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The Middle East, semi-democracy and monarchy: a comparative analysis of Algeria, Jordan, and Morocco Bestland, Tanis 1996

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THE MIDDLE EAST, SEMI-DEMOCRACY AND MONARCHY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ALGERIA, JORDAN AND MOROCCO by TANIS BESTLAND B.A. (Honours), Carleton University, 1994 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES Department of Political Science We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA August 1996 © Tanis Bestland, 1996 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada DE-6 (2/88) ABSTRACT Democratization in the Middle East has been fraught with pitfalls - the Islamist challenge, rentierism, and the weaknesses of democratic political culture, independent civil society and multipartisrn; yet democratization has become attractive (if not indeed necessary) to many regimes in the last decade or so, facing as they are legitimacy crises due to economic difficulties. This thesis explores the Middle Eastern experience with democratization through the analysis of three relevant case studies: Algeria, Jordan and Morocco. None of these countries is at present fully democratic, but all have experienced periods of semi-democratic rule - Jordan being the most successful to date, Algeria the least. The potential for transition from non-democracy to semi-democracy (and eventually democracy) and the factors which contribute to successful transition and consolidation of such new systems are the issues analyzed here. The theoretical literature on democratization is reviewed, with particular attention to cultural and economic factors, historical legacies, democratic transition and consolidation, elite behavior, the role of Islam, and political legitimacy. Comparative variations in levels of development tend not to be the best explanation for the relative success of the three case studies examined here. Instead, the factors determined to be most conducive to a stable, successful transition are a medium- to long-term time frame for the process, the presence of a pact between the government and the opposition (elite consensual unity), and the presence of a stable, legitimate institution to guide the process. Democratization in the Middle East also requires a decision by the regime on how to deal with Islamist groups/parties, and this decision always has important repercussions for the success of the process. In the cases of Jordan and Morocco legitimate authority has been found in the person of the king. Thus this thesis points out that the presence of a monarch in a democratizing society is likely to be a stabilizing force in the transition and, later, the consolidation of the democratic system. Scholars would thus be wise to explore further the potentialities of monarchy in democratization, as well as other ways that new democratic regimes might gain and maintain legitimacy. TABLE OF CONTENTS A B S T R A C T ii T A B L E OF CONTENTS iii LIST OF TABLES iv CHAPTER ONE: T H E MIDDLE EAST A N D D E M O C R A C Y 1.1 Introduction 1 1.2 Definitions 3 1.3 The Data 6 1.4 Conclusion 9 CHAPTER TWO: T H E O R Y 2.1 Introduction 15 2.2 Socioeconomic Factors and Democracy 16 2.3 Cultural Factors and Democracy 19 2.4 Democratic Transition 21 2.5 Consolidated Democracies, Unconsolidated Democracies, and Democratic Breakdown 26 2.6 Conclusion 34 CHAPTER T H R E E : ALGERIA 3.1 Introduction 39 3.2 Political Development 40 3.3 Prelude to the Initiation of the Democratization Process 42 3.4 The Elections and their Implications 46 3.5 Conclusion 52 CHAPTER FOUR: JORDAN 4.1 introduction 56 4.2 Political Development 56 4.3 Prelude to the Initiation of the Democratization Process 61 4.4 The Democratization Process 64 4.5 Conclusion 72 CHAPTER FIVE: M O R O C C O 5.1 Introduction 77 5.2 Political Development 78 5.3 Democratic Development 82 5.4 The Push for Genuine Democratization 86 5.5 Conclusion 93 CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS 97 BIBLIOGRAPHY 108 APPENDIX T A B L E 111 LIST OF TABLES Table One: Political freedom in Algeria, Jordan and Morocco, 1972 to 1995 Table Two: Changes in degree of freedom in the Middle East, 1972 to 1995 Appendix Table: Freedom in the Muslim World, 1972 to 1995 CHAPTER ONE: THE MIDDLE EAST AND DEMOCRACY 1.1 Introduction 1974 saw the beginning of the third wave of democratization.1 In the 1970s and 1980s these changes were largely driven by internal pressures within each respective society. However, in the last few years the world's situation has changed so that countries are "expected" by the West, aid agencies, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, to be democratic or to aim for democracy. In many cases such new "democracies" are no more than authoritarian systems with sham elections, but nevertheless democratization is en vogue both in the real world and amongst academic analysts. This has renewed the debate about the essential conditions of democracy and indeed, its suitability and sustainability. However, the recent focus in studying this phenomenon has been on East-Central Europe, Latin America, Africa and Asia, with very little being written on the Middle East. But the Middle East is not immune to global trends - liberalization and pluralism in the region are of increasing significance in the 1990s. Like other Third World countries, Muslim autocracies have been facing pressures since the mid-1980s to open up their political systems in the light of economic crises and social pressures which have eroded their political legitimacy. Some leaders (in opposition and in government) think a degree of democratization could be the answer - it could restore regime legitimacy and bring peace, prosperity and a better future. But some analysts feel that Islam presents an insurmountable obstacle to democracy in Muslim-majority countries. The results of the efforts to open up authoritarian political systems in the Middle East have been mixed at best. For this reason, I believe it is important to identify which approaches and factors are likely to lead to an effective transition to what I shall define as semi-democracy (or even consolidated semi-democracy), and which are likely to lead to failure or even disaster. Many scholars who have completed studies on democratization in the Third World (Diamond et al., 1989; Chazan et al., 1988) have excluded Middle Eastern countries from their examination, as they see little potential for democratization there in light of the region's social, economic, cultural and religious characteristics.2 The assumption is that tremendous barriers prevent the establishment of fully-1 functioning democratic systems in the region. All those politically debilitating features delineated so comprehensively in the early literature on political development are still judged to be characteristics of the region - weak institutions, ethnic divisions, entrenched authoritarian structures of government, religious extremism, and a lack of unity, political legitimacy and tolerance of opposition. Muslim countries have been regarded as possessing elements inimical to any form of democratization.3 For example, Samuel Huntington writes that: Many Arab countries... are reaching levels of economic and social development where autocratic forms of government become inappropriate and efforts to introduce democracy become stronger. Some openings in Arab political systems have already occurred. The principal beneficiaries of these openings have been Islamist movements. In the Arab world, in short, Western democracy strengthens anti-Western political forces.4 However, in spite of these weaknesses, there has been a push for democracy in many Middle Eastern countries since the mid-1980s.5 Why? By all conventional indicators of modernization, from communication to education, Middle Eastern societies have been going through a social revolution. A glimpse of this can be seen in their advances in literacy rates and the Human Development Index (HDI) of the United Nations.6 But at the apex of the political pyramid, there is relative stagnation, if we measure by this the duration of top leadership. King Hussein of Jordan has been in power for 43 years, President Qaddaffi of Libya for 37 years, King Hassan of Morocco 35, President Assad of Syria 24, President Saddam Hussein of Iraq 18, and President Mubarak of Egypt 15. According to Bahgat Korany, this gap between social transformation and political stagnation has made democratization not only a matter of academic interest, but a political necessity to manage the transition (from authoritarianism to a more participatory system) and avert political breakdown.7 Korany believes democratization is needed to discourage a mood of national disenchantment and inertia and especially to provide rules for elite mobility during the bottlenecks of societal transformation (i.e. political transformation must go along with social and economic transformation or popular frustration will likely result). Once a political transition has been initiated one of the inherent dangers is the possibility of anarchy if there is not a strong opposition force and viable political alternative to the ruling government.8 The three countries analyzed in this thesis (Algeria, Jordan, and Morocco) have been chosen for both their similarities and their contrasts. All three countries faced economic crises in the late 1980s 2 resulting in calls for greater mass participation in politics. All three face the challenge of Islamist opposition groups. Morocco and Jordan are both governed by long-ruling monarchs (Kings Hassan and Hussein, respectively). Algeria, on the other hand, has since its independence been a one-party state in which the military has been highly influential. Algeria liberalized the most rapidly of the three cases, but the democratization process fell apart and military authoritarianism was re-imposed. Jordan has democratized/liberalized slowly and cautiously, and on the whole the process seems to be functioning well and strengthening as time passes.9 Morocco has liberalized slowly and allowed elections, but the King has said he does not intend to create a constitutional democracy which would limit his ruling powers. These three countries have been chosen to have their records compared against each other because they have each faced many of the same challenges but have chosen different approaches to dealing with them, some more successful than others. Looking at these three cases together makes it much easier to see a general trend for Middle Eastern countries in terms of democratization than a two-country comparison could. 1.2 Definitions At this point it is important that definitions be provided for the terms that will be used in understanding democratization in this thesis. First, democracy is understood here as being comprised (at a minimum) of four components: 1) fair and competitive multiparty elections; 2) political participation open to all citizens; 3) guaranteed civil liberties; and 4) responsible government.10 Fair and competitive multiparty elections means elections are impartially monitored and parties are allowed to organize and compete with the government for electoral support. Open political participation means that all adult citizens are allowed to vote and to run for office if they choose. Civil liberties are the rights citizens have in free societies, i.e., the rights to free speech, association, opinion, movement, fair trial and freedom of the press. Responsible government is defined here as a situation in which the head of government is ultimately responsible to the electorate and not (or only marginally) to a non-elected body like the military or the monarch.11 A constitutional monarchy is normally defined as a democracy where the monarch's powers are reduced (or limited) to such an extent that s/he is largely a figurehead (although not always 3 completely so.12 These factors have not been easy to find in the Middle East and thus most Muslim states have often been left out of studies on democratization in the Third World.13 A non-democracy exists where any of the factors mentioned above is essentially absent. Thus, semi-democracy exists when all four factors are present to some degree, but not all (or any) of them are fully established. A typical example is a regime which, although it holds multiparty elections and has broad popular suffrage, does any or all of the following: imposes limits on civil liberties such as press freedom, disallows certain types of 'radical' parties (communist, religious) even if they are not anti-system, enforces a property qualification on voting, denies suffrage to certain ethnic groups, marshals majority support for the governing party through corrupt or coercive practices, or reserves powerful government posts for individuals or bodies that are neither directly nor indirectly responsible to the electorate.14 Responsible government is the most interesting democratic concept in this thesis, as in all three cases the prime ministers are responsible to the monarch (or military, in Algeria's case) as much as or even more than to the electorate (parliament). In the Arab world there is also the concept of ta 'addudiyya which is translated by most scholars as pluralism. Pluralism in this traditional Arab sense means that there are various social groupings in society with different social and political views and a kind of political participation at the local level. This concept does not necessarily include competitive multiparty elections or formal political parties, but rather a kind of civil society in which citizens organize and participate but are not necessarily doing so in the sphere of the national government. Democratization refers to the process of change toward democratic forms of rule. The first phase involves the breakdown of the non-democratic regime. In the second phase, the elements of the democratic order are established. This is democratic transition: the process by which the former authoritarian regime breaks down and a relatively stable configuration of political institutions within a democratic regime is established.'5 During the third phase, democratic consolidation, the new democracy is further developed; eventually, democratic practices become an established part of the political culture. Democratic consolidation implies that the regime meets all the procedural criteria for democracy and also that all politically significant groups accept the established political institutions and adhere to democratic 4 rules of the game.16 However, there is no guarantee that a given democratic system will actually become consolidated. Political culture refers to the system of values and beliefs that defines the way citizens and elites understand their relationship with others and with their government. Thus, a democratic political culture implies that values such as the rule of law, equality of all before the law, toleration of opposition, personal freedom, and participatory politics define the way citizens in a democracy understand their relationship with their fellow citizens and their government.17 A political pact is an explicit, but not always publicly explicated or justified, agreement among political elites which seeks to define (or better, redefine) rules governing the exercise of power on the basis of mutual guarantees for the 'vital interests' of those entering it.18 Dahl suggests that what is really important is whether or not the elites support the democratic system and "buy into" the democratic political culture - in his view mass apathy is not a problem in democratic transition.19 Civil society is the network of independent, voluntary organizations (such as political parties, newspapers, radio stations, trade unions, community associations) which function outside of the government.20 The norms of equality, participation, tolerance and political inclusion characterize activity within civil society. It is a sphere of democratic social interaction which is fundamental to the transition of authoritarianism to democracy. When individuals and groups begin to challenge the boundaries of permissible behavior in an authoritarian state - for example, by speaking out against the regime or demanding a governmental response to social needs - civil society begins to take shape.21 Elites are persons who are able, by virtue of their strategic positions in powerful organizations, to affect national political outcomes regularly and substantially.22 They are the principal decision-makers in the largest or most resource-rich political, governmental, economic, military, professional, communications, and cultural organizations and movements in a society. This means they are made up of people who may hold varying attitudes toward the existing social, economic, and political order, including the holders of key positions in powerful dissident organizations and movements. Legitimacy is the belief that in spite of shortcomings and failures, the existing political institutions are better than any others that might be established, and that they therefore can demand obedience.23 This . . 5 ultimately means that when the rulers who hold constitutional power demand obedience and another group questions that demand in the name of an alternative political arrangement, the citizens will voluntarily opt for compliance with the demands of those in authority. Democratic legitimacy rests on the belief in the right of those legally and democratically elevated to authority to issue certain types of commands, to expect obedience, and to enforce them, if necessary, by the use of force.24 This belief does not require agreement with or support for a particular government or its policy decisions, but it does require acceptance of its binding character and its right to issue commands until changed by the procedures of the regime. Finally, democratic breakdown occurs when a regime is threatened by an anti-democratic challenger and the challenger succeeds in destabilizing the democratic system to the point at which it falls apart. According to Linz, "They undermine the regime's authority by demonstrating its inability to maintain order, [and] forcing it to resort to an unwarranted, arbitrary, and ^ discriminate use of power."25 1.3 The Data This thesis uses data compiled from the annual Freedom in the World analyses, which go from 1972 to 1995. I have modified the ranking system for the purposes of this thesis, so I shall first briefly explain the Freedom House methodology, then my modifications of it. The Freedom House methodology ranks countries and territories in two categories, Political Rights (PR) and Civil Liberties (CL), each on a seven point scale with 1 representing the most free and 7 representing the least. These two scores can then be averaged. As defined by Freedom House, political rights enable people to participate freely in political processes (vote and compete for public office), and civil liberties are the freedoms to develop views, institutions and personal autonomy apart from the state (free speech, a free press, freedom to organize political parties).26 Freedom House determines the numeric scores by averaging scores given on a list of questions in each category. Those whose category numbers average 1-2.5 are considered free, 3-5.5 are partly free, 5.5-7 are not free. In some cases, Freedom House's categorizations (of 5.5's) are based on judgement calls, taking into account the full data on all questions for the country in question. 6 For the purposes of this thesis countries will be divided into groups of democracies (D), semi-democracies (SD), and non-democracies (ND). According to my system, democracies are countries with a PR score of 2 or less and an average score (PR and CL) no higher than 2.5. (Thus a 2.5 does not indicate democracy if the country's scores are 3 and 2, whereas with Freedom House a 2.5 is always free) Non-democracies are countries with a PR score of 5 or above or a CL score of 6 to 7. Semi-democracies are what remains; countries with a PR score of 3 to 4 and an average score between 2.5 and 4.5 inclusive. I have decided to make PR the determining factor because I think free and fair elections are of greater importance to democracy than civil liberties, albeit marginally so, and I think the categorization should reflect that. I also feel that scores higher than 4 and 5 cannot reasonably be considered semi-democratic. If the PR score is 5 on a scale of 7 than 11hink the country should be considered a non-democracy. In short, 1 believe Freedom House has been somewhat too generous in their partly free category; my use of their data in studying democratization corrects for that. I have used the modified Freedom House data to make three tables. First, in the Appendix table I have listed the average scores of all Muslim countries from 1972 to 1995, ranked from most democratic to least democratic in the most current year (1995). Break years - years when a country's status shifted categories (ND, SD, or D) - are highlighted in bold. Table One lists the PR, CL and status scores from 1972 to 1995 for the three countries under examination in this thesis, Algeria, Jordan, and Morocco. Table Two lists the break years for all Muslim countries from 1972 to 1995, their combined mean scores and their standard deviations over the time frame of the survey, ranked by standard deviation. Looking at the data one notices several patterns. First, in the Appendix table, note that across the time frame of the survey Muslim countries have ranged in freedom (degree of democracy) from good averages scores of 2.5s and 3s, to very poor scores of 6.5s and 7s. Countries with poor scores (6s, 7s) — Iraq, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Oman - have had a tendency to stay that way, as have countries with slightly better scores (5s, 5.5s) ~ Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Iran. This is reflected in Table 2 in the standard deviation (SD) column where all of these countries rank in the bottom third, implying that their scores have fluctuated the least of the 21 countries (excluding Yemen)27 7 However, those countries who have often attained lower scores of 2.5, 3 and 4, have tended to vary widely in freedom (degree of democracy) over time. These countries —Lebanon, Bangladesh, Turkey, Pakistan, and Kuwait ~ all rank in the top one third in the SD column because their scores have fluctuated from lows to highs quite dramatically in the 24 years of the survey. From this it is clear that stability in democratic and semi-democratic systems in the Muslim world is difficult to maintain. The two other countries in the top third in the SD column are Afghanistan and Jordan. For Afghanistan this is due to two years of semi-democracy in 1972 and 1973, and then slight fluctuations between 6s and 7s thereafter, so although the SD number implies significant deviation over the 24 year period, there really was not much of a deviation if one looks at year by year changes. As for Jordan, the situation is similar -6s and 5s (non-democracy) until 1991 when there was a lasting improvement to 4s and one 3. So in the Jordanian case there have not been wild deviations but rather a slow and apparently lasting improvement over time. The middle third of countries in terms of SD includes both Morocco and Algeria, as well as Bahrain, Egypt, Indonesia, Qatar, and Syria. These countries fall into two sub-categories. First there are those which shifted from a period of non-democracy to a brief (2 years in all cases) period of semi-democracy and then back to non-democracy again. These countries are Bahrain (SD 1974-75), Egypt (SD 1984-85), and Algeria (SD 1990-91). The second sub-category is made up of countries which have been consistently non-democracies, but have shifted up and down within the ND category a few times. These countries are Iraq, Qatar, and Syria. Morocco fits neither or those patterns. Morocco was a non-democracy until 1978 when it became a semi-democracy and did not shift back to non-democracy until 1991. The Morocco chapter in this thesis will explain why Morocco shifted to semi-democracy for thirteen years and then shifted back, while many other transitions appear to have ended after a two-year experiment. Also significant in the tables is the contrast between monarchies and non-monarchies. There are eight continuing monarchies in the region - Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia.29 I intend to argue in this thesis that monarchies have been and are presently the most legitimate and stable form of government in the Muslim world and that they are thus the most likely type of regime to be able to successfully manage a democratization process without violence or breakdown. Table Two shows that four of the monarchies (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, and United Arab Emirates) have had no durable break years - they have been consistently non-democratic. Three of the others (Jordan, Morocco and Bahrain) have moved at some point from a non-democratic system to a semi-democratic one. Bahrain moved quickly back to non-democracy again, while Morocco remained semi-democratic for thirteen years before switching back. Jordan alone forges ahead with a semi-democratic system.30 The case studies undertaken in this paper provide insight into managing an effective transition from authoritarianism to a more open, participatory system. The Jordanian regime faced difficulties similar in certain respects to those of Algeria (and arguably, greater difficulties due to the specific peculiarities of the Jordanian population and geo-strategic position) which most analysts suggest led to calls for greater democratization. The Algerian leadership nullified their elections and are now fighting a near-civil war with the Islamists they deprived of government. In Jordan the parliament is functioning quite effectively as a multiparty consultative and deliberative body, with the Islamist opposition largely co-opted. How has this been accomplished? What are the obstacles that still stand in the way? In the case of Morocco, always a fairly liberal Muslim regime, King Hassan is trying to fight off pressures to democratize further, as that would spell the end of his royal prerogatives. It is necessary to consider whether the contemporary climate in the Middle East is likely to be more conducive to the establishment of democratized forms of government. The growth of political pluralism is always at the expense of authoritarian power, and this causes tension between the established elite and the emergent democratic elite which must be resolved if the process is to continue to succeed. 1.4 Conclusion The key characteristic of democracy, according to Dahl, is the continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals.31 A democratic society features competition between diverse groups, but although diversity and opposition are stressed and groups are encouraged to disagree on particular issues, there must exist an overriding commitment to the 9 system from all groups to the rules of society. Should a group, party or organization hold deeply antagonistic ideas about the functioning of the political system it must be regarded as a threat to that regime. A loyal opposition (loyal to the democratic system), then, is a central feature of liberal democratic society, as it seeks neither to undenriine nor eliminate the structures of the state. Many analysts who are not enthusiastic about the prospects for democracy in the Middle East feel that this concept of 'loyal opposition' is one of the main impediments to the creation of stable democratic regimes in the region. Daniel S. Sisken asserts that the Middle East is not fundamentally inhospitable to democracy, and that while a fully-fledged democracy in the region is not likely to emerge in the next few years, intermediate steps toward political pluralism are quite viable in most Middle Eastern states in the short to medium term.32 An important factor in a successful transition is to fashion a new political order that allows for a measure of real political competition within an inclusive institutional framework that provides elements of stability and flexibility. In this thesis I want to explore this notion further by analyzing the democratization processes in Algeria, Jordan and Morocco, and through this to determine which factors are conducive to a stable transition to a more open, pluralistic and participatory system. The theoretical framework will stress the impact of cultural and socio-economic factors, the significance of political pacts in democratic transition, the concept of democratic consolidation, the speed of the transition, and the significance of a legitimate institution guiding the democratization process (e.g. the roles of the monarchs in Jordan and Morocco). These ideas will be addressed in chapter two, the theory component of this thesis, where a review of some of the classic works on democratization will be undertaken to determine which factors are most critical to establishing the pivotal, intermediate stage of semi-democracy, and thus laying the groundwork for more far-reaching democratization in the long-term. The chapter structure of the remainder of the thesis is as follows: Chapter two is a review of the democratization literature (i.e., culture factors, socio-economic development, democratic consolidation, political pacts, and transition theory). Chapter three explores the case of Algeria. Chapter four examines the case of Jordan. Chapter five explores the political past and present of Morocco. And, finally, chapter six draws together the theories and the case studies for analysis, synthesis, and conclusions. 10 Endnotes - Chapter One 1 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991. Huntington picks 1974 because of transition to democracy in Portugal. According to him, the earlier waves of democratization were in 1828-1926 and 1943-1962. 2 L. Diamond, J. Linz and S M . Lipset, Democracy in Developing Countries, Vol. 3. London, 1989, and N . Chazan, R. Mortimer, J. Ravenhill, and D. Rothchild, Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa. Boulder, 1988. 3 Heather Deegan, The Middle East and Democracy. Buckingham: Open University Press, 1993: 9. 4 Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993: 32. 5 The geographic area of the Middle East reaches from Morocco to Iran and from Turkey to the Gulf states. Middle East scholars typically do not include Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, the Soviet successor states, or other Muslim countries in their studies. All Muslim countries are included in the tables of this thesis, but when I refer to the Middle East or Muslim countries, I am primarily referring to the Muslim Middle Eastern countries, as defined here. 6 In 1970, Algeria's literacy rate was 25 percent; by 1992 it had improved to 57. The comparable figures for Jordan are 47 and 84; for Morocco 22 and 41. (United Nations, Human Development Report for the UN Development Programme. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995: 162-163.) In terms of HDI, in 1970, Algeria, Jordan and Morocco's scores were 0.358, 0.428 and 0.268, respectively. In 1992 they were 0.732, 0.758 and 0.554, respectively, which placed the at 85th, 80* and 117*. respectively, in the 1992 rankings - all in the medium human development range. (United Nations, Human Development Report for the UN Development Programme. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993: 156.) But of course, they are still not rich countries; GNP per capita in Algeria, Jordan and Morocco in 1993 was US$1,500, US$1,120, and US$1,020, respectively. {Hie World of Information: The Middle East Review, 21s t ed. The Economic and Business Report. London: Kogan, Page and Walder Publishing, 1995: v.) 7 Bahgat Korany, "Arab Democratization: A poor cousin?" Political Science and Politics, Vol. XXVII, No. 3, September 1994: 512. 8 The multiplication of parties including Sofa parties - i.e., political parties so tiny that all the members can sit together on one sofa - would not prevent the emergence of a Hobbesian world of war of all against all. The difference with the classical Hobbesian world is that the actors are not individuals but social groups of various sizes, compositions, and interests. 9 Obviously the recent protests against the doubling of the price of bread are a challenge to the semi-democratic system. This issue will be addressed further in chapter four. 1 0 Deegan: 1-2. 1 1 Vernon Bogdanor, "The Monarchy and the Constitution," Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 49, No. 3, July 1996: 407. 1 2 The main remaining political powers held by constitutional monarchs in the West are 1) the right to refuse the prime minister's request for an early election; and 2) discretion in picking a prime minister when an election produces a hung parliament. Indeed, in the smaller Euro-monarchies where hung parliaments are the norm the monarchs preserve their neutrality by relying on the advice and recommendations of informateur(s). Bogdanor: 407. 1 3 Jean Leca, "Democratization in the Arab World: uncertainty, vulnerability and legitimacy. A tentative conceptualization and some hypotheses," in Democracy without Democrats? Hie Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World. London. I B TaurisPublishers, 1994: 49. 1 4 Michael Burton, Richard Gunther and John Higley, "Introduction: elite transformations and democratic regimes," in John Higley and Richard Gunther (eds), Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe. London: Cambridge University Press, 1992: 1. 1 5 Richard Gunther, Hans-Jurgen Puhle, and P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, "Introduction," in Richard Gunther, Nikiforos Diamandouros and Hans-Jurgen Puhle (eds), The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995: 3. 1 6 Burton, Gunther and Higley: 3. 1 7 Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset, Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1989: 16-17. 1 8 Leca: 49. 1 9 Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1971: 124. 2 0 Jillian Schwedler (ed.), Toward Civil Society in the Middle East? Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995: 2. 2 1 Schwedler. 5. 2 2 Burton, Gunther and Higley: 8. 2 3 Juan J. Linz, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978: 16. 11 ^ 4 Linz:17. 2 5 L i n z : 15. 2 6 Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil Liberties, 1991-92. N e w York: Freedom House, 1992: 65-67. 2 7 Yemen is excluded because it has only existed in its united form since 1990 and thus its S D and mean are not comparable. 2 8 Excepting the also-exceptional Jordanian case and the back-and-forth cases - Bangladesh, Pakistan, Turkey, Lebanon. 2 9 Note that none of the Middle Eastern monarchies is a "constitutional monarchy" as denned for this thesis in the Western liberal-democratic sense. 3 0 Kuwait is also a unique case because it started out semi-democratic in 1972, then moved to non-democracy in 1977, then back to semi-democracy in 1982, then to non-democracy again in 1986. 3 1 D a h l : 1. 3 2 Daniel S. Sisken, "Democracy or Pluralism? Reform Processes in Egypt, Algeria and Jordan," paper presented at the annual meeting o f the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, Apri l 1996: 1. 12 TABLE ONE: Political freedom in Algeria, Jordan and Morocco, 1972 to 1995 Year Algeria Jordan Morocco PR CL status PR CL status PR CL status 1972 6 6 ND 6 6 ND 5 4 ND 1973 6 6 ND 6 6 ND 5 4 ND 1974 6 6 ND 6 6 ND 5 5 ND 1975 6 6 ND 6 6 ND 5 5 ND 1976 7 6 ND 6 6 ND 5 5 ND 1977 6 6 N D ' 6 6 ND 5 5 ND 1978 6 6 ND 6 6 ND 4 3 SD 1979 6 6 ND 6 6 ND 3 4 SD 1980 6 6 ND 6 - 6 ND 3 4 SD 1981 6 6 ND 6 6 ND 4 4 SD 1982 6 6 ND 6 6 ND 4 5 SD 1983 6 6 ND 6 6 ND 4 5 SD 1984 6 6 ND 5 5 ND 4 5 SD 1985 6 6 ND 5 5 ND 4 5 SD 1986 6 6 ND 5 5 ND 4 5 SD 1987 6 6 ND 5 5 ND 4 5 SD 1988 5 6 ND 6 5 ND 4 5 SD 1989 6 4 ND 5 5 ND 4 4 SD 1990 4 4 SD 5 5 ND 4 4 SD 1991 4 4 SD 4 4 SD 5 5 ND 1992 7 6 ND ^ 3 SD 6 5 ND 1993 7 6 ND 4 4 SD 5 5 ND 1994 7 7 ND 4 4 SD 5 5 ND 1995 6 6 ND 4 4 SD 5 5 ND PR and CL stand for Political Rights and Civil Liberties. 1 represents the most free and 7 the least free. D means democratic, SD means semi-democratic, and ND means not democratic. Compiled from data in: Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties All years, 1972-73 to 1995-96, inclusive. 13 TABLE TWO: Changes in degree of freedom in the Middle East, 1972 to 1995 break years mean standard deviation Country # (year(s) of break) (1972-1995) (1972-1995) 1. Lebanon 2 (1976, 1983) 4.25 1.189 2. Bangladesh 7(1976, 1979, 1983, 1986, 1990,1991, 1993) 4.04 1.052 3. Turkey 4(1974, 1981, 1983, 1994) 3.44 0.913 4. Pakistan 2 (1978, 1985) 4.60 0.909 5. Jordan * / (1991) 5.27 0.897 6. Kuwait * 3 (1977, 1982, 1986) 4.73 0.847 7. Afghanistan 1 (1974) 6.60 0.722 8. Algeria 2 (1990, 1992) 5.875 0.680 9. Egypt 2 (1984, 1986) 5.02 0.634 10. Qatar * 0 5.48 0.580 11. Syria 0 6.46 0.569 12. Morocco * 2 (1978, 1991) 4.52 0.541 13. Bahrain * 2(1974, 1976) 5.15 0.521 14. Indonesia 0 5.33 0.504 15. Libya 0 6.50 0.442 16. Tunisia 0 5.27 0.390 17. Iran 0 5.71 0.388 18. Saudi Arabia * 0 6.35 0.375 19. United Arab Emirates * 0 5.31 0.355 20. Oman * 0 6.08 0.241 21. Iraq o 6.90 0.207 22. Yemen (united) [united: 0,N: 1 (1975), S: 0] [5.25] [0.418 Ranked by standard deviation (highest to lowest). A * signifies a continuing monarchy. Yemen is bracketed because it is not to be included in the comparison due to the fact that it has only been united for six years. Compiled from.data in: Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties All years, 1972-73 to 1995-96, inclusive. 14 CHAPTER TWO: THEORY 2.1 Introduction Diamond, Linz and Lipset justified their exclusion of Middle Eastern countries from their comprehensive study on democratization in the developing world on the grounds that Middle Eastern countries '... generally lack much previous democratic experience and most appear to have little prospect of transition to even semi-democracy'.1 Similarly, though from a Marxist perspective, Giacomo Luciani, writing in the 1980s about the notion of the rentier state, also implied that democratization in the Middle East was unviable.2 But while the new literature on democratization has pointedly excluded the Middle East, a growing number of area specialists have sought to identify local developments that signal the early phases of, or at least the potential for, a democratic transfonnation of state and society in the Middle East. The Middle East (with the notable exception of Algeria) has not seen the rapid sort of democratization that parts of Asia, Latin America and Africa have, but important changes have occurred. These changes have been extremely slow and hesitant in most cases and have not involved the development of an independent civil society, nor have they entailed progress toward a fully democratic outcome. The literature on "liberalization" and "democratization" in the Middle East has tended to focus on change in formal rules, laws and procedures. The shift from one party rule to ta 'addudiyya (traditional Arab pluralism) involving the functioning of numerous community organizations, professional associations and parties, has been stressed.3 Yet, according to Waterbury, the impact of such developments is limited so long as the political parties' contestation is tightly controlled from above and emergency laws remain in effect. More important, it would appear, is the change in political attitudes that has occurred from outside the realm of formal political structures and elites. Such change has flowed less from a deliberate shift in regime strategy than from a combination of regime exhaustion from above and Islamic institution-building and mobilization from below.4 15 2.2 Socioeconomic Factors and Democracy In democratic theory it is generally considered that the development of a healthy pluralistic democracy depends on a rigid set of conditions.5 Schumpeter's 'competitive theory of democracy' stresses that to be truly democratic countries must have a high standard of living and a reasonable spread of income, both of which tend to diminish social unrest.6 In this view, poverty, illiteracy, hunger and ignorance are all viewed as rendering a country unlikely to be able to sustain democracy. Underdeveloped countries have been seen, then, to face enormous obstacles in that different religions, tribes, and other cultural groups can present major difficulties in achieving national unity. From this outlook, divisive and destructive forces in underdeveloped countries undermine any attempts at unity and in the absence of a general toleration of varied opinions, opposition cannot be institutionalized. But 'lesser developed countries' are not completely hopeless - urbanization, improved literacy rates, expanding economies, and exposure to mass communications - in short, development - are all factors which are considered positive steps toward the growth of political participation and democratization. Measured in these respects, most Middle Eastern countries have improved by leaps and bounds in the past few decades. Algeria, Jordan and Morocco have all doubled (or nearly doubled) their literacy scores since 1972, and all are ranked in the medium range on the HDI.7 Yet Huntington has argued that in its early stages, economic development - precisely the phenomenon which had been hailed as the harbinger of political potential and advancement - creates dislocation in states with fragile political institutions.8 If governments failed to govern, 'political degeneration' would occur and any attempts to democratize would vanish in a haze of tyranny. Other analysts have since found the linkage important: The process by which democracy is 'liberalized' is a key one, for it ties together notions of capitalist development, class formation and class conflict, as well as such essentials of liberal democracy as competitive parties and majority rule.9 As Lipset pointed out in 1963 at the height of the modernization debate: "Men may question whether any aspect of this interrelated cluster of economic development... .gradual political change, legitimacy and democracy is primary, but the fact remains that the cluster does hang together."10 Liberal democracy, then, not only requires a supportive economic climate but it also needs as a prerequisite some degree of social cohesion and political consensus. 16 Related to this is the necessity of a large middle class in a democracy. A middle class is fairly well-educated and financially secure and thus less more likely than poorer, less-educated classes to value, participate in, and support the democratized system. The middle class is also the component of society most active in the formation and perpetuation of an independent civil society - which, as noted earlier, is the network of independent, voluntary organizations which function outside the sphere of the government. Further, the development of a large middle class tends to signal the decline of a rentier economy (discussed below) and the creation of a modern taxed economy more compatible with a democratic system. The theory of rentierism is of extreme significance to the understanding of political development in the Middle East. The hegemony of the rentier state reaches deeply into the collective minds of Middle Easterners and reinforces people's dependence on the state. In primary or secondary rentier states the state becomes the sole provider of collective and individual goods as well as political order, even if it is undemocratic order. Ibn Taymiya, an Arab philosopher, wrote that sixty years under the authority of a just tyrant is better than one night without government.11 It is no wonder then that segments of the Arab political discourse are littered with descriptions of the enlightened dictator, the heroic leader, the exceptional Za'im and revered head of the family. The sultanate (princely) state is almost indistinguishable from its patrimonial leader. The rentier state analysis rests on the hypothesis that external sources of income resulting from the export of oil (oil revenue) are in fact a form of rent. Income is raised by the state - not through the more traditional means of domestic taxation and economic strategy, which are often seen to be associated with popular demands for political reform and legitimacy - but externally through the commodity of oil.1 2 In a sense, the economic development argument is turned on its head because although many Middle Eastern states are vastly wealthy in terms of gross national product, which might present a prima facie case for political development, the nature of the wealth is not a result of industrialization and societal differentiation, factors once seen as necessary to political change, but simply the result of massive oil revenues. As Luciani states: 17 The need to raise revenues is the basic reason why the state has an interest in the prosperity and economic well-being of the country. Without such an interest, it is inevitable that rentier states will display little tendency to evolve towards democratic institutions.'3 Algeria has had both oil and natural gas revenues to use as "rent." The Moroccan regime, perhaps because of its lack of "rent," has always been more responsive to the will of the people, but has still operated under a neopatrimonial rentier system. While Jordan is not an oil-producing country itself, it can be termed a "secondary" rentier state in that it has historically received grants and loans from its richer Arab cousins, as well as from Britain and the United States.14 Thus many Muslim regimes, be they oil-rich or not, have operated very much along the lines of the oil-rich Gulf states, as bakshish states (i.e. one that gratuitously bestows favors or bribes) that integrate pre-modern sectors to their control mechanisms. Thus, the significance of the rentier state analysis is not so much oil-wealth, but rather that if public finance is the basis of governability and political power civil society is inescapably weak in the face of the rentier state's hegemony.15 The principle that typically governs the state-society relations in states with rentier economies is a reversal of the slogan "no taxation without representation."16 This has been the governing principle in Jordan where foreign grants have been a much more important source for covering government expenditure than income from taxation, at least until the mid-1980s, and where the principle of political representation laid down in the constitution has had little practical effect. In all three of the case studies examined here the social contract has been one where the state provides a certain level of economic security in exchange for substantial political autonomy granted it by society. This stands in contrast to production states where the citizens are expected to contribute to the welfare of the state through taxation on their labor, and therefore have a more direct claim to take part in the allocation of state resources.17 The increase in government resources caused by the oil boom enabled most Middle Eastern states to distribute political and economic benefits to loyal supporters of the regime and to assure, if not active endorsement of, at least acquiescence to, government policy.18 In both primary and secondary rentier states, the road to democracy is full of stumbling blocks. For democracy must begin with the creation of a civil society consisting of a complex web of 18 interrelationships and mutual responsibilities formed by the free choices of individuals and by the natural relationship among them. Political participation at the top level of government is not enough. Democracy must grow from the grassroots of society upward through the creation and mediation of structures of community life. Thus the status of civil society is a key element in the presence or absence of democratization: this is why a firm understanding of the societal context is crucial. Dahl agrees on the importance of pluralism (and thus, implicitly, a non-rentier economy). He further agrees that the socio-economic situation of a country provides key insights into the potential for mutual security of governments and oppositions (an important factor for successful public contestation and polyarchy). He writes: A competitive political regime, and therefore a polyarchy, is unlikely to be maintained without a pluralistic social order. A centrally dominated social order is more favorable to a hegemonic than to a competitive regime (and therefore to a polyarchy)... A competitive regime cannot be maintained in a country where the military or police forces are accustomed to intervening in politics, even if the social order is otherwise pluralistic and not centrally dominated... Public contestation, and hence polyarchy, is unlikely to exist in a country with highly centralized direction of the economy, no matter what the form of ownership.19 Another important factor is the relative strength of the authoritarian regime versus the opposition. In DahPs words, ...the lower the cost of the government tolerating the opposition, the greater the security of the government. The greater the costs of suppression, the greater the security of the opposition. Hence the conditions that provide a great degree of mutual security for government and oppositions would tend to generate and to preserve wider opportunities for oppositions to contest the conduct of the government.20 2.3 Cultural Factors and Democracy Democratization goes beyond a type of pluralist political system to denote a type of society based on respect for basic civil rights and an institutionalized political culture accepting and negotiating differences. Many analysts argue that the process in the Arab world presents on the whole altogether different characteristics. Carrie Rosefsky Wickham views the present process as not yet political democracy, but at best a limited and shy process of organizational political pluralism (ta 'addudiyya). She considers this revival of ta 'addudiyya to be a regime response to a political and economic crisis, resulting 19 in a democratization process that is defensive, truncated and tactical.21 Thus the process can easily break down - it is neither linear nor irreversible. Further, many analysts argue that the emergence of independent sites of social and political expression within an authoritarian setting does not necessarily mean that a traditional 'liberal-democratic' civil society is emerging. As Sami Zubaida observed, "Civil society is not merely a sphere outside of government but rather one endowed with a legally mandated autonomy, involving legal rights and protections backed by the law-state."22 For instance, despite their liberal trappings, the Jordanian and Moroccan states (and the Algerian state during the two years of its democratization process) retain, and selectively exercise, their power to supersede constitutional rights and guarantees in defence of their own interests. For their part, mainstream Islamic groups are often willing to play by the rules of a liberal social and political order, yet their ultimate goal is to transform it from the bottom up. That is, they aim not to establish a civil sphere separate from and coexistent with the secular state, but gradually to extend the Islamic domain until it encompasses the state itself.23 The great difficulty faced by Middle Eastern states experimenting with democratization is that in the last decade many regimes have been forced (mainly by economic woes) to partially retreat from their country's economic, political and ideological spheres, while hanging on to coercive power. This has been the case because their perceived lack of efficacy and effectiveness in managing economic affairs has resulted in the erosion of their legitimacy in all spheres. With the platforms of liberal and leftist groups largely discredited and their organizations in disarray, the groups and associations that constitute the Islamic movement are virtually the only forces moving into the public space left by the state's retreat. (Witness the Algerian and Egyptian cases.)24 These Islamic groups have developed parallel networks of Islamic institutions, including private mosques, health clinics, schools, banks, and investment companies. Within the bounds of authoritarian systems, then, Islamic activists have developed an alternative domain in which new values are being cultivated and new styles of participation being forged.25 In Muslim countries, the way in which the democratizing regime chooses to deal with Islamist opposition is often a key determinant in the success or failure of the democratization experiment. In each of the three cases discussed in this thesis the established authoritarian regime has chosen to deal with the Islamist opposition 20 i n a different way, and I w i l l argue that these decisions had a significant impact on the progress each made toward democracy. The uneasy relationship between Islam and democracy is an issue that must be grappled with i n this thesis. A historical legacy, arguably beginning with the initiation o f the Crusades, encourages a mutually hostile image in the interaction between Islam and West (and later, by implication, Western democracy). A s in the C o l d War, mirror images are based on categorical, reductionist black/white characterizations. 2 6 Obviously, just as there are differences between Western democracies, there wi l l also be within the Islamic w o r l d . 2 7 For instance, some Islamic advocates equate Western democracy with the West, extreme social permissiveness, and moral dissolution. Others conceive o f this "alien import" as neocolonialism's ploy to subvert Dar al-Islam's social fabric. Similarly, a dominant Western image o f Islam reduces it to fanaticism and terrorism. Some slogans are quoted out o f context and emphasized ad nauseam, slogans such as "Islam is the solution and the Koran is the constitution." 2 8 Negative mirror images apart, the opposition between Islam and Western democracy is not a creation o f the imagination or o f image-forgery. Between a sacred faith and a political doctrine, there are bound to be differences. 2 9 But at the level o f general norms, Islamic and Western democratic values tend to overlap; for example, Islam's basic concepts o f equality o f persons and strong notion o f justice. A t the level o f political practice, however, it is important to emphasize that political Islam cannot be reduced to some o f its radical groups, for other groups - with a larger membership - have accepted explicitly most o f the mechanisms of Western democracy. 3 0 But a transition to Western democracy is difficult for M u s l i m countries - the West is at one level a model o f power, progress and civi l liberties, but on another level it is a symbol o f past humiliation, repeated double standards, and empty political slogans. For democracy to be successful in the M i d d l e East, these historical/psychological blocks must be overcome. 2.4 Democratic Transition A s noted i n the Introduction, democratic transition is the process by which a former authoritarian regime breaks down and a relatively stable configuration o f political institutions within a democratic regime is established. Dahl believes there are three paths to democracy: 3 1 21 I. Liberalization precedes inclusiveness: A. A closed hegemony increases opportunities for public contestation and thus is transformed into a competitive oligarchy. B. The competitive oligarchy is then transformed into a polyarchy by increasing the inclusiveness of the regime. II. Inclusiveness precedes liberalization: A. A closed hegemony becomes inclusive. B. The inclusive hegemony is then transformed into a polyarchy by increasing opportunities for public contestation. III. Shortcut: A closed hegemony is abruptly transformed into a polyarchy by a sudden granting of universal suffrage and rights of public contestation.32 Dahl says that the first path is a fair approximation of the paths taken by England and Sweden; the second is roughly the path taken by Germany from the Empire to Weimar; and the third was taken by France from 1789 to 1792. Dahl considers that the commonest sequence among the older and more stable democracies has been some approximation of the first path; i.e., competitive politics precedes expansion in participation. As a result the rules, practices and culture of competitive politics developed first among a small elite, and the critical transition from non-party politics to party competition also occurred initially within the restricted group.33 Although this transition was rarely an easy one, and party conflict was often harsh and bitter, the severity of conflict was restrained by ties of friendship, family, interest, class, and ideology that pervaded the restricted group of notables who dominated the political life of the country. Later, as additional social strata were admitted into politics, they were more easily socialized into the norms and practices of competitive politics already developed among the elites, and generally they accepted many if not all of the mutual guarantees evolved over many generations.34 As a consequence neither the newer strata nor the incumbents who were threatened with displacement felt that the costs of toleration were so high as to outweigh the costs of repression, particularly since repression would entail the destruction of a well-developed system of mutual security. The other two paths, according to Dahl, are more dangerous, and for the same reason: to arrive at a viable system of mutual security is a difficult matter at best; the greater the number of people and the variety and disparity of interests involved, the more difficult the task and the greater the time required.35 Tolerance and mutual security are more likely to develop among a small elite sharing similar perspectives 22 than among a large and heterogeneous collection of leaders representing social strata with widely varying goals, interests and outlooks. This is why the first path is more likely than the other two to produce stable transformations away from hegemony toward democracy. The third path drastically shortens the time for learning complex skills and understandings and for arriving at a what may be an extremely subtle system of mutual security.36 The second path requires that the system of mutual security be worked out, not within a small and relatively homogenous elite, but among spokespersons who reflect the whole spectrum of social strata and political perspectives in the society, or at least in broad part. Dahl writes: When suffrage is extended before the arts of competitive politics have been mastered and accepted as legitimate among the elites, the search for a system of mutual guarantees is likely to be complex and time consuming. During the transition, when conflict erupts neither side can be entirely confident that it will be safe to tolerate the other. Because the rules of the political game are ambiguous, and the legitimacy of competitive politics is weak, the costs of suppression may not be inordinately high.37 The danger is, then, that before a system of mutual security can be worked out among the contestants, the emerging but precarious competitive regime will be displaced by a hegemony ruled by one of the contestants. Although the first path seems to be the safest of the three, it is not likely to be followed in the future, because most countries with hegemonic regimes are already inclusive. Dahl writes: "Only a small minority of countries deny suffrage to more than ten percent of their male citizens, and probably no more than a half dozen traditional monarchies or dictatorships have refused to grant suffrage at all."38 The process has typically been uni-directional - once granted, history shows that suffrage is rarely taken away. Thus the first path is unlikely to be taken at the end of the twentieth century, since demands for inclusion and liberalization which threaten a regime are most often met by the cheapest concession possible - by granting suffrage. In so doing leaders can clothe their hegemony with the symbols and some of the legitimacy of democracy - at little cost, initially, to themselves. Dahl's argument on this point can be summarized in four propositions: 1) the first path is more likely to produce the mutual security required for a stable regime of public contestation; 2) the first path is no longer open to most countries with hegemonic regimes; 3) the liberalization of near-hegemonies will run a serious risk of failure because of the difficulty, under conditions of universal suffrage and mass 23 politics, of working out a system of mutual security; and 4) the risks of failure can be reduced if steps toward liberalization are accompanied by a dedicated and enlightened search for a viable system of mutual 39 guarantees. On the question of how democracies are to come into being in the late twentieth century, Dahl concludes that of all the options (evolution, revolution, military conquest, national independence struggle), in the future as in the past, stable polyarchies and near-polyarchies are more likely to result from rather slow evolutionary processes than from the revolutionary overthrow of existing hegemonies.40 He reminds us that well-established Western democracies which are tolerant of their oppositions developed over very long periods of time. Also on the subject of the time frame for transition, Huntington suggests that in cases where the regime is highly autocratic a rapid and/or violent displacement of it by a democratic regime is likely to result in the emergence of extremist mass movements that tend to transform the new democracy in anti-democratic directions.41 An important component of political culture (and by implication, democratic development) in the Middle East, and in most other developing countries, is indeed the impact of the colonial legacy. As part of the various paths of democratic transition (discussed below), Dahl believes there are two ways the colonial legacy can impact upon democratization former colonies. [1] The old regime is transformed by evolutionary processes: the new regime is fostered among the local population, whose leaders inaugurate polyarchy or near-polyarchy without a national independence movement or serious struggle against the colonial power.... [2] The old regime is transformed as part of the struggle for national independence, in the course of a "revolution" against the colonial power: the new regime is inaugurated by leaders of national independence movement, who install polyarchy or near-polyarchy during or after a successful struggle for national independence.42 The first route was more typically that taken by British colonies. The British allowed greater autonomy under traditional local elites and tended to instill a democratic political culture. British colonialism tended to be very pragmatic - they took advantage of whatever they could make use of, tried to set up efficient administration procedures, and then, when it was clear their time was up (i.e. the nationalist movement became powerful) they shipped out, usually with little hesitation, and usually leaving newly established democratic constitutions and institutions behind them.43 The experience of French colonies, however, was quite different. The French colonialists tended to involve themselves much more 24 deeply in the affairs of their colonies, and in the Algerian case they actually annexed the colony and considered it an integral part of France. As a result, they had a much more difficult time letting go when nationalist movements emerged - they fought bloody wars in both Algeria and Indochina. Because their departures from colonies were often bloody and complicated, they most often left the former colony in a state of political chaos, with no established constitution or institutions of any sort. The implication of this second of Dahl's routes is often that the first government of the newly independent state derives its legitimacy from its role in the independence movement. If it was a violent struggle that led to independence this often means that the army has a legitimate political role. This factor will come up again in the country studies, as both Algeria and Morocco were French colonies, whereas Jordan was a British one. Another key to a successful transition to democracy is that the party system not be fragmented. Dahl notes: Since the costs of toleration are raised by excessive fragmentation into competing political parties, a strategy of liberalization requires a search for a party system that avoids a great multiplication of parties.44 This point is significant in all three of the cases under examination in this thesis, as we shall see in the upcoming chapters. In relation to the question of the need for democracy to develop over time, Dahl stresses the significance of allowing participation and contestation first at the local levels of government. Dahl writes: Since somewhat autonomous representative institutions below the national level can provide opportunities for the opposition to acquire political resources, help to generate cross-cutting cleavages, and facilitate training in the arts of resolving conflicts and managing representative governments, a strategy of toleration requires a search for ways of developing subnational representative governments.45 He suggests that allowing oppositions to expand their participation in municipal elections may help to socialize both the opposition and the government. Smaller representative units provide training in solving concrete problems for which abstract ideological solutions are less relevant. Confronting these problems may unite groups that would be antagonistic in national political life. Moreover, he notes, extending opposition rights and privileges at subordinate levels is likely to be less threatening to the incumbent national leadership since it can be treated as a trial; if the trial 'fails,' the step can be reversed 4 6 25 Dahl concludes by noting that the main elements in his strategy of liberalization - mutual security among conflicting groups, a strong and vigorous executive dependent on institutions responsive to a variety of interests and demands, an integrated rather than a fragmentary party system, and representative governments at sub-national levels - are all familiar aspects of the most durable representative democracies.47 DahPs theory of democratization is quite comprehensive, but he considers fewer factors than Huntington, who lists twenty-seven potential variables that have been said to contribute to democracy or democratization.48 Neither of these scholars, however, considers an element which I consider key - the role of a legitimate authority guiding the process. In the case studies we will see that both Jordan and Morocco have legitimate authorities (the monarch in both cases) to guide their processes, whereas Algeria has not had a legitimate authority. I believe that the existence of a legitimate monarch in Morocco and Jordan has resulted in a higher degree of elite consensual unity and mass support for the process and the new institutions, which has led to less political violence and averted a meltdown of the democratized system in times of crisis. (Obviously the attitude of the monarch is of extreme importance, however - s/he must be willing to lend her/his legitimacy to the process.) In the Algerian case, without a legitimate guiding authority, elite consensual unity and mass support were not clearly established and when the process faced crisis it fell apart. I believe there are lessons to be learned in these case studies that can prove that 'legitimate authority guiding the process' should be added to the list of factors that favor a successful transition to democracy.49 Admittedly, however, there will ultimately be tension between the monarch and the emergent democratic elite, as in a full democracy any real monarchical power is illegitimate. But in the transitional phase and in semi-democracy, at least, I feel that a legitimate monarch can lend a great deal of legitimacy and stability to the process. 2.5 Consolidated Democracies, Unconsolidated Democracies, and Democratic Breakdown Gunther, Puhle and Diamandouros point out that transition and consolidation are conceptually distinct aspects of democratization, although in practice they may temporally overlap or sometimes even 26 coincide.30 "They write: Transition begins with the breakdown of the former authoritarian regime and ends with the establishment of a relatively stable configuration of political institutions within a democratic regime. Consolidation... refers to the achievement of substantial attitudinal support for and behavioral compliance with the new democratic institutions and the rules of the game which they establish.51 In most cases, the consolidation of democracy requires more time than the transition process; consolidation, according to Gunther et al.'s definition, is much more complex, and it involves a much larger number of actors in a wider array of political arenas.52 The outcomes of these processes are also distinct: transition results in the creation of a new regime; consolidation results in the stability and persistence of that regime, even in the face of severe challenges. The end points of the two processes may differ in another way as well. While a transition could culminate in a new, democratic regime, it might not - it could lead to a new regime which is not fully democratic. Worse, a transition might actually fail and lead to the re-imposition of authoritarianism. But for democratic consolidation to occur, as Gunther et al. define it, full conformity with all the criteria inherent in a procedural definition of democracy is required -thus, the transition must have been fully successful.53 Gunther et al. suggest that the concept of democratic consolidation is "double-barreled" in that it joins two distinct concepts that must be assessed separately in analyzing the status of political regimes.54 They write: In order to conclude that democratic consolidation has succeeded in a particular case, it is necessary first to ascertain whether the regime is fully democratic and then to determine if that regime is consolidated. In our conceptualization, both democracy and consolidation are ideal types, and both must be closely approximated before one can conclude that democratic consolidation has occurred.55 Achieving democratic consolidation involves the stabilization, routinization, institutionalization and/or legitimization of patterns of politically relevant behavior, according to Gunther et al.5 6 They quote Phillipe Schrnitter, who noted, ... the basic idea common to all of these is that social relations can become social structures, i.e., patterns of interaction can become so regular in their occurrence, so endowed with meaning, so capable of motivating behavior that they become autonomous in their internal function and resistant to externally induced change.57 27 The essence of consolidation, then, is that the new regime becomes institutionalized and a framework of open and competitive political expression becomes internalized in the society. In Adam Przeworski's terms, democracy is consolidated when under given political and economic conditions a particular system of institutions becomes the only game in town, when no one can imagine acting outside the democratic institutions, when all the losers want to do is to try again within the same institutions under which they have just lost.58 Burton, Gunther and Higley concur that the key to the stability and survival of democratic regimes is the establishment of substantial consensus among elites concerning rules of the democratic political game and the worth of the democratic institutions.59 They cite Giovanni Sartori: "... democratic stability requires that elites perceive politics as 'bargaining' rather than 'war' and that they see political outcomes as positive - not zero sum."60 Burton et al. regard the establishment of this elite procedural consensus and outlook as the central element in the consolidation of new democratic regimes. If this has taken place they call the regime a 'consolidated democracy.' In their view, the difference between unconsolidated and consolidated democracies is the absence of elite consensual unity in the former. They write: The extent to which social groups are organized and led by elites, and the ability of such elites to reach agreement on divisive issues and subsequently, commit their respective groups of followers to the terms of those agreements, are crucial to democratic consolidation and stability.61 Gunther et al. agree that the basic character of politics within consolidated democracies is different from political interactions within unconsolidated systems, and that this enhances the prospects for stability and long-term survival of consolidated systems. They write: First, acknowledging the legitimacy of democratic institutions and respecting the rules of democratic procedure discourages governing elites in new democracies from trampling on the rights of opposition groups. A lack of such commitment, in contrast, could be compatible with an abridgment of democracy that might ultimately culminate in its transformation into a limited democracy or an authoritarian regime.... Governing elites in consolidated democratic regimes share in the consensus supporting a democratic regime and respect its norms and institutions. This serves as a check on abuses of executive power.62 According to Linz, the key to democratic stability (consolidation) is the existence of democratic legitimacy. He writes: 28 More than any other type of regime, [democracies] depend for support on the activation of commitments for the implementation of decisions binding on the collectivity. In normal times, habit and rational calculation of advantage might assure compliance, but in crisis situations, when the authority of the government is challenged by some group in society, or when decisions affect many citizens negatively, this is not sufficient. It becomes even less so when those in authority must make use of force, asking others to risk their lives and to take the lives of fellow citizens in the defence of the political order.63 He goes on to state that the most effective means of upholding the law is not state policemen or the national guard, but rather the citizens who accept the democratically-formulated laws with which they disagree as well as those with which they agree. This belief in legitimacy assures the capacity of a government to enforce decisions. Normally a democratic government should enjoy that legitimacy even among those who constitute its opposition. (Thus the term 'loyal opposition.') Democratic legitimacy, therefore, requires adherence to the rules of the game by both a majority of the voting citizens and those i positions of authority, as well as trust on the part of the citizenry in the government's commitment to uphold them.64 With respect to the question of how legitimacy is created and/or maintained, Linz writes: Why do people believe in the legitimacy of democratic institutions? Answering this question is almost as difficult as explaining why people believe in particular religious dogmas... Undoubtedly, political socialization plays a decisive role, and this is an advantage for long-established democratic regimes whose educational system, mass media, and high culture have made democratic ideals pervasive and understandable. As in the case of other social beliefs, the major role in formulating, elaborating, and transmitting the legitimacy formulae is played by intellectuals.... Most people give allegiance to the regime on the basis of a complex set of beliefs.65 Thus democratic legitimacy is often reinforced by becoming a form of tradition, and the personal charisma of democratic leaders committed to the regime tends to reinforce its institutions. But Linz also argues that efficacy and effectiveness have a great deal to do with whether a democratic regime will be perceived as legitimate or not. Efficacy... refers to the capacity of a regime to find solutions to the basic problems facing any political system... that are perceived as more satisfactory than unsatisfactory by aware citizens.... The efficacy of a regime is judged not by the actions of a particular government over a short span of time, but as the sum of its actions over a longer period of time compared to the performance of different governments likely to be more satisfactory to one or another segment of the society.66 29 Linz points out that this represents a special disadvantage for new regimes facing serious problems during the period of consolidation, since their governments cannot point to past achievements as proof of the regime's efficacy in the face of their presumably temporary failures. The problem becomes even more serious if the preceding regime had considerable efficacy to its credit, efficacy to which remaining supporters can point. Effectiveness, on the other hand, is the capacity actually to implement the policies formulated, and to achieve the desired results, according to Linz. Despite widespread consensus about the goals to be pursued, and even about the means to be used, those goals, and above all, the means, can actually turn out to be unavailable, inefficient, and subject to delay and resistance in the process of implementation. Such ineffectiveness weakens the authority of the state, and, as a result, weakens its legitimacy. Ineffectiveness also raises questions about policies that had been perceived as efficacious. Linz notes, "Here again, new regimes face particular problems, since they have not yet assembled the administrative staff necessary to implement policies."67 The initial surge of support for the regime, plus the disorganization and weakness of the opposition, leads them to underestimate the resistance their policies are likely to encounter. Dahl also notes the importance of effectiveness. He asserts that expectations about governmental effectiveness can be a more or less fixed element in the political culture of a country: the young may be regularly socialized into believing that their government is, on the whole, highly effective or chronically ineffective. He writes: Where beliefs about the effectiveness of government are uncertain or shallow, as is often true with new regimes, inept performance is even more dangerous. Thus the inability of new established polyarchies in Italy, Germany, and Spain to cope effectively with palpable problems - even to maintain public order - generated doubts about the effectiveness of polyarchy and spurred the shift toward dictatorship.68 Thus beliefs about governmental effectiveness may reinforce, weaken or alter prevailing beliefs about authority. Since all governments fail some of the time, socialization builds up a reservoir of confident expectations that function as a reserve during periods of adversity. Dahl then argues, like Linz, that in new regimes these reservoirs are likely to be low or even empty - thus new regimes are likely to face particular challenges (especially in times of economic distress) and a tendency toward instability. 30 Burton et al. assert that democratic stability requires a careful balance between conflict and consensus. The failure of a democracy to achieve or maintain this balance is manifested in at least three ways. The first is the deliberate stifling of democracy through de facto or de jure denial of civil and political rights (preventing significant groups from participating in politics) or through electoral corruption that effectively negates the preferences of a majority of voters, enabling a dominant elite to govern unchecked by electoral accountability. Second, democratic regimes may be unable to keep the expression of conflict within non-violent bounds. Thus the occurrence of frequent and widespread political violence is evidence of instability. Finally, efforts to topple the regime itself, through organized coups or mass rebellions, clearly manifest the collapse of democratic stability (consolidation), and thus, of the legitimacy of the democratic regime.69 Conversely, in stable democracies, civil and political rights are respected; large-scale mass violence does not occur; and coups and other forcible power seizures are essentially unthinkable. For Burton et al., because no democratic regime is ever fully consolidated in the ideal-typical sense, a democratic regime is best regarded as a 'process of adaptation/freezing of democratic structures and norms, which come to be accepted as legitimate by part or all of civil society.'70 According to Linz, Legitimacy is granted or withdrawn by each member of society day in and day out. It does not exist outside the actions and attitudes of individuals. Regimes, therefore, enjoy more or less legitimacy just by existing.71 Thus, consolidated democracies can be thought of as encompassing specific elite and mass features. However, it should be noted that Dahl, Linz and Burton et al. disagree on the significance of the masses versus the elite in accomplishing consolidation. Dahl feels that the masses are quite insignificant - if they elites support the system and the masses are apathetic, that is not a problem in Dahl's view. Linz, on the other hand, thinks mass attitudes and mass participation are important in the achievement of consolidation. Burton et al. are somewhere in the middle - they believe at a irrinimum that there must be mass support for the democratic constitution, even if the masses are apathetic between (and even during) elections. My opinion is closer to that of Linz. I believe it is imperative that all important elite groups and factions share a consensus about rules and codes of political conduct and the worth of political institutions. They must be unified structurally by extensive formal and informal networks that enable them to influence decision 31 making and thereby defend and promote their factional interests peacefully.72 Secondly, there must be extensive mass participation in the elections and other institutional processes that constitute procedural democracy. No segments of the mass population may be arbitrarily excluded or prevented from mobilizing to express discontents, and recourse to various corrupt practices that distort mass participation is minimal.73 Having both the elite and mass features of consolidated democracy makes new regimes more stable and resilient in the face of sometimes severe challenges, with good prospects for long term survival.74 In contrast, an unconsolidated democracy, according to Burton et al., is a regime where the trappings of procedural democracy exist and there is substantial mass participation, but where there is no real elite consensus about democratic rules of the game and institutions, and where elites are instead disunified in the sense that they distrust and have little interaction with one another.75 This typically follows in the wake of an authoritarian regime's sudden collapse or overthrow.76 Burton et al. caution against the temptation to infer consolidation from observed regime stability and survivability, as this is tautological. For them, one of the most telling measures reflecting the presence or absence of consolidation is found at the time when a constitution is being drafted and ratified, as this process involves numerous public statements by representative elites, as well as formal votes of ratification by elites and often the electorate.77 A substantial vote against a constitution (or a mass abstention on the vote) motivated by fundamental disagreements signals the absence of consolidation. The presence of anti-system parties with significant and persistent levels of electoral support also indicates a lack of consolidation.78 It is clear that definitions of consolidation clearly have an attitudinal component - that is to say, existing political institutions must be regarded as being acceptable and as having no legitimate alternatives - as well as, or even producing, a behavioral component - i.e., a specific set of norms is respected and adhered to by all politically significant groups.79 Linz verifies this: In a democracy, citizens are free to disagree with the law, but not to disobey it, for in a government of laws, and not of men, no one, however prominent or powerful, and no mob, however unruly or boisterous, is entitled to defy them. This belief does not require agreement with the content of the norm or support for a particular government, but it does 32 require acceptance of its binding character and its right to issue commands until changed by the procedures of the regime.80 Thus a lack of democratic consolidation is in evidence if there exists sustained mass mobilization or insurrection against a regime by a large movement demanding radical political change through irregular means ~ in other words, democratic instability. This is the numerical component to determining the political significance of dissident groups. A regime cannot be regarded as consolidated if it cannot not survive and remain stable in the face of serious challenges (i.e., major economic or international crises, or outbreaks of terrorist violence).81 Dissidents against the system must be numerically insignificant, basically isolated from regime supporting forces, and therefore incapable of disrupting the stability of the regime for the democratic system to be considered consolidated. The strategic location of anti-democratic forces is also relevant - for example, are they fringe groups or commanders of key military units? When the situation gets to the point where mass mobilizations in the streets take the place of bargaining amongst elected representatives and become the principal form of 'dialogue' between government and opposition (or even between rival opposition groups), Gunther et al. assert that a self-reinforcing cycle of protest-repression-protest may be set in motion that progressively polarizes relations among groups and raises the overall level of violence within the polity. Given the magnitude of such a movement (in contrast to the British and Spanish experiences), such a regime cannot be regarded as consolidated and thus likely to survive over the long term without undergoing considerable change. Dahl shares a concern about the threat that violence poses to democratic consolidation. He writes: "The likelihood that a government will tolerate an opposition increases as the resources available to the government for suppression decline relative to the resources of an opposition."82 Two very general kinds of circumstances can reduce the capacity of a government to use violence or socioeconomic sanctions against an opposition. First, these factors sometimes cease to be available as political resources. This possibility is particularly relevant to violence against opponents of the government by police or military forces, for the police and military may actually be very small, or, what amounts to very nearly the same thing, they may become so depoliticized that they can no longer be used by political leaders for internal political purposes.83 Second, these (and other) political resources may be so widely dispersed that no 33 unified group, including the government (or a unified group of leaders in the government) has a monopoly over them. Where the military is relatively large, centralized and hierarchical, democratic consolidation is impossible unless the military is sufficiently depoliticized to permit civilian rule, in Dahl' opinion. The circumstances most favorable to competitive politics exist when access to violence and socioeconomic sanctions is either dispersed or denied to both the opposition(s) and the government. The least favorable circumstances exist when violence and socioeconomic sanctions are exclusively available to the government and denied to the oppositions.84 Gunther et al. argue that democratic consolidation contributes to stability in that it reduces the intensity of political conflict by restricting it to peaceful institutionalized channels. Having a common set of democratic norms of behavior reduces uncertainty about appropriate and inappropriate behavior and creates a routine of nonviolent and mutually respectful expressions of political disagreement, in their view Gunther et al. also argue that since threat of violence has been removed in a consolidated democracy, incumbents are more willing to step down if they lose an election, because they can feel confident that they will survive and perhaps return to power in a future election.85 They write: Acknowledgment of the legitimacy of governmental institutions in a new democracy also increases the probability that conflict will be channeled as a matter of choice through democratic, representative institutions, rather than into unregulated extra-parliamentary arenas... The dynamics of political conflict in unconsolidated regimes are distinct in several ways. Important and powerful elites and their supporters deny the legitimacy of the existing regime and may seek to overthrow it. Challenges to regime legitimacy and the absence of consensual acceptance of democratic norms of behavior also impart a tenuous and mutually suspicious quality to expressions of political conflict. ... [leaders] engage in democratic processes only as long as such activities are useful in advancing their interests...86 Thus the presence or absence of violence in a society is a telling indication of whether or not the democratic regime is consolidated or not. 2.6 Conclusion It has been made clear that transition to democracy (and the maintenance of it) is aided by several conditions ~ the development of an independent civil society; a modern economy and the taxation of citizens' labor (i.e. a non-rentier economy); the development of a political culture based on democratic 34 values (as previously laid out); political pluralism (multipartism and government toleration of opposition); and, a depoliticized military. I would argue that all of these factors are of roughly equal importance and must be present to some degree in order for a transition to democracy to be successful. All of these factors exist to some degree or another in one, two or all three, of the countries studied in this thesis, and it will be made clear in the following chapters how the presence or absence of each of these factors as affected the success or failure of each country's transition. It has also been established in this chapter that democracies stabilize (consolidate) when elite consensual unity is established concerning the rules of the democratic political game and the worth of the democratic institutions. This necessitates a careful balance between conflict and consensus in the system. Since the issue of interest in this thesis is democratization in the Middle East, and the region's freest and most democratic countries are still only semi-democracies, this analysis has raised an interesting question to be addressed: Can there ever be a consolidated semi-democracy? Exploration of the case of Jordan will be most insightful on this point, and the question will be answered in the conclusion. 35 Endnotes - Chapter Two 1 Larry Diamond, Juan L. Linz and S. M . Lipset, Democracy in Developing Countries. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1989: 5. 2 Giacomo Luciani, The Arab State. London, 1990: xxiv. 3 Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, "Beyond Democratization: Political Change in the Arab World," Political Science and Politics, Vol. XXVII, No. 3, Sept. 1994: 508. Traditionally ta 'addudiyya meant relative freedom outside of the "national politics" realm. It meant participation, debate and compromise in community life (i.e. at the more local or grassroots level). 4 John Waterbury, "Democracy without democrats?" in Ghassan Salame (ed), Democracy Without Democrats, London: I B . Tauris Publishers, 1994: 34. 5 Waterbury: 34. 6 Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. London: 1957, as cited in Heather Deegan, The Middle East and Problems of Democracy. Buckingham: Open University Press, 1993: 3. 7 See footnote no. 6 in chapter one. 8 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave. Norman, Oklahoma: Oklahoma University Press, 1991: 59. 9 Deegan: 7. 1 0 S. M . Lipset, Political Man. London: 1966: 71. 1 1 Bahgat Korany, "Arab Democratization: A poor cousin?" Political Science and Politics, Vol. XXV11, No. 3, September 1994: 511. 1 2 Waterbury: 30. Giacomo Luciani, "Economic Foundations of Democracy and Authoritarianism: The Arab World in Comparative Perspective," Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 4, 1988: 462. 1 4 Korany: 511. "Korany: 511. 1 6 Luciani: 462. 13 17 Luciani: 463. 1 8 Rex Brynen suggests that possibly three-quarters of all East Bank Jordanians were employed by the state in the 1980s. Rex Brynen, "Economic Crisis and Post-Rentier Democratization in the Arab World: The Case of Jordan," The Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. X X V , No. 1, March 1992: 72. 1 9 Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971: 60-61. 2 0 Dahl: 15-16. 2 1 Rosefsky Wickham: 508. 2 2 Sami Zubaida, "Islam, the State, and Democracy: Contrasting Conceptions of Society in Egypt," Middle East Report, Vol. 22, No. 79, 1992: 179. 2 3 Rosefsky Wickham. 508. 2 4 Gundrun Kramer, "The Integration of the Integrists: a comparative study of Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia," in Ghassan Salame (ed.), Democracy Without Democrats, London: I B . Tauris Publishers, 1994: 201. 2 5 Rosefsky Wickham: 508. This Islamic sphere calls to mind the "parallel polis" or "parallel society" of Central and Eastern Europe, in which norms and values associated with the official order were contested well before the collapse of communist rule. 2 6 John L . Esposito, Islam and Politics (3rd Ed) , Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1991: 12. 2 7 Islam has three major political tendencies: the Sunni theory, the Shi'ite theory, and the Kharidjite theory. The first holds that the question of the caliphate belongs to the community, which can choose its own guide. Yet the caliph, according to this theory, must come from the tribe of Quoreich, the tribe of the Prophet. The Shi'ite theory, which was held by the partisans of Mohammed's son-in-law Ali, teaches that the caliphate belongs to Ali and is transmitted to his hereditary successors. The Kharidjite theory maintains that any otherwise worthy Muslim can succeed to power without regard to tribal or familial identity. The Sunni theory prevailed in the immediate aftermath of the Prophet's death, and became operative through the caliphate, which from then on would be considered the power base of political and religious life in the Muslim community. Omar Bendourou, "Power and Opposition in Morocco," Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7, No. 3, July 1996: 122. 2 8 Esposito: 154. 2 9 Esposito: 153. 3 0 Korany: 512. 3 1 Dahl uses the term "polyarchy" because he feels it is more precise, but for the purposes of this paper democracy and polyarchy are one and the same. 36 3 2 Dahl: 34. 3 3 Dahl: 36. 3 4 Dahl: 36. 3 5 Dahl: 37. 3 6 Dahl: 37. 3 7 Dahl: 39. 3 8 Dahl: 39. 3 9 Dahl: 40-41. 4 0 Dahl: 45. 4 1 Huntington, The Third Wave: 123. 4 2 Dahl: 41. 4 3 Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa. Washington, D C : Howard University Press, 1982: 164-172. 4 4 Dahl: 221. 4 5 Dahl: 226. 4 6 Dahl: 226. 4 7 Dahl: 227. 4 8 Huntington, The Third Wave: 37-38. The list reads as follows: a high overall level o f economic wealth; relatively equal distribution o f income and/or wealth; a market economy; economic development and social modernization; a feudal aristocracy at some point in the history o f society; the absence o f feudalism in the society; a strong bourgeoisie; a strong middle class, high levels o f literacy and education; an instrumental rather than consummatory culture; Protestantism; social pluralism and strong intermediate groups; the development o f political contestation before the expansion o f political participation; democratic authority structures within social groups, particularly those closely connected to politics; low levels o f civil violence; low levels o f political polarization and extremism; political leaders committed to democracy; experience as a British colony; traditions o f toleration and compromise; occupation by a pro-democratic foreign power; influence by a pro-democratic foreign power, elite desire to emulate democratic nations; traditions o f respect for the law and individual rights; communal (ethnic, racial, religious) heterogeneity; communal (ethnic, racial, religious) homogeneity; consensus on political and social values; absence o f consensus on political and social values. 4 9 B y definition, presidential systems cannot have monarchs and thus the legitimacy o f the monarch cannot be used to legitimate a newly democratic system. O f course, not all parliamentary systems have monarchs, but some do. For a broader discussion o f the general importance o f presidential versus parliamentary systems on democratic stability, see Linz and Valezsuela (eds.) The Failure of Presidential Regimes. 5 0 Richard Gunther, Hans-Jurgen Puhle and P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, "Introduction," in Richard Gunther, Nikiforos Diamandouros and Hans-Jurgen Puhle (eds), The Politics of Democratic Consolidation. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995: 3. 5 1 Gunther, Puhle and Diamandouros: 3. 5 2 Gunther, Puhle and Diamandouros: 3. 5 3 Gunther, Puhle and Diamandouros: 3. Gunther et al. believe that what matters for the transition may be less relevant or irrelevant for democratic consolidation, and vice versa. They caution readers to distinguish conceptually between transition and consolidation insofar as the two distinct aspects o f the broader democratization process may interrelate with one another in subtle but important ways. " Gunther, Puhle and Diamandouros: 5. 5 5 Gunther, Puhle and Diamandouros: 5. 5 6 Gunther, Puhle and Diamandouros: 7. 5 7 Phillipe Schmitter, "The Consolidation o f Political Democracy in Southern Europe (and Latin America)," unpublished manuscript, 1985, as cited in Gunther, Puhle and Diamandouros: 7. 5 8 Adam Przeworski, Democracy in the Market: Political and Economic Reform in Eastern Europe and Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, as cited in Gunther, Puhle and Diamandouros: 7. 5 9 Michael Burton, Richard Gunther and John Higley, "Introduction," in Higley and Gunther (eds), Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe. London: Cambridge University Press, 1992: 3. 6 0 Giovanni Sartori, The Theory of Democracy Revisited, Part One: The Contemporary Debate. Chatham, N.J. : Chatham House Publishers, 1987, as cited in Burton, Gunther and Higley: 3. 6 1 Burton, Gunther and Higley: 10. 6 2 Gunther, Puhle and Diamandouros: 9. 37 Juan J. Linz, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown andReequilibration. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978: 16. 6 4 Linz: 17. 6 5 Linz: 18. 6 6 Linz: 20-21. 6 7 Linz: 23. 6 8 Dahl. 147. 6 9 Burton, Gunther and Higley. 3. 7 0 Burton, Gunther and Higley: 4. 7 1 Linz: 17. 7 2 Burton, Gunther and Higley: 4. 7 3 Burton, Gunther and Higley: 4. 7 4 Burton, Gunther and Higley: 5. Burton et al. consider the United Kingdom and Spain to be consolidated democracies even though both countries have separatist movements in small regions which deny the legitimacy of their national government. They feel that the theoretically and politically important point is that consolidation at the national level has enabled the democratic regimes of the United Kingdom and Spain to withstand serious and often violent challenges to their stability and survival. 7 5 Burton, Gunther and Higley. 5. 76 Burton et al. also outline two other categories: stable limited democracies are systems where elites share substantial consensus and display structural unity, but where mass participation does not extend much beyond relatively well-off strata owing to a restricted suffrage, and/or when a passive peasantry makes up a large section of the population. The examples of this are said to be Britain and Sweden in the nineteenth century. Burton et al.'s last category of'democratic regimes' is pseudo-democracies, by which they mean regimes which regularly hold elections and proclaim themselves to be "democratic" but in which the elite and mass features of consolidated democracies do not exist to any meaningful extent. These regimes typically are rather tight one-party regimes, de facto if not officially, where elections are held, but they involve so little elite competition and so much mass intimidation that they merely represent perfunctory public ratification of the dominant elite's political choices. Burton, Gunther and Higley: 6-7. 7 7 Burton, Gunther and Higley: 7. 7 8 Burton, Gunther and Higley: 8. By anti-system Burton et al. mean a party which is unequivocally opposed to the existing regime. Luckily these parties are most often easily recognizable as they make no bones about their stance -they vote against constitutions or organize boycotts of constitutional referenda, they regularly condemn the regime and articulate their vision of the alternative regime they seek, and they often try to subvert existing institutions, even when elected to serve in them. 7 9 People in a new democracy may not see the distinction between the democratic regime and the particular type of democratic regime (i.e., first-past-the-post versus proportional representation, presidential versus parliamentary, etc.). Thus, while they may not support the particular type of democratic system they are living under, they are not anti-democratic. However, if enough citizens (and particularly, elites) do not support the type of democratic system that has been installed, the regime cannot consolidate. 8 0 Linz: 17. 8 1 Gunther, Puhle and Diamandouros: 9. 8 2 Dahl: 48. 8 3 Dahl: 49. 8 4 In the remaining case of the key resources being under the monopoly of the opposition, a pure case would hardly exist, since the 'government' would lack the operational characteristics of a government. However, if a sort of situation as this were to occur it would mean that the government would be weak and unstable - if it displeased the opposition it would be easily overthrown. 8 5 Gunther, Puhle and Diamandouros: 9. 8 6 Gunther, Puhle and Diamandouros: 10. Examples of this are several European democracies in the inter-war period and several of the initial democracies in post-colonial Africa, in which democratic norms were not widely internalized, violent extra-parliamentary behavior was common, and elites who lost power were denied civil and political rights, having no real prospect of returning to power through the regime's 'representative' institutions. 38 CHAPTER THREE: ALGERIA 3.1 Introduction In 1991 Algeria held the first national multiparty elections in its history, and the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) came to the brink of controlling Parliament - a very unpleasant surprise for the Algerian regime, many Algerian citizens, and the international community at large - which led to the annulling of those elections, the ouster of then-President Benjedid, and a brutal military crackdown that drove the Islamic movement underground. Since then a wave of terror has bloodied the country, resulting in the deaths of some 35,000 people, and the destruction of billions of dinars of property.1 The bloody struggle between Algeria's unpopular, repressive military regime and the Islamist opposition (part of which is resorting to vicious terrorism in its attempt to overthrow the government), appears to have reached a deadly stalemate. The result has been over four years of paralysis in which two potentially authoritarian solutions - one military and the other possibly theocratic - have battled for supremacy while secular democrats agonized over the narrow space left for them. These facts beg the question: how did Algeria's democratization process turn so sour? The case of Algeria is interesting because its democratization process was the boldest one ever undertaken in the Middle East. Tragically, however, it fell apart. This chapter will argue that the Algerian process fell apart for the following reasons: there was no pact (no elite consensual unity); the speed of the transition was far too fast; there was no legitimate institution to guide the transition (the army had been a legitimate guiding institution in the post-colonial period, but its role in this respect had completely diminished by the mid 1980s); and finally, the party system was too fragmentary. Consequently, there was no consolidation of the democratic system. Further, because the process was a regime response to political, social and economic crisis, it was, in Rostefsky Wickham's terms, 'defensive, truncated and tactical,' and did not involve an attitudinal or behavioral shift in the government or the opposition. Finally, the fact that coercive power was concentrated in the hands of the military did not bode well for a democratic Algerian future. 39 3.2 Political Development Algeria was a French colony from 1830 until 1962. By 1954, however, the National Liberation Front (FLN) had arisen as the guiding force of the nationalist, anticolonial struggle. In their drive to defeat the French in the eight-year long war of independence, FLN leaders concentrated on developing military institutions at the expense of political institutions, a move which largely determined the future destiny of the FLN and the political development of Algeria as a whole.2 The colonial period in Algeria was unusually harsh, and the war of independence was particularly costly. Algeria finally became independent on July 5, 1962, following a referendum on self-determination that was massively approved. Out of the colonial status quo emerged the new Algerian political system. Ahmed Ben Bella, an FLN war hero, became the first ruler of the newly-independent Algeria. Since the FLN had developed during the war as a military institution rather than a political party, a process was immediately set in motion to rebuild it as an institutionalized mass party by reorganizing its structure and by integrating and co-opting popular constituent groups such as trade unionists into the resuscitated party organization.3 But Ben Bella insisted that the FLN's emerging institutions had to integrally reflect his personal leadership. The coup of 1965 produced a decisive shift in Algeria's post-independence history. With the disappearance of Ben Bella, the party system and all the institutions which the FLN had represented were dismantled.4 New power, under the aegis of the army, effectively replaced the old institutions. Immediately after the coup, army officers created the Council of the Revolution as the leadership of the newly militarized political system, headed by Colonel Houari Boumedienne. The council's twenty-six members soon established firm control of state and society. Yet despite the dramatic change in political leadership and organization, there was some continuity in political policy, roles and philosophy from the Ben Bella regime to the military government. Foreign policy continued to be generally aggressive vis-a-vis the Western powers, particularly France and the United States. But ideology vanished as an issue of official concern in the post-Ben Bella era. The Boumedienne regime maintained a formal attachment to socialism but made no effort to develop an ideological synthesis to theoretically explain and justify governmental decision-making.5 Instead, efficiency and productivity emerged as the prime motivating 40 factors of the new government's policies and actions. The problems of divisiveness of political leadership was largely alleviated after the coup with the consolidation of the military government and the elimination of politicians from the decision-making arena. Despite the fact that Ben Bella's revolution had failed, substantive socioeconomic changes resulted from the anti-colonial struggle and its aftermath. Algerians from peasant backgrounds were able to rise to powerful positions; there were changes in property ownership following the exodus of the French; and there was a new sense of self-esteem and positive identity among independent Algerians.6 Thus, despite the failure of the Algerian regime to develop a mass party based on a cohesive ideology, the Boumedienne regime established its legitimacy through its leaders' records in the war of independence and a focus on government efficiency and productivity. It attempted to modernize the country from the top-down: it did not tolerate direct challenges, and it valued order over freedom. But life was tolerable for most Algerians, who were sick of the violence and disorder which had plagued their country prior to and during the war of independence.7 In its attempts to develop the economy, the Algerian regime embarked on a far-reaching nationalization of the economy and very ambitious projects for industrialization.8 The regime also developed an impressive infrastructure and bureaucracy for health care and basic education. The result was a significant drop in infant mortality rates, which caused the population to rise considerably. Further, increased access to health care and education led to rapid urbanization. As a result of the ever-increasing population growth and urbanization, the regime eventually could not keep up in terms of providing quality education and training, and the economy could not provide enough jobs for the large mass of semi-educated, unemployed youth that resulted. To summarize, Boumedienne's regime, despite its military nature and lack of cohesive ideology or mass party support, provided stability and a degree of economic well-being. It was able to maintain its legitimacy based on its leader's central role in the war of liberation from France, its moderately successful economic management, and its ability to provide order. 41 3.3 Prelude to the Initiation of the Democratization Process In the 1980s, Algeria ~ by now under the kinder, but less charismatic, rule of President Chadli Benjedid ~ faced three simultaneous crises. The first was economic. In the 1970s oil and gas revenues had grown large enough to allow a boom in consumer goods, and a private economic sector emerged. Algeria borrowed billions of dollars at high interest rates to pay for its industrialization and social programs on the assumption that mounting oil and gas revenues (upon which the Algerian economy was highly dependent) would be available when repayments came due. As a result, the economy would be extremely vulnerable if energy prices were to drop sharply, which they did in the mid-1980s. In response to the sharp drop in Algerian oil and gas revenues in 1985-86, sharp price increases had to be implemented, and the Benjedid government faced a tough choice.9 It could pull back from liberalization and impose austerity measures, or it could take economic and political liberalization even further, in pursuit of a new kind of legitimacy. It was clear that the social security budget, along with education and health spending, were no longer sustainable. When violent riots (partly in reaction to price increases) broke out in October 1988, resulting in the deaths of several hundred demostrators, the Benjedid regime made the decision to pursue greater economic and political liberalization. The rentier "social contract" that the regime had once had with the people - support of the people in return for the benefits of a welfare state - was no longer considered sustainable. The regime would instead seek legitimacy through liberalization. This economic crisis came at the same time as social and cultural unrest began to emerge. By the late 1980s half-educated and unemployed young people were fuming that the government had failed them. These young, predominantly male, Algerians began to group together at mass protests which culminated in the riots of October 1988, and became increasingly Islamist in their views. The riots revealed that a gulf had opened between the regime and the post-independence generation. The government's post-independence legitimacy, based on the leaders' roles in the war of liberation from France and the initially satisfactory management of the economy, meant nothing to this younger generation.10 They were sickened by the stagnation and corruption they perceived in the government hierarchy. More than two decades had passed since independence had been achieved: what had the regime accomplished since then? These 42 young men did not remember the war or its heroes - thus, as the economy began to fail the legitimacy and authority of the regime disintegrated. It has already been stated that the Benjedid government chose to pursue a new legitimacy through economic and political liberalization. As a result of this decision, Benjedid ended one-party rule by means of constitutional reforms in 1989. These reforms allowed for greater openness in politics, perrmtting virtually any political tendency to organize. As a result, for a brief period in the late 1980s Algerians enjoyed one of the freest presses in the Middle East and formed political parties with abandon.1' Dozens of "sofa parties" formed - some consisting of no more than a handful of people loyal to one or another of the country's past leaders.12 But the most significant impact of the reforms, in hindsight, was the opportunity they presented for the Islamists to develop into a potent mainstream social movement that fed on the widespread sociopolitical discontent among Algerians. The Islamists offered a simple explanation for the economic ills and social problems troubling Algeria: the government had strayed from the path of Islamic piety.13 The government had realized at the time that recognizing the Islamist movement as a legal political party presented problems and was, in fact, something most Arab governments had (and have) not done. There was a great deal of disagreement within the FLN about how the Islamic movement should be handled. It is suggested by some analysts that Benjedid, because he was at odds with the leftists in the FLN over economic policy, might have counted on enlisting the Islamists in a new coalition.14 For whatever reason he made his decision, the decision to recognize the Islamists as a legal party transformed Algerian politics, because, as the Algerian political scientist Abdelkader Djeghloul has pointed out, "the FIS... is not a party like the others."15 The indisputable result of Benjedid's political decisions, however, was that the economic and sociocultural crisis in Algeria developed into a political crisis. The growth of Islamic opposition in Algeria occurred in much the same way that it has in many other Middle Eastern countries. A home-grown Islamic opposition movement in Algeria was to be expected for two reasons: first, Islam remained the major source of cultural identity well beyond the colonial period; and second, the mosques provided the only feasible space in which opposition to the one-party state could be expressed. Many of the "moudjahidines" who took up arms against France had had 43 their nationalism defined by their Muslim heritage.16 When more secular forces took control of the state after independence, the Islamic cultural nationalists withdrew to the mosques, mamtaining a stand that was bound to find political expression sooner or later. As disillusionment with the Algerian regime grew, recruitment of Islamic activists at high schools and universities became a particularly successful way for the Islamists to spread their views. The movement addressed issues like poverty and unemployment, the growing gulf between rich and poor, inadequate government services, political corruption, perceived government subservience to Western demands, and the hedonistic or European lifestyles of the well-to-do.17 Islamists both in Algeria and in other countries dealt with these issues through a comprehensive critique of modern life and argued persuasively that a return to core values would bring social justice, good government, and a higher level of moral life while putting Muslims in touch with their glorious past. As economic grievances accumulated throughout the 1980s, the support network for the Islamic movement grew. The movement's message of morality appealed to many Algerians who were fed up with the stagnation they felt after 25 years of FLN rule. Supporters came to include a large number of the best-educated and most intelligent young Algerians, including scientists, engineers, agronomists, doctors, and Western-style lawyers.18 These professionals prayed side by side with, and possibly even outnumbered, formally trained mullahs and specialists on Islamic law. However, the leaders of the Islamic movement saw the rootless poor of the big cities - inclined by their village origins to turn to religion for solace - as natural allies. As a result of their growing support, the Islamists began to see the ballot box as the most effective instrument for achieving social and political change.19 And so it happened that the Islamists were waiting in the wings when President Benjedid made his two shocking political moves: first, to open up Algerian politics after nearly three decades of one-party rule; and second, to allow the Islamic movement to become a legal political party. Thus Algeria's disparate Islamist movement organized itself as a formal political party known as the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). The FIS was created out of an amalgamation of several trends in Islamic thought, but focused on the idea that the religious and political spheres are one and the same. The founders organized a 35-member governing council that appointed as their leader Abassi Madani, a 44 university professor imprisoned from 1982 to 1984 for his support of acts of political violence.20 It was he who led the FIS to its electoral victory in 1991. Two issues came to form the core of the FIS's ideology: the need to enshrine sharia (holy Islamic law) as the law of the land, and the need to return to Koranic practice with respect to the treatment of women. Point eleven in the FIS platform requires the chief of state to enforce sharia; point twelve enjoins the protection of feminine dignity, morals, and honor as guaranteed in the Koran.21 The fact that these two issues were central to the formation of the FIS suggested to many that the party was not committed to democratic values.22 Another aspect of the FIS which added to their appeal was the fact that they were able to steal the nationalist mantle from the FLN. One tends to forget that the Islamists too have imbibed Western culture -they knew the vocabulary of the modern nation-state and became nationalists without abandoning in their hearts Islam's borderless appeal.23 In fact, very interesting arguments have been made by some analysts that the FIS - with its political acumen, nationalist fervor, and use of Western political vocabulary -actually has much in common with the original, anticolonial FLN, and may in fact be taking up the ball that the FLN dropped shortly after independence.24 Once it was formally established, the FIS quickened its development of a mass following through skillfully tapping the resentments of the generation of young, predominantly male, Algerians at the margins of society and economy. In an attempt to gain even greater electoral support the FIS brandished the slogan: "To vote against the FIS is to vote against God."25 Madani said the front was not a political party but an all-embracing expression of the popular will, while his deputy, Ali Benhadj, declared that Algeria "is not a nation that thinks in terms of a majority and a minority."26 These and other statements caused serious doubts about the long-term intentions of the Islamist party. Did it accept freedom of conscience and political pluralism? What would be the fate of secular Algerians or of women's rights if the FIS came to power? While the FIS had committed itself to using peaceful means to obtain power (the ballot box) there was considerable concern that if the FIS won an election its leaders would not be willing risk losing power by holding another election once their term was up. The FIS did not answer any of these 45 questions in the 27 months between the official recognition of the FIS as a political party and the movement's sweeping electoral victory in December 1991.27 3.4 The Elections and their Implications It is now appropriate to step back and look at the first set of multiparty elections held in Algeria, the municipal elections of 1990. Despite growing support for the FIS, Benjedid kept his promise and the elections went forward. As the FIS closed ranks, the FLN, under Benjedid, was disintegrating. It was split into three major factions: socialists who had dominated state policy under former President Houari Boumedienne; economic liberals who had found favor under Benjedid; and Arabists who were close in many ways to the Islamists.28 When Benjedid chose Mouloud Hamrouche as prime minister in 1989, it had signaled the rise of the liberal reformers, and left both the socialist old guard and the Arabists unenthusiastic about the party's direction. The November 1989 party congress brought these rifts to the fore, and left the FLN poorly equipped to take on the insurgent FIS in the municipal elections. As a result of these rifts, it is said that Benjedid toyed with the idea of a presidential alliance with the FIS, but the Islamists had no interest in any such alliance.29 As noted earlier, a plethora of smaller parties developed after the political reforms of 1989. None of these parties was able to build a significant political base, however, and many made the tactical decision to boycott the balloting, which basically made the election a contest between the FLN and the FIS. This allowed the FIS to consolidate the Islamic vote, and further, allowed it to be the benefactor of a protest vote against the government. When the ballots were counted, the FIS had won approximately 4.3 million votes out of an electorate of 12.8 million (54 percent of ballots cast, 33.7 percent of eligible voters), which translated to control of some 850 cities and towns in the country, including the major centers of Algiers and Oran, and over two-thirds of the 48 provincial assemblies.30 It should be noted, however, that some 38 percent of the eligible voters abstained, suggesting that many Algerians supported neither the government nor the FIS, and felt there were no parties mnning which they considered a viable alternative. The fact that the FLN had garnered only 28 percent of the ballots cast further suggests that Algerians were profoundly 46 dissatisfied with their government and longing for real change. As a result of their astounding success, the FIS called for national elections - not only for parliament but for the presidency as well - immediately after their success in the municipal elections. The shock of the municipal election results divided the Benjedid government over what to do next. Many in the government were not yet willing to panic. Due to the fact that many of the non-Islamist, democratic parties had boycotted the elections, and the fact that voter turnout had been less than 70 percent, it was felt that the FIS could not do nearly as well when other alternatives were presented.31 For example, the 1990 election did not test the potential of a coalition of democratic parties opposed to both the FIS and the FLN. The majority in the government, the army, and the non-Islamic parties believed that it was still possible to stem the tide of the Islamic challenge. Thus, after great controversy, the government decided to go ahead with parliamentary elections in December 1991. Concerned about their prospects in a national election, the FLN took advantage of their control of the sitting parliament, under Prime Minister Hamrouche, and passed what Mortimer called "an outrageous redistricting bill."32 The plan increased the number of seats in the Popular National Assembly from 295 to 542, with most of the new seats going to small towns in southern Algeria - the only part of the country in which the FLN had done well in the 1990 elections.33 A poll conducted in May suggested that the tactic might work: it showed the FIS receiving 33 percent of the popular vote and sending 206 deputies to parliament, while giving the FLN 244 seats for only 24 percent of the vote. This move by the governing FLN was denounced by all other parties as blatant gerrymandering. Hocine Ait Ahmed, leader of the Socialist Forces Front (FFS), declared that it would leave Algeria no choice but a police state or a fundamentalist state.34 The FIS called the law "high treason" and demanded that it be repealed. When the assembly did not repeal it, the FIS decided to go to the streets, with protesters occupying key transit points around Algiers. President Benjedid ordered them removed, and after violence erupted he canceled the scheduled elections and declared martial law, as he had in 1988. The military restored order but demanded that the president fire Hamrouche, whom they held responsible for the breakdown of civil order. The army proposed Sid Ahmed Ghozali, a prominent figure during the 47 Boumedienne era, as Hamrouche's replacement. The president agreed, and Ghozali was appointed prime minister and handed the task of organizing "free and clean elections." It was thus that the military moved back to the front line in Algerian politics. After the municipal elections of 1990, the army was very concerned about the Islamic challenge to the government. Their concern grew during the Persian Gulf crisis of 1990-91, when the FIS criticized the army for not training and dispatching "volunteers" to aid Iraq.35 This kind of rhetoric reinforced the army's distrust of the Islamic movement, and fed a growing concern about Islamist influence amongst army recruits - a phenomenon the military's upper echelons sought to control through strict discipline. The army then began to arrest Islamist activists for their alleged role in sparking incidents of violence. When tensions failed to subside, the army hardened its position by arresting Madani, Benhadj, and five other top leaders at the end of June. Having thus decapitated the FIS, the military leadership lifted martial law and allowed the electoral process to resume under Ghozali's direction. The military's distrust of the FLN was growing alongside its concerns about the FIS, especially after the redistricting bill fiasco. For the second time in less than three years it had had to intervene on behalf of the state in a clash with civil society. Since the military had earlier withdrawn its bloc of representatives from the Central Committee of the FLN, it viewed the crisis as primarily the fault of the politicians who had pushed through the redistricting law.36 The military tempered its attacks on militant Islam with its disapproval of strong anti-Islamist sentiments - it even removed some officers known for their strong anti-Islamist views. But in spite of its doubts about the FLN, it can be conclusively stated that the army did not look benignly on the idea of further electoral gains for the FIS.37 The army assumed that the more moderate elements of the FIS, who were publicly voicing their dissent, would take control of the FIS once Madani and Benhadj were imprisoned.38 Despite divisions within the leadership, however, the Madani faction held onto control through Abdelkader Hachani, a member of the younger generation of Islamist leaders who was made head of a new "provisional executive bureau" of the FIS in July. In the fall months of 1991 the FIS did not make known its intention with regard to participating in the rescheduled parliamentary elections. Many analysts believed that the uncertainty was the result of a 48 loss of popular support for the FIS after the divisions that emerged in the movement following Madam and Benhadj's arrests. These analysts were proven wrong, however, when the FIS organized a huge rally on November 1 (the anniversary of the outbreak of the war of national independence) which demonstrated its continuing hold on many voters.39 Meanwhile, the Ghozali government prepared a new redisricting bill that set the number of seats in the new parliament at 430.40 An electoral system similar to the French two-round, winner-takes-all model, was chosen in the hope that the FLN would be able to use this system to its own advantage, winning more seats than it would be entitled to through a popular vote. It is clear, then, that the regime had not given up on its plan to modify the system to give it a better chance at winning the elections, it simply went about it in a less blatant way. Regardless of the regime's careful planning, however, the plan backfired. Only the FIS succeeded in running a candidate in every district; the ruling FLN had a candidate in all but one of the constituencies, and five other parties were represented in at least two-thirds of the districts around the country.41 Although rumors circulated throughout the fall that the army would intervene if the Islamists won the election, the most common expectation was that no party would win a majority and some kind of coalition government would have to be formed. Just a few days before the December 26 balloting, Benjedid announced that he was available to remain in office until the end of his term in December 1993, implying that he anticipated some form of "cohabitation" with a prime minister selected by a parliamentary coalition.42 The election results dashed any such hopes. The FIS captured 188 seats - just 28 seats short of a parliamentary majority. The FLN won only sixteen seats, while the Front of Socialist Forces (FFS) took twenty-five, and three independents were also elected; this made a total of 232 races that were decided in the first round.43 Moreover, the FIS was fielding one of two candidates in 186 of the 198 districts scheduled for runoffs - in most cases, the candidate in the lead. The non-Islamist vote turned out to be so badly fragmented amongst the plethora of small parties that a stunning FIS electoral victory was virtually assured after the first round. 49 The fundamental question at this point was what would happen if the FIS took control of the government and the National Assembly. Many Algerians feared the imposition of a theocratic Islamic republic if the FIS took office.44 Although Abdelkader Hachani reassured secular Algerians that public liberties would be guaranteed, other FIS leaders spoke of banning non-Islamist parties and closing down anti-FIS newspapers. Many prominent Algerians were concerned that their country was on the verge of returning to a monolithic state similar in form if not in content to the past single-party ideology. Women's groups raised their voices in protest in January of 1992 against the FIS's attitudes and policies toward women. These real rifts developing within civil society, and the Benjedid regime's paralysis in face of the results, provided the military with a justification for intervention. The military did not trust Benjedid. They suspected that he had either made a deal with the Islamists, or that he would if he was given the chance. As a result they decided to get rid of him immediately. Continuing their traditional role as kingmaker, they forced him to announce his resignation in January 1992. Prior to stepping down Benjedid signed a decree dissolving the national assembly, thus preventing its president from serving as acting president of the republic, as would normally occur under the constitution.45 The decision on how to proceed in light of this double vacancy fell to the Constitutional Council, which decreed that the army and the prime minister held primary responsibility for "assuring the continuity of the state."46 Prime Minister Ghozali convened an advisory organ, the High Security Council, which made two important decisions: it canceled the second round of elections, and it announced it would name a new collective executive organ to assume the powers of the presidency.47 The point of all these complex maneuvers was to avoid calling a presidential election - which the FIS could be expected to win, of course - and to establish a new institution in which the military would be represented but would not be in overt control of the government. This transitional authority came to be called the High State Council, also known simply as the ruling council. Shortly after the election was annulled security forces began arresting prominent members of the FIS, including some who had been elected in the December balloting. Soon Hachani was taken into custody for allegedly inciting soldiers to desert, and another prominent FIS spokesman was detained for condemning the coup.48 At the same time militant Islamists began a campaign of attacks on soldiers and 50 policemen. As the frequency of these incidents increased, the authorities carried out more arrests. Some 5,000 people were arrested in the month following the cancellation of the election. On February 9, 1992, the ruling council declared a state of emergency and outlawed the FIS. Response to these machinations of the military-bureaucratic elite was mixed. The FIS condemned the coup as "a plot against Algeria and the Islamic project"; some of the other parties (though notably neither the FLN nor the FFS) welcomed the intervention to prevent the FIS from taking power.49 But while many Algerians were relieved that the Islamists had been prevented from seizing power, the new regime had no legitimacy, and not even a strategy on how to attain it. Thus Algeria's economic and social crises were compounded by a political crisis of unprecedented magnitude.50 Having parliamentary elections before presidential elections was one of President Benjedid's first mistakes. He was in no position to act as the guarantor of the democratic constitution in the face of the 1991 election results because he allowed municipal, regional and legislative elections to take place before he had secured his own legitimacy as president. One cannot say conclusively that he would have won a presidential election, but it seems likely that voters would be less likely to vote for an Islamist presidential candidate as a protest vote. Running as a presidential candidate Benjedid could have organized a much more inspiring and cohesive campaign than the deeply divided FLN ran in the parliamentary elections. The point here is simply that since the army could not act as a legitimate institution guiding the democratization process, there needed to be some institution or individual granted with that legitimacy. Since Algeria has no monarch an elected head of state was likely the best they could do. But this was not the path the regime chose to follow. The army has been the primary source of power in Algerian politics since independence in 1962, if not before. But it has been able to play this role only because it has actually been the principal mediator of something else, namely the sovereignty of the Algerian people. The army was the product of the liberation war, and its political legitimacy was entirely a function of the collective legitimacy of the FLN and the personal legitimacy of the men who commanded it in virtue of the authority and representativeness they had acquired during the war.51 Thirty years later the army had outgrown the wartime generation of heroic ex-maquisards, and it was commanded, for the most part, by professional soldiers with technical 51 expertise but neither political legitimacy nor political ability. It has therefore lost its capacity to function effectively as the source of political mandates. Lahouari Addi writes: The contradiction that has led the regime toward the current violence is its inability to endow itself with legitimate leadership - an inability that has propelled the Islamists into the resulting gap, which had existed ever since the death of President Boumedienne in 1987.52 As a result, the army's attempts since 199.1 to recover its old legitimacy-granting role, far from being conducive to order, have precipitated a terrible disorder. 3.5 Conclusion In theoretical terms, Algeria's democratization process most obviously failed because there was no elite consensual unity, or pact, between the regime and the opposition(s) setting out and agreeing to the rules of the new political game. The regime should have cooperated with its opponents in the formulation of a new constitution so that all parties competing were clear on the rules of the game and confident that they could trust each other to respect the rules. As it was, the Algerian regime had as little to do with the Islamists as possible and thus there was never any understanding or agreement between the regime and its strongest challengers. A democratic system cannot work unless there is a mutual agreement and trust among participants on the rules of the system. Algeria ignored this step in the process and suffered the consequences. Further conditions which theoretically made Algeria a poor candidate for democratization were: its rentier economy (and a stagnant one at that), a military with a history of influence upon and intervention in the political sphere, and the lack of a legitimate institution to guide the democratization process. Another key factor was the time-frame - Dahl tells us that stable democracies develop over a long period of time, not overnight. The Algerian regime did not allow enough time for the development of a more democratic political culture, an independent civil society, or a competitive party system. The difficulties encountered as a result of the hurried nature of the process were exacerbated by the fact that Algeria has no democratic history - right from independence it was a one-party authoritarian state, and prior to that, a French colony. Algerians had virtually no say in their government. Thus the process in 52 Algeria should have been one in which greater participation and influence were granted first at the local levels of government, for a significant period of time, so as to familiarize voters and their chosen representatives with democratic institutions, procedures and values, and to encourage the formation of strong, cohesive parties, interest groups and ultimately an independent civil society imbued with democratic values. The party system at the time of the parliamentary was extremely embryonic, weak and fragmentary - not yet ready for such an important election. Because political parties had been illegal for so long pro-democratic parties did not have time to form and get their messages out to the voters. Only the FIS had their organization and campaigning apparatus ready, due to their years of organization in the mosques. Perhaps their greatest strength has been the failure of secularized Algerians within the regime to create a solid, historically secure, and competitive identity.53 As for the FLN, it was in a state of complete paralysis and disrepair - divided into competing factions with wholly different ideas of what the future of the party and the country should be, unable to assemble a coherent campaign platform. Thus the FLN went to the electorate expecting support for little more than its tepid economic liberalism and its willingness to hold elections in the first place. And as for other parties - the fact that party membership had been illegal for so long resulted in the formation of hundreds and hundreds of parties, each with only a handful of members. Thus for the first multiparty elections in its history Algeria had a party system which was completely disorganized and chaotic. It is no great surprise, then, that in the first multiparty elections in the country's history nearly 30 percent of voters did not bother to cast their ballots. It was clear from the beginning that the Algerian power elite had no intention of handing over power to an Islamic party. The Benjedid government was not genuinely seeking democracy, it was seeking a means to renew itself in face of its rapidly diminishing legitimacy and authority in the eyes of the Algerian populace. As a result, the Algerian democratization process was an extremely sloppy, ill thought-out one. It appears to be the proto-typical model of what not to do if you are a formerly authoritarian government wishing to democratize. In the next chapter the democratization process in Jordan reveals itself as a more encouraging example. 53 Endnotes - Chapter Three 1 Hugh Roberts, "Algeria's ruinous impasse and the honorable way out," International Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 2, 1995. 247. 2 Henry F. Jackson, The FLN in Algeria. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, Inc., 1977: 22. 3 Jackson: xvii. 4 Jackson: 203. 5 Jackson: 205. 6 Jackson: 209. 7 Andrew J. Pierre and William B. Quandt, "Algeria's War on Itself," Foreign Policy, Summer 1995: 134. 8 Pierre and Quandt: 134. 9 Pierre and Quandt: 132. By the early 1990s, Algeria was spending virtually all of its oil income - some $8 to $9 billion annually - just to meet payments on $26 billion of external debt. 1 Robert A. Mortimer, "Algeria: The Clash between Islam, Democracy and the Military," Current History, January 1993: 37. uPierre and Quandt: 135. Even in today's dangerous political climate Algeria's press is remarkably free compared to that of neighboring Tunisia. 12 Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil Liberties, 1994-95. New York: Freedom House, 1995. 96-97. 1 3 Mortimer: 37. 1 4 Mortimer: 38. 1 5 Abdelkader Djeghloul, "Le multipartisme a l'algerienne," Maghreb-Machrek (Paris), January-March 1990: 199. 1 6 Mortimer: 37. 1 7 Richard W. Bulliet, "The Future of the Islamic Movement," Foreign Affairs, Nov-Dec 1993: 39. . 1 8 Bulliet: 42. 1 9 Bulliet: 39. Contrary to the popular; media-encouraged stereotype, the vast majority of Islamists generally, and those in Algeria particularly, prefer to pursue the democratic route to governance. When denied the opportunity to exist as a party or participate in elections, however, increasing numbers (but still not the majority) turn to killing public officials and blowing up buildings in the hopes that through bringing about chaos they may be able to seize power. 2 0 Mortimer: 38. 2 1 Edward G. Shirley, "Is Iran's present Algeria's future?" Foreign Affairs, May-June 1995: 30. 2 2 Many Western observers of Islamic activism have stressed that sharia, like any body of law, must be interpreted and applied, which raised the possibility of gradual innovation and adaptation to the modern world. But, according to Shirley, Sunni Islamists are, as a general rule, strict constructionists. They believe in God's sole legislative authority. They are not impressed with Islamic modernists who want to use ijtihad, the practiced but unacknowledged right of a religious jurist to interpret the holy law, and ijma, a historical understanding that Muslims as a community can modify Islamic practice, as traditional devices to delete medieval legalism from modern-day life. 2 3 Shirley: 30. 2 4 Shirley: 31. "The FLN and the FIS have always shared an anti-Western faith. The FLN opposed the West both because of its left-wing, anti-imperial ideology and because its members were Muslim, however calcified. The Islamic sensibilities within the FLN has become the FIS's ideology. The FIS's "war" against France is not primarily political, as was that of the FLN, which wanted the French settlers out of / Algerie francaise. It is cultural. The FIS wants Christian France, with its American television shows dubbed in French, out of the Algerian mind." 2 5 Mortimer: 38. 2 6 Mortimer: 38. 2 7 Mortimer: 38. 2 8 Mortimer: 38. 2 9 Mortimer: 38. 3 0 Pierre and Quandt: 135. 3 1 Mortimer: 38. 3 2 Mortimer: 39. 3 3 Mortimer: 39. 3 4 Mortimer: 39. 3 5 Mortimer: 38. 3 6 Mortimer: 39. 3 7 Mortimer: 38. 54 3 8 Mortimer: 39. Bashir Faqih, a leader from western Algeria, publicly charged Madani with disregarding the majority view of the front's governing council during the events of early June. El Hachemi Sahnouni, one of the party's founders, reportedly wanted to reorganize the front, leaving out its "stray sheep." Ahmed Marani, another member of the governing council, went on television to criticize Madani: "The FIS's success has gone to his head. He heeds only the flatterers who glorify him." 3 9 This event further substantiates the view that the FIS was able to take up the mantle of the earlier, anticolonial F L N , as the embodiment of the spirit of nationalism and cultural pride. 4 0 Mortimer: 39. 4 1 Mortimer: 39. 4 2 Mortimer. 39. 4 3 Mortimer: 39. 4 4 Mortimer: 40. 4 5 Mortimer: 40. 4 6 Mortimer: 40. 4 7 Mortimer: 40. 4 8 Mortimer. 40. 4 9 Mortimer: 40. 5 0 Obviously a great deal has happened in Algeria since 1991, however, I have chosen not to discuss those events here since this thesis is focused on democratization processes. While the process arguably continues in Algeria today in starts and stops I consider the most interesting and theoretically relevant part of Algeria's story to end with the military coup and ouster of Benjedid. 5 1 Lahouari Addi, "Algeria's Tragic Contradictions," Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7, No. 3, July 1996: 95. 5 2 A d d i : 95. 5 3 Shirley: 33. 55 CHAPTER FOUR: JORDAN 4.1 Introduction The strength of the Jordanian parliamentary institutions in political life has varied greatly since the country achieved independence. In the immediate post-independence period there was a drive towards democratization which culminated in free elections to the fifth Parliament in 1956. This was followed by repression and authoritarian rule during which the National Assembly was reduced to a rubber-stamp parliament before being disbanded in 1974 for ten years.1 Jordan is an important case study for this thesis because it has faced the same cultural and socio-economic challenges as Algeria and Morocco but has developed a liberalization process to deal with them that has been significantly more successful than the processes in Algeria or Morocco.2 There are a number of reasons for this. First, in Jordan there has been a pact (elite consensual unity) between the king's regime and the opposition. Secondly, the transition took place at a much more cautious speed than in the Algerian case. Thirdly, unlike Algeria, Jordan has had a legitimate institution (the monarchy) to guide the democratization process. Coercive power, it is concentrated in the hands of the king, but since he began the liberalization process he has been careful to use it only when it is absolutely necessary. With respect to Islamic organization within Jordan, the king has maintained cordial relations with traditional Islamists since his ascension to the throne, and thus has allowed them to participate as a party in elections. In so doing, he has largely co-opted them into the system and averted political violence. 4.2 Political Development In order to understand why the Jordanian process has been so much more successful than those of its neighbors, it is necessary to be familiar with the country's rather unique history. On July 25, 1928, a national conference was convened in Jordan, comprised of a large number of leaders, thinkers and notables who perceived themselves as representing the people of Jordan.3 The purpose of their meeting was to discuss the first Anglo-Jordanian treaty concluded on February 20 of the same year, as well as to adopt a plan for political action. The conference issued "The National Pact,' which was the first of its kind. It stated that parliamentary elections should be based on 'true representation' and adopted the principle of accountability. The charter can be seen as a precursor for the National Charter which was worked out in 1990, and it seems to represent a significant background factor to the early democratic development in the country. Jordan was proclaimed independent on April 25, 1946.4 A month earlier, on March 22, a new Treaty of Alliance securing British interests after independence was concluded between the British government and King Abdullah. The Constitution of 1946 transformed the Amirate of Transjordan into a constitutional monarchy (as opposed to remaining an Amirate) with a hereditary monarchy and only a consultative parliament.5 Emphasis was put on the executive power, and the Constitution served to perpetuate "the patriarchal nature of government" under King Abdullah (King Hussein's grandfather)6 During the Arab-Israeli war of 1948 the Arab League occupied the West Bank of the Jordan River, and the territory was subsequently annexed by King Abdullah in December 1948. Shortly thereafter, the name 'The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan' was adopted on April 26, 1949. According to Kathrine Rath, three factors contributed to the initiation of the early democratic process which took place in Jordan in the 1950s: the merger of the two banks, the disappearance of Abdullah from the political scene, and the initiative of a group of young, educated, urban deputies who discovered the appropriate circumstances for exerting pressure to obtain constitutional change.7 The incorporation of the West Bank into the Kingdom led to substantial changes in the legislature. The electorate increased from 100,000 to 304,000 of which the Palestinians accounted for 157,000. The number of seats in the Lower House was doubled from twenty to forty, and the two banks were given equal representation.8 While the first election after the proclamation of independence was conducted in a peaceful manner with only one party, al-Nahda, participating, five parties - not officially recognized -campaigned in the election of 1950. Of those five, three were opposed to the government. These derived their main support, not surprisingly, from the West Bank.9 The unification led to an increased importance for the middle class in Jordanian political life and generated pressure for democratic reform. The elections held in 1950 and 1951 disclosed the erosion of government support and showed an increasing support for the opposition and their demands for greater political freedom.10 57 The assassination of King Abdullah in July 1951 led to a period of uncertainty due to problems sorting out the succession.11 In this atmosphere the palace group, consisting of traditional allies of the monarchy, gained influence while handling the daily affairs of the state and deciding the succession. For a short period, Talal, Hussein's father and Abdullah's oldest son, was placed on the throne. During his reign a new constitution was drafted, promulgated in January 1952.12 This constitution, still in force today, changed the old patriarchal structure of government by introducing parliamentarism and allowing the people to participate in the political system. According to Rath, The legislature was for the first time permitted control over the executive as the cabinet was made accountable to the House of Representatives. By a vote of two-thirds majority the cabinet or a minister could be dismissed. The House of Representatives was also given the power to impeach ministers and members of the Senate, and the House of Representatives was given the right to direct questions at any member of cabinet concerning public affairs. The bills passed by the Senate and the House of Representatives still had to be submitted to the king for approval. However, if he refused to sign, a bill could be passed by the National Assembly, after a delay of six months with a two-thirds majority in each of the Houses. The new constitution further increased the say of the National Assembly in economic matters. Article 112 states that the general budget should be submitted to the National Assembly for revision, and it gives the Assembly the power to reduce expenditure and to propose the creation of new provisions.13 The promulgation of the 1952 constitution was an important step in the direction of democracy. Because it recognized the basic freedoms of opinion, expression, press and assembly, and established, in principle, the right to form societies and political parties, Jordanian political life became remarkably free for a number of years. However, despite these gains in freedom, under the new constitution the king retained his power to dissolve parliament without causing the resignation of the cabinet. Under this constitution the king also appoints and dismisses the prime minister and his ministers, calls elections, convenes and prorogues the House of Representatives as well as appoints the president and the members of the Senate. Moreover, despite the increased role of the legislature, the cabinet continues to have monopoly on proposing legislation.14 In short, government under this constitution was not responsible. Hussein became king on May 2, 1953, upon reaching the age of majority. He came to power at a time when the political climate was volatile and greatly influenced by revolutionary tendencies in the region, notably in Egypt. The young king found himself caught between the pressure of public opinion and the interests of the conservative forces in the palace group loyal to the Hashemite dynasty.15 Careful not 58 to be identified with any one side, King Hussein assumed a role of arbitrator between the different political factions. The first years of his reign were distinguished by a liberal political life under the new constitution promulgated by his father. Several changes favourable to a democratic development took place. In line with the spirit of the constitution, restrictions on freedoms of speech, press and assembly were removed. Political parties were formed, previously banned newspapers started publishing again and political prisoners were freed. Constitutional amendments were undertaken giving more power to the parliament. A simple majority became sufficient for overturning a cabinet as opposed to the previous two-thirds, and in the event of parliament being dissolved, the cabinet had to resign.16 A caretaker government, whose ministers could not stand for election, would take it place until a new election could be held.17 The election of October 1956 was the freest ever held in the history of Jordan.18 The debate on the Baghdad Pact preceded this event. The nationalist opposition ~ represented by the Ba'th, Communist and National Socialist parties — was strongly opposed to the pact. With only three representatives in Parliament at the time, the nationalists resorted to expressing their opinion in the street. Despite active attempts by the army and the security forces to quell the demonstrations, it was not possible to silence all the opponents of the government.19 The regime had arrived at a crossroads, and important decisions about the future direction of the political development of the country needed to be made. Acquiescence in the demands of the opposition involved the alienation of the West from Hussein's regime, and the risk of Israeli incursion into the West Bank. Suppression of public opinion, on the other hand, would have made Jordan a police state.20 The king chose to yield to public pressure and make concessions to the opposition.21 Those events contributed to creating the free political atmosphere in which the 1956 election was conducted. There was overt campaigning, and support for the different candidates was openly expressed. The election was a victory for the opposition. The National Socialists received a plurality of votes, and Hussein designated its leader, Sulayman Nabulsi, as prime minister.22 The Nabulsi government committed itself to liberalize the legislation concerning political parties and the press. It abrogated the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty and adopted a pro-Egyptian line in foreign affairs, Nabulsi being an ardent admirer of Nasser. The cabinet received an almost unanimous vote of confidence; even conservative 59 parties such as the Arab constitutionalists gave their consent to the new policies.23 With this overwhelming support the cabinet developed a more independent role, which diminished the initiative of the monarch in the decision-making process. The Nabulsi government undertook changes in the army and the bureaucracy removing several prominent persons from office and replacing them with supporters of the ruling parties.24 Initially a supporter of democratic change, the king was discontented with the way things evolved under Nabulsi, and he proceeded, in alliance with the palace group, to launch a counter-offensive against the liberals.25 Continued royal support for the liberals would almost certainly have entailed an erosion of the king's prerogatives and could even have led to the abolition of the monarchy, with a view to the forces favoring a republican state. It was apparent to the king that concessions given to the opposition had not succeeded in broadening the support for the monarchy. The liberal reforms were perceived as a threat to the position of the palace group as well, and thus the king relied on these conservatives to restore the throne's control on power. Thus it was that in April 1957, after five months in government, Nabulsi and his cabinet were asked to resign. The liberals protested vociferously, but they were politically inexperienced and not united. Days after the government's dismissal a sort of coup was attempted, but luckily for the king units loyal to the crown put it down.26 This "coup attempt," however, was a convenient excuse for the king to terminate the democratic experiment, mrahim Hashim, a Hussein loyalist, formed a new government, outlawed all political party activity, and declared martial law.27 The opposition all ended up in prison or in exile and the press was again subjected to censorship. Martial law remained in effect until 1958, when royal authority had been firmly retrenched. Little changed from that point until the 1967 War, which brought about a new opening up of the political system and some short-lived political changes. The humiliating defeat in 1967 discredited the Jordanian regime and resulted in both a crisis of legitimacy and an economic recession.28 In an attempt to regain legitimacy, political opposition was allowed to operate more overtly and political parties re-emerged even though they were formally banned. However, elections were suspended on both banks on the grounds that they were impossible to carry out in the occupied West Bank and because it could be 60 regarded as a recognition of Israeli occupation if parliamentary elections were to be limited to the East Bank. 2 9 Civil liberties, then, improved slightly for a brief period after 1967, while political rights did not. (Elections to the National Assembly had been held in the 1958-67 period, but they had been held without parties and without opposition candidates.) However, this political opening closed abruptly with the outbreak of the Jordanian civil war (between the Jordanian regime and the Palestinian Liberation Army), in September 1970, which formally lasted ten days, but sporadic fighting continued into mid-1971. King Hussein had been aiding Palestinian guerrillas (fedayeen) in their struggle against Israel by providing them with training sites and assistance. Based in refugee camps, the fedayeen virtually developed a state within a state, obtaining funds and arms from other Arab states and Eastern Europe and openly flouting Jordanian law.3 0 By late 1968 the main fedayeen activities in Jordan seemed to shift from fighting Israel to attempts to overthrow Hussein. Hussein responded in September 1970 by setting out on a campaign to crush fedayeen strongholds in Jordan, which he succeeded in doing. These events put a definitive lid on political activity in the country and marked a return to pre-1967 conditions with a heavy-handed suppression of political parties and a tight control of freedom of expression.31 The political oppression culminated in the dissolution of the House of Representatives in November 1974, and all political power was concentrated in the hands of the king and his cabinet.32 Popular disillusionment with Arab nationalism post-1967, as well as the expulsion of the PLO in 1971, removed much of the internal and external pressure on the king. The 1973 War was followed by a decade of relative stability, in spite of the lack of pohtical expression and popular participation. The oil boom generated aid flows from the oil-exporting countries and large earnings from expatriate workers in the Gulf It led to economic prosperity for the country and served to attenuate political discontent. 4.3 Prelude to the Initiation of the Democratization Process The authoritarian but placid period in Jordanian political history post-1971 came to an end in May 1986 when riots erupted at Yarmouk University in response to the breakdown of the Jordanian-PLO dialogue in February of that year (after only a year had passed from the conclusion of the Jordanian-PLO 61 Accord in Amman) and the development of an economic crisis. The king was faced with two policy alternatives: political liberalization and equal political rights for Jordanians and Palestinians, or the continuation of past policies of co-optation and balancing of the two communities to generate regime support.33 King Hussein opted for the status quo policy, which did not satisfy any of his domestic constituencies and which fueled the already mounting popular frustration. From 1987-88, the economic crisis deepened. In 1988 the Jordanian dinar experienced a sharp decline against the US dollar, losing 45 percent of its value.34 The GDP shrank, unemployment soared, and there was a shortage of foreign currency. Finally, in March 1989 the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was called in to assist in rescheduling the country's foreign debt and restructuring the economy. As part of the deal with the IMF, which included $275 million in standby credits, the government agreed to adopt a five year economic stabilization plan.35 Thus immediate price increases were implemented on a wide range of commodities. The response was swift: spontaneous rioting broke out in Ma'an, situated in the south of Jordan, and spread throughout the country to Karak and Tafileh and as far north as Salt, not far from Amman.36 The rioters were protesting the price increases on basic commodities imposed as part of the IMF structural adjustment plan. A significant feature of these riots is the fact that they started in the rural areas of the south which have traditionally constituted the backbone of support for the Hashemite monarch, and that it was East Bank Jordanians protesting, not Palestinians. Thus the riots can certainly be seen as a sign of the erosion of the regime's legitimacy. During this period the political stability of the country was threatened and the king had to make concessions to the protesters. The community leaders in Karak developed a reform programme which they submitted to the authorities. Their demands included: the amendment of the electoral law to provide democratic pluralist parliament representation; the granting of more political freedoms and a freer press and the formulation of a national economic programme.37 The demands were endorsed by other towns and villages, including those where there was no rioting.38 The reasons for these riots, simply put, was the economic crisis in Jordan coupled with a lack of political pluralism and political freedom. The people were unwilling to bear all three at the same time. 62 At this point let us address the economic factors which led to the push for liberalization in Jordan. The Jordanian economy has been historically characterized by a high dependency on foreign aid and a low contribution of taxation towards the national budget. Dependence on external rent has not been as high as in the case of the oil-exporting countries of the Gulf where oil revenues usually account for more than 90 percent of the budget revenues and domestic taxation is non-existent or negligible; however, external rent has represented a substantial contribution to national income.39 With a view to the crucial importance of foreign aid and workers' remittances, the Jordanian economy clearly has features pertaining to a rentier economy, and the country could be defined as semi-rentier (or secondary rentier) - together with Egypt, Syria and Yemen. Between 1952 and 1966 foreign aid accounted for 30 percent on average of all government revenues and represented between one fifth and one third of GDP. 4 0 After the 1967 war Arab economic and military aid to Jordan started to increase. In the period 1967 to 1972, foreign grants accounted for as much as 58 percent of all government revenues 4 1 The Jordanian experience has been unequivocally one in which "it is the state that supports the domestic economy through public expenditure, rather than the economy supporting the state."42 The state has been the largest employer and supplier of services and benefits. The economic development following the oil boom reinforced the role of the state in the economy. The expansion of the public sector was explosive. From 1974 to 1985 government expenditure rose from JD 139.79 million to JD 707.61 million.43 Economic development (or rather, lack thereof) seems to be directly linked to the initiation of the democratization process in Jordan. The collapse of the Arab oil market in the early 1980s and the substantial fall in oil prices had severe economic and political consequences for the country and came to threaten the social contract based on rentierism. Worker's remittances and petrodollar foreign aid, Jordan's two most important sources of income, fell drastically. Between 1981 and 1987 income from these sources declined from about $2.3 billion to $1.5 billion 4 4 During the same period the share of external grants in government expenditures fell from more than one third to less than a sixth. Despite this considerable decline in income, the government was reluctant to cut its expenditures, which would have meant the withdrawal of economic benefits used to co-opt support for the regime. Instead, state 63 expenditure continued to increase at an average of over six percent per year. The result was a growing budget deficit.45 The economic climate continued to worsen until finally the IMF was beckoned in 1989. 4.4 The Democratization Process Just as the king had come to some crucial decisions about the future of an East-West Bank state comprising the Palestinians he was faced with the 1989 riots against the austerity programme developed by the IMF. 4 6 The king, thus, found himself again at a crossroads. He essentially had three choices: abolish the austerity programme; impose the austerity programme by force and crack down on dissent; or, seek popular support for the economic reforms through political opening, democratization and political freedom. The first two options were not viable - the first would only buy time, the second could eventually result in a coup (if the military became disgruntled and disloyal) - thus King Hussein set upon a cautious programme of political democratization. The king gave in to the demands of the protesters and he proposed a new National Charter which would redefine the state-society relationship and provide a framework for future democratic development. Full parliamentary elections were announced in August 1989 and were set to take place in November of the same year.47 A cautious liberalization of the press also took place. But the king did not recall the austerity programme, and the process of democratization and liberalization was slow and cautious. The parliamentary election of 1989 was the first reasonably free one conducted in Jordan since 1956, and can be seen as a primary test of incipient democratization and the government's commitment to that process. The pre-election atmosphere was characterized by heightened political sensitivity and popular uncertainty about the practical effect of the reforms. The king's personal legitimacy was an important instrument in safeguarding national unity and in communicating the need for peaceful and gradual economic restructuring 4 8 Domestic issues played the main role in the election campaign. Important issues included corruption, mismanagement, the economic crisis and personal freedoms. The list of candidates competing for the eighty seats in parliament was long: 647 candidates ran in twenty multi-member constituencies.49 There were no formal parties (the 1957 law banning them was still in effect) but "political associations" were allowed to operate in the election relatively freely. Most 64 candidates ran as independents, however. Of the potential electorate, 82 percent registered while under 55 percent actually cast their votes.50 Low turnout was attributed to the fact that there were so many candidates and their platforms were very similar. Further, there was lingering doubt about how free the elections would be. The elections were held in November of 1989 with a record turnout of 63 percent of the electorate. The results of the election took many by surprise. It was generally estimated that the Islamists would win seven or eight seats. In fact, out of eighty seats Islamist candidates took thirty-four.51 (The Muslim Brotherhood had twenty of its twenty-six candidates elected; the remaining fourteen seats were won by independent Islamists.) The broadly pro-government forces made up of 'traditionalists, rural community leaders, former officials and Bedouin leaders' won only 31 of 80 of the seats.52 The remaining seats were won by Palestinian and Arab nationalist candidates. A candidate affiliated to the Jordan Communist Party also won a seat. The Muslim Brotherhood was, of course, the only 'opposition' grouping; no political parties had been permitted to participate, but as has been seen, often individuals would act in concert with each other or would operate in affiliation with an organization. In other words, oppositionists could be represented even though parties were proscribed. However, the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood was an 'official' participant may have distorted the level of support it received, especially in light of the fact that during its campaign it called for non-payment of foreign debt.53 The new composition of the Lower House was a radical change from the previous parliament. Initially it was feared that the king would use his constitutional power to abolish the newly-elected parliament and dispose of a largely oppositional Lower House. Instead, he chose a course of accommodation and reconciliation. The Senate was appointed to counter-balance the Lower House and was chiefly composed of traditional supporters of the regime.54 In the semi-democratized system, the king continued to appoint and dismiss the cabinet. He was not obliged to take into consideration the composition of the Lower House when appointing the prime minister. The cabinet and the parliament were regarded as two separate bodies. In fact, a motion to ban Lower House deputies from holding ministerial posts was presented to Parliament for debate early in 1992. It was motivated by a fear that 65 there might be "a conflict of interest for those deputies holding ministerial posts," as well as by a desire to distinguish clearly between the legislative and the executive.55 The new cabinet had as its head Mudar Badran, who represented traditional values and had a conciliatory attitude toward the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood, however, was not included in the government. It conditioned its participation on obtaining the important ministries of interior, education, justice and information, but this was not accommodated. Of the twenty-four ministers in Badran's cabinet, seventeen were either ex-ministers, had held managerial positions, or had had former careers in the civil service.56 These could therefore be regarded as relatively closely linked to the regime and providing a balance to the newly elected parliament. Ten of the ministers were current members of the Lower House; of these, three were Islamists. The formation of the cabinet seemed to be an attempt at weakening the cohesion of the two major alliances in the parliament - the Islamic bloc and the Democratic bloc. The process of democratization continued after the election into the 1990s. The anti-communist law was abolished in 1990. The practice of withholding passports was suspended, political exiles were allowed to return home, and the government began giving permission for political demonstrations.57 In June 1991 a National Charter was agreed upon. It provided guidelines for multiparty politics, greater rights for women, and enhanced freedom of the press.58 The writing of the Charter was undertaken by persons chosen by the king because they represented the different political perspectives (liberals, conservatives, socialists, Islamists, tribal leaders, community leaders, and so on) of Jordanian society. This could be regarded as revived ta-addudiyya in that it involved consensus and mediation among various societal and political groups. The Charter can be seen as a programme for the future democratic development of Jordan, providing a new basis for the relationship between state and society. The National Charter was founded on the "constant tenets of the constitution" as well as on "political and national tradition."59 It was a democratically advanced and a relatively idealistically formulated document with a long-term political perspective.60 66 It will take time to implement the norms laid down in the Charter. But for the time being the most important element seems to be the emphasis which is put on political pluralism and on personal freedoms. According to Kathrine Rath: In order to strengthen the democratic structure, the National Charter gave mandate to introduce constitutional amendments. However, while stating the right of Jordanians 'to establish and belong to political parties', it also included some restrictions on party activity. Parties must be locally based and must not have any 'structural or financial affiliation' to any foreign body. The parties were further not allowed to recruit members of the armed forces or security services. All political organizations must maintain premises with 'known and declared addresses.' There was a prohibition on using 'charitable or religious institutions or bodies for the benefit of any party or group.' The latter could have consequences for the Islamic groupings. Chapter three states that a strengthening of democracy would contribute to deepening the commitment to the homeland, thus linking democratic development and national security.61 In his address to the Jordanian National Congress, King Hussein insisted that democracy must not be mistaken for 'irresponsible freedom'.62 He cautioned against a misuse of democratic rights which could threaten the stability of the regime, and consequently, damage the democratization process. But he and representatives of the country's main political movements endorsed the National Charter, and accordingly, he lifted the ban on political parties in return for allegiance to the monarchy. However, the King reminded the country that political pluralism remained the only guarantee against dictatorship, adding that "there is not a single party that can claim to possess the truth."63 Confusion exists with regard to the National Charter, however. It is not clear what relationship it has with the constitution - which takes precedence? Further, the process appeared undemocratic in many ways - particularly because of the formation of the Commission by royal appointment. (However, his inclusion of various elites was wise in terms of establishing elite consensual unity.) Also, the king ratified the document himself, rather than having it deliberated and voted upon in parliament, or having it voted on in a national referendum. By bypassing the democratic system the king retained his control over the democratization process. The Charter also served his interests in that it implicitly endorses the 1952 Constitution which acknowledges the legitimacy of the monarchy. And, because of its far-reaching goals and long-term perspective, the Charter served to buy time for the king's regime, taking some pressure off the leadership and giving it some maneuverability.64 67 King Hussein took a calculated risk in opening up the political process - an opening of the political system with the accordance of personal freedoms, as well as the implementation of political pluralism, creates a potential for political forces and trends to emerge which might pose a threat to the process of democratization. However, so far the king's move seems to have been successful. But it should be clear that owing to the fact that it is a state-led process, democratization in Jordan is closely linked to the stabilization of the present regime. Why did the Islamists end up being so popular? Valerie Yorke suggests several essential factors.65 A significant cause was the failure of secular nationalism to provide solutions to pressing political and economic problems. As a consequence, a more puritanical and activist form of Islam grew in its appeal among university students and graduates, particularly of Palestinian descent, but increasingly among East Bank Jordanians. Further, political, social and economic problems became more serious after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and with the fall in oil prices in the 1980s.66 Another factor in the Islamists' success was likely the 'alliance' that had existed between the monarchy and the Islamists (notably the Muslim Brotherhood) since the rule of King Abdullah. While all other political parties were banned post-195 7, the Muslim Brotherhood had been allowed to function openly.67 However, in November 1985 there was a clamp-down on the growing Islamic activism - three hundred members of the Muslim Brotherhood were arrested and stricter control was placed on Muslim preachers. This marked the ended of the alliance between the government and the Islamists. However, when the 1989 election came the Muslim Brotherhood still had their well-developed organization comprising an established social network, mosques, schools, welfare services, religious programmes in the national media. In contrast with other political groupings, the Muslim Brotherhood's years of alliance with the government had allowed them to develop fully so that at the time of the election they offered the only coherent, unified alternative.68 There does not seem to be reason for fear of a "green menace" in Jordan, threatening the embryonic democratization process. It seems reasonable to assume that the Islamists will face stronger competition in future elections when the semi-democratized system has been allowed to operate for awhile. With time and the opportunity to operate freely, other political parties are likely to offer more 68 credible alternatives to the Islamist movement than they did in the last election. In fact, it seems that King Hussein was wise to allow the Islamists to participate in elections because in so doing he has moderated their politics by forcing them to compromise in a parliamentary setting. They are unlikely to turn to violent, anti-system tactics if they continue to participate in the sanctioned forum. The difference between the Jordanian and Algerian experiences on this point is that while both regimes allowed Islamists to participate in elections, the Jordanian regime has implemented its process at a much slower pace, forcing the Islamists to accept the system and have their views modified and tempered through parliamentary experience. As the process moves along more influence will likely be accorded to the National Assembly - unlike Algeria where the regime tried to do everything at once (that is, transfer considerable ruling power to an untested assembly). The 1990-91 Gulf Crisis was an important test for the process of democratization. The events following Iraq's August 2 invasion of Kuwait represented the first major political crisis after the initiation of political reform.69 The crisis had the potential to destabilize the Jordanian regime and thereby challenge the democratization process. However, instead it improved political cooperation between parliament and the leadership and led to greater national unity.70 During the crisis the population used its newly acquired political freedom to express its views on the events. Overall, the reactions of the parties were more restrained than those of the masses, leading analysts to suggest that the parties served as a 'cushion' between the masses and the leadership.71 At the same time the political organizations respected and supported the position of the king. King Hussein, for his part, made a move to co-opt the powerful Muslim Brotherhood by including several prominent members of the Brotherhood in cabinet after the January 1991 reshuffle. The importance of the cooperation between the regime and the opposition is shown by the informal pact reached by the parties shortly after the invasion to curb demonstrations in order not to put unnecessary pressure on the king, who had already assumed, in their view, a favorable position with respect to the crisis.72 In theoretical terms, these actions could be termed 'elite consensual unity' with regard to the semi-democratized political process. In a more general sense, too, Jordan has achieved broad elite convergence in terms of its semi-democratized system. The elites have all agreed to abide by the rules of the new system, and there is a 69 degree of trust amongst the political players. There is some question, however, as to whether or not this indicates that the semi-democratic system in Jordan has become consolidated. While the opposition are participating actively in the system as it exists now, they are also anxiously awaiting further progress in the democratization process, culminating in at least shared power between the King and the National Assembly, or even eventually a Western constitutional monarchy along the lines of the United Kingdom. Thus there has not been a definitive settlement on how the political system will function, and because of that the system cannot be truly said to have become consolidated. But there is a pact among elites to work within the system for the time being, at least. And that is considerably more than Algeria had when it embarked on its democratization experiment in 1991. With respect to the future of the 'Islamist challenge' to democracy in Jordan, it is important to note that in June 1991 the Muslim Brotherhood suffered a setback when there was a change of government. Tahir al-Masri, who was foreign minister in the previous government, was assigned the task of forming a cabinet. The new government advocated a negotiated settlement with Israel. No representative from the Brotherhood was included in the al-Masri cabinet. The Brotherhood issued a statement saying it would not take part in any government willing to negotiate with Israel or 'its American partner.'73 The Islamist movement (the Muslim Brotherhood and the smaller Islamist parties) was also opposed to the Madrid peace conference, and ongoing negotiations. This uncompromising stance destabilized the al-Masri government and finally led to its resignation. But opinion polls showed that a majority of Jordanians favored negotiations with the Israelis, which legitimized the regime's decision to continue the peace process. Thus, the Islamist movement does not seem to represent a serious challenge to the democratization process. Even though there are Islamist groupings in Jordan that operate on the fringe of the political system - examples are Hizb al-Tahrir al-hlami and Jihad al-Bait al-Muqaddas - the mainstream of the movement, notably the Muslim Brotherhood, has accepted the rules of the democratized system and acts within the framework of the parliamentary system.74 Neither does the mihtary appear to be a threat to democratization in Jordan. Traditionally in authoritarian regimes the army, as the most important means of force in the state, is regarded as a potential threat to the incumbent regime. The Jordanian Arab Army, however, has since the establishment of the 70 state been closely linked to the throne, and it has, in the past, been completely loyal to King Hussein.75 There are signs that the links between the leadership and the army might be weakening with a gradual shift to urban and Palestinian recruits, but even so, it seems unlikely that this would drastically alter the relationship between state and army in the foreseeable future. The king still has full control over the appointment and promotion of officers in the armed forces, and thus the military leadership is strongly behind him. A more likely challenge to the ongoing democratic development might occur in a scenario where the monarchy perceives its position as threatened and where the loyal army would be called in to reinforce the power of the king. Should the leadership feel that it is losing control over the process of democratization as a consequence of popular pressure for more rapid and more fundamental changes, the king could resort to the use of force to quell the opposition. This is what happened in 1957. Certainly as long as the means of force remains in the hands of the authoritarian ruler, the process of democratization can be reversed. It was perhaps inevitable that Jordan would have long periods with no elections and legal political parties; rule by decree and clamp-downs on a number of freedoms. If there are difficulties with citizenship and suspected affinities and loyalties these fears will be reflected in the political arena. Yet irrespective of the imbalance within the population, people did demonstrate for greater democratization and a return of political and civil rights. When the IMF's restructuring scheme began to bite economically popular demonstrations made it quite clear that Jordanians were tired of political repression and wanted change. Although there had been few elections and virtually no conduit for legitimate political opposition this did not completely extinguish political awareness and interest - there had been a groundswell of political activity festering within Jordan for many years. The 1989 elections revealed a mature electorate that could exercise a level of autonomy and form associations with a variety of different groupings, thus utilizing their votes to a maximum effect even within the obvious constraints. Once the elections were held and significant support was revealed for the Islamic opposition the king again appears to have taken a lesser gamble and won - whereas the Algerian regime reacted to a similar circumstance with a nullification of the election results and a military crackdown, King Hussein 71 pursued a policy of reconciliation. As a result the Islamic opposition in Jordan has largely been co-opted mto the king's political process. There is good reason to believe that as the election process continues, support for Islamic parties may decline as non-Islamic opposition parties grow in strength and influence. 4.5 Conclusion The Jordanian case appears to be a relatively positive example of, if not the dramatic democratizing wind (hurricane?) believed by some analysts to have been blowing through other developing countries in the late 1980s-early 1990s, at least a gentle breeze of greater openness and participation in national politics. As we have learned, what is in operation today in Jordan is not a democracy but a semi-democracy. The political system is in a transitional phase and future development contains an important element of uncertainty. For example, Jordan continues to face rising indebtedness and increasing unemployment - the strain of these factors has led to increasing frustration amongst the country's citizens, as the recent protests have shown. Further, the Palestinian issue is still not fully resolved in political, territorial or demographic terms. Until the Israel-Palestine issue is definitively resolved the future of Jordanian democratization will remain uncertain. It is clear that democratic development in Jordan has been motivated by a need for the regime to maintain legitimacy and by the necessity of implementing economic reforms to lead the country out of the recession. So far, it has been a state-led process. Political reforms have been pursued for the purpose of generating support for government policies. However, the democratized system, with its realization of political pluralism and personal freedom, is likely to produce popular forces with vested interests in the democratic development. As mentioned above, such forces might represent a challenge to the regime and could lead to a clamp-down on democratic rights. On the other hand, because of the severity of the country's economic and ideological problems as well as the strength of the popular pressures, a strategy of repression is probably not a viable alternative for the Jordanian leadership. It is more likely that the policy of compromise and of give-and-take will continue to operate, whereby the regime favors a positive democratic development which would pacify the opposition and contribute to maintain national unity. It 72 seems to follow from this that in order to stay in power, King Hussein is forced to continue on the path of democratization. The natural aim of the process, however, is an institutionalization and consolidation of democracy. This would spell the loss of most of the king's political power. Thus the pace of the development is slow and incremental. Setbacks can be expected to take place, and the final stage might therefore not be reached during the life-time of King Hussein. There is uncertainty about the succession of power in a highly personally-ruled Jordanian state. It is possible that the process of democratization would make a leap forward at King Hussein's disappearance from power by natural causes. However, if the king's withdrawal from the political scene were to happen prematurely, i.e. before the semi-democratized political system has had time to become consolidated, a negative development would be the likely result. It is evident, then, that King Hussein plays a pivotal role in Jordan's democratization process. 73 Endnotes - Chapter Four 1 Kamal Salibi, The Modern History of Jordan, London: I B . Tauris and C o . Ltd . , 1993: 115. 2 Jordan continues to face serious challenges, however. The recent protests against the lifting o f government subsidies on bread and animal feed have illustrated the effect that economic difficulty can have on the stability and legitimacy o f a regime. 3 Rodney Wilson, Politics and the Economy in Jordan, London: Routledge, 1991: 79. 4 The Jordan region came under British control after W W I when Ottoman territories in the Middle East were divided into French and British zones o f control and interest. Mandate allocations made Britain the mandatory power for Palestine (including the East Bank and all o f present-day Jordan) and Iraq. For the British government, pressed with heavy responsibilities after W W I , the objective o f mandate administration was the peaceful development o f Palestine by Arabs and Jews under British control. The British established the Amirate o f Transjordan (separated from Palestine) under Abdullah, son o f the Sharif o f Mecca , in 1921, and in 1923 recognized Transjordan as a national state preparing for independence. B y 1946 the British had completed their slow process o f extrication from the governing o f the Amirate and Transjordan became independent under Abdullah's rule. Helen Chapin Metz (ed) , Jordan: A Country Study (4 l h ed) . Washington, D . C . : Federal Research Division, Library o f Congress, 1991: 26-27. 5 Thus it was not a constitutional monarchy in the political science sense o f the term. 6 Salibi: 153. "The patriarchal nature o f government" means that the king functions not simply as a head o f state but as a father to all o f his people - guiding them along the right path. 7 Kathrine Rath, "The Process o f Democratization in Jordan," Middle Eastern Studies, V o l . 30, N o . 3, July 1994: 531. 8 Rath: 531. 9 Salibi: 177. The Palestinian population on the West Bank and the refugees from 1948 Palestine differed from the East Bank Jordanians in several ways. They were generally better educated, had a higher degree o f urbanization and were more politicized. 1 0 Rath: 531. 1 1 Abdullah was assassinated as he entered the A l Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem for Friday prayers. His grandson, fifteen year old Prince Hussein, was at his side. The assassin was a Palestinian reportedly hired by relatives o f Hajj Amin al Husayni, a former Mufti o f Jerusalem and bitter enemy o f Abdullah. Before he was killed by the king's guard, he also fired at Hussein. Chapin Metz: 29. 1 2 Salibi: 178. 1 3 Rath: 532. 1 4 Rath: 532. 1 5 Salibi: 183. 1 6 Salibi: 184. 1 7 The latter provision was intended to prevent the government from influencing the elections in it own favor. 1 8 Earlier that year the king had submitted to public pressure and dismissed General Glubb and other British officers from the Arab Legion. The expulsion o f General Glubb, who was seen as a symbol o f British dominance o f Jordan, gave a significant boost to the popularity o f the king both inside and outside the country. 1 9 Rath: 533. 2 0 Rath: 533. ' 2 1 This decision seems to have formed a precedent for the handling o f similar crises later, a strategy which falls short o f satisfying any one side completely. It seems to be successful in lessening the immediate pressure in the regime and is an example o f the short-to-medium term policy often pursued in the rapidly changing political environment o f the Middle East. However, certain matters have called for more peremptory action, as o f which the expulsion o f the Palestinian fedayeen in Black September is an example. 2 2 Chapin Metz: 32. 2 3 Rath: 533. 2 4 Rath; 534. 2 5 Salibi: 192. 2 6 Chapin Metz: 32-33. This incident is known as the " A z Zarqa Affair." It began when Al i A b u Nuwar, the commander o f the Jordan Arab Army, made a statement to Said al Mufti , who was then attempting to form a caretaker government. Said al Mufti misinterpreted the statement to be an ultimatum that any new cabinet be approved by the army. A sequence o f dramatic events followed. The public in Amman, sensing the explosive political atmosphere, became restive. Rumors that the king was dead spread at the main army base at A z Zarqa. Taking A b u Nuwar with him to demonstrate that he, the king, was very much alive and in control, Hussein set off for 74 Az Zarqa. En route he met several truckloads of troops, who were overjoyed at seeing the king alive but who demanded the execution of Abu Nuwar. Hussein allowed Abu Nuwar to retreat to the safety of the palace and then spent several hours with the enthusiastic troops who were anxious to demonstrate their support for and loyalty to him and the throne. The next day Abu Nuwar fled the country. 2 7 Chapin Metz: 182. 2 8 Salibi: 222-223. 2 9 At the beginning of the Jordanian constitution it is stated that 'the Kingdom is indivisible and no part of it may be ceded.' Accordingly, the West Bank continued to be considered part of Jordanian territory after its loss to Israel in 1967. This led to a radicalization of Palestinian nationalism and increased Palestinian antagonism towards the king. 3 0 Chapin Metz: 40. 3 1 Rath: 535 32 38 1< 39 In April 1978, the National Consultative Council (NCC) was created. It was established in an attempt to satisfy popular pressures for a more formal process of political participation. The N C C was composed of sixty members who were appointed by the king for a two-year period. It did not have any legislative power but assumed a purely consultative function. The king had the power to dissolve the N C C at any time. Rath: 535. 3 3 Valerie Yorke, Domestic Politics and Regional Security: Jordan, Syria and Israel. Aldershot: Gower, 1988: 46-47. 3 4 Rath: 539. 3 5 Rex Brynen, "Economic Crisis and Post-Rentier Democratization in the Arab World: the Case of Jordan," The Canadian Journal of Political Science, X X V : 1 March 1992: 72. 3 6 Rath: 535. 3 7 Heather Deegan, The Middle East and Problems of Democracy. Buckingham: Open University Press, 1993: 27. Rath: 536. In several places the demands were expanded to add the termination of martial law (in effect since 967), as well as the granting of financial support to small farmers.  Rath: 536. 4 0 Rath: 537.. 4 1 Rath: 537. The oil-boom created economic opportunities for the Jordanian population and offered a way out of the recession of the early 1970s. A large number of Jordanians went to work in Gulf countries, where labor was in demand and wages were higher than at home. By 1983 about 350,000 Jordanians were working abroad, mainly in the Gulf. This constituted 40 percent of the overall workforce. 4 2 Giacomo Luciani, "Economic Foundations of Democracy and Authoritarianism: The Arab World in Comparative Perspective," Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 4, 1988: 463. 4 3 Rath: 537. 4 4 Rath: 538. 4 5 Rath: 538. In order to finance the national budget, the government resorted to domestic and external borrowing. The external debt grew rapidly and became increasingly difficult to service. By 1989 Jordan's real external debt amounted to as much as $8.4 billion, which represented more than twice the country's total GDP. 4 6 Deegan: 30. The outbreak of the Intifada caused King Hussein to re-evaluate his position on the West Bank as an integral part of Jordan. In 1987 he disengaged from the West Bank, canceling Jordan's $1.3 billion Development Plan for the territory (which had been opposed by the PLO), and severing its legal and administrative links. This action had implications for Jordan's domestic political structure: the house of representatives was dissolved on the grounds that Palestinian representatives for the West Bank still occupied thirty of the sixty seats. This move alarmed many Jordanians who still regarded Parliament, mostly moribund and unrepresentative though it was, as still an important forum and a minimal expression of democratic life. In August 1988 legislative elections were postponed pending the revision of the now inapplicable electoral laws. King Hussein announced his willingness to recognize a Palestinian government in exile were one established. In November when the PNC proclaimed the establishment of the independent state of Palestine King Hussein immediately recognized it. 4 7 Rath: 543. 4 8 Rath: 544. 4 9 Rath: 544. 5 0 Philip Robins, "Jordan's Election: A New Era?", MERIP, Vol. 20, No. 4, July-August 1990: 57. 5 1 Robins: 57. 5 2 Deegan: 32. 5 3 Deegan: 33. 75 5 4 Chapin Metz: 188-89. The bicameral legislature is made up of the popularly elected House of Representatives and the thirty-member Senate which is appointed by the king. Senators serve in four year terms. The Senate is regarded as the more elitist house, but like the legislature it has had very little influence in the legislative process. 5 5 Rath: 547. 5 6 Robins: 55. 5 7 Rath: 548. 5 8 Salibi: 270. 5 9 Rath: 548. 6 0 In addition to women's rights, it concerned itself with the rights of children and the rights of handicapped persons to receive special care and education. It also stressed the importance of protecting the environment. 6 1 Rath: 549. 6 2 Rath: 549. 6 3 Deegan. 33. 6 4 Rath: 549. 6 5 Yorke: 52. 6 6 Chapin Metz: 230. Support for the Islamists was first revealed in the election of 1984, which was a very restrictive sortie into participatory politics. The results revealed significant support for the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamic organization which had been permitted to participate as a non-political da 'wa (evangelical) movement. In the absence of formal political parties it is perhaps inevitable that Islamic movements assumed a political role, not only in Jordan, but indeed, all across the Middle East. Had the electorate been allowed to cast their votes for a variety of political parties, the Muslim Brotherhood might not have been so popular. As it was, ministers began giving public sermons in mosques outlining their preference for the establishment of Islamic rule in the country. For the king, this sortie into even such a minimal aspect of democratic activity had proved to be unsettling. Thus he did not try it again until he was forced to after the 1989 riots and the Karak programme. 6 7 Rath: 546. 6 8 Robins: 56. A further significant reason for the Islamist parties' success was the fact that they appealed to the Palestinian part of the population with their uncompromising call for the liberation of Palestine. And finally, the Islamists seem to have been perceived as breaking with the ancien regime (particularly after the breakdown of their 'alliance' with the king). The Islamists in the previous parliament had frequently criticized the regime and spoken out for personal and political freedoms. 6 9 Rath. 550. 7 0 The close links between Jordan and Iraq and Jordanians' responsiveness to Saddam Hussein's rhetoric led all major political parties and groupings, including the king and his supporters, to support Iraq during the crisis. 7 1 Rath: 551. 7 2 Rath: 551. If the king had adopted a pro-Western stance during the crisis the democratization process could have fallen apart due to friction between the leadership and the people. A clamp-down on democratic freedom would likely have been necessary and this would have severely damaged national unity, and could ultimately have led to the fall of the regime. However, by adopting a view in line with those of his people, the king gained support and strengthened the position of the regime. 7 3 Rath: 552. 7 4 Rath: 552. 7 5 Yorke: 22. 76 CHAPTER FIVE: MOROCCO 5.1 Introduction King Hassan II has ruled Morocco since 1961, weathering two attempted military revolts in the 1970s and civil disorders in 1981 and 1990 stemming from economic problems.1 Meeting these economic challenges (above all lowering the unemployment rate) is a key issue for the future of Morocco, where the interior ministry keeps a tight rein on fundamentalist groups in order to pre-empt young and jobless Moroccans from joining their ranks and steering the country towards the anarchical situation in neighboring Algeria. As commander of the faithful and a direct descendant of the Prophet, King Hassan holds an unchallenged religious authority against Islamic fundamentalists who would like to see Morocco ruled by an Islamist regime. The trend in Morocco has been towards a more representative form of government in which the prime minister theoretically enjoys greater freedom of action, although this process has been extremely slow and hesitant. Morocco's scores on democratization in Table One show that the country was non-democratic from 1972 to 1977, semi-democratic from 1978 to 1990, and non-democratic again from 1991 to the present. However, its scores have usually been 4s and 5s, with only one 6 in either category in 1992 (6 in PR). Its mean score is the fourth lowest in the Muslim world, indicating that it is one of the freest societies in the Middle East. The reason for the return to a status of non-democratic in 1991 is that the king instituted a new, more democratic constitution and held elections under it, only to refuse to implement the degree of power-sharing mandated by the constitution once the elections were over. As well, there was some question as to the fairness of the elections, with significant irregularities being reported. But Morocco does have a long history of multipartism and competitive elections, stretching back to its independence in 1956. However, there has always been conflict between the parties and the monarch, who is unwilling to allow Morocco's multipartism and political pluralism to blossom into a full-fledged democracy. The reason why Morocco has not broadened its pluralism and multipartism into a full-fledged democracy is clear: King Hassan is not willing to give over a substantial amount of his ruling power to an 77 elected parliament and prime minister. Because of his intransigence on this issue, it has not been possible for the king's regime to form a pact with the opposition, that is, to create elite consensual unity. The opposition has attempted to cooperate and compromise with the king on the question of ruling power, but since the king is willing to give nothing it is not likely that a lasting pact can be struck. As a result, the 'democratic transition' in Morocco is stalled. The king is very cautious not to find himself in the position the Algerian regime has found itself in, but as a result he is too cautious, and his hesitancy could lead to turmoil eventually if the opposition loses hope that change is coming. Thus, while Morocco has a legitimate institution (the monarchy) to guide the democratization process, that same institution is holding back the process rather than guiding it further along while the citizenry and party system are ready for greater freedom and participation in government. Although the constitution provides for a pluralistic political system and a parliamentary form of government, ultimate power rests with the monarch. He has the power to appoint and dismiss ministers, declare states of emergency, dissolve parliament and rule by decree. Elected opposition members may attack the government's economic record but not foreign policy, which is the king's preserve.2 The parliament can send back budgets, question ministers and bring up issues such as human rights. But coercive power remains concentrated in the hands of the king. In spite of elections in 1993 he is unwilling to turn over control of key rninistries (foreign affairs, defense, interior) to a democratically-elected government. Further, the king's regime both has and uses the power to suppress unauthorized groups by political imprisonment, disappearances and torture.3 5.2 Political Development In order to understand why the Moroccan process has been long-lasting and stable but is now stalled, it is necessary to be familiar with the country's history. The way in which power has been exercised in Morocco has always been affected by the country's geographical remoteness at the western edge of the Muslim world, as well as by the influence of the Kharidjite version of Islam that Moroccans follow (the Muslim world's most democratic).4 The long tradition of a cohesive political culture in Morocco was not destroyed by the brief period of colonialism. This contrasts with the Algerian 78 experience, where 132 years of French colonial domination profoundly shattered traditional cultural and political structures and processes. French rule in Morocco did not fundamentally disrupt the Muslim tradition of political consensus but rather catalyzed and reinvigorated it so that it eventually fused with the legitimacy of the monarchy in the post-independence period.5 As Joffe notes, the fundamental assumption of the Moroccan political system is that it has always involved strong elements of limited and democratic constitutional monarchy.6 The informal but fundamental dynamic in Morocco has been to preserve political stasis and balance. This has traditionally meant the balancing of patron-client groups against each other to achieve an overall stability. In the past the central feature of this system was the sultanate -traditionally weak and thus forced to arbitrate to retain its grasp on power. Traditionally, the status and power of the sultan were carefully specified. At times of succession, the heir presumptive from the reigning dynasty would be named only after consultation with the ulema (the doctors of Islamic law). The new sultan, moreover, would officially ascend the throne only after receiving their formal act of allegiance. This was considered a contract; under its terms, the ulema had the right to dethrone a sultan who failed to fulfill his mission - a right which was exercised on several occasions.7 The sultan's powers had limits; he had executive but not legislative authority. The power to interpret key Islamic texts resided with the ulema. In short, it was the doctors of the law rather than the sultan who exercised sovereignty, right up to the time of the establishment of the French protectorate in 1912.8 The French changed this, endowing the sultan with all the powers of sovereignty so as to be better able to rule through him. With the coming of independence in 1956, therefore, the sultan appeared as the sole depository of sovereignty. Thus the vital assumption for the traditional system that the sultanate was weak no longer applied. The major legacy of colonialism was the assurance that the forces of law and order operated effectively across the whole of the new, modern state. Yet at the same time, the political culture of the weak sultanate, rendered vital to political stability by its mediating role, survived. It was for this reason that a system of limited democracy, with a superficially constitutional monarch, became an essential aspect of the post-colonial system.9 In effect, however, behind this political culture, Morocco developed into a clientelist state in which the sultan-monarch became the supreme patron.10 Thus, from the time of 79 independence, the parties were expected to understand the limits of their influence, and on this basis the king encouraged their participation. This participation has most often been based on the principle of shura: consultation and consensus. Shura means that the king has frequently gone above the party political scene to achieve elite consensus amongst party leaders if some major step is contemplated. This situation created numerous problems for the nationalist parties that hoped to govern the newly independent Morocco. Entelis notes: Everyone understands one thing about politics in Morocco: Personality overpowers organization. Power is not exercised through the formal channels of politics and authority, although in recent years established political structures and governmental institutions, particularly the multiparty system, have been revitalized and given a new sense of purpose and direction; power is exercised through a highly developed system of clientelism. The essential feature of such a patrimonial system is the basic patron-client relationship, involving the exchange of resources between key figures in government and strategically located individuals.11 Independence was gained through the efforts of an alliance struck between the late King Mohammed V and the nationalist forces grouped largely around the Istiqlal Party (PI). Mohammed established the independence coalition during the protectorate, which led the French to depose him in 1953. By the time he was restored to his throne in 1955 Mohammed had become the hero of the independence cause - a status gained when the French deposed him.12 The PI, formed in 1943, brought together leading nationalists from various milieus, including the traditional middle class, the modern grand bourgeoisie of commerce, and the young, left-leaning intelligentsia.13 Their first public act was putting out its "Independence Manifesto" in January 1944. This document - approved by Sultan Mohammed - urged Moroccan independence and the creation, under the sultan, of a democratic regime. The Pi's leaders had an important following in the country, and some of them made no secret of their desire to turn Morocco into a monarchy of the British type, where the sovereign reigns but does not rule. In sum, the PI presented itself after independence as the natural "party of power," destined to be involved in managing public affairs and creating a constitutional monarchy that the sultan had approved in principle back in 1944. Thus the sultan found himself forced to invite the PI to join in the exercise of power in 1956, despite his awareness of the political risks that its presence in government would pose.14 80 In order to shelter his throne from any nationalist threat he created a royal army and an internal security service that depended directly on him and placed all the agents of state authority under his immediate control. These efforts protected the palace against subversion, and above all against parties that might seek to control the state apparatus. The king also sought to encourage the creation of new parties and to accentuate any cleavages within the'PI. He established a constitutional regime only after he had marginalized the parties and consolidated his grip on state power. Morocco was six years into its regained independence before it got a constitution. This interlude allowed the monarchy to strengthen its authority by minimizing the influence of political parties. The Constitution of 1962, not surprisingly, favored the monarch. King Mohammed V s son and heir, King Hassan II, had ascended the throne in 1961 and devised the Constitution on his own; the lack of party involvement showed that the constitutionalization of political life was a unilateral royal act.15 Since then, Morocco has had three other written constitutions (promulgated in 1970, 1972, and 1992), each confirming the preeminence of the monarchy and the subordination to it of all other political institutions, whether legislative, executive, or judicial. Among the major innovations of the first constitution was its introduction of the hereditary principle of royal succession. This principle represented a break with the centuries-old tradition of conferring popular legitimacy on new sultans - a break that caused controversy among the ulema.16 While the hereditary principle might appear natural in a monarchy, the goal of any constitution worthy of the name is to place power within the rule and framework of the law. Yet according to its official interpretation, the Constitution of Morocco recognizes the supremacy of the king as head of state and defines the respective competencies of the other institutions under his control. The head of state is not merely a secular authority, but a religious authority in his capacity as "commander of the faithful," a capacity recognized and affirmed in Article 19 of the Constitution.17 This religious quality raises the king above other institutions and above any juridical order, including that of the Constitution itself. This situation has led the king to reject the principle of the separation of powers, even though it is in the constitution, and to limit the sovereignty of the nation insofar as the king is invested with power by the divine will. 81 The king sees himself as the legitimate holder of all the powers he can monopolize. This theocratic conception of power has important consequences for Morocco's other political institutions and political forces. To understand how these work, we must look at both the written Constitution and the king's statements defining the roles of the different political institutions. The Constitution places the government in a subordinate role as an instrument of the royal will. The king appoints and dismisses prime ministers and cabinets. The government is only meant to implement the king's policies, not to carry out policies of its own.18 The Constitution gives Morocco's unicameral assembly, the Chamber of Representatives, legislative and policy-making powers. Deputies technically have as much right to introduce legislation as the cabinet does, and can vote definitively on proposed laws. But the king views the Chamber as a consultative assembly, not a deliberative one. The deputies are to act as mere agents who owe obedience and loyalty to the king. The Chamber is expected to support blindly whatever the king proposes, and never to challenge those ministers in whom the king has publicly placed his trust.19 As for the judiciary, the Constitution proclaims that the administration of justice is independent of the legislative and executive powers. In practice, however, according to the logic of Muslim law, justice in Morocco is delegated justice. The king, as commander of the faithful, gives judges their mandate and he can in principle decide at any time to resume this mandate for himself.20 This is why the sovereign's decisions - be they legislative, administrative, or personal in nature - are not susceptible to review by the courts. 5.3 Democratic Development Multipartism was adopted right after independence and remains one of the essential features of the Moroccan political system, and one which has been reinforced in recent years. Today there are fifteen parties, most of which belong to one of two major groupings: the Democratic Bloc and the National Entente. The former, created in 1992, comprises the opposition parties: the Istiqlal Party (PI); the National Union of Popular Forces (UNFP), a socialist grouping that split from the PI in 1959; the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP), born out of a subdivision within the breakaway UNFP in 1974; and two other leftist groups, the Party of Progress and Socialism and the Organization of Democratic and Popular 82 Action.21 The National Entente, created in 1993 by the rightist parties, currently makes up the coalition government. It consists of the Popular Movement (MP), the National Democratic Party (PND), and the Constitutional Union (UC).2 2 There are two other right-of-centre parties that do not fit into either of the coalitions. These are the National Popular Movement (MNP), which split from the MP in 1991, and the National Assembly of Independents (RNI), which was established in 1978 as Morocco's original "administration party," but later began to distance itself from the government.23 Morocco's multipartism does not extend to Islamist parties, which have no legal existence; nonetheless, there are more than 70 Islamic associations, at least ten of which are political in character. There appearance can be traced back to the 1970s. Two are particularly influential - Justice and Welfare, and the Movement for Reform and Renewal.24 These two groups are clandestine, although some of their activities are unofficially tolerated. The peaceful character of their discourse sets Morocco's Islamist groups (like Jordan's) apart from their counterparts in such Arab countries as Algeria and Egypt. These organizations denounce the decline in moral values and society's deviations from the Muslim faith, as well as the government's responsibility for these failings, but they do not call for violence or armed struggle. Bendourou suggests that the religious character of the Moroccan regime keeps the Islamist parties from being officially recognized. As commander of the faithful, the king regards it as his task to safeguard Islam and religious values. Bendourou writes: Recognizing Islamist parties would mean allowing them to rival him as a source of religious authority. Nevertheless, it seems that government representatives have been negotiating with these two formations, offering them a place in the regime for their recognition of the king's constitutional and religious status, abandonment of confrontational Islamist rhetoric, and acceptance of pluralism.... What is certain is that these organizations... regard multipartism and democracy only as a means to be used in their quest to gain power and establish a nonpartisan and authoritarian Islamic state.25 Relations between the king and the parties have often been strained, sometimes to the breaking point. From independence to 1960, when the PI had a role in government, they found themselves in frequent conflict with the monarch. The issue was control over the state apparatus, especially the military and other agencies of national security. The PI wanted these placed under its control like other cabinet ministries; otherwise, it complained, it could not properly conduct policy. The monarchy, which had reserved control over these agencies to itself since 1956, responded that the security forces could not be 83 placed under a party government for fear that they might be used against political rivals.26 Relations between the party and the monarchy worsened until 1963, when the PI became completely alienated from the regime. After that, and especially during the 1965 to 1971 "state of emergency," both the PI and the leftist UNFP became targets of unprecedented repression. The king changed his approach only after two military coup attempts in 1971 and 1972. While the regime was repressing the parties, it relied on the army, heaping privileges upon it and promoting senior officers to high government posts. The army became tempted by the prospect of toppling the monarchy and grasping supreme power for itself.27 The coup attempts made the king rethink his strategy. He decided to mend relations with the opposition, hoping to bring it into the regime to help counter the army. He then used the Western Sahara issue to unite the country. Since its independence, Morocco had been laying its claim to the Spanish-controlled Western Sahara. In 1973-74 Spain was preparing the territory for independence with the intention of guarding it completely against the claims of Morocco, as well as those of Mauritania. The Spanish were planning a referendum on self-determination prior to the granting of independence. Morocco's independence parties, whose platforms all declared Western Sahara to be an integral part of their country, clamored for the king to prevent the Spanish plan from being carried out.28 With strong support from the parties in opposition, King Hassan adeptly rallied support for his domestic and international campaign to press for Morocco's legitimate claim to the Western Sahara, culminating in the Green March of 1975 when some 300,000 unarmed Moroccans peaceably entered the territory.29 This effort was more than a tactic to win back the Western Sahara - it was a carefully planned political maneuver to rouse popular enthusiasm for the monarchy, and many Moroccans did, in fact, interpret it as a sign of divine favor toward the king. The opposition, meanwhile, was thrown into confusion and could not agree on a strategy to pursue in dealing with the strengthened monarch. Of the two main parties, the PI agreed to join the government in 1977, while the USFP broke with its former ally and shifted to a posture of radical dissent.30 Thus 1977, a year that saw legislative elections and the putting in place of the institutions mandated by the Constitution of 1972, also witnessed the breakup of the opposition and the beginning of a new era with the establishment of "Hassanian democracy."31 Henceforth the parties had to subscribe to the official theocratic conception 84 of power, which made the king the temporal and spiritual head of the kingdom and the undisputed guide of the nation, if they wished to share in the exercise of power and enjoy the favor of the palace. In a 1981 speech, the king defined the role of the opposition: Hassanian democracy will not be complete, and we will not rest easy, until we teach Moroccans how to practice opposition to the government of the king of Morocco. ... If we were in opposition, we would say, 'we are before anything else servants of the king, who is the king of all Moroccans.32 The only holdout against this notion was the USFP, which persisted in challenging the king's leadership and the structure of the regime until 1982. When the USFP opposed the king's decision in that year to accept a referendum in the Western Sahara, he responded by jailing the party's leaders and banning its publications and activities. For all practical purposes, the USFP ceased to exist. As a member of the government coalition, the PI supported these repressive measures.33 Eventually the USFP gave in, accepting the official line and regaining its legal status. This resulted, however, in an internal split that gave rise to a new party, known as al-Talia. Back in the good graces of the palace, the USFP let one of its leaders be named to head of the Ministry of Cooperation as a show of support for the king's Western Sahara policy. The problems with "Hassanian democracy" are quite clear. A democracy does not exist where individual citizens, as well as opposition parties, cannot express opposition to the policy decisions of the regime. It appears that Morocco has the opposite problem to Algeria. In Algeria the government moved ahead with multiparty elections to a fully democratized system too quickly, but in Morocco the king is moving far too slowly with the democratization process to suit his subjects and his opposition elites. Moroccan citizens and the parties have established a fairly stable system of pluralism and multipartism and now they wanted to move forward to greater participation in government decisions. It seems to be that an independent civil society has emerged (and continues to develop) in Morocco. Bendourou agrees, stating: Recent months have witnessed the emergence of political and civic associations that are not affiliated with any parties or with the regime, and which want to become forums for discussion, and in some cases, instruments for change in political, economic, social and cultural life.34 85 were in i case These new groups, if they can resist pressures designed to entrap them in the web of partisan and governmental maneuverings, will contribute to the pressure on King Hassan to loosen his grip on power in favor of a regime based on the concept of responsible government, where elected officials make government decisions and are accountable to the people. 5.4 The Push for Genuine Democratization The beginnings of a revived parliamentary opposition capable of challenging centralized monarchical power occurred in 1985 when the PI, after spending eight years in the ruling coalition, left the government and began to mend fences with its former ally, the USFP. Together, these two parties a position to advocate genuine democratization and demand constitutional reforms.35 By 1990, the < for reform was so pressing that the opposition raised the possibility that it would boycott the next elections if a course of serious reform was not begun. The opposition hoped to play a role in the planning of new reforms and thus to reach a compromise agreement with the palace on a constitutional pact. In response, King Hassan did produce a new constitution, but he did so without involving the direct participation of the opposition. Thus a political pact was not formed along with the new constitution and there was no elite consensual unity. Nevertheless, on paper the constitution seemed to meet most of their specific procedural demands, although, it did not go so far as to institute a genuine constitutional monarchy, which many in the Democratic Bloc ultimately desire. However, this new constitution was approved by 99.96 percent of the voting population of the country in a referendum held on September 4, 1992.36 The constitutional changes provided for future governments to reflect the political composition of the Chamber of Deputies, with the majority party being able to select its own cabinet for royal approval. Previously this had been part of the royal prerogative. The chamber also acquired the right to pass a vote of confidence on the program proposed by a new government on coming into office. The chamber will also remain in session during a state of emergency, rather than being prorogued as was the case in the past. There are also provisions safeguarding human rights. King Hassan, however, on the grounds that his Islamic duties prevented him from mstimting constitutional monarchy, retains the right to prorogue the Chamber at will. In April 1992 the king had also promised that the 86 anticipated elections would be 'free and honest' and, as a result, the following month had set up two commissions to review the electoral law and to monitor the electoral process.37 Under the new constitution, King Hassan remains the ultimate authority, and retains the right to declare an emergency. However, under the new constitution the government is now, theoretically, more accountable to parliament, the Chamber of Representatives. The Chamber has the power to approve ministers, pass or kill legislation, set up commissions of inquiry, and challenge the government with votes of confidence.38 The new electoral law, passed by the Chamber of Deputies on June 4, 1992 (despite a boycott by the opposition parties), had been a source of considerable political friction before the elections. It provided for a continuation of an electoral process split between direct and indirect elections, although it reduced the minimum voting age to 20 years and the minimum candidate age from 25 to 23 years.39 It also provided for equal state funding and media exposure for all political parties. The opposition's objections were that they sought a minimum age of 18 years for voting and of 21 years for candidates and, more importantly, a two-tier voting process under an independent supervisory body.40 However, despite their objections, and in the wake of a successful vote in the Chamber, the government was dismissed in August and replaced by an interim government in which no ministers with formal party affiliations participated.41 At about the same time (May 1992), the parliamentary opposition further strengthened itself by forming the Democratic Bloc. They were disturbed at having been left out of the decision-making on the recently promulgated Constitution - it did not entirely meet their expectations and demands (as previously noted, they sought a genuine constitutional monarchy and responsible government, which King Hassan has unequivocally said he opposes). They continued to call for thoroughgoing revisions with a view to the full democratization and modernization of Morocco's political institutions.42 On September 17, 1993, Morocco completed its complex legislative electoral process - the first national election experience for nearly nine years. In June, Moroccan voters went to the polls to elect 222 members of the country's national assembly, the Chamber of Deputies, by direct election43 In September the remaining one third of the Chamber - 111 deputies - was elected in an indirect election from among the country's municipal councilors, members of professional bodies and the professions.44 87 The direct round voting in June showed a surge in voter support for the opposition Democratic Bloc, which won 101 out of 222 seats.45 In the second, indirect round, however, it collected only 21 out . of 111 seats. Nonetheless, the king asked the Democratic Bloc to provide the new cabinet, promising its leaders stability and the support of a majority in parliament for the first of what he envisioned as a series of alternating leftist and rightist governments. He offered the Democratic Bloc thirty-one out of thirty-five cabinet portfolios, choosing to retain under his own control the premiership, interior, foreign affairs/national security and justice. For several reasons, the Democratic Bloc was not certain they wanted to take the king up on his offer. First, they (particularly the USFP, but also the PI) wished to protest against electoral abuses and pressure the king to annul the elections on those grounds and hold new ones. While there were undoubtedly abuses of the electoral process during the direct elections in June, according to the monitors supplied by the US-based International Foundation for Electoral Systems, they were probably not the result of interference by the Ministry of the Interior (as had allegedly been the case in the past) 4 6 In most cases irregularities were the result of tampering by local administrations in particular constituencies, seeking to curry favor with political representatives. Any irregularities, however, caused much embarrassment to the king, in view of his promise that the elections would be 'free and fair.' However, while there was likely no interference by the central government in the direct elections, it appears that serious electoral tampering took place in the running of the indirect elections.47 Suspicion centered on the role played by Driss Basri, the powerful interior minister (and close ally of the king), who was popularly believed to have rigged the results in favor of the centre-right, in order to counter the success of the left-wing Democratic Bloc in the direct elections48 It was this development more than any other that led the Democratic Bloc to refuse to participate in the new government and demand that the results be declared null and void. Also problematic for the Democratic Bloc were the conditions the king made clear he would place on their exercise of governmental power. The Democratic Bloc wanted to wield real authority, which would have put it on a collision course with the king. According to King Hassan, the Democratic Bloc was not to have complete freedom to carry out its own agenda - they would have to compromise with him on 88 all major decisions. Beyond that, the Bloc leaders wanted the right to fill all cabinet posts, including interior, justice, foreign affairs/national security, and the premiership. The king would not give in, and thus the Democratic Bloc rejected the king's invitation to form the new cabinet, urging him instead to grant the cabinet of his choosing more leeway in executing policies. Following the Bloc's formal rejection of cabinet seats on 4 November, the king nominated Mohamad Karim Lamrani, a businessman and acting prime minister since August 1992, to head the conservative/centrist coalition government. In July 1994, King Hassan asked that "the opposition come together in a coalition with whomever they wanted from the parliament and to form a majority government which would enable it to assume its role in the change of political power."49 In October, he announced his decision to choose a new prime minister from the opposition. But in December 1994 talks with the PI and the USFP collapsed due to their insistence on replacing Basri, the interior minister, who also held the information portfolio.50 King Hassan refused to yield and abandoned plans for a new government led by the opposition. With all the strain in their dealings, one must wonder why the king and the opposition parties continue to deal with each other. I think there are two reasons. The first is that while the traditional shura (consensus) system seems to be breaking down, it is still the operative system in that nothing has been established to replace it. Thus the opposition parties, in spite of their growing frustration, still tend to be cooperative with the king's regime because that it the consensus-oriented political culture that they have developed in, and because there is still "no other game in town." The second reason, this one put forward by Joffe, is that both the king and the opposition parties realize the need to present some kind of a common front against the Islamic threat. But their strategies are different. The king, as commander of the faithful, monopolizes authority over the religious sphere, and tolerates no competition there - mosques are kept under governmental control and Islamic activists are closely watched.51 Religious discourse is restrained within the officially approved bounds, and the king does not hesitate to use repression if he senses a threat of destabilization. He wants to encourage Moroccans to support the secular parties and rely on him for religious guidance. The opposition parties, on the other hand, are also aware of the growing influence of dissident Islamic discourse, and try to mobilize their own activists, particularly in the universities, to counter it. But the opposition parties are 89 urging that Islamic groups be legalized as parties to constrain them to act within the limits of legality and respect for democratic rule and so that the non-Islamist parties can compete with the Islamists on an even playing field.52 They realize that if they are co-opted into the king's "democratized" system and that system loses legitimacy, they too will lose legitimacy and it will be the Islamists' gain. The rising influence of Islamist parties became worrisome just as the country was experiencing an unprecedented economic crisis. In mid-1995, the king requested from the World Bank, and later made public, a set of analyses and policy recommendations that detailed, among other things, Morocco's unhealthy economy and finances. Between 1984 and 1994, the government managed to restore the country's financial situation by reducing the budget and current-accounts deficits to 4.2 and 3.4 percent of annual GDP, respectively.53 The average annual growth of real GDP over this period was 4.3 percent, enough to fuel a rise in living standards. Yet the lack of an economic strategy has thwarted the diversification of national production away from heavy dependence on agriculture, and this is needed to guard against fluctuations in key overseas markets. The World Bank saw behind this the absence of a coherent, comprehensive, medium term strategy for economic development, and it recommended drastic reforms to lead the country out of crisis.54 The Bank called for an overhaul of the fiscal system, spending controls, increased saving, amelioration of socioeconomic disparities and measures to help neglected rural areas. It also insisted on the need to reform official bureaucracies, which remain over-centralized, archaic, stagnant, and corrupt, and hamper national development. It pushed, finally, for the development of a domestic political consensus to support such reforms. The economic crisis has continued and is now (as of 1996) impelling the king and the opposition to seek common ground on which to take a stand against the small but growing Islamist influence. There can be little doubt that the major social effect of economic reform in Morocco has been to create disillusionment with the political process amongst much of the population. In spite of constitutional changes and the latest elections the electorate still sees the Chamber of Deputies as part of a power structure from which they are excluded and they generally do not believe the claims of the political parties to be committed to the public welfare. The turnout for the June 1993 legislative elections was only 62.75 percent, well down compared to the turnout usually reported for national referenda, for example.55 It is 90 also clear that this sense of disillusionment has been stimulated by the long drawn-out economic crisis that Morocco has faced and the fact that improvements at the macro-economic level are not reflected throughout society as a whole. Indeed, although a minority has certainly benefited from the economic restructuring programme, the majority has not and this had led to great resentment and a continued alienation from the political process. Serious constitutional reform to address the growing problems in the Moroccan polity requires that the essential power now held solely by the king be shared, in balanced fashion, among various institutions. The problem of electoral transparency is well-known and has been widely discussed for many years; the significance of the king's reserved powers has not been publicly debated. In fact, to discuss it is taboo. No opposition party dares openly to question the extensive powers of the sovereign, particularly in light of Article 19 of the Constitution, which states: The king, commander of the faithful, supreme representative of the nation, symbol of its unity, and guarantor of the endurance and continuity of the state, keeps watch over Islam and the Constitution. He is the guardian of the rights and liberties of citizens, social groups, and collectivities.56 The Constitution gives the king other powers that considerably reduce the authority of parliament and subject the government to the royal will. The political parties, without questioning Article 19, wish to endow the government with certain autonomous powers in order to clarify the respective competencies of the sovereign and the government. The parties also want to broaden Parliament's authority so that it can act as more of a counterweight to the government. They are asking for curbs on the diverse and extensive powers wielded by the Interior Ministry, and they are insisting on both the need to organize scrupulously fair elections that will accurately reflect the people's will, and the need for the king to implement the new constitution as it is written.57 The king continues to hedge and put off serious changes to the country's power structures. As a result, democratic development is stalled. This relates to the profound problem in Morocco that may adversely affect the future of democracy. The problem is the innate political culture of Morocco, which is traditionally directed towards consensus and stasis.58 Patron-clientage and arbitration have been the major techniques of the political process, in which radical change is a feared and least desired outcome. The parliamentary and electoral 91 processes are therefore viewed from this standpoint, rather than as opportunities to achieve social and political change. These attitudes are reinforced by the role of the monarchy within the political system. King Hassan's dominance of the political process and his ability to subvert it or abandon it, if he chooses, gives the practice of parliamentary democracy a conditionality that seriously damages its credibility.59 Nor is this situation likely to change, for the king's determination to reject the constitutional monarchy option means that all modifications of the political system will be merely cosmetic in effect. But a growing number of Moroccans have become socially mobile during the past two decades as a result of mass education and the social consequences of economic development and reform, and they now form a significant group within the population at large. Joffe writes: They are now transferring into the politically conscious elite which seeks a genuine transformation of political culture and behavior. For them, the potential of a democratic process is not confined to the 'retour eternel' to the political culture of the past. They seek genuine democratic participation and inform the growing civil society inside the country.60 As a result, criticism of the status quo, although still likely to attract official repression, is becoming more outspoken. For example, in November of 1993 an article was published in the French language daily newspaper of the PI, L 'Opinion, which argued that Morocco had never known real political plurality and that real democratization required "a redefinition and the limitation of the powers and prerogatives of representatives of [state] authority."61 Basri, the interior minister, reacted unfavorably to this, but his criticisms were denounced by the opposition, which suggests to Joffe that they are counting on a real political change in the near future. The bipolarization of Moroccan politics that the king now seeks does offer hope for the future. Such a system would provide a clear-cut division within the political arena through which political choices could be made. It would also offer the politically conscious elite an opportunity to participate in the exercise of accountable power, if the amended constitution were properly put into effect. This would require, however, considerable restraint on the part of the king. The state of "pseudo-democracy" that Morocco currently finds itself in is not sustainable in the long-term. It is imperative that the king move the process beyond the "Hassanian" democracy that exists 92 at present towards the substantive democracy that will ultimately be essential for survival - both of the monarchical regime and of Morocco's emergent democratic institutions themselves.62 Indeed, unless he does, the growing community of modernist and politically-aware Moroccans will become increasingly estranged from the current political process, and, thereby, make its eventual conversion even more difficult to achieve. Morocco's great advantage in the quest for democracy is that it opted at the time of its independence to embrace multipartism. This has given rise to a tradition of pluralism that cannot be questioned. The recent appearance of civic, political and cultural groups that wish to remain independent of government and parties will contribute to the growth of a fledgling civil society that can act as a counterweight to power and work over the long run to raise awareness of the need for change. Moreover, unlike the other pluralistic Arab regimes (notably Algeria and Egypt), Morocco has done a good job of integrating into its political system the military, the modern elite, and the opposition parties (except for the Islamists).63 This integration will give the regime an advantage in pursuing the constitutional reform process, which is something that it needs to do if it wants to keep a potentially destabilizing degree of frustration from overwhelming the elite and the opposition alike. 5.5 Conclusion In conclusion, it is clear that Morocco possesses most of the factors that are necessary for a successful transition to democracy. An independent civil society is developing steadily, and a stable, non-fragmentary party system exists. The long history of multipartism has created the basis for a democratic political culture. Morocco has a military which is firmly under the control of the king and is less likely to intervene in political affairs, as the military did in Algeria. Dependence on a rentier, patron-client economic system has deteriorated as the country has modernized, and particularly since the implementation of IMF and World Bank recommendations for economic reform. Morocco also has a legitimate institution to guide and stabilize its democratization process in its king. All that is required for democratic transition in Morocco now is the king's realization that his dynasty's tradition of concentrated power is no longer appropriate for a modernized Morocco. Since all the conditions for a successful 93 transition for democracy exist he must either agree gracefully to cede most of his ruling powers in the next decade or so or face a revolt by opposition parties and citizens at large. Obviously consolidation of even semi-democracy does not presently exist in Morocco, as the opposition parties are forced to kowtow to the king in order to participate in even the most limited of ways, in spite of the fact that they long for greater influence and control over the political system. A political pact would require the participation of the opposition in the setting up of the rules of the game (i.e., the writing of a new constitution), or at the very least their unforced agreement to the new rules. The fact that the opposition parties contemplated a boycott of the 1992 constitutional referendum indicates that no pact or elite consensual unity was established - the king's modifications to the system were his alone and involved no compromises between elites. Thus while the opposition parties are supporters of a democratic system in Morocco, they are dissatisfied with the system the king has put in place unilaterally -they desire a democratic system much grander than the one the king envisions. Until there is elite consensual unity on the structure of the Moroccan regime, there will be no consolidation of the system. 94 Endnotes - Chapter Five 1 Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil Liberties, 1994-95. New York: Freedom House, 1995: 413. 2 Freedom in the World, 1994-95. 414-15. 3 The government limits freedom of speech and the press. Citizens face reprisals if they discuss any of the three forbidden topics: the monarchy, Morocco's claim to Western Sahara, and the sanctity of Islam. The government also subsidizes and controls the news media. Freedom of association and assembly are restricted, as the government may suppress peaceful demonstrations and mass gatherings. Freedom in the World, 1994-95. 415. 4 Omar Bendourou, Power and Opposition in Morocco," Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7, No. 3, July 1996: 108. 5 John P. Entelis, Culture and Counterculture in Moroccan Politics. Boulder: Westview Press, 1989: 5-6. 6 George Joffe, "Elections and Reform in Morocco," in Richard Gillespie (ed), Mediterranean Politics, Vol. I. London. Pinter Publishers, 1994. 218. 7 Entelis: 57. 8 Bendourou: 108-9. 9 Joffe: 219. 1 0 John Waterbury, The Commander of the Faithful: The Moroccan political elite - a study of segmented politics. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970: 267-274. " Entelis: 47-48. 1 2 Entelis: 57. 1 3 Bendourou: 109. 1 4 Anwar M . Shabon, The Political, Economic and Labor Climate in Morocco, No. 9, Middle East and North African Studies. Philadelphia: Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, 1986: 15. 1 5 William Evans-Smith (ed.) Morocco: A country study. Washington, D C : The American University, 1978: 229. 1 6 Thus one of Morocco's greatest Islamic jurists, Mohammed Ben Larbi Alawi, a venerable counselor to the Crown and himself a member of the royal family, did not hesitate to condemn the constitutional provisions mandating automatic hereditary succession. Bendourou: 110. 1 7 The Europa World Yearbook 1995, Vol. II.: 2133. 1 8 Europa: 2133. ^Europa .2133. 2 0 Europa: 2133. 2 1 Worldmark: Encyclopedia of the Nations 1995. 281. 22 - -Worldmark: 281. The PND and the U C were founded by the regime and are commonly known as "administration parties." 2 3 The RNI has declared its readiness to form a coalition government with the Democratic Bloc in the event of a change in government. 2 4 Bendourou: 112. Abd Assalam Yasine, the leader of Justice and Welfare, has been under house arrest since 1989, and was imprisoned from 1974-78 and 1983-85. 2 5 Bendourou: 113. 2 6 Evans-Smith: 229. 2 7 Evans-Smith: 75-76, 232-234. 2 8 Evans-Smith: 236. 2 9 This plan, conceived and planned personally by the king, forced Spain to enter into three-sided negotiations (with both Morocco and Mauritania) on the future of the territory. 3 0 Evans-Smith: 235. 3 1 Bendourou: 114. 3 2 Bendourou: 114. 3 3 Evans-Smith: 238. 3 4 Bendourou: 116. 3 5 Europa: 2123. 3 6 Joffe: 212. 3 7 Joffe: 213. 3 8 Freedom in the World, 1994-95: 414. 3 9 Joffe: 213. 4 0 Joffe: 214. 4 1 Freedom in the World, 1994-95: 413. 4 2 Europa: 2123. 95 4 3 Joffe: 212. 4 4 Joffe: 212. In theory, legislative elections must be held every six years, according to the Moroccan constitution. However, in 1989, King Hassan proposed that the elections should be delayed by two years (a proposal that was approved by referendum) in order to try to complete the resolution of the Western Sahara issue.44 This was not achieved, with the result that, during 1992, municipal elections went ahead throughout the whole country including the disputed Western Sahara. The experience was repeated in the legislative elections of 1993 on the same basis. The Moroccan government has, in short, thereby treated the Western Sahara as if it were de jure an integral part of Morocco. In the interim, between the end of the extended eight-year term of the previous Chamber of Deputies and the latest legislative elections, Morocco was ruled by a caretaker government of national unity under the authority of the king, Mawlay Hassan II, and led by the veteran politician and former head of the Office Cherifienne des Phosphates, Karim Lamrani. 4 5 Europa: 2124. 4 6 Joffe. 216. 4 7 Joffe: 216. 4 8 The surprising surge in support for the centre-right led to the Constitutional Union, led by former UNFP leader Maati Bouabid, obtaining more seats than any other party in the Chamber. Yet Bouabid's election in a Casablanca constituency had been marred by serious irregularities. This caused a storm of protest, and cast the shadow of suspicion on Basri. 4 9 Freedom in the World, 1994-95: 414. 5 0 Freedom in the World, 1994-95: 414. 5 1 Joffe: 220-221. 5 2 Joffe: 213-214. "Bendourou: 118. 5 4Bendourou: 118. 5 5 Joffe: 224. 5 6Bendourou: 121. 5 7Bendourou: 121. 5 8 Joffe: 224. 5 9 Joffe: 224. 6 0 Joffe: 225. 6 1 Joffe: 225. 6 2 Joffe: 225. 6 3Bendourou: 121. 96 C H A P T E R SIX: C O N C L U S I O N S It was pointed out in the Introduction to this thesis that democratization in the Middle East, although apparently rare, was occurring and should be studied to determine if there are any pitfalls that are particular to the region. The evidence suggests that Islam and rentierism present special challenges to democratization in the Middle East, but not insurmountable ones. One thing is clear: there definitely appears to be a trade-off between stability and democracy in the history of the post-independence Middle East. Most of the countries that were categorized as democracies or semi-democracies for periods of time since 1972 have been very unstable, with high standard deviations in Table One. However, while there has historically been a trade-off between stability and democracy in the Middle East, since the 1980s, the decline in legitimacy of most Middle Eastern autocracies has signaled a resultant decline in stability. This has meant that most Middle Eastern autocracies, in the face of crumbling legitimacy, have been forced to choose between reliance on increased repression and coercion to remain in power, or to attempt to regain legitimacy (and stability) through democratization. The coercive power method is most in evidence in Egypt. All three of the cases analyzed in this thesis opted for the second option, however. But, as Linz has pointed out, legitimacy can only be gained and maintained through perceived efficacy and effectiveness. Democratization, if successful, could lead to a government that is more efficacious and effective, but it might not. All countries, and small and/or developing countries in particular, are in the 1990s subject to the vagaries of the global economy, and this means that often national governments' policies are neither efficacious nor effective in the face of global trends. Linz does not have much advice or insight to offer to countries bereft of legitimacy and unable to execute efficacious and effective policy. Without efficacy and effectiveness over time (or a democratic political culture which is well established) there is no way to generate legitimacy for a new democratic system. The timing at which a new democracy is launched, then, is key. Unfortunately, however, autocracies tend not to initiate democratization when their legitimacy is at its highest. They choose democracy when they have run out of other options - usually when the political situation is at its worst. Thus many new democracies are in a risky position. 97 However, this is where I thirik the potential for Middle Eastern monarchies comes in. In spite of political and economic woes, the monarchies of Morocco and Jordan have been remarkably stable over time and have retained a great deal of legitimacy in the eyes of their subjects. This cannot be said for the army or the FLN in Algeria. The reasons for the continuing legitimacy of King Hassan and King Hussein are largely found in their religious authority. They are both said (and more importantly, believed by their subjects) to be direct descendants of the prophet Mohammed. This fact has not only given them political legitimacy, but it has also insulated both regimes against the kind of mass Islamist movement that has developed in Algeria. Admittedly the stability and legitimacy of these two monarchies could deteriorate quickly if Hassan and Hussein acted as repressive despots, but each has been wise enough to rule with a careful blend of coercion and consensus. Further, monarchs are often able to remain somewhat above the rough and tumble of everyday politics - they most often step in to resolve deadlocks, provide general direction, and serve as arbitrators. This has certainly been the case in Morocco and Jordan, for the most part. The clear separation of the government from the state helps to provide an institutional barrier between political struggle and the rules of the game. Hassan, like Hussein, must recognize the need for his monarchy to evolve to suit the needs of a modernizing society. Now that pressure for greater democratization has emerged in both societies- both kings must be wise enough to use the stability and legitimacy of their positions to mold semi-democratic systems that can evolve into democracies, with their positions at the top intact, although with greatly reduced powers. It would appear that the only alternative would be an eventual overthrow of the monarchies, particularly after the present kings pass away. But for the medium term, anyway, the viability of the regimes in Jordan and Morocco is good - both kings remain quite healthy and of sound minds. However, since a degree of their legitimacy is based on their own personages and wisdom as rulers, the question of what will happen once they are gone - i.e., will their successors also be considered legitimate - is a valid one. Consolidation ultimately means that the system remains stable based on rules and institutions, not on particular personalities. It is not clear that either Morocco or Jordan has reached this point of consolidation yet. 98 Democratization is a process fraught with pitfalls — particularly if a country is suffering economic woes and a legitimacy crisis. The establishment and maintenance of democracy are aided by several conditions — the development of an independent civil society; the development of a political culture based on democratic values (including among a depolificized military); a modern economy, a large middle class and the taxation of citizens' labor (i.e. a non-rentier economy); and, a non-fragmented party system.1 Two other important factors are the time frame of the transition, and the existence of a legitimate authority to guide the democratization process. Democracies consolidate when elite consensual unity is established concerning the rules of the democratic political game and the worth of the democratic institutions. This necessitates a careful balance between conflict and consensus in the system. In this concluding chapter brief summaries must be given of how well each of the three countries analyzed here fit with these criteria. In Algeria's case, the situation did not bode well right from the beginning due to the economic crisis the country was facing. Further, twenty-five years of one-party rule had not provided the basis for either a democratic political culture or an independent civil society. It has also been noted that the Algerian regime historically operated on the basis of a rentier economy, an economic model which is virtually antithetical to the operation of a democratic regime. However, since independence a middle class of significant size has emerged. The problem is that alongside the middle class a large, half-educated, under-employed underclass also developed. Multipartism was a problem in Algeria because the country's history as a one-party state meant that when parties were allowed to form in the late 1980s they formed with abandon and that led to extreme fragmentation of the party system, which as Dahl says is very problematic to the operation of newly-established democracies, in particular. Finally, Algeria had a long history of military intervention in the political sphere. All of these factors, combined with the fact that Algeria did not have a legitimate institution to guide its democratization process, indicate that from the beginning that Algeria was not a particularly good candidate for democracy in the late 1980s - early 1990s. However, despite these factors which were basically beyond the control of the regime, there were a number of factors that the government could have influenced. First, the Algerian government did not establish a pact with the opposition, agreeing on the rules of the democratic political game. As a result, 99 neither side could feel confident that the other would respect the new constitution or the election results -and indeed that was the case: the regime did not respect the constitution or the election results. In other words, there was no elite consensual unity between the regime and the opposition. A democratic system cannot work unless there is mutual agreement and trust among participants on the rules of that system. Moreover, with respect to the time-frame of the democratization process, the Algerian regime went ahead far too rapidly. As Dahl noted, stable democracies evolve over long periods of time, sometimes centuries. It was foolish for the Algerian government to think they could institute a completely democratized system in the space of two years. It takes a long time for a democratic political culture, an independent civil society and a competitive party system to develop. Finally, Algeria had no legitimate institution to guide its democratization process. The army had been the source of political legitimacy in the post-colonial period, but by the 1980s it had completely ceased to be regarded in this light in the eyes of the Algeria populace. The case of Jordan presents, on the whole, very different characteristics. The development of an independent civil society can be seen in the protests in the 1980s for a more democratic political system, culminating in the Karak programme. This independent civil society has grown since the ban on parties was lifted. A democratic political culture is also emerging, evidenced by the fact that virtually all groups have supported the new system. Thus, in Jordan there is elite consensual unity as to the rules of the political game. Rentierism in Jordan has been on the decline since the early 1980s when the IMF had to be brought in to liberalize and modernize the economic system. In Jordan there has also developed a large middle class, which is a prerequisite for the development of civil society. With respect to political pluralism and multipartism, while Jordan does not have the consistent history of these that Morocco has, these factors have been present in Jordanian history in stops and starts, which put it in a better situation than Algeria, which had no history of either. Jordan has not seen the explosion of small 'sofa' parties that Algeria saw, perhaps since the much slower pace of the process in Jordan has not resulted in the great rush of enthusiasm the fast-paced Algerian process had. Also unlike Algeria, Jordan has a depoliticized military firmly under the regime's control. Other factors that have boded well for the Jordanian process are the king's slow implementation of democratization measures and the fact that Jordan has a legitimate 100 authority to guide its process in the person of the king. King Hussein has made a great deal of progress in co-opting the growing opposition movement into the political process, and using them to legitimize his rule.2 But the king is not the only one to have benefited from the democratization process. Society has benefited because the growing opposition movement now has a legitimate outlet, averting Algeria-style potential violence and disorder. With regard to consolidation, while Jordan is not yet a full-fledged democracy, I would argue that the semi-democratic system has become consolidated. I would argue this because elite consensual unity has been established with respect to the rules of the semi-democratized political game. While the opposition parties are striving for a more democratic system, they are content to work within the system in existence now, for the time being. Thus, I think semi-democracies can be consolidated, but I do not think they can remain so for the long periods of time that democracies tend to be maintained. This is because a semi-democracy will always reach a point where pressure to move towards a full-fledged democratic system causes a breakdown in the elite consensual unity on the rules of the semi-democratic system. Jordan though, to repeat, has not reached this point yet. Morocco is an important case study for this thesis because it has features in common with both Algeria and Jordan, while those two countries are quite radically different from each other. The inclusion of Morocco has bridged the gap between the other two case studies, and provides this thesis with a broader picture of democratization in the Middle East. Morocco has faced many of the same cultural and socioeconomic challenges as both Algeria and Jordan, but unlike those two other countries, its regime has not initiated a sweeping democratization process. The Moroccan process makes the Jordanian process look fast-paced, in fact. But while the democratization process has been somewhat disappointing, what can be said for the Moroccan regime is that it has remained quite remarkably stable for forty years. So if there is some trade-off between democracy and stability, as the Algerian case suggests, the Moroccan regime has valued stability more greatly. Strictly viewed in terms of the economic factors contributing to democracy - per capita income, literacy, etc. - Morocco is in fact most often ranked third out of the three countries under study here. However, Morocco, more so than either Algeria or Jordan, possesses most of the non-economic factors 101 that are necessary for a successful transition to democracy. An independent civil society is developing steadily, and a stable, non-fragmentary party system is well-established. The long history of multipartism has created the basis for a democratic political culture. The tradition of multipartism has allowed the opposition in Morocco to take root and develop the sort of social bases that parties like the PI and the USFP undeniably possess, as well as a pluralism of other groups and associations.3 Morocco, like Jordan, has a military which is firmly under the control of the king and thus much less likely to intervene in political affairs than the Algerian army has been. Dependence on a rentier, patron-client economic system has deteriorated slowly, and particularly so since the implementation of IMF and World Bank recommendations for economic reform starting in the early 1980s. Morocco has a significant middle class, but, like Algeria, it also has a problem with a disgruntled underclass of poorly educated, under-employed people, who have been particularly negatively affected by structural adjustment. Further, Morocco, like Jordan, has in its king a legitimate institution to guide and stabilize its democratization process. The difference, however, is that Morocco's king is not as willing as Jordan's to slowly cede his ruling powers to a democratically elected government. The problem with the time-frame in Morocco is the opposite to the problem in Algeria - Algeria's process was far too rapid, Morocco's is too slow. Since all the conditions (in varying degrees) for a successful transition for democracy exist in Morocco the king must either gracefully agree to cede most of his ruling powers in the next decade or so or he may eventually face a revolt by opposition parties and citizens at large. Thus while Morocco seems to be in the best position of the three countries to make a successful transition to democracy, consolidation of the Moroccan process does not presently exist. Opposition parties are forced to kowtow to the king in order to participate in even the most limited of ways, in spite of the fact that they long for (and are ready for) greater influence and control over the political system. A political pact would require the participation of the opposition in the setting up of the rules of the game (i.e., the writing of a new constitution), or at the very least their unforced agreement to the new rules. The fact that the opposition parties contemplated a boycott of the 1992 constitutional referendum indicates that no pact or elite consensual unity was established - the king's modifications to the system were his alone and involved no compromises amongst elites. Thus while the opposition parties are supporters of a 1 0 2 democratized (and eventually democratic) system in Morocco, they are dissatisfied with the system the king has put in place unilaterally - they desire a democratic system much grander than the one the king envisions. Until there is elite consensual unity on the structure of the Moroccan regime, there will be no consolidation of the system. Multipartism in most Middle Eastern countries that have it has often been at the mercy of an authoritarian ruler who can rein in or suspend multiparty politics and thus hamstring democratic development. In addition to Morocco, Jordan and Algeria, this analysis applies to Egypt and Tunisia. While this has been true in Morocco it is also true that Morocco is in a much better position than many other Muslim states in that its party system is so well-entrenched and also quite bipolar, as opposed to being new and fragmentary like that of Algeria. The political systems of all three countries examined in this thesis are in transitional phases and future developments are uncertain. All three countries continue to face rising indebtedness and increasing unemployment. The recent food riots in "stable" Jordan illuminate the seriousness of this point. This raises questions about the ability of these regimes to be perceived as efficacious and effective in the future, particularly in light of their inability to alleviate their serious economic difficulties, as small countries in a global economy. If they are not perceived as efficacious and effective (the Algerian regime presently is not regarded in this light) they will not be perceived as legitimate, and thus their stability will be threatened. If this happens the semi-democratic regime in Jordan, and the non- (but nearly semi-) democratic regime in Morocco could very easily falter. It is clear that in all three cases democratic development has been motivated by a need for the regime to reproduce legitimacy and by the necessity of implementing economic reforms to lead the country out of recession. So far, these have been state-led processes. Political reforms have been implemented for the purpose of generating support for government policies. In the Algerian case this failed badly. In the Jordanian case this approach has been quite successful, and in the Moroccan case it has been slightly less successful. While the Algerian process completely fell apart, in the Moroccan and Jordanian cases the semi-democratized systems, with their realization of political pluralism and personal freedom, have produced popular forces with vested interests in democratic development. Such forces 103 may eventually represent a challenge to the regime and could lead to a clamp-down on democratic rights. On the other hand, because of the severity of the countries' economic and ideological problems as well as the growing strength of these popular pressures, strategies of repression might not be viable for the Moroccan and Jordanian leaderships. It is more likely that the policy of compromise and of give-and-take will continue to operate, whereby the regimes favor positive democratic developments which would pacify the opposition and contribute to the maintenance of national unity. It seems to follow from this that in order to stay in power, King Hassan and King Hussein will be forced to continue on their paths of democratization. The natural aim of the process, however, is an institutionalization and consolidation of democracy. This would spell the loss of most of the kings' political powers. Thus the pace of the development is slow and incremental in Jordan, and virtually stalled in Morocco. It is my opinion that in spite of all of the difficulties outlined in this paper, democratization is possible in many Middle Eastern countries in the near future. The situation in the Middle East has changed rapidly in the years since independence, and significantly since the end of the Cold War and the Gulf War. The weakening of rentier economies since the 1980s has led to growing calls for political opening and participation across the Middle East. The 'special circumstances' of the Middle East do not make it capable of ignoring these fundamental changes, both in global politics and in their own societies. Greater political participation is becoming increasingly necessary, and attempts to stifle popular movements for change seem doomed to fail in the end (Algeria, for example, and possibly impending doom in Egypt). The experience of Jordan provides a very useful model for other Arab states in that it has been very tentative and slow, has not displaced the ancien regime, but yet has managed to give the people a sense of power and influence and has created a 'cushion' between the regime and the people, which allows the people to vent their steam without Algeria-style violence and political disorder. Some comments are in order here about the other Middle Eastern monarchies, some of which have been consistently non-democratic (Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, U.A.E.) and others with some variance (Kuwait, Bahrain), but all of which are oil-rich rentier states. There could be an argument made that my comments on the prospects for democracy in Middle Eastern monarchies are not borne out by these Gulf kingdoms. But I would argue that the reason there has been no movement toward 104 democratization in these societies is that they all remain strongly rentier due to their continued oil-wealth, and thus they have been able to avert popular pressure for greater participation in politics through patron-client relationships with their citizens. However, if a serious economic downturn does occur which erodes these rentier economies, I think the fact that they have strong and legitimate monarchs makes them more likely to succeed in democratic transition (if the monarchs choose to lend their legitimacy to such a process) than countries like Libya, Syria and Iraq, with no legitimate government institution to guide a such an endeavor. Both the Algerian and Jordanian experiences are instructive on the subject of how to deal with Islamist groups. King Hussein had the natural advantage in this area in that his regime has a religious authority that the military-FLN regime in Algeria could never hope to have. However, it is clear that recognizing Islamist parties can only work if the regime is willing to cooperate and share power with them if they are able to win an election. Tfiis has been the case in Jordan where the king has recognized the need to cooperate with the Islamist opposition to co-opt them into the bounds of the semi-democratic system. The Algerian cases teaches that it is more dangerous to formally acknowledge the Islamic opposition, allow them to spread their message and grow, then hold elections, and finally ban the party and crack down on its supporters when it wins. The Moroccan approach of simply banning Islamic parties, while likely not sustainable in the long term, seems to be a wiser approach than the Algerian approach. It was not very politically astute of President Benjedid to let the Islamists organize a political party when it was clear that the military-bureaucratic regime had no intention of ever allowing such a party to gain power. The fact that the FIS was a legitimate party and won a democratic election added immeasurably to their legitimacy in the eyes of a significant number of Algerians. This question of how to deal with Islamist parties in democratizing Middle Eastern societies is a deeply troubling one, and there appears to be no clear answer. A democratic society operates on competition between diverse groups, but although diversity and opposition are stressed and groups are encouraged to disagree on particular issues, there must exist an overriding commitment to the system from all groups to the rules of society. Should a group, party or organization hold deeply antagonistic ideas about the functioning of the political system (as Islamist parties are alleged to) it must be regarded as a 105 threat to that regime. A loyal opposition (loyal to the democratic system, that is), then, is a central feature of liberal democratic society, as it seeks neither to undermine nor eliminate the structures of the state. Many analysts who are not enthusiastic about the prospects for democracy in the Middle East feel the absence of a 'loyal opposition' may be one of the main impediments to the creation of stable democratic regimes in the region, inasmuch as Islamist groups are likely to be, at best, semi-loyal. However, the answer is not so simple as that. In a society like Algeria where an Islamist party has the support of such a large percentage of the voting population, that party cannot simply be banned and forgotten about because it 'holds deeply antagonistic ideas about the functioning of the political system.' In my opinion, democracy (or even semi-democracy) cannot exist where large segments of the population are denied the right to vote for the party they fervently support. Thus the decision of how to treat Islamist parries in a democratized or semi-democratized Middle Eastern state is a very difficult and controversial one which seems likely to be best made at the level of each case, in light of its own circumstances. The relatively successful transition period in Jordan, the disaster of Algeria and the mixed record of Morocco suggest that the concepts of elite consensual unity and a legitimate institution to guide the democratization process be given more attention ~ both by Middle Eastern policy makers and by Middle East scholars — as vehicles for resolving conflict and successfully implementing political reform. Democracy may be the goal for many Middle Easterners, but its institutionalization requires an extended transition period for institutions to be established and for the creation of an independent civil society and a democratic political culture. In the meantime, semi-democracy holds more promise for. Middle Eastern societies than the premature establishment of a necessarily unstable full-fledged democracy.4 It also seems clear that societies with a legitimate institution (such as a monarch) to guide the process are more likely than those without one to execute a successful transition to semi-democracy, and eventually democracy. This is something which is not sufficiently addressed in the theoretical literature, probably because it is not prescriptive - you either have a monarchy or you do not, you cannot just institute one in 1996 because democratization scholars say it will give your country a better chance of executing a successful transition. Thus the presence of a monarch in a democratizing society is not a 'practical' solution to the problem of instability and lack of legitimacy, but nevertheless this component of democratization should be studied 106 more for the sake of those societies that are lucky enough to have a legitimate monarch. Linz's "legitimacy through efficacy and effectiveness" is a virtually useless prescription for democratizing Third World societies with serious long-term economic difficulties. More study on the gaining and maintenance of legitimacy in democratizing societies is required in order for such societies to execute effective transitions to semi-democracy, and eventually democracy, as we enter the twenty-first century. Endnotes - Chapter Six 1 Some of these conditions - in particular civil society and a democratic political culture - are more problematic in democratizing Muslim countries, which must always compete with Islam as an alternative political ideology based on Koranic values. 2 This is not to imply that the process initiated by the king is entirely self-serving. The early political history of the Jordanian state shows that the king has harbored liberal and democratic sympathies since he assumed the throne. 3 Bendourou: 121. 4 Simply calling an election amongst a whirlwind of newly-formed parties in the hopes that the tallying of ballots will result in legitimacy is naive at best, dangerous at worst. This kind of process begs for the fragmentation of the non-Islamist vote in the face of a united Islamic vote. This is exactly what happened in Algeria and it is a special danger in any economically depressed Islamic society trying to democratize. 107 BIBLIOGRAPHY Addi, Lahouari. "Algeria's Tragic Contradictions," Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7, No. 3, July 1996. Bendourou, Omar. "Power and Opposition in Morocco," Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7, No. 3, July 1996. Bogdanor, Vernon. "The Monarchy and the Constitution," Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 49, No. 3, July 1996. Brynen, Rex. "Economic Crisis and Post-Rentier Democratization in the Arab World: The Case of Jordan," The Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. XVV, March 1992. Bulliet, Richard W. "The Future of the Islamic Movement," Foreign Affairs, November-December 1993. Burton, Michael, Richard Gunther and John Higley. "Introduction: elite transformations and democratic regimes," in John Higley and Richard Gunther, Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe. London: Cambridge University Press, 1992. Chapin Metz, Helen (ed.). Jordan: A Country Study (4th ed.). Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1991. Dahl, Robert A. Polyarchy. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971. Deegan, Heather. The Middle East and Problems of Democracy. Buckingham: Open University Press, 1993. Diamond, Larry, Juan J. Linz and S. M. Lipset. Democracy in Developing Countries. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1989. Djeghloul, Abdelkader. "Le multipartisme a Vsigeherme," Maghreb-Machrek (Paris), January-March 1990. Entelis, John P. Culture and Counterculture in Moroccan Politics. Boulder: Westview Press, 1989. Esposito, John L. Islam and Politics (3rd ed.). Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1991. The Europa Yearbook 1995, Vol. II. Evans-Smith, William (ed.). Morocco: A country study. Washington, D.C.: The American University, 1978. Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil Liberties. New York: Freedom House, 1973-96, inclusive. Gunther, Richard, Hans-Jurgen Puhle, and P. Nikiforos Diamandouros. "Introduction," in Richard Gunther, P. Nikiforos Diamandouros and Hans-Jurgen Puhle, The Politics of Democratic Consolidation. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995. Huntington, Samuel P. "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993. Huntington, Samuel P. The Third Wave. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991. 108 Jackson, Henry F. The FLN in Algeria. Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, Inc., 1977. Joffe, George. "Elections and Reform in Morocco," in Richard Gillespie (ed.), Mediterranean Politics, Vol. I. London: Pinter Publishers, 1994. Korany, Bahgat. "Arab Democratization: A poor cousin?" Political Science and Politics, Vol. XVII, No. 3, September 1994. Kramer, Gudrun. "The Integration of the Integrationists: A comparative study of Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia," in Salame, Ghassan (ed.). Democracy without Democrats: The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World. London: LB. Tauris Publishers, 1994. Leca, Jean. "Democratization in the Arab World: uncertainty, vulnerability and legitimacy. A tentative conceptualization and some hypotheses," in Salame, Ghassan (ed.). Democracy without Democrats: The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World. London: LB. Tauris Publishers, 1994. Linz, Juan J. The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown and Reequilibration. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978. Lipset, S. M. Political Man. London, 1966. Luciani, Giacomo. The Arab State. London, 1990. Luciani, Giacomo. "Economic Foundations of Democracy and Authoritarianism: The Arab World in Comparative Perspective," Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 4, 1988. Mortimer, Robert A. "Algeria: The Clash between Islam, Democracy and the Military," Current History, January 1993. Pierre, Andrew J. and William B. Quandt. "Algeria's War on Itself," Foreign Policy, Summer 1995. Przeworski, Adam. Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reform in Eastern Europe and Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. Rath, Kathrine. "The Process of Democratization in Jordan," Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 30, No. 3, July 1994. Robins, Philip. "Jordan's Election: A new era?" MERIP, Vol. 20, No. 4, July-August 1990. Roberts, Hugh. "Algeria's ruinous impasse and the honorable way out," International Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 2, 1995. Rodney, Walter. How Europe Underdeveloped Africa. Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, 1982. Rostefsky Wickham, Carrie. "Beyond Democratization: Political Change in the Arab World," Political Science and Politics, Vol. XXVII, No. 3, September 1994. Salame, Ghassan. "Introduction," in Salame, Ghassan (ed.). Democracy without Democrats: The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World. London: LB. Tauris Publishers, 1994. Salibi, Kamal. The Modern History of Jordan. London: LB. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 1993. 109 Sartori, Giovanni. The Theory of Democracy Revisited, Part One: The Contemporary Debate. Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House Publishers, 1987. Shabon, Anwar M. The Political, Economic and Labor Climate in Morocco. No. 9, Middle East and North African Studies. Philadelphia: Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, 1986. Schmitter, Phillippe. "The Consolidation of Political Democracy in Southern Europe (and Latin America)," unpublished manuscript, 1985. Schumpeter, Joseph. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. London, 1957. Schwedler, Jillian. Toward Civil Society in the Middle East? Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995. Shirley, Edward G. "Is Iran's present Algeria's future?" Foreign Affairs, May-June 1995. Sisken, Daniel S. "Democracy or Pluralism? Reform Processes in Egypt, Algeria, and Jordan." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, April 1996. United Nations. Human Development Report. For the UN Development Programme. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993. United Nations. Human Development Report. For the UN Development Programme. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. Waterbury, John. The Commander of the Faithful: The Moroccan political elite - a study of segmented politics. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1970. Waterbury, John. "Democracy without democrats?" in Salame, Ghassan (ed.). Democracy without Democrats: The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World. London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1994. Wilson, Rodney. Politics and the Economy in Jordan. London: Routledge, 1991. Worldmark: Encyclopedia of the Nations 1995. Yorke, Valerie. Domestic Politics and Regional Security: Jordan, Syria and Israel. Aldershot: Gower, 1988. Zubaida, Sami. "Islam, the State, and Democracy: Contrasting Conceptions of Society in Egypt," Middle East Report, Vol. 22, No. 79, 1992. 110 APPENDIX TABLE: Freedom in the Muslim World, 1972 to 1995 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 Country score status score status score status score status score status 1. Bangladesh 3 SD 3 SD 4 SD 4 SD 6 ND 2. Pakistan 4 SD 4 SD 4 SD 4 SD 5 ND 3. Jordan * 6 ND 6 ND 6 ND 6 ND 6 ND 4. Kuwait * 4 SD 4 SD 3.5 SD 3.5 SD 3.5 SD 5. Morocco * 4.5 ND 4.5 ND 5 ND 5 ND 5 ND 6. Turkey 3.5 SD 3.5 SD 2.5 D 2.5 D 2.5 D 7. Lebanon 2 D 2 D 2 D 2 D 4 SD 8. Yemen (N) 4 SD 4 SD 4.5 SD 4.5 ND 5 ND 9. Yemen (S) 7 ND 7 ND 7 ND 7 ND 7 ND 10. Tunisia 5.5 ND 5.5 ND 5.5 ND . 5.5 ND 5.5 ND 11. United Arab Emirates * 6 ND 5.5 ND 5.5 ND 5.5 ND 5.5 ND 12. Bahrain * 5.5 ND 5.5 ND 4 SD 4 SD 5 ND 13. Egypt 6 ND 6 ND 5 ND 5 ND 5 ND 14. Oman * 6.5 ND 6.5 ND 6.5 ND 6.5 ND 6.5 ND 15. Indonesia 5 ND 5 ND 5. ND 5 ND 5 ND 16. Iran 5.5 ND 5.5 ND 5.5 ND 5.5 ND 6 ND 17. Qatar * 5.5 ND 5.5 ND 5.5 ND 5.5 ND 5.5 ' ND 18. Afghanistan 4.5 SD 4.5 SD 6.5 ND 6.5 ' ND 6.5 ND 19. Algeria 6 ND 6 ND 6 ND 6 ND 6.5 ND 20. Iraq 7 ND 1 ND 1 ND 1 ND 1 ND 21. Libya 6.5 ND 1 ND 1 ND 1 ND 6.5 ND 22. Saudi Arabia * 6 ND 6 ND 6 ND 6 ND 6 ND 23. Syria 7 ND 6.5 ND 6.5 ND 6.5 ND 6.5 ND The numbers follow the Freedom House scale, in which 1 is the most free (democratic) and 7 is the least. The 'political rights' and 'civil liberties' scores have been collapsed into one number. D represents 'democracy,' SD represents 'semi-democracy,' and N D represents 'non-democracy.' A * signifies a continuing monarchy. Break years are marked in bold. The three case study countries are in italics. Note that this list of Muslim countries does not include Soviet successor states. I l l - Appendix table continued (ii) -1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 Country score status score status score status score status score status 1. Bangladesh 5.5 ND 5 ND 4 SD 3 SD 3 SD 2. Pakistan 4.5 SD 5 ND 5.5 ND 6 ND 6 ND 3. Jordan * 6 ND 6 ND 6 ND 6 ND 6 ND 4. Kuwait * 5.5 ND 5 ND 4.5 ND 5 ND 5 ND 5. Morocco * 5 ND 3.5 SD 3.5 SD 3.5 SD 4 573 6. Turkey 2.5 D 2.5 D 2.5 D 2.5 D 5 ND 7. Lebanon 4 SD 4 SD 4 SD 4 SD 4 SD 8. Yemen (N) 5.5 ND 5.5 ND 5.5 ND 5.5 ND 5.5 ND 9. Yemen (S) 7 ND 7 ND 7 ND 6.5 ND 6.5 ND 10. Tunisia 5.5 ND 5.5 ND 5.5 ND 5.5 ND 5.5 ND 11. United Arab Emirates * 5 ND 5 ND 5 ND 5 ND 5 ND 12. Bahrain * 5 ND 5 ND 5 ND 5 ND 4.5 ND 13. Egypt 4.5 ND 4.5 ND 5 ND 5 ND 5 ND 14. Oman * 6 ND 6 ND 6 ND 6 ND 6 ND 15. Indonesia 5 ND 5 ND 5 ND 5 ND 5 ND 16. Iran 6 ND 5.5 ND 5.5 ND 5.5 ND 5 ND 17. Qatar * 5 ND 5 ND 5 ND 5 ND 5 ND 18. Afghanistan 6.5 ND 6.5 ND 7 ND 7 ND 7 ND 19. Algeria 6 ND 6 ND (5 ND <5 ND 6 ND 20. Iraq 7 ND 7 ND 6.5 ND 7 ND 6.5 ND 21. Libya 6.5 ND 6.5 ND 6 ND 6 ND 6 ND 22. Saudi Arabia * 6 ND 6 ND 6 ND 6 ND 6 ND 23. Syria 6 ND 5.5 ND 5.5 ND 5.5 ND 5.5 ND 1 - Appendix table continued (iii) -1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 Country score status score status score status score status score status 1. Bangladesh 3.5 SD 5.5 ND 5.5 ND 5 ND 4.5 SD 2. Pakistan 6 ND 6 ND 6 ND 4.5 SD 4.5 SD 3. Jordan * 6 ND 6 ND 5 ND 5 ND 5 ND 4. Kuwait * 4 SD 4 SD 4 SD 4 SD 5.5 ND 5. Morocco * 4.5 SD 4.5 SD 4.5 SD 4.5 SD 4.5 SD 6. Turkey 5 ND 4.5 SD 4 SD 4 SD 3.5 SD 7. Lebanon 4 SD 4.5 ND 4.5 ND 4.5 ND 4.5 ND 8. Yemen (N) 5.5 ND 5.5 ND 5 • ND 5 ND 5 ND 9. Yemen (S) 6.5 ND 6.5 ND 6.5 ND 6.5 ND 6.5 ND 10. Tunisia 5 ND 5 ND 5 ND 5 ND 5.5 ND 11. United Arab Emirates * 5 ND 5 ND 5 ND 5 ND 5 ND 12. Bahrain * 5 ND 5 ND 5 ND 5 ND 5 ND 13. Egypt 5.5 ND 5 ND 4 SD 4 SD 4.5 ND 14. Oman * 6 ND 6 ND 6 ND 6 ND 6 ND 15. Indonesia •5 ND 5 ND 5.5 ND 5.5 ND 5.5 ND 16. Iran 6 ND 6 ND 5.5 ND 5.5 ND 5.5 ND 17. Qatar * 5 ND 5 ND 5 ND 5 ND 5 ND 18. Afghanistan 7 ND 7 ND 7 ND 7 ND 7 ND 19. Algeria 6 ND 6 ND 6 ND 6 ND 6 ND 20. Iraq 6.5 ND 6.5 ND 1 ND 1 ND 7 ND 21. Libya 6.5 ND 6 ND 6 ND 6 ND 6 ND 22. Saudi Arabia * 6 ND 6.5 ND 6.5 ND 6.5 ND 6.5 ND 23. Syria 5.5 ND 6.5 ND 6.5 ND 6.5 ND 6.5 ND 1 - Appendix table continued (iv) -1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 Country score status score status score status score status score status 1. Bangladesh 4.5 SD 4.5 SD 4 SD 5 ND 2.5 D 2. Pakistan 4.5 SD 3 SD 3 SD 4 SD 4.5 SD 3. Jordan * 5 ND 5.5 ND 5 ND 5 ND 4 SD 4. Kuwait * 5.5 ND 5.5 ND 5 ND 1 ND 5.5 ND 5. Morocco * 4.5 SD 4.5 SD 4 SD 4 SD 5 ND 6. Turkey 3 SD 3 SD 3 SD 3 SD 3 SD 7. Lebanon 5.5 ND 5.5 ND 5.5 ND 5.5 ND 5 ND 8. Yemen (N) 9. Yemen (S) 5 5 ND ND 5 5 ND ND 5 7 ND ND 5.5 - ND 5.5 ND 10. Tunisia 5.5 ND 5 ND 4 SD 4 5 ND 5 : ND 11. United Arab Emirates * 5 ND 5 ND 5.5 ND 5.5 ND 5.5 ND 12. Bahrain * 5- ND 5. ND 5.5 ND 5.5 ND 5.5 ND 13. Egypt 4.5 ND 4.5 ND 4.5 , ND 4.5 ND 5 ND 14. Oman * 6 ND 6 ND 6 ND 6 ND 6 ND 15. Indonesia 5.5 ND 5 ND 5 ND 5.5 ND 5.5 ND 16. Iran, 5.5 ND 5.5 ND 5.5 ND 5.5 ND * 5,5 ND 17. Qatar * 5 ND 5 ND 6 ND 6 ND .6 ND 18. Afghanistan 7 ND 6 ND 7 ND 7 ND 7 ND 19. Algeria 6 ND 5.5 ND 5 ND 4 SD 4 SD 20. Iraq 7 ND 1 ND 6.5 ND 1 ND 7 ND 21. Libya 6 ND 6 ND 7 ND 1 ND 7 ND 22. Saudi Arabia * 6.5 ND 6.5 ND 6.5 ND 6.5 ND 6.5 ND 23. Syria 6.5 ND, 6.5 ND 7 ND 7 ND 7 ND 114 - Appendix table continued (v) -1992 1993 1994 1995 Country score status score status score status score status 1. Bangladesh 2.5 D 3 SD 3 SD 3.5 SD 2. Pakistan 4.5- SD 4 SD 4 SD 4 SD 3. Jordan * 3 SD 4 SD 4 SD 4 SD 4. Kuwait * 5 ND ' 5 ND 5 ND 5 ND 5. Morocco * 5.5 ND 5 ND 5 ND 5 ND 6. Turkey 3 SD 4 SD 5 ND 5 ND 7. Lebanon 4.5 ND 5.5 ND 5.5 ND 5.5 ND 8. Yemen (united) 5 ND 4.5 SD 5.5 ND 5.5 ND 10. Tunisia 5.5 ND 5.5 ND 5.5 ND 5.5 ND 11. United Arab Emirates * 5.5 ND . 6 ND 5.5 ND 5.5 ND 12. Bahrain * 5.5 ND 6 ND 6 ND 6 ND 13. Egypt 5.5 ND 6 ND 6 ND 6 ND 14. Oman * 5.5 ND 6 ND 6 ND 6 ND 15. Indonesia 5.5 ND 6.5 ND 6.5 ND 6.5 ND 16. Iran 6 ND 6.5 ND 6.5 ND 6.5 ND 17. Qatar * 6.5 ND 6.5 ND 6.5 ND 6.5 ND 18. Afghanistan 6 ND 7 ND 7 ND 7 ND 19. Algeria 6.5 ND 6.5 ND 7 . ND r5 ND 20. Iraq 7 ND 1 ND 7 ND 7 ND 21. Libya 7 ND 1 ND 7 ND 7 ND 22. Saudi Arabia * 7 ND 1 ND 7 ND 7 ND 23. Syria 7 ND 1 ND 7 ND 7 ND Compiled from data in: Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties. All years, 1972-73 to 1995-96, inclusive. 115 

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