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Real and apparent inconsistencies in Davidson’s view of interpretation Johnson, Jennifer Elisabeth 1995

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REAL AND APPARENT INCONSISTENCIES IN DAVIDSON'S VIEW OF INTERPRETATION by JENNIFER ELISABETH JOHNSON B.A., The U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia 1990 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER... OF ARTS':: in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Department  of Philosophy)  We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming to the r e q u i r e d standard  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA October 1995 (c) J e n n i f e r E l i s a b e t h Johnson, 1995  In  presenting this  degree at the  thesis in  University of  partial  fulfilment  of  the  requirements  British Columbia, I agree that the  for  an advanced  Library shall make it  freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of  this thesis for  department  or  by  his  or  scholarly purposes may be her  representatives.  It  publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not permission.  Department of  Ptf/L-OSopM V  The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada  Date.^C^.  DE-6 (2/88)  Q5>.  l - ^ S  is  granted  by the  understood  that  head of copying  my or  be allowed without my written  ABSTRACT  In  " R a d i c a l I n t e r p r e t a t i o n " and  E p i t a p h s " Donald Davidson  addresses  a b l e to understand what people say. p o s i t i v e arguments i n these two  "A Nice Derangement of the q u e s t i o n how Davidson  argue,  In  i n t e n d s the  However, t h e r e are, I  i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s between the t h e o r i e s i n h i s  essays which suggest coherent  are  essays to be p a r t of a  coherent e x p l a n a t i o n of communication. will  we  two  that they are not r e c o n c i l a b l e i n t o a  picture. chapters one and two  t h a t Davidson  I will  e x p l i c a t e the arguments  p r e s e n t s i n " R a d i c a l I n t e r p r e t a t i o n " and  Derangement of E p i t a p h s " .  "A Nice  In chapter three I w i l l d i s c u s s  s e v e r a l areas i n which d i s c r e p a n c i e s between the p o s i t i o n s p r e s e n t e d i n these two papers  seem to a r i s e .  The  w i l l be d i s c u s s e d i n chapter three stem from an i n c o n s i s t e n c y i n Davidson's  issues that  apparent  p o s i t i o n r e g a r d i n g the time p e r i o d  over which i n t e r p r e t a t i o n should occur. In " R a d i c a l I n t e r p r e t a t i o n " Davidson maintains t h a t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n occur over an extended  should  p e r i o d of time, w h i l e i n "A N i c e  Derangement of E p i t a p h s " he maintains t h a t what i s n e c e s s a r y for  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n cannot be l e a r n e d p r i o r to the o c c a s i o n of  utterance.  Although  i t may  appear t h a t he i s i n c o n s i s t e n t  t h i s issue,  I w i l l argue that the d i f f e r e n c e s between the  on  d e s c r i p t i o n s of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n m  the two papers are  d i f f e r e n c e s of emphasis r a t h e r than d i f f e r e n c e s of substance. In chapter four I w i l l argue that there genuine i n c o n s i s t e n c y  i s , however, a  between the c o n c e p t i o n of  meaning p r e s e n t e d i n "Radical  I n t e r p r e t a t i o n " and the one  p r e s e n t e d i n "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs". "Radical  linguistic  Whereas i n  I n t e r p r e t a t i o n " meaning i s h e l d to be d i s c o v e r e d  the i n t e r p r e t e r , i n "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs"  by  meaning  i s h e l d to be c r e a t e d by the speaker and i n t e r p r e t e r .  I will  argue t h a t t h i s l a t t e r c o n c e p t i o n of meaning i s p r o b l e m a t i c because i t assumes that meaning i s d e r i v e d b e i n g independent of, communication.  from, r a t h e r  than  I w i l l conclude that the  t h e o r i e s of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n presented i n these two essays are, therefore,  i r r e c o n c i l a b l e and that, of the two, the p i c t u r e  p r e s e n t e d i n "Radical  Interpretation" i s superior.  TABLE OF CONTENTS  Abstract  i i  Table of Contents  iv  Acknowledgement  v  INTRODUCTION  1  Chapter One  Davidson's View of I n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n "A Nice Derangement of E p i t a p h s "  Chapter Two  5  Davidson's View of I n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n  "Radical  Interpretation"  27  Chapter Three  Apparent  Inconsistencies  56  Chapter Four  Real I n c o n s i s t e n c i e s  Works C i t e d  82  97  iv  ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS  I would l i k e t o thank Gary Wedeking f o r encouraging me to c o n t i n u e s t u d y i n g p h i l o s o p h y . I am g r a t e f u l t o my mother and my b r o t h e r Greg f o r always being proud of me and f o r r e s p e c t i n g my d e c i s i o n s . I owe s p e c i a l thanks t o Aleem f o r h i s p a t i e n c e , l o v i n g support, and f o r s h a r i n g my enthusiasm f o r philosophy. F i n a l l y , I would l i k e t o express my deeply f e l t g r a t i t u d e t o Kate Talmage f o r being both a f r i e n d and a mentor.  v  INTRODUCTION  Donald Davidson's p o s i t i v e agenda i n both I n t e r p r e t a t i o n " and e x p l a i n how  "Radical  "A Nice Derangement of E p i t a p h s " i s to  we are a b l e to understand a speaker's u t t e r a n c e s .  To understand a speaker's u t t e r a n c e s we must be a b l e to understand how  the syntax of a speaker's words r e l a t e s to the  words' semantics. Davidson asks how  At the o u t s e t of " R a d i c a l  Interpretation"  we can, f o r example, determine t h a t a  speaker's u t t e r a n c e "Es regnet" means " I t i s r a i n i n g " .  We  may  know t h a t "Es regnet" i n German means " I t i s r a i n i n g " i n E n g l i s h but i n order to understand the speaker's u t t e r a n c e we must f i r s t determine that the speaker i s , i n f a c t , German-.  As a r e s u l t ,  the q u e s t i o n that Davidson poses  be answered simply by e x p l a i n i n g how  an i n t e r p r e t e r  t r a n s l a t e an u t t e r a n c e from an unknown language language.  cannot  may  i n t o a known  What Davidson wants to address i n both  I n t e r p r e t a t i o n " and  speaking  "Radical  "A N i c e Derangement o f E p i t a p h s " , i s what  c o u l d we know that would make communication  possible?  Though the q u e s t i o n that i s addressed i n both papers i s the same, t h e r e are obvious d i f f e r e n c e s i n the manner i n which it  i s addressed.  Davidson analyses i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  entirely  from the p e r s p e c t i v e of the i n t e r p r e t e r i n " R a d i c a l Interpretation".  By c o n t r a s t , i n "A Nice Derangement of  1  E p i t a p h s " he analyses both the speaker's and the i n t e r p r e t e r ' s r o l e i n c r e a t i n g the meaning o f the speaker's  utterances.  What I w i l l address i n t h i s t h e s i s i s whether the p o s i t i v e p i c t u r e s of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n presented i n "Radical Interpretation"  and "A Nice Derangement of E p i t a p h s " a r e p a r t  of a c o n s i s t e n t ,  coherent view.  In chapter one I w i l l  e x p l i c a t e the argument that Davidson p r e s e n t s i n " R a d i c a l Interpretation".  Davidson maintains that the a b i l i t y to  understand a speaker's u t t e r a n c e s i s d e r i v e d  from  u n d e r s t a n d i n g the r e l a t i o n s h i p between language and the nonlinguistic  facts relevant  Thus the a p p r o p r i a t e  to a speaker's language use.  model f o r a theory of meaning, he s t a t e s ,  i s one which r e l a t e s language to the world i n a s y s t e m a t i c manner.  The meaning of an u t t e r a n c e , he argues, i s  c o n s t i t u t e d by the c o n d i t i o n s true.  We a r e able  under which an u t t e r a n c e i s  to understand a speaker's u t t e r a n c e , he  maintains, when we have determined the t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s or her u t t e r a n c e .  Interpretation,  of h i s  then, i s a p r o c e s s of  d e v e l o p i n g a theory of meaning or t r u t h f o r a speaker's utterances. In c h a p t e r two I w i l l d i s c u s s constructive  arguments that Davidson p r e s e n t s i n "A N i c e  Derangement of E p i t a p h s " . consists  both the d e s t r u c t i v e and  Davidson's d e s t r u c t i v e  argument  i n a r e j e c t i o n of the p i c t u r e of communication i n  which meaning i s d e r i v e d Convention, d e f i n e d  from a c o n v e n t i o n a l use of language.  as shared r u l e s and r e g u l a r i t i e s i s , 2  Davidson c l a i m s , both i n s u f f i c i e n t and unnecessary f o r communication.  I w i l l defend t h i s aspect of h i s argument  a g a i n s t M i c h a e l Dummett's c r i t i c i s m that Davidson f a i l s to r e c o g n i z e the importance of convention to  communication.  Davidson's c o n s t r u c t i v e argument i n "A N i c e Derangement of  E p i t a p h s " i s developed i n o p p o s i t i o n to a c o n v e n t i o n a l  p i c t u r e of communication.  In order to understand a speaker's  u t t e r a n c e s i t i s necessary, Davidson argues, to i n t e r p r e t a speaker a c c o r d i n g to a theory which i s the same or e q u i v a l e n t to  the t h e o r y of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n that guides the speaker's  language use. the of  Communication, he argues, i s s u c c e s s f u l o n l y to  degree that the speaker and the hearer use the same t h e o r y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n to speak or i n t e r p r e t .  However, these  t h e o r i e s of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n need not be guided by c o n v e n t i o n a l r u l e s or r e g u l a r i t i e s . In  chapter three I w i l l address s e v e r a l areas i n which  d i s c r e p a n c i e s seem to e x i s t between " R a d i c a l and  "A N i c e Derangement of E p i t a p h s " .  Interpretation"  I t appears  that  Davidson i s i n c o n s i s t e n t r e g a r d i n g the p e r i o d of time r e q u i r e d for  interpretation.  Whereas i n "Radical I n t e r p r e t a t i o n "  he  s t r e s s e s the b e n e f i t s of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n over time, i n "A N i c e Derangement of E p i t a p h s " he argues that what i s n e c e s s a r y f o r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n cannot be l e a r n e d p r i o r to the o c c a s i o n of utterance.  I will  f i r s t d i s c u s s the s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h i s  apparent i n c o n s i s t e n c y and then address whether Davidson i s , in fact,  inconsistent i n t h i s regard.  In the f i n a l chapter I w i l l describe, the apparent d i f f e r e n c e s between the r o l e of the i n t e r p r e t e r as i t i s described  i n "Radical  of E p i t a p h s " .  I will  I n t e r p r e t a t i o n " and "A N i c e Derangement then d i s c u s s  the evidence f o r the c l a i m  t h a t Davidson's c o n c e p t i o n of the i n t e r p r e t e r ' s r o l e i s not the same i n the two papers.  In c o n c l u s i o n ,  I w i l l answer the  question  whether the p i c t u r e s of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n p r e s e n t e d i n  "Radical  I n t e r p r e t a t i o n " and "A Nice Derangement of  are,  Epitaphs"  i n f a c t , p a r t of a coherent p i c t u r e of communication.  4  CHAPTER 1: DAVIDSON'S VIEW OF INTERPRETATION IN "RADICAL  INTERPRETATION"  At the outset of "Radical I n t e r p r e t a t i o n " Davidson q u e s t i o n s what we c o u l d p o s s i b l y know that would enable us t o i n t e r p r e t other people's u t t e r a n c e s . asks,  How i s i t , Davidson  t h a t we are able to understand what people say even when  we do not share a language?  Davidson does not advance an  e m p i r i c a l c l a i m r e g a r d i n g what we, i n f a c t , know t h a t would enable us t o do t h i s . is distinct know.  As Davidson notes,  what we c o u l d know  from the i s s u e r e g a r d i n g what, i f anything,  I t i s p o s s i b l e , he suggests,  t h a t we possess t h a t i s necessary  we do  t h a t there i s no knowledge  for interpretation.  However, i f there were a theory that e x p l a i n e d what we c o u l d know t h a t makes i n t e r p r e t a t i o n p o s s i b l e i t must, i n order f o r it  to be v i a b l e , a l s o be p o s s i b l e to g i v e a p l a u s i b l e account  of how i n t e r p r e t e r s c o u l d a c q u i r e knowledge of t h i s According of ot hers  theory.  to Davidson, the need to i n t e r p r e t the speech  i s ubiquitous.  I t i s not o n l y when we encounter  speakers w i t h whom we do not share a language t h a t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s necessary. who we b e l i e v e a r e speaking i n t e r p r e t t h e i r utterances interpretation will,  radical  Even when we encounter speakers our own f i r s t  language we must  to determine t h a t our theory of  i n f a c t , apply to t h e i r  utterances.  Speakers of the same language, Davidson maintains, 5  can be  i n t e r p r e t e d u s i n g the same theory of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . t h i s addresses  what speaking  Though  the same language means, i t does  not answer the f u r t h e r q u e s t i o n r e g a r d i n g how we r e c o g n i z e when someone i s speaking  the same language as us.  be a b l e to r e c o g n i z e speakers  of the same language we must be  a b l e to d i s t i n g u i s h between cases sound the same and cases same meaning.  In order t o  i n which u t t e r a n c e s merely  i n which these u t t e r a n c e s have the  Consequently, the question, both  f o r languages  which a r e f a m i l i a r and those which a r e u n f a m i l i a r to an interpreter,  i s what c o u l d we know t h a t would enable us t o  i n t e r p r e t a speaker's It  i s tempting,  utterances? Davidson suggests,  t o answer t h i s  q u e s t i o n simply w i t h the c l a i m that what we know'is the meaning of a speaker's  words.  Meanings, a c c o r d i n g t o many  t h e o r i s t s , a r e e n t i t i e s t h a t correspond expressions. a speaker's  According  t o meaningful  to t h i s model, knowing the meaning of  u t t e r a n c e s would be d e s c r i b e d as knowing a  particular linguistic entity.  T h i s conception of meaning,  however, does not p r o v i d e a s a t i s f a c t o r y answer to the i n i t i a l q u e s t i o n t h a t was posed.  Even i f we d e s c r i b e the o b j e c t of  our knowledge as a meaning or e n t i t y ,  t h i s does not e x p l a i n  how we a c q u i r e knowledge of t h i s e n t i t y .  I f we accept  p i c t u r e of meaning, the emphasis of the i n i t i a l simply s h i f t  this  q u e s t i o n would  from an i s s u e of how we i n t e r p r e t a  speaker's  u t t e r a n c e s to an i s s u e of how we a c q u i r e knowledge of the meaning of a speaker's  utterances. 6  Davidson maintains, t h e r e f o r e , meanings i s unproductive and necessarily relevant  that the p o s t u l a t i o n  removes us  of  from what i s  to i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .  Rather than r e l a t i n g  language to a f u r t h e r l i n g u i s t i c concept such as meaning, Davidson argues, we language and explanation  should look to the r e l a t i o n between  n o n l i n g u i s t i c things  and  events to p r o v i d e  of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .  Other t h e o r i s t s have avoided p o s t u l a t i n g such as meanings and  have, i n s t e a d ,  components.  extra e n t i t i e s  attempted to  communication i n terms of i t s p h y s i c a l or  instances  an  explain  syntactic  Reduction t h e o r i s t s have argued that  of v e r b a l  conventional  communication are n o t h i n g more than  i n t e n t i o n a l movement of the speaker's t h r o a t and  larynx  the which  produces sound waves which, i n turn, have a p h y s i c a l e f f e c t the eardrums of the  interpreter.  A c c o r d i n g to r e d u c t i o n i s t s , there i s a c a u s a l ,  and  necessary, l i n k between n o n l i n g u i s t i c a c t i v i t i e s and communication.  The  p r e c e d i n g d e s c r i p t i o n of the  components of communication does not, causal  Questions regarding  verbal  however, e x p l a i n  e x a c t l y how  hence  physical  l i n k between n o n l i n g u i s t i c a c t i v i t i e s and  communication.  on  the  verbal nonlinguistic  a c t i v i t i e s cause or f a c i l i t a t e communication remain unanswered. we  Though Davidson i s sympathetic to the view  must look to n o n l i n g u i s t i c events and  to e x p l a i n how  we  are able  things  i n the  to i n t e r p r e t speaker's  the p h y s i c a l i s t model does not,  world  utterances,  i n h i s view, p r o v i d e a 7  that  s u f f i c i e n t e x p l a n a t i o n of how r e l e v a n t to t h i s  n o n l i n g u i s t i c events  are  explanation.  Davidson a l s o r e j e c t s the suggestion t h a t the between language and  the world should be analysed  the r e l a t i o n between i n d i v i d u a l words and events. another  connection i n terms of  nonlinguistic  Words taken i n d i v i d u a l l y or i n i s o l a t i o n from are not, Davidson argues,  one  the a p p r o p r i a t e semantic  unit for this analysis.  N o n l i n g u i s t i c f a c t s such as o b j e c t s  and events  Davidson maintains,  i n the world,  are r e l a t e d to  words o n l y i n so f a r as these words occur i n or as As .will become apparent l a t e r ,  sentences.  t h i s i s because i t i s the  c o n d i t i o n s under which a speaker holds an u t t e r a n c e to be  true  which, a c c o r d i n g to Davidson, determine the meaning of t h a t utterance.  I f we  are able to d i s c e r n under what c o n d i t i o n s a  speaker holds a p a r t i c u l a r u t t e r a n c e to be t r u e we a c c o r d i n g to Davidson, determine the meaning of  can,  this  utterance. I n d i v i d u a l words do not have a t r u t h value, however, u n l e s s they are being used as sentences. for  My word " r a b b i t " ,  example, r e l a t e s to a n o n l i n g u i s t i c e n t i t y o n l y to the  extent t h a t i t i s being used to make an a s s e r t i o n r e g a r d i n g a nonlinguistic fact. sentence,  I may  use the word " r a b b i t " as a  f o r example, with the i n t e n t i o n of conveying  meaning t h e r e i s a r a b b i t .  Clearly,  t h i s utterance  the  will  e i t h e r be t r u e or f a l s e depending on the r e l e v a n t c o n d i t i o n s i n the world.  According  to Davidson's theory of meaning, a 8  n e c e s s a r y c o n n e c t i o n between my word " r a b b i t " and a p a r t i c u l a r c o n d i t i o n i n the world w i l l occur o n l y when t h i s word i s b e i n g used t o make an a s s e r t i o n r e g a r d i n g the world and, hence, o n l y when the u t t e r a n c e has a t r u t h v a l u e .  As a r e s u l t , words,  when taken alone, have no necessary r e l a t i o n t o the n o n l i n g u i s t i c f a c t s t h a t are r e l e v a n t to the semantics  of the  words i n q u e s t i o n . Davidson  f u r t h e r r e j e c t s the suggestion, made by G r i c e  and o t h e r s , t h a t the i n t e n t i o n s of the. speaker  a r e the  a p p r o p r i a t e evidence r e g a r d i n g what the speaker's means.  utterance  In order f o r i n t e n t i o n s to serve as evidence  f o r the  meaning of a speaker's words, Davidson maintains, we must be a b l e to d i s c e r n the speaker's  i n t e n t i o n s p r i o r to and  independently of the meaning of h i s words. Davidson,  According to  however, b e l i e f and meaning a r e i n e x t r i c a b l y  linked.  Thus we cannot use a speaker's b e l i e f s o r i n t e n t i o n s f o r the evidence r e g a r d i n g what h i s words mean because we cannot  know  what h i s i n t e n t i o n s a r e independently of knowing the meaning of  h i s words. The  Davidson  final  r e j e c t s i s Quine's theory of r a d i c a l  Though Davidson maintains  s u g g e s t i o n f o r a theory of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t h a t  admits  translation.  a p h i l o s o p h i c a l debt to Quine, he  t h a t r a d i c a l t r a n s l a t i o n i s an i n s u f f i c i e n t  e x p l a n a t i o n of what we c o u l d know that would enable us to i n t e r p r e t a speaker's of  utterances.  A c c o r d i n g t o Quine's t h e o r y  r a d i c a l t r a n s l a t i o n , what i s r e q u i r e d f o r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s 9  a t r a n s l a t i o n manual which r e l a t e s words o r u t t e r a n c e s i n one language  to words or u t t e r a n c e s i n another language.  However,  t h i s does not e x p l a i n what we must know to understand the meaning of a speaker's u t t e r a n c e . that  I may, f o r example, know  "Es regnet" i n German t r a n s l a t e s to "11 p l e u t " i n French  without b e i n g a b l e to r e c o g n i z e what would make e i t h e r of these sentences t r u e . for  Knowing what the c o r r e c t  translation  a p a r t i c u l a r u t t e r a n c e i s , t h e r e f o r e , does not ensure  we w i l l understand the meaning of the u t t e r a n c e .  that  In o r d e r t o  ensure t h a t we understand the meaning of a t r a n s l a t i o n we must f i r s t understand the meaning of the language utterance i s being t r a n s l a t e d i n t o .  that the  As a r e s u l t , what must be  e x p l a i n e d i s our understanding of the known language.  Quine  takes t h i s understanding as g i v e n and, consequently, f a i l s t o e x p l a i n how we come to t h i s understanding. What a v i a b l e theory of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n should e x p l a i n , a c c o r d i n g to Davidson, something  finite,  i s how an i n t e r p r e t e r w i t h knowledge of  and hence comprehensible by a mind w i t h  f i n i t e c a p a c i t i e s , may be a b l e to understand any p o t e n t i a l u t t e r a n c e to which the theory a p p l i e s .  The evidence t h a t  supports such a theory, Davidson argues, should not r e l y on concepts such as meaning, i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , and synonymy.  The  theory t h a t Davidson seeks w i l l e x p l a i n how a h e a r e r i n t e r p r e t s a speaker's u t t e r a n c e s and, i n the p r o c e s s , what determines  the meaning of a speaker's u t t e r a n c e s .  Consequently,  we cannot presuppose 10  an understanding o f these  l i n g u i s t i c concepts  i n order to v e r i f y a theory r e l a t i v e to  which these concepts w i l l be d e f i n e d . A theory of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n must, a c c o r d i n g to a l s o r e c o g n i z e the semantic utterances.  Davidson,  r e l e v a n c e of the s t r u c t u r e of  The meaning of an u t t e r a n c e , Davidson argues,  c o n s t i t u t e d by i t s t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s and,  consequently,  meaning and t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s of an u t t e r a n c e are one same t h i n g .  is  the  and  the  Thus, because Davidson i s g i v i n g a t r u t h -  c o n d i t i o n a l account  of meaning we must understand  i n which the s t r u c t u r e of a sentence  the manner  i s r e l e v a n t to i t s t r u t h  conditions. The  r e l e v a n c e of s t r u c t u r e to t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s i s  apparent  i n complex sentences  such as c o n j u n c t i o n s .  sentence  i s a c o n j u n c t i o n the t r u t h v a l u e of the  conjuncts w i l l be independent of one other. e n t i r e sentence, to be t r u e . false,  The  individual t r u t h of the  however, w i l l r e q u i r e each of the  I f the f i r s t  If a  conjuncts  conjunct i s t r u e w h i l e the second i s  the e n t i r e sentence w i l l a l s o be f a l s e .  But,  c o n j u n c t w i l l remain t r u e d e s p i t e the f a c t t h a t the  the  first  sentence  i n which i t appears i s f a l s e . In order f o r a theory to be s e n s i t i v e to the r e l e v a n c e of s t r u c t u r e to t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s i t must, Davidson argues, structurally revealing. maintains,  T a r s k i ' s theory of t r u t h ,  shows, i n the r e q u i s i t e manner, how  the  be  Davidson truth  c o n d i t i o n s of u t t e r a n c e s depend on t h e i r l i n g u i s t i c s t r u c t u r e . But,  i n c o n t r a s t to Davidson,  T a r s k i does not attempt to 11  e x p l a i n what knowledge we  c o u l d have that would enable us  i n t e r p r e t a speaker's  utterances.  Davidson argues,  t h a t T a r s k i ' s theory,  a p p r o p r i a t e l y modified,  can  to  however,  provide  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of u t t e r a n c e s . The  c e n t r a l c l a i m of T a r s k i ' s theory i s t h a t a  s a t i s f a c t o r y theory of t r u t h must generate every sentence i n the o b j e c t language.  a T-sentence f o r  The g e n e r a l form of a  s o - c a l l e d T-sentence i s as f o l l o w s : "s i s t r u e i f and o n l y i f p".  S r e p r e s e n t s the sentence i n the o b j e c t language f o r  which t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s are to be given, w h i l e p r e p r e s e n t s t r a n s l a t i o n of s i n the metalanguage.  the  A sample i n s t a n c e of a  T-sentence f o r an u t t e r a n c e i n E n g l i s h i s ""snow i s white' t r u e i f and o n l y i f snow i s white". the b i c o n d i t i o n a l , white"  "snow i s  i s mentioned r a t h e r than used, while, on the  assumes t h a t we of  On the l e f t - h a n d s i d e of  " i f and o n l y i f " , the u t t e r a n c e  s i d e of the b i c o n d i t i o n a l ,  right-hand  the same u t t e r a n c e i s used.  Tarski  are a b l e to r e c o g n i z e t h a t the r i g h t - h a n d s i d e  the b i c o n d i t i o n a l i s a t r a n s l a t i o n of the sentence on  left-hand side.  is  The b i c o n d i t i o n a l w i l l be t r u e i f both p  s are t r u e , or i f both p and s are f a l s e . because T a r s k i assumes that we  the and  Consequently,  are able to r e c o g n i z e t h a t p i s  merely a t r a n s l a t i o n of s we  can conclude  t h a t p and  have the same t r u t h v a l u e s .  As a r e s u l t ,  the b i c o n d i t i o n a l  which connects  s will  p and s must be t r u e .  Each i n d i v i d u a l T-sentence w i l l d e f i n e t r u t h r e l a t i v e to a p a r t i c u l a r u t t e r a n c e but w i l l not, on i t s own, 12  generate  a  d e f i n i t i o n of what i t means to be t r u e . t r u t h which generates  a T-sentence f o r every p o s s i b l e  u t t e r a n c e i n a language w i l l , means to be t r u e . maintains,  However, a theory of  T a r s k i argues,  d e f i n e what i t  The t o t a l i t y of T-sentences w i l l , T a r s k i  t h e r e f o r e p r o v i d e a d e f i n i t i o n of what i t means t o  be t r u e by p r o v i d i n g t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s f o r every p o s s i b l e utterance. sentence  Thus he concludes  t h a t the a b i l i t y to p r o v i d e a T-  f o r every p o s s i b l e u t t e r a n c e i n a language i s a t e s t  of the adequacy of a theory of t r u t h . T a r s k i ' s theory of t r u t h was developed  f o r a formal,  e x t e n s i o n a l language r a t h e r than a n a t u r a l language. result,  As a  i n order to use T a r s k i ' s theory to y i e l d  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of a speaker's  u t t e r a n c e s Davidson must show  t h a t i t i s a p p l i c a b l e to n a t u r a l languages.  Tarski himself  was a p p a r e n t l y s c e p t i c a l about t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y .  The formal  languages which T a r s k i used f o r h i s theory do not i n c l u d e c e r t a i n f e a t u r e s of n a t u r a l languages such as i n d e x i c a l i t y . I n d e x i c a l e x p r e s s i o n s a r e those e x p r e s s i o n s which may v a r y i n t r u t h v a l u e a c c o r d i n g to the speaker, utterance.  time, and p l a c e of  Such expressions are w i d e l y used i n n a t u r a l  languages as i s apparent  i n the use of p e r s o n a l pronouns,  tensed verbs, and words such as "there", "here", Thus i n order f o r Convention  and "now".  T to apply to n a t u r a l languages  i t must be m o d i f i e d to accommodate such e x p r e s s i o n s . be accomplished,  a c c o r d i n g to Davidson,  by s t a t i n g the t r u t h  c o n d i t i o n s of an u t t e r a n c e r e l a t i v e to the p a r t i c u l a r 13  T h i s can  speaker  and  the time and p l a c e of h i s or her  utterance.  Other c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of a n a t u r a l language, such as adverbs, a t t r i b u t i v e a d j e c t i v e s , and m o d a l i t i e s , may e a s i l y accommodated w i t h i n a theory  do we is  uncontentious  a l l aspects of a n a t u r a l language.  determine, f o r example, i f the statement,  true?  Amy  may  members of her  be  t a l l r e l a t i v e to her  f a m i l y but not  so  of t r u t h l i k e T a r s k i ' s .  Davidson concedes that there i s c u r r e n t l y no means of r e p r e s e n t i n g  not be  "Amy  How  is tall"  female peers and  the  t a l l r e l a t i v e to her male p e e r s .  I t would seem, consequently, that the t r u t h v a l u e presumably many other a d j e c t i v e s i s r e l a t i v e . admits t h a t these i s s u e s are problematic  of t h i s  and  Though Davidson  he remains o p t i m i s t i c  t h a t f u t u r e progress i n t h i s area w i l l r e s o l v e these i s s u e s . What Davidson r e q u i r e s relating linguistic  f o r h i s theory  f a c t s to o b j e c t s and  i s a means of  events i n the world.  I n d i v i d u a l T-sentences, which are e n t a i l e d by a theory s a t i s f i e s Convention T,  r e l a t e l i n g u i s t i c utterances  o b j e c t s and  events i n the world which these  represent.  The  right-hand  to  which the  utterances  s i d e of the b i c o n d i t i o n a l i n a  T-  sentence s t a t e s the sentence f o r which t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s are be g i v e n w h i l e the l e f t - h a n d s i d e s t a t e s the conditions  that must be s a t i s f i e d i n order  sentence t r u e . is  relevant  to make the  In t h i s manner, the language of an  given  utterance  r e l a t e d to a c o n d i t i o n of the world. Davidson maintains that the process of c h a r a c t e r i z i n g a  theory  of t r u t h f o r a n a t u r a l language w i l l proceed i n 14  two  to  stages.  Initially,  t r u t h w i l l be c h a r a c t e r i z e d  p o r t i o n of the language.  f o r only  B a s i c examples of l o g i c a l form w i l l  be generated by a " c a r e f u l l y gerrymandered" p o r t i o n of language.  a  Presumably, t h i s w i l l be  the p o r t i o n of  the  the  language that i s most amenable to c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n by a t r u t h theory.  These b a s i c sentences w i l l p r o v i d e examples of  l o g i c a l form of a l l p o t e n t i a l sentences.  the  In the second stage  of t h i s process, the remaining sentences of the g i v e n  language  w i l l be c o r r e l a t e d w i t h one  of  sentences c h a r a c t e r i z e d conditions be  or p o s s i b l y more than one  i n the f i r s t  stage.  f o r any p o t e n t i a l utterances  The  will,  the  truth  i n t h i s manner,  given. As noted above, Davidson i s attempting to use  Tarski's  t h e o r y to generate i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of g i v e n  utterances.  T a r s k i i s able  s i d e of  to assume that the r i g h t - h a n d  the  b i c o n d i t i o n a l i n Convention T s t a t e s the t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s the  l e f t - h a n d s i d e because the r i g h t - h a n d  t r a n s l a t i o n of the l e f t - h a n d s i d e . conditions  has  s i d e i s merely a  statement of the  truth  i s , consequently, merely a t r a n s l a t i o n of the  given  utterance.  The  for  However, Davidson cannot assume that t r a n s l a t i o n  occurred  until  he has  provided  an adequate theory of  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n to assess the accuracy of t r a n s l a t i o n s . Whereas T a r s k i attempted to d e r i v e a theory of t r u t h assuming an a b i l i t y  to i n t e r p r e t or t r a n s l a t e  utterances,  Davidson proposes to assume knowledge of what i s r e q u i r e d t r u t h and  attempt to use  t h i s to d e r i v e an account of 15  by  for  interpretation.  Thus i t i s necessary f o r Davidson to r e v i s e  T a r s k i ' s Convention T so that an a b i l i t y to r e c o g n i z e c o r r e c t t r a n s l a t i o n s i s not presupposed. Convention T, as s t a t e d by T a r s k i , assumes an a b i l i t y to i n t e r p r e t u t t e r a n c e s i n the f o l l o w i n g manner: s i s t r u e , a c c o r d i n g to Convention T, i f and o n l y i f p, where p i s assumed t o be a t r a n s l a t i o n of s.  Davidson cannot assume  that  p i s a c o r r e c t t r a n s l a t i o n of s and, t h e r e f o r e , he m o d i f i e s Convention T by e l i m i n a t i n g t h i s assumption.  What i s r e q u i r e d  under Davidson's c o n c e p t i o n of Convention T i s that p, whatever i t r e p r e s e n t s , i s something if  s i s also true.  for  that i s t r u e i f and o n l y  In order to r e c o g n i z e what p r e p r e s e n t s  a p a r t i c u l a r sentence we must be a b l e to determine the  t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s f o r the g i v e n sentence. Davidson has r e j e c t e d the s u g g e s t i o n that the s p e c i f i c b e l i e f s and i n t e n t i o n s of a speaker can serve as the evidence for  the meaning of a speaker's u t t e r a n c e .  B e l i e f s and  i n t e n t i o n s , he argues, are interdependent i n the sense t h a t they a l l c o n t r i b u t e to the content of a speaker's u t t e r a n c e s and,  thus, they cannot be determined independently of t h i s  content.  A c c o r d i n g to Davidson, a speaker w i l l h o l d a  sentence to be t r u e on the b a s i s of the meaning of the sentence and what the speaker b e l i e v e s r e g a r d i n g the n o n l i n g u i s t i c c o n d i t i o n s r e l e v a n t to the u t t e r a n c e .  Though  s p e c i f i c b e l i e f s cannot be taken as evidence f o r the meaning of  a speaker's words, he argues that a g e n e r a l b e l i e f , 16  which  may a p p l y to a l l u t t e r a n c e s , may be used as evidence f o r the meaning of a speaker's words.  For the most p a r t ,  m a i n t a i n s , speakers i n t e n d to say something make an u t t e r a n c e .  Davidson  t r u e when they  Consequently, most speakers, he s t a t e s ,  share the common a t t i t u d e of h o l d i n g t h e i r sentences o r u t t e r a n c e s to be t r u e .  Because t h i s i s a g e n e r a l a t t i t u d e  t h a t may a p p l y to a l l sentences i t i s not necessary, he argues, t o know the s p e c i f i c meaning of a sentence i n o r d e r to recognize t h i s  belief.  Davidson maintains that a speaker may h o l d a sentence to be t r u e i n cases where the speaker wishes, wants, o r b e l i e v e s t h a t something w i l l be made t r u e .  The a t t i t u d e of h o l d i n g a  sentence to be true, a c c o r d i n g to Davidson, has a broader a p p l i c a t i o n than those sentences which a r e o b v i o u s l y s i n c e r e assertions.  And, i n many of the s i t u a t i o n s i n which a speaker  i s not making a s i n c e r e a s s e r t i o n , such as those o c c a s i o n s when a speaker i s b e i n g i r o n i c , dramatic e f f e c t ,  sarcastic,  or e x a g g e r a t i n g f o r  there may be a r e c o g n i z a b l e a t t i t u d e  that  suggests that such u t t e r a n c e s a r e not h e l d t r u e by the speaker. The  f a c t that a speaker holds p a r t i c u l a r sentences to be  t r u e under p a r t i c u l a r c o n d i t i o n s i s , a c c o r d i n g to Davidson, the evidence that enables an i n t e r p r e t e r to understand t h a t speaker's u t t e r a n c e s .  Evidence i s r e l a t e d to T-sentences i n  the f o l l o w i n g manner.  Consider a speaker, Jane, who u t t e r s  the phrase,  "It i s raining".  The a p p r o p r i a t e T-sentence f o r 17  t h i s u t t e r a n c e w i l l be as f o l l o w s :  " I t i s raining" i s true-  i n - E n g l i s h when spoken by x a t time t i f and o n l y i f i t i s r a i n i n g near x a t time t .  The evidence(E) that supports t h i s  T-sentence w i l l be of the f o l l o w i n g form.  (E) Jane i s a member  of the E n g l i s h speech community and holds the sentence " I t i s r a i n i n g " to be t r u e on Saturday a t noon and i t i s , i n f a c t , r a i n i n g near Jane a t the time of u t t e r a n c e . We may be h e s i t a n t to conclude that the p r e c e d i n g Tsentence i s t r u e on the b a s i s of merely one p i e c e of evidence because  t h e r e i s always the p o t e n t i a l that a speaker i s wrong  r e g a r d i n g what she b e l i e v e s .  I may, f o r example, look out the  window and make the statement  " I t i s r a i n i n g " when, i n f a c t ,  there i s merely a lawn s p r i n k l e r o u t s i d e my window.  However,  s e v e r a l i n s t a n c e s i n which u t t e r a n c e s which a r e the same o r e q u i v a l e n t to Jane's a r e c o r r e l a t e d w i t h the same event, i n t h i s case i n s t a n c e s i n which i t i s a c t u a l l y r a i n i n g , would suggest t h a t the T-sentence  i n the p r e c e d i n g paragraph i s  true. On any g i v e n o c c a s i o n of u t t e r a n c e a speaker may be wrong r e g a r d i n g what she b e l i e v e s .  The evidence that a speaker  h o l d s a p a r t i c u l a r sentence to be t r u e on one o c c a s i o n of utterance w i l l ,  t h e r e f o r e , be i n s u f f i c i e n t evidence to support  an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of an u n f a m i l i a r sentence. i s s u f f i c i e n t evidence to support p a r t i c u l a r  What i s r e q u i r e d interpretations  and t h i s , Davidson suggests,  r e q u i r e s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n over  time.  i s "one of g e t t i n g the b e s t  The method, he s t a t e s ,  18  fit"  (323).  The  "fit"  r e f e r s to the f i t between the meaning t h a t  we a s c r i b e to a speaker's u t t e r a n c e s and the evidence which supports these a s c r i p t i o n s .  Hence, the s i g n i f i c a n c e of  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n over time becomes apparent as i t i s o n l y over time t h a t a c o n s i d e r a b l e amount of evidence can be gathered i n order to assess what i s or i s not an a p p r o p r i a t e f i t . A c c o r d i n g to Davidson,  we  should i n t e r p r e t a  speaker's  u t t e r a n c e s i n order to make the speaker r i g h t to the extent t h a t the evidence w i l l is right.  support the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t the  Only once a theory of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n f o r a  p a r t i c u l a r speaker or language  i s s u f f i c i e n t l y developed  we make sense of a t t r i b u t i n g e r r o r to a speaker. Davidson  speaker  can  Error,  seems to be suggesting, can be r e c o g n i z e d o n l y once  an i n t e r p r e t e r has s u f f i c i e n t evidence to support a g e n e r a l i z a t i o n r e g a r d i n g the meaning of a p a r t i c u l a r u t t e r a n c e or  term. The evidence, to r e i t e r a t e ,  c o n s i s t s of the circumstances  under which speakers h o l d p a r t i c u l a r sentences to be t r u e . i s not apparent,  however, how  It  t h i s evidence w i l l serve as a  b a s i s f o r s p e c i f i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of a speaker's u t t e r a n c e s . As has a l r e a d y been s t a t e d , Davidson maintains that a  speaker  h o l d s an u t t e r a n c e to be t r u e on the b a s i s of what the u t t e r a n c e means and what she b e l i e v e s to be Consequently,  true.  knowing that a speaker holds an u t t e r a n c e to be  t r u e , but not knowing what t r u t h i t expresses, may an i n s u f f i c i e n t b a s i s f o r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . 19  seem to be  What i s r e q u i r e d ,  according  to Davidson, i s that we assume not o n l y t h a t the  speaker g e n e r a l l y holds her u t t e r a n c e s make assumptions r e g a r d i n g  to be t r u e but we a l s o  what f a c t o r s determine the s p e c i f i c  content of a speaker's b e l i e f s . Davidson s t a t e s that we should hold,  " b e l i e f constant  f a r as p o s s i b l e w h i l e s o l v i n g f o r meaning"(324). accomplished, a c c o r d i n g speaker's u t t e r a n c e s o f t e n as p o s s i b l e .  as  This i s  to Davidson, by i n t e r p r e t i n g a  i n a manner that makes them r i g h t as Consequently, we assume not o n l y  speakers b e l i e v e that t h e i r u t t e r a n c e s  that  are t r u e but, f u r t h e r ,  we i n t e r p r e t them w i t h the presumption that t h e i r b e l i e f s a r e , in fact,  true.  For example, c o n s i d e r Jane who u t t e r e d when i t was r a i n i n g i n her v i c i n i t y . b e l i e v e s t h a t her utterance  "It i s raining"  We assume that she  i s t r u e and, f u r t h e r , we i n t e r p r e t  w i t h the presumption that i t i s , i n f a c t ,  true.  I f , over  r e p e a t e d i n s t a n c e s , we can draw a c o r r e l a t i o n between h e r utterance  " I t i s r a i n i n g " and the presence of r a i n i t may seem  reasonable to assume that Jane b e l i e v e s that i t i s r a i n i n g . I f we simply utterances  assume that a speaker b e l i e v e s t h a t her  are true without drawing the f u r t h e r assumption  t h a t her u t t e r a n c e s  are, i n f a c t ,  true then there i s no means  of d e t e r m i n i n g the a c t u a l t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s of her u t t e r a n c e . T h i s i s due to the f a c t that without t h i s assumption we cannot j u s t i f y the c o n c l u s i o n  that a c o r r e l a t i o n between a p a r t i c u l a r  event and an u t t e r a n c e  w i l l be s i g n i f i c a n t t o the meaning of 20  the  utterance. The  not,  presumption that a speaker's b e l i e f s a r e t r u e does  however, support the c o n c l u s i o n  that the i n t e r p r e t e r w i l l  be a b l e to determine what t h i n g or event the speaker i s responding t o .  In order  f o r an i n t e r p r e t e r to be a b l e to  determine the t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s of a speaker's u t t e r a n c e s  he  must be aware, or p o t e n t i a l l y aware, of what makes a speaker's utterances should  t r u e . Davidson makes the f u r t h e r c l a i m t h a t we  assign truth conditions  to a l i e n u t t e r a n c e s  to our own view of what i s the case. therefore,  according  We must assume,  that the speakers who we are i n t e r p r e t i n g a r e  responding to what we b e l i e v e i t i s reasonable or obvious t o respond t o .  The t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s  r e s u l t , w i l l be assigned appropriate  f o r a l i e n utterances,  according  as a  to what we b e l i e v e a r e the  truth conditions.  We assume not o n l y that speakers are r a t i o n a l and t h a t t h e i r b e l i e f s are, by and l a r g e , c o n s i s t e n t but we must a l s o make the f u r t h e r assumption that speakers b e l i e v e what i t i s obvious or r a t i o n a l to b e l i e v e .  The b e l i e f s of a speaker  must, as a r e s u l t , be p u b l i c l y a c c e s s i b l e .  In order f o r  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n to get s t a r t e d we must assume, when i n t e r p r e t i n g a speaker, that there  i s a s i g n i f i c a n t amount of  agreement between the speakers and o u r s e l v e s . we have a f a i r l y w e l l - d e v e l o p e d theory we can a t t r i b u t e e r r o r to a speaker. more sentences that we c o n s p i r e  I t i s o n l y once  of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t h a t As Davidson s t a t e s , "the  to accept or r e j e c t . . . t h e  21  b e t t e r we understand the r e s t " ( 3 2 4 ) .  T h i s suggests  that  d e v e l o p i n g a theory of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n f o r a language becomes e a s i e r once a c o n s i d e r a b l e amount of understanding i s a l r e a d y p r e s e n t and, hence, i t i s a p r o j e c t which occurs over time. R a d i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , Davidson maintains, proceeds i n three i n c r e m e n t a l s t e p s .  We must, he c l a i m s , f i r s t  b a s i c l o g i c a l t r u t h s on the language d e v e l o p i n g a theory of t r u t h .  f o r which we  impose our  are  T h i s i s done by a n a l y s i n g  sentences of the unknown language form or s t r u c t u r e of the language.  to determine  the  logical  The evidence t h a t we  rely  on i n t h i s p o r t i o n of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s , he maintains, those sentences which v i r t u a l l y a l l speakers of the language h o l d t r u e a l l of the time.  Sentences whose t r u t h v a l u e does not  v a r y a c c o r d i n g to time and speaker are v e r y l i k e l y l o g i c a l or a n a l y t i c a l truths. can determine  By a n a l y s i n g such sentences, he s t a t e s ,  the l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e of the  we  language.  In the second step of r a d i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  sentences  whose t r u t h v a l u e v a r i e s a c c o r d i n g to observable changes i n the world are analysed.  The s i m i l a r i t y between  Davidson's  t h e o r y of r a d i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and Quine's  theory of r a d i c a l  t r a n s l a t i o n becomes apparent a t t h i s p o i n t .  Davidson  acknowledges both a s i m i l a r i t y and a debt to Quine's  theory  but t h e r e are, he notes, s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e s between Quine's  theory and h i s own.  Quine d e f i n e s sentences i n terms  of t h e i r s t i m u l u s meaning, and,  i n turn, d e f i n e s s t i m u l u s  meaning i n terms of what a speaker experiences t h a t causes her 22  to a f f i r m or deny a p a r t i c u l a r sentence.  Stimulus meaning,  then, i s the p a t t e r n of sensory s t i m u l a t i o n that a speaker e x p e r i e n c e s when she assents or d i s s e n t s to a p a r t i c u l a r utterance.  Davidson,  on the other hand, maintains that the  a p p r o p r i a t e c o n d i t i o n s f o r an u t t e r a n c e are p a r t i c u l a r t h i n g s or events i n the world. utterances,  from which,  The t r u t h v a l u e of p a r t i c u l a r a c c o r d i n g to Davidson,  interpretations  of u t t e r a n c e s are to be generated, w i l l depend d i r e c t l y t h i n g s or events i n the world. we do not, as i n Quine's  on  T h i s i s a s i g n i f i c a n t s t e p as  theory, have to i n f e r a r e l a t i o n s h i p  between a t h i n g i n the world and a p r i v a t e sensory e x p e r i e n c e . In Davidson's  theory, the r e l e v a n t cause of an u t t e r a n c e i s  assumed to be an o b j e c t i v e c o n d i t i o n or event i n the world and,  as a r e s u l t ,  the meaning of a speaker's u t t e r a n c e i s  l i n k e d w i t h something which i s p u b l i c l y The  accessible.  f i n a l step of r a d i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , a c c o r d i n g to  Davidson,  i s the a n a l y s i s of sentences on which t h e r e i s no  consensus  r e g a r d i n g t h e i r t r u t h v a l u e and a l s o of those  sentences whose t r u t h v a l u e i s not d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d to o b s e r v a b l e changes i n the world. sentences w i l l be determined, to o t h e r sentences.  The t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s of such  i n l a r g e p a r t , by t h e i r  relation  Once c e r t a i n words and u t t e r a n c e s have  been a s s i g n e d semantic p r o p e r t i e s ,  these p r o p e r t i e s  will  e n t a i l c e r t a i n l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n s to other words and utterances.  Consequently,  even i f the t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s of  p a r t i c u l a r sentences are not l i n k e d d i r e c t l y to experience, 23  the  t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s may be determined by a n a l y s i n g a  sentence's r e l a t i o n to other, a l r e a d y i n t e r p r e t e d , sentences. However, even i f we assume that the three steps of r a d i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n w i l l proceed smoothly, a l l t h a t Davidson has proven thus f a r i s that a theory of t r u t h f o r a p a r t i c u l a r language can be determined from the a v a i l a b l e evidence. the  As he acknowledges,  i t i s i n s u f f i c i e n t to say that  meaning of a sentence i s g i v e n by i t s T-sentence. A l l  that the T-sentence s t a t e s i s that i f p a r t i c u l a r are  conditions  p r e s e n t the g i v e n sentence w i l l be true, but t h i s does not  support the c o n c l u s i o n that these p a r t i c u l a r c o n d i t i o n s the  cause  g i v e n sentence to be t r u e . Furthermore, because T-sentences a r e i n the form of  b i c o n d i t i o n a l s , a l l that i s r e q u i r e d f o r an e n t i r e  T-sentence  to be t r u e i s that the r i g h t and l e f t - h a n d s i d e s of the b i c o n d i t i o n a l share the same t r u t h v a l u e .  As Davidson notes,  i f mere t r u t h v a l u e were s u f f i c i e n t then we c o u l d simply say that  "Snow i s white" i s t r u e i f and only i f grass i s green.  Because both of the statements "Snow i s white" and "Grass i s green" a r e t r u e then the b i c o n d i t i o n a l ,  i f and o n l y i f , w i l l  a l s o be t r u e . I t appears that there i s no guarantee that  truth  c o n d i t i o n s w i l l p r o v i d e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of sentences.  Because  Davidson i s attempting to develop a theory of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , he cannot assume, i n advance,  that the r i g h t - h a n d s i d e of the  b i c o n d i t i o n a l i s a t r a n s l a t i o n of the l e f t - h a n d 24  side.  Consequently, what i s r e q u i r e d i s a c o n s t r a i n t or r e s t r i c t i o n that w i l l  somehow ensure that the r i g h t - h a n d s i d e i s , i n f a c t ,  a t r a n s l a t i o n of the l e f t - h a n d  side.  Davidson attempts to f u l f i l  t h i s requirement by imposing  a h o l i s t i c c o n s t r a i n t on h i s theory.  There i s no guarantee,  he m a i n t a i n s , that each T-sentence taken i n i s o l a t i o n w i l l be s u f f i c i e n t to p r o v i d e an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of a g i v e n u t t e r a n c e . Davidson suggests, however, that the t o t a l i t y of T-sentences f o r a p a r t i c u l a r language w i l l be s u f f i c i e n t to guarantee t h a t each i n d i v i d u a l T-sentence w i l l p r o v i d e an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of a given utterance.  Thus, i n the same manner i n which  Tarski  used a h o l i s t i c c o n s t r a i n t to y i e l d a d e f i n i t i o n of t r u t h , Davidson uses a h o l i s t i c c o n s t r a i n t to y i e l d  interpretations.  I f we a n a l y s e T-sentences i n a h o l i s t i c manner then we must seek to a t t a i n an o p t i m a l f i t between a l l the a v a i l a b l e evidence r e g a r d i n g the c o n d i t i o n s under which n a t i v e speakers h o l d sentences to be t r u e and the content that we a s c r i b e t o these sentences.  I f T-sentences are to be i n t e r p r e t i v e ,  then  the t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s a s s i g n e d to a p a r t i c u l a r u t t e r a n c e must relate,  i n the a p p r o p r i a t e manner, to the t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s of  o t h e r sentences i n the g i v e n language. Though t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s are a s s i g n e d to sentences, r a t h e r than i n d i v i d u a l words, each word that occurs i n i n t e r p r e t e d u t t e r a n c e s must be a s s i g n e d a p a r t i c u l a r meaning.  Once these  i n d i v i d u a l words are g i v e n semantic p r o p e r t i e s these semantic p r o p e r t i e s w i l l e n t a i l c e r t a i n l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n s to o t h e r 25  words. the  I f , f o r example, we a s s i g n the c o n v e n t i o n a l meaning to  words that occur i n the sentence "Snow i s white" the  semantic p r o p e r t i e s that we a s s i g n to these words must be c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n that i s a s s i g n e d t o these words when they appear i n other T-sentences. I t would appear,  then, that i n order to f u l f i l  this  h o l i s t i c requirement we must assume that i n t e r p r e t a t i o n occur over time.  will  In order f o r an i n t e r p r e t e r to determine  r e l i a b l y the meaning of any g i v e n sentence i n a language she must be a b l e to understand not o n l y the g i v e n u t t e r a n c e but a l s o how t h i s u t t e r a n c e r e l a t e s to a s i g n i f i c a n t number of other sentences i n the same language.  26  CHAPTER 2: DAVIDSON'S VIEW OF INTERPRETATION IN "A NICE DERANGEMENT OF EPITAPHS"  In  "A N i c e Derangement of E p i t a p h s " Davidson argues  that  knowledge of the c o n v e n t i o n a l use of words i n a g i v e n language may not o n l y be i n s u f f i c i e n t f o r understanding a member of t h a t speech community, i t may be unnecessary. stated,  i n "Radical Interpretation",  have to i n t e r p r e t  Davidson had  that i n i t i a l l y we may  speakers of our own language to determine  t h a t we are, i n f a c t ,  speaking the same language.  However, i n  t h i s l a t e r paper he suggests that even once we have determined the  l i n g u i s t i c community that a p a r t i c u l a r  speaker belongs to  we cannot assume that a speaker w i l l adhere to the conventions of h e r community. Meaning, Davidson argues, need not a r i s e c o n v e n t i o n a l use of language.  As a r e s u l t , he m a i n t a i n s ,  language, d e f i n e d as shared r u l e s ,  r e g u l a r i t i e s , and  conventions, i s not necessary f o r l i n g u i s t i c His  from a  communication.  argument to t h i s e f f e c t leads to the seemingly c o n t e n t i o u s  c o n c l u s i o n that,  "[T]here i s no such t h i n g as a language, not  i f a language i s anything l i k e what p h i l o s o p h e r s and l i n g u i s t s have supposed"("Nice" 446). Davidson bases h i s r e j e c t i o n  of language on the c l a i m  that c o n v e n t i o n i s unnecessary f o r communication.  This i s  apparent, he argues, from cases i n which we a r e a b l e t o 27  understand  a speaker d e s p i t e an i r r e g u l a r or u n c o n v e n t i o n a l  use of words.  We are able to do so, he argues,  the c o n v e n t i o n a l meaning of a speaker's  by i g n o r i n g  words and i n t e r p r e t i n g  the speaker a c c o r d i n g to her intended meaning. not necessary  to understand  meaning of a speaker's speaker's  the standard or c o n v e n t i o n a l  words i n order to understand  a  u t t e r a n c e i t f o l l o w s that meaning i s not d e r i v e d  from convention. states,  Because i t i s  The meaning of a g i v e n u t t e r a n c e ,  Davidson  i s c o n s t i t u t e d by how the speaker intends the  u t t e r a n c e to be understood.  Thus, the intended meaning o f a  g i v e n u t t e r a n c e , he maintains,  i s what the speaker's  words  mean w h i l e the speaker meaning i s what the speaker i n t e n d s to do w i t h h e r words. we understand  I will  speakers  e l a b o r a t e on Davidson's c l a i m t h a t  by i n t e r p r e t i n g them a c c o r d i n g to t h e i r  intended meaning l a t e r i n t h i s  chapter.  Often we a r e able, Davidson argues, meaning of a speaker's  to understand the  u t t e r a n c e even when she has a s l i p of  the tongue, g a r b l e s her words, or uses a malapropism. such usage i s i r r e g u l a r i t i s impossible, Davidson to  Because  maintains,  l e a r n how to i n t e r p r e t such words p r i o r to the speech  occasion i n question. argues,  T h i s becomes p a r t i c u l a r l y apparent, he  i n the case of malapropisms.  We may s u c c e s s f u l l y  i n t e r p r e t Mrs. Malaprop as meaning t h i s i s a n i c e arrangement of  e p i t h e t s when she says  "This i s a n i c e derangement of  e p i t a p h s " , but what supports  this  unconventional  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Mrs. Malaprop's u t t e r a n c e ? 28  C l e a r l y , the  strangeness suggest  of the c o n v e n t i o n a l meaning of her words may-  t h a t t h i s i s not the intended  However, though i t may be u n l i k e l y , Mrs.  interpretation.  i t i s not i m p o s s i b l e t h a t  Malaprop's i n t e n t i o n i s to communicate the c o n v e n t i o n a l  meaning of, "This i s a n i c e derangement of e p i t a p h s " . There i s no r u l e or r e g u l a r i t y t h a t determines when we should a t t r i b u t e the c o n v e n t i o n a l meaning of a word to a speaker's in  u t t e r a n c e and when we should d i s r e g a r d t h i s meaning  favour of an unconventional  interpretation.  i f we b e l i e v e t h a t the speaker i s b r e a k i n g t h e r e i s no r u l e that determines what  Furthermore,  from  convention,  unconventional  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n we should a s c r i b e to the speaker's  utterances.  In the case of malapropisms, the speaker i s understood i f the i n t e r p r e t e r a s c r i b e s the intended meaning, r a t h e r than the c o n v e n t i o n a l meaning, to the speaker's example, we understand  utterance.  For  Mrs. Malaprop's u t t e r a n c e c o r r e c t l y by  t a k i n g i n t o account her i n t e n t i o n and d i s r e g a r d i n g the c o n v e n t i o n a l meaning of her words.  The intended meaning, i n  t h i s manner, takes over from the c o n v e n t i o n a l meaning. According  to Davidson, i t i s important  d i s t i n c t i o n between what a speaker's  t o p r e s e r v e the  words mean, the l i t e r a l  or f i r s t meaning as Davidson terms i t , and what a speaker wants to do w i t h her words, that i s , the speaker meaning. a result,  Davidson argues,  As  the e x i s t e n c e of malapropisms  t h r e a t e n s the d i s t i n c t i o n between l i t e r a l meaning and speaker meaning.  Communication i s s u c c e s s f u l , i n the case of 29  malapropisms, o n l y i f the c o n v e n t i o n a l meaning i s i g n o r e d and a speaker  i s understood  be i n t e r p r e t e d .  i n v i r t u e how she intends h e r words to  But, because the c o n v e n t i o n a l meaning i s  simply d i s r e g a r d e d there i s no p o t e n t i a l f o r a meaningful d i s t i n c t i o n between what a speaker's  words mean and what the  speaker wants to do w i t h these words. A c c o r d i n g to Davidson,  the d i s t i n c t i o n between  literal  meaning and speaker meaning i s s i g n i f i c a n t and must be preserved.  In order to do so, he maintains, we must ensure  t h a t l i t e r a l meaning i s d e f i n e d i n a manner so t h a t i t i s r e l e v a n t to the meaning that we a s c r i b e to speakers' utterances.  Malapropisms and the l i k e r a i s e  r e g a r d i n g the n e c e s s i t y of convention Consequently,  questions  f o r communication.  i n order to p r e s e r v e the d i s t i n c t i o n between  l i t e r a l meaning and speaker meaning we must, Davidson "pry a p a r t what i s l i t e r a l  argues,  i n language from what i s  c o n v e n t i o n a l or e s t a b l i s h e d " ( 4 3 4 ) . L i t e r a l meaning, Davidson maintains, by the speakers  should be  determined  of the words r a t h e r than the words as d e f i n e d  by c o n v e n t i o n a l usage.  Davidson r e d e f i n e s l i t e r a l  meaning,  or f i r s t meaning as he dubs i t , i n a manner s i m i l a r to G r i c e ' s n o t i o n of nonnatural meaning.  A c c o r d i n g to G r i c e , we  s u c c e s s f u l l y communicate the meaning t h a t we a t t r i b u t e t o our words when the hearer r e c o g n i z e s our i n t e n t i o n to communicate t h i s meaning.  Davidson,  l i k e G r i c e , a l s o uses  i n t e n t i o n s t o determine f i r s t meaning. 30  self-referring  In the s e r i e s o f  intentions associated with a p a r t i c u l a r utterance f i r s t meaning, Davidson s t a t e s ,  i s s p e c i f i e d by the f i r s t  that has t h i s s e l f - r e f e r r i n g  intention  quality.  To i l l u s t r a t e h i s n o t i o n of f i r s t meaning Davidson the  cites  example of Diogenes' u t t e r a n c e , "I would have you s t a n d  from between me and the sun"(435).  Assume, Davidson  states,  t h a t Diogenes addresses Alexander and i n t e n d s him to i n t e r p r e t his  u t t e r a n c e as t r u e i f he, i n f a c t ,  i n t e n d s Alexander t o  stand from between him and the sun. Diogenes a l s o  intends,  Davidson s t a t e s , to have h i s u t t e r a n c e r e s u l t i n Alexander moving from between him and the sun and he f u r t h e r i n t e n d s that, u l t i m a t e l y , posterity.  t h i s a c t i o n w i l l serve as a good anecdote t o  T h e r e f o r e , there a r e s e v e r a l d i s t i n c t  r e l a t e d to t h i s utterance. the  intentions  A c c o r d i n g to Davidson, however,  f i r s t meaning of the u t t e r a n c e i s determined by the f i r s t  s e l f - r e f e r r i n g i n t e n t i o n i n t h i s s e r i e s of i n t e n t i o n s . the  Thus  f i r s t meaning of Diogenes' statement "I would have you  stand from between me and the sun"(435) i s determined by h i s i n t e n t i o n t h a t Alexander i n t e r p r e t h i s u t t e r a n c e as t r u e i f he i n t e n d s to have Alexander move from between him and the sun. Consequently, the f i r s t meaning of t h i s u t t e r a n c e i s r e a l i z e d o n l y when Alexander r e c o g n i z e s Diogenes' i n t e n t i o n to communicate t h i s meaning. In  order to understand or grasp the speaker meaning,  Davidson m a i n t a i n s , we must know the f i r s t meaning of a speaker's u t t e r a n c e .  C i t i n g a passage from Shakespeare, he 31  s t a t e s t h a t most of the passage i s not meant to be taken i n terms of i t s l i t e r a l  or f i r s t meaning.  The passage i n  q u e s t i o n , Davidson maintains, i s meant to convey an image f o r the  reader or l i s t e n e r .  I t i s the image that Shakespeare i s  attempting to convey that c o n s t i t u t e s the speaker meaning. a'result, the  As  t h e r e i s a d i s t i n c t i o n between the f i r s t meaning of  words, which h e l p us to grasp the image, and the image  t h a t i s c r e a t e d by them. Conversely, Davidson maintains that we may,  on o c c a s i o n ,  d i s c e r n the speaker meaning and then determine the meaning of an u t t e r a n c e . the  literal  I t i s not necessary, he s t a t e s ,  o r d e r of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n always proceed from the  meaning to the speaker meaning.  that  literal  However, Davidson has d e f i n e d  f i r s t meaning not i n terms of the order of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , rather,  i n terms of the i n t e n t i o n s of the speaker.  but  The  i n t e n t i o n to be i n t e r p r e t e d i n a p a r t i c u l a r manner w i l l , Davidson argues, g e n e r a l l y be the f i r s t of  intention i n a series  intentions. A c c o r d i n g to Davidson's view, the l i t e r a l  or f i r s t  meaning of Mrs. Malaprop's u t t e r a n c e i s t h i s i s a n i c e arrangement  of e p i t h e t s .  I f we accept that l i t e r a l  meaning  w i l l be determined by the speaker we can m a i n t a i n the p o t e n t i a l f o r a meaningful d i s t i n c t i o n between what Mrs. Malaprop's words m e a n ( f i r s t meaning) and what she wants to do w i t h those words(speaker meaning).  Alternatively,  i f we  accept the c o n v e n t i o n a l or standard n o t i o n of l i t e r a l 32  meaning  then, i n the case of Mrs. Malaprop, we are l e f t w i t h a meaning t h a t i s i r r e l e v a n t w i t h r e s p e c t t o the meaning t h a t she i s attempting  t o convey.  Further, i n order f o r t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s  t o m a i n t a i n r e l e v a n c e t o Mrs. Malaprop's b e h a v i o u r  the  truth  o r f a l s i t y of her statement s h o u l d be a n a l y s e d r e l a t i v e t o her i n t e n d e d meaning.  I f a n a l y s e d i n t h i s manner, her  statement,  "This i s a n i c e derangement of e p i t a p h s " w i l l be deemed t o be t r u e i f what she r e f e r s t o i s , i n f a c t , a n i c e arrangement of epithets.  I f we accept  the c o n v e n t i o n a l meaning of  Malaprop's u t t e r a n c e , c o n s i s t e n c y r e q u i r e s t h a t the c o n d i t i o n s be d e t e r m i n e d r e l a t i v e t o the interpretation.  Mrs. truth  conventional  As a r e s u l t , l i t e r a l meaning would be  d i v o r c e d from b e h a v i o u r d i f f i c u l t i f not  making r a d i c a l  interpretation  impossible.  I f an i n t e r p r e t e r i s a b l e t o u n d e r s t a n d a speaker d e s p i t e her u n c o n v e n t i o n a l of Mrs.  or i r r e g u l a r use of words, as i n the case  Malaprop, the speaker, a c c o r d i n g t o Davidson,  " [ g o t t e n ] away w i t h i t "  (440).  the s p e a k e r ' s u n c o n v e n t i o n a l  T h i s i s due  has  t o the f a c t t h a t  u t t e r a n c e c o u l d not have been  u n d e r s t o o d i n v i r t u e of something l e a r n e d p r i o r t o the speech occasion.  I n s i t u a t i o n s such as these, Davidson argues,  s u c c e s s f u l communication i s a m a t t e r of w i t and l u c k r a t h e r t h a n l i n g u i s t i c s k i l l as s t a n d a r d l y  conceived.  Thus Davidson takes i s s u e w i t h the  traditional  p h i l o s o p h i c a l or l i n g u i s t i c n o t i o n of communication w h i c h a t t r i b u t e s an i n t e r p r e t e r ' s a b i l i t y t o u n d e r s t a n d n o v e l 33  u t t e r a n c e s to the i n t e r p r e t e r ' s knowledge of c o n v e n t i o n a l r u l e s or r e g u l a r i t i e s .  As noted above, Davidson d e f i n e s  meaning i n terms of the f i r s t referring intentions.  i n t e n t i o n i n a s e r i e s of  first  self-  This d e f i n i t i o n i s s u f f i c i e n t l y  ambiguous to a l l o w f i r s t meaning to apply to any i s made w i t h a s p e c i f i c i n t e n t i o n .  Consequently,  symbol t h a t there i s  n o t h i n g i n Davidson's d e f i n i t i o n of f i r s t meaning thus f a r t h a t l i m i t s i t to l i n g u i s t i c meaning.  Davidson proceeds to  pose the q u e s t i o n : what would be r e q u i r e d to c o n s t r a i n f i r s t meaning to l i n g u i s t i c meaning? I t has  t r a d i t i o n a l l y been thought,  Davidson s t a t e s ,  l i t e r a l or f i r s t meaning i s "systematic, shared, prepared".  that  and  Though Davidson accepts that f i r s t meaning i s both  s y s t e m a t i c and shared he takes i s s u e w i t h the f u r t h e r c l a i m t h a t i t must be prepared,  that i s to say l e a r n e d i n advance of  the speech o c c a s i o n . A s y s t e m a t i c r e l a t i o n between a speaker's necessary,  Davidson maintains,  interpretable. speaker's  An  words i s  i n order f o r a speaker  i n t e r p r e t e r i s a b l e to understand  u t t e r a n c e o n l y i f she can d i s c e r n both the  p r o p e r t i e s of the p a r t s of a speaker's  u t t e r a n c e and  s y s t e m a t i c r e l a t i o n between these p a r t s .  Consequently,  the  the  u t t e r a n c e would be t r u e .  to be able to understand  34  semantic  p r o p e r t i e s of  u t t e r a n c e an i n t e r p r e t e r must understand  c o n d i t i o n s under which the speaker's  a  In order to d i s c e r n  the s y s t e m a t i c r e l a t i o n s h i p between the semantic a speaker's  to be  novel u t t e r a n c e s  an  i n t e r p r e t e r must know, e i t h e r e x p l i c i t l y o r i m p l i c i t l y ,  the  t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s of a l l p o s s i b l e sentences t h a t a s p e a k e r might u t t e r . D a v i d s o n m a i n t a i n s t h a t the a p p r o p r i a t e model f o r a t h e o r y of t r u t h , i n t h i s c o n t e x t , i s a d e f i n i t i o n of t r u t h s i m i l a r to T a r s k i ' s .  As was n o t e d i n the p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r ,  T a r s k i has a d i s q u o t a t i o n a l t h e o r y of t r u t h .  According to  T a r s k i s t h e o r y , "The f l o w e r i s blooming" i s t r u e i f and o n l y 1  i f the f l o w e r i s blooming.  Tarski's theory i s appropriate,  D a v i d s o n m a i n t a i n s , because i t p r o v i d e s a c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s t h a t i s based on an a n a l y s i s of a f i n i t e number o f u t t e r a n c e s but which i s a p p l i c a b l e t o any p o t e n t i a l utterance.  An i n t e r p r e t e r who understands the d i s q u o t a t i o n a l  a s p e c t of T a r s k i ' s t h e o r y , e i t h e r e x p l i c i t l y o r can a p p l y t h i s knowledge t o any g i v e n s e n t e n c e . the  implicitly, Understanding  s y s t e m a t i c r e l a t i o n s h i p between the semantic p r o p e r t i e s of  a s e n t e n c e a l s o r e q u i r e s t h a t an i n t e r p r e t e r u n d e r s t a n d such axioms as a c o n j u n c t i o n i s t r u e i f an o n l y i f i t s c o n j u n c t s are  true. Davidson, as n o t e d above, f u r t h e r a c c e p t s the c l a i m t h a t  l i t e r a l meaning i s s h a r e d by speakers and i n t e r p r e t e r s .  What  i s s h a r e d , a c c o r d i n g t o Davidson, i s a s y s t e m a t i c method of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n between the speaker and the i n t e r p r e t e r .  If  communication i s s u c c e s s f u l b o t h the speaker and the i n t e r p r e t e r w i l l use the same o r e q u i v a l e n t t h e o r i e s . s p e a k e r ' s t h e o r y concerns how  The  she b e l i e v e s the i n t e r p r e t e r 35  will  i n t e r p r e t her utterances while the i n t e r p r e t e r ' s theory  c o n c e r n s how he b e l i e v e s t h e speaker i n t e n d s t o be interpreted.  I f t h e meaning t h a t t h e i n t e r p r e t e r a s c r i b e s t o  the speaker's  words i s t h e same as t h e meaning t h e s p e a k e r  i n t e n d s t o convey w i t h h e r u t t e r a n c e then these t h e o r i e s w i l l , i n f a c t , be t h e same o r e q u i v a l e n t . Though Davidson a c c e p t s t h a t f i r s t meaning i s s y s t e m a t i c and shared,  as a l r e a d y s t a t e d , he r e j e c t s t h e f u r t h e r  s u g g e s t i o n t h a t f i r s t meaning i s governed by c o n v e n t i o n s o r regularities.  T h i s c l a i m , he argues,  e x i s t e n c e o f malapropisms.  i s i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the  To r e i t e r a t e , t h e r e i s no r u l e  t h a t can e x p l a i n when t o a t t r i b u t e t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l meaning t o a speaker's  words and when t o i g n o r e i t i n f a v o u r o f an  unconventional  interpretation.  And t h e r e i s no r u l e t o  e x p l a i n what t h e u n c o n v e n t i o n a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s h o u l d be.  As  a r e s u l t , t h e s u c c e s s f u l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f malapropisms cannot be e x p l a i n e d i n terms o f a r u l e , r e g u l a r i t y , o r c o n v e n t i o n learned p r i o r t o the occasion of utterance. Davidson concludes,  F i r s t meaning,  need n o t be c o n v e n t i o n a l i n c h a r a c t e r .  A f u r t h e r e m p i r i c a l q u e s t i o n may be r a i s e d r e g a r d i n g how f r e q u e n t l y we do, i n f a c t , communicate w i t h o u t r e l y i n g on convention.  A c c o r d i n g t o Davidson, t h i s i s a u b i q u i t o u s  phenomenon.  I n o r d e r t o understand  t h e speech o f o t h e r s we  must, he m a i n t a i n s , be a b l e t o adapt our t h e o r i e s o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n to the i d i o s y n c r a s i e s of p a r t i c u l a r  speakers.  What p r o p e r names, f o r example, w i l l have meaning and t h e 36  meaning t h a t they w i l l have w i l l person. will  l a r g e l y v a r y from p e r s o n  to  Members of the same f a m i l y , work, o r s o c i a l group  share the same t h e o r i e s of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n f o r p a r t i c u l a r  names, but v a r i a t i o n i n the members of such groups,  through  the group expanding or d e c r e a s i n g i n some manner, w i l l r e q u i r e t h a t we adapt our t h e o r i e s of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . The meaning, Davidson m a i n t a i n s , t h a t we a t t r i b u t e t o a speaker's words, whether i t i s a p r o p e r name, common noun, etc.,  depends on how  we b e l i e v e he i n t e n d s t o be i n t e r p r e t e d .  Even i n s t a n d a r d c a s e s , Davidson m a i n t a i n s , we w i l l the c o n v e n t i o n a l meaning of words to a speaker's o n l y i f we assume t h i s i s how interpreted.  the speaker  utterance  i n t e n d s t o be  As a r e s u l t , i t i s i n s u f f i c i e n t m e r e l y t o a p p l y  the c o n v e n t i o n a l meaning t o a speaker's words as w i l l always be secondary Due  attribute  convention  to i n t e n t i o n .  t o the importance  of the speaker's  intention i n  d e t e r m i n i n g the meaning of her words b o t h the meaning t h a t we a s c r i b e t o p a r t i c u l a r words and the meaning t h a t we p a r t i c u l a r words t o have may occasion.  intend  v a r y depending on the speech  At the o u t s e t of an o c c a s i o n of u t t e r a n c e b o t h  the  speaker and the h e a r e r , Davidson m a i n t a i n s , have a t h e o r y of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n w h i c h he terms the p r i o r t h e o r y . p r i o r t h e o r y , then, c o n s i s t s of how  I n a p a r a l l e l manner,  the h e a r e r ' s p r i o r t h e o r y c o n s i s t s of how  he b e l i e v e s the  i n t e n d s t o be i n t e r p r e t e d . The speaker won't 37  speaker's  she b e l i e v e s the h e a r e r i s  prepared to i n t e r p r e t her u t t e r a n c e s .  speaker  The  n e c e s s a r i l y speak i n accordance w i t h her p r i o r theory as, i n the course of u t t e r a n c e , modify h i s p r i o r theory.  she may  attempt to have the  As a r e s u l t , a hearer may  hearer be  r e q u i r e d to a d j u s t the meanings t h a t he a s c r i b e s to p a r t i c u l a r words d u r i n g the course of the speaker's According  utterance.  to Davidson, i t i s the p a s s i n g theory,  than the p r i o r theory,  rather  that i s e s s e n t i a l to communication.  For both the speaker and  the hearer,  the p a s s i n g  theory  i n c l u d e s any nonstandard uses of words, t h a t i s , any meanings t h a t are a t t r i b u t e d to s p e c i f i c words f o r the o c c a s i o n of utterance only.  While the speaker's  p a s s i n g theory c o n s i s t s  of the theory she intends the hearer to use her u t t e r a n c e ,  in interpreting  the hearer's p a s s i n g theory c o n s i s t s of how  a c t u a l l y i n t e r p r e t s the u t t e r a n c e . s u c c e s s f u l , Davidson argues,  he  Communication i s  i f the p a s s i n g t h e o r i e s of  the  speaker and the hearer c o i n c i d e . Davidson maintains  t h a t n e i t h e r p r i o r nor  passing  t h e o r i e s are l a n g u a g e - l i k e as they cannot be a c q u i r e d or mastered by l e a r n i n g a s e t of r u l e s , r e g u l a r i t i e s , conventions.  and  I t i s c l e a r that a p a s s i n g theory c o u l d not  c o n s t i t u t e a language as, by d e f i n i t i o n ,  i t c o n s i s t s of words  and meanings agreed upon o n l y f o r a p a r t i c u l a r o c c a s i o n of utterance.  Davidson concedes t h a t a p r i o r  s p e c i f i c a l l y one  theory,  t h a t we b r i n g to a f i r s t c o n v e r s a t i o n ,  may  conform more o b v i o u s l y to our sense of what a n a t u r a l language is.  Having s a i d t h i s , however, he proceeds to argue t h a t 38  p r i o r t h e o r i e s need n o t be shared. s t a t e s , because we w i l l for age,  d i f f e r e n t people.  T h i s i s apparent,  he  tend t o have d i f f e r e n t p r i o r t h e o r i e s Even s u p e r f i c i a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s such as  d r e s s , and o c c u p a t i o n may i n f l u e n c e t h e f o r m a t i o n o f a  p r i o r theory.  Davidson m a i n t a i n s , then, t h a t o u r speech w i l l  always be r e l a t i v e t o a p a r t i c u l a r speaker on a p a r t i c u l a r occasion.  As  a r e s u l t , s u c c e s s f u l communication, he argues,  does n o t depend upon t h e adherence t o e i t h e r r u l e s o r regularities. I t may appear t h a t Davidson i s t o o q u i c k t o d i s m i s s t h e importance of convention  f o r communication.  M i c h a e l Dummett,  i n h i s c r i t i c i s m o f "A N i c e Derangement o f E p i t a p h s " , has a t t e m p t e d t o argue t h a t t h i s i s t h e case.  However, what  becomes most apparent i n examining Dummett's c r i t i c i s m s i s t h a t he m i s r e p r e s e n t s much o f Davidson's t h e o r y . Davidson r e j e c t s a p h i l o s o p h i c a l or l i n g u i s t i c n o t i o n of language, t h a t i s , language t h a t i s based on r u l e s and r e g u l a r i t i e s and i s l e a r n e d p r i o r t o t h e speech o c c a s i o n .  At  no p o i n t does he deny t h a t c o n v e n t i o n a l n o t i o n s o f meaning e x i s t and t h a t we o f t e n r e l y on these c o n v e n t i o n a l meanings i n communication. conventions  What he c l e a r l y s t a t e s , however, i s t h a t such  a r e u n n e c e s s a r y f o r communication.  Consequently,  t o address Davidson's c o n c l u s i o n d i r e c t l y  Dummett must argue t h a t c o n v e n t i o n communication.  i s necessary f o r  B u t , r a t h e r than a t t e m p t i n g t o do so, Dummett  s i m p l y a s s e r t s t h a t we r a r e l y d e v i a t e from t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l 39  use  of words when we communicate and, as a r e s u l t ,  some  concept of language i s necessary to e x p l a i n t h i s phenomenon. According  to Dummett, we must appeal to the concept of  language i n order  to e x p l a i n c e r t a i n e m p i r i c a l f a c t s .  For example, he questions  how we can d e s c r i b e the  d i s t i n c t i o n between an E n g l i s h speaker and someone who speaks o n l y Yoruba without r e f e r e n c e  to language.  A l l that i s  r e q u i r e d to e x p l a i n such d i s t i n c t i o n s , however, i s an appeal to c o n v e n t i o n .  Specifically,  the standard  word o r sound t h a t  i s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h a p a r t i c u l a r meaning i n E n g l i s h w i l l be different  from the standard  word or sound that i s a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h the same or s i m i l a r meaning i n Yoruba.  Though i t may be  convenient to use the term "language" t o a s s o c i a t e  such  groups, i t does not f o l l o w from t h i s that any p a r t i c u l a r n o t i o n of language must be invoked. Dummett f u r t h e r c r i t i c i z e s Davidson f o r d i s m i s s i n g the d i s t i n c t i o n between c o r r e c t and i n c o r r e c t usage. because Davidson presents  I t i s only  an a r t i f i c i a l speech s i t u a t i o n ,  Dummett argues, that the s i g n i f i c a n c e of c o r r e c t usage does not become apparent. maintains, there hearer.  According  to Davidson's model, Dummett  i s no i n t e r a c t i o n between the speaker and the  The hearer can n e i t h e r ask the speaker to c l a r i f y o r  e x p l a i n what he i s saying nor c o r r e c t the speaker's word usage.  As a r e s u l t , Dummett argues, Davidson f a i l s to  acknowledge the f a c t that we h o l d o u r s e l v e s conventional  use of words.  responsible  T h i s i s apparent, Dummett 40  t o the  maintains,  from our w i l l i n g n e s s to conform to c o n v e n t i o n a l  usage when we r e a l i z e t h a t we have d e v i a t e d from i t . Dummett's c l a i m r a i s e s the f o l l o w i n g q u e s t i o n s : do we, i n f a c t , h o l d o u r s e l v e s r e s p o n s i b l e to convention what does t h i s prove?  In response to Dummett's  Davidson argues t h a t there i s no evidence  and, i f so, criticisms,  to support  Dummett's  c l a i m t h a t we h o l d o u r s e l v e s r e s p o n s i b l e to convention.  A  w i l l i n g n e s s to conform to convention may be based s o l e l y on our d e s i r e to f a c i l i t a t e communication.  I may speak i n a  c o n v e n t i o n a l manner but not f e e l an o b l i g a t i o n o r responsibility  to do so.  Moreover, even i f we d i d f e e l an o b l i g a t i o n to speak i n a c o n v e n t i o n a l manner t h i s does not prove t h a t convention i s a c t u a l l y necessary belief  f o r communication.  t h a t convention  communication. not support  i s important  T h i s may r e f l e c t o n l y a  or necessary f o r  However, the b e l i e f t h a t t h i s i s the case does  the c l a i m t h a t t h i s i s , i n f a c t ,  may be an i n t e r e s t i n g  the case.  This  p s y c h o l o g i c a l f a c t but i t does not  fundamentally  c h a l l e n g e Davidson's c l a i m t h a t convention i s  not necessary  f o r communication.  Furthermore, the b a s i s f o r Dummett's c r i t i c i s m , t h a t i s , the c l a i m t h a t Davidson presents an a r t i f i c i a l situation,  i s unfounded.  speech  In p r e s e n t i n g h i s p r i o r and p a s s i n g  t h e o r i e s , Davidson r e f e r s to the speaker and the hearer and analyses  these r o l e s r e l a t i v e to a s p e c i f i c o c c a s i o n of  utterance.  I f we c o n s i d e r only a p a r t i c u l a r 41  phrase i t h a r d l y  seems a r t i f i c i a l  to assume t h a t the speaker and the h e a r e r  not exchange r o l e s .  I f we  do  c o n s i d e r an e n t i r e c o n v e r s a t i o n as  our standard, however, there i s no reason to assume t h a t the r o l e s of speaker  and hearer are not interchanged  the speech o c c a s i o n .  There i s nothing i n  throughout  Davidson's  d e s c r i p t i o n of p r i o r and p a s s i n g t h e o r i e s t h a t excludes p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t these r o l e s are exchanged d u r i n g the  the  course  of a c o n v e r s a t i o n . Dummett i s concerned,  however, not o n l y w i t h e r r o r but  a l s o w i t h the s i g n i f i c a n c e of a hearer a s k i n g a speaker c l a r i f y or e l a b o r a t e on her comments. how  t h i s i s r e l e v a n t to Davidson's  But i t i s not  theory.  apparent  Davidson s t a t e s  t h a t he i s i n t e r e s t e d i n cases i n which the speaker with it"(440) .  "gets away  T h i s i n c l u d e s o n l y those cases i n which the  h e a r e r understands  the speaker d e s p i t e the f a c t t h a t the  h e a r e r c o u l d not understand  the speaker an v i r t u e of something  l e a r n e d p r i o r to the speech o c c a s i o n .  Consequently,  h e a r e r does not understand  then the speaker  "[gotten] away w i t h  the speaker  and have to c o n f i r m that her i n t e r p r e t a t i o n was T h i s may  the  convention  However, even i n cases where a speaker  c l a r i f i c a t i o n of the speaker's 42  speaker  than adherence to  on the c o n v e n t i o n a l use of words, the hearer may elicit  hasn't  the i n t e n d e d  show t h a t d e v i a t i o n from  makes communication more d i f f i c u l t convention.  i f the  it"(440).  Perhaps a hearer c o u l d p a r t i a l l y understand  interpretation.  to '  intent.  We  i s relying  have to o f t e n have  to c o n f i r m that a speaker intends to convey the c o n v e n t i o n a l meaning of her words when t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n u t t e r a n c e sound odd or strange As a r e s u l t ,  makes the  sounding.  i t i s not r e a d i l y apparent how such  i n t e r a c t i o n between speaker and hearer i s r e l e v a n t t o Davidson's  argument.  There i s n o t h i n g i n h i s t h e o r e t i c a l  d e f i n i t i o n of p r i o r and p a s s i n g t h e o r i e s ,  then, that  the p o s s i b i l i t y of t h i s type of i n t e r a c t i o n . these cases a r e of l i t t l e  excludes  Consequently,  as  i n t e r e s t to h i s argument i t would  have been a d i s t r a c t i o n to have i n c l u d e d them. In a g e n e r a l sense Dummett i s emphasizing the significance  of the s o c i a l element of communication.  C o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h i s , he emphasizes the importance  of the  d i v i s i o n of l i n g u i s t i c labour and c r i t i c i z e s Davidson f o r ignoring i t .  A c c o r d i n g to the d i v i s i o n of l i n g u i s t i c labour,  we o f t e n use words which we have o n l y a p a r t i a l knowledge o f and,  i n so doing, we r e l y on the r e l e v a n t experts i n our  community t o determine  the e x t e n s i o n of our words.  Dummett  and o t h e r s argue that, i n these contexts, the speaker's words have a determinate meaning and e x t e n s i o n even though the speaker does not have s u f f i c i e n t knowledge to f i x the meaning on her own. Responding to t h i s c l a i m , Davidson maintains t h a t he does not q u e s t i o n that we o f t e n use words without having a determinate concept of what the meaning of the word i s .  In so  doing, we may, as Dummett claims, be r e l y i n g on the "experts" 43  i n o u r l i n g u i s t i c community t o f i x t h e meaning o f o u r term. But t h i s , Davidson argues, proves o n l y t h a t we b e l i e v e t h a t e x p e r t s e x i s t b u t n o t t h a t they, i n f a c t , do.  The f a c t t h a t  we b e l i e v e t h a t t h e e x t e n s i o n o f our words i s f i x e d by t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l o r e x p e r t use o f p a r t i c u l a r terms does n o t p r o v e that t h i s i s the case.  I n s i t u a t i o n s i n w h i c h t h e speaker  does n o t have s u f f i c i e n t knowledge  t o f i x t h e meaning o f h e r  words, Davidson argues, t h e meaning remains i n d e t e r m i n a t e . D a v i d s o n wants t o m a i n t a i n a c o n n e c t i o n between t h e s p e a k e r ' s b e h a v i o u r and t h e meaning o f a s p e a k e r ' s words.  If  a speaker i s unaware o f t h e meaning o f h e r words, as would be the case i f meaning were d e t e r m i n e d by t h e e x p e r t s i n a l i n g u i s t i c community, then t h i s meaning cannot p o t e n t i a l l y be r e f l e c t e d i n t h e speaker's b e h a v i o u r .  As n o t e d above,  D a v i d s o n e x p l a i n s communication i n terms o f p r i o r and p a s s i n g theories.  What i s n e c e s s a r y f o r communication,  Davidson  a r g u e s , i s n o t c o n v e n t i o n , b u t r a t h e r , t h e convergence o f passing theories.  When p a s s i n g t h e o r i e s c o i n c i d e t h e meaning  t h a t t h e speaker i n t e n d s t h e h e a r e r t o a s c r i b e t o h i s words c o i n c i d e s w i t h t h e meaning t h a t t h e i n t e r p r e t e r does, i n f a c t , a s c r i b e t o t h e speaker's words.  I n such a manner t h e  i n t e r p r e t e r forms an a c c u r a t e t h e o r y r e g a r d i n g how t h e speaker i n t e n d s t o be i n t e r p r e t e d .  Dummett argues, however, t h a t  this  p i c t u r e o f communication i s f l a w e d because such s e c o n d - o r d e r t h e o r i e s , t h a t i s t h e o r i e s about o t h e r t h e o r i e s , a r e o p e r a t i o n a l o n l y i n e x c e p t i o n a l cases and cannot be t h e norm. 44  Dummett i n c l u d e s , amongst t h e s e e x c e p t i o n s , cases i n which a t h i r d p a r t y overhears a conversation.  According to  Dummett, i n o r d e r f o r t h e t h i r d p a r t y o r eavesdropper t o form an a c c u r a t e p i c t u r e o f what i s g o i n g on, she must t a k e i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n b o t h what t h e speaker i n t e n d s t o convey and how the  h e a r e r u n d e r s t a n d s what t h e speaker s a y s .  There i s no  r e a s o n , however, t o assume t h a t t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n a c o n v e r s a t i o n w i l l be any b e t t e r a c q u a i n t e d w i t h one a n o t h e r than a t h i r d p a r t y l i s t e n i n g t o t h e i r c o n v e r s a t i o n .  As a  r e s u l t , i t i s n o t apparent why c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f i n t e n t and u n d e r s t a n d i n g a r e any l e s s n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n the  c o n v e r s a t i o n than t h e y a r e f o r t h e eavesdropper. Furthermore, h a v i n g acknowledged  t h e importance o f such  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s i t i s j u s t a short step to conceding that there w i l l be c e r t a i n cases i n which t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f i n t e n t i o n o v e r r i d e s knowledge o f c o n v e n t i o n .  How i s an eavesdropper  a b l e t o u n d e r s t a n d a speaker's g a r b l e d words, malapropism, o r s l i p o f t h e tongue?  What emphasis s h o u l d t h e eavesdropper  p l a c e on t h e speaker's i n t e n t i o n s i n o r d e r t o form an a c c u r a t e p i c t u r e o f t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n ? A l l t h a t Davidson r e q u i r e s i s one case i n w h i c h c o n v e n t i o n o r s h a r e d p r a c t i c e s a r e n o t n e c e s s a r y t o e x p l a i n i n g how s u c c e s s f u l communication o c c u r s . That i s , a case i n which t h e eavesdropper d i s r e g a r d s t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l meaning i n f a v o u r o f t h e i n t e n d e d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Dummett must p r o v i d e a r e l e v a n t d i s t i n c t i o n t o e x p l a i n why c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f i n t e n t and u n d e r s t a n d i n g a r e n e c e s s a r y 45  for  the eavesdropper and not necessary f o r the p a r t i c i p a n t s i n  the  conversation.  However, the d i s t i n c t i o n that Dummett  p r o v i d e s i s a t h e o r e t i c a l r a t h e r than a p r a c t i c a l one. Because the eavesdropper i s not a p a r t i c i p a n t i n the c o n v e r s a t i o n , Dummett argues, he can r e l y on second-order t h e o r i e s i n order to i n t e r p r e t the c o n v e r s a t i o n .  A c c o r d i n g to  Davidson's d e f i n i t i o n of p r i o r and p a s s i n g t h e o r i e s ,  Dummett  argues, i f the p a r t i c i p a n t s i n the c o n v e r s a t i o n were to speak and i n t e r p r e t each other w i t h r e f e r e n c e to such t h e o r i e s an infinite  r e g r e s s would a r i s e .  As noted above, Davidson maintains that the speaker's p r i o r t h e o r y c o n s i s t s of how she b e l i e v e s the h e a r e r i s p r e p a r e d t o i n t e r p r e t her u t t e r a n c e s .  Similarly,  the h e a r e r ' s  p r i o r t h e o r y c o n s i s t s of how he b e l i e v e s the speaker i n t e n d s her u t t e r a n c e s to be i n t e r p r e t e d .  Consequently,  Dummett  argues, the t h r e a t of an i n f i n i t e r e g r e s s a r i s e s .  That i s ,  the  hearer(H) forms h i s p r i o r theory based on how he b e l i e v e s  the  speaker(S) wants to be i n t e r p r e t e d .  I f the h e a r e r takes  i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n the f a c t that the speaker wants to be i n t e r p r e t e d based on how he(H) i s prepared to understand h e r ( S ) , the hearer may then modify h i s p r i o r t h e o r y accordingly.  T h i s r e t u r n s us to the i n i t i a l  t h a t the h e a r e r ' s p r i o r theory i s supposed  consideration  to be c o n s t i t u t e d  by how he b e l i e v e s the speaker wants to be i n t e r p r e t e d , and so on ad i n f i n i t u m . In  response, Davidson s t a t e s i n "The S o c i a l Aspect of 46  Language" t h a t a l t h o u g h he d e s c r i b e d t h e speaker and h e a r e r as h a v i n g t h e o r i e s t h i s was m e r e l y an e x p l a n a t o r y d e v i c e .  The  p o i n t i s n o t t h a t they a c t u a l l y have a t h e o r y , D a v i d s o n m a i n t a i n s , b u t r a t h e r t h a t they communicate i n accordance w i t h a theory.  I t i s c l e a r that the s i t u a t i o n described i n the  p r e c e d i n g p a r a g r a p h would n o t a r i s e i f t h e speaker and h e a r e r d i d n o t have e x p l i c i t knowledge o f t h e t h e o r y .  Though t h e y  w i l l have knowledge o f t h e meanings o f p a r t i c u l a r words, f o r example, d e v i a n t uses t h a t a r e agreed upon f o r t h e o c c a s i o n o f u t t e r a n c e o n l y , they do n o t have knowledge o f t h e framework o f the p r i o r and p a s s i n g t h e o r i e s .  As a r e s u l t , t h e r e i s no  t h e o r e t i c a l reason why t h e eavesdropper can have a secondorder theory w h i l e the p a r t i c i p a n t s i n the conversation cannot. Dummett, then, accuses Davidson o f b e i n g d i s m i s s i v e w i t h respect to the s i g n i f i c a n c e of the c o r r e c t versus i n c o r r e c t use o f words.  D e s c r i b i n g t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n as s h a l l o w ,  D a v i d s o n s t a t e s t h a t he wants t o p r e s e r v e a deeper n o t i o n o f what words mean i n p a r t i c u l a r c o n t e x t s .  Dummett i n c o r r e c t l y  b e l i e v e s t h a t t h i s deeper d i s t i n c t i o n i s between, "the speaker's  long-range  theory  ( p r i o r theory) and h i s  short-range  t h e o r y " , between, "how he wants t h e h e a r e r u s u a l l y t o understand  c e r t a i n words t h a t he has u t t e r e d , and how he wants  him t o u n d e r s t a n d  t h a t p a r t i c u l a r u t t e r a n c e o f them"(461).  There a r e two s u b s t a n t i a l e r r o r s r e f l e c t e d i n Dummett's analysis.  Dummett c l a i m s t h a t t h e p r i o r / p a s s i n g d i s t i n c t i o n 47  i s c o n f u s i n g and that these t h e o r i e s are more a p p r o p r i a t e l y dubbed, the long-range and the short-range theory.  Though a  p a s s i n g theory i s n e c e s s a r i l y short-range a p r i o r t h e o r y need not be long-range. prior  I t i s p r i o r o n l y i n the sense of b e i n g  to the o c c a s i o n of u t t e r a n c e .  Secondly, he  m i s r e p r e s e n t s the deeper d i s t i n c t i o n that Davidson  seeks.  In order f o r t h i s deeper d i s t i n c t i o n to be between how a speaker u s u a l l y wants to be -understood and how, o c c a s i o n , the speaker wants to be understood, standard f o r what i s u s u a l .  on t h i s  t h e r e must be a  As a r e s u l t , Dummett's a n a l y s i s  of the d i s t i n c t i o n depends on h i s mistaken c l a i m that theories are long-standing. prior  prior  In the absence of a l o n g - s t a n d i n g  theory there i s no standard f o r what i s u s u a l and,  consequently, no b a s i s f o r comparison. The d i s t i n c t i o n that Davidson i s , i n f a c t , is  the d i s t i n c t i o n between l i t e r a l  speaker meaning.  To r e i t e r a t e ,  interested i n  or f i r s t meaning and  he d e s c r i b e s the d i f f e r e n c e  between f i r s t meaning and speaker meaning as the d i f f e r e n c e between what a speaker's words mean and what she means by them.  Dummett's f a i l u r e to understand the r e l e v a n t  d i s t i n c t i o n i s f u r t h e r apparent i n h i s c r i t i c i s m of Davidson's r e f e r e n c e to K e i t h Donnellan.  Donnellan's example, Dummett  argues, does not e x h i b i t a d i s t i n c t i o n between what a speaker means and what h i s words mean.  However, Dummett a n a l y s e s  Donnellan's example r e l a t i v e to h i s erroneous of Davidson's  interpretation  d i s t i n c t i o n and consequently f a i l s 48  to grasp i t s  significance. A c c o r d i n g to Donnellan, the t r u t h v a l u e of a sentence that c o n t a i n s a d e s c r i p t i o n that i s used r e f e r e n t i a l l y won't n e c e s s a r i l y a f f e c t the success of the speaker's r e f e r e n c e . For  example, Jones can r e f e r to someone by s a y i n g ,  murderer fact,  "Smith's  i s insane" i f the person he i s r e f e r r i n g to i s , i n  insane, even i f that person d i d not murder Smith.  t h i s manner, Jones can use a f a l s e sentence to say  In  something  true. Davidson maintains that t h i s i s not an example of words changing t h e i r meaning or r e f e r e n c e but i t i s , he argues,, a c l e a r example of the d i s t i n c t i o n between f i r s t meaning and speaker meaning.  In order f o r a speaker's words to convey a  p a r t i c u l a r meaning the speaker must not o n l y have the i n t e n t i o n that t h i s meaning be conveyed,  Davidson m a i n t a i n s ,  he must a l s o r e a s o n a b l y expect that h i s l i s t e n e r i s ready to i n t e r p r e t him i n the intended manner.  Jones, however, has  i n t e n t i o n of changing the meaning of the u t t e r a n c e , murderer  i s insane".  "Smith's  Jones intends to convey the c o n v e n t i o n a l  meaning of the word "murderer"; b e l i e f t h a t the man  no  he i s simply mistaken i n h i s  he i s r e f e r r i n g to i s Smith's  murderer.  Jones can be c o n t r a s t e d to Humpty Dumpty's c h a r a c t e r i n A l i c e i n Wonderland when he makes the b o l d c l a i m that h i s words mean e x a c t l y what he intends them to mean.  Humpty  Dumpty says that h i s words "There's g l o r y f o r you" mean t h e r e ' s a n i c e knockdown argument. , Humpty Dumpty 49  fails,  however, to p r o v i d e A l i c e w i t h c l u e s to the u n c o n v e n t i o n a l meaning t h a t he intends to convey.  As a r e s u l t , h i s words,  a c c o r d i n g to both Davidson and Donnellan, do not mean what he says they mean. In a n a l y s i n g t h i s example, Donnellan uses the same phrase,  "There's g l o r y f o r you", w i t h the i n t e n t i o n t h a t h i s  u t t e r a n c e w i l l have the meaning t h e r e ' s a n i c e knockdown argument.  The r e l e v a n t d i f f e r e n c e between Humpty Dumpty's use  of the phrase and Donnellan's i s that, i n the course of h i s a n a l y s i s , Donnellan p r o v i d e s s u f f i c i e n t i n f o r m a t i o n to make h i s i n t e n d e d meaning apparent to the i n t e r p r e t e r . Consequently,  Donnellan's u t t e r a n c e , "There's g l o r y f o r you"  means t h e r e ' s a n i c e knockdown argument w h i l e Humpty Dumpty's u t t e r a n c e does not. Donnellan uses h i s d i s c u s s i o n of the Humpty Dumpty example to support h i s c l a i m that Jones can say something when he says "Smith's murderer i s insane" i f the man i s r e f e r r i n g to i s insane even i f t h i s man murder Smith. phrase  true  t h a t he  d i d not, i n f a c t ,  However, Donnellan's u n c o n v e n t i o n a l use of the  "There's g l o r y f o r you" supports h i s c l a i m s r e g a r d i n g  Jones' u t t e r a n c e of t h i s sentence, Davidson maintains, o n l y i f t h i s l a t t e r u t t e r a n c e i s an example of words changing meaning or r e f e r e n c e . to Davidson i t i s not.  their  As has a l r e a d y been s t a t e d , a c c o r d i n g What must be made c l e a r i s what i s  r e q u i r e d f o r words to change t h e i r meaning or r e f e r e n c e . d i f f e r e n c e between the Jones case and Donnellan's 50  sentence  The  "There's g l o r y f o r you", Davidson argues, i s that i n the l a t t e r case Donnellan changes the meaning  of the u t t e r a n c e  "There's g l o r y f o r you" by p r o v i d i n g c l u e s to i t s new whereas, words.  meaning,  Jones has no i n t e n t i o n of changing the meaning  of h i s  Jones i s s u c c e s s f u l l y a b l e to r e f e r u s i n g a sentence  which i s ,  i n fact,  f a l s e because he i s u s i n g the phrase  "Smith's murderer" i n a p u r e l y r e f e r e n t i a l manner. A c c o r d i n g to Dummett, i f Jones does not mean a n y t h i n g unusual by h i s words then t h i s example  cannot e x h i b i t a  d i s t i n c t i o n between what Jones words m e a n ( f i r s t meaning) and what Jones does w i t h those words(speaker meaning).  In  c o n t r a s t to Dummett's claim, however, i t i s because  this  example  meaning  has n o t h i n g to do w i t h words changing t h e i r  that t h e r e i s a c l e a r d i s c r e p a n c y between f i r s t meaning speaker  and  meaning.  I f Jones had intended to a t t r i b u t e an unusual meaning h i s words,  to  then h i s sentence, "Smith's murderer i s insane"  need not have been f a l s e .  For example,  t h a t Jones b e l i e v e s murdered  assume that the  man  Smith i s s t a n d i n g i n the c o r n e r  of the room w i t h i n Jones' v i s u a l f i e l d .  I f Jones has p r o v i d e d  the a p p r o p r i a t e c l u e s to h i s intended meaning,  "Smith's  murderer" c o u l d then have the nonstandard meaning  of, the man  i n the corner, without any of the c o n v e n t i o n a l c o n n o t a t i o n s of murder or any a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h Smith.  I t would not be an  e m p i r i c a l q u e s t i o n as to whether the man  i n the c o r n e r i s  Smith's murderer, but r a t h e r , i t would be the case t h a t 51  "Smith's murderer" means the man  i n the c o r n e r .  Consequently,  the  l i t e r a l or f i r s t meaning of t h i s u t t e r a n c e would s i m p l y be  the  man  i n the corner i s insane.  However, as noted above, Jones has s u c c e s s f u l l y via  the u s u a l meaning of the words.  referred  A c c o r d i n g to Davidson,  t h i s has to do w i t h the d i f f e r e n c e between what a speaker's words mean or r e f e r to and what a speaker wants to do w i t h these words.  In t h i s case, the r e f e r e n c e of the words,  "Smith's murderer" Smith.  i s the i n d i v i d u a l who  However, Jones i n t e n d s to r e f e r to the man  i n c o r r e c t l y b e l i e v e s murdered Smith. utterance, the  man  a c t u a l l y murdered  "Smith's murderer",  As a r e s u l t ,  refers,  Jones b e l i e v e s murdered Smith.  who  Jones'  i n t h i s i n s t a n c e , to Because he doesn't  have the i n t e n t i o n to change the meaning of the words murderer",  he  "Smith's  t h e r e i s a d i s c r e p a n c y between what Jones' words  mean and what he does w i t h those words. The Humpty Dumpty example i s s i g n i f i c a n t , however, because  i t emphasizes  the need f o r a speaker to be  i n t e r p r e t a b l e i n order f o r h i s words to have meaning. Davidson has s t a t e d that i n order f o r communication the  to succeed  p a s s i n g t h e o r i e s of the speaker and h e a r e r must c o i n c i d e .  Humpty Dumpty's u t t e r a n c e "There's g l o r y f o r you", then, does not  mean t h e r e i s a n i c e knockdown argument because he has not  p r o v i d e d s u f f i c i e n t c l u e s to support t h i s u n c o n v e n t i o n a l interpretation.  Moreover,  as Davidson notes, Humpty Dumpty i s  e n t i r e l y aware that he has not p r o v i d e d s u f f i c i e n t 52  clues.  T h i s i s apparent  when A l i c e r e t o r t s  "I don't know what you  mean by g l o r y " and Humpty r e p l i e s by saying, don't - ' t i l  I tell  "Of course  you  you"(440).  Before Humpty p r o v i d e s the a p p r o p r i a t e c l u e s to h i s unconventional  meaning of t h i s u t t e r a n c e A l i c e would a p p l y  meaning i n her p r i o r theory which would l i k e l y be c o n v e n t i o n a l meaning.  the  In t h i s manner Humpty's p a s s i n g  and A l i c e ' s p a s s i n g theory do not c o i n c i d e .  the  theory  I f Humpty were to  p r o v i d e the a p p r o p r i a t e c l u e s and i f A l i c e m o d i f i e s her  prior  theory a c c o r d i n g l y then she w i l l be d i s p o s e d to i n t e r p r e t Humpty's u t t e r a n c e  "There's g l o r y f o r you"  as there's a n i c e  knockdown argument. Though what i s necessary  f o r communication i s convergence  of p a s s i n g t h e o r i e s , the speaker's terms of a c h i e v i n g convergence. her theory about how utterances,  p r i o r theory i s r e l e v a n t i n  The  speaker's  theory,  the hearer i s d i s p o s e d to i n t e r p r e t  i s p a r t of what the speaker has  e n s u r i n g t h a t she i s i n t e r p r e t a b l e . A l i c e i s not prepared g l o r y f o r you"  prior  her  to go on i n  Humpty Dumpty knows t h a t  to i n t e r p r e t h i s u t t e r a n c e of  "There's  as meaning there's a n i c e knockdown argument.  He n e g l e c t s to p r o v i d e c l u e s to t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and,  consequently,  unconventional  h i s u t t e r a n c e does not have  that meaning. However, had Humpty Dumpty encountered knew was his  prepared  someone who  he  to a t t r i b u t e the unconventional meaning to  u t t e r a n c e , i t would be unnecessary .  53  f o r him  to p r o v i d e  c l u e s to t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .  When Humpty Dumpty i s speaking  to A l i c e h i s u t t e r a n c e won't be meaningful;  however, i n the  h y p o t h e t i c a l case h i s words would convey the intended meaning. T h i s emphasizes the need f o r a speaker to t a i l o r h i s speech to a particular interpreter.  The  s e l f - r e f e r r i n g i n t e n t i o n s which  determine f i r s t meaning must, as a r e s u l t , be d i r e c t e d towards a particular  interpreter.  In c o n t r a s t to Humpty Dumpty, Donnellan  does, i n f a c t ,  p r o v i d e the a p p r o p r i a t e c l u e s to the unconventional t h a t he wants to convey with the u t t e r a n c e , you".  meaning  "There's g l o r y f o r  P r i o r to g i v i n g these c l u e s , Davidson maintains,  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Donnellan's  this  u t t e r a n c e would have been wrong.  Consequently, the i n t e r p r e t e r w i l l  interpret  Donnellan's  u t t e r a n c e c o r r e c t l y i f he or she m o d i f i e s h i s or her  prior  theory o n l y once the a p p r o p r i a t e c l u e s have been g i v e n . I t i s o n l y when the speaker and hearer's p a s s i n g t h e o r i e s correspond  t h a t there i s communication and,  Davidson, meaning.  according  to  However, the hearer's a b i l i t y to i n t e r p r e t  the speaker a c c u r a t e l y i s not, Davidson maintains,  a s i g n of  her l i n g u i s t i c competence as s t a n d a r d l y conceived. to Davidson, i t i s simply knowing how p a r t i c u l a r u t t e r a n c e on a p a r t i c u l a r  According  to i n t e r p r e t a occasion.  By c h a l l e n g i n g the c l a i m that language i s necessary communication Davidson a l s o questions  the c l a i m t h a t  s u c c e s s f u l communication i s a r e s u l t of l i n g u i s t i c s k i l l . the extent t h a t we  are a b l e to i n t e r p r e t malapropisms, 54  for  To  slips  of the tongue, and g a r b l e d words e t c . we Davidson argues,  as a r e s u l t of i n t e l l i g e n c e and  than l i n g u i s t i c s k i l l . regularities,  are a b l e to do  so,  luck, r a t h e r  There i s no s e t of r u l e s ,  or conventions  that we  f o r i n t e r p r e t i n g unconventional  can'master i n p r e p a r a t i o n  utterances.  speak w i t h a p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r p r e t e r  A speaker must  i n mind and,  similarly, a  hearer must i n t e r p r e t with the p a r t i c u l a r speaker i n mind. Consequently, most t h e o r i e s of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  rather  than  b e i n g l e a r n e d i n advance of a speech o c c a s i o n are, Davidson argues,  t a i l o r e d to a p a r t i c u l a r o c c a s i o n of u t t e r a n c e .  55  CHAPTER 3: APPARENT INCONSISTENCIES  In chapters one  and  two,  we  saw  how  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n h i s essays "Radical N i c e Derangement of Epitaphs".  Davidson  describes  I n t e r p r e t a t i o n " and  At no p o i n t  i n the  "A  latter  paper does Davidson suggest that the p i c t u r e of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n p r e s e n t e d i n t h i s essay i s intended to be d i f f e r e n t from one  p r e s e n t e d i n "Radical  papers he  Interpretation".  Further,  s t a t e s that a theory of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n may  the  i n both be  thought of as a machine which y i e l d s an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of given utterances.  While i n "Radical  Interpretation"  he  defends the c l a i m that T a r s k i ' s theory of t r u t h i s the appropriate  model f o r such a machine, i n "A N i c e Derangement  of E p i t a p h s "  he  simply d i r e c t s the reader to the argument  p r e s e n t e d i n "Radical  Interpretation".  suggests t h a t Davidson intends N i c e Derangement of Epitaphs" c o n s i s t e n t p i c t u r e of how Yet,  "Radical  This,  I would argue,  I n t e r p r e t a t i o n " and  "A  to be p a r t of a coherent,  l i n g u i s t i c meaning i s determined.  there appear to be d i f f e r e n c e s between  the  c o n c e p t i o n s of communication p r e s e n t e d i n these essays which suggest that these may  be  separate, i r r e c o n c i l a b l e p i c t u r e s .  Presumably Davidson would a t t r i b u t e any  apparent  differences  between the p i c t u r e s of communication p r e s e n t e d i n these essays to mere d i f f e r e n c e s of emphasis. t h a t there  are r e a l ,  However, I w i l l  r a t h e r than merely apparent, 56  two argue  differences  which make these pictures- of communication d i f f i c u l t t o r e c o n c i l e i n t o a coherent whole. In both "Radical of Epitaphs"  I n t e r p r e t a t i o n " and "A N i c e Derangement  Davidson attempts to e x p l a i n how we are a b l e to  understand a speaker's u t t e r a n c e s .  However,  i n the l a t t e r  paper he q u e s t i o n s not only what i s necessary f o r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n but a l s o what i s necessary f o r speech. Whereas, i n "Radical  I n t e r p r e t a t i o n " , Davidson a n a l y s e s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n e n t i r e l y from the p e r s p e c t i v e interpreter,  of the  i n "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs"  he a n a l y s e s  both the speaker's and the i n t e r p r e t e r ' s r o l e i n f a c i l i t a t i n g communication. What Davidson r e j e c t s , that i s , h i s d e s t r u c t i v e  project,  i s a l s o f a r more c e n t r a l to the s t r u c t u r e of "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs" "Radical  than the d e s t r u c t i v e p r o j e c t i s i n  Interpretation".  Though, i n "Radical  I n t e r p r e t a t i o n " , Davidson r e j e c t s many a l t e r n a t i v e suggestions regarding  what we c o u l d know that would enable us to  understand a speaker's u t t e r a n c e s , constructed  i n clear opposition  N i c e Derangement of Epitaphs", own e x p l a n a t i o n  essay.  to any p a r t i c u l a r view. however,  In "A  Davidson advances h i s  by s t r e s s i n g the o p p o s i t i o n between h i s own  view and the c o n v e n t i o n a l as a r e s u l t ,  h i s p o s i t i v e p r o j e c t i s not  view which he r e j e c t s .  There are,  obvious d i f f e r e n c e s between the agendas of each  What must be r e c o n c i l a b l e , however, a r e the p o s i t i v e  views p r e s e n t e d i n "Radical  I n t e r p r e t a t i o n " and "A N i c e 57  Derangement of E p i t a p h s " .  The q u e s t i o n remains,  then, are the  c o n s t r u c t i v e p i c t u r e s presented i n these essays p a r t of a c o n s i s t e n t , coherent view? Davidson's  d e s t r u c t i v e p r o j e c t i n "A Nice Derangement of  E p i t a p h s " i s to c h a l l e n g e and r e j e c t the p i c t u r e of communication i n which meaning i s d e r i v e d from a c o n v e n t i o n a l use of words. regularities,  Convention, d e f i n e d as shared r u l e s or Davidson argues, i s not e s s e n t i a l f o r  communication.  In chapter two,  I defended h i s c l a i m t h a t  c o n v e n t i o n a l meanings, which are l e a r n e d p r i o r to the o c c a s i o n of u t t e r a n c e and are shared by speakers of a g i v e n  language,  are f r e q u e n t l y used f o r communication but are not, i n f a c t , n e c e s s a r y f o r communication. communication,  Davidson s t a t e s , cannot be l e a r n e d p r i o r to the  o c c a s i o n of u t t e r a n c e . appear  What i s necessary f o r  I f t h i s i s the case then i t would  t h a t our t h e o r i e s of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n f o r a g i v e n  u t t e r a n c e must be developed d u r i n g the course of the utterance.  Furthermore,  i f what i s necessary f o r  communication cannot be l e a r n e d p r i o r to the o c c a s i o n of u t t e r a n c e then i t appears  that there i s no need to i n t e r p r e t a  speaker over an extended p e r i o d of time i n order to understand the speaker's u t t e r a n c e s . Interpretation"  In c o n t r a s t , i n " R a d i c a l  Davidson p r e s e n t s an e x p l a n a t i o n of how,  over  an extended p e r i o d of time, we can develop a theory of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n f o r a p a r t i c u l a r language.  I t may  appear,  consequently, that Davidson i s i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h r e s p e c t to 58  the time p e r i o d t h a t i s r e q u i r e d to develop a theory  of  interpretation. Davidson does acknowledge, i n "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs", to  t h a t what we  know about a p a r t i c u l a r speaker, p r i o r  the o c c a s i o n of utterance,  i s s i g n i f i c a n t with respect  our a b i l i t y to develop a convergent p a s s i n g theory i n t e r p r e t the speaker's u t t e r a n c e s . some knowledge that may o c c a s i o n t h a t may  to  to  There i s , as a r e s u l t ,  be a c q u i r e d p r i o r to the speech  be b e n e f i c i a l to i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .  According  to Davidson, however, the knowledge that i s r e l e v a n t to t h i s ability of how  should not be narrowly d e f i n e d i n terms of knowledge to i n t e r p r e t p a r t i c u l a r words or u t t e r a n c e s .  of a speaker's age, . maintains,  may  occupation,  manner of dress, e t c . ,  a l l be r e l e v a n t to developing  p a s s i n g theory.  Knowledge he  a convergent  T h i s knowledge i s so broad, a c c o r d i n g  to  Davidson, that, at the end of "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs",  he concludes  t h a t what i s r e q u i r e d f o r  communication i s much l i k e what i s r e q u i r e d f o r making one's way  i n the world  i n general.  In c o n t r a s t , i n " R a d i c a l I n t e r p r e t a t i o n " Davidson appears to have a much more narrow sense of what we  can l e a r n  t h a t w i l l enable us to understand a speaker's u t t e r a n c e s . Furthermore, the d e s c r i p t i o n of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n t h i s paper suggests t h a t what i s l e a r n e d i s l e a r n e d over an extended p e r i o d of time. regarding  T h i s i s apparent from Davidson's comments  the b e n e f i t s of a w e l l - d e v e l o p e d 59  theory  of  interpretation.  He maintains that we  to a speaker once we  already  can  only a s c r i b e  have a f a i r l y w e l l - d e v e l o p e d  theory of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n f o r the speaker's Interpretation,  he  Thus, i t i s c l e a r that i n "Radical that  utterances.  f u r t h e r s t a t e s , w i l l become  e a s i e r the more sentences that we  believes  error  progressively  have a l r e a d y  interpreted.  Interpretation"  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n over time i s , i f not  Davidson necessary,  at v e r y l e a s t b e n e f i c i a l to understanding a speaker's utterances. As  a r e s u l t , i n i t i a l l y i t may  seem that Davidson i s  i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h r e g a r d to the p e r i o d of time over which i n t e r p r e t a t i o n should occur.  It i s possible,  r e c o n c i l e the apparent d i s c r e p a n c i e s Derangement Of Epitaphs" and issue.  "Radical  however, to  between "A N i c e Interpretation"  on  this  Though Davidson maintains i n "A N i c e Derangement of  E p i t a p h s " that what i s necessary f o r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n cannot learned  p r i o r to the o c c a s i o n of u t t e r a n c e i t i s a l s o  that a speaker may learned  occasion.  Consider, f o r example, Donnellan's d i s c u s s i o n Dumpty's u t t e r a n c e "There's g l o r y f o r you".  you" has  possible  be understood only because of something  p r i o r to the speech  established  be  We  of Humpty  have  already  that Humpty Dumpty's u t t e r a n c e "There's g l o r y  cannot mean there's a n i c e knockdown argument because not p r o v i d e d A l i c e w i t h the a p p r o p r i a t e  unconventional i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .  clues  for he  to t h i s  Conversely, Donnellan's  u t t e r a n c e of the phrase "There's g l o r y f o r you" 60  does have  the  meaning there's a n i c e knockdown argument. Donnellan,  i n c o n t r a s t to Humpty Dumpty, has p r o v i d e d the  a p p r o p r i a t e c l u e s to t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . speaker's  T h i s i s because  In order f o r a  words to convey the intended meaning, then, the  speaker must p r o v i d e c l u e s to the i n t e r p r e t e r r e g a r d i n g the intended meaning. Now,  c o n s i d e r a s c e n a r i o i n which an i n t e r p r e t e r  encounters  Donnellan  years a f t e r he has had a c o n v e r s a t i o n  w i t h him r e g a r d i n g Humpty Dumpty's u t t e r a n c e i n the manner o u t l i n e d i n "A Nice Derangement of E p i t a p h s " . o c c a s i o n Donnellan, you"  On t h i s  again, uses the phrase "There's g l o r y f o r  to mean there's a n i c e knockdown argument.  Donnellan  does not p r o v i d e any more c l u e s to t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , but r a t h e r , he assumes that the speaker w i l l remember  their  e a r l i e r c o n v e r s a t i o n and i n t e r p r e t him a c c o r d i n g l y . h e a r e r does r e c a l l the c l u e s from the e a r l i e r and,  consequently, The  she i n t e r p r e t s Donnellan  interpreter,  The  conversation  as intended.  t h e r e f o r e , must i n t e r p r e t Donnellan  over  time i n the sense t h a t she must r e l y on c l u e s from t h e i r e a r l i e r c o n v e r s a t i o n i n order to understand  h i s utterance.  Consequently, because a speaker must p r o v i d e the a p p r o p r i a t e c l u e s to h i s or her intended i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t h i s may, r e q u i r e t h a t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n occur over time.  i n turn,  T h i s may appear  to be i n c o n s i s t e n t with Davidson's c l a i m t h a t what i s necessary  f o r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n cannot be l e a r n e d p r i o r to the  o c c a s i o n of u t t e r a n c e .  But, we cannot assume, p r i o r to the 61  o c c a s i o n of u t t e r a n c e , w i t h p a s t usage. new  Donnellan,  c l u e s to a new  f o r you"  t h a t a speaker w i l l  speak i n accordance  f o r example, c o u l d have p r o v i d e d  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the phrase "There's g l o r y  r a t h e r than u s i n g t h i s phrase to mean t h e r e ' s a n i c e  knockdown argument.  Thus the i n t e r p r e t e r who s u c c e s s f u l l y  understands Donnellan's  utterance  "There's g l o r y f o r you"  as  meaning there's a n i c e knockdown argument because of the c l u e s t h a t she was  g i v e n e a r l i e r cannot assume, p r i o r to the  o c c a s i o n of u t t e r a n c e , again,  that Donnellan  to convey t h i s unconventional  c l u e s t h a t suggest  w i l l use t h i s meaning.  t h i s unconventional  Though the  interpretation  l e a r n e d p r i o r to the o c c a s i o n of u t t e r a n c e ,  the  must determine, i n . t h e course of u t t e r a n c e , how i n t e n d s to use  this  phrase,  are  interpreter Donnellan  phrase.  In "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs" Davidson not maintains  t h a t what i s necessary  only  f o r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n cannot  be  l e a r n e d p r i o r to the o c c a s i o n of u t t e r a n c e , but he f u r t h e r argues t h a t i t i s u n l i k e l y that our t h e o r i e s of w i l l be shared with other speakers. chapter,  Davidson b e l i e v e s that we  As noted  interpretation  i n the  previous  t a i l o r both our speech  our t h e o r i e s of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n to p a r t i c u l a r occasions utterance. geared  to p a r t i c u l a r speakers  and occasions of u t t e r a n c e  that these t h e o r i e s w i l l be w i d e l y  w i l l have d i f f e r e n t p r i o r t h e o r i e s f o r d i f f e r e n t  and,  of  I f our t h e o r i e s of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n are, i n f a c t ,  t h e r e i s no reason We  and  Davidson maintains,  shared.  people  d i f f e r e n t passing theories for 62  then  v i r t u a l l y every o c c a s i o n of u t t e r a n c e . I t i s c l e a r i n " R a d i c a l I n t e r p r e t a t i o n " , however, t h a t Davidson assumes that t h e o r i e s of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n w i l l be w i d e l y shared by both speakers and i n t e r p r e t e r s . apparent  from Davidson's  This i s  d e s c r i p t i o n of the t h r e e step p r o c e s s  which he p r e s e n t s f o r d e v e l o p i n g a theory of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n for  a g i v e n language.  What i s s i g n i f i c a n t about the  d e s c r i p t i o n of these steps i s that Davidson d i s t i n g u i s h e s the evidence to be a n a l y s e d i n each step i n terms of the consensus,  or l a c k t h e r e o f , amongst speakers r e g a r d i n g the  t r u t h or f a l s i t y of v a r i o u s sentences. The  first  on the language are  step, Davidson suggests, i s t o impose our l o g i c i n q u e s t i o n by a n a l y s i n g those sentences which  always h e l d t r u e or always h e l d f a l s e by members o f a  linguistic  community.  Because he i s u s i n g t h i s method to  develop a theory of t r u t h o r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , we w i l l be a b l e to  i d e n t i f y sentences o n l y i n terms of t h e i r syntax.  result,  As a  t o determine which sentences a r e always h e l d t r u e o r  always h e l d f a l s e by speakers we must not o n l y i n t e r p r e t speakers over time but we must a l s o assume that they a r e speaking i n accordance w i t h a shared theory of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . I f t h e r e i s consensus  over time then i t i s probable, he  assumes, t h a t these sentences express l o g i c a l or a n a l y t i c truths.  Thus Davidson i s attempting to i d e n t i f y f i r s t the  g e n e r a l nature of u t t e r a n c e s , i n terms of the consensus r e g a r d i n g t h e i r t r u t h or f a l s i t y , 63  and then use t h i s  i n f o r m a t i o n to a s s i s t i n determining the meaning of the utterance. The second step, Davidson maintains, i s to a n a l y s e those sentences whose t r u t h or f a l s i t y depends on o b s e r v a b l e changes i n the environment utterance.  and the time, p l a c e , and c o n d i t i o n s of  A c c o r d i n g to Davidson,  the f i n a l step i s to  a n a l y s e those sentences on which t h e r e i s no g e n e r a l r e g a r d i n g t h e i r t r u t h or f a l s i t y . will  Presumably  consensus  these sentences  express b e l i e f s which are not o b s e r v a b l y or  demonstrably  true. In o r d e r to i d e n t i f y sentence types i n the p r e c e d i n g manner, t h e r e f o r e , we must assume that a l i n g u i s t i c  community  exists  i n which members use s y n t a c t i c a l l y s i m i l a r words to  convey  the same meaning.  F u r t h e r , we must assume that  usage i s r e l a t i v e l y constant over time.  this  I f t h i s usage i s not  c o n s t a n t over time then we cannot conclude that  particular  sentences are always h e l d t r u e by speakers u n l e s s we a l r e a d y have a theory which generates an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  f o r the  sentences i n q u e s t i o n .  cannot  In a s i m i l a r manner, we  determine whether t h e r e i s consensus  regarding a p a r t i c u l a r  b e l i e f or c l a i m , p r i o r to d e v e l o p i n g i n t e r p r e t i v e  theories, i f  speakers do not use a c o n v e n t i o n a l or shared means of e x p r e s s i n g such statements.  In the absence  of a shared means  of e x p r e s s i o n each i n d i v i d u a l speaker would, e f f e c t i v e l y , speak i n a d i f f e r e n t language.  Though the same t r u t h may  expressed i n each speaker's language we cannot determine 64  be which  u t t e r a n c e expresses the t r u t h i n q u e s t i o n u n t i l we have a theory of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n f o r each language b e i n g i n t e r p r e t e d . Clearly,  t h e r e w i l l be consensus amongst r a t i o n a l  r e g a r d i n g the t r u t h of l o g i c a l or a n a l y t i c t r u t h s .  speakers The  problem w i l l a r i s e i n i d e n t i f y i n g which sentences express these  truths. Unless we can f i r s t  the  i d e n t i f y the sentences which  l o g i c a l t r u t h s of the language i n q u e s t i o n we  a n a l y s e and impose our f i r s t Consequently,  express  cannot  order l o g i c on a language.  i n order f o r t h i s f i r s t  step, as d e s c r i b e d by  Davidson i n " R a d i c a l I n t e r p r e t a t i o n " ,  to be v i a b l e i t would  seem t h a t speakers must share a common language that i s r e l a t i v e l y constant over time. If  the meaning that speakers i n t e n d t h e i r words to have  i s c o n s t a n t over time then, presumably, to  l e a r n how  utterance.  i t would be p o s s i b l e  to i n t e r p r e t a speaker p r i o r to the o c c a s i o n of However, as noted above, i n "A N i c e Derangement of  E p i t a p h s " Davidson r e p e a t e d l y s t a t e s that what i s r e q u i r e d f o r communication utterance.  We  cannot be l e a r n e d p r i o r to the o c c a s i o n of cannot assume that the meaning t h a t  speakers  i n t e n d to convey w i t h p a r t i c u l a r words w i l l remain c o n s t a n t over time because,  a c c o r d i n g to Davidson, speakers and h e a r e r s  t a i l o r t h e i r t h e o r i e s of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n to p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l s and o c c a s i o n s of u t t e r a n c e .  Consistent with t h i s  we a l s o cannot assume that t h e o r i e s of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , a c c o r d i n g to which speakers and hearers speak and 65  interpret,  r e s p e c t i v e l y , w i l l be shared.  Because these t h e o r i e s are  geared to s p e c i f i c i n d i v i d u a l s and s p e c i f i c o c c a s i o n s of u t t e r a n c e i t i s improbable,  Davidson maintains, t h a t  such  t h e o r i e s w i l l be shared. We  have a l r e a d y e s t a b l i s h e d that the manner i n which  Davidson d e s c r i b e s the f i r s t  step of r a d i c a l  interpretation  assumes that language use w i l l be both shared and constant over time.  relatively  However, from the p i c t u r e of  communication p r e s e n t e d i n "A Nice Derangement of E p i t a p h s " i t would appear  that t h e o r i e s of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n w i l l n e i t h e r be  w i d e l y shared nor constant over time. There are two ways i n which we may  attempt  to r e c o n c i l e  these apparent d i s c r e p a n c i e s between " R a d i c a l  Interpretation"  and  first  "A N i c e Derangement of E p i t a p h s " .  We may  attempt  to  r e c o n c i l e the two by a d d r e s s i n g the q u e s t i o n whether i t i s , i n f a c t , n e c e s s a r y to assume that meaning i s shared and c o n s t a n t over time i n order f o r the f i r s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n to be v i a b l e .  step of r a d i c a l  I f the answer to the p r e c e d i n g  q u e s t i o n i s yes, then t h i s f i r s t  step can be v i a b l e under the  p i c t u r e p r e s e n t e d i n "A Nice Derangement of E p i t a p h s " o n l y i f we may  can show that meaning, under t h i s p i c t u r e of  communication,  be shared and constant over time. With r e s p e c t to the f i r s t q u e s t i o n we must c o n s i d e r  whether i t i s p o s s i b l e to determine what c l a s s of sentences express l o g i c a l or a n a l y t i c a l t r u t h s simply by a n a l y s i n g one speaker over time.  I f the speaker's language use i s constant 66  over time then we can determine what sentences the always h o l d s t r u e .  speaker  But, without an a l r e a d y w e l l - d e v e l o p e d  t h e o r y of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , we would be unable to d i s t i n g u i s h between sentences which express l o g i c a l or a n a l y t i c t r u t h s those which express f i r m l y h e l d b e l i e f s or o p i n i o n s .  and  I f we  c o n s i d e r a speaker whose language use i s n e i t h e r w i d e l y shared nor constant over time then i d e n t i f y i n g those sentences which express l o g i c a l t r u t h s appears If for  these assumptions  making the f i r s t  to be even more d i f f i c u l t .  r e g a r d i n g language use are n e c e s s a r y  step v i a b l e then i n order to r e c o n c i l e  t h i s w i t h the p i c t u r e of communication p r e s e n t e d i n "A N i c e Derangement of E p i t a p h s " we must prove that i t i s p o s s i b l e f o r language picture.  to be both shared and r e l a t i v e l y constant under t h i s Though Davidson argues that convention i s not  n e c e s s a r y f o r communication he does not take i s s u e w i t h the c l a i m t h a t we convention.  f r e q u e n t l y communicate i n accordance w i t h To the extent that we do communicate i n  accordance w i t h convention, language use w i l l be shared w i t h o t h e r c o n v e n t i o n a l speakers. As a r e s u l t ,  i t i s an e m p i r i c a l r a t h e r than a t h e o r e t i c a l  q u e s t i o n r e g a r d i n g whether t h i s f i r s t  step can be v i a b l e under  the p i c t u r e of communication p r e s e n t e d i n "A N i c e Derangement of  Epitaphs".  Because Davidson's  objective i n this  latter  paper i s to prove that convention i s unnecessary f o r communication he emphasizes those cases i n which i t i s not. The q u e s t i o n remains,  then, i f these cases are as u b i q u i t o u s 67  as Davidson  suggests can we, i n f a c t , develop a theory of  t r u t h f o r a language along the model t h a t he o u t l i n e s i n "Radical Interpretation"? As noted above, Davidson  has claimed t h a t u s u a l l y p r i o r  t h e o r i e s w i l l not be shared because they a r e t a i l o r e d t o p a r t i c u l a r speakers and h e a r e r s .  The p r i o r theory t h a t I have  f o r Mrs. Malaprop, f o r example, may i n c l u d e some words which are d e f i n e d i n an unconventional manner. Mrs.  And, i f I i n t e r p r e t  Malaprop c o r r e c t l y , my p a s s i n g theory must i n c l u d e words  which a r e a t t r i b u t e d unconventional meanings.  In t h i s manner,  both my p r i o r and my p a s s i n g theory f o r Mrs. Malaprop may be somewhat d i f f e r e n t from t h e o r i e s t h a t I adopt other occasions.  f o r speakers on  S i m i l a r l y , another speaker's p r i o r  f o r Mrs. Malaprop may be d i f f e r e n t from my own. s a f e t o assume, I would argue,  theory  I t i s also  t h a t many of the phrases o r  words i n both my p r i o r and p a s s i n g t h e o r i e s ' w i l l be shared w i t h other speakers and i n t e r p r e t e r s .  When speaking w i t h Mrs.  Malaprop I may a s c r i b e an unconventional meaning to the words "derangement" and "epitaph" but much of my p r i o r theory and p a s s i n g theory may c o n s i s t of words which a r e a s c r i b e d c o n v e n t i o n a l meanings.  In t h i s manner, much of my p r i o r and  p a s s i n g t h e o r i e s may be shared w i t h other Davidson,  of course,  speakers.  i s attempting to c h a l l e n g e the  c o n v e n t i o n a l p i c t u r e of communication so, i n keeping w i t h agenda, he emphasizes the p o t e n t i a l d i f f e r e n c e s between speakers.  However, a l l t h a t i s r e q u i r e d to prove t h a t 68  this  c o n v e n t i o n i s unnecessary f o r communication i s one which a speaker i s understood d e s p i t e r e l y on c o n v e n t i o n a l  usage.  instance  the f a c t that she  As a r e s u l t , Davidson can  in  didn't prove  that convention i s unnecessary f o r communication without presenting  a p i c t u r e of communication i n which language i s so  dynamic and  i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c that i t threatens the v i a b i l i t y  the p r o c e s s f o r d e v e l o p i n g a theory of t r u t h which he in  "Radical The  outlines  Interpretation".  apparent d i f f e r e n c e s between the manner i n which  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s described  i n "Radical  N i c e Derangement of Epitaphs" however. the  of  I n t e r p r e t a t i o n " and  have f u r t h e r  implications  These d i f f e r e n c e s are s i g n i f i c a n t w i t h r e s p e c t  i s s u e of r e c o g n i z i n g  and  s i g n i f i c a n t l y , with respect constraint described  to the v i a b i l i t y of the  Davidson s t a t e s i n "Radical  holistic  I n t e r p r e t a t i o n " t h a t we  developed theory of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .  can  have a f a i r l y w e l l -  Presumably t h i s i s  can determine e r r o r only r e l a t i v e to a background  or h i s t o r y of usage. described  more  Interpretation".  a s c r i b e e r r o r to a speaker only once we  because we  to  a s c r i b i n g speaker e r r o r and,  i n "Radical  "A  Consider, f o r example, the  i n chapter one  scenario  i n which a speaker s t a t e s ,  "It i s  r a i n i n g " when water from a s p r i n k l e r h i t s a nearby window. U n t i l we  can be c o n f i d e n t  conditions  that we  know the a p p r o p r i a t e  f o r a speaker's u t t e r a n c e  a speaker i s making an e r r o r .  we  cannot be  I t i s only when we  truth  c e r t a i n when are c e r t a i n  t h a t a speaker does not want h i s term " r a i n " to apply to water 69  from s p r i n k l e r s that we can a s c r i b e e r r o r when he does so. However, i n order f o r the h i s t o r i c a l use of a term t o be r e l e v a n t t o whether a speaker i s u s i n g the term c o r r e c t l y we must f i r s t determine that the speaker i n t e n d s t o use h e r words e i t h e r i n a c o n v e n t i o n a l manner or i n a manner c o n s i s t e n t w i t h her  h i s t o r y of use.  I t appears, t h e r e f o r e , that i n " R a d i c a l  I n t e r p r e t a t i o n " Davidson maintains that we cannot  ascribe  e r r o r to a speaker u n l e s s we know the h i s t o r y of the speaker's use of a p a r t i c u l a r term and we a l s o know that the speaker i s i n t e n d i n g to use t h i s term i n a manner c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h i s history.  However, i n "A Nice Derangement of E p i t a p h s "  Davidson maintains that we cannot assume that speakers a r e speaking i n accordance e i t h e r w i t h convention or t h e i r h i s t o r y of usage.  own  T h i s l a t t e r p o i n t i s made when Davidson  s t a t e s that we cannot i n f e r from a p a s t o c c a s i o n of u t t e r a n c e t h a t a speaker w i l l use the same theory of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t o guide her c u r r e n t u t t e r a n c e s . difficult,  As a r e s u l t ,  i t may  appear  i f not impossible, to a s c r i b e e r r o r under the  p i c t u r e p r e s e n t e d i n "A Nice Derangement of E p i t a p h s " . Although e r r o r may,  of course, occur, i t i s r e c o g n i z i n g  and d e t e r m i n i n g the exact nature of the e r r o r that seems problematic.  I t i s c l e a r from h i s d e f i n i t i o n of f i r s t meaning  t h a t , a c c o r d i n g to Davidson, speakers must speak w i t h the i n t e n t i o n of b e i n g understood.  T h i s was apparent i n the  Humpty Dumpty example i n which Humpty's words d i d not mean what he s a i d they meant because he had not p r o v i d e d the 70  .  a p p r o p r i a t e c l u e s to t h i s unconventional meaning. Davidson  argues,  are supposed to f a c i l i t a t e  Speakers,  understanding by-  p r o v i d i n g c l u e s to the intended meaning of words which are used  i n an unconventional manner or i n a manner i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h t h e i r p a s t usage.  I t i s p o s s i b l e , i n the p r e c e d i n g  example, then, t h a t a speaker who  u t t e r s the phrase,  "It i s  r a i n i n g " when water from a s p r i n k l e r h i t s the window i n t e n d s to use the term  " r a i n " i n an unconventional manner.  t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y there are two may  commit.  The  speaker may  types of e r r o r t h a t the  have e r r e d by f a i l i n g  the a p p r o p r i a t e c l u e s to t h i s unconventional or,  alternatively,  Given  the speaker may  speaker  to p r o v i d e  interpretation  have intended to use h i s  words i n a c o n v e n t i o n a l manner but he has simply made an empirical  error.  Thus g i v e n the p i c t u r e of communication d e s c r i b e d i n "A N i c e Derangement of E p i t a p h s " a s c r i b i n g e r r o r may, circumstances, be i m p o s s i b l e .  I f the speaker  in certain  i n t e n d s to use a  term i n an unconventional manner but, a t the same time, makes an e m p i r i c a l e r r o r then i t may  be i m p o s s i b l e to c o n s t r u c t a  convergent  hence, to a s c r i b e e r r o r .  p a s s i n g theory and,  This  would be comparable to a s i t u a t i o n i n which we do not have a w e l l - d e v e l o p e d theory of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n f o r a speaker  and  so  *  cannot  a t t r i b u t e e r r o r because we  cannot determine  of  a speaker's words.  I t i s apparent,  of  usage i s s i g n i f i c a n t w i t h r e s p e c t to our a b i l i t y  r e c o g n i z e or a s c r i b e e r r o r to a 71  the meaning  therefore, that h i s t o r y  speaker.  to  However, the need f o r the speaker t o p r o v i d e c l u e s t o her i n t e n d e d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n may  a l s o enable an i n t e r p r e t e r t o  r e c o g n i z e an e r r o r on the p a r t of the speaker.  I t may  be  p o s s i b l e , then, t o determine the meaning of a s p e a k e r ' s term and r e c o g n i z e an e r r o r i n the use of the same term i n the course  of a g i v e n u t t e r a n c e .  For example, c o n s i d e r  the  s c e n a r i o i n w h i c h Humpty Dumpty p r o v i d e d c l u e s t o the meaning of the u t t e r a n c e hearer  "There's g l o r y f o r you"  intended  so t h a t the  s u c c e s s f u l l y i n t e r p r e t s him as meaning t h e r e ' s a n i c e  knockdown argument.  Assume t h a t Humpty then uses t h i s p h r a s e ,  "There's g l o r y f o r you", fact, fallacious.  t o r e f e r t o an argument w h i c h i s , i n  Because Humpty Dumpty has p r o v i d e d  a p p r o p r i a t e c l u e s t o h i s i n t e n d e d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n the  the hearer  knows t h a t Humpty's u t t e r a n c e means t h e r e ' s a n i c e knockdown argument.  Assuming t h a t the h e a r e r a l s o knows t h a t the  argument t o w h i c h Humpty r e f e r s i s f a l l a c i o u s , the h e a r e r i s a b l e t o a s c r i b e e r r o r i n the a p p r o p r i a t e manner.  Though  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n over a c o n s i d e r a b l e p e r i o d of time and a w e l l d e v e l o p e d t h e o r y of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n may  make i t e a s i e r t o  a s c r i b e e r r o r to a speaker they are not, s t r i c t l y  speaking,  necessary. Davidson's emphasis i n "A N i c e Derangement of  Epitaphs"  on i n t e r p r e t a t i o n d u r i n g the course of an u t t e r a n c e ,  rather  t h a n over an extended p e r i o d of time, a l s o appears t o be p r o b l e m a t i c w i t h r e s p e c t to the v i a b i l i t y  of the  holistic  c o n s t r a i n t t h a t he i n t r o d u c e s i n " R a d i c a l I n t e r p r e t a t i o n " . 72  We  e s t a b l i s h e d i n chapter one t h a t there i s no guarantee t h a t i n d i v i d u a l T-sentences w i l l y i e l d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of g i v e n sentences.  Davidson maintains, however, t h a t i f T-sentences  are c o n s t r a i n e d i n a h o l i s t i c manner they w i l l interpretations.  yield  The h o l i s t i c c o n s t r a i n t r e q u i r e s t h a t the  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of words that comprise a g i v e n u t t e r a n c e must "fit"  i n an optimal manner w i t h the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of these  words i n other u t t e r a n c e s .  In a d d i t i o n , optimal f i t must a l s o  be s e n s i t i v e t o the l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n s between words. Davidson proposes,  then,  that i f we impose a h o l i s t i c  c o n s t r a i n t on the T-sentences the meaning t h a t we a s c r i b e t o p a r t i c u l a r u t t e r a n c e s w i l l be c o n s t r a i n e d by the r e l a t i o n between the u t t e r a n c e i n q u e s t i o n and other u t t e r a n c e s . example, i f we i n t e r p r e t the u t t e r a n c e s  For  "Snow i s c o l d " and " I t  snows i n w i n t e r " h o l i s t i c a l l y then the meanings t h a t we a s c r i b e to " c o l d " ,  "winter", and "snow" must be r e l a t e d i n the  a p p r o p r i a t e manner. effective,  In order f o r t h i s c o n s t r a i n t to be  consequently,  the words which appear i n u t t e r a n c e s  which are b e i n g i n t e r p r e t e d must a l s o appear i n other u t t e r a n c e s i n a g i v e n s e t of i n t e r p r e t e d sentences. T h i s appears to be unproblematic  w i t h r e s p e c t to the  e x p l a n a t i o n of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n g i v e n i n " R a d i c a l Interpretation".  Because a theory of t r u t h f o r a g i v e n  language i s developed  over time,  there w i l l presumably be a  c o n s i d e r a b l e amount of evidence w i t h which to i n t e r p r e t a language.  I f we assume, however, that the evidence  i s what i s  a v a i l a b l e o n l y on an i s o l a t e d o c c a s i o n of u t t e r a n c e then t h e r e i s no assurance that a f i t between t h i s evidence and the g i v e n T-sentences w i l l serve to c o n s t r a i n the meaning t h a t a s c r i b e to words i n a g i v e n u t t e r a n c e .  Consider, f o r example,  the evidence that supports an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the u t t e r a n c e "Snow i s c o l d " . speaker's language  we  I f we do not i n t e r p r e t  isolated  the  over time then the a c t u a l evidence which we  c o n s i d e r when a s c r i b i n g a meaning to t h i s u t t e r a n c e w i l l  be  l i m i t e d to what i s a v a i l a b l e d u r i n g the o c c a s i o n of u t t e r a n c e . Only i f a theory of meaning or i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s developed over a s u b s t a n t i a l p e r i o d of time w i l l t h e r e be a s i g n i f i c a n t body of a c t u a l evidence and a l a r g e number of T-sentences. Presumably,  the g r e a t e r the p o o l of evidence the more  likely  t h a t the f i t between a v a i l a b l e evidence and T-sentences  will  serve as a c o n s t r a i n t on the meaning that i s a s c r i b e d to p a r t i c u l a r words or u t t e r a n c e s . As a r e s u l t ,  i t i s not apparent how  the h o l i s t i c  c o n s t r a i n t can be e f f e c t i v e under the p i c t u r e of communication p r e s e n t e d i n "A N i c e Derangement of E p i t a p h s " .  I f the words  t h a t we use to convey p a r t i c u l a r meanings change depending who  on  we are speaking w i t h and when we are speaking, i t i s not  c l e a r t h a t t h e r e would n e c e s s a r i l y be any b e n e f i t to i n t e r p r e t a t i o n over time.  I f language does not  remain  r e l a t i v e l y constant over time then the o n l y b e n e f i t that  can  be d e r i v e d from i n t e r p r e t i n g a speaker over time i s the b e n e f i t of b e i n g i n a p o s i t i o n to observe any c l u e s r e g a r d i n g 74  the d i r e c t i o n and manner i n which the language i s changing. Though a hearer may evidence will,  have o n l y a l i m i t e d p o o l of a c t u a l  r e g a r d i n g the meaning of a speaker's  words there  presumably, be s i g n i f i c a n t p o t e n t i a l evidence  g i v e n time.  For example, a speaker may  at  any  u t t e r the sentence  "snow i s c o l d " under a p a r t i c u l a r s e t of c o n d i t i o n s on a g i v e n occasion.  Though the only a c t u a l evidence w i l l be  the  p a r t i c u l a r c o n d i t i o n s which prompted the g i v e n u t t e r a n c e w i l l be s i g n i f i c a n t p o t e n t i a l evidence.  there  A v a r i e t y of  p o t e n t i a l s i t u a t i o n s i n which both the term "snow" and  "cold"  and r e l a t e d terms c o u l d be used would, f o r example, be p a r t of t h i s p o t e n t i a l evidence. actual,  evidence  If i t i s potential, rather  that i s to be considered,  than  then the a c t u a l  time over which i n t e r p r e t a t i o n occurs i s i r r e l e v a n t to the v i a b i l i t y of the h o l i s t i c for of  the h o l i s t i c  constraint.  T h i s would then  allow  c o n s t r a i n t to be e f f e c t i v e under the p i c t u r e  communication presented  i n "A Nice Derangement of  Epitaphs". Whether Davidson intends the h o l i s t i c c o n s t r a i n t to a p p l y to a c t u a l evidence  or to p o t e n t i a l evidence  The  i n which Davidson i n t r o d u c e s the  l a r g e r context  c o n s t r a i n t suggests  remains u n c e r t a i n . holistic  t h a t Davidson intends i t to be a p r a c t i c a l  d e v i c e t h a t i s to be used to analyse a c t u a l evidence.  At  the  o u t s e t of " R a d i c a l I n t e r p r e t a t i o n " Davidson s t a t e s t h a t he i s l o o k i n g f o r a p o s s i b l e e x p l a n a t i o n of what we would enable us to i n t e r p r e t other people's 75  c o u l d know t h a t  utterances.  C l e a r l y , a f i n i t e mind cannot determine the o p t i m a l f i t between an i n f i n i t e number of T-sentences and a l l p o t e n t i a l evidence.  Thus, i n order f o r the h o l i s t i c c o n s t r a i n t to be a  p r a c t i c a l t o o l i t would seem that the c o n s t r a i n t should to  a c t u a l evidence  apply  only.  At the end of " R a d i c a l I n t e r p r e t a t i o n " there a r e f u r t h e r suggestions  t h a t Davidson intends the h o l i s t i c c o n s t r a i n t to  be a p r a c t i c a l t o o l . addresses  In t h i s p o r t i o n of the essay Davidson  the q u e s t i o n whether T-sentences can, i n f a c t ,  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of g i v e n u t t e r a n c e s .  yield  Before d i s c u s s i n g h i s  own p r o p o s a l , however, he f i r s t r e j e c t s s e v e r a l suggestions of how T-sentences c o u l d be supplemented so t h a t they may y i e l d interpretations.  T h i s d i s c u s s i o n i s s i g n i f i c a n t because the  manner i n which Davidson r e j e c t s these p r o p o s a l s suggests  that  he i s l o o k i n g f o r a p r a c t i c a l t o o l t h a t w i l l a s s i s t i n interpretation.  Firstly,  Davidson r e j e c t s the s u g g e s t i o n t h a t  T-sentences w i l l y i e l d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s i f we p r o v i d e a c a n o n i c a l proof of the T-sentences. a c c o r d i n g t o Davidson,  This suggestion  fails,  not because we can't p r o v i d e such a  proof but because i t would not r e v e a l anything more about meaning.  As he s t a t e s ,  " i n f a c t we would know no more than  b e f o r e about how to i n t e r p r e t " ( " R a d i c a l " 325-6).  Secondly,  Davidson r e j e c t s the suggestion t h a t we can i n t e r p r e t a sentence  p r o v i d e d we know a c o r r e c t theory of t r u t h t h a t d e a l s  w i t h the language of the sentence. for  He r e j e c t s t h i s p r o p o s a l  the same reason as the p r e v i o u s suggestion. 76  This  knowledge, Davidson m a i n t a i n s , won't be of any  assistance  r e s p e c t t o our a b i l i t y to i n t e r p r e t s e n t e n c e s .  Thus  the  manner i n w h i c h Davidson r e j e c t s t h e s e p r o p o s a l s s u g g e s t s he  i s looking  f o r something w h i c h we  can use  with  that  as a p r a c t i c a l  t o o l to a s s i s t i n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . I f we more n a r r o w l y c o n s t r u e the c o n t e x t s u r r o u n d i n g Davidson's i n t r o d u c t i o n of the h o l i s t i c c o n s t r a i n t , i t appears t h a t he a p r a c t i c a l device. constraint,  i n t e n d s i t to be a t h e o r e t i c a l r a t h e r In o r d e r to f u l f i l the  Davidson s t a t e s , the  sentences... should optimally t r u e by n a t i v e  however, than  holistic  " t o t a l i t y of  T-  f i t e v i d e n c e about s e n t e n c e s  speakers"("Radical"  326).  held  What remains  ambiguous i s whether " t o t a l i t y " r e f e r s to the a c t u a l  T-  s e n t e n c e s w h i c h are b e i n g i n t e r p r e t e d or the p o t e n t i a l  T-  s e n t e n c e s and,  actual  s i m i l a r l y , whether "evidence" r e f e r s t o  or p o t e n t i a l e v i d e n c e .  Because the t o t a l p o t e n t i a l number of  T-sentences f o r a g i v e n language i s i n f i n i t e we  could  a s s e s s a f i t between the t o t a l i t y of T-sentences, so  not defined,  and p o t e n t i a l e v i d e n c e . S h o r t l y a f t e r d e f i n i n g the h o l i s t i c c o n s t r a i n t n o t e s the s i m i l a r i t y between h i s h o l i s m and the s i m i l a r i t y between the two  Davidson  Tarski's.  Though  are c l e a r , T a r s k i , i n  contrast  t o D a v i d s o n , i s unambiguous w i t h r e s p e c t to the e x a c t n a t u r e of h i s h o l i s m .  T a r s k i attempts to use  to y i e l d a d e f i n i t i o n of t r u t h . can  a holistic  I f the h o l i s t i c  constraint constraint  e l i c i t a l l p o t e n t i a l sentences to w h i c h the p r e d i c a t e 77  "is  t r u e " w i l l a p p l y then T a r s k i w i l l , e f f e c t i v e l y , have a d e f i n i t i o n of t r u t h .  But, i n o r d e r t o y i e l d a d e f i n i t i o n of  t r u t h i n t h i s manner T a r s k i ' s h o l i s m must a p p l y t o a l l p o t e n t i a l T-sentences f o r a g i v e n language.  This i s  s i g n i f i c a n t because Davidson notes the s i m i l a r i t y between h i s h o l i s t i c c o n s t r a i n t and T a r s k i ' s but does not draw any d i s t i n c t i o n between the two.  Because i t i s c l e a r l y  necessary  that T a r s k i ' s h o l i s t i c c o n s t r a i n t apply to a l l p o t e n t i a l sentences  i t may  be c o n c l u d e d t h a t Davidson  T-  intends h i s holism  to a p p l y t o p o t e n t i a l u t t e r a n c e s as w e l l . G i v e n t h i s a m b i g u i t y i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o determine Davidson  what  intends h i s h o l i s t i c c o n s t r a i n t to apply to.  i s i n t e r p r e t e d as a t h e o r e t i c a l d e v i c e then the  If i t  holistic  c o n s t r a i n t i s v i a b l e under the p i c t u r e of communication p r e s e n t e d i n "A N i c e Derangement of E p i t a p h s " . c o n s t r a i n t , then, w i l l be something  which,  The  holistic  i n a sense,  c o n s t r a i n s what the a p p r o p r i a t e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s . There w i l l be a f a c t of the m a t t e r r e g a r d i n g how w e l l the p o t e n t i a l e v i d e n c e f i t s w i t h the t o t a l i t y of T-sentences,  but we  cannot  be aware of a l l p o t e n t i a l e v i d e n c e and, c o n s e q u e n t l y , we a s s e s s t h e o p t i m a l f i t between p o t e n t i a l e v i d e n c e and  can't  T-  sentences. A l t e r n a t i v e l y , i f the h o l i s t i c c o n s t r a i n t i s i n t e n d e d t o be a p r a c t i c a l d e v i c e then what deems an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t o be a p p r o p r i a t e w i l l be the f i t between a c t u a l e v i d e n c e and sentences.  I t may  be argued, however, t h a t the 78  holistic  T-  constraint  can be b o t h a p r a c t i c a l and t h e o r e t i c a l d e v i c e .  We  may i n t e r p r e t u t t e r a n c e s based on t h e manner i n w h i c h p a r t i c u l a r a s c r i b e d meanings r e l a t e t o o t h e r u t t e r a n c e s and, i n t h i s sense, our i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s w i l l be c o n s t r a i n e d h o l i s t i c approach.  I n t h e same manner, whether a T-sentence  i n f a c t y i e l d s an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f a g i v e n u t t e r a n c e depend on whether t h e T-sentence o p t i m a l l y a c t u a l and p o t e n t i a l e v i d e n c e . not  will  f i t s with a l l  The two i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s a r e  i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h one another.  h o l i s t i c constraint  by t h i s  T h i s would a l l o w t h e  t o be v i a b l e under t h e p i c t u r e o f  communication p r e s e n t e d i n "A N i c e Derangement o f E p i t a p h s " though t h e e x t e n t t o w h i c h i t may be used as a p r a c t i c a l g u i d e would be l i m i t e d .  In order to present a consistent  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n Davidson s h o u l d , I b e l i e v e ,  p i c t u r e of  characterize  the  h o l i s t i c constraint  i n t h i s manner.  I f he d e f i n e s t h e  h o l i s t i c constraint  i n terms of t h e o p t i m a l f i t between a c t u a l  e v i d e n c e and T-sentences then we must f u r t h e r  characterize  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n a manner t h a t ensures t h a t s u f f i c i e n t a c t u a l e v i d e n c e w i l l be a v a i l a b l e .  Thus t h e c o n s t r a i n t would be  v i a b l e o n l y i n c o n t e x t s i n which t h e r e i s a s i g n i f i c a n t amount of a c c u m u l a t e d e v i d e n c e , l i k e t h e p i c t u r e o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n presented i n "Radical  I n t e r p r e t a t i o n " , b u t i t would n o t be  v i a b l e under t h e p i c t u r e p r e s e n t e d i n "A N i c e Derangement o f Epitaphs". Though Davidson's agenda i n " R a d i c a l  Interpretation" i s  t o e x p l a i n what we c o u l d know t h a t would e n a b l e us t o 79  understand a speaker's utterances, it  i s not  necessary that we  t h e o r y of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . maintains, i s that we appropriate  theory.  he r e p e a t e d l y  have e x p l i c i t  What i s necessary, Davidson  i n t e r p r e t i n accordance w i t h The  of g i v e n u t t e r a n c e s and,  holistic  constraint,  between a c t u a l evidence and  describe  an  Davidson interpretations  hence, that h i s theory w i l l  for interpretation.  T-sentences w i l l ,  that  knowledge of a  maintains, w i l l ensure that T-sentences y i e l d  sufficient  states  be  However, an optimal f i t  T-sentences w i l l not  ensure  i n fact, y i e l d interpretations.  We  that  must  the p o o l of evidence i n a manner that ensures t h a t i t  w i l l be  s u f f i c i e n t l y l a r g e to c o n s t r a i n the  ascribe  to u t t e r a n c e s .  more l i k e l y that the the a p p r o p r i a t e  greater  And,  the  interpretation in  interpretation.  the h o l i s t i c  f i t between p o t e n t i a l evidence and the h o l i s t i c  the  we  u l t i m a t e l y , what Davidson seeks  explain  to d e s c r i b e  theoretically,  the p o o l of evidence  f i t w i l l constrain  manner.  i s a theory which can appropriate  The  interpretations  Thus i t i s  c o n s t r a i n t as the  a l l T-sentences.  optimal  Though,  c o n s t r a i n t w i l l be v i a b l e under  the p i c t u r e of communication i n "A Nice Derangement of E p i t a p h s " i t i s apparent that we  w i l l be more l i k e l y  i n t e r p r e t i n accordance w i t h the h o l i s t i c model p r e s e n t e d i n "Radical  c o n s t r a i n t under  the  Interpretation".  Thus the apparent d i s c r e p a n c i e s  between the  over which i n t e r p r e t a t i o n occurs i n "Radical and  to  "A N i c e Derangement of E p i t a p h s " do not 80  time  period  Interpretation" result in  any  substantive  d i f f e r e n c e s between the p i c t u r e s of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  p r e s e n t e d i n these essays. model of how  to develop a theory of t r u t h to be v i a b l e under  the p i c t u r e d e s c r i b e d Similarly,  I t i s p o s s i b l e f o r Davidson's  i n "A Nice Derangement of  though i t may  Epitaphs".  be b e n e f i c i a l to have a w e l l -  developed theory of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n order to a s c r i b e to a speaker i t i s not, Further,  s t r i c t l y speaking, necessary.  the h o l i s t i c c o n s t r a i n t d e s c r i b e d  I n t e r p r e t a t i o n " may  in  "Radical  be v i a b l e under the p i c t u r e of  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n p r e s e n t e d i n "A Nice Derangement of if  i t i s i n t e r p r e t e d as a p p l y i n g  actual,  evidence.  error  Therefore,  Epitaphs"  to p o t e n t i a l , as w e l l  there  as  i s nothing discussed  thus  f a r t h a t suggests that the p i c t u r e s of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n p r e s e n t e d i n "Radical of E p i t a p h s "  I n t e r p r e t a t i o n " and  are not p a r t of a c o n s i s t e n t ,  81  "A N i c e Derangement coherent view.  CHAPTER 4: REAL INCONSISTENCIES • The  issues discussed  apparent i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s time p e r i o d  need not time.  of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  the degree to which these t h e o r i e s  More s u b s t a n t i v e discuss  i n Davidson's p o s i t i o n r e g a r d i n g  over which t h e o r i e s  developed and  we  i n chapter three r e s u l t e d from  differences  are are  shared.  i n h i s p o s i t i o n become c l e a r  what motivates Davidson's c l a i m that  the  as  interpretation  and perhaps cannot occur over a s u b s t a n t i a l p e r i o d  of  Because he maintains i n "A N i c e Derangement of  E p i t a p h s " that speakers t a i l o r interpreters, benefit  i t i s not  t h e i r speech to p a r t i c u l a r  obvious that there would be a c l e a r  to i n t e r p r e t i n g a speaker over an extended p e r i o d  of  time.  A c c o r d i n g to Davidson, i t i s necessary f o r speakers to  tailor  t h e i r speech to p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r p r e t e r s because  i n t e r p r e t e r s p l a y an a c t i v e r o l e i n c r e a t i n g the meaning of a speaker's words.  The  i n t e r p r e t e r as c h a r a c t e r i z e d  i n "A N i c e  Derangement of Epitaphs" i s a c t i v e i n c r e a t i n g - t h e  meaning of  a speaker's words i n a way  i n which the  "Radical  This,  Interpretation".  c l e a r and  and  f i r s t characterize  "Radical  "A N i c e Derangement of E p i t a p h s " . the r e s p e c t i v e  r o l e s of the  then argue that these conceptions of the  "Radical  Interpretation" 82  Davidson  I will  interpreter  and  interpreter's  r o l e are d i s t i n c t and i r r e c o n c i l a b l e . In  in  I would argue, i s both a  an i r r e c o n c i l a b l e d i f f e r e n c e between  Interpretation"  I will  i n t e r p r e t e r i s not  characterizes  meaning as something t h a t i s d i s c o v e r e d by the i n t e r p r e t e r . T h i s i s apparent i n h i s d e s c r i p t i o n of the proposed t h r e e s t e p p r o c e s s f o r d e v e l o p i n g a t h e o r y of t r u t h f o r a  language.  D a v i d s o n m a i n t a i n s t h a t , i n o r d e r t o d e v e l o p a t h e o r y of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , we s h o u l d f i r s t c l a s s i f y and a n a l y s e s e n t e n c e s a c c o r d i n g t o the degree of consensus  amongst s p e a k e r s  r e g a r d i n g e i t h e r t h e i r t r u t h or f a l s i t y .  He does not  suggest  t h a t we s h o u l d i n t e r p r e t the b e h a v i o u r of b o t h the speaker  and  the h e a r e r t o determine the meaning of a sentence, o r whether the s e n t e n c e , i n f a c t , has meaning.  R a t h e r , he seems t o  assume t h a t meaning i s p r e s e n t and t h a t i t w i l l be d i s c o v e r e d over t i m e . T h i s i s made f u r t h e r apparent when Davidson s u g g e s t s t h a t we can a l l o w f o r i n t e l l i g i b l e e r r o r o n l y once we have a f a i r l y w e l l - d e v e l o p e d t h e o r y of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .  Presumably,  error  w i l l be i n t e l l i g i b l e o n l y once we have a t h e o r y of interpretation.  Davidson does not suggest t h a t e r r o r i s Only  p r e s e n t once i t can be i d e n t i f i e d , but r a t h e r , he  suggests  t h a t we can o n l y i d e n t i f y e r r o r once we have d e v e l o p e d a theory of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .  Thus, a t no p o i n t i n " R a d i c a l  I n t e r p r e t a t i o n " does Davidson suggest t h a t meaning w i l l not be p r e s e n t u n l e s s s u c c e s s f u l communication  has o c c u r r e d .  The p i c t u r e p r e s e n t e d i n "A N i c e Derangement o f E p i t a p h s " is quite different.  As n o t e d above, i n " R a d i c a l  I n t e r p r e t a t i o n " Davidson addresses the q u e s t i o n what we c o u l d know t h a t would enable us t o i n t e r p r e t a speaker's u t t e r a n c e s . 83  In  "A N i c e Derangement of E p i t a p h s " Davidson a l s o q u e s t i o n s  what the a b i l i t y to i n t e r p r e t a speaker c o n s i s t s i n , but he f u r t h e r q u e s t i o n s what c o n s t i t u t e s the a b i l i t y t o speak t o another person.  Davidson  responds  to the l a t t e r  q u e s t i o n by  s t a t i n g that the a b i l i t y to communicate c o n s i s t s i n the a b i l i t y t o make o n e s e l f understood.  It i s fairly  uncontentious that communication w i l l succeed o n l y i f the speaker  i s i n t e r p r e t e d as he intended.  A c c o r d i n g to Davidson,  however, communication i s necessary not merely f o r understanding;  i t i s a l s o necessary f o r a speaker's words to  have meaning. L i n g u i s t i c or f i r s t meaning i s d e f i n e d by Davidson N i c e Derangement of Epitaphs" as the f i r s t  i n "A  i n a s e r i e s of  s e l f - r e f e r r i n g i n t e n t i o n s r e l a t e d to a g i v e n u t t e r a n c e . A c c o r d i n g to Davidson,  these i n t e n t i o n s a r e the i n t e n t i o n s to  be understood i n a p a r t i c u l a r manner. i n the sense that the speaker's  They a r e s e l f - r e f e r r i n g  i n t e n t i o n s w i l l be f u l f i l l e d  o n l y when the hearer r e c o g n i z e s these i n t e n t i o n s . to Davidson,  According  these i n t e n t i o n s not o n l y i d e n t i f y f i r s t meaning,  f i r s t meaning i s p r e s e n t o n l y when these i n t e n t i o n s a r e f u l f i l l e d and, hence, when a hearer has understood the speaker as the speaker  intended.  S u c c e s s f u l communication, Davidson  s t a t e s , occurs when  the speaker and hearer c o n s t r u c t convergent p a s s i n g t h e o r i e s . He f u r t h e r maintains that the a b i l i t y to speak t o another person r e q u i r e s the a b i l i t y to form a convergent p a s s i n g 84  theory.  T h e r e f o r e , convergence  of p a s s i n g t h e o r i e s i s  n e c e s s a r y b o t h f o r s u c c e s s f u l communication  and f o r the  s p e a k e r ' s u t t e r a n c e s t o be m e a n i n g f u l . L i n g u i s t i c a b i l i t y , Davidson m a i n t a i n s , i s the a b i l i t y t o converge on a p a s s i n g t h e o r y from u t t e r a n c e t o u t t e r a n c e .  In  the same manner i n which the a b i l i t y t o i n t e r p r e t depends on the a b i l i t y t o understand, the a b i l i t y t o speak depends on the a b i l i t y t o make o n e s e l f u n d e r s t o o d . linguistic  Thus Davidson r e d e f i n e s  a b i l i t y i n accordance w i t h h i s p i c t u r e of  communication. In the absence of u n d e r s t a n d i n g , t h e r e f o r e , the will,  speaker  i n essence, have f a i l e d t o speak and so h e r "words" w i l l  be n o t h i n g b u t sounds w i t h o u t meaning.  Thus i n o r d e r f o r  meaning t o be p r e s e n t , under the p i c t u r e of  communication  p r e s e n t e d i n "A N i c e Derangement of E p i t a p h s " , must be s u c c e s s f u l .  communication  By c o n t r a s t , i n " R a d i c a l I n t e r p r e t a t i o n "  Davidson suggests t h a t , through i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , meaning i s d i s c o v e r e d r a t h e r than c r e a t e d .  I t appears,  consequently,  t h a t i n " R a d i c a l I n t e r p r e t a t i o n " and "A N i c e Derangement of E p i t a p h s " Davidson i s p r e s e n t i n g two d i s t i n c t linguistic  conceptions of  meaning.  As n o t e d above, t h e r e a r e no r e f e r e n c e s made i n " R a d i c a l I n t e r p r e t a t i o n " t o the n e c e s s i t y f o r the h e a r e r t o u n d e r s t a n d a s p e a k e r ' s u t t e r a n c e s i n o r d e r f o r the speaker's u t t e r a n c e s to be m e a n i n g f u l .  Perhaps we c o u l d c o n c e i v e of the  i n t e r p r e t e r " as a t h i r d p a r t y who 85  "radical  observes the speaker but  who  i s n o t t h e h e a r e r t o whom t h e speaker's u t t e r a n c e s a r e directed.  There i s no reason g i v e n i n " R a d i c a l  I n t e r p r e t a t i o n " f o r assuming t h a t t h e i n t e r p r e t e r i s s p e a k i n g w i t h t h e speaker meaning.  f o r whom he i s d e v e l o p i n g a t h e o r y o f  But, presumably, t h e r e must be someone t o whom t h e  speaker d i r e c t s h e r U t t e r a n c e s .  I f we assume, then, t h a t t h e  i n t e r p r e t e r i s a t h i r d p a r t y i t would be t h e case t h a t t h e h e a r e r t o whom t h e speaker's  conversation i s d i r e c t e d i s  " a c t i v e " i n c r e a t i n g the meaning o f t h e speaker's words w h i l e the r a d i c a l i n t e r p r e t e r i s n o t . However, n o t o n l y i s t h i s e x p l a n a t i o n cumbersome, i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o defend t h e c l a i m t h a t t h i s p i c t u r e o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s what Davidson i n t e n d s t o convey i n " R a d i c a l Interpretation". meaningful  I f t h e speaker's u t t e r a n c e s a r e , i n f a c t ,  o n l y i f the h e a r e r t o whom t h e u t t e r a n c e i s  d i r e c t e d understands  t h e speaker as i n t e n d e d , then, i t would  appear t h a t t h e i n t e r p r e t e r can a s c r i b e meaning o n l y when she i s c e r t a i n t h a t communication has been s u c c e s s f u l . due  This i s  t o t h e f a c t t h a t , i n t h e absence o f s u c c e s s f u l  communication, meaning w i l l n o t be p r e s e n t .  I t may appear  t h a t i f t h e r a d i c a l i n t e r p r e t e r has u n d e r s t o o d  t h e speaker,  even i f t h e i n t e n d e d h e a r e r has not, then communication has been s u c c e s s f u l and t h e speaker's words w i l l be m e a n i n g f u l . However, D a v i d s o n has s t a t e d t h a t l i n g u i s t i c  ability,  s p e c i f i c a l l y t h e a b i l i t y t o speak, i s t h e a b i l i t y t o c o n s t r u c t a convergent  passing theory.  A speaker's p a s s i n g t h e o r y , he 86  m a i n t a i n s , i s s p e c i f i c b o t h t o a p a r t i c u l a r h e a r e r and  an  o c c a s i o n of u t t e r a n c e and, as a r e s u l t , i f a speaker i s not u n d e r s t o o d by the i n t e n d e d h e a r e r then, a c c o r d i n g t o Davidson, h e r words cannot be m e a n i n g f u l . Thus i f we assume t h a t the r a d i c a l i n t e r p r e t e r i s a t h i r d p a r t y o b s e r v i n g the speaker i n v a r i o u s speech o c c a s i o n s then the i n t e r p r e t e r must a n a l y s e not o n l y the speaker but the i n t e n d e d h e a r e r as w e l l .  T h i s i s n e c e s s a r y i n o r d e r f o r the  i n t e r p r e t e r t o a s s e s s whether the h e a r e r has u n d e r s t o o d  the  u t t e r a n c e as i n t e n d e d and, hence, whether the s p e a k e r ' s words are meaningful.  There i s no s u g g e s t i o n made, i n " R a d i c a l  Interpretation",  t h a t the i n t e r p r e t e r s h o u l d i n t e r p r e t not  o n l y the speaker but the h e a r e r as w e l l .  T h e r e f o r e , i t i s not  the case t h a t the " c r e a t i v e " r o l e of the i n t e r p r e t e r w h i c h i s e x p l i c i t l y d e s c r i b e d i n "A N i c e Derangement of E p i t a p h s " i s merely i m p l i c i t i n "Radical I n t e r p r e t a t i o n " . As n o t e d above, i n " R a d i c a l I n t e r p r e t a t i o n "  Davidson  d e s c r i b e s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n a manner which suggests t h a t the i n t e r p r e t e r d i s c o v e r s , r a t h e r than c r e a t e s , the meaning of a speaker's u t t e r a n c e s .  I n c o n t r a s t , i n "A N i c e Derangement of  E p i t a p h s " , Davidson suggests t h a t the speaker and t o g e t h e r , c r e a t e meaning.  It is difficult,  interpret "Radical Interpretation"  interpreter,  I have argued,  i n a manner w h i c h i s  c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h i s p i c t u r e of the i n t e r p r e t e r ' s r o l e . However, the a c t i v e r o l e which the i n t e r p r e t e r p l a y s i n "A N i c e Derangement of E p i t a p h s " , i s p r o b l e m a t i c f o r s e v e r a l 87  to  reasons.  I t would be a mistake,  as a r e s u l t ,  to r e v i s e  " R a d i c a l I n t e r p r e t a t i o n " to accommodate t h i s c o n c e p t i o n o f the interpreter's  role.  We have a l r e a d y e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t meaning, under the t h e o r y o f communication presented i n "A Nice Derangement o f E p i t a p h s " , w i l l be present o n l y when the intended h e a r e r understands  the speaker's u t t e r a n c e s .  This presents a  c o m p l i c a t e d p i c t u r e i n which people who overhear a c o n v e r s a t i o n may understand  the speaker as intended w h i l e the  h e a r e r t o whom the u t t e r a n c e was d i r e c t e d may not and,.thus, the u t t e r a n c e won't be meaningful.  This raises a further  c o m p l i c a t i o n r e g a r d i n g the i s s u e o f e r r o r . C o n s i d e r A r c h i e Bunker's u t t e r a n c e "We need a few laughs to break up the monogamy".  I f we assume t h a t the h e a r e r t o  whom the u t t e r a n c e i s d i r e c t e d a s c r i b e s the c o n v e n t i o n a l meaning t o the word "monogamy" then i t would seem t h a t the h e a r e r has f a i l e d t o understand  the u t t e r a n c e c o r r e c t l y .  A c c o r d i n g t o the p i c t u r e of communication i n "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs", however, the hearer cannot be wrong r e g a r d i n g the meaning of A r c h i e ' s words because, i n the absence o f understanding,  A r c h i e ' s words a r e meaningless.  An i n t e r p r e t e r can be wrong i n the sense t h a t he a s c r i b e s meaning o r content t o a speaker's u t t e r a n c e i s not meaningful.  u t t e r a n c e when, i n f a c t , the  But he cannot be i n e r r o r i n the  sense o f a s c r i b i n g the wrong o r i n c o r r e c t content t o a speaker's  u t t e r a n c e s because t h i s assumes t h a t there i s a 88  content  t o be d e s c r i b e d .  There seems, as a r e s u l t ,  v e r y l i m i t e d manner i n which e r r o r can manifest r e s p e c t to the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of a speaker's  itself  hence, the speaker's  alternatively,  with  utterances.  E i t h e r the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n w i l l r e f l e c t the speaker's and,  t o be a  intention  u t t e r a n c e s w i l l be meaningful or,  the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n w i l l be wrong i n the sense  of a s c r i b i n g content when there i s none. Thus the p i c t u r e of communication i n "A Nice Derangement of E p i t a p h s " does not a l l o w f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t an i n t e r p r e t e r c o u l d be i n e r r o r about what a speaker's mean.  words  In the absence of t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y Davidson's  c o n c e p t i o n of l i n g u i s t i c meaning f a i l s t o r e f l e c t a fundamental c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of our l i n g u i s t i c Therefore,  i t i s not o n l y d i f f i c u l t  experience.  to r e c o n c i l e " R a d i c a l  I n t e r p r e t a t i o n " with t h i s p i c t u r e of l i n g u i s t i c meaning i t i s , moreover, u n d e s i r a b l e . We must, consequently,  dispense with the i d e a t h a t  s u c c e s s f u l communication i s r e q u i r e d f o r a speaker's be meaningful.  As. a l r e a d y noted,  meaning t h a t Davidson presents  words to  the c o n c e p t i o n of l i t e r a l  i n "A Nice Derangement of  E p i t a p h s " assumes that meaning w i l l be p r e s e n t o n l y when communication occurs.  What i s r e q u i r e d , then,  i s an  a l t e r n a t i v e c o n c e p t i o n of l i t e r a l meaning t h a t does not r e q u i r e t h a t communication be s u c c e s s f u l i n order f o r meaning to be p r e s e n t .  An a p p r o p r i a t e a l t e r n a t i v e to the d e f i n i t i o n  of l i t e r a l meaning i n "A Nice Derangement of E p i t a p h s " 89  is, I  w i l l argue, presented  by John S e a r l e i n h i s essay "Meaning,  Communication, and Representation".  In examining  Searle s 1  argument, the p a r t i c u l a r nature of the d i f f e r e n c e s between the conceptions  of l i t e r a l meaning i n " R a d i c a l I n t e r p r e t a t i o n " and  "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs"  becomes c l e a r .  I t also  becomes apparent that the p i c t u r e of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n p r e s e n t e d in  " R a d i c a l I n t e r p r e t a t i o n " i s s u p e r i o r to the one p r e s e n t e d  in  "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs". In h i s essay "Meaning, Communication, and  S e a r l e argues t h a t the i n t e n t i o n to r e p r e s e n t  Representation"  i s independent  of and n e c e s s a r i l y p r i o r to the i n t e n t i o n to communicate. Meaning, S e a r l e maintains,  i s d e r i v e d not from communication  i n t e n t i o n s but r a t h e r from r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n t e n t i o n s . f a c t t h a t the i n t e n t i o n to represent  and the i n t e n t i o n t o  communicate a r e d i s t i n c t has p r e v i o u s l y gone because, S e a r l e s t a t e s , we have analysed strictly  i n terms of l i n g u i s t i c a c t s .  The  unnoticed  these  notions  However, a d i s t i n c t i o n  between r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and communication i n t e n t i o n s becomes apparent, he argues, when we analyse  communication i n terms of  p i c t u r e s r a t h e r than speech a c t s . S e a r l e i l l u s t r a t e s t h i s p o i n t by p r e s e n t i n g an example i n which a person's c a r breaks down while d r i v i n g i n I t a l y . Speaking no I t a l i a n and confronted  w i t h a mechanic who speaks  no E n g l i s h , the d r i v e r must f i n d a nonverbal means of communicating w i t h the mechanic.  The d r i v e r b e l i e v e s t h a t the  source of h i s c a r t r o u b l e i s a broken c r a n k s h a f t 90  and so  attempts to convey t h i s to the mechanic by drawing a p i c t u r e of a broken c r a n k s h a f t : s t a t e of a f f a i r s but  The p i c t u r e r e p r e s e n t s  i t does not,  according  communicate t h a t s t a t e of a f f a i r s .  a particular  to S e a r l e ,  What i s communicated i s  the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of the s t a t e of a f f a i r s .  The  distinction  between r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and communication i s made apparent, S e a r l e argues, by the n e c e s s i t y f o r a t h a t c l a u s e i n the statement of communication. the p i c t u r e r e p r e s e n t s  my  I may  be c o r r e c t i n s a y i n g  crankshaft  as broken but  that  i t is  i n c o r r e c t and ungrammatical to say t h a t the p i c t u r e communicates my  crankshaft  as broken.  I t would be c o r r e c t ,  however, to s t a t e t h a t the p i c t u r e communicates t h a t crankshaft The  my  i s broken.  d i s t i n c t i o n between r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and  communication  i s a l s o apparent i n the d i f f e r e n c e between what counts as a success  or a f a i l u r e f o r each.  i n t e n t i o n to r e p r e s e n t  According  In order  the  i s the i n t e n t i o n t h a t a p i c t u r e or a  s e r i e s of words or symbols represent affairs.  to S e a r l e ,  a p a r t i c u l a r s t a t e of  to determine whether a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s  s u c c e s s f u l we  must, S e a r l e maintains,  nonlinguistic  f a c t s that are r e l e v a n t to the  Thus the i n t e n t i o n to represent  look to  the representation.  a p a r t i c u l a r s t a t e of  he argues, e n t a i l s that the success  of t h i s  affairs,  representation  w i l l be determined i n p a r t by whether the s t a t e of a f f a i r s i n fact obtains.  For example, the t r u t h or f a l s i t y of  the  d r i v e r ' s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of a broken c r a n k s h a f t w i l l depend on 91  whether h i s c r a n k s h a f t  i s , i n f a c t , broken.  i n t e n t i o n to communicate w i l l be a success recognizes  h i s i n t e n t i o n to  In c o n t r a s t , h i s i f the  hearer  represent.  Communication i n t e n t i o n s , S e a r l e argues, are s i m i l a r to G r i c e a n nonnatural referring.  meaning i n the sense t h a t they are  self-  These i n t e n t i o n s are s e l f - r e f e r r i n g i n the  t h a t they are r e a l i z e d o n l y when the hearer  recognizes  sense the  speaker's i n t e n t i o n to communicate a p a r t i c u l a r representation.  I t i s apparent, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t the manner i n  which S e a r l e i d e n t i f i e s communication i n t e n t i o n s i s s i m i l a r to the manner i n which Davidson i d e n t i f i e s f i r s t meaning i n "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs". consists,  S e a r l e argues, i n my  My  i n t e n t i o n to communicate  i n t e n t i o n t h a t you  recognize  t h a t a p i c t u r e of a s e r i e s of words or symbols i s a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of a p a r t i c u l a r s t a t e of a f f a i r s . at which you  r e c o g n i z e my  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n my  At the p o i n t  i n t e n t i o n to communicate  this  i n t e n t i o n w i l l be s u c c e s s f u l .  Thus communication i n t e n t i o n s presuppose t h a t there i s something to be communicated.  Consequently,  representation  i n t e n t i o n s , c h a r a c t e r i z e d i n t h i s manner, are p r i o r to independent of communication i n t e n t i o n s . i n the sense t h a t one without having representation.  They are  can have the i n t e n t i o n to  this  because communication i n t e n t i o n s  presuppose t h a t there i s a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n to be it  independent  represent  the f u r t h e r i n t e n t i o n to communicate Further,  and  communicated  i s n e c e s s a r i l y the case t h a t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n t e n t i o n s are 92  p r i o r to communication i n t e n t i o n s .  According  to t h i s model,  then, meaning i s d e r i v e d from r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n t e n t i o n s r a t h e r than communication i n t e n t i o n s . Though S e a r l e ' s theory c l e a r l y presents the c o n c e p t i o n  an a l t e r n a t i v e to  of l i n g u i s t i c meaning presented  Derangement of Epitaphs" w i t h the conception  i n "A  i t i s , at the same time,  compatible  of l i n g u i s t i c meaning presented  "Radical I n t e r p r e t a t i o n " .  Nice  in  Davidson maintains i n " R a d i c a l  I n t e r p r e t a t i o n " t h a t meaning i s c o n s t i t u t e d by the t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s of a g i v e n u t t e r a n c e .  What an u t t e r a n c e means,  according  to t h i s p i c t u r e , i s what would be r e q u i r e d f o r the  utterance  to be  represent  a p a r t i c u l a r s t a t e of a f f a i r s e n t a i l s t h a t  success  true.  S e a r l e argues that the i n t e n t i o n to the  of t h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n w i l l be determined i n p a r t  whether the s t a t e of a f f a i r s i n f a c t o b t a i n s . Davidson analyses S e a r l e analyses i s derived,  Therefore,  meaning i n terms of n o n l i n g u i s t i c f a c t s  the i n t e n t i o n to represent,  i n terms of n o n l i n g u i s t i c f a c t s .  meaning of my  utterance  " I t i s r a i n i n g " i s the  under which t h i s u t t e r a n c e  i s true.  these c o n d i t i o n s . utterance  the  conditions  Thus " I t i s r a i n i n g " w i l l  mean i t i s r a i n i n g i f and o n l y i f t h i s u t t e r a n c e  t h a t my  and  from which meaning  In " R a d i c a l I n t e r p r e t a t i o n " Davidson s t a t e s t h a t  by  by  i s made t r u e  S e a r l e , i n a s i m i l a r manner, m a i n t a i n s  " I t i s r a i n i n g " w i l l be a s u c c e s s f u l  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of the s t a t e of a f f a i r s i n which i t i s r a i n i n g if  i t i s , i n f a c t , r a i n i n g at the time of u t t e r a n c e . 93  Searle's  conception with  of l i n g u i s t i c meaning, then, i s c l e a r l y c o n s i s t e n t  the c o n c e p t i o n  of l i n g u i s t i c meaning p r e s e n t e d  in  "Radical Interpretation". In c o n t r a s t , S e a r l e ' s n o t i o n of l i n g u i s t i c meaning i s i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the n o t i o n of l i n g u i s t i c meaning in  "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs".  Nice Derangement of Epitaphs" s p e c i f i e d by the f i r s t  Davidson s t a t e s i n  "A  t h a t l i t e r a l meaning i s  i n a s e r i e s of  self-referring  i n t e n t i o n s a s s o c i a t e d with a g i v e n u t t e r a n c e . r e s p e c t , h i s conception  presented  In  this  of l i t e r a l meaning i s , as Davidson  acknowledges, much l i k e G r i c e ' s n o t i o n of nonnatural  meaning  which i s a l s o d e f i n e d i n terms of s e l f - r e f e r r i n g i n t e n t i o n s . However, S e a r l e argues t h a t the i n t e n t i o n s from which meaning are d e r i v e d ,  that i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n t e n t i o n s , w i l l not  self-referring. represent to be  T h i s i s due  to the f a c t t h a t an i n t e n t i o n to  does not have to be r e c o g n i z e d  fulfilled.  be  by a hearer  i n order  I t i s communication i n t e n t i o n s , S e a r l e  argues, t h a t are s e l f - r e f e r r i n g i n t h i s manner.  Furthermore,  i f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n t e n t i o n s are p r i o r to communication i n t e n t i o n s , as S e a r l e maintains,  then Davidson's  c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of l i t e r a l meaning i n "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs"  w i l l not  i d e n t i f y the i n t e n t i o n t h a t determines  meaning.  Therefore,  i f we  accept  S e a r l e ' s argument t h a t  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n t e n t i o n s are p r i o r to and  independent of  communication i n t e n t i o n s then i t appears t h a t Davidson's d e f i n i t i o n of f i r s t meaning i n "A Nice Derangement of 94  Epitaphs" i s flawed.  The t h e o r y of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n p r e s e n t e d  i n "A N i c e Derangement of E p i t a p h s " i s a l s o f l a w e d as i t r e l i e s on an inadequate c o n c e p t i o n of l i n g u i s t i c meaning. Thus the p i c t u r e of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n p r e s e n t e d i n "A N i c e Derangement of E p i t a p h s " i s p r o b l e m a t i c f o r s e v e r a l r e a s o n s . Not o n l y does i t r e l y on a f l a w e d c o n c e p t i o n of l i n g u i s t i c meaning, but a l s o the i n t e n t i o n s t h a t Davidson uses t o i d e n t i f y l i t e r a l meaning are not the i n t e n t i o n s t h a t a r e r e l e v a n t t o meaning.  One may  argue, however, t h a t much of the  p o s i t i v e argument i n "A N i c e Derangement of E p i t a p h s " t o be r e l e v a n t t o e x p l a i n i n g how communication of how  intentions.  a speaker may  appears  r e a l i z e her  For example, Davidson's  discussion  a speaker must t a i l o r her speech t o h e r i n t e n d e d h e a r e r  i s r e l e v a n t t o the speaker's a b i l i t y t o r e a l i z e h e r communication  intentions.  F u r t h e r , h i s c l a i m , t h a t the  speaker  and h e a r e r must converge on t h e o r i e s of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n o r d e r f o r communication  t o succeed i s a c l e a r statement  of  what i s n e c e s s a r y i n o r d e r f o r a speaker t o r e a l i z e h e r communication  intentions.  But, though we may  r e s u r r e c t the p o s i t i v e a s p e c t of Davidson's  attempt  to  argument by  c h a r a c t e r i z i n g i t i n t h i s manner, i t would be f u t i l e  as  Davidson does not c h a r a c t e r i z e t h i s p o r t i o n of h i s argument as a d i s c u s s i o n of communication  intentions.  R a t h e r , as n o t e d  above, he m a i n t a i n s t h a t l i n g u i s t i c meaning i s d e r i v e d from communication  and, hence, he m a i n t a i n s t h a t t h i s a s p e c t o f h i s  p o s i t i v e argument addresses what i s n e c e s s a r y i n o r d e r f o r 95  l i n g u i s t i c meaning t o be p r e s e n t .  But, as S e a r l e argues,  meaning i s d e r i v e d from r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n t e n t i o n s r a t h e r than communication i n t e n t i o n s .  Thus Davidson m i s t a k e n l y assumes  t h a t h i s argument i s r e l e v a n t t o what i s n e c e s s a r y  i n order  f o r l i n g u i s t i c meaning t o be p r e s e n t when, i n f a c t , i t i s r e l e v a n t o n l y t o what i s n e c e s s a r y i n o r d e r f o r a speaker t o r e a l i z e h e r communication i n t e n t i o n s . However, Davidson's d e s t r u c t i v e argument i n "A N i c e Derangment o f E p i t a p h s " remains c o n v i n c i n g . t h a t c o n v e n t i o n i s unnecessary  I n order t o prove  f o r communication, a l l t h a t he  must do i s c i t e one example i n which communication i s s u c c e s s f u l d e s p i t e t h e f a c t t h a t t h e speaker and t h e h e a r e r d i d n o t r e l y on c o n v e n t i o n i n o r d e r t o communicate.  Michael  Dummett's c r i t i c i s m s o f t h i s argument a r e t h e r e f o r e unconvincing.  But, o f t h e two p o s i t i v e p i c t u r e s o f  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i t i s the p i c t u r e presented i n "Radical Interpretation" that i s convincing.  Davidson m a i n t a i n s , i n  t h i s essay, t h a t t h e meaning o f an u t t e r a n c e i s t h e c o n d i t i o n s under w h i c h t h e u t t e r a n c e i s t r u e .  A l t h o u g h he does n o t deny  t h i s c l a i m i n "A N i c e Derangement o f E p i t a p h s " he m a i n t a i n s , i n t h i s l a t t e r paper, t h a t a speaker's u t t e r a n c e s w i l l be meaningful  o n l y when s u c c e s s f u l communication o c c u r s .  Thus  the p i c t u r e s o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n p r e s e n t e d i n " R a d i c a l I n t e r p r e t a t i o n " and "A N i c e Derangement o f E p i t a p h s " a r e n o t p a r t o f a c o n s i s t e n t , coherent t h e o r y o f communication because t h e y r e l y on d i f f e r e n t c o n c e p t i o n s o f l i n g u i s t i c meaning. 96  WORKS CITED Davidson, Donald.  " B e l i e f and the B a s i s of Meaning."  I n q u i r i e s i n t o T r u t h and I n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Oxford UP, 1990.  New York:  141-54.  . " F i r s t Person A u t h o r i t y . "  D i a l e c t i c a 38 (1984): 101-11.  . "Knowing One's Own Mind."  Proceedings and Addresses of  the American  Philosophical Association  . "A N i c e Derangement of E p i t a p h s . "  (1987): 441-58.  T r u t h and  I n t e r p r e t a t i o n : P e r s p e c t i v e s on the P h i l o s o p h y o f Donald Davidson.  Ed. E r n e s t LePore.  New York: B l a c k w e l l , 1986.  433-46. "Radical Interpretation."  D i a l e c t i c a 27 (1973): 313-28.  . "The S o c i a l Aspect of Language." Unpublished essay, 1991. . "Thought and T a l k . " Interpretation. Dummett, M i c h a e l .  I n q u i r i e s i n t o T r u t h and  New York: Oxford UP, 1990.  155-70.  "A Nice Derangement of E p i t a p h s : Some  Comments on Davidson and Hacking." •Interpretation:  T r u t h and  P e r s p e c t i v e s on the P h i l o s o p h y of Donald  Davidson. Evnine, Simon. S e a r l e , John.  Donald Davids on.  S t a n f o r d : S t a n f o r d UP, 1991.  "Meaning, Communication, and R e p r e s e n t a t i o n . "  P h i l o s o p h i c a l Grounds of R a t i o n a l i t y . Grandy and R i c h a r d Warner. 209-26. 97  Ed.  R i c h a r d E.  Oxford: Clarendon, 1986.  

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