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Public records : a study in archival theory Livelton, Trevor 1991

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PUBLIC RECORDS: A STUDY IN ARCHIVAL THEORY By TREVOR LIVELTON B.A., The U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1987 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARCHIVAL STUDIES i n THE FACULTY OF ARTS Schoo l o f L i b r a r y , A r c h i v a l , and I n f o r m a t i o n S t u d i e s We a c c e p t t h i s t h e s i s as conforming t o the r e q u i r e d standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA February 1991 (c) T r e v o r L i v e l t o n , 1991 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada Department of DE-6 (2/88) ABSTRACT T h i s t h e s i s p r o v i d e s a t h e o r e t i c a l examination of the n a t u r e o f p u b l i c r e c o r d s . The study begins by o u t l i n i n g a /view of a r c h i v a l t h e o r y as knowledge r e s u l t i n g from the a n a l y s i s o f i d e a s . T h i s form o f a n a l y s i s i s f i r s t a p p l i e d t o the concept of r e c o r d s , and then t o the narrower concept of p u b l i c r e c o r d s . The r e s u l t i s a view of p u b l i c r e c o r d s as documents made or r e c e i v e d and p r e s e r v e d by the s o v e r e i g n or i t s agents i n the l e g i t i m a t e conduct of governance. TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT i i LIST OF FIGURES i v ACKNOWLEDGMENTS V INTRODUCTION 1 CHAPTER 1. RECORDS 27 CHAPTER 2. FROM RECORDS TO PUBLIC RECORDS 76 CHAPTER 3. PUBLIC RECORDS 93 CONCLUSION 158 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 161 APPENDIX. ACCESS TO INFORMATION 176 i i i LIST OF FIGURES 1. The Nature of A r c h i v a l S t u d i e s 17 2. The Content of A r c h i v a l S t u d i e s 17 3. A r c h i v a l Tree of Porphyry 75 i v ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I t i s both an honor and a g r e a t good p l e a s u r e t o express my g r a t i t u d e t o those who have c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h i s study. V i c t o r i a Lemieux generously shared some o f her r e s e a r c h on Canadian a r c h i v a l l e g i s l a t i o n . Kyoko L i v e l t o n and Susan S t e i n p r o v i d e d i n v a l u a b l e s e c r e t a r i a l h e l p when i t r e a l l y counted. And the U n i v e r s i t y o f A l b e r t a A r c h i v e s p r o v i d e d t i m e l y t e c h n i c a l support. T e r r y Eastwood, as ever, o f f e r e d a very s p e c i a l combination o f p a t i e n c e , encouragement, and t h o u g h t f u l c r i t i c i s m . Gary M i t c h e l l stood q u i e t l y behind me from the o u t s e t . And my s u p e r v i s o r , Luciana D u r a n t i , deserves s p e c i a l mention f o r the r a r e s e n s i t i v i t y and acumen w i t h which she managed t h i s p r o j e c t from f i r s t t o l a s t . To a l l o f them, my h e a r t f e l t thanks. v INTRODUCTION I T h i s study i s about the nature of p u b l i c r e c o r d s . Mainly t h e o r e t i c a l i n approach, i t p r o v i d e s an a n a l y s i s of the concept of p u b l i c r e c o r d s i n order t o d e f i n e them i n a way t h a t may prove u s e f u l t o a r c h i v i s t s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r a d v i s i n g a d m i n i s t r a t o r s on the c r e a t i o n and maintenance of such r e c o r d s , f o r a c q u i r i n g them, a p p r a i s i n g them, o v e r s e e i n g a c c e s s t o them, or who v a l u e c o n s i s t e n t terminology. Although t h e s e s p e c i f i c concerns are not addressed d i r e c t l y , the a n a l y t i c a l framework t h a t the study o f f e r s w i l l p r o v i d e a t l e a s t one way of mapping the broad t h e o r e t i c a l t e r r i t o r y t h a t more s p e c i f i c s t u d i e s i n e v i t a b l y r e l y on as they make t h e i r d e t a i l e d e x p l o r a t i o n s . The t h e o r e t i c a l approach taken i n t h i s t h e s i s draws only modestly on work done i n areas of study c l o s e l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h a r c h i v a l s t u d i e s . H i s t o r y w i l l be used from time t o time by way o f example, as w i l l law, d i p l o m a t i c s , and language s t u d i e s . But t h i s i s by and l a r g e a work o f s t r a i g h t a r c h i v a l t h e o r y . The degree t o which any attempt a t a r c h i v a l theory i n c o r p o r a t e s work done i n k i n d r e d areas depends on the study i n q u e s t i o n , and a study of the nature of p u b l i c r e c o r d s today almost demands a p u r e l y a r c h i v a l approach. T h i s i s t r u e not j u s t because of the s i z e o f the s u b j e c t , but f o r deeper reasons connected w i t h the nature of the s u b j e c t i t s e l f . 1 2 For one t h i n g , d i f f e r e n t groups o f people have d i f f e r e n t i d e a s about the nature o f p u b l i c r e c o r d s . T h i s s h o u l d come as no s u r p r i s e . A f t e r a l l , documents i n g e n e r a l a re of deep importance t o a number of p r o f e s s i o n s , each w i t h i t s own work t o do and a c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y d i f f e r e n t view o f the nature of r e c o r d s . H i s t o r i a n s , i n t h e i r s e a r c h f o r evidence of the pas t , g e n e r a l l y d i s t i n g u i s h between w r i t t e n and un w r i t t e n sources, d i v i d i n g the w r i t t e n ones i n t o n a r r a t i v e o r l i t e r a r y s ources and n o n - n a r r a t i v e o r r e c o r d sources. They may or may not have a r c h i v a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s i n mind when making such d i s t i n c t i o n s , but t h a t i s n a t u r a l and a l l t o the good; they have t h e i r own d i s t i n c t concerns. 1 The same h o l d s f o r judges and lawyers, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t h e i r concern over documentary evidence. The d i s t i n c t i o n s they draw between such t h i n g s as p u b l i c , o f f i c i a l , and j u d i c i a l documents may be c o n f u s i n g a r c h i v a l l y , but were h a r d l y formulated f o r a r c h i v a l purposes. 2 What may be c o n f u s i n g t o an a r c h i v i s t i s no doubt c l e a r t o a judge. So, 1 See, for example, David C. Douglas and George W. Greenaway, eds., English His tor ica l Documents. 1042-1189 (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1968), p. 11; and Bryce Lyon, A Constitutional and Legal History of  Medieval England. 2nd ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1980), p. 3. Among those historians showing a particular sensi t iv i ty to archival concerns, one might note C.R. Cheney, "The Records of Medieval England," in his Medieval Texts and Studies (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), p. 3; and G.R. Elton, England. 1200-1640 (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, The Sources of History, 1969), p. 137. 2 C D . Nokes, An Introduction to Evidence. 4th ed. (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1967), pp. 353-56, 432-42. 3 too, t h e s p e c i a l l e g a l d e f i n i t i o n o f r e c o r d s i n the common law which, though important f o r a r c h i v i s t s t o know, remains j u s t t h a t — a l e g a l , not an a r c h i v a l , d e f i n i t i o n . 3 Legal d e f i n i t i o n s s e t down by l e g i s l a t o r s pose s i m i l a r problems, f o r l e g i s l a t o r s a l s o have t h e i r own p a r t i c u l a r concerns. S t a t u t o r y laws, a t whatever l e v e l o f government, g e n e r a l l y d e a l w i t h s p e c i f i c s u b j e c t s . They may d e f i n e r e c o r d s , but o f t e n " f o r the purposes o f t h i s A c t " alone. And such d e f i n i t i o n s r a r e l y j i b e w i t h one another. 4 A r c h i v i s t s should of course know the l e g i s l a t i o n under which they work, and w i l l be bound i n any case by the p a r t i c u l a r d e f i n i t i o n o f p u b l i c r e c o r d s enacted i n t h e i r own j u r i s d i c t i o n . But they need not f e e l bound t o accept such d e f i n i t i o n s as the fo u n d a t i o n of t h e i r i n t e l l e c t u a l l i f e , e s p e c i a l l y when they are u s u a l l y made by o t h e r s w i t h t h e i r own d i s t i n c t p e r s p e c t i v e s . 5 These s e v e r a l d e f i n i t i o n s o f r e c o r d s are, as suggested, n a t u r a l and understandable. For a r c h i v i s t s , though, they are 3 For an example of this common law definit ion, see p. 28 below. * Gary M. Peterson and Trudy Huskamp Peterson, Archives and  Manuscripts: Law (Chicago: Society of American Archivists , Basic Manual Series, 1985), p. 10. Oliver W. Holmes, "'Public Records' - - Who Knows What They Are?" American Archivist 23 (January 1960): 6, 10. 5 Although legal definitions of "records" and "public records" are thus only indirect ly relevant to the development of archival theory, definitions of those terms deriving from archival theory may be direct ly relevant to the framing of related legis lat ion. See Vic tor ia Bryans [Lemieux], "Towards an Integrated Approach to Public Records Legislation," paper presented at the 5th Canadian Records Management Conference, sponsored by ARMA and entit led "Black Gold '89: Capping the Information Explosion," Edmonton, Alberta, 27 February to 2 March 1989, pp. 3-7. 4 l i k e faux amis. words having the same s p e l l i n g i n E n g l i s h and French but p o s s e s s i n g d i f f e r e n t meanings. We t r y t o square them a l l a t our p e r i l . Consider, f o r example, the s i t u a t i o n i n England d u r i n g the middle of the n i n e t e e n t h century. At t h a t time i t was not c l e a r whether the r e c e n t l y c r e a t e d P u b l i c Records O f f i c e was t o house o n l y the Chancery's l e g a l r e c o rds or Departmental r e c o r d s o f a l l s o r t s as w e l l . The term " r e c o r d s " had f o r c e n t u r i e s been a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the l e g a l d e f i n i t i o n , and a r c h i v i s t s now wanted t o apply i t t o a wider range of m a t e r i a l . But a c l e a r d i s t i n c t i o n was not always drawn between the l e g a l and a r c h i v a l d e f i n i t i o n s o f r e c o r d s . As a r e s u l t , some a r c h i v i s t s attempted t o t w i s t the l e g a l d e f i n i t i o n toward an a r c h i v a l one, but o n l y got themselves t i e d up i n k n o t s . 6 Then t h e r e i s the p i o n e e r i n g work of Holmes, who shows t h a t s t a t u t o r y and case law d e f i n i t i o n s of p u b l i c r e c o r d s are so much "brush and brambles" on the path 6 For an example of an archivist labouring manfully, but with small success, to deal with Sir Edward Coke's inf luent ia l common law pronounce-ments, see F .S . Thomas, Notes of Materials for the History of Public  Departments (London, 1846), pp. 113-15. A sketch of the general confusion of terms can be found in the "Grigg Report," pp. 8-15 (Great Bri ta in , Parliament, Report of the Committee on Departmental Records. Cmnd. 9163, July 1954). Outlines of the background are available in Peter Walne, "The Record Commissions, 1800-37," in Prisca Munimenta: Studies in Archival &  Administrative History Presented to Dr fs ic l A . E . J . Hollaender. ed. F e l i c i t y Ranger (London: University of London Press, 1973), pp. 9-18; and John Cantwell, "The 1838 Public Record Act and Its Aftermath: A New Perspective," Journal of the Society of Archivists 7 (Apri l 1984): 277-86. A useful annotated bibliography can be found in Edgar B. Graves, ed., A Bibliography of English History to 1485 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), pp. 110-18. 5 toward an a r c h i v a l d e f i n i t i o n . 7 I f a r c h i v i s t s and l i b r a r i a n s can use the word " s e r i e s " i n d i f f e r e n t ways and not get confused, t h e r e i s no reason why we should f e e l a t a l l uncomfortable w i t h d e f i n i t i o n s of p u b l i c r e c o r d s s e t down by judges, l e g i s l a t o r s , h i s t o r i a n s or, indeed, even c i v i l l i b e r t a r i a n s . D i f f e r e n t c o n t e x t s generate d i f f e r e n t meanings. 8 The need, then, t o s t e e r c l e a r o f p o t e n t i a l faux amis suggests approaching the s u b j e c t o f p u b l i c r e c o r d s w i t h a minimum o f borrowing from o t h e r a r e a s . Even w i t h i n the a r c h i v a l realm, however, t h e r e a re good reasons f o r a s t r i c t l y t h e o r e t i c a l approach t o the s u b j e c t today. Among other t h i n g s , the nature o f p u b l i c r e c o r d s i s i n some ways a hot t o p i c . The q u e s t i o n s o f access t o i n f o r m a t i o n , the r i g h t t o p r i v a c y , and the proper d i s p o s i t i o n o f m i n i s t e r i a l and p r e s i d e n t i a l papers have caused no end of debate. Any account o f p u b l i c r e c o r d s produced i n such an atmosphere i s bound t o be a f f e c t e d by i t i n some way, e s p e c i a l l y the more e m p i r i c a l 7 Holmes, "'Public Records,'" p. 26. Many readers thought he was in fact attempting to define the concept rather than clear away the obstacles, though Holmes denies this in "Remarks of Oliver W. Holmes," American Archivist 25 (Apri l 1962): 238. 8 C i v i l l ibertar ian concerns over access to information give a different twist to the notion of "public" records, as indeed do similar archival concerns. See, for example, B.C. C i v i l Liberties Association, "Right to Public Information and the Protection of Individual Privacy" (Vancouver, 1985), and the Appendix to this thesis. On the "insulating power of the context," see C S . Lewis, Studies in Words (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), pp. 8-14. 6 i t attempts t o be. T h e o r e t i c a l e f f o r t s are d o u b t l e s s a l s o a f f e c t e d , i f perhaps i n s u b t l e r ways. But i t seems reasonable t o suppose t h a t the c l o s e r a study remains t o s p e c i f i c bodies of r e c o r d s , the more l i k e l y w i l l i t tend t o g r a v i t a t e toward i s s u e s s u r r o u n d i n g those r e c o r d s . Another reason f o r s t r a i g h t t h e o r y i s t h a t a l l a r c h i v i s t s have i d e a s about the nature of p u b l i c r e c o r d s . I t would be s u r p r i s i n g i f they d i d not, f o r the concept i s c e n t r a l t o the p r o f e s s i o n . A r c h i v i s t s use i t t o a g r e a t e r or l e s s e r degree i n most areas of a r c h i v a l work, i n c l u d i n g a p p r a i s a l , a c q u i s i t i o n , arrangement, and d e s c r i p t i o n . And they do so whether working i n r e p o s i t o r i e s housing p u b l i c r e c o r d s , p r i v a t e r e c o r d s , o r combinations of the two. A l l the same, they work wi t h d i f f e r e n t k i n d s of i n s t i t u t i o n a l o r p e r s o n a l documents, and t h e i r d a i l y concerns n a t u r a l l y tend t o draw t h e i r a t t e n t i o n toward c e r t a i n q u e s t i o n s . A u n i v e r s i t y a r c h i v i s t may p u z z l e over the p u b l i c or p r i v a t e nature of f a c u l t y papers — o r even which of them are i n f a c t r e c o rds — w h i l e h i s c o l l e a g u e i n the l e g a l a r c h i v e s a c r o s s town may wonder whether judges r e a l l y have a r i g h t t o take t h e i r benchbooks home. To do j u s t i c e t o a l l of the p a r t i c u l a r concerns t h a t a r c h i v i s t s have, a g e n e r a l account of p u b l i c r e c o r d s t h a t attempted t o s t a y c l o s e t o a c t u a l bodies of r e c o r d s would have t o be i m p o s s i b l y broad i n scope. Theory, on the o t h e r hand, has the m e r i t o f speaking by i m p l i c a t i o n t o a l l concerns, and doing so w i t h f a r fewer words — a t l e a s t 7 i n t h e o r y . Perhaps, without p r e t e n d i n g t o exhaust the q u e s t i o n , a f i n a l reason f o r the near n e c e s s i t y o f a t h e o r e t i c a l approach might be o f f e r e d ; namely, t h a t many of us tend t o t r y t o d e f i n e t h i n g s by p o i n t i n g t o examples. 9 I f asked what a c a t i s , f o r i n s t a n c e , (and i f f e e l i n g p a t i e n t , and a b l e t o assume t h a t the asker i s not crazy) one might reasonably p o i n t t o the grey P e r s i a n here, the orange tabby t h e r e , and the white Siamese a c r o s s the way. Some might t h i n k t h a t North Americans w i t h t h e i r reputed pragmatism are s p e c i a l l y prone t o t h i s h a b i t , and o t h e r s might suspect t h a t North American p r a c t i t i o n e r s of an a p p l i e d s c i e n c e might be even more so. However t h a t may be, i t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t the simple f a c t of e x p e r i e n c i n g the world moment by moment and t h i n g by t h i n g makes t h i s tendency t o d e f i n e by examples q u i t e n a t u r a l and understandable. I t might be r e c a l l e d , i n t h i s regard, t h a t S o c r a t e s was always bumping up a g a i n s t such answers among the Athenians, those supposedly a r c h e t y p a l ideas-men. But, whatever the e x p l a n a t i o n , t h i s way o f d e f i n i n g t h i n g s i s not the b e s t approach t o an understanding o f p u b l i c r e c o r d s . P r a c t i c a l l y , i t would simply bog the d i s c u s s i o n down by r e q u i r i n g d e s c r i p t i o n s o f h a l f o f a l l r e c o r d s , a t l e a s t i f 9 A typical example of definit ion by examples occurs in the Canadian Access to Information Act, where the term "record" includes "any correspondence, memorandum, book, plan, map, diagram, pictoral or graphic work, photograph, f i lm, microform, sound recording, videotape, machine-readable record, and any copy thereof" (Revised Statutes of Canada 1985, Ch. A - l , Sec. 3). 8 p u b l i c and p r i v a t e may be assumed t o exhaust the whole. Even more, though, i t would not persuade, f o r a t some p o i n t i t becomes necessary t o ask what a l l the examples have i n common. What i s i t about the P e r s i a n , tabby, and Siamese t h a t encourages us t o apply the word " c a t " t o a l l of them? In the same way, an approach t h a t asks d i r e c t l y what a l l p u b l i c r e c o r d s have i n common, s t a r t i n g perhaps w i t h u n c o n t r o v e r s i a l examples, may f i n a l l y prove more p r a c t i c a l and p e r s u a s i v e . Such e f f o r t s a t t h e o r y may be immediately r e j e c t e d , of course, and w i l l i n any case have t o be r e f i n e d , f l e s h e d out, and t e s t e d by o t h e r s t u d i e s d e a l i n g more d i r e c t l y w i t h p a r t i c u l a r b o d i e s of r e c o r d s . S t i l l , perhaps the p r e s e n t s t a t e of a r c h i v a l knowledge has room f o r some attempt a t h y p o t h e s i s b u i l d i n g . Much work remains t o be done a l l around. Given the t h e o r e t i c a l approach taken by t h i s t h e s i s , i t i s necessary t o o u t l i n e the view of a r c h i v a l t h e o r y t h a t u n d e r l i e s i t . Although no doubt i m p l i c i t i n the body of the t h e s i s i t s e l f , the u n d e r l y i n g view of a r c h i v a l t h e o r y must be s e t f o r t h a t the o u t s e t f o r two b a s i c reasons. F i r s t , as s h a l l be seen, North American a r c h i v i s t s do not share a common view o f a r c h i v a l t h e o r y . And, second, the method employed may seem unorthodox t o readers accustomed t o a more e m p i r i c a l approach. The p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r misunderstanding, g i v e n these f a c t o r s , are l e g i o n . A c c o r d i n g l y , an attempt t o share the assumptions u n d e r l y i n g t h i s study seems opportune. In o u t l i n i n g the view of a r c h i v a l t h e o r y u n d e r l y i n g t h i s 9 study, t h e r e i s no p r e t e n s i o n toward examining the nature of a r c h i v a l t h e o r y p e r se, nor i t s r e l a t i o n t o the whole of a r c h i v a l s t u d i e s — a l a r g e q u e s t i o n i n i t s own r i g h t t h a t would r e q u i r e a t h e s i s o f i t s own.10 A c c o r d i n g l y , i t i s by no means cl a i m e d t h a t t h i s view i s the b e s t p o s s i b l e , f o r only a thorough examination o f the nature o f a r c h i v a l t h e o r y c o u l d p o s s i b l y p r o v i d e the background necessary f o r making any such judgment. I t can be claimed, however, t h a t the one u n d e r l y i n g t h i s study i s a t l e a s t a p o s s i b l e view o f a r c h i v a l theory, and cannot t h e r e f o r e be d i s m i s s e d out o f hand. And i f i t cannot be d i s m i s s e d out of hand, t h e r e i s a prima f a c i e case f o r b e l i e v i n g t h a t the approach t o t h i s t h e s i s , however unorthodox i t may appear t o some, i s none the l e s s l e g i t i m a t e . Perhaps i t i s unnecessary a t p r e s e n t t o argue f o r the l e g i t i m a c y of any approach t o a r c h i v a l q u e s t i o n s , c o n s i d e r i n g t h a t o n l y a h a n d f u l o f En g l i s h - l a n g u a g e academic theses i n a r c h i v a l s t u d i e s have been completed t o d a t e . 1 1 S t i l l , c l a r i t y a t the o u t s e t i s d e s i r a b l e , and a ske t c h o f a r c h i v a l t h e o r y as assumed i n t h i s t h e s i s i s t h e r e f o r e o f f e r e d a c c o r d i n g l y . T h i s s k e t c h i s made up of t h r e e p a r t s , each o f them 1 0 The term "study" or "studies" is used here to refer, in the broadest sense, to a l l aspects of the archivist 's professional work. The term includes a l l that different writers - - from various points of view - - have cal led archival theory, practice, knowledge, science, scholarship, administration, economy, management, and so on. 1 1 For a l i s t of some two dozen of these, see Terry Eastwood, "Nurturing Archival Education in the University," American Archivist 51 (Summer 1988): 252. 10 shedding a somewhat d i f f e r e n t l i g h t on t h i s view of a r c h i v a l t h e o r y : f i r s t , an o u t l i n e o f how a r c h i v a l s t u d i e s can be c h a r a c t e r i z e d a c c o r d i n g t o t h i s view of t h e o r y ; second, an argument t o the e f f e c t t h a t t h i s view of a r c h i v a l t h e o r y h o l d s promise as a means of advancing the p r o f e s s i o n i n t e l l e c t u a l l y ; and, t h i r d , a d i s c u s s i o n of how t h i s view of a r c h i v a l theory r e l a t e s t o a r c h i v i s t s ' use of h i s t o r y , as e x e m p l i f y i n g the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the t h e o r e t i c a l and e m p i r i c a l approaches t o the examination of a r c h i v a l q u e s t i o n s . I I "Theory," as mentioned, has been a troublesome word f o r North American a r c h i v i s t s o f l a t e . Some say t h a t i t does not, or cannot, e x i s t . Others, warning t h e i r c o l l e a g u e s a g a i n s t p r e t e n t i o u s attempts a t " h i g h - f a l u t i n * a r c h i v a l t h e o r y , " c o n s i d e r i t e i t h e r "myth or b a n a l i t y . " S t i l l o t h e r s see i t ext e n d i n g i n t o the realm o f metaphysics. 1 2 Theory, as understood here, i s n e i t h e r n o n - e x i s t e n t , h i g h - f a l u t i n 1 , m y t h i c a l , b a n a l , nor m e t a p h y s i c a l . I t i s , q u i t e simply, the 1 2 Frank G. Burke, "The Future Course of Archival Theory In the United States," American Archivist 44 (Winter 1981): 40-46; John W. Roberts, "Archival Theory: Much Ado About Shelving," American Archivist 50 (Winter 1987) : 74; Terry Cook, "ACA Conference Overview," ACA Bul let in 12 (July 1988) : [3-4]. See also Frank G. Burke, "In Defense of Archival Theory, or Pinkett's Last Charge!" paper presented at the 52nd Annual General Meeting of the Society of American Archivists , Atlanta, Georgia, 30 September 1988; and John W. Roberts, "Archival Theory: Myth or Banality?" American Archivist 53 (Winter 1990): 110-20. 11 knowledge r e s u l t i n g from the a n a l y s i s of b a s i c i d e a s . 1 3 No mystery l i e s hidden here. A n a l y s i s , from t h i s p o i n t of view, i n v o l v e s examining the meaning of an i d e a , attempting t o determine what i t i s , i t s nature, what i t amounts t o — the same a c t i v i t y t h a t S o c r a t e s was engaged i n when a s k i n g f o r d e f i n i t i o n s . 1 * Rather than a d i r e c t development of t h i s view of theory, c o n s i d e r b r i e f l y the o v e r a l l c o n c e p t i o n of a r c h i v a l s t u d i e s t h a t i t i m p l i e s . F i r s t of a l l , any t e n a b l e view of a r c h i v a l t h e o r y w i l l have t o f i n d some way of d e a l i n g w i t h the f a c t t h a t a r c h i v a l s t u d i e s i s g e n e r a l l y c o n s i d e r e d an " a p p l i e d " study. That i s , a r c h i v i s t s o f t e n make a primary d i s t i n c t i o n between t h e o r y and p r a c t i c e , however any i n d i v i d u a l may use the terms. On the view of a r c h i v a l t h e o r y as the a n a l y s i s of 1 3 Basic ideas concern the nature of such things as archives, records, fonds, and so on. They are "basic" i n the sense that other ideas are based on them. L o g i c a l l y , the analysis of a l l ideas i s t h e o r e t i c a l i n t h i s sense, whether the ideas are simple or complex, commonplace or exotic, c e n t r a l or p e r i p h e r a l . For c l a r i t y ' s sake, however, the d i s c u s s i o n i s best l i m i t e d to basic concepts. 1 4 There i s much to be s a i d about the r e l a t i o n s between words and things, but t h i s i s neither the time nor place. A l l the same, the reference to Socrates i s intended to suggest that nothing i n t h i s study i s made to r e s t on any d i s t i n c t i o n between d e f i n i t i o n s of words and analyses of ideas. For present purposes, a r e a l d e f i n i t i o n i s the verbal r e f l e c t i o n of a concept, a pro p o s i t i o n about the nature of things (Morris R. Cohen and Ernest Nagel, An Introduction to Logic and S c i e n t i f i c Method [New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1934], p. 230). The reader, then, need not worry overmuch about occasional s h i f t s between what look l i k e d e f i n i t i o n s and analyses. P l a t o n i s t s -- or at l e a s t r a t i o n a l i s t s , as opposed to e m p i r i c i s t s -- are simply funny that way. I t should be evident, but may none the less be stated e x p l i c i t l y at the outset, that i n t h i s paper the terms "idea," "concept," "notion," and "view" can be considered synonyms. 12 i d e a s , t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n between th e o r y and p r a c t i c e amounts t o a d i s t i n c t i o n between idea s and t h e i r p r a c t i c a l a p p l i c a t i o n . 1 5 A r c h i v i s t s , one might say, both have and use i d e a s . They do t h e i r everyday work i n c e r t a i n ways because they h o l d c e r t a i n i d e a s about the nature o f the m a t e r i a l they work w i t h . For example, they m a i n t a i n the or d e r o f documents o r i g i n a l l y g i v e n them by t h e i r c r e a t o r s because they h o l d c e r t a i n i d e a s about the nature o f an o r g a n i c body of records o r "fonds." They may not always be co n s c i o u s o f those ideas w h i l e working, l e t alone s e t them up f o r examination, but t h e i r concepts guide t h e i r p r a c t i c e a t almost every t u r n . 1 6 There i s room f o r more p r e c i s i o n here. For i t w i l l have been n o t i c e d t h a t a st e p between th e o r y and i t s p r a c t i c a l a p p l i c a t i o n has been overlooked. A r c h i v i s t s indeed have ideas about the nature o f the m a t e r i a l w i t h which they work. But those p a r t i c u l a r i d e a s imply s u b s i d i a r y i d e a s about how to work w i t h the m a t e r i a l . These l a t t e r i d e a s , c o n c e r n i n g how 1 5 These comments simply describe how the dist inct ion between theory and practice looks through the lens of the analysis-of-ideas view of archival theory. A more formal treatment would f i r s t require demonstrating how this view of theory can actually generate those categories. It might be noted, though, that i f one starts from the assumption that theory deals purely with ideas, and that ideas can be analysed in their own right, then i t follows that ideas can be distinguished from their application. 1 6 Working out in detai l the precise nature of archival theory and practice and the complex relations between the two remains a task for the future. Those thinking about such questions may wish to consult Immanuel Kant, On the Old Saw: That May Be Right in Theory But It Won't Work in  Practice. trans. E.B. Ashton (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1974), pp. 41-43. 13 t o t r e a t the m a t e r i a l , are a l s o t h e o r e t i c a l , simply because they are i d e a s . But, f o r the sake of c l a r i t y , they can be d i s t i n g u i s h e d from the i d e a s about what the m a t e r i a l i s by c a l l i n g them " m e t h o d o l o g i c a l . " One can then speak of theory, methodology, and p r a c t i c e . For i n s t a n c e , the methodology f o r a r r a n g i n g documents d e r i v e s from the t h e o r y about the nature of an o r g a n i c body of r e c o r d s , and a r c h i v i s t s employ t h a t methodology when a c t u a l l y a p p l y i n g the t h e o r y t o a p a r t i c u l a r body o f r e c o r d s . A l l t h r e e c a t e g o r i e s t o g e t h e r — theory, methodology, and p r a c t i c e — c o n s t i t u t e the p a r t of a r c h i v a l s t u d i e s t h a t can be c a l l e d a r c h i v a l s c i e n c e . " S c i e n c e " i s a u s e f u l term because i t i s commonly d i v i d e d i n t o two elements: pure and a p p l i e d . "Pure" r e l a t e s t o the t h e o r e t i c a l p a r t of the s c i e n c e , i t s b a s i c i d e a s about the nature of t h i n g s . " A p p l i e d , " by c o n t r a s t , r e l a t e s t o the p r a c t i c a l and m e t h o d o l o g i c a l p a r t s , both o f which t o g e t h e r comprise a r c h i v i s t s ' use of t h e i r b a s i c i d e a s . But t h e r e i s more t o a r c h i v a l s t u d i e s than a r c h i v a l s c i e n c e . The primary d i s t i n c t i o n between t h e o r y and p r a c t i c e , w i t h the m e t h o d o l o g i c a l l i n k between the two, needs t o be supplemented by a d i s t i n c t i o n between t h e o r y and s c h o l a r s h i p . I f i t was p o s s i b l e t o say, on the view o f a r c h i v a l t h e o r y as the a n a l y s i s o f i d e a s , t h a t a r c h i v i s t s both have and use i d e a s , i t i s now p o s s i b l e t o supplement t h a t d i s t i n c t i o n by adding t h a t a r c h i v i s t s ' use o f t h e i r i d e a s r e s u l t s i n 14 knowledge. For they not o n l y m a i n t a i n the o r d e r o f documents o r i g i n a l l y p r o v i d e d by the c r e a t o r because they have c e r t a i n t h e o r e t i c a l i d e a s about the nature of a fonds and a r e s u l t i n g methodology. They a l s o g a i n knowledge about the p a r t i c u l a r body of r e c o r d s they are a r r a n g i n g . I t i s not simply t h a t they hone t h e i r a r r a n g i n g s k i l l s by e x p e r i e n c e , which of course they do. They a l s o g a i n a s y s t e m a t i c understanding of what documents were made, r e c e i v e d , and kept, how and why t h i s was done, and how these a c t i v i t i e s changed o r d i d not change over time. A c c o r d i n g l y , i f s c h o l a r s h i p can be seen as the examination o f e x i s t i n g t h i n g s i n l i g h t o f c o n c e p t i o n s about r e a l i t y and the b e s t way of d i s c o v e r i n g i t , then the note i n an i n v e n t o r y d e s c r i b i n g the types o f documents, t h e i r extent, and t h e i r r e l a t i o n t o the c r e a t o r c l e a r l y r e p r e s e n t s an example o f a r c h i v a l s c h o l a r s h i p . 1 7 And one might note i n p a s s i n g t h a t a r c h i v a l knowledge can now be d i v i d e d i n t o two c a t e g o r i e s , t h e o r y and s c h o l a r s h i p . Because o f t h i s s c h o l a r l y element, a r c h i v a l s t u d i e s may be c o n s i d e r e d a d i s c i p l i n e as w e l l as a s c i e n c e . " D i s c i p l i n e , " as commonly used, denotes a form of study w i t h a d i s t i n c t methodology used t o g a i n knowledge. A d i s c i p l i n e encompasses both a way o f g a i n i n g knowledge — r u l e s of procedure t h a t d i s c i p l i n e the s c h o l a r ' s s e a r c h — and the r e s u l t i n g knowledge 1 7 As suggested by David B. Gracy et a l . , Inventories and Registers:  A Handbook of Techniques and Examples (Chicago: Society of American Archivis ts , 1976), p. 21. 15 i t s e l f . A r c h i v a l s t u d i e s i s a d i s c i p l i n e i n t h a t i t s methodology p r o v i d e s a way of g a i n i n g knowledge, but the r e l a t i o n between a r c h i v a l methodology and s c h o l a r s h i p i s d i f f e r e n t from the r e l a t i o n between the two i n o t h e r d i s c i p l i n e s . What i s d i s t i n c t about the a r c h i v a l d i s c i p l i n e i s t he c o n n e c t i o n between i t s methodology and the t h e o r e t i c a l i d e a s d i s c u s s e d e a r l i e r . As mentioned, a r c h i v a l methodology d e r i v e s from a r c h i v a l theory, and i t i s now c l e a r t h a t a r c h i v a l p r a c t i c e and s c h o l a r s h i p a re two pro d u c t s o f the a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h a t methodology. T h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p between the o r y , methodology, and s c h o l a r s h i p i m p l i e s t h a t a r c h i v a l methodology h e l p s a r c h i v a l s c h o l a r s g a i n knowledge a c c o r d i n g t o t h e o r e t i c a l i d e a s about the nature o f the same aspect of r e a l i t y t h a t the s c h o l a r i s t r y i n g t o understand. That i s , t h e o r e t i c a l i d e a s about the nature o f a fonds as such — about a fonds g e n e r a l l y o r i n the a b s t r a c t — d i c t a t e the a r c h i v a l methodology by which a p a r t i c u l a r fonds i s examined by the a r c h i v a l s c h o l a r . Other d i s c i p l i n e s do not always have such a c o n n e c t i o n between the o r y and methodology. H i s t o r y , f o r example, has i t s own methodology and body of s c h o l a r s h i p , but h i s t o r i a n s do not g e n e r a l l y c o n s i d e r i t p a r t o f t h e i r l e g i t i m a t e concern t o d i s c u s s o r p r o f e s s i d e a s about the nature o f human h i s t o r y as such. While t h e o r i e s o f the nature o f h i s t o r y have been s e t f o r t h over the y e a r s , they do not u s u a l l y f i n d a p l a c e o f primary importance i n d i s c u s s i o n s 16 about h i s t o r i c a l methodology. 1 8 A c c o r d i n g l y , one may say t h a t , i f h i s t o r y i s a d i s c i p l i n e , a r c h i v a l s t u d i e s i s both a s c i e n c e and a d i s c i p l i n e a t the same time. T h i s b r i e f l o o k a t the nature o f a r c h i v a l s t u d i e s as i t can be c h a r a c t e r i z e d by assuming t h a t t h e o r y i s the a n a l y s i s of i d e a s can be summarized as f o l l o w s . As a whole, a r c h i v a l s t u d i e s c o n s i s t s o f two o v e r l a p p i n g and interdependent p a r t s , which have here been c a l l e d a r c h i v a l s c i e n c e and the d i s c i p l i n e o f a r c h i v e s . The s c i e n c e i s both pure and a p p l i e d . The pure as p e c t r e l a t e s t o theory, understood here as the produ c t o f a n a l y s i n g i d e a s about the fundamental e n t i t i e s i n the a r c h i v i s t ' s world — a r c h i v e s , r e c o r d s , fonds, and so on. The a p p l i e d a s p e c t r e l a t e s both t o the me t h o d o l o g i c a l ideas d e r i v e d from t h e o r y and t o the p r a c t i c a l a p p l i c a t i o n of those i d e a s . The d i s c i p l i n e comprises both methodology and s c h o l a r s h i p . The methodology d e r i v e s from the t h e o r e t i c a l element of a r c h i v a l s c i e n c e , and the s c h o l a r s h i p r e s u l t s from an a p p l i c a t i o n o f those b a s i c i d e a s . These c a t e g o r i e s w i t h i n a r c h i v a l s c i e n c e as a study, s e t down g r a p h i c a l l y i n f i g u r e 1 below, take on a s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t c o n f i g u r a t i o n when looked a t from the vie w p o i n t of the c o n t e n t o f t h a t study, as s e t down i n f i g u r e 2. T h i s c o n t e n t has by and l a r g e been o n l y i m p l i c i t i n the f o r e g o i n g d i s c u s s i o n . However, one may say t h a t a r c h i v a l s t u d i e s can 1 8 Jacques Barzun and Henry F. Graff, The Modern Researcher. 3rd ed. (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977), pp. 157-65. 17 SCIENCE DISCIPLINE Pure 1 T h e o r y 1 A p p l i e d Methodology P r a c t i c e S c h o l a r s h i p F i g u r e 1. The Nature o f A r c h i v a l S t u d i e s KNOWLEDGE PRACTICE | T h e o r y 1 Methodology 1 S c h o l a r s h i p P r a c t i c e F i g u r e 2. The Content o f A r c h i v a l S t u d i e s 18 be d i v i d e d , not j u s t i n t o the c a t e g o r i e s of s c i e n c e and d i s c i p l i n e , but a l s o i n t o the c a t e g o r i e s of knowledge and p r a c t i c e . A r c h i v a l knowledge comprises both t h e o r y and s c h o l a r s h i p , w h i l e a r c h i v a l p r a c t i c e i s b a s i c a l l y j u s t t h a t — what a r c h i v i s t s do, i n p r a c t i c a l terms, w i t h the documents i n t h e i r c a r e . Methodology, from both p o i n t s o f view, remains a somewhat ambiguous i n t e r m e d i a t e category, and c l e a r l y r e q u i r e s deeper a n a l y s i s . A l l the same, whether d i s t i n g u i s h i n g a r c h i v a l s c i e n c e from the d i s c i p l i n e of a r c h i v e s o r a r c h i v a l knowledge from a r c h i v a l p r a c t i c e , the n o t i o n o f a r c h i v a l t h e o r y as the a n a l y s i s of i d e a s can o b v i o u s l y c o n t r i b u t e t o an o v e r a l l understanding o f the nature and c o n t e n t of a r c h i v a l s t u d i e s . 1 9 T h i s view o f a r c h i v a l t h e o r y can a l s o c o n t r i b u t e d i r e c t l y t o the development o f a r c h i v a l s t u d i e s . I t can do so because 1 9 An extended treatment of the nature of a r c h i v a l theory as i t r e l a t e s to the nature and content of a r c h i v a l studies would l i k e l y require an examination of recent c u r r i c u l a r developments i n a r c h i v a l studies. (For an example of these developments, see The Education Committee, A s s o c i a t i o n of Canadian A r c h i v i s t s , "Guidelines for the Development of a Two-Year Curriculum for a Master of A r c h i v a l Studies Programme [December 1988]," A r c h i v a r i a 29 [Winter 1989-90]: 128-41.) Although such an examination would perhaps enhance the c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of the view of a r c h i v a l theory underlying t h i s study, a serious e f f o r t would take the disc u s s i o n too f a r a f i e l d . At the present juncture, broad brushstrokes must s u f f i c e . S t i l l , i t might be worth noting that, within t h i s scheme, t h i s author tends to view a u x i l i a r y d i s c i p l i n e s l i k e diplomatics as beginning outside the sphere of a r c h i v a l studies, but coming within i t as they are f i l t e r e d through the categories of a r c h i v a l theory and methodology. They would seem to e x i s t , that i s , as independent d i s c i p l i n e s , becoming part of a r c h i v a l studies when refocused through the conceptual lenses p e c u l i a r to a r c h i v i s t s . In other words, while a r c h i v a l studies may not e x i s t quite so independently as these broad categories may at f i r s t glance suggest, the categories have not been set down without at l e a s t some consideration of c u r r i c u l a r r e a l i t i e s . 19 i t focuses a r c h i v i s t s 1 a t t e n t i o n and c o n c e n t r a t e s t h e i r e f f o r t s on t h e o r y — on the concepts u n d e r l y i n g a l l aspects of t h e i r work. For, as noted, on the a n a l y s i s - o f - i d e a s view of a r c h i v a l theory, i d e a s come f i r s t . They guide both p r a c t i c e and s c h o l a r s h i p . In thus f o c u s i n g a t t e n t i o n and c o n c e n t r a t i n g e f f o r t on the a n a l y s i s of i d e a s , t h i s view of t h e o r y can c o n t r i b u t e t o the development of a r c h i v a l s t u d i e s i n s e v e r a l areas. F i r s t of a l l , the i n t e r d i s c i p l i n a r y c h a r a c t e r of a r c h i v a l s t u d i e s r e q u i r e s the c l a r i t y of thought t h a t the a n a l y s i s of i d e a s can b r i n g . 2 0 When borrowing ideas developed i n o t h e r areas of study and a d a p t i n g them t o our own needs, we have t o be c l e a r about the nature of those ide a s and the i m p l i c a t i o n s of a d a p t i n g them, i n order t o keep c o n t r o l of the i n t i e l l e c t u a l d i r e c t i o n i n which we subsequently t r a v e l . Second, the i n f l u e n c e of a r c h i v i s t s ' i n t e l l e c t u a l environment r e q u i r e s the c l a r i t y born o f a n a l y s i s . For a l l our i d e a s , whether adapted from o t h e r s t u d i e s or not, are i n f l u e n c e d by a host of c u l t u r a l , l e g a l , and p o l i t i c a l i d e a s forming p a r t of the environment i n which we t h i n k . A s e l f - c o n s c i o u s a n a l y s i s of i d e a s makes i t p o s s i b l e t o d i s c o v e r a t l e a s t some of the ways i n which we have u n w i t t i n g l y allowed t h a t environment t o shape our i d e a s , and then t o judge whether t h a t "shape" i s t r u l y 2 0 On the i n t e r d i s c i p l i n a r y character of a r c h i v a l studies, see Luciana Duranti, "Comments on Hugh Taylor's and Tom Nesmith's Papers" (paper presented at the 13th Annual Conference of the Association of Canadian A r c h i v i s t s , Windsor, Ontario, 8 June 1988), p. 10. 20 f i t t i n g . T h i r d , a n a l y s i s can guard us a g a i n s t easy acceptance of h a b i t u a l o r supposedly s e l f - e v i d e n t n o t i o n s , w h i l e a t the same time opening up and c l a r i f y i n g a l t e r n a t i v e views of the v a r i o u s elements o f a r c h i v a l s t u d i e s . 2 1 In e x p l o r i n g a l t e r n a t i v e views, we d i s c o v e r new p o s s i b i l i t i e s , d i f f e r e n t p o t e n t i a l d i r e c t i o n s i n which we might t r a v e l . And i n thus f i n d i n g out what a r c h i v a l s t u d i e s c o u l d be, a r c h i v i s t s w i l l be b e t t e r equipped t o choose the b e s t path t o f o l l o w i n the f u t u r e . While t h i s i s not the p l a c e t o m u l t i p l y examples, perhaps these t h r e e may serve t o demonstrate the s o r t of c o n t r i b u t i o n t h a t the a n a l y s i s - o f - i d e a s view of the o r y c o u l d make t o a r c h i v a l s t u d i e s , and thereby h e l p f u r t h e r c h a r a c t e r i z e the co n c e p t i o n o f a r c h i v a l t h e o r y t h a t u n d e r l i e s t h i s t h e s i s . 2 2 2 1 For a discussion of the differences between the psychological feeling of certainty and logical demonstration, see Morris R. Cohen, Reason and Nature: The Meaning of Scient i f ic Method. 2nd ed. (New York: Macmillan, Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), pp. 83-88. 2 2 The heavy concentration on the analysis of ideas promoted by this view of archival theory would confer a benefit that w i l l not have been lost on those concerned to establish the inte l lectual cred ib i l i ty of archival studies beyond any possible doubt. For i t seems reasonable to suppose that a body of analytical knowledge would silence a l l but the most bl indly adamant of those sceptics described in Terry Eastwood, "Misunderstandings of Graduate Archival Education" (speech delivered to a session of the Archives Course at the National Archives of Canada, Ottawa, Ontario, 7 October 1987), pp. 2-3. Needless to say, one hopes, this is not in the least to suggest that archival education should involve only theory. Quite obviously, the education of those involved in an applied science, as discussed ear l ier , w i l l f a i l unless i t finds some way of combining theory and practice. None the less, the view of archival theory espoused in this study does imply, once again, that ideas come f i r s t , as education comes before training. 21 Having d i s c u s s e d the way t h a t a r c h i v a l s t u d i e s as a whole can be c h a r a c t e r i z e d a c c o r d i n g t o the view t h a t t h e o r y i s the a n a l y s i s o f i d e a s , and then having noted some of the p o t e n t i a l b e n e f i t s t h a t t h i s view of t h e o r y c o u l d c o n f e r , i t remains t o examine b r i e f l y the r e l a t i o n s h i p between a r c h i v i s t s ' use of h i s t o r y and the a n a l y s i s - o f - i d e a s n o t i o n of t h e o r y . To some a r c h i v i s t s , t h i s approach t o t h e o r y may appear i n s e n s i t i v e t o the h i s t o r i c a l s e n s i b i l i t y t h a t they h a b i t u a l l y b r i n g t o bear on t h e i r work. A f t e r a l l , w h i l e a r r a n g i n g a fonds, w r i t i n g an i n v e n t o r y , or a p p r a i s i n g a s e r i e s of r e c o r d s the a r c h i v i s t must take due n o t i c e of the s o c i a l , c u l t u r a l , l e g a l , p o l i t i c a l , and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e environment i n which the documents were made and kept. As w e l l , an understanding of the h i s t o r y of r e c o r d s making and keeping undoubtedly c o n t r i b u t e s t o the a r c h i v i s t ' s ongoing e d u c a t i o n . And have not a r c h i v i s t s argued f o r y e a r s t h a t "past i s prologue"? Is i t , then, l e g i t i m a t e t o d i v o r c e a r c h i v a l t h e o r y from h i s t o r y or the h i s t o r i c a l c o n t e x t o f a r c h i v e s ? 2 3 While sympathizing w i t h these concerns, one may s t i l l h o l d t h a t a c l o s e r l o o k a t the a n a l y s i s - o f - c o n c e p t s view of 2 3 The long a s s o c i a t i o n between a r c h i v i s t s and h i s t o r i a n s has l e d many a r c h i v i s t s to conclude that a r c h i v a l theory i s a species of historiography (for example, see Burke, "The Future Course of A r c h i v a l Theory," pp. 42-43, 45-46; and Roberts, "Archival Theory: Much Ado," pp. 69-72). This b e l i e f , one may suppose, dwells behind the various objections i m p r e s s i o n i s t i c a l l y hinted at i n t h i s paragraph, at l e a s t f o r some a r c h i v i s t s . However, a discussion of the r e l a t i o n between a r c h i v a l studies and the d i s c i p l i n e of h i s t o r y would take us f a r a f i e l d , and therefore w i l l not be undertaken here d i r e c t l y . A l l the same, th i s author's point of view on the issue should be i m p l i c i t i n the text. a r c h i v a l t h e o r y w i l l show t h a t i t i s n e i t h e r i n s e n s i t i v e t o nor i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h a r c h i v i s t s ' l e g i t i m a t e i n t e r e s t i n h i s t o r y . F or one t h i n g , i t w i l l be r e c a l l e d t h a t , on t h i s view o f theory, a r c h i v a l t h e o r y can be c o n c e p t u a l l y o r l o g i c a l l y d i s t i n g u i s h e d from a r c h i v a l p r a c t i c e and s c h o l a r s h i p . T h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i n no way i m p l i e s a n e c e s s a r i l y unbreachable dichotomy between t h e o r y and the h i s t o r i c a l s e n s i b i l i t y t h a t a r c h i v i s t s a pply t o t h e i r p r a c t i c a l and s c h o l a r l y work. To d i s t i n g u i s h i s not t o d i v o r c e , but r a t h e r t o c l a s s i f y , c a t e g o r i z e , arrange i n t e l l e c t u a l l y f o r t he sake of c l a r i t y and understanding. For example, o n l y a r a s h person would conclude, from the c o n c e p t u a l l y u s e f u l d i s t i n c t i o n between mind and body, t h a t a c t u a l human l i v e s can t h e r e f o r e be s e p a r a t e d i n t o two k i n d s o f substance o r m a t e r i a l . A r c h i v a l t h e o r y , l i k e w i s e , can be d i s t i n g u i s h e d from a r c h i v a l p r a c t i c e and s c h o l a r s h i p , a l o n g w i t h the h i s t o r i c a l s e n s i b i l i t y t h a t l e g i t i m a t e l y accompanies them. But t h i s i n no way d e n i e s the p o s s i b i l i t y — indeed, the i n e v i t a b i l i t y — of mutual i n t e r p l a y and nourishment between a r c h i v a l theory and t he h i s t o r i c a l element o f a r c h i v a l p r a c t i c e and s c h o l a r s h i p . 2 * The a n a l y s i s o f ideas — t h a t i s , a r c h i v a l t h e o r y — can 2 4 These comments can be related to the broad outline of archival studies suggested above by noting that historiography and the history of administration may be considered auxil iary discipl ines which, beginning from outside the realm of archival studies, enter i t somewhere before archival methodology, to which they primarily contribute: See p. 18, note 19 above. a l s o be u s e f u l l y d i s t i n g u i s h e d from the h i s t o r y of those i d e a s . For i t i s one t h i n g t o ask how i d e a s arose, developed, or spread; i t i s another t h i n g a g a i n t o ask what those i d e a s mean and whether they are t r u e . To d e s c r i b e the h i s t o r y of an i d e a o r e x p l a i n i t s s o c i o l o g i c a l r o o t s i s not the same t h i n g as examining the l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e of the i d e a i t s e l f , nor can i t serve as a s u b s t i t u t e . 2 5 The q u e s t i o n as t o whether, or t o what degree, P l a t o borrowed h i s t h e o r y of ideas or forms from the Pythagoreans m e r i t s a t t e n t i o n , but does not go v e r y f a r toward d e t e r m i n i n g what he meant o r whether he was r i g h t . Perhaps an example may c l a r i f y t h i s argument somewhat. I t has r e c e n t l y been suggested t h a t a body of a r c h i v a l theory w i l l r e s u l t from " r e c o g n i z i n g p a t t e r n s i n the g e n e r a t i o n and management o f a r c h i v e s i n any l e g a l and s o c i a l r e a l i t y and i n any t i m e . " 2 6 On t h i s view, a work l i k e Posner 1 s on a n c i e n t Cohen and Nagel, An Introduction to Logic, pp. 389-90. 2 6 Eastwood, "Nurturing A r c h i v a l Education," p. 235 and note 29 at the same place. In f a i r n e s s , i t should be pointed out that Eastwood i s working, i n t h i s context, from a twofold d i v i s i o n of a r c h i v a l studies into the basic categories of theory and p r a c t i c e . As a r e s u l t , h i s use of the word "theory" involves the whole of what has i n the foregoing discussion been c a l l e d a r c h i v a l knowledge which, i n turn, has been divided into the categories of theory and scholarship. Judging from the d e f i n i t i o n s of theory given i n an e a r l i e r d r a f t of t h i s a r t i c l e -- "extended d e f i n i t i o n of the nature of things" (edited to read "extended exploration" i n the published version, p. 234) -- there i s no reason to imagine any necessary disagreement, f i n a l l y , between h i s argument and the one presented here (Terry Eastwood, "Nurturing A r c h i v a l Studies In A Canadian U n i v e r s i t y : A Personal View," June 1988, p. 8, emphasis added). 24 a r c h i v e s would be c o n s i d e r e d t h e o r e t i c a l . 2 7 S t i l l , without denying the v a l u e o f such work or the need f o r more of i t , one may none the l e s s wonder where these p a t t e r n s come from and how we r e c o g n i z e them. H i s t o r i o g r a p h e r s and p h i l o s o p h e r s have urged time and again t h a t f a c t s do not "speak f o r themselves." 2 8 F i n d i n g the r e l e v a n t f a c t s , r e c o g n i z i n g meaningful p a t t e r n s among them, and p r o v i d i n g p e r s u a s i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f both f a c t s and p a t t e r n s a l l depend on a p r i o r i c o n c e p t i o n s . These co n c e p t i o n s are assumptions, ideas t h a t guide the se a r c h f o r and r e c o g n i t i o n o f p a t t e r n s . They p r o v i d e the l i g h t by which we see those p a t t e r n s . 2 9 U s i n g the c a t e g o r i e s d i s c u s s e d e a r l i e r , these p a t t e r n s and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s can be c o n s i d e r e d a form o f a r c h i v a l knowledge f a l l i n g w i t h i n the categor y o f s c h o l a r s h i p r a t h e r than theory, because they r e s u l t from the use of fundamental ideas. A r c h i v a l theory, from t h i s s t a n d p o i n t , would r e s u l t from an a n a l y s i s o f the b a s i c concepts used i n a r r i v i n g a t the 2 7 Ernst Posner, Archives in the Ancient World (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972). 2 8 "How odd i t i s ," thought Darwin, "that anyone should not see that a l l observation must be for or against some view, i f i t is to be of any service" (cited in Cohen and Nagel, An Introduction to Logic, p. 197). 2 9 As the Greeks used to ask: i f you do not know what something i s , how can you try to discover i t , and how w i l l you know when you have found i t , even i f you do so (Plato, Meno 80d, in Plato: The Collected Dialogues, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns [Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, Bollingen Series 71, 1961], p. 363)? See also Henry Steele Commager, The Nature and Study of History (Columbus, Ohio: Charles K. M e r r i l l , 1965), p. 5; and Cohen, Reason and Nature, pp. 76-82. p a t t e r n s . A c c o r d i n g l y , Posner's book would p r o p e r l y be c o n s i d e r e d what he h i m s e l f c a l l e d i t , an "essay i n a r c h i v a l h i s t o r y " ; i n p a r t i c u l a r , an attempt t o i n t e r p r e t the m a t e r i a l b e f o r e him i n l i g h t o f p r i o r assumptions about the nature of a r c h i v e s . 3 0 He may have been, i n one sense, t e s t i n g the h y p o t h e s i s t h a t a r c h i v e s were the same then as now. But t h a t h y p o t h e s i s l o g i c a l l y r e q u i r e s the p r e v i o u s assumption t h a t a r c h i v e s are indeed r e c o r d s made and r e c e i v e d i n the course o f p r a c t i c a l a f f a i r s . However, an examination o f t h a t assumption — an a n a l y s i s o f the id e a i t s e l f , the assumption i n l i g h t o f which Posner saw the p a t t e r n s t h a t he d i d — would c l e a r l y be a c o n t r i b u t i o n t o a r c h i v a l theory, a t l e a s t on the view t h a t t h e o r y i s the a n a l y s i s o f i d e a s . T h i s d i s t i n c t i o n between a r c h i v a l t h e o r y and a r c h i v a l h i s t o r y , l i k e the d i s t i n c t i o n between a r c h i v a l t h e o r y and the h i s t o r i c a l element o f a r c h i v a l p r a c t i c e and s c h o l a r s h i p , does not imply t h a t the two should o r need be e n t i r e l y d i v o r c e d . Not o n l y do s u c c e s s f u l combinations o f a r c h i v a l h i s t o r y and th e o r y a l r e a d y e x i s t . 3 1 Even s t r a i g h t h i s t o r i c a l works l i k e 3 0 Posner, Archives in the Ancient World, p. v i i , emphasis added. 3 1 Among others, successful examples of such mixtures of archival history and theory would include Richard Berner, Archival Theory and  Practice in the United States: A Histor ica l Analysis (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1983); and Luciana Duranti, "The Odyssey of Records Managers," Records Management Quarterly 23 (July 1989): 3-11, and (October 1989): 3-11. It has been pointed out that the more developed an area of study, the less i t re l ies on history - - at least for discipl ines l ike mathematics, physics, and biology (Cohen, Reason and Nature p. 370). The foregoing discussion, however, suggests that archival studies as a whole w i l l always have a significant h i s tor i ca l component, although archival 26 Posner's can spur r e f l e c t i o n on t h e o r e t i c a l q u e s t i o n s , and perhaps p r o v i d e a t e s t i n g ground f o r t h e o r y as w e l l . A r c h i v a l t h e o r y , as the a n a l y s i s o f i d e a s , and a r c h i v a l h i s t o r y are not c o n t r a d i c t o r y , but complementary. Given the view of a r c h i v a l t h e o r y u n d e r l y i n g t h i s t h e s i s , as c h a r a c t e r i z e d i n the f o r e g o i n g sketch, i t seems b e s t t o proceed i n t h r e e d i s t i n c t s t e p s : f i r s t , t o ana l y s e the concept o f r e c o r d s ; second, t o p r o v i d e a l o g i c a l b r i d g e between the concepts o f r e c o r d s and p u b l i c r e c o r d s ; and, t h i r d , t o analyse the concept o f p u b l i c r e c o r d s i t s e l f . 3 2 theory may well be found mixed with archival history less often as that theory gains in depth and sophistication - - o n the assumption, once more, that theory is viewed as the analysis of ideas. 3 2 To thus divide the central part of the thesis into two parts - - one on records, the other on public records - - may remind the reader of that character in Dickens who wanted to write an ar t i c le on Chinese metaphys-ics . Opening the encyclopedia, he "read for metaphysics under the letter M, and for China under the letter C, and combined his information" (cited in Barzun and Graff, The Modern Researcher, p. 17). But perhaps this sad result can be avoided by f i r s t discussing records in general and then narrowing the f i e l d to public records. CHAPTER 1 RECORDS The word " r e c o r d " e n t e r e d the E n g l i s h language d u r i n g the Middl e Ages. F i l t e r e d through French, i t d e r i v e s u l t i m a t e l y from the L a t i n word " r e c o r d a r i , " meaning " t o remember, b r i n g back t o mind." T h i s verb combines " r e , " as i n "again, back," w i t h " c o r , c o r d i s , " which means " h e a r t " o r "mind" ( " a r i " s i g n a l l i n g t he i n f i n i t i v e mood); l i k e the Romans, we f i n d i t easy t o remember t h i n g s l e a r n e d by h e a r t . " R e c o r d a r i " gave b i r t h t o the French " r e c o r d e r , " meaning " t o remember f o r o n e s e l f , t o r e c a l l t o another," which l e d t o the French noun " r e c o r d " o r "memory, a memory." The verb " r e c o r d e r " became "recorden" i n E n g l i s h , g i v i n g way e v e n t u a l l y t o " r e c o r d , " w h i l e the French noun " r e c o r d " r e t a i n e d the same form and meaning i n E n g l i s h . 3 3 These e a r l y meanings of " r e c o r d " i n E n g l i s h , t r a n s f e r r e d from L a t i n and French, do not exhaust the f i e l d . They p o i n t 3 3 Eric Partridge, Origins: A Short Etymological Dictionary of Modern  English. 2nd ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1959), p. 555. Joseph T. Shipley, Dictionary of Word Origins (1945; rpt. Totowa, New Jersey: L i t t l e f i e l d , Adams & Co. , 1967), p. 298. Oxford English Dictionary. 12 vols, with supplements (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933-1980), 8: 265-67. So that the reader may refer to them conveniently, and because of their generally high quality, a l l definitions in the several paragraphs that follow, except where noted, w i l l be found in this work, hereafter cited as OED. For the general interplay between English, French, and Latin, see Frederick Pollock and Frederic William Maitland, The History of English  Law Before the Time of Edward I. 2nd ed. , 2 vols. (1898; reissued, with a new introduction and select bibliography by S .F .C . Milsom, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 1: 80-87. 27 28 r a t h e r t o a g e n e r a l sense o f the word, a core i d e a around which v a r i o u s meanings c l u s t e r . The noun, f o r i n s t a n c e , c o u l d r e f e r t o memory, a memory, or an account o f something, w h i l e the verb c o u l d mean t o remember, t o memorize, t o s e t down, t o r e l a t e , t o be m i n d f u l o f , and s e v e r a l o t h e r t h i n g s . Most of these senses o f the word are o b s o l e t e , though i t can be argued t h a t those s t i l l i n common use con t i n u e t o r e f l e c t the r o o t sense o f the word: r e c o l l e c t i o n . 3 4 Among the meanings of " r e c o r d " common t o both medieval and modern times, two s t r a i n s e x i s t . These might be c a l l e d the l e g a l and l i t e r a r y uses o f the word, from the k i n d s of examples c i t e d i n the OED. On the l e g a l s i d e , a standard d e f i n i t i o n might run as f o l l o w s : "an a u t h e n t i c o r o f f i c i a l r e p o r t o f the proceedings i n any cause coming b e f o r e a c o u r t o f r e c o r d , t o g e t h e r w i t h the judgements g i v e n thereon, entered upon the r o l l s o f c o u r t and a f f o r d i n g i n d i s p u t a b l e evidence of t he matter i n q u e s t i o n . " 3 5 The co r r e s p o n d i n g l i t e r a r y d e f i n i t i o n would then be: "an account o f some f a c t o r event 3 4 Although "memory" is the more common term, "recollection" is used here to point to the element of choice implic i t in the idea. Memory can be involuntary, whereas recollection suggests something more deliberate. As well , "recollection" better embodies the ambiguity in this root meaning between memories that are d is t inct ly personal or subjective and those that have a social or objective quality, simply because they are shared with others. 3 5 OED. which cites mainly jur i s t s such as Coke and Blackstone, as well as leg is lat ion. See also Black's Law Dictionary. 6th ed. (St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Co. , 1990), pp. 1273-74; and William Holdsworth, A History of English Law. 3rd ed., 16 vols. (London: Methuen, 1944), 9: 148. 29 p r e s e r v e d i n w r i t i n g or o t h e r permanent form; a document, monument, e t c . , on which such an account i s i n s c r i b e d . 1 1 3 5 As can be seen, though the l i t e r a r y o r common meaning i s somewhat broader, the two are r e l a t e d by the common i d e a of s e t t i n g something down i n w r i t i n g f o r l a t e r r e c a l l . I t was not always so. U n t i l the e a r l y t h i r t e e n t h century, f o r example, l e g a l r e c o r d s were not w r i t t e n but o r a l . Summons were i s s u e d by word of mouth, p l e a d i n g s i n c o u r t had t o be spoken, and the memory of r e s p e c t e d e l d e r s was c o n s i d e r e d p r o o f o f what had o c c u r r e d . In f a c t , " t o r e c o r d " i n the t w e l f t h c e n t u r y meant e s s e n t i a l l y "to bear w i t n e s s o r a l l y . " 3 7 During the t r a n s i t i o n from o r a l t o w r i t t e n r e c o r d s , judges a p p a r e n t l y had t o work l a r g e l y from t h e i r memory of precedents and p e r s o n a l e x p e r i e n c e , r e l y i n g on the w r i t t e n r e c o r d s mainly as a check. 3 8 These n o t i o n s are p a r t l y brought t o g e t h e r i n the i d e a t h a t : 3 5 OED. which c i t e s mainly writers l i k e Shakespeare and Tennyson. Although the examples given date back only to the beginning of the seventeenth century, a r e l a t e d d e f i n i t i o n l i s t s examples going back to the fourteenth century. I t reads as follows: "the f a c t or condition of being preserved as knowledge, e s p e c i a l l y by being put i n w r i t i n g , " as i n phrases l i k e "on record" ("knowledge" here r e f e r r i n g to things "known" i n the sense of "capable of being acknowledged"). 3 7 M.T. Clanchy, From Memory to Written Record: England 1066-1307 (London: Edward Arnold, 1979), pp. 56-57, 203-04, 220-23, 232-33. The e a r l i e s t w r i t t e n records of t h i s sort s t i l l In existence date from the end of the twelfth century (Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law. 1: 169) . 3 8 J.H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History. 2nd ed. (London: Butterworths, 1979), p. 152. 30 Records be n o t h i n g e l s e but memorials (or monuments) of t h i n g s done b e f o r e judges t h a t have c r e d i t i n t h a t b e h a l f ... thus r e c o r d (or testimony) i s f i r s t c o n t a i n e d w i t h i n the b r e a s t of the Judge (as our law speaketh) and afterwards commited [ s i c ] t o the r o l l s , which are t h e r e f o r e f i g u r a t i v e l y speaking c a l l e d Records a l s o . 3 9 Lack o f evidence makes i t d i f f i c u l t t o determine whether or not the l i t e r a r y o r common meaning of the word a l s o underwent a s i m i l a r s h i f t as w r i t i n g came t o predominate over memory. However, by the f o u r t e e n t h and f i f t e e n t h c e n t u r i e s both the s p e c i a l i z e d l e g a l and the common meanings of " r e c o r d " were the same as those i n use today, as noted above i n c i t a t i o n s c u l l e d from the OED.40 In c o n s i d e r i n g the two main d e f i n i t i o n s o f " r e c o r d s " common among a r c h i v i s t s today, most of t h i s e t y m o l o g i c a l m a t e r i a l stands l a r g e l y as a c o n t e x t u a l backdrop. As noted e a r l i e r , p r e s e n t purposes r e q u i r e s c a n t d i s c u s s i o n of the l e g a l meaning of the term, and the d i s t i n c t i o n between o r a l and w r i t t e n r e c o r d s need not concern t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y a r c h i v i s t s overmuch, f o r i t i s l a r g e l y a c u l t u r a l matter whether something s e t down f o r l a t e r r e c a l l i s recorded i n 3 9 William Lambarde, Eirenarcha (London, ca. 1600), cited in F.S. Thomas, Notes of Materials, p. 113. It is in this sense that certain judges in English c i t i es or boroughs, and in some American states, are s t i l l cal led recorders. Original ly the t i t l e denoted a legal ly knowledge-able person appointed "to 'record' or keep in mind the proceedings of [the] court and the customs of the c i ty , his oral statement of these being taken as highest evidence of fact" COED: Black's Law Dictionary, p. 1275). 4 0 Clanchy, From Memory to Written Record, pp. 214-20, 226-30. M.T. Clanchy, "Remembering the Past and the Good Old Law," History 55 (1970): 165-76. o r a l o r w r i t t e n form.* 1 S t i l l , the common meaning of " r e c o r d " over the p a s t s i x c e n t u r i e s or so has much i n common w i t h one of the two main a r c h i v a l d e f i n i t i o n s o f the word today: "recorded i n f o r m a t i o n . " * 2 Without p r e t e n d i n g t o a comprehensive t e r m i n o l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s , the p r e s e n t d i s c u s s i o n w i l l move forward w i t h g r e a t e r c l a r i t y and p r e c i s i o n i f t h i s d e f i n i t i o n o f " r e c o r d s " as "recorded i n f o r m a t i o n " i s p l a c e d b r i e f l y w i t h i n a rudimentary l o g i c a l h i e r a r c h y o f terms.* 3 I t might be noted, f i r s t o f a l l , t h a t " i n f o r m a t i o n " i s the fundamental term from which the authors o f the d e f i n i t i o n have decided, d e l i b e r a t e l y o r not, t o work. In f o r m a t i o n i s the genus and r e c o r d s are the s p e c i e s . I f p r e s s e d back f u r t h e r , the h i e r a r c h y would i n c l u d e an even more fundamental genus of which i n f o r m a t i o n i s a s p e c i e s — and so on, t i l l some b a s i c m e t a p h y s i c a l genus were 4 1 Although some commentators have emphasized the differences between oral and written records, quite r ight ly in some respects, one may suspect that the evidence arrayed by Clanchy and others points to a large measure of continuity between the two as well - - what one might in fact construe as functional equivalence (see, for instance, Hugh Taylor, "'My Very Act and Deed': Some Reflections on the Role of Textual Records in the Conduct of Af fa i r s ," American Archivist 51 [Fal l 1988]: 456-69). * 2 Frank B. Evans, Donald F. Harrison, and Edwin A. Thompson, comps., "A Basic Glossary for Archivists , Manuscript Curators, and Records Managers," American Archivist 37 (July 1974): 428; Mary F. Robek, Gerald F. Brown, and Wilmer 0. Maedke, Information and Records Management. 3rd ed. (Encino, Cal i fornia: Glencoe Publishing Company, 1987), p. 4. * 3 Those considering such matters in greater detai l may wish to consult Helmut Felber, Terminology Manual (Paris: UNESCO, General Information Programme and UNISIST/Infoterm, 1984). 32 reached, from which a l l the o t h e r s u l t i m a t e l y d e r i v e . For the purposes of these authors, though, i n f o r m a t i o n ( l e f t undefined) i s c o n s i d e r e d the b a s i c category. As w e l l , i t i s e v i d e n t t h a t the s p e c i e s o f i n f o r m a t i o n c a l l e d " r e c o r d s " i s d i f f e r e n t i a t e d from a l l o t h e r p o s s i b l e s p e c i e s o f i n f o r m a t i o n by b e i n g "recorded." T h i s d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g a t t r i b u t e i s the a d j e c t i v e t h a t q u a l i f i e s the noun, which i n t u r n r e p r e s e n t s the p a r t i c u l a r s p e c i e s of the genus i n q u e s t i o n . A c c o r d i n g l y , as one can d e f i n e "man" as the " f e a t h e r l e s s b i p e d " — with "biped" b e i n g the genus and " f e a t h e r l e s s " the d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g a t t r i b u t e o f t h i s p a r t i c u l a r s p e c i e s o f b i p e d , man — so too can one say t h a t , i n t h i s d e f i n i t i o n , the s p e c i e s " r e c o r d s " l o o k s up the l o g i c a l h i e r a r c h y t o i t s genus " i n f o r m a t i o n , " and may be d i s t i n g u i s h e d from a l l o t h e r s p e c i e s of i n f o r m a t i o n because i t alone i s q u a l i f i e d by the a d j e c t i v e "recorded."* 4 I t may seem p e d a n t i c , but w i l l none the l e s s prove u s e f u l as the d i s c u s s i o n p r o g r e s s e s , t o f u r t h e r c h a r a c t e r i z e these 4 4 In t r a d i t i o n a l terms, "recorded information" i s thus a "complete" or workable d e f i n i t i o n of "records." For, according to A r i s t o t l e , a complete d e f i n i t i o n must possess at l e a s t two terms: one that incorporates the genus-species r e l a t i o n s h i p , and one that incorporates the a t t r i b u t e that d i f f e r e n t i a t e s the species i n question from a l l others (see Cohen and Nagel, An Introduction to Logic, pp. 235-36). I t w i l l have been noticed that, while the only species of information given f o r purposes of the present d e f i n i t i o n i s records, at l e a s t two species of information are t a c i t l y assumed to e x i s t -- recorded and unrecorded. Any given d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g a t t r i b u t e , that i s , l o g i c a l l y implies at l e a s t one other: i t s contradictory. However, unrecorded information i s l e f t undefined i n the a r c h i v a l l i t e r a t u r e , perhaps for the sensible reason that the authors are i n t e r e s t e d only i n d e f i n i n g terms of d i r e c t a r c h i v a l relevance. two elements o f d e f i n i t i o n — the genus-species r e l a t i o n s h i p and the d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g a t t r i b u t e o f the s p e c i e s — i n s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t terms. In p a r t i c u l a r , the d i s t i n c t i o n between these two elements o f any workable d e f i n i t i o n can a l s o be viewed as the d i f f e r e n c e between necessary and s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n s . For example, " r e c o r d s , " as has been seen, can be d e f i n e d as "recorded i n f o r m a t i o n . " In t h i s case, b e f o r e any g i v e n t h i n g can be i n c l u d e d w i t h i n the ca t e g o r y o f " r e c o r d s , " i t must f i r s t , o f n e c e s s i t y , be p a r t o f the category of " i n f o r m a t i o n . " I f i t does not f i t w i t h i n t h i s c a t e g o r y of t h i n g s , then i t cannot p o s s i b l y be c o n s i d e r e d a r e c o r d . However, t h e r e may be any number of t h i n g s we might c a l l i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t we w i l l want t o exclude from the category of " r e c o r d s . " Hence i t may be s a i d t h a t , w h i l e a g i v e n t h i n g must n e c e s s a r i l y f a l l w i t h i n the bounds of " i n f o r m a t i o n " t o be c o n s i d e r e d a r e c o r d , o n l y those k i n d s o f i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t are i n f a c t " recorded" have a l l the q u a l i t i e s s u f f i c i e n t t o q u a l i f y them as r e c o r d s proper.* 5 In a formal o r t e c h n i c a l sense, then, the d e f i n i t i o n of " r e c o r d s " as "recorded i n f o r m a t i o n " i s sound. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , though, i t does not a c t u a l l y r e v e a l much about what records are, because " i n f o r m a t i o n " i s such a f u z z y word. While r i s i n g enormously i n s t a t u s over the l a s t f o r t y y e a r s , the term has perhaps decreased p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y i n c l a r i t y and p r e c i s i o n — * 5 For a more rigorous explication of this dis t inct ion, though in a s l ight ly different context, see p. 39, note 51 below. 34 so much so t h a t one r e s p e c t e d commentator has seen f i t t o dub the term "an a l l - p u r p o s e weasel-word." 4 6 Given the vagueness and ambiguity surrounding " i n f o r m a t i o n , " a s t r a t e g i c r e t r e a t t o a c l a s s i c d e f i n i t i o n may prove a u s e f u l s t a r t i n g p o i n t . For p r e s e n t purposes, i n any case, t h e r e seems l i t t l e reason f o r r e j e c t i n g Samuel Johnson's t e r s e d e f i n i t i o n of i n f o r m a t i o n : " i n t e l l i g e n c e g i v e n . " 4 7 Both terms of the d e f i n i t i o n are u s e f u l . " I n t e l l i g e n c e " r e f e r s t o a message, something t h a t makes sense — not g i b b e r i s h , but something w i t h an i n t e l l e c t u a l form capable of b e i n g shared by o t h e r s . I n t e l l i g e n c e " g i v e n " i s i n t e l l i g e n c e conveyed, communicated — not n e c e s s a r i l y w i t h conscious 4 6 F r i t z Machlup, "Semantic Quirks i n Studies of Information," i n The  Study of Information: I n t e r d i s c i p l i n a r y Messages, ed. F r i t z Machlup and Una Mansfield (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1983), p. 653. Thoughtful commentary on t h i s term and the circumstances involved i n i t s meteoric r i s e i n status w i l l be found i n Theodore Roszak, The Cult of Information:  The F o l k l o r e of Computers and the True Art of Thinking (New York: Pantheon, 1986); and Joseph Weizenbaum, Computer Power and Human Reason:  From Judgment to C a l c u l a t i o n (1976; rpt., with a new preface, Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1984). Ample evidence of the confusion over the term among those involved i n information science i t s e l f i s provided i n Christopher John Fox, Information and Misinformation: An  In v e s t i g a t i o n of the Notions of Information. Misinformation. Informing,  and Misinforming (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, Contributions i n L i b r a r i a n s h i p and Information Science No. 45, 1983), pp. 39-74. Among a r c h i v i s t s , the term has been defined at l e a s t once -- i n Peter Walne, ed. , Dictionary of A r c h i v a l Terminology (Miinchen: K.G. Saur, 1984). Unfortunately, t h i s compilation (which r e l a t e s terms h i e r a r c h i c a l l y i n the order of data / information / documents / records / archives) i s both in c o n s i s t e n t and disorganized, though i t none the le s s merits s c r u t i n y by those i n t e r e s t e d i n devising a workable hierarchy of terms for a r c h i v a l use. 4 7 Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language ... (London: W. Strathams, 1755). 35 i n t e n t , but none the l e s s shared; both telephone c o n v e r s a t i o n s and shards unearthed i n a r c h e o l o g i c a l d i g s p r o v i d e " i n f o r m a t i o n . " When " i n t e l l i g e n c e g i v e n " i s recorded, however, we encounter a message s e t down i n more or l e s s permanent form. Conscious i n t e n t t o convey a message i s e v i d e n t i n the a c t of r e c o r d i n g , though not n e c e s s a r i l y an i n t e n t t o b r i d g e time. S t i l l , t he message, w h i l e not n e c e s s a r i l y b e i n g s e t down f o r l a t e r r e c a l l — t o b r i d g e time — none the l e s s does so. There i s a d i f f e r e n c e , f o r example, between simply w r i t i n g a l e t t e r and d e l i b e r a t e l y making a carbon copy o f i t ; the l e t t e r o n l y i n a d v e r t e n t l y b r i d g e s time, i f kept by the r e c i p i e n t and r e r e a d a t a l a t e r date. Dr. Johnson's d e f i n i t i o n thus does s e r v i c e t o a r c h i v i s t s , i n t h a t i t l e a d s them toward a d e f i n i t i o n o f " r e c o r d s " t h a t p r o v i d e s some measure of o b j e c t i v i t y . They may loo k a t the m a t e r i a l b e f o r e them on i t s own account, not worrying about the o r i g i n a l i n t e n t i o n s o f those who a c t u a l l y made or r e c e i v e d i t — w h i l e a t the same time h a v i n g the bonus o f working from a sense o f what those i n t e n t i o n s may have been. T h i s r e s u l t o f so d e f i n i n g " r e c o r d s " stems from the d e f i n i t i o n ' s p r o x i m i t y t o the d e f i n i t i o n o f "document" employed i n d i p l o m a t i c s , which speaks o f "the e x p r e s s i o n o f idea s i n a form which i s both o b j e c t i f i e d (documentary) and s y n t a c t i c (governed by r u l e s of 36 arrangement)." 4 8 Since the basic a r c h i v a l glossary used by North American a r c h i v i s t s defines "documents" as synonymous with "records," i n the sense of "recorded information, 1 1 the term "documents" w i l l henceforth be used when r e f e r r i n g to "records" i n t h i s f i r s t sense. 4 9 The second d e f i n i t i o n of "records" common to a r c h i v i s t s today was set down c l a s s i c a l l y by Theodore Schellenberg: A l l books, papers, maps, photographs, or other documentary materials, regardless of physical form or c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , made or received by any public or private i n s t i t u t i o n i n pursuance of i t s leg a l obligations or i n connection with the transaction of i t s proper business and preserved or appropriate for preservation by that i n s t i t u t i o n or i t s legitimate successor as evidence of i t s functions, p o l i c i e s , decisions, procedures, operations, or other a c t i v i t i e s or because of the informational value of the data contained t h e r e i n . 5 0 This d e f i n i t i o n can be analysed more conveniently i f i t s elements are set out i n point form: (1) A l l books, papers, maps, photographs, or other documentary materials, 4 8 Luciana Duranti, "Diplomatics: New Uses for an Old Science," Archivaria 28 (Summer 1989): 15. 4 9 Evans, Harrison, and Thompson, "Glossary," p. 421. To use "documents" to refer to "recorded information" seems opportune as well for a second reason. As noted, two definitions of "records" are common among archivists today. And by using "records" to refer only to the second concept - - that set down by Schellenberg which, as w i l l be seen in a moment, must be placed a step further down the logical hierarchy of terms - - some measure of c l a r i t y results , for one term refers to one concept. 5 0 T.R. Schellenberg, Modern Archives: Principles and Techniques (1956; rpt. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Midway Reprint, 1975), p. 16. 37 (2) r e g a r d l e s s of p h y s i c a l form o r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , (3) made or r e c e i v e d (4) by any p u b l i c or p r i v a t e i n s t i t u t i o n (5) i n pursuance of i t s l e g a l o b l i g a t i o n s or i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h the t r a n s a c t i o n o f i t s proper b u s i n e s s ( 6 ) and p r e s e r v e d or a p p r o p r i a t e f o r p r e s e r v a t i o n (7) by t h a t i n s t i t u t i o n o r i t s l e g i t i m a t e s u c c e s s o r (8) as evidence of i t s f u n c t i o n s , p o l i c i e s , d e c i s i o n s , procedures, o p e r a t i o n s , o r o t h e r a c t i v i t i e s o r because o f the i n f o r m a t i o n a l v a l u e o f the data c o n t a i n e d t h e r e i n . The d e f i n i t i o n begins (element 1) by l i s t i n g a few types of "documentary m a t e r i a l s , " which may r e a s o n a b l y be shortened t o "documents." E v i d e n t l y , S c h e l l e n b e r g means t o suggest t h a t r e c o r d s comprise a l l documents o f whatever type and (element 2) whatever p h y s i c a l form — i n c l u d i n g , presumably, e l e c t r o n i c r e c o r d s , paper, microforms, and so on. Elements 3 , 4, and 5 and elements 6 , 7 , and 8 form two p a r a l l e l groups. The f i r s t group r e l a t e s t o the c r e a t i o n of documents, and the second r e l a t e s t o t h e i r p r e s e r v a t i o n . The t h r e e elements w i t h i n each group d e a l w i t h t h r e e a s p e c t s of c r e a t i o n and p r e s e r v a t i o n : the nature o f each a c t i v i t y , i t s purpose, and the agent who performs i t . Elements 3 and 6 d e a l w i t h the nature of the a c t i v i t y , elements 4 and 7 d e a l w i t h the agent, and elements 5 and 8 d e a l w i t h the purpose. The p a r t i c u l a r a c t i v i t i e s t h a t s e t r e c o r d s a p a r t from o t h e r s p e c i e s of documents are (element 38 3) c r e a t i o n or r e c e i p t and (element 6) p r e s e r v a t i o n ("appropriate f o r p r e s e r v a t i o n " presumably i n c l u d e s documents t h a t may not but should have been p r e s e r v e d ) . The agent of c r e a t i o n and r e c e i p t (element 4) i s an i n s t i t u t i o n , not an i n d i v i d u a l , but the nature of the i n s t i t u t i o n i s c o n s i d e r e d i r r e l e v a n t . The i n s t i t u t i o n i s a t the same time (element 7) the agent o f p r e s e r v a t i o n ( " l e g i t i m a t e s u c c e s s o r " presumably r e f e r r i n g t o a s u c c e s s o r t h a t c o n t i n u e s the mandate and f u n c t i o n s of the o r i g i n a l agency). The reasons f o r c r e a t i o n (element 5) are e i t h e r l e g a l or f u n c t i o n a l and, f o r p r e s e r v a t i o n (element 8), e i t h e r e v i d e n t i a l or i n f o r m a t i o n a l . I t s h o u l d be noted t h a t , f o r S c h e l l e n b e r g , c r e a t i o n and p r e s e r v a t i o n of a c e r t a i n k i n d — as s p e l l e d out i n elements 3 through 8 — p r o v i d e the s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n s , as opposed t o the necessary c o n d i t i o n s , f o r the e x i s t e n c e of r e c o r d s . In the p r e s e n t context, t h i s f a m i l i a r d i s t i n c t i o n can b e s t be a p p l i e d by r e c a l l i n g t h a t S c h e l l e n b e r g f i r s t i m p l i e s , i n elements 1 and 2, t h a t i t i s necessary f o r the m a t e r i a l t o have a documentary q u a l i t y b e f o r e i t can be deemed r e c o r d m a t e r i a l o r r e c o r d s . The m a t e r i a l must n e c e s s a r i l y have t h i s q u a l i t y t o q u a l i f y as r e c o r d s , because a r e c o r d i s a s p e c i a l k i n d o f document; a l l r e c o r d s are n e c e s s a r i l y documents, but not a l l documents are n e c e s s a r i l y r e c o r d s . By c o n t r a s t , the q u a l i t i e s s u f f i c i e n t t o q u a l i f y the documents as r e c o r d s — t h a t i s , s u f f i c i e n t t o d i s t i n g u i s h them from o t h e r k i n d s of 39 documents — are c r e a t i o n and p r e s e r v a t i o n . 5 1 S i n c e a l l the elements o f the d e f i n i t i o n have been brought t o g e t h e r by d i s t i n g u i s h i n g necessary from s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n s , the d e f i n i t i o n can now be r e s t a t e d as f o l l o w s : r e c o r d s are documents made or r e c e i v e d by an i n s t i t u t i o n a c c o r d i n g t o law or i t s p a r t i c u l a r mandate and pr e s e r v e d by t h a t i n s t i t u t i o n as evidence o r i n f o r m a t i o n . S c h e l l e n b e r g * s d e f i n i t i o n o f r e c o r d s bears a f a m i l y resemblance t o a number of d e f i n i t i o n s o f a r c h i v e s s e t down by e a r l i e r and l a t e r a r c h i v i s t s . Among o t h e r s one might note, c o n s i d e r the f o l l o w i n g : "The whole of the w r i t t e n documents, drawings and p r i n t e d matter, o f f i c i a l l y r e c e i v e d o r produced by an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e body or one of i t s o f f i c i a l s , i n so f a r as those documents were intended t o remain i n the custody o f t h a t body or of t h a t o f f i c i a l " ( M u l l e r , F e i t h , and F r u i n , 1898); "[Documents] drawn up or used i n the course of an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e o r e x e c u t i v e t r a n s a c t i o n (whether p u b l i c or p r i v a t e ) o f which [they] formed a p a r t ; and subsequently p r e s e r v e d i n t h e i r own custody f o r t h e i r own i n f o r m a t i o n by the person o r persons r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h a t t r a n s a c t i o n and t h e i r l e g i t i m a t e s u c c e s s o r s " ( H i l a r y Jenkinson, 1922); "The o r d e r l y accumulation o f documents which were c r e a t e d i n t he course o f i t s a c t i v i t y by an i n s t i t u t i o n o r an i n d i v i d u a l , and which are p r e s e r v e d f o r the accomplishment of 5 1 The dis t inct ion between necessary and sufficient conditions can be stated formally as follows: "a proposition p_ states a sufficient condition for another proposition a i f ' E implies q' is true. A proposition p_ states a necessary condition for another proposition £ i f 'not-p implies not-q' is true (or what is the same thing, i f 'q implies p. is true)" (Cohen and Nagel, An Introduction to Logic, p. 388). In terms of the present discussion, the relevant propositions for a necessary condition would be, p., "This is a document," and a., "This is a record." For a sufficient condition, the relevant propositions would be, p., "This is a document with the qualit ies outlined in elements 3 through 8," and q, "This is a record." 40 i t s p o l i t i c a l , l e g a l , o r c u l t u r a l purposes by such an i n s t i t u t i o n o r i n d i v i d u a l " (Eugenio Casanova, 1928); " A l l documents of a l l k i n d s which accrue n a t u r a l l y and o r g a n i c a l l y as a r e s u l t o f the f u n c t i o n s and a c t i v i t i e s o f any a d m i n i s t r a t i v e o r g a n i z a t i o n , body or i n d i v i d u a l . . . and which are kept f o r r e f e r e n c e purposes" (Michel Duchein, 1977). These d e f i n i t i o n s o f a r c h i v e s d i f f e r t o some degree i n d e t a i l and emphasis. 5 2 S t i l l , without s t o p p i n g t o ana l y s e them i n depth, one might note t h a t they do not d i f f e r s i g n i f i c a n t l y on fundamentals. They a l l emphasize c r e a t i o n and p r e s e r v a t i o n , and hence are compatible w i t h S c h e l l e n b e r g 1 s d e f i n i t i o n o f r e c o r d s . However, when d e f i n i n g a r c h i v e s , S c h e l l e n b e r g p a r t s company w i t h the t r a d i t i o n a l d e f i n i t i o n s c i t e d above. He s p l i t s a r c h i v e s o f f from r e c o r d s by d e f i n i n g them as a s p e c i e s of r e c o r d s . Having d e f i n e d r e c o r d s , he goes on t o d e f i n e a r c h i v e s as f o l l o w s : Those r e c o r d s o f any p u b l i c o r p r i v a t e i n s t i t u t i o n which are adjudged worthy o f permanent p r e s e r v a t i o n f o r r e f e r e n c e and r e s e a r c h purposes and which have been d e p o s i t e d o r have been s e l e c t e d f o r d e p o s i t i n an a r c h i v a l i n s t i t u t i o n . 5 3 2 The f i r s t three definitions are given as cited in Schellenberg, Modern Archives. p. 12. The last one is from Michel Duchein, "The Principle of Provenance in Archives Administration," in Modern Archives  Administration and Records Management: A RAMP Reader, ed. Peter Walne (Paris: UNESCO, General Information Programme and UNISIST, 1985), p. 85. 5 3 Schellenberg, Modern Archives. p. 16. Some idea of the range of influence this def init ional s p l i t has had w i l l be found in Clive Smith, "Glossary of Terminology," in Keeping Archives, ed. Ann Pederson (Sydney: Australian Society of Archivists , 1987), pp. 357, 364. See also the exchange of views between Commonwealth archivists in Archives 7 (April 1965: 57-58; October 1965: 93-94; A p r i l 1966: 163-66; October 1966: 237). At f i r s t glance, i t might be thought that extended consideration of the re lat ion between the tradit ional def init ion of archives (or records) 41 As w i t h h i s d e f i n i t i o n o f r e c o r d s , S c h e l l e n b e r g * s d e f i n i t i o n o f a r c h i v e s may a l s o be c o n v e n i e n t l y s e t out i n p o i n t form: (1) Those r e c o r d s (2) o f any p u b l i c o r p r i v a t e i n s t i t u t i o n (3) which are adjudged worthy o f p r e s e r v a t i o n (4) f o r r e f e r e n c e and r e s e a r c h purposes (5) and which have been d e p o s i t e d o r have been s e l e c t e d f o r d e p o s i t i n an a r c h i v a l i n s t i t u t i o n . T h i s d e f i n i t i o n begins, w i t h element 1, by simply p o i n t i n g back t o the e a r l i e r d e f i n i t i o n o f r e c o r d s , which S c h e l l e n b e r g now proceeds t o narrow. Element 2 i s redundant, s i n c e i t has a l r e a d y been i n c l u d e d i n the d e f i n i t i o n o f r e c o r d s . A p p l y i n g once a g a i n the d i s t i n c t i o n between necessary and s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n s used t o c l a r i f y h i s d e f i n i t i o n o f r e c o r d s , elements 1 and 2 can be summed up by s a y i n g t h a t t h e i r q u a l i t y of being r e c o r d s p r o v i d e s the c o n d i t i o n necessary f o r documents t o be c o n s i d e r e d a r c h i v e s . and the one formulated by Schellenberg is beside the point, because archivists today generally use the term "records" when writing inventories of archival material. It can be agreed that the term "records" is generally so used; see, for example, the l i s t of inventories in National Archives and Records Administrat ion, Select L i s t of Publications of the  National Archives and Records Administration (Washington, D . C : National Archives and Records Administration, General Information Leaflet No. 3, 1986), pp. 6-16. However, two basic questions remain unanswered. F i r s t , what do archivists real ly mean when they use the term "records" in this way? And, second, is that meaning the best possible formulation? In other words, It can be urged that the simple fact that a particular term is used t e l l s us very l i t t l e about what that term is supposed to mean, let alone whether that meaning - - i f indeed unambiguous - - is the best possible. Only by extrapolating from unexamined theoretical premises can one assume that such usage has a particular meaning and significance. Hence, the concern here with opening up such questions for examination. The c o n d i t i o n s s u f f i c i e n t f o r them t o be so c o n s i d e r e d are found i n elements 3, 4 , and 5. I t w i l l be noted t h a t these t h r e e elements form a group t h a t p a r a l l e l s the group of elements r e l a t e d t o p r e s e r v a t i o n i n S c h e l l e n b e r g 1 s d e f i n i t i o n o f r e c o r d s . The reasons f o r t h i s p a r a l l e l i s m w i l l be d i s c u s s e d s h o r t l y ; f o r now, they w i l l simply be d e s c r i b e d . As i n the d e f i n i t i o n of r e c o r d s , these t h r e e elements d e a l w i t h t h r e e a s p e c t s of p r e s e r v a t i o n : the nature of the a c t i v i t y , i t s purpose, and the agent who undertakes i t . Element 3 c h a r a c t e r i z e s the a c t i v i t y not j u s t as p r e s e r v a t i o n , but as permanent p r e s e r v a t i o n . And S c h e l l e n b e r g adds the phrase "adjudged worthy," which was not i n c l u d e d a t the c o r r e s p o n d i n g p l a c e i n h i s d e f i n i t i o n of r e c o r d s , even though i t i s i m p l i c i t i n t h a t d e f i n i t i o n (the phrase " a p p r o p r i a t e f o r p r e s e r v a t i o n " suggests t h a t judgment precedes p r e s e r v a t i o n ) . Element 4 c h a r a c t e r i z e s the purpose o f p r e s e r v a t i o n i n a s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t way as w e l l . Rather than p o i n t t o the uses o f the r e c o r d s (as evidence and i n f o r m a t i o n ) , he now r e f e r s t o the a c t i v i t i e s of those who may use the r e c o r d s ; namely, r e f e r e n c e and r e s e a r c h . Element 5, a l s o d i f f e r e n t , d e s c r i b e s the agent of p r e s e r v a t i o n not as the c r e a t i n g agency, but as a s p e c i a l a r c h i v a l i n s t i t u t i o n i n which r e c o r d s have been d e p o s i t e d — and presumably t r a n s f e r r e d t o from the c r e a t i n g agency ( " s e l e c t e d f o r d e p o s i t " a p p a r e n t l y r e f e r r i n g t o r e c o r d s i n t r a n s i t ) . A c c o r d i n g l y , h i s d e f i n i t i o n of a r c h i v e s may be r e s t a t e d as f o l l o w s : a r c h i v e s are r e c o r d s judged worthy of 43 permanent p r e s e r v a t i o n f o r r e f e r e n c e o r r e s e a r c h and d e p o s i t e d i n an a r c h i v a l i n s t i t u t i o n . 5 * S c h e l l e n b e r g 1 s d e f i n i t i o n s o f r e c o r d s and a r c h i v e s having thus been d e s c r i b e d and r e s t a t e d , i t i s now p o s s i b l e t o e x p l o r e h i s aim i n s p l i t t i n g the two a p a r t by l o o k i n g again a t the d i f f e r e n c e s between the d e f i n i t i o n s . As noted, t h e r e are f o u r main d i f f e r e n c e s w i t h r e g a r d t o p r e s e r v a t i o n : r e c o r d s are p r e s e r v e d , but a r c h i v e s are permanently p r e s e r v e d ; records are i m p l i c i t l y judged worthy of p r e s e r v a t i o n , but a r c h i v e s are e x p l i c i t l y "adjudged worthy" of i t ; r e c o r d s a re kept f o r evidence and i n f o r m a t i o n , but a r c h i v e s a re kept f o r r e f e r e n c e and r e s e a r c h ; r e c o r d s are kept by the c r e a t o r , but a r c h i v e s are kept by an a r c h i v a l i n s t i t u t i o n . A l l o f these d i f f e r e n c e s r e f l e c t S c h e l l e n b e r g ' s e f f o r t toward d e f i n i n g the a r c h i v i s t as the p r o f e s s i o n a l who s e l e c t s documents used f o r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e purposes and p r e s e r v e s them mainly f o r the s c h o l a r l y uses t o which they can be p u t . 5 5 For example, r e c o r d s are p r e s e r v e d by the c r e a t o r t o 5* With regard to the act iv i t ies of reference and research, "or" is a better combining term than "and" for two reasons. F i r s t , "or" generally implies "and" in standard English usage (Wilson Fo l l e t t , Modern American  Usage: A Guide. ed. Jacques Barzun [New York: H i l l & Wang, 1966], pp. 64-65). Second, i t would be best to avoid the possible assumption that only records useful for both reference and research would qualify as archives. Schellenberg - - t o anticipate what follows - - i s trying to insinuate into his def ini t ion of archives the value of records for scholarly research above a l l else. Accordingly, while "and" may have been the best rhetorical form for his own purposes, "or" seems closer to his meaning. 5 5 Schellenberg, Modern Archives, p. 30; T.R. Schellenberg, "Principles of Archival Appraisal, " in Modern Archives Administration, ed. Walne, pp. 269, 270. 44 accomplish the work f o r which they were c r e a t e d , which i s assumed t o have a l i m i t e d time-span, whereas a r c h i v e s are p r e s e r v e d permanently because s c h o l a r s o f a l l s o r t s may f i n d any number of uses f o r them f a r i n t o the f u t u r e . 5 6 Moreover, a r c h i v e s a re e x p l i c i t l y "adjudged worthy" of p r e s e r v a t i o n , whereas r e c o r d s are not, i n order t o underscore the a r c h i v i s t 1 s prime r o l e i n e v a l u a t i n g r e c o r d s f o r permanent p r e s e r v a t i o n . 5 7 As w e l l , the somewhat c o n f u s i n g d i s t i n c t i o n between r e c o r d s kept f o r evidence and i n f o r m a t i o n and a r c h i v e s kept f o r r e f e r e n c e and r e s e a r c h i s mainly intended t o a s s o c i a t e the word " r e s e a r c h " w i t h a r c h i v e s , because f o r S c h e l l e n b e r g i t i s a synonym f o r " s c h o l a r l y r e s e a r c h . " 5 8 5 6 Schellenberg, Modern Archives. p. 110. 5 7 Ibid. , p. 30. 5 8 Ib id . , p. 140. Schellenberg's definit ion is confused, as well as confusing, at this point. With regard to records, he does not in fact state what he real ly means concerning the reasons for which records are preserved by the inst i tut ion that created them. He savs that they are preserved for evidence and information, but he actually means that they are preserved for administrative, legal , and f i s ca l purposes in order to carry out the inst i tut ion's work. This intent becomes clear later on in his discussion of appraisal, where he distinguishes the primary administrative, legal , and f i s ca l values of records - - values for the creator - - from their secondary evidential and informational values for scholarly research above a l l else. He continually connects the uses of records as evidence and information with the act iv i t ies of reference and research (noting that their occasional use in this way by the creating ins t i tut ion is not the same as their f i r s t use in accomplishing the inst i tut ion's work). Accordingly, he c learly means to define records as "documents made or received by an inst i tut ion according to law or its part icular mandate and preserved to f u l f i l l i ts administrative, legal , or f i s ca l needs." The correspondingly revised definit ion of archives would read, "records judged worthy of permanent preservation for reference or research use because of their evidence and information and deposited in an archival inst i tut ion." This confusion is mainly verbal, and does not affect the substance of the two definit ions. (See Modern Archives. pp. 133, 139-60.) 45 F i n a l l y , r e c o r d s kept by the c r e a t o r are d i s t i n g u i s h e d from a r c h i v e s kept by an a r c h i v a l i n s t i t u t i o n f o r two reasons: f i r s t , t o underscore the d i s t i n c t i o n between the primary a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and secondary s c h o l a r l y reasons f o r p r e s e r v i n g r e c o r d s ; and, second, t o underscore the a r c h i v i s t ' s r o l e i n j u d g i n g which r e c o r d s should be s e l e c t e d as a r c h i v e s . S c h e l l e n b e r g ' s d e f i n i t i o n s of r e c o r d s and a r c h i v e s have been d e s c r i b e d and r e s t a t e d , and i t has a l s o been shown how the d i f f e r e n c e s between the two r e l a t e t o h i s aim i n s p l i t t i n g a r c h i v e s from r e c o r d s . I t now remains t o i n v e s t i g a t e the reasons he g i v e s i n j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f h i s u n t r a d i t i o n a l d e f i n i t i o n of a r c h i v e s . As w i l l be seen, he o f f e r s two l i n e s o f argument i n t h i s regard, which w i l l be e x p l o r e d i n t u r n . The f i r s t l i n e o f argument S c h e l l e n b e r g o f f e r s t o j u s t i f y s p l i t t i n g a r c h i v e s from r e c o r d s i s intended t o support h i s t w o f o l d c l a i m : f i r s t , t h a t " t o be a r c h i v e s , m a t e r i a l s must be p r e s e r v e d f o r reasons o t h e r than those f o r which they were c r e a t e d and accumulated"; and, second, t h a t those reasons are m a i n l y c u l t u r a l . 5 9 In support o f t h i s c l a i m , he o f f e r s two arguments from a u t h o r i t y and one argument from the s t a t u s quo. F i r s t he suggests t h a t Jenkinson's d e f i n i t i o n of a r c h i v e s supports h i s own s p l i t between a r c h i v e s and r e c o r d s . Jenkinson, he notes, says t h a t " r e c o r d s become a r c h i v e s when, •having ceased t o be i n c u r r e n t use, they are d e f i n i t e l y s e t a s i d e f o r p r e s e r v a t i o n , t a c i t l y adjudged worthy of being 5 9 I b i d . , pp. 13, 14, 140. kept.'" S t i l l , h a v i ng s t u d i e d the E n g l i s h r e g i s t r y system, S c h e l l e n b e r g should have known b e t t e r than t o t w i s t J e n k i n s o n ' s meaning toward h i s own, however tempted he may have been. There i s a touch o f o l d - w o r l d charm (or m a g i s t e r i a l condescension, depending on one's p o i n t o f view) i n J e n k i n s o n ' s r e j o i n d e r , b u r i e d i n a f o o t n o t e , t h a t t h i s was merely "a s l i p " on S c h e l l e n b e r g 1 s p a r t , " j u s t i f y i n g no more than a m i l d remonstrance." 6 0 S c h e l l e n b e r g 1 s second appeal t o a u t h o r i t y i s a quote from the German a r c h i v i s t Brenneke. And i t i s t r u e , as Posner noted, t h a t the American and German d e f i n i t i o n s o f a r c h i v e s s t a n d t o g e t h e r . 6 1 A l l the same, w h i l e arguments from a u t h o r i t y were p e r s u a s i v e i n medieval times, today we g e n e r a l l y r e q u i r e r e a s o n i n g based on p r o p o s i t i o n s t o j u s t i f y a c l a i m , e s p e c i a l l y when a u t h o r i t i e s d i s a g r e e . 6 2 A r g u i n g as w e l l from the s t a t u s quo, S c h e l l e n b e r g c l a i m s t h a t " i t i s q u i t e obvious t h a t modern a r c h i v e s are kept f o r the use o f o t h e r s than those t h a t c r e a t e d them." 6 3 T h i s 6 0 Ib id . , pp. 13-14; Hilary Jenkinson, "Modern Archives. Some Reflections on T.R. Schellenberg: Modern Archives: Principles and  Techniques." in his Selected Writings of Sir Hilary Jenkinson. ed. Roger H. E l l i s and Peter Walne (London: Alan Sutton, 1980), p. 340. It might also be noted that Schellenberg seems to have borrowed the peculiar phrase, "adjudged worthy," from Jenkinson. 6 1 Schellenberg, Modern Archives, p. 14; Posner, Archives in the  Ancient World, p. 4. 6 2 C.S. Lewis, The Discarded Image: An Introduction to Medieval and  Renaissance Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964), p. 11. Schellenberg, Modern Archives. p. 14. c l a i m would be " q u i t e obvious" o n l y i f the N a t i o n a l A r c h i v e s of the U n i t e d S t a t e s — S c h e l l e n b e r g 1 s employer, which d i d i n f a c t keep a r c h i v e s f o r such uses — were the o n l y a r c h i v a l i n s t i t u t i o n housing modern a r c h i v e s . But a r c h i v a l i n s t i t u t i o n s l i k e t h a t o f I l l i n o i s under the d i r e c t i o n of Margaret Cross Norton kept a r c h i v e s p r i m a r i l y f o r the use of those who c r e a t e d them. 6 4 S t i l l , even i f a l l a r c h i v a l i n s t i t u t i o n s housing modern a r c h i v e s d i d f o l l o w the N a t i o n a l A r c h i v e s o f the U n i t e d S t a t e s , S c h e l l e n b e r g would not have s u b s t a n t i a t e d h i s c l a i m . For he i s attempting t o argue t h a t what e x i s t s i s what should e x i s t , simply because i t e x i s t s . To do so s u c e s s f u l l y , he would f i r s t have t o demonstrate t h a t terms l i k e " should" and "ought" are meaningless — which of course he does not do, because he uses them c o n t i n u a l l y . 6 5 C l e a r l y , S c h e l l e n b e r g has not adequately supported h i s c l a i m t h a t documents have t o be p r e s e r v e d f o r secondary c u l t u r a l reasons t o be a r c h i v e s . H i s second l i n e o f argument i n j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f s p l i t t i n g a r c h i v e s from r e c o r d s i s e q u a l l y q u e s t i o n a b l e . He argues t h a t North American a r c h i v i s t s should f e e l f r e e t o p o s i t any view of a r c h i v e s they l i k e because a r c h i v i s t s everywhere have always d e f i n e d a r c h i v e s w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o t h e i r own p a r t i c u l a r 6 4 Margaret Cross Norton, Norton on Archives: The Writings of Margaret  Cross Norton on Archival and Records Management, ed. Thornton W. Mitchell (Carbondale: Southern I l l ino i s University Press, 1975), pp. 4-5. 6 5 Examples of Schellenberg's normative language abound. See, for instance, Modern Archives, pp. 28, 29, 30. 48 needs. 6 6 T h i s c l a i m can be shown t o be f a l s e by s e t t i n g i t out i n s y l l o g i s t i c form: (a) A l l a r c h i v i s t s d e f i n e a r c h i v e s a c c o r d i n g t o t h e i r own needs; (b) North American a r c h i v i s t s need t o s e l e c t which r e c o r d s t o p r e s e r v e ; (c) T h e r e f o r e , North American a r c h i v i s t s should d e f i n e a r c h i v e s w i t h the need f o r s e l e c t i o n i n mind. I f t h e f i r s t two elements o f the argument are t r u e , then the c o n c l u s i o n f o l l o w s without q u e s t i o n . C o n s i d e r , f i r s t , the minor premise — t h a t North American a r c h i v i s t s need t o s e l e c t r e c o r d s f o r p r e s e r v a t i o n . They do, of course: l e g a l o b l i g a t i o n s and the sheer b u l k o f documents r e q u i r e them t o do so. But North Americans a re not the only a r c h i v i s t s i n t h i s p o s i t i o n . S c h e l l e n b e r g argues t o the e f f e c t t h a t E n g l i s h a r c h i v i s t s o f the mid-twentieth century (and, presumably, t h e i r C o n t i n e n t a l peers — though perhaps not i n Germany) were concerned s o l e l y w i t h "the a n c i e n t p u b l i c r e c o r d s . " T h i s c l a i m i s untrue. J e n k i n s o n h i m s e l f had gone on r e c o r d i n 1922 as a witness t o the bu l k o f rec e n t documents, d e v o t i n g a l a r g e p o r t i o n o f h i s manual t o a d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e i r s e l e c t i o n and p r e s e r v a t i o n . 6 7 S c h e l l e n b e r g ' s major premise — t h a t a l l a r c h i v i s t s d e f i n e 6 6 Ibid. , p. 15. 6 7 Ib id . ; Hilary Jenkinson, A Manual of Archive Administration. 2nd ed. (1937; reissued, with an introduction and bibliography by Roger H. E l l i s , London: Percy Lund, Humphries & Co., 1965), pp. 21, 136-90. a r c h i v e s a c c o r d i n g t o t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r needs — i s e q u a l l y troublesome. True enough, a l l the d e f i n i t i o n s o f a r c h i v e s noted above r e f l e c t d i f f e r e n c e s i n p r a c t i c e . 6 8 But these d i f f e r e n c e s i n p r a c t i c e do not n e c e s s a r i l y express d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e o r y . In f a c t , as e x p r e s s i o n s o f theory, the d e f i n i t i o n s f i t w e l l w i t h one another, f o r a l l o f them emphasize both o r i g i n a l use and p r e s e r v a t i o n as the fundamental elements o f a r c h i v e s . They d i f f e r somewhat i n the way those fundamentals are expressed simply because they were framed w i t h i n s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t environments. To put i t another way, these other a r c h i v i s t s d i d not d e f i n e a r c h i v e s a c c o r d i n g t o t h e i r p r a c t i c a l needs; r a t h e r , they d e f i n e d the nature o f a r c h i v e s i n i t s e l f , though t h e i r d i f f e r e n t environments c o l o r e d the way they formulated t h e i r d e f i n i t i o n s . The r e s u l t i n g d i f f e r e n c e s are a c c i d e n t a l , not e s s e n t i a l , t o the d e f i n i t i o n s . S c h e l l e n b e r g , however, confuses a c c i d e n t s w i t h essences, m i s s i n g e n t i r e l y the agreement about fundamentals. A c c o r d i n g l y , s i n c e n e i t h e r h i s major nor minor premise i s d e f e n s i b l e , S c h e l l e n b e r g f a i l s t o support h i s c o n c l u s i o n t h a t North American a r c h i v i s t s should d e f i n e a r c h i v e s w i t h the need f o r s e l e c t i o n i n mind. And s i n c e he a l s o f a i l s t o support h i s c l a i m t h a t documents have t o be p r e s e r v e d f o r secondary c u l t u r a l reasons t o be a r c h i v e s , both S c h e l l e n b e r g • s l i n e s of argument f a i l t o support h i s u n t r a d i t i o n a l d e f i n i t i o n of 6 8 See p. 39 above. It might be noted that a l l except the last of these definitions are cited by Schellenberg in defense of his position, as set down here. a r c h i v e s . A s i d e from S c h e l l e n b e r g ' s own arguments, t h i s author has come a c r o s s o n l y two o t h e r s o f f e r e d i n favour o f h i s p o s i t i o n . The f i r s t was s u c c i n c t l y phrased by Frank Evans, who thought the s p l i t between a r c h i v e s and r e c o r d s a good t h i n g . For, as he put i t , " t o extend the meaning of a r c h i v e s back t o r e c o r d s not y e t a p p r a i s e d by the a r c h i v i s t and s u b j e c t t o d i s p o s i t i o n would be t o i n v o l v e the a r c h i v i s t i n the d e s t r u c t i o n of a r c h i v e s . " 6 9 I t i s t r u e t h a t a r c h i v i s t s f e e l a s t r o n g r e s p o n s i b i l i t y about t h e i r r o l e as the p r o f e s s i o n a l s d e s i g n a t e d t o choose which documents t o keep and which t o d e s t r o y . And t h e i r age-old commitment toward p r e s e r v a t i o n d o u b t l e s s l e a d s a t times t o uncomfortable f e e l i n g s about d e s t r o y i n g documents. 7 0 A l l the same, they can onl y mask those f e e l i n g s , not a l l e v i a t e them, by changing the name of the m a t e r i a l they d e s t r o y . Moreover, many a r c h i v a l i n s t i t u t i o n s today are i n any case d e s t r o y i n g documents a l r e a d y i n t h e i r c a r e — a r c h i v e s , t h a t i s , as d e f i n e d by S c h e l l e n b e r g . For example, s i x t y - f i v e p e r c e n t o f a r c h i v a l i n s t i t u t i o n s responding t o a r e c e n t Canadian n a t i o n a l survey 6 9 Frank B. Evans, "Modern Concepts of Archives Administration and Records Management," UNESCO Bul let in for Libraries 24 (1970): 244. The same argument was offered earl ier by Arthur H. Leavitt , "What Are Archives?" American Archivist 24 (Apri l 1961): 177. 7 0 P. Boisard, for example, found general agreement among Continental archivists the the "task of destroying records, which makes i t necessary to make a selection (and selection always means the sacrif ice of something else), gives archivists a most uncomfortable feeling" ("Disposal Policy: Reflections on the Practice of the Archives of the Seine," in Modern  Archives Administration, ed. Walne, p. 212). 51 r e p o r t e d t h a t they are a c t i v e l y i n v o l v e d i n r e a p p r a i s i n g and " d e - a c c e s s i o n i n g " ( t h a t i s , t o a l a r g e e x t e n t d e s t r o y i n g ) m a t e r i a l they had a p p a r e n t l y once deemed worthy of permanent p r e s e r v a t i o n . 7 1 The o t h e r argument i n support o f S c h e l l e n b e r g ' s p o s i t i o n c l a i m s t h a t s p l i t t i n g a r c h i v e s from r e c o r d s i s a good t h i n g because i t i s a d m i n i s t r a t i v e l y c o n v e n i e n t . 7 2 In s e v e r a l r e s p e c t s , t h i s c l a i m i s understandable. F i r s t , some aspects of the work done w i t h documents i n use by those who made or r e c e i v e d them (commonly r e f e r r e d t o as "r e c o r d s management") w i l l be d i f f e r e n t from work done w i t h r e c o r d s t h a t are used by o t h e r s as w e l l (commonly r e f e r r e d t o as " a r c h i v e s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o r management"). Second, i t may be u s e f u l , at l e a s t i n l a r g e r e p o s i t o r i e s , t o have s p e c i a l i z e d s t a f f t o do these somewhat d i f f e r e n t k i n d s o f work. T h i r d , i t may be u s e f u l t o have more than one program t o accommodate those somewhat d i f f e r e n t k i n d s o f work, and t o have t h a t f a c t r e f l e c t e d i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s s t r u c t u r e . And, f o u r t h , i t may be convenient t o have d i f f e r e n t names f o r those d i f f e r e n t programs. 7 1 National Archives of Canada, Program Evaluation and Research Policy Branch, Acquisit ion Evaluation Study, vo l . 2, Research Reports (November 1987), pp. 9, 10. An argument in favour of reappraisal and de-accessioning w i l l be found in Leonard Rapport, "No Grandfather Clause: Reappraising Accessioned Records," in A Modern Archives Reader: Basic  Readings on Archival Theory and Practice, ed. Maygene F. Daniels and Timothy Walch (Washington, D .C . : National Archives and Records Service, 1984), pp. 80-90. 7 2 Peter Walne, letter to the editor, Archives 7 (Apri l 1966): 165; Ivor M. Graham, let ter to the editor, Archives 7 (October 1966): 237. Many i n s t i t u t i o n s having two programs do i n f a c t d e s c r i b e them as " a r c h i v e s and r e c o r d s management," or something s i m i l a r . But f o r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e convenience, any names would do, l o g i c a l l y , so lo n g as the programs are d i s t i n g u i s h e d from one another. "Documents X documents Y management" would serve p u r e l y a d m i n i s t r a t i v e concerns as w e l l as any ot h e r names, because the l o g i c o f a d m i n i s t r a t i v e convenience makes any c h o i c e o f d i s t i n g u i s h i n g names a r b i t r a r y . However, i f the names g i v e n programs are a r b i t r a r y , they cannot be used t o support S c h e l l e n b e r g 1 s p o s i t i o n , because no reasons r e l e v a n t t o a t h e o r e t i c a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n can be g i v e n f o r choosing one s e t o f names over another; t h e o r y i n v o l v e s s u b s t a n t i v e , r a t h e r than nominal, d e f i n i t i o n s . 7 3 Moreover, i f a d m i n i s t r a t o r s choose, f o r t h e i r own convenience, t o use S c h e l l e n b e r g * s terms because they b e l i e v e t h a t they express the t r u t h , t h e i r c h o i c e can a g a i n not be used t o b u t t r e s s S c h e l l e n b e r g 1 s c l a i m , f o r they a re a p p l y i n g h i s t h e o r e t i c a l p o s i t i o n t o t h e i r own p r a c t i c a l needs. An a p p l i c a t i o n o f a t h e o r e t i c a l c l a i m assumes by d e f i n i t i o n t h a t the c l a i m i s t r u e , and t h e r e f o r e cannot be used t o support i t . 7 4 7 3 Theory, that i s , as understood for the purposes of this study. Nominal definitions are agreements about what specific words shal l mean, whereas substantive definitions are propositions about the nature of things. A nominal def init ion of the term "study," for example, is offered above at p. 9, note 10. Substantive definitions are mentioned, and a c i ta t ion given, shortly afterward at p. 11, note 14. 7 4 A common reason for administrators' choice of the terms "archives" and "records" to refer to their separate programs, one might suppose, is that attributed to Solon Buck, second Archivist of the United States. According to H.G. Jones, Buck, l ike Jenkinson and Waldo G. Leland, As shown, the arguments of S c h e l l e n b e r g and o t h e r s i n defense o f h i s s p l i t between a r c h i v e s and r e c o r d s a re not p e r s u a s i v e . However, t o demonstrate t h a t h i s arguments do not s u b s t a n t i a t e h i s c l a i m i s not, i n s t r i c t l o g i c , t o prove t h a t h i s c l a i m i s f a l s e , because bad reasons can be g i v e n f o r a t r u e p r o p o s i t i o n . One might, f o r example, argue t h a t the sky i s b l u e because "I say i t i s so." The reason may persuade an o v e r - d o c i l e dependent c h i l d , but not the r e s t o f us, though we would have no t r o u b l e a g r e e i n g t h a t the sky i s i n f a c t b l u e . To r e f u t e arguments i n favour o f a p r o p o s i t i o n , then, i s not t o r e f u t e the p r o p o s i t i o n i t s e l f but, r a t h e r , t o show t h a t b e t t e r reasons f o r b e l i e v i n g the p r o p o s i t i o n are necessar y . To make t h i s p o i n t c l e a r e r , c o n s i d e r an attempted r e f u t a t i o n o f S c h e l l e n b e r g • s p o s i t i o n t h a t does not succeed but may none the l e s s be t r u e . Reviewing Modern A r c h i v e s . J e n k i n s o n attempted t o prove t h a t S c h e l l e n b e r g was wrong, i n or d e r t o defend what has here been c a l l e d the t r a d i t i o n a l view of a r c h i v e s , which t r e a t s " a r c h i v e s " and " r e c o r d s " as synonymous terms. J e n k i n s o n urges t h a t S c h e l l e n b e r g ' s d e f i n i t i o n o f a r c h i v e s i s " f r a n k l y a r b i t r a r y , " going on t o strongly believed that records are in fact archives as tradit ional ly defined. But he none the less agreed to use the term "records" because i t was supposedly more easi ly understood by non-archivists - - and i t was during his tenure as National Archivist that "records administration" emerged (H.G. Jones, The Records of a Nation: Their Management.  Preservation, and Use [New York: Atheneum, 1969], p. 36, note 25; p. 25). An example of Buck's equation of records and archives w i l l be found in his "Let's Look at the Record," American Archivist 8 (Apri l 1945): 110-11. 54 suggest t h a t e a r l i e r d e f i n i t i o n s had been "based simply on an a n a l y s i s o f the nature o f documents used i n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . " Then he says: P o t e n t i a l v a l u e f o r Research i s no doubt the reason why we c o n t i n u e t o spend time and money on p r e s e r v i n g A r c h i v e s and making them a v a i l a b l e : but the f a c t t h a t a t h i n g may be used f o r purposes f o r which i t was not inte n d e d — a hat, f o r i n s t a n c e , f o r the p r o d u c t i o n of a r a b b i t — i s not p a r t o f i t s nature and should not, I submit, be made an element i n i t s d e f i n i t i o n , though i t may reas o n a b l y a f f e c t i t s t r e a t m e n t . 7 5 T h i s argument can be an a l y s e d by u s i n g the s y l l o g i s t i c form employed e a r l i e r t o an a l y s e one of S c h e l l e n b e r g ' s arguments: (a) Things should be d e f i n e d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e i r nature; (b) Uses f o r which t h i n g s were not intended a re not p a r t o f t h e i r nature; (c) T h e r e f o r e , t h i n g s should not be d e f i n e d by uses f o r which they were not intended. I f t he f i r s t two premises are t r u e , then the c o n c l u s i o n f o l l o w s without q u e s t i o n . The major premise, t h a t t h i n g s should be d e f i n e d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e i r nature, seems reasonable enough. But the minor premise i s p r o b l e m a t i c . The d i f f i c u l t y l i e s i n the n o t i o n of 7 5 Jenkinson, "Modern Archives. Some Reflections on T.R. Schellenberg," Journal of the Society of Archivists 1 (Apri l 1957): 148-49. Some five l ines of this ar t i c l e , including most of the quote about the rabbit from a hat, have been omitted from the ar t i c l e as reprinted in Jenkinson's Selected Writings (p. 341), c ited ear l i er . Accordingly, a double c i ta t ion to the same art ic le seems both useful and necessary. " i n t e n d e d uses" o f t h i n g s , because the concept i s ambiguous. Jenkin s o n ' s r a b b i t - f r o m - a - h a t analogy — t o which he l i k e n s S c h e l l e n b e r g ' s d e f i n i t i o n o f a r c h i v e s as r e c o r d s used f o r purposes o t h e r than those f o r which they were f i r s t used — assumes t h a t "intended uses" r e f e r s o n l y t o the o r i g i n a l i n t e n t i o n . Hats are o r i g i n a l l y made t o be worn, and we f i n d i t d i f f i c u l t t o imagine any oth e r use t h a t might f i t t i n g l y be made p a r t o f t h e i r d e f i n i t i o n . But the use o r i g i n a l l y i n t e n d e d i s not always the o n l y l e g i t i m a t e "intended" use. S c h e l l e n b e r g c o u l d , q u i t e l o g i c a l l y , r e p l y t h a t a r c h i v e s are not so much l i k e h ats as l i k e an o l d p a i r o f b l u e j e a n s ; they may no l o n g e r be f i t f o r wearing, but may s t i l l be used f o r ra g s . In so r e p l y i n g , he would simply be p o i n t i n g out t h a t the intended uses of some t h i n g s can change over time. And i t i s h i s b e l i e f t h a t r e c o r d s are e x a c t l y t h a t s o r t o f t h i n g . They may be intended t o be used f i r s t o f a l l f o r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e purposes by those who c r e a t e d them, he would urge, but a f t e r they have served those purposes the equation of f i r s t use w i t h intended use no l o n g e r a p p l i e s . For i t i s t h e i r second use by s c h o l a r s — v e r y much "int e n d e d " — t h a t i n f a c t p r o v i d e s them w i t h t h e i r a r c h i v a l q u a l i t y . By thus c l a r i f y i n g , o r a t l e a s t r e s t a t i n g , h i s p o s i t i o n , S c h e l l e n b e r g would show t h a t Jenkinson begs the q u e s t i o n . That i s , J e n k i n s o n assumes, i n h i s n o t i o n o f intended use, an answer t o the q u e s t i o n a t i s s u e ; namely, which p o s s i b l e " i n t e n d e d " use o f r e c o r d s — o r i g i n a l o r secondary — p r o v i d e s 56 the b e s t d e f i n i t i o n of a r c h i v e s ? He assumes i n h i s f o r m u l a t i o n o f the q u e s t i o n (the r a b b i t - f r o m - a - h a t analogy) t h a t the o r i g i n a l use i s the o n l y p o s s i b l e way of t a l k i n g about "i n t e n d e d " use, and t h e r e f o r e does not a l l o w S c h e l l e n b e r g a chance. The game i s won b e f o r e i t i s ever p l a y e d , because Je n k i n s o n does not argue d i r e c t l y a g a i n s t S c h e l l e n b e r g 1 s c l a i m . He assumes, r a t h e r , i n h i s f o r m u l a t i o n of the q u e s t i o n , t h a t h i s i s the o n l y p o s s i b l e answer. Jenkin s o n ' s counter-argument i s t h e r e f o r e flawed, and decides n o t h i n g . 7 6 I t has been seen so f a r t h a t S c h e l l e n b e r g 1 s u n t r a d i t i o n a l d e f i n i t i o n o f a r c h i v e s i s n e i t h e r r e f u t e d by Jenkinson's counter-argument nor supported by the arguments o f f e r e d i n i t s favour, though i t s t i l l remains c o n c e i v a b l y t r u e on p u r e l y l o g i c a l grounds. 7 7 I t might seem n a t u r a l t o proceed by a s k i n g d i r e c t l y whether S c h e l l e n b e r g ' s d e f i n i t i o n i s i n f a c t 7 6 Arguments formulated i n the heat of b a t t l e are often s i m i l a r l y flawed. For example, two recent arguments seeking to undermine the view that archives can be defined by the s c h o l a r l y uses to which they can be put also beg the question at issue. Both authors assume i n t h e i r premises that things cannot be defined according to the c r i t e r i o n of use (taking a s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t l i n e of attack from Jenkinson, although toward the same end). But things l i k e hats, blue jeans, rags, and tools of a l l sorts can c l e a r l y be so defined. The question that these authors beg i s : are archives i n f a c t things that can or cannot be defined by t h e i r uses? See Eastwood, "Nurturing A r c h i v a l Education," p. 234; and Trevor L i v e l t o n , "Some Thoughts on the A r c h i v a l Function and Method, With a Note on Their Rel a t i o n to the Arsenal of the Forum" (term paper for ARST 500, School of Library, A r c h i v a l and Information Studies, U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, September 1988), pp. 4-6. 7 7 This l o g i c also holds f o r Jenkinson's counter-argument. His question-begging does not demonstrate h i s point, but neither does i t show that he i s wrong, l e t alone that Schellenberg i s therefore r i g h t . Once again, bad reasons can be given for a true proposition. 57 t r u e o r f a l s e , e s p e c i a l l y on the assumption t h a t i f S c h e l l e n b e r g • s d e f i n i t i o n i s r i g h t then Jenkinson's must be wrong and v i c e v e r s a . But such a procedure would i l l serve the d i s c u s s i o n , because i t i n v o l v e s two f a l s e assumptions. F i r s t , t h a t the two d e f i n i t i o n s are m u t u a l l y e x c l u s i v e by n e c e s s i t y — t h a t o n l y one can be t r u e and the o t h e r must be f a l s e . And, second, t h a t i t s t r u t h i s a s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n f o r a c c e p t i n g one d e f i n i t i o n over another. A b r i e f examination of these assumptions w i l l p o i n t toward a more s a t i s f a c t o r y method of c o n t i n u i n g the d i s c u s s i o n of S c h e l l e n b e r g ' s s p l i t between a r c h i v e s and r e c o r d s . The assumption, f i r s t , t h a t the d e f i n i t i o n s are mutually e x c l u s i v e by n e c e s s i t y i s f a l s e because more than one d e f i n i t i o n o f a t h i n g can be t r u e . T h i s i s not t o suggest t h a t t r u t h i s r e l a t i v e , but t h a t the world i s complex. The t h i n g d e f i n e d possesses many q u a l i t i e s , a t t r i b u t e s , o r t r a i t s t h a t may be emphasized or i g n o r e d by d i f f e r e n t d e f i n i t i o n s of i t , and the d e f i n i t i o n s w i l l a l l be t r u e so l o n g as they p o i n t t o a c t u a l t r a i t s . A c a t , f o r example, can be d e f i n e d both as "a f u r r y independent pet t h a t mews" and as "a domesticated c a r n i v o r o u s mammal w i t h r e t r a c t i l e c l a w s . " 7 8 Both are t r u e statements because both p o i n t t o a c t u a l q u a l i t i e s . In t h i s sense, both S c h e l l e n b e r g ' s and Jenkinson's d e f i n i t i o n s are t r u e . Jenkinson's d e f i n i t i o n of a r c h i v e s , l i k e S c h e l l e n b e r g ' s 7 8 Funk & Waenalls Standard College Dictionary. 1974 Canadian ed., s.v. "Cat." 58 o f r e c o r d s , emphasizes the o r i g i n a l use and p r e s e r v a t i o n of documents, whereas S c h e l l e n b e r g ' s emphasizes t h e i r s e l e c t i o n and secondary use — and a l l o f these q u a l i t i e s can be p r e d i c a t e d o f the documents i n q u e s t i o n . 7 9 The assumption, second, t h a t i t s t r u t h alone i s a s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n f o r a c c e p t i n g one d e f i n i t i o n over another i s a l s o f a l s e , because d e f i n i t i o n s can have d i f f e r e n t c ontexts d e r i v i n g from the purposes f o r which they a re framed. There i s a t times a temptation t o simply i n s i s t t h a t one d e f i n i t i o n o r another c a p t u r e s what A r i s t o t l e c a l l s t he "essence" o f the t h i n g d e f i n e d , and i s t h e r e f o r e the r e a l o r the t r u e r d e f i n i t i o n . 8 0 However, a t t r i b u t e s e s s e n t i a l f o r one purpose o f d e f i n i n g a t h i n g a re not e s s e n t i a l f o r o t h e r purposes. For example, the e s s e n t i a l q u a l i t i e s o f a c a t , as d e f i n e d f o r everyday purposes, would l i k e l y i n c l u d e the f a c t t h a t c a t s are pe t s , t h a t they are independent, and t h a t they mew. By c o n t r a s t , the e s s e n t i a l q u a l i t i e s o f a c a t , as d e f i n e d f o r the purpose o f d e v e l o p i n g a z o o l o g i c a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n scheme, would l i k e l y i n c l u d e the f a c t t h a t c a t s are mammals, t h a t they are " c a r n i v o r e s , t h a t they have r e t r a c t i l e claws, and t h a t they 7 9 The expression "Jenkinson's definition" is meant to refer to what has here been cal led the tradit ional view of archives, not Jenkinson's own formulation of i t . His view that unbroken custody is essential to the def init ion of archives was direct ly attacked by Schellenberg (Modern Archives, pp. 14-15); and, while the controversy is of interest in i ts own right , i t is irrelevant to the present discussion, and is best ignored. In the present context, Jenkinson is but a symbol for the widely held view against which Schellenberg argues. 8 0 Cohen and Nagel, An Introduction to L o g i c , p. 235. 59 a r e domesticated. Moreover, each of these t r u e d e f i n i t i o n s i s more a c c e p t a b l e than the o t h e r i n i t s own c o n t e x t . And i t f o l l o w s t h a t i f two d e f i n i t i o n s e x i s t w i t h i n the same context — are both, f o r i n s t a n c e , c o n s t r u c t e d f o r the purpose of d e v e l o p i n g a z o o l o g i c a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n scheme — then one i s more a c c e p t a b l e than the o t h e r t o the degree t h a t i t b e t t e r s u i t s t h a t c o n t e x t . One can t h e r e f o r e say t h a t the t r u t h of a d e f i n i t i o n i s a necessary, not a s u f f i c i e n t , c o n d i t i o n f o r i t s acceptance over another. To be accepted over another, a d e f i n i t i o n must not o n l y be t r u e but a l s o more s u i t a b l e i n a g i v e n c o n t e x t , which d e r i v e s from the purpose f o r which i t i s framed. Assuming, then, t h a t the b e s t procedure f o r examining a d e f i n i t i o n i s t o ask whether i t i s both t r u e and s u i t a b l e i n i t s c o n t e x t , the d i s c u s s i o n of S c h e l l e n b e r g ' s s p l i t between a r c h i v e s and r e c o r d s can be f u r t h e r e d a c c o r d i n g l y . F i r s t of a l l , S c h e l l e n b e r g ' s u n t r a d i t i o n a l d e f i n i t i o n i s , as noted, t r u e . Both o f the a t t r i b u t e s t h a t he emphasizes — s e l e c t i o n and secondary use — can be p r e d i c a t e d of the documents i n q u e s t i o n . Jenkinson, f o r i n s t a n c e , accepts these as a c t u a l t r a i t s , a l t h o u g h he does o b j e c t t o S c h e l l e n b e r g ' s emphasizing them. The main q u e s t i o n about S c h e l l e n b e r g ' s d e f i n i t i o n of a r c h i v e s i s how w e l l i t s u i t s i t s c o n t e x t . T h i s n o t i o n of a d e f i n i t i o n ' s c o n t e x t , as p o i n t e d out, d e r i v e s from the purpose f o r which i t i s intended, and should not be equated w i t h the aim o r purpose o f the person who f i r s t framed the d e f i n i t i o n . 60 S c h e l l e n b e r g ' s s t a t e d aim, as suggested e a r l i e r , was t o d e f i n e the a r c h i v i s t as the p r o f e s s i o n a l r e s p o n s i b l e f o r s e l e c t i n g documents, mainly f o r s c h o l a r l y r e s e a r c h , i n or d e r t o c o n t r o l the b u l k o f r e c e n t m a t e r i a l . 8 1 However, the degree t o which h i s d e f i n i t i o n may have served t h a t aim i s i r r e l e v a n t t o the pr e s e n t d i s c u s s i o n , f o r the co n t e x t here i s a r c h i v a l theory. The attempt here i s t o p r o v i d e a t h e o r e t i c a l account of the nature o f a r c h i v e s , and S c h e l l e n b e r g 1 s d e f i n i t i o n must t h e r e f o r e be examined t o f i n d out how s a t i s f a c t o r y a t h e o r e t i c a l account i t p r o v i d e s . 8 2 An i d e a l t h e o r e t i c a l account i n any f i e l d o f knowledge i n v o l v e s s e v e r a l elements, and any g i v e n b i t o f th e o r y comes c l o s e r t o t h a t i d e a l as i t embodies them. One of those elements, and the o n l y one needing mention f o r now, i s the i d e a l o f s i m p l i c i t y . T h i s concept, otherwise known as Ockham's Razor o r the P r i n c i p l e o f Parsimony, can be s t a t e d i n s e v e r a l ways. As a maxim, i t reads: " e n t i t i e s are not t o be m u l t i p l i e d beyond n e c e s s i t y " ; "what can be done w i t h fewer i s done i n v a i n w i t h more"; " m u l t i p l i c i t y i s not t o be assumed 8 1 Schellenberg, Modern Archives. pp. 15-16. 8 2 It can be urged, in l ight of the view of archival theory underlying this thesis, that the def init ion of a l l basic concepts must f ina l ly have a purely theoretical context because, as argued ear l ier , a l l aspects of archival methodology, practice, and scholarship follow from the fundamental concepts that archivists adopt and the analyses they make of them. In other words, whatever aims underlie a particular definit ion of a basic concept, the ultimate jus t i f i ca t ion of that definit ion must be theoretical . With regard to the def init ion of basic concepts, not a l l contexts are equal. Although this be l ie f l i es in the background here, a softer argument has been used in the text, for a broadax need not be employed where a paring knife w i l l do. 61 without n e c e s s i t y . " 8 3 I t i s the p r i n c i p l e by which s c i e n t i s t s p r e f e r the more " e l e g a n t " o f two t h e o r i e s t h a t f u l l y account f o r the same phenomena — the one w i t h the fewest assumptions, or t h a t makes the fewest moves i n i t s argument. 8 4 A p p l i e d t o the pr e s e n t d i s c u s s i o n , the p r i n c i p l e of s i m p l i c i t y can be s t a t e d as f o l l o w s : i f two d e f i n i t i o n s f u l l y account f o r the same phenomena, the one t h a t does so by r e l y i n g on the fewest assumptions p r o v i d e s the b e t t e r t h e o r e t i c a l account. As shown, S c h e l l e n b e r g f i r s t d e f i n e s r e c o r d s i n terms v i r t u a l l y i d e n t i c a l w i t h the t r a d i t i o n a l d e f i n i t i o n of a r c h i v e s , assuming t h a t both cover the same ground. He then t a k e s the f u r t h e r s t e p o f r e - d e f i n i n g a r c h i v e s , c l a i m i n g t h a t h i s d e f i n i t i o n takes account of two r e c e n t phenomena t h a t the 8 3 William L. Reese, Dictionary of Philosophy and Rel i g i o n : Eastern  and Western Thought ( A t l a n t i c Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1980), s.v. "William of Ockham (8)." For a d e t a i l e d discussion of what the term "simple" means i n t h i s context, and f o r examples of fa l s e s i m p l i c i t y , see Cohen and Nagel, An Introduction to Logic. pp. 212-15, 384-88. 8 4 Cohen, Reason and Nature. pp. 106-114. Cohen discusses s i m p l i c i t y as an element of the broader i d e a l of system, according to which, i d e a l l y , any given b i t of theory i s l o g i c a l l y connected to every other b i t of theory i n the same f i e l d of knowledge, a l l of them together forming a cohesive and comprehensive whole - - a system. He suggests, however, that even a syllogism can be considered a l o g i c a l system of sorts, which implies that the i d e a l of system and the p r i n c i p l e of s i m p l i c i t y can be applied both to the whole of a f i e l d of knowledge and to i t s parts. Considering the c e n t r a l i t y of the d e f i n i t i o n of archives to the f i e l d of a r c h i v a l studies -- considering, that i s , how wide-ranging are the implications f o r the whole, depending on how t h i s c e n t r a l part i s framed -- there has been no h e s i t a t i o n here to apply the p r i n c i p l e of s i m p l i c i t y d i r e c t l y to the d e f i n i t i o n of archives, rather than take the c i r c u i t o u s route of f i r s t discussing the i d e a l of system i n r e l a t i o n to a r c h i v a l studies as a whole. 6 2 t r a d i t i o n a l d e f i n i t i o n i g n o r e s : f i r s t , the s e l e c t i o n of documents f o r co n t i n u e d p r e s e r v a t i o n by the a r c h i v i s t ; and, second, the use of those s e l e c t e d documents by persons other than those who f i r s t accumulated them i n the course o f t h e i r d a i l y b u s i n e s s . However, a c l o s e r l o o k w i l l show t h a t the t r a d i t i o n a l d e f i n i t i o n i s i n f a c t powerful enough t o account f o r both s e l e c t i o n and secondary use, a t l e a s t g i v e n a l i b e r a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h a t d e f i n i t i o n . S i n c e S c h e l l e n b e r g • s d e f i n i t i o n o f r e c o r d s i s v i r t u a l l y i d e n t i c a l w i t h the t r a d i t i o n a l d e f i n i t i o n o f a r c h i v e s , and has a l r e a d y been analysed, i t may be used as a convenient model f o r r e v i e w i n g the t r a d i t i o n a l concept o f a r c h i v e s . 8 5 As noted e a r l i e r , S c h e l l e n b e r g ' s d e f i n i t i o n o f r e c o r d s c o n t a i n s two three-element components d e a l i n g w i t h the a c t i v i t y , the agent, and the purpose o f both c r e a t i o n and p r e s e r v a t i o n . Moreover, the t h r e e - p a r t component d e a l i n g w i t h p r e s e r v a t i o n i s p a r a l l e l e d i n h i s d e f i n i t i o n o f a r c h i v e s . As w e l l , h i s d e f i n i t i o n o f a r c h i v e s r e f e r s t o r e c o r d s "adjudged worthy" of permanent p r e s e r v a t i o n , a phrase excluded from but i m p l i c i t i n t he p a r a l l e l component of h i s d e f i n i t i o n o f r e c o r d s . 8 6 Now, i f the n o t i o n o f judgment i s i m p l i c i t i n the idea of t h i s f i r s t p r e s e r v a t i o n — i f , t h a t i s , a moment of judgment e x i s t s between the moments of c r e a t i o n and p r e s e r v a t i o n i n a 8 5 Schellenberg's def init ion of records is discussed above at pp. 36-38. 8 6 These paral le ls between Schellenberg's definitions of records and archives are described at pp. 41-43 above. document's o f f i c e o f o r i g i n — then the o r i g i n a l p r e s e r v a t i o n of a r c h i v e s as t r a d i t i o n a l l y d e f i n e d l o g i c a l l y i m p l i e s t h a t the documents have been s e l e c t e d f o r p r e s e r v a t i o n i n the o f f i c e o f o r i g i n . Between the judgment t h a t a document i s worthy o f p r e s e r v a t i o n and the d e c i s i o n t o p r e s e r v e i t must come a moment when t h a t judgment i s confirmed. And t h a t c o n f i r m a t i o n i m p l i e s s e l e c t i o n . T h i s apparent d i s c o v e r y , however, i s l i t t l e more than an exposure o f the l o g i c u n d e r g i r d i n g a c l a i m once made by Jenk i n s o n . As he put i t , "every document which i s pr e s e r v e d has been s u b j e c t t o [ s e l e c t i o n ] a t some stage (or even some stages) i n i t s e a r l y c a r e e r when f o r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e reasons i t was consigned t o the f i l e as an a l t e r n a t i v e t o the waste-paper b a s k e t . " 8 7 S i n c e s e l e c t i o n f o r p r e s e r v a t i o n thus takes p l a c e i n the o f f i c e where documents o r i g i n a t e , the element of s e l e c t i o n i n S c h e l l e n b e r g • s d e f i n i t i o n o f a r c h i v e s i s c l e a r l y not i n i t s e l f what s e t s i t a p a r t from the t r a d i t i o n a l d e f i n i t i o n (or h i s own d e f i n i t i o n o f records) . What i n f a c t s e t s i t a p a r t are answers t o t h r e e q u e s t i o n s t h a t sharpen the u n q u a l i f i e d n o t i o n of s e l e c t i o n : (1) By whom are the documents s e l e c t e d , the c r e a t o r o r the a r c h i v i s t ? (2) For whom are they s e l e c t e d , the c r e a t o r o r the r e s e a r c h e r ? (3) For what purpose are they s e l e c t e d , a d m i n i s t r a t i v e o r c u l t u r a l ? 8 8 These t h r e e 8 7 Jenkinson, "Modern Archives, " in his Selected Writings, pp. 340-41. 8 8 These three elements refine the three-part structure of the preservation component of Schellenberg's definitions of records and archives: ac t iv i ty , agent, and purpose. This component having been 64 q u e s t i o n s , c l o s e l y bound t o one another, are brought t o g e t h e r i m p l i c i t l y i n S c h e l l e n b e r g ' s d e f i n i t i o n s o f r e c o r d s and a r c h i v e s . 8 9 With r e c o r d s , on the one hand, (1) the c r e a t o r s e l e c t s (2) f o r h i s own (3) a d m i n i s t r a t i v e use. With a r c h i v e s , on the o t h e r hand, (1) the a r c h i v i s t s e l e c t s (2) f o r r e s e a r c h e r s ' (3) c u l t u r a l use. Because the t h r e e elements i n each d e f i n i t i o n are so c l o s e l y bound t o one another, i t w i l l be b e s t t o examine them i n a way t h a t c o v e r s them a l l a t the same time. T h i s can be done by f i r s t r e c a l l i n g t h a t S c h e l l e n b e r g d i s t i n g u i s h e s between two b a s i c s o r t s o f v a l u e a c c o r d i n g t o which documents are s e l e c t e d f o r p r e s e r v a t i o n — primary and secondary. Though somewhat ambiguous a t times, "primary" f o r S c h e l l e n b e r g g e n e r a l l y means " f i r s t i n time," r e f e r r i n g t o the va l u e s restated as "selection for preservation," the act iv i ty of selection has now been divided into (1) the agent, (2) the recipient, and (3) the purpose. This procedure brings together the phenomena of selection by the archivist and use by persons other than the creator, which makes i t possible to view them as complementary aspects of a single phenomenon. It should be noted as well that the dist inct ion between documents selected for temporary or permanent preservation is ignored here, because i t is subordinate to the question of the use or purpose for which they are selected. Documents are preserved for as long as they are of use, whatever that use might be. The term "permanent" is in any case ambiguous, at least without some modifying context. "Permanent" suggests something close to "forever" - - and does this mean u n t i l the universe, our galaxy, our solar system, l i f e on earth, the present geo-polit ical structure, ideological systems, or archival inst i tut ional pol icies cease to exist? Accordingly, as the reader w i l l have noticed, the term "continued" has generally been used throughout this study in preference to "permanent" (cf. James M. O'Toole, "On the Idea of Permanence," American Archivist 52 [Winter 1989]: 10-25). 8 9 He brings them together impl ic i t ly , that i s , in the definitions he offers formally. As pointed out, for instance in note 58 above (p. 44), they would to some extent have been more expl ic i t i f Schellenberg had said what he actually meant. documents have f o r the c r e a t o r i n c a r r y i n g out h i s everyday b u s i n e s s . Primary v a l u e s t h e r e f o r e i n c l u d e such t h i n g s as a d m i n i s t r a t i v e , o p e r a t i o n a l , f i s c a l , and l e g a l v a l u e s . Secondary v a l u e s , by c o n t r a s t , are those t h a t documents have f o r persons o t h e r than those who c r e a t e d them, and who put them t o d i f f e r e n t uses. The two b a s i c k i n d s o f secondary v a l u e are e v i d e n t i a l and i n f o r m a t i o n a l . The former r e f e r s t o documents t h a t p r o v i d e evidence about the s t r u c t u r e of an o r g a n i z a t i o n and the manner i n which i t operated, w h i l e the l a t t e r r e f e r s t o i n f o r m a t i o n i n the documents about persons, t h i n g s , and phenomena. 9 0 S c h e l l e n b e r g would say, then, t h a t whereas r e c o r d s a re s e l e c t e d f o r p r e s e r v a t i o n by the c r e a t o r f o r h i s own a d m i n i s t r a t i v e use because o f t h e i r primary v a l u e s , a r c h i v e s a re s e l e c t e d by the a r c h i v i s t f o r r e s e a r c h e r s ' c u l t u r a l use because o f t h e i r secondary v a l u e s . Looking a t S c h e l l e n b e r g ' s d e f i n i t i o n s o f re c o r d s and a r c h i v e s w i t h these d i s t i n c t i o n s between d i f f e r e n t k i n d s of v a l u e i n mind, one n o t i c e s s e v e r a l t h i n g s . F i r s t o f a l l , i t i s e v i d e n t t h a t no a b s o l u t e temporal d i s t i n c t i o n e x i s t s between documents s e l e c t e d by the c r e a t o r f o r h i s own a d m i n i s t r a t i v e use and those s e l e c t e d by the a r c h i v i s t f o r r e s e a r c h e r s ' c u l t u r a l use. That i s , no date l i n e can be drawn b e f o r e which documents have o n l y primary v a l u e s and a f t e r which they have o n l y secondary v a l u e s . S c h e l l e n b e r g draws the 9 0 T.R. Schellenberg, The Appraisal of Modern Public Records (Washington, D . C : National Archives of the United States, Bul let in No. 8, 1956), pp. 6-7. d i s t i n c t i o n between primary and secondary v a l u e s a b i t too s h a r p l y i n a r g u i n g t h a t secondary v a l u e s " i n h e r e i n p u b l i c r e c o r d s a f t e r t h e i r primary v a l u e s have been exhausted." 9 1 Documents such as c h a r t e r s , c o n s t i t u t i o n s , and bylaws, f o r example, though no doubt a s m a l l percentage o f the whole, l o s e t h e i r primary v a l u e o n l y when the o r g a n i z a t i o n ceases t o e x i s t . 9 2 B e a r i n g i n mind S c h e l l e n b e r g 1 s d i s t i n c t i o n between the d i f f e r e n t v a l u e s o f documents, one a l s o n o t i c e s t h a t no a b s o l u t e d i s t i n c t i o n e x i s t s between the u s e r s o f documents. Although the a d m i n i s t r a t o r may be most concerned w i t h primary v a l u e s and the s c h o l a r w i t h i n f o r m a t i o n a l v a l u e s , both are concerned w i t h e v i d e n t i a l v a l u e s . As S c h e l l e n b e r g h i m s e l f p o i n t s out, the s c h o l a r may use the documents t o w r i t e a h i s t o r y o f the o r g a n i z a t i o n , w h i l e the a d m i n i s t r a t o r may use them t o r e c a l l precedents, s o l v e problems, p r o v i d e c o n t i n u i t y , and prove h i s " f a i t h f u l stewardship o f the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s d e l e g a t e d " t o him. 9 3 Another t h i n g one n o t i c e s , and i t r e l a t e s t o both the 9 1 Schellenberg, "Principles of Archival Appraisal ," in Modern  Archives Administration, ed. Walne, p. 236. 9 2 Maygene F. Daniels, "Records Appraisal and Disposition," in Managing Archives and Archival Institutions, ed. James Gregory Bradsher (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), p. 61. Bodies of documents that were accumulated in the course of business by defunct organizations and have been acquired by a repository are of course unlikely to have any primary values. The discussion here, in l ine with Schellenberg, relates to an ongoing concern. 9 3 Schellenberg, Modern Archives. p. 140. f o r e g o i n g o b s e r v a t i o n s , i s t h a t documents have both primary and secondary v a l u e s from the moment of c r e a t i o n . N e i t h e r of S c h e l l e n b e r g ' s d i s t i n c t i o n s — the temporal one and the one between u s e r s — takes i n t o account the f a c t t h a t secondary v a l u e s e x i s t f o r j o u r n a l i s t s , s c h o l a r s , and c i t i z e n s l o n g b e f o r e documents are t r a n s f e r r e d , i f a t a l l , t o an a r c h i v a l r e p o s i t o r y . In f a c t , the j o u r n a l i s t ' s hunger f o r a "scoop," l i k e t he concerned c i t i z e n ' s w a t c h f u l eye, amply demonstrates t h a t documents are laden w i t h p o t e n t i a l evidence and i n f o r m a t i o n f o r such groups from the v e r y moment they are c r e a t e d o r r e c e i v e d . T h i s i s not t o say t h a t these groups are n e c e s s a r i l y i n a p o s i t i o n t o e x p l o i t those secondary v a l u e s . A f t e r a l l , numerous r e s t r i c t i o n s can e x i s t on access t o documents t r a n s f e r r e d t o an a r c h i v a l r e p o s i t o r y , l e t alone those s t i l l used f o r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e purposes i n the o f f i c e o f o r i g i n . The p o i n t i s not t h a t these groups can e x p l o i t those v a l u e s . The p o i n t , r a t h e r , i s t h a t they c o u l d do so, g i v e n a l i b e r a l enough ac c e s s p o l i c y , because secondary v a l u e s do e x i s t p o t e n t i a l l y from the moment of a document's c r e a t i o n or r e c e i p t , i f not sooner. These i n h e r e n t secondary v a l u e s may have been l e s s e v i d e n t when S c h e l l e n b e r g wrote i n 1956 than they are today. A f t e r a l l , now t h a t access t o i n f o r m a t i o n laws acknowledge the r i g h t of c i t i z e n s t o c o n s u l t c e r t a i n documents s t i l l i n use by a d m i n i s t r a t o r s , we are b e g i n n i n g t o witness i n p r a c t i c e the 68 e x p l o i t a t i o n o f secondary v a l u e s t h a t e x i s t whether or not the documents are r o u t i n e l y open t o i n s p e c t i o n . C l e a r l y , time and circumstance a re not n e c e s s a r i l y the t h e o r i s t ' s a l l i e s . For, w h i l e the d i v i s i o n between primary and secondary v a l u e s has always been t h e o r e t i c a l l y tenuous, though never noted as such, i t i s now coming t o be r e c o g n i z e d as " d e c i d e d l y f u z z y " even i n p r a c t i c e . 9 * Three main o b s e r v a t i o n s have been made so f a r r e g a r d i n g S c h e l l e n b e r g ' s d i s t i n c t i o n s between (a) r e c o r d s s e l e c t e d f o r p r e s e r v a t i o n by the c r e a t o r f o r h i s own a d m i n i s t r a t i v e use because of t h e i r primary v a l u e s and (b) a r c h i v e s s e l e c t e d by the a r c h i v i s t f o r r e s e a r c h e r s ' c u l t u r a l use because of t h e i r secondary v a l u e s . F i r s t , the a r c h i v i s t i s charged wi t h the p r e s e r v a t i o n o f some documents w i t h a d m i n i s t r a t i v e v a l u e t o the c r e a t o r . Second, both c r e a t o r and r e s e a r c h e r e x p l o i t e v i d e n t i a l v a l u e s , the former f o r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and the l a t t e r f o r c u l t u r a l reasons. And, t h i r d , a l l documents used by the c r e a t o r f o r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e purposes have secondary v a l u e s f o r r e s e a r c h e r s and c i t i z e n s . A f u r t h e r o b s e r v a t i o n a l s o f o l l o w s from the secondary v a l u e s i n h e r i n g i n documents from the moment of c r e a t i o n ; namely, t h a t the a r c h i v i s t ' s s e l e c t i o n o f documents f o r continued p r e s e r v a t i o n i s not the c r i t i c a l f a c t o r i n det e r m i n i n g which documents wit h secondary 9* Jay Atherton, "From Life Cycle to Continuum: Some Thoughts on the Records Management-Archives Relationship," Archivaria 21 (Winter 1985-86) : 47. 69 v a l u e s w i l l i n f a c t become e x p l o i t a b l e by r e s e a r c h e r s or when. For i t i s a matter of law or i n s t i t u t i o n a l p o l i c y whether or not documents s t i l l i n use f o r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e purposes by the c r e a t o r may a l s o be e x p l o i t e d f o r t h e i r secondary v a l u e s by o t h e r s , and when. S c h e l l e n b e r g ' s d i s t i n c t i o n between r e c o r d s and a r c h i v e s can d o u b t l e s s be m o d i f i e d and q u a l i f i e d enough t o i n c o r p o r a t e these o b s e r v a t i o n s , j u s t as medieval astronomers c o u l d add e p i c y c l e s t o the Ptolomaic system i n o r d e r t o save the appearances. None the l e s s , the same r e s u l t can be achieved more simply by making t h r e e s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d moves: (1) s e t t i n g a s i d e S c h e l l e n b e r g ' s i d i o s y n c r a t i c d e f i n i t i o n o f a r c h i v e s ; (2) e q u a t i n g h i s d e f i n i t i o n o f r e c o r d s , i n broad o u t l i n e , w i t h the t r a d i t i o n a l d e f i n i t i o n o f a r c h i v e s ; and (3) r e s t a t i n g the t r a d i t i o n a l d e f i n i t i o n o f a r c h i v e s as "documents made or r e c e i v e d i n the course of the conduct of a f f a i r s and p r e s e r v e d . " S e l e c t i o n , as has been seen, i s i m p l i c i t i n the n o t i o n of p r e s e r v a t i o n . And, by l e a v i n g i t i m p l i c i t — t h a t i s , by r e f r a i n i n g from q u a l i f y i n g the n o t i o n of p r e s e r v a t i o n — t h i s r e f o r m u l a t i o n of the t r a d i t i o n a l d e f i n i t i o n can accommodate, a l b e i t t a c i t l y , both the " r e c o r d s " and the " a r c h i v e s " s i d e s of S c h e l l e n b e r g ' s d i s t i n c t i o n s between the agents, the r e c i p i e n t s , and the purposes o f s e l e c t i o n f o r p r e s e r v a t i o n . More c o u l d be s a i d a t t h i s p o i n t about the g r e a t e r s i m p l i c i t y , f l e x i b i l i t y , and t h e o r e t i c a l p o t e n t i a l t h a t t h i s v e r s i o n o f the t r a d i t i o n a l d e f i n i t i o n has i n comparison with S c h e l l e n b e r g • s s p l i t between a r c h i v e s and r e c o r d s . However, i t s h o u l d s u f f i c e t o note two f u r t h e r c o r o l l a r i e s o f h i s s e p a r a t i o n o f the one from the ot h e r . F i r s t o f a l l , c o n s i d e r the r e s u l t s f o r a r c h i v a l s t u d i e s . Given S c h e l l e n b e r g 1 s d e f i n i t i o n s , a r c h i v a l s t u d i e s s p l i t s i n t o two s o r t s o f study — a r c h i v a l s t u d i e s and r e c o r d s t u d i e s . Major components of a r c h i v a l s t u d i e s would go t o both of these areas, although a r c h i v a l s t u d i e s would be i n some important r e s p e c t s s u b o r d i n a t e t o and dependent on r e c o r d s t u d i e s . For example, a r c h i v a l s t u d i e s would embody the theory, methodology, and p r a c t i c e o f a p p r a i s a l , r e f e r e n c e , and prob a b l y a c q u i s i t i o n and a c c e s s i o n i n g — a l l d e r i v i n g from the d e f i n i t i o n o f a r c h i v e s . But some major p o r t i o n s o f what was a r c h i v a l s t u d i e s would s h i f t t o r e c o r d s t u d i e s . Among o t h e r t h i n g s , the t h e o r e t i c a l component o f r e c o r d s t u d i e s would i n c l u d e a l l a n a l y s e s o f the q u a l i t i e s i n h e r i n g i n bodies o f documents from the circu m s t a n c e s o f t h e i r o r i g i n a l accumulation and p r e s e r v a t i o n , such as i m p a r t i a l i t y , a u t h e n t i c i t y , n a t u r a l n e s s , and i n t e r r e l a t e d n e s s — a l l o f which d e r i v e from the d e f i n i t i o n o f r e c o r d s . A c c o r d i n g l y , the p r i n c i p l e s o f provenance and o r i g i n a l order, which are fundamental t o a r c h i v i s t s ' methodology f o r a r r a n g i n g and d e s c r i b i n g documents and d e r i v e from the t h e o r e t i c a l a n a l y s i s o f r e c o r d s , would have no b a s i s i n a r c h i v a l t h e o r y . In o t h e r words, the fundamental m e t h o d o l o g i c a l p r i n c i p l e s u n d e r l y i n g arrangement and d e s c r i p t i o n , o f t e n regarded as the h e a r t of a r c h i v i s t s ' p r a c t i c a l work, would p r o p e r l y form p a r t of the separate s c i e n c e o r d i s c i p l i n e of r e c o r d s t u d i e s — even though formulated, e l a b o r a t e d t h e o r e t i c a l l y , and used e x c l u s i v e l y by a r c h i v i s t s . The o t h e r c o r o l l a r y of the s p l i t between a r c h i v e s and r e c o r d s i s t h a t the concept (or concepts) r e p r e s e n t e d by these terms — the b a s i c t h e o r e t i c a l c o n s t r u c t o f a r c h i v a l s t u d i e s (or r e c o r d s t u d i e s , or both) — becomes l e s s s t a b l e , g i v e n S c h e l l e n b e r g • s d e f i n i t i o n of a r c h i v e s . T h i s i n s t a b i l i t y can be seen from s e v e r a l a n g l e s . For one t h i n g , i f secondary use i s a primary element i n the d e f i n i t i o n o f a r c h i v e s , then a r c h i v e s have o n l y e x i s t e d d u r i n g the n i n e t e e n t h and t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r i e s , c o l l a t e r a l l y w i t h the development of modern documentary h i s t o r y , and o n l y i n those p l a c e s where such uses of documents are c o n s i d e r e d primary. A c c o r d i n g l y , none of the documents accumulated i n the course o f i t s b u s i n e s s and p r e s e r v e d by the U n i t e d S t a t e s Government were a r c h i v e s u n t i l a t l e a s t the c r e a t i o n i n 1934 o f the N a t i o n a l A r c h i v e s , from which time we may date t h e i r p r e s e r v a t i o n f o r s c h o l a r l y use, as opposed t o t h e i r i n c i d e n t a l p r i o r p r e s e r v a t i o n by b u r e a u c r a t s . But t h i s i s not completely a c c u r a t e , f o r one would a l s o have t o say t h a t U n i t e d S t a t e s Government documents gathered by manuscript c o l l e c t o r s and arranged i n a r t i f i c i a l g roupings f o r h i s t o r i c a l r e s e a r c h d u r i n g the l a s t two c e n t u r i e s are a r c h i v e s , a t l e a s t i f p r e s e r v e d i n a r e p o s i t o r y c a l l i n g i t s e l f an a r c h i v e s . I t would a l s o f o l l o w t h a t r e p o s i t o r i e s l i k e t h a t o f the S t a t e o f I l l i n o i s under the d i r e c t i o n o f Margaret Cross Norton which, as mentioned above, kept documents p r i m a r i l y f o r the use o f those who c r e a t e d them, are not a r c h i v a l r e p o s i t o r i e s and do not house a r c h i v e s — even though the m a t e r i a l i n the s t a c k s a t both I l l i n o i s and the N a t i o n a l A r c h i v e s might not t u r n out t o be a l l t h a t d i f f e r e n t i n form and f u n c t i o n . 9 5 As w e l l , the a r c h i v e s a t the N a t i o n a l A r c h i v e s c o u l d a g a i n become r e c o r d s w i t h a change of p o l i c y , as the r e c o r d s o f I l l i n o i s c o u l d become a r c h i v e s i f t h a t i n s t i t u t i o n changed i t s p o l i c y . Given the p r i n c i p l e of s i m p l i c i t y , the ease wi t h which the t r a d i t i o n a l d e f i n i t i o n o f a r c h i v e s can accommodate the phenomenon o f secondary use, and the complexity, i n s t a b i l i t y , and perhaps even c o n t r a d i c t i o n s a r i s i n g from S c h e l l e n b e r g 1 s s p l i t between a r c h i v e s and r e c o r d s , i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o av o i d the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t r e c o r d s a re b e s t d e f i n e d — a t l e a s t f o r purposes o f a r c h i v a l t h e o r y — as a r c h i v e s i n the t r a d i t i o n a l sense: documents made or r e c e i v e d i n the course o f the conduct of a f f a i r s and p r e s e r v e d . 9 6 9 5 Compare Schellenberg, Modern Archives. pp. 139-60 with Norton, Norton on Archives. pp. 239-46. 9 6 Unfortunately, the focus of this study precludes a thorough discussion of the nature of records, which warrants an entire study in i ts own right - - at the very least. In line with the broad theoretical considerations outlined here, this study foregos the examination of important and d i f f i c u l t questions such as the status of electronic arid three-dimensional records in order to draw attention to some overarching considerations. However, i t may be of some use here to at least glance The two main d e f i n i t i o n s o f r e c o r d s f a m i l i a r t o a r c h i v i s t s today h a v i n g been examined, the r e s u l t s can be summarized b r i e f l y by p l a c i n g them w i t h i n the l o g i c a l h i e r a r c h y of a r c h i v a l terms i n t r o d u c e d a t the o u t s e t . At the top of the h i e r a r c h y i s the genus " i n f o r m a t i o n , 1 1 d e f i n e d as " i n t e l l i g e n c e g i v e n . " The o n l y s p e c i e s o f i n f o r m a t i o n c o n s i d e r e d d i r e c t l y i s "documents, 1 1 d i f f e r e n t i a t e d from a l l o t h e r s p e c i e s of i n f o r m a t i o n by having the q u a l i t y o f be i n g "recorded." "Documents" i n t u r n becomes a genus f o r the s p e c i e s of documents c a l l e d " r e c o r d s , " which are d i f f e r e n t i a t e d from a l l o t h e r s p e c i e s o f documents by having the q u a l i t y o f being "made or r e c e i v e d i n the course o f the conduct o f a f f a i r s and pr e s e r v e d " ; t h a t i s , by be i n g " a r c h i v a l " i n the t r a d i t i o n a l s e nse. 9 7 These r e l a t i o n s h i p s a re s e t down g r a p h i c a l l y i n f i g u r e 3 a c c o r d i n g t o a format t r a d i t i o n a l l y known as the Tree at the question of "non-records." From the standpoint of the argument developed so far, i t follows that the dist inct ion sometimes made between records and non-records is generally unwarranted, at least when the latter term is used to denote records used and preserved only temporarily (see Peterson and Peterson, Law, pp. 13-15). There are often d i f f i c u l t decisions to be made about the length of time different records should be kept. But this length of time does not enter into the definit ion of records, which requires only that documents be made or received and preserved, no matter how long. These "non-records" are more properly dubbed "transitory records," as Peterson and Peterson note, and as some organizations have done ( i b i d . , p. 15; Government of Br i t i sh Columbia, Records Management Branch [now part of the B.C. Archives and Records Service], Administrative Records Class i f icat ion System [1987; rev. March 1988], "Special Schedules," pp. 1-12). 9 7 The nature of manuscripts and papers, sometimes distinguished from records or documents, is discussed below at pp. 100-102. o f Porphyry. 74 See Cohen and Nagel, An Introduction to Logic, p. 236. The preceding d i s c u s s i o n would permit one to place " i n t e l l i g e n c e " at the top of the hierarchy i n place of "information," and to divide I t into the d i f f e r e n t i a "given" and "not given." " I n t e l l i g e n c e , " however, has been omitted from f i g u r e 3 to keep the l a t t e r as c l e a r and simple as possible. 75 Summum Genus .INFORMATION D i f f e r e n t i a RECORDED NOT RECORDED S u b a l t e r n Genus DOCUMENTS. D i f f e r e n t i a MADE OR RECEIVED NOT MADE OR RECEIVED Infima S p e c i e s t RECORDS F i g u r e 3. A r c h i v a l Tree o f Porphyry CHAPTER 2 FROM RECORDS TO PUBLIC RECORDS W i t h i n the c o n t e x t of t h i s study, d i s c u s s i o n of the nature of p u b l i c r e c o r d s can most u s e f u l l y b e g i n by p l a c i n g t h a t concept w i t h i n the l o g i c a l h i e r a r c h y of a r c h i v a l terms developed i n the l a s t chapter. Such a b e g i n n i n g w i l l make f o r a f a i r l y a b s t r a c t d i s c u s s i o n , which some read e r s may f i n d t i r e s o m e . However, i n t a k i n g time a t the o u t s e t t o p l a c e the concept of p u b l i c r e c o r d s w i t h i n the h i e r a r c h i c a l s t r u c t u r e developed e a r l i e r , two fundamental and i n t e r r e l a t e d t a c t i c a l o b j e c t i v e s w i l l be gained. F i r s t , by f o c u s i n g on the l o g i c of the concept a t the b eginning, i t should be p o s s i b l e t o f o r e s t a l l t o some extent the p r e s s i n g i n t u i t i v e concerns t h a t a l l a r c h i v i s t s i n e v i t a b l y b r i n g t o such a d i s c u s s i o n , but which may tend t o c l o u d t h a t d i s c u s s i o n i f allowed t o e n t e r i n f u l l f o r c e a t the o u t s e t . Second, i t w i l l be d i s c o v e r e d t h a t the concept of p u b l i c r e c o r d s has l o g i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s which, though g e n e r a l l y overlooked, enable those p r e s s i n g concerns t o be focused more s h a r p l y and c l e a r l y . To b e g i n wit h , i t w i l l be r e c a l l e d t h a t the l a s t chapter ended by p l a c i n g the two senses of the term " r e c o r d s " — as documents and a r c h i v e s — w i t h i n a l o g i c a l h i e r a r c h y of terms c o n s i s t i n g of " i n t e l l i g e n c e , " " i n f o r m a t i o n , " "documents," and " r e c o r d s . " I t w i l l a l s o be r e c a l l e d t h a t the r e l a t i o n s between those terms were drawn out by n o t i n g t h a t , w i t h i n t h i s 76 h i e r a r c h y , a s p e c i f i c a d j e c t i v e - n o u n r e l a t i o n s h i p corresponds t o each species-genus r e l a t i o n s h i p . In p a r t i c u l a r , i t was noted t h a t a s p e c i e s i s d e f i n e d by combining a s p e c i f i c a d j e c t i v e w i t h the noun r e p r e s e n t i n g t h a t s p e c i e s ' genus. Thus, f o r i n s t a n c e , "documents" — as a s p e c i e s of the genus " i n f o r m a t i o n " — was d e f i n e d as "recorded i n f o r m a t i o n . " The a d j e c t i v e "recorded," combined w i t h the noun " i n f o r m a t i o n , " y i e l d e d a f u l l d e f i n i t i o n o f "documents." T h i s combination y i e l d e d such a d e f i n i t i o n because "recorded," while g r a m m a t i c a l l y an a d j e c t i v e , i s a t the same time the l o g i c a l c o n n e c t o r between genus and s p e c i e s ; i t p r o v i d e s the d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g a t t r i b u t e o f the s p e c i e s "documents" t h a t d i s t i n g u i s h e s the l a t t e r from a l l o t h e r s p e c i e s o f the genus " i n f o r m a t i o n . " S i m i l a r l y , a st e p f u r t h e r down the h i e r a r c h y , the noun "documents" was i n t u r n viewed as a genus i n i t s own r i g h t . And t h i s p a r t i c u l a r noun/genus, when combined wi t h the a d j e c t i v e c l a u s e "made or r e c e i v e d i n the conduct of a f f a i r s and p r e s e r v e d , " y i e l d e d the s p e c i e s " r e c o r d s " — the a d j e c t i v e c l a u s e having d i f f e r e n t i a t e d " r e c o r d s " from a l l o t h e r s p e c i e s of the genus "documents." By t h i s method o f r e l a t i n g a d j e c t i v e s and nouns t o s p e c i e s and genera, i t was p o s s i b l e t o move downward through the h i e r a r c h y o f terms, s t e p by step. Each genus was connected w i t h i t s s u b o r d i n a t e s p e c i e s through the i n t e r m e d i a t e s t e p o f combining a s p e c i f i c a d j e c t i v e with the noun r e p r e s e n t i n g t h a t genus. 78 I t s h o u l d not be assumed, however, t h a t the simple f a c t of an a d j e c t i v e - n o u n r e l a t i o n s h i p between the terms " p u b l i c " and " r e c o r d s " n e c e s s a r i l y i m p l i e s the same l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between a s p e c i e s and i t s genus. A d j e c t i v e s and nouns can be r e l a t e d l o g i c a l l y i n more than t h i s one p a r t i c u l a r way — however u s e f u l t h a t r e l a t i o n s h i p may have proved as a means of d e v e l o p i n g the h i e r a r c h y o f a r c h i v a l terms s e t f o r t h i n the l a s t c h a p t e r . In f a c t , by comparing the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the a d j e c t i v e " p u b l i c " and the noun " r e c o r d s " w i t h t h a t o f the species-genus r e l a t i o n s h i p s developed i n the l a s t chapter, i t can be shown t h a t p u b l i c r e c o r d s a re b e s t c o n s i d e r e d , not so much a s p e c i e s , as r a t h e r a subsp e c i e s o r type o f r e c o r d s . R e c a l l t h a t , i n the l a s t chapter, i n f o r m a t i o n was d e f i n e d as i n t e l l i g e n c e g i v e n , documents as recorded i n f o r m a t i o n , and r e c o r d s as documents made o r r e c e i v e d i n the conduct of a f f a i r s and p r e s e r v e d . By so d e f i n i n g these terms, a c o n s i s t e n t c r i t e r i o n f o r d i s t i n g u i s h i n g a s p e c i e s from i t s genus was s e t down. For, when examined, i t w i l l be seen t h a t a l l o f thes e d e f i n i t i o n s r e s t upon the d i s t i n c t i o n between a t h i n g and ah a c t i o n ; or, more p r e c i s e l y , a t h i n g d i f f e r e n t i a t e d from o t h e r s i m i l a r t h i n g s because i t r e s u l t s from a p a r t i c u l a r a c t i o n . A t h i n g , i n f o r m a t i o n , i s d i f f e r e n t i a t e d from o t h e r t h i n g s resembling i t — other s p e c i e s , t h a t i s , o f the genus " i n t e l l i g e n c e " — by the a c t i o n of "being g i v e n . " A t h i n g , documents, i s l i k e w i s e d i s t i n g u i s h e d from o t h e r s i m i l a r t h i n g s — o t h e r s p e c i e s of 79 the genus " i n f o r m a t i o n " — by the a c t i o n of "being recorded." And a t h i n g , r e c o r d s , i s i n the same manner d i s t i n g u i s h e d from o t h e r s resembling i t — o t h e r s p e c i e s o f the genus "documents" — by the a c t i o n o f "being made or r e c e i v e d i n the conduct of a f f a i r s and p r e s e r v e d . " In each of these d e f i n i t i o n s , the q u a l i t y r e p r e s e n t e d by the a d j e c t i v e (as i n "recorded i n f o r m a t i o n , " when d e f i n i n g documents) r e f e r s t o a s p e c i f i c k i n d o f a c t i o n t h a t d i f f e r e n t i a t e s the s p e c i e s i n q u e s t i o n from a l l o t h e r s p e c i e s o f the same genus. However, the same r e l a t i o n s h i p does not h o l d between the a d j e c t i v e " p u b l i c " and the noun " r e c o r d s . " For the conceptual move a s t e p down the h i e r a r c h y from the t h i n g , r e c o r d s , t o the more s p e c i f i c t h i n g , p u b l i c r e c o r d s , does not i n v o l v e an a c t i o n . I n t e l l i g e n c e i s " g i v e n , " i n f o r m a t i o n "recorded," and documents "made or r e c e i v e d i n the conduct o f a f f a i r s and p r e s e r v e d . " But " p u b l i c " i s an a t t r i b u t e which, i n r e l a t i o n t o the a r c h i v a l d e f i n i t i o n o f r e c o r d s , does not r e p r e s e n t a comparative a c t i o n . As i t q u a l i f i e s the a r c h i v a l d e f i n i t i o n o f r e c o r d s , " p u b l i c " r e f e r s r a t h e r t o a k i n d o f person — t o a s p e c i f i c type o f a c t o r r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the a c t i o n o f "making o r r e c e i v i n g ..." the documents d e f i n e d as " r e c o r d s . " In moving from r e c o r d s t o p u b l i c r e c o r d s , i n o t h e r words, a new term has been i n t r o d u c e d t o the d i s c u s s i o n , i n v i t i n g a new q u e s t i o n : who has accomplished the a c t i o n (of "making and r e c e i v i n g ...") t h a t d i s t i n g u i s h e s the t h i n g , r e c o r d s , from o t h e r s p e c i e s o f documents? 80 Before examining why t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n between an a c t i o n and the person who performs i t l e a d s t o vi e w i n g p u b l i c r e c o rds as a s u b s p e c i e s o r type of r e c o r d s , two p r i o r q u e s t i o n s must be addressed: (1) Should the concept o f person be the c r i t e r i o n f o r d i v i d i n g r e c o r d s i n t o p u b l i c r e c o r d s and other r e l a t e d s u b c a t e g o r i e s ? (2) Should the concept o f person be l i m i t e d t o the a c t o r who makes or r e c e i v e s and pres e r v e s documents?" The f i r s t q u e s t i o n r e f e r s t o the s u i t a b i l i t y of the concept o f person i n g e n e r a l as the c r i t e r i o n f o r d i v i s i o n , w h i l e the second q u e s t i o n r e f e r s t o the s u i t a b i l i t y of t he p a r t i c u l a r d e f i n i t i o n o f t h a t concept employed here. Both q u e s t i o n s w i l l be b r i e f l y examined i n t u r n . The f i r s t q u e s t i o n — about whether or not the concept of person s h o u l d be the c r i t e r i o n f o r d i v i d i n g r e c o r d s — hinges 9 9 These questions are prior to the question of the status of "public records" in the hierarchy of terms - - species or subspecies? - - because the formulation of the status question offered here in fact assumes that the answer to both questions is "yes." To speak of "dividing" records refers to what is generally called "logical division" or, more simply, "division." This act iv i ty differs technically from definit ion in that i t involves sp l i t t ing up a given category into i ts various subcategories, as opposed to determining the nature of a given species (or subcategory) by relating i t to i ts genus (or superior category) by means of a differentiating attribute. Whether to speak of dividing records or defining public records, however, is largely a matter of perspective - - which may readily be gained by reflecting br ie f ly on the archival Tree of Porphyry set down in figure 3 above. Since the entire archival hierarchy of terms may, from one perspective, be considered a form of logical divis ion, i t would be possible to speak here of subdividing records into public records and whatever other subcategories may result . However, the neutral term "divide" has none the less been used in the present context. It might also be noted that divis ion can further be distinguished from c lass i f icat ion , by which a number of subcategories are brought together under a superior category. For a discussion of these matters, see Cohen and Nagel, An Introduction  to Logic, pp. 241-44. 81 on the r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h a t concept and the h i e r a r c h y of terms so f a r developed. That h i e r a r c h y forms a l o g i c a l system of terms, each o f them connected t o a l l the o t h e r s as p a r t s of a c o h e s i v e and comprehensive whole. T h e r e f o r e , the q u e s t i o n o f whether o r not the concept o f person i s a s u i t a b l e c r i t e r i o n f o r d i v i d i n g r e c o r d s depends on two t h i n g s : f i r s t , whether t h a t concept i n f a c t f i t s w i t h i n the system; and, second, i f i t does f i t w i t h i n the system as a whole, whether i t f i t s a t t h i s p a r t i c u l a r p l a c e i n the system, t h a t i s , as a s u i t a b l e c r i t e r i o n f o r d i v i d i n g r e c o r d s . C l e a r l y , the concept o f person does f i t w i t h i n the system of terms, f o r i t i s one of the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s t h a t have t a c i t l y been agreed on as r e l e v a n t t o the d e f i n i t i o n o f those terms. I t w i l l be r e c a l l e d , f o r example, from the a n a l y s i s o f S c h e l l e n b e r g 1 s d e f i n i t i o n o f r e c o r d s and the t r a d i t i o n a l d e f i n i t i o n o f a r c h i v e s , t h a t a r c h i v i s t s have s t r e s s e d a t l e a s t f i v e a s p e c t s o f r e c o r d s when d e f i n i n g them: the nature o f the m a t e r i a l , i t s form, the a c t i o n from which i t r e s u l t s , the purpose o f the a c t i o n , and the person who performs t h a t a c t i o n . 1 0 0 Without, f o r the moment, weighing the r e l a t i v e 1 0 0 See pp. 36-40 above. While the elements of the definitions noted here were not exp l i c i t l y set out above, a moment's ref lect ion should demonstrate that these were in fact the elements distinguished. Peterson and Peterson provide a similar analysis of the elements of standard definitions in Law (p. 12), though they do not treat the nature of the material and i t s form as separate elements. The term "form," i t should be noted, is used here as loose shorthand for "physical form," i t s e l f an ambiguous term generally referring to the medium in which a record is embodied. The physical form of a record - -electronic, video, paper, and so on - - may be contrasted with (among other kinds of form) i t s functional form, such as correspondence, minutes, and 82 importance o f these s e v e r a l elements, they may be d i s t i n g u i s h e d by r e p e a t i n g a t r a d i t i o n a l d e f i n i t i o n of a r c h i v e s . As Duchein puts i t , a r c h i v e s are " a l l documents [the nature o f the m a t e r i a l ] o f a l l k i n d s [ i t s form] which accrue n a t u r a l l y and o r g a n i c a l l y as a r e s u l t o f the f u n c t i o n s and a c t i v i t i e s [the a c t i o n from which i t r e s u l t s ] o f any a d m i n i s t r a t i v e o r g a n i z a t i o n , body or i n d i v i d u a l [the person who performs t h a t a c t i o n ] . . . and which are kept f o r r e f e r e n c e purposes [the purpose o f the a c t i o n o f p r e s e r v a t i o n ] . " 1 0 1 Moving a s t e p up the h i e r a r c h y o f terms from r e c o r d s t o documents, o n l y f o u r o f these f i v e elements are d i r e c t l y r e l e v a n t : the nature o f the m a t e r i a l , i t s form, the a c t i o n from which i t r e s u l t s , and the person who performs t h a t a c t i o n . The d e f i n i t i o n o f documents as "recorded i n f o r m a t i o n " s u p p l i e s two of these d i r e c t l y — " i n f o r m a t i o n " r e f e r r i n g t o the nature o f the m a t e r i a l , and "recorded" t o the a c t i o n from which i t r e s u l t s . But a l s o i n c l u d e d i m p l i c i t l y a re the form o f the m a t e r i a l and the person who performs the a c t i o n . For t h e r e can be no a c t i o n without an a c t o r , and e v e r y t h i n g t h a t reports. The latter seems tradit ional ly to have been considered a secondary characteristic of records, following from both the manner in which a document was made or received and the purpose of that action. For some insight into the widespread ambiguity of the term "form," see Toward  Descriptive Standards: Report and Recommendations of the Canadian Working  Group on Archival Descriptive Standards (Ottawa: Bureau of Canadian Archivists , December 1985), pp. 42-43. A useful beginning toward untangling some of this terminological confusion w i l l be found in Duranti, "Diplomatics fArchivaria 28]," p. 15. See p. 40, note 52 above. 83 i s r e c o r d e d must be recorded i n some p h y s i c a l form. The d e f i n i t i o n does not i n c l u d e the purpose f o r which the person performs the a c t i o n o f r e c o r d i n g . T h i s i s reasonable, however, s i n c e i t was e a r l i e r demonstrated t h a t the r e c o r d i n g of i n f o r m a t i o n need not be a d e l i b e r a t e a c t . 1 0 2 The d e f i n i t i o n o f i n f o r m a t i o n , one ste p f u r t h e r up the h i e r a r c h y , i n c l u d e s o n l y t h r e e o f the f i v e elements used i n the d e f i n i t i o n o f r e c o r d s : the nature o f the m a t e r i a l , the a c t i o n from which i t r e s u l t s , and the person who performs t h a t a c t i o n . For, i f i n f o r m a t i o n i s i n t e l l i g e n c e g i v e n , then both the nature o f the m a t e r i a l ( i n t e l l i g e n c e ) and the a c t i o n from which i t r e s u l t s (being given) are e x p l i c i t l y i n c l u d e d . And, as w i t h the d e f i n i t i o n o f documents, the occurrence o f an a c t i o n a l s o i m p l i e s the presence o f an a c t o r . However, once a g a i n , the presence o f an a c t o r does not imply a purpose. Nor, as demonstrated e a r l i e r , does the a c t o f " g i v i n g " i n t e l l i g e n c e imply t h a t the l a t t e r i s embodied i n a p h y s i c a l form. 1 0 3 S i n c e the concept o f person i s thus a d e f i n i t i o n a l element a t each l e v e l o f the h i e r a r c h y o f terms, i t c l e a r l y does f i t w i t h i n the system. And i t a l s o f i t s w i t h i n the system as a s u i t a b l e c r i t e r i o n 1 0 2 See pp. 35-36 above. 1 0 3 In one sense, of course, even the spoken word is "embodied" in the "physical form" of sound waves. However, the st ipulation that, for present purposes, "physical form" refers to things such as floppy disks, photographic emulsions, and leaves of paper l imits the notion of form to things stable enough for intelligence or information to be "recorded" on them. 84 f o r d i v i d i n g r e c o r d s i n t o p u b l i c r e c o r d s . In f a c t , o f the f i v e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s i d e n t i f i e d as elements of the d e f i n i t i o n o f r e c o r d s , the n o t i o n o f person i s the most reasonable c a n d i d a t e . The nature o f the m a t e r i a l i s c l e a r l y an i n a p p r o p r i a t e c r i t e r i o n f o r d i v i d i n g r e c o r d s , s i n c e r e c o r d s themselves must be c o n s i d e r e d the nature o f the m a t e r i a l i n any d e f i n i t i o n o f p u b l i c r e c o r d s ; the nature o f the m a t e r i a l i s i t s e l f what i s be i n g d i v i d e d , and cannot t h e r e f o r e be the c r i t e r i o n f o r t h a t d i v i s i o n . The concept o f form i s i n a p p r o p r i a t e because i t i s c o u n t e r - i n t u i t i v e ; " p u b l i c r e c o r d s " simply does not p a r a l l e l c a t e g o r i e s l i k e e l e c t r o n i c r e c o r d s , v i d e o r e c o r d s , and paper r e c o r d s . The concept of purpose i s a l s o i n a p p r o p r i a t e because, as noted, i t i s dependent on the p r i o r e x i s t e n c e o f a person performing an a c t i o n f o r a purpose; i t cannot stand alone. The concept of a c t i o n , by c o n t r a s t , c o u l d c o n c e i v a b l y f i t . A f t e r a l l , "to p u b l i c i z e " o r " p u b l i s h " i s a r e c o g n i z a b l e verb, meaning "to make p u b l i c , b r i n g b e f o r e the p u b l i c . " 1 0 4 However, the n o t i o n o f p u b l i c a t i o n i s dependent on f i r s t d e t e r m i n i n g the nature o f the " p u b l i c " whom the r e c o r d s are "brought b e f o r e " o r made known t o . In o t h e r words, t h i s p a r t i c u l a r form of a c t i o n , l i k e t he n o t i o n o f purpose, i s meaningful o n l y i n r e l a t i o n t o a p r i o r d e f i n i t i o n o f the k i n d o f person i t i m p l i e s ; namely, "the p u b l i c " — whoever o r whatever t h a t may Funk & Waenalls. p. 1089. 85 be. 1 0 5 A c c o r d i n g l y , the concept o f person remains the s t r o n g e s t c a n d i d a t e f o r the c r i t e r i o n used t o d i v i d e r e c o r d s . The concepts o f the nature o f the m a t e r i a l and i t s form are c l e a r l y inadequate, w h i l e the concept o f person u n d e r l i e s the concepts o f both purpose and a c t i o n . And, i n i t s e l f , i t i s hard t o imagine the n o t i o n o f person doing an i n j u s t i c e t o anyone 1 s i n t u i t i v e sense o f the k i n d o f t h i n g t o which " p u b l i c " r e f e r s . 1 0 6 1 0 5 At this point in the discussion, phrases such as "the public" are not intended to convey any substantive meaning. As yet, they are used in an attempt to determine only that the concept of person is the best cr i t er ion for delimiting the general kind of thing that "public" refers to - - namely, a person or persons of some sort. It is to be hoped, therefore, that readers w i l l , for the moment, hold in abeyance whatever substantial def init ion of "the public" they may bring to the discussion. 1 0 6 A word of explanation is in order here, since readers may, at f i r s t glance, f ind this result somewhat at odds with the definit ion of records offered in the previous chapter. There, i t w i l l be recalled, three of the five elements of the definit ion were tac i t ly drawn out for extended scrutiny on the assumption that they deal with the heart of the matter - - the nature of the material, the action from which i t results, and the purpose of that action. Records, accordingly, were defined as "documents [the nature of the material] made or received in the course of the conduct of affairs [the action from which i t results] and preserved [a further action which, as demonstrated, entails the several purposes subsumed under what is usually referred to as "evidence and information"]." Excluded from primary consideration were the elements of form and person. It was assumed that neither the medium in which they are embodied nor the nature of the person who makes or receives them has any essential bearing on the fundamental nature of records. (Although this statement may not raise many eyebrows today, most archivists in the past have believed that the nature of the person generating records has an essential bearing on their fundamental nature. Schellenberg, for instance, restr icts his def init ion of records to those documents made or received by "any public or private inst i tut ion." thereby excluding physical persons from consideration [Modern Archives, p. 16, emphasis added]. But the matter is more complex, for even Schellenberg devoted much of his later Management of Archives [New York: Columbia University Press, 1965] to erasing the dist inct ion between various types 86 S i n c e the concept o f p e r s o n thus i s , i n g e n e r a l t erms , an a p p r o p r i a t e c r i t e r i o n f o r d i v i d i n g r e c o r d s i n t o p u b l i c r e c o r d s and o t h e r s i m i l a r s u b c a t e g o r i e s , i t i s now n e c e s s a r y to d e t e r m i n e whether the p a r t i c u l a r d e f i n i t i o n o f t h a t concept o f f e r e d h e r e i s a l s o a p p r o p r i a t e . More s p e c i f i c a l l y , s h o u l d the c o n c e p t o f p e r s o n be l i m i t e d , as i t i s assumed h e r e , t o t h e a c t o r who makes o r r e c e i v e s and p r e s e r v e s documents? F i r s t o f a l l , t o assume t h a t the concept o f p e r s o n s h o u l d be l i m i t e d i n t h i s way t o what may be c a l l e d "provenance" i s not t o i g n o r e a l t e r n a t i v e d e f i n i t i o n s o f the c o n c e p t . 1 0 7 I t of records creator. None the less, this statement may stand for present purposes, since i t w i l l be dealt with fu l ly in due course.) The reader, then, recal l ing this taci t downplaying of the person element in the def init ion of records, may wonder why i t is here raised above the notions of action and purpose. The answer l i es in the different purposes of the two analyses, and the correspondingly different role played in each by the concept of person. This concept, though secondary for the purpose of defining records, is primary for the purpose of dividing records. In other words, though the notion of person was of only secondary importance in the chapter where the nature of records was at issue, i t is of primary importance in this chapter, providing a bridge between the analysis of records and that of public records. The same concept may bear different amounts of weight, depending on the context in which i t is employed. Even so, these different contexts are part of a whole, and do have some bearing on one another. Note, for instance, that while the notion of person may be of only secondary importance in the definit ion of records, i t s mere existence within that definit ion ensures that a division of records using the cr i ter ion of person is not at a l l arbitrary. Moreover, the mere fact that "public" is a type of records creator tradi t ional ly employed in the definit ion of archives or records though generally not defined precisely (reca l l , for example, Duchein's definition) - - further ensures that an acceptable subcategory of records has been chosen for examination, no matter how that subcategory may be defined substantively when the analysis is done. 1 0 7 In archival terms, "provenance" may be defined as the entity (or actor or person) who makes or receives documents in the conduct of affairs and preserves them (Evans, Harrison, and Thompson, "A Basic Glossary," pp. 427-28). From this concept, archivists derive the principle of provenance; namely, that the "archives of a given records creator must not 87 i s , r a t h e r , t o choose among those a l t e r n a t i v e s by f o l l o w i n g the l o g i c i n h e r e n t i n the d i s c u s s i o n so f a r . The a l t e r n a t i v e s are f a i r l y c l e a r . The law, f o r example, o f f e r s s e v e r a l p o s s i b l e ways of q u a l i f y i n g "person": provenance i n the l e g a l sense ("proceeding from" the p u b l i c ) ; p e r t i n e n c e ( " r e l a t i n g t o " the p u b l i c ) ; e f f e c t s ( " a f f e c t i n g " the p u b l i c ) ; access ("open t o " the p u b l i c ) ; and ownership ("belonging t o " the p u b l i c ) . 1 0 8 I n t u i t i v e l y , a l l these ways of l i m i t i n g the concept o f person have m e r i t . However, the l o g i c o f the d i s c u s s i o n so f a r f o r c e s the i s s u e : provenance i s the o n l y n o t i o n by which the concept of person can rea s o n a b l y be l i m i t e d o r q u a l i f i e d . To understand why t h i s i s so r e q u i r e s a gla n c e a t both the g o a l o f the pr e s e n t d i s c u s s i o n and the means necessary t o ac h i e v e i t . The go a l o f the d i s c u s s i o n , as mentioned, i s t o l o g i c a l l y d i v i d e r e c o r d s i n t o i t s s u b c a t e g o r i e s — i n p a r t i c u l a r , t o determine the nature o f the subcategory c a l l e d p u b l i c r e c o r d s . The means t o ac h i e v e t h a t g o a l are s e v e r a l . But one of the most be intermingled with those of other records creators" ( ib id . ) - As the reader may suspect, the concept of provenance is central to this study, and w i l l accordingly be examined more fu l ly later on. 1 0 8 Black's, p. 1227. It should be noted, however, that "public record" is defined by the law in far narrower terms, echoing the long history of the term "record" discussed at the beginning of the f i r s t chapter ( ib id . p. 1231, emphasis added). Provenance as "proceeding from" the public is here dubbed the "legal sense" of the term to distinguish this narrower meaning from the broader archival sense mentioned above - -the latter being referred to simply as "provenance," considering the archival context of this study. 88 important i s t o determine an a p p r o p r i a t e c r i t e r i o n on which t o base the d i v i s i o n , and then t o r e f i n e t h a t c r i t e r i o n . For on l y by det e r m i n i n g whether the c r i t e r i o n i s a p p r o p r i a t e can i t be ensured t h a t the d i v i s i o n i s sound, and o n l y by r e f i n i n g t h a t c r i t e r i o n can i t be ensured t h a t the d i v i s i o n i s p r e c i s e . And, i t may a l s o be added, o n l y by det e r m i n i n g t h a t the c r i t e r i o n so r e f i n e d i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the t h e o r e t i c a l s t r u c t u r e o f which i t forms a p a r t can i t be ensured t h a t the r e s u l t i n g d i v i s i o n o f r e c o r d s conforms t o the s c i e n t i f i c i d e a l o f system. A c c o r d i n g l y , the a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s o f the concept o f person as a means of d i v i d i n g r e c o r d s having been determined, i t i s now necessary t o r e f i n e t h a t concept by l i m i t i n g o r q u a l i f y i n g i t . And the argument here i s t h a t provenance i s the only n o t i o n by which the concept o f person can reasonably be q u a l i f i e d . T h i s c l a i m i s based p r i m a r i l y on the need t o ma i n t a i n c o n s i s t e n c y w i t h i n the t h e o r e t i c a l s t r u c t u r e so f a r developed i n t h i s s t u d y . 1 0 9 For, i f the e a r l i e r d e f i n i t i o n o f r e c o r d s as a r c h i v e s i n the t r a d i t i o n a l understanding i s a c c e p t a b l e , then i t f o l l o w s t h a t the o n l y reasonable b a s i s f o r r e f i n i n g t he concept o f person as a c r i t e r i o n f o r d i v i d i n g r e c o r d s i s the n o t i o n o f provenance embedded w i t h i n t h a t  d e f i n i t i o n — a t l e a s t i f one v a l u e s c o n s i s t e n c y . The n o t i o n 1 0 9 This need for consistency is an important aspect of any attempt at systematic investigation (see Cohen, Reason and Nature. pp. 106-14). It is even more so, perhaps, in a preliminary investigation of the sort attempted here - - where the effort is toward providing a structure against which further studies may at least press, i f not bui ld upon. 89 o f provenance i s simply b u i l t i n t o t he s t r u c t u r e so f a r developed, and can o n l y be abandoned a t the c o s t o f c o l l a p s i n g e v e r y t h i n g t h a t has gone b e f o r e . At any r a t e , h a ving spent so much time d e t e r m i n i n g t h a t r e c o r d s are documents made or r e c e i v e d and p r e s e r v e d by someone, t h e r e seems l i t t l e reason a t the p r e s e n t j u n c t u r e f o r s h i f t i n g toward some oth e r q u a l i f y i n g n o t i o n o f person, however i n t u i t i v e l y p l a u s i b l e i t might seem out o f con t e x t . The burden o f p r o o f and what goes w i t h i t — s p e c i f i c a l l y , an e n t i r e l y new d e f i n i t i o n o f records and an a p p r o p r i a t e r e s t r u c t u r i n g o f the h i e r a r c h y o f terms — would seem t o r e s t w i t h those who d i s a g r e e . 1 1 0 I f i t may thus be taken t h a t the concept o f person i s an a p p r o p r i a t e c r i t e r i o n f o r d i v i d i n g r e c o r d s , and t h a t the n o t i o n o f person as provenance i s a s u i t a b l e way of r e f i n i n g t h a t c r i t e r i o n , then i t i s now p o s s i b l e t o approach d i r e c t l y the q u e s t i o n o f why p u b l i c r e c o r d s a re b e s t c o n s i d e r e d a sub s p e c i e s o r type o f r e c o r d s . T e c h n i c a l l y , p u b l i c r e c o r d s c o u l d i n f a c t be c o n s i d e r e d a s p e c i e s o f r e c o r d s , simply because the concept possesses a l l 1 1 0 Despite their apparent harshness, these words may stand. Logic, as Mr. Spock might say, is logic . S t i l l , simple co l l eg ia l i ty - - and perhaps as well a sense that these results may be as surprising to some readers as, i t must be confessed, they were at f i r s t to the author - -requires at least some further consideration of alternative ways to l imit or qualify the concept of person. Accordingly, an effort w i l l be made at an appropriate place later on to consider such concepts as records proceeeding from, relating to, affecting, open to, and belonging to the person known so far only as "the public ." the a t t r i b u t e s of r e c o r d s p l u s an a d d i t i o n a l one. 1 1 1 However, as suggested above, here i t i s b e s t c o n s i d e r e d a s u b s p e c i e s o r type of r e c o r d s . There are two main reasons f o r t h i s s u g g e s t i o n , which w i l l be e x p l o r e d i n t u r n : f i r s t , the d e s i r a b i l i t y of m a i n t a i n i n g the s y s t e m a t i c q u a l i t y of the h i e r a r c h y of terms developed so f a r ; and, second, the a c c i d e n t a l nature of " p u b l i c " as an a t t r i b u t e of r e c o r d s . F i r s t of a l l , as noted, an asymmetry e x i s t s between the d e f i n i t i o n s o f (a) i n f o r m a t i o n , documents, and r e c o r d s , and (b) p u b l i c r e c o r d s . T h i s asymmetry d e r i v e s from the use of d i f f e r e n t c l a s s e s of d i s t i n g u i s h i n g a t t r i b u t e s . For, while the d e f i n i t i o n s o f i n f o r m a t i o n , documents, and r e c o r d s are a l l based on the n o t i o n of a c t i o n , the d e f i n i t i o n of p u b l i c r e c o r d s i s based on t h a t of the person who performs an a c t i o n . As mentioned, t h i s f a c t i s not i n i t s e l f enough t o keep one from c o n s i d e r i n g p u b l i c r e c o r d s a s p e c i e s of r e c o r d s , should i t be so d e s i r e d . But i t i s both prudent and u s e f u l a t t h i s p o i n t t o c o n s i d e r p u b l i c r e c o r d s r a t h e r as a s u b s p e c i e s or type o f r e c o r d s . A f t e r a l l , t h i s study i s intended as a p o i n t of d e p a r t u r e , and a c l e a r and simple map g e n e r a l l y p r o v i d e s the b e s t guide a t the o u t s e t of any v e n t u r e . T h e r e f o r e , i t seems b e s t t o r e t a i n the symmetry w i t h i n the h i e r a r c h y of terms by p o i n t i n g t o the d i f f e r e n t r e l a t i o n s e x i s t i n g between those terms when i t comes time t o d i v i d e r e c o r d s i n t o p u b l i c 1 Felber, Terminology Manual, p. 122. r e c o r d s . And the d i f f e r e n t r e l a t i o n s between those terms i s ec o n o m i c a l l y brought out by c o n s i d e r i n g p u b l i c r e c o r d s a sub s p e c i e s o r type, not a s p e c i e s , o f r e c o r d s . While perhaps r i s k i n g t he charge o f pedantry, t h i s t a c t i c a l move none the l e s s o f f e r s i n r e t u r n some g a i n i n c l a r i t y , s i m p l i c i t y , and p o t e n t i a l f o r l o g i c a l development. 1 1 2 The second main reason f o r c o n s i d e r i n g p u b l i c r e c o r d s a sub s p e c i e s o r type o f r e c o r d s l i e s i n the a c c i d e n t a l nature o f " p u b l i c " as an a t t r i b u t e o f r e c o r d s . The q u a l i t y o f being " p u b l i c " i s l o g i c a l l y a c c i d e n t a l t o the d e f i n i t i o n o f records i n t h a t i t i s n e i t h e r p a r t o f the d e f i n i t i o n nor commensurate w i t h i t . 1 1 3 Records may be p u b l i c , and y e t again they may not — j u s t as they may or may not be pornographic, r e c t a n g u l a r , o r a g r i c u l t u r a l . A t e s t o f t h i s " a c c i d e n t a l n e s s " i s whether i t i s reasonable t o suppose t h a t o t h e r s p e c i e s of documents may, l i k e r e c o r d s , e i t h e r be or not be " p u b l i c , " no matter how the term may e v e n t u a l l y be d e f i n e d i n f u l l . And, c l e a r l y , s p e c i e s o f recor d e d i n f o r m a t i o n such as p u b l i s h e d books housed i n a l i b r a r y c o u l d v e r y w e l l have a reasonable 1 1 2 It might also be noted that this move places the concept of records at the base of the hierarchy, underscoring i t . This result is extremely useful i f i t is granted - - as argued ear l ier in the sketch of archival theory - - that the nature of records should provide the basis for any consideration of the nature of archival studies. For records, as the lowest species in the hierarchy, may therefore be considered the fundamental concept, the point of departure in any consideration of the nature of archival studies. 1 1 3 On log ica l ly accidental qual i t ies , see Cohen and Nagel, An  Introduction to Logic, pp. 237-38. 92 c l a i m t o b e i n g c o n s i d e r e d , i n some way, " p u b l i c . " D e s p i t e the " a c c i d e n t a l n e s s " of p u b l i c as a q u a l i t y of r e c o r d s , p u b l i c r e c o r d s are none the l e s s an a c c e p t a b l e subcategory o r type o f r e c o r d s f o r the purpose of d i v i s i o n . As seen e a r l i e r , a g e n e r i c n o t i o n o f the person who makes or r e c e i v e s documents i s i n h e r e n t i n the d e f i n i t i o n o f r e c o r d s , and the n o t i o n o f p u b l i c f a l l s w i t h i n the g e n e r a l category of person. Moreover, w i t h i n the pr e s e n t h i e r a r c h y o f terms, the d i v i s i o n o f r e c o r d s i n t o p u b l i c r e c o r d s and o t h e r r e l a t e d s u b c a t e g o r i e s must be based on a d e f i n i t i o n o f the concept of person as the a c t o r who makes or r e c e i v e s and pr e s e r v e s documents i n the course o f the conduct o f a f f a i r s . S i n c e i t has thus been determined t h a t the l o g i c a l b r i d g e between r e c o r d s and p u b l i c r e c o r d s i s the concept o f person — more s p e c i f i c a l l y , the provenance-based concept o f person as the o n l y reasonable c r i t e r i o n f o r moving from r e c o r d s t o p u b l i c r e c o r d s through the d i v i s i o n o f the s p e c i e s o f records i n t o i t s s u b s p e c i e s — the d i s c u s s i o n may now move on t o an a n a l y s i s o f the s u b s t a n t i v e meaning o f " p u b l i c r e c o r d s " w i t h i n the framework so f a r developed. CHAPTER 3 PUBLIC RECORDS Having determined the g e n e r a l form o f a d e f i n i t i o n of p u b l i c r e c o r d s — which l i m i t s the n o t i o n o f p u b l i c t o a k i n d of person who makes or r e c e i v e s and p r e s e r v e s documents — i t i s now necessary t o determine i t s substance. In p a r t i c u l a r , t o put i t i n the form o f a q u e s t i o n : what s o r t o f person, e x a c t l y , i s t h i s " p u b l i c " by which the concept o f re c o r d s i s t o be q u a l i f i e d ? As wit h the a n a l y s i s o f the concept of r e c o r d s , an examination o f the common language d e f i n i t i o n of " p u b l i c " can p r o v i d e a u s e f u l s t a r t i n g p o i n t . 1 1 * In both common and l e g a l usage, "the p u b l i c " i s an ambiguous e n t i t y c l o s e l y r e l a t e d t o another ambiguous e n t i t y c a l l e d "the people." "The p u b l i c " i s v a r i o u s l y d e f i n e d as "the people o f a l o c a l i t y o r n a t i o n , " "the i n h a b i t a n t s of a s t a t e , " and "the whole body p o l i t i c , o r the aggregate o f the c i t i z e n s o f a s t a t e , n a t i o n , o r m u n i c i p a l i t y . " "The people" i s s i m i l a r l y d e f i n e d not o n l y as "the e n t i r e body of human beings l i v i n g i n the same co u n t r y , " but a l s o as "the whole 1 1 4 Since this study is written within the context of a modern democratic po l i ty , common language definitions and those drawn from common legal sources w i l l naturally reflect a democratic bias. There is no d i f f i cu l ty in this tact ic , so long as i t is recognized that the basic reason for doing so is to begin the discussion with provisional definitions most l ike ly to be readily understood and agreed on by the majority of readers. As works of analysis from Plato to recent l inguist ic philosophers attest, there is merit in beginning with the familiar. Plenty of time, after the appropriate groundwork has been la id , for attempts at universal ity. 93 body o f persons [ i n a s t a t e ] i n v e s t e d w i t h p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s ; the e n f r a n c h i s e d . 1 , 1 1 5 As can be seen from these examples, "the p u b l i c " and "the people" are ambiguous i n t h a t both terms r e f e r t o two d i s t i n c t t h i n g s : (1) the i n h a b i t a n t s o f a s t a t e , and (2) i t s c i t i z e n s — the g r o s s count o f warm bodies, t h a t i s , and those i n v o l v e d by r i g h t i n the governance of the s t a t e . T h i s democratic d i s t i n c t i o n between i n h a b i t a n t s and c i t i z e n s would be r e a d i l y apparent i n a s t a t e where c i t i z e n s h i p was r a d i c a l l y l i m i t e d , f o r t he e n f r a n c h i s e d few who had a say i n the governance of the s t a t e would be c l e a r l y v i s i b l e a g a i n s t the backdrop of the many i n h a b i t a n t s who were merely governed. The e n f r a n c h i s e d members o f such a s t a t e ( " c i t i z e n s , " i f you w i l l ) , being i n h a b i t a n t s as w e l l , would o f course a l s o be s u b j e c t t o the laws, although t h e i r involvement i n making those laws, o r a t l e a s t empowering the l e g i s l a t o r s , would almost c e r t a i n l y s e t them a p a r t as somehow p r i v i l e g e d . However, the s i t u a t i o n i s q u i t e d i f f e r e n t i n E n g l i s h -s peaking c o u n t r i e s today t h a t enjoy a p o p u l a r f r a n c h i s e , and can make f o r no end o f c o n f u s i o n . A f t e r a l l , the b a s i c c o m p l e x i t i e s o f democratic l i f e a r i s e l a r g e l y from the f a c t t h a t v i r t u a l l y a l l the i n h a b i t a n t s o f such a s t a t e are, a t the 1 1 5 Black's, pp. 1135, 1227; Funk & Wa(mails. pp. 999, 1089. "People" derives from the Latin "populus," meaning the whole of the cit izens, of which "public" is generally considered a possible but uncertain derivative. See Partridge, Origins. p. 483. 95 same time, i t s c i t i z e n s . 1 1 6 As members of democratic s t a t e s , we are a t the same time both i n d i v i d u a l s u b j e c t s who are r u l e d and c i t i z e n s who c o l l e c t i v e l y share i n the r u l i n g f u n c t i o n . We wear two ha t s , and may a t times f i n d o u r s e l v e s understandably confused about which i s which as we t r y to untangl e our p u r e l y p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t s as s u b j e c t s from our c i t i z e n l y o b l i g a t i o n s as members of the s o v e r e i g n t r i b u n a l , the c o l l e c t i v e source o f p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y i n the s t a t e . 1 1 7 S t i l l , t he d i s t i n c t i o n between c i t i z e n s and i n h a b i t a n t s — or, more a c c u r a t e l y , between c i t i z e n s and s u b j e c t s . c o n s i d e r i n g the s t r e s s l a i d here on t h e i r r e l a t i v e p o s i t i o n s w i t h i n the s t a t e — none the l e s s remains as c l e a r as i n a s t a t e w i t h a 1 1 6 The qual i f ier "virtually" is used here to both acknowledge and ignore a l l those inhabitants who are subject to the laws but not party to their enactment - - minors, resident aliens, v i s i tors , and so forth. This is done not to s l ight them, nor to suggest that their number is small, but simply because they are largely irrelevant to the immediate discussion. 1 1 7 Though most readers of this study l ike ly share a common p o l i t i c a l vocabulary, i t seems only fa i r to state that this author's understanding of the basic ideas of c i t izen , subject, state, and sovereignity employed here derive most direct ly from Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan: Parts I and II. ed. Herbert W. Schneider (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill , Library of Liberal Arts , 1958), and Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, ed. Charles Frankel (New York: Hafner Press, 1947). The works of Alexander Meiklejohn and Joseph Tussman have also been drawn on heavily, especially Meiklejohn's Education Between Two Worlds (1942; rpt. New York: Atherton Press, Atheling, 1966) and Tussman's Obligation and the Body Pol i t i c (London: Oxford University Press, 1960). Readers may want to balance these works by sampling some of the c r i t i c s . Relatively br ie f treatments of particular concepts w i l l be found in Daniel T. Rodgers, Contested Truths: Keywords in American Pol i t ics  Since Independence (New York: Basic Books, 1987) and Albert Jay Nock, "Imposter Terms," in his Free Speech and Plain Language. pp. 285-304 (1937; rpt. Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1968). A more systematic treatment w i l l be found in Robert Paul Wolff, In Defense of  Anarchism (New York: Harper & Row, Harper Colophon Books, 1976). f a r more l i m i t e d f r a n c h i s e . I t must be admitted, though, t h a t the n o t i o n s o f "the p u b l i c " and "the people" are understandably prone t o a measure of ambiguity i n a democratic p o l i t y . 1 1 8 In o r d e r t o d e c i d e which of these two common n o t i o n s of "the p u b l i c " — as s u b j e c t s and c i t i z e n s — i s t o be p r e f e r r e d when d e f i n i n g p u b l i c r e c o r d s f o r p r e s e n t purposes, i t i s f i r s t n e c e s s a r y t o c o n s i d e r how they r e l a t e t o the way t h a t a r c h i v i s t s view such r e c o r d s . 1 1 9 T y p i c a l l y , a r c h i v i s t s d e f i n e p u b l i c r e c o r d s as "government r e c o r d s , " o r "records accumulated by government a g e n c i e s , " thereby e q u a t i n g "the p u b l i c " w i t h "the government." 1 2 0 They g e n e r a l l y go on, i n 1 1 8 A recent fai lure to make this dist inct ion between citizens and subjects - - not an isolated instance, and pointed out only because i t l ies most conveniently at hand - - w i l l be found in Anne Morddel, "The Delusion of Accountability," Records Management Quarterly 24 (July 1990): 42. Here "the public tax payer" - - c learly , a reference to those subject to the law, since even non-voting residents, v i s i tors , and minors may well pay taxes - - is confused with "the true 'employer' of a l l . . . ministers [of the Crown] and c i v i l servants alike" - - which can only refer to the sovereign c i t izens , in whose name Ministers of the Crown and c i v i l servants perform their duties. 1 1 9 This chapter having begun with common-language definitions, that i s , those notions may now be refined for archival purposes by comparing them with what might be cal led "archival common-language" definitions. 1 2 0 Evans, Harrison, and Thompson, "A Basic Glossary," p. 428. Another common definit ion, secondary to this one, is "records open to public inspection by law or custom" ( i b i d . ) . This "access" definit ion descends from the English common law definit ion mentioned earl ier (see p. 4 above). Expressing a form of the action cr i ter ion centering on the concept of publ ic i ty (see p. 84 above), i t is r ight ly considered secondary to the "person" definit ion, which was shown in the previous chapter to offer the best cr i ter ion for dividing records into public records and related categories. A l l the same, since the concept of access merits consideration, i t s relat ion to the present study is discussed below in the Appendix. 97 the t r a d i t i o n a l manner, t o c h a r a c t e r i z e the government as c o n s i s t i n g o f t h r e e organs o r branches (depending on which o r g a n i c metaphor i s p r e f e r r e d , the body or a t r e e ) performing, o r r e s p o n s i b l e f o r , t h r e e d i s t i n c t f u n c t i o n s : the l e g i s l a t u r e , the e x e c u t i v e , and the j u d i c i a r y . 1 2 1 The d e f i n i t i o n i s then f u r t h e r s e t o f f a g a i n s t what i s taken t o be the a n t i t h e s i s of p u b l i c r e c o r d s , namely, p r i v a t e r e c o r d s — both o f which t o g e t h e r a re taken t o c o n s t i t u t e the e n t i r e u n i v e r s e of r e c o r d s , as b l a c k i s s e t o f f a g a i n s t non-black o r w h i t e . 1 2 2 1 2 1 Peterson and Peterson, Law, p. 12; Michael Cook, The Management  of Information from Archives (Aldershot, Hants, England: Gower Publishing Company, 1986), p. 13. Both of the above also show that the constraints of tradit ion and legis lat ion in the authors' respective countries have made for accumulations of records in their national repositories rather less, though in different ways, than the theoretical ideal of f u l l and equal retention of records from a l l three organs. Generally speaking, i t would seem, the l ion's share of government records handled by archival agencies accrues from the executive or administrative branch. For the Canadian equivalent of these Br i t i sh and American examples, one may compare (perhaps with some injust ice, considering the different dates) the National Archives of Canada Act (Revised Statutes of Canada 1985, 3rd Supp. [1987, Ch. 1]) with the comparative extent of that archives' holdings of parliamentary, executive, and j u d i c i a l records outlined in Terry Cook and Glen T. Wright, General Guide Series 1983: Federal Archives  Divis ion (Ottawa: Public Archives of Canada, 1983). To speak of the t r ipar t i t e d iv is ion of government as "traditional" is of course to draw on writers such as Aris tot le and Montesquieu. See, for instance, J .A . Corry and J . E . Hodgetts, Democratic Government and Po l i t i c s . 3rd ed. , revised (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1959), pp. 90-92, where the basic distinctions are between the organ that makes the laws, the one that puts them into effect, and the one that determines in specific instances whether they have been upheld. 1 2 2 Evans, Harrison, and Thompson, "Glossary," p. 427. In a technical sense, "non-black" would be the proper antithesis of "black," and "non-public" the proper antithesis of "public." S t i l l , i t is often useful - -indeed, hardly avoidable - - to bring such antitheses to l i f e by giving them a recognizable name. And i t w i l l prove useful in the discussion that follows to reca l l that the shades of grey of which l i f e is said to be constituted do not in the least negate the dis t inct ion between white and black - - contraries which, in fact, provide the basic dist inct ion without 98 In thus d e f i n i n g p u b l i c r e c o r d s as government re c o r d s , w h i l e c o n s i d e r i n g government as t r i p a r t i t e and s e t t i n g p r i v a t e o f f a g a i n s t p u b l i c , a r c h i v i s t s have e s s e n t i a l l y s i d e d w i t h the " s o v e r e i g n c i t i z e n s " n o t i o n o f "the p u b l i c . " They have o b v i o u s l y not accepted a l l t h a t t h i s n o t i o n i m p l i e s because, i n e q u a t i n g p u b l i c r e c o r d s w i t h government r e c o r d s , they have missed an important d i s t i n c t i o n i n h e r e n t i n the concept. For the government, as suggested, i s i n f a c t but an instrument t h a t the s o v e r e i g n c i t i z e n s employ i n the governance of themselves — a complex of i n s t i t u t i o n s t o which the c i t i z e n s d e l e g a t e , by p r o v i s i o n s w i t h i n the same c o n s t i t u t i o n by which they f o r m a l l y b i n d themselves t o one another as equal members of the s o v e r e i g n power, a s p e c i f i c measure of t h e i r a u t h o r i t y . 1 2 3 S t i l l , i t i s understandable t h a t a r c h i v i s t s , which such shades could not even be conceived, let alone recognized. Sophisticated blurring of boundaries is often necessary, but remains at a l l times dependent on fundamental distinctions; sophistication rides the shoulders of s implic i ty . A l l the same, though "private" may not have any positive meaning etymologically, i t is acceptable because today i t is a substantive term in i t s own right - - not simply the antithesis of "public," as non-black is the antithesis of black (as hinted at the dist inct ion between citizens and subjects). For the etymologically correct derivation of "private," see Luciana Duranti, "Diplomatics: New Uses for an Old Science (Part III) ," Archivaria 30 (Summer 1990): 14. An account of the complex history of the term in English usage over the past several centuries, and incidentally of i t s undeniably substantive character, w i l l be found in Raymond Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society (London: Fontana/Croom Helm, 1976), pp. 203-204. 1 2 3 Rousseau, The Social Contract, pp. 50-55. See also Alexander Meiklejohn, "The F i r s t Amendment Is An Absolute," in his Alexander  Meiklejohn. Teacher of Freedom: A Collection of His Writings and A  Biographical Study, ed. Cynthia Stokes Brown (Berkeley: Meiklejohn C i v i l Liberties Institute, Studies in Law and Social Change No. 2, 1981), p. 247. It is worth noting, in this context, that "government" is 99 who almost always f i n d themselves working i n b u r e a u c r a t i c a g e n c i e s , should tend t o d e f i n e "the p u b l i c " as simply "the government." The government, a f t e r a l l , may be but an instrument o f the s o v e r e i g n c i t i z e n s , but i t i s f a r more t a n g i b l e . U n l i k e the s o v e r e i g n per se, the government can be found housed i n b u i l d i n g s , i n charge o f a p a y r o l l , and possessed o f myriad f i l e s . J u s t as a r c h i v i s t s ' d e f i n i t i o n o f p u b l i c r e c o r d s as government r e c o r d s comes c l o s e t o the " s o v e r e i g n c i t i z e n s " n o t i o n o f "the p u b l i c , " so too does t h e i r d e f i n i t i o n of p r i v a t e r e c o r d s as "non-governmental r e c o r d s " come c l o s e t o the " i n h a b i t a n t s o f a s t a t e " o r " s u b j e c t s " n o t i o n o f "the p u b l i c . " T h i s symmetry i s obvious i f one c o n s i d e r s o n l y t h a t the d e f i n i t i o n o f p r i v a t e r e c o r d s i s c o n s i d e r e d the a n t i t h e s i s of p u b l i c r e c o r d s . For, i f government r e c o r d s are the records of the s o v e r e i g n , and the dichotomy between the s o v e r e i g n and the s o v e r e i g n ' s s u b j e c t s i n c l u d e s a l l "persons" w i t h i n a s t a t e , then a l l r e c o r d s t h a t a re not " o f " the s o v e r e i g n must be r e c o r d s " o f " the so v e r e i g n ' s s u b j e c t s . The same symmetry between a r c h i v i s t s ' d e f i n i t i o n s o f p u b l i c and p r i v a t e r e c o r d s and the co n c e p t i o n s o f "the p u b l i c " as the s o v e r e i g n and the s o v e r e i g n ' s s u b j e c t s h o l d s t r u e , etymologically derived from Latin and Greek terms meaning "to steer or pi lot" (Partridge, Origins. p. 262). This meaning derives from the ancient metaphor of the ship of state, and is so recognized by modern j u r i s t s , who r ight ly note that the government must accordingly be considered "but an agency of the state," as the helmsman is but an agent of the captain or owner of a ship (Black's. p. 695). 100 though somewhat l e s s o b v i o u s l y , even when we r e a l i z e t h a t North American a r c h i v i s t s are i n the h a b i t o f d e f i n i n g p r i v a t e r e c o r d s as those o f non-governmental " o r g a n i z a t i o n s and i n s t i t u t i o n s . 1 1 1 2 4 The d i f f i c u l t y here o f course i s t h a t , i n l i m i t i n g p r i v a t e r e c o r d s t o those o f o r g a n i z a t i o n s , a r c h i v i s t s e xclude the l a r g e s t and most obvious group o f the sovereign's s u b j e c t s ; namely, i n d i v i d u a l p e r s o n s . 1 2 5 However, North American a r c h i v i s t s f i l l i n t h i s gap, completing the f i e l d which p r o v i d e s the symmetry sought f o r here, by c o n t r a s t i n g p r i v a t e r e c o r d s w i t h p r i v a t e o r p e r s o n a l papers — by which n a t u r a l accumulations o f p e r s o n a l and f a m i l y m a t e r i a l s are d i s t i n g u i s h e d from the n a t u r a l accumulations o f m a t e r i a l d e r i v i n g from o r g a n i z a t i o n s . 1 2 6 T h i s common a r c h i v a l d i s t i n c t i o n between p r i v a t e r e c o rds and papers, however, i s more an h i s t o r i c a l a c c i d e n t than a 1 2 4 Evans, Harrison, and Thompson, "Glossary," p. 427. 1 2 5 There may be some useful technical reason for distinguishing organizations from inst i tutions, but whatever difference there may be between the two is irrelevant to the argument being developed here. Accordingly, "organizations" is used as a generic term for a l l groups of subjects who have bound themselves together to form what Hobbes would c a l l an " a r t i f i c i a l person" - - or, more precisely, in his fine-meshed logic net, "regular, dependent p o l i t i c a l systems," meaning a r t i f i c i a l persons subject to the sovereign and gaining their existence therefrom by letters patent or some other lawful means, such as business corporations (Leviathan, pp. 180-92). Such organizations f a l l within the broader category of j u r i d i c a l , as distinguished from physical, persons (see Duranti, "Diplomatics" rArchivaria 28], p. 25, note 20). 1 2 6 Evans, Harrison, and Thompson, "Glossary," pp. 426, 427; "manuscripts" are often considered the equivalent of "papers" so defined ( i b i d . ) . 101 r e s u l t o f r a t i o n a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n , and need not d e l a y us long. The s t o r y o f how North American a r c h i v i s t s came t o speak of the r e c o r d s of o r g a n i z a t i o n s and the papers of persons i s long and i n v o l v e d . E s s e n t i a l l y , though, i t i s a bow t o those e i g h t e e n t h - and n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y c o l l e c t o r s of manuscripts and t h e i r descendants who, l o n g b e f o r e the emergence of a r c h i v a l r e p o s i t o r i e s working from the European-based p r i n c i p l e s t h a t s t i l l guide a r c h i v a l work, sought t o salvage whatever m a t e r i a l they c o u l d f i n d t h a t might prove of v a l u e f o r h i s t o r i c a l r e s e a r c h . The o f t e n fragmentary m a t e r i a l thus gathered from d i v e r s e sources, and u s u a l l y c r e a t e d by i n d i v i d u a l persons, was g e n e r a l l y arranged more i n the manner of the a r t i f i c i a l s u b j e c t c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s used by l i b r a r i a n s t o d e a l w i t h d i s c r e t e items than a c c o r d i n g t o a r c h i v a l p r i n c i p l e s r e s p e c t i n g the o r g a n i c u n i t y of bodies of r e c o r d s — as perhaps b e f i t s such t h i n g s as i s o l a t e d autograph l e t t e r s of famous persons. Although such m a t e r i a l s t i l l l i e s o u t s i d e the p r o v i n c e of what has been d e f i n e d as r e c o r d s , e a r l y a r c h i v i s t s , attempting t o mark o f f t h e i r p r o f e s s i o n a l t u r f , f a i l e d t o p r e s s the d i s t i n c t i o n between these m i s c e l l a n e o u s c o l l e c t i o n s and the o r g a n i c b o d i e s o f r e c o r d s made or r e c e i v e d i n the course of a f f a i r s by persons and f a m i l i e s . The a r c h i v i s t s , as one commentator puts i t , i n e f f e c t "assumed t h a t [ a l l ] manuscripts [whether o r not they had a r c h i v a l q u a l i t i e s ] were h o p e l e s s l y l o s t t o the l i b r a r i a n s , and as p a r t of t h e i r b a t t l e t o prevent 102 the same t h i n g from happening t o a r c h i v e s they emphasized the d i f f e r e n c e s between h i s t o r i c a l manuscripts and a r c h i v e s . " 1 2 7 G e n e r a l l y working w i t h o r g a n i c accumulations o f records generated through the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f the o r g a n i z a t i o n s t h a t employed them, a r c h i v i s t s s e t themselves a p a r t from c u r a t o r s of manuscripts, making a v e r b a l d i s t i n c t i o n between the " r e c o r d s " o f o r g a n i z a t i o n s and the "papers" o r "manuscripts" of persons and f a m i l i e s , no matter whether the l a t t e r p ossessed the d i s t i n g u i s h i n g q u a l i t i e s o f r e c o r d s o r not. C l e a r l y , a c l a s s i c case o f throwing out the baby wi t h the bath water — though the s i t u a t i o n has l a r g e l y , i f not completely, been r e c t i f i e d . 1 2 8 T h i s a n a l y s i s o f common usage and a r c h i v a l terminology 1 2 7 Robert L. Brubaker, "Archival Principles and the Curator of Manuscripts," American Archivist 29 (October 1966): 507. 1 2 8 For an overview of these developments, see Terry Eastwood, "Unity and Diversity in the Development of Archival Science in North America," speech delivered on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Special School for Archivists and Librarians at the University of Rome, September 1989, pp. 4-6. A longer tale is told in Berner's Archival Theory and  Practice in the United States. As well , a glance at the c lass ica l definitions of archives provided earl ier (see p. 39 above) shows that only the Dutch exclude documents generated by private persons (and, i t would appear, non-governmental organizations as well) , while Brenneke too includes both physical and j u r i d i c a l persons in his def init ion of archives (see Schellenberg, Modern Archives. pp. 12-13) - - a l l of which underscores the h i s t o r i c a l l y accidental nature of the North American s p l i t between records and papers. One strong indication that this conceptually needless s p l i t has been a l l but healed w i l l be found in the recent legal codif ication in both the United States and Canada of the term "personal records" (on the American Presidential Records Act [1980], see Maygene F. Daniels, "Introduction to Archival Terminology," in A Modern Archives  Reader, ed. Daniels and Walch, p. 337, note 5; see also the National  Archives of Canada Act [1987], Sees. 2, 4 [1]). 103 p r o v i d e s a prima f a c i e case f o r equating the p u b l i c w i t h the so v e r e i g n , as c o n t r a s t e d w i t h persons and o r g a n i z a t i o n s s u b j e c t t o the s o v e r e i g n . That i s , both everyday language and a r c h i v a l terminology, when f r e e d from ambiguity and unnecessary d i s t i n c t i o n s , not o n l y permit t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n but a l s o support i t . T h i s i s not t o c l a i m t h a t such an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n needs no f u r t h e r support but, r a t h e r , t h a t the a n a l y s i s so f a r encourages f u r t h e r e x p l o r a t i o n . A u s e f u l method of s u p p o r t i n g t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s t o expand on, r e f i n e , and t e s t i t w i t h i n an a r c h i v a l context. B efore doing so d i r e c t l y , however, i t i s necessary both t o address the c r i t i c s and t o examine a l t e r n a t i v e models t h a t now h o l d t h e f i e l d . The most ambitious c r i t i c i s m f aced by the p r e s e n t study i s not i n f a c t d i r e c t e d a t the s u b s t a n t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n so f a r o f f e r e d . I t i s d i r e c t e d , r a t h e r , a t the v e r y attempt t o d i s t i n g u i s h p u b l i c from p r i v a t e r e c o r d s . One commentator, f o r i n s t a n c e , argues t h a t "the s e p a r a t i o n o f the ' p u b l i c ' from the ' p r i v a t e ' ... i s pro b a b l y a r e c o r d keeper's nightmare, and perhaps even a chimaera." T h i s c l a i m may perhaps be t r u e i n the l i m i t e d sphere t h a t was under c o n s i d e r a t i o n ; namely, a M i n i s t e r o f the Crown's r i g h t t o c l a i m t h a t some p o r t i o n of h i s r e c o r d s a re not " p u b l i c " but " p r i v a t e . " 1 2 9 A f t e r a l l , i t c o u l d be t r u e , as the author comes c l o s e t o i n s i s t i n g , t h a t 1 2 9 Terry Eastwood, "The Disposition of Minis ter ia l Papers," Archivaria 4 (Summer 1977): 14. 104 M i n i s t e r s forego any c l a i m o f p r i v a c y when they e n t e r p u b l i c l i f e . T h i s argument may or may not be t r u e . What matters f o r p r e s e n t purposes, however, i s t h a t the argument i t s e l f would be c o m p l e t e l y u n i n t e l l i g i b l e i f i t d i d not i n f a c t take f o r grante d a p r i o r d i s t i n c t i o n between p u b l i c and p r i v a t e . In ot h e r words, we take t h i s argument s e r i o u s l y — c o n s i d e r i t i n t e l l i g i b l e , t h a t i s — mainly because we assume, wit h the author, t h a t t h i n g s l i k e c l a i m s t o p r i v a c y and p u b l i c l i f e r e a l l y do e x i s t — however those terms may be d e f i n e d , and whether o r not the author's argument i s accepted. Another commentator, s e e k i n g t o persuade a r c h i v i s t s t o focus t h e i r a p p r a i s a l s o f the v a l u e o f r e c o r d s and the a c q u i s i t i o n s t h a t r e s u l t from them on broad areas t h a t t r a n s c e n d a l l d i s t i n c t i o n s about the nature o f records c r e a t o r s , c l a i m s t h a t i n s t i t u t i o n s i n the " p u b l i c and p r i v a t e s e c t o r s " a re today i n f a c t i n t e g r a t e d . which i s tantamount t o c l a i m i n g t h a t they have somehow melded i n t o one. 1 3 0 The author's examples, however, r e f e r t o no more than the obvious f a c t t h a t governments both h i r e b u s i n e s s e s t o do c e r t a i n jobs and s e t down g u i d e l i n e s f o r r e g u l a t i n g them. C o n t r a c t u a l d e l e g a t i o n and r e g u l a t i o n s , however, as com p l i c a t e d a p i c t u r e as they may r e s u l t i n , h a r d l y argue i n any p e r s u a s i v e way the a c t u a l i n t e g r a t i o n o f government and b u s i n e s s . More important, though, the v e r y n o t i o n o f two d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e 1 3 0 Helen Samuels, "Who Controls the Past." American Archivist 49 (Spring 1986): 110-11. 105 " s e c t o r s " i n f a c t assumes a d i s t i n c t i o n between p u b l i c and p r i v a t e as the b a s i s o f an i n t e l l i g i b l e d i s c u s s i o n — no matter how those terms may be d e f i n e d , and whether o r not the author's argument i s a c c e p t e d . 1 3 1 Assuming, then, t h a t t h i s s o r t o f c r i t i c i s m may be l a r g e l y 1 3 1 By far the freshest and most promising recent sketch, in archival terms, of how public and private affairs are "inextricably linked in myriad ways" w i l l be found in Terry Eastwood, "Reflections on the Development of Archives in Canada and Austral ia ," speech delivered to the Biennial Conference of the Australian Archivists , Hobart, Tasmania, 3 June 1989 (quote from p. 18). Unfortunately, though, at one point the author's rhetorical exaggeration about "the i l lusory public and private boundary" (p. 20) would, i f taken at face value, logical ly undermine his otherwise persuasive account of archives' and archivists ' responsibi l i ty toward what he ca l l s the ideal of democratic accountability and cultural continuity in a democratic po l i ty . For his entire construction rests on a strong, i f largely tac i t , commitment to a prior dist inct ion between the public and private realms. See also p. 97, note 122 above. Though a certain tendency to diminish and blur the dist inct ion between public and private, noted in such examples as those provided above, may perhaps jus t ly be characterized as rhetorical exaggeration, however legitimate in context, that characterization by no means suggests that in some ways the dist inct ion between public and private may indeed be not only i l lusory but retrograde. An opportunity to deal with such matters may present i t s e l f later on, but here i t may be said that, at the very least, any such dist inct ion is very much i l lusory when i t is a question, say, of how to arrange and describe records. The public/private dichotomy, after a l l , is subsidiary to that of the def init ion of records, which inevitably means that a l l records must be treated in the same manner in a l l cases (such as that of arrangement and description) where the only question at issue is their existence as, their possession of the nature of, records. This conclusion seems not to be tota l ly accepted in a recent discussion of the nature of archives and the consequences for description (Michael Cook and Margaret Procter, A Manual of Archival Description. 2nd ed. [Aldershot, Hants, England: Gower Publishing Company, 1989], pp. 3-5). Noting the difference between organic accumulations of records that generally end up in the archives of a sponsoring agency responsible for them and single items that often end up in so-called manuscripts repositories, these commentators f a i l to stress that the only real difference between the two kinds of material - - a t least for the sake of description - - i s that while the former may be described col lect ive ly , the latter can only be described individually. In other words, the difference between the two l ies more in the level at which they can be described than in any supposed difference in their fundamental nature. 106 i g n o r e d f o r p r e s e n t purposes, a l t e r n a t i v e models o f p u b l i c and p r i v a t e r e c o r d s t h a t now h o l d the f i e l d r e q u i r e examination. Although many commentators have touched on these concepts t o some degree i n p a s s i n g , t h e r e has r e a l l y been o n l y one s u s t a i n e d e f f o r t i n the E n g l i s h - s p e a k i n g world t o date i n f l u e n t i a l enough t o warrant d e t a i l e d scrutiny'. I t i s found i n t he c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f E n g l i s h a r c h i v e s developed p r i m a r i l y by J e n k i n s o n . 1 3 2 Though much might be s a i d about the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n as a whole, the main area o f i n t e r e s t f o r t h i s study i s the d i v i s i o n o f r e c o r d s i n t o what Jenkinson c a l l s p u b l i c , s e m i - p u b l i c , and p r i v a t e . In t h i s scheme, p u b l i c r e c o r d s , as i n North America, c o n s i s t l a r g e l y o f government r e c o r d s w i t h i n a l l j u r i s d i c t i o n s and a t a l l l e v e l s . P r i v a t e r e c o r d s , on the o t h e r hand, i n c l u d e "the documentary r e s u l t s o f every k i n d o f Undertaking o r J u r i s d i c t i o n conducted f o r p r i v a t e advantage or s a t i s f a c t i o n , whether by an I n d i v i d u a l o r by a C o r p o r a t i o n o r I n s t i t u t i o n . " 1 3 3 In o t h e r words, the se e k i n g o f a p a r t i c u l a r s o r t o f "advantage o r s a t i s f a c t i o n " i s judged the c r i t e r i o n t h a t d i s t i n g u i s h e s p r i v a t e persons from the p u b l i c . For, by p a r i t y o f rea s o n i n g , i t must be 1 3 2 The standard c lass i f icat ion of archives in the United Kingdom, Jenkinson's scheme is now most readily available in three sources: A Manual of Archive Administration, pp. 191-97; "General Report of a Committee on the Class i f icat ion of English Archives" [1936], in his Selected Writings, pp. 122-46; and "The Class i f icat ion and Survey of English Archives" [1943], in his Selected Writings, pp. 196-207. 1 3 3 Jenkinson, "General Report of a Committee on the Class i f icat ion of English Archives," p. 125. 107 assumed t h a t J enkinson means t o speak of p u b l i c r e c o r d s as those r e s u l t i n g from a f f a i r s undertaken f o r p u b l i c "advantage or s a t i s f a c t i o n " or, as i s commonly s a i d , i n the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t . Without doubting f o r a moment t h a t p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t s may be d i s t i n g u i s h e d from p u b l i c , i t must be noted t h a t t h e r e i s a d i f f i c u l t y w i t h thus attempting t o d i s t i n g u i s h the p u b l i c from p r i v a t e persons a c c o r d i n g t o t h e i r i n t e r e s t s o r aims. T h i s d i f f i c u l t y i s c l e a r l y demonstrated by the major p o s i t i o n h e l d by " s e m i - p u b l i c " r e c o r d s i n Jenkinson's c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . S e m i - p u b l i c b o d i e s , he says, a re those "which, e x i s t i n g p r i m a r i l y f o r p r i v a t e advantage or s a t i s f a c t i o n , u s u a l l y d i s c h a r g e more o r l e s s P u b l i c f u n c t i o n s and are p r i v i l e g e d and c o n t r o l l e d a c c o r d i n g l y , " such as banks, i n s u r a n c e companies, e d u c a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , c h a r i t i e s , and p r o f e s s i o n a l b o d i e s . 1 3 4 The d i f f i c u l t y here i s not t h a t J enkinson l o c a t e s a grey area between p r i v a t e persons and the p u b l i c ; i n a complex world, t h e r e w i l l always be an area i n which fundamental d i s t i n c t i o n s have t o be q u a l i f i e d . The d i f f i c u l t y , r a t h e r , i s t h a t J e n k i n s o n seems i n some ways too much a pragmatist t o t o l e r a t e f o r l o n g the t e n s i o n between p u b l i c and p r i v a t e , and s e t t l e s f o r a l e s s than s a t i s f a c t o r y c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f what 1 3 4 Jenkinson, Manual. p. 196. While Jenkinson speaks here of serving a public "function," this term does not affect his meaning when speaking of "interests"; functions may be thought of as areas of act iv i ty , so that a "public" function would be one that furthers the public interest. 108 pragmatic compromise o f t e n speaks o f , i n an appeal t o reason and moderation, as "the middle ground." 1 3 5 A symptom o f t h i s d i f f i c u l t y l i e s i n the v e r y s i z e and prominence o f t h i s supposed middle ground. O f f e r e d as a ca t e g o r y unto i t s e l f , " s e m i - p u b l i c " p r o v i d e s no p r i n c i p l e d way of d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between p u b l i c and p r i v a t e persons, because i t s v e r y e x i s t e n c e as a formal c a t e g o r y p r e c l u d e s any p o s s i b l e r e s o l u t i o n o f d i f f i c u l t cases i n t o the c o n t r a s t i n g c a t e g o r i e s of p u b l i c and p r i v a t e . The d i f f i c u l t y i t s e l f becomes e v i d e n t when h i s c o n s t r u c t i o n i s examined more c l o s e l y . One n o t i c e s , f i r s t , t h a t J e n k i n s o n i s not r e a l l y speaking o f s e m i - p u b l i c bodies a t a l l — a t l e a s t i f "semi" i s taken t o mean something g e n u i n e l y halfway between two extremes, a b l e n d i n g o f both, as grey i s halfway between white and b l a c k . What he speaks of are o r g a n i z a t i o n s t h a t are, i n h i s terms, both p u b l i c and p r i v a t e . Though p r i v a t e by i n t e n t i o n , he assumes, they are both p u b l i c and p r i v a t e i n t h e i r e f f e c t s — i n the i n t e r e s t s 1 3 5 These comments about an apparent pragmatic bent in some of Jenkinson's theoretical offerings doubtless "tread on the quicksand of perception," as Terry Eastwood nicely puts i t ( in "Going Nowhere in Particular: The Association of Canadian Archivists Ten Years After," Archivaria 21 [Winter 1985-86]: 187). Though not direct ly relevant to the present discussion, such comments are based on long contemplation of this portion of Jenkinson's work, and are offered as no more than a possible explanation of his l ine of reasoning. Needless to say, one trusts, they imply no disrespect to this giant, upon whose work - - l ike Schellenberg's - - this study largely rests. For a searching discussion of pragmatic compromise, see Joseph Tussman, Obligation and the Body P o l i t i c , pp. 114-18. 109 they a c t u a l l y s e r v e . 1 3 6 In oth e r words, they c o n s t i t u t e something l e s s l i k e grey than l i k e a b l a c k and white checkerboard, not so much a bl e n d o f extremes as an unmixed combination o f both t o g e t h e r . One n o t i c e s , secondly, t h a t Jenkinson r a t h e r too q u i c k l y assumes t h a t s e m i - p u b l i c bodies may be c h a r a c t e r i z e d as having o n l y p r i v a t e i n t e n t i o n s and both p r i v a t e and p u b l i c e f f e c t s . Some of thes e b o d i e s , o f which v o l u n t a r y c i v i c and c h a r i t a b l e o r g a n i z a t i o n s perhaps come most r e a d i l y t o mind, can h a r d l y be thought o f as having a n y t h i n g but p u b l i c i n t e n t i o n s . Modern c i v i l l i b e r t i e s o r g a n i z a t i o n s , f o r example, are g e n e r a l l y founded w i t h the broad i n t e n t o f e n s u r i n g t h a t the government o f the day i s c o n t i n u a l l y reminded o f i t s o b l i g a t i o n t o uphold c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s r e g a r d i n g the b a s i c r i g h t s o f c i t i z e n s , such as freedom o f speech, and of s u b j e c t s , such as due process o f law. C l e a r l y , the i n t e n t of 1 3 6 The dis t inct ion between intentions and effects is made here only for the purpose of c lar i fy ing Jenkinson's exposition of "semi-public" bodies; in his scheme, private effects follow direct ly from private intentions, whereas public effects follow inadvertently. It should also be noted that public effects, in Jenkinson's scheme and according to the distinctions worked out ear l ier , are effects upon the public as the sovereign's subjects or the whole of the inhabitants of a state. This may seem confusing in l ight of the preliminary judgment offered above that the noun "public" is best reserved for speaking about the sovereign rather than the sovereign's subjects. The confusion, however, is only verbal, since the sovereign's main concern, by def init ion, is to rule the whole of i t s subjects; effects upon "the public" as the whole of the inhabitants of a state are public effects because, affecting the whole, they are the legitimate business of "the public" as sovereign. Private effects, by contrast, are those that affect individual subjects, or particular groups of them, rather than the whole. 110 such o r g a n i z a t i o n s i s t o promote the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t . 1 3 7 The e f f e c t s o f t h e i r work, however, are both p u b l i c (by i n t e n t i o n ) and p r i v a t e ( i n a d v e r t e n t l y ) . By c a p t u r i n g the ear of the so v e r e i g n ' s government on i s s u e s t h a t d e a l w i t h a l l c i t i z e n s o r a l l s u b j e c t s o f the s o v e r e i g n , t h e i r work has obvious p u b l i c e f f e c t s . 1 3 8 But when they go t o c o u r t t o a s s i s t an i n d i v i d u a l s u b j e c t on, say, a q u e s t i o n o f due process, they not o n l y produce a p u b l i c e f f e c t by drawing a t t e n t i o n t o a matter o f g e n e r a l i n t e r e s t (and perhaps even change a giv e n law o r p o l i c y ) . They a l s o produce an i n a d v e r t e n t p r i v a t e 1 3 7 The discussion here relates to the intent or purpose of the organization, which should be distinguished from the motives of the organization's members. Although the two might be expected to coincide, they need not, and any lack of such correspondence does not affect the point made here about organizational purposes. There may be officers of c i v i l l ibert ies organizations, for example, who volunteer their time and talents with the intent of gaining some personal "advantage or satisfaction," such as fame, fortune, and the love of beautiful women (as Freud would put i t ) , though one suspects that they are often disappointed. Never the less, personal successes and disappointments of this sort hardly affect the purposes of the organization, which is not the sum of i ts individual members and officers but a body unto i t s e l f with i ts own purposes, as set down in i ts constitution. The monetary contributions that such organizations may from time to time receive from agencies of the sovereign only reinforce the claim that they have public effects, and perhaps lend credence to their more particular claim to represent at least a portion of "the inst i tut ional izat ion of c iv ic conscience," however unoff ic ia l (a phrase borrowed from John Dixon [past President of the Br i t i sh Columbia C i v i l Liberties Association], letter to the author, 20 August 1989. Dixon's formulation draws on Joseph Tussman, The Burden of Office: Agamemnon and  Other Losers [Vancouver: Talonbooks, 1989], pp. 15-25). C i v i l l ibert ies organizations are mentioned here partly because they are the type of voluntary organization with which this author is most familiar and partly because they seem to provide an incisive example of the relations between public and private interests and effects. If the example seems somehow strained or inappropriate, readers may prefer to reflect on their own experience with voluntary organizations of whatever sort. I l l e f f e c t by a s s i s t i n g t h a t i n d i v i d u a l s u b j e c t . For, t o whatever degree the t e s t case may be g e n e r a l i z e d , i t i s a l s o a s i n g l e case a f f e c t i n g t he l i f e o f a p a r t i c u l a r s u b j e c t a t a p a r t i c u l a r moment i n t i m e . 1 3 9 But Jenk i n s o n does not take i n t o account these v a r i a t i o n s on the r e l a t i o n s between the p u b l i c and p r i v a t e i n t e n t i o n s and e f f e c t s o f c e r t a i n o r g a n i z a t i o n s f a l l i n g w i t h i n the categor y he c a l l s "semi-p u b l i c . " S e v e r a l c o n c l u s i o n s can be drawn, so f a r , from t h i s examination o f Jenkinson's d e p i c t i o n o f s e m i - p u b l i c bodies. For one t h i n g , i f some s e m i - p u b l i c bodies have both p u b l i c i n t e n t i o n s and e f f e c t s , then i t cannot f o l l o w t h a t s e m i - p u b l i c b o d i e s are, as Jenk i n s o n d e f i n e s them, those t h a t e x i s t p r i m a r i l y f o r p r i v a t e advantage o r s a t i s f a c t i o n w h i l e having p u b l i c e f f e c t s as w e l l . H i s c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n i s simply not broad enough t o encompass the a c t u a l t r a i t s o f bodies o f f e r e d 1 3 9 When considering public intentions and effects of this sort, i t should be noted that a l t r u i s t i c acts in general, though usually contributing nothing to the actor's private "advantage or satisfaction," are not for that reason to be considered public in effect, as this notion has been characterized above. It has been assumed so far, following Jenkinson, that private intents and effects are self-interested or self-aggrandizing. However, i f public effects are defined as those affecting the whole of the sovereign's subjects (or the members of the sovereign tribunal i t s e l f , as when suggesting that c i v i l l ibert ies organizations promote freedom of speech for the cit izens of a state), then i t follows that private effects - - and, by implication, private intents - - must be defined as those affecting only a part of the whole of the sovereign's subjects. whether or not the intent of the actor or the effect of the act is "selfish." In other words, an a l t r u i s t i c act can be either public or private in effect, depending on whether i t affects either the whole of the sovereign's subjects or a part of those subjects, whether an individual or a group. 112 as e x e m p l i f y i n g the category. Moreover, because the category o f s e m i - p u b l i c bodies i n c l u d e s both o r g a n i z a t i o n s t h a t have p r i v a t e i n t e n t i o n s and o r g a n i z a t i o n s t h a t have p u b l i c i n t e n t i o n s , such bodies cannot be d e f i n e d s o l e l y by the i n t e n t i o n s u n d e r l y i n g them. For the i n t e n t i o n s of d i f f e r e n t o r g a n i z a t i o n s w i t h i n the same category p o i n t i n o p p o s i t e d i r e c t i o n s , p o s s e s s i n g n o t h i n g i n common, and thereby t e a r the c a t e g o r y a p a r t . However, s i n c e both k i n d s of o r g a n i z a t i o n have both p u b l i c and p r i v a t e e f f e c t s , whether intended or i n a d v e r t e n t , the c a t e g o r y might s t i l l seem capable of b e i n g salvaged, should J e n k i n s o n abandon " i n t e r e s t " f o r " e f f e c t " as the d i s t i n g u i s h i n g mark of s e m i - p u b l i c b o d i e s . Among s e m i - p u b l i c b o d i e s would have t o be i n c l u d e d a l l those t h a t have both p u b l i c and p r i v a t e e f f e c t s , independent of whether those e f f e c t s are intended or i n a d v e r t e n t , because o r g a n i z a t i o n s w i t h both s o r t s of e f f e c t have been i n c l u d e d i n the category. However, t h i s combination of both s o r t s of o r g a n i z a t i o n w i t h i n the same ca t e g o r y r e t u r n s us t o the f i r s t o b j e c t i o n t o the c a t e g o r y of s e m i - p u b l i c b o d i e s ; namely, t h a t i t i s not so much a b l e n d i n g o f p u b l i c and p r i v a t e as an acceptance of both e x i s t i n g s i d e by s i d e , independent o f one another, and i n c a p a b l e o f r e s o l v i n g d i f f i c u l t cases because no meaningful l i n k e x i s t s between two s u p e r f i c i a l l y complementary s o l i t u d e s . Given t h e s e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , i t must be admitted t h a t J enkinson's n o t i o n of a k i n d of o r g a n i z a t i o n halfway between 113 p u b l i c and p r i v a t e a i d s the pr e s e n t d i s c u s s i o n l a r g e l y i n a n e g a t i v e way, s i n c e i t p o i n t s toward a co n c e p t u a l dead end. 1 4 0 But i t i s i n s t r u c t i v e none the l e s s . Jenkinson, a f t e r a l l , was attempting t o develop a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n t h a t would do j u s t i c e not o n l y t o r e c o r d s r e s u l t i n g from the conduct o f contemporary a f f a i r s , but a l s o t o r e c o r d s generated i n England over the p a s t 800 ye a r s o r so. And he c l e a r l y r e c o g n i z e d t h a t some " s e r i e s " o f r e c o r d s — t h a t i s , those r e s u l t i n g from the e x e r c i s e o f p a r t i c u l a r f u n c t i o n s — had a t v a r i o u s times over t h i s l o n g span o f time been generated by d i f f e r e n t k i n d s o f r e c o r d s c r e a t o r . T h i s r e c o g n i t i o n means t h a t a t h e o r e t i c a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n scheme drawn up today w i l l almost c e r t a i n l y r e q u i r e c r o s s - r e f e r e n c e s from one category t o another i n o r d e r t o do j u s t i c e t o h i s t o r i c a l r e a l i t y — at l e a s t i f one i s determined, as Jenkinson was, t o attempt as f a r as p o s s i b l e t o r e l a t e a s i n g l e s e r i e s o f r e c o r d s t o a s i n g l e c l a s s o f r e c o r d s c r e a t o r over t i m e . 1 4 1 U n f o r t u n a t e l y , 1 4 0 It is a dead end, to reiterate, for two main reasons. F i r s t , as a category, "semi-public" fa i l s to throw any l ight on the dist inct ion between public and private records creators, serving more as a pragmatic dumping ground for a disparate group of records creators that appear to possess characteristics of both public and private bodies, distinguished from one another on the basis of the interests they serve. Second, the notion of interests as the distinguishing mark between public and private organizations cannot be applied consistently. 1 4 1 Jenkinson, "General Report," pp. 126, 132-33. This apparently f e l t necessity to reconcile h i s tor i ca l changes in the creators of certain series of records with what he considered a necessarily static theoretical c lass i f i cat ion of records creators that would do justice to the records of the present day may well point toward Jenkinson's decision to accept what has here been characterized as a pragmatic compromise. Unfortunately, at times he comes perilously close to conflating the 114 he chose t o d i s t i n g u i s h r e c o r d s c r e a t o r s by the c r i t e r i o n of " i n t e r e s t s , " which, as shown, does not work w e l l . A l l t he same, Jenkinson p o i n t s us i n the r i g h t d i r e c t i o n by showing t h a t the d i s t i n c t i o n between p u b l i c and p r i v a t e r e c o r d s c r e a t o r s should be capable o f d e a l i n g w i t h p o t e n t i a l s h i f t s o f r e c o r d s c r e a t o r s from one ca t e g o r y t o the o t h e r over time. Jenkinson's h i s t o r i c a l s e n s i t i v i t y may have emerged w i t h i n the co n t e x t o f d e v e l o p i n g a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n scheme f o r England's 800 y e a r s ' worth of r e c o r d s , which would not seem t o a p p l y t o the North American exper i e n c e , and the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n i s based on the n o t i o n o f the " i n t e r e s t s " of r e c o r d s c r e a t o r s , which does not work. But he none the l e s s reminds us t h a t good th e o r y should be as broad as p o s s i b l e , p r e s s i n g ever toward u n i v e r s a l v a l i d i t y . A f t e r a l l , the d i s t i n c t i o n between p u b l i c and p r i v a t e r e c o r d s c r e a t o r s , l i k e the d e f i n i t i o n o f r e c o r d s , w i l l take us beyond p a r o c h i a l i s m o n l y t o t h e ex t e n t t h a t i t can be a p p l i e d t o o t h e r s o c i e t i e s today and over time. 1* 2 h i s t o r i c a l with the theoretical , which could result in no end of confusion, as when he contrasts the private interests that, at some time in the past, brought an organization into existence with the public interests that they are, at present, considered to further ( i b i d . , p. 133) . 1 4 2 Although developed within the context of "ancient" English records and in an attempt to distinguish public from private records creators on the basis of interest, the h i s tor i ca l sensi t iv i ty displayed by Jenkinson is dependent on neither. There are two reasons for this . F i r s t , the temporal extent of English records, and the accompanying changes in the public or private nature of records creators, seems not to apply to "modern" records in North America only when we f a i l to reca l l the increasing sphere of public jur i sd ic t ion over the last f i f t y years with 115 H o l d i n g i n mind f o r a moment the broader ground toward which Jenkinson's h i s t o r i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s p r e s s the d i s c u s s i o n , i t w i l l be u s e f u l t o take a b r i e f s t e p backward b e f o r e moving forward and note t h a t what i s sought has not y e t been found; namely, a workable c r i t e r i o n f o r d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between p u b l i c and p r i v a t e r e c o r d s c r e a t o r s . As mentioned, Jenkinson's c r i t e r i o n o f " i n t e r e s t , " which may seem the most p r o m i s i n g contender on i n t u i t i v e grounds, has o b v i o u s l y not p r o v i d e d the s o l i d base t h a t i s sought. 1* 3 And, t r u t h t o t e l l , t h i s o r any s i m i l a r c r i t e r i o n begs the q u e s t i o n , s i n c e i t does not t e l l us how p u b l i c and p r i v a t e persons are t o be d i s t i n g u i s h e d ; i t o n l y removes the q u e s t i o n a ste p f u r t h e r from immediacy. I f , f o r example, i t i s claimed t h a t p u b l i c the r ise of the welfare state. Accordingly, even a parochial account of the nature of public and private records creators within recent North American experience w i l l remain unpersuasive unless i t displays some amount of sens i t iv i ty to h i s tor i ca l change. Second, given that such changes in the public and private character of records creators do in fact occur, any cr i t er ion used to distinguish between the two - - "interest" or any other - - is necessarily bound to, or dependent on, the prior fact of change. In other words, shifts between the public and private nature of the creator of a certain series of records may be described with greater precision by employing a particular cr i ter ion for distinguishing between the two. And that description w i l l be better or worse depending on the cr i t er ion chosen. However, the description of the fact - - not i ts explanation - - can but follow the existence of the fact i t s e l f . 1 4 3 This intuit ive sense, one might suppose, has much to do with our j u r i d i c a l environment, as exemplified by the formal divis ion of positive domestic law into the spheres of public and private based on the interests involved (see, for example, Gerald G a l l , The Canadian Legal System. 2nd ed. [Toronto: Carswell Legal Publications, Carswell Student Edition, 1983] , pp. 19-20). For a definit ion of " jur id ica l ," which is broader than but includes the law, see Duranti, "Diplomatics: New Uses for an Old Science (Part II) ," Archivaria 29 (Winter 1989-90): 5. 116 r e c o r d s c r e a t o r s are t o be d i s t i n g u i s h e d from p r i v a t e ones because they serve the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t , then i t s t i l l remains nec e s s a r y t o determine how t o d i s t i n g u i s h the p u b l i c w i t h i t s i n t e r e s t s from p r i v a t e r e c o r d s c r e a t o r s w i t h t h e i r presumably d i v e r g e n t i n t e r e s t s . I f i t i s a l r e a d y agreed, say, t h a t the p u b l i c i s b e s t c o n s i d e r e d as the s o v e r e i g n and p r i v a t e persons the s o v e r e i g n ' s s u b j e c t s , whether s i n g l y o r i n groups, then w e l l and good. One may then go on t o d e s c r i b e the nature of the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t a c c o r d i n g l y , should one c a r e t o attempt i t . But any account of the nature o f t h a t i n t e r e s t would depend on the d e f i n i t i o n of the p u b l i c a l r e a d y p r o v i d e d . To say t h i s i s t o r e i t e r a t e from another angle a p o i n t s t r e s s e d i n the p r e v i o u s chapter: however much i t may be p r e s s e d a g a i n s t , i n t u i t i v e l y or otherwise, the d e f i n i t i o n of p u b l i c r e c o r d s i s bound by the n o t i o n of provenance. And i t f o l l o w s t h a t a n y t h i n g o t h e r than a d i r e c t account of the nature o f the p u b l i c as a r e c o r d s c r e a t i n g person o f f e r s at b e s t c i r c u m l o c u t i o n , and perhaps even i n v i t e s c o n f u s i o n . 1 4 4 A c c o r d i n g l y , s i n c e a t l e a s t the o u t l i n e of a d i r e c t account has a l r e a d y been p r o v i d e d — framed as a d i s t i n c t i o n (understood i n modern democratic p o l i t i e s ) between the p u b l i c as the s o v e r e i g n c i t i z e n s and the p r i v a t e realm of those s u b j e c t t o the s o v e r e i g n , i n d i v i d u a l l y or i n groups — the r e s t o f the d i s c u s s i o n may most p r o f i t a b l y be spent i n 4 See pp. 80-88 above. 117 expanding on, r e f i n i n g , and t e s t i n g t h a t account w i t h i n an a r c h i v a l c o n t e x t . In o r d e r t o move the d i s c u s s i o n forward, i t w i l l be u s e f u l a t t h i s p o i n t t o review the d e f i n i t i o n o f p u b l i c r e c o r d s t o which the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n so f a r l e a d s . As noted, the concept of t he p u b l i c as s o v e r e i g n p r o v i d e s a s u b s t a n t i v e account of . the n o t i o n o f person, which i s fundamental t o the d e f i n i t i o n of p u b l i c r e c o r d s . S l o t t i n g t h i s concept i n t o the a p p r o p r i a t e p l a c e i n the d e f i n i t i o n o f r e c o r d s l e a d s t o a d e f i n i t i o n of p u b l i c r e c o r d s as "documents made or r e c e i v e d i n the conduct of a f f a i r s and p r e s e r v e d by the s o v e r e i g n . " By c o n t r a s t , the c o o r d i n a t e d e f i n i t i o n o f p r i v a t e r e c o r d s f i l l s i n the person "blank" — the l a s t phrase — w i t h "by the so v e r e i g n ' s subj e c t s . " Although c l e a r l y not enough i n i t s e l f t o p r o v i d e as sharp an a n a l y t i c a l t o o l as one would l i k e , t h i s d e f i n i t i o n of p u b l i c r e c o r d s a t l e a s t has the v i r t u e o f o f f e r i n g a s u b s t a n t i v e n o t i o n o f "the p u b l i c . " Some d e f i n i t i o n s do not. Consid e r , f o r example, the d e f i n i t i o n o f p u b l i c r e c o r d s o f f e r e d by t h e o r i s t s o f d i p l o m a t i c s . "A document i s p u b l i c . " from t h i s p e r s p e c t i v e , " i f i t i s c r e a t e d by a p u b l i c person  or by h i s command or i n h i s name, t h a t i s , i f the w i l l d e t e r m i n i n g the c r e a t i o n o f the document i s p u b l i c i n nature." 1* 5 F a i r enough. But what, e x a c t l y , i s a p u b l i c person w i t h i t s p u b l i c w i l l ? The response, e s s e n t i a l l y , i s 1 4 5 Duranti, "Diplomatics (Part III) ," p. 16. 118 t h a t a p u b l i c person i s "a j u r i d i c a l person performing f u n c t i o n s c o n s i d e r e d t o be p u b l i c by the j u r i d i c a l system i n  which the person a c t s . " 1 4 6 In o t h e r words, the p u b l i c must be c o n s i d e r e d as whatever i t i s c o n s i d e r e d as i n any s o c i e t y a t any time. For a r c h i v a l theory, t h i s example from a k i n d r e d d i s c i p l i n e o f f e r s both i n s i g h t and danger. I n s i g h t , f o r two reasons. F i r s t , because i t suggests t h a t t he d e f i n i t i o n of p u b l i c r e c o r d s w i l l v e nture beyond p a r o c h i a l i s m o n l y t o the ext e n t t h a t i t can be a p p l i e d u n i v e r s a l l y — a p o s i t i o n toward which Jenkinson's h i s t o r i c a l s e n s i t i v i t y a l s o l e a d s . And, second, because i t f u r t h e r suggests t h a t a r e a l i s t i c account o f the p u b l i c must come t o g r i p s w i t h the n o t i o n s of a u t h o r i z e d and d e l e g a t e d a c t i o n — as w i l l be s h o r t l y seen. The example p r e s e n t s danger i n t h a t i t tends toward a somewhat a b s t r a c t l e v e l o f theory- D i p l o m a t i s t s r i g h t l y suggest t h a t t he d e f i n i t i o n o f p u b l i c r e c o r d s should aim a t u n i v e r s a l i t y , and t h a t d i f f e r e n t j u r i d i c a l systems w i l l tend t o c h a r a c t e r i z e the p u b l i c i n d i f f e r e n t ways. However, by not d e f i n i n g t h a t concept s u b s t a n t i v e l y , they would seem t o have 1 4 6 Ib id . , emphasis added. To be f a i r , i t should be noted that the author qualif ies this statement by adding that "in so doing, [that public person is] vested with the exercise of some sovereign power." This statement seems to point in the same direction as the present discussion, so that there may not be any real disagreement, f ina l ly , between diplomatic and archival theory on the nature of public persons. However, this qual i f icat ion is given only as a hint in passing. No suggestion is given about what this clause may refer to in substance, the rest of the discussion stressing rather the re la t iv i ty of the concept of public person from one j u r i d i c a l system to another ( i b i d . , pp. 14-18). 119 passed by the o p p o r t u n i t y t o g a i n a c l e a r view o f what remains c o n s t a n t about p u b l i c persons from p o l i t y t o p o l i t y — and, by i m p l i c a t i o n , what as p e c t s o f the concept undergo change. One can o n l y hope t h a t the example i s not u n f a i r o r i n some ot h e r way i n a p p r o p r i a t e ; a f t e r a l l , any concept with p o t e n t i a l l y u n i v e r s a l a p p l i c a t i o n would s u f f i c e . However, the d i p l o m a t i c treatment o f p u b l i c persons s t r i k e s t h i s author i n somewhat the same way as would the s u g g e s t i o n t h a t b e a u t i f u l persons are b e s t c o n s i d e r e d as those persons c o n s i d e r e d b e a u t i f u l i n any g i v e n s o c i e t y . While not h e s i t a t i n g t o agree, and perhaps welcoming the i m p l i c a t i o n t h a t d i f f e r e n t s o c i e t i e s w i l l have d i f f e r e n t n o t i o n s o f beauty, one might none t h e l e s s wonder e x a c t l y what concept the word " b e a u t i f u l " i s meant t o i n d i c a t e . 1 * 7 T h i s danger having been s k i r t e d , the i n s i g h t o f f e r e d by d i p l o m a t i c t h e o r y w i l l have t o be a p p l i e d b e f o r e too lon g . However, as u s e f u l as i t may be t o p r o v i d e a s u b s t a n t i v e d e f i n i t i o n o f the p u b l i c , the a r c h i v a l d e f i n i t i o n o f p u b l i c r e c o r d s a r r i v e d a t so f a r can be improved on. To do so e f f e c t i v e l y r e q u i r e s a second look a t the nature o f provenance 1 4 7 The indication that diplomatists believe both that "public" should be defined relative to any given system and that "there is no clear dis t inct ion between public and private law in any j u r i d i c a l system" suggests a certain ambivalence at the root of the diplomatic treatment of public and private persons ( i b i d . , p. 16). This ambivalence is further suggested by diplomatists' apparent be l ie f that the substantive notion of the concept of person is subject to "philosophic conceptions which may di f fer within the same j u r i d i c a l system" (which seems true enough), while assuming that the forms and procedures enacted by public persons can somehow be discerned as public without a prior substantive definit ion of "public" ( i b i d . , p. 17). 120 which, as noted, l i e s a t the h e a r t of a "person-centered" d e f i n i t i o n o f p u b l i c r e c o r d s . 1 4 8 F i r s t , however, a word of warning. The o v e r a l l e f f e c t i v e n e s s of t h i s approach r e q u i r e s the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of s e v e r a l r e l a t e d concepts, none of which may a t f i r s t seem to bear d i r e c t l y on the q u e s t i o n of the nature of p u b l i c r e c o r d s . Only a f t e r agreement i s reached on the g e n e r a l r e l e v a n c e of these concepts w i l l i t be p o s s i b l e t o apply them d i r e c t l y t o the q u e s t i o n a t i s s u e . As mentioned, provenance i s g e n e r a l l y d e f i n e d by a r c h i v i s t s as the e n t i t y who makes or r e c e i v e s documents i n the conduct of a f f a i r s and p r e s e r v e s them. 1 4 9 L i t e r a l l y meaning o r i g i n or source, "provenance" i s open t o a measure of ambiguity, even among a r c h i v i s t s , because t h e r e are v a r i o u s " s o u r c e s " o f the r e c o r d s they d e a l with, depending on how the term i s d e f i n e d . 1 5 0 C l a r i t y t h e r e f o r e r e q u i r e s a b r i e f attempt a t c o n t r a s t i n g standard a r c h i v a l usage w i t h other r e l a t e d ways of u s i n g the term "provenance." At l e a s t t h r e e senses of provenance as the source of r e c o r d s can be d i s t i n g u i s h e d from standard a r c h i v a l usage. F i r s t , t h e r e i s what might be c a l l e d c u s t o d i a l provenance; namely, the e n t i t y or e n t i t i e s who maintained a p a r t i c u l a r body of r e c o r d s over time. Second, what might be c a l l e d 1 4 8 See pp. 86-87 above. 1 4 9 Ibid. , note 107. 1 5 0 Funk & Waenalls. p. 1085. 121 t r a n s m i s s i v e provenance; namely, the e n t i t y from whom a p a r t i c u l a r body of r e c o r d s was r e c e i v e d i n t o custody by an a r c h i v a l r e p o s i t o r y . 1 5 1 T h i r d , what might be c a l l e d d i p l o m a t i c provenance; namely, the e n t i t y who a c t u a l l y authored the r e c o r d s . 1 5 2 A l l , o r none, of these types o f provenance may c o i n c i d e w i t h a r c h i v a l provenance. Imagine, f o r i n s t a n c e , a government w i t h s e p a r a t e departments o f Edu c a t i o n , A r c h i v e s , and Records Management, the l a t t e r m a i n t a i n i n g a c e n t r a l r e c o r d s c e n t e r f o r t he whole government. A l l t h r e e may be c o n s i d e r e d independent r e c o r d s c r e a t o r s . W i t h i n the Department of Edu c a t i o n , a s e n i o r o f f i c i a l sends a memorandum t o the head of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . The memorandum i s read, a c t e d on, and f i l e d f o r r e f e r e n c e . M a i n t a i n e d over time by the Department, i t i s e v e n t u a l l y t r a n s f e r r e d by an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e o f f i c e r t o the Department of A r c h i v e s as p a r t o f a s e r i e s o f memoranda 1 5 1 This is the sense in which Jenkinson, perhaps unfortunately, seems to have understood the term "provenance" - - summarily dismissing its appl icabi l i ty to the principle that bodies of documents created or received by dist inct entities should be maintained separately (see his Manual, pp. 97-98). Michael Cook comments on Jenkinson's usage in Archives Administration: A Manual for Intermediate and Smaller  Organizations and for Local Government (Folkestone, Kent, England: Dawson, 1977), p. 223, note 9. 1 5 2 Diplomatic provenance is thus akin to what was earl ier called "legal provenance," in that both focus on the entity from which documents are issued (see p. 87, note 108 above). For a precise and illuminating account of what diplomatists mean by "authorship," see Duranti, "Diplomatics (Part III) ." 122 d e a l i n g w i t h o f f i c e p o l i c y and pr o c e d u r e . 1 5 3 In t h i s case, the Department of Ed u c a t i o n made and r e c e i v e d the document i n the conduct o f a f f a i r s ( a r c h i v a l provenance), authored i t ( d i p l o m a t i c provenance), maintained custody o f i t over time ( c u s t o d i a l provenance), and t r a n s f e r r e d i t t o the Department of A r c h i v e s ( t r a n s m i s s i v e provenance). Imagine, on the o t h e r hand, a l e t t e r r e c e i v e d by the same s e n i o r o f f i c i a l from the A t t o r n e y General's Department. I t i s read, a c t e d on, f i l e d , and l a t e r sent t o the Department of Records Management f o r s t o r a g e i n the r e c o r d s c e n t e r . A f t e r a number o f years i t i s sent from the r e c o r d s c e n t e r t o the Department of A r c h i v e s . In t h i s case, the A t t o r n e y General's Department authored the document ( d i p l o m a t i c provenance), the Department o f E d u c a t i o n r e c e i v e d i t i n the conduct o f a f f a i r s ( a r c h i v a l provenance), the Department of Records Management maintained custody o f i t over time and t r a n s f e r r e d i t t o the Department o f A r c h i v e s ( c u s t o d i a l and t r a n s m i s s i v e p r o v e n a n c e ) . 1 5 4 1 5 3 As hinted here, archivists generally deal with series of records rather than individual items. However, a single (and admittedly mundane) record is here used by way of example for the sake of s implicity - - and therefore, one may hope, c l a r i t y . 1 5 4 Several points may be noted from these examples. For one thing, custodial provenance refers primarily to physical rather than legal custody. Presumably, the Department of Education had every right to reca l l the document, or the series of which i t formed a part, from the Department of Records Management at any time. It follows, moreover, that to speak of archival provenance as documents made or received and  preserved by a particular entity implies that "preservation" is used in the legal rather than the physical sense of "maintenance over time." As well , with respect to archival provenance, the notion of "creation" refers only to or ig inal documents that are directed internally and reference 123 Over the ye a r s , t h i s e q u a t i o n o f a r c h i v a l provenance with the p h y s i c a l o r j u r i d i c a l person who makes or r e c e i v e s documents i n the conduct o f a f f a i r s and p r e s e r v e s them has stood a r c h i v i s t s i n good s t e a d . 1 5 5 However, t h e r e i s a t l e a s t one asp e c t o f t h i s e q u a t i o n t h a t has not o f t e n been noted, but m e r i t s c o n s i d e r a t i o n a l l the same. In p a r t i c u l a r , t o put i t i n the form o f a q u e s t i o n : what e x a c t l y i s meant by the phrase, " i n the conduct o f a f f a i r s " ? In the t r a d i t i o n a l d e f i n i t i o n o f a r c h i v e s , t h i s phrase i s i n e x t r i c a b l y t i e d t o the person who makes or r e c e i v e s and p r e s e r v e s documents. "In the conduct o f a f f a i r s " s e r v e s i n f a c t t o h e l p d e f i n e t h a t person, p o i n t i n g toward the l a r g e r sphere o f a c t i v i t y t o which the a c t i o n s o f making or r e c e i v i n g and p r e s e r v i n g documents c o n t r i b u t e . For a r c h i v a l purposes, t h a t i s , persons are t o a l a r g e extent c h a r a c t e r i z e d by the copies of documents that are sent outward from an agency. A carbon copy of the let ter authored by the Attorney General's Department and f i l ed therein would have archival provenance for that Department, whereas the orig inal sent to the Department of Education has archival provenance for the lat ter Department. 1 5 5 Not a l l archivists would agree. One commentator, for example, suggests that archival provenance should be redefined to include custodial and transmissive (but not diplomatic) provenance. The reasoning behind this recommendation seems sound; namely, that the more knowledge archivists have about these several kinds of provenance, the better they w i l l understand the overall h i s tor i ca l and administrative context of the records under their care - - and, in applying that understanding, the better the care they w i l l be able to provide (see Debra Barr, "Protecting Provenance: Response to the Report of the Working Group on Description at the Fonds Level," Archivaria 28 [Summer 1989]: 141-42). None the less, i t seems reasonable to believe that this need for as much contextual knowledge as possible can be stressed while maintaining a clear sense of the kind of provenance that is d i s t inct ly archival . As discussed earl ier , distinctions provide c lar i ty ; they do not imply divorce. 124 k i n d s o f a c t i v i t i e s they are i n v o l v e d i n , a c t i v i t i e s i n which r e c o r d s a re generated as a matter of course. In oth e r words, i f i t i s t r u e t h a t an adequate d e f i n i t i o n o f p u b l i c r e c o r d s must focus on the concept o f person, i t i s e q u a l l y t r u e t h a t , f o r a r c h i v i s t s , persons must be c h a r a c t e r i z e d l a r g e l y by the p a r t i c u l a r areas o f a c t i v i t y i n which they make or r e c e i v e and p r e s e r v e documents. 1 5 6 For convenience, r a t h e r than p r e c i s i o n , these spheres or areas o f a c t i v i t y w i l l from here on be r e f e r r e d t o as " f u n c t i o n s . " Though o f t e n hard t o p i n down, the term i s w i d e l y used by a r c h i v i s t s . 1 5 7 I t would d o u b t l e s s be u s e f u l t o c o n s i d e r a t l e n g t h the r e l a t i o n s between such concepts as a c t i o n , a c t i v i t y , sphere o f a c t i v i t y , f u n c t i o n , and mandate. However, such a d i s c u s s i o n i s not necessary f o r presen t purposes. Here i t i s necessary o n l y t o note t h a t c r e a t i o n , r e c e i p t , and p r e s e r v a t i o n o f documents are s p e c i f i c k inds of a c t i o n t h a t form p a r t o f one or more l a r g e r wholes, and t h a t t h e s e wholes may be c o n s i d e r e d as such because they draw a l l the p a r t s t o g e t h e r toward a common end. 1 5 6 The notion of a sphere or area of act iv i ty , as used here, may be contrasted with the notion of action discussed in the previous chapter. In that ear l ier discussion, the focus was on the specific actions of making, receiving, and preserving documents. Here the focus is on the larger spheres of act iv i ty in which those specific actions take place, and toward which they contribute. 1 5 7 For recent discussions of function, act iv i ty , and related concepts, see Duranti, "Diplomatics (Part III) ," p. 19, note 10; and Frances Fournier, "Faculty Papers: Appraisal For Acquisition and Selection," Master of Archival Studies thesis, University of Bri t i sh Columbia, 1990, p. 17 and note 15, pp. 35-36. 125 These wholes may be o f d i f f e r e n t s i z e s . One may speak, f o r example, o f the f u n c t i o n o f a c q u i s i t i o n w i t h i n an a r c h i v a l agency, and note t h a t the documents v a r i o u s l y comprising c o n t a c t f i l e s and the a c c e s s i o n s r e g i s t e r are a l l c r e a t e d and pr e s e r v e d i n the course o f e x e r c i s i n g t h a t f u n c t i o n . By the same token, one might speak more b r o a d l y o f the f u n c t i o n of the a r c h i v a l agency w i t h i n i t s l a r g e r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e context. In t h i s l a t t e r case, a c q u i s i t i o n (along w i t h a p p r a i s a l , arrangement, d e s c r i p t i o n , and so on) would r e p r e s e n t but a s i n g l e p a r t — perhaps a s u b f u n c t i o n — of the l a r g e r f u n c t i o n o f , say, p r e s e r v i n g (and, by i m p l i c a t i o n , communicating) r e c o r d s . 1 5 8 Given the t r a d i t i o n a l d e f i n i t i o n o f a r c h i v e s (or r e c o r d s ) , " i n t h e conduct o f a f f a i r s " thus p r o v i d e s a k i n d o f shorthand. A r c h i v a l provenance, as assumed by the t r a d i t i o n a l d e f i n i t i o n , means more than simply the e n t i t y who makes or r e c e i v e s and pr e s e r v e s documents. I t a l s o b inds t h a t e n t i t y t o the 158 That these functions, at whatever level , are comprised of actions directed toward a common end seems an acceptable (albeit undemonstrated) assumption for present purposes in that archivists generally speak as though words l ike "acquisition" and, more broadly, "preservation" have some i n t e l l i g i b l e meaning. Since their generality implies that such terms cannot in themselves refer to discrete actions, they must represent a kind of shorthand for composite series of actions. And since archivists seem to refer to goals when using such terms, pointing toward jobs to be done, i t follows that these general words are commonly considered end-directed. See, for example, Canadian Council of Archives, The Canadian Archival  System: A Report on the National Needs and Pr ior i t i e s of Archives (Ottawa: Canadian Council of Archives, May 1989). The f l e x i b i l i t y of the concept of function noted in the present study may be compared to the "maximalist" and "minimalist" views of the concept of fonds noted in Duchein, "The Principle of Provenance in Archives Administration," pp. 90-94. 126 f u n c t i o n i t performs w h i l e i n a d v e r t e n t l y g e n e r a t i n g (making, r e c e i v i n g , p r e s e r v i n g ) such documents. A c c o r d i n g l y , the d e f i n i t i o n o f p u b l i c r e c o r d s can be f u r t h e r r e f i n e d as "documents made or r e c e i v e d and p r e s e r v e d when performing i t s f u n c t i o n o r f u n c t i o n s by the s o v e r e i g n . " Here, however, i t has been noted o n l y t h a t a f u n c t i o n o f some s o r t i s i n v o l v e d . S i n c e i t has t e n t a t i v e l y been determined t h a t the person who generates p u b l i c r e c o r d s i s the s o v e r e i g n , the f u n c t i o n t h a t the s o v e r e i g n performs must a l s o be s p e c i f i e d — j u s t as, a f t e r i t had been determined t h a t a person o f some s o r t generates p u b l i c r e c o r d s , a s u b s t a n t i v e d e f i n i t i o n o f t h a t person had t o be p r o v i d e d as w e l l . B efore t a k i n g t h i s f u r t h e r step, however, i t should be noted t h a t " i n the conduct o f a f f a i r s " does more than simply p o i n t t o the f u n c t i o n performed by r e c o r d s c r e a t o r s . Or perhaps i t would be more s u i t a b l e t o say t h a t the n o t i o n o f f u n c t i o n embedded w i t h i n t h i s pregnant phrase i m p l i e s more than a t f i r s t appears. For, c l e a r l y , t o speak about, say, the f u n c t i o n o f a c q u i s i t i o n performed by an a r c h i v a l r e p o s i t o r y i s not o n l y t o speak about an area o r sphere o f a c t i v i t y . I t i s t o assume, as w e l l , t h a t such an a r c h i v a l r e p o s i t o r y i s i n f a c t t he agency l e g i t i m a t e l y e n t i t l e d t o perform t h a t f u n c t i o n , the agency t h a t a c q u i r e s m a t e r i a l i n the conduct of i t s a u t h o r i z e d o r l e g i t i m a t e a f f a i r s . 1 5 9 1 5 9 Theorists of diplomatics l ink the notions of person and function through the concept of competence, defined as "the authority and capacity of carrying out a determined sphere of act iv i t ies within one function, 127 T h i s concept o f l e g i t i m a c y i s h a r d l y an i n n o v a t i o n . I t was assumed not o n l y i n the example of an a r c h i v a l a c q u i s i t i o n program, but a l s o i n those r e l a t e d t o the Departments of A r c h i v e s , Records Management, Education, and A t t o r n e y General. A f u r t h e r example, v e r g i n g on a b s u r d i t y , w i l l demonstrate how c l o s e l y we do i n f a c t connect the e x e r c i s e o f a f u n c t i o n with the l e g i t i m a t e e x e r c i s e o f i t . Imagine, f o r i n s t a n c e , t h a t "some deranged author o f a Master of A r c h i v a l S t u d i e s t h e s i s " has j u s t taken over the o f f i c e o f a P r o v i n c i a l A r c h i v i s t by f o r c e . 1 6 0 While working i n the A r c h i v e s on c o n t r a c t , t h i s person c o n c e i v e d the n o t i o n t h a t the i n s t i t u t i o n ' s a c q u i s i t i o n program needed " p u r i f y i n g " i n some way — and t h a t t h i s change had t o be made immediately. Having taken the f i r s t s t e p, he attributed to a given office or an individual" (Duranti, "Diplomatics [Part III] ," p. 19, note 10). Although the notion of competence is valuable, the present study links person and function through the similar concept of legitimacy. The latter may be defined for present purposes as the authority and capacity of carrying out a function, attributed to a given physical or j u r i d i c a l person. Though similar to the diplomatic concept of competence, this def init ion of legit icacy employs the term "function" in a broader way (as discussed above- at pp. 123-25), and therefore warrants a different term for the sake of c l a r i t y . Moreover, as w i l l be seen shortly, this study places unequal emphasis on the concepts of authority and capacity within the def init ion of legitimacy, stressing that of authority. Both concepts - - competence and legitimacy - - should be distinguished from the use of the terms "competence" and "legitimacy" in Weber's inf luent ia l work. On the one hand, his discussion of legitimacy bears close resemblance to the concept of legitimacy employed here. On the other hand, however, his notion of competence is far narrower than the diplomatic concept, being closely bound to the legal structure of bureaucracy, part icular ly in the modern world. See Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, trans. A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, ed. Talcott Parsons (New York: The Free Press, 1964), pp. 330-31, 343-44, 360. 1 6 0 The phrase, not the concept of archival propaganda by the deed, is borrowed from Eastwood, "Going Nowhere in Part icular," p. 189. 128 p r e s e n t s a ready-made a c q u i s i t i o n s p o l i c y t o the P r o v i n c i a l A r c h i v i s t , who r e f u s e s t o s i g n i t . The c o n t r a c t a r c h i v i s t then f i r e s t he incumbent, a p p o i n t s h i m s e l f P r o v i n c i a l A r c h i v i s t , and s i g n s the new p o l i c y . C o n s i d e r i n g the new a c q u i s i t i o n s program thus shaped a t gunpoint by a usurper, do we c o n s i d e r the r e s u l t i n g document i n e x a c t l y the same l i g h t as the p r e - e x i s t i n g a c q u i s i t i o n s p o l i c y generated while p e r f o r m i n g the a c q u i s i t i o n f u n c t i o n by the P r o v i n c i a l A r c h i v i s t ? O b v i o u s l y not. And the reason, o f course, i s t h a t we take f o r granted the union between e x e r c i s i n g a f u n c t i o n and e x e r c i s i n g i t l e g i t i m a t e l y . That i s how we expect t h i n g s t o operate i n the normal course o f the conduct o f a f f a i r s ; the word "normal" t a c i t l y q u a l i f i e s "course," and the i m p l i e d norms d e r i v e from the system o f a u t h o r i t y i n which those a f f a i r s take p l a c e . T h i s example, though d o u b t l e s s absurd, p o i n t s toward a u s e f u l p r i n c i p l e — what might be c a l l e d , f o r l a c k o f a b e t t e r term, the p r i n c i p l e o f n u l l i t y . That i s t o say, any document i l l e g i t i m a t e l y made or r e c e i v e d and p r e s e r v e d i n the course o f e x e r c i s i n g a f u n c t i o n i s a r c h i v a l l y n u l l and v o i d , a non-r e c o r d . Whether a p o l i c y document s i g n e d by a usurper, as i n the p r e v i o u s example, or a cheque b e a r i n g the fo r g e d s i g n a t u r e of one o f the s o v e r e i g n ' s s u b j e c t s , such documents are non-r e c o r d s because they have not i n f a c t been made or r e c e i v e d i n t he (normal) conduct o f a f f a i r s . In our system, and almost c e r t a i n l y i n most o t h e r s , such 129 documents are a l s o l e g a l l y n u l l and v o i d . And l e g a l i t y , f o r a r c h i v a l purposes, i s not e n t i r e l y b e s i d e the p o i n t , s i n c e the n o t i o n s o f l e g a l i t y and a r c h i v a l l e g i t i m a c y may be assumed t o d e r i v e , i n any g i v e n system, from the same u l t i m a t e source. The s u g g e s t i o n here, however, i s t h a t the p r i n c i p l e o f n u l l i t y can be understood i n p u r e l y a r c h i v a l terms. For i f the concept o f f u n c t i o n i s e s s e n t i a l t o the n o t i o n o f a r c h i v a l provenance, and f u n c t i o n i s wedded t o the u n i v e r s a l concept o f l e g i t i m a c y , then any document made a t any time o r p l a c e can have a r c h i v a l provenance o n l y i f i t i s made o r r e c e i v e d and p r e s e r v e d i n the l e g i t i m a t e e x e r c i s e o f any gi v e n f u n c t i o n . 1 6 1 A c c o r d i n g l y , s i n c e the a r c h i v a l d e f i n i t i o n of re c o r d s i s bound t o the n o t i o n o f provenance, documents made or r e c e i v e d i l l e g i t i m a t e l y cannot be r e c o r d s i n the a r c h i v a l sense. A r c h i v a l l y , they are non-records, without s t a t u s — n u l l i t i e s . They are s t i l l documents. i n the sense o f recorded i n f o r m a t i o n , because even instruments generated by un a u t h o r i z e d persons s e t down an i n t e l l i g i b l e message capable o f l a t e r r e c a l l . But they a re not r e c o r d s . T h i s a n a l y s i s o f a r c h i v a l provenance has so f a r teased out the elements o f f u n c t i o n and l e g i t i m a c y . Before t u r n i n g t o a d i r e c t a p p l i c a t i o n o f the a n a l y s i s t o the concept o f p u b l i c r e c o r d s , one f u r t h e r element o f provenance r e q u i r e s b r i e f mention. I t w i l l be r e c a l l e d t h a t d i p l o m a t i s t s speak not only 1 6 1 On the universal nature of the concept of legitimacy, see p. 126, note 159 above. 130 o f documents c r e a t e d by a person, but a l s o o f those c r e a t e d "by h i s command or i n h i s name." 1 6 2 Employed here i s the concept o f d e l e g a t i o n o r agency. T h i s n o t i o n has been d e f i n e d as the " r e l a t i o n i n which one person a c t s f o r o r r e p r e s e n t s another by [the] l a t t e r ' s a u t h o r i t y . " 1 6 3 L i k e l e g i t i m a c y , t h i s concept has been assumed throughout the d i s c u s s i o n so f a r . I t i s i n f a c t but one area i n which the broader concept of l e g i t i m a c y can be witnessed i n a c t i o n . For the sake o f e x p o s i t i o n , c o n s i d e r the concept o f agency w i t h i n a modern democratic c o n t e x t . Among o t h e r t h i n g s , i t i s d i f f i c u l t indeed t o even b r i n g t o mind the modern democratic s o v e r e i g n without some n o t i o n o f t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p of d e l e g a t e d a u t h o r i t y . For "the people" ( i n t h i s sense) are r a r e l y seen t o a c t except through the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f t h e i r own u l t i m a t e a u t h o r i t y . As noted, one of these agents o f the s o v e r e i g n — the government — i s o f t e n confused w i t h the s o v e r e i g n i t s e l f f o r the v e r y reason t h a t i t g i v e s t o t h i s a p p a r e n t l y a i r y n o t h i n g a l o c a l h a b i t a t i o n and a name. However, what i s l o o s e l y c a l l e d "the government" — g e n e r a l l y r e f e r r i n g o n l y t o the most obvious m a n i f e s t a t i o n s o f the l e g i s l a t u r e , e x e c u t i v e , and j u d i c i a r y — i s i t s e l f a complex i n s t i t u t i o n comprised o f many o r g a n i z a t i o n a l u n i t s p e r f o r m i n g a wide v a r i e t y o f f u n c t i o n s . A d m i n i s t r a t i o n s , 162 See p. 117 above. 1 6 3 Black's, p. 62. See also Tussman, Obligation and the Body  P o l i t i c . pp. 58-76. 131 a u t h o r i t i e s , boards, bureaus, commissions, departments, and s e r v i c e s may a l l be counted among t h e i r number. 1 6 4 Though e x i s t i n g a t d i f f e r e n t degrees of d e l e g a t i o n from the u l t i m a t e source o f a u t h o r i t y , they a l l partake o f some p o r t i o n o f t h a t a u t h o r i t y , and may t h e r e f o r e be c o n s i d e r e d agents o f the s o v e r e i g n i n t h e i r own r i g h t . 1 6 5 The l o g i c o f d e l e g a t i o n from the s o v e r e i g n a u t h o r i t y can be taken one ste p f u r t h e r . In f a c t , one may i n c l u d e among such p u b l i c b o dies o r agencies a l l s c h o o l s , c o l l e g e s , 1 6 4 Needless to say, t h i s l i s t of organizational forms i s hardly exhaustive. The enormous task of l i s t i n g them a l l , l e t alone determining a s a t i s f a c t o r y c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , may be imagined by noting that one recent study puts the number of governmental units at the l o c a l l e v e l i n the United States at some 81,000 -- comprising an u n i d e n t i f i e d number of forms (see H.G. Jones, Local Government Records: An Introduction to Their  Management. Preservation, and Use [Nashville: American Asso c i a t i o n for State and Local History, 1980], pp. x, 107). 1 6 5 The generic a r c h i v a l term f o r a l l such departments, boards, commissions, and so on -- namely, "agencies" - - i s e n t i r e l y apt (see, for instance, Max J . Evans, "Authority Control: An A l t e r n a t i v e to the Record Group Concept," American A r c h i v i s t 49 [Summer 1986]: 249-61). For, as the term "agent" t y p i c a l l y (and h i s t o r i c a l l y ) r e f e r s to a phy s i c a l person act i n g f o r another (or a j u r i d i c a l person i n the form of a p o s i t i o n ; "the Chief A r c h i v i s t , " as opposed to any given incumbent), the cognate term "agency" may reasonably be ascribed to a j u r i d i c a l person i n the form of an "organization" acting f o r another. Accordingly, "agency" i s the term that w i l l be used from here on to r e f e r to a j u r i d i c a l person ( i n the form of an organization) acting on behalf of the sovereign. That we c a l l many of these agencies quasi - governmental bodies (usually i n the phrases " q u a s i - j u d i c i a l bodies" and "quasi-administrative bodies") doubtless r e f l e c t s to some extent our sense of t h e i r r e l a t i v e distance from the sovereign i n terms of l e g i s l a t e d authority. But i t may also r e f l e c t a measure of confusion about the diffe r e n c e between what i s c a l l e d "the government" and the sovereign -- or, to put i t more exactly, the dif f e r e n c e between those agencies that derive t h e i r powers d i r e c t l y from the c o n s t i t u t i o n , and the source of the c o n s t i t u t i o n i t s e l f . I f , that i s , we are unsure of the exact r e l a t i o n s h i p between the government and the sovereign, while sensing that many boards and commissions do not have equal status with the government, i t may be that we tend to relegate such bodies to the conceptually fuzzy land of "quasi-ness." u n i v e r s i t i e s , h o s p i t a l s , and c o r p o r a t i o n s t h a t u l t i m a t e l y d e r i v e t h e i r mandate (and u s u a l l y a major share o f t h e i r funding) from the s o v e r e i g n — g e n e r a l l y through the i n t e r m e d i a t e a u t h o r i t y o f the l e g i s l a t u r e o r e x e c u t i v e . A l l such agenci e s , because o f the circumstances o f t h e i r c r e a t i o n and c o n t i n u i n g e x i s t e n c e , are u l t i m a t e l y accountable t o the s o v e r e i g n . 1 6 6 The same p r i n c i p l e o f agency through d e l e g a t i o n can be a p p l i e d t o p u b l i c o f f i c i a l s a t a l l l e v e l s . " O f f i c i a l s " may not be the b e s t term t o use, s i n c e the term i s o f t e n a p p l i e d o n l y t o those persons h o l d i n g e l e c t e d o f f i c e , as d i s t i n g u i s h e d from appointees, employees, and so on. From the p e r s p e c t i v e o f t h i s study, however, " p u b l i c o f f i c i a l s " may reasonably r e f e r t o a l l persons i n v o l v e d i n making or r e c e i v i n g documents w h i l e p e r f o r m i n g the f u n c t i o n o r f u n c t i o n s o f an agency o r o f f i c e d e r i v i n g i t s u l t i m a t e a u t h o r i t y from the so v e r e i g n . That t h e r e a re d i f f e r e n c e s between heads o f s t a t e and, say, temporary data e n t r y c l e r k s o r c o n t r a c t a r c h i v i s t s goes without s a y i n g . S t i l l , the p r i n c i p l e o f agency can be a p p l i e d t o them a l l , r e g a r d l e s s o f p o s i t i o n , s i n c e a l l o f them are 1 6 6 The logic of delegation, as the concept is used here, also extends to contractors hired by any such agency to produce goods or perform services on behalf of the agency, because they are themselves (at least under ther terms of the contract) a species of agent (Black's. pp. 62-64, 326) . It w i l l have been noted that the relat ion between the sovereign and organizations l ike universit ies , hospitals, and corporations inevitably changes across societies and over time. In the present context, as pointed out, the concern is with contemporary English-speaking democracies alone. 133 i n v o l v e d i n con d u c t i n g some aspect o f the sovereign's l e g i t i m a t e b u s i n e s s , a t whatever l e v e l o f d e l e g a t i o n . 1 6 7 The n o t i o n o f agency thus broadens and r e f i n e s the concept of a r c h i v a l provenance by extending the n o t i o n o f person. And i t depends f o r i t s v a l i d i t y on the broad concept of l e g i t i m a c y , s i n c e agents can o n l y l e g i t i m a t e l y be such i f the persons f o r whom they a c t not o n l y have the a u t h o r i t y t o d e l e g a t e but a l s o e x e r c i s e t h a t a u t h o r i t y w h i l e performing t h e i r l e g i t i m a t e f u n c t i o n s . As w i t h the concepts o f f u n c t i o n and l e g i t i m a c y , t h a t o f agency has i t s own p l a c e i n the d e f i n i t i o n o f p u b l i c r e c o r d s , which may now be r e s t a t e d as f o l l o w s : "documents made or r e c e i v e d and p r e s e r v e d i n the ( l e g i t i m a t e ) conduct o f i t s f u n c t i o n o r f u n c t i o n s by the s o v e r e i g n o r i t s agents." As shown, the n o t i o n o f a r c h i v a l provenance, based on the concept o f person, i n c o r p o r a t e s the n o t i o n s o f f u n c t i o n , 1 6 7 It must be said that, with regard to the principle of agency, the argument once put forth by a number of archivists that the constitutional nature of the office of President of the United States makes each incumbent's records purely private holds no water (see J . Frank Cook, "'Private Papers' of Public Of f i c ia l s ," American Archivist 38 [July 1975]: 301). After a l l , as pointed out above, a dist inct ion must be made between (a) those agencies or offices that derive their authority direct ly from the constitution and (b) the source of the constitution i t s e l f - - namely, the sovereign c i t izens . With the passing of the Presidential Records Act in the United States and the National Archives Act in Canada, some archivists may have concluded that this issue is now dead, since both acts point toward the public nature of the records of high-ranking o f f i c ia l s . However, i t is useful to reca l l that the winning of battles does not ensure the winning of wars, and that the winning of wars does not ensure the triumph of principles . (For an update on the leg is lat ion mentioned above, see Peterson and Peterson, Law, pp. 15-16; and Charles Mackinnon and Robert Czerny, "Managing the Records of a Minister's Office," The  Archivist 16 [September-October 1989]: 2-4). 134 l e g i t i m a c y , and agency. The f i r s t s t e p toward a p p l y i n g these concepts f u l l y t o the concept o f p u b l i c r e c o r d s w i l l be t o determine the p a r t i c u l a r f u n c t i o n t h a t the s o v e r e i g n performs i n any g i v e n s o c i e t y . "The p u b l i c " having been t e n t a t i v e l y equated w i t h the s o v e r e i g n , t h a t s u b s t a n t i v e d e f i n i t i o n must now be deepened and i t s u n i v e r s a l a p p l i c a b i l i t y demonstrated. Though a l l o w i n g a measure of h i s own b e l i e f s about the nature o f s o v e r e i g n i t y i n a democratic p o l i t y t o shape the e a r l i e r d i s c u s s i o n about s u b j e c t s , c i t i z e n s , and t h e i r r e l a t i o n t o "the people," t h i s author does not want t o c l a i m t h a t t h i s p a r t i c u l a r concept can be t r a n s p o r t e d wholesale a c r o s s the reaches o f time and sp a c e . 1 6 8 I t can be claimed, however, t h a t the f u n c t i o n performed by the s o v e r e i g n c i t i z e n s i n a. democracy today e x i s t s i n v i r t u a l l y a l l s o c i e t i e s . And, i f such a f u n c t i o n e x i s t s , the term " p u b l i c " may reasonably be a p p l i e d t o whatever person, p h y s i c a l o r j u r i d i c a l , e x e r c i s e s t h a t f u n c t i o n i n a g i v e n s o c i e t y , s i n c e t h a t person w i l l be t h e o r e t i c a l l y e q u i v a l e n t t o "the p u b l i c " as the s o v e r e i g n c i t i z e n s i n a democratic p o l i t y . In o t h e r words, 1 6 8 Though not wanting to claim that his own understanding of democratic sovereignity is universally applicable in the present context, this author does not for that reason suggest that some such thesis could not be defended. Among other things, one need only contemplate for a moment the consequences of applying to a l l pol i t ies the idea of the social contract, not as an h i s tor i ca l concept, but as an analytical tool for laying bare the logic of p o l i t i c a l society - - which seems very much to have been what Hobbes and Rousseau were aiming toward, though often interpreted rather differently (see, for example, Morris R. Cohen, The  Meaning of Human History [Lasalle, I l l i n o i s : Open Court, The Paul Carus Lectures Series 6, 1947], pp. 238-45). However, only one thesis can be written at a time, and this author gladly leaves this potential study to a legitimate candidate in p o l i t i c a l philosophy. 135 w h i l e our own concept o f the p u b l i c — as members of modern democratic p o l i t i e s — may not be u n i v e r s a l l y a p p l i c a b l e , the same term may none the l e s s be a p p l i e d t o a l l persons or i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t perform the same f u n c t i o n i n other s o c i e t i e s ; t he term i s our own, the f u n c t i o n u n i v e r s a l . As mentioned, the b a s i c f u n c t i o n performed by the democratic s o v e r e i g n comprised o f a l l c i t i z e n s i s t h a t of governance. Government o f the people (as s u b j e c t s ) , by the people (as c i t i z e n s ) , f o r the people (as c i t i z e n s ) may be a complex and a t times c o n f u s i n g b u s i n e s s i n a democracy, but the same f u n c t i o n i s found i n a l l s o c i e t i e s . However they may be c h a r a c t e r i z e d i n any g i v e n s o c i e t y , r u l e r s and r u l e d are a g i v e n and b a s i c component of the human scene. More p r e c i s e l y , i t can be s a i d t h a t "every s o c i e t y has a p o l i t i c a l system and ... the f u n c t i o n o f every p o l i t i c a l system i s the maintenance o f a s o c i a l o r d e r w i t h i n a t e r r i t o r i a l framework by the e x e r c i s e o f a u t h o r i t y . " 1 6 9 1 6 9 F .H. Hinsley, Sovereignity (London: C A . Watts & Co., 1966), p. 5. This statement is taken to be part icular ly authoritative because i t comes from an expert who Is at pains to deny that the undisputed existence of such p o l i t i c a l systems in a l l societies demonstrates the universality of a certain technical version of the modern concept of sovereignity. He concedes that such systems are universal in order to deny their relevance to the technical notion of sovereignity with which he disagrees. The generic notion of sovereignity employed here is accordingly jus t i f i ed by i t s appeal to the simple fact of an ultimate source of authoritative or legitimate governance, with no technical complications implied. See also S.N. Eisenstadt, The P o l i t i c a l Systems of Empires (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), pp. 5-6, who maintains that this position represents a consensus among scholars across a l l relevant discipl ines; and Posner, Archives in the Ancient World, pp. 3-4. Both authors also delineate what they consider the constant subfunctions into which the broad function of governance may be divided. 136 On t h i s account, i t may be s a i d t h a t the s o v e r e i g n i s the f i r s t and f i n a l a u t h o r i t y i n any g i v e n p o l i t i c a l system; the f i r s t , as the source from which a l l l e s s e r a u t h o r i t y d e r i v e s by d e l e g a t i o n ; the f i n a l , as the l a s t source o f appeal a g a i n s t the a c t i o n s and judgments o f a l l l e s s e r a u t h o r i t i e s . 1 7 0 The key word here i s " a u t h o r i t y , " which d i f f e r s from power because o f i t s l e g i t i m a c y . As one commentator puts i t : " a u t h o r i t y i s the r i g h t t o command, and c o r r e l a t i v e l y , the r i g h t t o be obeyed. I t must be d i s t i n g u i s h e d from power, which i s the a b i l i t y t o compel compliance, e i t h e r through the use or the t h r e a t o f f o r c e . " 1 7 1 To put i t another way, a u t h o r i t y r e p r e s e n t s the l e g i t i m a t e e x e r c i s e o f power. There would seem t o be s e v e r a l c o n s t a n t elements o f such s o v e r e i g n a u t h o r i t y i n a l l p o l i t i e s . Among them may be 1 7 0 Diplomatists complement the notion of competence (discussed above at p. 126, note 159) with that of responsibi l i ty, defined as the obligation to answer for an act (see Duranti, "Diplomatics [Part III] ," p. 8). The concept of responsibil ity is not included in the present discussion, because i t does not apply to the sovereign as defined here. It applies, rather, only to the sovereign's agents. As the f i r s t and f ina l authority in any given pol i ty , the sovereign can never be held responsible, because the obligation to answer can only be borne by an entity that is in some way subordinate to another. Since the supreme authority is in no way subordinate, i t is in no way responsible in this sense. If, for example, a constitutional monarch can be held responsible in some ways, i t cannot for that very reason be considered the sovereign in those particular ways. To the extent that, say, the Queen of England is responsible to Parliament, she is not in fact the sovereign, at least as the concept is defined here. Sovereignity, in this instance, would reside in the citizens of England, on whose behalf Parliament s i t s . In other words, while the present study may in some cases lead away from particular j u r i d i c a l entit ies such as queens and emperors toward a more conceptual view of the sovereign, i t takes seriously the adage that "the king can do no wrong" (cf. Duranti, i b i d . , p. 9). 1 7 1 Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism, p. 4. i n c l u d e d the number o f p h y s i c a l persons o f which the so v e r e i g n i s comprised, the means by which s o v e r e i g n i t y was obtained, the reasons by which i t i s j u s t i f i e d , and the i n t e r e s t s t h a t the s o v e r e i g n s e r v e s . S o v e r e i g n i t y , as a r e s u l t , may take on any number o f forms, depending on how any g i v e n p o l i t y views the s e s e v e r a l elements. The manner i n which the elements are ar r a y e d matters l i t t l e , however, so l o n g as the a u t h o r i t y of the s o v e r e i g n — of the j u r i d i c a l person who performs the r u l i n g f u n c t i o n — i s i n f a c t r e c o g n i z e d as such, i t s p r i v i l e g e d p o s i t i o n accepted as l e g i t i m a t e . 1 7 2 The number o f p h y s i c a l persons c o m p r i s i n g the s o v e r e i g n does not r e a l l y matter, because the f u n c t i o n o f l e g i t i m a t e governance — of a u t h o r i t y — remains i n t a c t whether the s o v e r e i g n i s deemed one person, a group, o r the whole. The k i n g i n a monarchy, the " p a r t y " i n an o l i g a r c h y , and the "people" i n a democracy can a l l be l e g i t i m a t e forms of s o v e r e i g n i t y . The means by which t h a t s o v e r e i g n i t y was o b t a i n e d does not r e a l l y matter, because the f u n c t i o n o f l e g i t i m a t e governance remains i n t a c t whether k i n g , p a r t y , or people a t t a i n e d i t by conquest, r e v o l u t i o n , h e r e d i t a r y endowment, o r common consent — a t l e a s t where such methods 1 7 2 Logical ly , i t would seem, there are two sources of recognition for the sovereign's authority within any given p o l i t i c a l system, one internal and the other external. The recognition may exist within a given pol i ty , by the persons obligated to obey the sovereign, or i t may come from the other sovereigns with which any given sovereign may form part of an international p o l i t i c a l system. In other words, one must look both to constitutional and international law, or their equivalent (where they exist) , for empirical answers to questions about the legitimacy of the sovereign in any given pol i ty . 138 o f a c q u i s i t i o n a re r e c o g n i z e d as l e g i t i m a t e . The means by which t h a t s o v e r e i g n i t y i s j u s t i f i e d does not r e a l l y matter, because t h e f u n c t i o n o f l e g i t i m a t e governance remains i n t a c t — when r e c o g n i z e d — whether a h e r e d i t a r y k i n g appeals t o God, o r t h e l e a d e r s o f a s u c c e s s f u l people's r e v o l u t i o n appeal t o t h e law of nature. The i n t e r e s t s t h a t the s o v e r e i g n serves do not r e a l l y matter, because the f u n c t i o n o f l e g i t i m a t e governance remains i n t a c t — again, when r e c o g n i z e d — whether the people as c i t i z e n s r u l e themselves as s u b j e c t s f o r the common good of a l l , o r the k i n g r u l e s the people as s u b j e c t s f o r h i s own g a i n . 1 7 3 A l l these p o s s i b i l i t i e s demonstrate the v a r i e t y o f forms t h a t s o v e r e i g n i t y may take. But what concerns the p r e s e n t i n q u i r y p r i m a r i l y i s the b a s i c q u a l i t y common t o them a l l : l e g i t i m a t e governance, r e c o g n i z e d as such. 1 7* 1 7 3 A further element could be added at this point; namely, the part icular areas of act iv i ty governed by the sovereign's authority in any given po l i ty - - what might be cal led the subfunctions of governance. As noted above (pp. 131-32), organizations such as schools w i l l be considered public that Is, agents of the sovereign - - wherever governance is taken to include authority over the development of the minds of i t s subjects. Similarly , rel igious organizations w i l l be considered public wherever governance of the s p i r i t is considered a subfunction of the sovereign. For a discussion of the sovereign "teaching power" in democracies, see Joseph Tussman, Government and the Mind (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977). 1 7 4 It seems only fa i r to suggest at this point how such theoretical considerations might possibly be applied to empirical questions. Consider, for instance, the claim made by historians of medieval England that the dis t inct ion between public and private did not exist before, say, the fourteenth century (see Pollock and Maitland, The History of English  Law Before the Time of Edward I. vo l . 2, pp. 230-31; and S.B. Chrimes, An Introduction to the Administrative History of Medieval England. 3rd ed. [Oxford: Blackwell, 1966], pp. 65, 156). Rather than reply with empirical claims, one could ask the following counter-questions, by way of 139 I f i t i s a c c e p t e d t h a t t h i s b r o a d n o t i o n o f s o v e r e i g n i t y p r e s e n t s a r e a s o n a b l e approach t o d e f i n i n g "the p u b l i c , " then t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f p u b l i c r e c o r d s may be r e s t a t e d as f o l l o w s : " a l l documents made o r r e c e i v e d and p r e s e r v e d i n the l e g i t i m a t e conduct o f governance by the s o v e r e i g n o r i t s a g e n t s . " 1 7 5 W h i l e drawing t o g e t h e r many o f t h e c o n c e p t s d i s c u s s e d so f a r , t h i s d e f i n i t i o n o f p u b l i c r e c o r d s cannot y e t s t a n d a lone as a d i s t i l l a t i o n o f t h e p r e s e n t c h a p t e r , l e t a l o n e the e n t i r e s t u d y . The d e f i n i t i o n may be l o g i c a l , g i v e n t h e a n a l y s i s o f p r o v e n a n c e . And i t may be r e a s o n a b l e , g i v e n t h e need f o r a s u b s t a n t i v e d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e p e r s o n who makes o r r e c e i v e s and p r e s e r v e s p u b l i c r e c o r d s . But i t cannot s t a n d a l o n e because i t s t h e o r e t i c a l and p r a c t i c a l u t i l i t y have y e t t o be d e m o n s t r a t e d . To p u t i t b l u n t l y , how much f a i t h can c lar i fy ing exactly what claim i t is that they are making: Does the fact that the king's domains were perceived as merely private demonstrate that no d is t inct ion was in fact made between what "belonged" to the king and what "belonged" to his subjects? Did they recognize a dis t inct ion between ruler and ruled either in principle or in practice; and, i f so, does i t matter substantially i f they recognized such a dis t inct ion but did not use the terms in vogue today? On what grounds, anyway, do we claim that what we c a l l "private" is bound to the quality of "ownership" - - for do we not, to use our own terms, distinguish between what is owned by the public and what is owned by private persons and groups? To ask such questions is not to suggest that the answers to them are self-evident. The questions suggest only that, while theory cannot provide empirical evidence, i t can provide ways to question existing empirical investigations and suggest further l ines of inquiry. 1 7 5 Considering the earl ier discussions about the nature of records and provenance, this def init ion is but an application for present purposes of the various elements that must be accounted for in any definit ion of a subspecies or type of records based on a particular kind of records creator. 140 u l t i m a t e l y be p l a c e d i n l o g i c and reason i f t h e i r products are seen as i r r e l e v a n t t o those who may c o n s i d e r employing them? A c c o r d i n g l y , the remainder o f the d i s c u s s i o n w i l l attempt t o determine, from the concepts developed so f a r , the d i f f e r e n c e s between p u b l i c and p r i v a t e r e c o r d s w i t h i n a number of t y p i c a l s i t u a t i o n s . 1 7 6 As these s i t u a t i o n s are exp l o r e d , i t w i l l be u s e f u l t o bear i n mind a c o r o l l a r y o f the a n a l y s i s so f a r : p u b l i c and p r i v a t e r e c o r d s are mutu a l l y e x c l u s i v e c a t e g o r i e s . Records, t h a t i s , can be e i t h e r p u b l i c o r p r i v a t e , but not both a t the same time; s e m i - p u b l i c and s e m i - p r i v a t e are n o n - e x i s t e n t c a t e g o r i e s o f r e c o r d s . The reason f o r t h i s i s t h a t no re c o r d s c r e a t o r can be both p u b l i c and p r i v a t e a t the same time. No r e c o r d s c r e a t o r can be both p u b l i c and p r i v a t e a t the same time, because r e c o r d s can o n l y be generated through p a r t i c u l a r a c t i o n s s e r v i n g s p e c i f i c f u n c t i o n s . And r e c o r d s can o n l y be generated through p a r t i c u l a r a c t i o n s s e r v i n g s p e c i f i c f u n c t i o n s , because o n l y one a c t i o n can be done a t a time and 1 7 6 This author must confess to being of two minds about this procedure. On the one hand, he is loathe to sully his logical constructions with reference to mere concrete rea l i ty . On the other hand, however, he has spent more hours than he would care to admit studying theoretical works which, while to a certain extent log ica l and persuasive, have fa i l ed to convince because of their almost perverse refusal to deal with concrete rea l i ty . If the latter position is sided with for now, i t is because this author suspects that the former assumes a false dis t inct ion between the theoretical and the concrete, mistaking the concrete for the empirical. The theoretical and the empirical may be dist inct approaches to any subject. But theory can usefully be placed along a continuum from the abstract to the concrete, depending on various factors ranging from i ts own internal necessity to the author's respect for his readers. 141 such a c t i o n s cannot be ambiguous — cannot p o i n t i n two d i r e c t i o n s , s e r v i n g two opposed f u n c t i o n s , a t the same time. Only one such unambiguous a c t i o n can be done a t a time, because o f the nature o f the governing f u n c t i o n t h a t r e s u l t s i n p u b l i c r e c o r d s . The nature o f the governing o r r u l i n g f u n c t i o n i s such t h a t a person cannot both r u l e and be r u l e d a t t he same t i m e . 1 7 7 T h i s p r o p o s i t i o n f o l l o w s from the p r e v i o u s d i s c u s s i o n . For i f , as suggested, t o r u l e i s t o have the r i g h t t o command and, c o r r e l a t i v e l y , the r i g h t t o be obeyed, t o be. r u l e d i s t o have the o b l i g a t i o n t o accept command and, c o r r e l a t i v e l y , the o b l i g a t i o n t o obey. 1 7 8 The r i g h t o f the r u l e r , t h a t i s , can o n l y e x i s t as such i n r e l a t i o n t o the o b l i g a t i o n o f the r u l e d ; r i g h t s and o b l i g a t i o n s e x i s t as o p p o s i t e but necessary and complementary a s p e c t s o f the same phenomenon. And i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o imagine any s i t u a t i o n i n which a person c o u l d both r u l e and be r u l e d a t one and the same time. The unique nature o f democratic p o l i t i e s , which might a t f i r s t g l a n c e be taken as the s t r o n g e s t p o s s i b l e counter example, a c t u a l l y underscores t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n . Consider, f o r example, a d u l y r e g i s t e r e d c i t i z e n a t a p o l l i n g s t a t i o n on e l e c t i o n day, f i l l i n g out a b a l l o t . Few would deny, one may 1 7 7 This impossibil ity, as suggested above, exists only at the level of single actions; action by action, one either rules or is ruled. "To rule," in other words, is a different sort of verb than, say, "to kick," for one can both kick and be kicked at the same time. 1 7 8 See p. 136 above. 142 assume, t h a t t h i s person i s a c t i n g as p a r t of the s o v e r e i g n t r i b u n a l , p erforming one of the c l a s s i c f u n c t i o n s (or s u b f u n c t i o n s ) o f democratic governance. But, as a l l c i t i z e n s of such p o l i t i e s know i n t h e i r bones, the s i t u a t i o n i s somewhat ambiguous. For w h i l e the r e a l q u e s t i o n we are asked t o v o t e on may be whether or not the community needs a new s c h o o l , we may f i n d i t d i f f i c u l t a t times t o d i s s o c i a t e t h i s q u e s t i o n from our i n t e r e s t s as s u b j e c t s — as the ones who w i l l have t o pay f o r the new s c h o o l through a r a i s e i n our t a x e s , even though we have no c h i l d r e n . I t may happen t h a t , when i t comes t o marking the s e c r e t b a l l o t , one chooses t o v o t e a g a i n s t the new s c h o o l because — w e l l , because we may o r may not need i t , but i n c r e a s e d taxes are a burden t h a t may f i n a l l y make b e t t e r e d u c a t i o n f o r the community i r r e l e v a n t , whether we have c h i l d r e n or not ... And so on. A q u e s t i o n asked of a c i t i z e n , i n o t h e r words, i s answered w i t h the h e a r t o f a s u b j e c t . A sad s i t u a t i o n i t may be, i f perhaps not n e c e s s a r i l y a t y p i c a l . J u s t another s m a l l and mediocre democratic tragedy. But what o f the f u n c t i o n s being performed? One b a l l o t i s c a s t , a s i n g l e document c r e a t e d . And t o a l l eyes t h a t b a l l o t was c a s t i n the performance of the g o v e r n i n g f u n c t i o n . A c c o r d i n g l y , i t w i l l r i g h t l y be p l a c e d among the o t h e r b a l l o t s as p a r t o f a s e r i e s w i t h i n the fonds of the a p p r o p r i a t e agent of the s o v e r e i g n . In a s e l f -r i g h t e o u s mood, we may c a r e l e s s l y throw the f i r s t stone, denouncing the b a l l o t as "merely p r i v a t e " •— and so, by the 143 c r i t e r i o n o f i n t e n t i o n , i t may be. But t h a t i s simply the way of democratic p o l i t i c s . We always wear two ha t s , and may or may not l i v e up t o our d u t i e s when performing the r u l i n g f u n c t i o n . But the d u a l i t y o f f u n c t i o n s w i t h i n a l l c i t i z e n s does not i n the l e a s t mean t h a t they can perform both a t the same time. I f one i s v o t i n g , one i s v o t i n g , whatever the i n t e n t i o n t h a t u n d e r l i e s the r e s u l t . The ambiguity i s not i n the f u n c t i o n , but i n our nature as both c i t i z e n s and s u b j e c t s . Consider, a l t e r n a t i v e l y , the case o f a p u b l i c o f f i c i a l i s s u i n g a cheque t o h i m s e l f as a p r i v a t e s u b j e c t o f the s o v e r e i g n . An o f f i c i a l o f the Department o f S o c i a l Welfare, he s i g n s the f a m i l y allowance cheques t h a t the Department i s s u e s each month, and one o f them i s addressed t o him. Not an i d e a l s i t u a t i o n , perhaps, but not i n c o n c e i v a b l e . Though he wears two ha t s , he i s performing a s i n g l e f u n c t i o n a t any g i v e n time — one, as a p u b l i c o f f i c i a l , when he i s s u e s the cheque, and one as a p r i v a t e s u b j e c t , when he cashes i t . P u b l i c o f f i c i a l and p r i v a t e s u b j e c t may e x i s t w i t h i n a s i n g l e person, but o n l y one of them can be c r e a t i n g o r r e c e i v i n g and p r e s e r v i n g any g i v e n document a t any g i v e n time, f o r document-g e n e r a t i n g f u n c t i o n s can o n l y be performed one a t a time and the f u n c t i o n s o f r u l i n g and be i n g r u l e d are mutually e x c l u s i v e . Although i t i s thus i m p o s s i b l e t o generate p u b l i c and p r i v a t e r e c o r d s c o n c u r r e n t l y , i t i s more than p o s s i b l e t o generate them c o n s e c u t i v e l y i n the performance of d i f f e r e n t 144 f u n c t i o n s . Of course, as most working a r c h i v i s t s know, i t i s o f t e n p o i n t l e s s t o t r y t o separate the two f o r purposes of a r c h i v a l d e s c r i p t i o n , s i n c e they are o f t e n found meshed t o g e t h e r w i t h i n a s i n g l e f i l i n g scheme. However, the two can be d i s t i n g u i s h e d t h e o r e t i c a l l y — and perhaps even p r a c t i c a l l y , a t l e a s t by those a r c h i v i s t s who enjoy the lu x u r y o f d e t e r m i n i n g how the p u b l i c and p r i v a t e r e c o r d s o f p u b l i c o f f i c i a l s s h o u l d be c l a s s i f i e d , f i l e d , and scheduled f o r l a t e r d i s p o s i t i o n . C o n s i d e r , f o r example, a common s i t u a t i o n . An a r c h i v i s t i n a medium-sized C i t y A r c h i v e s m a i n t a i n s a v a r i e t y of documents i n a c a b i n e t next t o her desk. For whatever reason, they a re not c l a s s i f i e d as p a r t o f the A r c h i v e s ' c e n t r a l f i l i n g system. The documents may be d i v i d e d i n t o t h r e e broad groups: those r e s u l t i n g from her work f o r the C i t y ; those r e s u l t i n g from her membership i n and work f o r her r e g i o n a l p r o f e s s i o n a l a s s o c i a t i o n ; and correspondence from c o l l e a g u e s . The j o b - r e l a t e d documents, moreover, can be d i v i d e d i n t o two s o r t s o f f i l e s those d e r i v i n g from v a r i o u s p r o j e c t s she has been working on f o r the A r c h i v e s , and those d e r i v i n g from her s e r v i c e on a committee of the C i t y C l e r k , t o whom the C i t y A r c h i v e s r e p o r t s . S i m i l a r l y , the a s s o c i a t i o n - r e l a t e d documents can be d i v i d e d i n t o those d e r i v i n g from her work on the E d u c a t i o n Committee, and those d e r i v i n g from her i n i t i a l a p p l i c a t i o n and c o n t i n u i n g i n d i v i d u a l membership. Which, i f any, o f these documents are p u b l i c r e c o r d s ? A 145 case can be made f o r c o n s i d e r i n g them a l l p u b l i c . For one t h i n g , the a r c h i v i s t i s a l e g i t i m a t e o f f i c e r o f the C i t y , i t s e l f a l e g i t i m a t e agent o f the Sovereign, and the documents were a l l made or r e c e i v e d w h i l e working f o r the C i t y . As w e l l , the documents are p r e s e r v e d i n an agency of the C i t y , i n equipment p r o v i d e d and owned by the C i t y . And, f u r t h e r , the documents a l l e x i s t t o g e t h e r w i t h i n a s i n g l e f i l i n g scheme. \ The case, however, i s not a s t r o n g one. F i r s t o f a l l , as mentioned, the manner i n which documents are f i l e d may pose p r a c t i c a l problems f o r a r c h i v a l d e s c r i p t i o n , but has no b e a r i n g on t h e i r p u b l i c or p r i v a t e nature. Even documents c l a s s i f i e d f o r placement i n the o f f i c i a l f i l e s can be mis-c l a s s i f i e d , and scheduled documents mis-scheduled. We can o n l y know which i s which by employing c r i t e r i a e x t e r n a l t o the means of c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , f i l i n g , and s c h e d u l i n g . Moreover, i f the documents are p r e s e r v e d i n an agency of the C i t y , t h a t does t e l l us t h e i r c u s t o d i a l provenance. But c u s t o d i a l provenance, as d i s c u s s e d e a r l i e r , i s not a t a l l the same as a r c h i v a l provenance, the primary concept f o r d i s t i n g u i s h i n g p u b l i c from p r i v a t e i n a r c h i v a l terms. To urge t h a t the documents a r e housed i n equipment owned by the C i t y may r e i n f o r c e the C i t y ' s c u s t o d i a l r o l e , but says as l i t t l e about t h e i r p u b l i c or p r i v a t e nature as the s t a t u s of the a r c h i v i s t ' s d w e l l i n g — whether rented, borrowed, o r owned — says about her nature as a c i t i z e n o r s u b j e c t or both. 146 Furthermore, w h i l e i t i s reasonable t o c h a r a c t e r i z e the a r c h i v i s t as an o f f i c i a l o f an agency of the Sovereign, t h e r e i s an ambiguity i n s a y i n g t h a t the documents were made or r e c e i v e d w h i l e working f o r the C i t y . The ambiguity l i e s i n the word " w h i l e , " which can r e f e r t o the temporal p e r i o d when a person i s e i t h e r (a) p h y s i c a l l y a t the workplace or (b) engaging i n the work t h a t he or she i s d i r e c t l y p a i d t o do. The argument f o r c o n s i d e r i n g as p u b l i c r e c o r d s a l l documents made o r r e c e i v e d w h i l e working f o r the C i t y equates these two meanings. In some i n s t a n c e s t h i s e q u a t i o n may be j u s t i f i a b l e , but i n many cases i t i s not. There are two angles from which t h i s s u g g e s t i o n can be seen t o be t r u e . On the one hand, many agen c i e s (these days, a t l e a s t ) are s e n s i t i v e enough t o r e a l i z e t h a t a l l o w i n g a t l e a s t a modicum of p e r s o n a l b u s i n e s s t o be conducted on agency time c o n t r i b u t e s t o the w e l l - b e i n g and hence o v e r a l l j o b performance of i t s o f f i c i a l s — whether t h a t means a l l o w i n g the s e c r e t a r y t o accept emergency c a l l s from home, the p r o f e s s i o n a l t o accept c a l l s from f r i e n d s , or the head o f s t a t e t o accept c a l l s from g o l f i n g buddies. On the o t h e r hand, any of these persons may take t h e i r work with them i n the evening, performing i n t h e i r own homes the work t h a t they are d i r e c t l y p a i d t o do — perhaps even t o the e x t e n t o f m a i n t a i n i n g the r e s u l t i n g documents i n t h e i r p e r s o n a l f i l i n g system. Because t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n between p h y s i c a l presence a t the workplace and the performance of o f f i c i a l f u n c t i o n s i s workable i n any number of i n s t a n c e s , 147 those who would draw the meanings t o g e t h e r bear the burden of demonstrating t h e i r case i n any p a r t i c u l a r i n s t a n c e where the d i s t i n c t i o n seems t o them i n a p p r o p r i a t e . C o n s i d e r i n g the a n a l y s i s o f f e r e d i n the p r e s e n t study, the fundamental q u e s t i o n i n the p r e s e n t i n s t a n c e i s t h i s : g i v e n t h a t the a r c h i v i s t makes o r r e c e i v e s these v a r i o u s documents w h i l e p h y s i c a l l y a t the workplace, and t h a t a l l of them are t h e r e f o r e r e c o r d s , i n the performance of what p a r t i c u l a r f u n c t i o n s are they generated — and do those f u n c t i o n s d e r i v e from the s o v e r e i g n a u t h o r i t y or not? The a r c h i v i s t ' s p r o j e c t f i l e s are u n c o n t r o v e r s i a l l y p u b l i c , d e r i v i n g from work t h a t the C i t y i s mandated t o do on b e h a l f o f the Sovereign. So, too, t h e f i l e s d e r i v i n g from the C i t y C l e r k ' s committee, though w i t h a t w i s t . In t h i s case, the a r c h i v a l provenance o f the r e c o r d s i s the C i t y C l e r k ' s Department, not the A r c h i v e s (assuming, again, t h a t both may be c o n s i d e r e d as a g encies i n themselves) . The reason f o r t h i s i s t h a t the a r c h i v i s t , though an employee o f the A r c h i v e s , was performing a f u n c t i o n o f the C i t y C l e r k ' s Department — an u n o f f i c i a l , though perhaps f a i r l y common, form of secondment w i t h i n the l a r g e r c o n t e x t of the C i t y a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . I t may w e l l be t h a t the C i t y C l e r k i s u n i n t e r e s t e d i n t h i s committee member's f i l e s , and t h e r e f o r e makes no e f f o r t t o have them p l a c e d i n her Department's f i l e system. The r e s u l t a n t e f f e c t , however, i s on t h e i r c u s t o d i a l , not on t h e i r a r c h i v a l , provenance. However,, i n the performance o f what f u n c t i o n or f u n c t i o n s 148 were the a r c h i v i s t ' s correspondence and a s s o c i a t i o n f i l e s generated? Without much doubt, the correspondence r e c e i v e d from c o l l e a g u e s must be c o n s i d e r e d n o n - p u b l i c o r p r i v a t e . I t need not be marked "Pe r s o n a l and C o n f i d e n t i a l " t o be so c o n s i d e r e d . For i t does not r e l a t e t o the f u n c t i o n s performed by the C i t y o r the A r c h i v e s . I t c o n s i s t s , r a t h e r , o f t h a t v a r i o u s l y newsy, c o n s o l a t o r y , c o n g r a t u l a t o r y , g o s s i p y and g e n e r a l l y f r a t e r n a l brew of thought and sentiment t h a t c o l l e a g u e s h a b i t u a l l y share w i t h one another. Such correspondence, c l e a r l y , d e r i v e s from the f r e e a s s o c i a t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l c o l l e a g u e s engaged i n a common endeavor. P u b l i c matters may be spoken o f , as i n any c o n v e r s a t i o n . But the v e r y candor o f such shared musings p r a c t i c a l l y ensures t h a t no p u b l i c f u n c t i o n s are be i n g performed. 1 7 9 L i k e h er correspondence, the a r c h i v i s t ' s a s s o c i a t i o n f i l e s must a l s o be c o n s i d e r e d p r i v a t e . The a s s o c i a t i o n i s not an agent o f the Sovereign, because i t s c o n s t i t u t i o n and bylaws w i l l almost c e r t a i n l y have been r e g i s t e r e d w i t h an agency of the S o v e r e i g n under the terms of a S o c i e t i e s A c t . And such r e g i s t r a t i o n , i n our own system, t y p i c a l l y c o n f e r s the r i g h t s and d u t i e s whereby an o r g a n i z a t i o n i s r e c o g n i z e d by the 1 7 9 At least not direct ly . If one colleague is indirect ly examining another for a potential job through such correspondence, i t may be considered manipulatory, but is none the less "off the record." Accordingly, a function of one sort disguised as another must be taken at face value; with regard to archival provenance, the role presented is the role performed. An actual job offer, for example, would most l ike ly require, at some point, an appropriate form of documentation signed over the colleague's o f f i c i a l t i t l e . 149 So v e r e i g n as a l e g a l l y v a l i d s u b j e c t . S t i l l , i f the p r o f e s s i o n a l a s s o c i a t i o n may thus be c o n s i d e r e d a p r i v a t e o r g a n i z a t i o n , t h e r e i s a d i f f e r e n c e between the a r c h i v i s t ' s E d u c a t i o n Committee and p e r s o n a l membership f i l e s . The s i t u a t i o n p a r a l l e l s t h a t o f the a r c h i v i s t ' s p u b l i c r e c o r d s , where one s e t o f f i l e s were generated w h i l e performing a f u n c t i o n o f the A r c h i v e s and the ot h e r w h i l e performing a f u n c t i o n o f the C i t y C l e r k ' s Department. In t h i s case as w e l l , two d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e f u n c t i o n s a re be i n g performed. The E d u c a t i o n Committee, on the one hand, i s a c r e a t u r e o f the p r o f e s s i o n a l body. Having been s t r u c k t o perform a f u n c t i o n o r s u b f u n c t i o n o f t h a t body, i t s e r v e s as one o f i t s ag e n c i e s ; w i t h r e g a r d t o the parent body, i t p a r a l l e l s the r e l a t i o n o f the A r c h i v e s o r the C i t y C l e r k ' s Department t o the C i t y . Hence a l l those who serve on the E d u c a t i o n Committee a c t as o f f i c i a l s o f the a s s o c i a t i o n , and the r e c o r d s they generate i n the conduct o f t h e i r f u n c t i o n must t h e r e f o r e be a r c h i v a l l y " p r o v e n i e n t " from the a s s o c i a t i o n . 1 8 0 I t matters l i t t l e whether the a s s o c i a t i o n c a r e s t o c l a i m any such r e c o r d s f o r i t s own. A f t e r a l l , i t may o n l y be i n t e r e s t e d i n r e c e i v i n g the f i n a l v e r s i o n o f a s e t of e d u c a t i o n a l g u i d e l i n e s ready f o r p u b l i c a t i o n , and may t h e r e f o r e t a c i t l y l e a v e any d e c i s i o n s about the f i n a l d i s p o s i t i o n o f working documents t o the committee members who 1 8 0 Unfortunately for archivists , perhaps, the English language has no accepted adjectival and verbal forms of the noun "provenance." For the sake of economy, the cognate term "provenience" has been drawn on here. 150 m a i n t a i n them c u s t o d i a l l y on b e h a l f o f the a s s o c i a t i o n . S t i l l , the a r c h i v a l provenance o f such r e c o r d s c l e a r l y r e s t s w i t h the a s s o c i a t i o n on whose b e h a l f they were made or r e c e i v e d . In c o n t r a s t t o the a r c h i v i s t ' s Committee r e c o r d s , however, those o f her membership must be c o n s i d e r e d p a r t o f her p e r s o n a l fonds. As a member o f the a s s o c i a t i o n , pure and simple, she performs no f u n c t i o n s o r s u b f u n c t i o n s on b e h a l f of t he a s s o c i a t i o n . The a c t i o n s o f j o i n i n g , p aying annual dues, r e c e i v i n g n e w s l e t t e r s , and so f o r t h are those o f an i n d i v i d u a l member of the o r g a n i z a t i o n . Cheques and l e t t e r s r e c e i v e d from her by the a s s o c i a t i o n form p a r t o f the o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s fonds, whereas r e c e i p t s and l e t t e r s r e c e i v e d by h er from the a s s o c i a t i o n form p a r t o f her p e r s o n a l fonds — j u s t l i k e the pay stubs on her monthly cheques from the C i t y , maintained as evidence o f r e c e i p t i n her own f i l e s . A q u e s t i o n n a t u r a l l y a r i s e s from t h i s s i t u a t i o n . Assume t h a t t he C i t y had a p o l i c y o f supplementing i t s h o l d i n g s o f documents made or r e c e i v e d by i t s agents d u r i n g the e x e r c i s e o f t h e i r f u n c t i o n s through the a c q u i s i t i o n o f p r i v a t e r e c o r d s . What would be the s t a t u s o f the a r c h i v i s t ' s correspondence and membership f i l e s i f , a t the end of a lo n g c a r e e r , they were donated t o the A r c h i v e s ? Would they then be p u b l i c or p r i v a t e ? 1 8 1 I t f o l l o w s from the d i s c u s s i o n so f a r t h a t they 1 8 1 This question is raised in Bernard Weilbrenner, "L'homme politique et ses archives: papiers publics ou prives?" Archives 10 (Decembre 1978): 35-36. 151 would be both. They would be p u b l i c as t o c u s t o d i a n s h i p (and most l i k e l y ownership as w e l l , except perhaps f o r c o p y r i g h t ) . But t h e i r a r c h i v a l provenance would remain p r i v a t e . The q u e s t i o n o f p o s s e s s i o n i s important, but i n no way a f f e c t s the n a ture o f the "person" who made or r e c e i v e d the documents i n the course o f h i s , her, or i t s l e g i t i m a t e f u n c t i o n s . C o n s i d e r another t y p i c a l s i t u a t i o n . An o f f i c i a l o f a c e n t r a l government body, such as the P r i v y C o u n c i l i n Canada, c h a i r s an i n t e r n a l committee on a p r e s s i n g c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a c c o r d . The committee i s charged w i t h s t u d y i n g the p o t e n t i a l consequences of the accord, and p r e s e n t i n g r e l e v a n t c o n c l u s i o n s and recommendations. The o f f i c i a l , as w e l l , knows t h a t the r e c o r d s r e s u l t i n g from the committee's d e l i b e r a t i o n s w i l l not be scheduled f o r c ontinued r e t e n t i o n , so t h a t they can be d e s t r o y e d when they have served t h e i r immediate u s e f u l n e s s . However, c o n s i d e r i n g them of importance t o the n a t i o n a l debate over the a c c o r d t h a t has meanwhile been t a k i n g p l a c e , the o f f i c i a l makes c o p i e s of the r e c o r d s and o f f e r s them t o the N a t i o n a l A r c h i v e s as a d o n a t i o n of p r i v a t e r e c o r d s . The o f f i c i a l i n s i s t s t h a t the r e c o r d s are p r i v a t e because he c r e a t e d them on h i s own as a concerned p r i v a t e person. Are they indeed p r i v a t e r e c o r d s ? F i r s t o f a l l , i t f o l l o w s from the p r i n c i p l e s o f a r c h i v a l provenance and agency t h a t the r e c o r d s generated by the committee are p u b l i c . For they were made or r e c e i v e d by agents o f the Sovereign i n the conduct o f t h e i r l e g i t i m a t e 152 f u n c t i o n or s u b f u n c t i o n . But what o f the c o p i e s made by the chairman of the committee and o f f e r e d t o the A r c h i v e s ? I t f o l l o w s from the e a r l i e r d i s c u s s i o n of provenance t h a t these documents are p r i v a t e by t r a n s m i s s i o n , s i n c e the chairman o f f e r e d them t o the A r c h i v e s i n h i s p r i v a t e c a p a c i t y ; he was not a u t h o r i z e d t o do so on b e h a l f of the committee. However, because they were not a u t h o r i z e d , i t f o l l o w s from the a r c h i v a l p r i n c i p l e o f n u l l i t y t h a t the c o p i e s are not even r e c o r d s . A r c h i v a l l y , they are non-records. The o f f i c i a l was a b l e t o make c o p i e s of them o n l y because he had access t o them i n h i s c a p a c i t y as an agent of the Sovereign. As a p r i v a t e person, they were e n t i r e l y beyond h i s reach; they c o u l d never have been generated i n the course of h i s l e g i t i m a t e p e r s o n a l f u n c t i o n s . In making the c o p i e s f o r d i s s e m i n a t i o n , the o f f i c i a l was performing an i l l e g i t i m a t e f u n c t i o n or s u b f u n c t i o n o f the Sovereign, s i n c e the r e c o r d s were not meant t o be r e t a i n e d — l e t alone d i s s e m i n a t e d — a f t e r t h e i r immediate u s e f u l n e s s t o o t h e r agents of the S o v e r e i g n had been exhausted. A c c o r d i n g l y , the non-records o f f e r e d by the o f f i c i a l t o the A r c h i v e s may be c o n s i d e r e d s p u r i o u s p u b l i c r e c o r d s masquerading as p r i v a t e r e c o r d s . But what i f the o f f i c i a l had o f f e r e d those c o p i e s t o a newspaper and, a f t e r some y e a r s , they had been donated t o the A r c h i v e s as p a r t of the newspaper's fonds? What, then, would t h e i r s t a t u s be (assuming t h a t the newspaper's fonds may be taken as a l e g i t i m a t e l y p r i v a t e body o f r e c o r d s ) ? One's f i r s t 153 impulse might be t o urge t h a t , though i t would l i k e l y be more d i f f i c u l t t o a r r i v e a t i n p r a c t i c a l terms, the v e r d i c t would remain the same: a r c h i v a l l y , the documents are n u l l and v o i d , s p u r i o u s p u b l i c r e c o r d s . While b e i n g p r i v a t e by c u s t o d i a n s h i p and t r a n s m i s s i o n , t h a t i s , they would remain n u l l i t i e s by the c r i t e r i o n o f a r c h i v a l provenance. T h i s answer, though reasonable, i s incomplete. For i t does not take i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n the nature of e n c l o s u r e s or annexations, r e c o r d e d i n f o r m a t i o n of any s o r t ( t h a t i s , "documents" as e a r l i e r d efined) a t t a c h e d t o a genuine r e c o r d . T y p i c a l l y , i t may be assumed, the c o p i e d committee r e c o r d s would be sent t o the newspaper as an e n c l o s u r e t o a c o v e r i n g l e t t e r . Such a l e t t e r may or may not i d e n t i f y the sender, but would l i k e l y d e s c r i b e the g e n e s i s of the c o p i e s and o u t l i n e the supposed importance of the i n f o r m a t i o n recorded i n them. S i n c e p a r t of a newspaper's b u s i n e s s i s t o g a t h e r such sources f o r p o t e n t i a l a r t i c l e s , the a r c h i v a l provenance of the l e t t e r i t s e l f must be p l a c e d w i t h the newspaper; i t was r e c e i v e d i n the l e g i t i m a t e conduct o f one o f the newspaper's f u n c t i o n s . The c o p i e d documents e n c l o s e d w i t h the l e t t e r must be c o n s i d e r e d an i n t e g r a l p a r t o f i t , completing the documentary t r a n s m i s s i o n from sender t o r e c e i v e r . 1 8 2 Here i t i s important t o note t h a t , whatever i t s o r i g i n a l s t a t u s , a document i n c l u d e d as an e n c l o s u r e t o another takes on the Jenkinson, Manual. pp. 4-7. 154 a r c h i v a l provenance o f the l a t t e r . 1 8 3 In the present i n s t a n c e , documents t h a t would be c o n s i d e r e d non-records i n a r c h i v a l terms from the circumstances o f t h e i r c r e a t i o n by the o f f i c i a l — a t l e a s t i n the form i n which they were o f f e r e d t o the N a t i o n a l A r c h i v e s — must be judged as an ( o r i g i n a l l y s p u r i ous) e n c l o s u r e t o a genuine p r i v a t e r e c o r d when sent t o and r e c e i v e d by a newspaper. The f o r e g o i n g s i t u a t i o n s are meant t o i l l u s t r a t e s e v e r a l t y p i c a l d i f f e r e n c e s and r e l a t i o n s between the g e n e s i s of p u b l i c and p r i v a t e r e c o r d s . While f a r from e x h a u s t i v e , they do employ most o f the concepts d i s c u s s e d i n t h i s chapter, and sample a range o f a l t e r n a t i v e s i t u a t i o n s . Among the l a t t e r , c o n s i d e r a t i o n has been g i v e n t o the f o l l o w i n g : how a v a r i e t y 1 8 3 Note should be taken of what l i es in the background of this statement. The present study assumes, from the ear l ier analysis of both records and provenance, that the archival provenance of any given record can change over time - - with one fundamental qual i f icat ion. As an or ig ina l , a document can have but a single provenance, the person who made or received i t in the course of h is , her, or i t s legitimate functions; only as an enclosure or annexation to a subsequent original document can the archival provenance of such a document change. The principle behind this statement, though i ts exegesis would lead the discussion too far af ie ld at the present juncture, may be stated dogmatically as follows: for any given documentary transaction, an original document exists; and no document can be an original part of more than one complete documentary transaction. Accordingly, even a genuine public record leaked to a newspaper would take on the private provenance of the newspaper. The legal concept of replevin may assume that the ownership of any document or ig ina l ly made or received in the conduct of the sovereign's legitimate functions remains the property of the sovereign. Archival ly , however, at least in terms of the present study, i t s provenance can change. Having said this , however, one must immediately note that documentary transactions can take on enormous variety and complexity within a bureaucratic environment (see Duranti, "Diplomatics [Part II] ," pp. 13-14). The principle of "one transaction, one orig inal document" should therefore be used with caution. (On the concept of or ig ina l i ty , see Duranti, "Diplomatics" rArchivaria 281: 18-21.) 155 o f p u b l i c and p r i v a t e r e c o r d s can be generated by a s i n g l e person w h i l e performing d i v e r g e n t r o l e s ; how a s i n g l e p u b l i c person can generate non-records d e r i v e d from p u b l i c r e c o r d s but masquerading as p r i v a t e r e c o r d s ; how, over time, non-r e c o r d s can p o t e n t i a l l y become p a r t o f a body of p r i v a t e r e c o r d s ; and how p u b l i c r e c o r d s can become p a r t o f a body of p r i v a t e r e c o r d s , t a k i n g on t h e i r provenance. 1 8 4 These s i t u a t i o n s can be rounded out by a b r i e f examination of the r e l a t i o n s between two persons, one p u b l i c and one p r i v a t e , making or r e c e i v i n g documents i n the course o f t h e i r l e g i t i m a t e f u n c t i o n s w h i l e s h a r i n g a common database. Imagine, f o r example, the Department o f Energy i n a p r o v i n c e dependent on the h e a l t h o f the o i l i n d u s t r y . One of i t s f u n c t i o n s o r s u b f u n c t i o n s might be t o keep t r a c k o f both p u b l i s h e d and "grey" l i t e r a t u r e r e l e v a n t t o the i n d u s t r y , and t o p r o v i d e p e r i o d i c l i s t s f o r i t s own r e s e a r c h e r s . 1 8 5 A major o i l company i n the p r o v i n c e , wholly owned by p r i v a t e 1 8 4 To be exhaustive here would require, among other things, the description of situations where the opposite results may occur; that i s , where the roles of public and private in each of the situations were reversed, so that (for example) i t could be shown how private records can take on the provenance of public records in certain circumstances. Although confident that the present analysis could support such exhaustive exemplification, this author has hesitated to do so for fear of needlessly bloating this study, while hoping that a set of representative situations w i l l be enough to c lar i fy the overall argument. 1 8 5 Grey l i terature has been defined by one commentator as material not available through normal bookselling channels. See David N. Wood, "Management of Grey Literature," in Management of Recorded Information:  Converging Discipl ines: Proceedings of the International Council on  Archives' Symposium on Current Records: National Archives of Canada.  Ottawa. May 15-17 1989. comp. Cynthia J . Durance (Mlinchen: K.G. Saur, 1990), pp. 61-62. 156 persons, a l s o t r i e s t o keep t r a c k o f such m a t e r i a l f o r i t s own purposes. R e a l i z i n g t h a t each has ready access t o m a t e r i a l t h a t might not be q u i t e so r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e t o the ot h e r when they work alone, the two de c i d e t o j o i n t l y fund and c o n t r i b u t e e n t r i e s t o a common database t h a t both may e x t r a c t i n f o r m a t i o n from f o r t h e i r own purposes a t any g i v e n t i m e . 1 8 6 What would be the s t a t u s o f the l i s t s e x t r a c t e d by each? Though the t o t a l i t y o f i n f o r m a t i o n i n the database would be j o i n t l y owned. i t f o l l o w s from d i s c u s s i o n s e a r l i e r i n t h i s c h a p t e r t h a t the a r c h i v a l provenance o f the l i s t s e x t r a c t e d from i t would n e c e s s a r i l y d i v e r g e . Those e x t r a c t e d by the Department o f Energy would be p u b l i c ; those by the o i l company, p r i v a t e . The database i t s e l f c o n s i s t s o f documents — r e c o r d e d i n f o r m a t i o n — r a t h e r than r e c o r d s . Only as the l i s t s a r e e x t r a c t e d i n the course o f t h e i r d i v e r g e n t f u n c t i o n s by each o r g a n i z a t i o n do they become r e c o r d s ; and, as re c o r d s , they r e f l e c t t he p u b l i c o r p r i v a t e nature o f the "person" who made o r r e c e i v e d them i n the conduct o f h i s , her, o r i t s l e g i t i m a t e f u n c t i o n s . The database i t s e l f may be co n s i d e r e d both p u b l i c and p r i v a t e through ownership; the rec o r d s e x t r a c t e d from i t , e i t h e r p u b l i c o r p r i v a t e by the c r i t e r i o n o f a r c h i v a l provenance. 1 8 6 Since the material so gathered by either organization could lead to disagreement among archivists about whether i t is genuinely archival or gathered merely as reference material, let i t be exp l i c i t l y assumed - -as hinted at above - - that both the Department of Energy and the o i l company have directed their l ibrary , or "intelligence gathering," sections to generate l i s t s of material for internal c irculat ion; that i s , such l i s t s are genuine operational records for both organizations. 157 T h i s l a s t s i t u a t i o n , l i k e the ones p r e v i o u s l y examined, h a r d l y exhausts a l l the v a r i o u s p o s s i b i l i t i e s . Nor i s i t meant t o . The p r e v i o u s few pages mark an attempt t o i l l u s t r a t e the main concepts examined e a r l i e r i n t h i s chapter, and t o demonstrate t h a t one's approach t o such s i t u a t i o n s depends as much on the concept o f r e c o r d s one ho l d s as on one' s view o f the nature of the person o r persons who generate p u b l i c r e c o r d s . I t i s a l s o hoped t h a t such i l l u s t r a t i o n s have shown a t l e a s t some of the u t i l i t y o f the o v e r a l l argument p r e s e n t e d i n t h i s study, which may be s t a t e d as f o l l o w s : p u b l i c r e c o r d s can b e s t be understood as documents made or r e c e i v e d and p r e s e r v e d i n the l e g i t i m a t e conduct o f governance by the s o v e r e i g n o r i t s agents. CONCLUSION The s u b j e c t o f p u b l i c r e c o r d s , of c e n t r a l importance t o many a r c h i v i s t s , i s l a r g e and complex. As such, i t i n v i t e s many q u e s t i o n s from many angl e s . Because i t i s u n l i k e l y t h a t such a s u b j e c t can be encompassed e m p i r i c a l l y , a study o f such r e c o r d s intended t o be of use t o a r c h i v i s t s may reasonably a p p l y the method o f a r c h i v a l t h e o r y . For the r e s u l t s o f such a broad study can be a p p l i e d t o a wide range of concerns, and p r o v i d e a b a s i s f o r a v a r i e t y o f d e t a i l e d e x p l o r a t i o n s . Because North American a r c h i v i s t s do not share a common view of a r c h i v a l theory, however, and because such a method may seem unorthodox, i t was necessary t o o u t l i n e the view of a r c h i v a l t h e o r y u n d e r l y i n g t h i s t h e s i s . I t was suggested, a c c o r d i n g l y , t h a t the n o t i o n o f a r c h i v a l t h e o r y as the a n a l y s i s o f i d e a s can p r o v i d e a d i s t i n c t and comprehensive account o f a r c h i v a l s t u d i e s , i s capable o f advancing the a r c h i v a l p r o f e s s i o n i n t e l l e c t u a l l y , and complements a r c h i v i s t s ' use of h i s t o r y and o t h e r l a r g e l y e m p i r i c a l approaches t o a r c h i v a l q u e s t i o n s . T h i s concept o f a r c h i v a l t h e o r y having been s e t f o r t h , the d i s c u s s i o n o f r e c o r d s began by b r i e f l y examining etymology and h i s t o r i c a l usage. A f t e r t h i s , the common a r c h i v a l meanings of " r e c o r d s " were p l a c e d i n a h i e r a r c h y o f terms comprising i n t e l l i g e n c e , i n f o r m a t i o n , documents, and r e c o r d s . The n o t i o n o f r e c o r d s as documents made o r r e c e i v e d i n the conduct of 158 159 a f f a i r s was then c o o r d i n a t e d w i t h the t r a d i t i o n a l d e f i n i t i o n o f a r c h i v e s , which i s l a r g e l y s i m i l a r . T h i s concept was a l s o c o n t r a s t e d w i t h S c h e l l e n b e r g • s d e f i n i t i o n o f a r c h i v e s as r e c o r d s judged worthy o f permanent p r e s e r v a t i o n f o r r e f e r e n c e or r e s e a r c h and d e p o s i t e d i n an a r c h i v a l i n s t i t u t i o n . A f t e r a l e n g t h y d i s c u s s i o n , i t was determined t h a t the t r a d i t i o n a l d e f i n i t i o n of a r c h i v e s o f f e r s a l l t h a t S c h e l l e n b e r g 1 s does and more. I t was concluded, as a r e s u l t , t h a t r e c o r d s are best c o n s i d e r e d as a r c h i v e s i n the t r a d i t i o n a l understanding. The study then went on t o examine the nature of p u b l i c r e c o r d s . A f t e r re-examining the l o g i c a l h i e r a r c h y of a r c h i v a l terms s e t out e a r l i e r , i t was determined t h a t p u b l i c records are b e s t c o n s i d e r e d as a s u b s p e c i e s or type of r e c o r d s based on the concept o f person. T h i s concept, i t was demonstrated, p r o v i d e s a l o g i c a l b r i d g e between the concepts of r e c o r d s and p u b l i c r e c o r d s . More s p e c i f i c a l l y , i t was shown t h a t the provenance-based n o t i o n o f person i n h e r i n g i n the d e f i n i t i o n o f r e c o r d s o f f e r s the o n l y reasonable c r i t e r i o n f o r moving from r e c o r d s t o p u b l i c r e c o r d s through the d i v i s i o n of the concept o f r e c o r d s i n t o i t s s u b c a t e g o r i e s . Given t h i s framework, a s u b s t a n t i v e d e f i n i t i o n of p u b l i c r e c o r d s was then o f f e r e d . A f t e r examining common language and s t a n d a r d a r c h i v a l d e f i n i t i o n s , i t was c l a i m e d t h a t "the p u b l i c " as a r e c o r d s c r e a t i n g person can b e s t be d e f i n e d as the s o v e r e i g n , i n c o n t r a s t t o p r i v a t e persons and o r g a n i z a t i o n s c o n s i d e r e d as the s o v e r e i g n ' s s u b j e c t s . T h i s 160 c l a i m was then s u b j e c t e d t o the c r i t i c s , from whose arguments i t emerged unscathed, and c o n t r a s t e d w i t h Jenkinson's c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f p u b l i c r e c o r d s , which was found wanting. The e q u a t i o n o f the p u b l i c w i t h the s o v e r e i g n was then expanded on, r e f i n e d , and t e s t e d w i t h i n an a r c h i v a l context. C o n s i d e r a t i o n was f i r s t g i v e n t o the n o t i o n o f provenance, the a r c h i v a l v e r s i o n o f which was c o n t r a s t e d w i t h the concepts of provenance as c u s t o d i a n s h i p , t r a n s m i s s i o n , and c r e a t i o n . The a r c h i v a l n o t i o n o f provenance was then shown t o i n c l u d e the concepts o f f u n c t i o n , l e g i t i m a c y , and agency. As a r e s u l t , i t was concluded t h a t p u b l i c r e c o r d s can be d e f i n e d as documents made o r r e c e i v e d i n the l e g i t i m a t e conduct o f i t s f u n c t i o n o r f u n c t i o n s by the s o v e r e i g n o r i t s agents. T h i s d e f i n i t i o n was then deepened by showing t h a t the f u n c t i o n o f the s o v e r e i g n i s governance, and t h a t t h i s i s so a t a l l times and p l a c e s . 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APPENDIX ACCESS TO INFORMATION In c h a p t e r 3, the attempt t o p r o v i d e a s u b s t a n t i v e d e f i n i t i o n o f "the p u b l i c " l e d t o e q u a t i n g i t wit h the s o v e r e i g n . And some e f f o r t was made t o e l a b o r a t e on and t e s t t h a t e q u a t i o n . However, the t h e o r e t i c a l u t i l i t y o f any concept d e r i v e s p a r t l y from i t s a b i l i t y t o frame r e l a t e d i s s u e s i n new and e f f e c t i v e ways. Toward t h i s end, the reader i s i n v i t e d t o c o n s i d e r the n o t i o n o f access t o i n f o r m a t i o n from the p e r s p e c t i v e o f the p u b l i c as s o v e r e i g n . As was mentioned e a r l i e r , p u b l i c r e c o r d s a re commonly d e f i n e d by a r c h i v i s t s not o n l y as government r e c o r d s but as r e c o r d s "open t o " the p u b l i c as w e l l . While the former n o t i o n i s somewhat more common than the l a t t e r these days, i t was not always so. In f a c t , u n t i l the middle o f the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y i n Great B r i t a i n , " p u b l i c " r e c o r d s r e f e r r e d e x c l u s i v e l y t o those open t o i n s p e c t i o n by "the p u b l i c " c o n s i d e r e d as the aggregate o f the s o v e r e i g n ' s s u b j e c t s . Such r e c o r d s were t r a d i t i o n a l l y r e f e r r e d t o as "the people's e v i d e n c e s " — the source on which a l l s u b j e c t s might draw as evidence o f r i g h t s r e q u i r i n g e s t a b l i s h m e n t o r defense a g a i n s t e i t h e r the Crown or o t h e r s u b j e c t s . 1 1 Great Br i ta in , Public Record Office, F i r s t Report of the Deputy  Keeper of the Public Records (London, 1840), p. 67. Comment on the changing usage of "public records" during the nineteenth century w i l l be found in the Grigg Report, pp. 8-9 (for a f u l l bibliographical c i tat ion of which see p. 4, note 6 above). For the archival def init ion of "public" 176 177 However, w i t h the r i s i n g c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f a democratic p o l i t y i n the wake of the American and French r e v o l u t i o n s over the p a s t hundred and f i f t y y e a r s , the n o t i o n o f "the people's e v i d e n c e s " has s l o w l y expanded. Records once c o n s i d e r e d open t o the p u b l i c as i n d i v i d u a l s u b j e c t s o f the s o v e r e i g n a re now, w i t h a c c e s s t o (or "freedom of") i n f o r m a t i o n a c t s , a l s o seen as open t o the p u b l i c as c i t i z e n s h o l d i n g membership i n the s o v e r e i g n t r i b u n a l . While s t i l l p r o v i d i n g evidence about the r i g h t s o f i n d i v i d u a l s , t h a t i s , such r e c o r d s a re now seen as p r o v i d i n g c i t i z e n s w i t h evidence o f the work performed on t h e i r b e h a l f and i n t h e i r name by t h e i r d e l e g a t e d agents. P u b l i c r e c o r d s , i t might be s a i d , a re now seen as the a r s e n a l o f the p o l i s — the m a t e r i a l means by which f r e e c i t i z e n s g a i n much of the i n f o r m a t i o n necessary t o " e x e r c i s e judgment on b e h a l f o f a c o n s c i o u s l y s e l f - g o v e r n e d community." 2 Such, a t any r a t e , i s a reasonable i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of r e c e n t f e d e r a l a c t s i n the U n i t e d S t a t e s and Canada from the p o i n t o f view adopted i n t h i s study — namely, the p u b l i c as as records accessible to the public, see p. 96, note 120 above. 2 Graham Wallas, as quoted in Tussman, Obligation and the Body  P o l i t i c . p. 10. While expressing his fa i th that truth w i l l always win out in a f a i r f ight, which one need not share, James Madison once expressed something close to this idea when he urged that: "A popular Government without popular information, or the means of acquiring i t , is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both. Knowledge w i l l forever govern ignorance: And a people who mean to be their own Governors must arm themselves with the power which Knowledge gives" (as quoted in Arthur Schleisinger, J r . , "Foreward," The Records of Federal Off ic ia l s :  A Selection of Materials from the National Study Commission on Records and  Documents of Federal Of f i c ia l s , ed. Anna Kasten Nelson [New York: Garland Publishing, 1978], p. ix ) . 178 the s o v e r e i g n . These a c t s — thedJ.S. Freedom of Information  A c t and the Canadian Access t o I n f o r m a t i o n Act — are i n s t r u c t i v e i n both t h e i r s i m i l a r i t i e s and d i f f e r e n c e s . 3 The main s i m i l a r i t i e s between the two a c t s r e s i d e i n the b a s i c p r i n c i p l e on which they are founded and i n the way t h a t they q u a l i f y t h a t p r i n c i p l e . Both a c t s adopt the p r i n c i p l e t h a t a l l " i n f o r m a t i o n " generated by the e x e c u t i v e branch of government s h o u l d be open t o "the p u b l i c " from the moment of c r e a t i o n o r r e c e i p t . Access t o i n f o r m a t i o n i s thus seen as a r i g h t , not a p r i v i l e g e , from which i t f o l l o w s t h a t any w i t h h o l d i n g of such i n f o r m a t i o n must be c l e a r l y j u s t i f i e d . In s e t t i n g out the c a t e g o r i e s of " i n f o r m a t i o n " t h a t are exempt from immediate access, and thereby q u a l i f y i n g the p r i n c i p l e of openness, the two a c t s are a l s o s i m i l a r . Both o u t l i n e a number of exempt c a t e g o r i e s which f a l l w i t h i n two broad areas where c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y i s deemed necessary: s e n s i t i v e areas o f p o l i c y and procedure r e l a t i n g t o the f u n c t i o n i n g o f the government, such as n a t i o n a l defense and law enforcement; and the p e r s o n a l l i v e s and commercial a f f a i r s o f i n d i v i d u a l s . * In these two areas of exemption from the p r i n c i p l e o f immediate access are found once aga i n the d i s t i n c t i o n between the p u b l i c as the s o v e r e i g n , whose 35 United States Code. Sec. 332; Revised Statutes of Canada 1985, Ch. A - l . * See Peterson and Peterson, Law, pp. 45-60; and Robert J . Hayward, "Federal Access and Privacy Legislation and the Public Archives of Canada," Archivaria 18 (Summer 1984): 50. 179 d e l e g a t e d agents r e q u i r e a sphere o f c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y i n order t o c a r r y out t h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , and the p u b l i c as the aggregate o f the s o v e r e i g n ' s s u b j e c t s , i n d i v i d u a l l y and i n c o r p o r a t e groups, who r e q u i r e a measure of p r i v a c y i n order t o c a r r y on t h e i r l a w f u l a f f a i r s without undue i n t r u s i o n . The d i s t i n c t i o n between these two senses o f "the p u b l i c " a l s o s u r f a c e s i n the s t i p u l a t i o n s l a i d down about who s h a l l be g r a n t e d such a c c e s s . On t h i s s c o r e , the two a c t s seem t o d i f f e r . The American a c t i s wide open, s t a t i n g t h a t v i r t u a l l y anyone and everyone should be gran t e d f r e e access t o government i n f o r m a t i o n . The Canadian a c t , on the othe r hand, l i m i t s t h i s r i g h t t o c i t i z e n s and permanent r e s i d e n t s . 5 T h i s d i f f e r e n c e i s o n l y apparent, f o r the two a c t s c o u l d not be founded on the same b a s i c p r i n c i p l e and y e t d i f f e r on the cat e g o r y o f persons t o whom t h a t p r i n c i p l e i s a p p l i e d . Whatever the reason f o r the d i f f e r e n c e , i t seems c l e a r t h a t the American a c t may perhaps be worded more generously than the Canadian, but t h a t the Canadian a c t i s more p r e c i s e , r e l a t i n g t h e p r i n c i p l e o f f r e e access t o government i n f o r m a t i o n d i r e c t l y t o the category o f persons t o whom such a c c e s s a p p l i e s — and thereby c l a r i f y i n g the b a s i c p r i n c i p l e . To put i t s u c c i n c t l y , the Canadian p r o v i s i o n t h a t access t o 5 "Permanent residents," that i s , as defined in the Immigration Act, which l imits this category to persons who (a) have been granted landing (defined as "lawful permission to come into Canada to establish permanent residence"), (b) have not become Canadian c i t izens , and (c) have not ceased to be permanent residents (Revised Statutes of Canada 1985, Ch. I-2, Sec. 2). 180 i n f o r m a t i o n a p p l i e s o n l y t o c i t i z e n s and permanent r e s i d e n t s sends a c l e a r message t h a t such access i s both warranted and d e s i r a b l e i n or d e r t h a t the s o v e r e i g n c i t i z e n s may t r u l y have the means t o govern themselves. 6 In o t h e r words, access t o i n f o r m a t i o n i s a r i g h t of c i t i z e n s , not s u b j e c t s . The members of the s o v e r e i g n t r i b u n a l have an unch a l l e n g e d r i g h t t o i n f o r m a t i o n generated by t h e i r agents, because t h a t i n f o r m a t i o n i s generated i n t h e i r name. To extend t h a t r i g h t t o s u b j e c t s and f o r e i g n e r s , as i n the American a c t , may be wise, i n s o f a r as the i n f o r m a t i o n brought t o l i g h t by such persons can a s s i s t the s o v e r e i g n c i t i z e n s i n t h e i r r u l i n g work. But any such e x t e n s i o n must be co n s i d e r e d a t a c t i c a l p r o v i s i o n , not a fundamental element o f the p r i n c i p l e i t s e l f . 7 6 The extension of this right to non-citizen permanent residents reduces to some extent the "purity" of the argument that the principle of free access derives from the sovereign ci t izens' need for evidence and information. S t i l l , there is a vast difference between permanent residents, who have made a commitment to the pol i s , and a l l other non-ci t izens . This commitment, which entails a personal stake in the well-being of the state, goes a long way toward just i fy ing the extension of this right to permanent residents. 7 The argument that extending such access to a l l subjects and foreigners may help the sovereign citizens perform their ruling function also applies to American and Canadian constitutional provisions for freedom of speech. This particular right also derives from the cit izens' need for ideas and information necessary for the successful performance of their job as rulers . As evidence about the performance of their agents and information about pol icies are two results of access to "information" intended by the citizens in enacting access legis lat ion, provision for the free interplay of ideas that may lead to new policy is the primary intent of the constitutional guarantee of "free speech" (see John Dixon, "Freedom of Speech as a Fundamental Right," position paper adopted by the Board of Directors of the Br i t i sh Columbia C i v i l Liberties Association, 13 March 1989, especially pp. 9-22). It w i l l be noted that the tac t ica l extension of access to subjects and foreigners provides an even stronger reason for 181 The p o s i t i o n adopted here might be c o n t r a s t e d w i t h t h a t taken by some members of the Canadian h i s t o r i c a l p r o f e s s i o n , who have c a l l e d i t " s i l l y " and " i r r i t a t i n g " t h a t the p r o v i s i o n o f access s h o u l d apply o n l y t o Canadian c i t i z e n s and permanent r e s i d e n t s . I g n o r i n g the d i f f e r e n c e between immediate access t o c u r r e n t i n f o r m a t i o n and access t o " h i s t o r i c a l " i n f o r m a t i o n o f the s o r t housed i n a r c h i v a l r e p o s i t o r i e s t h a t has been and s t i l l i s open t o c i t i z e n s , s u b j e c t s , f o r e i g n e r s , and a l l other comers, they have viewed the new law as t h r e a t e n i n g to " r e v e r s e a l o n g and honorable t r a d i t i o n i n Canada of a l l o w i n g access t o our h i s t o r i c a l r e c o r d s t o c i t i z e n s o f any c o u n t r y . " 8 T h i s may perhaps be so. However, from the p e r s p e c t i v e adopted i n t h i s study, i t would be both c l e a r e r and more p e r s u a s i v e t o argue t h a t , s i n c e such r e s e a r c h e r s have c o n t r i b u t e d over the years t o the s t o c k o f i n f o r m a t i o n and i d e a s needed by the s o v e r e i g n c i t i z e n s i n o r d e r t o r u l e e f f e c t i v e l y , they should be allowed access i n o r d e r t h a t they may c o n t i n u e t o do so. extending this right to permanent residents. 8 Robert Craig Brown, "Government and Historian: A Perspective on B i l l C43," Archivaria 13 (Winter 1981-82): 122. 

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