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Briand and the French search for security Elliot, Ottowell Blake 1940

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Ltft> # 7 »/"7 W O fin BRIAND AND THE FRENCH SEARCH FOR SECURITY by Ottowell Blake E l l i o t A .Thesis submitted i n p a r t i a l fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS i n the Department Of HISTORY The University of B r i t i s h Columbia A p r i l , 1940 BRIAND AND THE FRENCH SEARCH FOR SECURITY TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction. Chapter I. Chapter IV. Chapter V, The Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s . Chapter I I . The French Search f o r A l l i a n c e s , 1920-1925 * Chapter I I I . France and the Making of Locarno. Briand's Work and influenoe, 1926-1932. France and the Years of C r i s i s , 1929-1932. Page page 17. page 35. Page 61, Page 98. Chapter V i i Briand and the Struggle f o r Disarmament, 1921-1932. Page 115, Chapter VII. Epilogue. Page 153, Bibliography, Pages i-LVI. INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION From the catastrophe of 1914-1918 France as one of the major A l l i e d Powers emerged v i c t o r i o u s . Her statesmen were determined that one of the basic f r u i t s of v i c t o r y must be the permanent guarantee of n a t i o n a l seourity. The nonrrealization of the Anglo-American Guarantee was a serious blow to the French security structure and was fraught with i l l i m i t a b l e consequences. This f i r s t breach i n the system of c o l l e c t i v e seourity which the French people were so anxious to see established on a f i r m basis, resulted temporarily i n the French reversion to a p o l i c y of force un- der Poincare'* The f a i l u r e of t h i s method to promote security led to the emergence of A r i s t i d e Briand to a p o s i t i o n of prominence on the French p o l i t i c a l stage. The polioy of rapprochement which he advocated l a r g e l y dominated the French security picture from 1925 u n t i l his death i n 1932. Because of t h i s f a c t the name of Briand i s in e v i t a b l y linked with t h i s problem whioh i s so important i n the national l i f e of Franoe. An introduction to t h i s study would not be complete with- out a word of thanks to Professor Frederic H. Spward f o r his invaluable assistance c h e e r f u l l y extended at a l l times. Ap- p r e c i a t i o n must be also be given to Miss Anne M. Smith and Miss M. L. Lanning of the University of B r i t i s h Columbia Lib- rary S t a f f f o r t h e i r guidance i n the se l e c t i o n of materials. CHAPTER I. THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES BRIAND AND THE FRENCH SEARCH FOR SECURITY CHAPTER I. THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES Tlie treaty which marked the end of the Great War of 1914-1918 was r a t i f i e d i n the b e a u t i f u l H a l l of Mirrors at V e r s a i l l e s . I t was i n t h i s same place that the a r t i c l e s of peace were signed by the French and German ple n i p o t e n t i a r i e s a f t e r the War of 1870. " I t i s a moot question i f i n human history there ever has been a swifter and more tremendous 1 r e v e r s a l . " Everything i n the peace and i n the circumstanoes surrounding i t emphasize t h i s rapid ohange and for France t h i s was one of the most s i g n i f i c a n t f a c t o r s . Each of the A l l i e d nations represented at the Conference had c e r t a i n national aspirations which desired s a t i s f a c t i o n . The French f e l t that however important these needs might be the question which required p r i o r consideration was t h e i r national security. There were two approaches to t h i s problem advocated by groups of comparative importance* M. Henri de Jouvenel, a strong figure i n one group, urged that both the government and people of France give t h e i r support to the League and work through i t for enduring peace and also f o r the s a t i s - f a c t i o n of t h e i r needs. There were others i n France who c a l l e d M. de tiouvenel and his friends i d e a l i s t s and t h e o r i s t s :1. Anon., The Signing of the Peace, Manchester Guardian Weekly, y o l . 1, July 4, 1919, p. 2. 1 2 and maintained that security for France lay i n the complete disarmament of Germany coupled with a heavy indemnity. Both of these solutions to the problem of security were probably put forward by t h e i r advocates i n a l l honesty of purpose and both, i n greater or less degree, influenced the making of the treaty. The Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s contains several a r t i c l e s d i r - 1 ec t l y concerned with the problem of security. President Wilson's i d e a l was to e s t a b l i s h a League of nations which would introduce a s p i r i t of trust and mutual understanding between nations, i t was natural that i n the months immed- i a t e l y a f t e r the war when peoples throughout the world were receptive to such ideas that the League of Nations idea should take hold. Wilson's power which was on the ascen- dant at t h i s period enabled him to have the League of iMations Covenant placed at the beginning of the Treaty text. Although the A r t i c l e s of the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s mentioned above have an important bearing on the problem of security the main a r t i o l e around which the problem resolves i s A r t i c l e 10 of the League Covenant. It reads: The members of the League undertake to respect and preserve against external aggression the t e r - r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y and e x i s t i n g p o l i t i c a l indepen- dence of a l l members of the League. In case of any such aggression or i n case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council s h a l l advise upon the means by which t h i s obligation s h a l l be f u l f i l l e d . 1. Text of the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s , A r t i c l e s 42 , 45 , 44 , 428, 429, 431 , 432. 2 i i b i d . , A r t i c l e 10. 3 President Yvilson maintained that t h i s A r t i c l e was the Monroe 1 Doctrine of the world yet his insistence upon the in s e r t i o n of t h i s A r t i c l e i n the League of Nations section alienated the support of many of his friends who, although opposing the Peace Treaty, were i n favor.of the idea of a League. Robert Lansing says of t h i s s i t u a t i o n , "The President's un- alterable determination to have his form of guarantee i n the Covenants . .and his firm r e f u s a l to modify it, i n any sub- s t a n t i a l way, resulted i n the strengthening of the opponents of the League to such an extent that they were able to pre- vent the Treaty from obtaining the necessary consent of two- 2 thirds of the Senators." This r e f u s a l of the Senate to con- sider A r t i c l e 10 was a very serious blow to the plan of se- cu r i t y which the French leaders were tr y i n g to b u i l d up and would mean that France would probably be less receptive to overtures of friendship which the German statesmen might make to her. Europe had been assured by President Wilson with a s i n c e r i t y which i t never occurred to the common man to doubt, that he was morally and c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y the p l e n i - potentiary of his country, and that i n future the French might count without reserve upon the United States. Failu r e to win support from the United States was a very serious blow to proponents of the League of Nations who, not r e a l i z i n g 1. Stannard- Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement, Double day-irage and Company, 1923, v o l . 1, p* 326. 2. Lansing, Robert, The Peace Negotiations, London, Constable and Company, 1921, p. 112. 4 the power of the Senate to n u l l i f y the work of a ^resident at w i l l , took i t for granted that the United states would endorse the completed treaty. The Reparations problem loomed very large i n the French security p i c t u r e . When the Conference at Paris began i t s study of the problem of Reparations, there were several attitudes at once apparent. In the case of the A l l i e d (count- r i e s i t was the general f e e l i n g that Germany must be made to pay for a l l the damage done to the destroyed portions of Prance and Belgium as well as any additional payments which the A l l i e s through the Peace Conference should see f i t to impose. This additional clause was contained i n A r t i c l e 19 which went much farther i n scope than did A r t i c l e 8 of the Fourteen j o i n t s which merely provided that a l l French t e r - r i t o r y should be freed and the invaded portions restored. That t h i s would be the extent of the f i n a n c i a l demands on Germany was the b e l i e f before the end of the War but at the .feace Conference t h i s view underwent a decided change. The word "Reparations" was given the broadest interpretation; English and French a l i k e put forward, what from the German 1 standpoint were considered impossible demands. The Germans urged that a fixed sum be set, otherwise they declared that i t would be impossible for them to organize t h e i r i n t e r n a l f i n a n c i a l a f f a i r s i n order to prevent f i n a n c i a l chaos. The 1* Bergmantjf C a r l , History of Reparation^ London, E. Benn Limited, 1927, p. 3. 5 1 Americans supported the Germans in. t h i s stand. However, as Congress refused r a t i f i c a t i o n of the Treaty, t h e i r objection did not carry as much weight as i t might have under other circumstances * The French stand on t h i s issue was the r e a l stumbling-block. They f e l t that f i x i n g a t o t a l sum might have a serious effect on t h e i r f i n a n c i a l security i n the future, i f a fixed sum was agreed upon at t h i s juncture, improvement i n the German f i n a n c i a l s i t u a t i o n would mean a decided loss i n indemnity payments to France. The French preferred to leave the matter i n d e f i n i t e and were successful i n having i t placed i n the hands of a Reparations Commission. "The future/" said Foch, "can only be assured i n any l a s t i n g manner, by making the Rhine our m i l i t a r y f r o n t i e r 2 and holding i t with A l l i e d forces." Marshal Foch was very i n s i s t e n t that i n order to guarantee the security of France i n the future the Rhine must be considered as the boundary between France and Germany. There were many people i n France who were of a l i k e opinion. Some of the arguments used by the French i n support of t h i s thesis were the fact that France had a population of approximately one-half that of Germany, and her b i r t h - r a t e was not increasing at anything near the rate of her neighbor across the Rhine. She was also bereft i . 1. Tardieu, Andre7, The Truth about the Treaty, Indianapolis, BobbSfMieErill, 1921. 2. Great B r i t a i n , nis Majesty's Stationery.uffice, Memorandum Communicated.by Marshal Foch to president ?7ilson, Mr. Lloyd Geropge, signor L*Orlando, at a meeting on March 31, 1919, Gmd. 2169, p. 85. 6 of the Russian A l l i a n c e due to the revolution i n that country, which deprived her of an a l l y on the extreme f r o n t i e r of Ger- many. Thi r d l y , France did not have a natural f r o n t i e r on the East facing Germany. The Rhine would provide t h i s . This p o l i c y was not new with Foch, i t had been developed and ad- vanced i n 1916 aft e r S i r Edward Gray had suggested that the A l l i e s should make known t h e i r war aims. In addition, M. Doumergue submitted to the Russian Emperor a telegram on February 12, 1917i i n which he stated e x p l i c i t y the desire of France that " i n the future the River Rhine might form a 1 permanent strategic f r o n t i e r against a German invasion." Louis Madelin, a French j o u r n a l i s t and author writing in' "La Revue des Deux Mondes", compares the French p o s i t i o n to that of an owner of a garden whioh had been p i l l a g e d f o r many times over. Should he be s a t i s f i e d merely to place at his gate, as Madelin says "un c r i t e a u sur lequel serait 2 e'crit: Defenser d'entrer?" Foch did not think so and made very determined e f f o r t s to ensure that the statesmen at the Conference were conversant with his views. He was so deter- mined on one occasion that Clemenceau had to remind him that he was not d i c t a t i n g the peace but was merely acting as a 3 consultant. The great Commander-in-Chief regarded Clemenceau 1. Temperley, H. W. V., ed., A History of the Peace Confer- ence of Paris, London, Oxford University Press and Hodder & Stoughton, 1920, v o l . 1, appendix I I . 2. Madelin, Louis, Le Marechal Foch, Part . i l l . , Revue des Deux Mondes, Tome 22, 1 Aout, 1924, p. 795* 3* Tabouis, Genevieve, The L i f e of Jules Cambon, London, Jonathan Cape, 1938, p. 352. 7 as the betrayer of his country. He himself outside and Louis Barthou inside the Chamber of Deputies kept up an i n - cessant c r i t i c i s m of the "Tiger's" e f f o r t s towards a s e t t l e - 1 ment on the eastern f r o n t i e r . Foch, at t h i s time was merely endorsing the work of the Comite/ d TEtudes, headed by the h i s t o r i a n , Ernest Lavisse, which had met i n 1917 to study the Rhine f r o n t i e r question and had conoluded that the new f r o n t i e r should be that of 1814 with cer t a i n extensions i n the Saar area to include the coal basin. The m i l i t a r y bound- ary was by t h i s solution to be separated from the p o l i t i c a l boundary and the t e r r i t o r y i n between was to be organized into a separate region from which German forces were to be 2 e n t i r e l y excluded* Tardieu vehemently denies that his gov- ernment at any time ever contemplated the dismemberment of German unity when he says that "..*at no time did the Gov- ernment, the Parliament or even the Press demand the des- 3 t r u c t i o n of German unity." Yet i f these three elements did not favor the establishment of a separate Rhineland, the 4 m i l i t a r y c e r t a i n l y did. General Mangin, i n control of the French zone was not antagonistic to the movement of Dr. 1. Lloyd George, David, The Truth about the Peace Treaties, London, V i c t o r Gollancz, 1938, vol.-'l, p. 580. 2. Tabouis, op. c i t * , p. 352. 3. Tardieu, Andre', op. c i t . , p* 364* 4. Ellington-Wright, C. E., The Rhineland, Past and Future, London, Ration and Athenaeum, v o l . 35, August 23, 1924, p* 635* 8 Dorten, but England and the United States were greatly op- posed* Dr. Dorten complained that England secretly supported the central government at B e r l i n i n i t s e f f o r t s to stamp out the secession movement. A l l i e d s o l i d a r i t y behind the Separ^ a t i s t s would have meant the building of a r e a l b a r r i e r against 2 the influence of Prussianism, Dr. Dorten maintained. How- ever, Lloyd George i s credited with forcing the r e c a l l of General Mangin and with his departure the secession movement l o s t force very r a p i d l y , i t i s very probable that the Rhine- land elements f e l t that the forming of a separate peace would mean that they would weather the storm with easier terms, but i t was the decentralization of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y which B r i t a i n feared. Her object was to restore trade re l a t i o n s with Germany i n the quickest possible time. She was not so v i t a l l y interested i n France's problem of secur- i t y ; President Wilson and Lloyd George w.ere agreed as to the requirements of French security.; They f e l t that de- m i l i t a r i z a t i o n of the Rhineland Zone i n addition to an Anglo-American promise to come to France's aid i n case of 3 aggression against her were s u f f i c i e n t guarantees. Colonel House appears to have been favorable at f i r s t but Lansing, 1. ' Stannard-Baker-, op. c i t . , v o l . .2, p. 86 f f . 2. Dorten,.Hans, The Rhineland Movement, Foreign A f f a i r s , v o l . 3 "flQ. 3, A p r i l , 1925, p* 399* , 3. Tardieu, Andre7, op. c i t * , p. 175 f f . 9 1 White and B l i s s decidedly were not. However, President Wilson disregarded t h e i r opinion i n order to reach a d e f i n i t e decis- 2 ion. Clemenceau f i n a l l y gave i n i n his urging for an inde- pendent state on the l e f t bank, i n t h i s way a compromise was reached to guarantee Frenoh security* Provisions made i n the Treaty covering t h i s problem are: 1. Germany i s forbidden to maintain or construct any f o r t i f i c a t i o n whether on the l e f t bank of the Rhine or on the right bank to the west of a l i n e drawn 50 kilometres to the East of the Rhine. 2. i n the area defined above the maintenance and the assembly of the armed forces, either per- manent or temporarily, and m i l i t a r y manoeuvers of any kind, as well as the upkeep of a l l per- manent units for mobilization, are In the same way forbidden. 3. i n ease Germany vi o l a t e s i n any manner what- ever the provisions of A r t i c l e s 42 and 43 she s h a l l be regarded as committing a h o s t i l e act against the Powers signatory of the present Treaty and i s calculated to disturb the peace of the world* 3 4 F i f t e e n years was s p e c i f i e d as the period of occupation but i n case at any time the guarantees against unprovoked aggression were thought to be i n s u f f i c i e n t , the evacuation of the occupying troops could be delayed for the period 5 f e l t to be necessary. By these measures it.was hoped that 1. The Intimate i-apers of Colonel House, Arranged as a narrative by Charles Seymour, London, Ernest Benn, Limited, 1926-28, p. 394. 2* Lansing, Robert, The Peace Negotiations, A Personal Narrative, New York, Houghlon, M i f f l i n , 1921, p. 124 3. Treaty Text, op. c i t . , A r t i c l e s 42, 43, 44. 4. Ibid., A r t i c l e 49. 5. i b i d . , A r t i c l e 429. 10 the French had been provided with ample security. Various misgivings ..were f e l t i n some French quarters as to the degree of reliance to be placed i n a T r i p a r t i t e Guarantee. There were two factors which seriously bothered French statesmen, i n the f i r s t instance i t was f e l t that too great a time would elapse before s u f f i c i e n t American troops could arrive i n France to be an e f f e c t i v e f i g h t i n g force and i n the second, doubts were raised as to whether the United States Senate would support the guarantee i F a i l - ure to r a t i f y the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s on the part of the Senate brought the fears of the French to f u l l r e a l i z a t i o n and i n addition the Amerioan government refused to endorse the T r i p a r t i t e Guarantee claiming that i t wanted no com- 1 mitments i n Europe. The basic thesis of the French, "the more powerful the guarantees of peace, the smaller w i l l be 2 the p r o b a b i l i t y you w i l l have to c a l l upon, them" had suf- fered a severe blow and they were greatly disheartened by t h i s set-back. From observation of French p o l i c y i n respect to the Rhineland i t i s evident that a powerful section of Frenoh opinion was not averse to seeing the disruption of German unity, i t i s quite understandable then that the French would be greatly averse to any thought of permitting 1. Lord Ridded, intimate Diary of the .Peace Conference and A f t e r , 1918-1923, London, Victor Gollanez Ltd., 1933, p. 55. 2. haskins, C. H., Franco-German Frontier, Foreign A f f a i r s , v o l . 3, Wo.'2, December 15, 1924, p. 199. 11 Austro-German union. One of the most famous doctrines advan- ced by Wilson at the Conference was that of the "self-deter-, mination of peoples." This was used at f i r s t i n reference to the Balkan peoples, but i t had an unexpected reaction when i t was observed that the Germanic peoples were applying i t to. the s i t u a t i o n of A u s t r i a . There were three suggestions put forward as to the fate of that country. , 1* Become part of a Danubian confederation with Czecho- slovakia, Yugo-Slavia and the Balkan nations* 2. doin with the German Republic* 3. Remain an independent Republic. m the f i r s t instance France was not against Austrian union with other Danubian countries from the standpoint of her security* She f e l t that i t would s h i f t some of the German influence from Central Europe to the eastward. Yet the I t a l - ians feared that i t might lead to a r e v i v a l of the old Austro- hungarian Empire and the small ambitious Balkan nations were averse to becoming linked up with a decadent people so that 1 e f f o r t s towards that sol u t i o n were dropped, uf the two r e - maining solutions, the French favored an independent Austrian Republic and when on March 4, 1919, the Austrian Assembly made known i t s desire for union with Germany there almost seemed to be a s p i r i t of r e c o n c i l i a t i o n to the in e v i t a b l e , but as time went on the f e e l i n g that i t was the prerogative of the vi c t o r s to disregard the "self-determination of peoples" i f 1* Temperley, op. c i t . , v o l . 4, p. 470 f f . 12 1 they so wished for t h e i r own security asserted i t s e l f . France made a very serious blunder over t h i s question of Austro- 2 German union. Her fear of 60,000,000 Germans on her f r o n t i e r was r e a l enough and she f e l t that the addition of several m i l l i o n s more Austrians would make the German influenoe too strong. Yet, openly f l o u t i n g the p r i n o i p a l of se l f - d e t e r ^ mination i n t h i s manner aroused i n these peoples a s p i r i t of resentment which Lloyd George i n a l e t t e r to Clemenceau said 3 would f i n d some means of exacting r e t r i b u t i o n . The trend of French r e l a t i o n s with the Germany of H i t l e r seems to bear out this conclusion. I t was f e l t i n some quarters that A u s t r i a might have successfully used t h i s indecision over her future to press for more favorable conditions of peace. Yet her government f a i l e d to do so and l e t matters take t h e i r course. Colonel House comments that Austrians would not j o i n the 4 Germans i f the Conference intimated otherwise. The French f i n a l l y won i n t h e i r desire to prevent t h i s union and gained one of t h e i r e s s e n t i a l points for security. In the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s Germany promises to "respect s t r i c t l y the 1. Noble, G. B., Problems and Opinions at j^aris, New York, Macmillan and Uompany, 1935, p. 222. 2. Aubert, Louis F., France and the League, Foreign A f f a i r s , v o l * 3, No. 4, July, 1925, p. 637. 3. Great B r i t a i n , His Majesty's Stationery Offic e , Letter from Lloyd George to Glemenceau: Some Considerations for the .teace Conference before they f i n a l l y draft t h e i r terms, Cmd* 2169, p. 76* . 4. Papers of Colonel House, v o l . 4, p* 335. 13 1 independence of A u s t r i a . " With the loss of her hoped-for f r o n t i e r on the Rhine, France turned her attention to the negotiations i n progress towards the establishing of the new. European states. Poland was one of her chief objects of in t e r e s t . French leaders f e l t that only the counter-balance of a strong Poland would i n some degree compensate her for the loss of the Rhine fron- t i e r . Conversely, Germany believed that a strong Poland would be a serious obstacle to her recovery* For t h i s reason she raised vigorous objections to the p a r t i t i o n of upper S i l e s i a as w e l l as for the loss of the natural resources i n that 2 area. Poland was responsible f o r some f r i c t i o n on the Ger- 3 man f r o n t i e r and i n t h i s she was encouraged by France. It i s very possible that her bitterness towards Germany i n some 4 measure poisoned her sense of j u s t i c e * however, France was taking a l l possible steps within her power to assure security for h e r s e l f . Doubts began to "enter the French national mind as to the continued whole-hearted support of her a l l i e s so besides t r u s t i n g to the regular machinery set up by the Con- ference France was working i n other directions to a large degree independently. One of the mainstays of the security of France i n pre-war 1. Treaty Text, A r t i c l e 80. 2. Ibid., A r t i c l e 88. 3. Lord R i d d e l l ' s Diary, p. 191. 4. Lloyd George, op. c i t . , v o l . 2, p. 990. 14 years was her friendship with Russia. In 1917 with the out- break of revolution i n that land the old Regime was overthrown and with i t went, i n French eyes, an i n t e g r a l part of t h e i r system of a l l i a n c e s * Also, from the Soviet point of view went the o b l i g a t i o n to pay debts incurred by the Czarist gov- ernment to France i n pre-war and war years. French opinion f e l t that the Leninist organization set up i n Russia aft e r the Revolution did not represent the r e a l Russian people and the French were n o t ; l i k e Wilson^troubled with i d e a l o g i o a l qualms about "self-determination" and the "right of peoples". There were two courses open.-to France. One was to adopt a "stand-off p o l i c y and allow the Russians to develop t h e i r own plans for salvation* This was c a l l e d the "cordon s a n i t a i r e " . I t s aim was to block o f f a l l Russian contacts with the western countries so as to starve the country into abandoning Bolshe- vism* In the second case the French government favored a p o l - i c y of intervention, even although t h i s did not f i n d favor with the S o c i a l i s t and Labor press. Intervention was not to be f o r conquest but rather i t was to take on the appearance of a crusade—to save the Russian people. Which of these two p o l i c i e s would best aid French security? In the case of the "cordon s a n i t a i r e " i t was f e l t that i t would starve the wrong people and abandoning Russia i n that way would be tantamount to a complete loss as f a r as the vast Russian debts to France were concerned. To openly attack Russia would offend some of the basic p r i n c i p l e s of the Conference so eventually the Supreme Council decided to throw i t s weight behind Admiral 15 Kolchak. However, t h i s White Russian leader l o s t out and as a r e s u l t each nation was l e f t to i t s own designs as far as Russia was concerned. Once an a l l y , Russia was now feared by France. However, her Russian p o l i c y was f a i r l y dormant u n t i l she sent General Weygand to reorganize the F o l i s h forces which 1 were being seriously beaten by the rejuvenated Soviet armies. The French feared the idealogy of the Russian Soviets, and Its possible influence on French nation a l unity more than attack on t h e i r national f r o n t i e r s by Russian forces. Also they were alarmed l e s t Russia should j o i n forces with Germany i n a common front; Then her s e c u r i t y would indeed be ser- iously menaced. In t h i s introductory chapter an e f f o r t has been made to analyze some of the factors involved i n France's search f o r security through the Peace of V e r s a i l l e s . Twenty years a f t e r the Treaty the world can s i t i n sober judgment and f i n d fault with many of i t s provisions, i t did commit i n j u s t i c e s without doubt, yet i f i t had obtained the support from the nations which formulated i t , as f a r as France i s concerned i t would have guaranteed her security s a t i s f a c t o r i l y . The f a i l u r e of the United States to r a t i f y the Treaty and the T r i p a r t i t e Guarantee r e s u l t i n g i n England's r e f u s a l to stand by her pro- mise, caused the French to f e e l that they were being deserted* Speaking of his country one French writer said, "Son a c t i v i t e ' s r o r i e n t vers l ' a r t s de l a paix, son e&prit ne nourit aucune 1. Lord Riddell's Diary, p. 227. 16 1 idee de conquetei" Yet France f e l t that she was going to have to preserve that peace alone. As her confidence i n her former a l l i e s lessened France turned to a new system of a l l i a n c e s to supplement the guarantees of the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s . This search for a l l i e s i s the second phase of the French search for s e c u r i t y . 1* Dumont-Wilden, L., La France et Les A l l i a n c e s , Revue des Deux Mondes, Tome 21, 15 Mai, 1924, p. 272. CHAPTER I I . THE FRENCH SEARCH FOR ALLIANCES 19£0-1925 CHAPTER I I . THE FRENCH SEARCH FOR ALLIANCES 1920-1925 "FourteBn Points," said Clemenoeau of Wilson's plan f o r 1 peaoe, "God Almighty only had ten*" Suoh was the s p i r i t with which some Frenoh p o l i t i c a l leaders set about reorganizing the national l i f e of France for peace. Victory had been achieved at great cost i n l i v e s and property, not only for France but for others as well* Herein lay the cause f o r the note of im- patience i n Clemenceau's remark. For i n a l l post-war arrange- ments France's w i l l was not only to be considered. Woodrow Wilson's leadership f o r peace through the League of Nations found such active support i n so many countries that the French authorities could not overlook i t i n t h e i r c a l c u l a t i o n s . Yet they would not put t h e i r whole f a i t h i n i t . Rather must they t r y to f i n d other safeguards should the League f a i l to provide France with the security she must have. What were these other safeguards? In the f i r s t case Franoe could r e a l l y disarm. This might be a safeguard against a future war* Yet the Frenchman i s a m i l i t a r i s t i c p a c i f i s t . He does not f e e l safe unless he has an army of s u f f i c i e n t size always on c a l l . However, t h i s point, as an argument against disarming, i s very weak i n comparison to that of pop- u l a t i o n . Franoe, whose population was at one time larger than 1. Anon., France and Germany, Round Table, v o l . 21, tiune, 1931, p. 506. 17 18 1 Germany's, had much less i n 1921. In addition, the b i r t h - r a t e i n Germany was much greater than that i n trance, i n the f i r s t s i x months of 1921 i n France there were 72,000 bi r t h s whereas 2 for the same period i n Germany there were 180,000. This, coupled with the fact that during the Great War France l o s t 3 2,000,000 men made French leaders very sensitive about the problem of security and precluded any p o s s i b i l i t y of France accepting the dictum that by disarming herself she could best a t t a i n her o b j e c t — s e c u r i t y . The second alternative, natur- a l l y follows therefore, that France must maintain a large army and r e l y upon herself f o r protection. As she had the largest army i n Europe under arms two years af t e r the war ended one might ask why she did not f e e l secure? Her leaders knew that she could no longer consider herself as the sole a r b i t e r i n European matters, because just as she waged long and b i t t e r wars under the banner of Louis XIV* to maintain the balance of power i n that period of her history, she knew, others would be just as i n s i s t e n t that i t be maintained a f t e r 1. Toynbee, A. J . , Survey of International A f f a i r s , London, The Royal Ins t i t u t e of i n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , 1927, p.131. Professor Toynbee states that at t h i s time France had a population of 39,604,992. Anon., French Preparations f o r Genoa, Current History, v o l . 16, No. 1, A p r i l , 19.22, p. 171. The writer of t h i s a r t i c l e sets the population of Ger- many at 64,000,000. He says Franoe has 37,000,000 which i s at variance with the figure of Professor Toynbee. 2. Anon., The Malady of Europe, Round T a l l e , v o l . 12, September, 1922, p; 751. 3. Toynbee, A. J . , op. c i t . , 1927, p. 131* 19 the Great War. i n addition French statesmen knew that i f France i n s i s t e d upon maintaining a large army, competitive b u i l d i n g might ensue which would make her task that much cost- l i e r i n order to maintain a correspondingly larger foroe. The t h i r d a lternative would be for France to r e l y upon the League of Nations to provide her with adequate protection. In the f i r s t enthusiasm of success the great mass of French people were whole-heartedly behind t h i s altogether novel and thoroughly promising organization. The Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s marked the end of the Great War and the Covenant of the League of Nations was part of the Treaty, therefore the Frenoh people expected that the signatures of the former Central Powers to the V e r s a i l l e s Pact would mark t h e i r acceptance of the "status quo" as established by the Treaty. This was very necessary, the French considered, before they could f e e l that security Was assured. Yet i n German eyes t h i s attitude of the French could only mean that the Germans were to be placed i n a po s i - t i o n of permanent i n f e r i o r i t y i n Europe. In addition to German opposition to the idea of the per- manence of the V e r s a i l l e s Pact,other factors soon became apparent which caused the French to decide that they could not place a l l t h e i r hope of security i n the League of Nations organization* They deoided to r e v i s e the pre-war system of •developing a l l i a n c e s . The f i r s t of these factors was the f a i l - ure of the united States to r a t i f y the T r i p a r t i t e Treaty of Guarantee. As Robert de Jouvenel, a Radical j o u r n a l i s t wrote, "President Wilson came to Europe to represent a p r i n c i p l e which 20 lie brought i n the name of a superior morality. The Frenoh soon learned i t was only i n the name of his country that he 1 came*" French enthusiasm for the future received a severe shock; The second factor which caused the French to stop and consider was the rapidly changing B r i t i s h a t t i t u d e . B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t on the continent was not concerned with French sec- u r i t y , rather was i t i n the resumption of normal economic re- 2 l a t i o n s , p r i n c i p a l l y with Germany; The German market was thought to be e s s e n t i a l to B r i t i s h commerce and i f Germany was to be held i n economic subjection through Reparations i t would mean that the buying power of the Germans would be seriously affected, hence the B r i t i s h and French attitudes were at complete variance. B r i t a i n f e l t the best method to gain Rep- arations was the re s t o r a t i o n of trade wlith Germany. The French thought that payments should come from Germany without a s s i s t - ance from the outside. The attitude of the B r i t i s h on world problems was becoming increasingly wider i n scope, that of the French remained fundamentally narrow and continental; As the French leaders perceived that t h e i r former a l l i e s were not going to f u l f i l l t h e i r promises i n respect to guaran- tees and also that the gap between the French and B r i t i s h view on continental problems was growing wider without any apparent 1. Jouvenel, Robert de, A French Debate on the League of Nations, L i v i n g Age, v o l . 321, May 1924, p. 931. Translated from La Grande Revue, Paris monthly. 2. Toynbee, Arnold, The World .after the Peace Conference, Oxford University Press,. 1925, p. 49-ff* 31 hope of r e c o n c i l i a t i o n they turned t h e i r attention towards the formation of A l l i a n c e s . i n the early summer of 1920 m i l i t a r y conversations were begun between Belgium and France. These conversations r e- sulted i n the signature of an agreement on the seventh of Sep- tember of the same year. This m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e was l e g a l i n 1 view of the v i o l a t i o n of the n e u t r a l i t y treaty of 1839. It was f i r s t thought that A r t i c l e 8 of the Covenant of the League which says that "Every treaty or i n t e r n a t i o n a l engagement entered into hereafter by any member of the League s h a l l be 2 forthwith registered with the S e c r e t a r i a t " would destroy the effectiveness of t h i s m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e , however n o t i f i c a t i o n that i t was purely a defensive agreement was sent to the Sec- retary-General but i t s clauses were not disclosed. This de- parture from her h i s t o r i c p o l i c y was a very r a d i c a l step for the Belgian government to take and i s testimony to the power and prestige of post-war France. The Belgian government re- garded the widening breach between Great B r i t a i n and France with concern for the cooperation and friendship of these two Powers was e s s e n t i a l to her se c u r i t y . Yet, on the other hand, the commercial int e r e s t s of the Belgians were la r g e l y bound up with Germany and i n d u s t r i a l i s t s feared that i f a serious breach did take place between France and Great B r i t a i n t h i s m i l i t a r y 1, B r i t i s h Foreign Office H i s t o r i c a l Section Handbook, Bel- gium, Appendix,, by Hymans, E-, La Belgique et L f Oeuvre de*M. Leon DeLacroix, P a r i s , Le Correspondant/ Tome1 281, 10 Decembre, 1920, p. 769. 1 2. Covenant of the League of Nations, A r t i c l e 8. 22 a l l i a n c e with France, i n addition to her geographical p o s i t i o n 1 would drive her too much into dependence upon that country. However, the a l l i a n c e held and the f i r s t l i n k i n the French security chain had been forged. The fundamental factor i n the French plan of security was, the more powerful the guarantees of peace, the smaller w i l l be the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of war. Although many French p o l i t i c a l leaders and writers f e l t that France should have had complete 2 control over the Rhineland and the Saar she was forced to accept the conditions of the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s and share control of the Rhineland with Great B r i t a i n and Belgium and to use the mines of the Saar only f o r a stipulated period to take the place of those destroyed i n the Great War within her own national f r o n t i e r s . The French hoped that A l l i e d oecUpa- tionatogether with the support of the League of Nations would give her her wonted security i n the west. By the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s , the foundations of the old p o l i t i c a l and economic order i n Eastern Europe had been burst asunder. Whereas the three great empires, the German, the Russian and the Austrian formerly dominated the p o l i t i c a l scene, now smaller, more r a c i a l l y i n t a c t groups which had 1. The Belgian Cabinet which signed the A l l i a n c e was voted out shortly a f t e r t h i s but the A l l i a n c e was not seriously menaced u n t i l l$/£ir. 2. Degouy, l e contre-amiral, Dans La Sarre, Revue des Deux Mondes, Tome 18, 15 Novembre, 1923, p. 430* This naval man says complete control of the Saar i s absolutely e s s e n t i a l to the security of France. 23 broken away from the larger organizations were carrying on independently. France, keenly conscious of the f a i l u r e of the United States and ureat B r i t a i n to guarantee her security i n the west as President Wilson and Lloyd George had promised, saw i n these smaller groups, an opportunity, p a r t i a l l y at least, to make up for t h i s f a i l u r e ; The help given to the Poles i n the war with Russia, given independently by Prance a f t e r Lloyd 1 George had refused to cooperate, led i n February, 1921, to the signing of the Franco-Polish A l l i a n c e ; M. Dmowski, one of Poland's greatest statesmen, considered t h i s pact to be an i n t e g r a l part "d'un nouveau systeme d'equilibre p o l i t i q u e en 2 . - Europe." This i s not exactly what France was t r y i n g to est- a b l i s h . She was t r y i n g to guarantee herself security through an a l l i a n c e with Poland against a very r e a l fear of aggression by Germany i n the ."east and against Russia i n the north; This Franco-Polish A l l i a n c e might have dominated the p o l i t i c a l s i t - uations i n Europe for the following years exoept for the fact that the P o l i s h leaders r e a l i z e d that t h e i r own security might be further enhanced by a peaceful solution of t h e i r differences 3 with Germany over the Upper S i l e s i a n question. This was done and thus Poland was not forced to come e n t i r e l y into the French o r b i t , however a commercial agreement was undertaken between 1. Patterson, E r i c J . , Poland, London, Arrowsmith, 1934, p. 72. 2. Gaston, V i c t o r , La P o l i t i g u e exterieure de l a Pologne, Pa r i s , Revue Bleue.( P o l i t i q u e et L i t t e r a i r e j , No. 23, 1 Decembrej 1923, p. 825. 3. Toynbee, A. J . , op. c i t . , 1920-1923, p; 269. 24 Franoe and Poland by which they agreed to open up the markets of the two countries at a lower t a r i f f and by a French loan 1 to Poland of 400,000,000 francs. i n discussing France's search f o r a l l i a n c e s i t i s now necessary to turn back again to the "west and to trace the developments i n Anglo-French r e l a t i o n s . At the close of hos- t i l i t i e s , England and the United States took immediate steps to disband t h e i r armies. France did not. Thus i n the new European system of A l l i a n c e s which France was working out so assiduously B r i t i s h m i l i t a r y power had become only a secondary factor u n t i l such a time as i t could be brought into l i n e with the p o l i c y of Franoe and her two a l l i e s , Belgium and Poland. Writing to Clemenceau at the time of the Peace Conference of 1919, Poincare''states, "the precious assistance which our friends w i l l give us i n the event of a German aggression, can unfortunately, never be instantaneous, l t cannot be a 2 substitute for occupation." In spite of the French determin- ation to occupy the Ruhr and even although the united States refused to r a t i f y the T r i p a r t i t e Treaty of Guarantee, i t was hoped that some way would be found to prevent the breakdown of the Anglo-French r e l a t i o n s h i p which had been such a potent factor i n European a f f a i r s . With t h i s object i n view the French ambassador to Great B r i t a i n , the Count de Saint-Aulaire plaoed before the Marquis of Curzon tentative proposals that 1. i b i d . , 1924, p. 441, foot-note 1. 2. Cmd. 2169, p. 100. 85 1 conversations should be begun towards that end. He f e l t that advantage to Europe generally and England s p e c i f i c a l l y would be f o u r - f o l d : l i France would be able to reduce her land armaments, thus enabling Great B r i t a i n to do likewise. 2. France would consent to immediate entry of Germany into the League of Nationsi 3. An Anglo-French A l l i a n c e would have a steadying effect on the continent,, and more s p e c i f i c a l l y on Germany h e r s e l f . 4* i t would enable France to work with Great B r i t a i n and Germany to help Kussia r e b u i l d the shattered fab r i c of 2 her state. Somewhat the same thoughts were stated by Briand l a t e r i n the same month of December during a v i s i t to Mr. Lloyd George but no o f f i c i a l B r i t i s h stand was taken u n t i l the l a t - t e r statesman placed some concrete proposals before Briand during the economic conference of some of the western nations 3 held at Cannes. He recognized the French need f o r security but stressed the B r i t i s h d i s l i k e of any continental commit- ments. Briand i n his reply stated that i n the opinion of the French government "some mutual guarantee of m i l i t a r y security and demonstration of the close p o l i t i c a l understanding e x i s t i n g 1. Ibid., No. 32, The Marquis of Curzon to Lord Harding, December 5, 1921, p. 108. 2. Cmd. 2169, p. 110. 3. i b i d . , No. 33, Notes of a conversation between Mr. Lloyd George and M. Briand at 10 Downing Street, December 21, 1921, p. 112. ' 26 between them would be of c a p i t a l importance for the p a c i f i c 1 settlement of European,,questions. Here we see the divergent B r i t i s h and French views on the problem of security. I t was i n an e f f o r t to overcome t h i s c o n f l i c t of aims that these two statesmen were carrying on t h e i r conversations; This d i f f e r - ence can best be understood by examining A r t i c l e 1 of the B r i - t i s h and French drafts of a proposed Anglo-French treaty. 8 B r i t i s h i n the event of a direct and unprovoked aggression against the s o i l of France by Germany, Great B r i t a i n w i l l immediately place herself at the side of France with her naval, m i l i t a r y and a i r forces. 3 French In the event of unprovoked aggression by Germany against France, Great B r i t a i n w i l l place herself immediately at the side of France with her naval, m i l i t a r y and a i r forces. Reciprocally i n the case of an unprovoked aggression by Germany against ^reat B r i t a i n , France w i l l place herself im- mediately at the side of Great B r i t a i n with her m i l i t a r y , \ naval and a i r forces. 1. Gmdi 2169, No. 35, Statement of the views of the Frenoh 4 government on Anglo-French Relations sent to Mr. Lloyd George by M. Briand on January 8, 1922, p. 123. 2. i b i d . , No. 38, B r i t i s h Draft of Treaty between the Govern- ment of the B r i t i s h limpire and the drench Republic, handed by Mr. Lloyd George to M. Briand, January 12, 1922, p. 127. 3. i b i d . , No. 39, French Draft of Proposed Anglo-French Treaty V communicated to the marquis of Curzon of Kedleston by the French Ambassador, January 22, 1922j, p. 128. 27 I t w i l l be seen i n the above two extracts that the B r i - t i s h guarantee i s u n i l a t e r a l i n character, because i t contem- plated, a guarantee against German aggression given to France by Great B r i t a i n without r e c i p r o c a l obligation by France to Great B r i t a i n . As soon as the French Chamber got word of the contents of the proposed pact Briand was r e c a l l e d to jr'aris by President Millerand where b i t t e r h o s t i l i t y caused him to summarily resign. The French wanted the B r i t i s h guarantee very badly but so great was t h e i r pride a f t e r the war that they wanted the world to think that they were ready to accept i t but were not a c t u a l l y pressing for i t * Poincare',who suc- ceeded Briand^carried on negotiations but the B r i t i s h govern- ment had s t i l l no desire to make the Pact r e c i p r o c a l . The French were determined that i t should be undertaken on a basis of absolute equality. Mo understanding could be arrived at for another reason as well* Referring again to the statement of the above two A r t i c l e s i t w i l l be noticed that the word " d i r e c t " i s used i n the B r i t i s h and omitted i n the French d r a f t . This was another serious point of contention. The question.of Poland i s brought into the ^problem; here. France had an a l l i a n c e with Poland which included a m i l i t a r y convention and she was thereby obligated to go to the a i d of Poland i f that country should be attacked by Germany. Now, i n the immediate post-war years B r i t a i n regarded Poland as an a r t i f i c i a l creation, a protege^of France and above a l l as a threat to the B r i t i s h p o s i t i o n i n the B a l t i c . In addition, Poland's f r o n t i e r s were not natural geographically and therefore 28 were d i f f i c u l t to defend. For these reasons the B r i t i s h f e l t that i f they should r a t i f y the French draft i t would obligate them to go to the defense of the Poles while f i g h t i n g with France. This,..of course, was not within B r i t i s h comprehension at t h i s period, although i n l a t e r years the attitude of the B r i t i s h changed r a d i c a l l y , due to the pressure of events. Poincare''concluded the abortive conversations i n his l e t t e r to the Marquis of Crewe when he wrote that i f i n the future any further negotiations should be undertaken i n respect to a Pact i t must be b i l a t e r a l ; must be accompanied by e f f e c t i v e recipro- c a l m i l i t a r y guarantees and that i t must have a p r a c t i c a l value 1 for both countries. i n summarizing the Anglo-French phase of the French search for a l l i a n c e s what was the basis of the difference of opinion i n t h i s problem of security? It i s the difference of attitude on the part of a Frenchman and Englishman on the int e r p r e t a t i o n of "aggression". In France, a guarantee such as that discussed above, would be regarded as a binding commitment on the part of England to a s s i s t France against Germany whatever might be the circumstances of the quarrel or the conditions which led up to i t , so long as Germany was formally the aggressor. In Eng- land i t was taken f o r granted that when the time came for a decision on the part of the B r i t i s h government and people that they would be free to decide for themselves on the merits of the case as to who was i n r e a l i t y the aggressor. Great B r i t a i n 1. Cmd. 2169, No. 55, Enclosure I*, M. Poincare to the Marquis of Crewe, August 20, 1923, p. 173. 29 had t6a dominions i n the B r i t i s h Commonwealth to con- sider and i n these early post-war years they were showing div- ergencies of i n t e r e s t , French narrowness and the world view- point of the B r i t i s h could not be reconciled at t h i s period. A f t e r t h e i r f a i l u r e i n the negotiations with Great B r i t - ain, French statesmen turned t h e i r attention to the furtherance of t h e i r p o l i c y of building up a l l i a n c e s on the European con- tinent i France had already negotiated t r e a t i e s with Belgium and Poland and she now turned towards the east. French leaders had been watching with interest the course of conversations being carried on by her a l l y , Poland ;with Rumania and also by Rumania with Jugo-Slovia and Czecho-Slovakia. By the t h i r d of March,1921, Poland had already concluded an agreement with Rumania. Both of these countries feared Russia and were an- xious f o r each other's support. The L i t t l e Entente structure 1 was completed by the Rumanian-Jugo-Slav treaty on June 7, 1921, and although these A l l i a n c e s had been entered into by the Balkan and Eastern European countries primarily for t h e i r interests, yet those interests were clos e l y connected with those of France by the fact that they rested on the common basis of 2 the Four European Peace Treaties. The French motive i n desir- ing d e f i n i t e understandings with Rumania, Jugo-Slavia and Czecho-Slovakia has a d i f f e r e n t foundation than that which prompted her to make the Belgian and P o l i s h A l l i a n c e s . With 1. Temperley, H. W. V., op. c i t . , v o l . 4, 1921, p* 519. 2. Toynbee, A. J"., op. c i t . , 1926, p. 144 f f . 30 them It was merely a desire on the part of France to cement t h e i r common intere s t i n keeping a check on Germany. But with the new states i n South-eastern Europe i t was la r g e l y t h e i r common interest to preserve the "status quo" through the sep- arate peace t r e a t i e s made hy them with the Central Powers. Broadly speaking, i f Prance could come to some understanding with these smaller nations I t would he d e f i n i t e l y to aid Ru- mania against Russia, Czeoho-Slovakia against Hungary and Jugo- s l a v i a against I t a l y . I t would mean heavy commitments f o r France, but she was the ri c h e s t and most powerful nation on the European continent. The p o l i c y of attaining seourity through a l l i a n c e s was being pursued while France a c t i v e l y engaged i n the Ruhr occu- pation; However, t h i s episode i n French post-war history i s more concerned with the f i n a n c i a l side of French p o l i c y than with security; The o f f i c i a l French government stand on t h i s question was conveyed to the English government by the Count de Saint Aulaire when he stated that the invasion was under- taken for economic purposes only and had no connection with 1 the question of seourity. C r i t i c i s m which resulted from t h i s action was very b i t t e r and i n spite of the French disclaimer regarding security, t h i s action was bound to affect French national security i n the attitudes i t engendered i n other peoples. Within Germany sentiment can best be described by quoting the. words of a young married woman who said: "When 1. Cmd. 3169, i\io. 51, The Marquis Curzon of Kedleston to the Marquis of Crewe, Paris, (Extract), July 10, 1923, p. 171. 31 I married 1 hoped I would have no c h i l d r e n . We were ruined by the i n f l a t i o n , we were l i v i n g from hand to mouth.;.but now I want sons so that I may bring them up and dedicate them : 1 to the task of avenging the Fatherland." An American writer, Nicholas Roosevelt, maintains that the Ruhr occupation yielded a net p r o f i t of nearly 4,000,000,000 paper francs and that as 2 a diplomatic weapon i t was a success,but a Frenchman, George Leschartier says that "the r e s u l t s of t h i s adventure;..proved disastrous i n every way, materially, f i n a n c i a l l y , p o l i t i c a l l y and even morally, for i t dealt a severe blow to French prestige 3 abroad. Y e t t h a t the French Chamber of Deputies was thor- oughly behind the p o l i c y of the Premier, Poincare^ i s shown by the fact that the vote taken a f t e r the S o c i a l i s t deputy M. Leon Blum censured the government, was 478 to 86 i n favor 4 of the p o l i c y of the administration. Thus the f i r s t puhitivie e f f o r t undertaken j o i n t l y by the two a l l i e s , Franoe and Bel- gium was begun, i n spite of o f f i c i a l declarations to the con- trar y , the Frenchman's sense of security was reduced. 1. Anon., The Regeneration of Germany, Quarterly Review, No. 484, A p r i l 25, 1925, p. 231. 2. Roosevelt, Nicholas, The Ruhr Occupation, Foreign A f f a i r s (New York], v o l . 4, No. 1, October 25, 1925, p. 112* 3* Leschartier, Georges, French P o l i c y and Disarmament, i n t e r - national problems and Relations, Academy of p o l i t i c a l Science, Columbia University, 1927, p. 36. 4. Anon., The French invasion of the Ruhr, Current History, v o l . XVII., Ho* 5, February, 1923, p. 711. 32 It i s necessary to mention at t h i s juncture the use by France of a new t o o l i n building her security structure v i z . money. Her object was to hold the friendship of her a l l i e s by every possible method and her strong f i n a n c i a l condition made I t possible f o r her to use money as a l e v e r . On December 17, 1923, the French Senate r a t i f i e d the o f f e r of c r e d i t s to Poland, Yugo-Slavia and Rumania to be used f o r the purchase 1 of war materials i n Prance. I t was at once a convenient way of getting r i d of her old war supplies and arming her a l l i e s . One of the reasons why Poland, iugo-Slavia and Rumania found i t so d i f f i c u l t to ra i s e funds f o r constructive purposes was the large amount of t h e i r indebtedness to Prance and when they did want money for construction they were usually forced to go to London and New York as Prance was not interested when 2 she could not put her money to p o l i t i c a l use. Prance drove a hard bargain at t h i s period and at the basis of a l l her schemes was her great o b j e c t — s e c u r i t y . On March 24, 1924, a Franco-Czecho-Slovak treaty was r a t - i f i e d . Gzecho-Slovakia was situated on Germany's southern border and the conclusion of t h i s treaty meant that France had a l l i e s now on the west, north and South borders* The Frenoh could r i g h t l y f e e l that they were making progress i n t h e i r p o l i c y of keeping Germany weak. For France the key 1. Toynbee, A. J *, op. c i t * , 1924, p. 444, foot note No. 1. 2. E i n z i g , Paul, Finance and P o l i t i c s , London, Macmillan. 1932, p. 47 f f . 33 1 point of t h i s Treaty i s A r t i c l e 1 which states^ "The governments of the French Republic and the Czecho- slovak Republic undertake to concert t h e i r action i n a l l matters of foreign policy which may threaten t h e i r security or which may tend to subvert the s i t u a t i o n created by the Treaties of Peace of which both parties are signatories." This was a purely consultative pact. Accusations were made that there 2 were secret m i l i t a r y clauses to the Pact but t h i s was denied by Dr. Benes. This treaty added another nation to the bu l - wark against r e v i s i o n of the V e r s a i l l e s Treaty. French states-r men were encouraged i n t h e i r b e l i e f that the security of France was stea d i l y increasing; The Frenoh were pleased with t h e i r success i n the pur- suance of t h e i r policy of building up a l l i a n c e s against Ger- many, but Romain Roland, one of the greatest of French paci- f i s t s said of t h i s p o l i c y of France "...the boundaries esta- blished by the t r e a t i e s of 1919 cannot from the point of view of two-thirds of Europe be maintained. Our French informants stop t h e i r ears to the agonized c r i e s of the vanquished coun- t r i e s , Germany i s starved and w i l l not be able to bear t h i s 4 repression." 1; Anon., France and Germany, Round Table, v o l . 13, March, 1923, p. 237. 2. Toynbee, op. c i t . , 1924, p. 446. 3. i b i d . , pi 441. 4. Koland, Romain, Broaden Europe or Die, New York, Nation, v o l . 132, No. 3433, A p r i l 22, 1931, p; 443. 34 T h e French claim to be r e a l i s t s , so much so that they did not place a l l t h e i r t r u s t i n the League but preferred to b u i l d a second l i n e of defense i n t h e i r A l l i a n c e s . .By tne time f i v e years had passed since the T r e a t y of V e r s a i l l e s France had done much to increase German bitterness, and yet at the same time had increased her own security through her own e f f o r t s . Yet a movement began to take shape f o r a broader i n t e r - pretation of the word security; France was whole-heartedly behind i t ; But she a l w a y s knew that whatever the outcome she always had a developing system of a l l i a n c e s which was gradually increasing her national security. CHAPTER I I I . FRANCE AND THE MAKING OF LOCARNO CHAPTER I I I . FRANCE AND THE MAKING OF LOCARNO Even while French statesmen were busy weaving other count r i e s into t h e i r security pattern f o r France, they always pro- fessed readiness to discuss broader guarantees of peace which would embrace continental Europe as well. The more nations prepared to guarantee French security the better France was pleased* The f i r s t of these discussions led up to the attemp- ted Treaty of Mutual Assistance. Although not accepted by many of the Powers t h i s treaty and the Geneva Protocol which followed i t l a i d the foundations f o r the Locarno Peace Pact and because of that must be included i n t h i s study. In the month of July, 1922 negotiations between France and Great B r i t a i n towards an Anglo-French guarantee f i n a l l y lapsed; The differences between the French and B r i t i s h a t t i - tudes were sharply brought out. The French f e l t that t h e i r armies saved B r i t a i n In the f i r s t months of the Great War and therefore a guarantee of some sort was an obli g a t i o n on the part of the B r i t i s h . The B r i t i s h trusted to t h e i r insular p o s i t i o n for security. "Englishmen," says M. Andre''Cheradame, "have never been able to get the French point of view. They 1 are mutually indispensable, yet incomprehensible." What was needed was a new approach to the problem. This was provided i n the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance begun under the 1. M. Andre7Cheradame cited by Wickham Steed, The P o s i t i o n of France, London, Journal of t h e . B r i t i s h I n s t i t u t e of International A f f a i r s , v o l . 2, March 20, 1923, p. 65. 35 36 auspices of the League of Nations. During the deliberations of the Second Assembly of the League the conclusion was arrived at that security could be attained through the reduction of armaments * France had never held to t h i s theory, rather did she i n s i s t that guarantees must precede disarmament. However, i n accordance with i t s 1 new theory the Assembly set up a Temporary Mixed Commission which was to bring i n a report as to how t h i s reduction could be carried out; Lord Esher brought forward a new proposal that reduction be carried nut, not by a treaty, but by devel- oping a numerical factor as a common measure and reducing proportionately. His plan was to take a unit of 30,000 men as a basis upon which to develop the size of the armed forces of European countries. This would give France an army of 180,000 men which he deemed s u f f i c i e n t for her protection. Naturally the plan did not m a t e r i a l i z e , as i t did not include a l l the nations and the problem of security was not dealt with d i r e c t l y as i t was thought that i t would follow out of the Esher plan. That was not good enough for the French. There must be something more concrete and possessing a clearer d e f i n i t i o n . The members of the Temporary Mixed Commission agreed that before a state could reduce i t s armaments i t must have some form of guarantee to assure i t of security* This 1. Toynbee, A. J.', Survey, 1924, p. 18. 2. Maurice, F. B., Lord Esher's Proposals f o r the Limitation of Armaments, Journal,of the B r i t i s h I n s t i t u t e of International A f f a i r s , v o l . 1, July, 1922, p. 101. 37 was the o r i g i n a l French thesis which formed the basis for the abortive Anglo-French conversations* with the c r i t i c i s m of Lord Esher's plan i n mind the Third Assembly of the League charged the Temporary Mixed Commission 1 with a new task contained i n Resolution XIV. A r t i c l e s 1 and 2 of t h i s r e solution serve to show the l i n e of reasoning along which men were thinking at t h i s time. A r t i c l e 1. no scheme for the reduction of armaments within the meaning of A r t i c l e 8 of the Covenant can be f u l l y successful unless i t i s general. A r t i c l e 2. In the present state of the world many Govern- ments would be unable to accept the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for a serious reduction of armaments unless they received i n exchange a s a t i s f a c t o r y guarantee of the safety of t h e i r country. 2 In 1914, there were 3,740,000 men i n Europe under arms. 3 i n 1923 there were 3,600,000. According to A r t i c l e 160 of the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s Germany was allowed 100,000 men under arms. The former A l l i e s must be maintaining large establishments 1* Records of the Third Assembly, v o l . 1, p. 287 f f . , c i t e d by K e l l o r , Frances and Hat-vany, Antonia, Security Against War, New York, Macmillan, 1924, v o l . 2, p. 699. Toynbee, A. J . , op. c i t . , 1924, p. 21, Substance of Resol- ution XIV. was put forward by the French as a compromise and was accepted by the Assembly for the same reason. 2. Maurice, F . 3., op. c i t . , p. 105. 3. Maurice, F. B*, The Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance, Journal of the B r i t i s h i n s t i t u t e of i n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , v o l . 3, March 1924, p. 47. 38 to account for the balance. Yet i n spite of t h i s figure s t i p - ulated i n the Treaty the-.French maintained that the Germans were spending the equivalent of 591,656,273 French francs on 1 t h e i r army and i t s equipment to the i r 372,186,410 francs. A l - 2 though Stresemann denied t h i s the French never doubted i t s tr u t h . Hence the importance to them of the above mentioned a r t i c l e s of Resolution XIV. The French were favorable to a general agreement but i t must be according to a "pre-arranged 3 plan." The French must know the consequences of each step. Lord Robert C e c i l and Colonel Requin, a former o f f i c e r on the s t a f f of Foch each prepared a draft of a proposed treaty. That of Lord C e c i l was general i n type, placing i n the hands of the League the power to make supplementary agreements where the s i t u a t i o n warranted i t . That of Colonel Requin was based on the premise that i t i s inevi t a b l e i n European p o l i t i c s f or nations to d r i f t into a scheme of a l l i a n c e s and that therefore any treaty must be a general one, with supplementary t r e a t i e s to be created by i n d i v i d u a l members undePthe general treaty, for the regulation of s p e c i a l circumstances. Lord C e c i l went further than Colonel Requin i n that he made provision for the naming of an aggressor. This was to be decided within four 1. Anon., Depenses m i l i t a r r e s de l'Allemagne et de l a France, L'Europe Nouvelle, No. 429, 8 Mai, 1926, p. 647. 2. Stresemann, Gustave, His d i a r i e s , l e t t e r s and papers, edited and translated by E r i c Sutton, Macmillan, London, 1935, v o l . 2, p. 12. 3; A r t i c l e 3 of Resolution XIV. 39 1 days a f t e r an attack was made* But the basic difference be- tween the two drafts lay i n t h e i r attitude to p a r t i a l a l l i a n c e s . Lord Robert C e c i l held that they should only be undertaken aft e r permission of three-fourths of the Council was obtained but Colonel Re'quin f e l t that r e g i s t e r i n g t r e a t i e s already made with the Council was s u f f i c i e n t . Here again w i l l be seen the philosophy that permeated French p o l i c y at t h i s p e r i o d — t o work through and with the League f o r security, but at the same time maintain the a l l i a n c e s already made and preserve the r i g h t for making new ones. Out of these two e f f o r t s a Draft 2 Treaty of Mutual Assistance was drawn up which was l a i d by the Temporary Commission before the Assembly during i t s Fourth 3 Session i n September, 1923. Although the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance discussed above was never adopted owing l a r g e l y to the opposition of the B r i t i s h Commonwealth i t found favor i n French eyes because i t provided for those factors which were points at issue i n the Anglo-French negotiations, i n the f i r s t instance i t took i n the eastern sphere of Europe as w e l l as the western, i t i n - volved much broader r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s for Great B r i t a i n than the b i l a t e r a l pact discussed during the Anglo-French negotiations 1; Much j u s t i f i a b l e c r i t i c i s m i s made of t h i s idea as 20 years af t e r the Great War ended there i s s t i l l much doubt as to who was the actual aggressor. 2; Anon., A P r a c t i c a l Plan for Disarmament, International C o n c i l i a t i o n , Carnegie Endowment of International Peace, No. 201, August, 1924, Appendix, p. 360. 3. Toynbee, opu c i t . , 1924, p. 22. 40 of 1921-1922i The second factor was that i t allowed the form- ation of special groups of a l l i a n c e s under the supervision of the League. France and some of the smaller Central European states were already party to several of these a l l i a n c e s . Great B r i t a i n was suspicious of them and the Dominions were openly h o s t i l e . In the t h i r d instance i t permitted those nations party to these a l l i a n c e s to arrange for m i l i t a r y cooperation i n advance although i n t h i s A r t i c l e (No. 8) provision was made that the League of Nations must be informed at once of the agreements undertaken. The Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance was an attempt to combine the two p r i n c i p l e s of general agree- ment and sp e c i a l a l l i a n c e or more broadly speaking,combining of the idea of a general agreement among a l l states with that of p a r t i a l a l l i a n c e s among s o m e — a l l under the control of the League of Nations. French hopes of a guarantee through t h i s Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance were dissipated. The r e f u s a l of some rowers to sanction t h i s treaty had a d e f i n i t e reaction on public opinion i n France. One French commentator, writing i n the French magazine, Correspondant, speaks s a r c a s t i c a l l y on the action of the League Assembly i n not endorsing the Draft Treaty at once when he says, "Craig- nant de s'engager trop a fond, e l l e se contenta de l'envoyer pour avis aux gouvernements interesse's," while of England's stand he remarks, "L'Angleterre,.. .dont l a collaboration e'tait indispensable s i l'on ne voulait pas rester dans l a domain de reve, avait p r i s une t e l l e attitude qu'on se demandait serieu- sement comment reprendre l a question sans risquer de 41 compromettre deflnitimment l e prestige de l a Societe." While the negotiations for the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance were i n progress French participants were embued with the n a t i o n a l i s t i c s p i r i t of Poincare'' and his group. As a r e s u l t i t was necessary for the framers of the Draft Treaty to provide i n t h e i r draft for the maintenance of the system of a l l i a n c e s which Prance had b u i l t up i f they wanted to pro- duce a treaty at a l l . With the f a i l u r e of t h i s treaty to win the acceptance of so many nations the -French people, as i n d i - viduals, began to take stock and came to the conclusion that perhaps they were t r y i n g to get security by the wrong method. Thus i n the l a t t e r part of 1923 and the early part of 1924 we see a new s p i r i t abroad i n Prance—one which reasoned that i f France hoped to a t t a i n security through o s t r a c i z i n g herself from the rest of the world she was making a serious mistake. From a national opinion almost s o l i d l y behind the Kuhr policy of M. Poincare'', there has developed a c o n f l i c t of opinion remarkable i n i t s contrasts. The old idea of a l o c a l s e t t l e - ment of the Franco-German problem i s put forward by M. Paul Reynaud when he says that i t would be shirking r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to r e f e r t h i s great problem to the League, but M. Robert de Jouvenel takes a stand fast growing In popularity, the exact opposite from that of M. Reynaud. He says that the Quai d'Orsay has not s e t t l e d anything between France and Germany yet and the security of Europe depends on in t e r n a t i o n a l action, so how 1. Anon., La Probleme De La Securite', Le Correspondant, Tome 301, 25 Novembre, 1925, p* 493. 42 could Prance and Germany se t t l e the peace of Europe between 1 themselves? The changing o f f i c i a l attitude i s shown i n the words of Edouard Herriot, the new premier, when he said, "To wish f o r the destruction of Germany i s stupid from both the moral and p o l i t i c a l point of view...because of t h e i r weak- nesses these German democrats ought to have been aided, even directed by us." This was the s p i r i t which prompted Herriot i n the conver- 3 sations at the London Gonferenoe on Reparations to respond to the f r i e n d l y overtures put forward by Ramsay McDonald, the new Labor Prime Minister of Great B r i t a i n . The B r i t i s h always had started from the basis of a r b i t r a t i o n and disarmament i n the formulae for world peace b e l i e v i n g that security would take care of i t s e l f . The French, although s t i l l i n s i s t i n g on con- crete guarantees, were w i l l i n g to search for an agreement based more on moral guarantees than on d e f i n i t e m i l i t a r y commitments j to cooperate i n the defining of an aggressor and thus remedy one of the major f a u l t s i n the Treaty of Mutual Assistance, and to draw up a procedure to be followed i n the case that action against an aggressor should become necessary* The crux of M. Herriot's stand was i n his speech when he referred d i r e c t l y to the problem of secu r i t y . " A r b i t r a t i o n , " he says, 1; Reynaud, Paul, and Jouvenel, Robert de, A French Debate on the League of iMations, L i v i n g Age, v o l . 321, May 17, 1924, p. 931. ITranslated from La Grande Revue;) 2. Herriot, Edouard, The Program of L i b e r a l France, Foreign A f f a i r s , v o l . 2, Wo. 4, June 15, 1924, p* 560. 3. July 15, 1924, Toynbee, op; c i t . , 1924, p. 370. 43 i s e s s e n t i a l but i t i s not s u f f i c i e n t , i t i s a means but not an end. i t does not e n t i r e l y f u l f i l l the intentions of A r t i c l e 8 of the Covenant, which...are security and disarma- ment .. . A r b i t r a t i o n must not be a snare f o r t r u s t f u l nations... we Frenchmen believe that a nation which accepts a r b i t r a t i o n . . . 1 be i t great or small has a r i g h t to security." In accordance with these sentiments h e r r i o t and MacDonald presented a joint statement to the F i f t h Assembly which was adopted by i t on 2 September 6, 1924. i n view of the f a i l u r e of Anglo-French negotiations up to t h i s point on the question of a guarantee and the difference of the view-point already disclosed i n the F i f t h Assembly, i t i s of utmost i n t e r e s t to note the text of 3 t h i s j o i n t note. 1; The Third Committee i s requested to consider the material dealing with security and the reduction of ' armaments, p a r t i c u l a r l y the operations of the Govern- ments i n the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance con- tained i n the Covenant of the League i n r e l a t i o n to the guarantees of security which a resort to a r b i - t r a t i o n and a reduction of armaments may require. 2. The F i r s t Committee i s requested: a. to consider i n view of possible amendments, the a r t i c l e s i n the Covenant r e l a t i n g to the settlement of disputes; b; to examine within what l i m i t s the terms of A r t i c l e 36, paragraph 2, of the statute of establish-? ing the Permanent Court of International Justice might be rendered more precise and thereby f a c i l - i t a t e the more general acceptance of the clause 1; Toynbee, op; c i t . , 1924, p. 42. 2. i b i d . , p. 45. 3. Assembly Document, A 135, 1924, c i t e d by Toynbee, op. c i t . , pp. 45-46. 44 and thus strengthen the s o l i d a r i t y and the security of the nations of the world by s e t t l i n g by p a c i f i c means a l l the disputes whieh may a r i s e between states. I t can be seen i n the above three extracts from t h i s Anglo- French note that both England and France were anxious to reach some basis of understanding* F a r t i o u l a r l y i n the case of France as her s a c r i f i c e would l i k e l y be much the greater i f some soluti o n were agreed upon; 1 In t h i s study of the Geneva Protocol i n as f a r as i t effe c t s French security i t now remains to examine those A r t i c l e s from the document which had a direc t bearing on ,and c o n t r i - buted something to, the security of -crance. "Nous sommes pao- ifi q u e s et nous en avons fourni l a preuve en donnant notre adhesion entiere a l a clause de 1'arbitrage o b l i g a t o i r e , nous sommes meme prets a une certaine reduction de notre etat m i l - i t a i r e , mais sentement en echange de garanties concretes et precises." A r t i c l e s 1, 7, 10, 16, 18 and 19 of the Protocol dealt with the problem of compulsory a r b i t r a t i o n , A r t i c l e 10 c l e a r l y defining the word, aggressor. The Prench were very pleased with that yet they were c r i t i c a l of A r t i c l e 15 which, i n speaking of punishment of the aggressor says i n part that neither the t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y nor the p o l i t i c a l indepen- dence of an aggressor state s h a l l be affected i n the event of 1. Text.of the Geneva Protocol, International C o n c i l i a t i o n , 1924, p. 531. 2. Anon., Le Protocole de Genevie et l a Reduction des •" Armements, Kevue des Deux Mondes, Tome 28, Janvier, 1925, p. 41. 45 application of any of the clauses of the Protocol, i n the old days, argued the French, the v i c t o r had hope of compensat- ion but today i t i s better to lose on the enemy's t e r r i t o r y than to win a battle fought on one's own. That t h i s i s a log- i c a l view i s evidenced by the post-war experience of France. The French ask, what basis have we for assuming that a l l ag- gression i s impossible? What would happen to France i f she disarmed as i s provided for under A r t i c l e 17 and then Germany and Russia were suddenly to spring upon her when she became involved i n i n t e r n a l problems? France was not convinced that t h i s could not happen as i t was only two years previous that xGermany and Russia had come to an understanding i n The Treaty of Rapallo. i t was t h i s natural g r a v i t a t i o n of these two Powers towards some understanding that France feared. On turning to the problem of the Rhine we see a f a i r l y s a t i s f i e d France i n as f a r as the Rhineland i s concerned. So long as the French and Belgian forces were i n the Ruhr and the A l l i e d forces i n the Occupied Zone the p r i n c i p a l parts of the enemy's arsenal were i n French or A l l i e d hands, however, the war-like s p i r i t of the Germans made the trench f e e l that no Power, as provided for under the Protocol, oould be on the spot with s u f f i c i e n t speed to keep the German armies from v i o l a t i n g French s o i l i n case of sudden attack. Again A r t i c l e 11 states that i n time of war the signatories of the Protocol, w i l l a l l promise to cooperate to the utmost i n the application 1. A p r i l 16, 1932 46 of sanctions against an aggressor. But what becomes of that country whose well-being depends on i t s exports when i t can get no market? In addition, the French say that both England and Japan show a d e f i n i t e aversion to acting i n common i n t h i s way. £oth these countries are primarily mercantile. ¥/hy i s i t necessary to mention the long l i s t of f a u l t s which the French found i n the Protocol? The answer i s simple. To show the extent to which the French were ready to cooperate. Professor Noel-Baker asked twelve years a f t e r the Geneva Pro- t o c o l whether these plans for peace undertaken year a f t e r year 1 were a l l cant? Surely i t was not cant that prompted M. Briand to say, as he stood before the League Assembly, "I am here on behalf of the Delegation and with the f u l l assent of my Govern- ment to say, i n response to the appeal of your Committees, •France adheres to the Protocol; France i s prepared to sign 2 i t . " * France, whose borders were f a r less secure than those of Great B r i t a i n , whose obligations were far greater than any of the overseas Dominions.signed t h i s Pact which none of the 3 B r i t i s h Dominions were prepared to do. This attitude of the B r i t i s h government i s commented on very b i t t e r l y by one French 1. Noel-baker, P h i l i p , The Private Manufacture of Armaments, London, V i c t o r Gollancz, 1936, v o l . 1, p. 518. 2. Noel-Baker, P h i l i p , The Present J u d i c i a l Status of the B r i t i s h Dominions i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l Law, London, Longmans, Green, 1929, p. 59. 3. Dumont-Wilden, L., Le Protocole de Geneve et La Question de La Se'curite', Revue Bleue, No. 7, 7 Mars, 1925, ' p. 171. 47 writer who says i n part that t h i s h e s i t a t i n g position of B r i - t i s h p o l i t i c i a n s so c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of English diplomacy i n post-war years has shown up very c l e a r l y i n t h i s a f f a i r of the 1 Geneva protocol. The government at London imagines that to get peace a l l i t has to do i s to wish for i t . he adds that i n order to get peace i n the new Europe i t i s necessary to have the adhesion of the B r i t i s h nations who are represented at Geneva. Two great e f f o r t s towards making another major war i n Europe impossible have f a i l e d * By both of these e f f o r t s France hoped to gain a guarantee s u f f i c i e n t to assure her se- c u r i t y * x'et t h i s i n a b i l i t y to f i n d agreement did not close the heart of the sincere Frenchman towards the pursuit of fur- 2 ther means and when on February 9, 1925, the Germans put f o r - ward suggestions for a security pact, t h e i r note was given a great reception by the -t'reneh people who f e l t that t h i s novel departure might bring fort h r e a l r e s u l t s . From the German view-point i t was f e l t that i f the French policy of continuing the formation of A l l i a n c e s was to go on i t would in e v i t a b l y lead to the complete encirclement of Germany and prevent her l i b e r a t i o n from her bonds of the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s * What made these very progressive agreements of Locarno possible? In order to answer t h i s i t i s necessary to search 1. Ibid., p. 172. 2. Stresemann, Gustav, op. c i t . , Memorandum handed i n Paris by Counsellor of Legation,Forster to the French Premier M. Herriot on behalf of the Ambassador rierr von Hoesch, v o l . 1, p. 457. ! 48 Into the immediate background of the peace Pacts, i n the f i r s t instance we f i n d German statesmen facing a great decision. Internally a c r i s i s was reaching serious proportions. The G-overnment had two alternatives to face. They could give way to the- demands of the 'German Na t i o n a l i s t s and i n s i s t that before any discussions began the war g u i l t clause i n the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s must be withdrawn, or they could make entry into the League the primary object on the best possible terms. This was the p o l i c y of Stresemann, the leader of the S o c i a l Demo- c r a t i c party,who used every means i n his power to further Ger- many r s progress towards League membership. But he did i n s i s t that entry into the League depended upon the recognition of his country's status as a Great .rower. T h i s would e n t a i l a permanent seat on the League Council, i n a l e t t e r written on the s i x t h of September, 1924, to the Chancellor, Dr. Marx, Stresemann writes, "An e s s e n t i a l condition...is the acknow- ledgement of our equality by the other Powers...If these con- 1 dit i o n s are given, then Germany i s ready." The French people by 1925 had come to the place where they were beginning to f e e l that a Franco-German understanding was necessary. England and France overcame t h e i r centuries- old antagonism i n 1904 due to t h e i r common fear of Germany's r i s i n g power. France and Germany'in 1925 also had a common fear—war. The French people urged the ending of.Poincare's 1. i b i d . , Letter to Chancellor Marx; Sigmaringen, September 6, 1924, v o l . 1, p. 442. 49 p o l i c y . "La tete "a tete franco—allemand conduit "a une catas- 1 trophe.'r Germany would become an implacable enemy i f t h i s policy was not brought to an end, m addition, the finances of France were not i n a very sound state at t h i s time, .tier large m i l i t a r y expenses were a heavy burden and she had im- mense i n t e r n a l and external l i a b i l i t i e s to meet i n 1925 as well. M. de Mouy, one of the Treasury o f f i c i a l s described 2 the s i t u a t i o n as desperate. It was hoped that Locarno would r e l i e v e i t . France also hoped that an agreement might be made because she expected that the next war would probably s t a r t i n the East and she wanted to be sure that the TWest would re- main at peace; Yet even as these steps v/ere being taken to f i n d grounds for discussion France was continuing the p o l i c y used so successfully three hundred years before by Richelieu and to be used again i n post-Lacarno years by Barthou—that of making issue of the d i v i s i o n of her neighbors i n the East; It was approximately at t h i s time that the case of the spy, 3 Margot Nadau was brought to l i g h t i n Warsaw. A b e a u t i f u l woman with a German passport was detected i n her nefarious a c t i v i t i e s i n Poland, which country was an a l l y of France. Such exposures as these made the French o f f i c i a l s worry but 1. Anon., La Securite' Gontinentale, L'Europe Nouvelle, No. 363, 31 Janvier, 1925, p. 134. 2. Bonnet, Georges, Les echeances de 1925, L'Europe Nouvelle, No. 374, 18 A v r i l , 1925, p. 514. Anon., L'Annee de Locarno, No. 410, 26 Decembre, 1925, p. 1723 3; Anon., Une emule de Mata-Hari, L'Europe Nouvelle, No. 363, 31 Janvier, 1925, p. 137. 50 s t i l l that nation urged a r e c o n c i l i a t i o n . The average French- man believed that i t was inev i t a b l e that Germany would regain her independent status sooner or l a t e r and that unless i t was regained through peaceful methods, French security would never 1 be a certainty. The best way of summarizing the French view- point i n respect to t h i s new e f f o r t towards security would be to note the words of Henri de Jouvenel who described Franco- German r e c o n c i l i a t i o n through Locarno as " l e moyen de l'en- tree europeenne"aahd adds "C'est pour cela que nous l a sou- 2 haitohs." Briand's reply to the German note of February 9 mentioned above l a i d down several conditions which would govern the en- tr y of Germany into the League. It i s e s s e n t i a l that some of these faotors be mentioned In t h i s study as they a s s i s t i n 3 the o rientation of France's stand at Locarno. In the f i r s t instance, Germany must assume the obligations as l a i d down i n the Covenant. Here there i s a point of c r i t i c i s m which must be made against France i n respect to her desire to get Germany to assume the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of League membership. Why was France so impatient at t h i s time to see Germany i n the League i f not to make i t complementary to the French a l l i a n c e with Poland? As a member of the League i t was prac- t i c a l l y impossible for her to v i o l a t e the f r o n t i e r s of Poland 1. Anon., The Locarno Treaties, Round Table, v o l . 16, December, 1925, p. 1. 2. Jouvenel, Henri de, Pas d'entente franco-allemande sans l'Europe, L'Europe Nouvelle, No..452, 9 Octofeee, 1926, p. 139. 3. Cmd. 2435, c i t e d i n Toynbee, 1925, v o l . 2, p. 38. 51 and thus her m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e with that state would not In- volve her i n any major incidents. This was a double form of security for France yet i t was not l i k e l y to arouse any f e e l - ing but suspicion i n Germany. Briand 1s second point was that the search for guarantees of security cannot be considered to involve any modification of the Peace Treaties. The French motive i n laying down a s t i p u l a t i o n of t h i s nature i s at once apparent when i t i s r e a l i z e d that security for France i n French eyes meant the Immobilization of Germany behind the German f r o n t i e r as l a i d down i n the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s . The French also knew that from the German point of view se- c u r i t y for themselves rested i n t h e i r recovery of t h e i r l i b - 1 erty of movement. This the French were determined to prevent without f i r s t securing adequate safeguards. In l i n e with t h i s l a s t condition France would be favorable to a Rhineland Pact which would include Belgium. This Pact should be guaranteed by a l l signatories to the Pact who should take action i f one of them should attempt h o s t i l i t i e s ; The Council should de- cide as to what form the coercive action should follow. Ger- many put forward the proposal i n connection with these pro- posed agreements that other a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s could be undertaken i n addition to the regular pacts and that other Bowers who were signatories of the V e r s a i l l e s Pact and the proposed Rhineland Pact could become the guarantors of these I. Anon*, Entre l e traite'de V e r s a i l l e s et l e pacte, L'Europe Nouvelle, No-. 399, 10 Octobre, 1925, p. 1338. 52 Pacts i f they so wished. France agreed. Why? Simply because t h i s system of agreements was i n complete accord with her sys- tem of a l l i a n c e s . She already had a l l i a n c e s with Poland, Rum- ania and Czecho-Slovakia and she wanted to keep herself free to guarantee any a r b i t r a l agreements into which any of her eastern a l l i e s might enter. This would further increase her 1 security. However, Briand was determined that the Germans should be careful as to what i n t e r p r e t a t i o n they might put on these French concessions. They must understand that the con- di t i o n s l a i d down i n the V e r s a i l l e s Treaty must be enforced. It was t h i s phase of the Briand system which the German people found so hard to understand. Why should he s t r i v e with straight-forward realism to promote Franco-German understand- ing and yet at the same time be building a system of encirc- l i n g a l l i a n c e s around Germany? For Briand the answer was s i m p l i c i t y i t s e l f — t h e security of his country. While conversations were s t i l l i n an early stage i t was questioned i n England as to whether the English in t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e i r obligations under Locarno was the same as that of 2 Briand. He thought that disputes between Germany and her neighbors could automatically come under the Locarno Pact and any decision rendered by whatever authorized authority under the Pact would automatically be guaranteed by Great 1. B u e l l , R. L., Poland, Key to Europe, Mew York, A. A. Knopf, 1939, p. 312. 2. Swanwick, H. M., The Seourity Pact, Foreign A f f a i r s ( B r i t i s h ) , v o l . 7, No. 1, July, 1925, p, 5. 53 B r i t a i n . England had never at any period p r i o r to t h i s under- taken to guarantee anything further eastward than the Rhine, 2 and she did not contemplate any such thing at t h i s time. Briand was taking too much f o r granted. The English were very cautious i n t h e i r early post-war commitments and they had never been l e g a l l y committed by anything other than the guar- antee of the t e r r i t o r i a l "status quo" as defined i n the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s to protect the Franco-German and German-Belgian f r o n t i e r s and to enforce A r t i c l e s 42 and 43 which concern the demilitarized zone along the Rhine. In s p i t e of these differences s u f f i c i e n t unanimity of view-point had been achieved to enable the governments to come to three basio conclusions which would form the ground-work 3 for the new Pact. These i l l u s t r a t e what Briand considered to be e s s e n t i a l to French security. In the f i r s t case the pro- posed Pact was to have no connection with the Treaty of Ver- s a i l l e s other than that the French government recognized that the Treaty could be modified and also Franoe guaranteed to observe t h i s clause of the Treaty. Germany while i n the pro- cess o f entering the League can claim no spe c i a l status, that i s she w i l l have no power, but must r e l y upon the other members to treat her with j u s t i c e . In the t h i r d instance Franoe 1. Gmd. 2435, p. 11, c i t e d i n Toynbee, op. c i t . , 1925, p. 34. 2. Anon*, The Locarno Treaties, Round Table, v o l , 16, December, 1925, p. 1. 3. Toynbee, op. c i t . , 1925, p. 42. Stresemann, pp. c i t * , v o l ; 2, p. 156. 54 i n s i s t e d that a l l issues whioh might become contentious must be s e t t l e d by peaceful methods. The word aggressor was automatically defined, i t would r e f e r to that nation which took up arms and crossed the f r o n t i e r of a neighbor, i n the case of the .Rhine area-^-the demilitarized zone. This r e f e r - ence to the d e f i n i t i o n of an aggressor was the outcome of Anglo-irench conversations i n which Great B r i t a i n i n s i s t e d that she r e t a i n the right to decide f o r herself the d i f f e r - ence between a doubtful and flagrant v i o l a t i o n of a f r o n t i e r , i n the doubtful case she would r e f e r the s i t u a t i o n to the League while i n the flagrant case she would declare war with- out consultation. A weakness i n the Pact (Treaty of Mutual Guarantee) i s found i n t h i s l a s t above-mentioned point i n that i n the case of a s i t u a t i o n developing which might i n - volve several countries England's formula might prove of l i t - t l e value /yet the fact that Briand accepted i t shows that he was anxious to cooperate to the uttermost. At t h i s time he was embued with the s p i r i t of peace which carried him through t h i s whole period of negotiations, uf t h i s elusive s p i r i t he said, " i l faut avoir l a chose dans l a coeur, i l f a i t s a i s i r toutes occasions, toutes p o s s i b i l i t i e s de l a s e r v i r et de 1 ' l a s e r v i r constamment." A meeting of j u r i s t i c experts was held i n London on 1. Discours prononce' a l a Ghambre des deputes par M. Briand, pre'sident du oonseil, 26 Eevrier, 1926, c i t e d i n L*Europe Nouvelle, No. 422, 2G Mars, 1926, p. 371. 55 September 1, 1925, whose object was to put into exact l e g a l terminology any controversial problem s t i l l outstanding. The German representative, Dr. GauSj took an active part i n the 1 proceedings. I t hardly seems possible that Dr. Gaus could have reported to Stresemann that the ithineland Pact was the only topic discussed by the j u r i s t s , yet when just p r i o r to the summoning of the f i r s t meeting of the o f f i c i a l delegates at Locarno the A l l i e s announced the i n c l u s i o n of Poland and Czecho-Slovakia as participants there was a natural and jus- t i f i e d protest from Germany. Briand had overstepped the mark. As more than one c r i t i c described i t , Briand was just a b i t too clever; of course, the c o n f l i c t centered around the question of a guarantee of the eastern f r o n t i e r s . Germany refused to consider the Po l i s h Corridor as l o s t forever. Yet Poland and Czecho-Slovakia as active participants i n the ne- gotiations would be a d e f i n i t e factor i n Briand*s security plans. The Germans had hoped that the question of the eastern f r o n t i e r s would not be included i n the same discussions as the Rhineland Pact but the P o l i s h government i n s i s t e d that i t should; The only s o l u t i o n to t h i s problem was that Germany 2 3 and Poland and Germany and Czecho-Slovakia should make 1. Stresemann*s d i a r i e s , l e t t e r s and papers, v o l . 2, p. 157. Loutre, Camille, La Reunion des j u r i s t e s a Londres, L'Europe Nouvelle, No* 394, 5 Septembre, 1925, p. 1173. This French writer says that the Ri g h t i s t s hold that he was not given power to act. 2. Cmd. No. 2525 Annex D. I n i t i a l l e d October 16, 1925. 3. Ibid., Annex F. I n i t i a l l e d October 16, 1925. 56 separate agreements and that these agreements should be covered by any guarantee s p e c i f i e d i n the Locarno Pact. A serious d i f - f i c u l t y arose over A r t i c l e 15 of the Covenant i n t h i s connection. In the case of a f a i l u r e of the Council to reach a unanimous decision any member of the Council was at l i b e r t y to take whatever action that member f e l t to be i n keeping with r i g h t 1 and j u s t i o e . Poland and Czecho-Slovakia were determined that they would not be l e f t to t h e i r own resources i n such a ease and Prance supported them. B i l a t e r a l t r e a t i e s were negotiated 2 3 between France and Poland and France and Czecho-Slovakia where i n the case of f a i l u r e by the Council to reach a decision they would come to each others support i f unprovoked aggression against either of them should take place. This was understood by a l l signatories to mean that France's response to aggressive action against Poland or Czecho-Slovakia would be to a l i g n herself automatically on the side of the invaded nation. This gave a c l a r i t y to France's stand and although there was resent- ment on the part of the extreme German n a t i o n a l i s t s of the Dr. Hugenberg group, Stresemann agreed* The German People's Party endorsed the stand of .'Dr.' Stresemann that almost any s a c r i f i c e was warranted i f i t could speed Germany's entry into the 4 League of Nations. 1. A r t i c l e 15, Paragraph 7. 2. Cmd. 2525 Annex F. p. 56, i n i t i a l l e d , October 16, 1925. 3. Cmd. 2525 Annex E. p* 44, i n i t i a l l e d , Uctober 16, 1925. 4. Stresemann, op. c i t . , v o l . 2, p. 172* 57 The agreements which en toto form the Locarno Pacts were accepted by the d i f f e r e n t governments and were signed on the f i r s t of December i n London and were placed i n the archives 1 at Geneva on the fourteenth of, the same month. The f i r s t of the factors preventing the putting into force of these Peace Pacts was now removed, a l l that remained was for Germany to enter the League and take her place as a member of the Council. A l l nations had been agreed from the commencement of negot- ia t i o n s that the ultimate goal was to see Germany at the Coun- c i l table, but there were c e r t a i n Powers which put forward t h e i r claims to a permanent seat at t h i s time. Poland, Spain, B r a z i l and China f e l t that the time was r i p e to throw t h e i r hats into the r i n g . A l l had i n t h e i r own opinions, just rea- sons for t h i s demand. It would be i r r e l e v a n t at t h i s time to discuss the claims of each of these nations for our i n t e r e s t i s only to analyze the p o s i t i o n taken by France* Public opinion i n France and Lngiand showed a wide diver- gence on the Council Issue. Briand favored an increase i n the Council by the addition of Poland. This would provide a coun- ter-weight against the newly-acquired power of Germany. This stand was endorsed by public opinion i n France and Poland and also by the" B r i t i s h Foreign Secretary, S i r Austin Chamberlain. Yet i n England both parliament and people were d e f i n i t e l y against an. enlargement of the Council at t h i s time for two reasons, i n the f i r s t instance i t would make the Council more 1. Toynbee, op. c i t . , 1925, v o l . 2, p. 61* 58 cumbersome and remove the f l e x i b i l i t y which the smaller group would have* Secondly, i t had a l l the appearance of a direot affront to Germany* How was the problem of French security involved i n t h i s question of increase of the Council? To ans- wer t h i s question we must r e c a l l that the French people, quite j u s t i f i a b l y i n t h e i r opinion, looked upon the League as an organization established e s p e c i a l l y for t h e i r support. As a r e s u l t , they f e l t i t quite i n order that t h e i r government should give support to P o l i s h i n t e r e s t s . France was torn be- tween two fears; F i r s t , Russia, f o r whom Franoe s t i l l had a very r e a l antagonism, made advances to Poland which resulted i n a rumor of a commercial treaty and far more important, a f e e l i n g i n France that a new rapprochement was i n the o f f i n g between Germany and Russia as a r e s u l t of the commercial trea- 1 ty negotiated by M. Chioherin i n B e r l i n on October 12, 1925. The Frenoh had no r i g h t to question the s i n c e r i t y of Germany's 2 intention to f u l f i l l the conditions of League membership. Re- gardless of t h i s fact, Briand was unconsciously influenced by public opinion i n his e f f o r t s to f i n d a solution to the con- troversy centering around the question of Germany's admission to the Council; The s p e c i a l session of the League Assembly ended on March 1. Ib i d . , v o l . 2, p. 65. This treaty, following only three years a f t e r the Treaty of Rapallo, disturbed the French. 2. Anon., ( e d i t o r i a l ) , New Statesman, v o l . 27, No. 678, A p r i l 24, 1926, p. 33. 59 1 17 without f u l f i l l i n g i t s obl i g a t i o n to Germany. Briand had again over-reached himself; S i r Austin Chamberlain was equally at f a u l t , yet he took his lead from Briand, who had a greater 2 understanding of the European s i t u a t i o n . Although Germany was admitted to membership i n the F a l l of 1926, yet i f M. Briand and the B r i t i s h Foreign Secretary had had the true Locarno • s p i r i t , Locarno could have become a r e a l i t y several months 3 before. During the period which elapsed a f t e r the fiasco i n March over the question of enlarging the Council and the accep- tance of Germany i n the F a l l , seeds of doubt were planted, R u s s i a rained a v e r i t a b l e barrage of abuse against the League, 4 a T r e a t y of Friendship between Germany and Russia was signed and most serious of a l l , the wisdom and s i n c e r i t y of S i r Austin Chamberlain and Briand was challenged, unce awakened, par- t i c u l a r l y i n the mind of the oppressed Germans, t h i s doubt was hard to eradicate, i f Stresemann could have addressed his people he might with j u s t i f i c a t i o n have said, "In spite of a l l t h i s our best p o l i c y i s s t i l l to get i n the League. We w i l l byythis gain concessions which w i l l make us stronger; When we are strong enough we w i l l throw o f f a l l pretence and take our r i g h t f u l place. We w i l l not have to bargain then." 1. Toynbee, op. c i t . , 1926, p. 52. 2. Huddleston, s i s l e y , Briandissimo, New Statesman, v o l . 26, March 20, 1926, p.. 702. 3. Harris, J±. Wilson, The breakdown: at Geneva, Contemporary Review, v o l . 129, A p r i l , 1926, p. 416. 4. A p r i l 24, 1926, Toynbee, 1926, p. 151. 60 That he did not i s greatly to his cr e d i t , but the nation- a l i s t s i n Germany were b u s i l y at work along t h i s very l i n e , , i t was hoped that Locarno would mean the end of the Great War. i t was hoped that i t would mean the emergence of Germany from p o l i t i c a l and psychological i s o l a t i o n , i t was hoped that i t would dry up what Lord Baldwin i n 1925 c a l l e d 1 the "quaking bog" of European uncertainty. Yet i t did none of these things. To know why we can best turn to a remark made by Briand who said, "Locarno gave us a l l the security we need, but the French armies must be kept on the Rhine to assure payments of Reparations and the f u l f i l l m e n t of L i s - 2 armament conditions." 1. Steed, Wickham, Locarno and B r i t i s h Interests, Journal of the B r i t i s h I n s t i t u t e of Foreign A f f a i r s , v o l . 4, November, 1925, p. 286. 2; Anon., France and America Renew a Treaty, New York, Outlook, v o l . 148, February 15, 1928, p. 258. CHAPTER IV. BRIAND'S WORK AND INFLUENCE 1926-1952 CHAPTER IV. BRIAND*S WORK AND INFLUENCE 1926-1952 I t has been stated e a r l i e r i n t h i s study that the French were w i l l i n g to extend every form of assistance within t h e i r power to the League of Nations to assure the peace of the world* In return France expected the League to provide her with adequate national security, l e t u n t i l the time should come when she could t r u s t e n t i r e l y to the League as the sole means for her protection she must continue her system of form- ing a l l i a n c e s . This was the p o l i c y of Briand. During the summer of 1926 when a solution was being sought for the problem which had arisen over Germany's entry into the Council of the League, Briand turned his attention to the completion of his system of A l l i a n c e s already well be- gun i n the period p r i o r to Locarno. When observers examined the Central European scene during t h i s "breathing space" from the tension of the Locarno conferences they noted several very important factors, i n the f i r s t instance Czecho-Slovakia, Jugo-Slavia, and Rumania were busy unifying t h e i r relationships with each other by renewing t r e a t i e s of friendship and also with a l l i a n c e s involving m i l i t a r y commitments. At the same time these smaller Powers were coordinating their e f f o r t s i n order to present a u n i f i e d front on questions of t e r r i t o r i a l adjustments advanced by Germany and her former a l l i e s . The second observation was the r e a l i z a t i o n that the L i t t l e Entente Powers were cl o s e l y watching to observe the extent to which 61 62 the Great Powers carried out t h e i r Locarno commitments. Owing to his f a i l u r e — o r r e f u s a l — t o understand the com- p l e x i t i e s of French f inane ey Briand was forced from the Prem- iers h i p shortly a f t e r Locarno. His successor, M. Poincare', carried on Briand's p o l i c y owing to the fact that i t had the popular support at the moment. He retained Briand as Foreign M i n i s t e r . Thus began Briand's long term as Minister of For- eign A f f a i r s during which his p o l i c i e s did much to shape the course of events i n Europe* Briand f e l t that a f i r m system of a l l i a n c e s with the L i t t l e Entente Powers was v i t a l l y necessary to the seourity of France, inasmuch as the French geographical s i t u a t i o n made them i n t e g r a l factors i n the French objective, the preser- vation of the "status quo". In accordance with t h i s plan Briand announced the Franco-Rumanian Treaty i n Paris on dune 1 10, 1926. This treaty was made when the Locarno s p i r i t was at i t s height; It omits any provisions which are obviously directed against a third 1 power and i n addition contains a supplement which lays down a procedure for the peaceful set- tlement of disputes between the two countries. This treaty compares very favorably with the treaty already negotiated with Czecho-Slovakia which was entered into during a period when l i t t l e sympathy was extended to the defeated powers, i n addition to the Franco-Rumanian Treaty, an agreement was negotiated between France and Jugo-Slavia at t h i s time although 1. Toynbee, A. J . , Survey of International A f f a i r s , 1926, p. 156, 63 i t was not made known for fear of arousing h o s t i l i t y i n I t a l y , Comment should be made at t h i s juncture on the general European si t u a t i o n as i t presented i t s e l f a f t e r the drawing up of these t r e a t i e s . France now had established a net-work of a l l i a n c e s which included Jugo-Slavia, Czecho-Slovakia, Rumania and Poland. Poland already had t r e a t i e s with these other smaller powers. Thus Briand*s security picture should have been complete. Yet i t was not. Already a new menace had presented i t s e l f i n the form of the aspiration of I t a l i a n Fascism for expansion into the south-east of Europe* The fundamental c o n f l i c t between France and I t a l y i n post-Locarno years lay i n the fact that Mussolini wanted to share equally with France i n the p a c i f i c a t i o n of Europe, where as France hoped to keep I t a l y i n a p o s i t i o n of permanent In- f e r i o r i t y ; This antagonism in.the south-east had i t s counter- part i n the Mediterranean where naval r i v a l r y led to animosity 2 between the two nations; I t was not long before France was forced to recognize the t r u t h of Count Bethlen's statement to the. Foreign A f f a i r s Committee of the Hungarian Chamber when he said that the development of the s i t u a t i o n i n Central Europe no longer depends on France alone but also on the i n - 3 fluence of various other states. The implication was not l o s t 1. Anon., Italp-French Relations, Manchester Guardian Weekly, v o l . 17, No. 24, December 16, 1927, p. 465; 2* This stand was taken by France at the Washington Naval Con ference, 1922, and held throughout e f f o r t s at naval disarmament; 3. Anon., Traite'' franco-yougoslay, L'Europe Nouvelle, No. 513 10 Decembre, 1927, p. 1645; 64 on the French yet Briand f e l t that a p a c i f i c approach to the I t a l i a n problem was the wisest p o l i c y . Consequently when the I t a l i a n d i ctator launched a p o l i c y of treaty-making i n the Balkan area, the French stood quietly but ever watchfully on guard; France was brought d i r e c t l y into the picture when I t a l i a n overtures to Jugo-Slavia f a i l e d owing to the fears of that country that Mussolini had some unrevealed plans re- garding Albania. Jugo-Slavia asked for r a t i f i c a t i o n of the Franco-Jugo-Slav Fact mentioned above; This was accomplished 1 November 11, 1927; Briand would have preferred to delay pub- l i c a t i o n of t h i s agreement owing to his fear that the I t a l i a n d i c t ator would view the Treaty i n much the same l i g h t as did both the Left and Right press i n Franoe—as a direct attack 2 on I t a l y . I t i s of interest to note that opinion i n France which i n the l a s t nine years had endorsed the t r e a t i e s with Poland, Rumania and Czecho-Slovakia without serious comment, reacted vigorously to the treaty with Jugo-Slavia. These t r e a t i e s were directed towards defeated powers. Yet i t was f e l t that the above-mentioned pact was direoted against a former a l l y which was a r i s i n g power i n Europe as well and Briand was thought to be "involving France i n an undertaking, 3 the danger of which was as r e a l as i t was unnecessary." 1. Loc. c i t . 2; Anon., France's Network of A l l i a n c e s , Manchester Guard- ian Weekly, v o l . 17, No. 19, November 11, 1927, • p. 364. 3. Ibid., p.. 364. 65 Although Premier Mussolini, maintained that t h i s treaty was merely a part of Briand*s | o l i c y of building a l l i a n c e s , the enthusiasm with which i t was received i n Belgrade convinced observers that there i t was looked upon as a counter-balance 1 to the increasing intimacy between I t a l y and Albania. The 2 Treaty of Tirana signed eleven days l a t e r by these two states was a d i r e c t answer to Jugo-Slavia and an i n d i r e c t one to Briand. The former A l l i e s of 1'rance, Great B r i t a i n and the United States had l e f t France with an estate which she was finding i t hard to maintain i n face of r i s i n g opposition, not the least of which was the new threat from I t a l y . For France, Jugo-Slavia was a buffer state against I t a l i a n expansion. One of the basic problems i n the Italo-Frenoh differences was that I t a l y demanded everything from France and had nothing but the o f f e r of friendship to give i n return. Briand could not see wherein France could benefit i n a p r a c t i c a l sense. He hoped that the Yugo-Slav Fact would be followed by I t a l i a n r e c o n c i l i a t i o n with that state. The Treaty of Tirana was his 3 answer. He was convinced by t h i s action that the I t a l i a n aim was to construct a system of a l l i a n c e s to counter-balance 1. Anon. I e d i t o r i a l ) , Manchester Guardian Weekly, v o l . 16, no* 23, June 10, 1927, p. 444. 2. Anon., Traite' 5'd'alliance defensive entre l ' l t a l i e et I'Albanie, signe' a Tirana, l e 22 Novembre, 1927, L'Eur- ope Nouvelle, No. 513, 10 De'cembre, 1927j p. 1647. 3. Anon., Le traite'franeo-yougoslav, L'Europe Nouvelle, No. 509, 12 Novembre,.1927, p. 1494. 66 1 that of the Frenchi Although both systems of a l l i a n c e s aimed at the preser- vation of peace yet the tension whioh developed caused r e- lat i o n s to become so strained that other European nations be- gan to fear that post-Locarno security was menaced and that the danger might spread to other areas through the envolve-? ments of these respective nations with t h e i r a l l i a n c e s . Briand sensed t h i s growing fear and eight days a f t e r the Treaty of Tirana he temporarily r e l i e v e d Franco-Italian ten- sion by declaring that he was always ready to undertake d i s - cussions with I t a l y at any time and that he had the support of the whole Cabinet i n t h i s assertion. The f i r s t r e s u l t of t h i s statement was an agreement made by the I t a l i a n ambassa- dor i n Pa r i s with France towards the c l a r i f i c a t i o n of the status of nationals of either country resident i n the other. The I t a l i a n diotator responded to these overtures of Briand i n his statement to the I t a l i a n Senate that e f f o r t s towards an understanding with France which would eliminate oauses of 2 f r i c t i o n would be undertaken i n the near future. This e f f o r t of Briand might be regarded as a return to the pure Locarno s p i r i t . What success t h i s attempted rapproohement would have was questioned i n I t a l i a n quarters i n Great Britain—where i t was f e l t that because of I t a l y ' s i n a b i l i t y to o f f e r France 1. Gerando, F* de, Les Balkans Apres Le Pacte de Tirana, Revue Po l i t i q u e and Parlementaire, Tome 130, 10 Mars, 1927, p. 422. 2. Speech made at Rome, December 15, 1927. 67 much to complete a bargain i t was problematical whether any 1 l a s t i n g settlement could be achieved. I t a l y ' s demands were two-fold, i n the f i r s t instance she demanded that France grant her complete equality with herself i n the work of con- s o l i d a t i n g south-eastern Europe on the Treaty basis* This the French f e l t i n the int e r e s t s of t h e i r national security, they could not do; In the second case the I t a l i a n s i n s i s - ted that they be given naval equality with France. Here again, i n the interests of t h e i r national security, the French f e l t that they could not comply. However, as a dir e c t re- sul t of the lessening of tension between France and I t a l y the announcement of the I t a l i a n d i c tator that the'^Eour Great Eur- opean Feace Treaties were not beyond the pale as far as re- v i s i o n was concerned did not arouse b i t t e r protest i n France. I t could be looked upon as a deliberate play to the d i s s a t - i s f i e d rowers i n south-eastern Europe, i n his observation of the s i t u a t i o n , Herr von Hheinbaben, a former under-sec- retary i n the German ministry of Foreign A f f a i r s wrote i n A p r i l of 1927, that: "Ruled as she i s today by a n a t i o n a l i s t government,Italy i s more than usually i n c l i n e d to expansion, and from an expansionist policy she i s p r i n c i p a l l y restrained "2 by the attitude of France." Italo-French re l a t i o n s did 1. Anon., Italo-German Relations, Manchester Guardian Weekly, v o l . 17, Mo. 24, December 16, 1927, p. 465* 2. Jouvenel, Henri de, France and I t a l y , Foreign A f f a i r s , v o l . 5, JMo. 4, July 27, 1927, p. 546, c i t i n g statements of herr von Rheinbaben from the Taglische Rundschau, A p r i l 27, 1927. 68 Improve however, and t h i s enabled Briand to focus his atten- t i o n on the Rhineland problem. The idea of a r e a l entente was one of the aspirations of both Briand and Stresemann when they met at Thoiry to t r y and move nearer to a settlement of t h e i r national differences through personal consultations, i n order that a d e f i n i t e basis for security oould be achieved Briand f e l t that the firm establishment of Republican sentiment throughout Germany was necessary. This would prevent any i d e o l o g i c a l clash be- tween the two countries and help to curb the power of the re- actionary forces i n Germany. Secondly, France wanted Ger- many to show some r e a l willingness to make good the destruct- ion wrought on French s o i l , and l a s t l y , to grant a more cor- d i a l reception to Poland and her L i t t l e Entente A l l i e s as po- l i t i c a l e n t i t i e s . France believed that these smaller Powers would grow as p o l i t i c a l e n t i t i e s i n spite of the opinion of 1 economists to the contrary. German commentators questioned the s i n c e r i t y of the French for they asked why did they force the post-war German government to assume r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the war when they had already l a i d r e s p o n s i b i l i t y at the door 2 of the Kaiser, i n 1815 the A l l i e s did not place a heavy i n - demnity on the French people. They were merely required to pay a comparatively small sum and to support an army of occupa- t i o n . Castlereagh himself had made the assertion that no 1* Sanchez, A. Mt de, Further Economic Consequences of the Peace, Foreign A f f a i r s , v o l . 1, No. 1, September 15, 1922, p. 158. 2i Kautsky, K a r l , Germany Since the War, Foreign A f f a i r s , v o l . 1, Mo. 2, December 15, 1922,~~p. 101. 69 peace could be wise that envolved the r u i n of one of the countries concerned i n the making of the treaty. To a large extent they blamed Napoleon f o r the unrest and l e t responsi- b i l i t y rest there. In addition, i n 1918 the German people repudiated the Kaiser,necessitating his f l i g h t tp Holland for 1 safety* Stresemann f e l t himself faced with a s i t u a t i o n how- 2 ever, the r e a l i t i e s of which were only too apparent. The German Foreign Minister c a l l e d for the evacuation of the 3 Rhineland. briand offered the second and t h i r d zones. French troops from those zones were to be transferred into the t e r - r i t o r y s t i l l under French occupation, however, at t h i s time the influence of M. Poincare had to be considered and he was able to interpret A r t i c l e 431 of the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s ( I f before the expiration of f i f t e e n years Germany complies with a l l the undertakings r e s u l t i n g from the present treaty, the occupying forces w i l l be withdrawn immediately) so as to j u s t i f y continued occupation by l i n k i n g up evacuation with Reparations* Part of the compensation for evacuation d i s - cussed at Thoiry was to have been 250-300 m i l l i o n s of gold 4 marks s p e c i f i c a l l y earmarked for the Saar mines. At that 1. Loc. c i t . 2. Stern-Rubarth, Edgar, Three Men Tried, London, Duckworth, 1939. An excellent character study of Stresemann i s given i n t h i s volume. 3. Toynbee, op* c i t . , 1929, p. 110. 4. Figure stated i n the Frankfurter Zeitung, February 22, 1926, c i t e d by Toynbee, op. c i t . , 1927, p. 110. 70 time t h i s sum would have been of invaluable assistance because of the precarious f i n a n c i a l s i t u a t i o n i n Prance, but M. Poin- care xhad succeeded i n r e s t o r i n g confidence through re-esta- b l i s h i n g the soundness of the franc and t h i s enabled the French to disregard t h i s factor as a consideration i n the question of evacuation. The occupation of the Rhineland might be regarded as a monument to diplomatic s t u p i d i t y . During the period 1926-1928 the French and B r i t i s h could come to no understanding on a common po l i e y . ..Dr:* Stresemann, 1 f e e l i n g that the B r i t i s h were sympathetic to the idea of evac- uation, t r i e d to get the English to bring pressure against France which S i r Austin Chamberlain would not do. At t h i s period the English Rhineland p o l i c y seemed to be merely to feebly endorse that of the French, while within Germany Stres- emann was t r y i n g to hold the support of the people i n favor of his r e c o n c i l i a t i o n p o l i c y . French propaganda maintained that there was s t i l l no security i n Europe, i t was unques- tionably r i g h t , but i t f a i l e d to r e a l i z e that the reason for 2 It lay at home. It i s d i f f i c u l t to estimate to what extent Briand was responsible for t h i s unfortunate turn which French p o l i c y had taken following Locarno. Poincare''had himself ,1. Glasgow, George, The Gloom of 1928, Contemporary Review, vol.-135, January 1929 , p. 101. Statement made by Mr. Stanley Baldwin, November 9, 1928, at banquet of the Lord Mayor of London. 2* Rober-Raynaud, M., La France en Sarre, L'Europe Nouvelle, No. 507, 29 Octobre, 1927, p. 1455. ' The French thesis i s supported by t h i s writer through- out t h i s a r t i c l e . 71 shown his support of the p o l i c y of Briand throughout the Locarno conferences, yet he never f u l l y persuaded himself that his policy of intimidation i n the Ruhr was wrong, even afte r }h><L.\\y&r;fiyjtx stand forced his withdrawal of the French forces from that area, 'i'o Briand a f t e r Locarno, his occupancy of the Quai d'Orsay became somewhat of a r e l i g i o n with him^ yet i n t h i s lesser post he was forced to f a l l i n l i n e with the wishes of r o i n c a r e / i n order to r e t a i n his o f f i c e . During t h i s period scant progress was made towards evacuation of the Rhine- land and as a r e s u l t France was no nearer permanent security* Turning to survey the course of Franco-Russian r e l a t i o n s we find they have followed just as tortuous a route as the Franco-German negotiations over the Rhineland. Angered by the withdrawal of Russia from the A l l i e d side and piqued by the defeat of the White Russians i n South Russia whom they had p u b l i c l y supported, the French found i t easy to erect a wall between themselves and the new and unknown state of Soviet Rus- s i a . Their support of Poland during the Russo-Folish war did not soften the hearts of the Russians towards France and the Soviet r e f u s a l to honor the debts contracted by Imperial Rus- s i a united the French people behind t h e i r Government's a n t i - Russian p o l i c y . Much has been written about the venality of the French press, and there i s small doubt that p r i o r to the Great War t h i s c r i t i c i s m was deserved. Certain sections of the French press were responsible for the contraction of these very debts which they ranted on so b i t t e r l y a f t e r the war was over, i n return f o r money considerations the French newspapers 72 persuaded the peasants and i n d u s t r i a l workers to loan t h e i r savings to'the Russian government. Poincare'was involved as well i n t h i s manoeuv<r.:ling;» i t i s estimated that one thousand m i l l i o n pounds s t e r l i n g of the savings of small holders went 1 to Russia i n t h i s way; The Soviet authorities were loath to acknowledge t h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s for payment, however on October 28, 1924, the French government formally recognized the Soviet administration as the l e g a l government of Russia; The French leaders were tr y i n g to adjust the new Russia to t h e i r post-war security system and as well were anxious to share i n the Russian markets which had been opened to Germany by the Treaty of Rappallo negotiated during the Conference 2 of Cannes. The period of the Franco-Russian e f f o r t to re - e s t a b l i s h normal diplomatic r e l a t i o n s as well as commercial, runs f a i r l y p a r a l l e l to the improvement of r e l a t i o n s with Germany p r i o r to and immediately following the Locarno Pact. The Russians f e l t that establishing the Frenoh connection would aid them 3 In strengthening t h e i r own p a r t i c u l a r i n s t i t u t i o n s . They need- ed, above a l l , cash and c r e d i t s . But before any agreement could be made the French government i n s i s t e d that some understanding 1. Anon., The Hrench Press and Russia, The Nation and Athenaeum, v o l . 34, No. 19, February 9, 1924, p. 659; 2. Anon., Franco-Soviet Trade, Foreign Po l i c y Association In- formation Service, v o l . 6, No. 19, November 26, 1930, p. 371. 3. Rakovsky, C h r i s t i a n , The Foreign Po l i c y of Soviet Russia, Foreign AfsEairs, v o l . 4, No 4, July, 1926, p. 574. 73 be arrived at concerning the debts of the Imperial Regime. Many conferences were held, the course of which does not enter into the f i e l d of this study, but the two parties were unable to come to any decision. Any payments which Russia could under- take must of necessity be extended over a long period of time and the French were adamant that the payments should be larger and cover a shorter period. During the Russo-Polish War the Russian leader,Trotsky vouchsafed the fact that the Soviet was about to launch a grandiose scheme which would envolve the conquest of Germany 1 and France a f t e r the suppression of Poland. It was not long, however, before these dreamers began to appreciate the scope of t h e i r problem and they turned to the use of subversive methods* The Third i n t e r n a t i o n a l which had been formed a year pr i o r to the public declaration of t h i s plan was the agency 2 used. I t was t h i s organization which the French feared. France had, since the establishment of the Third Republic been a r e - fuge for e x i l e s of many n a t i o n a l i t i e s and t h i s made her task of counteracting the work of t h i s organization very d i f f i c u l t . In s pite of the fact that there grew up i n France a large group which f e l t that the Third International was a c t u a l l y a menace to the security of the country, h e r r i o t , Poincare'and 1. Chernov, V i c t o r , Bolshevik Romance and R e a l i t y , Foreign A f f a i r s , v o l . 5, No. 2, January, 1927, p. 307. 2* Anon., La i i i e Internationale contre l a France, son arme'e et ses colonies, Le Correspondant, Tome 299, 10 Mai, 1925, p. 321* 74 others refused to sever diplomatic r e l a t i o n s with Russia as 1 did the English government. They f e l t that shutting t h e i r eyes to an ©xi'st:emt, danger did not remove that danger. Briand, also was i n favor of the continuation of diplomatic r e l a t i o n s . " I t i s by charity, patience and tolerance that we can be of 2 service to Russia," Herriot sa i d about the time France entered into formal r e l a t i o n s with that country, and Briand carried on that policy i n spite of Russia's rather d i f f i c u l t behavior - during the period of the Locarno negotiations. She looked upon the whole League system as an innocent-looking organization b u i l t up by B r i t a i n and France to strengthen t h e i r grasp on 3 t h e i r " i l l gotten gains". In accordance with t h i s b e l i e f she t r i e d to detach Poland from her a l l i a n c e with France at the time of the d i f f i c u l t y over the Council seat. French states- men, anxious about the security of t h e i r country, might well have been pleased when Poland c u r t l y informed Russia that economic discussions were quite i n order but that security .4 issues should be l e f t to Locarno. During the three years immediately following Locarno the i d e o l o g i c a l differences between Russia and the western 1. Over the Z i n o v i e f f Letter p a r t i a l l y ; Text i n Toynbee, op. c i t . , 1924, Appendix, p. 493. 2. Herriot, Edouard, The Program of L i b e r a l France, Foreign A f f a i r s , v o l . 2, No. 4, June 15, 1924. 3; Machray, Robert, The Red Reaction to Locarno, Fortnightly Review, v o l . 119, January 1, 1926, p. 158. 4; European Economic and P o l i t i c a l Survey [issued by the Reference Service on International A f f a i r s , P a r i s j , No. 18, May 31, 1926, p. 14. 75 democracies were s t i l l too potent a force to make for close cooperation. No success was achieved between France and Rus- s i a towards settlement of the i r debt problem and from the se- ourity angle Russia s t i l l remained an enigma. On August 27, 1 1928, Russia received an i n v i t a t i o n from the united States through France to adhere to the Briand-Kellogg r a c t . The French fear of Germany, the gradual s t a b i l i z i n g of Russia i n - t e r n a l l y and the waning French fear of that country made France the i d e a l country through which to transmit such an i n v i t a t i o n . Russia had come within the range of French statesmen guarding secur i t y . In looking at the European scene i n 1928 with the object of getting a panoramic picture we see a continent beset with a l l i a n c e s and counter-dalliances. Under the cover of the League the western nations have established fundamentally the same system as was i n use i n pre-war Europe. In some groups the partners are di f f e r e n t * Not the least responsible of post- War statesmen for t h i s s i t u a t i o n was Briand. Locarno was a great step forward for peace, yet by 1928 considerable of the enthusiasm of 1925 had disappeared and a new note of cynicism seemed to be creeping i n . Briand envisaged a Europe at peace through the League of Nations, but he was not big enough to place his whole trust i n that organization. That he genuinely sought peace i s never questioned, but only his method i s open to censure, h i s reactions during the negotiations of the ract 1. The United States was not i n diplomatic r e l a t i o n s with Russia at t h i s time. 76 whioh bears h i s name p a r t i a l l y i l l u s t r a t e t h i s weakness. An- xious to improve Franco^American r e l a t i o n s which had become somewhat strained owing to the r e f u s a l of the French govern- ment to take part i n a new maritime conference, Briand said: France wishes to l i v e i n an atmosphere of confidence and peace and the evidence of t h i s i s her signature of the agreements tending to hold at bay the threat of c o n f l i c t . . . F o r those whose l i v e s are devoted to securing t h i s l i v i n g r e a l i t y of a p o l i c y of peace the united States and France already appear before the world as morally i n f u l l agreement.;.France would be w i l l i n g to subscribe p u b l i c l y with the United states to any mutual agreement to outlaw war...as between these two countries. 1 What was behind Briand's proposal? His desire was to conclude a b i l a t e r a l agreement between France and the united States which would eliminate war between these two countries only. By thus l i m i t i n g the proposal i t would not commit France to any such p o l i c y on the European continent thus leaving the way open for her to take defensive action i n case of aggression by Germany. T h u s Briand would preserve the i n s t i t u t i o n of war as the means of assuring the triumph of his post-war po l i c y i n Europe and at the same time protect France by making the p a c i f i c settlement of a l l differences with the united States mandatory. Mr. Kellogg was not deceived by t h i s lin.e of approach on the part of Briand. A treaty of t h i s kind between the two countries only would t i e the American hands i n respect to France and might even envolve the united States i n a war of which France was a part. The a t t i t u d e of Mr. Kellogg was shown 1. Foreign P o l i c y Association information Serviee; Text of Letter, v o l . 3, No. 7, June.8, 1927, p. 87* 77 i n his reply to Briand through the French ambassador at Wash- 1 ington. He was very favorable to a declaration of peace but he declared that i t should be a general one. He argued that since the aim of both France and the united States i s to abolish war, why l i m i t i t , l e t a l l the Great Fowers be included. Briand's proposal was being stretched far beyond his o r i g i n a l idea. He began to r e a l i z e from the point of French security the s i t u a t i o n was becoming complicated. This broadening of the scope of the proposal by the American statesman caused _ much disquiet i n France where i t was f e l t that the complete renunciation of war would t i e French hands i n case Germany should repudiate the V e r s a i l l e s Treaty. Also i t would n u l l i f y the value of the sanctions created by the Covenant and by the Locarno t r e a t i e s i n which France placed so great a f a i t h , i n accordance with t h i s sentiment Briand t r i e d to solve the pro- blem by s p e c i f i c a l l y introducing the q u a l i f i c a t i o n of a war 2 of aggression which he maintained would cover the French ob- jections to the phrase "war as an instrument of national p o l i c y " which was too broad from a French point of view. Thus the basic cause of disagreement, i t w i l l be seen, was that Mr. Kel- logg wanted to outlaw war on any grounds while Briand main- 3 tained that defensive wars should be permitted* . French public 1. The Secretary of State at Washington to the French Ambass- ador (Claudel), December 28, 1927, International Con- c i l i a t i o n , No. 243 Documents, 1928, p. 465. 2. 'i'he French Ambassador (Claudel) to the Secretary of State, Washington, January 5, 1928, i n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n c i l i a t i o n , , No. 243 Documents, 1928, p. 466. 3. M i l l e r , David Hunter, The Pact of r a r i s , New York, G. Putnam's Sons, 1928, p. 38. 78 opinion at t h i s time was conjecturing as to whether the Amer- ican Secretary of State wasunot just t r y i n g to give s a t i s - 1 f a c t i o n "aux aspirations du mysticisme p a c i f i s t e " without enough attention to the r e a l i t i e s of the post-war s i t u a t i o n i n Europe. I t i s of v i t a l interest to observers that Briand had brought on a s i t u a t i o n through his l e t t e r to the Ameri- can people from which he now might have to retreat, i n order to avoid t h i s Briand dispatched a new note i n which he l a i d 2 down conditions f o r which the commentator, "Pertinax" f e l t the Foreign Minister should be congratulated as they would l i k e l y put an end to the discussions and i f by chance they should be accepted, they would deprive the proposed treaty 3 of any value or s i g n i f i c a n c e i The expected stagnation i n the negotiations did not occur as Mr. Kellogg disregarded the l a t e s t objections of 4 Briand and re-stated the American thesis i n a new note d i s - patched to the Governments of Great B r i t a i n , Germany, I t a l y , and Japan. This was followed almost immediately by a new Draft Treaty thought by the French to safeguard t h e i r 1; Anon., La Reponse de M. B iand a Mr. Kellogg, L»Europe wouvelle, No. 530, 7 A v r i l , 1928, p. 450. 2. At t h i s time a p o l i t i c a l writer on The Conservative Echo de r a r i s . 3. Anon., War Outlawry proposal, Manchester Guardian Weekly v o l . 18, No. 15, A p r i l 13, 1928, p. 284. 4. International C o n c i l i a t i o n No. 243, p. 478, A p r i l 13, 1928. 79 1 country's security. With, these two texts before them, i t was hoped that the Great .rowers could see both sides of the pro- blem and that some common ground could be reached. As one French writer said, " C r i s t a l i i s e e s dans des textes rendus publics, les oppositions de points de vue vont s'affirmer en- core d'avantage et l a c o n c i l i a t i o n des deus theses n'en sera 2 sans doute pas rendue plus f a c i l e . " Franoe was v i t a l l y con- cerned that the proposed pact should cover the League Covenant ( A r t i c l e 1, French draft of A p r i l 20], i n order that she could protect her continental a l l i a n c e system p a r t i c u l a r l y her en- volvements with her a l l y , Poland, which country had already caused considerable d i f f i c u l t y at Locarno, and also over the question of the enlarging of the League Council; Public opinion i n France seemed to favor the American draft of A p r i l 13, whioh had been dispatched by Mr. Kellogg to the Powers, i t was feared that further French objections 3 would put France Inc. a very bad l i g h t . However, the American Secretary of State dispatched a new draft to the Powers pre- viously mentioned and in i addition, Czecho-Slovakia and Poland. It was accepted by a l l countries named. In addition a l l other countries having c o n s t i t u t i o n a l governments were inv i t e d to 1. Ibi d . , p. 481. i t was thought that M. Poincare was behind much of these negotiations, as M. Briand was i l l at the time. Bound Table, The Outlawry of War, v o l . 18, June 1928, p. 455. 2. Anon., Le project Kellogg, L'Europe Nouvelle, No. 532, 21 A v r i l , 1928,. p. 55. 3. Huddleston, S i s l e y , European A l l i a n c e s , New Statesman, v o l ; 31, No. 782, A p r i l 21, 1928, p. 38. 80 1 adhere. What was the significance of the Briand-Kellogg Pact i n - sofar as French security was concerned? i t has been stated e a r l i e r i n t h i s study that the new element of cynicism was creeping into international a f f a i r s during the period pre- ceding t h i s r a c t . l o a c e r t a i n extent t h i s was temporarily/ arrested; This was important for prance because i t meant that the accusation that she might not r e a l l y desire peace a t a l l would be s t i l l e d , she had shown her desire and w i l l i n g - ness to cooperate; France had p a r t i c u l a r l y to face t h i s c r i - t i c i s m from the united States and Briand hoped that for a while at le a s t t h i s would be silenced. l e t at the time of the signing of t h i s r a r i s reace Fact, France was staging the 2 greatest m i l i t a r y manoeuvres i n her history. From the view- point of the outside observer t h i s appeared inconsistent, but for the r e a l i s t , Briand, i t was good business, i t showed the German people that France was s t i l l a supporter of the peace e f f o r t s yet was not prepared to brook any t r i f l i n g over the Reparations question. By the briand-jxellogg ract the 3 right of a nation to self-defense was retained. This 1; M i l l e r , David hunter, op. c i t . , Addendum, p. 149. 2. nuddleston, S i s l e y , An Act of F a i t h , New Statesman, v o l ; 31, No. 801, September:.!, 1928, p. 628. 3. A r t i c l e s 1 and 2 of the text of the Briand-Kellogg treaty. Although not s p e c i f i c a l l y mentioned t h i s s i t u a t i o n i s understood, i f Germany should take action, the con- diti o n s governing an aggressor come into play. Sieburg, F r i e d r i c h , Briand, Foreign A f f a i r s , v o l . 10, No. 4, July 19 32, p; 586. 81 p a r t i c u l a r l y pleased France as the French were l e f t the power to protect themselves i n case of attack by Germany. The treaty of V e r s a i l l e s , (Covenant) and the Treaties of Locarno were not affected by the new Fact. Any breach of the Briand- Kellogg Fact would mean a simultaneous breach of the Covenant 1 of the League of Nations, i n the world at large the new Fact was received with varying degrees of enthusiasm. The re- actionary and r a d i c a l press was l a r g e l y condemnatory or 2 3 apathetic but the more moderate organs f e l t that t h i s Pact was a step i n advance and that i t would a s s i s t the cause which every nation maintained was the goal of i t s internat- i o n a l p o l i c y — p e a c e f u l cooperation. T h i s thought was very ably expressed by an American c r i t i c , George W. WIckersham, when he wrote that i f people r e a l i z e the f u l l scope of the .tact "they w i l l v i s i t with p o l i t i c a l infamy those who would deride t h e i r f a i t h and v i o l a t e t h e i r honour by making a mock- 4 ery of i t s r e a l import." Briand's record i n italo-French r e l a t i o n s In the post- war years has shown moderation and r e s t r a i n t . Rather than conclude an exclusive pact with Jugo-Slavia he urged the 1. M i l l e r , David Hunter, op. c i t . , p. 131. 2. Cocks, F. Seymour, The American Dove and the B r i t i s h Lamb, London, The S o c i a l i s t Review, New Series, No. 24, June, 1928, p. 8. 3. Dumont-Wilden, L., La R a t i f i c a t i o n du Pacte Briand-Kellogg Revue Bleue, No. 3, 2 Fevrier, 1928. 4i Wiekersham, G. W., The Pact of Paris; A Gesture o r a Pledg Foreign A f f a i r s , v o l ; 7, No. 3, A p r i l 1929, p. 356. 82 inclusion- of I t a l y and even refrained from signing that Pact u n t i l l a t e r so that the I t a l i a n d i c t a t o r could be the f i r s t 1 to append his signature. However, Signor Mussolini refused to adhere and the Franco-Jugo-Slav Treaty was r a t i f i e d Nov- ember 11, 1927. i t appeared from t h i s that I t a l y was deter- mined to enter upon a path divergent from that of France. To the French, t h e i r own lay on the road to peace, and there- fore that of I t a l y could only lead to war. This f e e l i n g was confirmed immediately a f t e r the r e f u s a l of Mussolini to enter into a treaty with France and Jugo-Slavia when I t a l i a n en- gineers began to construct m i l i t a r y roads a l l converging on 2 ' the French f r o n t i e r , i n addition, during the period of approx- imately one year while Briand was waiting for Mussolini's answer to his overtures for peace, the I t a l i a n dictator con- 3 eluded a treaty of c o n c i l i a t i o n and n e u t r a l i t y with Spain. The French regarded t h i s as a d i r e c t affront to dugo-Slavla and as the f i r s t move towards encirclement of France. Fascist I t a l y was becoming a po t e n t i a l menace to French security. Both France and I t a l y i n common with other European countries adhered to the Briand-lvellogg Fact to outlaw war.N During the months which followed i t became apparent that 1. Sforza, Comte Carlo, I t a l i e et France, Revue de F a r i s , Tome 4, 15 J u i l l e t , 1930, p. 721. 2. Aubert, Louis, France and I t a l y , Foreign A f f a i r s , v o l . 9, No. 2, January 1931, p. 237. 3. August 7, 1926. Foreign P o l i c y Association Information Service, v o l . 3, No. 1, March 16, 1927, p. 1. 83 neither country was prepared to take i t too seriously u n t i l a f t e r they had achieved t h e i r respective aims. The entry of Germany into the League and the growing power of I t a l y caused a loosening of the bonds between France and the L i t t l e Entente states. Where onoe these nations would have jumped at the crack of the French whip now a gr a v i t a t i o n of Czecho-Slovakia 1 towards Germany and Rumania towards I t a l y took place. How- ever, Briand persisted i n his e f f o r t s towards a peaceful set- tlement of differences, i n spite of the dispatch of M. Beau- marehais, one of the most successful French c o l o n i a l admin- i s t r a t o r s , to Rome, no settlement was reached. The e f f o r t s of French statesmen were to a considerable extent thwarted by the press and people of both countries which indulged i n a campaign of mutual recrimination which went to absurd lengthsi Accusations by the French that the I t a l i a n s were savages and the friendship of French Cabinet ministers for ant i - F a s c i s t emigres did nothing to further the eff o r t s to- 2 wards c o n c i l i a t i o n . When i t became apparent that no progress could be made towards settlement of differences on the con- tinent, the sphere of interest s h i f t e d to the Mediterranean where the problem of naval parity was rapidl y coming to the fore i n italo-French r e l a t i o n s . This w i l l be dealt with l a t e r i n t h i s study. 1. Huddleston, S i s l e y , A Diplomatic S h i f t i n g , New Statesman, v o l . 31, No. 788, June 2, 1928, p. 249. 2. Newman, E. W. P., Franco-Italian Relations, Contemporary Review, v o l . 138, August 1930, p. 155. 84 An aot of f a i t h must never be made to look r i d i c u l o u s . In the Pact of Paris the Great Powers solemnly renounced war as an Instrument of national p o l i c y , The continued occupation of the Rhineland looked f o o l i s h a f t e r Locarno, i t s continu- ation a f t e r the pact of Paris would almost appear offensive. Por years the occupation of the Rhineland had been explained by the French on the ground of secu r i t y . No further reason had been vouchsafed even although the Treaty of "Versailles c a l l e d for the complete f u l f i l l i n g of a l l conditions l a i d 1 down there before evacuation would be considered. Almost at the moment of the signing of the Briand-Kellogg Pact Briand was presenting new demands to Stresemann; The f i n a n c i a l s i t - uation must be adjusted. German public opinion received a severe shock. The Germans might well have asked "Why should our every e f f o r t towards sincere cooperation be regarded as new evidence of hypocrisy? Why should not the same judgment be meted out to France, to B r i t a i n and even the United States of America?" For Stresemann, Briand's attitude was a severe blow, for he only too well r e a l i z e d the c r i t i c i s m his p o l i c y of r e c o n c i l i a t i o n was -going to have to contend with from his n a t i o n a l i s t opponents. Yet i t i s not hard to find a l o g i c a l reason f o r t h i s s t i f f e n i n g of the attitude of the French For- eign M i n i s t e r . He was no longer s o l e l y i n control of the foreign p o l i c y of France. Poincare'', the man who had saved 1. A r t i c l e 431. 85 1 the franc i n 1926 was making his presence f e l t i n the inters 2 national f i e l d . Briand who by the end of 1930 had served i n twenty-four Cabinets and had been prime minister many times as well,was beginning to look upon himself as an i n s t i t u t i o n , as a man above p o l i t i c s , as the father of Briandism—the accepted foreign p o l i c y of France. In order to r e t a i n his place i n the Quai d*0>rsay he would make himself amenable to the opinions of the premier of the time, hence to a c e r t a i n extent i t was a d i f f e r e n t Briand which Stresemann had to reckon with i n his struggle for the evacuation of the Rhine- land during the period following the r a t i f i c a t i o n of the Briand-Jiellogg Pact* The question of evacuation was o f f i c i a l l y raised by Pres- ident von Hindenburg to be followed shortly afterwards by Stresemann. The l a t t e r maintained that the p r i n c i p a l ob- stacle to improving Franco-German rel a t i o n s was the presence 3 of A l l i e d troops i n the Rhineland. It was a French s e m i - o f f i c i a l newspaper which said, r e f e r r i n g to the President's speech, that the world had become acuustomed to the r h e t o r i c a l e f f o r t s of German pol i c y , and therefore expressed the b e l i e f that German demands should not be taken too ser- i o u s l y . French public opinion would be gravely mis- taken i f i t accepted t h i s point of view.* 1. Sanchez, J . A. M. de, A Year of M. Poincare', Foreign A f f a i r s , v o l . 6, No. 1, October 1927, p. 41. 2. Huddleston, S i s l e y , The Group System, New Statesman, v o l . 36, No. 922, December 27, 1930, p. 353. 3. toynbee, op. c i t . , 1929, p. 170. 4. Address to the German Reichstag, January 30, 1928, ?Qieeler- Bennett, J . Y/. ed., Documents of international A f f a i r s , 1928, p. 33. 86 Briand r e p l i e d on February 2, 1929, i n a statement to the Sen- ate i n which he summarized the stand of France. Germany must consent to placing the Hhineland under perpetual supervision of the League of Nations. Dr. Stresemann's proposal that sup- e r v i s i o n should continue only u n t i l 1935 Briand said was i n - adequate; In addition, Germany must make positi v e f i n a n c i a l 1 proposals. He maintained that Germany must pay cash down at once; He advocated that German railway bonds be brought i n 2 under the Dawes scheme. The French Foreign Minister had l o s t ts a considerable amount of his idealism. For him t h i s was purely a matter of business. Just as i n the Fact of Paris of 1928, when the American Secretary of State took Briand fs pro- testations of peace too l i t e r a l l y and proposed a world pact instead of one r e s t r i c t e d to t h e i r two nations only, now :he . was experiencing the same qualms. Equality between France and Germany had been recognized i n the Locarno Pacts and i n the Briand-Kellogg Pact yet Briand wished to maintain some means of supremacy over Germany through the Rhineland eit h e r by m i l i t a r y or f i n a n c i a l means. Perhaps Briand did not be- l i e v e so much i n the worth of Locarno as he protested or pos- s i b l y his quest for security was so much of a phobia to him that i t warped his sense of j u s t i c e . Evidence of t h i s was given during the ninth session of the League Assembly when 1. Anon., M. Briand*s Terms to Germany, Manchester Guardian Weekly, v o l . 8, No. 6, February 10, 1928, p. 104. 2. Loc. c i t . 87 he stated that he doubted whether Germany had r e a l l y disarmed. "Who would oare to maintain," he asks, "that a great country, so powerfully equipped f o r peace, that i s to say, f o r industr- i a l development, would be at a loss to supply an army with war 1 materials?" I t must be admitted that Briand had some grounds for t h i s statement for i t was approximately at t h i s time that the German trade union leader, Bullerjahn, was sentenced to prison by a m i l i t a r y t r i b u n a l on a charge of treason for re- vealing to the A l l i e d Commission of Control that machine-guns •2 • were being manufactured i l l e g a l l y i n German foundries. In any case, his address seemed to d i s p e l the hope that the German plea for evacuation would be treated sympathetically by the French government. Lord Cushendun, who was taking S i r Austin Chamberlain's place at t h i s session seemed to take up a stand by the side of Briand. One French correspondent wrote, "Lord Cushendun, en definessant l a p o s i t i o n Britannique est venu con- 3 firmer puisamment l a p o s i t i o n francaise." No progress seemed possible by direot negotiation between 4 Briand and Dr. Muller but i n a private discussion between 1. Documents of International A f f a i r s , 1928, p* 43, Verbatim records of the speech by M. Briand i n the Assembly, September 10, 1928. 2. Noel-Baker, P h i l i p , Private Manufacture of Armaments, v o l , 1, p. 373. Bullerjahn was accused by Paul von Gontard, Chief Engineer of Deutsche Waffen und Munitions Fabrik, who before the war.by his machinations had done much to cause the race i n machine-gun manufacture between France and Germany* 3. Anon., Ne'gociation rhenane, L'Europe Nouvelle, No. 553, 15 Septembre, 1928, p. 1239. 4. Dr. Stresemann*s f a t a l i l l n e s s was the cause of his absence. 88 the delegates of France, Germany, Great B r i t a i n , I t a l y and Japan a basis for future e f f o r t s was agreed upon* Three con- ditions were l a i d down. I*. The opening of negotiations at the request of the German Chancellor on the anticipated evacuation of the Rhineland. 2. The need fo r the settlement of the problem of Reparations and the naming for t h i s purpose of a committee by the s i x governments. 3. The acceptance of the p r i n c i p l e of the c o n s t i t u t i o n of a Committee on V e r i f i c a t i o n and C o n c i l i a t i o n . (The function and duration of t h i s committee was to be s e t t l e d by com- 1 mon agreement l a t e r * j Chancellor Muller's agreement to these conditions was regar- ded with mixed feelings i n Germany. Br. Marx, a former Chan- c e l l o r , declared that Dr. Muller had succeeded i n getting no better terms than any other party might have done. He re- 2 gretted that Stresemann had not been the negotiator. Yet i t i s pointed out i n L'Europe Nouvelle, that Dr. Stresemann had agreed to the three conditions p r i o r to t h e i r acceptance 3 by Dr. Marx. In 1926 when a n a t i o n a l i s t government had been i n power i n Germany Briand had held out the hand of friendship 1. Anon.j Le Rhin vu de Geneve, L'Europe Nouvelle, No. 554, 22 Septembre, 1928, p* 1271. Clause 3 had been advoc- ated by Briand i n February 1928, before the Frenoh Senate. 2. Anon., French Uneasiness at German C r i t i c i s m , Manchester Guardian Weekly, v o l . 19, No. 2, September 24, 1928, p.224. 3. Anon., Le Rhin vu de Geneve, op* c i t . , by telephonic communication* p. 1271. 89 and had been favorable to evacuation, but at t h i s time, i n spite of the fact that there was a s o c i a l i s t administration there, he appeared to rebuff t h e i r e f f o r t s . Why? Because the Locarno s p i r i t , even i n Briand, was/wearing o f f under the pressure of i n t e r n a l publio opinion i n France which evinced great uneasiness due to the vi o l e n t reaction i n Germany to the agreement outlined above* I t could be said of Briand that he was playing a game of p o l i t i c a l poker* Because of the b i t t e r f e e l i n g i n Germany, he was i n a state of great uneasiness, but the speeoh of S i r Austin Chamberlain i n the House of Commons caused his s p i r i t s to revive* The B r i t i s h Foreign M i n i s t e r stated that "the 1 • concession provided for i n A r t i o l e 431 of the Text of the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s could only take effect when Germany had completely executed and discharged the whole of her Repar- 2 ations o b l i g a t i o n . This assertion was received i n Paris with great e l a t i o n because no French authority had ever put suoh a l i b e r a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n on A r t i c l e 431 before. German o f f i c * i i a l opinion was shocked and the n a t i o n a l i s t elements grew more: c r i t i c a l than ever*1 I t seemed that the old entente be- tween /France and B r i t a i n was being r e v i t a l i z e d and that the new s p i r i t of Locarno was fast being forgotten* 1. Article-431 (Text of the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s ) — P r o v i d e d fo r the withdrawal of A l l i e d troops p r i o r to 1935 i f Germany f u l f i l l e d a l l her obligations. 2. Anon., Treaty Pledges on Evacuation, Manchester Guardian Weekly, v o l * 19, No* 23, December 7, 1928, p. 445. 90 The two main points at issue between Germany on the one hand and the A l l i e s on the other were the rel a t i o n s h i p of the impending Reparation agreement to the contemplated agreement for Rhineland evacuation and the re l a t i o n s h i p between Rhine- land evacuation and the Jj'renoh desire f o r a Committee of Ver- i f i c a t i o n and C o n c i l i a t i o n . No progress was possible to- wards evacuation u n t i l some understanding had been a r r i v e d at on the f i n a n c i a l question and for t h i s purpose an Expert Com- mittee on Reparations was appointed which began work on i'eb- 1 ruary 11, 1929. An attempt had been made towards an under- standing on the question of a Committee of V e r i f i c a t i o n and C o n c i l i a t i o n at the f i f t y - t h i r d session of the League Council 2 held at Lugano, butthis had f a i l e d owing to the ref u s a l of Dr. Stresemann to consider under any circumstances the ex- tension of control of the Rhineland beyond the treaty l i m i t 3 prescribed i n A r t i c l e 431. h i s stand was taken i n accordance with his speech made to the Reichstag the previous November i n whioh he stated that the moral and l e g a l r i g h t of Germany i ^ to the evacuation eould not be questioned; so he refused to 4 compromise his p o s i t i o n . The report of the Expert Committee on Reparations, c a l l e d 1. Toynbee, op. c i t . , 1929, p. 177. 2. Loo. c i t . 3. Anon., The league and Rhineland, Manchester Guardian Weekly, v o l , 19, No. 25, December 21, 1928, p, 490. 4. Documents of inte r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , November 19, 1928, p. 49. i 91 1 the ioung Plan was issued on June 7, 1929. Objection to i t was raised by some sections of French opinion. In France the idea s t i l l found much support that war debts had been incur- red i n a common cause and therefore the United States should overlook the French obligation on that score. The Young Flan was not based on that premise. Only i f some plan i s r a t i f i e d for the settlement of the Reparations issue could p o s i t i v e steps be taken towards evacuation. O f f i c i a l French opinion led by Poincare' was determined that France should accept the Young Plan for to refuse i t would cause "unecrise economique avectoutes ses consequences s o c i a l e s . " An agreement was reached between Poincare', Briand and Stresemann that a spec- i a l conference should be ca l l e d by the powers for the r a t i - f i c a t i o n of the Young F l a n and also to arrange for evacuation 3 of the Rhine l a n d . i t wasopenedat the Hague on August 6, 1929. i t was at t h i s conference that Briand brought up the question of the Committee for C o n c i l i a t i o n and Control. For him i t was a question of prestige that some form of commission i be established, k. Wladimir d'Omesson, an i n f l u e n t i a l French writer outlined^ at that time what would be p r a c t i c a l type of commission. ! f E l l e ne co n s t i t n e r a i t qu'une simple mesure de precaution et n ' a g i r a i t qu'en cas de danger europeen*' E l l e reste'rait en harmone'e avec l ' a r t i c l e 213 du t r a i t e 7 de 1* Toynbee, op. c i t . , 1929, p. 179. 2. Dumont-Wilden, L., Le Reglement de l a Paix, Revue Bleue, No; 11, 1 Juin, 1929, p. 340. 3. Toynbee, op. c i t i , p. 180. 1 paix." He envisaged the intervention of the Committee only i n exceptional cases. This desire for a Uommittee on the part of Briand was not so much as a measure for security as to enable him to return to Paris with something d e f i n i t e to show to the Chamber of Deputies; Por i f he should return and merely declare that the Rhineland was to be evacuated, even although his action was correct, he probably would be relieved of his post; i t would be too r a d i c a l an action for the Chamber. This would be i n keeping with the t r a d i t i o n of the French system. The Deputies never take much int e r e s t i n foreign a f f a i r s u n t i l some minister does something i n a pre- 2 c i p i t a t e manner—he i s usually ejected at once; Briand had to have some card which would carry him through the play. A commission would be able to see that d e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n was enforced. By t h i s proposal he implied that as soon as the withdrawal of A l l i e d troops had taken place, A r t i c l e s 42, 43 3 - and 44 of the text of the T r e a t y of V e r s a i l l e s would be bro- ken by the Germans and they would proceed to rebuild t h e i r f o r t i f i c a t i o n s ; "We w i l l withdraw our troops," Briand might have said, "but i n return we ?/ant a permanent committee of control." "We w i l l agree to a temporary committee," Dr; Stresemann might have re p l i e d , "but according to the Treaty 1. Ormesson, 7/ladimir d* , L'Evacuation de l a Rhenanie, Revue de Paris, Tome 4,.11 Aout, 1929, p* 492* 2* S e i g f r i e d , Andre', France, A Study i n Na t i o n a l i t y , Yale University P r e s s 1 9 3 0 , p. 72. 3. Deal with d e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n . 93 of V e r s a i l l e s whioh your own countrymen helped to draw up, • 1 you have no just r i g h t to expect i t to act beyond 1935;" The acceptance of the idea of a committee would have meant the delaying of a sincere rapprochement between France and Germany beyond 1935. poincare at t h i s time seemed to favor the plan of an immediate settlement rather than the creation of machinery which would serve to prolong h o s t i l i t y by r a i s i n g points of contention between the two countries. The l e g a l i t y of the committee was questioned and a board of j u r i s t s decided that briand had no l e g a l right to demand a committee of t h i s type according to the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s ' and that? the problem of Rhineland supervision should be l e f t i n the hands of a committee created under the Locarno Agree- 3 ments. The B r i t i s h and Belgian governments had announced that t h e i r troops would be withdrawn by the end of the year 1929. This p l a i n l y placed the onus on Briand. On the finan- c i a l question, he remained adamant i n s i s t i n g " i l ne f a i t au- 4 1 cune concession." U n t i l a s a t i s f a c t o r y f i n a n c i a l settlement 1. A r t i c l e 429, clause 3 provided for continuation of the oc- cupation i f Germany had not f u l f i l l e d her obligations. Stresemann's appeal for j u s t i c e obtained much support both from many French people and outside of France as well . 2. V a l l i n , Charles, L*Occupation Francaise Des Pays Rhenans, Revue P o l i t i q u e et parlementaire, Tome 148, 10 Octobre, 1929, p. 124; He maintains that continued occupation had become an anachronism and would be d i f f i c u l t to defend. 3* Toynbee, op* c i t . , p:. 180. 4. Anon*, La Conference de l a Haye, L'Europe JMouvelle, No. 602, 24 Aout, 1929, p. 1131. 94 had. been reached, he refused to t i e France down to a d e f i n i t e date f o r evacuation. He i n s i s t e d that i n the settlement the Young Plan should be considered as i n d i v i s i b l e , i f i t were 1 not i t would be tantamount to demolition. At the Hague the B r i t i s h Chancellor of the Exchequer, P h i l i p Snowden,insisted upon a larger share of the Reparation payments for B r i t a i n which demand was oonceded by Briand only aft e r Snowden gave vent to a great show of rage which one French writer says 2 compromised the f i n a n c i a l seourity of the B r i t i s h Empire. An agreement was reached between the B r i t i s h , Belgian, Ger- 3 man, French, I t a l i a n and Japanese delegations. In the Cham- ber of Deputies the cry was raised that Briand had compromised the security of France; M. Franklin-Bouillon stated that Ger- many was already at work b u i l d i n g r a i l r o a d s for m i l i t a r y pur- ' 4 poses near the French f r o n t i e r . In view of the fact that the 5 new French war budget brought i n at t h i s time by M. Maginot—. the minister of war, set aside 4,567,000,000 francs for war purposes, 2,900,000,000 of which was for a new l i n e of f o r t i - f i c a t i o n s along the Rhine f r o n t i e r , the French government 1. Huddleston, S i s l e y , The Hague, New Statesman, v o l . 33, No* 850, August 10, 1929, p. 546. 2. Anon., L'Accord de principe a l a Haye, L'Europe Nouvelle, NO. 603, 31 Aout.,, 1929, p. 1151. 3. Documents of in t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , 1929, p. 4. 4; Le Temps, December 19, 1929, c i t e d by Toynbee, op. c i t . , 1929, p. 187. 5. Anon., More Armaments for France, Manchester uuardian Weekly, v o l . 22, No. 1, January 3, 1930, p. 10. 95 seemed to be quite aware of any danger. Briand r e p l i e d to his accusers that this, was no time to be c r i t i c i s i n g the lack of measures of security--"...pourquoi done n'ont e l l e s pas ete i n s c r i t e s dans l a traite'de V e r s a i l l e s ? Pourquoi?" This r e t o r t was quite j u s t i f i e d for Briand had had no part i n the making of that treaty owing to the hatred with which he was 2 regarded by Glemenceau. Briand had to take c r i t i c i s m even from his own personal supporters for his acceptance of a post under Tardieu, but l i k e Stresemann, Briand would work 3 with any man f o r the sake of furthering his p o l i c y . Both men were to a considerable extent above party. Tardieu sup- ported Briand but when the death of Stresemann took place he feared that the n a t i o n a l i s t reaction i n Germany would r e s u l t In an increase i n the tension between Germany and France. France eagerly awaited the r e s u l t of a vote taken by the Ger- man n a t i o n a l i s t leader, iiugenberg, based on the r e j e c t i o n of the Young Plan and i n a general disapproval of Franco- 4 German negotiations. The people rejected i t by an 86fo vote. As a r e s u l t the new S o c i a l Democratic Foreign Minister, Dr. 1. Documents of International A f f a i r s , 1929, p. 59. Extracts from Speech of M. Briand on Foreign P o l i c y i n the Chamber, December 27, 1929. 2. Lloyd George, The Truth About the Peace Treaties, v o l . 1, p. 581. 3. D'Abernon, IViscount), Stresemann, Foreign A f f a i r s , , v o l . 8, No. 2, January 1930, p. 208. 4. Anon., France and Germany, Round Table, v o l . 21, June 1931, p. 506. 96 Curtinis was able to decree the endorsement of the Young F l a n 1 and the agreements made at The Hague. The r a t i f i c a t i o n of 2 the French Chamber of Deputies was obtained on A p r i l 4, 1930 and soon after Tardieu Informed the German ambassador at Paris that the French troops would be e n t i r e l y withdrawn. This was completed by the t h i r t i e t h of June. The vote i n the Chamber of Deputies was a vote i n favor of the p o l i c y of Briand. I t also s i g n i f i e d that the French government had confidence i n the p a c i f i c s p i r i t of the 'Ger- man people and i n the good f a i t h of the German government. But what guarantees of security were l e f t for France a f t e r the evacuation of the Rhineland? M. T i r a r d , the French High Commissioner i n the Rhineland said that the withdrawal of French troops removed " l e dernier, l e seul obstacle an rap- prochement a 1*entente sincere et d e f i n i t i v e entre l a France - 4 et l'Allemagne." There were the Locarno Facts and the Briand- Kellogg Pact, which,if honestly adhered to,would provide ample security. But could they be honestly adhered'to? There were powerful elements i n France which believed that several 1. German Freedom, Manchester Guardian Weekly, v o l . 22, No. 11, March 14, 19 30, p. 207. 2. Fayen, Edouard, Le Douzieme D'Avril, La R a t i f i c a t i o n du Flan Young, Paris, Journal-des liconomistes, Tome 96, A v r i l , 1930, p. 3. 3. Huddleston, S i s l e y , French Foreign Policy, Contemporary Review, v o l . 140, July 1931, p. 1. 4* Anon., line ide c l a r a t i o n de M. T i r a r d sur 1'evacuation de l a Rhenanie, L'Europe Nouvelle, No. 642, 31 Mai, 1930, p. 830.. . thousand sol d i e r s on the Rhine were f a r better security for France than a hundred F a c t s . "C'est notre armee qui, par sa seule existence remplit l e role de l a gendarmerie i n t e r - n a t i o n a l , qui l'on a refuse'a l a socie'te des iMations." Yet France had taken the step. The Rhineland had been evacuated and whether Frenchmen thought t h e i r f r o n t i e r was the Rhine or the V i s t u l a was of no matter now. I f the growing forces of the reactionary elements won out i n Germany there was the rapidl y r i s i n g Maginot l i n e of f o r t i f i c a t i o n s / b u t i f the moderates remained i n control and reason triumphed then the p o l i c y of Briand would be vindicated. 1. Dumont-Wilden, L*, La France Accusee, Revue Bleue, No. 22, 15 Novembre, 1930, p. 696* CHAPTER V. FRANCE AND THE YEARS OF CRISIS, 1929-1932 CHAPTER V. FRANCS AND THE YEARS OF CRISIS. 1929-1932 The evacuation of the Rhineland by the occupying forces removed one of the most pressing causes of bitterness between France and Germany. Briand with his great knowledge of Eur- opean a f f a i r s r e a l i z e d the t e r r i f y i n g weakness of the r e l a - tionships of European nations and f e l t that a further e f f o r t should be made to strengthen those bonds already existent* To t h i s end he introduced to the tenth meeting of the League 1 Assembly a plan for closer cooperation between European nations* Already numerous pacts had been made between the nations, a l l professedly aiming at the prevention of any f u t - ure war. As Briand said, "I think that among peoples con- s t i t u t i n g geographical groups, l i k e the peoples of Europe, there should be some kind of Federal bond; i t should be pos- s i b l e f o r them to get i n touch at any time, to confer about t h e i r i n t e r e s t s , to agree on j o i n t resolutions and to es- t a b l i s h among themselves a bond of s o l i d a r i t y which w i l l enable them, i f need be, to meet any grave emergency which 2 might a r i s e . " This proposal on the part of Briand was not o r i g i n a l with him. During the Great War of 1914-1918 F r i e d - r i c h Naumann published a book " M i t t e l Suropa? which had a great c i r c u l a t i o n i n Central Europe* During the decade 1. September 5, 1929. 2* Toynbee, op. c i t * , 1930, p. 136. 98 99 following the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s one of the most important apostles of the Fan-Europe idea was Count Coudenhove-nalergi, a distinguished Austrian p u b l i c i s t , who by his great q u a l i t i e s 1 of personality helped keep the idea a l i v e . Commenting on the influence which Coudenhove-Jiaiergi had on Briand, A l f r e d Duff Cooper remarks, "...I had known...that he was working on plans for the federation of European nations which was known as the Fan-Europa movement and that he had gained the .support of no less a person than A r i s t i d e Briand;..." With t h i s support the movement took on a new importance. Of the great French statesman's action, Count Coudenhove-Jialergi wrote, "Une f o i s accomplie l a l i q u i d a t i o n d e f i n i t i v e de l a guerre...l'Europe se trouve en face de l a deoision siuvante; ou bien retomber dans l e systeme des a l l i a n c e s et des contre- a l l i a n c e s , qui i l ya quinze ans a conduit Na l a guerre mon- d i a l e , ou bien se reunir en un seul bloc, a f i n de constituer, 3 par l a collaboration de toutes les nations*..." His proposal found a favorable reception on a l l sides and t h i s encouraged him to seek the concrete views of twenty-six European nations 1. Amery, L . S. IThe Right Hon.), The B r i t i s h Empire and the Pan-European Idea, London, journal of the Koyal I n s t i - tute of International A f f a i r s , v o l . IX., No. 1, January, 1930, p. 1. 2* Cooper, A. Duff, The Second World War, London, Jonathan Cape, 1939, p. 92. 3. Dumont-Wilden, L., Les Stats-Unis D»Europe, Revue Bleue, No. 16, 7 Aout, 1929, p. 508. Count Coudenhove-Jialergi i n vossische-Zeitung i s c i t e d . 100 through a "Memorandum d'Union Federale Europeenne" dispatched 1 on May 17, 1930. P r i o r to his advocacy of the idea of a European Federa- t i o n , Briand 1s work i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i e l d had been large- l y negative i n character, that i s , he u t i l i z e d his great qual- i t i e s to the smoothing away of d i f f i c u l t i e s which beset post- war Europe, he was always, however, working for the security of France. By the plan for a united States of Europe he hoped to strengthen that security and yet to make a move to- wards the goal he had envisioned—the eventual p o l i t i c a l union of nations i n continental Europe through th e i r immediate economic union* In looking at t h i s proposal put forward by Briand from the stand-point of security there i s one important factor which must be r e c a l l e d , namely, the attitude of European nations towards, the united States of America. For several years i t had been f e l t i n Europe that the American nation constituted a d i s t i n c t menace to the security of European 2 peoples. M. Dumont-Wilden, an authoritative French c r i t i c , writes that although Briand has warned that t h i s proposed Federation must not be interpreted as being directed against the united States, t h i s project i s interpreted by a great number of Europeans "comme une reponse au berger a l a bergere 1. Text i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n c i l i a t i o n , S pecial b u l l e t i n , . June, 1930, p. 325 2. Aron, Robert and Dandieu, Armaud, America: Europe's Cancer, Li v i n g Age, v o l . 341, October, 1931, p. 117. (translated from "Europe".) 101 l'Amerique, maitresse du tresor me^allique du monde manifeste 1'intention de coloniser l a v i e l l e Europe, ou du moins de l a require a une sorte de vassalite' economique vers laquelle l e 1 plan Young n'est qu'un premier pas." In 1930, European nations purchased goods to the value of §21,341,000,000 from the united States and American c a p i t a l invested i n Europe amounted 2 to $650,000,000. This heavy f i n a n c i a l hold which the united States was getting i n Europe was par t l y due to the fact that 3 Europeans had become fascinated by American l i f e . An attempt was made to draw a p a r a l l e l between the united states and Europe. If,with her vast hinterland and no i n t e r n a l t a r i f f s , the united States could become so prosperous, surely European 4 nations could eliminate t h e i r t a r i f f s and do the same. Only the sober thinkers r e a l i z e d that the states of Europe could not be united without the peoples, that passports and fron- t i e r s are only outward signs, that the inner substance, the national s p i r i t i s the factor which makes peoples r e a l l y d i f - ferent* i n America industry i s homogeneous, production i s devoted to no p a r t i c u l a r specialization,but i n Europe the 1. Dumont-Wilden, L. jLes'Etats-unis D'Europe, op. c i t . , No. 16, 17 Aout, 1929, p. 508.- 2* Bidwell, r . W., The New American T a r i f f : Europe's Answer, Foreign A f f a i r s , v o l . 9, No. 1, October, 1930, p* 13. 3. Luddecke, Theodor, Germany Goes American, Li v i n g Age, v o l . 338, duly 1, 1930, p* 544. (translated from Revista de Occidente of Madrid.) 4. Mitrany,. David, i-an-Europe—A Hope or a Danger, London, P o l i t i c a l Quarterly, v o l . 1, No. 4, 1930, p. 457. 102 nationals of d i f f e r e n t countries are engaged i n a variety of production, the nature of which has been established through 1 many years of t r a d i t i o n , possibly i n France, above a l l coun- t r i e s , have craftsmen been b i t t e r opponents to standardization and r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n i n industry. Just as a man raises his arm to ward o f f a blow so does a country use the t a r i f f to protect i t s trade, i t i s t h e o r e t i c a l l y possible that fear oould be turned into trust and r i v a l r y into cooperation, however, as some non-European nations have a greater volume of trade with i n d i v i d u a l European countries than those coun- t r i e s have with each other, i t would be very d i f f i c u l t to erect a European Federation without including these nations. This would defeat one of the basic purposes of the Federation-- i t would give the united states of America even a greater hold i n European markets. The reply of o f f i c i a l Germany to the Memorandum con- veyed to Briand the concurrence of Stresemann i n the proposal 2 insofar as economic union was concerned, he saw i n the plan a means whereby Germany's recovery could be advanced through protection for her industries and the increased markets which would r e s u l t from a lowering of t a r i f f b a r r i e r s by her neigh- bors. However, the, n o n - o f f i c i a l German press saw a s i n i s t e r 1. Madariaga, Salvador de, Our Muddling World, Forum, v o l . 83, January .1, 1930, p. 9. He mentions the wine and dress industry as being good examples. 2. Anon., Reponse du gouvernement allemand, L'Europe Nouvelle, Mo. 659, 27 Septembre, 1930, p. 1388. 103 motive behind the plan, i t was interpreted as a new d i p l o - matic move to strengthen the hegemony of the French Republic 1 i n i t s e f f o r t s to dominate continental Europe. The moderate French press, on the other hand, asserted that the plan was simply an e f f o r t to get back to the protocol of 1924, but of t h i s view i t can be said that i t proves that French p o l i c y has not changed, i t was an attempt to obtain guarantees, perhaps of a p a c i f i c type, yet s t i l l they were guarantees. Briand speaks i n his Memorandum of agreements or security as a v i t a l necessity before economic unity could be achieved, i t i s f a i r l y obvious that he i s thinking of security i n the French sense, because he only too well knows that the B r i t i s h and French view of the use of sanctions are at complete var- iance. The B r i t i s h government was c r i t i c i z e d for i t s cool 2 reply to the Memorandum but i t was f e l t i n ^reat B r i t a i n that the plan of Briand would cause an unnecessary duplication of 3 the League machinery and was i n addition a disguised attempt by Briand to increase French security. 1. Hanotaux, Gabriel, Le Project D'Union Europe'ene, Revue des Deux Mondes, Tome 58, 15 Aout, 1930, p. 766, c i t i n g Berliner Tageblatt. Stone, W. T., The Briand F l a n for European Union, Foreign Po l i c y Association information Service, v o l . VI* No. 14, September 17, 1930, p. 261* 2. Anon*, Europe Meets H riand Half-way, IMew York, Nation, v o l . 131, Wo. 3395, July, 1930, p. 112. 3. Anon*, Reponse du gouvernement Britannique, L'Europe Nouvelle, No. 659, 27 Septembre, 1930, p. 1397. 104 On March EO, 1931, the news that A u s t r i a and Germany intended to consummate an economic union e l e c t r i f i e d Europe. I t had been r e a l i z e d from the nature of the r e p l i e s received by Briand from European nations generally that i n protection- 1 i s t Europe economic union among most nations was impossible. Yet the b i t t e r denunciation which Briand accorded the proposed Austro-German move revealed that i n the mind of Briand even the broad v i s i o n of economic union i n Europe was secondary to French security. Yet economic union was the very policy which Briand had been urging for Europe. In addition the p r i n c i p l e of regional economic agreements had already been endorsed by i the supporters of European union at the 1930 Assembly of the League. Whether the move had been premeditated or not by Dr. Curtius, the 0-erman Foreign Minister and his Austrian counter- part, Dr. Schober, i s of l i t t l e consequence; i t did put Briand i n a very awkward po s i t i o n . It gave Europe, e s p e c i a l l y the r e v i s i o n i s t countries, the prerogative of doubting Briand*s s i n c e r i t y . However, i t should be said i n his favor that he might have been influenced somewhat i n his stand by P C Benes of Czecho-Slovakia. Germany and A u s t r i a formed the greatest markets for Czecho-Slovakian goods so that any union which those two nations might consummate v/ould l i k e l y be a serious blow commercially to Czecho-Slovakia. A r i s t i d e Briand was a r e a l i s t i c i d e a l i s t , his i d e a l was 1. Sorel, R., Federation europeenne, F a r i s , Journal des E*conomistes, Tome 97, Octobre, 1930, p. 198. 105 the United States of Europe. His realism lay i n the use of t h i s union as a means for gaining further security for France. However, leaders of Germany and A u s t r i a were r e a l - i s t s as w e l l . Yet when they t r i e d to solve a problem which faced t h e i r two countries without consulting France, Briand l o s t some of his idealism. His vigorous denunciation of Anschluss led to i t s reference to the Permanent Oourt of In- ternational J u s t i c e . A r u l i n g was given by which i t was de- clared i l l e g a l . This decision was based on A r t i c l e 88 of the Treaty of St. Germain and the Geneva Protocol of October 1 4, 1922. By the l a t t e r A u s t r i a promised to undertake no agreements which would endanger her economic independence. The decision against the Union was given by a group of eight judges which included French, P o l i s h , Rumanian and I t a l i a n . With the exception of the I t a l i a n , a l l the other leading states voting against .Anschluss were clo s e l y connected with France. B r i t i s h and American judges voted i n favor of the 2 Union* This decision weakened the prestige of t h i s Court. Some English comment was p a r t i c u l a r l y caustic. The Spectator remarked that " i t was a choice between the safety of the Treaties and the safety of Europe. Evidently the sanctity 1. Dean, Vera Micheles, European E f f o r t s for Economic Collaboration, Foreign p o l i c y Association Information Service, v o l . VII., No. 12, August 19, 1931, p. 233. 2. Glasgow, George, Germany, The Hague and Disarmament, Contemporary Review, v o l . 140, October, 1931, p. 522. 106 ., 1 of the Treaties won out." The tone of the French press was •just as sharp from the opposite side. The writer."Pertinax" 2 c a l l e d for Briand*s removal from o f f i c e . However, the l a t - ter* s apparent success resulted i n the retirement of Dr. Cur- t i u s i n disgrace and his departure from o f f i c e marked the end 3 of the p o l i c y of Stresemann i n foreign a f f a i r s . National 4 Socialism was on the ascendant i n Germany. The German nation was undergoing a far-reaching transformation* Only two years had passed since the reactionary referendum of Hugenherg was so soundly defeated and now many m i l l i o n s i n Germany "run aft e r any rat-catcher as i f he were 'the Pied-Piper of Hamlin* or else they go into ecstacies over tinsel-decked m i l i t a r y 5 fi g u r e s * " Such was the Germany under the growing power of the groups of reaction. " T i l l France can change her s p i r i t , " wrote d. St. Loe 6 Strachey i n 1923, "Europe cannot recover." This same comment 1; Anon., Germany and Europe, London, Spectator, v o l . 146, dune 13, 1931. 2* Pertinax, Briand Must Go, L i v i n g Age, v o l * 339, November 1930, p. 240. (translated from Echo de Paris.] 3. Carr; E. H. International Relations since the Peace Treaties, London, Macmillan, 1938, p. 139. 4; Glasgow, George, The German C r i s i s , Contemporary Review, v o l . 138, November, 1930, p. 653. Nazis gained 12 seats i n 1928, 107 i n 1930. 5; Wolff, Theodor, The Republic W i l l Live, L i v i n g Age,, v o l . 339, November, 1930, p. 237* (translated from Be r l i n e r Tageblatt.j 6. Strachey, J". St. Loe, Reparations and Debts, Spectator, v o l . 130, dune 23, 1923, pi 1032* 107 might have been made of the France of the years of c r i s i s . Frenchmen looked askance at the changes taking place i n Ger- many. Their f e e l i n g was marked by deep suspicion. In 1930 the German state insurance fund faced a d e f i c i t of £20,000,000 and an extra fc20,000,000 was needed for s p e c i a l r e l i e f and 1 unemployment schemes* One French Senator, looking at the s i t u a t i o n i n Germany asked how i n face of the dire f i n a n c i a l stress i n Germany could the budget for the Reichswehr be i n - creased from 178,000,000 marks i n 1929 to 197,000,000 i n 2 1930. The f a i l u r e of the policy of Stresemann combined with the stringent economic conditions led to a decline i n the power of the S o c i a l Democratic party. A corresponding increase i n the strength of the extreme elements, the National S o c i a l i s t s , 3 took place. Behind the growing strength of these two groups the broadening shadow of the Reichswehr became apparent. A l l Frenchmen were disturbed by these conditions within Germany, yet, l i k e i n the days before Locarno, elements favorable to compromise came to the fore i n France. The French people were i n a prosperous condition. "La France est un e'den. Nos reserves d'or notre epaigne reconstituea, notre industries sans 1. Lloyd, G. M i , The Edge of the Precipice, New Statesman and Nation, v o l ; 1, No. 6, (new s e r i e s ) , June 13, 1931, p. 569. 2. Eccard, Frederic, Le' Budget M i l i t a i r e Allemand en 1930, Revue P o l i t i q u e et Parlementaire, Tome 144, 16 Juille.t, 1930, p. 2. 3. Dobb, Maurice, The C r i s i s i n Germany, London, Labour Monthly, v o l ; 13, August, 1931, p. 491. 108 chomage, notre population de bon sens content d'une p o l i t i q u e exterieure t r a n q u i l l e , autour de biens rares aux regards d'une Europe sans argent et sans t r a v a i l en de grandes re- 1 gions, minee d'armes clandestines. ;' These moderate forces put forward proposals for active Franco-American cooperation i n a f i n a n c i a l e f f o r t to help stave o f f the f i n a n c i a l d i s - aster i n Europe which a l l f e l t to be impending. l e t the statesmen i n France were not s u f f i c i e n t l y convinced that they should advance funds to help the great Jiredit-Anstaldt, when Au s t r i a so recently t r i e d .to endanger French security through the Anschluss proposal. French assistance was offered to A u s t r i a only at the cost of impossible p o l i t i c a l concessions* B r i t a i n came to the a i d of Austrian finance with an outright loan which staved o f f the t o t a l collapse of the bank u n t i l the 2 Austrian government could take i t over. The effect of these d i f f i c u l t i e s of t h i s Austrian bank resulted i n a general lack of confidence i n other countries bordering on f i n a n c i a l panic and only the proposal of president Hoover of a years' mora- torium prevented a possible European f i n a n c i a l collapse. In view of the fact that the French f e l t they had made a major, s a c r i f i c e under the Young Flan they objected to i t s being set aside i n t h i s manner, i n a statement before the Chamber of Deputies Briand had stated that the Young Flan was a f i n a l 1. Anon., La Prosperite'de l a France, L'Europe Nouvelle, 1MO. 675, 17 Janvier, 1931, p. 68. 2. Anon., ( e d i t o r i a l ) , L i v i n g Age, v o l . 340, No. 4379, August, 1931, p. 527. 109 1 settlement. Hence he came i n for much abuse when i t was learned that the Hoover Moratorium would necessitate what was stated to be a temporary postponement of the Young Plan, but what was f e l t by a l l would be permanent i n view of world con- d i t i o n s . Even, the S o c i a l i s t s i n the Chamber voted s o l i d l y for the government i n i t s denunciation of the manner i n which 2 the moratorium was proposed; Prance already had aroused world h o s t i l i t y over her attitude i n the Kredit-Austaldt pro- blem and v i r t u a l i s o l a t i o n was not an i m p o s s i b i l i t y . However, one French writer observed that, " i f there could be no pros- p e r i t y i n Europe without prosperity i n Germany, there can be 3 no prosperity i n Germany without or i n spite of Prance." The eventual concurrence of Prance i n the Hoover Moratorium came too l a t e to be of much help. The psychological improve- ment which had followed the announcement of the moratorium had dissipated and i n the month which followed conditions i n Germany became so d i f f i c u l t that that country had p r a c t i c a l l y to declare a moratorium on her short-term loans. This had a serious reaction i n England, which country had heavy invests 4 ments i n Germany. England's f i n a n c i a l structure was endangered. 1; Anon., M. Briand*s Declaration, Manchester Guardian Week- l y , v o l ; 24, No. 24, June 12, 1931, p. 464. 2. Anon*, French Stand on the Hoover Proposal, London, S t a t i s t , v o l ; CXVIII., No. 2784, duly 4, 1931, p. 14; 3. Loc. c i t . , c i t i n g M. Gignoux i n dournee I n d u s t r i e l l e . 4. Armstrong, H. F., France and!the Hoover Flan, Foreign A f f a i r s , v o l . 10, No. 1, October, 1931, p. 30. Great B r i t a i n had 1,800,000,000 marks invested i n Ger- many* France had 300,000,000 marks invested, a consid- erable part being through Great B r i t a i n . 110 Although the B r i t i s h withdrawal from the gold standard was the f i r s t major defeat received by France i n her progress towards national p o l i t i c a l security through f i n a n c i a l dom- inance i n Europe yet t h i s set-back was more than counter- balanced by other successes achieved by the French. In the south-east Hungary was forced to discontinue her accord with I t a l y ; The Hungarian government could get no f i n a n c i a l a i d from either I t a l y or Great B r i t a i n * I t had to meet the price . 1 of the French. This can be regarded as a great triumph f o r Briand's I t a l i a n policy i n i t i a t e d shortly after Locarno. France had become undisputed a r b i t e r of Balkan finance through her monetary p o s i t i o n i n Europe. Turning to the New World we see, the united states forced to bow to the dictates of Laval under threat of taking measures which might result i n the c o l - lapse of the d o l l a r . The French statesman l e f t 7/ashington with Mr. Hoover's promise to grant France a free hand i n Eur- opean f i n a n c i a l a f f a i r s upon the expiry of the Hoover Mora- 2 torium on June 1, 1932. The most discordant note from the French point of view was Senator Borah's insistence that the best guarantee of French security would be the r e v i s i o n of 3 the Feace Treaty of 1919. The whole French p o l i t i c a l and 1. Toynbee, op. c i t . , 1931, p* 100 f f . 2* Anon*, Re'sultats de cinq jours aux Etats-Unis, L'Europe Nouvelle, No. 717, 7 Novembre, 1931, p. 1487. 3. Anon., The Franco-American Discussions, S t a t i s t , v o l . CXYIII.., No. 2801, October 31, 1931, p. 592. I l l f i n a n c i a l p o l i c y aimed to prevent any further destruction of the sacred documents which formed t h i s treaty. Why, i t might be asked, could France pursue t h i s appar- ently extremely s e l f i s h policy? The answer can be found i n the fact that she was apparently s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t . The pros- pe r i t y of *jreat B r i t a i n depended l a r g e l y on the prosperity of the world, but i n Paris t h i s great f i n a n c i a l success led to the development of the b e l i e f that France could aggravate the world with perfect equanimity as any consequences would leave her comparatively unaffected. Franco-Rumania r e l a t i o n s presented a p a r t i c u l a r l y g l a r i n g example of the French system. In Romania the French government allowed the f a i l u r e of one 1 of the largest banks to take place, because i t s administration, f r i e n d l y to King Carol, was favorable to the furthering of the 2 German connection rather than the French. Yet the "spider and f l y " p o l i c y of the French would not permit the c r i s i s to go too f a r , for thus i t would endanger French i n t e r e s t s . The French exports to the whole of the Danubian countries, amounted to only a small f r a c t i o n of the national trade but French se- cu r i t y required that a keen in t e r e s t i n Balkan economic and p o l i t i c a l l i f e be maintained. The threat to French security was of f a r greater scope than merely the question of finance. That was but the lever. The main concern of France was to 1; Banca Marmorosch and Co., Ltd. 2. Armstrong, H. F., Danubia: R e l i e f or Ruin, Foreign A f f a i r s , v o l . 10, No. 4,.July, 1932, p. 610. 7u/o of French exports went to the Balkan area i n 1927-28. 112 use Rumania as a means to prevent Germany and Russia from be- coming too f r i e n d l y . I t was the drench ambition to i s o l a t e both Germany and Russia. For c a p i t a l i s t i c France, Russia contributed the most dangerous enemy of the day. Since the days of Rapallo, Russo-German r e l a t i o n s had been comparatively harmonious. Besides considerable commercial contact, German o f f i c e r s had been active i n t r a i n i n g the reorganized Russian army and the extent of Reichswehr influence i n the Red Army 1 was a constant source of fear to the French. Russian foreign policy since 1926 had been consistently based on an o f f e r f i r s t made i n that year to guarantee herself security by the conclusion of non-aggression pacts with whatever nations would consider i t to be i n t h e i r own in t e r e s t s to enter one. I t was the aim of the French Radical S o c i a l i s t leader, Herriot, to promote a settlement between Russia and Rumania over the disputed t e r r i t o r y of Bessarabia* His e f f o r t s brought a new orientation to French policy which showed a d i f f e r e n t view of the problem of security. When Herriot became premier i n the spring of 1932, his attitude towards Russia showed the change i n o f f i c i a l French p o l i c y . His e f f o r t s were completed by a Franco-soviet Pact of Mon-rAggression of which he said, "The present treaty com- pletes a whole series of non-aggression t r e a t i e s which must 1. Eccard, Fre'derip, P o l i t i q u e De L'Allemagne et de l a Russie A L fEgard De La France, Revue Pol i t i q u e et Parlementaire, v o l * 146, 10 Mars, 1931, p. 329. 113 1 contribute towards the consolidation of peace." A P o l i s h - Russian non-aggression treaty had been signed i n July, 1932, followed l a t e r by a c o n c i l i a t i o n convention. Herriot f e l t i f he could encourage the Rumanian government to come to an understanding with Russia over the problem of Bessarabia the greater oertainty of peace which would r e s u l t would be a means to increased security for Prance. Negotiations towards a Russo-Rumanian understanding were begun at Warsaw between M. Cadere, the Rumanian minister at Warsaw and M. L i t v l n o f f . These negotiations were f r u i t l e s s , due some aut h o r i t i e s state, to the machination of Andre' Tar- dieu, who hated Herriot intensely, and the idea of a Franco- Russian rapprochement even more. Thus i t can be seen how i n - te r n a l animosities between p o l i t i c a l parties can be made to seriously disrupt French foreign p o l i c y . Somewhat the same t a c t i c s had been used by Herriot*s own Radical S o c i a l i s t party to seriously hinder Tardieu i n his work at the London Naval Conference, by bringing about his temporary defeat over 2 an i n t e r n a l f i n a n c i a l question, i t i s one of the peculiar- i t i e s of the French p o l i t i c a l system that a government carry- ing on a very important negotiation i n the foreign sphere can be brought down over a comparatively i n s i g n i f i c a n t phase 1. Anon., Pacts of Non-Aggression, Manchester Guardian Weekly, v o l . 27, No. 23, December 2, 1932, p. 445. 2. Glasgow, George, A French Respite, Contemporary .Review, v o l . 137, A p r i l , 1930, p. 513. 114 1 i n i n t e r n a l p o l i c y , 'i'his f a i l u r e of French policy to encom- pass the signing of the Non-Aggression Pact between Russia and Rumania was a d i s t i n c t blow to the e f f o r t s of some French statesmen to guard t h e i r eastern f r o n t i e r s because i t meant defeat i n t h e i r plan to complete the o i r c l e of countries bound to Franoe by promises not to make war; What can be estimated as the basic objective behind French p o l i c y i n the years of c r i s i s ? Frenoh eyes were s t i l l directed at Germany across the Rhine. The e f f o r t s to b u i l d up a union among the nations of Europe as was envisioned by Briand f a i l e d and French statesmen from then onward proceeded to strengthen t h e i r country's security through the establish- ment of the f i n a n c i a l hegemony of France. This was supported by non-aggression t r e a t i e s . I t was unfortunate that t h i s p o l i c y i n both i t s phases aroused only bitterness i n the Ger^ man people who nat u r a l l y f e l t that French e f f o r t s were aimed at domination, i f not strangulation, of the German f i n a n o i a l structure and the exclusion of Germany from normal contacts with her neighbors. Such was the legaoy of suspicion which followed i n the wake of the French search f o r security. 1. S i e g f r i e d , Andre', Tableau des Parties en France, Paris, Bernard Grasset, 1930, p. 153 ,ff. CHAPTER VI.. BRIAND AND THE STRUGGLE FOR DISARMAMENT 1931-1952 CHAPTER YI. BRIAND AND THE STRUGGLE POR DISARMAMENT. 1921-1952 "We are the hollow men We are the stuffed, men Leaning together Headpiece f i l l e d with straw. A l a s l . . . . " T. S. E l i o t , 1925. Since the close of the Conferences which drew up the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s , the world has become accustomed to witnessing two forms of i n t e r n a t i o n a l gatherings whose pur- port was to advance the cause of p e a c e — i n the f i r s t case the meeting of i d e a l i s t s without power and i n the second the meet- 1 ing of r e a l i s t s without p r i n c i p l e s . These conferences and meetings came i n the wake of the Great War of 1914-1918 when the passions of the great nations of the world were unleashed and the road towards the settlement of differences was bound to be a d i f f i c u l t one to t r a v e l . A l l peoples of the world had si n c e r e l y hoped that the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s would pro- vide the nations with security which would then be able to reduce t h e i r great armament, however, i t did not i n the French view give France adequate guarantees so when President Harding issued an i n v i t a t i o n to take part i n a conference at Washington to discuss the problem of disarmament, A r i s t i d e Briand, who was premier of France at the time, accepted with what might be c l a s s i f i e d as mental reservations. The Washington Conference had been summoned primarily to 1. Anon., Lessons from Washington, New Statesman, v o l . 18, December 17, 1921, p. 308. 115 116 discuss the problems of the P a c i f i c . Although France was v i t a l l y concerned i n p a c i f i c questions, her main interest at t h i s time was i n the I t a l i a n demand for naval p a r i t y which was r a p i d l y assuming the proportions of a major issue. In view of t h i s fact and also considering that the French people were expecting him to cooperate i n any e f f o r t towards disarmament and yet to protect French security, Briand went to Washington with no predetermined fixed p o l i c y . Andre' Tardieu maintained that t h i s was a serious blunder f o r Briand to make; He f e l t that a concrete p o l i c y formulated i n advance would have en- 1 abled the French delegation to present a stronger front. I t was f e l t by a large section of public opinion i n France that France had suffered repeated diplomatic defeats through Clem- enceau i n the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s and Briand hoped that through his personal representation at Washington he would be able to stimulate American in t e r e s t i n the French position. A second factor which Briand f e l t to be of great impor- tance was the need to convince the delegates at Washington that i n the present s i t u a t i o n of uncertainty i n Europe f u r - ther French land disarmament i n Europe was impossible. At the same time he r e a l i z e d that he must convince the men at the Conference that a peace p o l i c y was the dominant feature of French diplomacy.. This was proclaimed at V e r s a i l l e s , at St. Nazaire.and now at Washington. Briand had a d i f f i c u l t 1. Tardieu, Andre', The P o l i c y of France, Foreign A f f a i r s , v o l . 1, No. 1, September 15, 1922, p. 11. : 117 assignment. He had to proclaim to the world that his country- would consent to no further land disarmament yet at the same time he was expected by his countrymen to so present the French case that the world would not think France m i l i t a r i s t i c ; What was the s p e c i f i c reason l y i n g behind Briand*s stand on the question of land disarmament? It- was French apprehen- sion regarding Germany and Russia. This fear was widely f e l t i n spite of the fact that the French president of the Inter- A l l i e d Commission had reported that Germany had disarmed i n accordance with the conditions l a i d down i n the Treaty of 1 V e r s a i l l e s . The delegates at Washington were anxious that something concrete i n the way of reduction should be achieved. People throughout the world were beginning to think that a l l Conferences must inevitably meet with the same disappoint- ments which had resulted heretofore at Geneva. C r i t i c s , sympathetic to the work being undertaken at Washington pointed out, that the d i f f i c u l t y faced at Geneva, namely that the Council was i n a sense primarily to administer the Treaty of 2 V e r s a i l l e s , should not impede the e f f o r t at Washington. Briand, however, l u c i d l y expressed the French stand, that France must maintain m i l i t a r y supremacy over Germany, and would be prepared to reduce her armament only i f by means 1. Abbot, A. H., The League Disarmament A c t i v i t i e s — a n d the Washington Conference, New York, P o l i t i c a l Science Quarterly, Academy of P o l i t i c a l Science, v o l . 37, No* 1, March, 1922, p. 1* 2. Anon., Former Conferences that F a i l e d — a n d Succeeded, L i t e r a r y Digest, v o l . 71, November 12, 1921, p. 44; 118 of security guarantees, some other nations would pledge their support to her i n case of aggression by Germany. In his speech Briand expressed the hope that owing to 1 his stand France would not become morally i s o l a t e d . He pleaded for the recognition by other Powers of the justice of the French stand on armaments and pointed out that his coun- tr y had reduced the size of her army by shortening the term of service from three to two years. However, the American c r i t i c f e e l s that Briand seriously injured his cause by stressing the dangers of attack by Germany and Russia. The world saw the former prostrated and the l a t t e r i n the throes 2 of revolution, so i t f a i l e d to see Briand*s point; To many of the delegates at Washington, Briand was pleading for a cause which they considered was a regional concern. Briand apparently had f a i l e d to see t h i s view; The stand taken by Briand was deeply regretted by the leading English delegate, Arthur Balfour; Briand had pre- dicted that England would make the Washington Conference the arena for the prosecution of the Anglo-French duel which had developed i n the immediate post-war years, a thing which he 3 was sincerely anxious to avoid. Balfour did his best to 1. November 21, 1921; Speech made at the Third Plenary Session of the Conference; 2. Anon., The Washington Conference, Independent, v o l . 107, December 3, 1921, p. 233. 3. Tabouis, Genevieve, Perfidious Albion—Entente Cordiale, (.translated by j . A. Dempseyj , London, Butterworth, 1938, p. 200. 119 diminish the fears of Briand by the promise that i f a s i t - uation s i m i l a r to that of 1914 should develop again, B r i t i s h 1 . aid would again be forthcoming. However, the French states- man was adamant i n his stand and f e e l i n g that nothing further could be accomplished i n respect to land disarmament the Con- ference turned to the naval question, une competent English c r i t i c maintains that by thus dropping the subject of land armaments from the agenda of the Conference, the representa- t i v e s of the nations taking part made the i r f i r s t serious 2 mistake* A French m i l i t a r y attache' has said, "The main, i f not the only, French naval problem consists i n protecting the trans- portation of the resources i n man-power and raw materials of the French-African block across the mediterranean to 3 France." The most popular authoritative opinion at the time i n France held that for t h i s purpose warships were not a;- s a t i s f a c t o r y protective weapon as they were too vulnerable and too c o s t l y . Submarines and aeroplanes supported by a group of very fast cruisers were considered to be the most sa t i s f a c t o r y means of naval protection. In 1920 i n his re- port on the naval program of France, Gustave de KerguezeCj 1. Chaput, Holland A., Disarmament i n B r i t i s h Foreign Policy, London, George A l l e n and Unwin, 1935, p. 280* 2. Anon., The Peacemakers at Washington, Manchester Guardian Weekly, v o l . 6, No. 5, February 3, 1922, p. 84. 3* B u e l l , K. L., Anglo-American Naval Understanding, Foreign P o l i c y Association information Service, v o l . 5, No. 10, July 24, 1929, p. 172. C i t a t i o n from Brassey's Naval and Shipping Annual, 1928, p. 37. 120 spokesman for the Chamber Committee on Naval Appropriations, recommended the permanent abandonment of work on f i v e b a t t l e - ships which had been authorized i n 1916, with the declaration that France refused to enter upon an armaments race and was prepared to be acknowledged as a second rate naval power i n spite of the 54,484 miles of coast-line which she had to pro- 1 tect throughout her Empire. When Briand turned to consider the problem of naval re- duction he found that an agreement already had been reached by Great B r i t a i n , the united States and Japan to reduce their c a p i t a l ship strength to the extent of approximately 40 per- 2 oeht. I t was not fea s i b l e to reduce the tonnage of France and I t a l y by the same r a t i o . . Briand asked for a maximum replacement strength of 550,000 tons. The Secretary of State; of the united States informed Briand that i f he persisted i n his demand the Conference would be a f a i l u r e and the respon- s i b i l i t y f o r that catastrophe would be on his shoulders. 3 Briand gave way and accepted the figure of 175,000 tons. 4 Anglo-American pressure had forced the hand of Briand. There i s no question but that the stand taken by the French 1. Kerguezec, Gustave de, French Naval Aims, Foreign A f f a i r s , v o l . 4, No. 3, A p r i l , 1926, p. 372. Great B r i t a i n has 66,044 miles, u. S. A. 16,507, Japan 4,822 and I t a l y 3,889 miles of coast-line. 2. Toynbee, A. J . , Survey of i n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , 1920-23, p. 495. 3. Loc. c i t . , footnote 1. 4; Ichihashi, Yamato, The Washington conference and A f t e r , Stanford university Press, 1928, p. 68 f f . 1.21 delegation had for the time r u f f l e d the B r i t i s h , but an under- standing with France s t i l l remained the "fixed p o l i c y " of 1 B r i t a i n * Yet, i n addition to the agreeing to the tonnage problem, Briand acknowledged, through M. Sarrant, whome.heehad l e f t at Washington a f t e r he returned to France, the p r i n c i p l e of naval p a r i t y with I t a l y i n respect to battleships, heavy 2 cruise r s and a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r s . I f I t a l y should interpret t h i s concession as applying to the whole f i e l d of naval con- struction and should build to the French l e v e l i t would mean that the p o s i t i o n of France would be seriously menaced i n the Mediterranean; Why did Briand apparently give way i n these phases of the naval discussions? In the f i r s t case France was i n a serious i n t e r n a l f i n a n c i a l s i t u a t i o n . Her ordinary budget was be- tween four and fi v e times larger than that of 1913 and she 3 would probably be able to meet les s than h a l f of i t . Briand hoped that by entering an agreement and thus promoting and not hindering the progress of negotiations he might be able to improve Franco-American r e l a t i o n s to the extent that i n the future h i s country might be able to obtain some form of 1. Moulat, H , B*, A History of European Diplomacy, 1914-1918, London, Edward Arnold, 1927, p. 245, c i t i n g , New York Times, aanuary 12, 1922, p. 16. 2. Macartney, H. H. and Cremona, Paul, I t a l y ' s Foreign and Colonial p o l i c y , 1914-19 37, London, uxford university .tress, 1938, p. 137. 3. Huddleston, Sisley,,France's P o s i t i o n and P o l i t i c s , contemporary Review, v o l . 19, March, 1921, p. 289* French Budget—1913—4,738,000,000 francs, 1921—22,327,000,000 francs. 122 1 assistance from the united States. France signed the Wash- ington or Five Power Treaty on February 6, 1922, which l a i d down a d e f i n i t e replacement tonnage f o r each of the f i v e Powers taking part, namely, Great Britain^-525,000 tons. United States--525,000 tons. Japan-- 315,000 tons. France— 175,000 tons. I t a l y - - 175,000 tons, 2 Much of the enthusiasm-which Briand had hoped to arouse In America through h i s c a p i t u l a t i o n on the ca p i t a l , s h i p issue was dissipated by his reservation that his country could not accept any th e s i s which led to the proportional l i m i t a t i o n of a u x i l i a r y c r a f t on the same scale as that accepted f o r 3 c a p i t a l ships. The French regarded the use of a u x i l i a r y c r a f t as e s s e n t i a l l y defensive i n nature and therefore not to be classed i n the same grouping as c a p i t a l ships for proportional reduction. Over the submarine issue perhaps the most b i t t e r anti-French f e e l i n g was aroused. As a r e s u l t of the t e r r i f i c loss to t h e i r merchant shipping during the period of intensive U-boat campaigns, the B r i t i s h proposed the complete a b o l i t i o n of the submarine. Lord Lee suggested that a l l submarines 4 should be taken out into deep water and scuttled. To Franoe 1. Huddleston, S i s l e y , France and Washington, New Statesman, v o l . 18, NoA 444, October 15, 1921, p. 39. 2. Latimer, Hugh, Naval Disarmament, Chatham House Monographs, No. 3, London, Royal I n s t i t u t e of i n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , 1930, p. 9. 1 3. Fay, M. B., L*Opinion Americaine et l a France, Correspon-r dant, Tome-287, 25 Mai, 1922, p. 577. 4. Anon., France's Demand for Submarines, L i t e r a r y Digest, v o l . 72, No. 1, January 7, 1922, p. 7, 123 t h i s was an absurd proposal. One journal, Intransigeant of Paris, remarked that the French brain cannot comprehend the emotion which has taken possession of at least a part of B r i - t i s h public opinion over the idea that Prance w i l l not re- 1 nounce her submarine defense. The French refused to consider any submarine r e s t r i c t i o n except aft e r the establishment of a minimum of 90,000 tons for a l l nations wishing to maintain a submarine force. T h i s would be three times as large as the 2 then existent t o t a l tonnage of France. Nothing more resulted from the discussion on submarines except that the Naval Com- mittee of the Conference adopted several resolutions condemn- ing the i l l e g i t i m a t e use of undersea vessels. In these 3 resolutions the French concurred. The French d i f f i c u l t i e s at Washington were increased with the publication of some allegedly secret documents which gave d e t a i l s of correspondence between France and japan i n which they promised to support each other i n an e f f o r t to curb American power i n the Far East. One document from the French Foreign Office to the minister of Foreign A f f a i r s i n Tokio i s supposed to have contained the following statement, "...America's intention to secure for he r s e l f a place i n Sov- i e t Russia has been frustrated by our p o l i c y . Americans are... 1. Anon., B r i t a i n Puzzled by France, The L i t e r a r y Digest, v o l . 72, No. 3, January 21, 1922, p. 17. 2. Anon., Drawing the Sting of Submarines, Manchester Guard ian Weekly, v o l . 6, No. 1, January 6, 1922, p. 9. 3. Toynbee, op. c i t . , 1920-1923, p. 497. 124 pushing the Eastern question so as to secure supremacy i n the 1 East*" Although the authenticity of these documents was at once questioned^yet they did great damage to the French cause at Washington as they made Briand appear h y p o c r i t i c a l i n his advocacy of an honest peace p o l i c y . In addition they pro- vided food for thought for those elements which maintained that Briand had u l t e r i o r motives i n his cautious p o l i c y i n respect to disarmament. Briand's main contribution to the disarmament problem made at Washington was his clear enunciation off the irench stand—no reduction without adequate compensating guarantees by other powers. Although the reception which his e f f o r t s at Washington received at home and abroad were at complete variance—he returned to a triumphal r e c e p t i o n — y e t his s i n - c e r i t y i s not to be doubted. Briand i s often dismissed as a s c i n t i l l a t i n g but shallow statesman yet he did see as early as the Washington Conference that before disarmament could be achieved i n r e a l i t y there must be a moral disarmament i n Ger- 2 many. I t has been pointed out e a r l i e r i n t h i s discussion that Briand made too great an issue of the danger from Germany. He stressed t h i s so emphatically that the fact that he did hold out the o l i v e branch to Germany was overlooked* He said, 1. Nevinson, H. W., Decisions i n c o n f l i c t with America, Manchester uuardian Weekly, v o l . 6, No. 1, January 6, 1922, p. 7. 2. Anon;, The Heart of Briand*s Appeal, Mew York, indepen- dent and Weekly Review, v o l . 107, No. 3794, December 3, 1921, p. 227. 125 There i s one part of Germany that i s f o r peace; There are many people, esp e c i a l l y among the work- ing classes, who want to work....We s h a l l do every- thing to h'elp that Germany and i f she wants to restore her balance i n the bosom of a p a c i f i c republic.. .we can help her and we s h a l l be able -j_ to contemplate the future with feelings of security. Yet Briand feared the secret machinations of Hugo Stinnes and his i n d u s t r i a l i s t friends going on behind the s h e l l of a weak democratie government; i t was towards these men that Briand directed his attacks. Moral disarmament i n the mind of B r i - and c a l l e d for the peaceful elements of the people of Germany to curb the reactionary industrialists and t h e i r monarchist: a l l i e s , unly i n t h i s way could disarmament be made a r e a l i t y i n Europe. i n spite of the f e e l i n g that was current i n France at the time of the Washington Conference that the Anglo-Saxon rowers were antagonistic to France, Briand never l o s t sight of his plan to restore amicable, r e l a t i o n s between his country 2 and England, i f t h i s could be accomplished the disarmament problem could be approached from another angle. An opportun- i t y came to Briand at the London Conference, December 18-22, 1921. Mr. Lloyd George remarked that the attitude adopted by Briand at Washington had had a very adverse effect on pub- l i c opinion i n B r i t a i n . Briand used t h i s statement as an ex- cuse for bringing up a proposal f o r an Anglo-French A l l i a n c e , s t a t i n g that such an a l l i a n c e would enable France to reduce 1. Loc. c i t . 2. Fournol, Etienne, M. A r i s t i d e Briand, Revue Bleue, No. 11, 3 Juin, 1922, p. 327. 126 her m i l i t a r y burdens. This proposal was i n l i n e with his assertion at Washington that there could be no reduction of armaments unless guarantees were forthcoming. These con- versations were continued at Cannes, February 6-13, 1922, where Briand put forward the idea of a m i l i t a r y convention to 1 supplement the r e c i p r o c a l guarantee under discussion. Kis defeat was. brought about by the d i r e c t interference of pres- ident Millerand, who supported by the Gauche Republicaine group and Poincare' f e l t that Briarid was playing "fast and loose with the r i g h t s of Prance as l a i d down i n the Treaty of 2 V e r s a i l l e s . " Briand resigned. He was accused by the Chamber of Deputies of weakness which i n the French view i s a synonym for reasonableness. In t h i s way ended another e f f o r t of B r i - and to bring about some measure of disarmament i n Prance. During the period immediately following the retirement of Briand from o f f i c e , Franco-German r e l a t i o n s reached a very low point. Premier Poincare's speech at Bois-le-Pretre on September 23, 1922, struck the warning note announcing the coming invasion of the Ruhr which took place four days l a t e r . Briand was of the common people and i t was the common people of France who,put an end to t h i s dangerous adventure. The majority of French voters forced Poincare' from o f f i c e and i n doing so showed that i t s t i l l f e l t that France could not f i n d 1. Cmd. 2169 No. 35, 1924.v?.p. 121, Statement of the Views of the French Government sent to Mr. Lloyd George by M. Briand on January 8. 2. B a i n v i l l e , Jacques, The French Republic, 1870-1935, London, Jonathan Uape, 1936, p. 237. 127 security through, the separate exercise of m i l i t a r y force i f that p o l i c y alienated the public opinion of the rest of the world. The e f f o r t to trace Briand*s attempts to achieve some measure of disarmament i n France i s , during the period between his withdrawal from o f f i c e i n 1922 and his return to power i n 1925, marked by his collaboration with other French statesmen i n the promoting of the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance and the Geneva Protocol. Both of these e f f o r t s sought some means to assure security f o r France so that disarmament could become a r e a l i t j r . The Draft Treaty had been aeceptable to the French delegation at Geneva and i n t h i s i t was supported by the French general s t a f f which f e l t that the "complementary agree- ments" encouraged by the Draft Treaty would n u l l i f y the whole purpose of the scheme i n that they would greatly aid i n pre- 1 venting disarmament * Edouard Herriot presented the French case at Geneva and he was ably assisted, to a great extent behind the scenes, by Briand and other French statesmen such as Loucheur, Paul-Poncour and Henri de jouvenel. Even although the Geneva Protocol never became a r e a l i t y i t gave Briand an opportunity to stand f o r t h as a leading apostle of the new s p i r i t of peace abroad i n France--prompted by thB reaction from the French invasion of the Ruhr. At the F i f t h Session of the League Assembly he gave the o f f i c i a l acceptance of the 1. D e l l , Robert, Peace, Disarmament and the League, New Statesman, v o l . 23, August 2, 1924, p. 484; 128 1 French government of the Geneva r r o t o c o l . Once again i n the struggle for disarmament Briand was coming to the fore-front. In spite of the fact that Great B r i t a i n rejected the Protocol a new'feeling of eventual success was evinced i n many quarters. With the exception of the thesis i n respect to the pro- blem of disarmament that there should be no disarmament with- out previous guarantees of security the foreign p o l i c y of France i n the early post-war period was marked by a tendency to fluctuate. When he succeeded to the premiership, jierriot had adopted a p o l i c y of c o n c i l i a t i o n towards Germany but early i n 1925 he discarded this- c o n c i l i a t o r y p olicy and took advantage of some breaches of the disarmament clauses of the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s by Germany to delay the evacuation of the Cologne zone of the Khineland. With t h i s apparent re- ver s a l of policy i t would not be l i k e l y that a disarmament 3 program would be encouraged. The f a l l of he r r i o t on A p r i l 10, 1925, over a monetary question brought Fainleve' to o f f i c e as premier, ne selected Briand as his Foreign Mi n i s t e r . Painleve' lent a w i l l i n g hand i n the negotiation of the-;Locarno reace .tacts, ne had es- caped from the past which so influenced Clemenceau at the r a r i s Peace Conference. " J ' a i vecu," said Fainleve', "a 1. Toynbee, op. c i t . , 1924, p. 52. 2. League of Nations o f f i c i a l Journal, A p r i l , 1925, p. 490, ci t e d by Toynbee, op. c i t . , 1925, v o l . 2, p. 24, footnote 1 3. Anon., France and Security, Cologne as Bargaining Piece, Manchester Guardian Weekly, v o l . 12, No. 9, February 27, 1925, p. 176. 129 Geneve cote a cote avec Briand, les semaines de 1925 on fut 1 prepare'le pacte de Locarno." '.Hiere i s no doubt that Briand and Painleve'hoped that the security which followed the sign- ing of the Locarno pacts would r e s u l t i n disarmament, poin- care', withal a deeply sincere man had said, "Nous oublierons les crimes allemands l e jour ou nous serons surs q u ' i l s ne 2 recommenceront pas." Briand took the opposite view. He 3 - said, "Pour q u ' i l s ne commencent pas, oublions-les." Briand was undertaking a po l i c y which was not without r i s k s . This brought out very f o r c i b l y by Painleve, . . . i l n'est pas de geste c i v i l i s a t e u r qui n'ai t , xa son origine, comporte' des risques, et c'est parce que ces risques ont e'te brave's que l'hum- anite'a progressed Entre une po l i t i q u e qui n'est pas sans p e r i l , et une p o l i t i q u e qui mene sure*- ment a. un de'sastre, notre choix est f a i t . 4 This was a very bold and courageous stand to take, but Briand at the same time was not acting without "protecting his rear." On February 26, i n an address to the Chamber of Deputies, he remarked, Bien des flammeches voltigent en Europe demeurent menacantes, bien des flammeches encore trop pro- dies'* des bar i l s de poudre qui n'ont pas ete' en- leve's;;.. Gardons notre force."5 1. Painleve, Paul, paroles et E c r i t s , .taris, Editions Rieder, 1936, p. 559. 2. Barthelemy, Joseph, Apres Locarno: Vers Les Etats--unis D'Europe, Kevue P o l i t i q u e et parlementaire, Tome 125, Novembre, 1925, p. 238. 3. Loc. c i t . 4. Chaumeix, Andre/, Les Tr a i t e s de Locarno, Revue de r a r i s , Tome 6, Novembre, 1925, p* 227. 5. Anon., A Propos Du Desarmament, Revue des Deus Mondes, Tome 33, 1 Mai, 1926, p. 124. 130 A f t e r Locarno painleve' and Briand took care to point out that i n future the m i l i t a r y organization of France would be 1 e n t i r e l y defensive i n character. In l i n e with t h i s p o l i c y the m i l i t a r y budget had been greatly reduced i n 1926 compared to that of 1922. In the l a t t e r year the French government set aside 3,190,000 gold francs f o r the armed forces while 2 i n 1926 the sum had decreased to 1,251,000 gold francs. The return of the Grown Prince to Germany and the elevation of Field-Marshal von Hihdenburg to the Presidency had caused c e r t a i n uneasiness i n France which the Locarno Pacts had gone far to eliminate, but u n t i l the League of nations obtained an armed force of i t s own the danger of war would continue to e x i s t . Therefore every nation had the r i g h t to prepare i t s own system of defense although aiming at no s p e c i f i c other power* i t could be said that Germany was the f i r s t of the Powers which signed Locarno to derive concrete advantage from i t s terms. The evacuation of the B r i t i s h forced from the Cologne Zone of Occupation coincided with the signing of the treaty i n London on December 5, 1925. Briand was quick to press home to Germany the significance of t h i s gesture, i n a l e t t e r to the German ambassador i n Paris he said, "En faisant a i n s i coincider le de'but de 1* evacuation avec l a signature des accords de Locarno, l a conference marque l a confiance dont 1. La Bruyere, Kene', France's New Army and wavy, Current History, v o l . 24, N o . l , A p r i l , 1926, p. 21. 2. Anon., A Propos Du De'sarmament, p. 124. 131 sont animes les gouvernements represented par e l l e , que cette signature inaugurera une nouvelle periode dans leurs r e l a t i o n s 1 , avec l'Allemagne." The Locarno Agreements were based on the three-sided formula of a r b i t r a t i o n , security and disarmament and although most of the t r e a t i e s which make up these agree- ments deal with the f i r s t two problems, the short paragraph touching on disarmament i s very s i g n i f i c a n t . I t states, "They (the Contracting Parties) undertake to give t h e i r sinoere cooperation to the work r e l a t i n g to disarmament already under- taken by the League of Nations and to seek the r e a l i z a t i o n 2 thereof i n a general agreement*" Briand, i n common with the other negotiators of the Pact f e l t that a r e a l forward step had been taken towards disarmament. "Away with r i f l e s , machine-guns, cannons!" he cr i e d , "Room for c o n c i l i a t i o n , 3 a r b i t r a t i o n , and peacel" During the Si x t h Assembly of the League which met i n September, 1925, a res o l u t i o n c a l l i n g upon the League Council to take steps towards convening a Conference for the Reduction 4 and Limitation of Armaments was brought forward. In accor- dance with t h i s request the Council arranged for the formation 1. Anon., Lettre de M. Briand a l'Ambassadeur Allemand, von rioesch, L'Europe iMouvelle, No. 406, 28 Novembre, 1925, p. 1619. - 2. Wheeler-Bennett, J . W. and Langermann, P. E*, information on the Problem of Security, London, George A l l e n & Un- win, Locarno Conference, October, 1925. 3. Stern-Rubarth, Edgar, op. c i t . , p. 117. 4. League of Nations Documents, C. P. D. I., Documents of the Preparatory Disarmament Conference, Series I., p, 5. Cited by Wheeler-Bennett, j . W., Disarmament and Seourity, 1925-1931, p. 46, footnote 1. 132 of a preparatory Commission to study the problem of disarm- ament. The f i r s t and second sessions of t h i s Commission were held i n 1926 but i t was not u n t i l March, 1927, at the meeting of the t h i r d session that the French stand was c l e a r l y de- 1 fined. "M. Briand s a i s i s s a n t . . . l a b a l l e au bond, aceepta d'entamer les negooiations" and through M. Paul-Boncour summarized the French view "a securite' limited desarmament 2 l i m i t e d " At 7/ashington Briand had maintained that u n t i l some guarantee was provided, his country must maintain m i l i t a r y s uperiority over Germany. Even afte r Locarno, sincere though he undoubtedly was, Briand f e l t that France had disarmed u n i l a t e r a l l y to the lowest point i n keeping with national safety. The French Draft proposed the l i m i t a t i o n of a l l e f f e c t i v e s , land, sea and a i r i n service and i n formations or- ganized on a m i l i t a r y basis. The period of service was also to be limited and land war material was to be controlled through the l i m i t a t i o n of budgeting expenditure. The B r i t i s h also put forward a Draft and the problem of harmonizing the two plans occupied the Preparatory Commission u n t i l December, 1930. The e f f o r t s of Briand were not confined s o l e l y to the work of the Preparatory Commission. The whole of the period 1925-1931 was a time i n the history of Europe when the foreign p o l i c i e s of a l l nations were directed towards fi n d i n g some way 1. Anon., La preparation .du desarmament, L'Europe JMouvelle, No. 483, 14 Mai, 1927, p. 634s. 2* Loc. c i t . 133 i n which to es t a b l i s h peace on a firmer basis. Briand, the French foreign minister at the time the Locarno Treaties were consummated, had come to be regarded by Frenchmen as the l o g i c a l man to best protect the interests of France while at 1 the same time to direc t i t i n the s p i r i t of Locarno. Follow- ing the F i r s t Session of the Preparatory Commission held i n May 1926, Briand was faced with the important problem of re- con c i l i n g these two factors. At that Session a wide diver- gence of opinion was revealed on the question of naval l i m i t - 2 ation. Great B r i t a i n and France were i n favor of f i x i n g the size of vessels i n each category while ^riand advocated t o t a l tonnage without f i x i n g vessel s i z e . In order to reconcile the divergent views i f possible,' President Coolidge issued an i n v i t a t i o n to the naval Bowers to take part i n a conference. Briand refused because he f e l t that such a conference on a lim i t e d f i e l d of the whole disarmament problem would jeopar- dize the chances f o r success of the "movement for general d i s - armament, lie maintained that the naval problem eould not be iso l a t e d . I t must be r e c a l l e d , however, that statesmen do not always make th e i r innermost thoughts public. At t h i s time I t a l y , under the Fascist regime was extending her sphere of i n t e r e s t . There i s not much doubt that Briand was alarmedj 1; Dumont-Wilden, L., Les Accords de Locarno et La Nouvelle urientation p o l i t i q u e , Revue Bleue, No. 21, 7 Novembre, 1925, p. 708; 2. Anon., La premiere session de l a commission preparatoire de l a conference du de'sarmement, L'Europe Nouvelle, No. 437, 3 J u i l l e t , 1926, p. 912. 134 by t h i s expansion* Briand, i n spite of his declarations i n 1927 that the naval problem could not be i s o l a t e d from the main factor of general disarmament was prepared i n March, 1928, to take part i n discussions with the B r i t i s h Foreign Secretary, S i r Austin Chamberlain. Great B r i t a i n was prepared to make same con- cession on the m i l i t a r y side i f Briand would give way i n some respect on the naval* i t i s possible that Chamberlain i n making these proposals to Briand was mindful of the l a t t e r ' s statement at the seventh session of the League Assembly when he said that i n order to achieve success i n negotiation i t might be necessary to grant "certaines concessions r e c i p r o - 1 ques." In addition a proposal of t h i s nature found favor with Briand insofar as i t opened up a larger section of the disarmament problem In involving part of the French land force the trained reserves. The agreement at which Briand and Cham- b e r l a i n ultimately arrived enlarged the li m i t e d categories to four. In addition to a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r s and c a p i t a l ships, 2 already limited under the Washington treaty, cruisers armed with more than six inch c a l i b r e guns and submarines of more than 600 tons were to be included. Briand surrendererd.the 1. Discours prononce' par M. Briand, ministre des a f f a i r e s etrangeres de France,- & l a septieme se'ance de 1'As- semble' de l a Socie'te' de Nations, l e 10 septembre, 1926, L'Europe Nouvelle, No. 449, 18 Septembre, 1926, p. 1321 2. i b i d . , Note de l'ambassade de l'Angleterre au ministe're des a f f a i r e s e'trangeres en date du 28 j u i l l e t , 1928, IMQ. 562, 17 novembre, 1928, p. 1581. 135 theory so long held by the French i n respect to global ton- nage i n fa>vor of l i m i t a t i o n by category and i n consenting to take part i n discussions i n the naval phase of disarmament alone he.abandoned the stand that naval, land and a i r arma- 1 ments are interdependent. This removed the two major d i f - f i c u l t i e s which heretofore paralyzed the e f f o r t s of the pre- paratory Commission. Briand secured the i n s e r t i o n i n t h i s Anglo-French Compromise of 1928 the important provision that the same maximum tonnage for submarines and cruisers should be f i x e d for a l l the great naval Bowers'. Briand said that t h i s recognition of equality was only a question of " c h i f f r e s 2 de prestige" and that France would not b u i l d up to the l i m i t . The f i r s t reaction of the United States to these conversations was favorable as they represented an e f f o r t by two nations to reach an agreement by mutual concession, however, when the conditions of the compromise were revealed both o f f i c i a l 3 and public c r i t i c i s m was severe. The agreement would allow the building of certain highly e f f i c i e n t f i g h t i n g ships while imposing r e s t r i c t i o n s on those types e s p e c i a l l y suited to the needs of the united States. 1. Anon., A Plea for an independent Foreign r o l i c y : The Anglo-French Compromise, The Round Table, v o l . 19, December, 1928, p. 17. 2. B u e l l , R. L.,'Anglo-American Naval understanding, Foreign p o l i c y Association information Service, No. 10, July 24, 1929, p. 182. 3. Lettre de M. Norman Armour, Charge d'affaires des Etats- . u'nis va Paris, a M. A r i s t i d e Briand, 28 septembre, 1928, L'Europe Nouvelle, No. 562, 17 Novembre, 1928, p. 1582. 136 Why did Briand and Chamberlain make t h i s Compromise without consulting the united States i n accordance with the t r a d i t i o n of the Washington Conference, and Germany as required by the s p i r i t of Locarno? Briand had made a serious error. The actions of the French and B r i t i s h statesmen revealed the weakness of a l l e f f o r t s made towards disarmament since the end of the war of 1914-1918. Each was looking at the problem of security from a narrow, n a t i o n a l i s t view-point. Briand had consented to an agreement by which France and B r i t a i n would make t h e i r own pos i t i o n secure, without thinking of the security of other interested nations. Germany could not ap- preciate Briand's point, that i f England and France came to an understanding then the security of Germany would be i n - creased. This f a i l u r e to consult Germany aroused again i n the German mind the suspicion that France s t i l l held that her own security continued to rest on the permanent disarmament of Germany. Briand had l e f t the Locarno road. The old system of secret diplomacy was back, i t was charged. Briand was deep ly hurt, i n a speech before the Chamber of Deputies, he com- plained that as soon as an agreement, towards disarmament was arrived at the world cried out "pas pour qui, mais contre qui." One French c r i t i c writes, "M. Briand, M. Faul-Boucour ont eu raison de denoncer avec emotion, ce q u ' i l y avait de tragique dans l a suspicion que declenche, aussitot annonce', tout accord conclu entre deux grandes nations de'sireuses, par cet accord- 1. Wheeler-Bennett, J . W*, Disarmament and Security Since Loc arno, wew iork, Macmillan, 1932, p. 135. 137 meme et par les concessions bilate'rales q u ' i l comporte, de hater l a solution dont depend 1'evolution pacifique de I l'Europe." The Anglo-French Compromise collapsed hut i n spite of t h i s Briand t r i e d to hold the B r i t i s h to t h e i r agreement concerning trained reserves, i n a speech before the house of Commons r e l a t i v e to t h i s problem Lord Cushendun declared that the B r i t i s h government "were under no o b l i g a t i o n i n the 2 matter;..." In 1925 Briand had given French policy a d e f i n i t e orien- t a t i o n based on the Locarno s p i r i t . At that time no states- man was accused of harboring anything but the l o f t i e s t motives. In the years following Locarno the forces In opposition to Briand's p o l i c y were st e a d i l y increasing i n power. One of the factors most responsible for t h i s trend was the armament press, not only i n France and Germany but i n other countries as w e l l . In addition to the press, the armament industry was a power- f u l factor because i t s ramifications are so wide-spread i n the 3 i n d u s t r i a l l i f e of the country i n which i t i s located. In France these elements car r i e d on such a continued attack on Briand af t e r his conversation with Stresemann at Thoiry that French public opinion began to have fears that possibly the policy of Briand was not i n the best interests of France. 1. Ormesson, Wladimir d, Rentre'e...., L'Europe Nouvelle, IMo. 555, 29 Septembre, 1928, p. 1302. 2. Cited i n Wheeler-Bennett, J. W., opp c i t . , p. 141. 3. Spender, J . A., These Times, London, C a s s e l l , 1934, p. 110. 138 I f Briand and Stresemann had had t h e i r way, France and Germany together would have led the world to peace. That they f a i l e d to do so was very larg e l y the work of those who thought of foreign p o l i c y i n terms of s e l l i n g guns. 1 One factor p a r t l y responsible for the increasing d i f - f i c u l t y which Briand encountered i n his disarmament e f f o r t s 2 was the reaction i n Germany to every concession made by France. Although chauvinistic elements l i k e the press of the Hugen- berg-Konzern could not be said to represent the German people yet continued references to the i n j u s t i c e s of the V e r s a i l l e s 3 Treaty did not f i n d a favorable reception In France. The vice-president of the Chamber of Deputies and Rapporteur of the War Budget for the Chamber said, ftM$me, a diffe'rentes reprises, empruntant l a tribune de l a Presse, je l ' a i c r i l e au pays tout entiere, je me suis ef force" de montre cette nuee Infernale" qui s'eleve ia-bas dans l ' E s t gagnant de plus en plus v i t e notre c i e l bleu de France." A more concrete French reaction was the s t a r t i n g of construction on the wall of for - t i f i c a t i o n s on the eastern f r o n t i e r of France, the Maginot 5 Line* French opinion was beginning to harden. As early as 1. i\ioel-Baker, P h i l i p , The Private Manufacture .of Armaments, London, V i c t o r Gollancz, 1937, v o l . 1, p. 58. 2. Stresemann i n his Memoirs has spoken i n t h i s vein, i t i s almost c e r t a i n that these personal thought -! were- never meant for publication. 3. Ohaumeix, Andre', L'Etat D'Esprit De L'Allemagne^Paris, Re- vue de Paris, Tome 1, Fevrier, 1926, p. 943. 4. Bouilloux-Lafont, M., Geneve et L'Aviation Allemand, Revue de Paris, Tome 6, Movembre, 1926, p. 481. 5. Brown, F., War Strength of France, Current History, v o l . 42, No. 2, May, 1935, p. 197. 139 1926 one French writer warned Stresemann to "Stop your para- keets from repeating 'We did not cause the war, we did not cause the war!* Who knows we may strangle them one of these 1 days." General Maginot some years l a t e r c l e a r l y expressed t h i s f e e l i n g when he said, "Two conditions are necessary to ensure peace—the peaceful countries must remain strong and 2 the warlike ones must keep t h e i r mouths shut." I t i s small wonder that with such a f e e l i n g beginning to take hold i n France that the French delegation went to the London Naval Conference with no i l l u s i o n s about a moral mission, rather was i t s watch-word "en garde". It is a factor of great significance that the f i r s t i n d i - cation of the French stand at the London Naval Conference was 3 not made by Briand but by Andre Tardieu, the Premier gt France at the time. Before the Foreign A f f a i r s Naval Committee of the Chamber he stated that naval disarmament could not be dealt with as a separate problem and that the decisions reached at the London iMaval Conference would have to form part of the basis of the coming World Disarmament Conference. Thus i t w i l l be seen that the man who so severely c r i t i c i z e d Briand for his handling of the French case at the Washington Conference w i l l now be with Briand at London or at least 1. F l e r s , Robert de, Germany i s to Blame, L i v i n g Age, v o l . 331, No. 4294, p. 293, (translated from Paris Figaro). 2. B a r t l e t t , Vernon, Nazi Germany Explained, London, Victor-Gollancz, 1933, p. 195. 3. Anon., De/but de Conference, L'Europe Nouvelle, No. 625, 1 Favrier, 1930, P. 194. 140 nearby at Pa r i s , i n a supervisory capacity, He was determined that there would not be a r e p e t i t i o n of the catastrophe of 1 Washington. P r i o r to the assembling of the Conference a Memorandum was sent by the French government to the nations which were 2 to take part i n the Conference s e t t i n g f o r t h the French stand. This enabled them to take the i n i t i a t i v e i n the necessity of r e l a t i n g disarmament to,security and national needs and on the question of l i m i t a t i o n on the basis of t o t a l tonnage. having paved t h e i r way i n t h i s manner, the French had a ta c t - 3 i c a l advantage. During the period of the Conference c a l l e d the F i r s t Phase, the French delegation announced that a naval building plan had been l a i d down i n France which by 1936 would give her 4 a naval strength of 724,479 tons. I f guarantees were f o r t h - coming b o l s t e r i n g French security, a reduotion of t h i s t o t a l would be considered. The period c a l l e d the Second Phase was marked by the absence of the Frenoh delegation from London 1. Tardieu, Andre', The Po l i c y of France, Foreign A f f a i r s , v o l . 1, No. 1, September 15, 1922, p. 11. 2. B u e l l , H. L., The London Naval Conference, Foreign P o l i c y Association News Service, v o l . VI., No. 6, May. 28, 1930, p. 102. 3. Anon., Naval Conference Makes Progress, Manchester Guardian Weekly, v o l . 22, No. 5, January 31, 1930, p. 84. 4. Ib i d . , Short Adjournment of the Naval Conference, v o l . 22, No. 8, February 21, 1930, p. 144. 141 owing to the defeat of the Tardieu Cabinet on i n t e r n a l issues. While the French delegation was absent the remaining delegates concluded that i n order for the Conference to meet with suc- cess i t would be necessary to reduce the bu i l d i n g program of France and to solve the problem of p a r i t y between I t a l y and Franc e. With the return of Briand to London after the r e c a l l of ,Tardieu to the premiership, the problem of security came to the fore; In accordance with the Memorandum of December 20, 1929, there could be no further reduction by France without reinforced security. Briand returned to the old stand of French statesmen, security f i r s t , however, French opinion was adamant that the security question could not be solved only by a new guarantee from Great B r i t a i n — t h e parity problem with I t a l y must also be s e t t l e d . In France i t was f e l t that I t a l y was pursuing a po l i c y of prestige whereas i n France superior- i t y over I t a l y was f e l t to be a necessity. Briand hoped that Great B r i t a i n would consent to a re i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of A r t i c l e 16 of the League Convenant which would go considerably i n the 1 di r e c t i o n towards developing a formula, however, insofar as no solution could be reached over the parity question with I t a l y , Briand suggested that the best plan would be for the Conference to draw up a Three-Bower Bact between Great B r i t a i n , united States and Japan among which Bowers some agreement had 1. Lippmann, Walter, The London Naval conference, Foreign A f f a i r s , v o l ; 8, No. 4, July, 1930, p. 499. 142 1 been reached, he refused to consider a Four-Bower Fact which would leave I t a l y out. He f e l t that a Four-i?Ower Bact would i n t e n s i f y rather than reduce the danger of the Italo-French parity issue thus rendering disarmament through l i m i t a t i o n even more i l l u s o r y , i t would exasperate I t a l y . "M. Briand a mis l a une f o i s de plus, au service de l a paix l a grande 2 finesse de son jugement;" I t a l i a n c r i t i c s were not so laud- atory. One great Milan journal, the Gorriere d e l l a Serra, 3 said that at London, France had committed a grave error, while II Popolo d * I t a l i a stated that while working for peace the 4 basis for a new war had been l a i d . Perhaps the most i n t e r - esting comment was not made at a formal session at a l l but at the ceremony of the signing of the Treaty when Briand said, "Competition i n armaments i s no longer possible af t e r the 5 London Conference of 1930." This optimistic statement by Briand was somewhat pre- mature for on his return to Paris he found himself facedc'with a problem of great importance, rhe s i t u a t i o n i n Germany was 1. B u e l l , R. L., op. c i t . , p. 109. 2. Joxe, Louis, Conclusions '"a Londres, L'Europe Nouvelle, No. 639, 19 Avril'i 1930, p. 615. 3. Pernot, Maurice, I t a l i e et La France apres l a Conference de Londres, L'Europe Nouvelle, No. 639, 10 Mai, 1930, p. 719; 4. Anon., Five Powers Sign the Naval Treaty, Manchester Guardian.Weekly, Vol. 22, No. 17, A p r i l 25, 1930, p. 328. 5. Loc. c i t . 143 taking a grave turn with the increase i n power of the National S o c i a l i s t and Communist forces and the f a i l u r e to reach a solution of the I t a l i a n naval question further complicated the outlook for his policy of understanding, he was on the defensive. The fact that he brought forward at t h i s time the proposal f o r a United States of Europe i s evidence enough that he was beginning to despair of achieving security through d i s - armament, at. least i n the immediate future, i n the Chamber of Deputies i t was argued that the publication of the .Feder- ation idea revealed that Governments of Europe were divided into two camps* r e v i s i o n i s t and a n t i - r e v i s i o n i s t , the League of Nations had f a i l e d to organize peace on a s o l i d foundation, and the Briand-Kellogg Fact was without force* i n his own defense Briand maintained that his was the only policy. Ger- many was a nation of six t y m i l l i o n i n t e l l i g e n t people and a foreign minister who did not try to diminish the danger of such a neighbor by agreements and understandings would f a l l 1 to do his duty. Nevertheless, during the course of the same' debate, Tardieu, while supporting Briand, warned that further disarmament of France would -be governed by the conduct of the German delegation at the sessions of the Preparatory Commission. He i n s i s t e d that u n t i l the German representatives stopped de- manding that France reduce her. agmament to the l e v e l forced 1; Documents on International A f f a i r s , 1930, Extract from Speech of M. A r i s t i d e Briand i n the chamber of Deputies, November 14, 1930, p. 89. 144 1 upon Germany, France would do nothing more* A p o l i c y of understanding was fin e , s a i d the French premier, but no chances would be taken on the future, as Briand had been prepared to do afte r Locarno. The way of France must be clear ahead. The period following the London Conference was further complicated for Briand by his f r u i t l e s s e f f o r t s to reach some agreement with I t a l y over the par i t y issue. Negotiations between Briand and Signor Grandi were continually upset by the v i o l e n t speeches of premier Mussolini who r i d i c u l e d the French insistence that France must have a superior f l e e t to the I t a l i a n s and boasted that he was prepared to b u i l d ship 2 for ship with France. The problem was further complicated by the new ori e n t a t i o n of I t a l i a n foreign p o l i c y — t h e r e were 3 signs of an Italo-German rapprochement. To the R i g h t i s t i n France t h i s was claimed to be the direct outcome of the pol- i c i e s of Briand. To the world at large i t was f e l t that the Treaty of Locarno and the entry of Germany into the League would provide France with the extra measure of security which she f e l t was needed so badly. When the Preparatory Disarmament Commission was set up i t was expected that the problem of security would 1. Ibid., Extract from the Speech of M. Andre'Tardieu i n the Chamber of Deputies, November 14, 1930, p. 89. 2. Anon., Les V i s i t e s de M. Grandi, L'Europe Nouvelle, No. 645, 21 Juin, 1930, p. 921* 3* Vermeil, Edmond, Danger from Germany, Revue Politique et Parlementaire, Tome 144, 10 A v r i l , 1930, p. 169* 145 be absorbed by the greater problem of disarmament. Thus, as the e f f o r t s towards disarmament progressed and armaments de- creased i n quantity, then as a natural c o r o l l a r y , the secur- i t y of France would increase. As the period 1930-31 advanced i t was seen that t h i s was not to be the case. As far back as Locarno Briand had f e l t that the differences between France and Germany were to be eventually regulated. l e t both at Locarno and Thoiry, there i s strong evidence to show that the sentiments of not only Briand, but Stresemann as well, were, 1 not i n harmony with a great part of t h e i r respective peoples. Public opinion was more n a t i o n a l i s t i c than either statesman 2 thought; This resulted i n France i n an extreme reluctance On the part of many to give up the guarantees which t h e i r country had received i n the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s . In spite of the growing n a t i o n a l i s t opposition i n France Briand, a f t e r the London Naval Conference, was s t i l l deter- mined to press forward his p o l i c y . Speaking before the Eleventh Assembly he said, The Disarmament question has just been raised from t h i s platform. Obviously a l l our work for peace must, unless accompanied by i t s necessary c o r o l l a r y — 1 mean the l i m i t a t i o n and reduction of armaments— remain hazardous and cause many disappointments to the Nation. The promise l a i d down in the Covenant must therefore be f u l f i l l e d . . . ; Whatever bad times we go through...! personally mean disarmament to go straight ahead. So long as 1 am where 1 am there 1; Lais, Maurice, Stresemann, Revue des Sciences P o l i t i q u e s , Tome 55, Uctobre-Decembre, 1932, p. 365. 2. Lichtenberger, Henri, The Third Reich, New York, The Greystone Press, 1937, p. 29. 146 1 w i l l be no war." Yet, i n spite of t h i s statement, when the Draft Convention of 1930 came up for r a t i f i c a t i o n i n December 1930, the French government took the stand that unless A r t i c l e L I I I . of the Convention was adopted, France would not r a t i f y the Conven- t i o n . This A r t i c l e says i n part, The present Convention s h a l l not affect the pro- v i s i o n s of the previous t r e a t i e s under which cer- t a i n of the high Contracting Parties have agreed to l i m i t t h e i r land, sea or a i r armaments and have thus fixed i n r e l a t i o n to one another t h e i r re- 2 spective rights and obligations i n t h i s connection. There was no doubt that i n the German mind th i s was meant as a reaffirmation of the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s * Germany was to 3 be kept i n a bond of perpetual i n f e r i o r i t y . This was not the p o l i c y of Briand. Then why was i t put forward as the p o l i c y of the French government of which Briand was an i n t e g r a l part? Simply because, Briand i s s t i l l nominally the director of French foreign policy, but actually he.:is being used more i n the nature of a front by the n a t i o n a l i s t forces, Also Briand was aware of the mood of the French people and even he f e l t that the Germany of Luther and Curtius was r a p i d l y departing from the ways of Stresemann. Confirmation of the correctness of t h i s conclusion come 1. Verbatim Record of the Eleventh Assembly, September 11, 1930, c i t e d by P h i l i p iMoel-Baker, op. c i t . , v o l . 1, p. 519 f f . 2. A r t i c l e L l I I . of the Draft Convention, signed December^, 1930. ' ' 3. iieibronner, Andre', La Reduction Des Armaments: Ses D i f f i - cultes, Kevue Des Sciences p o l i t i q u e s , Tome"-''55, Octobre-Decembre, 1932, p. 254. 147 to by the Germans i n respect to the French stand in the d i s - armament issue was given i n the speech of one of the fore- most French delegates at Geneva, M. Mass i g l i when he said, When the.,Conference meets, a certain number of rowers,"including France, w i l l submit proposals i n figures, for the l i m i t a t i o n of t h e i r armaments, xhese proposals w i l l be i s o l a t e d i n r e l a t i o n to a given s i t u a t i o n ; they w i l l correspond to a given degree of security.... By the text ( A r t i c l e LlII) the Fower.-s': concerned define the conditions under which they accept the figures for l i m i t a t i o n to be inserted i n regard to themselves, i n the Con- vention. . .. 1 . i h i s i s the statement of M. massigli, but Briand was the head of the French delegation. The Briand who endorsed t h i s speech was not the Briand of the Locarno days, i t i s a Briand who i s on the defensive. Behind t h i s speech can be seen the shadow of roincare'and Foch. Briand was beginning to find 2 that the "pens made from the same s t e e l as cannons" were be- ginning to command an ever-widening audience i n France, i n view of the tension at the time of the r a t i f i c a t i o n of the Convention i t was f e l t by many that an important success had been achieved i n the struggle to disarm, not so much for what the Convention contained, but simply because of i t s very exis- tence. The evacuation of the Rhineland took place i n June of 1930 and i f Briand's p o l i c y of appeasement had borne healthy f r u i t , the future of Franco-German r e l a t i o n s would have become 1. Toynbee, op. c i t . , 1930, p. 120. 2. M; Briand speaking to a Committee of Women's Organizations at Geneva, September 23, 19 30. Cited by Noel-Baker, op. c i t . , v o l . I., p. 255. 148 brighter. Two months l a t e r 107 National S o c i a l i s t s were 1 elected to the Keichstag. This confirmed French public opin- ion i n the b e l i e f that each concession made to the Germans by Briand only led to further demands. Thus the b e l i e f grew stronger that Briand's p o l i c y of appeasement was an i l l u s i o n which was leading France to r u i n . This growing tension be- tween France and Germany had a d i r e c t bearing on the negoti- ations between I t a l y and France on the naval question which followed the London Naval Conference. After much consultation, a proposal whereby I t a l y i n 19 36 would have a naval tonnage of 441,256 tons to 670,723 tons for France was accepted by the I t a l i a n s . The French Foreign A f f a i r s Committee of the Cham- ber of Deputies, however, turned i t down, maintaining that i t would approve only those agreements which were connected with guarantees for international security which had already been obtained or might be i n the future, i n making t h i s decision the French government linked t h i s problem of disarmament with the broader question of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n . The decision was made on the same day on which the proposed cus- toms union between A u s t r i a and Germany was announced. Briand says of this plan i n an address to the French Senate, "Si vous me maintenez votre confiance, je t i e n d r a i jusqu'au bout dans 1'attitude que je viens d'indiquer avec l'espoir formel que l'Allemagne et l'Autriche prevenues de nos intentions ne persisteront pas a accomplis ce que l a France considere 1. Ormesson, Wladimir d, France, London, Longmans Green, 1939, p. 83. 149 1 comme l a v i o l a t i o n d'engagements solonnels." Thus we have Briand, the "man of peace", condemning the action of Germany and A u s t r i a . Hope for disarmament was waning i n Europe. So great had the pressure of events i n the inte r n a t i o n a l f i e l d become i n the l a t t e r part of 1931 with the consequent embitterment of inte r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s that i t was f e l t i n many quarters that i t would be a wise step to postpone the World Disarmament Conference which was ,to open February 2, 1932. This move was urged by many statesmen of the Left i n France who f e l t that i f the Conference could be postponed u n t i l a f t e r the French General e l e c t i o n i n May, 1932, a new government, freed from control of the n a t i o n a l i s t s might bring i n a change of policy i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s . Briand was determined however that postponement should not take place. He sincerely f e l t that a conference i n February would help to c l a r i f y the si t u a t i o n which was growing extremely complex. At the Twelfth Assembly of the League of Nations held at Gen- eva i n September 1931, he made the formal announcement that France -did not propose that the Disarmament Conference should 2 be delayed, let on the other side of the picture a less pro- mising;; prospect i s observed. The n a t i o n a l i s t elements of the Government are equally determined and i n some cases very frank 1. Anon., E x t r a i t s de discours prononce /par M. Briand au Senat l e 28 mars, L'Europe Nouvelle, No. 686, 4 A v r i l , 1931, p. 481. 2. Address by Briand before the Twelfth Assembly of the League of Nations, September, 1931. Cited by J . W. Wheeler-Bennett, Disarmament and Security, 1925-31, p. 346. 150 as to t h e i r stand. They would consider granting j u r i d i c a l equality to Germany, hut actual equality i n armaments France 1 was not prepared to grant. To them Germany had never recog- nized that the d i s a b i l i t i e s under which she suffered were the Inevitable consequences of defeat. Behind the scenes but undoubtedly a strong force urging that the Conference be held on the designated date was the French General S t a f f , which strongly supported Maginot, the Minister of War; This group f e l t that i f the Conference was held i n February that, i n view of the d i f f i c u l t i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n , i t would l i k e l y 2 break down. This would leave France, free of any blame for i t s f a i l u r e , rather would she be given credit for so vigor- ously urging that i t be held; On July 15, 1931, the French government had issued a very important document r e l a t i v e to the coming World Disarm- ament Conference i n which was set f o r t h the keynote of the 3 French stand, "security f i r s t . " This document r e i t e r a t e d the stand taken on many previous occasions that further guarantees must precede further reduction of.armaments on the part of France. By t h i s Memorandum i t was shown that France had no intention of abandoning the thesis that a perpetuation of the inequality of status imposed upon the defeated powers was 1. Cot, Pierr e , France and Disarmament, Spectator, v o l . 148, January 9, 1932, p. 38. 2; Toynbee, op. c i t . , 1931, p. 287, footnote 1. 3. Documents of inte r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , 1931, p. 43. Extract from the French Memorandum, July 15, 1931, League Document, 19 31, IX 9. 151 e s s e n t i a l to the security of Europe. Briand's position was badly shaken by the Austro-German Custom's proposal and although t h i s scheme was condemned by the Hague Uourt, i t nevertheless influenced Briand.. i n his attitude towards Germany. Coupled with t h i s reverse i n the foreign f i e l d was his unsuccessful attempt to a t t a i n the Pres- idency of the Republic* Briand f a i l e d to appreciate the truth of the old axiom i n French p o l i t i c s , that any statesman who has shown very pronounced views and taken a prominent place i n p o l i t i c a l l i f e had better not t r y for the P r e s i d e n t i a l post* These two serious reversals, one i n the pol i c y on which he had based his whole p o l i t i c a l philosophy, that of rap- prochement with Germany, and the other i n what he f e l t was a personal defeat, convinced him that his p o l i t i c a l race was nearly run. Perhaps t h i s f e e l i n g that he had been thwarted caused him to neglect a r e a l opportunity to take a stand at Geneva on the proposal fp>D an Arms Truce put forward by Sig- 1 nor Grandi of It a l y on September 8, 1931. On September 11, Briand made a speech before the League Assembly i n which he made no reference to the I t a l i a n proposal, even although i t had been given a generally favorable reception by other na- tion s . The French had. always i n s i s t e d that security should precede a r b i t r a t i o n and disarmament; Briand brought t h i s doc- t r i n e up again. i\iot content with t h i s he further complicated 1. Anon., Instant Halt i n Armaments, Manchester Guardian Weekly, v o l . 25, JMo. 11, September 11, 1931, p. 205. 152 the s i t u a t i o n by stating that France would be w i l l i n g to disarm only i f the Treaty of Mutual Assistance was revised. This was the most extreme of a l l proposals involving the use 1 of m i l i t a r y sanctions. On January 7, 1932, A r i s t i d e Briand r e t i r e d from the Quai d'Orsay. Was i t a retreat? Had his policy f a i l e d ? Cer- t a i n l y during the seven years he had spent as.Foreign Minister he had gone the f u l l c i r c l e i n his attitude towards disarm- ament. Some French c r i t i c s f e l t that at Locarno he was pre- pared to r i s k the security of France i n order to give Germany every chance, let at Geneva i n the f a l l of 1931 he brought up the Treaty of Mutual Assistance. It was the gesture, not of the Briand, who with the flame of idealism burning deep i n his soul, strove with Stresemann for the new day, but of a man who has l o s t the zest for b a t t l e . Briand had become merely the symbol of the foreign p o l i c y which was fast disap- pearing i n France, Bis power was gone, ne was the front used by the new forces to make t h e i r p olicy acceptable, lie had f a i l e d to reach his goal. Upon his departure from o f f i c e his country had a stronger m i l i t a r y establishment than ever before* France did not yet f e e l secure. 1. Anon., M. Briand and Disarmament, Manchester Guardian weekly, v o l ; 25, No. 12, September 18, 1931, p. 223. CHAPTER VII. EPILOGUE CHAPTER VII. EPILOGUE To estimate the contribution of A r i s t i d e Briand to the security of Prance i s a d i f f i c u l t task. It i s d i f f i c u l t not so l e l y because the structure of peace which he so laboriously b u i l t up crashed almost immediately aft e r his retirement from o f f i c e , but also because of the very nature of the man himself* Briand was an opportunist both i n his personal l i f e and i n his p o l i t i c a l career, his opportunism i s largely due to the fact that he was a r e a l i s t , i t was his appreciation of r e a l i t y that caused Briand to stay i n o f f i c e a f t e r he had had two successive r e v e r s e s — t h e r e j e c t i o n of the Franco-German rapprochement plan which grew out of the Thoiry conversations and the r e f u s a l of his government to r a t i f y the Anglo-French- I t a l i a n Naval Agreement of 1931. he did not resign because he f e l t that to stay i n o f f i c e would be to accomplish more than i f he had withdrawn from the government. His appreciation of the r e a l i t y of the European picture caused him to be con- tent to watch and wait after his r e c a l l from the Cannes Con- ference because he knew that with a strongly n a t i o n a l i s t Chamber l i t t l e could be accomplished along the l i n e s he inten- ded to follow, he must await the swing of the p o l i t i c a l pen- dulum. That t h i s swing had taken place was seen by the en- thusiasm which was aroused by the signature of the Locarno 1 Pacts. The Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s had been humanized. 1. Bois, Jules, A r i s t i d e Briand, Member of Twenty-one French. Cabinets, Current History, v o l . 31, lMo. 3, December, 1929, p. 529. 153 154 Locarno was the climax of the foreign policy of Briand. Its whole s p i r i t was a compromise, an appeal to the humanity which Briand so f a i t h f u l l y believed i n , but above a l l he f e l t that Locarno was the work of a r e a l i s t , he believed that he had a grasp not only on the pulse of France, but on that of the new Europe as well. For t h i s reason the defeat of h i s Franco-German rapprochement e f f o r t was a profound blow to him but he s t i l l held true to his great i d e a l — F r a n c e secure i n a Europe at peace. A statesman has a two-fold task; i n the f i r s t instance he must be an advocate of the in t e r e s t s of h i s own country primarily, and i n the second case he must be an architect t r y i n g to improve the i n t e r n a t i o n a l organization. It has been said by many responsible thinkers that Briand did not guard the security of France s u f f i c i e n t l y , that he was w i l l i n g to barter i t away for the sake of compromise, i e t never once did Briand refuse to agree to the appropriations for the armed forces set aside by the French governments i n which he served. In spite of t h i s fact he f e l t another road could be t r a v e l l e d besides that of armed might to reach his goal of security; he believed that Anglo-French cooperation was imperative f o r the well-being of France. For t h i s reason he accepted a reduced naval strength for France at V'/ashington i n the hope of being able to drive a wedge between the United States and 1 Great B r i t a i n ; F a i l i n g to do t h i s he only saved his p o l i t i c a l 1. Carr, P h i l i p , A r i s t i d e Briand, Contemporary Review, v o l . 141, A p r i l , 1932, p. 431. 155 l i f e by his famous speech i n defense of French land armaments. Briand had t r i e d for the friendship of Great B r i t a i n once— he was to t r y again* poincare', the n a t i o n a l i s t , scorned B r i - t i s h advice and sent French troops into the Ruhr. It i s an open question as to which French statesman was thinking p r i - marily of the security of his country. Briand hated war. There i s no reason to disbelieve the assertion he made at Guerdon on June 19, 1931, i n which he r e c a l l e d with what horror war f i l l e d his s p i r i t and that ever since he took o f f i c e he had persevered i n h i s e f f o r t s to gain 1 security for France and peace i n Europe. His s i n c e r i t y i n his low© of peace was believed i n by the statesmen of other count- r i e s with whom he came i n contact, i t was believed i n by the common people of other lands and those of prance as well . The great success of Locarno following so closely upon the con- demnation of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance and the Geneva Protocol led Frenchmen to believe both i n his s i n c e r i t y and his method. As time progressed many began to question his method. His greatest and most destructive c r i t i c s were the n a t i o n a l i s t leaders and t h e i r press whose independence of the armament industry was often questioned. The accusation of the n a t i o n a l i s t press began and ended with the one thought—the war g u i l t of Germany* That view would brook no compromise. Briand believed i n rapprochement which would c a l l for com- promise. 1. Anon., M. Briand 1s Fight for Peace, Manchester Guardian Weekly, v o l . 24, HQ. 25, June 19, 1931, p. 491. 156 Briand was a revolutionary, a revolutionary i n method. For him the security of France through peace i n Europe was the only g o a l — b u t the ways to reach that goal were many. One of his outstanding methods was through the fos t e r i n g of the idea of the Treaty f o r the Renunciation of War. In the Assembly of the League of iMations the idea was received i n sile n c e ; U n t i l t h i s suggestion of Briand was brought before them the delegates had talked of peace—and thought of war; They l i v e d i n perpetual fear that war would come because of some hole i n the Covenant hitherto undisclosed. Briand's proposal wrought a revolution i n t h e i r whole concept. I t was the proposal of an unfettered mind, l e t i t was too revolu- tionary; The world responded with l i p - s e r v i c e , yet each na- t i o n made reservations i n i t s own soul. . A r i s t i d e Briand was an i d e a l i s t , tie was a r e a l i s t . Be had the support of m i l l i o n s throughout the world i n his quest. He was sincere yet his e f f o r t s came to nought. Why? The answer i s found i n the story of his struggle. He knew where his goal lay, but the narrow-minded statesmen of the European nations could not wait for him to fin d a safe way. One of his keenest yet most appreciative c r i t i c s describes him as having "a dynamic and ardent heart, an a r t i s t i c s e n s i b i l i t y , which had transferred a commonplace ugly obstinate wrangle to the l o f t i e s t and noblest plane, and which f i n a l l y had squandered 1 i t s e l f f o r a dream." 1. Stern-Rubarth, Edgar, op. c i t . , p. 275. 157 In his l a s t speech before the Assembly of the League of Nations Briand spoke of the approaching World Disarmament Con- ference of 1952. "We are approaching," he said, "a date on which the eyes of the people are more and more ardently fix e d . . . Itwill.bea.solemn hour...never w i l l the nations have borne heavier r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . W i l l the nations, who can do every- thing, leave unanswered the t e r r i b l e interrogation which s t i l l 1 weighs us down?" Were these words a portent of the fate of his own policy? Looking back over the years we see that the passing of Briand was followed by the collapse of his work. For Briand's p o l i c y was within the very soul of the man him- s e l f . When the spark went out of that soul'-after the an- nouncement of the Austro-German Customs plan was made, i t l e f t a hollow s h e l l which soon gave way. Yet perhaps no greater t r i b u t e to t h i s statesman of France who struggled sometimes not wisely, but always v a l i a n t l y , f o r the security of his country, can be found than i n the words of a l i t t l e old woman who murmured over his b i e r , "God keep your soul. 2 ro the peacemakers may God give his peace." 1. September, 1931; Cited by Wickham Steed, The Briand I Knew, Fortnightly Keview,'vol. 131, A p r i l 1, 1932, p. 409. 2. Slocomb, George, A Mirror to Geneva, London, .Jonathan Cape, 1937, p. 175. BIBLIOGRAPHY BIBLIOGRAPHY PRINTED DOCUMENTS. PERSONAL NARRATIVES. SPEECHES A Primer on Europe's Armament Makers who Prolong War and Disturb Peace. (Text of Wye Resolution). Washington, United States. Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1934. A scathing denunciation of t h i s industry. I t s wide ramifications give i t a hold i n almost every section of the i n d u s t r i a l l i f e of the major powers. Armaments Xear Book, League of Nations publication, IX, Disarmament, 1930, LX2, Si x t h 1 ear. S t a t i s t i c a l information on the armed foroes of League members i n 1930. Bainbridge, w. M. A Report on the Present Conditions i n the Ruhr and R h i n e l a n d . New York, Of f i c e of the M i l i t a r y Order of Foreign W ars, 1923. A report made by a physician who made a tour through t h i s area. It i s sympathetic to the French case. Value doubtful. Borah, W; E. Munitions Manufacturers Should be Curbed. (Speech i n the United States Senate, March 5, 1934J. I II Washington, United States. Government P r i n t i n g Office, 19 34. An i s o l a t i o n i s t speaks. Command Papers (Cmd.), London, His Majesty's Stationery Office. Of these documents avail a b l e f o r t h i s study, No. 2169 on the Anglo-French tension, (1919-23), Nos. 2525, 2764 on the Locarno Conference and Nos. 3547, 3485 on the London Naval Conference of 1930 are of most value. Germany Speaks. London, Thornton Butterworth, Ltd., 1938. This volume i s composed of a c o l l e c t i o n of a r t i c l e s contributed by 21 leading Nazi Party members or State o f f i c i a l s . Some of these men are d i r e c t l y responsible for German po l i c y and because of that fact t h i s volume i s of great i n t e r e s t , i t contains a Foreword by Joachim von Hibbentrop. Lansing, Robert. The Peace Negotiations, A Personal Narrative. New York, Houghton, M i f f l i n Co., 1921. An account by a member of the American delegation to the Peace Conference. He brings out some of the weaknesses of President Wilson. Lloyd George, David.The Truth About the Peace Treaties. London, V i c t o r Gollancz, Ltd., 1938, 2 volumes. An attempt as the writer says i n his Preface, to present "the case as a whole to trained judges and to a jury of c i t i z e n s . " I l l Sessional Paper, No. 47, 12 George V, A 1922; conference on the Limitation of Armament held at Washington, November 12, 1921 to February 6, 1922. uttawa, F. A. Acland, 1922. A report on the Washington Conference. Shotwell, J . T. At the Paris Peace Conference. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1937. An ess e n t i a l source as i t was written by an Amer- ican h i s t o r i a n present at the Conference. Stresemann, Gustav. Essays and Speeches on Various Subjects (Translated by C. R. Turner!). London, Thornton Butterworth, Ltfl. , 1930; Tardieu, Andre7. The Truth About the Treaty. Indianapolis, the Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1921. A French c r i t i c i s m of the Treaty by an important statesman of France. The Treaties of Peace, 1919-1923. New York, The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1924, 2 volumes. These volumes contain some excellent maps by Lt. Col. Lawrence Martin which help to c l a r i f y the settlement; There i s also a summary of the l e g a l basis of the new boundaries. Treaty of Peace between the A l l i e d and Associated Powers and Germany, signed at IV V e r s a i l l e s , June 38, 1919. London, His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1919. (Treaty Series, No. 4). What Really Happened at Paris; The Story of the Peace Conference, 1918-1919. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1931. This volume i s a series of c r i t i c i s m s compiled by S. M. House and Charles Seymour, made by various American delegates and observers at the Conference. Wheeler-Bennett, J.W. ed., Documents on i n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s . London, Oxford University Press, vo l s , 1929^1953. These volumes of documents are very valuable as a supplement to Professor Toynbee's Survey of i n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s . / MEMOIRS Benes, Eduard. My War Memoirs. (Translated from the Czech', by Paul Server), London, George A l l e n and Unwin Ltd., 1928. T e l l s of the re l a t i o n s h i p of Prance with the Czechs during the l a t t e r years of the Great War and i n the early years after the peace. Chamberlain, Austen. Down the Years. London, C a s s e l l and Company, Ltd., 1935. A series of sketches of t h i s statesman's experiences over a long period i n B r i t i s h public l i f e . Foch, Marshal. Memoirs. (Translated by Col. T. Bentley Mo t t ) . New York, Doubleday, Doran and company, 1931. The reader i s l e f t with the problem as to whether the A l l i e s did right i n not i n s i s t i n g on a complete peace. H i t l e r , Adolf. Mein Kampf. (Translated by E. T. S. Dugdale). New York, Houghton, M i f f l i n Co., 1933. This volume shows how bitterness on the part of some Germans against France increased rather than declined with the passing of the years. House, Colonel. intimate Papers. London, Ernest Benn, Ltd., 1926-28. These Papers, arranged as a narrative by Charles Seymour are of great use i n the study of the Paris Peace Conference. V VI Poincare, Raymond, Memoirs. (Translated and adapted by S i r George Art h u r j . London, William heinemann, Ltd*, 1928. 2 volumes. Of considerable value as i t a s s i s t s i n the under- standing of the man whose work had such a bearing on that of Briand. R£ddfe#, Lord. War Diary. London, Ivor Nicholson and Watson, Ltd., 1933. The period covering the Peace Conference i s of great i n t e r e s t ; Steed, Wickham. Through T h i r t y Years. New York, Doubleday, Page and Company, 1924, 2 volumes. An i n t e r e s t i n g account by the Vienna correspondent and l a t e r the editor of the London "Times". Gives the j o u r n a l i s t ' s view-point of some of the entan- glements i n the p o l i t i c a l background of the post- war period. Stresemann, Gustav. Diaries, Letters and rapers. (Edited and Translated by E r i c Suttonj. London, The Macmillan Co., Ltd., 1937. 2 volumes. These volumes form an invaluable reference i n the study of the Franco-German problem. SECONDARY—GENERAL SURVEYS Abel, Theodore; Why H i t l e r Came to power. New York, Prentice-Hall, 1938; This well-written volume materially a s s i s t s i n the comprehension of t h i s engrossing problem. Angell, J . W. The Recovery of Germany; New Haven, Yale University press, 1929.. Armstrong, H. F. Europe Between Wars, New York, The Macmillan Co., 1934. A good general survey but b r i e f i n some f i e l d s . Ashton, H. S. Clamour for colonies. London, Thornton Butterworth, Ltd., 1936. B a i n v i l l e , Jacques. The Third French Republic, 1870-1935. London, Jonathan Cape, 1935. The writer does not hold much of a b r i e f f o r Briand's work. Barthele'my, Joseph. The Government of France. (Translated by J . B. Morris). London, G. A l l e n and unwin, Ltd., 1924. B a r t l e t t , Vernon. iMazi Germany Explained. London, V i c t o r Gollancz, Ltd., 1933. Buell, R. L-. A History of Ten Years. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1928; This i s an excellent general reference. VII VIII Bue l l , R. L. Poland, Key to Europe, new York, A. A. Knopf, 1939. A clear and authoritative volume. B u e l l , R. L. The Washington conference of 1922. New York, D. Appleton and Company, 1922. Burns, 0. D e l i s l e ; 1918-1928: A Short h i s t o r y of the World. London, V i c t o r Gollancz, Ltd., 1928. Carr, E, H. i n t e r n a t i o n a l Relations since the Peace Treaties. London, The Macmillan Co., 1938. The writer of t h i s volume gives a survey of the period following the War of 1914-18 which i s made more valuable by the addition of a group of splen- did maps. Chaput, Rolland A. Disarmament i n B r i t i s h Foreign p o l i c y . London, George A l l e n and Unwin Ltd., 1935. Discusses the r e l a t i o n s h i p of French policy to that of B r i t i s h i n many phases of the post-war period. Chardon, Henri. L'Organization de l a Republic pour l a Paix. New Haven, Yale University press, 1926, A study of the French p o l i t i c a l scene i n the early years "after 1918. Chase, E. P. and Valeur, Robert. Democratic Governments i n Europe.. New York, T. Nelson and Sons, Ltd., 1935. IX C h u r c h i l l , Winston. The Aftermath; New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929. The writer discusses the problem of security at considerable length. Clark, R. T. The F a l l of the German Republic. London, George A l l e n and Unwin Ltd., 1935. Cole, G. D. H. and M. I. The I n t e l l i g e n t Man's Review of Europe Today. London, V i c t o r Gollancz, Ltd., 1933. Cole, G. D. H. The I n t e l l i g e n t Man's Guide Through World Chaos. London, V i c t o r Gollancz, Ltd., 1933. Cooper, A. Duff. The Second World War. London, Jonathan Cape, 1939. Of especial interest i n view of the p o s i t i o n of i t s author. Crabites, P i e r r e . Benes, Statesmann of Central Europe. New York, Coward-McCann, inc., 1936. Dawson, V/. H. Germany Under the Treaty. London, George A l l e n and Unwin, Ltd., 1933. Dean, Vera Micheles. Europe i n Retreat. New York, A. A. Knopf, 1939. Contains a fine chapter on the s h i f t i n g trends i n European governments. X D e l l , Robert. My Second Country (France). London, John Lane, Ltd., 1920. D i l l o n , E. J . The Peace Conference. London, Hutchinson and Company, (n. d.) This writer i n s i s t s that the best way to judge the leaders who made the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s i s i n t h e i r attitude towards Russia; Dutch, Oswald. Thus Died A u s t r i a . London, Edward Arnold, 1938. E i n z i g , Paul. Finance and P o l i t i c s . London, The Macmillan Uo., 1932. A good study of the Years of c r i s i s from the f i n a n c i a l side. Gathorn-Hardy, G. M. A Short History of int e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s . London, Oxford university Press, 1934. A very authoritative work. Glasgow, George. From Dawes to Locarno. London, Ernest Benn, Ltd., 1925. Greenwood, H. P. The German Revolution; London, George Routledge and Sons, Ltd., 1934; Hart, L i d d e l l . Foch, the Man of Orleans. London, Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1931. Gives a good insight into the l i f e of t h i s great m i l i t a r y leader. XI Hawtrey, R. G. Trade Depression and the Way Out. London, Longmans Green and Company, 1931. Huddleston, S i s l e y . France. London, Ernest Henn, Ltd., 1926 Huddleston, S i s l e y . France and the French. New York, C. Scribner's Sons, Ltd., 1925. Ichihashi, Yamato. The Washington Conference and A f t e r . Stanford university press, 1928. A usefu l study by a Japanese commentator. K e l l o r , Frances and Hatvany, Antonia. Security i&gainst War. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1924; This detailed study goes into many of the elements of the security problem and gives a useful analysis, Keynes, J'." M. Essays i n Persuasion. London, The Macmillan Co., 1931. King-Hall, Steven. Our Own Times, 1913-1934. London, Ivor Nicholson and Watson, Ltd., 1934, 2 volumes; "Valuable as a source of f a c t u a l information; Lajos, Ivan Germany's War Chances. London, V i c t o r Gollancz, Ltd., 1939. Traces some of the present problems in Europe to the immediate post-war period. XII Latimer, Hugh. Naval Disarmament. (Chatham house Monographs, No. 3). London, uxford University press, 1930. Leschartier, G-eorges. French policy and Disarmament* New York, Columbia university press, 1927, This volume i s an e s s e n t i a l reference work. Lichtenberger, Henri. The Third Reich. New York, The Greystone press, 1939. This i s a valuable reference owing to i t s excellent c o l l e c t i o n of documents. Macartney, M. H. H. and Cremona, Paul. I t a l y ' s Foreign and Colonial policy, 1914-1937. London, Oxford university Press, 1938. This volume brings out the I t a l i a n side to the Franco-Italian disputes. Michon, Georges. The Franco-Russian A l l i a n c e , 1891-1917. London, George A l l e n and Unwin Ltd., 1929, Good background reference on the r e l a t i o n s h i p of France with Czarist Russia. Mouat, R. B. A g i s t o r y of European Diplomacy, 1914- 1925. London, Edward Arnold, 1927. XIII Muir, Ramsay. The P o l i t i c a l Consequences of the Great War. London, Thornton Butterworth, Ltd., 1930. Munro; W. B. The Governments of Europe. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1925. Murray, G i l b e r t . The ordeal of t h i s feneration. London, George A l l e n and Unwin Ltd., 1929. Professor Murray f e e l s that world peace i s a pro- blem of the s p i r i t . Myers, Benys. World Disarmament. Boston, World peace Foundation, 1932. A good study, detailed and well documented. Newfang, Oscar. World Federation. New York, Barnes and iMoble, Inc., 1939. Nicolson, Harold. Peacemaking, 1919. London, Constable and Company, Ltd., 1933, A well-balanced analysis. Noel-Baker, P h i l i p . The private Manufacture of Armaments. London, V i c t o r Gollancz, Ltd., 1937. 2 volumes. A remarkable study, very b i t t e r against private manufacture. His case i s amply proven, however. Nomad, Max. (pseud.jRebels and Renegades. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1932. xrv Useful insofar as i t deals with the early l i f e of Briand. Ormesson, Wladimir d'. Franoe. (Translated by J . L i May). London, Longmans Green and Company, 1939. The writer makes out a good case f o r France. Pascal, Roy. The Nazi Dictatorship. London, George Routledge and Sons, Ltd., 1934. Patterson, E r i c J . Poland. London, Arrowsmith, 1934. Gives a general survey, but good i n the early period. Patterson, E. M* The World's Economic Dilemma. New York, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1930. Payen, Fernand. Raymond Poincare', l'homme—le parlementaire- l'avooati P a r i s , B. Grasset, 1936i A good study of t h i s French statesman whose l i f e and work so greatly influenced Briand's e f f o r t s . Poincare', Raymond. How France i s Governed. London, T. F. Unwin, 1915. Old, but useful for background reading. XV Reboul, l e colonel. L'Armee. Paris, Marcel Seheur, 1931. Renouvin, Pie r r e . La c r i s e europe'ene et l a grande guerre I1904-1918). Paris, P. Alcan, 1934. Good background reference. Rowell, Newton W. The B r i t i s h Empire and fiforld peace, Toronto, V i c t o r i a College press, 19S2. Of interest and value because of the stand taken l a t e r by the Empire at u-eneva, Sarolea, Charles. Europe and the League of nations. London, G. B e l l and Sons, Ltd., 1919. Schuman, P. L. The Nazi Dictatorship. New York, A. A. Jinopf, 19 35. Of value for i t s thorough treatment of the early phases of the Nazi movement. Schuman, P. L. War and Diplomacy i n the Prench Republic. New Tork, McGraw-Hill Book Co., Ltd., 1931. worth-while for i t s detailed analysis of the Prench p o l i t i c a l system. Scott, A. p. An introduction to the peace Treaties, Chicago, University of Chicago press, 1920. Sforza, Count carlo. Diplomatic Europe since the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s . new Haven, Yale university press, 1928. XVI A statesman's view of the problem. Shotwell, J . T. War as an Instrument of National Pol i c y . Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1929. e s s e n t i a l . iiieburg, F r i e d r i c h . Who are these French? New York, The Macmillan Co., 1938. A German's study of the French people, lie finds i n himself a r e a l a f f e c t i o n for them. Si e g f r i e d , Andre'. A Study i n N a t i o n a l i t y . New Haven, Yale university Fress, 1930. S i e g f r i e d , Andre'. Post-War B r i t a i n . (Translated from the French by H. H. Hemmingj. London, Jonathan cape, Ltd., 1924. Studying England through French eyes i s useful i n developing a balanced view-point. S i e g f r i e d , Andre'. Tableau des par t i e s en France. Paris, B. Grasset, 1930. Valuable reference. Slocomb, George. A Mirror to Geneva. London, Jonathan cape, Ltd., 1937. The writer's intimate d e t a i l s of l i f e i n Geneva are very i n t e r e s t i n g . He helps to humanize a subject which by i t s very nature tends to be abstract. soltau, K. H. French p o l i t i c a l Thought i n the nineteenth century. XVII London, Ernest henn, Ltd., 1931. Gives a valuable background i n the f i e l d of French thought i n respect to government. Sontag, K. J , England and Germany: Background of C o n f l i c t , 1848-1894. i\i'ew lork, D. Appleton-Century co., 1938. Brings out the bases of c o n f l i c t between these two rowers, helps to understand the place of France as a nation between the two. Sontag, K. J'. European Diplomatic hist o r y . iMew lork, Century Co., 1933. Soupault, P h i l i p p e , ihe American influence i n France. Seattle, university of Washington Book Store, 19 30. Deals with the bsroad influences of American l i f e i n French customs and thinking. Soward, Frederic H. Moulders of national Destinies, London, uxford university press, 19 38. A series of studies of world statesmen of whom Briand i s one. Spender, o. A. These Times. London, c a s s e l l and Company, Ltd., 1934. A volume which provokes much thought. Stannard-Baker, Kay. Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement. new York, Doubleday, page and Company, 1923, 3 volumes. XVIII These valuable volumes contain important material from president'Wilson's hitherto unpublished doc- uments and papers. s t e f f e s , «J . P. Disarmament. (George schreiber, ed.}. Koln, Gilde-Verlag, G. M. b. h. 1933. The disarmament problem from a r e l i g i o u s angle. Stern-Rubarth, Ldgar. Three Men Tr i e d . London, Duckworth, 1939. An exceptionally fine volume, not only for i t s st y l e but for i t s keen analysis of the l i f e and work of Briand, Stresemann and S i r Austen Chamberlain. Tabouis, Genevieve. Perfidious Albion--Entente Cordiale. (Translated by J . A. Dempsey). London, Thornton Butterworth, Ltd., 1938. . A notable volume marked by i t s fine study of the Anglo-French problem i n post-war years. Tabouis, Genevieve. The L i f e of Jules Cambon. (Translated from the French by C. F. Atkinson). London, Jonathan Cape, 1938. Tardieu, Andre'. Sur l a Pente. Paris, E'. Flammarion, 1935. Temperley, A. C. The Whispering Gallery of Europe. London, C o l l i n s , 1938. XIX A survey of the p o l i t i c a l scene i n Europe written i n a popular s t y l e . Temperley, H. W. V. ed. A History of the peace Conference of Par i s . London, Oxford University press and Hod- der and Stoughton. 6 volumes. The thorough study of these volumes is ess e n t i a l . They contain many documents of the utmost value. Toynbee, Arnold J . Survey of International A f f a i r s . London, Oxford University press, volumes 1920-23--1932 i n c l u s i v e . The nine volumes used i n t h i s study were of i n v a l - uable a i d . They contain many extracts from speeches and o f f i c i a l documents which make them an e s s e n t i a l source. Valuable Appendices present state documents. Toynbee, Arnold. The World A f t e r the peace Conference. London, Oxford University Press, 1925. An authoritative study by one of England's foremost his t o r i a n s . Valentin, Antonina. Stresemann. (Translated by E r i c Sutton). London, Constable, 1930. Invaluable because of i t s intimate personal.infor- mation about Stresemann. Vaucher, Paul. Post-War Prance. London, Thornton butterworth, Ltd., 1934. XX Werth, Alexander. franoe i n Ferment. London, dafrold's Ltd., 1934, Very usef u l reference work. Werth, Alexander. The Destiny of France. London, Hamish Hamilton, 1937. A penetrating survey. The writer possesses an intimate knowledge of Frenoh i n t e r n a l problems but i s pessimistio as to the future of Franoe. There are too many medioore p o l i t i c i a n s s t r i v i n g f o r p o s i t i o n . Wheeler-»Bennett, J . W. Disarmament and Security Since Locarno, 1925-1931. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1932. Contains many extracts from o f f i o i a l documents and speeches. The writer covers the whole period stated i n the t i t l e i n a very thorough manner, discussing and weighing problems i n a method very h e l p f u l to the student. Wheeler-Bennett, J . W. Information on the Reduction of Armaments. London, George A l l e n and Unwin Ltd., 1925. This volume covers the period 1919-1925. Besides being well documented i t compares the d i f f e r e n t pro- posals put forward by statesmen and leaders of d i f - ferent nations i n a way which c l a r i f i e s t h i s d i f f i c u l t problem. Wheeler-Bennett, «T, W. The Disarmament Deadlock. London, G. Routledge and Sons, Ltd., 1934. A valuable contribution to t h i s series of studies. XXI Deals with the background of the Conference and the deadlock of the year 1931. Wheeler-Bennett, J. W. The Forgotten Peace. New York, William Morrow and Company, 1939. The story of Brest-Litovsk and the attitude of Ger- many, which was anything but merciful. Wheeler-Bennett, J . W. and Langermann, F. E. Information on the Problem of Security. London, George A l l e n and unwin Ltd., 1927. An e s s e n t i a l reference on the early post-war period. Treaties are quoted. Wheeler-Bennett, J . W. and Latimer, Hugh. Information on the Reparation Settlement. London, George A l l e n and Unwin Ltd., 1930. Besides containing a u s e f u l discussion of the Rep- arat i o n s problem, t h i s volume has a valuable series of documents. The Text of the Young Plan i s printed i n f u l l . Woolf, Leonard, ed* The I n t e l l i g e n t Man's Way to prevent War. London, V i c t o r Gollancz, Ltd*, 1933. A series of essays on t h i s problem by leading thinkers; Zimmern, A l f r e d . Europe i n Convalescence. London, M i l l s and Boon, Ltd., 1922. SECONDARY—ARTICLES, ESSAYS, REVIEWS Abbot, A. H. The League Disarmament A c t i v i t i e s — a n d the Washington Conference. New York, The P o l i t i c a l Science Quarterly, v o l . 37, No* 1, p. 1. Abejjon, Viscount d'. Stresemann* New York, Foreign A f f a i r s , v o l . 8, No. 2, January, 1930, p. 208. A very fine short commentary on the l i f e and work of Stresemann. • A f t a l i o n , Albert. La Si t u a t i o n Economique De La France* La Revue de Paris, Tome 6; 15 Decembre, 1931, p. 776. A i g l a t . Armaments et Se'curite'* P a r i s , Le Correspondant, Tome 302, 10 Janvier, 1926, p. 10* Amery, L. S. (The Rt. Hon.). The B r i t i s h Empire and the Pan-European Idea. London, Journal of the Royal I n s t i t u t e of International A f f a i r s , v o l . IX, No. 1, January, 1930, p. 1. An e s s e n t i a l a r t i c l e * Armstrong, H. F. Danubia: R e l i e f or Ruin. XXII XXIII New York, Foreign A f f a i r s , v o l . 10, No. 4, July, 1932, p. &10. A competent study of the economic phase of the Danubian problem. Armstrong, H. F. France and the hoover Flan. New York, Foreign A f f a i r s , v o l . 10, No. 1, October, 1931, p. 30. Aron, Robert and Dandieu, Arnaud. America: Europe's Cancer. New York, L i v i n g Age, v o l . 341, October, 1931, p. 117 (trans- lated from 'Europe'); America i s gradually penetrating and disrupting European l i f e . Aubert, Louis. Anon;, Anon., France and I t a l y . New York, Foreign A f f a i r s , v o l . 9, No. 2, January, 1931, p. 237. A Plea for an Independent Foreign Policy: The Anglo-French Oompromise. London, The Round Table, v o l . 19, December, 1928, p. 17. A Propos Du Desarmament.. -•, La Revue des Deux Mondes, Tome 33, 1 Mai, 1926, p. 124; XXIV As Russia sees England and France. New York, The L i t e r a r y Digest, v o l . 75, No. 3, October 21, 1922, p. 20. Comparison des postes des depenses mil- i t a i r e s de l'Allemagne et de l a France. Paris, L'Europe nouvelle, No. 429, 8 Mai, 1926, p. 647. Dehut de Conference. L'Europe Nouvelle, No. 625, Fevrier, 1930, p. 194. Drawing the Sting of Submarines; The Manchester Guardian Weekly, v o l . 6, No. 1, January 6, 1922, p. 9. Entre l e t r a i t e ' de V e r s a i l l e s et le pacte. L'Europe N 0uvelle, No* 399, 10 Octobre, 1925, p. 1338. European Economic and p o l i t i c a l Survey. Paris, Reference Service on International A f f a i r s , No. 18, May 31, 1926, p. 14; Europe Meets Briand half-way. New York, The Nation, v o l . 131, No. 3395, July, 1930, p. 112. XXV France and Germany. London, The Round Table, v o l . 13, March, 1923 , p.'237. France and Security, Cologne as Bargain- ing Piece. The Manchester Guardian 7v7eekly, v o l . 12, IMo. 9, February 27, 1925, p. 176. France C h i l l s Disarmament hopes. The L i t e r a r y Digest, v o l . 110, No. 1, August 8, 1931, p. 8. Some American opinion at t h i s time is not very sympathetic to France. France's Demand for Submarines. The L i t e r a r y Digest, v o l . 72, No. 1, January 7, 1922, p. 7. France, England and the Ruhr. London, The Nineteenth Century, vol* 93, May, 1923, p. 652. France's Network of A l l i a n c e s . The Manchester Guardian Weekly, v o l . 17, No. ,19, November 11, 1927, p. 364. France's Recognition of Soviet Russia. The L i t e r a r y Digest, v o l . 83, No. 9, -November 29, 1924, p. 18. XXVI Franco-Soviet Trade. New York, Foreign F o l i c y , Information Service, v o l . VI, No. 9, November 26, 1930, p. 371. The Malady of Europe. The Round Table, ' v o l . 12, September, 1922, p. 751. French Stand on the hoover proposal$ London, The S t a t i s t , v o l . CXVIII, No. 2784, July 4, 1931, p. 14. A valuable reference from the economic angle. Five Powers Sign the Naval Treaty. The Manchester Guardian Weekly, vol* 22, No. 17, A p r i l 25, 1930, p. 328. A note of discord i s heard. Former Conferences that F a i l e d — a n d Succeeded* The Li t e r a r y Digest, v o l . 71, No. 7, November 12, 1921, p. 44. French uneasiness at u-erman c r i t i c i s m . The Manchester Guardian Y/eekly, v o l . 19, No* 12, September 24, 1928, p. 224. Germany and Europe. London, The Spectator, >acvn • v o l . 146, dune 13, 1931, p. 923. Germany and Europe. The Spectator, v o l . 146, dune 13, 1931, p. 923. An e f f o r t to explain the German pos i t i o n i n respect to Jiuropefe problems* Instant halt i n Armaments* The Manchester Guardian Weekly, v o l . 25, No. 11, September 11, 1 9 3 1 J p. 205, italo-Erench Relations, The Manchester Guardian Weekly, v o l . 17, No. 24, December 16, 1927, p. 465. Italo-German Relations. The Manchester Guardian Weekly, v o l . 17, No. 24, December 16, 1927, p. 465. Pacts of non-Aggression. The Manchester Guardian Weekly, v o l . 27, No. 23, December 2, 1932, p. 445. indicates the trend towards pacts and a l l i a n c e s even during the World Disarmament Conference. La Conference de l a haye. L'Europe nouvelle, No. 602, 24 Aout, 1929, p* 1131. La Ne'gociation rhe'nane. XXVIII L'Europe Nouvelle, Mo. 553, 15 Septembre, 1928, p. 1239. La premiere session de l a commission preparatoire de l a conference du desarma- ment . 4 L'Europe Nouvelle, No. 437, 3 J u i l l e t , 1926, p. 912. La preparation du desarmament. L'Europe Nouvelle, No. 483, 14 Mai, 1927, p. 623. La Problem de l a Se'curite'. Le Correspondant, Tome 301, Octobre, 1925, p. 493. Valuable reference as i t i s concerend so l e l y with t h i s problem. La Prosperite' de l a France. L'Europe Nouvelle, No. 675, 17 Janvier, 1931, p. 68. Prance had not yet been hard-hit by the f i n a n c i a l c r i s i s . La Reponse de M. Briand *a Mr. Kellogg. L'Europe Nouvelle, No.- 530, 7 A v r i l , 1928, p. 450. La Securite' oontinentale. L'Europe Nouvelle, XXIX No. 365, 31 Janvier, 1925, p. 134. La i i i e International contre l a Franc son arme'e et ses colonies i Le Correspondant, Tome 299, 10 Mai, 1927, p. 321. Makes out a severe indictment against Russia. Le project Jiellogg. L'Europe Nouvelle, No. 532, 21 A v r i l , 1928, p. 551; Le Protocle De Geneve et La Reduction Des Armaments. La Revue Des Deux Mondes, Tome 25, 1 Janvier, 1925, p. 39. The French wished for a return to the Geneva Protocol. Le Rhin vu de Geneve. L'Europe Nouvelle, No. 554, 22 Septembre, 1928, p. 127. Le t r a i t e ' franco-yougoslav. L'Europe Nouvelle, No. 509, 12 Novembre, 1927, p. 1494. L'Accord de principe V l a liaye. L'Europe Nouvelle, No. 603, 31 Aout, 1929, p; 1151. XXX Anon., L'Anne'e de Locarno. L'Europe Nouvelle, No. 410, 26 Decembre, 1925, p. 1723. Expresses hope for a new outlook i n European r e l a t i o n s . Anon., Les V i s i t e s de M. Grandi. L'Europe Nouvelle, No. 645, 21 Juin, 1930, p. 921. Anon., Lessons from Washington* London, The New Statesman, v o l . 18, December 17, 1921, p. 308. Anon., M. Briand and Disarmament. The Manchester Guardian Weekly, v o l . 25, Mb. 12, September 18, 1931, p. 223. Does not altogether believe i n Briand's s i n c e r i t y . Anon., M. Briand's Terms to Germany. The Manchester Guardian Weekly, v o l . 8, No. 6, February 10, 1928, p. 104. Anon., More Armaments for France. The Manchester Guardian Weekly, Vo l . 22, No. 1, January 3, 1930, p. 10. Anon., Naval Conference Makes Progress. The Manchester Guardian Weekly, v o l . 22, No. 5, January 31, 1930, p. 84. XXXI Reponse du gouvernement allemand. L'Europe Nouvelle, No. 659, 27 Septembre, 1930, p. 1388. Response du gouvernement Britannique. L'Europe Nouvelle, No. 659, 27 Septembre, 1927, p. 1397. Re'sultats de cinq jours aux Etats-Unis* L'Europe Nouvelle, No. 717, 7 Novembre, 1931, p. 1487. Short Adjournment of the Naval Conference. The Manchester Guardian VJeekly, vol* 22, in'oi 8, February 21, 1930, p. 144. The writer asks i f t h i s adjournment forecasted f a i l u r e ; The Briand Flan for European Union. Foreign Policy Association Information Service, v o l . VI, No. 14, September 17, 19 30, p. 216. The Franco-American Discussions; The S t a t i s t , v o l . GXVIII, wo. 2801, October 31, 19 31, p. 592. The French Invasion of the Ruhr. New York, Current History, XXXII v o l ; XVII, No, 5, February, 1923, p. 711. C r i t i c a l of the French action. Anon., The French Foint of View. The Round Table, v o l . 21, June, 1930, p; 507. Anon., The French Frees and Russia. London, The Nation and Athenaeum, v o l . 34, No. 19, February 9, 1924, p. 659. " Many i n t e r e s t i n g disclosures regarding the venality of the French press are made. Anon,, The Heart of Briand's Appeal. New York, The Independent and Weekly Review, v o l . 107, No. 3794, December 3, 1921, p. 227. A sympathetic American c r i t i c i s m * Anon*, The League and Rhineland. The Manchester Guardian Weekly, v o l ; 19, No. 25, December 21, 1928, p; 490. Anon., The Locarno T r e a t i e s . The Round Table, v o l . 16, December, 1925, p. 4. Anon., The Outlawry of War. The Round Table, XXXIII v o l . 18, dune, 1928, p. 455. A valuable study. The Regeneration of Germany. London, The Quarterly Review, No. 484, A p r i l 25, 1925, p. 231. The Peace Makers at f/ashington. The Manchester Guardian Weekly, v o l . 6, No. 5, February 3, 1922, p. 84. A comprehensive discussion of t h i s conference. The Security of Prance. The Nation, v o l . 116, No. 3014, A p r i l 11, 1923, p. 406. The Washington Conference. The Independent and weekly Review, v o l . 137, No. 3794, December 3, 1921, pi 233. T r a i t e ' d ' a l l i a n c e defensive entre l ' l t a l i e et l'Albanie, signe' a Tirana, l e 22 Novembre, 1927. L'Europe Nouvelle, No. 513, 10 Decembre, 1927, p. 1647. Traite' franco-yougoslav* L'Europe Nouvelle, No. 513, 10 Decembre, 1927, p. 1645. Anon., Anon., Anon., Anon., Anon., Anon. Barthelemy, J . XXXIV Treaty Pledges on Evacuation. The Manchester Guardian Weekly, v o l ; 19, No. 23, December 7, 1928j p. 445. une declaration de M. T i r a r d sur 1'evac- uation de l a Rhe'nanie. L'Europe Nouvelle, No. 642, 31 Mai, 1930, p. 830. une emule de Mata-Hari. L'Europe Nouvelle, No. 363, 31 Janvier, 1925, p, 137. War by Due Process of Law. New York, The New Republic, v o l . 31, No. 425, January 24, 1923, p. 211, What France Wants. The New Republie, v o l . 27, No. 363, November 16, 1921, p* 21. Why France and I t a l y don't get along. The L i t e r a r y Digest, v o l . 93, No. 9, May 28, 1927, p* 17* Apres Locarno: Vers Les Etats-unis D'Europe. Paris, La Revue p o l i t i q u e et rarlementaire, Tome 125, Novembre, 1925, p. 238* This writer breathes an a i r of hope for the future. B a r t l e t t , Vernon. Struggle for Security. London, The Contemporary Heview, v o l . 141, May, 1932, p. 589. A comprehensive a r t i c l e . Bernus, r i e r r e . Bidwell, F. W. Bonnet, Georges, The hoover Plan: Speaking for Pranee* The L i v i n g Age, v o l . 340, August, 1931, p. 540. (Trans- lated from Journal des Debatsj. The new American T a r i f f : Europe's Answer, Mew York, Foreign A f f a i r s , v o l . 9, Mo. 1, October, 1930, p. 13. Les e'cheances de 1925* L'Europe Nouvelle, No. 374, A p r i l 18, 1925, p. 514. Bouilloux-Lafont, M. Geneve et L'Aviation Allemande. La Revue de Paris , Tome 6, Novembre, 1926, p* 481. Bourget-raiHeron, M.- Franee i n Decay. The L i v i n g Age, v o l . 341, October, 1931, p. 124. (Trans- lated from L*Opinionj. Brown, P. War Strength of France, Current History, XXXVI v o l . 42, No. 2, May, 1935, p. 197. Buel l , R. L. Anglo-American understanding. Foreign p o l i c y Association Information Service, v o l , V, No. 10, July 24, 1929, p. 182. B u e l l , R. S. Economic Imperialism. New l o r k , Forum and Century, v o l . 84, October, 1930, p. 213. This i s a valuable a r t i c l e . Economic factors are stressed. B u e l l , R. S. The London Naval Conference. Foreign p o l i c y Association News Service, v o l . VI, No. 6, May 28, 1930, p. 102. Discusses the Conference i n many of i t s varied phases* Bugnet, Charles. The New French Army. New York, Outlook and Independent, v o l . 154, A p r i l 23, 1930, p. 646. Cambon, Jules. The Bases of rrench Foreign p o l i c y . New York, Foreign A f f a i r s , v o l . 8, No. 2, January, 1930, p. 173. This writer presents a clear picture of the bases of French policy i n the foreign f i e l d . Chaumeix, Andre. L'Etat D'Esprit De L'Allemagne. La Revue de P a r i s , p'ome;!, Fevrier, 1926, p. 943. Chaumeix, Andre. Chernov, V i c t o r . XXXVII Les T r a i t e s de Locarno. L a Revue de r a r i s , T ome 6, Novembre, 1925, p. 227. b o l s h e v i k R o m a n c e and R e a l i t y . New lork, Foreign A f f a i r s , v o l . 5, No. 2, January, 1927, p. 309 A discussion of Russian aims i n respect to Western Europe. Cocks, P. Seymour. The American Dove and the B r i t i s h Lamb, London, xhe S o c i a l i s t Review, June, 1928, p. 8. Cot, r i e r r e . Cot P i e r r e . France and Disarmament* The Spectator, v o l . 148, January 9, 1932, p. 38. iiow Germany can be Saved. The Living Age, v o l . 339, January, 19 31, p. 455. lated from Revue des Vivantsj. (Trans- Coudenhove-Kalergi, Count Richard. The ran-3£urope c u t l o o k . Journal o f the R o y a l i n s t i t u t e of i n t e r - national A f f a i r s , vol* X, NO. 5, September, 1931, p. 638. An authoritative a r t i c l e b y one o f the apostles of the ran-Piurope idea. XXXVIII Cunningham, T. M. Disarmament: Some European D i f f i c u l t i e s , Ihe Nineteenth Century, v o l . H I , January, 19 32, p. 49. Davenport, E. H. Dean, vera to. J'Accuse La prance. London, The new Statesman and nation, v o l . 3, no. 45, (New Series), January 2, 1932, p. 17. European E f f o r t s at Economic Collaboration. New xork, Foreign policy Reports, v o l . VII, No. 12, August 19, 1931, p. 233. Degouy, l e contre-amiral. Dans La Sarre. D e l l , Robert. D e l l , Robert. La Revue Des Deux Mondes, Tome 18, 15 novembre, 1923, p. 430. peace, Disarmament and the League. The New statesman, v o l . 23, no. 614, August 2, 1924, p* 484. The Age-Long Franco-German C o n f l i c t . Current history, v o l . 34, August, 1931, p. 658. uobb, Maurice. The C r i s i s i n Germany. London, The Labour Monthly, v o l . 13, no. 8, August, 19 31, p. 491. A good a r t i c l e from the s o c i a l i s t i c view-point. XXXIX Doyle, i i . Cr, France's i n t e r n a t i o n a l View-point Today. current n i s t o r y , v o l . 29, November, 1928, p. 331. Drexel, Constance. Armament Manufacture and Trade. New-xork, Carnegie Endowment for i n t e r - national peace (International c o n c i l i a t i o n ) , • No. 295, December, 1933, p. 531. Dublin, Louis I. TO Be or not To Be. new lork, Harper's Monthly, v o l . 161, September, 1930, p. 492. Some s t a r t l i n g figures on suicide during the years •. of c r i s i s are given. Dulles, A l l a n W. Misconceptions About Disarmament. New xork, Foreign A f f a i r s , v o l . 5, No. 3, A p r i l , 1927, p. 412. Dumont-Wilden, L. La France Accuses. Paris, La Revue Bleue, (La Revue Pol i t i q u e et Litteraire) , No. 22, 15 Novembre, 1930, p. "696. An e f f o r t to defend France's stand. Dumont-Wilden, L. La France et Les A l l i a n c e s . La Revue Des Deux Mondes, Tome 1, 15 Mai, 1924, p. 272. Dumont-Wilden, L.' La R a t i f i c a t i o n du Facte Briand-Kellogg. Dumont-Wilden, L. XL La Revue Bleue, No. 3, 2 Fevrier, 1929, p. 87. Le Protocle de Geneve et La Question de Se'curite'. La Revue Bleue, No. 5, 7 Mars, 1925, p. 171. Dumont-Wilden, L. Le Reglement de l a paix. La Revue Bleue, No. 11, 1 Juin, 1929, p. 340. Dumont-Wilden, L. Les Accords de Locarno et La Nouvelle Orientation P o l i t i q u e . La Revue Bleue, No. 21, 7 Novembre, 1925, p. 708. Dumont-Wilden, L. Les Etats-Unis D'Europe. La Revue Bleue, Mo. 16, 17 Aout, 1929, p. 508. Eccard, Frederic. La Menace Sovie'tique. Paris, La Revue P o l i t i q u e et Parlementaire, Tome 148, 10 J u i l l e t , 1931, p. 5. Eccard, Fre'deric. Le Budget M i l i t a i r e Allemand en 1930. La Revue P o l i t i q u e et Parlementaire, Tome 144, 10 J u i l l e t , 1930, p. 2. Accuses Germany of secret m i l i t a r y a c t i v i t y . • XLI Eccard, Frederic, p o l i t i q u e de L'Allemagne et de l a Russie A L*Egard De La France. La Revue P o l i t i q u e et parlementaire, Tome 146, 10 Mars, 1931, p. 329. The Russian menace to French interests i s outlined. An a l l i a n c e between Russia and Germany i s discussed. Fay, M i B. L'Opinion Americaine et l a France. Le Correspondant, Tome 287, 25 Mai, 1922, p. 577. F l e r s , Robert de and Sauerwein, Jules. Stresemann and France. The L i v i n g Age, v o l . 331, No. 4294, November 15, 1926, p. 291. (Translated from Paris Figaro). Fournol, Etienne. M. A r i s t i d e briand. La Revue Bleue, No. 11, 3 Juin, 1922, p. 327. French, B. L. Disarmament as affected by Freedom of the Seas. Current h i s t o r y , v o l . 31, December, 1929, p. 481. Garnett, Maxwell. The World C r i s i s and the Disarmament Conference. The Contemporary Review, v o l . 141, February, 1932, p. 144. XLII The economic condition of the world must have a hearing on the Conference. Gaston, "Victor. La P o l i t i q u e exterieure de l a cologne. La Revue Bleue, No. 25, 1 De'cembre, 1923, p. 825. Gathorn-Hardy, G. M.The Fourteen Points and the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s . London, Oxford, 1939, (Pamphlets of World A f f a i r s ) . Gedye, G. E. R. France Astride Middle Europe. The oontemporary Review, v o l . 140, October, 1931, p. 446. A splendid a r t i c l e . Gedye, G. E. R. The Fascist Thrust i n Au s t r i a . The Contemporary Review, v o l . 138, December, 1930, p. 712. Austrian i n t e r n a l problems had a d e f i n i t e bearing on French p o l i c y ; Gerando, P. de Les Balkans Apres Le Pacts de Tirana. La Revue P o l i t i q u e et parlementaire, Tome 130, 10 Mars, 1927, p. 422. Glasgow, George. Conference Preliminaries: France and Great B r i t a i n . The Contemporary Review, v o l . 141, January, 1932, p. 101. Glasgow, George. Glasgow, George, Glasgow, George. Gunther-,- John. XLIII French Influence on B r i t i s h P o l i c y . Kingston, Queen's Quarterly, v o l . 36, October, 1929, p. 563. Germany, the Hague and Disarmament. The Contemporary Review, v o l . 140, October, 1931, p. 522. The German C r i s i s . The Contemporary Review* v o l . 138, November, 1930, p. 653* French Gold and the Balkans. New York, The Nation, v o l . 133, No. 3462, November 11, 1931, p. 511. French finance had wide ramifications i n the Balkans. Hallgren, M. A. What France Really Wants. New York, The North American Review, v o l . 233, February, 1932, p. 100. Hanotaux, Gabriel. Le Project D'Union.Europeenne. La Revue Des Deux Mondes, Tome 58, 15 Aout, 1930, p. 766. Harris, H. Wilson. Geneva and the World. The Contemporary Review, v o l ; 138, October, 1930, p. 545. Harris, H. Wilson. XLIV The Breakdown at Geneva. The Contemporary Keview, v o l . 129, A p r i l , 1926, p. 416. Heibronner, Andre'. La Re'duction Des Armaments: Ses D i f f i c u l t e s , P a r i s , La Revue Des Sciences p o l i t i q u e s , Tome 55, Octohre-Decembre, 1932, p. 254. Herriot, Edouard. The Program of L i b e r a l France % New York, Foreign A f f a i r s , v o l . 2, No. 4, June 15, 1924, p. 558. A very important a r t i c l e ^ , .particularlyvbecauselof i t s author. H i r s t , F. W. Some Real Causes of the Slump. The Contemporary Review, v o l . 138, November, 1930, p. 554. Huddleston, S i s l e y . A Diplomatic S h i f t i n g . The New Statesman, v o l . 31, January 2, 1928, p. 249. Huddleston, S i s l e y . An Act of Faith. The New Statesman, v o l . 31, September 1, 1928, p . 628, Huddleston, S i s l e y . Briandissimo. The New Statesman, volw 26, March 20, 1926, p. 702. Huddleston, S i s l e y . European A l l i a n c e s . XLV The New Statesman, v o l . 31, A p r i l 21, 1928, p. 38. Huddleston, S i s l e y . France and the World. The Contemporary Review, v o l . 141, January, 1932, p. 9. A review of the French po s i t i o n i n international a f f a i r s at the time of Briand's retirement. Huddleston, S i s l e y * France's Part. New York, The A t l a n t i c Monthly, v o l . 130, August, 1922, p. 269. Huddleston, S i s l e y . France's P o s i t i o n and p o l i t i c s . The Contemporary Review, v o l . 19, March, 1921, p. 289. Huddleston, S i s l e y . French Foreign P o l i c y . The Contemporary Review, v o l . 140, July, 1931, p. 1. Huddleston, S i s l e y . M. Poincare /'s P o l i c y . The Fortnightly Review, v o l . 117, March, 1922, p." 366. Huddleston, S i s l e y . The Group System. The New Statesman, v o l . 36, December 27j 1930, p. 353. Huddleston, S i s l e y . The Hague. The New Statesman, v o l . 33. August 10, 1929, p. 546. XLVI Hyams, P. La Belgique et L'Oeuvre de M. Leon Delacroix. Le Correspondant, Tome 281, 10 Decembre, 1920, p. 769. Jouvenel.,.. Henri de. Prance and I t a l y . new York, Foreign A f f a i r s , v o l . 5, No. 4, July 27, 1927, p. 546. A masterly discussion of the Franco-Italian problem. Jouvenel, Henri de. pas d'entente franco-allemande sans l'Europe. L'Europe Nouvelle, No. 452, 9 octobre, 1926, p. 159. Jouvenel, Robert de. A French Debate on the League of Nations. The L i v i n g Age, v o l . 521, May, 1924, p. 951, (Translated from La Grande Revue). He was associated with Paul Reynaud i n t h i s debate. Joxe, Louis. Conclusions a Londres. L'Europe Nouvelle, No. 639, 19 A v r i l , 1930, p. 815. States the French view of the London Conference on naval problems. Kautsky, K a r l . Germany Since the War. New York, Foreign A f f a i r s , v o l . 1, No. 2, December 15; 1922, p. 101. Pleads for a more sympathetic treatment of Germany. Kennedy, A. L. XLVI I France and the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s . The Fortnightly Review, v o l . 119, dune, 1923, p. 881. Kerguezec, Gustave de. French Naval Aims. New York, Foreign A f f a i r s , v o l . 4, No. 3, A p r i l , 1926, p. 372. A very useful study of t h i s question. An e f f o r t i s made to explain the French need for s p e c i a l types of vessels. La Bruyere, R. France's New Army and Navy. • current History, v o l . 24, A p r i l , 1926, p. 21. Es p e c i a l l y i n t e r e s t i n g i n that t h i s a r t i c l e was published when the Locarno s p i r i t was at i t s height. L a i r , Maurice. Stresemann. La Revue des Sciences p o l i t i q u e s , Tome 55, Octobre-Deceiabre, 19 32, p. 365. Landry, Adolphe. L'Evolution De La Crise Economique en Septembre, 1930. La Revue P o l i t i q u e et Parlementaire, Tome 145, 10 Novembre, 1930, p. 125. La Valette, J. de. France and Germany Today, the P l a i n Truth. The Nineteenth Century, v o l ; 96, December, 1924, p. 769. A very useful reference. XLVIII' Lippmann, Walter. The London Naval Conference; New xork, Foreign A f f a i r s , v o l . 8, No. 4, duly, 1930, p. 499. Lippmann, ?/alter. The Intimate papers of Colonel house; iMew York, Foreign A f f a i r s , v o l . 4, No. 3, A p r i l , 1926, p. 382. A commentary on these famous Papers. Lloyd, C. M. The Edge of the pr e c i p i c e . The New Statesman and Nation, v o l . 1, No. 6, (new s e r i e s ) , June 13, 1931, p. 569. Loutre, C ami'He. La Reunion des j u r i s t e s a. Londres. L'Europe Nouvelle, No. 394, 5 Septembre, 1925, p. 1173. Luddecke, Theodor. Germany Goes American. The L i v i n g Age, v o l . 338, July 1, 1930, p. 544. (Translated from Revista de Occidente of Madrid). Machray, R. The Red Reaction to Locarno. The Fortnightly Review, v o l . 119, January 1, 1926, p. 158. The Soviet government was very c y n i c a l . Madariaga, S. de. Our Muddling World. Forum and Century, v o l ; 83, January 1, 1930, p. 9. Madariaga, S. de. Mar combes, J r i . Maurice, Jf. B , Maurice, P. B ; M e l v i l l e , 0. F. Montgomery, G. R. Mitrany, David. XLIZ The D i f f i c u l t y of Disarming. Geneva, I n s t i t u t e of International Re- l a t i o n s , 1931, p. 284. France; a rorce for peace. Forum and Century, v o l . 87 * March, 1932, p. 21. The Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance. Journal of the B r i t i s h I n s t i t u t e of International A f f a i r s , vol.' H I , Mo. 2, March, 1929, p. 47. Lord Esher's proposals for the Limitation of Armaments. journal of the B r i t i s h i n s t i t u t e of in t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , v o l . 1, Mo. 4, July, 1922, p.. 101. I t a l y , France and Southeastern Europe. The Fortnightly Review, v o l . 129, May, 1928, p. 646; Secret racts of France and I t a l y with Turkey. Current h i s t o r y , v o l . 14, March, 1921, p. 203. Pan-Europe-—A Hope or a Danger. London, The P o l i t i c a l Quarterly, v o l ; 1, Mo. 4, September, 1930, p. 457. L Nevinson, H. W. Decisions i n C o n f l i c t with America. "The Manchester Guardian Weekly, v o l . 6, No. 1, January 6, 1922, p. 7. Newman, i i . W. P. Pranco-italian Relations. The Contemporary Review, v o l . 138, August, 1930, p. 155. A usefu l discussion of t h i s problem by a m i l i t a r y w r i t e r . Ormesson, Wladimir d T. _ L'Evacuation de l a Rhenanie. La Revue de par i s , Tome 4, 11 Aout, 1929, p. 492. Ormesson, Wladimir d'. Rentree.... L'Europe Nouvelle, No. 555, 29 Septembre, 1928, p. 1302* Payen, Edouard. Le Douzieme D'Avril, La R a t i f i c a t i o n Du Plan Young. Paris, Le Journal des Economistes, Tome 96, A v r i l , 1930, p. 3. Pernot, Maurice. I t a l i e et l a Prance apres l a Conference de Londres. L'Europe Nouvelle, No. 639, 10 Mai, 1930, p. 719. "Pertinax". Briand Must Go. LI The Living Age, v o l . 339, November, 1930, p. 240. (Translated for Echo de P a r i s ) . Briand i s ruining the French p o s i t i o n . P i non, Rene'. French Case fo r the ̂ Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s . Current History, v o l . 34, August 31, 1931, p. 646. The Treaty must be enforced to assure security for France. Pinon, Rene* rermament Guiding P r i n c i p l e s of French Foreign P o l i c y . Current h i s t o r y , v o l . 30, May, 1929, p. 206. Polyzoides, Adamantios T. The Mistakes of France, Current History, v o l . 14, June 10, 1921, p.573. Price, J; M. Raffalovich, G. Rakovsky, C. Influence of Paris on the Comity of Nations, The Fortnightly Review, v o l . 117, June, 1922, p. 977. War Clouds, i n South Europe. Outlook and Independent, v o l . 158, June 8, 1931, p. 304. The Foreign P o l i c y of Soviet Russia.'. New York, Foreign A f f a i r s , v o l . 4, No. 2,- July, 1926, p. 574. LII Richmond, Admiral H. Some Elements of Disarmament. The Fortnightly Review, v o l . 131, February 1, 1932, p. 149. Rober-Raynaud, M. La France en Sarre. L'Europe Nouvelle, No. 507, 29 Octobre, 1927, p. 1455. Roland, Romain. Broaden, Europe or L i e . The Nation, v o l . 132, No. 3433, A p r i l 22, 1931, p. 443. A plea for a wider outlook. Roosevelt, N. The Ruhr Occupation* New York, Foreign A f f a i r s , v o l . 4, No. 1, October 25, 1925, p. 112. Sanchez, J . A. M. de. A Year of. M. Poincare 7. New York, Foreign A f f a i r s , v o l . 6, No. 1, uctpber, 1927, p. 41. Sanchez, J . A. M. de. Further Economic Consequences of the Peace. New York, Foreign A f f a i r s , v o l . 1, No. 1, September 15, 1922,' p. 158. Sieburg, p.' Briand. New York, Foreign A f f a i r s , v o l . 10, No. 4, July, 1932, p. 586. S i e g f r i e d , Andre. Smith, H. A. Sorel, R. Steed, Wickham. LIII The Psychology of French p o l i t i c a l parties. Journal of the Royal Inst i t u t e of Inter- national A f f a i r s , v o l . VII, No. 1, January, 1928, p. 12. The Problem of Disarmament i n the Light of History. Journal of the Royal I n s t i t u t e of i n t e r - national A f f a i r s , v o l . X, No. 5, September, 1931, p. 600. Federation europe'enne. Le Journal des Economistes, Tome 97, Octobre, 1930, p. 198. Locarno and B r i t i s h - i n t e r e s t s . Journal of the B r i t i s h I n s t i t u t e of in t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , v o l * IV, No. 6, November, 1925, p. 286. Steed, Wickham. The Po s i t i o n of France, journal of the B r i t i s h Institute of in t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , v o l . I I , No. 2, March 20, 1923, p. 65. A very fine discussion by a competent observer. Stoddard, L. What France Really Wants. Forum and Century, v o l . 86, December, 1931, p. 374. LIV Stolper, G. Lessons of the World Depression. New York, Foreign A f f a i r s , v o l . 9, No. 2, January, 1931, p; 243. Stone, W. T. The Briand Flan for European union. Foreign p o l i c y Association Information Service, v o l . VI, No. 14, September 17, 1930, p. 261. A very valuable study. The writer concludes that Briand was anxious to improve the French economic position through the proposed European union. Strachey, J , St. Loe. Reparations and Debts. The Spectator, v o l . 130, June 23, 1923, p. 1032. Swanwick, ri. M. The Security Fact. London, Foreign A f f a i r s , v o l . VII, N§. 1, July, 1925, p. 5. Tardieu, Andre'. French and German unity. The L i v i n g Age, v o l . 306, July 3, 1920, p. 153. (Translated from L ' I l l u s t r a t i o n ) . Touhy, F. France's Rhineland Adventure. The Contemporary Review, v o l . 138, July, 1930, p. 29. A good review of t h i s episode i n the l i g h t of l a t e r developments. V a l l i n , Charles. L'Occupation Francaise Des Pays Rhenans, Vermeil, Edmond. V i l l a r d , u. G. V i v i a n i , Rene. L V La Revue P o l i t i q u e et Farliementaire, Tome 148, 10 Octobre, 1929, p. 124. Danger from Germany. La Revue P o l i t i q u e et parlementaire, Tome 144, 10 A v r i l , 1930, p. 169. prance Against the World. The Nation, v o l . 133, No. 3449, August 12, 1931, p. 149. What the French Statesmen have to say about Disarmament. Outlook and independent, v o l . 129, September 21, 1921, p. 86. The Pact of Pari s : A Gesture ©r a Pledge' New York, Foreign A f f a i r s , v o l . 7, No. 3, A p r i l , 1929, p. 356. The C r i s i s of the Gold Standard. New York, Foreign A f f a i r s , v o l . 10, No. 2, January, 1932, p. 173. The Republic W i l l Live. The L i v i n g Age, v o l . 339, November, 1930, p. 237. (Translated from Berliner Tageblattj. Wright, C. E. E l l i n g t o n . The Rhineland, Past and Future. Wiekersham, G. W, Williams, J . H, Wolff, Theodor. LVI The Nation and Athenaeum, v o l . 35, No. 21, August 23, 1924, p* 635. A good analysis of the elements envolved i n the Rhineland problem.

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