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Land use and transportation planning: The Greater Vancouver Regional District North East Sector: 1951-… Elder, Brian W. 1992

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Land Use and Transportation Planning: The Greater Vancouver Regional DistrictNorth East Sector: 1951 - 1990.byBrian Wilson Elder.B.A. (Honours) Simon Fraser University, 1981A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillmentof the Requirements For The Degree ofMaster Of ArtsinThe Faculty of Graduate StudiesSchool of Community and Regional PlanningWe accept this thesis as conformingto the require • standardThe University of British ColumbiaApril, 1992 -© B. Elder.In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanceddegree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make itfreely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensivecopying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of mydepartment or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying orpublication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my writtenpermission.Department of  School of Community and Regional PlanningThe University of British ColumbiaVancouver, CanadaDate April 29, 1992DE-6 (2/88)iiAbstract One of the most pressing problems faced by large urban areas is traffic congestion.Traffic congestion, or the urban transportation problem is not a new phenomenon, havingexisted since the process of urbanization began. Low density urbanization orsuburbanization, facilitated by the availability of large numbers of automobiles hascontributed to the present traffic problem. The causes of the problem have long beenrecognized by planners and decision makers, and viable solutions have been proposed.However, in spite of solutions being known, the problem still exists and has become worse.The purpose of this study is to observe how planners have dealt with the land useand transportation factors which contribute to the ever worsening traffic problems in asuburban area. It is hypothesized that the fragmented nature of the planning and decisionmaking processes have resulted in a lack of co-ordination and co-operation in planning toresolve the urban transportation problem.The objectives of this thesis are to gain an understanding of: 1) why the urbantransportation problem exists; 2) the planning process involved in finding solutions to thisproblem; and 3) the effect of the fragmentation of authority over various factors of land useand transportation.The methodology includes the following steps. The first is a literature review of thecurrent thought on the subject of traffic congestion, and the factors causing it. The second isa literature review of the planning process and the theoretical foundations of currentthought on land use and transportation studies. This will be followed by a case study using adescriptive historical approach. The case study reviews developments as well as past landuse and transportation studies for the study area. The fourth step involves an interpretationof the information provided in the case study in light of the literature review.The area chosen for the case study is the Greater Vancouver Regional District'sNorth East Sector. This Sector has experienced accelerated development and an increasing111population dependant upon the automobile for mobility. Low density land use, has createdautomobile dependent development, which make an automobile a necessity. A largepercentage of the workforce in the area has to commute to other areas.Numerous studies have been commissioned to find solutions to the North EastSector's transportation problems. Despite the realization of the causes of traffic congestion,the solutions presented in the studies have not been comprehensively implemented toachieve workable results.There were two major findings of this study. The first is that planners and decisionmakers are aware of the relationship between land use and transportation planning. Thesecond is the fragmentation of authority for different aspects of land use and transportationhas frustrated attempts to resolve traffic congestion, through a fragmenting of the planningand decision making process.ivTable of Contents AbstractTable of Contents^ ivlist of Figures viList of Graphs viiList of Maps^ viiilist of TablesDefinitions xiAcknowledgements^ xiiChapter 1 Introduction to Thesis.1.1 Introduction^ 11.2 Purpose of Thesis 21.3 Methodology 21.4 The case Study^ 31.5 Scope and Limitations of Study^ 31.6 Organization of the Thesis 4Chapter 2 Literature Review.2.1 Introduction^ 52.2 Land Use and Transportation^ 52.3 Traffic 92.4 Urbanization^ 112.5 Advent of the Modern City^ 132.6 Suburbanization 182.7 The Present Transportation Problem^ 192.8 Sources of Authority and Jurisdiction 202.9 Solutions Proposed^ 222.10 Conclusions 25Chapter 3 Theory and Methodology.3.1 Introduction^ 273.2 Theoretical Foundations^ 293.3 Relationship of Transportation and Land Use^ 343.4 Land Use/Transportation Theory and The planner 363.5 Methods of Study^ 363.6 Conclusion^ 38Chapter 4 Case Study: The Background.4.1 Foreword^ 394.2 The Study Area 414.3 The Periods from 1951 to 1980, and 1981 to 1990^ 624.4 The Regional Context^ 644.5 Alternative Solutions 774.6 The Regional Situation, 1981 to 1990^ 874.7 Institutional Arrangements^ 884.8 Conclusions^ 91VChapter 5 The North East Sector.5.1 Introduction^ 935.2 The Period 1951 to 1980^ 935.3 The Period 1981 to 1990 1045.4 Future Concerns^ 1155.5 Summary of Events from 1951 to 1990^ 117Chapter 6 Transportation in the Study Area.6.1 Introduction^ 1206.2 Highway Proposals^ 1206.3 Transit Proposals: 1951 to 1990^ 1376.4 Study Area Traffic Impacts on Adjacent Municipalities^ 1526.5 Conclusions.^ 158Chapter 7 The Plans and The Process.7.1 Introduction^ 1607.2 Comprehensive Planning Studies^ 1657.3 Transportation Studies^ 1747.4 Conclusions^ 185Chapter 8 Interpretation.8.1 Introduction^ 1868.2 The Transportation Problem^ 1868.3 Fragmentation of the Planning Process^ 1988.4 The Role of the NIMBY Attitude 2098.5 Factors Creating Transportation Difficulties 2118.6 Transportation Options^ 2178.7 Planning on a Regional Basis 2188.8 Conclusions^ 220Bibliography^223Appendices Appendix 1^ 253Appendix 2 256viList of Figures 2-1 Land Use-Transportation Interaction^ 93-1 Transportation Planning Process 35List of Graphs vu8-1 Vehicle Occupancy Rates^ 193List of Maps 4-1 The location of the North East Sector in relationship to theother areas within the Greater Vancouver Region^ 404-2 The location of roads, railways, landscape features, largecommercial undertakings, and institutions^ 474-3 The location of the early roads in the North East Sector^ 544-4 The location of present day roads in the North East Sector 555-1 Residential Density in Coquitlam, 1955^ 975-2 Residential Density in Coquitlam, 1961 975-3 North East Sector proposed developments^ 995-4 Location of residential developments, 1980 to 1990^ 1065-5 Location of commercial/industrial areas of the 110North East Sector, 1980 to 19905-6 Location of most recent housing developments^ 1166-1 Location of highway projects, 1951 to 1990^ 1216-2 Route of Chines Expressway^ 1266-3 Route of Port Moody Bypass (Spring Street)^ 1276-4 Route of David Avenue/Pathan Avenue Connector 1296-5 Route of North Fraser Freeway^ 1316-6 East Broadway/Como Lake Road 1326-7 Route of Hastings/Gaglardi Connector^ 1336-8 Route of Benson's Waterfront Freeway 1356-9 Route of Commuter Rail^ 1436-10 Light Rapid Transit routes 1466-11 North East Sector SkyTrain proposed routes^ 149ix6-12 East/west highway routes through Burnaby^ 1.547-1 SkyTrain route alignment, Coquitlam/Surrey^ 181List of Tables 8-1 Illustrates rates of population growth for various communitiescomprising the Greater Vancouver Region8-2 1985 GVRD Inter-municipal Travel PatternsAppendix 1-1 The number of automobiles in local municipalities within theGreater Vancouver Regional District, 1945 to 1985.Appendix 1-2 The number of vehicles in British Columbia, 1905 to 1940.^256x190196253Definitions of Abbreviations ALRT^Advanced or Automated Light Rapid TransitB.C. British ColumbiaBCE or BCER^British Columbia Electric Railway CompanyBN or BNR^Burlington Northern RailwayCN or CNR^Canadian National RailwayCP or CPR^Canadian Pacific RailwayGV^Greater VancouverGVRD Greater Vancouver Regional DistrictGVTS^Greater Vancouver Transit SystemLMRPB^Lower Mainland Regional Planning BoardLRT Light Rapid TransitMTOC^Metropolitan Transit Operating CompanyNIMBY Not In My Back YardTCMHP^Technical Committee for Highway PlanningUTA Urban Transit AuthorityxixiiAcknowledgements I would like to express my appreciation to Dr. V. Setty Pendakur and ProfessorBrahm Wiesman, for their time, support, insights, and encouragement during the undertakingof this project. My appreciation also goes to Mr. Donald Buchanan, Director of Planning forCoquitlam, for his advise and support. I would also like to thank the Mayors and Staffs of theCities of Port Moody, and Port Coquitlam, for the time, advise, and assistance they havegiven. The information and comments provided by the staffs of the Greater VancouverRegional District Development Services and B.C. Transit were greatly appreciated and helpedimprove the final product. A special thank you goes to the staffs of the Greater VancouverRegional District Library and University of British Columbia Fine Arts Library for theirmuch appreciated assistance.The students of the Planning School also assisted through the provision of constructivecriticism and moral support. Finally, I would like to thank my parents and family for theircontinued encouragement during the time this project was undertaken.1CHAPTER 1 1.1 INTRODUCTION.One of the more pressing problems facing modern urban centres is traffic congestion.Traffic congestion increases the time and cost of transportation, hinders development, anddiminishes the quality of life. Unlike many other concerns, traffic congestion occurs on a dailybasis, causes frustration, and people are more likely to demand solutions from those in power.Cities of a century ago were small, with mixed land uses and most of the populationcrowded into small residences close to their places of employment. This type of land use wascaused by the lack of convenient and inexpensive transportation. As convenient and lessexpensive transportation became available, land uses became specialized. Workers could findbetter and less costly housing on the urban fringe. The advent of reliable, inexpensivepersonal transportation in the form of automobiles allowed people to commute longerdistances, and to locate their residences farther away from their place of work. This actionhelped create low density suburbs which, in turn made the use of the automobile a necessity.The almost universal availability of the private automobile has helped create the trafficcongestion it was supposed to solve in the first place.The concern of commuters for the problems they face in their twice daily commutebetween work place and residence have persistently been conveyed to those with the power tofind solutions. Numerous studies have led to an understanding of the causes of urbantransportation problems, as well as to workable solutions. However, the urban transportationproblem still exists, and has become worse. There appears to be a breakdown in the processbetween initiating the studies of the causes of traffic congestion, the recommendation ofsolutions and the implementing of the solutions.21.2 PURPOSE OF THE THESIS.The purpose of the thesis is to: 1) describe the processes involved in the planning anddecision making to resolve the urban transportation problem; and 2) to use a case study toillustrate a breakdown of the process which prevents the transportation problem from beingsuccessfully dealt with.1.3 METHODOLOGY.The procedure to be followed in this study will involve the following steps. They are:1) a review of the pertinent literature on the urban transportation problem and its origins; 2)a review of the planning process, and the historical background on the theoretical foundationsinfluencing land use and transportation planning; 3) a case study involving the use of adescriptive historical method to illustrate the role of the planning process in seeking resolutionto traffic congestion; and 4) interpret and analyse the information provided in the case studyto gain an understanding of the why the planning process has not been effective in solving theurban transportation problem.The First step will be a review of the available literature on the urban transportationproblem, to provide background information on to the current thought on causes, acceptablesolutions and the extent of current research. The literature review will also cover theevolution of transportation technology and its impact on land use. Information will befurnished on the interrelationship between land use and transportation in understanding andproviding solutions to the urban transportation problem. Current transportation problems willthen be discussed. The review will conclude with discussion of the various authorities withjurisdiction over different aspects of land use and transportation.The second step will be a review of the planning process, followed by an overview ofthe theoretical foundations of planning thought which influences the procedure used ininvestigating a problem and formulating possible solutions.3The third step will entail the use of an historical descriptive method applied to a casestudy. The case study will provide background information on how the problem of trafficcongestion originated and how the planning process was applied to seek solutions. The casestudy will also serve to illustrate one of the weakness of the planning process resulting from afragmented jurisdiction, and lack of co-ordination and co-operation.The final step involves an interpretation and analysis of the case study in light of theliterature review. This will aid in understanding the planning process involved in resolvingtraffic congestion, and offer insights on how to improve the process.1.4 THE CASE STUDY.The case study will focus on the North East Sector of the Greater Vancouver RegionalDistrict, which comprises the cities of Port Moody and Port Coquitlam, and the Municipalityof Coquitlam. The case study will 1) document the transportation planning process and 2)provide material for an analysis of its effectiveness.1.5 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF STUDY.The scope of the case study is limited to the post 1950 planning process, and describeshow planners and politicians have dealt with urban transportation questions. It will providethe historical background of the factors influencing transportation, and provide details onsolutions proposed but not implemented, as well those which were implemented.The sources for the case study include information supplied in local histories,municipal council minutes, newspaper articles, published and unpublished reports and studiesby municipalities and other relevant organizations (i.e. B.C. Transit, B.C. Ministry ofHighways, and the Greater Vancouver Regional District), and notes recorded at publicmeetings by the author. These will be supplemented by interviews of selected personnel whohave been or are at present involved in the planning process within the study area.41.6 ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS.Chapter 2 reviews the available literature on the urban transportation problem, therole of the planner, the fragmentation of authority, and land use transportation relationships.Chapter 3 begins by discussing planning and planning process. It then provides anoverview of the origins of the land use and transportation theories which have influencedcurrent planning thought, and which are utilized to identify possible solutions to the urbantransportation problem.Chapter 4 presents the first part of the case study, and provides an historical reviewof both the land use and transportation changes within the study area from the advent ofEuropean development to 1950.Chapter 5 describes the development in the North East Sector during period from1951 to 1990.Chapter 6 covers the transportation planning, construction of infrastructure, andproposals for projects for the study area for the period 1951 to 1990.Chapter 7 presents a review of the role of the politicians, the planners, and theprocess of planning.Chapter 8 provides an interpretation and analysis of the information presented in thecase study, and provides conclusions derived from this study.5CHAPTER 2 Literature Review.2.1 INTRODUCTION.One of the most pressing problems facing modern urban areas is traffic congestion.Traffic congestion occurs when an increasing population places pressure upon the existingtransportation infrastructure, along with changes in transportation technology and modalsplit. The physical layout and nature of the road systems within older cities reflects thetransportation technologies then available. These past technologies helped create certain typesof land use. Today, changes in the land use coupled with changes in transportationtechnologies have rendered much of the older transportation infrastructure obsolete. It isincapable of handling today's traffic loads.This movement problem, referred to as the urban transportation problem, occurschiefly during the peak work day hours, when most people follow set commuter travelpatterns in order to reach their work places or residences. There is a clear link between landuse, transportation technology, and the present urban transportation problems.This chapter reviews the literature on land use, transportation, and the origins of thepresent suburban problems. This is followed by a discussion of the present urbantransportation problem, the fragmentation of the planning processes, and solutions suggestedin the literature.2.2 LAND USE AND TRANSPORTATION.In order to explain the relationship between transportation and land use and itsimportance to the planning process, it is necessary to define the terms "land use" and"transportation".6Definition of Land Use.Land use can refer to activities taking place upon a site, or to the buildingsconstructed on it:It may refer to buildings or other improvements on the land, to the occupantsor users of the land, to the major purpose of the occupancy of the land, or tothe kind of activities on the land. (Mitchell & Rapkin, 1954: 13)all aspects of the built environment of a SEC [suburban employment centre] -its density, composition of activities, scale, layout, and physical design.(Cervero, 1989: 18)In a general sense,`urban land use' means the spatial distribution orgeographical pattern of city functions (Blunden & Black, 1984: 2)To a transportation planner, the term "urban land use" refers to:the spatial distribution of people and activities within an urban region. (Meyer& Miller, 1984: 178)The chief functions of land use are residential, commercial, retail, industrial, institutional,recreational (parks), streets, transportation, and open space (vacant lands) (Chapin Jr. &Kaiser, 1979: 4; Creighton, 1970: 67; Black, 1981: 22-23). In an urban area, the major landuses are principally residential and streets. Residential land use can account for from 30 percent (Yeates & Garner, 1979: 185) to between 40 to 50 per cent (Creighton, 1970: 65) of thetotal land area of a city. Streets and lanes can account for between 20 per cent (Yeates &Garner, 1979: 185) and 28 to 32 per-cent (Creighton, 1970: 68) of the total land area of acity.In a suburban area, the residential component can rise to as high as 70 per-cent of thetotal land area. The amount of land utilized for any purpose tends to vary with the distancefrom the Central Business District (C.B.D.). The density or intensity of use also varies withthe distance from the centre of a city. The intensity of use is related to the value of theproperty. The highest land values usually lie at the centre of an urban area. As one movesaway from the CBD, the land values drop rapidly until the suburbs are reached (Wheeler,71974: 7, Figure 1-2). Chapin defines density as a measure of the designed population capacityof urban land (Chapin Jr., 1970: 43). Density could also refer to the amount of built up space(floorspace), or the intensity of an activity (business or residential).Definition of Transportation.Transportation can be defined as the movement of people or goods from one location toanother. "Transportation is essentially a service which enables people, firms, and variousother entities to carry on activities at sites selected for these purposes in separate locations."(Chapin Jr, 1970: 339). Transportation not only suggests movement but within its meaning isalso included the physical features and conveyances that facilitate movement. The featuresconsist of foot paths, streets, roads, railway lines, and waterways. The conveyances needed tomove goods, could include such means as horse drawn carts and wagons, buses, privateautomobiles, streetcars, commuter rail trains, and boats. Harrison (1974: 18) refers totransportation as a derived demand, as it results from other activities.Relationship of Land Use and Transportation.Land use and transportation involve activities and movement. Accessibility is animportant factor in discussions of land use, while circulation is a factor of transportation. Theinterrelationship between transportation and land use tends to be circular in nature (Meyer &Miller, 1984: 70). That is, a change in one function, for instance land use, results in animpact upon the other, in this case transportation. This in turn has an impact upon theexisting transportation infrastructure. If the infrastructure is not improved and the volume oftraffic increases to the point at which congestion results, then this reduces the perceivedaccessibility of a location. Thus traffic congestion increases the cost of movement by reducingthe accessibility of certain locations for particular land uses. If it takes longer to travelbetween locations, costs are increased, making the particular land use at the locationuneconomical, and leading those involved to seek another location where the accessibility is8better and the costs of the land and the costs of transportation reach an acceptable level ofequilibrium.If, however, improvements to the transportation infrastructure occur as a result of theincreased volumes of traffic, this would increase the accessibility of the location and createimpacts upon the land use.Such improvements to the transportation system make the land moreaccessible to existing activity centers, thereby making it more desirable andaffecting its monetary value. Increased accessibility and improved land valuesin turn influence the locational decisions of individuals and firms, once againspurring new land development and starting this cycle again, until anequilibrium is reached or until some other external factor intervenes. (Meyer &Miller, 1984: 62)This cycle of influence can occur over various lengths of time. The time span could be severaldecades, or only a few years.A new road between two locations can have a major impact on land uses along theroute. Conversely, the decision to build some major commercial, residential or industrialfacility in an area where previous use required a lower level of transportation infrastructurecan force the construction of new, higher capacity roads. This will in turn, attract more peopleand activities, and will result in additional pressure for yet more road improvements.A graphic illustration of the relationship between transportation and land use isshown in Figure 2-1.1..TransportadonSystemAccessibilityActivitySystemLocationDecisions ofIndividualsand Firms^STransportation Facilityand Service ChangesActivityPatterns DemandTravelDecisionsLand Development(changes to theactivity system)9Figure 2-1 Land Use-Transportation Interaction.Source: Meyer, Michael D. and Eric J. Miller. Urban Transportation Problem Toronto:McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1984. Page 63.The above flow chart graphically illustrates the circular relationship between transportationand land use. "In the long run, the provision of transportation infrastructure and theintroduction of new technologies will influence urban form because of the improvedaccessibility that results." (Meyer & Miller, 1984: 63).2.3 TRAFFIC.There are several meanings attached to the word "traffic." It can involve the physicalmovement of people, goods or vehicles along a route, or the people or material moved by atransportation system.10Coming and going of persons and goods by road, rail, air, sea, etc.; vehiclescoming and going; . . . number or amount of persons or goods conveyed; .. .dealings between persons etc. (Oxford Dictionary, 1984)Another definition of traffic suggests "Traffic - is the joint consequence of land use andtransport supply." (Black, 1981: 23; Blunden & Black, 1984: 1).In this study, "traffic" means the movement of persons and goods, as well as theconveyances used. The current concern with traffic has to do with the increased numbers ofvehicles the urban transportation infrastructure has to accommodate. The number of vehiclesthat a road can accommodate is labeled its capacity. "Capacity is defined as the maximumnumber of vehicles that can pass over a given lane or roadway in one direction . . . during agiven time period under prevailing roadway and traffic conditions. It is the maximum rate offlow that has a reasonable expectation of occurring." (Carter Jr., 1965: 310). Under idealconditions, the capacity for multi-lane roadways can be an average of 2,000 passengercars/hour each lane, and for a two-lane, two-way roadway, the capacity could be a total of2,000 passenger cars/hour for both directions (Carter Jr., 1965: 312).Congestion.In defining the term "congestion", one has to take into account two types. The firsttype is "recurrent, which is caused by too many commuters and others trying to use a giventransportation facility at the same time" (Witheford, 1988: 2) and "nonrecurrent, which iscaused by events that disrupt traffic flow, such as vehicle breakdowns and accidents."(Witheford, 1988: 2). "Congestion is simply a condition of any transportation facility in whichthe use of the facility is so great that there are delays to the users of that facility." (Meyer &Miller, 1984: 24). Another way of defining congestion would be in the manner of "economistsand engineers as a situation where the sum of the costs (all kinds: money, time, discomfort,etc.) of a number vehicles using a road together exceeds the sum of the costs if each of thevehicles were to use it separately. In other words, in a congested situation each additionalvehicle disturbs and slows down the traffic flow with the result that not only does that vehicle11suffer time loss or experience increased operating cost, but it also imposes thesedisadvantages on all other vehicles on the same road. (Bhatt, 1976: 5).Causes of Congestion.Robert Cervero identifies four major causes of today's congestion. These are: 1)continued growth of population and employment opportunities; 2) shift to smaller sizedhouseholds with both husband and wife employed; 3) decentralization of businesses; and 4)greater physical separation of the places of employment and residence (Cervero, 1987-88:57).Owen (1966: 195-196) suggests "the basic causes of congestion are the absence ofappropriate land use planning and the crowding of too many people into too little space."Costs of Congestion.Traffic Congestion, is not only seen as an inconvenience to those experiencing it, butthere is a cost in the time spent in travelling as well as in the extra fuel consumed and theresulting air pollution. Having to face long delays in the daily commutes to and from workand home creates stress upon individuals which can reduce the perception of the quality of life(Cervero, 1987-88: 57).2.4 URBANIZATION.Historic Background to Urbanization.Urbanization can be defined as:a complex process in which a country's organized communities become larger,more specialized and more interdependent. Urbanization is the result of manyvariables--economic, technological, demographic, political, etc--and it isinevitably accompanied by other changes in society (Canadian Encyclopedia,1985)12Another definition suggests "modernization and urbanization may be roughly equivalentterms although dispersion could conceivably accompany urbanism." (Eldredge, 1967: 3). Theterm "dispersion" refers to the low density land use occurring in recent times around theurban fringe (suburbs). "The spatial distribution of the population and its composition . . . arethe demographic bases for urbanization and urbanism." (Eldredge, 1967: 93). Therelationship between transportation technologies and urbanization is covered in the followingsections.Cities.A city can be defined by its function,--its reason for existence.Cities have sometimes been defined as 'workshops' (Nelson & Aschman, 1957:31)A city is primarily a place where people work (Nelson & Aschman, 1957: 32)A city is also "a functional entity--that is, it is a complex of population, land, facilities,equipment, and amenities, all of which are functionally interrelated." (Nelson & Aschman,1957: 42). In past eras, there had been a religious or defense rationale, but the principalreason for modern cities is economic.In North America, the major function of cities is to provide employment. Ifemployment opportunities exist, then people will be drawn to a site. If employmentopportunities are removed, a city will decline and possibly physically disappear. Examples ofthis include resource frontier communities, many of which contained large populations andvaried activities. The city of Sandon, or the city of Phoenix, British Columbia, are examples oflarge mining communities located at the site of a resource, but which declined anddisappeared when the mineral resources were depleted.Western cities are chiefly manufacturing centres, commercial centres, transportationcentres, regional trading centres (Nelson & Aschman, 1957: 24-25), and administrativecentres.13The Characteristics of the Walking City.The nature and form of the early city were created by the transportation technologyof the day. It was a pedestrian or walking city. Jackson lists five characteristics of thewalking city. These were: congestion; a clear distinction between city and country; a mixtureof functions; the short distance between home and work; and the tendency for the mostfashionable and respectable addresses to be located close to the center of town (Jackson, 1985:14-15).Congestion resulted from the walking city being small in size with the uses of landbeing more intense closer to the centre. In larger cities an extremely high level of populationdensity was common. The boundaries between urban and rural areas tended to be clearlydelineated. This was due to fortifications in Europe and a strong political sense in NorthAmerican cities (Jackson, 1985: 14-15). There was little exclusionary zoning practiced priorto the late 19th and early 20th Century, and land was used for a mixture of functions.Because people had to walk to work, it was advantageous to live as close to the work place aspossible, thus homes and work places were located close together.The last characteristic of the walking city was the location of elite residential areasclose to the center of the urban area (Jackson, 1985: 15) reflecting a desire on the part of themerchants and industrialists to be located close to their places of business. In the medievalcity, they often lived above their shops, while later they might build their residences adjacentto or a very short distance away, to avoid the need to commute long distances.2.5 ADVENT OF THE MODERN CITY.Prior to 1800, cities were compact. People walked or rode on horseback. About 1850,a number of technical improvements in transportation resulted in cities changing fromcompact, densely populated centres, to sprawling cities with decreasing densities as distanceincreased from the city centre.14Electric Streetcars.In the late 1880's, the electric-powered streetcar was introduced as an alternativeform of transportation to foot or horsepower. Within a few years the streetcar had become thedominant form of urban transportation. Its introduction allowed for the further expansion ofthe urban area and the greater separation of the residence from the workplace.When on a separated right of way the streetcar could travel at a relatively high speed,and thus could serve to open the suburban fringes of cities. Land developers were quick toappreciate this fact.It is a well known fact that real estate served by adequate street railwayfacilities is more readily saleable and commands a higher price than realestate not so served. (Jackson, 1985: 120)Most of the streetcar companies were able to negotiate service monopolies within thecommunities they served. The arrangements worked out forced the companies to keep theirfares low. The five cent fare became almost an industry standard (Jackson, 1985: 109). Witha transfer, an individual could travel across a large urban area for a single fare. Thisencouraged people to move from the congested centres of cities and seek less expensive andmore spacious accommodations away from those inner city mixed-use areas where businessesand residential units often stood side by side. Many streetcar companies extended their linesbeyond the built-up areas, and out into the countryside. This enabled real estate developers tosubdivide large tracts of land and to lure people to purchase homes in the suburbs.Many of the streetcar company promoters were more interested in land speculationthan in transportation: they used the streetcars with their inexpensive fares as a tool to makelarge profits from developing suburban lands adjacent to their tram lines (Mumford, 1961:503-504). These streetcar lines tended to converge on the central business districts.Employment opportunities and most of the retail outlets were concentrated there. Thestreetcar lines radiated from the centre, thus causing growth to be concentrated along these15radial lines. The radial nature of the lines served to reinforce the importance of the centre(Jackson, 1985: 113-114; Rugg, 1972: 55-56).To many communities, the streetcar symbolized "progress and technologicalachievement; . . . The streetcar was a source of pride; the very symbol of a city." (Jackson,1985: 111). The impact of the electric streetcar permitted a decrease in the density of newlydeveloping areas on the fringes of the old high density urban areas, allowing the population tospread out over a wider area as streetcars enabled people to move freely from home to work.Automobiles.Though the automobile was first developed in the 1880's, its impact upon the form ofcities was not felt until after 1920. Prior to that time, the vehicles were too expensive and toounreliable to be seen an alternative to the streetcars.Once the automobile became available in large quantities and at a price the averageindividual could afford, it provided an extremely convenient form of personal transportation.The auto could move an individual from one place to another with a minimum amount ofwasted time. Unlike public forms of transportation, such as the streetcars and later buses, theautomobile required no change in the mode of travel. That is, an individual would not have towalk to a public transit stop, board a streetcar or bus, transfer to another streetcar or busafter a wait, then walk to the final destination. The automobile streamlined the process, andenabled people to seek out more distant, lower-priced residential locations.The automobile brought about a radical change in the form of the city. It enabled ahigh degree of decentralization. "The low population density in these enlarged suburbs makesthe setting up of public transportation lines unprofitable." (Bairoch, 1988: 314). Theautomobile suburbs tended to have specialized uses, principally residential. This separation ofuse isolated the residential areas from the retail and commercial areas, making it necessaryto travel to work or to shop. The automobile freed the individual from a limited choice of16residential location, but contributed to a phenomenon referred to as urban sprawl. The low-density suburb does not allow for the effective use of public transit.Urban sprawl is used to described the haphazard, disorderly, and discontinuousdevelopment that occurs on the fringes of most North American Cities andmetropolises. (Yeates & Garner, 1980: 242)During the depression of the 1930's and World War II, little housing was constructed. Thisresulted in a severe housing shortage in the post-war period, and large tracts of rural landwere developed for housing. Since every family was assumed to own an automobile, therewas no need to worry about providing public transit to facilitate movement within the suburbsor to the central business area.This rapid expansion of the low density suburbs into the formerly rural areas blurredthe boundaries between country and city. It slowly changed the central focus of the city asbusinesses began to move to the periphery to take advantage of changing transportation andland use requirements.Retail shopping, which had been focussed around the central core, to take advantageof the transportation focal point created by the streetcar lines and later buses, began to finditself losing business. The centres of most of the older cities were laid out when people walkedor used transit. Therefore, there were few areas set aside for parking.Developers saw an opportunity to fill a need through the creation of suburbanshopping centres that provided ample parking for automobile-oriented customers. Anillustration of the amount of land in a suburban shopping centre that might be set aside forparking is Surrey Place Shopping Centre, in Surrey, British Columbia, where the building sitecoverage is only 0.37 (Toby Russell Buckwell & Partners, 1989). The rest of the site, or 63per cent, is used for parking, roads and landscaping. A further example is the Eaton Centrein Burnaby, British Columbia, which has 2,800 parking spaces on two levels underground, inspite of an adjacent ALRT Station and a major bus loop.The creation of suburban shopping malls decentralized the urban areas even further.The old transit lines were focussed toward the city core where business and retail functions17had formerly been clustered. Many businesses and retail functions found it advantageous tolocate to the fringes of the urban area, drawn by cheaper and larger parcels of land, lowertransport costs due to less traffic congestion, and a need to follow customers, suppliers andcompetitors to the suburbs (Yeates & Garner, 1980: 140).Roadways adequate for the older forms of transportation were soon congested withlarge numbers of private automobiles that funnelled into the central core.private automobiles need about 30 times more street surface for each carriedperson in comparison to the required street surface for each passenger ridingin a tram or in a bus. (Weigelt, Gotz & Weiss, 1977: 1)In the 1950's and 1960's the solution to the traffic congestion problem was seen to be theconstruction of freeways and expressways linking the suburbs to the central city core (Yeates& Garner, 1980: 207). Little thought was given to the disruption caused by these roadwayscutting through established neighbourhoods and reducing the quality of life by the creation ofnoise, air and view pollution.The low density developments in the suburbs and the desire of the population to enjoythe advantages of a personal means of travel have created or compounded the trafficcongestion in modern cities. As the suburbs continue to develop with single family housing inlow density developments, more automobiles flood the existing roadways. The decentralizationof some business from the core to the periphery changes the traditional commuter travelpatterns of movements from homes in the suburbs to jobs in the core, to job sites spread allaround the fringes of the urban area. This decentralization of some businesses reinforces theneed for an automobile. The dispersal of the employment limits the usefulness of publictransit as a solution to the traffic congestion problem. Public transit needs population densityalong its lines in order to be effective and economical. The use of the automobile has changedthe land use patterns in urban areas and created automobile-oriented patterns in the suburbs.The dependency upon the automobile has been part of the cause of the present urban trafficproblem along with the low density land use that makes automobile ownership a necessity.182.6 SUBURBANIZATION.The process of suburbanization occurred after the process of urbanization had createddensely populated centres. Suburbanization is not a recent phenomenon. It has been occurringsince the 17th Century in England (Jackson, 1985: 13). In North America, the process beganin the 19th century, when it became fashionable for wealthy businessmen to locate theirresidences away from the unhealthy congestion of the city, into the quiet healthy countryside(Mumford, 1961: 492). It became a status symbol for those who could afford to work in thecity but reside in the country. The advent of railroads enabled those with the ability to pay tocommute from rural homes to urban offices.The advent of the horsecar allowed more people to move from the crowded city centresto less expensive dwellings, but it was the electric streetcar that began the massivemovement of the urban population to the suburbs. Land was less expensive, so less well offpeople could afford their own homes. The dream of most people was to own a place of theirown, as ownership was an indication of social success. The streetcar opened up the suburbsby providing relatively fast and inexpensive transportation over long distances from thecentral core. The old densely populated central city locations were now being vacated for theless dense suburbs. As the central core was still the focus . of commercial enterprise, thestreetcar lines tended to radiate from this central point. This reinforced the transportationadvantage of locating in the central core.The advent of the automobile offered a solution to the inconvenience of change inmode, from walking to streetcar. It removed the need for a residence to be located close towork or close to a streetcar line. It opened up large expanses of low cost lands to residentialuse. The car allowed for very low density residential development, and helped to expand theextent of the built up urban and suburban areas. Instead of having a compact form, aconcentrated core, land uses became widely separated and decentralized. The automobilecreated small nodes of retail land uses designed to cater to the vehicular borne customers.19Individuals had to travel greater distance in order to reach their places of work or places toshop.Jackson supplies a working definition of suburb. It has "four components: function(non-farm residential), class (middle and upper status), separation (a daily journey-to-work),and density (low relative to older section)." (Jackson, 1985: 11). Yeates & Garner supply thedefinition of suburbanization:as the spatial expression of the class divisions in society that emerged with thegrowth of employment in manufacturing, commerce, business, and financialactivities. (Yeates & Garner, 1980: 61)Suburbanization enabled people to separate the location of work from the location oftheir residences (Jackson, 1985: 174). This process was facilitated by the development ofmore efficient and convenient forms of transport. The advantages of suburbanization was aless congested residential location and the opportunity to own one's own home as the cost ofland was less in the suburbs. The disadvantages included the increased length of travel fromresidence to work place. The low density of the suburbs meant individuals needed anautomobile to commute, and as populations increased the suburbs increased in size, causingstrain upon the existing transportation infrastructure, resulting in congestion and what werefer to as the urban transportation problem.2.7 THE PRESENT TRANSPORTATION PROBLEM.The term transportation problem is used often in the media to describe the trafficcongestion which restricts movement in urban areas. Creighton suggests there are sevencomponents of the transportation problem. These are "accidents, congestion, inefficientinvestment, inaccessibility, ugliness, strain and discomfort (noise and nuisance, and airpollution)." (Creighton, 1970: 6-13). He sees the problem as a collection of what people dislikeabout the present transportation system.20In effect, the term Urban Transportation Problem describes a city transport systemnot functioning efficiently (Atkinson, 1976: 199). Meyer, Kain & Wohl see the peak rush hourmovement as being the problem.It is these movements that tax the capacity of existing urban transport facilities andcreate the congestion and delays that most people associate with what has come to beknown . . . as "the urban transportation problem. (Meyer, Kain & Wohl, 1971: 3)Yeates & Garner see the origin of the present transportation problem as being "the conflictbetween private and public forms of transportation." (Yeates & Garner, 1980: 486). Reynoldsequates the problem with expanding urban populations, on the one hand and increasing carownership and use on the other (Reynolds, 1971: 5).The modern urban transportation problem comes about through urbanization, thelower density of newer developments around urban areas, the increased extent of thesuburban fringes, the increasing reliance upon the private automobile, the increase in thedecentralization of businesses, the inability to expand the existing urban roads toaccommodate additional traffic, and the problem of peak use.2.8 SOURCES OF AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION.It should be noted that one of the components of the urban transportation problem hasto do with the fragmented authority for dealing with it.In Canada, there are two major levels of government. The Federal level has powersprescribed by Section 91 of the British North America Act of 1867, (since 1982 known as theConstitution Act of 1867), (British North American Act, 1867), the second level is Provincial,with prescribed powers under Section 92 of the same Act. The Federal powers under the Actinclude all powers not expressly assigned to the Provinces. The Federal responsibilitiesrelevant to this study include, amongst others, navigation and shipping, 91 (10), and Indiansand lands reserved for the Indians, 91 (24). In the case study area, the Federal Government21has jurisdiction over the railways (92 [10a and c]), and the Harbours, both the Fraser Riverand Burrard Inlet under the National Harbours Board.The Provincial powers include management and sale of public lands, 92 (5); MunicipalInstitutions, 92 (8); property and Civil Rights, 92 (13); and generally all matters of a merelylocal or private nature, 92 (16). Section 92 (10) gives the Provincial Government jurisdictionover local works and undertakings, except for those works the Federal Government declaresto be for the advantage of the country or two or more Provinces.The Act allows the Province to delegate its authority for local affairs to municipalities,under the Municipal Act of the Province of British Columbia  RSBC (Revised Statutes ofBritish Columbia) 1979, Chapter 290 (Province of British Columbia, 1987a). Under theMunicipal Act, the municipalities are responsible for the management of development. UnderPart 29: division (1)--Official Community Plans,-- they may make general statements ofobjectives and policies respecting the form and character of existing and proposed land useand servicing requirements in the area covered by the plan (945 [1]). Part 29: division (4)--Land Use Designation,--(Section 963) allows a Municipal Government to create land use zonesand to regulate density, use, and the siting, size, and dimensions of buildings. Section 963 (3)also gives the municipality the power to prohibit any use or uses in any zone or zones.In the case study there are a number of Provincial authorities that havetransportation or land use powers. These included the Municipalities, the Provincial HighwaysMinistry, B.C. Transit, the Ministry of Health (Riverview and Colony Farm), the Ministry ofMunicipal Affairs, and B.C. Hydro (Coquitlam Lake Dam, Buntzen lake power generatingstation, and power transmission lines). The Federal Government has control of the NationalHarbours Board (jurisdiction over Burrard Inlet and Fraser River shipping and the portfacilities), an Indian reserve adjacent to Colony Farm, and the Canadian Pacific Railwayunder the Canadian Transport Commission.The fragmentation of jurisdictions over transportation and land use accounts for thedifficulty in formulating viable solutions to the urban transportation problem. Each22department has its own agenda and puts it ahead of what might be considered best for allconcerned.2.9 SOLUTIONS PROPOSED.There are a number of factors that have to be considered in any attempt to offerpossible solution to the urban transportation problem. Three broad fields of concern have to beconsidered. They are the administrative sector, the human sector, and the physical sector.Administrative Sector.The administrative sector involves the political sphere where policy and projectdecisions are made. This sphere consists of policy formulation, decision making, andimplementation. The planners form a bridge between these spheres. Planners assess needs asa mandate from the political masters, propose goals and objectives, and from these,recommend policies to bring about a desired result. This involves complex interactionsbetween planners, decision makers, the public, and the implementors. This complexity isaggravated by jurisdictional fragmentation.The obvious solution is to provide a mechanism to co-ordinate the policies andprocesses of the different jurisdictions. The mechanism, for example, would have to givesimultaneous consideration to applications for land development and their transportationimplication in a way that would help achieve a better balance between expenditure on roadsand transit. This could be facilitated by a planning process that includes constant monitoringand appropriate modification to plans to meet changing needs.Human Sector.The human sector involves modifying the behaviour of people that have created orcompounded the problem. It is the choice of a place of residence in the suburbs, at a23considerable distance from the place of work, that has created part of the urbantransportation problem, a problem compounded by the use of private automobiles.Another possible solution might be to encourage commuters to make use of publictransit. This might be accomplished through reducing the number of parking spaces availablein the central business area, or, as in Singapore, restricting the number of privateautomobiles allowed into the central area (Pendakur, 1986: 42). In Hong Kong, there was aplan to introduce electronic road pricing as a means of controlling traffic congestion through aphilosophy of user pay. This could be accomplished through the use of sensors attached tovehicles and other sensors recessed into the roadways which would record the time andlocation when a vehicle crossed from one zone to another. Costs would be assessed the ownerof a vehicle for the number of zones crossed at times of traffic congestion (Catling & Roth,1987: 51-55).A further solution to the traffic problem would be to stagger work hours. This wouldserve to "distribute the traffic load more evenly over the day." (Owen, 1966: 204). Thissuggestion would see better utilization of existing facilities instead of the expenditure of largeamounts of scarce resources on expanding the transportation infrastructure to accommodatepeak traffic during two short daily periods.The concern for pollution might prove useful in modifying mode choice. According toair pollution studies in the Greater Vancouver area, 75.9 per-cent of emissions come fromvehicles. If people are concerned about the quality of life and the health effects of thispollution, then there should be a change in travel behaviour from automobiles to public transit(TransVision Consultants Ltd., 1990: 19).Another method of reducing the number of single occupancy vehicles would be toencourage car or van pooling. A number of programs in the United States initiated by largecompanies seek to reduce the commuter traffic and the size of the parking lots by supplyingvans or offering preferential parking to those who carry three or more people in their vehicle.24A further possible solution might be to use telecommunications to replace personaltransportation. This use of a home work station would allow the transmittal of informationwithout the worker having to spend the time and money commuting (Schneider & Francis,1989: 18).Physical Sector.The physical sector involves those factors having to do with the material world. Thesefactors include land use, that is the planned or unplanned changes in uses that can influencethe generation of traffic, as well as transportation infrastructure, that is the roads andguideways, or the vehicles using them. There are a number of possible solutions to the urbantransportation problem that could be suggested involving these factors.One possible solution would involve the improvement of the capacity of existing roadand bridges and/or construction of new roads or bridges. Another solution could involve theconstruction of Light Rapid Transit lines and bus ways. More buses or larger capacityarticulated buses might also be considered.Yet another possible solution might be making better use of existing infrastructurethrough better management of traffic, by the installation of turning lanes; delayed trafficcontrol lights; High Occupancy Vehicle (HOV) lanes; or reversible lanes where the costs infinancial terms or in community disruptions are too great, to consider widening a road. Theintroduction of other forms of transportation technology such as commuter rail or ferry boatsmight serve to mitigate some of the transportation problem.Solutions derived from land use change factors could involve decentralizing of thework place from the Central Business District to the urban fringe. As a possible solution tothe urban transportation problem this would serve to change the travel patterns ofcommuters by reversing the direction of travel, thus making use of under-utilized existingtransportation capacity.25Another solution, linked to decentralization could involve the concept of the creation ofnew towns (Owen, 1966: 206) or new town centres surrounding existing urban centres. Thissolution recognizes the relationship that exists between land use and transportation. Owen(1966: 188) suggested "solutions thus appear to depend not simply on measures designed toprovide additional transportation capacity, but on the ability to develop urban communities inwhich satisfactory transportation is possible."Summary.There are a large number of possible solutions that could be considered. Some mightwork in isolation or they might work better in unison. The problems of urban transportationcan be resolved with co-ordination among the affected institutions and the establishment of aplanning process which accounts for the complexity and dynamic nature of the problem whileallowing input from all those involved so that realistic goals and objectives can be formulated.2.10 CONCLUSIONS.From the review of the literature, it is apparent that the urban transportationproblem is directly related to the changes in land use occurring in cities. The behaviour ofpeople has changed over time due to changes in transportation technologies allowing thedecentralization of formerly compact urban centres. There has been a steady reduction in thedensity of the fringes of cities as people have sought to leave the crowded confines of the cityand seek the solitude and health of the countryside.As the population increases, the level of traffic congestion increases and reducesliveability. There is need for resolution of the traffic problem; however, the nature of thepolitical situation, with fragmentation of authority over land use and transportation, creates asituation where co-operation cannot be easily be achieved. There is need to plan on a longterm, region-wide scale, to achieve the best results from the available resources. Thisfragmentation, however, renders the role of the planners difficult as it restricts the scope26within which they can work. This creates solutions that do not address all factors, and thuscannot adequately resolve the problems under study.27Chapter Three Planning Theory and Methodology.3.1 INTRODUCTION.To understand the planning process it is necessary to define what is meant by termssuch as plan, planning and the planning process. This chapter will begin with a defining ofwhat is meant by each of these terms. The chapter will then review the theoreticalfoundations of the transportation and land use relationship and the importance of this toplanning. Although an awareness of the interrelationship between transportation and landuse has existed since the earliest days of human settlement, it was not until the early 19thCentury that modern theories were developed to explain the processes involved in the creationof various land use patterns and the impact of different levels of accessibility. The theorieswere developed to explain economic questions about the optimum rent to be derived from ause at a specific location, in relation to other possible uses. Land use theory will beextensively discussed as transportation theory evolved from it.The Planning Process.The terms plan and planning have been used interchangeably on occasion.Technically, however, they have very distinct meanings. The term "plan" can be taken tomean "a strategy or policy to guide or govern a growth situation or a course of action."(Blunden, 1971: 19). It is associated with a solution to a problem.The term planning can be taken to mean "essentially the methodological processleading to the plan." (Blunden, 1971: 19). There are a number of planning methodologies andapproaches. The methodologies are:a) the projective (extrapolation),b) the deductive (synthesis), andc) the objective (programming). (Blunden, 1971: 20)28Three approaches have been formulated. These are "the remedial approach, the preventiveapproach and the promotive approach." (Rugg, 1972: 293-295). As the name suggests, theremedial approach to planning attempts to correct an already existing problem (Rugg, 1972:293). The preventive approach anticipates a problem and tries to reduce or eliminate it.Finally, the promotive approach is concerned with promoting new developments to resolve anexisting or potential problem (Rugg, 1972: 295).According to Friedmann (1987: 31) planning can take three forms. They areallocative, innovative and radical planning. Allocative planning "is concerned with the centraldisposition of scarce resources amongst competing claimants or uses." (Friedmann, 1987: 33-34). Innovative planning "is concerned with institutional changes in the system of societalguidance." (Friedmann, 1987: 34). Finally, radical planning "is distinctive in drawing onorganized citizen power to promote projects pointing towards social transformation."(Friedmann, 1987: 34). These three forms of planning have areas of overlap in theircoverage.The first form of planning, allocative, "involves program budgeting, land use planning,economic development planning and various forms of sectoral planning" (Friedmann, 1987:34). Allocative planning is the form operating in the transportation and land use sphere.Meyer and Miller suggest there are six stages to the planning process. They are:1) incremental or tending towards relatively small changes,2) remedial, where decisions are made to move away from ills rather thantoward goals,3) serial, where problems are not solved at one stroke but are successivelyattacked,4) exploratory, in that goals are continually being redefined or newlydiscovered,5) fragmented or limited, in that problems are attacked by considering alimited number of alternatives than all possible options,6) disjointed, where there are many dispersed 'decision points'. (Meyer &Miller, 1984: 83)The planning process can be explained as a series of interconnecting steps. These are:291) problem identification (including needs and deficiencies),2) summary of existing and projected states of the relevant functioningsystems,3) problem structure analysis,4) specification of goals and objectives,5) inventory of ideals about available relevant policies, goal forms and actioninstruments and strategies, and6) tentative specification of scenarios for the future. (Chapin Jr. & Kaiser,1979: 84)This process also involves a review of the steps to ensure changes in the nature of theproblem or parts of it are taken into account. Meyer and Miller identify four stages in anurban transportation planning process. These are:1) diagnosis and data management,2) analysis and evaluation,3) scheduling and budgeting, and4) monitoring. (Meyer & Miller, 1984: 10, Figure 1-1)The process described has developed over time as a means of explaining the methodsused by planners in resolving problems.3.2 THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS.Many of the ideals developed to explain or assist in the understanding of landuse or transportation phenomena have been presented in the form of theories. The word"theory" can be defined as a "supposition or system of ideas explaining something, especiallyone based on general principles independent of particular things to be explained." (Oxford Dictionary, 1987). The rationale for creating theories stems from the need to explain how asituation or process came into existence. The value of theories lies in their explanation ofphenomena at an abstract level without the large expenditure of resources to duplicate thesituation in reality.In recent years theories have been part of the methodology used in the investigationand explanation of why phenomena exist, and what processes can influence developments.Their importance lies in the fact that they are transferable from one geographical location toanother or one situation to another.30A short historical review of the theories which influenced or are influencing land useand transportation will now be undertaken. The importance of reviewing the origins of landuse theory is that transportation theory evolved out of land use theory.Evolution of Land Use Theory.The land use theories and models presented give an indication of the evolutionof thought concerning land use in urban areas. In a critique of land-use theory, Harvey (1973:160) noted land use theories arose from a number of schools of thought. These included,geography, sociology, and economics.In effect the land use theories served to describe the observable patterns of land useand assign behavioural motives to individuals, without taking into consideration the role otherfactors might have in influencing choice and then distorting the observed patterns. Much hasbeen written on the subject of land use models and theories (Schlager, 1968: 193-205; Meyer& Miller, 1984: 177-217; Karlqvist, Lundquist, Snickars & Weibull, 1978; Wingo, 1961: 85-94; Lowry, 1968: 121-146).Early land use theory was economic in orientation. It dealt with where to locatecertain agricultural uses around an urban centre. It was based on a best use of, or besteconomic rent from land at a certain location. Economic return was the important criterion toexplain land use. Johan Von Thunen developed the first widely known theory on land use inthe early 1820's. He used an abstract concept to explain a real world phenomenon, and usepatterns (Scott, 1975: 3). Transportation was seen as a cost of distance in the theory.By the early 1900's, industrial location was seen as the key to explaining land usepatterns in urban areas. Alfred Weber developed a land use theory in 1909 to explain thelocation of manufacturing concerns by identifying a minimum transport cost location.In the 1920's the choice of housing location by new residents was seen as a way toexplain urban structure. In the early 1930's Walter Christaller developed the Central PlaceTheory, a theory relating the location of centres and their size to the types and numbers of31services they provided. In the late 1930's, Homer Hoyt developed the Sector Theory out ofstudies of residential area patterns of change. His theory "placed a greater emphasis ontransportation as a dynamic element in growth patterns." (Bridger & Greer-Wootten, 1971:119-120). These theories which attempted to explain the patterns of existing land use, werebroad in nature, making assumptions about motivations. One major assumption was that allindividuals would seek a location where there was an equilibrium between rents and the costsof transportation.In the 1940's the emphasis finally shifted towards the importance of transportation asa factor in land use. Losch, in the early 1940's, was concerned with the location of industrialfirms, their spatial relationships and their service hinterlands (McLoughlin, 1973: 63). In1945, Harris and Ullman developed the Multi-Nuclei theory of urban growth. Instead ofaccepting the notion of a single central focus for an urban area, they suggested in fact thereexisted a number of nodes of activities which came into existence due to a need to locate someactivities in close proximity (Rugg, 1972: 212-214; Breese, 1966: 105; McLoughlin, 1973: 63;Bridger & Greer-Wootten, 1971: 120).A recent theory developed (1964) to explain land use patterns was Ira Lowery'sModel of Metropolis. The model deals with three sectors of activities. These are:a) a Basic sector of industrial, business and administrative activities .. .b) a retail sector . . . andc) a household sector . . ." (McLoughlin, 1973: 246)The model attempts to estimate population and service employment for areas within regions(Masser, 1972: 109). Lowery's model was designed to allocate activities over an urban area,but not to try to simulate the actual processes involved (Meyer & Miller, 1984: 188; ChapinJr. & Kaiser, 1979: 560-570).The early attempts to explain the processes producing identifiable urban land usepatterns were initially descriptive in nature (Bridger & Greer-Wootten, 1971: 120). Theymade use of a gravity model to explain the results--high value, and thus high density at the32city centre, with the value and density decreasing with the distance from the centre until anequilibrium is reached in the rural-urban fringe.Transportation Theory.In the past the concern of those involved with transportation was linked to otherconsiderations.The demand for transportation is in most circumstances a derived demand.Travel may sometimes in itself be pleasurable, but normally it is an end--toget to work, to shop or to visit friends. (Harrison, 1974: 18)The study of transportation and its impacts originated from the study of such disciplines aseconomics and civil engineering.The theories formulated to explain the nature and impacts of transportation werecomponents of larger theories developed to explain economic or engineering phenomena. Tothe economist, transport was a cost consideration in the calculations of business ventures andsite locations in economic theory. To the civil engineer, transportation involved the need toplan and construct the necessary transportation infrastructure to ensure the efficientmovement of goods and people.Transportation models were developed as a planning tool to explain how to increasethe efficiency of transportation and the arrangement of land uses. Models were developed inorder to elucidate the source of transportation problems and assist in planning what wasneeded in order to prevent or mitigate potential problems. "The basic use of the transportmodel is to describe the operation of a specific transport network." (Roberts, 1971: 39).Initially, general models were developed. These were intended to be applicable in any urbanarea, but it was subsequently found that smaller, more problem-specific models producedmore usable results.Models simulating the interrelationship between transportation and land use havebeen in existence since the early 1960's (Mackett & Lodwick, 1985: 251). These models33resulted from processes evolving within the planning field which allowed the introduction ofthis methodology to better understand changes and potential impacts on existing factorswithin urban systems.In the case of a commodity transportation model, Roberts suggests there are eightsteps to consider. These are:1) commodity disaggregation;2) network definition;3) modal choice and routing;4) commodity distribution;5) commodity assignment;6) modal cost-performance calculation;7) transport price determination;8) a summary of the system performance measures. (Roberts, 1971: 39)This sequence of steps illustrate, the process needed to describe the operation of a specifictransport network in which commodities are being moved, but also these steps could just aseasily be used to describe a process that takes into account the day-to-day travel of people.Travel demand models are one example of transportation modelling. These developedout of large scale transportation studies undertaken in the United States (Chicago, Detroit,and Washington) (Fischer, 1987: 173). The purpose of the models was to study the behaviourof people in order to understand the factors that influence their decisions. The earliest of thesemodels was the Urban Transportation Model System Approach (UTMS) (Fischer, 1987: 173).The model consisted of four stages:1). trip generation;2). trip distribution;3). modal split;4). trip assignment. (Meyer & Miller, 1984: 246)Each stage represents a point in the personal decision-making process. A variety of modelshave been developed to deal with the processes involved with each of the stages mentioned(Meyer & Miller, 1984: 246-273).Other types of models have been developed to simulate other transportation-orientedconcerns. Some examples are: "Network Performance Evaluation Model for HOV Facilities."34(Janson, Zozaya-Gorostiza & Southworth, 1987), "Optimizing Urban Mass Transit Systems:A General Model" (Black, 1978), "Trip Production Forecasting Models For Urban Areas"(Fogerty, 1976) and "Synthetic Models For Through Trips In Small Urban Areas" (Chatterjee& Raja, 1989).The use of models and simulations has become an accepted method for analysing ofthe potential impacts of changes in relation to the relevant variables.3.3 RELATIONSHIP OF TRANSPORTATION AND LAND USE.There are many factors common to both land use and transportation. These includerates of population growth, size of urban area, nature of the separation of residence andemployment, and the nature of the existing transportation infrastructure. There are alsofactors that may be more important to one of the fields than the other, though it should benoted most of the factors are in fact applicable to both land use and transportation. Fortransportation, these factors include the mode split, the amount of congestion at what times ofday, and the amount of available capacity in the existing infrastructure which could be usedto alleviate the congestion through traffic management. In the case of land use, the factorswould include location of different use, density, accessibility of locations, and the economicviability of a region.The interrelationship between transportation and land use is evident. "A uniqueproperty of land use is its ability or potential to 'generate' traffic." (Blunden, 1971: 12). Landuse activities create sets of trip patterns, volumes of traffic, as well as a choice of modes oftransportation. A change in the use of a parcel of land can result in the creation of new trips.These new trips utilize any excess capacity and create pressure on the existing transportationinfrastructure for new facilities to reduce the perceived traffic congestion.Figure 3-1 serves to illustrate the interrelation between land use and transportation.The flow chart is of the organization of the transportation planning process, but it alsoillustrates the importance of land use decisions to transportation decision making.SekctloctandD41-11 -SingAnalysis ofExistingConditionsI TransportationPolo OptionsLand UsePolicy Options.roads-publictransportationLocation le Intensity-homing-employment-recreation-educationLand UsePlanningModelTransportationPlanningModelEvaluation of .TransporzasianAlternativesC35Figure 3-1 TRANSPORTATION PLANNING PROCESS. Illustrating theinterrelationship of Land Use and Transportation. ^D3c-2ImplementationSource: Roads and Transportation Association of Canada. Urban Transportation Planning Guide Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977. Figure 1-1 Organization of theTransportation Planning Process and of this guide. Page 8.Transportation and land use models can be seen as planning tools. In the case oftransportation planning, it "has in general failed to operate effectively as a planning toolpartly because too few communities have adopted plans to guide transport development andpartly because of legal, financial, and administrative obstacles have prevented effective use oftransportation as a means of carrying out planning objectives." (Owen, 1966: 193). Land use36planning has had more success in fulfilling its mandate, despite not having the power tocontrol transportation developments.3.4 LAND USE/TRANSPORTATION THEORY AND THE PLANNER.A number of factors have to be considered by planners when applying theory to landuse and transportation concerns. The land use planning factors of primary importance includethe spatial location of various uses, the economic well-being of the region, and whichorganization has the power to make decisions concerning usage. Transportation planningfactors of importance include modes of travel available and the mode split (public transitverses private automobile verses bicycles), the transportation policies of governing authoritiesof urban areas (do they encourage use of public transit or embark on road building projects inorder to resolve traffic congestion and other problems), and the existing transportationinfrastructure.In the case of land use and transportation, the components include populationmigration, demography, and income; levels of land use densities; location of employmentcentres relative to residential areas; and the political goals and policies of those with themandate to make decisions.3.5 METHODS OF STUDY.To analyse the importance attached to the interrelationship of land use andtransportation in the resolution of urban transportation problems, an historical descriptivemethod will be used. The rationale for choosing to use this approach is, "The assumptionbehind any historical approach is that we can learn from the past, that study of the past is ofvalue philosophically as well as in making us aware of the complexity and overlapping ofthings." (Rapoport, 1969: 11). The present form of the man-made landscape is the result ofdecisions made in the past. This is of importance to planners as Hodge (1986: 22) noted,planners have to work with decisions made in the past.37To analyse the importance attached to the interrelationship of land use andtransportation in the resolution of urban transportation problems, several steps must befollowed. It is necessary to define the problem, to identify available courses of action, and toexamine the impact of solutions on other factors in the system.The material needed to study the process include present land uses with estimates ofthe amounts still available for future use; the potential changes in use that might result frompopulation pressures or economic considerations; the present population with a forecast ofwhat magnitude increases might be in the future; an inventory of the present transportationinfrastructure and what problems (congestion) exists; the volumes carried and the capacity ofthe present infrastructure; the modal split; and the division of political jurisdiction over thestudy area with a listing of the key authorities with power over land use and/ortransportation related functions. This is not a complete list but it covers the major factorsthat have to be considered.Information on the present land use is available from the Land Use Plans that, in thecase of British Columbia, are required under the Municipal Act of the Province of British Columbia. (Province of British Columbia, 1987a) Part 29 "Management of Development"sections 943 to 945. These Plans describe in broad terms the rationale for the decisions madefor proposed uses, as well as in map form. Information on past land use which explain thepatterns of present use are available from past land use reports as well as historicaldocumentation or local histories.Population information is available from the Census, while forecasts of populationincreases are available from a variety of Governmental sources (locally most municipalitiesmaintain population forecasts, as does the Greater Vancouver Regional District).Information on transportation infrastructure is available from the Department ofHighways and from the local Municipalities. A number of studies commissioned over theyears, have assessed the levels of service provided by existing roadways and have suggestedimprovements or additions that might make for more efficient movement.38Basic information on the traffic component that uses the transportation infrastructureis available from a number of sources. The components are modal split, the volume of traffic,the capacity of existing roads, length of trips, duration of trips, and the reason for trips. Thisinformation has been gathered by various agencies over the years, through origin-destinationstudies, screenline studies, traffic counts, route choice studies, and studies of trip generation.The various sources mentioned will be used in the analysis of the case study.3.6 CONCLUSIONS.This chapter provides background information on important factors in the study of theurban transportation problem. The first factor was planning and involved defining the termsneeded to understand the planning process. The planning process itself is a method of defininga problem, collecting and assessing data, proposing solutions, and evaluating the results.The next factor was the theoretical foundations of transportation and land use. Theinclusion of the origins of transportation theory provided basic information necessary tounderstand the urban transportation problem and possible solutions. The origins of land usetheory was included firstly because transportation theory evolved from it, and secondly toappreciate the strong relationship that exists between land use and transportation.Modern land use and transportation theories have had a large impact upon theplanning processes influencing current transportation and land use developments. Thisinformation is necessary if the planning processes used to study and recommend solutions tothe problems are to be understood. Planners work within an information continuum, and areinfluenced by and in turn influence the planning processes.39CHAPTER 4 Case Study: The Background.4.1 FOREWORD.This chapter will provide the geographical and historical background aboutdevelopments in the study area and the region. The approach taken will divide the chapterinto three sections. The first section will deal with the background information on the studyarea, the second will deal with the regional context of events, and the third will deal withinstitutional arrangements. The historical events will be broken into three periods to assist inunderstanding the origins of the traffic problems facing the North East Sector today. Thethree periods are, pre-1950, 1951 to 1980, and 1981 to 1990.Miles.=•1111. Nana almMI^••••■^411••••^•■■•within the Greater Vancouver Region.North East SectorBeicarra^Anmore.1-Port Moody:1-\\Burnaby^:1 Coquitlam\\\rWestVancouver NorthVancouverrBurrard InletVancouverort oquitlamPitt MeadowsNew WestminsterSurreyFraser RiverNLangley;0^5DeltaCoquitlan: River\\\•Pitt River40Map 4-1 The location of the North East Sector in relationship to the other areasSource: Greater Vancouver Regional District. Greater Vancouver Key Facts: A Statistical profile of Greater Vancouver, Canada Burnaby, B.C.: GVRD Development Services,December, 1990. Page 36.414.2 THE STUDY AREA.The case study area consists of two cities and one district municipality. The cities arePort Moody and Port Coquitlam; the district municipality is Coquitlam. The study area is46,802 acres in size and contained an estimated population of 139,400 people in 1990(GVRD, 1990a: 42) up from 114,156 in the 1986 Census (Statistics Canada, 1986).Coquitlam has the largest area with 37,594 acres and an estimated population of 85,500(69,291 in 1986 (Statistics Canada, 1986)), City of Port Coquitlam is next with 6,200 acresand an estimated population of 35,800 (29,115 in the 1986 Census), and finally the City ofPort Moody covering 3,008 acres and with an estimated population of 18,100 (15,750 in 1986Census).The area is referred to as the North East Sector since, it comprises the north eastsector of the Greater Vancouver Regional District. It should be noted that two municipalitiesto the east, Pitt Meadows and Maple Ridge, have considered joining the GVRD and haveengaged in discussions concerning this matter since early 1989 (GVRD, 1989a: 4). These twomunicipalities will not be considered part of the study area.The City of Vancouver is considered the urban centre of the GVRD. It has the largestpopulation, the greater number of jobs, and contains the central business district. The studyarea lies approximately 12 miles east of the downtown core, or about 6 miles from theeastern Vancouver border. The District of Burnaby, which over the last 30 years, has becomeurban in nature lies between Vancouver and the North East Sector. Map 4-1 illustrates theposition of the study area.4.2.1 Physical Nature of Study Area.The Geography of the Study Area.The geographical layout of the region is important as it compounds the problemscreated by the urbanization process. The downtown core of Vancouver is situated upon apeninsula surrounded by water on three sides. Burrard Inlet forms the northern boundary of42Vancouver and Burnaby, and forms part of the north-west boundary of the study area. Thesouthern boundary of Vancouver, Burnaby and the North East Sector is formed by the FraserRiver. The land mass between the two bodies of water is in the form of two ridges of landseparated by a central valley (Armstrong, 1956: 2) containing a series of lakes and peat bogs(Armstrong, 1956: 15). The northern ridge is the highest, and rises in elevation west to eastuntil it peaks at Burnaby Mountain on the western boundary of the study area. The ridgethen decreases in height until it reaches the Fraser River on the east. The position of BurnabyMountain and its eastern ridge creates limitations on the transportation routes available forthose wishing to travel between the study area and either Vancouver or other areas of theregion. The boundaries of the region are defined mainly by water bodies. To the east is thePitt River, to the south, the Fraser River, and to the north west, Burrard Inlet and IndianArm. The Mountains to the north limit both settlement and the construction of roads.The road and rail lines on an east-west alignment between Vancouver and the studyarea, are restricted in the northwest by Burrard Inlet and a steep escarpment that forms thenorthern slope of Burnaby Mountain. The road and rail lines to the south west are restrictedby the steep escarpment of the central ridge and the peat bogs that lie between the ridge andthe Fraser River.Geology of Study Area.The materials underlying most of the GVRD consist of three main types. The firstmaterial which forms the mountains to the north, is granitic igneous rocks and Tertiarysandstone and conglomerate (Eisbacher & Clague, 1981: 206). The granitic material is veryhard and durable which makes the process of constructing roads through it difficult andexpensive. The Tertiary sandstone and conglomerates form the bedrock of the northern ridgeextending from Stanley Park to Burnaby Mountain. They consist of river sediments that havenot had the geological time or pressure to have hardened into a durable material. There arealternating bands of these materials, with the conglomerate bands being hard enough to serve43as an impervious capping to prevent the underlying soft sandstones from being eroded by theheavy rainfall in this local.the rocks are 65 million years old and haven't had time enough to compact sothat 'the sandstone can be scooped up with a shovel'. (D'Andrea, 1990: 3)The second material represented in the region is unconsolidated Pleistocene sedimentsoverlain by glacial till. These sediments were laid down before and during the last period ofglaciation. The ridge forming the uplands in the central part of the study area is "underlainby thick glacio-marine sediments complexly interstratified with till and deltaic and ice-contactsand and gravel." (Eisbacher & Clague, 1981: 206). This ridge reaches an elevation of over450 feet in heights with steeply sloping edges along all sides. Along the northern side, asmentioned previously, the slope is exceedingly steep.The third material represented in the region is Halocene sediments, which weredeposited within recent times by the Fraser River. This material comprises a large segment ofthe eastern and southern part of the study area. A landscape composed of this material tendsto be fairly flat and low lying. There are often drainage problems associated with thismaterial, and since it is low-lying, it is subject to flooding during the spring runoff and the fallperiods of heavy rainfall (Eisbacher & Clague, 1981: 208). The low, water-saturatedconditions are conducive to the development of Peat deposits. The area of river sedimentsforming the southern part of the study area was once known locally as "Cranberry Bog"(Wright & Wright, 1978: 19). Building roads over peat can be a costly and time-consumingenterprise. When the Lougheed Highway was extended through Coquitlam, a section of itpassed through this area of peat and river sediments. At that time,the normal procedure was to place relatively thin landfill on the bog and tobuild the road . . . Consequently, in a few years the road developed a rollercoaster type of surface . . . This was followed by an attempt to drain the bogswith ditches, building culverts on piles over the ditches . . . The result in a fewyears was to have the culverts project above the road which had settledbetween the culverts; a good example was on Highway 7 (Lougheed Highway)between New Westminster and Port Mann Bridge. (Armstrong, 1984: 30)44Along the northern edge of the northern ridge there is an escarpment that runs alongthe southern side of Burrard Inlet. This feature is important as it serves to limit the choicesavailable in resolving the transportation problems plaguing the area. In the case of the steepnorth slope of Burnaby Mountain and the shore of Burrard Inlet, there is very limited spaceavailable for future road building due to the nature of the geology of the Mountain. "Thewhole north slope of Burnaby Mountain and part of the north slope of capital Hill consist of aTertiary (1) bedrock slide area." (Armstrong, 1957: 15). The material along the steepescarpment has reached an angle of repose, and unless disturbed poses little danger to the railand road facilities. If disturbed, the material slumps until it reaches a new angle of repose."When the Barnet Highway was upgraded in the 1950's one such slide developed."(Armstrong, 1984: 35). In January, 1991, construction of the new Barnet Highway along theNorth Side of Burnaby Mountain was slowed due to longitudinal fractures appearing in theroadbed, caused by slippage of material under it. "Slipage (sic) is a longstanding (sic) problemin some sections of the road, Port Moody Mayor Dave Driscoll said." (The Burnaby & New Westminster News, January 30, 1991: 4). The materials forming the escarpment have nothad sufficient time to compact properly, and tends to crumble very easily. Eisbacher andClague (1981: 211), and Armstrong (1957: 14) mention the uncovering of a buried forestwhen a site was being cleared in Port Moody. The material covering the site was found tohave originated from a hillside 1/2 a mile south.During a period of particularly heavy rainfall in 1979, there was a large land slideconsisting of water-saturated materials that flowed into the heart of Port Moody and damageda number of homes (Eisbacher & Clague, 1981: 211-212). A few years later in 1985, afterseveral days of heavy rainfall, a 300 foot-wide section of the Barnet Highway just west of theBarnet Highway and St Johns Street intersection, slipped down the embankment and coveredthe railway tracks below (The News, November 6, 1985: 16).The geological factors present in the study area and along the routes to and from thearea are important elements that limit transportation and land use choices.454.2.2 Political, Social and Economic History of the Study Area.Political History of Study Area.As mentioned earlier, the study area comprises three political entities. These are theCity of Port Moody, the City of Port Coquitlam and the Municipality of Coquitlam. TheMunicipality of Coquitlam was incorporated in 1891 and comprised an area that includeswhat is now the City of Port Coquitlam. The City of Port Coquitlam was created when theurban area adjacent to the C.P.R. Yards, known as Westminster Junction, was ceded fromthe Municipality of Coquitlam and became the City of Port Coquitlam. This occurred in 1913,during a time of economic expansion.The City of Port Moody came into being during the construction of the C.P.R. in theearly 1880's. Port Moody was originally designated as the terminus of the railway, and as aresult there was much building activity in anticipation of a rapid economic expansion.However, when the terminus was moved to Vancouver, further down Burrard Inlet, thesettlement fell into a state of slumber that lasted nearly 20 years. With the Panama canalnearing completion and promising to make local products easier to ship to the Europeanmarkets, there was renewed interest in the fortunes of Port Moody, with the result that itbecame incorporated in 1913.In the past there were several other political entities in and around the study area.The District of Fraser Mills was originally part of Coquitlam, but separated in 1913 to form aseparate political entity, whose boundaries happened to coincide with the boundaries of theland holdings of the Western Canadian Lumber Company. Fraser Mills was seen for manyyears as a tax haven for the Lumber Company and its successor companies. In the early1970's it was forced by the Provincial Government to join the Municipality of Coquitlam.Within the present GVRD, the Villages of Anmore and Belcarra were recentincorporations (Anmore 1979, Belcarra 1987 (GVRD, 1990b: 35)). They include several smallareas to the north west that are essentially rural in nature, but which opted for incorporation46in order to provide needed services, and an organization to ensure that their views ondevelopment were heard.Just outside the present boundaries of Port Moody there is a small community calledloco. It was created in 1915 by the Imperial Oil Company in order to house its work force, ata time when the site was isolated from other settlements by a lack of roads, and its workershad to live at the site or commute daily by boat from adjacent communities.History of Early Settlement in Area, 1859-1950.The first activity to take place in the study area during the colonial era involved theChief Commissioner of Lands and Works, Colonel Richard Moody. He was searching for asuitable site for the capital of the colony of British Columbia. He decided initially on Mary Hillas the hill would serve as a good defensive position (Monk & Stewart, 1958: 12). However, abetter site was chosen downstream at what was to become New Westminster.ciL0 Mary Hill Industrial Park —CoquitlamRiverview hospitalLougheed HighwayFraser RiverCanada IlifghwayCoquitlam RiverColony FarinMayfair Industrial Park••• ••Fraser MillsTransCoast MountainsWestwood Plateauloco ••••Port CoquitlainN0^1MileBurke MountainBurrard Inlet•Port Moody :.• cu.roc^ Eagle Mounfain o'ro^.c?Ge^• #4,,•Barnet HighwayMinnekahada RanchCD0,4e (1)o,p.0 00"o,F)ro"0(1)sv1-11aCD17) .arqlD0CDcig •B oriyhy. Mo• t °111111\imanammtain•bqy. 4S)• e•. • •Burnaby C>‘b.Port Mann BridgeSt. Johns Street ^• • .. ^ • 6 • • • • •Chines• •Prairie Road\ • \ \ ■at Burns Farm I:\\Dominion ReservePitt River BridgePitt Meadows• •Mary Hill4j,yet48Farming and Ranching.The earliest settlers were mainly farmers and ranchers. For the first few years theiroperations were initially subsistent in nature. During and after the building of the C.P.Railway, in the period 1881-1885, commercial farming and ranching operations came intobeing. For many years, and to a lesser extent today there has existed some farming in thearea. In the past, three of the largest operations were: "Minnekhada", the "Pat Burns" MeatCompany operation, and The Provincial Government's Colony Farm. Map 4-2 illustrates thelocation of Minnekhada, the Pat Burns Farm, and Colony Farm."Minnekhada, was a very large operation covering 1,600 acres and involving theraising of crops and livestock. Thoroughbred stock was raised, as well as 500 acres of oatsand hay for feed. There was a large dairying operation on the property. Potatoes and otherroot crops were grown as well. In later years a large chicken raising operation was begun(Chambers, 1973: part 6). Beginning in 1900 the property had a number of illustrious ownersover the years, including two Lieutenant-Governors of the Province of British Columbia.Today part of the property forms one of the GVRD Regional parks.The "Pat Burns" farm was approximately 1,000 acres in size; it was mainly involvedin sheep raising, which supplied wool and meat. There was also a large pig raising operationon the property. The stock raised on the farm was processed at the Burns Packing Plantsituated in Vancouver. This operation supplied meat to the local markets.Colony Farm was begun in 1905, and was intended to employ patients from theMental Health Hospital in nearby New Westminster. It was also to serve as a model farm, todemonstrate new farming techniques and to raise purebred stock to improve the breeds in theProvince.From the 1920's onwards, a number of smaller operations raised strawberries, peasand beans that were sold to the Royal City Canning Company in New Westminster. Chickenfarming and dairying were also conducted on a small scale on a number of family type farms(Koberstein, 1990).49Logging.For many years logging provided employment for residents of the study area. Thebuilding of the C.P.R. created a large market for lumber, stimulating the local loggingindustry. Large-scale commercial logging with horses and oxen began when the timber closeto the waterways was exhausted. After the turn of the century, steam donkey engines andlogging railways were employed to move the timber to the mills.In the study area, the largest logging operations were owned by the McNair ShingleCompany and the Dollar Company (The Canadian Robert Dollar Company of Dollarton,Dollarton is now called Deep Cove). Both companies operated logging railways, making use ofpart of the Port Moody-Coquitlam Railway. This railway, originally built through anagreement between McNair and the British Columbia Electric Railway Company, ran fromPort Moody up into the Coquitlam River watershed. The B.C. Electric Company needed therailway to facilitate the construction of the Coquitlam Lake Dam, and McNair paid half theconstruction costs in order to gain access to its timber properties (Ewert, 1986: 117). Fromthe early 1920's to the early 1940's, the Dollar Company logged large portions of northernCoquitlam and Port Coquitlam, using the logging railway.During the period 1920 to 1950, there were a number of small scale loggingoperations within the study area to remove small stands of privately owned timber andshingle bolts. There were also a number of local small scale shingle mills in the area obtainingtheir materials from the local farmers and developers clearing their lands.An example of a small scale operator that logged in the area was Albert Thomas, whoin 1931 moved a bush mill into the Harbour Chines area of Port Moody, and used aCaterpillar tractor to drag logs to the mill for conversion to railway ties (InternationalWoodworkers of America, 1976: 158-159). Another example was Mr. Edwards of what isnow Edwards Road, who from the 1930's to the early 1950's used a mile long steel cable to50transport shingle bolts from steep terrain on the south slope of Burke Mountain to his shinglemill.During the 1960's and 1970's, Mr. Frank Wirsz logged intermittently a timber claimon Burke Mountain he had purchased in 1958 (Postma, 1992: 17). Local residents who usedthe existing logging roads to hike and access a local ski slope, lobbied for an end to logging topreserve the natural environment. "The campaign to stop logging was ultimately successfuland by 1981 all logging ceased on Burke Mountain" (Postma, 1992: 17).There is still some logging being carried out to the north of Burke Mountain, mainlywithin the G.V.R.D. watershed, but it is on a very reduced scale.Manufacturing.One of the largest manufacturing industries in the study area produced woodproducts, especially lumber and shingles made from local timber. The building of the C.P.R.stimulated the establishment a number of lumber operations at Port Moody. Later, largeoperations were started at Fraser Mills and in the area that later became Port Coquitlam.The Western Canadian Lumber Company operations, which were the largest, employed up to850 men when business was brisk (Monk & Stewart, 1958: 35). In 1913 "the big mill wasreputed at this time to be the largest lumbering operation in the British Empire and thesecond largest in the world." (Monk & Stewart, 1958: 38). In Port Moody, Thurston-FlavelleCedar was the largest operation, followed in size by Canadian Pacific Lumber, Reynold'sTimber, Port Moody Shingle, Robert McNair Shingle, Sardis Shingle and F.M. Singer andCompany (Norton, 1987: 110-122). Robert McNair also operated a single mill and a smallsawmill at Port Coquitlam. This company operated for a very long time and purchased muchof its material from the local farmers when they were clearing their lands (Koberstein, 1990).Interestingly enough, there was a rubber manufacturing plant in Port Coquitlam. Theplant began operations in 1926 as the Gregory Rubber Company. Later, in 1934, the51Huntington Rubber Company acquired the operation. The facility manufactured automobiletires, belts, and rubber mats.Prior to the First World War, there was a steel rolling mill at Port Moody but thisshut down soon after the end of hostilities.In spite of the amount and scope of the agricultural endeavours, there were noprocessing plants or creameries built within the study area.Associated with the lumbering business was shipbuilding. Prior to and during the FirstWorld War, there were major shipbuilding operations in Port Coquitlam. A contract wassecured by the Pacific Construction Shipbuilding Firm. "During the years from 1914 to 1918a crew of 400 carpenters, shipwrights and metal workers launched these boats." (Chambers,1973: part 8).There were two oil refineries constructed near Port Moody just prior to the FirstWorld War. The Imperial Oil Refinery at loco is still in existence and provides employmentfor a large number of local residents (Norton, 1987: 149-151).Hydro Development.In the period 1902-03, the Vancouver Power Company, built a dam at CoquitlamLake, a tunnel connecting Coquitlam Lake with Buntzen Lake and a power house on IndianArm (Monk & Stewart, 1958: 59). In the period 1909 to 1911 the dam and the tunnel wereenlarged and another power house built. The British Columbia Electric Railway Companyowned the Vancouver Power Company, and at this time it entered into an agreement with alogging company to construct a railway that could be used to carry supplies to the dam siteand to transport timber from the surrounding forests to the mills at Port Moody.52The C.P.R. and The Provincial Mental Health Hospital.Prior to the 1950's the Canadian Pacific Railway (C.P.R.) and the Provincial MentalHealth Hospital (Essondale Hospital. See Map 4-2 for location) were the largest employers inthe study area (City of Port Coquitlam, 1988: 117).The C.P.R. construction in the early 1880's stimulated settlement and economicgrowth which had languished in the area. The railway construction created a land boom atPort Moody and initiated lumbering, farming, and ranching to meet the needs created by therailway construction. At what is now Port Coquitlam, then Westminster Junction, a branchline was constructed to service the then main urban and commercial centre of the region, NewWestminster. This transportation node developed into a service centre for the local industriesand the railway.During the period just prior to the First World War, there was considerabledevelopment activity in the region due to the anticipated benefits of the impending completionof the Panama canal. The area that is now Port Coquitlam was considered to have thepotential to be a large manufacturing and shipping centre. The C.P.R. in anticipation ofdevelopments expropriated a very large tract of land to create what were at that time thelargest rail yards in western Canada (Chambers, 1973: part 6). This activity brought about aland boom resulting in the creation of the City Of Port Coquitlam in 1913. Extensive shopswere created at the site for the repair of freightcars and locomotives. This created the needfor a large workforce which sought accommodation in the adjacent community of PortCoquitlam.The next largest employer in the area was the Mental Health Hospital at Essondale.The hospital had originally been located in New Westminster, but due to an inability toexpand the facility within the city, a site was purchased in 1904 in Coquitlam (Poole, 1990:4). The new hospital was constructed between 1909 and 1913, on the hillside adjacent to thesite of the Colony Farm. Many of the patients from the hospital were employed on the Colonyfarm raising vegetables for use at the facility and purebred livestock to improve the breeds53within the Province. In the mid 1950's the institution housed over 4,700 patients (Poole,1990: 4) and employed over 1,500 people many of whom lived in the surroundingcommunities (Monk & Stewart, 1958: 55-56).Land Use Prior to 1950.Prior to 1950, land uses within the study area were those that one might expect in arural area. The south-west area of Coquitlam, adjacent to Burnaby and Fraser Mills, wasmainly residential in nature, with some retail outlets to serve local needs and a small amountof farming, and dairying. A 1952 study by the Lower Mainland Regional Planning Boardindicated that most of the land in the study area was vacant. The next largest use wasagriculture, with the major holdings in the eastern part of the study area, mostly in PortCoquitlam. Many of the agricultural holdings took the form of small-sized plots of one to fiveacres, and were residential, with some gardening to supply the owners needs along with someberries or eggs that could be sold to the local markets. The owners often worked part or full-time at another job with the farming being more of a hobby (Koberstein, 1990).By 1950, the study area was still primarily rural, with the vast majority of the landbeing vacant, and covered with logging slash or second growth timber.4.2.3 Transportation Developments Prior to 1950.Roads.The first modern transportation development that took place in the study area wasthe construction of the North Road from New Westminster to Burrard Inlet in 1859 (Draper,1945: 25; Hill, 1987: 150). It was seen as a strategic necessity as it offered an alternativemeans to access the then capital of the crown colony of British Columbia should the FraserRiver be blocked by flood, ice, or an invasion by the United States of America.The next road to be built was the Pitt River Road, in 1861. This road basicallyfollowed the same route as the present day Lougheed Highway as far as Essondale, then54crossed the Coquitlam River, and reached the Pitt River north of Mary Hill. Its purpose wasto open up the agricultural lands of the region and enable settlers to transport their produceto the only major urban centre in the region. Map 4-3 illustrates the route followed by thisroad.Map 4-3 The location of the early roads in the North East Sector.Bur. ard Inlet0^2^ NC=M1111:=7MilesNorth Road —01Coqukqarn RiverSource: Draper, W.N. "Some early roads and trails in New Westminster District." inBritish Columbia Historical Quarterly Volume IX Number 1. Victoria, B.C.: Published by theArchives of British Columbia, 1945. Pages 25-35. Map on page 26.Other roads were developed over the years as required. The main roads included theDewdney Trunk Road, which linked Port Moody with Port Coquitlam, and the BarnetHighway, which linked Port Moody with Hastings Street, and thus gave access to Vancouver.The present Lougheed Highway was constructed in 1950.00CoquitlarnaurrardNTMile.t••Port Moody;...:••••BarnetHighway.s•1;Y3b ^ .^, Dewdney,Como Lake Road TrunkRoadPort Coquitla.mte,5eeci."..,.,,,,,42.44.+4.,^•tx...;^.^\^ects.4../..Pit: River RoadLoueneedTrans Canada/Fraser River^6";54.„1:„Inlet55Map 4-4 The location of present day roads in the North East Sector.Source: Urban Transit Authority. On Track for the 80's Vancouver, B.C.: May, 1981.Exhibit 2.1 "The Service Corridor in the Context of the Lower Mainland." Located betweenpages 11 and 12.An important event occurred in 1922, when the Provincial Government declared theNorth Road, Dewdney Trunk and the Pitt River Roads as secondary highways, with the costsof repairs and improvements to be paid equally by the Province and the Municipalities (Monk& Stewart, 1958: 46).Examples of what the early road conditions were like are indicated from the followingdescription of North Road.nothing but an ugly trail. . . . The track is all furrowed by the late floods.(Norton, 1987: 80)56andSTUCK IN THE MUD . . . A wagon loaded with goods for Port Moody, startedout the other day to brave all the adventures of the so-called road to theterminus. The driver must have been a brave man, but wanting in that betterpart of valour called discretion. . . . the horses had to be rescued fromsuffocation in the mud . . . the wagon remained sunk to the hubs, to be dug outon some future occasion (Norton, 1987: 80)The roads would improve somewhat, but not greatly, until well after the advent of theautomobile.In 1912 a bridge was constructed across the Pitt River enabling farmers to travel toNew Westminster with their produce.One major point concerning the lack of a network arterial roads within the North EastSector is a result of there not being, early in its development, an overall arterial road plandevised for the area. The suburbanization process began in the early 1950's, and it was atthis time, an overall regional road plan should have been developed. It was not until the early1970's that Coquitlam and Port Coquitlam commissioned studies of the road needs of the area(Associates Engineering Services, 1970, 1971). However, by this time a great deal ofresidential development had already taken place which restricted the available options increating a continuous arterial road network.The City of Vancouver has a good system of arterial roads due to its commissioningHarland Bartholomew and Associates (1929) in the late 1920's to produce a plan for theupgrading and extension of the existing road systems. The plan also contained a regionalcomponent which included the Municipality of Burnaby and the City of New Westminster.This regional road plan was to ensure adequate access from Vancouver to its suburbs.Unfortunately, the regional plan stopped at the western boundary of the North East Sector.The layout of the arterial road system in Richmond was the result of the initial landsurveys carried out in the early 1860's, since the land was of superior agricultural qualityand attracted early settlers before other areas. "The land was to be divided into 160 acreallotments by the block and range system, each block being three miles square and divided57into thirty-six sections of forty chains, which is a half mile square." (Ross, 1979: 21). Theinitial roads were spaced one mile apart to provide access to each quarter section. "In 1881,Richmond's major roads were gazetted." (Ross, 1979: 46). Thus Richmond was supplied withan arterial road system on a grid-system.The North East Sector, though possessing some good agricultural lands, contained toomuch rough, and heavily wooded terrain to necessitate early land subdivision surveys.Railways.The construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway (C.P.R.), which began in 1881, hadthe greatest immediate impact upon the study area. At that time the only means of highspeed surface travel, or to move large and heavy loads of material was by railway. Theconstruction process provided a ready market for lumber, foodstuffs and draft animals. Afrantic land boom occurred at the same time, resulting in the creation of the settlement ofPort Moody in 1883. The designation of Port Moody as the Pacific Terminus of the trans-continental railway was sufficient to cause premature development of local facilities inanticipation of an influx of citizens. Unfortunately the hopes were dashed when the terminuswas moved to Vancouver, further down the Inlet, in 1886.In the same year, a branch line was built from the C.P.R. mainline at Port Coquitlam(then Westminster Junction, now Coquitlam Junction), which gave the Company access to thealready established urban and industrial centre of the region at New Westminster.In 1899, the Vancouver, Victoria and Eastern Railway (now the Burlington NorthernRailway) was built from Vancouver to New Westminster, passing along the southernboundary of the study area. When the New Westminster Railway bridge was opened in 1904,the line was able to link up with its American parent's lines in the U.S.In 1915 the Canadian Northern Railway was completed and track use rights alongthis line into Vancouver were negotiated with the Vancouver, Victoria and Eastern Railway.58In the period shortly before the 1914-18 War, the British Columbia Electric Railway(B.C.E.R.) built a tram line from its operation in New Westminster to the Fraser Mills to"meet the needs of the increasing number of residents and workers." (Monk & Stewart, 1958:35). The residents of Port Moody had been petitioning the B.C.E.R. from 1906 to 1915 for thebuilding of the tram line from New Westminster to their community (Ewert, 1986: 123;Norton, 1987: 133-134). The residents felt the line would make commuting to NewWestminster easier, as well as improve the commercial opportunities of the community. TheB.C.E.R., however, felt there was not sufficient demand to warrant the expense involved inconstructing the extension.Water Transportation.Prior to the building of the modern highway system, beginning in the late 1920's, theFraser and Pitt Rivers were used widely for commerce, and the local communities wereserved by river boats. Ocean going ships were towed up to Fraser Mills and Port Coquitlam toload lumber and shingles for export. The harbour at Port Moody was also used to ship lumberas well as to import crude oil to supply the two oil refineries that operated after 1915.Tugboats were extensively used to tow log booms and barges to the lumber mills.There had been talk of the building of a canal to link Burrard Inlet with the Pitt Riverto further the economic development of the region. This scheme was first proposed during thegold rush period. It is not presently known definitively who initiated the scheme, though theHammond Brothers of what is now Hammond, Maple Ridge, did actively promote it for manyyears (Nichols et al, 1972: 23).This plan was to dam the mouth of the Pitt River, using Mary Hill as a supplyof earth fill, and to divert the flow of the Pitt and Lillooet River systemsthrough a canal to Burrard Inlet. (Nichols et al, 1972: 23(The present day Alouette River and Lake were known prior to the 1930's by the nameLillooet.) The scheme once again came to the fore in 1891 (Chambers, 1973: part 11), and59was promoted up to the time of the First World War. The great flood of 1894 added anotheruse for the canal as a possible flood control project, but aside from a number of surveys beingundertaken, little was accomplished at this time. After the great flood of 1948, the NewWestminster Harbours Board resurrected the canal proposal as a flood control measure (Cityof Port Coquitlam, 1988: 125). The proposal was again revived in 1962, after the CoquitlamRiver flooded, causing considerable property damage. "The Board of Trade formed a CanalCommittee whose objective was to oversee the construction of a canal, 200' wide and 35'deep." (City of Port Coquitlam, 1988: 125). The proposal, however, was once again allowed tolapse after a detailed study indicated that it would be exceedingly costly (City of PortCoquitlam, 1988: 125).Situation in the Rest of the Region, 1859 to 1950.The period 1859 to 1865 was one of rapid development due to the discovery of gold inthe interior. Local development centred in New Westminster, the capital of the colony ofBritish Columbia. Aside from a few farms and logging operations in the Lower Fraser Valley,there was little urban development outside of New Westminster. The City served as theindustrial and commercial centre of the mainland Colony up to the founding of Vancouver in1886 (Jones, 1966: 29). New Westminster did remain a major industrial centre for the regionuntil the disastrous fire of 1898 destroyed much of the City and most of the industries. Manyof the industrial concerns relocated to Vancouver, which had rapidly become the new centre ofthe region due to changes in transportation technology that reduced the reliance on rivertransportation and emphasized the use of the railway (Jones, 1966: 28). New Westminster,however, still retained its regional importance.Friday is market day. Farmers come fifteen to twenty miles with theirproduce, and thither dealers from Nanaimo, Victoria, Vancouver and localcentres repair to make their purchases. (Lawson & Young, 1913: 127)60Vancouver thus became the commercial and transportation centre for British Columbia andWestern Canada, while New Westminster served the function of market place andtransportation centre for the Lower Fraser Valley.The period between 1865 and 1880 was one of relatively depressed times, anddevelopment although steady, was slow. The construction of the C.P.R. between 1880 and1885 brought in a large influx of new residents and stimulated a host of economicundertakings that were initially directed to supplying the railway. From 1885 to 1900 therewas rapid development of the lands around Burrard Inlet between the First and SecondNarrows. Vancouver, which occupied the south shore of the Inlet, was the centre of extensivelumbering operations, metalworks and foundries, and wholesale distribution for the Province,and became the primary centre of commerce and population.The settlement which became Vancouver (incorporated in 1886) had a population in1881 of about 800. By 1891, the population was 13,709, and by 1901, 27,010 (McDonald,1981: 39). The Province of British Columbia contained a population of 49,459 in 1881,98,173 in 1891, and 178,657 in 1901 (McDonald, 1981: 39). After 1890, the landssurrounding Vancouver and New Westminster, began to be divided into municipalities. Thewhole of the Lower Fraser Valley experienced substantial growth in the period prior to 1900.Rapid development continued up to the beginning of the First World War, withVancouver's population reaching 100,401 in 1911 and the Province registering a populationof 392,480 (McDonald, 1981: 39). As the centre for transportation, manufacturing anddistribution for the whole of the Province, Vancouver became even more eminent in the regionand the Province. It was seen as the gateway to the orient.The events of the First World War, slowed development, and the rate of populationincrease declined. The period between the two World Wars saw some development, but it wasonly after the Second World War that changing circumstances would result in the process ofurbanization overflowing the boundaries of Vancouver and impacting the rural lands in thesurrounding municipalities. Economic changes and technical changes in transportation began61to affect the settlement patterns of the region. The old transportation means of streetcars andinterurbans gave way under the pressures of increased numbers of private automobiles. As inother urban areas in North America, the advent of increased numbers of inexpensive andreliable vehicles enabled people to seek residences in the suburbs. The formerly compactcentre of Vancouver, with its arms of developments radiating from the centre along the oldstreetcar lines, began to feel the effects of decentralization and urban sprawl. People werenow able to locate wherever inexpensive land was available for housing.The City of Vancouver was initially established as a transportation centre, for modechange between land and ocean-going transport. Over time Vancouver retained this function,but it also began to emerge as an industrial city. The major development of the City wasrelated to the growth of its manufacturing and distribution functions (Jones, 1966: 28), andthis continued until the 1960's. In recent years, it has been said the City has become an"executive" city, that is, the main economic function of the downtown core has become thelocation of a large number of regional corporate offices. Partially in anticipation of this andpartially as a result, a large amount of office space has been constructed in the downtowncore since the mid 1950's (Hardwick, 1974: 58-61).As the vacant residential lands within the boundaries of Vancouver began to fill, andthe land values began to rise, many people began to seek affordable residences in thecommunities surrounding the City. In the late 1940's and early 1950's, Burnaby, NorthVancouver, Richmond and Surrey began to feel the pressures of suburbanization. In the early1960's there was little vacant residential land available within Vancouver, and greaterpressures were exerted upon the communities surrounding the city. The suburbanization ofthe peripheral communities into automobile-oriented, low-density developments resulted in anincreasing traffic load upon the existing transportation infrastructure. The increasedcongestion has reduced mobility around the lower mainland, and has become one of the mainproblems facing residents.624.3 THE PERIODS FROM 1951 TO 1980, AND 1981 TO 1990.Introduction.Past events can be divided into three stages. The period prior to 1951 was pioneer innature, with the wild landscape gradually being modified to reflect a European ideal ofproductive land use. The lands were logged, then some were used for agricultural purposes.The transportation system was initially designed to serve the developing land uses. Theearliest road systems were constructed as a means to encourage development of the land. Thebuilding of the railway in 1885 was designed to develop the whole of Canada rather thanbenefiting just the local region. However, the new transportation technology had a profoundimpact upon the whole region, and focussed developmental attention away from the old centreof settlement New Westminster to the new centre, Vancouver. In the study area, the comingof the railway offered an economic reason for increased development. There were increasedopportunities for utilizing the timber resources of the area, as well as markets for agriculturalproducts in the rapidly growing commercial and industrial centre of Vancouver.The period of the streetcar and interurban had a profound impact on land developmentall across the region, but aside from a short spur line to Fraser Mills in south-westernCoquitlam, the residents in the study area were compelled to use either the Canadian PacificRailroad (C.P.R.) or a ferry from Port Moody to travel to Vancouver, or a horse-drawn vehicleor, later, a primitive automobile travelling on the few existing gravel roads to reach NewWestminster. Prior to 1950, there could be little thought of commuting to jobs in Vancouverfrom the study area as the travel costs would have been far too great in relation to the costsof land closer to Vancouver.The period between 1951 and 1980 marked the beginning of the conversion of thelands in the study area from rural to suburban. New roads opened up the lands to residentialdevelopment. This development brought additional services which in turn attracted morepeople seeking lower-priced homes. This in turn created a demand for better transportationinfrastructure.631951 marked a time when automobiles had become a major component of thetransportation system. The first automobile-oriented shopping mall was constructed in 1950,at Park Royal in West Vancouver. It was the first major retail development outside thedowntown core of Vancouver, and signaled the change in the design of communities in thatthe land use would be oriented to automobile travel as opposed to the old system of streetcars.The 1980 date, a rather arbitrary choice, marked the end of a period when development inthe North East Sector was minor as there was still an abundance of easily developed andinexpensive land available within the municipalities south of the Fraser River.The lands to the south of the Fraser were preferred for housing for a number ofreasons. The first involved the general impression of the landscape. Richmond, Delta andSurrey were long-established agricultural areas, and possessed cleared fields, old farmhouses,and barns. They reflected the ideal of a rural area. The study area on the other hand,possessed a rugged landscape, and due to the nature of the soils, which had limited the extentof land for agriculture, they did not convey the feeling of a farming area. The large expansesof unoccupied lands covered with scrub timber and second growth trees gave the impression ofan undeveloped wilderness. People tended to locate in the idealized farming areas.The developers also preferred to built houses on the level cleared farmlands of thesouth of the Fraser River Municipalities. The costs of clea .ring and building were considerablyless on the level, already cleared ground, than on the heavily treed sloping ground of thestudy area. There was also a noticeable difference in climate. The cleared lands in Richmond,Delta, and Surrey looked sunny, while the treed lands of the study area appeared dark anduninviting. A study of the climatic variation of the region indicates that there is a markeddifference in the amount of rainfall received by the areas south of the Fraser River and thestudy area (Stager & Wallis, 1968: 93-96).The final period, 1981 to 1990, marks a major movement to develop the lands of theNorth East Sector for housing. This development has increased the levels of traffic congestionwithin the area. It has also contributed to traffic congestion within the neighbouring64municipalities that face the brunt of the commuter traffic originating within the study areaand destined for Vancouver or the industrial parks or commercially zoned lands in the southof the Fraser River municipalities.4.4 THE REGIONAL CONTEXT.Regional Situation 1951 to 1980.Introduction.This period saw a massive population increase in the Greater Vancouver Region duepartly to a natural increase (called the baby boom), and partly to a large in-migration ofpeople from other parts of Canada and from other countries. In 1951 the population of theCity of Vancouver stood at 344,833; this rose to 384,522 in 1961, 426,256 in 1971, anddeclined slightly to 413,952 in 1981 (Statistics Canada, 1971; Statistics Canada, 1981). Thedecline was due partly to the fact people preferred to move to the suburbs where housing wasless expensive. It also reflected the desire of the existing population to preserve theirneighbourhoods by ensuring older single family dwellings were not demolished to make wayfor higher density apartments. During this period, the population of the suburbs rosedramatically. Burnaby's population rose from 58,376 in 1951 to 136,494 in 1981 (StatisticsCanada, 1971; Statistics Canada, 1981). Richmond, a suburb to the south of Vancouver, in1951 contained a population of 19,186 which rose to 96,154 in 1981. Surrey showed an evengreater increase, beginning with 33,670 in 1951 and reaching 147,138 in 1981. The vastmajority of the growth occurred in the outlying municipalities.In addition, many people from other parts of Canada sought to escape harsherclimates (Stager & Wallis, 1968: 89) and declining economic circumstances by relocatingwithin the region. The dependence of the local economy on the processing of raw materials forexport lessened, and more specialized manufacturing and a larger service sector developed.During the mid 1950's, urban sprawl in the lower mainland was identified as a majorproblem by planners and decision makers (Lower Mainland Regional Planning Board, 1956a;65Lower Mainland Regional Planning Board, 1956b). One of the main concerns was theinefficient use of the land and the costs of supplying services to widely dispersed residences.An additional concern had to do with the loss of productive agricultural lands. The planners ofthe time suggested controls to ensure land was developed in a compact and orderly manner soexisting service and transportation problems would not be exacerbated.The needs of the expanding population served to spur the residential constructionindustry to develop land for housing. A new-found affluence after the Second World War,created by a strong economy allowed people to purchase private automobiles (BritishColumbia Ministry of Highways, 1986: 11). The increased availability of the privateautomobile enabled the development of more distant suburbs. An example of the link betweenautomobiles and residential development of suburbs is the information provided throughscreenline surveys. To the north of Vancouver, Burrard Inlet served as the screenlinebetween the City and the North Shore communities, and to the south of Vancouver the NorthArm of the Fraser River served as the screenline between the City and Richmond. Data fromsurveys completed in 1947 (4:30 to 6:30 pm) and 1955 (4:00 to 6:00 pm) indicate a dramaticincrease in traffic volumes, with the traffic to and from the North Shore growing from 2,340to 8,008 during the afternoon peak period, in the eight year period (Technical Committee forMetropolitan Highway Planning, 1955-56: 8). The number of automobiles entering andleaving the City from Richmond during this period rose from 1,881 to 5,469 (TechnicalCommittee for metropolitan Highway Planning, 1955-56: 8).Despite the rapid increase of development in the suburbs, Vancouver and Burnabystill possessed an abundance of developable land until about 1960 (Hardwick, 1974: 127). Asthe available supply of land decreased, higher prices forced developers to seek less expensivelands further out. The farm lands south of the Fraser then came under pressure. Those areaswithin the study area close to the existing transportation routes into Vancouver and NewWestminster were beginning to become attractive to housing developers.66At the same time people began to move to the suburbs in response to the increasedemployment opportunities as industry began to move out of the centre of the city, to escapeproblems of accessibility and other increased costs. As the value of the land and thus thelevels of rent increased, many companies found it was advantageous to locate on the fringe ofthe urban area, where large parcels of inexpensive land were available and materials could betransported more easily and less expensively utilizing the newly constructed multi-lane roads.Many of the employees of these industries, seeking affordable residences, had already movedto the suburbs, and in some cases this movement of companies to the suburbs, enabledemployees to reduce commuting time.In the period, 1951 to 1980, many major land use changes occurred. The movement ofindustry and warehousing to the suburbs marked one change, but a more important changeinvolved the construction of large amounts of office space in the downtown core. In 1957,there were 5.7 million square feet of office space in the downtown core. By 1973, this figurehad risen to 11.2 million square feet (Hardwick, 1974: 61). Between 1965 and 1975, theamount of office space in the downtown core almost doubled, and about 75,000 people wereemployed in the office space (Collier, 1978: 159).The importance of this land use is the requirement of large numbers of employees, onan average about 7,000, for every 1 million square feet of office space (Taylor, 1990).Role of the Central Business District of Vancouver.Prior to 1951, most of the major retail outlets in the region had clustered in thecentral business area of Vancouver. In the past, the radial nature of the streetcar lines hadreinforced this pattern of consumers shopping in the downtown area. However, 1950 markedthe advent of the first of the modern automobile-oriented shopping mall, at Park Royal, inWest Vancouver. This foreshadowed, an evolution of shopping activities which would see adecline of region-wide shopping downtown, and an increasing number of shopping malls in thesuburbs. Unlike the downtown shopping areas, the new shopping malls were designed to67accommodate the automobile by supplying large expanses of parking. The motivation for thiswas the large increase in automobile ownership. In 1925 there were 46,336 passenger carsregistered in British Columbia. By 1945 the number stood at 99,421 and this figure rose to341,650 in 1956 (Williamson, 1958: 269). In 1964, the number of vehicles registered in theProvince stood at 571,807 of which 290,941 were registered in the Greater Vancouver Region(Province of British Columbia, 1965: L9). In 1972 there were 906,268 passenger vehiclesregistered in the Province of which 467,148 were registered in the Greater Vancouver Area(Province of British Columbia, 1973a: K7, K10).A study of the Motor-Vehicle registration statistics for the Province of BritishColumbia (see Appendix No. 1), illustrates the change in the origins of registration, with thegreater numbers shifting from the City of Vancouver to the suburbs over the period 1951-1985.The role of the C.B.D. has changed over the past few decades. The C.B.D. stillremains the major employment location in the region, however, since the early 1970's jobgrowth has increasingly been dispersed throughout the region (GVRD, 1989b: 6). There hasbegun a shift of the type of employment in the C.B.D. to increased service and administration,while manufacturing has moved to the suburbs. This shift has resulted in a division of labour,with the white collar workers left to continue in the C.B.D. and the blue collar workerscommuting to jobs in the areas away from the central part of Vancouver. This state of affairsdoes not mean that the importance of the C.B.D. to the economic well-being of the region isdiminished, but that the suburbs are becoming more important in the economic growth of theregion.Population Increase.The massive increase in the region's population resulted in pressure upon theavailable housing stock. Many people sought to locate in the suburbs, where the land was lessexpensive, and since there were few services provided, the taxes were lower. Many of the68residential locations in the suburbs were on city-sized lots scattered amongst larger holdingsor lots that had not been built upon and were left covered with weeds or scrub trees. Thescattering of city-sized lots in a rural or suburban setting has been referred to as urbanSprawl. Three forms of Sprawl have been identified. They are low-density continuousdevelopment, ribbon development, and leapfrog development (Bahl & McGuire, 1977: 248).The Federal Veteran's Land Act (Statutes of Canada  1942-43, Chapter 33)encouraged sprawl, because it would provide assistance only if the parcel of land was over 1.6acres (Lower Mainland Regional Planning Board, 1956b: 10). This legislation resulted in anumber of veterans moving to the suburbs and seeking parcels that would fulfill the Act'srequirements. The Union of British Columbia Municipalities in the late 1950's, expressed theconcern of some of the member municipalities over the impact the minimum size of theholding required had upon the supply of lots of this size, and the associated costs of servicingthese large sized lots (Union of British Columbia Municipalities, 1959: 43). The MunicipalUnion passed a resolution at its 1959 annual convention suggesting "that the U.B.C.M.petition the Federal Government to reduce the size of lots required to the equivalent of theNational Housing Act" (Union of British Columbia Municipalities, 1959: 44). The impact ofthe existing requirement was to begin or increase the extent of suburbanization in thosemunicipalities surrounding the established urban centres.'At the end of the Second World War, the major concentration of commercial andindustry was still the downtown core of Vancouver. There were some minor concentrations ofindustry, mainly sawmilling and fishing (canning and ship building) along the Fraser River.However, most of those veterans who took advantage of the financial assistance availableunder the Veteran's Land Act had to commute from the urban fringe, from Surrey andRichmond, to jobs in the urban core. An example of the impact of the Act can be seen fromthe fact that "homes established by the V.L.A. in Surrey between 1949 and 1954 representabout 42% of the lots occupied in this size range." (Lower Mainland Regional Planning Board,1956b: 10).69The massive influxes of population coupled with the availability of automobiles,encouraged people to settle in the suburbs. Since public transit was not available in most ofthe suburbs and there was not the density of population to support transit service, anautomobile became a necessity. The increased numbers of automobile commuters entering theCity each day soon resulted in traffic congestion along the main routes. The roads and bridgesexisting in 1951 became inadequate to handle the increased traffic. There was a call by thepublic for improved roads, and bridges. In the late 1950's a major Highway Study wasundertaken. At that time, the automobile was widely seem as the key to the future oftransportation. Its flexibility coupled with the fact that it was essential for suburban living,dictated that the old narrow roads and bridges needed to be upgraded. "In the 1950's and1960's a large program was embarked upon to upgrade alignment and pave the rural trunkroad system." (British Columbia Ministry of Highways, 1986: 11).Roadways in the Region.The increasing population and subsequent increase in automobile ownership resultedin congestion upon the exiting and inadequate road system. Due to a lack of funds during the1930's (depression years) and the scarcity of materials during the Second World War (1939-1945), maintenance and improvements to the existing transportation infrastructure weredelayed. In the late 1940's and early 1950's many gravel roads and old, narrow-lane woodenbridges that had long outlived their usefulness were being used to accommodate steadilyincreasing traffic. As the situation worsened, it was decided the existing roads would have tobe improved and new routes constructed to provide better access around the region and to thecentral business district.In the early 1950's the Provincial and Municipal Governments began to assess thetransportation needs of the region. A Metropolitan Highways Committee was set up in 1953,and between 1956 and 1959, it commissioned a number of transportation studies. The studiesrecognized the importance of the relationship between land use and the future transportation70needs of the region. The Provincial Ministry of Highways (now Ministry of Transportationand Highways), embarked on a number of major studies enabling it to allocate its limitedresources to those projects providing the greatest benefit. Major bridge projects were planned,and later constructed during the late 1950's and 1960's.The whole of the Province was in need of improved roads and bridges. The ProvincialGovernment recognized the economic and political desirability of creating a province-widenetwork of modern roads and bridges to encourage the development of the resources of theProvince. "Infrastructure creation provided the motif of the 1950's, making possible the bigdevelopment projects, especially in hydro-electric power, that marked the 1960's." (Barman,1991: 281). There was a pressing need for high capacity express or freeways into the city,but the Provincial Government decided to spread the financial resources around the Provinceinstead of concentrating it in the Lower Mainland (Adam, 1970: 6).During the early years of 1952-55, highways consumed almost a third of thetotal provincial budget (Pendakur, 1972: 54)During the first 6 years of Bennett's tenure more money was spent buildinghighways than in the entire history of the province. (Barman, 1991: 281)W.A.C. Bennett was Premier of British Columbia for the period from 1952 to 1972. It shouldbe noted, however, the political party (at that period, a coalition of provincial Liberals andConservatives) holding power prior to 1952, also spent a large portion of its budget on roads.Byron Johnson, premier of British Columbia from 1947 to 1952, allocated one-third of the1949 provincial budget to road building (Barman, 1991: 272).The local projects completed in the late 1950's were the Oak Street Bridge in 1957, toreplace the old two lane swing bridge at Marpole and allow the increasing population ofRichmond commute to Vancouver more easily; a new Granville Street Bridge (1954) acrossFalse Creek to allow the increased traffic using the Oak Street Bridge easier access to thedowntown core of Vancouver; a new Pitt River Bridge (1957) which, like the Oak StreetBridge, replaced an old wooden bridge; and a new Second Narrows Bridge (1959), which, like71the others, replaced an old low-level railway bridge which had allowed only alternating one-way traffic across the narrows. Within the City of Vancouver many of the major roads werewidened to accommodate increased traffic volumes. There were also a number of local roadprojects allowing increased traffic on the major routes into Vancouver. The Barnet Highway,the Lougheed Highway, Kingsway, and the King George Highway were all improved. In the1960's, the Deas Island Tunnel (Completed in 1962, now called the Massey Tunnel) linkedDelta to Vancouver and extended to the United States Border at Blaine, Washington. ThePort Mann Bridge and the 401 Freeway (1964) served as an alternative route for traffictravelling from Surrey or further up the Fraser Valley, to reach Vancouver; the old GeorgiaViaduct was replaced in 1972 by a new structure designed to be a component of a city-widefreeway system (Pendakur, 1972: 95). In 1974 the Knight Street Bridge was completed toreplace the old wooden Fraser Street Bridge linking the central area of Richmond toVancouver (British Columbia Ministry of Highways, 1986: 45). In 1979 a new Pitt RiverBridge was constructed parallel to the old one in order to reduce the traffic congestionresulting from the increase in population in Pitt Meadows, Maple Ridge, and Mission.During this period the highway and road network in the lower mainland was beingextended and improved. The completed projects included the Upper Levels Highway in NorthVancouver, the 401 Freeway, the 499 freeway to the United States Border, Marine Drive inVancouver and Burnaby, the Lougheed Highway through Burnaby, Coquitlam, and east toMaple Ridge (this included a new parallel bridge over the Coquitlam River). The Mary HillBypass which was suggested in the report of the Technical Committee for MetropolitanTransportation Planning, was constructed to relieve some of the congestion along the sectionof the Lougheed Highway passing through Port Coquitlam. This Bypass allowed the ever-increasing traffic from the communities east of the Pitt River to commute to Vancouver whilehelping reduce the congestion along the study area's roadways.Another attempt to improve access and traffic flow into the study area was a majorreconstruction of the freeway interchange with the Lougheed Highway and Mary Hill Bypass72at the western end of the Port Mann Bridge (Cape Horn Interchange). This removed abottleneck for traffic attempting to access or leave the Freeway from the Lougheed Highway.The Great Freeway Debate in Vancouver.Unlike many of the major North American Cities, Vancouver does not at present(1990) possess freeways or expressways radiating out of the central core to the suburbs. InCanada, Toronto and Montreal, planned and later acquired these modern transportationfeatures in the late 1950's and early 1960's. In the United States, limited access roadways orfreeways were first begun in the 1920's in New York State, and in the 1930's in Los Angelesand other major urban areas. These were planned and built in reaction to the lack of adequateroads existing in the nation at that time. They were seen as a means of allowing easy accessof automobiles into the compact cores of cities.The so-called great debate over Freeways in Vancouver was a lengthy process takingplace between 1952 to 1972, and it would take too long to relate all the events. However, theoutcome of the debate has had far-reaching implications for the present attempts to resolvetransportation congestion. The chronological listing of events and the importance of each hasbeen adequately covered and discussed in a number of articles and publications. There is littleneed to repeat all the detail as a full account can be found in Cities, Citizens and Freeways byDr. V. Setty Pendakur, published in 1972.A brief summary of the events might, however, be in order to emphasis theimportance of the outcome to the transportation planning process which has since that time,tried to find workable solutions to the ongoing and ever-worsening traffic congestion problemsfacing the Greater Vancouver Region.In the 1950's the planners and those in political power saw the need to improve thetransportation infrastructure between the City of Vancouver and the surrounding suburbs. Atthat time it was believed the automobile would solve most personal transportation needs, andto ensure Vancouver would remain the focal point of the region, a system of limited multi-lane73freeways or expressways was required. At that time, the enormous costs involved meant thesenior levels of government would have to be brought into the process.In 1964, the 401 Freeway was completed, bringing traffic up to the eastern boundaryof the City. Those in power wished to extend the freeway into the heart of the City andconnect it to another crossing of Burrard Inlet. The First narrows Bridge (The Lions GateBridge) was too narrow to accommodate the increased traffic load caused by the rapiddevelopment of North Shore communities. There was a great deal of debate over the need foror the location of a third Crossing of Burrard Inlet. In late 1972, the Simon Fraser UniversityGeography Student Union produced a publication entitled Vancouver's Transportation Future containing a number of articles by people or organizations having an opinion on the subject(Geography Student Union, 1972).The suggestion of an east-west freeway across the residential neighbourhoods of theCity brought large numbers of alarmed citizens to public meetings to inform their politiciansthat they did not wish the city and their neighbourhoods bulldozed and carved up byfreeways. The last attempt to construct a cross-city freeway was the building of the newGeorgia Viaduct, which was designed to be a component of the east-west freeway. Many ofthose politicians involved in the discussions and the process were defeated in the subsequentelections, and the citizens of Vancouver made it clear they did not wish freeways within thecity of Vancouver.There had been attempts at various times to plan for a waterfront freeway, but theNational Harbours Board and local citizens opposed this proposal. The importance of the socalled Great Freeway Debate was the clear message it sent to local and provincial politicians;that under no circumstances were the citizens prepared to a accept freeways within the Cityof Vancouver. The result of this was although major multi-lane roadways could be constructedin the suburbs in order to provide easy access for motorists commuting to employment inVancouver, there could be no continuation of these roadways within the City of Vancouver.Thus some other means of resolving the commuter traffic congestion would have to be found.74Transit in the Region.In 1951, the regions' public transportation system was owned by the private BritishColumbia Electric Railway Company. This Company had negotiated a number of agreementswith the local municipalities giving it a monopoly over public transit. From the company'sinception in 1897, it had extended its streetcar and interurban lines throughout the lowermainland. It had the distinction of operating the longest streetcar/tram lines in Canada. Thecompany's original purpose was transportation, and in the early days, it sold its excesselectric power to local customers. However, after 1917, the Company Directors came torealize most of their revenue would be obtained from the generation and sale of electricpower. Due to labour troubles in 1917 and 1918, and the request of the B.C. ElectricCompany for assistance from the Provincial Government to eliminate competition with itstransit operations, there were strong public pressures for a public inquiry. The B.C. ElectricCompany wished to limit the inquiry to its transit operations only "because almost all of thecompany's profits had been earned by the lighting division, the B.C. Electric Railway did notwant any outside agency to investigate lighting rates." (Roy, 1965: 197-198). In 1928 theB.C.E.R. Co. was sold to the Canada Power Corporation. The new owners saw thetransportation component of the company as a liability, but since it at least paid its own way,and provided a small dividend, they would continue to operate it. In the First Annual Reportof the British Columbia Power Corporation, the successor to the old B.C. Electric RailwayCompany, it was noted that "notwithstanding the growth in population, the revenue fromrailway passenger operations, due to the ever-increasing number of private automobiles,shows only a slight increase over last year." (B.C. Power Corporation, 1929: Operations:Railway systems).During the War years, from 1939 to 1945, when fuel was rationed and automobileparts were scarce, many commuters were forced to make use of transit. After the War, thepublic transit lines continued to enjoy high public use until the early 1950's when moreautomobile were available and many new residents sought homes in the suburbs. Due to the75age of the transit fleet, and the lack of maintenance during the depression and War years, theB.C.E.R. embarked upon a modernization program. The old streetcars were replaced bymodern trolley and motor buses.The old, established residential areas of Vancouver and part of Burnaby and NewWestminster were fairly well serviced, but the new suburbs were not. The Company didoperate an interurban bus service to the main centres in the lower mainland; however, thelimited service offered was not convenient for the suburban residents who wished to travel towork.In 1961, the Provincial Government, expropriated The British Columbia ElectricCompany (B.C. Power Corporation, 1961: 3), and created the British Columbia Hydro andPower Authority. The new Company, like the old, was more interested in the generation ofelectric power than in transit, and did little to improve service, though due to politicalconsiderations, it did replace some of the obsolete equipment. In the 1960's the ProvincialGovernment's vision of transportation was focused upon automobiles and freeways. Thefuture was viewed as one of prosperity where all residents would be able to purchaseautomobiles and travel about at their own convenience. However, as the population steadilyincreased and traffic congestion became more evident, planners began to realize public transitwould be a better and less expensive solution to the problem. In 1973 the provincialgovernment created the Bureau of Transit Services within the ministry of municipal affairs(Kelly and Francis, 1990: 94). Its responsibilities were "initially to deal with the GreaterVancouver Regional District and the Capital Regional District in an effect to beef up and addto the present public transit systems" (Province of British Columbia, 1973b: 1666) throughthe direction of the funding and planning of transit (Kelly and Francis, 1990: 94). B.C. Hydrocontinued to operate the money-losing transit function. Later the Urban Metro TransitCommission was created to assist in the planning and operation of Transit in the region.Finally, in 1978, the Urban Transit Authority was created to take control of transit in the76Province and assumed the responsibilities formerly held by the Bureau of Transit Services(Kelly and Francis, 1990: 94)In 1980, the responsibility for the operation of transit was removed from B.C. Hydroand given to the Metro Transit Operating Company (MTOC). MTOC continued in existenceuntil June 1, 1985 when the provincial government expanded the role of B.C. Transit (createdin 1982) to cover transit province wide, and MTOC was merged with this expanded B.C.Transit (Ewert, 1986: 299; Kelly & Francis, 1990: 96).In 1982, the local municipalities were given a role to play in the planning and fundingof transit through the creation of the Greater Vancouver Regional District TransitDepartment also referred to as the Greater Vancouver Transit Department (GreaterVancouver Transit System, 1982a: 1). This delegation of responsibilities, however, did notachieve the desired effect of streamlining transit operations. There were overlappingjurisdictions, and the ultimate decision-making lay with the provincial government and notwith the local authorities. The outcome of this friction between the components was theprovincial government retained control of the operating and capital spending functions, whileassigning the GVRD part of the responsibility for the funding of local transit. In February,1983, the provincial government through an order-in-council removed the transit planningfunction from the GVRD (Gutstein, 1986: 77).In July, 1982, the Urban Transit Authority underwent a name change and becameBritish Columbia Transit, under a Provincial Minister (Province of British Columbia, 1982a:8656). Since 1982, the transit functions have been under the control of B.C. Transit, which isa responsibility of the Ministry of Municipal Affairs.Numerous reports had been commissioned during the 1970's outlining a number ofstrategies that could reduce traffic congestion through the encouragement of transit. Newroutes and the introduction of new technologies were suggested. In the early 1980's LightRapid transit was chosen to provide a fast means of moving large volumes of passengersalong high traffic routes. As a result, construction of SkyTrain (Automated Light Rapid77Transit or ALRT) began in 1982, and became operational in 1986, connecting Vancouver andNew Westminster (Kelly and Francis, 1990: 131). An extension to south of the Fraser Rivercommunities was started in 1986 and became operational in 1990 to Scott Road Station. Afurther extension is presently under construction, and when completed in 1993 will extendALRT service to Whalley.Since the 1970's the cost of providing road capacity for the increasing numbers ofautomobiles flooding the routes and bridges into the C.B.D. has become prohibitive, and themore efficient utilization of transit has been seen as one possible method of reducing theproblem. Attention has been directed towards those forms of public transit that can operateon exclusive roadways or guideways so automobile traffic does not interfere with them.4.5 ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS TO RESOLVE TRAFFIC CONGESTION.There have been a number of alternative solutions proposed by individuals andorganizations studying the urban transportation problem. These solutions have includedtraffic management, ridesharing, private commuter buses, bicycling, staggered work-hours,and teleworking.Traffic Management.One approach to resolving traffic congestion would be to make more efficient use ofthe existing transportation infrastructure. This could be accomplished through a number ofmethods which could include the use of reversible or counter-flow lanes during congestedperiods, designating lanes for bus and high occupancy vehicle use, co-ordinating traffic signallights to ensure a smooth flow of traffic, and control the amount of traffic allowed intocongested areas.The first method involves the use of reverse or counter-flow traffic lanes. Theprogram of reversible or counter-flow lanes involves making use of the excess capacity ofadjacent lanes which would normally be used by traffic moving in the opposite direction. Forexample, if morning traffic on a four lane highway was congested on the two lanes coming78into the Central Business District, while the outgoing traffic was lighter, one of the outgoinglanes could be used to accommodate incoming traffic in the morning. In the evening, when theoutgoing traffic is heavier, then one of the incoming lanes could be reversed. At the end of thepeak use periods, the lanes could be reassigned to their normal traffic directions. There aretwo case at present where reversible lanes are used in the Lower Mainland. In the first case,the Lions Gate Bridge makes use of a reversible lane. This state of affairs is resorted to sincethe Bridge was constructed with only three lanes. The second case involves the GeorgeMassey Tunnel (Deas Island Tunnel) (Province of British Columbia, 1987b: 35). In thissituation there are four lanes, one of which is reversed to accommodate the direction of trafficthat is congested. This program has been in place since 1986.The second method would involve the use of dedicated or high occupancy vehicle lanes.The use of designated lanes for buses and high occupancy vehicles (HOV) is a program thathas been suggested to increase the passenger capacity of some of the major routes in theLower Mainland. The Hastings/Barnet People Moving Project has suggested this program beinstituted to alleviate the present traffic congestion the Hastings/Barnet route has beenexperiencing. The Barnet Highway is to be widened and the additional lanes are to be used forbuses and HOVs. This would allow more people to be moved without dramatically increasingthe numbers of vehicles that have to be accommodated. At present the vehicle occupancy ratefor the G.V.R.D. is 1.3 per vehicle (Seelig & Artibise, 1991: 64). If the vehicle occupancy ratecan be increased through the inducement of the use of a traffic lane with freer flow, or ifpeople could be induced to take transit because it could use the dedicated lane and provide afaster service than the automobile, more people could be moved and better use could be madeof the roadway. In the case of Transit, "Every 50 people diverted to transit mean 38 fewerautomobiles on the road." (Seelig & Artibise, 1991: 64).The third method would involve co-ordinating traffic signals. The program for co-ordinating traffic signals would allow for traffic flow to be uninterrupted along majorcommuter routes during peak periods. It could also allow for more time for the traffic on the79congested roadway to pass through a controlled intersection in respect to the crossingroadway.The fourth method would involve the control of vehicles entering areas duringcongested periods. This could be accomplished through number of methods such as collectingtolls either through a toll-gate or by electronic sensors, and reducing the available parkingspaces on the street and in parking lots. The first program of limiting the number of vehiclesentering congested areas has been initiated in Singapore (Pendakur, 1986: 42). In Hong Kongthere was a plan to institute a program of user pays, with the introduction of electronic roadpricing (Catling & Roth, 1987: 51-55). Both these programs were discussed in Chapter 2, theLiterature Review Section 9, "Solutions Proposed: Administrative Sector."And finally the last means of limiting traffic in congested areas of a city would be tolimit the available parking spaces and/or increase the cost of parking. In limiting parkingspaces, zoning requirements for the number of parking spaces could be lowered for newbuilding construction. Parking on public streets could also be reduced or eliminated withincongested areas. When the demand for parking exceeds the supply, the costs will rise.These four methods of traffic management would serve to slow the necessity ofexpanding the available transportation capacity. Their greatest impact would be felt if theywere used in conjunction with other methods to control traffic congestion.Ridesharing.The first suggestion was ridesharing or carpooling. Studies have shown the rate ofvehicle occupancy has dropped over the last thirty-five years. In 1956 the vehicle occupancyrate was 1.56 people per vehicle (TCMHP, 1958-59b), with the rate dropping to around 1.3persons per vehicle in 1991 (Seelig & Artibise, 1991: 64). An obvious suggestion would be toencourage an increase in the vehicle occupancy rate.The first attempt in Canada by government to initiate a program to encourageridesharing occurred in Vancouver in September 1976. At this time "the federal governmentgave the City of Vancouver $500,000 to launch the country's first computerized car pool"80(Clarke, 1977: 8). The funding was to allow the program to function for two years and it wasanticipated 5,000 car pools moving 20,000 people would be created. A reduction of at leastten per cent in the number of automobiles was anticipated from the program.The method used to begin the program was to initiate a pilot program through seekingthe assistance of five of the firms employing the largest number of people within the City ofVancouver. These firms were, B.C. Telephone, McMillan Bloedel, The Hudson Bay Company,B.0 Hydro, and Continental Insurance Company (The Columbian, November 5, 1976: 2).These five companies employed over 8,000 (The Columbian, July 29, 1976: 2). In September1976, when the main program was begun, the methods used included advertising the carpoolproject on radio, and in the local newspapers.Unfortunately, after 6 months the program was seen as being a failure, as "only2,000 have submitted their names and only slightly more than 200 have joined carpools."(Clarke, 1977: 8).A study was commissioned in 1977 to assess the information gained from theprogram (City of Vancouver, Engineering Department, 1977). In total 59,000 applicationforms were distributed, but only 8,400 were returned, and of these only 2,485 were frompeople actually interested in forming carpools (City of Vancouver, Engineering Department,1977: 83-84). Of those who expressed an interest in forming carpools, "70 per cent ofCommuter Club applicants made no effort to contact anyone on their matchlist. This providesan excellent indication of the lack of interest in or commitment to the carpooling concept evenamong the small percentage of persons that applied to Commuter Club for matchingassistance." (City of Vancouver, Engineering Department, 1977: 90).The result of the exercise was "as of June 1977, a total of 52 pools with 173 poolerswere registered with Commuter Club's parking discount program. 21 of these poolers (or12%) had also been applicants for computer matching" (City of Vancouver, EngineeringDepartment, 1977: 92).81This project, now known as the Commuter Club, is still in operation. There are still anumber of signs posted on the main routes out of the city, which provide a telephone numberfor those interested in carpooling. The telephone number, 872-POOL or 872-7665, connectsthe interested part with the Vancouver Traffic and Engineering Department. The Departmenthas a person in charge of providing information on carpooling and serving as a liaison tointroduce interested parties wishing to form a carpool. Approximately 5 to 10 calls are stillreceived each month from people interested in joining a carpool.To successfully form a carpool there are four factors necessary. These are, thoseindividuals involved, 1) have to leave from the same place, 2) leave at the same time, 3)arrive at the same place, and 4) arrive at the same time. The lesson learned fromVancouver's attempt at organizing carpools has been, governments cannot successfully createthem. The government can, however, provide inducements which encourage the creation ofcarpools. The major inducements involve, controlling the price of parking, and controllingavailable parking spaces in the central core of the city (keeping supply below demand), andoffering a reduced parking rate for carpoolers. The City of Vancouver, can influence theavailability of parking spaces and pricing through the ownership of a number of parking lotswithin the downtown area.In the last few years, several large companies have embarked upon programs toreduce the need to provide or increase the number of parking spaces at their businesslocations. The most successful of these to date has been the B.C. Telephone Company. "Morethan a third of the 3,500 employees at the company's headquarters in Burnaby share rides."(Wilson, 1991a: B-17). The need for the company and the employees to organize carpoolsoriginated from the decision by the company to limit parking when it constructed itsheadquarters building in Burnaby. The idea at the time was employees would make use oftransit. However, most employees found it more convenient to use their automobile and seekparking on the residential streets surrounding the office complex. Complaints from local82residents and pressure from Burnaby Council persuaded B.C. Telephone to embark uponprograms to reduce the usage of private automobiles by employees.Another example of a company encouraging carpooling to avoid the costs of having toprovide additional parking spaces is Canadian Airlines International, whose operations arelocated at the Vancouver International Airport, on Sea Island. The company has 3,500employees and 2,686 parking spaces (Wilson, 1991b: B-16). Instead of providing additionalparking, the company decided to try to reduce parking demand through carpooling and theintroduction of a van pooling program. Van pooling has been encouraged through the companyarranging to lease vans for groups of employees who have the operating expenses deductedfrom their paycheques. One of the inducements to belong to a car or van pool is preferredparking. The company's carpooling co-ordinator noted "The most difficult aspect of setting upa pooling program is the marketing . . . It's hard to get people to change their habits."(Wilson, 1991b: B-16).Between 1976 and 1990, there were periodic suggestions by interested organizationsand individuals that the local governments, the regional districts and the provincialgovernment should actively promote ridesharing. Lip service was given to the benefitspossible from carpooling, but little action by government was initiated until late 1990. In late1990, in response to public concern over the transportation problem, the provincialgovernment proposed the addition of special traffic lanes on highways reserved for transit andvehicles carrying three or more people. The provincial government through B.C. Transitbegan a program to promote transit use or carpooling. The program was titled "Go Green"(District of Burnaby, Transportation Committee, 1991: Appendix A, 37). The Go Greenprogram was created through the co-operation of B.C. Transit, the B.C. Ministry ofTransportation and Highways, Environment Canada (Federal Government agency), and theGreater Vancouver Regional District. It was to provide information to companies orindividuals about the benefits of transit use or carpooling.83The Go Green program initiated the "Transit Options Program" (TOP) to encouragecompanies to promote transit through the subsidization of monthly transit passes or B.C.Transit FareSaver tickets (District of Burnaby, Transportation Committee, 1991: 2). Theprogram is still in the preliminary stages and the final outcome is unknown.Private Commuter Buses.As an alternative to carpooling, some commuters have opted to group together, andcharter a bus. Chartering a bus has financial benefits if enough people can be broughttogether to share the expense. "According to the 1986 family Expenditure Survey conductedby Statistics Canada, Canadians spend on the average $6,100 a year, about $500 per month,for their vehicles." (District of Burnaby, Transportation Committee, 1991: Appendix A, 33).An example of this commuting option would be Cascade Charter Service of Chilliwack,B.C., which "operates several daily commuter buses . . . from Chilliwack to Vancouver"(Farrow, 1990: B-1) a distance of seventy miles one-way. The cost of a trip is $7.45 which isless than the cost of operating an automobile over the same route. The automobile operatingcosts include not only the price of fuel, but price of insurance, maintenance, depreciation, andparking charges if any.Some companies operate shuttle bus service between work centres. An example of thiswould be the B.C. Telephone Company's Shuttle Bus service. This service was initiated toreduce the number of automobiles the company would have to provide its employees tocommute between its numerous outlets (Dist of Burnaby, Manager's Report, 1990). Thecompany, in early 1990, begin to run the Shuttle Bus service to the nearest SkyTrainStations, to encourage employees to commute by transit.Public Institution Initiated Carpooling.Some public institutions, which employ large numbers of people, have sought to reducetheir parking requirements through encouraging carpooling amongst staff. One examplewould be the District of Burnaby which has begun a program to give preferential treatment tothose carpooling. "A total of 15 parking spaces closest to the entrance of municipal hall will be84designated for 'car pools only' " (Burnaby Now, February 24, 1991: 3). Another examplewould be the University of British Columbia Ridesharing Program. The program is designedto match drivers and riders. The program was initiated in an attempt to reduce the number ofvehicles entering the campus. "UBC has over 32,00 daily users. The majority drive alone."(AMS Student Environment Centre, 1991). The AMS (Alma Mater Society) is working withUBC Parking to establish rideshare reserved parking in B-lots (AMS Student EnvironmentCentre, 1991).The actions initiated by Simon Fraser University in the fall of 1991, are a furtherexample of an attempt to promote carpooling. The University introduced a computerizedcarpooling system entitled Rideshare, developed by the B.C. Government and NorthVancouver's STW Communications (Edwards, 1991: 16). A severe shortage of parking spacewas one of the primary reasons the University considered introducing this system. One of theinducements offered to drivers to consider entering the program has been a planned carpoolonly parking area (Edwards, 1991: 16). The computerized Rideshare program has also beenof interest to B.C. Transit, and is to be utilized as part of the GO Green campaign. B.C.Transit intends to introduce the carpooling program at its Scott Road SkyTrain Station,through setting aside a rideshare parking area (Edwards, 1991: 16).Commuting By Bicycle.Another commuting option is the use of bicycles. In the past some individuals havefound this mode of transportation to be most convenient though the practical commutingrange of a bicycle, would limit its effectiveness. There are safety concerns with the use ofbicycles, especially when bicycles have to share the road with automobiles. Despite the safetyconcerns, "in Vancouver over 47,000 trips each weekday are made by bicycles. 85% of theseare for non-recreational purposes, i.e., commuting." (Seelig & Artibise, 1991: 65).Until recently municipalities did not pay much attention to bicycles as a viable modeof commuting. The City of Vancouver has established a Bicycle Advisory Committee to serveas liaison between cycling organizations, and the Engineering Department. In 1988, the85Vancouver Comprehensive Bicycle Plan  was approved by City Council (City of VancouverEngineering Department, 1991: 3). The purpose of the plan was to make the city bicyclefriendly.The University of British Columbia Alma Mater Society has also begun a program ofencouraging commuting by bicycles. "The AMS Society has joined with the City of Vancouverin working to make bicycling commuting a practical reality." (AMS Student EnvironmentCentre, 1991).Staggered Work-Hours.The present road system in the Lower Mainland is at capacity only during the twodaily peak periods, when commuters arrive and depart from their places of employment. Ithas been suggested that staggering the work hours would eliminate part of the traffic loadduring the peak period and thus reduce the level of traffic congestion. Most businesses havefound this suggestion impractical due to the need to operate at the same hours as theircustomers. Public organizations such as some municipal governments have institutedstaggered work-hours as an example of the viability of the scheme. An example would be theCity of Vancouver initiating a four day week for its city hall employees. This program wasinitiated in 1976 at the same time its ridesharing program was introduced (Clarke, 1977: 8).Telework.Teleworking or telecommuting is a fairly recent phenomenon. "Teleworking is part ofa movement in the workplace that has seen an increase in telecommuting, or working out ofthe home and communicating with the office electronically" (Mishima, 1991: D-2). It can alsobe defined as making use of modern communication methods to work without having tocommute to a central office. The British Columbia Telephone Company has launched a pilotprogram to assess the effectiveness of telecommuting as an alternative to employees havingto commute long distances to a central office. Instead, the employees will commute to asatellite office in the suburbs. One of the benefits to the employees is "they have an awful lot86less stress and are more productive" (Mishima, 1991: D-2). This is a result of some of theseemployees not having to face long commutes on crowded roadways.The pilot program, begun in October, 1991, has fifteen employees working in asatellite office in Langley, a Vancouver suburb. The employees communicate "withsupervisors and colleagues in their former offices in Vancouver, Burnaby and NewWestminster by computer, telephone, fax and voice mail." (Mishima, 1991: D-2).B.C. Telephone has enlisted the assistance of Bentall Development Inc., in locatingsuitable suburban office space to lease. The Bentall Company through subsidiaries constructs,and sells or leases commercial buildings and has taken a great interest in the project. "If it isdeemed a success, Bentall Development . . . will consider setting up satellites that could beused by a cluster of companies" (Gibb-Clark, 1991: B-4).There has also been an increasing numbers of people who due to the nature of theiremployment, are able to work out of their homes. Like those who commute to a satellite officein the suburbs, some of these people are able to make use of the technical advances made intelecommunications to avoid commuting to a central office. The Home Business Network, aToronto based organization with 1,200 members, "estimates that more than a million peoplein Canada work out of their homes." (Kines, 1989: B-5), and market studies have indicated"by the year 2000, four out of ten Canadians will be working out of the home." (Kines, 1989:B-5).These alternatives to commuting by automobile or make better use of the existingtransportation infrastructure are means which could have an impact upon traffic congestion.Some are more readily acceptable to the commuting public while others have limitedapplicability. These options have been discussed in the past, but only recently have theyactually been seriously considered.874.6 THE REGIONAL SITUATION, 1981 TO 1990.The last decade has seen major development in all the Greater Vancouver Regionsuburbs. There has been accelerated immigration of people from other parts of Canada andfrom abroad. The economy while registering little or no growth in the first few years of thedecade, rallied and served to attract large numbers of people to the Lower Mainland.There have been attempts within the older residential areas of Vancouver to allowincreased density. This would entail the rezoning of single family residential areas to allow formulti family units. In many parts of the City, residents have sought to preserve theirneighbourhoods from the changes this would bring about. There have been discussions as towhat impacts this might have on the future prospects for the City to continue to grow andprovide accommodation for people who might wish to reside there (Sarti, 1990: B-3).With the inner residential areas unable to accommodate large numbers of additionalresidents, pressure has been exerted upon suitable under-utilized commercial and industriallands within the City. As more industry is forced by high land values and increasing taxes torelocate to the suburbs, the C.B.D. has become a major focus for office building. In 1990,there was in excess of 22 million square feet of office space, with enough land presently zonedto build another 30 million square feet (Taylor,1990).The movement of blue collar jobs to the suburbs has been replaced by an influx ofwhite collar jobs. The transportation needs and expectations of these two classes are quitedifferent. The white collar executive has more money, and a more demanding schedule oftenrequiring the use of an automobile, while a blue collar workers usually works set hours, andhas a predictable travel routine.The concerns of the local communities and the GVRD have been to preserve andenhance the quality of life in the region. In a series of public meetings and workshops held inlate 1989 and early 1990, the people of the region were asked, what they perceived were thelimitations to livability in the region. The main points mentioned were concerned withaccessibility and the need for better co-ordination of different modes of transportation.884.7 INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS.A Lack of Governmental Co-operation.A major handicap in the resolution of the problem of traffic congestion in the LowerMainland is the result of a lack of co-operation and co-ordination of activities between thoselevels of governments and the departments having jurisdiction over land use andtransportation planning. When major land use and transportation planning issues areconsidered in a fragmented manner without adequate concern being given to the potentialnegative impacts on other factors, it becomes apparent the problem of traffic congestioncannot be adequately addressed.As discussed in the Literature review, Chapter 2 section 8, under "Sources ofAuthority and Jurisdiction," there are three levels of government having decision makingpowers over various aspects of land use and transportation in this province. The three levelsare the federal, provincial, and municipal governments. Both the federal and provincialgovernments have paramount powers over prescribed areas of service, while the municipalgovernments derive their powers from those functions delegated to them from the provincialgovernments.There has been a recognition by various federal and provincial ministers of the need toco-ordinate activities in land use and transportation planning, to produce better results. Mostof the attempts at co-ordination have been between the provincial and municipal levels ofgovernment. In the case of the federal government, there have been from time to timeattempts to establish some means of co-ordinating efforts with provincial governments, butthe results have not been all that successful to the present.In the case of the provincial government and the municipalities, the municipalitieshave had to often pressure a reluctant provincial government to allow for a mechanism tofacilitate co-ordination, though on occasions the provincial government has had to impose a co-operative mechanism upon reluctant municipalities.89The creation of regional districts was one effort by the provincial government toestablish a mechanism for co-operation and co-ordination between local municipalities and toan extent the provincial government. The provincial government through its Minister ofMunicipal Affairs, created the regional districts in 1965, to facilitate better co-operationbetween member municipalities in a region as well as co-operation between the districts andministries of the provincial government. One of the difficulties experienced in theencouragement of regional co-operation has been some of the municipalities "fear of losinglocal autonomy." (Hrushowy, 1971: 16).Dan Campbell, Municipal Affairs Minister in 1971 and the driving force behind thecreation of the regional districts, had tried to encourage government departments and theregional districts to co-ordinate their efforts to reduce duplication. However, both thedepartments and the districts "viewed this policy with some suspicion and resentment"(Hrushowy, 1971: 16). Campbell noted:To get this arrangement to work requires co-ordination--and "co-ordination isnot just a word."All the problems of compartmentalized government had to be shakenup. All the problems of compartmentalizated decision-making had to bestopped.It has been expressed that there is an attitude of them verses us--theprovincial government verses the regional districts. Nothing can be furtherfrom the truth. (Hrushowy, 1971: 16).There were others who possessed a different view of the situation. "Some regional districtrepresentatives say the difficulty in dealing with various government departments, especiallylands, is a struggle between Campbell and other cabinet ministers." (Hrushowy, 1971: 16).In the case of the federal government, Barney Danson the federal Minister of UrbanAffairs in 1975, noted the need to better co-ordinate activities between different levels ofgovernment. During the opening ceremonies of the Arthur Laing Bridge, which linked theAirport on Sea Island to Vancouver, Mr. Danson said the bridge which was designed to servethe airport, did "little to relieve commuter traffic from the suburbs" (The Columbian, August29, 1975: 25), was a mistake that would not be made again. "The bridge was planned and90financed by the federal Ministry of Transport." (The Columbian, August 29, 1975: 25). TheMinistry of Transport had its own agenda, and the design of the bridge fulfilled its needs withlittle if any thought being given to the possible needs of adjacent municipalities.Mr. Danson noted:the bridge "illustrates the need for co-operation" between different levels ofgovernment and different federal departments which his department is tryingto foster. . . . he described a "tri-level" planning process instituted by hisdepartment in which federal, provincial and municipal leaders meet to debateprojects while they are still in the discussion stage. (The Columbian, August29, 1975: 25).Despite the planning process described by the Minister of Urban Affairs, the problem of alack of co-ordination and co-operation between departments and levels of governments stillexists.On the municipal level, a strong suspicion exists concerning the motives of theprovincial government attempts to co-ordinate local efforts on matters of a regional naturethrough the introduction of regional districts. The mayor of Port Moody in 1976, Mr. NormPatterson, attacked the Greater Vancouver Regional District by describing "the organizationas a "monolithic monster feeding on its own bureaucracy." It has become a fourth level ofgovernment, he said, taking over many of the functions of the municipality. This is inviolation of its intended purpose of co-ordinating agencies between the municipalities" (TheColumbian, January 6, 1976: 2).The regional districts function of co-ordinating planning and action on regionalconcerns, on occasions pitted feuding municipalities against each other. The case of thelocating of a regional town centre in the North East Sector is an example of one of theweaknesses that exist within the organization of the GVRD. Both Coquitlam and PortCoquitlam wanted the regional town centre to be located within their boundaries, since thiswould serve as a springboard for further developments. The GVRD could not reach a decision,so Coquitlam resolved the matter by ignoring the concerns of the regional district andproceeding with plans of its own.91There were other weaknesses noted with the regional districts. The provincialgovernment can add to or delete the functions the regional districts can control. In the case ofthe GVRD, transportation, which has far reaching regional impacts is not one of the functionsit has control over. In fact, there is no one organization exercising control over all facets oftransportation. In 1977 it was noted:Greater Vancouver is the only metropolitan region in the country without aregional transportation planning and operating authority. Instead,responsibility--if you can call it that--is scattered amongst 13 municipalities,three provincial government ministries and three public transportationagencies. Co-ordinated planning on roads, existing transit lines and thedesperately needed rapid transit is sadly inadequate. (The Vancouver Sun,October 18, 1977: A-4).Today the situation has changed somewhat, with the three public transportation agencieshaving been replaced by one agency, B.C. Transit, but the rest of the situation as outlined bythe 1977 newspaper articles still exists at present.The examples provided illustrate the difficulties facing planners and politicians inattempting to resolve problems composed of factors coming under a number of jurisdictions.4.8 CONCLUSIONS.The North East Sector has experienced the sort of land use and transportationdevelopment which could be expected in a formerly rural area undergoing suburbanization. Itsdevelopment prior to 1950 was limited to resource extraction, and agricultural pursuits.Developments after 1950, paralleled those of the other rural areas of the region surroundingVancouver, which were experiencing low density, automobile oriented residentialdevelopment.The region as a whole faced a series of problems stemming from a rapid increase inpopulation and the availability of inexpensive automobiles. Traffic congestion which began totrouble the region as a whole, was more severe in the study area due to geological andgeographical imposed limitations, as well as a lack of early plans creating an arterial road92network. Richmond for example had a grid system of main roads placed a mile apart bysurveyors dividing the land for agricultural use.Solutions to resolve traffic congestion involved more and improved roads and bridges,provision or improvement of existing transit service to the suburbs, as well as the introductionof alternative transportation solutions to make better use of the existing transportationinfrastructure.A major influence upon the continuation of traffic congestion was identified as a lackof co-operation and co-ordination of the governmental agencies responsible for land use andtransportation planning.93CHAPTER 5 The North East Sector.5.1 INTRODUCTION.This chapter will deal specifically with the North East Sector and provide an in-depthlook at the factors contributing to the traffic problems facing the study area. It will discussthe commercial, industrial and residential developments, and major land use projectsimpacting the study area. It will also cover some of the concerns that local officials haverelating to the perceived traffic problems in the study area and its surroundings.5.2 THE PERIOD 1951 TO 1980.When the period began, there were only 22,545 people in the North East Sector. Atthe end of the period, the population of the sector was 103,529 (Statistics Canada, 1981).This tremendous growth paralleled the growth other suburbs experienced.During this period, there were some improvements to the transportationinfrastructure, but these did not keep pace with the demands created by the increasedpopulation. The topographic and geological limitations of the study area were expensive tomodify to improve the roads in the region. The Provincial Highways Department during the1950's was charged with improving a province wide transportation network that had beenneglected for many years. Its first priorities were the needs of those areas where thetransportation problems appeared to be more pressing. The result of this policy was the studyarea received enough improvement to solve the then problems but never enough to ensurefuture needs would be addressed. Another part of this policy was to direct a large part of theavailable road building funds to the interior of the province to develop the resources, and thusimprove the economic well-being of the citizens of the province as a whole (McGeer, 1971:187).94To comprehend the changes in land use in the study area, and the impact thesechanges had on transportation, it would be beneficial to view these factors separately forcommercial, industrial, and residential development.5.2.1 Industry.In the 1950's there was a movement of heavy industry into the study area. A steelrolling mill was built in Port Moody to supply the local and Prairie markets with steel tubing.In Port Coquitlam, in 1955, a tungsten smelter was established by Kennametal Ltd (GreaterVancouver Metropolitan Industrial Development Commission, 1956: 39), and in 1957, aspecialty metal foundry (Esco) (District of Coquitlam, 1990a: 118) was established for themanufacturing of manganese steel castings. These industries located in the North East Sectorbecause of the availability of railway transportation.In the early 1970's, a number of the trucking and warehousing firms located in thecentral industrial areas of Vancouver began to seek alternate sites as redevelopment projectswere beginning to cause an increase in the value of the land.The Canadian Pacific Railway (C.P.R.) was one of the major owners of industriallands around the centre of Vancouver. Many of its tenants were involved in businesses thatcomplimented railway activities. The businesses included warehousing, trucking and/or thetransferring of materials brought in by the railway or by ocean shipping utilizing the wharfsadjacent to the Railway's property.The C.P.R., not wishing to loose the business generated by its tenants, commissionedits real estate arm, Marathon Realty, to develop lands served by the C.P.R. in Coquitlam, toreplace the lands being redeveloped in Vancouver. The new lands, the Mayfair IndustrialPark, had the advantage of being located adjacent to the Trans Canada Highway (401), theLougheed Highway, and next to the Fraser River for barge access. Situated on the fringe ofthe urbanizing area, Mayfair Industrial Park allowed easy access to other industries that hadlocated in the suburbs.95An example of the benefit trucking companies enjoyed by moving to the North EastSector from Vancouver can be illustrated by a comment Port Coquitlam Mayor George Lakingmade concerning the Howell Trucking Company that in 1981 had relocated from Vancouverto Port Coquitlam. "Howell has informed me that they have cut 24 hours off delivery sincethey moved here." (Sanderson, 1981: 77).The C.P.R. encouraged those businesses dependent upon its services, to move to theNorth East Sector through locating its extensive trucking and intermodal business in thearea. This encouraged shipping container loading/unloading, repair and storage facilities torelocate from the City of Vancouver.The composition of the commercial and industrial businesses in the North East Sectorchanged over the period between 1951 and 1980. The business emphasis changed fromlogging, and sawmilling, to warehousing, transfer (trucking), light and heavy manufacturingwhich would include steel fabrication, foundries, cabinet making and so forth. As thepopulation and the number of industrial concerns increased, the number and extent ofcommercial operations and services also increased. The number of concerns locating in theNorth East Sector prior to 1980 steadily increased but not to the same extent as the increasesin Southern Vancouver, Richmond or Burnaby.5.2.2 Extractive Industries.The logging industry began to decline in the early 1950's, while the sand and gravelexcavating industry began to expand. Extensive sand and gravel operations were begun orexpanded in the region along the Coquitlam River above the Lougheed Highway Bridge. Themassive expansion of roads, water and sewerage lines, and the construction of bridges,modern concrete office buildings and concrete foundations for new residential buildings createda great demand for sand and gravel, and the older operations with access to watertransportation were unable to meet the increased demands. This increased demand madeoperations dependent upon trucking economically viable. This shift to road transportation96placed pressure upon the existing road network. The traffic created by the heavily loadedtrucks not only intensified congestion, but also aggravated maintenance problems. In 1976 onPinetree Way, the main route from the gravel extraction area, it was estimated that "Graveltrucks now number some 1,300 in one direction on Pinetree Way or 65% of the total 2,000vehicles." (District of Coquitlam Planning Department, 1976: 62).5.2.3 Residential Development.Residential development in the early 1950's took place mainly around thesouthwestern part of Coquitlam and around the fringes of the urbanized areas of PortCoquitlam. In addition there was a scattering of houses constructed throughout the studyarea. In the southwest region of Coquitlam, the process involved the infilling of vacant lotsrezoned during the economic boom years prior to World War I. As with Surrey and Richmond,the Veteran's Land Act had an impact on settlement, which saw a number of parcels as smallas 1.6 acres being developed (Lower Mainland Regional Planning Board [LMRPB], 1961: 11-12). Coquitlam and to a lesser extent Port Coquitlam experienced the problem of urbansprawl. The type of sprawl experienced was a leapfrogging of developments which left amixture of densities from small urban sized lots to large vacant rural parcels.The spread of development in Coquitlam can be seen in Map 5-1 and Map 5-2 whichcompares residential density between the years 1955 and 1961.Dwelling units per raw acre.f---1 o - .1 Rural.1 - 1.0 SprawlEli 1.0 - 4.0 Suburbar0 1 2Miles1955NN0 1 2how"^-.1MilesDwelling units per raw acre.I 0 - .1 Ruralk\-741 .1 - 1.0 Sprawlmg 1.0 - 4.0 Suburban1961Map 5-1 Residential Density in Coquitlam, 1955.Residential DensitySource: Lower Mainland Regional Planning Board. Planning for Coquitlam NewWestminster, B.C.: 1961. Page 22.Map 5-2 Residential Density in Coquitlam, 1961.Residential DensitySource: Lower Mainland Regional Planning Board. Planning for Coquitlam NewWestminster, B.C.: 1961. Page 22.Land development in the District has not been orderly. The southern half ofthe municipality is only 40 percent developed with- 6200 dwellings dispersedover an area of some nine square miles. The overall density of thisdevelopment is 6 persons per acre to be compared with a possible 14 personsper acre. (Lower Mainland Regional Planning Board, 1961: 21)9798Much early residential construction involved individuals building single units. However, as thedemand for housing increased, a number of large companies purchased extensive tracts ofland and began construction of large numbers of single family houses.By 1975 it was recognized that "the GVRD North East Sector is a dormitory suburb,with only one local job for every two workers." (Dunhill Development Corporation Ltd.,1975a: 19). In the 1960's there were an increasing number of housing developments withinPort Coquitlam and the southwest sector of Coquitlam. The tempo of development continuedto increase in the 1970's as large areas along the Coquitlam River were opened for residentialdevelopment.In the late 1970's much of the development became focussed around Coquitlam Centreand Lougheed Mall. The Lougheed Mall area also began to experience redevelopment as theolder single family housing was replaced with apartment units. It was during the 1970's theavailability of developable lands in the North East Sector began to attract the attention ofdevelopers and home seekers. The potential of the area to accommodate increased density ofland use resulted in a number of studies being undertaken, with several large governmentsponsored projects being proposed. The largest of these were the Burke Mountain Project, andthe Coquitlam Community Project (Riverview Heights).In Port Moody, in 1966, the LMRPB was commissioned to study the existing land useand formulate a Master Plan for the orderly development of the City. "The Master Planprovides long term land use objectives to proceed towards employing various planning tools."(LMRPB, 1966a: 1). The study presented a number of concepts to guide the City Council informulating appropriate policies to direct future land use.In Port Moody, in 1971, a proposal was put forward to develop 1,000 acres on thenorth shore of the City for housing (The Vancouver Sun, November 24, 1971: 23). In 1973,development was considered a top issue as the Council unveiled a proposal that would take 10to 30 years to complete resulting in a doubling of the population of the City (The Vancouver • 0•/Z99Sun, November 8, 1973: 18) to about 34,000 people. Map 5-3 illustrates the location of theseprojects.Map 5-3 North East Sector proposed developments.Source: Urban Transit Authority. On Track for the 80's Vancouver, B.C.: May, 1981.Exhibit 2.1 "The Service Corridor in the Context of the Lower Mainland." Located betweenpages 11 and 12.100The Burke Mountain Project.There was a shortage of rental and low-cost housing in the Lower Mainland duringthe early 1970's. In response to this shortage the provincial government, decided to makeavailable undeveloped crown-own lands for rental and low-cost housing. The governmentassessed the available vacant crown-owned lands located on the fringes of the urban area andfound several suitable sites within the North East Sector. One of the locations was an area ofCoquitlam immediately north of the City of Port Coquitlam on the southern slope of BurkeMountain. The rationale for selecting this parcel of land for development was linked to thedecision to create regional town centres to reduce development pressures upon the C.B.D."The intention is to siphon off some Vancouver downtown growth pressure and work towardsself-sufficiency for the Coquitlam area." (Dunhill Development Corporation Ltd., 1974: 3).There has been a suggestion that another reason for choosing the North East Sector as thelocation for this project might have been that it was within the home riding of the Premier ofthe province for the period 1972 to 1975.A large part of the proposed development site was moderately to fairly steepmountain side (Dunhill Development Corporation Ltd., 1975b: Soils). The existing land usewas small hobby farms and vacant brush covered land. The intended land use was highdensity residential through the creation of an community of 80,000 to 100,000 residents. Theproject was initially envisioned to contain up to 20,000 housing units on 4,000 acres of landand to be constructed within 10 years (Oberfeld, 1975a: 33). Due to the topographicallimitations of the site, the proposed housing would take the form of high density clusters ofapartment buildings and townhouses surrounded by large areas left in their natural state.The provincial Minister of Housing said the development "would consist of high-densitycondominiums and exclusive homes." (Odam, 1975: 6). The intention was to integrate theproject into the surrounding metropolitan region. "We do not envisage Burke Mountain as adormitory suburb languishing on the eastern extremity of the transit connection." (DunhillDevelopment Corporation Ltd., 1975a: 5). The Government's concept for the project was to101have it form the residential component of a satellite regional town centre that would supply alarge component of the commercial and retail needs of the residents. Employmentopportunities were seen as being available through the future development of large vacantareas located along the floodplain of the Fraser River, stretching from New Westminster toPort Coquitlam. This potential industrial land was beginning to be developed to accommodatebusinesses leaving the central industrial areas of Vancouver. "Most of the residents will lookto the as yet undefined regional town centre as their commercial focus, and southwesterly fortheir jobs." (Dunhill Development Corporation Ltd., 1975a: 5).The Burke Mountain Project was to create a large residential community on lands notsuitable for agriculture, and to focus development in the North East Sector to create a viablesatellite community on the fringe of the metropolitan area, had been politically initiated andencouraged. In the elections of December 1975, the ruling party was defeated. The partygaining power had a different philosophy and instead of using government power to initiatedevelopment, they preferred to leave development to the private sector. As a result the BurkeMountain Project was cancelled.The cancellation of the project did not mean there were no benefits for the North EastSector from the planning process. The transportation problems that had hindereddevelopment over the years were brought to the attention of those in power, and some of thedeficiencies had been resolved. The awareness of the consequences of a lack of transit in thestudy area resulted in the introduction of bus routes making the residents not so completelydependent upon automobiles.Another more far reaching result was the research into the impacts this developmentwould have upon the existing transportation routes and the need for other forms oftransportation, besides buses and automobiles. The idea of constructing Light Rapid Transit(LRT) lines (Dunhill Development Corporation Ltd., 1975a: 40) and utilizing Commuter Rail(Dunhill Development Corporation Ltd., 1975a: 47) were put forth as viable options to solvecommuter traffic congestion. The option of Commuter Rail service to the study area was102considered so viable that it was felt the option could be operational by 1976 (DunhillDevelopment Corporation Ltd., 1974: 3).Coquitlam Community Project.While the Provincial Government was promoting the Burke Mountain Project, it wasalso considering a smaller project on crown-owned land in Coquitlam. This project, called theCoquitlam Community Project, was situated upon part of the 1,000 acre Mental HealthHospital lands (Dunhill Development Corporation Ltd., 1975c: background). The statedpurpose of the project was "to provide moderately-priced, family oriented housing." (DunhillDevelopment Corporation Ltd., 1975c: Development Objectives). The first component of thisproject was to accommodate about 7,600 people in 2,000 units on 314 acres of land. It wasrecognized that this type of land use would have a considerable impact upon the existingtransportation infrastructure. The transportation impacts were expected to be resolvedthrough the encouragement of the use of transit. Buses were to be routed on an exclusiveright-of-way, focussing on the Lougheed Mall as well as the proposed regional town centre tothe north east (Dunhill Development Corporation Ltd., 1975c: Transportation).Like the Burke Mountain Project, this one was cancelled when the change ofgovernment occurred in late 1975. However, unlike the Burke Mountain Project, this one wasrevived some years later, but with the private sector in control.5.2.4 Town Centre Controversy.Between the early 1950's and the late 1960's, the Regional Planning Board, in majorregion wide studies, suggested development should be directed away from the core ofVancouver to a number of regional centre in the suburbs (1952 report and 1966 report).Initially four centres were proposed, in Burnaby, in Surrey, New Westminster and the lastone somewhere in the North East Sector. There was controversy between Coquitlam and PortCoquitlam over the location of this town centre (The Province, January 10, 1975: 8). The103Mayor of Port Coquitlam suggested since the City of Port Coquitlam was already anestablished urban centre with the necessary infrastructure, it should be the location of thenew town centre. The Mayor of Coquitlam, realizing the importance of this project to thedevelopment of the largely undeveloped forest lands in the central part of Coquitlam, wantedthe town centre located within his municipality. The Greater Vancouver Regional Districtmembers could not reach a consensus on the best location, so in 1976, the Mayor ofCoquitlam decided Coquitlam would create its own town centre in an area just to the north-west of Port Coquitlam (Oberfeld, 1976: 15). A large developer, Ira Young and Associates,proposed a large shopping centre at Sharpe Street (now Lougheed) and Barnet Highway. Theproject was initially called the East Gate Project then later Coquitlam Centre Shopping Mall(Urban Programme Planners, 1969). The project was first presented to Coquitlam Council in1972, but was blocked by the then Provincial Government (The Vancouver Sun, May 27,1977: 40). This was due to a number of concerns, both political and physical, including theneed for massive and expensive building and reconstructing of the road systems in the area.The project was not begun until 1977 and was completed in May 15, 1979 (The Province,May 27, 1977: 17). The competition between the municipalities was an attempt to ensurethat the Town Centre would be located within their respective boundaries. "At stake iscreation of a regional town centre in either Coquitlam or . Port Coquitlam. Both municipalitieswant a shopping centre as an anchor for such a centre." (Coffin, 1976: 23). Once the shoppingcentre was completed, there was a series of development applications to take advantage of itsdrawing power. Mayor Tonn of Coquitlam described the completion of the Mall as:the most exciting development in Coquitlam's history and the start of the over-all town centre that will cover about 1,000 acres. . . . Other developmentsadjacent to the centre will be built. We'll see a new provincial court-house, amajor hotel, a new municipal hall, and there will be office structures, culturalfacilities, more commercial buildings, a school, a new 19 acre Douglas Collegecampus in time to come. (The Province, August 14, 1979: E-7)104As the population increased in the area around the new Centre, more businesses locatedadjacent to the site. This in turn attracted developers who wished to construct high densityapartments and condominiums in close proximity to the commercial/retail centre.5.3 THE PERIOD 1981 TO 1990.This period began when the economy was experiencing a downturn. The effects of thisdownturn lasted well into the middle of the decade and either delayed or caused some projectsto be cancelled. However, after the middle of the decade, an improving economy coupled witha large increase in the numbers of people moving to the Province from other parts of Canadaand over-seas caused a housing shortage. This in turn resulted in an increase indevelopmental pressures on suburban municipalities. The supply of subdividable residentialand industrial lands in other municipalities began to be depleted. This caused areas possessingsome limiting factors, to become economically viable as alternate locations for development.The North East Sector communities, containing large blocks of undeveloped lands, began tofeel pressure from developers. The increase in land development proposals accentuated thetransportation inadequacies of the study area.The following sections discuss residential, and commercial/industrial developments inthe decade of the 1980's.Residential Development.The existence of large undeveloped blocks of land in the North East Sector became thefocal point of large numbers of development proposals as the need for additional housingstocks increased.In Port Coquitlam, the northern portions of the City were developing with newhousing while in the area adjacent to the commercial centre around Coast Meridian Road andPrairie Road, higher density housing began to replace the older single family dwellings. In theearly 1980's the undeveloped lands on Mary Hill were rezoned and several large housing105developments were approved. The Citadel Hill Project involved the building of high qualitysingle family housing and was expected to take eight or more years to complete.In the late 1980's, the older single family housing in the areas closest to the oldcommercial centre of Port Coquitlam, began to be replaced by three floor apartment andcondominium complexes (The Sunday Magazine, March 25, 1990: M-22).In Port Moody, the development of the north shore of the City was moving ahead. TheEagle Ridge Development on the border with Coquitlam, was rapidly advanced with theconstruction of numerous single family and town house units. The location of a regionalhospital (Eagle Ridge Hospital) also served as a stimulus to further development. With thegood economic climate for the Province in the late 1980's, a large area of the north shore,called Heritage Mountain, was rezoned for housing. Map 5-4 illustrates the location of thesehousing projects.Burke liountainEagle RidgeBarnetHighwayPrairie RoadWestwood Plateau106Map 5-4 Location of residential developments, 1980 to 1990.Source: Base Map, Urban Transit Authority. On Track for the 80's Vancouver, B.C.: May,1981. Exhibit 2.2 "Proposed Residential Development Areas." Map located between pages11 and 12.The whole North East Sector was experiencing rapid development during the late1980's. As land prices steadily rose, some developers proposed increasing the allowabledensity to permit the construct of high rise towers with adjacent commercial/retail and officespace. In early 1990 in Port Moody, two projects were proposed. They were the Port MoodyNew Town Centre by Bosa Construction, and the Seaside Village by Kerkoff Construction.These proposals would see a series of towers, up to 28 stories in height constructed in (Hirvo,1990: 4) the eastern part of the City. The Projects have also been referred to locally as the"New Wave" proposals. The Bosa Project called for 800 units on 13 acres with 270,000square feet of commercial space, and the Kerkoff Project suggested 1,300 housing units on 22acres with commercial/retail space and several office towers (Diamond, 1990: 4). The two107proposals were presented at an open Council Meeting on April 2, 1990, (City of Port Moody,1990) with an estimated 320 citizens present. One of the main criticisms of the projects wasthe apparent unrealistic traffic impact assessments. In an earlier Council presentation, theprojects' traffic studies suggested there would be little if any traffic impacts in the earlyphases, and by the time the projects were completed, SkyTrain and road improvements wouldbe in place (Bryce, 1990a: 9). There were those residents who expressed the view thatproposals such as Bosa's and Kerkoff s belonged in Vancouver or a large urban area, not in alow density still relatively suburban area such as Port Moody.In spite of the concerns of residents, Port Moody Council approved the two projects inSeptember, 1990, though the Kerkoff proposal had to be scaled down to 22 stories in height.There was also a reference to the Port Moody New Town Centre, including these projects,having accessibility to SkyTrain (The Burnaby & New Westminster News, September 30,1990: 14).In Coquitlam, as with other municipalities in the early 1980's, began to feel increaseddevelopmental pressures. In response to these pressures, Coquitlam divided its area into fourdistinctive sectors. Each of these four sectors possessed different terrain features which wouldinfluence their developmental possibilities. Coquitlam then began a process to create to createOfficial Community Plans with each area receiving its own Official Community Plan. TheFour sectors and the dates the Plans were adopted are , Northeast Coquitlam in 1986(District of Coquitlam, 1986), Northwest Coquitlam in 1987 (District of Coquitlam, 1987),Southwest Coquitlam in 1988 (District of Coquitlam, 1988a), and Southwest Coquitlam--TownCentre in 1988 (District of Coquitlam, 1988b).In the 1980's, a number of large projects were considered for Coquitlam. In the areaeast and north of Coquitlam Centre, large tracts of housing were constructed in CanyonSprings and on the lands adjacent to the Coquitlam River. In the areas closest to CoquitlamCentre, apartment buildings were constructed. In the areas adjacent to Lougheed Mall, thethree floor apartment buildings constructed in the late 1960's and early 1970's were now108beginning to be replaced by high rises. In early 1990 the first of three 21 story high rises wasnearing completion (Rebalski, 1990: E7).The largest proposed project to be suggested in 1990 involved the redevelopment of alarge tract of Provincially owned land on the Westwood Plateau. In 1989, the 1,100 acre sitewas sold to a private company, which then indicated to Coquitlam Council they wished todevelop up to 5,000 housing units over a five to eight year period. The first phase was toinvolve 1,200 units and the proposal came before Council in March, 1990 (District ofCoquitlam, 1990b).In keeping with the desire of Coquitlam Council for increased development ofCoquitlam Centre as the Regional Town Centre for the North East Sector, there are plans forthe relocation of the Municipal Hall, to a site just north of the Centre. Adjacent to the newMunicipal Hall there would be a new Public Safety Building, the possibility of a new CourtHouse to replace the overcrowded facilities now located in Port Coquitlam, a new communitycentre and library complex, a recreational complex, and an arts centre ("Choosing OurFuture" Public Meeting at GVRD North East Sector Livable Regions Plan Update,information display board, March 29,1990). There are developers who have proposed theconstruction of large apartment/condominium complexes in conjunction with the new CivicCentre.Residential Developmental Impacts on Transportation.The impacts the residential developments and the accompanying increases inpopulation would have upon the transportation infrastructure were known to the politicians ofthe study area. In 1976, the Mayor of Port Moody, Norm Patterson said in response to theGVRD's Livable Region population target figure for Port Moody, which envisioned a doublingof the City's population, "transportation is a key link to growing areas." (The Progress, June10, 1976). At this time, there was increasing traffic congestion being experienced by the area.The politicians were feeling pressure from residents who wanted the problem resolved.109In 1983, Les Garrison, a Coquitlam Alderman noted "The Coquitlam, Port Moody,Port Coquitlam, Maple Ridge, and Pitt Meadows areas are the key for housing development inthe next 10 to 15 years. . . . but there's no way you can develop that kind of housing withoutproviding transportation for it." (Fitton, 1983: A-3). Garrison also added "Port Moody isalready having difficulties handling morning and evening commuter traffic on the BarnetHighway. If something isn't done soon, it's going to be chaos." (Fitton, 1983: A-3).In a 1988 newspaper article, the premier of the province described the Coquitlam areaas being "one of the fastest growth areas in the lower mainland" (Smith & Bryson, 1988),and the Provincial Transportation Strategy, a review of the transportation needs of theprovince, would identify needed changes to the transportation infrastructure for the area"before traffic begins to choke on itself." (Smith & Bryson, 1988).The concern of some local politicians for the impacts of increased residentialdevelopments on the existing transportation infrastructure is reflected in a vote taken in thePort Coquitlam Council in February, 1991. The vote allowed a proposal to build 317apartments near the Pitt River Road to proceed to public hearing. "Alderman Mike Thompsonargued vigorously against the proposal, saying it will compound existing traffic gridlock."(Ross, 1991: 3).From the few examples given, it becomes apparent the politicians were aware of theimplications additional development of residential and industrial projects would have uponcreating additional traffic. The existing traffic situation was already perceived to becongested, and the political leaders believed there was need to increase the capacity of thetransportation infrastructure to accommodate the increase in traffic the projected landdevelopments create.Commercial and Industrial Development.In the decade of the 1980's, there had been a substantial increase in the number ofbusinesses locating in the North East Sector. There had also been expansions of the size of^••••• • •• •• ••••Ioco Oil Refinery••• CoquitlarnCentre Mall••DominionIndustrial Reserve•LougheedMallAustin/Blue MountainMary HillIndustrial ParkMayfairIndustrialParkMeridianIndustrial Park1Fraser MillsIndustrial Park110the existing industrial parks. Map 5-5 indicates the location of the various commercial areasand industrial parks.Map 5-5 Location of commerciallindustrial areas of the North East Sector, 1980 to1990.Source: Urban Transit Authority. On Track for the 80's Vancouver, B.C.: May, 1981.Exhibit 2.1 "The Service Corridor in the Context of the Lower Mainland." Located betweenpages 11 and 12.Commercial Development.The decade of the 1980's witnessed, a steady growth of commercial/retail space withinthe North East Sector. Much of the new growth was centred around the Coquitlam Centre111Mall, as the largest increase in residential development was occurring in this area. The oldercommercial/retail centres within the region, the North Road/Clarke Road, Austin/BlueMountain, Lougheed and Brunette, the Port Moody and Port Coquitlam City Centres, alsoexperienced growth though not on the same scale as the Coquitlam Centre. Map 5-5 locatesthe commercial areas and industrial parks. An indication of the rapid growth of commercialfloorspace can be perceived by the total floorspace of 5,375,754 square feet (Zaborowski,1989: 49) in 1987 being increased in 1988 by 250,851 square feet (Zaborowski, 1989: 50) ora 5 per cent increase within one year.The importance of the increase in the amount of Commercial/retail space the studyarea can be seen by the fact that in 1988 this sector of the economy employed, 5,519 workersof which 3,210 workers were in retail trade (Zaborowski, 1989: 21). The study area possessesabout 10 per cent of the shopping centre floorspace of the Lower mainland and is ranked fifthin size (Zaborowski, 1989: 49).The increase in shopping centre floorspace is a reflection of the increase in the area'spopulation and also serves as an important source of employment. The amount of office spacewithin the study area is still relatively minor, however, there are plans to construct largeoffice complexes in Port Moody (Kerkoff/Bosa projects) and in the vicinity of the proposed newcivic complex adjacent to the Coquitlam Centre.Industrial Development.The rise in the value of land within the older industrial areas of Vancouver, coupledwith the relocation of some of the major firms, prompted a continuing number of firms torelocate in the suburbs to be closer to their suppliers and customers. The North East Sectorcommunities have developed strategies which would see a balance of different complimentaryindustries which would not impact adversely upon residents and other businesses within thearea.112In Coquitlam, industry has been located within the low lying lands along the FraserRiver, from the Port Mann Bridge west to New Westminster. In the past, the sawmill atFraser Mills was the main industry within the District. In recent years, the MayfairIndustrial Park has been developed on 250 acres adjacent to the Port Mann Bridge. By 1989,this Industrial Park was full, and the lands adjacent to Fraser Mills, about 300 acres werebeginning to develop (Zaborowski, 1989: 54). The types of industrial concerns locating withinthe municipality have ranged from light manufacturing, to truck transportation firms.In Port Moody, industry is located along the south shore of Burrard Inlet, in an areanorth of St. Johns Street. Land adjacent to the loco Oil Refinery has been annexed by PortMoody and could possibly be used for industrial or commercial activities. There is still onelarge sawmill operating (Flavelle Cedar), and the bulk loading facilities (Pacific CoastTerminals) served by the C.P.R. The oil refineries are still operating and have beenmodernized over the years. The available industrial and commercial space within the City hasalmost been fully occupied, though the 375 acres near the loco Oil Refinery which have beenannexed to Port Moody, could possibly be rezoned for industry. There has been some pressureon industrial lands in the eastern part of Port Moody, as developers have sought to changethe land use to residential/commercial/retail for high density projects. The Kerkoff Projectwould remove a large segment of industrially zoned land from the limited available stock.This in turn would place pressure upon several other large parcels of vacant or under utilizedindustrial lands close to or adjacent to the Kerkoff site.Finally, Port Coquitlam has three Industrial Parks, along with an extensiveundeveloped area that could be utilized when the existing Parks have been filled. The threeParks are Mary Hill with 648 acres available, the 10 acre Davies Park with 1 acre stillavailable, and the Meridian Park of 60 acres with 20 acres still available (Zaborowski, 1989:56). Port Coquitlam's location with large parcels adjacent to the C.P.R. Rail Yards, enabled anumber of large metal processing and fabricating firms to establish within the municipality.Coast Steel Fabricator, Record Chemicals, Ellett Copper and Brass, and Ellett Valve Co. have113located alongside Kennametal (tungsten refinery) and Esco (alloy steel foundry). These firmsalong with C.P. Transport and a number of container loading/unloading firms have served todraw other businesses to the vicinity.Port Coquitlam has a large area which could be utilized for industrial use when theneed arises. The Dominion Industrial Reserve covers 268 acres presently zoned agriculture,but with the rapid urbanization of the adjacent areas, it will come under developmentalpressures. The Reserve lands are adjacent to the Pitt River and are located upon peat oralluvial soils in the flood plain. Present land use policies prevent the use of such land forhousing, so industrial usage appears to be a viable future possible use.Within the last decade, the North East Sector has experience a very rapid increase inland use for industrial purposes. "The region has progressively become more industrialized. In1983, there were 1,348 acres of land used for industrial purposes, a 21% increase over1976." (Zaborowski, 1989: 54). By 1990, large areas presently zoned for industry, butremaining undeveloped, were being serviced to make more space available as existingIndustrial Parks filled. Mayfair Industrial Park in Coquitlam reached capacity in 1989 andthe Meridian Industrial Park in Port Coquitlam expanded its serviced lands to meet thedemand.The future demand for industrial lands can be met from the stock of available zonedlands. However, there is little additional land that can be zoned industrial in the future,particularly when there is a strong demand for residential land.Industrial Developmental Impacts on Transportation.The concerns of local residents and politicians with the traffic impacts of moreindustrial development is reflected in the statements made by several of the mayors of thestudy area. In 1981, Port Coquitlam Mayor George Laking noted that "the immediateconstraint on development of his city is the lack of good access to potential residential andindustrial growth areas. Otherwise he says, PoCo's central location within the Lower114Mainland can prove a real bonus to industry." (Sanderson, 1981: 77). While in 1988, MayorDavid Driscoll of Port Moody, said "Transportation is the critical element in economicdevelopment." (Spaner, 1988).These statements indicate the local leaders were aware of the importance of co-ordinating transportation improvements with residential and industrial developments.Summary of 1981-1990 Period.The period from 1981 to 1990 saw the pace of urbanization in the North East Sectorincrease significantly faster than in the previous periods. The large undeveloped parcels ofresidentially zoned lands were subject to increased development pressures. Large Provinciallyowned blocks of land were beginning to be made available to developers for residential use.The availability of large blocks of developable lands when the transportation infrastructurewas perceived to be at or near capacity further complicated traffic conditions within the NorthEast Sector. Rapid residential developments in the municipalities lying to the east of the PittRiver, and north of the Fraser, also increased the pressures on the existing transportationinfrastructure within the North East Sector. Most of the residential development wasautomobile oriented, low density development which did not make the introduction of transitan economically viable option.Towards the end of the decade, there were many businesses seeking to locate theirwarehousing and manufacturing operations to the suburbs. All the fringe municipalities weresubject to this movement from the old central industrial locations. As the available industrialand commercial zoned lands within Richmond and Surrey became limited, and the prices rose,attention turned to other areas which did not have the same pressures nor high land prices.The North East Sector was recognized as a very good location, and there was stillvacant industrial lands available for development. Some of the transportation infrastructuredeficiencies had been resolved over the previous decades and those industrially zoned landsadjacent to the Trans Canada Highway, began to experience rapid development. Many of the115businesses which had been dependent upon the C.P. Railway, followed the Railway to theNorth East Sector after it began to remove its operations from the valuable land around thecentre of Vancouver. The amount of industrial land available in the North East Sector islimited. However, Port Coquitlam possesses a large block of undeveloped low lying lands alongthe Pitt River, north of the Lougheed Highway which could be rezoned for industrial use (theDominion Industrial Reserve), and Coquitlam has approximately 300 acres of land nearFraser Mills available for industrial development (Zaborowski, 1989: 54-55).Future development of land will depend upon and influence the level of transportationservices available within the study area. To date, much of the housing has been low densitymaking transit difficult and expensive. The geographical and geological constraints of thestudy region limit the available transportation options, to accommodating increasedautomobile traffic.5.4 FUTURE CONCERNS.There are a number of concerns the residents and Councils in the North East Sectorshare. The three political jurisdictions within the study area have their own land developmentplans for the remaining undeveloped lands. Coquitlam has a growth strategy that will see,4,400 new units constructed within the Westwood Plateau to accommodate about 15,000people, and Burke Mountain, which could accommodate about 25,000 people depending uponthe type of density allowed (Zaborowski, 1989: 44). The sites close to Coquitlam Centre havebeen zoned for higher density use. An example would be Bosa's Glenborough condominiumdevelopment, located across the street from Coquitlam Centre (The Burnaby & New Westminster News, September 16, 1990: 32).Port Moody has an area called Heritage Mountain which could accommodate apopulation of about 10,000 people. Map 5-6 locates the most recent housing developments.This area is at present undergoing development to create additional housing.Burke Mountain2,730 acresI^ ...^.^•. .• North Shore .• i...:•••••:•840^Acres^•.•Westwood Plateau•Eagle Ridge••• Coguitlarn-Centre•• •Port CoquitlamPitt MeadowsRiverviewHeights314  acres116Map 5-6 Location of most recent housing developments.Source: Base Map, Urban Transit Authority. On Track for the 80's Vancouver, B.C.: May,1981. Exhibit 2.2 "Proposed Residential Development Areas." Map located between pages11 and 12.Port Coquitlam is developing the remaining vacant lands on Citadel Hill (Mary Hill).There are also a number higher density residential developments underway close to thecommercial/retail centre of the City of Port Coquitlam. For example Andre Molnar'sShaughnessy Court project (The Sunday Magazine, September 16, 1990: M-13).117As the amount of developable land decreases, with the resulting increase in the value,higher density uses will be considered. In Port Coquitlam this is already occurring. Anexample would again be Molnar's Shaughnessy Court condominium complex consisting of athree story building enclosing a central court and containing 33 units. The site was formerlycovered by a few single family homes on large lots. In the southwestern area of Coquitlam,close to Lougheed Mall, a number of high-rise towers have been constructed whichdramatically increase the density.One can expect the replacement of many of the older low density, favourably locatedsuburbs with higher density usages as the value of the land increases. This will have apronounced impact on the feasibility of introducing a more extensive transit system within thestudy area.5.5 SUMMARY OF EVENTS FROM 1951 TO 1990.The past four decades has seen a remarkable change in land use within the NorthEast Sector of the GVRD. Development, in the first decade was slow due to the lack ofdemand for the largely uncleared and poorly serviced lands in the study area. The vacantlands within Vancouver, the municipalities on the north shore of Burrard Inlet, Burnaby, andRichmond, were well able to accommodate the needs of the expanding population.The small amount land use change, from the subdivision of small agricultural holdingor wooded lots to housing on urban sized lots, occurred mainly in southwestern Coquitlam,and on the fringes of the already built-up portions of Port Coquitlam and Port Moody. In thesecond decade, the 1960's, there was a diminishing amount of readily available landsconvertible into residential use within Vancouver. More pressures began to be felt inRichmond, Delta, Surrey and the North East Sector communities of Coquitlam, PortCoquitlam and Port Moody. The pressures for urbanization on the North East Sector werestill felt mainly in or near areas already undergoing land use changes. The southwest area ofCoquitlam up to the border of Port Moody was being converted from small farms or brush118covered plots to small city sized urban lots. The vacant northern slopes of Mary Hill, justsouth of the commercial area of Port Coquitlam and the vacant acres or small farms just tothe north of the Canadian Pacific Rail Yards were beginning to undergo change to housing oncity sized lots. These land use changes with the accompanying increase in population wouldcreate pressure upon the exiting transportation infrastructure in the study area.In the third decade, the 1970's, the pressures for the conversion of the large blocks ofundeveloped lands to residential use were greater as the availability of low cost accessiblelands in other Municipalities began to become depleted. Major land use changes were plannedfor the large blocks of Government owned vacant lands within the study area. A largeresidential community was planned, however in late 1975 an election brought about a changeof Government resulting in many of the government sponsored land use plans beingabandoned. This did not prevent Coquitlam from rezoning land at the junction of the improvedLougheed and Barnet Highways for the construction of a large regional shopping centre whichwas seen as the needed anchor development for the creation of a regional town centre.Despite the curtailed Provincial Government sponsored residential developments, privatedevelopers began to view the North East Sector as an attractive area to seek opportunities todevelop lands that were less expensive than those closer to the centre of Vancouver.The final decade, that of the 1980's, witnessed la. rge numbers of development projects.The increased population brought about more traffic. More businesses moved from thecongested Vancouver central business area to the outlying areas. A split between the locationof blue collar and white collar work locations began to appear. Office locations remained in theC.B.D. while warehousing and manufacturing facilities located in the suburbs to takeadvantage of the less expensive and larger parcels of land, as well as the access totransportation routes to other regions within the country or south to the United States.The study area has seen rapid urbanization occurring, with large expanses of landbeing cleared and residences constructed. The type of developments has for the most partbeen low density, automobile oriented suburbs, which would contribute additional traffic, and119necessitate improvements to the transportation infrastructure. There has been somerecognition of the need to co-ordinate land use and transportation within the study area, sincesome of the public officials have recognized the impacts land and transportation have uponeach other. On top of the local concerns about low density automobile oriented land use, theareas east of the Pitt River are now beginning to experience the type of rapid development thestudy area and other municipalities in the region underwent a decade earlier. This easternautomobile oriented land development, has the potential of contributing more traffic to theexisting transportation infrastructure and forcing improvements to meet the increasingdemand.120CHAPTER 6 The Case Study: Transportation in the North East Sector, 1951 to 1990.6.1 INTRODUCTION.The purpose of this part of the case study is to provide background information on thetransportation situation in the study area from 1951 to 1990. It will provide information onthe improvements made to the highways and bridges and to transit in the area. It will thenprovide an overview of the transit needs of the North East Sector in relation to the region asa whole.Over the last four decades, there has been continuous planning processes to study theLower Mainland region including the North East Sector to arrive at solutions to thetransportation problem. The North East Sector transportation problems like those of otherareas have a unique component created by a combination of geographical and geologicalconditions. These conditions may be further compounded by political and/or administrativeboundaries superimposed without regard for the topography of the region.6.2 HIGHWAY PROPOSALS.6.2.1 Highway and Bridge Proposals and Improvements, 1951 to 1990.After the Second World War, the road infrastructure in the study area, as with otherareas of the Lower Mainland, was in poor condition. A lack of funding and reducedmaintenance between 1930 and 1945 had stalled any major improvements. However, after1951, the study area along with the other lower mainland communities became the focus of anumber of land use and transportation studies. These studies initially recommended a numberof automobile-oriented improvements which would make the Lower Mainland Region moreaccessible to commuters.121A number of projects within the North East Sector were proposed and someconstructed. In the period, 1955-57, there were improvements made to the Lougheed andBarnet Highways to bring them up to the then modern standards (Province of BritishColumbia, 1957: J-26, J-30; Province of British Columbia, 1958: N-25, N-30). Up to thepresent day, the Lougheed Highway in particular has undergone upgrading and widening asthe traffic demands increased. In 1974, the level crossing of the Lougheed Highway with theC.P. Rail tracks in Port Coquitlam, was removed through the relocation of part of thehighway, and the construction of an underpass to remove the constant traffic disruptionscaused by train traffic.Map 6-1 Location of highway projects, 1951 to 1990.• ••-toe°aa 0•liEe19:=:=1Milede...-Coquitlam RiverCoquitlam River Bridge 1976Barnet Highway1951-1990NPrairie Road41•1•111MMunil,--Lougheed HighwayPitt River Bridge1957, 1979401 Freeway1963-1990Cape Horn InterchangeiBrunette Avenue^1963-190Source: Base Map, Urban Transit Authority. On Track for the 80's Vancouver, B.C.: May,1981. Exhibit 2.2 "Proposed Residential Development Areas." Map located between pages11 and 12.In 1979, the Lougheed Highway was widened to four lanes, and this necessitated aparallel bridge across the Coquitlam River. This widening was part of the improvement of• a.Goa122accessibility to communities east of the Pitt River. The Pitt River Bridge which had beenreplaced in 1957 with a more modern structure, was paralleled in 1979 so the LougheedHighway east of the river could be widened to four lanes.The Barnet Highway, like the Lougheed Highway was constantly being upgraded astraffic pressures increased. The stretch along the north side of Burnaby Mountain wasimproved in 1956. The development of the Coquitlam Centre Shopping Mall between 1977 to1979, necessitated the rebuilding and widening of the stretch of the highway from its junctionwith the Lougheed, to the Junction with St. Johns Street in Port Moody. The ProvincialGovernment announced in 1990, the stretch from Port Moody to where it becomes HastingsStreet in Burnaby, would be widened from two lanes to four lanes. This would enable theBarnet Highway to accommodate articulated commuter buses and possibly car and van poolvehicles (High Occupancy Vehicles or HOVs) (Hilborn, 1989: 3; Hilborn, 1990a: 3).The remaining bottleneck along the Barnet Highway-St. Johns Street was thesegment running through the centre of Port Moody. Due to the existence of commercialestablishments, the value of the lands along St. Johns Street precludes the possibility offurther widening or upgrading. The inconvenience created by this bottleneck, has upsetresidents, merchants and commuters. There have been discussions of the possibility ofconstructing a bypass to remove rush hour traffic from the centre of Port Moody. In the early1960's a route to the south was proposed to connect with the Lougheed Highway west ofNorth Road (Buchanan, 1990). This, however was not constructed. In the 1970's, there was aproposal to build a bypass north of the Inlet, and then across Burrard Inlet by bridge to carrytraffic onto the Barnet/Hastings Corridor. This proposal was also not constructed. At present,there are discussions occurring between the Ministry of Highways and the City of Port Moodyon the possibility of constructing a bypass along Spring Street, a few blocks north of St JohnsStreet (The Burnaby & New Westminster News, January 7, 1990: B-4).The construction of the Trans Canada Highway (401) and the Port Mann Bridge inthe early 1960's (Port Mann Bridge opened in 1965), provided another access to the North123East Sector. The Freeway (401) opened up the southern area of the Coquitlam to bothresidential and commercial/industrial development. There were two off-ramps constructed.The first was at Brunette Avenue, allowing traffic from North Road and Lougheed Highwayto access the freeway. The second was at Cape Horn. The Cape Horn Interchange, just westof the Port Mann Bridge, allowed access to traffic from the Lougheed Highway, as well asegress for the freeway traffic.The Cape Horn Interchange has undergone a number of modifications andimprovements since its construction in the early 1960's, as the amount of traffic hasincreased. This caused the nature of the land use in the immediate vicinity to change fromvacant flood plain and garbage dumps to industrial/commercial use. When Marathon Realty(C.P. Rail's real estate arm) first began to develop an industrial park (Mayfair IndustrialPark) in the area adjacent to the freeway and the interchange, a network of access roadswere constructed to service the new industrial park.In the B.C. Department of Highways' Coquitlam Area Planning Study  of 1971, (B.C.Department of Highways, 1971) there were a number of suggestions for possible newhighway routes in and around the Cape Horn Interchange. One of these was the PortCoquitlam Expressway, a route along the north bank of the Fraser River and west bank ofthe Pitt River, linking the Lougheed Highway just west Of the Pitt River Bridge to the CapeHorn Interchange (B.C. Department of Highways, 1971: Exhibit 28). The recommendations ofthe report suggested the Port Coquitlam Freeway or as it is now known, the Mary HillBypass, would not be needed before 1980 (B.C. Department of Highways, 1971: 51). Thisroad was constructed in the early 1980's and additional off-ramps were built to allow trafficfrom the 401 and the Lougheed Highway to access or egress the industrial access roads or theMary Hill Bypass.At the present time, there is heavy commuter traffic originating from the rapidlyexpanding population of the municipalities east of the Pitt River. There is a bottleneck wherethe Bypass is reduced from four lanes to two lanes where the highway passes under the C.P.124Rail line just west of the Pitt River Bridge. There is also a controlled intersection where theBypass joins the Lougheed Highway, and this contributes to the rush hour congestion. Therehave been suggestions for building a new Pitt River Bridge from Mary Hill in order to takepressure off this intersection. However, the costs as well as the possibility of the introductionof other modes of transportation (Transit, Commuter Rail, car and van pooling) have shelvedthe proposal.In the early 1970's, due to commuter traffic congestion at the intersection of NorthRoad and the Lougheed Highway, a road was constructed between Gaglardi Way and NorthRoad, using an alignment along Como Lake Road and East Broadway. The use of the route,allowed some commuter traffic and the traffic to Simon Fraser University, to bypass theLougheed Highway. This state of affairs has over the last 20 years created a good deal ofconcern and inconvenience for the Burnaby residents living along the routes or alongCurtis/Parker which connects to Vancouver.6.2.2 Proposed Highway Projects for the North East Sector.As with other areas within the GVRD, there were a number of transportationproposals considered but for a variety of reasons not constructed. The most important of thesereasons involved funding and political considerations. Some of the proposals have long sinceceased to be viable as other routes have removed their need, while others are still viable andare awaiting the proper timing to be acted upon.The proposed projects to be covered will include: the Port Moody Bypass or ChinesExpressway, the more recent Port Moody Bypass, the David/Pathan Connector, the NorthFraser Freeway, the Como Lake/East Broadway Connector, the Hastings/Gaglardi Connector,and the Burrard Inlet Waterfront Freeway.Port Moody Bypass/Port Moody Highway/Chines Expressway/Burnaby MountainExpressway.125This lengthy list of titles was assigned to a road project designed to remove trafficcongestion from the centre of downtown Port Moody and offer an additional route allowingtraffic to move from the North East Municipalities to the rest of the Metropolitan area. Thehigh central ridge, with its steep slopes forming part of the western boundary of Coquitlamhad served in the past to limit the viable possible routes that could be used to move traffic.(see Chapter 4 Section 2 "Physical Nature of the Study Area," which provides thegeographical and geological information on the North East Sector.)As the multitude of names suggests, there were a number of proposals, all of whichused the same central routing, with each project's beginning and/or end point varying. Oneproposed route was to follow a right-of-way connecting the Trans Canada Highway at theCariboo Road Interchange with the Lougheed Highway near Port Coquitlam (Buchanan,1990). Another was to link up with the access roads built to service Simon Fraser University,and possibly link up with the eastern end of Hastings Street. The central part of most of theprojects was to follow a route skirting the Port Moody-Coquitlam boundary and climb thesteep embankment, utilizing a lengthy roadway so as to reduce the necessary gradient. Thefirst proposal was suggested in a report entitled Planning for Coquitlam undertaken by theLower Mainland Regional Planning Board in 1961 (LMRPB, 1961: 92; LMRPB, 1966a: 40).Bai-net Highway e.t.4Port MoodyClarke Road0Mile‘T• I126Map 6-2 Route of Chines Expressway.Source: Base Map, Urban Transit Authority. On Track for the 80's Vancouver, B.C.: May,1981. Exhibit 2.2 "Proposed Residential Development Areas." Map located between pages11 and 12.The Chines Expressway project was recommended by the City of Port Moody to theProvincial Highways Department for consideration, but little was done about it. In 1971, theProvincial Highways Department in a planning study of the Coquitlam area, concluded that"the proposed Port Moody Highway does not appear to serve a major travel desire." (B.C.Department of Highways, 1971: 37). Port Moody Council which had set aside lands for theroute, was so upset at the apparent lack of action on what they perceived to be a verypressing transportation problem, expressed their disgust for the findings by asking theProvincial Government not to build any more freeways in the area (Vancouver Sun, April 19,1972: 43).Barnet HighwayNtPort MoodyBurrard InletSpring StreetN10c=amic=rMilesIBarnet HighwaySt. Johns Street.4,0Op,127The Highways Department explained the reason for the decision not to recommendthe construction of the Port Moody Highway in its Coquitlam Area Planning Study. The routedid not fulfil the projected travel desires, and its terminal location would result in a largevolume of traffic being "dumped" onto already congested routes at the western terminus ofthe Highway B.C. Department of Highways, 1971: 50). The lands on the proposed routehave now been developed, thus rendering the project unfeasible.Port Moody Bypass (Recent Proposal).Due to the increasing traffic funnelling through the centre of Port Moody during rushhours, and the disruption it creates for residents and businesses along the St Johns Street,there has been increased pressure to resolve the congestion and inconvenience caused bytraffic using this route. The topography of the area limits the practical routes available. Twomodern proposals have been suggested. One will be discussed here while the other will bediscussed under the David Avenue/Pathan Avenue connector. The one to be discussed hereinvolves the construction of a road following Spring Street, which is north of St Johns Street)and south of the C.P. Railway line.Map 6-3 Route of Port Moody Bypass (Spring Street).Source: Urban Transit Authority. On Track for the 80's Vancouver, B.C.: May, 1981.Exhibit 2.1 "The Service Corridor in the Context of the Lower Mainland." Located betweenpages 11 and 12.128This route would carry traffic through the industrial area of Port Moody and over the C.P.R.Yards at the western end of Port Moody to connect with the Barnet Highway.This route would begin at the junction of the Barnet Highway, Ioco Road, and StJohns Street, and carry the through traffic along a route either through the present industrialarea, utilizing a viaduct to carry traffic over the industrial area, or along a route closer to thewaterfront so as to avoid the costs relocating businesses. This route is at present underconsideration as it appears to be the least expensive and could be completed within theshortest time compared to other automotive proposals.The David Avenue/Pathan Avenue Connector.The North West and North East Sectors of Coquitlam and Northern areas of PortCoquitlam have either experienced rapid growth or are projected to experience such growthover the next few years. To ensure east-west traffic does not have to make use of the fewexisting routes, a proposal has been put forward for a major roadway along the alignment ofDavid and Pathan Avenues (Dunhill Development Corporation Ltd., 1975a: 41), from the PittRiver to Burrard Inlet with a bridge across the Coquitlam River, north of the LougheedHighway.N1•. . . . .•^" ' • • • •■ ••••.q^0•Pathan Avenueum to • is as an miMile4/ David AvenueAN sr UN as^id• David/Pathan Connector•• Pine Tree Way--r^:^••.. • •^ ..^ • .. .• V. • •129Map 6-4 Route of David Avenue/Pathan Avenue Connector.Source: Urban Transit Authority. On Track for the 80's Vancouver, B.C.: May, 1981.Exhibit 2.1 "The Service Corridor in the Context of the Lower Mainland." Located betweenpages 11 and 12.This proposal was suggested in the mid 1970's by planners for the Burke Mountain Project.This would allow the freer movement of local traffic wishing to move about the area, as wellreduce some of the congestion on the Lougheed Highway. An important feature of thisproposal is the possibility of connecting the western end of this roadway to the BarnetHighway by the construction of a Bridge from Burns Point to Barnet Beach, across BurrardInlet to create a major new east-west route within the Vancouver Metropolitan Region. Thisbridge/road proposal would aid in the removal of through traffic from the centre of PortMoody and render the construction of the Spring Street Port Moody Bypass unnecessary.In a 1966 study, there was a suggestion to construct a North Shore Freeway, routedto the north of Port Moody, through Anmore and Bedwell Bay, then cross Indian Arm bybridge and connect with the Upper Levels Highway (LMRPB, 1966a: 40). There was also asuggestion of a rail link to North Vancouver utilizing this route (LMRPB, 1966a: 41).A further suggestion for a northern expressway, has been the possibility of a bridgeover the Pitt River to connect to a North Fraser Freeway to improve access to the rapidlygrowing north shore of the Fraser River east of the Pitt River.130At present the David Avenue/Pathan Avenue Connector is merely a proposal, withlittle work having been effected. The Municipality of Coquitlam would be the majorbeneficiary of the proposal, and has reserved part of the corridor the connector might follow.Port Moody has actually constructed a short piece of the roadway, north of the BarnetHighway and along part of the loco Road right-of-way.At the moment, there is not sufficient traffic to warrant this costly connector, but withthe rapid increase in housing in the area, the pressures for the connector will increase unlessa viable alternative is provided (i.e. Rapid Transit, Commuter Rail, or buses on exclusiveright-of-ways).The North Fraser Freeway.With the rapid increase in housing in Pitt Meadows and Maple Ridge, the resultingincrease in traffic has strained the existing roads. Commuters wishing to reach their workplaces in the rest of the GVRD have to cross the Pitt River Bridge which has two traffic lanesin either direction. At the present time, during rush hours, there is severe congestionexperienced on the roads leading to the bridge. The presence of traffic signals at both ends ofthe bridge or the fact the bridge has to open for river traffic does not help the situation. Anew high level crossing of the Pitt River from Mary Hill to Pitt Meadows, near the mouth ofthe Pitt River, with a limited access roadway north of the Lougheed Highway has beenproposed.Map 6-5 Route of North Fraser Freeway.131Harris RoadWebster's Corners•North Fraser Freeway ***** • *.a a a a...' • a e a.II Maple Ridge^•*I N••Mary Hill BypassLougheed Highway•I•Albion FerryFraser River/Source: British Columbia Agricultural Commission. "A Brief to the Dewdney-AlouetteRegional District Transportation Committee." March 28, 1989 in Dewdney-Alouette RegionalDistrict, Transportation Committee Recommendations. Freedom to Move Mainland-Southwest -- Region 2. Victoria, B.C.: British Columbia Ministry of Transportation andHighways. 1989. Appendix B, map following page 7 of brief.This could connect to 256th Street, with a bridge crossing the Fraser River near the AlbionFerry and enable the North Fraser Freeway to link with the Trans Canada Freeway inLangley as well as at the western end of the Port Mann Bridge in Coquitlam.There has been a proposal to construct a new crossing of the Fraser River near thePort Mann Bridge. This would see the construction of a new bridge joining Mary Hill in PortCoquitlam to North Surrey. This would be in conjunction with an upgrading and widening ofthe Lougheed Highway and the 401 Freeway west of Port Mann Bridge. The proposal to buildthe North Fraser Freeway is currently under study, but there is an immense cost involved inthe construction of the bridges and a lack of sufficient traffic to warrant it.Como Lake/East Broadway Connector.This connector was constructed during the 1970's. Its purpose was to take some ofthe traffic off the Lougheed Highway. The traffic previously had to travel south along NorthRoad and converge with the already congested Lougheed Highway.Presently traffic is congested on the East Broadway section of this road and there hasbeen a proposal by the Provincial Highways Department to widen this stretch to funnel more132commuter traffic from the Lougheed and Barnet Highways onto Gaglardi Way and then viaeast-west streets to the downtown core. Como Lake Road, which has recently been ungradedto four lanes from approximately Mariner Way near Riverview Hospital through to NorthRoad, funnels traffic onto two lanes on East Broadway. This creates a severe bottleneck atNorth Road.Map 6-6 East Broadway/Como Lake Road.•CC>c4'1'•• 4'A /Como Lake Road C.sv East Broadway••Lougheed Highway BBurnaby I Coquitlam191...^0 1/2^11 0 • zMilesSource: Base Map, B.C. Transit. SkyTrain Extension to Coquitlam  Transit Planning Study.Summary Report. Vancouver, B.C.: September 25, 1986. Figure 1 "Regional TransitSystem." Between pages 1 and 2.The Burnaby Municipal Council has expressed concern about the proposal to widenEast Broadway as traffic has to funnel itself onto two lanes of traffic on Curtis Street whichis classed as a residential street, but has carried an increasingly higher number of vehiclesover the years. At present (1989) traffic counts have shown upwards of 20,000 vehicles makeuse of this supposed residential road (Burnaby Now. October 8, 1989: 3). The residents havebecome increasingly vocal in recent years as a Hastings/Gaglardi Connector was promisedover 20 years ago to prevent the present situation.133Hastings Street/Gaglardi Way Connector.This connector was to link Gaglardi Way, to Hastings Street, to avoid the commutertraffic having to pass through the residential neighbourhoods along Curtis and Parker Streets.Map 6-7 Route of Hastings/Gaglardi Connector.Barnet HighwayHastings StreetCurtis StreeComo Lake RoadCoquitlamBrunette AvenueTrans Canada HighwayCariboo Roaci'-4.0^23;;;;ETE=MiesSource: Base Map, B.C. Transit. SkyTrain Extension to Coquitlam Transit Planning Study.Summary Report. Vancouver, B.C.: September 25, 1986. Figure 1 "Regional TransitSystem." Between pages 1 and 2.The concept for this connector was proposed as "a provincial project originating with theSimon Fraser University Master Plan." (District of Burnaby, Manager's Report, 1987: 1). Inthe 1979 Transportation Plan for Burnaby, the connector was seen to serve several purposes,including, the addition of a link in the arterial road network; removing commuter traffic fromParker/Curtis, downgrading the roads to collector classification; and reducing the grades fortransit buses serving Burnaby Mountain (District of Burnaby, Transportation Committee,1979: 25).There has been a good deal of controversy and public concern over the possibleconstruction of this connector. The citizens residing in the area impacted by the commutertraffic have over the last 15 years expressed impatience over the lack of progress. At thefi134public meetings dealing with Burnaby's response to The Greater Vancouver TransportationTask Force Report, one of the participants statedthere is an unacceptable number of vehicles moving along Curtis and ParkerStreets, both residential streets, which should be diverted to either HastingsStreet or Lougheed Highway the main provincial arterials. (District ofBurnaby, Transportation Committee, 1989a: 3)This stretch of road has not to date been constructed due to the Provincial HighwaysDepartment concern aboutthe double loading of Hastings Street by a widened Barnet Highway (aMinistry project) and the development of a new link from Hastings to GaglardiWay (District of Burnaby, Manager's Report, 1987: 1)The Burnaby Transportation Committee, in their response to the Greater VancouverTransportation Task Force Report, noted the widening of East Broadway from Como Lake toGaglardi was recommended as a necessary project, but the Hastings/Gaglardi Connector wasnot identified as such (District of Burnaby, Transportation Committee, 1989b: 3). Burnaby'sresponse was the East Broadway widening should not take place without theHastings/Gaglardi Connector, as the East Broadway widening would only serve to increasethe amount of traffic using residential roadways within Burnaby.Burrard Inlet Waterfront Freeway.A waterfront freeway along the south shore of Burrard Inlet was proposed by a Mr.Burt Benson in 1975 (Romero, 1987: B-1). This proposal has subsequently been referred to asBenson's Waterfront Freeway, or Benson's Freeway.The initial idea was composed of three sections. The first involved a plan proposingthe freeway would:run from downtown Vancouver along the south shore of Burrard Inlet to PortMoody; through Port Moody, the Coquitlam Town Centre area, PortCoquitlam, and across the Pitt River; then across the Fraser River at BarnstonIsland to connect with the Trans Canada Highway. (Buchanan, 1990)This was the initial version suggested in the mid 1970's.Map 6-8 Route of Benson's Waterfront Freeway.135Fraser-Surrey Docks /Barnston Island/NIWaterfront Freeway.Burrard Inlet^tI• •^•grAraorri^t^rt...I a* • 0 0014^IBurnaby^1..... — ... ...mu 1 • 1I^ I^'4I $ Coquitlam ' .■.Vancouver^II Freeway Pitt MeadowsN^♦♦New Westminster^•0 1'RichmondFraser Rivero^5 I‘ NTilbury IslandMiles/Surrey .Source: Base Map, Greater Vancouver Regional District. Greater Vancouver Key Facts: A Statistical Profile of Greater Vancouver, Canada Burnaby, B.C.: GVRD DevelopmentServices, December, 1990. Page 36.Information, Romero, Reg. "Freeway attracts attention." Tri-City News October 18,1987. Map, B-24.•A later version suggested an abbreviation of the first proposal. This would be theconstruction of a four lane arterial road that would in effect be an extension of the BarnetHighway, and would run along the waterfront from Inlet Drive in North Burnaby toterminate in Vancouver at the Second Narrows Bridge. It was suggested this section of theproposed road would have positive benefits as "it would take commuter traffic off residentialstreets in Vancouver and Burnaby" (Constantineau, 1981: A-3). This version of the plan wascalculated to cost about $30 million (Fitton, 1987: 8).The second component of the plan included "associated cargo handling facilities tohandle dangerous cargo at the head of Burrard Inlet in Port Moody and the C.P. Rail Yards inPort Coquitlam." (Buchanan, 1990). A benefit of this roadway would be to "reduce thenumber of transport trucks using local roads to carry hazardous goods" (Romero, 1987: B-1).136The Waterfront Freeway would also serve to link the various port facilities in the region.That is the Vancouver Port would be linked to the facilities at Port Moody, the intermodalfacilities at the C.P. Rail Yards, the C.N. Rail Yards in Surrey and the port facilities alongthe south bank of the Fraser River (Surrey-North Delta Docks, and Tilbury Island). Anadditional benefit of this proposal, aside from the elimination of dangerous cargos from theexisting congested roadways, would be a reduction of the heavy truck traffic travellingbetween the different port facilities on the local roads within the region.The third component involved the development of a marina in the vicinity of BerryPoint in North Burnaby.This facility was proposed to accommodate the fishing and marine industries,which were being displaced by redevelopment in the Coal Harbour and FalseCreek areas of Vancouver. (Buchanan, 1990)The proposal has been included in a number of transportation studies of the Municipality ofBurnaby.The Municipality first considered the technical feasibility of the WaterfrontRoad in 1979/80 subsequent to the adoption of the ComprehensiveTransportation Plan. (District of Burnaby, Manager's Report, 1987: 1)A feasibility study was undertaken in 1981 for a joint Burnaby and Ministry ofTransportation and Highways Technical Staff Committee (District of Burnaby, Manager'sReport, 1987). The result of the study was the project appeared both technically feasible aswell as economically desirable. However, nothing further was done at that time as theMinistry bearing the responsibility for the project "was not interested in pursuing theproposal." (District of Burnaby, Manager's Report, 1987: 2). A third study was commissionedin 1987. The study was initiated due to concerns about traffic problems expressed when areview of the Hastings Centre Plan was undertaken. The study discussed the costs andbenefits of the waterfront road, and its potential impact upon the various municipalities. Thefindings indicated the residents of the North East Sector would benefit most from the road.137The extra road capacity along Burrard Inlet will reduce congestion pressure oncorridors to the south of Burnaby Mountain such as Austin and LougheedHighway. (District of Burnaby, Manager's Report, 1987: Exhibit 2)In Appendix A of the Report, it was calculated that the road would carry 2,245 vehicles perhour. The road would thus reduce the amount of commuter traffic from the North East Sectorusing the arterial roads within Burnaby. The Report estimated 1,600 vehicles per hour wouldbe removed from Hastings Street if the Waterfront Road was constructed. As the WaterfrontRoad would have few links with Burnaby's streets, it would allow commuter traffic to traveluninterrupted. An observation made in the Appendix was the impact of the route woulddecrease rapidly with the distance from its western end (District of Burnaby, Manager'sReport, 1987: Appendix A 5).One of the advantages of the waterfront route would be the opportunity to develop anexpress bus service more cost effective than commuter rail (District of Burnaby, Manager'sReport, 1987: Appendix A 6). On the negative side the waterfront freeway "is not expected tobe as cost effective as widening the freeway." (District of Burnaby, Manager's Report, 1987:Appendix A 6).At the present time (1990) Burnaby Council has expressed an unwillingness toconsider a waterfront freeway. The Council wishes to retain the waterfront for park use, andfeels the improvement of transit or introduction of commuter rail on the C.P. Rail line wouldbe more beneficial than building more roads.6.3 TRANSIT PROPOSALS: 1951 TO 1990.6.3.1 Transit in the Study Area.In the period prior to 1951, although the population was very small, the study areawas served by two private transit companies, the Columbia Stage lines and the Pacific StageLines, a subsidiary of the British Columbia Electric Railway Company. The service providedby the Pacific Stage Lines was limited to the main nodes of activity within the study area138(Maillardville in Coquitlam and the Port Coquitlam business area) and provided one round tripdaily. This type of service was not suitable for commuter purposes.Columbia Stage Lines, which began operations in 1934 (Canadian Coach, July, 1969:3) provided a rudimentary bus service from Port Moody through Coquitlam to NewWestminster. The service was operated along the various routes several times each day. Dueto increased competition from private automobile ownership within its service area, coupledwith increased operating costs, the company was forced in early 1968 to apply to the PublicUtilities Commission for permission to reduce its evening service after attempts by thecompany to seek financial assistance for its service from the Councils of Port Moody andCoquitlam met with failure (Canadian Coach, February, 1968: 5). On May 23, 1969, theColumbia Stage Lines ceased operations (The Province, December 31, 1973: 16; Canadian Coach, July, 1969: 3) leaving the 70,000 residents of the area without transit services. B.C.Hydro, the Provincial Government agency charged with the responsibility of operating thetransit services department of the nationalized B.C. Electric Company "firmly stated that it isnot interested in extending its routes which fringe the area." (Canadian Coach, July, 1969: 3).On October 22, 1969, a local company, Sabina Enterprises Ltd. (also known asSabina Inter-City Transit), began local transit operations utilizing eight surplus B.C. HydroTransit Buses (Canadian Coach, November, 1969: 1; The Province, December 31, 1973: 16).The company began servicing the Coquitlam, Port Coquitlam and Port Moody areas alongthree routes on a six day per week schedule (Canadian Coach, November, 1969: 4). Thecompany managed to continue operations until 1973 despite low public patronage caused byan inability to provide a reliable service due to poor equipment and inadequate finances. Thecompany, whose finances had always been precarious, had proposed to initiate a dial-a-bussystem and the City of Port Coquitlam offered to provide $12,000 to assist with the scheme(The Province, December 31,1973: 16). This offer of financial assistance, however, wasdropped after the sudden action of the Provincial Government in authorizing the successor toB.C. Hydro Transit (Province of British Columbia, 1973b: 1666) to provide transit service to139the area. This action made the efforts of the local private service redundant and resulted inits demise.In 1973 the Provincial Government operated Bureau of Transit (later B.C. Transit)began to provide local transit services as well as express buses to downtown Vancouver(Bureau of Transit Services, 1974: 2). The rationale for extending regional transit servicesinto the Coquitlam/Port Coquitlam/Port Moody areas, was based upon two points. The firstwas, part of the region was the home riding of the new premier, and an election promise wasto establish transit services (Province, December 31, 1973: 16). The second reason was theGovernment's desire to create a large residential community in the northern part of the studyarea, on the slopes of Burke Mountain. This new community was to house 80,000 to 100,000people. The local communities would not co-operate in the promotion of this instantcommunity unless the then existing traffic problems were addressed.The study area contained approximately 90,000 people, scattered over 40 squaremiles, and with an increasing population, the existing roads and bridges did not havesufficient capacity. A road development study commissioned by the City of Port Coquitlam in1970, noted that during the am peak traffic period, the intersection of Pitt River Road and theLougheed Highway way accommodating 109 per cent of its theoretical capacity (AssociatedEngineering Services Ltd., 1970: 25). The east bound pm peak traffic period saw theintersection of Pitt River Road and Shaughnessy Street accommodating 101 per cent of itstheoretical capacity (Associated Engineering Services Ltd., 1970: 25). The traffic levels atother intersections were for the most part below the rated capacity, though there were a fewexceptions.The study provided a projection of possible traffic volumes likely to be created by theincreasing residential developments that were being proposed. Eastbound traffic at the PittRiver Road and Shaughnessy Street intersection was projected to be in 1973 at 175 per centcapacity, while eastbound traffic at the Lougheed Highway and Shaughnessy Street wasprojected to reach 150 per cent of capacity (Associated Engineering Services Ltd, 1970: 34).140These projections assumed continued rates of growth and no major road or bridgeimprovements. The information presented in the report suggests that the road capacity wassufficient for existing traffic except during peak periods. Additional residential developmentswould have a negative impact upon the available road capacities, and create traffic congestionat key intersections. One of the options available to relieve the problem of increased peakhour traffic congestion was to provide another means of moving increased numbers of people.Transit service linked into the existing regional system appeared as the best viable option.The transit service option was made operational in 1973.The new service in 1973 consisted of 10 local route and two express buses, one fromLougheed Mall and the other along the Barnet Highway (Bureau of Transit Services, 1974:cover letter). In a study of the first year of operation, it was found that 25 per cent of all tripswere related to work, 23 per cent to shopping, and 13 per cent to school. The remainder werefor recreation, or personal business reason (Bureau of Transit Service, 1974: 9).Increased residential development and the construction of Coquitlam Centre ShoppingMall, brought about a number of new routes and express bus service during rush hours. Sincethe mid 1980's Transit has commissioned a number of studies to aid in the planning anddesign of proposed new bus routes to serve new residential communities being constructed onthe as yet large expanses of vacant lands still existing in the North East Sector. In 1990,there were two studies conducted to seek public input concerning a new routes, to serve theWestwood Plateau (B.C. Transit, 1990a) and the Citadel Heights area of Port Coquitlam (B.C.Transit, 1990b).Transit has evolved a process for introducing new routes into formerly unservicedareas. The process is to provide an initial service operating only during the morning andevening rush hours. When demand increases, the service hours are extended to ensure thecosts of providing this service are kept to a level reflecting the level of patronage. Therationale for this process is reflected in the findings of the reports. The main trips generatedby the residential areas are work and school trips (B.C. Transit, 1990a: 3). The rush hour141service within the new subdivisions also has the purpose of reducing the automobiledependency of the residents.6.3.2 Proposals to Improve Transit in the Study Area.It is difficult to separate the needed transit improvements of the North East Sectorfrom those of other areas within the Greater Vancouver Region. The transit needs of eacharea are linked, as they impact on each other and so the improvements will be discussed inthis section although some of the information is also applicable to the whole of the region.Since the early 1970's there have been a number of proposals for the improvement oftransit within the study area as well as the improvement of the transit linkages to otherareas within the transit service area.The transit proposals have included the use of conventional buses, express buses,commuter rail, and some form of Light Rapid Transit. The use of conventional and expressbuses have been initiated, but the later two suggestions are still before the planners and thepoliticians.Commuter Rail.One of the more persistent proposals to resolve commuter traffic in the North EastSector has to do with the concept of Commuter Rail. The origins of the modern suggestion forusing the local rail lines to move large numbers of rush hour commuters goes back to the timewhen the B.C. Electric Railway Co., finished converting its fleet of interurban and street carsto rubber tire buses in April, 1955. Transportation planning in the decade after this wasoriented to the construction of freeways to accommodate automobiles. In the mid 1960's,public concern over the impact on neighbourhoods from the routing of major roadwaysthrough urban areas, caused planners to look to transit as the most efficient means of movinglarge numbers of commuters.142The first regional planning document to suggest commuter rail, was a 1967 proposalfor a Metropolitan Vancouver Transportation study by the Lower Mainland Regional PlanningBoard (LMRPB, 1967: 1). A change in the political party governing British Columbia in 1972,brought about a change in urban transportation philosophy. Transit was considered to bemore effective than freeways and the Provincial Government, set about to up-grade theexisting inadequate transportation infrastructure. There was a suggestion to construct a LightRapid Transit line to service the new development on Burke Mountain as well as to make useof the existing railway lines to introduce commuter rail (Dunhill Development CorporationLtd., 1975a: Map 7).Negotiations were entered into with the C.P.R. and in the 1974 Burke Mountaindevelopment proposal, it was announced commuter rail was likely to be in place within twoyears (Dunhill Development Corporation Ltd., 1975a). A change of government in late 1975resulted in a corresponding change of philosophy on transportation. The North East Sectorland development plans were cancelled, and the commuter rail proposal was placed on hold.However, the increase in residential land use and increasing commuter traffic on the alreadyinsufficient road network of the study area, as well as pressure from the local councils andresidents, caused the Provincial Government to order a feasibility study of Commuter Railwithin the North East Sector in 1979 (Urban Transit Authority, 1980a). The following year amore extensive study was commissioned proposing an integrated commuter transit system forthe lower mainland, stretching from downtown Vancouver to Mission. The Rail section of theline would run as far as Port Coquitlam with a bus line extending further east to Mission(Urban Transit Authority, 1981).*fleNCity of VancouverFraser RiverCommuter Raildi■•..... ....r4Port Moody^•.04,4Port Coquitlam ----.45111•1101==1=111f..--11111111111MilesBurrard Inlet,...)peagsaal■ir a ossaan s143Map 6-9 Route of Commuter Rail.Source: Base Map, Parkinson, Tom E. "Light Rail in Western Canada: Vancouver,Edmonton, Calgary, Winnipeg." in Transit Canada May/June 1975 Volume XI Number 3,pages 7 to 10. Map illustrating possible routes for LRT and commuter rail. page 7.The GVRD in a 1982 five year conceptual plan for transit mentions negotiations wereunderway and upon completion (by late 1982) "it can be expected that the commuter rail/busservice . . . may commence service by early 1984." (Greater Vancouver Transit System,1982b: 42-44). During the negotiations with the C.P.R., the Railway announced that beforecommuter rail could use the Vancouver to Port Coquitlam line, up-grading and signalingequipment would be necessary. At this point the Provincial Government was involved withplanning an ALRT system (SkyTrain) for the GVRD, with a proposal for an extension fromNew Westminster to Lougheed Mall in Coquitlam as Phase 1, and a further extension toCoquitlam Centre sometime in the future when sufficient passenger traffic warranted itsconstruction.The Commuter Rail Project languished up to 1989, partially due to the cost ofimproving the C.P.R. line and the apparent reluctance on the part of the ProvincialGovernment to authorize another form of transit which might draw public support away from144the proposed ALRT line extension to Coquitlam. At this time, the Chief Operating Executiveof B.C. Transit, Mr. Michael O'Connor, announced Commuter Rail was dead (Burnaby Now,August 1, 1990: 5). A meeting of concerned Mayors from the North East Sector, Dewdney-Alouette Regional District, and other interested parties was held on August 22, 1989 in PortMoody to discuss means of reviving the project.In 1989, VIA Rail announced cut-backs of the cross-Canada rail passenger service. Aspart of the VIA route used C.P.R. right-of-way from New Westminster to Mission, interestedparties suggested commuter rail could make use of this route which would take passengers tothe Main Street Station of VIA Rail, and allow access to the adjacent SkyTrain line throughthe Main Street SkyTrain Station (Vogler, 1990; Smith, 1990a: 8). This concept was not newas the De Leuw Cather Report of 1970 on Transit suggested the use of the C.N./B.N. rail linefrom Main Street to New Westminster, then the use of the C.P. Rail line from there towardsMission (De Leuw Cather, 1970: Exhibit #6).In spite of the announcement by the Provincial Government of the demise ofcommuter rail, local politicians have been keeping the issue alive. "Burnaby North MLABarry Jones wants Burnaby Council to support his call for a trial commuter rail run." (TheBurnaby & New Westminster News, October 17, 1990: 13). At the present time the conceptof Commuter Rail is still before the public and may yet again be revived.The history of the evolution of the concept of commuter rail is a long and complicatedone. To adequately understand it and also to gain an understanding of the forces andprocesses involved in transportation planning and decision making in the Lower Mainland, amore extensive discussion of Commuter Rail can be found in Appendix #2, "Commuter Rail."Rapid Transit (L.R.T.) and Conventional Transit.De Leuw Cather & Co. 1970 suggested there would be need of Rapid Transit by theyear 2000 as the population of the Greater Vancouver Region was forecasted to double in 30years. There were to be four routes focused on the Central Business District in Vancouver.145There would be a line from the North Shore, that could have three sections. One would runinto West Vancouver, another would run north from the Inlet crossing to the Upper LevelsHighway, while the third would run parallel to Marine Drive to Lonsdale then run up towardsthe Upper Levels Highway (De Leuw Cather & Co., 1970: Exhibit #2). The next route wouldtravel south from the CBD along the Arbutus Railway Alignment to Richmond. The thirdroute would follow the old Central Park Interurban alignment paralleling Kingsway toEdmonds Street in Burnaby, then follow an alignment taking the Rapid Transit line down 6thStreet (Along the original Streetcar route), then across the Fraser River to Surrey. TheFourth and final route would follow Hastings Street, by placing the line underground fromClark to Willingdon (De Leuw Cather & Co., 1970: 42). The line was to later be extended tothe vicinity of Lougheed Mall. It was suggested feeder buses and automobiles would transportthe passengers to the Rapid Transit Stations.The idea of using LRT to service the suburbs in the North East Sector was firstproposed in the Burke Mountain New Community proposals presented in the mid 1970's(Dunhill Development Corporation Ltd., 1975a: 40). The use of LRT to serve the area wasconsidered at the time to be a reasonable proposal, as the abandoned right-of-way of the B.C.Electric Railway (from Port Moody to the Coquitlam Lake Dam) was available and could beupgraded for the purpose. However, this concept was abandoned when a change in theProvincial Government resulted in cancellation of the Burke Mountain Project.During the late 1970's and early 1980's when Light Rapid Transit was beingconsidered for the Lower Mainland, there were suggestions for an LRT line to serve the NorthEast Sector. When the form of the technology for LRT had been decided upon, in the early1980's (Urban Transit Authority, 1981/82: 12), and the route for the system was beingselected, there was the suggestion that after the initial line had been constructed, fromVancouver to New Westminster, branch lines be considered, to serve the suburbs.On March 1, 1982 the ground-breaking ceremony was held to mark the beginning ofconstruction of a demonstration section of the ALRT (Automated or Advanced Light Rapid)1rTo Port MoodyNorth Road/Barnet Highway RouteTo Cooultlam CentreN4Lougheed Highway CoquitlainLougheed Highway RouteIKing Edward Avenue^Lougheed Mall 2^ Park and Ride Lot/■^•^• 00^•North Road--021^,•\North Road Route -"al Columbia/Brunette RouteCity of New WestminsterI^Fraser River/4th_Street Stationel, (Columbia Street Station)/Mile146Transit), later to be known as SkyTrain. Shortly afterwards, construction of the main route,from the Waterfront to New Westminster was begun and was finished in late 1985. Therewere a number of studies undertaken at the time concerning the extension of the SkyTrain toLougheed Mall or to King Edward Avenue (site of a large park-and-ride lot) to serve theNorth East Sector. A 1983 study commissioned by the GVRD, examined the feasibility of theextension of the ALRT to both the North East Sector and Surrey (GVRD, 1983: 1).There were several possible routes available for ALRT to serve the North East SectorB.C. Transit, 1986: 1).Map 6-10 Light Rapid Transit routes.Source: Base Map, B.C. Transit. SkyTrain Extension to Coquitlam Transit Planning Study.Summary Report. Vancouver, B.C.: September 25, 1986. Figure 1 "Regional TransitSystem." Between pages 2 and 3.The first was an extension of the line from New Westminster following North Road toLougheed Mall. The advantage of this route was the access provided to an already existingmajor retail and transportation focal point. Another possible route to the Lougheed Mall wouldfollow Edmonds Street in Burnaby, then pass through Burnaby Park, across the 401 Freewayto reach the Mall (District of Burnaby, Manager's Report, 1986). This route offered the147advantage of being shorter than the route from New Westminster. A third proposal would seethe line follow Brunette Street to the Lougheed Highway, then east to King Edward Avenuewhere a large park-and-ride lot existed, located adjacent to the Lougheed Highway and the401 Freeway. This lot was in an industrial area, away from existing residential orretail/commercial uses. The soil conditions in the area are of a silt/peat nature which makefoundation construction extremely expensive.The ultimate destination for the Coquitlam ALRT line was the Coquitlam Centre Mall.The choice of the first leg of the project would possibly dictate the second. If Lougheed Mallwas chosen as the first destination, then the second leg would likely run north to Port Moody,then east to Coquitlam Centre Mall. This route would stimulate development of the vacantland on the north shore of Port Moody. If King Edward Avenue was chosen, then the mostlikely route would be one following the Lougheed Highway to Coquitlam Centre. Adisadvantage of this route would be the lands along it are either vacant or have low densityresidential use and thus there would not be the ridership to make the ALRT viable. Anadvantage of this route, however, might be the opportunity to create new higher densityresidential developments in the area and reduce the pressures upon farm lands south of theFraser River.A variation of the routing from Lougheed Mall, would be possible if the Edmonds routeto Lougheed Mall were used, as it would then be possible to choose between the Port Moodyalignment or the Lougheed Highway alignment (B.C. Transit, 1986: Figure 3).In late 1985, when the first section of the ALRT was completed, the ProvincialAuthorities decided due to the high costs of construction, any additional segments would haveto wait until there was sufficient demand to justify the expense. This state of affairscontinued until 1989, when traffic conditions deteriorated to such an extent that localpoliticians and residents began to pressure the Provincial Government to begin construction ofthis segment of the ALRT.148Current LRT Proposals. 1990.In 1989, the Minister in charge of Transit announced the Provincial Governmentwould extend SkyTrain (LRT) to Whalley in Surrey. The North East Sector Mayors becameincreasingly vocal over their area's need for transportation improvement especially when theSurrey extension was seen as a decision made more on political grounds, than need. At thistime the Provincial Government had sold a large parcel of undeveloped land in Coquitlam(Westwood Plateau). The Mayor of Coquitlam, Lou Sekora was reported in the localnewspaper as saying "I certainly can't support rezoning the Westwood Plateau lands until wehave some transit." (The Province, March 11, 1990: 5). The result of the local concern wasthe Provincial Government announcing the creation of a committee to assess the best route toserve the North East Sector and that construction of the first segment would begin in mid1992 (Smith, 1990b: 3). The terms of reference for the committee members was outlined incorrespondence sent to Burnaby and included in the Council's agenda (District of Burnaby,1989: 33-34).The Coquitlam SkyTrain Route Advisory Committee was initially authorized to studythree possible routes to the Lougheed Mall from the existing SkyTrain line.MileMap 6-11 North East Sector SkyTrain proposed routes.149Lougheed HighwayOn ■ 1111•11 • ••• a nil • •••• a NNW •Broadway/Lougheed RouteCariboo Road4•iiiiiiirdo: Lougheed Mall• • • • • •0,, a^I1.^.?cp1 IP-a-^.3o4' e,e,"' 7 /P .c.'ic / czc-I',Burnaby^/ o'b,tc'^Oc/'i) 4°' , ".gese^..•Edmonds Station• StiIIJ 4'—North Road RouteIIIFraser River•40^1Existing SkyTrain Line4th Street Station(Columbia Street Station)Source: Base Map, B.C. Transit. SkyTrain Extension to Coquitlam Transit Planning Study.Summary Report. Vancouver, B.C.: September 25, 1986. Figure 1 "Regional TransitSystem." Between pages 3 and 4.The first routes was to leave the line in New Westminster and follow North Road or BrunetteAvenue to the Mall. The second route was to leave the SkyTrain line near Edmonds Stationand follow an alignment along Edmonds Street, then through Robert Burnaby Park to theLougheed Mall. Finally, the third route was to leave the SkyTrain line at the BroadwayStation in Vancouver and follow the Lougheed Highway to the Lougheed Mall.The Broadway or Lougheed Highway SkyTrain route was removed from the terms ofreference for the Coquitlam SkyTrain Route Advisory Committee by the ProvincialGovernment in April, 1991 (Hilborn, 1991b: 9). An issue of the SkyTrain Coquitlam 150Extension public information paper, offered reasons for the removal of the Broadway routefrom consideration. These reasons include:--At this time it is outside the scope of the province's announced rapid transitprogram and funding.--it traverses the City of Vancouver, which has not been involved in theplanning process; and--compared to the other two corridors it provides poor connections to theexisting SkyTrain line. (B.C. Transit, 1991a)Burnaby council felt this decision did not take into consideration, the long term benefits theBroadway route offered. In an interview with a local newspaper, Burnaby Alderman DougDrummond, a member of the Coquitlam SkyTrain Route Advisory Committee, noted "thealignment would be more accessible to a greater number of people than a single extensionalong the Edmonds or New Westminster corridors." (Hilborn, 1991b: 9). Statistics providedby B.C. Transit, support this view. The statistics indicate the likely ridership of the Broadwayline would be 16.7 million compared with 10.6 million for Edmonds and 8.8 million for NewWestminster (B.C. Transit, 1991a: 3). The travel time for Broadway would be identical withthe Edmonds route at 26 minutes, compared to 35 minutes for the New Westminster route(B.C. Transit, 1991a: 3). The cost of the Broadway line at $480 million compared to $225 forNew Westminster and $245 million for Edmonds appears to be the principal reason forrejecting this route (B.C. Transit, 1991a: 3).A leaked confidential memo from a transportation consultant to the B.C. Transitpresident was published in the local Burnaby newspapers (Horn, 1991a: 1; Burnaby Now,April 24, 1991: 5). The memo suggests that despite a promise from Coquitlam SkyTrainRoute Advisory Committee, and B.C. Transit to consider all the routes and listen to thecomments and concerns of the affected citizens, a decision had already been made in favour ofthe Edmonds route. An editorial in a local newspaper commented that:151there is something fundamentally insulting in a process which promises thatthe public will have input before a decision is made and then seemingly ignoresthat process . . . A year ago, the premier herself, then transportation minister,inadvertently announced the Coquitlam SkyTrain extension would run alongthe Edmonds alignment . . . There have been too many 'inadvertent'references to the Edmonds route to attribute to absentmindedness. (Burnaby Now, April 24, 1991: 6)A result of the controversy has been the resignation of one of the Committee members and aloss of credibility in the route choice process (Hilborn, 1991c: 1, 5).In spite of the apparent reluctance of the provincial government to consider theBroadway/Lougheed Corridor in planning for the Coquitlam rapid transit extension, TrileaCentres, the owner of two shopping malls along the route decided to commission its ownfeasibility study. The Company hired six consulting groups to research and write the reporttitled Let's Do It Right! The Lougheed Corridor: A Key to Regional Transportation  (AitkenWreglesworth Associates et al., 1992), then presented the results to the Burnaby Council whowhere in support of the Broadway/Lougheed route over the other routes (Marziali, 1992: 3).The report concluded that the Broadway/Lougheed Corridor, aside from the higherconstruction costs, was a superior route to the other two (Aitken Wreglesworth et al, 1992:31). The superiority was seen to be in the size of the population served, greater developmentpotential of the lands along the Lougheed Highway, the potential for greater employmentcreation, and a lesser impact upon the environment and existing neighbourhoods (Marziali,1992: 3). The report also concluded the "Lougheed Corridor presents a major opportunity forenacting long term integrated land use and rapid transit planning." (Aitken WreglesworthAssociates et al., 1992: 32). The report suggested integrated long term land use and transitplanning should be the rational for judging the benefits of the choosing of the best route, notthe present rationale of "which route would provide the lowest capital cost terminus toterminus connection." (Aitken Wreglesworth Associates et al., 1992: 1).Two other possible routes had been suggested at the same time as the three routesthat have already been discussed. Early 1990, B.C. Transit announced two other possible152routes would be considered for study. These routes would run from the Waterfront Stationend of the existing SkyTrain line to the Pacific National Exhibition (PNE) grounds in EastVancouver, then one would follow the waterfront to Port Moody, while the other line wouldtravel south and around Burnaby Mountain to Coquitlam Centre (Austin & Turnbull, 1990:4).6.4 STUDY AREA TRAFFIC IMPACTS ON ADJACENT AREAS.Impacts on Adjacent Municipalities.This is the final part of the case study and will discuss the impacts the trafficproblems and their possible solution may have upon the municipalities adjacent to the NorthEast Sector. The two municipalities most directly impacted are the Municipality of Burnabyand the City of New Westminster. Burnaby.The Municipality of Burnaby has had to contend with traffic congestion on its majorroad network over the past decades. Burnaby "suffers from some of the worst motor-vehiclenightmares in the Lower mainland." (Smith, 1989a: 5). Staff Sergeant Ron Poulter, head ofthe Burnaby R.C.M.P.'s traffic section, "the largest traffic section of all the RCMPdetachments in Canada" (Smith, 1989a: 5), said:The major problem rests with commuters travelling in and out of the GreaterVancouver area, coming from their homes in the Fraser Valley or the northside of the Fraser River. Burnaby, meanwhile, has two major roads for thecommuters to use: the Lougheed Highway and Highway No. 1. BarnetHighway is also a well-used route."A lot of commuters from outside areas, commute through Burnaby totheir places of work and increase traffic on arterial routes in the municipality,"explained Poulter. The road system in the Lower Mainland is not adequate forcarrying the number of vehicles coming into the area each day, and has notkept up to the increase in population."Our roads are overloaded--that's the bottom line. There are just toomany cars for the amount of roads we have" (Smith, 1989a: 5).As the municipalities to the east develop, more commuter traffic is generated. A BurnabyAlderman commented "every community to the east of us would like to drive 1,000 roadsthrough Burnaby. And we don't need any new roads." (Burnaby Now, November 28, 1990:1535). In a newspaper article entitled "Burnaby won't be an intersection", the Mayor stated "Iwill oppose any road development which will create further traffic problems and congestionand is of little or no benefit to the citizens of Burnaby." (Holland, 1976: 5).The problem of traffic congestion is not a new phenomenon in Burnaby. In 1968 alocal newspaper printed an article titled "Traffic has to go somewhere in the future", andnoted that the question of "where and how will traffic flow is a problem plaguing council."(Burnaby Courier, May 9, 1968: 2). In 1989 another local newspaper printed an article titled"Burnaby plugged--Worsening of traffic snarls predicted." The article commented that:"Burnaby's network of streets and highways--important links for eastern commuters headingto Vancouver's downtown core--is fast becoming a smog producing plug instead of a funnel.. .. the Greater Vancouver traffic snarl is eroding Burnaby's quality of life." (Smith, 1989b: 3).A Burnaby alderman noted "part of the problem is the skyrocketing growth which has beencontinuing unchecked in eastern communities such as Coquitlam." (Smith, 1989b: 3).Again in 1989, another local newspaper carried a story that stated "Council wants thepublic to know they are aware of massive traffic problems in the area and are workingtowards a solution." (The Sunday News (Burnaby & New Westminster), April 23, 1989: A-3).These newspaper articles illustrate that the Burnaby Council and the public are awarethat a traffic problem exists, and are also aware of the causes for the problem.A major portion of the traffic from the municipalities east of Surrey have to use the401 or other main routes through Burnaby to reach employment in or near Vancouver.Burnaby possesses five main east/west roadways. They are Hastings, Lougheed, the Trans-Canada Highway (401 Freeway), Kingsway, and Marine Way, all of which are underProvincial Government control.N4Burnaby0^2cr.•■■[---7MilesBoundary Road1**1741,4).I^Marine Way154Map 6-12 East/west highway routes through Burnaby.Fraser RiverSource: Base Map, B.C. Transit. SkvTrain Extension to Coquitlam Transit Planning Study.Summary Report. Vancouver, B.C.: September 25, 1986. Figure 1 "Regional TransitSystem." Between pages 1 and 2.The Provincial Government can widen or modify these roads to accommodate increased trafficwithout taking into account the impact on the adjacent businesses and residents.In the late 1960's and early 1970's, residents along Burnaby's eastern boundarieswith Coquitlam and New Westminster were faced with large volumes of commuter trafficseeking to avoid the congestion on the main thoroughfares by searching for shortcuts alongresidential streets. The result of this was Burnaby Council ordering a number of streetsproviding access from 10th Avenue (the Burnaby/New Westminster Boundary) to be blockedto traffic. Along the Burnaby/Coquitlam boundary (along North Road north of the LougheedHighway) the Council order a number of streets on the west side of North Road to be blocked.There was considerable friction between the Councils of Burnaby and Coquitlam over thisaction. The Vancouver Sun Newspaper described the situation as being a "Traffic war155between Coquitlam and Burnaby" (Vancouver Sun, February 4, 1975: 18). Coquitlam wantedBurnaby streets open so morning rush hour traffic funnelling into the intersection of NorthRoad and Lougheed Highway and which created traffic congestion could be reduced by somevehicles using local residential streets as shortcuts to the Lougheed Highway. This frictionwas later reduced by the construction of the East Broadway connector allowing Coquitlamtraffic to bypass the Lougheed and Barnet Highways and reach Vancouver destinations viathe use of Gaglardi Way-Curtis/Parker Streets.Recently, the Provincial Ministry of Highways and Transportation announced theBarnet Highway would be widened to four lanes, to accommodate increased traffic from theNorth East Sector, and Hastings Street which is the main road through North Burnaby wasto be widened from four lanes to six through the elimination of on street parking. The localresidents and merchants became upset as the already heavy traffic volumes during rushhours were disrupting business. Traffic volumes on Hastings Street have been measured at44,500 vehicles per day (Burnaby Now, October 10, 1990: 3). Local residents were also upsetas the already heavy traffic along Hastings Street served to divide the neighbourhood, and asthe capacity of the street was exceeded, there was spill-over of commuter traffic onto the sidestreets. Burnaby Council had offered an alternative plan, which would see the LougheedHighway and the Freeway widened from four to six lanes to reduce the amount of traffic onHastings (Burnaby Now, October 10, 1990: 3). In order to protect and preserve the uniquecharacter and quality of life of North Burnaby, the Burnaby Planning Department recentlyproduced the Hastings Street Area Land Use Plan (Hastings Street Advisory Committee,1990). This Plan was developed to aid in the revitalization of the neighbourhood and topreserve its "village atmosphere".Burnaby Council discussed the announcement and suggested any additional trafficlanes created be used for transit or car/van pool (High Occupancy Vehicle or HOV) use.Residents along the Curtis Street access route to Simon Fraser University had over theprevious 25 years, to contend with ever increasing numbers of commuters using Gaglardi156Way as a by-pass route to the already congested Lougheed and Hastings/Barnet Highways.In 1989, traffic counts placed the volume of traffic using Curtis Street at 20,000 vehicles perday. This volume was far in excess of the amount of traffic one might expect a residentialcollector street.The local residents were upset by unfulfilled promises made by the ProvincialGovernment in the past to restore Curtis Street to residential use by constructing a longpromised connector between Gaglardi Way and Hastings Street (Choosing Our Futures PublicMeeting, Burnaby, April 17, 1990). Construction of this connector had been stalled as theMinistry of Highways became aware over the years that the increase in traffic along bothBarnet and Gaglardi Way would result in a bottleneck where the connector joined HastingsStreet.A public information meeting was held in North Burnaby on April 9, 1991,(Barnet/Hastings People Moving Project public meeting) to provide information on theprovincial Ministry of Highway and Transportation's plans to widen the Barnet Highway andupgrade Hastings Street (Prince, 1991a: 3). There was also a proposal to construct the longawaited Hastings/Gaglardi connector (Burnaby Now, April 14, 1991: 4).The residents in the North Burnaby areas to be affected by the Barnet/Hastings andthe Hastings/Gaglardi projects were angered by the proposals. Local newspapers reportedaffected citizens were organizing to "make sure the provincial government minds its p's andq's when expanding Barnet Highway." (Prince, 1991b: 5). The local residents' concerns werethat "Our kids and ours community are in serious danger and we have to stop this damnthing now." (Prince, 1991b: 5).Residents along two blocks of Inlet Drive are outraged with a plan that couldmove the Barnet Highway within 20 feet of their bedroom windows. (Hilborn,1991d: 4)The construction of Marine Way in South Burnaby, a project designed to removecommuter and heavy truck traffic from the two lane, largely residential Marine Drive, was157begun in the late 1970's. Upon completion, it did alleviate traffic congestion and theinconvenience experienced by residents who lived near or along Marine Drive. However, by1990, the heavy traffic volumes using Marine Way were again beginning to impact localresidents through noise and visual pollution. A local resident in a letter to Burnaby Councilnoted "the peaceful vista he used to have over Marine Way has now changed. 'The constantstream of traffic . . . creates a cacophony of sound that comes across the flat lands of themarket gardens and hits our homes' " (Horn, 1990: 5). Another local resident, in a Letter ToThe Editor stated that "the incessant din of truck engines and tires only makes us nervousand irritated." (Rettich, 1990: 6).The proposed Coquitlam extension of the SkyTrain could also have a great impactupon the residents of Burnaby. If the Edmonds/Cariboo route was chosen, then the largelyresidential area of East Burnaby would be subjected to the noise and visual pollution thatcould result if the line were constructed at or above grade. The immediate impact upon thecommunity would be "the expropriation of about 63 homes and a dozen businesses . . . theline would also cut through the northern end of Robert Burnaby park, over an existingswimming pool." (Horn, 1991b: 3).There would also be other impacts, such as developers seeking to rezone lands at ornear stations in order to increase densities or change uses to retail/commercial which wouldcreate traffic and parking congestion in what was a quiet residential area. The East BurnabyRate Payers Association held a public meeting on October 12, 1989, just after the Coquitlamextension was announced and emphasized their opposition to the choice of this route to thelocal Member of the Legislative Assembly, the Mayor, members of the Municipal Council andmembers of the press (East Burnaby Rate Payers Association Meeting, 1989).Burnaby Council, during the municipal election of November, 1990, included areferendum to dedicate certain municipal parks to ensure no other but the prescribed usecould be made of the land. This "Parks Referendum" also had the consequence of placing anobstacle to the possible routing of the SkyTrain to Coquitlam along the Edmonds Street route,158as this line would have to pass through Robert Burnaby Park. The Mayor of Coquitlam statedthat "Burnaby's decision to hold the vote without telling the affected communities showedcontempt for the Coquitlam rapid transit advisory committee." (Hilborn, 1991e: 1). A citizenwho resides near the proposed Edmonds Street SkyTrain route commented that she did notwant "a noisy concrete eyesore" (Arsenault, 1991: 6) passing through her neighbourhood. Thesame citizen in a letter to the editor of a local newspaper, expressed cynicism over the processinvolved in the consultation with the public by the various Provincial Government bodies.`grassroots' input receives only head nodding from Transit and the Socreds,while in the back rooms they go right ahead without our backing. (Arsenault,1991: 6)Coquitlam Council has indicated it wants the Lougheed Mall extension of SkyTrain begunimmediately, and strongly endorsed the Edmonds route (Mark, 1991: 2). A BurnabyAlderman was upset with Coquitlam Council passing a motion showing strong support for theEdmonds route. The Alderman commented this action by Coquitlam Council was "a great signof disrespect for Burnaby." (Hilborn, 1991b: 9).Whatever transportation choices are made, the Municipality of Burnaby will beaffected, being located between Vancouver and the areas to the east where population growthwill likely occur.6.5 CONCLUSIONS.There has been four decades of planning studies completed, and many projectsproposed to resolve the North East Sector traffic problems. Compared to the region as awhole, the North East Sector has received a reasonable share of the transportationinfrastructure funding provided by the province. Despite this, however, the upgrading ofexisting , and construction of new infrastructure has not kept pace with the increasingdemand for more capacity from expanding automobile oriented residential development withinthe North East Sector and the municipalities to the east.159At present the increased generation of traffic from the North East Sector has causedtraffic congestion in adjacent municipalities. The congestion has caused disruption to localbusinesses and residents. This has created the need for transportation infrastructureimprovements within these municipalities to accommodate the increased traffic. Thesemunicipalities prefer a solution that reduces the volume of traffic, instead of widening ofexisting roadways. The preferred solution would see both a greater role for transit, and aswell as other means of increasing the movement of people rather than automobiles.160CHAPTER 7 Planning Process.7.1 INTRODUCTION.The chapter presents a descriptive history of the land use and transportation plans forthe North East Sector and the Greater Vancouver Region. Prior to 1950, most smallmunicipalities did not possess planning bodies as they exist today. The City of Vancouver wasan exception as it had the Vancouver Town Planning Commission (Vancouver Town PlanningCommission, 1943). This Commission served to oversee the development of the City asoutlined in the "Town Plan" which was developed between 1926 and 1930 by the firm ofHarland Bartholemew. The Vancouver Town Planning Commission was aware of "the factthat the planning of bordering municipalities has an important bearing on the value of ourown plan." (Vancouver Town Planning Commission, 1943: 5).The Commission worked to create a Lower Mainland Planning Association in 1937.The Association's members included: Vancouver, Surrey, Burnaby, New Westminster, NorthVancouver, West Vancouver, Richmond, Delta, and Coquitlam. By 1938 the Associationsuggested a Provincial Planning Bureau be formed, and lobbied for a number of years for itscreation. It was not until after the Second World War the Provincial Government created aplanning organization with the power to co-ordinate regional planning in the Lower Mainland.in 1948 the Town Planning Act was amended to authorize the definition of`regional areas' and the establishment of 'regional planning boards'. (LMRPB,1969: unnumbered first page)This legislation recognizing the need for planning on a regional basis, and led to the creationin 1949 of the Lower Mainland Regional Planning Board of British Columbia (LMRPB). TheLMRPB was empowered to offer planning services to the local municipalities and prepareregional plans.161The Lower Mainland Regional Planning Board, functioned until 1969, at which timeits responsibilities were redistributed to four regional districts including the GreaterVancouver Regional District which was created in 1967.The original function of the Regional District was to provide hospital financing. Otherfunctions included since that time were, planning, parks, water and drainage, and sewerage.In 1983, amendments to The Municipal Act, removed the planning function (Bish, 1987: 37).It was felt by the Provincial Government that the local municipalities were better placed tohandle planning matters within their own jurisdictions than to have another level ofbureaucracy duplicating their efforts.the legislation provides for the removal of the power of regional districts toenact and enforce official regional plans. These plans have become anunnecessary level of land use control, particularly in view of the number ofcomprehensive municipal plans now in place. The government also wishes tostrengthen municipal government, and this legislation reinforces the primaryrole of municipalities in determining the land use pattern of local communities.(Province of B.C., 1983: 473)The actions by the provincial government on matters of concern to municipalities havenot always been welcomed. The municipalities, as illustrated by their desire for a mechanismfor co-ordinating matters of regional concern, had to lobby long and hard to achieve their goal.The provincial government on occasion was known to act in an arbitrary manner and infringeupon municipal jurisdiction, and impose obligations while removing the power formunicipalities to have a say in activities. The next section will discuss the matter of municipalfears of provincial interference in local jurisdiction.The Uneasy Municipal-Provincial Relations.There has traditionally been a sense of mistrust between municipal and provincialpoliticians and bureaucracies in British Columbia. The municipalities have chaffed underprovincial inertia in matters of finance and changes in jurisdiction and decision making power.This mistrust has over the years served to preserve the fragmentation of action contributingto the inability of local and provincial governments to resolve regional problems.162Since the early 1950's municipal government has been concerned with the erosion ofits powers and jurisdiction. At that time, the Minister of Municipal Affairs conducted a reviewof the Municipal Act. In 1954, a policy statement of the Union of British ColumbiaMunicipalities expressed the concerns of the municipalities on, "the damaging effect on localgovernment when senior governments invade the fields of endeavour best handled at the locallevel" (Union of British Columbia Municipalities, 1954: 10), and "the desirability of checkingthe trend to set up separate authorities for special purposes thereby losing the co-ordinatingeffect and overall consideration which a municipal council can supply." (Union of BritishColumbia Municipalities, 1954: 10). The municipalities felt threatened by provincial actionsthat could be taken without regard for the wishes and concerns of the municipalities.The fear of the provincial government imposing legislation potentially detrimental tomunicipal power and freedom of action, spurred the municipal union to seek a strengtheningof their position through a more equitable sharing of the powers possessed by both theprovincial and federal governments. In October, 1955 at the Dominion-Provincial Conference,"for the first time in the history of Dominion-Provincial relations, the majority of theProvinces of Canada had direct municipal representation on their respective delegations."(Union of British Columbia Municipalities, 1956: 36). The municipal delegates to theConference suggested the municipalities "use all our influence and all our energy in bringingabout, first, a new tax agreement, and secondly, a new allocation of responsibilities." (Unionof British Columbia Municipalities, 1956: 37).At the Dominion-Provincial Conference held the following year, the municipaldelegates commented on the possibility of a Federal-Provincial-Municipal Conference beingheld.Prior to the last general election the Prime Minister expressed his sympathywith the idea of such a Conference. This naturally raised municipal hopes thatmunicipal representatives would be invited to take their place at the nextFederal-Provincial Conference, not as silent observers but as activeparticipants, even if only informally.163Clearly this was bound to raise constitutional issues of some delicacybut it was assumed, perhaps too readily, that even if no place could be foundfor municipal representatives within the letter of the constitution, the PrimeMinister might succeed in finding a place for them within its spirit. . . . wemust accept the fact that a three way meeting depends more on the consent ofthe Premiers of the ten Provinces than it does on the invitation of the PrimeMinister of Canada. (Union of British Columbia Municipalities, 1958: 31).As much as they would like to see a more equitable division of power with both senior levelsof governments, the municipalities realized they were under the control of the provincialgovernment, and would ultimately depend upon its good offices for any change in municipalpowers and jurisdictions.There has been a continuing struggle between the provincial and municipal levels ofgovernment over jurisdictional matters since the events of the early 1950's. The province onoccasion has tried to shift responsibility for the provision of some services to themunicipalities while at the same time withholding the decision making powers and notproviding extra sources of revenue to cover the costs of the additional services.An example of the struggle between the two levels of government is illustrated in Bill72 "land Use Act" (Province of British Columbia, 1982b: 9050) presented to the Legislaturein 1982. The President of the Union of British Columbia Municipalities described the proposedlegislation as going "much farther than first reports that it would abolish regional planningand co-ordination among municipalities." (The Province, July 28, 1982: A-4). Section 19 wasparticularly objectionable to municipal politicians. The designated speaker of the officialopposition said of the legislation, "the minister will have the authority, personally, to rewritebylaws--personally to redraw and redesign local plans and local authority in the execution ofthose plans." (Province of British Columbia, 1982b: 9053). In addition to this feature, thePresident of the Union of Municipalities noted "another major cause for complaint, . . . is aclause giving cabinet the power to force a municipality to accept a development 'if the cabinet,not the municipality and regardless of local planning, thinks it is in the public interest'." (TheProvince, July 28, 1982: A-4). A member of the provincial opposition commented on Bill 72 assignalling:164the end of regional government. It signals the beginning of a set of committeesthat act, so to speak as spiritual advisors to local government. They will haveno planning authority, except in the unincorporated areas. Those areas are notwhere the problems of overlap and duplication ordinarily lie. It is in thoseareas of built-up community, be it in greater Vancouver, greater Victoria or insome of the other rapidly expanding districts of the province, where thoseconflicts of land use, problems of duplication and difficulties of planning lie.This bill spells the end of regional government as a means of resolvingdisputes between municipalities. . . . In fact, for all practical purposes this billturns back the clock and will return notions of regional planning to the prewarera when no one believed in these things at all; when municipalities conducteda kind of range warfare, attempting to seize from one another territory andassets; when no regional authority had the opportunity to help them behave ina far more useful and intelligent way. This bill takes us back to a prewarBritish Columbia, before people realized the value of regional planning,strategies, development and collaboration. (Province of British Columbia,1982b: 9052).The municipal union saw the regional districts as having a positive influence through theprovision of a structure to resolve inter-municipal concerns. The attempts by the provincialgovernment to reduce the existing functions of the regional districts was seen by themunicipal governments as a threat to their powers. The municipal governments had lobbiedlong and hard during the 1930's and 1940's for the creation of the regional district for thelower mainland, and again for the creation of the smaller regional districts, the legislation forwhich was passed in 1965 (Bish, 1987: 33). This lobbying was partially initiated by theprovincial government reducing its financial contributions to the planning board during the1950's and early 1960's (Union of British Columbia Municipalities, 1959: 20).The antagonism is illustrated in a 1982 speech by an opposition member in theprovincial legislature.Greater Vancouver, for many years, has lived with the problems of rapidgrowth of a residential, commercial and industrial order. They have dealt withthose problems as best they could, initially on a voluntary basis. It's a matterof public record that when the former planning review agency for greaterVancouver decided that it could not countenance the Roberts Bankdevelopment, W.A.C. Bennett shut them down. In 1968, when the provincialgovernment of the day ran into opposition from the version of regionalgovernment of the day that existed, instead of dealing with the planningconflicts they encountered, they wiped out the planners. (Province of BritishColumbia, 1982b: 9053).W.A.C. Bennett was the premier of the province for the period 1952 through 1972.165The information provided by the examples, makes it clear that the municipalgovernments have good reason to fear any attempt by the senior level of government atchanging or streamlining local government or bureaucracy. Inevitably within the proposedlegislation, there is always the possibility the provincial government will interfere in localjurisdictions and dilute local decision making powers. This fear by local governments of theloss of powers has served to preserve and intensify the fragmented nature of departmentaland governmental activities.7.2 COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING STUDIES.Between 1952 and 1983, in spite of fragmented authority, the Lower MainlandPlanning Board and the Greater Vancouver Regional District prepared a number of majorplanning studies that had significant impacts upon development within the region. These willbe reviewed so the origins of the present day transportation problems can be betterunderstood, in light of the remedies proposed, and those adopted.The Lower Mainland Looks Ahead. 1952 Study.This study was the first major undertaking of the Lower Mainland Regional PlanningBoard. The purpose of the study was to gather the information necessary to outline a plan forthe development of the region. The report emphasized the need to co-ordinate developmentwithin the region so the best use might be made of the limited developable land. The studyfound there were developmental pressures upon land in the floodplains and on agriculturallands.An important observation made by the study was:since traffic on roads depends on the number and distribution of the peopleusing them the planning of highways must be preceded by the planning offuture residential and industrial areas. (Lower Mainland Regional PlanningBoard, 1952: 32)166The desirability of linking land use and transportation planning, was seen as an importantconsideration as:the proportion of automobile owners in the population is still increasing .. .even without any increase in population, traffic volumes can be expected toincrease by at least one quarter. (Lower Mainland Regional Planning Board,1952: 32)A recommendation to reduce commuting was to move away from the concept of theregion being focussed upon a single core, and consider "a constellation of smaller communities. . . clustered around a centre containing the specialized commercial, professional and culturalfacilities which none of the smaller communities can afford alone." (LMRPB, 1952: 40). Thisscheme, however, depended upon a network of good roads linking the centres and thedecentralization of work places.The Land Use Component of the 1955-59 Highway Studies.The Technical Committee for Metropolitan Highway Planning, recognized theimportance of land use in calculating the traffic generation. In the 1955-56 segments of thestudy, an inventory of land use, and a technical study of population and land use forecastswere included.The travel desire patterns and traffic usage are, to a large extent, the functionof the development of the land use pattern and of the transportation facilitiesavailable. . . . detailed information on the existing spatial distribution of landuses is essential to a knowledge of the cause of traffic movement. (TechnicalCommittee for Metropolitan Highway Planning [TCMHP], 1955-56: 18)The study also recognized the necessity to inventory land use, not only to explain the existingtraffic situation, but also to serve as a basis for forecasting what the future transportationneeds might be, in relation to different potential land use patterns. It should be noted that thestudy found the predominant land use in the region was residential, with only three per centof the total land are devoted to commercial and industrial use (TCMHP, 1955-56: 3).167The travel mode at this time was predominantly by automobile. "An average of1,227,900 person trips occur daily, of which 979,400 or 80 percent are made by motor vehicleand 248,500 or 20 percent, by public transit." (TCMHP, 1955-56: 3). The objective of thetransportation study was focussed upon the highway needs of the region, as the automobilewas, not only the predominant mode, it was thought its use would increase even further andthe building of more highways would solve any transportation problem that might occur.Public transit, however, was not entirely forgotten. In 1959 the Technical Committeecommissioned a report entitled "Freeways with Rapid Transit" (TCMHP, 1958-59c) whichsuggested the use of high speed buses on the freeways.The Technical Committee's studies of the region were comprehensive and the datacollected served as a basis for future studies of land use and transportation.Land for Living Reports. 1961/63 Chance and Challenge Report. 1964.In 1961, it was decided there was a need for a regional plan for the Lower Mainland.The Lower Mainland Regional Planning Board initiated studies of the industrial sector, andthe residential sector so future development could be co-ordinated. The Land for Living Reportwas concerned with residential land development in the Lower Mainland. Haphazarddevelopment or urban sprawl was identified as a major problem. There were foursupplementary reports covering such aspects of residential land use as, the attitudes ofresidents in the sprawl areas, the patterns of residential development, the infrastructureneeds of suburban areas, and the consequence of urban sprawl.The Chance and Challenge Report of January, 1964, was a proposed regional plan forthe Lower Mainland. The report presented a concept for the region.The Regional Concept reflects two main ideas:1) the development of a number of Valley Cities of limited size surrounded bybelts of farmland, and(2) a regional freeway network linking these cities. (LMRPB, 1964a: 7)168The report called for the satellite cities to be as economically independent as possible, thoughit recognized that the metropolitan core would still be the dominant employment centre(LMRPB, 1964a: 9).Under the heading of contributory programs, Provincial Highways are identified asimportant to the implementation of the regional plan.A freeway network is essential, not only to accommodate automobile and trucktraffic but to give the region, through the use of high-speed freeway buses, itsbest hope of economic public transportation. (LMRPB, 1964a: 22)This passage indicates planners at this time believed that freeways were the answer totransportation needs, and if public transit were to be initiated, it should make use of thisfreeway network. There was also the recognition various Provincial and Federal agenciescould play an important role in ensuring the recommendations of the plan were achieved.Some of the agencies included: the Provincial Department of Highways, the Ministry ofMunicipal Affairs, the Department of Lands, B.C. Hydro and the B.C. Telephone Companies,and the Central Housing and Mortgage Corporation (now Canada Housing and Mortgage)(LMRPB, 1964a: 22).The report recognized the importance of the automobile for travel at that time."Modern urban life depends on the ability to move freely, chiefly by means of theautomobile." (LMRPB, 1964a: 9). It should be noted the report made use of the word"Livable" in reference to the creation of cities. This word would surface again as part of thetitle of a major report on the quality of life and methods to preserve it, in 1975.Official Regional Plan for Lower Mainland. 1966.In 1966, the various agencies involved with planning within the lower mainlandregion, formulated a plan to guide the development of the region. It stated:169The plan serves as a policy framework within which local policies can beformulated, provides guidelines for private actions, and acts as a vehicle for co-ordinating the activities of the senior governments and their Agencies withinthe Region. (LMRPB, 1966b: 2)The plan focussed on controlling the development of land, to achieve a balance of residentialand employment growth. It anticipated a continued increase in population and set out aframework of broad concepts to guide development.There were a number of general policies: to have orderly development; an adequateenvironment; most suitable land utilization; an efficient transportation system; and a soundregional economy (LMRPB, 1966b: 3).As part of the planning process, the LMRPB in 1967 presented a proposal for ametropolitan Vancouver and region transportation study to provide the necessary backgroundfor a dynamic growth model for the Lower Mainland (LMRPB, 1967). The study suggested areview of the existing transportation network "with a view to advising on an adequatetransportation system to serve transportation demands and to support an accepted regionaldevelopment pattern." (LMRPB, 1967: 1). The study as envisioned was not carried out whenthe Lower Mainland was divided into four of regional districts in 1967.Livable Regions Report. 1975.In the early 1970's it was recognized by the politicians, some members of the publicand planners that the Greater Vancouver Region was growing at a rate far in excess of therest of the country. The Greater Vancouver Regional District (GVRD) population was growingat 2.9 per-cent per year compared to a country wide growth rate of 1.5 per-cent (GVRD,1975: 5). This presented a number of challenges to the quality of life within the region. Ahigh rate of population growth created pressures upon the infrastructure and housing withinthe region, and contributed to traffic problems. The increased demand for housing acceleratedthe pressures to convert agricultural lands to residential use.170The Livable Region Report identified five strategies for managing growth in order topreserve the quality of life of the region. These strategies were arrived at through a series ofconsultations, that took place between 1971 and 1975 (GVRD, 1975: 8). The five strategieswere:1. Achieve residential growth targets in each part of the region.2. Promote a balance of jobs to population in each part of the region.3. Create regional town centres.4. Provide a transit-oriented transportation system linking residential areas,regional town centres and major work areas.5. Protect and develop regional open space. (GVRD, 1975: 10)These strategies required the regulation of land use so jobs and residences could be located inthe same areas to reduce commuting. This necessitated the preservation of industrial land inthe suburbs so there would be sufficient land available to accommodate industry when theneed arose (GVRD, 1977: 5). The creation of Regional Town Centres linked by public transit(Light Rapid Transit or Fastbus) (GVRD, 1975: 47) would reduce the number of long distancetrips and this would lessen the need for highway construction.Public concern about traffic congestion, air pollution, reduction in the ability to moveabout freely, lengthening commuting times, and increasing the costs of movement, broughtabout a change in the emphasis in transportation planning. Public transit began to be seen asthe most effective means of moving commuters. In order to make public transit economicallyviable, there was a need to ensure sufficient population density along the routes. Thedecentralization of industry and the encouragement of regional centres was seen as the meansfor creating nodes with sufficient density to make public transit viable.The concern for efficient transit is expressed in the Livable Region report. One of thesuggestions made was to prepare corridor designs for Light Rapid Transit. These designswould have to be made in consultation with agencies such as the Provincial Government, themunicipalities, and the GVRD so that "the engineering of the route, the provision ofcommunity facilities and land use controls support each other in providing goodtransportation." (GVRD, 1975: 50). The GVRD recognized the importance of transportation in171the shaping of regional growth and the need to co-ordinate transportation planning with landuse to achieve the greatest benefits.Coquitlam Town Centre Plan. 1976.In keeping with the concept of creating a series of satellite town centres in thesuburbs, the District of Coquitlam in 1973 begun a process to create an "Advance Plan" for atown centre for the District (District of Coquitlam, 1976: 1). The idea of satellite town centresin the suburbs was first proposed in the LMRPB's 1952 Land for Living Report, as a possiblemeans of reducing the amount of travel commuters would have to endure.Since the late 1960's, Coquitlam and Port Coquitlam vied for the right to locate aregional town centre within their respective boundaries (see Chapter 5 Section 2.4 "TownCentre Controversy" for the background to the rivalry). As the GVRD Directors could notdecide where the Town Centre should be located, Coquitlam decide it would build its own.Between 1973 and 1976, there were a series of studies that looked at various aspects andimpacts of the possible locations for a town centre.The issues of concern were that:1. The GVRD established a policy to create a regional town centre in theBarnet Highway corridor.2. The GVRD proposed Light Rapid Transit to serve the regional town centres.3. Negotiations with C.P. Rail were initiated to introduce commuter trainsbetween Mission and Vancouver, thereby establishing a potential in Coquitlamfor a major commuter station.4. The Ministry of Housing announced a large land assembly programme inthe Burke Mountain area .. .5. Several major developments were proposed by private developmentcompanies. (District of Coquitlam, 1976: 4)The studies evaluated the North East Sector for potential regional centre locations andpresented the advantages and disadvantages of each site (District of Coquitlam, 1976: 56-57).For the District of Coquitlam's proposed site, it was found that 51.9 per cent of areawas vacant (574.1 acres) (District of Coquitlam, 1976: 76). Also reviewed was the existingtransportation infrastructure and future needs of the area. "The area at present is exclusively172automobile-oriented, with no local public transportation except for Fast-Bus connections atWestwood Mall." (District of Coquitlam, 1976: 84). The transportation needs were on twolevels, local and regional. Locally, there would have to be extensive road construction to servethe proposed regional town centre and the potential developments that would ultimately beexpected to occur in the surrounding vacant lands. Regionally, the existing major roads wouldhave to upgraded. There was the suggestion Light Rapid Transit should be built to connectthe regional town centre and Vancouver, and commuter rail should be considered as a viablemeans of linking the North East Sector with the downtown core of Vancouver (District ofCoquitlam, 1976: 43-46).The study listed the options Coquitlam had available in order to create a viable towncentre, and the likely changes in land use, that could be expected under a variety oftransportation and zoning scenarios.Official Regional Plan Update. 1979/1980.In 1979, a review of the 1966 Official Regional Plan was undertaken by the fourRegional Districts replacing the Lower Mainland Regional Planning Board. A report on thestate of the Lower Mainland, entitled The Way Ahead was produced. The rationale for thereview stemmed from the changes that had occurred over the previous 13 years. There hadbeen accelerated growth in all parts of the lower mainland, the population was aging with anaccompanying change in housing, and transportation needs.A number of important trends became evident from the study. There was a continuedhigh rate of growth of households and in the growth of the labour force: the process ofurbanization was still spreading into rural lands in the Lower Fraser Valley; increaseddensities had reduced the rate of land consumption for housing; and finally, there was agreater interdependence between the various parts of the Lower Mainland (GVRD et al.,1979: 16). This information was used to review and revise the 1966 Official Regional Plan.173In 1980, the revised Official Regional Plan for the Lower Mainland of BritishColumbia was produced. The review found much of the projected population growth was likelyto take place outside the Greater Vancouver Region, while the projected growth ofemployment was likely to continue to occur mainly within downtown Vancouver or theimmediately adjacent municipalities (GVRD et al, 1982: 8).This would lead to an increase in commuting. The projected increase in the numbers ofcommuters and lengths of trips, "would require a doubling of the highway capacity that wasin place in 1980, at a staggering cost in new roads and bridges and in disruption of existingcommunities in the metropolitan areas." (GVRD et al, 1982: 9). The report went on to saythat the dispersed pattern of development encouraged by the availability of the automobile,had created a situation where only the automobile was flexible enough to service thetransportation needs of the area.Without a concerted effort to change land-use patterns in conjunction withtransportation improvements, the region will continue to become increasinglydependent on the private automobile and its transportation problems willbecome increasingly intractable. (GVRD et al, 1982: 9)The report suggested a number of changes to update the 1966 Official Regional Plan. Thefirst was to create fewer and smaller satellite cities. The second was to define more fully whatwas meant by the "Sea of Green", to reflect the necessity to preserve farmlands andrecreation spaces. Finally, "the emphasis on freeways has been redirected to include othermodes of transportation in order to conserve energy and reduce dependence on the privateautomobile" (GVRD et al, 1982: 16). Thus there was a realization amongst the planners andpoliticians there had to be a change in thinking on land use and transportation to reducetraffic congestion and community disruption.Review and Update of Livable Regions Report. 1990.For a period of nearly 15 years, there had not been a major review of the 1975 GVRDLivable Regions Report (GVRD, 1975). The goals and objectives outlined in the Report had174been followed by the local planning authorities and the results were approximately what hadbeen desired. In 1988, with the population of the Lower Mainland increasing rapidly, theGVRD decided there was a need to review the Livable Regions Concept.A series of public meetings were held in early 1989 (Burnaby Now, February 15,1989: 3). There was also a large gathering of experts on various aspects of urban problems,to review the concerns expressed by the public. One of the series of seminars was titled"Urban Mobility." This seminar noted that:the difficulty of transportation development given the region's wedge shapeand water crossings, the coordination of transportation development given thenumber of authorities involved, and the reliance on automobiles to servewidely dispersed job and residence locations. (GVRD, 1990c: 1).The seminar also noted the municipalities in the North East Sector were planning forresidential growth, but transportation development and employment were not increasing at asufficient rate to reduce the need for commuting and the resulting traffic congestion (GVRD,1990c: 5).The results of this review were expressed in a series of publications which were titledChoosing Our Future (GVRD, 1990c). From the information provided from the review, thesteps to the creation of a more livable region were outlined in a report entitled Creating Our Future (GVRD, 1990d). Section 3 of the report, discussing "Conserving our land resources",dealt with the need; to balance land uses throughout the region, tame the automobile throughthe improvement of public transit, and continue to emphasis the importance of the regionalcentres concept. The question of means of encouraging people to live close to where they workwas also researched (GVRD, 1990e).7.3 TRANSPORTATION STUDIES.In the early 1950's the inadequacies of the transportation infrastructure in the LowerMainland created a need for action. This brought about a series of transportation planningstudies and reports. The continued high growth of the region's population and the effects of175automobile oriented suburban development had meant each road improvement whichincreased accessibility, stimulated greater development which in a short time rendered theimprovements inadequate for the increasing needs.The major transportation studies from 1955 to the present will be reviewed in order toprovide pertinent information on the planning process that generated the presenttransportation infrastructure and influenced the current land use.The 1955 to 1959 Highway Studies.In the early 1950's concern about the rapidly increasing population of the LowerMainland, and the resulting traffic congestion caused the Provincial and MunicipalGovernments to establish a committee to plan for the highway needs of the region. TheTechnical Committee for Metropolitan Highway Planning embarked on a lengthy study of thepresent and possible future transportation needs.The emphasis of the Committee's mandate was on Highways as the main means oftransportation was the automobile. Increased prosperity meant more people could afford toown automobiles and thus avoid the inconvenience of utilizing public transit. It was during thedecade after the Second World War, with the decreased dependency upon transit, people wereable to locate their residences in those areas not serviced by transit.The Committee's work involved collecting data on the future transportation needs. Thedata included trip generation by land use, motor vehicle trip density, origin-destinationsurveys, screenlines, inventorying the existing roads and bridges that serviced the study area,and listing the current land use in the study area (Technical Committee for MetropolitanHighway Planning, 1955-56). The data was used to calculate current and futuretransportation demand (Technical Committee for Metropolitan Highway Planning, 1958-59a& 1958-59b).176The 1960's Highway Studies.The transportation needs of the City of Vancouver were extensively studied during thedecades of the 1950's and 1960's. The accepted view at the time was the need for additionalcrossings of Burrard Inlet so land development could continue to occur on the North Shore(Pendakur, 1972: 17).During the 1960's a series of transportation studies were commissioned. These studiesproposed the construction of the freeways suggested in the 1950's studies, through the city tothe C.B.D. These freeways were to connect with the proposed bridges designed to improvetraffic access from the North Shore to Vancouver. The rationale for these proposals was toensure the core of the city would retain its pre-eminence and the value of the land wouldcontinue to increase.A Major redevelopment plan "Project 200", called for the building of a Freeway intothe downtown area to link up with the Trans-Canada Highway (Highway #1 or 401), whichterminated just at the eastern boundary of the City. One scheme was for a waterfrontfreeway and another for one cutting its way through the working class neighbourhoods ofEast Vancouver (Pendakur, 1972: 59). The result of the studies and proposals, was whatcame to be known as the Great Freeway Debate (refer back to Chapter 4 Section 4 "TheGreat Freeway Debate in Vancouver" for more details). The ultimate result of the debate wasthe decision by Council at the insistence of the citizens of the city, not to allow theconstruction of freeways through Vancouver. This decision has influenced transportationplanning within the city to the present day.Greater Vancouver Area Rapid Transit Study. 1970.In 1969, the consulting firm of De Leuw Cather & Co. was commissioned toundertake a study of "Is there a role for Rapid Transit in Greater Vancouver within the next20 years?" This study was undertaken at a time when the concept of freeways solving allurban traffic problems was being discredited in Vancouver. It analysed the existing177transportation needs and projected what would be required in 30 years when the population ofthe Greater Vancouver Region would be doubled to two million.The study considered the appropriate routes and the possible costs of construction. Itsuggested the nature of the Rapid Transit development could follow one of four patterns thatwould impact on the form of land use. These four patterns were:1. Trend-existing development pattern projected2. Satellite sub-centres3. Corridor development-normal Central Business District4. Corridor development-strong Central Business District. (De Leuw Cather &Co., 1970: 19)Each of these patterns involved the distribution of population and employment over the regionat different densities and created different transportation needs. If the core of the City wereto be enhanced, then the amount of commuter traffic from the suburbs would increase andcreate the need for one type of transit service. If satellite centres were created in thesurrounding suburbs, with employment opportunities being drawn away from the core, thenthe transportation needs would be different.The suggestions and the routes projected by the study still have validity andsubsequent transit and transportation studies built upon the data and recommendations madein this study.Transit Studies. 1970's.With the Public's rejection of freeways within the City of Vancouver, thetransportation concerns turned towards transit. In the 1970's a series of transit studies werecommissioned. A number of these included: Immediate Improvements to Public Transportation In Greater Vancouver in 1971 by B.E. Sullivan; Regional Transportation as a GVRD Function by A.C. Kelly in 1971; T.E. Parkinson's A Preliminary Study of Light Rapid Transit in Vancouver in 1972; Downtown Vancouver Transit Concepts  in 1972 by WilburSmith and Associates; City of Vancouver Transport Systems Appraisal in 1974 by N.D. Lea178& Associates; Rapid Transit Investigation in 1978 by the GVRD; and The Rapid Transit Project: final report summaries and staff committee recommendations  in 1979 by the GVRD.The result of the studies was a better understanding of the role transit might play inimproving the accessibility of the C.B.D. One of the major obstacles to progress was thefragmented jurisdiction over the different aspects of transportation. The ProvincialGovernment possessed the power to co-ordinate the various departments, ministries, andmunicipal bodies in order to achieve positive results. However, at this time it appeared tomerely allow the various parties to conduct numerous studies, publish reports and make avariety of recommendations, but declined to make a commitment to action. The GVRD reportTransportation for a Livable Region produced in 1973 (GVRD, 1973) proposed one politicaljurisdiction over all planning, operation and financing of regional transportation (GVRD,1973: 29).GVRD Transportation/Transit Studies. 1980's.In 1980, the GVRD negotiated with the Urban Transit Authority (UTA) and theMetro Transit Operating Company (MTOC) to assume responsibility for transit planning forthe Greater Vancouver area (Anton Kuipers, 1980: 1). Prior to this the GVRD had authorizeda study of rapid transit including possible routes which Were presented to the affectedcommunities.Another report completed in 1980, recognized the impact of land use on transitdemand (Urban Transit Authority, 1980b: 5). It stated that if the managed growth conceptsoutlined in the Livable Region Plan were implemented, this could "reduce travel demand byencouraging people to live closer to where they work, and vice versa." (UTA, 1980b: 5). Therewas also the realization that managed growth would come about over a long period of time asit was necessary to increase population densities in the regional centres and to createemployment close to residences.179In 1982, the GVRD prepared a report discussing the organizational requirements fortransit within the region. This report was considered necessary as there appeared to beconfusion over the transit functions assigned to the GVRD. The powers held by the UTA,MTOC and GVRD Transit Committee under the enabling legislation appeared to overlap. Thereport suggested the creation of a Regional Transit Authority as the best means of providingservice in the region (Greater Vancouver Transit System [GVTS], 1982a: 34). As a result,B.C. Transit was created, under a Provincial Government Ministry by renaming the UrbanTransit Authority to reflect its province wide activity (Province of B.C.,July 8, 1982:8656).In 1983, the GVRD prepared a report titled Automated Light Rapid Transit and Regional Transportation in the GVRD 1986-1996. The report looked at "the level of futurecommuter travel in relation to the available road and transit system capacity for major travelcorridors in our region." (GVRD, 1983: 1). The findings were traffic congestion created by thegrowth of peak hour traffic would become worse, an ALRT extension to Coquitlam mightserve to delay costly road improvements within the North East Sector, and the ALRTextensions to both Surrey and Coquitlam might have:the potential to enhance the development of regional town centres . . . and .. .This would contribute to achieving the better balance of jobs to residentworkers in each area, thereby moderating transportation demand growth inthe region. (GVRD, 1983: 1)An important point made by the GVRD report was "the most critical weakness in thecurrent approach to transportation infrastructure development in Greater Vancouver: the lackof integrated road, transit and land use planning." (GVRD, 1983: 1). The two key elements ofimportance in transportation planning within the GVRD area were identified as "the greatvariety of agencies and perspectives involved in this question, and the necessity of workingtogether on those questions because of the impact of decisions upon other jurisdictions."(GVRD, 1983: 3). The report proposed that the independent transportation and land useagencies co-operate in the collection and analysis of information so the impact of actions ofeach agency might be viewed in relation to the impacts on others.1801983 Rapid Transit Route Extension Studies.B.C. Transit, in 1983, commissioned a study of the two possible extensions from theeastern end of the then under construction ALRT line from Vancouver to New Westminster.The study ALRT to Surrey and Coquitlam (B.C. Transit, 1983) considered possiblealignments and station locations. In 1984 another study was commissioned dealingspecifically with the Surrey extension and the possible impacts of a number of possible routesand station sites on Bridgeview and Whalley (B.C. Transit, 1984). Due to the immense costsof constructing the first phase of the ALRT, and the perceived lack of the populationnecessary to make the extensions to Coquitlam and Surrey economically viable at that time,neither extension was commenced. Public input was sought in the case of the Surrey study, inearly 1985 (B.C. Transit, 1985). The Surrey extension, to Scott Road was begun in 1986 andcompleted in 1990.In 1986, a Transit Planning Study on SkyTrain Extension to Coquitlam  was prepared(B.C. Transit, 1986). Like the Surrey study, this report discussed several possible routes andthe impacts each might have upon existing neighbourhoods and future development. Thenorth route would reach Lougheed Mall from Edmonds Station. The South Route would followBrunette Street from the New Westminster 4th Street Station. A combination route wouldoriginate at the 4th Street Station and follow North Road or Brunette/Lougheed to LougheedMall (B.C.Transit, 1986).Port MoodyFirst PrioritySecond Priority :/^Third Priority .4"''■.,,...„41. :.^ •• Vancouver^Lougheed Mall—*:••. 0^5N * i==IC=EINC=IMilesThirdPriority so•WhalleyBridgeview.181Map 7-1 SkyTrain route alignment, Coquitlam/Surrey.Priorities For LRT Construction.Source: Partridge, Terry. "Rapid Transit: Moving Closer to a Decision." Quarterly Review Vancouver, B.C.: Published by the City of Vancouver Planning Department. July, 1980.Volume 7 Number 3. Pages 9 to 11.The District of Coquitlam considered the implications of this report. One point madewas "B.C. Transit has not discussed SkyTrain extension with affected Municipalities so thisstudy was done in isolation." (District of Coquitlam, 1986b). The District of Coquitlam'sresponse to the report was the north route from Edmonds to Lougheed Mall and ultimately tothe Coquitlam Town Centre would offer the greatest ridership potential (District of Coquitlam,1986c: 2).1989-90 Rapid Transit Studies.In mid 1989, the Minister in charge of transit announced ALRT (SkyTrain) would beextended to Whalley in Surrey (Babic, 1989: A-2). This statement brought a good deal ofindignation from the officials within the North East Sector. They felt the Whalley decisionwas based upon political considerations rather than actual need. The result of the Mayors'protests, was a decision by the Minister in charge of Transit to announce the first phase of182the Coquitlam extension would be fast tracked (Babic, 1989: A-2). A committee to reviewpossible routes was created and began its work in 1990.Transportation Planning Overview of British Columbia. 1988.In 1988, the Provincial Ministry of Transportation and Highways of British Columbia,hired the DelCan Corporation, to undertake a complete study of the transportation needs ofthe province (The DelCan Report). The purpose of the study was to establish priorities toensure an effective transportation network. The report provided a general overview of thetransportation needs of the province as well as a proposed planning framework. The report,comprised of 18 volumes, was completed within the relatively short time of 5 months(DelCan, 1988a: 1-4).Volume 3 of the report provided an overview of the provincial situation, while Volume18 dealt specifically with the south-west region of the province (the Lower Mainland). Volume3, recommended "the entire Vancouver metropolitan area requires an independentTransportation study." (DelCan, 1988b: 5-31).The planning framework suggested in the report, was designed to aid the Ministry ofTransportation and Highways to co-ordinate the various jurisdictions having responsibility fordifferent components of the transportation system.Greater Vancouver Transportation Task Force. 1989.After the Provincial Government had commissioned the major review of thetransportation needs of the Province in 1988 (The DelCan Study), the Greater VancouverRegional District set about to conduct an in depth study of the transportation needs of theLower Fraser Valley. There had not been a major regional transportation study for the Lowermainland area since the late 1950's (GVRD, 1989c: 10).183One of the main points the study found was:that this region's transportation problems cannot be resolved by simplybuilding more facilities to feed our addiction to the inefficient use of the privateautomobile. (GVRD, 1989c: ix)Another finding of the study was over half the future growth of the Greater VancouverRegion could be "expected to occur in the North East Sector, Dewdney-Alouette, Surrey, Deltaand the Langley area." (GVRD, 1989c: 2). The study also projected that in spite of increasingsuburban employment, over 40 per cent of the new employment would likely continue to bewithin the centrally located municipalities (GVRD, 1989c: 2). This state of affairs wouldresult in an increasing amount of commuter traffic. The study recognized the need to improveor construct a number of transportation facilities to ensure the continued accessibility withinthe region.In the North East Sector, a number of briefs were presented to the Task Forceaddressing the problems the community faced and offered possible solutions (CoquitlamChamber of Commerce, 1989).The GVRD Transportation Task Force Report suggested a five point transportationstrategy to make the best use of the existing transportation infrastructure, manage the trafficdemands on the system, encourage the utilization of public transit and improvements to thesystem, and "funding, policy and institutional arrangements that support coordinatedplanning, development and improvement of the Region's transportation systems." (GVRD,1989c: 8). The task Force also called for:the establishment of an on-going transportation planning process to achievethe cooperation of and the coordination of all provincial, regional and municipalagencies. (GVRD, 1989c: 8)Burnaby Transportation Task Force. 1989.The Municipality of Burnaby, in response to the Provincial Government's Freedom toMove (DelCan) Report, and the GVRD's Transportation Task Force Report, initiated a studyof its own transportation needs. Public meetings were held to solicit input from local residents.184One such meeting was held on September 28, 1989 at the Burnaby Municipal Hall(District of Burnaby, Transportation Committee, 1989a: Attachment A). A number of thepresentations commented on the impacts the projected widening of Barnet Highway andHastings Street would have upon the North Burnaby neighbourhood. Others were concernedabout the massive increases of commuter traffic originating in the North East Sector usingthe Curtis route to Vancouver. This group suggested the long proposed Gaglardi/HastingsConnector be built.There were also suggestions for improvements to other modes of transportation. Onespeaker suggested rapid transit should be emphasized (District of Burnaby, TransportationCommittee 1989a: Attachment A, 4). Another suggested commuter rail, along Burrard Inlet,as a solution to the congestion caused by the east/west corridor commuter traffic originatingfrom the North East Sector.Other road improvement suggested that might not have an adverse impact onneighbourhoods, were to widen the Lougheed Highway, and to construct a WaterfrontFreeway.The District of Burnaby outlined the major issues in the Greater VancouverTransportation Task Force Report they considered important. One was the need to balanceroad and transit improvements. It identified the main transportation problem for themunicipality, as that of "commuter traffic congestion on both arterials and major collectorroutes and the spill-over through residential neighbourhoods." (District of Burnaby,Transportation Committee, 1989b: 2).The geographical position of Burnaby resulted in it becoming a traffic corridor forcommuters from the North East Sector, Surrey and North Delta, to Vancouver.There is however, the fundamental question of the most efficient use of thesecorridors to carry more people rather than simply more vehicles. Maximizingthe people-moving capacity in these corridors will require measures to increasetransit use of the highway system. (District of Burnaby, TransportationCommittee, 1989b: 2)185On the subject of transportation planning and funding, Burnaby noted:A major challenge in the future will be to work towards a coordinatedapproach to planning and funding transportation infrastructure, so that therelative costs and benefits of road and transit alternatives are explicitlyrecognized. (District of Burnaby, Transportation Committee, 1989b: 2)7.4 CONCLUSIONS.Over the past four decades, there has been many regional and local transportationand land use studies. Each has recognized the relationship between transportation and landuse. The transportation problems of the North East Sector have long been recognized and thedifferent studies have acknowledged them and offered various solutions. However, afternearly four decades of studies and substantial investment in transportation facilities, theproblem of traffic congestion still exists.The GVRD and its predecessor the LMRPB proposed the development of regional towncentres surrounding Vancouver so people could have the choice of living in close proximity totheir place of employment. The original town centre plan called for the linking of the towncentres and the C.B.D. by freeways or expressways. However, in the late 1960's--early1970's rapid transit was seen as offering a less disruptive mode of transportation. Since thattime, there has been an emphasis on the role of transit to compliment the role of highwayswithin the region.186CHAPTER 8 Interpretation.8.1 INTRODUCTION.The purpose of this chapter is sixfold. Firstly, it will summarize the informationprovided in the case study on transportation in the North East Sector. Secondly, it will reviewthe impact of the fragmented government jurisdiction. Thirdly, it will discuss the role of the"Not In My Back Yard" attitude of neighbourhoods concerning regional transportationprojects. Fourthly, it will analyse the information furnished by the case study, and interpret:a) the factors creating transportation difficulties in the North East Sector; and b) the factorsinfluencing land use and transportation planning in the study area. Fifthly it will then discussthe alternatives transportation options which could serve to reduce traffic congestion withinthe study area. Finally the chapter will end with some observations on the necessity to planregionally to resolve local transportation problems.8.2 THE TRANSPORTATION PROBLEM.Modern urban and suburban areas have experienced increasing traffic congestion.This urban transportation problem originated through changing transportation technologiesinfluencing land use, which created a landscape reflecting the accessibility provided by theautomobile.The advent of reliable inexpensive automobiles enabling large numbers of people topurchase their own vehicles, along with the construction of better roads, freed the averageperson from having to live close to work or the streetcar line. This availability of privatetransportation in the early post World War II period, was seen as the panacea for peoples'transportation needs. The land use impact was the movement of people from the expensivelands within and at the fringes of the city, to low density rural areas with substantially lower187prices. People traded lower land prices for longer journeys to work. Low density residentialland use in the suburbs created by automobile ownership, made transit uneconomical, forcedpeople to rely upon the automobile. One main feature of the suburbs was the exclusiveness ofland use. There was little mixing of industry, commerce or residential uses. This alsocontributed to the need for automobiles in the suburbs.8.2.1 Perceptions of Traffic Congestion.The major premise of this study has been that a problem of traffic congestion existswithin the North East Sector. Evidence of the concern the public holds for traffic is illustratedin a newspaper article, which asked local officials to list the items that the public complainedmost about. "Traffic, traffic, traffic--most of the complaints we get have to do with traffic,"says Gary Wirachowsky, producer for the Complaint Department, a Rogers Cable TV phone-in show (The Vancouver Sun, September 22, 1990: C-1). The article also noted that accordingto the Burnaby deputy municipal clerk "people complain when they are directly affected by aproblem, no matter how big or small." (The Vancouver Sun, September 22, 1990: C-1).Examples of some of the titles of newspaper articles on the traffic situation in the region andwithin the North East Sector further illustrate this perception. For the region such titles as,"Extending rush-hour controls proposed to ease traffic flow" (Krangle, 1982: A-3), "Trafficjams not exactly toast of town" (Priest, 1987: A-9), "How Vancouver got itself in a trafficjam" (Braham, 1989: A-10) with a sub-title of "Gridlock: a system going nowhere," "Transituse up as roads clog up" (Lee, 1989: A-10), "Transport system strained" (The Vancouver Sun, January 5, 1990: D-1), "Gridlock?" (Seelig & Artibise, 1990: B-2, B-3), and "Locked inthe grip of traffic" (Macdougall, 1991a: 4).Title of articles focussed more on the North East Sector include, "Traffic worriesgrowing in PoMo" (Bryce, 1990b), "Transportation concerns top complaint list at landhearings" (Macdougall, 1990: 3), "Traffic ties up Westwood proposal" (Postma, 1990),"Bypass bottleneck relief at least three years away" (Macdougall, 1991b: 8), "More Traffic188for PoCo" (Ross, 1991: 3), "Gridlock prompts gathering" (The Maple Ridge Pitt Meadows News, February 23, 1992: 1), and "Gridlock: No money, no quick fix says Art Charbonneau"(Ross, 1992: 3).These newspaper articles could very well contribute to the public's perception. Even ifthere is a problem, the articles could convey the impression that it is far worse than wouldotherwise be perceived.8.2.2 Prevailing Regional Developmental Philosophy.Increased traffic congestion within the region reduced the livability of the region andincreased the costs of conducting business. Since the creation of the Lower Mainland RegionalPlanning Board, and its successor the Greater Vancouver Regional District, there has been anoverall philosophy for improving the results of development of the region. It supported bymost of the municipal governments of the Lower Mainland, has a long history. It was firstexpressed as a developmental guide in the Lower Mainland Looks Ahead published in 1952.The philosophy supported a number of themes that were to make the region a better place forthe residents to live and work. These were based on the importance of co-ordinating land useand transportation developments was expressed in The Lower Mainland Looks Ahead as wellas each of the subsequent reports that have been produced to date. Chapter 6 sections 2.1 to2.5 provide the background information of these reports. Despite this recognition of theimportance of co-ordinating land use and transportation within the Greater VancouverRegion, problems in implementing a co-ordinated planning process still persist.8.2.3 Population.A major component of the urban transportation problem, is population change. In theearly post Second World War period, there was a sharp increase in the number of familyformations and in the birth rate. After this short rise, the numbers of births and the size offamily units resumed their previous decline. This declining birth rate has been offset by a189large increase in immigration from other countries. After the War, the Federal Governmentchanged its immigration policies to encourage large numbers of immigrants to settle in thiscountry.This increase in the population, coupled with the reduction in the size of the family, aswell as the short term increase in the birth rate, created pressures upon the available housingstock. This pressure along with a societal desire for a home in a rural like setting, coupledwith a shortage of land within urban areas, caused people seeking housing to look to the lowerpriced lands on the urban fringe. In the period from the early 1950's to early 1960's, rapidsuburbanization occurred in the municipalities immediately surrounding the City ofVancouver. Table 8-1 illustrates this shift of population increases from the City of Vancouverto the suburbs.190Table 8-1^Illustrates rates of population growth for various communities comprisingRegion.the Greater Vancouver1941 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991Province 817,861 1,165,210 1,629,082 2,184,620 2,744,470 3,160,300GVRD 393,898 562,462 790,741 1,028,334 1,169,831 1,579,500Vancouver 275,353 344,833 384,522 426,256 414,281 464,200Burnaby 30,328 53,376 100,157 125,660 136,494 159,200North Shore 22,514 44,146 88,081 126,544 135,367 154,100Surrey 14,840 33,670 70,838 98,601 147,138 235,100Richmond 10,370 19,186 43,323 62,121 96,154 125,300Coquitlam 7,949 15,697 29,053 53,073 61,077 85,500Port Coquitlam 1,539 3,232 8,111 19,560 27,535 35,800Port Moody 1,512 2,246 4,789 10,778 14,967 18,100Source: Statistics Canada. Population: Census Subdivisions (Historical)  Volume 1: Part B(Bulletin 1-2). Table 2: Population of Census Subdivisions, 1921-1971.Statistics Canada. Population: Geographical Distribution. British Columbia  Volume2: Provincial Series. Table 5: Population for Census Metropolitan Areas and CensusAgglomerates, Urbanized Areas and Fringes with Components, 1976 and 1981.Greater Vancouver Regional District. Greater Vancouver Key Facts  December,1990.The slower rate of growth for Vancouver and the increase in the rate for the surroundingsuburbs is due to a reduction in the available developable lands for residential purposes withinthe City. It is also due to a resistance on the part of residents and local politicians to increasedensity to encourage redevelopment of the older low density housing stock (Sarti, 1990: B-3).If Vancouver does not modify its zoning, to allow increased density, most of the populationgrowth will have to be accommodated by those municipalities South of the Fraser River.Forecasts of population increases for the Greater Vancouver Region, indicate a steadygrowth is expected. The greatest growth, however, will be in the suburban municipalities,191possessing inventories of developable lands. Surrey, whose population is estimated to be235,000 in 1991, is projected to have a population in the neighbourhood of 393,000 in theyear 2011, an increase of 158,000 (GVRD, 1990a: 51). Vancouver, presently containing thelargest population of the region at 464,000, is expected to increase by only 80,000 people(G.V.R.D., 1990b: 42, Forecasts Table).The North East Sector's population is estimated to rise from 139,400 to 215,200(G.V.R.D., 1990b: 42 Forecast Table) in the same period, an increase of 75,800. Compared toSurrey, this increase is small but can be attributed to the North East Sector containing only 7per cent of the region's developable land (Seelig & Artibise, 1991: 43).8.2.4 Location of Industry and Employment Opportunities.Over the last century, a process of separating land uses has taken place. Theintroduction of zoning, to control the location of various uses was designed to prevent theoccurrence of incompatible uses. As new areas underwent suburbanization, this caused theseparation of residence from the work place, necessitating commuting.Until the early 1960's, most of the new employment opportunities within the GVRD,occurred in or around the existing commercial areas. Since most of the industrial andcommercial activities within the region were in Vancouver, those workers who lived in thesuburban fringe, were forced to commute longer distances. As little public transit wasavailable within the suburbs, commuters were forced to use the private automobile. Increasedregional population meant more residences located in the suburbs, and more automobiles wereused to commute into the city. This steady increase in the numbers of automobiles using theroads, during peak periods, 7:00 to 9:00 am and 4:00 to 6:00 pm, caused increasing trafficcongestion.In recent years as the nature of business and communications changed, more firmslocated in the suburbs. This was due to lower land values, better accessibility to customers192and suppliers, and proximity to their workforce. The businesses locating in the suburbsrequired larger sized parcels of land unavailable within the older commercial areas of the city.This movement of the manufacturing and warehousing concerns to the suburbs,reinforced a separation of land use. Despite this movement, a large percentage of the region'sworkforce still commute into the C.B.D. The downtown workforce is now composed mainly ofoffice or service workers, while the blue collar workers, employed in industry or warehousingare now employed in scattered locations around the suburbs. When there is a centraldestination for commuters, easily applicable solutions can be suggested for the trafficcongestion experienced during the two rush hour periods. These include carpooling, staggeredwork-hours, and public transit. However, when the destinations are scattered all around theperiphery of the urban area, this complicates the selection of effective transportation options.The Coquitlam Traffic Study of 1971 (B.C. Department of Highways, 1971) estimatedemployment within the study area was about 16,000, up from 10,000 in 1965. Since thepopulation of the area was about 76,000, this indicated most workers had to travel to otherareas for employment (Associated Engineering Services, 1971: 30).8.2.5 Traffic.As suburbanization increased in the Greater Vancouver Region, since the early1950's, volumes of traffic have also increased. This increase was due to a number of factors,which include: a) the rapid increase in the population; b) the better economic conditionsenabling people to afford their own home; c) the availability of inexpensive privateautomobiles; and d) the reduced need to rely upon the available public transit. At the sametime little if any expansion of the transit service was initiated. The existing service at the endof the Second World War was provided by obsolete and worn out equipment. During wartime,the transit service was heavily utilized. Many people who had to crowd onto rickety oldstreetcars, endure long waits for transfers to other routes, and a long walk to theirdestination, relished the idea of being able to drive to work or where they shopped.193The better economic conditions after the War, allowed more people to purchase theirown residences and an automobile. Appendix #1, shows the rapid increase in the numbers ofautomobiles in the Province, the region and key municipalities.Graph 8-1 illustrates the decline in the occupancy rate of vehicles in the region from1955 to 1990.Graph 8-1 Vehicle Occupancy Rates.1955-1990Peracm per Vehicle1.6 ^1.e^1.4 ^^1.2 ^1 ^0.6 ^0.6 -^CJ. 4 ^0. 1:7 —^0^t^ I^1 1 1:455G65^1;460 1'.170^1;475^1r.;%..(-;^-1''.6E;^1C.:.;0Yearvc FiSource: Technical Committee for Metropolitan Highway Planning. A Study of Highway Planning Part II. Technical Report No.2 "Analysis and Forecast of Motor Vehicle Travel."1958-59.Greater Vancouver Regional District. The Journey to Work February, 1982.The findings of the Technical Committee for Metropolitan Transportation, indicate theaverage vehicle entering Vancouver in 1956 carried 1.54 people. Over the last 35 years, thisrate has steadily gone down and now stands at around 1.3 persons per vehicle (Seelig andArtibise, 1991: 64).194North East Sector.In the North East Sector, there was little transit available aside from an interurbanlong distance bus service (Pacific Stage Lines) and a local service providing a limited servicefrom a few local centres of population to New Westminster. These services were notconvenient for most commuters, thus the private automobile provided the only reliable andconvenient transportation alternative.After the Provincial Government began providing transit in 1973, service was slowlyextended, as additional areas were developed within the North East Sector. B.C. Transitconducted studies in 1989-1990, for the provision of transit services into new neighbourhoodsof the study area. The survey samples indicated that for work trips, between 73 and 84 percent of the residents used their automobiles, and of the remainder, between 8 and 11 per centused transit (B.C. Transit, 1989: 3; B.C. Transit, 1990a: 3). Of the people who responded tothe surveys, 98 per cent owned at least one vehicle and 89 per cent owned two or more (B.C.Transit, 1989: 3; B.C. Transit, 1990a: 4).Traffic congestion in the North East Sector, has been steadily increasing, and thiscould serve to reduced the accessibility and livability of the area.Screenlines.Screenlines are cordon lines established to count the volumes of traffic moving acrossthem. These cordon lines are usually established on main arterial roads crossing someconvenient boundary. In the case of the Greater Vancouver Region, the Fraser and PittRivers, and Burrard Inlet provide convenient boundaries. In the North East Sector, thewestern boundary of the established screenline is North Road, which is crossed by the threemain routes. The south and eastern screenlines are at the Port Mann and Pitt River Bridges.The data from the B.C. Department of Highways' Coquitlam Area Planning Study of1971, indicated 142,000 vehicles crossed the Municipal boundary of Coquitlam daily. The195largest volume leaving and entering the Municipality in the south-west corner was nearly 50per cent of all traffic leaving and entering the area (B.C. Department of Highways, 1971: 17).The data from the 1985 Metropolitan Vancouver Origin-Destination Survey "Vehicleand Passenger Screenline Survey" (GVRD, 1987) stated the Pitt River Bridge, had 3,600vehicles crossing for the 4:00 to 6:00 pm period. The total increased to 4,616 if the time wasincreased from 3:00 to 6:00 pm (GVRD, 1987: 51). For the east-bound traffic on the NorthRoad screenline, the three main routes had 8,301 vehicles during the evening rush hour(GVRD, 1987: 27-29). Information provided in the GVRD 1989 Freedom to Move Report(GVRD, 1989c) indicates traffic congestion on many of the bridges in the region as well as theLougheed and Barnet Highways was reaching or exceeding their design capacity. TheLougheed Highway carried 118.9 per cent of its designed capacity, while the Barnet carried100 per cent.Origin/Destination Studies.The 1955-56 Highway Planning Study data indicated most of the residents of theNorth East Sector worked within the area in 1955, and of those working outside the area, themajority worked in the immediately adjacent municipalities with New Westminster being thedestination of most. As the population of the North East Sector increased the employmentlocations became more diversified.In the 1971 Coquitlam Area Planning Study, the Planning Branch of the B.C.Department of Highways, found the majority of the trips were home based (B.C. Departmentof Highways, 1971: 15). As mentioned earlier, the employment in the area was estimated in1971 to be about 16,000, which indicated that with a population of about 76,00, most of theworkers travelled outside the area (Associated Engineering Services, 1971: 3).In the 1985 Metropolitan Vancouver Origin-Destination Study, the North East Sectorhome to work trips totalled 36,800. Table 8-2 illustrates the inter-municipal travel patterns in1985.Richmond Surrey^17^182684^1491906 10844138 3478^1132^956895^318228^354^ 6^15616267^4994107 16123^0 ^09985531256302187823198911184107140136640^0TotalLangley ExternW Rock M RidgeU.E.L.^Van C.B.D. W Van^70^07637^3353107^1002711^861337^1379095 2911824^69752^175600^2884105^162102^031844 10823564 923570 1954376^0621^381078^630^00 ^71454 1354459 3622228 4704108 1910337 615248 134244 753720 8652192 6132154 2564579 '54348360 5010113 22530^4090 116842^14110^04252557438 111737 76393 7334From,ToBelcarBurnCoquitDeltaNew WestN VanPt CoqPt MoodyRichmondSurreyU.E.L.VanC.B.D.%V VanW RockM RidgeLangleyExternTotal0^18^0^0^49484^336^332^441^4 8 1 8 722^362^357^189^23198252^100^343^250^248510 98^196^167^1293117^38^ISO^476^353170^30.5^138^0^S7710 54^61^94^483456^44^135^125^360091496^294^2419^660^498630 0 0^0^615146^170^639^611^12282226 29 46^86^115170^13^0^230^10699614 0^270^16^345119^5269^236^161^12568121^281^7343^958^191280 0 0^0 02353^7416 12759 4464Table 8-2 1985 GVRD Inter-municipal Travel Patterns.1985 GVRD Home to Work Trips.196FrorniTo^Belcar Burn CoquitBelcar^53^88^35Burn 0 14043 1041Coquit^72 5238 3177Delta 0 1645^255New West^0 3016^374N Van 0 2702^235Pt Coq^47 1373 1246Pt Moody 17^966^819Richmond^0 1676^111Surrey 68 5191 13210^69^17Van^0 9780 1029C.B.D. 0^859^94%V Van^0^724^123W Rock 0^131^16M Ridge^39 1317 1009Langley 18 1330^312Extern^0^0^0Delta N Van0^35871 1865501^6105342^232349^240250 11275156^314157^40845^3653121^87417^01145 311746 4470 1254123^0259^181632^2470^0New West Pt Coq Pt Moody0^36297 3881170^618142 63216^10073 761587^300213 7741^41532 200^0^014 ^566 307133^51^2778^20 22123^0^0551^801 311627^123^550^0 05322942004877259522S4354514942866Total^314 50153 11264 13814 21096^15299 5832^2621^42621 317971985 GVRD Home to Work Trips.Source: Greater Vancouver Regional District. 1985 Metropolitan Vancouver Origin-Destination Survey Inter-Municipal Travel Patterns. Burnaby, B.C.: GVRD, 1987.197Of the 36,800 home to work trips: 4,800 work within their own municipality (4,366 workwithin one of the other North East Sector municipalities); 5,700 travel to Vancouver; 7,580 toBurnaby; and 2,800 to New Westminster. Of the total work trips; approximately 25 per centare located within the North East Sector; approximately 44 per cent are to locations withinVancouver, Burnaby and New Westminster; with the remainder scattered amongst the rest ofthe regions' municipalities. Thus 69 per cent of the workforce are employed within theBurrard Peninsula and do not have to cross one of the bridges in the Greater VancouverRegion.The B.C. Transit studies commissioned between 1989 and 1990, found between 36and 39 per cent of the residents in the new subdivision areas within the North East Sectorworkeu in Vancouver, between 24 and 31 per cent worked in Burnaby or New Westminster,and between 18 and 23 per cent worked within the North East Sector. In total between 82and 88 per cent of the respondents to the Transit Studies work within these three areaswhich comprise the Burrard Peninsula (B.C. Transit, 1989: 2; B.C. Transit, 1990a: 4; B.C.Transit, 1990b: 4). From this information, one can conclude that the available resourcesshould be directed to improve accessibility within the Burrard Peninsula.8.2.6 Summary of Development Trends.The information provided from the screenline, origin-destination studies, the censusstatistics, and the employment statistics, indicate that despite a large increase in theemployment opportunities within the study area, a large per cent of the work force still needsto commute outside the area. The ever increasing population attracted by the availability ofattractively priced homes, and a suburban life-style, will likely cause the numbers ofcommuters to increase. At present, roughly 80 per cent of the commuters utilize theautomobile to travel to and from their work places, the levels of traffic congestion will likelyincrease, unless some form of action is undertaken.198The option of building new roads or drastically improving the existing highways islimited due to the geology and geography of the study area. This leaves as solutions:managing traffic (reversible traffic lanes during peak periods, and co-ordinating trafficsignals, restricting the number of automobiles from entering congested areas at peak periods,reducing the number of parking spaces while at the same time increasing the parking costs inthe C.B.D.); encouraging carpooling; providing better transit service through improved busservice or extending some form of Light Rapid Transit to the commercial centres of the area;and/or improving the employment opportunities for the residents of the area. This last optionmakes the assumption most people would prefer to live close to where they work. Thisassumption of economic rationality precludes some individuals who choose to reside in an areabecause of other factors, such as being close to friends or relatives, or a preference for thelandscape or amenities of an area.Another option involves density and types of land use allowed within the study area.Increased density coupled with a mixture of complementary uses would offer people theopportunity to live in close proximity to their place of work. This would reduce the amount oftime and the distance people would have to spend commuting, and help reduce the level oftraffic congestion. This would require a change in the philosophy behind the present zoning,as well as a change in the vision politicians, planners and residents have for the area.8.3 FRAGMENTATION OF THE PLANNING PROCESS.Fragmentation of the planning process contributes to the traffic congestionexperienced by the North East Sector as well as the region as a whole. This fragmentationhas its origins in the legal division of jurisdiction and authority between the different levels ofgovernments, as well as between departments within each level of government. The divisionof power between the federal, provincial, and municipal levels of government was discussed inthe Literature Review, Chapter 2 Section 8 "Sources of Authority and Jurisdiction." The199situation created by this fragmentation of authority and jurisdiction was illustrated within thecase study, specifically in Chapter 4 Section 7 "A Lack of Governmental Co-operation."The fragmentation of authority and its impact upon the planning process has beenrecognized by those in positions of power. The federal Minister of Urban Affairs in 1975,recognized the need for the different levels of government and departments to seek input fromeach other, to make the best use of the limited resources available. At the time, the Ministerdescribed a tri-level planning process his department had instituted (The Columbian, August29, 1975: 25) to attempt to initiate discussion between federal, provincial, and municipalleaders about projects before they progressed beyond the planning stage. The obvious intendedresult of this discussion amongst interested parties would be a co-ordination of each party'sconcerns for positive and negative impacts of a project. However, it has to be recognized thateach level of government and each department of the various levels of government has itsown mandate. Attempts at consensus building about the benefits of projects might be viewedby some departments as infringement upon their mandate.The provincial Minister of Municipal Affairs, had attempted to encourage co-operationand co-ordination of regional efforts through legislation establishing regional districts in 1965.In 1971, however, the Minister had "gone out of his way to discourage the regional districtsfrom hiring personnel or consultants when there is provincial government staff assigned tothe area that could do the same job." (Hrushowy, 1971: 16). The lack of co-ordination wasattributed to an "us verses them" attitude, between the regional districts and the provincialgovernment. Coupled with this was an observation made in 1971 by some regional districtrepresentatives that "the difficulty in dealing with various governmental departments,especially lands, is a manifestation of a power struggle between Campbell and other cabinetministers." (Hrushowy, 1971: 16). Mr. Dan Campbell was the Minister of Municipal Affairsat that time.The inclination of various levels of governments and departments to guard theirauthority, has resulted in each placing its own concerns first, to the potential detriment of200others. This jealousy may stem from a desire to achieve higher status and exclusive control.It may even result in withholding information from another department. These attitudes maymean that the needs and concerns of one department would be met, while the concerns ofothers may or may not be met.In the mid 1960's the provincial government passed legislation creating regionaldistricts. As a result of extensive lobbying by the Union of B.C. Municipalities. As with thelobbying to create the Lower Mainland Regional Planning Board, the efforts of themunicipalities took an extended period (see Chapter 7 Section 1 "Introduction" for thebackground information). The regional districts were to co-ordinate functions which could bebetter planned and provided on the regional basis.Mr. Dan Campbell, provincial Minister of Municipal Affairs, observed that one of theproblems of fragmented authority was a compartmentalization of the decision making process(Hrushowy, 1971: 16). In his capacity as Minister of Municipal Affairs, he created regionaldistricts to provide a means for local municipalities to discuss matters of a regional concern toarrive at mutually agreed solutions. Not all local politicians, however, viewed the creation ofthe regional districts as beneficial. The mayor of Port Moody in 1976, described the GVRD as"a monolithic monster feeding on its own bureaucracy. . . . taking over many of the functionsof the municipality." (The Columbian, January 6, 1976: 2). The mayor viewed the purpose ofthe regional district as being the co-ordination of agencies between the municipalities (TheColumbian, January 6, 1976: 2). Instead it had become another level of government seekingto acquire powers and functions that were beyond its mandate.The provincial government's creation of regional districts to co-ordinate municipal andto a lesser extent provincial government activities, has suffered from changes in theprovincial government. However, the different political parties' philosophy was not always inaccord with its actions. The party forming the government in the early to mid 1970'ssupported the need for inter-governmental co-ordination, but embarked upon major land useand transportation projects with little or no consultation with those municipalities directly201affected. The $1 billion Burke Mountain Project is an example of a land use project where thelocal governments of the affected communities were not consulted until the planning was wellunder way. The Highway improvements suggested by the planning process to access theBurke Mountain Project are an example of the lack of consultation between provincial andlocal governments. In the mid 1970's, a newspaper article made the announcement "despitethe fact that Coquitlam District officials were only told of the massive project moments beforenewsmen were informed, Mayor Jim Tonn said he views it with a positive attitude." (Coffin,1974: 1) The title of the article was "$1 billion housing Plan set for Burke Mountain." "TheBurke Mountain affair is symptomatic of this government's penchant for planning from thetop, virtually without consultation with those most directly affected" (The Province, February24, 1975: 4). This goes against the government's commitment to foster co-operation and theco-ordination of planning through the utilization of the regional districts.One positive aspect of the creation of the regional districts has been to provide aforum for local governments to discuss issues of a regional nature. This has served to resolvesome of the regional concerns of municipalities, though it has not removed all the rivalrybetween municipalities. Examples of the rivalry would be the situation described in the casestudy in Chapter 5 Section 2.4 "The Town Centre Controversy" where the GVRD decided aregional town centre should be constructed within the North East Sector, but could not reacha decision on the location in which municipality, either the District of Coquitlam or the City ofPort Coquitlam, should be the site. In the end the matter was resolved through Coquitlamembarking upon its own program of development, and effectively establishing its claim to thebe the site of the regional town centre.Prior to 1976, the G.V.R.D. and the two municipalities could only debate the relativemerits of each site, as the provincial government of the day had its own plans for the areaand would not allow Coquitlam to proceed with plans for the construction of the shoppingcentre when Coquitlam first sought permission in the early 1970's. Chapter 5 Section 2.4 the"Town Centre Controversy," provides background information on this period. The change in202the provincial government in early 1976 brought a change in developmental philosophy. It feltprivate initiative was better than governmental sponsorship.The provincial government, despite an apparent desire to co-ordinate actions,neglected to provide a workable mechanism to co-ordinate transportation planning andconstruction between different provincial departments and the municipalities. In a 1977newspaper article, it was noted the Lower Mainland was the only metropolitan region in thecountry without a regional transportation planning and operating authority (The Vancouver Sun, October 18, 1977: A-4). The article also noted people in the Lower Mainland werebecoming increasingly upset with the problem of traffic congestion. The traffic problem wasnot being addressed properly "because urban transportation in Greater Vancouver is on thethreshold of chaos, created, fed and fanned alive by a level of planning and responsibility thatis pure bush-league small town" (The Vancouver Sun, October 18, 1977: A-4).In the period of the early 1970's, there were two provincial government controlledagencies involved with public transit. The Bureau of Transit looked after planning, while B.C.Hydro looked after the operation of the transit services Chapter 6 Section 3 "Transit in theStudy Area" provides background information on this separation of the operating andplanning for public transit. In the late 1970's, the Urban Transit Authority was created tohandle planning and the Metro Transit Operating Company was created to take over transitoperations from B.C. Hydro.An example of the fragmentation of authority for transit was the reorganization oftransit in 1980, with "transit operations . . . controlled by the provincially appointed UrbanTransit Authority (UTA), the regionally represented GVRD, and the Metro Transit OperatingCompany (MTOC). The MTOC runs the buses; the UTA-GVRD combine does everythingelse." (Ingram-Johnson, 1982: 4). The citizens:203don't realize what 'a bureaucratic nightmare' the transit agreement is. 'Youhave to have a unified organization which is able to plan its capitalexpenditures and its operating costs. As it stands now, we're spending capitaldollars, not knowing what the operating costs are going to be." (Ingram-Johnson, 1982: 4)A further example of this lack of co-operation involves the city of Vancouver and B.C.Transit, a Crown corporation.B.C. Transit, has also started running the city. It is ignoring the official citycouncil position on the rapid transit line along Commercial Drive and ismerrily proceeding with its own plans as though the city government had beendisbanded." (Hossic, 1983: A-12)Chapter 4 Section 4 "Transit in the Region" provides more background information on theseevents.In effect the provincial government created two bureaucratic organizations controllingtwo aspects of the same function. This fragmentation did not aid in the planning and provisionof efficient transit. Coupled with this fragmentation was the creation of a separateorganization to plan rapid transit to the region. The creation of three separate organizationsto plan and operate public transit meant an overall vision of the region's needs could not beproduced.Since the early 1980's, the transit functions have been amalgamated under thecontrol of B.C. Transit, a provincial government agency reporting to the Minister of MunicipalAffairs, and mandated to plan and provide transit services to communities in the province.The local municipal governments do not have a direct say in service changes. There has beena process for the local municipalities to offer suggestions on local transit matters, but there isno mechanism which would compel B.C. Transit to act upon them.In the late 1970's the Greater Vancouver Regional District was given a role in theplanning of transit service, as well as planning for the route of Light Rapid Transit. Theprovincial government, however, in 1983 decided this power should be taken back by B.C.204Transit. This left the region with little effective input into the transit planning process, andthis state of affairs persists today.The Ministry of Transportation and Highways, formerly the Ministry of Highways,was another component of the transportation function. This Ministry possessed immensepowers over the designation of provincial routes within municipalities. The Ministry ofHighways could operate according to its own mandate, and build or improve the routes it feltwere needed, and did not have to co-ordinate its activities to take into account the concerns ofthe local municipalities.It is apparent from the information provided in Chapter 3, and the case study, thatone of the major sources of fragmentation of transportation planning, is the separation of thetwo major components of transportation. these two components are the B.C. Ministry ofHighways and B.C. Transit. Ideally the functions of both ministries should be integrated, toenable a unified approach to the transportation needs of the region.In 1980, the provincial government created an urban land policy in response to the1979/80 Official Community Plan review for the region. It was designed to focus new landdevelopment north of the Fraser River, to relieve the suburbanizing pressures being exertedupon the agricultural lands and floodplains of the municipalities south of the Fraser River.Developers' attentions were directed to the vacant or underdeveloped lands within the NorthEast Sector. However, despite a great deal of improvements to the transportationinfrastructure to handle the increased traffic resulting from the urban land policy, it provedinsufficient to handle the increased volumes of traffic. It should be noted the provincialgovernment had made promises to improve local transit services, upgrade the existinghighway infrastructure, and initiate commuter rail service. In spite of these promises, most ofwhich had been carried out, there still existed a problem with traffic congestion.In more recent times, in 1989, the Provincial Government decided to offer for sale alarge tract of vacant Crown owned land in Coquitlam, known as the Westwood Plateau. Thecurrent zoning in the surrounding area, would allow for the construction of a total of about2055,000 housing units (District of Coquitlam, 1990b). This sale was made despite ferventprotests from the municipal leaders and large segments of the public, on grounds of trafficcongestion.At this same time, there were a number of transportation proposals under discussionin order to improve accessibility to the study area. Commuter Rail, was repeatedly supportedand rejected by the provincial authorities (see Appendix 2, Commuter Rail for additionaldetails); Light Rapid Transit was proposed, and a route study was announced, but thissolution was at least five years way from operation; there was talk and later anannouncement of a widening of part of the Barnet Highway to reduce the traffic congestion inthe northern area; and there was talk of improved bus service to the area. However, none ofthis was in place before the sale and it would appear the impact of the change in land use ofthe Westwood Lands on transportation within the area was not considered.As a result of the public outcry over the likely traffic impacts of the new residentialprojects either being constructed or proposed including the Westwood Lands, the provincialgovernment somewhat belatedly began a process in late 1990 to improve the transportationsituation in the North East Sector. The process was also designed to address the concerns ofthe surrounding municipalities which were being negatively impacted by the traffic congestioncreated by commuter traffic originating from the study area. A Barnet/Hastings PeopleMoving Project was announced at this time. This project would see the widening of the BarnetHighway, and the inclusion of bus and carpool lanes on Barnet Highway and Hastings Street.The people in North Burnaby have expressed their opposition to the project while some haveconsidered the whole public process to be a waste as the project is "a done deal" (Prince,1991b: 5). The Municipality of Burnaby used a 1990 "Park Referendum" to seek theauthorization of the voters to dedicate park lands to prevent their use for highways andtransit (SkyTrain) projects. The dedication of the Barnet Marine Park lands allowed council tostall the Barnet Highway widening project (Burnaby Now, February 13, 1991: 1, 4).206A Coquitlam SkyTrain route selection committee was organized by the provincialgovernment to make recommendations on which of three routes was the better. A leakedconfidential memo, suggested a decision had already been made on the route to berecommended despite the assurances of those involved there would be public hearings and allpoints of view would be considered (Horn, 1991a: 1; Hilborn, 1991c: 1, 5). The question aroseas to whether the provincial government had stacked the committee (Hilborn, 1991c: 5) andthe process of gathering information and soliciting opinions from the public was merely forshow. One of the members of the Committee commented that:We had very little information that would support anything but that conclusion(Edmonds route) . . . Some of the committee members were concerned thatwith such a narrow source of information it may precluded any reasonablealternatives. (Hilborn, 1991c: 1)The information gained from this state of affairs suggests the decision making process wasfragmented. The municipality most affected by the decision did not have any effective inputinto the process, as it would appear a decision had already been reached by the provincialgovernment before the undertaking had been announced. The Municipality of Burnaby's 1990"Park Referendum" was again used as a stalling mechanism to influence the SkyTrain routechoice (Hilborn, 1991f: 1, 3). The Mayor of Coquitlam remarked "That means you've now gotone municipality working against another for transportation." (Hilborn, 1991e: 1).Regional Co-operation.The need for co-ordination and co-operation between the various municipal andprovincial authority was seen as necessary by many of the municipal governments in thelower mainland. There were many problems of a regional nature, such as the provision ofwater and sewerage, hospitals, and parks which needed a regional approach. Chapter 7Section 1 discussed the origins and evolution of the present regional districts.There are nevertheless some politicians and members of the public who view thefunction of the G.V.R.D. as a fourth level of government. In fact the Regional District was207designed to serve as a co-operative forum for the discussion of problems of a regional nature,not as another level of government. In reality however, the G.V.R.D. does function as a quasi-government. The members municipalities forming the board of the G.V.R.D. have produced aseries of documents that outline the type development they propose for the region. This visionhas its origins in the The Lower Mainland Looks Ahead report of 1952. It envisioned thedevelopment of the region focussed around a strong central core in Vancouver, surrounded bya series of regional town centres. These town centres and their core would be linked byefficient transportation. The discussion of geographic theory in Chapter 3, provides abackground for the concepts of the regional town centres.The vision of a strong central core surrounded by regional town centres has not beenaltered appreciably in subsequent revisions of the Regional Board's concept plans. Therecognition of the need for efficient transportation links between the individual regional towncentres and central core has also not changed. What has changed has been the type oftransportation technology suggested. In 1952, automobile dominance was accepted, while inthe late 1950's, with traffic congestion becoming a problem, the use of buses on the freewayswas suggested as an alternative. When the 1976 update of the vision for development of theregion was produced, public transit was seen as the best means of connecting the centres. Thelast update, the Creating Our Future  Report of 1990 (GVRD, 1990d), supported the need toencourage the use of public transit over the private automobile.The vision of regional town centres has altered the role of the Central BusinessDistrict. Prior to 1950, the C.B.D. was the focus of most of the distribution and industrialactivities for the region, and was the focus of the transportation system. This in turnencouraged business and industry to locate there. At present the C.B.D. is still an importantdestination, but its importance lies in its role as an office centre compared to its past rolewhich included manufacturing and distribution activities. Solutions to the problem of trafficcongestion can thus no longer be focussed on the C.B.D., but now have to take into accountthe scattered destinations of the workforce.208The G.V.R.D. of course tried to encourage co-operation between the municipalities inorder to achieve the goal of making the region more livable through an ordering of the landuse and co-ordinating of the investments in transportation. This might sound achievable intheory, however each municipality had its own vision of what developments it would like tocreate.The idea that there should be a mechanism available to help the municipalitiesachieve some sense of regional needs and their own position within the region possessedpositive and negative aspects. On one hand the municipalities were concerned about the needfor co-ordinating efforts on issues of mutual concern, while on the other hand, they vigorouslyprotested any attempt or apparent attempt by the provincial government to intrude uponareas they saw as part of their jurisdiction. These concerns were best expressed in the policystatement of the Union of British Columbia Municipalities in 1954. This statement wasdiscussed in Chapter 7 Section 1 "Introduction."The municipalities found themselves in a situation where they wanted mechanisms tofacilitate co-operation between municipal and provincial organizations, but did not want toloose any of their own powers in the process. They lobbied for the creation of a regionalplanning board during the 1930's and the 1940's. Once this legislation was passed and theregional planning board was created for the whole Lower. Fraser Valley, the municipalitiesfound they might be better served by an organization covering a smaller area. Repeatedlobbying resulted in the creation of four regional districts in 1965. Once again however, someof the smaller municipalities felt threatened by the Regional District powers. There was a fearamongst some as expressed by the Mayor of Port Moody in 1976, that "the GVRD hadbecome a monolithic monster feeding on its own bureaucracy . . . taking over many of thefunctions of the municipalities." (The Columbian, January 6, 1976: 2). despite this fear, theGVRD was also perceived as a mechanism to create a united front which could lobbying theprovincial government on regional needs.2098.4 THE ROLE OF THE "NOT IN MY NEIGHBOURHOOD" ATTITUDE.The term "NIMBY" or "Not In My Back Yard" was coined to describe an attitudeamongst some residents of a neighbourhood who, while they might acknowledge the need for aproject to solve a regional problem, do not want it in their neighbourhood. This aversion tohaving one's neigbourhood disrupted, has its origins in most peoples' reluctance to see radicalchanges occur in their lives. Most people like stability, and though most are not againstchange of any kind, they become defensive if the proposed changes confer benefits to othersand has negative impacts to them. The importance of NIMBY lies in the pressures awidespread campaign against a project has upon the political decision making process.The problem that arises concerns the rationalization of what public benefit means,who should benefit and who should make a sacrifice. If all residents of a region are expectedto contribute to a project benefiting all, then there could be a case made for a project. Ifhowever, a handful of neighbourhoods have to absorb all the negative impacts of a projectwhile those benefiting make little or no sacrifice, then the residents of the impactedneighbourhoods will likely react to stop the project.Information presented in the case study indicates one of the obstacles to improving thetransportation infrastructure within the G.V.R.D. is a reluctance of residents to see theirneighbourhoods disrupted by the widening of roads and/or the construction of rapid transit.There are several examples presented in the case study which illustrate this point. In the Cityof Vancouver in the late 1960's and early 1970's, the Great Freeway Debate, discussed inChapter 4 section 4.5, was in reaction to attempts by the City government to push a freewaythrough long established neighbourhoods, without taking into consideration the impacts thiswould have on the residents and their neighbourhoods. The result of the freeway debate wasa recognition on the part of the city officials that the citizens were not prepared to tolerateany major roadways being constructed that could disrupt their neighbourhoods.The provincial government in constructing the ALRT line through East Vancouver inthe early 1980's, chose to ignore the negative impacts this project, and sacrificed the quality210of life enjoyed by these residents for the benefit of the region as a whole. The lesson of thisincident has not been lost on other residents and neighbourhoods which have foundthemselves in the path of potential routes of new rapid transit lines.In more recent times, the developments in the North East Sector have increased thetraffic volumes on the main routes through Burnaby and New Westminster, creatingproblems of congestion. The provincial government, through the Ministry of Transportationand Highways and B.C. Transit have offered proposals to improve the existing transportationnetwork. The Barnet/Hastings People Moving Project discussed in Chapter 6 Section 4, wasone project that has caused the local residents to pressure local and provincial politicians toshift it away from their neighbourhood to the Lougheed and/or the Freeway. The localresidents feel those who live in the North East Sector should make use of transit instead ofsingle occupant automobiles.Within the North east Sector, the City of Port Moody has experienced trafficcongestion from residents living in more easterly communities. The residents of Port Moodyhave for several years sought a remedy to the problem through the construction of a bypassas was described in Chapter 6 Section 2.2 "The Chines Expressway" or the more recent"Spring Street Bypass."The suggestion of a transit remedy as an alternate to widening existing highways hasbeen offered. The residents and politicians within the North East Sector have activelysupported the proposal to extend the ALRT line to Lougheed Mall and later to the CoquitlamCentre Mall. Chapter 6 Section 3.1.3 "Current LRT Proposals. 1990" describes the routesand provides some background information. The reaction of the residents in the East Burnabyneighbourhood likely to be impacted by one of the proposed routes is described in Chapter 6Section 4 "Impacts on Adjacent Municipalities." The residents see the choice of this route forthe ALRT as being politically motivated. It would require the shortest time and the leastexpense to construct, and would fulfill a politically promise. The residents of the affectedneighbourhood pointed out, the choice of the route would not take into account the long term211needs of the region and its construction would only provide short term benefits to the Northeast Sector.The introduction of the NIMBY attitude into the process of rationalizing thetransportation infrastructure to better serve the region, has complicated the search for asolution to the problem of traffic congestion. There is a need for improvements to both thehighway and transit components of the transportation infrastructure, and if every affectedneighbourhood while acknowledging the need for improved transportation infrastructurechooses to fight to exclude it from impacting on their neighbourhood, little positive can beaccomplished.8.5 FACTORS CREATING TRANSPORTATION DIFFICULTIES.Traffic congestion in the study area has been created by a number of local andregional factors. These include, the position of the study area in relation to the rest of theregion, the geographical and geological make-up of the area, and the division of politicaljurisdiction and power within the area.8.5.1 Position of Study Area in Region.The North East Sector occupies a peripheral position, in the region. In the past mostof the region's urban and economic development was focused around the C.B.D. of Vancouver,with a few smaller centres such as New Westminster and North Vancouver serving as focalpoints for smaller more local developments. The roads and transit lines radiated out from thecentre of Vancouver serving to reinforce its importance to the region.The suburbanization process which began after the Second World War saw most ofthe early developments occur in the City of Vancouver and the adjacent municipalities. Themunicipalities in the North East Sector, were just after the War considered to be the suburbsof New Westminster, as the existing road system drew residents to work and shop there.There were some early developmental pressures for the conversion of land to small urban212sized lots, but this was mainly located in the areas adjacent to New Westminster or the fewcommercial points that existed in the North East Sector.The North East Sector was initially bypassed by large scale suburbanization sincelarge tracts of level cleared lands were available in Richmond and Surrey, or the mountainside view lots of North Vancouver. It was only after the available developable lands closer into Vancouver began to fill, that the lands within the North East Sector began to attract homeseekers.This lack of early suburban development also had an impact upon the road system inthe North East Sector. Municipalities which were developed earlier, either commissionedplans for developing an arterial road system such as in the case of Vancouver in the late1920's, or due to the nature of the original land surveys possessed a blueprint for roadbuilding as in the case of Richmond in the 1960's. Chapter 4 Section 2.3 "Roads" providesadditional background information. Thus the lack of an earlier plan to locate a completenetwork of internal arterial roads to service the study area, prior to the beginning ofsuburbanization has contributed immensely to the area's traffic problems.Since the mid 1960's the North East Sector has had good highway access to the restof the region. The study area lies across or adjacent to the main regional highways linking theEastern Fraser Valley to Vancouver. However, the 401 Freeway, and the LougheedHighway. The main railway lines also either pass through, as in the case of the CanadianPacific Railway, or pass by the southern edge of the study area, as in the case of theCanadian National Railway and the Burlington Northern Railway.The study area was initially bypassed by the great suburban movement of peopleseeking inexpensive residences or a rural lifestyle. The lack of good road access prior to the1960's, as well as the costs of clearing the hilly tree covered lands persuaded house seekers tolocate elsewhere. Later a shortage of inexpensive developable lands elsewhere brought theNorth East Sector to the attention of developers and home seekers.213Geological and Geographical Limitations.The geographical nature of the North East Sector has played a major role ininfluencing the transportation options. The geographical and geological history of the studyarea has been covered in Chapter 4 Section 2 "Physical Nature of Study Area." Access to thecentral business district is restricted by water on three sides, while the remaining side ispartially blocked by a high ridge of land. The available routes around this central ridge arelimited to a narrow space between the sea and a steep unstable mountain side to the northand a slightly wider space curving between the south of the central ridge and a low swampyriver floodplain. Both the northern and southern routes have engineering problems due to theexistence of unstable soils.These limitations cause traffic choke-points where traffic has to funnel through thetwo main roads, and heavy traffic volumes or a traffic accident can cause congestion to occur.These geological limitations can be overcome, but the costs are high.Political Considerations.As noted in Chapter 2 Section 8 "Sources of Jurisdiction and Authority" and in thecase study, both land use and transportation fall under different governmental jurisdiction.The provincial government gave municipalities control over land use within their boundaries,but retained control of regional transportation.Provincial Government.The provincial government controls regional transportation through the Ministry ofTransportation and Highways. The province also controls the regional transit authority. Inthe past the highways and transit planners did not appear to co-ordinate their planningactivities.Municipal Government.The municipalities were given the power to control land use. As each of the threemunicipalities was primarily concerned about its own development, there was friction between214them over which one would receive the lion's share of development. An example of thisfriction was the battle between Coquitlam and Port Coquitlam over the location of the regionaltown centre proposed in the early 1950's by the Regional Planning Authority.The traffic problems in the North East Sector have reach a level that is forcing themunicipalities to co-operate to find solutions. North East Sector municipal planners andpoliticians have attempting to cope with the increasing traffic. But, practical routes for theconstruction of new roads were few, and as the Provincial Highways Department had thepower and resources to construct them, little could be done. One of the few alternative routesavailable was the Burnaby Mountain Expressway, paralleling the Barnet Highway with theexception of passing to the south of Burnaby Mountain. The Highways Department studiesindicated in the late 1960's and early 1970's, the transportation demand for the region wassouthwest from the C.B.D. and thus despite the concerns shown by the local municipalitiesover the future need for this roadway, nothing was done.In recent years, there has been considerable co-operation between the political leadersof the three municipalities of the study area to resolve some of the more pressing urbanproblems. This is particularly evident in the collective actions they have taken in the matterof improving the road and transit services to the area. The local politicians and planners havea better record of co-operating on matters of area concern then do the other levels ofgovernment. Their actions concerning the interrelationship of land use and transportationreflect an understanding of the importance of this relationship. They have collectivelyattempted to attract the necessary businesses and employment opportunities that wouldtheoretically reduce the need of local residents from having to commute to employmentelsewhere in the region.They have tried to keep the Provincial Highways and Transit Authorities informed ofthe needs of the area, but on many occasions have found that in spite of their concerns, thesetwo bodies have made decisions in isolation.2158.5.2 Factors Influencing Land Use and Transportation in the North East Sector.Both land use and transportation are influenced, singly or collectively, by factorswhich impact on them. The factors include, the political alliances of the politicians of the areaand the party forming the provincial government, the vision of the area's development held bythe local municipal leaders planners and residents, the influence of the Greater VancouverRegional District's long range development plans for the area, the number of transportationinfrastructure improvements funded by the provincial government, and the number of newand/or improved transit services.Political Affiliations.The party affiliation of local and provincial politicians in relation to the party in powerhas an important effect. Most major transportation projects are funded by the province, and ithas been suggested that these decisions are based on the party affiliation of the Member ofthe Legislative Assembly. For example, when the provincial budget for British Columbia waspresented to the Legislative Assembly in late March, 1992, it was noted in a local newspapercolumn that "the reduction of the highways (budget) was a matter of routine: B.C.governments have always cut spending on roads and bridges in the year after a provincialelection." (Palmer, 1992: A-18).In the early 1970's the Member of the Legislative Assembly for the North East Sectorwas also premier of the province. It was during his term of office that many new land use andtransportation projects were planned for the area. After the next election and another politicalparty formed the government, and many of the plans were shelved. Later, in the late 1970'sand early 1980's some of the transportation projects were constructed as traffic congestionworsened.In the late 1970's the provincial government promoted the North East Sector as theplace where most of the regional residential development should occur. This action was toreduce the demand for more transportation capacity to the south of the Fraser River.216The importance of the political affiliation of the politicians to the source of the decisionmaking and ultimately funding is evident. Those politicians who form part of the provincialgovernment are in a better position to express their constituents' views and needs.Developmental Visions for the North East Sector.Most people develop over time a sense of belonging, and pride in their community.They perceive their community to have the potential to achieve greatness through thecontinued development of its position of importance within its region. To most people,continued growth of population and the development of land into higher uses such ascommercial, industrial, and higher density residential indicate their community is dynamic.This vision of continued growth is evident in the planning activities of the municipalitieswithin the North East Sector. The Official Community Plans for each set out programs andblueprints on the extent and direction of future growth. The Regional District also developed avision for the region as a whole. Prior to 1983, the Regional District had the power to planregionally, but the loss of this planning function in 1983, left the individual municipalities towork out their own plans. An example of what can happen if adjacent communities cannotagree on what is the best for the region as a whole is the North East Sector Regional TownCentre controversy of the 1970's.Each of the municipalities forming the region has its own vision of greatness."Municipalities, not surprisingly, tend to look after their own citizens first, with little regardfor the regional impacts of their decisions." (Seelig & Artibise, 1991: 87). This lack of co-operation and co-ordination complicated the achievement of a unified vision for the region.Transportation Infrastructure Improvements.In spite of the increasing traffic congestion and the complaints of residents of theinadequacy of the existing transportation infrastructure, and the need for more bridges androad capacity, over the last twenty years there has been large sums of money spent onimproving access to the North East Sector. As illustrated in Chapter 6 "Transportation in theNorth East Sector, 1951 to 1990," there were many improvements to the area's217transportation infrastructure though often their construction has been long overdue, and whenbuilt provided capacity for the existing congestion, without providing much excess capacity toaccommodate future traffic growth.Transit Service Improvements.As related in Chapter 6 Section 3.1 "Transit in the Study Area," the study area wasnot serviced by the regional transit authority until 1973. Over time, as the populationincreased and more land was converted to residential use, transit service was slowlyincreased. In recent times, improved transit service has been seen as a means of reducing thetraffic congestion. "Every 50 people diverted to transit means 38 fewer automobiles on theroad." (Seelig & Artibise, 1991: 64). Information provided in Chapter 8 Section 2.5 "Traffic"indicates that at present only from 8 to 11 per cent of the residents of the North East Sectorutilize transit to commute to and from work. To provide full transit service would be costlysince the study area has a low density of development, and congestion is limited to the tworush hour periods. Transit has provided a rush hour express service from bus interchanges toVancouver and New Westminster. However, since the buses have to use the same roads asautomobile traffic, it has to contend with the existing traffic congestion, and many commutersbelieve it is more convenient to use their own vehicles.Transit could provide a viable option to the automobile and help relieve congestion,provided the service could prove to be more convenient. To achieve this, bus only lanes orHigh Occupancy vehicle lanes reserved for transit vehicles and automobiles carrying three ormore people, would enable transit to provide a service that could be faster than a singleoccupancy automobile. The suggestion for bus lanes as well as Rapid Transit using its ownright-of-way have been planned and discussed but not yet implemented.8.6 TRANSPORTATION OPTIONS.There have been other options to reducing the urban transportation problem. Theseinclude controlling the supply of parking spaces, ridesharing, commuter bus service, bicycling,218and staggered work hours. The first major local attempt to use these alternatives was theCity of Vancouver 1976 rideshare program. The city also promoted cycling as an alternativeto the automobile. There were attempts by the city and local cycling enthusiasts to permitbicycles on the SkyTrain, or to have bicycle lockers at the stations. B.C. Transit has finallyinitiated a pilot program of lockers at several park-and-ride lots and the Scott Road SkyTrainStation in early 1992. As of October 5, 1991, B.C. Transit decided to allow bicycles on theSeabus (B.C. Transit, 1991b: 5).Some municipalities have instituted staggered hours amongst their staff, though largescale employers such as the provincial government have until recently resisted this option.Municipalities do have some direct say in encouraging alternative transportation optionsthrough rezoning and reducing the parking requirements when a company commits toencouraging carpooling or transit use amongst its staff.Another option related to parking is to increase the price of parking which may causecommuters to leave their vehicles. In the case of Vancouver, the City owns a number ofparkades in the C.B.D. and can control the pricing. The City could also influence the price ofparking at other lots through changes in its bylaws.The provincial government though having the power to promote and encourage theuse of alternatives to the automobile has until very recently declined to act. Its recentinitiative, the Go Green program, is still too new to judge how effective it might be in reducingtraffic congestion, or how well the planing and decision making will be co-ordinated betweenthe different levels and departments of the government.8.7 PLANNING ON A REGIONAL BASIS.Officially there has been regional planning of one form or another in the GreaterVancouver Area since the late 1940's. The Lower Mainland Regional Planning Board(LMRPB) and its successor, the Greater Vancouver Regional District (GVRD), have producedand modified development guidelines which included both the land use and transportation219components. These two bodies have produced a series of reports, which have reflected theconcerns of planners, politicians and citizens about the impacts of development upon thefuture livability of the region. The GVRD which assumed the functions of the LMRPB in1967, has provided services of a regional nature.The Regional Planning Board began the development of the series of regional plans in1952, emphasizing the interrelationship between land use and transportation. The first reportwas The Lower Mainland Looks Ahead, (LMRPB, 1952) published in 1952. It emphasized theimportance of co-ordinating development so the best use might be made of the limiteddevelopable land. The study recognized the importance of planning future land use in thesuburban areas to control the growth of traffic. The report recommended the creation of anumber of satellite towns in the suburbs around Vancouver to provide alternate sites foremployment and the provision of services. It also recommended that these satellitecommunities be liked together by the provision of good transportation infrastructure. At thattime, the type of transportation infrastructure suggested was freeways, as the automobilewas still considered the best available means of providing efficient transportation.The Land for Living report of 1964 (LMRPB, 1964b) supported the recommendationfor satellite towns connected by freeways, though there was an acknowledgement of the roleof transit, since it suggested express buses on the freeways. In 1966, the importance of co-ordinating land use, was recognized and an Official Regional Plan was developed for the wholeof the Lower Fraser Valley, from Vancouver to Hope.The next major study was the Livable Regions report of 1975 (GVRD, 1975). Thisreport recognized the need to balance the rate of population growth in the region, balance theprovision of jobs and residences, create regional town centre and provide a transit orientedtransportation system. In this study there was a recognition of the need to find anothersolution to automobile traffic congestion.Accelerated growth over the previous decade and a change in the transportationemphasis from the automobile to public transit, forced a review of the Official Regional Plan220in 1979/80. Additional work on the Regional Plan was halted in 1983, due to the provincialgovernment removing its planning power.In 1990, the GVRD embarked upon a review of the 15 year old Livable Regions Program. This review was entitled Choosing Our Future (GVRD, 1990c) and from this aseries of reports entitled Creating Our Future (GVRD, 1990d) were produced. These updatedstudies re-emphasized the need to "tame" the automobile.Several studies of the impact of the automobile upon the quality of air were alsocompleted. Transit and the Environment and Clouds of Change  noted that between 75.9 percent (B.C. Transit, 1990c: 3) and 80 per cent (City of Vancouver, 1990: 17) of the airpollution in the region was the result of vehicle exhaust fumes.Traffic congestion is a region wide problem, and a region wide plan of action isrequired. The fragmentation of the different levels of governments and departments may notbe easily resolved. However, a regional approach enabling the local municipalities to identifytheir individual and mutual problems, and present a united front to the provincial governmentholds the best promise for the future.8.8 CONCLUSIONS.The main conclusion which can be drawn from this study is, the principle cause of theinability of those charged with the task of resolving the problem of traffic congestion withinthe North East Sector as well as the Greater Vancouver Region as a whole, is thefragmentation of the planning and decision making process. This fragmentation is due to theseparation of jurisdiction over the two factors that have the greatest influence over trafficgeneration. These two factors are land use and transportation.There has been a recognition by those agencies involved in planning for land use andtransportation, of the importance of the interrelationship that exists between the two. Despitethis recognition, plans and decisions have been made on changes to land use andtransportation, without any effective attempt being made to seek co-operation between the221responsible agencies, to co-ordinate their action to produce the best result with the minimumnegative impacts.There are of course, other factors contributing to the North East Sector's problem oftraffic congestion. These include, locational limitations, the lack of an early arterial road plan,the political divisions with the area, the regional pressures of an increasing population seekingdevelopable land for new housing, the construction of automobile dependent residentialdevelopments, and the increasing separation of residence from workplace. Some of thesefactors could be dealt with by the authorities within the North East Sector, while somerequire a more regional approach.Regional Planning Boards has existed in the Lower Mainland since the late 1940's.They has long recognized the need to co-ordinate land use and transportation planning toreduce the negative impacts of suburbanization. Forty years of planning studies haveidentified the problems facing the region and have suggested solutions. Unfortunately, due tothe fragmentation of control over land use and transportation, and the lack of a mechanism tofacilitate effective co-operation, the traffic problems that reduce the livability of the NorthEast Sector and the Greater Vancouver Region as a whole, exist and are worsening.To many residents and politicians, the best solution to congestion is to provideincreased capacity through the building of new highways and bridges or the widening ofexisting ones. This solution, however, has in the past encouraged the creation of low densitydevelopment in the suburbs, and served to generate more traffic. The disruption caused bytraffic and the expansion of roads through existing neighbourhoods has led the development ofan attitude amongst those affected of "Not In My Back Yard." The organization of localresidents to campaign against improvements to the region's arterial road system hasincreasingly served to pressure the politician to rethink the option of increasing the region'sroad capacity.Alternatives have been suggested, which would see better utilization of the existingtransportation infrastructure, through the introduction of a philosophy of moving people not222vehicles. Viable options include, greater utilization of transit, ridesharing, telework, livingcloser to work, using bicycling, and allowing higher density land use along transit corridors,amongst other options. Some of these would require the government encouragement, whileothers would require a change in attitude by members of the public.A recommendation that could be made to aid in resolving the region's traffic problems,would be to create some mechanism to produce effective co-operation between the levels ofgovernment and their agencies to co-ordinate planning. This could serve to allow planning ona regional basis, to produce the best results with the least negative impacts for the region.223Selected Bibliography Cited References Adam, Neale. "Slow steps towards rapid transit." The Vancouver Sun June 30, 1970. 6Aitken Wreglesworth Associates, Ray Spaxman Consulting Ltd., B-A Consulting Group Ltd.,Urbanics Consultants, Gannett Fleming, and Karyo Communications. Let's Do ItRight! The Lougheed Corridor: A Key to Regional Transportation  Submitted to TrileaCentres Ltd., 1992.AMS Student Environment Centre. UBC Commuting Options  Vancouver, B.C.: University ofBritish Columbia, Alma Mater Society, 1991.Anton Kuipers. Summary of Municipal L.R.T. Alignments Recommendations and Associated Costs Rapid Transit Project. Authorized by the Greater Vancouver Regional District.August, 1980.Armstrong, John E. Surficial Geology of New Westminster Map Area, B.C.  GeologicalSurvey of Canada, Paper 57-5, 1957.Armstrong, John E. Surficial Geology of Vancouver Area, B.C. Geological Survey ofCanada, Paper 55-40, 1956.Armstrong, John E. Environmental and Engineering Applications of the Surficial Geology ofthe Fraser Lowland, B.C. Geological Survey of Canada, Paper 83-23, 1984.Arsenault, Heather. "Voters were smart." Burnaby Ndw February 20, 1991. Letter to theEditor. 6Associated Engineering Services Ltd. City of Port Coquitlam Road Development Study Vancouver, B.C.: January 28, 1970.Associated Engineering Services Ltd. Traffic Study The Corporation of the District ofCoquitlam, B.C. 1971.Atkinson, Wallace. "Urban Transportation Problems-Solutions." in Canada: An Urban Agenda Peter Oberlander, ed. Ottawa: Published by the Community Planning Pressand the ASPO Press, 1976. 199-224Austin, Ian and Malcolm Turnbull. "Transit system plans on track." The Province March11, 1990. 4224Babic, Mary. "Whalley extension part of $1 B deal." The Le