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UBC Theses and Dissertations

The practical significance of the Hegelian dialectic Morgan, J.G. 1973

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THE PRACTICAI SIGNIFICANCE OF THE HEGELIAN DIALECTIC by J.G. M o r g a n THE PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE HEGELIAN DIALECTIC by «T. G. Morgan A Thesis submitted f o r the Degree of MASTER OF ARTS i n the Department of ECONOMICS THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA A p r i l - 1934, CONTENTS page INTRODUCTION i - v i CHAPTER I - Tke Function of tiae Ideal 5 CHAPTER I I - From Bacon to Kant 6 CHAPTER III - KANT £0 CHAPTER IV - HEGEL £7 CHAPTER V - FROM HEGEL TO MARX 47 CHAPTER YI - MARX 59 CHAPTER VII * LENIN 75 CHAPTER VIII * CONCLUSION 85 BIBLIOGRAPHY - I - X INTRODUCTION "Whatever deals with the. fundamental and simple-is hound to he d i f f i c u l t and complex, and i t i s no good ignoring the fact that philosophy, which i s not l i g h t l y to be attempted by any, must always seem sin g u l a r l y l i k e nonsense to some." (C.E.M. Joad) This world or complex of physical and s o c i a l environ-ment into which we are incontinently thrust at a somewhat early period i n our existence presents, for those of us who are provided with a f a i r share of what Veblen used to c a l l " i d l e c u r i o s i t y , " a whole series of problems which, i n the l a s t resort, resolve themselves into the question as to the nature of experience or common-sense r e a l i t y . How? whence? and why? presuppose what? And t h i s , notwithstanding the current b e l i e f that metaphysics i s concerned only with things foreign to human experience, i s the problem which philosophy sets h e r s e l f namely, what i s t h i s experience or r e a l i t y ? or, what i s the ultimate condition which t h i s experience presupposes? Now, t h i s question, just because i t i s fundamental, i s tremendously important, since the solution we f i n d conditions and colors a l l °ur subsequent findings. Whether i t begins with i t or not every branch of human knowledge has to reckon with philosophy i n the end. In the hey-day of i t s career, say a generation or more ago, Science, secure, as i t thought, i n i t s • positivism, thought i t could ignore metaphysics; to-day i t i s not so certain, witness the declarations of Jeans, Eddington, i i Whitehead, Haldane and others. "The whole method of science i n i t s newest speculative and c r i t i c a l reaches i s increasingly metaphysical; perhaps i t i s not too much to say i t i s Hegelian rather than Binsteinian i n i t s r e l a t i v i t y , and increasingly monistic. Although i t s monism i s one that i s purely tentative and hypothetical, i t i s the r e s u l t of a new and very recent recrudescence of i n t e r e s t i n the leadings of s c i e n t i f i c experiments which point to the universal extension of a causality apparently t e l e o l o g i c a l and purposive which science must recognize, i f i t cannot explain. It i s not indeed a "block universe, 1 as James used to c a l l i t , but i t i s s t i l l a universe with causal continuity. The excesses of a n t i - i n t e l l e c t u a l i s m appear to be passing i n the world of 1 science." It i s to my mind an evidence of the v a l i d i t y of the Hegelian formulation that D.G. R i t c h i e , over f o r t y years ago could say: "The sciences; ultimately refuse to recognize dualism. The world i s only i n t e l l i g i b l e by science on the assumption that i t forms one coherent system. A philosophy based on the special sciences cannot recognize anything outside the material universe. But then an examination of the nature of science (a c r i t i c i s m of the conditions of knowledge) shows us that the material universe can mean nothing except f o r thought. Science leads us to Monism; and Monism, to be philosophic, must be i d e a l i s t i c . " 2 1. E l l i o t t , W.Y., "The Pragmatic Revolt i n P o l i t i c s , " (The MacMillan Company, Hew York, 1928, p.51. ) 2. R i t c h i e , David G., "Darwin and Hegel," (Swan Sonnenschein 1893, p.91.) To a t t a i n to a complete view of the world, to a comprehension of the t o t a l i t y of experience, to "see i t st e a d i l y and to see i t whole," such i s the end and aim of philosophy. I t , therefore, sees an ultimate i d e n t i t y i n the contradictions which, on lower planes of thought, appear impossible to reconcile i t sees i d e n t i t y i n opposition, being i n becoming, the p o t e n t i a l i n the actual, and the matter i n the form. In the f l u x of thought the old d i s t i n c t i o n s , once so sharp and clear, become blurred and lose t h e i r meaning, and, as aspects of a larger whole, become merely a matter of emphasis. There i s , a f t e r a l l , but one philosophy as there i s but one physical science and the history of philosophy i s the record of the e f f o r t of the human mind to a t t a i n to such a u n i f i e d view. True, there has always been a tendency to use or abuse philosophy i n the i n t e r e s t s of c o n f l i c t i n g s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s or to r a t i o n a l i z e p o l i c i e s inspired by special or class i n t e r e s t s . I f , however, we hold that s o c i a l h i s t o r y exhibits the d i a l e c t i c f l u x and that Reality i s a continuous Becoming, even t h i s would warrant us i n holding with Croce that the philosophy of hist o r y i s very much the 1 same thing as the hi s t o r y of philosophy. It i s a matter of common, everyday experience that the mind of youth accepts unhesitatingly a l l things just as they are presented to consciousness, i n t h e i r immediacy, and holds u n c r i t i c a l l y the views dictated by common-sense and current morality. Presently there supervenes a stage i n which 1. Cf. Joad, "Modern Philosophy," p.43. these common-sense views i n respect of custom, t r a d i t i o n and whatnot, are negated i n scepticism and cynicism. With some th i s phase assumes an extravagant form and may, as may also the f i r s t phase, last through l i f e . F i n a l l y the mature mind e f f e c t s a synthesis which consists i n the recognition that the older views were not so empty of content as at f i r s t appeared: that they r e a l l y expressed, however crudely, cert a i n values having s o c i a l or personal sign i f i c a n c e . In the synthesis, however, they are transmuted, sublimated and enriched hy the c r i t i c a l experience. S i m i l a r l y , i n the hi s t o r y of the race, we f i n d that i n the e a r l i e s t period of human hist o r y man does not di s t i n g u i s h himself from the natural objects and forces about him. Nature, may for him, i s animated and conscious and Abe f r i e n d l y or otherwise. It i s i n t h i s stage that we observe those b e l i e f s , or rather, practices, which we cover by the terms totemism and animism. So also, i n t h i s phase, the i n d i v i d u a l does not d i s t i n g u i s h himself from the group to which he belongs, nor has he i n t e r e s t s as against i t . With r e f l e c t i o n , however, there comes a time when he separates the s e l f and n o t - s e l f and recognizes the world as something over against himself. It i s probable that t h i s change i s more or l e s s coincident with the development of the property concept which, by se t t i n g the i n d i v i d u a l over against the group, ultimately dissolves t r i b a l society. So soon, therefore, as man having become self-conscious, thus separates himself i n thought from nature, every department of experience f a l l s apart into corresponding antitheses. Man i s now mind as V opposed to matter and an i n d i v i d u a l as opposed to society, l a t e r he w i l l think of himself as subject as opposed to object; h i s soul as opposed to his body and God as oyer against the world. The growth of science accentuates these antagonisms and there developes a one-sided and crude materialism opposed to a more or l e s s i d e a l i s t i c theology. The continued develop-ment of individualism disintegrates society into a crowd of i n d i v i d u a l s , each seeking h i s own i n t e r e s t , l o o s e l y held together by the p o l i c e - s t a t e ; while the world, for philosophy, i s dissolved i n the scepticisms generated by materialism. But now the synthesis i s well on i t s way. The power, complexity and co-ordination of the s o c i a l productive forces are k n i t t i n g together again and strengthening the s o c i a l bonds. But s o c i a l production i s at war with i n d i v i d u a l ownership and thus the other antagonisms are but i n t e n s i f i e d . The battle i s joined and, what i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of our time, the opposing forces state t h e i r respective cases i n philosophic terms. The catch-words of the philosopher have become the slogans of the politician!.. Already Idealism has reconciled i n thought the old antagonisms of knowing and being, subject and object, body and mind, and even of materialism and idealism. Only such a p h i l -osophy, recognizing the immanent d i a l e c t i c f l u x i n nature, i n s o c i a l l i f e , and i n thought can, i t i s my b e l i e f , point the way to a resolution of the antagonisms which rend society to-day. Most discussions of the subject either take the d i a l e c t i c method for granted or else explain i t i n such a way that i t i s , to my mind, unconvincing. It has occurred to me v i that the d i a l e c t i c can best he explained i n terms of i t s own development and I have so set i t f o r t h . CHAPTER I THE FUNCTION OF THE IDEAL For i f the trumpet give an uncertain sound, who s h a l l prepare himself f o r the battle? (Paul of Tarsus,I Corinthians 14.8) A l l movements fo r s o c i a l betterment are e s s e n t i a l l y i d e a l i s t i c i n form. Their propaganda, whatever i t s content, must j u s t i f y i t s e l f on e t h i c a l grounds, must appeal to the moral sentiment, since we conceive ourselves, not as pigs at the trough, f i g h t i n g f o r a larger share of the s w i l l , but as a l l i e s of the universe helping i t to give b i r t h to a juster 1 human order. Only an intense e t h i c a l passion kindled by i d e a l i s t i c conceptions can sustain the discouraging b a t t l e that a m i l i t a n t minority must wage before i t grows to be a majority, or better, attains i t s objective. And although, to be sure, men do not order t h e i r l i v e s by the u t i l i t a r i a n calculus, yet the conditions of s o c i a l l i f e are such that no man w i l l surrender present personal advantage f o r the future i n t e r e s t s of others except under the urge of a compelling categorical imperative - a commanding sense of obli g a t i o n to 3 an i d e a l . ^ 1. As world events of the comparatively recent past have shown, even propaganda of a more s i n i s t e r character must assume such a form. 2. It i s no accident that the movements associated with the r i s e of the middle-class i n England and Northern Europe took on a r e l i g i o u s color. So also with the early s o c i a l i s t i c movements headed by such men as John Huss, Gerard Winstanley and even St. Simon. An " i d e a l " may be defined as a mental picture of a state of a f f a i r s which, under the conceived circumstances, ought to e x i s t , and which i s capable of being brought into existence. Thus defined, an i d e a l i s seen to r e s t on two conceptions: the conception of " r i g h t " ana the conception of " p o s s i b i l i t y . " 1 For the L i b e r a l s of the eighteenth century, as for the S o c i a l i s t s of the early nineteenth century, t h i s "rightness was absolute and authoritative since i t was imposed, ab extra, by the f i a t of a Supreme Being, or for some, existed of i t s 2 own right i n the nature of things - the Order of Nature. The p o s s i b i l i t y , on the other hand, was contingent and r e l a t i v e , being dependent on the r e c e p t i v i t y and educability of the human mind - on i t s response to the appeal to Reason, i n a word 1. "Les l o i s naturelles sont ou physiques, ou morales. ^ On entend i c i , par l o i physique, le cours re'gle de tout evenement physique de I'ordre naturel, eviaemment l e plus avantageux au genre humaine. On entend i c i , par l o i morale, l a regie de tout,action humaine de I'ordre morale, conforme a I'ordre physique evide-mment l e plus avantageux au genre humaine. Ces l o i s forment ensemble ce que on appelle l a l o i n a t u r e l i e . Tous l e s hommes et toutes l e s puissances humaines doivent e*tre soumis a ces l o i s souveraines, ^instituees par 1'Stre-Supreme: e l l e s sont immuables et ir r e f r a g a b l e s , et l e s me i l l e u r e s ' l o i s possible.'! (Francois Quesnay, (1694-1774) Le Droit Naturel, C o l l e c t i o n Daire, Vol.11, p.5S. 2. "Nature acts and ex i s t s necessarily: a l l that she contains necessarily conspires to perpetuate her active existence. ... Matter acts because i t ex i s t s , and exi s t s to act." D'Holbach, "The System of Nature," p.35. 3 on the progress of the Human S p i r i t . For the l a t e r S o c i a l i s t s , who were, and are, i n general, i n c l i n e d to deny the existence of a P r o v i d e n t i a l Order even i n the attenuated form o f "a power not ourselves, which makes for Righteousness," the melior-i s t i c trend must he asserted and explained on philosophical grounds. To be sure, oppression, poverty and misery breed discontent and moral indignation, even r e v o l t , but a revolut-ionary movement requires more than t h i s ; there must be assur-ance that there i s a c t u a l l y a d e f i n i t e trend and that i t taxes, or can be made to take,, a d i r e c t i o n towards an end, proximate i t may be, which i s i n i t s e l f worth-while. This, then, i s the function of the Hegelian D i a l e c t i c as used by Marx and h i s school, with whom i t becomes, as " D i a l e c t i c Materialism," a means of explaining the past, of understanding the present and predicting the future. Socialism, or Communism, i s thus seen as something which "must" happen -rather than that which "ought" to happen - as "the res u l t of a processus immanent i n h i s t o r y . " The " p o s s i b i l i t y " becomes " i n e v i t a b i l i t y " and the contingency a mere matter of "how soon" and " i n what manner" the p r o l e t a r i a t w i l l accomplish i t s " h i s t o r i c mission." Since the process, which i s both objective and subjective, i s a "necessary" development the e t h i c a l factor tends, with the 1. " S c i e n t i f i c socialism consists, i n so f a r as i t affirms the coming of communistic production, not as a postulate, nor as the aim of a free v o l i t i o n , but as the r e s u l t of the processus immanent i n h i s t o r y . " Antonio l a b r i o l a , Essays on the M a t e r i a l i s t Conception of History, (CH. Kerr & Company, Chicago, 1904, p.190.) doctrinaires, to be obscured. Thus Engels*: could write: "Upon t h i s , (the exploitation of labor) therefore, Marx never based his communistic conclusions, but upon the inevitable breakdown of the c a p i t a l i s t mode of production which we see d a i l y approach-1 ing i t s end." The animus i n such a passage was due, no doubt, to a revulsion against the teachings of the Utopian s o c i a l i s t s 8 of the time. ' Ho one can read Marx, or consider the f a c t s of hi s l i f e , without f e e l i n g that, however much he may condemn mere sentimentality, he had a strong sense of justice and some system of e t h i c a l values, however obscure. Benedetto Croce i s i n s i s t e n t on t h i s point and observes: " I t i s , however, evident that idealism or absolute morality i s a necessary postulate of socialism." Notoriously, however, the s o c i a l i s t movement i n practice neglects no opportunity of exposing the defects of capitalism, of contrasting these with the benefits hoped f o r from socialism, and of denouncing a l l those who, i n t h e i r apprehension, oppose or delay the change. The emphasis here of course varies according to the school of socialism, but even 1. Preface to Marx's "Poverty of Philosophy," CH. Kerr and Company, Chicago, 1910, p.14. 8. This animus i s very apparent i n passages such as: "The robe of speculative cobwebs, embroidered with flowers of r h e t o r i c , steeped i n the dew of s i c k l y sentiment; t h i s transcen-dental robe i n which the German S o c i a l i s t s wrapped t h e i r sorry "eternal truths," a l l skin and bone, served to wonderfully increase the sale of t h e i r goods amongst such a p u b l i c . " Communist Manifesto (Whitehead Estate, Vancouver, p.49). 3. Croce, Benedetto, " H i s t o r i c a l Materialism," G.Allen and Unwin, London, 1914, p.85. Many Marxists would probably disagree with the form i f not the content of t h i s statement. s t r i c t Marxists would agree with John Strachey when he says: "The conquest hy comprehension of man,s relat i o n s h i p to man, when i t has been added to the conquest of man over nature, w i l l not automatically usher i n any impossible millenium of universal happiness. It would he c h i l d l i k e to believe any such thing. But i t w i l l make possible a whole new era of c i v i l i z a t i o n , an era based on the f u l l use of man^ ever-growing power and knowledge; a c i v i l i z a t i o n f a r r i c h e r , because a c i v i l i z a t i o n which w i l l embrace whole communities and not merely certain 1 classes within communities, than any we have yet known. The point here i s , that most Marxists would i n s i s t that moral standards, i f not the higher e t h i c a l values, are not absolute, since each h i s t o r i c a l epoch generates i t s own 2 morality, i t s own s o c i a l consciousness. This i s well i l l u s t r a t e d i n the following: "According to C h r i s t i a n i t y and the E t h i c s oa* r e l i g i o n of Introspection generally, regeneration must come from within, must begin i n the heart and mind of the i n d i v i d u a l . The ethic and r e l i g i o n of modern socialism, on the contrary, look f o r regeneration from without, from material conditions and a higher s o c i a l l i f e . The ethic and r e l i g i o n of socialism seek not the i d e a l society through the i d e a l i n d i v i d u a l , but conversely the i d e a l i n d i v i d u a l through the i d e a l society. It finds i n an adequate, a free and harmonious s o c i a l l i f e , at once the primary condition and the end and completion of i n d i v i d u a l i t y . " 1. Strachey, John, "The Coming Struggle for Power," V i c t o r Gollancz, London, 1932, p.172. 2. Cf. Marx, " C r i t i q u e , " Chicago, C H . Kerr,& Co., 1913, p.11. Also Kantsky, "Ethics and the Mat.Con. of History," C.H.Kerr, & Co. 1907, passim. 3. Bax, "The E t h i c s of Socialism," Swan, Sonnenschein. 1893, p.19. CHAPTER II PROM BACON-TO KANT N i h i l est i n i n t e l l e c t u quod non prius i n sensu f u e r i t . It i s i n the authentic Hegelian manner that Edward Caird characterizes modern philosophy, i n i t s e a r l i e r period, as "the philosophical counterpart of the Protestant Reformation, which, f o r the f i r s t time, gave i t s due importance to the subjective and i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c aspect of C h r i s t i a n i t y This reassertion of the r i g h t s of the f i n i t e and i n d i v i d u a l consciousness coincides with the great development of the secular s p i r i t , which marks the end of the seventeenth, and beginning of the eighteenth, century The i n d i v i d u a l was becoming to himself the beginning and end of a l l truth and knowledge; he could not, i t was argued, transcend h i s own l i m i t s as an in d i v i d u a l ; i f there was a truth that could not be brought 1 within those l i m i t s , i t must be for him as good as nothing." From a Marxian point of view, of course, he might have gone further, and e x p l i c i t y connected t h i s i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c ideology with the r i s e of the middle-classes. In the seventeenth century the foundations of modern c i v i l i z a t i o n i n a l l i t s aspects were l a i d ; the era of "free contract" was well on i t s way; 1. Caird, Edward, "The Philosophy of Kant," Maclehose, Glasgow, 1877, p.52. 6 7 authority and status were undermined i n a l l d i r e c t i o n s , and the middle class was asserting i t s power against a l l forms of feudal domination. Philosophy, although now free from the p h y s i c a l persecution of e c c l e s i a s t i c i s m , s t i l l f e l t i n d i r e c t l y the influence of dogma; a constraint, however, which was more of a moral and s o c i a l than a l e g a l character. The holder s p i r i t s among the philosophers could now r e f l e c t the changing ideology of the times, and t h i s they did with greater freedom as time went on. Though there i s much to he noted i n e a r l i e r writers, our present enquiry may very well begin with Bacon. "By elimin-ating the theosophic character which Hatural Philosophy had acquired during the t r a n s i t i o n a l period, by the l i m i t a t i o n of i t s method to experience and induction, and by r a i s i n g the fundamental c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of t h i s method to a philosophical d i g n i t y free from the narrowness attaching to any special c i r c l e of physical research, Bacon of Verulam (1561-1626) i s the founder, not indeed of the empirical method i n natural science, but of 1 the empiricist l i n e of development i n modern philosophy." Bacon, to he sure, invented neither experience nor induction, which are the es s e n t i a l elements of a l l knowledge whatever, but he stressed t h e i r importance as Just p r i n c i p l e s and pronounced the method of a l l i n v e s t i g a t i o n to be the obser-vation, c o l l i g a t i o n and comparison of the i n d i v i d u a l f a c t s . 1. Ueberweg, T o l . i i i , p.35. Quoted by Bax "History of Philosophy," Geo. B e l l & Sons, london, 1888, p.177. 8 A d i s c i p l e of Bacon, Thomas Hohhes of Malmesbury, (1588-1679) takes a d i s t i n c t stand on experience and observation as the sole source of knowledge. There i s , f o r Hobbes, no metaphysical problem other than that which concerns the c o n s t i t -ution of our knowledge. "Concerning the thoughts of man," says he, "I w i l l consider them f i r s t singly, and afterwards i n a t r a i n of dependence upon one another. Singly, they are every one a representation, or appearance of some quality or other accident of a body without us, which i s commonly c a l l e d an object, which object worketh on the eyes, ears, and other parts of a man*s body; and, by d i v e r s i t y of working, produces d i v e r s i t y of appearances. The o r i g i n a l of them a l l i s that which we c a l l "sense." There i s no conception i n a man's mind which hath not at f i r s t , t o t a l l y or by part, been begotten upon the organs of 1 sense. The rest are derived from that o r i g i n a l . " The views expressed by Hobbes were amplified and reinforced by John Locke (1633-1704) i n h i s Essay on the Human understanding which i s , ostensibly, a polemic against the doctrine of "necessary" or "innate" ideas. The understanding i s , f o r Locke, o r i g i n a l l y a tabula rasa. Every idea must be the r e s u l t of some experience and experience was of two kinds -sensation and r e f l e c t i o n . The experience due to sensation was that received from outside the mind through the organs of sense, while that due to r e f l e c t i o n was the r e s u l t of the mind r e f l e c t i n g 1. Leviathan, Chapter I. Quoted by Bax, op. c i t . , p.180. 9 "on i t s own operations within i t s e l f . " But whether what we perceive he an outward or an inward f a c t , our understanding i s i n either case nothing more than the mirror i n which i t i s r e f l e c t e d . The capacity of an object to produce an idea i n our understanding i s c a l l e d i t s "quality." Where the idea i s similar to the state of the object producing i t , i t i s termed a "primary" q u a l i t y . External objects possess two primary q u a l i t i e s . " S o l i d i t y " (impenetrability) and "extension." In respect of these the idea corresponds to the object. But with most q u a l i t i e s the ease i s otherwise. These "secondary" q u a l i t i e s , as Locke c a l l s them, such as color, odor, taste, smoothness, beauty, unpleasantness, and so f o r t h , only indicate a certain r e l a t i o n between our organs and the object, but nothing existent i n the object i t s e l f . The simple ideas thus received are worked up i n r e f l e c t i o n into "complex" ideas which, however, since they are figments of the imagination correspond to nothing r e a l , for there i s nothing r e a l but the p a r t i c u l a r . Locke here revives, unconsciously i t may be, the teaching of William of Gcoam and the scholastic nominalists concerning the un r e a l i t y of "Universals." Locke holds, however, that we are compelled to postulate a substratum as that i n which the q u a l i t i e s of things inhere, and which, although we have no evidence of i t i n experience, and cannot even form any d e f i n i t e idea of i t , we oannot help regarding as r e a l . The idea of "substance1? 1 corresponds therefore to a r e a l i t y , a l b e i t an unknown r e a l i t y . 1. Essay, book I I I , Chapter I I I . 10 " I f , " says Caird, "we begin with the i n d i v i d u a l mind, we are forced to conceive i t s knowledge as l i m i t e d to the simple ideas of i t s own sensations and actions, and the various complex ideas which may be got by combining these simple ideas. In t h i s view, objective r e a l i t y , or things i n themselves, l i e altogether beyond the p o s s i b i l i t y of knowledge. I f we begin, on the other hand, with the idea of a world, which immediately acts on the mind of the i n d i v i d u a l through the senses, we assume a knowledge of things i n themselves, independent of the sensations of the in d i v i d u a l , and explain by thi s means these very sensations themselves. In t h i s case, i n addition to the d i f f i c u l t i e s which, on i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c p r i n c i p l e s , beset any ontological theory whatever, we have to encounter the double d i f f i c u l t y of a mater-i a l i s t i c ontology. For even i f we admit that things i n themselves can be known, and known to be material, the r e l a t i o n of the physical impression which the material object makes i s the thought which i s i t s consequent, remains u t t e r l y u n i n t e l l i g i b l e . The philosophy of Locke reduces i t s e l f to an attempted synthesis of two contradictory theories. For one of two things i s i n e v i t a b l e . E i t h e r consciousness must be conceived as transcending the i n d i v i d u a l i t y of the human animal, as embracing i n one thought the dua l i t y of subject and object, which then can have no existence i n themselves apart from the unity i n which they are known. Or i f , on the other hand, the i n d i v i d u a l consciousness i s not to be conceived as transcending i t s e l f , then we must be i n earnest about i t s l i m i t s and we must give up a l l pretence of knowing things i n themselves, or construing out of our own affections a r e a l i t y not included i n them. It i s impossible to preserve both the sensationalist view of the development of knowledge, and the m a t e r i a l i s t i c account of 1 the origen of sensation." Comes now George Berkeley (1685-1753) who, on Lockeian grounds, denies the Lockeian Substance. " I f , " he says, "we enquire into what the most accurate philosophers declare themselves to mean by "material substance," we s h a l l f i n d them acknowledge they have no other meaning attached to these sounds than the idea of being i n general, together with the r e l a t i v e notion of 2 i t s supporting accidents." Or again: "I oannot conceive how i t i s possible to speak of the absolute existence of things without t h e i r r e l a t i o n to the fact that somebody perceives them. To exist means to be 3 perceived. (Esse est p e r c i p i ) . "Some things there are," says Berkeley, "so near and obvious to the mind, that a man need only open his eyes to see them. Such I take t h i s important one to be, to wit, that a l l the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth, i n a word, a l l those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not any subsistence without a mind; that t h e i r being i s to be perceived or known; that consequently so long as they are not a c t u a l l y perceived by me, or do not exist i n my mind or that of any other created s p i r i t , they must either have no existence at a l l , or else subsist i n the mind of some eternal s p i r i t . To be convinced of which the reader need 1. Caird, Edward, op. c i t . , p.59. 2. Berkeley, G-., "Principles of Human Knowledge," Introd. p.Xv 3. Ibid., paragraph 4. 12 only r e f l e c t , and t r y to separate i n h i s own thoughts the 1 being of a sensible thing from i t s being perceived.™ The conclusion Berkeley draws from h i s analysis i s that "there i s not any other substance than s p i r i t or that which perceives" and that the existence of external things consists i n t h e i r being e t e r n a l l y present i n the mind of God, by whom they are revealed to us. It i s not that Berkeley denies the existence of an "external" world. What he does, i n short, amounts to "substituting i n the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the data of sense-perception the concept "object-for-mind" 2 for the concept "quality-inhering-in-substance." The change, no doubt, makes a profound difference i n the way we think about what we perceive, but i t makes none i n what we a c t u a l l y perceive. As Berkeley himself says: "I do not argue against the existence of any one thing that we can apprehend by sense or r e f l e c t i o n . That the things I see with my eyes and touch with my hands do exi s t , r e a l l y e x i s t , I make not the least question. The only thing whose existence I deny i s that which philosophers c a l l Matter or corporeal substance. And i n doing t h i s there i s no damage done to the rest of mankind, who, I dare say, w i l l never 3 miss i t . " The significance of Berkeley, f o r our present purpose, l i e s i n the fact that he opened up the question of the meaning of the general name "matter." Hume, as we s h a l l see presently, 1. Berkeley, G., op. c i t . , p.VI. 2. Hoernle, R.F.A., "Idealism," p.69. 3 . Ibid., p.35. i n e f f e c t took up the application of h i s method at the point • * where Berkeley dropped i t , and proceeded to inquire into the 1 meaning of the general name "mind." Berkeley, while r e j e c t i n g the Lockeian substance, that i s , the substratum i n which q u a l i t i e s inhere, i n so f a r as the material world was concerned, never once thought of r e j e c t i n g the same conception i n respect of the in t e r n a l or mental world. For Berkeley, as we have seen, the only possible substratum for external objects was the mind or minds by which they are perceived. Hume, on the other hand, contends that the concept of a Soul-substance - "mind," " s p i r i t " or " s e l f " - i s no l e s s an absurdity than the conception of an independent substance or substratum of matter. "This question," says Hume, "we have found impossible to be answered with regard to matter and body. But besides that i n the case of mind i t labours under a l l the same d i f f i c u l t i e s , i t i s burdened with some additional ones which are peculiar to that subject. As every idea i s derived from a precedent impression, had we any idea of the substance of our minds, we must also have an impression of i t : which i s very d i f f i c u l t , i f not impossible, to be conceived. For how can an impression represent a substance otherwise than by resembling i t ? And how can an impression represent a substance, since according to t h i s philosophy i t i s not a substance and has none of the peculiar q u a l i t i e s or 2 ch a r a c t e r i s t i c s of a substance?" 1. Hume, David, (1711-1776). The "Treatise on Human Nature" was published i n 1738, and the "Enquiry concerning Human understanding" towards 175S. 2. Treatise, pt. IV, section 5. 14 As we see i n t h i s passage, Hume draws a d i s t i n c t i o n between "impressions" and "ideas." Both Locke and Berkeley x had employed the term "idea" f o r the objects of both sense and r e f l e c t i o n . Every idea, according to Hume, has i t s origin, i n an impression or combination of impressions. The having of impressions i s f e e l i n g ; the having of ideas i s thinking. The fundamental p r i n c i p l e s of connection or association among ideas Hume finds to be three, namely - resemblance, contiguity, and cause and e f f e c t . "A picture n a t u r a l l y leads our thoughts to the o r i g i n a l (resemblance); the mention of one apartment i n a building n a t u r a l l y introduces an inquiry or discourse concerning the others (contiguity); and I f we think of a wound, we can 1 scarcely forbear r e f l e c t i n g on the pain which follows i t . " For Hume, again, the objects of human reason or inquiry may be divided into " r e l a t i o n s of ideas," and "matters of f a c t . " The former alone are susceptible of demonstration. (This statement r e c a l l s the d i s t i n c t i o n made by L e i b n i t z between "necessary" and "empirical" truth.) Now, a l l reasonings concerning matters of fact are founded on the r e l a t i o n of cause and e f f e c t . "But,"says Hume, "causes and e f f e c t s are discoverable, not by reason, but by experience?" He, therefore, c a t e g o r i c a l l y denies the existence of any causal nexus, of any p r i n c i p l e , that i s , u n i t i n g the cause with the e f f e c t . 1. Enquiry, s e c t . I l l , p.20, e d i t i o n of 1822. 2. Enquiry, sect.VII, of the Idea of Necessary Connection. Also Treatise, Pt.lEII, sect. 6. In mathematics alone can we have certitude. " A l l other i n q u i r i e s of men regard only matter and existence; and these are evidently incapable of demonstration. Whatever i s may not be; no negation of a fact can involve a contradiction the non-existence of any being i s as clear and d i s t i n c t an idea as i t s existence. The proposition which affirms i t not to be, however f a l s e , i s no l e s s conceivable and I n t e l l i g i b l e than that which affirms i t to be. The case i s d i f f e r e n t with the sciences, properly so-called.. Every proposition which i s not true i s there confused and u n i n t e l l i g i b l e . That the cube root of sixty-four i s equal to the h a l f of ten i s a f a l s e proposition, and can never be d i s t i n c t l y conceived; but that Caesar or the angel Gabriel, or any being never existed, may be a f a l s e proposition, but s t i l l i s p e r f e c t l y conoeivable 1 and implies no contradiction." In respect of Science, Hume's findings have been summarized thus: "Science i s e n t i t l e d to our confidence on two conditions only - a l l i t s elements must bear the stamp of necessity and u n i v e r s a l i t y . But our ideas being the ef f e c t of variable impressions or of pure habit, present nothing universal or necessary. Therefore there i s no absolutely true science. Our knowledge i s mere b e l i e f and p r o b a b i l i t y , 2 and therefore contingent." Science, to be sure, was not much concerned about Hume's conclusions, since, f o r a l l p r a c t i c a l purposes, h i s 1. Inquiry, sect. XII, pt. 3, p.163. 2; Lefevre, Andre, "Philosophy", Chapman & H a l l , london 1879, p.350. " p r o b a b i l i t y " was just as good as certitude. Hume's scepticism does not suppress the ideas i t explains; i t merely teaches us to employ them with a f u l l knowledge of t h e i r nature. As a matter of fact the tremendous development of science i n England and Europe generally proceeded apace as i n d i f f e r e n t to Hume's n i h i l i s m as i t remained to M i l l ' s d e f i n i t i o n of matter as "permanent p o s s i b i l i t y of sensation," or Spencer's statement that "By R e a l i t y we mean persistence i n consciousness." Notwithstanding then, the scepticism of Hume, B r i t i s h Empiricism, worked out by the Scottish School, became the dominant philosophy i n England, under the name of Associationalism, f o r the greater part of the nineteenth century. In the hands of Hamilton, M i l l , Bain and others, while always suspect to the c l e r i c a l mind, i t avoided the crass materialism of the French school and commended i t s e l f to the English mind by i t s 1 a i r of sound common-sense. From Hume we should go immediately to Kant, but i t w i l l be necessary to notice the development of B r i t i s h Empiricism i n France, a process which resulted i n the formation of the French M a t e r i a l i s t School. 1. Dobb, Maurice, "Marxism To-Day," Hogarth Press, London, 1932, p.7. " I t i s usual f o r the Englishman, with the b l u f f common-sense of a nation of shopkeepers, to hold philosophies and broad generalizations i n contempt. The t r a d i t i o n of our thought i s empi r i c i s t . The pride of our thinkers i s to be p r a c t i c a l , to turn paradox into the obvious and to translate the mysteries of the universe into the language of the b e s t - s e l l e r . The scepticism of Hume st r i k e s us as eminently urbane and reasonable, contrasted with the stupendous dogmatism of Hegel; and we prefer even to be frankly inconsistent i f consistency means a s t r i v i n g a f t e r architectonic systems of thought i n the manner of c l a s s i c German philosophy." 17 The teachings of Locke were popularized i n France hy Condillac (1715-1780) who introduced them to h i s countrymen i n h i s "Essay on the Origin of Knowledge" published i n 1746. This work i s l i t t l e more than an exposition of Locke's "Essay," but i n h i s "Treatise on Sensation" he develops h i s own contrib-ution to the theory of knowledge. Locke, as we have seen, had admitted the a c t i v i t y of r e f l e c t i o n as well as sensation i n the formation of ideas. Condillac considered t h i s a concession to the i n t e l l e c t u a l i s t s of the time and i n s i s t e d that, no matter how ideas may be combined and recombined, i n no matter how -complex a manner, they are a l l ultimately reducible to sensat-ions. "The Ego of each i n d i v i d u a l i s but the sum-total of the sensations he experiences, or of those revived by memory; i t i s at once the conscience of what he i s , and the r e c o l l e c t i o n 1 of what he has been." Penser o'est s e n t i r . Helvetius ca r r i e d on the work of Condillac. His teaching i s of a marked hedonistic and u t i l i t a r i a n character. The end of l i f e i s happiness and there i s no sueh thing as disinterested conduct. Since society i s merely the sum of i n d i v i d u a l s , i n d i v i d u a l s a t i s f a c t i o n , as such, contributes to the general well-being. Since Self-love i s the only motive of conduct, a l l p r a c t i c a l a ction i n l i f e i s traceable to s e l f -interested motives. From t h i s i t follows that no moral teaching, whose aim i s not to show that virtuous conduct i s that most conducive to i n d i v i d u a l happiness, i s of any value. 1. Quoted by Lefevre, op. c i t . , p.362. 18 La Mettrie (1709-1751) combined the mechanioist and m a t e r i a l i s t side of Descartes*, philosophy with the sensat-ionalism of Gondillac and Helvetius and thus opposed an a t h e i s t i c doctrine to the De i s t i o teachings of h i s contemporaries. Denis Diderot (1713-1784), who originated and edited 1 the "Encyclopedia," was one of the outstanding men of h i s time. B e l f o r t Bax says of him: "Diderot may most accurately be described as a ma t e r i a l i s t monist. To him a l l nature was one; the d i f f -erence between organic, inorganic, animal and human, were only differences of degree. There was no such thing as dead matter; the molecule was no l e s s an active agent than the man. To employ an i l l u s t r a t i o n of h i s : 'the great musical instrument we c a l l the universe plays i t s e l f . ' Matter i s i t s e l f active by i t s very nature, i t s e l f sentient, i t s e l f conscious, potent-i a l l y when not act u a l l y . In other words matter, i . e . , physical substance, i s the ultimate of a l l existence; nature i s the sum 2 of i t s combinations." It i s i n the text-book, however, of the m a t e r i a l i s t movement that we must look f o r the systematic statement of i t s doctrines. This i s the celebrated *?Systeme de l a Nature" o f . D'Holbach. (Paul Heinrich D i e t r i c h , Baron von Holbach, 1721-1789). In thi3 book we f i n d the Empiricism of the B r i t i s h school, the sensationism of Condillac, the s e l f - i n t e r e s t ethics of Helvetius and the Epicureanism of La Mettrie; the whole 1. Lenin speaks of him as "one of the great m a t e r i a l i s t s -Diderot, IPeuerbach, Marx and Engels." "Materialism and Empirio-c r i t i c i s m , p.28. 2. Bax, E. B e l f o r t , op. c i t . p.209. 19 forming the bibl e of materialism as understood i n France during the eighteenth century and, f o r that matter, of a l l the freethink-ers i n Europe f o r long a f t e r . CHAPTER III KANT N i h i l est In i n t e l l e e t u quod non prius i n sensu f u e r i t , sed ipse i n t e l l e c t u s (Leibnitz) For the Englisfa Empiricists, as for the French Material-i s t s , who drew on Locke and his school, the human mind, i n the act of perception, was e s s e n t i a l l y passive. To be sure the mind was active i n r e f l e c t i o n but only i n r e l a t i n g and combining the sense-data provided by perception. The only source of knowledge was experience. But t h i s l i n e of reasoning, i f l o g i c a l l y followed out, as i t was by Hume, leads i n e v i t a b l y to a form of scepticism which i s f a t a l to a l l certitude, a l l "universal and necessary" 1 ideas, Eternal V e r i t i e s and Absolutes whatever. I t was equally deadly to Theology i n spite of Hume's i r o n i c a l "accomodations." Now, Materialism has always been vulgar and disreput-able and may, therefore, be frowned down. Scepticism, however, bears another complexion; i t i s u r b a n e p o l i s h e d , and i n s i d i o u s . I t must, therefore, be met by argument or by a restatement of the p o s i t i o n attacked. To be sure science and industry could get along quite well with materialism, whether modified by an infusion of scepticism into positivism, naturalism, agnosticism or whatnot. But i t was otherwise with the theological and dogmatic schools which were thrown into confusion by the impact £ of the Humean scepticism. I t was thus that Immanuel Kant was, 1. Hume's concession i n respect of mathematical concepts, on h i s own p r i n c i p l e s , was doubtfully v a l i d . £. Kant was born at Koenigsberg i n 17£4 and died 1804 i n the same place. 20 as he t e l l s us, "awakened from the dogmatic slumber." "Metaphysic," he says, "has been the b a t t l e f i e l d of endless c o n f l i c t s . Dogmatism at f i r s t held despotic sway; but from time to time scepticism destroyed a l l s e t t l e d order of society; 1 and now a widespread ind i f f e r e n t i s m p r e v a i l s . " And again: "The unavoidable problems, set by pure reason i t s e l f , are God, freedom, and immortality, and the science which brings a l l i t s resources to bear on the one single task of solving 2 them i s metaphysic." As a matter of f a c t , the development of the "Theory of Knowledge" which was Kant's main preoccupation does not immediately involve these matters at a l l , as Kant himself proves, but he had to make up his account, some way or other, with the old question of dogmatics and i t must be admitted he does so with remarkable ingenuity. What he did do, i n the 3 "Critique of Pure Reason," was to lay the groundwork of the movement which l e d up to Hegel and German Idealism. In i n s i s t i n g on the importance of perception as the only source of Knowledge the Em p i r i c i s t s had reduced philosophy to the status of psychology and had r e a l l y evaded the main problems of philosophy proper. Had they enquired into the conditions of experience i t s e l f they could have seen that t h e i r postulates were not ultimate i n themselves, and presupposed conditions not recognized i n their theory. With Locke, Kant 1. Watson, J., "The Philosophy of Kant," (Maclehose & Co., Glasgow, 1923) p . l . 2.Ibid., p.11 3.The "Critique of Pure Reason," was published i n 1781. 22 admitted that every concrete concept can come only through experience, but h i s great merit l i e s i n having seen the issue which l i e s beyond t h i s mere psychological question, the problem,. namely, as to the conditions of experience i t s e l f . The question which Kant asked himself was t h i s : How, then, i s experience possible? C l e a r l y , i f we have perceptions, there must be acts of perceiving for the sense-data and also things as c o l l e c t i o n s of sense-data to exist. But what about the nature of the act? The sense-data which at any given moment we perceive are, taken thus as momentary events, mere shreds of that t o t a l world of which we believe them to be a part. I f we were r e s t r i c t e d at any moment merely to what, at that moment, we a c t u a l l y perceive, we should be aware only of a confused mass of manifold sense-data. We could not be aware of Nature as a "World," that i s , as an ordered whole, and the term "law of nature" would have no meaning fo r us at a l l . Kant's answer to h i s own question was the assertion of the es s e n t i a l a c t i v i t y of the human understanding i n the act of perception as well as i n that of conception. I f conceptions without perception are empty, i t i s equally true that perceptions 1 without conception are b l i n d . " I f s e n s i b i l i t y i s the r e c e p t i v i t y of the mind i n the actual apprehension of some impression, understanding i s the spontaneity of Knowledge, or the f a c u l t y that of i t s e l f produces ideas. ...... Understanding can perceive nothing, the senses 1. Watson, J"., op. c i t . , p.41. 23 can think nothing. Knowledge arises only from t h e i r united 1 action." An act of Knowledge, therefore, i s an act of judgment, 2 and an act of judgment i s an act of synthesis. I f i t be true that even for ordinary common-sense, l e t alone f o r science, Nature i s not a mere stream of sense-data but i s given as a system, a whole ordered according to laws, i t i s not i n v i r t u e of mere seeing, or hearing or touching that we thus know nature, but i n v i r t u e of acts of judgment affirming the universal r e l a t i o n s i n which sense-data stand to each other. These r e l a t i o n s are, f i r s t l y , those of space and time, both forms of sense. Upon the "matter," that i s , the impression or sense-data received from "without," s e n s i b i l i t y imposes i t s own unifying forms. In space the manifold sense-data are united i n co-existence, i n time as sequence. "Time and space are not r e a l things or objective r e a l i t i e s , neither are they any q u a l i t i e s , r e l a t i o n s , or determinations of such things. ... Space, therefore i s simply the form of external sense, and henee the formal condition of a l l external phenomena. Time, i n l i k e manner, i s simply the form of i n t e r n a l sense, and hence the form of a l l phenomena 3 whatever." Secondly, the sense-data, thus u n i f i e d i n space and time, are combined by the understanding i n another seri e s o f r e l a t i o n s or categories, t y p i c a l l y those of substance and 1« Watson, G., op. c i t . , p.40. 2. Kant, I., "Prolegomena," G.Bell & Co., London, 1885,par.22. 3. Caird, Edward, op. c i t . , p.243. 24 accident, eausality, and r e l a t i v i t y . " I t has been j u s t l y remarked that space and time i n , the " c r i t i c a l philosophy," are the warp of Knowledge, across which the shuttle of thought has to throw i t s woof before r e a l i t y , o b j e c t i v i t y or experience can obtain. A world of three-dimensioned space, and of one-dimensioned time, forms the warp. This material i s supplemented by the spontaneity of the understanding or pure form of thought. The function of the understanding may be compared to the action of an e l e c t r i c spark, passing along and illu m i n a t i n g the whole series of sensations. Sensations, even though u n i f i e d i n space and time, are, to use Kant's expression, " b l i n d , " u n t i l they are reacted upon by the understanding. The understanding synthesizes them, and thereupon a f u l l y - f l e d g e d objective or experienced world a r i s e s . This system of experienced objects i s the "nature" with which science i s concerned. Science, no l e s s than common 1 experience, i s based upon the pure thought forms or categories." "Further, while the unity of space and time i s thus presupposed as conditioning a l l the objects of experience, presupposition i s also made, t a c i t l y i f not e x p l i c i t l y , of the id e n t i t y of the s e l f which i s the subject of i t . " That i s to say, that the experience of an ordered objective world, u n i f i e d i n space and time, presupposes unity and continuity i n the experient. "The i d e n t i t y of the s e l f i s , in: f a c t , but the subjective counterpart of the unity of the world as one whole, 1. Bax, B e l f o r t , op. c i t . , p.232. 1 e x i s t i n g i n space and time." "Mb knowledge whatever, no unity and connection of objects, i s possible f o r us, apart from that unity of conscious-ness which i s p r i o r to a l l data of perception, and without r e l a t i o n to which no consciousness of objects i s possible. This pure, o r i g i n a l , unchangeable consciousness I c a l l Transcendental Apperception The numerical unity of t h i s apperception i s , therefore, :just as much the a p r i o r i foundation of a l l concept-ions as the various determinations of space and time are the a p r i o r i foundation of the perceptions of sense. It i s t h i s transcendental unity of apperception which eonneots a l l the possible phenomena that can be gathered together i n one exper-2 ience, and subjects them to laws." How, a l l the unifying acts we have been considering eventuate, or f i n d their ground, i n time; t h i s one, the transc-endental unity of apperception, i s not i n time, but time i s for i t . B e l f o r t Bax interprets Kant to the effect that: "This primary synthesis i s i d e n t i f i e d by Kant with the productive or pure ego, the ultimate datum of "theory of Knowledge, as opposed to the empirical ego or subject-object with which psychology i s concerned. The transcendental synthesis of apperception includes the secondary or psychological synthesis (the empirical s e l f ) as i t does the whole world of experience. From the synthesis of apperception, the primordial "I think," every other synthesis 3 i s deducible." 1. Gaird, Edward, op. c i t . , p.333. 2. Watson, G., op. c i t . , p.62 - or Kant, E., "Critique of Pure Reason," p.201. 3. Bax, B e l f o r t , op. c i t . , p.237. Cf. Watson, G., op. c i t . , p.65 f f . 26 This objective world, however, which i s the only one we can possibly experience i s merely phenomenal. Rea l i t y i n i t s e l f - the Kantian ding-an-sich - i s unknowable. Kant says on t h i s point: " i f the conception of a noumenon i s interpreted i n a problematic sense, i t i s not only admissible but indispensable, serving as i t does to define the l i m i t s of s e n s i b i l i t y . In that sense, however, a noumenon i s not a special kind of object f o r our understanding, namely, an i n t e l l i g i b l e object; on the contrary i t i s problematic whether there i s any understanding that could 1 have such an object a c t u a l l y before i t . " Nevertheless Kant, somewhat inconsequently, retained the t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f , not so much because he required i t as a ground f o r sensation, but for reasons connected with h i s theories 2 of free w i l l and free causality, which do not concern us here. "Jacobi w i t t i l y remarks that Kant's thing i n i t s e l f 'as i n i t s e l f r e a l , but unknown and unknowable by us, enjoys a p o s i t -3 ion of otium cum dignitate,' which i s the next thing to non-existence" 1 The p r a c t i c a l outcome of the Kantian philosophy was modest enough and i t s burden a warning against the pretensions of the metaphysicians but the impact of the " c r i t i c a l philosophy" on the i n t e l l e c t u a l world of his day was tremendous and marks a turning point i n the history of human thought. Kant had builded, possibly, better than he knew, and i t was on Kantian p r i n c i p l e s and the c r i t i c a l method that philosophy moved toward the solution of the problem of R e a l i t y . 1. Watson, Gr., op. c i t . , p.133. 2. Ibid., "Critique of P r a c t i c a l Reason," passim. 3. Werke, III , p.74. Quoted by Caird, op. c i t . , p.670. CHAPTER IV HEGEL "The l i g h t dove, p i e r c i n g i n her easy f l i g h t the a i r and perceiving i t s resistance, imagines that f l i g h t would be easier i n empty space." (Kant) For the thinkers of the Age of Reason the universe was a rounded out whole, fix e d for a l l time and governed by r i g i d and unchanging laws. The things and beings which i t contained were r i g i d l y divided into orders, genera and species and were co-existent i n space and succeeded one another i n time. A c t i v i t y i n plenty, there was, to be sure, but i t worked round i n a perpetual c i r c l e of growth and decay, composition, reeom-po s i t i o n , and decomposition. Changes there were but not change. "To form the universe,™ says D'Holbach,"Descartes asked but matter and motion: a d i v e r s i t y of matter s u f f i c e d f o r him; v a r i e t y of motion was the consequence of i t s existence, of i t s essence, of i t s properties; i t s d i f f e r e n t modes of action would be the necessary consequence of i t s d i f f e r e n t modes of being. Matter without properties would be a mere nothing: therefore as soon as matter exi s t s , i t must act; as soon as i t i s various i t must act variously; i f i t cannot commence to exi s t , i t must have, i t must have existed from a l l eternity; i f i t has always existed, i t can never cease to be; i f i t can never cease to be, i t can never cease to act by i t s own energy. Motion i s a manner of being, which matter derives from i t s £7 p e c u l i a r existence These elements (earth, water, a i r , and f i r e ) which our senses never discover i n a pure state which are continually and r e c i p r o c a l l y set i n motion hy each other, which are always acting and reacting, combining and separating, a t t r a c t i n g and r e p e l l i n g , are s u f f i c i e n t to explain to us the formation of a l l the things we behold. Their motion i s uninterruptedly and r e c i p r o c a l l y produced from each other, they are a l t e r n a t e l y causes and e f f e c t s . Thus they form a vast c i r c l e of generation and destruction, of combination and decomposition, which i t i s quite reasonable to suppose could never have had a beginning, and which, consequently, can never have an end. l e t us therefore content ourselves with saying that matter always existed; that i t moves hy v i r t u e of i t s essence; that a l l the phenomena of Nature i s ascribable to the d i v e r s i f i e d motion of the variety of matter she contains and which, l i k e the phoenix, i s continually regenerating out 1 of i t s own ashes." So f a r as objective nature i s concerned there i s not, therefore, any conception of change i n the sense of "process" or development towards an end, proximate or f i n a l . Veblen i s undoubtedly correct when he says that "the 'natural laws* were looked upon as i n t r i n s i c a l l y meretorious and beneficent,, and 2 were held to carry a sanction of t h e i r own." But he i s as c e r t a i n l y wrong when he goes on to say: "Hence these 'natural 1. D'Holbach, op. c i t . , p.19. 2. Veblen, T., "The Place of Science," (Huebsch & Co., New York, 1919) p.53. 29 laws,* as t r a d i t i o n a l l y conceived, are laws governing the accomplishment of an end" - that i s to say, laws as to how a 1 1 sequence of cause and ef f e c t comes to rest i n a f i n a l term." Eather must we say with Dr. Beard: "This i s a scholastie-Bewtonian scheme of thought, founded on a fixed-order notion of things -not on the concept of eternal flow or change, eith e r Hegelian 2 or Marxian." Development and progress, i t was held, took place rather i n the order of ideas and resulted from the study of nature, the increasing Knowledge of her laws and processes, and hence a greater conformity and adaptation thereto. "Improvement i s the necessary effect of the laws of nature; f o r hy the law of sensation, man as i n v i n c i b l y tends to make himself happy, as the flame to ascend. His ignorance i s the obstacle which misleads him as to the means, and deceives him respecting causes and e f f e c t s . By force of experience he w i l l set himself r i g h t ; he w i l l become wise and good, because i t i s h i s interest to be so; and ideas communicating themselves through a nation, whole classes w i l l be instructed, science w i l l be u n i v e r s a l l y f a m i l i a r , and a l l men w i l l understand what are the p r i n c i p l e s of i n d i v i d u a l happiness and of public f e l i c i t y . .... Individuals w i l l f e e l that private happiness i s a l l i e d to 3 the happiness of society." 1. Veblen, op. c i t . , p.53. 2. Beard, phas. A., "The P o l i t i c a l Heritage of the Twentieth Century,* Yale Review, March, 1929. 3. Volney, "The Ruins of Empires," T. Allman, 1842, p.64. F i r s t published about 1794. 30 Now these are excellent sentiments but they do not indicate the existence of any concept of development. This attitude, however, i s neither a r b i t r a r y nor accidental. When we remember that, up to a time well within the century i n which these writers l i v e d , Europe was s t i l l carrying on the a c t i v i t i e s i n c i d e n t a l to getting a l i v i n g , agriculture, transportation and industry generally, - i n very much the same way as had been employed f o r , say, eight thousand years. As we have already noted, the expansion of the market and the r i s e of the middle-class profoundly affected the thought of the seventeenth century; so now the tremendous development of industry i n the eighteenth century had i t s r e f l e x i n the philosophic thought of that time and of the early nineteenth century. The f i r s t i ndications of the changing ideology are to be observed i n the sciences, n a t u r a l l y enough, since the s c i e n t i s t s are more intimately associated with industry. But, as D.G. R i t c h i e has noted, "the method and leading conceptions of philosophy 1 are s p e c i a l l y affected by the sciences." Already, i n 1755, Kant, although the idea of evolution i s e n t i r e l y absent i n 2 h i s philosophy, had advanced the Nebular Hypothesis. In 1790 Goethe published h i s "Metamorphoses of Plants," while Erasmus Darwin foreshadowed the work of h i s grandson i n h i s "Zoonomia" (1794). Hegel thus grew up, and developed his philosophy, i n an i n t e l l e c t u a l atmosphere i n which the concept of development formed no inconsiderable part. 1. R i t c h i e , D.G., "Darwin and Hegel," Swan.Sonnenschein and Company, London, 1893, p.38. 2. "Natural History and General Theory of the Heavens." 31 Seorg Wilhelm F r i e d r i c h Hegel (1770-1831) i s i n the .direct.-line of thought represented hy Kant, Fichte and Sehelling. The contribution of Fichte and Sehelling consisted i n the transformation of Kant's d u a l i s t i c phenomenalism into a monistic idealism. The ideas of u n i v e r s a l i t y and necessity grounded on the transcendental unity of apperception were taken up and devel-oped while the t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f was rejected as a s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t -ory and impossible abstraction. Kant had assumed as had Locke before him, that there must be a ground or cause f o r sensations. But, on Kantian p r i n c i p l e s , t h i s assumption i s seen to be absurd since, i f we assert that the t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f e x i s t s and i s a cause, then we apply the categories of "existence" and of "cause and e f f e c t " to i t and, therefore, know i t ; but i t i s , by hypothesis, unknown and unknowable. "Thus the t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f which Kant had reduced to a phantom, i s banished from the i n t e l l i g i b l e world and the consciousness of man finds no l i m i t 1 i n i t s e l f to preclude i t from the knowledge of i t s object." How Kant had already proved the e s s e n t i a l a c t i v i t y of mind and that the forms of knowledge, space, time and the-categories, are the product of minds, and ari s e from nothing external. But he had also assumed that the content of these forms was given as the t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f . I f t h i s , however, be rejected then both matter and form are the product of mind and t h i s leads, unavoidably, to the conclusion that the whole object, and every object, and f i n a l l y the entire universe, i s a product of mind. 1. Caird, Edward, op. c i t . , p.670. 32 I f a l l t h i s be granted then the g u l f between subject and object i s bridged; we know the objective world d i r e c t l y and immediately since i t i s not only of the same s t u f f as we our-selves but forms part of the same a l l - i n c l u s i v e whole. Further, there i s nothing i n the universe which i s unknowable. An unknown r e a l i t y , a r e a l i t y not an actual object of knowledge, may be spoken of, but c e r t a i n l y not an unknowable r e a l i t y , since r e a l i t y simply means the p o s s i b i l i t y of being an object of consciousness. To avoid misunderstanding:- "As commonly understood, Consciousness i s regarded as the attribute of the i n d i v i d u a l . Each i n d i v i d u a l mind i s supposed to have i t s own consciousness over against other in d i v i d u a l minds and the world without. But Consciousness, i n a philosophical sense, does not mean consciousness conceived as appertaining to t h i s or that i n d i v i d u a l , which at best constitutes the subject-matter of empirical psychology, but consciousness considered i n i t s essential nature. This i s what i s meant by consciousness-in-general, or consciousness as such. To say that the whole system of things stands or f a l l s with your, or with my, in d i v i d u a l consciousness, or psyche, (the p o s i t i o n of Solipsism) 1 i s a palpable absurdity." The precise r e l a t i o n of consciousness-in p a r t i c u l a r , which concerns the i n d i v i d u a l mind, to consclousness-in-general, which concerns the system of things, or r e a l i t y , i s the problem, to f i n d an adequate formula f o r which has been the constantly 1. Bax, B e l f o r t , "The Roots of Re a l i t y , " B.W. Bodge & Company, New York, 1908, p . 1 5 . recurring pre-oceupatlon of philosophy, i n i t s wider aspect, from Plato to the present day. The Hegelian system represents the most elaborate and comprehensive of these attempts, and forms the culmination of the i d e a l i s t i c movement which took i t s r i s e i n Kant. That Hegel did not f i n d a f i n a l s o l u t i o n of t h i s problem, as the differences among h i s successors would indicate, does not immediately concern us. In i t s more p r a c t i c a l aspects h i s system purported to e f f e c t , not only the transcend-ence of that dualism of i d e a l and material which had p e r s i s t e d even i n the Kantian philosophy, but to account f o r the moving, h i s t o r i c a l and s o c i a l aspects of r e a l i t y while yet providing a method of investigation and a c r i t e r i o n of certainty which would bring the apparently chaotic f l u x of experience into some kind of order. The a c q u i s i t i o n of Knowledge i s a synthetic process i n which things or events are brought into a new r e l a t i o n s h i p ; some content i s brought into a new unity, the p a r t i c u l a r under the u n i v e r s a l . Every u n i f i c a t i o n of t h i s kind constitutes an apperception or, as Kant would say, an apperceptive synthesis of knowing and forms a step i n the constitution of higher and more comprehensive categories. It i s the bringing of p a r t i c u l a r contents-things or events - under new u n i f i c a t i o n s . The more comprehensive the unifying thought form or generalization, the higher the point of view as science. In physical science t h i s process of the reduction of the "sense manifold" to unity reaches i t s highest point i n the bringing of the world of objects, making up the content of space and time, under the 35 generalization matter-in-motlon. The higher u n i f i c a t i o n s have, hitherto, l a i n within the province of philosophy. The d r i f t of recent s c i e n t i f i c research, however, i s towards a quest f o r ultimate r e a l i t y . S i r James Jeans, i n a recent book, comes to the i n t e r e s t i n g conclusion that "either our supposed laws of nature become a mere s p e c i f i c a t i o n of our own mental processes, t e l l i n g us l i t t l e or possibly nothing about nature, but c e r t a i n l y something about ourselves," or " r e a l i t y must 1 have something of a mental nature about i t . " Thus even the s c i e n t i s t i s driven to conclude that R e a l i t y , i n the l a s t resort, i s nothing but a synthesis of thought r e l a t i o n s . It i s a Unity which, while self-consistent, includes and transcends a l l d i s t i n c t i o n s whatever. It i s an " i d e n t i t y i n differences." This ultimate p r i n c i p l e of a l l Knowledge, 1. S i r James Jeans, "The New Background of Science," MacMillan Company, New York, 1933. It l e worthy of note, however, that the reviewer "William Gruen) of t h i s book, i n the Nation of July 19, 1933, takes occasion to chide S i r James for thus venturing beyond the t r a d i t i o n a l l i m i t s of science. Referring to physical laws he says " t h e i r function i s not - as Jeans supposes - to tear the v e i l of phenomena from the " r e a l " substratum of nature. Their function i n science and technology i s rather to disclose some order and connection between events and to endow the arts with i n t e l l i g e n t foresight and some measure of co n t r o l . " One i s reminded of Veblen who also says: "Modern technology makes use of the same range of concepts, thinks i n the same terms, and applies the same tests of v a l i d i t y as modern science Hence the easy copartnership between the two. Science and technology play into each others hands. The processes of nature with which science deals and which technology turns to account, the sequence of changes i n the external world, animate and inanimate, run i n terms of brute causation, as do the theories of science. These processes take no thought of human expediency or inexpediency..... Modern science carries on i t s i n q u i r i e s and states i t s conclusions i n terms of the same objective character as those employed by the meehanical engineer." "The Place of Science," p.17, f f . which i s Experience-in-general, or Consciousness-as-such, i s the system of a l l possible momenta or determinations of Knowledge, thought or consciousness. It i s what Kant c a l l e d the "Synthetic Unity of Apperception," Fichte the "Pure Ego," and Hegel the "Concrete Idea.1' Now the Absolute, thus conceived, i s a l l - i n c l u s i v e , and therefore embraces a l l differences, oppositions and antagonisms whatever. But i t must also transcend and unite a l l contradictions i n a coherent whole. And thus the drive toward Unity, to the thought of the universe as a self-consistent whole i s a process of the elimination of contradictions. We have already seen that Empiricism and Scepticism, i n undermining the d i s t i n c t i o n s of the ordinary consciousness, and of the philosophy immediately a r i s i n g from i t , pave the way for a t r u l y synthetic view. Thus scepticism shows us, that on the ordinary crude d u a l i s t i c assumption of the independence of subject and object, mind and matter, perceiver and perceived, Knowledge would be impossible. We are therefore forced to reconsider the assumptions which we have hitherto received as unquestionable truth. So with every f i x e d d i s t i n c t i o n , great and small, whether important or seemingly i r r e l e v a n t ; every such d i s t i n c t i o n w i l l be found on examination, when consistently carried out, to refute i t s e l f , that i s , to contain the germ of i t s own destruction or negation. As Hegel has i t , i t contains i t s own " i n t e r n a l d i a l e c t i c . " It i s i n t h i s word D i a l e c t i c that we have the key to the whole Hegelian system. The method of Hegel i s the d i a l e c t i c method, and i t i s the discovery of the f u l l significance of t h i s dynamic p r i n c i p l e which has given Hegel that pre-eminence he enjoys i n the philosophic world. It i s the p r i n c i p l e which Herakleitos of E Ephesus foreshadowed when he said, " a l l things flow," and "there i s nothing that comes into being but i t forthwith ceases to be." Zeno of Elea, the Sophists and Socrates, Plato and A r i s t o t l e a l l recognized t h i s p r i n c i p l e though even Plato never d e f i n i t e l y transcended the contradiction between the unity and permanence of R e a l i t y and the m u l t i p l i c i t y of the sense-world, between Form and Matter, between the One and the Many. Goethe catches the beat of the world-rhythm when he makes the Erdgeist i n Faust exclaim: "In Being's floods, i n Actions storm I walk and work, above beneath, Work and weave i n endless motion! B i r t h and Death An I n f i n i t e ocean, A seizing and g i v i n g The f i r e of l i v i n g •Tis thus at the roaring loom of Time I ply, And weave fo r God the garment thou seest him by." "Whoever," says Croce, " f e e l s the dignity of man and the dignity of thought can f i n d s a t i s f a c t i o n i n no.other solution of c o n f l i c t s and of dualisms than i n the d i a l e c t i c a l , the solution won by the genius of Hegel." The Hegelian d i a l e c t i c i s based on the recognition of i d e n t i t y i n difference, of the fact that a l l affirmation implies negation, and a l l negation affirmation. In a l l things there i s a capacity unrealised, and a capacity r e a l i s e d ; the f i r s t i n 1. Croce, Benedetto, "The Philosophy of Hegel," MacMillan Company, London, 1915, p.71. the "material" moment, the second the "formal" moment. The acorn i s the unrealised capacity of the oak, i t i s r e a l i s e d as oak. The r e a l i s a t i o n of the capacity of a thing i s the negat-ion of that thing as a c t u a l l y existent. The p o s s i b i l i t y or capacity present in-the c h i l d i s r e a l i s e d i n the man, but manhood i s the negation of childhood. The d i a l e c t i c runs through a l l things, and may be discovered by analysis on every plane of r e a l i t y of which i t i s the ultimate expression. Prom t h i s more comprehensive viewpoint the old formal l o g i c i s seen to be inadequate to deal with a universe i n f l u x . So f a r from i t s being the case, as the law of contradiction asserts, that a thing cannot both be and not be, we now see that, i n a sense, everything i s , and at the same time i s not. Since r e a l i t y , that i s , the synthesis of experience, consists i n the union of contradictories, i t necessarily follows that f o r experience pure affirmation i s p r e c i s e l y on the same l e v e l as pure negation; a l l d i s t i n c t i o n s , affirmations and negations are dissolved i n the Absolute. This i s a l l that Hegel means by the somewhat paradoxical statement, with which be begins h i s "Logic," that "being"and"non-being"are the same. Absolute sBeing=Hothing. Hegel himself somewhere observes that i t was 2 Spinoza who f i r s t introduced into European thought the monistic conception that the f i r s t p r i n c i p l e of the universe must be a single p r i n c i p l e , and that t h i s p r i n c i p l e must be a unity; an absolute unity i n which f i n i t e and i n f i n i t e are merged. For 1. "The Logic of Hegel," translated by Wallace, Oxford Clarendon Press, 1874, p.137. 2. Baruch de Spinoza, 1632-1677. the ultimate r e a l i t y i s only r e a l i n vi r t u e of the fact that i t i s dependent on nothing outside i t s e l f ; to be thus s e l f -dependent i s to be self-determined and what i s self-determined must be a unity. This unity Spinoza defined as Substance -the One Substance. And, since i t was substance, and a unity; thought was d e f i n i t e l y excluded and remained over against i t . He could not therefore deduce thought from i t nor the m u l t i p l i c -i t y of the f i n i t e since thought i s of the essence of these things. Many philosophies have asserted that " a l l i s one" and that, i n some sense, the f i r s t p r i n c i p l e i s a unity. Even for science the world i s only i n t e l l i g i b l e on the assumption that i t forms one coherent system. The word " a l l " as used above c l e a r l y means the many, the m u l t i p l i c i t y of things. The statement then means that the "many" i s i d e n t i c a l with i t s opposite the "one." Again, i t i s said that the "one" i s the i n f i n i t e , while the "many" i s the f i n i t e . The i n f i n i t e produces the f i n i t e out of i t s e l f , becomes f i n i t e , and therefore i s f i n i t e . The i n f i n i t e i s i d e n t i c a l with i t s opposite the f i n i t e . Thus the problem appeared to Hegel and, as thus stated, i t i s h a l f solved. The older philosophies, however, remained, more or l e s s e x p l i c i t l y , of a d u a l i s t i c character since they could not bridge the g u l f between the one and the many. The ma t e r i a l i s t s emphasized the m u l t i p l i c i t y and could never compass the unity, while the subjective i d e a l i s t s and pantheists stressed the unity and could not account f o r the m u l t i p l i c i t y . For Hegel, of course, the problem had to be stated i n l o g i c a l terms, since 40 the universe was a mental fact and the thought process a progression from category to category u n t i l the Absolute i s reached. The Absolute contains a l l the categories; i n f a c t is_ the categories. Now, i t had hitherto been assumed, on A r i s t o t e l i a n p r i n c i p l e s - the laws of i d e n t i t y , of contradiction, and of the excluded middle - that, speaking l o g i c a l l y , a p o s i t i v e and i t s negative simply excluded each other; were r e c i p r o c a l l y exclusive and separated from each other by an impassible g u l f . I f , as these laws enjoin, we can only say A i s A, and never that A i s not-A, we obtain nothing but a s t e r i l e i d e n t i t y which even as truth i s inadequate since i t obscures that r e l a t i v i t y which i s of the essence of truth i n a coherent system. This was, p a r t l y , Spinoza's d i f f i c u l t y . He regarded the i n f i n i t e and the f i n i t e as being mutually exclusive and found i t imposs-i b l e to solve the problem as to how the f i n i t e could ever issue out of the i n f i n i t e . I f we cannot say other than that A i s A, or the i n f i n i t e i s the i n f i n i t e , then A must remain A f o r ever and the i n f i n i t e remain i n f i n i t e , and therefore s t e r i l e , f o r ever and never give b i r t h to the f i n i t e world. This problem can only be solved on the basis of the Hegelian p r i n c i p l e that the i n f i n i t e contains the f i n i t e , just as being contains non-being; that the i n f i n i t e i s the f i n i t e ; that A i_s not-A. It was, however, Spinoza's famous formula, a l l determination i s negation, (omnis determinatio est negatio) which, possibly, suggested to Hegel h i s conception of the importance of the contradiction or negation. To determine an object i s to mark i t off; to separate i t from more general class, to l i m i t i t . A thing i s known by i t s l i m i t a t i o n s . What we affirm of i t denies something else of i t . I f we say i t i s within c e r t a i n l i m i t s then we deny that i t i s outside those l i m i t s . Affirmation, therefore, involves negation. To be sure, i t i s generally i n the converse form - a l l negation i s determination - that Hegel uses t h i s p r i n c i p l e . "It has been hitherto one of the rooted prejudices of l o g i c and a commonly accepted b e l i e f that the contradiction i s not so essential or so inherent a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c ( i n thought and existence) as the i d e n t i t y . Yet i n comparison with i t the i d e n t i t y i s , i n truth, but the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of what i s simply and d i r e c t l y perceived, of l i f e l e s s existence. The contradict-ion, however, i s the source of a l l movement and l i f e ; only i n so f a r as i t contains a contradiction can anything have movement poweri and ef f e c t Only active reason reduced the mere m u l t i p l i c i t y and d i v e r s i t y of phenomena to a n t i t h e s i s . And only when pushed to t h i s point do the manifold phenomena become active and mutually stimulating, producing the state of negation which i s the very heart-beat of progress and l i f e . Only through t h e i r d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n and unfolding as opposing forces and factors i s further progress beyond the a n t i t h e s i s to a higher p o s i t i v e stage made possible. Where, however, the power to develop the contradiction and bring i t to a head i s lacking, 1 the thing or the being i s shattered on the contradiction." 1. Hegel, "Science of Logic," Part I, p.66 f f . Quoted hy Beer, " L i f e and Teaching of K a r l Marx (National Labor Press, London, 1921) p.XXI. 42 So f a r we have two elements or momenta, an affirmation or p o s i t i v e and a contradiction or negation, r e c i p r o c a l l y deter-mined. And, since r e a l i t y cannot remain at war with i t s e l f , a r e c o n c i l i a t i o n or synthesis must he effected. Thus, as we have seen the contradiction provides the drive, the forward impulse implied i n a l l development. There i s , thus, a t r i p l e a r t i c u l a t -ion i n each stage of development which i s completed hy the neg-ation of the negation or synthesis. But i t i s important to note that neither negation i s absolute; both momenta are preserved i n the synthesis. The i d e n t i t y i s not the whole truth, nor i s the contradiction the whole truth; the whole truth i s the i d e n t i t y i n difference. "In so f a r as the resultant, the negation, i s a d e f i n i t e negation, i t has a content. It i s a new conception, but a higher and r i c h e r conception than the preceding one; f o r i t has been enriched by the negation or a n t i t h e s i s of t h i s ; i t therefore contains i t and more than contains i t , being indeed 1 the synthetic unity of i t s e l f and i t s contrary." The synthesis, thus formed, becomes the thesis, or p o s i t i v e , of a new t r i a d which again develops an a n t i t h e s i s leading to a new synthesis and so on, the process representing a necessary movement leading up to the Absolute which i s the sum t o t a l of these determinations. Hegel thus sought to show that every separate idea l o g i c a l l y involves every other separate idea, and that the world of ideas as a whole i s an organic, 1. Hegel, op. c i t . , quoted, op. c i t . , p.XXII. Of also Wallace, " l o g i c of Hegel," p.192; Cf also Croce, "Philosophy of Hegel,S op. c i t . , p.20 self-explained, self-determined unity, and f i n a l l y that the actual world of objects follows by l o g i c a l deduction from this self-determined unity. In h i s "Logic" Hegel proceeds to make t h i s deduction, or series of deductions. They are here, however, presented, not i n the order i n which they present themselves, the under-standing t r y i n g to comprehend the universe, but i n the necessary or l o g i c a l order. He, therefore, begins with the most abstract category (which i s also the most concrete, since, f o r Hegel, the end i s the beginning) which i s presupposed by, and l o g i c a l l y p r i o r to, a l l other categories. The categories of quantity, quality, substance and cause a l l presuppose being. From t h i s , then, the summum genus, Hegel proceeds to deduce the species, and, treating the species, thus obtained as a new genus, passes from i t to lower species, and so on. But he can only proceed from genus to species adding a d i f f e r e n t i a to the genus, and where can he f i n d the d i f f e r e n t i a i n a pure abstraction such as being. It i s axiomatic that the consequent should be contain ed i n the antecedent, otherwise we commit the f a l l a c y of i l l i c i t process, since the genus expressly excludes the d i f f e r e n t i a and ex.nihilo? n i h i l f i t . It i s the d i a l e c t i c method which performs f o r Hegel t h i s apparent miracle. He finds h i s d i f f e r e n t i a neatly tucked away i n the category as the contradiction which, i t w i l l be remembered, was preserved, as well as abolished, (aufgehoben) i n the formation of the synthesis. How, pure "being" abstracted from a l l determinations whatever, has neither content nor form. Being, therefore, i s the same as nothing. "Being, as Being, i s nothing f i x e d or ultimate; i t y i e l d s to d i a l e c t i c and sinks into i t s opposite, 1 which, also taken immediately, i s Nothing. n The pure concept of being may thus he said to contain the idea of nothing. Since, therefore, they are i d e n t i c a l the one passes into the other. Being passes into nothing, and, conversely, nothing passes back into being; f o r the thought of nothing i s the same as the thought of being. The idea o f "passage," of t r a n s i t i o n from one concept to another gives us the t h i r d term i n the t r i a d , namely, Becoming. This, then, i s the explanation of the statement that everything " i s " and " i s not." I f i t be asked how a thing can both be and not be, the answer i s that i t both i s and i s not when i t becomes. Since i t i s the d i a l e c t i c method rather than the system Hegelian/we are concerned with here the above should s u f f i c e to i l l u s t r a t e the prooess. There are altogether an i n d e f i n i t e number of categories but a l l on the same plan. We may note, however, that the category "becoming" does not become the thesis of the next succeeding t r i a d but i s substituted f o r by "deter-minate being. 1 1 The element of "change" i s thereby eliminated, which seems to be a somewhat a r b i t r a r y procedure, since, on 2 Hegelian p r i n c i p l e s , nothing i s ever l o s t i n the process. The reason for t h i s was, no doubt, that Hegel was describing a l o g i c a l process of which the res u l t was to be a unity of pure thought forms. The Absolute f o r him was an e t e r n a l l y complete 1. l o g i c of Hegel, op. c i t . , p.137. 2. Wallace, "Logic of Hegel," op. c i t . , p.144. Gf. Stace, "The Philosophy of Hegel," MacMillan Company, London, 1924, p.140 system of thought determinations; eternal because timeless. Any formulation that makes thought per se the beginning and end of a l l things necessarily issues i n a conception which regards the universe as completed and s t a t i c . In i t s f i n a l r esult i t i n e v i t a b l y assumes the form of a complete and perfect divine mind composed of purely r a t i o n a l elements, from which i s eliminated a l l the material element i n r e a l i t y , a l l f e e l i n g , a l l p a r t i c u l a r i t y , a l l contingency, and a l l impulse or w i l l as such - i n short, a l l the dynamic factors i n experience. We may very well agree that a l l objects whatever are nothing but determinations of consciousness and yet i n s i s t that these material and dynamic factors are e s s e n t i a l elements i n a l l mental a c t i v i t y . The l o g i c a l form i s always s t a t i c , i t i s a process of f i x i n g , of defining things, while the dynamic element i n the r e a l i s always incapable of comprehension under l o g i c a l forms - i t i s i n f i n i t e . The one i s thought, but the other i s being which, while nothing i n i t s e l f , contains the i n f i n i t e p o t e n t i a l i t y of becoming. For t h i s reason Hegel f a i l s , i n any adequate manner, to make the t r a n s i t i o n from the Ideal to nature. Hislpanlogism -reveals i t s e l f as a species of dualism, as must a l l formulations which hypostatlze the purely formal 1 element i n experience. I f then there he, admittedly, a contin-gent and ar a t i o n a l element i n nature which cannot he compassed or explained hy the l o g i c a l and formal element, there e x i s t s a d i v i s i o n between nature and s p i r i t , and the l a t t e r appears 1. Cf. Croce, "The Philosophy of Hegel," op. c i t . , p.l92,f. also Stace, "The Philosophy of Hegel," op. c i t . , p.297,f. as a somewhat over against the world of nature which Hegel w i l l characterize as "God i n h i s eternal essence before the creation 1 of nature and of the f i n i t e s p i r i t . " "We can," says Croce, "very well think God i n nature and i n the f i n i t e s p i r i t , Deus i n nobis et nos, but c e r t a i n l y not a God outside or p r i o r to nature and man. ... This dualism not overcome, i n which Hegel's absolute idealism becomes entangled i s the reason of the d i v i s i o n of the Hegelian school into a right and a l e f t , and f o r the eventual extension of the l a t t e r to an extreme l e f t . The r i g h t wing interpreted Hegel t h e i s t i c a l l y .... while the l e f t wing was opposed to a l l transcendence and to the whole conception of a personal God. It emphasized the character of immanence of the system, and f i n a l l y came to sympathize with philosophic materialism, i n so far as t h i s i n i t s own way has an immanent and not a transcend-ental character. It would be impossible to decide which of the two interpretations was the more f a i t h f u l to the thought of Hegel; f o r both of them were founded upon Hegelian doctrines, and were opposed and h o s t i l e to one another, p r e c i s e l y because 2 those doctrines were contradictory." 1. Quoted by Croce, op. c i t . , p.201. 2. Ibid., p.202. CHAPTER V FROM HEGEL TO MARX "Als Hegel auf dem Todbette lag, sagte er:-•Hur einer hat mich verstanden!' Aber g l e i c h darauf fugte er v e r d r e i s s l i e h hinzu. 'Und der hat mich auch nicht verstanden!*" (Heine) Hegel himself somewhere observes: "A party shows i t s e l f to have won the v i c t o r y f i r s t when i t has broken up into two par t i e s ; f o r then i t proves that i t contains i n i t s e l f the p r i n c i p l e with which at f i r s t i t had to c o n f l i c t , and thus that i t has got beyond the onesidedness which was i n c i d e n t a l to i t s e a r l i e s t expression. The interest which formerly divided i t s e l f between i t and that to which i t was opposed, now f a l l s e n t i r e l y within i t s e l f , and the opposing p r i n c i p l e i s l e f t behind and forgotten, just because i t i s represented by one of the sides i n the new controversy which now occupies the minds of men. At the same time, i t i s to be observed that when the old p r i n c i p l e thus reappears, i t i s no longer what i t was before, f o r i t i s changed and p u r i f i e d by the higher element into which i t i s now taken up. From t h i s point of view, that discord which appears at f i r s t to be a lamentable breach and d i s s o l u t i o n of the unity 1 of a party, i s r e a l l y the crowning proof of i t s success." Hegel, therefore, might very well, on h i s own p r i n c i p l e s , have foreseen the breakup of h i s school but t h i s was prevented, 1. Quoted by Bax i n "History of Philosophy," p.337. 47 48 not only by a very natural conceit i n h i s own o f f s p r i n g , but by the f a c t that, i n h i s zeal for the Prussian bureaucracy, he had contrived to show that German nationalism, the Prussian State church, and the Prussian State i t s e l f were the highest objective expressions of the universal mind. He had sought to r e - e s t a b l i s h a modus V i v e n d i between Theology and Philosophy - a l b e i t at the 1 cost of the former - by an ingenious esoteric i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of leading dogmas. And, what i s more important, he abandoned the i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c ethics stressed by Kant, and restored the old conception of s o c i a l v i r t u e , the morality which has f o r i t s end 2 the family, the city,and the State. Whereas the Kantian philosophy represented the revolutionary period, that of Hegel t y p i f i e d the Restoration. Germany, however, was on the eve of a tremendous s c i e n t i f i c and i n d u s t r i a l development and the German middle-classes were d a i l y becoming more i n s i s t e n t i n t h e i r demands for popular government and democratic i n s t i t u t i o n s . Since, therefore, the o f f i c i a l philosophy, i n a sense, apotheosized class despotism on the ground that "what i s , i s necessary and, therefore, ought to be," i t was not long before a r i f t appeared 1. "Observe, however, that of C h r i s t i a n i t y as understood by us he leaves nothing but the essence, a something, one knows not what, equivalent to zero, what M. Renan, f o r instance, w i l l l a t e r on c a l l the "sentiment of the divine." Lefevre - "Philosophy," p.400. 2. Beer accounts f o r Hegel's support of the Prussian i n s t i t u t i o n s by reference to h i s "strong p a t r i o t i c sentiments" ( l i f e and Teachings of K. Marx, p.XXVII) but Strauss may be closer to the f a c t s of the case when he says that "a philosopher may have very good reasons (grunde) f o r c a l l i n g himself a C h r i s t i a n , but he can have no reason (grund)." Quoted by B e l f o r t Bax, "History of Philosophy," p.339. i n the Hegelian school, which r a p i d l y developed a right and l e f t wing a f t e r the death of the master i n 1831. "No philosophic statement has so i n v i t e d the thanks of narrow-minded governments and the pnger of equally narrow L i b e r a l s as the famous statement of Hegel: 11 A l l that i s r e a l i s reasonable, and a l l that i s reasonable i s r e a l . " This was e s s e n t i a l l y the blessing of a l l that i s , the philosophical ben-ed i c t i o n of despotism, police-government , star-chamber justice and the censorship. So Frederick William I I I and h i s subjects understood I t ; but, according to Hegel, not everything which exi s t s i s , without exception, r e a l . The at t r i b u t e of r e a l i t y belongs only to that which i s at the same time necessary. R e a l i t y proves i t s e l f i n the course of i t s development as necessity. But what i s necessary proves i t s e l f i n the l a s t instance as reasonable also So i n the course of progress a l l e a r l i e r r e a l i t y becomes unreality, loses i t s necessity, i t s right of existenoe, i t s n a t i o n a l i t y ; i n place of the dying r e a l i t y comes a new v i t a l r e a l i t y , peaceable when the o l d i s s u f f i c i e n t l y sensible to go to i t s death without a struggle, f o r c i b l e when i t s t r i v e s against t h i s necessity. And so the Hegelian statement through the Hegelian d i a l e c t i c turns to i t s opposite - a l l that i s r e a l i n the course of human h i s t o r y becomes i n the process of time i r r a t i o n a l and i s , therefore, according to i t s destiny, i r r a t i o n a l , and has from the beginning inh e r i t e d want of r a t i o n a l i t y , and everything which i s reasonable i n the minds of men i s destined to become r e a l , however much i t may contradict the apparent r e a l i t y of e x i s t i n g conditions. The statement of the r a t i o n a l i t y of everything r e a l dissolves i t s e l f , according to the Hegelian mode of thought, i n the other, " a l l that stands has ultimately only so much worth that i t 1 must f a l l . " The I n t e l l e c t u a l l i f e of Germany during the seventeen years from the death of Hegel to the revolution of 1848, i s mainly taken up with the controversies l i b e r a t e d by the d i s s o l -ution of the o r i g i n a l Hegelian school, and, since p o l i t i c a l controversy was a somewhat dangerous game i n the Germany of those days, t h i s took the form of philosophical arguments i n the press, which quite n a t u r a l l y c r i t i c i s e d Hegel»s idealism and the state r e l i g i o n . The Hegelian right wing, under Gans, Rosenkrantz Michelet and others, took part i n these discussions but presently ceased from troubling and ultimately died out. The fact i s , system i s that while the content of the Hegelian/dynamic i n respect of i t s d i a l e c t i c method, the o f f i c i a l form was s t a t i c and thus but i l l -accorded with the ideology of a country i n a state of t r a n s i t i o n . 2 A passage from Joad*s Modern Philosophy may be u s e f u l l y c i t e d here: "Since the Absolute, that i s the Universe, i n i t s character of I n f i n i t e T o t a l i t y , cannot i n i t s e l f be supposed to change, or, i n other words, to be h i s t o r i c a l i n character, since h i s t o r y presupposes change i n what i t records This 1. Engels, Feuerbach, "The Roots of the S o c i a l i s t Philosophy Translated by Austin Lewis, C H . Kerr & Company, Chicago, 1903. 2. Joad, C.E.M., "Modern Philosophy," Oxford Press, London, 1924. 51 conception i s attacked more p a r t i c u l a r l y because, by l o c a t i n g the Absolute, with which R e a l i t y i s i d e n t i f i e d , behind and beyond our f i n i t e experience, i t makes r e a l i t y transcend our experience and so precludes the p o s s i b i l i t y of Knowledge of r e a l i t y ; because, by making the Absolute the immanent spring from which a l l thought r i s e s as well as the all-embracing sea into which a l l thought merges, the universal presupposition of experience as well as the f i n a l synthesis of experience, i t renders progress non-existent and change unreal; and because f o r t h i s very reason Re a l i t y becomes an embodiment of thought as a passive structure, and not an expression of thinking as as an active p r i n c i p l e . I f , i n short, the Universe i s r e a l l y given and immutable as a whole, the apparent d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n and multip-l i c i t y which i t exhibits are equally given and Immutable, and the Hegelian dictum that 'Philosophy i s History' becomes meaningless." Under the impact of developing German science the German mina, f o r a while, dropped i t s tendency to transcendent-allsm ana reverted to those forms of "positivism" and "natural-ism" which had served so well the corresponding development i n England associated with the names of Bentham ana the U t i l i t a r i a n s , of M i l l , Darwin, Huxley, Spencer, ana l a t e r , K a r l Pearson. To be sure the continuity of philosophic thought was not completely broken: there was merely a change of emphasis imposea by the r a p i d l y changing economic environment. Many sources fed the stream of n a t u r a l i s t i c thought. We may discern the influence of the English Empiricists, of Hume, of the French M a t e r i a l i s t s , and more immediately, of Kant himself. "There was a strong n a t u r a l i s t i c motive i n Kant himself which had been overruled hy his i d e a l i s t i c followers, and which was now revived. Although Kant gave no encouragement to materialism, h i s "Critique of Pure Reason," s t r i c t l y construed, ana separated from the "Critique of P r a c t i c a l Reason," could he ci t e d as an indorsement of positivism; since i t set f o r t h the view that science alone f u l f i l s the requirements of knowledge, as uniting the forms of i n t u i t i o n and the categories of the understanding with the data of experience. Hence, i n the early 1860's, German positivism, as represented by Albert Lange and 1 Otto Liebmann, adopted the shibboleth 'Back to Kant,' ana appealed to the Master against h i s a i s c i p l e s . " "But while German naturalism may be saia to have sprung i n part from within the Kantian movement i t s e l f , i t receivea i t s chief impetus at t h i s time from the achievements of science. Although naturalism i s inspirea by science, i t unaertakes to s a t i s f y the philosophical demand for a comprehen-sive view of the world, and i s therefore influenced hy the generalization of science, rather than hy i t s p a r t i c u l a r items. And i n the miaaie of the nineteenth century the most impressive s c i e n t i f i c generalization was that of conservation, or the quantitative constancy of both matter ana energy i n a l l t h e i r 1. This exhortation (also mussauf Kant zuruckgegengen weraen!) appearea at the close of each chapter of liebmann*s "Kant una aie Epigonen" (1865). Lange publishea h i s "History of Materialism™ i n 1866. With the name of Lange shouia be associatea that of Eugen Duhring (1833-1921) now rememberea only as the man against whom Bngels wrote h i s "Antl-Duhring.™ diverse q u a l i t a t i v e manifestations. These p r i n c i p l e s suggested a new type of philosophical monism, i n which nature was regarded as a f i x e d amount of energized matter proceeding i n a ceaseless and c i r c u l a r round of change, l i f e and mind were regarded as parts of t h i s closed system, the organism being one of the forms assumed by matter, and consciousness one of the forms assumed 1 by energy." The outstanding names of t h i s school are: K a r l Vogt (1817-1895), b i o l o g i s t ; Jacob Moleschott (1822-1893) who published h i s " C i r c u l a t i o n of l i f e " i n 1852; and Ludwig Buchner (1824-1899) who published h i s famous book "Force and Matter" (Kraft und Stoff) i n 1855. Ernst Haeckel (1834-1919) continued t h i s t r a d i t i o n but was distinguished as belonging to a l a t e r period by the s h i f t of emphasis from the p r i n c i p l e of conser-vation to that of evolution, due to the influence of Darwin. In England, i n the meantime, capitalism had become s t a b i l i z e d a f t e r the storm and stress of i t s formative period and the English people had time, so to speak, to f i n d t h e i r 2 soul. The publication of S t i r l i n g ' s "Secret of Hegel" marks the beginning of that i d e a l i s t i c movement which dominated B r i t i s h philosophy i n the l a s t t h i r d of the nineteenth century. This movement did good work i n i t s attempt to r e h a b i l i t a t e philosophy properly so-called i n B r i t a i n , that i s to say, the problem as to the consti t u t i o n of experience or r e a l i t y , which 1. Perry, R.B., "Philosophy of the Recent Past," p.4. 2. S t i r l i n g , James Hutchinson, 1820-1909. 54 occupied the attention of Plato and A r i s t o t l e i n the ancient world and whieh was revived i n i t s f u l l meaning hy the main l i n e of the post-Kantian thinkers. A b r i l l i a n t coterie of thinkers, mainly Scottish, contributed to the influence of t h i s school. Among these we may mention T.H. Green, Robert Adamson, the Gairds, Edward and John, the Haldanes and the Wallaces. The l i n e was closed by F.H. Bradley (1846-1924) and Bernard Bosanquet (1848-1923). The l a t t e r w r i t e r i s important because of h i s work on the Hegelian theory of the State-embodied i n h i s "Philosophical Theory of the State" published i n 1899. This book e l i c i t e d a powerful and destructive attack i n the Metaphysical Theory of the State" by L.T. Hobhouse. Nevertheless the theory exerts a s i n i s t e r influence i n oertain quarters to-day and w i l l have to be reckoned with as one of the props of Fascist theory. F i n a l l y , i n the early years of the present century the Neo-Hegelian school petered out because i t could not transcend the incurable contradiction which besets the right-wing formulation of the Hegelian p o s i t i o n . But to return to the German left-wingers. As we have already noted the revolt against the o f f i c i a l r i g h t wing took a r e l i g i o u s , or rather a n t i - r e l i g i o u s complexion. In 1835 Lavia Strauss published h i s "Leben Jesu" i n which he reduced the orthodox dogmas to myths, and contended that the only r e l i g i o n consistent with a s t r i c t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Hegel's teachings was a n a t u r a l i s t i c pantheism. He held that, to the philosopher, for whom there i s no hard and fast d i s t i n -ction between t h i s and the other world, f o r whom a l l such d i s t i n c t i o n s , as mind and matter, subject and object, divine and natural, are at once embraced and transcended i n a higher unity there i s no greater enemy than a doctrine which affirms and perpetuates t h i s dualism of conception. Strauss has an important place i n the philosophy of r e l i g i o n and b i b l i c a l c r i t i c i s m as founder of the Tubingen school. On the other hand, owing to the highly synthetic character of the Hegelian doctrine, i t could, by a s l i g h t 1 s h i f t of emphasis, be made to support a p l u r a l i s t i c view, from which an extreme individualism might be deduced. The Bauer brothers, Bruno and Edgar, took t h i s turning and put forward a doctrine which, being worked out i n a metaphysical form by 2 Max Stirner, l a t e r formed the i n t e l l e c t u a l stock-in-trade of the extreme i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c school or Philosophical Anarchists. " S t i r n e r , " says Engels, "remained a "freak" even a f t e r Bakunine had mixed him with Proudhon and designated h i s amalgamation 3 "Anarchism." More immediately of interest to us i n t h i s connection i s the contribution of Ludwig Peuterbach (1804-1872) whose book the "Essence of C h r i s t i a n i t y " was very popular i n i t s day and was translated into English by George E l i o t . Fenerbach gave the movement a more p r a c t i c a l and de c i d i d l y m a t e r i a l i s t i c complexion. Engels says of him: "Fe.uerbach alone (of those mentioned) possessed any significance as a philosopher, 1. See on t h i s point Hoernle, "Idealism," p.115. Also McTaggart, "Studies i n the Hegelian D i a l e c t i c 2. Pseudonym of Caspar Schmidt (1806-1856) whose book "The Individual and h i s Property" (Des Einzige und sein Eigenthum i s s t i l l well-known. Fenerbach, p.92. , 56 (but he s t o o d as a composite p h i l o s o p h e r ) the under h a l f , of h i m m a t e r i a l i s t , the upper h a l f i d e a l i s t . He was not an apt c r i t i c of H e g e l but s i m p l y p u t him a s i d e as of ao accou n t , w h i l e he h i m s e l f , i n comparison w i t h the e n c y c l -opedic w e a l t h of t h e H e g e l i a n system, c o n t r i b u t e d n o t h i n g o f any p o s i t i v e v a l u e , except a bombastic r e l i g i o n of l o v e and a 1 t h i n , impotent system o f e t h i c s . " N e v e r t h e l e s s , F e u e r b a c h i s r a t h e r i m p o r t a n t s i n c e i t was h i s work which d e t e r m i n e d , i n g r e a t measure, the pa t h t o be f o l l o w e d by K a r l Marx, t h e n a young man of t w e n t y - t h r e e , and h i s f r i e n d and c o l l a b o r a t o r , F r e d e r i c k E n g e l s . Of t h i s E n g e l s s a y s : "Then came Feuerbach's "Wesen des C h r i s t e n t h u m s . " W i t h one blow i t c u t the c o n t r a d -i c t i o n , i n t h a t i t p l a c e d m a t e r i a l i s m on the t h r o n e a g a i n w i t h o u t any c i r c u m l o c u t i o n . N a t u r e e x i s t s i n d e p e n d e n t l y of a l l p h i l o s o p h i e s . I t i s the f o u n d a t i o n upon which we, o u r s e l v e s p r o d u c t s of n a t u r e , a r e b u i l t . O u t s i d e man and n a t u r e n o t h i n g e x i s t s , and the h i g h e r b e i n g s which our r e l i g i o u s f a n t a s i e s have c r e a t e d a re o n l y the f a n t a s t i c r e f l e c t i o n s o f our i n d i v -u a l i t y . The c o r d was broken, the system was s h a t t e r e d and d e s t r o y e d , the c o n t r a d i c t i o n , s i n c e i t o n l y e x i s t e d i n t h e i m a g i n a t i o n , was s o l v e d . One must have e x p e r i e n c e d the d e l i v e r -i n g power of t h i s book to g e t a c l e a r i d e a of i t . The enthus-i a s m was u n i v e r s a l . We were a l l f o r the moment f o l l o w e r s o f Feuerba c h . How e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y Marx g r e e t e d the new i d e a and how much he was i n f l u e n c e d by i t , i n s p i t e o f a l l h i s c r i t i c a l 1. Feuerbach, p.93. 57 1 r e s e r v a t i o n s , one may r e a d i n t h e "Holy F a m i l y . " I n t h i s book, (Die H e i l i g e F a m i l i e , G-egen Bruno Bauer und K o n s o r t e n ) p u b l i s h e d a t F r a n k f o r t i n 1845, Marx f r e e l y c r i t i c i z e s t h e Young H e g e l i a n s , from whom he q u i t e d e f i n i t e l y s e p a r a t e s h i m s e l f . H e n c e f o r t h he w i l l d e v e l o p and c l a r i f y h i s 2 own p o s i t i o n w h i c h i s not y e t , by any means, c l e a r and d i s t i n c t . Marx i s now, 1844-5, i n P a r i s where he makes a number of i m p o r t a n t c o n t a c t s , H e i n r i c h H e i n e , F r i e d r i c h E n g e l s , and P i e r r e J o s e p h Proudhon (1809-1865). Proudhon had a l r e a d y , i n h i s "What i s P r o p e r t y ? " p u b l i s h e d i n 1840, used the H e g e l i a n f o r m u l a but i n a v e r y a m a t e u r i s h manner, as Marx proved i n h i s " l a Mis"ere de l a P h i l o s o p h i e . " The w r i t i n g of t h i s book, i n answer t o P r o u d h o n T s " P h i l o s o p h i e de l a M i s e r e " w h i c h had j u s t appeared, "gave him the o p p o r t u n i t y o f d e v e l o p i n g h i s p r i n c i p l e s i n opposing them to the i d e a s of the man who from then was t o take a p r e p o n d e r a t i n g p l a c e among the F r e n c h S o c i a l i s t s of h i s 3 epoch." 1. E n g e l s , F., "Feuerbach," op. c i t . , p.53. 2. The H o l y F a m i l y has never been t r a n s l a t e d i n t o E n g l i s h , w i t h the e x c e p t i o n of a s i n g l e c h a p t e r , t r a n s l a t e d by S i d n e y Hook, which may be found i n the "Modern M o n t h l y " f o r September 1933. I t i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f the younger s c h o o l of M a r x i a n " a c t i v i s t s " t h a t they quote f r e e l y from t h i s book and o t h e r , s h a l l we say, j u v e n i l i a of Marx. "Je c r o i s que pour une p l e i n e i n t e l l i g e n c e du systeme de Marx, l a l e c t u r e de l a " S a i n t e F a m i l i e " e s t i n d i s p e n s a b l e . " A r t u r o L a b r i o l a , l e Marxisme, p.76. 3. E n g e l s ' p r e f a c e t o the " P o v e r t y o f P h i l o s o p h y " by K a r l Marx, t r a n s l a t e d by H. QueIch, ( C h i c a g o , C H . K e r r , 1910) p.9. However much Marx may have owed to Proudhon - a disputed point - there can be no doubt that h i s controversy with him did much to c l a r i f y Marx's own pos i t i o n . With the "Communist Manifesto," published i n February of 1848, h i s doctrine becomes d e f i n i t i v e . Marx now stands apart. things, at the same time also, the recognition of the negation of that state, of i t s inevitable breaking up; because i t regards every h i s t o r i c a l l y developed form as i n f l u i d movement, and therefore takes into account i t s transient nature not l e s s than i t s momentary existence; because i t l e t s nothing impose 1 upon i t , and i s i n i t s essence c r i t i c a l and revolutionary." Before writing the above Marx had just quoted, with apparently, f u l l endorsement, a Russian reviewer who had said: "Consequently Marx only troubles himself about one thing; to show, by r i g i d s c i e n t i f i c investigation, the necessity of successive determinate orders of s o c i a l conditions, and to establish, as i m p a r t i a l l y as possible, the f a c t s that serve him f o r fundamental s t a r t i n g points. For t h i s i t i s quite enough, i f he proves, at the same time, both the necessity of the present order of things, and the necessity of another order into which the f i r s t must i n e v i t a b l y pass over; and t h i s a l l the same, whether men believe i t or do not believe i t , whether they are conscious or unconscious of i t . Marx treats the s o c i a l movement as a process of natural history, governed by laws not only independent of human w i l l , consciousness and i n t e l l i g e n c e , but rather, on the contrary, determining that w i l l , conscious-2 ness and i n t e l l i g e n c e . " Now, t h i s was written i n 1873 and may be taken to be Marx' considered and mature opinion. T h i r t y years e a r l i e r -to be exact, i n 1845 - he had written i n "Die Deutsche Ideologic 1. Marx, " C a p i t a l , " (CH. Kerr, 1906, Chicago) Preface to second ed. p.25. 2. Ibid., p.23. "Social structure and the State constantly a r i s e out of the processes of existence of d e f i n i t e people: of people not as they may appear i n th e i r own or another's imagination, but as they r e a l l y are, that i s to say, as they work, as they produce material things, i n short, as they act under determinate material l i m i t a t i o n s , premises and conditions - fac t o r s indep-endent of t h e i r w i l l s Consciousness can never be anything else but conscious being, and men's being i s t h e i r actual process of existence. Consciousness does not determine l i f e 1 but l i f e determines consciousness. S i m i l a r l y , i n the "Poverty of Philosophy," written i n 1846-7, we f i n d him saying: "The same men who e s t a b l i s h s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s conformably with t h e i r material productivity, produce also the p r i n c i p l e s , the ideas, the categories, conform-ably with t h e i r s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s . Thus these ideas, these categories, are not more eternal than the r e l a t i o n s which they express. They are h i s t o r i c a l and t r a n s i t o r y products. There i s a continual movement of growth i n the productive forces, of destruction i n the s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s , of formation of ideas; there i s nothing immutable but the abstraction of the movement -2 mors immortalis." In the "Communist Manifesto," written towards the end of 1847, we f i n d the same doctrine, i m p l i c i t throughout, but e x p l i c i t i n such statements as t h i s : "When people speak of ideas that revolutionize society, they do but express the f a c t , that within the old society, the elements of a new one have 1. Marx and Engels, "Die Deutsche Ideologic," Translation i n Labor Monthly of March, 1933. 2. Marx, "Poverty of Philosophy," (C.H.Kerr, 1910,Chicago) p.119. 62 been created, and that the d i s s o l u t i o n of the old ideas keeps even pace with the d i s s o l u t i o n of the old conditions o f 1 existence." 2 So also i n "Wage-labor and C a p i t a l " and p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the well-known statement which appears i n the preface of the "Critique of P o l i t i c a l Economy" published i n 1859. "The sum t o t a l of the r e l a t i o n s of production constitutes the economic structure of society - the r e a l foundations, on which r i s e l e g a l and p o l i t i c a l superstructures and to which correspond d e f i n i t e forms of s o c i a l consciousness. The mode of production i n material l i f e determines the general character of the s o c i a l , p o l i t i c a l and s p i r i t u a l processes of l i f e . It i s not the consciousness of men that determines t h e i r existence, but, on the contrary, t h e i r s o c i a l existence determines t h e i r conscious-ness. ... t h i s consciousness must rather be explained from the contradictions of material l i f e , from the e x i s t i n g c o n f l i c t between the s o c i a l forces of production and the r e l a t i o n s of 3 production." Prom a l l of which I gather that the body of doctrine here presented was consistently maintained during the period of Marx' active l i f e . Marx seems to postulate: F i r s t l y , that the physical world e x i s t s independently of our Knowledge, but i s capable of being known. Secondly, that the m u l t i p l i c i t y of objects which go 1. Marx and Engels, "The Communist Manifesto," (The Whitehead Estate, Vancouver, 1918, p.38. ) 2. Marx, "Wage-labor and C a p i t a l , " (The Whitehead Estate, Vancouver, 1919, p.21 et passim.) 3. Marx, "The Cri t i q u e of Pol.Econ." (C.H.Kerr, Chicago 1913, p.11.) 63 to make up t h i s world form a system of interconnected things i n a state of continual f l u x ; a process which, controlled hy immanent laws, i s d i a l e c t i c i n i t s nature. Thirdly, that men, i n the acts i n c i d e n t a l to l i v i n g , come to know and react upon r e a l i t y , of which they form a part. Fourthly, that the r e l a t i o n s of production, imposed hy the conditions under which menvmake the i r l i v i n g , determine the s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n a l structure. F i f t h l y , since both men and t h e i r thinking are cond-it i o n e d by the natural and s o c i a l environment each plane of development generates a corresponding ideology. There i s thus an objective order conceived to be i n a state of d i a l e c t i c a l f l u x , and a subjective ideology or s o c i a l consciousness which r e f l e c t s more or l e s s accurately the objective process. It i s important to notice that i t i s the s o c i a l ideology that i s stressed here, since only thus can the causal nexus be established. As Engels says: "Men make th e i r own history i n that each follows h i s own desired ends indepen-dent of re s u l t s , and the results of these many w i l l s acting i n d i f f e r e n t directions and the i r manifold e f f e c t s upon the world constitute h i s t o r y . .... In the majority of instances the numerous desired ends cross and int e r f e r e with each other, and either these ends are u t t e r l y incapable of r e a l i z a t i o n , or the means are i n e f f e c t u a l . So, the innumerable c o n f l i c t s of i n d i v i d u a l w i l l s and i n d i v i d u a l agents i n the realm of histo r y reach a conclusion which i s on the whole analogous to that i n the realm of nature, which i s without d e f i n i t e purpose. The ends of the actions are intended, hut the r e s u l t s which follow from the actions are not intended, or i n so f a r as they appear to correspond with the end desired, i n t h e i r f i n a l r e s u l t s are quite d i f f e r e n t from the conclusion wished. H i s t o r i c a l events i n t h e i r e n t i r e t y therefore appear to be likewise controlled by chance. But even where according to s u p e r f i c i a l observation, accident plays a part, i t i s , as a matter of f a c t , consistently governed by unseen, i n t e r n a l laws, and the only question remaining, therefore i s to discover these 1 laws." "For Marx," says Sydney Hook, "the motives which guide i n d i v i d u a l men are quite various. And i t i s only the rare i n d i v i d u a l who knows what h i s motives r e a l l y are. But Marx i s not i n the least concerned with the motives of i n d i v i d u a l s as such except i n so f a r as they t y p i f y a s o c i a l or class a t t i t u d e . His problem i s to explain why certain i d e a l s p r e v a i l at one period rather than at another; and to discover what factors 2 determine the succession of ideals f o r which men l i v e and die." From a l l t h i s i t would follow that i n society events are brought about by means of the human w i l l , since a l l such changes must go through the human mind, but they do not o r i g i n -ate there; the i n d i v i d u a l man i s subject to an unconscious natural process which i s the product of the i n d i v i d u a l w i l l s . 1. Engels, F., "Fenierbach," op. c i t . , p.104-105. Cf. also Marx, "The Eighteenth Brumaire," (International Publishing Co., Hew York, 1898, p.5.) 2. Hook, Sydney,"Towards the Understanding of K a r l Marx," (John Day Co., Hew York, 1933, p.149.) Further, once a certain s o c i a l r e s u l t of the i n d i v i d u a l w i l l s has been obtained, t h i s s o c i a l r e s u l t determines the conduct of the i n d i v i d u a l . " I t may be said," says Bukharin, "that the s o c i a l product ( s o c i a l phenomenon) dominates the persons. Thus we may set up the following laws: 1. Social phenomena are the resultant of the c o n f l i c t of i n d i v i d u a l w i l l s , f e e lings, actions etc. 2. Social phenomena determine at any given moment the w i l l of the various i n d i v i d u a l s . 3. Social phenomena do not express the w i l l of i n d i v i d u a l persons, but frequently are a direct contradiction of t h i s w i l l ; they p r e v a i l over i t by force, .with the r e s u l t that the i n d i v i d u a l 1 often f e e l s the pressure of s o c i a l forces on h i s actions." There i s thus a h i s t o r y of ideas; a continuous process of development i n the subjective order of things, but t h i s does not consist i n the "vicious c i r c l e of ideas that explain them-2 selves." We must r i s e from the thing to the idea. "The o r i g i n , change, and destruction of the associat-ion of ideas, under the influence of the o r i g i n , change and destruction of s o c i a l forces, to a predominant extent explain 3 the h i s t o r y of ideology." And since these s o c i a l forces have already been described as the material forces of production, any change i n 1. Bukharin, U., " H i s t o r i c a l Materialism," (International Publishing Co., New York, 1925, p.40.) 2. l a b r i o l a , Ant., "The M a t e r i a l i s t Conception of History," ( C H . Kerr, Chicago, 1904, p.219. 3. Plekhanoy, G.V., " C r i t i c i s m of our C r i t i c s , " p.333. Quoted by BukhaTin, op. c i t . , p.242. t h e i r form must aris e from some variable factor either i n t h e i r operation or i n objective nature. Now, i t has been suggested that such material factors as race, geographical s i t u a t i o n , or climate may be operative. So they are, no doubt, but they are constant, or r e l a t i v e l y so, and merely form that constant environment i n which any given society develops. When Marx i n s i s t s on the economic factor i t i s not f o r any a r b i t r a r y reason or preconception, but because i t i s the only material factor which changes, and changes at a rate adequate to account for the observed e f f e c t . "Material culture i n changing causes other s o c i a l changes i n what we have defined as adaptive culture. But frequently there i s a delay i n the changes thus caused, so that the old adaptive culture hangs over into the new material conditions. This lag i n the adaptive culture produces a period of maladjustment, which i s l e s s harmonious as an adaptation than the period which precedes or follows. ... The great size of material culture to-day, i t s r a p i d i t y of change, and i t s significance as a source of other changes i n society make the material culture i n modern society play a most important part. Since lags i n s o c i a l movements follow changes i n material culture, and since there are many rapid changes i n material culture, i t follows that there w i l l be an accumulation of these lags and malajustments If the material culture should continue to accumulate and change with increasing r a p i d i t y , i t would seem that the c u l t u r a l lags w i l l p i l e up even more than at the present time. ... It i s thinkable that the p i l i n g up of these c u l t u r a l lags may reach such a point that they may he changed i n a somewhat wholesale fashion. In such a 1 case, the word revolution probably describes what happens." Now, the contradictions which thus develop i n the s o c i a l f a b r i c press for a solution since the system cannot endure a permanent disequilibrium. The restoration of s o c i a l equilibrium may proceed i n either of two ways: there may be a gradual adaptation of the various elements i n the s o c i a l whole by an evolutionary process, or there may be a v i o l e n t upheaval, a revolution. "At a certain stage of t h e i r development, the material forces of production i n society come In c o n f l i c t with the e x i s t -ing r e l a t i o n s i n production, or - what i s but a l e g a l expression for the same thing - with the property r e l a t i o n s within which they had been at work before. Prom forms of development of the forces of production these r e l a t i o n s turn into t h e i r f e t t e r s . Then comes the period of s o c i a l revolution. With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure i s more or l e s s r a p i d l y transformed. In considering such transformations, the d i s t i n c t i o n should always be made between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production which can be determined with the p r e c i s i o n of natural science, and the l e g a l , p o l i t i c a l , r e l i g i o u s , esthetic or philosophic - i n short, i d e o l o g i c a l - forms i n which men 1. Ogburn, W.F., " S o c i a l Change," (Huebseh, New York, 1922, p.279.) Cf. also A.D. Lindsay, "Karl Marx C a p i t a l , " (Oxford University Press, london, 1925, p.22.) 1 become conscious of t h i s c o n f l i c t and f i g h t i t out." From t h i s i t would appear that Marx conceived of revolution as intervening only when the equilibrium between the productive forces of society and the foundations of i t s economic structure i s disturbed; thus necessitating a t r a n s i t -ion from one form to another. But so long as the economic structure s t i l l permits the productive forces to evolve, the s o c i a l changes w i l l not take the form of revolution, but w i l l be brought about i n a more or l e s s orderly manner by an evolut-ionary process. To be sure t h i s solution may be delayed by the opposition of vested i n t e r e s t s , the dead weight of custom, or just ordinary conservatism. It i s only when the readjustment involves the transfer of class property i n the means of product-ion that revolution becomes imminent. It i s thus that i n any society i n which groups of people stand i n d e f i n i t e r e l a t i o n s to the means of production, such as ownership or control, that these s o c i a l contradictions manifest themselves and become acute As the methods of wealth production develop c o n f l i c t i n g class ideologies are generated which express themselves p o l i t i c a l l y as Toryism, l i b e r a l i s m , Socialism or whatnot, a l l of which imply some d e f i n i t e attitude i n respect of the means of l i f e . For Marx "the h i s t o r y of a l l hitherto e x i s t i n g society i s the 2 h i s t o r y of class struggles." 1. Marx, K., " C r i t i q u e , " op. c i t . , p.12. 2. Marx, K., "Communist Manifesto," op. c i t . , p.10. 69 There i s nothing a r b i t r a r y or accidental i n this development. "No s o c i a l order ever disappears before a l l the productive forces, for which there i s room i n i t , have been developed; and new higher r e l a t i o n s of production never appear before the material conditions of t h e i r existence have matured i n the womb of the old society. Therefore, mankind only takes up such problems as i t can solve; since, looking at the matter more closely, we w i l l always f i n d that the problem i t s e l f a r i s es only when the material conditions necessary for i t s 1 solution already exist or are i n process of formation." In a l l of thi s i t i s held that the i n i t i a t i v e l i e s with the material or objective factor though, to be sure, since the category involved i s not that of "cause and e f f e c t " but rather that of "action and reaction," man reacts upon nature, u t i l i z e s her resources and forces, and reshapes h i s s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s to meet changing conditions. Now, since the mind, or consciousness, here involved i s either the i n d i v i d u a l or group mind, both of which come well within the province of science, of s o c i a l psychology, and are purely empirical i n the i r nature, i t does not appear that there i s anything i n t h i s doctrine to which an objective i d e a l i s t could very well object. Many Marxian students have so held. Hegel himself would seem to agree: "Philosophy, as the thought 1. Marx, K., "C r i t i q u e , " op. c i t . , p.13. 2. Cf. B e l f o r t Bax, "Ethics of Socialism," also B. Croce, " H i s t o r i c a l Materialism," p.82. Also T.B.H. Brameld, "A Philosophic Approach to Communism, (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1933, p.57). 70 of the world, does not appear u n t i l r e a l i t y has completed i t s formative process, and made i t s e l f ready. History thus corroborates the teaching of the conception that only i n the maturity of r e a l i t y does the i d e a l appear as counterpart of the r e a l , apprehends the r e a l world i n i t s substance, and shapes 1 i t into an i n t e l l e c t u a l Kingdom." It was t h i s insistence on the p r i o r i t y and predomin-ance of the material factor and h i s protest against the p r e v a i l -ing tendency to seek the motive factors i n society i n human concepts and ideals which caused Marx to reject an idealism which could be made to support an " i d e a l i s t i c " attitude towards 2 the facts of l i f e . 1. Hegel, "The Philosophy of Right," p.xxx. 2. "In human society thought or r e f l e c t i o n enters i n as a factor, l i f t i n g i t above the merely natural organism, and so perhaps we may look at the nature of thought i n order to f i n d out the way i n which society progresses. On every subject we think about we begin with some rough opinion, either received from others or the r e s u l t of hasty observation. I f we go on to think about t h i s opinion, we have to question i t , to examine i t , and unless we come to a s t a n d s t i l l at the stage of doubt or c r i t i c i s m , we go on'to form some more adequate opinion, which may indeed be only the old opinion i n a better form or may be something very d i f f e r e n t . But t h i s new opinion may i n i t s turn be questioned i n order to be corrected, and soon, f o r the truth always proves i t s e l f more complex than at f i r s t appeared: and, unless we l a z i l y acquiesce i n dogmatic solutions, we cannot cease from the labor of thinking. It might indeed be more prudent to avoid mentioning Hegel's name; but t h i s very commonplace process i s his " d i a l e c t i c method" i n i t s simplest and most f a m i l i a r form. This "advance by negation" i s the way we think about everything. And i f we apply t h i s d i a l e c t i c method to society, what does i t suggest? That we cannot rest i n the c r i t i c a l or negative stage of modern individualism. But does that mean a return to the medieval type of society? to "the good old days" of a r i s t o c r a t i c and e c c l e s i a s t i c a l dominat-ion? By no means. It implies an advance to a stage i n which a l l that i s most precious i n individualism must be retained along with the s t a b i l i t y of s o c i a l condition which individualism has destroyed. And t h i s new stage can best be described as "Socialism." Hitchie, David E., "Darwinism and P o l i t i c s , " Humboldt e d i t i o n 1890, p.87. 71 But, f o r Marx, the objective and subjective orders are not only co-related and i n t e r a c t i v e , they are, since they are d i a l e c t i c a l l y a n t i t h e t i c , bound together as constituent elements of the s o c i a l movement. While, therefore, the objective factor i s fundamental and has p r i o r i t y , s o c i a l change cannot be brought about i n the absence of a f e l t need for change. We may go further and assert, on Marxian p r i n c i p l e s , that adjust-ments only take place when the s o c i a l organism w i l l no longer function i n respect of the required service. Changes are effected, not so much because they are desirable i n themselves, but because they are necessary. Men do, not what they would, but what they must. In the Manifesto Marx says: "And here i t becomes evident, that the bourgeoisie i s u n f i t any longer to be the r u l i n g class i n society, and to impose i t s conditions of e x i s t -ence upon society as an over-riding law. It i s un f i t to r u l e , because i t i s incompetent to assure an existence to i t s slave within h i s slavery, because i t cannot help l e t t i n g him sink into such a state that i t has to feed him, instead of being fed by him. Society can no longer l i v e under th i s bourgeoisie, i n 1 other words, i t s existence i s no longer compatible with society." It i s for t h i s reason that the Marxists have always rested t h e i r case not on the d e s i r a b i l i t y of socialism but on 2 the " i n e v i t a b l e " break-down of the e x i s t i n g order. 1. Marx, K., "Communist Manifesto," op. c i t . , p.27. 2. Veblen holds that " i t may well be that t h e i r t r a i n i n g i n subservience to t h e i r employers w i l l bring them (the workers;) again to r e a l i z e the equity and excellence of the established system of subjection and unequal d i s t r i b u t i o n of wealth." (op.cit. p.441) Marx, however, would answer: "But i n order to oppress a class, certain conditions must be assured to i t under which i t can, at l e a s t , continue i t s s l a v i s h existence." Manifesto p.26, Wow, although i t i s true that i n the year 1847 Europe was going through a period of severe depression, to be followed by a series of r e v o l t s i n several countries, i t i s also-true that these p o l i t i c a l disturbances served to extend middle-class power i n those countries; while the c a p i t a l i s t world, under the impetus of the great s c i e n t i f i c and technological discoveries of the time swept forward into a period of tremendous expansion. Capitalism had by no means exhausted i t s p o s s i b i l i t i e s . Under these circumstances the revolution became the a f f a i r of a more or l e s s distant future; a sort of " f i n a l aim" which would be . approached by a whole series of gradual changes i n the mutual re l a t i o n s of s o c i a l classes. Obviously, the only thing the s o c i a l i s t s could do was to contribute to the gradual changes and worx f o r reforms. A minority of Marxists were addicted to the practice of keeping up a continuous c r i t i c i s m of both reforms and reformers and were, therefore, generally referred to as " i m p o s s i b i l i s t s . " It was not that they objected to the reforms as such but they disapproved of the reformers whom they stigmatized as "Utopians - which, as a matter of f a c t , they were. This, of course, r e f e r s more p a r t i c u l a r l y to England and America. In Germany the movement was i n i t i a t e d under Marxian auspices and was committed to the Marxian doctrine. In practice however, i t could do no other and p r a c t i c a l l y l e f t i t to the " s c i e n t i f i c laws of s o c i a l evolution" to bring about socialism while they busied themselves with e l e c t o r a l and s o c i a l reforms. And so, i n due time, the Social-democracy, each section i n i t s 1 own country - came to support the i m p e r i a l i s t i c world war and, even, to denounce the Russian revol u t i o n on the ground that Russia had not undergone the necessary c a p i t a l i s t i c development The Marxian doctrine as i t was held during the greater part of the pre-war period may be summed up as follows: 2 1. The s o c i a l revolution cannot be made at w i l l . 2. The s o c i a l revolution comes as the culminating point of a long-drawn-out class-struggle. 3. This class-struggle i s not created by class-conscious-ness: on the other hand, class-consciousness i s created by the class-struggle. 4. The workers must continually fight for t h e i r d a i l y demands; anything gained i n t h i s f i g h t , whether p o l i t i c a l or s o c i a l reforms, strengthens the workers i n t h e i r f i g h t against capitalism. 5. Socialism cannot be established before capitalism has developed a l l i t s p o s s i b i l i t i e s though i t may be "penetrated" by socialism to some extent. 6. The s o c i a l revolution w i l l be the mass-action of the majority of the workers and cannot be the act of a conspiracy by a revolutionary minority. 1. Cf. Rosa Luxemburg, "The C r i s i s i n the German S o c i a l -Democracy (The Junius pamphlet) New York, Soc. Pub. S o c , 1919. 2. "To set about to make a revolution i s f o l l y , .... and i t i s equally f o o l i s h to attempt to repress a revolution which has once developed i t s e l f i n the womb of a community.n F. L a s s a l l e , "Arbeiter-Programm" (New York, International Publishing Co., 1899, p.24.) 74 7. The f i r s t act i n the s o c i a l revolution i s the conquest of p o l i t i c a l power, the inauguration of the p r o l e t a r i a n dictatorship, although t h i s dictatorship i s nothing else than the p o l i t i c a l rule of the working-class, i . e . , the majority of the population. To he sure the rank and f i l e of the German or any other pre-war S o c i a l i s t party did not concern themselves overmuch with the n i c e t i e s of Marxian doctrine; they did the things they had to do and the party pundits r a t i o n a l i z e d them afterwards i n Marxian terminology f o r t i f i e d with appropriate quotations. But a l l t h i s accommodation, coupled with the adjustments necessitated by the exigencies of the b i t t e r controv-ersies which raged both within and without the movement forced a reconsideration of the main philosophical basis. It was seen that the concept of a d i a l e c t i c a l f l u x immanent i n nature and h i s t o r y cannot rest upon a materialism of the baser sort. There was thus, on the part of the party theoreticians a steady d r i f t back to Kant; not, of course, to Kant himself, but to some form of Neo-Kantianism of the schools of lange, Mach, Avenarius, or K a r l Pearson. This d r i f t , i t may be noted, s t i l l continues and i s a matter of no small concern i n o f f i c i a l c i r c l e s i n Russia. This, however, i s a matter which only became important i n respect of the new orientation of theory imposed by the advent of the Revolution. CHAPTER y-II LENIN Im Anfang war die That. (Goethe) "What, then," says Joseph S t a l i n , " i s Leninism i n i t s l a s t analysis? Leninism i s Marxism i n the epooh of imper-i a l i s m and of the pr o l e t a r i a n revolution, or, to be more exact, Leninism i s the theory and t a c t i c s of the pr o l e t a r i a n revolution i n general, and the theory and t a c t i c s of the dictat o r s h i p of the p r o l e t a r i a t i n p a r t i c u l a r . Marx and Engels worked i n a pre-revolutionary epoch when imperialism was s t i l l i n an embryonic state, when the workers were only preparing for the revolution, when the pr o l e t a r i a n revolution was not yet a di r e c t , p r a c t i c a l necessity. Lenin, the d i s c i p l e of Marx and Engels, worked i n an epoch of expansion of imperialism and development of the pr o l e t a r i a n revolution, an epoch when this revolution, triumphant i n one country, destroyed bourgeois democracy there and ushered i n the era of p r o l e t a r i a n democracy, the era of the S o v i e t s . " From th i s we gather that, i n the opinion of the Lenin i s t s , Capitalism has reached the peak of i t s development and has exhausted a l l the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of expansion; that i t s i n t e r n a l contradictions have assumed an intense form, thus generating a revolutionary p r o l e t a r i a t . 1. S t a l i n , Joseph, "Foundations of Leninism" (International Publishing Co., 1932, p.8.) 75 The impact of the Russian revolution was such as to shatter for the time being the ranks of the Social-Democracy, which, i n spite of the bickerings caused by the left-wing sections that had developed even before the war, s t i l l presented a s o l i d front under the Second International. The o l d - l i n e Marxists, led by K a r l Kautsky, George Plekhanov, Otto Bauer and others assailed the Bolsheviks on the grounds: 1. "That no s o c i a l revolution could be made successfully by an armed minority. 2. That socialism could not be established i n an economic-a l l y undeveloped country. 3. That the Soviet government would not be able to hold 1 out long against the c a p i t a l i s t countries of the world." The communists could, and did, reply to the l a s t item i n the most r e a l i s t i c manner by simply holding out, but i n respect of the others they had to r a t i o n a l i z e the i n f o r m a l i t i e s of the revolution i n Marxian terms as best they might. Hence arose a re-orientation of the entire t h e o r e t i c a l structure of the movement. It was the subjective order of ideas rather than the objective order that was important. A c t i v i t y was opposed to p a s s i v i t y and f a t a l i s m . But since a c t i v i t y i s f r u i t l e s s without d e f i n i t e d i r e c t i o n , correct theory becomes of prime importance. Revolutions do not make themselves; they are made. And they are made well or i l l i n the degree that the participants 1. Kantorovitch, Haim, "The Hise and Decline of Neo-Communism The Modern Quarterly, Baltimore, Spring 1924. 77 have a correct ideology. On the other hand i t i s i n action, i n practice, that knowledge i s discovered and v e r i f i e d . In the seventh gloss on Feuerbach Marx had said: "The l i f e of society i s e s s e n t i a l l y p r a c t i c a l . A l l the mysteries which seduce speculative thought Into mysticism f i n d t h e i r solution 1 inhuman practice and i n concepts of t h i s p r a c t i c e . " And^again i n the second gloss: "The question i f objective truth be possible to human thought i s not a t h e o r e t i c a l but a p r a c t i c a l question; i n practice men must prove the t r u t h The m a t e r i a l i s t i c doctrine that men are the products of conditions and education forgets that circumstances may be altered £ by men and that the educator has himself to be educated." Sidney Hook i s undoubtedly correct when he says: " I t i s f a i t h i n action which makes of Marxism a c r i t i c a l 3 hypothesis, instead of a dead dogma or a romantic myth." But he displays a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c weakness of the Communist l e f t when he adds: "What j u s t i f i e s Marx and Engels i n holding that the mode of economic production i s the decisive factor i n s o c i a l l i f e i s the revolutionary w i l l of the p r o l e t a r i a t 4 which is prepared to act on the assumption." Quite apart from the f a c t that the "revolutionary w i l l " of the p r o l e t a r i a t , however vociferously i t may be expressed by a small minority, manifests i t s e l f only i n a feeble and sporadic manner, we have 1. Engels, F., "Feuerbach," p.; 132. £. Ibid., p.130. 3. Hook, Sidney, "Towards the Understanding of K a r l Marx," p.181. 4. Ibid., p.181. 78 to note that the economic factor i s accepted as decisive by many whose only j u s t i f i c a t i o n would be an appeal to the f a c t s . And t h i s , as a matter of f a c t , i s p r e c i s e l y what Marx and Engels did. S i m i l a r l y Dr. Hook, i n another connection, asserts: "that the truth of Marx's theory of the class-struggle can be establ-ished only i n the experience of s o c i a l revolution, i . e . , a f t e r 1 class society has been overthrown." Now, i t i s true that Marx did i n s i s t on the importance of the category of consciousness, hut he also i n s i s t e d that i t was not self-determined. H i s t o r i c a l and s o c i a l forces stand behind motives of action. It i s a l l very w e l l to protest the determinism and "mechanism" which, was sponsored by the Second International, but the protest may be carried too f a r and i t i s p r e c i s e l y i n t h i s that the " l e f t deviation," as the Russian o f f i c i a l philosophers c a l l i t , c o n s i s t s . Already i n 1909 Lenin had denounced pragmatism of this sort, "which recognizes practice as the only c r i t e r i o n of 2 truth," as being "reactionary bourgeois philosophy." He does so because i t obscures, or denies, the d i a l e c t i c process. It i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of such unstable combinations as D i a l e c t i c a l Materialism that their components tend to d r i f t apart. We have already noted that the doctrinaires of the Social Democracy attempted to f i n d a more secure basis for the d i a l e c t i c i n some form of Neo-Kantianism. lenin's remarkable work, "Empiro-Criticism," was expressly directed against t h i s 1. Hook, Sidney, op. c i t . , p.248. 2. le n i n , H., "Materialism and Empirio-Criticism," International Publishers, Hew York, 1927, p.296. 79 deviation, this time to the r i g h t , and i n i t he b i t t e r l y attacks the Revisionists and other S o c i a l i s t theorists who accepted the views of Mach, Avenarius and Pearson, l e n i n here i n s i s t s on a return to Materialism and that of the crudest v a r i e t y . "Such," he says, " i s the view of materialism; that matter, acting on our sense organs, produces sensation. Sensation depends upon the brain, nerves, r e t i n a , etc.; upon matter organized i n a c e r t a i n way. The existence of matter does not depend upon sensation. Matter i s of a primary nature. Sensat-ion, thought and consciousness are the highest products of 1 matter organized i n a c e r t a i n manner." long before D THolbach had said as much: "Since man, who i s matter, who has no idea but of matter, enjoys the faculty of thought, matter can think; that i s , i t i s susceptible of that p a r t i c u l a r modification 2 c a l l e d thought." So too Haeckel, whom Lenin quotes approvingly, asserts that: "Knowledge i s a phy s i o l o g i c a l process, with the 3 brain for i t s anatomical organ." So also i n his epistemology i s he si n g u l a r l y naive and matter of f a c t . For example, he holds: 1. "Things exist independently of our consciousness. 2. There i s absolutely no difference between the phenomenon and the t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f , and there can be none. The difference i s only between what i s known and what i s not yet known. 1. Lenin, B"., op. c i t . , p.34. 2. D'HLolbach, "System of Nature," p.63. 3. Lenin, N., op. c i t . , p.305. 80 3. In the theory of knowledge, as i n other branches of science, we must think d i a l e c t i c a l l y , that i s , we must not regard our knowledge as ready made and unchangeable, but must determine how from ignorance knowledge i s gradually b u i l t up, and how incomplete, inexact knowledge becomes more complete 1 and more exact." And again: "The recognition of the f a c t of natural order and the approximate r e f l e c t i o n of that order i n the mind 2 of man is materialism." To support this p o s i t i o n l e n i n appeals, i n the f i r s t place, to common-sense: "The naive b e l i e f of mankind i s consciously taken by materialism as the basis of i t s theory 3 of knowledge." Secondly: "The s c i e n t i s t s recognize without h e s i t a t i o n the existence of nature prior to man and organic 4 matter." The authority of Engels, however, i s conclusive. "Row do we know that our senses give us correct representations of the objects we perceive through them? .... human action had solved the d i f f i c u l t y long before human ingenuity invented i t . The proof of the pudding i s i n the eating. From the moment we turn to our own use these objects, according to the q u a l i t i e s we perceive i n them, we put to an i n f a l l i b l e test the correctness 5 or otherwise of our sense-perceptions." Now a l l this i s not very conclusive and r e a l l y evades the main issue so f a r as philosophy i s concerned. Nor i s the 1. Lenin, N., op. c i t . , p.77. 2. Ibid., p.125. 3. " p. 47. 4. " p.221. 5. Engels,F., "Socialism, Utopian and S c i e n t i f i c , " p.XV. matter mended i n a more recent statement which: has, however, the merit of being at once l u c i d and concise: "Matter i s a permanent process of t r a n s i t i o n i n which organic and inorganic; consciousness and inconsciousness, l i v i n g and non-living beget progressively an i n f i n i t e succession of transformation of themselves and th e i r own in t e r a c t i o n s . Hence the process i s 1 both material and d i a l e c t i c . " From the point of view of any modern philosophy such a p o s i t i o n i s unthinkable. And so the Soviet philosophers kept 2 d r i f t i n g off, one way or the other, mostly to the " r i g h t . " This, i t appears, one might do i n either of two ways. One might be a "mechanicist," that i s , one of the o l d - l i n e material-i s t s who ignored the d i a l e c t i c ; or one might be an " i d e a l i s t " and opposed to materialism. In either case one was suspect since both of these trends of thought had bourgeois or petty bourgeois a f f i l i a t i o n s , and, i n any case, the "general l i n e " of the o f f i c i a l philosophy required a b e l i e f i n d i a l e c t i c a l materialism i n i t s i n t e g r i t y . Now the Soviet regime had inherited from the old order many s p e c i a l i s t s and s c i e n t i f i c workers comprising the s t a f f s of the c u l t u r a l i n s t i t u t i o n s of the country. "Cultural work i n a l l f i e l d s , " says Prince Mirsky," i n so far as i t was not a dire c t part of the p o l i t i c a l and administrative work of the Party was carried on by i n t e l l e c t u a l s who, though many of them were l o y a l to the p r o l e t a r i a t , were e s s e n t i a l l y part and parcel 1. Jackson, T.A., " D i a l e c t i c a l Materialism," The Labour Monthly, London, August 1933. 2. The d i s t i n c t i o n here has a p o l i t i c a l rather than a philo s o p h i c a l si g n i f i c a n c e . of the old bourgeois world. Many of these had joined the Communist Party i n good f a i t h but, for the most part, they remained "mechanicists" c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y averse to a l l p h i l o s -ophy l i k e a l l the rank and f i l e of bourgeois s c i e n t i s t s . Their slogan was 'Science i s i t s own philosophy. 1 Subjectively they were good communists and honest m a t e r i a l i s t s , but their adherence to the unphilosophical and antiquated mechanistic outlook of the 19th century and t h e i r contempt for philosophical t r a i n i n g made them objectively i d e o l o g i c a l wreckers i n so f a r as they t r i e d to deprive the p r o l e t a r i a t of such a powerful weapon as the d i a l e c t i c a l method. Their inadequate philosophical equip-ment prevented them from r e a l i s i n g the p o l i t i c a l implications of t h e i r mechanistic theory and i t s es s e n t i a l i d e n t i t y with the mechanistic and a n t i - d i a l e c t i c a l pseudo-Marxism of Bukharin, which by the beginning of the period of reconstruction had 1 become the t h e o r e t i c a l gospel of the Right Wing. S t i l l more serious was the deviation represented by the followers of one A.M. Deborin, evidently a man of parts, editor of the review "Under the Banner of Marxism" which had been founded i n 1922 as the organ of Soviet philosophy. This coterie soon became dominant as i t included most of those engaged i n teaching philosophy i n the c u l t u r a l centres throughout the Union. Now, Dehorin and his group, as representing the o f f i c i a l attitude, had conducted an active controversy with, the mechanicists, but i n so doing had unduly stressed the d i a l e c t i c as d i s t i n c t from Materialism and had adopted an u n c r i t i c a l 1. Mirsky, D.S., "The Philosophical Discussion i n the C.P.S.U. i n 1930-31." (The labor Monthly, London, October 1931) attitude towards Hegel and idealism generally. The Dehorin group had gone too f a r i n their opposition to mechanicism and were now themselves the object of attack on the ground that they had reduced d i a l e c t i c a l materialism to "a d i a l e c t i c a l scholasticism that was devoid of material content and was thus 1 v i r t u a l l y i d e a l i s t i c . " I t was S t a l i n himself who raised the question during the great drive of 1929-30. He pointed out that the development of Marxist theory had been lagging behind Communist practice and that i t was high time to take up the slack and indicated that, i n his opinion, " t h i s abstract formalism and neglect of practice were nothing less than a form of idealism, for materialism i s materialism only as long as i t regards abstract categories as one with t h e i r material 1 content and theory as the servant of p r a c t i c e . " The outcome of t h i s controversy was that the e d i t o r i a l board of the review was overhauled and new men i n s t a l l e d who knew how to keep to the "general l i n e " and were possessed of an "unexceptionable l i n e i n p o l i t i c s as well as theory." The director of the Marx-Engels-Ienin I n s t i t u t e , Mr. I. Rudas, informs us as to the manner of attaining to t h i s unexceptionable l i n e : "Whoever, he says, "wants to understand d i a l e c t i c a l materialism must study the whole of Marxism-leninism and then combine t h i s t h e o r e t i c a l study with p r a c t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the revolut-2 ionary proletarian movement." 1. Mirsky, l o c . c i t . , 2. Rudas, 1. " D i a l e c t i c a l Materialism and Communism," i n The Labour Monthly, September, 1933. 84 I t i s ray opinion that M. Rudas, i n spite of h i s dogmatism - and he i s very dogmatic - does not himself understand the d i a l e c t i c . For example he appears to hold that "a synthesis of materialism and idealism would i n f a c t be no synthesis but another of the many vain attempts to reconcile the i r r e c o n c i l a b l e 1 fundamental tendencies of philosophy - materialism and idealism." But i t i s p r e c i s e l y because they are fundamental and i r r e c o n c i l -able that they must be taken up and comprehended i n a synthesis, otherwise the d i a l e c t i c method has no meaning. To deny the p o s s i b i l i t y of a synthesis of matter and mind, of materialism and idealism, i s to assert that two fundamental and s e l f -determined e n t i t i e s exist, that i s , to assert that R e a l i t y i s a Dualism., and Mr. Rudas i n s i s t s he i s a Monist. It i s the f a i l u r e to e f f e c t this synthesis which i s at the root of the whole problem. And so, despite the o f f i c i a l insistence on the "general l i n e , " the Soviet theorists cannot help but d r i f t o f f to one side or the other since the o f f i c i a l attitude imposes on them the impossible task of conceiving matter as endowed with a l l the properties of the Hegelian S p i r i t . 1. Rudas, I., l o c , c i t . , p.642. Cf. also a slashing attack on the above a r t i c l e by Sidney Hook i n the Hew York "Modern Monthly" f o r A p r i l 1934. Hook, of course, exhibits lapses peculiar to h i s own approach. CHAPTER VIII CONCLUSION "And so,"said Hans Kepler,"we think after Him the thoughts of God." "I confess," says Croce, "that I have never been able to understand - however much I have considered the matter the meaning of t h i s passage, (which ought however to be very evident, since i t i s quoted so often without any comment) i n the preface to the second edition of " C a p i t a l " : fMy d i a l e c t i c method i s not only d i f f e r e n t from the Hegelian, but i s i t s direct opposite. To Hegel, the l i f e - p r o c e s s of the human brain, i . e . , the process of thinking, which, under the name of "the Idea," he even transforms into an independent subject, i s the demiurgos of the r e a l world, and the r e a l world i s only the external, phenomenal form of "the Idea." With me, on the contrary, the i d e a l i s nothing else than the material world r e f l e c t e d by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought. 1 Now i t seems to me that the "idea" of the l a s t phrase has no r e l a t i o n to the Hegelian "Idea" of the preceding phrase. Croce i s quite r i g h t ; i t has no r e l a t i o n , or at least no direct r e l a t i o n , since the Idea of Hegel i s the concrete Idea, consciousness-in-general, while that of Marx i s the i n d i v i d u a l or empirical mind. But when Marx thus substituted the empirical f o r the trans-empirical ego he thereby threw the whole question into 1. Croce, B., " H i s t o r i c a l Materialism," p.83. 85 the empirical f i e l d - into the province of science. The structure and functioning of the i n d i v i d u a l mind, of society and of nature i n general are a l l well within the ambit of science. But the d i a l e c t i c , as developed by Hegel, was an a p r i o r i construct, deduced from the conditions of knowledge and had, therefore, transcendental v a l i d i t y . Only thus could we impute to concepts deduced by i t s employment the quality of "necessity" or " i n e v i t a b i l i t y . " Whatever may have been the opinion of Marx on the subject does not appear; i t was Engels, i n t h i s case as i n many others, who drew the necessary conclusions. He frankly adopted the p o s i t i o n that the basis f o r the necessity which he imputed to the Marxian variant of the d i a l e c t i c was s c i e n t i f i c and empirical. "Nature," he says, " i s the proof of d i a l e c t i c s , and i t must be said for modern science that i t has furnished t h i s proof with very r i c h materials increasing d a i l y , and thus has shown that i n the l a s t resort, Nature works d i a l e c t i c a l l y and not metaphysically; that she does not move i n the eternal oneness of a perpetually recurring cycle, but goes through a r e a l 1 h i s t o r i c a l evolution." Now, Hume had, long before, pointed out. that the re s u l t s of empirical observation, being mere "matters of f a c t , " were merely contingent and by no means possessed the quality of necessity or the authority which appertained to the l o g i c a l concept. True, an appeal to Kant would have saved f o r Engels 1. Engels, P., Socialism, "Utopian and S c i e n t i f i c , " p.34. 87 the quality of necessity i n his empirical world but t h i s resource was closed f o r him by his insistence on associating the crude materialism of the French school with his d i a l e c t i c . If , however, we remember that, at the time Engels was writing, science was triumphant ana therefore i n i t s most dogmatic and p o s i t i v i s t i c phase we can well imagine that Engels thought he haa warrant f o r founding the Marxian " i n e v i t a b i l i t y " on scien-t i f i c certainty, that i s , on such necessity as can arise from the causal r e l a t i o n . So much was he impressed by the findings of contemporary science that he describes i t as dealing "the death-blow to the old metaphysics i n the realm of philosophy" and commends i t s method as being "pre-eminently an arranging of knowledge, the science of changes, of the o r i g i n and progress of things, and the mutual connection which binds these changes 1 i n nature into one great whole." The fact seems to be that the s c i e n t i f i c doctrine of evolution, at that time new and s t r i k i n g , was taken by Engels to confirm the Hegelian d i a l e c t i c and e s t a b l i s h i t as the "rhythm of the development of things, 2 i . e . , the inner law of things i n t h e i r development." 1 So too, Engels 1 unqualified acceptance of the w e l l -known statement of Hegel: " A l l that i s re a l i s reasonable, and a l l that i s r a t i o n a l i s r e a l , " (a statement which i s unexcept-ionable taken i n i t s proper setting) coupled with the determin-i s t i c science of the day, no doubt contributed very l a r g e l y to 1. Engels, F., "Feuerbach," op. c i t . , p.99. 2. Croce, B., op. c i t . , p.83. 88 the determinism, acquiescence and fatalism which characterized the Social-democracy under the Second International. For the time being, however, Engels" " i n e v i t a b i l i t y , " even i f i t had only empirical v a l i d i t y , was s u f f i c i e n t l y adequate. Senatore Pareto, even though he denied the ..scientific character of Marxist doctrine, admitted i t s pragmatic usefulness i n providing an i d e o l o g i c a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n for the aspirations 1 of the working c l a s s . Science, however, i n the course of time, grew l e s s sure of he r s e l f . The'Irrefragable laws of Nature" were found to be merely "observed uniformities" having only r e l a t i v e v a l i d i t y . The ultimate e n t i t i e s , matter and force, were found to be much l e s s concrete and tangible than they had been considered and by no means ultimate. The materialism -Naturalism or Positivism - which had served science i n i t s early years was now dissolved i n Agnosticism and s c i e n t i f i c determinism faded into the past. The "pragmatic r e v o l t , " which marked the early years of the present century, under the leadership of James, Dewey and others s t i l l further weakened the e x i s t i n g i n t e l l e c t u a l structures. Science as well as philosophy f e l t the impact of a movement which emphasized pluralism, conditional truth, expediency and " a c t i v i t y . " Thus Georges Sorel could write: "II ne faut pas esperer que l e mouvement revolutionnaire puisse jamais suivre une d i r e c t i o n convenablement determinee d'avance, 1. Novack, Geo. E., "ViIfredo Pareto," New Republic, July 19, 1933. 89 q u ' i l puisse etre conduit suivant un plan savant comme l a conquete d'un pays, q u ' i l puisse etre etudie scientifiquement 1 autrement que dans son present. Tout en l u l est imprevisible." It i s , however, i n America, the cradle of the pragmatio philosophy or, rather, method that we f i n d the clearest expression of t h i s " l e f t deviation" as the Russians would c a l l i t . At the hands of the communist i n t e l l i g e n t s i a , nurtured i n what passes for philosophy i n America, the d i a l e c t i c suffers some strange transformation as witness the acrimonious and generally i l l -informed controversy now raging i n the r a d i c a l press. Dr. Sidney Hook of Hew York has written a book to prove to us that "There are no musts i n history; there are only conditional p r o b a b i l i t -i e s , " and that "Neither God, man nor the economic process guarantees the f i n a l v a l i d i t y and certainty of communism. Only 2 the objective p o s s i b i l i t i e s are given." Further to the l e f t we f i n d Max Eastmam who a f t e r describing "the d i a l e c t i c myth bound up i n s c i e n t i f i c socialism" as a "wish-fulfilment mechan-ism which has a value similar to that sometimes possessed by the C h r i s t i a n Science myth i n the eyes of a neuro-pathologist,-" g^es on to say that "a revolutionary science would study the material world with a view to changing i t according to some 3 p r a c t i c a l plan." It may be said of a l l t h i s , that, whether Eastman believes i t or not, his Utopianism i s also part of a d e f i n i t e s o c i a l response to the exigencies of the socio-economic s i t u a t i o n . . 1. Sorel, Georges, "La Decomposition duMarxisme," (Marcel Riviere, P a r i s , 1907, p.66.) 2. Hook, Sidney, op. c i t . , p.111. 3. Eastman, Max, "Against the Marxian D i a l e c t i c , " The New Republic, February 21, 1934. 90 As a matter of fact the phrase " d i a l e c t i c a l material-ism" i s a contradiction i n terms and the concept f o r which i t stands a philosophical monster. B e l f o r t Bax, who was a philosop-her as well as a competent Marxian scholar, observes: "The Hegelians of the " l e f t " thought they could r e t a i n the method of d i a l e c t i c s apart from metaphysics. But the d i a l e c t i c a l method without metaphysic i s a tree cut away from i t s roots. It has no basis and therefore no j u s t i f i c a t i o n as an instrument of research. Unless we recognize the fact that thought enters into the constitution of r e a l i t y , that r e a l i t y i s nothing other than experience possible and actual, and that the unity of experience and the r a t i o n a l i t y which we fi n d i n the universe, or system of experience, i s deducible i n the l a s t resort from the primal unity of the consciousness, and from the conditions of i t s synthesis - unless we recognize t h i s , where i s our locus standi i n employing the d i a l e c t i c a l method? Or, i n f a c t , where i s our ground for assuming a determinate order i n things at a l l ? The commonest categories must then be inadmissable, and we have no alternative but the Humean po s i t i o n i n i t s most extreme and 1 impossible form." It i s not, be i t noted, that the v a l i d i t y of either factor i n the combination i s i n question. Philosophy, i n the Kantian t r a d i t i o n , has no quarrel with science i n respect of any of i t s findings on the empirical plane, whatever they may be. 1. Bax, B e l f o r t , "Outlooks from the New Standpoint," (Swann Sonnenschein, london, 1893, p!87) We may f r e e l y admit, i f need be, that a l l physical f a c t s or phenomena may be interpreted i n terms of matter and motion and, further, that the i n d i v i d u a l mind presupposes material condit-ions, that i s , that t h i s p a r t i c u l a r mind, now functioning, i s dependent on, and subsists by v i r t u e of, a material, organic body, of which i t may be said to be the function. The i n d i v i d u a l mind necessarily presupposes the whole conditions of experience as given. But, i t i s the object of metaphysics to inquire how they come to be given. And so we f i n d that the "matter" and "mind" of common-sense apprehension are neither of them ultimate w the d i s t i n c t i o n between matter and mind f a l l s within thought or the province of mind - but that both a l i k e owe t h e i r r e a l i t y to the fact that they are experienced, that i s , to t h e i r apprehensibility. This, again, merely means that they are, i n the l a s t resort, the self-determinations or objects of a Subject of that consciousness-in-general the determinations of which comprehend and comprise the universe. It i s t h i s f a c t , that i s , that matter and mind have a common basis, which alone gives the p o s s i b i l i t y of abstract thought. It i s thus that we recognise the "law" reproduced i n our minds as being i d e n t i c a l with the law imbedded i n the "object." In f a c t , our perception of the object i t s e l f i s only possible simply because i t i s "of such s t u f f as we are made o f . w The r e a l i s r a t i o n a l , no doubt, but i s i t a l l r a t i o n a l ? A r i s t o t l e held that Reality was a synthesis of Matter and Form and Kant i n s i s t e d that there was an element of sense as well as r a t i o n a l i t y i n a l l experience. May we not have here the truth 11 of Kant's " t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f ?" For A r i s t o t l e , pure matter equal nothing, but i t i s also pure p o t e n t i a l i t y ; i t i s i n a perpetual process of assuming form; i t i s continually "becoming." Being i s therefore the i n f i n i t e p o s s i b i l i t y of Becoming, and i s , i n some sense, i d e n t i c a l with the " I " which i s not exhausted i n the thought but stands over as the i n f i n i t e p o s s i b i l i t y of thought. " I t i s the Subject for which a l l things mental and material are objects; the Universal one and i n d i v i s i b l e , which includes a l l p a r t i c u l a r s that were, or that are, or that can be." 2 Some such formulation, i t seems to me, would avoid the panlogism of Hegel and h i s school, while i t would meet the objections not only of Croce, Gentile and Bergson but also of the Jamesian pragmatists. We should have an objective idealism which would give Croce and the others t h e i r creative, emergent universe, while the Pragmatists could enjoy i t s "blooming, buzzing confusion" and i n f i n i t e p a r t i c u l a r i t y . There are d i f f i c u l t i e s , of course, but then there are always d i f f i c u l t i e s . The solution of these d i f f i c u l t i e s w i l l , I imagine, have to wait. As B e l f o r t Bax observed, nearly f i f t y years ago: "The immediate future of philosophy, the next formulation of the ultimate worlds-problem of being and knowledge must, we believe, be consequent on the r e a l i z a t i o n of that vast transformation with which the current order i s b i g . 'The republic has no need 1. I am not f o r g e t f u l of the f a c t that Kant would seem to traverse much of t h i s i n the "Transoendental D i a l e c t i c . " But see, however* Caird's "Philosophy of Kant," p.534 f f . Bax, B e l f o r t , "Outlooks from the New Standpoint," p.197. 93 of chemists, 1 Lavoisier was t o l d . Thus with b r u t a l frankness was the truth expressed, that i n periods of great p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l change, Theory, as such, be i t s c i e n t i f i c or philosophical, must cede to the all-absorbing questions of Pr a c t i c e . The student as he lays down t h i s l i t t l e volume, should he by chance take up a newspaper, w i l l i n e v i t a b l y l i g h t on accounts of great s t r i k e s , of armaments, of the struggle for colonies c a l l e d imperial expansion, of vast popular revolutionary movements, a l l of which point to one thing, when followed out i n a l l t h e i r bearings, the steady approach of the great class struggle. Let him ponder on t h i s and bethink himself of the part even he, or i f not he, h i s children, may be forced to take i n the resolution of that great l i v i n g contradiction - the contradiction between i n d i v i d u a l and society - expressed i n what we term Modern 1 C i v i l i z a t i o n . " 1. Bax, Bel f o r t , "History of Philosophy," p.404. BIBLIOGRAPHY Aveling, Edward, The Student's Marx, Swan Sonnensohein & Co., London, 1895. Bax, Ernest B e l f o r t , The History of Philosophy, Geo. B e l l & Sons, london, 1888. The Roots of Reality, Dodge & Company, Hew York, 1908. Outspoken Essays, William Reeves, London, 1897. The Real, The Rational and the A l o g i c a l , The Richards Press, London, 1920. The Ethics of Socialism, Swan Sonnensohein & Co., London, 1893. Outlooks from the Hew Standpoint, Swan Sonnensohein & Co., London, 1893. The Religion of Socialism, Swan Sonnensohein & Co., London, 1896. II Beer, Max, A E i s t o r y of British: Socialism, G. B e l l & Sons, london, 1919. Berdyaev, Nicholas, The End of Our Time, Sheed and Ward, london, 1933. Bonar, James, Philosophy and P o l i t i c a l Economy, Swan Sonnensohein & Company, London, 1898. Boudin, Louis B., The Theoretical System of K a r l Marx, C.E. Kerr & Company, Chicago, 1907. Brameld, T. B *H., A Philosophic Approach to Communism, Chicago University Press, Chicago, 1933. Bukharin, N i k o l a i , H i s t o r i c a l Materialism, International Publishers, New York, 1925. Caird, Edward, Hegel, Blackwood & Son, Edinburgh, 1883. Chang, S.H.M., The Philosophy of Kant, James Maclehose, Glasgow, 1877. The Marxian Theory of the State, John Spencer, Philadelphia, 1931. Croce, Benedetto, H i s t o r i c a l Materialism, D'Holbach, Baron, Dobb, Maurice, Dutt, R. Palme, E l l i o t t , W.Y., Engels, F., Geo. A l l e n & Unwin, london, 1914. What i s l i v i n g and what i s Dead of the Philosophy of Hegel, MacMillan & Company, london, 1915. The System of Nature, E. Truelove, London, 1863. C a p i t a l i s t Enterprise and S o c i a l Progress, Routledge & Sons, London, 1925. On Marxism To-day, Hogarth Press, london, 1932. Marxism a f t e r F i f t y Years, The T r i n i t y Trust, london, 1933. The Pragmatic Revolt i n P o l i t i c s , The MacMillan Company, Hew York, 1928. The Condition of the Working Class i n England i n 1848, Geo. A l l e n & Unwin, London, 1892. P r i n c i p l e s of Communism, Daily Worker Publishing Co., Chicago, 1925. Engels, F., Landmarks of S c i e n t i f i c Socialism, C H . Kerr & Company, Chicago, 1907. Socialism, Utopian & S c i e n t i f i c , Swan Sonnensohein & Company, London, 1892. Fenerbach, C H. Kerr & Company, Chicago, 1903. Foster, William Y., Toward Soviet America, Coward-McCann, Hew York, 1932. Hegel, CW.F., Philosophy of History, C o l l i e r & Son, Hew York, 1901. Philosophy of Right, Geo. B e l l & Sons, London, 1896. The Phenomenology of Mind, Swan Sonnensohein, London, 1910. Hobson, J.A., From Capitalism to Socialism, The Hogarth Press, London, 1932. Hoernle, R.F.A., Idealism, Hodder & Stoughton, London, 1924. 7 Rook, Sidney, Towards the Understanding of K a r l Marx, The John Day Company, New York, 1933. Joad, C.E.M., Modern Philosophy, Oxford University Press, london, 1924. Kantsky, K a r l , Ethics and the M a t e r i a l i s t Conception of History, C H . Kerr & Company, Chicago, 1907. The Class Struggle, C H . Kerr & Company, Chicago, 1910. l a b r i o l a , Antonio, The M a t e r i a l i s t Conception of History, CH. 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K a r l Marx1 C a p i t a l , Oxford University Press, London, 1925. l o r i a , A c M l l e , The Economic Foundations of Society, Swan Sonnensohein & Company, london, 1907. Luxemburg, Rosa, The C r i s i s i n the German S o c i a l -Democracy, The S o c i a l i s t Publishing Society, New York, 1919. MacDonald, J.Ramsay, Parliament and Revolution, National labor Press, Manchester, 1919. McTaggart, J.M.E., Studies i n the Hegelian D i a l e c t i c , Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1896. Marx, Karl, Capital, C H. Kerr & Company, Chicago, 1906. The Critique of P o l i t i c a l Economy, CH. Kerr & Company, Chicago, 1913. Wage-labor and Capital, The Whitehead Estate, Vancouver, N.D. C. 1918. The Poverty of Philosophy, CH. Kerr & Company, Chicago, 1910. Revolution and Counter-Revolution, C H . Kerr & Company, Chicago, 1907. VIII Mirsky, D.S., The Philosophical Discussion i n the C.P.S.D"., labor Monthly, london, October 1931. 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Materiaux d'une Theorie du P r o l e t a r i a t , Marcel Riviere, Paris, 1929. l a Decomposition du Marxism, Marcel Riviere, Paris, 1907. K a r l Marx, B.W. Kuebsch, New York, 1910. The Philosophy of Kegel, MacMillan & Company, London, 1924. Foundations of leninism, International Publishers, New York, 1932. The Secret of Kegel, Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh, 1898. The Coming Struggle f o r Power, V i c t o r Gollancz, London, 1933. Veblen, Thorstein, Volney, M., Wallace, William, Watson, John, The Place of Science i n Modern C i v i l i z a t i o n . B.W. Huebsch, New York, 1919. The Ruins, T. Allman, London, 1842. The Logic of Hegel, The Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1874. The Philosophy of Kant, Maclehose, Jackson & Company, Glasgow, 1923. 

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