Open Collections

UBC Theses and Dissertations

UBC Theses Logo

UBC Theses and Dissertations

Participation in and employee attitude toward organizational change : a case study on strategic change… Clay, Nancy Margaret 1993

Your browser doesn't seem to have a PDF viewer, please download the PDF to view this item.

Item Metadata

Download

Media
831-ubc_1993_fall_clay_nancy.pdf [ 5.27MB ]
Metadata
JSON: 831-1.0098819.json
JSON-LD: 831-1.0098819-ld.json
RDF/XML (Pretty): 831-1.0098819-rdf.xml
RDF/JSON: 831-1.0098819-rdf.json
Turtle: 831-1.0098819-turtle.txt
N-Triples: 831-1.0098819-rdf-ntriples.txt
Original Record: 831-1.0098819-source.json
Full Text
831-1.0098819-fulltext.txt
Citation
831-1.0098819.ris

Full Text

Participation In and Employee Attitude TowardOrganizational Change: a Case Study ofStrategic Change at George Pearson CentreBYNANCY MARGARET CLAYB.S.W., University of British Columbia, 1992A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OFTHE REQUIREMENT FOR THE DEGREE OFMASTER OF SOCIAL WORKinTHE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIESSchool of Social WorkWe accept this thesis as conforming to therequired standard for theDegree of Master of Social WorkTHE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIAJune, 1993Copyright Nancy Margaret Clay, 1993In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanceddegree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make itfreely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensivecopying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of mydepartment or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying orpublication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my writtenpermission.(Signature)\„ -.S^c.J\ErErfaTtriltslir-of ^The University of British ColumbiaVancouver, CanadaDate DE-6 (2/88)iiABSTRACTTitle:^Participation In and Attitude TowardOrganizational Change: a Case Study ofStrategic Change at George Pearson Centre.The British Columbia Rehabilitation Society (B.C. Rehab)recently approved a strategic plan which, when implemented, willchange the organization's delivery of services to BritishColumbians with disabilities. In addition to a review of theliterature to determine the factors influencing employees'participation in the strategic change process and their attitudesto it, this case study employs two primary methods of inquiry.Firstly, B.C. Rehab's strategy development process is identifiedand examined through perusal of B.C. Rehab documents. Secondly, aself-administered mail questionnaire surveys employees' attitudestoward the strategic change effort and their participation in theplanning.Results reveal that the organization followed a corporateplanning model of strategic change; strategy formulation wasaccomplished through strategic planning. This method of strategyformation is consistent with B.C. Rehab's traditional structure andits apparent adherence to hierarchical authority. Results revealdifferential opportunity to participate in strategic planningaccording to organizational role. Those in professional/managementroles report greater opportunity to participate than those in non-professional designations. More impoverished understanding of theiiistrategic plan and weaker overall agreement with the organization'sfive strategic goals are reported by the non-professional group.Employees' concerns about the strategic plan relate tofeelings of uncertainty about their future with the organization.In addition to their prediction of its being the most difficult toimplement, staff report a high degree of ambivalence to the goal tomove to a "consumer-driven" framework. Respondents assessemployees' overall attitude toward the strategic plan asambivalent.The results lend support to organizational models whichencourage employee participation. However, it is concluded thatseveral elements, including the organization's cultures, itsstructure and politics, interact to systematically pre-determineemployees' participation in decision-making processes.ivTABLE OF CONTENTSPageAbstract^ iiTable of Contents^ ivList of Tables viiiList of Figures^ ixAcknowledgements xDedication^ xiINTRODUCTION 1Chapter One - Contextual Overview^ 8Historical Perspective 8History of Change at George Pearson Centre^9Decision to Undertake Strategic Planning 13Antecedent Conditions^ 13Demographics 14Institutional Care Issues^ 16Self-Advocacy Movement 18Consumerism^ 18Issues of Health CareProvision in British Columbia^19Strategic Planning Process^ 20Mission Statement 21Formal Planning^ 21Staff Participation 22Planning Principles and Values^ 23Strategic Goals^ 24vOperational Implications^ 25Implementation^ 26Chapter II - Literature Review^ 28Organizational Response to Issues^ 29Need for Change^ 29Increasing Focus on Needs ofSpecial Populations^ 30Declining Resources^ 31Increasing Pressures forAccountability in Human Services^32Change in Human Service Organizations^34Organizational Change Perspectives 35Locality Development Model^ 36Social Planning Model 36Social Action Model^ 37Strategic Change^ 38Strategic Planning 40Learning Perspective^ 43Influences on Implementation ofStrategic Change 46Formal Organizational Structure^46Organizational Politics^ 52Organizational Culture 53Employee Attitudes^ 56Organizational Research 60Employee Participation inStrategic Planning^ 60Centralization^ 61Target of Inquiry 62Attitude Measurement 63Research Questions 64viChapter III -Methodology:George Pearson Centre Employee Attitudesto Strategic Plan Implementation^ 65Methodology^ 65Subjects 66Response Rate^ 68Respresentativeness^ 69Procedures 70Measures 73Limitations^ 73Variables 73Reliability of the Measure^ 77Validity of the Measure 77Threats to Validity^ 78Data Coding^ 79Analysis Plan 80Tests of Significance 81Chapter IV - Results^ 82Research Questions^ 82Findings^ 82Chapter V - Discussion 101In Conclusion^ 119Recommendations for Further Study^ 121Epilogue^ 123References 124Appendix A -^George Pearson CentreOrganizational Chart^ 131Appendix B -^Questionnaire^ 133Appendix C -^Letter of Permission^ 141Reprints and PermissionsAmerican Sociological Associationvi iAppendix D -^Letter of Agency ApprovalBritish Columbia RehabilitationSociety^ 143Appendix E -^Certificate of ApprovalUniversity of British ColumbiaBehavioural Sciences Screening CommitteeResearch and Other Studies InvolvingHuman Subjects^ 145Appendix F -^Pre-test of the Measure^ 147viiiLIST OF TABLESPageTable 1 Disabled Adults Residing inInstitutional^Settings inBritish Columbia 15Table 2 Strategic Planning Process^ 21Table 3 Proportionate Sampling By OrganizationalRole^ 68Table 4 Response Rates By Organizational Role^ 69Table 5 Socio-Demographic Information^ 84Table 6 Attitude Toward Strategic Goals^ 87Table 7 Agreement With Strategic Goals By Group^ 88Table 8 "No Opinion" Scores by Group^ 89Table 9 First Awareness of Strategic PlanBy Employment Group^ 93Table 10 Opportunity For Input^ 94Table 11 Participation in the Strategic Plan^ 95Table 12 Understanding of the Strategic Plan^ 96Table 13 Perceived Staff Attitude to theStrategic Plan by Employment Group^ 100LIST OF FIGURESFigure 1^Percentage Agreement by Goal ^86Figure 2^Degree of Perceived Staff Acceptanceof the Strategic Plan ^98ixxACKNOWLEDGEMENTSThere are many individuals without whom this thesis would nothave been possible. First among them are those at George PearsonCentre who gave generously of their time to participate in theresearch. I thank them for their thoughtful responses for they arethe essence of this study.I am indebted to B.C. Rehab for allowing me to conduct myresearch at George Pearson Centre. Special thanks to Mr. BillFraser, Ms. Cathy Crozier, Ms. Donna Moroz and Ms. Hege Glittenbergfor sharing their wealth of information and for their ongoingassistance and support.To Mr. Roopchand Seebaran, my advisor and Dr. Sharon Manson-Singer, second reader, I acknowledge, with special thanks, theirexpert guidance and patient assistance. Each of them walked everystep with me. For that I am truly grateful.To "Trouble," my constant companion. For the hundreds ofhours she spent patiently waiting for me, my gratitude.Finally, special thanks to Brenda Young, Margaret Clarke,Murray & Alison Clarke and Jaret Clay for their unflagging supportand assistance and their belief in my abilities. Without them,none of this would have been possible.N.M.C.DEDICATIONTo the memory ofWalter John Clarkex i1INTRODUCTIONGeorge Pearson Centre is a 200-bed facility which provideslong-term residential care for adults severely disabled bytraumatic injury and debilitating disease. Operated originally bythe provincial government as a hospital for tuberculosis and thenpolio patients, George Pearson Centre's governance was assumed bythe British Columbia Rehabilitation Society (B.C. Rehab) in 1984.B.C. Rehab also operates the G.F. Strong Rehabilitation Centrewhich it has done since the Centre's inception in 1949.Great technological advances, drastically changing demographictrends plus several socio-economic and political pressures promptedB.C. Rehab to examine its service delivery system and to plan forthe future. In May, 1991, the organization began a formal processof developing a long-range plan. The process had actuallycommenced in the mid-1980s with a number of preparatory activitiesincluding an external environmental analysis, internal assessmentof organizational strengths and needs, inception of organizationaldevelopment programs and reformulation of the mission statement.The formal planning process is referred to by B.C. Rehab as"strategic planning" and the results, the "strategic plan."Strategic planning differs from other forms of planning in that itinvolves "making strategic decisions about major plans for theorganization" (Anthony, 1985, p.3). It differs, according to thisauthor, "in importance, scope, resource commitment, time frame, andpurpose" (p.3). Five key elements distinguish strategic planning2from other forms of planning:It recognizes the outside environment and explicitlyincorporates elements of it into the planning process.It has a long-term time focus, often 3 to 5 years, butsometimes as many as 10 to 20 years.It is conducted at the top of the organization and at thetop of the organization's major divisions or productgroups.It involves making decisions that commit large amounts oforganizational resources.It sets the direction for the organization by focusing onthe organization's identity and its place in a changingenvironment. (Anthony, 1985, p.4)By definition, strategic change exacts significant impact on anorganization's various, interdependent systems. The "top-down"approach of strategic planning reflects its roots in thehierarchically-structured military (Mercer, 1977). Strategicplanning models were first adopted by "big business" in the 1960s.In the three decades since, strategic planning has been viewed bythe private corporate sector as a necessary, if not integral, meansof surviving and flourishing in an increasingly competitive globaleconomy.The economic and political realities which affect corporationshave also had an impact on government-funded social service andhealth care organizations. In an attempt to respond to these andother external pressures, many non governmental or non-profitorganizations have resorted to tactics previously the purview ofthe corporate sector. B.C. Rehab, like so many of itscounterparts, has turned to strategic planning as a means of3identifying, planning for and dealing with future contingencies.At the outset of formal planning, the organization articulatedseveral philosophies intended to underpin the planning. Among themwas the ideal that planning include input by staff at all levelsand from all parts of the organization. Documents indicate that inexcess of two hundred people, many of whom were staff of GeorgePearson Centre, participated directly in the planning process asmembers of various working groups or committees.By definition, strategic planning models have traditionallyexcluded participation from those occupying positions in the lowerlevels of the organization's hierarchical structure. Lower-levelparticipation has been considered cumbersome and inappropriate forthe type of (substantive) change desired by organizationsundertaking strategic planning.It is widely recognized, however, that the successfulimplementation of a strategic plan is significantly impairedwithout the shared vision and a reasonable level of commitment bystakeholders, such as employees (Senge, 1991).Despite its enduring popularity, many feel that strategicplanning has yielded disappointing results, relative to thecommitment of resources it demands. Some critics question themodel's ability to effectively improve organizational performance(Pearson, 1990). Many proponents of strategic planning agree thatthe process has problems and identify many process issues ascontributing to this malaise (Gray, 1986). The lack ofstakeholder participation, however, is rarely identified by4proponents as an issue to be addressed.From the criticisms of strategic planning models have emergedalternative models of strategy development, many of which espousebroad participation by stakeholders. Among the more recentapproaches is the learning school of thought which is underpinnedby the belief that in any organization there are many potentialstrategists, a resource which should be developed and tapped.Critics assert, however, that most organizations do not have theluxury of time needed to approach strategy from a decentralizedperspective. Moreover, organizations often require strategicvisions that are innovative and consolidated--more likely toemanate from a centralized approach than one of decentralizedlearning (Mintzberg, 1990).Six months after B.C. Rehab had commenced strategic planning,five strategic goals were identified and adopted by the Board ofDirectors. One year later, June, 1992, the strategic plan wascompleted and Year I of implementation commenced.The strategic plan generated considerable interest amongststaff--often a topic of discussion in formal and informal settings.After the strategic plan was set, the author had the opportunity tointeract with staff about their perceptions of its content andprocess. It appeared that despite the formal policies to thecontrary, employees had perceived the strategic planning process ashaving a "trickle down," rather than a "bubble up," orientation.It appeared that many staff were anxious about the plan, and itsimplications and felt alienated from the process.5From this experience, the author became interested in both thecontent of the plan, the process B.C. Rehab had used to derive itand possible explanations for what appeared to be resistance to theproposed strategic changes. Specifically, since employees wouldultimately be responsible for implementing the plan, the author wascurious about their role. Hence, the decision to research thesubject and to use the research as the basis for a thesis.By conducting a case study of the B.C. Rehab experience, theauthor hoped to ascertain George Pearson Centre employees'attitudes toward and concerns about the strategic plan. She wishedto determine the process by which the plan was developed and todetermine employees' perception of their involvement in theprocess. Finally, the author hoped to identify those systemicfactors may have affected the strategic change experience.The research project, which comprises the core of this thesis,was conducted at George Pearson Centre and utilized a self-administered mail questionnaire. Its purpose was to survey theattitude of the Centre's employees regarding the content andprocess of the strategic plan. The project addressed thefollowing questions:What are George Pearson Centre staff attitudes to thecontent of the strategic plan?What are George Pearson Centre staff perceptions of theirparticipation in the development of the strategic plan?What^are^the^staff-identified^concerns^regardingimplementation?What is the relationship between the staff's perception ofparticipation and its attitude toward the strategic plan?6The author expected results to reveal a high degree ofdisagreement with the strategic goals, particularly the two goalsdescribing changes to how services to the disabled community wouldbe delivered (namely Goal #1 which promoted the idea of consumer-driven service delivery model and Goal #5 which proposed theorganization's movement to community-based services.)The researcher expected to find a high degree of participationin planning by management and professional staff but a low degreeof participation by non-professional and support staff.The researcher expected to find a relatively higher degree ofagreement with the strategic goals for those who had participatedin the plan and corresponding low agreement by those who had notparticipated in the plan.The researcher expected to find three major areas of staff-identified concerns:(1) issues relating to job security(2) issues related to the future of George Pearson Centreresidents and(3) issues related to the dissemination of reliable informationabout the progress and impact of the strategic plan.In addition to the questionnaire, this case study of the B.C.Rehab strategic planning experience included a review of severalB.C. Rehab documents, as well as library research. B.C. Rehabdocuments provided the basis for much of the first chapter of thisthesis which discusses George Pearson Centre's history and itsresponse,7over time, to changing technological, political andsocial trends. Additionally, the first chapter gives an overviewof B.C. Rehab's strategic planning process and the plan's content.The library research provided information which ultimatelyhelped guide the design of the research project and identifysalient issues and perspectives. The findings of the libraryresearch are included in the second chapter, the Literature Review.The design and methodology of the research project aredescribed in Chapter III while the fourth chapter discusses thecontent of the questionnaire and presents the survey findings.The results of the survey, the literature review and thereview of B.C. Rehab documents are integrated and interpreted inthe Discussion, Chapter V. A short concluding piece, Chapter VI,briefly discusses outstanding issues and makes recommendations forfuture research.8CHAPTER I - CONTEXTUAL OVERVIEWThe idea of organizational change is not a new concept toGeorge Pearson Centre or its staff. As is apparent in thehistorical account included in this chapter, the Centre's currentservices and roles have evolved over the years in response tochanging conditions.Changing external conditions have prompted the currentstrategic change effort, as well. These antecedent conditions willbe discussed in this chapter as will the organization's response tothem.HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVEIn 1949, two years after the organization's inception, theWestern Society for Physical Rehabilitation opened BritishColumbia's first free-standing rehabilitation facility, G.F. StrongRehabilitation Centre. On April 1, 1984, the Society, later namedthe British Columbia Rehabilitation Society (B.C. Rehab), alsoassumed responsibility for the operation of the George PearsonCentre.George Pearson Centre provides long term residential care fortwo hundred adults who, as a result of neuromuscular dysfunctionand related disorders, experience severe physical disability and,therefore, require specialized assistance.9The Centre is distinguished from other long-term carefacilities in the province by the relative youth of its residentsand by its provision of therapeutic programs and services. Inaddition to nursing care, residents have access to, as appropriate:physiotherapy, hydrotherapy, occupational therapy, leisure-timeservices (recreational therapy), communications assistance (speechtherapy), counselling (social worker, chaplain, sexual healthclinician), in-house medical, dental, ophthalmology, psychiatry andpodiatry services. Additionally, Pearson Centre offers outreachservices to people with disabilities who reside in the community.HISTORY OF CHANGE AT GEORGE PEARSON CENTRESince its inception, as a 264-bed tuberculosis hospital in1952, George Pearson Centre has experienced many changes. Aschronicled by B.C. Rehab (1992a), some were the result ofinternally-motivated influences and changing priorities. Most,however, were in response to external, environmental conditions.The first of many externally-motivated changes occurred veryearly in the institution's history. In 1954, as a result of thedevelopment and increased availability of new anti-T.B. drugs,tuberculosis rates began to decline. However, in 1954 the provinceexperiencedan outbreak of polio--with a high incidence of bulbarparalysis, which shuts down the breathing muscles andorgans--(which) produced hundreds of new patients in theprovince. (B.C. Rehabilitation Society, 1992d, p.6)Vancouver General Hospital could not meet the demand created by the10epidemic. In November, 1954, the provincial government decided toadd a new wing to the Pearson Hospital to accommodate non-ambulatory polio patients who required specialized chronicrespiratory care. The new wing, referred to as the Polio Pavilion,was completed in June, 1955, and polio patients were admitted toPearson Hospital, marking the beginning of its service to peoplewith physical disability.With the decline of polio, Pearson Hospital's patient profilebegan to diversify to include patients with other respiratorydiseases and patients with spinal injuries.The Marpole Infirmary, originally built as a hotel in 1912,was converted by Vancouver General Hospital circa 1917 as a "homefor incurables." In 1923, the provincial government assumedresponsibility for its operation. The province also operated asimilar facility, the Haney Infirmary. Both were extended-careinstitutions that provided residential services to frail andelderly people, as well as those with cerebral palsy, musculardystrophy and other neuromuscular dysfunctions.The physical conditions in both facilities were poor. Thisinspired the formation of the Marpole Women's Auxiliary whose goalwas to assist the residents of both infirmaries. When conditionsdid not improve, the group began to pressure the provincialgovernment to close the two institutions.Concurrently, declining tuberculosis rates created empty bedsat Pearson Hospital. In 1963 the provincial government decided toclose both infirmaries and transfer residents to Pearson Hospital.11The transfer of residents was completed in 1965 with the resultthat Pearson Hospital's focus officially changed to "patients whocan benefit from rehabilitation" (B.C. Rehab., 1992d, p.11). Inresponse to the new focus, new staff were hired and trained, newprograms and facilities planned.The 1970s saw an increasing number of spinal cord injuries asa result of motor vehicle and recreational accidents. This trendwas reflected in those admitted to Pearson Hospital. Thetechnological advances made during this period accorded severelydisabled people significantly more mobility than they previouslyenjoyed. The availability of electric wheelchairs, which could beoperated by means of "sip and puff" air, and portable, positive-pressure ventilation drastically improved quality of life for manyresidents at George Pearson Hospital.The technological revolution continued and, in fact,accelerated through the 1980s and into the 1990s.Many wheelchairs are electronic, as well as electric.Personal computers with a plethora of input devices openup communication and learning to many who previously hadlittle opportunity for either. (B.C. RehabilitationSociety, 1992d, p.13)With technological advances came the potential for Pearsonresidents to experience greater independence and self-determination. Residents became increasingly vocal in advocatingfor their rights, precipitating several innovative developments.Two are particularly notable: development of community livingoptions and formation of a residents' council.With the assistance of the Canadian Paraplegic Association,12six young men with high lesion quadriplegia, four of whom wereventilator-dependent, moved from Pearson to a group apartment inthe False Creek area of Vancouver. Creekview, as it was called,was "probably the first time anywhere that people with such severedisabilities had made such a move and achieved such independence."(B.C. Rehabilitation Society, 1992d, p.18) In January, 1992, sevenadditional ventilator-dependent residents left Pearson to take upresidence at a new-developed co-operative apartment complex knownas Noble House.In July, 1992, the residents of George Pearson Centre formallyorganized a residents' council. The council provided a vehicle forcommunication. It provided a formal structure through whichresidents could file grievances, lobby for changes, provide inputinto the centre's policies and procedures. Additionally, itprovided a structure for the centre's administration to communicatewith residents.On April 1, 1984, responsibility for the operation of GeorgePearson Hospital was transferred from the provincial government tothe B.C. Rehabilitation Society (then known as the WesternRehabilitation Society.) George Pearson Hospital was the last ofseveral provincial hospitals to be so transferred, reflecting theprovincial government's policy to divest itself of directresponsibility for hospital operation.Pearson's increasingly important rehabilitation component madethe inclusion of G.F. Strong Rehabilitation Centre and GeorgePearson Hospital under one governance a sensible option.13Ultimately, the name, "George Pearson Hospital," changed to"George Pearson Centre," more adequately reflecting theinstitution's evolving philosophy and focus.THE DECISION TO UNDERTAKE STRATEGIC PLANNINGAs it approached the 1990s, B.C. Rehab recognized that theorganization was facedwith far-reaching changes on various fronts, bothinternal and external. External government policy andeven social trends such as changing family values allhave an impact on our consumers and on us as anorganization. (B.C. Rehabilitation Society, 1992c, p.6)In the mid-eighties, in response, the organization commissioned aconsulting firm to conduct an environmental analysis. Anassessment of internal strengths and needs was also conducted andseveral organizational development programs were instituted at boththe G.F. Strong Centre and George Pearson Centre. In May, 1991,the organization officially embarked on a process of strategicplanning (B.C. Rehabilitation, 1992c).ANTECEDENT CONDITIONSA number of antecedent conditions prompted B.C. Rehab'sdecision to undertake external and internal assessments andultimately to commit to strategic planning. Among them: changing14demographic trends, technological advances, shifting socio-economicconditions, changing government policy and increasing demands foraccountability in health-care provision.DemographicsAccording to the Health and Activitv Limitation Surveyconducted by Statistics Canada, 28,475 of British Columbia's394,265 disabled adults (age 25+), reside in institutionalsettings. Institutional settings include nursing homes and otherlong-term care facilities. The British Columbia figure is exceededin absolute terms only by Ontario which supports nearly 38% ofCanada's 3.3 million disabled citizens.As it evident by Table 1 Disabled Adults Residing inInstitutional Settings in British Columbia, 80% of those disabledpeople who are institutionalized are 65 years of age and older.This is consistent with trends in the general population.Currently, 8% of Canada's 65+ population and 39% of Canada's 85+population is institutionalized. (Marshall, 1987)Table 1DISABLED ADULTSRESIDING IN INSTITUTIONAL SETTINGSIN BRITISH COLUMBIA*AGE^ N^PERCENTUnder 25 Years 850 2.925 - 34 1,750 5.935 - 44 1,110 3.845 - 54 840 2.955 - 64 1,330 4.565 - 74 2,920 9.975 - 84 9,885 33.785+ 10,685 36.4*Source: Statistics CanadaHealth and Activity Limitation Survey199115It has been suggested that "Canada has recently joined theranks of the old nations or societies. . . those 65 and over exceed7% of the population. (Havens, 1981, p.1). Many demographers,utilizing assumptions about fertility, mortality and migration,predict that the rate of growth of the Canadian population over 65will be 46% by the year 2000 while rate of total population growthwill be less than 10% in the same period (Havens, 1981). Otherssuggest that while the absolute numbers of those under age 45 willremain relatively constant, the number of people aged 65 years andover will more than double by 2021 (Evans, 1985).161981 figures indicate that life expectancy for women increasedfrom 1950 by 25% to 78.9 years; for men by approximately 10% to71.9 years (Peron & Strohmenger, 1985). Although life expectancyis only one factor contributing to the increased average age, ithas important implications for the long-term care system.Evidently, people with chronic diseases are being kept alive longer(National Council on Welfare, 1990). Consonant with this is theprediction that as a result of increased life expectancy,individuals will spend relatively more time in a disabled state(Culyer, 1988). More people will utilize extended care servicesand facilities for longer periods.A 1984 study of the impact of demographic change of thehealth care system suggested that Canada has one of the highestrates of institutionalization of its elderly in the world (WoodsGordon, 1984). Given Canada's apparent demographic transition, asignificant increase in long-term care usage can be anticipated.Should patterns of health care provision remain unchanged, theanticipated expenditures to the health care system will increase75% by 2021 (Woods Gordon, 1984).Institutional Care IssuesIn the 1991 report of the British Columbia Royal Commission onHealth Care and Costs, chaired by Mr. Justice Peter D. Seaton, itwas stated that "the commission views long term care. .. and other17assistance to the chronically ill, the frail or the disabled as oneof the most critical elements in our health care system" (p.C-163).This document reveals an emerging trend towards maintaining, in thecommunity, individuals who would previously have beeninstitutionalized (Seaton, 1991).The trend toward community living is a result, in part, of thecommunity's changing values around the appropriateness ofinstitutionalization (Forbes, Jackson & Kraus, 1987). It is alsoindicative of a perceived need to ensure cost effectiveness in theprovision of health care services (Marshall, 1987).The issues associated with institutional care of vulnerablepopulations are well documented (Goffman, 1961; Rosenfelt 1965;Wolfensberger, 1972; Menolascino, 1977; Nelson, 1978; Vladeck,1980). Many people who live in institutions experience greatlosses as a result of their placement. These include loss ofindividuality, of privacy, former meaningful roles, control overliving space and self-determination. Responses of hostility,depression, withdrawal and increased dependence, are oftendiagnosed and treated from a medical perspective. Individualsbecome defined by their disease and dysfunction (Kalish, 1979) andaccept roles of disablement which are socially devalued(Sutherland, 1981). Within the traditional structure,institutionalized individuals are powerless. Powerlessness isfurther reinforced by the protective attitudes of caregivers whoperceive residents as victims, unable to control their lives (Kari& Michels, 1991).18Self-Advocacy Movement Over the past few years, there has emerged an "uncompromisingmood" among people with disabilities. Increasingly, people withdisabilities have begun to see themselves as disabled, "not by theidiosyncrasies of (their) bodies but by a society which is notprepared to cater to (their) needs" (Sutherland, 1981, p.9). Thedisabled community has manifested a strong self-advocacy movementwhich has demanded that disabled individuals be in control of theirenvironment and direct any service that they require. This demandhinges on the right to be treated as "able-bodied" and is perceivedby those who are disabled as a "right, not a privilege" (Brisenden,1986). This philosophy dictates that service must be provided insuch a way as to empower people with disabilities to "remain incontrol of both the personal assistance. .. that they require, andthe people who provide it" (Holdsworth, 1991, p.22).ConsumerismUsers of social services have traditionally been referred toas "clients" or "patients" rather than "consumers." These termsreflect important philosophical distinctions. In its traditionalusage, the term "client" has connoted dependency on the serviceprovider (Perlman, 1975). In contrast, the use of the term"consumer" implies a power-base in which the individual exercises19his/her prerogative in acquiring and utilizing goods and servicesto satisfy needs.As evidenced by the increased numbers of citizen advocacyorganizations and lobby groups, there has been growing concernabout protecting rights of consumers of social services (Perlman,1975). Despite the discourse, however, there has been littleprogress in involving consumers of human-service institutions inthe decisions that affect their welfare (Fawcett et al, 1982).Most long-term care facilities are structured around a medicalmodel of service (Kari & Michels, 1991). The subject of consumers'rights is of particular concern in these settings because,inherent in their practice model is a view of the consumer as apatient and the medical personnel as experts who, by virtue oftheir role, merit the greatest authority. Within this model, alsoreferred to as the disease model, the resident and his/her familyare less powerful and are ancillary to the medical roles (Kari &Michels, 1991).Issues of Health Care Provision in British ColumbiaThe British Columbia Royal Commission on Health Care and Costs(1991) received submissions from many sources who were critical ofthe current health care system as "insensitive to local andregional questions, inflexible in its programs and policies andunfair in its distribution of resources" (Seaton, 1991, p.B-35).20As a result, the Commission recommended that control of the healthcare system be decentralized to encouragepublic accountability for the management of our healthcare resources; cost control through the efficient andeffective use of resources; coordination and integrationof professions, institutions and ministries; serviceswhich will serve local needs; access to services in or asnear to an individual's home as is possible.(Seaton, 1991, p.B-36)In supporting the ideology of decentralized service, the commissionrecommended that primary and secondary health services be offeredin local communities and tertiary care be provided by the largeinstitutions located in the Greater Vancouver Regional HealthDistrict. Tertiary care is defined ascare that requires highly specialized skills, technologyand support services. Usually provided in facilitiesserving a large region or the province as a whole.(Seaton, 1991, p. E-13)B.C. Rehab has been identified in the Seaton Report as one of theLower Mainland agencies jointly responsible for setting provincialstandards and consultation to the regions regarding delivery ofservice to people with disabilities.STRATEGIC PLANNING PROCESSB.C. Rehab's strategic planning process is summarized in Table2 Strategic Planning Process.210 Table 2STRATEGIC PLANNING PROCESSPlanning Stage DateEnvironmental Analysis mid-1980sInternal Assessment mid-1980sReformulation of Mission Statement June,^1990Strategic Planning Commences May,^1991Approval of 5 Strategic Goals November,^1991Examination of Organizational andOperational^Implications March,^1992Implementation June,^1992Mission StatementThe Society's mission statement was reformulated andultimately adopted by the Board of Directors in June, 1990:The mission of the British Columbia RehabilitationSociety is to provide a continuum of coordinated,interdisciplinary, consumer-driven rehabilitationservices to enable persons with physical disabilities todevelop and use knowledge, skills and attitudes necessaryto reach their potential. (B.C. Rehabilitation Society,1992c, p.18)Formal PlanningPrior to its commencing the formal planning process, the22organization established a Strategic Planning Department andseconded a senior manager to act as Strategic Planning Co-ordinator. Financial resources, support staff and office spacewere allocated to the newly-formed department, giving strategicplanning a high profile within the organization. When seniormanagers began the formal process of formulating a strategic plan,they perceived the finished product as a prescription or frameworktomake the best use of . . . energy and resources over thenext decade. Certainly such a plan is necessary, comingas it does at the end of the International Decade ofDisabled Persons, and at a time when our assumptionsabout what we do and how we do it are being challenged bymany sectors of society. At the same time, we mustimplement any change within a framework of economicrestraint and a demand for 'value.' (B.C. RehabilitationSociety, 1992c, p.1)Staff ParticipationB.C. Rehab allotted itself fourteen months to complete thestrategic planning process. B.C. Rehab documents report that inexcess of two hundred people from within B.C. Rehab participated inthe process. Their perspectives provided the foundation for theidentification and analysis of the resulting five strategic goals.There were three planning committees: a Board PlanningCommittee, a Management Planning Committee and a Senior ManagersImplementation Planning Group. In addition, eighteen staffworking-groups addressed strategic planning^from specific23perspectives, including: Approaches to Service Delivery; Arthritis;Assistive Technology; Behaviour Management; Brain Injury; Childrenand Adolescents; Community Living; Education and Training; OtherNeurological Disabilities; Pain Management; Palliative Care;Psycho-Social Rehabilitation; Research; Respiratory Services;Sexuality; Spinal Cord Injury; Stroke; Substance Abuse; VocationalServices.Planning Principles and Values B.C. Rehab documents reveal a number of beliefs and valuesrelating to the planning process. Firstly, the organizationdecreed that the plan must address itself to B.C. Rehab as a whole,not to two separate organizations (referring specifically to TheG.F. Strong Centre and George Pearson Centre.) Secondly, that theplanning process include ". . .participation by staff at all levelsand in all parts of the organization. ." (B.C. RehabilitationSociety, 1992c, p.6). The third tenet was a recognition that theplanning process must shape the needed physical and organizationalstructures as opposed to allowing the structure to dictate theplan. Fourthly, was the expressed perception of planning as adevelopmental process, "that will equip staff both to maintain astrategic vision and to take on planning as an ongoing function ofline management. . ." (B.C. Rehabilitation Society, 1992c, p.6).The fifth underpinning was the organization's commitment that24planning be grounded in "mutual respect, teamwork and a drive forcontinuous improvement" (B.C. Rehabilitation Society, 1992c, p.7).STRATEGIC GOALSIn November, 1991, the B.C. Rehab Board of Directors approvedfive strategic goals in response to current and anticipateddemographic, economic and philosophical trends. The strategicgoals, which are complementary and inter-related, are consistentwith many of the recommendations of the British Columbia RoyalCommission on Health Care and Costs (B.C. Rehabilitation Society,1992c; Seaton, 1991). The five strategic goals:(1) B.C. Rehab will commit to a consumer-driven policyand practice framework in all aspects of our work(2) B.C. Rehab will pursue community partnership inplanning, delivery, research and funding ofrehabilitation services(3) B.C. Rehab will focus clinical activity on therehabilitation of individuals with neurologicaldisabilities(4) B.C. Rehab will become a provincial resource centrein rehabilitation education, research and technology(5)^B.C. Rehab will become a resource centre forspecialized community-based programs supportingpeople with disabilities. (B.C. RehabilitationSociety, 1992b, p.4)25OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONSPhase II, examination of the organizational and operationalimplications of the five strategic goals by senior management, wascompleted by March, 1992. The findings of this second phase wereoutlined in a discussion document called Formulating the StrategicPlan, which was distributed to participants and other stakeholders.In addition to a discussion of the plan's implications, thedocument also included an outline of planning tasks and a scheduleof projected time lines.Implementation of the strategic plan has major implicationsfor the consumers, staff and the community. Some anticipatedchanges include:(1) Eventual merging of G.F.Strong and George Pearson Centre toone site, probably at the George Pearson Centre site.(2) Organizational restructuring with two main components:movement towards one organizational structure (as opposed tothe current situation of two separate entities) and adoptionof a "Program Model" with its more lateral structure(3) movement from a primary to a tertiary service delivery modelwith greater emphasis on provision of decentralizedrehabilitation services (closer to home);^B.C. Rehab tobecome a resource to other communities. Primary care to beprovided by B.C. Rehab for only those individuals requiringspecialized intervention.(4) focusing of developmental resources on rehabilitation26activities related to neuromuscular disability; corroborationand planning with community agencies providing rehabilitationprograms and services to populations outside of the"neurological disability" classification(5) visible participation of consumers in all systems supportingand providing rehabilitation; increasing accountability to andevaluation by consumers (B.C. Rehabilitation Society, 1992a).IMPLEMENTATIONFollowing the time frame set during strategic planning, thethird phase of the process, implementation, commenced in the year1992/93. Year I was considered the "developmental stage where keyconcepts are . . confirmed, resources identified, individuals,systems and funds committed and benchmarks identified" (B.C.Rehabilitation Society, 1992c). The primary goal of Year I ofimplementation (1992/93) was development of the organization'scapacity to progress towards the strategic goals. Withorganizational development as an objective, the ManagementCommittee established a number of priorities to be addressed in theplan's first year:1. Develop^an operational definition of^'consumer-driven'^soevaluate ourthat^we^canprogress.agree^on the^goal^and2. Establish an internal^communication process^whichwill ensure that our staff are kept well informed atall stages of our development.273. Encourage both formal and informal cross-Centrecommunication at all levels and begin to inventoryand integrate systems, resources and services.4. Establish a public profile in the community andensure a process of ongoing communication andconsumer involvement.5. Training and involvement of the key personnel neededto undertake the development envisioned.6. Adoption of a Program Model of organization.7. Encouraging, initiating, and implementing activitiesin the three identified areas: facility-basedservices, research and education and technology, andcommunity-based programs.8. Undertaking the major collaborative planningactivities in Children and Adolescent Services,Arthritis and Orthopaedics/Trauma. (B.C. Rehab,1992c, p.40)28CHAPTER II - LITERATURE REVIEWThe primary purpose of this chapter is to identify the issuesrelevant to an examination of strategic change. Secondly, itspurpose is to discuss the findings and conclusions of scholars whomhave studied this subject area. In so doing, this chapter definesthe tenets which framed this case study.A review of the literature begins with a discussion ofconditions antecedent to change in organizations and is followed bya discussion of change in human service organizations. A number oforganizational change perspectives are identified and discussed andthe models of community work which traditionally underpinorganizational change episodes are outlined. The nature andfunction of strategic change is then described and perspectives onstrategy development are discussed. This discussion focusesprimarily on strategic planning and the learning perspective,giving particular attention to employee participation. The role oforganizational structure, organizational culture and politics areexamined as they relate to substantive organizational changeefforts. This piece then concludes with a discussion of attitudestoward change, particularly employee attitudes toward strategicchange.29ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSE TO ISSUESAn examination of the literature of the past three decadesreveals a growing recognition that organizations operate within avery dynamic social-political-economic environment. Increasingly,these organizations are compelled by rapid environmental change tomake appropriate adjustments, not only for the achievement of theirrespective mandates and goals, but for their very survival (Judson,1991).Organizations are faced with issues generated from within,as well as from outside their structures. Internally motivatedpressures relate to organizational climate and leadership issueswhile external pressures relate to the market and include theorganization's need to remain current and competitive in productline and services (Chandler, 1962; Cummings, 1980). A thirdmotivator for organizational change, according to Beer (1980), isthe pressure exerted by the community--consumer interest groupsbeing one form; changes in government policies and regulations,another.NEED FOR CHANGEBeginning in the 1980s, there emerged several trends which putinto question the direction of human services delivery systems.30Kettner, Daley & Nichols (1985) identify four trends which havechallenged the status quo. They include:the increasing focus on the needs of special populations,the decline in the resources available for human serviceprograms,the increasing pressures for accountability in humanservices, andthe introduction of new techniques for both managementand direct service personnel. (p.3)Increasing Focus of Needs of Special Populations Warner (1977) argues that many human service programs havereinforced and sustained the subjugation of the very populationsthey claimed to serve. According to this author, many humanservice programs are not only ineffective but serve to furtheroppress recipients. Such programs refuse to acknowledge andaddress the systemic causes of the social issues and are,therefore, prepared only to treat symptoms, not causes. Thisauthor suggests that, in addition, human service programssystematically deny recipients access to decision-making--dictatingsolutions in a very paternalistic manner, without considering thewishes or opinions of the consumer group.The insensitivity of some human services systems torecipients' needs and the oppression they engender has always beenunacceptable to recipients. Individually, recipients have been31powerless to effect changes. However, as organized groups theyhave political, economic and legal power to advocate their specialinterests and to influence how social services are conceptualized,designed and delivered (Kettner et al., 1985).Interest groups have organized and advocated around a numberof issues and needs relating to age, race, class, gender, sexualpreference and disability. As a result, human servicesorganizations are becoming increasingly aware of the need tofashion themselves to fit the needs of their target population.Declining ResourcesMost human service programs depend on government funding fortheir survival. In the past decade, however, the federalgovernment has introduced several initiatives to withdraw from itsinvolvement in social expenditures. As a result, social programs,delivered provincially by government institutions, private firms,non-profit societies and volunteer bodies have felt the negativerepercussions (Hanvelt, 1992).The current social policy climate is the result of anevolutionary process.^Sustained by the economic growth of thepostwar era (1950s and 1960s), social programs expanded. Theybegan to crumble in the 1970s with the realization that theeconomic climate was "unsustainable" (Helco, 1981). Guest (1985)interprets this "reformulation" period as having resulted from a32loss of "political consensus" which had previously supported socialprograms:this amounts to a crisis of faith in the welfare state.. . (which) paradoxically arrives at a time when theproportion of people needing its support is the largestsince the Great Depression. (p.235)According to Kettner et al (1985), commonly-held strategiesfor agencies dealing with the resultant funding cutbacks--reducingstaff and cutting services back--do not address the real issues.The current climate challenges basic values and assumptionsconcerning the provision of social programs. Turem & Born (1983)warn that the survival of social programs and the agencies thatprovide them may well lay in the balance.If human service agencies fail to get across theirmessage that they provide necessary social benefits andif they persist in conducting business as usual inminiature, they may find out that it may soon be too lateto prevent their demise. (p. 207)Increasing Pressures for Accountability in Human ServicesIn 1974, Tropp defined accountability as:a legal obligation to account for the terms of acontracted transaction. These include obligations to thepublic, the agency, and the client to maximizeeffectiveness (measurable achievement of positive changeas a result of planned intervention) and efficiency(optimum results for the lowest expenditure of resources,including time, money and energy). (as cited in Kettneret al., 1985, p.5)33The issue of accountability began to surface in the 1970s andcontinues to challenge human service organizations. No longer arehuman service programs able to justify their existence solely onthe basis of their caring and benevolent attitudes towards theirtarget populations. Along the same lines, the existence of humanservice programs cannot be considered evidence of a caring societyand justified solely on that premise (York, 1982).Taxes generate a major portion of human services funding. Asa result of public contribution of tax and voluntary dollars tohuman service programs, three realities exist. Firstly, thefinancial support constitutes the public's sanctioning of suchprograms to meet socially accepted goals and objectives. Secondly,upon accepting public funding, human service programs implyagreement with sanctioned goals and objectives and accept theobligation to work within established parameters. Finally, thepublic trusts that in return for funding, programs will achievedesired outcomes and the funds will be used as efficiently aspossible to this end (Kettner et al., 1985).Carter (1983) suggests that agency accountability must addresstwo issues. The first is that of efficiency. Efficiency refers tothe number of units of output per resource. Effectiveness, thesecond issue, refers to the number of desired outcomes as a resultof outputs. Essentially, the questions which must be answered are:Are programs achieving their goals and objectives? Is the publicgetting good value for dollars spent? In other words, are theprograms worth it (York, 1982)?34CHANGE IN HUMAN SERVICE ORGANIZATIONSAs evidenced by the rapid growth of social services in thiscentury, Skidmore (1990) suggests that human services organizationshave assumed an increasingly important role in mitigating theincreasing stressors of the fast-paced modern western life.Human services organizations function within the same socio-economic and political milieu as do business and otherorganizations. Like their for-profit counterparts, social serviceorganizations are susceptible to changes in their environment.Ideally, provision of social services should be driven byclient need. To most effectively serve their clients, humanservice organizations, then, must be prepared to assess and respondto changing needs and conditions. However, research has indicatedthat without pressure to do so, organizations generally resistchanges to the status quo (Greiner, 1967). Despite the fact thatin human services, "clients' problems and needs are constantlychanging, many social services agencies, similar to otherorganizations, are reluctant to change. Kettner et al (1985)propose that, to the detriment of their target populations, fewhuman services organizations have been designed to readilyaccommodate revisions to the status quo. According to theseauthors, suchservices . . .take on a life of their own, and the needsof individuals and special populations may not berecognized or understood. When delivery systems becomefixed and inflexible, the emphasis shifts from meeting35clients' needs to surviving as an organization and tofitting potential clients into the services offered bythe agency. The match between needs and servicesdeteriorates. (p.2)ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE PERSPECTIVESFar from its being perceived as a naturally-occurring process,organizational change is viewed by many writers as a calculated anddeliberate response to changing internal and external environmentalconditions. In her 1980 work, Huff, advances the argument thatorganizations are political entities--microcosms of a broaderpolitical system. The external pressures that motivate them arepower-based, as are the organizations' responses.Huff (1980) also suggests that organizational responses areinfluenced by internal power-based conflicts. She suggests that,often, decisions are made or alternative options chosen, not on thebasis of their intrinsic merits but on the basis of theiradvocates. Similarly, the timing of decisions is attributed to theinfluence of special interests within the organization, as well asto the requirements of the task. Huff's political paradigmsupports the view that planned change can be initiated at allorganizational levels.Rothman and Tropman appear to support this thesis in their1987 work. While they do not specifically address the role ofintra-organizational politics, their writing appears to support the36concept of organizational change as an issue of power relations.They identify essentially three community work models which havehad a significant impact purposive change experiences in the pastquarter century. Each of these approaches--locality development,social planning and social action--describes organizational changefrom a different power perspective.Locality Development Model The locality development model came to prominence in the 60s,70s and 80s. Underpinning locality development is the belief thatchange is optimal when there is meaningful participation of a widecross-section of people comprising the defined community. Centralto this method, which is utilized in community developmentinitiatives, is its heavy use of "democratic procedures, voluntaryco-operation, self-help, development of indigenous leadership andeducational objectives" (Dunham, 1963 as quoted in Rothman &Tropman, 1987, p.5).Social Planning Model Whereas the locality development model underscores the valueof broad-spectrum stakeholder participation, the social planningapproach maximizes technical expertise of professional planners to37guide the deliberate, substantive change processes of complexbureaucracies. Unlike the locality model, the social planningmodel is not so concerned with community building or fosteringsocial change. Rather, its "concern. .. is with establishing,arranging, and delivering goods and services to people who needthem" (Rothman & Tropman, 1987, p.6). The strength of the socialplanning model, according to proponents, is in its ability toattend, firstly, to the design of social plans and policies and,secondly, to their cost-effective implementation.Social Action Model The social action modelpresupposes a disadvantaged segment of the populationthat needs to be organized . . . in order to makeadequate demands of the larger community for increasedresources or treatment more in accordance with socialjustice or democracy. (Rothman & Tropman, 1987, p.6)Examples of such movements include consumer and environmentalprotection groups, civil rights groups and groups dedicated toensuring the rights of people with disability. Social activistsoften seek "redistribution of power, resources and/or decision-making in community and/or changing basic policies of formalorganizations" (Rothman & Tropman, 1987, p.6). Historically, thismodel has been used extensively to advocate for social change.Although it does not currently enjoy its former popularity, aspectsof this model are still selectively used in community change38episodes.In their 1985 work, Kettner et al suggest that organizationalchange can be achieved through several approaches. The approachchosen depends somewhat of the type of change desired. Whencomprehensive, long range change is desired, it often becomes thepurview of boards of directors and high-ranking administrativeofficials and is addressed from the policy level.Whereas policies provide the framework for service delivery,programs are the permanent structures through which anorganization's articulated goals and objectives are achieved,through which human service organizations meet perceived clientneeds. Therefore, change in organizational policy is oftenreflected in and manifested by program change.It is the contention of Kettner et al (1985) that traditionalmodels of planned change such as the "problem-solving" model are nolonger adequate. For organizations to flourish, they must be ableto anticipate needs and plan for services. Models of plannedorganizational change must, therefore, incorporate an anticipatoryelement. To this end, these authors propose a change model whichcomprises five components: considering antecedent conditions,preparing for change, planning, implementing change and assessingchange residue.STRATEGIC CHANGEThe non-incremental, substantive nature of strategic change39distinguishes it from most other forms of planned change. This isdepicted in Tichy's (1983) definition of strategic change as,non routine, nonincremental, and discontinuous changewhich alters the overall orientation of the organizationand/or components of the organization. (p.17)By definition and intention, strategic change is designed toproduce substantial organizational innovation which it accomplishesby addressing the issues of organizational goals, objectives andpolicies (Webster & Wylie, 1988; Turton, 1991).Change originating from upper-level bureaucratic positions ismore likely to be comprehensive, involve more risk and cause moreuncertainty than change decisions proposed by lower-level, lesspowerful bureaucrats. As Turton (1991) observes, "the nature ofthe problems confronting decision-makers is a function of theirlocation in the organizational hierarchy (p.198).Likewise, this author states, there is a relationship betweenthe complexity of strategic change, its duration and the degree ofuncertainty it produces.The longer the timescale, the greater the complexity andthe likely degree of uncertainty that will beexperienced. (Turton, 1991, p.198)The uncertainty, which accompanies substantive change, posesa considerable threat even to those occupying the senior positionsin the organizational hierarchy. Strategic change is, therefore,resisted in many organizations. As one author observes,because of their familiarity, older options are usually40perceived as having lower risks (or potential costs) thannewer alternatives. (Quinn as quoted in Turton, 1991,p.196)Change which emanates from lower-level positions is morelikely to be incremental, partly because lower-level change agentsmust often mobilize "coalitions" within the organization to supporttheir desired change. Large changes at these levels are,therefore, often resisted in favour of smaller ones (Cyert andMarch, 1963).STRATEGIC PLANNINGPlanning, as a means of strategy formulation, came toprominence in the 1960s and is considered by many to be aneffective approach, particularly for multi-business firms. It hasenjoyed considerable professional and academic attention and hasbeen lauded as an essential aspect of contemporary organizationallife.There has been considerable confusion in the terminologyrelated to strategic planning (Pearson, 1990). In the literature,the phrase, "strategic planning" is often used generically todescribe strategy formation through planning. However, Schaffer(1967) depicts "strategic planning" as one aspect or stage of"corporate planning," which he describes asthat collection of methods, departments, functions,tools, and activities which companies buy or create tohelp assure their future. . . . (p.158)41According to Schaffer's framework, the corporate planningprocess includes research, formulation of objectives, strategicplanning and operational planning. Schaffer's first step isidentification of corporate strengths and weaknesses andidentification of opportunities and risks created by external orenvironmental trends. From this information, objectives aredefined--the organization's future role (what it should become) isidentified. Once goals and objectives are identified, the thirdelement, strategic planning, commences. Its function is toformulate strategy or establish an "overall framework outlining howthe corporation will move to its ultimate objectives" (Skidmore,1990, p.69). According to Schaffer's model, once strategicplanning is accomplished, implementation procedures (how eachdepartment will carry out the strategic plans) are established.Despite its persistent popularity, strategic planning hasoften been disappointing in its impact on organizationaleffectiveness. This perception has prompted considerable research.However, there is a dearth of inquiry into the impact of thisperspective's adherence to a relatively centralized, non-participative style (Camillus, 1980). In fact, Ensign & Adler(1985) scanned 300,000 records in a leading business database(ABI/INFORM) to arrive at 500 articles which comprise theiranthology of contemporary viewpoints on strategic planning. It isvery telling that this anthology includes not one reference toparticipatory style as it relates to strategic planning.42In the literature, constructs such as enrolment, commitmentand compliance are discussed only as they apply to managers. Fullparticipation in strategic planning by those at lower levels of theorganizational hierarchy is either not supported or not addressed.A notable exception is Mercer's 1991 work which supports a modifiedstrategic planning model. Even so, this model includesstakeholders only at certain intervals in the planning process.Strategic planning models often span the organizationalhierarchy, each level with responsibility for a distinct type ofstrategy. Typically, however, the lowest organizational level thatis systematically included in this process is the functionalmanagement level (Chakravarthy & Lorange, 1991)--this, despite thea wide consensus that the successful implementation of a strategicplan requires the shared vision and commitment/enrolment ofstakeholders (Senge, 1991).Ironically, as highly centralized planning approaches weretaking a foot-hold in the 1960s, a number of authors, Argyris(1957), McGregor (1960) and Likert (1961) were conducting researchwhich ultimately revealed positive correlations betweenparticipative management styles, quantity & quality of workperformance and increased positive employee attitudes.Blake and Mouton (1977) concurred. It was their thesis thatimplementation of change in organizations requires the concertedparticipation of the whole organization. They suggested thatleaders must lead the change, not dictate change by virtue of theirorganizational rank. Employee43commitment comes from having a stake in the outcome ofinterdependent effort. . .the key is involvement andparticipation in working planning and execution. (Blake& Mouton, 1977, p.180)More recent work supports these earlier conclusions. In his1991 work, Whyte asserts that people are not passive beings but, tothe contrary, are active agents who become strongly committed togoals and objectives they set or have had a part in setting forthemselves. He concurs with Walton (1985) that one of the elementswhich separates authoritarian organizations from participatoryorganizations is the shift from control to participation. One ofthe attributes and great strengths of effectively organizedparticipation programs is strong stakeholder "ownership of ideas."Whyte (1991) discusses this concept with respect to potential fororganizational change. He suggests that stakeholdersare more likely to respond to ideas for which they havesome sense of ownership. And that sense is more likelyto arise for ideas they have had some part in developingthan for ideas imposed on them. (p. 177)Learning PerspectiveStakeholder participation is a central tenet in more recentapproaches to strategic thinking. In his 1990 work, Mintzbergexamines one such approach, which he coins the "learning school ofthought."The learning perspective approaches strategy development from44an organizational or collective point of view. Whereas thestrategic planning perspective views the Chief Executive Officer(C.E.O.) as the main component, this perspective recognizes thetalent of the collective. Underpinning this perspective is thebelief that in any organization, there are many potentialstrategists, a resource which should be developed and tapped.According to this perspective, for collective learning to occur,retrospective thinking must be encouraged. The development ofstrategy in response to various external pressures and events musttake root at all levels of the organization. The leader's role isnot to envisage strategies (as in the planning models) but tomanage a process of strategic learning within the organization.This perspective supports the idea of "emergent strategy" andsuggests thatstrategy making must. . .take the form of a process oflearning over time, in which, at the limit, formulationand implementation become indistinguishable.While the leader must learn too and sometimes (is) thesole learner, more commonly it is the collective systemthat learns;. . .learning proceeds in emergent fashion throughbehavior that stimulates thinking retrospectively, sothat sense is made of action. . . strategic initiativesare taken by whoever has the capacity to learn and theresources to support that capacity. (Mintzberg, 1990,p.155)Supporters of this perspective suggest that as theorganization learns, its plans evolve from patterned responses(emulating past efforts) to innovative, prototypical stances.Critics suggest, however, that the learning approach is "anti-45strategic," that it leans toward incrementalism--"prefers constantnibbling to a good bite" and as a result, does not establish clearstrategy (Mintzberg, 1990, p.155).Staw (1976), opposes the learning approach. He suggests thatorganizations committing to it often find themselves enticed intounintended circumstances, having been drawn, throughincrementalism, into "escalating commitment." It has also beensuggested that the learning perspective encourages disjointedness,thereby reducing organizational effectiveness.With many actors free to choose, independent of strongcentral direction, the organization may continuallybounce back and forth between competing perspectivespromoted by different groups. Of course the oppositedanger can be present too--that one perspective may winnot because it is better but because its proponents arebetter politicians or champions. (Staw, 1976, p.27)The stakeholder participation advocated by the learningperspective is further criticized as a cumbersome way to deal withstrategic change notably when major commitments are required(Makridakis et al., 1982 as cited in Mintzberg, 1990).It has been pointed out that organizations in crisis may nothave the luxury of time needed to approach strategy from adecentralized perspective. Similarly, Mintzberg (1978) suggeststhat even when not in crisis, organizations often require strategicvisions that are innovative and consolidated--more likely toemanate from a centralized approach than one of decentralizedlearning. The final criticism of this perspective relates to itscost. Critics suggest that the learning approach demands46considerable time and often results in "false starts" which arecostly in terms of time, money and human resources.Despite its limitations, the learning school approach hasmade a significant impact. It most commonly finds support inprofessional bureaucracies and in other organizations duringperiods of dramatic or unprecedented change or strategic changeevents which evolve due to the need for political manoeuvring(Mintzberg, 1983).INFLUENCES ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF STRATEGIC CHANGEThe literature speaks to a number of issues which have animpact on strategic change. Four, in particular, are worthy offurther discussion: the nature of an organization's formalstructure, organizational culture, organizational politics andemployee attitudes.Formal Organizational StructureIn their 1961 work, Burns and Stalker examine organizationalresponse to changing environmental conditions. They conclude thatnot all organizations have the same capacity for change. Thoseorganizations which fail to change or to innovate are, typically,those which demand obedience and employee loyalty and operate witha clearly defined hierarchy of control. In these organizations,47coined "mechanistic organizations," communication is usuallyvertical with the knowledge-base situated exclusively at the top ofthe hierarchy.Conversely, organizations that are effective innovators, ableto cope and thrive in new and unfamiliar situations, are thosewhose system of communications flows in both directions. These"organic organizations" enjoy a high degree of commitment toorganizational goals and are distinguished by a leadership stylewhich is leadership by expertise.^That is, leadership is notdetermined by virtue of hierarchical status but is determinedaccording to who has the most expertise to offer the issue(s) athand.In his 1987 work, Harrison suggests that organic organizationsor systems, "encourage creativity and innovativeness, andfacilitate rapid, flexible responses to change" (p.84).Further, this author suggests, organic systems help organizationsadapt touncertainties stemming from poorly understood andchanging technological conditions and from unpredictableenvironmental conditions--such as markets subject tosudden changes of taste and unstable financialconditions. (p.84)However, such systems are more costly and more difficult toadminister. Hence, when environmental conditions are stable andpredictable, organizations often choose the top-down orientation ofmechanistic systems for their relative efficiency and ease.Mintzberg (1983) and Walton (1985) concur with the earlyfindings of Burns and Stalker that organizations differ in their48ability to successfully implement change. In this regard, Walton,too, delineates bureaucracies according to their power structure.Essentially he classifies organizations as adhering to one of twostructures: a traditional approach based on imposing control or anapproach which is based on eliciting commitment.Traditional or "control-oriented" approaches provide littleopportunity for employee input. At the heart of an organizationinvested in a control orientation is its desire to "establishorder, exercise control and achieve efficiency in the applicationof the work force" (Walton, 1985, p.77). This model, a remnant ofFrederick W. Taylor's turn-of-the-century views, promotes thepartialization of the organization's "work" into small fixed tasksfor which individuals can be held accountable. Job descriptionsoutline acceptable standards of performance but are orientated to"lowest common denominator" assumptions about workers' skill andmotivational levels. According to Walton, massive hierarchicalstructures of top-down authority prevail over these organizationsto provide order and to monitor and control as an assumed low-calibre workforce.Recently, however, changing expectations among workers haveprompted a growing disillusionment with traditional controlmechanisms. Concurrently, growing global competition has renderedthis approach obsolete.A model that assumes low employee commitment and that isdesigned to produce reliable if not outstandingperformance simply cannot match the standards ofexcellence set by world-class competitors. . . marketsuccess depends on a superior level of performance, alevel that, in turn, requires the deep commitment, not49merely the obedience .^. of workers. (Walton, 1985,p.79)Realizing that needed employee commitment will not be realizedwithin traditional control structures, a growing number oforganizations have begun to develop and adopt strategies to moveaway from these structures. Strategies are numerous but haveincluded removal of hierarchies, increasing managerial spans ofcontrol, integration of quality and production activities at lowerorganizational levels, creation of broader-based jobs that involvegreater responsibility and more flexibility and development ofsystems to encourage participation by all employees. As Walton(1985) suggests, these policies are often underpinned by a writtenstatement of philosophy which "acknowledges the legitimate claimsof the company's multiple stakeholders--owners, employees,customers, and the public" (p.80).Mintzberg's 1983 work, followed in 1990 by Pearson's alsofound support for the thesis that organizational structure is adeterminant of an organization's facility for change. Their workfocused on the impact of power-relations and leadership stylewithin bureaucratic structures.Simple organizational structures, according to Pearson (1990)demand little standardized or formalized behaviour and are notheavily invested in planning or training. Because these (oftenyoung) organizations are run by direct supervision from the top,they are often flexible and can "outmanoeuvre" the more complexbureaucracies. With good entrepreneurial leadership, such50organizations are able to respond innovatively and quickly tochange. However, only a few such organizations "retain theirsimplicity as large organizations" (Pearson, 1990, p.159).In contrast are the well-established organizations whichrequire large numbers of highly specialized, low skill jobs toundertake large-scale production. Mintzberg's characterization ofthese "machine bureaucracies" approximates the mechanisticorganizations described by Burns & Stalker (1961). Machinebureaucracies are rigidly departmentalized, support a large-scalemiddle management hierarchy and are highly invested in maintainingsystems of standardization. Such organizations, according toMintzberg (1983), need a stable environment in which to function.For this reason, they search out such setting. Alsocharacteristic, is "alienated employees, an obsession with controland an inability to adapt" (p.12). Mintzberg's characterization issupported by Pearson (1990) who concludes that bureaucraticstructures brandishing these characteristics are fundamentallyunsuited to innovation and are increasingly perceived asineffective in meeting contemporary needs for flexibility and speedof response.Mintzberg (1983) suggests there is a second bureaucraticstructure the "professional bureaucracy." Whereas the machinebureaucracy relies on standardization of organizational processesand products, the professional bureaucracy relies on thestandardization of skills of trained professionals. Professionalbureaucracies yield much of their power to professional employees51and their professional associations. Mintzberg (1983) observes,however, that although the systems within professionalbureaucracies are highly decentralized and participatory for theprofessionals, themselves, the structures are equally non-participative and autocratic for the numerous support staff whoperform roles and functions discarded by the professionals. Thesegroups, as a result, often experiences a sense powerlessness andalienation.The situation of long-term care nursing aides is forwarded byVladeck (1980) and Tellis-Nayak et al (1989), as an example of thisphenomenon. This group, which occupies the low-end oforganizations' hierarchical structure constitutes 70% of long-termcare personnel and generally has the most direct contact withresidents. Despite incumbent first-hand knowledge of residents,however, this group has traditionally had little influence inplanning, setting policy and decision-making. Yet, when careissues arise, this group is often targeted for criticism. There islittle recognition of the often-conflicting expectations of variousplayers within the system and the resulting ambiguity in which thisgroup must function without the power to change or influencepractice. As a result, this group experiences low morale, low-level commitment to the organization and a high turnover rate.As opposed to individual performance issues, these problemsare symptomatic of organization-level issues. Harrison (1987)maintains that they are symptoms of "poor fit" between theorganization's power structure or its administrative system and the52organization's overall environment, technology and personnel.Issues associated with organizational climate are very damaging tothe organization. The resulting conflicts divert energy away fromorganizational goals and objectives and reduce the organization'seffectiveness.^They impair intra-organizational communication,reduce the organization's ability to be innovative and to cope withchanging market or technical conditions and interfere with itsability to carry out complex projects. (Harrison, 1987)Organizational PoliticsAccording to Pfeffer (1981a), organizational politicsinvolves those activities taken within organizations toacquire, develop, and use power and other resources toobtain one's preferred outcomes in a situation in whichthere is uncertainty or dissensus [sic) about choices.(P.7)Often, "preferred outcomes" are driven by self-interest and theinfluencing of decisions is a means to align these self-interestswith organizational interests (Culbert and McDonough, 1980). Thisprocess is not sanctioned by the organization and, in fact, isoften counter-productive to organizational goals and objectives,used often as a tool of resistance. Mayes and Allen (1977) focuson the illegitimacy of both the means and the end in theirdepiction of organizational politics as themanagement of influence to obtain ends not sanctioned bythe organization or to obtain sanctioned ends throughnon-sanctioned influence means. (p.675)53During episodes of strategic change, the organizationexperiences shifts in power. Conflicts often arise, especially inmature, complex organizations of experts (Mintzberg, 1990). Theimpact of micro-political struggles (within the organization) areparticularly feltduring periods of blockage, when strategic change cannottake place, often because of political intransigence, andperiods of flux, when an organization is unable toestablish any clear direction and so decision-makingtends to take the form of a free-for-all. (Mintzberg,1990, p. 165)Organizational CultureAlthough micro political action is used to resist change, manybelieve that a more powerful source of resistance is organizationalculture.Many definitions of culture exist but Schein's (1985)definition is the most comprehensive:A pattern of basic assumptions--invented, discovered ordeveloped by a given group as it learns to cope with itsproblems of external adaptation & internal integration--that has worked well enough to be considered valid and,therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct wayto perceive, think and feel in relation to thoseproblems. (Schein, 1985, p.9)Organizational culture is powerful, not only because of itsdynamic nature but by virtue of its pervasiveness. It not onlyserves to form the attitudes and behaviours of the organization's54members, it is itself a result of organizational behaviour andattitudes. Scholz (1986) describes it as "the implicitconsciousness of an organization which develops out of its members'behaviour, and which influences their behaviour" (p.235)Much of the impact of organizational culture results from thefact that much of it operates at a preconscious level and is takenfor granted. Schein (1980) demonstrates this dynamic aspect by hisdelineation of culture into three levels. He suggests that themost visible representations of organizational culture are theorganization's artifacts, technologies, art and behaviour. Whilethis level is the most visible, it is often difficult to interpret.The second, less visible level of organizational culture iscomprised of the organization's values--testable in the physicalenvironment and by social consensus. The third level is comprisedof the organization's basic assumptions and addresses theorganization's relationship to the environment. This leveladdresses the reality of time and space, human nature, humanactivity and human relationships. These, according to Schein, arethe invisible aspects of any organization's culture which are sopowerful because they are accepted without question by members.Tichy (1983) suggests that as a system of influence, anorganization's culture is both the most pervasive and the leastobvious. Because it is implicit, people are not always aware of itin the same way they are of political dynamics and technicalsystems. As a result it is frequently overlooked in strategicchange efforts. Even when it is identified as important, it is55often addressed only superficially. Tichy decries this as a fatalflaw. Organizational culture "is an essential condition ofstrategic change, requiring major attention and accounting forsuccess or failure of a change effort" (Tichy, 1983, p.282).Pfeffer (1981) suggests that the effective management ofstrategic change involves the successful linkage of political,cultural and technical systems. He argues that strategic changeagents can only marginally influence the intra-organizationalpolitical system. They have slightly more potential to influencethe organization's technical outcomes (quality and quantity ofgoods/services). Their most significant capability in strategicchange efforts, however, is their potential to influence theorganization's culture.Much of the organizational literature has addressed culture asa tool^for analyzing^and understanding complex^socialorganizations. It has been investigated as a key element inimproving economic output and socializing organization members tomanagement-defined values. Culture has been viewed as an avenue toorganizational development processes and as a cognitive sense-making tool for organizational members in turbulent environments(Pedersen and Sorensen, 1988) Overall, much of the researchportrays organizational culture as a monolithic entity and hasimplied a causal relationship between "strong cultures" andimproved organizational performance. While Pedersen and Sorensendo not reject the idea of a dominant organizational culture, theyfeel it must be acknowledged that56organizations are often dominated by differentiation,inconsistency, ambiguity, conflict . . . .Instead of adominant and cohesive culture, (some) organizations. . .could be characterized as consisting of differentsubcultures and lacking a significant corporate culture.(P. 7 )Myerson and Martin (1987) suggest that in reasonably effective,multi-cultural organizations, the subcultures likely share elementsof a dominant culture. The presence of different sub-culturesoften produces conflict as members of the various sub-groups act onthe basis of their internally consistent values, some of which maybe inconsistent with those in other sub-cultures present in theorganization.Employee AttitudesDespite the fact that change is recognized as one of theinevitabilities of modern western life, it is perceived by many asa threat. Organizational changes often require stakeholders tomodify the way in which they perform their duties. In fact, theirchange in behaviour, known as the operational effect, is often theprimary purpose of the organizational change effort (Judson, 1991)In addition to an operational effect, most change has apsychological impact on stakeholders.^Often with good reason,impending changes trigger feelings of uncertainty andvulnerability. Stakeholders become concerned, to some degree,about their ability to learn (new roles) and to be competent inthese roles. Performance, often directly connected to feelings of57self-worth, looms as an unknown quantity. As well, stakeholdersare often concerned about being treated fairly, about the effect ofimpending changes on their status (and therefore, too, theirpersonal worth).Organizational change also alters the way that stakeholdersinteract with others in their network. Almost any change in workor work environment will tend to alter established, fulfilling andcomfortable relationships with co-workers, managers and supervisors(Judson, 1991). Particularly at the outset of change, stakeholdersare often concerned about the future of established workrelationships.Cultural factors play a large role in attitudes towardschange. The organizational culture engenders in its members,certain beliefs and norms which enjoy universal acceptance withinthat culture. The development of a culture with its requisitebehavioural norms and beliefs, enables individual members toexpress their own needs and tendencies. The beliefs and norms thattake root serve to maintain equilibrium and continuity among theculture's members and are the effect of that organization'shistory, its experience with past leadership, its successes andfailures (Judson, 1991).Once established, any culture tends to influence the attitudesand behaviour of its members, particularly its more recent members,to conform to accepted beliefs and norms. Such cultural beliefsand behavioural norms are significant to any change effort,particularly when the real or imagined effects of change are in58conflict with them (Judson, 1991).Although resistance to purposive organizational change may beaffected by individual personality traits, the salient issue formany is that of loss of investment--investment in the status quo."People's time, energy, and experience may all be considered to beinvestments, and any loss or reduction in their value may be feltas keenly as if actual money or property were involved." (Filley,House & Kerr, 1976, p.468) From this perspective, known as the"sunk cost" concept, proposed change may be perceived asdevaluation of individuals' knowledge and experience and theendangerment, not only of their ability to make a living but, tothe esteem attached to their career performance. Considering theimplications, stakeholder resistance or opposition to proposedchanges may be well-founded and rationally defensible (Warren,1977).Senge (1991) asserts that resistance to changeis neither capricious nor mysterious. It almost alwaysarises from threats to traditional norms and ways ofdoing things.^Often these norms are woven into thefabric of established power relations.^The norm isentrenched because the distribution of authority andcontrol is entrenched. (p.88)Attitudes toward organizational change range from commitmentand enrolment to apathy. It is suggested that enrolment impliesfree choice and is the process of "becoming part of something bychoice" (Kiefer as quoted in Senge, 1991, p.218) Commitment, onthe other hand, implies not only enrolment but, in addition, asense of assuming full responsibility for making the vision59underlying the change happen. In most contemporary organizations,there are, however, relatively few people enrolled and even fewercommitted. The great majority of stakeholders fall within acontinuum of compliance--genuine compliance, formal compliance orgrudging compliance. They go along with the vision and do what isexpected of them to achieve it. Those genuinely complying see thebenefits of the vision and do everything that is expected of them;those formally complying see the benefits of the vision but do onlywhat is expected of them; those with grudging compliance do not seethe benefits of the vision and do enough of what is expected to notrisk losing their jobs (Senge, 1991).It is often difficult to discern between those genuinelycompliant and those who are enrolled or committed; compliance oftenbeing confused with enrolment or commitment. While those ingenuine and formal compliance sincerely try to contribute, those ingrudging compliance or noncompliance are distinguished by their"malicious obedience," often with the attitude of "I'll do it toprove it doesn't work" (Senge, 1991, p.220). While theseindividuals may not speak formally against the organization's goals(that is to the legitimate power figures), their opinions areexpressed informally, for example at coffee breaks or other socialgatherings of staff. Finally, according to Senge's model, arethose who are apathetic, neither for nor against the vision. Theseindividuals show no interest in and have no apparent energy for theplan.Hardy (1992) identifies stakeholder resistance or opposition60to strategic change as the result of "poor process"--the ultimate"major crime" of strategic planning. He suggests that, as a resultof poor process, "participants are turned off by the planning,(and) they often do not buy into the resulting plans" (p. 72).Arbitary, top-down driven planning results in resistance by middlemanagers who actively or passively oppose attainment of thestrategic goals. Of the two, states Hardy, passive resistance isthe most insidious because it is so difficult to detect.ORGANIZATIONAL RESEARCHIt is widely recognized that the latter part of this centuryhas been a time of tremendous demographic, technological andeconomic change. If they are to survive, organizations must copewith resulting "gyrating markets, mushrooming technologies, andshifting political frontiers" (Strebel, 1992, p. vii).Employee Participation in Strategic PlanningMany organizations have turned to strategic planning as ameans of developing strategies to meet these challenges. Althoughstrategic planning has received much professional and academicattention over the past three decades, there has been an verylittle research on the impact of participative style on strategic61planning. One of the few pieces of research conducted on thissubject revealed a "negative relationship between broadparticipation-consensus strategies and major change outcome"(Webster & Wylie, 1988, p.42). The study's non-parametric designprecluded its generalizability, but the data revealedincompatibility between full stakeholder participation and thegoals of strategic planning--non-incremental, substantive change.However ungeneralizable these conclusions are empirically, theymirror an attitude prevalent in most strategic planning literaturewhich supports exclusivity in the formulation of strategy.CentralizationCentralization is an important aspect of organizationaleffectiveness since the distribution of power affects the way anorganization functions and the behaviour of its stakeholders(Miller, 1991). An economical and useful tool for measuringorganizational participation is the Aiken and Hage Scale ofPersonal Participation in Decision Making and Hierarchy ofAuthority. It utilizes a Likert scale to measure "how much theindividual participates in decisions about the allocation ofresources and the determination of organizational policies"(Miller, 1991, p. 410).62Target of InquiryImplementation of any planned change is characterized by ashifting in focus from planning and development to activation ofthe plan (Kettner et al., 1985). To identify problems or issues inthe implementation of a program Posavac and Carey (1985) suggestthat the target of inquiry should be "those who have a seriousinterest in the program and whose lives may potentially be affectedby the program" (p. 31). There is concurrence that in suchevaluations, the target group should appropriately include thosewho implement the program, the staff (Legge, 1984; Herman, Morris& Fitz-gibbon, 1987). Successful implementation of planned changenecessarily requires the support and interaction of many players.Challenges to the status quo are not always well received as. .proposed changes may threaten existing territorialprerogatives or patterns of resource distribution. . ."(Kettner etal., 1985, p.216).The perceived impact of organizational change on staff hasreceived some research attention. Alpander and Gutmann (1974)examined the staff perceptions of an organizational change effortwith respect to staff perceptions of organizational climate. Thechange included major restructuring of policies, procedures andworking relationships within a psychiatric hospital. The researchmethodology included two questionnaires directed to direct-linestaff and team leaders and face-to-face interviews of some of therespondents. The questionnaires addressed nine variables of63organizational climate. Subjects were also asked to assess theimpact of the change on their own jobs and individual environment.The researchers concluded that resistance to change stems largelyfrom fear of the unknown and that it can be reduced by providingemployees with appropriate information. Further, these authorsmaintain that ". .. such communication can best take place ifemployees are included in some phases of the planning for change"(p.723).Attitude MeasurementAttitude measures can be used effectively to communicateemployees' feelings or reactions to major corporate change.According to Henerson, Morris & Fitz-gibbon (1978) measurement ofattitudes is best accomplished through a direct, self-reportingapproach, including self-administered questionnaires. Thequestionnaire survey has some general advantages in that theattitudes of many individuals can be canvassed at the same time,each respondent receives identical questions, the tool provides avehicle for expression without respondent fear or embarrassment andinterviewer bias can be avoided. Additionally, the uniform datafacilitates long-range research applications. However, it must benoted that these measures have limitations. Because respondentsstrive for internal consistency, self-report response to onevariable may be related to responses to previous variables64(Orlich, 1978). Rubin and Babbie (1989) suggest that the use ofmultiple measures and inclusion of qualitative and quantitativedata, may assist in ameliorating the difficulties inherent inreliance on one measure. De Man (1988) goes one step further insuggesting that evaluation of organizational change is best servedby research designs which generate qualitative data. In particularsuch designs are the most appropriate for situations where there isan underdevelopment of theory in the field of inquiry or when thephenomena involves processes about which the researcher hopes togain contextual data.Research Ouestions An examination of the employees' experience will assist ingaining insight into the strategic change processes at GeorgePearson Centre and answer the following research questions:What are George Pearson Centre staff attitudes to thecontent of the strategic plan?What are George Pearson Centre staff perceptions of theirparticipation in the development of the strategicplan?What is the relationship between the staff's perceptionof participation and its attitude toward the strategicplan?What are staff-identified concerns regardingimplementation?65CHAPTER III - METHODOLOGY: GEORGE PEARSON CENTRE EMPLOYEEATTITUDES TO STRATEGIC PLANIMPLEMENTATIONThe purpose of this third chapter is to describe themethodology used to conduct the research project. The firstsection of the chapter begins with a definition of the researchquestions and is followed by a discussion of the researchmethodology. Issues such as appropriateness of the measure, sampleselection procedures, reliability, validity, samplerepresentativeness and data analysis are addressed.METHODOLOGYEmployees play an integral role in the implementation ofstrategic change. It is imperative, as much as possible, to havetheir commitment to the planned changes. Without understanding andaddressing their attitudes and concerns, successful implementationwill be unpredictable and inefficient.B.C. Rehab planning documents (1992) state that a number ofthe staff at George Pearson Centre, perhaps as a function of theirposition in the organization, participated in the strategicplanning process. However, it appears that many staff did notparticipate directly.As a result of these issues, the research project was designedto explore the following questions:66What are George Pearson Centre staff attitudes to thecontent of the strategic plan?What are George Pearson Centre staff perceptions of theirparticipation in the development of the strategicplan?What is the relationship between the staff's perceptionof participation and its attitude toward the strategicplan?What are staff-identified concerns regardingimplementation?In formulating the research methodology, it was important tobe sensitive to the potential anxiety engendered by the strategicchange plans. It was imperative that the research design take intoaccount subjects' possible feelings of vulnerability and fear. Theanalysis and conclusions will be presented to B.C. Rehab and willassume a developmental format in order to allay potential fears ofthe results, and as partial compensation for the time expended bysubjects.SubjectsGeorge Pearson Centre has approximately 400 full-time andpart-time employees. The sampling frame for this study included:all staff at George Pearson Centre except the Administrator, theActing Director of Social Work, a fellow-student/social worker; andthose who have worked a minimum of 500 hours at George PearsonCentre in the previous one-year period.67A total of 100 subjects were selected by a proportionatestratified random sampling method. With the assistance of theActing Director of Social Work at Pearson Centre, the researcherutilized a list supplied by the Human Resources Department, whichindicated all staff employed at George Pearson Centre as atFebruary 1, 1993. The listed information included employee name,department and job title. Lists of auxiliary employees alsoincluded number of hours worked in previous twelve months.The researcher reviewed the employee list to ensure eachemployee's eligibility according to the sampling frame definition.As eligible employees were identified, they were assignedconsecutive numbers, commencing with number 100.Using job titles as a guide, the researcher divided the totalpopulation into four groups according to role:^direct careprofessionals, direct care non-professionals,management/supervisory, administrative/support staff. The numberof employees in each group was counted; the total population in thesampling frame N=377. The ratio of each employee group to totalnumber of eligible employees was calculated. Ratios for each ofthe four groups were used to calculate absolute proportionatenumbers of subjects selected by the stratified random samplingmethod. Details are summarized in Table 3 Proportionate Sampling by Organizational Role.68TOTAL^SAMPLEPOPULATION^POPULATIONROLEN=377N^Percent NN=100PercentDIRECT CARE NON-PROFESSIONAL 145 38 38 38DIRECT CARE PROFESSIONAL 66 18 18 18ADMINISTRATIVE/SUPPORT 121 32 32 32MANAGERIAL/SUPERVISORY 45 12 12 12Totals 377 100 100 100Response RateIn total, 47 of a possible 100 subjects responded, producingan overall response rate of 47%. The response rates are delineatedaccording to organizational role in Table 4 Response Rates byOrganizational Role.69Table 4RESPONSE RATES BY ORGANIZATIONAL ROLEROLE PercentDirect Care Non-Professional^16^42.1Direct Care Professional^10 55.6Administrative/Support 13^40.6Managerial/SupervisoryTotal8 66.747It should be noted that five days after questionnaires weredistributed to the sample population, George Pearson Centre staffcommenced a 21-day strike--a coincidence which likely had someaffect on the rate of return.RepresentativenessThe sample population appeared to be representative of thetotal population with two limitations noted. Firstly, the samplingframe included only those currently employed at George PearsonCentre. At the time of sample selection, implementation of thestrategic plan had commenced and some staff restructuring wasoccurring. Some supervisors and managers had moved to G.F. StrongCentre or had left the employment of B.C. Rehab. Because of thesampling frame definition, the input of these individuals was not70solicited despite the fact that their opinions may have been quiteinsightful.The second limitation relates to the fact that a large numberof casual/relief workers (18%) constitute the staffing componentalthough they do not affect the Full-Time Equivalents (F.T.E.)These employees are offered work on an "as and when needed" basis,providing relief for absent regular staff--vacations, illness andleaves of absence. Their employment status is quite difficult toascertain since they are considered employees until such time asthey refuse work opportunities. Seven incompleted questionnaireswere returned to the researcher marked "no longer works here." Sixwere from administrative/support staff group; one was from thedirect care non-professional group.ProceduresThe Table of Random Digits (Hessler, 1992, p.329) was utilizedto select a proportionate stratified random sample. The DirectCare Non-Professional group was selected first, the Direct CareProfessional selected second, the Managerial/Supervisory staffgroup selected next, followed by the Administrative/Support Staffgroup. Selection commenced with the number in the fourth column,sixth line of the above-mentioned Table of Random Digits; themiddle three digits of this random number were read and a numbermatch in the appropriate grouping sought. When no match was found,the middle three numbers from the next number down the column were71considered and so on until selection of the first group wascompleted. The same procedure was followed for the second andthird group.As each subject was selected, his/her name, department (formailing purposes) and matching number was placed on a master list.The master list was kept in a locked filing cabinet at the studentresearcher's home office. Each subject-number was placed on achecklist (Subject Tracking Checklist) to track date of initialletter, date of follow-up letter, date of return, etc.Each group received the same questionnaire and each group wasassigned a different colour to easily distinguish between groups.The direct care groups received pink questionnaires, theadministrative/support group received yellow questionnaires and themanagers/supervisory group received white questionnaires.Researcher originally intended to delineate all groups by usingfour different coloured questionnaires. However, due to a clericalerror, a fourth colour was not printed. Therefore, to distinguishbetween professional and non-professional direct care staff,questionnaires directed to professional direct care staff weremarked with an "x" in the bottom right-hand corner of the lastpage. Subject-number was recorded on the top right-hand corner ofeach questionnaire.Sample selection was made on February 11, 1993. On that date,each subject was sent, through George Pearson Centre's internalmail system, an initial letter of introduction. On February 171993, the questionnaire and covering explanatory letter were72directed to each subject through the internal mail system.Included in the questionnaire package, was a self-addressed returnenvelope. Respondents were invited to place the completedquestionnaire in the envelope provided and to return it toresearcher either through the internal mail system or to placecompleted questionnaires in the researcher's mail basket in thesocial work department.On Monday, February 22, 1993, five days after questionnaireswere distributed, the staff at George Pearson Centre went onstrike. They returned to work on Tuesday, March 16, 1993. On March16, 1993, 21 completed questionnaires were collected from the mailbasket. On March 17, 1993, each non-respondent was sent a secondquestionnaire, identical to the first, covered by an explanatory,follow-up letter. A second follow-up letter was sent to non-respondents on March 23, 1993.The mail basket was cleared of questionnaires again on March18, March 23 and March 26 and March 30, 1993. Questionnaires weredate stamped when collected. The return of each completedquestionnaire was noted on the Subject Tracking Checklist.Questionnaires were batched according to the stamped date. Datacoding, using a Fortran Coding Form, was done by batch. Transferof coding information to SPSSx commenced March 27, 1993 and wascompleted April 3, 1993. Data collection terminated at noon, March30, 1993.73MeasuresThe research can be characterized as a descriptive, cross-sectional sample survey of 100 randomly selected employees ofGeorge Pearson Centre.An attitudinal self-administered mail questionnaire was chosenfor its inherent strengths, particularly feasibility, in askinguniform questions of a relatively large number of individuals.This method was chosen also for its ability to counteract twoissues: explicit researcher bias and the sensitive nature of thesubject-area because of fear of change.LimitationsThe study has recognized limitations, namely the ability toelicit contextual data about process.The research design precludes the generalization of data topopulations other than the sample population. The design and poorresponse rate preclude inferences about causal relationships.VariablesVariables were intended to measure perceived participation anddegree of agreement with strategic goals and acceptance of thestrategic plan itself; to describe demographics and to explorestaff-perceived issues potentially affecting implementation of74strategic goals. Variables were identified through formal andinformal discussions with stakeholders, by observing the work-setting informally for several months, by examining strategicplanning documents and organizational policies and by reviewing theliterature.Variables explored four loosely-organized categories:demographics, content, process and organizational climate.Demographic variables included respondents' age, educationallevel, length of employment at George Pearson Centre and firstlanguage. Additionally, subjects' role within the organization,non-professional direct caregiver, professional direct caregiver,administrative/support staff or management/supervisory role, isdelineated.Content variables were concerned primarily with staffattitudes about the content of the strategic plan itself. Using afive-point Likert scale, the questionnaire explored respondents'level of agreement with each of the five strategic goal statements.The research attempted to identify the goal statement which stafffelt would be the easiest to achieve and most difficult to achieve.In an effort to explore the overall feeling at George PearsonCentre respondents were asked to proffer a third-party assessmentof the degree of staff's endorsement of the strategic plan.Respondents were asked, "In your opinion, how well is the strategicplan accepted by staff at George Pearson Centre?" A five-pointLikert scale was utilized for responses which ranged from "1 -completely accepted" to "5 - completely rejected."75In an attempt to ascertain staff perception of the impact ofthe strategic plan, the questionnaire asked, firstly, "Will thestrategic plan affect employees at George Pearson Centre?" Thosewho answered affirmative were then asked through an open questionto indicate "What effect will it (the strategic plan) have?"Also relating to content, subjects were asked to comment ontheir perceived level of understanding of the strategic plan. Thequestionnaire used a five-point Likert scale, responses rangingfrom "1 - very good understanding" to "5 very poorunderstanding."Process variables pertained to the strategic planning processand staff's involvement in and attitude about it. Researchendeavoured to ascertain the staff's first awareness of theSociety's (intention to undergo) strategic planning. Subjects wereasked, "When did you first hear about B.C. Rehab's Strategic Plan?"Four choices were offered: "when B.C. Rehab first decided to do astrategic plan; when the strategic plan was being developed; afterthe strategic plan was set; I had not heard of it before today."A number of variables attempted to determine staff'sparticipation in the planning process. Firstly, subjects werequestioned about their opportunity to participate. They were asked,"Did you have the opportunity to express your opinions about thestrategic plan?" Those who answered "no" were then asked if theywould have liked the opportunity while those who answered "yes"were asked to discuss when the opportunity presented itself and ifthey took it. Also, respondents were asked how they gave their7 6opinions. Possible answers included "discussions with my manageror supervisor, in meeting(s) called by management to discuss theplan, as part of a strategic planning working group or committee,in writing as part of a report or brief." Additionally,respondents were invited to list other opportunities.Respondents who indicated that they had participated in theplanning, were asked how they felt about the experience. Twoquestions were asked, "How comfortable did you feel about givingyour opinion?" and "How seriously would you say your opinions weretaken?" A five-point Likert scale was utilized to measureresponses to both questions.Two open-ended questions were posed in order to elicitsubjects' ideas about the reasons the strategic plan might not beaccepted by staff and barriers which must be overcome before theplan's implementation will be successful. The former question wasasked of those subjects who indicated that staff mostly orcompletely reject the plan--"If you feel the plan is not accepted,why not?" The latter question was worded: "In your opinion, arethere concerns which must be addressed by administration before thestrategic plan can get started?"As previously described, Aiken & Hage's Scales of PersonalParticipation in Decision Making and Hierarchy of Authority wereincluded to acquire information concerning organizational climate.77Reliability of the MeasureSince the instrument is not a standardized measure,reliability is of concern. An internal consistency reliabilitycheck was included in the measure. Two items were repeated. Oneitem related to staff acceptance of the strategic plan (#11 & #25)and one related to staff's first awareness of the organization'sstrategic plan (#5 & #17).The two repeated variables for acceptance, when cross-tabulated, revealed a perfect correlation. The variables for firstawareness also revealed a strong positive correlation, p.< .001.Validity of the MeasureThe measure appeared to have face validity as judged by theresearcher and two individuals, each of whom has a Master of SocialWork degree.The Aiken and Hage scales of Personal Participation inDecision Making and Hierarchy of Authority were included in thequestionnaire and administered, with permission (see Appendix C),concurrently. Inclusion of The Aiken and Hage Scale of PersonalParticipation in Decision Making provided comparative data on whichto determine the concurrent validity of the researcher-constructedmeasure of participation. Miller (1991) supports this scale ashaving validity in measuring participation in organizationaldecision-making (see page 412 for detailed description.) It should78be noted, however, that documentation on this scale does notprovide reliability information.When cross-tabulated, the variable indicating opportunity forparticipation and the variables comprising the Aiken & Hage'sPersonal Participation in Decision Making demonstrated a strong,positive correlation (Pearson's r, p.<.05).Threats to ValidityCoinciding approximately with this project were two eventswhich the researcher identifies as possibly threatening theinternal validity of this research. The first is the coincidentaljob action against B.C. Rehab by the employees of the GeorgePearson Centre. Two factors are notable:(1) the employees' perception of management's adversarial approachduring the strike-- the perceived reluctance of management to"sit down at the table" with the striking employees(2) when the job action ended, the issues were not resolved.Employees returned to work but a mediator was scheduled toreview the issues and make non-binding recommendations byApril 5, 1993. During data collection period, employees wereaware that further job action by staff was a possibility.A second threat to internal validity was identified, namelythe Provincial government's announcement to close ShaughnessyHospital. The announcement, made in early February, 1993, sparked79controversy throughout the health care system. Employees of otherhealth care institutions articulated fears around the possibilityof losing their jobs as a result of similar government initiatives.Additionally, they expressed concerns about their being "bumped" bydisplaced Shaughnessy workers. There is a sense that health carejobs will become more scarce and that workers will not risk leavingtheir positions for fear of not finding alternative jobs.Potentially, the political climate (micro and macro) may havecaused subjects to respond less favourably to B.C. Rehab'sstrategic goals, many of which can be identified with (and indeedhave been advertised by B.C. Rehab as) aligning with the Province's"closer to home" health policy.Data CodinqThe values of each variable were assigned numeric codes andrecorded into a code book. As questionnaires were returned,responses were assigned appropriate numerical codes and wererecorded on a Fortran Coding Sheet. Quantitative data was thenentered into the SPSSx program for analysis.The qualitative data generated by the questionnaire's openquestions were categorized by the researcher into mutuallyexclusive categories. Each category was assigned a numeric codeand responses were coded accordingly for quantification.80Analysis PlanEach response to the open-ended questions was read, recordedon a file card and categorized according to theme. All responseswere placed in one category, and only one category. The creatingof categories was guided primarily by theory; the number ofcategories needed to include all responses determined the number ofcategories which were created. (Hessler, 1992) Quotes by categorywere transcribed into a personal computer for inclusion in theanalysis of results or conclusions.The low return (n=47) resulted in small cell sizes,particularly for variables which were part of a decision treeformat. To maintain statistical significance, several codingcategories were necessarily collapsed.As mentioned previously, two organizational variables,participation in decision-making and hierarchy of authority, wereexamined using Aiken and Hage scales of Personal Participation inDecision Making and Hierarchy of Authority. These instruments wereoriginally developed to reflect the properties of organizations.The author-recommended procedure for computing organizationalscores is to weight each respondent's scores according his/herposition in the hierarchical stratum. This methodattempts to represent organizational life more accuratelyby not giving disproportionate weight to those socialpositions that have little power and that are littleinvolved in the achievement of organizational goals.(Aiken & Hage, 1967, p.918)However, the authors suggest that an81alternative procedure for computing organizational meansis to weight all respondents equally. These twoprocedures yield strikingly similar results for thevariable reported in this paper. (Aiken & Hage, 1967,p.918)Given this information and for the sake of simplicity, anunweighted mean score was calculated for each of these twoorganizational variables.Tests of SignificancePearson's Correlation (Pearson's r) was selected to calculatestatistical significance. Chi-square was deemed inappropriatebecause of the high frequency of expected cell sizes of less thanfive (Weinbach and Grinnell, 1991).It is recognized that Pearson's r is most appropriately usedwith data emanating from interval or ratio level variables. Areview of social work research literature reveals that in someinstances the usual requirements for the use of statistical testscan be disregarded (Yegidis and Weinbach, 1991).The data generated by this research was primarily rank-orderdata and strictly speaking does not meet the requirements of thePearson's r test. However, consistent with common practice insocial work research, the ordinal level data is treated as intervallevel.82CHAPTER IV - RESULTSWithin this chapter the findings of the research project willbe presented. A review of the research questions is followed bythe findings.RESEARCH QUESTIONSThis research project addresses four questions:What are George Pearson Centre staff attitudes to thecontent of the strategic plan?What are George Pearson Centre staff perceptions of theirparticipation in the development of the strategic plan?What is the relationship between the staff's perceptionof its participation and its attitude toward thestrategic plan?What^are^staff-identified^concerns^regardingimplementation?FINDINGSDemographic data reveal that 68% of those surveyed werebetween 31-50 years of age. Seventy-five percent of non-professionals and 56% of professionals report falling within thisage range. Twenty-eight percent of professionals as compared to14% of non-professionals are between the ages of 51 and 60.Sixty-one percent overall report having at least some collegeeducation. Eighty-three percent of the professional group and 31%83of the non-professional group report having university graduation.Nearly one-half of all employees surveyed have been employedby the organization for five years or less. Over two-thirds of theprofessional group falls within this category as compared to 38% ofthe non-professional group. Also notable is the fact that one infive of the non-professional group report length of employment tobe sixteen or more years. This compares to 6% reported by theprofessional group.Thirty-eight percent of all surveyed staff indicated thatEnglish was their second language. In the non-professional group,over half reported English as a second language. This compareswith 17% reported by the professional group.For details of socio-demographic data, see Table 5 Socio-Demographic Information..e:•DKNIPGRAPH:c NPPRMATTPVALL SURVEYED^NONEMPLOYEES PROFESSIONAL PROFESSIONALN=47^N=29^N=18PercentN=(^)Percent* Percent*AGE21-3031-4041-5051-6061-65^11^(5)36^(17)32^(15)19^(9)2^(1)7413414316282828EDUCATIONHigh School 28^(13) 41 6Some College 10^(21) 28 11University Grad 51^(24) 31 83LENGTH OF EMPLOYMENT0 - 5 years 49^(23) 38 666-10 years 17^(8) 14 2211-15 years 19^(9) 28 616+ years 15^(7) 21 6FIRST LANGUAGEEnglish 62^(29) 48 83Other 38^(18) 52 1784*Note: percentage figures are rounded.85Agreement with the following five strategic goals wasexamined:Goal #1^B.C. Rehab will commit to a consumer-driven policy andpractice framework in all aspects of our work.Goal #2^B.C. Rehab will pursue community partnership in planning,delivery, research and funding of rehabilitationservices.Goal #3^B.C. Rehab will focus clinical activity on therehabilitation^of^individuals^with^neurologicaldisabilities.Goal #4^B.C. Rehab will become a provincial resource centre inrehabilitation education, research and technology.Goal #5^B.C. Rehab will become a resource centre for specializedcommunity-based^programs^supporting^people^withdisabilities.Each of the five goals received high percentage agreement fromrespondents as a whole. The first goal (consumer-driven framework)generated the lowest level of overall agreement (60%). Nearly one-third of respondents indicated having "no opinion" about this goal.This goal also received the highest degree of disagreement.Goal #4 (commitment to research and education) receivedhighest agreement at 89% and the lowest rate of "no opinion." Thiswas followed very closely by the fifth goal (B.C. Rehab as acommunity resource centre) which realized 87% agreement. Agreementlevels for all goals are outlined in Figure 1 Percentage Agreement by Goal, page 86. Note that for the purposes of Figure 1, thevalues "strongly agree" and "agree" were collapsed.•^.^"'"V'SiNnaV •Atm.. .^• :Ne.^.4#4.^.;04", •:.4, •^ • •^•Figure 1 Percentage Agreement By Goal N = 47Community BasedProgramsProv. Resource CentreNeurological FocusCommunity PartnershipConsumer Driven0%^10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%!C*e::TTTOPE:.::TOWARP $TRATEG._..............Agree No Opinion Disagree No AnswerGOAL #1GOAL #2GOAL #3GOAL #4GOAL #5%6079778987%3221191113%64%287The breakdown for values comprising each of the five goalvariables is detailed in Table 6 Percentage Results of Attitude Toward Strategic Goals.Note: Percentage figures are rounded.Comparison of each of the five goals by employment grouprevealed some interesting results. Level of agreement with eachgoal was consistently higher for the professional/management group,particularly for Goals 1, 2 & 3, as indicated in Table 7 Agreement of Strateqic Goals by Group.Note that for the purposes of this and other groupcomparisons,^the four groups^(Direct Care Professional,88Managerial/Supervisory, Direct Care Non-Professional andAdministrative/Support) were collapsed into two employment groups,Professional and Non-Professional. The "Professional" groupincludes Direct Care Professional and Managerial/Supervisory staff.The "Non-Professional" employment group includes Direct Care Non-Professional and Administrative/Support staff. Small cell sizes,particularly for the original Managerial/Supervisory and DirectCare Professional categories, necessitated the collapsing ofcategories.e:GREEMENT*WI^TOTAP :.O0A Pi: Y AOGROUPNon-Professional^ProfessionalN=29^ N=18GOALPercent PercentGoal #1 41.4 12 88.9 16Goal #2 69.0 20 94.4 17Goal #3 65.5 19 94.4 17Goal #4 86.2 25 94.4 17Goal #5 82.7 24 94.4 17GROUPNon-Professional^ProfessionalN=29^ N=18Percent* n Percent* nGOAL #1 48 14 6 1GOAL #2 31 9 6 1GOAL #3 28 8 6 1GOAL #4 14 4 6 1GOAL #5 17 5 6 189Similarly, the non-professional group scored consistentlyhigher in the "no opinion" categories.^This is evidencedparticularly in Goals 1, 2 & 3 as indicated in Table 8 Percentaqeof "No Opinion" Scores bv Group. While Pearson's r revealed lowstatistical significance for Goal #4 and Goal #5, calculationsreveal a statistical significance for Goal #1 #2, and #3 ofp.<.05.*Note: Percentage figures are rounded.Sixty-eight per cent of the staff surveyed felt that thestrategic plan will affect staff. One quarter felt the plan would90have no effect; 3 respondents gave no answer. Those replying inthe affirmative were asked to specify the plan's effect on staff.Five of the 32 possible respondents did not answer. The remaining27 produced a total of thirty-nine responses.Two issues--job security and the need for staff to changeroles, behaviours &/or attitudes--comprised over 80% of theresponses and were equally cited (41% each). Typical of responsesconcerning job security:Some employees may end up being let go.The skills of staff here have to be changed through newstaff being hired and/or some education to others.restructuring and possible personal and professionallosses or gains....some jobs eliminated, others created.uncertainty of their present positions--job securities.Incumbent changes in attitude, roles and behaviours aredepicted in the following text:Staff will require a change in attitude to parallelchanging focus....less institutionalized attitudes and job performance.It requires that employees shift attitudes significantly.Attitudes will have to change and some changes in how wecarry out our jobs.Employees will need to adopt a 'doing with' stanceinstead of a 'doing to' attitude.When asked to disclose their concerns about the strategicplan, 23% of respondents did not answer.^More than two-thirds91(68%) indicated they had concerns while 8.5% indicated no concerns.Of those who had concerns, three were not specific. The remainingrespondents (n=29) generated 37 responses. Issues regardingcommunication of information comprised a majority (46%) of theexpressed concerns as depicted in the following excerpts:Education to staff re strategic plan, how it affects themand how to deal with this change.the idea of consumer-driven must be defined.more information in plain language about the long termeffect on staff and the future of residents, job securityissues.Seven responses identified organizational issues as concernsto be addressed:There are managers...who do not fully buy the planthemselves and undermine the work.Supervisors need to relax complete control and encouragestaff to actively participate in decision-making.Yes, better staff/management relationships.Five responses related to client issues; five responses toissues around job security and three were classified as "other."The first variable to address the question of process askedrespondents to indicate when they first became aware of thestrategic plan. Overall, one out of five staff indicated noawareness of the plan before receiving the research questionnaire.An additional one out of five indicated awareness only after theplan was set. One-third indicated their first awareness occurredwhen the plan was being developed and 23% stated their firstawareness when the organization first decided to undertake92strategic planning.When considered by employment group, results demonstrateearlier awareness by the professional group. Well over 2/3 of theProfessional Group indicated awareness of the plan before or duringits development while, in the same period, only 45% of the Non-Professional group were aware. Also notable is the extent towhich the non-professional group indicated its lack of awareness ofthe plan at the time of the research, relative to the ProfessionalGroup. Pearson's r reveals p. < .05. These results are aresummarized in Table 9 First Awareness of Strategic Plan by Employment Group.93APT AWARENSPV^RATgPLOYMENT: ORMGROUPNon-Professional^ProfessionalN=29^N=18FIRST AWARENESSWhen B.C. RehabPercent* N Percent* NFirst Decided 17 5 33 6During Developmentof the Plan 28 8 39 7After the PlanWas Set 17 5 22 4No Previous Awarenessof the Plan 31 9 6 1No Answer 7 2Note: Percentage figures are rounded.When asked if they had been afforded the opportunity toparticipate in the strategic plan, 60% answered negative.^Just94over one-third of staff surveyed indicated they had an opportunityto participate. Delineation of this variable by group, revealeda difference between the rate of opportunity of those in theprofessional/management group to provide input to the strategicplanning process as compared to the group with the non-professionaldesignation, p.<.01. Table 10 Opportunity for Input providesdetails.All Staff^Non-Professionals^ProfessionalsN=47 N=29^N=18OPPORTUNITYPercent* N^Percent* N^Percent* NYes 34 16 14 4 67 12No 60 28 79 23 28 5No Answer 6 3 7 2 5 1Note: Percentage figures are rounded.Of those who indicated no opportunity to participate, overtwo-thirds indicated that they would have liked the opportunity.Twenty-nine per cent indicated they did not want the opportunity.One respondent did not answer.Respondents who indicated that they did have the opportunity95to give their opinions were asked if they took advantage of thatopportunity. A full 94% stated that they took the opportunity.Participation rates are detailed in Table 11 Participation in the Strategic Plan.RTTPPATI^S TEAll Staff^Non-Professionals ProfessionalsN=47 N=29^N=18PARTICIPATIONPercent N^Percent N^PercentYES 34 16 14 4 67 12NO 66 31 86 25 33 6Note: Percentage Figures are Rounded.Of the sixteen respondents who participated in the planning,over two-thirds (69%) stated that the opportunity came when theplan was in the developmental stages. Two respondents (12.5%)indicated that the opportunity was presented after the strategicplan had been approved. The remaining 19% were unsure or did notanswer.Seventy-five per cent of those who participated in theplanning process indicated that they were comfortable doing so;three respondents indicated they were uncomfortable; one respondentdid not answer.96Of those who participated, 62% felt their opinions were takenseriously while most of those remaining reported they were"unsure." One did not answer.Over one-third of all staff surveyed indicated theirunderstanding of the strategic plan to be good. Thirty-two percentfelt they had some understanding.Delineation by employment group reveals a relatively moreimpoverished understanding by those designated non-professional.Pearson's r reveals p.<.01. Comparative results are detailed inTable 12 Understanding of the Strategic Plan.ALL STAFF NON-PROFESSIONALS PROFESSIONALSN=47^N=29^N=18UNDERSTANDINGPercent N^Percent N^Percent NGood 36 17 17 5 67 12Some 32 15 38 11 22 4Poor 28 13 38 11 11 2No Answer 4 2 7 2Note: Percentage Figures are Rounded.Respondents' perception of staff acceptance of the strategicplan (N=47), revealed that nearly one-half felt staff were neutralabout the plan, one-quarter felt staff mostly accepted the plan.97One out of eleven staff members felt the plan was rejected bystaff.Because the question which generated this data asked for athird-party assessment, the results cannot stand on their own. Thequestion was originally set, not for the purpose of acquiring"hard" data as to attitude but to get a sense of the ambiance orprevalent mood. The results generated by this question arecapsulized in Figure 2 Degree of Perceived Staff Acceptance of the Strateqic Plan, page 98.98Figure 2 Perceived Staff Acceptance of Strategic Plan N = 472% El NeutralE3 Mostly Accepteda No AnswerMostly Rejected[111 Completely Accepted15%49%99When delineated by employment group, results showed theprofessional group's perception of acceptance within theorganization is higher than that of the non-professional group.Table 13 Perceived Staff Attitude to the Plan by Employment Groupprovides a summary of results from this bivariate analysis.Pearson's r test revealed no statistical significance (p.=.63).Results are included because of their assumed clinicalsignificance.There is some suggestion in the literature that ambivalence orapathy are passive forms of resistance and function contrary toenrolment and commitment to planned change (Senge, 1991). Ifcategories were collapsed to reflect this perspective, resultsindicate that more than 62% of non-professionals assess staff'sattitude as that of non-acceptance. Using these parameters, a fullone-half of the professional staff would assess the overallattitude as that of non-acceptance.CTZ 11LoymENTPm; NON-PROFESSIONAL^PROFESSIONALPERCEIVED ATTITUDEN=29Percent^NN=18PercentAccepted 24 7 39 7Neutral 55 16 39 7Rejected 7 2 11 2No Answer 14 4 11 2100 Note: Percentage Figures are Rounded.Mean scores were calculated for the two organizationalvariables, participation in decision-making and hierarchy ofauthority, as generated from Aiken and Hage scales of PersonalParticipation in Decision Making and Hierarchy of Authority.Overall mean score for participation in decision making was4.27 (a score of 5 denoting no participation, a score of 1 denotingfull participation).Overall mean score for hierarchy of authority was 2.64, (ascore of 1 denoting high deference to hierarchical authority, ascore of 5 denoting low deference to hierarchical authority.)101 CHAPTER V - DISCUSSIONThere were several goals in conducting this case study. Thefirst was to ascertain George Pearson Centre employees' attitudestoward and concerns about B.C. Rehab's strategic plan. The secondwas to determine the process by which B.C. Rehab developed thestrategic plan and, in conjunction, determine employees' perceptionof their involvement in this process. Finally, the study attemptedto identify the influences which may have affected theorganization's choices around processes of strategic change.The information for this case study was derived by threemethods. Firstly, prior to the commencement of formal research,the author had knowledge of some policies and procedures of GeorgePearson Centre. Additionally, she observed and participated indiscussion with employees and planners about the strategic plan.Secondly, information about B.C. Rehab's strategic planningexperience was obtained through examination of B.C. Rehabdocuments, the results of which are contained in the introductorychapter. Academic and professional literature was reviewed. Theseresults comprise the second chapter entitled Literature Review.Finally, a questionnaire was distributed to a sample of 100randomly selected employees of George Pearson Centre to elicitinformation on three issues. Firstly, it examined employees'attitudes toward and concerns about the strategic plan. Secondly,it explored employees' perceived participation in the planning.Thirdly it attempted to determine what, if any, relationship102 existed between employees' participation and their attitude towardthe strategic plan. The methodology for this research project iscontained in the third chapter and the findings are outlined in thefourth, Results, chapter.This chapter is an integration of the previous chapters. Itspurpose is to pull the findings together, to identify emergingthemes and to provide some interpretation of them.While George Pearson Centre has evolved over the years inresponse to changing environmental conditions, none of the changesit previously experienced were as comprehensive as those suggestedin the current strategic plan. Previous changes were incrementalin nature, adjustments to the existing service delivery system. Aschronicled by the B.C. Rehabilitation Society (1992d), they wereunplanned responses to changing conditions. A prime example isPearson's response to the 1954 "outbreak of polio. .. whichproduced hundreds of new patients in the province" (p.6). Byresponding to the polio epidemic, the institution changed its focusto non-ambulatory patients; emanating from this an expertise inrespirator-dependent care developed. This, in turn, "meant thatnon-polio patients with breathing problems also became residents"(B.C. Rehabilitation Society, 1992d, p.9). While thesedevelopments had a significant impact on the organization and thecommunity, they were not planned. Nor were they radical. PearsonHospital remained a hospital in both infrastructure andorientation.103The current change effort, by comparison, is an "intentionalprocess, a conscious and deliberate intervention to change aspecific situation" (Kettner et al., 1985, p.7). The plannedchanges are radical, challenging the philosophical underpinnings ofthe organization's service delivery system. The organization'sdecision, for example, to "commit to a consumer-driven policy andpractice framework"^(B.C.^Rehabilitation Society, 1992b,^p.4) isintended to make^fundamental^changes^to the^way services aredelivered. It will,^undoubtedly,^have a dramatic impact on theissues of organizational control and accountability. This is alsotrue of the other philosophical goal which proposes theorganization's refocusing from a primary to tertiary care.Some of the impetus for the organization's strategic changewas brought to bear by consumer advocacy groups who lobbied forchanges in the delivery of services to people with disabilities.Single-interest groups, comprised primarily of people withdisabilities, have advocated for the right of disabled people todirect their own care and their own lives. They have demanded thatthey, the consumers, be the locus of control and that serviceproviders be accountable to them (Sutherland, 1981).It could be suggested from this that some of B.C. Rehab'sproposed changes are in response to a social action approach, sincemany of the changes are essentially a "redistribution of power,resources and/or decision-making . . .(and involve) changing basicpolicies of formal organizations" (Rothman and Tropman, 1987, p.6)However, B.C. Rehab's change effort was more than a single-104issue response. It was a comprehensive response to a complex setof conditions. Although some of the conditions antecedent to thestrategic change effort were consistent with those described byKettner et al--"the increasing focus on the needs of specialpopulations, the decline in resources available for human servicesand increasing pressures for accountability" (p.3), there wereothers as well. They included B.C.'s changing demographics(Havens, 1981), the impact of technological advances on thedemographics of the disabled population (National Council onWelfare, 1990) and the provincial government's movement towardsdecentralization (Seaton, 1991).B.C. Rehab's experience is consistent with Turton's (1991)observation that the hierarchical level of decision-making covarieswith the nature of the problems confronting the organization. Inthis case the antecedent conditions and the needed changes weresufficiently complex to demand the decision-making power of thoseoccupying upper-level positions.As evidenced by the high hierarchical position of the changeagents and by the radical, comprehensive nature of the proposedchanges, the George Pearson Centre experience is appropriatelyclassified as "strategic." It falls within Tichy's (1983)definition of strategic change as "nonincremental...change whichalters the overall orientation of the organization" (p.17)The impact of B.C. Rehab's change effort is consistent withthat traditionally expected of strategic change. It, more thanother type of change, is reported to yield great uncertainty not105 only for the organization as a whole but also for its stakeholders,notably its staff (Turton, 1991). Adding to the uncertainty is thetimescale. B.C. Rehab's change effort has continued, formally andinformally, over the period of a decade and is scheduled tocontinue formally, until at least 1997. Turton's observation that,"the longer the timescale, the greater the complexity and thelikely degree of uncertainty... experienced" (p.198) appears tohold true at George Pearson Centre with the confirmed presence ofuncertainty and concern among staff.While some degree of uncertainty may "go with the territory,"results suggest that the system of strategy development and itsapproach to communication contributed to employees' apprehension.Pearson Centre employees perceived communications originating fromchange agents as sporadic and "one way," that is top-down, withlittle provision for a two-way flow. Alpander and Gutmann (1974)suggest that uncertainty, fear of the unknown, is a leading causeof employee resistance. They maintain, however, that it can bereduced by simply providing employees with appropriate information.B.C. Rehab followed a corporate planning framework (Schaffer,1967). The process commenced with research of the issues, followedby an external environmental analysis and assessment of theorganization's internal strengths and needs. On the basis of theresearch results, the mission statement was revised. Upon itsreformulation, Schaffer's second stage, strategic planningfollowed--commencing in May, 1991--with the formation of aStrategic Planning Department. Although not so-delineated by the106 organization, the latter months of the planning process constitutedSchaffer's last stage, the beginning of operational planning. Atthis time, typical of processes adhering to strategic planningmodels (Chakravarthy and Lorange, 1991), the organization involvedthose occupying lower-level management and supervisory positions.This would account for why 29% of the organization's most powerfulgroup, its professional/management sector (Mintzberg, 1978) statedthat they had not heard of the plan until after it was set.Documents state that strategic planning was completed in June,1992, and the first year of the implementation process began. Itshould be noted that even at the end of Year I of implementation,operational planning continued, involving middle and lowermanagement and the co-ordinator of the former strategic planningdepartment. This, too, is somewhat typical of the planningperspective in strategy formation which sees responsibility for theoverall process as belonging, in principle, to the Chief ExecutiveOfficer (C.E.O.) with responsibility for the plan's executionresting, in practice, with staff planners (Mintzberg, 1990). Thisis also indicative of the organization's commitment to a socialplanning approach whererational, deliberately planned, and controlled change hasa central place. . . . community participation may varyfrom much to a little depending on how the problempresents itself and what organizational variables arepresent. The approach presupposes that change in acomplex . . . environment requires expert planners who,through the exercise of technical abilities, includingthe ability to manipulate large bureaucraticorganizations can skillfully guide complex changeprocesses. (Rothman and Tropman, 1978, p.6)107The issue of employees' participation in the planning processand the nature of communication with employees were pre-determinedby the organization's decision to use a planning approach andspecifically a strategic planning approach to formulate itsstrategy. Strategic planning, by definition, precludes broad-basedparticipation and is "conducted at the top of the organization andat the top of the organization's major divisions or product groups"(Anthony, 1985, p.4). To a large extent, B.C. Rehab held to theseprinciples. Particularly in the stages prior to operationalplanning (Schaffer, 1967), strategy development was the purview ofthe organization's upper-echelon. Documentary evidence states,however, that even during operational planning, employeeparticipation was restricted to those occupying lower-levelmanagement and professional positions within the organization (B.C.Rehab, 1992c, p.3).The decision to commit to a strategic planning model mirroredthe organization's roots in traditional structure, its strongcommitment to a medical model of practice and its orientation as aprofessional bureaucracy. These organizational structures have hadconsiderable influence in determining who would participate in thechange effort.As B.C. Rehab embarked upon strategic planning, its decision-making processes appear to have been highly centralized in theupper levels of the organization's hierarchy. To a large extent,employees' responses to the research confirm this. In addition totheir perception of the organization as highly centralized, they108 perceive the organization as adhering rigidly to hierarchicalauthority. There appears to be consistency between employees'attitudes about hierarchy and decision-making and theorganization's structure as illustrated in the George Pearson Centre Organizational Chart (Appendix A). The organizational chartreveals a departmentalized organization, supporting a large-scalemiddle management hierarchy. In many respects, the organizationfalls into the category of what Mintzberg (1983) refers to as a"machine bureaucracy." The rigid structures of such organizations,according to this author, beget "alienated employees, an obsessionwith control and an inability to adapt" (Mintzberg, 1983, p.12).George Pearson Centre, from its beginnings as a hospital,adheres to a medical model of service. This model predicates thepower and authority of medical professionals on the presumption ofthe discipline's superior ability to address issues (Kari &Michels, 1991). To a large extent, George Pearson Centre's serviceis dependent on the expertise of medical professionals. Thisreliance is demonstrated and supported in the organization'sstructure which, as illustrated in the organizational chart(Appendix A), is highly departmentalized along a functional model--largely according to professional discipline.George Pearson Centre confers much influence and power on itsprofessionals although this group is a numeric minority,constituting only 30% of the employee population. Althoughstructurally, George Pearson Centre displays many characteristicsof a "machine bureaucracy," it also has many of the attributes of109 a "professional bureaucracy."^According to Mintzberg (1983)professional^bureaucracies^are^highly^decentralized^andparticipative with respect to their professionals. They are,however, equally non-participative and centralized with respect tothose in non-professional designations. Consistent with this, themajority of those participating in George Pearson Centre'sdecision-making processes originate primarily from within the ranksof professional or managerial designations. The professionalgroup, relative to its size, was significantly over-representedwhile the non-professional group was likewise under-represented inthe strategic planning effort.B.C. Rehab documents outline the principles intended to guidethe organization's planning:. . .participation by staff at all levels and in allparts of the organization. . .Planning. . .viewed as a developmental process that willequip staff both to maintain a strategic vision and totake on planning as an ongoing function of linemanagement. . . .Planning. . . centred in mutual respect, teamwork, and adrive for continuous improvement. (B.C. RehabilitationSociety, 1992c, p.6/7)These principles depart from traditional strategic planningmethodology, particularly with regard to staff participation. Inmany aspects, they are more closely aligned with the "learningschool of thought" which suggests that "the complex and dynamicnature of the organization's environment precludes deliberatecontrol" (Mintzberg, 1990, p. 155). This perspective asserts that110 "deliberate control" in the planning process must be relaxed infavour of collective, stakeholder participation andstrategy making must. . .take the form of a process oflearning over time, in which, at the limit, formulationand implementation become indistinguishable.While the leader must learn too and sometimes (is) thesole learner, more commonly it is the collective systemthat learns;. . .learning proceeds in emergent fashion throughbehavior that stimulates thinking retrospectively, sothat sense is made of action. .. strategic initiativesare taken by whoever has the capacity to learn and theresources to support that capacity. (Mintzberg, 1990,p.155)Despite B.C. Rehab's guiding principles and the leadership'sdesire to relax control and avoid "going 'from the top down'" (B.C.Rehabilitation Society, 1992c, p.6), results suggest that broad-based employee participation was not fully realized. The tenets ofparticipation applied to the professional group but not to the non-professional. In many respects this incongruity between policy andpractice is a benchmark issue. The factors which contribute to theresistance of this policy are also the same factors which willultimately influence implementation of the strategic changes.Several perspectives are appropriate when addressing the issueof resistance to such changes. In this case, the resistanceappears to originate with those responsible for the policy'simplementation, likely the organization's managers. The principlesof employee participation are resisted because, despite theirmanagement roles, the incumbents do not share the leadership'svision (Senge, 1991) a result, in part of their lack of involvement111 in its development. As a result, they feel no sense of "ownership"of the ideology (Whyte, 1991).Mintzberg (1990) suggests that in certain environments,organizationsmay be better off with a forceful leader who already hasa strategic vision to save it (the organization) or atleast can develop one quickly. Even when not in crisis,some organizations need strategic visions that are noveland tightly integrated. . . and these are more likely tocome through a centralized entrepreneurial approach thanone of decentralized learning. (Mintzberg, 1990, p.157)This appears to be the case with B.C. Rehab.^It appears thatnecessitated by the technological, social, political and economicconditions facing the organization, B.C. Rehab's "vision" hasemanated from the leadership, without the concensus of lower-levelbureaucrats.^The team of top executives, led by the C.E.O.,remains the architect of strategy.^Even in Year I ofimplementation, the task at hand is to "selectively move peopletoward a broadly conceived organizational goal" (Quinn, 1980,p.32). This process is aptly described as "politicalimplementation" (Mintzberg, 1990).The Alpander and Gutmann (1974) thesis that resistance can bemitigated through the adequate provision of information is perhapsa simplistic approach in settings where change challenges thefundamentals of an organization. To address the issue ofresistance, its existence must first be diagnosed. Managers andother employees although heavily invested in the status quo oftendo not wish to be perceived as non-compliant. Their dissonanceoften results in what Hardy (1992) refers to as "passive112 resistance" characterized as: " 'Me fighting the plan? Why, I'mdoing everything you told me to do, boss!'--and nothing more"(Hardy, 1992, p.72). The "nothing more" is the crux of passiveresistance. The participatory processes advocated by the planningprinciples are cumbersome and time-consuming (Makridakis et al.,1982). To be successfully implemented, such principles must enjoya high level of commitment from those charged with theirimplementation. Given the demands that participatory models placeon scarce resources (staff time, managerial time, financialresources) relative to more centralized approaches, there is greatpotential for them to be undermined or dismissed, as untenable, bythose not really in agreement.Another possible explanation for the failure of the thrusttowards participation may have been the threat it posed to thepower of the organization's traditional decision-makers. Thispolicy's poor implementation suggests that this issue engenderedsome dissension among managerial staff. In light of this, onecannot dismiss the possibility of the policy's having fallen victimto organizational politics or "activities to acquire, develop, anduse power and other resources to obtain one's preferred outcomes insituations in which there is uncertainty of dissensus [sic] aboutchoices" (Pfeffer, 1981a, p.7).The organizational learning espoused by B.C. Rehab's statementof planning beliefs and values and by the learning perspective,generally, assumes that employees have skills in strategicthinking. The development of these skills requires a climate which113 encourages individuals to think critically and retrospectivelyabout the organization's previously-attempted behaviours andstrategies (Mintzberg, 1990). Traditionally George PearsonCentre's organizational climate has not been conducive to thedevelopment of these skills, particularly in those employeesdesignated as non-professional. It may, therefore, have beendevelopmentally premature to expect the organization to welcome andsuccessfully implement collective strategic thinking. Such"organizational revitalization through steady learning" (Mintzberg,1990, p.153), is more appropriately a goal for B.C. Rehab's futurethan for the current strategic change effort.Assumptions around the nature of organizational cultureprovide a useful perspective in addressing influences on GeorgePearson Centre's strategic change effort. The first assumption isthat George Pearson Centre, like all organizations, has a dominantculture which has developed over time and is affected by and, inturn, affects the beliefs, attitudes and assumptions of its members(Scholz, 1986). The second assumption is that in fact, GeorgePearson Centre supports several, sometimes conflicting, sub-cultures (Pedersen and Sorensen, 1988). A comprehensivedescription of the Centre's culture(s) was outside the parametersof this study but the issue of culture is deserving ofconsideration. Examination of the organization's establishedpolicies and procedures in concert with simple observations of thephysical and social environment hints at a culture which supportsa paternalistic, control orientation and resists attempts to114 deviate from the status quo.Despite the fact that the organization is apparentlyrefocussing its service delivery away from a medical or diseasemodel, many of the artifacts of this orientation persist. Mostnoticeable is the sign in front of the building which refers to thefacility as "George Pearson Hospital" [italics added] despite thefact that the name changed several years ago to "George PearsonCentre" [italics added].A number of the facility's resident care policies andprocedures reflect the medical model's protective attitude--itsneed to control and make decisions for residents. One artifactwhich reflects this aspect of culture is the strong presence ofmedical personnel in the ward teams and the time-honoured practiceof professionals planning for residents, rather than planning inequal partnership with residents.A cultural manifestation of the organization's strict sense ofhierarchy and control is keenly depicted in informal socialsettings. For example during coffee or meal breaks, managementfigures remain cloistered at one designated table while otherprofessional staff, support staff and nursing aides, each accordingto group, congregate separately. There is an unwritten rule orsense that one must not associate outside one's "class."The organization's mission statement, reformulated andaccepted by the Board of Directors in June, 1990, is still not inevidence in the Centre. However, until it was removed in March,1993, to make way for renovations, a public notice board at George115Pearson Centre sported the previous mission statement.In isolation, these may be perceived as insignificant.However these examples in concert with numerous others may beindicative of a dominant culture explicitly opposed to or passivelyresisting fundamental change. The climate or ambience with respectto the strategic plan appears to be one of ambivalence orresistance as reported by respondents in the survey. A quick lookat the results reveals that only one in four respondents felt theplan was completely or mostly accepted. In addition to the 8% whofelt the staff mostly rejected the plan, 40% felt the staff wasneutral. There was no response by 15% of respondents. In total,a full 63% assessed the prevailing mood as either one ofambivalence or rejection or did not care to answer the question.The strategic plan's content may, in many respects, be theembodiment of an emerging culture--a culture which takes its valuesand assumptions from the leadership's vision (Pfeffer, 1981). Thevalue system of the emerging culture, however, appears to challengemany of the norms of the current dominant culture which, supportedby a traditional organizational structure, seeks out a stableenvironment and actively resists change (Mintzberg, 1983; Pearson,1990).Research results reveal a reasonably high employee agreementwith the content of four of the strategic goals. Receiving mostagreement (89%) was the goal relating to B.C. Rehab as a provincialresource centre in rehabilitation education, research andtechnology. This goal has the least immediate impact on employees116 and will likely generate the lowest operational effect (Judson,1991) of any of the goals. That is, it is the least likely of allthe goals to require substantial changes in behaviour, particularlyof non-professional staff.Following close behind is the goal which proposes that B.C.Rehab's focus shift from that of primary care to tertiary care, insupport of a philosophy of decentralized service. Employees reporthigh agreement with this goal, despite the fact that whenimplemented, this goal will have a significant operational effect.Documentary evidence states that changes in staff's work venues,duties, attitudes and behaviour will result (B.C. Rehab, 1992c).The other philosophical goal, engenders significantly morecontroversy and received substantially less agreement (56%). Thegoal which commits B.C. Rehab to a consumer-driven framework,unlike the previously discussed goals, is inadequately explained.At the time of the research project, it had not yet been defined.The development of an operational definition has been identified asone of the priorities for the first year of the plan'simplementation.The degree of uncertainty surrounding this goal appears toseparate it from the other four goals. In the absence of officialinformation on its operationalization, many employees have formedtheir own, perhaps inaccurate, perceptions of this strategicthrust. In the minds of some, the implementation of a consumer-driven philosophy will require staff to undergo significantattitudinal and behavioural adjustments. Some believe that the117implementation of this goal will drastically alter power-relationsbetween residents and staff; professional discretion beingundermined by the consumer's wishes. Once again, the observationsof Alpander and Gutmann (1974) that, "resistance to change stemslargely from fear of the unknown. . ." (p.723), appear to hold trueas employees appear to react to the uncertainty and lack ofinformation about the first goal.From an implementation standpoint, employees' low rate ofagreement with this goal should be of concern. A full fortypercent of respondents either disagreed with, gave no answer to orhad no opinion about this goal. These results indicate that alarge sector of staff that feels little or no commitment to a goalwhich is expected to underpin the organization's service deliverysystem. Translated into practice, the lack of commitment by twoout of five employees may seriously affect the implementation ofthis goal and ultimately, the plan.If one assumes that the non-professional group has a largerole to play in accomplishing a consumer-driven framework,implementation concerns are further underscored. Substantiallyless than half (41%) of the non-professional group reportedagreement with the "consumer-driven" goal.Without adequate information on which to base their decisionsand in the face of great speculation, it may be that employees'resistance to the consumer-driven goal is well-founded or at leastrationally defensible. Particularly for those individuals who viewit as a threat to established power relations or as contravening118 traditional norms or ways of doing things, resistance isunderstandable (Judson, 1991; Senge, 1991).Without their achieving an understanding of this goal, thebest that can be expected from employees is their grudgingcompliance--they do what is expected of them although they do notsee the benefits of the vision (Senge, 1991). The research was notintended to identify employees' behaviours, to identify their placealong Senge's (1991) continuum of commitment to maliciousdisobedience and apathy. However, the research did identify apervasive sense of employee ambivalence toward the strategic plan.How this ambivalence will translate behaviourally, is open tospeculation. Certainly, it appears unlikely that those who feelambivalent toward the goals are committed or even enrolled in theorganization's vision.While single variables cannot stand on their own to defineassociations, they can, in concert, present a picture. The resultsof this research reveal a particular pattern. Essentially, thelargest group of employees appears to have been systematicallyexcluded from participating in the strategic planning process.This, despite the fact that a major proportion of them indicatedthat, given the chance, they would have liked to participate. Thissame group indicated (relative to the professional group) a poorunderstanding of the plan and a lower rate of agreement with thegoals.In contrast, a larger percentage of the professional group wasgiven the opportunity to participate and subsequently did 119 participate. Overall, they assessed themselves as having a betterunderstanding of the plan and indicated relatively higher agreementwith the goals.This study cannot, nor was it ever intended to, infercausality. Certainly a review of the literature reveals numerouspotential influences on employee participation and on employeeattitude. To predict that employees' participation in the B.C.Rehab's strategic planning process would beget agreement with theplan would not only be a methodological error but would be a graveoversimplification of what turns out to be a very complex issue.It can be concluded that organizational culture, politics andstructure appear to influence employee participation and employeeattitude. It seems apparent also, that employees' participation inthe process, their understanding of the plan and their agreementwith the organizational goals are positively associated.IN CONCLUSIONWhile others are evident, one theme in particular emerges fromthis examination: that the organization's structure, its cultureand its micro-political interests are interdependent and influence,either implicitly or explicitly, all organizational processes,including strategy development and implementation. These factorsexert great influence on the opportunities presented employees andthe degree to which employees participate in organizationaldecision-making.120 The employee group which traditionally held positions of powerat the Centre were those who were invited and ultimately took theopportunity to participate in the strategic planning process. Onthe whole they demonstrated more agreement with the organization'sgoals and objectives. Those who were not invited, and thereforedid not participate, were those traditionally excluded fromdecision-making--namely those occupying non-professional positions.This group demonstrated lower agreement and higher ambivalence,overall. The proposed philosophical changes to a consumer-drivenframework generated the most disagreement from staff although thisgoal will not necessarily have the most immediate nor the greatestoperational effect on staff. The uncertainty surrounding this goalsets it apart from the others and may be a factor in employees'attitude toward it.Although not unexpected, the uncertainties surrounding thestrategic change, appeared to motivate many of the concerns. Asimplementation proceeds, employees are asking to be kept informed.They are asking for a better understanding--to be kept abreast, formore, current information from planners and upper-level management.They are asking, too, for the opportunity for two-waycommunication, for input into the process.121RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDYFrom this study, there is reasonable evidence to support anassociation between the staff's participation in the planning andacceptance of the strategic plan. However, the research design didnot produce data that were generalizable.There are many questions emanating from the data which shouldbe explored from a contextual perspective. Such exploration couldbe accomplished through a face-to-face interview or focus groupformat. These methods could more fully explore employees' feelingsabout the strategic change experience and elicit rich contextualdata to help make sense of employees' reactions to the strategicchange effort.An inquiry should be made into the existence, causes andeffects of staff's ambivalence toward the strategic plan. Althoughnot stated unequivocally, much of the literature implies thatambivalence translates into a lack of commitment. If this isindeed, so, addressing this issue would be vital to implementationof any strategic plan.Although some of this study's results indicated that culturemay be a significant consideration, it was outside this study'smandate to examine the organizational culture at George PearsonCentre. The literature suggests that organizational culture is oneof the most important factors influencing strategic change efforts.An ethnographical study would be useful in describing the variouslevels of George Pearson Centre's culture and determining how it122ultimately affects and is affected by organizational changeefforts.Another aspect worthy of research attention is the prevalenceand role of organizational politics at George Pearson Centre.Although unsubstantiated, there were a number of responses whichindicated that internal power struggles and self-interest were notonly evident but had a negative impact on the change effort.The case study of strategic change at George Pearson Centreraises a number of research questions:To what extent are employees ambivalent about thestrategic change efforts?What factors contribute to employee ambivalence?What impact does ambivalence have on implementation ofthe strategic plan?What are the beliefs, values, assumptions and artifactsof the culture(s) at George Pearson Centre?What is the impact of the Centre's organizationalculture(s) on its organizational change effort?If George Pearson Centre has several cultures, how dothey interact with each other?To what extent is organizational politics in existence atGeorge Pearson Centre?What, if any, role do organizational politics and self-interest have in George Pearson Centre's organizationalchange efforts?123 EPILOGUEB.C. Rehab's decision to commit itself to strategic change wasnot only an act of wisdom and vision but was one of courage, aswell. In light of the current socio-economic and political climatewith its incumbent pronouncements of restraint, accountability anddecentralization, the decision to undertake strategic change was,essentially, the organization's bid to survive.The proposed strategic changes are consistent with B.C.Rehab's articulated belief that British Columbians withdisabilities can be better served than they are currently. Guidedby the five strategic goals, the strategic plan has become thevehicle through which the organization will adjust its servicedelivery system to meet the changing needs of its constituents.By challenging the status quo, by opening to scrutiny everyaspect of its philosophy, policies, structures and service deliverysystem, the organization and its players took considerable risk.The uncertainty engendered by the resulting plan demands and willcontinue to demand parallelled commitment from those who willultimately implement it--community, service-provider and consumeralike.124REFERENCESAiken, M. & Hage, J. (1968). Organizational interdependence andintra-organizational structure. American sociological review,33(6), 912-930.Alpander, G. G. & Gutmann, J. E. (1974). A model for measuring theimpact of change on an organization. Hospital & communitypsychiatry, 25(11), 719-723.Anthony, W. P. (1985). Practical strategic planning: a guide andmanual for line managers. Westport, Connecticut: QuorumBooks.Argyris, C. (1957). Personality and organization.^New York:Harper.Beer, M. (1980). Organization change and development: a systems view. Santa Monica, California: Goodyear Publishing Company,IncBlake, R. R. & Mouton, J. S. (1977).^The managerial grid: keyorientations for achieving production through people.Houston: Gulf Publishing Company.Brisenden, J. (1986). Independent living and the medical model ofdisability. Disability, handicap and society. 1(2), 173-178.British Columbia Rehabilitation Society. (1992 a).^Formulating the strategic plan: a statement of operational implications of our strategic goals. Unpublished paper.British Columbia Rehabilitation Society. (1992 b).^Refocusing rehab: a discussion document. Unpublished paper.British Columbia Rehabilitation Society. (1992 c). From awareness to action. Unpublished paper.British Columbia Rehabilitation Society.^(1992, d). 40 byGeorge!. (Available British Columbia Rehabilitation Society,4255 Laurel Street, Vancouver, B.C., Canada V5Z 2G9).Burns, T. & Stalker, G. M. (1961). The management of innovation.London: Tavistock Publications.Camillus, J. C. (1980).^From the abstract of corporate planningsystems: too much of a good thing? Managinq, 1, 9-37.125Carter, R. K. (1983). The accountable agency. Beverly Hills: SagePublications.Chakravarthy, B. S. & Lorange, P. (1991). Managing the strategyprocess: a framework for a multibusiness firm. EnglewoodCliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.Chandler, A. D. (1962). Strategy and structure. Cambridge: M.I.T.Press.Culbert, S. A. & McDonough, J. J. (1980).^The invisible war:pursuing self-interests at work. New York: John Wiley & Sons.Culyer, A. (1988). Health expenditures in Canada: past and future.Toronto, Ontario: Canadian Tax Foundation.Cummings, T. G. (Ed.). (1980).^Systems theory for organizationdevelopment. New York: John Wiley & Sons.Cyert, R. M. and March, J. G. (1963). A behavioural theory of the firm. New York: Prentice Hall.De Man, H. (1988). Organizational change in its context. Delft,Holland: Eburon.Dunham, A. (1963).^Some principles of community development.International review of community development. 11, 141-151.Ensign, M. S. & Adler, L. N. (Eds.). (1985). Strategic planning: contemporary viewpoints. Santa Barbara: ABC-Clio InformationServices.Evans, R. (1985). Illusions of necessity: evading responsibilityfor choice in health care. Journal of health politics, policy and law, 10(3), 439-467.Evered, R. (1980).^Consequences of and prospects for systemsthinking in organizational change. In T.G. Cummings (Ed.),Systems theory for organization development (pp.5-14). NewYork: John Wiley & Sons.Forbes, W., Jackson, J. & Kraus, A. (1987). Institutionalizationof the elderly in Canada. Toronto: Butterworths.Goffman E. (1961). Asylums: essays o the social situation of mental patients and other inmates. Chicago: Aldine PublishingCompany.Gray, D. H. (1986).^Uses and misuses of strategic planning.Harvard Business Review, January-February 1986, 89-97.126Greiner, L. E. (1967). Patterns of organization change. Harvardbusiness review, May-June, 1967, 119-128.Guest, D. (1985).^The emergence of social security in Canada.Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.Hanvelt, R. (1992) Social services and 'restraint'. In R.C. Allan& R.C. Rosenbluth (Eds.),^False promises: the failure of conservative economics (pp.243-256).^Vancouver: New StarBooks.Hardy, K. G. (1992).^The three crimes of strategic planning.Business Quarterly, 57(1), 71-74.Harrison, M. I. (1987). Diagnosing organizations: methods, models, and processes. Newbury Park: Sage Publications.Havens, B. (1981).^Population projections: certainties anduncertainties. In G. M. Gutman (Ed.), Canada's changing age structure: implications for the future (pp. 1-31). Burnaby,British Columbia, Canada: S.F.U. Publications.Helco, H.^(1981).^Toward a new welfare state? In P. Flora &A.J. Heidenheimer (Eds.), The development of welfare states in Europe and America. New Brunswick, N.J.: TransactionBooks.Henerson, M. E., Morris, L. L. & Fitzgibbon, C. T. (1978). How tomeasure attitudes. Beverly Hills: Sage.Herman,^J. L., Morris, L.^L., Fitz-gibbon, C. T.^(1987).Evaluator's handbook. Newbury Park: Sage.Hessler, R. M. (1992).^Social research methods.^St. Paul: WestPublishing Company.Holdsworth, L. (1991).^Empowerment social work with physicallydisabled people. Norwich: University of East Anglia.Huff, A. S.^(1980).^Organizations as political systems:implications for diagnosis, change, and stability. In T. G.Cummings (Ed.), Systems theory for organization development (pp.163-180). New York: John Wiley & Sons.Judson, A. S. (1991).^Changing behavior in organizations: minimizing resistance to change. Cambridge, Massachusetts:Basil Blackwell, Inc.Kalish, R. (1979).^The new ageism and the failure models: apolemic. Gerontologist. 19, 398-402.127Kari, N. & Michels, P. (1991). The Lazarus project: the politics ofempowerment. The American journal of occupational therapy.45(8), 719-725.Kettner, P., Daley, J. M. & Nichols, A. W. (1985).^Initiatingchange in organizations and communities: a macro practice model. Monteray California: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company.Likert, R. (1961). New patterns of management. New York: McGrawHill.Likert, R. (1967). The human organization. New York: McGraw Hill.Makridakis, S. G. (Ed.). (1982). The handbook of forecasting: amanager's guide. New York: John Wiley & Sons.Marshall, V. (Ed.) (1987). Aging in Canada: social perspectives.Markham, Ontario: Fitzhenry & Whiteside.Mayes, B. T. & Allen, R. W. (1977).^Towards a definition oforganizational politics.^Academy of management review, 2,672-678.McGregor, D. (1960).^The human side of enterprise.^New York:McGraw-Hill.Menolascino, F.^(1977).^Challenge in mental retardation: progressive ideologies and services. New York: Human ServicesPress.Mercer, J. L. (1991). Strategic planning for public managers. NewYork: Quorum Books.Miller, D. C. (1991).^Handbook of research design and social measurement. Newbury Park: Sage.Mintzberg, H. (1978). Patterns in strategy formation. Management Science, 24(9), 934 - 948.Mintzberg, H. (1983).^Power in and around organizations.Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall.Mintzberg, H. (1983a).^Structure in fives: designing effectiveorganisations. New York: Prentice Hall.Mintzberg, H. (1990). Strategy formation: schools of thought. InJ.W. Frederickson (Ed.), Perspectives on strategic management (pp.105-236). New York: Harper Business.National Council on Welfare. (1990).^Health, health care andmedicare. Ottawa: Author.128Nelson, R. (1978). Creating community acceptance for handicappedpeople. Springfield: Charles C. Thomas.Orlich, D. C. (1978). Designing sensible surveys. Pleasantville:Redgrave Publishing Company.Pearson, G. (1990). Strategic thinking. New York: Prentice Hall.Pedersen, J. S. & Sorensen, J. S. (1988). Organizational cultures in theory and practice. Aldershot: Gower Publishing Company.Perlman, R. (1975). Consumer and social services. Toronto: JohnWiley & Sons.Peron, Y. & Strohmenger, S. (1985). Demoqraphics and healthindicators. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services.Pfeffer, J. (1981). Management as symbolic action: the creation andmaintenance or organizational paradigms. In L.L. Cummings, &B.M. Staw, (Eds.), Research in organizational behavior,(Vol.3) (pp. 1-52). Greenwich: JAI Press.Pfeffer, J. (1981a).^Power in organizations.^Cambridge,Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company.Posavac, E. J. & Carey, R. G. (1985). Program evaluation: methods and case studies. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.Quinn, J. B. (1980).^Managing strategic change.^SloaneManagement Review, 3-9.Rosenfelt, R. (1965).^The elderly mystique.^Journal of social issues. 21, 37-42.Rothman, J. & Tropman, J. E. (1987). Models of communityorganization and macro practice perspectives: their mixing andphasing. In F. M. Cox, J. L. Erlich, J. Rothman & J. E.Tropman, (Eds.), Strateqies of community organization, (4thed.), (pp. 3-26). Itasca, Illinois: F.E. Peacock Publishers.Rubin, A. & Babbie, E. (1989). Research methods for social work.Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company.Schaffer, R. H. (1967).^Putting action into planning. HarvardBusiness Review, 45, 158.Schein, E.H. (1985). Organizational culture and leadership: adynamic view. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, Inc.129Scholz, C. (1986). The symbolic value of computerized informationsystems. In P. Gagliardi, (Ed.), Symbols and artifacts: views of the corporate landscape, (pp. 233-254). Berlin: Walter deGruyter.Seaton, P. D. (1991). Closer to home: the report of the BritishColumbia commission on health care costs. Victoria: CrownPublications, Inc.Senge, P. M. (1990). The fifth discipline: the art and practice of the learning organization. New York: Doubleday.Skidmore, R. A. (1990).^Social work administration: dynamic management and human relationships. Englewood Cliffs, NewJersey: Prentice Hall.Statistics Canada. (1991).^The health and activity limitationsurvey. Ottawa: author.Staw, B. M. (1976).^Knee deep in the big muddy: a study ofescalating commitment to a chosen course of action.Organizational behaviour and human performance, 16, 27-44.Strebel, P. (1992).^Breakpoints: how managers exploit radical business change.^Boston, Massachusetts: Harvard BusinessSchool Press.Sullivan, A. T. (1981).^Disabled we stand.^London: SouvenirPress.Tellis-Nayak, V. & Tellis-Nayak, M. (1989). Quality of care andthe burden of two coutures: when the world of the nurse's aideenters of the world of the nursing home. Gerontologist. 29,307-313.Tichy, N.M. (1983).^Managing strategic change: technical, political, and cultural dynamics.^New York: John Wiley &Sons.Turem, J. S. & Born, C. E. (1983). Doing more with less. Social Work, 28(6), 206-210.Turton, R. (1991). Behaviour in a business context. New York:Chapman & Hall.Vladeck, B. (1980). Unloving care. New York: Basic.Walton, R. E. (1985). From control to commitment in the workplace.Harvard Business Review. March-April, 77-84.130Warner, M. B.^(1977).^Minorities and human rights. In W. F.Anderson, B. J. Frieden & M. J. Murphy (Eds.), Managing humanservices. Washington, D.C.: International City ManagersAssociation.Webster, S. A. & Wylie, M. L. (1988).^Strategic planning incompetitive environments. Administration in social work,12(3), 25-43.Weinbach, R. W. & Grinnell, R. M. (1991). Statistics for social workers. New York: Longman.Whyte, W. F. (1991). Social theory for action: how individuals andorganizations learn to change. Newbury Park: SagePublications.Wolfensberger, W. (1972). Normalization.^Toronto: NationalInstitute on Mental Retardation.Woods Gordon Management Consultants. (1984). Investigation of the impact of demographic change on the health care system inCanada. Toronto: Woods, Gordon.Woodward, J.^(1958).^Management and technology.^Problems of progress in industrv, 3, H.M.S.O.Yegidis, B. L. & Weinbach, R. W. (1991).^Research methods forsocial workers. New York: Longman.York, R. 0. (1982).^Human service planning: concepts, tools, & methods. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.Zald, M. N. (1970). Political economy: a framework for comparativeanalyses. In M. N. Zald (ed.), Power in organizations (pp.221-261). Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press.APPENDIX AGeorge Pearson CentreOrganizational Chart131I ST ORES Firi.NEALTHH1PAYROLL I-'NUT*. SEA.!FOOD SER.APPROVALSIr•JLINEN TRANS,.I PLANT OP'S 1PNANNACV IICNAPL'N1—SLOG SE*KennSUPERUC.S.O.CLINICSASSTDONSEXUALMALINASSOC.DONUNIT 7 INFEC.CONTOLRADIOLOGY IOASPTHERAPYAEU+.OUT ICH810 nEoGEORGE PEARSON CENTRE^ POLICY IS-ODDORGANIZATIONAL CHART DATE' JUNE, 1011HOARD OF DIRECTORSPRESIDENTnonzmisrnfirottASSOC. XEDICAL ORM.ADAINISTRATIUE ASSTOR COORDINATOR ■ I I EDUCATION I TRAININGII I1L I MARV1^1FINANCE minim NUTRITION NURSING I SOCIALINFOR. SEA. RESOURCES FOOD SERUICES RES. SUPP. SERUICES1 THERAPEUTIC^FACILITIESPROGRAM SERU .^nnmnoenEnrAPPENDIX BQuestionnaire133134Strategic Planning Content and Process:Exploration of George Pearson Centre Employees'Attitudes and Implementation ConcernsQUESTIONNAIREThank you for agreeing to participate. Your help is appreciated. Please be assured that allinformation will be kept in strict confidence. Names of those participating in this project willnot be discussed with anyone.Instructions: Read each question and CIRCLE the answer which best describes youLet's begin with a little bit about yourself. CIRCLE the best answer.1. What is your age?a. 20 years or underb. 21 - 30 yearsc. 31 - 40 yearsd. 41 - 50 yearse. 51 - 60 yearsf. 61 - 65 years2. What is your highest level of education?a. Less than Grade 8b. Some High Schoolc. High School Graduated. Some College/Universitye. College/University Graduate3. How long have you worked at George Pearson Centre?a. under one yearb. 1 - 5 yearsc. 6 - 10 yearsd. 11 - 15 yearse. 16+ years4. Is English your first language?a. Yesb. NoB.C. Rehab has developed a new strategic plan which will set the direction for George PearsonCentre for the next five years.5. When did you first hear about the strategic plan?a. when B.C. Rehab first decided to do a strategic planb. when the strategic plan was being developedc. after the strategic plan was setd. I had not heard of it before today135The strategic plan has five goal statements. CIRCLE the answer that best describes yourfeelings.6.^Goal statement #1:"B.C. Rehab will commit to a consumer-driven policy and practice framework in allaspects of our work"a. strongly agree with this goalb. agree with this goalc. no opiniond. disagree with this goale. strongly disagree with this goal7. Goal statement #2:"B.C. Rehab will pursue community partnership in the planning, delivery,research andfunding of rehabilitation services."a. strongly agree with this goalb. agree with this goalc. no opiniond. disagree with this goale. strongly disagree with this goal8. Goal statement #3"B.C. Rehab will focus clinical activity on the rehabilitation of individuals withneurological disabilities."a. strongly agree with this goalb. agree with this goalc. no opiniond. disagree with this goale. strongly disagree with this goal9. Goal statement #4:"B.C. Rehab will become a provincial resource centre in rehabilitation education,research and technology."a. strongly agree with this goalb. agree with this goalc. no opiniond. disagree with this goale. strongly disagree with this goal10. Goal statement #5:"B.C. Rehab will become a resource centre for specialized community-based programssupporting people with disabilities."a. strongly agree with this goalb. agree with this goalc. no opiniond. disagree with this goale. strongly disagree with this goal13611. In your opinion, how well is the strategic plan accepted by staff at George PearsonCentre?a. Completely Acceptedb. Mostly Acceptedc. Neutrald. Mostly Rejectede. Completely Rejected12. In your opinion, which of the five strategic goals will be the easiest to achieve?a. Goal #1b. Goal #2c. Goal #3d. Goal #4e. Goal #5^13.^In your opinion, which of the five strategic goals will be the most difficult toachieve?a. Goal #1b. Goal #2c. Goal #3d. Goal #4e. Goal #514.^How well do you understand the strategic plan?a. Very Good Understandingb. Good Understandingc. Some Understandingd. Poor Understandinge. Very Poor Understanding15. In your opinion, will the new strategic plan affect employees at George Pearson Centre?a. Yes^(If you answered "Yes", go to question 16)b. No^(If you answered "No", go to question 17)c. Unsure^(If you answered "Unsure", go to question 17)16. In your opinion, what effect will it have on employees?17.^When did you first hear about B.C. Rehab's Strategic Plan?a. I had not heard of it before todayb. after the strategic plan was setc. when the strategic plan was being developedd. when B.C. Rehab first decided to do a strategic plan137^18.^Did you have the opportunity to express your opinions about the strategic plan?a. Yes^ (If you answered "Yes",go to question 20)b. No(If you answered "No",go to question #19)19.^Would you have likedthe opportunity toexpress your opinions?a. Yesb. No(Skip questions 20 - 24,Go to question 25)20. When were you given the opportunity to give youropinion?a. After the strategic planhad been approvedb. When the strategic plan wasin the development stagesc. Unsure21. Did you take the opportunityto give your opinions?a. Yes (If you answered yes,go to next questionb. No(If you answered no,Skip questions 22,23 & 24;Go to question 25)22. How did you communicate your opinions?CIRCLE As Many As Appropriatea. discussions with my manageror supervisorb. in meeting(s) called by management to discussthe new planc. as part of a strategicplanning working group orcommitteed. in writing as part of areport or briefe. Other: (please specify)13823. How comfortable did you feel about giving^youropinion?a. Very comfortableb. Comfortablec. Neutrald. Uncomfortablee. Very uncomfortable24. How seriously would you sayyour opinions were taken?a. taken very seriouslyb. taken seriouslyc. were not taken seriouslyd. not taken at all seriouslye. unknown25. In your opinion, do staff accept the strategic plan?a. Completely Acceptedb. Mostly Acceptedc. Neutrald. Mostly Rejectede. Completely Rejected26. If you feel the plan is not accepted, why not?Now a few general questions. CIRCLE the best answer.27. How frequently do you usually participate in the decision to hire new staff?a. neverb. seldomc. sometimesd. oftene. always28. How frequently do you usually participate in the decisions on the promotion of any ofthe professional staff?a. neverb. seldomc. sometimesd. oftene. always13929. How frequently do you usually participate in decisions on the adoptions of new policies?a. neverb. seldomc. sometimesd. oftene. always30. How frequently do you participate in the decisions on the adoptions of new programs?a. neverb. seldomc. sometimesd. oftene. alwaysThe next few items are about working at George Pearson Centre. Circle the answer which bestdescribes your feelings.31. There can be little action here until a supervisor approves a decision.a. Definitely falseb. Falsec. Trued. Definitely true.32. A person who wants to make his or her own decisions would be quicklydiscouraged here.a. Definitely falseb. Falsec. Trued. Definitely true33. Even small matters have to be referred to someone higher up for a final decision.a. Definitely falseb. Falsec. Trued. Definitely true34^I have to ask my boss before I do almost anything.a. Definitely falseb. Falsec. Trued. Definitely true35. Any decision I make has to have my boss's approval.a. Definitely falseb. Falsec. Trued. Definitely trueDon't give up. Only one more question to go! Please take your time and answer as fully asyou can. Use the back of the page if you need more space.14036. In your opinion, are there concerns which must be addressed by administration before thestrategic plan can get started?Any additional comments that you would like to make?Thank you so much for your time.^You may use the envelope provided to return thisquestionnaire through the Centre's mail system.If you wish, you may leave your questionnaire in my mail basket located in the social workdepartment.Any questions or comments?Call me,^Nancy Clay, at 321-3231, local 781, orDr. Sharon Manson-Singer, 822-3251.Again, thank you for your assistance in this project.APPENDIX CLetter of PermissionReprints & PermissionsThe American Sociological Association141142the american sociological association1722 N Street NW, Washington, DC 20036phone: (202) 833-3410^fax: (202) 785-0146Reprints and PermissionsWe are in receipt of your request to reprint the following:Jerald Hage and Michael Aiken, American Sociological Review (1968):912-30.Scale of Personal Participation in Decision Making and Hierarchy of AuthorityASA policy dictates that reprint permission from ASA and its authors is required only when materials are to be publishedand/or sold for profit. Therefore, if neither of these conditions apply, permission from ASA and its authors is assumed for:^ Photocopies: ASA allows material to be reproduced in any quantity as long as duplication is for classroom use and notfor profit.xx ^Educational use: ASA material may be reproduced for use in unpublished dissertations or educational material. Ifdissertation or educational material will be published at a later date, permission will be required from ASA at that time.Permission from ASA is also not required if:^ Copyright has expired: This material is now in the public domain. (Material published before 1963 is now in the publicdomain. Copyright on material published from 1963 through 1977 will expire 27 years after the publication date.Copyright on material published after 1978 will expire 75 years after the publication date.)^ Material to be reused is less than 200 words: Short passages of less than 200 words are in the public domain.Author's own work: An author of ASA copyrighted material does not need permission to reuse his/her own work.We are unable to reply to your reprint request at this time because:^ The information included with your request is incomplete: Please provide the following:(1) Name of author and/or title of article(2) Correct title/edition of publication(3) List of quotes you wish to reprint(4) Page numbers and/or illustration numbersIn order to serve you better and avoid overcharges, we ask that when you plan to reproduce only part of an article or afigure, table, or graph, you supply us with a photocopy of the material and highlight the portion(s) you wish to use.Michele M. Walczak/x320 qt,),Jup^ 1/5/93ASA Reprint J nd Permissions Representative^ DateAPPENDIX DLetter of Agency ApprovalBritish Columbia Rehabilitation Society143W.^serPresident/C.British Columbia^ 4255 Laurel Street Tel (604) 734-1313^The Society encompassesRehabilitation Society Vancouver^Fax (604) 737-6359 the C.F. Strong Centre andBritish Columbia the George Pearson Centre,Canada and is affiliated with theV5Z 2G9^ University of British Columbia.144November 30, 1992Behavioural Sciences Steering CommitteeThe University of British ColumbiaVancouver, B.C.TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERNRe: Research Proposal - B.C. Rehab Strategic PlanThe above noted research proposal submitted by Nancy Clay has beenreviewed by senior staff of the B.C. Rehabilitation Society. Thisreview has consisted of a number of interviews with Ms. Clay aswell as an examination of a number of draft documents.The B.C. Rehabilitation Society approves this research projectsubject to final approval by the appropriate committees at U.B.C.,including the Ethical Review Committee.WGF/jhAPPENDIX ECertificate of ApprovalBehavioural Sciences Screening CommitteeResearch and Other Studies InvolvingHuman Subjects145MAR 29 '93 01:24PM ORSIL,UBC^ 146The University of British Columbia^B92-002Office of Research ServicesBEHAVIOURAL SCIENCES SCREENING COMMITTEE FOR RESEARCHAND OTHER STUDIES INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTSCERTIFICATE^of APPROVALINVESTIGATOR: Manson Willms, S.UBC DEPT:^Social WorkINSTITUTION: Hospitals;VSBTITLE:^Class project: Student projects for SW 551NUMBER:^B92-002APPROVED:^FEB it 1992The protocol describing the above-named project has beenreviewed by the Committee and the experimental procedures werefound to be acceptable on ethical grounds for researchinvolving human subjects.t Dr. R.D. •ra leyDirector, Research Servicesand Acting ChairmanTHIS CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL IS VALID FOR ONE YEARFROM THE ABOVE APPROVAL DATE PROVIDED THERE IS NOCHANGE IN THE EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURESAPPENDIX FPre - test of the Measure147148APPENDIX FPRE-TEST OF THE MEASUREThe questionnaire was pre-tested by two B.C. Rehab employeesemployed at another B.C. Rehabilitation Society facility, G.F.Strong Rehabilitation Centre. Pre-test participants were asked toprovide feedback on format, clarity of instructions and timing. Asa result of participant feedback, the instrument's format wasamended for clarity. The wording of some directions was simplifiedand made consistent throughout the instrument. As well, confusingwording in one question (#36) was corrected.

Cite

Citation Scheme:

        

Citations by CSL (citeproc-js)

Usage Statistics

Share

Embed

Customize your widget with the following options, then copy and paste the code below into the HTML of your page to embed this item in your website.
                        
                            <div id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidgetDisplay">
                            <script id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidget"
                            src="{[{embed.src}]}"
                            data-item="{[{embed.item}]}"
                            data-collection="{[{embed.collection}]}"
                            data-metadata="{[{embed.showMetadata}]}"
                            data-width="{[{embed.width}]}"
                            async >
                            </script>
                            </div>
                        
                    
IIIF logo Our image viewer uses the IIIF 2.0 standard. To load this item in other compatible viewers, use this url:
https://iiif.library.ubc.ca/presentation/dsp.831.1-0098819/manifest

Comment

Related Items