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Mistaken identities Brewer, A. Stephen 1992

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MISTAKEN IDENTITIES  by A. STEPHEN BREWER B.A., The University of British Columbia, 1990 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Department of History)  We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA June 1992  © A. Stephen Brewer, 1992  7W-CkEZ_I-S.A.7-11-CPAT  In presenting this thesis in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a Master of Arts degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department, or by his or her representative(s). It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.  A. STEPHEN BREWER  Department of History The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada  24 June 1992  DE-6^(2/88)  ABS TRA CT As many as 150,000 Americans immigrated to Canada during the VietNam Era (1965-1977), because of their objections to the war their country was waging in SouthEast Asia. Overwhelmingly, those of the war-inspired immigrants who remained in British Columbia in late 1991 believed that they were radical British Columbia leftists. They were not. Research for this paper primarily involved the collection of data from a self-selected group of emigres, who were asked to complete an eight-page survey questionnaire designed to provide both demographic data and a measure of their political orientation. The latter was tested through use of a standard question set, currently in wide use across North America as a measure of political thought, philosophy and orientation. A total of one hundred and fifty-two emigres, all resident in British Columbia, completed the survey questionnaire between July and October, 1991. The data base these completed questionnaires supplied was crosstabulated, then compared to other data bases which reflected the political orientation and philosophies of the population of the province as a whole. The immigrant data base revealed several demographic surprises, the most notable being that immigration by American VietNam War objectors into Canada was not the exclusively male phenomenon it has been believed to be. While two-thirds of the respondents were the young, male military evaders they were expected to be, the remaining third were, typically, slightly older female objectors who came to Canada independently, for personal philosophical reasons. As a group, the respondents were exceptionally well-educated at the time of immigration, and tended to have come to  Canada, to British Columbia, from homes in the Western United States. Survey responses showed that most respondents believed -- at the time they immigrated or one year later -- that they were radical British Columbia leftists. There is some evidence which suggests they may, in fact, have been radical American leftists before immigration; but the evidence clearly shows that, by Canadian standards, the emigres were not what they believed themselves to be. Survey responses further showed the majority of respondents still saw themselves, in late 1991, as radical British Columbia leftists. Again, their responses to the standard question set showed them to be anything but. This self-perception which was so at odds with a measurable reality poses a host of questions. Most were beyond the scope of this paper, which can be seen as little more than an entry point into research on this group of immigrants. The size and political motivation of the immigrant group make further study of its members vital to ongoing studies of the Canadian body politic and to considerations of Canadian society and culture in the late twentieth century.  ThAb.Le calf Cori ten is  ii  Abstract: Foreword: About the Author  1  Introduction: 'Extraordinary Problems' Definitions A History of Conflicts Notes  4 4 6 9  Chapter 1: Mistaken Identities Political Efficacy Populism Notes  12 15 21 25  Chapter 2: 'A Strange Mix' Individual versus Collective Responsibility Willingness to Compromise Notes  31 34 38 42  Conclusion: Entry Point  45  Selected Bibliography: Primary Sources Secondary Sources General Reference Works  52 57 59  Appendix A: The Numbers Game: How Many Came? Notes  60 66  Appendix B: Notes  The Immigrants  68 74  Appendix C: Notes  Methodology for Circulation of Survey  78 82  Appendix D: Notes  A Political Yardstick  84 97  Appendix E Survey Questionnaire and Responses  ^  Biographical information follows page 117.  102  FOREWORD t.12^_A.  41  C> L2  t2  .12 c›...r-  "Tell me what you know," American poet Ralph Waldo Emerson once said. This paper is an attempt to do just that. Because it is, it will offer more of my own judgment than is usual in academic analysis, in statements which will usually be endnoted with the phrase "author's personal experience." This makes it vital that I offer some information about who, and what, I am. It is necessary to explain how I know what I know, why my own experience should be considered at least support for a statement. I was born in the United States, in 1949, in the middle of that demographic phenomenon commonly called the Baby Boom. After spending my childhood in Latin America, I lived in northern California, in or near San Francisco, from 1960 until I again left the United States in December, 1969. I am one of my own subjects in this paper, an American who -- after twoand-a-half years' service -- deserted the United States Marine Corps to take up a new life in another country: a VietNam War-inspired immigrant. After coming to Canada, I became a newspaperman, working for a string of newspapers scattered across southwestern British Columbia, both on the mainland and on Vancouver Island. As a newspaperman, I wrote frequently about the politics -- local, provincial and federal -- of my adoptive country, both reporting on and analysing political thought, opinion and trends. Following thirteen years of such work, I became the editor of a magazine published by an industrial union, Local 180 of the Hospital Employees' Union, a job in which I continued to report on, and analyse, -- 1 —  politics (particularly labour politics) in British Columbia. I spent three years as a labour editor, then worked as editor of the official publication of the New Democratic Party of British Columbia, a tabloid newspaper called The Democrat. There I spent six years probing politics, politicians and political parties, both provincial and federal, while reporting on each from at least a moderately leftist perspective. Despite this job history -- and despite the consultant's role I have played for the Liberal Party of British Columbia since October, 1991 -- I have never belonged to a political party. Conventional journalistic wisdom holds that group membership makes objective evaluation of the group, or those in opposition to it, impossible. While recognising that complete detachment is a forever unattainable goal, I have always tried to maintain the highest degree of objectivity possible when undertaking analysis of any group. My refusal to join the New Democratic Party, in fact, was at least part of the reason I ultimately left my job as editor of The Democrat, to become a student of history at this University. My background in journalism and politics was the reason I was asked, in 1982, to become a guest lecturer in this University's political science department. I have lectured there -- to British Columbia Government and Politics (Political Science 304) classes -- for eight of the last ten years, declining invitations in 1986 and 1989 because of conflicting commitments on the occasions I was to have lectured. I last lectured in 1992. My background in journalism and politics was also the reason I was asked, in 1984, to become an associate of United Communications Research, a market survey firm specialising in political polling and analysis in this province. When that company's principals parted ways three years later, I  became an associate of the two firms they subsequently set up, Storey Research Associates and The Research Group. I remain a consultant to both companies, which currently conduct political attitudinal surveys from offices in Vancouver; the former publishes ongoing research analysis, on a quarterly basis, in the journal Voice of BC. This is how I know what I know.  A. Stephen Brewer  University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada 24 June 1992  INTRODUCTION e_E!...Trt  2--.5zcar- c: 1 1 z2.6Lx- ..T.-_1::'_r-ca la 1 ri2 ,s '  Between 1965 and 1977, almost 300,000 Americans left the United States to emigrate to Canada. 1 They came legally and illegally, for a variety of reasons. About half of them, though, came for the same reason: their objections to the war their country was waging in SouthEast Asia were so strong they felt compelled to leave. 2 This paper is about the political orientation of some of the immigrants who came to, and stayed in, British Columbia. It seeks to answer a single question: Were these newcomers radical leftists? A survey of one hundred and fifty-two of the immigrants -- carried out in the summer and fall of 1991 3 -- shows they believed themselves to be just that. But it also shows that, by British Columbian standards, they were something else altogether, a group whose politics defy classification in Canadian terms. The one thing certain is that they were not radical British Columbia leftists. DEFINITIONS Before considering the evidence which supports this argument, it is necessary to define some of the terms which will be used throughout this paper. This is not so simple a matter as it might seem. "Because of its length, its immensely confusing nature, its proximity to the present, and the emotions which still surround it," University of Kentucky historian George Herring wrote in the introduction to his 1986 history of the VietNam War, "[it] presents extraordinary problems for historians."  4  The same fac-  tors present the same problems for historians examining events related, if — 4 --  only indirectly, to the war. The mass exodus of Americans to Canada between 1965 and 1977 is still surrounded by strong emotions, for those who came and for those they left behind. Most Canadians, and most Americans, refer to this group of emigres as "draft dodgers" -- a very specific group of people who fled the United States to avoid conscription into the American armed forces -- even though military deserters are usually included in the group they have in mind. But "draft dodger" is an emotionally-laden phrase, as well as an inaccurate one; for these reasons, draft evaders and military deserters are here jointly called military evaders. As discussed in Appendix B, they formed only a part of the group under consideration. It is also necessary to define the parameters of this larger group of immigrants, of which the military evaders were but a part. In this paper, the emigres as a group will be called war-inspired immigrants. In this number will be included any American who emigrated from the United States to Canada because of the VietNam War -- or its effects on American society -- during the VietNam Era. Again, Appendix B treats this definition in more depth. The term VietNam Era, in turn, is used here because anyone studying the period soon comes to recognise the truth of another part of Herring's litany: the immensely confusing nature of the war itself. There is no "day of infamy" for the VietNam War, no "December seventh, 1941," any more than there is a definitive end-date. But it is not the war itself on which this paper centres; here, the conflict is cause, not effect. The effect is a disillusionment with the United States which was intense enough to prompt individual Americans to emigrate. As the statistical evidence in Appendix A makes clear, such disillusionment occurred over a thirteen-year period,  -- 6 — starting roughly in January, 1965, and ending sometime in late 1977. In this paper, this span will define the VietNam Era. A HISTORY OF CONFLICTS VietNam was not the United States' first unpopular war. All American wars, in fact, have been unpopular with the country's citizenry, to one degree or another, from the Revolution to Operation Desert Storm. The Revolution was not only America's first war; it was also the first one which saw Americans who did not support it picking up and heading north, thus establishing a two-century tradition of flight to Canada as a means of escaping American militarism (if not necessarily conscription). As David Surrey noted, in Choice of Conscience, [desistance, while varied in form and quantity, was apparent across [the whole of the United States'] history of military conflicts. . . . The use of Canada as a refuge . . . dates back to the Revolution, was very significant in the Civil War, and noticeable in World War I. The War of 1812 -- the first to follow the Revolution -- was highly unpopular with many Americans, so much so that it was not uncommon for state legislatures to refuse to allow their militias -- then the primary component of national military organisation -- to fight outside their own boundaries. Some analysts have suggested the refusal of Ohio and New York regiments to cross the Niagara River into Canada was the deciding factor in the American troops' loss in that war's decisive Battle of Queenston Heights. 6 The Mexican-American War of 1846-48 was similarly unpopular with many Americans. Henry David Thoreau's famous "Essay on Civil Disobedience" 7 was written while he was in jail for refusing to pay taxes which, he believed, would be used to support the war. Many thousands of his countrymen agreed with Thoreau's assessment of the war as a "disgrace."  It was not until the War Between the States, sixteen years later, that the government of the United States first mandated conscription into its armed forces. 9 While that war cannot, with any accuracy, be described as a widely-unpopular one, the military draft it gave birth to was. Easily evaded by those who could afford to hire a substitute to serve in their places, unfairly administered, it quickly led to almost universal resentment: "Outright evasion was so widespread," Leon Friedman writes in "Conscription and the Constitution," that a new word -- 'skedaddling' -- was coined to describe it; new towns sprang up just across the northern borders in Canada, and many men took refuge in California or the mining towns of the western territories and British Columbia. . . . The total number of I skedaddlers' may have been as high as 200,000. 10 Flight to Canada as a means of avoiding military conscription in the United States became, for the first time, a reality." The draft -- intended as a wartime measure only -- ended with the War Between the States, not to reappear until the United States entered the First World War in 1917. 12 Conscription then was re-introduced the day before Congress declared war on Germany, and faced immediate, highly vocal, opposition. Ironically, the men who escaped the draft during World War I by flight to Canada were following in the footsteps of a sizable number of their countrymen who had come north months -- even years -- earlier to volunteer for service in Europe with the Canadian armed forces. 13 It was twenty-four years before the United States was again at war. The Second World War was all but universally supported by Americans, at least after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour on 07 December 1941. Even before then, Congress had passed a new Selective Service Act, designed to provide the nation with the armies it might need. 14 It was not  — 8 — soon enough, however, for some Americans; as happened before the United States entered World War I, thousands of Americans had travelled north in the period between 1939, when the war started, and late 1941 -- when the United States was finally dragged into it -- not to evade military service, but to volunteer for it. 15 What was different was that these men were passing Canadians, heading south to avoid military service, as they crossed the border. The trickle of Canadians who went to the United States as military evaders between 1939 and 1941 was never large enough to present a serious worry to the Canadian government. 16 But their reception in the United States was to have repercussions during the VietNam Era, when at least one Canadian politician cited it as justification for allowing American military evaders to enter Canada. Mitchell Sharp, external affairs minister during much of the VietNam Era, decided to welcome American military deserters to Canada only after he had his department look back to see what the United States had done during the period 1939-1941 when we were at war and they were not. We found that the Americans had accepted deserters from the Canadian army without question. So we said, 'Well, that's fine. The Americans are in a war that we're not in, so we will apply the same policy in Canada that they applied to us.' 17 There undoubtedly was some use of Canada as a refuge for American military evaders during both World War II and the Korean War which followed hard on its heels. But most analysts believe the flow was too small to be remarkable during either conflict, both because of the first conflict's popularity with the American public in general and because of Canada's active involvement -- as a combatant -- in both struggles. 18  Some of the seven American wars which separated the Revolution of  1775 and the VietNam War were long, some short. Some were popular, supported by most Americans, others were not. Conscription was used in only four of the seven: the Civil War, the First and Second World Wars and Korea. What differentiates the VietNam War from these others is its extraordinary length; its reliance, from its inception, on inducted troops to carry the burden of the fighting; and its unpopularity, with only small numbers of Americans initially, but with vast segments of the American population by the time it was over. That unpopularity led, for many Americans, to disillusionment. For 150,000 of them, disillusionment led to immigration to Canada. Not since the Revolution had so many Americans chosen life in Canada as a preferable alternative to life in a United States at war. ZiC  etc AC  1^Canadian government immigration statistics; see bibliography for a complete listing of sources. 2^See  Appendices A and B.  3^See  Appendix C for details of the methodology used to circulate the survey questionnaire. Appendix D outlines the methodology of survey interpretation, while tabulated responses to the survey questionnaire form Appendix E. C. Herring, America's Longest War: The United States and VietNam, 1950-1975, 2nd ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1986), p. xi.  4^George  David S. Surrey, Choice of Conscience: VietNam Era Military and Draft Resisters in Canada (New York: Praeger Special Studies, 1982), p. 32. G. Carleton, "Raising Armies Before the Civil War," in The Military Draft: Selected Readings on Conscription, Martin Anderson and Barbara Honegger, eds. (Palo Alto, California: Stanford University/Hoover Institution Press, 1982), pp. 69-72; also see Richard Halloran, Serving America: Prospects for the Volunteer Force (New York: Priority Press Publications, 1988), pp. 1-4; and James L. Lacy, "Military Manpower: The American Experience and the Enduring Debate," in Toward a Consensus on Military Service: Report of the Atlantic Council's Working Group on Military Service (New York: Pergamon Press, c1982), pp. 21-24.  6^William  ^  --  10  --  ^7^Widely  available in a number of sources; see, for example, Henry David Thoreau, Walden & The Essay on Civil Disobedience (New York: Lancer Books, 1968).  ^8^Carleton,  "Raising Armies," pp. 78-82; Lacy, "Military Manpower," pp. 23-28; and Leon Friedman, "Conscription and the Constitution: The Original Understanding," in The Military Draft, pp. 273-74.  ^9^Though  a conscription bill had been proposed by secretary of war -later president -- James Monroe in 1814. The end of the War of 1812 only a few weeks after the measure's introduction in Congress led to the plan being quietly dropped. See Lacy, "Military Manpower," pp. 21-22; and David R. Segal, Recruiting for Uncle Sam: Citizenship and Military Manpower Policy (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1989), pp. 23-24.  to^Friedman, "Conscription and the Constitution," p. 276; also see Frank Shannon, The Organization and Administration of the Union Army, 1861-1865 (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1928), pp. 184-85; and James W. Geary, We Need Men: The Union Draft in the Civil War (Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1991), p. 43. Friedman, "Conscription and the Constitution," pp. 275-80; Segal, Recruiting for Uncle Sam, pp. 25-26; Halloran, Serving America, p. 5; and Lacy, "Military Manpower," pp. 22-24. For a thorough treatment, see Geary, We Need Men. •  The Spanish-American War of 1898-99 was both too popular and too brief -- the former due, at least in part, to the latter -- to require military conscription. See W.A. Swanberg, Citizen Hearst (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1961), pp. 116-172, for an excellent treatment. Sullivan, "Conscription," in The Military Draft, p. 20; also see Halloran, Serving America, pp. 5-6; Lacy, "Military Manpower," pp. 2329; Segal, Recruiting for Uncle Sam, pp. 26-29; David M. Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and American Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), pp. 164-66; James A. Henretta and others, America's History Since 1865 (Chicago: The Dorsey Press, 1987), p. 685; and J.L. Granatstein and others, Twentieth Century Canada, 2nd ed. (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, Limited, 1983), pp. 256-60.  ^13^Mark  and others, America's History, pp. 813-14; Segal, Recruiting for Uncle Sam, p. 30; Richard Gillam, "The Peacetime Draft," in The Military Draft, pp. 102-04; Lacy, "Military Manpower," pp. 32-33; and Halloran, Serving America, pp. 5-6.  ^14^Henretta  Granatstein and others, Twentieth Century Canada, pp. 272-73.  •  Ibid., pp. 276-78.  17^Cited in Lawrence M. Baskir and William A. Strauss, Chance and Cir-  cumstance: The Draft, the War, and the VietNam Generation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), p. 174.  is^Granatstein and others, Twentieth Century Canada, pp. 274-77; Henretta and others, America's History, pp. 821-23; Gillam, "Peacetime Draft," p. 106; and Sullivan, "Conscription," g. 24.  CHAPTER 1 Mistake n 12  Icf rz ti ties The one hundred and fifty-two VietNam War-inspired immigrants whose political philosophies are this paper's focus shared a vision: they overwhelmingly viewed themselves as being radical British Columbia leftists. 1 This was their shared perception of themselves some two decades agog -- either at the time they immigrated or one year later 3 -- and it was their shared perception in late 1991. 4 The persistency and consistency of this shared self-perception is remarkable, for a number of reasons. It is remarkable, first, because it is so consistent. The fact that almost three-quarters of the war-inspired immigrant respondents saw themselves as radical leftists is enough to justify the group as a whole being treated, here, as one homogeneous body which shared that perception. This is especially so in light of the demographic unifiers discussed in Appendix B. While the assertion that "war-inspired immigrants saw themselves as radical leftists" is not absolutely accurate, it is statistically accurate enough to form the basis of the analysis undertaken here. The emigres' shared self-perception is remarkable for another reason: its persistency. Most Canadians' political self-image changes gradually over time, becoming slowly more conservative -- regardless of its starting point on the political spectrums -- as the individual grows older. 6 The warinspired immigrant respondents' self-perception remained virtually static. Less than five per cent of those who saw themselves as leftists twenty -- 12 --  -- 13 -years ago no longer saw themselves as such in 1991. 7 Less than one per cent of those who earlier saw themselves as radical leftists no longer saw themselves as radicals. 8 This shared self-perception is, finally, remarkable because it was so inaccurate. When the war-inspired immigrant respondents' political philosophies are measured against the yardstick of British Columbia political orientation created through use of the University of Michigan (UoM) standard sets, as discussed in Appendix D, precisely what they were remains uncertain. Their responses to the standard sets suggested several things they might have been, as will be seen, but proved only the negative: whatever else they were, the war-inspired immigrants were not radical British Columbia leftists.  There is at least some evidence which suggests the war-inspired immigrants were neither radicals nor leftists in the United States, before they emigrated, either. Many contemporary analysts shared the notion articulated by Renee Kasinsky in Refugees From Militarism -- a 1976 analysis of military evaders based on her earlier surveys of two groups of them -- in response to the rhetorical question "who were the young men that fled to Canada . . .?" She answered herself: The picture we have in our minds . . . is that most of these young men were radicals of the New Left 9 . . . who had given up their hope in the American Dream." Kasinsky, and others, were quick to point out how erroneous such a view was. For most war-inspired immigrants, she said, flight to Canada was "the first political act of significance in their lives." 11 Her own studies suggested the emigres were not radicals of the American left; 12 another, 1970, survey of military evaders suggested much the same conclusion.  -- 14 -That second survey was reported by war-inspired immigrant Kenneth Fred Emerick in his 1972 work, War Resisters in Canada. Based on his questioning of thirty-three military evaders, it showed most of them reported themselves as either Democrats or Republicans, or as having had no interest in politics, before they left the United States." Only 9 per cent of his subjects reported they had belonged to other, unspecified, political parties in the United States before immigration; another 30 per cent described themselves as "independents." 14 Neither of the latter two responses, it must be noted, necessarily translates as "leftist." Nor, Emerick reported, were the military evaders in his study the "sons of wildeyed radicals, communists, or anarchists." 15 Most were the children of Democrats and Republicans, or of independents, in proportions "which [we]re relatively close to the (American] national percentages" of the day. 16 What all of this suggests" is that the war-inspired immigrants were neither radicals nor leftists, even by American standards, before they came to Canada. In the absence of some attempt to measure political orientation among war-inspired immigrants before they left the United States against contemporary American standards, however, this remains little more than an intriguing possibility." It is a possibility, obviously, which poses a direct contradiction to any idea that the war-inspired immigrants might have come to see themselves as radical British Columbia leftists because they had been radical leftists in the United States. 19 If the suggestion that the war-inspired immigrants never were radical leftists by American standards is valid, it may explain why they never became radical leftists by Canadian standards. But while the suggestion would thus help to answer the one question, it would only further complicate the other: why the emigres came to see themselves as radical leftists  — 15 — in British Columbia. This unresolved -- and, with the data available here, unresolvable -- problem prevents this paper from doing more than suggesting possible reasons for the war-inspired immigrant respondents' selfidentification as radical British Columbia leftists. The actual reasons could form the basis for another paper, and an interesting one at that. But this paper can do little more than take the first step towards such further research, by noting that the war-inspired immigrants did identify themselves as radical British Columbia leftists . . and by showing just how mistaken such identification was.  POLITICAL EFFICACY This scale was designed to measure respondents' alienation from government, the degree to which they feel distanced from the system and institutions of their polity. 20 University of British Columbia (UBC) political scientist David Elkins, writing in Two Political Worlds, defined efficacy as the individual's "belief that he can, if he tries, have a say about political matters of concern to him." 21 It is tied inextricably to the individual's trust in the system, and those who administer it, he added, and linked strongly -- in British Columbia, at least -- to populist values. "Trust," the professor said, does not refer simply to satisfaction with a particular policy, leader, or party, but to a general orientation towards the political process as a whole. It concerns the extent to which people feel that government and politicians are competent, considerate of citizens' views, and interested in the public welfare rather than their own private fortunes. 22 As a whole, Canadians tended to feel alienated from their governments at the time Elkins and his co-authors conducted their survey. 23 But the three professors found their subject population did not share the  — 16 — "widespread cynicism or mistrust" characteristic of the nation as a whole;  24  "British Columbians," they reported, "c[a]me out somewhat more trusting than d[id] the populations of several other provinces and much more so than the citizens of Atlantic Canada or French Canadians. " 25 Still, the three authors conceded that leftists in British Columbia in the late 1970s and early 1980s were far more likely than those in other political camps to feel alienated from, and mistrustful of, government. 28 And, of course, the opinions the three men were reporting on were those of a decade ago and more. Decima Research analysts Allan Gregg and Michael Posner, relying on more recent and comprehensive data, 27 noted that things had changed considerably in Canada during that decade: "As [Canadians] entered the 1980s, our post-war values were challenged by changing experiences," they reported. 28 The challenge increased in the decade which followed, prompting Canadians to become even less trusting of government -- to become less efficacious -- than they had ever been. 29 By 1990, in fact, Canadians . . . harbour[ed] serious doubts about the political process . . .. Skepticism about the efficacy of government [had] led . . . to an unprecedented loss of confidence in the people in charge, the politicians, and the system. 30 More and more people -- ultimately, three of every four -- began to believe their governments were dominated by special interests, and cared little for the welfare of individual citizens, much less the opinions of those citizens. 31 Political parties were so out of touch with the electorate, Gregg and Posner reported, that "almost half [of Canadians] said that none of [them] 'really stand for the things I believe in,' a shocking indictment." 32 Politicians at the start of the 1990s "enjoy[ed] even less trust" than the governments they administered or the parties they belonged to, Gregg  -- 17 -and Posner said: less than a third of the Canadian population held generally favourable opinions about politicians; "inevitably, this sentiment translate[d] into mistrust of both federal and provincial governments -and, indeed, [of] the civil service." 33 If this mistrust of governments and politicians was strong in Canada, it was even stronger in British Columbia, Gregg and Posner reported in an abrupt reversal of Elkins and his coauthors' findings. As the country entered the 1990s, the later analysts reported, British Columbians and other Westerners tended to feel more alienated from their governments than any other Canadians. 34 If this was true of British Columbians generally, it was even more true of the province's leftists, Storey reported. 35 Like the three political scientists, he found British Columbia leftists were generally far more likely than either liberals or conservatives to distrust their governments, to believe their political institutions were so dominated by special (corporate and/or capitalist) interests that they are incapable of understanding, much less of responding to, the concerns of the individual citizen. 38 Storey's own ongoing analysis suggested a high -- and growing -- level of alienation among British Columbia leftists, with the degree of such alienation increasing as one moved from moderate leftist to radical on the political yardstick." All of this suggests, and that strongly, that Canadians generally were, by late 1991, very alienated from their governments, none more so than British Columbians. And, among British Columbians, no political camp felt more alienated than did the province's radical leftists. 38 If this paper's war-inspired immigrant respondents' self-perception as radical British Columbia leftists matched reality on this scale, then, those respondents would be expected to report a high level of alienation. They did not.  -- 18 -The war-inspired immigrant respondents, in fact, turned out to be far more efficacious than even Elkins and his co-authors' decade-old population sample of the province as a whole; 39 and the UBC survey was undertaken before the collapse of confidence in government, politicians and bureaucrats Gregg and Posner reported as having occurred in the late 1980s. 40 "I was convinced . . that a parliamentary system was superior" to the American republican system, war-inspired immigrant "Michael S" said from Nanaimo. It was [m]ore accountable to the people. In the U.S. I had to buy a New York Times to find out how a legislator voted (party affiliation was no guarantee), and sometimes this wasn't sufficient since a congressman could vote one way in committee, another on the floor of the House or Senate. In Canada votes were taken by parties, so you knew how a legislator would vote . 41 ..  "Canadian political parties were more sensible, effective and integrated into government," emigre Bobby Kovar, of Hornby Island, agreed. "The ruling party governed, rather than campaigned for re-election." 42 And almost two-thirds of the war-inspired immigrant respondents* would likely have agreed with Victoria's "Fran T": "Do I make a difference, yes, me and a thousand others!"" For "Michael S," this trust in government and its institutions even extended to bureaucrats: "My experience with government bureaucracies suggested that the Canadian civil service was . . . competent, honest and effective," he wrote.* Cross-tabulation of war-inspired immigrant responses to this scale showed that, as a group, the emigres were slightly less efficacious two decades after they came to Canada than they were at the time of their immigration.* But their responses to the UoM standard set propositions in Section VII are generally close enough to those in Section VI to indicate the moderation of their trust was so slight as to be statistically significant  -- 19 -only in that the latter responses are different enough from the former to strongly suggest an honest attempt to differentiate between the respondents' feelings twenty years ago and today.° The war-inspired immigrant respondents, in other words, started out trusting Canadian governments more than did native" Canadians and British Columbians. When the crash of confidence in government came in the late 1980s, the war-inspired immigrant respondents were not a part of it; they remained almost as efficacious as they had been at the time they immigrated . . . which made them, suddenly and without any significant movement on their own part, one of the most trusting groups within the polity. To be sure, that trust was not absolute: Strong majorities of the war-inspired immigrant respondents gave answers which showed high levels of efficacy to the first three questions in this scale; in fact, the emigre respondents' efficacy actually increased substantially, over twenty years, on all three." When these high efficacy scores were compared with those of British Columbia's population as a whole -- as measured in two Storey Research Associates (SRA) surveys conducted in late 1991 and early 1992 -the contrast was startling: British Columbians were almost as inefficacious as the war-inspired immigrant respondents were efficacious. 5° But war-inspired immigrant responses were less clear-cut with regard to Question 11, where efficacy and trust required disagreement with the statement "I don't think the government care(d/s) what I (thought/think)." More than three-quarters of native British Columbia leftists agreed with the statement in the SRA surveys, 51 a position reflective of the native population's general disenchantment with governments and politicians. About a third of war-inspired immigrant respondents shared that disenchantment  -- 20 -twenty years ago, with just less than half disagreeing.  52^But  those  figures were virtually reversed when the way-inspired immigrants responded to the proposition in terms of governments generally in 1991.  53  On this proposition, at least, the emigres had moved closer to the province's political mainstream, as they did in their responses to Question 13, a re-staterqnt of the premise designed to test responses at Question 11,m This slight movement towards the political mainstream on two isolated propositions should not be over-emphasised, however, as cross-tabulation of responses to all questions in the scale is essential in any analysis of the efficacy political attitudinal scale. "Any given person can express agreement with a particular item which seems to reflect alienation, and yet not feel alienated," Elkins cautioned: Hence, one should never rely on any one fallible indicator of an attitude. Instead one should use a battery of items on the assumption that although each item is imperfect, many items together are reasonably reliable and accurate. 55 Practiced analysis of the scale requires four of six responses to reflect either efficacy or inefficacy ("neither" or "don't know" responses are not counted) before an individual or group is labelled either.  56  When war-  inspired immigrant responses to the remaining question in the scale are considered," it becomes clear that, as a group, they must be considered to have had a significant level of efficacy, particularly at the time they were completing their questionnaires. The SRA surveys, of course, showed native British Columbians -reacting to the same propositions at almost exactly the same time -- scoring a "perfect" six-of-six on the inefficacious side of the yardstick, confirming Gregg and Posner's suggestion that the province's population as a whole  — 21 -had suffered a staggering loss of confidence in government, politicians and bureaucrats over the preceding decade. 58 Both Storey's and the three UBC political scientists' results, as was seen earlier, strongly suggested that the province's leftist political camp was less efficacious than the population as a whole, with the degree of inefficacy increasing as one moved from the moderate leftist camp to the radical. 59 Cross-tabulation of the war-inspired immigrant respondents' reactions to this scale, then, shows them to have held different views than native British Columbians generally, and very different views than native British Columbia radical leftists. In terms of the war-inspired immigrant respondents' self-perception as radical British Columbia leftists, this difference poses clear problems.  POPULISM In a British Columbian context, populism involves commitment to the principle of government by the people, accompanied by a deep and abiding mistrust of government by politicians and experts of any kind. Elkins defined the term as a conviction that "people, the little people, matter more than institutions, especially rich and powerful ones like banks and railroads or even legislatures. " 60 Since "[p]opulism . . . is strongly and positively related to B.C. alienation," 61 it is no surprise to find the three political scientists concluding that British Columbia was a basically populist province. 82 So widespread was native British Columbians' commitment to populist ideals, in fact, that the three men concluded that a "fair assessment of populism [in the province at the time] might conclude that it was not `really' an ideology [here,] but a mood or sentiment or style of politics. The distinction," they added,  -- 22 — loses its force . . . when we consider populism as one pillar of B.C. political culture . . .. [T]he outlook [was] so widely shared [that it did] not, as a rigid ideology would, entail very specific policies, legislation, or overarching goals. 63 That lack of an ideological base for it within the polity made populism a truly provincial phenomenon in British Columbia, the three men continued: Its agrarian origins and supporters [originally] made the movement naturally suspicious of urban sophistication and led to glorification of . . . the people, especially the hardy and self-reliant farmers. Both features have given populism a strong flavour of conservatism . . ., [but] the emphasis on 'little people' and the 'grass roots' has given many populist ideas a liberal flavour . . .. Populism, like all predispositions which gain wide recognition, has . . . become a label covering several distinct elements . . .. No longer exclusively rural or agrarian, populism [today] chops up in diverse manifestations." Given populism's emphasis on mistrust of "politicians and their socalled experts," 65 it is hardly surprising to find Gregg and Posner reporting -- if only indirectly -- that the rest of Canada had become more populist than it had been following the collapse of trust in government and its institutions in the late 1980s. 66 This increased belief in the "little people" at the "grass root" level was so widespread by 1990, the two analysts reported, it crossed both party and political ideological lines. 67 In fact, virtually all Canadians could be considered populists, to one degree or another 68 . . . except radical leftists. The UBC political scientists' work focussed on political parties in the province, and thus must be used carefully when their findings are applied to camps, rather than specific political groups. But their report is detailed enough to allow broad inferences to be drawn from it, including the strong suggestion that those on the extreme, radical leftist fringe of the British  -- 23 -Columbia NDP -- and, by extension, those leftists even further to the left than those who can bring themselves to join the NDP -- tend to be far less populist than their more moderate brethren. 69 This is confirmed by Storey, whose SRA surveys reported in more detail, breaking down data bases not only by party affiliation, but by political self-identification as well." Radical British Columbia leftists, those surveys showed, disagreed with every proposition put to them in the populism scale, by margins ranging from a low of 71.3 per cent -- still almost three-quarters of respondents -- at Question 20 to a high of 83.1 per cent at Question 23. 71 Given this camp's oft-repeated commitment to the common, working man and its general mistrust of government and politicians," this might, at first, seem surprising. But the radical left's distrust of government must be considered within the context of its historical overall commitment to large, centralised governmental institutions, a commitment clung to so long as those institutions are controlled and administered by the "right" people: the radical leftists themselves." Behind the radical left's rhetorical demands for the focus of the Canadian polity to be shifted from the privileged few to the common masses, in other words, lies a strong belief that the workings of government are "so arcane as to be beyond the understanding of the average citizen." 74 Only the radical leftists themselves, as political leaders and as the experts advising them, can be relied upon to make the polity operate for the benefit of the many: while government has to be made to work for the people, it cannot be made to work by the people.  The war-inspired immigrants' survey responses on this scale placed  — 24 — them well within the populist British Columbian political mainstream. Only on two questions were the reactions of a majority of their number not that expected of populists; 75 support for the other propositions in this scale -indicative of a belief in populist principles -- ranged from a low of about 47 per cent 76 to a high of about 55 per cent. 77 This range cannot, obviously, be counted as an overwhelming emigre respondent commitment to populist ideals. But it is enough to distance them as a group from the radical British Columbia leftist camp, where their self-perceptions said they belonged.  VietNam War-inspired immigrant responses to the closely inter-related in British Columbia, at least -- efficacy and populism political attitudinal scales show they fit uncomfortably into the province's polity. "Consistency," within a British Columbian context, would require of them either: 4c If they are to be considered "typical" British Columbians, a high level of mistrust of government, its institutions and its attendant politicians and bureaucrats, one married to a commitment to populist ideals of faith in the common man; or zic If they are to be classed as radical leftist British Columbians, a similar, but more intense, level of alienation from the existing polity, coupled with a strong -- and decidedly non-populist -- commitment to a powerful centralised government composed of, and administered by, radical leftists. What the war-inspired immigrant respondents showed, instead, was a relatively high level of efficacy -- one, in fact, which placed them completely outside the native political spectrum -- coupled with a mild dedica-  — 25 -tion to populist ideals and principles. Because this combination was not shared by any native Canadian or British Columbian political camp, it forces the conclusion that the war-inspired immigrants cannot really be considered to have been "Canadian," nor even "British Columbian," in this context, but must be seen as having existed beyond the pale of the province's political culture. What the war-inspired immigrants were, in relation to these two political attitudinal scales, remains uncertain; what they were not does not. On both scales, the war-inspired immigrant response was at sharp odds with that expected of radical British Columbia leftists. Where such natives could be relied upon to be among the most alienated of British Columbians, the war-inspired immigrants were found to be the most efficacious. Where radical British Columbia leftists could be expected to be the least populist of all native political camps, the war-inspired immigrants were found to be at least moderately populist. The war-inspired immigrants identified themselves as radical British Columbia leftists. With regard to these scales -- and, as will be seen in the next chapter, at least one of the other two scales of the UoM standard set as well -- they were clearly mistaken in that self-identification. mic Air zic 1^See Appendix D for a full discussion of the methodology used to identify political orientation in this paper. 2^Here,  and throughout the remainder of this paper, the imprecise -but reasonably accurate -- phrases "twenty years ago" and "two decades ago" will be used to mean "either at the time they immigrated or one year later, some fourteen to twenty-seven years ago (1965-1977)."  3^77.0  per cent saw themselves as both radical and leftist; Questions VI29 and 30, cross-tabulated. Throughout this paper, questions from the survey questionnaire will be identified by section and number (as reproduced in Appendix E); Question VI29, for example, will be number 29 in Section VI.  — 26 -^4  ^  73.8 per cent; Questions V1129 and 30, cross-tabulated.  See Appendix D for a full discussion of the creation of a political spectrum for British Columbia, and the sub-division of that spectrum into political camps. ^6^Les  Storey, interview with author (Vancouver: 23 January 1992); Allan Gregg and Michael Posner, The Big Picture: What Canadians Think About Almost Everything, (Toronto: Macfarlane Walter & Ross, 1990), pp. 53-56; and author's personal experience (see foreword).  7  ^8 ^9 ^10  Questions V129 and V1129. Cross-tabulation of these responses shows the less-than-five per cent who no longer saw themselves as leftists by 1991 had come to view themselves as liberals, as fitting into the centre of the political spectrum.  ^  ^  Questions V130 and V1130, cross-tabulated to V129 and V1129. See fn 41 in Appendix D.  ^  Renee G. Kasinsky, Refugees from Militarism: Draft-Age Americans in Canada (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1976), p. 10; also see Kenneth Fred Emerick, War Resisters in Canada: The World of the American Military-Political Refugees (Knox, Pennsylvania: Free Press, 1972), pp. 16-17; and Richard L. Killmer and others, They Can't Come Home Again (Philadelphia: Pilgrim/United Church Press, 1971), p. 31; and Baskir and Strauss, Chance and Circumstance, p. 101; among others. Kasinsky, Refugees from Militarism, pp. 10 and 14; also see Killmer and others, They Can't Come Home Again, p. 31; Baskir and Strauss, Chance and Circumstance, p. 181; and Roger Neville Williams, The New Exiles: American War Resisters in Canada (New York: Liveright Publishers, 1971), pp. 114-15.  •  Kasinsky, Refugees from Militarism, p. 287.  ^13^60  per cent; Emerick, War Resisters in Canada, p. 40.  ^14^Ibid.  •  Ibid., p. 17.  ^16^Ibid. ^17^Neither  Kasinsky's nor Emerick's samples were large enough to permit the conclusion that they have proven their arguments.  •  One of many unfortunately beyond this paper's scope.  ^19^See  Appendix D, pp. 94-97.  ^20^While  the individual questions of this scale can -- and do -- reveal a  -- 27 -great deal about each respondent's specific reasons for feeling either distant from, or close to, Canadian systems of government, no single question can be used to gauge that distance. As a measure of alienation, this scale must be taken as a whole; only cross-tabulation yields the measure being sought. Storey, interview, 23 January 1992. 21^Donald E. Blake, David J. Elkins and Richard Johnston, Two Political Worlds: Parties and Voting in British Columbia (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1985), p. 57. 22^Ibid. 23^The  three men's work was based on a study of the British Columbia electorate between 1979 and 1983.  24^Elkins,  in Blake and others, Two Political Worlds, p. 58.  25^Ibid. 26^Ibid.,  p. 60.  27^The  pair used quarterly samples of 1,500 randomly-selected Canadians, eighteen years of age or older, collected over an eleven-year period (1980-90) by Gregg's Decima Research company as their data base. Gregg and Posner, The Big Picture, p. 9.  n^Ibid., p. 10. 29^Ibid. 30^Ibid.,  p. 205.  31^Ibid.,  p. 54.  32^Ibid.  33^Ibid. 34^Ibid., p. 32. 35^Storey, interview, 22 January 1992. 36^Ibid.;  and Blake and others, Two Political Worlds, p. 60.  37^Storey, interview, 28 April 1992; based, in part, on two unpublished Storey Research Associates (SRA) surveys of 29 October-12 November 1991 and 07-15 January 1992. 38^Ibid. 39^Questions  8-16, cross-tabulated and compared to Blake and others, Two Political Worlds, pp. 59-61.  — 28 -40^Gregg  and Posner, The Big Picture, p. 54.  41^"Michael  S," Respondent 140, letter to author (Nanaimo: 17 September 1991). Some of the war-inspired immigrants still living in British Columbia in late 1991 wrote letters, frequently long letters, which were mailed to the author independently, or along with completed survey questionnaires. Others were interviewed after completing their questionnaires. The letters form one source of the evidence which will be cited in this paper; the interviews, another. Where possible, these cited respondents will be identified both by their true name and by the three-digit number assigned to each as a part of the data entry process. But confidentiality was important to some respondents, and all were free to remain unknown. Those who chose anonymity are differentiated from their fellows here by the use of quotation marks: John Smith is the respondent's actual name; "John Smith" is a self-selected pseudonym.  42^Bobby  Kovar, Respondent 107, letter to author (Hornby Island: 07 July 1991).  43^Questions 44^"Fran  T," Respondent 074, letter to author (Victoria: 13 October 1992).  45^"Michael 46^Storey, 47^See  10, 11 and 12, in both Sections VI and VII, cross-tabulated.  S," letter to author.  interview, 24 January 1992; and author's personal experience.  discussion at p. 96 in Appendix D.  43^Here,  and throughout this paper, "native" refers to those born in Canada or British Columbia, including -- though by no means limited to -- aboriginals.  49^66.4  per cent disagreeing at Question VI8, 71.1 per cent at VI18; 65.8 per cent disagreeing at Question VI9, 88.8 per cent at VI19; 55.9 per cent agreeing at Question VI10, 63.2 per cent at VII10.  so^83.7 per cent agreeing at Question 8 in an unpublished SRA survey conducted between 29 October and 12 November 1991 (hereafter, Survey 1), 84.5 per cent agreeing in a similar survey conducted between 07 and 15 January 1992 (Survey 2); at Question 9, 87.3 per cent of natives agreed in Survey 1, 85.6 per cent agreed in Survey 2; at Question 10, 84.3 per cent disagreed in Survey 1, 81.7 per cent in Survey 2. 51^76.8  per cent in Survey 1; 79.2 per cent in Survey 2.  sz^32.2 per cent agreed at Question VIll, 41.4 per cent disagreed. so^47.4 per cent agreed at Question VIM, 36.8 per cent disagreed.  — 29 --54^Efficacy requires disagreement with the proposition put at Question 13; large majorities of native British Columbians instead agreed in the two SRA surveys (as many as 81.3 per cent), while war-inspired immigrant response was essentially evenly split at Question VI13; more than half of the war-inspired immigrant respondents, on the other hand, agreed at VII13. ss^Elkins, in Blake and others, Two Political Worlds, p. 116; also see fn 20 above. Storey, interview, 24 January 1992; and author's personal experience.  56^Ibid.;  sr^57.2 per cent disagreed -- as expected for the efficacious -- at Question VI12, 82.2 per cent at VI112. 58^Gregg and Posner, The Big Picture, pp. 32 and 54; also see earlier discussion at pp. 16-17 of this chapter. 59^Blake and others, Two Political Worlds, p. 60; and Storey, interview, 27 April 1992 (see discussion at p. 17.) so^Elkins, in Blake and others, Two Political Worlds, p. 62. 61^Ibid.,  p. 128.  62^Ibid.,  p. 57.  63^Ibid.,  p. 63.  64^Ibid.,  p. 62.  65^Question  21 of the UoM standard set; also see ibid.  63^See, for example, Gregg and Posner, The Big Picture, pp. 54, 63 and 205. 67^Ibid.  68^Ibid., pp. 205-06; also see Blake and others, Two Political Worlds, pp. 62-63. 69^Blake  and others, Two Political Worlds, p. 60.  70^Storey,  interview, 28 April 1992. The author's personal experiences in the British Columbia NDP also tend to confirm this inference.  71^Surveys 72^See  1 and 2.  preceding section.  73^Perhaps still best described by Marx's phrase, "the dictatorship of the proletariat."  -- 30 -74^Robert  Bothwell, Ian Drummond and John English, Canada Since 1945: Power, Politics and Provincialism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), p. 176; also see ibid., pp. 161-64 and 176-78; and Granatstein and others, Twentieth Century Canada, pp. 293-96 and 312-20.  75^About  70 per cent disagreed with the proposition at Question 19; a similar number disagreed at Question 24.  76^At  Question VI22.  77^At  Question VI123.  CHAPTER 2 1.4.Stran ge  4  Two decades after the end of the Second World War, "a visitor seeing Canada for the first time since 1939 might well conclude that Canada, even more than the nations devastated by war, had become another country."' In very real ways, it had. In the twenty years leading up to 1965, Canada created what has come to be known as the national welfare state, a system in which a complex webbing of social safety nets were woven to cushion the fall when one of its number stumbled: old-age pensions, unemployment insurance and a universal health care plan were -- and are -- only the three most obvious manifestations of these nets. Their existence, and the existence of other social safety nets, necessitated the creation of a huge new bureaucracy, one inconceivable to most Canadians before the advent of World War II. The bureaucrats were needed to manage the national welfare state. Increased government intervention in the day-to-day workings of Canadian society and the lives of its citizens was needed to control and finance it. 2 In the period between the end of the Second World War and the collapse of trust in government in the late 1980s, 3 when this new Canada was being created, there was widespread support for both the national welfare state and its attendant powerful, centralised government. 4 Elkins and his co-authors' studies suggested this national support was largely replicated in British Columbia: "Virtually all residents of B.C. agree[d]," the political scientist reported, -- 31 --  -- 32 -about prosperity, economic development, social well-being, improved health care and education, minimum welfare benefits, and individual betterment or advancement. 5 Gregg and Posner reported that this faith in society's ability to provide for the common weal, in collectivism, remained largely untouched by the collapse of faith in government. As the country faced the 1990s, they said, its post-war values were threatened, [Nut rather than abandon traditional values, Canadians chose to reassess the traditional means of realising them. . . . Rather than abandon the belief that government could solve all problems, they concluded that government was badly run and the nation's political leaders to blame. 6 Efficacy, trust in government, declined, in other words, without affecting the national commitment to collectivism. Canada as a whole moved closer to what had been the norm in British Columbia all along. In this province, Elkins reported in the early 1980s, there really never had been a link between belief in society's major institutions and trust of those who administered them. In British Columbia, the professor reported, "alienation bears no relationship at all to individual versus collective responsibility." 7 Storey's surveys in late 1991 and early 1992 confirmed this was still the case a decade after the UBC political scientists concluded their work. 5 As was seen in the last chapter, this paper's VietNam War-inspired immigrants were unusual, in the British Columbian and even the Canadian context, in having retained their high level of trust in governments, so much so that it is difficult to consider them "Canadian" in their perceived relationship with government. It is much easier to do so when their attitudes about collectivism are considered: they were more Canadian in the support they showed for it, on the individual versus collective responsibi-  -- 33 __ lity scale, than they were on any of the other scales used to measure their political orientation. But faith is not enough, in the British Columbian and Canadian contexts, to create the policies and programs collectivism suggest. In polities based on the British parliamentary system, as both Canada's and British Columbia's are, such faith must be tied to a willingness to compromise if collectivism is to be implemented. 9 It is hardly surprising, then, to find a large degree of support for compromise among Canadians generally, or British Columbians specifically, as the UBC researchers" and Gregg and Posner 11 -- along with Storey 12 -- did. But the SRA surveys also revealed that this general support for compromise did not include all political camps in British Columbia: radical leftists were found to have a strong antipathy for virtually any form of compromise." If the emigre respondents' support for collectivism was essentially leftist -- as it will be seen it was -- their feelings about compromise cannot be so described. The message they sent about compromise was at best mixed; but it tended more toward political mainstream support for the principle than towards radical leftist distaste for it. The war-inspired immigrants' philosophies, as reflected in both of the scales considered in this chapter, was captured succinctly by Harold E. Macy, of Courtenay: "If I had to stick a political label on myself," he wrote, it would have to be something on the order of the old CCF-style socialists. Yet I still have some residual feelings of Yankee cussed independence. Makes for a strange mix at times." A strange mix indeed. The collectivism and compromise scales are strongly linked to one another in the British Columbian context. Generally speaking, the war-  inspired immigrants' attitudes on both reflected essentially mainstream native ones; the newcomers "fit" into British Columbia's overall political culture better here than they did on the two scales considered in the last chapter. But that fit in itself poses a problem for the war-inspired immigrants' self-perception as radical British Columbia leftists, a political camp whose members stood well outside the mainstream on at least one of these scales.  INDIVIDUAL VERSUS COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY Collectivism is "one of the hallmarks of Canadian [political] culture," one tied to an absence of faith in the individual -- a sentiment best expressed by the view, 'I can't really do very much to solve our problems, but society's institutions can.' 15 The UBC studies suggested this faith in collectivism was equally strong in British Columbia: "social risk-sharing," Elkins reported, "appear[ed] to be a cultural norm in B.C. which exist[ed] equally in virtually all groups and all sectors of society." 16 This was true, he reported, even though it was not always seen to be true. 17 Elkins found that less than twenty per cent of British Columbians could be described as "strongly individualist" at the time of the political scientists' studies; almost a third of the UBC respondents were "strongly collectivist," and just more than half stood between the two extremes. 18 Despite "widely different positions, most respondents d[id] not take extreme positions," he said, "finding themselves slightly more collectively oriented or slightly more individualistically oriented." 19 There were, he added, more of the former than of the latter: "more than seven out of ten respondents" were found to lean "in the collectivist direction. " 20 While British  -- 35 -Columbians did differ in the importance they attached to individualistic and collectivist values, he concluded, "most of them [we]re found near the centre when their positions on a variety of issues [we]re taken into account." 21 The SRA surveys indicated little had changed a decade after Blake, Elkins and Johnston concluded their research. Storey reported broad support for the first two propositions of the individual versus collective responsibility scale, with leftists showing slightly -- but only slightly -more enthusiasm for them than liberals and conservatives.  22  The war-  inspired immigrant respondents showed greater support for the propositions than even the leftists. 23 But the emigre respondents adopted a stance which placed them between the leftists and the liberal and conservative camps at Question 3, which asked respondents to agree or disagree with the proposition that anyone who really wanted to work could find a job.24 Leftists 25 tended to disagree far more vehemently with the proposition than did liberals and conservatives, 26 but a majority of all respondents to the SRA surveys did disagree with it. The war-inspired immigrant respondents' reaction to Question 4 was so mixed -- the group split into three roughly-equal divisions -- it is impossible to talk about a group consensus on the proposition that government regulations tend to stifle individual initiative. They were, as a group, far more decisive in agreeing that the government should assist those who "got a bad break" after doing their best: almost two-thirds ultimately agreed with the proposition in the last section of the survey questionnaire. 28 This tilted them further in the collectivist direction than either native leftists 29 or liberals and conservatives. 30 Question 6 of the UoM standard set -- "Each individual should (have)  -- 36 -accept(ed) the consequences of their own actions" -- poses a problem for analysis of the political orientation of the war-inspired immigrant respondents. Elkins discussed the question's implications in depth: In assessing the 'trade-offs' among political goals and costs, two major orientations may be identified. One focuses on each individual's responsibility . . ., [t]he other emphasizes the risks one runs in an individualistic and competitive economic system . . .. The latter view acknowledges that many individuals 'fail' or fall behind through no fault of their own, because of illness, accident, or handicaps. Since these misfortunes can, in principle, affect any given person, the latter view stipulates that these risks should be shared collectively. . . . The individualistic perspective . . . retorts that these are the breaks, and each person must bear the costs and consequences whether positive or negative. 31 This question is important, within the overall context of this political attitudinal scale, in isolating moderate conservatives from other collectivist camps. Those who tend to support collectivism generally will disagree with this proposition; 32 moderate conservatives, on the other hand -- while showing strong collectivist principles on the rest of the scale -- will tend to strongly agree with it. 33 Thus anyone who shows strong collectivist impulses, but who also agrees with this proposition, is usually considered a moderate conservative. Since the war-inspired immigrant respondents tended to score even higher on the collectivism scale than either leftists or liberals and conservatives, their responses at Question 6 should, in theory, offer crucial information about their overall political ideology with regard to collectivism generally. Like native moderate conservatives, the emigres overwhelmingly endorsed the proposition, by margins of as much as 86.2 per cent. 34 The problem is that this may say more about their individual lives than it does about what Canadian political camp, if any, they belong in. "The concept that the individual should accept the consequences of  -- 37 -their own actions," war-inspired immigrant Respondent Paul Strickland wrote, "is a moral statement . . . and not at all in conflict with the belief in the political view that the government has an interest and obligation in assisting those in distress." 35 In a subsequent interview, he made it clear that he had not read the question in the context it was intended he should. As a deserter, he read the proposition as an affirmation that he alone was ultimately responsible for what he did or did not do. "If I had gone to VietNam," Strickland explained, "I would be responsible for that,  not the government, just as individual Germans, not the Nazis, were responsible for the Holocaust. "36 Such a reading of the proposition is, clearly, not the one Elkins -or any other analyst using the UoM standard set -- intended. It is also, given the context of the emigres' decision to leave the United States two decades ago, a reading which may not be unique to Strickland, which may in fact be shared by many of his fellows. Traditional analysis of the UoM standard set here demands the war-inspired immigrants' reactions be taken as "proof" of their being moderate Canadian conservatives. But such a classification, in the face of the interpretation Strickland proposes, would be inadvisable, at best. Almost nine out of ten war-inspired immigrant respondents agreed with the proposition at Question 6; this may mean they are, in reality, moderate conservatives. But it may also mean they share a reading of the question unique to them alone, one outside the usual process of analysis of this scale. The matter deserves further exploration, but is beyond clarification with the data available for this paper. Here, responses to the proposition must be simply set aside from the process of cross-tabulation analysis.  — 38  —  Emigre reaction to the final proposition of the individual versus collective responsibility scale was more collectivist than native responses than at any other question of the scale. Unlike the SRA respondents, who tended to support (if weakly) the proposition that taxes were too high for society to be able to afford to help everyone who needed assistance, the war-inspired immigrants rejected the statement emphatically." Coupled with their strong support for collectivism at all but one of the other questions in this scale -- when responses at Question 6 are discounted -- emigre responses here suggest the war-inspired immigrants, as a group, shared a political outlook which was at least somewhat to the left of mainstream British Columbian attitudes. If this scale alone were used to test their self-perceptions as radical British Columbia leftists, in fact, it would be fair to argue they might have been what they believed themselves to be. This scale, though, cannot be considered in isolation. When it is considered in conjunction with the other three scales of the UoM standard set, the argument that the war-inspired immigrants' self-perception was at serious odds with measurable reality can only be strengthened.  WILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISE British Columbians at either extreme of the political spectrum, Elkins reported, do not like compromise, which he defined as a willingness "to give up some principles in order to further others, to find solutions even when they do not fully measure up to one's ideal standards." 38 It might be more simply stated as a belief that half a loaf is better than none; but, whatever definition one attaches to political compromise, it seems clear from both the UBC study and Storey's SRA surveys that a significant number of British Columbians -- though by no means a majority of them -- found it  — 39 -unpalatable. 39^Elkins, in fact, found rigidity to be so prevalent in this area that he wondered how anything ever got done in the province at all: [W]ith so many [British Columbians] espousing an unwillingness to compromise, . . . normal political deals can be consummated [only] if they [are] publicly announced as principled victories."" Significantly for the purposes of this paper, Elkins found that British Columbian leftists were less willing than any other political camp to sacrifice principle for results," though their commitment to getting the whole loaf was almost matched by those on the extreme right of the provincial political spectrum." The majority political mainstream, though, the middle of the spectrum, was far more willing to compromise, he said." The SRA research revealed very similar patterns."  War-inspired immigrant responses to the first proposition of this scale -- a general statement that compromise "was the best way . . . to handle conflicts" within society -- was decidedly mainstream: about twothirds of the emigres agreed, 45 roughly the same proportion as the province's liberals and conservatives." Native leftist responses, in contrast, were an intensified mirror image of those feelings, with far more than two-thirds of them disagreeing with the proposition." Similar response patterns were found at Question 26, which posited the idea that compromise was "essential to make Canadian democracy work."" Only at Question 28, in fact, were war-inspired immigrant responses on this scale in line with those of the British Columbian left." A good three-quarters of the emigres agreed politicians should never give up principle for "some other goal," 50 a proposition very strongly endorsed by the leftists in the SRA surveys. 51 Liberals and conservatives were much  — 40 -less rigid: between half and two-thirds of them disagreed with the statement when the SRA researchers put it to them. 52 Taken as a whole, the war-inspired immigrant respondents' willingness to compromise, at least some of the time, was close to the British Columbian mainstream's tolerance for it. This put the emigres at distinct odds with native leftists, who shared little of either group's enthusiasm for bargaining and compromise. Again, as on two of the other three scales which make up the UoM standard set, the war-inspired immigrant responses placed them at a spot on the political yardstick far distant from the one they believed they should occupy.  What their reactions to the various political attitudinal scales reveals about the war-inspired immigrant respondents in British Columbia in 1991 is that they simply did not fit the mould of radical leftists in the province, despite their ongoing insistence that that was exactly what they were, and always had been. Unlike Canadians generally, and radical British Columbian leftists specifically, the emigre respondents felt close to, not distant from, their governments. In fact, when their cross-tabulated responses to the political efficacy, populism and willingness to compromise scales are compared to those of British Columbians as a whole, it is possible to say that they felt closer to government than any other identifiable group of individuals in the province. Leftists in British Columbia, on the other hand, reported they felt more alienated from government than ever before, and remained almost certainly the most alienated group of people in the province. Cross-tabulation reveals that the war-inspired immigrant respondents believed in government, specifically the governments of what had become  -- 41 -their country, feeling those institutions were relevant to their day-to-day lives. Despite a niggling populist mistrust of government institutions and the people who make them work, they almost paradoxically felt politicians and bureaucrats were doing a reasonable job of meeting their needs and representing their interests. The war-inspired immigrant respondents were generally prepared to compromise, and were prepared to see their representatives compromise, in an attempt to resolve conflicts between their own needs and interests and those of other groups in society. All of this stood in sharp contrast to native British Columbia radical leftist attitudes and beliefs. The emigre respondents were, however, like leftists in some of their beliefs. Like virtually all leftists -- and, for that matter, liberals -- they continued to exhibit strong support for both the national welfare state and its attendant social safety nets. Unlike native British Columbians, their support for both was largely unleavened by concern for how to pay for social programs or how they were administered. It is not possible to neatly fit the war-inspired immigrant respondents into any one Canadian, or British Columbian, political camp. In their political thought, opinion and beliefs, they were most like moderate Canadian conservatives, though there were significant differences between them and this group. What they definitively were not, however, is British Columbia leftists of any stripe, much less radical ones. Overwhelmingly, they continued, in late 1991, to believe they were. It is this continuing dichotomy, this ongoing difference between what they thought they were and what they actually were, that made them victims of a mass case of mistaken self-identity. The survey on which much of this paper's conclusions have been  ^  — 42 — based has proven a timely and useful corrective for the British Columbia war-inspired immigrants' mistaken self-perceptions. "In order to get at the truth," Richard Ketchum wrote recently, "[historians] need to collect beliefs, as well as facts, since myths that become sufficiently popular have a way of becoming accepted as the truth." 53 The facts have shown that the successive waves of immigrants who came to British Columbia from the United States because of the VietNam War were neither radicals nor leftists. It is time to lay to rest the myth of their belief that they were . . . lest it be accepted as a truth it is not.  1^Bothwell and others, Canada Since 1945, p. xi. ^2^See  ibid., pp. 161-64; Granatstein and others, Twentieth Century Canada, pp. 293-304; and Robert J. and Doreen Jackson and Nicolas Baxter-Moore, Politics in Canada: Culture, Institutions, Behaviour and Public Policy (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada, 1986), pp. 20 and 67-74, for discussion of the creation of the Canadian welfare state.  ^3^See  discussion at pp. 16-18 of Chapter 1.  ^4^Bothwell  and others, Canada Since 1945, pp. 162-63; Granatstein and others, Twentieth Century Canada, pp. 301-04; and Jackson and others, Politics in Canada, p. 66.  ^5^Elkins, ^6^Gregg  in Blake and others, Two Political Worlds, p. 67.  and Posner, The Big Picture, pp. 10-11.  ^7^Elkins,  in Blake and others, Two Political Worlds, p. 129.  s^Storey, interview, 27 April 1992, commenting on Surveys 1 and 2. 9^See discussion at pp. 94-97 of Appendix D. is^Elkins, in Blake and others, Two Political Worlds, p. 65.  ^n^Gregg and Posner, The Big Picture, p. 12. 12^Storey, interview, 22 January 1992. ^13^Ibid.,  based on Surveys 1 and 2.  -- 43 -14^Harold  E. Macy, Respondent 085, letter to author (Courtenay: 13 August 1991).  15^Gregg  and Posner, The Big Picture, p. 12.  16^Elkins,  in Blake and others, Two Political Worlds, p. 72.  17^Ibid.,  pp. 56 and 69, where Elkins explains that "individual versus collective responsibility' partakes of elements of [both] liberalism and conservatism[,] but is not equivalent to these standard slogans. It appears superficially similar to 'free enterprise versus socialism' -and may help to explain the continuing appeal of that slogan [in British Columbia politics] -- but it is a fundamentally different orientation."  18^Ibid.,  p. 69.  is^Ibid. 20^Ibid. 21^Ibid.,  p. 75.  22^76.4  per cent of leftists agreed with the proposition at Question 1 in Survey 1; 78.1 per cent in Survey 2; this compares with 72.3 and 74.6 per cent of liberals and conservatives. At Question 2, the figures were 64.8 and 63.7 per cent of leftists agreeing, 61.3 and 66.3 per cent of liberals and conservatives.  23^In  all cases, more than 80 per cent; Questions VI1 and 2 and VIII and 2.  24^By  1991, 73.0 per cent of war-inspired immigrant respondents disagreed; Question VI13. 80.2 per cent in Survey 1; 83.1 per cent in Survey 2.  26^59.3  per cent in Survey 1; 67.9 per cent in Survey 2.  27^  25.7 per cent agreeing in Section VI, 24.3 per cent with no opinion, 47.4 per cent disagreeing; but, in Section VII, the divisions had evened to 35.5, 27.0 and 36.2 per cent, respectively.  28^62.5 per cent at Question VI15, compared with 58.6 per cent at VI5. 29^55.2 per cent agreed in Survey 1; 58.1 per cent in Survey 2. 30^54.3  per cent agreed in Survey 1; 60.1 per cent in Survey 2.  31^Elkins, 32^And,  in Blake and others, Two Political Worlds, p. 67.  in the SRA surveys, did so: 83.2 per cent in Survey 1; 87.4 per cent in Survey 2.  -- 44 -a3^74.6 per cent in Survey 1; 81.3 per cent in Survey 2, for example. 34^Question VI16. os^Paul Strickland, Respondent 051, letter to author (Prince George: 23 July 1991); emphasis original. 36^Strickland,  interview with author, 13 May 1992.  37^About  80 per cent of war-inspired immigrant respondents disagreed with the proposition, compared to 54.3 per cent of native British Columbians who agreed with it in Survey 1; 61.2 per cent in Survey 2.  38^Elkins, in Blake and others, Two Political Worlds, p. 65. 39^Ibid.,  pp. 65-66; and Storey, interview, 27 April 1992.  40^Elkins, 41^Ibid.,  in Blake and others, Two Political Worlds, p. 66.  p. 65.  42^Ibid.  Ibid. 44^Storey,  interview, 23 January 1992, based on Surveys 1 and 2.  45^65.8  per cent at VI25; 67.8 per cent at VI125.  46^63.4  per cent in Survey 1; 61.8 per cent in Survey 2.  47^80.1  per cent in Survey 1; 84.3 per cent in Survey 2.  48^74.3  per cent of war-inspired immigrants agreed at VI26 -- and 80.3 per cent at VI126 -- compared to 61.2 per cent of liberal and conservative respondents in Survey 1; 65.8 per cent in Survey 2. Leftists, on the other hand, disagreed, by a margin of 63.9 per cent in Survey 1; 68.5 per cent in Survey 2.  49^War-inspired  immigrant responses at Question 27 were so evenly divided as to make a postulated group consensus impossible.  so^Questions VI28 and VI128. 51^83.1  per cent in Survey 1; 85.7 per cent in Survey 2.  52^54.1  per cent in Survey 1; 63.2 per cent in Survey 2.  so^Richard M. Ketchum, "Memory as History," American Heritage, 42/7 (November, 1991), p. 143.  CONCLUSION .H 22 1  F'CY.122  t  This paper cannot be considered more than an entry point to a full study of the American war-inspired immigrants who came to Canada during the VietNam Era, between 1965 and 1977. It raises far more questions than it answers, questions which themselves could form the basis of papers, articles, even books. This paper establishes only that those of these emi-  gres who remained in British Columbia in late 1991 formed a demographically cohesive group whose members shared a common, mistaken, notion of their political identity in their adoptive country. They believed, overwhelmingly, that they were radical British Columbia leftists. This paper has shown they were not. This group self-perception, which was so at odds with a measurable reality, itself suggests any number of studies. Political self-perception is the usual determinant of political affiliation; individuals tend to join political parties whose self-identification matches that of the individual's self-identification. People who believe they are leftists, in other words, will tend to gravitate to political parties identified -- by their own members, by society as a whole, or by both -- as leftist. In the case of the British Columbia war-inspired immigrants, their self-perception as radical leftists would, if they followed the usual pattern, tend to draw them to political parties generally recognised by British Columbians as leftist. If such was the case, however, an obvious problem -- 45 —  -- 46 -would arise, one rooted in the emigres' own basic political philosophies. Since they were not, by any British Columbian definition, leftists, those philosophies would be at distinct odds with those of the native Canadians already belonging such a party. A clash between conflicting philosophies would seem inevitable. The outcome of such a clash would depend on a variety of factors, including the relative numbers of each group within the party, their respective organising and persuasive skills, even the party's success at the polls with its "old" philosophies, to name but a few. But, generally speaking, one of four things would probably happen: The newcomers would ultimately leave, or be forced out of, the party; The new members would alter their philosophies; The party's philosophies would be changed to match those of the new members'; or, The newcomers would remain in the party, mounting an ongoing, though unsuccessful, campaign to alter its philosophies. In British Columbia in the last half-century or so, political polarisation has resulted in the emergence of two distinct political groupings, one personified by the NDP, both federally and provincially, the other by the Social Credit Party provincially and the Progressive Conservative Party federally. The NDP is perceived, by both its own members and the populace generally, as being essentially leftist, though the desirable degree of that leftism is very much a matter of debate. Provincially, the Socred Party can be described as a coalition of non-leftists. Today the party is in disarray following a devastating electoral loss in November, 1991; whether that loss is reflective of a rejection of its basically conservative/liberal values or of the party specifically remains unclear. Federally,  -- 47 -the Conservative party largely tends to still represent the province's nonleftists, though recent polls suggest that situation could well change at the next election. But disarray on the political right is not a subject touched by any aspect of this paper; the character of the NDP clearly is. Many analysts, both within and outside the party itself, agree the NDP's philosophy has become less leftist in the last twenty-five years. The question, in the context posed by this paper, is whether that is true or not and, if it is, whether that movement on the political yardstick is attributable to large numbers of war-inspired immigrants having joined the party. The letters written by some respondents to the author hint that not a few war-inspired immigrants have joined the NDP, with some rising to high levels of influence within its ranks. "For the first ten or so years" after immigrating, Harold Macy wrote, "I kept out of politics, out of anything more seditious than voting. . . . [But today, I] am in politics up to my ears." His involvement, he added, was through the NDP. Carolyn Hilbert -- Respondent 112, of Quesnel, who came north with her draft evader husband in the late 1960s -- reported a similar experience in her letter of 09 June 1991: After arriving in Canada, we both felt burned out and not interested in politics of any stripe. That didn't last long and after unconsciously shopping around we were drawn to the N.D.P. not because we needed to attach ourselves to a 'party', but because we felt the N.D.P. closely reflected our own personal philosophies of life. My husband ran as a candidate for the [NDP in the] Cariboo in 1983 and I presently serve on the Provincial Executive of the B.C.N.D.P. These two are not atypical of many other respondents, nor of other prominent New Democrats, known to the author, who are war-inspired immigrants. The latter include Peter McNelly -- now the Ottawa executive pro-  — 48 -ducer for the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation's regional television news program -- who served as NDP Premier Dave Barrett's executive assistant between 1972 and 1975; the same premier's press secretary, John Twigg; and Langley's Steve Duguid, long a member of the party's provincial council and executive, and a candidate for it in several elections, both provincial and federal. The same letters also provide some evidence of the war-inspired immigrants finding themselves somewhat ill-at-ease within the ranks of the NDP, a discomfort Macy earlier conceded might be attributable to his American background. Hilbert, again, echoed his sentiments: "I discovered very early," she said, "to mellow my activist philosophies in social settings. Even my 'left-wing' Canadian friends sometimes felt resentful of my more global political perspective. As recently as three years ago a person told me (after too many beers, of course) Canada didn't need 'Americans' telling them how to do things." New Democrats, if uncomfortable ones. Have they, and their fellows within the party's ranks, played a significant role in altering the party's philosophies and policies over the last two decades? Clearly beyond the scope of this paper, the question is nonetheless an intriguing one . . . and one worthy of further exploration. To the war-inspired immigrants themselves, there seems little doubt that they have had a tremendous impact on their adoptive country. Respondent after respondent, in letter after letter, voiced essentially the same opinion offered by Bob Cowan (Respondent 076, of Enderby) in his letter of 16 August 1991: "I have long felt that we have made an interesting contribution to Canadian culture. Perhaps [we have] hastened the process of Americanization, but also [our presence] has perhaps led to a more open and less dogmatic Canada."  -- 49 -"I can think of a staggering number of ex-Americans, even in my backwater little town -- some determinedly neutral, some eco-freaks, some staunch NDPers and labour types -- but all held together by the immigrant experience," Sue Camps (Respondent 098) added in a 19 August 1991 letter from Burns Lake. "If my village is a microcosm, there has been a profound if ill- or un- defined presence added to the Canadian political soul." Hilbert agreed, as did Susan Pollock (Respondent 141) in a 12 August 1991 letter from her home in Victoria, Bruce Bailey (Respondent 069) in a 22 July 1991 letter from Sidney and Vancouver's Carol Marica (Respondent 090) in a letter dated 08 July 1991. What contribution, if any, have the warinspired immigrants made to the political culture of their new country? Another question raised by this paper -- quite specifically at several points, though it is nowhere answered -- relates to the war-inspired immigrants' self-perception as radical British Columbia leftists. The question is why they see themselves as such. Are they, in fact, leftists by any standard? Is it possible, given the differences in the nature of the two polities which share most of North America, that they remain leftists by American standards, if not British Columbian ones? The answer to the last question, one again beyond the scope of this paper, may well answer, at least in part, the first. Again, it is submitted, a subject well worth pursuing. This paper has considered only those VietNam War-inspired immigrants who lived, in the latter half of 1991, in British Columbia. It would be foolish to attempt to argue they constitute even a majority of the emi-  gres who came to Canada from the United States because of the VietNam War. Another obvious question, then, is whether the British Columbia emi-  gres are typical of all war-inspired immigrants, or whether they are in  -- 50 -some way unique. A national study of the group, one perhaps focussing on regional differences, would seem to be in order. The demographics of the survey used to research this paper suggest that such a study might prove interesting, indeed. Appendix B shows that the British Columbia war-inspired immigrants tended to be Westerners before they decided to come north. Is such regionalism replicated in the other areas of Canada? Are most of the former Americans living on the Prairies originally from the American Midwest? Are those in Ontario and Quebec from the American eastern seaboard? Or are most war-inspired immigrants, wherever they now live, originally from the American West? In other words, what role, if any, did regionalism play in the mass migration of American war objectors to Canada during the VietNam Era? Class is another unexplored area which the demographics provided by the survey relied upon for this paper suggest might prove a fertile field for further enquiry. Most of the respondents to that survey were at the least high school graduates; many had earned university degrees before leaving their native land. This seems to suggest that many were middle or upper class, though it by no means proves it. Such proof, or disproof, offers future researchers yet another avenue of exploration, again on both provincial and federal scales. These are by no means the only unanswered questions at the least suggested by either this paper or the survey which lies at its core. Still to be explored are areas such as the role of sex in the mass migration of war-inspired immigrants, into British Columbia and into Canada. While the sex of the emigre turned out to have no statistical relevance to the topic of this paper, the phenomenon of independent female immigration caused by the VietNam War clearly bears investigation in its own right. So, too, does  -- 51 -the role of political activity by the emigres in the United States before immigration, along with a host of other questions. Nor does this paper address the more classical historical questions about the war-inspired immigrants, either in British Columbia specifically or in Canada generally. How did they come? What was their reception like? What have they done with their lives since their arrival? Where are they now? What are they doing? Have the host society's perceptions of them changed over the last two decades and more? How has their presence changed Canada, if, indeed, it has? Why . . .  Because of its size alone, the mass migration of Americans into Canada during the VietNam Era warrants full and exhaustive study, by historians and by other scholars. It is only necessary to consider the range and volume of scholarly works treating other immigrant groups Chinese, Japanese, Indian, Irish, British, German, southern European, to name but a few -- which came to Canada to realise the potential this group offers for further study. This paper, limited in scope as it must be, offers a glimpse of that potential. It is to be hoped it will prove to be, at the least, what it sets out to be: a point of entry for succeeding waves of critical enquiry and analysis.  SELECTED  _E?_i bilicogi -...i.D.12 J---  PRIMARY NI_A_FZ Y" C) Tj FW E : -  .  Books: Baskir, Lawrence M. and William A. Strauss. Chance and Circumstance: The Draft, the War, and the VietNam Generation. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978. Christy, Jim.^The New Refugees: American Voices in Canada. 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Serving America: Prospects for the Volunteer Force. New York: Priority Press Publications, 1988. Hawkins, Fred. Canada and Immigration: Public Policy and Public Concern. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1972. Henretta, James A., and W. Elliot Brownlee, David Brody and Susan Ware. America's History Since 1865. Chicago: The Dorsey Press, 1987. Herring, George C. America's Longest War: The United States and VietNam, 1950-1975, 2nd ed. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1986. Hofstadter, Richard. The American Political Tradition & the Men Who Made It. New York: Random House, 1974. Jackson, Robert J., and Doreen Jackson and Nicolas Baxter-Moore. Politics  — 58 -in Canada: Culture, Institutions, Behaviour and Public Policy. Scar-  borough: Prentice-Hall Canada, 1986.  Kasinsky, Renee G.^Refugees from Militarism: Draft-Age Americans in Canada. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1976. Kennedy, David M. Over Here: The First World War and American Society. New York: Oxford University Press, 1980. Kessler, Lauren. After All These Years: Sixties Ideals in a Different World. New York: Thunder's Mouth Press, c1990. Segal, David R. Recruiting for Uncle Sam: Citizenship and Military Manpower Policy. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1989. Shannon, Frank. The Organization and Administration of the Union Army, 1861-1865. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1928. Swanberg, W.A. Citizen Hearst. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1961. Troper, Harold M. Only Farmers Need Apply: Official Canadian Government Encouragement of Immigration from the U.S., 1896-1911. Toronto: Griffin House, 1972.  Journal Articles: Bennett, Paul W.^"VietNam War Resisters in Canada, 1965-1977: 'Draft Dodgers' or Refugees From Militarism?" History and Social Science Teacher, 25/1 (Fall, 1989). Carleton, William G. "Raising Armies Before the Civil War." In The Military Draft: Selected Readings on Conscription, Martin Anderson and Barbara Honegger, eds. Palo Alto, California: Stanford University/Hoover Institution Press, 1982. Friedman, Leon. "Conscription and the Constitution: The Original Understanding." In The Military Draft. Gillam, Richard. "The Peacetime Draft." In The Military Draft. Ketchum, Richard M.^"Memory as History."^American Heritage, 42/7 (November, 1991). Lacy, James L.^"Military Manpower: The American Experience and the Enduring Debate."^In Toward a Consensus on Military Service:  Report of the Atlantic Council's Working Group on Military Service.  New York: Pergamon Press, c1982.  Sullivan, Mark. "Conscription." In The Military Draft.  — 59 -N ^REFERENCE WORKS GENERAL -  Abbott, Elizabeth, editor-in-chief. Chronicle of Canada. Montreal: Chronicle Publications, 1990. Daniel, Clifton, editor-in-chief. Chronicle of the Twentieth Century. Mt. Kisco, New York: Chronicle Publications, c1987. Marsh, James H., editor-in-chief.^The Canadian Encyclopedia, 2nd ed. Edmonton: Hurtig Publishers, 1988.  The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations, 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980.  APPENDIX A Thy Arum bar s Gamma: "Ica T4 Mari y C".2..rn T? ,-  There are, as American humourist Mark Twain once told Benjamin D'israeli, "lies, damned lies and statistics." Statistics can lure the incautious into far more trouble than the other two, if only because all those numbers can seem to prove what they do not. Still, statistics are sometimes necessary, and are now: no history of the VietNam War-inspired immigrants from the United States to Canada could be complete without some estimate of their number. The estimate here is 150,000, men, women and children, a number far higher than many others' guesses, lower than a few others'. "No one can say how many draft resisters and deserters chose exile during the war years," Lawrence Baskir and William Strauss said in Chance and Circumstance: Popular estimates of the number of VietNam Era exiles reflected the hyperbole of those years. Richard Nixon referred to exiles as 'those few hundreds,' and antiwar spokesmen often used a figure of 100,000. Each side tried to tailor the exile phenomenon to suit its own political purposes. 2 There is much truth in this, especially when the two authors' caveat to their statement is also considered: In one sense, however, the 100,000 figure of the antiwar movement was close to the truth. Draft resisters and deserters were the core of a much larger American exile community that included tens of thousands of other young people . . .. 3 As noted in Appendix B, though, even Baskir and Strauss were off the — 60 --  --61 -mark in their evaluation of who left the United States because of the VietNam War. They assumed only " young people" -- presumably those of draft age -- formed the "larger American exile community." They were wrong. The survey questionnaire which was used to research the political attitudes of war-inspired immigrants in British Columbia 4 revealed that more than a quarter of them were not young people at all: 16.4 per cent were born in 1939 or earlier, making them twenty-six or older at the start of the VietNam Era (1965) and at least thirty-eight when it ended (1977). The oldest respondent -- Mary Cox, of Victoria 5 -- was born in 1910; she was fifty-five when she immigrated in 1965, sixty-seven in 1977 and eightytwo in 1992. Cox came to Canada with her husband, who was two years older than she, and their four children, none of them old enough at the time of immigration to have had to register with the United States Selective Service System. Cox is not typical of non-draft age respondents; she hardly could be, since she sits at one extreme of the total sample. But neither is her case, and her family's, atypical of the 27.4 per cent of survey respondents who did not fall within the eighteen- to twenty-five-years-old at time of immigration parameters usually used to calculate the number of American immigrants who came to Canada during the VietNam Era because of the war in SouthEast Asia. Many of the respondents who fell into this group came with families -- "mother of male baby," 6 "with three adolescent sons," 7 "with two sons, two daughters" -- before their children were old enough to have to register for the draft. Those children, while definitely young, were too young to have been included in Baskir and Strauss' "larger exile community." Baskir and Strauss, of course, were not alone in their error. Most of  -- 62 -those who attempt to come up with a number make the same mistake, assuming that only "young people" left the United States because of the  war in VietNam. This leads them to search whatever data files they are using for a group-within-a-group, the parameters of which depend on the individual estimator: Many try to isolate eighteen- to twenty-five-year-olds, those being the Americans most likely to be conscripted. Those who rely, even in part, on Canadian immigration figures find those figures list age at time of immigration only in five-year increments, and usually end up setting their lower figure at age fifteen, since the only alternative is to raise it to twenty. Others try to isolate immigration by eighteen- to thirty-five-yearolds (again frequently dropping their lower age to fifteen), that being the period for which American males were subject, in the VietNam Era, to conscription. The problem with either approach, or any of the others used to date, is the initial error: assuming all war-inspired immigrants were either military evaders or their immediate families. The survey makes it clear this assumption bears little relationship to reality. 9 The new insight provided by the survey questionnaire results makes it possible to stop trying to find a group-within-a-group, to look at immigration from the United States between 1965 and 1977 as a whole. Looking at the whole picture makes life much simpler, in this case at least, because the whole picture requires no subtle manipulation of figures to discover a formula by which war-inspired immigration can be isolated from natural immigration (immigration by those who came to Canada for reasons unrelated to the war). Common sense provides a very good formula.  -- 63 -Statistics Canada has figures on total immigration from the United States to Canada between 1957 and 1984 10 which tend to confirm Sharon Airhart's assertion that [t]he first VietNam Era draft dodgers, deserters and exiles crossed the United States border into Canada in 1965. A trickle at first, . . . [i]n 1966 more came, and the next year a steady stream. . . . By 1968, . . . the stream had become a river. In 1970, for the first time in two generations, more people immigrated to Canada from the United States than the other way around. 11 By 1975, the river was drying up: Total immigration from the United States that year was a still-high 20,155. But that was a steep drop from the preceding year's 26,541 immigrants, the highest number recorded for the twenty-eight years figures are available for. By 1977, the number had fallen to pre-war levels (12,888) and the year after that -- the first of what has been identified of the post-era years -- it hit 9,945. Even the trickle was gone. Statistics Canada's figures show that 91,979 people immigrated from the United States in the period from January, 1957, to December, 1964. In the period from January, 1978, to December, 1984, a total of 62,515 Americans applied for -- and received -- legal status as immigrants to Canada. Some quick math shows that this means an average of about ten thousand people immigrated, each year, in each of the periods which bracket the VietNam Era. That figure, ten thousand immigrants per year, can reasonably be treated as natural immigration for the entire January, 1957, to December, 1984, period. Isolating the war-inspired immigrants becomes a matter of more simple math: subtract ten thousand from the number of immigrants recorded for each year between January, 1965, and December, 1977, the VietNam Era. What is left, the adjusted annual total, is the number of peo-  -- 64 -ple who immigrated because of the war. Adding those adjusted yearly totals together yields the total number of war-inspired immigrants . • • or at least the total number of emigres who came to -- and stayed in -Canada legally. The number produced by all this simple math is 138,451 war-inspired immigrants, an average of 10,650 every year. But there are years in which war-inspired immigration soars far above, and falls far below, this average. 12 The year with the most war-inspired immigration remains the year with the most immigration: 1974, with 16,541 war objectors crossing the border. The year with the lowest number of war-inspired immigrants becomes, perhaps predictably, 1977, when only 2,888 war objectors are counted. 13 What the adjusted totals show is confirmation of Airhart's metaphor (and the extension of it). War-inspired immigration came in three waves: The period of early immigration began in January, 1965, and lasted until December, 1968. A total of 32,117 war objectors immigrated legally during this period, an average of just over eight thousand per year. The second period, one of mass immigration, stretched from January, 1969, to December, 1974. An average of more than fourteen thousand war-inspired immigrants per year makes the total for the period 85,976 war objectors. Finally, the period of late immigration lasted only three years, from the beginning of 1975 to the end of 1977. Total war-inspired immigration is fixed at 20,358, an average of almost seven thousand per year. But 138,451 war objectors are not the 150,000 it has just been said  — 65 -came to Canada during the VietNam Era. The "extra" 11,500 are those a reasonable estimate suggests came to, and remained in, Canada during the VietNam Era as illegal immigrants. The figure is not arbitrary. Between 1972 and 1979, Canadian immigration authorities administered Project P97, inelegantly described by Ottawa as the Adjustment of Status Program. Its purpose, put simply, was to persuade illegal immigrants to become legal ones. A true amnesty, it had but one requirement for legal status: the applicant had to have been in Canada continuously for two years before applying for legal status under Project P97. 14 Becoming a legal landed immigrant, in other words, became as simple as providing rent receipts for a two-year period, or establishing that one had held a job in Canada for a similar time. Nothing else mattered. No one asked how, or when, the illegal immigrants had gotten into the country, why they had come, nor how they had managed to remain undetected. It was the perfect opportunity for war-inspired immigrants in the country illegally to become legal immigrants, and it is both logical and reasonable to assume that a majority of them did just that. 15 Adding every one the 8,013 16 former Americans who used Project P97 to "adjust" their immigration status to the earlier total of war-inspired immigrants brings the number to 146,482. Whether all P97 applicants whose country of origin was the United States should be counted as war objectors or not is problematic: it is almost certain that each and every one of them does not fit even this paper's definition of what constitutes a warinspired immigrant. But, given the years when P97 was mounted, it is reasonably safe to argue that many, probably a majority, of those who applied had first come to Canada because of the VietNam War. 17 It is also reasonably safe to argue that not all of the war-inspired  ^  — 66 -immigrants in Canada illegally came forward under the amnesty P97 offered. Employment and Immigration Canada "likes to believe" P97 "regularised" two of every three illegal immigrants in the country during its run, Rick Carleton -- an information officer for the ministry -- said in 1991. But even Carleton admits that figure may be high, reflecting more of a bureaucratic desire for the program to have been a success than reality. 18 In the long run, it probably does not matter much, one way or the other. The figures compiled for P97 strongly suggest that adding some 11,500 immigrants to the 138,451 isolated earlier -- bringing the total to about 150,000 war objectors -- is most probably to err on the low, not the high, side. And, while statistics may sometimes lie, in this case they are all we have. ale .air ale  ^1^"There are three kinds of lies," D'israeli reports Twain said: "lies, damned lies and statistics." Cited in The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 187. ^2 ^3  ^6  Baskir and Strauss, Chance and Circumstance, p. 180.  ^  ^4 ^S  ^  ^  ^  ^  Ibid.  See Appendix E.  Mary Cox, Respondent 061, letter to author (Victoria: 17 July 1991).  Delia Dreis, Respondent 088, letter to author (Parksville: 08 July 1991).  ^7^Sue  Camps, Respondent 098, letter to author (Burns Lake: 19 August 1991).  8^Joanne Johnson, Respondent 042, letter to author (Nanaimo: 29 August 1991). ^9^See ^10^All  Appendix B.  immigration statistics -- unless otherwise noted -- were obtained from the relevant year's Immigration Statistics, issued by the federal ministry (under whatever name) responsible for immigration at that  -- 67 — time; see bibliography for a complete listing. Since the Immigration Statistics, in one form or another, stretch back to Confederation and before, the ideal comparison would be between the VietNam Era and the decades immediately preceding and following it. But it was not until 1957 that the Canadian government formalised classification of immigrants by their citizenship, their country of origin and the country from which they were emigrating. Until 1957, for example, a Briton who crossed the Atlantic on a ship which docked in New York, who immediately caught a train to the Canadian border and there became an immigrant, might -- depending on the officer who dealt with his papers at the border -- show up in the Statistics as: 1) an immigrant from Britain; 2) an immigrant from the United States; or 3) an immigrant from the United States with British citizenship. Or he could be listed in any two, or all three, statistical tables. This confusion leads to the use of 1957 as the first year of pre-VietNam Era immigration by Americans to Canada. Sharon Airhart, "The ties that bind," Toronto Globe and Mail, 30 June 1990, p. D5; also see Baskir and Strauss, Chance and Circumstance, pp. 174 and 180; and Paul W. Bennett, "VietNam War War Resisters in Canada, 1965-1977: 'Draft Dodgers' or Refugees From Militarism?" History and Social Science Teacher, 25/1 (Fall, 1989), p. 43. Not the case in the bracketing periods, a fact which strengthens the argument for ten thousand natural immigrants every year. 13^It  is worth noting that Jimmy Carter's inauguration as president -in January, 1977 -- did much to ease the fear which had gripped the New Left in the United States for more than a decade. In the specific case of those whose radicalism was limited to objection to the VietNam War and its aftermath, this was perhaps especially so, since one of Carter's first acts as chief executive was to promise an amnesty program for war objectors still living abroad.  14  ^  Rick Carleton -- information officer with Employment and Immigration Canada, Immigration Division, Immigration Statistics Section -- interviews with author (Ottawa: 08 and 10 January 1991). Carleton also made unpublished data on Project P97 available to the author (see bibliography).  Ibid. 16^Ibid. 17^Ibid. 18^Ibid.  APPENDIX B .12 112 n2 zgr  "Even now," Vancouver journalist Mary Murphy complained in 1990, "most Americans who came [to Canada during the VietNam Era] are assumed to have been draft dodgers or deserters. In fact, this was not true." 1 It was not true for reasons Baskir and Strauss spelt out, if far too circumspectly, in Chance and Circumstance: "Draft resisters and deserters were the core of a much larger American exile community . .  "  112  The community  the two men identified, however, included much more than young people acting in solidarity with military evaders. 3 It included men and women of all ages, many of whom came to Canada for reasons of their own, reasons having little or nothing to do with military evasion. Murphy, herself a war-inspired immigrant, need do little more than look up from her computer terminal in the Vancouver Sun newsroom to find the people who created the assumption she disputes. If Canadians think most VietNam War-inspired immigrants were military evaders, they believe so because that is precisely what the Canadian media told them to believe. While other groups of emigres "were largely overlooked, the [military evaders] captured the attention of the public and the press. Over time, they became the stuff of political mythology," Baskir and Strauss reported. 4 Paul Bennett noted the same phenomenon in a 1989 article about military evaders in History and Social Science Teacher: American military evaders, he said, "were seldom far from the eye of [the] public . . . during  — 69 — the VietNam and immediate post-VietNam years." 5 Most writers in the field -- Murphy, Bennett and Baskir and Strauss included -- at least acknowledged the existence of these other emigres, before then proceeding to ignore them. This despite the suspicion that these ignored immigrants numbered, at the very least, in Baskir and Strauss' "tens of thousands" . . . a suspicion which should alert the historian to the possibility that something far more than mere avoidance of military service was motivating Americans to leave for Canada during the VietNam Era. In the case of most analysts, it did not. All of the works considered in researching this paper shared the assumption that the "others" were almost universally the wives or girlfriends of the military evaders. As such, they were considered people who would not have emigrated had their husbands or boyfriends not decided to flee military service. This conclusion can be, and was, used to justify the treatment of these other emigres as mere appendages of the military evaders, people with no reasons of their own for leaving the United States. This, in turn, was used to justify them being ignored by analysts seeking to explain the exodus to Canada during the VietNam Era. Even Murphy, who started her article with an assertion that the assumption this process of justification created was "not true," was unable to escape that assumption. She wrote exclusively about "young men who, for a variety of reasons, refused to submit to the draft or the dictates of the armed forces" 6 two decades ago . . . about, in other words, military evaders.? Little wonder that most war-inspired immigrants "are assumed to have been draft dodgers or deserters." Cross-tabulation of the responses to the survey questionnaire which forms the core of the research for this  -- 70 -papers shows exactly how flawed that assumption is.  Cross-tabulation shows the respondents to this paper's own survey questionnaire were a much more diverse group than the one suggested by the phrase "military evaders," though most were, in fact, exactly that: a full two-thirds reported they were either military deserters, 9 draft evaders" or had come north in the company of these military evaders. 11 But 28.3 per cent of respondents were what have been earlier called independents: immigrants whose reasons for leaving the United States were in no way related to their own military or Selective Service System (SSS) status, or the status of their immediate family members. 12 What is particularly interesting about this last figure is that it seriously undermines the stereotypical notion that all non-military evader emigres were married to draft evaders and deserters: in fact, only 5.2 per cent of the respondents were so related." The image of a war-inspired immigrant as a military evader is accurate most of the time, though by no means all of the time. But the image of the women who came as being the wives or girlfriends of those evaders is simply not true; overwhelmingly, female war-inspired immigrants were not accompanying military evaders when they crossed the border." In fact, many of the women who came were old enough to be at the least the very much older sisters -- if not always the mothers -- of the military evaders: female war-inspired immigrants were more than twice as likely as men to have been born in 1939 or earlier," and to have been more than twenty-seven years old at the time they immigrated." Men were far more likely than women to have been born in 1940 or later, 17 and were typically under twenty-five years old when they crossed into Canada."  —GY M Just over half of the war-inspired immigrants who responded to the survey came to British Columbia from the western United States, 19 where they had either been born or had made their homes." Another 20 per cent were in the American Northeast 21 when they decided to emigrate, 22 but almost half of that number reported they had been born in the western United States, and were in the Northeast only temporarily, because of work, school or a military posting. 23 Similar patterns emerge for other regions considered. 24 VietNam War-inspired immigration into British Columbia, in other words, appears to have been a regional phenomenon, with most of the respondents who came to the province doing so because it was the part of Canada closest to what they identified as "home" in the United States. This geographical commonality is not the only demographic niche the respondents shared. As a group, they were also extremely well-educated. Less than ten per cent of their number had only a high school education or less. 25 Almost a quarter of them had at least attended a college or university, 26 just less than half had earned an undergraduate degree, 27 and more than ten per cent crossed the border with a graduate degree already in hand. 28 Almost all of the least-educated group were male military deserters, 29 with the remaining respondents falling into the various postsecondary categorisations in a way which is statistically significant only because it is so consistent: the ratio of men to women -- and of those born before 1940 to those born in, or after, that year -- in the overall sample" is more or less replicated in each of the five available responses offered to respondents who had at least some post-secondary education. 31 A final demographic niche is shared by the war-inspired immigrants who responded to the survey: virtually all of them were American citizens. 32 All but seven respondents reported they were born in the United  -- 72 -States, 33 and four of those seven were born in Canada to parents who were American citizens. 34  The picture which seems to emerge from this series of demographic snapshots is one of two distinct groups of VietNam War-inspired immigrants: Male military evaders and their spouses, who made up about twothirds of the sample. They tended to be somewhat younger than the other respondents in the sample, but otherwise shared with them largely similar personal, geographic and educational backgrounds. mic  Independent immigrants, the remaining third of the sample, usually female, slightly older than the military evaders on average, but sharing with them common citizenship, high levels of education and a feeling that the western United States was their home. Given the above, it seems almost natural to treat these two groups as  separate entities. The first, it might be argued, confirms the stereotypical image of a war-inspired immigrant as a young, male military evader -- the draft dodger or deserter of Baskir and Strauss' "political mythology" 35 -fleeing to Canada to escape service in the United States armed forces. That flight might be presumed to have occurred because, for whatever reason, these young men did not want to serve as participants in the VietNam War. The second group of emigres, largely women, would no doubt be of great interest to the analyst, since they so patently did not conform to the stereotype of what a female war-inspired immigrant should be. The problem with such a perception is that it is inherently flawed, due to its statistical suppositions. It is almost always possible to subdivide large groups into smaller ones, using sex, 36 or age, or some other criteria to do so. At times -- when such a categorisation yields significant  -- 73 -differences between the groups so created -- it is even desirable to undertake such sub-division. But the danger of statistics is that those reading them are often tempted to emphasise the differences they find in their tables, while either consciously or unconsciously downplaying the similarities, simply because an identifiable demographic difference exists.  What cross-tabulation of the statistics yielded by this study reveals is that the war-inspired immigrant respondents were not separate groups, but one. They had far more in common than citizenship, education and a shared sense of home. One thing which truly unified these two seemingly disparate groups -- younger male military evaders and older female independents -- was their motivation for deciding to leave their native land. Here, where it might most be expected to surface, no statistically significant difference existed. More than half of the survey's respondents reported their reason for leaving the United States was either a personal experience or a specific event in that country: 37 the assassination of a political figure, 38 police or other official reaction to a political demonstration, 39 even the reaction of a group of friends to seeing one man, for the first time, in his military uniform." Another 28.9 per cent reported a broader motive, what the survey calls a "cumulative effect of a wide range of events and experiences." 41 Together, these responses -- which can be interpreted as a general dissatisfaction with life in the United States -- constituted just more than three-quarters of all responses. 42 They were spread evenly across all possible demographic sub-divisions of the sample, being no more likely to surface in one sub-division than in another. 43 Less than a quarter of all respondents reported their reason for  --74-deciding to emigrate as being an event directly related to personal military service." And, for many of that quarter, that event was only one of several reasons given for the war-inspired immigrant's decision to leave the United States.'" Cross-tabulation of responses to Question III1, in other words, shows that neither duty in SouthEast Asia specifically," nor even military service generally, was the main reason even the military evaders came to Canada. They came, almost all of the emigres,47 because of what can best be described as disillusionment with their native land. This was true whether the individual war-inspired immigrant was male or female, regardless of age, education or geographic background. While the survey's demographics on sex, age and relationship to military evaders clearly create a new image of the women who came to Canada during the VietNam Era -- one at sharp odds with the stereotypical image of such women -- the picture thus created is not one which warrants their being treated as a group separate from their male contemporaries for the purposes of this paper. Women were not appendages to the men who came, but individuals with their own reasons for leaving the United States behind them. Those reasons were so similar to the men's, however, that they can only justify the two sexes being treated -- in this paper, at least -- as one group, not two. The VietNam War-inspired immigrants in British Columbia who responded to the survey were not only a single group, but a remarkably homogeneous one.  1^Mary Murphy, "Americans in Canada: why they like it here," Vancouver Sun, 29 June 1990, p. A13. 2^Baskir and Strauss,  Chance and Circumstance, p. 180; also see dis-  ^  -- 75 --  cussion in Appendix A. ^3  ^  ^4 ^5 ^6 ^7  ^  ^ ^  ^  ^8  See Appendix A.  Baskir and Strauss, Chance and Circumstance, p. 167.  Bennett, "War Resisters in Canada," p. 44.  Baskir and Strauss, Chance and Circumstance, p. 167. Murphy, "Americans in Canada," p. A13.  ^  See Appendix D, pp. 84-86, for a full discussion of cross-tabulation analysis.  ^9^21.1  per cent at Question Il; half of the deserters had been soldiers in the United States Army (Question I2a); a full third of them had served one year or more before their desertion (Question I2b).  ^10^45.5  per cent at Question Il.  5.2 per cent at Question IL Question I1; also see Canadian Press, "30,000 draft dodgers don't want to go back," Vancouver Province, 21 June 1971, p. 1. Ibid. ^14^Question  •  II1 cross-tabulated to Il.  Question 112 cross-tabulated to M. Questions II1 and 112 cross-tabulated to 1112 and 1113.  ^17^Question  112 cross-tabulated to In.  •  Questions II1 and 112 cross-tabulated to 1112 and 1113.  •  Defined, here, as California, the Northwest (Idaho, Montana, Oregon, Washington and Wyoming), and the Southwest (Arizona, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico and Utah); Question 115.  ^20^Question  116 cross-tabulated to 115.  21^Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin. 22^Question 115 cross-tabulated to 116. Question 113 cross-tabulated to 115 and 116. ^24^Ibid.  ^25^Question IV8.  -- 76 — 26^Ibid. n^Ibid. 28^Ibid. 29^Question  1V8 cross-tabulated to II1 and Il.  30^Questions  II1 and 112.  31^Question 32^94.7  IV8 cross-tabulated to II1 and 112.  per cent; Question 117.  33^Question 113. 34^Question 113 cross-tabulated to 117. 35^Baskir  and Strauss, Chance and Circumstance, p. 167.  36^Nouns  have gender; people have sex.  37^Question  III1 cross-tabulated.  38^See,  for example, Sara Kirkby, Respondent 115, letter to author (Kelowna: 05 September 1991); and "Bear," Respondent 067, letter to author (Powell River: 12 July 1991).  39^See, for example, Susan Pollock, Respondent 141, letter to author  (Victoria: 12 August 1991); and James D. Spears, Respondent 016, letter to author (Vancouver: 20 August 1991).  40^C.F.  (Kipp) Campbell, letter to author (Rexdale, Ontario: 15 August 1991).  a^Question III1. 42^Question  III1 cross-tabulated; also see "30,000 draft dodgers don't want to go back," p. 1; and Carl L. Kline and others, "The Young American Expatriates in Canada: Alienated or Self-Defined?" American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 41(1) (January, 1971), pp. 76-77.  a^Question III1 cross-tabulated to I1, 111-3, 115-7 and 1V8. 44^Requirement  to register with the SSS, loss of SSS deferment, denial of conscientious objector status or imminent prosecution for some activity related to the SSS or military service; Question III1 crosstabulated.  45^Up  to five responses were allowed at Question III1. Cross-tabulation reveals which respondents gave multiple answers, and what those answers were.  — 77 -46^Only  7.2 per cent of respondents cited this reason; Question III1.  47^Taken  together, cross-tabulation of responses to Question III1 shows just more than 80 per cent of the VietNam War-inspired immigrant respondents came to Canada for reasons other than personal SSS or military status. Of the remaining group -- less than 20 per cent of the total -- a full three-quarters reported other reasons for emigration, in addition to their personal status. Similar findings were reported in a United Church of Christ study in 1971, which said "disagreement over the VietNam War is not the only reason [Americans] move to Canada. There is increased immigration by Americans of all ages . . . of late. The exodus is not only a `no' to [American] military policies . . ., but is a 'no' to the quality of life and the style of the United States generally.'" (Reported in "30,000 draft dodgers don't want to go back;" also see Kline and others, "Young American Expatriates," pp. 76-78.)  APPENDIX C M e t12 c:, ci ol cy ar ,x_r- c• 1,1 fez tic r2 for Girt .Pcs of ..S' Ex 2- - -c-- e j-- 4Q zi...s tic::•.r2 r2 ... i2-- e .  -  -  For this study, Census Canada divisions for the province were generally used to separate British Columbia into numbered geographical regions. To rationalise high-density population areas -- frequently subdivided into separate areas by Census Canada -- six regions were grouped according to other geopolitical criteria, and were coded alphabetically. The February, 1991, edition of Canadian Advertising Rates and Data was then used to identify media outlets in each region. Twenty-six regions with media outlets were thus established for the province: A B C D E F  Southern Vancouver Island Northern Vancouver Island Vancouver Lower Mainland* Gulf Islands Queen Charlotte Islands  2 4 5 6 7  Bulkley-Nechako Cariboo Fraser Valley Central Kootenay Central Okanagan *includes Vancouver numbers  8 12 13 14 16 17 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 28 29  Columbia-Shuswap East Kootenays Fraser-Cheam Fraser-Fort George Kitimat-Stikine Kootenay Boundary North Okanagan Ocean Falls South Okanagan Peace River Powell River Skeena Squamish-Lillooet Sunshine Coast Thompson-Nicola  Two other regions were also established and coded alphabetically: the province as a whole (H), and Canada as a whole (I). These regions were used for releases mailed to regional or national media outlets. Each outlet was sent a copy of the media release reproduced below. Twenty-eight versions of the release were produced, one for each -- 78 —  — 79 -region. Two variables were used in the first paragraph of each version: SPACE A was the number of American war objectors who might have settled in the region in the period under study (1965-1977). This number was arrived at by adding together the number of VietNam War-inspired immigrants from the United States who told Canadian immigration officials they intended to settle in the region at the time of immigration. Since there was no subsequent monitoring of whether these immigrants did, in fact, go the region they said they intended to -- and since it is known that a significant number of them not only did not, but never intended tol -- these numbers are valueless insofar as this study is concerned. They were tallied and included in the release as a means of "localising" the release, thereby inducing editors in each region to use it. SPACE B was the assigned name of the region.  !  These variables were introduced because regional media outlets prefer to use material with specific relevance to their readers/listeners. The release itself read: VANCOUVER -- As many as SPACE A American war objectors may have settled in SPACE B during the VietNam War. The American government may not be looking for them any longer, but a university history researcher is. Stephen Brewer has taken up where the FBI left off. The University of BC (UBC) history graduate student is researching the lives and attitudes of the men -- and women -- who left the United States for Canada because  -- 80 -of the VietNam War. Brewer wants the objectors to fill out a short questionnaire for him, on which they will be quizzed about their attitudes at the time of their immigration, their attitudes today and what they have done in Canada since coming north. The questionnaires available from Brewer at 4257 West 15th Avenue, Vancouver V6R 3A7 -- can be filled out anonymously, he says, and shouldn't take more than 10 minutes to complete. "Mass immigration to Canada by Americans objecting to the war in VietNam is virtually an unstudied field," the UBC researcher says. "We know it happened, but we don't know, for certain, how many war objectors there were, or why they really came. . . .tt Perhaps surprisingly, he says, almost half of those war objectors were women, a group he is especially interested in surveying. He stresses that he is not just looking for draft evaders or military deserters: "A war objector," Brewer says, "is virtually any American who came to Canada because of the VietNam War, whether they were fleeing criminal prosecution in the US or not." Study of the group is vital, he adds. "Next to the mass exodus of the United Empire Loyalists following the American insurrection of 1776, VietNam  -- 81 -war objectors represent perhaps the largest politicallymotivated mass migration into Canada in our country's history. "It's possible, just possible, that American war objectors will turn out to be every bit as important to Canada in the coming decades as the Loyalists were two centuries ago." That's why it's important to begin studying the war objectors now, while their memories are still relatively fresh, Brewer says. Brewer, a candidate for a Master's degree in Canadian history at UBC, expects to complete his research this summer, and to finish his report on his findings in the 1991-92 academic year. This language is obviously not academic, nor was it intended to be: the style and usage is journalistic. The approach adopted was designed, not to meet the usual rigourous academic standards, but to encourage media outlets to use the release by adopting their standards and usage. The release itself forms no part of the study undertaken -- it was designed to elicit maximum response from media outlets and, thus, war objectors, whose responses form the core of the study. Put crudely, the release was bait, designed to lure research subjects into the study's fold. Initial response to the release was enthusiastic. The releases were mailed on Saturday, 29 June 1991, at the main post office in Vancouver. In the period to Monday, 28 October 1991, twenty-one media outlets -- as well as two CBC Radio regional affairs broadcasts -- conducted interviews with the author aimed at expanding the release into a larger story. These  -- 82 — interviews included four with regional daily newspapers (Victoria, Vernon, Kamloops and Cranbrook) and seventeen with regional community (usually weekly) newspapers, scattered from northern Vancouver Island to the Rockies. Another forty-eight media outlets are known to have used the release, in one form or another, within the same period. It is not known how many other outlets may have used the release, or saved it for later use. In addition to these, it is known that the release was used, in one form or another, by the Toronto Star newspaper, by University Affairs magazine and by the Ottawa Citizen newspaper. To Monday, 28 October 1991 -- when it was decided to close the study to allow responses to be coded and entered into a data base one hundred and fifty-two completed questionnaires were received from American war objectors in British Columbia. The responses received represented virtually every region of the province. ale at- .4e  Immigration Canada, during the entire VietNam Era, granted immigrant status on the basis of a point system, with a maximum possible total of 100. Points were awarded on the basis of age, fluency and literacy in both official languages, education and a number of other factors, including where the potential immigrant intended to settle if admitted to Canada. Potential immigrants who said they intended to settle in sparsely populated regions received more immigration points than did those who said they were intending to settle in urban centres: the Skeena region "earned" the potential immigrant the maximum ten points, the Lower Mainland was worth none. But Immigration Canada had no way of determining whether the immigrant, once granted legal status, actually went to the region he had said he intended to. Nor, if it had, would it have had any legal right to compel the immigrant to either go to, or remain in, that region: "We cannot, still, compel a legal immigrant to stay in one place," a ministerial spokesman (Rick Carleton) said in 1991. Because of this system, potential immigrants were frequently encouraged, by anti-war immigration counsellors, to report their intended destination in Canada as one which would earn them the maximum number of points, whether they actually planned to go there or not. Only an offer of employment -- worth an additional ten immigration  -- 83 -points -- in a low-point area was considered enough to change this advice. All of this, quite obviously, had a dramatic effect on statistical tables showing where immigrants "intended" to settle; while the Immigration Statistics do include such tables, even Carleton acknowledges they bear little relationship to the realities of immigrant settlement.  APPENDIX D A Pc:x.7i ti c z51._1 17;e5e2- cf ,s tic lc The war-inspired immigrants who responded to this paper's survey were, as was seen in Appendix B, a remarkably homogeneous group. There was little which differentiated them from one another, save their sex and -as a consequence of United States selective service lawsl -- their draft or military status. As a group, their ages, educational backgrounds, places of birth and residence, reasons for leaving their country two decades and more ago, even howl and when 3 they came, were so similar as to be of little or no statistical significance. This overall cohesiveness makes it not only possible, but necessary, to view them as a single group of individuals. 4 This paper has sought to determine the political orientation of this cohesive group of individuals, by measuring their self-perception of their political identity against a standard yardstick of the political orientation of British Columbians as a whole. The use of this particular measure raises an obvious question: How accurate is the measurement that yardstick provides?  The yardstick is based on cross tabulation analysis, a process which -  involves comparing responses to one question -- or set of questions -- to responses to another question or set of questions, in search of statistically significant relationships between the two. At its simplest, cross-tabulation -- 84 --  -- 85 -analysis tells the analyst how many of the respondents who chose answer A at question 1 also chose answer A at question 2. For example: crosstabulation revealed that none of the ninety-eight respondents who identified themselves as "male" at Question II1 of this paper's survey were included in the four people who identified themselves as "deserter's spouse" at Question IL Cross-tabulating responses to Question Il with those at Question II1 one more time reconfirmed this: all four deserter's spouses identified themselves as "female," meaning no husbands of female deserters were included in the sample. Another cross-tabulation check revealed that thirty-one of the thirty-two respondents who identified themselves as "deserters" at Question also identified themselves as "male" at Question II1; it is thus almost certain that the lone female deserter was not accompanied by a husband or boyfriend when she came north. A final cross-tabulation -- between Questions Il and II1, compared to Question 1117 -- confirmed conclusively that the lone female deserter did not come north "with [a] husband/boyfriend." This tedious and repetitious process -- so time-consuming as to be impossible without the aid of electronic computers -- is the heart of crosstabulated survey analysis, the primary source of much of the information in this paper. Rather than cite each cross-tabulation in full in the notes, a form of shorthand has usually been used. The example above, for instance, would be stated in text as "All deserter's spouses were female." The note would say simply "Question Il cross-tabulated to II1," though that notation reflects only the preliminary cross-tabulation used to verify the statement. This shorthand was necessary because cross-tabulation frequently involved comparing a large number of responses to one another. As a consequence, full citation of the cross-tabulations would quickly become mean-  -- 86 -ingless. The simple statement above would require, in full, the somewhat puzzling citation "Question II1 cross-tabulated to II., Question Il cross-tabulated to II1, Question Il cross-tabulated to II1 (repeat), Questions Il and II1 cross-tabulated to 1117." For some analysis statements, as many as twenty-seven cross-tabulations were required; the reader can appreciate the futility of attempting to cite them all in a paper of this length. 5 Cross-tabulation analysis frequently requires the development of a standard set of questions or propositions, development undertaken by  teams of psychologists, linguists, sociologists, statisticians and, in the case of the standard set used here, political scientists. When necessary, other specialists are consulted in the creation and refinement of standard sets. As the standard set is used in the field, it undergoes further, continuous, refinement and modification, until the team is satisfied that it can, and does, yield results which can -- in the statisticians' usual phrase -be considered "accurate within plus or minus 2.6 percentage points, ninetyfive times out of one hundred." 6 Such results can be, and all but universally are, treated as being so accurate as to be an acceptable defence to even the most rigourous challenge. The survey on which this paper was based, which was used to create the political yardstick used here, relied on just such a standard set. Developed for the Gallup company by a research team at the University of Michigan in the mid-1960s, it has been widely used across North America since. Though it has no official name, it was here called the University of Michigan (UoM) standard set. Through use, it has acquired a level of acceptability which today makes it the primary tool for measurement of political thought, opinion and philosophy across North America. Groups such as Gallup and the Roper organisation in the United States and, in  -- 87 — Canada, the Decima Research group, Marktrend and the Environics-Crop and Storey Research Associates companies use variations of the UoM standard set. The UoM standard set is divided into five different sections, or poli-  tical attitudinal scales. These divisions, not revealed to respondents, are each designed to measure some specific aspect of the respondent's political thought, opinion or belief: zi The individual versus collective responsibility scale, consisting of Questions 1-7 of the standard set, which measures degrees of individual acceptance of state intervention in the workings of the polity and the lives of its citizens.? AU  The political efficacy scale, consisting of Questions 8-16 of the standard set, was originally designed to help determine how likely a respondent was to vote. 8 These questions have evolved into a set which helps determine the respondent's acceptance of the Canadian parliamentary system and the degree to which he is willing to participate, at various levels, in that system. These two factors -especially when cross-tabulated to the third and fourth scales -- also help determine the degree to which the respondent feels alienated from the Canadian system of government. 9 The populism scale, consisting of Questions 19-24 10 of the standard set, was designed to measure the individual respondent's commitment to populist principles. Populists, in British Columbian studies, have come to be defined as people who deeply distrust governments and - most of all -- the bureaucrats who make them function. 11  zic The willingness to compromise scale, Questions 25-28 of the standard set, designed to measure just that. ^Because the essence of the  Canadian parliamentary system is compromise, 12 this scale -- especially as cross-tabulated with the political efficacy scale -- is crucial in helping determine the respondent's acceptance of, and belief in, the Canadian system of government. 13 K The self evaluation scale, Questions 29-34 of the standard set, which -  allows the respondent to rate himself on questions which measure political leaning directly. This scale -- used as a sort of poll -- is the one used to arrive at definitions of what a political camp consists 0 04  It is important to emphasise that the five scales which make up the UoM standard set are not designed to be considered in isolation, either as divisions of the standard set or as individual questions. Cross-tabulation of each response to each other response, and of each scale to every other scale, is what makes this standard set "work." Responses, and scales, are pieces of a puzzle. Each response, each puzzle piece, in conjunction with all other pieces, ultimately helps to form a reasonably accurate picture of a political camp, which is then named according to the majority's description of that camp, that puzzle. Some of the pieces are interchangeable from puzzle to puzzle; others are not, or will fit only some of the puzzles rather than all of them. 15 While this paper considered, in isolation, each section of the puzzles as they were assembled, it must be remembered that it is the puzzle as a whole which ultimately defines the group.' 6 Over the last decade and more, Vancouver-based political analyst Les Storey has worked with Professor Donald E. Blake, currently head of the department of political science at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver, and Professors David J. Elkins and Richard G.C. Johnston, of that same department, 17 to modify and refine the UoM standard set for specific  -- 89 -application to the population of British Columbia. That modification and refinement -- carried out in close consultation with experts from other fields -- has yielded a measurement tool of recognised accuracy. This standard set was, in the survey undertaken for this paper, put to each respondent three separate times, in an effort to determine each's political thought, opinions and philosophies in relationship to the government of the United States at the time of emigration from that country; 18 in relationship to the government of Canada either at the time of immigration or one year later; 19 and in relationship to government generally today. 2° Three questions were eliminated from the standard set in the first two applications: 21 the questions seek information on how often a respondent votes in federal, state/provincial and local (municipal) elections. They were not included in Sections V and VI of this paper's survey because a majority of the war-inspired immigrant respondents were known to have been ineligible to vote at the time being considered; in the United States, because of their age, in Canada because they were not citizens. The questions were included, as Questions 14, 15 and 16, in Section VII of the sur-  vey .22 Two other questions were added to the standard set in the survey, in an effort to determine respondents' willingness to take direct action to alter a government's policies or actions. These propositions appeared, in all three sections, as Questions 17 and 18: When a government's activities become intolerable to me, I feel it is my duty to take whatever legal action I can to make it cease those activities.  (Agree or Disagree)  When a government's activities become intolerable to me, I feel it is my duty to take whatever action is necessary to make it cease those activities.  (Agree or Disagree)  — 90 -While the data produced by the responses to these propositions is interesting, it has not proven to be conclusive enough to allow -- as had been the original intention -- conclusions to be drawn about the survey respondents' willingness to engage in violent anti-government activity in pursuit of their political goals. The data, then, could form no more than an interesting footnote to this paper, and played no part in the analysis offered here. Similarly, the data generated by responses to the questions and propositions in Section V 23 played no part in the analysis offered here. This data could be used to measure the war-inspired immigrant respondents' placement on an American political yardstick, calibrated for the VietNam Era; but such measurement was beyond the scope of this paper. Because it was, it was not attempted; the data contained in Section V, again, played no part in the analysis offered here. The modified UoM standard set, as applied in Sections V1 24 and V11 23 of this paper's survey, provided the data base relied upon for the analysis which was undertaken here. Each question of each standard set was analysed, through cross-tabulation, to every other question on the survey questionnaire, using both the Chi-square and Pearson significance tests. Both are standard tests used to evaluate political orientation by uncovering statistically significant relationships between the variables (responses) of the UoM standard set and its variations. The modified UoM standard set used for this paper's survey has been used over five hundred times to measure political thought, opinion and philosophy in British Columbia, where "right/left orientation has likely been studied more intensely than almost anywhere else in North America, because of the polarisation of provincial politics here over the last forty  -- 91 -years." 26 Undergoing continuous refinement and modification, it can be considered an exceptionally accurate and meaningful measure of the population of the province as a whole. The data gleaned from these general surveys provides a base which allows definition of a political group, or camp, which can be considered accurate to within .3 per cent. Political camps are general groupings of people which can be broad -- "leftist, liberal, conservative" -- or narrow: "radical, centrist, moderate." Here, the political spectrum of British Columbia was divided into nine camps: leftist, radical, centre- and moderate; liberal, left-, centre- and right-; and conservative, moderate, centre- and radical. In British Columbia, it is unusual to find these labels translating directly into party affiliation, though many people assume that all leftists are members of the New Democratic Party (NDP), that all liberals belong to the Liberal Party and that all conservatives pay dues to either the Progressive Conservative or the Social Credit (Socred) parties, or both. 27 In fact, there are virtually no radical leftist New Democrats in British Columbia, as radical British Columbian leftists tend to find the NDP both "too liberal" and "too committed to electoralism," to success at the polls, for their liking. In this province, radical leftists tend to belong to one of the various Communist parties, when they belong to a party at all. The NDP, from time to time, enters into nervous alliances with some of these groups, 28 but formally prohibits any of its own members from joining them. 29 In British Columbia, then, "radical leftist" and "New Democrat" are almost always self-exclusionary labels. 39  Very loosely speaking, the British Columbia NDP tends to draw its membership from the centre- and (primarily) moderate leftist camps, as well as from the left- and centre-liberal ones. The Liberal Party's support base  — 92 -has historically been much narrower: its support has tended to come from the centre-liberal camp alone. Social Credit and Progressive Conservative support usually comes from the centre-liberal to radical conservative camps, and everything in between. Those on the extreme end of the radical conservative camp tend to support parties such as Reform, when they support parties at al1. 31 As all of this should make clear, the nine political camps here identified are  not  defined by application of some abstract measure determined by  the analyst, nor by anyone else. "Radical leftist," in other words, is not defined by trying to guess how Karl Marx or Freidrich Engels would have responded to the standard set, any more than "radical conservative" is defined by trying to determine how Adam Smith or John D. Rockefeller would have responded to the same propositions. Nor are political camps defined by reference to manifestoes, proclamations or other abstract statements drafted by those who claim leadership of, nor even membership in, the camp. Such documents are political statements intended for public consumption. They generally reflect little more than a consensus on what is considered correct political thought by members of specific political groups or parties. At best, they represent such a group's view of what constitutes an ideal society or polity. At worst, they are cynical attempts to present the group in a favourable light before society as a whole. Not infrequently, they are historical statements of philosophy a group clings to for little more than nostalgia. 32 Because they by no means necessarily represent the true political philosophies or beliefs of even the individuals who today endorse them, either publicly or privately, they are of little interest here. What this paper sought was not abstract definitions of political camps  -- 93 -based on grandiose proclamations, but very real, concrete definitions based on what people actually believe and feel. To create such definitions, the paper relied -- as does all political analysis based on the UoM standard set -- on a sort of electoral process: from the data base as a whole, those respondents who identify themselves as, for example, radical leftists 33 are isolated. Those respondents' answers to each question or proposition of the standard set are then tabulated. When a majority of respondents answer a question in a given manner, that response is considered to be typical of a radical leftist. The stronger the majority, the more important the response to that particular question can be considered to the definition of that particular camp. When the majority becomes overwhelming, or unusual in relationship to responses to other questions or scales, that question can become a key identifier of the camp. Key identifiers can provide the basis for fitting an individual respondent precisely on the political spectrum. In British Columbia, for example, most respondents whose self-identification places them on the spectrum between radical leftist and moderate-conservative will indicate broad support for social welfare programs.  34  The extent to which they  support these programs helps determine where on the spectrum they belong. What separates moderate conservatives from the pack, the key identifier here, is Question 6: "Each individual should accept the consequences of their own actions." A solid majority of British Columbians disagrees, very strongly, with this proposition. 35 An equally solid majority of those British Columbians who identify themselves as moderate conservatives strongly agrees with it. 36 The proposition thus becomes one of several key identifiers of moderate conservatives."  — 94 — A final matter needs to be addressed here: This paper set out to prove the war-inspired immigrant respondents were not radical British Columbia leftists; cross-tabulation of their responses to the UoM standard set, when compared to the responses of the provincial population as a whole, clearly reveal they were not. But is it reasonable to judge Ameri-  cans by British Columbian standards? This issue is a crucial one, because Americans are very different politically from Canadians generally, and British Columbians specifically, despite real similarities. "One of the hallmarks of Canadian [political] culture," Gregg and Posner pointed out in The Big Picture, has been a collectivist impulse that embraces the notion that government must not only arbitrate on behalf of the public interest, but, if necessary, provide it. . . . The flip side of our historical collectivist impulse was an  absence of faith in the individual . .  ..  38  This hints at one of the key differences between Canadians and Americans in their relationship to their political systems. It is a difference of perception of how those systems should work, and of how individuals within those systems -- politicians -- should behave. Americans generally, and the war-inspired immigrant respondents quite specifically and strongly, 39 not only have faith in the individual, but believe implicitly that it is only the individual who can be relied upon in situations of grave emergency. This emphasis on the individual not only informs traditional American historical mythology -- where it is enshrined in Herbert Hoover's phrase "rugged individualism" 40 -- it permeates much of the espoused ideology of the American New Left, a political movement of the 1960s which it is reasonable to conclude informed much of the political development of the VietNam War-inspired immigrants. 41 In relationship to its political system, this cult of rugged individualism is expressed in Ameri-  -- 95 -can expectations of their politicians. What Americans view as principled politicians are an essential feature of the American democratic republican system. This system is one in which politicians are elected to carry their own principles into the legislative chamber, not those of "the mob" (their constituents). Voting the party line is not an integral part of -- nor a much admired trait in -- the ideal of the American political system. 42 In Canada, in sharp contrast, politicians are elected to carry their  constituents' principles, as agreed upon by their party, into the legislative chamber. Except in the relatively rare free votes in parliament, Canadian legislators are very much expected to vote the party line, regardless of their personal feelings on a given issue. Even during a free vote, the parliamentarian is expected to vote as his constituents want him to -- presumably, on the issue in question, a position at odds with his party's policy -- not as his own personal principles might dictate. 43 It is thus no accident that Edmund Burke's 1774 speech to the electors of Bristol -- "Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion."" -- is quoted approvingly far more often in the United States than it is in his native Great Britain . . . or in Canada, for that matter. Benjamin D'israeli's notions of what constitutes proper political behaviour -- "Damn your principles! Stick to your party!" 45 are far more descriptive of what a Canadian, of whatever political stripe, expects from his legislator, perhaps because the Canadian recognises the truth of something else D'israeli said: "Without party, Parliamentary government is impossible. " 46 These differing perceptions -- neatly if perhaps unconsciously char-  — 96 -acterised by political iconography which visualises the symbol of the United States as a lone, predatory eagle, while assigning the Canadian persona to the collectivist beaver -- will clearly colour responses to the propositions put in each of the political attitudinal scales of the UoM standard set. Given as much, the question remains: Is it fair to judge Americans, even Americans who have become Canadians, by strictly British Columbian, or Canadian, standards? In a word: yes. What philosophies an American leftist, or New Leftist, embraced are irrelevant here, because this paper did not seek to explore the question of whether its respondents were leftists. It sought to determine whether they were, as they perceived themselves to be, radical  British Columbia leftists by Canadian or British Columbian standards. The data in Section V of the survey questionnaire could clearly be used to measure the war-inspired immigrant respondents' political orientation against an American yardstick. But that was neither the measurement sought here, nor the yardstick this paper used. Differing political traditions may well explain why the war-inspired immigrants saw themselves as radical leftists. Differing definitions of what a leftist is may even explain how the war-inspired immigrant respondents came to see themselves -- after arriving in British Columbia -- as something this paper has shown they were not; actually being an American leftist 47 can be reason enough to at least suspect that one is also a British Columbia leftist. But those differing definitions and traditions are cause, not effect. They may explain a reality . . . they do not create one. Here, respondents were asked how they viewed their relationship with the governments of what has become their country. Their relationship with the government of their former country has clearly influenced their  -- 97 -views of their relationship with the governments of their new one. A study of the extent to which this is true, and the ways in which is true, might well form an interesting paper. But it is not the study this paper undertook. "How did you view your relationship to the government of Canada twenty years ago?" "How do you view your relationship to government today?" These were the questions this paper posed. It posed them in a Canadian, and a British Columbian, context. It must assume the respondents answered them in that same context. From the statistical perspective, this is a reasonable assumption. Responses to the three UoM standard sets put to the war-inspired immigrants show only one statistically significant relationship of each set as a whole to the others: they are just different enough to ensure respondents were not copying their answers to Sections VI and VII from their answers to the same questions in Section V, or their answers in Section VII from their answers in Section VI. Any attempt to re-create emotions or beliefs twenty years after the fact will be influenced by the emotions and beliefs of today; there is no reason to suppose this paper's war-inspired immigrant respondents escaped such an influence. But the differences in their responses to the different sections of the questionnaire strongly suggest they made an attempt to recreate the context of their lives in the period immediately following their immigration. It is only in that context that this paper can consider their answers. zlic =lc 'lc  Laws which, during the VietNam Era as today, discriminated against women by not allowing them to register for conscription.  ^  -- 98 -^2 ^3  ^  Questions 1V1-7, cross-tabulated.  ^  Cross-tabulation of Questions 1112 and 1113 shows that an overwhelming majority of war-inspired immigrant respondents came north during the period of mass immigration (1967-1972; see Appendix A, p. 64), within six months of having decided to leave the United States.  ^4^Though,  as is readily apparent, there are exceptions to any general statement made about the war-inspired immigrant respondents as a group.  The cross-tabulations relied upon for this paper are available on a 3 1/2 inch, high density, machine-readable diskette -- containing all data files, analysis blocs, result files and an INDEX.DOC for the survey -- which has been deposited in the University of British Columbia Data Library at Vancouver, British Columbia. The analysis blocs alone fill more than two hundred and fifty single-spaced pages of text. -  ^6 ^7  ^  Gregg and Posner, The Big Picture, p. 9.  ^  Storey, interview, 22 January 1992; Elkins, in Blake and others, Two Political Worlds, p. 67; and author's personal experience.  8^And includes, of course, questions which ask exactly that, omitted in two of the three UoM standard sets put to this paper's own respondents. ^9^Storey,  interview, 22 January 1992; Elkins, in Blake and others, Two Political Worlds, pp. 57-58; and author's personal experience.  Questions 17 and 18 were added to the UoM standard set for this survey, but failed to yield usable analytic data. 11^Storey, interview, 23 January 1992; Elkins, in Blake and others, Two Political Worlds, pp. 61-63; and author's personal experience. ^12^Storey,  interview, 23 January 1992; Elkins, in Blake and others, Two Political Worlds, p. 65; and author's personal experience; also see Jackson and others, Politics in Canada, pp. 20-27. Storey, interview, 24 January 1992; Elkins, in Blake and others, Two Political Worlds, pp. 65-66; and author's personal experience.  ^14^Storey,  interview, 24 January 1992; and author's personal experience.  Ls^These latter are frequently key identifiers of the camp. Storey, interview, 27 April 1992; Blake and others, Two Political Worlds, pp. ix-x; and author's personal experience. 17^The  three professors used the identical UoM standard set and scales, in conjunction with other scales, in their pioneering study -- begun  in 1979 -- of the political attitudes and behaviour of British Columbia voters. Their results are reported in Two Political Worlds. is^Section V in Appendix E. is^Section VI in Appendix E. 20^Section  VII in Appendix E.  21^Sections 22^See  V and VI in Appendix E.  Appendix E.  23^"Feelings About Government . . . American -- 20 Years Ago;" Appendix E. 24^"Feelings  About Government . . . Canadian -- 20 Years Ago;" Appen-  25^"Feelings  About Government . . . General -- Today;" Appendix E.  dix E.  2s^Storey, interview, 22 January 1992. Blake and others, Two Political Worlds, p. 8; and author's personal experience.  27^Ibid.;  28^Vancouver's civic electoral coalition, the Committee of Progressive Electors (COPE) was long one of the most visible of such alliances. 29^The  NDP's constitution forbids membership in any other political party or group, whether at the civic, provincial or federal level.  30^Storey,  interview, 22 January 1992; and author's personal experience.  31^This  description, it must be noted, is a rough one, and one based on British Columbia politics up to the November, 1991, general election, in which the electorate made the Liberals the province's Official Opposition with votes clearly "stolen" from traditional Socred bases. It is far too soon to know whether this election reflects a basic realignment of the province's political party bases or was a statistical "blip" in electoral history, occasioned by issues specific to that particular election. The disarray of the parties, however, is confined to the non-NDP camps: the New Democrats formed a provincial government after the 1991 election precisely because their traditional bases of support held firm at the polls.  32^New  Democrats, for example, cling tenaciously to The Regina Manifesto, though few of them could, today, comfortably endorse its ringing pledge to "bring capitalism to its knees." The Social Credit Party similarly clings to a name and philosophy created by a retired British army major, whose peculiar "A plus B" monetary theories have  --  100  -  not been endorsed by any Social Credit government in recent memory. No such government, in fact, has recently advocated wholesale, free distribution of money or spendable credits ("social credit") as even policy, let alone as a program. Still, Socreds are not anxious to change their party's name, nor to disavow its founder. 33^At Questions 29 and 30 of the UoM standard set. 34^Questions  1-7 of the UoM standard set. These questions form one of five scales used in the standard set.  3s^Storey, interview, 24 January 1992; Elkins, in Blake and others, Two Political Worlds, p. 67; and author's personal experience.  36^Ibid. Ibid. 38^Gregg 39^As  and Posner, The Big Picture, p. 12; emphasis added.  was seen in Chapter 2, at pp. 35-38.  40^Herbert  Hoover, cited in Oxford Dictionary, p. 255.  This paper is not the place for a full discussion of the ideology -espoused or actual -- of the American New Left. For such discussion, see Todd Gitlin, The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage (Toronto, New York: Bantam Books, 1987); Charles DeBenedetti, An American Ordeal: The Antiwar Movement of the VietNam Era (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1990); Peter Collier and David Horowitz, The Destructive Generation: Second Thoughts About the Sixties (New York: Summit Books, c1989) and Second Thoughts: Former Radicals Look Back at the Sixties (Lanham, Maryland: Madison Books, c1989); and Lauren Kessler, After All These Years: Sixties Ideals in a Different World (New York: Thunder's Mouth Press, c1990). For a slightly different perspective, Richard N. Goodwin, Remembering America: A Voice From the Sixties (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1988), provides an interesting look at liberal politics in the United States of the day. DeBenedetti's Origins of the Modern American Peace Movement, 1915-1929 (Millwood, New York: KTO Press, c1978), offers an excellent summary of the ideological wellsprings of the New Left. F. Kennedy's Pulitzer Prize-winning book, Profiles in Courage -inaugural ed. (New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1961) -- is perhaps the most telling contemporary evocation of this philosophy. In it, Kennedy admiringly tells the stories of "the moral heroism of men of principle confronting the passion of colleagues, constituents, and the general public" (Allan Nevins' foreword, p. xi). The volume was widely-assigned required reading in American history and civics classes throughout the 1960s and early 1970s. As the book makes clear, this rugged individualism on the part of  42^John  -- 101 -politicians is not the day-to-day reality of American politics. Indeed, American politicians usually find it every bit as expedient as their Canadian counterparts do to vote the straight party line. Kennedy's volume, though, shows that such behaviour is not the ideal in American politics, as it is in Canada. Nor does deviation from it cause the upheaval (in a worst-case scenario, the fall of the government) it does in a parliamentary system.  a^Jackson and others, Politics in Canada, pp. 18-29. 44^Edmund  Burke, cited in Oxford Dictionary, p. 109. The speech is also cited approvingly in Nevins' foreword to Profiles in Courage (p. xiv), and another Burke quotation is featured on the volume's frontspiece.  a^Benjamin D'israeli, ibid., p. 185. 46^Ibid. 47^There  is some question whether the war-inspired immigrants were American leftists or not; see discussion at pp. 13-15 of Chapter 1.  APPENDIX E 1.2^ Qour  es tic:kra.r2.:st-ii--  Zit Z2 a  A total of 152 VietNam War-inspired immigrants completed the survey questionnaire with enough valid responses to be included in the data base.  I.^I C AME TO CANADA... 1.  Respondents were asked to categorise their status, in relation to the United States Armed Forces, at the time of immigration: Number  Military deserter Deserter's spouse Draft evader Draft evader's family/spouse Personal conviction, unrelated to military/draft status ("Other") 2.  2a.  2b.  32 4 69 4 43  Xage of total  21.1 2.6 45.5 2.6 28.3  Military deserters and their spouses were asked which branch of the United States Armed Services they (or their spouse) had deserted from, and how long they (or their spouse) had served before desertion (%age of 36 respondents): US Army 55.6 20 US Navy 3 8.3 US Marine Corps 9 25.0 US Air Force 4 11.1 US Coast Guard 0 0.0 Served one year or less 12 33.4 Served more than one year 13 36.1 Refused answer 11 30.6  II^113E FC)12 E I C A.1■4 Respondents were asked for personal background information to establish a demographic base: 1.^Male^ Female^ Refused answer^ -- 102 --  Number %age of total 98^64.5  53^34.9 1^0.7  -- 103 --  2.  (An open-end question, in^which respondents filled in a blank by writing their year of birth; groupings shown here were generated by computer during the process of tabulation.)  Born in, or before, 1939^ Born in, or after, 1940^  3.  25^16.4 127^83.6  Place of birth^(open-end question; groupings here created during  tabulation):  California Northwestern U.S. Southwestern U.S. Midwestern U.S. Texas & Oklahoma Northeastern U.S. New York & New Jersey New England Southern U.S. Canada Britain All other countries Refused answer  24 20 5 11 6 37 24 4 11 4 1 2 3  15.8 13.2 3.3 7.2 3.9 24.3 15.8 2.6 7.2 2.6 0.7 1.3 2.0  139 13  91.4 8.6  4.  Raised in place of birth Raised elsewhere  5.  At time of immigration, resided in (open-end question; groupings here  created during tabulation):  California Northwestern U.S. Southwestern U.S. Midwestern U.S. Texas & Oklahoma Northeastern U.S. New York & New Jersey New England Southern U.S. Alaska & Hawaii All other countries Refused answer  6.  7.  Reason for residence in 5.: Home (permanent) Work (temporary) School ( tem porar y ) Military posting Other Refused answer  52 19 6 10 2 30 9 6 14 2 1 1  34.2 12.5 3.9 6.6 1.3 19.7 5.9 3.9 9.2 1.3 0.7 0.7  79 19 33 15 5 1  52.0 12.5 21.7 9.9 3.3 0.7  Citizenship at time of immigration (open-end question; groupings here  created during tabulation): U.S.  Dual U.S./Canada  All other countries Refused answer  144 5 2 1  94.7 3.3 1.3 0.7  -- 104 --  III^  C)MINI--  /. Immigration was a complex decision for many war objectors, one which was often the cumulative effect of a wide range of events and experiences. But, for many, there was one specific event which triggered the decision, a "straw that broke the camel's back;" for you, was that event (up to five responses were allowed; consequently, totals may be much higher than 100%): Number %age of total No triggering event; immigration 44 28.9 was a cumulative decision 4 2.6 Requirement to register for draft 7.2 11 Loss of draft deferment Draft call-up/induction 8 5.3 Denial of conscientious objector 9.2 status by draft board/military 14 Receipt of orders for VietNam duty 11 7.2 Personal experience(s) in VietNam left after full tour of duty 3 2.0 0.7 left during tour of duty 1 Others' experience(s) in VietNam 7 4.6 Family member(s) Friend(s) 18 11.8 7.2 As reported in media 11 7.2 Specific event in VietNam 11 35 23.0 Specific event in U.S. 47 Personal experience(s) in U.S. 30.9 15 Others' experience(s) in U.S. 9.7 Fleeing prosecution for war-related activity 11 7.2 Other reason(s) written in 13 8.6 1 Refused answer 0.7 2.  What year did you decide to come to Canada? (Open-end question; groupings here created during tabulation): 15^9.9 Before 1967^ 127^83.6 1967 to 1972^ 1973 to 1977^ 6^3.9 4^2.6 Refused answer^  3.  How long after making your decision did you actually come to Canada? Immediately (less than 1 month)^ 18^11.8 After 1 to 3 months^ 44^28.9 After 3 to 6 months^ 36^23.7 After 6 to 12 months^ 34^22.4 More than 1 year later^ 18^11.8 Refused answer^ 2^1.3  - 105 -4.^How did you learn that you could come to Canada?  responses were permitted):  Mainstream media reports Underground media reports Draft/military counsellors Friend(s) or family Other response written in Refused answer  50 39 21 63 28 6  (Up to five 32.9 25.7 13.8 41.4 18.4 3.9  5.  Which people/groups encouraged or supported your decision to emigrate?^(Up to seven responses were permitted): 10.5 Father 16 Mother 29 19.1 Spouse/boy- or girlfriend 72 47.4 Other family member(s) 33 21.7 Draft/military counsellor(s) 11.8 18 Friend(s) 76 50.0 5.3 Other response written in 8 0.7 1 Refused answer  6.  Which people/groups discouraged or opposed your decision to emigrate?^(Up to seven responses were permitted): 37.5 Father 57 34.2 Mother 52 Spouse/boy- or girlfriend 1.3 2 Other family member(s) 32 21.1 Draft/military counsellor(s) 3.9 6 Friend(s) 15.1 23 18 Other response written in 11.8 Refused answer 1 0.7  7. When you came to Canada, did you come (up to four responses were  permitted):  Alone With husband/boyfriend With wife/girlfriend With other family member(s) With other war objector(s) Other response written in Refused answer  IV  50 44 46 25 12  1 1  32.9 28.9 30.3 16.4 7.9 0.7 0.7  GETTING IN...  1.^When you immigrated, did you enter Canada for the first time as: Number %age of total Pre-approved immigrant or granted status on first border crossing 90 59.2 Illegally, as "visitor" who applied for status later 57 37.5 Other response written in 2.6 4 Refused answer 0.7 1  - 106 -2.  If you entered Canada for the first time legally -- as a pre-approved immigrant, or were granted status on your first border crossing how did you obtain your status (%age of 90 respondents)? Before travelling to border, sponsored by family member in Canada ^5^5.6 Before travelling to border, 32^35.6 unsponsored^ At the border, sponsored ^ 14^15.6 38^42.2 At the border, unsponsored^ Other response written in^ 1^1.1 1^1.1 Refused answer^  3.  If you entered Canada for the first time illegally ^-- as a "visitor" who applied for status later -- how long were you in the country before you applied for legal immigrant status (%age of 57 respon-  dents)?  Immediately (less than 1 month) ^ 1 to 3 months^ 3 to 6 months^ 6 to 12 months^ more than 1 year^ Other response written in^ Refused answer^ 4.  12^21.1 21^36.8 4^7.0 8^14.0 5^8.8 10^15.5 9^15.6  If you entered Canada for the first time illegally, ^but subsequently obtained legal immigrant status, did you get your status (%age of 57  respondents)?  As a regular applicant, sponsored ^13^22.8 As a regular applicant, unsponsored^37^64.9 Through a Canadian immigration amnesty, such the program of 1972-1979^ 4^7.0 3^5.3 Refused answer^ 5.  Did you seek or receive counselling from non-government agencies in Canada (Vancouver Committee to Aid American War Objectors, Toronto Anti-Draft Programme, etc.) before applying for immigrant status? YES^ 52^34.2 NO^ 79^52.0 Refused answer^ 21^13.8  6. How many attempts did you make to obtain immigrant status before getting it (excluding an application under a Canadian immigration amnesty)? (Open-end question; groupings here created during tabu-  lation): 1 attempt^  2 attempts^ 3 attempts^ more than 3 attempts^ Other response written in^ Refused answer^  114^75.0 13^8.6 3^2.0 2^1.3 3^2.0 17^11.2  -- 107 -7.  Was your last attempt successful? YES^ 129^84.9 NO; but I later got legal status under an immigration amnesty ^ 1^0.7 NO; I remain in the country illegally^1^0.7 Other response written in^ 5^3.3 Refused answer^ 16^10.5  8.  At the time you immigrated, how much schooling did you have? Less than high school graduation ^ 3^2.0 High school graduation ^ 10^6.6 Some college/university^ 37^24.3 Undergraduate degree^ 64^42.1 Some graduate school^ 15^9.9 Master's degree^ 14^9.2 PhD degree^ 2^1.3 Refused answer^ 7^4.6  9. Have you taken out Canadian citizenship since arriving in Canada? YES^ 121^79.6 NO^ 24^15.8 Other response written in^ 1^0.7 Refused answer^ 6^3.9 STANDARD ID .A.1=1.1D T.-T ESP' ON SET S  Y.^FEEL 30 INGS INGS ALES 0 T-T "I` GAD E FM" /k4 brr Am erican — .00 Years ig'ca Respondents were asked to remember their feelings about the government of the United States at the time they immigrated: C:XMI WEL) _P"40 02? THIS P'_AL4PW.1?..  ^ ^  -- 108 --  YI  ^  FEEL INGS ALE1 C, T.J '1" GOVERNMENT. .. Cana di^sn -- 20 Yews  Respondents were asked to remember their feelings about the Canadian government, either at the time they immigrated or -- if they knew too little about it to have opinions at the time of immigration itself -- one year after they arrived in the country. (Respondents answered all questions on the UoM standard sets by placing an "x" or drawing a circle on a five-unit scale, on which "1" was "very strongly agree," "3" was "no opinion" and "5" was "very strongly disagree." Groupings here were computer generated during tabulation.) 1. After a person had worked until the age of 65, it was proper for the community to support him. Number^%age of total Agree ^130^85.5 Neither 13^8.6 Disagree 8^5.3 Refused answer 1^0.7  2. The government should have made sure that everyone had a decent standard of living. Agree Neither Disagree Refused answer  ^ 83.6 127^ 13 ^8.6 10^6.6 2 1.3  3.^Let's face it: Anyone who really wanted to work could have found a job.  4.  Agree Neither Disagree Refused answer  ^ 47^30.9 25^16.4 51.3 78^ 2 1.3  Government regulations most often ended up stifling individual initiative. ^ Agree 39^25.7 Neither 37 ^24.3 Disagree 72^ 47.4 Refused answer 4 2.6  5.  If I did my best, it was only right that the government help me out if I got a bad break. Agree ^89 ^58.6 Neither 26^17.1 Disagree 33^21.7 Refused answer 4^2.6 6.^Each individual should have accepted the consequences of their own actions. ^ Agree 120^78.9 Neither 18^ 11.8 Disagree 7.9 12  -- 109 -7.  It would have been nice to help out people who were less fortunate, but our taxes were so high that we could no longer afford to help everyone who needed it. Agree^ 12^7.9 Neither^ 18^11.8 Disagree^ 120^78.9 2^1.3 Refused answer^  8.  Politics and government were so big and complicated that it was hard for me to really understand what was going on. Agree^ 38^25.0 Neither^ 11^7.2 Disagree^ 101^66.4 Refused answer^ 2^1.3  9.  What was happening in government then was irrelevant to me in my day-to-day life. Agree^ 39^25.7 Neither^ 11^7.2 Disagree^ 100^65.8 Refused answer^ 2^1.3  10.  People like me could^and did -- have an effect on what the government did. 85^55.9 Agree^ 26^17.1 Neither^ Disagree^ 39^25.7 Refused answer^ 2^1.3  11.  I don't think the government cared what I thought. Agree^ 49^32.2 Neither^ 37^24.3 Disagree^ 63^41.4 3^2.0 Refused answer^  12.  I didn't pay much attention to what the government did, or didn't do, because I had too many other priorities that took up my time and attention. 43^28.3 Agree^ 20^13.2 Neither^ 87^57.2 Disagree^ 2^1.3 Refused answer^  13.  In general, people who got elected to government only cared about what people like me thought at election time. Agree^ 57^37.5 33^21.7 Neither^ Disagree^ 60^39.5 Refused answer^ 2^1.3  14.  QUESTION OMITTED IN THIS SET.  15. QUESTION OMITTED IN THIS SET.  --  110 --  16.  QUESTION OMITTED IN THIS SET.  17.  When a government's activities became intolerable to ^me, I felt it was my duty to take whatever legal action I could to make it cease those activities. 110^72.4 Agree^ 21^13.8 Neither^ 19^12.5 Disagree^  18.  When a government's activities became intolerable to^me, I felt it was my duty to take whatever action was necessary to make it cease those activities. 47^30.9 Agree^ 31^20.4 Neither^ 72^47.4 Disagree^ Refused answer^ 2^1.3  19.  I didn't mind so much what methods a politician used, as long as he did the right thing. 24^15.8 Agree^ 17^11.2 Neither^ 107^70.4 Disagree^ Refused answer^ 4^2.6  20.  In politics, talk without action was worse than nothing at all. 79^52.0 Agree^ 38^25.0 Neither^ 32^21.1 Disagree^ 3^2.0 Refused answer^  21.  I had a lot more faith in the opinions of my friends and family than I did in those of politicians and their so-called experts. 92^60.5 Agree^ 33^21.7 Neither^ 24^15.8 Disagree^ 3^2.0 Refused answer^  22.  What we needed was a government that could get things done without all the red tape. 71^46.7 Agree^ 48^31.6 Neither^ 31^20.4 Disagree^ 2^1.3 Refused answer^  23.  We could have solved most of the country's problems if government could have been actually brought back to the people at the grassroots level. 83^54.6 Agree^ 41^27.0 Neither^ 25^16.4 Disagree^ 3^2.0 Refused answer^  24.  The private sector could have accomplished most of the things the government did more cheaply and efficiently. Agree^ 15^9.9 25^16.4 Neither^ Disagree^ 110^72.4 2^1.3 Refused answer^  25.  The give and take of political compromise was the best way we had to handle the conflicts that arose between groups in our society. Agree^ 100^65.8 Neither^ 27^17.8 Disagree^ 22^14.5 3^2.0 Refused answer^  26.  Compromise and bargaining were essential to make Canadian democracy work. Agree^ 113^74.3 Neither^ 22^14.5 Disagree^ 15^9.9 Refused answer^ 2^1.3  27.  In the final analysis, most of the compromising that went on between politicians ended up being bad for the general public. 50^32.9 Agree^ Neither^ 40^26.3 Disagree^ 59^38.8 3^2.0 Refused answer^  28.  It was not right for a politician to give up his ideals or principles to achieve some other goal. Agree^ 116^76.3 Neither^ 16^10.5 Disagree^ 17^11.2 3^2.0 Refused answer^  29.  Score yourself on your political leanings, either at the time you immigrated or one year later. You may have been more or less left or right on one or more issues, but circle the word that comes closest to how you viewed yourself in general. (Respondents used a five-  unit scale; groupings here created during tabulation.) Left^ Middle^ Right^ Refused answer^  129^84.9 19^12.5 1^0.7 3^2.0  30. Rate yourself on how strongly you generally believed in the political positions or viewpoints you held, either at the time you immigrated or one year later, regardless of what those positions were.  (Respondents used a five-unit scale; groupings here created during tabulation.) Radical^ Moderate^ Apathetic^ Refused answer^  121^79.6 23^15.1 6^3.9 2^1.3  -- 112 --  31.  Rate how politically active you were. (Respondents used a five-unit  scale; groupings here created during tabulation.) Very Active^ Moderately active^ Inactive^ Refused answer^  32.  Would you say that you made yourself aware of federal political news and events on a day-to-day basis? (Respondents used a five-unit  scale; groupings here created during tabulation.) Frequently^ Sometimes^ Never^ Refused answer^  33.  65^42.8 42^27.6 43^28.3 2^1.3  109^71.7 34^22.4 7^4.6 2^1.3  Would you say that you made yourself aware of provincial political news and events on a day-to-day basis? (Respondents used a five-  unit scale; groupings here created during tabulation.) Frequently^ Sometimes^ Never^ Refused answer^  34.  105^69.1 30^19.7 15^9.9 2^1.3  Would you say that you made yourself aware of local political news and events on a day-to-day basis? (Respondents used a five-unit  scale; groupings here created during tabulation.) Frequently^ Sometimes^ Never^ Refused answer^  91^59.9 39^25.7 20^13.2 2^1.3  VII- FEELINGS .A.E1 C) Ai 'I' IGICYV E Mg /%4 EMT . . . C . v - ,. rite -.2E-.5t,1 -- 2-1 ca. ci zky...- (Y 99i) .  -  Respondents were asked for their feelings about government in general at the time they were completing the questionnaire. (Respondents used a five-unit scale, as discussed at Section VI; groupings here created during tabulation.) 1. After a person has worked until the age of 65, it is proper for the  community to support him.  Number Agree Neither Disagree Refused answer  126 12 12 2  Xage of total 82.9 7.9 7.9 1.3  - 113 2.  The government should make sure that everyone has a decent standard of living. Agree^ 131^86.2 12^7.9 Neither^ 8^5.3 Disagree^ 1^0.7 Refused answer^  3.  Let's face it: Anyone who really wants to work can ^find a job. Agree^ 26^17.1 Neither^ 14^9.2 Disagree^ 111^73.0 Refused answer^ 1^0.7  4.  Government regulations most often end up stifling ^individual initiative. 54^35.5 Agree^ Neither^ 41^27.0 55^36.2 Disagree^ Refused answer^ 2^1.3  5.  If I do my best, it is only right that the government help me out if I get a bad break. 95^62.5 Agree^ Neither^ 27^17.8 Disagree^ 28^18.4 2^1.3 Refused answer^  6.  Each individual should accept the consequences of their own actions. Agree^ 131^86.2 Neither^ 15^9.9 Disagree^ 5^3.3 1^0.7 Refused answer^  7.  It would be nice to help out people who are less fortunate, but our taxes are so high that we can no longer afford to help everyone who needs it. Agree^ 20^13.2 Neither^ 8^5.3 123^80.9 Disagree^ Refused answer^ 1^0.7  8.  Politics and government are so big and complicated that it is hard for me to really understand what is going on. Agree^ 24^15.8 Neither^ 18^11.8 Disagree^ 108^71.1 Refused answer^ 2^1.3  9.  What is happening in government is irrelevant to me in my day-today life. Agree^ 14^9.2 Neither^ 2^1.3 Disagree^ 135^88.8 Refused answer^ 1^0.7  -- 114 -10.  People like me can^and do -- have an effect on^what the government does. Agree^ 96^63.2 Neither^ 17^11.2 Disagree^ 38^25.0 Refused answer^ 1^0.7  11.  I don't believe the government cares what I think. Agree^ 72^47.4 Neither^ 23^15.1 Disagree^ 56^36.8 Refused answer^ 1^0.7  12.  I don't pay much attention to what the government does, or doesn't do, because I have too many other priorities that take up my time and attention. 16^10.5 Agree^ Neither^ 10^6.6 125^82.2 Disagree^ 1^0.7 Refused answer^  13.  In general, people who get elected to government only care about what people like me think at election time. 91^59.9 Agree^ Neither^ 18^11.8 42^27.6 Disagree^ 1^0.7 Refused answer^  14.  Would you say you vote in federal elections: (Respondents used a five-unit scale; groupings here created during tabulation.) 122^80.3 Frequently^ 0^0.0 Sometimes^ 29^19.1 Never^ 1^0.7 Refused answer^  15.  Would you say you vote in provincial elections: (Respondents used a five-unit scale; groupings here created during tabulation.) 122^80.3 Frequently^ Sometimes^ 0^0.0 Never^ 29^19.1 1^0.7 Refused answer^  16. Would you say you vote in local elections: (Respondents used a fiveunit scale; groupings here created during tabulation.) 116^76.3 Frequently^ Sometimes^ 6^3.9 29^19.1 Never^ Refused answer^ 1^0.7  -- 115 -  17.  When a government's activities become intolerable to me, I feel it is my duty to take whatever legal action I can to make it cease those activities. Agree^ 130^85.5 Neither^ 6^3.9 Disagree^ 14^9.2 Refused answer^ 2^1.3  18.  When a government's activities become intolerable to me, I feel it is my duty to take whatever action is necessary to make it cease those activities. Agree^ 63^41.4 Neither^ 22^14.5 Disagree^ 66^43.4 Refused answer^ 1^0.7  19.  I don't mind so much what methods a politician uses, as long as he does the right thing. Agree^ 27^17.8 Neither^ 16^10.5 Disagree^ 106^69.7 Refused answer^ 3^2.0  20.  In politics, talk without action is worse than nothing at all. Agree^ 82^53.9 Neither^ 35^23.0 Disagree^ 34^22.4 Refused answer^ 1^0.7  21.  I have a lot more faith in the opinions of my friends and family than I do in those of politicians and their so-called experts. Agree^ 94^61.8 Neither^ 37^24.3 Disagree^ 21^13.8  22.  What we need is a government that can get things done without all the red tape. Agree^ 80^52.6 Neither^ 33^21.7 Disagree^ 37^24.3 Refused answer^ 2^1.3  23. We could solve most of the country's problems if government could  actually be brought back to the people at the grassroots level. Agree^ 84^55.3 Neither^ 31^20.4 Disagree^ 35^23.0 Refused answer^ 2^1.3  -- 116 24.  The private sector could accomplish most of the things the government does more cheaply and efficiently. Agree^ 22^14.5 Neither^ 25^16.4 103^67.8 Disagree^ 2^1.3 Refused answer^  25.  The give and take of political compromise is the best way we have to handle the conflicts that arise between groups in our society. 103^67.8 Agree^ 23^15.1 Neither^ 25^16.4 Disagree^ 1^0.7 Refused answer^  26.  Compromise and bargaining are essential to make Canadian democracy work. 122^80.3 Agree^ Neither^ 14^9.2 14^9.2 Disagree^ Refused answer^ 2^1.3  27.  In the final analysis, most of the compromising that goes on between politicians ends up being bad for the general public. 56^36.8 Agree^ 48^31.6 Neither^ 47^30.9 Disagree^ 1^0.7 Refused answer^  28.  It is not right for a politician to give up his ideals or principles to achieve some other goal. 115^75.7 Agree^ 16^10.5 Neither^ 17^11.2 Disagree^ 4^2.6 Refused answer^  29.  Score yourself on your political leanings. You may be more or less left or right on one or more issues, but circle the word that comes closest to how you view yourself in general. (Respondents used a five-unit scale; groupings here created during tabulation.) 122^80.3 Left^ 20^13.2 Middle^ 8^5.3 Right^ Refused answer^ 2^1.3  30.^Rate yourself on how strongly you generally believe in the political positions or viewpoints you hold, regardless of what those positions are. (Respondents used a five-unit scale; groupings here created during tabulation.) 121^79.6 Radical^ Moderate^ 23^15.1 7^4.6 Apathetic^ Refused answer^ 1^0.7  -- 117 -31.  Rate how politically active you are. (Respondents used a five-unit  scale; groupings here created during tabulation.) Very Active^ Moderately active^ Inactive^ Refused answer^  32.  Would you say that you make yourself aware of federal political news and events on a day-to-day basis? (Respondents used a five-unit  scale; groupings here created during tabulation.) Frequently^ Sometimes^ Never^  33.  76^50.0 48^31.6 25^16.4 3^2.0  144^94.7 8^5.3 0^0.0  Would you say that you make yourself aware of provincial political news and events on a day-to-day basis? (Respondents used a five-  unit scale; groupings here created during tabulation.) Frequently^ Sometimes^ Never^  34.  144^94.7 7^4.6 1^0.7  Would you say that you make yourself aware of local political news and events on a day-to-day basis? (Respondents used a five-unit  scale; groupings here created during tabulation.) Frequently^ Sometimes^ Never^  136^89.5 12^7.9 4^2.6  In the final section of the survey questionnaire, respondents were asked whether they were prepared to have their true name -- or a self-selected pseudonym -- used in this paper, and whether they were willing to be interviewed for it.  

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