostensibly communal proclivities and values of the 21 While it idealizes the peasantry, peasantry.  however,  this type  of populism does not emanate from within the peasantry; rather, it With reference to the  springs from the minds of intellectuals. Russian  context,  for  example,  populism  was  by  no  means  “the  ideology of the small producer”: Russian populism “was an ideology of intellectuals oriented toward the peasantry” and  naively  overestimated  the  . 4 Canovan, p.10 9 ‘ Ibid., pp. 105-10. 20 Ibid. 21 8  latter’s  that drastically  marginally  communal  22 Indeed, instincts.  the Russian peasants proved to be remarkably  resistant to the inculcation of the utopian socialist vision that was  espoused  Thus,  and carried to  Canovan  identifies  a  them by  the  separate  idealistic narodniks. 23  sub-species  of  agrarian  populism as a means of categorizing populist movements both for, and of,  3.  the peasantry.  Peasant Movements  Canovan  attempts  to  render  her  larger  notion  of  agrarian  populism intelligible by viewing “peasant populism” as a kind of conceptual bridge between each of the above sub-species: [B]etween grass roots farmers’ movements on the one hand and intellectual dreams of the transformation of society by the peasantry on the other, there surely lies another vast and significant category of rural radicalisms: 24 actual grass-roots peasant movements. As examples of  such movements she points to the various peasant  parties that appeared in eastern Europe shortly after the end of the First World War.  Referred to collectively as “the Greens,” the  eastern European peasant parties were often led by peasants, former  and  peasants,  perspective  that  peasants  invariably  expressed  could relate  to and  an  or  ideological  25 At support.  the  Ibid., p.92. For an interpretation of Russian populism as an 22 expression of the class perspective of the small agrarian producer, see Conway, op. cit. Canovan, pp.91-2. 23 Ibid., 24  p.11O.  Ibid., p.123. In passing, it is interesting to note that the 25 Alexander Stamboliski, in Bulgaria, of the Greens leader articulated a vision of democracy that bears remarkable similarity to the democratic vision that was put forth at roughly the same 9  core of the Greens’ ideology was a desire to preserve the ties that bound  the  peasantry  the  to  Fearful  land.  of  both  industrial  capitalism and state socialism, the Greens typically emphasized the sanctity  of  family  property,  favoured  and  small-scale  industry over industry centralized in the cities,  rural  and voluntary  26 cooperation over enforced collectivization.  4.  Populist Dictatorship  Populist dictatorship refers to  “the familiar phenomenon of  a charismatic leader who builds a dictatorship by appealing past the  elite  established  Guided  by  populism,  the  and  political  scholarly  prolific  system  literature  to on  ‘the  27 people’.”  Latin  American  Canovan looks to the Peron regime in Argentina for her  paradigmatic  instance  of  populist  dictatorship.  After  his  democratic election to Argentina’s presidency in 1945, Peron easily overturned the country’s nascent democratic structures, maintaining a dictatorial hold on power until overthrown in 1955. dictatorship  was  sustained  on  the  basis  of  his  His ten-year compelling  rhetorical appeals to Argentina’s lower classes, with whom he built a direct,  personalistic relationship,  thus rendering impotent his  time by the Albertan Progressive leader Henry Wise Wood. Both called for the replacement of party government by a kind of corporatist form of government, referred to by Wood as “group government.” For a detailed discussion of Wood’s group government see C.B. Macpherson, Democracy in Alberta model, ( Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1953), chapter two. Canovan, pp. 26  123-8.  Ibid., p.137. 27 10  enemies within the formerly powerful landed aristocracy. 28  Within the North American context, Huey  Long,  ranks  as  a  the Louisiana “Kingfish,”  characteristic  Louisiana’s governor from 1928  to 1932,  populist  29 dictator.  and a Louisiana senator  from 1932 until his assassination in 1935,  Long established and  maintained a virtually unassailable grip on the state’s politics by of promises  means  and appeals  to poor  through use of bribery, patronage, by his  “reputation as  farmers  and workers,  and  and blatant thuggery. ° Secured 3  the champion of the common man,”  Long was  able to withstand the vehement hostility with which he was regarded by the state’s political and economic elites,  represented “by an  31 oligarchy of established planters and new industrialists.”  Canovan claims that Nazism and Italian Fascism can also be portrayed in a sense as manifestations of populist dictatorship. “Both Mussolini and Hitler,” she points out,  “made much of the fact  that they were men of the people, born outside the social elite and 32 able to articulate the interests and values of ordinary people.” Citing the elitism inherent in both Nazism and Fascism, Canovan balks  at  categorizing  them as  “populist” dictatorship.  143-7.  Ibid., 28  pp.  Ibid., 29  p.151.  Ibid., 30  pp.  Ibid., 31  p.152.  Ibid., 32  9. 4 p.l  151-8.  11  ideal  however,  representatives  of  Populist Democracy  5.  applies  Canovan different  kinds  the  label  “populist  of political phenomena:  democracy”  political  to  movements  two and  parties which campaign for the implementation of various forms of direct  democracy,  and  political  jurisdictions  which  routinely  employ direct democracy measures in the conduct of public affairs. Examples  of  the  former  include  the U.S.  People’s  Party and the  American Progressive movement, each of which vigorously campaigned for the implementation of the referendum, 33 Their support recall. of  politics  and  the initiative,  for these mechanisms  society  according  to  and the  “rested upon a view  which  ‘special  interests’  (particularly the big corporations and the corrupt politicians in their pay) tend constantly to dominate the political process to the detriment of ‘the people’ with  a  system  By replacing representative democracy  synthesizing direct  and  delegate  democracy,  “the  people” would be able to govern themselves without the tutelage of “professional politicians” and “party bosses,” thus resulting in a more effective and responsive political decision-making process.  The  political  jurisdictions  to  which  Canovan  attaches  the  label populist democracy, based on their more or less routine use of referenda, citizens’ initiatives, and recall mechanisms, include 33 pp. 176-8. Canovan thus places the U.S. People’s Party Ibid., in two categories: populist democracy and farmers’ radicalism. The Canadian Progressive movement may also be given the same dual “Direct Legislation and the See W.L. Morton, classification. Origins of the Progressive Movement,” Canadian Historical Review, vol. 25, no. 2 (1944), pp. 279-88. Ibid., 34  p.178. 12  Switzerland and several western and mid-western American states. 35  6. Reactionary Populism  somewhat  While definitions  to  the  elusive labels  of  at  times  in  attaching  precise  her populism sub-species,  Canovan  could hardly provide a more concise definition of what she calls reactionary populism: “Populism” of this sort is an appeal to the people which deliberately opens up an embarrassing gap between “the people” and their supposedly democratic and representative elite by stressing popular values that conflict with those of the elite: typically, it involves a clash between reactionary, authoritarian, racist, or chauvinist views at the grass roots, and the progressive, liberal, tolerant cosmopolitanism characteristic of the 36 elite. She points  to  the policies  and views  espoused to great popular  appeal by George Wallace and Enoch Powell during the late 1960s as 37 characteristic expressions of reactionary populism.  In the wake of the passage of U.S.federal government, national  notoriety  and,  the Civil Rights Act by the  Alabama governor George Wallace attained indeed,  popularity,  38 outspoken opponent of desegregation.”  “as  a  particularly  Upon situating himself as  the political point guard of pro-segregationists, Wallace ran as an independent candidate in the 1968 presidential election, garnering  192-9.  Ibid., 35  pp.  Ibid., 36  p.229.  Ibid., 37  pp.  Ibid., 38  p.  226-9. 226. 13  ten million votes.  “His platform of concern with racial issues,  traditional moral values and anti-elitism was clearly one  crime,  which had considerable appeal to the mass of American voters.” 39  Concurrent with Wallace’s efforts to encourage grass rootselite  vis  cleavage  attempt  Powell’s  a  vis  to  the  issue  mobilize  of  desegregation  Britons  government’s liberal immigration policy. the nation’s political  elites  against In 1968,  “by breaking the  was  the  Enoch  British  Powell stunned  tacit  convention  whereby all major parties in Britain had avoided making immigration and  race  political  ° 4 issues,”  calling  for  a  reduction  in  ’ 4 immigration levels and for stricter immigrant admission criteria. immigration policy views  Although his from  Conservative  party  leader  resulted in his dismissal  Edward  Heath’s  Shadow  Cabinet,  Powell’s stance was enormously popular among rank and file Britons. “According to various opinion polls, he was supported by between 60 and 75 percent of the electorate could command.  made  sentiments  far more than any party leader  ,,42  then,  Once again, appeals  -  by  among  reactionary populism,  Powell  and  ordinary  Wallace,  citizens  as embodied in the  mobilizes against  the  reactionary ostensibly  progressive policies and values of a political elite. Ibid., 39  227-8.  pp.  Ibid., p. 40  228.  Douglas E. Schoen, Enoch Powell and the Powellites 41 Macmillan Press, 1977), chapter two. Canovan, 42  p.  228. 14  (London:  7.  Politicians’  Populism  The last of the populism sub-species that Canovan considers, politicians’ populism,  of political phenomena,  assortment Jimmy  Carter’s  P.R.I.,  encompasses a vast and seemingly disparate  and  campaign  the  for  from the style and themes of  President  Scottish National  in  Party.  1976,  to  Indeed,  the  Mexican  politicians’  populism seems to be a kind of residual category within Canovan’s schema, a sort of conceptual haven for phenomena that scholars have at times labelled “populist,” but do not seem to fit into any of Canovan’s  Nonetheless,  categories.  other  in the  course  of  her  discussion of politicians’ populism, Canovan provides an insightful look at some of the practical uses to which “populism” has been put by the politically opportunistic.  “Politicians’ political  style  43 commitments.”  populism,” and  She  One  form witnesses  the  five  more  “is  Canovan,  not  tactics,  lists  politicians’ populism,  states  of  or  a  particular  less  distinct  attempt by a political  leader  “appealing away from politics altogether.” 44  of  genre  politicians people”  to  as  rhetorically  “denounce  parties  45 self-interested manipulators,”  transcend  Ibid., 43  p.  286.  Ibid., 44  p.  263.  of  policy forms  of  only one of which will be considered here.  power by this  matter  politics  partisan  Ibid. 45 15  and  to attain Populists  as  factions  and  implore  rally  behind  and “the an  leadership  “unpolitical This  that  will  “antipolitical”  generally  put  their  rhetorical  interest  46 first.”  orientation  can  be  discerned from a look at the character of Jimmy Carter’s campaign for  in  President  l976.  Capitalizing  on  widespread  public  cynicism towards politicians in the wake of the Watergate scandal, Carter  placed  great  emphasis  during  honesty and openness in government,”  the  campaign  upon  “truth,  and cultivated an image of  himself as a political outsider, unbeholden to interest groups and above partisan politics. 48 views,  however,  manner.  As  In articulating his substantive policy  Carter evinced a strategically vague and evasive a  means  of  appealing  to  both  liberals  and  conservatives, he simultaneously espoused fiscal conservatism and progressive social policy.  At the same time, Carter “rejected all  ideological labels except that of ‘populist,’ explaining that this I derived my political  last epithet indicated ‘that  support,  my  advice and my concern directly from the people themselves, not from powerful  intermediaries  49 groups.’”  He  or  representatives  attempted  also  to  idealize  of the  special-interest simplicity  and  wholesomeness of average American citizens, and portrayed himself among the latter. He dwelt constantly upon his home and family, the small town he lived in, his experience as a small businessman, that of a “bornEven his religion his family farm. again” Southern Baptist, which seemed so exotically helped to confirm his image as archaic to the reporters an ordinary, decent American who was not too clever to .  .  -  -  Ibid., p. 265. 46 Ibid., pp. 269 47 Ibid., 48  -  73.  270.  Ibid., p. 271. 49 16  believe in God. ° 5 Thus,  to  summarize  very briefly,  populism  exemplified  the  witnesses  the strategic use of  by  the  character  form of of  politicians’  Carter’s  “antipolitical”  campaign  and more or less  ideologically-neutral populist rhetorical themes and appeals.  Having thus set forth the salient characteristics of Canovan’s populism sub-species,  the analysis will now turn to the matter of  fitting the Reform Party’s “populism” into Canovan’s typology.  The  subsequent analysis begins with a specification of the categories that the party would not appear to fall within.  II. What the Reform Party is Not  Of  all  of  populism  Canovan’s fall  that  populism  under  the  sub-species, heading  the  three  forms  “agrarian populism”  of  would  appear to provide the least appropriate means of characterizing the The party,  Reform Party’s ostensibly “populist” nature. all,  obviously  peasants’  cannot  populism,  be  given  identifiable  peasantry.  intellectual  agrarian  categorized fact  the  Nor  can  socialism:  it  as  that be  a  whatever  manifestation  Canada  cited it  first of  as is  possesses an  that  example the  of no of  party  idealizes, it is certainly not an indigenous peasantry, fictitious or otherwise.  Finally,  the applicability of Canovan’s conception  of farmers’ radicalism to a characterization of the Reform Party’s populism would appear to be compromised by the general orientation  soIbid., p. 2. 27 17  of the party’s agricultural policy.  Party policy favours “a shift  from a government-supported agricultural industry to an industry shaped  by  the  free  operation  of  comparative  between  advantage  regions and commodities, free entry into all sectors of production and marketing, and free trade on a global basis.” 51 In general, the party’s agricultural policy rejects the kinds of interventionist favoured  mechanisms  by  radical  farmers’  movements,  and  leans  markedly towards the interests of consumers over the interests of agricultural producers. policy  can  The party’s consumer-oriented agricultural  partially  be  explained  via  reference  socioeconomic composition of the party’s membership. the  results  of  a  1989  survey  of  5,000  party  the  to  Summarizing  members,  Peter  McCormick writes, The largest single [socioeconomic] category was “retired” accounting for 38.4 percent of the respondents... Another 41.3 percent were clearly middle class (small business 16.7 percent, professional 15.75 percent and management 8.9 percent), 9.5 percent were homemakers and only 4.7 percent identified themselves as involved in labour or trade. Striking by its absence is the agricultural sector; on this profile, the party emerges as solidly urban middle class and not a rural phenomenon 52 at all. -  Of  Canovan’s  dictatorship  may  political also  be  populism  summarily  sub-species,  rejected  as  a  populist means  conceptualizing the nature of the Reform Party’s populism. sure,  as  displayed  will  be  discussed  an autocratic  below,  tendency  Reform Party of Canada, 51 Book 1991 (Reform Fund Canada,  in  of  To be  the  party’s  leadership  has  its  efforts  to  the  control  Principles and Policies: 1991), p. 16.  The Blue  Peter McCormick, “The Reform Party of Canada: New Beginning 52 Sixth Edition, Hugh or Dead End?” Party Politics in Canada, Thorburn, ed. (Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall, 1992), p. 347. 18  party’s membership and policy-making processes,  and has attempted  to gain power “by appealing past the established elite.., to ‘the 53 However, it has not given any indication that it wishes people.’” to subvert Canada’s democratic political institutions with a view to the creation of a dictatorship, categorized alongside Peron,  Long,  and thus cannot be accurately Hitler and Mussolini.  Reference to Canovan’s conception of populist democracy would appear  to provide  somewhat more  a  encouraging means  of  lending  substance to the notion that the Reform Party is a populist party. Indeed,  since  its  inception  in  1987,  the  Reform  Party  has  distinguished itself as a vocal proponent of direct legislation, calling for binding referenda and voters’ initiatives.  The party’s  policy book states, The Reform Party supports the mechanism of binding referendums on the current government of Canada by a simple majority vote of the electorate, including a simple majority in at least two-thirds of the Provinces (including the territories) .  Further, The Reform Party supports voters’ initiatives by way of a referendum, if three percent (3) or more of the eligible voters of Canada sign a petition to the Chief requesting that question or Electoral Officer a legislative proposal be put before the people. Such a question or legislative proposal should be placed on the 55 ballot at the subsequent federal general election. The party has also emphasized the need to “break the back of party discipline”  in the House of Commons,  and thus render Members of  . 37 Canovan, p.1 53 Reform Party of Canada, Blue Sheet: Principles and Policies 54 and Election Platform (Reform Fund Canada, 1993), p.3. Ibid. 55 19  Parliament book  more  states  constituents  accountable  that a  the party  recall  their  to  “supports  procedure  violated his/her oath of  56 constituents. the principle  against  an M.P.  The of  they  57 Party policy also office.”  policy  allowing feel  has  calls  for  amendments to Parliamentary procedure concerning the circumstances 58 in which a government may be defeated in the House. We believe that the defeat of a government measure in the House of Commons should not automatically mean the defeat of the government. Defeat of a government motion should be followed by a formal motion of non-confidence, the passage of which would require either the resignation of the government or dissolution of the House for a general 59 election. This  procedure  strips  thus  the  government  of  the  capability to  threaten to dissolve Parliament as a means of forcing its backbench M.P.s to vote in favour of government measures notwithstanding the views on such measures held by backbench M.P.s’  Thus, legislation,  insofar such  as as  it  clearly  referenda  and  constituents.  forms  embraces voters’  of  direct  initiatives,  and  espouses means of enhancing the people’s control of their elected representatives by means of  such mechanisms as  and freer  recall  votes in the House of Commons, the Reform Party appears to manifest ° Before definitively 6 what Canovan refers to as populist democracy. Reform Party of Canada, So You Don’t 56 Neither Do We. ( Reform Fund Canada, 1993). Blue Sheet, 57  p.  Trust  Politicians?  3.  Ibid. 58 Ibid. 59 See Tom Flanagan and Martha Lee, “The Roots of Reform.” A 60 paper prepared for presentation to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Charlottetown, P E. I., June .  20  locating the party conceptually alongside Progressives, however,  the Populists  and the  it is perhaps relevant to consider whether  the party to date has conducted its internal affairs in a manner that would appear to conform to the spirit in which the earlier movements campaigned for the implementation of direct democracy. As  earlier,  stated  the  Populists  and  the  American  and  Canadian Progressive movements predicated their case  western  for direct  democracy upon a desire to wrest control of the political decisionmaking process away from party bosses and political professionals ’ 6 and vest such control in “the people.”  In light of the party’s militant support for direct democracy, one might reasonably expect the party’s decision-making and policy making processes to be firmly ensconced in the hands of the party’s and  rank  file  membership.  Indeed,  the  party’s  leadership  and  spokespersons have gone to great lengths in attempting to solidify the party’s public image as a party that is driven and directed by its  However,  membership.  populist party,  i62  election campaign,  despite  its  image  as  “a  bottom-up  as Manning characterized it during the recent there is substantial evidence to suggest that  the Reform Party is controlled to a large extent by the party’s leadership, 1992,  p.  as  embodied  in  Preston Manning  and  other prominent  18.  Canovan, p. 179; Morton, The Progressive Party in Canada, pp. 61 15-17; J.D. Hicks, The Populist Revolt (Lincoln: University of The Hofstadter, Richard 406-8; Press, Nebraska pp. 1961), Progressive Movement 1900-1915 (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall Ltd., 1963), part three. 1993.  ”Manning at 62  the Crossroads,” 21  Vancouver Sun,  September 11,  members of what dissidents within the party have referred to as the “Calgary Clique.  t63  Notwithstanding Manning’ s public crusade against “professional politicians” and the organizational methods of Canada’s “old-line” parties, to  the party’s head office in Calgary has not been hesitant  retain  the  of  services  professionals,  political  nor  has  it  refrained from employing organizational tactics and devices that are characteristic of Canada’s old-line parties. and Don Braid point out,  As Sidney Sharpe  atop  the grass roots sits a modern political apparatus that operates out of the party’s headquarters on 4th Avenue every in day, computer Nearly Calgary. Southwest operators open sacks of mail and pour out new membership applications, each with $10 enclosed. By fall of 1991 the party had launched a major drive for corporate donations, headed by Reform chairman Cliff Fryers; hired Frank Luntz, a Republican pollster and campaign planner who used to work in Ronald Reagan’s White House; engaged national pollsters; and signed Hayhurst Communications, a sharp Calgary-based advertising firm, to sell its image 64 Meanwhile,  the party’s fund raising vehicle,  “is exactly the same as the PC Canada Fund,”  Reform Fund Canada, 65 to quote Manning.  From the Liberals the Reform Party has appropriated Rick Anderson, who  campaign. the  a  served as  senior director of  the party’s  recent  At the time of his defection to the Reform Party from in  Liberals  1991,  Anderson was  the  general  manager  prominent Ottawa-based lobbying firm Hill and Knowlton. his  election  defection,  Anderson had  served as  an organizer  for  of  the  Prior to several  Brian Bergman, “Judgement Day,” Maclean’s, December 16, 1991. 63 Sharpe and Braid, p. 64 Ibid., 65  p.  8.  9. 22  noteworthy Turner,  Liberal  present  Party  finance  figures,  including  minister  Paul  former  Martin  leader  Jr.,  and  John  Donald  66 Johnston.  From its headquarters in Calgary the Reform Party hierarchy has exercised control over much more than day-to-day administration of party affairs.  The members  of  prominent of which include Manning,  the Calgary Clique,  party chairman Cliff Fryers,  and former Chief Policy Officer and current M.P. Stephen  have  Harper,  exercised  the most  considerable  for Calgary West control  over  the  party’s policy agenda, as well as over the party’s membership.  In  one of the very few in-depth works that have been published to date on the formation and development of the Reform Party, Murray Dobbin provides an intriguing account of how the party’s Calgary-based hierarchy has dominated the party’s membership and policy-making processes.  An  impression  of  the  hierarchy’s  somewhat  domineering  and  manipulative proclivities can be gleaned from a look at the policy making  process  that  culminated  in  the  current policy book at the 1991 Assembly.  adoption  of  the  party’s  According to Dobbin,  There were, in Harper’s words, “two channels” through which policy reached the 1991 Assembly: local riding 67 These two associations and the Party Policy Committee. streams of policies were then screened by the Party  4,  Glen Allen, 66 1991.  “Converts in High Places,” Maclean’s,  November  Appointed by the party’s Executive Council, the PPC consisted 67 of fourteen members, and was presided over by Manning and Harper. Murray Dobbin, Preston Manning and the Reform Party (Halifax: Formac Publishing Co. Ltd., 1992), p. 147. 23  Policy Committee and reduced to 159, eighty-eight from the constituency associations and seventy-one from the committee itself. .These 159 resolutions, assembled in an “Exposure Draft,” were sent to each constituency which was then expected to vote on them and submit the results 68 to the committee. .  Upon  tabulating  the  results,  the  PPC  prepared  resolutions to be voted on at the Assembly. consisted  of  the  resolutions  constituency level  a  set  of  sixty  The set ostensibly  which garnered most  favour at  the  •69  “Of those final sixty resolutions,” Dobbin claims, “just seven 70 This result, had originated with the constituencies.”  he argues,  would appear to have been engineered by the Party Policy Committee: The Exposure Draft itself was heavily loaded in favour of the policies put forward by the Party Policy Committee. Resolutions were ordered according to policy area. In most policy areas there were two resolutions to choose usually one from the party and one from a from But in fifty instances, only party constituency. resolutions were available for discussion. .The structure of the draft also reinforced the authority of the committee’s resolutions. Following the text of competing resolutions was a section called “Rationale.” Most of the resolutions had not come with an constituency accompanying rationale, so for these resolutions the category was followed by the word “None” a subtle hint that perhaps the policy had not been well thought out. In every case, the competing party resolution had a detailed Following was the “Party Policy rationale. that criticizing Remarks,” most often the Committee’s resolution and making a constituency competing ’ 7 recommendation on which resolution to support. -  .  -  The  Party  Policy  Committee,  evidently  disdainful  of  the  ideas  emanating from the grass roots, recommended all but four of its own Ibid., pp. 68 Ibid., p. 69  156-7. 161.  “Ibid. ’Ibid., 7  p.  157. 24  resolutions,  and  counselled  constituency resolutions  members  to  reject  all  but  two  •72  At the Assembly itself Manning and Harper kept firm control of debate  on  the  policy  assembled delegates.  resolutions  that  were  presented  to  the  In addressing policy resolutions, individual  delegates who attempted to speak any longer than two minutes had their microphones automatically switched off. Manning and Harper, meanwhile,  exercised extraordinary speaking privileges.  Throughout the policy discussions either Preston Manning or Stephen Harper were at the head table at the front of the meeting hail. They were permitted by the assembly chairman to intervene at any time and to speak to resolutions before any discussion from the floor had taken place. 73 Further  evidence  of  elite-level  manipulation  of  the  grass  roots can be discerned by way of reference to the leadership’s use and abuse of party task forces.  In the spring of 1990,  the Party  Policy Committee began to appoint a series of policy task forces, which were to explore and report on given policy issues as a means of guiding the PPC in its efforts to formulate resolutions for the pre-Assembly Exposure rank  and  file  party  74 Draft.  The  task  forces  were  members,  and  were  publicly  composed  touted  by  of the  leadership as giving voice to the grass roots in the policy-making s 7 process.  The  task  forces  ultimately  proved,  however,  to  be  somewhat less than idyllic manifestations of grass roots policy Ibid., 72  p.  158.  Ibid., 73  p.  166.  Ibid., p.147. 74 Ibid., p.163. 75 25  making,  revealed  as  memorandum.  by  the  terms  of  The memo in question,  leaked  a  internal  party  signed by the party’s policy  development coordinator but drafted by Manning, was released to the press in November 1990 by disgruntled Manitoba party off icials. 76 Addressed to members of the Executive Council, the  leadership’s  emanating  from  dissatisfaction  task  force  with  the  77 discussions.  the memo expressed “unorthodox”  “The  key  ideas  problem,  as  described in the memo, was that ‘the Chairperson does not control the  policy  direction  of  the  task  force  but  rather  acts  as  a  facilitator and feels obligated to incorporate all views expressed individuals chosen from  78 Henceforth, by the task force members.’” the  to preside directly over policy discussions.  PPC were  The  individuals who would lead discussions were to be in “100-percent agreement with existing party policy,”  and were  to possess  the  79 capacity to “manage an idea.”  Indeed,  the leadership has continuously demonstrated little  tolerance of dissent or deviation from the party line from among those  beneath  it.  the  In  summer  of  1992,  the  hand  of  the  leadership fell heavily on a group of Toronto party officials who deigned to criticize the Executive Council for allegedly “exerting too much  control  over  the  appointment  of  Ibid 76 Bergman, 77  “Judgement Day.”  Dobbin, p. 164. 78 “Ibid.,  and Bergman,  “Judgement Day.” 26  Ontario  regional  co  The  ° 8 ordinators.”  officials  in  question  were  subsequently  reprimanded by party Chairman Cliff Fryers via letter. continued to criticize Reform’s head office, become  marginalized  within  the  party  “Those who  Fryers warned,  and  the  ‘will  constituencies  involved will find the leader unavailable to them’  Fryers was  .  also prominent in enforcing internal party unity during the recent election campaign in attempting to make senior campaign organizers 82 “The oaths,” according to the Globe and Mail, sign loyalty oaths. “were meant to prevent a repetition of the internal dissension that divided Reform during the referendum campaign on the Charlottetown The dissension was caused by Manning’s appointment of  accord... Rick  Anderson  appointment policy, Anderson  was  advisor  vehemently  strategy as  an  as  too  and much  to  opposed  an  the  by  communications of  leadership.  the  Ottawa  Tom  party’s  Flanagan,  84 insider.”  Anderson’s director  viewed  “who  In  of  July  1993,  Flanagan was unilaterally fired by Manning after Flanagan’s refusal 85 to pledge to muzzle his concerns about Anderson’s appointment.  The party’s policy book contains an ingenious device for the enforcement  of  Notwithstanding Bergman, 80  unity its  among Reform Party Members provisions  calling  for  of  Parliament.  freer votes  “Manning’s Dilemma,” Maclean’s,  October 4,  and  the  1993.  Ibid. 81 Ibid. 82 Miro Cernitig, 83 October 20, 1993. Bergman, 84 Ibid., 85  “The  Paradox of  Manning,”  Globe  “Manning’s Dilemma.”  and Cernitig,  “The Paradox of Manning.” 27  and Mail,  implementation of a recall mechanism, within caucus will  votes  “always  the policy book states that  [be]  made public.” 86 As Dobbin  points out, the publication of caucus votes will “actually [lessen] caucus  other  parties,  caucus  faced with publicly disagreeing  Reform M.P.s might  In  democracy.  twice  think  about  such  87 action.”  an  votes  are  with  their  The  secret. leader  leadership  has  evidently taken other steps to help ensure caucus solidarity.  The  party’s candidate recruitment process, devised largely by Manning, requires  potential  which  questionnaire, candidate every  in  the  completed  the  to  includes  Blue  answer an extensive an  required to answer  is  policy  submit  candidates  “orthodoxy  ‘agree,  89 Book.”  questionnaire  88 check.”  “Each  disagree or modify’,  Prospective to  forty-page  candidates  Constituency  to  must  Nominating  The latter, upon interviewing aspiring candidates, are  Committees.  to advise the aspirants on whether they should contest candidate Those who are advised not to run are nonetheless free  nominations. to do  so,  committees’  although their chances  of winning are  reduced by the  circulation of “a list of ‘recommended candidates’  to  party members.” ° 9  The evidence cited above would thus appear to question the efficacy of specifying the nature of the Reform Party’ s populism by “Principles and Policies: The Blue Book 1991, p. Dobbin, 87  10.  p.171.  “Kenneth Whyte, “Demanding Qualifications: The RPC’s Unusual Recruitment Plan,” Act of Faith, p. 127. Dobbin, p. 89  173.  “Ibid. 28  way of reference to Canovan’s notion of populist democracy.  The  party’s espousal of direct democracy rings hollow in light of the leadership’s  apparent attempt  to manage the party’s  affairs and  membership in a manner that is fundamentally incongruent with the basic  essence  of  populist  democracy,  which  entrusts  ordinary  citizens with ultimate power in determining the substance of policy without the tutelage of political elites, the power to  control  and gives  their elected representatives,  “the people” rather than  vice versa.  Having eliminated the first five of Canovan’s populism sub species as appropriate means of delineating and conceptualizing the nature of the Reform Party’s populism, we are left to consider the applicability of politicians’ populism and reactionary populism.  III.  The  Reform  Party,  Politicians’  Populism  and  Reactionary  Populism  there is such a thing as “the common sense of the common people,” and if a politician, a party or a government can tap into it and harness that power to the formulation and implementation of public policy, there is no more potent political force on the face of the earth. Preston Manning The. .problem is that when you seek input from the bottom up, often the ideas are simple and low quality, or just slogans. They need a lot of fleshing out. But if people feel you’re listening to them, they’ll have faith in you, and then they’ll be very open to what you’re trying to .  p.  Preston Manning, The New Canada 91 25. 29  (Toronto: Macmillan,  1992),  92 sell them. Stephen Harper  The quotations above betray a kind of instrumentalist view of the It is a view that embraces the grass roots not out of  grass roots. or  idealism, Rather,  recognition  of  the  intrinsic  merit  of  doing  so.  it is a view that perceives the mobilization of the grass  roots as a means to an end.  Preston Manning has not always been a grass roots politician, or,  has  rather,  always  played  the  role  of  a  Viewing his political career as a whole,  politician. his  not  involvement  initial  in  politics  as  a  policy  grass  roots  dating from advisor  to  Alberta’s Social Credit government during the late 1960s, one sees that Manning’s engagement in grass roots,  or “populist,” politics  emerges as a relatively recent endeavour.  According  to  Murray  Dobbin,  the  Reform  Party  represents  Manning’s third major attempt at launching a new political party of the right.  His first two attempts,  carried out in collaboration  with his father Ernest, Alberta’s premier from 1943 to 1968, were largely  secretive,  elite-oriented  affairs,  apparently  conducted  93 with little pretext of popular mobilization or support.  The  first  attempt  occurred  1an Pearson, “Thou Shalt 92 Night, December 1990, p. 43. Dobbin, 93  pp. 40-7 and pp.  just Not  83-7. 30  prior Ignore  to the  Ernest West,”  Manning’s Saturday  retirement as premier in 1968.  Under the aegis of an organization  called the National Public Affairs Research Foundation, launched in secret by Ernest Manning in 1965 with the financial support of a group of corporate executives, Preston Manning and a small corps of researchers set to work at developing the principles of a political philosophy that the Mannings hoped would stem what they perceived Canada. The end result of as the rising tide of collectivism in 94 their work was a political philosophy called “social conservatism,” which proposed to energy  entrepreneurs  of  normally  socialists  Manning’s mind, Social  the  solve  to  turned  the  their  problems  social  efforts  -  and,  to  to  which  Preston  turned to the disadvantage of conservatives... envisioned  conservatism  society  a  in  which  the  free  capitalist system would remain fundamentally intact,  enterprise, while  “employ the tenets of free enterprise and the  need  for  collectivist,  bureaucratically-administered  social programs would be averted by means of the pursuit of social policy  through  goals  private  institutions,  which  to  the  administration of social programs would be contracted-out by the 96 government.  The  social  conservative  philosophy,  and  the  organizational means by which the Mannings hoped to give it life, were revealed in a short tract entitled Political Realignment: A Challenge  to  called for forces  Thoughtful  Canadians.  “a national merger of  with  those  of  right-wing  Ibid., 94  p.  42.  Ibid., 95  p.  40.  Ibid., 96  pp. 40-7 and pp.  Social  their book  the  Mannings  Credit and Conservative  Liberals,”  61-4. 31  In  to  be  accomplished  through  reconstituted  a  reconstructed party was ideals  conservative  Progressive to be  and  however,  reconstruction,  Conservative  “based on  clearly defined  98 principles.”  was  to  be  a  97 Party.  The  top-down  The  social  process  of “Key  process.  Progressive Conservative leaders and supporters” were to launch the undertaking by establishing a committee, which would “prepare the statement of  formal 99 party.  The  modernized, which  would  new  ideals and principles”  party,  responsible, employ  furthermore,  was  of  the reconstituted  to  be  backed  by  “a  national political party organization,”  “the  latest  scientific  and  organizational  developments in the performance of its functions.”°° At no point did the Mannings explain what the role of the grass roots would be in the new party. if any,  The  however,  Political Realignment harbours little,  populist rhetoric.  Mannings’  Conservative ignored  Indeed,  by  Party the  vision never  of  materialized.  Conservative  the Mannings made  a  conservative political party. discussions  Ibid., 97  with  a  small  reconstituted  a  Their  ’ 0 establishment.’ second attempt In 1978,  group  of  proposals  Ten at  Progressive  years  were  later,  launching a new  after holding a series of  Western M.P.s,  the  Mannings  46.  p.  A Challenge to Political Realignment: Ernest Manning, 98 Thoughtful Canadians (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, Ltd., 1967), p. 85. Ibid.,p. 99  85.  ‘°°Ibid., p. ‘°‘Dobbin, p.  83. 56. 32  formed an organization called the Movement For National Political 2 Change.’°  “The formation of the Movement,” writes Dobbin,  came to the attention of the media in September, produced  organization Movement,  he  organization.  claims,  a  statement  “was  a  very  of  its  1978,  “first  when the  03 objectives.”  private,  if  not  The  secretive,  104  According to Preston Manning, who was executive director of the MNPC, the organization had a mailing list of “a core of between 250 and 300 people across the country. Some of these people,” said Manning without elaborating, 105 “are plugged into different groups.” In  its  published  statement,  the  Movement  proposed  to  “either  radically transform one of the existing federal political parties or produce a viable new political party capable of replacing one of the  existing  conception of  6 entities.”°  According  to  Dobbin,  “a viable new political party’  the  Movement’s  referred to a new  07 conservative party of the right.”  The Movement ultimately failed to attain the one-thousand or so members that it hoped would eventually assemble for a national convention,  08 Dobbin and evidently died soon after its inception.’  suggests that while the circumstances surrounding the Movement’s  lbid., 2 ‘°  p.84.  103 Ibid. 104  Ibid. 84-5.  lbid., pp. 5 ‘° lbid, p.85. 6 ‘° lbid., p. 7 ‘° lbid., pp. 8 ‘°  86. 86-7. 33  death are somewhat hazy,  it is probable that the Movement was an  indirect victim of the National Energy Program and the early-1980s each  recession,  of  which  delivered  a  crippling  blow  the  to  Movement’s  “principal  largely of  individuals representing the western Canadian energy  resource  figures and financial backers,”  consisting  •109  Manning’s appeal to the grass roots in helping him to build the Reform Party would thus appear to stand in stark contrast to his earlier efforts at forming conservative political movements. His earlier efforts scarcely permitted popular scrutiny let alone popular participation, apparently  Manning’s  and thus lend evidence to the notion that grass  roots,  or  “populist,”  approach  in  building the Reform Party is a kind of tactical manoeuvre, a means to the end of establishing  what Dobbin and others claim Manning  ° 11 has wanted all along: a new conservative political party.  If Manning’s  is tactical in nature,  “populism,” then,  it is  conceivable that what we are dealing with is politicians’ populism. Indeed,  as  the  following  appropriated many of that  Jimmy  Carter  discussion  the populist employed  so  will  show,  rhetorical themes successfully  Manning  has  and devices  during  the  1976  Presidential election campaign.  Like Carter before him, Manning has attmpted to capitalize on  lbid., 9 ‘°  p.  87.  10 also Sharpe and Braid, p. ‘ See 34  60.  public  acute  towards  cynicism  politicians  by  castigating the Canadian political establishment.  rhetorically  Taking advantage  of widespread public distrust of Canada’s political elites in the wake  the  of  Muironey  government’s  of  imposition  the  and  Goods  Services Tax and the failure of the government’s elite-oriented, backroom  approach  embodied  in  to  the  the  Quebec  cultivated  successfully  constitutional round  of  amendment  negotiations,  anti-politician  an  as  process, “Manning  1 image.”  In  has his  appeals to a politically disenchanted public, Manning has attacked with great regularity Canada’s “old-line” politicians and parties, and their  methods.  “top-down”  His anti-politician rhetoric was  prominently displayed right from the outset of the recent election During  campaign. emphasized  the  symbolized his  the  slogan  early “Let  intention  the  stages People  of  the  campaign  Speak,”  “to let the public  which  Manning  apparently  say first what they them  consider important rather than having the politicians  tell  2 While certainly unique, what this election is about.”  Manning’s  appeal came across as somewhat odd, party’s  election  platform,  fiscal,  justice,  and  which  parliamentary  in light of the fact that his placed  special  3 reforms”  -  emphasis  the  very  upon  issues  that the party focused upon more or less throughout the campaign  -  “Richard Sigurdson, “Preston Manning and the Politics of Postmodernism.” A paper prepared for presentation to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Ottawa, June 6, 1993, p. 39. Cernitig, “Manning Vows Public Voice 2 “ Elites,” Globe and Mail, September 9, 1993. The Blue Sheet, 3 “  p.  1. 35  Will  Be  Heard  Over  was  published  Meanwhile, be  seen  almost  flaunting  Reform  a  prior  the  to  Party pamphlet,  the  114 election. Manning could  cover  of  which  “So You Don’t Trust Politicians? Neither Do We.”  emphasized  also  months  on the nightly news during the campaign,  brazenly stated, He  ten  the need  for  restrictions  on M.P.’s  pension  benefits and for the elimination of various perquisites enjoyed by parliamentarians at taxpayers’  expense.  Manning would also appear to follow Carter in terms of his espousal  “the  of  sense  portray himself  attempt  to  Manning  reveals  5 citizen,”  common  himself  fact,  to be  “is  not  alone  too  among  leaders  in proposing to re-introduce a  the  his  public  an  worldview  faith  explicitly the  entails  lbid., 4 “  p.  frugal, clever  Canada’s  his  Carter,  hard-working  to  believe  federal  “spiritual  common  not  urgent  the  7 people.”  in  party  dimension”  agenda,  existing public  or  pursuit  of  pp.  19-21,  societal  107-8.  272.  The New Canada, p. 104. 36  He  imposing upon  by  8.  Canovan, p. 6 “  lbid., p. 8 “  the  religion-inspired  Sharpe and Braid, 5 “  Manning, 7 “  of  politics  to  Christianly with ostensibly  Like  and  to  claiming that “faith in the existence of God is still  public life,  apply  people,”  latter.  average,  In  of  is  an  common  the  6 God.”  part  Manning  the  among  as  furthermore,  who,  of  98.  but  intends  the  Canadian  by  “working  8 agenda.”  peace  to  and  This  harmony  through mediation and reconciliation. 119  Indeed,  worthy political  leaders must be skilled at mediation and recociliation, he argues, “for  the  harmonization  and  reconciliation  of  conflicting  20 interests.. .is at the heart of contemporary politics.”  Manning evidently derives great pride from his own mediation ’ as revealed during the English-language leaders’ 2 skills,’ that was held prior to the election. Manning tried to moderate debate,  debate  Instead of engaging in debate  calmly asking the other leaders  to state or clarify their respective positions on certain issues, often without revealing his own position on such issues.  At the  same time, Manning’s moderator role during the debate created the impression that he was somehow above partisanship and ideological an impression that  squabbling,  served to underscore yet another  facet of Manning’s non-political appeal. refused  classified as  to be  attempted  appeal  to  to  either  people  of  liberal all  who  Not unlike Carter, or  and  conservative  ideological  stripes  by  proclaiming himself a “populist,” Manning argues that his vision of a  “New Canada”  is  22 neither left nor right,’  and that  the party  that he leads is a potential political home for people of diverse past  partisan  23 Democrats.’  For,  lbid., pp. 9 “ Ibid., 2 ‘ 0 p. Ibid., 2 ‘ 1  pp.  from  affiliations, as  he  put  it  during  Conservatives the  campaign,  99-101. 101. 101-2,  Sigurdson, 2 ‘ 2 p.  and Sharpe and Braid,  3.  sharpe 2 ‘ 3 and Braid,  p.  66. 37  p.  21.  to “the  New most  fundamental thing about the Reform Party is that it’s a populist party.  ,124  In  several  respects,  then,  Manning’s  political  style  and  rhetoric would appear to manifest the form of politicians’ populism which  Canovan  campaign.  discerns  However,  from  there is,  Jimmy  Carter’s  of course,  1976  Presidential  much more to the Reform  Party’s populism than Manning’s anti-political rhetorical appeal. We have yet  to consider whether Canovan’s notion of  populism  a  populism.  is  sensible  characterization  of  the  reactionary  Reform  Party’s  The balance of the analysis will attempt to do so.  It will be clash between  recalled that  reactionary,  views at the grass roots, cosmopolitanism  authoritarian,  racist,  and the progressive,  characteristic  even more succinctly,  reactionary populism witnesses  of  the  or  chauvinist  liberal,  25 elite.”  To  “a  tolerant  describe  it  reactionary populism may be construed as a  form of grass roots backlash against the pluralist ideals embraced by a political elite.  The Reform Party would appear in a certain  fundamental sense to represent just such a backlash, as embodied in the party’s stark opposition to the pursuit by successive federal roughly,  governments since the late 1960s,  of policies which have  26 served to enhance the pluralist character of Canadian society.’ 24 ‘ Manning,  Question Period,  CTV,  Sept.,  12,  1993.  25 p.229. ‘ Canovan, “describes a according to Lipset and Raab, 26 ‘ Pluralism, society which tends to protect and nurture the independent coexistence of different political entities, ethnic groups, ideas.” See The Politics of Unreason (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 38  Among  policies,  such  federal bilingualism,  Reformers  have  focused  multiculturalism,  their  wrath  upon  and immigration policy. 127  The terms of the party’s opposition to federal policy within these three areas of concern, as expressed in the party’s official policy book, are outlined immediately below.  The analysis will then move  on to reveal the latent intolerance which appears to underpin the party’s aversion towards and  immigration  policy  federal bilingualism, initiatives,  and  thus  multiculturalism, bring  the  party’s  reactionary populist character to light.  As enunciated in the party’s most recent comprehensive policy statement,  The Blue Book,  1991,  the party’s opposition to federal  bilingualism, multiculturalism, and immigration policy is expressed for the most part with moderation and with little indication of underlying intolerance.  With reference to official bilingualism,  for example, as embodied in the Official Languages Acts of 1969 and 1988,  and  Freedoms,  sections  in the  party  “comprehensive enforced  of  to  registers  language  bilingualism  infringement  16  22  of  its  the  opposition  legislation, or  freedom of  Charter  whether  in  the  the “two founding peoples” view of Confederation  -  also  p.  of an  rejects  ostensibly one  of the key underpinnings of official languages legislation  1970),  that  nature  constitutes  Party policy  and  Rights  claiming  by  unilingualism,” 28 speech.’  of  -  “as an  5.  27 a different view of how Reform Party policy in these ‘ For areas can be invoked as a means of characterizing the party’s populism, see Patten, op. cit., pp. 23-5. 28 Blue Book, ‘ The  1991, p.  33. 39  inappropriate description of the regions outside Central Canada, unfair  as  [and]  Canadians.  129 p  At  to  the  the  same  vast time,  discourages personal bilingualism,  The  central  majority  statement  the  party  of  unilingual “in  no  way  11130  of  party  policy  regarding  multiculturalism reads as follows:  The Reform Party of Canada opposes the current concept of multiculturalism and hyphenated Canadianism pursued by the Government of Canada. We would end funding of the multiculturalism program and support the abolition of the ’ 3 Department of Multiculturalism.’ Depending  on  statement,  one’s  with  its  evidently blunt  policy  “hyphenated Canadianism,”  may be  interpretation, attack on  this  taken as an expression of intolerance of ethnic diversity, or,  if  you like, as an expression of racism.  “Assimilationist,” however,  is perhaps a better descriptive term.  As Peter McCormick posits,  assimilationism is “less aggressive than racism (in that if ‘they’ stay over ‘there’ there is no problem) and less vicious come  here,  Nonetheless,  should  ‘they’ the  apparent  be  willing  to  assimilationist  become thrust  like of  (if ‘they’ ‘us’) the  ,132  policy  would appear to be softened somewhat by the policy statement which precedes it in the policy book:  29 ‘ Ibjd 130  Ibid.  31 p. 35. ‘ Ibid., 32 P. ‘ McCormick,  352,  note 13.  40  The Reform Party supports the principle that individuals or groups are free to preserve their cultural heritage using their own resources. The Party shall uphold their right to do so.’ 33 Thus,  the party’s opposition to official multiculturalism emerges  in part as a means of expenditure reduction, which appears to sit well with the party’s overall fiscally conservative agenda. 134  federal  Unlike or  decades  immigration policy,  has  so  reflected  a  which,  “mixture  for the last two  of  compassion  Reform Party immigration policy appears  pragmatism,  and  to evince  a predominantly pragmatic orientation.  The Reform Party supports an immigration policy which Immigrants would be essentially economic in nature. should possess the human capital necessary to adjust quickly and independently to the needs of Canadian 136 society and the job market. Family  class  immigrants  to  immigration, Canada  which  during  “restricting  the  provided 37 1980s,’  sponsorship  by  immediate  families,  children,  38 and aged dependent parents.”  33 Blue Book, ‘ The 34 p. ‘ Dobbin,  is,  1991, p.  wives  would  privileges  curtailed  that  almost  or husbands,  half  of  all  presumably  be  members  of  to  minor dependent  Family members who do  35.  200.  35 Fleras and Jean Leonard Elliott, Multiculturalism in ‘ Augie Canada: the Challenge of Diversity (Scarborough, Ont.: Nelson Canada, 1992), p. 44. 36 Blue Book, ‘ The  1991, p.  34.  37 and Elliott, p. 44. ‘ Fleras 38 Blue Book, ‘ The  1991, p.  34. 41  not  fall  within  immigration as  these  categories  independents,  would  and thus be  have  to  subject  for  apply  to the  “human  capital” criterion. 139  As changes  skeletally  outlined to  federal  above,  policy  in  the the  Reform Party’s areas  of  proposed  bilingualism,  multiculturalism and immigration come across in a relatively benign and moderate manner.  In and of themselves,  they appear to betray  little in the way of intolerance or chauvinism.  However,  upon a  more detailed consideration of the implications of such changes and of what they appear to represent or symbolize within Reform Party circles,  a different view emerges.  An examination of some of the views and policies that have been espoused by various notable groups and individuals who have publicly supported, or possess ties to, the Reform Party begins, if only  tentatively,  to  provide  one  with  a  much  less  flattering  perspective on what it is that the party’s opposition to federal bilingualism,  multiculturalism,  and  immigration  policy  may  be  predicated upon.  One  of  the  more  prominent  and,  controversial  indeed,  individuals associated with the Reform Party, Bill Gairdner, claims that through its bilingualism, policies chapter  multiculturalism,  and immigration  the federal government has willingly perpetrated,  as a  Trouble  With  heading  in  Gairdner’s  polemical  39 ‘ Ibid. 42  work  The  “The  reads,  Canada  Silent  Destruction  of  English  ° 4 Canada.”  A  Reform Party member, Gairdner “was one of the key-note speakers at the Reform Party’s 1991 Assembly, and has been featured at many of the  party’s  in  rallies  ’ 4 Ontario.”  1991  The  Assembly  evidently  provided Gairdner with an audience that was enormously receptive to his views,  for as Dobbin testifies,  up to buy  [his book]  In  initiatives attempted  as  Gairdner  means  At  143 Canada.”  time,  same  the  plan  bilingualism  political  federal  “master  a  federal  interprets  which  by  implement  to  [delegates] lined  42 and to have it autographed.”  book  his  “hundreds of  for  he  the  elites  have  francization  argues  that  of  federal  multiculturalism has sown seeds of national disunity by emphasizing and promoting  cultural  differences  44 among Canadians.’  Instead,  Canada needs “to find a national cultural system that works; then to encourage everyone to assimilate to it, their  prior  The  differences.  government have been just development  very  until  English  thus gradually losing  culture  such a solution,  recently  and  as Canada’s peaceful  45 attests.”  As  government in 1967 to introduce the “points system” Trouble The 40 ‘ Gairdner, Paperbacks, 1991), p. 389.  2 Ibid., 4 ‘  4 Ibid., 4 ‘  With  133-4.  p.134.  3 p. Gairdner, 4 ‘ pp.  5 p. Ibid., 4 ‘  of  for  federal  Gairdner laments the decision by the Pearson  immigration policy,  ’Dobbin, pp. 4 ‘  system  397.  393-4. 395. 43  Canada  of immigrant  (Toronto:  General  admission, criteria  from  were  which  the  46 purged.’  previous Citing  system’s  figures  ethnic  which  racial  and  indicate  that  a  large majority of Canadians believe that immigration policy should to preserve  serve he  calls  for  Canada’s  the  current  replacement  of  ethnocultural Canada’s  47 composition,’  present  “universal”  immigration system by a variant of the old “control”  system that  was shelved in 1967.  After all, surely any nation has the right to defend itself against demographic capture, or, if you prefer, against passive racial or cultural take-over. One way I can think of to stop it is to use quotas: any year’s crop of immigrants must reflect the current racial, cultural, and religious composition of the nation. We currently have 1 percent Chinese? Then only 1 percent of the immigrants can be Chinese. Now, I don’t like quotas for anything, but in the face of outsiders determining the our nation by numerically overwhelming a fate of “neutral” selection system, I’d use them. I might even argue that we should use them to redress the present trend. Otherwise, we may become subordinated to people and cultures unlike our own through reliance on a system 148 designed to eliminate cultural bias! By  the  “present  increase  in  trend”  Gairdner  immigration  refers  all  outside  sources  Australia, New Zealand,  Also  numbered  of  p. 405.  48 ‘ Ibid.,  p. 413.  rapid  post-1968  sources  Non-traditional  Europe,  the  United  as  a  sources States,  49 and South Africa.’  among  the  46 pp. 404-416. ‘ Ibid., 47 ‘ Ibid.,  the  “non-traditional”  from  percentage of total annual immigration. include  to  49 p. 410. ‘ Ibid., 44  more  extremist  Reform  Party  Dobbin  as  “connections,”  refers  to  are  them,  the  Northern  Foundation, the Alliance for the Preservation of English in Canada (APEC),  and the Heritage Front.’ ° 5  officially  Although offers  free  non-partisan,  advertising  space  the  its  in  Northern  quarterly  Foundation  publication  “conservative” organizations such as the Reform Party taken advantage  has,  in  fact,  the  publisher  of is  newsmagazines,  a  the  of  such  staunchly  director  of  the  space)  .‘‘  pro-Reform 52 Foundation.’  (the party  Link Byfield, Party  Report  John Carpay  represents another link between the party and the Foundation. current Reform Party M.P. for Burnaby-Kingsway, editor  of  the  Foundation’s  quarterly  to  The  Carpay is a former  53 publication.’  The  Foundation  claims that “common-sense Canadians” are found in three groups: “economic conservatives, moral conservatives, and social conservatives” who appreciate “Canada’s British and Christian heritage and oppose forced bilingualism, and policies immigration governmentdestabilizing promoted official multiculturalism. ,154 Like  the  officially  Northern  linked  0 pp. Dobbin, 5 ‘  Foundation,  to  the  Reform  Ontario-based 55 Party.’  APEC  is  not  Nonetheless,  121-33.  122.  1bid., 151  p.  2 Ibid., 5 ‘  p.121.  53 Hawthorn, “Reformer Dismisses Link,” Vancouver Province, ‘ Tom October 24, 1993. 4 p. Dobbin, 5 ‘  122.  5 p.132. Ibid., 5 ‘ 45  significant informal ties exist. Party  Reform  headquarters, to  allow  hierarchy’s  disavowal  of  APEC,  “Reform  Party  and more specifically Preston Manning, were willing  Apec  organization  According to Dobbin, despite the  people  at  its  to  occupy  most  key  posts  sensitive,  early  in  Ontario  its  56 stages.”  APEC  members have also made their presence felt within Party circles on Vancouver Island.  Members of the organization have been elected to  sit on several Vancouver Island constituency executives.  One such  Bill Rumley, who was elected to serve as president of the  member,  party’s Esquimalt- Juan de Fuca riding association in 1991, goes so far as to claim that “most Reform Party of Canada members in B.C. 157 also belong to APEC.”  one might  As  Reform Party, language  surmise  opposes  policy  based  in light  official on  its name,  bilingualism.  freedom  comprehensive language policy;  of  of  speech  APEC,  “Both and  like  call  the  for a  reject  any  both call for an end to bilingual  158 criteria in the federal civil service.”  Each organization also  takes the position that the right to communicate in French within Canada’s further 1867.159  governing than the Their  institutions  terms  of  should  section  respective  policy  133  of  essentially the  stances  extend  no  Constitution Act, appear  to  differ  Ibid. Three Infighting Forces in B.C.: “Trouble 57 ‘ Whyte, Constituency Presidents From Office,” Act of Faith, p. 132. Dobbin, 158  p.  132.  1bid. Section 133 reads: “Either the English or the French 159 Language may be used by any Person in the Debates of the Houses of the Parliament of Canada and of the Houses of the Legislature of 46  primarily in terms of the way in which each approaches the on-going Canada- Quebec constitutional crisis.  The Reform Party’s position  on this issue will be dealt with later on in the analysis. moment,  it  is perhaps  sufficient  to  say that  For the  the party takes  a  somewhat less inflammatory and blatantly confrontational stand vis a vis Quebec than APEC does. that Quebec within  should not be granted special APEC,  ° 6 ConEederation.’  Quebec leave Confederation, by a federal  Like the Reform Party, APEC asserts  however,  status  declares  should  that  as it undoubtedly would if confronted  linguistic and constitutional  with APEC’s policies,  constitutional  regime  in accordance  the province  would be very much reduced from its current territory. APEC’s separate Quebec would be deprived of the huge northern area that was once part of Rupert’s Land; would be obliged to provide a “corridor of sovereignty” between Ontario and the Atlantic provinces; and would be obliged to allow “regional referenda” on separation in eastern and western Quebec and other smaller areas. Apec quotes Section 42(1) of the Constitution Act (1982) to back its ’ 16 claim that Canada has the right to partition Quebec. Indeed,  APEC’s chairman,  James Morrison,  goes so far as to claim  that Quebec “should not be allowed to separate.  .  .The use of force  62 in defence of the Constitution is legitimate self-defence.” Quebec; and both those Languages shall be used in the respective Records and Journals of those Houses; and either of those Languages may be used by any Person or in any Pleading or Process in or issuing from any Court of Canada established under this Act, and in or from all or any of the Courts of Quebec. The Acts of the Parliament of Canada and of the Legislature of Quebec shall be printed and published in both those Languages.” 0 p. Dobbin, 6 ‘ 61 p. ‘ Ibid.  131.  132.  62 ‘ Ibid. 47  The Heritage Front is perhaps the most extreme organization to publicly  endorse  the  Reform Party,  which,  in  has “given us some hope.” 63  Front’s leader,  the  words  of  the  The organization has  as its goal an “all-white Canada,” claiming that white people are “the most Front’s  precious  leader,  force  Wolfgang  on  this planet.” 64  Droege,  eventually white people will  follows:  as  a minority  become  because of our immigration policies.  Dobbin quotes  .  “We in  believe this  the that  country  .We are racial nationalists  65 working for the interests of whites everywhere.”’  some of the extremist policies and programs that  A look at  forth by various  have been put  groups  and  individuals who have  publicly supported or have been associated with the Reform Party thus creates the impression that the party’s opposition to federal bilingualism,  multiculturalism and immigration policy represents,  to some degree,  an appeal to reactionary sentiment.  the Reform Party hierarchy has gone to some lengths distancing the party from certain of the above,  with  reasonable  certainty  in publicly  as well as other,  Perhaps the most that one can  extremist groups and individuals. say  To be fair,  is  that  extremists  have  been  attracted to the party due to its opposition to aspects of federal bilingualism, multiculturalism and immigration policy.  To go any  further than this requires a more in-depth look at Reform Party policy  in these  3 1bid., 6 ‘  p.  areas.  The party’s  131.  64 ‘ Ibid. 65 ‘ Ibjd 48  immigration policy will be  reconsidered first.  During the election campaign the party’s immigration policy generated considerable controversy, been  have  deliberately  caused  by  some of which would appear to Manning  himself.  Amidst  discussion of immigration issues during the English-language party leaders’  for  debate,  example,  Manning made  a  special  effort  to  distinguish his party’s policy from the respective policies of the other parties as far as how many immigrants Canada should admit on 66 an annual basis.’ other  With some coaxing from Manning,  expressed  leaders  their parties’  support  for  each of the current  the  annual immigration figure, which stands at approximately 250,000. Manning,  in  turn,  accommodate 250,000  stated  the  that  Canadian  immigrants per year,  total to be reduced to 150,000.  economy  could  calling for the annual  Following Manning’s performance,  the party’s immigration policy, which, it will be recalled, its  Canada’s  focus  economic  not  needs,”  became  the  target  “has as  of  harsh  criticism for its “unspoken insinuation that most immigrants are a drain  on  67 economy.”’  the  The  criticism  intensified  with  the  publication, within about a week and a half of the leaders’ debate, of  extreme  immigration policy  Reform Party candidates. John  Beck,  stated  “overpowering,”  ian,  on  and were  statements  that  were made by two  The party’s candidate in York Center, CBC  television  that  immigrants  “taking jobs away from us,  were  the Gentile  66 Hume, “Reform Breaks Ranks on Immigration,” Vancouver ‘ Mark October 9, 1993. 67 ‘ Ibid 49  Meanwhile,  68 people.” Herb  Grubel,  debate  was  the party’s  reputed  “over the past  that  have  to  Capilano-Howe posited  15 years  at  an  Sound nominee, all-candidates  immigrants have been a net  169 drain to the Canadian economy.”  According  to  of  University  a professor of  John Conway,  Regina  and  well-known  a  sociology at  observer  of  the  populist  the Reform Party’s immigration policy “is intended to  movements,  appeal to those who are concerned about the increase in Third World immigration.  Of  course,  [Reformers]  can’t  say  that,  but  they  clearly imply that when they talk about the first criterion being an  economic  ° 17 one.”  Indeed,  it  is  quite  conceivable  that  if  it  were to be implemented, the party’s immigration policy would serve to reduce immigration from the developing world as a proportion of total immigration.  under a Reform Party government,  Once again,  immigrants would be selected on the basis of whether they “possess the human capital necessary to adjust quickly and independently to ’ 7 the needs of Canadian society and the job market.”  It takes no  great leap of the imagination to come up with the notion that the individuals necessary  to  who  will  adjust  most  likely  quickly  and  “possess  the  independently”  human will  capital  hail  from  societies and cultures which most closely resemble Canadian society 68 Ward, “Old-line Parties Put Spin on Losses to Reform by ‘ Doug Portraying Upstart Party as Far Right-Wing,” Vancouver Sun, October 14, 1993. 69 Cernitig, ‘ Miro October 14, 1993.  “Reform Party’s Many Faces,” Globe and Mail,  “°Cited in Sharpe and Braid, 71 Blue Book, ‘ The  1991, p.  34. 50  p.  127.  culture.  and  there  While  are,  of  many dissimilarities  course,  between Canadian society and culture and those of sources  traditional  of  immigration,  which  the  include  so-called  Europe,  the  United States, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, these would indeed,  seem very few,  which  differences  lie  when compared to the societal and cultural between  Canada  nations of the developing world. to  infer that of  chance  it  To be sure,  immigration.  immigrant  under  many  latter would to  takes  than individuals  independently”  class  what  acquiring  the  and  diverse  Thus, basic reasoning allows one  from the  individuals  and  from the  stand a  “adjust  lesser  quickly  traditional  sources  and of  in order to qualify as an independentfederal  current  immigration  guidelines,  candidates must meet certain “human capital” criteria in terms of skills,  “job-related  age,  language  skills,  and  72 education.”  However, unlike Reform Party policy, federal policy places greater emphasis  on  family  Such  reunification.  an  emphasis  encourage immigration among qualified candidates  serves  to  from developing  countries and other non-traditional sources, such as Hong Kong and Taiwan,  since such candidates are given the opportunity to remain  with their families  -  no small incentive in light of the importance  of kinship and collective responsibility among family members to many cultures, especially South and East Asian cultures, which lie outside the orbit of traditional immigration sources. with  its  Reform  much  Party  professor  Don  stricter  policy, De  limitations  accedes  Voretz,  Simon  “would  2 and Elliott, p. 43. Fleras 7 ‘ 51  on  sponsorship  Fraser  In contrast, privileges,  University  effectively  shut  economics  off  family  reunification quite  possibly  traditional  an  as  avenue  points  immigration  to  an  73 immigration.” additional  should  guidelines be implemented. typically brash fashion,  for  the  Bill  Gairdner  inhibition tighter  party’s  For “we do know,”  to  non  sponsorship  states Gairdner in  “that non-traditional immigrants tend to  have larger families than those from traditional sources.” 74  Aside  from  whether  Reformers  in  general  terms  view  their  party’s immigration policies as means of curtailing non-traditional immigration, it is abundantly clear that many within the party view with adversity a  federal  immigration policy  increase Canada’s ethnocultural diversity.  that  has  helped to  Until it was reworded  for the current edition of the Blue Book,party policy insisted that “immigration policy should not be ‘explicitly designed to radically or suddenly alter the ethnic makeup of Canada, seems  to be’” 75  means  of  In its  efforts  to re-work this  presenting a more moderate  current Blue Book,  as it increasingly statement  immigration policy  as  a  for the  the Party Policy Committee apparently received  little help from rank and file party members.  Prior to the 1991  Assembly, the PPC was forced to sort through a veritable “flood of 76 extremist resolutions on immigration.”  According to Dobbin,  Eighteen constituency resolutions were included in the Exposure Draft. All were extreme in one respect or 73 ‘ Hume 4 p. 414. Gairdner, 7 ‘ 5 p. 43. Pearson, 7 ‘ 6 p. Dobbin, 7 ‘  161. 52  another. .One that would prove very controversial would have “encourage(d) immigrants to settle in less populated areas. .“ The policy committee “sympathized with the objective...” but rejected it as being “unenforceable.” Another would have denied immigrants protection under the Charter of Rights. 177 .  Yet  another  exclaimed,  “RESOLVED  that  we  ethnic/cultural balance as of September 1990  Turning  to  the  party’s  should  maintain  178  multiculturalism  it  policy,  was  mentioned earlier that the party’s proposal to abolish the federal Department of Multiculturalism comes across as a means of trimming federal expenditures  -  a justifiable rationale, perhaps,  of the current fiscal crisis,  in light  and an understandable one given the  party’s staunchly conservative fiscal policy orientation. same time,  At the  there is some question as to whether the money to be  saved from such a move would be enough to outweigh the potentially negative symbolic message that would be sent to “ethnic Canadians” should the Department be unceremoniously done away with.  In 1991  the year in which the party’s current policy book was published  -  -  the federal Department was given a budget of $26.8 million, only 22 percent, including  or $5.9 million, the  79 programs.”  visual  of which was “funnelled into ‘culture,’  and performing arts  and heritage  language  The rest of the Department’s funding was “allocated  to immigration settlement and community participation 7 p. Ibid., 7 ‘  160.  1bid., p. 178  201.  (including  79 “From ‘Culture’ to ‘Equality’: Multiculturalism as ‘ Fleras, Ideology and Policy,” Social Inequality in Canada, eds. James Curtis et al (Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall Canada, Inc., 1993), p. 395. 53  programs for official-language instruction to counselling centres for new Canadians) and  understanding  far  as is  abolition  as  and  its  rograms to improve intercultural discriminatory  race  fiscal  concerned,  relations rationale  party policy,  as  barriers  separate policy document,  for  the  expressed  reduction  strategy  in  which outlines  greater  detail,  it  (through  training)  .  To  “°  Department’s in  cites the need to end funding of “culture” only.  Book, a  eliminate  promotion,  education, repeat,  [and to p1  ...  the  Blue  Indeed,  in  the party’s deficitis  stated  that  the  programs to which the larger portion of the Department’s budget is “would  allotted  be  preserved  Thus,  ’ 8 departments.”  and  moved  to  appropriate  according to the Reform Party’s plan,  savings to be derived from the Department’s abolition million  -  federal  -  the  about $5.9  is relatively minimal.  If the party’s fiscal rationale for the Department’s abolition appears,  at best,  shaky, then one is left with the impression that  the party’s purposes in proposing to do away with the Department reduce  to  the  multiculturalism  desire and  to  bury  hyphenated  “the  current  Canadianism  concept  pursued  by  of the  Government of Canada,” and the “valorization of difference” which, according to Patten,  Reformers see at the heart of the concept.’ 82  80 ‘ Ibid. 1993)  ’Reform Party of Canada, 18 Patten, 182  Zero in Three  pp. 24-5. 54  (Reform Fund Canada,  As Patten explains,  the  “belief that there exists a unitary  national culture or a single way of living which can be identified 183 as mainstream Canadian life is important to Reformers.”  Prior  to the current policy book’s publication, party policy “called on the  to  government  ‘promote,  culture  and.. encourage  national  84 culture.’”  preserve  cultures  ethnic  .  and  one  While  enhance  to  the  integrate argue  might  national into  the this  that  assimilationist orientation reflects just the sort of melting-pot which  mentality  is  definitely  part  not  of  culture, but a part, rather, of the American,  Canada’s  from which Canadians  have striven for decades to distinguish themselves, the  endured  after a prolonged period  that  case  constitutional  among aboriginal peoples, Canadians common 85 us.”  must,  ground  in  which  threats  crises,  order  in which Canadians of  secession,  to  remain  Canadians,  characterizes  command  have  uprisings  upon  which  “the  unites  it is also the case that glorification of  repression of differences. to  focus  that  “the national culture” may be taken to extremes,  efforts  it is perhaps  inter-provincial animosities, and so on,  supposedly  Alternatively,  national  Indeed,  attention  to  resulting in the  it would appear that in their their  conception  of  Canada’s  national culture, Reformers have taken to the extreme, as embodied in party policy regarding the “distinctive heritage and tradition of the RCMP..  3 Ibid., 8 ‘  p.24.  84 ‘ Ibid. 5 p. Ibid., 8 ‘  25.  86 Blue Book, ‘ The  1991, p.  31. 55  When the federal Solicitor General’s Ministry revealed to the Canadian public in March,  1988 that it intended to alter the dress  code of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in order “to accommodate minorities such as male orthodox Sikhs, turbans  and  controversy  refrain  from  87 ensued.’  cutting  By  the  who are required to wear  their  time  of  hair,” the  an  explosion  federal  of  government’s  eventual promulgation of the alterations in March, 1990, “the image of the Mounties had become a touchstone for racial and religious intolerance  in  88 Canada.”  Canadians  Many  registered  their  opposition to the dress code changes via petition to Parliament. Parliamentarians  were  asked  by  petitioners  distinctive heritage and tradition of uniformity  of  the  dress  opposition  in  much  less  Stasiulis,  associate  code.  professor  terms. in  “preserve  the  the RCMP by retaining the Others  fl189  moderate  to  registered  According Carleton  to  their Daiva  University’s  anthropology/sociology department,  more disturbing [than the petition-writing campaign] was successful and calenders sale which the of pins denigrated Sikhs, Chinese and Blacks. One pin which was reported to sell 30,000 copies around the country portrayed a white man, holding a Canadian flag and dwarfed by a Sikh in a turban, a Chinese man and a Black carrying a spear, bearing the words, “Who’s the minority in Canada?” ° 9  87 Stasiulis, “Symbolic Representation and the Numbers ‘ Daiva Game: Tory Policies on ‘Race’ and Visible Minorities,” How Ottawa Spends, Frances Abele, ed. (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1991), p. 250. 88 ‘ Ibid. 89 ‘ Ibid. 90 ‘ Ibid. 56  At its October,  1989 Assembly,  held in Edmonton,  the Reform  Party effectively instituted itself as the political point guard of the essentially Alberta-based opposition to the proposed dress code At the Assembly,  changes. resolution  that  Sikhs  be  delegates barred  “overwhelmingly supported a  from  wearing  in  turbans  the  Despite the fact that the dress code changes have now  91 RCMP.”  been in place for four years, party policy has maintained a vigil in opposition to them.  Current policy reads as follows:  The Reform Party supports the preservation of the distinctive heritage and tradition of the RCMP by retaining the uniformity of dress code. Changes should 192 not be made for religious or ethnic reasons. While the  behind  one  factor.  determine precisely  cannot  party’s  the  changes, gives  one  staunch  opposition  to  seemingly arbitrary nature impression that  the  It is obvious,  the  motives  the RCMP’s  of  lay code  dress  the party’s position  intolerance may be  first of all,  that  an underlying  that to refuse to permit any  exceptions to the terms of the dress code for religious  reasons  “would effectively, if inadvertently, preclude entry of Sikhs into 93 the national police force.” debate  on  the  dress  code  Having had seven years  changes,  and  thus  having  of public had  ample  opportunity to discern the potentially exclusionary nature of its policy,  the party cannot but expect to be labelled intolerant in  retaining  it  91 ‘ Ibid.,  in  its  policy  book.  see note 86.  92 Blue Book, ‘ The  1991, p.  93 and Elliott, p. ‘ Fleras  31. 143. 57  One  is  also  struck  by  the  seemingly anomalous character of the policy in relation to one of the salient themes that runs through party policy in its entirety. The Reform Party,  its exponents claim,  is about change.  Some of  the more notable changes that the party states that it wishes to make concern the fundamental character of one of the country’s most recognizable  venerable  and  national  symbols  -  Parliament.  In  proposing the creation of an “equal, elected and effective” Senate and  of  the use  party  has  party will dress  upon  not  package  Canada’s  accede  refuse  Reformers  a  to  of  and recall reforms  is  countenance  the  encroaches  tradition.  parliamentary  it  measures,  that  to some very minor changes  Furthermore,  code.  uniform,  forth  set  fundamentally  initiatives  referenda,  Yet,  the  to  the RCMP’s  interesting to note  that while  any  the  tampering  “since it was first formed in 1873,  its official uniform several times,  with  RCMP’s  the RCMP has altered  including a major change from  194 a brimless pill box to a broad-brimmed scout charge.”  In the final  analysis,  the policy trade-oft that the party  faces with reference to its RCMP dress code policy is similar to the  one  that  Department  of  it  faces  regarding  Multiculturalism.  its Just  proposal as  to  Reformers  abolish must  the  assess  whether the money to be saved from abolishing the Department is worth the potentially negative symbolic message that such a move would send to ethnic minorities, Reformers must assess whether “the preservation of the distinctive heritage and tradition of the RCMP by retaining the uniformity of dress code” is of greater value than Bob 9 ‘ 4 Bragg, Calgary Stasiulis, p. 251.  Herald, 58  February  25,  1990.  Cited  in  a truly representative national police force, or, alternatively, is worth the alienation of certain ethno-religious groups, such as the In the end,  Sikh community.  for stated or apparent reasons that  the above analysis portrays as somewhat irrational, in  each  policy  chosen  instance  options  which  the party has  provide  further  evidence to those who suspect that the party represents an appeal the  to  reactionary  more  and  intolerant  elements  Canadian  in  society.  The ostensible rationale of party policy regarding official bilingualism would also appear to be of questionable soundness. will  be  that  recalled  policy  rejects  It  language  “comprehensive  legislation” and calls for “a language policy based on freedom of speech, an  implying that official bilingualism somehow represents  “  attempt  Canadians  by  the  state  to  free  infringe  speech  by  forcing  to speak languages that may not be customary to them.  Indeed, as Therese Arseneau aptly points out, official bilingualism is  commonly  96 bilingualism.” bilingualism  party  circles  as  It is clearly the case,  however,  that official  referred  does  not  to  within  represent  an  attempt  by  the  “enforced  federal  government to force Canadians to speak in uncustomary tongues,  to  “force French down people’s throats” as English Canadians angry at the Trudeau government’s passage of the 1969 Official Languages Act  95 Blue Book, ‘ The  1991, pp.  32-3.  96 Arseneau, “The Reform Party of Canada: The Secret of ‘ Therese its ‘Success.’” A paper prepared for presentation to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Kingston, June 1991, p. 25. 59  were  fond  of  197 saying.  As  Trudeau  was  forced  to  explain  ad  nauseum in response to the coercive character that many Canadians erroneously  discerned  from  his  government’s  bilingualism  “[b] ilingualism is not an imposition on the citizens.  initiatives,  The citizens can go on speaking one language or six languages or no language if they so choose. and  state  not  bilingualism,  on  the  Bilingualism is an imposition on the 198 citizens.”  The  whole  point  of  in other words, is not to make the citizenry conform  to the state’s linguistic designs for the country, but to make the state conform to the linguistic needs of the citizenry. want,” stated Trudeau,  “What we  “is that the institutions be bilingual.  We  want the government of all Canadians, the central government, to be 99 able to communicate with the population.”  As George Radwanski  ably explains,  The only instance where the Official Languages Act imposes anything on individuals is in the case of a limited number of public servants, and here, too, no right is infringed in principle. There is no basic right to work for the government or any other employer without having the proper qualifications, and in a country with two principal language groups it is reasonable to require knowledge of both languages for certain government jobs 200 Official bilingualism, of course, represents much more than an attempt  by  the  federal  George Radwanski, 197 1978), p. 287.  government  Trudeau  98 ‘ Ibid. 99 pp. ‘ Ibid., 1bid., 200  p.  287-8. 288. 60  to  render  (Scarborough,  itself  Ont.:  more  Macmillan,  linguistically accessible to the Canadian populace as a whole.  Of  critical importance to an understanding of official bilingualism is a recognition of its symbolic aspect,  or,  more specifically,  its  function as a means of nation-preservation, if not nation-building. official bilingualism was the central component of  Under Trudeau, the  federal  strength  government’s  of  Quebecois  separatist option.  strategy  in  nationalism  combatting  and  the  the  emergence  growing of  the  By means of official language legislation and  the constitutional protection of francophone rights, each of which were to apply to the country as a whole, Quebecers, so the federal government’s reasoning went, own,  and  not  simply  the  would come to view Canada as their  domain  of  English  Canadians.  In  the  process, the province of Quebec would be seen less and less as the protector of francophone rights, and the attraction of sovereignty would fade away. ’ 20  To be sure,  with the passing of the Trudeau  era and the advent of the Mulroney administration, the emphasis of the federal government’s strategy in dealing with the separatist Through its constitutional amendment initiatives,  threat changed. as  in  embodied  respectively, predecessor  the  the in  new  Meech  Lake  government  attempting  to  and broke  assuage  Charlottetown decisively  Quebecois  Accords, with  nationalists  its by  acceding to the Quebec government’s demands for more provincial autonomy and for the recognition of Quebec as a “distinct society” within Canada.  Nonetheless, the Mulroney government maintained an  unwavering commitment to official bilingualism,  as shown by the  passage of a new Official Languages Act in 1988, which served to  1bid., p. 201  286. 61  strengthen the terms of the original Act. 202  The purpose of the foregoing discussion is simply to emphasize that over the past twenty-five years successive federal governments have attempted to a greater or lesser degree to employ official bilingualism as  a means  of  stemming the  separatist movement  in  The discussion also serves to properly contextualize the  Quebec.  opposition to official  Reform Party’s  bilingualism,  which,  when  viewed as part of the party’s general policy orientation towards emerges  Quebec, envision,  as  a  component  and perhaps encourage,  of  program  a  that  appears  to  a fully separate Quebec.  According to Sharpe and Braid,  Preston Manning likes to tell Quebec itself, then come to the bargaining wants to live in his “New Canada.” saying “No!” to the Reform Party’s 203 more than a century.  to go off and define table and see if it But Quebec has been kind of Canada for  In addition to opposing official bilingualism, the party denies the right of the government of Quebec to enforce language legislation of  the  kind  opposition to unilingualism”  embodied  in  Bills  101  and  178,  as  “comprehensive language legislation”  the  and “enforced  As mentioned earlier,  clearly implies.  party’s  the party  also stands rigidly opposed to any form of “special status” for the province of Quebec.  As party policy proudly exclaims, “We remained  Jean-Claude Ducharme, Official Languages Act (1988) 202 Library of Parliament, Research Branch, 1988). Sharpe and Braid, 203  p.  151. 62  (Ottawa:  to  the  end  the  only  federal  party  opposed”  to  the  Meech  Lake  Sharpe and Braid point out that an internal party poll  204 Accord.  that was released to the press in late 1989  -  just as the Accord  ratification process was entering a decisive phase  -  “showed that  94 percent of Reform members wanted to scrap the Meech Lake deal entirely even if this caused Quebec’s separation from Canada.” 205  Party policy goes on to explain that should Quebec persist in aspiring to be a province pas rest  of  Canada  should  political  arrangement”  purposes,  such an  comme les autres,  consider between  whether  the  “arrangement”  there  206 two.  entails  “Quebec and the exists  For all  a complete  a  better  intents  and  severance of  constitutional ties between Quebec and the rest of Canada.  Manning  has made it abundantly clear that his party will not countenance the kind of sovereignty-association that was sought by the Parti Quebecois during the 1970s and early 1980s.  During the election  campaign Manning reiterated  the only party that  will tell Quebecers that  “that Reform is  ‘their choice is either separation or a  new Canada, not the soft mushy ground of sovereignty-association in between. also  There  emphasized  government objective  is  no  that  support within  negotiating Quebec -  his  “New  outside Quebec.’” 207 Canada,”  independence  “any  He  federal  ‘would have only one  to maximize the benefits and minimize the costs to the  The Blue Book, 204  1991, p.  Sharpe and Braid, p. 205 The Blue Book, 206 11,  for that  7.  152.  1991, p.  8.  Anthony Wilson-Smith, “Reform on a Roll,” Maclean’s, October 207 1993. 63  208 rest of Canada.’”  Sharpe and Braid deftly summarize the relationship between the “Quebec problem” and the party’s policy and, indeed, popularity, as follows:  Manning is using against Quebec the same sort of hardball tactics Quebec has employed for years against the rest of to the disgust of so many people. This is Canada, emotionally pleasing to those who feel the urge to blow off the steam that has been building ever since the Official Languages Act was passed in 1969. The tactic is responsible for much of the party’s popularity. Manning continues to insist that his party is the only one that does not take as its starting point a reaction to Quebec. Yet it is clear that the Reform Party, from its creation in 1987 to its startling popularity today, is in large measure a hostile reaction to Quebec: to Quebec’s impact its influence in Ottawa, its on the constitution, contribution to the debt, and its language policies. The Reform Party was the only federal party that opposed Meech Lake from beginning to end. Manning owes his current employment to the very province the Reform Party claims not to consider as its starting point. Without Quebec, the Reform Party would not exist in its present form, just as the Bloc Quebecois and Parti Quebecois 209 would not exist without English Canada. By its “present form” the authors refer to the fact that the party formally  exists  in  provinces  all  but  Quebec.  The  party’s  conspicuous organizational absence in Quebec is apparently due to Manning’s  conviction  constitutional impasse, represent  the  that  given  on-going  Canada-Quebec  federal political parties cannot properly  interests  of  Canada  States Manning,  Sharpe and Braid, 209  the  p.  154. 64  and  Quebec  simultaneously.  Either you represent the rest of Canada in this or you represent Quebec. But you can’t represent both. .As long as you’re playing for votes on both sides you can’t be rest trusted by the of Canada to articulate its 210 interests .  Thus,  the  in  an unwillingness  manifests  and aspirations  desires  Canada:  within  latter  analysis,  final  the  party  One  Party  Reform  not  only  try to accommodate the expressed  to  of Quebecois  Quebecois.  represent  the  might  as  a means  refuses  to  therefore  of  keeping the  attempt be  to  justified  even in  interpreting the Reform Party as one that has its sights fixed on becoming “the party of English Canada,” the party that will either more likely,  “put Quebec in its place” or, from Canada altogether.  perhaps,  purge Quebec  Indeed, Dobbin argues that “from the time  of the failure of the Meech Lake Accord, Preston Manning’s strategy f or his new party has been to position himself as the spokesperson for English Canada on the question of Quebec and the Constitution. He has gradually established his negotiating stance: he is the man who will  ‘stand up to Quebec.’” 2  ***  Precisely how, Party  regarding  policy  bilingualism categorize populism?  then,  (and  the  Reform  p.  Party  as  Quebec) a  p.  217.  255. 65  of Reform  multiculturalism, allow  manifestation  reactionary populism,  Cited in Dobbin, 210 1bid., 211  foregoing analysis  immigration,  extension,  by  To repeat,  the  does  one of  to  and  properly  reactionary  as Canovan defines it,  consists of  an appeal to the people which deliberately opens up the embarrassing gap between “the people” and their democratic supposedly and representative elite by stressing popular values that conflict with those of the typically, it elite: involves clash a between reactionary, authoritarian, racist, or chauvinist views and the progressive, at the grass roots, liberal, tolerant cosmopolitanism characteristic of the elite. 212  Within  context  the  “elite”  been  has  elites, who,  of  the preceding  played  by  Canada’s  since the late 1960s,  analysis, elected  the  role  federal  of  governing  roughly, have pursued policies  which reflect a willingness to not only recognize diversity this instance,  the  ethnocultural and linguistic diversity  -  -  in  but also  encourage diversity and empower diverse groupings of citizens with “preserve and promote”  means to  their distinctiveness.  In this  sense,  successive federal governments have evinced what Canovan  refers  to  as  “progressive,  liberal,  tolerant  cosmopolitanism,”  which can alternatively be viewed as a form of pluralism.  the Reform Party, which claims to represent the grass  other hand, roots,  On the  or “the people,” has appealed to Canadians to oppose the  pluralist policies that have been pursued by the federal elites. At  the  same  suggested, expression  time,  as  the  above  analysis  of  party  policy  this opposition can be viewed, at least in part, of  intolerance  or  chauvinism,  or  an  has  as an  expression  of  unwillingness to accommodate deviation from some perceived national cultural norm.  Canovan, p. 229. 212 66  Summary and Conclusion  The preceding analysis has attempted to specify and conceptualize the nature of the Reform Party’s “populism” by means of Margaret Canovan’s typology,  typology  of  populisms.  Upon  describing  Canovan’s  the analysis turned to the matter of placing the Reform  Party within Canovan’s schema.  To this end,  the analysis began  with a more or less peremptory rejection of the applicability of farmers’  radicalism,  intellectual agrarian socialism, peasants’ populism,  and populist  four  Canovan’s  of  dictatorship.  Of  enquiry,  extended  appropriate  populism  the  party’s populism.  remaining  populist  conceptual  sub-species:  three,  democracy  means  of  after  was  a  also  specifying  somewhat  dismissed  the  nature  more as  of  an the  It was found that despite the party’s strong  support for various direct democracy measures,  the party hierarchy  has apparently conducted party affairs in a manner which seems to do harm to the basic essence of populist democracy, which entrusts “the people” with ultimate power in formulating policy without the tutelage of political elites, and gives “the people” the power to their elected  control  Ultimately,  representatives,  rather  than vice  versa.  it was argued that the party’s populism can best be  specified by way of reference to Canovan’s notion of reactionary populism,  as well as politicians’ populism.  was posited that Manning’s nature,  “populism”  On the one hand,  it  is in a sense tactical in  and that an examination of his populist rhetoric reveals  remarkable similarity to the kind of tactical,  “anti-political” employed  so  successfully during the 1976 Presidential election campaign.  On  populist  rhetorical  appeals  that  67  Jimmy  Carter  the other hand, as the bulk of the analysis attempted to show,  an  in-depth consideration of party policy regarding multiculturalism and  immigration,  and bilingualism and  Quebec provides  evidence  which suggests that recourse to Canovan’s conception of reactionary populism provides  a more  substantial means  of pinning down the  Reform Party’s populist character.  The fact that the Reform Party may be placed in two different categories within Canovan’s schema may be cited as evidence of a critical flaw in Canovan’s typology of populisms. typology is  of use  only in so  far as  Indeed,  the phenomena that  if a it  is  intended to organize can be located individually in no more than one conceptual box within a horizontal set of categories, Canovan’s typology is perhaps of marginal utility.  As pointed out  in the  section of the analysis which describes her typology in detail, additional examples of political phenomena that may be found in more than one of Canovan’s populism categories include the U.S. People’s Party and the Canadian Progressives.  Canovan, however, freely admits that her typology is far from “watertight,” and diligantly apprises the reader of instances where certain phenomena may be placed in more than one category.  “Since  the types suggested are analytical constructs,” she accedes, “real 21 life examples may well overlap several categories.”  Notwithstanding its affront to typological purity,  Canovan, p. 213  13. 68  Canovan’s  schema provides a helpful means of sorting through and organizing the truly “bewildering variety of phenomena” termed  In  214 populist.  general,  the  that  seven  scholars have  categories  yield  remarkably distinct groupings of political phenomena, and equip the interested analyst with reasonably viable means of making useful comparisons  among  the  various  actors  and  entities  that  have  heretofore shared the populist label, and of providing some sense of what the label means when it is applied to new phenomena, as the Reform Party of Canada.  1bid., p. 3. 214 69  such  List of Sources  Allen,  Glen.  Arseneau,  “Converts in High Places.” Maclean’s 4 November 1991: 21.  Therese. “The Reform Party of Canada: The Secret of its ‘Success.’” A paper prepared for presentation to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Kingston, June 1991.  Bergman,  Brian.  “Gaining Ground.” Maclean’s 24 June 1991:  Bergman,  Brian.  “Judgement Day.” Maclean’s 16 December 1991:  Bergman, Brian. Brian.  Bergman,  John.  12.  “Manning’s Dilemma.” Maclean’s 4 October 1993: 28. “The Crusader.” Maclean’s 25 October 1993:  Canovan, Margaret. 1981. Conway,  14.  14.  Populism. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,  “Populism in the United States, Russia, and Canada: Explaining the Roots of Canada’s Third Parties.” Canadian Journal of Political Science XI: 1 (March 1978) : 99-124.  Dobbin, Murray. Preston Manning and the Reform Party. Halifax: Formac Publishing Co. Ltd., 1992. Ducharme,  Jean-Claude. Official Lanquages Act (1988). Ottawa: Library of Parliament, Research Branch, 1988.  Flanagan,  Tom, and Martha Lee. “The Roots of Reform.” A paper prepared for presentation to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Charlottetown, P.E.I., June 1992.  Fleras, Augie. “From ‘Culture’ to ‘Equality’: Multiculturalism as Ideology and Policy.” Social Ineauality in Canada. Eds. James Curtis et al. Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall Canada Inc., 1993. Fleras, Augie, and Jean Leonard Elliott. Dimensions of Multiculturalism in Canada. Scarborough, Ont.: Nelson Canada, 1992. Gairdner,  William. The Trouble With Canada. Toronto: General Paperbacks, 1991.  Globe and Mail, Hicks,  September-October 1993.  Lincoln, Neb.: University of J.D. The Populist Revolt. Nebraska Press, 1961.  Hofstadter, Richard. The Progressive Movement 1900-1915. Englewood 70  Cliffs, N.J.: Howse, John.  Prentice-Hall Ltd.,  1963.  “The Man and His Mission.” Maclean’s 29 October 1990: 30.  Laycock, David. Populism and Democratic Thought in the Canadian Prairies, 1910 to 1945. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990. Link, Arthur S., and Richard McCormick. Progressivism. Arlington Heights: Harlan Davidson, Inc.,  1983.  Lipset,  S.M. Agrarian Socialism. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967.  Lipset,  S.M.,  Macpherson, Manning,  and Earl Raab. The Politics of Unreason. New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1970.  C.B. Democracy in Alberta. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1953.  E.C.  Political Realignment: A Chal1ene to Thoughtful Canadians. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1967.  Manning, Preston. The New Canada. Toronto: Macmillan Canada, 1992. McCormick,  Peter. “The Reform Party of Canada: New Beginning or Dead End?” Party Politics in Canada. Sixth Edition. Ed. Hugh Thorburn. Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall, 1992.  Morton, W.L. “Direct Legislation and the Origins of the Progressive Movement.” Canadian Historical Review vol.25, no.2, (1944), pp. 278-88. Morton,  W.L. The Progressive Party in Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1950.  Newman,  Peter C. “Preston Manning’s Contradictory Vision.” Maclean’s 24 June 1991: 43.  O’Neill, Terry. Act of Faith. Vancouver: B.C. Report Books, Patten,  Pearson,  1991.  Steve. “Populist Politics? A Critical Re-Examination of ‘Populism’ and the Character of the Reform Party’s Populist Politics.” A paper prepared for presentation to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Ottawa, June 1993. Ian.  “Thou Shalt Not Ignore the West.” Saturday Night December 1990: 36-43, 74-5.  Question Period. Radwanski,  CTV.  12 September 1993.  George. Trudeau.  Scarborough, 71  Ont.: Macmillan,  1978.  Reform Party of Canada. Blue Sheet. Principles, Policies and Election Platform. Reform Fund Canada, 1993. Reform Party of Canada. Principles and Policies: The Blue Book, 1991. Reform Fund Canada, 1991. Reform Party of Canada. So You Don’t Trust Politicians. Neither Do We. Reform Fund Canada, 1993. Reform Party of Canada. Schoen,  Sharp,  Zero in Three. Reform Fund Canada,  1993.  Douglas E. Enoch Powell and the Powellites. London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1977. Paul. The Agrarian Revolt in Western Canada. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1949.  Sigurdson,  Richard. “Preston Manning and the Politics of PostModernism.” A paper prepared for presentation to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Ottawa, June 1993.  Stasiulis, Daiva. “Symbolic Representation and the Numbers Game: Tory Policies on ‘Race’ and Visible Minorities.” How Ottawa Spends. Ed. Frances Abele. Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1991. Vancouver Province, Vancouver Sun,  September-October, 1993.  September-October 1993.  Wilson-Smith, Anthony. 1993: 16.  “Reform on a Roll.” Maclean’s 11 October  Young, Walter D. Democracy and Discontent. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd., 1978.  72  


Citation Scheme:


Citations by CSL (citeproc-js)

Usage Statistics



Customize your widget with the following options, then copy and paste the code below into the HTML of your page to embed this item in your website.
                            <div id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidgetDisplay">
                            <script id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidget"
                            async >
IIIF logo Our image viewer uses the IIIF 2.0 standard. To load this item in other compatible viewers, use this url:


Related Items