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Economic aspects of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1949-1964 Wan, Chi Shun 1990

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ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE SINO-SOVIET ALLIANCE (1949—1964) By Ch i Shun Wan B.A., The U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia,19 81 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY v We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming t o the r e q u i r e d standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA August 1990 © C h i Shun Wan, 1990 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada DE-6 (2/88) ABSTRACT The c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the S i n o - S o v i e t A l l i a n c e have been analyzed e x t e n s i v e l y f o r more than t h r e e decades. However, the economic as p e c t s of t h i s A l l i a n c e remain u n c l e a r . A number of f a c t o r s , such as s t a t i s t i c a l d i s c r e p a n c i e s , complexity of i n t e r -p r e t a t i o n , and the q u a l i t y and r e l i a b i l i t y of the Chinese and S o v i e t sources , are accountable f o r t h i s o b s c u r i t y . A more narrowly focused study examining the r o l e S i n o - S o v i e t economic r e l a t i o n s p l a y e d i n shaping the A l l i a n c e i s u s e f u l t o b e t t e r our understanding. A f t e r a c h r o n o l o g i c a l , review of the S i n o - S o v i e t economic r e l a t i o n s h i p , i t s s i g n i f i c a n c e i n shaping the A l l i a n c e i s ex-amined through the r e a p p r a i s a l of t h r e e major areas. F i r s t l y , the r e l a t i v e c o s t s and b e n e f i t s f o r each p a r t n e r are assessed i n an o b j e c t i v e and detached way. The S o v i e t Union made a d e c i s i v e c o n t r i b u t i o n t o China's i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n . S o v i e t f i n a n c i a l a i d , though modest i n f i g u r e , was p r o v i d e d i n a t i m e l y way. Together w i t h the p r o v i s i o n of s c i e n t i f i c and t e c h n o l o g i c a l knowledge, t h e v a l u e o f S o v i e t a i d must be r e g a r d e d as c o n -s i d e r a b l e . The b e n e f i t s t o the S o v i e t Union were l e s s i m p r e s s i v e ; but s i n c e the imported Chinese consumer goods were l a r g e l y con-sumed i n the S o v i e t Far East, the b e n e f i t s should not be underes-ti m a t e d . The c o s t f o r both s i d e s remains obscure; though i t i s obvious t h a t the q u e s t i o n s of " S o v i e t e x p l o i t a t i o n " , concerning the j o i n t - s t o c k companies, the o v e r v a l u a t i o n of the r o u b l e and - i i -the p r i c i n g i n S i n o - S o v i e t t r a d e are h i g h l y complex and should be i n t e r p r e t e d with g r e a t e r c a r e . Secondly, the e f f e c t o f S i n o - S o v i e t economic c o o p e r a t i o n on the A l l i a n c e — whether i t strengthened o r weakened i t — i s ex-p l o r e d . Undoubtedly, the economic r e l a t i o n s h i p had both u n i f y i n g and d i v i s i v e e f f e c t s . I t was a u n i f y i n g f a c t o r b e c a u s e t h e S o v i e t s had p r o v i d e d China w i t h support and a s s i s t a n c e t h a t would have been d i f f i c u l t t o o b t a i n elsewhere . Another f a c t o r which had t i e d C h i n a t o t h e USSR was t h e s t r o n g S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e s r e s u l t i n g from the implementation of the S o v i e t model and the c l o s e c o o p e r a t i o n i n the f i e l d s o f e d u c a t i o n and s c i e n c e s . On the othe r hand, these S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e s proved t o be a d i v i s i v e f a c -t o r as w e l l , because they produced a domestic p o l i t i c a l and so-c i a l s i t u a t i o n t h a t Mao found p r o f o u n d l y d i s t a s t e f u l . D i f f e r e n t economic i n t e r e s t s and c o m p e t i t i o n i n f o r e i g n a i d programs a l s o c r e a t e d t e n s i o n s and f r i c t i o n s . The i n d e p e n d e n t o u t l o o k o f China's l e a d e r s made them r e s e n t f u l o f t h e i r r o l e as a j u n i o r p a r t n e r i n the e a r l y 1950's, and prevented them from e n t e r i n g a long-term t r a d e agreement wi t h the USSR or j o i n i n g the C o u n c i l of Mutual Economic A s s i s t a n c e , as the S o v i e t s had wished. F i n a l l y , the impact of S i n o - S o v i e t economic r e l a t i o n s upon China's p o l i c y - m a k i n g i s d i s c u s s e d , a l b e i t s p e c u l a t i v e l y . In the e a r l y 1950's, China's economic and m i l i t a r y dependence on the USSR made i t s l e a d e r s e x e r c i s e g r e a t e r c a u t i o n i n t h e i r c l a i m of "Mao's Road " as the model f o r oth e r A s i a n c o u n t r i e s . As China - i i i -gained s t r e n g t h , however, S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e d e c l i n e d . While the d i s c o n t i n u a t i o n o f S o v i e t f i n a n c i a l a i d can r e a s o n a b l y be r e g a r d e d as one o f t h e major f a c t o r s c o n t r i b u t i n g t o C h i n a ' s d e c i s i o n t o abandon the S o v i e t model i n 1958, the economic p r e s -sure a p p l i e d by Khrushchev f a i l e d t o change China's p o l i c y , and proved c o u n t e r p r o d u c t i v e . - i v -TABLE OF CONTENTS Page A b s t r a c t i i Ta b l e o f Contents v L i s t of T a b l e s v i Acknowledgements v i i Chapter I. I n t r o d u c t i o n 1 I I . An Overview 9 I I I . The B e n e f i t s and the Costs 25 IV. A Cohesive o r D i v i s i v e F a c t o r i n the A l l i a n c e 68 V. The I n f l u e n c e on China's P o l i c y Making 100 1. The i s s u e o f "Mao's Road" 100 2. The abandonment of the S o v i e t model 101 3. S o v i e t economic p r e s s u r e 115 VI. C o n c l u s i o n s 12 6 B i b l i o g r a p h y 13 2 - v -LIST OF TABLES Table Page 1. Trade between The Nor t h e a s t e r n P r o v i n c e s and the USSR, 10 1947-1949 2. S o v i e t Exports t o, and Imports from China(1950-1965) 20 3. Percentage of Increased P r o d u c t i v e C a p a c i t y Owning to 3 3 156 S o v i e t - a i d P r o j e c t s 4. S o v i e t credits(1950-1956) 35 - V i -ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I am g r a t e f u l t o P r o f e s s o r Edgar Wickberg, my s u p e r v i s o r , f o r h i s i n s i g h t s , guidance and encouragement d u r i n g the course o f t h i s study. I thank Mr. G. Peterson, Mr. P.B.Y. May, and Mr. W.C. Ng f o r t h e i r f r i e n d l y h e l p . Thanks a l s o due t o Miss K.C. Lee and F. Wan f o r t y p i n g my i l l e g i b l e manuscript i n t o p r e s e n t form. During the two years o f study, my w i f e , Sue and our two sons Nam and Fung have t o l e r a t e d my absences and g i v e n support which i s g r e a t l y a p p r e c i a t e d . - v i i -Chapter I - I n t r o d u c t i o n The c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the S i n o - S o v i e t A l l i a n c e and the un-d e r l y i n g causes of i t s s p l i t have been the s u b j e c t o f a s i z a b l e body of s c h o l a r l y a n a l y s i s f o r more than t h r e e decades. While a g r e a t d e a l i s known about t h e p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between these two c o u n t r i e s , e s p e c i a l l y as a r e s u l t of t h e i r debates i n the 1960's, the economic aspect of t h i s A l l i a n c e remains r e l a -t i v e l y obscure. For some obse r v e r s , the A l l i a n c e "was o r i g i n a l l y wholly due t o the i d e o l o g i c a l f a c t o r . . . the common en m i t i e s provoked by the p u r s u i t of these g o a l s remain the c h i e f f a c t o r s h o l d i n g the a l -l i a n c e t o g e t h e r . " Meanwhile, the "pure n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s " of the two c o u n t r i e s "tend t o oppose them." 1 Hence, the economic aspect of the A l l i a n c e was c o n s i d e r e d o n l y f o r i t s p o l i t i c a l s i g -n i f i c a n c e . For i n s t a n c e , i t was b e l i e v e d t h a t "Russia's i n v e s t -ment of l e s s than two b i l l i o n r o u b l e s f o r the f i r s t f i v e - y e a r p l a n o f C h i n a ' s i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n " was m e r e l y "Moscow's x t r i b u t e ' t o P e k i n g f o r t h e t e m p o r a r y s e c u r i t y o f t h e USSR's e a s t e r n b o r d e r s . " 2 And China's "one-sided economic dependence on S o v i e t a i d " was regarded as n o t h i n g but a steady source of "deep resentment", because the terms and c o n d i t i o n s of the a i d i n the 1950's had convinced the Chinese t h a t " S o v i e t a i d was i n e f f e c t b l a c k m a i l , s i n c e economic p r e s s u r e was a p p l i e d i n e x c r u c i a t i n g f a s h i o n i n an e f f o r t t o i n f l u e n c e the p o l i c i e s of C h i n a . " 3 1 Even i n a more r e c e n t study by T.G.Hart (1987) which a t -tempted t o assess "the p o s s i b l e f u t u r e development of S i n o - S o v i e t r e l a t i o n s " through "determining the p r e s e n t s t a t u s of a l l i d e n - t i f i a b l e i s s u e s , c u r r e n t and h i s t o r i c a l " ( t h e i t a l i c s i n o r i g i n a l ) , i n i t s "complete l i s t " of twelve i s s u e s and e l e v e n " c o n t r o v e r s i a l p o l i c y areas" (pp. 69-70), o n l y two — t r a d e and t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e — were r e l a t e d t o economic r e l a t i o n s . In t h i s 127-page r e p o r t , these two i s s u e s occupied l e s s than t h r e e pages and t h r e e f o o t n o t e s a l t o g e t h e r . 4 To some oth e r authors who s p e c i a l i z e i n economics, however, t h e economic a s p e c t o f t h e A l l i a n c e i s o f major i m p o r t a n c e . However, many of them tend t o emphasize the d i f f i c u l t i e s f a c i n g r e s e a r c h e r s who study S i n o - S o v i e t economic r e l a t i o n s . In a major study of China's F i r s t F i v e Year Plan p u b l i s h e d i n 1959, Choh-ming L i s t a t e d : " P e i p i n g s t a t i s t i c s are open t o the charge of i n -c o n s i s t e n c y and even t o the s u s p i c i o n t h a t they are f a b r i c a t e d , " though he a l s o p o i n t e d out t h a t the u n r e l i a b i l i t y and i n a c c u r a c y of a v a i l a b l e s t a t i s t i c s apply e q u a l l y t o almost a l l o t h e r under-d e v e l o p e d c o u n t r i e s . 5 Chu-yuan Cheng, a s p e c i a l i s t i n S i n o -S o v i e t economic r e l a t i o n s , a l s o a f f i r m e d i n 1965 t h a t o r i g i n a l Chinese Communist sources "were o f t e n found t o be inadequate and u n r e l i a b l e . F i g u r e s on the same s u b j e c t appearing i n d i f f e r e n t s o u r c e s f r e q u e n t l y c o n f l i c t e d . Some o f t h e m a t e r i a l was ob-v i o u s l y propaganda." 6 2 S o v i e t a i d t o C h i n a was a major a s p e c t o f S i n o - S o v i e t economic r e l a t i o n s i n the 1950s. Y e t , i n h i s study on China's f o r e i g n t r a d e (1966), A l e x a n d e r E c k s t e i n , a p r o f e s s o r o f Economics at the U n i v e r s i t y of Michigan, p o i n t s out t h a t "the data concerning S o v i e t a i d to China are r a t h e r obscure and i n many ways i n c o n s i s t e n t . " 7 A number of f a c t o r s are accountable f o r the d i f f i c u l t i e s i n e v a l u a t i n g S o v i e t a i d . The f i r s t i s t h e c o n c e p t u a l d i s -c r e p a n c i e s i n d e f i n i n g " a i d " . The S o v i e t s f r e q u e n t l y c o n s i d e r e d the t r a n s f e r of a s s e t s l o c a t e d i n China from S o v i e t t o Chinese ownership as a p a r t of a i d . Imports from the U.S.S.R. p a i d by c u r r e n t Chinese exports were a l s o i n c l u d e d as " a i d " , though i n a narrower sense, a i d proper would be understood t o i n c l u d e only goods f i n a n c e d by S o v i e t c r e d i t not r e q u i r i n g c u r r e n t payment by C h i n a . Second, n o t enough i s known about t h e a c t u a l use o f S o v i e t l o a n s , e s p e c i a l l y because the Chinese had claimed, s i n c e 1964 , t h a t t h e y were u s e d " m o s t l y f o r t h e p u r c h a s e o f war m a t e r i a l from the S o v i e t Union, the g r e a t e r p a r t of which was used up i n the war t o r e s i s t U n i t e d S t a t e s a g g r e s s i o n and t o a i d [ N o r t h ] K o r e a . " 8 T h i r d , t h e r e i s no i d e a l way o f c o n v e r t i n g r o u b l e s , the c u r r e n c y i n which c a p i t a l goods exported t o China were c a l c u l a t e d , i n t o Chinese yuan t o o b t a i n the t r u e s c a r c i t y v a l u e w i t h i n China. Fourth, although S o v i e t - a i d e d p r o j e c t s had 3 p l a y e d an important r o l e i n China's i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n , the way of c o u n t i n g them — t h a t i s , what should be c o n s i d e r e d a p r o j e c t — as w e l l as t h e i r c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , have never been c l e a r l y d e f i n e d . Even a f t e r twenty years, i n the mid-1980's, s c h o l a r s were s t i l l p u z z l e d by the same problems i n t h e i r attempt t o e v a l u a t e S o v i e t a i d . A c c o r d i n g t o C a r l R i s k i n , "the exact amount and com-p o s i t i o n of S o v i e t a i d i s s t i l l a matter of u n c e r t a i n t y , and i t s c o n t r i b u t i o n t o China's development cannot be q u a n t i f i e d w i t h p r e c i s i o n . " 9 Furthermore, China's p u b l i c a t i o n s i n the reform years seem t o o f f e r l i t t l e h e l p i n s o l v i n g the p u z z l e . In 1986, f o r i n s t a n c e , a f a i r l y s y s t e m a t i c and c o m p r e h e n s i v e work on China's economic h i s t o r y , China's S o c i a l i s t Economy. An O u t l i n e  H i s t o r y (1949-1984) , was p u b l i s h e d by B e i j i n g Review i n Chinese, E n g l i s h , French, German, Japanese and Spanish. In the p r e f a c e to the book, Xue Muqiao, the D i r e c t o r of China's Economic Research C e n t r e , a f f i r m s t h a t t h e a u t h o r s o f t h i s book a r e well-known C h i n e s e e c o n o m i s t s who "have l o n g been w o r k i n g i n v a r i o u s economic departments and have devoted t h e i r e f f o r t s t o the study of New China's economic h i s t o r y . " In a d d i t i o n , t h e book has i n -c o r p o r a t e d the r e s u l t s of t h e i r " a l l - r o u n d a n a l y s i s and deep-going s t u d i e s " , i n c l u d i n g many p r e v i o u s l y unpublished d e t a i l s of e v e n t s and f i g u r e s which have emerged t h r o u g h t h e s i f t i n g o f l a r g e q u a n t i t i e s of documents and m a t e r i a l s . 1 0 4 Four ch a p t e r s ( v i i i , i x , x i , x i i i ) t o t a l i n g 70 pages are devoted t o the F i r s t F i v e Year P l a n ; y e t , S o v i e t a i d i s d i s c u s s e d on l e s s than two pages (4 l i n e s on p. 119, 1 l i n e on p. 123, 11 l i n e s on p.124, h a l f a page o f p.125, and 6 l i n e s on p . 1 88). Readers are t o l d t h a t the number of S o v i e t a i d p r o j e c t s was 156 (pp. 124, 188), though n e i t h e r the l o c a t i o n nor the nature of these p r o j e c t s are r e v e a l e d . They are f u r t h e r informed t h a t the t o t a l S o v i e t loans t o China amounted t o 1.406 b i l l i o n r o u b l e s (p.125) and t h a t " f o r e i g n l o a n s " accounted f o r 2.7% of the t o t a l s t a t e revenue d u r i n g the F i r s t F i v e Year P l a n (p.123). These cha p t e r s , however, f a i l t o i n d i c a t e what the yuan e q u i v a l e n t of t h e s e 1.406 b i l l i o n r o u b l e s would be o r how t h e y were s p e n t , though i t i s emphasized t h a t the loans " i n c l u d e d those used to p u r c h a s e S o v i e t m i l i t a r y equipment and m a t e r i a l " d u r i n g t h e Korean War (p.125). U n f o r t u n a t e l y , sources from the S o v i e t Union are e q u a l l y p r o b l e m a t i c . While exaggerating t h e i r " s a c r i f i c e s f o r the sake of p r o l e t a r i a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m " , most S o v i e t commentators of the 1950's, t e n d e d t o a v o i d any d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e b e n e f i t s t h e i r c o u n t r y had drawn from S i n o - S o v i e t economic c o o p e r a t i o n . The l i m i t a t i o n s of S o v i e t data have a l r e a d y been p o i n t e d out by West-ern r e s e a r c h e r s . For i n s t a n c e , i n 1961, L. A. Orleans s t a t e d t h a t " i t i s unusual t o f i n d f a c t s and f i g u r e s i n S o v i e t books and 5 j o u r n a l s t h a t are not a l r e a d y a v a i l a b l e from Chinese sources, w h i l e c r i t i c a l a n a l y s e s o f any o f t h e p r o b l e m s s i m p l y do n o t e x i s t . " 1 1 Even i n the presen t day, t o the b e s t knowledge of t h i s author, G l a s n o s t has not y e t r e v e a l e d any p a s t s e c r e t s of S i n o -S o v i e t economic c o o p e r a t i o n . In s p i t e of these handicaps, a f a i r amount of e f f o r t has been made t o examine the i s s u e s c o n c e r n i n g the economic aspect of the S i n o - S o v i e t A l l i a n c e . A f t e r having s u b j e c t e d myself t o some of the an a l y s e s and commentaries on the s u b j e c t , I am convinced t h a t a more narrowly focused r e p o r t examining the r o l e S i n o -S o v i e t economic r e l a t i o n s p l a y e d i n shaping the A l l i a n c e may be i n o r d e r . Drawing h e a v i l y from p r e v i o u s s t u d i e s which are o f t e n i n s i g h t f u l and well-documented ( though not always up-to-date) , the p r e s e n t study does not c l a i m t o be l e s s s p e c u l a t i v e or more c o n c l u s i v e . However,it i s hoped t h a t by assembling s c a t t e r e d b i t s o f i n f o r m a t i o n and s y n t h e s i z i n g e x i s t i n g r e s e a r c h , t h e a n a l y s i s o f t h i s s p e c i f i c i s s u e w i l l be u s e f u l t o b e t t e r our un-d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h i s more obscure aspect o f the S i n o - S o v i e t A l -l i a n c e . A f t e r a c h r o n o l o g i c a l review of the S i n o - S o v i e t economic r e l a t i o n s h i p , i t s s i g n i f i c a n c e i n shaping the A l l i a n c e w i l l be examined through the r e - a p p r a i s a l o f t h r e e major areas. F i r s t , t h e r e l a t i v e c o s t s and b e n e f i t s o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p f o r each p a r t n e r w i l l be assessed as a c c u r a t e l y as p o s s i b l e , though i n l i g h t o f t h e u n d e r d e v e l o p e d s t a t e o f t h e C h i n e s e economy and 6 China's g r e a t e r economic dependence on the S o v i e t Union d u r i n g the p e r i o d , both the c o s t s and b e n e f i t s were f a r more s i g n i f i c a n t f o r China than f o r the S o v i e t Union. Next, the e f f e c t of t h e i r economic c o o p e r a t i o n on the A l l i a n c e — whether i t strengthened or weakened i t — w i l l be e x p l o r e d . F i n a l l y , the impact of t h i s economic r e l a t i o n s h i p upon China's p o l i c y - m a k i n g w i l l be d i s -cussed, a l b e i t s p e c u l a t i v e l y . The aim of t h i s study, due t o the a u t h o r ' s l i m i t a t i o n s as w e l l as t h e n a t u r e o f t h e s o u r c e m a t e r i a l s , i s not so much t o p r e s e n t both s i d e s of the p i c t u r e as t o examine the Chinese s i d e i n d e t a i l . I f more q u e s t i o n s are r a i s e d t h a n answered, s u f f i c e i t t o say t h a t t h e p o i n t o f d i m i n i s h i n g r e t u r n f o r t h i s t o p i c has not y e t been reached. Notes 1. R i c h a r d Lowenthal, " F a c t o r s of U n i t y and F a c t o r s of C o n f l i c t , " Annals of the American Academy of P o l i t i c a l and S o c i a l S c i ence no.349 (September 1963), pp.109, 107. 2. Oton Ambroz, Realignment of World Power, v o l . 1 (New York : Robert S p e l l e r & Sons, P u b l i s h e r s , 1972), p.25. 3. Statement of Dr. Robert A. S c a l a p i n o a t the h e a r i n g s h e l d by the Subcommittee on the Far E a s t and the P a c i f i c of the Committee on F o r e i g n A f f a i r s , U.S.House of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , (March 1965). S i n o - S o v i e t C o n f l i c t (Washington D.C:U.S. Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1965), p.220. 4. Thomas G. H a r t , S i n o - S o v i e t R e l a t i o n s , R e - E x a m i n i n g t h e 7 P r o s p e c t s f o r N o r m a l i z a t i o n ( A l d e r s h o t : G o w e r P u b l i s h i n g Co., 1987) . 5. Choh-ming L i , Economic Development o f Communist C h i n a (Berkeley r U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a Press,1959), pp.3,4. 6. Chu-yuan Cheng, S c i e n t i f i c and E n g i n e e r i n g Manpower i n Com- munist China, 1949-1963 (Washington D.C.:National S c i e n c e Founda-t i o n , 1965), p . v i . 7. Alexander E c k s t e i n , Communist China's Economic Growth and For- e i g n Trade (New York : McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1966), p.154 8. Peking Review, May 8, 1964, p.7. 9. C a r l R i s k i n , China's P o l i t i c a l Economy (London:Oxford U n i v e r -s i t y Press, 1987), p.76 10. L i u S u i n i a n and Wu Qungan, ed., China's S o c i a l i s t Economy, An  O u t l i n e H i s t o r y (1949-1984) ( B e i j i n g : B e i j i n g Review P r e s s , 1986), p.2. 11. Leo A. Orleans, P r o f e s s i o n a l Manpower and E d u c a t i o n i n Com- munist China (Washington D.C.:U.S. Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1961 ), p . v i i . 8 Chapter I I - An Overview Economic r e l a t i o n s between the S o v i e t Union and the Chinese C o m m u n i s t s b e g a n l o n g b e f o r e t h e S i n o - S o v i e t T r e a t y o f F r i e n d s h i p , A l l i a n c e and Mutual A s s i s t a n c e s i g n e d i n February 1950. A c c o r d i n g t o the Y a l t a Agreement, the S o v i e t army invaded China's Northeast (Manchuria) on August 9, 1945. In o r d e r t o l i m i t the Guomindang's c a p a c i t y t o c h a l l e n g e t h e i r p o l i c y 1 , t h e S o v i e t s e n c o u r a g e d t h e C h i n e s e Communists t o form l o c a l ad-m i n i s t r a t i o n s t h r o u g h o u t t h e o c c u p i e d r e g i o n . Some 150,000 Chinese Communist Party(CCP) f o r c e s l e d by L i n Biao and Gao Gang pe n e t r a t e d the Northeast b e f o r e Guomindang armies reached i t . Though w e l l d i s c i p l i n e d , t h e y were p o o r l y armed. The S o v i e t a u t h o r i t i e s s u p p l i e d them with adequate amounts of ammunition, s i d e arms and p r o v i s i o n s , a s s i g n i n g them p o l i t i c a l and p o l i c e f u n c t i o n s . 2 Thus began the c o o p e r a t i o n between the CCP and the S o v i e t Union. The f i r s t t r a d e t a l k s between the S o v i e t f o r e i g n t r a d e o r -g a n i z a t i o n and the People's Democratic A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Commissions f o r the Nor t h e a s t e r n P r o v i n c e s were concluded on December 21, 1946 i n V o r o s h i l o v s k . A c o n t r a c t was signed, and d e l i v e r i e s of S o v i e t goods f o r b o t h t h e Communist army and t h e p o p u l a t i o n began. In a d d i t i o n , some captured war m a t e r i a l s and food were turned over t o CCP o r g a n i z a t i o n s . 3 9 In June 1949, Mao d e c l a r e d h i s " l e a n t o one s i d e " f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n h i s f a m o u s s p e e c h "On P e o p l e ' s D e m o c r a t i c D i c t a t o r s h i p " . At the same time, a t r a d e d e l e g a t i o n , headed by Gao Gang, went t o Moscow, where a one year agreement on mutual exchange of goods between China's N o r t h e a s t e r n P r o v i n c e s and the S o v i e t Union was s i g n e d . Under the terms of t h i s agreement, the S o v i e t Union exported i n d u s t r i a l equipment and goods, w h i l e the N o r t h e a s t e r n p r o v i n c e s d e l i v e r e d soy beans, v e g e t a b l e o i l s and o t h e r a g r i c u l t u r a l products i n r e t u r n . From 1947 t o 1949, t r a d e between the N o r t h e a s t e r n p r o v i n c e s and the S o v i e t Union expanded s t e a d i l y , as can be seen from the f o l l o w i n g data on t r a d e t u r n -over. Trade Between The N o r t h e a s t e r n P r o v i n c e s and the U.S.S.R. (In m i l l i o n s of r o u b l e s ) 4 1947 1948 1949 Imports i n t o USSR 201.7 346.5 470.7 Exports from USSR 212.1 327.5 445.2 T o t a l t r a d e t u r n o v e r 413.8 674.0 915.9 In August 1949, upon the request of the CCP, the f i r s t group 10 o f 250 S o v i e t s p e c i a l i s t s came t o p r o v i d e o r g a n i z a t i o n a l and t e c h n i c a l a i d i n the r e h a b i l i t a t i o n o f the " L i b e r a t e d Areas". Under t h e i r guidance, the t r a i n i n g of new Chinese cadres, who had been i n the Army or p a r t i s a n u n i t s and had no ex p e r i e n c e i n c i v i c a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , began on a day-to-day b a s i s . 5 The founding of the People's R e p u b l i c o f China (PRC) was pro c l a i m e d on October 1, 1949. The S o v i e t Union was the f i r s t c o u ntry t o extend i t s o f f i c i a l r e c o g n i t i o n . In December of the same year, Mao l e d a d e l e g a t i o n t o Moscow. A f t e r t e n weeks, the T r e a t y of F r i e n d s h i p , A l l i a n c e and Mutual A s s i s t a n c e was signed on February 14, 1950. Apart from s e c t i o n s d e a l i n g w i t h m i l i t a r y c o o p e r a t i o n d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t the U n i t e d S t a t e s and the r e b i r t h of Japanese m i l i t a r i s m , the t r e a t y a l s o committed both c o u n t r i e s t o develop and st r e n g t h e n t h e i r economic and c u l t u r a l r e l a t i o n s . In a d d i t i o n , the S o v i e t Union agreed t o extend t o China a 3 00 m i l l i o n d o l l a r loan, payable i n f i v e y e ars by d e l i v e r i n g S o v i e t i n d u s t r i a l equipment and m a t e r i a l s and repaya b l e over the t e n -year p e r i o d (1954-1963) a t a 1% i n t e r e s t r a t e . 6 The S i n o - S o v i e t a l l i a n c e was s e v e r e l y t e s t e d by the Korean War l e s s than a year a f t e r the t r e a t y was s i g n e d . D e s p i t e c e r -t a i n s t r a i n s , i t s u r v i v e d the t e s t , and i n some as p e c t s , S i n o -S o v i e t t i e s were even strengthened. Because of the war, China's freedom of d i p l o m a t i c maneuver was g r e a t l y reduced. Neverthe-l e s s , Moscow s o l d China l a r g e amount of m i l i t a r y equipment, and, d e s p i t e l a r g e c a s u a l t i e s , China's army was s u b s t a n t i a l l y modern-i z e d along S o v i e t l i n e s . The war a l s o a c c e l e r a t e d the r e o r i e n t a -t i o n of China's economy toward the S o v i e t b l o c : the UN embargo c o m p e l l e d C h i n a t o become more dependent e c o n o m i c a l l y on t h e S o v i e t Union. As a r e s u l t , China and the S o v i e t Union developed some very c l o s e , f a r r e a c h i n g r e l a t i o n s i n the economic, s c i e n t i f i c and e d u c a t i o n a l f i e l d s . From 1950 t o 1955, the S o v i e t Union appeared eager t o h e l p China i n her r e h a b i l i t a t i o n programs and her e f f o r t towards i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n . China's F i r s t F i v e Year P l a n (1953-1957) was d r a f t e d w i t h S o v i e t a d v i c e and was s p e c i f i c a l l y geared t o w ards S o v i e t p r o m i s e s o f t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e and c a p i t a l equipment. The g e n e r a l program f o r S o v i e t a i d over t h i s p e r i o d was agreed upon i n November 1952, when the S o v i e t Union pledged t o p r o v i d e economic and t e c h n i c a l a i d i n the c o n s t r u c t i o n of 141 p r o j e c t s . These i n c l u d e d l a r g e , modern complexes such as China's l a r g e s t s t e e l and i r o n complexes i n Anshan, Wuhan, and Baotou, the f i r s t automobile p l a n t i n Changchun, and the f i r s t t r a c t o r p l a n t i n Luoyang. 7 S i n o - S o v i e t economic c o o p e r a t i o n reached new h e i g h t s i n September 1954 when Bulganin and Khrushchev v i s i t e d B e i j i n g . The new S o v i e t l e a d e r s began t o pay more a t t e n t i o n t o the Chinese Communists' f e e l i n g s and i n t e r e s t s , and were o b v i o u s l y making a d e l i b e r a t e e f f o r t t o move toward a more equal p a r t n e r s h i p with China, removing p r e v i o u s causes of f r i c t i o n . A c c o r d i n g t o the v a r i o u s documents signed on t h i s o c c a s i o n , the USSR extended a 12 new development loa n of $130 m i l l i o n t o China. A l l the s p e c i a l r i g h t s a c q u i r e d i n 1 9 5 0 — t h e s t a t i o n i n g o f a S o v i e t f o r c e i n the shared n a v a l base i n Port A r t h u r and the j o i n t s t o c k - h o l d i n g companies—were removed. At t h i s p o i n t , the number o f S o v i e t a i d p r o j e c t s i n c r e a s e d t o 156. 8 In sum, from 1950 t o 1955, S o v i e t a s s i s t a n c e t o China was s u b s t a n t i a l . In r e t u r n , the CCP almost unanimously supported e v e r y p o l i c y d e c i s i o n o f t h e Communist P a r t y o f t h e S o v i e t Union(CPSU) . I t can w e l l be argued t h a t "never had any Chinese l e a d e r s gone so f a r i n l i n k i n g China's i n t e r e s t t o , or emulating the model p r o v i d e d by, a f o r e i g n n a t i o n . " 9 The year 1956 marked the t u r n i n g p o i n t i n S i n o - S o v i e t r e l a -t i o n s . The u n d e r l y i n g reason f o r the change, as the CCP l a t e r admitted was the process of d e - S t a l i n i z a t i o n unleashed a t the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU i n Februar y . 1 0 Chinese l e a d e r s were shocked by Khrushchev's s e c r e t speech. From the Chinese l e a d e r s ' p o i n t o f view, d e - S t a l i n i z a t i o n m i g h t t h r e a t e n t h e l e g i t i m a c y o f Communist r e g i m e s and p a r t i e s o v e r t h e w o r l d . M a k i n g s u c h a c r u c i a l d e c i s i o n w i t h o u t c o n s u l t i n g C h i n a beforehand was regarded as a g r e a t i n s u l t . Moreover, i n 1956 the PRC was, i n a sense, p a s s i n g through a S t a l i n i s t stage o f t h e i r own ; many o f t h e CCP's p o l i c i e s were e x p l i c i t l y modeled on S t a l i n ' s . An o u t r i g h t r e p u d i a t i o n o f S t a l i n c o u l d have l e d t o the q u e s t i o n i n g o f many of t h e i r own c u r r e n t p o l i c i e s . In a d d i t i o n , 13 s i n c e 1945, Mao had s t e a d i l y b u i l t up h i s own 11 c u l t o f p e r -s o n a l i t y " i n S t a l i n ' s way; the sweeping a t t a c k a g a i n s t S t a l i n might a l s o t h r e a t e n Mao's primacy i n China. Once the seeds of S i n o - S o v i e t c o n f l i c t were sown i n 1956, a c l e a r d i v e r g e n c e i n i d e o l o g y and b a s i c s t r a t e g y between China and the S o v i e t Union developed between 1957-1959 when the i n t e r e s t s o f t h e s e two c o u n t r i e s c l a s h e d . A t t h e same t i m e , S o v i e t economic a s s i s t a n c e t o China began t o dwindle. A c c o r d i n g t o Cheng Chu-Yuan's c a l c u l a t i o n , S o v i e t loans t o China, which reached $700 m i l l i o n i n 1955 , dropped d r a s t i c a l l y t o $50 m i l l i o n i n 1956 and d e c l i n e d t o l e s s than $10 m i l l i o n i n 1957. 1 1 1957 was a d i f f i c u l t y e a r f o r C h i n a . The bad g r o w i n g weather combined wi t h Mao's r a p i d pace f o r f u l l c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n made 1957 a poor crop year.The claimed g r a i n p r o d u c t i o n o f the year was 185 m i l l i o n tons, c o n s t i t u t i n g a 0.98% i n c r e a s e over 1 9 5 6 1 2 — l e s s than the p o p u l a t i o n i n c r e a s e which i s b e l i e v e d t o be about 2.2% per y e a r . 1 3 The o u t s t a n d i n g d e b i t t o the S o v i e t Union, w h i c h had t o be p a i d m a i n l y by t h e e x p o r t o f a g r i c u l t u r a l products, was b e l i e v e d t o be as h i g h as $2.4 b i l l i o n i n 1957. 1 4 The F i r s t F i v e Year Plan, which was near completion, f a i l e d t o r e s o l v e t h e p r e s s i n g p r o b l e m s o f g r o w i n g unemployment i n t h e c i t i e s and underemployment i n the c o u n t r y s i d e . 1 5 By pragmatic c a l c u l a t i o n , t h e r e f o r e , without f u r t h e r S o v i e t c r e d i t , China was not i n a p o s i t i o n t o con t i n u e i t s i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n f o l l o w i n g the S o v i e t model. A f t e r some debate on the development s t r a t e g y , 14 Mao and o t h e r 11 L e f t - w i n g " l e a d e r s began, i n the f a l l o f 1957, t o push f o r more r a d i c a l domestic p o l i c i e s . By 1958, when the Great Leap Forward (GLF) and Commune program took shape, the S o v i e t model was a p p a r e n t l y abandoned. 1 6 I n i t i a l l y , the S o v i e t Union appeared t o support the Great Leap Forward . In 1958, the S o v i e t s shipped more than 9,300 motor v e h i c l e s and locomotives, 8,000 t r u c k s and 2,000 t r a i l e r s , p l u s 500,000 tons of petroleum t o C h i n a . 1 7 However, such a s s i s -tance was c a r r i e d out e n t i r e l y through t r a d e . And i n c r e a s i n g l y , Mao's methods of i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n through mass movement were responded t o w i t h an unaccommodating a t t i t u d e from the S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p . For reasons t h a t cannot be c l e a r l y d e f i n e d even today, the Chinese communists launched a heavy s h e l l i n g of the o f f s h o r e i s -lands of Taiwan S t r a i t on August 24, 1958, c r e a t i n g an i n t e r n a -t i o n a l c r i s i s t h a t i n v o l v e d t h e major powers. A l t h o u g h t h e c r i t i c a l moment passed r a t h e r q u i c k l y , t h i s event h i g h l i g h t e d , t o the l e a d e r s of both Communist China and the S o v i e t Union, the c o n f l i c t o f t h e i r n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s , and thus had a c r u c i a l e f -f e c t on o v e r a l l S i n o - S o v i e t r e l a t i o n s . A c c o r d i n g t o A.D. B a r n e t t ' s a n a l y s i s , t h i s c r i s i s " p r e c i p i t a t e d a reassessment of t h e S o v i e t p o l i c y o f n u c l e a r a i d t o C h i n a . . . b e c a u s e i t h i g h -l i g h t e d the USSR's awareness of r i s k s i t s a l l i a n c e w i t h China c o u l d i n v o l v e " . 1 8 Consequently, Moscow began t o have s e r i o u s doubts about the wisdom of n u c l e a r a s s i s t a n c e t o China. Accord-15 i n g t o Chinese sources, i n June 1959, the S o v i e t government " t o r e up the agreement... and r e f u s e d t o p r o v i d e China w i t h a sample of an atomic bomb and t e c h n i c a l data c o n c e r n i n g i t s manufacture." 1 9 In a d d i t i o n t o t h i s r i f t o v e r n u c l e a r weapons, Moscow's n e u t r a l i t y i n the S i n o - I n d i a n border d i s p u t e of September 1959 s t r a i n e d the S i n o - S o v i e t r e l a t i o n s s e v e r e l y . However, t h i s s t r a i n was l a r g e l y concealed from the o u t s i d e world a t the time. From September 1958 when the Taiwan S t r a i t c r i s i s took p l a c e , t o the end o f 1959, C h i n a and t h e S o v i e t U n i o n s t i l l s i g n e d s e v e r a l agreements on economic and s c i e n t i f i c c o o p e r a t i o n . The most im-p o r t a n t one was the new S i n o - S o v i e t agreement f o r the e x t e n s i o n of economic and t e c h n i c a l c o o p e r a t i o n f o r the p e r i o d of 1959-1967, s i g n e d i n Moscow by Zhou E n l a i and Khrushchev on February 7, 1959. S o v i e t t e c h n i c a l a i d continued, d e s p i t e some s e r i o u s f r i c t i o n between S o v i e t e x p e r t s and the Chinese generated by the p o l i c y of the Great Leap Forward. The t o t a l v a l u e of S i n o - S o v i e t t r a d e i n 1959 r e a c h e d $2,054 m i l l i o n - - 3 . 5 t i m e s t h e 1950 l e v e l . 2 0 To sum up, d e s p i t e the s t r a i n and f r i c t i o n i n t h e i r p o l i t i -c a l and m i l i t a r y r e l a t i o n s i n the l a t t e r p a r t of the 1950s, the decade a f t e r 1949 saw a very c l o s e economic c o o p e r a t i o n between China and the S o v i e t Union. Besides the above mentioned f i n a n -c i a l and t e c h n o l o g i c a l a s s i s t a n c e , the S o v i e t Union a l s o helped t o r e o r g a n i z e the Chinese e d u c a t i o n a l system along S o v i e t l i n e s . By 1960, about 1,700 Chinese t e a c h e r s had been t r a i n e d i n the 16 S o v i e t Union. I f we i n c l u d e the number of t e a c h e r s t r a i n e d l o -c a l l y by S o v i e t e x p e r t s , the t o t a l would be 19,000 which was about a q u a r t e r of the t e a c h i n g p e r s o n a l a t Chinese c o l l e g e s . 2 1 S o v i e t c o l l e g e s and u n i v e r s i t i e s e n r o l l e d over 11,000 Chinese students and post-graduates between 1951 and 1962. 2 2 Over 1,3 00 S o v i e t e d u c a t i o n a l s p e c i a l i s t s and hundreds of S o v i e t t e a c h e r s worked i n C h i n a f o r b o d i e s a t t a c h e d t o t h e M i n i s t r y o f E d u c a t i o n . 2 3 S c i e n t i f i c and c u l t u r a l exchanges were e q u a l l y ex-t e n s i v e . The S o v i e t s claimed t h a t they had g i v e n China 24,000 s e t s of v i r t u a l l y c o s t - f r e e s c i e n t i f i c and t e c h n o l o g i c a l docu-ments over a p e r i o d of s l i g h t l y more than t e n y ears which were worth "many b i l l i o n s of d o l l a r s i n the world market" and amounted t o h a l f of the t e c h n i c a l documents g i v e n by the S o v i e t Union t o a l l s o c i a l i s t c o u n t r i e s . 2 4 From 1949 t o 1964, 566,059 S o v i e t books were sent t o China and i n r e t u r n the S o v i e t Union r e c e i v e d 39,3 66 Chinese books. 2 5 Between 1949 and 1958, 112 S o v i e t a r t i s -t i c groups and 134 Chinese groups v i s i t e d each o t h e r ' s c o u n t r i e s , and almost two b i l l i o n Chinese saw 747 S o v i e t movie p i c t u r e s . 2 6 S i n o - S o v i e t economic r e l a t i o n s began t o d e t e r i o r a t e i n 1960 when t h e i r r i f t s on i d e o l o g i c a l and p o l i t i c a l matters came i n t o t h e open. The C h i n e s e t o o k t h e i n i t i a t i v e i n A p r i l 1960 by l a u n c h i n g an i d e o l o g i c a l a t t a c k on S o v i e t " r e v i s i o n i s m " . They used t h e o c c a s i o n o f t h e n i n e t i e t h a n n i v e r s a r y o f L e n i n ' s b i r t h d a y t o p u b l i s h a b i t t e r p o l e m i c a l a r t i c l e i n the p a r t y ' s 17 main t h e o r e t i c a l j o u r n a l , Hong Qi(The Red F l a g ) , condemning the S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p f o r abandoning L e n i n i s t p r i n c i p l e s and b a s i c Communist v a l u e s . Khrushchev responded w i t h an a l l - o u t a t t a c k on the CCP a t t h e Rumanian P a r t y C o n g r e s s i n June 1960. I n a d d i t i o n , t h e S o v i e t g o v e r n m e n t t o o k p u n i t i v e a c t i o n s by an- i n s t a n t withdrawal of a l l S o v i e t experts working i n China. In r e t u r n , the Chinese d e c l a r e d the slogan "to r e v i v e through our own s t r e n g t h and b u i l d the country with d i l i g e n c e and t h r i f t " as the g u i d i n g p r i n c i p l e " f o r a long p e r i o d i n the c o n s t r u c t i o n of s o c i a l i s m . " 2 7 N e v e r t h e l e s s , d e t e r i o r a t i n g e c o n o m i c c o n d i t i o n s and widespread famine, due t o the f a i l u r e of the Great Leap Forward and the Communization program as w e l l as t o the bad weather, f o r c e d the Chinese l e a d e r s t o seek S o v i e t a s s i s t a n c e once again. But the h e l p granted by the S o v i e t government was r a t h e r meager compared t o China's p r e s s i n g needs. A f t e r t h r e e months of nego-t i a t i o n , the 1961 p r o t o c o l f o r S i n o - S o v i e t exchange of goods was s i g n e d i n Moscow, which p e r m i t t e d China t o repay i t s 1960 t r a d e d e f i c i t ( 2 8 8 m i l l i o n roubles) w i t h i n f i v e y e ars i n i n s t a l l m e n t s without i n t e r e s t , and the S o v i e t s agreed t o d e l i v e r 500,000 tons of sugar on c r e d i t t o be r e p a i d d u r i n g the p e r i o d 1964-67 without e x t r a i n t e r e s t c h a r g e s . 2 8 18 The meagerness of t h i s a i d , p l u s the withdrawal of experts i n 1960 and the u n i l a t e r a l a b r o g a t i o n of the n u c l e a r agreement i n 1959 f i n a l l y l e d the Chinese l e a d e r s t o b e l i e v e t h a t they were s u b j e c t e d t o S o v i e t economic b l a c k m a i l . I f the S o v i e t l e a d e r s had hoped t o use the c u r t a i l m e n t of economic a i d t o d i s c i p l i n e China, i t proved t o be a s e r i o u s mis-judgment; the economic p r e s s u r e o n l y made Chinese l e a d e r s ex-t r e m e l y b i t t e r and as u ncompromising as e v e r . D e s p i t e t h e i r r e l a t i v e l y weak p o s i t i o n , they determined t o end t h e i r economic dependency and v u l n e r a b i l i t y . They began, d e l i b e r a t e l y and s y s -t e m a t i c a l l y , t o reduce China's l i n k s w i t h the S o v i e t Union and expand her t r a d e w i t h the West. Once s t a r t e d , the process of economic disengagement gained i n momentum and soon became i r r e -v e r s i b l e . S i n c e much of the S o v i e t a i d was p r o v i d e d through t r a d e , the most important i n d i c a t o r of the changing S i n o - S o v i e t economic c o o p e r a t i o n was the d e c l i n e of t r a d e between the two c o u n t r i e s . The volume of t r a d e d e c l i n e d s t e a d i l y from 1849.4 m i l l i o n r o u b l e s i n 1959 t o 540 m i l l i o n r o u b l e s i n 1963, and f u r t h e r t o 375.5 m i l l i o n r o u b l e s i n 1965. As the Chinese proceeded t o repay a l l S o v i e t loans through export, t h e i r imports from the S o v i e t Union d e c l i n e d even more p r e c i p i t o u s l y : from 895.1 m i l l i o n r o u b l e s i n 1959 t o 121.8 m i l l i o n r o u b l e s i n 1964. S o v i e t Exports t o , and Imports from China (1950-1965) 2 9 19 ( i n m i l l i o n s o f new roubles) 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 Imports i n t o USSR 169.5 298.2 372.4 427.2 520.5 579.2 687.8 664.3 Exports from USSR 349.4 430.6 498.8 627.8 683.4 673.5 659.7 489.7 T o t a l Trade 518.9 728.8 871.2 1055.0 1203.9 1252.7 1347.5 1154. 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 Import i n t o USSR 793.1 990.3 763,3 496.3 464.7 371.7 282.8 203.0 Exports from USSR 570.6 859.1 735.4 330.6 910.1* 168.5 121.8 172.5 T o t a l Trade 1363.7 1849.4 1498.7 826.9 674.8 540.2 404.6 375.5 * p r i n t i n g mistake, must be 210.1 The drop i n t r a d e was accompanied by a g r a d u a l weakening of a l l o t h e r t i e s . S o v i e t e x p e r t s were never i n v i t e d back, d e s p i t e repeated o f f e r s from the S o v i e t s . 3 0 A c c o r d i n g t o S o v i e t sources, the c o n s t r u c t i o n o f many S o v i e t - a i d e n t e r p r i s e s was h a l t e d . Some of them were t u r n e d i n t o "'museums' f o r d i s c r e d i t i n g S o v i e t economic a i d . " 3 1 In an agreement s i g n e d i n J u l y 1961, China r e f u s e d f u r t h e r S o v i e t a s s i s t a n c e i n the c o n s t r u c t i o n o f 89 i n -d u s t r i a l p l a n t s , t h u s c a u s i n g a f i v e f o l d r e d u c t i o n i n t h e d e l i v e r i e s o f complete s e t s of equipment from the S o v i e t Union, as compared wi t h 1960. E v e n t u a l l y , i n December 1961, China an-nounced t o t a l r e f u s a l t o i m p o r t c o m p l e t e s e t s o f S o v i e t equipment. 3 2 New agreements on s c i e n t i f i c and c u l t u r a l coopera-t i o n were a l s o s i g n e d t o r e p l a c e the p r e v i o u s ones, a l l e g e d l y 20 upon the i n s i s t e n c e of the Chinese government. The r e s u l t was a sharp cutback i n o b l i g a t i o n undertaken by both p a r t i e s towards one another. 3 3 From the b e g i n n i n g of 1963, the S i n o - S o v i e t d i s p u t e i n -c r e a s i n g l y took on the form of a s t r u g g l e f o r power and i n f l u e n c e r a t h e r than t h a t of an i d e o l o g i c a l debate. On A p r i l 20, 1963, China announced i t s i n t e n t i o n t o repay a l l debts t o the S o v i e t Union ahead of s c h e d u l e . 3 4 China's d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o pay back a l l these debts i n d i c a t e d i t s wish t o pursue a path f r e e of S o v i e t c o n t r o l . In sum, whereas i n the mid-1950's China seemed w e l l on i t s way toward f u l l economic c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h the S o v i e t Union, by 1963, i t determined t o end a l l economic dependency on the S o v i e t U n i o n — r e g a r d l e s s of a l l problems and c o s t s . From then on, the S i n o - S o v i e t A l l i a n c e , which would have l a s t e d t o 1980, e x i s t e d o n l y on paper. 21 Notes 1. The S o v i e t p o l i c y i n C h i n a ' s N o r t h e a s t was v e r y h a r s h . Manchurian i n d u s t r y was regarded as "war booty", and some $95 m i l l i o n worth of equipment was removed by the end of 1945. In 1946, an American i n v e s t i g a t i o n commission e s t i m a t e d t h a t $895 m i l l i o n i n d i r e c t damage or $2 b i l l i o n i n p r o d u c t i o n l o s s and r e -placement c o s t s had been sustained.See Steven.I.Levine, A n v i l of  V i c t o r y , t h e Communist R e v o l u t i o n i n M a n c h u r i a . 1945-1948(New York:Columbia U n i v e r s i t y Press,1987), p.69 and notes 87,88, on p.259. 2. See t h e Forward i n O.B. B o r i s o v and B.T. K o l o s k o v S o v i e t - C h i n e s e R e l a t i o n s 1 9 4 5 - 7 0 ( I n d i a n a : I n d i a n a U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1975), p.25. 3. O.B.Borisov and B.T. Koloskov S i n o - S o v i e t Relations,1945-1973,  A B r i e f History(Moscow:Progress P u b l i s h e r , 1975), p.30. Hence-f o r t h i t w i l l be c i t e d as A B r i e f H i s t o r y . 4. M.I. Sladkovsky, I s t o r i y a Torqovo-Ekonomicheskaya O t n o s h e n i i  SSSR s Kitaem ( The H i s t o r y of Commercial-Economic R e l a t i o n s Be- tween the USSR and China ,1917-74, Moscow: Nauka Press, 1977 ), p.174. The reason f o r the excess of exports from China's North-east was, a c c o r d i n g t o Sladkovsky, t h a t " p a r t of the Manchurian food s t u f f was t r a n s p o r t e d by sea through V l a d i v o s t o k t o D a l i a n f o r t h e needs o f t h e C h i n e s e p o p u l a t i o n i n t h e L i a o d o n g P e n i n s u l a . " ( S e e I b i d . , p.175). 5. B o r i s o v and Koloskov S o v i e t - C h i n e s e R e l a t i o n s , p.60. 6. J i a Wenhua, S u l i a n Dui Wai Guanxi(The S o v i e t Union's F o r e i g n  Relations,Henan: J i a o y u Chubanshe, 1989), p.241 7. Chu-Yuan Cheng, Economic R e l a t i o n s Between P e k i n g and  Moscow(New Y o r k : F r e d e r i c k A. Praeger, P u b l i s h e r , 1964), p.14. 8. I b i d . , p.15. A l s o , L i u and Wu S o c i a l i s t Economy, p. 124. 9. A.Doak B a r n e t t , C h i n a and t h e Manor Powers i n E a s t A s i a (Washington D.C: Brookings I n s t i t u t i o n , 1977), p.26. 10. "The O r i g i n and Development of the D i f f e r e n c e Between the Leadership of the CPSU and O u r s e l v e s , " Peking Review, September 13,1963, p.7. 22 11. C.Y.Cheng, Economic R e l a t i o n s , p.3. 12. Ten Great Years (Compiled by The S t a t e S t a t i s t i c a l . Bureau of t h e PRC Government. B e i j i n g : F o r e i g n Languages P r e s s , 1960), p.119. 13. V i c t o r D. L i p p i t , The Economic Development of China (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, Inc. 1987 ), p. 110. The S i t u a t i o n s , however, were i n f a c t even more ominous. A c c o r d i n g t o The Development of China,  1949-89 ( B e i j i n g : B e i j i n g Review Press,1989),the t o t a l a g r i c u l -t u r a l output v a l u e of 1957 was 53,700 m i l l i o n yuan, r e p r e s e n t i n g a 12% decrease from 1956's 61,000 m i l l i o n yuan. p.27. 14. O.Edmund Clubb, China and R u s s i a , the "Great Game" (New York: Columbia U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1971), p.419. A c c o r d i n g t o J i a Wenhua, from 1950-56, t h e t o t a l S o v i e t c r e d i t was 567.6 m i l l i o n o l d r o u b l e s , 60.4% of t h i s t o t a l amount was used i n the Korean war. See h i s S u l i a n , p.253. 15. M a u r i c e M e i s n e r , Mao's C h i n a ( New York: The F r e e P r e s s , 1977), p.217. 16. T h i s c r u c i a l change of p o l i c y and the abandonment of s o v i e t model w i l l be d i s c u s s e d i n more d e t a i l i n Chapter IV. 17. C.Y. Cheng, Economic R e l a t i o n s , p.18. 18. A.D. B a r n e t t , China and the Major Powers, p.346. 19. Peking Review, August 16,1963, p.7. 20. C.Y. Cheng, Economic R e l a t i o n s , p.53. 21. " M e m o r a b l e P a g e s i n t h e H i s t o r y o f S o v i e t - C h i n e s e C o o p e r a t i o n , " Far E a s t e r n A f f a i r s , 1984, no.4, p.143. 22. Ibid.,p.141. 23. G i l b e r t Rozman, ed., The M o d e r n i z a t i o n of China (New York:The Free Press,1981), p.422. 24. B o r i s o v and Koloskov, S o v i e t - C h i n e s e R e l a t i o n s , p.161. 25. L . V . F i l a t o v , Ekonomicheskaya Otsenka Nauchno-Tekhnicheskoi  Pomoshchi Sovetskogo Soiuza K i t a i u , 1949-66 (Economic estimate of  s c i e n t i f i c - t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e by t h e S o v i e t U n i o n t o C h i n a  1949-66, Moscow: Nauka Press, 1980), p.152. 26. B o r i s o v and Koloskov, S o v i e t - C h i n e s e R e l a t i o n s , p.83. 23 27. Peking Review, August 23, 1960, p.15. 28. Vneshnyaya T o r g o v l y a , 1961, no.5, p.12. I t i s of i n t e r e s t t o note t h a t , t h i s a i d , as w e l l as China's t r a d e d e f i c i t had been s t a t e d 4 times on pp.12,13,14,and 18 i n a s e c t i o n t i t l e d "The Un-b r e a k a b l e F r a t e r n a l F r i e n d s h i p . " A c c o r d i n g t o t h e S o v i e t s , 300,000 tons o f g r a i n and f l o u r were a l s o d e l i v e r e d t o China, on c r e d i t , d u r i n g t h e s p r i n g and summer o f 1961.See B o r i s o v and Koloskov, A B r i e f H i s t o r y , p.217. 29. M.I. Sladkovsky, I s t o r i y a , pp.204, 222, 252, 281. 30. A c c o r d i n g t o B o r i s o v and Koloskov, a f t e r November 1960, the S o v i e t Union r e p e a t e d l y expressed i t s r e a d i n e s s t o r e t u r n i t s ex-p e r t s . S o v i e t - C h i n e s e R e l a t i o n s , p.212. 31. O l e g I v a n o v , S o v i e t - C h i n e s e R e l a t i o n s S e c o n d R e v i s e d ed.,(Moscow: N o v o s t i Press Agency P u b l i s h i n g House,1979 ), p.15. 32. E c k s t e i n , F o r e i g n Trade, pp.213-215. 33. I b i d . , pp.216-217. 34. C.Y.Cheng, Economic R e l a t i o n s , p.23. China indeed p a i d back a l l i t s debts t o the USSR by 1965. S o v i e t authors denounced such h i g h speed o f repayment, d e s p i t e t h e c o u n t r y ' s h a r d s h i p , as " c o n t r a r y t o a l l common s e n s e " and "a d e l i b e r a t e measure o f M a o i s t p r opaganda t o blame C h i n a ' s economic d i f f i c u l t i e s on S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p . " See Oleg Ivanov, Who I s To Blame? (Moscow: N o v o s t i Press , 1981), p.26. 24 Chapter I I I - The B e n e f i t s and The Costs An a p p r a i s a l of the economic r e l a t i o n s h i p between China and the S o v i e t Union must be based on an assessment of i t s r e l a t i v e c o s t s and b e n e f i t s f o r each p a r t n e r . In t h i s r e s p e c t , the p e r i o d from 1945 t o 1949 i s of c r u c i a l importance. I t was d u r i n g these few years t h a t the f o u n d a t i o n f o r S i n o - S o v i e t economic coopera-t i o n was l a i d down and the f u t u r e development of t h e i r a l l i a n c e was shaped. From August 1945 t o May 1946, the presence of S o v i e t t r o o p s i n the Northeast of China was a f a c t o r of major importance f o r the m i l i t a r y and economic development of the area. V a r i o u s con-s i d e r a t i o n s had shaped the USSR's China p o l i c y . I t s most c o n s i s -t e n t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c was c e r t a i n l y not "the e f f e c t i v e e f f o r t s f o r the m i l i t a r y and economic c o n s o l i d a t i o n of the r e v o l u t i o n a r y base i n Manchuria" — as S o v i e t authors o f t e n c l a i m e d . 1 Rather, i t was determined, as Steven I. Levine p o i n t e d out, " t o keep a l l o p t i o n s open and t o a v o i d too c l o s e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w i t h one s i d e or the o t h e r , " and aimed at "maximizing S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e w i t h i n the Chinese p o l i t i c a l arena w h i l e m i n i m i z i n g the r i s k of c o n f r o n -t a t i o n w i t h the U n i t e d S t a t e s . " 2 N e v e r t h e l e s s , Moscow d i d not pretend t o be i m p a r t i a l i n the c o n f l i c t between the CCP and the Guomindang, and c l e a r l y f a v o r e d the CCP i n important ways. 25 In g e n e r a l , S o v i e t c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e CCP's v i c t o r y i n Manchuria was i g n o r e d by Chinese sources. The d e a r t h of con-v i n c i n g evidence of S o v i e t a i d t o the CCP a l s o made many Western a u t h o r s downplay t h e " S o v i e t f a c t o r " i n C h i n a ' s c i v i l war. However, Moscow's c o n t r i b u t i o n d u r i n g the Manchurian p e r i o d , as S.I. Levine observes, was " s u b s t a n t i a l " . 3 The foremost was "the g i f t o f t i m e , " — a head s t a r t i n the c o m p e t i t i o n f o r power i n Manchuria which was "even more v a l u a b l e than the Japanese weapons t r a n s f e r r e d t o the CCP by the Red Army." 4 The CCP began t o o r g a n i z e armed g u e r r i l l a s i n a s y s t e m a t i c manner i n Manchuria i n the e a r l y 1930's. By 1935, the Communists came t o have a dominant i n f l u e n c e on the a n t i - J a p a n e s e movement. In 1936, " t h e r e were few armed men i n the r e g i o n who were not un-der t h e i r i n f l u e n c e . " 5 The a c t i v i t i e s of these g u e r r i l l a s spread i n t o more than f o r t y c o u n t i e s , and t h e i r number exceeded 20,000. 6 In t h e l a t e 1930's, however, t h e s e g u e r r i l l a s were " f i n a l l y decimated" by the c o n c e n t r a t e d e f f o r t s of the Japanese m i l i t a r y . By 1941, " o r g a n i z e d Communist and n a t i o n a l i s t g u e r r i l l a a c t i v i t y i n southern Manchuria ended." 7 In February 1941, a l l Communist g u e r r i l l a s evacuated i n t o the S o v i e t border areas. I n s i d e the S o v i e t Union, the CCP's Northeastern P a r t y Committee was e s t a b -l i s h e d i n A p r i l 1942. At the same time, the g u e r r i l l a s were o r -ganized i n t o a brigade "mainly f o r the purpose of p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y t r a i n i n g . " 8 26 From 1942 t o 1945, the Manchurian Branch o f the CCP was i n -capable o f ambitious a c t i o n s . Up u n t i l the S o v i e t d e c l a r a t i o n of war a g a i n s t Japan, the CCP's army was i n a v e r y bad c o n d i t i o n . A c c o r d i n g t o S o v i e t sources, t h e r e were no more than 10,000 Com-munist s o l d i e r s i n the a r e a . 9 When l a r g e numbers of Communist t r o o p s entered the Northeast a f t e r the S o v i e t d e c l a r a t i o n o f war a g a i n s t Japan, most of them were d i s g u i s e d as c i v i l i a n s . 1 0 I t was r e p o r t e d t h a t "two-thirds of the s o l d i e r s had no arms whatsoever; each r i f l e had o n l y 30 rounds o f ammunition; t h e r e was one machine-gun f o r every 100 s o l d i e r s . Except f o r a few p i e c e s of a r t i l l e r y c a ptured from the s u r r e n d e r i n g Japanese, CCP t r o o p s had no means f o r f i g h t i n g a s e r i o u s b a t t l e . " 1 1 These s o l d i e r s were t h e n e q u i p p e d w i t h weapons c a p t u r e d by S o v i e t f o r c e s from t h e J a p a n e s e Kwantung Army. A c c o r d i n g t o Guomindang's sources, " i n October 1945, L i n Biao l e d t h r e e d i v i -s i o n s o f unarmed troo p s t o Shenyang. A f t e r r e c e i v i n g the arms and equipment f o r a d i v i s i o n , [these t r o o p s ] took the t r a i n t o Changchun, where a l a r g e amount of arms and equipment was g i v e n [to them]. [ L i n ' s t r o o p s ] were then expanded i n t o f o u r d i v i s i o n s w h ich became t h e n u c l e u s o f t h e ^ U n i t e d D e m o c r a t i c Army.'" 1 2 Only d u r i n g the " f i r s t stage", S o v i e t sources c l a i m , the CCP's army r e c e i v e d more than 3,700 of a l l s o r t s o f guns, 600 tanks, 860 a i r c r a f t , about 12000 machine-guns and 680 d i f f e r e n t k i n d s of depots. 1 3 A c c o r d i n g t o R. Medvedev, a d i s t i n g u i s h e d " d i s s i d e n t " 27 h i s t o r i a n l i v i n g i n Moscow, i n a d d i t i o n t o the weaponry captured from the Japanese, " a s u b s t a n t i a l amount of arms and ammunition [was] taken from S o v i e t regiments and d i v i s i o n s " and handed over t o the CCP. U By December, the number of Communist s o l d i e r s i n the r e g i o n exceeded 200,000. In February 1946, the number was approximately 500, 000. 1 5 A f t e r Yanan was surrendered t o the Guomindang's t r o o p s , the Northeast became the most important base f o r the s u r v i v a l of the CCP and l a t e r , the p r e p a r a t i o n f o r i t s g e n e r a l o f f e n s e a g a i n s t the Guomindang regime. As L l o y d Eastman observes, the S o v i e t i n -t e r v e n t i o n e f f e c t i v e l y b l o c k e d the Guomindang from e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e c o n t r o l o f t h e r e g i o n and p r o v i d e d t h e CCP w i t h a " s p r i n g b o a r d f o r the conquest of China p r o p e r . " 1 6 For the economic development of t h i s area, S o v i e t support a l s o p l a y e d a s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e . Areas under the CCP's c o n t r o l , which were c u t o f f from China's c e n t r a l p r o v i n c e s , experienced an acute shortage of f u e l , motor v e h i c l e s , c o a l , medicines, s a l t , and o t h e r consumer goods. When southern Manchuria was invaded by Guomindang's t r o o p s , the c o n d i t i o n of food supply i n the Liaodong P e n i n s u l a d e t e r i o r a t e d s h a r p l y . 1 7 The s h o r t a g e o f goods n a t u r a l l y made the merchants as w e l l as the people i n these areas v e r y a p p r e h e n s i v e about t h e v a l u e o f t h e new c u r r e n c y ( t h e "Renmin P i a o " — p e o p l e ' s money) i s s u e d by the Communist govern-ment. Under such circumstances, s t a b i l i z a t i o n of t r a d e was c r u -c i a l i n c o n s o l i d a t i n g the CCP regime. In t h i s r e s p e c t , imports 28 from the S o v i e t Union, the commercial a c t i v i t i e s of the S o v i e t -owned companies i n t h e N o r t h e a s t , as w e l l as t h e S i n o - S o v i e t j o i n t - s t o c k companies i n t h e L i a o d o n g P e n i n s u l a were most c r i t i c a l . Of the Soviet-owned companies i n the Northeast, the most s i g n i f i c a n t was the " I . Ya. Churin Company". T h i s company was e s t a b l i s h e d i n 1868 by Russian merchant I. Ya. C h u r i n . A f t e r the Russian R e v o l u t i o n , i t s commercial a c t i v i t i e s had been centered on Manchuria, with the headquarters i n Harbin. In October 1945, i t became a S o v i e t S t o c k Company w i t h b r a n c h e s i n D a l i a n , H a i l a e r , J i a m ushi, Q i q i h a e r , Mudanjiang, Suifenhe and Shenyang. Through a w i d e l y spread network of s t o r e s and o t h e r e n t e r p r i s e s , the company s o l d s c a r c e i n d u s t r i a l goods imported from the S o v i e t Union on Renmin P i a o . 1 8 These measures undoubtedly helped t o s t a b i l i z e the f i n a n c i a l s i t u a t i o n of the Northeast. When f o o d s u p p l i e s d w i n d l e d i n t h e L i a o d o n g P e n i n s u l a , S o v i e t agencies s u p p l i e d g r a i n , v e g e t a b l e o i l , sugar and t i n n e d foods from V l a d i v o s t o k t o D a l i a n d i r e c t l y by sea and then d i s -t r i b u t e d them t o the p o p u l a t i o n a t p r i c e s f i x e d by the CCP l o c a l government. A c c o r d i n g t o S o v i e t sources, "the S o v i e t Union met a l l the c o s t s of food t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , s t o r a g e , and d i s t r i b u t i o n as p a r t of f r e e a s s i s t a n c e t o the Chinese p o p u l a t i o n . " 1 9 S e v e r a l S i n o - S o v i e t j o i n t s t o c k companies were e s t a b l i s h e d i n t h e L i a o d o n g P e n i n s u l a from 1947 t o 1950. Both t h e "Dal'anerko" and "Lyaodunryba" were on an equal share b a s i s . 29 The "Dal'anerko" c o n t r o l l e d 14 l a r g e e n t e r p r i s e s i n c l u d i n g two power s t a t i o n s i n D a l i a n , as w e l l as r a d i o - t e l e p h o n e , l i g h t b u l b , g l a s s and cement f a c t o r i e s . The major p r o d u c t s o f t h e "Lyaodunryba" were s a l t and f i s h i n g - p r o d u c t s . 2 0 The "Dar'dok" was t h e more i m p o r t a n t one and l a t e r became one o f t h e f i v e j o i n t - s t o c k companies i n the e a r l y 1 9 5 0 ' s — t h e D a l i a n Dockyard. In 1947 t h i s company employed over 2000 worker, 264 engineers and t e c h n i c i a n s ; from 1947 t o 1950, 246 s h i p s o f small-tonnage, 275 l i g h t e r s ( i n 100 ton) , and 21 barges ( i n 500 ton) were b u i l t . 2 1 The p r o d u c t i o n o f t h e s e companies c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e normal f u n c t i o n i n g of the i n d u s t r i e s , t r a n s p o r t a t i o n as w e l l as commerce i n t h e P e n i n s u l a . When t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f t h e P e o p l e ' s R e p u b l i c was proclai m e d i n 1949, the Liaodong P e n i n s u l a became one of the most important i n d u s t r i a l areas of the country. In a d d i t i o n , S o v i e t a s s i s t a n c e i n r e s t o r i n g the r a i l w a y s y s ^ tern and c o n t r o l l i n g p l a g u e s h o u l d n o t be i g n o r e d . I t was r e p o r t e d by a S o v i e t source t h a t a t the end of the war, 6000 km o f r a i l w a y l i n e s i n t h e N o r t h e a s t were d e s t r o y e d o r damaged. Toward December 1948, however, "as a r e s u l t o f the g r e a t work performed under the guidance of S o v i e t railwaymen... over 15,000 km of main r a i l w a y l i n e s . . . 120 l a r g e and medium-sized b r i d g e s . . . had been r e s t o r e d . " 2 2 In r e t r o s p e c t , t h i s t i m e l y r e s t o r a t i o n had c e r t a i n l y f a c i l i t a t e d t r o o p movement d u r i n g the f i n a l stages of L i n Biao's m i l i t a r y campaigns. 30 Plague epidemics had o c c u r r e d i n Manchuria p e r i o d i c a l l y i n i t s h i s t o r y . Poor n u t r i t i o n , inadequate p r e v e n t i v e p u b l i c h e a l t h care, as w e l l as the s t r a i n of war and r e v o l u t i o n had a l l i n -creased the s u s c e p t i b i l i t y t o d i s e a s e of man and animals a l i k e . In 1947, t h e r e were s e v e r a l s e r i o u s outbreaks of plague i n the N ortheast p r o v i n c e s . S o v i e t e p i d e m i c - f i g h t i n g teams were sent i n w i t h v i t a l l y needed medical s u p p l i e s and equipment. Chinese p e r -sonnel i n p r e v e n t i n g and combating plague were t r a i n e d by S o v i e t s p e c i a l i s t s . As a r e s u l t , the number of persons a f f l i c t e d w i t h plague i n the r e g i o n f e l l s h a r p l y from 30,326 i n 1947 t o 5947 i n 1948 and 250 i n 1949. 2 3 I t i s c e r t a i n l y t r u e t h a t " t h i s a i d was d i c t a t e d as much as by s e l f - i n t e r e s t as from i n t e r n a t i o n a l s o l i d a r i t y , because plague c o u l d e a s i l y have t r a v e l e d a l o n g r a i l l i n e s t o the S o v i e t Union as i t had i n e a r l i e r t i m e s . " 2 4 But the net e f f e c t of S o v i e t medical a s s i s t a n c e was the containment of what c o u l d have been a f a r more d i s a s t r o u s outbreak of the d i s -ease . In s h o r t , by f r u s t r a t i n g t h e Guomindang t a k e o v e r o f Manchuria i n 1945-46 and p r o v i d i n g a s s i s t a n c e t o the CCP i n t h a t same r e g i o n , the S o v i e t s c o n t r i b u t e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y t o the v i c t o r y of Mao's f o r c e s . However, j u s t how s i g n i f i c a n t was t h a t c o n t r i b u -t i o n i s d i f f i c u l t t o judge i n the absence of more d e t a i l e d i n -f o r m a t i o n . W h i l e t h e r e i s l i t t l e d oubt a b o u t t h e d u a l i t y o f S o v i e t p o l i c y which was f a r from as d i s i n t e r e s t e d as p r e s e n t e d by S o v i e t commentators, the t r a d e w i t h the S o v i e t Union, as w e l l as the m i l i t a r y , economic, t e c h n i c a l and medical a s s i s t a n c e rendered t o the CCP by the S o v i e t s had indeed made i t e a s i e r f o r the weak and s t r u g g l i n g r e v o l u t i o n a r y government t o cope w i t h the numerous problems of c i v i l war. As Levine had concluded i n h i s study, "without S o v i e t a s s i s t a n c e , i t would be f a r more d i f f i c u l t f o r the CCP t o mount a c h a l l e n g e t o the N a t i o n a l i s t s i n M a n c h u r i a — an area where the P a r t y l a c k e d support, e x p e r i e n c e , and l o c a l c a d r e s . 1 , 2 5 A f t e r the founding of the People's R e p u b l i c , the b e n e f i t s of S i n o - S o v i e t economic c o o p e r a t i o n f o r the Chinese Communists became even more obvious. When they came t o power, the Communists had had a l m o s t no e x p e r i e n c e i n d e v e l o p i n g modern i n d u s t r y . Determined t o embark q u i c k l y on an ambitious i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n program, they looked n a t u r a l l y t o S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p and t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e . Because of a U . S . - i n i t i a t e d and UN-backed embargo, the S o v i e t Union and other European Communist c o u n t r i e s became China's s o l e s u p p l i e r s of m i l i t a r y equipment as w e l l as o f many othe r types of machinery and c a p i t a l goods. A l l w r i t e r s a g r e e t h a t d u r i n g C h i n a ' s F i r s t F i v e Year plan(1953-1957) , the S o v i e t Union made a d e c i s i v e c o n t r i b u t i o n to China's i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n . The 156 S o v i e t - a i d p r o j e c t s formed the backbone of China's i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n , which equaled 41.7% of the t o t a l investment i n i n d u s t r y 2 6 and accounted f o r a v e r y h i g h percentage of China's t o t a l i n c r e a s e i n p r o d u c t i v e c a p a c i t y : 32 Percentage of i n c r e a s e i n p r o d u c t i v e c a p a c i t y owing t o 156 S o v i e t - a i d p r o j e c t s (1953-1957) 2 7 P i g i r o n 92.1 S t e e l 82.8 R o l l e d S t e e l 90.4 Coal 22.7 Crude o i l 51.4 M e t a l l u r g i c a l equipment ....50.3 E l e c t r i c g e n e r a t i n g equipment.... 45.0 Chemical f e r t i l i z e r s 28.5 Trucks ( u n i t s ) 100.0 The f o l l o w i n g percentages of products produced i n China i n 1960 a r e t h e r e s u l t s o f S o v i e t - a i d p r o j e c t s : P i g I r o n 30%; S t e e l about 40%; R o l l e d s t e e l more than 50%; Trucks 80%; T r a c t o r s more than 90%; E l e c t r i c i t y 25%; heavy machinery more than 10%. 2 8 On the ot h e r hand, S o v i e t f i n a n c i a l a s s i s t a n c e t o China has been a c o n t r o v e r s i a l aspect of S i n o - S o v i e t economic r e l a t i o n s . I t i s g e n e r a l l y assumed t h a t t h e r e was no f r e e a i d g i v e n t o C h i n a - - s a v e f o r a few g i f t s w i t h v e r y l i m i t e d v a l u e s u c h as S o v i e t equipment f o r a s t a t e farm g i v e n i n 1954 d u r i n g 33 Khrushchev's v i s i t t o China. But S o v i e t sources c l a i m e d t h a t they assumed 50% of a l l c o s t s f o r the i n s t r u c t i o n and p r o v i s i o n o f s t i p e n d s f o r t h e C h i n e s e t r a i n e d i n t h e i r c o u n t r y . 2 9 Moreover, as mentioned b e f o r e , the S o v i e t s c l a i m e d t h a t 24,000 s e t s of s c i e n t i f i c and t e c h n o l o g i c a l documents, worth "many b i l -l i o n s of d o l l a r s , " were g i v e n t o China v i r t u a l l y c o s t - f r e e . 3 0 The o n l y p u b l i c i z e d S o v i e t l o a n s were t h o s e i n 1950 and 1954, t o t a l i n g 1,720 m i l l i o n o l d r o u b l e s (=US $430 m i l l i o n ) . However, i t i s g e n e r a l l y agreed t h a t S o v i e t f i n a n c i a l a i d was not l i m i t e d t o t h i s amount. In f a c t t h e r e has been a t o t a l d i s a g r e e -ment as t o how much " a i d " had been s u p p l i e d by the S o v i e t Union t o China, not o n l y between the Chinese and S o v i e t governments but a l s o among Western s c h o l a r s . A c c o r d i n g t o R. L. P r i c e , t h e long-term S o v i e t c r e d i t s China has acknowledged amounted t o US $1,405 m i l l i o n . "These i n c l u d e d an economic l o a n of 300 m i l l i o n g r a n t e d i n 1950; a f u r t h e r economic c r e d i t o f 130 m i l l i o n i n 1954; a l o a n i n 1955 c o v e r i n g the t r a n s f e r t o China o f S o v i e t h o l d i n g s i n f o u r j o i n t - s t o c k companies and o t h e r Soviet-owned as-s e t s i n China b e l i e v e d t o t o t a l $330 m i l l i o n ; and o t h e r m i s c e l -laneous c r e d i t s t o t a l i n g $645 m i l l i o n s , probably mainly used f o r m i l i t a r y p u r p o s e s . " 3 1 I f c a l c u l a t e d from t h e sum t o t a l o f China's f a v o r a b l e t r a d e balance with the S o v i e t Union from 1956 t o 1965 ( s i n c e the Chinese debt repayment p r i n c i p a l l y took the 34 form of t r a d i n g s u r p l u s ) , the f i g u r e amounts t o 6,211 m i l l i o n o l d r o u b l e s , 3 2 which i s c l o s e r t o both A . E c k s t e i n ' s e s t i m a t i o n of 5,300 m i l l i o n o l d roubles(1950-1957) 3 3 and Zhou E n l a i ' s f i g u r e of 6,244 m i l l i o n o l d r o u b l e s . 3 4 Data p u b l i s h e d i n more r e c e n t years by both the S o v i e t s and the Chinese seem t o suggest t h a t Robert R. P r i c e ' s f i g u r e o f US $1,405 b i l l i o n might be c l o s e r t o r e a l i t y . In 1977, M.I.Sladkovsky gave a l i s t o f S o v i e t c r e d i t s t o t a l i n g 1.816 b i l l i o n r o u b l e s : Year T o t a l amount of c r e d i t used' ( i n m i l l i o n s of ro u b l e s ) 1950 270.0 1951 433.0 1952 241.5 1953 135. 2 1954 188.2 1955 218.2 1956 329.6 In China's s o c i a l i s t Economy (1986), the amount of t o t a l S o v i e t l o a n s was g i v e n as 1.406 b i l l i o n r o u b l e s 3 6 , w i t h o u t r e v e a l i n g f u r t h e r d e t a i l . Thus, i t seems reasonable t o assume t h a t the f i g u r e i s between 1.4 t o 1.8 b i l l i o n r o u b l e s . S t i l l , s i n c e much of the S o v i e t a i d t o China was g i v e n d u r i n g the 1950's when a l t e r n a t i v e sources of a i d were p o l i t i c a l l y out of the ques-t i o n , the v a l u e of S o v i e t a i d must be regarded as f a i r l y con-s i d e r a b l e and i n d i s p e n s a b l e . Besides, S o v i e t a i d cannot p o s s i b l y 35 be e v a l u a t e d o n l y i n terms of r o u b l e f i g u r e s a l o n e . The p r o v i -s i o n o f e x p e r t knowledge and t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e must have g r e a t l y c o n t r i b u t e d t o the e f f i c i e n c y of investment, e s p e c i a l l y i n view of the shortage of e n g i n e e r i n g and management personnel i n China. Without the a s s i s t a n c e and c o o p e r a t i o n of the S o v i e t Union, the p r o g r e s s of China's s c i e n c e and technology, as w e l l as the b u i l d i n g up of i t s s c i e n t i f i c and t e c h n i c a l manpower d u r i n g the 1950's c o u l d not have been achieved. For i n s t a n c e , the r e s t o r a -t i o n and development of r a i l w a y l i n e s i n the Northeast had t o be performed under the guidance of S o v i e t engineers and t e c h n i c i a n s , because under Japanese occupation, a l l t e c h n i c a l j o b s i n the Manchurian Railway system were h e l d by Japanese. 3 7 In China's l a r g e s t s t e e l - i r o n complex o f Anshan, t h e r e was n o t a s i n g l e C h i n e s e e n g i n e e r f a m i l i a r w i t h d e s i g n i n g b e c a u s e t h e f o r e i g n owners of i n d u s t r i a l e n t e r p r i s e s d i d not a l l o w the Chinese to p a r t i c i p a t e i n d e s i g n i n g as a r u l e . 3 8 A c c o r d i n g t o a survey taken i n 1957, o n l y 56% of c h i e f engineers, the number two men i n en-t e r p r i s e s , had graduated from h i g h e r s c h o o l s . Only 13% of 800,000 engineers and t e c h n i c i a n s had r e c e i v e d h i g h e r e d u c a t i o n , and 64% had t o l e a r n on t h e i r j o b . 3 9 Thus, the presence of S o v i e t ad-v i s e r s i n key i n d u s t r i a l u n i t s must have a l l e v i a t e d the problem of shortage of e x p e r t i s e i n t e c h n i c a l areas. 36 The C h i n e s e government was k e e n l y aware o f t h e need t o b u i l d up adequate s c i e n t i f i c and e n g i n e e r i n g manpower. From 1949 t o 1963, enrollment i n i n s t i t u t i o n s of h i g h e r l e a r n i n g i n c r e a s e d s e v e n f o l d , and l a r g e numbers of students were t r a i n e d as s c i e n -t i s t s and engineers i n v a r i o u s branches of modern s c i e n c e and t e c h n o l o g y . 4 0 In the t r a i n i n g of Chinese t e c h n i c a l p e r s o n n e l , the r o l e p l a y e d by the S o v i e t s i s undeniable. Even a l l o w i n g f o r some exag g e r a t i o n of S o v i e t c o n t r i b u t i o n , the f i g u r e s r e v e a l e d by the Chinese p r e s s i n the 1950's are s t i l l v e r y i m p r e s s i v e . For i n s t a n c e , as r e p o r t e d i n 1955, d u r i n g t h e 3 y e a r s o f j o i n t management of Changchun Railway, 45,900 managerial p e r s o n n e l and servicemen were t r a i n e d by S o v i e t s p e c i a l i s t s . The S i n o - S o v i e t Nonferrous and Rare Metals Company had t r a i n e d more than hundred young e n g i n e e r s and more t h a n 5,000 t e c h n i c i a n s and s k i l l e d workers. More than 2,000 t e c h n i c i a n s were t r a i n e d i n the X i n j i a n g Petroleum Company. Twenty f o u r t r a i n i n g courses were conducted i n the S i n o - S o v i e t C i v i l A v i a t i o n Company. I t was exclaimed: "In one word, where t h e r e are S o v i e t s p e c i a l i s t s working, t h e r e are l a r g e numbers of new-type t e c h n i c a l p e r s onnel t r a i n e d . " 4 1 Ac-c o r d i n g t o a study conducted under the N a t i o n a l S c i e n c e Founda-t i o n of the U n i t e d S t a t e s : A l m o s t e v e r y i m p o r t a n t b r a n c h o f t h e t e c h n i c a l o r n a t u r a l s c i e n c e s i n China was c r e a t e d or expanded with S o v i e t a s s i s t a n c e d u r i n g 1950-60. The S o v i e t s l a i d a f o u n d a t i o n f o r the development of branches of s c i e n c e p r e v i o u s l y unknown i n C h i n a . Departments f o r m e r l y s h o r t o f q u a l i f i e d p e r s o n n e l have g r a d u a l l y formed armies of e x p e r t s , w h i l e those branches of s c i e n c e p r e -v i o u s l y underdeveloped have advanced remarkably. 4 2 I t i s f a i r t o s t a t e t h a t S o v i e t c o o p e r a t i o n and a s s i s t a n c e l a i d the groundwork from which the Chinese have been a b l e t o co n t i n u e t h e i r i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n independently. As Mao I-sheng, an o u t s t a n d i n g Chinese c i v i l engineer, observed i n 1959, im-m e d i a t e l y a f t e r t h e " l i b e r a t i o n " , most o f t h e major c a p i t a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n was under S o v i e t a u s p i c e s . But by 1959, "our s c i e n t i f i c f o r c e c o u l d independently undertake such a j o b . " 4 3 On the oth e r hand, the seemingly u n g r a t e f u l Chinese a t t i t u d e expressed a f t e r t h e i r r e l a t i o n s w i t h the S o v i e t Union had soured was not t o t a l l y unreasonable. As e a r l y as September 1959, wh i l e commenting on S o v i e t a s s i s t a n c e , L i X i a n n i a n wrote: "In the past t e n years, ... wit h the e x c e p t i o n i n the the e a r l i e r years o f the founding o f our country when the S o v i e t Union granted us some l o w - i n t e r e s t l o a n s , ( i t s ) a s s i s t a n c e was p r i m a r i l y conducted through the tr a d e processes i n a mutually b e n e f i c i a l way." 4 4 T h i s statement can be regarded as w e l l founded, because i t was estimated t h a t the two well-known S o v i e t loans f o r economic development (US $430 m i l l i o n ) were o n l y enough t o pay 11% o f China's t o t a l imports from 1950-57 and c o n s t i t u t e d merely 3% of the t o t a l s t a t e investment f o r the F i r s t F i v e Year P l a n . 4 5 In c o m p a r i s o n w i t h S o v i e t a i d t o o t h e r s o c i a l i s t c o u n t r i e s , t h e "Chinese share" was completely d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e t o the s i z e of i t s p o p u l a t i o n . 4 6 In a d d i t i o n , the d e f i c i e n c y o f S o v i e t a s s i s -38 tance a l s o deserves n o t i c e here. C. Y. Cheng wrote, "some d i r e c t a s p e c t s of S o v i e t a i d were d e f i c i e n t i n many r e s p e c t s and some-times clumsy and i l l - a d v i s e d . " 4 7 O c c a s i o n a l l y , the Chinese a l s o r e p o r t e d t h a t some S o v i e t t e c h n i c a l data and machines were un-s u i t e d t o Chinese c o n d i t i o n s . For i n s t a n c e , i n 1951, an a r t i c l e p u b l i s h e d i n the magazine Zhonqsu Youhao ( S i n o - S o v i e t F r i e n d s h i p ) mentioned t h a t some mining machinery from the S o v i e t Union c o u l d n o t be made t o o p e r a t e i n C h i n e s e m i n e s . 4 8 I n 1957, i t was r e p o r t e d t h a t S o v i e t instruments f a i l e d t o operate i n China's s u b t r o p i c a l c l i m a t e . 4 9 In a l l f a i r n e s s , however, i t should be noted t h a t t h i s k i n d of d e f i c i e n c y would h a r d l y be a v o i d a b l e i n any f o r e i g n - a i d program. The c o s t s f o r China i n i t s economic c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h the S o v i e t Union are more d i f f i c u l t t o a s s e s s . While the harmful e f -f e c t s of S o v i e t economic p r e s s u r e , such as the sudden withdrawal of a l l e x p e r t s and the c u r t a i l m e n t of t r a d e a f t e r 1960 are ob-v i o u s , assessments of " S o v i e t e x p l o i t a t i o n " are o f t e n s p e c u l a t i v e i n nature. I t i s one t h i n g t o assume t h a t "economic dependence on t h e S o v i e t b l o c would p r o v e q u i t e e x p e n s i v e , " 5 0 b u t q u i t e a n o t h e r t o p r o v e i t w i t h p r o p e r l y i n t e r p r e t e d s t a t i s t i c a l evidence. Foremost among the cases of " S o v i e t e x p l o i t a t i o n " i s the s o - c a l l e d " S t a l i n 's i m p e r i a l i s t 50-50 j o i n t s t o c k d e a l . " The standard assumption of the matter was t h a t " i f the [ j o i n t - s t o c k ] formula of economic c o o p e r a t i o n [was] extended t o o t h e r p a r t s of China... the S o v i e t Union would by means of a c e r t a i n amount of i t s t e c h n o l o g i c a l equipment get h a l f of the wealth hidden under Chinese s o i l and a l a r g e amount of p r o f i t s from commercial under-t a k i n g i n China." 5 1 I t i s o f t e n observed t h a t even Khrushchev h i m s e l f admitted, i n h i s memoirs, t h a t i t had been a major e r r o r t o e s t a b l i s h j o i n t - s t o c k companies. 5 2 Moreover, the New York  Times r e p o r t e d t h a t Khrushchev s a i d S t a l i n had j e o p a r d i z e d the S i n o - S o v i e t a l l i a n c e by "demanding too much i n r e t u r n f o r a i d " , and Mao had been "extremely embittered" by S t a l i n ' s i n s i s t e n c e on j o i n t s t o c k companies and mining and i n d u s t r i a l c o n c e s s i o n s . 5 3 A more c a r e f u l and t h o r o u g h s t u d y o f S o v i e t and C h i n e s e sources, however, seems t o suggest t h a t the q u e s t i o n might not be as simple as had been assumed. F i r s t of a l l , i t i s not e n t i r e l y c l e a r who i n i t i a t e d the d e a l . I t was g e n e r a l l y assumed t h a t the S o v i e t had d e s i r e d i t , and the Chinese Communists' acceptance of the d e a l r e p r e s e n t e d t h e i r c o n c e s s i o n s t o S o v i e t demands. As e a r l y as November 194 5, the S o v i e t s a l r e a d y n e g o t i a t e d with the Guomindang, demanding ex-t e n s i v e S i n o - S o v i e t economic c o o p e r a t i o n i n the form of j o i n t S i n o - S o v i e t management. The S o v i e t commander i n Manchuria, Mar-s h a l Malinovsky, as w e l l as the S o v i e t economic a d v i s o r M. I. Sladkovsky, r e p e a t e d l y warned t h a t a s o l u t i o n t o the problem of economic c o o p e r a t i o n would have t o be found b e f o r e S o v i e t t r o o p s 40 would l e a v e Manchuria. These demands were turne d down by the Guomindang on the ground t h a t such c o o p e r a t i o n would g i v e the S o v i e t s a permanent economic i n t e r e s t i n the r e g i o n . 5 4 L a t e r , i n the E a s t European s a t e l l i t e s , when j o i n t - s t o c k companies were es-t a b l i s h e d , the S o v i e t share was based on e x p r o p r i a t e d German as-s e t s . T h i s p a t t e r n was p a r a l l e l e d c l o s e l y when the f i r s t two j o i n t - s t o c k companies i n the Northeast, the Changchun r a i l w a y and the D a l i a n s h i p y a r d s , were e s t a b l i s h e d . In these two companies, the S o v i e t c o n t r i b u t i o n was r e p r e s e n t e d by Japanese shares and h o l d i n g s which had been e x p r o p r i a t e d by the S o v i e t o c c u p a t i o n a u t h o r i t i e s i n Manchuria. 5 5 T h e r e f o r e i t i s p l a u s i b l e t h a t the S o v i e t s had demanded the d e a l . However, i n h i s r e c e n t l y p u b l i s h e d memoirs, A n d r e i Gromyko, the deputy-head of the S o v i e t d e l e g a t i o n n e g o t i a t i n g the d e a l of j o i n t - s t o c k companies i n 1950, gave the f o l l o w i n g account: Soon a f t e r the formation of the Chinese People's R e p u b l i c , the Chinese had proposed t a l k s w i t h the USSR on the c r e a t i o n of two j o i n t - s t o c k companies, one Sov-k i t n e f t ( S o v i e t - C h i n e s e O i l ) and the o t h e r S o v k i t m e t a l ( S o v i e t - C h i n e s e M e t a l ) , t o be b u i l t i n the north-western p a r t of China, i n the p r o v i n c e of X i n j i a n g . I t o n l y remained t o put i t a l l on paper. The two s i d e s a c c o r d i n g l y agreed t h a t s p e c i a l l y ap-p o i n t e d d e l e g a t i o n s should conduct the t a l k s . . . A f t e r a few s e s s i o n s i n Moscow, however, i t became c l e a r the Chinese had changed t h e i r minds, and, when I r e p o r t e d t h i s t o the P o l i t b u r o , S t a l i n vented h i s f e e l i n g s on the matter i n the s t r o n g e s t terms. 5 6 41 I t would be i n t e r e s t i n g t o know how a c c u r a t e such an account i s . U nless both Moscow and B e i j i n g open t h e i r a r c h i v e s , however, t h e r e i s no way t o know f o r c e r t a i n . Second, the S o v i e t c o n t r i b u t i o n t o the j o i n t - s t o c k companies was not l i m i t e d t o the e x p r o p r i a t e d Japanese shares o r h o l d i n g s , or a " c e r t a i n amount of S o v i e t t e c h n o l o g i c a l equipment." T h e r e were f i v e S i n o - S o v i e t j o i n t - s t o c k companies: t h e Changchun Railway,the D a l i a n Shipyards, the X i n j i a n g Nonferrous and Rare Metals Company, the X i n j i a n g Petroleum Company, and the S i n o - S o v i e t C i v i l A v i a t i o n Company. 5 7 The D a l i a n S h i p y a r d s were e s t a b l i s h e d on t h e base o f "Dal'doc" a s h i p y a r d founded by the Russian government i n 1903, when R u s s i a h e l d a l e a s e on the Liaodong P e n i n s u l a . I t was s u r -r e n d e r e d t o t h e J a p a n e s e under t h e terms o f t h e T r e a t y o f P o r t s m o n t h i n 1905. The s h i p y a r d s were t h e n expanded by t h e Japanese i n t o one of the b i g g e s t s h i p b u i l d i n g f a c t o r i e s i n China w i t h the c a p a c i t y of b u i l d i n g and r e p a i r i n g s h i p s up t o 12,000 tons. Under Japanese management, a l l e n g i n e e r s and t e c h n i c i a n s were Japanese. When S o v i e t a u t h o r i t i e s took c o n t r o l i n 1945 , they were p a r a l y z e d : major equipment was b a d l y worn out d u r i n g t h e war, and a l l J a p a n e s e p e r s o n n e l had been e v a c u a t e d . R e b u i l d i n g of the s h i p y a r d s was conducted by S o v i e t e n g i n e e r s and t e c h n i c i a n s w i t h S o v i e t equipment. By t h e end o f 1949, t h e prewar o u t p u t o f t h e y a r d s was s u r p a s s e d . In t h e p r o c e s s , Chinese workers and managerial personnel were t r a i n e d . By mid-1949 , the s h i p y a r d s were put under S i n o - S o v i e t j o i n t management. And a c c o r d i n g t o the agreement of 1950, i t became a j o i n t - s t o c k company. 5 8 Up t i l l 1943, t h e r e were some j o i n t S i n o - S o v i e t e n t e r p r i s e s i n X i n j i a n g , s e t up a t t h e r e q u e s t o f t h e l o c a l C h i n e s e a u t h o r i t i e s f o r e x p l o r i n g , mining , the d r e s s i n g of some nonfer-rous metal ores, as w e l l as f o r e x t r a c t i n g and r e f i n i n g o i l i n the area. In 1950, these e n t e r p r i s e s became the b a s i s f o r the j o i n t - s t o c k companies i n the p r o v i n c e . 5 9 the 1950 agreements d e f i n e d t h a t these j o i n t - s t o c k com-panies, except the Changchun Railway which was r e t u r n e d f r e e of charge t o China on January, 1953, 6 0 were s e t up f o r a term of 3 0 y e a r s , on a p a r i t y b a s i s w i t h t h e p r o v i s i o n s f o r t h e p a r t i e s e q u a l l y s h a r i n g i n the c a p i t a l and management of t h e i r a f f a i r s . The S o v i e t U n i o n p r o v i d e d i n d u s t r i a l equipment, m a c h i n e r y , a i r p l a n e s and a p p l i a n c e s ; China c o n t r i b u t e d l a n d and b u i l d i n g m a t e r i a l s . The a c t i v i t i e s o f t h e s e companies were t o be d i r e c t e d by r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of both s i d e s a l t e r n a t e l y . 6 1 In October 1954, on the i n i t i a t i v e of the S o v i e t government, an agreement was s i g n e d i n order t o t r a n s f e r a l l S o v i e t r i g h t s and shares i n these j o i n t - s t o c k companies i n t o China's f u l l pos-s e s s i o n . Presumably, the reason f o r t h i s t r a n s f e r e n c e was t h a t the Chinese were, a t the time, capable of managing these com-panies on t h e i r own. More l i k e l y , however, i t was a r e s u l t of a d e l i b e r a t e e f f o r t on the p a r t of the new S o v i e t l e a d e r s t o remove 43 p a s t causes of f r i c t i o n . For China t o purchase these shares, a long-term c r e d i t of more than 60 m i l l i o n r o u b l e s was p r o v i d e d by the S o v i e t government. 6 2 Renmin Ribao wrote i n t h i s c o n n e c t i o n : The use o f advanced S o v i e t e x p e r i e n c e i n economic development and f i r s t - r a t e technology has made i t pos-s i b l e t o resume and expand w i t h i n a s h o r t space of time the o p e r a t i o n of the e n t e r p r i s e s taken over by these companies; these modern e n t e r p r i s e s have c o n t r i b u t e d e f f e c t i v e l y t o the r e h a b i l i t a t i o n and development of our economy.... The investments of the s o c i a l i s t S o v i e t Union. . . were t o (be used f o r ) d e v e l o p i n g our n a t u r a l wealth, which we o u r s e l v e s were unable t o develop, or t o o r g a n i z e the o p e r a t i o n of those e x i s t i n g e n t e r p r i s e s t h a t was d i f f i c u l t f o r us t o operate on our own, and thereby t o h e l p c r e a t e the c o n d i t i o n s f o r economic i n -dependence of our p e o p l e . 6 3 I t i s important t o note t h a t a f t e r more than 3 0 y e a r s , both Chinese s c h o l a r s and governmental o f f i c i a l s s t i l l h o l d l a r g e l y the same view. For i n s t a n c e , i n h i s memoirs My E i g h t y ears i n  the M i n i s t r y of F o r e i g n A f f a i r s ( 1 9 8 3 ) , Wu Xiuquan c l e a r l y s t a t e d t h a t the j o i n t - s t o c k companies were " b e n e f i c i a l t o both s i d e s " ; b e c a u s e a t t h a t t i m e , "we had no means t o d e v e l o p t h e s e r i c h n a t u r a l r e s o u r c e s . We had to ask the S o v i e t .Union f o r h e l p . . . I n our n e g o t i a t i o n , we emphasized t h a t our country kept her i n d e -pendence , w h i l e the S o v i e t Union t r i e d her b e s t t o h e l p without e x p l o i t i n g ( u s ) . " 6 4 J i a Wenhua, i n h i s S o v i e t Union's F o r e i g n  R e l a t i o n s ( 1 9 8 9 ) , a l s o a f f i r m s t h a t the j o i n t - s t o c k companies were " b e n e f i c i a l t o both s i d e s . For China, they p r o v i d e d the t e c h n i -c a l b a s i s of these f i r m s and helped t o t r a i n the managerial s t a f f and t e c h n i c i a n s capable of d i r e c t i n g modern i n d u s t r i e s . " 6 5 44 A c c o r d i n g t o Wu Xiuquan, even i n the e a r l y 1950s, t h e r e were some disagreements c o n c e r n i n g j o i n t s t o c k companies. For i n -stance, the S o v i e t s had once proposed t o expand the areas of ex-p l o r i n g o i l d e p o s i t s . The Chinese c o n s i d e r e d the area with o i l d e p o s i t s t h e i r investment. I f the area of e x p l o r i n g was t o be i n c r e a s e d , the S o v i e t s should a l s o i n c r e a s e t h e i r investment i n t h e form o f equipment f o r o i l f i e l d s . But what t h e S o v i e t s wanted was onl y - the expansion of the o i l f i e l d s without f u r t h e r i n v e s t m e n t . As a r e s u l t o f t h i s d i s a g r e e m e n t , t h e i s s u e was dropped. For Wu Xiuquan, t h i s was an example which manifested t h a t "we were not always i n t o t a l agreement w i t h the S o v i e t Union even a t t h a t t i m e . " 6 6 To an o u t s i d e observer, however, i t a l s o demonstrated t h a t "even a t t h a t time," China was not merely a d o c i l e " s a t e l l i t e " i n matters of economic c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h the S o v i e t Union. S o v i e t sources used t o c l a i m t h a t the j o i n t - s t o c k companies g r e a t l y c o n t r i b u t e d t o China's economic r e h a b i l i t a t i o n . For ex-ample, the Non-ferrous and Rare Metals Company had b u i l t 11 non-f e r r o u s and r a r e metal ore mines, s e t up a s p e c i a l i z e d mining and p e t r o l e u m s e c o n d a r y s c h o o l o f 600 C h i n e s e s t u d e n t s , and had t r a i n e d 5,150 Chinese engineers, t e c h n i c i a n s , and s k i l l e d opera-t i v e s as w e l l as 300 members of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and managerial personnel. 6 7And as mentioned b e f o r e , Chinese sources o f the mid-1 9 5 0 ' s w e r e no l e s s e n t h u s i a s t i c a b o u t t h i s S o v i e t c o n t r i b u t i o n . ( S e e p.37 of t h i s paper.) U n f o r t u n a t e l y , even w i t h a l l t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n , the p i c t u r e of S i n o - S o v i e t j o i n t - s t o c k companies i s s t i l l not v e r y c l e a r , be-cause n e i t h e r t h e i r a c c o u n t i n g system nor the method of p r o f i t -s h a r i n g i s known. Moreover, i t i s f a r from c e r t a i n how equal the managerial r i g h t was f o r both p a r t i e s — e s p e c i a l l y because i t was the S o v i e t s who had the know-how—though A . E c k s t e i n b e l i e v e d t h a t the t h r e e j o i n t - s t o c k companies i n X i n j i a n g " were based much more on a genuine p a r t n e r s h i p . " 6 8 However, i t would be s a f e t o assume t h a t w h i l e t h e r e were p l e n t y of c o m p e l l i n g reasons, b o t h d o m e s t i c and f o r e i g n , f o r K h r u s h c h e v t o l i f t h i s hand a g a i n s t S t a l i n , i t would be f a r more d i f f i c u l t t o p r o v i d e i n c e n -t i v e s f o r a r e t i r e d Wu Xiuquan t o f l a t t e r the S o v i e t Union i n 1983. In f a c t , a v a i l a b l e evidence i n d i c a t e s t h a t , a t l e a s t up t i l l 1983, Wu was not a t a l l " p r o - S o v i e t " . To the c o n t r a r y , i n h i s memoirs, the S o v i e t s were accused of attempting t o "take ad-vantage of China" i n the n e g o t i a t i o n of rouble-yuan exchange r a t e i n 1950. 6 9 And h i s account of the S i n o - S o v i e t d i s p u t e , p u b l i s h e d i n l a t e 1983, was b i t t e r a t times and i n g e n e r a l not l e s s par-t i s a n than the Chinese p o l e m i c a l r h e t o r i c of the 1960's. 7 0 In the case of Mao's r e p o r t e d "extreme b i t t e r n e s s " a g a i n s t the d e a l of j o i n t - s t o c k companies, i t should be noted t h a t , i n view of Mao's r a t h e r c o n s i s t e n t " a n t i - S o v i e t " r e c o r d , 7 1 more evidence i s needed t o prove t h a t h i s r e a c t i o n was due more t o the economic c o s t t o the n a t i o n than t o some o t h e r p s y c h o l o g i c a l or p e r s o n a l f a c t o r s . 46 In S i n o - S o v i e t t r a d e , the s u p e r i o r i t y of S o v i e t b a r g a i n i n g power must have been e v i d e n t t o a l l o b s e r v e r s . As a whole, China was e c o n o m i c a l l y much more dependent on the S o v i e t Union than v i c e v e r s a . In i t s urgent demand f o r S o v i e t i n d u s t r i a l equip-ment, China had no r e a l i s t i c a l t e r n a t i v e , whereas S o v i e t demand f o r Chinese consumer goods was r a t h e r low on Moscow's l i s t of p r e f e r e n c e s . In a d d i t i o n , the S o v i e t commitment t o export c a p i -t a l goods t o China was d i r e c t l y c o m p e t i t i v e w i t h the USSR's own d o m e s t i c demand and i t s commitment t o o t h e r l e s s d e v e l o p e d c o u n t r i e s . None of these f a c t o r s was l i k e l y t o have f a v o r a b l e i n f l u e n c e s on China's b a r g a i n i n g p o s i t i o n . Hence, i t i s not i n -c o n c e i v a b l e t h a t S o v i e t s u p e r i o r i t y i n b a r g a i n i n g power c o u l d be r e f l e c t e d i n adverse t r a d e terms f o r China. In a study which compares the u n i t v a l u e of S o v i e t exports t o and imports from both China and Western Europe from 1955 t o 1959, F.H. Mah t r i e d t o f i n d o u t whether t h e S o v i e t s had " o v e r p r i c e d " t h e i r e x p o r t s t o C h i n a , o r w h e t h e r t h e y " u n d e r p r i c e d " t h e i r imports from China. The c e n t r a l f i n d i n g of t h i s i n v e s t i g a t i o n i s t h a t t r a d e with the S o v i e t Union i n v o l v e d a p r i c e disadvantage f o r China. A c c o r d i n g t o Mah's c a l c u l a t i o n s , i n the case of China's imports, " f o r r o u g h l y f o u r out of every f i v e commodities s o l d t o both China and Western Europe, R u s s i a charged China h i g h e r u n i t v a l u e s between 1955 and 1957. In 1958 47 and 1959 China p a i d h i g h e r u n i t v a l u e s f o r r o u g h l y n i n e out of every t e n commodities." As a r e s u l t , the Chinese p a i d on average about 30% more f o r t h e i r imports than d i d Western Europe. 7 2 I f the same degree of u n i t v a l u e d i f f e r e n t i a l s i s a p p l i e d t o S i n o -S o v i e t t r a d e as a whole, China's t o t a l overpayment from 1955-1959 would be approximately $928 m i l l i o n , which i s roug h l y equal t o China's t o t a l imports from the S o v i e t Union i n 1959. 7 3 However, what does t h i s p r i c e d i f f e r e n t i a l r e a l l y mean? Can i t be i n t e r p r e t e d as S o v i e t e x p l o i t a t i o n ? In f a c t , many que s t i o n s can be r a i s e d concerning the b a s i s o f t h i s a n a l y s i s . For i n -stance, t o what extent i s the sample of goods s t u d i e d r e p r e s e n t a -t i v e ? Can the f i n d i n g of the study be a p p l i e d t o a l l imports? S i n c e so many d e t a i l s of the needed i n f o r m a t i o n are m i s s i n g , even F.H. Mah i s o b l i g e d t o acknowledge t h a t h i s f i n d i n g a t b e s t o n l y s e t s up a presumption r a t h e r than a p r o o f . 7 4 S e v e r a l f a c t o r s might have c o n t r i b u t e d t o the p r i c e d i f -f e r e n t i a l . One important f a c t o r was the t r a n s p o r t c o s t s . As a l l t h e c a l c u l a t i o n s o f u n i t v a l u e a r e b a s e d on o f f i c i a l S o v i e t s t a t i s t i c s , i t i s important t o keep i n mind t h a t the r e p o r t e d v a l u e s of S o v i e t e xports and imports are based on the s e l l e r ' s d e l i v e r e d p r i c e s a t the b o r d e r p o i n t . The b u l k of S o v i e t exports t o China moved v i a the T r a n - S i b e r i a n r a i l r o a d ; t h e r e f o r e , the p r i c e of China's imports from the S o v i e t Union i n c l u d e d the c o s t of long and expensive t r a n s p o r t h a u l s . On the o t h e r hand, the 48 t r a n s p o r t c o s t t o c o u n t r i e s i n Europe was much lower simply be-cause the r o u t e was much s h o r t e r . Thus the t r a n s p o r t c o s t c o u l d be the major reason f o r the p r i c e d i f f e r e n t i a l . 7 5 I f one assumes t h a t the t r a n s p o r t c o s t s e x p l a i n the major p o r t i o n of the p r i c e d i f f e r e n t i a l , can the u n e x p l a i n e d r e s i d u a l be a t t r i b u t e d t o S o v i e t s u p e r i o r i t y i n b a r g a i n i n g power? Mah i n c l i n e d t o e x p l a i n the s i t u a t i o n by r e f e r r i n g t o the e f f e c t s of China's " l e a n t o one s i d e " f o r e i g n p o l i c y . A c c o r d i n g t o him, such f o r e i g n p o l i c y had l e f t China " not much c h o i c e but t o be a p r i c e - t a k e r " i n p r i c e n e g o t i a t i o n , " and i t i s thus con-c e i v a b l e t h a t s u p e r i o r b a r g a i n i n g power might have been employed by the R u s s i a n s . " 7 6 And China's complaint of the USSR's " u n f a i r economic treatment" was c i t e d as an e v i d e n c e . 7 7 N e v e r t h e l e s s , s u c h e v i d e n c e s h o u l d be examined more c a r e f u l l y . On t h e one hand, up t o the year 1989, the Chinese were s t i l l a c c u s i n g the S o v i e t s of o v e r p r i c i n g t h e i r goods, though not as h i g h as 30%. J i a Wenhua a s s e r t s : The S o v i e t Union a l s o p r o v i d e d i n d u s t r i a l equipment at the p r i c e s h i g h e r than i n t e r n a t i o n a l market. In pur-c h a s i n g s e t e quipments, C h i n a was a l w a y s t h e p r i c e t a k e r . Before d e l i v e r y , China was r e q u i r e d t o pay a t the s o - c a l l e d temporary p r i c e upon r e c e i v i n g g o o d s — p o r t i o n by p o r t i o n . A f t e r the d e l i v e r y of a whole s e t of equipment, the S o v i e t Union would d e c i d e the f i n a l p r i c e . On the f a c e, China would pay the d i f f e r e n c e s or get r e f u n d ; a c t u a l l y i t was China who almost always p a i d more. A f t e r 1960, an i n v e s t i g a t i o n of more than 3 0 a c c o u n t i n g agreements on f i n a l p r i c e s proposed by the S o v i e t Union i n d i c a t e d t h a t the p r i c e s of a l l the e quipments p r o v i d e d by t h e S o v i e t U n i o n were on an average 10-20% h i g h e r than the i n t e r n a t i o n a l market p r i c e s . on the top of such p r i c e s , China was charged 3% more as fee f o r " s e t equipment". 49 On t h e o t h e r hand, o n l y a few y e a r s b e f o r e t h e CCP p u b l i c i z e d i t s complaint a g a i n s t S o v i e t o v e r p r i c i n g , China's min-i s t e r o f F o r e i g n Trade had a l s o d e c l a r e d i n h i s speech, d e l i v e r e d a t the N a t i o n a l People's Congress, t h a t "the p r i c e s under the S i n o - S o v i e t t r a d e a g r e e m e n t were r e a s o n a b l e a nd f a i r . " 7 9 Moreover, a c c o r d i n g t o S o v i e t sources: Each year a t the s t a r t o f the n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h Chinese r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s on the t r a d e p r o t o c o l f o r the f o l l o w i n g y e a r , t h e USSR M i n i s t r y o f F o r e i g n T r a d e a s k e d t h e C h i n e s e s i d e t o e x p r e s s i t s v i e w s on t h e p r i c e s o f S o v i e t commodities. The Chinese r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s i n -v a r i a b l y r e p l i e d t h a t they saw no reason f o r a r e v i s i o n of the p r i c e s . 8 0 Even two months a f t e r t h e C e n t r a l Committee o f t h e CCP openly accused the S o v i e t s of o v e r p r i c i n g i n May 1964, 8 1 Chinese r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s s t i l l expressed the view t h a t a r e v i s i o n o f the p r i c e s was not needed f o r the t r a d e p r o t o c o l . 8 2 I t was important t o note a t t h i s j u n c t u r e t h a t the Chinese were hard b a r g a i n e r s even i n the e a r l y 1950'Sw I t took t e n weeks f o r them t o s i g n the T r e a t y of A l l i a n c e i n 1950. A c c o r d i n g t o Wu Xi u q u a n , a p a r t i c i p a n t o f t h e n e g o t i a t i o n , e v e r y word o f t h e Tr e a t y had been d i s c u s s e d over and over. For i n s t a n c e , an a r -t i c l e i n the T r e a t y s t a t e d t h a t both s i d e s agreed t o "immediately r e n d e r m i l i t a r y and o t h e r a s s i s t a n c e by a l l means a t i t s p r o p o s a l " i f e i t h e r a l l y were a t t a c k e d by J a p a n o r any s t a t e 50 a l l i e d w i t h i t . The phrase "by a l l means a t i t s p r o p o s a l " was added i n t o the o r i g i n a l S o v i e t d r a f t because Zhou E n l a i had i n -s i s t e d t h a t i t would be "not p o s i t i v e enough" without i t . 8 3 The n e g o t i a t i o n o f rouble-yuan exchange r a t e i n 1950 was a l s o "not so harmonious and f a c i l e " . The Chinese r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s gave i n onl y a f t e r some unpleasant d i s p u t e s w i t h the S o v i e t d e l e g a t e s . 8 4 I f such b a r g a i n i n g had happened d u r i n g the f i r s t months of t h e i r A l -l i a n c e , i t would be d i f f i c u l t t o imagine the Chinese b e i n g so d o c i l e i n 1964, had the S o v i e t s indeed o v e r p r i c e d t h e i r goods. A c c o r d i n g t o the S o v i e t s , the Chinese s i d e d e c l i n e d t o review the p r i c e s because "they were, as a r u l e , s e t i n f a v o r o f China, and t h i s was a l s o a form of a i d t o the Chinese p e o p l e . " 8 5 A c c o r d i n g t o E c k s t e i n ' s o p i n i o n , the secondary f a c t o r which might have c o n t r i b u t e d t o the p r i c e d i f f e r e n t i a l c o u l d be the r e l a t i v e l y p o o r c o m p e t i t i v e p o s i t i o n s , b o t h as b u y e r s and s e l l e r s , o f a l l Communist c o u n t r i e s i n t h e non-communist market. 8 6 A study comparing the t r a d e among the Communist c o u n t r i e s of Europe and t h e i r t r a d e w i t h non-Communist Europe r e v e a l e d t h a t t h e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n e x i s t i n g between t h e S o v i e t s and t h e E a s t Europeans was mutual. 8 7 Such i n t r a b l o c p r i c e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , as E c k s t e i n suggests, c o u l d have r e s u l t e d from the weakness of t h e i r b a r g a i n i n g power i n the Western European market due t o inadequate q u a l i t y s t a n d a r d s . 8 8 A s i m i l a r s i t u a t i o n was q u i t e l i k e l y t o be found i n S i n o - S o v i e t t r a d e . 51 Another obscure problem of S i n o - S o v i e t t r a d e i s the r o u b l e -yuan exchange r a t e . S i n c e 1950, the rouble-yuan exchange r a t e has been v e i l e d i n s e c r e c y , c a u s i n g g r e a t d i f f i c u l t i e s f o r s c h o l a r s working w i t h the S i n o - S o v i e t t r a d e s t a t i s t i c s . A c c o r d i n g t o Kang Chao and F.H. Mah's study i n 1964, from the s i g n i n g of the S i n o - S o v i e t t r a d e agreement i n A p r i l 1950, t o t h e end o f 1957, t h e e f f e c t i v e r o u b l e - y u a n exchange r a t e was roughly 1 t o 1, which g r e a t l y o v e r v a l u e d the r o u b l e . I t was not u n t i l 1957 t h a t C h i n a began t o seek a d j u s t m e n t s t o t h i s un-f a v o r a b l e exchange r a t e . As a r e s u l t , a new exchange r a t e was i n t r o d u c e d a t 2 r o u b l e s = l yuan f o r f o r e i g n t r a d e and 6 roubles= 1 yuan f o r non-commercial exchange. 8 9 T h i s a d j u s t e d exchange r a t e was e f f e c t i v e u n t i l January 1961, when Moscow r e v a l u e d the r o u b l e ( i n t e r n a l l y 1 new rouble=10 o l d r o u b l e s ; e x t e r n a l l y 1 new rouble=4.44 o l d r o u b l e s ) . A f t e r t h i s c u r r e n c y reform, the ex-change r a t e of the new r o u b l e and a l l o t h e r Communist c u r r e n c i e s were r e c a l c u l a t e d a c c o r d i n g l y . The r e s u l t i n g rouble-yuan ex-change r a t e was 1 yuan=0.45 new r o u b l e f o r f o r e i g n t r a d e , and 1 yuan=0.60 new r o u b l e f o r non-commercial exchange. 9 0 T h i s 1961 adjustment of the exchange r a t e had probably c o r r e c t e d the over v a l u a t i o n o f t h e e x t e r n a l v a l u e o f r o u b l e i n a l l Communist c o u n t r i e s except C h i n a — b e c a u s e "only the S i n o - S o v i e t noncommer-c i a l exchange r a t e i s s t i l l h i g h e r than the c o r r e s p o n d i n g f o r e i g n 52 exchange r a t e . T h i s i n d i c a t e s t h a t even a f t e r the 1961 r o u b l e r e v a l u a t i o n , i n f o r e i g n t r a d e the rouble-yuan r a t e s t i l l over-v a l u e d the r o u b l e . " 9 1 The o v e r v a l u a t i o n of the r o u b l e s i n c e 1950 i s g e n e r a l l y as-sumed t o be u n f a v o r a b l e t o China's t r a d e w i t h the S o v i e t Union. For i n s t a n c e , C.Y. Cheng s t a t e s t h a t i t "proved t o f o s t e r S o v i e t e x p l o i t a t i o n . . . " because i t r e q u i r e d China t o i n c r e a s e e xports i n order t o be a b l e t o pay f o r S o v i e t i m p o r t s . 9 2 Kang Chao and F.H. Mah a l s o regarded the 1 t o 1 exchange r a t e from 1950 t o 1957 as " h i g h l y u n f a v o r a b l e " t o China, and were i n c l i n e d t o t h i n k t h a t " i t was probably o n l y f o r the sake of the then much needed S o v i e t support of i t s i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n program t h a t Peking had kept s i l e n t . " 9 3 L i k e w i s e , J i a Wenhua a s s e r t s t h a t i n s e t t l i n g t h e rouble-yuan exchange r a t e , the S o v i e t Union took advantage of China: the r o u b l e was g r e a t l y over valued , w h i l e the yuan was r e l a t i v e l y undervalued. As a r e s u l t , the e f f e c t i v e rouble-yuan exchange r a t e was r e l a t i v e l y u n f a v o r a b l e t o C h i n a . 9 4 However, the e f f e c t of the o v e r v a l u a t i o n of the r o u b l e might be more complex than the above. For i n s t a n c e , A. Nove argues t h a t s i n c e S i n o - S o v i e t t r a d e was supposed t o be based on world market p r i c e s , the exchange r a t e was i r r e l e v a n t , " u n l e s s i t can be shown t h a t t r a d e was conducted a t p r i c e s which were a f f e c t e d i n one way or the o t h e r by the o f f i c i a l rouble-yuan r a t e . " 9 5 In h i s 53 o p i n i o n , " i t was q u i t e i m p o s s i b l e t o use the exchange r a t e as a b a s i s f o r economic c a l c u l a t i o n s 11 i n S o v i e t f o r e i g n t r a d e as a w h o l e . 9 6 Thus, t h e o n l y e f f e c t o f t h e o v e r v a l u a t i o n o f t h e r o u b l e i n S i n o - S o v i e t economic r e l a t i o n s which can be known f o r c e r t a i n was t h a t the S o v i e t diplomats and e x p e r t s who worked i n China would be a b l e t o purchase more Chinese goods and s e r v i c e s w i t h l e s s r o u b l e s . M.A. Klochko, a S o v i e t e x p e r t worked i n China i n the l a t e 1950's, r e p o r t e d : " At the o f f i c i a l exchange r a t e , one yuan was worth two o l d r o u b l e s , but i n p u r c h a s i n g power, i t was worth more. . . I t was a t the u n o f f i c i a l r a t e of t e n r o u b l e s t o a yuan t h a t we bought Chinese money from one a n o t h e r . " 9 7 In essence, the above d i s c u s s i o n s of the j o i n t - s t o c k com-panies, the u n i t v a l u e d i f f e r e n t i a l and the rouble-yuan r a t e a l l suggest t h a t the q u e s t i o n of " S o v i e t e x p l o i t a t i o n " i s a h i g h l y complex one. I t i s not p o s s i b l e t o form a r e l i a b l e judgment a t t h i s stage of my study. But t h e r e i s l i t t l e doubt t h a t i t r e -q u i r e s lengthy r e s e a r c h i n order t o a r r i v e a t a t e n t a t i v e c o n c l u -s i o n . As f o r t h e S o v i e t U n i o n , t h e b e n e f i t s and c o s t s o f t h e S i n o - S o v i e t economic r e l a t i o n s are a l s o c o n t r o v e r s i a l and d i f -f i c u l t t o i n v e s t i g a t e . One s t r i k i n g f e a t u r e o f t h e Western l i t e r a t u r e on the S i n o - S o v i e t r e l a t i o n s i s the imbalance of the a t t e n t i o n p a i d t o the two p a r t i e s . In most cases, the Chinese s i d e had been more thoroughly s t u d i e d than the S o v i e t s i d e . The 54 S o v i e t sources n a t u r a l l y avoided the d i s c u s s i o n of b e n e f i t s t h e i r country had drawn from S i n o - S o v i e t economic c o o p e r a t i o n and em-p h a s i z e d or even exaggerated t h e i r s a c r i f i c e s f o r the sake of " p r o l e t a r i a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m . " Hence, the economic b e n e f i t s f o r the S o v i e t Union have been d e p i c t e d o n l y by C h i n e s e s o u r c e s i n some d e t a i l . I n an o f t e n quoted l e t t e r of the CCP, the Chinese s t a t e d : S o v i e t a i d t o China was rendered mainly i n the form of t r a d e and i t was c e r t a i n l y not a one way a f f a i r . . .the p r i c e s of many of the goods we imported from the S o v i e t U n i o n were much h i g h e r t h a n t h o s e on t h e w o r l d market...No one can say t h a t China's a i d t o the S o v i e t Union has been i n s i g n i f i c a n t and not worthy of mention. ... Up t o the end of 1962 China had f u r n i s h e d the S o v i e t Union w i t h 2,100 m i l l i o n new r o u b l e s ' worth of g r a i n , e d i b l e o i l s , and o t h e r f o o d s t u f f s . ...and 1,400 m i l l i o n new r o u b l e s ' w o rth o f m i n e r a l p r o d u c t s and m e t a l s . ...Many o f t h e s e m i n e r a l p r o d u c t s a r e raw m a t e r i a l s which are i n d i s p e n s a b l e f o r the development of the most advanced branches of s c i e n c e and f o r the manufacture of r o c k e t s and n u c l e a r weapons. N a t u r a l l y , such a c l a i m i s not p a r t i c u l a r l y i m p r e s s i v e as most of these f o o d s t u f f s and m i n e r a l products c o u l d have been ob-t a i n e d elsewhere. More i m p o r t a n t l y , the endowments of the S o v i e t Union were capable of producing v i r t u a l l y a l l the e s s e n t i a l com-m o d i t i e s . T h e r e f o r e , from the p o i n t of view of the S o v i e t economy alone, Chinese imports were r e l a t i v e l y unimportant. In f a c t , i t can w e l l be argued t h a t the S o v i e t imports of Chinese goods were mainly out of p o l i t i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n . Or, as the S o v i e t s claimed, out of " p r o l e t a r i a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m . " One S o v i e t source s t a t e s : 55 ...the S o v i e t Union r e c e i v e d a c o n s i d e r a b l e amount of produce t h a t would probably have f a i l e d t o f i n d a market i n the c a p i t a l i s t world. ...They were not e s s e n t i a l t o t h e USSR and c o u l d have been e a s i l y m a n u f a c t u r e d by S o v i e t i n d u s t r y . The S o v i e t Union purchased these goods from China because i t was s i n c e r e l y eager t o improve China's economic s i t u a t i o n . 9 9 On the o t h e r hand, s i n c e a t the h e i g h t of S i n o - S o v i e t com-m e r c i a l r e l a t i o n s , China s u p p l i e d two t h i r d s of the USSR's food imports and t h r e e - q u a r t e r s of her t e x t i l e imports, the b e n e f i t s t o S o v i e t economy from l a r g e - s c a l e t r a d e w i t h China s h o u l d not be u n d e r e s t i m a t e d . 1 0 0 For i n s t a n c e , the "1400 m i l l i o n new r o u b l e s worth of m i n e r a l products and metals" mentioned i n the Chinese documents i n c l u d e d molybdenum and t u n g s t e n — b o t h were embargoed by the West, and the S o v i e t Union ob t a i n e d a l l of i t s imported t i n from C h i n a . 1 0 1 The imported Chinese f o o d s t u f f and o t h e r con-sumer goods, p a r t i c u l a r l y t e x t i l e s , were l a r g e l y consumed i n the Far E a s t e r n p r o v i n c e s of the S o v i e t Union. As an e d i t o r i a l i n the March 1958 Vneshnyaya To r q o v l y a s t a t e d : The c o a l , cement and p i g i r o n s u p p l i e d t o the USSR by China assures the needs of the Far E a s t e r n s e c t i o n s of our country. For the s a t i s f a c t i o n of the needs of our p o p u l a t i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the Far E a s t , the USSR pur-chases from China i n l a r g e q u a n t i t i e s c i t r u s f r u i t s , a p ples and a number of f o o d s t u f f s . 1 0 2 C o n s i d e r i n g t h a t the S o v i e t Far E a s t e r n s e c t o r s have h i s -t o r i c a l l y experienced many d i f f i c u l t i e s i n p r o d u c i n g enough food and consumer goods, and t h a t t r a n s p o r t a t i o n c o s t s were reduced by i m p o r t i n g such goods from n e i g h b o r i n g China i n s t e a d of s h i p -56 p i n g them thousands of m i l e s from European R u s s i a , the b e n e f i t s of t r a d i n g w i t h China might not be as unimportant as the S o v i e t s t r i e d t o imply i n l a t e r y e a r s . 1 0 3 In r e c i t i n g t h e i r " P r o l e t a r i a n I n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m " , the S o v i e t commentators o f t e n mentioned t h a t d e s p i t e the "tremendous d i f -f i c u l t i e s 11 of i t s postwar r e h a b i l i t a t i o n , the S o v i e t Union made e f f e c t i v e e f f o r t s t o c o n s o l i d a t e the CCP's p o l i t i c a l , m i l i t a r y , and economic power. 1 0 4 In a l l f a i r n e s s , t h i s i s not a groundless " S o v i e t exaggeration", because even a q u i c k survey of the USSR's postwar economy would be s u f f i c i e n t t o convince anyone t h a t the "tremendous d i f f i c u l t i e s " were not e n t i r e l y a r h e t o r i c . The S o v i e t s t a t e emerged i n triumph from the war w i t h an economy s e r i o u s l y damaged by war and a p o p u l a t i o n m e n t a l l y and p h y s i c a l l y exhausted. I t was r e p o r t e d t h a t a t the end of the war, the S o v i e t s had requested a l a r g e postwar c r e d i t from the U n i t e d S t a t e s , which W.A. Harriman, the U.S. ambassador t o the S o v i e t Union at the time, estimated would amount t o s i x b i l l i o n d o l l a r s . 1 0 5 The western h a l f of European R u s s i a and v i r t u a l l y a l l the Ukraine and B e l o r u s s i a were wrecked. A c c o r d i n g t o S o v i e t o f -f i c i a l f i g u r e s , "1710 towns and c i t i e s had been p a r t i a l l y or t o -t a l l y d estroyed, as were approximately 70,000 v i l l a g e s , 32,000 i n d u s t r i a l e n t e r p r i s e s , and 65,000 k i l o m e t e r s of r a i l r o a d . In a d d i t i o n , some 25 m i l l i o n people had l o s t t h e i r homes." 1 0 6 M i l -l i o n s of s o l d i e r s r e t u r n e d t o the t a s k of r e b u i l d i n g t h e i r homes with t h e i r own hands. M i l l i o n s , of course, never came back at 57 a l l , and g r e a t numbers of widows and orphans, e s p e c i a l l y i n v i l -l a g e s , had t o r e b u i l d t h e i r l i v e s alone as b e s t as they c o u l d . Even as l a t e as 1950, the p o p u l a t i o n of the USSR( 178.5 m i l l i o n ) was 15.6 m i l l i o n l e s s than t h a t b e f o r e the war. 1 0 7 The l e v e l of i n d u s t r i a l output, c o n s i s t i n g v e r y l a r g e l y of war equipment and munitions, i n 1945 was o f f i c i a l l y s t a t e d t o have been 8% below the l e v e l of 1940; w h i l e i n the p r e v i o u s l y oc-c u p i e d r e g i o n s i t was 70% below. In 1946, as m i l i t a r y output was c u r t a i l e d , t o t a l output d e c l i n e d t o 23% below the l e v e l of 1940. A g r i c u l t u r a l output i n 1945 was 40% below the 1940 l e v e l . 1 0 8 A f t e r 1946, however, the i n d u s t r i a l output i n c r e a s e d by a v e r y h i g h percentage. The prewar standards were l a r g e l y reached i n t h r e e y e a r s 1 0 9 The main c r e d i t f o r such achievement c l e a r l y belonged t o t h e h a r d work and i n c r e d i b l y h a r s h p r i v a t i o n s o f t h e S o v i e t people. In f a c t , by the end of the war, l i v i n g standards had f a l l e n t o a v e r y low l e v e l . A c c o r d i n g t o A.N. M a l a f e y e v , a S o v i e t economist, s t a t e and c o o p e r a t i v e r e t a i l t r a d e ( a l l t r a d e except f o r the c o l l e c t i v e farm markets) d e c l i n e d from 175.1 m i l -l i a r d r o u b l e s i n 1940 t o 73.5 m i l l i a r d s i n 1945, a r e d u c t i o n of 48%. 1 1 0 T h e r e f o r e l i v i n g standards of the urban p o p u l a t i o n may have been c u t by as much as h a l f between 1940 and 1945. I t was r e p o r t e d by M. H e l l e r and A.M. N e k r i c h , two S o v i e t h i s t o r i a n s now l i v i n g i n t h e West, t h a t i n 1946, w h i l e t h e minimum monthly 58 s a l a r y was o n l y 300 r o u b l e s and the average s a l a r y 475 r o u b l e s , one k i l o g r a m o f meat, s u g a r and b u t t e r c o s t 30 r o u b l e s , 15 ro u b l e s and 66 r o u b l e s r e s p e c t i v e l y . 1 1 1 Indeed, the t a s k o f postwar r e h a b i l i t a t i o n f o r the S o v i e t s was tremendous. Under such circumstances, any f o r e i g n a i d program would c e r t a i n l y be c o m p e t i t i v e with domestic needs and i n t e n s i f y the p r i v a t i o n s of the common people. I t was i n t h i s sense t h a t the $300 m i l l i o n c r e d i t t o China i n 1950 should be c o n s i d e r e d as s u b s t a n t i a l , because i t e n t a i l e d an i n v o l u n t a r y s a c r i f i c e by the S o v i e t people. Some s t u d i e s i n the 1950's, have suggested t h a t i n g e n e r a l , S o v i e t commitments t o export c a p i t a l goods t o China were d i r e c t l y c o m p e t i t i v e w i t h d o m e s t i c demands i n t h e S o v i e t U n i o n , s i n c e d u r i n g 1953 and 1954, the S o v i e t Union was s t i l l a net importer o f c a p i t a l equipment. Meanwhile, t h e b u l k o f C h i n e s e e x p o r t s which c o n s i s t e d of consumer goods and raw m a t e r i a l s f o r l i g h t i n -d u s t r i e s , stood low on the S o v i e t p l a n n e r s s c a l e o f p r e f e r e n c e . T h e r e f o r e , on p u r e l y economic grounds, a h i g h l e v e l o f t r a d e be-tween these two c o u n t r i e s would have been disadvantageous f o r the S o v i e t U nion. 1 1 2 On the oth e r hand, i t i s a l s o p o s s i b l e t o argue t h a t s i n c e S o v i e t m a c h i n e r y e x p o r t s t o C h i n a , even a t t h e i r peak d u r i n g 1959, were o n l y 2.5% of S o v i e t machinery p r o d u c t i o n 1 1 3 , i t does not appear t h a t t h i s k i n d o f t r a d e would e n t a i l a s a c r i f i c e o f S o v i e t growth f o r China's i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n . Even the import o f Chinese 59 consumer goods d i d not n e c e s s a r i l y r e p r e s e n t an i n v o l u n t a r y r e a l -l o c a t i o n of r e s o u r c e s from tlie s t a n d p o i n t of the S o v i e t planner s i n c e t h e t o t a l S o v i e t i m p o r t o f C h i n e s e consumer goods c o n -s t i t u t e d o n l y about 0.1 t o 0.3% of t o t a l S o v i e t consumption. 1 1 4 In f a c t , t h e i n c r e a s e i n consumption was rooted i n a p o l i c y d e c i -s i o n o f the S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p r a t h e r than i n the n e c e s s i t i e s imp-osed by t r a d e with C h i n a . 1 1 5 Notes 1. O. B o r i s o v , S o v e t s k i i Soiuz i Man'chzhurskaya R e v o l i u t s i o n n a y a Baza,1945-1949 (The S o v i e t Union and the Manchurian R e v o l u t i o n a r y  Base.1945-1949, Moscow: Mysl' Press,1975), p.178. 2. Le v i n e , A n v i l o f V i c t o r y , pp.33, 24 2. 3. I b i d . , p.239. 4. I b i d . , p.240. 5. Chong-Sik Lee, R e v o l u t i o n a r y S t r u g g l e i n Manchuria (Berkeley : U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a Press, 1983), p.268. 6. Wang J i n g and J i n Yuzhong, "An Overview of the Development of th e CCP's O r g a n i z a t i o n i n H e i l o n g j i a n g P r o v i n c e , 1921-1945," Zhong- gong Dangshi Z i l i a o , ( Source M a t e r i a l s of CCP's Party  H i s t o r y ) , 1983, Vol.7, p.284. 7. Chong-Sik Lee, R e v o l u t i o n a r y S t r u g g l e , pp.3 06, 294. 8. Wang J i n g and J i n Yuzhong, "CCP i n H e i l o n g j i a n g " , pp.285-286. 9. A.M.Dubinsky, "The M i s s i o n of the S o v i e t Union t o L i b e r a t e the Far E a s t (1945)", Voprosy I s t o r i i 1965, No.8 p.58. 10. Shen Shangwen, Zhong Su Guanxi J i a n s h i (A B r i e f H i s t o r y of  the S i n o - S o v i e t R e l a t i o n s , Hong Kong : Zhiyou P u b l i s h e r , 1951), p.85. 11. See Forward t o B o r i s o v and Koloskov, S o v i e t - C h i n e s e R e l a -60 t i o n s , p.25. 12. Zhang Yufa, Zhongquo J i n d a i X i a n d a i s h i (The Modern and Con- temporary H i s t o r y of China Taizhong: Donghua Shuju, 1978), p.428. 13. 0.Borisov, Man'chzhurskaya Baza, p.181. These f i g u r e s are pro b a b l y i n f l a t e d ; the Guomindang's source estimated t h a t the t o -t a l amount of captured Japanese arms and equipment i n c l u d e d 925 a i r c r a f t , 369 tanks, 2662 of v a r i o u s types of guns and 13825 machine-guns, e t c . , and "approximately a q u a r t e r of these arms and equipment were g i v e n t o the CCP by the end of 1945." Zhang Yufa Zhongquo J i n d a i pp.427-428. 14. Roy Medvedev, C h i n a and t h e Superpowers (New York: B a s i l B l a c k w e l l , 1986), p.18. 15. Guo T i n g y i , J i n d a i Zhongquo Shiqanq (An O u t l i n e of the Con- temporary H i s t o r y of China. Hong Kong : The Chinese U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1986), p.740. 16. L l o y d Eastman, Seeds of D e s t r u c t i o n : N a t i o n a l i s t China i n War  and R e v o l u t i o n (Stanford, C a l i f o r n i a : S t a n f o r d U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1984), p.224. 17. 0. B o r i s o v , Man'chzhurskaya Baza, p.182. Levine A n v i l of V i c - t o r y , pp.176,182. 18. Sladkovsky, I s t o r i v a . pp.165-167, 176-177. 19. B o r i s o v and Koloskov, A B r i e f H i s t o r y f p.30. 20. Sladkovsky, I s t o r i v a . pp.178-179. 21. I b i d . , p.180. 22. B o r i s o v and Koloskov, A B r i e f H i s t o r y , pp.34-35. 23. I b i d . , pp. 36-38. 24. Levine, A n v i l of V i c t o r y , p.149. 25. I b i d . , p.240. 26. C.M.Li, Economic Development of China, pp. 10-11, 171. A l s o Barnet t , China and the Major Powers, p.26. 27. Huang Chen-ming, Chonq Zhongsu J i n g j i Hezuo Kan Zhongsu Ren- min Weida Y o u y i ( L o o k i n g a t t h e G r e a t S i n o - S o v i e t F r i e n d s h i p  through S i n o - S o v i e t Economic Cooperation, B e i j i n g : 1956), pp.10-11, as quoted i n CM. L i Economic Development of China, p.10. 28. Yu.V. V l a d i m i r o v , " On the Question of S i n o - S o v i e t Economic R e l a t i o n s " , Voprosy I s t o r i i , 1969, No.6, p.48. 29. Pravda. November 3, 1966, as quoted i n John G i t t i n g s ed. , Survey of the S i n o - S o v i e t Dispute, (London: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1968), p.131. 30. A c c o r d i n g t o Sladkovsky, the t o t a l v a l u e of these documents (not i n c l u d i n g m i l i t a r y ones) was two b i l l i o n U.S. d o l l a r s — "equal t o the t o t a l v a l u e of S o v i e t c r e d i t s . " I s t o r i y a , p.218. 31. Robert L. P r i c e , " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Trade of Communist China, 1950-1965,". In An Economic P r o f i l e of Mainland China ( J o i n t Economic Committee o f t h e U.S. C o n g r e s s , New York: P r a e g e r , 1968), p.593. 32. G i t t i n g s , Survey of the Dispute, p.132. 33. E c k s t e i n , F o r e i g n Trade, p.155. 34. G i t t i n g s , Survey of the Dispute, p.132. 35. Sladkovsky, I s t o r i y a , p. 277 36. L i u and Wu, S o c i a l i s t Economy, p.125 37. B o r i s o v and Koloskov, A B r i e f H i s t o r y , pp.32-34. 38. F i l a t o v , Economicheshkaya Otsenka, p.8. 39. Rozman, The M o d e r n i z a t i o n , p.433. 40. C.Y. Cheng, S c i e n t i f i c and E n g i n e e r i n g Manpower, p . l . 41. L i u Nian L a i Zhongsu Youhao Hezuo De Gonggu He Fazhan (The  C o n s o l i d a t i o n and Development of S i n o - S o v i e t F r i e n d l y Cooperation  i n S i x Years ed. by The Propaganda O f f i c e f o r the E x h i b i t i o n of S o v i e t A c h i e v e m e n t i n Economic and C u l t u r a l Development. Guangzhou, 1955), p.32. 42. C.Y.Cheng, S c i e n t i f i c and E n g i n e e r i n g Manpower, p.206. 43. As quoted i n C. Y. Cheng, S c i e n t i f i c and E n g i n e e r i n g Man- power, p.210. 44. L i X i a n n i a n , "The Great Achievement i n Finance of the CPR d u r i n g the Past 10 Years," quoted from C.Y.Cheng, Economic R e l a - t i o n s . p.86. 45. Choh-ming L i , "Economic Development," China Q u a r t e r l y no.1 ( 62 January 1960), p.36. 46. M i k h a i l H e l l e r and Aleksandr M. Ne k r i c h , U t o p i a i n Power (New York :Summit Books 1986), p.566. I t was b e l i e v e d t h a t " S o v i e t c r e d i t a s s i s t a n c e t o the E a s t European s a t e l l i t e s had been con-s i d e r a b l e h i g h e r t h a t t h a t o f f e r e d t o C h i n a . " See L e o n a r d Schapiro, "The Chinese A l l y from the S o v i e t P o i n t of Views," i n Kurt London, ed. , U n i t y and C o n t r a d i c t i o n (New York: Praeger, 1962 ), p.357. 47. C. Y. Cheng, S c i e n t i f i c and E n g i n e e r i n g Manpower, p.208. 48. Zhongsu Youhao ( S i n o - S o v i e t F r i e n d s h i p ) August 10, 1951, p.9. See Henry Wei, Mao Tse-tung's "Lean-to-One-Side" P o l i c y (Lackland A i r Force Base, Texas: A i r Force Personnel and T r a i n i n g Research Center, 1955), p.50. 49. Xuexi (Study), 1957, No.5, p.13. As quoted i n C. Y. Cheng, S c i e n t i f i c and E n g i n e e r i n g Manpower, p.209. 50. Edward Friedman, "On M a o i s t C o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n s o f t h e C a p i t a l i s t World System," China Q u a r t e r l y no.80 (December 1979), p.816. 51. H. Wei, Lean-to-One-side, p.38. 52. Khr u s h c h e v Remembers: The L a s t T e s t a m e n t ( B o s t o n : L i t t l e Brown, 1974) p. 274 53. As quoted i n G i t t i n g s , Survey of the Dispute, p.57. 54. Zhang Y u f a , Zhongguo J i n d a i , p.429. Guo T i n g y i , J i n d a i Zhongguo, pp.730-731. Levine A n v i l o f V i c t o r y , pp.49, 70-71. 55. E c k s t e i n , F o r e i g n Trade, pp.138-139. 56. A n d r e i Gromyko, Memories (London : Hutchinson, 1989), p.249. 57. E c k s t e i n , F o r e i g n Trade, p.138. B o r i s o v and Koloskov, A B r i e f  H i s t o r y , pp.45-46. 58. M.I.Sladkovsky, ed. , Leninskaya P o l i t i k a SSSR v O t n o s h e n i i  K i t a y a ( L e n i n i s t P o l i c y of the USSR Towards China, Moscow: Nayka Press, 1968), pp.139-140. 59. B o r i s o v and Koloskov, A B r i e f H i s t o r y , p.45 note. 60. E c k s t e i n , F o r e i g n Trade, p.139. 61. I b i d . , pp.45-46. A l s o , J i a Wenhua, S u l i a n , p.245. 63 62. Sladkovsky, Leninskaya P o l i t i k a , p.167. 63. Renmln Ribao, October 13, 1954. 64. Wu Xiuquan, the d i r e c t o r of the USSR and E a s t European A f -f a i r s Dept. (1949-1952) and V i c e - M i n s t e r of F o r e i g n A f f a i r s (Jan. 1951-March 1955) , Wo Z a i Waii i a o b u Ba Nian De J i n g l i (My E i g h t  Years i n the M i n i s t r y of F o r e i g n A f f a i r s , B e i j i n g : S h i j i e Z h i s h i P u b l i s h e r , 1983), p.7. 65. J i a Wenhua, S u l i a n , p.215. 66. Wu Xiuquan, Waii iaobu. pp.22-23. 67. B o r i s o v and Koloskov, A B r i e f H i s t o r y , p.63. 68. E c k s t e i n , F o r e i g n Trade, p.139. 69. Wu Xiuquan, Waii iaobu, p.17. 70. See Wu Xiuquan, " M e m o i r s — E i g h t Years i n the Department of F o r e i g n L i a i s o n o f the C e n t r a l Committee of the CCP (Oct.1958— Dec.1966)," Zhonggong Dangshi Z i l i a o , 1983, V o l . 7 . 71. In a v e r y i n t e r e s t i n g a r t i c l e "Mao's r o l e i n the S i n o - S o v i e t c o n f l i c t , " ( P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , 1974 Summer) D. S. Z a g o r i a argues t h a t " a t d i f f e r e n t p e r i o d s t h e CCP has been d i v i d e d on b a s i c q u e s t i o n s . . . a f f e c t i n g i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h Moscow...at a l l or most of these c r u c i a l t u r n i n g p o i n t s , Mao has opted f o r a more independent p o l i c y . There has been i n s h o r t , an i m p r e s s i v e con-s i s t e n c y i n .Mao's ' T i t o i s m ' . " (p.140). 72. Feng-hwa Mah, " The Terms of S i n o - S o v i e t Trade," China Quar- t e r l y no.17 (January 1964), pp.182-183. 73. I b i d . . p.184. 74. I b i d , p.187. 75. E c k s t e i n , F o r e i g n Trade, p.172. 76. I b i d , p.189. 77. I b i d , p.189 note. 78. J i a Wenhua, S u l i a n , p.246. 79. X i n Hua Ban Yue Kan, 1957, no.16, p.90. 80. Ivanov, S o v i e t - C h i n e s e R e l a t i o n s , p.22. 64 81. Peking Review. May 8, 1964, p. 13 :" ...the p r i c e s of many of the goods we imported from the s o v i e t Union were much h i g h e r than those on the world market." 82. Ivanov, S o v i e t - C h i n e s e R e l a t i o n s , p.22. 83. Wu Xiuquan Waii iaobu. p.8. 84. I b i d , p.17. 85. Ivanov, S o v i e t - C h i n e s e R e l a t i o n s , p.23. 86. E c k s t e i n , F o r e i g n Trade, p.173. 87. F.H.Holzman, " S o v i e t F o r e i g n Trade, P r i c i n g and the Question of D i s c r i m i n a t i o n , " The Review of Economics and S t a t i s t i c s , v.44 no.2 (May 1962), pp.134-147. 88. E c k s t e i n , F o r e i g n Trade, p.173. 89. Kang Chao and Feng-hwa Mah, 11 A Study of the Rouble-Yuan Ex-change Rate," China Q u a r t e r l y no.17 (January 1964), pp.193-194. 90. I b i d . . p.199. 91. I b i d . , p.200. 92. C.Y.Cheng, Economic R e l a t i o n s , p.93. 93. Chao and Mah, "Exchange Rate," p.193. T h i s s p e c u l a t i o n i s now confirmed by Wu Xiuquan who wrote i n h i s memoirs: " A l l of us who p a r t i c i p a t e d i n t h e n e g o t i a t i o n ( o f t h e r o u b l e - y u a n exchange rate) were v e r y unhappy. However, under the circumstances of the t i m e , t o e x p o s e t h e d i s p u t e was a l s o n o t i n o u r i n t e r e s t . . . E v e n t u a l l y , we h a d t o g i v e i n and made some compromise." See Waii iaobu, p.17. 94. J i a Wenhua, S u l i a n , p.246. 95. A l e c Nove, Book Review on C.Y.Cheng's Economic R e l a t i o n s , China Q u a r t e r l y no.22 ( A p r i l 1965), p.191. 96. A l e c Nove, An Economic H i s t o r y of the U.S.S.R. (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1969), p.315. 97. M i k h a i l A. Klochko, S o v i e t S c i e n t i s t i n Red China (New York: Praeger, 1964), p.62. 98. " L e t t e r of the C e n t r a l Committee of the C.P.C. of February 29,1964, t o t h e C e n t r a l Committee o f t h e C.P.S.U.," P e k i n g Review, 8 May,1964, pp.13-14. 99. Ivanov, Who Is To Blame?, pp.27-28. A c c o r d i n g t o a study i n the West, the t e x t i l e manufactures and c l o t h i n g exported by China " i n a l l l i k e l i h o o d would (be) d i f f i c u l t t o s e l l a t reasonable p r i c e i n . . . o t h e r w o r l d market." See C h i n a Q u a r t e r l y no. 17 (January 1964), p.34. 100. P r i c e , " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Trade", p.593. 101. Vneshnyaya T o r q o v l v a SSSR 1918-1966 ( F o r e i g n Trade of the  USSR. 1918-1966, Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye O t n o s h e n i y a , 1967), p.105. 102. Vneshnyaya T o r g o v l y a , 1958, no.3, p.5 103. See, f o r i n s t a n c e , Y u . V l a d i m i r o v ' s "On t h e Q u e s t i o n o f S o v i e t - C h i n e s e Economic R e l a t i o n s , " which i m p l i e s t h a t the S o v i e t Union d i d the Chinese a f a v o r by a c c e p t i n g t h e i r goods ( pp.52-53 . ) . 104. See, f o r i n s t a n c e , B o r i s o v and Koloskov, A B r i e f H i s t o r y , p. 28. 105. Gar A l p e r o v i t z , Atomic Diplomacy, Expanded e d i t i o n , (New York: F i f t o n Books, 1985), p.71. L l o y d C. G a r d n e r , A r t h u r S c h l e s i n g e r , J r . and Hans J . Morgenthau, The O r i g i n s of the Cold  War (Waltham, Massachusetts: Ginn and Company, 1970), p.67. 106. H e l l e r and Ne k r i c h , U t o p i a i n Power, p.463 107. I b i d . . p.462 108. Raymond Hutchings, S o v i e t Economic Development second e d i -t i o n , (Oxford: B a s i l B l a c k w e l l , 1982), p.71. 109. J.N. Westwood, Endurance and Endeavour, R u s s i a n H i s t o r y  1812—1986, t h i r d e d i t i o n , (New York: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1987) , p.354. 110. A.N. Malafeyev, I s t o r i y a Tsenoobrazovaniya v SSSR (1917- 1963),( The H i s t o r y of P r i c i n g i n USSR (1917-1963). Moscow: Mysl' Press, 1964), p.407. 111. H e l l e r and Nekrich, U t o p i a i n Power, p.463. 112. A l e x a n d e r E c k s t e i n , "Moscow-Peking A x i s : t h e Economic P a t t e r n , " i n Howard L.Boorman, ed., Moscow-Peking A x i s , S t r e n g t h  and S t r a i n s (New York: Harper & Brothers,1957), pp.80-84. 66 113. E c k s t e i n , F o r e i g n Trade, p.176. 114. I b i d . . p.179. 115. Under S t a l i n , the top p r i o r i t y of heavy i n d u s t r y was r u t h -l e s s l y e n f o r c e d . But under h i s s u c c e s s o r s , t h i s was no l o n g e r so. "Housing, a g r i c u l t u r e , consumers' goods, t r a d e , a l l became matter of importance, even of p r i o r i t y . " (See A.Nove Economic H i s t o r y p.356) For i n s t a n c e , i n 1953, consumers' goods p r o d u c t i o n i n -creased f a s t e r than t h a t of producers' goods. In 1957, an am-b i t i o u s campaign t o c a t c h up the U n i t e d S t a t e s i n p r o d u c t i o n of meat, m i l k and b u t t e r began. ( I b i d pp.326,335.) 67 Chapter IV - A Cohesive or D i v i s i v e F a c t o r i n The A l l i a n c e What r o l e d i d economic r e l a t i o n s between C h i n a and t h e S o v i e t Union p l a y i n shaping t h e i r a l l i a n c e ? Were they a major f a c t o r i n p r o d u c i n g the t e n s i o n s i n the a l l i a n c e or d i d they t i e the two p a r t n e r s together? There i s no q u e s t i o n t h a t i n the 1950's, China had more ex-t e n s i v e economic l i n k s with the S o v i e t Union than i t ever had w i t h any f o r e i g n c o u n t r y . I t i s g e n e r a l l y assumed t h a t t h i s economic inti m a c y r e i n f o r c e d the m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l a l l i a n c e between the two c o u n t r i e s . In f a c t , d u r i n g the 1950's, the t i e s between t h e two c o u n t r i e s seemed so c l o s e , t h e a d v a n t a g e s o f c o o p e r a t i o n so g r e a t , t h a t t h e r e was e v e r y r e a s o n t o e x p e c t l e a d e r s of both s i d e s t o do e v e r y t h i n g p o s s i b l e t o m a i n t a i n the a l l i a n c e . 1 To China, the S o v i e t Union had p r o v i d e d support and a s s i s -t a n c e t h a t would be d i f f i c u l t t o o b t a i n e l s e w h e r e . When t h e S o v i e t model was a p p l i e d t o China d u r i n g the F i r s t F i v e Year Plan p e r i o d , the appeal as w e l l as the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of the model was more or l e s s taken f o r granted by the Chinese. In e f f e c t , what China a p p l i e d was a S t a l i n i s t model which c o n c e n t r a t e d a l l of the country's e n e r g i e s on m o b i l i z a t i o n : r e s o u r c e m o b i l i z a t i o n f o r i n -d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n and m i l i t a r y m o b i l i z a t i o n f o r defense. And u n t i l 1953, the " r e v i s i o n i s t " t e n d e n c i e s i n S o v i e t s o c i e t y were more or 68 l e s s suppressed and had not y e t become a dominant way of l i f e . As such, the S o v i e t model had a h i g h degree o f congruence f o r the CCP l e a d e r s h i p . In a l l f a i r n e s s , t h e S o v i e t model seemed t o have s e r v e d China's economy, e s p e c i a l l y her i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n , r a t h e r w e l l . A c c o r d i n g t o China's S o c i a l i s t Economy, by 1957, the F i r s t F i v e Year P l a n had been o v e r f u l f i l l e d and "tremendous success had been a c h i e v e d i n t h e s o c i a l i s t t r a n s f o r m a t i o n and s o c i a l i s t c o n s t r u c t i o n . " 2 The t o t a l i n d u s t r i a l output was 78.39 b i l l i o n yuan, which r e p r e s e n t e d a 128.3% i n c r e a s e o v e r 1952, o r an average annual growth of 18%, with, f o r i n s t a n c e , an annual i n -crease of 31.7% i n s t e e l p r o d u c t i o n and 4 . 5 - f o l d i n c r e a s e over 1949 i n e l e c t r i c i t y o u t p u t . 3 The a v e r a g e a n n u a l i n c r e a s e o f a g r i c u l t u r a l output was 4.5%. 4 And the 1957 consumption l e v e l was 38.5% h i g h e r than i n 1952 f o r workers and s t a f f members, and 27.4% f o r peasants. 5 Of a l l the a v a i l a b l e measures of China's economic growth, the data f o r f o r e i g n t r a d e are s u b j e c t t o s m a l l e r margins of e r -r o r because they are mostly d e r i v e d from the t r a d i n g p a r t n e r ' s s i d e and thus are not dependent on Chinese s t a t i s t i c a l p r a c t i c e . Measured a g a i n s t t h i s i n d i c a t o r , the pace of China's economic development a l s o appears i n q u i t e f a v o r a b l e l i g h t i n comparison w i t h I n d i a and other d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s . Up t o 1959, China's 69 t r a d e grew much more r a p i d l y than e i t h e r the t o t a l world t r a d e , the t r a d e o f a l l underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s , o r the t r a d e o f a l l A s i a n c o u n t r i e s as a group except Japan. 6 In 1953, I n d i a ' s f o r -e i g n t r a d e t u r n o v e r was j u s t about the same as t h a t o f China, i . e . about 2.3 b i l l i o n U.S. d o l l a r s . By 1959, China had a t t a i n e d a l e v e l o f $4.3 b i l l i o n as compared t o $3.3 b i l l i o n f o r I n d i a . 7 In summing up the v a r i o u s f a c t o r s c o n t r i b u t i n g t o the good economic r e s u l t s achieved i n the F i r s t F i v e Year P l a n p e r i o d , the authors o f China's S o c i a l i s t Economy p o i n t out: F i r s t , economic d e c i s i o n s were taken i n l i n e w i t h the a c t u a l c o n d i t i o n s , with due c o n s i d e r a t i o n f o r the country's c a p a b i l i t i e s , and work proceeded i n a steady manner and un-der c a r e f u l and circumspect guidance. Second, a t t e n t i o n was p a i d t o a c h i e v i n g o v e r a l l balance i n the n a t i o n a l economy.... T h i r d , g r e a t a t t e n t i o n was p a i d t o the c o s t o f produc-t i o n , l a b o u r and f i n a n c i a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f t h e en-t e r p r i s e s , a n d t h e i r e c o n o m i c a c c o u n t i n g was strengthened.... F i n a l l y , g r e a t e f f o r t s were made t o implement t h e p o l i c y o f b u i l d i n g up the country through t h r i f t and hard work. 8 S i n c e China's F i r s t F i v e Year Plan was d r a f t e d w i t h S o v i e t a d v i c e and implemented wi t h c l o s e S o v i e t c o o p e r a t i o n , such an en-t h u s i a s t i c e v a l u a t i o n o f t h e P l a n ' s a c h i e v e m e n t by C h i n e s e economists through h i n d s i g h t i s a l i v i n g p r o o f t h a t S i n o - S o v i e t economic c o o p e r a t i o n must a l s o have been a p p r e c i a t e d by t h e Chinese a t the time and had c e r t a i n l y strengthened the A l l i a n c e . 70 Another f a c t o r which most l i k e l y t i e d China t o the S o v i e t Union was S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e on China's e d u c a t i o n a l system, espe-c i a l l y i n h i g h e r e d u c a t i o n and the t r a i n i n g o f s k i l l e d workers, t e c h n i c i a n s and managerial p e r s o n n e l . In 1949, the absence of c o o r d i n a t i o n and p l a n n i n g was a major problem i n China's h i g h e r e d u c a t i o n a l s ystem. As a consequence, t h e r e was a s e v e r e shortage of students i n s c i e n c e and e n g i n e e r i n g and o t h e r new f i e l d s o f knowledge of which the n a t i o n a l economy was i n g r e a t need. With e x t e n s i v e S o v i e t a s s i s t a n c e , China's system of h i g h e r e d u c a t i o n underwent some fundamental changes. From 1950 t o 1952, i n s t i t u t i o n s of h i g h e r e d u c a t i o n supported by f o r e i g n e r s or run by m i s s i o n a r i e s were e l i m i n a t e d . At the same time, the S o v i e t system was c o p i e d through e l i m i n a t i n g most of the comprehensive u n i v e r s i t i e s (daxue) and combining departments such as eng i n e e r -i n g , medicine, a g r i c u l t u r e , t e a c h e r t r a i n i n g , and f i n e a r t s from d i f f e r e n t u n i v e r s i t i e s i n t o s p e c i a l i z e d c o l l e g e s o r t e c h n i c a l i n -s t i t u t i o n s (xueyuan). The i n t e n t i o n was t o s t r e n g t h e n s p e c i a l -i z e d e d u c a t i o n i n important f i e l d s by c o n c e n t r a t i n g the most com-p e t e n t f a c u l t y members, t h e b e s t equipment and r e s e a r c h f a c i l i t i e s , and t o speed up the process o f t r a i n i n g through an even h i g h e r degree of s p e c i a l i z a t i o n . 9 F o l l o w i n g the S o v i e t model, the/ primary a u t h o r i t y f o r t e r t i a r y e d u c a t i o n was p l a c e d under the M i n i s t r y o f Higher Education, which i n t r o d u c e d uniform c u r r i c u l a i n a l l i n s t i t u t i o n s o f h i g h e r e d u c a t i o n and u n i f i e d t h e i r t e a c h i n g p l a n s . 71 Such a b a s i c r e o r g a n i z a t i o n of h i g h e r e d u c a t i o n n a t u r a l l y l e d t o an acute shortage of t e a c h e r s . To r e s o l v e t h i s problem, S o v i e t s p e c i a l i s t s had by e a r l y 1957 t r a i n e d 8285 C h i n e s e graduate students and t e a c h e r s f o r employment i n China. 1 0 I n the f i e l d of p o l i t i c a l theory, f o r i n s t a n c e , 700 young t e a c h e r s were t r a i n e d f o r Renmin U n i v e r s i t y and a f u r t h e r 2,000 f o r o t h e r s c h o o l s . A l t o g e t h e r , i t was r e p o r t e d t h a t t w o - t h i r d s o f a l l p o l i t i c a l t heory t e a c h e r s i n Chinese u n i v e r s i t i e s i n the mid-f i f t i e s were S o v i e t - t r a i n e d . 1 1 Many Chinese c o l l e g e s and u n i v e r -s i t i e s e a c h employed a t l e a s t 10 S o v i e t s p e c i a l i s t s on t h e i r f a c u l t i e s . For i n s t a n c e , 57 S o v i e t s p e c i a l i s t s had l e c t u r e d a t Qinghua U n i v e r s i t y between 1952 and 1960. H a r b i n P o l y t e c h n i c U n i v e r s i t y employed 49 S o v i e t t e a c h e r s from 1951 t o 1956. B e i j -i n g U n i v e r s i t y l i s t e d 30 S o v i e t s p e c i a l i s t s on i t s f a c u l t y i n 1957 a l o n e . 1 2 I t was r e p o r t e d t h a t between 1950 and 1958, 583 S o v i e t t e a c h e r s h a d t a u g h t i n C h i n e s e u n i v e r s i t i e s and c o l l e g e s . 1 3 In many c a s e s , S o v i e t e x p e r t s were employed as p r e s i d e n t i a l or departmental c o n s u l t a n t s . To a g r e a t extent, they had the a u t h o r i t y t o make d e c i s i o n s i n academic a f f a i r s . The attempt a t u n i f y i n g t e a c h i n g p r o c e s s as w e l l as the i n -t r o d u c t i o n of new courses through the h e l p of S o v i e t s p e c i a l i s t s n a t u r a l l y r e q u i r e d a l a r g e amount o f new t e x t b o o k s and o t h e r t e a c h i n g m a t e r i a l s . Consequently, a major program o f t r a n s l a t i n g 72 S o v i e t t e a c h i n g m a t e r i a l s was launched i n 1952. From 1952 t o 1956, 1,400 t e x t b o o k t i t l e s were t r a n s l a t e d from R u s s i a n and p u b l i s h e d . 1 4 A c c o r d i n g t o Guanqminq Ribao, i n 1954, 2,700 u n i v e r -s i t y f a c u l t y members were capable of t r a n s l a t i n g from Russian and more than 3,000 volumes of S o v i e t t i t l e s were c o l l e c t e d and as-s i g n e d t o them f o r t r a n s l a t i o n . 1 5 The S o v i e t s a l s o made an e f -f o r t t o s u p p l y t h e C h i n e s e w i t h R u s s i a n t e x t b o o k s and o t h e r e d u c a t i o n a l m a t e r i a l s . For i n s t a n c e , as e a r l y as i n 1951, China had a l r e a d y r e c e i v e d 32,000 c o p i e s of books and j o u r n a l s pub-l i s h e d by S o v i e t s c i e n t i f i c a c a d e m i e s and e d u c a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . 1 6 Between 1949 and 1955 over 20 m i l l i o n c o p i e s of 3000 S o v i e t books on s c i e n c e and technology were p u b l i s h e d i n C h i n a . 1 7 Such e f f o r t s t o p r o v i d e Chinese u n i v e r s i t i e s w i t h new e d u c a t i o n a l m a t e r i a l s was probably unsurpassed i n h i s t o r y . The p a r t i c i p a t i o n of S o v i e t s p e c i a l i s t s i n a l l these reform e f f o r t s was both e x t e n s i v e and i n t e n s i v e . In o r d e r t o maximize the v a l u e of S o v i e t s p e c i a l i s t s , t h e i r l e c t u r e s were attended by f a c u l t i e s from o t h e r u n i v e r s i t i e s as w e l l as by s p e c i a l i s t s from the i n d u s t r y . Many S o v i e t l e c t u r e r s were p e r i o d i c a l l y r o t a t e d from c i t y t o c i t y . And the young Chinese s c i e n t i s t s and t e c h -n i c i a n s , as r e c a l l e d by M i k h a i l K l o c h k o , e x p e c t e d S o v i e t s p e c i a l i s t s "to be a s o r t of magician, capable of g i v i n g them the one c u r r e n t answer t o a l l s o r t s of complex problems i n pure and a p p l i e d s c i e n c e i n a few minutes." 1 8 In r e a l i t y , however,the 73 S o v i e t s p e c i a l i s t s sent t o China — a s Klochko concludes, were of uneven q u a l i t y . Some of them were " h i g h l y q u a l i f i e d , o t h e r s of debatable competence." 1 9 A c c o r d i n g t o C.Y. Cheng's study, only about 8 pe r c e n t of S o v i e t - a i d personnel sent t o China c o u l d be q u a l i f i e d as s e n i o r s c i e n t i s t s . 2 0 To C h i n a ' s s t u d e n t s , young s c i e n t i s t s and p a r t y c a d r e s , however, the h i g h regard f o r S o v i e t s p e c i a l i s t s was d i c t a t e d by a b e l i e f t h a t the S o v i e t s had d i g e s t e d the exp e r i e n c e o f the t e c h -n i c a l l y advanced c o u n t r i e s of the world and made i t s u i t a b l e f o r ad a p t a t i o n i n s o c i a l i s t c o n s t r u c t i o n . As Chen Boda, a member of the C e n t r a l Committee of the CCP a t the time, s a i d i n a speech t o the Chinese Academy of Sc i e n c e s , " g e n e r a l l y speaking, the good B r i t i s h and American s c i e n c e had a l r e a d y been absorbed by the S o v i e t s c i e n t i s t s ; hence, the q u i c k e s t and b e s t way i s t o l e a r n from the S o v i e t Union. 2 1 The be h a v i o r of S o v i e t s p e c i a l i s t s seemed on the whole t o have i m p r e s s e d t h e C h i n e s e f a v o r a b l y . S p e a k i n g o f t h e t o t a l 11,000 S o v i e t e x p e r t s , Yan J i c i , D i r e c t o r o f t h e T e c h n i c a l S c i e n c e Department of the Academy of Scien c e , s a i d i n February 1960: "Through our c l o s e c o n t a c t s w i t h S o v i e t s c i e n t i s t s , t h e i r n o b l e q u a l i t i e s as communists, t h e i r h a b i t s o f e n d u r i n g h a r d s h i p s , l i v i n g a p l a i n l i f e , and s t u d y i n g p e r s i s t e n t l y have g i v e n e v e r y one o f us a v e r y deep i m p r e s s i o n and a g r e a t l e s s o n . " 2 2 74 Another aspect of S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e i n the f i e l d of educa-t i o n was the t r a i n i n g of Chinese students and t e a c h e r s i n S o v i e t u n i v e r s i t i e s and r e s e a r c h o r g a n i z a t i o n s . As mentioned on p.17, i n the p e r i o d between 1951 and 1962, over 11 000 Chinese students and post-graduates were e n r o l l e d i n S o v i e t c o l l e g e s and u n i v e r -s i t i e s . T h r o u g h o u t t h e 1950s, C h i n e s e s t u d e n t s formed t h e m a j o r i t y of a l l f o r e i g n students i n the USSR. Some o f them were t r a i n e d i n v a r i o u s brandies of the p r e s t i g i o u s S o v i e t Academy of S c i e n c e ( S A S ) . D u r i n g t h e 1957-58 p e r i o d , f o r i n s t a n c e , 750 Chinese students were sent to r e c e i v e advanced t r a i n i n g i n the SAS' 4-year programs. In 1961-62, 76 of them had s u c c e s s f u l l y d e f e n d e d t h e i r d i s s e r t a t i o n s and e a r n e d c a n d i d a t e d e g r e e s . 2 3 Most of the Chinese students i n the USSR, however, were under-graduates whose c a l i b e r , as C.Y.Cheng has noted i n h i s study, "remains a s u b j e c t o f c o n t r o v e r s y . " 2 4 R e g a r d l e s s o f t h e i r academic achievement while i n the S o v i e t Union, they were always p l a c e d i n important t e a c h i n g , r e s e a r c h , managerial, and produc-t i o n j o bs immediately upon t h e i r r e t u r n t o China. H e n c e , t h e i r i n -f l u e n c e , a t l e a s t i n academic a f f a i r s and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f pr o d u c t i o n s were c o n s i d e r a b l e . In d i s c u s s i n g S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e s on China's e d u c a t i o n , i t i s i m p o r t a n t t o r e c o g n i z e t h a t t h e y went f a r beyond a m a t t e r o f s c h o o l i n g . As R. F. P r i c e p o i n t s out, "they i n v o l v e much wider s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e s and l e a r n i n g p rocesses which occur when t e a c h -ing and even conscious and i n t e n t i o n a l l e a r n i n g i s absent." 2 5 75 S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e s i n the 1950's were i n t i m a t e l y connected with the shaping of m o r a l - p o l i t i c a l b e h a v i o r i n Chinese s o c i e t y . For i n s t a n c e , the s t r u c t u r e , symbols and the k i n d s of a c t i v i t i e s i n C h i n a ' s Y o u t h L e a g u e ( G o n q q i n q t u a n ) and Young P i o n e e r s (Xi a o x i a n d u i) were v e r y s i m i l a r t o those of the S o v i e t youth o r -g a n i z a t i o n s . And S o v i e t l i t e r a t u r e was regarded as textbooks f o r Chinese b u i l d e r s of s o c i a l i s m . For example, Chao Jing-hua, a famous t r a n s l a t o r of Russian l i t e r a t u r e and c r i t i c , wrote i n 1954 t h a t M. Sholokhov's V i r g i n S o i l Upturned had become a standard textbook f o r those p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n l a n d reform i n C h i n a . 2 6 S o v i e t l i t e r a t u r e about the New Hero who had unwavering f a i t h i n Com-munism which f o r g e d h i s m e n t a l i t y , r u l e d h i s a c t i o n s and d i c t a t e d h i s a t t i t u d e s was h a i l e d by Chinese c r i t i c s and w i d e l y read by the younger g e n e r a t i o n . Novels such as N. Ostrovsky's The Temper- i n g of S t e e l ( 1 9 3 4 ) . B. Polevoy's The S t o r y of a Real Man(1947). and A . F a d e y e v ' s The Young Guard(1951) were f a v o r i t e s among Chinese youth and r e c o g n i z e d by the p a r t y as powerful v e h i c l e s of mass e d u c a t i o n . From 1949 t o 1955 , f o r instance,more than 42 m i l -l i o n works of c l a s s i c a l Russian and S o v i e t f i c t i o n were p u b l i s h e d i n C h i n a . 2 7 In the economic f i e l d , some a p p r e c i a t i o n of the e x t e n t of S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e over China's i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n may be deduced from data r e p o r t e d i n both the Chinese and S o v i e t p r e s s . The m a j o r i t y of S o v i e t s p e c i a l i s t s were engaged i n i n d u s t r i e s , f a c -76 t o r i e s , mining p r o j e c t s and communications. I t was r e p o r t e d t h a t more than 300 S o v i e t experts d i r e c t e d the r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of the Anshan s t e e l complex 2 8 and up t o 500 S o v i e t s p e c i a l i s t s had con-t r i b u t e d t o the development of X i n j i a n g o i l f i e l d s . 2 9 S e v e r a l h u n d red S o v i e t e x p e r t s p a r t i c i p a t e d i n t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f China's f i r s t automobile f a c t o r y i n Changchun. 3 0 S o v i e t e x p e r t s s u p e r v i s e d a l l phases of development of S o v i e t - a i d p r o j e c t s , b e g i n n i n g w i t h the s e l e c t i o n of b u i l d i n g s i t e s , the f u r n i s h i n g of d e s i g n s and machinery, through the c o n s t r u c t i o n and i n s t a l l a -t i o n o f p l a n t s , t o t h e i r o p e r a t i n g p r o c e d u r e s and t h e f i n a l p roduct. For p r o j e c t s i n i t i a t e d by China, S o v i e t e x p e r t s under-took s p e c i f i c a t i o n s , s e l e c t e d c o n s t r u c t i o n s i t e s and o f f e r e d con-s u l t a t i v e s e r v i c e s r e l a t i n g t o the i n s t a l l a t i o n and u t i l i z a t i o n o f equipment. 3 1 In the s c i e n c e s , S o v i e t s p e c i a l i s t s p a r t i c i p a t e d i n almost every major f i e l d o f r e s e a r c h . Beginning i n 1955, S o v i e t experts attended most of China's s c i e n t i f i c c o n f e r e n c e s . A c c o r d i n g t o the v i c e p r e s i d e n t of the Chinese Academy of S c i e n c e , S o v i e t s c i e n t i s t s p a r t i c i p a t e d i n most of the o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s e x p e d i -t i o n s . In 1958 alone, S o v i e t p e r sonnel j o i n e d more than 100 of them. 3 2 From 1950 t o 1960, approximately 1300 Chinese s c i e n t i s t s had r e c e i v e d advanced t r a i n i n g i n the USSR, most of them engaged i n the new areas of modern s c i e n c e and technology. About 20 t o p -l e v e l Chinese n u c l e a r p h y s i c i s t s , f o r example, were a c t i v e i n advanced r e s e a r c h a t the J o i n t I n s t i t u t e o f Nu c l e a r Research i n Dunba, near Moscow. Des p i t e the d e t e r i o r a t i o n o f S i n o - S o v i e t r e l a t i o n s s i n c e 1960, Chinese s c i e n t i s t s c o n t i n u e d t o s t a y t h e r e u n t i l 1964. 3 3 The b u l k o f C h i n e s e t r a i n e d i n t h e S o v i e t U n i o n were " p r a c t i c i n g s t u d e n t s . " I n c l u d e d i n t h i s c a t e g o r y were t e c h -n i c i a n s , s k i l l e d and s e m i s k i l l e d workers, and managerial person-n e l . I t was estimated t h a t from 1950 t o 1960, 28 000 p r a c t i c i n g s t udents had worked as a p p r e n t i c e s i n S o v i e t e s t a b l i s h m e n t s . 3 4 A c c o r d i n g t o S o v i e t sources, the per s o n n e l o f each S o v i e t - a i d p r o j e c t -- from t h e d i r e c t o r and c h i e f e n g i n e e r down t o t h e s k i l l e d w o r k e r s — a l l r e c e i v e d some t r a i n i n g i n S o v i e t f a c t o r i e s . 3 5 In the Changchun automobile f a c t o r y , some 500 per-sons were t r a i n e d i n the Moscow—Likhachev m o t o r - v e h i c l e p l a n t . 3 6 The Lanzhou r e f i n e r y sent 130 of i t s t e c h n i c i a n s and a d m i n i s t r a -t i v e s t a f f t o the S o v i e t Union f o r t r a i n i n g . 3 7 During the F i v e -Year Pl a n , 10 chemical p l a n t s were b u i l t w i t h S o v i e t a i d , and 400 Chinese workers i n these p l a n t s were t r a i n e d i n the S o v i e t Union. 3 8 To some o u t s i d e observers, the r e s u l t o f these many f a c e t s of S o v i e t a s s i s t a n c e i n China's i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n , s c i e n t i f i c r e s e a r c h , t r a i n i n g and ed u c a t i o n was an almost complete S o v i e t dominance i n many areas o f China's economy, e d u c a t i o n and s c i e n c e i n the 1950's. 3 9 Yet, many Chinese l e a d e r s as w e l l as s c i e n t i s t s had a p p r e c i a t e d t h e c o o p e r a t i o n and a s s i s t a n c e o f t h e S o v i e t 78 Union. The d i r e c t o r of the Chinese Academy's Department o f Tech-n i c a l S c i e n c e , Yen C h i - t z u , f o r i n s t a n c e , t e s t i f i e d i n 1960 t h a t a l l the l a t e s t achievements i n China's modern s c i e n c e s , such as the p e a c e f u l uses of atomic energy, semiconductors , and com-pu t e r s , were accomplished through S o v i e t a s s i s t a n c e . Furthermore, he c o n c l u d e d t h a t " w i t h o u t doubt, S i n o - S o v i e t s c i e n t i f i c and t e c h n i c a l c o o p e r a t i o n has p l a y e d an extremely important r o l e i n q u i c k l y r e v e r s i n g our s c i e n t i f i c and t e c h n i c a l backwardness. 1 , 4 0 In s h o r t , i t i s s a f e t o assume t h a t S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e s i n the 1950's were a powerful f a c t o r t h a t had strengthened the S i n o -S o v i e t A l l i a n c e — e s p e c i a l l y among the younger g e n e r a t i o n . T h i s can e a s i l y be seen from the f a c t t h a t , i n the f i e l d o f h i g h e r e d u c a t i o n , even t h o u g h t h e S o v i e t model had been p a r t i a l l y c r i t i c i z e d i n 1957, l a r g e l y abandoned d u r i n g the Great Leap For-ward and v i o l e n t l y a t t a c k e d d u r i n g the C u l t u r a l R e v o l u t i o n , i t s t i l l had a l a s t i n g i n f l u e n c e . In f u t u r e y e a r s , whenever the t r e n d was t o r e i n s t a t e academic v a l u e s ( moving away from "redness" toward " e x p e r t n e s s " ) , i t was a move toward the S o v i e t model. During the 1960's and 1970's, the Chinese students con-t i n u e d t o p r o f i t from S o v i e t textbooks. 4 1 I t was not u n t i l Deng X i a o p i n g ' s r e f o r m began t o r e p l a c e t h e S o v i e t model w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s model t h a t t h e l e g a c y o f S o v i e t e d u c a t i o n was r e t i r e d . However, i t i s worth n o t i n g t h a t many Chinese who had s t u d i e d i n the S o v i e t Union i n the 1950's " r e c a l l e d t h e i r time w i t h warmth." 4 2 Moreover, one should not n e g l e c t the r i s e t o 79 p o s i t i o n s o f power o f those t r a i n e d i n the USSR: Among the mem-bers of the CCP's 12th C e n t r a l Committee, one out of e i g h t mem-bers o f the P o l i t b u r o and S e c r e t a r i a t ( L i Peng ) had s t u d i e d i n the S o v i e t Union. And 6 out of 56 members o f the C e n t r a l Com-mi t t e e were r e p o r t e d t o have s t u d i e d i n the USSR. 4 3In the 4th Ple n a r y S e s s i o n o f the 13th C e n t r a l Committee( June 1989),Jiang Zemin, who had been i n the USSR from 1950-56 f o r p r a c t i c e and f u r t h e r t r a i n i n g , was e l e c t e d the new g e n e r a l s e c r e t a r y . L i T i e y -i n g , a graduate o f Ch a r l e s U n i v e r s i t y i n Czechoslovakia,became a member of the P o l i t b u r o . Obviously, i n China's l e a d e r s h i p , the " r e t u r n e d s t u d e n t s " who, t o use Medvedev's d e s c r i p t i o n , "had grown up wi t h an a t t i t u d e o f r e s p e c t f o r the S o v i e t Union and the t r a d i t i o n o f S i n o - S o v i e t f r i e n d s h i p " 4 4 are i n c r e a s i n g . T h i s may a f f e c t o f f i c i a l t h i n k i n g i n the f u t u r e . On the oth e r hand, the ap p a r e n t l y s u c c e s s f u l implementation of the S o v i e t model i n the F i r s t F i v e Year Plan p e r i o d , as w e l l as t h e r e s u l t a n t s t r o n g S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e on C h i n a ' s economic p l a n n i n g , s t r a t e g y o f i n d u s t r i a l development and e d u c a t i o n a l s y s -tem, might a l s o have had some d i v i s i v e e f f e c t upon the A l l i a n c e . The f i r s t q u e s t i o n t h a t comes t o mind i s whether the S o v i e t s made use o f t h e i r o v e r whelming i n f l u e n c e on C h i n a ' s economic p l a n n i n g system t o secure some economic advantages i n r e t u r n f o r t h e i r a s s i s t a n c e . For i n s t a n c e , s i n c e China's i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n was c o n c e n t r a t e d i n the North, one wonders whether t h i s r e g i o n a l 80 d i s t r i b u t i o n r e p r e s e n t s a r e f l e c t i o n of S o v i e t s t r a t e g i c i n t e r -e s t o r a p r e f e r e n c e on the p a r t o f the S o v i e t s i n d e v e l o p i n g im-p o r t a n t t r a d e between Northern China and the USSR? The i n d u s t r y of pre-Communist China was c o n c e n t r a t e d mainly i n t h e c o a s t a l a r e a s . When t h e F i r s t F i v e Y e a r P l a n was i n -i t i a t e d i n 1953, 77% o f t h e g r o s s v a l u e o f i n d u s t r i a l o u t p u t o r i g i n a t e d i n the areas which i n c l u d e the c i t i e s o f B e i j i n g , T i a n j i n , Shanghai and the p r o v i n c e s o f Hebei, L i a o n i n g , Shandong, J i a n g s u , Z h e j i a n g , F u j i a n and Guangdong. 4 5 T h i s p a t t e r n of l o c a -t i o n was c o n s i d e r e d h i g h l y u n d e s i r a b l e by the Chinese p l a n n e r s . Hence, the F i r s t F i v e Year Plan had sought t o s h i f t i n d u s t r y i n -la n d from the c o a s t a l areas by committing 55% of a l l i n d u s t r i a l i n v e s t m e n t — a n d about t h r e e - q u a r t e r s o f the investment i n new p l a n t c o n s t r u c t i o n — t o i n l a n d r e g i o n s . 4 6 For i n s t a n c e , two major i r o n and s t e e l complexes s i m i l a r t o the one a t Anshan were b u i l t a t Baotou (Inner Mongolia) and Wuhan ( c e n t r a l China) from the ground up t o S o v i e t s p e c i f i c a t i o n s . 4 7 A new t r a c t o r p l a n t was b u i l t a t Loyang, and a new o i l r e f i n e r y a t Lanzhou, both with S o v i e t a i d . 4 8 However, by the end of the F i r s t F i v e Year Plan, t h i s s p r e a d o f i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n t o t h e i n t e r i o r was s t i l l moderate. Over h a l f o f the modern s e c t o r i n i n d u s t r y was s t i l l c o n c e n t r a t e d i n t h e J i a n g s u , H e b e i and L i a o n i n g p r o v i n c e s . 4 9 L i a o n i n g s t i l l had the g r e a t e s t c o n c e n t r a t i o n o f heavy i n d u s t r y w i t h 23% of China's t o t a l output i n i r o n and s t e e l and 20% of machinery. 5 0 And the Northeast as a whole remained the most i n -81 d u s t r i a l i z e d p a r t of the country, w i t h Harbin and Shenyang as the c e n t e r s of the n a t i o n ' s machine t o o l i n d u s t r y , and J i l i n the most important producer of c h e m i c a l s . 5 1 Yet, t h i s l a c k of success i n r e l o c a t i n g the i n d u s t r y does not n e c e s s a r i l y r e f l e c t S o v i e t p r e f e r e n c e or s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t i n these areas even though they are c l o s e t o the S o v i e t borders and t h u s v u l n e r a b l e t o S o v i e t m i l i t a r y a t t a c k . In t h e f i r s t p l a c e , a war w i t h the USSR was too remote t o be c o n s i d e r e d and too h e r e t i c t o be mentioned i n the mid-1950's. Hence, Lanzhou and B aotou were n o t more v u l n e r a b l e t h a n Wuhan and Loyang. Secondly, what the Chinese p l a n n e r s o r i g i n a l l y d e s i r e d was the spread of i n d u s t r y t o the i n t e r i o r or westward, but not from the North ( e s p e c i a l l y Manchuria) t o the Southwest which would be l e s s v u l n e r a b l e t o a S o v i e t m i l i t a r y a t t a c k . T h i r d l y , the l a c k of success i n r e l o c a t i o n was most l i k e l y due t o the u n w i l l i n g n e s s of the p l a n n i n g a u t h o r i t i e s t o develop new i n d u s t r i a l c e n t e r s a t the expense o f t h e g e n e r a l r a t e o f economic e x p a n s i o n . S i n c e Manchuria was the pre-Communist base of China's i n d u s t r y , 5 2 i t was o n l y n a t u r a l f o r i t t o remain so d u r i n g the F i r s t F i v e Year P l a n b e c a u s e e x p a n s i o n would be e a s i e r and f a s t e r t h e r e . F o u r t h l y , t o a l e s s e r degree, the h a b i t as w e l l as the r e l u c t a n c e of the "bourgeois experts and i n t e l l e c t u a l s " t o l e a v e the c o a s t a l c e n t e r s might a l s o have c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h i s l a c k of success i n 82 r e l o c a t i o n . In s h o r t , no evidence so f a r has been found t o prove t h a t the c o n c e n t r a t i o n of China's i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n i n the North was wholly or p a r t l y due t o S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e . However, i n the p o l i t i c a l arena, S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e , espe-c i a l l y t h e way S o v i e t a i d was g i v e n , m i ght have weakened t h e A l l i a n c e . 5 3 China was c l e a r l y the j u n i o r p a r t n e r i n the A l l i a n c e w h i l e S t a l i n l i v e d . The Chinese, e s p e c i a l l y Mao, r e s e n t e d such a r o l e but were not i n a p o s i t i o n t o r e j e c t a s s i s t a n c e from Moscow a t a time when S o v i e t a i d was so c r u c i a l i n t h e i r s t r u g g l e f o r power c o n s o l i d a t i o n and r a p i d i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n . Under such circumstances, f r i c t i o n s and s t r a i n s were unavoidable. Many ob-s e r v e r s have n o t e d t h a t a l m o s t e v e r y economic agreement was preceded by p r o t r a c t e d n e g o t i a t i o n s and was n e a r l y always signed i n Moscow, not B e i j i n g . For i n s t a n c e , i n or d e r t o secure S o v i e t a i d f o r t h e i r F i r s t F i v e Year Plan, the Chinese sent a d e l e g a t i o n of s i x t e e n top l e v e l o f f i c i a l s , headed by Zhou E n l a i , t o Moscow i n August 1952. The n e g o t i a t i o n s were completed o n l y i n May 1953 when the l e v e l o f S o v i e t a i d was decided upon. Hence, some ob-s e r v e r s b e l i e v e t h a t S t a l i n and o t h e r top S o v i e t l e a d e r s d i d not d e s i r e t o u n d e r w r i t e an a m b i t i o u s C h i n e s e i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n program, but showed more i n t e r e s t i n China's p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the Korean War which was a l s o brought t o an end almost immediately f o l l o w i n g S t a l i n ' s death on March 5, 1953. I t a l s o seems l i k e l y t h a t the fundamental d e c i s i o n s c o n c e r n i n g the F i r s t F i v e Year 83 P l a n were made i n Moscow, because they were f i r s t announced i n Pravda w h i l e the same i n f o r m a t i o n was o n l y p u b l i s h e d i n China ten days l a t e r . 5 4 Thus, t h e r e seems t o be a f a i r l y s o l i d b a s i s f o r Khrushchev's a s s e r t i o n t h a t the S i n o - S o v i e t r e l a t i o n s h i p might have d e t e r i o r a t e d even e a r l i e r than i t d i d i f S t a l i n had not d i e d i n 1953 . 5 5 Beginning i n 1954, the new S o v i e t l e a d e r s made obvious e f -f o r t s t o move toward a more equal r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h China and to remove p a s t causes of f r i c t i o n . However, these e f f o r t s were not e n t i r e l y s u c c e s s f u l . That the mutual s u s p i c i o n s s t i l l r a n k l e d i s e v i d e n t from the f a c t t h a t from 1950 onwards, the S i n o - S o v i e t t r a d e agreement was s i g n e d on an annual b a s i s , even though l o n g -term p l a n n i n g i n s o c i a l i s t c o n s t r u c t i o n i s always f a v o r e d i n t h e o r y . A c c o r d i n g t o an a r t i c l e i n Vneshnyaya T o r q o v l y a , China had by 1958 concluded long term t r a d e agreements w i t h a l l the s o c i a l i s t c o u n t r i e s i n Europe — w i t h Poland, Hungary, Rumania, and B u l g a r i a (1959-62), with East Germany, Czechoslovakia(1960-62,and wi t h A l b a n i a ( 1 9 6 1 - 6 5 ) — e x c e p t w i t h the S o v i e t Union. 5 6 The c o n s p i c u o u s f a c t , however, was t h a t a l t h o u g h t h e S i n o - S o v i e t t r a d e was t h e b i g g e s t b i l a t e r a l f l o w among t h e s o c i a l i s t c o u n t r i e s , China remained the o n l y n a t i o n o u t s i d e the long-term t r a d e agreement system which l i n k e d a l l the r e s t of the c o u n t r i e s w i t h i n the S o v i e t b l o c . 84 In 1956, the S o v i e t Union i n v i t e d China t o j o i n the C o u n c i l of Mutual Economic A s s i s t a n c e (CMEA). China d e c l i n e d the i n -v i t a t i o n and merely sent observers t o the meetings. In a 1978 i n t e r v i e w w i t h a U.S. d e l e g a t i o n of c i v i c and world l e a d e r s i n B e i j i n g , Keng Piao (China's deputy prime m i n i s t e r ) s a i d t h a t the reason f o r China's d e c l i n a t i o n was t h a t , i n the S o v i e t v e r s i o n of " i n t e r n a t i o n a l d i v i s i o n of labour", China was t o have p l a y e d i t s r o l e i n a c o o r d i n a t e d CMEA by d e v e l o p i n g i t s a g r i c u l t u r e , not i t s i n d u s t r y . China c o u l d then e f f i c i e n t l y supply food g r a i n t o t h e i n d u s t r i a l i z e d S o v i e t U n i o n and E a s t e r n E u r o p e a n n a t i o n s w hich would i n t u r n s u p p l y m a c h i n e r i e s t o C h i n a . Such a r e l a t i o n s h i p was c e r t a i n l y unacceptable t o China's l e a d e r s . To them, t o r e m a i n an a g r i c u l t u r a l n a t i o n was t o have re m a i n e d backward, and t o have accepted a permanent r o l e of a s u b o r d i n a t e i n the S o v i e t b l o c . A c c o r d i n g t o Keng, t h i s and o t h e r unaccep-t a b l e " S o v i e t demands" soured the r e l a t i o n between B e i j i n g and Moscow. 5 7 However, i f the " S o v i e t v e r s i o n " of " i n t e r n a t i o n a l d i v i s i o n of l a b o u r " was indeed as simple as Keng Piao had the Americans t o b e l i e v e , why d i d the S o v i e t s g i v e so much i n d u s t r i a l a i d t o China which was supposed t o have developed a g r i c u l t u r e i n the f u t u r e , and c o n t i n u e t o do so u n t i l 1960? In t r u t h , i t i s more l i k e l y t h a t " S o v i e t demands" were i n t e r p r e t e d as "unacceptable" a f t e r S i n o - S o v i e t r e l a t i o n s had a l r e a d y gone s o u r , s i n c e t h e y e a r 1956 a l s o witnessed the d e - S t a l i n i z a t i o n r a i s e d i n the Twentieth 85 C o n g r e s s o f t h e CPSU, a s h a r p d e c l i n e o f S o v i e t l o a n s and a S i n o - S o v i e t c o m p e t i t i o n f o r p o l i t i c a l f a v o r i n the d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s through f o r e i g n a i d programs Z.K. B r z e z i n s k i had suggested t h a t China's d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w ith the extent of S o v i e t economic a s s i s t a n c e was a major f a c t o r i n the S i n o - S o v i e t d i s p u t e . 5 8 A . E c k s t e i n a l s o noted t h a t "the S o v i e t Union's f a i l u r e t o extend economic a s s i s t a n c e t o China i n the l a t e 1950s must have been at l e a s t an i r r i t a n t , i f not one of the most important f a c t o r s c o n t r i b u t i n g t o the t e n s i o n s i n S i n o -S o v i e t r e l a t i o n s " 5 9 While i t i s beyond any doubt t h a t B e i j i n g had never r e c e i v e d the amount of a i d i t hoped f o r , i t i s a l s o c l e a r t h a t , as W.E. G r i f f i t h p o i n t e d out, the amount of economic a i d r e q u i r e d t o g i v e China anywhere near what she needed was i n any case out of the q u e s t i o n f o r the S o v i e t U n i o n . 6 0 A c c o r d i n g to Roy Medvedev, China requested i n 1950 a i d t o the tune of 3 b i l -l i o n U.S. d o l l a r s , " w h i l e t h e S o v i e t U n i o n ' s c a p a c i t y was s t r i c t l y l i m i t e d . " 6 1 Thus , even on p u r e l y economic grounds, the d i s p u t e seemed i n e v i t a b l e . But why d i d S o v i e t f i n a n c i a l a i d slow down a f t e r 1955 and v i r t u a l l y end i n 1957? An a r t i c l e p u b l i s h e d i n 1961 advanced an argument t h a t the S o v i e t economy was too s t r e t c h e d a t the time to p r o v i d e more f i n a n c i a l a i d t o China. Coping w i t h the aftermath of the upheaval i n E a s t e r n Europe, the S o v i e t s were b e l i e v e d t o 86 have been f o r c e d t o d i v e r t some $1,000 m i l l i o n i n s h o r t - t e r m c r e d i t s t o c o u n t r i e s l i k e Hungary and Poland. As a r e s u l t , even t h e 6 t h F i v e - Y e a r P l a n was abandoned i n September 1957. 6 2 However, t h i s c o n t e n t i o n has n o t been c o n f i r m e d by o t h e r r e s e a r c h e s and thus remains as a s u p p o s i t i o n o n l y . 6 3 Based on the a v a i l a b l e evidence, two t e n t a t i v e e x p l a n a t i o n s can be advanced here. F i r s t , when S o v i e t l e a d e r s i n c r e a s i n g l y committed themselves t o the p o l i c y of p e a c e f u l c o e x i s t e n c e , i . e . economic c o m p e t i t i o n with c a p i t a l i s m , r e s o u r c e s had t o be con-c e n t r a t e d on continuous domestic economic expansion as w e l l as to be a l l o c a t e d t o those d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s where they had some l i k e l i h o o d of f a l l i n g on f e r t i l e ground. In 1956, the S o v i e t Union began t o implement a s t r a t e g y f o r winning p o l i t i c a l sym-p a t h y and s u p p o r t t h r o u g h a b r o a d program o f t r a d e and a i d d i r e c t e d t o some c a r e f u l l y s e l e c t e d d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s . As a r e s u l t , i n c o u n t r i e s l i k e Cuba, the U n i t e d Arab R e p u b l i c , I r a q , and Guinea, S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e advanced p e r c e p t i b l y . S o v i e t p o l i t i -c a l presence c o u l d a l s o be f e l t i n I n d i a , A f g h a n i s t a n , Burma, and Indonesia. A c c o r d i n g t o C. B. McLane's c a l c u l a t i o n , I n d i a r e c e i v e d S o v i e t c r e d i t s t o t a l i n g $250 m i l l i o n i n 1956, and $395 m i l l i o n i n 1959. Indonesia r e c e i v e d $100 m i l l i o n i n 1956, A f -g h a n i s t a n r e c e i v e d $234 m i l l i o n from 1956 t o 1959. 6 4 However, i f the same amount of r e s o u r c e s were used i n China, i t would on l y s t r e n g t h e n a q u e s t i o n a b l e a l l y t h a t had a l r e a d y begun t o r e f u s e a c c e p t i n g a subordinate p o s i t i o n . 87 Secondly, even b e f o r e the Chinese s t a r t e d r e p a y i n g t h e i r debts t o the S o v i e t s i n 1956, they had launched t h e i r own a c t i v e f o r e i g n a i d program. On terms t h a t were u s u a l l y more f a v o r a b l e than those of the S o v i e t s , the Chinese promised s e v e r a l hundred m i l l i o n d o l l a r s of a i d t o some c a r e f u l l y s e l e c t e d Communist and n e u t r a l i s t c o u n t r i e s . In some i n s t a n c e s , t h e r e were c l e a r s i g n s of c o m p e t i t i o n between the Chinese and the S o v i e t s as t o which of t h e s e two c o u n t r i e s would emerge as t h e most u n s e l f i s h and generous f r i e n d . For example, i n September 1953, North Korea r e c e i v e d a U.S. $250 m i l l i o n S o v i e t grant f o r r e h a b i l i t a t i o n . Then i n November, Kim I l - s u n g r e c e i v e d C h i n a ' s commitment t o forego Pyongyang's repayment of c o s t s of a l l m a t e r i a l s s u p p l i e d t o North Korea d u r i n g the course of the Korean war and a Chinese grant of U.S. $200 m i l l i o n t o be extended over t h r e e y e a r s . As O.E. Clubb has p o i n t e d out, " s i n c e China was c u r r e n t l y going i n t o debt t o the S o v i e t Union i n the process of s t r i v i n g f o r i t s own modernization, the p o l i t i c a l nature of the Sino-Korean d e a l was as c l e a r t o Moscow as i t was t o Pyongyang." 6 5 A c c o r d i n g t o C.Y. Cheng's c a l c u l a t i o n , from 1953 t o 1956, B e i j i n g ' s t o t a l f o r e i g n a i d amounted t o $1283.2 m i l l i o n , o n l y $42 m i l l i o n l e s s than the a s s i s t a n c e China had r e c e i v e d from the S o v i e t Union. 6 6 T h i s c a l -c u l a t i o n was c l o s e l y confirmed by China's F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r Chen Y i , who i n an i n t e r v i e w with Japanese j o u r n a l i s t s (November 1961) s a i d , " S o v i e t a i d extended t o China was roughly e q u i v a l e n t t o China's a i d extended t o Southeast A s i a n n a t i o n s . " 6 7 88 However h i g h the l i v i n g standards i n any country, f o r e i g n a i d always means a degree of s a c r i f i c e because i t c o u l d be used t o improve domestic l i v i n g c o n d i t i o n s . The f a c t t h a t Chinese l e a d e r s were e x p o r t i n g badly needed s k i l l s and commodities from t h e i r own p o o r c o u n t r y which was b a r e l y a b l e t o f e e d i t s e l f p o i n t e d t o an overwhelmingly p o l i t i c a l purpose behind these f o r -e i g n a i d programs. From the S o v i e t p o i n t of view, no j u s t i f i c a -t i o n c o u l d be found f o r p r o v i d i n g f i n a n c i a l a i d t o China, while China i t s e l f was p l a y i n g the r o l e of generous b e n e f a c t o r . On the o t h e r hand, i t must have been d i s t r e s s i n g f o r the Chinese t o see t h e i r Communist a l l y g r a n t i n g , f o r i n s t a n c e , $375 m i l l i o n f o r I n d i a ' s 3rd F i v e - Y e a r P l a n on 13 S e p t e m b e r — o n l y a week a f t e r they t o l d the S o v i e t charge d ' a f f a i r e s t h a t New D e l h i had provoked the border d i s p u t e w i t h C h i n a ; 6 8 o r t o see Khrush-chev p r o v i d i n g a $250 m i l l i o n c r e d i t t o Indonesia i n February I 9 6 0 , 6 9 when i t s government was i n d i s p u t e w i t h t h e C h i n e s e government over the i s s u e of overseas Chinese. I t was r e p o r t e d t h a t by 1961, I n d i a alone had a l r e a d y r e c e i v e d S o v i e t a i d t o t a l -i n g $800 m i l l i o n 7 0 w h i l e i n t h i s most d i f f i c u l t year, China only r e c e i v e d a c r e d i t of 500,000 tons of sugar. From 1954 t o 1960, the t o t a l c r e d i t s granted by the S o v i e t Union t o d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s amounted t o $2.55 b i l l i o n . 7 1 A l l these r e s o u r c e s c o u l d have been used i n China. T h e r e f o r e , when 89 the A l b a n i a n s a t t a c k e d the S o v i e t s f o r " a i d i n g n o n - s o c i a l i s t un-derdeveloped c o u n t r i e s b e f o r e the s o c i a l i s t s t a t e s have become showcases of p r o s p e r i t y " i n 1961, 7 2 i t was w i d e l y b e l i e v e d t h a t the A l b a n i a n s were e x p r e s s i n g the sentiment o f t h e i r mentors i n B e i j i n g . In s h o r t , i f S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e proved both as c o h e s i v e and d i v i s i v e f a c t o r s i n t h e A l l i a n c e , S o v i e t a i d m i g h t have been producing t e n s i o n s s i n c e the A l l i a n c e was e s t a b l i s h e d — b e c a u s e w h i l e the d e s i r e f o r S o v i e t a i d d i d not l i m i t China's e f f o r t i n p u r s u i n g p a r i t y w i t h i n the S o v i e t b l o c , the d e c l i n e of a i d d i d i n t e n s i f y B e i j i n g ' s a n t i - S o v i e t a t t i t u d e . I f a d o n o r - r e c i p i e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p d i d n o t n e c e s s a r i l y a s s u r e f r i e n d s h i p , economic pr e s s u r e , such as the withdrawal of e x p e r t s and c u r t a i l m e n t of S o v i e t e x p o r t s , was even more damaging. In f a c t , t h i s crude and s e l f - d e f e a t i n g S o v i e t s t r a t e g y o n l y i n t e n s i f i e d China's d e t e r -m i n a t i o n t o become ec o n o m i c a l l y " s e l f - r e l i a n t . " I t a l s o convinced Chinese l e a d e r s t h a t h e n c e f o r t h the S o v i e t s c o u l d not be t r u s t e d as an a l l y . I n a d e t a i l e d s t u d y o f S o v i e t economic p r e s s u r e a g a i n s t Y u g o s l a v i a , A l b a n i a and China, R.O. Freedman c o n v i n c i n g l y d e m o n s t r a t e s t h a t s u c h p r e s s u r e has h a r d l y e v e r s u c c e e d e d i n f o r c i n g a government t o change i t s p o l i c i e s . 7 3 Thus, c o n f l i c t i n g economic i n t e r e s t can i n f a c t be regarded as a " d e c i s i v e f a c t o r " u n d e r l y i n g the i d e o l o g i c a l d i s p u t e . 7 4 90 To t h e S o v i e t U n i o n , t h e A l l i a n c e c e r t a i n l y a l s o p r o v i d e d support and a s s i s t a n c e t h a t would have been d i f f i c u l t t o o b t a i n elsewhere. As an a l l y , China helped s h i e l d the S o v i e t f r o n t i e r from the P a c i f i c t o the h e a r t o f A s i a i n the Cold War, and r e n d e r e d c o n s i d e r a b l e a s s i s t a n c e i n e x t e n d i n g S o v i e t i n -f l u e n c e i n t o the d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s . In g e n e r a l , the people i n these c o u n t r i e s were ve r y impatient f o r i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n w i t h i n t h e s h o r t e s t p o s s i b l e t i m e . Any q u i c k s u c c e s s i n C h i n a ' s im-pl e m e n t a t i o n of the S o v i e t model would serve as a good precedent t o f o l l o w , b e c a u s e C h i n a s t a r t e d w i t h an economic and s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e s i m i l a r to. t h a t o f many A s i a n c o u n t r i e s . Hence, as long as C h i n a a c c e p t e d t h e r o l e o f a j u n i o r p a r t n e r i n t h e S o v i e t b l o c , i t would serve the purpose of making the S o v i e t brand of Communism u l t i m a t e l y a c c e p t a b l e i n the d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s . However, the b i n d i n g e f f e c t of Sino-Soviet: economic coopera-t i o n was not so s t r o n g as f a r as the S o v i e t s i d e was concerned. I t was sometimes argued t h a t China had p r o v i d e d the S o v i e t Union with food and raw m a t e r i a l s t h a t enabled the Russians t o con-c e n t r a t e t h e i r r e s o u r c e s elsewhere. Yet, as a l r e a d y mentioned on p. 60, s i n c e the t o t a l S o v i e t import of Chinese consumer goods c o n s t i t u t e d o n l y about 0.1% t o 0.3% of t o t a l S o v i e t consumption, such b e n e f i t was probably n e g l i g i b l e . On some o t h e r o c c a s i o n s , i t was n o t e d t h a t Mao p u l l e d S t a l i n ' s c h e s t n u t s out of the f i r e of the Korean War; but as long as the o r i g i n o f the Korean War, and e s p e c i a l l y the m o t i v a t i o n s 91 o f S t a l i n and Kim I l - s u n g r e m a i n o b s c u r e , i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o decide whose chestnuts they were. Moreover, the Chinese were i n e f f e c t a l s o a c t i n g i n t h e i r own defense. Some observers f u r t h e r suggested t h a t China's i n f l u e n c e on S o v i e t p o l i t i c s might be b e n e f i c i a l t o c e r t a i n f a c t i o n s w i t h i n the S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p i n t h e i r power s t r u g g l e , as w e l l as t o the maintenance of the S o v i e t l e a d i n g p o s i t i o n w i t h i n the Communist b l o c . For i n s t a n c e , H. Schwartz a s s e r t s t h a t "the evidence of a Molotov-Mao a l l i a n c e i s c o m p e l l i n g . " 7 5 R. MacFarquhar a l s o argues t h a t i n the autumn of 1957, "Khrushchev must have been anxious f o r Mao's support: f o r h i m s e l f i n the aftermath of the purge of t h e x a n t i - p a r t y group', and f o r t h e S o v i e t U n i o n a g a i n s t t h e Poles and the Yugoslavs a t the forthcoming Communist summit." 7 6 And L i u Xiao, China's ambassador t o the S o v i e t Union (1955-62)in h i s memoirs s t a t e s t h a t " i n the s t r u g g l e w i t h i n the S o v i e t p a r t y , both s i d e s had been seeking the Chinese p a r t y ' s support and t r i e d t o c l a r i f y China's p o s i t i o n . , , 7 7 L i u a l s o a f f i r m s t h a t a f t e r the June Plenary s e s s i o n of the S o v i e t p a r t y i n 1957, Khrushchev was v e r y u n c e r t a i n about C h i n a ' s a t t i t u d e t o w a rds him. Hence , Mikoyan was s e n t t o C h i n a i n J u l y t o e n l i s t Mao's and o t h e r Chinese l e a d e r s ' s u p p o r t . 7 8 Even though i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o e s t a b -l i s h such arguments or a s s e r t i o n s , they seem t o suggest t h a t t o the S o v i e t s , the b e n e f i t s of the A l l i a n c e were mainly p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y . 92 While i t i s not e n t i r e l y c l e a r how the S o v i e t s p e r c e i v e d t h e i r economic b e n e f i t s i n c o o p e r a t i n g w i t h China, they e v i d e n t l y saw t h a t the i n i t i a l s a c r i f i c e s i n v o l v e d i n s u p p o r t i n g China's F i r s t F i v e Year Plan were wdrthwhile o n l y i f the p a y o f f was t o be s u f f i c i e n t on economic grounds. T h i s might i n c l u d e China's ac-ceptance of i t s a s s i g n e d r o l e i n a S o v i e t v e r s i o n of " s o c i a l i s t d i v i s i o n of l a b o r " and a l o n g term t r a d e agreement. A c c o r d i n g t o O . H o e f f d i n g , a s p e c i a l i s t i n economic r e l a t i o n s o f t h e S i n o -S o v i e t b l o c , t h e S o v i e t s had been making e f f o r t " t o p l a c e b i l a t e r a l S i n o - S o v i e t economic r e l a t i o n s on a more o r d e r l y and p r e d i c t a b l e f o o t i n g by n e g o t i a t i n g a long-term t r a d e agreement" 7 9 s i n c e the S i n o - S o v i e t T r e a t y f o r A l l i a n c e was s i g n e d . As time went on, the d e c l i n a t i o n of the Chinese had made the S o v i e t p l a n -ners q u i t e f r u s t r a t e d and "a d i s t i n c t l y c r i t i c a l and i m p a t i e n t n o t e a p p e a r e d i n some S o v i e t comments." 8 0 From t h e C h i n e s e s t a n d p o i n t , however, the debts s t i l l o u t s t a n d i n g t o the S o v i e t U n i o n , combined w i t h t h e a p p a r e n t S o v i e t r e f u s a l t o e x t e n d c r e d i t s s i n c e 1954 had made i t h i g h l y u n d e s i r a b l e f o r China t o accept i t s p r e s e n t f i n a n c i a l s t a t u s as a b a s i s f o r a l o n g term t r a d e agreement wi t h USSR. As a r e s u l t , e a r l y i n 1960, the sub-j e c t was q u i e t l y dropped. And as d i s c u s s e d on p.85, China a l s o d e c l i n e d the i n v i t a t i o n t o j o i n the CMEA i n 1956. In s h o r t , a l l the economic p a y o f f s t h a t the S o v i e t s had been e x p e c t i n g f a i l e d t o m a t e r i a l i z e . When China d e c l i n e d t o accept the r o l e of j u n i o r 93 p a r t n e r i n the A l l i a n c e and thus made the p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y b e n e f i t s of the A l l i a n c e dubious t o the S o v i e t s , t h e i r economic r e l a t i o n s w i t h China became l a r g e l y a burden. 94 Notes 1. Up t o mid-1960, many Western observers s t i l l b e l i e v e d t h a t d e s p i t e the e x i s t e n c e of " r e a l d i v e r g e n c e s of n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t , " an open s p l i t was "improbable" and " u n l i k e l y i n the near f u t u r e " , because the c o h e s i v e elements i n the a l l i a n c e , as compared t o the d i v i s i v e f a c t o r s , were by f a r dominant, (See D.S. Z a g o r i a " S t r a i n s i n the S i n o - S o v i e t A l l i a n c e , " Problems of Communism. May 1960, p.11.) w h i l e an a r t i c l e on China by S t u a r t K i r b y , the Head o f t h e Department o f Economics and P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e i n t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f Hong Kong, was t i t l e d " R u s s i a ' s L a r g e s t S a t e l l i t e " , and p u b l i s h e d i n The China Q u a r t e r l y no.1 (January 1960). 2. L i u and Wu, S o c i a l i s t Economy, p.186 3. I b i d . . pp.190-191. 4. I b i d . f p.193. 5. I b i d . , p.198. 6. A. E c k s t e i n , "Economic Growth and Change i n China: A Twenty-year P e r s p e c t i v e , " China Q u a r t e r l y no.52 (September 1972), p.229 7. I b i d . , p.230. These f i g u r e s a r e now c o n f i r m e d by C h i n e s e s o u r c e . A c c o r d i n g t o The 1985 Almanac o f C h i n a ' s F o r e i g n  Economic R e l a t i o n s and T r a d e ( B e i j i n g : Water R e s o u r c e s and E l e c t r i c Power Press, October 1985), China's F o r e i g n t r a d e t u r n -over of 1953 was 2.836 b i l l i o n U.S. d o l l a r s ; and 4.381 b i l l i o n U.S. d o l l a r s f o r 1959. p.348. 8. L i u and Wu, S o c i a l i s t Economy, pp.211-212. 9. L e o A. O r l e a n s , " S o v i e t I n f l u e n c e on C h i n a ' s H i g h e r E d u c a t i o n , " i n Ruth Hayhoe and M a r i a n n e B a s t i d , e d . , C h i n a ' s  E d u c a t i o n and t h e I n d u s t r i a l i z e d World(Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, Inc.1987), pp.186-187. 10. C.Y.Cheng, S c i e n t i f i c and E n g i n e e r i n g Manpower, p.205. 11. Ronald F. P r i c e , Education i n Modern China(London:Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979), p.102. 12. C.Y. Cheng, S c i e n t i f i c and E n g i n e e r i n g Manpower, p.192. 95 13. R.F. P r i c e , E d u c a t i o n i n China, p.102. 14. I b i d . 15. Guangming Ribao. September 2, 1954. 16. Orleans, " S o v i e t I n f l u e n c e , " p.189. 17. I b i d . 18. Klochko, S o v i e t S c i e n t i s t , pp.23-24. 19. I b i d . . p.199. 20. C.Y. Cheng, S c i e n t i f i c and E n g i n e e r i n g Manpower, p. 187. 21. Chen Po-ta, "Speech b e f o r e the Study Group of Research Mem-bers of the Academica S i n i c a , " ( B e i j i n g : F o r e i g n Languages Press, 1953), as c i t e d i n Orleans " S o v i e t I n f l u e n c e , " p.190. 22. As quoted i n Stewart F r a s e r , E d u c a t i o n : Record of the F i r s t  Decade (New York:John Wiley & Sons, 1965), p.347 23. V e s t n i k Akademii Nauka SSSR, 1962 No. 3 (March). As c i t e d i n C.Y.Cheng, S c i e n t i f i c and E n g i n e e r i n g Manpower, p.199. 24. I b i d , p.200. 2 5. Ronald F. P r i c e , " Convergence or Copying: China and the S o v i e t Union," i n Hayhoe and B a s t i d , China's Education, p.158. 26. B o r i s o v and Koloskov, S o v i e t - C h i n e s e R e l a t i o n s , p.164. 27. I b i d . 28. Zhongguo Xinwen(China news S e r v i c e ) , Feb. 16, 1960, p.2. 29. Druzhba ( F r i e n d s h i p ) no.31, 1958, p.13. As c i t e d i n C.Y.Cheng, S c i e n t i f i c and E n g i n e e r i n g Manpower, p.190. 30. Zhongguo Xinwen. Aug. 17, 1959, p.15. 31. C.Y. Cheng, S c i e n t i f i c and E n g i n e e r i n g Manpower, pp.194,208. 32. I b i d . , p.195. 33. I b i d . , p.196. 34. I b i d . , pp.196,200. 96 35. Vneshnyaya To r q o v l y a , 1959, no.10, pp.18-22. 36. Zhongguo Xinwen. Nov.4,1959,p.11. 37. Novoye Vremya (The New E r a ) , Dec.19,1957, p.22. As c i t e d i n C.Y.Cheng, S c i e n t i f i c and E n g i n e e r i n g Manpower, p.201. 38. Druzhba. No.44,1959, pp.10-11. As c i t e d i n I b i d . 39. C.Y.Cheng, S c i e n t i f i c and E n g i n e e r i n g Manpower, pp.194,207. 40. Renmin Ribao, Feb. 19,1960. 41. Some idea of the percentage of books t r a n s l a t e d from f o r e i g n languages can be obtained from G.R. Nunn's account: In 1964, Rus-s i a n books a c c o u n t e d f o r 63% o f a l l t i t l e s , i n w h i c h , books d e a l i n g w i t h i n d u s t r y accounted f o r 75%, g e n e r a l s c i e n c e , 5 4 % . See h i s P u b l i s h i n g i n Mainland China (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T.Press, 1966), p.10. 42. R. Medvedev, China and Superpowers, p.161 43. R.F. P r i c e , "Convergence or Copying," p.317 note no.27. 44. Medvedev, China and Superpowers, p.78. 45. Nai-Ruenn Chen and Walter Galenson, The Chinese Economy Under  Communism (Chicago: A l d i n e P u b l i s h i n g Co., 1969), p.72. 46. R i s k i n , China's P o l i t i c a l Economy, pp.58-59. 47. C.Y.Cheng, Economic R e l a t i o n s , pp.3 2-33. 48. N.R.Chen and W.Galenson, Chinese Economy, pp.52-53. 49. E . T . W h e e l w r i g h t and Bruce M c F a r l a n e , The C h i n e s e Road t o  S o c i a l i s m (New York: Modern Reader 1970), p.41. 50. N.R.Chen and W.Galenson, Chinese Economy, p.74. 51. I b i d , p.85. 52. For i n s t a n c e , i n 1945, the i r o n and s t e e l complex a t Anshan had a c a p a c i t y of 1.96 m i l l i o n tons of p i g i r o n and 1.3 m i l l i o n tons of s t e e l , r e p r e s e n t i n g r e s p e c t i v e l y 68 and 65 per cent of t h e e n t i r e n a t i o n a l c a p a c i t y . See N.R.Chen and W.Galenson, Chinese Economy, p.85. 53. S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e as a d i v i s i v e f a c t o r w i l l be d i s c u s s e d i n 97 more d e t a i l i n Chapter V,p.l01, The abandonment o f the S o v i e t model. 54. Feng-hwa Mah, "The F i r s t F i v e - Y e a r P l a n and I t s I n t e r n a -t i o n a l Aspect," i n C.F.Remer, ed. , Three Essays on the I n t e r n a - t i o n a l Economics of Communist China (Ann Arbor: The U n i v e r s i t y of Michigan Press, 1959), pp. 41-42. 55. New York Times(June 4, 1956), c i t i n g Khrushchev's speech made i n Warsaw i n March 1956. As quoted i n A.D. B a r n e t t China and  the Major Powers, p.343 note 23. 56. Vneshnyaya T o r q o v l y a , 1959,no.8, p.4. 57. Edward Friedman, "On Maoist C o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n s , " pp.818-19. 58. Z b i g n i e w K. B r z e z i n s k i , The S o v i e t B l o c (Cambridge, Mas-s a c h u s e t t s : Harvard U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1967), pp.404-405. 59. E c k s t e i n , F o r e i g n Trade, p.182. 60. W i l l i a m E. G r i f f i t h , The S i n o - S o v i e t R i f t (Cambridge,Mass. : The M.I.T. Press,1964), p.28. 61. Medvedev, China and Superpowers, pp.22-23. The f i g u r e of $3 b i l l i o n was a l s o mentioned by P.K.I.Quested i n h i s S i n o - S o v i e t  R e l a t i o n s ( S y d n e y : George A l l e n & Unwin, 1984), p.115. 62. W e r n e r K l a t t , " S i n o - S o v i e t E c o n o m i c R e l a t i o n s , " i n G.F.Hudson, R i c h a r d L o w e n t h a l , and R o d e r i c k M a c F a r q u h a r , The  S i n o - S o v i e t Dispute (New York: Praeger, 1961), p.37. And a c c o r d -i n g t o J . W s z e l a s k i ' s s t u d y (1959), t h e sum t o t a l o f S o v i e t c r e d i t s granted t o the European Communist-ruled s t a t e s i n 1956-1957 was $1.3 b i l l i o n . See B r z e z i n s k i , •• The S o v i e t B l o c , p.286,note. 63. In d i s c u s s i n g the abandonment of the S o v i e t 6th F i v e - Y e a r Plan, o t h e r s c h o l a r s have proposed d i f f e r e n t c o n t r i b u t i n g f a c -t o r s , such as power s t r u g g l e w i t h i n the S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p o r an a l t e r n a t e Seven Year Plan which aiming a t more s t r i k i n g i n c r e a s e s i n p r o d u c t i o n , r a t h e r t h a n t h e $1,000 m i l l i o n s h o r t - t e r m c r e d i t s . See, f o r i n s t a n c e , Hutchings, S o v i e t Economic Develop- ment, pp.75-76; H e l l e r and N e k r i c h , U t o p i a i n Power, p.552. 64. C h a r l e s B. McLane, S o v i e t - A s i a n R e l a t i o n s ( London: C e n t r a l A s i a n Research Centre, 1973), pp.63,65,84. A l s o see Clubb, China  and R u s s i a , p.437. 65. Clubb, China and R u s s i a , p.402. 98 66. C.Y. Cheng, Economic R e l a t i o n s , pp.87-88. 67. As quoted i n Harry Schwartz, T s a r s , Mandarins and Commissars ( New York: J . P . L i p p i n c o t t Co.,1968), p.182. 68. A l l e n S. Whiting, "The S i n o - S o v i e t S p l i t , " i n Denis T w i t c h e t t and John S. Fairbank, ed., The Cambridge H i s t o r y of China Vol.14 (New York: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1987), pp.511-512. 69. I b i d . , p.509. 70. M a r s h a l l I . Goldman, " S i n o - S o v i e t T r a d e : A B a r o m e t e r , " Problems of Communism. 1962,no.6, p.49. 71. Leonard Schapiro, "The Chinese A l l y from the S o v i e t P o i n t of View," p.357. 72. P r a v d a ( B r a t i s l a v a ) , October 28,1961, as c i t e d i n M.I.Goldman, " S i n o - S o v i e t Trade," p.49. 73. Robert O. Freedman, Economic Warfare i n the Communist Bloc (New York: A. Praeger ,1970),. I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o note t h a t i n conducting economic p r e s s u r e on Cuba and some NATO c o u n t r i e s , the Americans were not more s u c c e s s f u l than the S o v i e t s , as R. Freedman p o i n t s out i n the c o n c l u s i o n s of h i s study.See p.168 74. C.Y.Chen, Economic R e l a t i o n s , p . l . 75. H. Schwartz, T s a r s . Mandarins and Commissars, p.187. 76. Roderick MacFarquhar, The O r i g i n s Of The C u l t u r a l R e v o l u t i o n .  2 The Great Leap Forward 1958-1960 (London: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1983), p.12. 77. L i u Xiao, Chu S h i S u l i a n Banian ( E i g h t Years As the Ambas- s a d o r t o t h e S o v i e t U n i o n , B e i j i n g : Zhonggong D a n g s h i Z i l i a o Chubanshe, 1986), p.51. 78. I b i d . . p.49. 79. Oleg H o e f f d i n g , " S i n o - S o v i e t Economic R e l a t i o n s i n Recent Years," i n Kurt London ed. , U n i t y and C o n t r a d i c t i o n ( New York: Praeger,1962.) p.298. 80. I b i d , p.299. 99 Chapter V - The I n f l u e n c e on China's P o l i c y - M a k i n g What e f f e c t , i f any, d i d t h e development o f S i n o - S o v i e t economic r e l a t i o n s have upon China's p o l i c y making? I t i s g e n e r a l l y assumed t h a t economic dependence l e a d s t o p o l i t i c a l dependence. Indeed, t h e r e i s l i t t l e doubt t h a t f a r -r e a c h i n g dependence upon t h e S o v i e t U n i o n had c h a r a c t e r i z e d China's economic r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h her a l l y d u r i n g the F i r s t F i v e Year Plan p e r i o d (1953-1957). Did t h i s economic dependence p l a c e any c o n s t r a i n t on China's ambition and a c t i o n a t any s p e c i f i c time and p l a c e ? C e r t a i n p o l i t i c a l events i n China seem t o suggest t h a t the development of S i n o - S o v i e t economic r e l a t i o n s might have had some weight on the Chinese l e a d e r s ' d e c i s i o n making. An attempt t o d i s c e r n S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e on China's d e c i s i o n making (1949-1964) w i l l be made i n the f o l l o w i n g pages through the d i s c u s s i o n of t h r e e major i s s u e s 1. The i s s u e of "Mao's Road". As e a r l y as s p r i n g of 1946, L i u Shaoqi t o l d Anna Loui s e Strong i n an i n t e r v i e w t h a t Mao's g r e a t accomplishment had been t o change Marxism from a European t o an A s i a t i c form, and s i n c e "there are s i m i l a r c o n d i t i o n s i n oth e r lands o f Southeast A s i a , the courses chosen by China w i l l i n f l u e n c e them a l l . " 1 100 In e a r l y 1950, Chinese propaganda attempted t o e l e v a t e the p o s i t i o n o f Mao t o t h a t of Communist t h e o r i s t and l e a d e r by h o l d -i n g up "Mao's Road" as the model f o r o t h e r A s i a n r e v o l u t i o n s . S o v i e t domestic propaganda, on the o t h e r hand, s a i d n o t h i n g about the r e l e v a n c e of China's r e v o l u t i o n t o o t h e r A s i a n r e v o l u t i o n s . In June 1951, I n d i a n Communists made an o v e r t d e n i a l o f t h e China-model l i n e i n t h e i r manifesto , presumably w i t h S o v i e t ap-p r o v a l . The I n d i a n m a n i f e s t o was p u b l i s h e d i n C h i n a o n l y i n November 1951. 2 T h i s five-month d e l a y suggests t h a t the Chinese were r e l u c t a n t t o change t h e i r l i n e , o r c o u l d not d e c i d e how t o respond. L a t e r , a new ge n e r a l formula f o r A s i a n r e v o l u t i o n s was formulated a t the Moscow S c i e n t i f i c Conference which s t a t e d t h a t the A s i a n r e v o l u t i o n s were t o f o l l o w the t e a c h i n g s o f L e n i n and S t a l i n without any r e f e r e n c e a t a l l t o Mao. China's acceptance of t h i s formula i s regarded by some ob-s e r v e r s as e v i d e n c e o f S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e o v e r t h e C h i n e s e Communists—probably because China's eagerness t o c o n s o l i d a t e her economy and i n d u s t r i a l i z e had p l a c e d the S o v i e t Union i n a f a v o r a b l e p o s i t i o n . I t was b e l i e v e d t h a t China's economic and m i l i t a r y dependence on the S o v i e t Union l e f t Mao w i t h no a l t e r -n a t i v e but t o a c t with g r e a t e r c a u t i o n and modesty. 3 2. The abandonment of the S o v i e t model The wholesale borrowing by the Chinese Communists from the S o v i e t model of i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n d u r i n g the F i r s t F i v e Year Plan p e r i o d was obvious t o any o u t s i d e observer . At the time, they 101 had o n l y the S o v i e t Union t o t u r n t o f o r examples, a s s i s t a n c e , and a d v i c e . The S o v i e t s ' success i n b u i l d i n g a l a r g e heavy i n -d u s t r i a l b a s e from a v e r y backward c o u n t r y had c e r t a i n l y im-pressed them. Besides, copying S o v i e t models was s i m p l e r and q u i c k e r than working out new forms and methods a l l a t once. However, the S o v i e t model never had a c l e a r f i e l d i n China. Almost from the ou t s e t , China r e b e l l e d a g a i n s t some of the f e a -t u r e s o f t h e S o v i e t model. In t h i s r e s p e c t , t h e h a l f h e a r t e d a d o p t i o n o f t h e S o v i e t s y s t e m o f i n d u s t r i a l management, t h e "one-man management" ( Y i Zhang Zhi) and i t s f i n a l abandonment i n the mid-1950s may serve as s t r i k i n g examples. In the R e h a b i l i t a t i o n p e r i o d (1949-52), two major types of i n d u s t r i a l management were p r a c t i c e d i n China's state-owned en-t e r p r i s e s : the "Shanghai", or "East China" system and the S o v i e t system. The Shanghai system was wid e l y adopted i n the o l d e r i n -d u s t r i a l c e n t e r s of the e a s t c o a s t . S t r e s s i n g c o l l e c t i v e respon-s i b i l i t y f o r p l a n t management and encouraging worker and s t a f f p a r t i c i p a t i o n v i a " f a c t o r y a d m i n i s t r a t i v e committees", 4 t h i s s y s -tem was o b v i o u s l y more i n a c c o r d w i t h t h e i d e a l o f t h e Yanan p e r i o d which s t r o v e t o i n s p i r e workers' performance by d e v e l o p i n g t h e i r p o l i t i c a l consciousness and group i d e n t i t y . The S o v i e t system of one-man management was f i r s t i n t r o d u c e d t o t h e r a i l r o a d network i n " l i b e r a t e d " M a n c h u r i a , s i n c e t h e S o v i e t s c o n t r o l l e d t h e Changchun R a i l r o a d and r a n p l a n t s and shops connected wi t h the r a i l r o a d . The essence of t h i s S o v i e t 102 system, as Franz Schurmann puts i t , i s "a h i g h l y t e c h n i c a l o r -g a n i z a t i o n o f p r o d u c t i o n , b a sed on p r o d u c t s p e c i a l i z a t i o n . C e n t r a l p l a n n i n g g i v e s t h e manager a complex o f t a r g e t s t o a c h i e v e ; and one-man management g i v e s him power t o m o b i l i z e r e s o u r c e s t o achieve h i s t a r g e t s . . . managers and workers are h e l d i n d i v i d u a l l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r work performance." 5 T h i s new method was c e r t a i n l y c o n s i s t e n t w i t h S t a l i n i s t i n -d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n b e c a u s e m a s s i v e , c a p i t a l - i n t e n s i v e p r o j e c t s c a l l e d f o r h i g h l y c e n t r a l i z e d c o n t r o l , an e x a l t e d r o l e f o r s c a r c e experts and t e c h n i c i a n s , and unambiguous l i n e s o f command. I t a l s o had a c e r t a i n r e l e v a n c e t o China's most acute needs. A f t e r d e c a d e s o f i n t e r n a l chaos, t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f a p o w e r f u l , c e n t r a l i z e d a u t h o r i t y was h e r n a t i o n a l i m p e r a t i v e . B e s i d e s , s i n c e the S o v i e t - a i d i n d u s t r i a l p r o j e c t s were key elements i n C h i n a ' s F i r s t F i v e Y e a r P l a n , and t h e S o v i e t s were t o s e t up t h e s e p l a n t s down t o t h e s m a l l e s t o p e r a t i o n a l d e t a i l s , t h e methods of management i n t r o d u c e d were and had t o be S o v i e t . Con-sequently, the system of one-man management r a d i a t e d f i r s t from the r a i l r o a d s and other j o i n t S i n o - S o v i e t companies, was then u sed i n t h e S o v i e t - a i d i n d u s t r i a l e n t e r p r i s e s , and f i n a l l y reached China's i n d u s t r y as a whole. Although the new method had been h a i l e d as a b a s i c p r i n c i p l e of s o c i a l i s t i n d u s t r i a l management,6 and some p o s i t i v e responses t o one-man management d i d come from newspapers i n t h e N o r t h -e a s t e r n P r o v i n c e s and E a s t e r n China, the spread of the new system 103 was " w i d e l y r e s i s t e d . . . and d i d n o t g a i n p r e d o m i n a n c e i n t h e thousands of s m a l l e r e s t a b l i s h m e n t s " o u t s i d e the o r b i t of d i r e c t S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e . 7 In the course of 1954, fewer r e f e r e n c e s were made t o one-man management. By the middle of 1955, t h i s system was c l e a r l y d e c l i n i n g . In September 1956, the o f f i c i a l a b o l i t i o n of the one-man management system was announced i n a r e p o r t t o the E i g h t h P a r t y Congress by L i Xuefeng, D i r e c t o r of the I n d u s t r i a l Bureau of the C e n t r a l Committee of the CCP. The new system of i n d u s t r i a l management, h e n c e f o r t h t o become the norm of a l l i n -d u s t r i e s , was c a l l e d "factory-manager (Chanqzhanq) r e s p o n s i b i l i t y under the l e a d e r s h i p of the Party Committee" which would combine P a r t y c o l l e c t i v e l e a d e r s h i p w i t h i n d i v i d u a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . Thus, as F. Schurmann puts i t : "the e x t e n s i v e a u t h o r i t y con-f e r r e d on t h e f a c t o r y managers by one-man management was now withdrawn, [though] f u l l i n d i v i d u a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r p e r f o r -mance was t o remain with them." 8 One-man management thus l o s t f a v o r even b e f o r e the comple-t i o n of the F i r s t F i v e Year Plan because, as C. R i s k i n p o i n t e d out, i t was i d e n t i f i e d with the d i s c r e d i t e d Gao Gang, and a l s o because i t v i o l a t e d i d e o l o g i c a l p r i n c i p l e s f a v o r e d by Mao, such as t h a t o f t h e supremacy o f P a r t y and p o l i t i c s . 9 The d e e p e r t r o u b l e i n maximizing the a u t h o r i t y of the managers however, l a y i n t h e f a c t t h a t under t h e Communist regime, p o l i t i c a l and economic power cannot be separated. I f the P a r t y committee's r o l e was t o be l i m i t e d t o t h a t of i d e o l o g i c a l (or moral) l e a d e r -104 s h i p , w h i l e the r i g h t t o s e l e c t and t r a i n p e r s o n n e l as w e l l as the f u l l power of reward and punishment were t o be p l a c e d i n the hands of the managers, a profound s h i f t o f power would have oc-c u r r e d . At the c e n t r e , i t would not o n l y have g r e a t l y i n c r e a s e d the power of the m i n i s t r i e s , but a l s o t h a t of the S t a t e P l a n n i n g Commission, a group t h a t had been headed by Gao Gang u n t i l 1954 and dominated by p r o - S o v i e t p r o f e s s i o n a l s . At the l o c a l l e v e l , down t o the i n d i v i d u a l f a c t o r i e s , most of the P a r t y cadres would have i n c r e a s i n g l y l o s t t h e i r i n f l u e n c e , s i n c e few of them had any hope of understanding the i n t r i c a c i e s o f management. In s h o r t , S o v i e t "advanced e x p e r i e n c e s " , even when ba c k e d by L e n i n ' s t e a c h i n g , 1 0 had t o stop a t the doorstep of P a r t y p r i v i l e g e . D e s p i t e t h e r e j e c t i o n o f c e r t a i n f e a t u r e s o f t h e S o v i e t Model,the F i r s t F i v e Year Plan(1953-1957) proved t o be on the whole a g r e a t success. Thus, the S o v i e t model seemed t o have s e r v e d C h i n a ' s economy, e s p e c i a l l y i t s i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n , r a t h e r w e l l . In September 1956, when Zhou E n l a i p r e s e n t e d the p r o p o s a l s f o r t h e b a s i c t a s k s o f t h e Second F i v e Y e a r P l a n (1958-1962) t o the E i g h t h Congress of the CCP, the fundamental assumptions were b a s i c a l l y i n accord w i t h the S o v i e t model which had guided the F i r s t F i v e Year Plan. C e r t a i n m o d i f i c a t i o n s , such as t h e e l i m i n a t i o n o f one-man management, t h e p a r t i a l d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of governmental apparatus and more emphasis on the development of l i g h t i n d u s t r y were i n t r o d u c e d . As a whole, however, i t 105 was e v i d e n t t h a t the Chinese l e a d e r s h i p a n t i c i p a t e d b e i n g a b l e t o proceed i n a s t r a i g h t l i n e of development through t h r e e F i v e Year Plans, as o r i g i n a l l y contemplated, t o l a y down the f o u n d a t i o n of China's s o c i a l i s t c o n s t r u c t i o n . By 1959, however, when the Great Leap Forward (GLF) and Commune program took shape, the S o v i e t model was a p p a r e n t l y abandoned. T h i s was, beyond any doubt, one of the most f a t a l changes of d i r e c t i o n i n the the PRC's h i s t o r y . To what extent d i d the development of S i n o - S o v i e t economic r e l a -t i o n s c o n t r i b u t e t o t h i s r a d i c a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f t h e CCP's domestic p o l i c y ? A c c o r d i n g t o R. MacFarquhar's a n a l y s i s , 1 1 t h i s a s t o n i s h i n g change of d i r e c t i o n took p l a c e between June and September 1957. During t h i s p e r i o d , t h e r e appeared t o have been a s t r u g g l e be-tween two o p p o s i n g " l i n e s " o r "ways o f c a r r y i n g on s o c i a l i s t t r a n s f o r m a t i o n and c o n s t r u c t i o n " w i t h i n the CCP. The Pragmatists were government o f f i c i a l s i n c l u d i n g Zhou E n l a i , Chen Yun (Deputy Premier), L i Fuchun (Chairman of the S t a t e P l a n n i n g Commission), L i X i a n n i a n ( M i n i s t e r of F i n a n c e ) , Bo Yibo (Chairman of the S t a t e Economic Commission) and Deng Z i h u i . They s t o o d f o r a "reasonable, sound and balanced approach" t o economic develop-ment. While r e c o g n i z i n g t h a t the S o v i e t model had proved not en-t i r e l y a p p l i c a b l e t o China's s i t u a t i o n , they b e l i e v e d t h a t the s o l u t i o n l a y i n some m o d i f i c a t i o n s o f t h e model, i n c l u d i n g a slower pace of i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n , some l i m i t e d d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n 106 of the economy and a p a r t i a l r e s t o r a t i o n of the f r e e m a r k e t — i n s h o r t , a model somewhat s i m i l a r t o the S o v i e t New Economic P o l i c y i n 1921. The " L e f t Wing" or the s l o g a n e e r s were f u l l - t i m e P a r t y o f f i -c i a l s such as L i u Shaoqi and Deng X i a o p i n g (the P a r t y ' s g e n e r a l s e c r e t a r y ) . They b e l i e v e d t h a t China c o u l d a c t u a l l y p u l l i t s e l f up by i t s own e f f o r t i f proper p o l i c i e s were adopted. 1 2 I f the S o v i e t model proved inadequate f o r China's d i s t i n c t i v e problems, t h i s model must be abandoned and r e p l a c e d by the P a r t y ' s g e n e r a l l i n e which L i u Shaoqi d e f i n e d as "to b u i l d s o c i a l i s m by e x e r t i n g our utmost e f f o r t s , and p r e s s i n g ahead c o n s i s t e n t l y t o achieve g r e a t e r , f a s t e r , b e t t e r and more economical r e s u l t s . " 1 3 By September, t h e a s c e n d a n c y o f t h e l e f t w ing was q u i t e c l e a r . In May 1958, when L i u ' s g e n e r a l l i n e was f o r m a l l y adopted a t the Second S e s s i o n of E i g h t h Congress, the GLF was launched i n f u l l s c a l e . And the , l x l e f t ' i d e a s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by impatience f o r s u c c e s s , " as L i u And Wu p u t i t , "grew t o an a p p a l l i n g p r o p o r t i o n . 1 , 1 4 Three major f a c t o r s — Mao's r o l e , the i n a p -p l i c a b i l i t y of the S o v i e t model and the l a c k of S o v i e t economic a i d — m i g h t have c o n t r i b u t e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y t o such a change of d i r e c t i o n . During the F i r s t F i v e Year Plan p e r i o d , the a d o p t i o n of the S o v i e t model had produced c e r t a i n s o c i a l , p o l i t i c a l and i d e o l o g i -c a l consequences t h a t Mao found p r o f o u n d l y d i s t a s t e f u l . For i n -s t a n c e , t h e c e n t r a l i z e d p l a n n i n g s y s t e m g e n e r a t e d a huge 107 b u r e a u c r a t i c apparatus which would not e a s i l y bend t o the w i l l of one man and c o u l d breed e l i t i s m and p r i v i l e g e . The p r i o r i t y o f heavy i n d u s t r y and the S o v i e t model's u t i l i z a t i o n of m a t e r i a l i n c e n t i v e s were c r e a t i n g an i n c r e a s i n g l y s t r a t i f i e d u r b a n s o c i e t y . The h i g h p r o p o r t i o n of c a p i t a l investment had robbed the c o u n t r y s i d e of the r e s o u r c e s i t would need t o grow, as w e l l as t h e p o l i t i c a l power from t h e p e a s a n t c a d r e s who had c o n -t r i b u t e d overwhelmingly t o the v i c t o r y of the r e v o l u t i o n . As K. L i e b e r t h a l has c o r r e c t l y p o i n t e d out, "Mao's a n t i - b u r e a u c r a t i c , e g a l i t a r i a n , and somewhat a n t i - i n t e l l e c t u a l and a n t i - u r b a n sen-s i t i v i t i e s were deeply of fended. 1 , 1 5 In a d d i t i o n , the c e n t r a l i z e d and s p e c i a l i z e d b u r e a u c r a c i e s so important t o the S o v i e t model might have robbed Mao of some of h i s p e r s o n a l p o l i t i c a l power. 1 6 In A p r i l 1956, Mao o f f e r e d an a l t e r n a t i v e p r o p o s a l t o the P o l i t b u r o . H i s now famous speech "On the Ten Great R e l a t i o n -s h i p s " (the t e x t was r e v e a l e d o n l y d u r i n g the C u l t u r a l R e v o l u t i o n ) c a l l e d f o r a g r a d u a l abandonment of the S o v i e t model and o u t l i n e d a r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t s t r a t e g y . However, h i s ideas were l a r g e l y ignored i n the p r o p o s a l s f o r the Second F i v e Year Plan adopted i n the E i g h t h N a t i o n a l Congress, even though many of them were much more r a t i o n a l i n the a b s t r a c t as w e l l as i n terms of China's c o n d i t i o n s i n 1956. 108 How Mao e v e n t u a l l y managed t o put h i s i d e a s through might never be known i n f u l l . However, i t d i d take some e x t r a o r d i n a r y maneuvers s u c h as u s i n g a n o n - P a r t y forum t o announce p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e s , 1 7 and d e c e n t r a l i z i n g the economic departments of the c e n t r a l government but not the P a r t y , 1 8 b e f o r e Mao c o u l d put f o r -ward h i s g e n e r a l l i n e i n March 1958 a t the Chengdu Conference. Besides Mao's p o l i t i c a l maneuvers and p e r s o n a l p r e s t i g e , the g e n e r a l r e a l i z a t i o n - - a t l e a s t among t h e l e a d e r s - - t h a t t h e S o v i e t model was not e n t i r e l y a p p l i c a b l e t o China's a c t u a l c o n d i -t i o n as w e l l as the l a c k of S o v i e t f i n a n c i a l a i d might a l s o have c o n t r i b u t e d t o the " L e f t - t u r n " t o the GLF. A c c o r d i n g t o China's S o c i a l i s t Economy, the p r o b i n g of new ways of b u i l d i n g s o c i a l i s m began i n e a r l y 1956 when: the experience gained i n implementing the F i r s t F i v e Y e a r p l a n showed t h a t w h i l e t h e r e were many u s e f u l t h i n g s f o r us t o l e a r n from S o v i e t economic c o n s t r u c -t i o n , t h e r e were a l s o s e r i o u s d e f e c t s and many t h i n g s not s u i t e d t o China's c o n d i t i o n s These i n c l u d e d l o p s i d e d development of heavy i n d u s t r y to- the n e g l e c t of a g r i c u l t u r e and l i g h t i n d u s t r y , e x c e s s i v e i n c r e a s e of accumulation and n e g l e c t of the people's w e l l - b e i n g , and an o v e r l y c e n t r a l i z e d and r i g i d s y s t e m o f economic management. A l l these exposed the l i m i t a t i o n of the S o v i e t experience i n economic c o n s t r u c t i o n . 1 9 109 In r e a l i t y , by 1957, not o n l y was the " l i m i t a t i o n of the S o v i e t e x p e r i e n c e " exposed, but some s e r i o u s problems i n China's "economic c o n s t r u c t i o n " indeed o c c u r r e d . The foremost among them were a g r i c u l t u r a l s t a g n a t i o n , unemployment and s o c i a l u n r e s t due to the economic h a r d s h i p of the masses. As f a r as the p a t t e r n of investment was concerned, China's F i r s t F i v e Y e a r P l a n was even more S t a l i n i s t t h a n i t s S o v i e t model. The f i r s t S o v i e t F i v e Year P l a n a l l o c a t e d 40.9% of i n -vestment t o the i n d u s t r i a l s e c t o r and 19.2% t o a g r i c u l t u r e . The Chinese, as i f determined t o outdo the S o v i e t s , a l l o c a t e d 47.9% of t h e i r investment t o i n d u s t r y and o n l y 14.9% t o a g r i c u l t u r e . 2 0 With such meager investment and a major c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n , s t a g -n a t i o n i n a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t i o n would be the b e s t one c o u l d hope f o r . The f a c t t h a t a g r i c u l t u r a l o u t p u t p e r head d i d n o t decrease was t r u l y a s i g n i f i c a n t achievement of the Communist government. A c c o r d i n g t o Xue Muqiao, between 1952 and 1957, the a n n u a l p e r c a p i t a g r a i n p r o d u c t i o n r o s e from 288 t o 306 kilograms, w h i l e the per c a p i t a p r o d u c t i o n o f o i l - b e a r i n g crops and the number of hogs f e l l . 2 1 However, a d i r e c t r e s u l t of such s t a g n a t i o n i n a g r i c u l t u r e was t h a t , i n 1956-1957, t h e S t a t e procurement of g r a i n and t a x a t i o n i n k i n d a c t u a l l y f e l l below the 1953-1954 l e v e l . 2 2 W i t h o u t s t e a d i l y g r o w i n g s u r p l u s e s i n a g r i c u l t u r e , not o n l y were t h e r e problems i n s u p p l y i n g food t o urban areas, but the f i n a n c i a l backing f o r i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n was a l s o l a c k i n g . 110 In s h o r t , the S t a l i n i s t s t r a t e g y f o r i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n a t the expense of a g r i c u l t u r e was not v i a b l e amidst the r e s o u r c e en-dowments o f C h i n a . Because o f i t s l a r g e p o p u l a t i o n and p o o r economic f o u n d a t i o n , a maximum a t t e n t i o n t o a g r i c u l t u r e was i m p e r a t i v e — i f o n l y t o keep the people a l i v e a t the b a r e s t sub-s i s t e n c e l e v e l . The completion of the F i r s t F i v e Year P l a n a l s o f a i l e d t o r e s o l v e the p r e s s i n g problem of unemployment. A c c o r d i n g t o Ta-Chung L i u and Kung-Chia Yeh's study (1965), the e s t i m a t e d number of unemployed males i n 1952 was 25 m i l l i o n , of whom seven m i l l i o n were i n urban a r e a s . 2 3 From 1952 t o 1957, i n d u s t r i a l employment grew from 6.15 m i l l i o n t o 10.19 m i l l i o n , an i n c r e a s e of 4.04 m i l -l i o n , but the p o p u l a t i o n expanded by 71.71 m i l l i o n i n the same p e r i o d . Such a growth r a t e of p o p u l a t i o n c e r t a i n l y "threatened t o overwhelm the employment p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t even a s u c c e s s f u l i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n program would be a b l e t o c r e a t e . " 2 4 Although q u a n t i t a t i v e i n f o r m a t i o n about the extent of urban unemployment a t the end of the p l a n p e r i o d i s s c a r c e and c o n t r a d i c t o r y , i t i s b e l i e v e d t h a t i t s number reached 7.8 m i l l i o n i n 1957, or 8.5% of the urban p o p u l a t i o n and about 2 0% of the urban l a b o u r f o r c e . 2 5 Fed by a c o n t i n u i n g flow of r u r a l migrants e s c a p i n g p o v e r t y and n a t u r a l d i s a s t e r s as w e l l as s e e k i n g s e c u r e and b e t t e r - p a i d j o b s , urban unemployment undoubtedly remained a s e r i o u s s o c i a l problem i n 1957. 2 6 In r e t r o s p e c t , i t i s c l e a r t h a t China's b a s i c demographics demanded t h a t more a t t e n t i o n be p a i d t o c r e a t i n g 111 employment, but n e i t h e r the c a p i t a l - i n t e n s i v e s t r a t e g y of the S o v i e t model nor the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c a p a c i t y o f the government was capable of responding adequately t o t h i s problem. As m e n t i o n e d on p. 14, 1957 was a p o o r c r o p y e a r which brought about some severe economic d i f f i c u l t i e s . There were ap-pe a l s t o c o a l miners t o g i v e up p a r t o f t h e i r Chinese New Year h o l i d a y i n order t o ensure t h a t o p e r a t i o n s of f a c t o r i e s , r a i l w a y , and s h i p s would not have t o be h a l t e d . There were r e p o r t s o f cu t s i n the c l o t h and pork r a t i o n s . 2 7 Most s e r i o u s of a l l , the economic h a r d s h i p of the masses and the t u r m o i l o f c o l l e c t i v i z a -t i o n had caused i n t e n s e d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n among the peasants and workers. Some re c e n t p u b l i c a t i o n s i n China seem t o c o n f i r m the e x i s -t e n c e o f su c h s o c i a l t e n s i o n . F o r i n s t a n c e , i n an a r t i c l e r e c a l l i n g h i s i n t e r v i e w w i t h Mao i n 1957, Wang Ruoshui, a w r i t e r now famous f o r h i s democratic i n c l i n a t i o n , r e c o r d s t h a t Mao s a i d : " i n 1953, the g r a i n procurement made the r e l a t i o n between Pa r t y and the peasants v e r y t e n s e . " 2 8 I f the l e v e l o f procurement was as h i g h as 28% of the t o t a l g r a i n o u t p u t 2 9 and per c a p i t a g r a i n p r o d u c t i o n was only around 300 kilograms (see p.110), the r e l a -t i o n s c o u l d have been even worse than "tense". In f a c t , i t i s now admitted by the Chinese p r e s s t h a t i n 1956 and 1957, "some peasants... had demanded t o withdraw from or t o d i v i d e up t h e i r c o l l e c t i v e s . " 3 0 And the growing u n r e s t among the workers and students was expressed i n s t r i k e s . A c c o r d i n g t o 112 the same sources, "from September 1956 t o the S p r i n g o f 1957, t h e r e were more than t e n thousand workers i n d i f f e r e n t p l a c e s who went on s t r i k e ; i n e l e v e n p r o v i n c e s and two c i t i e s , more than ten thousand students went on s t r i k e and demonstration." 3 1 In s h o r t , d e s p i t e the o v e r a l l s u c c e s s f u l performance of the F i r s t F i v e Year Plan, the a g r i c u l t u r a l s t a g n a t i o n , c o n t i n u i n g u r -ban unemployment and s o c i a l u n r e s t c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e d t h a t the S o v i e t model the Pla n embodied c o u l d not be maintained. In D. S. Z a g o r i a ' s o p i n i o n , "the o n l y a l t e r n a t i v e t o a r a d i c a l i n s t i t u -t i o n a l response t o China's economic problem would seem t o be a massive dose of S o v i e t a i d . " 3 2 Yet, s e v e r a l key statements made by China's economic p l a n -ners d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d seemed t o i n d i c a t e t h a t S o v i e t f i n a n c i a l a s s i s t a n c e was not expected i n r e s o l v i n g China's economic d i f -f i c u l t i e s . In May 1957, L i Fuchun warned, "we should r e l y on our own s t r e n g t h as f a r as p o s s i b l e . " 3 3 In J u l y , Bo Yibo t o l d the N a t i o n a l People's Congress t h a t China must reduce i t s " r e l i a n c e upon f o r e i g n c o u n t r i e s . " 3 4 Such statements may r e f l e c t i n p a r t China's u n w i l l i n g n e s s t o mortgage i t s e l f t o a S o v i e t a i d program, and i n p a r t i t s awareness t h a t more S o v i e t long-term c r e d i t s were not l i k e l y t o come. Almost at the same time ( J u l y t o October 1957) some a r t i c l e s p u b l i s h e d i n the S o v i e t p r e s s a l s o seemed t o imply the need f o r China t o depend on i t s own r e s o u r c e s . For i n -s t a n c e , an a r t i c l e i n t h e O c t o b e r 1957 i s s u e o f V o p r o s y  Ekonomiki(Problems of the Economy) s t a t e d : Of t h e s t a t e s o f t h e S o c i a l i s t Camp, a p a r t . from the S o v i e t Union, on l y a l a n d so r i c h i n immense human and n a t u r a l r e s o u r c e s as t h e Peoples R e p u b l i c o f China can assume the com-p a r a b l e t a s k o f c r e a t i n g a c o m p l e t e l y developed economy which w i l l f u l l y s a t i s f y a l l the needs of the c o u n t r y . 3 5 By t h i s stage, however, the CCP l e a d e r s might s t i l l have r e t a i n e d some hopes f o r the c o n t i n u a t i o n of S o v i e t economic as-s i s t a n c e as a means of a c h i e v i n g i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n . A c c o r d i n g t o F. Schurmann's a n a l y s i s , the s t r a t e g y of economic development advocated by Mao i n 1957 " r e q u i r e d heavy dependence on the S o v i e t U n i o n . " I t was more so t h a n t h e economic s t r a t e g y o f s e l f -r e l i a n c e envisaged by Chen Yun wit h balanced r e l a t i o n s h i p between heavy i n d u s t r y , l i g h t i n d u s t r y and a g r i c u l t u r e — b e c a u s e Mao had c a l l e d n o t j u s t f o r s i m u l t a n e o u s development o f i n d u s t r y and a g r i c u l t u r e , b u t had added: "on a b a s i s o f p r e f e r e n t i a l l y d e v e l o p i n g heavy i n d u s t r y . " Moreover, i t was hoped t h a t Mao's p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e w i t h Khrushchev l a t e i n 1957 might p o s s i b l y secure a S o v i e t promise f o r stepped-up t r a d e . 3 6 1957 was a good year f o r the S o v i e t Union: Moscow c e l e b r a t e d t h e f o r t i e t h a n n i v e r s a r y o f t h e O c t o b e r R e v o l u t i o n w i t h a " s p u t n i k " and a l a r g e l y s t a b i l i z e d s o c i a l i s t E a s t e r n E u r o p e . Heading the Chinese d e l e g a t i o n , Mao p a i d h i s second v i s i t t o Mos-cow. In a speech t o the Chinese students i n Moscow, he f u l l y ex-114 p r e s s e d h i s c o n c i l i a t o r y a t t i t u d e by a s s e r t i n g t h a t the head of the s o c i a l i s t camp was the S o v i e t Union and the head o f a l l Com-m u n i s t p a r t i e s and w o r k e r s ' p a r t i e s was t h e CPSU. 3 7 I t i s b e l i e v e d t h a t s u c h s t a t e m e n t s i n d i c a t e d t h a t B e i j i n g saw t h e ceremony as an o p p o r t u n i t y f o r endeavoring t o o b t a i n S o v i e t a i d f o r China i n i t s time of d i f f i c u l t i e s . 3 8 For i n s t a n c e , Le Monde (December 19, 1957) r e p o r t e d t h a t Gomulka, the P o l i s h l e a d e r , reproached Mao wit h advocating S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p i n exchange f o r S o v i e t economic and m i l i t a r y a i d . 3 9 And a c c o r d i n g t o O.E. Clubb, the CCP d e l e g a t i o n i n Moscow proposed t h a t the s o c i a l i s t camp's economic a i d t o n a t i o n a l i s t bourgeois governments should cease and a l l a v a i l a b l e a i d be channeled t o the needy members of the s o c i a l i s t camp. A 0 D e s p i t e a l l these e f f o r t s , however, Mao r e t u r n e d t o B e i j i n g empty-handed, and no S o v i e t f i n a n c i a l a i d was a v a i l a b l e f o r b r i d g i n g the widening gap between China's a g r i c u l t u r a l produc-t i v i t y and i t s growing needs f o r i n d u s t r i a l raw m a t e r i a l s , sup-p l i e s and a g r i c u l t u r a l export p r o d u c t s . When the sl o g a n "Great Leap Forward" was s e t f o r t h i n January 1958, r a d i c a l d e p a r t u r e s from the S o v i e t model began t o take p l a c e . Even the t i m i n g of the d e c i s i o n seemed t o suggest t h a t i n s u f f i c i e n t S o v i e t h e l p was an important f a c t o r c o n t r i b u t i n g t o t h i s f a t a l change of d i r e c -t i o n . 3. S o v i e t economic p r e s s u r e 115 Economic p r e s s u r e had been used by the S o v i e t Union as a means of d i s c i p l i n i n g and c o n t r o l l i n g o t h e r c o u n t r i e s w i t h i n the Communist b l o c s i n c e 1947. S t a l i n , the f i r s t S o v i e t l e a d e r t o employ economic p r e s s u r e a g a i n s t a f e l l o w Communist country, im-posed an economic embargo on Y u g o s l a v i a i n 1949, and c a n c e l e d economic a s s i s t a n c e agreements w i t h t h a t n a t i o n as w e l l . I n 1961, K h r u s h c h e v u t i l i z e d t h e same t y p e o f economic p r e s s u r e a g a i n s t A l b a n i a , i n c l u d i n g t h e s e v e r a n c e o f d i p l o m a t i c and economic r e l a t i o n s , and t h e e x c l u s i o n from t h e membership o f CMEA. S o v i e t economic p r e s s u r e a g a i n s t China was more g r a d u a l than i n the cases of Y u g o s l a v i a and A l b a n i a , and was not f o l l o w e d by a t r a d e embargo, s i n c e China was c o n s i d e r a b l y l e s s v u l n e r a b l e t o such p r e s s u r e : China was not dependent on S o v i e t l o a n s and i t s exports t o the S o v i e t Union were of g r e a t e r v a l u e t o the USSR than those of Y u g o s l a v i a and A l b a n i a . Nonetheless, i n the 1950's and e a r l y 1960's, China was v u l n e r a b l e t o S o v i e t economic p r e s -sure i n two a s p e c t s : i t s i n a b i l i t y t o a c q u i r e l a r g e amounts of m a c h i n e r y from c o u n t r i e s o t h e r t h a n t h e USSR and i t s s e v e r e shortage of t r a i n e d t e c h n i c i a n s . Not s u r p r i s i n g l y , the major asp e c t s of S o v i e t economic p r e s s u r e a g a i n s t China i n v o l v e d the withdrawal of t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e and the c u r t a i l m e n t of t r a d e . The most d r a s t i c a p p l i c a t i o n of S o v i e t economic p r e s s u r e took, p l a c e i n J u l y 1960. As the Chinese d e s c r i b e d i t : 116 In J u l y the S o v i e t Government suddenly u n i l a t e r a l l y d e c i d e d t o r e c a l l a l l the S o v i e t e x p e r t s i n China w i t h i n one month, thereby t e a r i n g up... 343 c o n t r a c t s and supplementary c o n t r a c t s on the employment of e x p e r t s . . . t o c a n c e l 257 items o f s c i e n t i f i c and t e c h n i c a l c o o p e r a t i o n , and p u r s u e d a r e s t r i c t i v e and d i s c r i m i n a t o r y t r a d e p o l i c y a g a i n s t China. ...Apparently, the l e a d e r s of the CPSU imagined t h a t once they... a p p l i e d immense p o l i t i c a l and economic p r e s s u r e they c o u l d f o r c e t h e C h i n e s e Communist P a r t y t o abandon i t s M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t and p r o l e t a r i a n stand and submit t o t h e i r r e v i s i o n i s t and g r e a t power behes t s . 4 1 However, s u c h a change o f p o l i c y d i d n o t o c c u r . I f t h e S o v i e t s t r a t e g y was t o g i v e China a f o r e t a s t e of the unpleasant consequences of c h a l l e n g i n g S o v i e t supremacy and thus s o f t e n the Chinese p o s i t i o n b e f o r e the Moscow conference which was planned t o take p l a c e i n November 1960, the r e s u l t were e x a c t l y the op-p o s i t e . The w i t h d r a w a l o f S o v i e t e x p e r t s o n l y i n t e n s i f i e d China's d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o become e c o n o m i c a l l y " s e l f - r e l i a n t " and convinced the Chinese l e a d e r s h i p t h a t h e n c e f o r t h the S o v i e t Union c o u l d not be t r u s t e d as an a l l y . S o v i e t economic p r e s s u r e might even have enhanced a d e f i a n t enthusiasm and s o l i d a r i t y w i t h i n the Chinese l e a d e r s h i p . For i n s t a n c e , b e f o r e the withdrawal of e x p e r t s t h e r e was some e v i d e n c e t h a t some members o f t h e C h i n e s e l e a d e r s h i p were i n f a v o r of a r e t r e a t . On March 30, 1960, Tao Zhu, the i n f l u e n t i a l Guangdong p r o v i n c i a l f i r s t s e c r e t a r y , s a i d i n a p u b l i s h e d speech t h a t the USSR had g i v e n China " an e n o r m o u s a m o u n t o f m a t e r i a l a n d s p i r i t u a l a s s i s t a n c e . . . . M u t u a l a s s i s t a n c e . . . must be s t r e n g t h e n e d b e f o r e the b u i l d i n g of s o c i a l i s m can be c a r r i e d out by us a t a f a s t e r rate...Because of t h i s , our b a s i c i n t e r e s t l i e s i n s t r e n g t h e n i n g the s o l i d a r i t y of the s o c i a l i s t camp headed by 117 the S o v i e t Union and the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s o l i d a r i t y o f the p r o l e t a r i a t . We must make our u t t e r a n c e s and a c t i o n b e n e f i -c i a l t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l s o l i d a r i t y . " 4 2 Yet, a f t e r the withdrawal of ex p e r t s , i n a r e v i s e d v e r s i o n o f t h e s p e e c h p u b l i s h e d i n t h e Au g u s t 5 Renmin R i b a o . Tao's o r i g i n a l s t r e s s on the need f o r S o v i e t a i d was watered down, and the theme of " s e l f - r e l i a n c e " was emphasized. 4 3 O b v i o u s l y , con-c i l i a t o r y views were overcome and a d e c i s i o n was made t o stand f i r m i n the fa c e of S o v i e t economic p r e s s u r e . I f s u c h m a s s i v e p r e s s u r e f a i l e d t o p r o d u c e t h e r e s u l t s d e s i r e d by the S o v i e t l e a d e r s , the c u r t a i l m e n t o f S o v i e t exports was even l e s s l i k e l y t o be s u c c e s s f u l . T o t a l S o v i e t exports t o China d e c l i n e d from $815 m i l l i o n i n 1960 t o $365 m i l l i o n i n 1961, and con t i n u e d t o decrease u n t i l they reached t h e i r lowest l e v e l o f $135 m i l l i o n i n 1964 . 4 4 In a l e t t e r t o t h e CPSU i n 1964, t h e C h i n e s e c o m p l a i n e d about t h e S o v i e t c u r t a i l m e n t o f t r a d e as "an i n s t r u m e n t f o r b r i n g i n g p o l i t i c a l p r e s s u r e t o bear on China": S i n c e 1960, you have d e l i b e r a t e l y p l a c e d o b s t a c l e s i n t h e way o f economic and t r a d e r e l a t i o n s between o u r two c o u n t r i e s and h e l d up or r e f u s e d s u p p l i e s o f important goods which China needs. You have i n s i s t e d on p r o v i d i n g l a r g e amounts of goods which we do not r e a l l y need or which we do not need a t a l l , w h i l e h o l d i n g back or s u p p l y i n g v e r y few of the goods which we need b a d l y . 4 5 However, statements with such s t r o n g polemic f l a v o r should not be accepted a t fa c e v a l u e , even though the Chinese g r i e v a n c e s must have been genuine and important. At l e a s t p a r t i a l l y , the 118 decrease i n S o v i e t exports must have been the d e c i s i o n of the Chinese l e a d e r s : p a r t l y due t o t h e i r d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o end China's economic dependency and v u l n e r a b i l i t y t o S o v i e t p r e s s u r e s , and p a r t l y due t o China's domestic economic d i f f i c u l t i e s caused by the f a i l u r e of the GLF as w e l l as the poor weather of 1960. In f a c t , the S o v i e t s d i d complain t h a t f o r p o l i t i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s r a t h e r than economic d i f f i c u l t i e s , the Chinese, i n June 1961, r e -quested S o v i e t d e l i v e r i e s of complete p l a n t s and equipment t o be reduced t o o n e - f i f t h of the 1960 volume, " r e g a r d l e s s of the f a c t t h a t the bulk of i t (to the v a l u e of tens of m i l l i o n s of r u b l e s ) was i n t h e p r o c e s s o f m a n u f a c t u r i n g o r had been o r d e r e d from t h i r d c o u n t r i e s and c o u l d n o t be u s e d i n t h e S o v i e t n a t i o n a l economy." 4 6 On August 15, the Chinese announced another reduc-t i o n ; e a r l y i n December, "the Chinese s i d e d e c l a r e d i t s complete r e f u s a l t o i m p o r t S o v i e t c o m p l e t e p l a n t s and equipment i n 1962-1963. " 4 7 S i n c e the d e l i v e r i e s of complete p l a n t s and equip-ment had c o n s t i t u t e d the b u l k of S o v i e t e x p o r t s i n the 1950s, t h e i r t e r m i n a t i o n c e r t a i n l y caused a sharp d e c l i n e i n S o v i e t ex-p o r t s . C h i n a ' s d o m e s t i c p o l i c y change, as w e l l as h e r a c u t e economic d i f f i c u l t i e s , a l s o d i c t a t e d the r e d u c t i o n of imports from the S o v i e t Union. A new p o l i c y of " r e a d j u s t i n g , c o n s o l i d a t -i n g , f i l l i n g out and r a i s i n g the standards" (Tiaozhenq qonqqu  chongshi t i g a o ) o f the n a t i o n a l economy was adopted a t the N i n t h P l e n a r y S e s s i o n of the E i g h t h P a r t y C e n t r a l Committee i n January 119 1961. The t o t a l investment i n c a p i t a l c o n s t r u c t i o n was reduced from 38.4 b i l l i o n yuan i n 1960 t o 12.34 b i l l i o n yuan i n 1961; i n 1962 i t was f u r t h e r r e d u c e d t o 6.76 b i l l i o n y u a n - - t h e l o w e s t f i g u r e f o r c a p i t a l c o n s t r u c t i o n s i n c e 1953. 4 8 The new p o l i c y a l s o d r a s t i c a l l y r e d u c e d t h e sp e e d o f growth o f i n d u s t r i a l p r o d u c t i o n and r e - a d j u s t e d i t s i n t e r n a l s t r u c t u r e . The planned t a r g e t s s e t f o r 19 62 were much lower than the a c t u a l f i g u r e s of 1960. For i n s t a n c e , t o t a l i n d u s t r i a l output v a l u e was reduced by 47%, t o t a l heavy i n d u s t r i a l output was s l a s h e d by 57%, and s t e e l output was c u t by 68%. 4 9 Among the i n d u s t r i a l e n t e r p r i s e s which were reduced or amalgamated i n g r e a t number were those i n metal-l u r g i c a l , c h emical, b u i l d i n g m a t e r i a l s and m a c h i n e - b u i l d i n g i n -d u s t r i e s , whose numbers were t o be c u t by 70.5%, 42.2%, 50.7% and 31.6%, r e s p e c t i v e l y . 5 0 The s t r u c t u r e of imported goods was a l s o changed r a d i c a l l y because of domestic economic d i f f i c u l t i e s . During the 1950s, 91.7% of imported goods were producer goods, but i n the f i r s t f i v e y e a r s of the 1960s, consumer goods such as g r a i n , e d i b l e o i l and sugar counted f o r 40.9% of the t o t a l imported goods. 5 1 Such a change i n p o l i c y and s t r u c t u r e of imported goods would n a t u r a l l y have d r a m a t i c a l l y reduced China's imports from the S o v i e t U n i o n — w i t h or without the c u r t a i l m e n t from the S o v i e t s i d e . 120 In s h o r t , S o v i e t economic p r e s s u r e a g a i n s t China proved i n -e f f e c t i v e or even c o u n t e r p r o d u c t i v e f o r the USSR. J u s t as i n the cases of Y u g o s l a v i a and A l b a n i a , i t o n l y hardened the r e s o l v e of the l e a d e r s of the " t a r g e t c o u n t r i e s " t o remain independent and u n i t e d . I t might a l s o have h e l p e d t h e C h i n e s e l e a d e r s r a l l y p o p u l a r support by a p p e a l i n g t o n a t i o n a l p r i d e and i n t e g r i t y , w h i l e the p r o - S o v i e t f a c t i o n s found themselves i s o l a t e d and s i -l e n c e d . 121 Notes 1. Donald S. Z a g o r i a , The S i n o - S o v i e t C o n f l i c t ( P r i n c e t o n , New J e r s e y : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y Press,1962), p.15. 2. P.Bridgham, A.Kohen, and L . J a f f e , "Mao's Road and S i n o - S o v i e t R e l a t i o n s , " China Q u a r t e r l y no.52 (September 1972), p.694. 3. Z a g o r i a , S i n o - S o v i e t C o n f l i c t , pp.14-15. And Bridgham, "Mao's Road and S i n o - S o v i e t R e l a t i o n s , " pp.694-695. 4. R i s k i n , China's P o l i t i c a l Economy, p.63. 5. Franz Schurmann, Ideology and O r g a n i z a t i o n i n Communist China ( B e r k e l e y : U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a Press, 1968), p.242. 6. Takungpao (Da Gong Bao), T i a n j i n , Dec.31, 1953. As quoted i n F. Schurmann Ideology, p.255. 7. R i s k i n , China's P o l i t i c a l Economy, p.60. 8. Schurmann, Ideology, p.285. As a whole Schurmann's study on the one-man management system (the Chapter IV,) i s both informa-t i v e and i n s i g h t f u l . 9. R i s k i n , China's P o l i t i c a l Economy, p.64. 10. "Any l a r g e - s c a l e i n d u s t r y — w h i c h i s the m a t e r i a l source and f o u n d a t i o n of p r o d u c t i o n i n s o c i a l i s m — u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y must have a r i g o r o u s , u n i f i e d w i l l t o d i r e c t t h e c o l l e c t i v e work o f hundreds, thousands, and even m i l l i o n s of men. But how can the r i g o r o u s u n i t y of w i l l s be assured? Only by the w i l l s of the t h o u s a n d s and m i l l i o n s s u b m i t t i n g t o t h e w i l l o f a s i n g l e i n d i v i d u a l . " Lenin, S e l e c t e d Works (Moscow, 1952) 11:398. 11. In h i s e x c e l l e n t a r t i c l e "Communist C h i n a ' s I n t r a - P a r t y D i s p u t e , " ( P a c i f i c A f f a i r s December 1958), R o d e r i c k MacFarquhar d e s c r i b e s the change i n economic p o l i c y which took p l a c e between June and September 1957. L a t e r , i n h i s book The O r i g i n s of the  C u l t u r a l R e v o l u t i o n . 1 C o n t r a d i c t i o n s Among t h e P e o p l e 1956- 1957(London: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1974),the p r o c e s s of p o l i c y change was d i s c u s s e d i n g r e a t e r d e t a i l . Some arguments i n the f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n are based on h i s a r t i c l e as w e l l as h i s book. 12. MacFarquhar, The O r i g i n s o f t h e C u l t u r a l r e v o l u t i o n 1, pp.88-89. I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o note t h a t such d i v i s i o n between the Pragmatists and " L e f t Wing" sl o g a n e e r s i s l a r g e l y "confirmed" i n L i u and Wu's d e s c r i p t i o n of the E i g h t h Congress o f the CCP i n 122 September 1956 and i t s Second S e s s i o n i n May 1 9 5 8 — c e r t a i n l y w i t h the e x c e p t i o n of Deng's r o l e . See S o c i a l i s t Economy, pp.216-221 and pp.2 24-2 25. 13. L i u Shaoqi," P o l i t i c a l Report t o the Second S e s s i o n o f the E i g h t h N a t i o n a l Congress of the CCP," ( May 1958). As quoted i n L i u and Wu, S o c i a l i s t Economy, p.224. 14. L i u and Wu, S o c i a l i s t Economy, p.228. The most s t r i k i n g i l -l u s t r a t i o n of such "impatience f o r s u c c e s s " was Mao's c a l l , i n the Second S e s s i o n of the E i g h t h Congress (May 1958), f o r s u r -p a s s i n g the i n d u s t r i a l output of Great B r i t a i n i n seven years, and t o overtake the U n i t e d S t a t e s i n another e i g h t t o t e n y e a r s . See Kuo Binwei, ed. , Zhonghua Renmin Goncfb e cru o J i a n s h i (A Short  H i s t o r y of the People's R e p u b l i c of China. J i l i n : J i l i n Wenshi Chubanshe, 1988), p.173. Zhang J i a n , ed., Danqdai Zhongguo  J i n g j i G a i s h u (An Overview o f C h i n a ' s Contemporary Economy, Guangdong: Guangdong Renmin Chubanshe, 1989), p.70. 15. Kenneth L i e b e r t h a l , "Domestic P o l i t i c s and F o r e i g n P o l i c y , " i n Harry Harding, ed., China's F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s i n 1980's (New Haven: Y a l e U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1984), p.49. 16. I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o note t h a t Wang Xizhe, a famous a c t i v i s t of China's democratic movement (1979-1981), charged t h a t Mao was not r e a l l y an enemy of the b u r e a u c r a t i c system: " I t was not the b u r e a u c r a t i c system t h a t he hated, but the e x i s t e n c e i n the p a r t y of an o p p o s i t i o n f o r c e t h a t prevented him from d i s p o s i n g of the p e o p l e ' s f a t e as he w i s h e d . " See Andrew J . Nathan, C h i n e s e  Democracy( New York: A l f r e d Knopf, 1985), p.9. 17. Meisner, Mao's China, p.228. 18. I b i d . . p.332. 19. L i u and Wu, S o c i a l i s t Economy, p.217. 20. N.R. Chen and W. Galenson, Chinese Economy, pp.38-39. Ac-c o r d i n g t o Wheelright and McFarlane, a g r i c u l t u r e r e c e i v e d o n l y 6.2% of the t o t a l investment a l l o c a t e d by the S t a t e budget. See Chinese Road, p.39. 21. Xue Muqiao, ed., Almanac o f C h i n a ' s Economy, 1981 ( Hong Kong: Modern C u l t u r a l Co. C o m p i l e d by t h e Economic R e s e a r c h Center, S t a t e C o u n c i l of the People's R e p u b l i c o f China, and the S t a t e S t a t i s t i c a l Bureau, 1982), p.111. 22. Wheelwright and McFarlane, Chinese Road, p.40. 23. Ta-Chung L i u and Kung-Chia Yeh, The Economy of the Chinese 123 Mainland: N a t i o n a l Income and Economic Development. 1933-1959 ( P r i n c e t o n , New J e r s e y : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1965), p.102. 24. L i p p i t Economic Development, p.110. 25. R i s k i n , China's P o l i t i c a l Economy, p.111. 26. Here i s a s t r i k i n g c o n t r a s t between the s i t u a t i o n o f employ-ment i n China and t h a t o f the S o v i e t Union i n t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e F i r s t F i v e Year P l a n . The S o v i e t s found i t necessary t o move m i l l i o n s o f people from country t o c i t y d u r i n g the 1930s. T h e i r u r b a n p o p u l a t i o n r o s e by 18 m i l l i o n from 1929 t o 1937. The Chinese government, on the other hand, had t o make an e f f o r t t o a r r e s t the c i t y w a r d flow o f r u r a l migrants; and the t o t a l non-a g r i c u l t u r a l employment grew by l e s s the 5 m i l l i o n between 1952-1957. See N. R. Chen and W. Galenson, Chinese Economy, p.37. 27. MacFarquhar, "Communist China's I n t r a - P a r t y D i s p u t e , " p.326. 28. Wang R u o s h u i , Z h i h u i D i Tongku (Sorrow from Wisdom, Hong Kong: Shan L i a n Shudian, 1989), p.323. 29. Kenneth Walker, Food G r a i n Procurement and Consumption i n  China (New York: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1984), p.45. 30. Hao Mengbi, ed., Zhongquo Gongchandang L i u s h i Nian ( S i x t y  Y e a r s o f t h e C h i n e s e Communist P a r t y . B e i j i n g : J i e f a n g j u n Chubanshe, 1984),p.483. 31. I b i d . 32. Z a g o r i a , S i n o - S o v i e t C o n f l i c t , p.86. 33. New C h i n a News Agency (NCNA) May 17, 1957, as q u o t e d i n I b i d . . p.68. 34. NCNA J u l y 1, 1957. I b i d . . p.68. 35. As c i t e d i n Freedman, Economic Warfare, p.112. 36. Schurmann, Ideology, pp. 2 04-205. 37. Renmin Shouce 1958. ( B e i j i n g : Da Gong Bao P r e s s , 1959), p.296. 38. See C l u b b , C h i n a and R u s s i a , p.420; C. Y. Cheng Economic  R e l a t i o n s . p.4. 39. See G i t t i n g s , Survey o f the Dispute, p.74. 124 40. Clubb, China and R u s s i a , p.422. 41. P e k i n g Review. September 13, 1963, p.14; and F e b r u a r y 7, 1964, p.9. 42. Nanfang R i b a o , May 13, 1960, as q u o t e d i n Z a g o r i a , S i n o - S o v i e t C o n f l i c t , p.334. 43. I b i d . , p.334 and p.444 note no.57. 44. R i s k i n , c h i n a ' s P o l i t i c a l Economy, p.76. 45. Peking Review, May 8, 1964, pp.14-15. 46. B o r i s o v and Koloskov, A B r i e f H i s t o r y , p.213. 47. I b i d . . p.215. 48. Zhang J i a n , Zhongguo J i n g j i , p.83. A l s o L i u and Wu, S o c i a l i s t Economy, pp.285-286. L i u and Wu's f i g u r e s a r e : 1960—38.4 b i l l i o n yuan, 1961—12.33 b i l l i o n yuan and 1962—5.66 b i l l i o n yuan. 49. L i u and Wu, S o c i a l i s t Economy, p.287. 50. I b i d . . p.289. 51. Song Tao, ed., X i a n d a i Zhongguo Duiwai J i n g j i Guanxi L i l u n yu  S h i j i a n ( T h e o r y and P r a c t i c e i n Contemporary C h i n a ' s F o r e i g n  Economic R e l a t i o n s , B e i j i n g : Zhongguo Huanjing Kexue Chubanshe 1989), p.64. 125 Chapter VI - C o n c l u s i o n s From t h i s a n a l y s i s of the S i n o - S o v i e t economic r e l a t i o n s h i p d u r i n g the 1950's and e a r l y 1960's, what c o n c l u s i o n s can we draw about i t s e f f e c t on shaping the A l l i a n c e ? How d i d i t i n f l u e n c e China's policy-making? Did i t s t r e n g t h e n or weaken the a l l i a n c e ? And f i n a l l y , what was the balance between b e n e f i t s and c o s t s t o the two p a r t n e r s ? C e r t a i n p o l i t i c a l events i n China seem t o suggest t h a t the development of S i n o - S o v i e t r e l a t i o n s might have had some weight on China's d e c i s i o n making. In the e a r l y 1950's, China's economic and m i l i t a r y depend-ence on the S o v i e t Union made China e x e r c i s e g r e a t e r c a u t i o n i n t h e i r c l a i m o f "Mao's r o a d " as t h e model f o r o t h e r A s i a n c o u n t r i e s . T h i s S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e on China's decision-making need not presuppose d i r e c t c o e r c i o n : economic and m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e , as w e l l as the common i d e o l o g i c a l g o a l were p r o b a b l y v e r y e f f e c -t i v e . As China gained s t r e n g t h , however, S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e on i t s p o l i c y - m a k i n g d e c l i n e d . The l a c k o f S o v i e t f i n a n c i a l a i d was c e r t a i n l y an important f a c t o r c o n t r i b u t i n g t o China's d e c i s i o n t o abandon the S o v i e t model i n 1958. But o t h e r f a c t o r s , such as Mao's t h o u g h t , t h e power s t r u g g l e w i t h i n t h e CCP, t h e i n a p -p l i c a b i l i t y o f the S o v i e t model, China's domestic economic c o n d i -t i o n and even the weather c o n d i t i o n s of 1957 a l l had t h e i r share 126 o f i n f l u e n c e . B e s i d e s , t h e d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n o f S o v i e t a i d t o o t h e r c o u n t r i e s probably should not be regarded as economic p r e s -sure i n t e n t i o n a l l y a p p l i e d by the USSR, s i n c e China was not the S o v i e t Union's o n l y concern. Moreover, China's own f o r e i g n a i d program was i n many o c c a s i o n s competing w i t h the S o v i e t program. When r e a l economic p r e s s u r e was a p p l i e d by Khrushchev w i t h the hope of changing China's p o l i c y , however, i t proved i n e f f e c t i v e and c o u n t e r p r o d u c t i v e . The S i n o - S o v i e t economic r e l a t i o n s h i p had both u n i f y i n g and d i v i s i v e e f f e c t s on t h e A l l i a n c e . On t h e one hand, i t was a u n i f y i n g f a c t o r because the S o v i e t Union had p r o v i d e d China with support and a s s i s t a n c e t h a t would have been d i f f i c u l t t o o b t a i n e l s e w h e r e — e s p e c i a l l y i n t h e f i e l d s o f e d u c a t i o n and i n -d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n d u r i n g the F i r s t F i v e Year P l a n p e r i o d . In the l o n g run, the S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e i n the above two areas may prove s t r o n g e r than the p o l i t i c a l h o s t i l i t y of the 1960's. Not o n l y because the r i s e t o p o s i t i o n s of power of those t r a i n e d under S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e may a f f e c t o f f i c i a l t h i n k i n g i n the f u -t u r e , b u t a l s o b e c a u s e t h e i r r a t i o n a l i t i e s o f t h e C u l t u r a l R e v o l u t i o n and the d i f f i c u l t i e s encountered i n Deng's reforms c o u l d l e a d the Chinese t o t h i n k more p o s i t i v e l y about the S o v i e t phase of t h e i r economic development. In f a c t , the impetus f o r the c u r r e n t n o r m a l i z a t i o n of S i n o - S o v i e t r e l a t i o n s comes not o n l y from Chinese l e a d e r s who d e s i r e more freedom o f maneuver between t h e two s u p e r p o w e r s , b u t a l s o has come from C h i n a ' s " t h i n k 127 tanks", P a r t y members and i n t e l l e c t u a l s who were educated d u r i n g the 1950's. Even Deng's p o l i t i c a l reforms, i t may be argued, t e s t i f y t o c e r t a i n S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e s , s i n c e they o b v i o u s l y aim a t changing China from a t e r r o r - b a s e d , t o t a l i t a r i a n d i c t a t o r s h i p t o a "mature", a d m i n i s t e r e d d i c t a t o r s h i p o f t h e p o s t S t a l i n i s t S o v i e t o r E a s t e r n European type. On t h e o t h e r hand, S i n o - S o v i e t economic r e l a t i o n s a l s o p r o v e d t o be a d i v i s i v e f a c t o r i n t h e A l l i a n c e . D i f f e r e n t economic i n t e r e s t s c r e a t e d t e n s i o n s and f r i c t i o n s . China's f i r s t g e n e r a t i o n of r e v o l u t i o n a r y l e a d e r s r e s e n t e d the r o l e of j u n i o r p a r t n e r i n the A l l i a n c e . T h e i r independence of mind, as w e l l as s u s p i c i o n s towards S o v i e t i n t e n t i o n s prevented them from adapting the S o v i e t system of i n d u s t r i a l management, e n t e r i n g long-term t r a d e agreements w i t h the USSR or j o i n i n g the CMEA. In a d d i t i o n , China's d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with the e x t e n t of S o v i e t economic a s s i s -tance proved t o be a major d i v i s i v e f a c t o r i n the A l l i a n c e : w h i l e t h e C h i n e s e might t h i n k t h e i r S o v i e t p a r t n e r n i g g a r d l y , t h e S o v i e t s might regard the Chinese as unreasonable i n t h e i r expec-t a t i o n s and demands. In t h e i r open debate d u r i n g the 1960's, both the S o v i e t and Chinese statements concerning t h e i r economic r e l a t i o n s tended t o be one-sided and extreme. While the S o v i e t s t r i e d t o emphasize t h e i r high-minded " p r o l e t a r i a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m " , the Chinese, i n t h e i r p o l e m i c a l documents, attempted t o p o r t r a y themselves as 128 "the H u m i l i a t e d and I n s u l t e d " — t h o u g h of course a l s o the d i g -n i f i e d ones. As t i m e p a s s e s , a more b a l a n c e d v i e w s h o u l d be r e a c h e d t h r o u g h a more o b j e c t i v e and d e t a c h e d s t u d y o f t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p . S o v i e t and Chinese economic i n t e r e s t s o v e r l a p p e d i n some a r e a s and d i v e r g e d i n o t h e r s . G i v e n t h e f a c t t h a t C h i n a was "poor and blank", the b e n e f i t s coming from i t s economic coopera-t i o n w i t h the USSR were more than obvious. The S o v i e t Union made a d e c i s i v e c o n t r i b u t i o n t o China's i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n d u r i n g the F i r s t F i v e Year P l a n P e r i o d — a n eminently S o v i e t phase of China's economic development, regarded by many as the "modernizing" phase as opposed t o the i r r a t i o n a l i t i e s o f subsequent phases. And i t i s b e l i e v e d t h a t "much t h a t China was a b l e t o accomplish l a t e r , when p r i o r i t i e s and s t r a t e g y had changed, r e s t e d on t h e heavy i n -d u s t r i a l achievements of the ^ S t a l i n i s t p e r i o d ' . " 1 S o v i e t f i n a n -c i a l a i d , though modest i n f i g u r e , was p r o v i d e d i n a t i m e l y way t o China when a l t e r n a t i v e sources of a i d were p o l i t i c a l l y out of t h e q u e s t i o n . T o g e t h e r w i t h t h e p r o v i s i o n o f s c i e n t i f i c and t e c h n o l o g i c a l knowledge t h r o u g h c o o p e r a t i o n i n e d u c a t i o n and o t h e r d i r e c t t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e , t h e v a l u e o f S o v i e t a i d , though d i f f i c u l t t o be q u a n t i f i e d w i t h p r e c i s i o n , must be r e g a r d e d as f a i r l y c o n s i d e r a b l e . To t h e S o v i e t U n i o n , t h e b e n e f i t s r e s u l t i n g from t r a d e with China were l e s s i m p r e s s i v e due t o the f a c t t h a t the USSR was a f a r more developed country, and i t s endowments were capable of producing almost a l l the e s s e n t i a l 129 c o m m o d i t i e s . However, c o n s i d e r i n g t h e f a c t t h a t i m p o r t e d Chinese consumer goods were l a r g e l y consumed i n the S o v i e t Far E a s t , t h a t i n every year between 1956 and 1965 t h e r e was a net flow o f r e s o u r c e s from China t o the S o v i e t Union i n the form of repayments on o u t s t a n d i n g debts, the b e n e f i t s s h o u l d not be un-d e r e s t i m a t e d . The c o s t o f S i n o - S o v i e t economic c o o p e r a t i o n r e m a i n s obscure. For the S o v i e t Union, the sheer s i z e of i t s economy must have r e n d e r e d t h e c o s t i n s i g n i f i c a n t i n c o m p a r i s o n t o China's. However, the q u e s t i o n of " S o v i e t e x p l o i t a t i o n " w i l l remain debatable u n t i l more d i r e c t evidence i s r e v e a l e d and more r e s e a r c h c a r r i e d out. Perhaps, the c h i e f c o s t t o China was the dependence the S i n o - S o v i e t economic c o o p e r a t i o n c r e a t e d . But i t i s not unreasonable t o assume t h a t , as a whole, the c o s t t o China c o u l d have been e a s i l y o f f s e t by the b e n e f i t s from such coopera-t i o n . The f a c t t h a t S i n o - S o v i e t t r a d e was t o mutual advantage i s e v i d e n t from the r a p i d i n c r e a s e of t h e i r t r a d e i n r e c e n t y e a r s . A c c o r d i n g t o the S i n o - S o v i e t t r a d e agreement s i g n e d i n 1985, the t o t a l v a l u e o f t r a d e from 1986 t o 1990 would r e a c h $1.32 b i l l i o n . 2 And i t was r e p o r t e d by the New York Times(December 4, 1988) t h a t , a t the end of 1988, w i t h a f o u r - f o l d i n c r e a s e of the 1987 t r a d e l e v e l , the S o v i e t Union became China's f i f t h l a r g e s t t r a d i n g p a r t n e r . The t r a d e l e v e l of these two c o u n t r i e s was to i n c r e a s e by 17% i n 1989 t o reach 4.3 b i l l i o n i n Swiss f r a n c s . 3 130 I t i s l i k e l y t h a t S i n o - S o v i e t economic r e l a t i o n s w i l l e v e n t u a l l y be based on e q u a l i t y and mutual r e s p e c t . With the e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f t h i s new t y p e o f r e l a t i o n s , " t h e 1950's s t y l e o f C h i n e s e -S o v i e t r e l a t i o n s h i p , b u i l t on xcomradeship' and ^ a l l i a n c e ' , " as Deng X i a o p i n g puts i t , " i s a t h i n g of the p a s t . " 4 Notes 1. R i s k i n , China's P o l i t i c a l Economy, p.60. 2. Song Tao, X i a n d a i Zhongguo. p.68. 3. Tao Kung Pao (Da Gong Bao). American E d i t i o n , March 31, 1989. 4. As quoted i n the New York Times. December 4, 1988. 131 B i b l i o g r a p h y A l p e r o v i t z , Gar. Atomic Diplomacy, Expanded e d i t i o n . New York: F i f t o n Books, 1985. Ambroz, Oton. 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