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Political reform in the Republic of China on Taiwan Rensted, Paul Milo 1989

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POLITICAL REFORM IN THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON TAIWAN By PAUL MILO RENSTED B.A., Augsburg College, 1987 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Department of P o l i t i c a l Science) We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA December 1989 (cV Paul Milo Rensted, 1989 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada Date DE-6 (2/88) Abstract The thesis looks at the question of political change in Taiwan. Specifically it examines the question of whether or not political liberalization has occurred simply as a result of economic development. The thesis also evaluates the extent of the political reform that has occurred. After examining a variety of information on the economic development and social changes, as well as the political history of the island, the thesis looks at specific political reforms. The conclusion is drawn that the process of political reform in Taiwan is not a carefully pre-determined plan on the part of the political elite. Rather, political reform is the response of the ruling Kuomintang to try and perpetuate their hold on power. Reforms occur only as they serve that particular goal. iii Table of Contents L i s t of Tables iv Chapter One Theory 1 Chapter Two Background 5 Chapter Three The Politics of Taiwan: the key actors 3 5 Chapter Four The Politics of Taiwan: the conflict 5 2 Chapter Five The Politics of Taiwan: political reforms 7 2 Chapter Six Conclusion 8 9 Bibliography 9 8 List of Tables Table One: Indicators of Social Development Table Two: Ethnic differences in social, cultural and economic organization Table Three: Individual reasons for joining the Kuomintang Theory Taiwan is one of the economic miracles of the twentieth century. It is grouped together with South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore as a showcase of economic development. Due to the successful nature of economic development in these states, and the desirability of replicating that success elsewhere, political scientists have worked to develop models that explain how such success has been achieved. One such model is the theory of 'intentional development' offered by Chalmers Johnson (Johnson South Korean Democratization). Johnson's model is used to explain the economic success of South Korea, though it may be worthwhile to apply it to Taiwan since there are frequent comparisons of the two countries due to their similarities. Johnson, along with a large number of others in this field, writes of the strong parallels between South Korea and Taiwan—and of the similarities in their processes of economic development. He creates this theory to explain how economic development and, to a lesser extent, social development, leads to changes in the political sphere, or what he terms political development. Johnson emphasizes the role of the political leadership of a state in guiding democratization. Given the frequent comparisons of the process of development of Taiwan to that of South Korea, and the linkage of economics to politics, this theory bears closer examination. Taiwan is often cited as an example of where economic development has produced democratization guided by those in power. Whether this is indeed the case, or whether the process of political change is more likely the result of various pressures on the ruling elite, is the focus of this paper. In this theory, development is always expressed in terms of 'per capita' gains. Thus, economic development is measured by per capita increases in productivity; social development is measured by per capita increases in quality of life areas such as increases in life expectancy, health care, education and so forth; political development is measured by per capita increases in access to forums where decisions for the whole of society are made (Johnson South Korean Democratization 5). Johnson explains that the guiding principle of this theory is that it is extremely difficult to promote development successfully in all three sectors simultaneously. Consequently, it is necessary to concentrate the efforts of the state and its resources upon one sector, making adjustments in the others when necessary. Eventually the development of one sector will have a spillover effect and help spur development in the other sectors. This theory is essentially one of unbalanced development, with one sector leading the way and pulling the others along. Johnson asserts that there are four crucial elements necessary for the success of intentional development. These are: 1) a receptive social environment; 2) determined leadership; 3) technical competence; and 4) capital (Johnson South Korean Democratization 4). Without all of these elements the potential for success is greatly diminished, and development is likely to be impeded. We need to examine each element individually for a clear understanding of the role it plays in the development process. A receptive social environment is rather a catch-all category consisting primarily of cultural factors. Simply put, development cannot succeed in an environment that is hostile or opposed to the economic activities that are an integral part of economic development. Neither is development going to succeed in an environment that is torn by ethnic strife or where economic affairs have a low priority. Determined leadership essentially means that the regime in power is able to set and maintain the appropriate priorities for achieving development. The leadership must be able to dis-aggregate development into economic, social, and political sectors and manipulate them accordingly. Whether it is possible to create this separation is a major question. The role of leadership becomes one of pushing one aspect of development at the expense of the other two. Clearly, the leadership must be extremely competent and well organized to accomplish such a difficult task. Making economic development the priority requires that the leadership be able somehow to isolate the political and social sectors while economic development is given full attention. Over time, and corresponding to development, the role of leadership will become one of balancing the uneven levels of economic, social and political development in order to maintain some sort of equilibrium, which in turn will reinforce the gains made in the area of economic development by guaranteeing stability. Technical competence refers to the existence of an educated elite to guide the process of development. Essentially, there is a need for expertise to translate the goals into action. Heavy investments in education, large numbers of students studying abroad, and an emphasis on improving the quality and quantity of education received are all characteristics of this developmental process and its pressing need for technical competence. Finally, no matter to what extent a society possesses all of the three previous necessary elements for intentional development, it will get nowhere without capital. The money can come from any number of sources, it can be squeezed out of the populace or borrowed from abroad, but it must be there. Generally it comes from forced savings, borrowing and international aid. Without the capital it is not possible to engage in the various activities that will promote development (Johnson South Korean Democratization 4-5). The theory seeks to explain how the leadership of South Korea was able to guide the economic success of that country and then translate that into political democratization. The theory states that if intentional development is utilized, then democratization will follow. To what extent this is indeed the case is considered now in this look at the Republic of China on Taiwan. B a c k g r o u n d Before considering the politics of Taiwan it is helpful to have some background information. This chapter provides that background information in three specific areas. The first section provides a brief overview of the political history of Taiwan to the death of Chiang Kai-shek. The second section examines economic and social development on Taiwan, considering the successes and problems. The final section in this chapter provides a brief summary of political developments in the past dozen years. Political History of Taiwan During the Imperial period, Taiwan had a distant relationship with China. Taiwan was ruled by appointees of the Emperor, but they enjoyed a great deal of autonomy; Taiwan was indeed on the periphery of the Middle Kingdom. After the Sino-Japanese war ended in 1895, Taiwan was ceded to Japan, and remained under Japanese control until 1945. The Japanese ruled the island in an authoritarian manner, giving the indigenous people little or no say in the running of the island. The Japanese concentrated on building up the infrastructure and educational level of the Taiwanese. By 1945 the infrastructure and economy of the island, despite the war, was more developed than the mainland. The populace was better educated and enjoyed a higher standard of living. With the departure of the Japanese, the island came under control of the KMT, which was in the midst of an ongoing conflict with the communists for control of China. Taiwan was placed under military rule by the KMT. The first military commander to rule Taiwan was Chen Yi, who did so in a brutal manner. The Nationalist troops on the island used all means to expropriate resources for troops still fighting on the mainland. Corruption was also widespread, and sapped what remained of the resources of Taiwan. The Taiwanese had not expected to be treated more harshly by their fellow Chinese than they had been by the Japanese, and instead of having a greater role in governing themselves, the Taiwanese saw 'carpetbaggers' from the mainland assume the positions of authority on the island. Anti-government feeling culminated in an uprising against the government on 28 February 1947. The uprising was suppressed through the use of considerable violence, which cost an estimated 20,000 Taiwanese their lives. Chen Yi was replaced by a more honest and able administrator, Chen Cheng, who placed primary emphasis on economic reconstruction. The KMT government was fully in control of, and based on, the island by 1949. In 1950, Chiang Kai-shek ended a year long retirement and once again became head of the government, party and military. The decision, the same year, of the Americans to use the US Seventh Fleet to prevent a communist invasion of Taiwan gave the KMT the opportunity to concentrate on domestic development. Confidence in the future grew with the protection and financial backing of the Americans. 1954 saw the signing of a mutual defense treaty between the US and Taiwan, which was followed a year later by a resolution empowering the US President to use military means if necessary to defend Taiwan or the offshore islands from attack. Widespread land reform, the lack of which was an important cause of the KMT defeat on the mainland, was undertaken. The government that was brought over to Taiwan was based on the 1947 Constitution. Before the government moved to Taiwan it had invoked the emergency measures portion of the constitution. On 19 May 1949 martial law was declared, which was followed one day later by the declaration of a state of siege. Extensive curbs were placed on political and human rights, and a whole list of actions became capital offenses. Over the next three years several decrees clarifying offenses and punishments were issued. The military had responsibility for investigating, apprehending and prosecuting those charged with security offenses. In July 1951, elections were held for local officials for both cities and counties. Provincial and local level elections have been held every four years since that time. 1969 was the first year in which elections were held for the national government. These 'supplementary' elections were held again in 1972 and 1973. They are termed supplementary because those elected are adding to the number already in the national government who had been elected on the mainland prior to 1949 and essentially have lifetime tenure. The notable lack of Taiwanese input into the national government is a result of the ROC claim to be the legitimate government of all of China. It has been the source of a great deal of unrest and tension between the mainlanders and the Taiwanese. For the most, part activities that sought to promote a change in this state of affairs were met with swift and harsh punishment. People were arrested and imprisoned, some were exiled, and a fair number lost their lives. It was not until the early 1970s that some dissent, or discussion, about the government was allowed. In 1972, when Chiang Ching-kuo became premier he made a commitment to make some reforms (Gregor and Chang ROC and US Policy 50-54). A system of social welfare was established in a rudimentary way, and rural development was stressed. Labor laws were passed enhancing workers rights and funding for major infrastructure projects was provided. Chiang Ching-kuo undertook a direct personal campaign to meet with all segments of the population. He toured the country and met with many different groups to enhance the authority of the government and the KMT. These policies were seen as meeting the 'appropriate' demands of the population. Direct election of the national government remained out of the question, because of the threat it would pose to KMT legitimacy. This was the state of affairs at the death of President Chiang Kai-shek on 5 April 1975. Economic development There can be no dispute that economic development on Taiwan has been an astounding success. To call this a miracle is not quite accurate, in that it is possible to locate many of the factors that have brought this 'miracle' about. Indeed the economic miracle of the Republic of China is due to a thoroughgoing application of neoclassical economics (Wade 31). This section on economic development considers five separate aspects of this development. The first four come directly from the theory of intentional development: receptive social environment; determined leadership; technical competence; and capital. The last aspect is the consequence of the above, namely growth and the subsequent changes or implications of that growth. Social Environment: The social environment on Taiwan has been stable, especially when its ambiguous international position is taken into account. The Confucian cultural tradition and its strong emphasis on family, communitarianism, and duty have provided both stability and a fertile ground for economic development. Many of the Confucian ethics, such as an emphasis on hard work or education, serve to facilitate the process of development. This phenomenon is apparent in a number of Chinese societies, particularly Hong Kong and Singapore (Hsu 22-23). Pragmatic assessment of channels for upward mobility, acceptance of an authoritarian state and strong bureaucracy, ambition for self and family, high value on education, frugality and entrepreneurship, though broad generalizations, present an accurate assessment of the cultural characteristics of Taiwanese society (Gold 125-126). The same can be said of South Korea, which shares a similar cultural tradition and whose economic development is slightly behind that of Taiwan for reasons attributable to divergent policies (Lau 139). The Confucian cultural tradition has been a boon to economic development on Taiwan. * The Republic of China on Taiwan has generally enjoyed political and social stability. This can be attributed to a number of different sources, in particular the authoritarian political structure and martial law. Other sources may include: a rising standard of living, the possibility for social mobility, and the existance of strong kinship/family ties. The sense of stability that existed created a climate which attracted foreign investment and also helped keep domestic capital on the island. Restrictions on the export of foreign currency and a cheap labor force were also significant factors. In spite of cleavages between mainlanders and Taiwanese and perhaps because of the external threat to the Republic of China the citizens on the island placed a high premium on stability and on economic success. The people living on Taiwan were receptive in terms of educational background and level of development, meaning the infrastructure and economic base built up during the years of Japanese control, to economic development on a large scale. The leadership for this development was provided by the KMT regime which, with American assistance, undertook large-scale land reform. The net effect of this land reform was positive in economic terms, and socially it created large numbers of people who owed their * It is interesting to note that the Confucian social ethos is often cited as the chief impediment to development in the pre-republican era. One possible explanation for this reversal may be in a change in the circumstances of China—from Middle Kingdom to a country dominated by foreigners—and the subsequent recognition of the need to incorporate foreign technology and business methods. livelihood to the regime. This fact made them more open to the policies of the KMT regime in economics in particular, but other areas as well. One very important area for stability is that of labor relations, particularly for attracting foreign investment. Taiwan, like South Korea, has strong legislation regulating unions and their activities. The unions that exist have been under close KMT supervision, with party controls over leadership selection and union activities. During the many years of martial law, strikes and collective bargaining were prohibited (Johnson Political Institutions and Economic Performance 150). The relatively tranquil and cheap labor force brought in much by way of foreign investment, technology transfer and enterprise creation. It was because of its ability to provide cheap labor that Taiwan was able to begin the process of economic development on a large scale. Export promotion and realistic interest rates to promote economic growth had beneficial effects upon the social environment as well as upon economic statistics. There has been a tremendous improvement in the living standards of the people of Taiwan. The equitable distribution of income along with the higher standard of living has given those who have benefitted from development a stake in the continued stability of Taiwan (Lau 4). The continued economic success of of Taiwan is dependent upon political stability which is conducive to further economic development and participation in the international economy. One possibility is that in order to protect their economic gains some Taiwanese have been willing to give lower priority to political reform. Given the KMT experience with class cleavages in the form of a peasant uprising/revolution on the mainland, the KMT regime was sensitive to the problem on Taiwan. This seems to be the main driving force behind the emphasis on equitable income distribution. The KMT worked on Taiwan to minimize class differences and the conflict that generally results from too great a stratification of society. In one sense the development of cleavages along economic lines which has occurred on Taiwan since the mid-1960s has been a positive phenomenon—since it shows that possibly ethnic cleavages may be crosscut by economic ones (Koo 171). There is some difficulty in obtaining reliable information to ascertain whether these cleavages are cross-cutting. The efforts to keep class differences at a minimum and to provide opportunities for social and economic mobility have helped maintain the social stability that is crucial to Taiwan's economic performance. Presently the difference between the richest fifth of society and the poorest fifth is only 4.18, meaning that the richest 20% earn 4.18 times as much as the poorest 20%—it was estimated to be as high as 11.56 in 1961 (Gold 112). Determined Leadership: Government officials will maintain that the ROC's economic policy is to let market forces take their course. This is not an entirely accurate assessment. The role of the government in the economy in the Republic of China is small when compared to the development experiences of South Korea or Japan, nonetheless there has been an important governmental role (Lau 145). In order to see the leadership role of the government in the process of economic development three items bear consideration: the goals and philosophy of the government; the implementation of those goals through specific policies; and the results of the process. The KMT approach to economic development is that there must be planning within the context of a free market economy. The idea is that the state will help provide a suitable climate for economic development, and even nurture that development if necessary. Eventually this support should not be necessary, as development progresses and these enterprises are able to fend off the competition in the domestic free market economy (Lau 44). Out of this philosophy came the goals of helping to create a favorable climate for economic development, with particular emphasis on industrialization. Also important were the goals of growth with equity and stability, in order to maintain the long-term health of the economy and the polity. The economy of Taiwan is a guided market economy. The guidance comes mainly from government manipulation of the market rather than direct governmental controls over industry. Initiative and the profit incentive all remain—with the state working to achieve its goals through various incentives. The means of production and supply and demand remain outside of government control (White and Wade 5-6). The government intervenes in the market to protect its goals, generally that of stable industrialization. The government and private industry do not make their plans without sharing some information. There is interaction through things like government budgets and industry's profit and loss statements. The two sides can see what is happening and respond accordingly. Thus, if the government perceives a certain domestic industry is threatened, it may provide relief via tax breaks (Johnson Political Institutions and Economic Performance 142). This way the government is able to insure that the economic development that is occurring will meet what it determines are the long term needs of the Republic of China. Industry is able merely to follow the market, and make decisions based on the economics. An example of this policy was the push for import substitution early on, which was later replaced by a push for production of goods for export. The government provided necessary tax incentives to make it more profitable to produce for export, and industry responded accordingly (White and Wade 3). Another approach the government has utilized has been to start up industries on its own, and then either hang onto them or eventually privatize them. In this way they are able to create types of development that they want to occur which the private sector is not developing (Koo 173). The building of the first major steel works on Taiwan is a prime example of this approach. Between this approach, and manipulation of the market the government of the Republic of China has been able to guide the economic development of Taiwan. These policies have been carried out by a relatively well-trained and efficient bureaucracy, although the level of corruption would be considered unacceptable by Western standards. The core of this bureaucracy is made up of American educated economists and administrators, whose philosophy is complementary to that of the government (Koo 174). The results of two specific policies demonstrate the implementation of the government philosophy. The first is the successful land reform and the second is the existence of so many small businesses, when generally a decline in their number occurs in the industrialization process. When the Republic of China came to power on Taiwan they recognized that they needed to implement land reform for both political and economic reasons. Politically they knew the appeal of land reform, because it had been used against them on the mainland by the communists. Economically, they needed to make agricultural production more efficient and free up resources for industrialization. This was accomplished by meddling in the market. First, rents were reduced; second, the supply of land was altered by the government selling public lands to tenant families; and, finally, landlords had to sell 'surplus' land to the government— who in turn sold it to the tenant families (Lu 145). Taiwan has encouraged those with entrepreneurial skills and inclinations to pursue their ideas. Unlike in Japan or South Korea, the number of small private enterprises is constantly increasing. By establishing industrial parks, which provide resources and technical assistance to entrepreneurs, Taiwan has helped its economy and increased the number of small firms, which encourages innovation (Lau 147). The smaller size of the average firm also makes it easier for new firms to enter the market—again, another plus that is the direct result of government policy. The government has created an environment in which small businesses can flourish, and so they do-closely paralleling the philosophical underpinnings of the policy. Technical Competence: The area of technical competence only needs brief consideration. The key points are that education has been a major priority, both domestically and through sending students abroad to study, and that the Republic of China has received technical assistance from abroad. The population of Taiwan is almost completely literate, and has a work force that possesses considerable skills. While the general population of Taiwan has doubled between 1952 and 1980, the number of school aged persons attending school has tripled . The government has expanded the number of places available at colleges and universities on the island, and the number attending vocational schools has gone from 40,092 in 1952 to 348,169 in 1981 (Lau 36). Clearly the KMT regime has made education a top priority. This selection has helped to create a skilled workforce. The Republic of China received important technical assistance from outside sources, but obviously the most important was American assistance. The American aid came in several forms, including: capital (discussed later), military protection by the Seventh Fleet and military aid, and in technical assistance in the development process. One of the most important consequences of US assistance was the creation of the private enterprise system (Tai The Kuomintang and Modernization in Taiwan 431). Because of the emerging cold war between capitalism and communism, the US decided to resume aid to the KMT regime. This decision was influenced by the Korean conflict, the 'China lobby' and various strategic considerations. This was another way in which the importance of the role of the market system was reinforced. The extent and degree of American aid and involvement was significant. Few countries have received that degree of support, and, without it, it is unlikely that the KMT regime would have survived. US technical assistance took a number of forms. Among the first was direction in land reform. The US advisors worked with the Republic of China government to develop plans that would create a viable agricultural system, capable of stimulating growth in other sectors of the economy. The US advisors pushed for a minimalization and liberalization of economic regulations, lessening of foreign exchange controls, and creation of both conditions and machinery for a market oriented economy. In addition, the Republic of China received favorable terms of access to the US market. Capital: In order to accomplish the goal of economic development the Republic of China needed capital, and lots of it. It got the capital it needed in a number of ways, including domestic savings, foreign aid, and using interest rates and exports to generate capital. The development plan has been such a success that now the Republic of China has a different type of problem on its hands: it has too much foreign capital and needs to find ways to invest its foreign reserves. In Taiwan household savings have played an important role in capital formation. The savings ratio of disposable income has ranged from 11 to 24 percent from 1965 to 1981, while the average rate in the United States has been 6.7 percent. Well over one third of the capital that has been used to fund the economic development of Taiwan has come from domestic savings (Lau 16). The crucial point here is that, unlike many Latin American countries, Taiwan has managed to avoid an overwhelming debt load. By accumulating capital on the domestic level and through foreign aid, indebtedness has been minimized, particularly foreign indebtedness. Taiwan had a policy of high interest rates, originally to curb high inflation, which was a major factor in the KMT's defeat on the mainland. The high interest rate policy helped encourage savings and kept inflation low which resulted in increased income for the people of Taiwan. These factors also helped to attract foreign capital and investment (Lau 47). These policies were also important when the US phased out its economic support in the mid 1960s. From 1951 to 1968 the US provided the Republic of China with approximately $1.5 billion in aid. The capital was used to fund infrastructure development and modernization of industry. The rest of the aid went to import capital, raw materials and consumer goods (Lau 47). These were important factors in maintaining domestic stability. In 1988 Taiwan felt it necessary to lift foreign exchange controls that had previously been in place for 40 years to prevent capital from leaving the country. All exchanges involving foreign capital had required full disclosure and had to be tied to business transactions (Copper Taiwan: A Nation in Transition 174). This action was taken because Taiwan had over $75 billion in US currency on hand. The consequences of the rise or fall of the US dollar were unduly strong in Taiwan, due to the large reserves of US currency and the linkage of the value of the Taiwan dollar to the US dollar (Asia 1988 Yearbook 244). There was no longer a shortage of capital for development, and the restrictions on capital exportation were ended. Growth: There are three significant aspects of economic growth on Taiwan: the causes, the growth itself, and the implications of that growth. All three are considered below. The causes for the successful economic growth of the Republic of China are presented first. There are a number of causes for the high rate of economic growth on Taiwan. Among the most important are the high rate of investment and the emphasis on exports. The KMT regime on Taiwan placed a great deal of stress on investment in the economy. It developed policies that promoted investment and both kept and drew capital into the country. Even though the infrastructure of Taiwan was somewhat developed—a legacy of almost 50 years of Japanese occupation—the government poured money into infrastructure projects (Lau 3). Capital and labor made available due to land reform was put into industry to create goods, and later services, that could be exported. The Japanese legacy in Taiwan was crucial in providing a base upon which the Taiwanese were able to build their economic modernization. During the period of Japanese colonialization, agriculture and small-scale manufacturing were developed. Taiwan began to export to Japan, particularly agricultural goods. Much of the groundwork for the education system of Taiwan was laid during this time. Japanese investment in projects such as road building left behind a solid infrastructure. The Japanese also left behind a highly developed state apparatus (Koo 175). Finally, the ongoing relationship between Japan and Taiwan is an important legacy of the period of occupation. Interaction between the two states, particularly at an informal level, is widespread. This interaction provides important business links—both in terms of capital and expertise. By highly investing in projects and industrial ventures that were suitable for export, and keeping the goal of economic development paramount over profits, the Republic of China government was able to create goods and services that were suitable for export at very competitive prices during a time of large-scale growth in the international market. These exports enjoyed easy access to the large American market and provided capital and momentum for export-led economic development. Trade between the US and Taiwan increased a phenomenal 13,000% in the last 20 years and presently Taiwan is moving towards free trade with the US (Werner 1097). The government also kept in mind long-term goals and was able to direct significant funds and energy into development of new types of enterprises. Finally, because the government was seeking to operate as closely as possible to the free market approach, small enterprises flourished rather than the large conglomerates that are common to Japan or South Korea. ^ The statistics that show the degree of economic development are really quite remarkable. Since 1970 unemployment has been less than 2%; in 40 years the GNP has increased 186 fold, per capita income 19.6 fold; GDP growth has averaged over 10.65% per year-greater than Japan's; Taiwan's stock market is now the third largest in the world in terms of capitalization; and the list goes on (Republic of China 1988 197-199). These economic indicators are only a few of many that provide some insight into the degree of economic change and development that has occurred under the K M T on Taiwan. Changes of this magnitude obviously have consequences for the economy and society, some of which are noted next; more of which will be considered in the next section on social development. The impact of the soaring economy has been felt in the area of labor. Taiwan has moved into a position of labor scarcity, with the result that wages are rising and workers' situations are improving. These improvements are not occurring rapidly enough for many of Taiwan's workers, some of whom have recently formed a labor party. The wage gaps that had existed between farm and non-farm workers have been narrowed and in some areas labor is becoming more militant in making demands (Moore 140). There has been a shift in the sectors of the economy in which most labor is utilized. In 1960 56% of the labor force worked in agriculture; 11% in industry; and 33% in service industries. By the 1980s the number in agriculture was 19%; industry 41%; and service industries 40% (Barret and Chin 27). Taiwan has shifted from an agricultural-based economy to an industrial one, and is now in the process, successfully, of becoming a capital-intensive, knowledge-intensive economy (Copper Taiwan in 1986 88). Statistically the appreciation in income has been greater among Taiwanese. This again presents the problem of the lack of reliable statistics. Also the greater numbers of mainlanders engaged in government work, with the opportunity of accepting bribes, needs to be noted. The differing rates of increase in reported income is due to the Taiwanese predominance in business and the mainlander reliance on government employment (Tai The Kuomintang and Modernization in Taiwan 424). Also it is due to the large headstart in income the mainlanders enjoyed. Growth has also made the diversification of exports possible, helping to make Taiwan competitive in a variety of areas. Textiles are still important exports, but are falling steadily behind electronics items as mainstays of the export market. In addition, banking, finance, insurance and real estate have become very significant contributors to the services that are providing increased revenue. All this does point out, however, that Taiwan is quite dependent upon foreign trade; to the point of being vulnerable. Finally, the increase in economic power has helped Taiwan to achieve a degree of international prestige and acts as a counterweight to its diplomatic isolation. Social Development Social and economic development are linked, influencing and affecting the course of one another. A number of societal changes have occurred in Taiwan since the KMT regime came to power. These changes are the result both of economic development and government policies. These changes are also significant because of the way they affect the politics of Taiwan. Table 1 Quality of Life Korea Taiwan Life expectancy at birth 65 72 Infant mortality per 1000 live births 37 25 Daily calorie intake per capita 2785 2805 Daily protein intake per capita (grams) 69.6 78 Residential floorspace per capita (m) 9.5 15.7 Households with running water (percent) 54.6 66.8 Households with television sets (percent) 78.6 100.4 Households with passenger cars and motorcycles (percent) 5.8 108.4 Electric power consumption per capita (KWH 914.8 2131.2 (Lau 138) A number of different aspects of social development are considered below, these include: 1) the improvement in material terms of the quality of life; 2) the impact of economic development upon society (i.e. income distribution); 3) education; 4) cultural transformation; and 5) family relationships. It is important to explore the changes that have occurred in these various areas in order to see further evidence regarding the theory of intentional development. Quality of Life: There are a number of statistics that provide a guide to the standard of living. Using these criteria, Taiwan's numbers look very good, and are a source of justifiable pride. The statistics compare favorably with South Korea, which lags behind in almost every category. This is significant because of the frequent comparisons between the two countries development experiences. By the 1970s in Taiwan automobiles, motorcycles, refrigerators, air-conditioners, and washing machines were commonplace; many other consumer goods like stereos, cameras and televisions were widely available as well. In short the Republic of China has become a full-fledged consumer society (Copper Taiwan's Recent Elections 25). Average life expectancy at birth is now 72 years; infant mortality is a low 25 per 1000 live births. The quantity and quality of food consumed has increased dramatically, the average diet is now rich in protein. The quality and availability of professional health care has risen dramatically as well. Residential floorspace per capita is almost double that of South Korea. The number of people owning motorized transportation and television sets has exceeded 100 percent. People on Taiwan are living better—in terms of material goods, health care and diet—and longer. Economic changes have been accompanied by urbanization and rising literacy rates. There has been a proliferation of business firms, high geographical mobility, high occupational mobility, an increase in exposure to the media and greater differentiation in the social structure (Tai The Kuomintang and Modernization in Taiwan 414). The Affects of Economic Development: The results of the economic development of the Republic of China are most definitely felt in the society. The society has reached a point where more than 50 percent consider themselves middle class. It is important to note, however, that Taiwan did have a well developed middle class prior to the arrival of the KMT. After the 28 February Incident (1947), in which the Taiwanese attempted to overthrow the KMT, approximately 20,000 Taiwanese were killed. Those numbers came disproportionately from the ranks of the middle class, and left the Taiwanese people without strong indigenous leadership—a factor which has had numerous repercussions. The implications include the absence of strong native Taiwanese leadership and the inculcation of fear in the Taiwanese. To its credit, Taiwan has one of the strongest records in terms of equitable distribution of income—exceeding the US and most communist countries (Copper Taiwan's Recent Elections 22-23). A technical-managerial class has emerged, and societal cleavages based on economic factors are noticeable. Industrialization has created new and divers© groups, whose interests are diverse. It has also created a new intelligentsia, which is linked strongly to societal institutions. (Huntington 33). Because it owes much of its status to the KMT it is limited in its ability to dissent from the government's policies and actions. These constraints are oftentimes the result of obligations incurred through government employment or through fear that dissent will jeapordize status and civil liberties. The effects of economic development are many and varied. One of the most significant has been the improved status of women. Women have gained at school, in the family, and in society at large. Relations with men in the family are becoming more egalitarian. The number of women completing university education has gone from a tiny minority to being nearly equal to their percentage of the population (Shaw 225). There has been a notable shift from an agricultural to an industrial economy, which now seems to be moving into a post-industrial economy (Tai The Kuomintang and Modernization in Taiwan 414). Economic development has also facilitated the penetration of media and popular culture throughout the island. Finally, economic development made it possible for the government to fund and pursue other policies which have greatly contributed to social development, such as education. Education: When the Republic of China came to Taiwan, the level of education of the populace was higher than that of the mainland, due to the Japanese occupation. However, it merely met the beginning needs of a society that was seeking to industrialize rapidly. Again, this is an area where statistics easily prove the point. The number of school age children in attendance is approximately 99 percent, second only to Japan. The number of schools and students on the island has more than tripled from 1950 to 1980, while during this time period the population doubled (Republic of China 1988 273-276). In the early 1980s, Taiwan had an education level more than four times the norm for a country with its GNP (Copper Taiwan's Recent Elections 28-29). The government sought to make the best use of its human resources in the face of a scarcity of other natural resources. The quality of the work force on Taiwan was improved through public education. Adequate funding for education was provided because it was a priority for the government. Informal education, such as adult education in either academic subjects or hobbies, is widespread amongst society as well as the formal school system, keeping the ideal of learning present amongst the members of society (Chen 68). Problems common to other developing and developed states, such as drug abuse, juvenile delinquency and so forth, are present in Taiwan. Cultural Transformation: The changes in economic and societal structures and in education all are part of, and help to create, a transformation of culture. Many traditional values have been changed, adapted or simply abandoned 28 as Taiwan races forward. The role of the media in this area is significant, as is the penetration of American popular culture and its values and attitudes. American values of consumerism, individuality, human rights, electoral politics and so forth are presented in the media and by the more than 1.5 million tourists to Taiwan each year (Gold 113). Taiwan has experienced all the problems of a materialist culture, such as social problems, crime and cynicism. The main impact of the materialist values has been a fostering of the idea of atomization of the individual. This is clearly a significant break with the past Confucian culture and its emphasis on community and family (Copper Political Development in Taiwan 367). Society is increasingly captured by Western, and especially American, culture—and increasingly drawn towards conformity with that culture. Interestingly enough, this process of change involves movement towards a culture that shares many of the cultural values that have contributed to Taiwan's economic success, such as upward mobility, a strong work ethic, ambition for self and family and entrepreneurship. Along with the urbanization and the industrialization have come many problems. These problems are evident in Taiwan, and manifest themselves in things like crime, pollution, and various types of social problems. The question of corruption also needs to be addressed. Corruption has created tensions between the Taiwanese and the mainlanders. Taiwanese resent corrupt mainlander officials and bureaucrats. From time to time highly placed officials are convicted of corruption. Chiang Ching-kuo used a crackdown on corruption to improve his public standing when he first came to power (Clough 41-53). There is a scarcity of reliable information on the extent of government corruption. Some sources indicate that corruption is less prevalant in Taiwan than in other Asian states, but there is not any evidence to support such a conclusion (Clough 43). The changing nature of society has had a large impact on the bedrock of Chinese society, the family. Family Relations: The cultural emphasis on families and kinship ties found on Taiwan has had a significant impact on the development process, being largely responsible for many business ties and the functioning of many small scale enterprises. The family has played a critical role in society and the process of development, providing a social safety net for its members which has decreased the resources the government has needed to devote to social assistance (Lee 550). Family and kin networks undergird both society and the economy, although this is in the process of changing. As development proceeds and the economic and social environment changes, non-kin groups and non-family ties are increasing in importance. The needs of business, as well as changed social needs due to the impact of the materialist culture, are causing individuals to pursue business and social interests without a great deal of regard for the extended family. The nuclear family is becoming the norm in Taiwan. Factors such as the changing status of women are bound to change the traditional patriarchal structure of the family. Thus the traditional concept of the family, and the role it plays, are under assault from a number of sources, including the new materialist culture, the rising levels of economic development, and the changing status of women. The political implications are not yet completely apparent. One implication is that the role of the government in society is expanding as a result of these changes. A stronger social welfare system, to fill a role previously occupied by the family, is a result of these changes. The expansion of pension coverage to farmers is an example of this expanded role. Since the K M T came to power, the changes that have occurred in Taiwan have been numerous and varied. Thus far the economic changes and the social changes have been considered, along with a brief political history of the island to 1975. An update of the political developments that have occurred between 1975 and the present provides a fairly complete picture of both the society and the polity. This provides the context and the necessary background information for the rest of the paper. Political Developments From 1975 to the Present Following the death of Chiang Kai-shek, his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, became the leader of the ROC. Chiang Ching-kuo was already premier, and several weeks after the death of his father he was elected leader of the KMT. It was not until March 1978 that he became president. Chiang Ching-kuo had been carefully groomed to succeed his father, serving in various capacities and being active in public life. His background, as someone educated in the Soviet Union and one who had worked with the secret police, made many leery of him and fearful of what policies he would pursue when he came to power. Partly as a result of this, Chiang Ching-kuo used media tours and meetings with members of the general public to try to build broader public support for himself. Because of the intricate relationship between the KMT and the government, Chiang Ching-kuo was able to exercise control over the government and the Party even without occupying the presidency immediately. The early years of Chiang Ching-Kuo's rule brought no major changes in policy from those of his father. In November 1978 the government announced it would be issuing tourist passports for the first time. The goal was to promote more "people to people" diplomacy. In December, the United States announced that it would recognize the People's Republic of China as the de jure government of China, effective in January. A great crisis of confidence swept Taiwan. Elections scheduled for that month were abruptly cancelled. Large anti-American demonstrations took place outside the US embassy. Arrangements were made to set up informal channels of communication between Taipei and Washington, as well as to continue the rapidly expanding trade between the two states. The loss of diplomatic recognition was a severe blow to the government's prestige both at home and abroad, and it was two years before the government rescheduled the cancelled elections. A year later, 10 December 1979, a large riot occurred at a demonstration in Kaohsiung. This event became known as the Kaohsiung Incident. An opposition journal had organized a rally to be held to protest the lack of democracy and freedom in Taiwan. The turnout was enormous, much greater than had been anticipated. As the rally progressed the police made its presence very noticeable and tried to disperse those present. The crowd responded to the rough behavior of the security police in kind, and the rally became a riot. The Kaohsiung Incident, and the rally organizers who were later imprisoned, became important symbols for those seeking greater freedom and democracy. In March of 1984 Chiang Ching-kuo was re-elected to another six year term as president. He won all but 8 votes in the National Assembly, the body which elects the president in the ROC system. In 1985 several events occurred which caused many to question the competence of the government. The 10th Credit Corporation loans scandal became public. The involvement of top level Party and government officials in receiving funds and in trying to cover up the scandal hit Taiwan's financial markets like a typhoon. Shortly afterwards the role of members of the government and military, along with members of Taiwan's crime syndicates, in the murder of Chinese-American writer Henry Liu became known. Individuals were sentenced to prison for the murder, but the damage to Taiwan's image abroad, and the loss of confidence in the government domestically, was extensive (FEER 21 March 1985 23). By October 1986 the situation had improved for the KMT regime. In response to the problems of the previous year and the domestic unease that accompanied them, Chiang Ching-kuo had formed a 12-member committee to study political reform. The committee and Chiang announced that martial law would soon be lifted, and other reforms would be forthcoming. A new National Security Law, which lifted martial law, allowed new political parties to be formed and clarified political crimes and their penalties was proposed by the KMT. Before the Law could be passed by the National Assembly, members of the Tangwai—literally meaning "outside the Party" and referring to those who opposed the KMT but were unable to create a formal opposition party because of martial law—met and announced the formation of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). After this, most opposition to the KMT was contained in the DPP, and the term Tangwai was dropped. Many of those who were living in exile chose to try and return to Taiwan. One, Hsu Hsin-liang, tried to return to Taiwan but was not allowed off the airplane in which he arrived. One thousand protesters stormed the airport and there was a clash with riot police. The security forces quelled the disturbance and sent Hsu back into exile (China Yearbook 1988 10). He was the most notable of the exiled political figures who sought to return to Taiwan at the first glimmer of political reform. The KMT regime attempted to deal with its ongoing human rights problem. Twenty-six people who had been convicted of sedition were released from prison in January 1987. These included some of the prominent people imprisoned for the Kaohsiung Incident. The move was explained as being an act of generosity on the part of the government in honor of the 100th anniversary of Chiang Kai-shek's birth. International pressure was no doubt an important factor, given the prominence of those imprisoned, and the severity of the sentences. Chiang Ching-kuo died on 13 January 1988. He was succeeded by Lee Teng-hui, the first native born Taiwanese to become president. Lee is a Chiang protege, and is viewed as a reformer. Two weeks after becoming president, Lee became chairman of the KMT, consolidating power in both the government and the party. His chief rival for the chairmanship of the party was Prime Minister Yu Kuo-hwa, a conservative who was viewed as anti-reform, and who enjoyed the support of Madame Chiang Kai-shek (FEER 4 February 1988 16-17). The Politics of Taiwan: The key actors In order to gain an understanding of the politics of Taiwan specific information on the key political actors is important. This chapter focuses on the main political actors in Taiwan. The role of the KMT is examined first, followed by consideration of the main opposition groups. Role of the Kuomintang The KMT has been the most important player in the political sphere in Taiwan. The Republic of China is a KMT creation, and the KMT has run the party-state, defining the limits of political activity, and ruling Taiwanese society for the past 40 years. With the changes brought about because of that leadership, the KMT is in the position of redefining its role in society and in the government. It is on the question of how the KMT eventually redefines its role(s) that any further democratization and economic and social development depends. The KMT is a pyramid structured party, established by Sun Yat-sen in 1919. The party is topped by the Central Executive Committee, with 130 members, although there is a Central Standing Committee of 31 members who exercise effective power. Below the Central Executive Committee are provincial, county and district committees, heading party cells of 3 to 15 members each. The majority of government officials and local politicians are party members. Approximately 2.2 million people belong to the party—making it the largest organization on the island (Clough 37). The Party has served to integrate the mainlanders and Taiwanese, and, although not completely successful in this task, it has greatly reduced tension between the two groups. The K M T provides a method of communication for people to the government and vice-versa (Winckler Institutionalization and Participation in Taiwan 143). This communication occurs informally through the response of party members to government and party policies. By expressing their opinions, and hopefully the opinion of the general population, the party members provide an important input into the policymaking process. When the K M T was still on the mainland, the guiding principle of the government party relationship was "to rule the state with the party." In the 1950s and 1960s the principle changed to "guide politics by the party." This represented the very subtle change from the party being above the state to the party being the behind the scenes policy-maker, even as it retained its dominant position over the government. The change may have been a reflection of the need to enhance the democratic image of "Free China." Since 1969 and the Tenth Party Congress, the principle has been "separation between the party and the government." Since then, the party has sought to portray itself as more of a policy coordinator than policy-maker (FCR Transformation of the K M T 40). The portrait is, however, not entirely accurate. A strong cabinet responsible to the Legislative Yuan has gradually evolved. Consequently, members of the government sector (19) have come to dominate the Central Standing Committee, while members from the party are a definite minority (3). While the greater role of technocrats in government is a positive change, to assume that their primary loyalty is not to the K M T would be mistaken. The Party continues to dominate the government, primarily due to the interlocking relationship of the two, which resembles the interlocking directorate found in communist states. Essentially the K M T acts as a government within a government, (FEER 5 September 1985 28-30). In the 1960s increasing opposition activities in the cities and electoral successes at the polls, as well as an increasingly diversified society, challenged the K M T . The response was a mixture of suppressing the most hostile elements and co-opting and assimiliating new groups and their leaders into the K M T . The K M T was in a position similar to that of the Republican People's Party in Turkey. It held such an overwhelming majority of votes and was so well established that it was almost inconceivable that it might be dislodged from power by granting greater freedom of activity to the political opposition. Thus, it was able to do so. Unlike the RPP, the K M T worked hard to bring many of the new groups into the party, and get them working within the system (Huntington 21). The comparisons of the Republic of China to South Korea often fail to note that, in spite of its problems, the K M T is still a fairly vigorous organization. It has strong technocratic leadership, a strong patronage system, control over some of the media, and control over the military. The advantages of the K M T are numerous. In addition to media control, the most significant advantage is the ability to set the rules of the game by determining election laws and campaign rules. The most likely future for the K M T is that of a hegemonic party. One possibility is that it would function like the LDP has in Japan (Chou and Nathan 296). The composition of the party has changed over time, and this has also influenced the role it plays in society. The party has undergone 'Taiwanization'—as the majority of members are now native Taiwanese. This change is now occurring at the top levels of the party (and government). The Thirteenth Party Congress in July of 1988 saw a native Taiwanese re-elected Chairman; 65% of Central Committee members were new and the average age dropped from 70 to 59; the proportion of Taiwanese went from 20% to 45%; the Central Standing Committee, with 31 members, has 17 Taiwanese and its first female member; and the number of military members dropped to 3 (Seymour Taiwan in 1988 56-58). One of the major roles of the K M T is to provide linkages between the leadership and the people. Party cadres work with and influence farmers' organizations, fishermen's groups, labor unions and women's organizations. They operate over 400 service centers that help people find jobs, receive vocational training and free medical care. The strongest K M T constituencies are military and ex-military members, and the mainlanders. They keep in close touch with students and overseas Chinese. The K M T is an active party, seeking to involve itself thoroughly throughout society. This may provide the K M T the opportunity to indoctrinate and influence people, and to win sufficient support to enable it to govern effectively (Clough 47). This close contact is not always welcome, however, and oftentimes produces negative results. People may feel watched or coerced, and the feeling that the K M T is unbearably dominant may enhance societal cleavages. The importance placed on meeting people's needs in return for their support is similar to the way in which the political machines operated in large American cities. It demonstrates the recognition by the K M T that it needs to generate support in order to govern, and that it must be sensitive to the political marketplace. These functions of the K M T serve a legitimating role as well. It remains to be seen if in a more open political environment the loyalty engendered will be lasting, or whether people will make their political decisions based on other factors. Ideologically, the K M T has changed very little since its founding. Its ideological foundation is in Sun Yat-sen's Three People'sPrinciples (san min zhuyi). These translate into a guided market economy and tutelary democracy (whereby democracy is instituted after a period of education in democratic principles and practice). The goal since the loss of the mainland has been to recover the mainland, originally through force, now by winning the 'political war'. Much energy is expended upon the claim that the K M T regime is the government of all of China. This claim is based on the elections that were held on the mainland before the communist victory. These election results, now more than 40 years old, provide the backbone of regime legitimacy and underlie much of K M T ideology. One other aspect that is important in understanding the K M T is the role of factions within it. The importance of factions is often overlooked when considering the K M T , primarily because information is difficult to obtain. Since the death of Chiang Ching-kuo, the appearance of factions within the ruling K M T has become more obvious. Lee Teng-hui has had the support of the reform-minded members of the K M T , and has been opposed by the conservatives. These seem to be the two principal factions in the leadership. A prime example of this factionalism was the change in premiers from Yu Kuo-hua to L i Huan. Yu had been made premier by Chiang Ching-kuo. That selection created quite a furor, because of Yu's strongly conservative positions. It was not clear if Chiang was positioning Yu to succeed him or not. Lee, a reformer, was selected to be vice-president. This juxtaposition made the succession after Chiang's death less than clearcut (PEER 27 February 1986 28). Many in the West thought that Lee would retain the presidency only briefly. Indeed, there was a clash between conservatives and reformers at the party meeting that occurred to select a new party Chairman after the death of Chiang. The choice was between Lee and Yu. Yu had the backing of Madame Chiang Kai-shek, who placed her status on the side of the conservative elements. Lee won the selection, yet retained Y u as premier. It was not until more than a year later that the conservative Yu was replaced as premier by a more reform-minded politician, L i Huan (FBIS-CHI 2 June 1989 65). This move was seen as an indication of Lee's consolidation of power. He is constrained by the power of the conservative elements within the K M T , and outside of it as well. Anti-communist groups have begun to criticize the K M T for not dealing more harshly with the opposition (FEER 2 July 1987 15). The K M T majorities in the national government are principally made up of those elected on the mainland. Too much liberalization, or changing the political structure to reflect the Republic of China's dramatically reduced geography threatens the ideology of the K M T , and consequently both the legitimacy and reality of its hegemony over politics in Taiwan. Opposition The domestic opposition to the K M T was concentrated in the forces of the Tangwai. This is particularly true of the years leading up to the formation of the DPP in 1986. The Tangwai achieved increasing electoral success prior to its formally becoming a party. The Tangwai had sought to work within the boundaries of acceptable and legal political activity, both to provide an opposition voice and to expand the realm of legitimate political discourse. Essentially this meant that because of K M T dominance of the government, the K M T was able to set the rules and laws for elections and political opposition. Because of the negative consequences of not abiding by those limits, i.e. harassment or imprisonment, the Tangwai had little choice but to follow the KMT's rules. As society changed on Taiwan, and became more pluralistic, the Tangwai's base of support expanded and its demands came to be seen as more mainstream. The traditional base of support for the Tangwai has been: 1) the old urban upper class, which was associated with the Japanese during the colonial era and whose numbers were decimated by Chen Y i in 1947; 2) landlord families who were adversely affected by land reform in the 1950s; 3) the urban lower middle class (small businessmen and laborers) , some of whom were and are adversely affected by industrialization; and 4) younger and well-educated members of the upper middle class, who resent the K M T and the lack of freedom (Domes 1016); and, 5) Taiwanese who view the K M T as a carpetbagger party which has oppressed the people of Taiwan by its authoritarian manner, and deprived them of basic rights. Since the early 1980s the following groups can be added: 6) workers, who feel that labor's interests are not adequately taken care of by the K M T ; 7) environmentalists, who feel that the government has pursued economic goals with disregard for the environmental consequences of their actions; and The diversity of this base means that the political leadership of the Tangwai, and now the DPP, is very broad. Oftentimes this diversity means the various factions have little in common with one another. This has led to serious factional disputes within the opposition, which has limited their effectiveness and lost them votes (Domes 1016-1017). What drew the Tangwai together was its dissatisfaction with the KMT's position on the interlocked issues of Taiwan's future in the international sphere, and the role of the K M T in the domestic political system (Chou and Nathan 281). The first real instance of electoral competition between the K M T and the Tangwai occurred in 1977 in local elections. The Tangwai captured 37% of the vote, and won 21 of 77 seats in the provincial Assembly. They also won several races for mayor in that election. The election was lively and provided an opportunity for widespread discussion of politics in a less inhibited fashion, relative to previous elections (Meyers 1009). The Tangwai used magazines, local organizations, and demonstrations to articulate their political views (Gold 130). The 1985 local election is also seen as a crucial one because of the degree of freedom given to K M T opponents in their campaigning, and the few restrictions placed on content of political messages, the primary restriction remaining that of discussion of Taiwanese self-determination. Other changes that have been occurring include greater differentiation within both the opposition and the K M T . The membership is increasingly diverse, and factions centering around a number of issues have developed. Another example of the changes is the start of a separate labor-based political party. Since the 1980s, "voices of the political opposition have grown more persistent and strident and political rallies and demonstrations have mushroomed. The political opposition continues to call for more 44 liberalization while the K M T spokesmen claim they now have democracy" (Gripp 194-195). By police count in the first four months of 1988 there were 729 demonstrations on Taiwan—70% were anti-government (Seymour Taiwan in 1988 60). This underscores the fact that, although the opposition finds itself in what seems to be a perpetual 70%—30% electoral relationship with the K M T , there is a significant portion of the population that is not satisfied with the pace and direction of political reform. Opposition to the K M T and its governmental dominance has had primary expression in two forms—that of the Democratic Progressive Party (previously the Tangwai) and the Taiwan Independence Movement (TIM). These will be examined separately, since the DPP has been a domestic movement and the TIM has primarily been an international one, operated by Taiwanese emigres. The formation of the DPP, its recent history and its future prospects are considered below. A brief look at the newly formed labor party is also included. This consideration is followed by a look at the TIM, and in particular at its present position. On 28 September 1986, before they could do so legally, many members of the Tangwai leadership met at a Taipei hotel and announced the formation of the Democratic Progressive Party. The party was formed out of the informal Tangwai, which had worked together on electoral campaigns previously, but had never been allowed to engage in many activities central to the function of a political party. The platform of the party advocated democracy, and in particular, that differences with the mainland be resolved not by negotiations between the government and the PRC, but rather by the free choice of all the people of Taiwan. The DPP pointedly never referred to the Republic of China, instead it used Taiwan' to refer to the national entity (Meyers 1110-1111). The DPP is structured so as to prevent the concentration of political power in the hands of one leader or one faction. The constraints include yearly party congresses and large decision-making bodies. It also operates as an elite party, letting in new members upon the recommendation of at least three present party members. One result of the careful attempts to prevent the party from becoming controlled by one faction is that the performance of the DPP is limited by its structure (Chou and Nathan 293-294). The leaders of the DPP say that self-determination simply means that the people of Taiwan would determine their future, rather than having the US , the P R C , and the K M T do so without their participation. The DPP maintains that there are only three options for the future: maintaining the status quo, reunification with the mainland, or independence. It holds, furthermore, that the people of Taiwan must have the final word in determining which option will be selected (Chou and Nathan 295). Naturally, the leaders are divided on this issue. It seems likely that most prefer independence, if it can be achieved without provoking the PRC. Many want to mute the question of independence, and push for democratic reforms. They fear that emphasizing either outright independence or self-determination would provoke a backlash from the K M T and jeapordize the political reforms that have occurred. The role of opposition in the Republic of China is a tenuous one. Public opinion polls taken shortly after the formation of the DPP showed public attitudes were mixed towards the latest political changes. Nearly two-thirds felt that the formation of a new political party would help promote democracy on Taiwan; over half said it would reduce tensions between the K M T and the opposition. However, less than forty percent saw it as helping to improve the investment climate or the economy, and almost forty percent opposed the formation of a new party for these and other reasons (Free China Journal, 13 October 1986 in Copper A Quiet Revolution 39). Given the authoritarian nature of the political system, the response regarding the promotion of democracy and reduction of tensions is significant. It is clearly by working within the system, at evolutionary change, that the DPP and other opposition voices will be most likely to generate support from amongst the people of Taiwan. Indeed the leadership of the DPP recognizes this, and advocates working for reform from within the political system. In December 1988 another political party was formed from the DPP, the Labor Party. The party was started by a DPP member of the Legislative Yuan, who became its first chairman. Labor activists had become unhappy with the DPP and its desire to try and be all things to all people (FEER 24 September 1987 31). The party was organized to fight for trade unions and workers' rights, particularly the right to strike. The party hopes to capitalize on what it sees as a rising tide of dissatisfaction amongst Taiwanese workers. Initially, the greatest impact of this party will be felt by the DPP, which also looks to workers as an important constituency. The party has sought to portray itself as a workers' party, while trying to avoid appearing too leftist. The test of strength for the party will be results from the Kaohsiung area, an industrial city where the Labor Party has been focusing its attentions, in the upcoming Legislative Yuan elections to be held in December 1989 (FEER 21 January 1989 18). The Taiwan Independence Movement (TIM) developed out of the suppression and later the massacre of Taiwanese at the hands of K M T troops. Tensions between native-born Taiwanese and the mainland-born Chinese led to the establishment of a revolutionary nationalist liberation movement (Gregor and Chang 363). In the early days of K M T control of Taiwan, the repressive nature of the regime generated widespread support for the TIM, especially after the 1947 uprising which was brutally suppressed by the K M T authorities. The tight political control that was prevalent throughout the 1950s and much of the 1960s meant much of the leadership and potential leadership (students) were either imprisoned or exiled. There are a few notable cases that attracted international attention, particularly that of Peng Ming-min, an internationally known Taiwanese political science professor who had served at the U.N. He was arrested after distributing a pamphlet that called for self-determination for the Taiwanese people. The trial and sentence provoked a negative response from people throughout the US, Canada and Western Europe. Eventually he escaped via Sweden and joined the ranks of many Taiwanese who live abroad and support the T I M . The T I M never did create an effective underground political organization on Taiwan. Arrests of people for engaging in activities supportive of the T I M do suggest, however, that there have been people supportive of the movement and willing to take grave risks in order to provide that support. Also, the pattern of arrests, as indicated by the Taiwanese press, indicates that people were more likely to be arrested for supporting the TIM than the PRC (Clough 39-42). Rumors abound about the activities of the TIM. Clough writes that allegations have been made that the TIM has received assistance from a variety of sources, including the CIA, the PRC, and the LDP in Japan. The weakness of the movement and its tendency to split into factions makes it probable that there was no single powerful backer of the T I M . Support more likely came from native Taiwanese, American and Japanese businessmen with ties to the TIM. The peak of its international activity seems to have occurred in an attempt on Chiang Ching-kuo's life while he was in New York in 1970. The vitality of the TIM began to decline after 1971, due to a number of factors: 1) serious factional disputes among rival groups located in Japan and the US , and within those groupings as well; 2) the Shanghai Communique was a serious blow to the morale of the TIM; 3) with the communique, members of the business communities in the US and Japan became more cautious in their support of the TIM; 4) the failure of the US to support the independence movement in Bangladesh seemed to signal a decline in American support for self-determination movements; 5) support in the American intellectual community began shifting towards Beijing, and many scholars who had supported the T I M abandoned it; and 6) domestic conditions on Taiwan made many of the claims of the T I M no longer accurate as political tensions have diminished and there has been a marked increase in the standard of living (Copper Political Development in Taiwan 371; Gregor and Chang 381). Many on Taiwan came to the realization that if they tried to overthrow the Republic of China government, the K M T might be inclined to strike a deal with the PRC. Essentially, the mainlanders might come to an accommodation with the PRC in order to get the best possible deal for themselves, rather than wait to see how they would be treated in an independent Taiwan. Also it was a possibility that the PRC might intervene if there was a domestic conflict on Taiwan that would provide a pretext for reclaiming the island. The T I M is able to present demands that the DPP and other politicians cannot, enabling an important perspective to be vocalized, and consequently to have an impact on the K M T . The impact is converse, either pushing the K M T towards further reform, or towards more conservative and authoritarian controls. It also allows the present K M T leadership to portray conservative members of the K M T as "extremists," who are likely to provoke more popular support for the opposition because of their refusal to support reforms. This enables 50 other segments of the K M T to appear more moderate, and using the conservatives, say that they cannot go 'too' far in reforms. The movement seems to winding down—its chief role being to articulate the case for Taiwanese independence, and to attempt to ensure, along with the opposition parties, that if the PRC and the Republic of China are going to strike a deal that the Taiwanese get a seat at the bargaining table (Copper Political Development in Taiwan 372). One major fear of the Taiwanese is that their future will be determined by others without their input. Perhaps the greatest factor affecting the decline of the TIM is that the issue of independence has become more a part of the mainstream of the politics of Taiwan Over time, with the improvement of conditions on Taiwan the support for the TIM has diminished. Independence can easily be interpreted as a confirmation of the status quo (Harris 24-37). The separation of the T I M supporters abroad from those on Taiwan has produced a cleavage in the opposition. Domestically, the opposition advocates, as openly as possible given governmental constraints, independence for Taiwan. This is primarily because for the Taiwanese the historical links to the Chinese mainland are not as strong as they are for the mainlanders and they do not care to be swallowed up by the mainland. For the members of the TIM living abroad, the K M T is an outside 'occupation' force that should be expelled (Gregor and Chang 363). For people living on the island, there is a need for stability to maintain the economic progress that has been attained under the K M T regime. Whether the Taiwanese are willing to make political reform a lower priority than economic issues is an important question that is yet to be answered. Given that the TIM does not seem to have a realistic chance of 'winning' its struggle the risks of supporting it are not worth the costs. The society on Taiwan has changed dramatically in the last 40 years, and consequently the T I M is not likely ever to have much of a constituency there—particularly now that there exist opposition parties on the island. The T I M position has been co-opted as a political issue by the DPP in the guise of self-determination, leaving the TIM without a cause of its own. The Politics of Taiwan: the conflict There are several areas where the KMT regime and the opposition have come into conflict, including elections and the issue of political and human rights. Elections will be considered first, followed by an examination of the ongoing problems in the area of political and human rights. Elect ions Elections have played a critical role in the life of the Republic of China on Taiwan. As a result of elections a major transformation of the governing elite has occurred, as the KMT has sought to present Taiwanese voters with Taiwanese candidates. Electoral participation has encouraged people to seek other forms of participation, and has broadened the bounds of acceptable political discourse. Elections have provided the people with "hands on" political experience, and served to educate the public on the workings of democratic institutions. The KMT regime has used elections as a legitimating tool, providing at least some public input into the key legislative bodies and indirectly into the selection of president and premier. Finally, elections have made the K M T and the Tangwai more responsive to the demands and wishes of the population at large. Both appear to lack a solid popular base, in spite of the organizational skill of the KMT and the natural constituencies of the DPP, and so each must compete for voter loyalty (Shih 311). Instead of continuing the practice of making appointments to fill vacancies, and in order to create a semblance of participation in the national electoral process, supplementary elections were held in 1969. The term supplementary was used because the new members were being added as representatives to the national elected bodies. This was necessary because of the high death rate amongst the elderly representative elected on the mainland in 1947 and 1948. In 1969, 15 new delegates representing the province of Taiwan and the municipality of Taipei were elected to the National Assembly; 11 to the Legislative Yuan; and 2 to the Control Yuan. The process was repeated in 1972 and 1975 for the Legislative Yuan. In 1972, 53 new members were added to the National Assembly, 51 to the Legislative Yuan and 15 to the Control Yuan. The newly elected delegates helped to revive the institutions to which they were elected. This occurred because many of the other members of these bodies were older, incapable of vigorous debate and oftentimes too ill to attend meetings (Copper Taiwan's Recent Elections 50-51). Consequently the younger members were able to be a more significant force then their numbers would indicate. This enhanced role was especially notable during the question period in the legislative bodies. Members were elected for three-year terms. Significantly, the newly elected members of the National Assembly, Legislative Yuan, and Control Yuan were 87% Taiwanese. Voter turnout went from 54.9% in 1969, to 68.35% in 1972, to 75.97% in 1975. Starting in 1973, the K M T changed its strategy, selecting bright young businessmen and politicians who would run their municipalities in a truly technocratic style. Originally leaders of the largest municipalities were elected, however, this changed after the K M T began to lose some of these positions in elections. The K M T points to the increasing number of Taiwanese who serve in local or national elected bodies, as well as their growing membership in the party as proof that ethnic cleavages do not matter in elections. The other side of this argument is that the K M T is using more Taiwanese because it would not win elections otherwise. Thus elite transformation, Taiwanization, appears to be caused by electoral pressure from the public, and also a decision by leaders to broaden their public appeal and enhance their legitimacy. A look at the elections that have occurred since the death of Chiang Kai-shek provides important insight into the political process in the Republic of China. It is important to bear in mind that these elections all occurred under martial law, with the K M T determining the rules. The 1986 election was the first in which an opposition party, informally, competed with the K M T . The elections to be held on 2 December 1989 will be the first in which legal opposition parties actually compete—again in a context determined by the K M T . The 1977 Local Elections: The 1977 election was an important step in the democratization process. For the first time in thirty years the government let it be known that businessmen could participate in campaigns other than those run by the K M T . If they chose to support Tangwai members, or run for office on their own they would not be retaliated against by the government or the K M T (Winckler Institutionalization and Participation on Taiwan 169). Criticism of local government and inefficiency was acceptable, and even encouraged—as long as the basic legitimacy of the regime was not challenged and independence not discussed. This came to be the formula for later national elections. In 1977, for the first time the K M T scheduled all local elections on the same day. This was done to diminish the number of disruptive campaigns, and to minimize the amount of support members of the Tangwai could give each other. The Tangwai made bold, shrewd and effective demands for a fair election—which were generally met. The Tangwai received an incredible 37% of the popular vote overall, and the stage was set for more open elections in the future. The 1980 National Election: During 1979 and early 1980 new campaign and election laws were formulated, with inputs coming from over 200 different scholars. The discussions were covered in the press, which also prompted public discussion and debate. The new law was adopted on 14 May 1980, and made clear how elections were to be conducted. Significantly, it also spelled out the rights of opposition candidates and what activities they may engage in. The election laws also made it plain that opposition parties would not be allowed to form. Opposition members objected to the limited campaign period and provisions that all written material must contain the name and address of the printer—making it difficult to find printers willing to publish Tangwai material (Copper Taiwan's Recent Elections 1033-1034). Tangwai members (candidates outside the Party) were able to circumvent the regulation that allowed campaigning for only 10 days prior to the election by holding parties and gatherings for more than a month before the campaign period officially began. Finally, Tangwai leaders expressed the view that new election laws were needed for the next set of elections. A number of informal arrangements were arrived at between the Tangwai and KMT that also shaped the election. The Tangwai agreed not to advocate communism or independence, and also not to say that they were representing individuals who had been jailed as a result of the Kaohsiung Incident. The KMT regime promised that it would allow the Tangwai complete freedom of expression, and if necessary suppress groups, like veterans, who might try to interfere with the Tangwai (Copper Taiwan's Elections 65). That "complete freedom of expression" was well qualified, however. Self-determination for Taiwan and other sensitive issues like ethnicity and political reform were outside the bounds of acceptable political discourse. The promise to hold the election of 1980 to the Legislative Yuan and National Assembly reflected public demands for fuller implementation of the constitution, as well as efforts by Chiang Ching-kuo to bring more Taiwanese into the government. The election represented a turning point in Taiwan's efforts to democratize its political system (Copper Taiwan's Recent Elections 1030). The candidates, almost all of whom were Taiwanese, criticized the K M T regime more openly than had ever been the case. The government and K M T were presented as being corrupt, oppressive, undemocratic, with a poor human rights record and riddled with nepotism—the K M T was even compared to the Communist Party in the PRC for being dictatorial. The Tangwai abided by the other limitations, ignoring the return to the mainland policy and the issue of a multi-party system (Copper Taiwan's Recent Elections 1035). The 1980 election took place without serious irregularities or charges of irregularities. The elections were closely supervised, and the final results were tabulated on national television (Copper Taiwan's Elections 68). Almost all the winning candidates were Taiwanese, giving them better representation in the Legislative Yuan and the National Assembly. The winners were younger, average age 44, and much better educated. The number of positions up for election was five times the number in the first national election in 1969. The younger and more vigorous people elected in 1980 were able to provide strong leadership in the national legislative bodies—given their age and education. Also the difference in age and education between the newly elected officials and the aging mainlanders is important to note (FCR Rising Political and Social Pluralism 35). Twenty percent of the newly elected members were Tangwai. However, the vote total they received was approximately 30%. The number of supplementary members, those elected on Taiwan, to the Legislative Yuan, the National Assembly and the Control Yuan became 23.3%, 6.2% and 46.3% respectively (Gold 117). The 1983 National Election: On 3 December 1983, the Republic of China held its fifth national supplementary election. The election was for 71 new members of the Legislative Yuan. The election was the first national one since the 1980 election, and served to confirm the development of party competition—in practice if not in name—on Taiwan. The election also served to test another set of election laws (Copper Taiwan's Elections 93). The new Election and Recall Law passed in July 1983 was essentially a revision of the previous election law. Changes included stricter limitations on the campaign period and the types of written material posted in public. The K M T regime clarified the definitions of illegal acts and their penalties; campaign spending limits were put in place; the penalties for vote buying and bribery were increased; and acceptance of foreign funds was made illegal (Copper Taiwan's Elections 95). The 15-day election period was termed a "holiday for freedom of expression," with issues such as self-determination (an acceptable way to touch on the independence issue) being raised (Chang Taiwan in 1983 122). The results of the election were mildly disappointing to the Tangwai. Their percentage of the vote dropped from 30% in 1980 to 22% in the 1983 election. Internecine fighting over the direction of the Tangwai caused them to field too many candidates, thus splitting their vote. The K M T was also exercising a new strategy, running people with strong voter appeal—businessmen, athletes and intellectuals. The K M T won 62 of the 71 seats, although 66 of the winners were Taiwanese (Gold 117-118). This reflected the decade-long Taiwanization of the K M T . The election was important for a number of reasons. It was more free, open and competitive than other elections that had occurred, and it suggests that the 1980 election was not a one-time event held merely for the benefit of foreign observers. Free speech was less inhibited than before, and the candidates had become more savvy campaigners. The election showed that politics in the Republic of China were becoming increasingly Taiwanized, rejuvenated with the election of younger people to institutions dominated by older men, and liberalized, with greater freedom of expression. The 1985 Local Elections Island-wide local elections were held on 16 November 1985. The K M T won 146 of the 191 posts that were contested. The Tangwai did well in both Taipei and Kaohsiung, places which both tend to be bell-wethers for the rest of the country. In Taipei opposition members won 13 of the 51 seats on the city council. In Kaohsiung the opposition candidate, Y u Chen Yue-ying won a bitterly contested election for county magistrate. The vote split remained approximately 70% to 30% in the KMT's favor (FEER 28 November 1985 13). Television coverage remained under the complete domination of the K M T , although newspaper coverage had become more balanced—even including detailed critiques of the K M T . Finally, there was a definite problem with vote buying in the election. The KMT's determination not to lose any more ground to the Tangwai was a contributing factor to this problem. Out of this determination local party members paid others to vote for the K M T rather than lose more ground to the Tangwai in an election. Many local banks ran out of NT$100 bills, which are the most common ones used for the buying of votes (FEER 28 November 1985 14). The 1986 National Election: The elections held in 1986 were the first between the K M T and another formal, though still technically illegal, opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party. This election was conducted in a fairly open manner, with a relatively free exchange of ideas. The DPP was much better organized and unified than the Tangwai had been in the past. The results of the election for the DPP were an improvement over the Tangwai's previous performance. The DPP received approximately 30% of the overall vote total, and the four largest vote recipients were DPP members. Of 73 seats up for election to the Legislative Yuan, the DPP won 12, the K M T 61. Of the 84 seats available in the National Assembly, the DPP won 11, the K M T 73. More significantly, of the total number of electoral contests that the DPP entered, 44, it won 23. Both sides, the K M T and the DPP, were able to claim victory. The K M T claimed to have maintained a clear hold on power—even though given the large numbers of mainland-elected members in both bodies this was never in doubt—in an open and fairly unrestricted election. The DPP had acted as a formal opposition party for the first time, and overcame many of the obstacles that had hindered the Tangwai in the previous election. The electorate wanted party competition and gradual change. They voted for the more conservative DPP members, and the more liberal K M T members (Copper A Quiet Revolution 41). A two-party system was in the rudimentary developmental stages. Most of the winning candidates were businessmen, which is considered significant for Taiwan's continuing prosperity. This group is surprisingly diverse in its positions, supporting pro-business views, labor reform legislation, social welfare programs, and environmental protection (Copper Taiwan's Recent Elections 1037). For the most part, ideology played a very minor role in the election. Certainly it was less important than ethnic identity; in order to win, one must be Taiwanese. Finally, in this election, the K M T and the DPP accepted each other as legitimate competitors in a game that had rules and implicit agreements. The evolution of this attitude, beginning in 1980, shows that the election system on Taiwan is becoming competitive, and the concept of a loyal opposition is beginning to be incorporated into politics. This is critical to the future evolution of democracy on Taiwan (Copper Taiwan's Elections 89-90). The election process on Taiwan has been an evolutionary one, with increasing democratization. The 1986 election, conducted under martial law, saw the introduction of a formal opposition party, and gave rise to demands for electoral and legislative reform. The transition from authoritarian rule to democracy is most apparent when the first fair, open, and competitive elections are held (Gripp 195). When this will occur in the Republic of China is not yet apparent. The elections scheduled for 2 December 1989 still will occur in an authoritarian context, with the K M T exercising control over election laws, campaign rules and the media. Human and Political Rights The issue of human rights in the Republic of China is one that is strongly influenced by the East Asian cultural context. In addition, external factors such as the threat from the mainland and pressures from other governments also affect the status of human rights on Taiwan. Finally, there has been some progress in the area of human rights as economic and social development have occurred. The cultural context for human rights is briefly touched on below. Ratings by international organizations of the political freedom present in the Republic of China are presented, as is a brief look at some of the more prominent demonstrations and political prisoners. Finally, mention of changes in controls over the island's media are examined. The people on Taiwan are strongly influenced by Confucian culture. The Taiwanese had no history of self-rule, or of democratic institutions. In the 50 years prior to the K M T coming to power in Taiwan, the Taiwanese were ruled by the Japanese in a strongly authoritarian manner. Particularly in the early days of the Republic of China on Taiwan, with the fear of the 'Red Menace,' the future of democracy worldwide was perceived as being threatened. The K M T regime's priorities were centered around survival and economic development, not democratization—which could possibly lead to chaos and social ills that are present in Western societies. In the U.S., traditionally, it has been believed that power needs to be divided to assure that it can be checked by power elsewhere. Concentration of power is to be feared because of the potential for abuse. In the Chinese political culture, the ruler and the ruled are ideally united by a common set of moral norms; the more capable the ruler is, the better for the whole country. According to the Confucian ethos greater uniformity of thinking was believed to bring greater social harmony (Tai Human Rights in Taiwan 100). This is a simplified interpretation of Chinese history, and brings out the point that there are, indeed, many Chinese political cultures. Nonetheless, it is accurate enough to help provide a context for the present discussion. Western conceptions of human rights were embodied in the constitution adopted by the Republic of China in 1947, yet for most of the life of the Republic of China on Taiwan those rights have been sharply curtailed under the reign of martial law, which remained in effect until 1987. The rights embodied in the constitution cover the basic political, economic, judicial and social rights found in almost all Western constitutions (Tai Human Rights in Taiwan 94). The concern for social stability and harmony, along with the external threat from the PRC, made it both expedient, and many felt necessary, to suspend constitutional rights. How genuine this external threat is, or has been, is debatable. The K M T regime has used it to justify a plethora of rights abuses. The strongly authoritarian and brutal rule of the K M T under General Chen Y i , prior to the K M T withdrawal from the mainland, caused a Taiwanese uprising in 1947. This was a signal which compelled the K M T to change its tactics in dealing with the Taiwanese. While suppressing some factions of the opposition the K M T has actively co-opted Taiwanese into the army, the government, and the party itself. It has sought to co-opt local elites and remove them as a potential source of either dissent or opposition leadership (Chou and Nathan 289). Rather than co-optation, during the first decade of K M T rule political opposition was removed primarily by imprisonment or execution. Freedom House presents an annual look at the status of freedom in the world. The results of their study help provide a comprehensive picture of the status of freedom in a given country. The 1989 edition's view of the status of freedom in Taiwan is considered briefly here. On a scale of 1-7, with 7 being the least free, Taiwan receives a 5 in political rights and a 3 in civil liberties (an improvement from the prior rating). The rating of 5 in political rights means that the state has some democratic processes, but that much of political decision-making occurs outside of public view, and based on individuals rather than institutions. A state receiving a 3 in civil liberties shows some degree of respect for civil liberties, however it is likely that a secret police force works in a country with this rating, and that there are political prisoners (Freedom House 33-39). Generally, censorship is present in these states as well, Taiwan is noted as a state in which significant progress has been made, both in media freedom and in opposition political activity (Freedom House 44). A look at the ratings over time show a very gradual improvement in the ratings—however each improvement is accompanied by many years at the new level; also progress has not always been in one direction. An important factor in the human rights story on Taiwan has been the role of the secret police. Even though they are not as noticeable as they once were, and people speak of them less often, the secret police continue to play a role in Taiwan. It is estimated that on Taiwan today there are close to a dozen secret police organizations. The recent history of these organizations shows both that they have broad power, and that the power has waned somewhat (Pye 628). Nonetheless, they remain a potentially strong force in society that could adversely affect human rights on Taiwan. The disaster of the Henry Liu assassination, and previous to that the Kaohsiung Incident, diminished the influence of the secret police, and probably caused them to be reined in somewhat by the politicians (Pye 628). The secret police have been used to intimidate vocal opponents of the K M T regime. Speaking on subjects that were taboo (i.e. Taiwanese independence), would likely prompt a visit from the authorities—which could easily lead to any number of dire consequences. Threats to job security, property, family or even one's life could be the price for continuing in activities not deemed appropriate. Oftentimes opponents were accused of being communist agents seeking the overthrow of the K M T in favor of the Mainland communists. The story of Professor Peng Ming-Min in his book A Taste of Freedom provides a fascinating account of one individual's experiences—from co-option to dissenter to exile (Cheng; 801-802). The area of student protest presents an interesting picture of some of the changes occurring in Taiwan's politics. In 1988, for the first time ever, an opposition backed candidate won election as the head of the National Taiwan University (NTU) student association—50% to 39% of the vote. The main campaign issue was how to increase student autonomy and freedom, and how to bring liberalization to the N T U campus. Before the election, the K M T officially withdrew its presence from campus, in response to DPP threats similarly to organize students. Students complain that the K M T presence is still felt through its intelligence apparatus, and through many students and professors on campus (FEER 14 July 1988 22). Since the election there have been an increasing number of student demonstrations, 67 involving thousands of students, seeking to accomplish liberalization and greater autonomy from the K M T at N T U . The secret police have been used by the regime to enforce the bounds of acceptable political discourse. One of the last major domestic confrontations was the Kaohsiung Incident on 10 December 1979, in which tens of thousands gathered on Human Rights Day to protest the violations of the freedom of assembly. The police tried to block access to the rally site, and failing to do that, they tear-gassed the crowd and did not provide a way to leave the rally site. Fighting broke out as people tried to flee the tear-gas but were unable to do so, however only five or six people were seriously injured. The secret police arrested over 100 people, and arbitrarily tried 60 of them in a military court on charges of sedition. This created an international furor—provoking protests from human rights groups, churches and the US State Department (Chai 1310-1311). Following the international condemnation, the K M T issued statements stressing the importance of the rule of law and committing itself to respect the rights of dissidents as long as they were exercised peacefully— statements that stand in sharp contrast to its actions (Tai Human Rights in Taiwan 95). The largest anti-government demonstration in 41 years occurred on 20 May 1988. It began much like the other 1400 protest rallies that had occurred in the previous ten months, after the lifting of martial law. It ended with 96 people being detained by the police, after a seventeen-hour rampage following a farmers' protest rally (FEER 2 June 1988 16). The beating of bystanders and demonstrators by the police astonished observers—and sparked questions about whether the government was warning people that the rising tide of demonstrations had gone too far. Others interpret it as part of a power struggle occurring within the K M T between reform and conservative factions (FEER 16 June 1988 25). Human rights lawyers said that those detained were badly beaten both before and after their arrests. Both sides have been distributing videotapes in attempts to bolster support for their view of what happened. When demonstrators approached the doors to the Legislative Yuan, riot police attacked. The seventeen hours of rioting started after this occurred. This riot clearly demonstrates that in spite of the political reforms that have occurred, there are still very strong tensions present in Taiwanese society and that political change is not always progressive. The political rhetoric surrounding demonstrations and political reform has been mixed as well. While apparently still one of the chief proponents of reform within the K M T , Lee Teng-hui gave several law and order speeches before the 20 May riot. His personal choice for premier, Lee Huan (also seen as a champion of political reform), made some less than promising comments when discussing the demonstrations of the last year. "Democracy depends on rule of law. The disturbances in Taiwan in the past year have to be ended so that law and order may be maintained" (FBIS-CHI 5 June 1989 124). Comments like this may be interpreted in a variety of ways, however, a cautious—almost pessimistic—interpretation seems warranted. For the reformers in the K M T , political freedoms may be a lower priority than perpetuation of power. Press freedom has also increased in the last few years. With the notable exception of television stations, which are state controlled, the print and broadcast media have been given relatively free rein to discuss issues. Criticism of the government is allowed, and open and fair coverage of the opposition during elections is common (Copper Taiwan's Elections 121). In fact, freedom of speech and press freedom have created something of a backlash. Large parts of the population feel that at times the press takes advantage of its freedoms and is excessive (Copper Taiwan's Elections 121). Members of the K M T also feel the press occasionally goes too far. A report by English-language radio stations about a demonstration by ex-servicemen (an important K M T constituency) prompted the government to crack down and tighten controls over the radio stations. Most importantly, the government felt that the English-language stations were not abiding by informal agreements that guide the selection of news by other radio stations (FEER 13 August 1987 7). Finally, the person responsible for the increased censorship is considered an important voice of reform, and one of Lee Teng-hui's most important supporters. Coverage of topics like self-determination for Taiwan, political rallies or demonstrations, and news from the mainland are controlled through informal arrangements about what is appropriate to cover. The coverage of the party congress in which Lee was elected chairman after a conflict with Madame Chiang Kai-shek astounded many because the issue was covered. Previously such a matter would have been taboo. The mass media have cast their lot with Lee and his supporters, and as a result they have been given more freedom to cover the news. That freedom is restricted, however, and could be further limited if the media alienates Lee (FEER 11 February 1989 12-13). Clearly the KMT is not in a position where it can move arbitrarily against media outlets, at least without a significant loss of credibility. Limits on the establishment of new newspapers and the number of pages that may be printed have been lifted. Relaxation of KMT control of the media has been one of the more visible reforms, and, as a result, a KMT crackdown on the media is unlikely. The only likely exception to this is if the KMT feels threatened enough to perceive that a crackdown is worth the political damage it would cause. The importance of television, and the continuing tight control of it by the KMT regime must also be noted. Political prisoners continue to be arrested and detained, press freedom remains limited, and the ability to demonstrate and/or express some political viewpoints remains constrained. In spite of these gloomy facts, there has indeed been some improvement in the situation in Taiwan. The improvement in ratings by Freedom House, the easing of some press restrictions, and the volume of anti-government demonstrations that has occurred since the lifting of martial law are all significant. The give-and-take nature of these various facts seem indicative of a reform process that is not part of grand scheme, but rather one that is developed as events develop. The Politics of Taiwan: political reforms Reforms Political reform has occurred throughout the life of the Republic of China on Taiwan. The reforms that have occurred can be broken down into two time periods, those which occurred prior to late 1985 and those which have occurred since. The reforms which occurred prior to 1985 liberalized the rule of the K M T and mark the preliminary stages of reform. The post-1985 reforms, which include the end of martial law and legalization of opposition parties demonstrate that, for whatever reason, political reform in Taiwan may indeed be more than a brief liberalization. The liberalizing reforms that have occurred over time show that the K M T was somewhat sensitive to the demands of the political marketplace; the post-1985 reforms show that a combination a factors have altered politics in Taiwan—the K M T can no longer manipulate and control politics, but must be sensitive to the population to a degree previously unknown. Throughout its reign, the K M T has used principally two means to control Taiwanese society. Originally it used repression and highly authoritarian tactics, more recently it has mixed the repressive authoritarian approach with some degree of liberalization. This change in tactics is due to a variety of factors, including foreign pressures to liberalize and the need for a stable environment in which to promote the goal of economic development. As discussed in the section on elections, one method was to allow local politics, where little real power was at stake, to be fairly free and democratic. That particular decision had other effects, besides merely co-opting local elites. It created Taiwanese politicians who were active in the K M T and helped to further the Taiwanization of the party. The reform process has been less a planned progression and more a series of ad-hoc political changes. The mixture of repression with liberalization shows that the K M T leadership was responding to various pressures, not engaging in a grand scheme. A look at the reforms that have occurred bears this out. On paper, the structure of the Republic of China government is a democratic one, with the important bodies being elected by the citizens of the Republic of China. The problem is that the definition of the citizenry of the Republic of China is in dispute, with the K M T clinging to the myth that it is the government of all of China. Local elections were held already in 1950, with the Taiwanese dominating the local positions. The reforms that occurred on Taiwan prior to 1985 were not on a grand scale. Through 1965, conditions were quite repressive. During this time, Chiang Ching-kuo, with an eye to his future, was consolidating his power on Taiwan, and literally turned the island into a police state. Secret agents were everywhere, and anyone opposing the government or the K M T , and seeking liberalization or merely to express dissent was labeled "pro-communist" and jailed. Taiwanese leaders who could not be co-opted were arrested and imprisoned on an island off Taiwan. Civil rights were ignored, news was censored, and schools were kept under the surveillance of the Youth Corps (Cheng 800-801). The Taiwan Garrison Command had the authority to maintain internal security. It tried dissidents on charges of treason or sedition in military courts, and many people were imprisoned for life or executed. A large number of leaders were sent into exile, or managed to flee the country. It was out of this group that the Taiwan Independence Movement found its leadership. Chiang Kai-shek ruled the Republic of China with a Confucian aloofness, and expressed the sentiment that politics was a matter for a professional elite. In spite of this, he allowed local politics to remain democratic and never really involved himself in local politics (Copper Taiwan's Elections 9). This was the state of affairs until the late 1970s. After Chiang Kai-shek's death he was replaced, in almost dynastic fashion, by his son Chiang Ching-kuo. Chiang Ching-kuo presented a very different style of leadership. As a result of opposition pressure for change, Chiang Ching-kuo moved away from his previously highly authoritarian manner. He mixed with the people, and gave public opinion some consideration when making decisions. He stressed the importance of elections, and the importance of the government representing all the people of Taiwan. He also pushed hard for recruitment from all sectors of society-leading the Taiwanization process of the party and government (Copper Taiwan's Elections 10). By the late 1970s the Republic of China had attained a high level of economic success, and progress in the area of social development was occurring as well. Taiwan was being touted as an economic miracle. From a position of relative power Chiang Ching-kuo was able to liberalize politics, and recognize, unofficially, the role of the Tangwai. The emergence of the Tangwai demonstrated the rise of a middle class that was highly educated and no longer fearful of political activity. The more pluralistic nature of society was creating forces both inside the K M T and outside that had different political agendas. Chiang Ching-kuo's approach was prompted by increasing pressures on the government. He was able to initiate them because of his standing, particularly with more conservative members of the K M T who were opposed to the policies, but loyal to Chiang Ching-kuo. Political reform and change on Taiwan has primarily been of an evolutionary nature. The changing nature of society came in conflict with the more static political system in the Kaohsiung Incident which occurred on 10 December 1979. Society demanded more political freedom while the political system did not allow for this increased freedom, in spite of rhetoric to the contrary. It was after this, and in recognition of society's changes, that Chiang Ching-kuo instituted major electoral changes that allowed a relatively open election in 1980. What the 1980 election did do, however, was to open the way for greater freedom in society. Along with the election came greater freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and freedom of the press. Certain subjects remained taboo, particularly advocating independence for Taiwan, or the communist alternative. Short of these limitations, society became much more open. The de-recognition of the Republic of China by the US was undoubtedly an important factor in the liberalization that occurred. The announcement split the members of the Tangwai over the issue of whether this was an appropriate time to press harder for democratization (Gold 116). The KMT was affected in a similar fashion, with some members feeling that this was an important time to push for reforms. Conservative elements within the party took a different view, feeling that renewed political repression was needed (Greenhalgh 63). Members of the Tangwai questioned whether the rejection was, in fact, due to government ineptitude or the absence of civil rights. In March of 1986, Chiang Ching-kuo formed a 12-member committee to discuss four important issues: terminating martial law; allowing the formation of new political parties, rejuvenating the elected bodies of government; and strengthening local government (Copper Taiwan 173). The government sought to create a new legal environment far more conducive to political pluralism. In 1986 the decision was made to lift martial law (effective July 1987), establish a new law for the creation of political organizations, enter into dialogue with the opposition (Tangwai), and even allow the Tangwai to form a new political party-the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)--in spite of the fact that the DPP was formed before it was legal to form new parties (Meyers 1003). This was most likely a strategic move on the DPP's part, to avoid the appearance that it was a creation of the KMT. Four days after the DPP was formed, 40% of the people on Taiwan were aware of the event. This was a surprising figure given the government controls over the media (Copper Taiwan in 1986 84-85). The lifting of martial law and the other reforms were great steps forward, however, the K M T did not give up its hold on power completely. With the lifting of martial law came a new National Security Law, which made it a crime to violate the constitution or advocate communism or the division of national territory in the exercise of the people's freedom of assembly or association (Harris 31). Another provision deprives former prisoners of the right to hold public office, which eliminates much of the opposition leadership from seeking public office. The effects of the National Security Law are similar in many ways to martial law, although it defines terms more carefully, decreases penalties for offenses, eases entry and exit from Taiwan, and puts civilian cases back into civilian courts (Chou and Nathan 289). The role of Chiang Ching-kuo in leading the reforms is of critical importance. After steadily consolidating power and constructing a system of personal loyalty (guanxi), he successfully turned many of the party's elder statesmen and the military professionals who had dominated the scene since the 1940s into museum pieces (Tien 620). Chiang Ching-kuo brought the technocrats into the ascendancy, and cultivated a popular image to generate support in society—moving beyond a system based on personal favors and guanxi. Because of his control, and the structure of the party, he was able to move from a position of centralized power in order to institute the reforms of 1986-1987. Taiwan's political reforms have been orchestrated personally by the popular Chiang Ching-kuo. To some extent he has reacted to a rising tide of pressure for reform, and there is no rival or inhibiting power center. The once powerful National Security Agency lacks its former clout. The amorphous 2.2 million member K M T is a useful tool for its leader, but the organization as a whole is no longer able to take political initiatives (Seymour Taiwan in 1987 74). Chiang Ching-kuo appointed many more Taiwanese to positions of power, as well as many more young people, in both the Party and the government. He cracked down on corruption; he promulgated information about the government; and he gave added importance to economic development (Copper A Quiet Revolution 7). These were important because they gave people more of a sense of involvement and input into the political process. There were obviously a number of reasons for these actions, the chief one being the increasing electoral appeal of the Tangwai (Chou and Nathan 283-284). Another important reason was the increasingly strident criticism from the Taiwanese population at large over the inequities of the political system (FEER 18 February 1988 21). Chiang Ching-kuo accomplished his tasks by using his inner circle, using his father's veteran cadres, promoting people of his own, co-opting those seeking to work with him, and by excluding other prominent leaders with independent power bases (Winckler Institutionalization and Participation on Taiwan 158-159). By this strategy, which relied heavily on guanxi and personal favors, he was able to implement his reform program. The reliance on political allies, and the need to placate the opposition strongly suggests that the reforms were the result of bargaining and give-and-take amongst various politicians. One of the most important aspects of Chiang Ching-kuo's actions was that he had the power to be able to initiate reform, and was also able to choose a successor. By taking major steps forward in the reform process, and by selecting a native Taiwanese technocrat to be his successor, he helped to ensure that reform would not die with him. In the years before his death, Chiang Ching-kuo removed General Wang Sheng, who seemed to be working his way into position to become president, and made him ambassador to Paraguay. Likewise he declared publicly that a member of the Chiang family would not succeed him. When Chiang Ching-kuo died in January of 1988 he was succeeded by the native-born Taiwanese technocrat, Lee Teng-hui. Madame Chiang Kai-shek, along with some conservative elements of the K M T , attempted to block Lee. (Seymour Taiwan in 1988 56). Lee moved quickly against the conservatives, and despite predictions to the contrary, he was able to consolidate power and develop a strong popular following. Lee became both president of the Republic, and chairman of the K M T . At his first party congress in the spring of 1988, the delegates refused to rubber-stamp the party leadership's list of candidates for the Central Executive Committee, and proposed their own list. The 1200 delegates proposed a list of 180 candidates for the 180 positions; Lee presented a list of 180 candidates as well. In the end, 147 of Lee's candidates were selected (FEER 12 July 1989 18-19). Conservative party leaders, like Prime Minister Yu Kuo-hua, received embarrassingly low numbers of votes. Y u had been the third on Lee's list of candidates, but came in 35th in the polling; this was a major contributing factor to Yu's subsequent retirement. A few days later when the Central Standing Committee was selected, the majority of its members were Taiwanese. After the congress, Lee selected a Cabinet, also with a Taiwanese majority (Copper Taiwan 176). Since coming to power, Lee has followed many of the policies of his predecessor. The emphasis of his administration has been to appoint and promote qualified people to office, to work on the public image of the government and the party, to move out actively into international affairs, and further to liberalize the politics of the Republic of China. New policies which enhance political rights are being implemented on a regular basis. Whether it is liberalization and relaxation of restrictions on student groups at universities, or a more open discussion of Taiwan's status, or even sending a finance representative to Beijing for a meeting of the Asian Development Bank, the Republic of China under Lee is on a course of reform, initiated by Chiang Ching-kuo (FCR Transformation of the K M T 42). Lee's strength and the fundamental changes that are occurring in the political sphere on Taiwan can be seen in the trial balloon floated earlier this year by Lee insiders of a "one China, two governments" approach to relations with the mainland. While still maintaining some semblance of the Republic of China position that it is the government of all of China, the proposal would recognize the de facto situation that has existed since 1949, without tying the future of Taiwan to the PRC in very direct ways. It is very likely an attempt to resolve the Republic of China's ambiguous international position, and to place regime legitimacy on more solid ground. This proposal would have been unthinkable even a decade earlier (FEER 4 May 1989 27). Lee's latest proposal calls for increasing the number of supplementary members of the Legislative Yuan, the National Assembly and the Control Yuan. Lee also proposes offering lump sum retirement bonuses to those elected on the mainland. Each retiring mainlander's position would be filled by election. Members who have been too old or ill to attend and participate in government functions will be forcibly retired. Many of the elderly members of the Control Yuan have indicated their willingness to retire. Lee needs to get the mainlanders to agree to retire quietly, without causing a backlash against him and the other reformers (FEER 18 February 1988 21). The politics of reform remain both difficult and sensitive, and Lee needs to be able to juggle the various forces (factions within the K M T and the opposition) making demands regarding the future of political reform. T a i w a n i z a t i o n It is not possible to discuss any sort of political reform without dealing with the mainlander-Taiwanese ethnic cleavage. In the area of reform, a process of Taiwanization has occurred, in which greater opportunities for participation have been provided for Taiwanese in areas previously reserved for mainlanders. The sharp ethnic division has been responsible for most of the conflict on the island, and can also be seen as a principal motivating factor for political reform. A consideration of mainlander-Taiwanese relations, and the most recent phenomenon—Taiwanization—is provided now. The relationship between the mainlanders and the Taiwanese got off to a poor start. The Japanese colonization/occupation of the island had been ended after World War II. Taiwan had spent close to 50 years being closely tied to Japan; its early history had not included a close relationship with the mainland. Fifty years of Japanese rule had accustomed the Taiwanese to second class citizenship (Gold 125). After World War II and the removal of the Japanese from the island, however, expectations were raised; the people of Taiwan expected to be treated as equals, and to participate fully in the political processes of the Republic of China. Using the poor military situation on the mainland as justification, the K M T acted in an arbitrary manner. The first governor of Taiwan was a general, Chen Y i , who treated the Taiwanese harshly. Chen's primary focus was on amassing a personal fortune, rather than helping to repair the damage of World War II. When the Taiwanese were pushed beyond the breaking point, there was an uprising. The uprising was deemed to be part of the larger communist threat and was put down brutally (Clough 41). The harsh treatment they received at the hands of this brutal governor generated very negative feelings. The problem was compounded by the arrival of large numbers of mainlander elites fleeing the communists. The mainlanders had higher social and governmental positions, and moved into Taiwan with the idea that they remained the nation's elite. The positions vacated by the departing Japanese, which the Taiwanese expected to fill , were instead filled with these individuals. This was true even before the K M T left the mainland. Some Taiwanese even lost their positions and their homes to these carpetbaggers. The government, party and the army were all dominated by the mainlanders—living on an island that until four years previously had been a colonial possession of another country, and which previous to that had had few ties to the mainland. One example of this failure at assimilation, which is inherently related to the idea that the Republic of China is the government of all of China, is the issue of language. Clearly it would have been more fitting for the fifteen percent of the population who spoke Mandarin to learn the local dialect. Instead the 85% of the population who were Taiwanese were forced to learn Mandarin. The burden of learning a new dialect, along with the accompanying awkwardness and linguistic ineptitude, was imposed upon the Taiwanese (Ahern and Gates 263). The poor situation of the Taiwanese, particularly in relation to access to government, party and military positions, continued to be the norm until the late 1960s. The main avenue open to Taiwanese was to do well in business or agriculture. This is something which they managed to accomplish, due in large part to the government-led process of land reform and industrialization. During this time, Taiwanese were encouraged to participate in local politics—which, though dominated by ethnic Taiwanese, were controlled by the K M T . The Taiwanese were, however, practically excluded from national politics. Any attempt to push for national political gains was perceived as threatening by the authorities and often ruthlessly suppressed (FCR Transformation of the K M T 39). Intermarriages between the two ethnic groups is common enough that it is all but impossible to find a Taiwanese who is not related to a mainlander and vice-versa. The urbanization trend brought the Taiwanese and mainlanders into greater contact with one another. The common education of the children of both groups, however, is the key factor. Young people are being educated together without an emphasis being placed on provincial origin, and consequently provincial origin is less important. It is still possible to make generalized statements about each group. The mainlanders dominate the government or public sphere, the Taiwanese dominate business; the mainlanders dominate the upper echelons of the K M T , the Taiwanese dominate local government; the mainlanders are better educated; and the list goes on. As time passes, however, these generalizations become less valid (Chen 71). More and more the issue of economic status is becoming the principal division in society, not provincial origin. However, it must be noted that to a certain extent class divisions run along ethnic lines as is indicated in Table 2 on ethnic differences: Table 2 Ethnic differences in social, cultural and economic organization Taiwanese Mainlander Average Religious beliefs/Practices 1. Identify self as Protestant, Catholic, no religion 11.9 63.9 27.0 2. Identify self as Buddhist, folk religionist 85.4 32.2 70.1 3. Have ancestral altar in home 62.9 17.9 54.8 4. Baibai ancestors at least once a year 95.0 71.9 91.9 5. Burn incense in temple several times a year 63.8 30.1 57.8 6. Contribute to temple 50.8 24.4 46.0 Familial Networks 7. Household size (persons) 5.6 4.39 5.36 8. Household structure solitary 1.8 7.2 2.8 nuclear 72.1 84.5 74.3 Education of Household Head 9. Junior college or higher 8.8 32.2 13.0 Socioeconomic status of Household Head 10. Employer 3.1 1.9 2.8 11. Manager 6.8 27.8 10.6 12. Own-account worker 40.2 9.6 35.0 13. Regular employee 43.9 58.0 46.1 14. Temporary worker 6.0 2.7 5.5 Occupation of Household Head 15. White-collar job 37.0 68.8 41.8 16. Blue-collar job 63.0 32.2 58.2 Economic sector of Household Head 17. Public sector 8.1 41.3 14.1 18. Private sector 91.9 58.7 85.9 Income (in 1976 New Taiwan $) 19. Total household income 124,000 129,000 125,000 20. Per adult equivalent household income 31,220 39,796 32,817 (Greenhalgh 539) The differences in income and lifestyles are still present, and they are important in showing the continuing presence of a major ethnic cleavage in society—not to mention the ethnic discrimination and decimation faced by the aboriginal people of Taiwan. The process of Taiwanization, which began in the early 1970s and which has since really taken off, changed much of this. When Chiang Ching-kuo became prime minister in 1972, more reforms were put into place and the K M T began an "affirmative action" policy of sorts. Many Taiwanese were recruited into the K M T and into positions in the government. The education gap that had earlier existed had been somewhat diminished during the intervening years. Also, the economic success that had occurred was a product of cooperation between the mainlanders and the Taiwanese, and the Taiwanese who dominated business were oftentimes more inclined to focus on their economic well-being rather than on overtly political issues. It should be noted that the Taiwanese may have dominated small business, but it was the mainlanders with connections to the government and party who dominated the larger enterprises. The crowning of the process of Taiwanization came with the appointment of Lee Teng-hui, a native Taiwanese, as Vice-President in 1984. This was surpassed when Lee became first the president of the Republic of China, and later the chairman of the K M T . Taiwanization is also notable in the number of Taiwanese in the K M T , over 80%. Almost every single local elected official is Taiwanese, and of those elected in national elections, generally more Taiwanese are elected than their percentage of the general population. Today, 45% of the members of the party Central Executive Committee are native Taiwanese. In the Standing Committee of the party there are seventeen Taiwanese; giving them the majority for the first time (FEER 28 July 1989 18-19). Finally, the increasing importance of business and business groups in Taiwan, and the Taiwanese dominance of many of these, has reinforced the process of Taiwanization. The process of Taiwanization is significant in a number of respects. It provides the opportunity for institutions to become more democratic, in a sense, by the increasing representation of native Taiwanese in the government and party. There is not an inherent link between Taiwanization and democratization. Taiwanization must be viewed as a process that may help address the major ethnic cleavage in Taiwan, but it can occur without democratization. In fact, Taiwanization is occurring more rapidly than democratization. Taiwanization serves to bolster regime legitimacy. However, the differences between mainlanders and Taiwanese are still quite notable. Compared to mainlanders the differing motivations of the Taiwanese in joining the K M T , as indicated below, is also an important consideration. Finally, co-optation of Taiwanese by the K M T in order to enhance its legitimacy is an important consideration in the process of Taiwanization. Tabic 3 Individual reasons for joining the Kuomintang Reason Taiwanese Mainlanders Peer pressure 22% 24% To get ahead in business 51% 13% To get ahead in government 5% 31% Agreement with KMT ideology 22% 32% (Zeigler 140) Thus while gradual Taiwanization may indicate the lessening of the degree of ethnic cleavage in society, it does not mark the end of that cleavage. The different reasons for joining the K M T and the notable differences between the lifestyles of the mainlanders and Taiwanese indicate that the problems between the two groups have not been eliminated by the process of Taiwanization. Indeed, if Taiwanization is to be the cure for this ethnic cleavage, it will require a long period of time—time which the opposition is unlikely to provide. Conc lus ion There are two areas that are considered in the conclusion. The first is, of course, the utility of the theory of intentional development in explaining the events in Taiwan. The consideration of the theory, and the changes that have occurred in Taiwan, bring up a number of questions which bear further clarification. These questions are examined in this first section. Second, broader theoretical conclusions are drawn. These will, hopefully, shed some light on the theory and its applicability elsewhere. Intentional Development and Taiwan The consideration of Taiwan has raised a number of questions, or issues, that need further clarification and explanation. Some of these affect the consideration of the theory of intentional development in the next section. The remainder simply need further consideration in order to complete this examination of Taiwan. There are specific factors that do not directly affect the theory, although they likely have affected the outcome of the development processes in Taiwan. These factors are the Japanese legacy, the role of American aid, and the question of independence/self-determination. These deserve separate consideration because they are specific to Taiwan. The Japanese legacy in Taiwan is extremely important because of the the starting point it provided for economic development. As was noted earlier, the Japanese left behind a developed infrastructure. They had raised the educational level of the islanders, and trained them in new methods of agricultural and industrial production. Finally, the Japanese had begun the difficult task of starting economic development. This legacy gave the KMT an advanced starting point for the economic development that they initiated. The question also must be raised, did the KMT make the best possible use of this legacy? Clearly, the answer is no. By killing off the indigenous Taiwanese leadership, and decimating the ranks of the middle class, the KMT wasted one of the most precious resources left behind by the Japanese—a well-trained population. By utilizing repressive political control, the KMT may have achieved a degree of political stability, but this political stability came at an excessively high cost. A second factor that has had a significant impact upon Taiwan, and its developmental processes, is American aid. The United States aid, in both financial and material terms, enabled the KMT to remain in power on Taiwan. American military protection from the communists on the mainland helped provide some stability to the island, and enabled the KMT to use some of Taiwan's resources in areas other than defense. The U.S. provided technical advisors in a number of areas, access to the U.S. market, and funds for investment. Because of its superpower status, the U.S. involvement sent a message to other countries, and helped the Republic of China retain diplomatic representation with many states after losing the mainland to the communists. Even with the change in the status of the relationship with the U.S., and the decline in diplomatic relations with other states, the involvement with the U.S. is crucial to the health of the Taiwanese economy. The American involvement begs the question of whether Taiwan's processes of development would have enjoyed the same degree of success without U.S. backing. The answer is a qualified no. The massive foreign support Taiwan received was critical in expediting the development processes. It is certainly much easier to engage in economic development when others are helping to bear the economic burden. Finally, the level of assistance received distinguishes Taiwan from many other developing countries. The last issue that is specific to Taiwan is the question of Taiwan's international status. Taiwan has informal relations with many states, but formal diplomatic ties with only 21 countries. Taiwan's ambiguous international position is part of a larger problem, namely, the major ethnic cleavage that exists in Taiwan. This cleavage also raises the question of Taiwan's international status—from the perspective of those living in Taiwan. Internationally, there seems to be little desire to change the status quo of Taiwan. The PRC doesn't want Taiwan to be independent, and the U.S. perceives the issue as a potential disaster for Sino-American relations. The people living in Taiwan are split on the issue as well. The KMT continues to maintain, as a key point to its legitimacy, that the Republic of China is the de jure government of China. Most Taiwanese favor independence for Taiwan, if it can be obtained through peaceful means*. This unique situation has created problems since the beginning of KMT rule in Taiwan, and has been, and is, the single most important issue in the politics of Taiwan. These three factors are all very important to understanding the processes of development in Taiwan. Issues which are more directly related to the theory of intentional development are considered now. Recall that the theory states that there are four factors that must be present in order for intentional development to occur, these are: a receptive social environment, determined leadership, technical expertise, and capital. Also recall that the theory says that the key approach of the determined leadership must be unbalanced development, with economic development leading the way. Finally, the theory states that because of unbalanced development, the regime may choose to liberalize. This liberalization is likely to occur when the regime recognizes that its economic development program has produced many small and medium-sized enterprises that are outside its control, and has created a significant middle class. Thus, because it trusts the moderating influence of the bourgeois forces, and wants to avoid seeing them become radicalized, the regime will liberalize. This liberalization tends to lead to democratization. There is one area of the theory, determined leadership, that has a number of points, related to Taiwan, that require clarification. Once * For further discussion of this point please see Lillian Craig Harris, "Towards Taiwan's Independence" in The Pacific Review 1:1 (1988): 24-37. these points have been considered, a broader consideration of the theory of intentional development will be done. In Johnson's article he refers to the "draconian process of priority setting" (7). The cornerstone of this theory, when applying it to Taiwan, is the role of the determined leadership. This is the case for several reasons. The primary reason is that the leadership had to overcome a number of major obstacles to create a receptive social environment for development. The second reason is the ongoing necessity of maintaining that receptiveness in the face of unbalanced development. Finally, along with the changes that have occurred in Taiwan, the leadership itself, as well as its role, have changed. There is, of course, the problem of never being able to prove what the motivation of the leadership was in the political reforms that have occurred. However, there were some important factors that likely caused the KMT regime's decision to liberalize. The decreased ability of the KMT to control Taiwanese society is undoubtedly the most important. Pressure came from below to liberalize, from middle class groups, for example, that had enhanced standing due to the success of economic development. Pressure also came from groups that had always pressed for change, such as native Taiwanese. Because of societal changes and other factors, the old methods of authoritarian control have become far less effective than had previously been the case. The cost of utilizing these methods had simply become too great. As the material on social development indicated, there are numerous changes that have occurred in Taiwanese society. The country enjoys reasonably equitable income distribution, according to government statistics, and the majority of Taiwanese consider themselves middle class. The creation of a strong middle class is important as the crucial link between economic development and political reform. Just as important, however, is the role of pressure from below. This was a more significant factor in prompting reform than any other. Thus, political reform in Taiwan was not simply instituted from above, as the theory would indicate, but emerged out of conflict in Taiwan's politics. The continued presence of the ethnic cleavage between mainlanders and Taiwanese is another source of pressure for political reform. The elections that have occurred indicate that ethnicity retains its importance—in order to win, one must be Taiwanese. Also the Taiwanization of the KMT and government do not necessarily mean that they are becoming more democratic. The KMT is perceived as a mainlander institution, even if it now consists mainly of Taiwanese members. Consequently, changing the personnel without changing the policies will not alleviate the pressure from below for political reform. Another important factor is the change in the leadership itself. There has been a transition from Chiang Kai-shek's old guard conservatives to a new generation of leaders. Most of these new leaders have spent the majority of their lives on Taiwan, and consider it home. This generational change also raises another question, is the current leadership part of what Johnson called "determined leadership"? It seems more likely, from the consideration of the political reforms, that the current leadership is, in a sense, a crisis management team. The leadership is no longer capable of engaging in the "draconian process of priority setting", rather, it is coping with multiple pressures from below to reform. As a result of this decreased ability to control, the leadership must find other methods to appease the populace and remain in power. Thus, they have adopted a crisis management approach, dealing with problems as they arise. The question of the utility of intentional development in explaining the events in Taiwan needs to be addressed. From the examination of the events in Taiwan it is clear that the theory has some utility. The description of the necessary elements for intentional development, along with the consequences, generally follows the events in Taiwan. The emergence of the middle class, and the other effects of economic development, create pressure on the leadership to liberalize. All along, the capability and the effectiveness of the leadership seem slightly overstated by the theory. Finally, the theory doesn't account for the unique role of foreign influence in the case of Taiwan, or, for that matter, in South Korea. The amount and degree of American involvement and assistance is particularly significant in both cases. The theory of intentional development does not require such a benefactor, yet, it seems to make a great deal of difference in the potential for success. The same can be said of the legacy of foreign occupation, which is somewhat similar in both South Korea and Taiwan. The theory of intentional development is an appropriate one for explaining events in Taiwan up until the present time. The theory's prediction of liberalization, leading to democratization, seems on track. A new theoretical framework needs to be developed to explain the future political changes in Taiwan, so that appropriate theory can be utilized which is not merely following events. Intentional Development Theory The critical question remains, what can be taken from this examination of intentional development theory and Taiwan, and be used elsewhere. Several important conclusions may be drawn. The first is that the theory of intentional development is a coherent approach to studying events in some developing states. It is, however, more likely to be useful if the state in question has a foreign benefactor, a strongly authoritarian government, and a positive (in an economic and organizational sense) colonial legacy. The utility of this theory in a state without One of these elements is most likely to be diminished. A second conclusion that may be drawn is that the theory needs to better account for the role of the leadership. The responsibilities assigned to determined leadership are arduous. The theory seems to lack a sense of time, and this problem is noticeable when referring to the leadership. Assigning these difficult tasks to the leadership, and then stating that the leadership will respond in a prescribed manner once the benefits of economic development are felt is problematic. Certainly it is necessary for a fair amount of time to pass before the benefits of economic development are experienced. In that type of time frame the leadership is likely to have changed. In the case of Taiwan, there was movement from a leadership left over from the mainland, to a new generation based in Taiwan. This is a significant change. 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