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Technology and change in national defense planning in the twentieth century Carter, Tim 1992

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TECHNOLOGY AND CHANGE IN NATIONAL DEFENSE PLANNINGIN THE TWENTIETH CENTURYbyTIM CARTERB.A., The University of British ColumbiaA THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OFTHE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OFMASTERS OF ARTSinTHE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES(Department of Political Science)We accept this thesis as conformingto the required standardsTHE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIADecember 1991Tim CarterDateIn presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanceddegree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make itfreely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensivecopying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of mydepartment or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying orpublication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my writtenpermission.Department of ^The University of British ColumbiaVancouver, CanadaDE-6 (2/88)i iABSTRACTThe national security policies of the great powers have changeddramatically since the turn of the century. These changes havehad vast implications for the study of international relations.This thesis examines the role of technology in changing nationalsecurity policies during the twentieth century. In order to doso, two issues are addressed. First, how is national securitypolicy formed, and how does it change. Second, what role hastechnology played in this process, and how has this role changedover time.Three historical cases are developed to address thesequestions. Each case highlights a different period in time andin technological development. Together, the three casesincorporate most of the major technological changes of thetwentieth century, as well as the main streams of thoughtregarding the importance of these changes to security planning.Three possible models for explaining the development of nationalsecurity policy, and technology's role in it, are developed andapplied across the appropriate cases. Each model providesinsight into the nature of the national security policy at oneparticular point in time.Since the turn of the century, national security policy hasbeen radically revised at every level of planning. Theconceptual foundation upon which security policy was constructedhas been fundamentally altered. Threats to the state havechanged, as have responses to those threats. Traditionalnotions, such as the defense of the state, have been discarded infavor of security through deterrence. The concept of deterrenceiiiitself has changed, as traditional methods of deterring attacksno longer apply.In each case the extent of these changes is more apparent.Similarly, in each case the role of technology in creating thesechanges is more dominant. By 1960, the role of technology is thesingle most important factor in understanding national securitypolicy. Technology shapes not only the methods by which a statemay be secured, but also the conditions of its security problem.The penultimate technological development, nuclear weapons, hastruly revolutionized national security and, therefore, nationalsecurity policy.ivTABLE OF CONTENTSAbstract^ iiList of Figures^ vChapter I:^Introduction^ 1Chapter II:^Methods of Analysis^ 4Chapter III:^Germany 1897-1914: The Dominance ofGrand Strategy 23Chapter IV:^France 1930-1940: The Dominance ofMilitary Doctrine^ 46Chapter V:^The United States 1960-1969: Technologyand the Problems of Strategic Paradox^ 68Chapter VI:^Conclusion^ 94Bibliography 98VLIST OF FIGURESFigure II. 1: The First Model of Interaction^ 16Figure II. 2: The Second Model of Interacton^ 18Figure II. 3: The Third Model of Interaction^ 201I/ INTRODUCTIONTechnology has progressed in the twentieth century from afactor which was largely used to solve the national securityproblems of the state, to one which actually creates andconditions these problems. Certain threats to the modern greatpowers are unique to the late twentieth century. They havearisen due to technological innovation and technology'sinteraction with military planning. This thesis investigates therole of technology in national defense policy during thetwentieth century. It examines three different cases in anattempt to explain the extent to which technology has altered thethreats to the state, and the way in which states have sought toaddress such threats.In an international system governed by the principle ofanarchy, all states must have some policies that ensure theirsecurity. Many states do not have autonomous security policies.For instance, Iceland is completely dependent on the UnitedStates for military protection. Great powers, by definition,cannot rely on others for their national security. While theymay enter into alliances in order to maximize their strength,they cannot rely on others for their protection. To do so wouldbe to forfeit their position as great powers.National security policy is usually a collection ofpolitical and military activities and plans designed to protectthe territory, independence and wealth of the state from hostileoutside influence, usually in the form of threats of militaryattack. A secondary, but related, issue for this thesis is how2does national security policy operate, and how has it changedduring the twentieth century? Change can be divided into twocategories: first, how has the defense of the state in theabstract changed over time, and second, how have substantivestrategies changed to conform (or not) with abstract principles.This study will further examine the role of technology in change,both in abstract notions and in actual strategy, and will suggestthat the role of technology in changing strategy has beenimmense.In order to examine change in national security policy,three cases will be presented. They are: Germany in the period1897-1914, France from 1930-1940, and the United States from 1960to 1969. Each case study will discuss the national defensepolicy of the state in question. Each state was undisputedly agreat power during the time under consideration. Furthermore,each had a clear and well thought-out national defense policy.The time periods were chosen to match different eras oftechnological innovation, and to match key actors with some ofthe catalytic events of the twentieth century. The specificstates themselves were chosen not only because each was a greatpower, but also because each represents a different attitudeabout technology and change in defense planning.These cases involve neither the same state, nor even similarstrategic situations. Change across the cases will therefore notconsist of differences in specific plans, as these are bound tobe different anyway. Rather, this thesis will examinesignificant change in the general manner in which states seek tosecure themselves. While details will be necessary to give3substance to the cases, the subject of analysis will be the moregeneral principles which underlie the specific actions and plansput forward by the state. The common denominator in each casewill be the role of technology. Analysis in each chapter willrevolve around technological change and its role in nationalsecurity policy.4II/ METHODS OF ANALYSIS1.0 IntroductionModern technology has been a dominant factor in nationalsecurity policy in the twentieth century. As Martin Van Creveldhas noted:war is permeated by technology to the point that everysingle element is either governed by or at least linkedto it. The causes that lead to wars and the goals forwhich they are fought; the blows with which campaignsopen and the victories with which they (sometimes) end;the relationship between the armed forces and thesocieties that they serve; planning and preparation andexecution and evaluation; operations and intelligenceand organization and supply; objectives and methods andcapabilities and missions; command and leadership andstrategy and tactics; and even the very conceptualframework adopted by our brains in order to think aboutwar and its conduct-all are and will be affected bytechnology. (Van Creveld 1989, 311)The terminology surrounding the security planning of thestate is less than precise. It will be useful at this point todefine the terms to be used throughout this thesis. Nationalsecurity policy is held to mean the overall plan, or group ofplans, as well as the actions which arise from these plans,designed to secure the state from external enemies.' As such, itis a general umbrella term for all activities concerning thestate and its security; for analytical purposes more specificterms are required. Grand strategy is a specific set of beliefsand plans for the security of the state at the level of inter-state relations (Craig 1986, 481; Luttwak 1987, 240). This is1 National security policy is also sometimes referred to asnational security strategy.5the highest functional level of security planning. Militarydoctrine is the operationalization of certain elements of grandstrategy at the level of military confrontation and conflict. 2It is important to note that grand strategy is operationalized inways other than military doctrine. For instance, there is adiplomatic component to grand strategy, as well as an economicone. Both of these will be operationalized in doctrines as well,although they do not fall within the scope of this study.Within the general rubric of grand strategy there are fiveissues that are important to this study: first, the nature andimportance of alliances to the security of the state; second,the nature of deterrence and its importance to the security ofthe state; third, the nature of strategies for the protection ofthe state in the event that deterrence should fail, andperceptions as to their relative importance and effectiveness;fourth, the general predilection of grand strategy as a whole tofavour either offensive or defensive options in the pursuit ofstate security; and finally, perceptions about the usefulness andimportance of the use of force in the defense of the state.These five issues form the national security agenda of the state.Change in the nature of grand strategy is expected to manifestitself through these five issues.As the operationalization of grand strategy, militarydoctrine deals with military issues and planning for theimplementation of the military aspects of grand strategy as a2 Luttwak considers both military doctrine and grand strategy tofall under the single term strategy. However, for the purposesof this thesis it is important to distinguish between the two(Luttwak 1987, 70).6whole. The impact of military technology on military planningwill be manifested in military doctrine. The only thing thattechnology actually changes is military capabilities; therefore,the influence of technology must be understood in the context ofmilitary doctrine. Therefore the interaction between militarydoctrine and grand strategy can be used to help explain exactlyhow technology influences grand strategy. At the same time,technological change gives military doctrine an independent rolein the national security making process. The affects oftechnology on military doctrine are uncontrollable, and,therefore, may change military doctrine in ways which forceunintended changes at the level of grand strategy.All of the technological changes to be examined are relatedmore or less directly to military capabilities. In many caseschanges have taken place in the nature of military equipmentitself. In other cases technology has affected areas which,while not originally military, have had great militarysignificance (Suzan 1987, 26-27). A good example of this is thecase of rail transportation during the late 19th century. Here,while the technology originated in a civilian element of society,its importance for military planning was quickly realized (VanCreveld 1977, 89-92; Brodie and Brodie 1973, 148-151).The source of technology is secondary in importance to theimpact that it has had on the military capabilities among thegreat powers. In particular, how has technology altered thinkingabout military issues within the particular state in question? 33 When the cases are examined in depth, specific states will beconsidered. However, for this chapter the theory and models willbe developed with reference to a prototypical great power. Thisabstraction is necessary to clarify the nature of the7Clearly there have been important changes at the level ofmilitary capability as a result of technological developments inthe twentieth century. The next issue then becomes how changesin military capabilities lead to changes at the level of grandstrategy.2.0 Grand Strategy: Threats and ResponsesThe formulation of grand strategy involves a three part,interactive process. First, grand strategy requires thedevelopment of, at least, a semi-coherent world view by thedecision-makers of the state. Some general notion of thestrategic environment and of potential friends and enemies isnecessary for a more specific evaluation of threats to the state.The determination of a package of threats should lead to asubsequent determination of a package of goals and objectives ofthe grand strategy. 4[t]he art of strategy is to determine the aim [of thestrategy], which is or should be political: to derivefrom that aim a series of military objectives to beachieved: to assess these objectives as to the militaryrequirements they create, and the preconditions whichthe achievement of each is likely to necessitate: tomeasure available and potential resources against therequirements and to chart from this process a coherentpattern of priorities and a rational course of action.(Fraser, quoted in Craig 1986, 481)In seeking to achieve the goals of grand strategy, decisionmakers must, therefore, assess the assets available to the staterelationship between doctrine, strategy and technology withoutcomplications, such as bureacratic politics, that inevitablyarise when real cases are considered.4 The first of which will be the survival of the state (Waltz1979, 91-92).8and formulate plans for maximizing resources. One common methodfor increasing resources is the formation of alliances.Alliances, particularly if they are directed against a specificopponent, provide the state with potentially many more resourcesthan would otherwise be available. As well, the general economicfoundations of national security must be considered as resourcemanagement. For instance, access to crucial mineral resources orthe focus of the national economy on militarily significantindustry might be concerns here. 5 The key issue is themanagement of resources in order to maximize capabilities,military or otherwise, for the defense of the state.Grand strategy is concerned with the creation andcomposition of military forces. Since the threats underconsideration here are primarily military in nature, theresponses to them will inevitably be dependent on militaryaction. There are two issues for military planning. At the mostgeneral level, questions such as the need for particular forcesare inseparable from grand strategy as a whole and, possibly, arebetter considered a part of resource management than militaryplanning. Operational military planning, the military doctrineof the state, can be separated from grand strategy. Given thatthe impact of technology will always manifest itself initially atthis level, there is considerable merit in separating doctrineand strategy. 65 See the example of the Soviet Union under Stalin in the 1930s(Kennedy 1987, 322-325).6 Inevitably the the border between these two concepts will besomewhat hazy. The procurement of weapons systems, for instance,would seem to fall within both categories, depending on the levelat which it is viewed. A good example of how doctrine andstrategy are divided is the question of whether the state should9At the most basic level, all grand strategies will considertwo methods for securing the state. These are deterrence andphysical protection (Snyder 1961, 3-5). Deterrence involves thepursuit of the interests of the state through the use of threats(Morgan 1977, 9). Physical protection involves the securing ofthe state and its interests through the actual use of force. 7There are two types of deterrence situations. Directdeterrence involves the use of threats to address hostileactivities aimed at the defending state itself. For instance,the use of threats by a state to prevent an attack on its ownterritory is considered an example of direct deterrence. A statemay also use threats to protect allies or other assets outside ofits borders, which it feels are important to its security. Thisis referred to as extended deterrence, as the state extendsdeterrent threats to cover areas or issues that are not containedwithin its borders (Buzan 1987, 151-153).Deterrence can be achieved in two ways, depending on thenature of the threats used. Threats can be manifested either interms of retaliation or denial. Retaliation implies that in themaintain a navy, as the Germans asked themselves in the late 19thcentury. In this case the decision to create a navy was one ofgrand strategy as it addressed strategic questions such as thenature of threats and goals and the nature of strategicinteractions such as alliances. Once this decision was made,however, considerations about the structure of the navy, itsintended missions and plans for the fufilment of these missionswere all issues of military doctrine.7 Obviously the dividing line between these two components ofgrand strategy is somewhat murky. In many instances thepreparation for deterrence entails physical protection and viceversa. On the other hand, as many authors have noted, undercertain circumstances decision makers may have to choose betweenplans which emphasize one component at the expense of the other.See Glen Snyder 1961.10event of non-compliance, the state will retaliate with militaryforce against the transgressor. 8 Deterrence through denial isthe threat to deny an opponent his goals by increasing the directcosts to him of pursuing those goals (Snyder 1961, 15). Eachtype of deterrence threat requires a different military posture,as well as different capabilities. It is quite possible,however, for a state to possess both denial and retaliationcapabilities.The physical protection of the state can be accomplished intwo ways: defensively or offensively. 9 Defensive measuresrevolve around the fortification of the state. This incorporatesactions such as the construction of fortresses, the developmentof military forces capable of repelling invaders, and thestructuring of the state so as to make it as invulnerable aspossible.' ° Offensive measures, on the other hand, generallyinvolve activities to protect the state by removing externalthreats before they can actually damage the state. Notions suchas preventative or preemptive war are closely associated withsuch a strategic posture. An offensive strategy may be based onthe hypothesis that the state will not be secure as long asstrong potential rivals exist in positions where they can harmthe state.8 For this thesis the definition will be limited to militarydeterrence. In general, retaliation need not be limited tomilitary means. (Buzan 1987, 135; Snyder 1961, 14-15)9 The use of terms such as defensive and offensive refer togeneral orientations rather than precise military plans, whichare properly considered under military doctrine. (see below)10 This may include self sufficiency strategies with respect tovital resources and alliances designed to divert possible attacksaway from the state itself.11In order for a grand strategy to be successful, it must havethe military means at its disposal to accomplish whatever goalsit has set. In a certain sense, then, the success of grandstrategy depends on the viability of the military doctrine (Posen1984, 16). In the case of protective strategies, the problem isclear: the military forces of the state must have the ability toeither defend the state or to remove the threats to the statethrough force. In the case of deterrence, the issue is somewhatmore complicated. In order for threats to be effective, theymust be perceived as credible by the states against which theyare targeted (George and Smoke 1974, 551).Deterrence credibility rests on two factors. First, thestate must have the ability to carry out its deterrent threats(George and Smoke 1974, 48-49; Snyder 1961, 13, 16). This ispart of military doctrine, and is subject to the sameconsiderations as planning for physical protection (Snyder 1961,4). Another factor involved in credibility is the perception onthe part of the target that the state will, in fact, carry outits threats. While this also is connected with militarycapability, other factors are equally important here.Intentions are a crucial element of deterrence credibility,particularly in the case of extended deterrence. When an assetor issue is only indirectly related to the security of the state,there may be some doubt as to the willingness of the state tocarry out deterrent threats in order to protect it (George andSmoke 1974, 551-565). Credibility can be enhanced through thedevelopment of strong political and economic ties between thedeterring state and its ally (Buzan 1987, 184). Credibility also12becomes an issue when weapons of mass destruction are involved.The immense consequences of a nuclear war have fosteredconsiderable debate as to whether the superpowers, in particularthe United States, would actually carry out its stated deterrencethreats in the event of a war (Buzau 1987, 169-170).3.0 Military DoctrineMilitary doctrine represents the manifestation of grandstrategic principles at the level of military planning andoperations. Both successful deterrence and the successfulprotection of the state from attacks depends on an effectivemilitary doctrine. Military doctrine can be divided into threerelated components. First, doctrine is concerned with thecomposition of military forces, the types of weapons they areequipped with, and the coordination of expected roles with forcestructure. Second, doctrine involves planning for the posture offorces during peacetime. This relates to what these forces areprepared to do and how they are arrayed under normal conditions.Finally, military doctrine involves planning for the conduct ofmilitary operations in the event of hostilities, such as war,limited war, or a serious crisis. Military doctrine is directedagainst particular threats as identified by grand strategy;therefore, the capabilities of opponents must be considered aswell as the capabilities of the state itself.Military doctrine can have either an offensive or adefensive orientation. This orientation may be determined bytechnological factors, geographic factors, or planning13preferences. The orientation of military doctrine can affect thenature of deterrent and protection strategies. If the militarydoctrine of the state is offensive, then deterrent threats willlikely be based on retaliation. The opposite will be true if thedoctrine is defensive. Similarly, the nature of the protectivestrategy will depend on orientation of the military doctrine. Anoffensive military doctrine will necessitate an offensiveprotection strategy, while a defensive orientation will lead to adefensive protection strategy.A direct connection exists, therefore, between theorientation of doctrine and the types of deterrence andprotection options at the level of grand strategy. This shouldnot be confused with the relationship between the overallorientation of grand strategy and that of military doctrine.While an offensive doctrine indicates a particular type ofdeterrent strategy, it does not necessarily mean that grandstrategy will be symmetrical. In fact, it is quite possible fora state to have a defensively oriented grand strategy and anoffensive military doctrine.4.0 Technology and Change: Three Models of Interaction.In seeking to explain technology and change, an importantissue is the nature of the interaction between military doctrineand grand strategy. The following section will present threedifferent models for explaining this interaction. Each modelwill correspond to one of the cases presented in the followingchapters, and will be used there to further explain change at14that time. Two connections between doctrine and strategy havealready been discussed. The first had to do with the overalleffectiveness of grand strategy. Without a congruent militarydoctrine, a successful grand strategy will be unlikely (Snyder1961, 84; Holley 1986, 13). A second connection was therelationship between the orientation of doctrine and the type ofdeterrent and protection strategies chosen.In both cases, the relationship has both a normative and anobjective element. In normative terms, it is important to havethe correct doctrine-to-strategy connection in order to maximizethe chances of success. Overall effectiveness will also beincreased if the general orientation of grand strategycorresponds with that of military doctrine. Objectively, theconnection between strategy and doctrine is important because itprovides a mechanism through which technology and change can bebetter understood. For analytical purposes, the connections areimportant because they can illuminate the flow of influencewithin the grand strategy formulation process as a whole.The first model will be derived from some traditionalperceptions about the interaction between strategy and doctrine,based on the writings of Clausewitz (Clausewitz 1976).Clausewitz envisioned a system of grand strategy formulationwhereby the state's political leaders constructed grand strategybased on their perceptions of the security requirements of thestate. These considerations then affected the nature of militarydoctrine.If war is part of policy, policy will determine itscharacter. As policy becomes more ambitious andvigorous, so will war, and this may reach the pointwhere war attains its absolute form. (Clausewitz 1976,15606)The demarcation between the political interests, referred tohere as grand strategy, and military doctrine, is not absolutelyclear. In some instances grand strategy may well influence theconduct of military operations; in others it may not. WhatClausewitz makes explicitly clear, however, is that issues ofgrand strategy are never fully absent from the process ofmilitary planning.That the political view should wholly cease to count onthe outbreak of war is hardly conceivable unless purehatred made all wars a struggle for life and death. Infact, as we have said, they are nothing but expressionsof policy itself. Subordinating the political point ofview to the military would be absurd, for it is policythat creates war. Policy is the guiding intelligenceand war only the instrument, not vice versa. No otherpossibility exists, then, than to subordinate themilitary point of view to the political. (Clausewitz1976, 607)What was so striking about this theory, when it was firstwritten, was Clausewitz's insight into the truly political natureof warfare. There was no logic to warfare unless military issueswere subordinated to policy. Hypothetically it is possible, andhas occurred in some cases, that grand strategy exerts adominating influence on military doctrine. The first model,therefore, suggests that while technology and grand strategyaffect military doctrine, military doctrine does not act as anindependent variable. Case number one will suggest that theSchlieffen Plan was a good example of such a process. Technologyhas an impact on doctrine in operational terms, but theimplications of technology for military operations were not adominant factor for grand strategy.16Fig II.1: The First Model of InteractionTechnology ----> Military Doctrine <---- Grand StrategyThe second model, in contrast to the first, suggests asituation in which military doctrine, and therefore technology,can have a direct influence on grand strategy. The second modelis based upon the modifications to Clausewitzian thinking made bya number of writers, in particular Edward Luttwak (Luttwak 1987).Luttwak divides strategy as a whole into five different levels.The four lower levels incorporate most of what is here termedmilitary doctrine. The fifth level for Luttwak is that of grandstrategy, which roughly corresponds to grand strategy as it isoutlined above. 11 All five levels interact in a hierarchicalsense, while internal logical processes interact within eachlevel individually. (Luttwak 1989, 69-71, 179-180)The five levels form a definite hierarchy, but outcomesare not simply imposed in a one-way transmission fromtop to bottom because the levels interact with oneanother in a two-way process. Technical effects onlymatter insofar as they have tactical consequences, buttactical-level action depends in turn upon technicalperformance to some extent, thus as many tacticalevents make up the operational level even as the latterdetermines their significance. Similarly, unfoldingoperations have their effect at the level of theaterstrategy, which defines their purpose, while militaryactivity as a whole affects what happens at the level11 Luttwak's levels of strategy, from lowest to highest, are: 1)the technical level, involving equipment and militarytechnologies; 2) the tactical level, involving small unit tacticsand the use of weapons; 3) the operational level, involving theoperation of military units in an interactive situation; 4) thetheater level, concerning the conduct of a campaign within ageographically define theatre; and 5) the grand strategy level,involving the broader political context in which militarystrategy operates. (Luttwak 1989, 70)17of grand strategy even as the scope of such activity isdetermined at the highest level. (Luttwak 1989, 70)Translated, this means that each level of strategy has theability to affect the others, depending on the circumstances.Furthermore, influence in the structure need not necessarily movedirectly through the hierarchy of levels. Radar technology andits effect on theater level strategy is used to demonstrate howinfluence can jump several levels (Luttwak 1989, 209).Luttwak shows convincingly that technology can, thoughmilitary doctrine, have a definite impact on grand strategy.However, this is a limited explanation of the ways in whichtechnology can change grand strategy. Luttwak fails to explainthe autonomous nature of modern destructive technology. In partthis criticism may be unfair, as the influence of technology isnot the focal point of his work. Nevertheless, without a fullunderstanding of how technology affects the strategy makingprocess, his model remains incomplete. 12The second model of interaction is similar in nature to themodel suggested by Luttwak, although couched in differentlanguage. The primary assumption of this process is thattechnology influences both grand strategy and militarydoctrine. 13 Technology can create operational militaryconditions which lead to changes in grand strategy. Since all of12 What Luttwak wants to explain through this model is theparadoxical nature of logic in strategy. For him, therefore,connections between the different levels is not as important aslogic processes within each level.13 Virtually all writers in strategic studies agree thattechnology can and does have a great impact on military doctrine.The issue of contention is usually how, and to what degree, thisimpacts on grand strategy.18the technological changes under consideration are of directmilitary significance, change as a whole is manifested throughmilitary doctrine. 14 The role of military doctrine as anindependent variable is somewhat misleading. In fact, militarydoctrine acts as a device through which the independent role oftechnology affects grand strategy.Fig II. 2: The Second Model of InteractionTechnology ----> Military Doctrine <----> Grand StrategyFor example, as noted above, the orientation of a militarydoctrine can and does have a great influence on the type ofdeterrence strategies selected. As well, a preference for aparticular emphasis in grand strategy, say for deterrence overprotection, may also result from doctrinal influences. Doctrinemay simply rule out certain strategic options either asphysically impossible or prohibitively risky. So long as themakers of grand strategy consider issues of military feasibilityand planning, military doctrine will have some measure ofinfluence over grand strategy. This is neither profound nororiginal; in fact, the second model encapsulated the contemporaryconventional wisdom regarding the influence of technology onstrategy (Quester 1977; Posen 1984; Holley 1986). The weakness14 A military doctrine is by definition a subjective entity,representing the opinions of particular planners andinstitutions, rather than some objective reality about the natureof technology and its importance. Therefore, it is notanalytically correct to argue that technology changes grandstrategy through doctrine but rather that perceptions abouttechnology at the level of military doctrine change grandstrategy. Throughout this thesis it is important to keep in mindthat planning at every level is subject to perceptions, and that,therefore, one can rarely talk about an objective reality.19of the model is not in its structure but in its scope: animportant aspect of technologically driven change is left out.I therefore put forward the third model, on that suggeststhat technology influences not merely the military capabilitiesof the state, but also the threats to the state as they areperceived at the level of grand strategy. This is the result ofinnovation within military doctrine. The third model identifieschanges which take place through the processes described by thefirst two models, but which remain unrecognized by them. Thegoal of this model is to describe how technology changes thestrategic environment through unintended consequences ofinnovation at the level of military doctrine.Innovation at the level of military doctrine leads not onlyto new military planning, but also to new strategic threats tothe state. According to the first two models, threats areperceived at the level of grand strategy. These threats are thenaddressed through the development of grand strategy and militarydoctrine. At the level of military doctrine, new technology isincorporated into military planning based on how this technologyhas altered the military capabilities of the state. Over time,new technology will lead to innovation of some kind in themilitary doctrine of the state. This innovation will, in turn,create new threats to the state at the level of grand strategy.The development of military aircraft serves as a usefulexample here. Aircraft were first deployed for military purposesshortly before the First World War (Brodie and Brodie 1973, 117).While their initial role was reconnaissance, other missions suchas troop support, strategic bombing and interception all soon20became important (Brodie and Brodie 1973, 177-180). In terms ofdoctrine, the use of aircraft was part of a general incorporationof new technology into military planning in an effort to win theFirst World War by breaking the deadlock associated with trenchwarfare. However, the introduction of the aircraft in an attemptto solve one security problem soon led to completely new threats.In particular, the threat of mass strategic bombing raids on thecivilian population of the state became a dominant factor indefense planning prior to the Second World War.Fig II. 3: The Third Model of InteractionTechnology ----> Military Doctrine <----> Grand Strategy <-]The rise of new threats due to technology is clearlyunintentional and, once the technology is deployed,uncontrollable. Technology can, therefore, have a direct impacton grand strategy without moving upwards through militarydoctrine. This is not to say that the first two models arewrong; rather they are incomplete. Unless the ability oftechnology to create new threats is understood, it will not bepossible to explain the total impact of technological change ongrand strategy.In effect, the third model argues that technology has theability profoundly to affect the strategic environment withinwhich states must develop their national defense policies.Technology does this by altering the nature of threats to thestate. The process as a whole can be envisioned as a loop.21Innovation at the level of military doctrine creates new threatsto the state. These threats force changes in grand strategy,leading to new strategic objectives and goals. These new goalspresent military doctrine with a new set of problems; thedoctrine then seeks to address these problems through innovation,and so the process repeats itself.In summary, then, there are three possible processes throughwhich technology can influence grand strategy. The first model,based on the precepts of Clausewitz, had little room fortechnological influence, outside of operational militaryplanning. Since military doctrine was clearly subordinate togrand strategy, there was little or no opportunity foroperational military factors to translate technological changeinto change at the level of grand strategy. The second model,based on a revision of Clausewitz, suggests that operationalmilitary factors can influence grand strategy. Luttwak hassuggested that in some instances, operational factors are soimportant that they shape policy at the level of grand strategy(Luttwak 1989, 70). Therefore, technology alters operationalfactors, and these factors, in turn, lead to changes in the grandstrategy. The third model suggests an entirely different processof influence. It suggests that when technology altersoperational military capabilities, it can, inadvertently, createnew threats to the state. New military technology is capable offundamentally altering the security problems of the state. Thischange reaches to the heart of the national security policy ofthe state, by redefining its starting point as well as itsprinciple logic.22As noted above, each of the cases to be considered below wasselected to fit one of these models. The cases are taken frompoints in the twentieth century when military technology wasproviding decision makers with new options, possibilities andproblems. Therefore, they will not only elaborate on thetheoretical structures put forward by the models, but will alsoilluminate certain trends in the development of technology andits impact on national security policy over the course of thetwentieth century.23III/ GERMANY 1897-1914: THE DOMINANCE OF GRAND STRATEGYIt is clear, consequently, that war is not a mere actof policy but a true political instrument, acontinuation of political activity by other means.What remains peculiar to war is simply the peculiarnature of its means.The political object is the goal, war is the means ofreaching it, and means can never be considered inisolation from their purpose. (Clausewitz 1976, 87)1.0 IntroductionThe legacy of Clausewitz played a crucial role in the waythat German strategists viewed warfare prior to World War One. 15Military thinkers were conditioned in their understanding ofwarfare by the notion of "war as a continuation of policy byother means" (Clausewitz 1976, 87). The swift and productivevictories over Austria in 1866 and France in 1870-1871 reinforcedthe concept of war a positive exercise. It might be bloody, butwar could be beneficial to the state as well. The "other means"available through war could fulfil policy objectives that mightbe difficult, if not impossible, to attain in peacetime.Analysis in this chapter will be aided by the first modelpresented in chapter one. This model reflects the analyticalframework within which the Germans constructed their grandstrategy. The model suggests that, regardless of the objectiveimportance of technological change, it will be difficult for thischange to influence grand strategy.15 A particular interpretation of Clausewitz was popular inGermany prior to 1914 which did not represent the full extent ofClausewitz's writing. In particular, strategists tended to focuson the notion of war as a continuation of policy and therecognition of total war and battles of annihilation, whileignoring Clausewitz's arguments about the strength of thedefensive and the importance of political and military relations(Brodie 1973, 10-11; Howard).24The first case is Germany prior to World War One because itis an example of the traditional methods of strategic thinking.It provides insights into how national security planners viewedwarfare and its implications for the security of the state.Finally, it provides the thesis with a historical starting pointfrom which to begin arguments about change. In order to concludethat substantial change has in fact taken place, it is necessaryto have a clear conception of how security issues stood at thebeginning of the process.The chapter will begin with an examination of the relevanttechnological changes prior to 1914. The grand strategy andmilitary doctrine of Germany will then be described. Finally,the interaction between strategy and doctrine will beinvestigated. This process will illustrate both how the Germansconstructed their national security policy and how technologyaffected this policy.2.0 Technological Changes: Railroads and Rapid FirePrior to the mid-nineteenth century, technology had notplayed a significant role in determining victory in the contestbetween the great powers for over 300 years (Dupuy 1980, 169).Wars simply were not won or lost based on superior or inferiortechnology. 16 All of the major European powers had the samebasic weapons, communications and transportation capabilities.16 This applies only to inter-European warfare, where all sideshad roughly the same equipment. Clearly technologicalsuperiority was a crucial factor in the colonial expansion of theEuropean powers.25In some cases, such as Marlbourough's march to Blenheim, existingtechnologies were exploited more effectively by one side than theother; however, innovations were few, and the time needed toreequip an entire army allowed potential opponents ample time tocopy innovations (Van Creveld 1989, 167). The combination of theindustrial revolution with the social revolutions of thenineteenth century greatly altered the relationship betweentechnology and warfare. The ability to raise mass armies and toequip them with mass-produced weaponry allowed states to rapidlyincrease their military strength relative to their neighbors. 17By the end of the nineteenth century, technology had become animportant factor in military strategy. It was thus widelyperceived that a decisive advantage could be gained on thebattlefield through technological innovation (McNeill 1982, 223;Dupuy 1980, 175-176).2.1 The Weapons Package: Some General ObservationsChanges in military technology from 1850 to 1914 revolvedaround two key issues: mobility and firepower. 18 Thetechnological package at the turn of the century held out tostrategic planners the possibility of immense strategic mobilitywhile concurrently threatening them with an operational17 It took Prussia 26 years to reequip its forces with breechloading rifles (1840-66). However, when the French saw theresult of Prussian firepower during the war between Prussia andAustria in 1866, it took only four years to completely refit theFrench army. See McNeill 1982, 236.18 The one technological development which does fit into thesecategories is the airplane. However, prior to the First WorldWar aircraft had been used only for reconnaissance purposes, andconsequently their impact on planning was slight (Brodie andBrodie 1972, 177).26quagmire. 19 The construction of large and efficient railwaynetworks vastly improved the strategic mobility of armed forcesin Europe. Large bodies of troops and supplies could now berapidly concentrated, deployed and supported in the field for anextended period of time (Brodie and Brodie 1973, 148-151).Railroads were first used in this role in 1859, but their realimportance did not become evident until the Prussians used railto facilitate their victories in 1866 and 1870 (Brodie and Brodie1973, 148-151; Ropp 1959, 161-162).If railroads created vastly greater strategic mobility, theincrease in firepower had the precisely opposite effect at thetactical and operational level. The development of infantryweapons and artillery capable of accurate and rapid fire overlong ranges made the movement of troops anywhere near enemyforces both difficult and costly. In order to avoid the effectsof massive firepower, armies were forced to rely onfortifications and dispersion (Dupuy 1990, 28). The end resultwas that, on land at least, forces could be rapidly moved fromone battlefield to the next; however, once on the battlefieldtheir ability to move declined to almost nothing.At sea, technology again had two effects which were in manyways as contradictory as the effects of technology on land.Advances in steam engines corresponded with new developments insteel armor and rifled, long range naval guns. The result was a19 The term "technological package" refers to the combination ofall of the relevant technological changes of the period. Thispackage is more important, in many ways, than individual changes,because it represents the complete picture of technologicalchange as it was available to planners at the time.27capital ship capable of rapid speeds and great firepower. 20However, these changes did not significantly alter the nature ofnaval warfare. Capital ships still contested with each other fordominance of the sea in large naval battles. At the same time,the perfection of the submarine and independently propelledtorpedoes was to have a major influence on the nature of seawarfare. Submarines combined stealth with killing power,allowing states like Germany to wage strategic warfare along theEnglish supply lines without ever contesting England's control ofthe sea in a conventional sense. 21 At sea, technology led to therefinement of traditional notions of warfare while simultaneouslyproviding the means by which such notions might be renderedobsolete. On land, railroads meant that the ability of the greatpowers to mobilize their military resources (manpower) hadreached unprecedented levels; however, the rise in firepowermeant that the ability of states to use these resources waslikely to be low.2.2 Weapons Technology: Some Selected Examples:The single greatest technological change between 1850 and1914 was the incredible increase in the amount of firepoweravailable to land armies. Basic infantry weapons were now20 The HMS Queen Elizabeth, the most modern battleship launchedprior to WW I, had a top speed of 24 knots, mounted 8 15" gunsand had 13" thick armor. A full broadside from all eight gunsweighed some 15,600 pounds (Hough 1979, 143).21 German submarines at the outset of World War One had anoperational range of 5000 miles. However, prior to the actualuse of unrestricted submarine warfare during World War Onethinking about the role of the submarine as a strategic weaponwas largely undeveloped. Instead the submarine was seen as onemore weapon with which control of the sea might be contested(Brodie and Brodie 1973, 181).28accurate up to 2000 yards, while artillery was accurate beyond6000 yards. 22 Both types of weapons had greatly increased ratesof fire (Howard 1984, 44). Well trained infantry could fire 30rounds or more a minute, while machine guns were capable ofputting out in excess of 400 rounds a minute (Brodie and Brodie1973, 147). Combined with the fact that there were now far moreinfantry and artillery than had ever been the case in the past,the amount of deadly firepower on the battlefield was greatlyincreased.The French 75mm artillery piece, which became a standarddesign in most armies before the outbreak of war in 1914, is agood example of how technology increased firepower. Threedifferent innovations contributed to the greatly increasedlethality of this weapon. 23 First, the development of explosiveshells in 1886 increased the number of fragments thrown out by ashell from 2-5 in 1860 to over 1000 by 1900 (Dupuy 1980, 213).Second, the new recoil mechanism on the French gun brought theweapon back to the same place it had been before it was fired.This allowed gunners to lay down an accurate barrage on the sametarget without having to reset the gun after every shot. As aresult, guns could fire ten or even twenty rounds a minute, asopposed to one or two before this invention (Brodie and Brodie1973, 143). Finally, the invention of the telegraph and fieldtelephone allowed forward observers to direct the fire of22 This compares to about 200 yards 100 years before.23 Breechloading and a rifled barrel greatly increased the rangeand rate of fire of the Seventy Five over weapons fifty yearsearlier; however, these innovations were not new by the time theFrench developed their cannon.29artillery onto targets that the gunners themselves could not see(Dupuy 1987, 204). The field telephone allowed armies to makethe most of the new range of field artillery, vastly expandingthe geographic reach of the new firepower. 24The vast increase in firepower created an obvious problemfor military planners: how to protect troops and how to move menacross contested areas without sustaining prohibitive casualties.In part, this problem could be addressed through the use offortifications and camouflage (Van Creveld 1989, 172). However,in order to advance an army would have to leave its defensivepositions and expose itself to enemy fire.2.3 The Effects of Technology on Planning: A First CutOne observer, at least, felt that new technology would havea profound impact on the nature of land warfare. Jean de Blochhad seen the impact of technology on several wars between theRussians and Ottoman Turks in the nineteenth century. He arguedthat by the turn of the century war between the great powerswould be a long and drawn out, bloody affair dominated bydefensive fortifications.The immense extent of the theater of war; the vastnessof the field of battle; the difficulties presented byattack on entrenched positions and fortifications, andthose natural defenses on the battlefield whichsoldiers are now taught to utilize, and whichinevitably will be utilized in view of the deadlinessof modern fire; the impossibility of massed attacks;finally, the duration of battles, which may beprolonged for several days, and which may yield nodecisive results - all these are new circumstances.(Bloch 1899, 41)24 Trevor Dupuy has attempted to give an empirical indication ofthe lethality of different weapons over different times.According to his index, a pre 19th century cannon had a lethalityof 940, as compared to 386,530 for the French Seventy Five (Dupuy1989, 313).30After the experiences of the Boer War (1899-1902) and theRusso-Japanese War (1905-06), there was general agreement withinthe military institutions themselves that infantry attacks wouldbe more costly than in the past (Sheffield 1988, 52; Strachan1983, 114-117; Bond 1983, 84-85). Military planners did not drawfrom this the conclusion that offensives were no longer possible.In fact, offensive action was still thought to be the only way ofwinning a war (Snyder 1984, 79-80; Van Evera 1984, 58-63).Instead, various tactical proposals were suggested which wouldovercome the problem of defensive firepower (Van Evera 1984, 61).These ranged from greater artillery support to flanking attackswhich avoided fortified positions (Snyder 1984, 21; Bloch 1899,31). In short, problems and potential solutions were containedat the level of military doctrine.Many military planners actually felt that increasedfirepower would help offensive operations more than defensiveones. Because offensive forces held the initiative in anyencounter they could concentrate overwhelming firepower against asmaller defensive force (Van Evera 1984, 61). These plannersoverlooked the fact that defensive forces could avoid theterrible effects of firepower through fortifications, whileattackers could not protect themselves. As well, the increasedrange of weapons meant that dispersed defenders could concentratetheir fire on the point of attack without having to mass theirforces.313.0 German Grand Strategy: Dealing with a Two Front WarThe politician should fall silent the moment thatmobilization begins (Von Moltke the elder, quoted inBrodie 1973, 11).The strategic environment that the Germans found themselvesin at the turn of the century was both rigid and menacing. 25 By1900 Germany was already the strongest single state in Europe(Kennedy 1987, 199-201,209-214). Yet, due to a combination ofgeography and political factors, it was faced with theprobability of having to confront both France and Russia at thesame time in the event of a war (Holsti 1991, 171). In the past,one of the cornerstones of German strategy had been the avoidanceof just such a situation. Through diplomacy, Bismark and otherstatesmen had sought to prevent two other major land powers fromallying with each other against Germany (Taylor 1954, 255-280).The flexibility of the balance of power during Bismark's tenuremade this goal easier to achieve.By 1894 the balance of power in Europe had been largely set,with the central powers of Italy, Austria-Hungary and Germanyopposing the Franco-Russian Entente. Only England remaineduncommitted to a continental alliance. As a part of its new-found status as a great power, Germany followed a policy ofcolonial expansion abroad (Fischer 1972, 136-38). However,unlike England, this policy could never make a significantcontribution to Germany's national security. Although German25 The term "strategic environment" refers to the combination ofpolitical, social, military and economic conditions in theinternational system that are relevant to national security. Itmeans the outside world in so far as it is important to thesecurity of the state.32statesmen and the German public desired a world policy, it wasgenerally recognized that in order for Germany to have a freehand in colonial development it must first have a dominantposition in continental Europe (Fischer 1975, 118-119).3.1 The Formulation of Grand StrategyIn abstract terms, the greatest threat to Germany duringthis period was that of physical invasion. Other threatsincluded a loss of prestige or the diplomatic isolation ofGermany through the disintegration of her alliances. However,the purpose of Germany's alliances was primarily to protectagainst a physical invasion. Furthermore, a dramatic loss ofprestige was most likely to come as the result of Germany havingto withdraw in an international crisis. Germany was only likelyto yield due to fear of an invasion.In more specific terms, German strategists identified theprimary threat to the security of their state as the militaryalliance between France and Russia. 26 It was from these twostates than an invasion was likely to originate. So long asthese states presented a military threat to Germany, the size andstatus of colonial possessions was of secondary importance to thesecurity of the state. 27 Furthermore, expansion into Africa and26 The threat from England was less of a factor for the Germans.In part, this was due to the fact that German political andmilitary leaders did not consider the English army to be much ofa threat to German security. When asked in 1870 what he would doif England landed an army in Germany in support of France,Bismark is reputed to have replied that he would "call out thelocal constabulary and have it arrested." (Taylor 1954, 340-341;Rothenberg 1986, 312).27 While colonial possessions did hold some potential forincreased wealth and, therefore, power, the fact that the statusquo colonial powers opposed German expansion meant that seekingsecurity through colonies was like putting the cart before thehorse.33Asia could only lead to conflict in Europe, as a war with one ofthe colonial powers was unlikely to be contained within colonialareas. 28France, politically hostile due to the German possession ofAlsace and Lorraine and militarily threatening due to a militarydoctrine based solely on a massive and headlong offensive intoGermany, presented a clear threat for German strategists (Holsti1991, 171; Snyder 1984, ch.2, 41-56). While the French threatwas based solely on the possibility of an invasion, Russiapresented the Germans with a variety of problems. On the onehand, the vast reserves of manpower available to the Russiansrepresented the greatest potential threat to the Germans in theevent of a prolonged war. On the other, the ideological threatthat the Russians presented towards the Austro-Hungarians in theBalkans jeopardized Germany's most important ally and, therefore,the overall balance of power in Europe. 29The objectives of German grand strategy were derived fromthese threats. Chief among these objectives was the ability toneutralize or defeat the military forces of France and Russia inthe event of a war. Subsidiary objectives included a strong setof alliances, the neutrality of England, the security of Austria-Hungary's Balkan interests and the expansion of German influencein Europe and abroad. In the case of alliances and English28 See, for instance, the threat of war with respect to theMoroccan crisis of 1911. War over Morocco would never have beenlimited to Africa, partly because the Germans did not have theresources to fight a major war outside of Europe.29 This can be seen by the German actions taken in July 1914 insupport of Austria-Hungary that precipitated the war.34neutrality, these objectives were merely part and parcel of anoverall strategy to win a war in Europe. 303.2 The German Strategic AgendaThe composition of German grand strategy is best consideredin the context of these overall objectives. Alliances were a keyelement of German security. For over twenty years, Germandiplomats tried to involve England in the Central Alliance(Taylor 1956, 365, 373; McDermott 1979, 107-108). Moresuccessful efforts secured Germany the support of Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey (the Ottoman Empire) before theoutbreak of war. Italy was a military ally of Germany as well,although when war actually broke out the Italians failed to liveup to their pre-crisis commitments (Fischer 1975, 392-396).The main purpose of alliances in this period was thestrengthening of the military power of the state. Alliesprovided troops and drew off the military power of potentialenemies. This is particularly clear with respect to the Germanalliance with Austria-Hungary. In political terms, the Germanalliance with Austria-Hungary was more troublesome than it was30 An interesting question here is the development of the Germannavy during this period, as it does not appear to have anyfunction relative to these goals and, in fact, would seemcounter-productive, as it virtually guaranteed the hostility ofEngland. The construction of a blue water navy is best explainedby bureacratic politics; Tirpitz and the other supporters of theNavy redefined German security to include the expansion ofGermany into colonial Africa and Asia, a move which both requireda navy and put Germany into conflict with England anyway.Throughout the period in question Tirpitz competed with theGermany army not just for funding but also for the right todetermine the nature of German security interests. First interms of funding and later when war actually broke out, the Armywon due to the fact that the threat from the French and RussianArmies was more obvious and more noticeable than abstractconcepts about German rights overseas.35beneficial. It confused the rhetorical position of "Teutonversus Slav" that was being developed to justify a war withRussia (Fischer 1975, Ch 17. esp 386). It also made Germanpolicy in the Balkans increasingly inflexible, particularly withrespect to other allies in the region. 31 Despite politicaldifferences, allies were sought and cultivated for militaryreasons. Germany desperately needed Austrian and Turkishmanpower to counterbalance Russia's tremendous advantage inmilitary potential, particularly in the early stages of a warwhen the focus of German attention would be in the West (Kennedy1987, 203).German alliance building was based on the notion that sooneror later Germany would have to fight a war with France andRussia. The Germans believed that their security could be bestattained through the neutralization of these enemies. As aresult, both the grand strategy and the military doctrine of thetime were aggressive in nature. The alliance between France andRussia was itself perceived by the Germans to be an aggressiveact. Alliances based on offensive action seemed to be the onlyviable response. There was, therefore, a general predilection atboth the level of military doctrine and grand strategy foroffensively oriented policies.The use of force was considered to be an inevitable elementof security policy. 32 War was unavoidable; the principle issue31 Rumania had been the source of considerable German diplomaticefforts from the turn of the century onwards. However,territorial disputes between Austria-Hungary and Rumaniaprevented any real agreement with Germany so long as Austria-Hungary remained a key German ally (Taylor 1956, 515).32 In fact, as Luard has noted, there was a general willingnessamong European leaders to go to war in order to secure foreign36for security planning were the terms on which a war was foughtand the chances that Germany would have for attaining a militaryvictory. Furthermore, based on past experiences in 1866 and1870, German strategists believed that the state could benefitfrom the use of force (Luard 1986, 259). If the principalthreats to German security could be eliminated through warfare,this would provide Germany with a stable internationalenvironment in which to expand its power.Given these beliefs about the utility of warfare, deterrencewas not highly valued by decision makers. This was partially dueto the perception among some German strategists that apreventative war held the key to German security. Even ifdeterrence were to be successful in the short run, conflict wasinevitable in the future. Therefore, there was a strongincentive to fight when Germany was perceived to have a strategicadvantage (Van Evera 1984, 71-78). Decision makers simply didnot perceive deterrence as providing long terms solutions to theproblem of national security. 33If deterrence was not highly valued, the opposite was thecase for protection. Given the weakness of deterrence and thepreference of German strategists for military action, thesecurity of the state rested almost entirely with physicalpolicy or security goals (Luard 1986, 357).33 As a revisionist power, it would have been difficult forGermany to fufill its foreign policy aims exclusively through apolicy of deterrence. At the least, a strategy of compellancewould have been necessary. Furthermore, given the strength ofthe Entente, it is unlikely that either France or Russia wouldhave been susceptible to threats over a long period of time. Thepolitical fallout of the 1911 crisis in Morocco in both Franceand Germany was such that public opinion was unlikely to supporta policy of compromise (Taylor 1954, 472-473).37protection. The exact nature of the protection element of grandstrategy was dictated by the military doctrine of the state,known as the Schlieffen Plan. 34 Given the military nature of thethreats to the state, protection had to be the central element ofgrand strategy. This preference for protective strategies wasreflected in the composition of military doctrine.4.0 Fighting a Two Front War: German Military Doctrine and theSchlieffen PlanThe military doctrine of Germany was shaped by two factors:the need to fight a two front war against France and Russia, andthe belief by military planners that such a war must be short anddecisive (Rothenberg 1986, 312; Ritter 1958; Geyer 1986, 530).Faced with having to fight a two front war, Schlieffen concludedthat he must neutralize one of Germany's opponents early in anyconflict before the full weight of the Franco-Russian alliancecould be brought to bear. 35 As the Russians were known to have ahuge reserve of manpower but a slow mobilization schedule,Schlieffen decided to attack France first. France would be athreat earlier and would also be easier to defeat in a singlelarge battle (Ropp 1959, 223; Ritter 1958, 24-27; Rothenberg1986, 316-317).Schlieffen concluded that Germany had to have an offensivedoctrine in order to have any chance of winning a war. This hadnot always been the case with German planning. Von Moltke the34 See the discussion of military doctrine below.35 Alfred Von Schlieffen was the Chief of Staff of the GermanArmy from 1891 to 1906. Von Moltke (the younger) succeeded him afew years later and was the German commander when war broke outin 1914.38elder, Chief of Staff under Bismark and the architect of thestunning Prussian victories over Austria and France (1866 and1870), firmly believed in the power of the defensive.Germany cannot hope to rid itself of one enemy by aquick victory in the west in order to turn against theother. We have just seen how difficult it is to bringeven the victorious war against France to an end.(Moltke quoted in Rothenberg 1986, 306)Rather than attempt to defeat one power and then the other,Von Moltke hoped to use the power of the defensive to fight bothto a standstill and then await a diplomatic solution (Rothenberg1986, 306). Furthermore, Von Moltke feared the implications ofan offensive doctrine. His experience in France in 1870-1871,where a popular movement kept France in the war long after herregular armies had been defeated, led him to conclude that warwas no longer likely to be either swift or profitable:Gentlemen, it may turn into a seven, even a thirtyyears' war! Woe betide him who sets Europe ablaze.(Moltke quoted in Geyer 1986, 531)Von Schlieffen, however, felt that a prolonged conflictwould be a disaster both for German interests and for Germansociety (Geyer 1986, 530). He fully expected a war fought alongVon Moltke the elder's plans to deteriorate into a long contestof attrition, one which would bleed Germany to death and which,given the superior resources of France and Russia, Germany couldnot win (Snyder 1984, 108-109; Ropp 1959, 222).In addition to the need to avoid a prolonged conflict, anoffensive doctrine was also needed because of the structure ofthe Triple alliance. One of the major sources of conflict in theearly twentieth century was the division of influence in theBalkans. As a result of the competition between Austria-Hungary39and Russia in this region, it was likely that in any war thesetwo states would fight. Furthermore, given Russia's much greatermilitary strength, it was likely that Austria-Hungary would lose.Therefore, a primarily defensive German military doctrine wouldresult in the loss of Germany's only reliable great power ally(Sagan 1986, 163). Alliance commitments bound Germany to anattack on Russia in defense of Austria-Hungary and, therefore, toan offensive doctrine. 36The operational part of the Schlieffen plan centered on awide sweeping move through Belgium and then south towards Paris(Rothenberg 1987, 317; Ropp 1959, 225). The overall objectivewas to force the French to fight a large battle away from theirformidable frontier fortifications, where the German army wouldhave a chance to encircle and destroy it. The destruction of theFrench army was expected to take eight to ten weeks, after whichthe bulk to the German army could be shifted east to deal withthe Russians.5.0 Analysis: The Dominance of Grand StrategyThe influence of technology on German grand strategy as awhole prior to the First World War was quite low. This is notbecause German military planners did not recognize certain36 Similarly, the French had to plan for an attack on Germany inorder to relieve pressure on the Russians. Following the samerational as the Germans, the French could not allow their Russianallies to be decimated by repeated German attacks while Francedid nothing. This would eventually lead to France having to facethe Germans alone after Russia surrendered, the precise situationthat the French had tried to avoid by allying with the Russiansin the first place. The same argument dictated a Russianoffensive to support the French.40technological effects, although they may well have underestimatedthem, but rather because of beliefs about the relationshipbetween military planning and grand strategy. These beliefsclosely reflected the mechanisms suggested by the first model.The German national defense establishment was heavily influencedby the writings of Clausewitz. The conduct of warfare obtainedits guiding logic through the domination of political issues.This belief in the domination of grand strategy had a crucialimpact on both the formulation of grand strategy and the rolethat technology played in the planning process.5.1 Explaining the Formulation of German Grand StrategyGiven that both the first model and German strategy makingwere influenced by Clausewitz, it should not be surprising thatthere is a considerable amount of symmetry between the theory andactual events. The central logic of German planning was providedby the need to fight a two front war. This need, an issue ofgrand strategy, dictated the terms of military doctrine. As aresult, there was little potential for military doctrine toinfluence grand strategy.This relationship has profound implications for theunderstanding of technological influence. Initially, technologyonly affects military doctrine. This is because technologicalchange takes place in the field of militarily significantequipment. If military doctrine is unable to influence thecomposition of grand strategy, then it will be difficult to arguethat technology is able to influence strategy either. Therelationship between doctrine and strategy in this case acted asa definite constraint on technological influences by preventing41technologically based changes in doctrine from having anyinfluence at all at the level of grand strategy. Thus, althoughtechnological change is recognized at the level of militarydoctrine, its influence on planning does not extend to the levelof grand strategy.5.2 Technology and Military DoctrineSeveral prominent authors have argued that the SchlieffenPlan, along with most of the other military doctrines of thetime, did not take modern technology into account (Howard 1984;Miller 1985; Snyder 1984). Such arguments, however, either failproperly to consider the role of technology in planning or aresimply erroneous. The development and proliferation of railnetworks was a crucial element to the Schlieffen plan. 37 Theplan was deliberately constructed around the mobilizationschedules of France, Russia and Germany. The "window ofopportunity" perceived by Germany was the result of therelatively slow Russian mobilization program, largely the resultof an underdeveloped rail net (Lebow 1984, 150-151). Without ahighly developed system of railways, it would have beenimpossible for the Germans to consider shifting a large portionof their army from one front to the other in the necessary time(Van Creveld 1977, 111-113). Support for this argument can befound in the reaction of strategists to the changes in the railcapacities of other states. When the Russians looked like theymight dramatically increase the speed of their mobilizationthrough better rail networks, many generals argued for a37 Furthermore, the construction of railways in Germany wasdeliberately structured around the military requirements of theSchlieffen Plan. See Ritter 1958, 44-46.42preemptive war with Russia in order to preserve Germany'smilitary doctrine (Van Evera 1984, 65; Lebow 1984, 150).The dramatic increase in the amount of firepower availableto a land army also did not go unnoticed. Schlieffen and otherswere very aware of the increasing costs of land warfare, inparticular when attacking a prepared position. However, ratherthan conclude that this made attacks impossible, German militaryplanners attempted to devise ways to avoid attacking preparedpositions. German planners knew full well that a defensiveposition was now likely to be very strong. However, they did notconclude from this that offensive action was impossible (Ropp1959, 224-225).German military observers had witnessed the impact of modernfirepower in the Russo-Japanese war and the Boer war, and hadlearned lessons from these experiences. As a result, the Germanshad for years advocated flanking maneuvers instead of frontalattacks to avoid superior defensive firepower (Snyder 1984, 21;Sheffield 1988, 52). For a short period of time, under VonMoltke the elder, the entire German strategy had been based ondefensive action (Rothenberg 1986, 306-307). However, with thesolidification of the Franco-Russian Entente the perception amongGerman strategists was that Germany would be unable to afford thekind of war a defensive strategy would bring.What German military planners failed to consider was thatmassed artillery would make flanking maneuvers costly while massarmies and new levels of dispersion would result in a continuousfront that could not be outflanked. 38 With hindsight it is clear38 At least this was the case in France. In Russia, continuousfronts were difficult to maintain due to the vast length of the43that the perception of war held by German military strategistswas not congruent with the known effects of current technology.But we must be careful not to judge too harshly based oninformation not available when the Schlieffen Plan was developed.To their credit, the Germans were a lot closer to reality intheir perception of technology than the planners of any of theother great powers (Ropp 1959, 227). Furthermore, of all themilitary planners of the day, only Schlieffen showed anyawareness of the implications of a drawn out war of attrition(Geyer 1986, 330). German planners did acknowledge the impact offirepower on the modern battlefield, even if they underestimatedits true potential. However, they felt that to accept thatoffensives were impossible was tantamount to accepting defeat.Furthermore, a war in which Germany risked offensive action wasthought to be less costly and more likely to bring success thanone in which it relied solely on defensive action.5.3 Technology and the Security of the StateIn addressing the relationship between technological changesand the security of the state as a whole, it will be useful onceagain to examine the way in which German grand strategy wasconstructed. Both in the definition of threats and theformulation of policies at the level of grand strategy to meetthese threats, technological change did not play an importantrole. Technology was not thought to have altered the essentialnature of warfare, nor the relationship between warfare andpolitics set down by Clausewitz and the first model.front, hence movement was much more prevalent and offensives byboth sides frequently met with more success.44The Germans valued protection over deterrence as themainstay of their national security. This had been the case atleast since the Concert of Europe fell apart and, arguably, evenbefore that. The important point to be made here is thatpreferences were based on non-technological factors, in this casethe nature of the alliance system in Europe at the time.Technological changes in the twenty years prior to the outbreakof war did little to alter this bias, even though militaryplanners recognized that the cost of war was rising dramatically.6.0 ConclusionTechnology has not necessarily played a dominant role in thenational security policy of the state. It is possible for thedecision makers of the state to construct a rational nationalsecurity policy without ever taking into account technologicalchanges except at the level of operational military planning.This is only likely to happen, however, if grand strategy is putin a position where it dominates military doctrine, and thereforesubverts the flow of influence from doctrine to strategy.In the case of German national security planning prior tothe First World War, issues of grand strategy dictated the termsunder which operational military planning took place.Furthermore, the inability of military doctrine to influencegrand strategy seems to have affected the role of technology inplanning at both levels. Technological considerations wereclearly subordinated to strategic interests. The offensivenature of the German military doctrine was the result of the need45for a quick victory on at least one front. While strategistswere not blind to the strength of the defensive, they stronglyfelt that a war could not be won without offensive action (Snyder1984, 20). Rather than embrace the influence of firepower,Schlieffen and others sought to get around it. This was notbased on any particular mode of thinking about technology itselfso much as on Germany's strategic position at the time. Germanycould not win a war without an offensive strategy, thereforetechnological biases for the defense had to be circumvented.What this case has shown is that technology during thisperiod had a definite influence at the level of operationalmilitary planning. However, because of the specificcircumstances involved, these changes had very little influenceon the composition of grand strategy. At the same time, theaffect of technology on operational military planning wassometimes indirect, and often misinterpreted or misunderstood.It seems logical to conclude that it is completely possible fortechnological change to have no impact on defense and deterrence,as this case has demonstrated, and as the first model suggests.46IV/ FRANCE 1930-1940: THE DOMINANCE OF MILITARY DOCTRINEA party of A Company men passing up to the front linefound... a man bogged to above the knees. The unitedefforts of four of them with rifles beneath hisarmpits, made not the slightest impression, and to dig,even if shovels had been available, would beimpossible, for their was no foothold. Duty compelledthem to move on up to the line, and when two days laterthey passed down that way the wretched fellow was stillthere; but only his head was now visible and he wasraving mad. (Major C.A. Bill of the 15th Battalion,Royal Warwickshire Regiment, quoted in Wilson 1986,473)they remembered the horrors of the ceaseless shelling,the wounded men agonizing untended, the hideousmutilations, the runners not returning, the reliefs andration parties not arriving, the thirst, the hunger,the stench, the misery, the fear; above all, always theshells. Privately to themselves they wondered if theycould do it again, if any Frenchman could? The answerthey felt was no. No human being could do Verdunagain. (Horne 1962, 340-341)1.0 IntroductionThe memory of the First World War greatly influenced themaking of both grand strategy and military doctrine from 1918 to1939. Building on their experience in the First World War, theFrench reversed the planning priorities set by the Germans in anattempt to achieve better results on the battlefield. The FirstWorld War taught the French that winning was not enough; war hadto be conducted in a manner which was not exorbitantly costly.As a result, the overriding priority of French defense planningwas preventing a repetition of the First World War experience.War itself, along with defeat, became a threat to the security ofthe state.French perceptions about the importance of planning forwarfare influenced doctrine and strategy. In contrast to thefirst case, it will be useful here to consider the French47military doctrine first, and then move on to examine grandstrategy. This is in keeping with the structure of the secondmodel of interaction presented in chapter one. This model viewstechnology as affecting military doctrine, and it in turninfluencing grand strategy. Once again, the goal will be toexplain the influence of technology both at the level of militarydoctrine and of grand strategy.2.0 Technological Change: Tactical Protection, StrategicVulnerabilityThe change in available military technology during and afterthe First World War fundamentally altered the militarycapabilities of the state. At the tactical level, the fieldarmies of the state were afforded a level of protection not seenin European warfare since the demise of the armored knight. Atthe strategic level, the state itself was more vulnerable than ithad ever been before. Long range bombers and gas weapons meantthat, regardless of the status of war on land, the civilianpopulation of the state was at risk. This led to conditions ofincreased durability for military forces in the field andincreased fragility for the civilian society that these forceswere supposed to protect. 392.1 The Technological PackageThe durability of military forces was the result of extraprotection through fortification, camouflage and a number ofdefensive obstacles such as minefields and barbed wire.39 The fragility of civilian society argument is similar to thatmade by Herz with respect to the third case. See Herz 1959,especially chapter one.48Furthermore, time and again in the First World War the immensefirepower available to entrenched troops prevented attackers fromclosing with defenders, further strengthening the power of thedefensive. The invention and development of the armored vehicle,in particular the tank, allowed troops to move across thebattlefield with relative immunity from opposing fire. 4°While soldiers might be better protected, society was madeconsiderably more vulnerable by technology. The development oflong range bomber aircraft capable of delivering heavy bomb loadsthreatened to devastate civilian centers with explosives, fireand gas. Interception capabilities were such that even robustdefenses were not likely to shoot down more than 5-10% ofattacking bombers. The predominant belief prior to 1939 was that"the bomber will always get through" (Posen 1984, 152).Submarines and the maritime blockade threatened states witheconomic ruin and starvation. While the armies of the statemight survive, technology had ended the direct connection betweensuccess on the battlefield and the protection of the state.2.2 Some Specific Technological DevelopmentsAfter 1918, technological change was not so much innovationas it was development and perfection of existing technologies.The submarine, the airplane and the tank had all been used in theFirst World War. However, the importance of these and otherweapons to military doctrine changed dramatically from 1918 to40 There is a built-in contradition here between the strength ofthe defensive due to firepower and the ability of troopsprotected by armor to move. However, armor attacks did not tendto lead to the kind of mass casualties seen in the past becausethey hit a considerably smaller segment of the enemy line. Thus,win or lose, entrenched or armored troops were better protectedthan their counterparts in 1914.491939 (Van Creveld 1989, 178-179; Ropp 1959, 303-313). In theinter-war period weapons were not invented so much as they wereimproved (Orgill 1970; Dupuy 1980, 232-233).Basic infantry weapons changed little during this period.The rifle and the machine gun had roughly the same capabilitiesin 1939 as they had had in 1914. Artillery, the most lethalweapon of the first war, also remained essentially the same(Dupuy 1987, 207-208). The tank, in contrast, was greatlyimproved (Orgill 1970, 110-114). By the mid 1930s tanks werefast (20-30 km/h), mechanically reliable and well armed. Theyalso had operational ranges in excess of 200 kilometers, whichgave them a great degree of flexibility and independence on thebattlefield (Van Creveld 1989, 180).Aircraft went through a process similar to that of the tank.Their combat capabilities were remarkably increased from thebeginning of the First World War to 1939 (Dupuy 1980, 144). Thisdevelopment was particularly important in the case of bombers.Increased aircraft range and payload gave air forces the abilityto strike civilian targets far behind enemy lines. Bombers werealso beginning to be equipped with a formidable defensivearmament, theoretically allowing them to fly over hostileterritory unescorted.Improvements in submarine technology added another dimensionto strategic warfare. In the past, a maritime blockade requireda large naval force to control trading routes and block enemyports. Long range submarines, used as commerce raiders,threatened to give blockade capabilities to states that did nothave the geographic or industrial resources needed for a blue50water navy (McNeill 1982, 341). The German U-19, developed earlyin 1914, had an operational range of 5000 miles (Brodie andBrodie 1973, 181). This range allowed submarines access toshipping lanes over a vast area. After their experience in theFirst World War, the German navy fully expected to fight a war ofattrition against the commercial shipping of France and GreatBritain. 412.3 The Conventional Wisdom: Initial Thoughts on the Significanceof Technological ChangeAs one might expect, the central debates about militaryplanning between the wars revolved around the implications ofarmor for the land battlefield and the implications of aircraftand submarines for strategic warfare. 42 Tanks provided men inthe field with a remarkable increase in mobility, if they wereequipped with such vehicles. Not only were tanks fast, but theycould drive through considerable amounts of enemy fire withouthaving to take cover. Tanks had the potential simply to drivepast enemy strong points, or through narrow gaps in enemy lines,without regard for defending forces (Van Creveld 1989, 179). Inboth England and Germany, military strategists argued that thiscapability offset the defensive advantage provided by increasedfirepower. As a result, their argument went, the next war wouldbe one of movement rather than attrition (Liddell Hart 1925, 64-41 At the outbreak of war in 1939 the German's had less thanthirty ocean going boats. However, within a year they wereproducing advanced submarines at a rate of twenty a month (Brodieand Brodie 1973, 217).42 In the case of submarines there was actually little debate perse, as the submarine had proved itself in the First World War.Rather the debate revolved around whether strategic warfare assuch was capable of deciding conflicts.5166; Carver 1979, 37-54).Many planners, particularly within the conservative militaryestablishments of the great powers, did not agree with thisassessment. They felt that anti-tank weapons would have the sameeffect on a tank attack that the machine gun had had on infantryassaults (Doughty 1988, 56; Watt 1975, 66, 69-70, 81). Despitethe new mobility of mechanized units, defenders would retain asignificant advantage if they fought from prepared positions. Aslong as the ratio of anti-tank artillery to tanks remainedfavorable, attacks were unlikely to meet with more success thanin the First World War. 43The advent of long range, high payload, bomber aircraftsparked a debate that was in many ways related to the debateabout the tank, although the scope of the aircraft debate waswider. Essentially the debate revolved around the impact thatstrategic bombing would have on the conduct of war. Prominentthinkers such as Douhet, Mitchell, and Seversky argued thatbombing would be the key element of any future conflict (MacIsaac1986, 624-634). In essence, their argument was that future warswould be waged between great air forces that bombed theindustrial and civilian centers of the enemy. Poisonous gas,delivered by bombers, was expected to see widespread use. Theend result of this type of campaign was expected to be thedeterioration of the industrial capacity and civilian morale ofone's opponents.One view, stressing images of death and destruction43 In part this was based on the experiences of the Spanish CivilWar, where anti-tank guns did beat back armored attacks (Watt1975, 66).52raining from the skies, was that the nature of warfarewould be directly and vastly changed, often with theimplication that armies and navies would be renderedimpotent. (MacIsaac 1986, 625).A fundamental assumption of the airpower theorists was thata land battle would be largely static, along the lines of theFirst World War. In part the resort to strategic bombing wasseen as a way to bypass the largely stagnant battlefield and winwars without the grotesquely costly offensives used from 1914 to1918 (MacIsaac 1986, 633).Theories of strategic attacks from the air were consideredimportant in the 1930s. Not only did this solve a politicalproblem by providing a theory of victory which did not involvehuge land battles, it also greatly influenced the nature ofstrategic defense. In the past, strategic defense had primarilyrevolved around maintaining the territorial integrity of thestate. In the 1930s, the state's assets were subject to a directthreat which was much more difficult to defend against. In fact,strategic air defense had never been tried before, andstrategists were uncertain about the best way to go about it. 443.0 French Military Doctrine: The Lessons of VerdunFor the French, the memory of Verdun had a lasting impact onthe nature of the grand strategy formulation process. Thehorrors of that battle were such that the French approach towarfare changed. Verdun epitomized the First World War for44 See Posen 1984, 144-146. Planning for strategic air defensewas vastly different in different states. England had the mostdeveloped strategy, while France, Italy and Germany all haddiffering ideas about the nature of the threat and how best tocombat it.53France (see Horne 1962, 336-339). It was heroic and, in the end,a French victory. However, the cost of that victory was so highthat after the First World War was over a priority in Frenchdefense planning was the prevention of its repetition (Horne1962, 337-338).3.1 The Discount War: French Military PlanningNew technology had a critical influence at all levels ofmilitary thinking. On land, the legacy of the First World Wardominated French planning (Young 1978, 14; Nere 1975, 94-95; Kemp1981, 15-18; Doughty 1987, 47). In general, French militaryplanners put a high priority on avoiding the costly and pointlessoffensives which had almost destroyed the army in 1917 (Kemp1981, 15-16; Doughty 1987, 59-60). The French believed thatfrontal assaults on prepared positions would be costly and had alow chance of success. The machine gun and coordinated,controlled artillery made movement anywhere near the front linesdangerous (Sheffield 1988, 52-55). It was concluded that thedefensive was an inherently stronger military posture,particularly between large armies when there was littleopportunity for maneuver.The French were not blind to the development of the tank andits potential impact on a new war. However, they felt that theanti-tank gun would have the same effect on a tank attack thatthe machine gun had had on the infantry assault (Watt 1975, 6669-70 81). Although the French army accepted the need formechanized and armored units because of the speed with which theycould move, they still expected a war to come down to a contestof attrition in which superior resources would eventually triumph54(Doughty 1988, 56). Given that offensive action was believed torequire more resources, and that defensive action could be usedto inflict disproportional casualties on attackers, Frenchmilitary planners opted for a defensively oriented doctrine.Two major problems with a defensive doctrine determined thespecific nature of French planning. Since the Germans had a muchlarger pool of resources on which to draw, it was feared thateven with the advantage of defensive firepower, France might losea war of attrition (Gunsburg 1979, 28-29; Kennedy 1987, 314).This was reinforced by France's inability to gain a solidalliance commitment from any of the other great powers. Withouta major ally, France might lose a defensive war through sheerinferiority in resources.The second problem with military planning was that adefensive strategy surrendered the initiative to the enemy. TheGermans could pick the time and location of their attack. Inorder to maximize the defensive advantage troops had to have timeto prepare fortified positions. Given the size of the Frencharmy it was impossible for it to cover the entire French frontierin strength. Therefore, it was feared that the Germans, wellknown for their preference for mobility, would outmaneuver asmaller and less mobile French army.The Maginot line, constructed in the late 1920s and early1930s, provided a logical solution to both of these problems.The line was, in fact, not a line at all. Instead it was aseries of independent fortifications each of which was designedto withstand heavy artillery while defeating tank and infantryassaults (Kemp 1981). The line covered the border with Germany55from Switzerland to Belgium. These fortresses made the defenseof the Franco-German border stronger while at the same timereducing the number of troops needed. 45 Thus the bulk of theFrench army would be available to meet the Germans at their pointof attack (Gunsburg 1979, 13).The Maginot line reduced the problem of initiative by moreor less forcing the Germans to attack through Belgium (Posen1984, 113; Gunsburg 1979, 13; Young 1978, 63). The Belgian andNorthern French plain was the only area where fortifications werenot strong enough to repel an attack without substantial support.The French expected the weakness of the Belgian border, combinedwith the strength of the Maginot fortifications, to force theGermans into a repetition of the Schlieffen plan (Doughty 1987,53). The difference this time would be that the French would beexpecting just such a move, and would take appropriate measures.The overall French war plan called for resisting the initialGerman offensive in Belgium through the use of defensivefirepower. The French hoped to establish a defensive line inBelgium similar to those seen during the First World War. Inorder to break the line the Germans would be forced into the kindof offensives that France and England had had to launch in WorldWar One. Once the German army had been battered by fruitlessoffensives, and France and her allies had mustered their fullstrength, offensive action might be contemplated (Bond 1975, 46).While the German army was weakened at the front, the German statewould be subjected to strategic bombing and an economic blockade,45 The need to reduce demands on manpower was a constant factorin the construction of the Maginot fortifications (Kemp 1981,13).56further increasing the Allied advantage."Despite the fact that Belgium had ceased to be a French allyafter 1936, French commanders still planned to fight the openingbattles of a war on Belgian soil (Gunsburg 1979, 126-131). Theadvantages of such a plan remained obvious to the French.Meeting the Germans in Belgium would move the initial lines awayfrom Paris, keep the devastation of the war off French territory,and protect the important industrial area in the North of France.After 1937 the French high command planned to move rapidly intoBelgium at the same time the Germans did, meeting them somewherein the middle (Posen 1984, 113-114). The French viewed the newmobility of their forces primarily in the context of this plan.Mobile forces would allow the French army to penetrate Belgianterritory more quickly, leading to a defensive line far from theFrench border.French doctrine in the air was also greatly influenced bytechnology. The French air force was concerned primarily withdefense against German bomber attacks, in particular thestrategic bombing of industrial centers and other civiliantargets. There was no centralized plan for the use of air forcesin the conduct of war as a whole. Proponents of the French AirForce were concerned mainly with exclusively airborne operations,such as strategic bombing and air defense. As a result, therewas little coordination between the air force and the army or thenavy. 47 The French air force had little concept of ground46 The naval blockade of Germany would be a combined operation bythe French and British fleets, while the bombing campaign wouldbe primarily a British responsibility.47 This is also explained by the bureaucratic infighting betweenthe respective services of the French armed forces. In57support for the army. The dispersion of fighter aircraft tocounter strategic attacks led to a curious situation in June1940, when despite being defeated thoroughly on the ground theFrench had a stronger air force when they surrendered than whenthe fighting started (Posen 1984, 133).The French military doctrine at sea was very simple. Frenchplanners recognized the threat from German submarines, as well asthe dependence of France on resources and trade from abroad. TheFrench navy dealt with the problem by presupposing an alliancewith England. In such an alliance France would take primaryresponsibility for the Mediterranean Sea while the British woulddefend the Atlantic sea lanes. Given budgetary restraints such adivision of labour was considered vital by the French, who simplydid not have the resources to deal with the U-Boat threat ontheir own.4.0 Preparing For A Discount War: French Grand StrategyBy 1930 it was clear to the French that the Treaty ofVersailles could not guarantee peace in Europe. Even in theyears immediately after 1918, when France was the militarilydominant power on the continent, and Germany teetered on thebrink of revolution, French strategists saw the Germans as theirmain enemy (Adamthwaite 1981, 27-28; Young 1978, 13). In part,this was due to demographic and geographic reasons. Germany wasthe only continental power that could present a serious threat toparticular the French were hampered, as were many other militaryorganizations at the time, by the lack of a unified militarycommand. (Young 1978, 175-177; Gunsburg 1979, 45-50, 135-136.)58France in the near future (Kennedy 1987, 304). While Germany wasmilitarily weak as a result of the Versailles Treaty, herpotential was immense (Kennedy 1987, 304). By the late 1930s theGerman population would be in excess of 60 million people, notcounting Germans in Austria and Czechoslovakia, while France wasunlikely to have more than 40 million. German industrialcapacity was also much greater than that of France, and relativegrowth rates indicated that this gap was increasing.French grand strategy was determined by military doctrine.The overriding logic of grand strategy, to use the term ofClausewitz, was located in the military doctrine of the state.This can be seen by the nature of threats to the French state.In addition to the traditional problem of invasion, France wasthreatened by a strategic bombing campaign which would destroyits urban and industrial areas, and kill its civilians. Thisthreat, which had been recognized in the abstract since strategicbombing was first attempted in 1917, became all too real when theGerman rearmament program, including a vast increase in thestrength of the German Air Force, became apparent. However,France was also threatened by the nature of modern warfare. TheFrench had lost over 10% of their active male population in WorldWar One, with four times that number wounded (Posen 1984, 107).Even a victorious war could impose seemingly unbearable costs onthe state.The French believed that future conflicts would be foughtalong the lines of total war (Posen 1984, 109-110). Theresources of the state, in terms of industry, manpower andmorale, would be taxed to the limit. Land battles would be59extremely costly, offensives would be difficult and bloody; amajor war with Germany would be long, two to three years at theminimum (Young 1978, 18; Watt 1975, 69). Victory would go to theside that mustered superior resources in men and material.Economic warfare was thought to be as important as the fightingbetween armies (Posen 1984, 108-109; Bond 1975, 46). Thepriority of French planners, therefore, was to minimize the costto France while maximizing the resources available in the eventof a war.4.1 The French Strategic AgendaThe easiest and most painless way for the French to maximizethe resources available in the event of a war was through theformation of alliances. In the First World War the French hadused Russia to balance the superior power of Germany. However,after the reconstituting of borders in 1918, Poland andCzechoslovakia separated the Soviet Union from Germany. Thisgreatly complicated the alliance situation in Eastern Europe. By1935, France had obtained defensive alliances with both Polandand Czechoslovakia, as well as a preliminary accord with theSoviet Union (Nere 1975, chs 10 & 11; Albrecht-Carre 1961, ch 6).However, tension between the Poles, Czechs and Soviets was high,preventing them from acting as a cohesive bloc against Germany. 48French attempts to unite Yugoslavia, Rumania, Czechoslovakia and48 This can be seen most clearly during the Munich crisis. ThePoles were apathetic at best to the plight of the Czechs, as theytoo had their eyes set on a piece of Czech territory. Both thePoles and the Rumanians refused to allow Soviet units to crosstheir territory, preventing the Soviets from coming to the aid ofthe Czechs themselves. This despite obvious German hostilitytowards the Soviet Union, and Nazi claims to a substantialportion of Polish territory. (Jordan 1989, 131)60Poland into a military alliance against Germany were similarlyunsuccessful (Komjathy 1976; Lee 1942, 41-43; Jordan 1989, 129-131).The Soviet alliance was always on shaky ground politically;the Soviets greatly feared a French plot to involve them in a warwith Germany. The Soviets, wishing to avoid a repetition of1914, refused to enter into any agreement which prematurelybrought them into conflict with Germany. (Nere 1975 ch 11 & pg210) As well, the Soviet military had suffered greatly from anumber of purges in the late 1930s. By the end of the decadethere was great doubt as to the effectiveness of the Sovietmilitary, even if a political commitment could be obtained (Nere1975, 210). Without the Soviets, Poland and Czechoslovakia wereconsiderably less useful to the French. On the one hand, theydid possess considerable military strength, and could divert aportion of the German army in the case of a war. 49 Yet neitherstate was likely to be able to attack the German rear in the caseof a Schlieffen-like assault on France. Furthermore, the Frenchcommitment to defend these states lacked credibility. The Frenchmilitary refused to seriously consider offensive action after1934. Furthermore, it was also incapable of sending direct aidto the East. (Jordan 1989, 152-154).The French system of alliances with Eastern European stateswas only likely to be effective in a war where Germany deployedmuch, but not all, of her force in Central Europe. This wouldallow the French some options in the West without leading to the49 The Czechs fielded about 40 divisions in 1938, just over halfthe German total. On the whole they were well equipped and theirmorale was high.61premature collapse of Czechoslovakia or Poland. The continuedrearmament of Germany effectively ended this strategy byintimidating the French to the point where they were no longerwilling, or able, to maintain their alliance commitments (Jordan1989, 154).Throughout the 1930s the French tried to bring Great Britaininto a firm alliance against Germany (Nere 1975, 196). TheBritish had specialized assets that were crucial to the Frenchmilitary doctrine. British interceptors were needed to counterthe German air force, while the British navy was needed toblockade Germany and ensure a continuous flow of goods to France(Adamthwaite 1977, 162-165). However, the memory of the FirstWorld War was as strong in London as it was in Paris. So long asGermany did not appear to be a direct and immediate threat toFrance the British were unwilling to become involved in analliance with the French. When the threat became overt, as itdid during and after the Munich crisis of 1938, militarycooperation began between the two. It was only as war actuallyapproached that the French were able to elicit a militarycommitment from Great Britain (Nere 1975, 225; Bond and Murray1987, 100).Due in part to the reluctance of the British to ally withFrance, Belgium was crucial to French grand strategy and militarydoctrine. Until 1936 France and Belgium were military allies,however the rise of Hitler and German belligerence led theBelgians back to their traditional position of neutrality, in thehopes of avoiding a repetition of their World War One experiences(Nere 1975, 202-205). The French, in contrast, were determined62to draw the Belgians into a war. By fighting on Belgianterritory, rather than in France, the inevitable collateraldamage that accompanied modern warfare could be kept away fromFrance. An alliance with Belgium would also bring over a millionmen of military age to the French side. If a substantial part ofBelgium remained out of German hands a large Belgian army mightbe maintained in the field. This army would conduct operationsand sustain casualties that otherwise would have had to come fromFrench forces (Posen 1984, 238). Most importantly, an invasionof Belgium would force Great Britain into the war, if she werenot already committed. This would bring another large army tothe field, which would further reduce the overall costs toFrance.As the pattern of alliances shows, French strategy was quiteclearly defensive. French military doctrine held that a warwould be long and bloody (Young 1978, 16-22). French strategyresponded to this by attempting to maximize the defensivestrength of the French position through alliances andfortifications.Given their perception of the costs of war, the Frenchplaced a high value on deterrence policies. Unfortunately, theirmilitary doctrine did not provided them with the necessary toolsfor a successful policy. 50 The French military doctrine dictateda policy of defensive protection; offensive action was much too50 Deterrence was used effectively in 1934 with repect to Germanclaims on Austria, however this was only accomplished with theassistance of determined allies, in particular Italy. After thispoint, deterrence became largely ineffective and as such did notform a major element of French strategy (Lee 1942, 95-98;Albrecht-Carrie 1961, 262).63costly to be undertaken at the outset of a war. The onlydeterrence option open to French strategists was deterrencethrough denial. This made extended deterrence difficult, if notimpossible. The fact that France might be difficult to conquerhad little influence on the German decision to threatenCzechoslovakia.While the Germans could not be deterred, they might well bedefeated. The protective strategy of France was both logical andwell thought out. The military doctrine was highly responsive totechnological change, as was grand strategy. That the Frenchunderstanding of technology was completely wrong does not alterthe fact that planners were responsive to change. The Frenchnotion of war as a battle of attrition was based on technologyand the experience of the First World War (Posen 1984, 106-107).The plan to move into Belgium after that country withdrew fromits alliance with France in 1936 was based on the new mobility ofarmored and mechanized forces. The issue of success cannot beallowed to divert attention away from the sensitivity of thestrategic agenda to technology. It is this sensitivity thatseparates France in 1930 from Germany in 1900.5.0 Analysis: Technology and the Dominance of Military DoctrineFrench strategic thinking prior to the Second World Waroperated in a fundamentally different manner from German thinkingbefore 1914. The difference between the two cases revolvesaround the importance of technology to planning. For the French,military doctrine became a dominant factor in the process of64grand strategy formulation. This follows the prediction of thesecond model. As the French military doctrine was highlysensitive to technological change, there was in existence aprocess whereby technology affected military doctrine and thatdoctrine, in turn, affected grand strategy. The logic whichdrove planning was no longer dominated exclusively be politicalfactors. The influence of technology, in particular the highcosts of modern warfare also structured planning at the level ofmilitary doctrine.5.1 Technology, Military Doctrine and the Second Model ofInteraction.In the first case, German strategy making followed a top-down approach, whereby issues of grand strategy tended todominate those of military doctrine. The second model suggeststhat military doctrine can, in fact, influence grand strategy.In this model, grand strategy and doctrine are able to influenceeach other. The example of French security policy fits thismodel well.Prior to the Second World War, military doctrine had asignificant influence on French grand strategy. It did so due toa commonly held perception in France that military planning wasthe preeminent factor for national security. In the past,military planning had been important because faulty planningmight lead to the military defeat of the state. However, afterthe First World War, the importance of military doctrine rosewith the perception that warfare threatened the state regardlessof who won. Warfare itself had become a threat to the state, asopposed to simply defeat.65The dominance of military doctrine was demonstrated by thefact that doctrinal issues greatly influenced the nature of thestrategic agenda. Alliances were constructed, and in the case ofCzechoslovakia, abandoned, on the basis of military realities.The preference for deterrence, as well as its abject failure, wasdetermined by military doctrine. Perceptions about the use offorce and the relative merits of offensive and defensive actionwere all conditioned by a notion of warfare that had its roots inthe military doctrine.Therefore, while some threats to national security continuedto be located in competitor states, other threats arose throughthe conduct of warfare, ie the military doctrine of the state.This is crucial to the understanding of the rising importance oftechnology to national defense planning. So long as militaryplanners remain responsive to technological change, technologyand doctrine will rise in importance simultaneously. In the caseof France, military planning was influenced by beliefs aboutmobility, fortifications and the effect of firepower on thebattlefield. This, in turn, led French planners to believe thatthe next war would be one of attrition, rather than maneuver.This belief directed much, if not all, of French grand strategy.6.0 ConclusionFor Clausewitz, war had to be subordinated to policy, as itwas policy that gave logic to the conduct of war. For Frenchstrategists, policy had to be subordinated to war; the cost ofsubordinating war to policy had proven too high between 1914 and661918. This accounts for the difference between the twoexplanatory models, as well as the difference between thepolicies of Germany in the first case and France in the second.The single greatest result of the First World War was that in itsaftermath, security planners ceased to consider warfare simplythe continuation of policy by other means. Whereas in the pastmilitary doctrine had been perceived exclusively as a mechanismthrough which threats to the state could be countered, after 1918decision makers had to face the fact that threats could originatewithin doctrine itself. The new importance of doctrine alsomarked a major leap in the importance of technology.Technological change was responsible for the increaseddestructiveness of war in the first place. As well, militaryplanners sought to counter the problems presented by technologywith technology.The traditional threat to the state, armed invasion, couldbe countered with diplomacy, traditional military resources ormilitary innovations which might or might not involve technology.Therefore, in the first case it was possible to present arational policy for the security of the state that to a largeextent ignored the impact of changes in technology. However, thedestruction of war, due to technology, could only be counteredby further technological innovations. Once deployed, moredestructive weapons systems could not be ignored or removed. Theonly option available to states was to seek even bettertechnology to deal with the increased destructiveness of weapons.However, it would be wrong to suggest that the new threat thatarose during the inter-war years dominated the other threats in67the international environment. The threat of a bloody war ofattrition conditioned French planning, however the end goal wasstill victory in a war. It would take the invention of nuclearweapons to make the threat of war the dominant factor in nationalsecurity planning.68V/ THE UNITED STATES 1960-1969: TECHNOLOGY AND THE PROBLEMS OFSTRATEGIC PARADOXI just could not understand why our surroundings hadchanged so greatly in one instant...I thought it mighthave been something which had nothing to do with thewar- the collapse of the earth, which it was said wouldtake place at the end of the world, and which I hadread about as a child. (Yoko Ota, writer and Hiroshimasurvivor, quoted in Schell 1989, 272)Thus far the chief purpose of our militaryestablishment has been to win wars, From now on itschief purpose must be to avert them. (Brodie 1946, 76)1.0 IntroductionNuclear weapons fundamentally altered the very roots of thenational security problem. For the first time in history, stateswere faced with the possibility of almost instantaneousdevastation, against which there was no defense. Inunderstanding the full impact of nuclear weapons on nationalsecurity policy, it is necessary to consider the third model ofinteraction. It is through this model that the dramatic andrevolutionary affect of nuclear weapons can best be illustrated.This chapter represents the culmination of the trendsidentified in chapters two and three. Technological change was,by 1960, the dominant factor in national defense planning.Nuclear weapons and their delivery systems defined the termswithin which grand strategy and military doctrine could operate.Furthermore, the rapid pace of innovation made technology evenmore important. Significant, if not crucial, advantages could begained by the state that maintained even a marginal lead intechnological development.692.0 New Technology: MAD and Unresolvable VulnerabilityThis case will examine changes in U.S. policy between 1960and 1969. Therefore, relevant technological change will be thatthat took place between 1940, when the second case ended, and theearly 1960s, when grand strategy and military doctrine were beingdevised. It will be necessary, to a degree, to divide changeinto sub-areas within this period in order to understand theprogression of the nuclear revolution.2.1 The Technological PackageThe technological package in the 1960s placed the state in asituation of unresolvable vulnerability. Regardless oftechnological innovations, clever military planning or superbdiplomacy, there was nothing that decision makers could do toprevent an enemy from totally destroying the state and itsassets, either through an attack or retaliation, if it chose todo so. 51 While conventional warfare remained basically unchangedfrom the form it took during the Second World War, strategicwarfare changed dramatically. Bombers and missiles armed withnuclear weapons altered the whole notion of offense and defensein international relations (Quester 1977, 156-157). In the past,it had been possible to argue that either offensive or defensivemilitary action had some form of advantage; by the 1960s it wasclear that offensive technology had rendered defensive actionmeaningless (Brodie 1959, 200-202). In the 1930s the axiom "thebomber will always get through" provided the rationale for fears51 In keeping with the previous chapters, this case deals onlywith the great powers of the time, in this instance the nuclearsuperpowers.70of strategic bombing. However, as the Second World War showed,the bomber getting through was not enough to destroy a state.Once the bomber was armed with a nuclear warhead, however, thestate was subject to threats from which there was no escape.2.2 Specific Technological ChangesConventional weaponry changed little during this period.While the capabilities of equipment were improved, fewsignificant innovations were developed. New aircraft werefaster, better armed and had longer ranges. Tanks were betterarmored and had longer ranged guns (Dupuy 1987, 208-209).Strategic mobility was also greatly enhanced, primarily by thedevelopment of huge transport aircraft that could move men andsupplies huge distances in a very short period of time (Haffa1984, 29-30). On the whole, however, the armed forces of the1960s did not look markedly different from those of the SecondWorld War. Principles of organization, as well as basic tactics,remained the same. For example, the tanks of the era may havebeen better than their predecessors, however, they remainedessentially the same type of fighting vehicle, with the same role(Liddell Hart 1960, 177).The same cannot be said for strategic weaponry. Whilenuclear weapons did make an appearance in the Second World War,their impact on the eventual outcome of that conflict wasmarginal at best. 52 Their influence on international politics inthe post war period, on the other hand, was very great (Hertz1959; Jervis 1989; Mandelbaum 1979). Due to the destructive52 Marginal in the sense that the victors in the war had alreadybeen decided, and the only role left to nuclear weapons was withrespect to the length of the conflict (Keegan 1989, 575-585).71nature of nuclear weapons, one reasonably accurate warhead waslikely to destroy all but the most hardened and protected targets(Rumble 1985, 130-134). Current methods of delivery were suchthat many warheads could be expected to arrive on target in theevent of a war. Strategic targets could be attacked by longrange bombers or ICBMs, while operational or tactical targetscould be hit by a plethora of battlefield delivery systems(Brodie 1959, 173-180).By 1965, Submarines, armed with nuclear missiles, could notonly remain at sea but could actually remain submerged for monthsat a time (Scoville 1972, 31). This had profound implicationsnot only for the conduct of conventional warfare but also fornuclear planning. Missile carrying submarines became virtuallyinvulnerable, as they were impossible to locate or track reliably(Scoville 1972, 30-31). This provided the great powers with aretaliatory capability which could not be defended against, aslaunchers could not be destroyed, and the missile could not beintercepted. 53 The invulnerability of missile submarines formedthe cornerstone of mutually assured destruction.Another important area of new technology was in the field ofcommunications and reconnaissance. Advanced communications53 The lack of defense against nuclear weapons was due to thefact that defensive systems, while capable of interdicting orsuppressing many launchers, were nowhere near 100% effective, norwere they likely to be at any time in the reasonable future.Most air defense networks, for instance, could not destroy morethan 25-40% of an attacking force, at the most. In aconventional war this was acceptable because many attacks wouldbe needed to destroy a target, and any attacking force suffering25% casualties over a number of attacks would rapidly cease to beeffective. Given the destructiveness of a single nuclear weapon,such a scheme was practically irrelevant (Brodie 1959, 191-202;Drell and Panofsky 1984, 313).72allowed for near instantaneous information relays around theworld. This was best displayed in the case of the Hot Linebetween Moscow and Washington, set up after the Cuban MissileCrisis, which allowed the Soviet and American leaders to speakdirectly to each other in times of crisis. (Blechman 1988, 469-471) Photographic reconnaissance satellites were also militarilyimportant, as they provided information on enemy dispositions andforce structure which was vital to rational planning. With thedevelopment of such satellites, predictions about thecapabilities of ones' opponents could be made with much morecertainty than in the past, avoiding the mistakes that had beenmade as a result of the "Bomber" and "Missile" gaps in the 1950s(Gaddis 1988, 357-359). The change in technology, then, wasnothing short of revolutionary. As authors such as BernardBrodie suggested as early as 1946, its impact on strategy wasexpected to be no less spectacular (Brodie 1946).2.3 Nuclear Weapons and Conceptual Changes in Strategy andDoctrine: A First Cut.Part of the nuclear revolution was the need toreconceptualize certain key elements of national security policy.As with other technological changes, nuclear weapons led tochanges in both military doctrine and grand strategy. However,they also led to fundamental changes in key security conceptswhich had not previously been subject to the influence oftechnology.Hertz has argued that nuclear weapons and modern deliverysystems put an end to the impermeability of the state:Total war, as distinguished from both kinds of73traditional war, limited and unlimited, is involvedwith developments in warfare which enable belligerentsto overleap or by-pass the traditional hard-shelldefense of the state. As soon as this happens, thetraditional relationship between war, on the one hand,and territorial sovereignty and power, on the other, isaltered decisively. (Hertz 1959, 97).The vulnerability of the state had immense consequences forthe use of both deterrence and protection strategies. In extremecases, there was no longer any method for protecting the statefrom an all out attack. This not only put more emphasis ondeterrence, but it simultaneously made the use of threats moredifficult. Under the traditional notion of deterrence, the statecould not only threaten to punish an opponent, but it could alsothreaten to make itself invulnerable to coercion. The fact thatthis invulnerability had disappeared created major problems fordeterrence credibility. A threat which carried with it the seedsof one's own destruction was simply not believable. This wasparticularly the case with respect to extended deterrence, wherethe activities that the state hoped to deter did not directlythreaten its security.The notion of vulnerability must be conditioned by theinvulnerability of the great powers to traditional threats.While both the United States and the Soviet Union faced asituation of mutual, unresolvable vulnerability because of theirnuclear arsenals, these same arsenals made them invulnerable toconventional invasions or coercion which had traditionally beenat the heart of the security problem for great powers.By the 1950s, the physical invasion of the United States wasno longer an issue for security planners (Art 1991, 11). Quiteaside from the geographical difficulties involved, the Americannuclear arsenal made a conventional attack extremely unlikely.74However, many threats perceived by the Americans did not directlyrelate to the physical security of the United States itself. 54To understand how the state dealt with this new situation it isnecessary to first consider early nuclear planning, followed by amore in-depth examination of American strategy in the 1960s.3.0 American National Security Policy in the Early Nuclear AgeWhile changes were taking place at the conceptual level ofnational security policy, it took some time for these changes tohave any influence over actual grand strategy and militarydoctrine. The initial American response to the nuclearrevolution was to attempt to make nuclear weapons fit withtraditional notions of security and security planning. Oldnotions of both deterrence and protection still prevailed at theplanning level.The American grand strategy of the 1950s revolved around theconcept of containment. The primary threat to the United Stateswas the spread of Soviet power and influence on a world-widebasis, rather than an actual physical invasion of the continentalUnited States (caddis 1982, 201). The primary goal of Americansecurity policy as a whole was, therefore, the containment ofSoviet power and influence to the areas where it already was incontrol.The American military doctrine in the 1950s revolved around54 Art has even gone so far as to argue that issues such as thesecurity of Europe and Asia did not relate to American securityeven indirectly, and that the American commitment to the defenseof these areas had nothing to do with the security of the UnitedStates itself (Art 1991, 18).75the concept of massive retaliation. Under massive retaliation,if the Soviet Union made an aggressive move against Americanforces somewhere in the world, the United States would respondwith a massive nuclear bombardment of the Soviet Union and itsCommunist allies (Rumble 1985, 47; Ball 1986, 62). There was nolatitude for discrimination among the Communist states, and nooptions for anything less than an all out attack (Sagan 1989,28). The Communist bloc was believed to be deterred by themassive amount of damage that they would sustain if an all outnuclear attack was launched. The SIOP, the planning documentwhich coordinates American nuclear targeting, reflected massiveretaliation by presenting a targeting structure which was highlyinflexible. 55Massive retaliation was possible because the Soviet Unionlacked a nuclear retaliatory capability. This allowed Americanmilitary planners to consider nuclear weapons along conventionallines, as they themselves did not have to face the consequencesof a nuclear attack. Therefore, traditional notions, inparticular the impermeability of the state, were still held to bean important and viable element of grand strategy. While massiveretaliation sought to use deterrence to ensure the security ofthe United States, it also relied on the premise that ifdeterrence failed the protective element of the doctrine could beused to solve the security problems of the state (Sagan 1989, 20-25). Therefore, if the Soviets were not deterred, the UnitedStates could protect itself through an offensive protection55 SIOP is an acronym for Single Integrated Operational Plan(Sagan 1989, 25-26).76strategy involving the elimination of the threat throughstrategic nuclear attacks.The ability of the United States to remove the Soviet threatthrough military action gave rise to a argument for preventivenuclear war (Trachtenberg 1991, 17-25). The logic behind thisargument was that sooner or later the Soviets would develop thestrength to match the United States, and that, therefore, theUnited States should attack while it still held a decisiveadvantage. 56 While the notion was not part of official policy,it did have some followers in the defense establishment.Furthermore, the was a common perception within the Kennedyadministration that massive retaliation did require a strategy ofpreemption in times of crisis. Therefore, it was not until the1960s, when members of the Kennedy administration began torethink both grand strategy and military doctrine, that theinfluence of nuclear technology on national security planningattained its true level of importance.4.0 The Kennedy Administration, Grand Strategy, Containment andFlexible Response: Everything is ImportantWhen John F. Kennedy was elected President of the UnitedStates in November of 1960, he and his Secretary for Defense,Robert McNamara, brought to office a desire to revise Americandefense planning along rational and analytically based lines56 In fact, as Trachtenberg notes, there was considerable concernthat the Soviets were capable of a preemptive attack during the1950s. This demonstrates, on the one hand, that weaponstechnology had not yet created the conditions for MAD, while atthe same time indicating that planners were not yetpsychologically prepared to accept assured destruction either(Trachtenberg 1991, 17-26).77(Murdock 1974, 44-45; Palmer 1978, 3-10). With the rise ofSoviet nuclear capabilities, Kennedy felt that the United Statesrequired both a new grand strategy and a new military doctrine(Kahan 1975, 74). Kennedy was unhappy with the nuclear planningof the previous administration. He felt that it was dangerous,unresponsive to changes, both in the Soviet Union and the worldat large, and that it was likely to be ineffective in the future(Gaddis 1982, 202-205).The strategy of massive retaliation was perceived to beflawed both because it was unable to contain the expansion ofSoviet influence and because it did not recognize the realitiesof the nuclear balance. Once the Soviets obtained a retaliatorycapability, the reliance on an all out nuclear strike becamedangerous. The strategy of massive retaliation was consideredboth inflexible and unlikely to succeed. The biggest weaknesslay with the strategy's lack of feasible options, shoulddeterrence fail (Gaddis 1982, 203; Ball 1986, 62). Inparticular, massive retaliation was considered incapable ofdealing with the spread of Communist governments in the ThirdWorld. Threatening the entire Communist bloc with nucleardevastation over such an issue was not credible, even during theUS nuclear monopoly; once the Soviets began to gain a retaliatorycapacity it was not only incredible, but also dangerous (Rumble1985, 49).At the heart of Kennedy's desire to revise American nationalsecurity policy was the belief that threats to American securityhad changed. While the source of threats, basically theexpansion of Soviet power, had not changed, the methodology78behind the Soviet threat had. Nuclear weapons divided threats tothe state into two categories, nuclear and non-nuclear. Nuclearthreats held the potential for massive destruction on both sidesof the conflict. The recognition of mutually assured destructionby the Americans in 1963 marked both the end of any practicalnotional of winnable total war and the acceptance of the newconcepts associated with nuclear weapons. Under MAD, thegreatest threat to the state was a nuclear war, regardless of thepolitical issues and irrespective of any notion of winners andlosers (Jervis 1989, 96-97).Threats to the security of the United States also existed atlevels below that of strategic nuclear war. The Kennedyadministration believed that the security of the United Stateswas directly linked to the "preservation of diversity" ininternational politics (Gaddis 1982, 201). In more plainlanguage, this translated into the preservation of non-communistgovernments which would not align with the Soviets against theUnited States. Threats were, therefore, conceptualized in aglobal sense. (McNamara 1968, 5-8)4.1 Flexible Response as a Grand StrategyThe term flexible response has been used to refer to boththe grand strategy and the military doctrine of the United Statesduring this period (See Gaddis 1982, chs 7-8). In this chapter,it will be used to refer to the grand strategy rather thanmilitary doctrine. The concepts associated with flexibleresponse influenced military doctrine through grand strategy,rather than independently of it. Flexible response originatedwith a group of academics and strategists based at the RAND79corporation in California (Kaplan 1983; Brown 1983, 161-163). Inthe 1950s, writers such as Bernard Brodie and Herman Kahn putforward arguments about controlled escalation and thepossibilities for limited nuclear war that provided the logic forboth the strategy of flexible response and its military doctrine(Brodie 1959; Kahn 1965).Flexible response arose as an alternative to massiveretaliation, based on offering policy makers a wide variety ofoptions which could be tailored to the specifics of a givensituation (Brown 1983, 162-165). The masterminds of flexibleresponse assumed that both the United States and the Soviet Unioncould be relied upon to act rationally in a conflict situation.Given this assumption of rationality, strategists planned to beable to analyze any given conflict and prescribe a policy whichcould lead to a U.S. victory (Palmer 1978, 3-5). While Kennedyand his advisors rejected the methods of retaliation, they neverconsidered revising containment as an overall policy objective.Instead, they sought a more rational set of methods through whichthe Soviets might be contained.Flexible response introduced the notion of distinct levelsof conflict (Freedman 1981, 233-234). In the past, there hadbeen a recognition that war could be conducted at differentlevels of intensity, however there was no real theory of limitedwar until the late 1950s. 57 Nuclear weapons put a priority on57 Clausewitz discussed the possibility of conducting wars avarying levels of intensity, depending on the political stakes.However, there was little consideration in his work for thepossibility that the stakes of warfare might be raised bytechnology, rather than politics (Clausewitz 1976, 78 -81). Thetheory of limited war as it is understood today was first laidout by Robert Osgood in 1957 (See Osgood 1957, also Garnett1975).80thinking about limited war because of the costs of a "total" war(Osgood 1957, 4-5). Since the threat of a nuclear holocaustexisted congruently to the threat of Soviet expansion, Americanstrategists had to develop a method for contesting Soviet moveswithout necessarily risking nuclear war. Therefore, they soughtto meet the Soviets at lower levels of conflict and to keep themat these levels if at all possible. The theory of limited warand levels of conflict provided them with a method for doing so:Limited wars were to be fought for ends far short ofthe complete subordination of one states will toanother's, using means that involve far less than thetotal military resources of the belligerents and leavethe civilian life and the armed forces of thebelligerents largely intact. (Osgood 1979, 3)The notion of levels of conflict, then, became a definingfactor in grand strategy.Flexible response was a strategy of pragmatism. Its primarygoal was to structure international conflict; this would do twothings. First, it would allow American strategists to properlyallocate resources, matching actions with the appropriate levelsof conflict. Second, by structuring conflict, and dividing itinto distinct levels, it was hoped that the United States couldexert some control over the escalation of conflict. 58Another important aspect of the strategy was theinterconnection between nuclear and non-nuclear forces. It was58 Escalation at the level of grand strategy was not limited tomilitary action. Instead, escalation could also refer todiplomatic pressure, alliance building or other politicalactivities. Part of the flexible response strategy involvedmeeting social and ideological threats with social andideological methods. Povery had to be combatted with economicaid. The acceptance of Communism as a global challenge entailedthe acceptance of means and ends not previously associated withnational defense planning (Gaddis 1982, 225).81quite possible, under flexible response, that an opponent who wasstymied at one level of conflict might seek victory by moving upto another level, presumably where he held an advantage (Kahn,1965). This reinforced the need for the United States to besuperior at all possible levels. If this were the case, thenthere would be no incentive for the Soviets to escalate. On theother hand, if the United States faced a difficult situation, itcould escalate or threaten escalation to provide a favorablesettlement (Kahan 1975, 90-91; Gaddis 1982, 231-232).4.2 The Strategic AgendaThe role of alliances changed substantially from 1930 to1960, although they remained an important element of grandstrategy. The key purpose of alliances in the 1960s was to allowthe United States to incorporate other states into its overallcontainment strategy vis a vis the Soviet Union (Gaddis 1982,153-154, 223). In a limited sense, alliances both maximizedpower and deferred the costs of containment (See Osgood 1968, 22-23). However, neither of these goals was central to the alliancesystem. The American alliance with South Vietnam, for instance,was actually a net loser in terms of military power and costs,because it required a substantial military commitment from theUnited States simply to survive. By incorporating states into analliance, the U.S. established a foothold from which it couldcontain the Soviets (Gaddis 1982, 153-154). American involvementin these alliances differed, depending on perceptions regardingthe appropriate level of conflict (Osgood 1968, chs 4 & 5).Therefore, in Europe the United States sought to extend itsnuclear deterrent to cover the NATO countries, while in South82East Asia more limited involvement was deemed appropriate. 59 Thecommon theme to all of the alliances made or used during thisperiod was that they all encouraged opposition to the SovietUnion and allowed the United States to become involved to thedegree that it felt was necessary. 60The methods by which the U.S. sought to defend its allieswere largely the result of a paradoxical view of the use offorce. While the overall strategy sought to enhance deterrence,and therefore avoid the use of force, the general perceptionamong the architects of flexible response was that in order to dothis, the United States had to be willing and able to use forceat any time (Garnett 1975, 116). The goal of avoiding total warwas perceived to be possible only if the state was willing torisk limited wars under certain conditions (Brown 1983, 162).Given this view of force at the level of grand strategy, theorientation of flexible response was bound to be defensive. 61 Asmilitary and technological factors supported deterrence, the mostrational goal for American grand strategy was the containment ofthe Soviet Union. Mutual assured destruction negated thepossibility of significant offensive action at the level of grand59 Limited in the sense that it was lower on the ladder ofescalation. While the United States eventually became veryheavily involved in the war in Vietnam, extended nucleardeterrence was never considered appropriate for this theatre.60 Osgood argued in 1968 that this had been the case in the pastand that the United States had to concentrate on keepingcommitments in line with appropriate responses in the future(Osgood 1968, 158-159).61 At least with respect to the Soviet Union. In the case ofintervention in the Third World some activities undertaken underflexible response were highly offensive vis a vis the specificcountries in question.83strategy. The fear of nuclear war changed the relationshipbetween deterrence and defense for national security planning.Deterrence was the dominant factor in flexible response (Gaddis1982, ch 6; Freedman 1981, 232-234). The basic goal of flexibleresponse was to strengthen the credibility of deterrence (Brown1983, 162-163).Protection also changed dramatically as a result of nuclearweapons. Mutually assured destruction was based on the principleof mutual and unresolvable vulnerability; defense in thetraditional sense no longer existed (Jervis 1989, 79). Intheory, the state could be protected by a preemptive strike onthe nuclear arsenal of ones' opponent, if this strike could bereasonably assured of destroying all or most of the enemy'snuclear weapons. However, the development of the missilecarrying nuclear submarine ended, once and for all, the potentialfor a preemptive first strike. Protective measures were stilluseful for defending American interests abroad, particularly inareas where the stakes were not high enough to warrant nuclearescalation, such as Vietnam (See Herring 1979; Karnow 1983).However, protective measures were limited to areas where thestakes involved, and therefore the risk of nuclear war, wererelatively low.Flexible response eliminated the clear distinction betweendeterrence and defense. 62 In the past, the two concepts could beseparated by the actual use of forces in action. Generally, oncemilitary forces had been used, one could argue that deterrence62 Although many strategists and political scientists continue tothink in these terms. See Snyder 1961 for one example.84had given way to defense (Snyder 1961, 3-5). However, under thedifferent levels of action that made up the flexible responsestrategy, armed forces could be used actively in combat inpursuit of deterrence as well as defense. To understand why thisis so it is necessary to consider the operational militaryaspects of flexible response.5.0 Flexible Response and Military Doctrine: Everything isConnectedThe military doctrine for flexible response was createdspecifically to meet the needs of the grand strategy. It was, inessence, a blueprint for how the U.S. military could meetmilitary threats at all levels of conflict on a global scale(Gaddis 1982, 214-215). Because the whole object of flexibleresponse was to divide issues into different levels, it will beuseful to consider the military doctrine associated with thestrategy as a series of levels of military action. These levelswere: one, strategic nuclear war; two, large scale conventionalwar; and three, unconventional war. Within each major levelthere were then a number of sub-levels, depending on the specificsituation and the resources at hand.5.1 Strategic Nuclear WarThe credibility of massive retaliation was weak for tworeasons. First, most Soviet moves were expected to come at alevel far below that of total nuclear war (Gaddis 1982, 214-215;Freedman 1981, 230; Brown 1963, 163). The threat to respond to alimited war, guerrilla conflict or even a full scale conventionalwar with nuclear weapons was simply not believable. Second, as85the Soviet nuclear arsenal developed, and the strategicrelationship between the superpowers approached that of mutuallyassured destruction, the ability to the United States todevastate the Soviet Union without suffering similar damage inreturn became extremely tenuous (Buzan 1987, 146).American strategists hoped to reintroduce credibility intotheir military doctrine by widening the range of optionsavailable to the President in the event of a war. In order to dothis, it was believed, the American military doctrine had toinclude planning for the rational prosecution of a nuclear war.If the Soviets believed that American strategists were preparedto fight a nuclear war, they would be deterred from ever startingone. Furthermore, the threat of controlled nuclear escalationcould be used both to limit and control a nuclear war and toachieve goals below the level of nuclear conflict (Smoke andGeorge 1974, 31).Robert McNamara, the Secretary for Defense under Kennedy andJohnson, was chiefly responsible for overseeing the developmentof nuclear planning in this period. McNamara presided over botha radical revision in nuclear targeting, and a massive buildup inequipment. In the first few years of the Kennedy administration,McNamara revised the SIOP in order to provide the United Stateswith a more flexible war fighting plan. Initially, McNamarawished to follow a "no cities" targeting program.The US has come to the conclusion that to the extentfeasible basic military strategy in a possible generalnuclear war should be approached in much the same waythat more conventional military operations have beenregarded in the past. That is to say, principalmilitary objectives, in the event of a nuclear warstemming from a major attack on the Alliance, should bethe destruction of the enemy's military forces, not his86civilian population. (McNamara 1962)Under this program, the United States would seek to hit militarytargets in the Soviet Union, rather than civilian centers (Marteland Savage 1986, 11). This would allow the United States to holdSoviet cities hostage during a nuclear war, hopefully providingthe Americans with bargaining leverage with which they could endthe conflict.The very strength and nature of the Alliance forcesmakes it possible for us to retain, even in the face ofa massive surprise attack, sufficient reserve strikingpower to destroy an enemy society if driven to it. Inother words we are giving a possible opponent thestrongest possible incentive to refrain from strikingour own cities. (McNamara 1962)In order for this sort of a scheme to be effective, the UnitedStates had to be able to absorb a Soviet first strike and stillhave enough strategic capability not only to strike back butactually to exert controlled pressure over time to force a Sovietsurrender (McNamara 1962; Martel and Savage 1986, 10-11; Ball1986, 64n). It was also hoped that the Soviets could beencouraged to follow a complimentary targeting doctrine, therebyminimizing the damage to American cities (McNamara 1962).Despite this apparent relapse into Clausewitzian thinking,McNamara could not avoid the consequences of MAD, and thereforehad to retreat somewhat from a pure warfighting strategy by themid 1960s (Sagan 1989, 34-37).To fight a nuclear war, a more diverse and advanced nucleararsenal was needed. More accurate weapons were needed to hitmilitary targets effectively. As well, given the vast number ofpossible military targets, combined with the desire by McNamaraand others to maximize flexibility in nuclear targeting, manymore weapons were required. By the end of the Johnson87administration the American strategic nuclear arsenal had climbedfrom 3127 to 4736 warheads (SIPRI 1990, 23).Flexible response illustrates one of the fundamentalparadoxes of nuclear planning in general. It revolves around theneed, on one hand, to recognize and deal with the condition ofMAD, and on the other hand, the need to be prepared to fight andwin a nuclear war in order to enhance deterrence credibility.The contradiction between these two issues was not lost onAmerican planners. However, because of the situation in Europeand elsewhere it was a difficult one to resolve.5.2 Extended Deterrence in EuropeOne of the primary reasons that American planning had toaccept the MAD versus war fighting paradox was because of theproblems of extended deterrence in Europe. American militaryplanners wanted to use controlled escalation to deter a Sovietattack on the NATO alliance (Rumble 1985, 54; Cimbala 1987). Intheory, according to the flexible response strategy, the threatof a conventional attack in Europe should have been counteredwith a conventional defense. Only if this defense failed wouldthe United States use the ladder of escalation to force afavorable outcome.In practice this was somewhat difficult to implement. 63There was a strong perception among NATO states that the Soviet63 Despite the lack of faith in a conventional deterrent, USconventional forces were strengthened under Kennedy, primarily inorder to enhance deterrence credibility as per the flexibleresponse doctrine. While this effort may have convinced somepeople that a war would not have to escalate to the nuclear levelimmediately, few strategists, on either side of the Atlantic,believed that NATO could defeat the Soviets in a purelyconventional contest (McNamara 1962; Kaufman 1982, 5-6; Kahan1975, 76-77).88advantage in conventional forces was so great that a conventionalstrategy was not likely to be fruitful (Brown 1983, 176).Therefore, the link between conventional and nuclear capabilitiesin NATO had to be reinforced in keeping with the concept of aladder of escalation (Kahan 1975, 92). Tactical nuclear weaponswere used to link the American strategic arsenal to theconventional balance of forces on the ground in Europe (Sagan1989, 378-39). In the event of a Soviet invasion the initialdefense would be purely conventional. If this failed, then thelimited use of nuclear weapons would begin. A gradual upwardescalation would be used to exert pressure on the Soviets,forcing them to concede." Once again, it was hoped that controlof the ladder of escalation could be used to force a politicalsettlement before the war reached the level of strategic counter-city strikes.5.3 Escalation Dominance and Flexible Response in the ThirdWorld.Outside Europe, similar notions of escalation dominance wereused to deal with threats in the Third World. Kennedy and hisadvisors recognized that military action in the Third World waslikely to take new and unconventional forms (Gaddis 1982, 216;Karnow 1983, ch 7). Rather than attempt to deter or meet suchaction with traditional responses, as massive retaliation had,Kennedy sought to meet unconventional threats with unconventionalresponses. In keeping with the concept of flexible response, the64 McNamara was determined to retain limited nuclear options inEurope. One of his main changes to NATO nuclear doctrine was tomake the proposed nuclear response initially very limited. Fromthis point forward the response would always be both controlledand restrained (McNamara 1962; Sagan 1989, 39).89key elements to the Third World section of U.S. military doctrinewere flexible options, controlled pressure through the ladder ofescalation, and initially symmetrical response to new threats.In practice, this amounted to a plan whereby the United Stateswould meet low intensity conflict with symmetrical responses; ifsuch action failed, then military planners had the option ofescalating to the next level of conflict (Gaddis 1982, 243-246).The war in Vietnam is possibly the best example of how thisworked in practice." In Vietnam, American strategistsidentified the initial problem as a guerrilla insurgency.Therefore, the initial response was a counterinsurgency program(Herring 1986, 78). However, when this program failed, theUnited States escalated by deepening its military commitment tothe war. Punitive bombing raids and conventional military forceswere used to move the conflict up the ladder of escalation(Gaddis 1982, 247-248). At each point great care was taken toensure that the escalatory process was under control." Thepurpose of the escalation was not so much to win the war throughdirect action as to exert controlled pressure on the enemy, inthis case North Vietnam (Gaddis 1982, ch 8). The key to victory,according to military doctrine, was to compel the North towithdraw from the conflict. Once this was accomplished, amilitary and political victory would be forthcoming.There is a clear and consistent symmetry between the grand65 See Gelb and Betts 1979.66 One of the great failings of flexible response in Vietnam wasthat while the United States was able to completely control theescalation of the war, this did not translate into any controlover the conflict itself.90strategy and the military doctrine of the United States duringthe 1960s. The repudiation of the strategy of massiveretaliation provided the Kennedy administration with theopportunity to totally rethink both strategy and doctrine, andthe perception that the resources of the United States werevirtually endless allowed it to act on its beliefs.6.0 Conceptual Changes and the Selective Defense of EverythingTechnology had a decisive impact on the formulation offlexible response in two ways. First, many of the specificpolicies involved in flexible response relied on militarycapabilities only available due to advanced technology. Forinstance, the ability to threaten escalation virtually anywherein the world was largely the result of advanced transportationand communications technology. In Europe, the connection betweenthe nuclear and non-nuclear levels of conflict rested on theexistence of sizeable numbers of tactical nuclear weapons, alsothe result of technological innovation.Second, technology dictated the strategic environment withinwhich American strategists had to operate during the 1960s.Threats to the state changed drastically, at least for the greatpowers. New threats required a new type of strategy to providesecurity for the state. Furthermore, the very nature of theplanning process was altered by technology. The whole notion ofa separation between grand strategy and operational militaryissues became obsolete in the wake of mutually assureddestruction.91Technology also led to a change in the nature of deterrenceas well. In the past, deterrence had been based on the threat ofmilitary defeat. Once the Soviets obtained nuclear weapons anddelivery systems capable of inflicting severe damage on theUnited States, deterrence threats ceased to revolve around thefear of defeat. Instead, they revolved around the fear of anuclear war. This altered the nature of deterrence by making thethreatened action unavoidable, while at the same time making thethreat itself less credible. While it was less likely that astate would start a war which was likely to destroy allcombatants, once started the destruction could not be avoided.Flexible response sought to address the new conceptualproblems associated with deterrence credibility in the age ofmutually assured destruction. In order to strengthen deterrence,a state had to convince its opponents that it would indeed starta nuclear war, if it felt that such action was necessary. Inorder for the nuclear threat to be credible, America had to havea rational plan for the conduct of nuclear war. This was thecase even if the original rationale for deterrence in the firstplace was that in the event of a war both sides would lose.In the first model, the logic which shaped military doctrinewas derived from political factors. This was in keeping with theClausewitzian notion of strategy making. According to the thirdmodel, the logic which defined both grand strategy and militarydoctrine was derived from MAD. In this sense, it can be arguedthat technology, which created the conditions of MAD, alsodominated the national security process.This confused the distinction between military doctrine and92grand strategy. In many ways, issues of nuclear planning at thelevel of military doctrine are more important than non-nuclearissues at the level of grand strategy. However, nuclear strategyissues dominate both strategy and military doctrine, includingmilitary nuclear issues. For the Kennedy administration, theapparent answer to these new priorities was to create anintegrated plan where all issues of grand strategy and militarydoctrine were coordinated. The logic of flexible response was,therefore, applied to strategy and doctrine over a wide range ofdifferent problems and threats. Overall consistency was neededto control the use of nuclear weapons and to rationalize allother policies to the realities of nuclear planning.7.0 ConclusionBy the 1960s, technology had fundamentally altered thenature of both warfare and national security. It was no longerpossible to guarantee, or even to attempt to guarantee, theabsolute protection of the state from all threats. The threat ofnuclear war was unresolvable; even the great powers had tocondition their defense policies upon their mutual vulnerability.This fact changed the nature of security planning. In theabstract, threats to the state changed completely, as traditionalones such as direct invasion disappeared, while new ones such asnuclear annihilation arose.A changed environment led to changed responses. Thestrategic agenda, from alliances on down to deterrence anddefense, was altered by the new requirements of national93security. This was partly due to new threats, and partly due toother changed conditions within the strategic environment. Inthe case of alliances, part of the change was due to the effectof the nuclear revolution on the distribution of power within theinternational system. The nuclear superpowers were so muchstronger than other states that alliances were not useful forpower balancing. Even nuclear armed allies like France andBritain did not contribute substantially to the security of theUnited States.94VI/ CONCLUSIONAt the outset of this thesis, two primary questions wereraised: 1) How have national security strategies changed in thetwentieth century; and 2) How has technology been a factor inthis change? Change in national security policy in the twentiethcentury has been profound. Almost no aspect of national defenseplanning has been left unaltered. Furthermore, the dominantforce behind this change has been technological innovation.Planning for the security of the state has changed in twofundamental ways. First, the nature of the threats to the statehave been dramatically altered. Second, the methods by whichstates seek to address these threats has also changed. Change inthese two categories has happened simultaneously, as both springfrom innovation at the level of military doctrine. It is,therefore, incorrect to argue that either of these types ofchange has driven the other.Changes in the nature of threats can be divided into twoareas: the location of threats, and the expected results ofthreats. Change in the location of threats was due to the risein the destructiveness of weapons. Traditionally, the greatesttheat to the state has come from action by another, opposing,state. In essence, states were threatened with military defeatand its implications. The costs of the First World War, followedby the development of nuclear weapons in the Second World War,shifted the primary threat away from defeat in war to war itself.In 1914, German strategists were seeking to protect Germany frominvasion by France and Russia. By 1960, American strategists95were trying to protect the United States from a nuclear war.While their rhetorical position revolved around protecting theU.S. from Communism, in fact, there was never any real danger ofa Communist attack in the traditional sense. While theCommunists might move against Third World countries, such asVietnam, because of nuclear weapons there was never any danger ofa traditional invasion of the United States. Political issueswere subordinated to issues of military doctrine, namely theavoidance of a nuclear conflict. In Vietnam, where there wasideological conflict, the United States chose to lose, ratherthan escalate the conflict to include the use of nuclear weapons.Threats were also different in terms of their underlyingpotential. In the past, a great power might well lose a war andstill remain a great power. Prior to the First World War,Russia, France and Austria-Hungary all lost wars within a fiftyyear period without suffering a serious loss in theirgeostrategic position. The threats associated with warfareincluded the loss of life of one's soldiers, the possibledestruction of a one's army, humiliating political concessions,and possibly some damage to the civilian population and wealth ofthe state, if the conflict was especially bitter. In the nuclearage, states were faced with the very real possibility of havingmost, if not all, of their major urban centers annihilated, and asubstantial portion of their population killed within minutes.While the actual effects of a total nuclear war can only besupposed, it is no exaggeration to suggest that the state wouldcease to exist as a functional unit.As threats changed, so too did responses to threats.96Technological change provided the state with a diverse range ofpossible responses to security threats. On one level, therefore,technology changed strategy by providing new options for dealingwith security problems. At the same time, by altering the actualthreats perceived by the state, technology forced new responsesat the level of grand strategy and military doctrine.Clearly, the pattern of alliance formation changed overtime. In part, this was due to changes in the nature of threatsperceived by the state. Deterrence is particularly interestingbecause not only did the actual composition of a deterrentstrategy change, but its importance to the security of the statewas revised as well. With the development of nuclear weapons andmodern delivery systems, deterrence became the overridingpriority of national security. The domination of the securityagenda by deterrence once again led to a revision of the othercomponents of security planning.If it is incorrect to argue that one type of change drovethe other, it is quite accurate to state that both types weredriven by technology. The role of technology in creating andpropelling change is clear. Technology fundamentally alteredboth the nature of threats to the state and the methods by whichthese threats could be met. Both the second and third modelscapture one aspect of the influence of technology on nationalsecurity planning. In order to understand the process as awhole, however, it is necessary to consider both of the models.This thesis has sought to examine the change in nationalsecurity planning in the twentieth century and the role oftechnology in that change. It has found that planning for the97protection of the state has changed dramatically since the turnof the century. Key concepts, such as deterrence and alliances,have been altered considerably, while operational methods havealso been constantly revised. 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